Opinion ID: 148154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's State Court Trial

Text: Prior to his own trial, Appellant filed a notice of intent to use party opponent statements, to wit, (1) the State Attorney's claims contained in the Notice of Revocation, (2) the State Attorney's statements at the Notice of Revocation hearing, and (3) the State Attorney's statements from the Elliot trial, in order to explore Junior's motivations for changing his story. Appellant hoped to use these materials for two reasons: (1) to examine whether Junior modified his testimony because he perceived that the Elliott acquittal jeopardized his plea bargain and so he wanted to assure Appellant's conviction, and (2) to explore whether the Notice of Revocation compelled Junior to stick to his new, enhanced version of events because he feared the successful revocation of his plea bargain if he changed his testimony again, returning to his prior story. Appellant concurrently filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the trial court's quashing of the Notice, because he believed that it was irrelevant, that its probative value, if any, was outweighed by its unfair prejudice, and that it constituted improper bolstering of Junior's testimony. The trial court ruled that Appellant could not discuss the Elliott case verdict because, among other reasons, under Fla. Stat. § 90.403, the prejudice would outweigh any probative value, and excluded the Notice of Revocation and the court's ruling on it as irrelevant. [1] R.E. Doc. 8 Ex. B at 2-3. The court further stated that if it were to admit the State Attorneys' Notice of Revocation, it would be obligated to admit the quashing of the Notice as well. R.E. Doc. 8 Ex. B at 3. During Appellant's trial, Junior testified to the following, as succinctly explained by the district court: Mr. Junior testified that on May 31, 2001, he went to [Appellant]'s office, and [Appellant] mentioned that he was sick and tired of trying to get three votes and would like to try to get some things done. Mr. Junior testified that he asked [Appellant] for $10,000.00, and [Appellant] wrote out a check and gave it to him. Mr. Junior identified a check dated May 31, 2001, made payable to him in the amount of $10,000.00 and authored by [Appellant]. He testified that although the memo line stated Ruth [Appellant's wife] and referred to six months at eight percent, there was no discussion about his paying back the funds to [Appellant]. Mr. Junior testified that he exchanged the check for a cashier's check and deposited the cashier's check. Mr. Junior further testified that between August and September of 2001, he met [Appellant] at [Appellant]'s office. He testified that he and [Appellant] went to a conference table, and [Appellant] wrote 100,000/100,000 on a legal pad and stated he and Mr. Junior would each receive a hundred. Mr. Junior testified that he believed the note represented that he would receive $100,000 and [Appellant] would receive $100,000 if the County's purchase of the Pensacola Soccer Complex was completed. Mr. Junior also testified that he met Joe Elliott in 2001. Mr. Junior testified that Mr. Elliott came to his office for a meeting, and based upon that meeting, Mr. Junior added an item to the agenda of the County Commission meeting on October 4, 2001, for the county to obtain an appraisal for the possible purchase of the Pensacola Soccer Complex. The Commission voted in favor of the appraisal. Mr. Junior testified that after County staff obtained the appraisal, he added an item to the agenda of the Commission meeting on November 1, 2001, for the county to purchase the Pensacola Soccer Complex. Mr. Junior testified that on November 24, 2001, he received a phone call from [Appellant] to come to his office. The two men met at [Appellant]'s office, and during the course of the meeting, [Appellant] gave Mr. Junior a pot with money in it. Mr. Junior described the pot as a stainless steel pot, approximately 10-11 inches wide and 9-10 inches deep.... Mr. Junior testified that when [Appellant] presented him with the pot, [Appellant] said I got 25-25 out. Mr. Junior testified that he received the money in the pot for my vote on the soccer complex. Mr. Junior testified he subsequently took $40,000 from the pot and took it to [Appellant] in exchange for a $40,000 cashier's check, because [Appellant] had told him that if he needed to exchange some of the cash for a check, he should bring [Appellant] the cash, and he would exchange it for a cashier's check. Mr. Junior identified a cashier's check dated December 5, 2001, in the amount of $40,000 as the check he received from [Appellant] and deposited into his checking account. Mr. Junior testified that he also received separate checks from [Appellant] in the amounts of $7,000, $10,000, $3,000, $11,000, and $9,000. Mr. Junior additionally testified that he ultimately signed two promissory notes, on behalf of the Junior Funeral Home and himself personally, in favor of [Appellant], but Mr. Junior testified that [Appellant] told him that he would not hold Mr. Junior responsible for the notes and never attempted to obtain repayment or security, and Mr. Junior never expected or attempted to pay on the notes. R.E. Doc. 26 at 13-15 (citations omitted). After direct examination, Appellant's counsel cross-examined Junior for approximately ten hours, during which he elicited the details of Junior's plea agreement and impeached Junior's testimony with prior inconsistent statements. With respect to his own indictment and plea agreement, Junior informed the jury that on April 30, 2002, he was indicted for racketeering, four counts of bribery, four counts of extortion, and grand theft. He testified that he learned that he was facing 125 years in prison for the crimes. Mr. Junior testified that he had a series of meetings with prosecutors in the middle of June of 2002, during which he told them a sequence of events. He testified that after the meetings, he gave a taped interview with investigators on June 