Opinion ID: 889039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying Crawford's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

Text: ¶14 Crawford argues that there was good cause for the withdrawal of his guilty plea for three reasons. First, Crawford argues that his guilty plea was involuntarily made because he was not specifically advised during the plea colloquy of the possibility of being convicted of the lesser included offense of possession. Second, Crawford contends that the District Court, not defense counsel, had the obligation to inform him of the possibility of being convicted of a lesser included offense during the plea colloquy. Third, Crawford argues that his first court-appointed counsel, LaFountain, should have obtained the results of the UA test, and that his failure to do so constitutes good cause for withdrawal of the plea. ¶15 Section 46-16-105(2), MCA (2007), allows a trial court, for good cause shown, to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn at any time before the judgment is entered or within one year after the judgment becomes final. Good cause includes a plea that has been involuntarily made but may also be demonstrated by other criteria such as ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149, ¶ 16, 327 Mont. 352, 114 P.3d 254; Hans v. State, 283 Mont. 379, 410-11, 942 P.2d 674, 693 (1997) (overruled on other grounds). This Court has adopted the standard for voluntariness set forth in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472 (1970), which considers a guilty plea voluntary only when the defendant is `fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel . . . .' State v. Lone Elk, 2005 MT 56, ¶ 21, 326 Mont. 214, 108 P.3d 500. To determine whether a plea was voluntarily made, we look at case specific considerations such as the adequacy of the district court's interrogation, the benefits obtained from a plea bargain, the withdrawal's timeliness, and other considerations that may affect the credibility of the claims presented. McFarlane, ¶ 17. ¶16 In State v. Sanders, 1999 MT 136, 294 Mont. 539, 982 P.2d 1015 (overruled on other grounds) and State v. Rave, 2005 MT 78, 326 Mont. 398, 109 P.3d 753, we determined that good cause existed when there was doubt in the record about whether the defendants had been adequately informed about possible lesser included offenses. In Sanders, we concluded that [t]o make an intelligent choice as to whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to know the precise nature of his alternatives. Sanders, ¶ 22. Because the defendant in Sanders was not specifically informed about the possibility of being convicted of a lesser included offense, compounded by the fact that the defendant had been given erroneous information, we determined that good cause existed for the withdrawal of the plea. Sanders, ¶ 23. We reached a similar conclusion in Rave, determining that the record left doubt about whether the defendant understood that the applicable lesser included offense was a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Rave, ¶ 18. However, in a recent decision we concluded that good cause did not exist even though the defendant had not been specifically advised about possible lesser included offenses when the defendant could not demonstrate that the factual circumstances warranted a lesser included offense instruction. In State v. Swensen, 2009 MT 42, ¶ 14, 349 Mont. 268, ___ P.3d ___, we affirmed the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the defendant's on-the-record admissions about the injuries he inflicted on the victim effectively eliminated the possibility of the defendant obtaining a lesser included offense instruction. We noted that a criminal defendant is only entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction if the jury, `in light of the evidence presented, could be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of the lesser, rather than the greater, offense.' Swensen, ¶ 14 (citing State v. Martinez, 1998 MT 265, ¶ 10, 291 Mont. 265, 968 P.2d 705). ¶17 Like Swensen, Crawford cannot demonstrate that he would be entitled to a lesser included instruction. Crawford admitted to officers during the search of his residence that he was a meth dealer and that he owned the drugs and paraphernalia. Crawford also admitted that he had not held a legitimate job for weeks and that he had no other source of income. Although the facts of this case differ from Swensen in that Crawford's admissions were not made during formal testimony, we conclude that Crawford's admissions to the officers and the substantial evidence regarding the nature of the offense eliminated the possibility that Crawford would be entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of possession. It follows that, since a lesser included offense instruction would not have been warranted under the facts, any error in the court's failure to advise Crawford of such a possibility was harmless. ¶18 Finally, Crawford's argument that his plea was involuntarily made because LaFountain did not request the results of the UA test is not properly before us. While we have held that ineffective assistance of counsel can affect the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea, we will not consider the issue for the first time on appeal. See McFarlane, ¶ 12. Crawford did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel as a reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea and thus, the District Court did not have the opportunity to consider the issue. Therefore, we decline to address the merits of Crawford's contention that LaFountain's representation affected the voluntariness of his guilty plea.