Opinion ID: 771391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Defect in the Section 924(c) Counts of the Indictments

Text: 21 The Grand Jury Clause of the United States Constitution provides that [n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. U.S. Const. amend. V. We have said that 22 [t]o comport with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a criminal indictment must (1) contain all of the elements of the offense so as to fairly inform the defendant of the charges against him, and (2) enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy in defense of future prosecutions for the same offense. 23 United States v. Santeramo, 45 F.3d 622, 624 (2d cir. 1995) (per curiam). The requirement that an indictment contain all of the elements of the offense provides a defendant with notice and protection from double jeopardy. See Const. amend. V (nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb); Const. amend. VI (the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation). An indictment also limit[s] [the defendant's] jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960). 24 The government concedes that the indictments here are defective in that they are missing an essential element of the separate, aggravated crime, Castillo, 120 S. Ct. at 2096, for which Som and Tran were sentenced. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (enhancement elements must be charged in an indictment). The government argues, however, that (1) Som's plea of guilty to aiding and abetting the use of a short-barreled rifle retroactively waived his right to be charged by a grand jury; (2) his failure to challenge the indictment below requires that he show plain error and he has failed to show plain error; and (3) the error was harmless because Som has failed to show any prejudice insomuch as he received adequate notice that he was being charged with the enhanced offense and he is protected from double jeopardy. We reject each of these arguments. 25 First, pleading guilty does not waive a defendant's right to indictment by a grand jury. See United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1980). Waiver of an indictment is an act clothed in formality. . . . [T]he waiver must be made in open court, defendants must be informed of the nature of and the cause for the accusation, and the court must be satisfied that the defendants waive their rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1985). Here, the record does not show that Som knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to be tried and convicted only upon charges presented by a grand jury. 26 Contrary to the government's argument, pleading guilty is not the equivalent of a waiver of the right to be charged by a grand jury. By pleading guilty, a defendant waives many of the objections to his conviction that he otherwise could have raised on appeal. He does not, however, waive all objections . . . . The objection that the indictment fails to charge an offense is not waived by a guilty plea. Meacham, 626 F.2d at 509-10 (relying on Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (A guilty plea . . . renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt . . . . We . . . hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that--judged on its face--the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.)); seealso United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960, 976-77 (10th Cir. 2000) (stipulating at trial to the element missing from the indictment did not waive right to grand jury indictment because the failure of the indictment to allege a federal crime cannot be cured by proof at trial by any means); United States v. Spinner, 180 F.3d 514, 516 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, the claim is that the government may not constitutionally prosecute the charge of the enhanced firearms offense because it is not charged in an indictment. Som could not, then, have pleaded guilty to an aggravated crime not charged in the indictment. Thus, Som has not waived this claim based on the defect in the indictment. 27 Second, plain error review is inappropriate where the defect in the indictment is jurisdictional. Where an indictment fails to allege each material element of the offense, it fails to charge that offense. See Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d at 143. [A] 'failure of the indictment to charge an offense may be treated as [a] jurisdictional' defect, . . . and an appellate court must notice such a flaw even if the issue was raised neither in the district court nor on appeal. United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1965)), abrogated on other grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); see alsoFed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) (objection that an indictment fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense . . . shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings) (emphasis added). 28 The notion that an indictment is a prerequisite to jurisdiction over a criminal case in the federal courts is long established. In Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), the Supreme Court first stated its opinion that an indictment found by a grand jury was indispensable to the power of the court to try the petitioner for the crime with which he was charged. 121 U.S. at 12-13. For this proposition, [t]he Bain case . . . has never been disapproved . . . . Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218. Consequently, 29 [i]t has long been a settled rule of law in the United States Courts that the Declaration of Article 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution that No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury is jurisdictional and no court of the United States has authority to try a prisoner without indictment or presentment in such cases. 