Opinion ID: 1830951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the lower court erred when it held donald to be too remote from the oil companies' negligence in breaching their duty to protect others from the hazardous waste produced.

Text: and
¶ 40. In the Amended Complaint, Donald alleged both negligence and negligence per se. The lower court focused on the negligence claim and found that [a]ny alleged negligent acts on the part of the Oil Company Defendants are too remote to the Plaintiff to give rise to a duty owed to the Plaintiff. Confusingly, Donald chose to combine his negligence per se claim with another claim, statutory waste. The lower court did not address the negligence per se claim based on alleged violations of statutes and oil and gas board regulations. Instead, the lower court examined waste under the definition, any substantial injury done to the inheritance by one having a limited estate, during the continuance of his estate. Dodds v. Sixteenth Section Dev. Corp., 232 Miss. 524, 99 So.2d 897, 901 (1958)( quoting Moss Point Lumber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 89 Miss. 448, 42 So. 290, 300 (1906)). In so doing, the lower court easily found that Donald had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
¶ 41. As a matter of law, the lower court held that Donald had not demonstrated that the Defendants owed him a duty which if breached would give rise to a cause of action. The lower court went to state: The foreseeability of the actions of Davis Brothers is the problem with the Plaintiff's alleged claim of negligence. Was it reasonably foreseeable that Davis Brothers would have dumped the oil field waste on its own property? Was it reasonably foreseeable that the Plaintiff would have bought the property form BankPlus in the foreclosure sale? Any alleged negligent acts on the part of the Oil Company Defendants are too remote to the Plaintiff to give rise to a duty owed to the Plaintiff. Donald first contends that the lower court improperly addressed foreseeability which is an issue of fact for the jury. In contrast, the Oil Defendants contend that the lower court properly determined an issue of law, that they owed Donald no duty. ¶ 42. To succeed on a claim for negligence, the plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation and injury. Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So.2d 866, 869 (Miss.1992). The plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty `to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against the unreasonable risk of injury', (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causal relationship between the breach and alleged injury, and (4) injury or damages. Id. at 870 n. 5 (citing and quoting Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Miss.1987)). Duty and breach of duty are essential to finding negligence and must be demonstrated first. Strantz v. Pinion, 652 So.2d 738, 742 (Miss.1995). ¶ 43. While duty and causation both involve foreseeability, duty is an issue of law, and causation is generally a matter for the jury. Juries are not instructed in, nor do they engage in, consideration of the policy matters and the precedent which define the concept of duty. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 37, at 236 (5th ed.1984). This Court has held that the existence vel non of a duty of care is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Foster v. Bass, 575 So.2d 967, 972-73 (Miss.1990). Therefore, the lower court properly decided a matter of law. ¶ 44. Next, assuming the lower court correctly decided a matter of law, Donald argues that the Oil Defendants did owe him a duty of care, because they generated the waste and put it into the control of the contractor without any warning of its radioactive properties. Donald asserts that a duty of reasonable care to remove a cause of danger exists when a cause of danger is reasonably foreseeable. Read v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n., 515 So.2d 916, 919 (Miss.1987). This standard applies whether the injury is to persons or property. Id. In Read, the plaintiff sued the power company after a faulty transformer caused several electrical problems which damaged to her property. Id. at 918. This Court held that the power company had a duty, because the cause of danger [was] reasonably foreseeable caused by and known to it. Id. at 919. ¶ 45. Donald asserts that the Oil Defendants had a similar duty here, because they alone knew of the hazardous materials in the waste and failed to warn others. It is foreseeable that a failure to warn could endanger others. Further, the Oil Defendants had a duty to ensure the proper disposal of their hazardous waste, because it was foreseeable that otherwise illegal dumping could result in danger to the public. Finally, Donald asserts that they had a duty to train properly the contractors on proper disposal of the hazardous waste so as to not endanger the general public. ¶ 46. The Oil Defendants focus on the absence of a nexus between Donald and themselves. They argue that they owe no duty to Donald based on the subject property, because Mississippi law clearly does not impose a duty on those in the oil company defendants' position to ensure, for the benefit of the purchaser, that an independent contractor and current owner of the property which might later be sold, handle that landin which the defendant has no interestwith good husbandry. In short, they argue that they owed no duty to prevent Davis Brothers from contaminating Davis Brothers' own land. ¶ 47. The lower court agreed with the Oil Defendants and held, [a]ny