Opinion ID: 2107935
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of the Other Crimes Evidence

Text: We review for abuse of discretion appellant's preserved objection that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the May 2005 incident because the charges from that incident were dismissed and, therefore, such evidence was inadmissible under Drew. Goines v. United States, 905 A.2d 795, 799-800 (D.C.2006) (citations omitted) (a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion). By definition, Drew and its safeguards are concerned with the admission of acts that are not charged in the present prosecution, see Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1095, and that have not been previously adjudicated. However, unadjudicated prior bad acts that constitute other crimes evidence do not preclude the admissibility of that evidence to show motive and intent, if otherwise admissible under Drew. See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1092 (D.C.2005) ([p]rior instances of unlawful conduct may be admitted under a Drew exception although not previously adjudicated a crime); Flores v. United States, 698 A.2d 474, 482-483 (D.C.1997) (evidence of prior assault was admissible although criminal charges were not adjudicated); Mitchell v. United States, 629 A.2d 10, 12-13 (D.C.1993) (prior bad acts evidence in a domestic violence case was admitted under a Drew exception even where the prior bad acts evidence was not criminally charged); Garibay v. United States, 634 A.2d 946, n. 2 (D.C.1993) (prior bad acts evidence was admitted under a Drew exception even where the prior assault case was apparently dismissed). The trial court has wide latitude in determining the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence. See generally Frye, 926 A.2d at 1092. On this record we find no abuse of discretion. We also reject appellant's argument challenging the admission of the other crimes evidence based on his analysis of Roper, 564 A.2d at 731. In Roper, this court held that where two or more offenses, joined under Rule 8(a) of the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, are misjoined and the defendant is acquitted of one of those offenses, the misjoinder cannot, under a theory of mutual admissibility, be held to be harmless. Id. at 732. In explanation, we stated that it is fundamentally unfair, that one could be acquitted of a crime by the trier-of-fact, yet have it held that that evidence of that same charge would have been admissible against him in another trial. Id. Appellant relies on Roper to support his argument that dismissal of the prior charges is equivalent to acquittal and, therefore, inadmissible in the instant case. His argument is flawed because, unlike the defendant in Roper, appellant was not acquitted of the charges, but rather the previous criminal charges were dismissed for want of prosecution. Dismissal for want of prosecution  particularly for the reasons (undisputed by appellant) proffered by the government, see supra note 7  is not the same as being acquitted after a trial on the merits. Thus, appellant's reliance on Roper is unfounded.
Although the trial court did not specifically find clear and convincing evidence that the May 2005 incident occurred and that appellant was connected to it, appellant did not raise this issue at trial. Appellant raises this issue for the first time on appeal and therefore we review for plain error. Under plain error review, this court will only reverse the trial court's decision upon a clear showing of a miscarriage of justice. See Harris v. U.S., 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992). The plain error test requires that the appellant show: (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that the error affected appellant's substantial rights, and (4) that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding, i.e., a showing of manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C.2006) (illustrating the application of these elements). The government, in addition to its proffer, asserts that Ms. Deloatch's testimony combined with the CPO and photographs of property damage in Ms. Deloatch's home established by clear and convincing evidence that appellant's prior assault on Ms. Deloatch occurred. It is well established that, unless requested by a party, the absence of explicit findings is not necessarily reversible error. See, e.g., Daniels, 613 A.2d at 347 (failure by the trial court to make all the necessary findings constitutes error, but such error is not necessarily cause for reversal). Here there was no such request. Notwithstanding, based on the record, we conclude that the clear and convincing evidence standard was met and that the trial court did not plainly err in failing to make the requisite finding on the record.
Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that the admission of the 2005 incident as other crimes evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible propensity evidence and highly prejudicial. Arguments or issues asserted for the first time on appeal are not adequately preserved for appeal. Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967) ([q]uestions not properly raised and preserved during the proceedings under examination, and points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis, will normally be spurned on appeal). As a result, a claim that is not properly preserved at trial is subject to the strictures of `plain error' review. Thomas, 914 A.2d at 8. Although appellant did not raise the issue of relevance or propensity below, the trial court specifically found that the May 2005 bad acts evidence was relevant to prove motive and intent and to provide context concerning the background of the relationship between appellant and Ms. Deloatch. Although, appellant denied involvement in the May 2006 incident, we have previously held that where the accused denies that he committed the act ... the prosecutor is permitted, as part of his effort to prove that the particular accused did commit the act, to prove that the accused had a motive for [the act]. See Hazel v. United States, 599 A.2d 38, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting ( Arnold) Hill v. United States, 600 A.2d 58, 61-62 (D.C.1991)) (internal quotations and other citations omitted). Specifically, this court has concluded that, [w]here one spouse or partner in a relationship commits a crime against the other, any fact or circumstance relating to ill-feeling; ill-treatment; jealousy; prior assaults; personal violence; threats, or any similar conduct or attitude by the [spouse] are relevant to show motive and malice in such crimes. Mitchell, 629 A.2d at 13 quoting Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.1977) (internal quotations and other citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord Rink v. United States, 388 A.2d 52, 56 n. 4 (D.C.1978) (for purposes of admitting prior bad acts, a significant relationship can be the functional equivalent of a marriage); Garibay, 634 A.2d at 948 (evidence of past aggressions between the same parties is relevant to material issues, malice and motive, not to show criminal propensity); Flores, 698 A.2d at 482 (evidence of previous hostility between partners is often relevant to malice, motive and intent, and is therefore admissible in domestic violence cases); cf. Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 420 (D.C.1988) (the intent exception has the potential to emasculate the other crimes rule because it is difficult or impossible to differentiate between the intent to do an act and the predisposition to do it). But see Hill, 600 A.2d at 61-62. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior assault as relevant to explain the history of the parties' relationship and the hostility between them and also relevant to appellant's motive and intent in committing the crimes charged. Next, we address appellant's argument that the other crimes evidence was highly prejudicial. In examining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of its prejudicial effect, we review for plain error. While the trial court did not make an explicit finding that the other crimes evidence was more probative than prejudicial, it is well settled that, [w]hen the evidence is relevant and important to one of [the Drew exceptions], it is generally conceded that the prejudicial effect may be outweighed by the probative value. Drew, 118 U.S.App. D.C. at 16, 331 F.2d at 90. Here the trial court admitted the disputed evidence to show motive and intent as permitted by Drew. The likelihood of the disputed evidence having an undue prejudicial impact is diminished because there was no jury. In bench trials the trial judge is presumed to know the purpose for which evidence may be considered, see, e.g., Flores, 698 A.2d at 482 (noting that the risk of the evidence having an unduly prejudicial effect on the jury is not present in a bench trial), and nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge-who credited the complainant's account  considered the May 2005 assault for any improper purpose. Therefore, we conclude that appellant has not demonstrated plain error.