Opinion ID: 7514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Preemption of State Law Claims

Text: 7 In Easterwood, the Supreme Court considered whether the FRSA preempted the plaintiff's Georgia common law negligence claim that the railroad crossing at which her husband was killed had inadequate warning signals. 2 Under the FRSA, a state may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary [of Transportation] has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State requirement. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 434 (emphasis added). In 1973, Congress enacted the HSA, which 8 makes federal funds available to the States to improve grade crossings, in return for which the States must 'conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings which may require ... protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose. Easterwood, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1737 (quoting 23 U.S.C. Sec. 130(d)). 9 The states' eligibility for and use of federal funds is governed by regulations promulgated by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). See generally 23 C.F.R. pts. 646, 655, 924, 1204. The issue before the Court in Easterwood was whether these regulations covered the subject matter of the plaintiff's state law claims and therefore preempted those claims. Easterwood, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1737. 10 The Court noted that the use of the term covering in the FRSA's express preemption clause implied a restrictive view of preemption, under which pre-emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law, and that the context of the provision, which is both prefaced and succeeded by express saving clauses, manifested a considerable solicitude for state law. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1738. The Court thus held that general regulations that do not establish particular requirements governing the installation of warning devices at grade crossings do not cover the subject matter of state tort law and thus could not have preemptive effect. 3 Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1738-40. 11 The regulations set forth in 23 C.F.R. Sec. 646.214(b)(3) and (b)(4), however, do prescribe such particular requirements. 4 The Court therefore held that, where applicable, these regulations do preempt state law:[U]nder Secs. 646.214(b)(3) and (4), a project for the improvement of a grade crossing must either include an automatic gate or receive FHWA approval if federal funds 'participate in the installation of the [warning] devices.' Thus ... Secs. 646.214(b)(3) and (4) displace state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.... In short, for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. The Secretary's regulations therefore cover the subject matter of state law which ... seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings. 5 Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1741 (footnote omitted). 12 Pursuant to Easterwood, the test we thus must apply is whether federal funds participated in the installation of warning devices at the Hatley Circle crossing. If they have, the Hesters' common law claims based on inadequate signalization are preempted. 13 CSX presented evidence, including Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) records and the affidavit of Newton McCormick, the Office Engineer of the Construction Division of MDOT, showing that from 1981 to 1983 federal funds were approved and expended in the upgrading and installation of reflectorized crossbucks, advance warning signs, and advance pavement warning markings at the Hatley Circle crossing. Such passive warning devices fall within the regulations' definition of devices for which federal funds may be expended. 6 See 23 C.F.R. Sec. 646.204(i). Having reviewed the record evidence, we find that CSX has established that federal funds did in fact participate in the installation of warning devices at Hatley Circle. 7 14 The Hesters argue that there is no record evidence demonstrating that the Secretary made a determination that these passive warning devices were adequate to protect motorists at Hatley Circle. The statute and regulations preclude this argument. The regulations direct the Secretary to authorize the expenditure of federal funds only on projects that satisfy, inter alia, the requirements of federal law, specifically 23 U.S.C. Sec. 109. 8 See 23 C.F.R. Sec. 630.114(b). Under that section, [n]o funds shall be approved for expenditure ... unless proper safety protective devices complying with safety standards determined by the Secretary at that time as being adequate shall be installed or be in operation at any highway and railroad grade crossing ... 23 U.S.C.A. Sec. 109(e) (emphasis added). The fact that federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices legally presupposes that the Secretary approved and authorized that expenditure, which in turn legally presupposes that the Secretary determined that the safety devices installed were adequate to their task. 9 There is no evidence that this did not in fact happen. Nor is there any evidence demonstrating that passive warning devices alone were deemed inadequate (or were not found adequate) to promote safety at Hatley Circle. 15 We therefore conclude that federal funds participated in the installation of warning devices at Hatley Circle. The Hesters' state law claims based on inadequate signalization at the crossing are therefore preempted.