Opinion ID: 896167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶ 10] In Samdahl, we dealt with a police officer's failure to immediately take possession of an operator's license and issue a temporary permit under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1. 518 N.W.2d at 715, 717. The relevant language of § 39-20-03.1(1) and § 39-20-04(1) is nearly identical; the only difference is that the former is triggered when a person fails one of the various chemical tests to determine blood alcohol content, while the latter is triggered when a person refuses to submit to any testing. Compare N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(1), with N.D.C.C. § 39-20-04(1). We will, therefore, give the same interpretive effect to N.D.C.C. § 39-20-04(1) as we have previously given to the relevant part of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(1). Cf. Schwind, 462 N.W.2d at 150 (stating [t]he language in section 39-20-04.1 is consistent with the language in section 39-20-03.1.). [¶ 11] In Samdahl, the driver, Samdahl, was arrested on February 17, 1993, for driving under the influence. 518 N.W.2d at 715. On February 23, 1993, the state toxicologist report reported an alcohol concentration of.24 percent. Id. It was not until thirty-six days later, on March 31, 1993, that the Report and Notice was served on Samdahl, his driver's license was taken, and he was issued a temporary operator's permit. Id. [¶ 12] At his administrative hearing, Samdahl argued the Department lacked jurisdiction because `immediately' after receiving the toxicologist results, a police officer neither took possession of [his] operator's license, nor issued him a temporary operator's permit as required under § 39-20-03.1. Id. at 717. The hearing officer rejected Samdahl's argument. Id. The district court was persuaded by the argument, however, and concluded § 39-20-03.1 is a mandatory provision; that extending the time in excess of thirty days is not a minor violation of the statute; and therefore the Department ... is deprived of its jurisdiction. Id. at 716. [¶ 13] This Court held although Samdahl did not immediately receive notice of suspension, the Department retained jurisdiction to suspend his license. We said: Although the jurisdiction of an administrative agency is dependent upon the terms of the statute and must meet at least the basic mandatory provisions of the statute before jurisdiction is established, the terms of the statute must be construed logically so as not to produce an absurd result. When adherence to the letter of the law would cause an absurd result, we give effect to the legislative intent even though contrary to the letter of the law. Id. at 717 (internal citation and quotation omitted). We, therefore, agreed with the Department the language of § 39-20-03.1 regarding the giving of notice of intent to suspend is not jurisdictional. Id. (emphasis added). [¶ 14] In circumstances similar to Samdahl, we concluded in Schwind an officer's failure to forward to the Department a DUI arrestee's driver's license did not deprive the Department of jurisdiction over the arrestee's revocation hearing. 462 N.W.2d at 150. This Court reasoned: The clear legislative intent in enacting chapter 39-20, [N.D.C.C.], was for the protection of the public, i.e., to prevent individuals from driving while under the influence of intoxicants. Section 39-20-03.1, [N.D.C.C.], was enacted, in part, to help ensure that an individual who violated this chapter would not continue to drive. It would be an absurd result if we were to hold that an officer's failure to strictly comply with this portion of the statute had the opposite effect. While it is clear that section 39-20-3.1, [N.D.C.C.], requires the officer to forward the operator's license, the failure to do so does not destroy the Director's jurisdiction to suspend a violator's driving privileges. A contrary holding would defeat the Legislature's intent to protect the public from potential hazards posed by intoxicated drivers. Id. (citations omitted). [¶ 15] Under the guidance of Samdahl and Schwind, we refuse to interpret the plain meaning of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-04(1) as a basic mandatory provision, which must be established in order to confer jurisdiction on the Department. We, therefore, conclude the officer's failure to comply with the immediacy requirement in § 39-20-04(1) is not jurisdictional and does not necessarily deprive the Department of authority to revoke an operator's driving privileges. [1]