Opinion ID: 775727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clem Evans

Text: 107 Clem Evans was convicted under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, of two counts of knowingly transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the intent that the individual engage in prostitution; under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), of knowingly persuading, inducing, or enticing an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution; and under 18 U.S.C. § 371, of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. He also was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 2, of money laundering; under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2, of money laundering; and under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), of conspiracy to launder money. 108 Following his conviction, the District Court sentenced Clem Evans to 20 years in prison (240 months). Based on a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of II, the imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines was 135 to 168 months. From the high end of the range, the Court departed upward by 72 months. 109 As with Monroe, the parties agree that the District Court committed plain error, violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, by applying altered versions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2422(a), which were amended after the date of the charged offenses, to counts 22, 23, and 24 of the indictment. The parties agree that the statutory maximum for each of those counts was five years in prison--not the ten years that Clem received--at the time of the charged offenses. 110 Clem Evans raises a number of arguments on appeal. Of these arguments, several also were made by Derry Evans or Terrance Roberts, including that: (1) the District Court's imposition of sentences for both money laundering and transporting an individual for prostitution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause; (2) various of the jurors' actions resulted in juror misconduct and merit a mistrial; and (3) the District Court gave conflicting jury instructions on the mental element for money laundering, resulting in the omission of the element of knowledge that the money being transferred constituted the proceeds of an illegal activity. For the reasons discussed previously, these arguments are without merit. 111 Clem Evans also argues that the District Court erred by allowing the government's expert witness on prostitution, Sergeant Andrew Schmidt, a Minneapolis police officer familiar with vice and prostitution investigations, to testify without holding a Daubert hearing. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). He contends that the Court was unable to determine properly the reliability of the testimony, and that the testimony was both prejudicial and improper. The government argues that the testimony was reliable and relevant. We review for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2001). Under Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the judge is to act as a gatekeeper in determining whether the proposed expert's testimony both is relevant and rests upon a reliable foundation. Id. at 149. 112 Here, the District Court was satisfied with Sergeant Schmidt's education, training, and experience. Sergeant Schmidt testified regarding the operation of a prostitution ring, including recruitment of prostitutes and the relationship between pimps and prostitutes, and regarding jargon used in such rings. There is no requirement that the District Court always hold a Daubert hearing prior to qualifying an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and the Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed testimony of Sergeant Schmidt to be both reliable and relevant, and in allowing that testimony. 113 Like Terrance Roberts and Monroe Evans, Clem Evans contends that the District Court committed clear error by enhancing his sentence for targeting vulnerable victims under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1(b)(1). Like both of them, he argues that his victims were not atypically vulnerable. However, the testimony reflects that when Clem, then 38 years old, met Stacy Ballantyne, one of his victims, sometime during 1985 or 1986, she was 14 years old, a runaway, and hiding from the police. Later, she developed a cocaine addiction. Clem argues that he was not aware of her age when they met, and that Ms. Ballantyne did not have a drug addiction when they met. Nevertheless, Clem certainly did take advantage of her condition--encouraging and contributing to her addiction by furnishing her with drugs to prevent her from leaving and moving her in with him and his mother. Thus, deferring to the District Court, we affirm the sentence enhancements. The Court did not clearly err. 114 Finally, also like Terrance Roberts and Monroe Evans, Clem Evans argues that the District Court acted unreasonably, abused its discretion, and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by granting the government's motion for an upward departure of 72 months based on U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5K2.2 (significant physical injury), 5K2.4 (unlawful restraint), and 5K2.8 (extreme conduct). Although Clem asserts that the Court used § 2A3.1 (criminal sexual abuse; base level 27) as the base offense and enhanced that base by four levels pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(1), the presentence report and the sentencing hearing reveal that the Court in fact used § 2G1.1 (promoting prostitution; base level 14) as the base offense, enhancing under §§ 2G1.1(b)(1) (4 levels for use of physical force), 2G1.1(b)(2)(B) (7 levels for age of victim), 3A1.1(b)(1) (2 levels for vulnerable victim), 3A1.3 (2 levels for victim restraint), and 3B1.1(c) (2 levels for aggravating role). 115 Regarding significant physical injury, there is sufficient evidence of significant injury to Ms. Ballantyne, including a split head, bruises, and swelling from beatings with a shoe and a cable cord. There is also sufficient evidence of Clem's extreme conduct toward Ms. Ballantyne, including repeated beatings of her with a cable cord and other weapons, preventing her from seeking medical treatment, forcing her to work as a prostitute while pregnant until the delivery of her children, and providing her with crack cocaine to prevent her from leaving. Regarding unlawful restraint, the District Court found that Clem's keeping Ms. Ballantyne at his sister's house--despite evidence indicating that she could come and go as she pleased--and tying her to a bed to beat her on one occasion satisfies this section. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward.