Opinion ID: 884318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: conclusion

Text: The District Court's correction of the personal property values had the effect of increasing the dollar value of Dee's share of the marital estate. After the valuation adjustment, the District Court found that Dee received $11,736 more in property than George. The District Court apparently determined that such a disparity in the property award served to meet the court's stated goal of giving Dee a proportionately larger share of the marital estate in consideration of her proportionally larger contribution to the estate's maintenance. It therefore vacated the additional award of $5,582, which it had apportioned to Dee in the original decree in order to equalize the cost of maintaining the marital estate. Dee notes that this Court affirmed this disputed award in Scott I, and therefore contends that the District Court erred in vacating it on remand. In asserting that the District Court erred, Dee contends that the court's earlier decision on this issue was res judicata or, in the alternative, that George is collaterally estopped from relitigating it. While we agree that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to disturb the previously affirmed award, we base our determination on law of the case, not on res judicata or collateral estoppel. In Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1979), 180 Mont. 434, 591 P.2d 196, this Court defined the interrelated theories of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. We noted that res judicata is a final judgment which, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim or demand. Fiscus, 591 P.2d at 197 (quoting Western Montana Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hydroponics, Inc. (1966), 147 Mont. 157, 161, 410 P.2d 937, 939). See also Hollister v. Forsythe (1996), 277 Mont. 23, 27, 918 P.2d 665, 667. We defined collateral estoppel as a final judgment which bars the parties, or those in privity with them, from relitigating matters which were previously necessarily litigated and determined, even if the claim or demand in the subsequent action is different. Fiscus, 591 P.2d at 197 (quoting Western Mont. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 410 P.2d at 939). See also Estate of Eide v. Tabbert (1995), 272 Mont. 180, 183-84, 900 P.2d 292, 295. In other words, res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, while collateral estoppel prevents the parties from relitigating only those matters that were determined. Fiscus, 591 P.2d at 197. Res judicata, therefore, also properly is referred to as claim preclusion, while collateral estoppel also properly is referred to as issue preclusion. Brault v. Smith (1984), 209 Mont. 21, 26, 679 P.2d 236, 238. In contrast, the law of the case doctrine expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided. It expresses the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is the final determination of the parties' rights. Fiscus, 591 P.2d at 197 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed.1968)). This Court has stated that [t]he rule is well established and long adhered to in this state that where upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. Fiscus, 591 P.2d at 197 (quoting Apple v. Edwards (1949), 123 Mont. 135, 139-40, 211 P.2d 138, 140). See also State v. Black (1990), 245 Mont. 39, 44, 798 P.2d 530, 533. Here, the parties appear in a second appeal of the same case which was reviewed by this Court previously. The parties and issues are identical to those addressed in Scott I. In that previous decision, this Court determined that only three issues warranted remand; we affirmed without comment all other issues raised on appeal, including the propriety of the $5,582 award to Dee in consideration of her maintenance of the marital estate. Having conclusively ruled on the propriety of that award, our determination became the law of the case so far as that specific issue was concerned, and the District Court lacked jurisdiction to exceed the scope of this Court's order of remand to revisit and vacate the award. Further, we note that the District Court in Scott I justified awarding this additional amount to Dee on the grounds that she had expended more time and effort in maintaining the marital estate during the time of the marriage. This rationale cannot be invalidated simply by the District Court's subsequent correction of property valuations; to do so would mean that Dee should now be deemed to have done less to conserve the marital estate. In any event, this Court's affirmation of the award in Scott I became the law of the case, which the District Court was without authority to disturb. The District Court's order vacating the $5,582 payment to Dee is reversed.