Opinion ID: 2806518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: IAC: Guilt Phase

Text: We turn now to Bemore’s claim that McKechnie offered ineffective assistance at the guilt phase by (1) presenting an “unprepared, uncorroborated, and uninvestigated” alibi defense, and (2) failing to investigate and present evidence of mental impairment that could have negated Bemore’s culpability. As we shall develop, the two subissues are closely related. To prevail on a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Counsel is deficient where he makes errors so serious as to deny the defendant the 20 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment—where he fails to offer “reasonably competent” assistance as measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Id. Reversal is warranted only if the defendant can show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A federal court applying AEDPA on habeas review must ask whether the state court was unreasonable in its application of Strickland, a question “different from asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. “The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. at 105.
alternative defenses “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. The duty to investigate is flexible, and not “limitless.” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 584 (9th cir. 1983)). Also, a tactical decision may constitute constitutionally adequate representation even if, in hindsight, a different defense might have fared better. See id.; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006). McKechnie’s investigation of defenses, we conclude, was so deficient as to fail these forgiving standards. Whether performance was deficient is a fact-specific inquiry; “[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 21 faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89. Prevailing professional norms do, however, provide insight into what it means to provide reasonably competent assistance. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4,7 (2009). Bemore was charged in 1985 and tried in 1989. During that period, “the prevailing professional norms, as outlined by the ABA Standards, required that a lawyer ‘conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case . . . .’” Doe v. Ayers, 782 F.3d 425, 434 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Van Hook, 588 U.S. at 7, 11) (internal alterations omitted). McKechnie’s investigation and preparation of the alibi defense did not meet this standard. The extent of McKechnie’s investigation was, apparently, reviewing police reports of the Wherehouse Records robbery and crossexamining at the preliminary hearing three eyewitnesses to that crime.10 McKechnie did not take steps to investigate the plausibility of the alibi by researching the timeline and geography to which Bemore planned to testify. He did not interview the eyewitnesses at all after the preliminary hearing, even though the trial was three years later. And the first and only time McKechnie met with Bemore to prepare the alibi testimony was the night before Bemore was to take the stand. Yet, Bemore’s alibi was the entire defense. 10 As indicated earlier, financial records show checks for “investigation” services made out to several payees, but the record does not indicate, and the state has not attempted to explain, what, if any, work was done. Any inference that productive work must have been completed is diminished by the allegations of fraudulent billing. 22 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL Because he expended such minimal effort, McKechnie did not learn of several critical flaws in the alibi presented. First, especially given the alibi’s central importance, McKechnie’s decision minimally to prepare Bemore, the primary alibi witness, was professionally unacceptable. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 890 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that failure to prepare a witness to testify “could [not] possibly ‘be considered sound trial strategy’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). Bemore was so unprepared that he could not supply basic facts about the crime, forgot his own direct testimony on cross, and testified to details easily disproved by investigator Cooksey’s rebuttal testimony.11 The discrepancies in Bemore’s testimony were so obvious that, in his closing argument, the prosecutor presented a chart comparing Bemore’s testimony on direct and crossexamination, telling the jury, “two people testified for the defense in this case. They were both named Terry Bemore.” Second, investigation into the geographical layout of Wherehouse Records and its surroundings would have revealed that the account Bemore provided on the stand rested in part on geographical features that were not there when the crime was committed. Third, and critically, a rudimentary investigation also would have demonstrated that it was possible for the same perpetrator to have committed both the Wherehouse robbery at 9:00 pm and the Aztec robbery and murder at 10:00 pm. Indeed, as McKechnie was aware from the preliminary hearing, the state initially charged, and the preliminary 11 McKechnie not only failed to prepare Bemore to testify, according to Barranco, but also rattled Bemore just before he took the stand by leaning over and whispering, “‘Just don’t act like a nigger’ or words to that effect.” BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 23 hearing magistrate judge found probable cause for, both crimes. In other words, the inherently risky “I was committing a different robbery” alibi was not really an alibi, as Bemore could have both committed that robbery and committed the murder. Bemore did testify to his whereabouts after the Wherehouse robbery, but that account was entirely uncorroborated, lacking in detail, and self-contradictory. Finally, McKechnie’s decision not to interview before trial the key eyewitnesses likewise contributed to the large gap in defense counsel’s pretrial information regarding the viability of the alibi. Such interviews could have revealed that one witness McKechnie planned to present to corroborate the alibi would recant. In light of Jacobs’s unavailability at trial, Salvatierra’s changed testimony meant that there was not a single witness testifying live before the jury who placed Bemore at Wherehouse Records. And Jacobs’s testimony, read to the jury by Barranco, was wavering, as she stated that she did not remember whether Bemore was the person she identified in a lineup after the Wherehouse Records crime; Jacobs thought the robber “might have been darker” than Bemore; and she indicated that, although Bemore’s face looked like what she remembered of the robber’s, she saw the robber’s face only “for an instant.” Counsel’s duty to investigate and to prepare his client’s defense becomes “especially pressing where . . . the witnesses and their credibility . . . are crucial.” Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1113. That is the case with regard to a lawyer’s decision whether to discourage his client from presenting an uncorroborated, implausible alibi theory, see Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1997), particularly in a capital case, where a penalty phase will follow. In that circumstance, it may well be preferable for the defendant not to take the stand where his alibi is weak, “thereby depriving the jury of [an] adverse credibility determination” that could 24 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL greatly undermine the jury’s sympathy for him at the penalty phase. Id.; see Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 181 (2004). The state maintains that these precepts are not pertinent here, as it was Bemore’s idea to present the alibi.12 But even if the alibi was suggested by Bemore, counsel cannot neglect to investigate both the possible alibi and alternative defenses. “Although a defendant’s proclamation of innocence . . . may affect the advice counsel gives,” it “does not relieve counsel of his normal responsibilities under Strickland.” Burt v. Tallow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013). We are not suggesting that, had McKechnie made an informed decision to present an imperfect, but well-prepared alibi, rather than a weak alternative defense (or no defense), that would necessarily have been deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But, as we develop later, in a capital case, the choice of guilt phase defense involves strategic decisions as to both the guilt and penalty phases. “[C]ounsel can hardly be said to have made a strategic choice when s/he has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision could be made.” Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1994)) (alteration omitted). “This is not a case where counsel ‘could not have predicted just how damaging placing [the defendant] on the stand would be.’” Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). With adequate investigation, McKechnie could have made an appropriate strategic choice and then competently advised Bemore as to whether to take the stand, 12 Bemore, by contrast, contends that McKechnie contrived that plan. We need not address that disagreement. As we explain, regardless of whose idea the alibi was, McKechnie was obliged to investigate it. BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 25 given the available alternatives. McKechnie, however, failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, nor did he make a reasonable decision rendering investigation unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Instead, McKechnie essentially abdicated his role as a lawyer in developing the principal defense. His failure adequately to investigate before putting on an alibi that was not really an alibi was constitutionally inadequate even under our “doubly deferential” review. Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. Moreover, and notably, a potentially “viable alternative defense”—a mental health defense—was quite possibly available, yet McKechnie did not investigate that defense, either. Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2001). The “deference owed [to] strategic judgments” to pursue one trial strategy and not an alternative is “defined . . . in terms of the adequacy of the investigations supporting those judgments.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Medical expert reports and statements by Bemore’s family and friends, all known or readily available to McKechnie at the time, evinced a possibility that Bemore was so mentally impaired as to be unable to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes. Dr. Fineman, hired by cocounsel Barranco to conduct an investigation for the penalty phase, issued an eighteen-page report a year before the trial began indicating that Bemore suffered from, among other mental defects, organic brain impairment and a “fundamental inability to control his behavior.” There was a possibility that Bemore had some form of mental illness, including bipolar disorder.13 According to Dr. Fred Rosenthal, a psychiatrist 13 There is no indication in the record before us that McKechnie was aware of the report. McKechnie led the guilt phase of the trial, and Barranco the penalty phase, with minimal overlap in their duties. Barranco stated that she placed the report “in the back of a file drawer” upon reading it. 26 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL hired by habeas counsel, bipolar disorder causes manic phases in which the individual “will become . . . impulsive, have lapses in judgment, and can even become psychotic.” Intermittent explosive disorder, another of the possibilities Dr. Fineman mentioned, causes episodes that “often resemble epileptic seizures” in which “the individual [may] engage in sudden violence and then have no memory of his actions when the episode ends.” Dr. Fineman’s declaration states that he “informed trial counsel of the test results and advised that a guilt-phase defense of diminished capacity was possible in this case, but recommended that further development was necessary.”14 No follow-up was ever conducted. McKechnie’s unawareness of the report—if he was so unaware—does not absolve him of his investigative duties or undermine the IAC claim with regard to the defense team as a whole. In Wiggins, the Court held that an investigation into a defendant’s background was deficient where counsel failed to uncover details about the defendant’s social history that were easily obtainable in “state social services, medical, and school records.” 