15, 2002. Mr. Junior testified that two days after he gave the taped interview, he signed a plea agreement. R.E. Doc. 26 at 15. Junior testified that, as a part of the agreement, he agreed to plea no contest to the charges in exchange for maximum sentence exposure of 18 months, and possibly no prison time at all. R.E. Doc. 26 at 16. In exchange, Junior promised to provide truthful information about what he knew to the prosecutor and to testify truthfully. If the State believed that he testified falsely or provided false information, he would suffer revocation of the agreement, retraction of criminal immunity for crimes he may have committed other than those mentioned above, and be subject to perjury charges. R.E. Doc. 26 at 15. During cross-examination, Junior also admitted that in 2001, due to his precarious financial state, he asked several acquaintances for loans. One individual gave him $40,000, which Junior failed to repay. R.E. Doc. 26 at 15. He admitted that when he received the $10,000 check from Appellant on May 31, 2001, it was a loan to pay off Junior's tax debts and had no relation to the Pensacola Soccer Complex. R.E. Doc. 26 at 19. When impeaching Junior's testimony with prior inconsistent statements, Appellant's counsel cross-examined Mr. Junior about when he first revealed to investigators [Appellant]'s alleged statement during the incident that [Appellant] was sick and tired of not being able to get three votes: Q. And what [Appellant] said was, that he said something like, words to the effect of, I'm sick and tired of not being able to get three votes on the commission; right? A. That's correct. Q. Now you had been asked repeatedly over a period of seven months about the May 31st check in, I believe, nine separate sworn statements or depositions, and you never ever said that those words were spoken until January of 2003; is that correct? A. That's correct. .... Q. Right. But you never told anyone about it until January of 2003; correct? A. I'm not certain about that. Q. Okay. Now, I could give you every single one of these depositions and you can start reading them A. (Interposing) No, I don't have to read them .... Q. And you stated that in January of '03 at the State Attorney's Office to Mr. Cotton, the investigator; correct? A. I think I stated it before then also. Q. To whom? A. To Mr. Cotton. .... Q. Tell me where. Give me a year when you said that. A. I'm remembering having made that statement more than one time. I just can't come up with a specific time frame. Q. Do you acknowledge that for seven months in all of your depositions and testimony, you never said it, though? A. If that's what it states, I'll accept that. .... Q. Now, this three-vote issue, you've just told us here, you've told the jury, that when that came up was on May 31st of '01, the day of that check, right, May 31st of '01? A. Yes. Q. But at other times, you have said that the three-vote issue came up when the 100/100 was written down on a piece of paper, that that's when it came up, not at the May 31st meeting; is that right? A. I'm not certain. Q. Okay. Well, did you tell Allen Cotton on January 17th of this year that the three-vote issue came up at the time that [Appellant] wrote the 100,0000/100,000 on the piece of paper, and that's when it was? A. I'm not certain. Q. But if you told him that on January 17th, you would've been mistaken, because what you're saying now is it came up on May 31st; correct? A. I'm not certain. Q. You're not certain as to when it came up? A. As to when I might've told Allen Cotton. Q. In other words, if you told Allen Cotton on January 17, '03 that it came up not on May 31st, but at the time of the 100/100, that would've been incorrect, or you don't know if that would've been incorrect? A. Don't know. Q. Okay. So you don't know when it came up? A. I don't know when I talked to Allen Cotton about it. Q. Well, I'm telling you that it was January 17th. My question is, were you telling him the truth then or were you mistaken? A. I'm not certain. Q. And, again, on January 31st when you met with Mr. Cotton again, did you tell him again that it was at the time of the 100/100, not at the time of the May 31st loan that the three-vote issue came up? A. As I said earlier, I'm not certain. Q. Under oath in June and under oath on numerous depositions and under all your prior testimony under oath prior to January of this year, though, you never, saidI asked you about Cotton, but under oath, you've never said anything about this three-vote issue, had you? A. I can'tall of those times I did the deposition, I'm not certain. R.E. Doc. 26 at 19-22 (citations omitted) (first & second ellipses in original). Appellant's counsel impeached Junior's testimony with his prior inconsistent statements on other issues as well, as recited by the district court opinion: Mr. Junior testified earlier in [Appellant]'s trial that the County's purchase of the Soccer Complex was not a good idea, and [Appellant's] counsel impeached him with his prior statements that the purchase was a good idea, as well as the inconsistent reasons he gave for his opinion. Additionally, Mr. Junior testified earlier in [Appellant]'s trial that the 100/100 note incident occurred between August and September of 2001, and [Appellant's] counsel impeached Mr. Junior with his grand jury testimony that the note incident occurred between October 4 and November 1, 2001, as well as his prior statement to [Appellant's] counsel that the note incident occurred in July or August of 2001, and his statement to Investigator Robbie Hughes that the note incident occurred after the closing on the Soccer Complex property. Mr. Junior eventually reverted back to his grand jury testimony that the note incident occurred after he put the appraisal issue on the Commission's agenda on October 4, 2001. Mr. Junior also testified earlier in [Appellant]'s trial that when [Appellant] wrote 100,000/100,000 on a legal pad, [Appellant] stated he and Mr. Junior would each receive a hundred, and [Appellant's] counsel impeached