Opinion ID: 1694090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: federal and state constitutional rights the same

Text: The chancellor held that Article 3, Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution gives different due process rights to individuals than Amendments 5 and 14 of the United States Constitution. Thus, the chancellor in his opinion stated our Mississippi Constitution is much more restrictive than the due process clauses contained in the United States Constitution. [R. 1052] And, the dissent tells us our State Constitution is ... broader, more encompassing protection of individual rights. In any event, it is different. As noted by Justice Roy Noble Lee, this pronouncement ignores two landmark cases rendered by this Court. Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485, 71 So.2d 433 (1954), p. 444 states: The due process required by the Federal Constitution is the same `due process of law' which is required by Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (1977), p. 1081 states: The basic decision of the case then is the simple statement that Gillard's right to engage in intercollegiate football is not a property right that falls within the due process clause of either Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, both of which are identical. [Emphasis added] Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, involved state laws authorizing seizure and delivery of property to private litigants upon making bond. Armstrong v. Manzo, supra, involved Texas statute permitting final judgment in adoption proceedings in certain instances without service upon a natural father. In this case we are considering the due process violation of the utility companies who, acting under a state statute, raise their rates under bond prior to final determination of the authorized rate. At issue is whether or not the consumers are entitled to a notice and a hearing prior to the companies raising their rates. It is thus clear that the due process concept applied in Fuentes and Armstrong is the same as this case. While it is true the 14th Amendment proscription is against the states, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that any state law, or any state legal proceeding which operates to deprive a person of due process of law violates the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This is the precise state constitutional objection which the chancellor found to the Mississippi Statute, § 77-3-39. As we held in Walters and Gillard, the rights guaranteed the parties in these rate cases under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution are precisely the same. There cannot be a violation of the one without the other. [10] PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, J., join this opinion.