Opinion ID: 4644702
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colorado State Law Procedures

Text: Colorado—in statutes and through its courts—has established particular procedures for assessing claims that implicate a public employee’s sovereign 8 immunity. See Martinez v. Estate of Bleck, 379 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2016) (“[T]he determination regarding a public employee’s claim to sovereign immunity is subject to all of [Colorado’s] procedures applicable to sovereign immunity determinations.”). Two of those procedures are relevant here. First, Colorado imposes a heightened pleading requirement for plaintiffs alleging that a public employee acted willfully and wantonly. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-110(5)(a) (“In any action in which allegations are made that an act or omission of a public employee was willful and wanton, the specific factual basis of such allegations shall be stated in the complaint.”). Second, even if the complaint contains sufficient allegations to support a claim against a public employee for willful and wanton conduct, the trial court, not a jury, must determine whether the employee is entitled to sovereign immunity. See Martinez, 379 P.3d at 322 (“The trial court . . . ‘shall decide such issue [of sovereign immunity] on motion[.]’” (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(2.5))). Thus, in Martinez, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that “the trial court erred” when “it determined that [Plaintiff] had sufficiently pled that [Defendant] acted in a willful and wanton manner, and that the ultimate determination of whether he in fact acted willfully and wantonly had to be left to trial.” Id. Instead, the court remanded the case to the district court “to determine whether [Defendant’s] conduct was willful and wanton.” Id.; see also L.J. v. Carricato, 413 P.3d 1280, 1288 (Colo. App. 2018) (“[I]t is not enough for the district court to merely determine that the complaint adequately alleged that the conduct was willful and wanton. The district court must determine whether the 9 conduct was in fact willful and wanton.” (citing Martinez, 379 P.3d at 317–18, 322)). In making this early immunity determination, Colorado trial courts may conduct what has become known as a Trinity hearing, effectively an evidentiary hearing dedicated solely to considering an employee’s possible immunity from suit. See Martinez, 379 P.3d at 322; Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 924–25 (Colo. 1993). But we’re unpersuaded that any of these procedural rules relating to Colorado’s Immunity Act apply in federal court because “the Erie doctrine instructs that federal courts must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” See, e.g., Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P’ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). At the outset, we emphasize that, in crafting their arguments, the parties merely assume the state procedures apply without so much as a passing reference to the governing caselaw for assessing whether a state procedural law applies in federal court, namely, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). Bereft of any substantive briefing from the parties on these issues, we’re ill-equipped to conduct the kind of intensive analysis that Erie and Shady Grove generally require. Even so, our abbreviated review suggests that Colorado’s procedural law doesn’t apply here. Though it appears that our precedents have yet to address this issue, other circuits have concluded that a state’s heightened pleading requirements don’t control in federal court. See Gallivan v. United States, 943 F.3d 291, 293–96 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that Ohio’s heightened pleading standard requiring prisoners 10 to submit a merits affidavit with their complaint didn’t apply in federal court); Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1260 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]here a state . . . requires heightened pleading requirements in the complaint, [those] rules . . . do not apply in federal court, even in cases based on diversity jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)); see also Glob. View Ltd. Venture Capital v. Great Cent. Basin Expl., L.L.C., 288 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Heightened pleading requirements for particular state causes of action do not apply in federal court.” (citing Stirling Homex Corp. v. Homasote Co., 437 F.2d 87, 88 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971))). And we recently rejected an argument that Colorado’s procedural rules governing the Immunity Act apply in federal court. See Scott v. Cary, 829 F. App’x 334, 336–37 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (emphasis added) (“Defendants cite Martinez v. Estate of Bleck, 379 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2016), for the proposition that Colorado requires courts to decide the issue of sovereign immunity on motion before trial. But state procedural law ordinarily does not govern proceedings in federal court; and in any event there are adequate federal procedures for disposing of immunity issues before trial . . . .”). Because Appellants present no contrary authority or argument, we will assume for purposes of this appeal that Colorado’s procedural laws don’t bind us here.