Opinion ID: 2355961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Testimony of Dr. Ann Burgess as an Expert on Rape Trauma Syndrome [24]

Text: Although we need not address the issue of whether Baby preserved his objection to the admission of the testimony of Dr. Ann Burgess as an expert on rape trauma syndrome, for the guidance of the circuit court on remand, should Dr. Burgess be recalled during a new trial, we shall address Baby's contention that Dr. Burgess' expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome should have been subjected to a Frye-Reed hearing prior to its admission, assuming the interposition of an appropriate objection. Baby argues a number of reasons why Dr. Burgess' testimony on rape trauma syndrome should not have been admitted into evidence, including that the term rape trauma syndrome was prejudicial and that she improperly rendered an opinion that J.L. had been raped; we only address, however, Baby's argument that the testimony was inadmissible because the reliability of rape trauma syndrome was not subjected to scrutiny under the Frye-Reed standard. Baby argues that because [n]o appellate court in Maryland has approved the introduction of `rape trauma syndrome' evidence in a criminal trial for any purpose, such evidence must first be submitted to a Frye-Reed inquiry to determine general acceptance in the scientific community before a trial court can consider allowing expert testimony based upon this scientific theory. Dr. Burgess was asked to testify about post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and rape trauma syndrome. As Dr. Burgess testified, rape trauma syndrome is a term that she and a colleague developed in 1974 to describe the response patterns they observed in women who had been raped. Dr. Burgess described how many of the general public's perceptions concerning rape are incongruous with the behaviors she and her colleagues have observed in the victims of sexual assault. In response to questions from the State, Dr. Burgess also stated whether she thought that certain actions such as offering minimal, physical resistance against her attacker, not immediately reporting the rape to the first person she saw even if that person might be their best friend, and engaging in everyday activities within a short time after the rape such as going to a supermarket and shopping, would be consistent with the behavior of a victim of rape, such behaviors as those explicated in J.L.'s testimony. The State offered Dr. Burgess as an expert witness in order to explain how the perceived aberrant behavior of victims of sexual assault can be explained as a result of rape trauma syndrome. In Reed, 283 Md. at 374, 391 A.2d at 364, this Court was asked to rule on the admissibility of voice identification testimony based on the analysis of spectrograms, otherwise known as voiceprints. In concluding that voiceprint analysis was inadmissible in Maryland courts as evidence of voice identification, we adopted the test for establishing the reliability of scientific methodology articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923). We characterized the Frye standard as requiring that before a scientific opinion will be received as evidence at trial, the basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field. Thus, according to the Frye standard, if a new scientific technique's validity is in controversy in the relevant scientific community, . . . then expert testimony based upon its validity cannot be admitted into evidence. Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368. Reed set forth Frye as a legal standard which governs the trial judge's determination of a threshold issue, stating that if a technique does not meet the Frye standard, a trial judge will have no occasion to reach [the] further issues of whether the expert testimony will be helpful to the jury [and whether] . . . the expert is properly qualified. Id. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372. See also Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 344, 363, 896 A.2d 1059, 1061, 1073 (2006) (characterizing our decision in Reed as mak[ing] evidence emanating from a novel scientific process inadmissible absent a finding that the process is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and requiring that prior to the admission of expert testimony based on the application of novel scientific techniques, the party seeking to use the expert testimony must establish that the particular methodology is valid and reliable). [25] The State argues that in Hutton, 339 Md. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301, we took judicial notice of the reliability and validity of rape trauma syndrome, when we stated that [e]xpert testimony describing PTSD or rape trauma syndrome may be admissible, however, when . . . offered, for example, to show lack of consent or to explain behavior that might be viewed as inconsistent with the happening of the event. This statement, however, could not, in any way, be construed as a holding that rape trauma syndrome testimony is admissible under Frye-Reed, as that was not the issue before us. Rather, our analysis in Hutton supports the proposition that rape trauma syndrome represents a scientific theory or methodology whose reliability must be established under Frye-Reed before opinions based upon it can be admitted into evidence, see id. at 493-97, 663 A.2d at 1295-96, as also reflected in the decisions of courts in our sister States that have addressed rape trauma syndrome and its umbrella syndrome, PTSD. [26] We have reaffirmed the importance of Frye-Reed analysis in determining the validity and reliability of a wide variety of scientific methodologies and conclusions, including various syndromes. In State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 233, 266, 844 A.2d 429, 448 (2004), we held that while expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome, and by analogy, battered child syndrome, is admissible by statute, such social scientific evidence would otherwise be subjected to analysis under Frye-Reed. See also Montgomery Mutual Insurance Company v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 333, 923 A.2d 939, 950 (2007) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Frye-Reed hearing before admitting expert testimony on sick building syndrome in a workers' compensation matter); Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 430 n. 18, 914 A.2d 113, 128 n. 18 (2007) (noting that expert testimony on the link between vaccines and autism would have to pass the Frye-Reed test before it could be admitted into evidence); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 182, 647 A.2d 405, 423 (1994) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony based upon a surface dust sampling technique that passed the Frye-Reed standard for general acceptance in the relevant scientific community). Cf. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 99, 517 A.2d 741, 746 (1986) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony on PTSD, we stated that [t]here is no issue in this case over the fact that psychiatrists and psychologists recognize PTSD as an anxiety disorder, and, in essence, took judicial notice of its admissibility under Frye-Reed). In Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986), we were asked to determine whether the trial court had erred in not admitting expert testimony on the issue of eye-witness identification, a decision partially based on the evidence not meeting the Frye-Reed standard of acceptance in the relevant scientific community. We held that while the Frye-Reed test was not applicable to the eyewitness identification evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the expert testimony as its decision was also based on an alternate ground. In our analysis of the applicability of the Frye-Reed standard in Bloodsworth, we noted with approval the similarity between the catalog of types of evidence which we stated would be subjected to Frye analysis in Reed and a list of scientific devices or processes to which California courts had applied Frye analysis, as provided by the California court in People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984), which list included rape trauma syndrome. Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 184, 512 A.2d at 1066. While it is true that not all testimony based upon scientific theory or methodology must first be subjected to a hearing on its reliability and validity, as we stated in Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 201, 803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (2002), Where the validity and reliability of a scientific technique is so broadly and generally accepted within the scientific community, as in the case of ballistic tests, blood tests, and the like, a trial court may take judicial notice of its reliability. We suggest that rape trauma syndrome evidence should first be subjected to Frye-Reed analysis, were an appropriate objection interposed.