Opinion ID: 6346448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis

Text: Here, the district court ordered the DNA testing that Buckman requested, and the State does not argue in its brief that the court erred in doing so. We begin by recalling the proc­ ess after such testing is ordered and results are received. 1. Procedure In the appeal from Buckman’s first proceeding under the DNA Testing Act, we set forth the procedure applicable after a court orders DNA testing. 9 Subsequent amendments to the act have not altered the procedure. 10 After DNA testing results are obtained, the question is whether the evidence obtained exonerates or exculpates the movant. Based on the test results, the movant may obtain relief in one of two ways, each of which requires a different quantum of proof. As previously noted, when the test results exonerate or exculpate the movant, the court may “vacate and set aside the judgment and release the person from custody.” § 29-4123(2). However, if the court does not vacate and set aside the judgment, the movant may file a motion for new trial based upon “newly discovered exculpatory DNA or similar forensic testing obtained under the DNA Testing Act.” 11 We elaborated on when a court may vacate a conviction and release the person under § 29-4123(2) and when it may order a new trial under § 29-4123(3). 12 We explained: 8 Id. 9 State v. Buckman, supra note 6. 10 See, 2015 Neb. Laws, L.B. 245, § 3; 2007 Neb. Laws, L.B. 296, § 48. 11 State v. Buckman, supra note 6, 267 Neb. at 515, 675 N.W.2d at 381. 12 See State v. Buckman, supra note 6. - 314 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BUCKMAN Cite as 311 Neb. 304 [T]he court may vacate and set aside the judgment in circumstances where the DNA testing results are either completely exonerative or highly exculpatory—when the results, when considered with the evidence of the case which resulted in the underlying judgment, show a complete lack of evidence to establish an essential element of the crime charged. . . . This requires a finding that guilt cannot be sustained because the evidence is doubtful in character and completely lacking in probative value. . . . [I]n other circumstances where the evidence is merely exculpatory, the court may order a new trial if the newly discovered exculpatory DNA evidence is of such a nature that if it had been offered and admitted at the former trial, it probably would have produced a substantially different result. 13 2. Whether Results Are Exonerative or Exculpatory [3] With this understanding, we turn to consideration of whether the DNA testing results exonerated or exculpated Buckman. We recall that postconviction DNA evidence that does not falsify or discredit evidence that was necessary to prove an essential element of the crime does not exonerate the movant. 14 DNA testing results that are not incompatible with trial evidence of the movant’s guilt fail to exonerate the movant of guilt. 15 We are also mindful of the definition of exculpatory evidence contained in the DNA Testing Act: “[E]xculpatory evidence means evidence which is favorable to the person in custody and material to the issue of the guilt of the person in custody.” 16 13 Id. at 518, 675 N.W.2d at 383. 14 See State v. Parmar, 283 Neb. 247, 808 N.W.2d 623 (2012). 15 Id. 16 See § 29-4119. - 315 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BUCKMAN Cite as 311 Neb. 304 Buckman argues that the DNA testing results contradict the State’s theory at trial and create a reasonable doubt about guilt that would have produced a substantially different result at trial. Because the State presented evidence at trial that blood consistent with that of Stawkowski was on the steering wheel cover and floormats of Buckman’s car but subsequent DNA testing found no evidence of blood, he contends that the scientific evidence used by the State to place him at the scene of the crime has been discredited. [4] The results of testing on the steering wheel cover and floormats is best regarded as inconclusive. When DNA test results are either inculpatory, inconclusive, or immaterial to the issue of the person’s guilt, the results will not entitle the person to relief under the DNA Testing Act. 17 Although Helligso was unable to detect any blood on the steering wheel cover or floormats, she testified that did not mean an expert who said there was blood present in 1988 was wrong. Buckman also contends that the DNA testing yielded exculpatory evidence because it excluded him as the source of semen/sperm found on Stawkowski at the time of her death. We disagree that the result fits within the definition of exculpatory evidence. What is important is that evidence must be “material to the issue of the guilt of the person in custody” in order to be exculpatory. 18 Buckman was not charged with a sexual assault, and his exclusion as the source of the semen was not material to whether he was guilty of murder or using a weapon to commit a felony. We also disagree with Buckman’s characterization of the evidence at trial regarding the semen. He called such evidence “exhaustive,” 19 “a great measure of evidence,” 20 and “a 17 State v. Amaya, supra note 7. 18 See § 29-4119. 19 Brief for appellant at 41. 20 Id. - 316 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BUCKMAN Cite as 311 Neb. 304 s­ potlight [of] the prosecution.” 