Opinion ID: 2002508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Changes in Substantive Law

Text: One of the hallmarks of existing case law is that the trial judge has broad discretion in framing child support orders. This court has repeatedly stated that there are no fixed standard, and the court must weigh the equities before entering any support decrees. E.R.B. v. J.H.F., 496 A.2d 607, 612 (D.C.1985). Specifically, the trial court has the duty of `balancing the many factors surrounding both the pecuniary situation of the [non-custodial parent] and the reasonable needs of the minor children.' Smith v. Smith, 344 A.2d 221, 223 (D.C.1975) (quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton, 247 A.2d 421, 422 (D.C.1968)). The trial court also has to make specific findings on net income and financial need. E.g., Brice v. Brice, 411 A.2d 340, 345 (D.C.1980); Benvenuto v. Benvenuto, 389 A.2d 795, 800 (D.C.1978) (cases cited therein.). The two specific relevant factors are the non-custodial parent's ability to pay based on net income and the child's needs based on his or her accustomed standard of living. [T]he courts in enforcing such obligation must be mindful of the [non-custodial parent]'s well being and must refrain from the imposition of unduly burdensome financial terms. Smith, supra, 344 A.2d at 223 (citations omitted). This determination of ability to pay has been based on net income. [I]t is essential that in exercising such discretion the trial court first determine the net income (or a reasonable approximation of such).... Brice, supra, 411 A.2d at 344. In Wright v. Wright, 386 A.2d 1191 (D.C. 1978), for example, the non-custodial parent had a gross bi-weekly wage of $406.40 but after subtracting state and federal taxes, medical insurance premiums, retirement contributions, garnishment for unpaid support, and automobile payments, he had only a net income of $66.91. Based on this calculation, the court held that the trial judge's order to pay $300 per month in child support amounted to impermissible punishment. Id. at 1193, 1195. The other side of the general formula is to consider the child's reasonable needs, looking to the standard of living to which the child has become accustomed or would have enjoyed had the parents not divorced. As to support, the best interests of the children must be assessed in the context of the standard of living to which the children have become accustomed. Cooper v. Cooper, 472 A.2d 878, 880-81 (D.C.1984) (separation agreement setting the level of child support) (citing Benvenuto v. Benvenuto, supra, 389 A.2d at 799 (child support award by the court in a divorce proceeding)). When the trial court has failed to determine net income or the child's needs, this court has remanded for further findings. Plumley v. Plumley, 465 A.2d 393 (D.C. 1983). Amici WLDF argues that the Guideline retains the broad principles underlying case law of (1) trial court discretion, (2) assessment of needs and ability to pay, (3) consideration of net income, and (4) fairness to both parents. However, there are several real differences between the Guideline and the case law. First, the ability to pay under the Guideline is calculated using gross income. [21] Amici WLDF argues that the Guideline percentages allow for tax and other expenses and that the Child Support Guideline Committee would have used a higher number had net income been used; however, there is no record support for this assertion. Furthermore, amici NCCR points out that the Guideline numbers do not specify how much tax is represented. Case law allows net income to be calculated using all legitimate deductions. Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762, 771 (D.C.1978). The Guideline merely codifies, according to amici WLDF, the legitimacy of the particular expenses starting with gross income but ending up with a purportedly fairer estimation of net income. The Child Support Guideline Committee used no such rationale, however. Alternatively, amici WLDF concedes that the Guideline is a departure from existing D.C. law by using gross income but justified as producing more equitable orders. Second, the Guideline determines a child's needs solely on the parents' income. Amici WLDF argues that studies show no fixed need; instead, the needs of a child will vary according to the income level and standard of living of the parents. However, the traditional way of assessing need has been to have the custodial parent to fill out a financial statement setting forth actual and projected expenses. The Child Support Guideline Committee concedes that the Guideline marks a definite departure from current practice of basing child support on the needs of the child and the ability of the parents to pay, but asserts that such a change was necessary to correct the current problems. Guideline Report at 11-12. Third, the presumptive nature of the Guideline places some limitation on the breadth of the discretion previously exercised by the trial court. To the extent that it takes on a binding quality or limits the inherent power of the Family Division to weigh the equities in each individual case, then it may constitute an unlawful overruling of prior case law in this jurisdiction. If the Guideline merely offers a suggested manner of apportionment, then much of the stated benefits in uniformity would be lost. As a rebuttable presumption, the Guideline avoids these two pitfalls, but the question remains regarding what level of proof is required to overcome the presumption. By its own terms, the Guideline is not binding. The guideline is fashioned to provide guidance, not to replace the discretion of the judicial officer. Guideline, supra note 1, at 20. It is also an evolving document subject to modification over time. Id. The list of four factors