Opinion ID: 1594325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admission of boykin's incriminating statement made during a strip-search

Text: On July 18, 1986, Boykin was undergoing a strip-search in the clothing storage area of Minnehaha County Jail, a procedure undertaken by the police because Boykin was about to be transported to Davison County. This room was routinely used by police for strip-searches. During the search, Boykin began complaining about police having earlier taken his tennis shoes, and that he would have to get another pair from Goodwill. Deputy Sheriff Doug Arntz, the officer conducting the search, commented that they had probably taken the shoes to make casts or take pictures to match the shoes to shoe prints at the crime scene. Boykin replied: Yeah, maybe they do. The conversation was initiated by Boykin, and Arntz did not ask him any questions about the shoes. Boykin had been given Miranda warnings, but was not given any such warnings by Arntz in the clothing storage room. On January 15, 1987, a hearing was held on a motion to suppress Arntz' testimony regarding Boykin's statement. The trial court entered findings of fact to the effect that Boykin's statement was not made in response to any interrogation or questioning by police and Deputy Sheriff Arntz' remark could not reasonably be construed as an attempt to elicit any incriminating response on Boykin's part. Boykin's motion was denied by the trial court. Boykin now alleges that denial of his suppression motion was erroneous, and that the admission of Arntz' testimony at his trial violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Specifically, Boykin maintains that Arntz' comment was a subterfuge to elicit an incriminating response by trickery, and the statement, therefore, should have been suppressed under Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 237 (1980). We disagree. In Innis, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Rhode Island Supreme Court's reversal of a conviction because the state court had stretched Fifth Amendment protections (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1632, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)) too far. The defendant in Innis led police to a shotgun used in a murder, after overhearing one of two policemen, riding in a police car; one policeman with him mused that children from a nearby school for the handicapped might find the weapon and hurt themselves. Justice Stewart, in the opinion of the Court, wrote: A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). On the facts of Innis, the Court held that the defendant, though in custody, had neither been interrogated nor subjected to the functional equivalent. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691, 64 L.Ed.2d at 309. Arntz' offhand remark could not be considered to trigger Fifth Amendment concerns. Boykin's response was voluntary, as the trial court found. The same result was reached in State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013, 104 S.Ct. 1017, 79 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (defendant, during a routine strip-search, initiated conversation with a policeman, and remarked that useable evidence might be found on his shirt and shoes taken at his arrest. Held: No interrogation). See also Harding v. Lewis, 641 F.Supp. 979, 997-98 (D.Ariz.1986). We find no error by the trial court on this issue. The record does not support Boykin's allegation of subterfuge and does indicate that Boykin initiated the incriminating exchange.