Opinion ID: 1901039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Threshold Question of Issue Preservation.

Text: Bruegger did not claim that his sentence violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the proceedings below. On appeal, he argues that he may raise the issue for the first time for two reasons. First, he asserts that his sentence is unconstitutional, as it inflicts cruel and unusual punishment, and thus amounts to an illegal sentence that can be challenged at any time. Second, he asserts that the failure of his trial counsel to raise the constitutional issue amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. Neither of these claims is subject to traditional preservation of error or waiver constraints. We first address the issue of whether Bruegger's challenge to his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment amounts to an attack on an illegal sentence. [1] There is substantial authority in other jurisdictions for such a proposition. See Defoe v. State, 750 A.2d 1200, 1201 (Del.Super.Ct.2000) (finding a sentence that violates the Double Jeopardy Clause illegal); State v. Kido, 3 Haw.App. 516, 654 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1982) (considering a cruel and unusual sentence to be illegal); Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989) (same); Brown v. State, 99 P.3d 489, 491 (Wyo.2004) (finding challenge to illegal sentence to include challenges that the sentence is unconstitutional). But see State v. Spriggs, 754 So.2d 84, 84 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.2000) (finding motion to correct an illegal sentence not proper vehicle for bringing a cruel and unusual punishment claim); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927-28 (Tex.Ct.App.2005) (same). We, however, have not taken this approach. In State v. Ramirez, 597 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1999), the defendant claimed that he was not required to preserve error on a claim that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. We rejected the argument, holding that the proper avenue for considering the alleged error was through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id. Similarly, in State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998), we held a claim that a sentence was illegal because it violated equal protection did not amount to an illegal sentence and was governed by our normal error preservation rules. We conclude the better view is that a challenge to an illegal sentence includes claims that the court lacked the power to impose the sentence or that the sentence itself is somehow inherently legally flawed, including claims that the sentence is outside the statutory bounds or that the sentence itself is unconstitutional. This conclusion does not mean that any constitutional claim converts a sentence to an illegal sentence. For example, claims under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments ordinarily do not involve the inherent power of the court to impose a particular sentence. Nor does this rule allow litigants to reassert or raise for the first time constitutional challenges to their underlying conviction. We further find that this course is consistent with interpretations of the comparable federal rule. Our Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(5)( a ), formerly rule 23(5)( a ), which allows a defendant to challenge an illegal sentence at any time is based on the pre-1966 federal rule. Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 2001). As the United States Supreme Court made clear, under the federal rule the purpose of allowing review of an illegal sentence is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of the sentence. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417, 422 (1962). The Supreme Court went on to note that challenges to an illegal sentence include whether [t]he punishment meted out was . . . in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were . . . imposed for the same offense, . . . [or] the terms of the sentence itself [were] legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect. Id. (emphasis added). Where, as here, the claim is that the sentence itself is inherently illegal, whether based on constitution or statute, we believe the claim may be brought at any time. To the extent our cases stand for a contrary proposition, they are overruled. Because we find Bruegger's claim a challenge to an illegal sentence we will address it directly and not under the guise of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. [2]