Opinion ID: 1783791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: orders on motions

Text: Appellees/Cross-Appellants Adams and Crows' Motion for Rehearing or Clarification as to Case No. 82,995 is hereby denied. OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. GRIMES, C.J., dissents. Appellants/Cross-Appellees Department of Revenue, et al.'s Motion to Strike That Part of Appellees' Reply Brief Not In Accordance With the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and This Court's Order of January 12, 1994, is hereby denied. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. Appellees/Cross-Appellants David Kuhnlein, et al.'s Motion to Remand Pursuant to Appellate Rule 9.600(b), or in the Alternative to Stay Defendants From Sending Class Notice Without Court Approval, and supplement thereto, is hereby denied. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. Appellees/Cross-Appellants Adams and Chow's Motion for Attorneys Fees is hereby denied. OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. GRIMES, C.J., dissents. The Florida Legislature moves for leave to appear in this case as amicus curiae solely for the purpose of asking for a clarification of our opinion with regard to the fiscal prerogatives of the legislative branch. The motion is granted, and we readopt and clarify our opinion as follows. We agree with the Legislature that it has authority to fashion a retroactive remedy under McKesson with respect to taxes declared illegal under the Commerce Clause. As McKesson notes, that remedy need not be perfect. In the present case, however, any conceivable retroactive remedy the Legislature might fashion necessarily would be so highly imperfect and involve such delays as to result in fundamental injustice. Accordingly, we believe the trial court was within its discretion in ordering a refund based on the facts at hand. We do not imply, however, that the courts of this state can order refunds in any or even most cases of this type. The facts of the present case are unusual because the number of individuals not subject to the illegal tax is enormous, the ability of the state to locate a very substantial percentage of them is unlikely, and the delays that inevitably would result from the effort of locating them would be grossly unfair to all involved  most especially those who paid the tax. This situation is substantially different from the facts of McKesson. In so saying we strongly emphasize that the courts should show great deference to the legislative prerogative. If there is any reasonable way that prerogative may be honored without substantial injustice to the taxpayers of this state, then a court reviewing a tax case of this type should give the Legislature the opportunity to fashion a retroactive remedy within a reasonable period of time. As a general rule, a reasonable period of time means by the end of the next regular legislative session plus the period of time in which the Governor must review bills approved by both houses. We also note that the Legislature in its motion has represented to this Court that it will not attempt to fashion a retroactive remedy even if given leave to do so. This is a fact that factors in our decision on clarification, if only because it tacitly acknowledges our conclusions as to this case. We do believe, however, that it would be of great benefit to the courts if the Legislature sought leave to intervene at the trial level in Commerce Clause cases of this type to address the question of a retroactive remedy. When such leave is sought, a trial court clearly would abuse its discretion by denying leave to intervene. Then the record on appeal would contain a full account of the Legislature's views as to a retroactive remedy. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.