Opinion ID: 625001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Neil and Heiman Had Probable Cause to Arrest, and Thus Qualified Immunity

Text: The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials `from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Thus, in order to determine whether qualified immunity protects a government official, a court must decide, first, whether a plaintiff has produced evidence showing that the official violated a constitutional right and, second, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808. In the Fourth Amendment context, an arrest is lawful . . . only if it is accompanied by probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed, or is committing, an offense. Torres, 548 F.3d at 1207 n. 7. Probable cause exists if, `under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.' Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.2002)). While the requirement of probable cause is clearly established, the Supreme Court has specified that the application of that requirement must be clearly established in a particularized context. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Thus, whether a right is clearly established turns on whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. Here, Heiman and Neil argue that, based on all the facts known to them, they could have reasonably concluded that a fair probability existed that Conner had committed theft in violation of Nevada Revised Statute § 205.0832(1)(a). Section 205.0832(1)(a) criminalizes knowingly . . . [c]ontrol[ing] any property of another person with the intent to deprive that person of the property. The district court concluded that, while there was no question that Heiman and Neil had probable cause to believe that Conner had committed the actus reus of theft, a reasonable jury could find that there was no probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had the requisite mens rea for theft, presumably because Conner's behavior was consistent with that of an innocent person. The fact that reasonable people could draw different conclusions based on Conner's behavior, however, is irrelevant to the probable cause analysis. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534 ([T]he court should ask whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed. . . .). The only question is whether Neil and Heiman could have reasonably concluded, under the totality of the circumstances, that a fair probability existed that Conner knew that he controlled Harrah's property and intended to deprive Harrah's of that property. [3] Whether the opposite conclusion was also reasonable, or even more reasonable, does not matter so long as the Neil's and Heiman's conclusion was itself reasonable. We think Neil and Heiman could have reasonably concluded that they had probable cause to believe that Conner knowingly controlled Harrah's property and intended to deprive Harrah's of that property. Heiman not only personally reviewed the available evidence, including the videotape, but also asked Neil to review his findings. The evidence they reviewed showed that Conner had received an overpayment and that the nature of the overpaymentpayment of $950 more than Conner could have won on the maximum betwas one that would have been obvious to most players. Moreover, Neil and Heiman knew that multiple Harrah's employees had informedor attempted to informConner of the overpayment, and that, when confronted by Lee and Coffee, Conner responded rudely and defensively. On the basis of this evidence, Neil and Heiman could have reasonably concluded that a fair probability existed that Conner knew that Harrah's had overpaid him. They could have reasonably suspected, for example, that Conner cynically hoped to keep the money or that he did not want to accede to Harrah's demands simply because he felt offended by the manner in which Harrah's employees confronted him. Thus, a reasonable officer would not find it clear that Neil and Heiman violated the Fourth Amendment when they concluded that they had probable cause to arrest Conner. Because Neil and Heiman did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, qualified immunity protects them from Conner's claims under § 1983, and they are entitled to summary judgment on those claims. The finding that Neil and Heiman have qualified immunity also bars Conner's § 1983 conspiracy claim. As this Court noted in Haldeman v. Golden, a § 1983 conspiracy claim is not a means of holding state actors liable on claims from which they are otherwise immune. 359 Fed.Appx. 777, 780 (9th Cir.2009). Accordingly, Neil and Heiman are also entitled to summary judgment on Conner's § 1983 conspiracy claim.