Opinion ID: 4532790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: Statute of Limitations and Standing. Before reaching the substantive issues presented by this appeal, we turn to Falls City’s arguments regarding the statute of limitations and standing. Falls City argues that the district court erred in not ruling that the statute of limitations had run on all of the firms’ claims. But Falls City failed to file a cross-appeal on this issue, and therefore, such issue is not properly before us, which prevents us from reaching it.7 [4] Falls City’s argument regarding standing is different in that the question whether a party has standing is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time.8 Specifically, Falls City argues that the firms have assigned, at least, their legal claims to DH-1, which Falls City argues is an unlicensed collection 4 Williamson v. Bellevue Med. Ctr., 304 Neb. 312, 934 N.W.2d 186 (2019). 5 Id. 6 Wintroub v. Nationstar Mortgage, 303 Neb. 15, 927 N.W.2d 19 (2019). 7 See In re Estate of Graham, 301 Neb. 594, 919 N.W.2d 714 (2018). 8 See Hawley v. Skradski, 304 Neb. 488, 935 N.W.2d 212 (2019). - 30 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports DH-1, LLC v. CITY OF FALLS CITY Cite as 305 Neb. 23 agency and as a result lacks standing. We disagree. The record shows that the firms assigned their claims to DH-1. That assignment was not challenged below. As the assignee, DH-1 is the real party in interest and has standing to bring suit in this case.9 We disagree with Falls City’s argument to the contrary. Recovery Under Fee Agreement. [5-8] We now turn to the firms’ argument that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, they were entitled to a fee under the contingency fee agreement. The construction of contracts between attorneys and their clients as to compensation is to be governed by the usual rules relating to the construction of agreements generally.10 A contract written in clear and unambiguous language is not subject to interpretation or construction and must be enforced according to its terms.11 A contract is ambiguous when a word, phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings.12 A determination as to whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is to be made on an objective basis, not by the subjective contentions of the parties; thus, the fact that the parties have suggested opposite meanings of a disputed instrument does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the instrument is ambiguous.13 [9,10] Where a contract is found to be ambiguous, it is construed against the drafter.14 This court will not rewrite the contract to provide terms contrary to those which are expressed. 9 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-301 and 25-302 (Reissue 2016). See, also, Hawley v. Skradski, supra note 8. 10 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 457 (2019). 11 Meyer Natural Foods v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 302 Neb. 509, 925 N.W.2d 39 (2019). 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 See Beveridge v. Savage, 285 Neb. 991, 830 N.W.2d 482 (2013). - 31 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports DH-1, LLC v. CITY OF FALLS CITY Cite as 305 Neb. 23 Nor is it the province of a court to rewrite a contract to reflect the court’s view of a fair bargain.15 To support their argument that they are entitled to a fee under the agreement, the firms note that the fee agreement was broad both because it covered the “prosecution of any claims that Falls City may have and any claims Falls City may pursue” on behalf of a myriad of organizations or members of those organizations and because it included language allowing a fee to be recovered on the “receipt of securities, or other non-cash assets,” or on the present value of a structured settlement. The firms further contend that the district court erred in limiting the terms “prosecution,” “verdict,” and “settlement” to the context of formal litigation and that Falls City received benefits because of the underlying litigation even though Falls City did not ultimately obtain a verdict or settlement with the defendants in that litigation. We find no error in the decision of the district court. Our analysis begins with the plain language of the opening paragraph of the parties’ fee agreement. That agreement, which was entered into in November 2006, states that the firms were retained to pursue claims “against any person or entity thought to be responsible for damages sustained as a result of actions by NMPP, its employees or CPEP.” In addition to setting forth the 40- to 50-percent contingency fee owed in the event of recovery, the agreement also notes that the firms are entitled to “$15,000.00 as an Initial Fee . . . for the initial investigation . . . and drafting of the Complaint.” It also states that the firms were employed to “prosecute such claims and assign to them a lien against all amounts recovered by settlement or otherwise in connection with this litigation” (emphasis supplied). When read together, this language plainly envisions the agreement’s applying to the litigation as set forth in the 15 Meyer Natural Foods v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., supra note 11. - 32 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports DH-1, LLC v. CITY OF FALLS CITY Cite as 305 Neb. 23 complaint filed against NMPP, CPEP, and others alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy to cause injury to Falls City and others. By contrast, the agreement did not encompass other services the firms might provide to Falls City. The firms assert that the withdrawal agreement is within the consideration of the agreement. However, the firms have failed to establish what work they completed with regard to the withdrawal agreement and how such work would bring the withdrawal agreement within the parameters of the agreement’s delineated list of claims. Therefore, since no recoverable verdict or settlement occurred from the specified claims set forth in the agreement, the contingency has not been met requiring the payment of a fee. There is no merit to the firms’ claim that they were entitled to a fee under the agreement. Recovery Under Equitable Principles. [11] The firms also assign that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Falls City on its equitable claims. A claim that a court should imply a promise or obligation to prevent unjust enrichment goes by a number of names—“quasi-contract,” “implied-in-law contract,” or “quantum meruit.”16 Such claims do not arise from an express or implied agreement between the parties; rather, they are imposed by law “‘when justice and equity require the defendant to dis- gorge a benefit that he or she has unjustifiably obtained at the plaintiff’s expense.’”17 [12] Unjust enrichment or quasi-contract claims are viable only in limited circumstances. For example, “‘[t]he terms of an enforceable agreement normally displace any claim of unjust 16 Bloedorn Lumber Co. v. Nielson, 300 Neb. 722, 915 N.W.2d 786 (2018). 