Opinion ID: 1212539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standing under the apa

Text: We first address the court of appeals' position that the plaintiffs in each case did not have standing under the APA to challenge the validity of the regulations because the regulations had never been enforced against them. To determine whether the APA allows one to seek judicial review in these circumstances, we look at the appropriate APA provisions. Section 24-4-106(1)-(4) provides for judicial review of an agency's actions. (1) In order to assure a plain, simple, and prompt judicial remedy to persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions, the provisions of this section shall be applicable. (2) Final agency action under this or any other law shall be subject to judicial review as provided in this section, whether or not an application for reconsideration has been filed, unless the filing of an application for reconsideration is required by the statutory provisions governing the specific agency. In the event specific provisions for rehearing as a basis for judicial review as applied to any particular agency are in effect on or after July 1, 1969, then such provisions shall govern the rehearing and appeal procedure, the provisions of this article to the contrary notwithstanding. (3) An action may be commenced in any court of competent jurisdiction by or on behalf of an agency for judicial enforcement of any final order of such agency. In any such action, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by such agency action may obtain judicial review of such agency action. (4) Any party adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court in accordance with the rules of civil procedure within sixty days after such agency action becomes effective. A proceeding for such review may be brought against the agency by its official title, individuals who comprise the agency, or any person representing the agency or acting on its behalf in the matter sought to be reviewed. The complaint shall state the facts upon which the plaintiff bases the claim that he has been adversely affected or aggrieved, the reasons entitling him to relief, and the relief which he seeks. Every party in the agency action not appearing as plaintiff in such action for judicial review shall be made a defendant. Thereafter service of process, responsive pleadings, and other matters of procedure shall be controlled by the rules of civil procedure. The residence of a state agency for the purposes of this subsection (4) shall be deemed to be the city and county of Denver. [4] It is evident that under this section, if the Commission's adoption of a regulation is a final agency action, and if CF&I and Colorado Ute are parties adversely affected or aggrieved, they may commence an action in the district court for judicial review within 60 days after the effective date of a regulation. The Commission was made part of the Department of Health pursuant to section 25-7-104, C.R.S.1973. Under the APA it is an agency and therefore is subject to the provisions of the APA. Section 24-4-102(3) and 24-4-107, C.R.S.1973. The definition of action by an agency includes an agency rule, order, interlocutory order, license, sanction, relief or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act, Section 24-4-102(1). The definition of rule is any part of every agency statement of general applicability and future event implementing . . . or setting forth the . . . practice requirements of any agency. . . including regulation. Section 24-4-102(15), C.R.S.1973. It is undisputed that the effective date of each regulation had been reached at the time the respective complaints were filed in the trial court and that the complaints were filed within the proper time period. In contrast to the court of appeals' statement in Colorado Ute that the promulgation of a rule of . . . general application does not, in itself constitute a final agency action . . ., it is plain that under the APA once a commission's rule or regulation has been promulgated and is in effect, the agency action is final as to that particular regulation. We note that this conclusion agrees with that expressed by the General Assembly as it recently amended the APA: Once a rule becomes effective, the rule-making process shall be deemed to have become final agency action for judicial review purposes. Colo.Sess.Laws 1979, ch. 212, 24-4-103 at 842. The next step necessary to determine standing under the APA is whether a plaintiff qualifies as one of the persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions who thereby is able to seek the plain, simple, and prompt judicial remedy espoused in section 24-4-106. APA defines party to include any person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any court or agency proceeding subject to the provisions of this article. Section 24-4-102(11). The definition of person includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, and public or private organization of any character other than an agency. Section 24-4-102(12). The Attorney General, representing the Commission, believes that these sections require that, before one be qualified as a party and thereby able to seek judicial review of an agency action, one must have been admitted as a party to the agency's proceeding concerning the regulation. He argues that the Act refines the APA definition of party by setting as a prerequisite to being admitted as a party to its proceeding that one file an alternative regulation not less than 20 days prior to the hearing on the proposed regulation. Meeting this requirement of filing an alternative regulation qualifies one to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing