Opinion ID: 1602016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction.

Text: ¶ 11. Plaintiffs' requested jury instruction P-3 states: The Court instructs the jury that under certain circumstances an accident speaks for itself and a presumption of negligence arises. In such cases, the plaintiffs need not allege or prove the particular act of negligence itself which caused the injury but the burden is on the defendants to show an absence of negligence. The conditions which must occur before this presumption of negligence arises are as follows: 1. the event must be one that would not normally occur absent someone's negligence; 2. the event must be caused by an agent or instrumentality within the defendant or defendants exclusive control; and, 3. the plaintiff must not have voluntarily contributed to the event. This presumption of negligence permits but does not compel the jury to find for the plaintiff. Accordingly, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the above factors are present then there is a presumption of negligence in this case. If you further find that the Defendant or Defendants have not met their burden to show an absence of negligence and that the negligence proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff then you must find for the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs argue that the trial judge erred in denying this instruction. ¶ 12. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence that allows negligence to be inferred in certain fact situations. Waddle v. Sutherland, 156 Miss. 540, 549-50, 126 So. 201, 203 (1930). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to medical malpractice cases. Id. This Court has stated that the general rule is that medical negligence may be established only by expert medical testimony, with an exception for instances where a layman can observe and understand the negligence as a matter of common sense and practical experience. Coleman v. Rice, 706 So.2d 696, 698 (Miss. 1997) (quoting Erby v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 654 So.2d 495, 500 (Miss.1995)). As this Court has noted, A jury may not presume negligence because of the untoward results of surgery. Ross v. Hodges, 234 So.2d 905, 909 (Miss.1970). Rather, the use of res ipsa loquitur should be cautiously applied. J.C. Penney Co. v. Evans, 172 Miss. 900, 160 So. 779 (1935). In Sanders v. Smith, 200 Miss. 551, 561, 27 So.2d 889, 893 (1946), the Court outlined its use: The real question, generally, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event, outside of the routine of the action of its performance, occurred, and beyond the regular scope of its customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained, would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. See also Latham v. Hayes, 495 So.2d 453, 459 (Miss.1986); DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190, 211, 164 So.2d 762, 771 (1964). ¶ 13. With these principles in mind, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires three things. First, the instrumentality causing the injury must be under the control and management of the defendant(s). Coleman, 706 So.2d at 698. Second, the injury must be such that in the ordinary course of things it would not occur if those in control of the instrumentality used proper care. Id. Finally, the injury must not be due to any voluntary act by the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 14. Wright makes two arguments as to why res ipsa loquitur should not apply in the instant case. First, he contends that Tammy did not prove the blanket caused her injury, and thus she was not entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction. Alternatively, he argues that Tammy failed to prove that he had exclusive control over the blanket. BCH argues that a res ipsa loquitur instruction was inappropriate because an alternate theory for Tammy's injuries was offered. BCH argues further that even if a res ipsa loquitur instruction were appropriate, it is not reversible error for the trial judge to have denied it. BCH argues that Instruction P-6 cured any error. Instruction P-6 states in part: [BCH] ... allowed Plaintiff to be burned while she was unconscious and totally dependent on their care. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that [BCH] was negligent in rendering or failing to care to the Plaintiff and if you should further find that such negligence was a proximate contributing cause to Plaintiff's injuries, then it is your sworn duty to find in favor of the Plaintiff and against [BCH]. ¶ 15. We find that Tammy was not entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction. This Court has noted the limits of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: That doctrine (1) has no operation to excuse or dispense with definite proof, by the plaintiff, of material facts which are tangible and are capable of direct and specific evidence, as much within the power of plaintiff to produce as of the defendant; and (2) it is available to establish negligence on the part of the defendant only when the accident is such that, according to ordinary human experience, it could not have happened without such negligence; from which it follows that the doctrine does not apply when, upon the whole case, there has been specific proof which discloses some reasonable explanation for the happening other than the negligence charged against the defendant. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Skaggs, 181 Miss. 150, 179 So. 274, 277 (1938). While it is true that Tammy was asleep during surgery and has no ability to state conclusively what occurred while she was unconscious, she is capable of having an expert testify as to whether the injury on her backside was the result of a burn or dead tissue, and in fact, Tammy offered such expert testimony that the tissue was burned due to the heating pad. Alternatively, Wright testified as to his contention that the injury suffered by Tammy was dead tissue resulting from loss of blood circulation. When both sides to a dispute have put forth evidence, we find that the issue is a fact question for the jury, and thus a res ipsa loquitur instruction is inappropriate. ¶ 16. This issue is quite similar to the question presented to this Court in DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190, 164 So.2d 762 (1964) overruled on other grounds by Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss.1985). In DeLaughter, a young boy had been given a penicillin shot by a nurse, as instructed by the doctor. 250 Miss. at 197, 164 So.2d at 764. The child reported back with various problems over the next two days, and the doctors were unable to definitively diagnose the problem. Ultimately, the boy lost his toes and skin off of his foot and lower leg. Id. The boy filed suit alleging that the nurse was negligent in giving the injection, resulting in gangrene. Id. at 200, 164 So.2d at 765. He alleged further that the doctors had been negligent in diagnosing the problem. Id. The doctors and the nurse contended rather that the boy suffered from an unusual allergic reaction to the penicillin, which resulted in the loss of his toes and part of his foot. Id. at 201, 164 So.2d at 766. Ultimately, in considering the issue of res ipsa loquitur, this Court concluded: In the case now before us, all of the facts have been presented in evidence. The plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligence. The cause of the injury is shown to have been an injection of penicillin. The results and circumstances are such as would warrant a jury in finding that the penicillin injection was negligently administered intravenously. On the other hand the defendants have shown that the nurse was competent and skilled, and the child was suffering with a peculiar allergy. Both questions are for the jury's determination ... All the facts are before the jury. There is no room for presumptions. All of the inferences are swallowed up in the known facts and circumstances, making up the issue for the determination of the jury. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied cautiously, and in this case we have reached the conclusion that the doctrine should not have been applied. There is no necessity to apply the doctrine in the instant case, because the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligence, which, in any case, required the defendants to go forward with the evidence. 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 289, p. 981. The doctrine does not apply where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause. 38 Am.Jur. § 296, p. 992, supra. 250 Miss. at 212, 164 So.2d at 771(emphasis added). ¶ 17. The same is true here. The plaintiffs put forth evidence that the injury to Tammy's leg was a burn and that a heating pad was used during her surgery. Wright and BCH put forth evidence that the injury to her backside was not a burn. The issue then became one of fact for the jury to determine. Thus, we hold that the trial judge did not err in denying plaintiffs' request for a res ipsa loquitur instruction.