Opinion ID: 2353758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Arguments (2) and (4)

Text: Our standard of review of the Court's refusal to grant a new trial on grounds (2) and (4) is abuse of discretion; but we must also find in such conduct significant prejudice so as to deny plaintiff a fair trial. Norlin Music, Inc. v. Keyboard 88 Inc., of Warwick, R.I.Supr., 425 A.2d 74 (1981); see also Coe v. Schneider, Del.Supr., 424 A.2d 1 (1980); Boyd v. Hammond, Del.Supr., 187 A.2d 413 (1963). Plaintiff's misstatement of the law argument (2) is premised on defendant's jury statements that wanton conduct would require a finding: that his client made a conscious decision to create an unreasonable risk; that he consciously injured plaintiff; or that defendant exhibited conscious indifference or disregard for plaintiff's safety. The argument is strained and unconvincing, for several reasons. One, our definition of wilful or wanton conduct includes as an essential element a conscious indifference to consequences ( see II above). Two, plaintiff failed to object to defendant's summation and elected to address the inaccuracies in his rebuttal. Failure to object to erroneous statements of the law or inaccurate statements of the facts (and to request curative instructions) is evidence of waiver. Supreme Court Rule 8. [5] See Cascella v. Jay James Camera Shop, Inc., Conn.Supr., 160 A.2d 899, 902 (1960); see also South Carolina Insurance Company v. Atlantic Transport, Del.Supr., 171 A.2d 219 (1961); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, Del.Supr., 144 A.2d 123, 139 (1958). Three, the Trial Court cured any potential prejudice by defining, not once but twice, wanton conduct as involv[ing] a conscious indifference ... [but that] [t]here need not be any actual intention ... to injure the plaintiff in order for the defendant to have been guilty of wilful or wanton ... conduct. Thus, error, if any, was waived or cured so as to foreclose prejudice. Plaintiff's appearance of bias argument (4) also lacks merit. The conduct of a trial is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Perrine v. Pennroad Corporation, Del.Supr., 47 A.2d 479, 490 (1946). A study of the trial transcript reveals that the Trial Judge, in admonishing counsel as to the rules of evidence, acted in a manner consistent with his responsibility to see that the rights of the parties were protected and to ensure that the rules of practice were applied. State Highway Department v. Buzzuto, Del.Supr., 264 A.2d 347, 351 (1970). Such actions were not prejudicial.