30 United States v. Krepper, 159 F.2d 958, 970 (3d Cir. 1946) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). 31 The government argues based on Foley and United States v. Glick, 142 F.3d 520, 523 n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Foley, 73 F.3d at 488), that the defect in Som's indictment is subject to plain error review because it was not raised below. Foley's statement that plain error review applies to a challenge that the indictment does not state an offense is not only contradicted by other statements in Foley, it is dicta. In discussing what the Court characterized as a jurisdictional defect, 73 F.3d at 488, the Court first stated that an appellate court that sees that the lower court proceeded without subject matter jurisdiction must correct the error even if neither party brought it to the lower court's attention, id. at 487 (emphasis added), and that an appellate court must notice such a flaw even if the issue was raised neither in the district court nor on appeal, id. at 488 (emphasis added) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)). After stating that the appellate court must notice and correct the error, the court then inconsistently concluded that [i]ssues that go to whether the conduct alleged and proved is punishable under the statute charged are thus cognizable on appeal under the plain-error doctrine. Id. Noticing plain error is discretionary. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (Plain errors . . . may be noticed . . . .). Where the district court acted without subject matter jurisdiction, this Court does not have the discretion not to notice and correct the error; it must notice and correct the error. See Foley, 73 F.3d at 487-88. It is therefore inappropriate to resort to discretionary plain error review in such cases. 32 Furthermore, Foley never addressed the argument that the indictment failed to state an offense. Instead, the Court addressed defendant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument and held that the government failed to prove Foley guilty of the offense at trial. Id. at 493 ([W]e conclude that the government failed to prove that Foley was guilty of an offense under § 666(a)(1)(B), and his conviction on the bribery count must be reversed.). Thus, Foley's statement with regard to reviewing a jurisdictional defect in an indictment is dicta because Foley never reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment. 33 In Glick, the Court cited Foley for the proposition that the defendant's argument that the indictment was missing an implicit element of the offense was reviewed for plain error. 142 F.3d at 523 n.3. The Court did not, however, do a plain error review. It held that there was no error because the element that the defendant suggested was missing from the indictment was not an element of the crime. Id. at 524. There was no jurisdictional or other error to be noticed. Glick, therefore, is also inapposite. 34 In its supplemental brief, the government now appears to acknowledge that truly jurisdictional defects must be noticed and corrected by the appellate court regardless of whether the defendant raised the issue. The government maintains, however, that an indictment is only jurisdictionally defective if it charges no federal offense at all. Here the indictments did charge a federal offense, the simple firearm offense. According to the government then, by charging a federal offense, these indictments provided the necessary jurisdiction; and, the failure to include the enhancing element in the indictments may have been a constitutional error, but it was not a jurisdictional error. Thus, the government contends, plain error review definitely applies. 35 We cannot accept the government's characterization of the district court's jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in Crosby v. United States, 339 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1964), [t]he scope of the indictment goes to the existence of the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. 339 F.2d at 744 (emphasis added) (citing Stirone, 361 U.S. at 213; Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12-13). In Crosby, the indictment charged the defendant with one offense, robbery, but the jury was instructed on a different offense, assault with a deadly weapon. The same facts that would have supported conviction on the charged offense supported conviction on the uncharged offense, and the defendant did not object to the jury instruction. Id. On appeal, the government essentially asserted that by failing to object, appellant has waived his right to be charged by a grand jury for the precise offense of which he was convicted. Id. The court disagreed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict appellant of that offense under the present indictment. To hold otherwise would in effect be to allow judicial amendment of the grand jury's indictment; this cannot be accomplished even with the a defendant's consent. Id. at 744-45 (citing Stirone, 361 U.S. at 213; Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12-13). This makes perfect sense. A prosecutor cannot make an end run around the jurisdictional prerequisite of an indictment by charging any federal offense, and then proceeding to prosecute a defendant for a different, albeit related, federal offense. Likewise, a prosecutor cannot make this jurisdictional end run, and then urge the court to sentence the defendant for an offense for which the defendant was neither charged nor convicted. 