Opinion ID: 160150
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sandin Analysis

Text: 24 Defendants argue that no compulsion exists because the adverse consequences present in this case implicate no protected liberty interest. Specifically, they claim that the Fifth Amendment is not violated because the consequences that would be imposed on Plaintiff as a result of his refusal to admit responsibility and disclose his past sex offenses do not constitute atypical and significant hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 25 In Sandin, the Supreme Court addressed liberty interests in prison in the context of a procedural due process claim. The Court held that, despite the mandatory language of the applicable prison regulation, a constitutionally protected liberty interest will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 484 (citations omitted). Applying this test, the Court held that being placed in disciplinary segregation for thirty days did not impose an atypical and significant hardship, and therefore the inmate had no protected liberty interest which required due process. See id. at 486. Relying on earlier Supreme Court precedent, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976), this court recognized that, under the Due Process Clause, a change in an inmate's prison classification ordinarily does not deprive him of liberty[] because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison. Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994). 26 However, nowhere in the relevant jurisprudence does the Supreme Court even hint that an individual attempting to show a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege must have a protected liberty interest for compulsion to occur. 7 See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285-88 (1998) (evaluating Fifth Amendment claim without any reference to liberty analysis and applying liberty interest analysis to due process claim only). From our review of the cases, Sandin has not been expressly used to analyze any kind of constitutional right claimed by a prisoner other than a due process violation. Moreover, nothing in either Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent expressly rule[s] out a challenge to a [prison policy] . . . on the ground that it violate[s] constitutional rights other than the right to procedural due process. Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 1979) (explaining that Supreme Court precedent allows that a prisoner's confinement could violate the constitution even if it did not implicate a liberty interest or violate due process); see also Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 561 (10th Cir. 1990) (surveying circuit court decisions and holding that Meachum addressed only the due process clause). This reasoning is equally applicable to a challenge to a sex offender treatment program based on a Fifth Amendment violation. Cf. Chambers v. Bachicha, 39 F.3d 1191, 1994 WL 596702 (10th Cir. 1994) (Table) (rejecting equal protection and due process claims because plaintiff challenging Colorado sex offender treatment program had no protected liberty interest in good-time or earned-time credit under discretionary Colorado statute, but not addressing liberty question with respect to Fifth Amendment claim); Colman v. Lahouse, 976 F.2d 724, 1992 WL 235534,  (1st Cir. 1992) (relying on Furtado to state that Fifth Amendment claim challenging sex offender treatment program has an arguable legal basis because no liberty interest is required). 27 Accordingly, we agree with the district court's assessment that by grafting a protected liberty interest to a finding of compulsion, the standard is set too high. Lile, 24 F. Supp.2d at 1159. Compulsion can be established by hardships that may not be atypical and that do not constitute enforceable liberty interests. The Supreme Court has indeed articulated several different types of penalties that constitute impermissible compulsion, none of which are explicitly characterized as deprivations of protected liberty interests. These include the threat of disbarment, damage to professional reputation, or loss of income, see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (describing such penalties as powerful forms of compulsion), economic penalties such as the loss of employment, see Turley, 414 U.S. at 82 (ruling that cancellation of contracts and five-year disqualification to contract constituted impermissible economic compulsion); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-85 (1968) (holding that discharge for invoking and refusing to waive constitutional right against self-incrimination impaired Fifth Amendment privilege); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that penalty of discharge for reliance on right to remain silent compelled policemen's incriminating testimony because it foreclosed a free choice to remain silent, and right against self-incrimination prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office), and the loss of the right to participate in political associations, see Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808-09 (depriving attorney of position as an unpaid political party officer would impinge on his right to participate in private political associations). See also Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968) (reversing policeman's dismissal which was based solely on his refusal to waive immunity to which he would be entitled under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). There is nothing in our precedent that says a challenger must demonstrate a liberty interest to prevail on a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination claim. 8 But cf. Tedder, 1991 WL 65497, at  (holding that Oregon sex offender program did not violate plaintiff's right against self-incrimination in part because he has no constitutional right to discretionary parole before the expiration of his sentence); Guilkey v. Holden, 865 F.2d 258, 1988 WL 134526 (6th Cir. 1988) (Table) (affirming district court determination that Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated because plaintiff had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in discretionary parole). It is clear that the compulsion element of a Fifth Amendment claim can be established by penalties which do not constitute a deprivation of protected liberty interests under the due process clause. 9 28