alleged negligent acts on the part of the Oil Company Defendants are too remote to the Plaintiff to give rise to a duty owed ... As such, Donald asserts that the lower court in effect held Davis Brothers' negligence as an intervening, unforeseeable risk that cut off any liability on the part of the Oil Defendants. Donald argues that any company which transfers toxic waste to any contractor for disposal without warning them of the hazards incident to disposal is aware of the risks. See Canton Broiler Farms, Inc. v. Warren, 214 So.2d 671, 676-77 (Miss.1968) (if the occurrence of the intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated, such intervening cause will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury). Further, in absence of a warning or at least instructions on proper disposal, the waste was virtually assured to be improperly disposed. See Howard Bros. of Phenix City, Inc. v. Penley, 492 So.2d 965, 968 (Miss.1986) (it is no defense that the defendants may not have anticipated exactly what transpired). ¶ 48. The standard of care applicable in cases of alleged negligent conduct is whether the party charged with negligence acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have under the same or similar circumstances. Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So.2d 196, 199 (Miss.1980); Danner v. Mid-State Paving Co., 252 Miss. 776 173 So.2d 608, 615 (1965). If a defendant's conduct is reasonable in light of the foreseeable risks, there is no negligence and no liability. Reaves v. Wiggs, 192 So.2d 401, 403 (Miss.1966). In addition, a defendant must only take reasonable measures to remove or protect against foreseeable hazards that he knows about or should know about in the exercise of due care. Millers of Jackson, Inc. v. Newell, 341 So.2d 101, 103 (Miss.1976). A defendant is obligated solely to safeguard against reasonable probabilities and is not charged with foreseeing all occurrences, even though such occurrences are within the range of possibility. Pargas of Taylorsville, Inc. v. Craft, 249 So.2d 403, 407-08 (Miss.1971). ¶ 49. The lower court's judgment of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is reversed because Donald has stated a claim for negligence. Duty is properly determined by the court as a matter of law and issues of public policy are considered. The Oil Defendants have a duty to ensure the safe disposal of their waste. Without such a duty, oil companies and others could hire anyone to remove it and claim their liability has ended. We would all bear the burden of such a rule. In this case, whether the Oil Defendants' liability was foreseeable and should continue, despite any negligence by Davis Brothers, is an issue of causation which should be subject to discovery and further proceedings in the lower court.
¶ 50. As stated above, the lower court failed to even address the negligence per se cause of action despite the allegation in the Amended Complaint that the Oil Defendants violated oil and gas regulations. Donald asserts that negligence per se is a valid cause of action where property damage results from violations of oil and gas regulations. See Madison v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 114 F.3d 514, 516-17 (5th Cir.1997)(applying Mississippi law, Fifth Circuit held that a state court could conceivably find a negligence per se recovery). Furthermore, Mississippi law follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286. Thomas v. McDonald, 667 So.2d 594, 597 (Miss.1995)(In order for doctrine of negligence per se to apply, plaintiff must show that he is member of class that statute was designed to protect and that harm he suffered was type of harm that statute was intended to prevent). In the Amended Complaint, Donald alleges that the Oil Defendants violated oil and gas regulations which he asserts are designed to protect him from the kind of harm he has suffered, i.e. property damage. Thus, he contends he has stated a claim for negligence per se. ¶ 51. Oil Defendants counter that Donald has not specifically enumerated the regulation violated or exhausted his administrative remedies. First, Donald does assert that the Oil Defendants violated Section 53-1-3( l )(ii) of the Oil and Gas Board statutes defining waste, as follows: (ii) The inefficient storing of oil; and the locating, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating or producing of any oil or gas well or wells in a manner causing or tending to cause unnecessary or excessive surface loss or destruction of oil or gas. Miss.Code Ann. § 53-1-3( l )(ii) (Supp. 1998). Donald further asserts that waste is unlawful under Section 53-3-3. Finally, he contends that the Oil Defendants violated Rule 45(III)(B) of the State Oil and Gas Board regulations, which reads, as follows: B. Crude oil, waste oil, oil sludge, oilwater emulsion, or oil-bearing mixtures of any kind, and all other liquid, gaseous, solid, radioactive, or other deleterious substances which may pollute or tend to pollute the air, soils, or any waters of the state shall be disposed of in such a manner as to prevent, eliminate or reduce waste by pollution to acceptable levels. ¶ 52. In general, a complainant must exhaust the administrative remedies available to him before resorting to the courts for resolution of his dispute. State v. Beebe, 687 So.2d 702, 704 (Miss.1996); NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072, 1082-83 (Miss.1977); Everitt v. Lovitt, 192 So.2d 422, 426 (Miss.1966); Davis v. Barr, 250 Miss. 54, 157 So.2d 505 (1963). However, where no adequate administrative remedy is provided, the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable. Mississippi Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Weems, 653 So.2d 266, 277 (Miss.1995); Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., v. J & G Express, Inc., 244 Miss. 427, 440, 141 So.2d 720, 726 (1962). ¶ 53. Here, the State Oil and Gas Board (the Board) has jurisdiction and authority over all persons and property necessary to enforce its regulations. