Opinion ID: 1860134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The exclusion of Brooks' medical records while a patient at Ten Broeck and evidence of her sexual history pursuant to KRE 412, The Rape Shield Law

Text: We agree with Ten Broeck's contention that the trial court's exclusion of Brooks' medical records while she was a patient at Ten Broeck, as well as evidence of her prior sexual history, pursuant to KRE 412(b)(2), effectively denied it the right to defend itself on the critical issues of (1) whether the sexual activity with Gilbert was consensual, and (2) the issue of Brooks' injury and damages and, thus, constituted error warranting a new trial. The parties do not dispute that during the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift on January, 2001, Gilbert and Brooks engaged in oral sex and intercourse. Brooks testified that she refused Gilbert's request for sex on two immediately prior occasions, but on the third such request, Gilbert engaged her in oral sex and raped her without her consent. She admits, however, that the sexual discussions that preceded the sexual activity, her denials, and the sexual activity itself did not disturb her sleeping roommate, nor did the nearby nurses' station hear any activity. Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records disclose that she advised the admitting nurse that her libido had recently increased. The records also reflect that she liked sex too much and had been sexually promiscuous and had unprotected sex with numerous men and with at least one woman. She reported conflicted feelings in regard to her sexual promiscuity, stating that she was bi-sexual and that this condition stresses her. The records also reflect that on January 8, 2001, Brooks informed her psychiatrist, Dr. Steve Gibson, that she had sex in the hospital the previous week. Upon further questioning from Dr. Gibson regarding this statement, and his pointing out to her that she had only been in the hospital since January 5, 2001, she stated that she did not remember where, or when, it occurred. Dr. Gibson discussed this matter again with her on January 9, 2001, whereupon she stated she was not sure whether it had occurred at the hospital or the night before she was admitted. Ten Broeck's records concerning her stay do not reflect that Brooks claimed, at any time, that she had been raped in the hospital. The discharge summary reflects that she felt 100% better in comparison to when she was admitted, that the group sessions had helped her, and that she had done extremely well in treatment. Upon discharge, Brooks indicated that her primary concern was that she may be bi-sexual and registered concern as to how her boyfriend would react to this. Later, around January 26, 2001, Brooks told her father that she had sex in the hospital. He then contacted an attorney, who advised calling the police, and on January 30, 2001, Gilbert was arrested and charged with raping Brooks. According to Ten Broeck, this was the first time it learned of any rape allegation. Gilbert was acquitted of the criminal charge of rape in a jury trial in August 2004. Dr. Lisa Goodman testified for Brooks at trial as an expert psychologist. She testified about outcomes associated with sexual assaults in the general population. In short, she was allowed to testify to a hypothetical damage theory based upon the consequences of an actual rape. Her opinions were based upon damage that a rape could cause an average victim. In contrast, Ten Broeck's expert witness was not allowed to testify on the issue of damages, that Brooks' mother reported that Brooks had been molested at age fourteen (14) by her father, and that her many sexual relationships caused her to express concerns of shame, guilt and lack of self esteem. [2] In denying admissibility of Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records, as well as the evidence of her sexual history noted above pursuant to KRE 412, the trial court found [t]here is a strong probability that evidence of Ms. Brooks' prior sexual conduct, if admitted, could unfairly prejudice the jury. Upon motion for reconsideration, the court again denied same, believing that the jury will be able to fairly and accurately decide whether Ten Broeck was negligent and whether Ms. Brooks sustained any injuries resulting from its negligence without evidence of her past sexual conduct. The trial court also denied Ten Broeck an evidentiary hearing on the question of admissibility on grounds that KRE 412(c)(2) only deals with evidence sought to be introduced under KRE 412(b). That section deals with particular acts of sexual conduct which are sought to be introduced to prove that the accused was not the perpetrator. Such is not the case herein.
