Opinion ID: 775759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continuing Violation Allegations

Text: 15 Weeks concedes that many of her claims were based on acts alleged to have occurred more than 300 days before she filed her EEOC complaint, but argues that they are preserved by the continuing violation exception to the statute of limitations, and that the district court therefore erred in granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss them. We review the dismissal de novo, but we must affirm if `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim[s] which would entitle [her] to relief.' Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). 16 Title VII permits recovery in cases such as this only for discriminatory conduct that occurred within 300 days of the plaintiff's filing of a complaint with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1996). The continuing violation exception to that limitation provides that if a plaintiff files a timely EEOC charge about a particular discriminatory act committed in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, the statute of limitations is extended for all claims of discriminatory acts committed under that policy. Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 907 (2d Cir. 1997); see Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 248-50 (2d Cir. 1999). 17 To invoke the doctrine, a plaintiff must show either (1) specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or (2) specific and related instances of discrimination [that] are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1993) ([M]ultiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation.). 18 Weeks fails to allege any specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices in either the Factual Allegations section of her amended complaint or in the description of her Title VII Cause[s] of Action. In describing her Cause[s] of Action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983--claims not at issue on appeal--she does allege that she was discriminated against pursuant to a DOP custom and policy of discrimination; but even if we were to consider this custom and policy in the context of the Title VII claims, such a conclusory allegation is wholly insufficient. 19 Weeks argues that writing down the words custom and policy in a complaint is sufficient to invoke the continuing violations exception, and stave off dismissal of otherwise untimely claims. She relies on the following highlighted clause from Lightfoot: Although the mere allegation of the existence of [a discriminatory] policy would be sufficient to withstand a challenge for failure to state a claim, something more is required to avoid summary judgment on the issue. 110 F.3d at 907 (emphasis added). The argument misreads the Lightfoot dicta. The distinction drawn is between the mere allegation of a discriminatory policy and the evidence of it; Lightfoot does not suggest that the discriminatory policy may be left unspecified or generic. The law is clear that the continuing violation exception applies only where there are specific or identifiable discriminatory customs or practices, or specific and related acts that are tantamount to such customs or policies. Examples include discriminatory seniority lists and discriminatory employment tests. Lambert, 10 F.3d at 53; see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907. So, what must be alleged to withstand dismissal on the pleadings, or supported by evidence to withstand summary judgment, is a discriminatory policy or practice, not the undertaking to come up with one: 20 a simple declaration that defendant's conduct violated the ultimate legal standard at issue (e.g., it was `because of sex' or `severe or pervasive') does not suffice. But it is enough to assert facts from which, construing the complaint liberally and in the plaintiff's favor, one could infer such a violation. 21 Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001). 22 Weeks contends that her allegations amount to a charge of a discriminatory policy because the discriminatory incidents she alleges continued for an extended period despite complaints she made to her employer's Affirmative Action Office (AAO). See Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 362 (2d Cir. 2001); Quinn, 159 F.3d at 765-66. Set forth in the margin are the allegations dismissed as untimely (¶¶ 13-19 of the amended complaint, as well as ¶ 20, which cites conduct of unspecified date). 2 The events pleaded, though embroidered with adjectives and adverbial phrases, are few and unlinked; they are not continuous in time with one another or with the timely acts that she has alleged. Quinn, 159 F.3d at 766. Significantly, the complaint dates no discriminatory incident within the three-year period between February 1993 and June 1996, see Amended Complaint ¶¶ 14(x)-19. At best, the gap is narrowed to a two-year period if one counts a June 1994 incident in which Weeks was given a 6 Month Recertification. Id. ¶ 18. Absent unusual circumstances, a two-year gap is a discontinuity that defeats use of the continuing violation exception. See Quinn, 159 F.3d at 766 (citing Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1992)). 23 Even if the alleged discriminatory incidents were continuous and related, Weeks cannot overcome the statute of limitations because her employer did not permit[] the violations to continue unremedied for so long that their repetition amount[ed] to a discriminatory policy or practice. Quinn, 159 F.3d at 766 (emphasis added). 24 The complaint effectively concedes that the DOP took remedial action on the (untimely) incidents through internal channels, to the extent Weeks reported them. The complaint does allege that she reported a problem to the AAO (misconduct by her supervisor, defendant Patrick Hoy, and others); but the same passage acknowledges that remedial action was taken. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 15-17. Other parts of the complaint are unhelpful in terms of a possible continuing violation, but even if they can be read as alleging a second report to the AAO (drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Weeks), it is clear that remedial action was taken on that occasion as well (by the transfer of her supervisor), see id. ¶¶ 19-20. 25 In sum, the complaint identifies no discriminatory policy of the DOP, and alleges no toleration of incidents that would be tantamount to such a policy.