Opinion ID: 811594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sheriff Dunning’s Liability

Text: Livers does not allege Sheriff Dunning directly participated in any alleged constitutional violation, but rather claims Sheriff Dunning is liable in a supervisory capacity for Commander Kofoed’s and others’ misconduct. The district court made only two findings specifically about Sheriff Dunning or the DCSO, noting there was evidence suggesting (1) DCSO employees knew of Commander Kofoed’s “administrative lapses;” and (2) Sheriff “Dunning’s failure to train, supervise, and discipline the” DCCSI staff, including Commander Kofoed, “contributed to the evidence fabrication and resulted in the concealing of evidence from [Livers], his counsel, and the prosecutor.”
Sheriff Dunning cannot be liable for Commander Kofoed’s actions based on respondeat superior. See Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 275 (8th Cir. 2011). Sheriff Dunning may be liable under § 1983 if he (1) had “notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates”; (2) was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized those acts; and (3) failed to take “sufficient remedial action”; -26- (4) proximately causing injury to Livers. Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Jane Doe A. v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cnty., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990)). In order to show deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, Livers must allege and ultimately prove Sheriff Dunning “had notice that the training procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation.” Id. The district court denied Sheriff Dunning summary judgment under this theory, but did not cite any specific reasoning or evidence. We review the record to see which facts the district court may have assumed. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. In Andrews, we concluded there was no “patently obvious need . . . to specifically train officers not to rape young women.” Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1077. Similarly, Sheriff Dunning faced no “patently obvious need” to train DCCSI employees—whose job was to “identify, document, collect, and preserve evidence from crime scenes”—not to fabricate evidence. See id. Any reasonable DCCSI employee would know fabricating evidence is unacceptable. Livers maintains “Dunning’s failure to train his employees in their duty to disclose exculpatory material resulted in the fabrication of evidence against” Livers. Livers does not causally link this alleged failure to Commander Kofoed’s misconduct. As such, this alleged training failure cannot be a basis for Sheriff’s Dunning’s liability. Livers also contends Sheriff “Dunning’s failure to adequately supervise DCCSI resulted in the violation of [Livers’] constitutional right . . . not to have evidence fabricated against him.” Livers argues Sheriff Dunning should be held liable because Sheriff Dunning admitted he left day-to-day supervision of the DCCSI to Commander Kofoed. Livers maintains Sheriff Dunning should have known Commander Kofoed would abuse his position by fabricating evidence because of (1) alleged unrelated dishonesty by Commander Kofoed; (2) Kush’s complaints about Commander Kofoed to her supervisors; and (3) Commander “Kofoed’s fishy 2006 public statement that -27- his finding of Wayne Stock’s blood in Will’s car may have been the result of contamination.” To impose supervisory liability, other misconduct must be very similar to the conduct giving rise to liability. Cf. Jane Doe A, 901 F.2d at 646 n.4 (holding notice of an employee’s sexual misconduct with adults did not provide notice of his sexual misconduct with children). Notice of allegations Commander Kofoed committed dishonest acts unrelated to handling evidence is not sufficient to support Sheriff Dunning’s liability for a failure to supervise. Cf. id. The district court’s finding that some DCSO employees knew of Commander Kofoed’s “administrative lapses” is legally insufficient to impose supervisory liability. See Andrews, 98 F.3d at 645 (requiring the defendant to have had notice). Nor does our own review of the record reveal notice to Sheriff Dunning. In the internal affairs report covering Commander Kofoed, none of the employees interviewed reported suspecting Commander Kofoed of misconduct in any investigation. The same report concluded there was no evidence Kofoed planted evidence in the Stock homicide investigation. Nor was Sheriff Dunning notified of Kush’s concerns about Commander Kofoed’s handling of evidence until after the Stock investigation was over. Without guidance from the district court on what facts and assumptions it relied upon for its decision, we undertook the “cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving part[ies], likely assumed.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. Our cumbersome review of more than 65 bound volumes and 40 video DVDs drew a blank. There is no evidence, or reasonable inference from any evidence, indicating Sheriff Dunning had notice Commander Kofoed may have mishandled evidence in this or any other investigation until after the Stock investigation ended, too late to prevent injury to Livers. -28- Livers also alleges Sheriff Dunning’s supervision was inadequate because he did not properly investigate and discipline DCCSI employees for misconduct. Livers contends Sheriff Dunning never disciplined DCCSI employees for possible mishandling of evidence, which made Commander Kofoed think he would not be punished for planting evidence. This assertion is mere speculation and argument, and is not a basis for denying qualified immunity. See Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting a party cannot withstand summary judgment based on “speculation, conjecture, or fantasy” (quoting Moody v. St. Charles Cnty., 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown, 518 F.3d at 558 (when reviewing a district court’s denial of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, “we do not resort to speculation.”). Livers’ final contention—that Sheriff Dunning knew Captain Olson instructed Commander Kofoed not to correct Commander Kofoed’s report about the date he “discovered” the blood evidence in Will’s car—is similarly unavailing. Captain Olson did not share this information with Sheriff Dunning until March 2008, long after Sheriff Dunning could have prevented injury to Livers. Again, the record does not support any finding that Sheriff Dunning received notice of the alleged misconduct in time for any failure to act by Sheriff Dunning to have injured Livers. Sheriff Dunning is entitled to qualified immunity both on Livers’ failure-totrain claim and his failure-to-supervise claim.
Livers also cites City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988), and Speer v. City of Wynne, Ark., 276 F.3d 980, 987 (8th Cir. 2002), for his claim Sheriff Dunning should be liable because he ratified Commander Kofoed’s fabrication of evidence after it occurred. Praprotnik and Speer are inapposite because they involve municipal—not individual—liability. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127; Speer, 276 -29- F.3d at 987. Applying those cases would violate the principle that a supervisor who does not directly participate in an employee’s constitutional violation can only be liable for the violation when it was caused by the supervisor’s failure to train or supervise his or her employees properly. See Wagner, 664 F.3d at 275.