Opinion ID: 1277355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Detainees' Identifying Information Exemption 7(C)

Text: Exemption 7(C) exempts from disclosure records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes when production of such records or information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Exemption 7(C) requires a court to balance the public interest in disclosure against the [privacy] interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 776, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989). The first question to ask in determining whether Exemption 7(C) applies is whether there is any privacy interest in the information sought [8] Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 509 (1992) (Only where a privacy interest is implicated does the public interest for which the information will serve become relevant and require a balancing of the competing interests.). [9] The Supreme Court has explained that such privacy interests include the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters as well as the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762, 109 S.Ct. 1468. It further explained that both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning his or her person, id. at 763, 109 S.Ct. 1468, and thus that there is a recognized privacy interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye, id. at 769, 109 S.Ct. 1468. It is well established that identifying information such as names, addresses, and other personal information falls within the ambit of privacy concerns under FOIA. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 380-81, 96 S.Ct. 1592 (recognizing privacy interest in identifying information about cadets redacted from case summaries arising out of ethics hearings at the Air Force Academy); Ray, 502 U.S. at 175-77, 112 S.Ct. 541 (reasoning privacy interest in names of interviewees is significant where their names could then be linked to other personal information in the interviews); Wood, 432 F.3d at 88 (recognizing privacy interest in identities of government investigators where disclosure could result in harassment and embarrassment); Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 958 F.2d at 510-11 (recognizing privacy interest in names and addresses of federal employees). We have said that FOIA requires only a measurable interest in privacy to trigger the application of the disclosure balancing tests. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 958 F.2d at 510. Thus, once a more than de minimis privacy interest is implicated the competing interests at stake must be balanced in order to decide whether disclosure is permitted under FOIA. Id. As for the public interest against which the privacy interest is to be weighed, the Supreme Court has made clear that there is only one relevant interest, namely, to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592). The public interest cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for information is made, and the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request. Id. at 771, 109 S.Ct. 1468. Whether the public interest in disclosure warrants the invasion of personal privacy is determined by the degree to which disclosure would further the core purpose of FOIA, which focuses on the citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up to. Ray, 502 U.S. at 177, 112 S.Ct. 541 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468). The Supreme Court has also said that: Where the privacy concerns addressed by Exemption 7(C) are present, the exemption requires the person requesting the information to establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure. First, the citizen must show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake. Second, the citizen must show the information is likely to advance that interest. Otherwise the invasion of privacy is unwarranted. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004). If the requester asserts that the reason for the disclosure is to uncover government impropriety or negligence, the requester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure. Id. at 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred. Id. With these standards in mind, we turn to the specific redactions at issue in this case. The first two sets of documents at issue are (1) eight files containing records documenting allegations of detainee abuse by military personnel; [10] and (2) documents containing reports of allegations of detainee-against-detainee abuse. In both sets of documents, DOD redacted all identifying information of the detainees involved, asserting that it did so to protect the detainees' personal privacy pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that these documents were compiled for law enforcement purposes so as to fall under Exemption 7(C). Indeed, the records were compiled to document allegations of abuse and to impose disciplinary sanctions against military personnel and detainees where appropriate. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2008) (certain United States Army's photographs gathered during its Criminal Investigation Command investigations were documents compiled for law enforcement purposes); cf. Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that Peers Commission Report was produced as an investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes). We proceed to the Exemption 7(C) analysis with this in mind.