539 U.S. at 516. Here, with minimal coordination between counsel, McKechnie should have been aware that Dr. Fineman had been engaged and that a report was in existence, and he should have read the report. 14 California’s diminished capacity defense had been abolished several years before Muck’s murder. See Cal Penal Code § 25 (1982). Dr. Fineman’s suggestion of a diminished capacity defense was therefore in error. But, although a criminal defendant on trial in California in 1989 could not use evidence of his mental health issues to demonstrate that he “could not” entertain the requisite mental state to commit the crime, and could not present evidence of insanity at the guilt phase, he nevertheless could introduce mental health evidence not rising to the level of insanity to demonstrate that “he did or did not” in fact possess the requisite mens rea. People v. Elmore, 59 Cal. 4th 121, 142–44 (2014) (quoting People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 350 (1949), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103 (1991)); see also Saille, 54 Cal. 3d at 1116–17. BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 27 McKechnie was also on notice that a number of Bemore’s family, friends, and acquaintances had described Bemore as having an erratic and “crazy” temperament. Transcripts of pre-trial interviews with several government witnesses reported that Cosby had described Bemore’s behavior during and after the killing as “crazy,” “frenz[ied]” and “berserk.” Another witness warned that Bemore was generally a calm, quiet person, but that he occasionally went into violent fits, “like a raging bull.” Finally, there were strong indications that Bemore’s daily functioning may have been impaired. Bemore’s brother testified at the penalty phase that Bemore was beaten with an extension cord and a cane in his childhood. McKechnie may also have been aware that Bemore suffered from periodic seizure-like episodes.15 Moreover, Bemore “freely admitt[ed] to at least a 10 year history of drug usage including PCP, heroin, marijuana and cocaine.” Dr. Isabel Wright, a social anthropologist hired for the penalty phase, explained in a letter to the judge that Bemore’s cocaine addiction left him “no longer able to control his behavior.” Taken together, these facts—or their availability on a proper investigation— would have alerted McKechnie to the possibility of serious mental-state issues that, properly investigated, might have given rise to an alternative to the alibi defense. 15 Bemore alleged in his state habeas petition that Cosby knew, and was willing to testify, that the drugs Bemore consumed made him “crazy,” and that Bemore “[s]ome times [sic] for no apparent reason . . . would start drooling like he had cerebral palsy.” Cosby’s declaration so stating, submitted in federal habeas proceedings, was not presented to the state court. However, Dr. Fineman’s declaration, which was before the state court, quotes from an “affidavit[]” of Cosby’s including the same language about “cerebral palsy” as quoted in Bemore’s state habeas petition and as appears in Cosby’s the later-submitted declaration. The record is not clear whether Cosby made these statements before the trial, and, if so, whether McKechnie was aware of them. 28 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL The state contends that, once McKechnie settled on the alibi defense, he had no duty to pursue a “directly conflicting” mental health defense. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1082 (1998); Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1266–68 (9th Cir. 1997). That contention puts the cart before the horse. Even if presenting mental health evidence would have conflicted with or diluted an alibi defense in this instance, that fact does not absolve counsel of a duty to investigate a mental health—or alibi—defense. That way, he could decide in an informed manner which defense was preferable, an especially critical decision where the weaknesses of an alibi should have been known. The cases the state relies on do not undermine our determination. In Turk, for example, counsel adequately investigated the self-defense strategy he ultimately chose, discovered significant evidence supporting that theory, and then made an informed decision not to pursue an insanity defense that would have conflicted with the requirement that a person who acts in self-defense act “as a reasonable person.” 116 F.3d at 1266. In Bean, counsel’s decision to reject a diminished capacity defense in favor of a properly investigated alibi defense was reasonable in large part because the defendant “refus[ed] to adopt the diminished capacity defense.” 163 F.3d at 1082. See also Phillips, 267 F.3d at 979–80 (explaining that Turk and Bean were not determinative of the IAC issue that case). These cases do not disturb the principle that counsel may not “settle[] early on an alibi defense,” without investigating potential mental health defenses: “strategic decisions . . . [must] be reasonable and informed.” Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1014 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). Nor are we convinced by the state’s arguments that counsel was absolved from his duty to investigate Bemore’s mental health because other evidence was inconsistent with BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 29 a guilt phase mental health defense. The state notes, first, that Dr. Fineman’s report mentioned possible unfavorable diagnoses, including anti-social personality disorder, in addition to bipolar disorder and other impairments. Relying on Hendricks v. Calderon, which held that “even where there is a strong basis for a mental defense, an attorney may forego that defense where the attorney’s experts would be subject to cross-examination based on equally persuasive psychiatric opinions that reach a different conclusion,” 70 F.3d at 1038, the state argues that where counsel has obtained an unfavorable expert report, he has no duty to “shop” for differing opinions. See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 