Opinion ID: 201453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment: Sufficiency of Proof.

Text: 58 We have established that, as a theoretical matter, subjecting a party to a hostile work environment in retaliation for protected activity may be actionable under both Title VII and chapter 151B. That poses the question whether the evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Garside, 895 F.2d at 48, shows that a hostile work environment existed. We turn to that question. 59 1. Elements of the Cause of Action. An allegedly retaliatory act must rise to some level of substantiality before it can be actionable. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456; MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 672 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (1996). The hostile work environment doctrine, as developed in the anti-discrimination jurisprudence of Title VII, embodies that prerequisite. 60 In order to prove a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that she was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment that materially altered the conditions of her employment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275. The harassment must be objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so. Id. at 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275. In determining whether a reasonable person would find particular conduct hostile or abusive, a court must mull the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Id. at 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367). The thrust of this inquiry is to distinguish between the ordinary, if occasionally unpleasant, vicissitudes of the workplace and actual harassment. Id. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275. 61 This framework is readily transferable to the retaliatory harassment context. On the one hand, if protected activity leads only to commonplace indignities typical of the workplace (such as tepid jokes, teasing, or aloofness), a reasonable person would not be deterred from such activity. After all, an employee reasonably can expect to encounter such tribulations even if she eschews any involvement in protected activity. On the other hand, severe or pervasive harassment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity threatens to deter due enforcement of the rights conferred by statutes such as Title VII and chapter 151B. 62 Along this continuum, rudeness or ostracism, standing alone, usually is not enough to support a hostile work environment claim. See Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir.2003); Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 850 (8th Cir.2002); cf. Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 52 n. 12 (1st Cir.1999) (noting, in related context, that social ostracism alone is rarely actionable). The anti-discrimination laws were not enacted to create or enforce a general civility code. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). So too the anti-retaliation laws. 63 2. Applying the Requirements. Having sketched the contours of retaliatory hostile work environments in the Title VII and chapter 151B milieus, we reach the central question presented in this appeal: viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most flattering to the plaintiff, is the evidence of retaliatory harassment adequate to allow a reasonable jury to find that she was confronted by a hostile work environment? 64 At the outset, we take note of a unique difficulty posed by allegations of retaliatory harassment. When dealing with discriminatory harassment (e.g., harassment based on gender, race, or the like), there is seldom, if ever, a defensible purpose behind the injurious actions. The only question is whether the bad acts, taken in the aggregate, are sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 261-62 (3d Cir.2001); Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 932 (7th Cir.1996). 65 Retaliatory harassment, however, requires a more nuanced analysis. The very act of filing a charge against a coworker will invariably cause tension and result in a less agreeable workplace. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 870. The target of the complaint likely will have coworker-friends who come to his defense, while other coworkers will seek to steer clear of trouble by avoiding both the complainant and the target. Although admittedly a source of unpleasantness in the workplace, such behavior should not be seen as contributing to a retaliatory hostile work environment. Id. After all, there is nothing inherently wrong either with supporting a friend or with striving to avoid controversy. We think it follows that those actions that are hurtful to a complainant only because coworkers do not take her side in a work-related dispute may not be considered as contributing to a retaliatory hostile work environment. It is only those actions, directed at a complainant, that stem from a retaliatory animus which may be factored into the hostile work environment calculus. 66 Even with these nuances in mind, we conclude that the evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit — although certainly not compel — a reasonable jury to find that the plaintiff was subjected to a retaliation-based hostile work environment. In reaching this conclusion, we take into account the relative ubiquity of the retaliatory conduct, its severity, its natural tendency to humiliate (and, on occasion, physically threaten) a reasonable person, and its capacity to interfere with the plaintiff's work performance. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. 67 In the months immediately following the plaintiff's initial series of complaints about Ortiz's actions, she was subjected to a steady stream of abuse. Much of this was significant and was of a kind that courts historically have found persuasive as evidence of a hostile work environment. She was falsely accused of misconduct (DiGirolamo levied a baseless charge against her in the tampon-throwing incident) — and the case law recognizes that false accusations of misconduct can contribute to the creation of a hostile work environment. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245; Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir.1999). DiGirolamo also interfered with the plaintiff's working conditions by falsely informing her that she was required to take her dinner breaks alone — and work sabotage, exclusion, [and] denial of support also may contribute to the creation of a hostile work environment. O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 730. The harassing insults directed at the plaintiff are likewise entitled to some weight in the decisional calculus. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir.1994) (noting that even infrequent harassing insults should be considered, along with other instances of harassment). So too the taunting of the plaintiff with the collection on behalf of Ortiz. 4 Marrero, 304 F.3d at 26 (finding that taunting plaintiff in relation to her filing of an EEOC complaint was evidence of retaliatory harassment); cf. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (noting that open and direct hostility clearly based on protected status is evidence of hostile work environment). 68 Gilardi's continued tormenting of the plaintiff is also relevant. Soon after the collection incident, Gilardi interfered with the plaintiff's ability to work by leaving her out in the cold (literally, not figuratively). This conduct may be seen as having contributed to the creation of a hostile work environment. See Gorski v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir.2002); O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 730. Gilardi later placed the plaintiff at risk of physical harm by coming close to striking her with a van; if that was intentional (and, for now, we must credit the plaintiff's averment that it was), it is a cogent indicator of an adverse change in the conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Cf. White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 298 n. 6 (4th Cir.2004) (noting that the presence of physical threats undeniably strengthens a hostile work environment claim); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 621 (2d Cir.2001) (similar). To cinch matters, the plaintiff offered evidence that these incidents contributed to physical and psychological problems that required treatment, thus underscoring the negative effect on her work performance. 69 Of course, no pat formula exists for determining with certainty whether the sum of harassing workplace incidents rises to the level of an actionable hostile work environment. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 367. Such a determination requires the trier of fact to assess the matter on a case-by-case basis, weighing the totality of the circumstances. Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 & n. 18 (1st Cir.1988). Our function is one of screening, that is, to determine whether, on particular facts, a reasonable jury could reach such a conclusion. Rivera-Rodriguez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, 265 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir.2001). Taking the aggregate facts of record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we believe that a jury rationally could find that the plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment arising out of retaliation for her complaint against a popular coworker.