on the proposed regulation. Section 25-7-109, C.R.S.1973. The Attorney General equates one's status as a cross-examiner with party status. He reasons that because CF&I failed to tile an alternative regulation, and thereby was unable to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing, CF&I is not a party as contemplated by the APA. He concludes that lacking party status, CF&I is not now able to seek judicial review of the regulation. To define party as the Attorney General urges would put a heavy and unreasonable burden upon many persons. In order to preserve one's right to seek judicial review of a final air pollution control regulation, one would be required to have filed an alternative to the proposed regulation, whether or not one disagreed with the proposed regulation. Such cannot have been the intent of the General Assembly. Reading the APA in its entirety, even noting the various usages of the words persons and parties, one must conclude that in order to achieve the contemplated plain, simple and prompt judicial review of agency action, the General Assembly must have intended a broader definition of party. We hold that CF&I is a party as defined by section 24-4-102(11) and as the term is used conferring a right of review in section 24-4-106(4). The next necessary determination is whether the plaintiffs qualify as parties aggrieved or adversely affected by the promulgation of the regulation. The court of appeals stated in Colorado Ute that only when one's rights, privileges, or duties are directly and adversely affected by the [administrative] action does one enjoy a right to judicial review. In support of that statement the court cited Board of County Commissioners v. State Board of Social Services, 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974). In that case, as here, the issue concerned appellant's standing. There, however, the inquiry focused on whether the County Commissioners were a party, not on whether they were adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency action. In holding that the County Commissioners were not a party under 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 3-16-5 (the predecessor to section 24-4-106, the statute under consideration here), we said: [t]he right to judicial review of the final administrative actions . . . is limited to those parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges or duties, as distinct from those of the State, are adversely affected by the decision. The county as an arm of the State Board of Social Services has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and hence does not come within the definition of `party.' (emphasis added) ( Board of County Commissioners v. State Board of Social Services, supra . It does not follow that Colorado Ute and CF&I, clearly not state entities and clearly having certain duties imposed upon them by the regulations, should be denied a right to judicial review of those regulations. Furthermore, we note again that no party before us contests that the plaintiffs' activities are exactly those to which the respective regulations apply and that their application adversely affects the plaintiffs. In contrast to County Commissioners is Colorado State Board of Optometric Examiners v. Dixon, 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968). In Dixon, the issue was whether the district court could properly enjoin the state Board of Optometric Examiners from enforcing a newly-adopted regulation. There respondents contested the injunction on the basis that the regulation was not a final action in that the commencement of the suit preceded the effective date of the regulation. While there the requirement of finality of agency action was challenged, and here we are concerned with the requirement that the plaintiff be adversely affected or aggrieved, the rationale and reasoning set out in Dixon applies equally well to our present concern. In Dixon we embraced as appropriate for modern times the view that one is not required to risk violation of a statute or rule in order to obtain a declaration of its invalidity. In so holding, we expressly overruled earlier cases contrary to that proposition. We believe that that proposition remains sound. Even where a regulation is of general applicability, and even where enforcement measures concerning compliance with the regulation have not yet been taken specifically against an individual, whether it be a permit denial, a cease or desist order, or the like, we can see nothing in the APA that denies standing to that individual to initiate a pre-enforcement challenge to the validity of the regulation, if he is subject to its demands. [5] See 2 F. Cooper. State Administrative Law, 1965, p. 538; accord, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). We note at this juncture that the court of appeals mistakenly relied upon Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977) to conclude that because Colorado Ute had not yet suffered an injury in fact it did not qualify as aggrieved. In contrast to the plaintiffs here, the plaintiffs in Wimberly had alleged that the defendant had already caused them severe financial losses. Consequently we were there concerned with whether plaintiffs' complaints reflected injury directly caused by the defendant, or whether the financial losses were merely incidental to the defendant's conduct, and therefore an insufficient basis on which to find standing. Furthermore, as respondents point out, the pertinent statements in that opinion are to the effect that the proper inquiry to be made as to the injury in fact requirement is whether the action complained of has caused or threatens to cause injury in fact to the plaintiff (emphasis added).