Opinion ID: 1554807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expert Opinions on Circumstantial Evidence

Text: McWatters argues that the State solicited improper opinion testimony from Dr. Diggs and Sergeant Shirk. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the province of the jury was improperly invaded by Dr. Diggs' opinion that within a reasonable degree of medical probability, a rape occurred and Sergeant Shirk's opinion that the crime scene was consistent with a sexually motivated crime. While the State did not formally tender the witnesses as experts, Dr. Diggs and Sergeant Shirk appear to have been called as expert witnesses. A trial court's decision on the admissibility of an expert opinion is subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See Anderson v. State, 863 So.2d 169, 179 (Fla.2003). McWatters contends that the opinions invaded the province of the jury because the experts' specialized knowledge about the circumstantial evidence was not helpful to the jury. Assuming without deciding that McWatters preserved his arguments for appeal by raising his arguments to the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert opinion testimony. In Dailey v. State, 594 So.2d 254 (Fla. 1991), a detective admitted as an expert in a homicide and sexual battery case testified during the penalty phase. He testified that because the victim's body was found nude and her clothing scattered, it was highly likely that a sexual battery or attempt had occurred. Id. at 258. This Court rejected the defendant's argument on appeal that the testimony was within the common understanding of the jury, holding that because the detective had extensive training and experience in homicides and sexual batteries[,] his expert testimony was helpful in consolidating the various pieces of evidence found at the crime scene. Id.; see also Smith v. State, 28 So.3d 838 (2009) (upholding admission of expert opinion that aspects of the crime scene were consistent with a sexual battery having occurred). Likewise, we find that the expert opinions offered in this case, which were based on the training and experience of the witnesses, were helpful to the jury. McWatters also argues based on Farley v. State, 324 So.2d 662 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), that the opinions were improper because the expert witnesses opined that a legal standard was applicable to the facts of the case. We disagree. In Farley, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in allowing an expert to testify that based on the presence of sperm in the alleged victim's vagina, she had been raped. The Fourth District distinguished the doctor's opinion in that case from the permissible opinion offered in North v. State, 65 So.2d 77 (Fla.1952). The doctor in North testified, Because of the multiplicity, nature and distribution of various wounds on this body, [he] concluded that they were most consistent with the person having been assaulted, principally by blunt force, and that the method of assault is most consistent with strangulation. Farley, 324 So.2d at 663 (quoting North, 65 So.2d at 87). The Fourth District explained that the expert's opinion in North that an assault caused the victim's injuries was proper because the expert did not opine about whether there was a felonious assault or who made the assault. Id. Like the expert opinion in North, Dr. Diggs used the terms rape and homicide to describe, based on the evidence and his professional training, what he believed likely happened to Bradley. He did not opine conclusively that Bradley was in fact raped or that McWatters was guilty of a crime. Sergeant Shirk's opinion that the crimes were sexually motivated likewise offered an explanation of why the women were attacked, without applying a legal standard or identifying a perpetrator. Finally, McWatters points to a line of cases holding that law enforcement officers may not testify to common patterns of criminal behavior and then opine that the defendant's behavior was consistent with such a pattern. McWatters cites Nowitzke v. State, 572 So.2d 1346 (Fla.1990), where this Court held that it was improper for an expert to testify that drug addicts often steal from their families and commit homicides to support their habit. The Court explained that testimony concerning past crimes that did not involve the defendant cannot be introduced to demonstrate that the defendant committed the crimes at issue. Id. at 1355. McWatters overlooks that in Anderson v. State, 841 So.2d 390 (Fla.2003), this Court distinguished Nowitzke. In Anderson, an investigator testified that based on his training, it was not typical to find evidence of a hit-and-run accident on both sides of the road ninety feet apart, and thus he did not think that the crime scene was a hit-and-run traffic homicide. The Court held that this opinion testimony was admissible because it was not about past crimes or criminal patterns, but rather about the investigator's experience investigating hit-and-run crimes. Id. at 400-01. The opinions offered in the instant case are more analogous to the expert opinion in Anderson. The opinions were not offered to prove that McWatters was the perpetrator of the crimes or to demonstrate some propensity on his part. Rather, they were offered not to show who committed the crimes but to help the jury assess what happened at a crime scene by explaining the experts' experience with such crime scenes. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the challenged testimony.