KRE 412, in its entirety, indicates as follows: KRE 412 Rape and similar cases; admissibility of victim's character and behavior (a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c): (1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition. (b) Exceptions: (1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules: (A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and (C) any other evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged. (2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim. (c) Procedure to determine admissibility. (1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must: (A) file a written motion at least fourteen (14) days before trial specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and (B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative. (2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise. When first promulgated in 1992, KRE 412 did not apply to civil cases. However, it was amended effective July 1, 2003, as above and now applies to any civil ... proceeding involving an `alleged sexual misconduct.' Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.30[2] (4th ed.2003). Except for a slight difference in language KRE 412 is now essentially the same as Fed.R.Evid. 412. The test of admitting evidence offered to prove sexual behavior or sexual propensity in civil cases differs in three respects from the general rule governing admissibility set forth in Rule 403. First, it reverses the usual procedure spelled out in Rule 403 by shifting the burden to the proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than making the opponent justify exclusion of the evidence. Second, the standard expressed in subdivision (b)(2) is more stringent than in the original rule; it raises the threshold for admission by requiring that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweigh the specified dangers. Finally, the Rule 412 test puts harm to the victim on the scale in addition to prejudice to the parties. Fed.R.Evid. 412 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). Prior to the 2003 amendment expanding coverage to civil cases, KRE 412 contained its own balancing standard, i.e., the court was required to find that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. KRE 412(c)(3) (2000 ed.) The 2003 amendment relegated the balancing test for evidence of criminal actions to KRE 403. [B]y requiring that evidence under [KRE 412(b)(1)] be `otherwise admissible under these rules,' the provision brings into play the balancing test of [KRE] Rule 403. Minutes, Evidence Rules Review Commission, Commentary on Amended KRE 412 (September 28, 2001). Thus, contrary to the old rule, the rule today, in its criminal application, tilts strongly in favor of admission over exclusion. Lawson, supra § 2.30[4][e]. KRE 412's balancing standard in civil actions, however, requiring the court to find that the probative value of the proffered evidence substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party, KRE 412(b)(2), tilts strongly in favor of exclusion over admission. Lawson, supra § 2.30[5]. Thus, in a civil analysis under KRE 412(b)(2), the court must determine (1) if the evidence is offered to prove an alleged victim's sexual predisposition or that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior, and, if so, (2) is such other evidence otherwise admissible under any other rule of evidence, particularly KRE 403, and, if so, (3) does its probative value substantially outweigh the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.
If the effect of the proof is to prove an alleged victim's sexual predisposition, or that an alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior, the evidence falls under the guidelines of KRE 412. Thus, this Court has approved under KRS 510.145 (Michie 1985), the predecessor to KRE 412 the exclusion of evidence showing that a stepdaughter had requested birth control devices. Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Ky.1991); but see Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 230, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (holding that evidence indicating the victim was seeing another man at the time of the rape and living with him at the time of the trial was not barred by [our] rape shield law.). In Commonwealth v. Young, 182 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Ky.App.2005), the court held that statements by an alleged victim to her co-worker, that she wanted to engage in sex with [the defendant] to such a degree that it would melt the ice in the water cooler, and that she also commented, in reference to the defendant, that she `wanted some of that,' constituted evidence of sexual behavior, although it was held admissible. Id. Yet, evidence that the victim, after the alleged rape, continued an ongoing relationship with the police department at which the defendant worked, which included work as a confidential informant, in no way involves ... sexual conduct and, as such, is not covered by Rule 412. Id. Like other `rape shield' laws, the primary objective of KRE 412 is `to protect alleged victims of sex crimes against unfair and unwarranted assaults on character.' Lawson, supra § 2.30[3]. Here, the evidence offered by Ten Broeck, even though offered primarily on the issue of damages, in order to attempt to show the extent of Brooks' preexisting injury, necessarily produces proof that Brooks engaged in other sexual behavior and implicates an alleged sexual predisposition. Thus, KRE 412 is applicable.
