Opinion ID: 1260328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Federal Constitutional Questions

Text: Since we approve in Part I of this opinion financial aid in the form of loans, repayable either in money or by public employment, to students in sectarian institutions, we must now consider the First Amendment questions raised by the Comptroller. We held in the first Miller case, as has been noted, that the financial aid programs there under review did not violate the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Comptroller, making the same Establishment of Religion contention he made before, asks us to reappraise our former holding and declare the present legislation invalid. If circumstances had not changed, we would decline the request to reappraise since the comptroller's contention was so clearly rejected in the first case. However, following our first Miller decision and, indeed, after we had heard argument of this matter, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down decisions in ten cases involving state programs of aid to private educational institutions. These new decisions require a reexamination of our earlier holding. We have had the benefit of supplemental briefs of counsel in this case concerning the question of the effect of the new decisions upon the issues here. Of the four opinions written by the Supreme Court disposing of the ten cases, three involved state programs aiding private elementary and secondary schools. In Levitt Committee for Public Education, 93 Sup.Ct. 2814 (1973), the Court struck down as an impermissible aid to religion a New York statute which would have reimbursed private schools for the cost of state-mandated testing and record keeping. In Sloan Lemon, 93 Sup.Ct. 2982 (1973), the Court declared unconstitutional Pennsylvania's Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Education, which would have reimbursed parents for tuition paid for their children to attend the state's private elementary and secondary schools. The Court held that the Act violated the constitutional mandate against the 'sponsorship' or 'financial support' of religion or religious institutions. $tIn Committee for Public Education Nyquist, 93 Sup.Ct. 2955 (1973), the Court invalidated a New York statute which would have (1) provided for direct grants to private elementary and secondary schools for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment, (2) established a plan of reimbursement to low-income parents for tuition paid for children attending such schools, and (3) provided tax relief to higher-income parents with children attending such schools. The Court held that all three aspects of the legislation had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. The fourth case, Hunt McNair, 93 Sup.Ct. 2868 (1973), involved the South Carolina Educational Facilities Act, a program aiding institutions of higher education. The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority to assist institutions of higher education in the financing and construction of physical facilities through the issuance of revenue bonds. The bonds, payable solely from funds derived from the revenues of projects, were not to constitute a debt or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state. Likewise, the expenses of the Authority were to be paid from the revenues of projects. No facilities so constructed could be used for sectarian instruction or religious worship. At issue was a proposal for the Authority to finance construction of a project for the Baptist College at Charleston. Although the school's trustees were elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, approval of the Convention was required for certain financial transactions, and 60% of the student body was Baptist, there was no evidence that the school was pervasively sectarian. Further, it was shown that there were no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student admission. The contractual arrangements between the Authority and the college gave the Authority the right to make inspections to determine whether any of the financed facilities were used for sectarian purposes. The contract terms also permitted the Authority, upon default by the college, to establish rules, charges, and fees for the use of the project. The Supreme Court upheld the South Carolina legislation against an Establishment of Religion attack asserted by a taxpayer. Reverting to the guidelines it had established in Lemon Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court held that the purpose of the legislation was secular; that the legislation did not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and that the legislation did not foster an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Of particular significance to the issue before us, the Supreme Court in the Hunt case relied upon its earlier decision in Tilton Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), stating two important propositions. First, there is a pertinent difference between aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools on the one hand and aid to church-related institutions of higher education on the other. Second, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit all programs which in some manner aid institutions with religious affiliations or, as the Court put it another way, not all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends. The Tilton case, upon which the Supreme Court relied, involved the federal Higher Education Facilities Act. The Act authorized grants and loans to institutions of higher education, both nonsectarian and sectarian, for the construction of physical facilities to be used only for secular education. The Supreme Court upheld the Act against a First Amendment attack. The Tilton holding is important here because in the first Miller case we said that the decision was wholly dispositive of the First Amendment question then before us. Now, the question is whether the new Supreme Court decisions have proved us wrong in our view. We think not. With the new decisions, the crucial difference between aid on the elementary-secondary level and aid on the college level remains intact. We relied in the first Miller case upon the Supreme Court's recognition of that difference, and we feel justified now in relying upon the Court's restatement of that difference in Hunt. With the new decisions, the three-pronged test -- secular purpose, primary effect, and degree of governmental entanglement -- also remains intact. We upheld the legislation under consideration in the first Miller case after applying each prong of the test. We reach the same result with respect to the legislation under consideration here. Our position with respect to Virginia's financial aid programs is buttressed by several considerations. In the three new decisions involving programs of state aid to private elementary and secondary schools, the Supreme Court stressed the highly parochial nature of many of the schools which would be benefited. It listed eight characteristics displaying the pervasiveness of religion in admission policies, curricula, student activities, and faculty appointments. However, under the Virginia legislation now before us, students in institutions of higher education which display those characteristics would be barred at the outset from participating in benefits. This is so because Section 11 of Article VIII of our Constitution and the legislation under review exclude from eligibility those institutions which have as their primary purpose to provide religious training or theological education. In the Hunt case, the Supreme Court stated that the burden rests upon the party challenging a state program of aid to show the extent to which the College is church-related. And the Court held that there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrination than were the colleges and universities involved in Tilton. Here, there is no evidence in the record of the extent of church relationship of the private institutions which would be eligible to have their students participate in benefits under the Virginia programs. We do have, however, the following statement in the Commentary of the Commission on Constitutional Revision upon Section 11 of Article VIII: }Many of the private colleges in Virginia are church-related, but typically they operate like any other college. For example, of the twelve members of the Association of Independent Colleges (composed of nearly all of the accredited private non-profit four-year colleges in Virginia), nine have some degree of church relationship. Yet none of the nine . . . imposes any religious tests for student admission or faculty selection, and none serves primarily a single religious faith. All, in short, are an integral part of Virginia's commitment to higher education, their doors open without discrimination to the youth of the Commonwealth. The state programs of aid involved in this case are to be dispensed in a college setting, as in Tilton and Hunt, rather than in elementary and secondary schools, and are confined to institutions having as their primary purpose to provide secular and not sectarian education. Therefore, we affirm the view expressed in the first Miller case and reject the Comptroller's contention that the programs violate the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment. This brings us to the Comptroller's further contention that the legislation under review violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment. This contention is answered directly by Tilton Richardson, supra, where the same attack was made upon the Higher Education Facilities Act there being considered. In rejecting the contention of the appellant taxpayers that the Free Exercise Clause was violated because they were compelled to pay taxes which in part financed grants under the Act, the Court stated: }Appellants, however, are unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs. 403 U.S. at 689. Finally, the legislation now before us differs in one respect, so far as the First Amendment questions are concerned, from that under consideration in the first Miller case. Under Chapters 2 and 106 of the Acts of 1973, the recipient of a loan may make repayment by employment by a religious organization or activity. We raised the question with counsel whether this provision violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Since we approve in Part I of this opinion such method of repayment of financial aid in the form of conditional grants to students in nonsectarian schools, we must consider the question. We believe the question is adequately answered in the supplemental brief of amicus curiae Council of Independent Colleges in Virginia, where Walz Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), is cited. Walz held that so long as a state does not single out a religious organization for special treatment, there is no violation of the First Amendment. In permitting repayment of financial aid by employment by religious organizations, the Virginia legislation has not specially favored such organizations in any respect. Instead, it has grouped them with charitable, scientific, literary, educational, and other organizations having worthy quasi-public purposes. So we find no violation of the First Amendment in this or any other aspect of the legislation under review.