Opinion ID: 1892335
Heading Depth: 1
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Heading: The New Hampshire statute

Text: The New Hampshire statute here in question is Revised Statutes Annotated 594:2. In substance, it permits a peace officer to stop any person abroad whom he has reason to suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime, and to demand of him his name, address, business abroad and destination. If the person so stopped fails to identify himself and explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer, he may be detained and further questioned and investigated. The total detention is not to exceed four hours, shall not constitute an arrest or be officially recorded as such, and at the end of the period the person detained shall be released unless arrested and charged with a crime. Both the State, and New Hampshire, as amicus, question the propriety of our passing upon the constitutionality of the New Hampshire statute. A novel question is presented, and we are cited to no decisions determinative of our right to make such a determination. We are, in any event, reluctant to pass upon constitutional questions not necessary for a determination of the case presented. State v. Mecier, 126 Vt. 260, 227 A.2d 298 (1967). Since, in our view, resolution of this issue is not required, we can accord the New Hampshire statute no less cavalier a treatment than our own. We think that the controlling issue here is not the constitutionality of the New Hampshire statute, as such, but the question of whether or not the Keene officers acted in good faith reliance upon its validity. Upon the record presented, we feel it a necessary conclusion that they did so act. While there is no square-cut decision upholding the validity of this statute, it has been litigated, without any holding that it is invalid. Hancock v. Nelson, 363 F.2d 249 (1st Cir., 1966), cert. den. 386 U.S. 984, 87 S.Ct. 1292, 18 L.Ed.2d 234 (1967). So has a similar Rhode Island statute. Lim v. Andruskiewicz, 360 F.Supp. 1077 (D.R.I.1973). The similar Rhode Island statute has been also expressly upheld. Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 174 A.2d 560 (1964). And, even absent a statute, a reasonable detention for questioning has been held not to be arrest, where the purpose is truly investigatory, and the police have good reason to believe person must be questioned further to determine whether he or any other person must be arrested. United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 238 N.E.2d 307 (1968). The United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit has twice reached a similar conclusion under an unconstitutional vagrancy statute somewhat similar to the statute here in question. Even though the statute was invalid, evidence and a confession (of a different crime) obtained as a result of an arrest under the statute, were held admissible, absent a showing that the police lacked a good faith belief in the validity of the statute when they acted under it. The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, later more carefully delineated in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), was held not to be served by barring evidence obtained, without coercion, under incarceration for violation of a statute considered valid at time of arrest. United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971); Hamrick v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1972). Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court seem to us also to sustain our refusal to apply the poisoned tree doctrine to evidence obtained under the New Hampshire statute. As indicated, we do not think the tree was poisoned where the officers acted in good faith reliance upon its validity. But, even if it were, the exclusionary rule the doctrine embodies is predicated upon a postulated deterrent effect. In holding that testimony obtained from a third person through questioning of the defendant conducted without full compliance with Miranda, is admissible in the absence of wilful or negligent conduct by the police, the Court said: By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care towards the right of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force. Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 417 U.S. at 433, 94 S.Ct. at 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d at 194. We cannot refrain from commenting that, whatever the deterrent effect of this Court's pronouncements upon Vermont police, its fall-out consequences in New Hampshire would most certainly be minimal. Our conclusion is further supported, we feel, by the holding and reasoning of United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Therein also the primary purpose of the poisoned tree exclusionary rule, deterrence of future unlawful police conduct, was also emphasized, and the Court held that extending the rule to exclude illegally obtained evidence from a grand jury would not significantly further the goal of deterrence. By analogy, using such evidence to procure a search warrant is also permissible, since both the indictment and the warrant have as their primary purpose a finding of probable cause. We therefore hold that the evidence introduced against the respondent, apart from his confession, obtained either (a) during his detention prior to formal arrest, and used as a basis for the search warrant, or (b) obtained as a result of executing the search warrant, was properly admitted and its suppression correctly denied. While we do not herein attempt to completely delineate the boundaries of the poisoned tree rule, we are convinced that it does not reach so far as respondent here contends. Apart from the very dubious deterrent effect in New Hampshire of any holding we might here make, as we have noted, the reprehensible conduct of the narcotics agents in Wong Sun does not appear. State v. Rocheleau, 131 Vt. 563, 313 A.2d 33 (1973). And even if it did, they were in no particular agents of Vermont, the prosecuting state.