Opinion ID: 798166
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gentek Waived any Challenge to Removal by Failing to Move for Remand

Text: 23 Gentek filed suit in state court raising only state-law claims. Sherwin-Williams then removed the case to federal court, contending that Gentek's state warranty claims were really Magnuson-Moss claims. In particular, Sherwin-Williams stated that the coating amounted to a consumer product under the Magnuson-Moss Act. Instead of challenging the removal by moving to remand to state court, Gentek simply amended its complaint to explicitly state the Magnuson-Moss claims. 24 Sherwin-Williams says Gentek accordingly waived any challenge it has to jurisdiction at the time of removal, now that there is a final judgment. Sherwin-Williams cites a number of the cases discussed above for the proposition that a plaintiff who does not move to remand a case after removal waives any objection to removal if jurisdiction exists at the time of judgment. But none of those cases involve a plaintiff who claims, as Gentek does here, that the defendant's false statement was the sole basis for (i) removal and, in turn, (ii) the amendment of the complaint that later provided federal jurisdiction. It makes sense to bar a plaintiff from challenging removal when the plaintiff voluntarily accedes to it; but it is less clear that, assuming the defendant's statement is fraudulent, a plaintiff is stuck with (purportedly federal) pleadings based on the defendant's fraud. In short, Gentek would ask, how could we expect it to object to a removal built on a defendant's false statement when Gentek did not know the statement was false? 25 These questions matter, however, only if we presume (as the parties appear to) that Sherwin-Williams's alleged misrepresentation regarding consumer products forced Gentek into federal court. But that is simply not the case. Gentek remained—regardless of Sherwin-Williams's statements—the master of its complaint. Sherwin-Williams could have lied about the consumer product and made plenty of additional lies suggesting that Gentek had other federal claims, but Gentek remained free to allege solely state claims in state court. Even if the coatings were consumer products, had Gentek moved to remand instead of amending its complaint, the district court would have granted the motion. First, it [would not] appear[] that some substantial, disputed question of federal law [was] a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). Additionally, although Gentek's state-law claims might be similar to claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act, that Act, unlike the LRMA and ERISA, does not completely preempt state law. See Automobile Importers of Am. Inc. v. Minnesota, 871 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir.1989); Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm., 755 F.2d 1192, 1206 (5th Cir.1985); In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1141 (7th Cir.1979); but see Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that the Magnuson-Moss Act preempts state warranty claims). Accordingly, a district court would grant a plaintiff's motion to remand a case that raises solely state claims when the defendant removes based on the Magnuson-Moss Act. See, e.g., Woods v. Nissan North Am., No. 04-2898, 2005 WL 1000089, at -3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7522, at -7 (D. Md. April 29, 2005) (granting plaintiff's motion to remand where defendants removed based on Magnuson-Moss Act and plaintiff's complaint raised no federal claims and complaint was not artful pleading to avoid complete preemption); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Am. Alternative Ins. Co., No. 99-3347, 2000 WL 28177, at , 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 467, at  15 (E.D.La. Jan. 13, 2000) (granting plaintiffs' motion to remand where defendants removed based on Magnuson-Moss Act and plaintiffs elected to proceed in state court exclusively relying on state law, and noting that Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims do not fall into th[e] category of claims that are completely preempted); Hinton v. Daimler Chrysler Servs. North Am. LLC, No. 05-0850, 2006 WL 469525, at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at  (W.D.Mo. Feb. 23, 2006) (granting plaintiff's motion to remand after defendant removed based on Magnuson-Moss Act because plaintiff's complaint merely referred to the Magnuson-Moss Act as providing a standard of care for state claims); Greene v. Gen. Motors Corp., 261 F.Supp.2d 414 (W.D.N.C.2003) (granting plaintiff's motion to remand after defendant removed based on Magnuson-Moss Act because plaintiff's complaint merely referred to Magnuson-Moss standards as further evidence of state-law violations). Thus, this Court would face a more difficult situation if a defendant made a false statement related to claims that would be completely preempted—e.g., a statement that would bring the claims within the ambit of the LRMA—thus duping the plaintiff to accede to (what appeared to be) the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiff might have a strong argument to say it did not waive a challenge to jurisdiction, because it would never have had a basis—presuming it reasonably believed the defendant's statement—to go to state court. 26 Here, however, the removal was improper—regardless of anything Sherwin-Williams stated—and Gentek simply could have shown the district court that was the case and been back in state court. Instead, Gentek voluntarily amended its complaint to explicitly state federal claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act. Thus, Gentek didn't just throw in the towel in a fight against removal; it never even entered the ring. It has therefore waived its argument that removal was improper. The only question, then, is whether the district court had jurisdiction at the time of judgment; if so, the judgment must stand. See Grubbs, 405 U.S. 699, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612. 27