Opinion ID: 768882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 5 Beltran's petition is subject to the transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 3 For that reason, we are precluded entirely from granting relief on two of Beltran's three claims. Section 309(c)(4)(E) of the transitional rules deprives us of jurisdiction to review the Board's discretionary denial of Beltran's applications for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997). Beltran contends that this provision violates her due process rights, but we have previously rejected this argument, and do so here. See Antonio-Cruz v. INS , 147 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998). Because the Board's denial of suspension of deportation and its denial of voluntary departure are supported by the Board's exercise of discretion, we lack jurisdiction to review those rulings. See Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152; Antonio-Cruz, 147 F.3d at 1130. 6 IIRIRA does not, however, deprive us of jurisdiction to review the denial, discretionary or otherwise, of Beltran's application for registry. 4 We have jurisdiction for that purpose under 8 U.S.C. S 1105a (1994) and S 309(c) of the transitional rules. We proceed, therefore, to address Beltran's registry claim. APPLICATION FOR REGISTRY 1. Statutory eligibility 7 The registry statute, 8 U.S.C.S 1259, is a remedial provision designed to regularize the status of long-resident aliens illegally in the country. Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560, 569 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); see also Rodriguez-Barajas v. INS, 992 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993). Congress originally enacted the registry statute in 1929 and has updated it periodically since. It now applies to an alien who (1) entered the United States prior to January 1, 1972, (2) has resided in the United States continuously since that time, (3) is a person of good moral character,  and (4) is not ineligible for citizenship. 8 U.S.C. S 1259. 5 The Board concluded that Beltran foundered on the third element: because her two convictions represented crimes of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(A), she could not demonstrate good moral character as that term is defined in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(f)(3). 8 The central question before us is whether Beltran's convictions under 18 U.S.C. S 1546(b)(3) (making false attestation on an employment verification form) and what is now 42 U.S.C. S 408(a)(7)(B) (1988) (using false Social Security number) constitute crimes of moral turpitude  within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(A). The text of the statute and federal decisional law provide no clear answer to this question. Congress spoke to this issue, however, in 1990 when it amended 42 U.S.C. S 408, one of the two sections under which Beltran was convicted. The amendment added a new subsection 408(d), which provided that aliens who had been granted permanent resident status under the amnesty or registry statutes were exempted from prosecution for certain past use of false Social Security numbers. 6 The amendment does not apply in terms to Beltran, but its rationale illuminates the view of Congress concerning the lack of moral turpitude involved in Beltran's actions. In explaining the purpose of the exemption from prosecution, Congress's conference committee report states: 9 The Conferees intend that this exemption apply only to those individuals who use a false social security number to engage in otherwise lawful con duct. For example, an alien who used a false social security number in order to obtain employment which results in eligibility for social security benefits or the receipt of wage credits would be considered exempt from prosecution . . . . 10 . . . The Conferees believe that individuals who are provided exemption from prosecution under this proposal should not be considered to have exhibited moral turpitude with respect to the exempted acts for purposes of determinations made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 11 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, at 948 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2653 (Conference Report). These principles are relevant to Beltran's case. The crime of use of a false social security number, of which Beltran was convicted, is one of the crimes described in 42 U.S.C. S 408(a)(7), for which immunity is granted byS 408(d) to aliens who have been granted amnesty or registry. 7 Specifically, she used a false social security number in order to obtain employment which results in eligibility for social security benefits or the receipt of wage credits . .. . Conference Report at 948, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2653. 12 Beltran's crime of false attestation was also addressed by the 1990 amendment to S 408. The exemption from prosecution in S 408(d)(1) applies, with exceptions not relevant here, to any alleged conduct described in paragraph (6) or (7) of subsection (a). That conduct includes false use of a Social Security number, which encompasses its use in such a document as an employment verification form. Thus the Conference Committee's comments apply both to the crime of use of a false Social Security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 408(a)(7)(B) and to the crime of false attestation with such a number in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1546(b)(3). 8 13 Of course, Beltran was not exempted from prosecution under S 408(d). The exemption grants immunity from future prosecution for past acts to persons who are granted permanent resident status under specified statutes, including the registry statute, 8 U.S.C. S 1259. Beltran was convicted before she sought registry. 