Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Prosecutor's Reference to Mitigating Evidence During Argument

Text: Defendant presented evidence that he had adjusted well to prison life when he was incarcerated in Tennessee. He had good relationships with inmates and prison staff, worked hard as a member of the prison maintenance crew, and engaged in hobbies such as building crafts from wood. This evidence was introduced pursuant to section 190.3, factor (k), which permits the jury to consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by using this evidence as an aggravating factor, thereby violating section 190.3 and defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. In his closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor described as aggravating factors defendant's previous criminal conduct and the circumstances of the present crime. He then stated: And of course, before [defendant] committed this crime, why did he do it? Well, he thought the worst thing that can happen to me, I probably won't get caught. But if I do, the worst thing that can happen to me, they're just going to send me back to prison again. [¶] Well, Cheryl Nesler was not given any chance in this case. And she has left this life forever because of the acts of [defendant]; because of the acts of a man who's led the type of life that you'[ve] heard about, [¶] But he's asking you, ladies and gentlemen, for yet another chance, and he has had many. He's asking you for another chance, where Cheryl had none. [¶] He wants to go back home to prison; prison where he gets along with the inmates, and gets along with the guards, where he gets three meals a day, and a roof over his head. He can make the crafts that he makes. [¶] Is that justice, or does that amount in the case of [defendant] to no punishment at all.... (Italics added.) In his rebuttal argument, after suggesting that defendant might pose a threat of violence in prison, the prosecutor stated: But assuming he could function in prison, and wouldn't hurt anyone in prison, and wouldn't escape, is he a man that deserves this? Would that be punishment for [defendant], or would that be giving him a break that he does not deserve because he's received breaks in the past? It would be sending him home to prison. [¶] What is the reason to vote for the death penalty for [defendant]? The reason is clear. Society is not safe with [defendant] alive. (Italics added.) Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks in the trial court, and his claim therefore has been waived. ( People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 149, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 495, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) In any event, the prosecutor's comments were not improper. We have held that evidence of a defendant's background and character is admissible under section 190.3, factor (k), only to mitigate the gravity of the crime, and that it is improper for the prosecutor to urge that such evidence should be considered in aggravation. ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]....) ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 494, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) Nonetheless, `[a] prosecutor does not mischaracterize [mitigating] evidence by arguing it should not carry any extenuating weight when evaluated in a broader factual context. We have consistently declined to criticize advocacy of this nature. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 184, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) In People v. Lucas , for example, the defendant asserted the prosecutor relied upon nonstatutory aggravating factors in arguing that prison would be an inadequate punishment for defendant, as his brutality was such that he `would not even see the bars.' (12 Cal.4th at p. 496, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) We determined that such argument was not inappropriate, because it was based upon proper aggravating factors (defendant's brutality as demonstrated by the circumstances of the crime and prior violent criminal activity) and was directed to the jury's `` individualized assessment of the crucial issue whether the death penalty is appropriate for the particular defendant on trial. [Citation.] ( Ibid., original italics; see also People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1020-1021, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 151-152, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990.) Similarly, in the present case the prosecutor contended, in light of defendant's prior violent criminal activity and the circumstances of the present crime, that a sentence of life in prison would not be an appropriate punishment for defendant. The prosecutor did not ask the jury to consider defendant's adjustment to prison life as a factor in aggravation, but rather essentially urged the jury not to give this mitigating evidence extenuating weight in light of other aggravating factors. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's argument.