21 The bill of exceptions from the trial spanned over 1,600 pages; fewer than 40 of those pages referred to semen, sperm, or Stawkowski’s sexual activity. Forty-six witnesses testified; four of those witnesses provided testimony about semen and Stawkowski’s having sexual intercourse. Over 200 exhibits were offered; 5 exhibits related to either Stawkowski’s panties or swabs from her vagina and rectum. The trial record shows that evidence concerning semen was a small part of the overall picture. To begin, the prosecution warned in its opening statement that there was “no indication that [Stawkowski] had been sexually assaulted” or that the semen discovery “has anything to do with this case.” Then, Stawkowski’s husband testified that he did not have knowledge of Stawkowski’s having sexual intercourse with anyone on the day in question. Next, Till, the pathologist, testified that Stawkowski’s body was fully clothed, that he found sperm in her vagina, and that the sperm could have been there within 8 hours of her death. After that, Schanfield testified that following testing of the panties extract and vaginal swab extract— which were among a number of items he tested—he was unable to draw any conclusions as to the genetic markers of the person responsible for the semen. Later, Roy offered her testimony about the numerous items of evidence she tested, which included testimony that Buckman was among the 35 percent of the male population who could be the possible semen donor and that the semen she found on the vaginal swab could not have been there longer than 12 hours. Moving to closing arguments, semen was first mentioned by the defense. Finally, in the State’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury that whether the murderer also committed a sexual assault was “not one of the mysteries of the case that we have to solve.” The presence of semen from someone other than Stawkowski’s 21 Id. at 42. - 317 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BUCKMAN Cite as 311 Neb. 304 husband seemed to be more of an unexplained happenstance than a focal point of the prosecution. Buckman relies on State v. Parmar. 22 There, a jury convicted LeRoy J. Parmar of first degree murder. Two eyewitnesses at trial testified that Parmar had physically assaulted the victim and that he was the only male present when the victim was robbed and killed. 23 Subsequent DNA testing on bloodstains found on the victim’s bedsheet excluded Parmar as a contributor. Two of the six samples contained mixed DNA from two male contributors—although the male victim was a contributor, Parmar was not. We agreed with the trial court that the DNA testing results did not exonerate Parmar; however, we determined that the court erred in denying Parmar a new trial. We noted that the testing results completely excluded Parmar as a contributor to the DNA samples found on the victim’s bedsheet, that the results established the presence of an unidentified male’s DNA, and that the results were contrary to the testimonies of two key eyewitnesses against Parmar. We concluded that the DNA testing results tended to create a reasonable doubt about Parmar’s guilt and that they were probative of a factual situation different from that testified to by the State’s two eyewitnesses against Parmar. Parmar is distinguishable. There, the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses were the key evidence against Parmar and the DNA testing results were probative of a situation contrary to their version of the facts. In the instant case, there was no eyewitness to the murder. Nor was there evidence that Stawkowski had been sexually assaulted at the time of the murder. And as discussed next, a multitude of other circumstantial evidence tied Buckman to the murder. [5] If DNA testing does not detect the presence of a prisoner’s DNA on an item of evidence, such result is at best inconclusive, especially when there is other credible evidence 22 State v. Parmar, supra note 14. 23 See id. - 318 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BUCKMAN Cite as 311 Neb. 304 tying the defendant to the crime. 24 Evidence at trial established that Buckman was dissatisfied with either the quantity or the quality of drugs he was buying from Stawkowski and that he had threatened to steal drugs from Stawkowski. When Stawkowski’s body was found, her purse—which had contained cocaine—was missing. The day prior to the murder, Buckman was trying to sell clothing to get money needed to pay Fisher’s babysitter. After the murder, and after Stawkowski’s purse containing approximately $2,000 went missing, Buckman spent large amounts of money and still possessed over $600 at the time of his arrest. Hours before the murder, Buckman had a gun in his possession; the same caliber gun was used to shoot Stawkowski. A cellmate of Buckman testified that Buckman bragged of killing Stawkowski over drugs, taking “$4500 of drugs” from her, and using it to pay off debts. Other evidence tied Buckman to the scene of the murder. Witnesses placed Buckman with Fisher in the hours before and after the murder, and Fisher was picked up on a road near the location of the murder at approximately 1:30 a.m. Buckman was known to wear slippers in public, and slippers were located near the murder scene. Buckman smoked Kool cigarettes and opened his cigarette packages from the bottom. A Kool cigarette butt was found in Stawkowski’s car and testing showed that Buckman fell within the 4.8 percent of the African-American population who could have smoked it. A package of Kool cigarettes, opened from the bottom, was located in a field near Stawkowski’s car. Stawkowski could not be excluded as the source of blood found on items of clothing that Buckman was wearing at the time of his arrest, on the slippers found near the murder scene, and on the steering wheel cover and floormats of Buckman’s car. In sum, the evidence regarding blood on the steering wheel cover and floormats was inconclusive and the evidence 24 State v. Amaya, supra note 7. - 319 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BUCKMAN Cite as 311 Neb. 304 excluding Buckman as the source of the semen was not material to the crimes charged. Given all of the other evidence linking Buckman to the crimes, the testing results were not of such a nature that they probably would have produced a substantially different result if offered at trial. We find no error in the district court’s findings of fact, and we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s motion to dismiss.