Opinion ID: 1833024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: prejudice: double jeopardy

Text: The prejudice component of the ineffective assistance of counsel test focuses on whether counsel's performance rendered the results of the proceeding unreliable or fundamentally unfair by depriving a defendant of a substantive or procedural right. [17] To prove prejudice for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [18] A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [19] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. [20] The protection provided by nebraska's double jeopardy clause is coextensive with that provided by the U.S. Constitution. [21] A defendant may raise a double jeopardy claim by filing a plea in bar. [22] We agree with the reasoning of the district court that trial counsel's failure to file a plea in bar could have prejudiced Miner only if there had been a meritorious double jeopardy defense. In order to address that issue, we must decide whether the prosecutions in Nance and Holt Counties were for the same offense. One of Miner's convictions in Nance County was for theft by receiving stolen property, which is committed when a person receives, retains, or disposes of stolen movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intention to restore it to the owner. [23] In Holt County, Miner was convicted of theft by unlawful taking, which is committed when a person takes, or exercises control over, movable property of another with the intent to deprive him or her thereof. [24] Although the two offenses are codified separately, §§ 28-511 and 28-517 must be read in conjunction with Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-510 (Reissue 1995), which provides: Conduct denominated theft in sections 28-509 to 28-518 constitutes a single offense embracing the separated offenses heretofore known as larceny, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion, receiving stolen property, and the like. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under sections 28-509 to 28-518, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the indictment or information, subject only to the power of the court to [e]nsure fair trial by granting a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. In State v. Jonusas, [25] we observed that § 28-510 mirrored A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.1(1) (1980). We wrote: In effect, § 28-510 has subsumed various forms of unlawful acquisitive behavior into a single offense of theft which may be committed by taking part in any one of several activities described in §§ 28-509 to 28-517. The unifying concept in all these crimes is that each involves the involuntary transfer of property. In each case, the actor appropriates the property of the victim without his or her consent or with a consent that was obtained by fraud or coercion. [26] The authors of the Model Penal Code note that consolidation of theft offenses reduces the opportunity for technical defenses based upon legal distinctions between the closely related activities of stealing and receiving. [27] One who is found in possession of stolen goods may be either the thief or the receiver. If the prosecution can prove the requisite state of mind to deprive the true owner of the property, it makes little difference whether the jury infers that the defendant took directly from the owner or acquired the goods from another person who committed the act of taking. [28] However, [c]onsolidation also has a consequence favorable to the defense by precluding conviction of both offenses for the same transaction. [29] Other courts in jurisdictions having consolidated theft statutes derived from the Model Penal Code have held that a defendant cannot be convicted of theft by taking and theft by receiving the same property. [30] Because the Legislature has unambiguously defined theft as a single offense which can be committed in several different ways, we do not employ the double jeopardy analysis established by Blockburger v. United States. [31] In this case, the district court distinguished Miner's two theft convictions by concluding that they did not involve the same property. The court reasoned that although the same 26 head of cattle were involved in each case, the Holt County case involved an additional 36 head which were not the subject of the Nance County prosecution. The court concluded that there was no double jeopardy violation regarding the additional 36 head of steers taken in Holt County. In effect, the district court treated the Holt County conviction as being based on 36 head and the Nance County conviction as being based on the remaining 26 head, thus constituting two separate offenses. This reasoning is contrary to Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-518 (Reissue 1995), which provides that theft may be classified as a Class III or IV felony or a Class I or II misdemeanor, depending on the value of the stolen property. However, § 28-518(7) adds: Amounts taken pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct from one person may be aggregated in the indictment or information in determining the classification of the offense, except that amounts may not be aggregated into more than one offense. (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, this court has held that an act of theft involving multiple items of property stolen simultaneously at the same place constitutes one offense, in which the value of the individual stolen items may be considered collectively for the aggregate or total value of the property stolen to determine the grade of the theft offense under § 28-518. [32] The record reflects that 62 head of cattle were taken pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct from one person on the same day. Accordingly, § 28-518(7) permits the value of all items of property, in this case steers, to be aggregated in order to determine the classification of the theft offense. However, the same statute specifically prohibits aggregation of individual values into more than one offense. Thus, Miner could not have been charged with one count of theft involving 26 head and a second count involving the remaining 36 head. For that reason, the district court erred in treating the two convictions as involving separate lots of cattle and therefore separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. In a case tried to a jury, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. [33] Although the record before us does not reflect the precise date on which the jury in the Nance County prosecution was sworn, we can reasonably infer that it was prior to March 25, 2002, when the jury, having been duly impanelled and sworn, returned its guilty verdict on the charge of theft. Trial in the Holt County prosecution began on april 30. A meritorious plea in bar could have been filed after jeopardy had attached in the Nance County case and before the commencement of trial in Holt County.