Opinion ID: 394855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Civil Court as a RICO Enterprise

Text: RICO § 1962(c) provides as follows: 15 It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 16 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Enterprise, as used in § 1962(c) is defined as follows: 17 enterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity; .... 18 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The enterprise in whose activities defendants are alleged to have participated through a pattern of racketeering, 7 is the New York City Civil Court. Defendants contend that governmental units such as the Civil Court are not enterprises within the meaning of RICO. 8 We disagree. 19 We begin with the language of the statute. On its face, the definition of enterprise is quite broad. We see no sign of an intention by Congress to exclude governmental units from its scope, cf. United States v. Turkette, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (construing enterprise to include illegal as well as legitimate ventures), and we note three pertinent aspects of the definition that suggest an expansive rather than a restrictive thrust. First, the term enterprise is defined to include( ) the entities listed thereafter. The use of the word includes, rather than a more restrictive term such as means, indicates that the list is not exhaustive but merely illustrative. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); United States v. Thevis, 474 F.Supp. 134, 138 (N.D.Ga.1979). See also 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction 82 (4th ed. 1973) (A term whose statutory definition declares what it 'includes' is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than where the definition declares what a term 'means' ). Second, the use of the word any indicates an intent to make the list all-inclusive. The inclusion of any individual, any ... partnership, any ... corporation, and so forth, belies an intention to distinguish, for example, between individuals having differing statuses, or between general and limited partnerships, or between business and municipal corporations. Finally, the word entity itself is hardly restrictive. It denotes anything that exists. As modified by the word legal, it suggests that any being whose existence is recognized by law is within the term enterprise. We conclude that on its face the definition of an enterprise to include( ) any ... legal entity is unambiguously broad, and that it does not exclude the Civil Court. 9 20 This conclusion is bolstered by certain of RICO's substantive goals, which appear to be directed particularly toward governmental entities. For example, racketeering activity is defined in § 1961(1) to include bribery, obstruction of justice, and obstruction of State or local law enforcement. The administration of justice and the enforcement of the law are obviously governmental functions, and bribery is a crime which is peculiar to public officials, including judges. United States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. 1091, 1096 n.12 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979) (table), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 S.Ct. 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980). Section 1961(1) also includes reference to the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which prohibits extortion under color of official right. Extortion under color of law is a crime which can only be committed in the context of governmental activity. United States v. Sisk, 476 F.Supp. 1061, 1062 (M.D.Tenn.1979): 21 At common law and under most statutes, bribery is limited to a payment given in exchange for the exercise of governmental power. Extortion under color of law is the use of governmental power to force an involuntary payment from another. By making bribery and extortion RICO offenses, Congress must be said to have understood that these offenses would be committed by governmental officials as a part of their work. Since these offenses can only be committed in the context of the work of a governmental agency, Congress must be taken to have intended that a governmental agency could be one of the types of enterprises, the affairs of which are conducted through a pattern of racketeering offenses. The connection between the named offenses of bribery and extortion and governmental work is too close to say that government work is not one of the kinds of activity that may constitute a RICO enterprise. 22 Id. 23 Our interpretation of the language of the statute to extend to activities affecting governmental entities is further supported by the purpose and legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (the Act), Pub.L.No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, of which RICO is Title IX. The overriding purpose of the Act, as reflected in Congress's Statement of Findings and Purpose, was to deal with a widespread problem the infiltration of organized crime into all areas of American life. While Congress was concerned principally with the relationship of crime to legitimate businesses, it does not appear that it intended to exclude the public sector from its assessment of the problem or its search for a cure: 24 The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. 25 It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. 26 84 Stat. 922-23 (emphasis added). Congress's concern about the infiltration of local governmental units had surfaced repeatedly in the debates on portions of the Act other than the RICO title. See comments in the Senate, e. g.: More important, these criminals have, in some localities, established corrupt alliances within the processes of our democratic society: with the police, prosecutors, courts, and legislatures. 116 Cong.Rec. 586 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); East of the Mississippi, particularly, it is the rare big-city government that is completely free of the fix. 116 Cong.Rec. 596 (reprinting Time Magazine cover story of August 22, 1969); Corrupt officials and bribed law enforcement officers operate as 'a silent conspiracy' in support of organized crime. The syndicate could not continue to operate without corrupt judges and prosecutors, or without the assistance of a handful of bribed police. 