Opinion ID: 450378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Deportation of Alien Witnesses

Text: 26 Piedrahita asserts that his rights to due process of law, compulsory process, cross-examination, and confrontation were violated by the government's deportation of the two aliens, Jose Marin-Cadavid and Rodrigo Pena-Estrada. 27 In order to prevail on this point, Piedrahita must make a plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). In addition, he must show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact. Id. at 874, 102 S.Ct. at 3450. Piedrahita's argument fails this test. 28 Before their deportation, both alien witnesses testified at grand jury proceedings. At trial, Piedrahita read their testimony to the jury. The first alien, Jose Marin-Cadavid, testified that he arrived at # 32-39 Sixty-eighth Street at about 1:00 p.m. on the day in question. According to Cadavid, at that time he met a stranger at the front door--identified as Luis Pena-Estrada. Cadavid asked Luis if he was a relative of Ana Pena-Estrada--who lived in the apartment--but Luis did not respond. The two men then proceeded in silence to the apartment where Luis and Ana talked in the living room while Cadavid remained seated at the dining room table. Cadavid testified that he did not overhear the conversation between Luis and Ana. A few minutes after their arrival at the apartment, the police arrived and arrested Cadavid and Luis. The second alien, Rodrigo Pena-Estrada, testified before the grand jury that he left the apartment before noon and was then arrested. Pena-Estrada stated that he never saw Piedrahita or Luis Pena-Estrada. 29 Essentially conceding that this testimony is in no way helpful to him, Piedrahita argues that there exist certain inconsistencies in the two alien witnesses' testimony and that these inconsistencies evidenced consciousness of their guilt for the crimes attributed to appellant. Piedrahita further contends that [t]he inconsistencies could only be lies to cover the suspects' [Rodrigo Pena-Estrada and Cadavid] own complicity and that either or both of these men could have been the delivery boys. Had the deported witnesses' testimony supported Piedrahita's imagined scenario, he might satisfy the first prong of the Valenzuela-Bernal test by showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense. However, the testimony of the two men before the grand jury--i.e., that they had no involvement with Albeiro or Piedrahita and that Cadavid had met Luis, but only on the day of the arrest--directly conflicts with Piedrahita's hypothesis, and he offers no reason to believe that at trial their testimony would have differed significantly. Moreover, we disagree with Piedrahita's implied assumption that to satisfy the Valenzuela-Bernal test he can simply posit the testimony most helpful to him that the deported witnesses could provide. We believe that he must show some reasonable basis to believe that the desired testimony would be both helpful and material to his defense. See United States v. Schaefer, 709 F.2d 1383, 1386 (11th Cir.1983). Piedrahita has failed to make such a showing here and we therefore dismiss his argument as meritless. 30 Having considered the arguments made by Piedrahita and having found them to be meritless, we now turn to those issues raised by his co-appellant, Ginsberg. Ginsberg presses two arguments in this appeal: first, Ginsberg argues that the evidence submitted at trial does not support his conviction on the second count of the indictment--i.e., possession with intent to distribute cocaine; and second, he contends that the government, by allowing its cooperating witness, Rhina Toro, to mingle with the defense, violated his sixth amendment right to counsel. 31 A. Ginsberg's Conviction for Possession of Cocaine 32 As noted, the second count of the indictment under which Ginsberg was convicted charged him with possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Ginsberg argues that the district court should have dismissed this count because the government presented no evidence showing that he at any time had either actual or constructive possession of any drugs. There is no merit to this argument. 33 Putting aside evidence of Ginsberg's actual possession of the sample of cocaine that he delivered to Sonny--which in itself would establish Ginsberg's possession with intent to distribute cocaine--the government presented ample evidence to support his conviction under the second count of the indictment. Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (1983) provides that anyone who aids, abets, or causes a crime is punishable as a principal. To be guilty of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute narcotics, one need not ever have actual or constructive possession of the drug. 34 In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. 35 Nye & Nissen Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949) (citation omitted). Here, the evidence demonstrates that Ginsberg not only sought out a buyer for cocaine and made the initial introduction of Sonny to Albeiro and Toro but also was present at each stage of negotiations. He informed Romanolo that he (Ginsberg) would earn $1,000 for each kilogram of cocaine sold, and he delivered to Sonny for transfer to Romanolo the sample of cocaine. Ginsberg's active participation in the conspiracy sufficiently establishes that he associated himself with the illegal venture with an intent to make it succeed, and this amply supports his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. B. Right to Counsel 36 Ginsberg claims that the government violated his right to counsel by allowing Rhina Toro--an unrevealed cooperating witness--to mingle with the other defendants prior to trial. More specifically, Ginsberg argues that the government concealed Toro's cooperation