Opinion ID: 2675964
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retaliation Claim Against the Board

Text: Trant argues that the Board terminated him in retaliation for his and his counsel’s statements threatening to reveal information related to the grand jury investigation to authorities. The familiar Garcetti/Pickering 2 analysis governs First Amendment retaliation claims. See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007). This test comprises five elements:
employee’s official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir. 2009). The first three elements are issues of law for the court to decide, while the last two are factual issues typically decided by the jury. Id. But see Cypert v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-050 of Osage Cnty., 661 F.3d 477, 483–84 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary 2 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). -9- judgment for defendants where plaintiff could not meet evidentiary burden at the fourth step). At the first step, our previous opinion in this case concluded that two of Trant’s statements were not made pursuant to his official duties—his statements about retaining counsel and his counsel’s statements about reporting alleged wrongdoing surrounding the grand jury investigation—and thus triggered First Amendment protection. See Trant I, 426 F. App’x at 660–61. We therefore proceed to the next four steps of the inquiry. At the second step, we determine whether the speech is a matter of public concern. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1202. Speech is a matter of public concern if it is “of interest to the community,” id. at 1205, and we “focus on the motive of the speaker and whether the speech is calculated to disclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Lighton v. Univ. of Utah, 209 F.3d 1213, 1224 (10th Cir. 2000). “Statements revealing official impropriety usually involve matters of public concern.” Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1205. The district court assumed, without deciding, that Trant’s speech involved a matter of public concern, and we agree. Irregularity in a grand jury investigation into a public agency’s alleged misconduct is a matter of public concern. Although Trant’s speech may have been motivated in part by his riff with the Board, the subject matter of the dispute concerned misconduct in a grand jury investigation involving official impropriety, -10- which is undoubtedly of interest to the community. Next, we determine “whether the employee’s interest in commenting on the issue outweighs the interest of the state as employer.” Id. at 1203. The only public employer interest that outweighs the employee’s free speech interest is “avoiding direct disruption, by the speech itself, of the public employer’s internal operations and employment relationships.” Id. at 1207 (quoting Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir. 1989)). When performing this step’s balancing test, the statement will not be considered in a vacuum; the manner, time, and place of the employee’s expression are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose. We have previously recognized as pertinent considerations whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). The employer’s interest in regulating an employee’s speech varies “with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee’s role entails.” Id. at 390; see also Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 934 (10th Cir. 1995). The district court held that, although the Board showed that many of Trant’s activities were disruptive, the Board did not meet its burden in showing that Trant’s protected speech was itself disruptive. -11- Because Trant’s claims can be resolved at a later step in the analysis, we will assume that the district court reached the correct conclusion. We note, however, that the Board was not required to show that the speech had in fact disrupted the OCME’s internal operations and employment relationships. It needed only to establish that the speech could potentially become so disruptive to the OCME’s operations as to outweigh Trant’s interest in the speech. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983). At the fourth step, if the employee’s interest in the speech outweighs the state’s, the employee must show that the speech was a “substantial factor or a motivating factor in a detrimental employment decision.” Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203. Even assuming the fourth step favors Trant, —that the Board terminated Trant at least partially because of his statement about hiring counsel—he does not show a fact dispute at the fifth step. 3 At the fifth step, if the employee establishes that his or her protected 3 The district court did not address whether Trant’s counsel’s statement about reporting wrongdoing to outside authorities was a motivating factor in his termination. Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is no dispute of material fact. Trant did not introduce any evidence that the Board members were aware of these statements at the time it scheduled the February 5 meeting or at the meeting itself. Trant can only argue that there was temporal proximity between his counsel’s statement and Trant’s termination. But this does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Trant’s counsel’s statement was a motivating factor in his termination. See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 746 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The mere temporal proximity of Plaintiff's protected speech to his termination is insufficient, without more, to establish retaliatory motive.”). -12- speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, “the burden then shifts to the defendant, who must show by a preponderance of the evidence it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected activity.” Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). This inquiry, also known as the Mt. Healthy analysis, arises from the Supreme Court’s recognition that a “rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a part” in an adverse employment decision “could place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing.” Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285; see also id. at 286 (“But [a borderline or marginal] candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in [protected] conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its decision.”); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006) (discussing Mt. Healthy) (“If there is a finding that retaliation was not the but-for cause of the discharge, the claim fails for lack of causal connection between unconstitutional motive and resulting harm, despite proof of some retaliatory animus in the official’s mind.”); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359 (1995) (“We held [in Mt. Healthy] that if the lawful reason alone would have sufficed to justify the firing, the employee -13- could not prevail in a suit against the employer.”). The district court granted summary judgment for the Board because it found the Board would have fired Trant regardless of his protected speech based on the allegations of sexual harassment and insubordination after his suspension. Trant acknowledged the incidents underlying the court’s holding, but he disputed that they amounted to sexual harassment or insubordination. The district court held, “Despite arguing that these grounds are merely pretext, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence actually contradicting Defendants’ stated reasons for termination. Thus, there is no issue of fact as to whether but for [Defendants’] alleged retaliatory motive, Plaintiff’s employment would not have been terminated.” Trant, 2012 WL 6690358, at . Trant argues that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof by requiring him to prove pretext at the summary judgment stage. He also argues that the record demonstrates that there are factual disputes as to the sexual harassment and insubordination allegations. We are not persuaded. Summary judgment is appropriate on the fifth step when “any reasonable jury would [have found] that [the plaintiff] would have been terminated even absent any desire on the Defendants’ part to punish him in retaliation for his allegedly protected speech.” Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d 97, 117 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Couch v. Bd. of Trs. of Mem’l Hosp. of Carbon Cnty., 587 F.3d 1223, 1244–45 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment in part -14- because defendants met their burden at the fifth step); Guilloty Perez v. Pierluisi, 339 F.3d 43, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2003) (granting defendants judgment as a matter of law based on Mt. Healthy analysis); Heil v. Santoro, 147 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); Harris v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1086 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, for example, in Anemone, the court found that the “undisputed evidence” of the plaintiff’s insubordination and the employer’s “ongoing efforts to address it—efforts beginning well before any allegedly protected conduct—” were sufficient to meet the defendants’ burden at the summary judgment stage. 629 F.3d at 117. And it was significant that the plaintiff was aware that his job was in jeopardy before he engaged in the protected conduct. See id. at 118. Anemone is instructive in its discussion on the proper way to conduct a Mt. Healthy analysis: [A]lthough the language in Mt. Healthy refers to the plaintiff’s [protected] conduct, the Court’s analysis, properly understood, attempts to weigh the impact of the defendant’s impermissible reason on the defendant’s decision to act. . . . The relevant question then, with respect to Anemone’s speech to the [New York] Times, is not whether he would have suffered termination absent the speech itself, but rather whether even without the improper motivation the alleged retaliatory action would have occurred. Id. at 120. Similarly, in Couch, we held that a public hospital had met its burden at the fifth step because it would have taken the same actions against the plaintiff, a staff physician at the hospital, even absent the plaintiff’s protected speech. 