Opinion ID: 146484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Antonio Sheley's Testimony

Text: Stenger argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting part of Antonio Sheley's testimony over Stenger's hearsay objection. After Sheley testified about inculpatory statements that Stenger made during his pretrial incarceration, Stenger's counsel sought to challenge Sheley on cross-examination by highlighting his motive for testifying. The following exchange then ensued: Stenger's Counsel: All right. So understanding no promise has been made to you and expecting nothing, you still have the hopes that something can be done with regards to your situation maybe. Is that fair? Sheley: Can I answer the question? Is it alright if I answer it? Stenger's Counsel: I think you did. You said you hope something can happen? Sheley: Right. I recently wrote a letter to the U.S. Attorney, and I didn't want to mention this because I don'tI mean I don't know if he received this, but I received threats from your client recently. Stenger's counsel then objected on the ground that Sheley's answer was nonresponsive to the question. The court sustained the objection, instructing the jury to ignore Sheley's response. Later, however, the government recalled Sheley, and he was permitted to offer limited testimony about receiving a threat. Sheley indicated that he had received the threat from an individual other than Stenger, at which point Stenger's counsel objected that the testimony was hearsay. The record reflects that the parties and the district court were confused about the application of the hearsay rule. The district court apparently concluded that some of the testimony concerning the threat was admissible under the exception for a present sense impression, but the parties now agree that the exception is inapplicable here. Sheley offered additional details over a hearsay objection, testifying that the threat came from Kevin Jordan, another inmate, and that it related to information that Sheley gave the government regarding Stenger. Stenger contends that the district court's admission of this testimony requires reversal. The government responds that testimony about the threat was relevant to establish Sheley's motive for testifying and Stenger's consciousness of guilt. Although the record lacks detail about the substance of the threat testimony, we are confident that any error in the admission of Sheley's testimony was harmless. As just discussed, it was unclear whether the threat originated from Stenger. When Sheley explained the incident, he testified only that the threat came from Kevin Jordan and that it concerned Sheley's testimony in Stenger's case. Even if the jury did connect the threat with Stenger, it is unlikely that the testimony was a significant factor in the jury's decision to find Stenger guilty. The testimony about the threat was brief and obscure, and the government made only a passing reference to that evidence in its closing argument. Furthermore, as detailed below, the evidence of Stenger's guilt was substantial. Accordingly, admission of the testimony did not constitute reversible error. See United States v. Bercier, 506 F.3d 625, 632 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that an error in admitting hearsay testimony is harmless under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 52(a) `if the reviewing court, after viewing the entire record, determines that no substantial rights of the defendant were affected, and that the error did not influence or had only a very slight influence on the verdict.') (quoting United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 140 (8th Cir.1991)).