Although at times other rules of evidence may be applicable, the reference in KRE 412(b)(2) to the inquiry, if it is otherwise admissible under these rules, generally implicates KRE 403. Under KRE 403, the probative value of the evidence may not be substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. KRE 403. Balancing the probative value versus the danger of undue prejudice is unnecessary in this step since this test is contained within the language of KRE 412 under the concept of unfair prejudice. [3] Confusion of the issues is generally used to exclude evidence that creates side issues that distract jurors from the real issues of the case. See, e.g., United States v. Pitocchelli, 830 F.2d 401, 404 (1st Cir.1987); Langer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir.1992); United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061 (D.C.Cir. 1989). Misleading the jury refers primarily to the possibility of the jury overvaluing the probative value of a particular item of evidence for reasons other than the emotional reaction associated with unfair prejudice. 1 Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, § 401.7 (4th ed.1996). Undue delay or cumulativeness are the remaining factors in Rule 403's equation and are designed to give courts needed discretion to control tireless litigators and to conduct trials efficiently. Lawson, supra § 2.10[5]. As to cumulative evidence: Not all evidence that is duplicative is ... cumulative.... At times it is reasonable for a party to insist that one witness is good, but two or three will make my case much stronger, even though all will testify in a similar vein. In short, the discretion to exclude cumulative evidence must be exercised in a discriminating fashion, and with wisdom, particularly where the evidence goes to issues of central importance. Lawson, supra § 2.10[5] ( quoting 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick Federal Evidence § 96 (2d ed.1994)). As is most often the case, rulings upholding the exclusion of cumulative evidence involve the limitation of witnesses testifying in the same vein, or to the same point. E.g., United States v. Shelton, 736 F.2d 1397, 1409-10 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Johnson, 730 F.2d 683, 688 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 272 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Gray, 507 F.2d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir.1975). In performing the analysis under KRE 403 on these issues, it is important to understand the fundamental difference between KRE 403 and KRE 412. [T]he primary objective of KRE 412 is `to protect alleged victims of sex crimes against unfair and unwarranted assaults on character,' Lawson, supra § 2.30[3] ( quoting Evidence Rule Study Committee, Kentucky Rules of EvidenceFinal Draft, p. 36 (Nov.1989)). KRE 403, on the other hand, was borrowed from the Federal Rules but is essentially a codification of longstanding evidence doctrine and policy. Lawson, supra § 2.10[2]. The issue [under KRE 403, then,] is whether the search for truth will be helped or hindered by the interjection of distracting, confusing, or emotionally charged evidence. Id. ( citing McLaughlin, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 403.02[1][a] (2d ed.2002)). Reviewing Brooks' Ten Broeck hospital medical records during her treatment, as well as evidence of her sexual history within the context of the issues and evidence presented at trial, it is clear the evidence was highly probative in regards to the issues of consent and damages. Her comments that she had sex at the hospital, rather than being raped, is relevant to issues of consent, while the remainder of the evidence is relevant to the issues of damages. Moreover, its prejudicial value was minimal on the relevant KRE 403 considerations of confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. KRE 403. To suggest, as Appellee does, that Dr. Granacher's testimony on Brooks' medical condition rendered the records (and Brooks' statements therein) cumulative, is inaccurate. Under the court's ruling excluding such evidence, Dr. Granacher could not testify as to Brooks' statements dealing with her sexuality or the mental and emotional turmoil arising from her sexual promiscuity, for which she was seeking treatment. Nor was Appellant's counsel's non-evidentiary comment that Brooks likes sex too much, likely to be on the same level of conviction as Brooks' report, in the records, that she likes sex too much. An attenuated comment seldom makes a direct comment cumulative. The excluded evidence was in fact the strongest evidence. Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002). Thus, the excluded evidence was, otherwise admissible under these rules, referring to the KRE 403 test referenced within KRE 412(b)(2).

`Unfair prejudice' means the undue tendency to suggest a decision based on improper consideration; it `does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.' Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn. By and Through Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 516 (6th Cir.1996) ( quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir.1993)) (emphasis in original). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if ... it `appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish,' or otherwise `may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.' Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir.1980) ( quoting Fe. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note). [U]nfair prejudice is that which is unnecessary and unreasonable. Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Ky.1996) rev'd on other grounds by Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288 (Ky.2008). Since Brooks is both the victim and the other party opposing the evidence, both tests must be applied with her in mind. And [w]e must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, `maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.' Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 360 (6th Cir.1997).