17 Id. at 729, 915 N.W.2d at 792, quoting City of Scottsbluff v. Waste Connections of Neb., 282 Neb. 848, 809 N.W.2d 725 (2011). - 33 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports DH-1, LLC v. CITY OF FALLS CITY Cite as 305 Neb. 23 enrichment within their reach.’”18 Put another way, an express contract claim will supersede a quasi-contract claim arising out of the same transaction to the extent that the contract covers the subject matter underlying the requested relief.19 [13] Though contract claims supersede unjust enrichment or quasi-contract claims, a plaintiff is permitted to allege both.20 We have said that when a plaintiff does so, a court should address the contract claim first.21 In this case, there was a contract, the contingency fee agreement, which expressly covered the litigation against NMPP. This agreement superseded the equitable claims to the extent of that contract. Thus, the issue presented is what work not covered by the fee agreement remains unpaid. There is no dispute that the firms would be entitled to compensation for work done on matters not covered by the fee agreement. Additional factual background is helpful to analyzing this issue. During the course of this litigation, the parties had engaged in discovery. As relevant, Falls City sought information regarding services provided by the firms, including “[w]hether the service provided related to the withdrawal agreement[, the] membership agreement[,] or some other serv­ ice the [firms] claim to have provided not covered by the contingency fee agreement.” To Falls City’s interrogatory, the firms responded as follows: The firm[s were] retained by [Falls] City to represent [Falls] City and its related entities in efforts to protect their interests and those of other community members of NMPP, MEAN and NPGA in [APEA,] which at the time 18 City of Scottsbluff v. Waste Connections of Neb., 282 Neb. at 860, 809 N.W.2d at 740, quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2, comment c. (2011). 19 Bloedorn Lumber Co. v. Nielson, supra note 16. 20 Id. 21 Id. - 34 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports DH-1, LLC v. CITY OF FALLS CITY Cite as 305 Neb. 23 was holding funds in excess of $20 Million and had valuable, proprietary, and profitable business interests. The firm[s were] to file a legal action against individuals and entities attempting to take APEA’s assets and business. There was no “contingency fee agreement” when the firm[s were] initially retained by [Falls] City. After the firm[s] filed the action and [were] in the midst of discovery, [Falls] City . . . requested that the firm[s] proceed on a “contingency fee agreement.” At all times, the scope of the engagement covered all efforts exerted by the firm[s] for a percentage of all benefits derived from the attorneyclient relationship. According to various motions to compel filed by Falls City, counsel attempted to clarify or get the firms to supplement this answer, but the firms stated they had no further answer. Following a hearing, Falls City’s motion to compel was granted, with the district court’s order noting: [Falls City] seek[s] to have [the firms] specify what serv­ ices were provided or what hours were spent outside the contingency fee agreement for which they have not yet been compensated (under any other agreement) and for which . . . Falls City received a benefit. Whether [the firms] can recover under an implied contract or other equitable theory of relief depends on whether they can show that they performed some services for the benefit of [Falls City] such that [Falls City] should be made to pay the reasonable value of those services. See Sorenson v. Dager, 8 Neb. App. [729], 601 N.W.2d 564 (1999). [The firms] have a duty to comply with the discovery requests by going through their time records and specifying such services. It was not sufficient for [the firms] to simply direct [Falls City] to hundreds of time records which have already been produced, especially if most of those serv­ ices were expended in performance of the contingency fee agreement. - 35 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports DH-1, LLC v. CITY OF FALLS CITY Cite as 305 Neb. 23 The firms were given 30 days to supplement their answers. No supplementation occurred, and Falls City filed another motion to compel. That motion was converted, with the agreement of all parties, to Falls City’s motion for summary judgment, which was granted, dismissing the firms’ equitable claims. For Falls City to obtain such relief as the defendant in this litigation, Falls City had to show that if this case proceeded to trial, the firms’ equitable claims would not have been successful, and that Falls City was entitled to judgment.22 Falls City did so by first relying on case law that showed that equitable claims based on actions which were covered by the contingency fee agreement should be determined under legal principles and not under equity. Given this, the only claims remaining could be those claims not covered by the contingency agreement. Because the firms, in their answers to interrogatories, declined to set forth any work they completed on behalf of Falls City outside of the contingency fee agreement, Falls City met its burden and was entitled to summary judgment. There is no merit to the firms’ equitable claim.