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-1-17 (Supp.1998). Any interested person has the right to have the Board call a hearing for the purpose of taking action in any matter within the Board's authority. Miss.Code Ann. § 53-1-29 (1990 & Supp.1998). The Board can enjoin continuing violations and assess penalties for any violations. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 53-1-43, 47 (Supp.1998). Furthermore, Section 53-1-47 reads, in pertinent part: (c) Any person who aids or abets any other person in the violation of any provision of Sections 53-1-1 through 53-1-47, inclusive, or Sections 53-3-1 through 53-3-21, inclusive, or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, shall be subject to the same penalties as are prescribed herein for the violation by such other person. (d) In determining the amount of the penalty under subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section, the board shall consider at a minimum the following factors: (i) The willfulness of the violation; (ii) Any damage to water, land or other natural resources of the state or their users; (iii) Any cost of restoration and abatement; (iv) Any economic benefit to the violator as a result of noncompliance; (v) The seriousness of the violation, including any harm to the environment and any harm to the health and safety of the public; and (vi) Any prior violation by such violator. (e) The board is authorized to utilize the provisions of Section 85-7-132 to enforce penalties provided by this section. Miss.Code Ann. § 53-1-47(c), (d), & (e) (Supp.1998). ¶ 54. Anyone assessed a penalty or enjoined by the Board has a right to appeal to the chancery courts. Miss.Code Ann. § 53-1-39 (1990 & Supp.1998). However, the statutes and regulations do not provide for or prohibit private causes of action. Regardless, Donald could have and should have filed a written request for hearing with the Board as an interested person. Miss.Code Ann. § 53-1-29 (1990 & Supp. 1998). Upon such request, the Board has thirty (30) days to take appropriate action. Id. Here, Donald did not give the Board a chance to take any action. Upon examination of Section 53-1-47, we conclude that the Board could have penalized the Davis Brothers and possibly the Oil Defendants and required them all to pay the costs of clean-up, restoration, etc. Therefore, the administrative remedy is adequate and should have been exhausted prior to filing a private suit. Thus, the negligence per se claim was properly dismissed, albeit for the wrong reasons.
¶ 55. The lower court dismissed Donald's breach of contract claim, because he failed to attach a written copy of the instrument to the pleading as required by Miss.R.Civ.P. 10(d). The lower court said that if no copy of agreement is attached there is no way to determine if the plaintiff is the alleged third party beneficiary of the agreement ... The lower court based this determination upon this Court's holding in Trammell v. State that the right of a third party beneficiary to sue for breach of contract must spring from the contract. 622 So.2d 1257, 1260 (Miss.1993). ¶ 56. Donald asserts that the lower court erred in this dismissal, because the claim is based on the probability that a contract existed between the Davis Brothers and the Oil Defendants, and without discovery, there is no way for him to know of the existence of any such contract. Thus, Donald contends that he could not comply with Rule 10(d), because the lower court dismissed his claim before he could determine if any contract did in fact exist. ¶ 57. Miss.R.Civ.P. Rule 10(d) provides: (d) Copy Must Be Attached. When any claim or defense is founded on an account or other written instrument, a copy thereof must be attached to or filed with the pleading unless sufficient justification for its omission is stated in the pleading. In regards to Rule 10(d), this Court held that a rigid application is no longer necessary. Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So.2d 933, 938 (Miss.1986). Furthermore, this Court has said: While Rule 10(d) must obviously be given effect according to its tenor, such may be done by providing that a defendant must timely assert the rule else any claim founded thereon will be deemed waived Where a party perceives that his adversary has failed to conform to Rule 10(d), he may file a proper motion reasonably in advance of trial seeking compliance with the rule, failing which compliance he may be entitled to dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. Any other construction would render the rule's primary function as a trap for the unwary. Where, as here, the fact of the statements was alleged and where it is obvious that there was no surprise to Gilchrist, it would be wholly inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of our rules to treat Rule 10(d) as an exclusionary rule. In view of the liberal provisions for discovery found in Rule 26-37, Miss.R.Civ.P. the attachment of exhibits to pleading is hardly as important as in former days. Gilchrist Mach. Co. v. Ross, 493 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss.1986) (emphasis added & footnotes omitted). In Gilchrist, this Court allowed Ross's claim despite his