Opinion ID: 59429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burgest’s Complaint is Time Barred.

Text: The accrual date for an action under section 1983 is “governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles.” Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1095 (2007). “Under those principles, it is ‘the standard rule that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action[,] that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 201, 118 S. Ct. 542, 549 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An action for false imprisonment accrues when the prisoner “becomes held pursuant to [legal] process,” id. at 1096, and an action for malicious prosecution accrues when the prosecution terminates in the prisoner’s favor. Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585–86 (11th Cir. 1996). Burgest’s action for false imprisonment accrued first. Burgest was arrested on November 12, 1998. Although it is unclear from the record whether Burgest was arrested with or without a warrant, we give Burgest the benefit of the doubt and assume the arrest occurred without a warrant. Florida law requires that “every arrested person shall be taken before a judicial officer . . . within 24 hours of arrest,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.130(a), so we assume that Burgest received an initial appearance on November 13, 1998, at which point his complaint for false 4 imprisonment accrued. See Kato, 127 S. Ct. at 1096. When this “legal process was initiated against him,” the period of limitation began “to run.” Id. Burgest contends that under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), his complaint for false imprisonment could not accrue until he was released from confinement based on the revocation of his probation, but the Kato Court rejected the argument that Heck affects the date of accrual. The Kato Court explained that such a “bizarre extension” of Heck would render the date of accrual indeterminate. 127 S. Ct. at 1097–98. The Court reasoned that tolling while the Heck bar subsisted would leave defendants without “notice to preserve beyond the normal limitations period evidence that [would] be needed for their defense.” Id. at 1098–99. The complaint for malicious prosecution accrued more than a year after Burgest’s complaint for false imprisonment accrued. To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S. Ct. at 2371; Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1004 (11th Cir. 1998). The district court determined that a jury acquitted Burgest of the charge of weapon possession on January 27, 2000, and that acquittal favorably terminated the criminal action against Burgest. See Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1005 (“[C]ourts have found favorable 5 termination to exist by virtue of an acquittal[.]”). The period of limitation for Burgest’s action for malicious prosecution began to run on January 27, 2000. Neither Burgest’s complaint of false imprisonment, which accrued on November 13, 1998, nor his complaint of malicious prosecution, which accrued on January 27, 2000, was timely. For both complaints of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, federal courts borrow the statute of limitation of the forum state. Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1002. Florida applies a limitation period of four years for an action for “malicious prosecution[] . . . [or] false imprisonment[.]” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(o) (West 2006). Burgest did not file his complaint until July 18, 2006, more than three years after the limitation period expired for the claim of false imprisonment and more than two years after the limitation period expired for the claim of malicious prosecution. Burgest argues that the period of limitation should be tolled under a Florida tolling statute. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.051 (West 1990). He acknowledges that the statute “does not specifically toll limitations periods for prisoners,” but contends that the provision that tolls an action during “[t]he pendency of any arbitral proceeding” applies to his complaint. Id. Burgest construes the term “arbitral proceeding” to encompass his efforts in state court to obtain relief from the revocation of his probation. 6 We disagree. Judicial proceedings are not equivalent to the arbitral process referenced in the tolling statute. As the district court explained, Burgest was not entitled to tolling of the limitation period. B. Burgest’s Complaint Does Not Relate Back to His Earlier Complaint. Burgest filed his complaint in the Southern District of Florida on July 18, 2006, but he argues that his complaint relates back to a complaint that he filed in February 2006. This argument fails. To qualify for the relation back doctrine, Burgest was required to establish that his complaint served as an amendment to his earlier complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Burgest failed to satisfy his burden. Burgest’s latest complaint is a newly filed civil action, so the relation-back doctrine does not apply. Alternatively, even if Burgest’s complaint somehow related back to his earlier complaint, his complaint would still be untimely.