Opinion ID: 2623199
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First element of stare decisis: original error or current unsoundness

Text: To meet the first essential element of the stare decisis test, the landlords bear the burden of convincingly demonstrating either that Swanner was originally erroneous or that intervening changes have made it unsound. [35]
A decision is originally erroneous if it proves to be unworkable in practice. [36] But the landlords here do not show that Swanner has proved unworkable in practice. They do suggest that Swanner left them with an unfair and unworkable moral dilemma by failing to meaningfully consider the right to free exercise of religion under Smith's hybrid rights theory, by mistakenly finding that the challenged anti-discrimination laws  especially their built-in exceptions  are facially neutral and generally applicable, and by leaving intact the laws' vague and overbroad provisions restraining free speech. Yet to override the rule of stare decisis, the landlords need to show not just that Swanner failed to meaningfully address these points, but that they would clearly have prevailed if the points had been fully considered. Here, no showing of clear and obvious error has been made. Despite the landlords' assertions to the contrary, Swanner did not ignore or overlook the hybrid rights exception to Smith's general rule. Although Swanner found no need to discuss the theory, our observation in Swanner that no hybrid violation had been alleged demonstrates our recognition of the theory and our implicit view that it had no clear and obvious application to the matter at issue. [37] The landlords' current arguments on this theory fall well short of convincing us that Swanner clearly would have been decided differently had the theory been raised. To the contrary, the landlords' current hybrid rights arguments convincingly illustrate that this constitutional theory remains controversial and largely undefined: considerable uncertainty continues to surround the doctrine's meaning, scope, and correct application  and, indeed, its very existence. [38] Hence, although the landlords' hybrid rights arguments certainly raise difficult and debatable constitutional questions, they fail to convincingly show that our holding in Swanner was clearly in error. [39] The landlords fare no better in criticizing Swanner's view that the challenged laws were facially neutral and generally applicable [40]  a view that potentially affects the analysis of free exercise rights under both the Smith test and the test set out in Sherbert. [41] As already mentioned above, the superior court's decision in the present case expressly found the landlords' contentions on this point to be lacking in merit. But even assuming that the landlords raised a fairly debatable issue on the neutrality and general applicability of the challenged laws, their arguments would still fail to make a clearly convincing showing that Swanner wrongly decided the issue. The landlords' arguments rely largely on the state statute's exception for singles only and married couples only classes of housing. The superior court found no evidence that this exception had any discriminatory intent or impact. Despite their strenuous protests to the contrary, the landlords offer no persuasive reason to challenge the superior court's findings. Notably, both the legislative history of this exception and the state commission's interpretation of it in past litigation suggest that the legislature intended that the exception would allow landlords considerable latitude to designate particular units or blocks of apartments as singles only or married couples only, provided that the landlords established these classifications before offering the properties for rental  thus eliminating the risk of discriminating against prospective tenants on a case-by-case basis. [42] The landlords do not assert that their religious beliefs compel them to rent to classes of tenants other than singles only or married couples; nor do they satisfactorily explain why they could not take advantage of this exception to mitigate any financial hardship they might otherwise experience by complying with the anti-discrimination provision. The landlords further suggest that Swanner should be deemed to have been wrongly decided because the statutory scheme it approved inevitably exposes them, and other similarly situated religious landlords, to intolerable restraints on their constitutional rights to free speech. But the superior court persuasively answered this contention by strictly construing the challenged laws to extend only to narrow limitations on commercial speech of the kind that is integral to activities undertaken as preliminaries to real estate transactions. The superior court's narrow construction of the statutes comports with their underlying purpose and defeats the landlords' vagueness and overbreadth claims. [43]
As an alternative to demonstrating that Swanner was wrong when it was originally decided, the landlords could meet their burden of establishing the first element needed to overcome the rule of stare decisis by making a clear and convincing showing that the decision is no longer sound because conditions have changed. [44] But the landlords' claims reveal few salient factual changes: the landlords' situation is nearly indistinguishable from the one we considered in Swanner. The landlords nonetheless allege that their current situation differs markedly from Swanner because the law has now changed. As we have previously recognized, a prior decision may be abandoned because of changed conditions if related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application.... [ [45] ] The landlords claim here that Swanner has recently been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. [46] Though they acknowledge that Dale dealt with associational freedom, not free exercise of religion, and so does not directly overrule Swanner, the landlords insist that  Swanner has been overruled sub silentio by Dale.  In the landlords' view, Dale stands for the general proposition that anti-discrimination laws like those challenged here must fail when placed in opposition to a serious fundamental First Amendment right. But it seems reasonable to wonder whether sub silentio rulings  in other words, rulings that inform existing law by mere force of analogy  can ever trump stare decisis by establishing changed conditions that have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine. [47] And more to the point, the landlords' reading of Dale overstates the opinion's holding. For the Supreme Court in Dale did not broadly rule, as the landlords suggest, that First Amendment rights should generally be deemed more compelling than laws barring marital discrimination; instead, the Court expressly found New Jersey's claim of compelling interest attenuated in the particular situation at issue there because New Jersey law extended its anti-discrimination requirements to private groups whose activities fell well beyond those usually involved in providing public accommodations. [48] This same observation obviously would not hold true in the circumstances at issue here, since the challenged Alaska and Anchorage laws deal exclusively with the core activity of providing public accommodations. It follows that Dale does not clearly and convincingly undermine Swanner's continuing soundness.