Opinion ID: 2184403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegation as to Work and Materials

Text: What has been said as to a pretense of necessity as an opinion applies also to a statement of value. In substance the second allegation in this indictment says that the accused persons represented that they had and were intending to supply to the complainant materials and labor worth $650.00 when in truth they knew that they had not supplied and did not intend to supply materials and labor worth more than $200.00 and so knowing made it a false pretense within the terms of our statute. Whether a statement as to value is opinion or a false fact depends on the circumstances. If made with the design that it shall be acted upon as a statement of existing fact it may be so regarded. 22 Am. Jur., False Pretenses § 16; 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 14; State v. Nash, 110 Kan. 550, 204 P. 736, 739 [3] (1922); Grady, supra, 111 So. at p. 149; and Williams, supra, 83 N.E. at p. 803. Though value rests upon opinion, it is a fact, and one constantly found by juries. Commonwealth v. Coshnear, 289 Mass. 516, 194 N.E. 900, 903 (Col. 1) (1935). Here also the plea answers the jury question. It is contended that the principles of caveat emptor prevent, as a matter of law, this allegation of value of work and materials supplied and to be supplied being a reliable representation. Upon an inference properly drawn from the indictment, the respondents had begun work on the Durell roof and were either employees of, or independent contractors for, Ada Durell when the alleged false pretenses were made. Where a confidential relationship could be found to exist between the complainant and the accused the ordinary doctrine of puffing does not apply if there is an intent to defraud. Commonwealth v. Stuart, 207 Mass. 563, 93 N.E. 825, 827, Par. 6 (1911); Nash, supra 204 P. at p. 738 [1, 2] and the following civil cases having to do with deceit consider the relationship between the complainant and the accused as pertinent and that the rule of caveat emptor should have no application. Fourth Nat. Bank in Wichita v. Webb, et al., 131 Kan. 167, 290 P. 1, 3, 71 A.L.R. 619 (1930) and to the same point without using the term caveat emptor see Melgreen v. Frank L. McGuire, Inc., 214 Or. 128, 327 P.2d 1114, 1118 [4] (1958); and Shepherd v. Woodson, 328 S.W.2d 1, 6 [5] (Mo.1959). A confidential relationship exists when one has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind. Thorne v. Reiser, 245 Iowa 123, 60 N. W.2d 784, 788 [7, 8] (1953). See also Peoples First National Bank & Trust Company v. Ratajski, 160 A.2d 451, 454 [6] (1960) and Anderson v. Lybeck, 15 Ill.2d 227, 399 Pa. 419, 154 N.E.2d 259, 262 [1-4] (1958). When the misrepresentation is the basis of a criminal charge the doctrine of caveat emptor has no application. People v. Bennett, 122 Cal.App.2d 244, 264 P.2d 664, 668 [1, 2] (1953); Nash, supra, 204 P. at p. 738 [1, 2] and we have held in Pelkey v. Norton, 149 Me. 247, 250, 99 A.2d 918 (deceit), that it gives no relief from intentional misrepresentation. Petitioner argues that State v. Binette, 159 Me. 231, 190 A.2d 744, is decisive of the issues here presented. We do not agree. Binette raised questions of pleading not here involved. Neither of the representations pleaded and dealing with necessity and value can be held as a matter of law to be expressions of opinion. The sense in which the alleged statements were used and understood by the complainant presents jury problems, which problems were resolved by the plea. There is no error. Writ dismissed. Conviction and sentence affirmed. WEBBER, J., did not sit.