Opinion ID: 1057701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 51

Heading: The Proportionality of Mr. Banks's Sentence

Text: When this Court conducts the proportionality review required by Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D), we do not function as a super jury that simply substitutes our judgment for the sentencing jury. State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 782 (Tenn.2001). Rather, our task is to take a broader perspective than the jurors who sentenced Mr. Banks in order to determine whether his death sentence is disproportionate to the sentences imposed for similar crimes and similar defendants. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 232 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 664). In doing so, the pool of cases upon which we draw in conducting this analysis are first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing was held, and the jury determined whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death. State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 679. No two defendants or their crimes are ever identical. Accordingly, the purpose of our review of other capital cases is not to identify cases that correspond precisely with the particulars of the one being analyzed. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 306 (Tenn.2007); State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233. Instead, our task is to identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665). A sentence is not disproportionate because other defendants have received a life sentence under similar circumstances. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 569 (Tenn.2000). Rather, a death sentence will be excessive or disproportionate where the case taken as a whole is plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in cases where the death penalty has been imposed. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 782. This Court uses the precedent-seeking method of comparative proportionality review, in which we compare a case with cases involving similar defendants and similar crimes. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 305 (quoting State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 619 -620). We examine the facts and circumstances of the crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved, and we compare this case with other cases in which the defendants were convicted of the same or similar crimes. State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 842. Our approach does not employ a rigid, objective test. Rather, each member of the Court draws upon his or her experience and judgment in comparing the case being reviewed with other cases. See State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668. When we conduct this comparison with regard to the nature of the crime, we generally consider (1) the means of death; (2) the manner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the victim's age, physical condition, and psychological condition; (6) the absence or presence of premeditation; (7) the absence or presence of provocation; (8) the absence or presence of justification; and (9) the injury to and effect upon non-decedent victims. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 35; see also State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d at 575. With regard to the defendant, we generally compare the defendant's (1) prior criminal record, if any; (2) age, race, and gender; (3) mental, emotional, and physical condition; (4) role in the murder; (5) cooperation with authorities; (6) level of remorse; (7) knowledge of the victim's helplessness; and (8) potential for rehabilitation. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 35; see also State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d at 575. We turn first to the nature of Mr. Banks's offense. Several days before Mr. Banks shot Mr. Atilebawi and then shot and killed Mr. Al-Maily, he formulated a plan with Mr. Hilliard to extract revenge on Mr. Atilebawi for conduct that had allegedly occurred almost one year earlier. He obtained a firearm from Mr. Hilliard and then waited for the opportunity to strike. This opportunity came during the early morning hours of September 16, 2002 when Mr. Banks went to Mr. Atilebawi's home for the purpose of seeking revenge. The fact that Mr. Al-Maily was visiting Mr. Atilebawi did not deter Mr. Banks. Carrying out the plan he had devised with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Banks shot Mr. Atilebawi four times and then tried to conceal his body. After shooting Mr. Atilebawi, Mr. Banks robbed Mr. Al-Maily and then ordered him to lie face down on the floor of Mr. Atilebawi's bedroom. Mr. Al-Maily did not resist. After looting Mr. Atilebawi's house and loading the stolen personal property into a stolen Jeep Cherokee, Mr. Banks calmly and deliberately returned to Mr. Atilebawi's house, walked to Mr. Atilebawi's bedroom where Mr. Al-Maily was lying on the floor, and fatally shot Mr. Al-Maily in the back of the head. Mr. Banks and Mr. Hilliard then left the scene of their crimes with the stolen property and the stolen automobiles. Later that morning, apparently believing that both Mr. Atilebawi and Mr. Al-Maily were dead, Mr. Banks went on a spending spree with the money he had stolen from Messrs. Atilebawi and Al-Maily. Mr. Banks had no personal animosity towards Mr. Al-Maily. In fact, he characterized their relationship as friendly. Shooting Mr. Al-Maily was not part of Mr. Banks's plan of revenge against Mr. Atilebawi. Neither was it necessary to commit the offense, because Mr. Al-Maily cooperated fully with Mr. Banks during the robbery and offered no resistence whatsoever to either Mr. Banks or Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Banks shot Mr. Al-Maily in the back of the head because he did not want to leave behind any live witnesses to his crimes. We now turn to Mr. Banks himself. While he opted not to testify on his own behalf during the sentencing phase, he called eleven mitigation witnesses. These witnesses presented a positive and sympathetic image of Mr. Banks. An implicit, and at times explicit, undercurrent of much of the testimony focused on the fact that Mr. Banks was only nineteen years old when he murdered Mr. Al-Maily. Mr. Banks was part of a large family that faced significant social and financial challenges. Despite the lengthy periods when his mother was in custody, he had a close relationship with his mother and received support from his grandmother, his older siblings, and members of his church. While many of his family and friends saw Mr. Banks's soft-hearted and gentle side, Mr. Banks became capable of resorting to cruelty and violence. By the time he murdered Mr. Al-Maily, he had been convicted of assault, battery, and domestic violence. He did not tell his former girlfriend that he was HIV-positive, and he pointed a gun to her stomach when she was eight months pregnant. We find that the death sentence, as applied to Mr. Banks in this case, is neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared to defendants in other cases. For example, in State v. Thacker this Court expressly noted that [w]e have upheld the death penalty in several similar cases where the defendant stole from the victims and committed murder to avoid arrest or prosecution. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233. Additionally, in State v. Davis we observed that we have frequently upheld the death penalty in first degree murder cases involving shooting offenses committed in the course of a robbery or other felony. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 621. The following are among the cases in which this Court determined that application of the death penalty was not disproportionate in light of other similar circumstances. In State v. Thacker, the defendant stabbed a wrecker driver who discovered that the defendant was using a stolen credit card. The defendant later returned to conceal the body and to steal the victim's credit cards and cash. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233. In State v. Reid, the defendant shot and killed two unresisting employees while they were lying face down on the floor as part of a planned and premeditated robbery in order to avoid arrest or prosecution. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 287. In State v. Sims, the defendant shot the victim in the back of head during a burglary of the victim's home in order to prevent identification. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tenn.2001). In State v. Chalmers, the Court upheld a death sentence where a defendant shot the victim five times as part of a robbery. State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 915, 919 (Tenn. 2000). Finally, in State v. King, the Court upheld the conviction of a defendant who fatally shot a tavern owner who was not resisting at the time. State v. King, 694 S.W.2d 941, 943, 947 (Tenn. 1985). We have also concluded that the mitigating circumstances in this case do not carry a disproportionately heavier weight than the mitigating circumstances in other cases in which the death penalty has been approved. The death penalty has been found proportional in a number of cases involving defendants who were as young as or younger than Mr. Banks when they murdered their victims. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 621-22 (eighteen-year-old defendant); State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 571-72 (nineteen-year-old defendant); State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d at 922-23 (eighteen-year-old defendant). Application of the death penalty has also been found not to be excessive in cases where the defendant experienced a difficult family life with parents in prison or otherwise absent, resulting in being raised with and by siblings and a grandmother. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 621-22; State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 571. In terms of being a model prisoner, this Court has found evidence of being a model inmate, including being a positive uplifting member to the prisoner community, not to render application of the death penalty disproportionate. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 457-58 (Tenn. 2002). Nor has suffering from disease or maintaining close contact with family members been sufficient to render a death sentence excessive. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d at 458. Considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case in light of all the evidence in this case, we find that Mr. Banks's conviction and sentence are not plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in cases where the death penalty has been imposed. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 782. Accordingly, we find the application of the death sentence in this case to be neither disproportionate nor excessive.