Opinion ID: 1359021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence of previous death sentence

Text: Jones next argues that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel because of counsel's introduction of evidence that Jones had previously been sentenced to death. We disagree. At the resentencing hearing, Jones's attorney called Sylvester Williams to testify. In the course of his testimony, Williams recounted an incident between Jones and himself: The officer let me out my cell to get a haircut, and on my way back to the cell Donald Jones was around my side, and he was supposed to be on death row, and inmates on lock-up and death row don't suppose to mingle together, so he was down there with no handcuffs on, and I was handcuffed in the front, and me and him had had a few words about a week ago, and the correction officer had told me.... and, It really wasn't no conflict. It was words, you know, and death row inmates is up on the thirdlike a two story house. It's a three story house.... Jones argues that as a result of these references to death row, the reliability of the jury's verdict and sentence was diminished by the knowledge that another jury had sentenced Jones to die for the same offenses that were under consideration at the resentencing hearing. In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant's prior death sentence did not deprive him of a fair sentencing proceeding. Jones argues Romano is distinguishable because in that case, the jury was made aware that the defendant had been sentenced to die for another offense. Jones's ineffectiveness argument lacks merit for several reasons. In the present case, there was no formal introduction of evidence of his previous death sentence. There was only a passing reference to death row from which the jury may have inferred that Jones had been sentenced to death before. Second, the statement did not state that he was on death row for committing the crimes against the Plylers. It may have been construed by the jury as a death sentence for a previous crime. Most importantly, however, Jones cannot escape the underlying rationale of Romano: We do not believe that the admission of evidence regarding petitioner's prior death sentence affirmatively misled the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of responsibility. Id. at 10, 114 S.Ct. at 2010, 129 L.Ed.2d at 11; see also State v. Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 24, 393 S.E.2d 364, 368 ([W]e also reject Bell's argument that the jurors' knowledge of the previous death sentence diminished their sense of responsibility in deciding what sentence to impose.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 227, 112 L.Ed.2d 182 (1990). Jones has not established how this passing reference to death row has misled the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process or diminished its sense of responsibility. Because Jones clearly fails to meet Strickland's prejudice prong, we need not address the first prong of the test.