Opinion ID: 1966693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Cipollone, Medtronic, Inc., and Ackles

Text: The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the issue whether FIFRA preempts common-law causes of action. The Court, however, decided two cases involving other statutes that courts rely on when deciding issues regarding preemption under FIFRA. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), the Court addressed the issue whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (1965 Act), as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (1969 Act), preempted common-law claimsincluding design defect and failure-to-warn claims. The 1965 Act provided that [n]o statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provision of this chapter. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (Supp. V 1965-69). The 1969 Act's preemption clause provides: No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000). Concerning the 1965 Act, the Court stated that Congress spoke precisely and narrowly by using the term statement. Thus, the Court determined that on its face, the preemption section of the 1965 Act prohibited only rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements on cigarette labels. In determining the preemptive effect of the 1969 Acta plurality of the Court held that unlike the 1965 Actthe 1969 Act preempted state common-law failure-towarn claims that were based on advertising. The plurality's focus was on the terms requirement or prohibition in the 1969 Act. The plurality stated: Compared to its predecessor in the 1965 Act, the plain language of the preemption provision in the 1969 Act is much broader. First, the later Act bars not simply statement[s] but rather requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law. Second, the later Act reaches beyond statements in the advertising to obligations with respect to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The plurality rejected an argument that common-law damages actions do not impose requirement[s] or prohibition[s], stating that this argument was at odds with the plain language of the 1969 Act and the general understanding of commonlaw damages actions. The Court reasoned: The phrase [n]o requirement or prohibition sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules. As we noted in another context, [state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. 505 U.S. at 521, 112 S.Ct. 2608, citing San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). The plurality also rejected an argument that the phrase imposed under State law excluded common-law actions, stating that it previously recognized that State law included common-law rules of liability. The Court noted that the preemption clause did not preempt all common law, but only those actions predicated on a theory that necessarily interferes with the 1969 Act. The Court determined that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim was preempted because it was specifically at odds with the labeling requirement of the 1969 Act. After the decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), every federal court of appeals to address the issue has held that common-law labeling-based failure-towarn claims brought against manufacturers of pesticides or herbicides are preempted by FIFRA. See Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 561 N.W.2d 573 (1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 928, 118 S.Ct. 329, 139 L.Ed.2d 255 (citing Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir.1995); Taylor AG Industries v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir.1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Intern., 47 F.3d 124 (4th Cir.1995); Bice v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., 39 F.3d 887 (8th Cir.1994); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir.1994); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir.1993); King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir.1993), cert. dismissed 510 U.S. 985, 114 S.Ct. 490, 126 L.Ed.2d 440; Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 913, 114 S.Ct. 300, 126 L.Ed.2d 248; Arkansas-Platte & Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 813, 114 S.Ct. 60, 126 L.Ed.2d 30). In addition, numerous state appellate courts hold that FIFRA preempts labeling-based common-law causes of action. See, e.g., Ackles, supra ; Schuver v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 546 N.W.2d 610 (Iowa 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 910, 117 S.Ct. 274, 136 L.Ed.2d 197; Hochberg v. Zoecon Corp., 421 Mass. 456, 657 N.E.2d 1263 (1995); Quest Chemical Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.1995); All-Pure Chemical Co. v. White, 127 Wash.2d 1, 896 P.2d 697 (1995); Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 256 Kan. 602, 886 P.2d 869 (1994), cert. denied 516 U.S. 820, 116 S.Ct. 80,133 L.Ed.2d 38 (1995). After the decisions of these courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996), revisited its decision in Cipollone. In Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff, who was injured when her pacemaker failed, sought to recover damages under Florida common law. The manufacturer contended that the claims were preempted under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976(MDA). Under the MDA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibits marketing certain classes of medical devices, including pacemakers, without assurances that the devices are safe and effective. This requirement subjects a company to a rigorous premarket approval process. Medtronic, Inc., supra . See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (1994). But the MDA provided a grandfather clause that allowed existing devices to remain on the market during the approval process. The MDA also allowed devices that were substantially equivalent to preexisting devices to avoid the rigorous approval process by filing a notice and completing a relatively simple approval process referred to as a `§ 510(k) process.' Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 478, 116 S.Ct. 2240. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(b). The pacemaker at issue in Medtronic, Inc. was approved under this § 510(k) process. The MDA provides in part: [N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000). The Court's plurality held that the MDA generally does not preempt common-law damages claims. The Court focused on the term requirement in the MDA. The plurality reasoned that if Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a singularly odd word with which to do it. The statute would have achieved an identical result, for instance, if it had precluded any remedy under state law relating to medical devices. Requirement appears to presume that the State is imposing a specific duty upon the manufacturer, and although we have on prior occasions concluded that a statute pre-empting certain state requirements could also pre-empt common-law damages claims, see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-522, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (opinion of Stevens, J.), that statute did not sweep nearly as broadly as Medtronic would have us believe that this statute does. Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 487-88, 116 S.Ct. 2240. The plurality noted that the act at issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), prohibited state requirements that were based on smoking and health and that common-law claims not based on smoking and health were not preempted. Concerning the MDA in Medtronic, Inc., however, the plurality determined that an examination of the entire MDA makes it apparent that the term `requirements,' as used throughout, is linked with language suggesting that its focus is devicespecific enactments of positive law by legislative or administrative bodies, not the application of general rules of common law by judges and juries. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). See, also, Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 561 N.W.2d 573 (1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 928, 118 S.Ct. 329, 139 L.Ed.2d 255 (discussing Medtronic, Inc. ). In Ackles, this court held that FIFRA preempted common-law failure-to-warn claims. The plaintiff, a mail carrier, was delivering mail when he became exposed to an insecticide that was being sprayed on an adjacent cornfield. He then sought damages under theories of negligence and strict liability based on a failure of the manufacturer to warn him of the danger. We addressed both Cipollone and Medtronic, Inc. and stated: [W]hile at first blush Medtronic, Inc. appears to retreat from the preemption analysis put forth in Cipollone, it was the separate and distinct statutes that were involved in each case that were the determining factor. Ackles, 252 Neb. at 281, 561 N.W.2d at 578. We then noted other courts which held that the preemption language employed in FIFRA was more similar to the statutory language in Cipollone than the statutory language in Medtronic, Inc. Ackles, supra (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (1996), aff'd as modified 155 N.J. 544, 715 A.2d 967 (1998), and Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1st Cir.1996)). See, also, S. Douglas Fish, Note, In Defense of FIFRA Preemption of Failure to Warn Claims, 12 J. Nat. Resources & Env. Law 123 (1996-97) (discussing Medtronic, Inc. ). In particular, we relied on the following reasoning from a New Jersey case: [L]ike the preemption clause at issue in Cipollone and unlike that in Medtronic, the preemption provision of FIFRA is precise and explicit; i.e., a State `shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.' Furthermore, FIFRA, like the Cipollone statutes, leaves unconstrained all state common law causes of action for defective products except those based on inadequate labels. Finally, FIFRA has no escape clauses like the `grandfathering' and `substantially equivalent' provisions of MDA. The statute and regulations provide that substantially all pesticides are subject to extensive review by the EPA, and the EPA prescribes precise content for pesticide labels.... Ackles, 252 Neb. at 281-82, 561 N.W.2d at 578, quoting Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., supra .