Opinion ID: 2621239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Jury instruction on propensity for sexual aberration

Text: Over Richmond's objection, the district court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of Richmond's prior bad acts to find that he possessed a specific propensity for sexual aberration. [49] This instruction derives directly from an instruction we upheld in Bolin v. State. [50] Our decision in Bolin relied entirely upon McMichael and Findley, the cases we overruled in Braunstein. Because we held in Braunstein that evidence of other acts offered to prove a specific emotional propensity for sexual aberration is inadmissible, [51] we direct the district courts to cease instructing juries that such evidence is admissible. Testimony implying that Richmond had been previously jailed A.B. twice testified, once during direct examination and once on cross-examination, that Richmond had been in jail prior to living with her family in 1999. Richmond did not object or move to strike that testimony, and thus a plain error analysis applies. [52] It is error for a witness to testify in such a manner that the jury could infer that the defendant had engaged in prior criminal activity. [53] To be plain, an error must be so unmistakable that it is apparent from a casual inspection of the record. [54] Here, the remarks were brief, and Richmond concedes that the attorneys did not purposefully solicit them. A.B. did not state why Richmond was in jail. Further, between A.B.'s testimony that Richmond lived with her for three to four months prior to November 1999, and A.R.'s testimony that she visited Richmond in his apartment in the summer of 1999, the jury could infer that any time Richmond spent in jail was brief. The district court did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte strike this testimony.