Opinion ID: 2310617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Flores' Appeal

Text: On direct examination, Flores testified that he was in the 1400 block of Park Road on an errand to repair his wife's beeper, when he saw his friend Marino. Flores approached Marino and allegedly asked him for a quarter to make a phone call. However, Flores testified that before Marino could give him the quarter, the police arrived and arrested both men. Flores also testified that he never saw or handled the ChapStick container. Prior to cross-examining Flores, the government approached the bench for permission to impeach the innocent bystander defense that Flores related during direct examination, with a positive drug test taken after his arrest. The trial court rejected defense counsel's objection that the drug test was beyond the scope of Flores' direct testimony, and permitted the government to question Flores on what brought him to where he was arrested and perhaps about his use of drugs, if that was where Flores' answers led. The trial court also noted that the government was free to impeach Flores' direct testimony by showing that he had given an untruthful account of what occurred even if it extended to Flores affirmatively stating that he doesn't know anything about drugs... [or] that he had never seen any [drugs]. The bench conference concluded and the ensuing cross-examination brought the following exchange: Government: Is it your testimony, sir that you were not there to use or buy drugs that evening, correct? Mr. Flores: No, sir. Government: And you've never at any time gone into that area to buy drugs? Mr. Flores: No, sir. Government: Or to sell drugs? Mr. Flores: No, sir. Government: You've never seen crack/cocaine before? Defense Counsel: Objection, Your Honor. Court: Overruled Mr. Flores: No, sir.    Government: Sir, isn't it true that on July 17, 1996, you went down to take a drug test? At this point in the cross-examination defense counsel again objected, this time on the basis that the government did not establish a proper foundation to ask Flores about the drug test. The trial court rejected counsel's argument and permitted the government to impeach Flores' innocent bystander defense, noting that if Flores was acquainted with drugs and was using drugs ... it is less likely that he was there for an innocent purpose. On appeal, Flores argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the government to cross-examine him as to his use of crack/cocaine, and consequently, by permitting the government to contradict his subsequent denial with his positive drug test. Before considering the admissibility of the positive drug test, we must first consider the propriety of the government's cross-examination of Flores' prior drug use. When a defendant in a criminal trial takes the stand the scope of cross-examination is very broad. United States v. Raper, 219 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 248, 676 F.2d 841, 845 (1982). The prosecutor may cross-examine not only about the facts asserted by a defendant in testimony, but may also ask questions reasonably related to the inferences to be drawn from the direct testimony. Kinard v. United States, 635 A.2d 1297, 1306 (D.C.1993) (citing Raper, supra, 219 U.S.App.D.C. at 248, 676 F.2d at 845). Although the prosecutor cannot set up the defendant on cross-examination, Bourn v. United States, 567 A.2d 1312, 1315 n. 3 (D.C.1989), where appellant attempt[s], on direct examination, to portray himself as an innocent bystander who had stumbled upon something illicit the government can explore his sophistication with respect to drugs and his general credibility. Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 39 (D.C.1988) (where appellant's defense was that he found packets of cocaine and was unaware of their contents) (citations omitted); see also Patterson v. United States, 580 A.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C.1990) (government's use of appellant's positive drug tests on cross-examination was proper to contradict appellant's defense that she had no knowledge of drugs found in her apartment and that she had never seen anything like that [i.e., drugs] before.). Furthermore, a trial court determination of relevancy is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1324 (citations omitted). Here, the government's cross-examination of Flores' prior cocaine use was relevant in view of his proffered defense. On direct, Flores testified that he was in the 1400 block of Park Road on an errand, the implication being that he did not frequent the high drug area to buy and distribute cocaine. Therefore, the prosecutor's cross-examination comprised legitimate exploration of two issues raised by Flores himself: his general credibility and the innocence of his presence in an area notorious for drugs. Accordingly, the trial court was well within the bounds of its discretion in permitting the government to question Flores about his use of cocaine. With the relevance of the government's cross-examination firmly established, the next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the government to use Flores' positive drug test to contradict his denied cocaine use. It is well settled that a party may not present extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on collateral issues. Washington v. United States, 499 A.2d 95, 101 (D.C. 1985) (citations omitted). While certain types of testimony are allowed for impeachment, it is generally held that `[f]acts showing misconduct of the witness (for which no conviction has been had) ... are collateral, and if denied on cross-examination cannot be proved to contradict.' Patterson, supra, 580 A.2d at 1322 (quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 47, at 111 (3d ed.1984)). However, an exception to this general rule allows the government to contradict any part of the witness's account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which as a matter of human experience he would not have been mistaken about if his story were true. This test is of necessity a vague one because it must meet an indefinite variety of situations, and consequently in its applications a reasonable latitude of discretionary judgment must be accorded to the trial judge. Id. One circumstance to which we have applied this exception is factually similar to this case. In Patterson, the government was permitted on rebuttal to introduce a positive drug test to refute appellant's testimony that she had no knowledge of the drugs found in her apartment and that she had not dropped the packets which the police found near her feet. Id. at 1323. We concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the drug test [g]iven the nature of appellant's defense, and considering that her testimony was the only exculpatory evidence. Id. Here, the reasoning in Patterson applies. In light of Flores' innocent bystander defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the extrinsic evidence of Flores' positive drug test to contradict his denied use of cocaine on cross-examination. Accordingly, we affirm. So ordered. WAGNER, Chief Judge, dissenting: Assuming the validity of the investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), I cannot agree that the search and retrieval of the chapstick from Marino was justified under Terry principles. Police are not at liberty to conduct a search of a citizen for contraband every time they make an investigatory stop. Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see Upshur v. United States, 716 A.2d 981, 983 (D.C.1998). Before [a police officer] places his hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so. Upshur, 716 A.2d at 984. The police did not have such grounds in this case. Here, the officer grabbed Marino and moved him back to search under his foot in order to recover the chapstick which he suspected might contain drugs. This was simply a stop and search for drugs. In my view, this was an inadequate basis for a seizure under Terry. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Upshur, 716 A.2d at 983-84. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.