Opinion ID: 2306880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction of the Family Division

Text: Hackney argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss Chamblee's complaint for entry of judgment by confession or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Civil Division. [O]ur standard of review is de novo because `the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.' Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 877 (D.C.2002). A division of the Superior Court may entertain an action more appropriate for another division so long as (1) doing so will not violate the statute or rules of the court, and (2) the claim has a rational nexus to a subject matter within the responsibility of that division. Clay v. Faison, 583 A.2d 1388, 1390 (D.C.1990). Without challenging Judge McKenna's determination that Chamblee's claim had a rational nexus to the subject matter within the Family Division, Hackney contends that Judge McKenna erroneously failed to apply the first prong of the test and should have found that the deletion of [Family Division] Rule 68-I precludes the Family Division of the Court from entertaining actions to enter confessed judgments. This argument is without merit. First, although Hackney correctly notes that Family Division Rule 68-I, which was identical to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 68-I, [1] was deleted as not appropriate to Family Division practice, D.C. Fam. Ct. R. 68-I cmt. (2009), we note that Hackney does not cite any authority to support his argument that the deletion of a court rule that permitted the clerk to take action without judicial approval in certain circumstances amounts to an affirmative prohibition against a judge taking an action that falls, as we now discuss, squarely within her jurisdiction in the Family Division. Second, the D.C.Code's jurisdictional grants to the Family Division actually point in favor of allowing it to hear and adjudicate Chamblee's complaint for entry of judgment by confession. D.C.Code § 11-1101(a) (2001) assigns and grants original jurisdiction to the Family Division for, inter alia, actions for divorce from the bond of marriage and legal separation from bed and board, including proceedings incidental thereto for alimony, pendente lite and permanent, and for support and custody of minor children, as well as for determinations and adjudications of property rights, both real and personal, in any action referred to in this section, irrespective of any jurisdictional limitation imposed on the Superior Court. D.C.Code § 11-1101(a)(1), (a)(8). The 2005 Settlement Agreement stems from the parties' original divorce, and there is no dispute that the Family Division had jurisdiction to grant that divorce. Moreover, D.C.Code § 11-1104 demonstrates a strong interest in keeping family-related cases not only in the Family Division, but also with the same judge. See id. § 11-1104 at (a), (b) (In addition to the [`one family, one judge'] requirement of subsection (a), any action or proceeding assigned to the Family Court of the Superior Court shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Family Court until the action or proceeding is finally disposed, except [under circumstances not relevant in this case].). In short, Hackney fails to point to an affirmative prohibition against a judge in the Family Division entertaining a complaint for entry of judgment by confession where the action stems from a suit that is indisputably within that court's jurisdiction, and the underlying jurisdictional grants to the Family Division point in favor of its retaining jurisdiction over the complaint for entry of judgment by confession in this case. Accordingly, Hackney has failed to show that doing so will violate the statute or rules of the court, Clay, supra, 583 A.2d at 1390, and we affirm.