Opinion ID: 2453356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dillard v. Strecker

Text: Dillard involved a collapse of a wall at a building site for a church and school. Plaintiff Lee Dillard, who was employed by a masonry subcontractor, was seriously hurt in the collapse and was covered by workers compensation for his injuries. He sued the owners of the site, the Roman Catholic archdiocese and its then archbishop, Ignatius J. Strecker, alleging that the defendants were directly liable because of their failure to obtain legally required inspections and vicariously liable for the negligence of his employer, the subcontractor, and/or the general contractor under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. The plaintiff argued that while the Workers Compensation Act provides an `exclusive remedy' against an employer, the act does not bar recovery against negligent third parties, and the defendants qualified as such third parties. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 708, 877 P.2d 371. The Dillard defendants' principal counterargument was that a landowner owed `no duty to an employee of an independent contractor performing work for the landowner.' 255 Kan. at 708, 877 P.2d 371. Instead, the injured employee's recovery should be limited to workers compensation benefits provided by his or her employer. To allow recovery against the landowner would permit `an end-run around the workers compensation law,' a form of `double recovery.' 255 Kan. at 708, 877 P.2d 371. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. When the case reached this court, we began our opinion by assuming that the archbishop had a nondelegable duty under the local building code to provide an independent inspector for the masonry work, and that the masonry work qualified as an inherently dangerous activity. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 707, 877 P.2d 371. We stated the issue broadly: [W]hether a landowner is liable for the negligence of an independent contractor which results in a work-related injury to an employee of the independent contractor when the employee is covered by workers compensation. 255 Kan. at 707, 877 P.2d 371. To resolve this issue, this court relied entirely on cases from other jurisdictions and the policy justifications we culled from them. Cases from Missouri, Maryland, and Connecticut had figured most prominently in the resolutions arrived at in the district court and in the Court of Appeals. Each case protected a defendant landowner when an injured employee of an independent contractor working on the landowner's property sought imposition of direct liability for violation of a nondelegable duty or vicarious liability under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. See Dillard, 255 Kan. at 710-18, 877 P.2d 371 (discussing Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 384 [Mo.1991] [inherently dangerous activity]; Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md. App. 590, 547 A.2d 1080 [1988] [nondelegable duty]; Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660, 548 A.2d 461 [1988] [inherently dangerous activity, nondelegable duty]). Zueck, the Missouri case, dealt with a landowner's vicarious liability. The Zueck court recognized that a landowner generally exercised no right of control over the manner in which an independent contractor performed work on the landowner's property and was thus protected from vicarious liability for the contractor's negligence. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 711, 877 P.2d 371 (quoting Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 386 [citing Prosser & Keaton, The Law of Torts, p. 509 (5th ed. 1984)]). An exception to landowner protection from vicarious liability existed at common law if the landowner knew or should have known that the work to be performed by the independent contractor was abnormally dangerous and the contractor failed to take adequate precautions. See Dillard, 255 Kan. at 711, 877 P.2d 371 (discussing Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 386). The narrow scope of the exception discouraged landowners from hiring inexpensive but unqualified or careless contractors. The Missouri court believed that this inherently dangerous activity exception was undercut by the adoption of comprehensive workers compensation statutes, under which injured employees sacrificed the ability to sue their employers but not necessarily owners of the premises who contracted with employers in exchange for certain recovery of limited amounts. See Dillard, 255 Kan. at 712, 877 P.2d 371 (discussing Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 390). The Missouri court did not want to provide an incentive for landowners to have their own, less-than-expert employees perform dangerous tasks, preferring to encourage landowners to hire independent contractors when the contractors' skills were appropriate for the work. It also reasoned that the contract price included a markup for the cost of the contractors' workers compensation coverage, and it did not want to force landowners to pay this portion of the contract price twice by allowing liability. