Opinion ID: 852610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Reach of Indiana's Long-Arm Provision

Text: Indiana has no statutory provision governing the permissible exercise of personal jurisdiction. The subject is addressed in Trial Rule 4.4(A), which serves as Indiana's long-arm provision. In 2000, this Court spelled out the test for personal jurisdiction under the Rule as it read at the time: First, the court must determine if the defendant's contacts with the forum state fall under [Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A)]. Second, if they do, the court must then determine whether the defendant's contacts satisfy federal due process analysis. Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1232 (footnote omitted). Anthem determined that it was error to evaluate personal jurisdiction by addressing only whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Anthem held that enumerated act jurisdiction provisions, such as Indiana's 2003 version of Trial Rule 4.4(A), require a two-step analysis. Because Trial Rule 4.4(A) at the time lacked any general language permitting personal jurisdiction on any constitutional basis, Indiana's long-arm statute was not coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction under the [Federal] Due Process Clause. Id. LinkAmerica contends that the subsequent amendment to Trial Rule 4.4(A) eliminated the need for the two-pronged personal jurisdiction test set forth in Anthem. At the time Anthem was decided, Trial Rule 4.4(A) listed eight activities that supported personal jurisdiction over a nonresident (doing business, causing personal injury, etc.). [2] Effective January 1, 2003, the following language was added to the end of subsection (A): In addition, a court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of this state or the United States. Two federal courts have concluded that the 2003 addition to Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) expanded personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause and eliminated any need to identify a specific jurisdictional basis from the list set out in the rule. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358(SAS), M21-88, 2005 WL 106936, at , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 753, at  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005); Litmer v. PDQUSA.com, 326 F.Supp.2d 952, 955 (N.D.Ind.2004). The Court of Appeals agreed that the 2003 amendment to Trial Rule 4.4(A) calls into question the continuing viability of the two-part test in Indiana because the Indiana long-arm statute seemingly now contains what the Anthem court referred to as `any constitutional basis' language. LinkAmerica, 828 N.E.2d at 392 n. 2. The Court of Appeals also observed that another recent panel of that court had concluded that the two-pronged test survived, reasoning that if Indiana's long-arm statute was intended to be coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, the enumerated acts listed in [Trial] Rule 4.4(A) could have been deleted and the Rule could have been rewritten with general language. . . . Pozzo Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Crown Beds, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 966, 969 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). [3] The Court of Appeals then left resolution of this issue for another day and evaluated LinkAmerica's personal jurisdiction claim under the Anthem test after stating that it would have reached the same result under a single due process inquiry. LinkAmerica, 828 N.E.2d at 392 n. 2. The Court of Appeals was correct in noting, as Pozzo pointed out, that a catchall permitting the exercise of jurisdiction on any constitutional basis logically embraces and renders unnecessary any laundry list of specific acts. However, as In re Methyl observed, several other states with enumerated acts long-arm statutes have expanded the reach of their long-arm provisions without deleting the list of specified acts. 2005 WL 106936, at -13, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at - (noting that [i]n recent years, Alabama, Alaska, Nebraska, Oregon, and Tennessee have amended their statutes in this manner without deleting the enumerated sections of the acts). In re Methyl concluded, correctly, that Indiana's long-arm provision now extends to the limits of the Constitution. Id. 2005 WL 106936 at , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at . The 2003 amendment to Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) was intended to, and does, reduce analysis of personal jurisdiction to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Federal Due Process Clause. Retention of the enumerated acts found in Rule 4.4(A) serves as a handy checklist of activities that usually support personal jurisdiction but does not serve as a limitation on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a court of this state.