Opinion ID: 771586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lopez and its Progeny

Text: 22 Corp relies principally on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), in making a Commerce Clause challenge to the statute at issue. Indeed, Lopez is the starting point for determining whether a particular statute constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748-49 (discussing the impact of Lopez). 23 In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (GFSZA), which punished those who knowingly possessed a firearm within a school zone. In finding that the statute was unconstitutional, the Lopez Court explained that Congress may properly regulate three broad categories of activity under the Commerce Clause: (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities; and (3)activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. The GFSZA fell under the third of these categories, because the possession of a gun, being purely intrastate activity, purportedly had a substantial effect on commerce. Id. at 559. The Court held the statute to be unconstitutional because, among other things, the statute contained no jurisdictional element that would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. Id. at 561. 24 After the conviction in the instant case and after the filing of briefs on appeal, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), which struck down the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). In that case, petitioner Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Tech, allegedly was assaulted and repeatedly raped during the fall semester of her freshman year bysome members of the school's varsity football team. After pursuing administrative remedies without success, Brzonkala sued her assailants and the university in federal court pursuant to § 13981, which provided that [a] person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured. Congress placed some limitations on § 13981, stating that [n]othing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action . . . for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated . . . to be motivated by gender. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1). Furthermore, the statute provides that it does not cover any state-law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4). 25 The Supreme Court applied the Lopez framework in addressing the constitutionality of § 13981, and suggested that four questions be raised in deciding a Commerce Clause controversy: 26 1) Is the prohibited activity commercial or economic in nature?; 27 2) Is there an express jurisdictional element involving interstate activity which might limit the statute's reach?; 28 3) Did Congress make findings about the effects of the prohibited conduct on interstate commerce?; and 29 4) Is the link between the prohibited activity and the effect on interstate commerce attenuated? 30 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750-51. First, the court noted that the conduct being controlled by § 13981 (gender-motivated violence) was not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. Id. at 1751. The Court determined that cases upholding Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity have done so only where that activity is economic in nature. Id.Second, the Court found that, like the GFSZA, the statute contained no explicit jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Id. 31 The Court acknowledged that, unlike the GFSZA, § 13981 did enjoy the support of congressional findings regarding the serious impact of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce. Id. at 1752. The Court warned, however, that the existence of congressional findings, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of legislation, and that simply because Congress finds that a particular activity affected interstate commerce does not make it so. Id. The Court quoted a footnote in Lopez to support its premise that whether a certain activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964))). The Court further stated: 32 [O]ur decision in Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated . . . . We rejected the costs of crime and national productivity arguments [which were supported by congressional findings] because they would permit Congress to regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they might relate to interstate commerce. 33 Id. at 1751. The Court then concluded that the existence of congressional findings to justify the enactment of VAWA was not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of [the] Commerce Clause legislation. Id. at 1752.