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 713, 877 P.2d 371 (citing Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 [Mo.1993] [relying on Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 388]). In the Maryland case, Parker, 76 Md.App. 590, 547 A.2d 1080, an injured contractor employee claimed that he was owed a nondelegable duty by the defendant landowner under a county building code requiring the premises to be kept in a reasonably safe condition. See Dillard, 255 Kan. at 714, 877 P.2d 371 (discussing Parker, 76 Md.App. at 594, 547 A.2d 1080). The Maryland court refused to recognize such a duty, even though it conceded that the landowner's responsibilities under the code could not be farmed out to a contractor: `As to the public generally, the duty remains[;] but it does not extend to employees of the contractor who already have a remedy paid for by the owner. ... No matter how appellant phrases it, what he is unsuccessfully attempting is an end run on the Worker's Compensation Law.' Dillard, 255 Kan. at 715, 877 P.2d 371 (quoting Parker, 76 Md.App. at 601-02, 547 A.2d 1080). The Connecticut case, Ray, 16 Conn.App. 660, 548 A.2d 461, involved an independent contractor's employee who sued a landowner under both vicarious and direct liability theories. As our Dillard opinion explained: Under the vicarious liability theory, the employee argued alternative claims, maintaining that the landowners failed to take appropriate safety precautions required because (1) the work was inherently dangerous, and (2) a nondelegable duty was owed to the employees to ensure a safe workplace. Under the direct liability theory, the employee alleged that the landowners were negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care in their selection of the independent contractor. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 716, 877 P.2d 371. The Connecticut court concluded that liability would not be permitted, distinguishing an employee of an independent contractor with workers compensation coverage from a member of the general public, and noting that the contract price charged to the landowner presumably would have included the cost of workers compensation coverage. The court also wanted to avoid the perversity of imposing greater liability on a landowner when an employee of an independent contractor was injured, as compared to when an employee of the landowner was injured. Again, the court hoped to encourage landowners to hire contractors with needed expertise. The court also believed that the employee's knowledge of any hazard would be superior to that of the landowner, making imposition of liability on the landowner unfair. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 718, 877 P.2d 371 (quoting Ray, 16 Conn.App. at 668-70, 548 A.2d 461). In addition to these three cases, our Dillard opinion also cited cases from 6 federal circuits, 2 federal district courts, and 17 additional states as consistent in rejecting landowner liability on at least one of the two theories before it. See Dillard, 255 Kan. at 721, 877 P.2d 371 (citing Scofi v. McKeon Const. Co., 666 F.2d 170 [5th Cir.1982]; Evans v. Transportacion Maritime Mexicana, 639 F.2d 848 [2d Cir.1981]; Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469 [9th Cir.1980]; Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., OY, 576 F.2d 1072 [4th Cir. 1978]; Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030 [5th Cir.1977], cert. denied 435 U.S. 924, 98 S.Ct. 1489, 55 L.Ed.2d 518 [1978]; Craig v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 427 F.2d 962 [7th Cir.], cert. denied 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 365, 27 L.Ed.2d 383 [1970]; Parsons v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 422 F.2d 610 [10th Cir. 1970]; Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288 [2d Cir.1966], cert. denied 387 U.S. 935, 87 S.Ct. 2061, 18 L.Ed.2d 997 [1967]; Galbraith v. United States, 296 F.2d 631 [2d Cir.1961]; Wallach v. United States, 291 F.2d 69 [2d Cir.], cert. denied 368 U.S. 935, 82 S.Ct. 373, 7 L.Ed.2d 197 [1961]; Corban v. Skelly Oil Company, 256 F.2d 775 [5th Cir.1958]; Hurst v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 251 F.2d 836 [5th Cir.1958]; Ackerman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 555 F.Supp. 93 [D.N.D.1982]; Olson v. Kilstofte and Vosejpka, Inc., 327 F.Supp. 583 [D.Minn.1971]; Morris v. City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 474 [Alaska 1976]; Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 552 P.2d 157 [Alaska 1976]; Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 [Alaska 1963]; Mason v. Arizona Public Serv. Co., 127 Ariz. 546, 622 