Opinion ID: 1775339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: did the trial court err in denying defendant the right to show prior experience and sexual exposure of the witness?

Text: The appellant has combined two alleged errors into one assignment of error and argument. Respectively, counsel for Mary Beth contends that (1) inquiry into her reputation was impermissibly restricted and (2) she was incorrectly denied her right to show that the six-year old victim in this case had been previously sexually abused by someone other than her. The appellant cites one case, Butler v. State, 253 Miss. 760, 179 So.2d 184 (1965) as authority for both errors. Butler supports neither of the appellant's contentions. This Court in Butler reversed because, Defendant's counsel did not have a reasonable time to investigate and prepare for trial and a reasonable opportunity to secure a witness from Florida. Rule 404 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence allows Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused.... However, the question in the case is whether the evidence regarding appellant's reputation for sexual morality should have been allowed into evidence. Finding that sexual morality was the evidence solicited, the State explains that counsel for Mary Beth did not attempt to ask the witness about Mary Beth's sexual morality. This Court holds that the trial court was correct in limiting testimony of specific acts of good conduct. As pointed out by the State, Rule 405 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence only allows proof of character by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of opinion. Following Rule 405, the trial court ruled correctly in refusing to allow testimony regarding appellant's prior specific acts of good conduct. The next question is whether the trial court erred in disregarding the evidence of the victim's prior sexual abuse with third parties. This same problem was recently raised in Woodruff v. State of Mississippi, 518 So.2d 669 (Miss. 1988). In Woodruff, the attorney for the appellant, Howard Bass, pointed out in his argument the importance of evidence of prior sexual experience or abuse. It was defense counsel's contention that evidence of prior sexual experience is relevant in proving fabrications by the victim. State v. Hancock, 46 Wash. App. 672, 731 P.2d 1133 (1987). Hancock stands for the proposition that: In order to be admissible, evidence of prior sexual abuse of alleged victim must be relevant, as to show motive for fabrication or to rebut inference that victim would not have knowledge of sexual acts and terminology unless defendants were guilty as charged. Id. 731 P.2d at 1134. Applying this reasoning of Hancock to the case at bar, the evidence of a prior sexual experience by Alicia becomes potentially relevant. In reviewing defense's argument, counsel points to testimony of Mr. Richard J. Fagard. The proffered testimony revealed that Mr. Fagard testified that he had observed another child, Matthew Price, put his hands under Alicia Gavagnie's dress. In Woodruff, this Court held: The question of relevancy appearing in situations as varied as the human experience, its answer must remain in each case discretionary with the trial judge. Roan v. Smith, 272 Ala. 538, 133 So.2d 224 (1961); Young v. Illinois C.G.R. Co., 618 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.1980); and cases cited. 31A C.J.S. Evidence, § 158, footnotes 86 and 87. We cannot say the circuit judge abused his discretion sustaining the state's objection to cross-examining John about the sexual abuse incident in Virginia. Moreover, its exclusion caused no harm to Woodruff. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's ruling on this issue, and under the authority of Woodruff, supra, this Court finds no reversible error. Finding no reversible error, the conviction of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur.