Opinion ID: 1155573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Virginia Standard of Fault for Compensatory Damages

Text: The parameters within which we must fix the Virginia standard as a matter of state law have been set forth in our prior discussion of Gertz. The plaintiffs in the present appeals argue for a negligence standard. Generally, the defendants assert that a defamed private individual should be required to establish New York Times malice to recover actual, compensatory damages in this State. In a brief amicus curiae filed in one of the media appeals, the Virginia Press Association, Inc., argues that a negligence standard is no standard at all and that such a requirement simply does not provide the protection needed to ensure a free and open press. Asserting that the matters involved in these four appeals involve issues of public concern, the defendants contend that our pre- Gertz Sanders decision is controlling and that liability for the alleged defamations requires proof of New York Times actual malice. We do not agree. The Supreme Court in Gertz left little doubt that it expected many of the states to adopt a negligence standard. Justice Powell, while noting that allowance of presumed damages would unnecessarily exacerbate the danger of media self-censorship, stated that the policy considerations concerning punitive-damage awards are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. Justice Blackmun, concurring, flatly said that the Court now conditions a libel action by a private person upon a showing of negligence, as contrasted with a showing of willful or reckless disregard.... Id. at 353, 94 S.Ct. at 3014. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, said that the majority introduces the concept that the media will be liable for negligence in publishing defamatory statements with respect to [ordinary private citizens]. Id. at 355, 94 S.Ct. at 3014. Justice Brennan, dissenting, forecast adoption of a reasonable-care standard by many states as the probable result of today's decision. Id. at 366, 94 S.Ct. at 3020. Justice White, dissenting and deploring the additional burden on the plaintiff of proving negligence or other fault, stated that [u]nder the new rule the plaintiff can lose, not because the statement is true, but because it was not negligently made. Id. at 376, 94 S.Ct. at 3025. Certainly, despite the Supreme Court's forecasts, we properly may choose to adopt as a matter of state law a stricter standard than ordinary negligence. We will not do so. Indeed, while we did not explicitly fix the standard in Fleming I, we implicitly indicated that a level of liability less than New York Times malice was all that was required. We said: Therefore, [the plaintiff] was not required to show, as a prerequisite to recovery of compensatory damages, that Fleming acted with malice that met the New York Times standard. 221 Va. at 892, 275 S.E.2d at 638. We hold, therefore, that in an action brought by a private individual to recover actual, compensatory damages for a defamatory publication, the plaintiff may recover upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the publication was false, and that the defendant either knew it to be false, or believing it to be true, lacked reasonable grounds for such belief, or acted negligently in failing to ascertain the facts on which the publication was based. Under this standard, truth no longer is an affirmative defense to be established by the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff must prove falsity, because he is required to establish negligence with respect to such falsity. In addition, we hold that such liability may be based upon negligence, whether or not the publication in question relates to a matter of public or general concern. The application of this negligence standard is expressly limited, however, to circumstances where the defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent. The trial judge shall make such determination as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, no substantial danger to reputation is apparent from the statement in issue, New York Times malice must be established to recover compensatory damages. Nothing in the public policy of the Commonwealth or in our prior decisions requires adoption of a standard higher than one of ordinary negligence. The Constitution of Virginia does not mandate embracement of a more stringent standard. Article I, § 12 provides, in part, that any citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.... That provision recognizes the balance to be struck between the right of free expression enjoyed by the individual and the press on the one hand and the right of defamed individuals to hold the speakers responsible for damage to reputation on the other. See I A. Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, at 249-59 (1974). And, as we already have said, our Sanders decision is not controlling, because it was decided before Gertz and was based on Rosenbloom, nor are any of our other cases. Moreover, we think that a negligence test strikes a proper balance between the rights of the news media and the rights of private individuals. As noted in Gertz, the private individual is more vulnerable to injury to reputation inflicted by defamatory falsehood than are public officials and public figures who ordinarily enjoy significantly greater access to channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. Even though the truth rarely catches up with the lie, id. n. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 3009 n. 9, the opportunity for rebuttal is more readily available to the public person. Consequently, the state interest in protecting the private individual is greater than in the case of a non-private person. In addition, we believe that the negligence standard will not result in self-censorship, as the media defendants argue, and that the duty of reasonable care is an acceptable burden for the press to bear. After all, the concept of negligence is fundamental to the imposition of tort liability in Virginia in the great majority of legal relationships that are created daily, and we have not been convinced that the publisher of the defamatory falsehood should be elevated to a preferred status for the assessment of liability for the harm caused by such a tort. Neither the intentional lie nor the negligent error substantially advances society's interest in uninhibited and robust debate. See id. at 340, 94 S.Ct. at 3007. Also, the limitations we have placed on the rule will serve to insulate the publisher from liability based on a publication the content of which does not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential. In such a case, New York Times malice must be established in order to recover compensatory damages. The mere negligent error or the careless misstatement of fact which, on its face, does not appear to be defamatory will not result in liability for compensatory damages being imposed on the publisher. Finally, the standard we adopt today is in accord with the rule embraced by a substantial number of the states that have decided the issue since Gertz. See E. Collins and J. Drushal, The Reaction of the State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 306 (1978). To date, at least 30 states and the District of Columbia have adopted a negligence standard in media cases involving private persons, either after discussing the issue or without discussing the question. [3] Also, two federal courts interpreting Virginia law after Gertz anticipated that we would adopt a negligence standard. See General Products Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F.Supp. 546 (E.D.Va.1981); Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F.Supp. 1005 (W.D. Va.1979). And the drafters of the Restatement responded to Gertz by adopting a negligence standard for the media defendant who defames a private person or a public person in a matter unrelated to his public capacity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B(c) (1977). See generally R. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1 (1983).