P.2d 493 [Ct.App.1980]; Welker v. Kennecott Copper Company, 1 Ariz.App. 395, 403 P.2d 330 [1965]; Jackson v. Petit Jean Electric Co-op., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66 [1980]; Florida Power and Light Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293 [Fla.1964]; Pearson v. Harris, 449 So.2d 339 [Fla.Dist.App.1984]; Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102 [1987]; Johns v. New York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382 [Ind.App.1982]; King v. Shelby Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659 [Ky.1973], cert. denied 417 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 2644, 41 L.Ed.2d 235 [1974]; Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 392 Mass. 165, 466 N.E.2d 500 [1984]; Conover v. Northern States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397 [Minn.1981]; Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Rinehart, 99 Nev. 557, 665 P.2d 270 [1983]; Donch v. Delta Inspection Services, Inc., 165 N.J.Super. 567, 398 A.2d 925 [1979]; Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 271 [1963]; Cooper v. Metropolitan Government, Etc., 628 S.W.2d 30 [Tenn.App. 1981]; Humphreys v. Texas Power & Light Company, 427 S.W.2d 324 [Tex.Civ.App. 1968]; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Bell, 180 S.W.2d 970 [Tex.Civ.App.1943]; Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash.2d 274, 635 P.2d 426 [1981]; Epperly v. Seattle, 65 Wash.2d 777, 399 P.2d 591 [1965]; Potter v. Kenosha, 268 Wis. 361, 68 N.W.2d 4 [1955]; Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029 [Wyo.1987]). The Dillard opinion acknowledged contrary rulings from one federal circuit and five other states but characterized them as inapposite to the specific issue under discussion because they did not discuss the policy justifications central to the majority rule. See Dillard, 255 Kan. at 722, 877 P.2d 371 (citing Lindler v. District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495 [D.C.Cir.1974]; Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal.2d 245, 66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508 [1968]; Makaneole v. Gampon, 70 Haw. 501, 777 P.2d 1183 [1989]; Giarratano v. The Weitz Co., Inc., 259 Iowa 1292, 147 N.W.2d 824 [1967]; Perry v. McLouth Steel Corp., 154 Mich.App. 284, 397 N.W.2d 284 [1986]; Vannoy v. City of Warren, 15 Mich.App. 158, 166 N.W.2d 486 [1968]; Elliott v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 128 N.H. 676, 517 A.2d 1185 [1986]). On its way to its public policy-based outcome, the Dillard opinion also dismissed the implications of an earlier Kansas vicarious liability case, Balagna v. Shawnee County, 233 Kan. 1068, 668 P.2d 157 (1983). Balagna involved the death of an employee of a general contractor on a construction project, and the main issue was whether the landowner could be liable for the contractor's negligent failure to shore up the ditch in which the employee was fatally injured. This court embraced both the general principal of no landowner vicarious liability set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1964) and the inherently dangerous activity exception to the general principal set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 (1964). Yet, under these rules, it ultimately held that there could be no landowner liability in the case before it, because the activity engaged in by the employee did not qualify as inherently dangerous. Balagna, 233 Kan. at 1082, 668 P.2d 157. The Dillard opinion gave Balagna and cases akin to it short shrift: Kansas has clearly recognized the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. However, the fact that the doctrine has been recognized and applied in Kansas is not determinative of the case now before us. None of the Kansas cases we have found addressed the issue of the effect of workers compensation on the applicability of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine under facts similar to the present case. The various policy reasons precluding liability of a landowner for injuries suffered by an employee of an independent contractor covered by workers compensation were not raised or considered in our earlier cases. We find the various policy provisions discussed in the various cases cited herein not only persuasive but also determinative of this case. 255 Kan. at 725, 877 P.2d 371. The Dillard opinion had already specifically stated that the controlling policy considerations applied to both the vicarious liability and direct liability claims before it. See Dillard, 255 Kan. at 715, 877 P.2d 371. It then enumerated nine policy rationales to support its conclusion that the archbishop and archdiocese had no duty: (1) The landowner should not have greater liability to an employee of an independent contractor than the liability of the contractor to that employee. (2) The landowner should not have greater liability to the employees of an independent contractor than the landowner has to the landowner's own employees. (3) Liability on the part of the landowner would encourage the landowner to use the landowner's less experienced employees rather than an experienced contractor. (4) Employees of an independent contractor, and their dependents, are protected under the provisions of the workers compensation statutes. (5) Workers in inherently dangerous jobs are fully aware of the dangers involved and receive compensation accordingly. (6) Landowners may not have expert knowledge of inherently dangerous work, the risks involved, and methods of avoiding such risks that an independent contractor engaged in such activity possesses. (7) Liability on the part of the landowner would create a class of employees, those of an independent contractor, with greater rights than the employees of the landowner for doing the same work. (8) To allow an employee of an independent contractor covered by workers compensation to invoke the inherently dangerous activity doctrine would (a) reward landowners who, despite their own lack of expertise, choose to perform work negligently resulting in injury to workers, (b) increase the risks to innocent third parties, and (c) punish landowners who seek expert assistance in an effort to avoid liability for injury. (9) A landowner who engages the services of an independent contractor pays directly or indirectly for the compensation coverage when the landowner contracts with the independent contractor. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 725-26, 877 P.2d 371. The opinion also assigned numbers to its specific substantive holdings: (1) A landowner is not liable to an employee of an independent contractor covered by workers compensation for injury sustained as a result of the breach of a nondelegable duty imposed upon the landowner by statute or ordinance. (2) The inherently dangerous activity exception to the nonliability of a landowner does not extend to employees of an independent contractor covered by workers compensation. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 726-27, 877 P.2d 371. All of the discussion of Dillard above outlines what it did. But this court was at least as emphatic about what it did not do. As Herrell has emphasized, its third numbered holding read: Our decision is limited to the facts herein and to those instances where the injured employee of an independent contractor covered by workers compensation seeks to hold a landowner liable under the theories discussed in the opinion. 255 Kan. at 727, 877 P.2d 371. Furthermore, this court had already twice taken pains to point out that it was considering only the two theories of recovery advanceddirect liability based on the archbishop's and archdiocese' failure to comply with the building code's nondelegable inspection requirement and vicarious liability under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. Dillard, 255 Kan. at 707-08, 877 P.2d 371 (setting out plaintiff's two theories), 709-10 (noting authorities from other jurisdictions had intertwined direct nondelegable duty liability, vicarious liability). Herrell is not urging us to overrule Dillard, and we accept its continuing controlling force on the two theories of landowner liability it so thoroughly addressed. Yet its limitationsand the court's intention that those limitations have meaningful impact in future casescould not be more clear. Herrell's premises cause of action alleging direct negligence by National Beef in creating a hazardous condition and failing to warn of it is not controlled by Dillard. It is neither based on a nondelegable statutory or regulatory duty of National Beef nor based on negligence of Herrell's employer for which National Beef may be exposed to vicarious liability. See also Dye v. WMC, Inc., 38 Kan.App.2d 655, 665, 172 P.3d 49 (2007) (recognizing application of Dillard in some negligence contexts). In these circumstances, we are unwilling to absolve National Beef of any duty to Herrell based purely on the policy considerations upon which Dillard exclusively relied. Compare McCubbin v. Walker, 256 Kan. 276, 297, 886 P.2d 790 (1994) (declining to extend Dillard to all cases involving landowners, injured employees of independent contractors; issue not directly determinative); Cuiksa v. Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1175 (D.Kan.2003) (limiting reach of Dillard to landowner defendants); Martin v. Mapco Ammonia Pipeline, Inc., Nos. CIV.A. 93-2218-GTV and CIV.A. 93-2303-GTV, 1994 WL 409591,  (D.Kan.1994) (unpublished opinion) (limiting reach of Dillard to landowner defendants). Rather, we turn to our workers compensation statutory scheme, that is, to what the Kansas Legislature has actually said about public policy choices. If those statements are clear, we need not guess or speculate, no matter how much company we may have from other jurisdictions if we were to do so.