Opinion ID: 618330
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speaking as Private Citizen on a Matter of Public Concern

Text: Defendants renew their unsuccessful argument that plaintiff did not speak as a citizen nor on a matter of public concern. We find that the district court made no error in this regard. Garcetti clarified what it means to speak as a citizen by holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Although plaintiff identified himself as a public employee, he appeared off duty, out of uniform, and at a public meeting to address the Mayor and City Council during the public comment period. Nothing in the record supports the claim that plaintiff's expression was made pursuant to a task that was within the scope of his official duties. See, e.g., Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 544 (6th Cir.2007) (holding statements made to a consultant hired by employer to evaluate workplace issues were made within the scope of employee's official duties). Connick instructed that speech involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be considered to relate to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Nor is it necessary for the entire expression to address matters of public concern, as long as some portion of the speech does. Id. at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. While motive for the speech is a relevant factor, this court has explained that the pertinent question is not why the employee spoke, but what he said. Farhat, 370 F.3d at 591. Defendants argue that, although plaintiff's speech was couched in terms of concern about the drowning death, it was motivated by plaintiff's financial loss of overtime and business, and communicated nothing more than `the quintessential employee beef: management has acted incompetently.' Fox, 605 F.3d at 349 (quoting Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 365 (6th Cir.2007)). Plaintiff denied that his speech was motivated by financial or personal interest, claiming that he  never advocated for overtime or equipment for [him]self as a priority over safety and security of the citizens [of Bay Village]. Plaintiff stated that his business earned only $600 to $700 in profits annually from sales to Bay Villagealthough neither party has indicated how much plaintiff may have lost in overtime payand attested that, as the highest credentialed dive rescue official in Bay Village, [he] wanted to state to [the] city council in the strongest terms the public concern over the detrimental effect of removing dive rescue capacity. (Doc. 42-2, p. 2.) Although plaintiff's comments were highly critical of the Mayor and City Council, the focus, point, or communicative purpose of plaintiff's speech was to express his opinion, as an expert in public safety diving, that the cuts to the Fire Department, especially the elimination of the dive team, had jeopardized public safety and hamstrung the rescue effort on September 1. See Farhat, 370 F.3d at 591. Nor can plaintiff's speech be said to have addressed matters only of personal interest. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684. That the comments were made publicly to the City Council, rather than in a memo sent solely to his superior, supports this conclusion. Cf. Haynes, 474 F.3d at 364 (holding that officer's memo addressed solely to his superior and expressing discontent about financial cutbacks and changes to a program he directed was not protected speech). As the district court found, the substance of plaintiff's expression undoubtedly involved matters of public concern.