failure to comply with the rule, because Gilchrist had failed to assert the violation reasonably in advance of trial and thus waived its rights under the rule. Id. at 1292. ¶ 58. In 1991, this Court affirmed these previous decisions on Rule 10(d) and held that a lower court had committed reversible error in not allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings to conform with the rule. Edwards v. Beasley, 577 So.2d 384, 386-87 (Miss.1991). Therefore, this Court reverses the judgment of dismissal of Donald's claim for breach of contract to allow him the opportunity to discover if any contracts did in fact exist, and if so, whether such contracts establish him as an intended third-party beneficiary. If such a contract does not exist, the lower court can easily dispose of this claim on summary judgment. Without discovery, it cannot be said that beyond a doubt Donald can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
¶ 59. The lower court held that Donald's claim of outrageous conduct failed to state a claim for relief because neither this Court nor the Legislature has ever recognized such a tort in Mississippi. Oil Defendants further contend that no such separate tort exists in Mississippi. However, Donald urges this Court to adopt such a tort based upon the egregious recklessness and intentional acts alleged here. As persuasive authority, Donald cites the Supreme Court of Kentucky, which has recognized the tort of outrageous conduct, in accord with Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in an asbestos case. Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Ky.1994). ¶ 60. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1966) reads, as follows: § 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress (1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. The Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted this tort in 1984. Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Ky.1984). In its reasoning, the court said: The basis of the cause of action is intentional interference with the plaintiffs rights causing emotional distress, with or without personal injury in the traditional sense. If there has been physical injury with pain to the body or mind, it is incidental to the emotional distress rather than essential to the cause of action as is the case in an action for personal injury. The plaintiff may have a cause of action for emotional distress from the intentional and unlawful interference with her rights, regardless of whether she suffers any bodily injury from such interference. Id. at 249. In Craft, the plaintiffs had been harassed by a former employer without physical injury. Id. at 248. A primary purpose of the tort then seems to be a way to avoid the normal requirement of some physical injury when asserting a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. ¶ 61. In fact, this Court has already accepted the tort of outrageous conduct by another name. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss.1981). There, this Court said: Where there is something about the defendant's conduct which evokes outrage or revulsion, done intentionally-or even unintentionally, yet the results being reasonably foreseeableCourts can in certain circumstances comfortably assess damages for mental and emotional stress, even though there has been no physical injury.... Id. In Devers, a store-patron was detained for a short time when a tag which had inadvertently been left on a sweater she had purchased set off an alarm while she was leaving the store. This Court held she could bring at action for negligence, and damages are recoverable for mental pain and anguish by a willful, wanton, malicious or intentional wrong even though no bodily injury was sustained. Id. ¶ 62. Recently, this Court reaffirmed the Devers holding in Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Cermack, 658 So.2d 1352 (Miss. 1995). In Cermack, this Court held a jury instruction was erroneous, because it failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that Peoples Bank's conduct was wanton or willful such that it would evoke outrage or revulsion in accord with Devers. Id. at 1365. ¶ 63. However, this Court has never allowed or affirmed a claim of emotional distress based on a fear of contracting a disease or illness in the future, however reasonable. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 658 (Miss. 1995). In Ferguson, some landowners filed action against a paper mill asserting infliction of emotional distress and nuisance claims. This Court reversed and rendered a jury award because the landowners could not recover emotional distress damages for fear of cancer from alleged dioxin in river released by paper mill, absent evidence of exposure and absent medical evidence of possible or probable future illness, and the evidence did not support finding that paper mill's conduct was malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, grossly careless, indifferent or reckless for purposes of claim for infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶ 64. Thus, in Mississippi, this Court has recognized outrageous conduct as a tort more commonly known as the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Donald alleges that the Oil Defendants willfully and wantonly caused the property to become contaminated. Therefrom, Donald alleges he suffered personal injury, anxiety, distress, fear, aggravation, and inconvenience. Based on these allegations being accepted as true, the lower court erred in dismissing this cause of action for failure to state a claim, and the judgment of dismissal is reversed.
