Opinion ID: 778692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ambiguity in unadorned factor (k)

Text: 28 The meaning of the factor (k) model instruction as it existed at the time of Payton's trial was far from clear. 5 That instruction directed the jury to consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. Cal.Penal Code § 190.3. We approach jury instructions in the same way a jury would — with a `commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial.' Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 800, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381, 110 S.Ct. 1190). Most naturally read, the phrase extenuates the gravity of the crime refers to evidence relating to or ameliorating the crime itself. On its face, factor (k) does not encompass the kind of post-crime evidence of good works, leadership and religious beliefs that Payton presented at the penalty phase of his trial. 6 Certainly, the prosecutor's interpretation of this factor as excluding post-crime evidence bolsters the conclusion that the jury instruction was ambiguous in its application to Payton's mitigating circumstances. 29 The year after the jury announced Payton's death sentence, the California Supreme Court recognized the potential for jury confusion inherent in the wording of factor (k). People v. Easley, 34 Cal.3d 858, 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813, 825-26 & n. 10 (1983). The court acknowledged that there was some force to the argument that a jury might reasonably construe the text of the instruction to permit consideration only of circumstances that relate to the `gravity of the crime ' and not of circumstances that relate to the general character, family background or other aspects of the defendant.  Id. at 825-26. 30 The United States Supreme Court held that the factor (k) instruction was not ambiguous as applied to pre-crime background and character evidence as long as the trial court provided clarification of its meaning. 7 Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381-82 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1190. The Court held that factor (k) passed constitutional muster because there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled into believing it could not consider Boyde's mitigating evidence. Id. at 381, 110 S.Ct. 1190. 31 Boyde did not address the question whether, on its face, the unadorned factor (k) instruction is unconstitutionally ambiguous as applied to post-crime evidence. The fact that all of Payton's mitigating evidence was post-crime distinguishes this case from the pre-crime evidence at issue in Boyde which more readily fits within factor (k). 8 Payton, 258 F.3d at 928 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Significantly, Boyde distinguished the pre-crime evidence at issue there from evidence — such as Payton's — that pertain[ed] to prison behavior after the crime for which he was sentenced to death. Boyde at 382 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1190. 32 Unlike the pre-crime evidence in Boyde, post-crime mitigation evidence is simply not covered by any natural reading of the words of the unadorned factor (k) instruction. Mitigation evidence occurring after the crime cannot possibly extenuate the gravity of the crime. Because the unadorned factor (k) instruction does not encompass post-crime evidence, it violates Skipper 's requirement that the jury be permitted to consider post-crime good behavior as mitigating evidence in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See 476 U.S. at 5, 106 S.Ct. 1669. Standing alone, the factor (k) instruction is unconstitutional as applied to post-crime evidence. 33