Opinion ID: 865169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 15 Sergeant White searched Hebert’s car after detaining Spicer and deciding to impound the truck until a positive identification of Spicer could be made and the identify of the owner determined. During the search, Sergeant White discovered registration papers stating Hebert to be the owner of the truck. 22 ¶37. At the close of the evidence, Spicer moved the trial judge for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had presented legally insufficient evidence to prove Spicer guilty of capital murder. The trial judge denied Spicer’s motion, and Spicer now argues that the trial judge’s denial was erroneous. ¶38. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard of review is as follows: [This Court] must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider all of the evidence–not just the evidence which supports the case for the prosecution–in the light most favorable to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt must be accepted as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. [This Court] may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Franklin v. State, 676 So. 2d 287, 288 (Miss. 1996). Spicer argues that there was not legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction of the underlying felony of robbery. A capital murder conviction under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e)16 must be supported by evidence legally sufficient to support a conviction of both the murder and the underlying felony, had either been charged alone. Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 212 (Miss. 1985). Spicer claims that the only 16 Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) states: (2)The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases: (e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnaping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit such felonies. 23 evidence to support a robbery conviction was the mere possession of Hebert’s Nissan truck,17 and the testimony of Michael Jones, a convicted felon.18 According to Spicer, there was no evidence to suggest Spicer had an intent to rob Hebert prior to Hebert’s death. Spicer cites no Mississippi case law to support his argument. ¶39. Spicer’s argument is not persuasive. In Knox v. State, the defendant argued that the prosecution failed to prove he intended to rob the murder victim. 805 So. 2d 527, 531 (Miss. 2002). Knox claimed that the prosecution presented no direct evidence as to when and under what circumstances he came into the possession of the murder victim’s keys. Id. Therefore, according to Knox, the jury could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Knox had committed an underlying robbery. Id. This Court rejected Knox’s argument, stating: Fully considering the crime in question, the location of [the murder victim’s body] in the trunk of her car, and the keys to that car in Knox's possession even after he changed his clothes, it is clearly a question for the jury whether [the murder victim] was robbed or whether it was Knox's intent to rob her. Id. Later in the opinion, this Court reiterated: [W]hen the defendant is discovered with the personal property of the deceased on his person it is entirely within reason for the jury to find that this fact in itself constitutes robbery. It is also within the jury's province to conclude that Knox killed [the murder victim] intending to take her car and that he either failed to do so or intended to return at a later time. 17 As part of his defense, Spicer elicited testimony from Jerry Woodward, the owner of a convenience store in Jackson County which Spicer and Hebert frequented, stating that he had observed at times previous to the murder Spicer driving Hebert’s truck alone. Spicer was attempting to prove Hebert allowed Spicer to borrow the truck and thus Spicer had permission to drive the truck the day he was caught in Jackson County. 18 Jones rode with Spicer in Hebert’s truck before Spicer picked up Hinger. Jones testified that Spicer told him “the truck is stolen.” 24 Id. at 532. ¶40. The present case is analogous to Knox. Law enforcement officials discovered Spicer in possession of Hebert’s truck and a sword taken from Hebert’s trailer. Following the holding of Knox, possession of a deceased’s property creates a reasonable inference that the property was stolen. Therefore, a reasonable juror could determine that Spicer stole Hebert’s property. In addition to Spicer’s possession of Hebert’s property, there was testimony that Spicer admitted to Michael Jones that the truck was stolen. The jury is the final arbiter of a witness’s credibility. Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 93 (Miss. 1996). Accordingly, there was enough legally sufficient evidence to determine Spicer robbed Hebert and convict Spicer of capital murder under Mississippi law. We find that Spicer’s fifth assertion of error is without merit. VI. Denial of a Lesser-Included Offense Instruction ¶41. Spicer argues that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jurors that they could find Spicer guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder.19 The trial judge refused two such instructions by Spicer on the basis that there was no evidence in the record that would justify the lesser-included offense of murder.20 Thus, the only potential findings by the jury were that Spicer 19 Murder is a lesser-included offense of capital murder. Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 744 (Miss. 2003). 