Opinion ID: 1655807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other errors occurred in the Chancery Court Proceedings.

Text: ¶ 15. Lieutenant Governor Tuck also argues that the proceedings in the chancery court were irregular and contrary to law. We agree. Although there are provisions to be found in our statutes and rules for expediting court proceedings as necessary to do justice, each of those shortcuts is in derogation of the general policy of allowing parties an opportunity to prepare and present their cases and is to be administered within strict limits. Between April 29 and May 1, 2000, when the Legislature was concluding its business for the session, the members of the legislative bodies and those presiding faced the greatest demands on their time and attention. [1] Nevertheless, upon receiving the complaint in this action, the chancellor immediately issued a restraining order and set the matter for a hearing on merits for the following day at 1:30 p.m., and by 4:00 p.m. she issued a final declaratory judgment. ¶ 16. Under Rule 65(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining order may be issued without notice, but only if it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party can be heard and the applicant's attorney certifies in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reason that notice should not be required. The complaint, although sworn to, merely asserts the violation of Section 59 as a violation of the plaintiffs' right and that they have no other remedies at law, and, in general terms that they will be irreparably injured unless the Lieutenant Governor is restrained from enforcing her rulings. Such a statement is not a clear and specific statement of irreparable injury. Nor does the complaint indicate any efforts to notify the Lieutenant Governor. While it does appear that, at the chancellor's direction, after the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs were directed to send word to the Lieutenant Governor of the proceedings, it is not clear that given the session-ending activities in the Senate she could reasonably be expected to respond quickly enough to present her side effectively. ¶ 17. In her temporary restraining order, issued at 7:40 p.m. on April 30, the chancellor set the matter for hearing on the merits at 1:30 p.m. the following day. The complaint asked for a writ of mandamus, temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction. The time span did not allow for an answer to the complaint, and upon the conclusion of the May 1 hearing of the merits, the chancellor issued her final order in which she declared that [t]he Court does not deem it necessary to issue an injunction ..., but instead will issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule 57 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. By this extraordinary action, a judgment was issued interpreting Section 59 contrary to the ruling of the Lieutenant Governor, without regard to M.R.C.P. 4 which requires the issuance of a summons by the clerk and service of process, or M.R.C.P. 12 which allows thirty days for service of an answer, and a timely hearing on the merits. The senators neither sought, nor could the Lieutenant Governor have reasonably expected that such relief would be granted pursuant to a restraining order setting the complaint for hearing on the merits eighteen hours after its issuance. Recognizing that the chancery court under M.R.C.P. 54(c) may grant relief not requested in the complaint, and that Rule 57(a) makes provision for expediting proceedings on declaratory judgment relief, in doing so the chancellor must keep in mind principles of fundamental fairness consistent with the relief granted. Here, if given such an opportunity to present her case in an orderly manner, the Lieutenant Governor might have saved the chancellor from error.