Opinion ID: 3151820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: retaliation claims under title vii

Text: The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII forbids employers from discriminating against a job applicant because she has “‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII ‘investigation, proceeding, or hearing.’” Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). 1 Title VII claims of unlawful retaliation based on circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802– 05 (1973). 2 First, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing “that (1) she participated in an activity protected under the statute; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a 1 The statutory text of the Title VII anti-retaliation provision provides, in full: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 2 Vargas contends on appeal that there is direct evidence of retaliation. However, the evidence cited by Vargas does not constitute direct evidence. The evidence cited is the closing argument of Vargas’s attorney during the EEOC hearing. Moreover, while other evidence in the record shows that individuals may have had knowledge of Vargas’s prior EEO activity, that evidence alone is insufficient to show retaliatory animus without inference or presumption. Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.”). We therefore analyze Vargas’s claim as based on circumstantial evidence. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001) (analyzing similar evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework). 5 Case: 15-50544 Document: 00513256830 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 No. 15-50544 causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Feist, 730 F.3d at 454. “If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for its employment action.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007). Finally, “the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving that [each of] the employer’s proffered reason[s] is not true but instead is a pretext for a real discriminatory or retaliatory purpose.” Id. The parties here disagree whether Vargas has raised a genuine dispute that a “causal connection” exists between the protected activity and adverse action. Temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action can prove the causation element “when the protected act and the adverse employment action are ‘very close’ in time.” Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001)). “However, we have made clear that ‘the mere fact that some adverse action is taken after an employee engages in some protected activity will not always be enough for a prima facie case.’” Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997)). While a five-day time lapse is sufficient to show a causal connection, Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001), a five-month lapse is too great a gap, standing alone, to show causation. Feist, 730 F.3d at 454 (citing Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 472 (5th Cir. 2002)). Here, the gap was approximately fifteen months between Vargas’s activity and the withdrawal of her job offer. Thus, the temporal lapse was too great, standing alone, to raise a genuine dispute of causation. Jackson v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 601 F. App’x 280, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (holding that a fifteen-month gap was insufficient to establish causation). 6 Case: 15-50544 Document: 00513256830 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 No. 15-50544 A plaintiff may be able to show a causal connection despite a significant time gap if there is other evidence of retaliation. See Feist, 730 F.3d at 454–55 (noting that a five-month lapse was insufficient to show causation “without other evidence of retaliation”); Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42– 44 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding a finding of causation based on other evidence even though fourteen months passed between the protected activity and the adverse action). “Such evidence may include an employment record that does not support [the employer’s action], or an employer’s departure from typical policies and procedures.” 3 Feist, 730 F.3d at 454–55. However, Vargas has not shown that the employment record did not support the employer’s action; in fact, the record contained a memorandum noting that post-employment emails sent by Vargas “exhibited a significant lack of judgment.” Nor has Vargas pointed to any express policy not followed by the Army. See Blow v. San Antonio, 236 F.3d 293, 295, 297 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the employer had “intentional[ly] and deliberate[ly] depart[ed] from stated policies” (emphasis added)). The only “evidence” cited by Vargas is her attorney’s closing argument at the EEOC hearing. However, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that résumé reviews by former supervisors were a routine part of the inquiry into prospective employees’ qualifications and suitability and that at least one other job offer was withdrawn after such a review. See Gemtron Corp. v. SaintGobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that “unsworn attorney argument to the contrary . . . is not evidence and cannot rebut” other 3 Vargas also argues that causation may be established through circumstantial evidence showing that the employer’s decision was based in part on the knowledge of the employee’s protected activity. Medina, 238 F.3d at 684. However, we will not consider this argument because it was raised for the first time on appeal. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, even if this argument were to raise a genuine dispute as to causation, Vargas has nonetheless failed to show that the Army’s reasons were pretextual. 7 Case: 15-50544 Document: 00513256830 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 No. 15-50544 evidence). The district court therefore did not err in finding that Vargas had failed to establish a prima face case of retaliation. 4 Furthermore, Vargas has also failed to show that the nonretaliatory reasons presented by the Army were pretextual. To show that the employer’s reason is actually a pretext for retaliation, the applicant must show “that the adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ the employer’s retaliatory motive.” Feist, 730 F.3d at 454 (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)). “In order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must show ‘a conflict in substantial evidence’ on the question of whether the employer would not have taken the action ‘but for’ the protected activity.” Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996)). In particular, “the plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason articulated by the employer.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 557. The Army produced four legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its employment action: (1) the settlement agreement’s terms, (2) exaggerations on Vargas’s résumé, (3) a false statement on Vargas’s employment forms, and (4) lack of elevated privileges. See id. at 556 (stating that an employer meets its burden of production if it can “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for its employment action”). On appeal, Vargas failed to raise any argument that the third reason—the false statement on her employment forms—was pretextual. Vargas has therefore abandoned this argument. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”). 4 While Vargas contends that “blacklisting” can function as a form of retaliation, the authority cited by Vargas relates to defamation claims and property interest claims under the Due Process Clause. Vargas has not explained how such authority relates to Title VII retaliation claims nor has Vargas cited any relevant Title VII precedent on this issue from the Fifth Circuit. Vargas has therefore failed to adequately brief this argument and has waived it. United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, at 446–47 (5th Cir. 2010). 8 Case: 15-50544 Document: 00513256830 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 No. 15-50544 Because Vargas has failed to rebut every reason articulated by the Army, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Vargas’s retaliation claim. 5