Opinion ID: 57479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether ERISA Preempts McAteer's Negligence Claims

Text: Because McAteer's appeal is not moot, we now turn to the merits of her arguments regarding ERISA preemption. As noted above, McAteer asserts that because she brought only state law negligence claims, ERISA does not preempt her causes of action and her case should be remanded to state court. In support of her position, McAteer relies on this court's decision in Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776 (5th Cir.1994), in which we held that ERISA does not preempt state law negligence claims. Id. at 786. Silverleaf, however, contends that Hook is no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004). Therefore, Silverleaf asserts that McAteer's claims do arise under federal law and are properly removable. Typically, whether a claim arises under federal law is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule. PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W.R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 543 (5th Cir.2005). Pursuant to the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Supreme Court has created an exception to this rule when federal law wholly displaces a state law cause of action through complete preemption. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). ERISA provides one such area of complete preemption. See id. The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans. Davila, 542 U.S. at 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488. To that end, § 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), states that ERISA shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may !kw or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. . . . Further, § 502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), sets forth the exclusive grounds for relief under ERISA. The Supreme Court has stated that a law relates to an employee benefit plan and is preempted if it has a connection with or reference to the plan. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.E d.2d 490 (1983). Under Fifth Circuit precedent, to determine whether a state law relates to a plan for purposes of ERISA preemption, the court asks (1) whether the state law claims address areas of exclusive federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan; and (2) whether the claims directly affect the relationship among the traditional ERISA entitiesthe employer, the plan and its fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries. Woods v. Tex. Aggregates, L.L.C., 459' F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2006); Hook 38 F.3d at 781. In Hook this court addressed those questions in a situation identical in all relevant respects to the instant appeal and concluded that ERISA did not preempt the plaintiff s claims. 38 F.3d at 786. As described by the court in Hook, Morrison Milling Company (MMC) enacted an ERISA plan in lieu of subscribing to. Texas workers' compensation insurance. Id. at 778. As part of the plan, Roxanne Hook agreed to waive her rights to bring suit against MMC and agreed that the plan's benefits were the exclusive remedy for personal injuries. Id. at 778-79. Following a job-related injury, Hook brought a state law negligence claim against MMC, and MMC removed the case on the basis of ERISA preemption. [2] Id. at 779. On appeal, we held that Hook's negligence claim was not preempted by ERISA, characterizing it as totally independent from the existence and administration of MMC's ERISA plan. Id. at 784. We also noted that Hook's claim did not affect Hook's administrator-beneficiary relationship with MMC, but only the employeremployee relationship. Id. at 783. With respect to MMC's contention that Hook's claim related to an ERISA plan because Hook waived her claims as part of her enrollment in the ERISA plan, we stated that this argument turn[ed] ERISA preemption analysis on its head. . . . Id. at 785. We reasoned that following MMC's logic would enable employers to avoid any state law simply by referring to that law in its ERISA plan. Id. Therefore, we [chose] to adhere to our traditional mode of analysis, as prescribed in ERISA § 514(a): a law or claim is preempted when it relates to an ERISA plan, and not the reverse. Id. Under Hook, the result in this case is clear. State law negligence claims for failing to maintain a safe workplace are not preempted by ERISA, even if the employee signed a waiver of such claims in order to participate in an ERISA plan. Absent an intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision, we are bound by the panel's decision in Hook. See United States v. Rodriguez-Jaimes, 481 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir.2007). Consequently, McAteer's state law negligence claims in this case are not preempted by ERISA and must be remanded. Silverleaf does not dispute that Hook requires this result, but instead contends that Hook is no longer good law as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Davila. We disagree. In Davila, the Supreme Court reversed this court's holding that certain state law claims were not preempted by ERISA. 542 U.S. at 214, 124 S.Ct. 2488. At issue were claims by several plaintiffs that administrators of ERISA plans failed to use ordinary care when making medical treatment decisions. Id. at 204-05, 124 S.Ct. 2488. The plaintiffs brought their claims under section 88.002 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which imposes a duty of ordinary care on health maintenance organizations when making health care treatment decisions. Davila, 542 U.S. at 205, 124 S.Ct. 2488. The Supreme Court held that a claim was preempted (1) if an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and (2) where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant's actions. . . . Id. at 210, 124 S.Ct. 2488. The Court determined that the plaintiffs in Davila complain[ed] only about denials of coverage promised under the terms of ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans. Id. at 211, 124 S.Ct. 2488. The Court recognized that Texas law created a duty of ordinary care that was owed by the defendants but that such duty was not independent of the ERISA plans. Id. at 212-13, 124 S.Ct. 2488. In other words, whether the plan administrators negligently declined to pay for certain medical treatments under Texas law depended on whether the ERISA plans provided for such coverage. See id. at 213, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (stating that the interpretation of the plan was an essential part of the plaintiffs' claims). The Supreme Court criticized this court for focusing on the distinction between a tort claim and a contract claim, stating that the label of a cause of action is not determinative. Id. at 214-15, 124 S.Ct. 2488. Further, the Court noted that ERISA need not strictly duplicate a state law cause of action in order for the state law to be preempted. See id. at 214-16, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (noting that even if a state law authorizes remedies beyond those permitted in ERISA, it may still be preempted). In the instant case, Silverleaf has not demonstrated how Hook is inconsistent with Davila. Silverleaf quotes in detail the Supreme Court's criticism of the Fifth Circuit for distinguishing between tort and contract claims and the Supreme Court's conclusion that even state law claims that are not identical to ERISA claims can be preempted. However, simply because the tort claims in Davila were preempted by ERISA does not mean that all tort claims are similarly preempted. Instead, the court must apply the reasoning used in Davila and consider not only whether McAteer's claims could have been brought under ERISA but also whether her claims arise from a legal duty independent of ERISA. See id at 210, 124 S.Ct. 2488. This court has already determined that state law negligence claims for failing to maintain a safe workplace are independent of ERISA. See Hook, 38 F.3d at 784. Thus, even under Davila, McAteer's claims are not completely preempted by ERISA. Further, this court has continued to apply Hook even after the Davila decision. In Woods v. Texas Aggregates, L.L.C., we considered whether ERISA preempted a plaintiffs claim for negligent maintenance of an unsafe workplace. 459 F.3d at 601. Although we cited Davila for general preemption propositions, id. at 602, we then applied Hook to conclude that ERISA did not preempt the plaintiffs negligence claims, noting that Hook remains good law. Id. at 602-03, 603 n. 5. Consequently, we are bound' by both Hook and Woods in this case and conclude that McAteer's workplace negligence claims are net preempted by ERISA. Davila does not mandate a different result, and the district court erred in so ruling. Therefore, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court.