Opinion ID: 853330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Trial Counsel Effectiveness

Text: A. On Jury Instructions. Ben-Yisrayl claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the word arises in a reasonable doubt instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof at the guilt phase of his trial. [8] (Appellant's Br. at 28-30). He also claims ineffective assistance for failure to challenge a presumption-of-truthfulness instruction. [9] Id. at 30-32. He concedes that we rejected these same arguments in his post-conviction challenge to his convictions and death sentences for killing the Balovski brothers. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d at 111-12; (Appellant's Br. at 27 n. 3). Our conclusion is the same here: counsel did not fall below an objectively reasonable performance for failing to challenge these instructions. See Ben-Yisrayl, 729 N.E.2d at 111-12. B. Exclusion of Jurors. Ben-Yisrayl claims that the post-conviction court violated his federal and state constitutional rights when it refused to admit affidavits by two prospective jurors who were dismissed because they said they could not vote to impose the death penalty under any circumstances. (Appellant's Br. at 47-54; T.R. at 1374, 1394-95.) The affidavits stated that these individuals opposed the death penalty as a matter of conscience. (P-C.R. at 1713, 1716.) A venireman who express[es] conscientious objections to capital punishment may be excluded for cause if his views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (citation omitted). See also Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872, 109 S.Ct. 189, 102 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988) (exclusion of jurors who cannot conscientiously consider the death penalty does not deny defendant a fair trial). Ben-Yisrayl argues that such exclusion is a form of religious discrimination, and he invokes case law dealing with racially discriminatory juror strikes. (Appellant's Br. at 48-50.) We have held, however, that precedent barring the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges does not preclude the exclusion of prospective jurors who would not recommend the death penalty under any circumstances. Lambert v. State, 643 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind.1994). Ben-Yisrayl also claims that Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-1-5(a)(3) (West 1991) [10] violates the equal privileges clause of the Indiana Constitution. [11] (Appellant's Br. at 51.) To pass constitutional muster, differential statutory treatment must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics that distinguish the unequally treated class. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994). Here, it is plainly reasonable to exclude prospective jurors in capital cases who are so inherently opposed to the death penalty that they could not recommend a death sentence regardless of the facts or the law. A second prong of the constitutional requirement is that the differential treatment must apply equally to all those similarly situated. Id. This statute treats all jurors who express such convictions, for whatever reason, the same. A lawyer who did not raise these various challenges to the prevailing rule of a death-qualified jury would be well within the standard of performance required by the Sixth Amendment. The post-conviction court appropriately rejected Ben-Yisrayl's contentions about the effectiveness of his trial counsel.