Opinion ID: 2514079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: consolidation of counts against morrison

Text: ¶ 23 The final issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying Morrison's motion to consolidate the fifty counts brought against him under section 76-5a-3 into a single count. Morrison contends the trial court's denial of that motion was based on an improper interpretation of section 76-5a-3. Alternatively, he argues, if the trial court correctly interpreted the statute in denying his motion to consolidate the counts, nevertheless, the prosecution of multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because Morrison could have been, effectively, sentenced to life in prison as a result of his guilty plea to twenty of the counts against him.
¶ 24 Morrison contends section 76-5a-3 provides only for the prosecution of a single count of sexual exploitation of a minor in this case, and the trial court's contrary conclusion was erroneous. Accordingly, Morrison argues, the State's prosecution of multiple counts violated the rule against multiplicity stem[ming] from the 5th Amendment, which prohibits the Government from charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple punishments for the same act. United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 729 (5th Cir.1995). We disagree. ¶ 25 We construe section 76-5a-3 according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote justice. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1999). In relevant part, section 76-5a-3(1) creates a second degree felony for knowingly . . . possess[ing] . . . material . . . depicting a nude or partially nude minor for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any person or any person's engagement in sexual conduct with the minor. Id. § 76-5a-3(1). Material is defined as any visual representation including photographs, motion pictures, slides, videotapes, or other pictorial representations produced or recorded by any mechanical, chemical, photographic, or electrical means and includes undeveloped photographs, negatives, or other latent representational objects. Id. § 76-5a-2(3). In short, then, section 76-5a-3(1) is violated by the knowing possession of any visual representation of child pornography. ¶ 26 The clearest reading of the statute is that each individual visual representation of child pornography that is knowingly possessed by a defendant constitutes the basis for a separate offense under section 76-5a-3. Accordingly, in this case, Morrison's possession of multiple photographs depicting child pornography constituted multiple violations of section 76-5a-3. Therefore, the rule against multiplicity was not violated, as that rule only prohibits the Government from charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple punishments for the same act, Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 729 (emphasis added), and the trial court did not err in denying Morrison's motion to consolidate the counts against him. [6]
¶ 27 Morrison next contends the prosecution of multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because he could have been, effectively, sentenced to life in prison as a result of his guilty plea to twenty of the counts against him. We conclude Morrison does not have standing to make this argument. ¶ 28 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Under the Eighth Amendment, `[a] criminal punishment may be cruel and unusual when it is barbaric, excessive, or disproportional to the offense committed.' State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 33, 993 P.2d 854 (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1996)). However, in this case, Morrison's constitutional, argument hinges solely on the theoretical existence of a penalty that was never imposed against him, as he received concurrent sentences on all counts. Furthermore, the trial court stayed execution of the sentence and, instead, placed Morrison on probation for three years. Morrison has no standing to argue the constitutionality of a sentence not imposed on him. See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 371 (Utah 1995); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1215 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, we do not address this issue. [7]