Opinion ID: 214311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: summary judgment as to the fee lien petition

Text: On September 9, 2009, the district court granted Kousoulas’s motion for summary judgment as to its fee lien petition after determining that the retainer agreement, which stated that fees awarded are to be paid to Kousoulas, was an enforceable contract. 3 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s conclusions of law and review its findings of fact for clear error. See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003). In doing so, we employ the same standard used by the district court in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As the district court recognized, in New Jersey the relationship between an attorney and client is contractual. See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 679 2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 We note that the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the fee dispute. See Kalyawongsa v. Moffett, 105 F.3d 283, 287-88 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that “although attorneys’ fee arrangements are contracts under state law, the federal court’s interest in fully and fairly resolving the controversies before it requires courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over fee disputes that are related to the main action”); Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 212, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1987). 4 A.2d 1188, 1196 (N.J. 1996) (“Agreements between attorneys and clients concerning the client-lawyer relationship generally are enforceable, provided the agreements satisfy both the general requirements for contracts and the special requirements of professional ethics.”). And in determining that Kousoulas’s fee lien petition should be enforced, the district court explained that: The facts of record establish that Petitioner has rendered legal services to Kant pursuant to the Retainer Agreement. As a result of these services, Kant obtained a damages award of $80,000.00. Additionally, Kant and Petitioner filed a fee application and the Court granted said application. The facts presented establish that Kant agreed to turn over any fees awarded by the Court to Petitioner. The fees are to be paid by Seton Hall University, and, therefore, there is no loss incurred by Kant. Kant has provided neither legal authority nor facts to support his position that he does not have to turn over the fees awarded to Petitioner. Kant asserts that the district court made several erroneous findings of fact in making its decision, including that he “agreed to turn over any fees awarded by the Court to [Kousoulas].” In support, he references several statements that he made regarding his continuing assertion that he, not Kousoulas, should be awarded attorney’s fees. However, the district court’s finding is correct, as Kant agreed “to pay [Kousoulas] twenty percent (20%) of the sum recovered, . . . or any legal fees awarded to [Kousoulas] by the Court, whichever is greater,” when he signed the retainer agreement. Further, although Kant correctly asserts that “courts scrutinize contracts between attorneys and clients to ensure that they are fair,” Cohen, 679 A.2d at 1196, he does not argue that the retainer agreement itself is unfair or unethical. Rather, Kant’s primary argument appears to be that Kousoulas should not be awarded fees because Kant is likely to succeed on his counterclaims. However, Kant’s success or failure on his 5 counterclaims has no bearing on the fee award paid by Seton Hall to Kousoulas pursuant to the retainer agreement. Moreover, despite Kant’s argument to the contrary, he is not eligible for the attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), as it is well-established that, “[s]ince the object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards must accrue to counsel.” Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977) (receded from on other grounds in Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980)). Kant’s remaining arguments are meritless. Therefore, we will affirm the district court’s orders granting Kousoulas’s motion for summary judgment as to its fee lien petition and denying Kant’s motion for reconsideration of that decision.