The probative value of evidence is measured by the strength of its tendency to prove one side or the other of a material issue in the case. Direct evidence is often stronger in value than circumstantial, but that which is most convincing, or proves to be the more conclusive, or finally pushes the strength of one's case to a conclusive level on a material issue of fact, is entitled to the strongest probative value. In Barnett v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Ky.1992), we stated: The purpose of the Rape Shield Statute[, then KRS 510.145,] in generally prohibiting evidence of prior sexual conduct of a complaining witness is to insure that that witness does not become the party on trial through the admission of evidence that is neither material nor relevant to the charge made. The statute does not prohibit the introduction of relevant, probative evidence at trial, if the evidence of prior sexual conduct directly pertains to the [act] with which the defendant is charged. Id. at 363. In Barnett , the Commonwealth offered the testimony of an examining physician who testified to findings of chronic sexual contact in regards to the young female victim and identified the appellant as the perpetrator of such contact. Yet, [d]espite the existence of several handwritten notes by the [youthful] victim and her brother which suggested the existence of a sexual relationship between them, and statements by the victim identifying her brother as one with whom she had sexual contact, the trial court denied appellant any right to cross-examine the complaining witness or her brother as to their possible sexual contact. Id. at 362. In reversing, this Court stated: In the case of a sexually active adult who claims to be the victim of rape, medical findings that she frequently engages in intercourse would not be probative of the crime charged. However, in the case of a female child who is presumed not to be sexually active, and with whom any sexual contact is prohibited, a medical finding of frequent sexual activity establishes the relevance of evidence that the perpetrator is one other than the person charged. .... Omission of the evidence concerning the ongoing sexual activity between the complaining witness and her brother was devastating to appellant in light of the testimony of the examining physician who expressed findings of chronic sexual contact and, without objection, identified appellant as the guilty party. The possibility that the victim had engaged in ongoing sexual conduct with her sibling was not revealed to the physician during his examination and interview of the victim. This revelation may have caused the physician to qualify or omit his branding of appellant as the assailant. Id. at 363. Thus, [a]ppellant was required to defend himself without the benefit of evidence which could have explained the expert's ... findings. The preclusion of the evidence of the victim's sexual contact with her brother was tantamount to a denial of appellant's right to present a defense. Id. at 363. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 135 (Ky.2001), involved similar circumstances where the excluded testimony was critical to the right to a defense. Again, the victim was a child and unlikely to have sexual partners. The only partner identified was the appellant. Therefore, testimony from a doctor that C.S.B. had a loose vaginal opening would lead the jury to believe that Appellant must have been the one who penetrated C.S.B. and caused her vaginal opening to be loose. Therefore, under Barnett , it appears that the evidence of the victim's past sexual encounter is relevant to provide an explanation for why she had a loose vaginal opening, and rebut the inference of guilt. Id. at 140. Young, 182 S.W.3d at 224, involved a defendant charged with rape who filed a motion pursuant to KRE 412 to be allowed to introduce evidence that (1) the alleged victim made statements to her co-worker that she wanted to engage in sex with the defendant to such a degree that it would melt the ice in the water cooler and also commented, in reference to the defendant, that she `wanted some of that,' and (2) that the alleged victim frequented the police department where he was working at night and flirted or made sexual advances directed at him. Young's entire defense to the charge of first-degree rape was that the sexual encounter was consensual. Id. at 224. The trial court sustained the motion to allow admission of the offered evidence and granted a continuance for the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating: This is a case which hinges solely on the credibility of the prosecuting witness and Young. There is no medical evidence since the alleged rape was not reported for months. Excluding the evidence as the Commonwealth desires would be tantamount to denying Young his constitutional right to present a defense of consensual sexual contact. Id. at 224-25. Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.1997), is also instructive as to probative value in regards to past and present sexual activities in a civil action for damages. In Rodman , Judd sued Rodman for damages, claiming he gave her herpes. On Judd's appeal, after a trial verdict in favor of Rodman, she contended that, under the balancing test of Rule 412(b), evidence of her prior sexual history should have been excluded because its probative value failed to outweigh substantially the unfair prejudice toward her. Id. at 1343. In upholding its admission, the court held: A central issue of the case, however, is whether Judd contracted genital herpes from Rodman. Expert testimony revealed that the herpes virus can be dormant for long periods of time and the infected person can be asymptomatic. Consequently, evidence of prior sexual relationships and the type of protection used during sexual intercourse was highly relevant to Rodman's liability. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Judd's prior sexual history. Id. Delaney v. City of Hampton, 999 F.Supp. 794 (E.D.Va.1997) involved similar circumstances. In Delaney , the court found that such evidence should be available to the jury, noting: It is clear from Delaney's psychiatric file that she has had numerous stressors in her life besides the alleged incident with Parker including a history of sexual abuse and other incidents such as an automobile accident. The City has experts who will testify that these stressors may have contributed to her current psychiatric problems. Therefore, evidence of such past abuse that is found in Delaney's psychiatric medical file should be admitted in this case. Id. at 796. Here, evidence that the sexual activity which admittedly occurredwas so quiet that Brooks' sleeping roommate was not awakened and the nearby nurses' station never heard any activity, sets the stage for a significant factual issue for the jury as to whether or not the sexual activity was consensual or non-consensual. Moreover, Brooks' comments to Dr. Gibson that she had sex in the hospital, as opposed to having been raped in the hospital, could be taken by the jury as strongly suggestive of consensual sex. Consistent with this point, her failure to report being raped during her admission and treatment is highly relevant on this same issue. In addition, Dr. Lisa Goodman was allowed to testify as plaintiffs expert regarding a hypothetical damage theory based on the consequences of an actual rape. She gave opinions which were based upon damage that a rape could cause an average victim. Though Dr. Goodman never saw, evaluated or diagnosed Brooks, she was allowed to testify that Brooks was raped. Thus, evidence that she liked sex too much and had been sexually promiscuous and had unprotected sex with numerous men and with at least one woman and had reported conflicted feelings in regards to her sexual promiscuity, that she believed she was bi-sexual and that these, along with the state of her resulting mental and emotional health, which were the reasons for her admission to Ten Broeck, are strongly relevant to the issue of damages. In addition, Brooks' mother's report that Brooks had been molested at age fourteen (14) by her father and that her many sexual relationships caused her to express feelings of shame, guilt and lack of self-esteem, all strongly relate to the issue of damages. Clearly, any damage she was suffering prior to the time of the sexual event of January 5, 2001, was highly relevant to the question of what damages she suffered as a result of the event. Thus, in the balancing required under KRE 412(b)(2), the probative value of the evidence excluded would necessarily be high when weighed in regards to the appropriate issues of consent and damages.
In Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637 (8th Cir.2006), a sexual harassment suit, the court allowed into evidence sexually charged comments made by the plaintiff in the work place. Testimony was also allowed that the plaintiff used lewd, rude and unlady-like language in the workplace. Id. at 643. The evidence was allowed on the basis that the plaintiff might have welcomed the alleged harassment. The admission of such evidence was affirmed on appeal, wherein the court noted: While we agree that the district court erred in mischaracterizing this evidence as non-Rule 412 evidence in the first instance, there was no danger of harm or prejudice to [the plaintiff] or any other party, and the district court correctly determined that it was admissible as relevant to the issues raised by [the plaintiffs] claims. Id. In another sexual harassment suit, Hall v. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 883 S.W.2d 884 (Ky.App.1994), the court allowed evidence of the plaintiffs extra-martial affair with a co-worker. In affirming admissibility, the court noted: If an employee made a claim for damages based upon a physical trauma allegedly suffered in the workplace, any prior or contemporaneous complaints relating to other causes of the alleged injury would most certainly be relevant. The same reasoning applies to injuries resulting from non-physical traumas such as sexual harassment. Evidence of other factors that possibly contributed to [the plaintiffs] emotional injuries are clearly relevant to the issue of damages in this case. Id. at 887. Thus, considering Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records during the term of her treatment within the context of the issues raised by the evidence, particularly in regards to the issues of consent and damages, we find no unfair prejudice. To the extent the jury finds the sexual event to have been non-consensual, it is unlikely that the evidence contained within the records dealing with her sexuality would suggest a decision on any improper basis. Were the jury to find the sexual event was consensual, then the damage to Brooks' case would be by virtue of the consent rather than the evidence of the medical records. Moreover, a trial court can, concurrent with the introduction of the evidence, give such admonitions to the jury as it deems proper to avoid any untoward use of the evidence. See Wilkinson, 307 F.3d at 422 (The court could minimize any danger of undue prejudice by admitting the evidence with a cautionary instruction.). We must also consider the danger of harm to the victim. KRE 412(b)(2). This test is, however, more objective than subjective, and must relate to potential actual harm of a physical, emotional or mental nature, as opposed to the unfair prejudicial affect one would assess upon behalf of a party. Thus, this test is separate from that of unfair prejudice. Yet, the measurement of this danger of harm to the victim, like that of unfair prejudice, may not transcend a party's right to a fair defense. See Wilkinson, 307 F.3d at 422 (The constitutional violations in this case are significant enough to outweigh any violation of the rape shield law, whose purposes can be served by the instructions of the trial court.). Conversely, the closer one gets to damaging a party's right to cross-examining a critical witness and presenting a defense, the higher the probative value of the evidence being considered for exclusion. Id. at 419-21. Considering the objective circumstances, we recognize that Brooks entered Ten Broeck for treatment stemming from her past sexual history and the mental and emotional turmoil and injury created thereby. We note from Ten Broeck's records that Brooks' discharge summary of January 20, 2001, states she felt 100% better than when she was admitted, that the group sessions had helped her, and that she had done well on her treatment. Her principal concerns upon discharge were that she might be bi-sexual and she was concerned about how her boyfriend might react to this. She noted this condition stresses her. Moreover, the fact of the trial itselfand we are not unmindful of her tearful testimonygenerated stressful, and emotional conditions for her. Yet, to the extent the evidence discussed herein is true, it is a truth she has lived with for some time. To the extent that it is not true, one would expect it would generate anger, which one would expect to be fleeting. It is not evidence, which if disclosed at trial, would cause someone to want to hurt her. In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence in this regard, the proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion. Thus, from a consideration of the evidence excluded and the relationship of this evidence to the other evidence of the case, we cannot place a value on the danger of harm to Brooks that would overcome the substantial need of Appellant for the probative value of the excluded evidence. We thus conclude that the probative value of the excluded evidence substantially outweighs the danger of harm and unfair prejudice to Brooks. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Brooks' Ten Broeck hospital records during her treatment period, as well as, the other evidence of her sexual history as discussed herein, excepting, however, Brooks' statement in her deposition that she had sex with one-hundred (100) men and one woman. This last statement should remain excluded for reasons that Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records already note that she stated she had been sexually promiscuous and had unprotected sex with numerous men and with at least one woman. Once sufficient evidence is introduced on a particular point, the KRE 403 and 412(b)(2) balancing considerations may shift to protect against unnecessary and unfair repetition designed solely to place a victim in a bad light. We note Brooks' argument that KRE 412(c) requires the defendant to file a written motion at least fourteen (14) days before trial specifically describing the evidence sought to be admitted for the purposes for which it is offered. However, two separate motions were filed by Ten Broeck seeking the admissibility of this evidence, both before, and after, the 2003 Amendment adding KRE 412(b)(2), and that Ten Broeck requested an evidentiary hearing, which the court improperly denied. Nor, do we consider the evidence to have involved evidence of reputation as argued by the Appellant. We find these arguments without merit. Moreover, having found error in the exclusion of the stated evidence, we cannot under the facts of this case, find it to be harmless. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. To the extent they are preserved and are capable of repetition, we will also address other issues raised.