Opinion ID: 853750
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Aggravator(s)

Text: Of these aggravators Hackett challenges only the fourth one, arguing it was improper to aggravate his sentence on the basis that a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense because the trial court never considered giving him a sentence below the presumptive. As this Court has noted on many occasions, this aggravator cannot be used to justify an enhanced sentence. This aggravating factor may be used only when considering the imposition of a sentence of shorter duration than the presumptive sentence. Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind.1994); accord Garrett v. State, 714 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind.1999); Jones v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ind.1996). Although this Court has upheld a sentence enhancement based upon a finding that a sentence less than an enhanced term sought by the prosecution would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, Ector, 639 N.E.2d at 1016 (emphasis in original), the trial court made no such finding here. Accordingly it erred in considering this factor to be aggravating. Hackett also suggests, albeit obliquely, that the trial court improperly considered his denial of guilt to be aggravating. [2] Although there is no mention of it in the sentencing order, Hackett quotes the trial court's sentencing statement in which it observed that the evidence against you was overwhelming at the trial. And youyou're either aaa very evil person or a very sick person because you are still in total denial. Hackett contends that, because he was well within his rights to continue to assert his belief that he was not guilty, the trial court could not aggravate his sentence on that basis. We find no merit to this argument. The trial court's sentencing statement merely mentioned that Hackett was still in total denial despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt. This did not infringe upon his privilege against self-incrimination when he admitted in his statement to police that he had had sex with Wilson, woke up in another room with blood on him, observed Wilson's bloody body, denied any memory of the stabbing but disposed of the knife after leaving the apartment, and pursued an intoxication defense at trial. Hackett's situation is unlike Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 816 (Ind. 1997), where we held that it was improper to consider that the defendant knew what happened, and it was just a question of whether or not the [police] could eventually put it together, as to what happened as an aggravating circumstance. The finding of error in Angleton was predicated on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination that protects [defendants] from having to confess to the police. Id. Although Hackett essentially confessed to the police, he then prepared a brief statement to the trial court before sentencing in which he stated [i]n my heart, I feel that I did not commit the offense. I am hopeful that the person who killed Caroline Wilson will be found and arrested. I cooperated with the police, because I wanted them to locate the person who committed the crime.... The trial court did not err in saying that Hackett was still in total denial nor did this infringe upon his privilege against self-incrimination.