Opinion ID: 1435335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good Samaritan Doctrine

Text: Petitioner Fried and Appellant Muthukumarana contend that the Good Samaritan doctrine, which subjects an individual to liability for his or her failure to exercise reasonable care in rendering protective services to another, is applicable to the actions of 911 operators and dispatchers taken in the course of performing their employment duties. According to Fried, Respondent Archer was paid to perform her functions as an emergency dispatch operator, failed to exercise reasonable care in performing her duties, and, as a result of her failure to exercise reasonable care, should be liable for the increased the risk of harm she caused to Tiffany by beginning to assist her, but failing to follow through.... Similarly, Muthukumarana alleges that Appellee Woodward undertook, for consideration ..., to render services to Appellant and should be subject to liability for her failure to exercise reasonable care where her failure to follow the S[tandard] O[perating] P[rocedure] increased the risk of harm to Appellant, and where she suffered harm by relying on 911 and Woodward's questioning. In response, Archer argues that a different tort principle, specifically the special relationship test, is controlling in her case. Woodward also argues that the Good Samaritan doctrine is not the appropriate standard to apply to determine the liability of 911 operators and cites the chilling effect it would have on a government's ability to hire and retain 911 operators. Additionally, Woodward maintains that she did not undertake to assist Appellant [Muthukumarana], as required by the Good Samaritan doctrine, by taking basic information from her. The Good Samaritan doctrine, as argued by Fried and Muthukumarana from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides: § 323 Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services. One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. [22] RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). Even assuming, for purposes of this analysis, that Maryland recognizes a common law Good Samaritan doctrine as framed in the Restatement, it would not apply here. Pursuant to § 323, an individual who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render protective services to another may be subject to liability for his or her failure to exercise reasonable care in doing so. Petitioner Fried and Appellant Muthukumarana would have us interpret the clause for consideration as including the salary paid to 911 operators and dispatchers by their employers, thereby imposing liability on those 911 employees for actions taken in the course of performing their employment duties. Drawing on our prior interpretation of the meaning of an analogous term in the context of Maryland's Good Samaritan immunity statutes, [23] we decline to do so. Under Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-603, certain emergency medical care providers are not civilly liable for any act or omission in giving any assistance or medical care, if, in part, [t]he assistance or medical care is provided without fee or compensation .... (Emphasis added.). In Tatum v. Gigliotti, 321 Md. 623, 583 A.2d 1062 (1991), we interpreted the language of an earlier version of the Good Samaritan Act, specifically Md.Code (1981), Art. 43, § 132(a) (recodified as Md.Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-603), which provided immunity to certain individuals rendering medical aid, care, or assistance for which he charges no fee or compensation. [24] In so doing, we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, Tatum v. Gigliotti, 80 Md. App. 559, 565 A.2d 354 (1989), aff'd, 321 Md. 623, 583 A.2d 1062 (1991), and held that a salaried emergency medical technician operating within the scope of his duties was entitled to the immunity provided in the statute. As the Court of Special Appeals explained, salaried personnel do not receive `compensation' within the meaning of this section. Tatum, 80 Md. App. at 568, 565 A.2d at 358. Although consideration, as used in § 323 of the Restatement, and compensation, as used in § 5-603, are not identical terms, they are recognized generally as synonyms of each other. [25] Accordingly, it is appropriate for us to extend our holding that a salary does not constitute a fee or compensation under § 5-603 to an interpretation of for consideration under § 323 of the Restatement. Specifically, under § 323, the imposition of liability on an individual for his or her negligent undertaking to render services to another does not include the non-voluntary actions taken by a 911 operator or dispatcher in the course of his or her employment. A 911 operator or dispatcher generally receives a salary from his or her employer, not from the person in need of assistance. That payment would not qualify as consideration within the meaning of § 323. Therefore, the common law Good Samaritan doctrine, at least as argued in this case, would not be applicable to the actions of 911 operators and dispatchers taken in the course of performing their employment duties.