Opinion ID: 204313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Post-TDRA, Ninth Circuit Case Law

Text: Abercrombie claims that, despite the absence of any reference in the TDRA to the identical or nearly identical standard, this standard nonetheless survived the passage of the TDRA. It points to three cases from this court to support that claim. Two of these cases, Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2007), and Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628 (9th Cir.2008), were addressed by the parties in their briefs; Abercrombie maintains that Levi Strauss's entire appeal is foreclosed by these cases. See Appellee's Br. 12. The third case, Visa International Service Association v. JSL Corp., No. 08-15206, 2010 WL 2559003 (9th Cir. June 28, 2010), was decided after oral argument in this appeal. Abercrombie submitted the case as further authority in support of its position, see Fed. R.App. P. 28(j), and Levi Strauss similarly submitted its comments on the case's application to the matter presently before the court. Our review of these cases leads us to conclude that the issue that we must decide todaywhether, to establish dilution by blurring under the TDRA, the junior mark must be identical or nearly identical to the senior markwas not presented or squarely resolved in these prior cases.
The first case on which Abercrombie relies is Perfumebay.com. In Perfumebay.com, eBay brought a dilution claim under California state law. In analyzing the state-law dilution claim, we observed that the state claim was subject to the same analysis as a federal claim, which required that [t]he mark used by the alleged diluter . . . be identical, or nearly identical, to the protected mark for a dilution claim to succeed. Perfumebay.com, 506 F.3d at 1180 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although applying California dilution law, we noted that our emphasis on the extent to which the marks are nearly identical and the strength of the senior mark is bolstered by Congress' passage of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, which explicitly included `[t]he degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark' and `[t]he degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark' in its dilution analysis. Id. at 1181 n. 9 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)). We do not believe these observations ought to be considered a binding determination that the identical or nearly identical standard survives the passage of the TDRA. We have held that, where a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that ruling becomes the law of the circuit, regardless of whether doing so is necessary in some strict logical sense. United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). However, in Perfumebay.com, we did not confront the issue of the applicable standard under the TDRA. Perfumebay.com involved a dilution claim under California state law. See Perfumebay.com, 506 F.3d at 1180 n. 8 (eBay's dilution claim is made pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 14330.). We previously had held that California's state dilution law was equivalent to the FTDA. Id. (eBay's `state law dilution claim is subject to the same analysis as its federal claim.' (quoting Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1324)). At the time that Perfumebay.com was decided, the California legislature had not altered its dilution statute to reflect the changes in the newly enacted TDRA. [6] Because the California statute had not been altered in the same manner as the federal statute, there simply was no opportunity for us to consider whether a change in the language of the federal statute effected a change in the standard applicable to federal claims. Indeed, our reference to the TDRA in Perfumebay.com was limited to our observation in footnote 9 that our emphasis on the degree of similarity and the strength of the senior mark was bolstered by Congress's passage of the TDRA. Id. at 1181 n. 9. In sum, Perfumebay.com did not present an opportunity for the court to address squarely the question currently before this panel. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 109 n. 4 (2d Cir.2009) (referencing Perfumebay.com and stating that [t]he Ninth Circuit has not resolved whether this `essentially the same' standard also applies to federal dilution claims post-TDRA).
The same is true of our decision in Jada Toys. Jada Toys had been using the name HOT RIGZ in conjunction with its line of toy trucks; Mattel believed that HOT RIGZ was diluting its HOT WHEELS trademark and therefore sued Jada Toys under state and federal law. Both at the time that Mattel instituted its action in 2004, and at the time the district court granted summary judgment against Mattel in 2005, the FTDA was the governing federal law. Similarly, when the action was briefed to this court, the parties framed their arguments under the FTDA, not the TDRA. Thus we originally decided the case under the FTDA and later amended the opinion in response to the TDRA. [7] The reason for amending the opinion was to apply the new likelihood of dilution standard incorporated into the then recently enacted TDRA. See Jada Toys, 518 F.3d at 634 n. 2. Beyond that change, the amended Jada Toys opinion did not confront any of the other differences between the TDRA and the FTDA. This is unsurprising because the plaintiff-appellant Mattel was entitled to a remand both under Thane's interpretation of the FTDA as well as under the TDRA's multifactor inquiry. In both Jada Toys opinions, we stated that Mattel had to show that (1) the mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the defendant is making use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause dilution, changing only the fourth element in the amended opinion to likely to cause dilution instead of dilutes the quality of the mark. Compare Jada Toys, 518 F.3d at 634, with Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974, 980-81 (9th Cir.2007). We made no change to the statement that: [F]or a plaintiff to establish that the mark is being used in commerce (as per step two), the mark used by the alleged diluter must be identical, or nearly identical, to the protected mark. Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 905(noting that this circuit's description of dilution by blurring and by tarnishment requires a defendant to use the plaintiff's actual mark) (citation omitted). In order to be nearly identical, two marks must be `similar enough that a significant segment of the target group of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same' Id. at 906 (quoting Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 806 n. 41). Compare Jada Toys, 518 F.3d at 634, with Jada Toys, 496 F.3d at 981. Applying Thane's standard, Jada Toys found a triable issue of fact regarding whether HOT WHEELS was nearly identical to HOT RIGZ. See Jada Toys, 518 F.3d at 635. We went on, after finding the marks nearly identical, separately to determine that a reasonable jury could find that HOT RIGZ was likely to dilute Mattel's HOT WHEELS trademark based on the six factors enumerated in the TDRA. See Jada Toys, 518 F.3d at 635-36. Because Mattel survived Jada Toys' motion for summary judgment under the standard articulated in Thane, we were not confronted with the discrepancy between Thane's standard and the textual changes embodied in the TDRA. [8] In revising the Jada Toys opinion to be consistent with the TDRA's shift to a likelihood of dilution standard, which was the principal focus of the case, we never considered that other parts of the TDRA might affect our standard of analysis for the requisite degree of similarity. As with Perfumebay.com, we do not believe that Jada Toys binds us to apply the identical or nearly identical standard for purposes of assessing a dilution by blurring claim under the TDRA. Jada Toys was tried under the FTDA, and the FTDA was the law employed by the parties in their briefing before this court. We resolved the case without any discussion of whether Thane's standard survived the change in law. Indeed, we copied the FTDA analysis of near identity into the TDRA opinion without mentioning the material changes in the statute's language regarding similarity. The parties never briefed the applicability of the TDRA or the significance of its revisions to the antidilution law. Nor did the facts of the case require us to confront the possible implications of a less stringent similarity standard. In short, our use of the identical or nearly identical standard in Jada Toys cannot represent a definitive resolution of the issue before us after reasoned consideration, and, therefore, does not establish the standard for dilution under the TDRA.
Finally, the parties have asked us to consider our recent decision in Visa International. In that case, Visa International sued JSL Corporation, which operates eVisa, a `multilingual education and information business that exists and operates exclusively on the Internet,' at www.evisa. com. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 610 F.3d 1088. Visa International claimed that eVisa was likely to dilute the Visa trademark. The district court agreed with Visa International and granted summary judgment in its favor. We affirmed. Both parties rely on the same passage of the opinion: A plaintiff seeking relief under federal anti-dilution law must show that its mark is famous and distinctive, that defendant began using its mark in commerce after plaintiff's mark became famous and distinctive, and that defendant's mark is likely to dilute plaintiff's mark. See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2008). . . . There are two types of dilution, but here we are concerned only with dilution by blurring, which occurs when a mark previously associated with one product also becomes associated with a second. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903-04 (9th Cir.2002). This weakens the mark's ability to evoke the first product in the minds of consumers. For example, Tylenol snowboards, Netscape sex shops and Harry Potter dry cleaners would all weaken the `commercial magnetism' of these marks and diminish their ability to evoke their original associations. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903. . . . . . . Congress has enumerated factors courts may use to analyze the likelihood of dilution, including the similarity between the two marks and the distinctiveness and recognition of the plaintiff's mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iv); see also Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1181 n. 9 (9th Cir.2007). And, in an appropriate case, the district court may conclusively determine one or more of these factors before trial. The marks here are effectively identical; the only difference is the prefix e, which is commonly used to refer to the electronic or online version of a brand. That prefix does no more to distinguish the two marks than would the words Corp. or Inc. tacked onto the end. See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir.2007) (use of identical mark provides circumstantial evidence of dilution). And Visa is a strong trademark. In general, the more unique or arbitrary a mark, the more protection a court will afford it. Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1987). Id. at 1089-90. In its 28(j) letter submitted on July 1, 2010, Abercrombie sets forth three reasons why the opinion conclusively establishes the applicability of the `identical or nearly identical' standard under the TDRA. First, Abercrombie notes that Visa International relied on cases that employ the identical or nearly identical standard. Second, Abercrombie believes that the Court's emphasis on the `one mark, two products' paradigm shows that the `identical or nearly identical' standard provides the appropriate legal framework under the TDRA. Third, it continues, in assessing the similarity between the two marks at issue, the Court applied the identical or nearly identical standard. We cannot accept Abercrombie's view of Visa International. We believe it clear that our reference to prior cases and our use of the one mark, two products paradigm were of little significance to our analysis. Nor can we agree that Visa International applied the identical or nearly identical standard. In evaluating the district court's judgment in Visa International, we stated that Congress has enumerated factors courts may use to analyze the likelihood of dilution, including the similarity between the two marks and the distinctiveness and recognition of the plaintiff's mark. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 610 F.3d 1088, 1089 (emphasis added). We then went on to evaluate the evidence presented according to those statutory standards. With respect to similarity, we observed that [t]he marks here are effectively identical with the only difference being the prefix `e.' Id. at 1090. Our reference to effectively identical was a factual assessment of the similarity of the two marks with which we were presented. There simply is no basis for asserting that we required a showing of identity or near identity in evaluating Visa International's claim under the TDRA. [9] With respect to the factors of the distinctiveness and recognition of the Visa mark, we observed that Visa had introduced uncontroverted evidence that Visa is the world's top brand in financial services and is used for online purchases almost as often as all other credit cards combined. Id. Having reviewed all of the authorities provided by Abercrombie, we conclude that we are the first panel to address the issue whether the identical or nearly identical standard survives Congress's adoption of the TDRA. We turn now to that question.