Opinion ID: 390874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Challenged Personnel Regulations

Text: 11 The district court struck down each of the four Sheriff's Office personnel rules, see n. 1 supra, challenged by the plaintiffs for overbreadth and vagueness. 7 Of course, either vagueness or overbreadth standing alone would present a fatal defect in the regulations. While the district court may well have been correct in concluding that three of the challenged regulations are so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at (their) meaning and differ as to (their) application, Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1925), we do not reach that question with respect to § 12 of the Sheriff's Office Code of Conduct or General Rules 1 and 2. We affirm the judgment below invalidating these regulations on the premise that these three sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedom. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1313, 12 L.Ed.2d 325 (1964). 12 Section 15, however, is a different story. We find the prohibitions on conduct subversive of the good order or discipline of the department and the use of abusive, insulting or indecent language to a supervisory officer facially constitutional in the context of rules regulating police department conduct. Cf. Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1552, 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977) (upholding police officer's discharge for breach of regulation forbidding conduct which tends to subvert the good order, efficiency, or discipline of the police department). While we can envision circumstances in which § 15 would be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as applied, 8 this case does not present that problem. We are reluctant to circumscribe narrowly the sheriff's discretion in promoting the legitimate ends of discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity among his law enforcement officers. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 1445, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976). 9 Therefore, we reverse that portion of the district court's judgment holding § 15 unconstitutional and vacate the provision of its permanent injunction barring enforcement of § 15. 13 The First Amendment freedoms infringed by the other challenged regulations are not absolute. (T)he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Public employers may legitimately curtail public criticism from their employees to promote efficiency, loyalty, and departmental morale, provided that these interests outweigh the employee's interests in commenting on matters of public concern. Id. Yet, in an effort to limit offensive speech, the public employer may not employ a prophylactic approach that prohibits constitutionally protected expression. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-19, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302-05, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 83 S.Ct. 328, 337-38, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). 14 The overbreadth doctrine stands as a barrier against governmental regulation of speech which undertakes to limit proscribable speech but sweeps too broadly and inhibits protected expression. Parts of Section 12 and General Rules 1 and 2 collide with this barrier. Section 12 flatly prohibits unauthorized public statements. General Rule 1 denies department employees their right to speak to reporters on any topic that is or could be of a controversial nature. General Rule 2 forbids discussions of Sheriff's Office policy or procedure with any elected official. Section 12 and Rules 1 and 2 are facially overbroad. They explicitly forbid acts that departmental employees have a clear constitutional right to do. Although promoting loyalty, discipline, and efficiency in the department is a legitimate goal, these rules sweep beyond their intended ambit and impermissibly chill protected speech by the department's employees. 15