from the other defendants until trial thereby allowing her to sit at the defense table during pre-trial court conferences and eat lunch with the defendants, all the while acting as a spy in the defense camp. 37 Ginsberg and the other defendants first discovered that Toro was cooperating with the government when at trial, the prosecution announced that she would be called as a witness. At that time, counsel for co-defendant Luis Pena-Estrada stated that since Toro's arrest and her grand jury testimony on behalf of the government, there had been at least three, four, or five Court conferences on this case and during those proceedings Rhina Toro was sitting here at defense table with the other defendants. Luis' counsel also observed that on at least one occasion [he had] conferred with her attorney and that, during court appearances, Toro had heard arguments counsel urged on behalf of his client. On this showing, Luis' counsel requested that the court 38 hold some sort of hearing whether formal or informal as to why the Government allowed Ms. Rhina Toro, after she became a cooperating witness, to sit on several occasions with the defense--with the defendants and have her attorney sit with the other defense counsel. 39 The trial judge responded by observing that this proffer did not warrant a hearing, but he nevertheless invited counsel to make some more formal presentation as to why there ought to be a hearing. He also stated that he would not grant a hearing on the basis of this presentation.The following day, Ginsberg's counsel joined in the request for a hearing on Toro's role. The trial judge again noted the insufficiency of the proffer made and invited counsel to make a more complete, formal motion in writing. Despite the court's invitation, defense counsel submitted no written application nor did he raise the issue in any other manner during the remainder of the trial. 40 We agree with the district judge that defense counsel made no offer of proof that would warrant holding a hearing. Unquestionably, government interference in the relationship between attorney and defendant may violate the latter's right to effective assistance of counsel. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). However, assuming that the government does not deliberately interfere in the relationship between defendant and counsel, the mere presence of a government agent, informant, or cooperating witness at conferences between defendant and counsel does not violate the sixth amendment. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554-59, 97 S.Ct. 837, 843-45, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); cf. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246. 41 We note that under Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 548-49, 97 S.Ct. at 840, 41, the need to maintain the confidentiality of an informant's identity is a legitimate law enforcement objective. The record here establishes that the purpose of the government's intrusion was both legitimate and justifiable under Weatherford. Prior to trial, the government submitted to the district court an ex parte application for an order permitting deferral until trial of any discovery that would disclose the identity of Rhina Toro as a cooperating government witness. The request was supported by a detailed affidavit substantiating the government's allegation that disclosure of Toro's informant status would place her life in danger. 42 Where the presence of the government's agent or informant at the defense conference is either unintentional or justified by the necessity of protecting the informant's identity, there can be no violation of the sixth amendment without some communication of valuable information derived from the intrusion to the government: absent such communication, there exists no realistic possibility of either prejudice to the defense or benefit to the government. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 845; Klein v. Smith, 559 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987, 98 S.Ct. 617, 54 L.Ed.2d 482 (1977). Under these standards, to make out a violation of his sixth amendment rights, Ginsberg would need to establish that privileged information [was] passed to the government or that the government ... intentionally invaded the attorney client relationship, and resulting prejudice. United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir.1979). To require a hearing on his sixth amendment claim, Ginsberg's proffer would need to allege facts which, if proven, would constitute a violation under this standard. We therefore hold that, to require a hearing on a claimed sixth amendment violation resulting from unintentional or justifiable presence of a government informant or agent at an attorney-client conference, a defendant must allege specific facts that indicate communication of privileged information to the prosecutor and prejudice resulting therefrom. Allegations that a prosecution witness testified concerning privileged communications, that prosecution evidence originated in such communications, or that such communications have been used in any other way to the substantial detriment of the defendant would meet this standard. Additionally, we note that if the defense attorney considers it necessary, in order to protect confidential communications from further disclosure, he may request that the court review the allegations supporting his motion in camera. 43 Turning to the case at hand, we note that the offer of proof made by Ginsberg's counsel alleged essentially only the presence of a government informant at defense conferences. Under the standard discussed above, this offer of proof is insufficient to require a hearing. We therefore reject Ginsberg's sixth amendment argument. 44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of conviction.