587 -15- F.3d at 1244–45. The plaintiff had accused other physicians at the hospital of using alcohol and illegal drugs and forcefully advocated for changes in drug and alcohol testing policy. Although the district court had granted summary judgment for the defendants at the fourth step, we held that alternate grounds existed at the fifth step of the Garcetti/Pickering test. Id. We concluded the alleged retaliatory conduct—hospital investigations of allegations against the plaintiff concerning disruptive conduct, billing fraud, and patient mistreatment and subsequent corrective actions—was “entirely appropriate” considering the serious allegations against the plaintiff and the recommendations of the investigations. Id. at 1245. The district court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Trant at the fifth step. In deciding that the Board would have fired Trant regardless of his statements about hiring counsel, the district court concluded that the Board had met its evidentiary burden at the fifth step. Trant’s bare assertion of pretext is simply another way of arguing that the Board did not meet its burden of proof that it would have fired Trant even absent his protected speech. But the reasons the Board offered were sufficient to show that any retaliatory motive was not the butfor cause of Trant’s termination. Considering the recent sexual harassment scandals at the OCME, Trant’s admitted statements to and about Ballard provided the Board more than a sufficient reason to terminate his at-will employment. Trant’s rebuttal evidence, that his actions did not constitute sexual harassment under the law, does not call -16- into question the soundness of the Board’s decision. The Board was justified in firing Trant for his misconduct even if it did not result in an actionable sexual harassment claim, especially as he was the head of an already scandal-plagued agency. The Board had interests in the smooth functioning of the agency and repairing the agency’s public image. Even though there may not have been an actionable claim of sexual harassment, there was an interest in eliminating the appearance of impropriety. Because “the lawful reason alone would have sufficed to justify the firing,” Trant cannot succeed on his claim. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 359; see also Couch, 587 F.3d at 1245 (holding that hospital would have taken same “entirely appropriate” actions concerning plaintiff’s alleged misconduct even absent plaintiff’s protected speech). Trant asserts that his alleged insubordination was a pretext for his termination. He supports his argument in two ways. First, he argues the Board’s directive to contact only certain people was open to interpretation. This, however, contradicts Trant’s own deposition testimony, in which he stated he understood he was to contact only Dr. Duval or Chris Ferguson. See App. 2701. Second, Trant points to the testimony of the Board’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, 4 who explained that there was no public reason offered for Trant’s termination. Trant argues that this testimony shows that the Board was unable to identify a basis for 4 Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits an entity to designate an individual to testify on its behalf in a deposition. -17- termination and that his alleged insubordination was “an excuse seized upon to attempt to avoid liability for the First Amendment violation.” Aplt. Br. at 48. But the Rule 30(b)(6) witness’s testimony—that there was no public reason given for Trant’s termination—is not inconsistent with Board members’ testimony that Trant was insubordinate. And the handwritten notes from the February 5 meeting, which indicate that the Board members fired Trant for violating the terms of his administrative leave, undermine Trant’s claim that the insubordination was a post hoc excuse for a retaliatory termination. We see no dispute of material fact. Finally, it is undisputed Trant’s conflict with the Board over the management of the OCME predated any of Trant’s protected speech. Trant recognized that his job was in jeopardy because of this conflict before any Board meeting was called, as his January 28 email to Andrews makes clear. The handwritten notes from the February 5 Board meeting list a dozen reasons for terminating Trant. The Board members articulated several legitimate bases for termination—in addition to those cited by the district court—including Trant’s questionable judgment in holding onto the emails related to the grand jury investigation for two months before revealing them, erratic behavior, conflicts with legislators in the media, failure to follow the reorganization plan, and ineffectiveness as Chief Medical Examiner. The impact of any impermissible motive on the Board’s decision to act was minimal in light of Trant’s inappropriate comments, insubordination, and other serious reasons for -18- termination. See Anemone, 629 F.3d at 120. Because the Board has introduced sufficient undisputed evidence to establish that it would have terminated Trant absent any alleged retaliatory motive, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment for the Board. 