Opinion ID: 153666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Mr. Veatch's Waiver of Counsel

Text: 65 Appellant counsel for Mr. Veatch claims that in deciding to represent himself, Mr. Veatch did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The question of whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992). 66 The Sixth Amendment grants a defendant the right to present his own defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). A defendant must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to counsel before electing to represent himself. Id. at 835. Faretta requires a showing on the record that the defendant who elects to conduct his own defense had some sense of the magnitude of the undertaking and the hazards inherent in self-representation when he made the election. United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir.1987). The Supreme Court has explained, To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948). We have made clear  'that the factors articulated must be conveyed to the defendant by the trial judge and must appear on the record so that our review may be conducted without speculation.'  United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578 (10th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court must inform the defendant on the record of the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, and the risks of proceeding pro se. United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1388 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992). 67 The record shows that there were numerous discussions with Mr. Veatch concerning his decision to proceed pro se. The initial discussion occurred during his arraignment. After a thorough discussion, the magistrate found that Mr. Veatch waived his right to assistance of counsel, and standby counsel was appointed. 68 During a hearing on May 2, 1994, the trial court queried Mr. Veatch if he wanted counsel appointed at government expense. He replied that he did not want appointed counsel. The court advised him that he could exercise his right of counsel by hiring counsel of his own choosing. The court advised him that he was facing serious charges with a possible sentence of thirty years. Mr. John Coyle, who was Defendant's counsel appointed for purposes of determining competency, was granted a recess to talk with Mr. Veatch. After the recess, Mr. Veatch informed the court that he wanted to represent himself with the assistance of Mr. Coyle as standby counsel. He expressed concern, however, that standby counsel would not maintain attorney-client confidentiality. The court replied that if he elected to represent himself, standby counsel would be appointed, but the selection of Mr. Coyle could not be guaranteed. The court provided a financial affidavit to Mr. Veatch and advised him that he had a week to decide whether he wanted to request court-appointed counsel, to hire counsel, or to waive his right to counsel. 69 On May 6, 1994, Mr. Veatch filed a pleading in which he cited to Faretta and stated that he intended to represent himself. He argued that there was no assurance of confidentiality with standby counsel. Also, he stated that he would represent himself because he could not sign the financial affidavit. 70 Another hearing concerning the issue of counsel was conducted on May 11, 1994. The court informed Mr. Veatch that under the Criminal Justice Act, he was presumptively entitled to court-appointed counsel and other services at government expense, and that this presumption would be indulged to the extent possible. The court summarized the allegations against Mr. Veatch, the alleged statutory violations, and the maximum potential punishment he could receive. The court told Mr. Veatch that he would be at an extreme disadvantage without counsel because he did not have personal access to a law library and because he could not personally investigate his case due to his incarceration. The court told him he was proceeding in a complex area where professional training and experience are desired and that an attorney could be aware of potential defenses that he had not considered. He was told that through standby counsel he could access a law library, legal materials, legal advice, legal procedures, and an understanding of defenses available in the case. 71 On May 12, 1994, Mr. Veatch filed a document entitled Advice to the Court. There, he stated, Ronald Veatch accepts the advice tendered by the Court on the perils of self representation, desires to represent himself in this matter with the assistance of stand-by counsel. (R., Doc. 193). 72 The record reveals that the trial court did ensure that Mr. Veatch was aware of the nature of the charges against him, that he knew the statutory violations of which he was accused, and that he was aware of the maximum sentences for the crimes with which he had been charged. The court also recognized that Mr. Veatch was aware of some defenses to the charges against him, and the court further advised him that counsel could assist him with defenses which he had not already considered. 73 The questioning of Mr. Veatch by the district court, the advise it gave him, the availability of standby counsel, his prior experience with the criminal justice system, the pleadings he filed in this case, and his performance at trial support our conclusion that Mr. Veatch made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 74