Opinion ID: 2334691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Homicide Was Foreseeable Consequence

Text: In this appeal, Hassan-El acknowledges that, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, it is clear that [he] was an accomplice to the planned robbery of the ice cream man. Although there is no evidence that any of the participants intended a killing to occur, Hassan-El had a loaded gun and was aware that Guy had a handgun when they approached the ice cream truck. Zayas testified that Guy and Hassan-El both fired their guns almost immediately. Defense counsel requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that Hassan-El could only be found guilty of felony murder if his intent as an accomplice was equivalent to the state of mind required for a conviction of felony murder, i.e., that Hassan-El had to have acted either recklessly or with criminal negligence with respect to the risk that death would result from the underlying felony of robbery. Hassan-El's defense also proffered a proposed instruction to the trial judge. Defense counsel acknowledged that the proposed instruction was contrary to this Court's holding in Claudio v. State. [17] Based upon Claudio, [18] the trial judge instructed the jury members that they could convict the defendant of felony murder as an accomplice if the murder was a foreseeable consequence of the robbery, regardless of whether the defendant specifically intended that the murder occur. The felony murder instruction to the jury contained the following language: It is also the law of the state that all persons who join together with a common intent and purpose to commit an unlawful act which, in itself, makes it foreseeable that a criminal offense not specifically agreed upon in advance might be committed are responsible for the commission of such incidental or consequential criminal offenses whenever the second offense is one in furtherance of or an aid to the original contemplated unlawful act. And in that regard, if you unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a principal-accomplice relationship existed between the defendant and Mr. Guy to rob the victim, and you find it is reasonably foreseeable that as a consequence of the robbery, that another offense might be committed in furtherance of the robbery, then all participants are responsible for the consequential criminal offense without the jury having to find that the defendant specifically intended the result of that consequential criminal offense. In this appeal, Hassan-El asks this Court to overrule Claudio and hold that the trial judge's foreseeable consequence instruction in this case was reversible error. In Claudio, as in this case, the defendant was convicted of felony murder based on accomplice liability. In Claudio, we addressed the elements necessary to impose liability on a defendant who was an accomplice to the felony murder: The inquiry under § 271 is not whether each accomplice had the specific intent to commit murder, but whether he intended to promote or facilitate the principal's conduct constituting the offense. The defendants did not have to specifically intend that the result, a killing, should occur. As long as the result was a foreseeable consequence of the underlying felonious conduct their intent as accomplices includes the intent to facilitate the happening of this result (internal citations omitted). Thus, Delaware law requires the jury to unanimously find that a principal-accomplice relationship existed between the participants with respect to a particular charge, e.g., in this case, robbery at knife point. Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 123 (Del.1988). However, the jury is not required thereafter to find that the defendants specifically intended the result of a consequential crime which occurs, e.g., in this case, murder and attempted murder. Id. In Martin, for example, the defendants originally agreed to burglarize a home for the purpose of stealing weapons. Martin v. State, 433 A.2d [1025] at 1028. This Court held that both were properly charged, pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 271, with the murder committed in furtherance of the burglary. [19] Hassan-El argues that this Court misinterpreted the accomplice liability statute [20] in Claudio, as applied to felony murder. In the felony-murder context, Hassan-El argues that the offense referred to in section 271, the offense that Hassan-El intends to promote or facilitate, is not the underlying felony of robbery, but the murder. That argument was rejected by this Court in Hooks v. State, [21] where we stated: The inquiry under § 271 is not whether each accomplice had the specific intent to commit murder, but whether he intended to promote or facilitate the principal's conduct constituting the offense. The defendants did not have to specifically intend that the result, a killing, should occur. As long as the result was a foreseeable consequence of the underlying felonious conduct their intent as accomplices includes the intent to facilitate the happening of this result. [22] The facts in Hassan-El's case are directly applicable to the ultimate holding in Hooks: . . . all the defendants knew that guns were to be carried and if necessary used in the course of the robbery. Therefore, under the evidence, including the use of guns to aid the criminal activity, appellants could be found guilty as accomplices to first degree felony murder committed by the act of another person. [23] Hassan-El also argues that the foreseeable consequence instruction given to the jury based upon this Court's holding in Claudio and Hooks relieves the jury of the need to find a mens rea element to convict the defendant of felony murder. That argument is not supported by the record. Hassan-El's quotation of the foreseeable consequence portion of the jury instruction must be read in the context of the entire charge to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the mens rea requirement as follows: The third element is that the defendant acted recklessly. And a person acts recklessly with respect to the act causing death again when the person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will occur as a result of his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have observed in the situation. If one is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will occur as a result of his conduct, then death is a foreseeable consequence of that conduct. Similarly, if death is a foreseeable consequence of certain conduct and an individual nevertheless engages in that conduct, then that individual acts recklessly, as defined in the trial judge's instruction to the jury. The concept of criminal liability embodied in Claudio and Hooks is that if the accomplice intended to commit the underlying felony, i.e., armed robbery, then he or she is also guilty of any consequential crime that is committed, i.e., murder, as long as the consequential crime was a foreseeable consequence of the armed robbery. In Claudio, the felony murder resulted after the defendants agreed to commit a robbery at knifepoint. In Hooks, the felony murder was accomplished when the defendants agreed to commit an armed robbery and then shot a store clerk with a handgun. In this case, the homicide occurred during an attempted robbery that was committed by two masked men who each discharged the gun he was carrying. We adhere to our holdings in Claudio and Hooks. The instructions to the jury at Hassan-El's trial correctly stated those well-established provisions of the Delaware law, which were applicable at the time.