Opinion ID: 781300
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The first prong — an actual conflict of interest

Text: 89 We now proceed to consider the first prong of the Sullivan test — whether Attorney Murphy's successive representations created a conflict of interest. In order to demonstrate a conflict of interest under Sullivan, the petitioners must point to specific instances in the record that suggest an actual conflict or impairment of [their] interests. Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481 (internal citations and quotations omitted). They further must make a factual showing of inconsistent interests and demonstrate that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses of action, such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one client but harmful to the other. Id. However, if the conflict is as to a matter that is irrelevant or the conflict is merely hypothetical, there is no constitutional violation. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708 ([U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.). See also United States v. Hopkins, 43 F.3d 1116 (6th Cir.1995) (finding a hypothetical conflict where attorney simultaneously represented one client who provided information to the government inculpating another of the attorney's clients without the attorney's knowledge). 90 The petitioners assert that their successive representations created a conflict of interest because Attorney Murphy's competing loyalties to Moss and Kohn impaired his ability to secure plea agreements requiring cooperation. This Court has stated that a conflict of interest occurs where defense counsel is prevented from effectively engaging in any separate plea negotiations on one party's behalf without detrimentally affecting co-defendants. Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481-482. However, such cases generally have addressed scenarios where a plea offer has been extended and defense counsel either (1) is unable to accept the plea on behalf of one client out of fear of detrimentally impacting the interest of another client; or (2) actively pressures the defendant into accepting the plea in order to ensure that defense counsel's other clients receive similar pleas. See Hall, 200 F.3d at 966 (determining that a conflict of interest arose from defense counsel's rejection of a plea agreement offered to jointly represented co-defendants); Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481-482 (finding a conflict of interest where the prosecutor extended a package plea where all three jointly represented co-defendants had to accept offer; two defendants were willing to accept the offer; and defense counsel pressured the third defendant to accept plea). 91 In the instant appeal, the record conclusively demonstrates that AUSA Janice did not extend plea offers to the petitioners. AUSA Janice repeatedly testified that he did not extend plea offers to the petitioners and the record lacks any documentary evidence indicating the existence of such offers. 21 As there was no plea offer, it was impossible for Attorney Murphy to either reject or accept a plea as a result of divided loyalties to Moss and Kohn. 92 Several unpublished decisions of this Court impliedly have indicated that a conflict of interest may arise where defense counsel's competing loyalties prevent the exploration of plea negotiations with the government. See Newman v. United States, No. 96-6326, 1998 WL 553048, 1998 U.S.App. LEXIS 20565 (6th Cir. August 19, 1998) (remanding for a evidentiary hearing where counsel failed to communicate the defendant's willingness to cooperate with government authorities); United States v. Holt, No. 95-5173, 1996 WL 262466, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 15631 (6th Cir. May 15, 1996) (reviewing claim that defense counsel failed to explore plea negotiations because of a conflict of interest arising from co-defendant's payment of the defendant's legal fees). These decisions are consistent with the Supreme Court's statements in Holloway that, in this case [a conflict of interest] may well have precluded defense counsel ... from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489-90, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is a reasonable expansion of prior precedent to hold that a conflict of interest arises where, as a result of joint representation of co-defendants, or successive representation of co-defendants in the same proceeding, defense counsel fails to explore possible plea negotiations. 93 The Court in Holloway established, however, an express limitation on conflict of interest claims where the claims are predicated upon defense counsel's failure to explore plea negotiations. The Court stated that such inaction may be proof of a conflict of interest only provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Id. At a minimum, Holloway requires a defendant alleging that his attorney's conflict of interest prevented the exploration of plea negotiations to demonstrate that the government was willing to extend, or consider, an invitation to commence plea negotiations. 94 The petitioners have met this burden because it is undisputed that the government was willing to negotiate a plea with Kohn during the April, 1991 meeting between Attorney Murphy and AUSA Janice. AUSA Janice specifically testified that he did not offer a plea at the time, but the [U.S. Attorney's Office was] willing at that point to discuss resolution by plea which included substantial assistance. Attorney Murphy also testified that [AUSA] Janice would have been very lenient to Kohn if [Kohn] had come in. 95 The petitioners further have demonstrated that Attorney Murphy's successive representations prevented him from exploring possible plea negotiations with AUSA Janice. While testifying at the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Murphy acknowledged the conflict posed by the government's requirement that Kohn cooperate against Moss: 96 Q. Do you see any ethical problems with having represented Mr. Moss through at least the arraignment, taking Mr. Kohn and his offer of substantial assistance against Moss and having him cooperate. 97 A. I suppose if there were a desire by Mr. Kohn to cooperate, if he had said, Yes, I want to cooperate and I want to say that this guy is doing the things they said, I might have had — I would have probably had a substantial problem. Attorney Murphy similarly testified: 98 Q. [I]f Mr. Kohn would have said, I would like to cooperate, you would have represented him, you would have gone to Mr. Janice and if an agreement would have been worked out you would have been a party to that? 99 A. I don't know about that because of my prior dealings with Mr. Moss. 100 The foregoing testimony reveals that a conflict of interest arose between Attorney Murphy's successive representations of Moss and Kohn in that Attorney Murphy could not explore AUSA Janice's invitation to pursue a plea negotiations on behalf of Kohn without breaching his duty of loyalty to Moss. As such, we determine that Attorney Murphy's successive and intertwining representations of Moss and Kohn satisfy the first prong of the Sullivan test — a conflict of interest. 101