Opinion ID: 612831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Count Eleven

Text: Venue for Count Eleven presents a trickier question. Count Eleven, quoted supra, charges Acosta-Gallardo with using a telephone to facilitate the methamphetamine distribution conspiracy alleged in Count One, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b). Acosta-Gallardo argues that venue was not proper in the District of Wyoming because the phone calls that took place on September 12, 2009 and which form the basis of Count 11, occurred entirely within the state of Utah and never touched the District of Wyoming. The government does not dispute this fact. However, the government argues that venue is nonetheless proper in the District of Wyoming because the conspiracy facilitated by Acosta-Gallardo's phone call occurred in the District of Wyoming. The government argues that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 119 S.Ct. 1239, 143 L.Ed.2d 388 (1999), supports this proposition. We agree. This issue presents a question of first impression for our circuit. Section 843(b) provides that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a [drug] felony ... Because Section 843(b) does not contain an explicit venue provision, we must determine the place at which the crime was committed based on the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. United States v. Cryar, 232 F.3d 1318, 1321 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Medina-Ramos, 834 F.2d at 876). Our precedent has not previously held that a Section 843(b) offense is committed in any jurisdiction where the underlying drug felony was committed. Our circuit has previously described venue for an 843(b) offense as being appropriate in both the district where the call was made and in the district where it was received. United States v. Goodwin, No. 09-3316, ___ Fed.Appx. ___, ___, 2011 WL 2006335,  (10th Cir.May 24, 2011) (citing Andrews v. United States, 817 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Barnes, 681 F.2d 717, 724 (11th Cir.1982)) (unpublished). Because the phone calls at issue here were neither initiated nor received in Wyoming, we must determine whether the reasoning of Rodriguez-Moreno extends to Section 843(b) so that venue would have been proper there. In Rodriguez-Moreno, the question before the Court was, where was venue proper for the offense of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 526 U.S. at 279, 119 S.Ct. 1239. The defendant Rodriguez-Moreno had kidnaped his victim in Texas, transported him to New Jersey, New York, and then finally to Maryland, where the defendant came into possession of a firearm. Id. at 277, 119 S.Ct. 1239. The Supreme Court held that venue for the firearms offense was proper in the District of New Jersey, even though the defendant did not use or carry the firearm until later, after he arrived in Maryland. Id. To determine where the firearms offense was committed, the Court began with the proposition that the `locus delicti [of the charged offense] must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.' Id. at 279, 119 S.Ct. 1239 (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7, 118 S.Ct. 1772, 141 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998)) (alteration in Rodriguez-Moreno ). For the Section 924(c)(1) offense, the Supreme Court identified two conduct elements constituting the offense: the using and carrying of a gun, and the commission of a kidnaping. Id. at 280-281, 119 S.Ct. 1239. The Court held that because the Section 924(c)(1) offense `consist[ed] of distinct parts which ha[d] different localities[,] the whole may be tried where any part can be proved to have been done.' Id. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1239 (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 77, 36 S.Ct. 508, 60 L.Ed. 897 (1916)). The underlying kidnaping was a continuing offense, so it was committed in all of the places that any part of it took place. Id. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1239. The Court in Rodriguez-Moreno therefore held that venue for the firearms offense was proper in all of those jurisdictions as well. Id. The Court was also careful to distinguish its precedent in Cabrales, where it faced a similar question. In Cabrales, the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 & 1957, which criminalize money laundering. 524 U.S. at 3, 118 S.Ct. 1772. All of the actual money laundering transactions occurred in Florida, not in Missouri where the defendant was tried. Id. at 8, 118 S.Ct. 1772; Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280 n. 4, 119 S.Ct. 1239. Although the illegal activity that generated the eventually-laundered proceeds occurred in Missouri, the statutes at issue did not proscribe the `anterior criminal conduct that yielded the funds allegedly laundered.' Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280 n. 4, 119 S.Ct. 1239 (quoting Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 7, 118 S.Ct. 1772). Thus, in Cabrales, venue was improper in Missouri. 