Opinion ID: 794817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The IJ's Adverse Credibility Finding

Text: 26 The IJ pointed to several legitimate grounds for skepticism as to Lin's account of her experiences with China's coercive family planning policies. For example, the IJ was troubled that, upon observing Lin's testimony, he ha[d] the impression that [Lin was] not testifying from actual experience [but] rather . . . [wa]s attempting to relate back information which she ha[d] not reduced to memorization very successfully. In reviewing adverse credibility determinations, [w]e give particular deference to [those] that are based on the adjudicator's observation of the applicant's demeanor, in recognition of the fact that the IJ's ability to observe the witness's demeanor places her in the best position to evaluate whether apparent problems in the witness's testimony suggest a lack of credibility or, rather, can be attributed to an innocent cause such as difficulty understanding the question. Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2005); accord Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. 27 We can be still more confident in our review of observations about an applicant's demeanor where, as here, they are supported by specific examples of inconsistent testimony. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 74. The IJ referenced two such examples, both of which lend credence to an adverse credibility finding. First, the IJ noted that when Lin was asked how long after the birth of her second child she was sterilized, she gave a precise date, May 30, 1991. It took additional questioning to adduce that the sterilization occurred 20 days after the birth of Lin's daughter. The IJ took this as suggestive that [Lin][wa]s not testifying from actual experience. It is possible, of course, that Lin gave a precise date because she misunderstood the question she was being asked. But it is not unreasonable for an IJ to conclude that, coupled with his observations of the applicant's demeanor, such a response indicates that the applicant is testifying from a script rather than from experience. 28 Second, and more significantly, the IJ noted that Lin's testimony as to the year of her IUD insertion was inconsistent. Lin variously testified that she had the IUD inserted in February 1991 and sometime in 1989. In light of the fact that Lin was several months pregnant with her second child in early 1991, the IJ legitimately took Lin's confusion as to the date of the IUD insertion as evidence that she was not testifying from actual experience. 29 The IJ, properly, also relied on various inconsistencies in the household registration documents that Lin submitted. Those documents indicated that her daughter — her second-born child — was registered in August 1993 but that her son was not registered until December 1999, at the couple's home address in China, when Lin and her husband were both in the United States. Lin testified that she registered her son in November 1988 and her daughter in May 1991, approximately one month after each child's birth. When the IJ asked Lin why the documents did not comport with her testimony, she first said that she did not remember exactly when her children were registered. Lin then attempted to clarify by saying a mistake was made when she was issued new registration documents. The IJ found this explanation non-credible and vague, a finding we have no cause to disturb. 30 The IJ also found Lin incredible based on perceived inconsistencies between her written asylum application and her testimony. In particular, Lin left out of her I-589 any mention of having an IUD inserted. Even if Lin was not truthful as to having an IUD inserted involuntarily, this would not, of course, speak directly to whether she was forcibly sterilized, which is the heart of Lin's withholding claim. See In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601, 607 (BIA 2003) (holding that coerced sterilization is a permanent and continuing act of persecution); see also Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 308 (an adverse credibility finding may not rest on inconsistencies that do not concern the basis for the claim of asylum or withholding, but rather matters collateral or ancillary to the claim); Diallo, 232 F.3d at 288 (relatively minor and isolated discrepancies in testimony need not be fatal to credibility where the disparities do not concern material facts). 31 Lin's omission of her IUD insertion, though, is not merely ancillary or collateral to the persecution complained of, but is rather an important episode in a narrative of continuing persecution at the hands of family planning officials. See Xu Duan Dong v. Ashcroft, 406 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam) (finding no error where an adverse credibility finding was based in part on an omission that bore a legitimate nexus to the petitioner's claim of persecution). Although we might question placing dispositive weight on Lin's neglecting to mention the IUD insertion in her initial application, it was not error for the IJ to consider it in making his credibility determination. 