Opinion ID: 2010460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cooke was denied the assistance of counsel in his defense.

Text: Generally, we do not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal. [68] The reason for that practice, in part, is to develop a record on that issue in a Superior Court Rule 61 post-conviction proceeding. In Cooke's case, however, the actions of trial counsel are not disputed and are clearly reflected in the Superior Court proceedings. [69] Therefore, the present record is sufficient for this Court to review Cooke's constitutional claims, including the argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. [70] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must typically satisfy the two-pronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington . [71] First, counsel's performance must have been deficient, meaning that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. [72] Second, if counsel was deficient, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [73] However, in United States v. Cronic, [74] a companion case to Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that there are three scenarios in which the defendant need not satisfy the Strickland test, because prejudice is presumed: (1) where there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) where counsel is asked to provide assistance in circumstances where competent counsel likely could not. The second circumstance applies in this case. In Cronic, the Court explained what it considered to be meaningful adversarial testing: The adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have counsel acting in the role of an advocate. The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted... the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated. [75] The Court further explained the defendant must show either the deprivation of a constitutional right of the first magnitude or specific errors of counsel [that] undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt. [76] The United States Supreme Court elaborated on Cronic's second exception more recently in Bell v. Cone. [77] In that case, the defendant's attorney failed to call witnesses, present available mitigating evidence, or make a closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial, although he did make an opening statement and cross-examine witnesses. The Court explained that in order to presume[e] prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's case ... the attorney's failure must be complete. [78] The Court further explained that in distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, [the] difference is not of degree but of kind, and that this distinction hinges on whether the petitioner alleges a defect in the proceeding as a whole or at specific points of the trial. [79] Noting that the defendant had alleged only that his counsel failed to introduce certain evidence and waived a closing argument, the Court held that these challenges were plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to Strickland's performance and prejudice components. [80] In this case, when Cooke exercised his ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions, his attorneys insisted on their own objective. The enormity of this conflict was accurately summarized by defense counsel during an exchange with the trial judge. They explained that Cooke had been nice and congenial in conversations with his attorneys, but in terms of where the two ships are sailing in this litigation, they're not on the same course. Cooke's overarching strategy was to obtain a verdict of not guilty by presenting evidence that he was factually innocent. Defense counsel had an independent and inconsistent strategy: to obtain a verdict of guilty but mentally ill by conceding Cooke's guilt and introducing evidence of his mental illness during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Counsel's override negated Cooke's decisions regarding his constitutional rights, and created a structural defect in the proceedings as a whole. Unlike the specific allegations at issue in Cone, the record in this case demonstrates to us a two-fold breakdown in the adversarial system of justice that pervaded Cooke's entire proceeding. [81] First, Cooke's attorneys did not assist Cooke with his trial objective of obtaining a not guilty verdict. [82] Second, in pursuing their own inconsistent objective of proving that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill, defense counsel not only failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, but also undermined the due process requirement that the State prove Cooke's guiltand his eligibility for the death penaltybeyond a reasonable doubt. [83] The defense attorneys introduced Cooke's confession to Dr. Turner, argued to the jury that Cooke's testimony was not credible, and told the sentencing judge and the jury that Cooke committed the crimes. Thus, on the issues of his guilt and his eligibility for a death sentencethe elements of capital murderCooke's defense attorneys' alignment with the prosecutors was complete. [84] Indeed, Cooke's attorneys helped the prosecution by introducing evidence against Cooke that was beyond the reach of the prosecutors. The assistance of counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their denial can never be treated as harmless error. [85] The conduct of Cooke's defense attorneys was inherently prejudicial and does not require a separate showing of prejudice, because Cooke's counsel negated his basic trial rights and failed to function in any meaningful sense as the [prosecution's] adversary. [86] Although done in good faith, defense counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Accordingly, we find no other alternative except to grant Cooke a new trial.