Opinion ID: 742736
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Migratory Bird Treaty Act

Text: 93 The plaintiffs argue that the Amended Plan also violates the MBTA, which provides, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, ... any migratory bird, [or] any part, nest, or egg of any such bird that is protected under the various migratory bird treaties to which the United States is a party. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988). The plaintiffs contend that an illegal taking or killing of migratory birds will occur because the ALRMP (1) destroys the essential habitat for neotropical migratory birds; and (2) directly kills such birds by allowing logging during neotropical bird nesting periods. 94 Contrary to the plaintiffs' first contention, a taking does not occur simply because of habitat modification or degradation. Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302-03 (9th Cir.1991). Rather, the statute defines the term take as meaning to pursue, hunt, shoot, capture, collect, kill or to attempt any of these acts. 16 U.S.C. § 715n (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1994). Although a similar prohibition against taking in the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, has been construed to prohibit habitat degradation, that construction is based upon the broader definition that Congress gave to the term take. More specifically, the ESA defines take to include harm. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) ([t]he term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or to attempt any such acts); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (providing that for purposes of the ESA, the term  'harm' ... means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.). 95 The recent Supreme Court decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995), supports this result. In Babbitt, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act to include habitat modification or degradation that actually kills wildlife was a reasonable interpretation of the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court found it significant that the word harm was included. The Supreme Court stated: 96 The statutory context of harm suggests that Congress meant that term to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent with but distinct from the functions of the other verbs used to define take. The Secretary's interpretation of harm to include indirectly injuring endangered animals through habitat modification permissibly interprets harm to have a character of its own not to be submerged by its association. 97 Id. at 2415 (quoting Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923)). As noted above, the statutory language of the MBTA differs from the ESA in that the word harm (along with the words harass, wound, and trap) is not included. This is strong evidence that the MBTA does not include a prohibition of habitat modification or degradation. 98 The plaintiffs next argue that the ALRMP will result in the killing of young migratory birds because it allows logging during the nesting season. Although the ALRMP prohibits logging in FIMUs during the nesting season to protect the nesting birds, this prohibition does not apply outside the FIMUs. (Compare ALRMP at IV-147 (prohibiting surface disturbing activities in Management Prescription 6.4 areas from April 1 to July 15) with ALRMP at IV-103 to IV-106 (no seasonal prohibitions for Management Prescription 2.1 areas).) The plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service, in calculating the population levels for forest interior birds, determined that their suitable habitat would include areas outside the FIMUs in addition to the FIMUs themselves. Therefore, the plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service must have assumed that these birds would nest outside of the FIMUs as well as within them. As a result, they contend that logging outside the FIMUs during the nesting season will result in the deaths of young migratory birds. 99 The Forest Service has failed to respond to this argument in any meaningful way. The Forest Service's brief makes the shrill declaration that Plaintiffs have not produced a shred of evidence that this purported taking or killing has occurred, will occur, or can occur. (Defs.' Consolidated Mem., Doc. 26, at 25 n. 11.) However, there is no attempt to respond to the plaintiffs' logical assumption that forest interior birds will be killed if they are nesting outside the FIMUs and there are no seasonal restrictions are placed on logging in these non-FIMU areas. Indeed, the Forest Service argues, with respect to another issue in its brief, that the FIMUs are not the only habitat used by these birds but, rather, that the FIMUs constitute the largest and the best neotropical bird habitat. (Defs.' Reply Brief, Doc. 36, at 4-5.) Thus, the Forest Service admits that it considers areas outside the FIMUs to be neotropical migratory bird habitat. 100 Based upon this discussion, the Court finds that the Forest Service has not adequately addressed the issue of whether the ALRMP will violate the MBTA by allowing logging outside the FIMUs during the nesting season. Accordingly, the Forest Service is directed to more fully address this issue upon remand.