Opinion ID: 3010504
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of Surace's Conduct and

Text: the Fifth Wade Factor In finding that the profiler's risks were not outweighed by its utility, the court concluded that the accident could likely have been avoided had Surace exercised due care. Specifically, 23 the court found that because Surace was an experienced construction worker, fully aware of the dangers posed by the profiler, his conduct in wearing earplugs and turning his back to the machine while standing in its pathway was both careless and a cause of the accident. The court observed that [i]t would be unjust to burden CMI with liability in a situation where there is clear evidence that Mr. Surace's own lack of care played a role in bringing about the accident. Surace, 1995 WL 495123, at . On appeal, Surace argues that the district court erred in considering his conduct as part of the Azzarello threshold analysis. He submits that such a consideration impermissibly interjects concepts of negligence into a strict liability case. Pennsylvania courts generally bar consideration of contributory negligence in strict liability actions. See Kimco Dev. Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet, 536 Pa. 1, 8, 637 A.2d 603, 606 (1993) (rejecting comparative negligence as a defense in a strict liability case); see also Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1992).12 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme 12 In Dillinger, after a thorough analysis of Pennsylvania strict liability law, we concluded that the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court has unequivocally excluded negligence concepts from product liability cases and, therefore, the district court had erred in ruling that evidence of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence was admissible to rebut causation. 959 F.2d at 443, 444. Our opinion in Dillinger has, however, not put to rest all questions relating to the manner in which a plaintiff's negligence may be considered in a § 402A case. Compare Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 840 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (relying on Dillinger for the proposition that evidence of a plaintiff's conduct is admissible only to show that the plaintiff has assumed the risk or misused the product), with Kern v. Nissan Indus. Equip. Co., 801 F.Supp. 1438, 1441 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (evidence of negligence is admissible to rebut causation where the plaintiff's conduct triggered events resulting in injury), and Kolesar v. Navistar Int'l Transp. 24 Court eschews the use of negligence concepts in a strict liability case. See Lewis, 515 Pa. at 341, 528 A.2d at 593 (negligence concepts have no place in a case based on strict liability). The theoretical basis for this approach is that strict liability focuses on the condition of the product; it is irrelevant that the injury was the result of the manufacturer's or consumer's negligence. Kimco, 536 Pa. at 7-8, 637 A.2d at 60506; Lewis, 515 Pa. at 341, 528 A.2d at 593. An individual plaintiff's failure to exercise care in the use of a product is not relevant to whether the product is unreasonably dangerous in the first place. See Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 119 (3d Cir. 1992) (product liability laws . . . encourage manufacturers to make safe products even for the careless and unreasonable consumer); Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 95 n.6, 100, 337 A.2d at 899 n.6, 902 (1975) (rejecting even the reasonable consumer standard for the ordinary consumer); see also William J. McNichols, The Relevance of the Plaintiff's Misconduct in Strict Tort Products Liability, the Advent of Comparative Responsibility, and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 47 Okla. L.Rev. 201, 207 (1994) (unreasonably dangerous determination requires objective inquiry into the class of ordinary purchasers). Therefore, the district court's consideration of Surace's conduct runs afoul of Pennsylvania § 402A jurisprudence.13 Corp., 815 F.Supp. 818, 822 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (same), aff’d, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993). 13 We note further that, even assuming arguendo, that consideration of Surace's conduct had been appropriate under 25 The district court believed that by endorsing the Wade factors, specifically, the fifth factor, (the user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product), the Pennsylvania Superior Court has expressly sanctioned consideration of a product user's conduct in failing to exercise care as an appropriate factor in performing the threshold analysis. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not sanctioned use of the Wade factors, we have predicted that it will. See supra at 14. That prediction nonetheless admits of the possibility that the court will adopt some but not all of the Wade factors. We note that at least one justice has commented on the limitations of these factors in one respect. See Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 625-26, 450 A.2d 615, 631-32 (1982) (Larsen, J., dissenting) (noting that use of these factors as the standard for determining whether a product is defective fails in its attempt to maintain a distance from negligence concepts”). In applying the fifth Wade factor, the district court looked to Surace's conduct, rather than to an ordinary product user's conduct. We believe that it erred in so doing. The Wade factors set forth an objective test to determine whether a product is Azzarello, the district court erred in its application of the facts. The district court first suggested that Surace's use of earplugs was careless. However, SJA required its crew to wear earplugs. Moreover, on appeal, CMI concedes that federal regulations require the use of protective ear gear at the level at which the profiler's alarms sounded (100 db). CMI Br. at 22. Furthermore, although it was undisputed that Surace had turned his back to the machine, it was also clear that the operator moved the machine without being signaled, and that he had never done this in the past. Surace Dep. at 150; Fisher Dep. at 44. Therefore, a reasonable jury could infer that Surace's actions were not careless. 