947 (9th Cir. 2001). The state also emphasizes that evidence was adduced at trial suggesting that Muck’s murder was premeditated, deliberate and intentional, and maintains that defense counsel therefore reasonably declined to investigate a mental health defense. For example, forensic experts testified that he suffered a number of non-lethal stab wounds—a result, the state argued, of Bemore’s “unsuccessful effort to torture him into opening the safe.” And a number of witnesses testified that Bemore told them he would not have stabbed the clerk so many times had he opened the safe rather than fighting back. Because such evidence was inconsistent with a defense that Bemore did not possess the requisite mens rea for the crime, the state argues, abandoning any investigation of a mental health defense for the guilt phase was reasonable. The state’s arguments are misguided. First, Dr. Fineman indicated that “further development was necessary” before firm conclusions could be reached. McKechnie could not have determined whether the potentially favorable expert testimony would be undermined by the partially adverse preliminary findings without the benefit of an actual diagnosis. The principle that counsel need not doggedly seek 30 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL out a favorable expert report in the face of a conclusively unfavorable one does not negate counsel’s duty to follow up on a concededly preliminary report that both contained some potentially promising information and recommended further inquiry. Further, that there was likely to be evidence introduced at trial consistent with premeditation, deliberation, and intent, while critical to the prejudice inquiry—as we later explain—did not absolve McKechnie of the duty to conduct an adequate mental health investigation. Notably, the alibi defense necessarily depended on convincing the jury to discredit witness reports of Bemore’s incriminating statements. So a mental health defense would have been no worse in that regard than an alibi defense. And a follow-up mental health evaluation might have resulted in a diagnosis consistent with what happened during the murder.16 Without uncovering the weaknesses of the alibi defense or investigating the contours of a potential mental health defense, McKechnie was not in a position to determine which defense was the more promising strategy. Finally, many of the potential diagnoses the state cites as inconsistent with a mental health guilt phase defense would likely have been of benefit at the penalty phase. Porter v. McCollum, for example, held that an neuropsychologist’s 16 That Muck was stabbed repeatedly and over an extended period does not, as the prosecution argued, mean that the crime must have been carried out in a planned, deliberate manner. Moreover, had McKechnie made an informed decision and then pursued a mental defense, the forensic evidence that the stabbing occurred in this manner could have been disputed. Although we find it unnecessary to reach Bemore’s IAC claim regarding the failure to challenge the torture special circumstance, see infra note 19, we note that McKechnie made no effort to dispute the forensic evidence regarding the manner of the stabbing. BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 31 report that the petitioner “suffered from brain damage that could manifest in impulsive, violent behavior” established mitigating evidence that the petitioner was “impaired in his ability to conform his conduct to the law and suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” 558 U.S. 30, 36 (2009). Had he conducted an appropriate investigation, McKechnie might have determined that a mental health defense, even if a longshot at the guilt phase, was the superior choice in view of the impending penalty phase. In capital cases, “counsel must consider in conjunction both the guilt and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed.” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192. Where the evidence of guilt is substantial, “avoiding execution may be the best and only realistic result possible.” Id. at 191 (quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases § 10.9.1, Commentary (rev.ed. 2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 1040 (2003)). In such circumstances, counsel “may reasonably decide to focus on the trial’s penalty phase, . . . [and] must strive at the guilt phase to avoid a counterproductive course.” Id. Presenting a weak alibi defense at the guilt phase, and thereby risking losing credibility in advocating for a client’s life at the penalty phase, is often a questionable strategy, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged. See id. at 192; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.19 (1984).17 As noted 17 Empirical data shows that “complete innocence” guilt phase defenses are often risky, sometimes contributing to the imposition of the death penalty, and also that, even if a defendant does not express remorse for his crime, jurors react favorably to strategies that reflect an acknowledgment of responsibility. Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 Cornell 32 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL in Yarborough v. Gentry, if defense lawyers “make certain concessions showing that [they] are earnestly in search of the truth, then [their] comments on matters that are in dispute will be received without the usual apprehension surrounding the remarks of an advocate.” 540 U.S.1, 9–10, (quoting Jacob A. Stein, Closing Argument § 204, at 10 (1992)). Given the hazards of a weak innocence defense, counsel’s failure even to investigate Bemore’s potential mental health issues is a strong indication of deficient performance. Any single omission in McKechnie’s investigation and preparation may not, on its own, have rendered his performance “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. But taken together, and in light of the consideration that Bemore’s defense was entirely dependent on the weak, uninvestigated alibi, we conclude that “there is [no] reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105, by presenting that defense after failing to investigate either it or a mental health alternative.
