Opinion ID: 2263053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: costs actually incurred

Text: We must decide whether the CAB's determinations of the costs actually incurred by Eagle under the void contract with DPW were based on substantial evidence in the record, and whether the CAB erred in holding that the District was entitled to a refund of its excess payment. For the most part, we affirm the trial court's decision, but in two respects we must reverse and remand for further proceedings. We review the CAB's factual findings deferentially. As this court said in Belcon, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority, 826 A.2d 380, 384 (D.C.2003): The Board's factual findings shall be final and conclusive and shall not be set aside unless the decision is fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence.  D.C.Code § 2-309.07 (2001) (emphasis added). Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion. Epstein, Becker & Green v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 812 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C.2002). So long as a finding is supported by substantial evidence, we must accept it, even though there may also be substantial evidence in the record to support a contrary finding. Harrison v. University of the District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 19, 22 (D.C.2000). Our review of the CAB's conclusions of law, however, is guided by a somewhat different standard: [W]hile as to questions of law . . . [the Board's] decision is not final or conclusive. . . nonetheless, we give careful consideration and great respect to [its] interpretation because legal interpretations by tribunals having expertise are helpful even if not compelling. . . . This deference is especially proper in cases such as this involving mixed questions of fact and law where the Board  and [this court] on review  must examine a detailed record of the parties' course of dealing and performance. Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 620 A.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. 1993) (citations omitted). Eagle seeks compensation under D.C.Code § 2-302.05(d)(2), which provides that [if] a contract is void, a contractor who has entered into the contract in good faith [and is not otherwise disqualified] shall be compensated for costs actually incurred  (emphasis added). It is important to emphasize here that the CAB determined, and the trial court agreed, that under this statute costs actually incurred are those which are properly allocable to the work, are reasonably incurred, and are allowable under the applicable cost principles. In other words, the CAB said, actual costs must be reasonable costs. This formulation is consistent with Abadie v. Organization for Environmental Growth, Inc., 806 A.2d 1225 (D.C.2002), in which we held that termination costs are allowed only if they are reasonable, allocable to the contract, consistent with cost accounting standards and generally acceptable accounting principles and practices, and consistent with any limitations in the contract or regulations with respect to the type or amounts of costs. Id. at 1227 (footnote omitted). A cost is reasonable if, in its nature and amount, it does not exceed that which would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of competitive business.. . . No presumption of reasonableness shall be attached to the incurrence of costs by a contractor. . . . [T]he burden of proof shall be upon the contractor to establish that such cost is reasonable.  Id. at 1228 (citation omitted; emphasis added in Abadie ). Any findings relating to the reasonableness of those costs must be supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1227.