Opinion ID: 496585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: unloading the goods

Text: 14 Section 8(b)(4)(i, ii)(B) of the Act, set out in material part in the margin, 2 casts a rather large shadow over this litigation. The Board's application of the statutory principles to the case at bar was, the appellant importunes us, erroneous in two respects: first, the Board's conclusion that the union engaged in unlawful secondary activity was flawed by an improper focus on the right to control the disputed platform work; and second, because the activities of Local 25 involved only the processing and enforcement of grievances under a collective bargaining agreement, Appellant's Brief at 17, the finding of violation was an unsupportable one. We assay these contentions separately. 15
16 Section 8(b)(4)(i, ii)(B) represents a legislative effort to accommodate twin lines of thought, lines which can easily snarl and tangle if not held straight and true. A union has a right to press a recalcitrant employer within the limits of the law; but, management has an equal and correlative right to be protected from becoming a union pawn in an end game directed at some other employer. Thus, in enacting Sec. 8(b)(4)(i, ii)(B), Congress sought both to preserv[e] the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and [to] shield[ ] unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own. NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692, 71 S.Ct. 943, 953, 95 L.Ed. 1284 (1951). Whether a labor union's behavior is unlawful depends on its object: is the pressure applied to force a change in the labor policies of the directly affected (i.e., primary) employer or of some other, more remote (i.e., secondary) employer? National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 632, 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1262, 18 L.Ed.2d 357 (1976). If the former, and if the means chosen are not themselves unlawful, the conduct is permissible. If the latter, the conduct is proscribed--secondary--even if the union members who stand to gain are on the payroll of the coerced concern. Id. at 644-45, 87 S.Ct. at 1268. 17 In this case, the Board found that Local 25's armtwisting was secondary because it was aimed at and in furtherance of the union's dispute with Sears--notwithstanding that Bodeli's arm alone was being bent. To be sure, the union's bottom line was the effort to salvage the platform work for its members. But, a broad goal of work preservation--laudable though that may be--does not save a labor organization harmless from the charge. If union pressure was brought to bear on the wrong entity, liability may attach notwithstanding the work preservation rationale. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1575 v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 439, 447 (1st Cir.1977). In short, the end does not justify every means. 18 The Board found that Sears--not Bodeli--was the primary employer and that the union's coercion, directed at a secondary employer, was therefore inappropriate. In order to enlist Bodeli's assistance in persuading Sears to reverse the decision to use self-help on the loading dock, the union turned its guns on Bodeli. In the circumstances of this case, that was forbidden conduct. See NLRB v. Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297, 305, 91 S.Ct. 402, 407, 27 L.Ed.2d 398 (1971). The record is replete with evidence--much of it uncontradicted--that Sears was the only game which was in season. Sears had absolute authority over the dock work. It was, in every meaningful sense, the ultimate arbiter of the job site. Sears agreed to subcontract to Bodeli only such chores as it chose. It was Sears which created the opportunity for platform work in the first place, Sears which destroyed that opportunity in the summer of 1985, and only Sears which could restore the lost jobs to the Teamsters. Without serious question, Sears and Sears alone possessed and exercised the right to control the work. Accordingly, Sears was the only allowable target of the union's quest. 19 The Court has held flatly that Sec. 8(b)(4)(i, ii)(B) will support a finding of an unfair labor practice where the union employs a product boycott to claim work that the immediate employer is not in a position to award.... NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, etc. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 525-26, 97 S.Ct. 891, 902, 51 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). Such coercion does not become lawful merely because it is designed to benefit the employees of the (improperly) coerced concern, id. at 529 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. at 903 n. 16, or because the coerced employer might be able to buy its way out of the dispute by paying higher wages to the affected union members. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 560 F.2d at 447. It is not necessary that the only object of the guild's actions be a secondary one; so long as an object is to pressure a neutral employer, the violation is complete. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. at 689, 71 S.Ct. at 951. These precedents appear to govern this case. 20 Appellant's rejoinder, essentially, is that under National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644-45 & n. 38, 87 S.Ct. at 1268 & n. 38, the Board was required to consider more than the right to control the work, and failed to do so. We find this position untenable. We have held before that, under the totality of the circumstances test, the Board has discretion to determine which circumstances it deems important. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 560 F.2d at 447. Put another way, it is for the Board to determine how important right to control is under the totality of the circumstances. Id. In this case, all of the pertinent facts were fully developed at the hearing. Those facts showed that Sears enjoyed a dominant position in its dealings with Bodeli. There was not the slightest basis for concluding that the intervenor had the right to assign the work and intentionally forfeited that right. See George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323, 328 (4th Cir.1973). Here, as in Koch, there was no intimation or trace of connivance or ... complicity.... Id. In the context of this case, the Board was amply warranted in concluding that the right to control the work was the overarching factor, and that the union, after it became aware of the dynamics of the situation, 3 nevertheless twisted the wrong arm, applying proscribed pressure on a neutral employer (Bodeli) in order to attempt impermissibly to influence the policies and practices of the primary employer (Sears). 21
