Opinion ID: 2536912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: February 2009 Letter

Text: Based upon Trease's February 2009 letter indicating a renewed desire to proceed with postconviction proceedings, discharged counsel argues that this Court should either reinstate Trease's postconviction appeal or remand for another Durocher hearing. We deny Trease's request. In James, 974 So.2d 365, this Court did not allow the reappointment of counsel to resume postconviction proceedings after a prior waiver of postconviction counsel and proceedings. Specifically, James filed a postconviction motion in 1998 but then filed a pro se notice of voluntary dismissal of the postconviction proceedings in 2003. James, 974 So.2d at 366. The trial court [in 2003] held a hearing to determine whether James was competent and fully understood the consequences of dismissing the postconviction motion filed on his behalf. Id. [T]he 2003 hearing was conducted in complete accord with [this Court's] opinion in Durocher . Id. at 368. After the hearing, the trial court discharged postconviction counsel and allowed James to withdraw the postconviction motion. Id. at 366. Then, in 2005, James changed his mind, and collateral counsel filed a motion in the trial court to reinstate the postconviction proceedings. Id. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to reinstate. Id. On appeal of that denial, this Court noted that James was not attacking the validity of the prior waiver. Id. at 368. Instead, James has simply changed his mind and has decided he wants `to take up [his] appeals again.' Id. This Court held that a mere change of mind is an insufficient basis for setting aside a previous waiver. Id. Therefore, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of James' motion to reinstate postconviction proceedings. Id. Like the defendant's motion in James, Trease's pro se letter does not contest the validity of the Durocher hearing. Instead, Trease's letter indicates that he simply changed his mind. Based upon this Court's holding in James, this mere changing of his mind is an insufficient basis for setting aside his prior valid waiver. If this Court were to allow Trease to reinstate his postconviction proceedings based upon a mere change of mind, there would be nothing to stop Trease from changing his mind again at a later date. In fact, based upon Trease's history, this is a likely scenario. Then, the trial court would be required to conduct another Durocher hearing because Trease has a right to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings. Thereafter, Trease could again change his mind, and the trial court would be required to reinstate the postconviction proceedings. The cycle could continue indefinitely. Cf. Waterhouse v. State, 596 So.2d 1008, 1014 (Fla.1992) ([A] defendant may not manipulate the proceedings by willy-nilly leaping back and forth between the choices [of self-representation and appointed counsel]. (quoting Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253, 259 (Fla.1984))). Accordingly, because this Court in James held that a change of mind is insufficient grounds to set aside a prior valid waiver, we deny Trease's request to reinstate his postconviction proceedings.