Opinion ID: 853019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Demand on Particular Services

Text: Unlike the Fifth Amendment, in addition to its Takings Clause, Article I, Section 21 of the Indiana Constitution also provides that no person's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. This provision applies only if both a person's particular services are rendered and they have been demanded by the State. Cheatham contends that the effect of the statute is to demand her attorney's particular services without just compensation in violation of this provision. We agree that the attorney's services are particular as that term appears in the Indiana Constitution. Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. 1991), provided us with the following test to determine whether there has been a state demand of particular services: (1) particular services were performed, (2) on the State's demand, (3) without just compensation. Id. at 411. There is no dispute that attorneys' services may be particular services within the meaning of this provision. Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156, 162 (Ind.2001); Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854). To be considered particular, services must be (1) historically compensated, and (2) something required of a party as an individual, as opposed to something required generally of all citizens. Bayh, 573 N.E.2d at 415-16. An attorney's services in a specific lawsuit meet that standard. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d at 162-63. But we find no demand in this arrangement. Cheatham engaged her attorney and the attorney agreed to represent her, all with no state intervention of any kind. In order for there to be a state demand on a person's particular services, there must be the threatened use of physical force or legal process that leads that person to believe that they have no choice but to submit to the will of the State. Bayh, 573 N.E.2d at 417. Here the attorney was free to accept or reject representing Cheatham on whatever terms the two would agree. There is no express or implied requirement in the statute that any attorney represent any specific plaintiff. Nor does Cheatham have a right to an attorney in any case where punitive damages may arise. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d at 165. And no attorney may be compelled to represent a plaintiff to pursue punitive damages without compensation. Id. at 164. Nor is there any requirement that attorneys represent clients without receiving a fee. The statute limits the amount of the client's recovery. If the parties have a contingent fee contract that operates as a percentage of all amounts recovered by the plaintiff, it may serve to reduce the amount on which the attorney calculates the fee. But that presents no constitutional issue. In the first place, any effect of the statute on the fee is attributable to the fact that Cheatham and her attorney agreed to that arrangement. Second, even if, as a practical matter, a fee based on a percentage of all recovery is the only available arrangement, the statute places no demand on the attorney's services. In Gorka v. Sullivan, 671 N.E.2d 122 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), the Court of Appeals held that there was no state demand on the services of transportation carriers. In that case, the State requested the services of transportation carriers and offered them a contract outlining the fees they would receive for transporting Medicaid recipients. Id. at 131. The court held that the offering of the contract did not constitute a demand of the carriers' services, but was instead a request that the carriers had the option to accept or deny, so there was no unconstitutional demand. Id. The same is true here. Indiana Code section 34-51-3-6 is merely a limitation on the amount of recovery from a punitive damages award permitted to a plaintiff. If the decision is made to pursue punitive damages, attorneys and their clients do so with the statutory framework in place to restrain the value to them of any recovery. The statute makes no mention of attorneys or attorneys' fees and there is no implication that attorneys' services to anyone have been demanded or requested by this statute. In sum, section 34-51-3-6 became effective in 1995. Cheatham and her attorney had notice of this statute when the suit against Pohle was filed in 1998. The attorney's fees were subject to that obstacle just like all other potential barriers to success in a contingent fee contract.