Opinion ID: 2081521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of Dr. Gilliard's Testimony

Text: Appellant B.P. argues that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Gilliard's testimony about the results of her mental examination. Specifically, she contends that the government did not set forth sufficient facts and allegations in its petition to support a finding of neglect under D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(C), and that, as a consequence, it was impermissible under D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4) (2001) to allow Dr. Gilliard to give testimony about B.P.'s mental capacity based on his examination of her. This argument has merit. D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(1) provides that the trial court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, for good cause shown, order the mental or physical examination of the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child whose ability to care for the child is at issue. However, D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4) states: The results of the mental or physical examination shall not be admissible evidence in the factfinding hearing unless the allegations contained in the petition set forth facts which support a petition pursuant to D.C.Code, section 16-2301(9)(C). [Emphasis added.] The petitions in this case did not meet this statutory standard. Dr. Gilliard testified about B.P.'s mental condition at the hearing, but the government's neglect petitions contained very little in the way of actual facts to support a subsection (9)(C) claim of neglect. The relevant portion of each child's neglect petition stated only that said child's parent/guardian/custodian is unable to discharge his/her responsibilities to and for the child because of physical or mental incapacity (to wit, substance abuse and mental illness). The petition contained no other factual allegations of mental illness or other incapacity with respect to the mother. On its face, therefore, the petition falls short of the requirements of section 16-2315(e)(4). The guardian ad litem (GAL) argues that the examination results were not privileged and that they were therefore properly admitted. He cites D.C.Code § 16-2359(e), which states in part that neither the husband/wife privilege nor the physician/client or mental health professional/client privilege shall be a ground for excluding evidence in any proceeding brought under this subchapter. This provision, however, refers only to proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship (title 16, chapter 23, subchapter III), and not to neglect proceedings  such as the one in this case  which are brought under subchapter I. We will assume that the GAL meant to cite former D.C.Code § 2-1355 (recodified in the 2001 edition as D.C.Code § 4-1321.05), which states the rule applicable to neglect proceedings: Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 14-306 and 14-307, neither the husband-wife privilege nor the physician-patient privilege shall be grounds for excluding evidence in any proceeding in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia concerning the welfare of a neglected child; provided, that a judge of the Family Division ... determines such privilege should be waived in the interest of justice. This statute is not dispositive here, however, because the mother did not assert the physician-patient privilege as a basis for exclusion of Dr. Gilliard's testimony; indeed, she admits that she expressly waived that privilege. Both the mother and the GAL cite In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230 (D.C.1990), but that case is not helpful. The issue in In re O.L. was whether the trial court erred in overruling the mother's claim of physician-patient privilege with respect to the results of a court-ordered mental examination in a neglect hearing when the petition alleged neglect as defined in subsections (9)(B) and (9)(C). We concluded that the former D.C.Code § 2-1355 did not automatically waive the mother's privilege; rather, it gave the trial court the power to determine when a waiver would be in the interest of justice, id. at 1233, and only after a specific finding that the privilege should be waived . . . . Id. at 1234. As we have observed, however, the mother here does not seek the protection of the physician-patient privilege. Instead, she invokes D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4), which specifies that court-ordered examination results may be admitted at a fact-finding hearing only when the petition contains factual allegations that would, if proved, support a subsection (C) finding. [18] This was not an issue in In re O.L., because the petition in that case did contain detailed allegations about the mother's mental illness and drug usage. See id. at 1231 (quoting from the neglect petition). Because the neglect petitions did not allege sufficient facts to meet the requirements of D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4), we hold that Dr. Gilliard's testimony about the results of the mother's mental evaluation was improperly admitted.