Opinion ID: 1443106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Medical Records

Text: Next, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the introduction, at the penalty hearing, of medical records of his deceased paternal grand-uncle, whom he claimed had been diagnosed with a psychiatric illness and institutionalized at Mayview State Hospital. Appellant argues that this information was relevant to establish a mitigating circumstance under 42 Pa.C.S.  9711(e)(2): that he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he killed Robin. The Commonwealth points out that in framing this issue, Appellant ignores the defense's lack of readiness to offer such evidence at trial. In fact, just a day before the start of the penalty phase of trial, defense counsel asked the court to sign an order authorizing release from Mayview State Hospital of Appellant's grand-uncle's medical records for Dr. Bernstein's review. Counsel told the trial court that she wanted to introduce the records in an effort to establish a possible connection between this grand-uncle's mental illness and Appellant's mental health. The trial court voiced its concern that the records might be privileged and that it was unreasonable for the defense to seek the records at such a late hour without giving the Commonwealth an opportunity to have its own expert review them. The defense then suggested that the court could order the hospital to release the records, they could be faxed to the Courthouse, where Dr. Bernstein could review them in the hall, and the Commonwealth could cross-examine Dr. Bernstein, in lieu of the Commonwealth calling its own expert. The trial court was not satisfied with this suggestion and did not sign an order directing the release of the medical records. Obviously, the defense's suggestion was not responsive to the Commonwealth's objection. The defense always had the right to have an expert review the medical records and the Commonwealth had the right to cross-examine any defense expert. What the Commonwealth sought, and at this late hour the defense could not provide, was the opportunity for it to assess the records and if necessary retain an expert to rebut any defense expert. Appellant now faults the trial court for excluding the medical records, when in fact the defense never secured the records prior to the penalty phase of the trial. Appellant would have us believe that the medical records were excluded based on an evidentiary ruling. However, the trial court explained its reasoning as follows: If the American justice system stands for anything, our trial procedure more specifically, it's that we do not condone trial by ambush. To allow this procedure to take place like this when a jury is empanelled upstairs and we're ready to begin a hearing to then have faxed some medical records and have a witness read them in the hall and the DA then get a copy with no time at all to check not only the authenticity of them but to give them to an independent expert for review so that the truth can emerge out of this process, it just won't occur by my allowing. In this case, the family members and [Appellant] with due diligence could have ascertained this information. You say [Appellant] didn't know about it. With due diligence, he could have found out. It was known that this was a diminished capacity matter and the possible hearing on the penalty phase. He could have easily asked family members whether or not there was any mental illness in the family. . . . Obviously, his family thought that it was significant enough to tell you. . . . This isn't a case of new and discovered [sic] evidence where [Appellant] no way could have ascertained this information. Just by asking family members do they know of any family history of mental illness, it could have been revealed weeks, maybe months ago, not now. N.T. Trial at 755-57. The trial court concluded that to sign an order would be to condone a very, very dangerous procedure that can lead to great injustices in the future. I know that the Commonwealth doesn't have the same rights as a defendant, but I think they're entitled to fundamental fairness. Id. at 756. We agree. Although the trial court questioned whether the records might be privileged, a review of the record reveals that the trial court did not exclude the medical records on evidentiary grounds. Instead, the trial court denied a request for the records due to its eleventh-hour nature. Presently, Appellant provides no argument whatsoever as to how the trial court abused its discretion in denying him an opportunity to secure the medical records at issue. Particularly, Appellant utterly fails to address what diligence was used to procure these records. As to whether the records were essential, he concedes that the medical records alone do not prove the mitigation as a matter of law. Instead, he submits that, had the jury heard [about the medical records], the jury may have found a mitigating circumstance. Appellant's Brief at 46. We addressed a similar question in Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 1098, 99 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). In Clayton, the defendant appealed from his death sentence alleging, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing his parents to testify on his behalf at the penalty phase of trial. However, a review of the record revealed that the parents were not excluded on evidentiary grounds, instead, they were excluded because they were not present and prepared to testify during the penalty phase. Apparently, the defendant in Clayton ignored defense counsel's advice that if the defendant wanted his parents to testify he should have them travel from New York and be present at the trial in case the jury returned a guilty verdict. Clayton, 532 A.2d at 393. Appellant allegedly did not want to put his parents through the trauma of another murder trial and so he did not try to secure their attendance until after the guilty verdict was rendered. Id. Because the defense required a four-day continuance, the trial court denied the motion. In his defense then, the defendant offered testimony from a psychiatrist who discussed the defendant's difficult childhood. On appeal, the defendant argued that his due process rights were violated when he was prohibited from presenting the jury with mitigation in the form of testimony from his parents. We rejected the position and affirmed. We recognized in Clayton that the trial court would have permitted the testimony had the defendant's parents been present and prepared to testify. The alleged mitigating evidence was not available at the time of the penalty hearing solely due to the defendant's deliberate decision to await the guilty verdict before attempting to secure his parents' presence. Similarly, in this case, the trial court refused to order the production of the medical records from Mayview, not as an evidentiary ruling, but because Appellant failed to seek the information sooner. Accordingly, Appellant's claim in this regard fails.