36 In Stirone, the Supreme Court also characterized the indictment as jurisdictional in both nature and scope: 37 The Bain case, which has never been disapproved, stands for the rule that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against him. . . . [The indictment] limit[s] [the defendant's] jeopardy to offenses charged by [the grand jury]. Thus, the basic protection the grand jury was designed to afford is defeated by a device or method which subjects the defendant to prosecution for [doing something] which the grand jury did not charge. 38 361 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). In keeping with the Supreme Court's characterization of the indictment as jurisdictional in nature and scope, we hold that the prosecution does not have jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant, and the district court does not have jurisdiction to try, convict, or sentence a defendant, for any offense other than the one charged in the indictment. In other words, the defendant cannot be held to answer for any offense not charged in an indictment returned by a grand jury. 39 In this case, the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter a conviction or impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment, namely the separate, aggravated crime of using or carrying a short-barreled rifle, or aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a short-barreled rifle. Castillo, 120 S. Ct. at 2096. Rather, the district court's jurisdiction was limited to trying (in this case accepting a guilty plea from) these defendants, and thereafter convicting and sentencing these defendants, on the offense charged in the indictment, namely the use or carrying, or aiding and abetting the use or carrying, of a simple firearm. 40 Finally, the government's argument that the error was harmless because Som was not prejudiced by this defect in the indictment, inasmuch as he received notice, admitted the conduct, and is protected from double jeopardy, is misplaced. Because the defect is jurisdictional, it cannot be cured by the absence of prejudice to the defendant. See United States v. Brown, 995 F.2d 1493, 1505 (10th Cir. 1993) ([F]ailure of the indictment to allege all the essential elements of an offense . . . is a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal . . . . The absence of prejudice to the defendant does not cure what is necessarily a substantive, jurisdictional defect in the indictment.). Deprivation of the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. . . . is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless error. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 217; see Prentiss, 206 F.3d at 976 (Applying harmless error analysis to the total omission of an essential element would allow the prosecution to circumvent the grand jury proceeding.); United States v. Spruill, 118 F.3d 221, 227 (4th Cir. 1997) (It is well established . . . that failure to recite an essential element of the offense in the indictment is not amenable to harmless error review.). But see United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 309-11 (1st Cir. Aug. 30, 2000) (holding that error of leaving the type of firearm out of § 924(c) count of indictment subject to harmless error review). 2 41 In sum, unless the right to be charged by an indictment containing all of the material elements of an offense is voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived by the defendant, the indictment as returned limits the scope of the district court's jurisdiction to the offense charged in the indictment. If the district court acts beyond its jurisdiction by trying, accepting a guilty plea from, convicting, or sentencing a defendant for an offense not charged in the indictment, this Court must notice such error and act accordingly to correct it, regardless of whether the defendant has raised the issue. 42 In this case, the indictments charged § 924(c) simple firearm offenses, and the district court had jurisdiction to convict and sentence Som and Tran for that offense. Because Som and Tran do not challenge their guilty pleas to or convictions for that offense, their § 924(c) convictions are deemed to be convictions for the simple firearm offense and need not be vacated. The district court acted outside its jurisdiction, however, in sentencing Som and Tran for the enhanced firearm offense not charged in their indictments. We therefore vacate their sentences and remand for resentencing based on their convictions for the simple firearm offense. See United States v. Jones, 172 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (remanding case to district court for resentencing without an enhancement for serious bodily injury because Supreme Court held that serious bodily injury is an element of the offense rather than a sentencing factor), on remand from Jones, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); United States v. Chandler, 125 F.3d 892, 898 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 860 enhancement is an element of a separate offense and remanding for resentencing based on conviction for unenhanced § 841(a)(1) offense charged in indictment). 43 As noted earlier, we take no position at this time on whether the government may seek reindictment of Som because we believe that the district court should address the issue in the first instance. Therefore, if the government wishes to seek reindictment of Som on the § 924(c) count, the government must move the district court to vacate Som's conviction and dismiss that count of the indictment for that purpose.