9 But the question before us is not whether Beltran should have been exempt from prosecution, but whether the crimes of which she was convicted involved moral turpitude. Section 408(d), in the light of its legislative history, establishes that use of a false Social Security number to further otherwise legal behavior is not a crime of moral turpitude when the user is granted amnesty or registry without first having been convicted for the behavior. The only reasons Beltran would not be immunized by S 408(d) upon being granted registry relief is that her crimes were committed a few weeks too late and she had already been convicted of them. Those deficiencies have nothing to do with the morality of her conduct. Exempt from prosecution or not, the underlying behavior is the same. We conclude that S 408(d) and the accompanying legislative history express Congress's intent that the crimes of which Beltran was convicted do not establish moral turpitude with respect to determinations made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 14 We find further support for this conclusion in the distinction between malum prohibitum, an act only statutorily prohibited, and malum in se, an act inherently wrong. As the exemption from prosecution indicates, Beltran's acts are mala prohibita, not mala in se. As such, they are not generally considered to involve moral turpitude. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379 n.21 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing W. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law S 6 (1972)). The Board recognizes this same distinction. See In re Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (BIA 1980) ([Moral turpitude] has been defined as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude.). 15 Although we would normally defer to the Board's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, we need not do so here because we conclude that the intent of Congress is clear. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986). 10 We therefore conclude that the Board erred in determining that Beltran's convictions establish moral turpitude within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(A), and in ruling that Beltran was statutorily ineligible for registry on that ground. 16 The Board's alternative exercise of discretion in denying Beltran registry does not insulate its decision from reversal. When a decision of the Board is subject to our review and no statute limits our jurisdiction to review discretionary determinations, we review the Board's exercise of discretion to determine whether that discretion has been abused. See, e.g., Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1995). A discretionary decision by the Board is subject to remand if it was reached by including an improper factor, see Ng v. INS, 804 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1986), or if it rests upon a legally erroneous conclusion, see Ananeh-Firempong v. INS , 766 F.2d 621, 629 (1st Cir. 1985). In weighing the factors leading to its discretionary denial of Beltran's application, the Board cited respondent's convictions; her unlawful employment; her repeated use of Ms. Wingbermuehle's personal information and identity over a period of almost 20 years for her own use and benefit; . . . the time, effort and expense incurred by the IRS and the Social Security Administration to discover, investigate and cure the problems caused by the respondent . . . . Although the Board did not expressly mention moral turpitude in its exercise of discretion, its reference to Beltran's convictions and conduct underlying those convictions leads us to conclude that the Board did rely in some measure on its erroneous conclusion that Beltran's convictions were for crimes of moral turpitude. 17 We reach no conclusion as to whether Beltran meets all the statutory requirements for registry, or, if she does, whether she merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the Board. But because we conclude the Board erred in its interpretation of the term moral turpitude as it applied to Beltran, and that this error impermissibly infected the Board's discretionary denial of relief, we reverse and remand to the Board for further proceedings. DUE PROCESS CLAIM 18 We reject Beltran's claim that she was denied due process when the immigration judge permitted witness Wingbermuehle to testify telephonically at Beltran's deportation hearing. Wingbermuehle was a sworn, out-of-state witness, and her testimony was subject to cross-examination. We have previously upheld the admission of this form of testimony under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a). See Alderman v. SEC, 104 F.3d 285, 288 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publications, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1393, 1398-99 n.2 (D. Or. 1990), aff'd, 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1993). We conclude that Wingbermuehle's testimony, therefore, could not have violated INA S 242(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. S 1252(b)(3) (1988) (recodified with amendments at INA S 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. S 1229a(b)(4)), which guarantee Beltran a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [her] . . . and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government. Beltran relies on Saidane v. INS, 129 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997), but this case is inapposite because Wingbermuehle's testimony was not hearsay. See Official Airline Guides, 756 F. Supp. at 1398-99 n.2 (telephone testimony is taken in open court). 19 The question then becomes whether admission of Wingbermuehle's testimony was fair. Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1983). Beltran had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Wingbermuehle. The government had reason to arrange for telephonic testimony because Wingbermuehle lived in Missouri and the hearing was in San Diego. Although the telephone presentation cost Beltran the opportunity to have the witness's demeanor more fully observed by the finder of fact, the testimony would have been admissible in a civil court proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a). We conclude that admission of the testimony was fair, and we accordingly reject Beltran's due process claim.