Opinion ID: 1434460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction on Intentional Discrimination

Text: Lewis next argues that the discrimination instruction was improper because it required Lewis to prove that the Defendants intentionally discriminated against her. She cites to Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893 (7th Cir.2007) and Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986), but those cases address hostile work environment claims. Lewis's hostile work environment claim was dismissed at summary judgment and not pursued at trial. A plaintiff bringing a disparate treatment claim must prove intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court has stated that it is the plaintiff's burden to persuade the trier of fact that defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)); Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1031 (7th Cir.1998) (Proof of intentional discrimination is required under a disparate treatment analysis.); see also Waite v. Bd. of Trs. of Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 408 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir.2005). Lewis herself admitted this in her briefing when she wrote that [t]his evidence is also necessary to prove discriminatory and retaliatory intent, which is an essential element under Title VII. See Appellant's Br. at 46 (emphasis added). The instruction requiring Lewis to prove intentional discrimination was therefore entirely appropriate.