justifying deviation from the Guideline states,  Among the specific factors which should be considered for overcoming the presumption are the following, id. at 27 (emphasis added), suggesting that it is not an exhaustive list. In short, some discretion remains. See also Pub.L. No. 100-485, § 103(a)(2), quoted supra. However, the Guideline places certain inherent and explicit restrictions on the discretion of the hearing commissioner and trial judge. As now written, a party opposing application of the Guideline has the burden of showing that he or she has an exceptional case or one involving some circumstances which would yield patently unfair results which justifies deviation from application of the Guideline. Guideline, supra note 1, at 27. [22] How the threshold of rebuttal is phrased and interpreted will substantially impact the restrictiveness of the Guideline. A narrow interpretation of the Guideline would establish a strong presumption that it applies, absent very extraordinary circumstances (e.g., the child is handicapped or one parent lives in a mansion and the other in a hovel). A looser interpretation would allow deviation whenever a case departs from the paradigm on which the Guideline is based. While the Family Support Act of 1988 amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 667 expressly makes the Guideline a legislative presumption, the validity of a presumption depends as a general rule upon a rational nexus between the proven facts and the presumed facts. United Scenic Artists Local 829 v. NLRB, 246 U.S.App.D.C. 48, 55, 762 F.2d 1027, 1034 (1985) (citations omitted). See also Bazemore v. Davis, supra, 394 A.2d at 1380-83. Adhering to a presumption in the face of facts to the contrary may constitute an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Legille v. Dann, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 82, 544 F.2d 1, 5 (1976) (presumption of timely delivery by postal service). Since the Guideline is presumptively fair, [23] any party opposing its application would have a higher burden of proof than it might have without the Guideline. Although mandated by federal regulations, the numeric formulae make it difficult to ascertain what assumptions are being made. Amici NCCR argues that it is impossible to tell the basis on which the Guideline is presumptively applied. The Guideline Report offers no economic basis for the Child Support Guideline Committee's determinations. Consequently, the party trying to argue against application of the Guideline faces a monumental obstacle in attempting to demonstrate a case is exceptional without knowing what unexceptional is. [24] The existence of the Guideline alone has coercive power through the rigidity of its calculations and the ease of its application. Rather than deciding each case individually, decision-makers may be tempted to plug in numbers that explain themselves without making further findings. These and other considerations will be relevant in drafting any future child support guidelines in light of the 1988 amendment to 42 U.S.C.A. § 667 and this opinion. [25] The classic cases  the poor woman as custodial parent who has to provide child care herself or pay someone to provide it while she works, and the custodial parent whose standard of living declines as the former spouse's standard of living increases [26]  historically indicate that support orders often did not adequately consider the situations. Consequently, the Child Support Guideline Committee sought to compensate by accommodating them, as well as other circumstances, under a new approach. One of the principles underlying the Guideline is to provide child support above the basic needs level. Guideline Report, supra, at 19 (Principle 3). Also, as the trial judge noted, the Guideline is based on the assumption that custodial parents devote a percentage of their income to support of their minor children, see Guideline, supra note 1, at 26 (Child care responsibility and expenses are borne by the custodial parent.), but does not provide for a precise calculation of the support obligation of the custodial parent. In the instant case, however, for example, the husband, a professional, is the custodial parent and he does not provide child care himself or pay for it since the child lives with her grandparents, and he contributes less than one third of the child's minimal needs. The wife, on the other hand, is a new doctor with substantial educational debts which the Guideline does not accommodate. [27] There was no evidence to suggest that the grandparents were not fully meeting the child's needs. On remand, the trial court declined to calculate Mr. Fitzgerald's child support obligation, being of the opinion that although the evidence showed that the custodial parent had been assisted for some time by his parents in supporting the minor child, such voluntary contributions should not reduce Dr. Fitzgerald's obligation, since it is Mr. Fitzgerald, not his parents, who is legally obligated. The Fitzgeralds' circumstances do not fit the models of concern to the Child Support Guideline Committee. [28] As applied, the Guideline focused solely on the wife's gross income, offset initially only by her malpractice insurance premiums, without regard to either the amount of the husband's child support obligation or the subsistence needs of the wife. [29] Under these circumstances it can hardly be argued persuasively that the difference between a net income and a gross income approach is theoretical. Nor is it accurate to conclude that the Guideline maintains the parties' ultimate substantive right to fact specific individual awards, D.C. ex rel. K.K. v. W.R.C., supra note 21, 117 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1376, since there is no indication of the husband's expenses.