Opinion ID: 2531181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Facial Challenges Contrasted With As-Applied Challenges

Text: ¶ 57 The special concurrence would find that claimants mischaracterized their challenge as a facial one rather than an as applied challenge. The special concurrence further asserts that this court is not bound by the parties' conception of the case, and we can instead make our own assessment and proceed to recharacterize the case as an as applied challenge. It then concludes that if we view this case as an as applied challenge, then the majority's analysis and conclusion (which the special concurrence says really invokes an as-applied analysis) is both appropriate and correct. See infra ¶ 100 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring). ¶ 58 There are some problems with the special concurrence's observations, the first of which is evident from its own standard of what constitutes a facial challenge. Quoting a law review article, the special concurrence states the following: [A] `valid rule facial challenge' is premised on the notion that because of something a statute contains or fails to include, it can never pass constitutional muster. The inclusion of the offending provision or the omission of a provision which constitutional principles require is an inherent and inescapable flaw which renders the law invalid no matter what the circumstances. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. at 387. See infra ¶ 87 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring). But this is precisely the kind of argument claimants are making in this case to support their facial challenge: i.e., the statute fails to include a provision for a probable cause hearing, which is an inescapable flaw that renders the forfeiture statute unconstitutional under every circumstance. Claimants argue that the flaw is that the statute does not require a probable cause hearing. ¶ 59 The special concurrence's idea that this could not be a facial challenge because claimants' objective was to prevent their own forfeiture proceedings from going forward (see infra ¶ 96 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring)) is without any legal foundation. Claimants do not ask for this court to provide a probable cause hearing and they do not allege that the time frame for the forfeiture hearing itself may sometimes satisfy probable cause. Instead they contend that the statute is unconstitutional in every instance by failing to provide a probable cause hearing at all. The remedy they seek is a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and for return of their vehicles. The trial court in turn declared the statute facially unconstitutional, specifically finding that it contained a defect that prevented its application in any circumstance. The trial court then issued an order complying with Rule 18 that explained the same. Under the circumstances, we believe that it is completely appropriate for this court to accept claimants' characterization of the challenge as a facial one. ¶ 60 The special concurrence's willingness to recharacterize claimants' argument under the circumstances here is also not supported by the authority it invokes. For example, in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to the procedures of the federal Bail Reform Act. The Court found that to sustain [the statutory procedures] against such a challenge, we need only find them `adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some [persons] charged with crimes' [citation], whether or not they might be insufficient in some particular circumstances. Id. at 751, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The Court found that the test was satisfied and the procedures passed constitutional muster. Id. The Court did not recharacterize the defendants' argument simply because it was ultimately unsuccessful or simply because it could have been reworked to fit within the framework of an as applied challenge. ¶ 61 Similarly, the Supreme Court in the other two cases relied upon by the special concurrence here Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2817, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010), and Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 893, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010)did not recharacterize or negate a litigant's decision to bring a facial challenge. In Doe, the parties disagreed about whether the claim was properly characterized as a facial or as-applied challenge. The Court found that it had characteristics of both, but the label was not what matters. Doe, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2817. The important point is that plaintiffs' claim and the relief that would follow    reach beyond the particular circumstances of these plaintiffs. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2817. The Court continued by stating that plaintiffs must therefore satisfy our standards for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2817. ¶ 62 In Citizens United, the Court found that a litigant had not waived his right to challenge the facial validity of a federal law restricting corporate political speech. The Court noted that the distinction between the two kinds of challenges is both instructive and necessary to the extent it goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 893. ¶ 63 Here, we must initially assess claimants' challenge for facial invalidity. This was the remedy sought and the one ordered by the circuit court when it found that the statute was unconstitutional in all its applications and therefore could not be enforced. ¶ 64 Inherent in the special concurrence's suggestion that claimants' challenge should not be characterized as facial is the notion that if the challenge is in fact a facial one, the analysis must employ the Mathews factors to determine the constitutional validity of the statute. But any argument that Mathews need inform the decision here ignores our in-depth discussion of $8,850 and Von Neumann. As we have explained above, a limited reading of $8,850 one that would apply it only to the time limits within which the forfeiture action itself must be initiated, rather than the timing of the initial postseizure hearingmight be plausible if the Supreme Court itself had not read the case more expansively less than three years later in Von Neumann. ¶ 65 In Von Neumann, the Court wrote: we have already noted that the [claimant's] right to a forfeiture proceeding meeting the Barker test satisfies any due process right with respect to the car. