Opinion ID: 723515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contradiction or Interpretation?

Text: 19 Since the Spring 1991 contracts constitute an integration of the parties' agreements, we must determine whether the alleged oral agreement contradicts the terms of those contracts, and thus whether evidence of it is barred by the parol evidence rule, or whether the evidence is admissible to explain or interpret the language of the integration. The difference between the term of the Tiscornia Farm lease (which was to be attached to the Agreement of Production and Services) and the term of the agreements between Zender and Vlasic renders the integrated agreement between Zender and Vlasic ambiguous. Therefore, the evidence of the oral agreement is admissible to explain the ambiguity and the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the parol evidence rule barred all evidence in support of the jury's finding of breach of contract. It was not error to admit the evidence, evidence which is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. We conclude the judgment as a matter of law must be reversed and the jury's verdict on liability for the claim for breach of contract must be reinstated. New Trial of Tort Claims 20 We review the grant of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 for an abuse of discretion. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278 (1989). 21 The grant of a new trial is reversed as to compensatory damages. The jury found, by special verdict interrogatory, that Zender had sustained damages which were proximately caused by Vlasic and that the damages amounted to $423,375.00. The jury then found by supplemental interrogatory that the evidence of each element of bad-faith denial of contract, intentional interference with economic advantage, intentional misrepresentation, and concealment of material facts was clear and convincing. Finally, in the interrogatory on punitive damages, the jury found that an officer, director or managing agent of the defendant committed, authorized or ratified the acts which [it] found to be fraud and awarded $891,000.00 in punitive damages. As to compensatory damages, Zender's counsel expressly told the jury in summation that the damages for Zender's breach-of-contract claim and for his tort claims were the same and that the jury should not award duplicative damages. The jury instructions reflect the same understanding; the court described the amount of damages that the jury must award if it found liability on the tort claims as those that reflected the benefit of the bargain, which is the same measure as for contract damages. Therefore, our affirmance of the district court's judgment as a matter of law vacating the jury's verdict on the claim for bad-faith denial of contract does not affect the jury's computation of compensatory damages. 22 The grant of the new trial on Zender's remaining tort claims must be affirmed. As to punitive damages, our affirmance of the judgment as a matter of law on the bad-faith-denial claim makes it, as the district court said, impossible to know ... what portion of ... damages [the jury] intended to allocate to that claim and what portion it intended to allocate to the other claims. Therefore, a new trial must be granted to determine the amount of punitive damages. Both federal and California law, however, generally require that the same jury determine both liability for, and the amount of, punitive damages because those questions are so interwoven. See United Air LInes, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1961), cert denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1962); Cal. Clv. Code § 3295(d); see also Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931). Therefore, the district court's grant of a new trial must be affirmed both as to liability for Zender's remaining tort claims 3 and as to the extent of punitive damages, if any, to be awarded.