20 Spicer’s proposed instruction D-3 stated: The Court instructs the Jury that if the evidence warrants it and you so believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may find the Defendant guilty of a lesser crime than Capital Murder. However, notwithstanding this right, it is your duty to accept the law as given to you by the Court, and if the facts and law warrant a conviction of the crime of Capital Murder, then it is your duty to make such findings 25 was guilty of capital murder or not guilty of any offense. Spicer asserts that because there was some evidence supporting his contention that he did not rob Hebert, he was entitled to a jury instruction of the lesser-included offense of murder that would allow the jury to convict him of a non-capital offense. ¶42. As support for his argument, Spicer cites Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980). In Beck, the United States Supreme Court held as unconstitutional the imposition of a death sentence on a defendant convicted by a jury of a capital offense when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesserincluded offense despite evidence supporting a lesser included offense. Id. at 638. An uninfluenced by your power to find a lesser offense. This provision is not designed to relieve you from the performance of a unpleasant duty. It is included to prevent a failure of justice if evidence fails to prove the original charge but does not justify a verdict for the lesser crime. Spicer’s proposed instruction D-11A stated: The Court instructs the Jury that you [sic] verdict should be written on a separate pierce [sic] of paper; need not be signed, and may be in one of the following forms: (1) If you find the Defendant, Freddie Sanford Spicer, Jr., guilty of Capital Murder of Edmond Herbert [sic], the form of your verdict shall be: “We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Freddie Sanford Spicer, Jr., guilty of Capital Murder of Edmond Herbert;” [sic] OR (2) If you find the defendant Freddie Sanford Spicer, Jr., guilty of Murder of Edmond Herbert [sic], the form of your verdict shall be: “We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Freddie Sanford Spicer, Jr., guilty of Murder of Edmond Herbert;” [sic] OR (3) If you find the Defendant, Freddie Sanford Spicer, Jr., not guilty, your verdict shall be in the following form: “We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Freddie Sanford Spicer, Jr., not guilty.” 26 Alabama jury convicted Beck of capital murder for the robbery and murder of an 80 year-old man. Id. at 639. As a defense, Beck asserted that he did not kill the victim or intend the victim’s death, but that instead his accomplice unexpectedly struck and killed the victim. Id. Under the Alabama death penalty statute at that time, the requisite intent to kill could not be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine. Thus, felony-murder could not be a lesser-included offense of the capital crime of intentional killing in the course of a robbery. Alabama law, however, specifically prohibited a trial judge from giving a jury the option of convicting a defendant of a lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court stated: when the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense–but leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense–the failure to give the jury the “third option” of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Id. at 637. ¶43. This Court’s standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is as follows: The Court does not single out any instruction or take instructions out of context; rather, the instructions are to be read together as a whole. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case. This entitlement is limited, however, in that the court is allowed to refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Parks v. State, 884 So. 2d 738, 746 (Miss. 2004) (citations omitted). Furthermore, this Court has stated: 27 Even though based on meager evidence and highly unlikely, a defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be submitted as a factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction of the court. Where a defendant’s proffered instruction has an evidentiary basis, properly states the law, and is the only instruction presenting his theory of the case, refusal to grant it constitutes reversible error. Hester v. State, 602 So. 2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). ¶44. This Court has articulated the following test to determine whether there is an evidentiary basis for a lesser-included offense: Lessor included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge–and ultimately this court–can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable references which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lessor included offense (and conversely not guilty of at least one element of the principal charge). Agnew v. State, 783 So. 2d 699, 702-03 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Graham v. State, 582 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Miss. 1991). ¶45. The facts in Beck are distinguishable from the facts of the current case. First, Mississippi courts are not governed by the same capital sentencing law at issue in Beck. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-20 states: The judge, in cases where the offense cited in the indictment is punishable by death, may grant an instruction for the state or the defendant which instructs the jury as to their discretion to convict the accused of the commission of an offense not specifically set forth in the indictment returned against the accused. ¶46. Second, Spicer presented no evidence before the trial court or this Court that would warrant a lesser-included offense instruction of murder. The United States Supreme Court stated in a later opinion interpreting Beck: 28 Beck held that due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction. But due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. The jury's discretion is thus channeled so that it may convict a defendant of any crime fairly supported by the evidence. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S. Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1982). Spicer presented no evidence that he acted with “deliberate design,” a “depraved heart,” or “in commission of any felony” other than the ones listed under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2), the capital murder statute. 21 Spicer’s basis for his argument that there was evidence to “support a verdict of guilt of a non-capital offense” is his continued assertion that he had permission to drive Hebert’s truck. Spicer’s argument is a defense to the charge of capital murder, not evidence of 21 Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1) states: (1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be murder in the following cases: (a) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being; (b) When done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual; (c) When done without any design to effect death by any person engaged in the commission of any felony other than rape, kidnaping, burglary, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnaturalintercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5-39, or in any attempt to commit such felonies; (d) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of an unborn child. 29 murder under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1). In addition, there is too much probative evidence in the record of the underlying felony of robbery for a reasonable juror to find Spicer guilty of simple murder beyond a reasonable doubt. There is evidence that he stole the sword because he was in possession of it after Hebert’s death and it had Hebert’s blood on it. There is also a lack of evidence that Spicer possessed a spare key to Hebert’s truck. This strongly suggests that he not only stole the keys, but also the truck. Even if the jury believed Spicer had permission to use the truck on previous occasions, it seems unlikely that he had permission here because Hebert was deceased. ¶47. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the accused, no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense. We find that the trial court correctly rejected the murder instruction because it was not warranted by the facts of this case. VII. Grant of Jury Instruction S-8 and the State’s Burden of Proving Intent to Commit the Underlying Felony Spicer argues that Jury Instruction 822 misled the jury on the intent necessary for a 22 Both Spicer and the State in their briefs refer to Instruction 8 as “Instruction S-7A.” However, their citations to “Instruction S-7A” correspond with Instruction 8 in the Clerk’s Papers and they quote Instruction 8 as “Instruction S-7A.” 30 for a conviction of capital murder as defined in Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e).23 According to Spicer, Instruction 8 “not only did not focus the jury’s attention on the issue of intent, but peremptorily instructed the jury that the issue of intent was irrelevant.” Thus, Spicer asserts, Instruction 8 “created an irrebuttable presumption relieving the jury of its responsibility of determining whether Spicer intended to commit robbery at the time of the killing.” ¶48. In support of his argument Spicer cites Jenkins v. State, 607 So. 2d 1171 (Miss. 1992). In Jenkins, the defendant was convicted of capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery. Id. at 1173-74. Jenkins objected to the following jury instruction: The Court instructs the Jury that if a person enters upon the commission of a crime involving danger to human life, such as robbery, said person is criminally accountable for death caused in the common enterprise. It need not be that the design is to commit the particular crime which is subsequently committed, but there must be a preconcerted plan to do some unlawful act. Therefore, if you find from the evidence in this case that all of the elements of Capital Murder, as defined in the Court’s instructions, have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant WILLIAM WAYNE JENKINS, 23 Jury Instruction 8 states: This Court instructs the Jury that in a case of Capital Murder the fact that the victim was dead at the time of taking his property does not mitigate against the conclusion of robbery. If the intervening time between the murder, if any, and the time of the taking of the property, if any, formed a continuous chain of events, the fact that the victim was dead when the property was taken cannot absolve the Defendant from the crime. If you should find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that the Defendant, Freddie Spicer, Jr., killed and murdered Edmond Hebert and then, after the said Edmond Hebert was dead, took his property; and if you should further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the intervening time of the murder, if any, and the time of the taking of the property, if any, formed a continuous chain of events, the fact that Edmond Hebert was dead when the property was taken does not absolve the Defendant from the crime of Capital Murder. 