Opinion ID: 1878949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Physical work stress requirement

Text: The special statutory twist this case presents, warranting our exercise of jurisdiction, is that the facts of this case do not present the fundamental requirement of physical work stress. Without physical work stress it becomes pointless to attempt to apply the two statutory requirements of Section 1021(7)(e), which both involve a comparison of the physical work stress experienced by the employee in the case before the court to other factors (i) the stress experienced by the average employee in that occupation, and (ii) some other source of stress or preexisting condition. Indeed, the relevance of the employee's physical condition enters the equation in making the latter comparison; hence, it is illogical to equate physical work stress under this statute with a preexisting physical condition. The requirement of physical work stress means physical work stress in the job environment. 13 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Louisiana Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 261 p. 668 (3rd ed. 1994). Physical work stress, as defendant points out, thus requires an analysis of the job duties the plaintiff was actually performing at the time of accident or death. Applying the proper definition of physical work stress to the facts of this case reveals that this fundamental requirement is lacking. Hatcherson's job did not involve manual labor; rather, he had an office job that entailed supervising several employees. As a customer service manager, Hatcherson's job duties were administrative in nature. He supervised slightly over a dozen service technicians' performance and equipment installation. He also had certain financial and customer relations duties. As to the latter duties, his job involved communicating with customers to ensure customer satisfaction levels were being met and customer contracts were being maintained. By nature, all of these duties were administrative, not physical. Indeed, his job involved the sedentary tasks of using the telephone, computer and car for travel. Describing Hatcherson's job duties, Shepherd, Hatcherson's direct supervisor, testified that the job involved supervising other employees. When questioned as to whether Hatcherson's job entailed any physical work stress, Shepherd response was: very limited. It would have been maybe a UPS package came in, and it would be opened and the parts in it. It's primarily administrative functions. Likewise, the workers' compensation hearing officer found that decedent's job did not involve heavy manual labor. Rather he held a[n] office-type job where he supervised a number of employees. And, plaintiff's own testimony indicated that she was unaware of any physical labor her husband engaged in during the interval between his June 1996 accident and his February 1997 death. Given the lack of physical work stress, it would be theoretically flawed for us even to attempt to apply the two requirements of Section 1021(7)(e) to the facts of this case. Both factors are based on the underlying assumption of physical, as opposed to mental, work stress. At best, the pain and suffering decedent suffered as a result of his back injury, though lamentable, was a form of mental stress, which the Legislature opted in 1989 to exclude from coverage. Moreover, the Legislature opted to hinge coverage for perivascular illnesses upon proof of extraordinary or unusual physical stress or exertion. Given that plaintiff's entire case is premised on the decedent's physical inactivity over a protracted eight month period, the converse of the standard the Legislature opted to impose, this perivascular accident is clearly statutorily noncompensable. [9] Given our conclusion that physical work stress is lacking and that the perivascular incident that resulted in Hatcherson's death is on that basis non-compensable, we pretermit consideration of whether his physical work stress was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the stress or exertion experienced by the average employee in that occupation or the predominant and major cause of the perivascular incident. Unlike in Harold and Charles in which we analyzed whether these two statutory requirements were satisfied, this case presents facts in which physical work stress was nonexistent and an analysis of these two requirements would be meaningless.