Opinion ID: 808270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forest Service Road 512

Text: -5- The trust argues that the 1976 patent reserved a certain right-of-way in Road 512 and provided that it would terminate if the United States ceased to use the road or any segment. See supra n.1. The trust argues that it made a conclusive showing that an obliterated segment of the Road 512 easement had not been used for five years and therefore, title should have been quieted in the trust, not the United States. Aplt. Br. 48; Aplt. Reply Br. 25. The trust relies upon the following: (1) the Forest Service published a decision memorandum closing and obliterating a portion of the road and removed the road surface, leveled the area, and planted grass on a smaller portion, and (2) Mr. Brandt declared that, to the best of his knowledge, the Forest Service had not used any part of the easement for five years and took issue with certain statements of Forest Service personnel about some of the claimed use. Aplt. App. 101; Aplee. Supp. App. 1–2. The trust argues that the United States failed to present any evidence that the obliterated portion had been used, and therefore the entire Road 512 easement terminated. The district court considered the trust’s argument that non-use of Road 512 terminated the easements for Roads 512 and 517. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust, 2008 WL 7185272 at  & –18. That is precisely the argument the trust made in response to the United States’ motion for summary judgment. 2:06-cv-00184-ABJ, ECF Doc. 147 at 25–26. In its own motion for summary judgment, the trust argued, consistent with its counterclaim, that non-use of Road 512 terminated the easement for only Road 512. Aplt. App. 72; -6- 2:06-cv-00184-ABJ, ECF Doc. 140 at 22–23. The district court held that the trust could not create a genuine issue of material fact as to non-use of Road 512 based upon Mr. Brandt’s affidavit that the Forest Service did not use the closed portion of Road 512. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust, 2008 WL 7185272 at –18. The trust admits that Road 512 has been used as a private road and Mr. Brandt allows the Forest Service, law enforcement, and emergency personnel to enter through a gate at the south end. Aplt. App. 71; Aplee. Supp. App. 2; Aplt. Reply Br. 24–25. Instead, the trust argues that the evidence submitted by the United States, Aplt. App. 151–56, listing over 30 incidents of use simply does not establish that the obliterated segment of Road 512 was used from 1996–2003. Even assuming that the trust could create a genuine issue of material fact as to use of the obliterated portion of Road 512, 2 we would reject the contention that non-use of part of the road is sufficient to terminate the entire easement, be it Road 512 or Road 517, or both. The meaning of “the easement traversed thereby,” which defines what terminates upon non-use, is the operative language. So as to give effect to all of the terms, “the easement traversed thereby” refers 2 We reject the trust’s contention that the United States failed to provide any evidence of use of the obliterated portion. See Aplt. App. 151–56; Aplee. Supp. App. 8–11. Such a conclusion would be particularly anomalous given summary judgment standards which require that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009). -7- back to non-use of “the above roads [Road 512 or 517], or “any segment thereof.” The trust’s reading essentially eliminates “any segment thereof.” Moreover, the language refers to easement in the singular which is completely at odds with the argument the district court considered: that non-use of one of the roads, or a segment thereof, results in termination of both easements, no matter the use being made of each. We note that the trust did not contend (either in its counterclaim or in the briefing) that non-use of a segment of Road 512 results in the termination of the easement in that segment, and we do not address it. See Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distribs. Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2012). AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court