32 We are less comfortable with the IJ's reliance on another omission: Lin's husband's failure to mention in his affidavit in support of her application that he had been detained for one day before her sterilization — an event that Lin herself testified to in detail before the IJ and which she included in her supplemental affidavit in support of her asylum application. Given Lin's extensive testimony on this matter, the omission of potential persecution of Lin's husband in his own affidavit — an omission, incidentally, that was mentioned on the record for the first time in the IJ's decision — lies within the category of inconsistencies which do not concern the basis for the claim of asylum or withholding, but rather matters collateral or ancillary to the claim. 8 Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 308. The IJ's reliance on this omission, therefore, was error. 33 Were overreliance on a tangential omission the sole error the IJ made in reaching his adverse credibility determination, this case would likely be akin to those cases in which we have held that, despite some errors, remand to the BIA was futile. See, e.g., Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148-50 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam); Qyteza v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 224, 227-28 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam); Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 159-60. The IJ's most troubling finding in this case, however, is also the one that, by his own description, he relied on as the most critical issue here. And the fact that the IJ stated that this finding was key to his credibility determination is crucial under the futility analysis of both Cao He Lin and Xiao Ji Chen, because by his own account the IJ relied on that finding as the most critical element of his credibility determination. 34 Lin testified that she was forcibly sterilized with only her hands and feet tied down, and that the procedure was intensely painful. The IJ found this account absolutely incredible, concluding that, based on the judicial[ly] notice[d] . . . fact that an individual's . . . thigh muscles . . . are . . . probably [the] strongest muscles in a person[']s body[,][a]ny person who would be subjected to the pain that [Lin] described would involuntarily react to that by vigorously moving her hips or thighs, which of course would mean that it would be impossible for the doctor to perform such a precise surgical incision [and] to locate the fallopian tubes and proceed to cut them in such a precise manner. Moreover, the IJ said, he would further find difficult to believe that in China sterilization procedures would be performed in such a manner [because] it would make no sense to sterilize individuals under those conditions where most of the time the sterilization would not be possible to complete successfully. Accordingly, the IJ concluded that he absolutely . . . under no circumstances [could] find [Lin's] testimony as to how this sterilization was performed to be credible. 35 This rationale amounts to speculation upon speculation. The IJ pointed to no evidence that the only conceivable — or even the most likely — reaction to pain of the sort Lin described would be to writhe uncontrollably, nor did he cite any evidence that sterilizations cannot be performed with the necessary precision under the conditions Lin testified to. In particular, the IJ failed at all to assess what effect, if any, the partial anesthesia administered on Lin would have had on her reaction to, or the success of, the sterilization procedure. Stripped bare, the IJ's contention, without any support, is that sterilization procedures cannot be performed successfully if the patient is experiencing pain and is not fully immobilized. We need not delve into whether this contention is true; it is enough that it is what it is not permitted to be — i.e., both beyond ordinary judicial competence and unsupported in the record. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 74 ([O]ur review is meant to ensure that credibility findings are based upon neither a misstatement of the facts in the record nor bald speculation or caprice.); Cf. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b) (describing a judicially noticed fact as one that is either (1) generally known . . . or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). 36 The IJ called Lin's account of the sterilization procedure the most critical issue here. The IJ's evaluation of this account was unduly speculative, and we cannot be confident that the agency would reach the same result on remand absent this error. For, as critical to the futility inquiry as the quantum simpliciter of non-erroneous evidence is the relative significance to the IJ of the IJ's erroneous findings. The more central an errant finding was to the IJ's adverse credibility determination, naturally, the less confident we can be that remand would be futile. In this respect, it is well to reiterate that had the IJ not — as he put it — relied on this finding as the most critical element of his credibility determination, our result would quite likely be very different. Similarly, and equally crucially, the BIA in summarily affirming did not modify the IJ's findings at all, and therefore must also be taken not to have objected to this erroneous finding, or at least, not to have found it to constitute reversible error. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (stating that a summary affirmance by the BIA does not necessarily imply approval of all of the reasoning of [the IJ's] decision, but does signify the Board's conclusion that any errors in the decision . . . were harmless or nonmaterial). 37 Accordingly, we vacate the BIA's order denying Lin's withholding of removal claim under the INA and remand it to the agency for reconsideration in light of this opinion.