31 guilty of the crime of Capital Murder, even though, at the outset, he may not have intended to do the particular thing constituting the crime. Id. at 1179. Jenkins objected that the instruction was erroneous “because it informed the jury that they could convict [him] of capital murder even if he did not form the intent to rob until the homicide had occurred.” Id. After having earlier in the opinion reversed Jenkins’s conviction due to discovery violations by the State, this Court replied to Jenkins’s assertion that the above jury instruction was given in error: Without a thorough review of the merits of this claim, we note that Instruction S-3 was, at best, confusing to the jury and, at worst, peremptory in nature. S-3 did nothing to focus the jury's attention upon the issue of Jenkins' intent. Consequently, it merely obfuscated the issue and left the jury shrouded by smoke. Upon retrial, we must recommend that S-3 be revised or deleted from the court’s instructions. Id. at 1179-80. ¶49. Spicer is procedurally barred from asserting his seventh allegation of error. At trial, Spicer objected to instruction 8 “on the basis that there is no time of death proven.”24 Spicer did not place before the trial judge the present issue of whether Instruction 8 relieved the State of the burden of proving intent to commit the underlying felony of robbery. This Court cannot find that a trial judge committed reversible error on a matter not brought before him or her to consider. Montgomery v. State, 891 So. 2d 179, 187 (Miss. 2004). “[A]n objection on one 24 Spicer’s attorney’s entire comments regarding the objection were as follows: BY MR. HURT: We object to this instruction on the basis that there is no time of death proven. If you’ll look at the last part of this instruction, it talks about the intervening time and the fact that Edmond Hebert was dead when the property was taken. That was never established by the State. There is no time of death in this case. I think you would agree with me on that one. There is no time of death ever proved in this case. Was there? 32 or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds.” Doss v. State, 709 So. 2d at379 (quoting Conner v. State, 632 So. 2d 1239, 1255 (Miss. 1993)). ¶50. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find that Spicer’s argument is without merit. “In determining whether error exists in granting or refusing jury instructions, the instructions must be read as a whole; if the instructions fairly announce the law and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Martin v. State, 854 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (Miss. 2003). The trial judge did not instruct the jury that Spicer’s intent was irrelevant nor did he relieve the jury of its responsibility of determining whether Spicer intended to commit robbery at the time of the killing. Instead, the trial judge allowed Instruction 8 which correctly stated the law regarding the continuous chain of events” theory in capital cases and when the underlying felony of robbery could have occurred. See Duplantis v. State, 708 So. 2d 1327, 1343 (Miss. 1998).25 This Court said in West v. State: 25 The instruction at issue in Duplantis stated: The Court instructs the jury that in a case of capital murder the fact that the victim was dead at the time of taking his property does not mitigate against the conclusion of robbery. If the intervening time between the murder, if any, and the time of the taking of the property, if any, formed a continuous chain of events, the fact that the victim was dead when the property was taken cannot absolve the defendant from the crime. If you should find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis that the Defendant, David Duplantis, killed and murdered Gary Thrash and then, after the said Gary Thrash was dead, took his property; and if you should further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the intervening time between the time of the murder, if any, and the time of the taking of property, if any, formed a continuous chain of events, the fact that Gary Thrash was dead when the property was taken does not absolve the Defendant from the crime of Capital Murder. 708 So. 2d at 1342-43. 33 [W]e construed our capital murder statute and held that “the underlying crime begins where an indictable attempt is reached . . ..” An indictment charging a killing occurring “while engaged in the commission of” one of the enumerated felonies includes the actions of the defendant leading up to the felony, the attempted felony, and flight from the scene of the felony. The fact that the actual moment of the victim's death preceded consummation of the underlying felony does not vitiate the capital charge. 553 So. 2d 8, 13 (Miss. 1989) (citations omitted). See also Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452, 477-78 (Miss. 2001); Turner v. State, 732 So. 2d 937, 949-50 (Miss. 1999). The trial judge’s instruction in the present case mirrored this Court’s holding in West and other cases. Furthermore, the trial judge’s instruction is almost an exact quote of the instruction upheld by this Court in Duplantis. The instruction cited by Spicer from Jenkins is not similar to the one at issue in the present case, and this Court’s disapproval of the Jenkins instruction is not controlling. We find that Spicer’s seventh assertion of error is without merit.