Opinion ID: 2257788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ownership of the Gristmill Property

Text: [¶ 17] Finally, Dorey argues that he possesses flowage rights relative to the outlet dam through his fee ownership of the original gristmill property, located downstream from the dam and sawmill. Here he relies on the 1849 conveyance from Joseph Foster to Benjamin Knapp of a half-interest in the sawmill property, in which Foster reserved to the mills on the old privilege below [the gristmill property], the right to draw water for the use of any mills which are, or may be on said old privilege when needed. [¶ 18] Dorey asserts that this express reservation remains with the original gristmill property he currently owns. We need not reach Dorey's argument, however, because he overlooks the fact that, in 1860, Knapp relinquished his half-interest in the sawmill property back to Foster, thus extinguishing the need for and existence of Foster's earlier reservation. See Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 94 (Me.1996) (An easement appurtenant can be terminated ... by conduct of both parties (merger or estoppel)); LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987 n. 3 (Me.1979) (Unity of title to the dominant and servient estate, of course, extinguishes an easement.); Fitanides v. Holman, 310 A.2d 65, 67 (Me.1973) (whatever claim to a right of way which might have existed ended with merger of the subject lots in one owner). [11] [¶ 19] In sum, Dorey does not own the property containing the dam or the sawmill, did not acquire rights to operate the dam by purchasing a distant piece of the original sawmill property, and could not acquire the appurtenant right to operate the dam without also acquiring the land upon which it sits. [12] The entry is: Judgment affirmed.