524 U.S. at 8, 118 S.Ct. 1772. Our circuit has applied the reasoning of Rodriguez-Moreno to firearms offenses under Section 924, e.g., United States v. Brown, 400 F.3d 1242, 1249-51 (10th Cir. 2005), and to other offenses as well. In Cryar, our circuit applied the reasoning of Rodriguez-Moreno to 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) which criminalizes crossing a State line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor. 232 F.3d at 1321. Noting that Section 2241(c) did not contain a specific venue provision, our court identified three distinct elements that the government had to prove to determine the locus delicti of the crime: the crossing of state lines, the intent to engage in the sexual act [with a child under twelve], and the attempt to do so. Id. at 1322. Finding that Section 2241(c) criminalizes a continuing offense, our court held that Congress permitted it to be prosecuted in any district where it was `begun, continued, or completed.' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)). Thus, venue was proper in the Western District of Oklahoma, where the criminal conduct was completed, even though the defendant crossed state lines into the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Id.; see also United States v. Byrne, 171 F.3d 1231, 1235 n. 2 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that because coercion and enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 is a continuing offense, venue for the companion Section 843(b) offense was also proper in the District of New Mexico, where the minor was enticed, even though the defendant did not initiate the call therefrom). Notably, our circuit declined to extend the reasoning of Rodriguez-Moreno, to a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) for making a false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal government. United States v. Smith, 641 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir.2011). Finding that making a false statement was the only essential conduct element of a Section 1001(a)(2) offense, our court held that venue would have been proper only in Minnesota, where the false statement was made. Id. at 1207-08. Venue was not proper in the Western District of Oklahoma, where the defendant was tried, even though the underlying crime for which the defendant was being questioned took place in the Western District of Oklahoma. Id. at 1208-09. With these principles in mind, we review the language of Section 843(b) to determine the essential conduct elements of the offense. For a Section 843(b) offense, the government must prove that the defendant (i) knowingly or intentionally (ii) used any communication facility (iii) in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting [a drug felony]. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Thus, there are two conduct elements that the government must prove: first that the defendant used a communication facility, and second, that in doing so, the defendant committed, facilitated, or caused to be committed a drug felony. That the commission of or facilitation of an underlying drug felony is a predicate offense to a Section 843(b) violation finds support in the Supreme Court's decision in Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 129 S.Ct. 2102, 173 L.Ed.2d 982 (2009). In Abuelhawa, the Court held that a defendant's misdemeanor drug purchase could not support a Section 843(b) offense, even though it made possible his drug supplier's felonious drug distribution. Id. at 2104. In analyzing the legislative history of Section 843(b), the Court reasoned that Congress meant to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than the felony of distributing drugs, and to narrow the scope of the communications provision to cover only those who facilitate a drug felony. Id. at 2107 (emphasis added). Implicit in this analysis is the proposition that the defendant commits a felony for which he may be convicted. Our case law similarly requires a defendant to be complicit in an underlying drug felony for a Section 843(b) conviction to stand. For example, in United States v. Baggett, our court held that simple possession of heroin, punishable only as a misdemeanor, could not support a Section 843(b) conviction. 890 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (10th Cir.1989); accord Abuelhawa, 129 S.Ct. at 2105 n. 2. Later, however, in United States v. Small , our court noted that because possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine is punishable as a felony, it could therefore support a Section 843(b) conviction. 423 F.3d 1164, 1185-86 (10th Cir.2005) (emphasis added). In the instant case, the underlying drug felony is a conspiracy. We have previously held that inchoate crimes such as attempt and conspiracy qualify as drug felonies that may underlie a Section 843(b) offense. United States v. Reed, 1 F.3d 1105, 1108-09 (10th Cir.1993) ([W]e hold that proof of an underlying inchoate crime, such as attempt or conspiracy under § 846, is sufficient to sustain a facilitation conviction under § 843(b).) (quoting with approval United States v. Pierorazio, 578 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir.1978)). Moreover, our circuit has characterized conspiracy as the prototypical continuing offense. United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1505 (10th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1568 n. 7 (10th Cir.1995); and United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C.Cir.1987)). Therefore, applying the reasoning of Rodriguez-Moreno, venue for prosecution of a Section 843(b) violation committed in furtherance of a conspiracy would be proper in any district where either the communication facility was used, or the underlying conspiracy was committed. In the instant case, because venue was proper in the District of Wyoming for the underlying drug felony (conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine), venue was proper there for the instant Section 843(b) offense.