Opinion ID: 2095712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Defense Witness

Text: Appellant claims that the court improperly limited his direct examination of a defense witness, thereby denying him the right to present evidence in his own behalf in violation of Ind. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13. Specifically, Poore charges that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow him to refresh the witness' recollection, to impeach the witness with prior inconsistent statements, or to ask the witness leading questions. During the course of the trial, defense counsel learned of a potential defense witness, Percy Mac Lacey, Jr., who was an inmate of the Hamilton County jail. During a recess, counsel and Hamilton County deputy Mitchell Russell interviewed Lacey. When the State and the defense deposed Lacey in the presence of the court, the following exchange occurred: Q. Is it my understanding that in one of these conversations something was said to the effect that from Goodwin that he was lying about what happened in the case involving Floyd Poore? A. Yeah, I heard him say that.       A. That's what I said and the deputy heard me. I told the deputy ... the deputy asked me, said, Do you think he was lying or what? and I said, Yeah. Q: Okay. You said that ... so Mitch Russell asked you if you thought he was lying? A: Yeah, he asked me that and at the other ... then Goodwin ... the way Goodwin was telling me I see (sic) through what he was trying to do then that he was telling a lie. And then the way he was telling me that he was telling a lie. Q: So, did Goodwin ever say anything to you in the library at that church service that night about lying? A: Yeah. Q: He did? A: (Affirmative nod) Q: What did he say? A: He said that he was trying ... that he would lie so he could get the less time. Poore then called Lacey during his case in chief. The tenor of this examination was set during the first few questions, when defense counsel asked the witness his name and Lacey responded: A. Percy Lacey Mac, Jr. Q: Okay, You say Percy Lacey Mac. Now, Mac is your middle name, isn't that correct? A: Yeah. Q: Yesterday when I met you you indicated Percy Mac Lacey, Jr., is your full name, is that correct? A: Right. [PROSECUTOR]: Your honor, I'm going to object at this point to counsel leading this particular witness. THE COURT: Sustained. When defense counsel questioned Lacey about his earlier conversations with Goodwin, Lacey related the conversation about Goodwin's deal. However, he did not testify that Goodwin admitted lying. Defense counsel embarked upon efforts to elicit Lacey's earlier testimony. When a witness has omitted information given in a previous statement, the former statement may be used in two ways. If the witness is deliberately omitting certain testimony, the defendant would be entitled to impeach him under Ind. Code § 34-1-14-15 (Burns 1973), which allows a party to impeach his own witness in case of manifest surprise. If, however, the witness merely inadvertently omitted certain crucial facts, the defense could use the witness' prior statement to refresh his recollection. King v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 422, 296 N.E.2d 113. Defense counsel's attempts to refresh Lacey's recollection or to impeach him with his prior inconsistent statements met with considerable opposition. In an attempt to demonstrate the witness' forgetfulness, counsel asked Lacey if he recalled anything further about the conversation with Goodwin. The State interrupted with preliminary questions, and the question was never answered. Further attempts to refresh Lacey's recollection met with continuing objections. Though defense counsel clearly expected Lacey to testify consistently with his earlier statements and expressed his surprise to the court, he was prevented from laying a proper foundation to impeach Lacey with his prior inconsistent statements. The proper foundation for a showing of a prior inconsistent statement is to show the date and place of the prior inconsistent statement and the person to whom it was addressed. Taylor v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 735. Defense counsel asked Lacey: Q: When did I first meet you? A: Yesterday in the jail. Q: Okay. And did we have a conversation then? [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, it's irrelevant. THE COURT: Sustained. Defense counsel also requested a continuance to allow the court reporter to type one page of Lacey's deposition. The State replied that every once in a while a witness backfires ... Let's go on with our trial. The continuance was denied. Counsel then requested access to Deputy Russell's interview notes; the State objected, asserting that any notes or memorandum used to refresh a witness' recollection must be made by that witness. Though a memorandum, written either by himself or by another, at or near the time of the occurrence, may be used to refresh the recollection of a forgetful witness, Gaunt v. State (1983), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 211, the State's objection was sustained. Following Lacey's testimony, the defense called Deputy Russell in an attempt to elicit Lacey's prior inconsistent statements made in his presence. The State again objected, arguing that Russell's testimony was irrelevant because Poore could not impeach his own witness. Russell's testimony was refused. Additionally, the court sustained a continuing series of premature objections, illustrated by the following testimony: Q: Now, you were more specific ... [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, your honor. That's the start of a leading question if I ever heard of one. THE COURT: Sustained. It is true that the general conduct of the trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Clifford v. State (1984), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 536. The trial court's discretion, however, is limited by the defendant's right to present evidence in his own behalf. Ind. Const., Article I, Sec. 13. A reversal should be granted when the trial court's exercise of discretion was unreasonable in the light of all attendant circumstances and prejudicial to the defendant. Emmons v. State (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 303, 305. In this case, Goodwin's testimony constituted the majority of the evidence against Poore. The defense had already shown Goodwin's bias with evidence that Goodwin had entered into a favorable plea agreement, which called for a sentence of thirteen years, reduced from a potential sentence in excess of one hundred years. In comparison, Poore received a total sentence of fifty-four years. Goodwin had also been impeached on the basis of his extensive criminal record. Poore wished to present evidence that Goodwin's testimony was false. Appellant's conviction rested in a substantial way on the testimony of Goodwin, a barely credible witness. On a matter so critical as this, the trial court should have allowed the presentation of this evidence. Considering the importance of the evidence defendant wished to present and its possible impact on the jury's determination, the court abused its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.