116 Cong.Rec. 601 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); see also Senate Judiciary Committee Report's discussion of Title VIII of the Act, the provisions aimed at syndicated gambling: Finally, Congress finds that corruption and bribery of State and local officials responsible for enforcement of criminal laws facilitate illegal gambling enterprises. S.Rep.No.617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969). Similar views were aired in the House of Representatives, e. g.: the Act places in the hands of the prosecution a number of necessary weapons in order to deal with the sophisticated operations of organized crime including its connections with many public officials. 116 Cong.Rec. 35203 (remarks of Rep. McClory); organized crime teaches the lesson that the law is for sale and that the road to success is to follow the path of corruption. 116 Cong.Rec. 35216 (remarks of Rep. McDade). Although the congressional discussion devoted expressly to Title IX did not state that governmental entities were to be the beneficiaries of RICO's substantive provisions, neither was there any statement that those entities were to be excepted. And of the three titles of the Act that create substantive offenses, RICO manifestly has the greatest substantive scope, and hence the greatest potential for dealing with corruption: the other two titles deal solely with illegal gambling activities (Title VIII), and with the importation, distribution, and storage of explosive devices (Title XI). 27 In sum, we view the language of § 1961(4), defining enterprise, as unambiguously encompassing governmental units, and we consider that the purpose and history of the Act and the substance of RICO's provisions demonstrate a clear congressional intent that RICO be interpreted to apply to activities that corrupt public or governmental entities. We note that this view is shared by virtually every other court that has considered the question. See, e. g., United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1980) (county prosecutor's office); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 857, 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (county law enforcement officials); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980) (County Attorney); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (county sheriff's department); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2152, 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980) (police department); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072, 98 S.Ct. 1256, 55 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978) (Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978) (police department); United States v. Sisk, supra, 476 F.Supp. at 1062 (state governor's office); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F.Supp. 195, 199 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978) (table) (Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia); United States v. Vignola, supra, 464 F.Supp. at 1095-98 (Philadelphia Traffic Court). 10 28 We find no merit in defendants' argument that the introduction in RICO of civil remedies such as divestiture and forfeiture of the defendant's interests in an enterprise compel the conclusion that governmental entities are not enterprises within the meaning of RICO. The fact that a convicted official will have no forfeitable property interest in a governmental unit does not suggest that that unit cannot be a RICO enterprise. As the Supreme Court stated recently in United States v. Turkette, supra, in rejecting a similar challenge to the inclusion of unlawful activities as RICO enterprises, 29 (e)ven if one or more of the civil remedies might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept. Congress has provided civil remedies for use when the circumstances so warrant. It is untenable to argue that their existence limits the scope of the criminal provisions. 30 --- U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 2530 (footnote omitted). To the extent that the remedy of forfeiture might be invoked to remove a defendant from his official position, we do not see its application as impermissibly altering sensitive federal-state relationships, by displac(ing) the State's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2474, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). In most instances, the issue would be moot since convicted felons are usually removed from office automatically. Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. of Crim. Law & Criminology 1, 13 n.108 (1978). 31 Nor do we find persuasive the argument that if the term enterprise is broad enough to include the New York Civil Court it would also be broad enough to include a federal court or other federal agencies, and that such a result could not have been intended in view of the many provisions in the Criminal Code dealing with corruption of federal officials. The existence of other provisions is not a persuasive argument for construing enterprise so narrowly. RICO was not intended to supplant these provisions. Section 904(b) of Title IX, 84 Stat. 947, provides that 32 (n)othing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this title. 33 RICO contemplates an overlap with other provisions of the Criminal Code. An essential element of a RICO violation is the commission of two or more predicate acts, all of which are crimes under state or federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), and a defendant may be punished separately for the RICO violation and the predicate crimes. E. g., United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 103, 66 L.Ed.2d 38 (1980). The Act expressly sought to establish new penal prohibitions, and to provide enhanced sanctions and new remedies. 84 Stat. 923. And RICO was intended to augment other provisions of the criminal law, and not to limit or be limited by them. See United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 235-238 (2d Cir. 1981).