Opinion ID: 2783134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mandamus Standard Applicable Here.

Text: The intersection of two constitutional mandates lie at the heart of resolution of petitioner's mandamus claim. First, both Article III and the Sixth Amendment provide that a criminal defendant shall be tried in the State where the . . . Crimes . . . have -8- been committed. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. amend. VI (right to trial by jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed). Second, the Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 377; see also U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right, ensuring the defendant a fair trial, has also been characterized as a basic requirement of due process. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 378 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In some situations, these constitutional mandates may be in tension. Notwithstanding the constitutional command that trials take place where crimes are committed, the defendant's rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial may require that in extreme cases the trial be moved to a venue other than where the crime was committed. We have described such cases as those where there is an everprevalent risk that the level of prejudice permeating the trial setting is so dense that a defendant cannot possibly receive an impartial trial. United States v. Quiles-Olivo, 684 F.3d 177, 182 (1st Cir. 2012).2 In those rare, extreme circumstances it may be 2 Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [u]pon the defendant's motion, the court must transfer the proceeding against that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there. Generally, a presumption of prejudice is reserved for those extreme cases where publicity is both extensive and sensational in nature. Stated differently, Rule 21(a)'s requirements tend to almost exclusively apply in cases in -9- a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963). Importantly, if petitioner goes to trial without a change of venue now and is convicted, he will have the opportunity to raise a challenge based on lack of a fair and impartial jury on direct appeal. Indeed, that is the customary mechanism by which such challenges are presented and assessed. See, e.g., QuilesOlivo, 684 F.3d at 182-84.3 Instead of traveling that typical route, petitioner asks this court for a writ of mandamus at this pretrial stage. And the mandamus petition in this case is particularly unusual. It came in the process of ongoing jury selection and is an attempt to prevent a trial in this jurisdiction from going forward. Petitioner urges this appellate court to intervene and halt that juror selection process in the trial court. He does so despite the fact that, the district court, sitting in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect, necessarily and properly under the law draws on its own perception of the depth and extent of news which pervasive pretrial publicity has inflamed passions in the host community past the breaking point. Quiles-Olivo, 684 F.3d at 182 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted). 3 At oral argument, it was the position of petitioner that denials of motions to change venue are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that a clear abuse of discretion would give rise to a clear entitlement to relief. Petitioner characterized the change of venue in this case as being at the heart of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. -10- stories that might influence a juror. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 427. The district court has not yet completed that process, and we are mindful that an appellate court's after-the-fact assessments of the media's impact on jurors . . . lack the on-the-spot comprehension of the situation possessed by the trial judge. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 386; see id. at 378 n.11 ([D]istrict-court calls on the necessity of transfer are granted a healthy measure of appellate-court respect.). Because petitioner's venue claim arises not on direct appeal after trial but on petition for a writ of mandamus, it is subject to an even more exacting burden than it would be on direct appeal. In re Bulger, 710 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2013).4 The petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted). That standard of review is extraordinarily deferential to the ruling of the trial judge. In our cases, mandamus has customarily been granted only when the lower court was clearly without jurisdiction, or exceeded its discretion to such a degree that its actions amount to a usurpation of power. In re Recticel Foam 4 For purposes of this opinion, we will assume that the petitioner can prove his argument that the district court's denial of the pretrial Third Motion for Change of Venue is subject to mandamus review at all, see In re Kouri-Perez, 134 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1998) (unpublished per curiam), though not all circuit courts agree. -11- Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1006 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted). As we explain below, neither of those conditions is true here. In addition to overcoming the daunting first requirement, petitioner must also meet two other standards. First, he must demonstrate that he has no other adequate source of relief; in other words, he must show irreparable harm. In re Bulger, 710 F.3d at 45 (citation omitted). This condition is designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process, Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81 (citation omitted), which, as we have noted, remains open to petitioner after trial should he be convicted. Petitioner does not rely on an argument that he will suffer irreparable injury, but argues a failure to accept his argument is so obviously wrong, the irreparable injury is to the reputation of the federal judicial system. And, second, a petitioner must demonstrate that, on balance, the equities favor issuance of the writ. In re Bulger, 710 F.3d at 45. Together, these standards mean that, when considering a petition for the extraordinary writ of mandamus, an appeals court is bound to employ an extraordinarily deferential form of review. Relief may be allowed here only (1) if it is clear and indisputable that the district court erred in denying petitioner's Third Motion for Change of Venue, (2) petitioner would suffer irreparable harm if the district court were not ordered to change venue, and (3) the -12- equities clearly favor the petitioner. See id. at 45-46. These onerous standards have not been met here.