22 Section 8(b)(4)(i) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(4)(i), prohibits unions from engaging in strikes or withholding services in furtherance of certain illegal objects. Section 8(b)(4)(ii), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(4)(ii), renders it unlawful for unions to threaten, coerce, or restrain in furtherance of those objects. This language is pragmatic in its application, looking to the coercive nature of the conduct, NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 68, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1069, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (1964), not to the label which it bears. It is, moreover, broad and sweeping. Read correctly, the statute encompasses virtually any form of economic pressure of a compelling or restraining nature. Associated General Contractors of California v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433, 438 (9th Cir.1975). The strike and the resultant picketing which occurred in this case were clearly proscribed by Sec. 8(b)(4)(i). Although Local 25 contends that such conduct was undertaken only as a means of enforcing the NEJAC award, the Board found otherwise. That finding was plainly supported by substantial--albeit inferential--evidence. A contract clause, however innocuous on its face, cannot be implemented by striking a secondary employer. See Enterprise Ass'n, 429 U.S. at 520-21, 97 S.Ct. at 899. 23 A closer question is presented as to the processing and enforcement of grievances. (Although the Board did not pass upon whether the union's grievance handling alone constituted unlawful secondary activity, see supra Part II, it did rule that Local 25's entire course of conduct--a course of conduct which prominently featured the processing and filing of multiple grievances--was violative of the proscriptions of the Act.) In the union's view, processing grievances under the collective bargaining agreement was classic primary activity addressed not to Local 25's problems with Sears, but to its contractual rights vis-a-vis Bodeli. So, the appellant's argument runs, such conduct could not properly be swept into the Board's Sec. 8(b)(4)(i, ii)(B) bin. We disagree. 24 In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983), the Court held that an employer's prosecution of a retaliatory state court suit against striking employees would amount to an unfair labor practice if filed with an improper motive and without a reasonable basis. Id. at 744, 748-49, 103 S.Ct. at 2172-73. See also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 2811, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). We apply Bill Johnson's by analogy here. 4 Cf. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 32 v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 773 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.1985) (applying Bill Johnson's test to union's effort to enforce arbitral award), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2277, 90 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986). 25 The Board found that the principal object of the flood of grievances which inundated Bodeli in the fall of 1985 was to pressure it, though a neutral employer, to use its influence on Sears to revive the preexisting work relationship. That finding was tantamount to a finding of improper motivation, for use of the grievance mechanism to achieve such an end is, as the Board ruled, secondary and violative of Sec. 8(b)(4)(B). [Sec. 8(b)(4)(i, ii)(B) ] The Board also held that, since three things were crystal clear--Bodeli had no right to control who did the platform work, Local 25 knew as much (at least from July 17, 1985 forward), and the collective bargaining agreement contained no prophylactic provisions protecting the union in the event the work was lost--the grievances were doomed to fail from the very start. It hardly warrants citation of authority to acknowledge that a party which undertakes an action (say, the processing of a stream of grievances) with an awareness of all the relevant facts and without the faintest hope of success on the merits, does so without a reasonable basis. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 743-44, 103 S.Ct. at 2170 (no reasonable basis if claim insubstantial or baseless); cf. Natasha, Inc. v. Evita Marine Charters, Inc., 763 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir.1985) (appeal frivolous when the result is obvious, or the arguments are wholly without merit) (citations omitted). 26 These findings are clearly consistent with the weight of the evidence adduced at the hearing. The scenario seems plain: the union, dismayed at the prospect of Sears' personnel taking over the dock work, chose to exert pressure in a variety of ways upon Bodeli, in the hope of influencing Sears to resume wearing the union label. The grievances--addressed to an employer which was powerless to award the controverted work--were but a tactical gambit, proffered without any basis in fact or in law. The weapons which Local 25 chose to employ in its struggle to regain the jobs comprised an assortment of unfairly coercive implements. The Board was well within its rights in holding that the union's course of conduct, including the scattershot filing of a succession of baseless grievances, amounted to the outlawed application of forbidden pressure in derogation of the Act.