Opinion ID: 1758518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the amended bill in the instant case charge invalidity of service of process in a manner sufficient to withstand a demurrer?

Text: One of the fundamental principles of justice is that no person may be divested of his rights until he has had an opportunity of being heard. In the absence of process on a defendant, even though the defendant may know of the pendency of the action, defendant's knowledge of the existence of the action does not supply the want of compliance with requirements of valid process. In Rice, et al. v. McMullen, 207 Miss. 706, 43 So.2d 195 (1949), we stated: Griffith's Mississippi Chancery Practice, Section 223, page 221, states the rule as follows: It is a cardinal principle in the administration of justice that no man can be condemned, or divested of his rights, until he has had an opportunity of being heard. He must, by service of process, by publication of notice or in some equivalent way, be brought into court, and if judgment be rendered against him before that is done, the proceedings will be as utterly void as though the court had undertaken to act where the subject matter was not within its cognizance. The principle is universal that no judgment, order or decree is valid or binding upon a party who has had no notice of the proceeding against him. The court must not only have jurisdiction of the subject matter, but also of the persons of the parties to give validity to its final judgments, orders and decrees, and it is not in the power of the legislature, under our constitution, to dispense with this notice, actual or constructive. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 83, page 124, announces the rule as follows: ... it is held that a person's knowledge of the existence of an action does not supply the want of compliance with the statutory or legal requirements as to service, and that a person's mere presence in court does not give jurisdiction to enter a judgment against him when he was not brought there by any legal means. This contention by appellant has been forever set at rest in this state by the decision in McCoy et al. v. Watson, 154 Miss. 307, 122 So. 368, 370, wherein it was said: Finally, it is argued that since the filing of the petition to remove shows conclusively that the nonresident defendant knows all about the suit, and has all the actual knowledge that could be conferred by a legal summons, we should not require the ceremony of a legal notification; that it would be an idle thing to do. Upon the same reasoning it could be maintained that the affidavit of the sheriff and witnesses could be received to show that, although the sheriff had not served the defendant with a formal legal summons, he had told the defendant orally in the presence of these witnesses all about the suit and warned him to appear and when to appear, and that the defendant had gone to the courthouse and read all the papers in the case and had obtained certified copies of the case papers and knew everything about the case that he could have learned from a legal summons. It is now so thoroughly well settled as to make it too late to urge that knowledge by a defendant of a suit, however definite and full, or however obtained, or whatever may have been the defendant's action under that knowledge, is of any avail or advances the case a step, unless there has been a legal summons or a legal appearance. McPike v. Wells, 54 Miss. 136; Jacks v. Bridewell, 51 Miss. 881; Burns v. Burns, 133 Miss. 485, 97 So. 814. (207 Miss. at 727, 728, 43 So.2d at 200, 201). Complainants allege that the averments in the petition for partition (Cause No. 71-86) as to diligent search and inquiry to ascertain the post office and street address of the non-resident defendants were false, also that petitioners did not make diligent search and inquiry to ascertain the post office and street addresses of the defendants. The bill of complaint clearly charges process was obtained by fraud. We hold the bill of complaint charged fraud in the procurement of process in a manner sufficient to withstand a demurrer. The court erred by sustaining the general demurrer. However, at the trial on remand, complainants have the heavy burden of establishing the allegation of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Crawford v. Smith Bros. Lumber Co., Inc., 274 So.2d 675 (Miss. 1973).