Opinion ID: 1112373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Lanham Act

Text: We also analyze this case based on cases decided under comparable provisions of the federal Lanham Act [3] [hereinafter Act], because section 495.181, Florida Statutes (1991), [4] directs that these cases be given great weight when construing chapter 495, Florida Statutes (1991). We find that the result we reach today would obtain under the Act as well. Under the Act, protection is afforded against the confusing use of corporate names based on the same principles as apply to protection of trademarks, and is subject to the same limitations and conditions. [5] 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 9.01[1]-[2] (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCarthy ]. A mark can be registered under the Act if it is distinctive. [6] 15 U.S.C. § 1052. [7] It cannot be registered if it is merely descriptive unless it has acquired secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1). Specifically, descriptive and geographically descriptive names used as names of businesses require proof of secondary meaning for legal protection, as do trademarks. McCarthy, § 9.01[2]. Cases decided under the Act explain what is distinctive, and therefore protectable without proof of secondary meaning, and what is descriptive. Distinctive marks are coined or fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive. Professor McCarthy explains these terms based on Act cases. Fanciful or coined marks are explained as follows: Fanciful marks consist of coined words that have been invented or selected for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark. Such marks comprise words that are either totally unknown in the language or are completely out of common usage at the time, as with obsolete or scientific terms... . If, in the process of selecting a new mark, a seller sits down and invents a totally new and unique combination of letters or symbols that results in a mark that has no prior use in the language, then the result is a coined or fanciful mark. McCarthy, § 11.03[1] (footnote omitted). [8] KODAK, POLAROID and XEROX are examples of fanciful or coined marks. Id. § 11.03[4]. Professor McCarthy thus explains arbitrary marks: Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures, etc., that are in common linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither suggest nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services. ... . Arbitrary means that the ordinary meaning of the word mark is applied to these goods in a totally arbitrary and non-descriptive sense. For example, IVORY soap is not made of ivory, OLD CROW whiskey is not distilled from old crows, and ROYAL baking powder is not used exclusively by royalty. Id. § 11.04[1] (footnote omitted). [9] BLACK & WHITE scotch whiskey, ICE CREAM chewing gum, and APPLE computers are examples of arbitrary marks. Id. § 11.04[3]. Suggestive marks [10] defy easy definition. Id. § 11.20[3], [4]. [11] Three tests have evolved to determine whether a mark is suggestive: the imagination test (how much imagination is required by the customer to get some description of the product from the term); the competitor's need test (is the mark needed by competitors to describe their goods); the competitor's use test (to what extent is the mark used by others on similar products). Id. § 11.21-.22. We approve these tests as appropriate for use with chapter 495. Suggestive marks include ARTYPE for cutout letters for artists, COPPERTONE for sun tan oil, FROM MAINE'S COOL BREEZE TO THE FLORIDA KEYS for a moving service, GOBBLE GOBBLE for processed turkey meat, HEARTWISE for low-fat foods, and TELECHRON for electric clocks. Id. § 11.23. Descriptive marks include marks that are simply descriptive, laudatorily descriptive and geographically descriptive. Thus: A mark is descriptive if it is descriptive of: the intended purpose, function or use of the goods, the size of the goods, the class of users of the goods, a desirable characteristic of the goods, or the end effect upon the user. ... . Marks that are merely laudatory and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product are also regarded as being descriptive. ... Self-laudatory or puffing marks are regarded as [descriptive]. Id. § 11.05[2][a], [b] (footnotes omitted). FRIENDLY, DEPENDABLE, and PREFERRED are examples of laudatory descriptive marks. Id. § 11.05[2][b]. GREAT and FIRST also are laudatory and, thus, descriptive marks. Regarding geographically descriptive marks, Professor McCarthy has this to say: [D]escriptive geographical terms are in the public domain in the sense that every seller should have the right to inform customers of the geographical origin of his goods. ... . A geographically descriptive term is any noun or adjective that designates geographical location and would tend to be regarded by buyers as descriptive of the geographic location of origin of the goods or services. ... . A geographically descriptive term can indicate any geographic location on earth, such as continents, nations, regions, states, cities, streets and addresses, areas of cities, rivers, and any other location referred to by a recognized name. ... . In order to determine whether or not the geographic term in question is descriptively used, the following... [question is] relevant: (1) Is the mark the name of the place or region from which the goods actually come? If the answer is yes, then the geographic term is probably used in a descriptive sense, and secondary meaning is required for protection. Id. §§ 14.01, 14.02, 14.02[1], 14.03 (footnotes omitted). SOUTHERN is geographically descriptive. Generic terms, by their nature, cannot serve to identify the source of goods or services and thus are not protectable. 15 U.S.C. § 1065; McCarthy, § 12.01. [12] The concepts of generic name and trademark are mutually exclusive. Thus, if, in fact, a given term is generic, it can never function as a mark to identify and distinguish the products of only one seller... . A generic term is one that is commonly used as the name of a kind of goods... . Unlike a trademark, which identifies the source of a product, a generic term merely identifies the genus of which the particular product is a species. ... . Generic names are regarded by the law as free for all to use. They are in the public domain. McCarthy, § 12.01[1], [2] (footnote omitted). We approve these definitions and adopt them for use with chapter 495. [13] We disapprove Gaeta Cromwell, Inc. v. Banyan Lakes Village, 523 So.2d 624 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 1988), to the extent that definitions therein disagree with those above. A composite mark is tested by looking at it as a whole, rather than its parts, although it is acceptable to separate a compound mark and discuss each part with respect to the question of descriptiveness provided that the ultimate determination is made on the basis of the mark in its entirety. McCarthy, § 11.10[2]. The trial court's error in finding First Southern Bank suggestive was facilitated by failing to view the mark as a whole, as required. Applying the tests of suggestiveness above, no great imagination is required to identify the product as banking services when the mark contains the word bank; many others use the word southern in their mark; and businesses in the south have the need and right to use the term descriptively. Applying the above definitions to the instant case we hold as a matter of law that the name FIRST SOUTHERN BANK, comprised of a laudatorily descriptive term, a geographically descriptive term, and a generic term, is, taken as a whole, merely descriptive and cannot be protected absent a secondary meaning. This too does not end our inquiry, because a determination of infringement involves more factors than the single factor of the distinctiveness of the name itself.
A cause of action for infringement is based on likelihood of confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). The various federal circuits have developed unique lists of factors to determine likelihood of confusion, all deriving from the first Restatement of Torts § 731 (1938). 2 McCarthy, § 24.06. The modern Restatement distills these factors into eight. [14] Professor McCarthy summarizes these as follows: (1) the degree of resemblance between the conflicting designations; (2) the similarity of the marketing methods and channels of distribution; (3) the characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree of care they exercise; (4) the degree of distinctiveness of the senior user's mark; (5) where the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood that prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand into the field of the junior user; (6) where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the extent to which the senior user's designation is known in the junior user's territory; (7) the intent of the junior user; and (8) evidence of actual confusion. 2 McCarthy, § 24.06[4]. [15] We approve these factors as appropriate to determining both registrability [16] and infringement [17] under chapter 495. We disapprove Tio Pepe, Inc. v. El Tio Pepe de Miami Restaurant, Inc., 523 So.2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 534 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1988), to the extent that it uses a simpler test of infringement.