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 610. Importantly, Von Neumann was claiming that the lack of a prompt answer on his remission petition violated due process. The remission procedure would be akin to a probable cause hearing in our case. In $8,850, the Court held that an 18-month delay in initiation of the proceedings did not violate due process. And in Von Neumann it held that a forfeiture proceeding meeting the Barker test satisfied any due process right ( Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 610). In so doing, Von Neumann reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that a remission hearing within 24 hours of the seizure was required by due process. The Von Neumann Court then went even one step further and found the remission-petition procedure itself was of no consequence and was not constitutionally required. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 610. ¶ 66 In other words, Von Neumann stands for the proposition that intermediary hearings are generally not required while awaiting the final outcome of forfeiture proceedings. Even if $8,850 and Von Neumann can be considered as-applied cases ( Von Neumann seems to have indicia of both), it is perfectly proper to rely upon them as we do without the need to discuss Mathews. This is because if an 18-month delay does not violate due process as applied and the forfeiture proceeding itself, without more, satisfies due process in terms of the kind of hearing required, then the failure to have a more prompt hearing while awaiting the outcome of the forfeiture proceeding (which would routinely take between three and six months under the Illinois procedure start to finish) could not possibly violate due process in terms of a facial challenge. Thus, the black letter law set forth in Von Neumann essentially controls the outcome here. ¶ 67 In the preceding section of this decision we do discuss the individual Barker facts in relation to the specific cases here to conclude that no unreasonable delay occurred in the proceedings below. However, we had already concluded by then that $8,850 and Von Neumann were the controlling precedent, which led to our holding that the statute was not facially unconstitutional and a probable cause hearing was not necessary. Application of the Barker factors to the specific proceedings below, however, was briefed and argued by the parties. We find it completely appropriate to consider those factors to determine the additional matter of whether these particular claimants were denied a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time under the circumstances of this case. ¶ 68 Parenthetically, we note that Mathews calls for consideration of the private interest affected, the risk of an erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards, and the government's interest. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Neither Von Neumann nor $8,850 employed the Mathews factors, but instead looked to the Barker speedy-trial test. Our decision finds Von Neumann and $8,850 determinative of the outcome here for the reasons noted above. However, if this court were to apply Mathews, we would find that the balance of the factors weighs in favor of the State. With respect to the risk of an erroneous deprivation found critical in Krimstock, we would find the risk is minimal in the kinds of cases involved here. The seizures in the cases before us occurred simultaneously with the aggravated DUI and DWLR arrests for which the police must have probable cause. This probable cause determination is made by trained police officers without a personal economic stake in the matter. Their evaluations are not the type prone to error. Objective tests confirm the presence of alcohol for purposes of DUI, and officers assess DWLR by a simple, objective review of the documentary evidence. As the court in Grinberg v. Safir, 181 Misc.2d 444, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 326 (1999), observed: [W]hen police have probable cause to arrest a drunk driver, the defendant's car is undeniably the instrumentality of the charged crime. The nexus between the crime and the property, and thus the justification for the forfeiture is obvious at arrest. There has been no showing than any additional or substitute safeguard would lessen the risk of an erroneous deprivation of petitioner's property. See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565-66, 119 S.Ct. 1555, 143 L.Ed.2d 748 (1999) (no warrant required for the seizure in a public place of a vehicle that police have probable cause to believe is itself contraband). We would also conclude that the City's interest in deterring drunk driving and safeguarding its ability to seek forfeiture by retaining possession of the vehicle outweighs the private interest affected. ¶ 69 As a final matter, we note that we have allowed the State's motion to cite as additional authority a recent amendment to the vehicle-forfeiture statute. The State correctly points out that the statute has been amended, effective January 1, 2012, to add an additional section that will allow for a timely probable cause hearing in vehicle forfeiture proceedings going forward. Specifically, Public Act 97-544 adds section 36-1.5 to the Criminal Code of 1961 and states in relevant part that [w]ithin 14 days of the seizure, the State shall seek a preliminary determination from the circuit court as to whether there is probable cause that the property may be subject to forfeiture. Pub. Act 97-544, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012) (adding 720 ILCS 5/36-1.5). The vehicles in the present case were obviously seized prior to the statute's future effective date of January 1, 2012. The parties do not argue the applicability of the statute to the instant proceeding. We will therefore not address it here other than to note that to the extent the amendment can be considered a procedural (rather than a substantive) change, it will be applicable to the proceedings on remand, but only so far as practical and only if it does not affect a vested right. See 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2010); see also People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill.2d 34, 46, 350 Ill.Dec. 839, 949 N.E.2d 631 (2011) (if the new rule were to guarantee the dismissal of the State's action, it would affect a vested right and therefore could not be applied retroactively).