2. Retaliation Claims Against Ballard, Jordan, and Balzer Trant next argues that Cherokee Ballard, Tom Jordan, and Sandra Balzer took retaliatory actions against him as a result of his protected speech. These claims require a different analysis since the Garcetti/Pickering test is not appropriate for a First Amendment retaliation claim against a defendant who is not the plaintiff’s employer. See Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000). Instead, under Worrell, claims against non-employers must satisfy three elements: “(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). At the summary judgment stage, some facts must demonstrate the defendants “acted on the basis of a culpable subjective state of mind” to satisfy the third step. See McCook v. Spriner Sch. Dist., 44 F. App’x 896, 905 (10th Cir. -19- 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the defendant’s intent in urging adverse action against the employee is not retaliatory (e.g., if the defendant identifies legitimate problems with employee’s qualifications or performance) or if the defendant’s conduct did not cause the adverse action, then the defendant may successfully defend the retaliation claim.” Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1213. And temporal proximity between the protected speech and the alleged retaliatory conduct, without more, does not allow for an inference of a retaliatory motive. See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 746 (10th Cir. 1999). We previously concluded that Trant engaged in protected speech, so we proceed to the second and third elements. 5
The district court correctly granted summary judgment for Ballard. Trant alleged that Ballard participated in the creation of a press release issued by state Representative Randy Terrill that accused Trant of stealing OCME property. The district court correctly determined that there was no record evidence of Ballard’s participation. Trant notes that he was unable to provide specific evidence for his allegations because the district court did not rule on his motion to compel Terrill 5 Ballard and Jordan were Trant’s subordinates. We have never held that true subordinate employees may be liable for First Amendment retaliation claims. The Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that true subordinates can be liable for an employer’s retaliation—only final decisionmakers may be liable. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 369 F.3d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 2004). Because Trant’s claims do not satisfy the Worrell test, it is not necessary to decide whether true subordinates may be liable for retaliation claims. -20- to provide testimony by the time Trant had to respond to the summary judgment motion, but Trant does not allege the court erred in denying the motion. Trant also alleged that Ballard participated in reporting to the media that Trant had stolen OCME property. But Trant mischaracterizes Ballard’s statements. Ballard merely responded to inquiries at a press conference initiated by Trant’s attorneys regarding missing OCME property. She explained that records indicated that Trant had checked out certain items and had not returned them. She never referred to the items as stolen. Further, there is no evidence that her statements were substantially motivated by Trant’s protected speech.
The district court also correctly granted summary judgment for Jordan. Trant alleged that Jordan twice advised the media that Trant was “inept or incompetent, was a liar and was mentally unstable.” Trant, 2012 WL 6690358, at . Trant concedes that these feelings predated any protected speech, but alleges that Jordan’s decision to go to the media was retaliatory. 6 Trant has pointed to no evidence, besides temporal proximity, that Jordan’s comments were substantially motivated by Trant’s protected speech or that Jordan made his comments with a retaliatory intent. Jordan’s comments are plainly 6 There is a fact dispute as to whether Jordan made the alleged statements to the media at all. Jordan asserts that any media quotes attributable to him actually came from an email that Trant circulated to a Board member. For purposes of summary judgment, we will resolve this factual dispute in favor of the non-moving party and assume Jordan went to the media. -21- directed at the ongoing dispute about Trant’s management of the OCME that preceded any protected speech. They bear no relation to Trant’s protected speech, which concerns hiring an attorney and reporting grand jury improprieties to authorities. Indeed, Trant’s statements do not implicate Jordan because they concerned only the Board, of which Jordan was not a member. This fact “implies that [Jordan did not have] any motivation for retaliating against” Trant. Butler, 172 F.3d at 746.
Finally, we also see no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Balzer. Balzer, a lawyer in the Oklahoma Attorney General’s office, was responsible for providing legal advice to the Board. Trant alleged that she participated in his termination by condoning the unlawful retaliation against him. Specifically, he argued that she condoned his termination by remaining silent when the Board considered firing Trant on February 5 in part because of his protected speech. Trant has not introduced any evidence that Balzer’s alleged condoning of the action was substantially motivated by the protected speech. She advised the Board on the legal definition of sexual harassment and advised them that they possessed the authority to fire an at-will employee. There is no evidence that she recommended Trant’s suspension or termination. Further, Trant provides no evidence that Balzer deliberately avoided advising the Board about the -22- unlawfulness of terminating an employee for his protected speech—nor is it clear that the situation called for such advice.