Opinion ID: 680615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Appellant deprived of a constitutional right?

Text: 15 Appellant's Bivens action is premised on the denial to him of a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment and a substantive due process right to continued employment. Appellant has a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government interference with his private employment. DiMartini v. Ferrin, 906 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1990), amending 889 F.2d 922 (1989), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991). 16 However, [f]or the purpose of a due process claim, an employee must show more than an expectation in continued employment; he must demonstrate a claim of entitlement to continued employment. DiMartini, 906 F.2d at 467; accord FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 475 (9th Cir.1991); Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.1987). In determining whether there is an entitlement to the benefit in question, we look not to the Constitution but to existing rules and understandings that stem from an outside source such as state law. Merritt, 827 F.2d at 1371 (internal quotations omitted); accord Henderson, 940 F.2d at 475. 17 Montana law does not provide Appellant with an entitlement to employment at CSSI. In Montana, employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee ... for any reason considered sufficient by the terminating party. Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 39-2-902. Appellant had no specified term of employment or even a contract. CSSI had no policy manual and no period of probation. Appellant's employment appears to have been at will. 18 Notwithstanding his at-will employment status, Appellant argues that he had a right not to be discharged in violation of public policy. Appellant alleges that he was fired in retaliation for suggesting that security measures at the Great Falls courthouse be improved. He suggests that his discharge in retaliation for suggesting improved security was in violation of public policy. 19 While we agree that Appellant has a right not to be discharged in violation of public policy, Krebs v. Ryan Oldsmobile, 843 P.2d 312, 315 (Mont.1992), we disagree that he was so discharged in this case. Administrative rules promulgated by state agencies are one source of public policy.... Termination of an employee for refusing to participate in illegal or immoral activities also violates public policy. Kittelson v. Archie Cochrane Motors, Inc., 813 P.2d 424, 426-27 (Mont.1991) (citations omitted). Examples include dismissal of employee for not perjuring himself; dismissal of employee who files for workers' compensation; or dismissal of the employee who refuses sexual relationships with employer. Belcher v. Department of State Lands, 742 F.2d 475, 478 (Mont.1987). 20 In Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont.1980), the Montana Supreme Court rejected the argument that public policy was violated when an employee was fired for complaining to his employer that customers were not being adequately served because the employer's promises to service business machines sold to customers were not fulfilled. 606 P.2d at 129-30. In doing so, the Court quoted from and cited with approval Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa.1974), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that no public policy was violated when an employee was fired for complaining to his superiors that the products his employer sold were unsafe. Id. at 175, 178-79. 21 In this case, Appellant alleges, at most, that he was discharged for disagreeing with the government as to how to provide security for the courthouse. We think that Appellant's claimed violation of public policy is most similar to those at issue in Keneally and Geary. Discharge in retaliation for mere disagreement with others as to public safety aspects of the product produced or the service provided by the employee is not in violation of public policy under Montana law. 2 22 Because Appellant was an employee at will and has not demonstrated that he was discharged in violation of public policy or law, we conclude that he has not shown an entitlement to employment. We therefore conclude that Appellant lacked a protected property interest in his employment. Inasmuch as Appellant's Bivens action rested on an unconstitutional deprivation of a protected property interest, it was properly dismissed. 23 Further, Appellant's substantive due process claim must fail. Affidavits supporting the defendants' motion for summary judgment adequately justify any government action that interfered with Appellant's liberty interest in pursuing the common occupations or professions of life. Lebbos v. Judges of Super. Ct., 883 F.2d 810, 818 (9th Cir.1989) (internal quotations omitted). Omitting those facts specifically disputed by Appellant's affidavit in rebuttal, we find that sufficient undisputed facts remain to show that the government's action was not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. (internal quotations omitted); Henderson, 940 F.2d at 474. 24 For the foregoing reasons, we also conclude that the government action alleged in this case violated none of Appellant's constitutional rights. His Bivens action was therefore properly dismissed. 25 AFFIRMED.