Opinion ID: 3063838
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Other Accessibility Codes

Text: Barker and Access Now further contend that the district court abused its discretion in barring evidence of stricter accessibility codes. The district court ruled before trial that Barker and Access Now could not refer to the ADA or Guidelines, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, the Georgia Accessibility Code, the Georgia Fair Housing Act, or O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. Barker and Access Now assert that this ruling impermissibly limited their cross-examination of Rafael Garcia as to whether he had considered other standards besides the FHA when he designed the Clairmont Campus housing. We find these arguments lack merit. “Trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross- examination based on concerns about, among other things, confusion of the issues or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1994). We review a district 11 court’s restriction on cross-examination for abuse of discretion. See id. at 1371. The district court did not abuse its discretion in this matter. The record reflects that the district court overruled Bolton’s objection and permitted Barker and Access Now’s counsel to impeach Garcia on cross-examination by asking him whether he had considered accessibility codes that were stricter than the FHA. Upon further cross-examination, Garcia admitted that he had considered two other standards other than the FHA when he designed the Clairmont Campus housing and that those standards generally required greater accessibility than the FHA guidelines. Although Garcia was precluded from mentioning the names of the other accessibility codes, this minor restriction was reasonable because only the FHA was at issue in the trial. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.