¶ 65. The lower court dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claim against BankPlus, because Donald had ample opportunity to inspect the property prior to inspection and BankPlus made no representations whatsoever through its quitclaim to Donald. The lower court based its opinion on Stonecipher v. Kornhaus, where this Court stated the general rule that a vendor of real estate is not liable to the purchaser in possession, ... which is caused by a dangerous condition on the premises, whether natural or artificial, which existed when the purchaser took possession. 623 So.2d 955, 962 (Miss. 1993). ¶ 66. The requirements for a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are: 1) A misrepresentation or omission of fact; 2) That the representation or omission is material or significant; 3) The failure to exercise reasonable care on the part of the defendant; 4) Reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation or omission; and 5) Damages as a direst result of such reasonable reliance. Id. at 964. Donald asserts that the Amended Complaint alleges these five elements. ¶ 67. First, Donald contends that BankPlus made an implied misrepresentation of material fact. As BankPlus notes, this allegation is developed more fully in the brief than the complaint. Second, BankPlus failed to exercise reasonable care by not properly inspecting the property when it knew the previous owner was in the oil field waste disposal business. Donald relied on these representations when he decided to purchase the property. His damages were the result, because he would not have knowingly purchased property contaminated with hazardous waste. ¶ 68. In Midsouth Rail Corp. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 697 So.2d 451, 459-60 (Miss.1997), this Court held that Miss. Code Ann. Section 17-17-29(4) [5] did not impose liability on lenders as any person creating, or responsible for creating, ... immediate necessity for remedial or cleanup action. Midsouth Rail at 460 ( quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 17-17-29(4) (1995)). In Midsouth Rail, Citizens Bank filed a declaratory judgment action to determine liability to MidSouth Rail for environmental clean-up costs arising from sulphur processing by an ultimately bankrupt sulphur processor, who had leased the land from MidSouth Rail and obtained a loan from Citizens Bank. Id. at 453-54. The trial court held Citizen's Bank liable for clearly enabling the operator of the facility to continue its business. Id. at 459. ¶ 69. This Court reversed declining to extend liability to Citizens Bank for public policy reasons, as follows: [E]xtending the scope of the statute would negatively impact lenders and their customers across the state. By placing liability on lenders for enabling business operations, banks would be subject to liability for environmental contamination to which they did not cause or contribute.... This liability would serve to discourage business development and to apply the consequences of one party's act to a more financially sound party with no fault. An innocent lender could become subject to liability in virtually any type of loan. [T]he ... only reasonable conclusions are an increase in the cost of loan transactions, a decrease in business capital due to stricter loan guidelines, and a corresponding decrease in business development. Midsouth Rail at 459. ¶ 70. Under the same rationale and with public policy in mind, this Court extends the holding of Midsouth Rail to prevent lender liability where the innocent lender has foreclosed on a parcel of real estate with a latent environmental defect and then sold by quitclaim deed that parcel to a third party at a foreclosure sale. Therefore, this Court affirms the lower court's dismissal of this claim.
¶ 71. Donald originally filed his Complaint and later his Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court of Hinds County. The Defendants moved for transfer of venue to the county where the property is located based primarily on the local action doctrine and secondarily on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Circuit Court of Hinds County agreed and issued an order transferring venue to Wayne County. Donald's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Circuit Court of Wayne County. Donald now contends that the transfer of venue was in error because neither the local action doctrine nor forum non conveniens supports the transfer. ¶ 72. The standard of review for a transfer of venue is, as follows: An application for a change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion or that the discretion has not been justly and properly exercised under the circumstances of the case. Estate of Jones v. Quinn, 716 So.2d 624, 626 (Miss.1998)( quoting Beech v. Leaf River Prods., Inc., 691 So.2d 446 (Miss.1997)( quoting Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Rogers, 240 Miss. 529, 128 So.2d 353, 358 (1961))).
