Opinion ID: 159197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fear of Cancer 99-1199

Text: 56 The district court granted Cotter's motion for summary judgment on Dodge plaintiffs' claim for damages for emotional distress caused by their increased fear of cancer. In their cross-appeal, Dodge plaintiffs contend the ruling was error. Because the ruling represents a final judgment appropriate for review under 28 U.S.C. §a1291, it, unlike the other issues mooted by our disposition, remains viable. We review the district court's order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) as did the district court. Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 1997). In this process, we draw all inferences in the non-movant's favor and analyze Colorado law afresh. Mares v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 971 F.2d 492, 496 (10th Cir. 1992). 57 To survive summary dismissal of this claim, Dodge plaintiffs argued their exposures to hazardous materials caused a range of physical conditions: bony growths, cataracts, headaches and irritability, to name a few. They contended these physical injuries met a threshold for recovery under Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Colo. 1978), which abolished the physical impact requirement in negligence cases for emotional distress and permitted a plaintiff who is subjected to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm because of another's negligence to recover upon proof of the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance. Id. at 1164, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §a436(2). Having met this requirement with the evidence of an array of manifestations of physical injuries, Dodge plaintiffs, relying on Boryla v. Pash, 960 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1998), then contended Colorado law recognized their right to recover damages for their resulting objective fear of developing cancer. 58 The district court rejected the argument, observing Dodge plaintiffs offered no evidence of an objectively reasonable chronic, continuing physical manifestation to support their fear of an increased risk of cancer as required by Towns and Boryla. 13 Dodge plaintiffs now argue the court misapplied Colorado's 'physical impact' rule, which gives inference to the genuineness of Plaintiffs' fears so as to permit the jury to consider damages. We disagree. 59 In Boryla, plaintiff sought non-economic damages for emotional distress including the fear of an increased risk of the recurrence of her cancer as a consequence of her physician's failure to promptly diagnose her breast cancer. 960 P.2d at 123. Reversing the Court of Appeals' granting defendant a new trial, the Colorado Supreme Court rested its discussion on what it believed was a clear distinction between fear of cancer cases arising from a medical malpractice setting and those involving toxic torts. 14 It stated, In cases where the plaintiff demonstrates that her cancerous condition physically worsened as a result of the delayed diagnosis, the plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficient physical injury to permit the recovery of emotional distress damages. Id. at 128. In contrast, the court noted a toxic tort case required a different standard because the plaintiff has yet to experience the onset of cancer, id., but believes the particular exposure makes him vulnerable to that increased risk. 15 60 The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, For these reasons, traditional negligence principles which focus on proximate cause as well as the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear are sufficient to evaluate fear of cancer claims in medical malpractice claims. Thus, Boryla was a medical malpractice case, and the court expressly limited its analysis and holding to that arena. Id. 61 Dodge plaintiffs, however, would extend the analysis to embrace their toxic tort claim, equating the manifestation of certain acute conditions with a permanent objective injury leading to an increased risk of cancer. In the absence of any indication the Colorado Supreme Court would permit such an expansion, we decline to do so. Nor is it necessary here. At a minimum, Dodge plaintiffs failed to set forth any evidence that they suffer from a chronic objective condition caused by their increased risk of developing cancer to permit their recovery for emotional distress damages. Although counsel would sweep every physical manifestation plaintiffs alleged under this mantle to satisfy Boryla, its efforts are misplaced. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate on the claim. 62 We therefore REVERSE and REMAND the case for a new trial. However, we AFFIRM the order granting summary judgment on the fear of cancer claim.