We nevertheless affirm the district court’s denial of Bemore’s guilt-phase IAC claim. Reasonable jurists, we conclude, could disagree whether, as the trial actually went, Bemore has illustrated “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. In a case in which counsel’s error was a failure adequately to investigate, demonstrating Strickland prejudice requires L. Rev. 1557, 1589 (1998) (cited in Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192). BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 33 showing both a reasonable probability that counsel would have made a different decision had he investigated, and a reasonable probability that the different decision would have altered the outcome. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36. On the record before us, fairminded jurists could conclude either that (1) had McKechnie conducted an adequate investigation into the alibi and available alternative defenses, he would likely have presented the alibi defense anyway, or that (2) although a reasonably competent attorney would have chosen to pursue a mental health defense instead of the alibi, the mental health defense was not reasonably likely to succeed. To prevail on a mental health defense, Bemore would have had to prove either that “because of his mental illness or voluntary intoxication, he did not in fact form the intent unlawfully to kill,” Saille, 54 Cal. 3d. at 1117 (emphasis omitted), or that he was not guilty by reason of insanity—i.e., that he “was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the commission of the offense,” Cal. Pen. Code § 25. See Elmore, 59 Cal. 4th at 142–44. Bemore did present some evidence to the state habeas court tending to show that these standards might have been met. But given the evidence suggesting Muck’s murder was deliberate and premeditated, the record does not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any reasonable jurist would have concluded that a guilt-phase mental health defense was reasonably likely to have been successful in avoiding a guilty verdict. Perhaps most notably, no expert testimony was presented on habeas indicating that, had follow-up mental health investigation occurred, counsel could have presented evidence sufficient to establish a mental health defense to first-degree murder. Dr. Fineman did not conduct a followup evaluation of Bemore for the habeas petition, despite his 34 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL insistence that a follow-up evaluation was necessary to make any firm diagnosis of Bemore’s mental state. And he did not attest on habeas that Bemore’s mental state at the time of the offense was consistent with any guilt phase defense to the crime. Rather, Dr. Fineman averred only that the facts “gave rise to the guilt-phase defense of whether he was able to form the requisite intent,” and that “it is questionable as to whether he was capable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act and of distinguishing right from wrong.” (Emphases added). Dr. Rosenthal’s state habeas declaration is more definite. Dr. Rosenthal met with Bemore after trial, and, having reviewed Dr. Fineman’s preliminary report and other materials, declared that Bemore “was not able at the time of the homicide to form the requisite specific intent, premeditate, deliberate, or harbor malice . . . because of his extreme mental disorders and intoxication.” But any testimony negating Bemore’s sanity or intent to kill or to premeditate at the time of the crime would have been countered by the substantial evidence that the crime involved deliberate, premeditated decisions. Witnesses testified that Bemore told them he stabbed Muck because he did not open the safe upon demand. Thus, even had the defense presented a mental health defense, the jury could well have concluded from the evidence that the killing was done in a calculated manner by a perpetrator able to understand and intend the consequences of his actions. Bemore may well have garnered more sympathy with the jury had he presented a mental health defense—or no defense—in lieu of an incongruous alibi BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 35 defense.18 But the prejudice resulting from Bemore’s appearance on the stand is not a basis on which we may grant relief at the guilt phase (although, we later conclude, it is quite pertinent to our penalty phase analysis). See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003); Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). In sum, Bemore has not shown a reasonable likelihood that the result at the guilt phase would have been different but for counsel’s errors. The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was therefore not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.19 18 Even a better investigated and prepared alibi would not have likely have been successful. Numerous state witnesses testified to conversations with Bemore in which he had admitted involvement in the Aztec murder and robbery. Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 820–25. Bemore did not contest that his car was at the scene of the crime and that he was involved in opening and disposing of the stolen safe. And knives linked to Bemore were consistent with those used to kill Muck. Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 819–20. 19 We need not address Bemore’s additional argument that McKechnie rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at the special circumstances phase by neglecting to challenge the prosecution’s theory that Muck was tortured. Even if McKechnie had persuaded the jury not to vote for the torture special circumstance, Bemore would still have been death-eligible based on the robbery special circumstance. True, any ineffectiveness at the special circumstances phase may have prejudiced Bemore at the penalty phase—facts established regarding the length of time and degree of pain Muck suffered may have made it more likely that the jury would vote for the death penalty rather than life in prison. But because we ultimately reverse as to the penalty phase, based both on counsel’s ineffective representation in investigating mitigating circumstances and also on prejudicial spillover from the guilt phase IAC, it does not matter to our ultimate judgment whether Bemore was additionally prejudiced by counsel’s performance at the special circumstances phase. See United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1029 n.29 (9th Cir. 2014). 36 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL