Opinion ID: 1951476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Centrality and Strength of the Government's Case

Text: The next two factors to be examined, in an effort to determine whether substantial prejudice resulted from the improper comments, are (1) the direct relationship [or centrality of the comments] to the issue of guilt, and (2) the strength of the government's case. Hammill, supra, 498 A.2d at 554 (citations omitted). The prosecutor's case turned, in part, on the credibility of M.B. and Thomas J., and to a lesser extent, M.B.'s sister, J.J. The jury reasonably could have perceived M.B. as a credible witness, without the prosecutor's closing or rebuttal arguments, because of her detailed account of the incident; and the description of M.B.'s demeanor by other witnesses after the encounter with Diaz. M.B.'s sister and cousin testified that when M.B. returned to the room where they were watching television, she was shaking. Her cousin said M.B. was scared ... [and] was crying real hard.... Her hands and her whole body ... [were] shaking. When M.B. saw her mother, Arnita B., on the evening of the encounter, she was shaking, crying. When Officer Jackson saw her, M.B. was upset, she had water in the bottom of her eyes. She was sort of shaking. Even though Thomas J.'s prior criminal record was brought out on direct examination, and he was impeached with his grand jury testimony, the jury could reasonably have believed his testimony that Diaz had been drinking on the night of the incident, and that Diaz told him that he might have touched M.B. in the wrong way. While the credibility of M.B. and the lack of credibility of Diaz were important to the government's case, there was sufficient other credible evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt, without the government's improper remarks, that M.B. was telling the truth when she recounted events proving sexual abuse by Diaz. In short, while Diaz's credibility was important with respect to his guilt, we cannot say with fair assurance, given the other evidence presented by the government, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the several improper prosecutorial comments, made during lengthy closing and rebuttal arguments. Consequently, we are constrained to conclude that Diaz was not substantially prejudiced by the improper prosecutorial comments.
Diaz argues that the trial court committed error in refusing to admit into evidence grand jury transcripts containing inconsistent statements made by S.J. and Thomas J. Diaz did not offer the exhibits until after the close of the evidence and submission of the case to the jury. In general, the decision whether to permit a defendant to reopen [his] or her case after the close of the evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse. King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 354 (D.C.1988) (citations omitted). Among the factors which the court should consider in exercising its discretion are (1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the nature of the evidence, including its relevance, and (3) prejudice to the opposing party. Id. (quoting United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1148, 103 S.Ct. 790, 74 L.Ed.2d 996 (1983)). The belated receipt of such [evidence] should not imbue the evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional evidence offered. Id. (quoting Thetford, supra, 676 F.2d at 182). The trial court properly weighed these factors in exercising its discretion to exclude the belatedly proffered evidence, concluding that the request was untimely and would unduly highlight the importance of the evidence, thereby prejudicing the government. Diaz had an opportunity to place both transcripts into evidence during the trial, but waited until after the jury began its deliberations to request that the documents be admitted. His reliance on Williams v. United States, 686 A.2d 552 (D.C.1996), is misplaced. There, we held that appellant was entitled to have the inconsistent statements introduced into evidence so the jury could decide for itself exactly how much `impeaching weight and significance' to give to these statements. Id. at 556. Our holding was prompted by the fact that during its deliberations, the jury requested the transcripts. Both counsel had urged the jury to evaluate the importance (or lack thereof) of the statements. Id. We said: By not allowing the jurors to review the statements, the trial court impeded their ability to perform the task assigned to them. Id. (citation omitted). Unlike the situation in this case where Diaz waited until the jury began to deliberate before requesting that the documents be admitted, the evidence in Williams was offered before the jury retired to deliberate, and the trial court determined erroneously that such evidence was not admissible. See id., 686 A.2d at 554. In this case, the jury made no request for the transcripts. Moreover, the inconsistent statements in the grand jury testimony of S.J. and Thomas J. did not have the same role in Diaz's trial as in that of Williams. S.J.'s inconsistent statements concerned whether Diaz had consumed alcohol prior to the incident, and Thomas J.'s transcript contained statements favorable and unfavorable to Diaz. Admitting the transcripts while the jury deliberations were in progress would have given them undue and exaggerated importance. We see no error in the trial court's refusal to allow late introduction of the transcripts into evidence. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed. SCHWELB, Associate Judge, concurring in the judgment: In my opinion, most of the remarks by the prosecutor of which Diaz complains, if improper at all, were only marginally so. The few speculative words that the prosecutor spoke about the defendant's having changed his story after consulting his attorney might providently have been left unsaid, but I do not believe that they represented an attempt by the prosecutor to burden the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to counsel. Rather, the prosecutor was attempting to show why Diaz may have changed an earlier account which he originally believed to be exculpatory but which was in fact incriminating. By and large, in my view, the prosecutor's arguments on the credibility of the complaining witness and of the defendant were grounded in the record or in reasonable inferences therefrom. They were not outright expressions of personal opinion of the kind which our cases have condemned. See, e.g., Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 36 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted). The prosecutor's statement that she has two daughters was inappropriate but, in my opinion, inconsequential. The trial judge was in the courtroom as the relevant events unfolded, and his vantage point and feel for the case were necessarily superior to ours. Under the circumstances, I cannot say that the judge abused his discretion in overruling most of the defense objections. As we noted in Irick, supra, 565 A.2d at 33, it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel. For my own part, I discern no such error or abuse of discretion, and I agree with Judge Reid that the judgment should be affirmed.