26 defective; the user referred to in the factors is the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses the product. Williams v. Briggs Co., 62 F.3d 703, 707 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Mississippi law and noting that the fifth Wade factor focuses on an ordinary person's ability to avoid the danger by exercising care); Riley v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 879, 88990 (E.D. Pa. 1995)(we are concerned with the ability of the [product's users], in general, to avoid the risks inherent in the product, not with the particular circumstances of [a] plaintiff's accident (emphasis added)); Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 128 N.J. 86, 100-01, 607 A.2d 637, 645 (1992) (risk-utility analysis is an objective test that focuses on the product and the fifth Wade factor requires consideration of the extent to which the hypothetical `average user' of the product -- not the plaintiff - - could avoid injury through the use of due care.); see generally Wade, supra, 44 Miss. L.J. at 847 (strict liability . . . is imposed on an objective basis). The proper focus in applying the fifth Wade factor then is an objective inquiry into whether the class of ordinary purchasers of the product could avoid injury through the exercise of care in use of the product, not whether this particular plaintiff could have avoided this particular injury. Put differently, the user's ability to avoid injury by the exercise of care in the use of the product appears to be a design factor that may justify a more or less exacting design depending on the facts, but it is, in any case, not a vehicle for injecting a plaintiff's (alleged) failure to exercise due care into the case. 27 Thus, the district court misapplied this factor. We acknowledge that, notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, it is unclear whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would endorse even an objective application of the fifth Wade factor in performing the Azzarello threshold analysis. The court has held that the existence of due care in strict liability cases is irrelevant, both with respect to the supplier and the consumer. Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899. Although it may appear that in doing so, that court has implicitly rejected the fifth Wade factor, its concern is with divorcing negligence concepts from strict liability proceedings;14 we do not believe that the inquiry suggested by the fifth Wade factor injects negligence into the action or diverts the focus away from the condition of the product, but rather it informs the decision as to whether the product, as designed, is not reasonably safe when used as intended. As Dean Wade explained in his seminal article enunciating the factors, the focus of the inquiry is on the product: Suppose that a consumer buys and wears shoes that are too little or tires that are too large for his automobile, or that he uses the product without following instructions. If he is injured as a result and brings 14 See Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900 (holding trial court erred in instructing on manufacturer's foreseeability, as [t]o require foreseeability is to require the manufacturer to use due care in preparing his product. In strict liability, the manufacturer is liable even if he has exercised all due care.); see also Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 364 Pa. Super. 26, 33, 527 A.2d 134, 138 (1987) (where trial court had instructed jury that plaintiff's misuse, abuse, or abnormal use of the product was a defense to a strict liability claim, the court cautioned that, on remand, the introduction of the element of due care was not an issue). 28 suit, the problem may be posed in terms of whether he was at fault and whether his fault should bar recovery in an action based on strict liability. The initial, and really significant, problem is whether the product was duly safe or not. A good pair of shoes size 5 is not unduly unsafe because it may be worn by a woman with feet size 7 . . . . A product with adequate instruction for its safe use may as a result be duly safe, and it is not rendered unsafe by the fact that the consumer did not follow the instructions. . . . Further illustrations easily present themselves. There is no drug, and perhaps no food, that is not dangerous if too much of it is consumed. It is missing the real point to pose the issue in terms of whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in taking too many pills or too much food. Wade, supra, at 846 (footnotes omitted). The analysis does not center on the due care vel non of the consumer but rather highlights whether a product is duly safe for its intended use. This is true of all of the Wade factors. For example, the focus of the sixth factor, which considers the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instruction, is on the product: [T]he dangers of a hoe or an axe are both matters of common knowledge and fully apparent to the user. But it is not necessarily sufficient to render a product duly safe that its dangers are obvious, especially if the dangerous condition could have been eliminated. A rotary lawn mower, for example, which had no housing to protect a user from the whirling blade would not be treated as duly safe, despite the obvious character of the danger. Note that the question here is whether the product possesses the quality of due safety, not whether the plaintiff assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent. 29 Id. at 842-43. Thus, insofar as the fifth Wade factor inquires into the (objective) conduct of the average product user as a factor that may justify a more or less exacting design depending on the facts, it seems to be an appropriate ingredient in the Wade riskutility balance, which itself seems a useful approach to performing the Azzarello threshold analysis. We thus predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow that approach. But only that Court can tell us, see Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 302304 (Becker, J., dissenting), and we hope that it will do so soon. Properly applying the fifth Wade factor to determine the objective user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the profiler, we find that the factor weighs slightly in Surace's favor. Although an individual working on the ground behind the profiler could, in theory, avoid danger by exercising care to always remain out of the machine's blind spot, it seems likely that ordinary workers at a highway construction site will occasionally find it necessary to step behind the machine, and that such workers may, like Surace, be habituated to the profiler's alarm and thus unable to avoid danger if the profiler's operator backs up without signaling.