Opinion ID: 747642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Agent Wolverton's Testimony

Text: 42 Next, Yoon argues that the district court committed reversible error in allowing Agent Wolverton to testify as an expert in check-kiting. At trial, defense counsel objected to Agent Wolverton's testimony on the grounds that the government failed to comply with the disclosure requirements under Rule 16. See FED. R.CRIM. PRO. 16(a)(1)(E). Rule 16(a)(1)(E) requires the government to provide a written summary of any expert witness testimony including: (1) the witness' opinions; (2) the bases and reasons for the opinions; and (3) the expert's qualifications. United States v. Jackson, 51 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir.1995). We review a district court's ruling on a Rule 16 disclosure for abuse of discretion. Id. Counsel essentially argued that the government had not supplied Mrs. Yoon with information as to the expert's opinions and the bases and reasons for them prior to trial. The district court ruled that he would admit the testimony, and that the defense could cross-examine the expert as to the grounds for objection. On appeal, Yoon continues to object that the Rule 16 disclosure did not explain how Agent Wolverton's testimony would relate to Mrs. Yoon's alleged involvement in the check-kiting scheme. 43 In response to Mrs. Yoon's request for disclosure, the government provided two letters, dated January 17, 1996 and March 18, 1996. These letters set forth Agent Wolverton's qualifications and experience in the area of suspected check-kiting. The government also gave defense counsel copies of all the checks and summary charts the government would use in connection with Agent Wolverton's testimony. Moreover, the government tendered to the defense copies of a transcript from an unrelated trial in which Agent Wolverton had previously testified as to the methodology and the bases he uses for analyzing check-kiting. We have reviewed the two letters and the trial transcript from Agent Wolverton's earlier testimony. The government more than fulfilled its obligation to disclose information about its expert to the defense. The two letters informed the defense that Agent Wolverton would testify consistently with the checks, charts, and graphs. Most important, in the January 17, 1996 letter, the government told defense counsel exactly what Agent Wolverton's opinion in this case would be--that a check kite occurred in the present case when the defendant and her husband caused checks to be drawn on various bank accounts that did not have sufficient funds and then deposited them into other accounts, thereby artificially inflating the account balance, resulting in the banks honoring checks based on non-sufficient and artificial funds. The March 18, 1996 letter stated that the information was being provided in accordance with Rule 16(a)(1)(E) and with Rules 701-703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That letter specifically went through the disclosure and showed how it complied with each of these rules. That letter also described Agent Wolverton's expert qualifications and credentials and itemized the courses he had taken related to analyzing financial transactions. The government's attorney stated to the court, I don't know what more I can give to [defense counsel] short of giving her his direct examination and his anticipated answers. We agree. 44 Defense counsel also objected at trial that Agent Wolverton's testimony could not comply with the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), because his methodology could not be authenticated under Rule 104(a). In Daubert, the Supreme Court established that when a trial judge is faced with a Rule 104(a) proffer of expert scientific testimony, he must determine whether the expert will testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1341 (7th Cir.1996). The Supreme Court explained that this requires a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. On appeal, Yoon argues that Agent Wolverton's testimony and methodology did not fit the circumstances of this case and was therefore improperly admitted, and that the district court never made the requisite preliminary findings as to the reliability and relevance of the expert testimony as contemplated by Daubert. We review that argument de novo. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1342. 45 Yoon's argument could not be farther from the mark. Our review of the trial transcript indicates that the district court properly made the preliminary findings. The district court ruled that the government has sufficiently established Mr. Wolverton's expertise in the relatively narrow discipline of forensic analysis being check-kiting schemes. And he certainly has the minimal education and experiential qualifications. The court further found that Agent Wolverton's methodology is accepted within the field of expertise in which he purports to be knowledgeable and that his testimony would aid the court, i.e., it would be relevant. 46 Moreover, our independent review of the trial transcript convinces us that Agent Wolverton's expertise, both as to his methodology and his experience, was perfectly fitted to the facts of this case. Agent Wolverton had been qualified as an expert in check-kiting in eight previous cases. Agent Wolverton testified that a check kite is a systematic scheme to defraud whereby nonsufficient funds checks are traded between two or more checking accounts in order to artificially inflate the account balances. And this is accomplished by utilizing the float time in the banking system. He explained that cross-deposits could also be used in a check-kiting scheme by cross-depositing or exchanging nonsufficient funds checks between commonly-held bank accounts controlled by the same person or persons. He explained that his methodology of analyzing check-kiting schemes involved examining bank records, including checks, deposit slips and bank statements, and then entering the information he garners from these bank records into a computer program called Check Kite Analysis System, or CKAS, which the FBI developed to analyze data in suspected check-kiting cases. In this case, Agent Wolverton examined the bank records himself, but the data was actually inputted into the computer program by an FBI financial analyst. Finally, Agent Wolverton offered his opinion that a check kite occurred here, which put the banks at risk of loss. 47 We take this opportunity to point out that Mrs. Yoon is somewhat mistaken in her understanding of the purposes of expert testimony. She seems to argue that Agent Wolverton's testimony should be inadmissible because he did not testify as to whether Mrs. Yoon was guilty of or responsible for the check kite and whether she had knowledge of the scheme. She fails to see that Agent Wolverton did not have to testify to those things. No expert need testify as to every material issue in the case; in fact, it would be surprising if one could. Here, it was perfectly permissible for Agent Wolverton to describe check-kiting schemes, analyze the data in this case, and determine that, in his opinion, a check kite occurred. His inability to prove Mrs. Yoon's intent or knowledge of the scheme is of no moment--that was not why he was put on the stand. There were other witnesses who testified at trial to provide the evidence of Mrs. Yoon's knowledge of the scheme. The procedure here was a perfectly acceptable way to present evidence as to a complicated series of illegal financial transactions. 48 When pronouncing judgment, the district court stated: [T]he Court embraces the methodology of Agent Wolverton and was persuaded by his evidence without exception about the existence of a scheme, a check kiting scheme. The district court was perfectly correct, and we will not disturb its determination by finding an abuse of discretion.