Opinion ID: 1656409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the bank may purchase those choses in action at a sheriff's execution sale if it is the highest bidder.

Text: ¶ 24. The Mississippi Code sets forth several requirements for a sheriff's execution sale. Section 13-3-161 requires the execution sale to be held at the county courthouse. Section 13-3-165 prohibits the execution sale from occurring on a Sunday and requires at least ten days of pre-sale advertising. Finally, Section 13-3-169 gives the time of day a sale can be conducted and states, [a]ll such sales shall be by auction to the highest bidder for cash, and only so much of the property levied on shall be sold as will satisfy the execution and costs. It is important to note that the plaintiffs do not contend the sheriff's execution sale was improper or unfair. ¶ 25. The sale was held at the door to the Lauderdale County Courthouse at 11:00 a.m., on a Monday, fourteen days after the county clerk issued the writs of execution. The bank, as the highest bidder, gave the sheriff $91,000. Each element of the sale complied with the statutory requirements. We have no specific information about the sale's advertising, but again, the plaintiffs never argue the execution sale was unfair. ¶ 26. The plaintiffs quote the portion of our Maranatha holding that states Colonial Trust may by writ of execution levy upon [Maranatha's] chose in action in the pending court action against Kerr-McGee, with such levy not to exceed the amount to which Colonial is now entitled.  Maranatha, 904 So.2d at 1010 (emphasis supplied). Although the plaintiffs do not articulate a clear reason for emphasizing the above language, it appears the plaintiffs believe that, because their evaluation of the lawsuits is $4,000,000, an amount which far exceeds the amount owed to the bank, the sheriff could not conduct a valid sale and pass title to the lawsuits for $91,000. Stated another way, the plaintiffs contend the statutory language prohibits the execution sale of their 03-CV-030-B lawsuits because their value far exceeded the amount of the bank's judgments. Thus, the plaintiffs argue, the sheriff must have sold more property than was necessary to satisfy the bank's judgments. The plaintiffs provide us no authority for this assertion. For purposes of the execution and sale, the value of the lawsuits was set by the highest bid. The plaintiffs' subjective valuation is irrelevant. ¶ 27. In Maranatha, the judgment debtor argued its lawsuits against Kerr-McGee were worth $15,000,000. Id. at 1005 n. 2. The judgment against Maranatha in favor of Colonial Trust was approximately $877,000. Id. at 1005. The multi-million dollar difference between Maranatha's valuation of its pending claims and the judgment against it did not prevent execution in that case, and it does not prevent execution here. ¶ 28. The language in Maranatha that such levy [is] not to exceed the amount to which Colonial is now entitled, id. at 1010, accurately tracks the language of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-3-169, which states, only so much of the property levied on shall be sold as will satisfy the execution and costs. Here, the sheriff's execution sale yielded $91,000, an amount far less than the $845,949.91 total judgment to which the bank was entitled. ¶ 29. No statutory exception exists to prevent a judgment creditor or a defendant from bidding at the sale of a chose in action. In dicta in Maranatha, this Court envisioned the possibility that a defendant in a lawsuit (chose in action) might be the purchaser at an execution sale. 904 So.2d at 1010 n. 9. Here, the bank is analogous to the defendant, Kerr-McGee. Under the scenario discussed in Maranatha, the bank, as the highest bidder, was eligible to purchase the plaintiffs' choses in action at the sheriff's sale. ¶ 30. The plaintiffs' primary argument centers on the bank's sham purchase of their choses in action for $91,000, because the $91,000 bid was a figure very close to the unwarranted attorneys (sic) fees and collection costs that [the bank] required of Pope to satisfy its Judgment. According to the plaintiffs' calculations, they were required to pay $88,327.28 in attorney's fees and collection costs in order to bring current their debts. The plaintiffs argue they tried to pay the debts less these fees, but the bank refused the payment. Finally, the plaintiffs argue the bank could not ask for any fees because the trial court specifically reserved the issue of attorney's fees for a future damages hearing. ¶ 31. The plaintiffs' calculations can only be found in their Brief, as they were not derived from any document in the record. Needless to say, their figures are dubious at best. The plaintiffs calculate the debt owed on the Clarkdale note as of September 28, 2004, as $846,322.15, and on the Pacesetter note as of September 27, 2004, [10] as $31,973.01. Thus, the total judgment amount owed was $878,295.16. The plaintiffs then obtain the $845,622.94 figure, allegedly the bank's demand, from a letter not contained in the record. This amount apparently represented the amount owed by the plaintiffs on October 5, 2004, after the $91,000 execution sale credit. The plaintiffs then added the credit amount and bank demand together to get $936,622.94. After subtracting the amount they felt they owed$878,295.16 the plaintiffs arrived at $88,327.78 in improper fees and costs assessed by the bank. Since this amount is close to the bank's $91,000 bid for their choses in action, the plaintiffs argue the sale was merely pretense to force them to pay more than necessary to bring current their debts. ¶ 32. This argument is meritless for a number of reasons. First, the calculations are all based on different datesSeptember 27, September 28, and October 5. Second, even assuming the plaintiffs' method of calculation was correct, the amount of improper fees assessed by the bank would be $58,327.78, [11] a figure not nearly as coincidentally close to the $91,000 bid, and hardly evidence of a sham purchase. ¶ 33. Poor math aside, the plaintiffs also omit several relevant facts regarding their payoff and the documents allegedly supporting their calculations. The bank's letter to the plaintiffs on October 25, 2004 (from which the plaintiffs take their $845,622.94 bank demand figure) concerns the payoff of three loans, not just the two judgment loans. Additionally, the letter notes that the plaintiffs paid off the judgments as well as a number of unspecified deeds of trust. According to the bank, the calculation relied on by the plaintiffs also included the cancellation of five deeds of trust and two UCC-1 filings. ¶ 34. The plaintiffs never asked the trial court for assistance in determining their payoff. In fact, the plaintiffs willingly paid all of their debts due to the bank, and only now do they complain about the amount. The plaintiffs claim they tendered an amount that would have brought their debts current, but the bank refused their offer. The trial court found the plaintiffs' offer could not have cured the default, so the bank properly rejected it. The trial court also stated, [j]ust picking an amount that the debtor thinks is correct and offering it as a tender to bring the note current is not an acceptable practice. ¶ 35. The plaintiffs cite no authority to support any of their arguments. Maranatha actually supports the bank's contention that it could purchase the choses in action at the properly conducted sheriff's execution sale. Parties are required to cite relevant authority or face imposition of a procedural bar. See Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358, 1361 (Miss.1998); Cook v. Mardi Gras Casino Corp., 697 So.2d 378, 383 (Miss.1997). The plaintiffs concede the execution sale was fair. Their only argument concerns the closeness of the $91,000 purchase price with the $88,327.78 they claim to have paid in improper fees and costs. Bald, unsupported assertions simply cannot invalidate a properly conducted sheriff's execution sale. As such, the bank, as the highest bidder, could purchase the plaintiffs' choses in action.