Opinion ID: 2386649
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he was guilty of the Cross murder or to support the special circumstance finding that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery. We conclude substantial evidence supports the challenged verdict. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we `examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceevidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance allegations. [Citation.] `[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.' [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility. [Citation.] ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict because the trial court should have excluded certain testimony and evidence, and because Jessica Brock's testimony was not credible. As discussed ante, we have concluded the challenged evidence, specifically the composite drawings of the suspects completed with Agent Bulman, Bulman's identification of defendant's photographs, and the presumptive blood tests on the seized jacket, was properly admitted. Therefore, that aspect of defendant's claim is without merit. As to Jessica's testimony, defendant is correct that Jessica's version of events changed numerous times between her pretrial statements to the police and the defense attorney, and during her trial testimony. However, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact reasonably could have believed the first version that Jessica gave to the police, the version that strongly incriminated defendant, and reasonably could have found that her story changed only because defendant, his family, Jessica's family, and even Jessica's own internal conflicted loyalties, pressured Jessica to lie and undermine the case against defendant. The possible shortcomings defendant points to in Jessica's testimony, Agent Bulman's identification of defendant's photographs, the presumptive blood tests on the jacket, and the evidence of the eyeglasses found at the scene were brought out through the examination of the relevant witnesses and counsel's arguments to the jury. On appeal we do not reevaluate the weight or credibility of this evidence, nor do we examine each piece of evidence in isolation. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and the reasonable deductions arising from it adequately support the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of Agent Cross's murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Even were we to conclude the evidence reasonably might be reconciled with a contrary finding, this would not warrant a reversal of the judgment. Defendant challenges the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding on the grounds (1) that there was insufficient evidence that defendant intended to rob Agents Bulman and Cross; and (2) that the taking of the shotgun and keys constituted a robbery in the course of committing the murder, which would not support the special circumstance finding. (See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 41 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262] ( Marshall ).) (21) The special circumstance applies if defendant was engaged in the commission of, or the attempted commission of, a robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) The jury reasonably could have found from the evidence that the assailants identified the agents, who appeared to be civilians parked on a poorly lit street, as potential victims to rob, cased the victims by slowly driving by twice and by watching the agents from behind the vegetation-covered fence next to their car, and waited until it was dark to commit their crime. The jury reasonably could have found that when defendant and the other assailant approached the agents' car from behind, one on each side and with at least one of them being armed with a firearm, they intended to take the agents' personal property from their presence by force or fear with the intent of permanently depriving them of that property and had taken a substantial step towards completing the robbery, and that they therefore were engaged in the attempted commission of a robbery. ( Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 34 [defining robbery]; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 604 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994] [To constitute an attempt, there must be (i) proof of specific intent to commit the target crime and (ii) a direct, ineffectual act done towards its commission.].) The jury also reasonably could have found that once the would-be robbers discovered their victims were armed law enforcement officers who might apprehend them on the spot, defendant decided to murder the agents in order to facilitate his and his partner's escape from the botched robbery. (See People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1025-1026 [248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017] [robbery-felony-murder special circumstance includes murder committed during period the perpetrator is in flight from the crime until he reaches a place of temporary safety].) That the incident never progressed to the point where the assailants could say to the agents, This is a robbery, give us your property, is immaterial because the reasonable inferences the jury could draw from the evidence amply support the finding that committing a robbery was their unspoken intent. Similarly, given that the jury reasonably could have found that defendant was engaged in an attempt to commit a robbery by the time he and his partner first contacted the agents, and that defendant subsequently murdered Agent Cross during his flight from this unsuccessful attempt, we need not consider whether, as defendant contends, the taking of the shotgun and the keys was an incidental robbery in the course of a murder such that reliance on that evidence to prove the special circumstance would violate the rule we stated in Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 41, that [t]he robbery-murder special circumstance applies to a murder in the commission of a robbery, not to a robbery committed in the course of a murder. In sum, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict and its finding that the robbery-murder special circumstance was true.