Mr. Junior with his prior deposition testimony and prior testimony in court proceedings in December of 2002 (the Elliott trial) that there was no talk when the note was written. Additionally, [Appellant's] counsel cross-examined Mr. Junior about the fact that he stated during a deposition just two weeks prior to [Appellant]'s trial that he did not know about the Soccer Complex at the time the 100/100 note was written, but at [Appellant]'s trial he testified he was aware of the Soccer Complex issue at the time the note was written. Mr. Junior also conceded on cross-examination that he said different things at different times about what happened to the 100/100 note after [Appellant] wrote it. Additionally, [Appellant's] counsel cross-examined Mr. Junior about his testimony regarding the physical description of the pot that he received from [Appellant], and impeached him with prior inconsistent statements about this subject, including Mr. Junior's testimony during a court proceeding in December of 2002 (the Elliott trial). [Appellant's] counsel further cross-examined Mr. Junior about the date [Appellant] gave him the pot. Mr. Junior testified earlier in [Appellant]'s trial that he received the pot on November 24, 2001, but he admitted on cross-examination that he told an investigator on June 13, 2002 that he received the pot the week before Christmas, he also admitted that he told the grand jury that he received it in early December, and then Mr. Junior explained how he arrived at the November 24 date. [Appellant's] counsel also cross-examined Mr. Junior about his earlier testimony that when [Appellant] presented him with the pot, he said I got 25-25 out. [Appellant's] counsel asked: Q. And isn't it true that for the first time, two months ago, ... on January 17th, of '03, after ten prior sworn statements, you told Investigator Cotton for the State Attorney's Office that there was conversation when you got the pot; is that true? A. That's true, and I'd like to give an explanation. .... A. And I had stated there was no discussion or no conversation, so therefore, it was justit was not, to me, a conversation, it was just a statement made. Q. Okay. So what you're saying is, tell the jury, I just want to make sure, that for one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine separate sworn statements, when you said that there was no talk, nothing was said, that what you really meant was, Well, I didn't say anything, but [Appellant] did, and he said, `I took $25,000 out'? A. He made the statement, that's correct. Q. So in those nine statements, when all the lawyers and prosecutors and judges and investigators were saying was anything said by [Appellant], by you, by anyone, and you said no, you really meant yes? A. At that time, I was not remembering, and then I remembered that that was the statement that was made, because their thing was, was there a discussion, and to me a statement and a discussion is two different things. .... Q. And for all of those nine statements, whenever anyone asked, was anything said at that time, you figured nobody was interested in whether or not [Appellant] said anything to you, when he supposedly gave you this pot filled with cash? A. That's correct. .... After further questioning, Mr. Junior testified that it just didn't register that he should tell the prosecutor or investigators that [Appellant] made a statement to him when [Appellant] gave him the pot of cash .... .... [Appellant's] counsel again questioned Mr. Junior about his revelation of new facts less than three months prior to [Appellant]'s trial: Q. On January 17, 2003, this year in other words, when you told Investigator Allen Cotton for the first time that [Appellant] told you that he took $25,000 out of the money pot before he gave it to you, isn't it true that Investigator Cotton asked you why all of a sudden are you telling me this now? A. I don't know if he asked me the question about why am I telling him that now, but I had gone back and talked to my attorneys and they said whatever the truth was, tell it, and then that's what I told Allen Cotton. Q. In other words, in January of '03 your attorneys said, whatever the truth is tell it? A. Yes. Q. Did you need legal advice to know that? A. It was not legal advice. He was my lawyer and that's what his statement was. Q. Okay. And then after Mr. Cotton said that to you, you couldn't give him an answer, correct? A. I'm not sure. Q. Yesterday, in other words, he was saying, how come you never said before about the $25,000 and you said, oh, well, because no one ever asked and it was always they said about a conversation, not about a statement that was made. But when Allen Cotton on January 17th asked you specifically the same question that I did in court yesterday, how come you never said it before, you couldn't give him an answer? A. Well, if I didn't give him an answer, I didn't give him an answer. Q. You just shrugged your shoulders, right? A. I'm not certain. .... Q. And when you told Mr. Cotton on the same date, January 17th of this year, that when [Appellant] supposedly wrote the 100/100 note, he also said, If the deal goes through on the soccer complex, it is $100,000 for you and $100,000 for me. Mr. Cotton again asked you, Why did it take you so long to come up with this memory of what happened? That's a quote. And you saidand you couldn't even give him a reason. Is that true? A. That's true. R.E. Doc. 26 at 22-26 (citations omitted) (first & second ellipses in original). This testimony demonstrates Junior's confusing and inconsistent statements. The court, however, prohibited Appellant's attorney from attacking Junior's credibility with the Notice of Revocation or the Elliot acquittal by linking them to Junior's motivations for changing his testimony. On April 10, 2003, the jury found Appellant guilty of one count each of bribery and of unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior, and found him not guilty on the money laundering charge. The court sentenced him to 42 months of incarceration.