Opinion ID: 2777003
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: for malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the

Text: part of the judges of election at any polling place, or of any board of canvassers, or any judge or member of the board sufficient to change the result; .... (d) when illegal votes have been received or legal votes have been rejected at the polls sufficient to change the result; (e) for any error of any board of canvassers or judges of election in counting the votes or declaring the result of the election, if the error would change the result; .... (f) when the election result would change because a sufficient number of ballots containing uncorrected errors or omissions have been received at the polls; .... 12 Cite as: 2015 UT 20 A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II (h) when an election judge or clerk was a party to malconduct, fraud, or corruption sufficient to change the result of the election . . . . 27 The lieutenant governor reads this provision to “require[] proof that the result would have been different if you added or subtracted the actual votes.” We disagree. The statutory condition that the alleged malconduct, errors, or illegal voting be “sufficient to change the result” acts as a threshold materiality requirement. Ostensibly, the legislature believed that an election contest that cannot possibly lead to a different result does not warrant the time and attention of the court. By way of example, consider an election resulting in a 100-vote margin between two candidates. If the defeated candidate brought a challenge alleging that forty illegal votes had been counted, such a challenge, even if proven, could not impact the final result. It would not merit review by a court, and thus the legislature likely sought to prevent such immaterial contests. In contrast, when a challenger alleges errors that could actually change the result, the court’s review is warranted. ¶ 27 The lieutenant governor’s interpretation of the statute would foreclose a challenge any time the ballots could not be opened, reviewed, and recounted.28 Under this approach, even in 27 UTAH CODE § 20A-4-402 (emphases added). 28 At oral argument, counsel for the lieutenant governor argued that a court could determine for whom a particular individual voted through voluntary testimony by the voter or by looking to circumstantial evidence such as party affiliation or whether a voter put signs for a particular candidate in his front yard. Because we disagree with the lieutenant governor’s statutory interpretation, we do not reach this issue. However, we express great suspicion that these types of circumstantial evidence could properly be relied upon to determine the outcome of an election. See 29 C.J.S. Elections § 480 (“As a general rule, a legal voter cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he or she voted.”); see also Helm v. State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 229 (Okla. 1979) (“There can be no doubt that where paper ballots are concerned, the testimony of voters as to how they voted is not competent.”). But see In re Petition to Contest the Gen. Election for Dist. Justice in Judicial Dist. 36-3-03 Nunc Pro Tunc, 670 A.2d 629, (con’t.) 13 COX v. LAYCOCK A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II circumstances where there is wide-scale or egregious conduct (for example, intentional burning of ballot boxes), a defeated challenger may have no recourse because the votes could not be counted. We elect to take a more sensible approach—an approach that comports with the statute’s plain language. We hold that a contest may move forward under section 20A-4-402(a), (d), (e), (f), or (h) where a candidate challenges enough votes to meet or exceed the margin of victory. ¶ 28 Additionally, this approach does not open the floodgates to election contests. Challengers remain bound by our civil pleading standards. 29 Additionally, the election code itself provides a heightened pleading requirement. Section 20A-4- 403(2) sets forth filing procedures for a petition to contest an primary election. Where, as here, illegal voting is alleged, the candidate must provide the name and address of each person whose vote he intends to contest at trial. 30 If a voter is not included on the petition list, the challenger forfeits his right to contest that vote.31 This requirement provides a significant hurdle to prevent individuals from indiscriminately challenging elections without evidence of wrongdoing or errors. ¶ 29 Moreover, even with carefully prescribed instructions for election contests, the statute nowhere requires a challenger to state for whom each disputed vote was cast. 32 The lieutenant governor cites section 20A-4-403(2)(c) as evidence that the votes must be capable of a final accounting. This section provides that when challenging illegal votes or rejected legal votes, “it is sufficient to state generally” that illegal votes were given to the declared winner or legal votes were denied another candidate such that the final tally of legal votes would yield a different 638–39 (Pa. 1996) (allowing voluntary testimony of voters as evidence of how they originally voted). 29 See UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a) (providing that a claim “shall contain a short and plain: (1) statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief; and (2) demand for judgment for specified relief”). 30 UTAH CODE § 20A-4-403(2)(b)(vii). 31 Id. § 20A-4-403(2)(d)(ii). 32 Id. § 20A-4-403. 14 Cite as: 2015 UT 20 A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II winner. 33 But, as explained above, that section merely sets forth the general filing procedures. It does not speak to the ultimate level of proof required for the contested votes. Section 20A-4- 403(2)(a) prescribes when and where the petition is to be filed, subsection (b) details the required contents of the petition, and subsection (c) provides the applicable pleading standard for the petition. This pleading standard simply requires the challenger to allege enough wrongly counted or wrongly rejected votes, which, if proven, would yield a different victor than the person declared elected. Moreover, the statute requires the challenger only to “state generally” his allegations regarding the disputed vote count. Thus, this language cannot be read to require the challenger to submit definitive proof of the final election result. It is enough to challenge the number of votes that would be sufficient to change the result, even if that result cannot be determined. ¶ 30 In sum, because Mr. Dyer challenged over twenty votes as illegal in an election with a five-vote margin, we hold that he met his pleading burden and his election contest was properly before the district court.