Opinion ID: 1799918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was letter defamatory?

Text: In the recent case of Lathan v. Journal Co. [1] we quoted with approval the Restatement test of defamatory which is: A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. [2] We commend this test for its conciseness as well as its accuracy. The reference in the letter to plaintiff's unpatriotic attitude and her intemperate and offensive behavior falls within this definition. Furthermore, plaintiff's profession is that of a teacher and the letter certainly would tend to deter school authorities contemplating hiring a teacher of her qualifications from employing her. This facet of defamation is embraced within that part of the above definition which states, or to deter third persons from ... dealing with him. [3] We find no merit in defendant's contention that the letter was not defamatory. Responsibility of defendant for publication of letter. Publication is defined in the Restatement as follows: Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person defamed. [4] Defendant contends that the only publication of the letter for which he is responsible is the delivery of copies thereof to Principal Wagner and Superintendent Kromrey, and they had such an interest in the letter because of their official position as school officials as to cloak such delivery to them with privilege. He denies any responsibility for the reading of the letter by Wagner to the teachers of the Parkside Heights school. The record on the motion for summary judgment substantiates defendant's contention that he was not responsible for Wagner's reading of the letter to the teachers of the school in which plaintiff had been teaching. Both Wagner and Kromrey by affidavit stated that defendant did not order, request, or consent to Wagner's reading of the letter to the teachers. The only rebutting evidence is plaintiff's testimony in her adverse examination deposition that she was told by other unnamed teachers that defendant had requested or ordered the letter to be read to the teachers. In Forbus v. La Crosse [5] this court held that a party standing in plaintiff's position, who opposes a motion for summary judgment, cannot rely upon a hearsay affidavit based on information and belief, and outlined two alternative procedures which such person could have followed which would have been sufficient to defeat summary judgment. One would be for plaintiff to have taken the depositions of the informants, if such informants refused to give affidavits. The other would be for plaintiff to have stated in an affidavit the names of her informants, that these informants had refused to give affidavits, the reason for not taking depositions, and set forth the statements these informants had given her and that she expected they would give such testimony at the trial. However, defendant did cause delivery of copies of the letter to Wagner and Kromrey. This publication would be sufficient upon which to ground an action for libel if not privileged. Thus whether there was the requisite element of publication by defendant turns on whether or not this delivery to Wagner and Kromrey was privileged. This question will be hereinafter dealt with in connection with our consideration of the privilege issue.