Opinion ID: 2609009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The application of the farm labor, service or materials lien provided by ORS 87.294.

Text: ORS 87.294 provides: (1) Any person furnishing labor, service or materials to another upon any farmland, range, ranch or orchard to aid the growing or harvesting of crops or the raising of livestock thereon shall have a lien upon such crops or animals. The lien shall be the contract price for such labor, service or materials, or for the reasonable value thereof if there is no contract. The lien shall attach to the crop or animals from the date of commencement of the furnishing of labor, service or materials. (2) Except as provided in ORS 87.740, the lien shall attach to the crop, animals or the proceeds of the sale of the crop or animals in the possession of the purchaser, agent, broker, cooperative agency or other person at the time such person is notified of the filing of the lien by delivery to him of a true copy thereof; if (a) Prior to the filing of the lien, the crop, animals or any part thereof is sold; or (b) Prior to the filing of the lien possession of the crop, animals or any part thereof is delivered to a purchaser, agent, broker, cooperative agency or other person to be sold or otherwise disposed of. (3) Except as provided in ORS 87.740, the lien shall also attach to proceeds of the crop or animals coming into the possession of such person after notification of the filing of the lien. (Emphasis added) Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to a lien under the provision of ORS 87.294(3). It contends that ARZ is subject to the terms of subsection (3) despite the fact that it was the farmer engaged in growing and harvesting the crops which plaintiff claims to be subject to the lien. In support of this contention plaintiff points out that the words such person, as used in subsection (3) to describe those subject to the provisions of that subsection, refers to the term purchaser, agent, broker, cooperative agent or other person, as used in subsection (2) to describe those subject to the provisions of that subsection, and that the term other person is sufficiently broad so as to include the farmer engaged in growing or harvesting the crop. Defendant ARZ contends, however, that the group referred to in subsection (2) includes purchasers, agents, brokers, cooperative agencies and other persons and that in construing the term other person the doctrine of ejusdem generis applies. As a result, it contends that the farmer who grows or harvests the crop, not being of the same class as that described by the terms purchaser, agent, broker, cooperative agency, was not intended by the legislature to be included within the class of persons subject to the lien provided by subsection (2). It may be that defendant ARZ is correct in its contention that neither the term other person in subsection (2) nor the term such person in subsection (3) was intended to include the farmer engaged in growing and harvesting the crop subject to the liens provided by those subsections. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the farmer is not subject to a lien under the provisions of subsection (1). As we read ORS 87.294 in its entirety, it would appear that the legislature may well have intended that under the provisions of subsection (1) a person who furnishes labor, services or materials to a farmer in accordance with those provisions is entitled to a lien against the farmer upon the filing and recording of the lien, without further notice, and that the provisions of subsection (2) for notice by delivery of a true copy of the lien were intended to be applicable as requirements to be satisfied in order to make such a lien enforceable against a purchaser, agent, broker, cooperative agency or other person. Because no such contention was made in the case and because the lien is invalid for another reason, we need not decide that question. For the same reasons, we need not decide whether defendant ARZ is correct in its further contention that plaintiff is not entitled to a lien against it under subsection (3) because the requirement of notification in that subsection is the same as that required under subsection (2), under which there must be delivery to [it] of a true copy of the lien, which was not done in this case.