Opinion ID: 694883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garbers' Title VII Religious Accommodation Claim

Text: 4 We analyze Title VII religious accommodation claims under a two-part framework. First, employee Garbers must establish a prima facie case by proving that (1) he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with his employment duty; (2) he informed the Postal Service of the belief and conflict; and (3) he was subjected, or threatened to be subjected, to an adverse employment practice because of the conflict. See Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir.1993); E.E.O.C. v. Townley Engineering & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n. 5 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). Second, even if Garbers proves his prima facie case, the Postal Service can still prevail if it can show that any accommodation would have resulted in an undue burden. Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438, 1440; Townley, 859 F.2d at 615. 5 We need not reach the first part of the two-part inquiry in this case because the Postal Service has demonstrated that any accommodation would have resulted in an undue burden. We review for clear error the lower court's findings of fact on whether the Postal Service has met its statutory burden to accommodate Garbers' religious belief. See E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir.1989). We conclude the magistrate judge did not clearly err in finding that any accommodation by the Postal Service would have resulted in an undue burden. 6 Although the Postal Service did not attempt to negotiate with Garbers, an employer need not make good-faith efforts to accommodate the employee if it can show that any accommodation would impose undue hardship. Heller, 8 F.3d at 1440; see also Townley, 859 F.2d at 615 (If an employer can show that no accommodation was possible without undue hardship, it makes no sense to require that he engage in a futile act). An accommodation causes an undue hardship when it results in more than a de minimis cost to the employer. Heller, 8 F.3d at 1440. In TWA v. Hardison, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that paying overtime or not replacing [the employee] constitutes more than a de minimis cost. See TWA, 97 S.Ct. at 2277 n. 15. 7 Here, the magistrate judge found that replacing Garbers with a replacement worker on Thursday mornings would have incurred overtime costs and that excusing Garbers without replacing him would have caused the Sunnyvale Post Office to fail to meet the needs of its customers. The evidence supports the magistrate judge's findings. The record indicates that Garbers' skills were needed during the morning hours and that the Postal Service could not replace him without incurring overtime costs. The Sunnyvale Post Office was experiencing staff shortages and was using 12% overtime when 3% was normal and 6% was the maximum allowed by the San Francisco division, the office to which Sunnyvale was accountable. Thus, the magistrate judge did not clearly err in finding that the Postal Service did not have to negotiate with Garbers or accommodate Garbers' requests to attend bi-monthly Baptist Minister meetings.