Opinion ID: 2772756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: proceedings in the federal courts

Text: After exhausting his state court remedies, Sessoms filed a federal habeas petition, arguing primarily that he had invoked his right to counsel. A magistrate judge recommended denying the petition. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and denied the petition, but granted a certificate of appealability on the Miranda and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.5 5 The ineffective assistance of counsel claim arose from counsel’s “fail[ure] to investigate and present evidence that [Sessoms’s] constitutional rights were violated by Sacramento Detectives Woods and Keller during his interrogation.” SESSOMS V. GROUNDS 13 A divided three-judge panel of this court upheld the district court’s denial of Sessoms’s habeas petition. Sessoms v. Runnels, 650 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2011). The majority held that “[b]ecause Sessoms’s statements were made prior to his Miranda waiver, Davis cannot apply as ‘clearly established Federal law’ in this case.” Id. at 1283. But the majority held that it was not unreasonable for the state court to require an unambiguous request for counsel and concluded that Sessoms’s request was ambiguous. Id. at 1284–89. We granted rehearing en banc. In an opinion authored by Judge B. Fletcher, the majority concluded that the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Sessoms v. Runnels, 691 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Grounds v. Sessoms, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). The majority reasoned that Davis’s requirement that a request for counsel be unambiguous applies only after a suspect has been informed of his Miranda rights, and thus granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1060–63. The majority also noted that Sessoms “clearly expresse[d] his desire for an attorney.” Id. at 1063. The Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded the case in light of Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). Sessoms, 133 S. Ct. 2886. Following supplemental briefing, the en banc panel heard oral argument. We now reconsider this case in light of Salinas, which suggests, contrary to the reasoning of the first en banc court, that Davis’s requirement of an unambiguous invocation of a right to counsel applies to pre-Miranda statements. Although Salinas points in that 14 SESSOMS V. GROUNDS direction, it involved a noncustodial interrogation. Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2183. Indeed, Justice Alito’s plurality opinion stressed that the noncustodial nature of the interview placed the “petitioner’s situation outside the scope of Miranda.” Id. at 2180. This case, in contrast, involves a custodial interrogation in which the defendant should have been informed of his rights before he could knowingly waive them. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. We nevertheless assume that the clear invocation requirement of Davis applies to Sessoms. With this requirement clearly in mind, we hold that, under the circumstances, a reasonable law enforcement officer would have understood Sessoms’s statements as an unambiguous request for counsel, which should have cut off any further questioning under clear Supreme Court precedent.6