¶ 73. In Mississippi, the local action doctrine is codified in Section 11-11-3 which states: Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county in which the defendant or any of them may be found or in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue and, if the defendant is a domestic corporation, in the county in which said corporation is domiciled or in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue, except where otherwise provided, and except actions of trespass on land, ejectment and actions for the statutory penalty for cutting and boxing trees and firing woods and actions for the actual value of trees cut which shall be brought in the county where the land or some part thereof is situated. If a civil action is brought in an improper county, such action may be transferred to the proper county pursuant to section 11-11-17. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). ¶ 74. In explaining the local action doctrine under the old venue statute, this Court said that [t]hey must be brought in the county in which the land lies. All other actions must be brought with reference to the person of the defendant. City of Jackson v. Wallace, 189 Miss. 252, 196 So. 223 (1940)(McGowen, J. dissenting)( quoting Oliver v. Loye, 59 Miss. 320 (1881)). Furthermore, The statute alone governs. The only local actions with us are ejectment and trespass on land. They must be commenced in the county in which the land lies. Id. The effect of the local action doctrine on venue is jurisdictional, i.e. subject matter jurisdiction lies only where the property is located and objections to venue cannot be waived. Belk v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 473 So.2d 447, 449 (Miss.1985); Leake County Coop. v. Dependents of Barrett, 226 So.2d 608, 615 (Miss.1969). ¶ 75. Obviously, under the local action doctrine, Donald's original Complaint as filed would have been required to be brought in Wayne County, because it contained a claim for trespass to land. However, Donald amended his Complaint and dropped the cause of action for trespass to land. Despite dropping the trespass to land claim, the Hinds County Circuit Court transferred the case to Wayne County after oral arguments at a hearing on the Defendants' motion. ¶ 76. The Defendants argue here, as they did at the hearing, that Donald's allegations are primarily those of trespass to land whether he titles it trespass or nuisance. The Defendants rely upon Filtrol, in which the Fifth Circuit said, Our examination of Mississippi law indicates that on the facts of this case nuisance, trespass, and strict liability are not separate theories of liability. Mississippi allows a plaintiff damaged by a physical invasion to its land to recover upon a simple showing that the defendant was responsible for the physical invasion. 624 F.2d 1384, 1389 (5th Cir.1980). Furthermore, [t]he label that a court attaches to the theory under which it holds a defendant liable does not appear to be of critical importance. Id. at 1390. Similarly, the Defendants contend that Donald's claims all revolve around an alleged physical invasion to land, and are thus in the nature of trespass whether labeled as such or not. ¶ 77. On the other hand, Donald seeks to distinguish Filtrol on grounds that the Fifth Circuit was not faced with the legal issue of venue, and never considered or interpreted Mississippi's statutes and rules governing venue. Moreover, in contrast to the Fifth Circuit's above-quoted determination of Mississippi law, the theory under which the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable is of critical importance for purposes of venue and the local action doctrine. ¶ 78. In regards to the distinction between trespass and nuisance, this Court has said: There is a distinction between a nuisance and a trespass, although many things are sometimes called nuisances which are mere trespasses, and it has been said that an action for a nuisance which violates a property right incident to the ownership of land is in the nature of one for trespass to realty. The difference is that a nuisance consists of use of one's own property in such a manner as to cause injury to the property or other right or interest of another and generally results from the commission of an act beyond the limits of the property affected, while a trespass is a direct infringement of another's right of property. Thus, where there is no actual physicial [sic] invasion of the plaintiff's property, the cause of action is for nuisance rather than trespass. Blue v. Charles F. Hayes & Assocs., Inc., 215 So.2d 426, 429 (Miss.1968)( quoting 39 Am.Jur. Nuisances § 3 (1942)). Here, Donald alleges an actual physical invasion of the subject property, although he labels it a nuisance cause of action. Therefore, this action is in the nature of one for trespass to realty and is thus subject to the local action doctrine of Section 11-11-3. Hence, the Hinds County Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the venue of this case to Wayne County where the property is located. Likewise, the Wayne County Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of the venue transfer issue.
¶ 79. Because we hold that venue was properly transferred pursuant to the local action doctrine, we need not discuss forum non conveniens except to note that we recently held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable when the trial court is faced with a choice of venue between two Mississippi counties. Clark v. Luvel Dairy Prods., Inc., 731 So.2d 1098 1129 (Miss. 1998).