Opinion ID: 1505912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: dhcd's enforcement order

Text: The DHCD enforcement effort, pursuant to D.C.Code § 5-513 (1981), is a different matter altogether. Given our resolution of the permit revocation issue, the remaining issues as to enforcement are: (1) whether the BAR has jurisdiction to review DHCD's enforcement order (and, if so, whether petitioner's appeal to the BAR was timely); (2) if not, whether the Superior Court or this court has jurisdiction to review DHCD's enforcement order (a question that inherently requires resolution of whether the real property owner's show cause opportunity under §§ 5-513, -515 must meet the contested case requirements of the DCAPA); (3) whether DHCD has authority to invoke § 5-513 to order removal of petitioner's sign; (4) if so, whether petitioner filed a timely petition for review in this court (a question that inherently deals with whether petitioner obtained, or attempted to obtain, a contested case hearing); (5) if so, whether petitioner is entitled to relief.
Petitioner argues that the BAR's appellate jurisdiction over a permit revocation under Organization Order No. 112, Part E, Class C Cases, supra, necessarily embraces jurisdiction over enforcement of the revocation. The District contends that revocation and enforcement are separate actions, and that Organization Order No. 112 expressly grants BAR appellate jurisdiction only over revocation. We agree with the District. [11] A § 5-513 enforcement action, including a property owner's show cause opportunity, is wholly separate from the revocation process. There is some force to the argument that revocation and enforcement are related; that the BAR has expertise in revocations which would be relevant to their enforcement; that the BAR has established hearing procedures whereas DHCD does not; that there is economy in presenting these related issues to the same tribunal; and that we accordingly ought to deem revocation to include enforcement. On the other hand, revocation and enforcement procedures are different and typically take place at different times. Moreover, in contrast with the revocation process, DHCD must afford a show cause opportunity under § 5-513, and must do so in contexts that do not provide for BAR appellate review. [12] DHCD, therefore, must be prepared to do so. Finally, Organization Plan No. 112, Part E, Class C cases, by its terms, does not confer jurisdiction on the BAR to hear appeals of § 5-513 enforcement actions. We find the latter reasoning more persuasive. Accordingly, we hold that the BAR does not have jurisdiction under Organization Order No. 112, Part E., Class C cases, to review DHCD efforts to enforce revocation of a permit. [13]
DHCD has attempted to enforce revocation of petitioner's sign permit by implementing D.C.Code § 5-513(a) (1981), which provides: Whenever the owner of any real property in the District of Columbia shall fail or refuse, after the service of reasonable notice in the manner provided in § 5-515, to correct any condition which exists on or has arisen from such property in violation of law or any regulation made by authority of law, with the correction of which condition said owner is by law or by said regulation chargeable, or to show cause, sufficient in the judgment of the Mayor of said District, why he should not be required to correct such condition, then, and in that instance, the Mayor of the District of Columbia is authorized to: Cause such condition to be corrected; assess the cost of correcting such condition and all expenses incident thereto (including the cost of publication, if any, herein provided for) as a tax against the property on which such condition existed or from which such condition arose, as the case may be; and carry such tax on the regular tax rolls of the District, and collect such tax in the same manner as general taxes in said District are collected: Provided, that the correction of any conditions aforesaid by the Mayor of said District under authority of this section shall not relieve the owner of the property on which such condition existed, or from which such condition arose, from criminal prosecution and punishment for having caused or allowed such unlawful condition to arise or for having failed or refused to correct the same. [Emphasis added.] We reject the District's contention (note 9 supra ) that its enforcement threat is not ripe for review. Thus, we must evaluate, first, whether the Superior Court or this court has jurisdiction, in the first instance, to review the availability of § 5-513 for a DHCD enforcement action. To an extent, either route is available. The Superior Court has jurisdiction under D.C.Code § 11-921 (1981) to declare whether DHCD has authority to use § 5-513 to take down an unpermitted sign on real property, for that lone question does not present a contested case. See Part III.B., supra. Alternatively, under § 5-513(a), a real property owner who wants to challenge DHCD's authority to invoke that statute has a simultaneous opportunity, based on particular facts, to show cause, sufficient in the judgment of the Mayor of said District [of Columbia], why he should not be required to correct such condition. This presents two questions bearing on this court's jurisdiction: whether the owner (1) is entitled by law or by constitutional right to a trial-type, i.e., contested case, hearing before DHCD and (2) either attempted to obtain, or did obtain, such a hearing. D.C.Code §§ 1-1502(8), -1509, -1510 (1981); see Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n, supra, 327 A.2d at 314; Capitol Hill Restoration Society, supra, 287 A.2d at 104-06. Because § 5-513 authorizes DHCD, an administrative agency of the District (note 1 supra ), to deprive the owner of his property, and because the BAR does not have appellate jurisdiction over an enforcement order, we conclude that due process entitles the owner to a contested case hearing at DHCD if he elects to show cause . . . why he should not be required to correct such condition. D.C. Code § 5-513(a) (1981). Whether DHCD grants or refuses such a hearing, the owner can seek review of DHCD's final action directly by this court. See Capitol Hill Restoration Society, supra, 287 A.2d at 104-06. If the owner takes this route, he necessarily would present this court with the threshold question whether § 5-513 is applicable. Thus, by first invoking his show cause opportunity and obtaining (or attempting to obtain) a DHCD contested case ruling under § 5-513, an owner can seek direct review in this court of both issues: whether the statute authorizes DHCD to remove unpermitted signs and, if so, whether DHCD properly used the statute against the owner. In summary, a real property owner, such as petitioner, may seek declaratory and injunctive relief from Superior Court as to the applicability of § 5-513 to a DHCD enforcement action (subject to this court's appellate review). However, since the § 5-513 show cause provision requires a contested case hearing under the DCAPA, the Superior Court may not consider whether the owner's rights were violated by DHCD's particular use of § 5-513 as to him. Thus, if he went first to Superior Court and lost, i.e., if the court declared § 5-513 available to DHCD (and this court, if asked, upheld that ruling), the owner would have to return to DHCD to show cause why DHCD violated his § 5-513 rights. He could then file a timely petition for review of DHCD's action in this court. In this case, petitioner filed both a Superior Court action and a petition for review by this court on February 17, 1982. Thus, if the petition for review was timely, there is, theoretically, a question whether the Superior Court or this court should initially resolve the § 5-513 applicability issue. The answer does not matter in this case. The Superior Court did not address the issue, but, given a timely appeal, we can now review the court's dismissal of that issue, just as we can review it directly by way of the petition for review, if timely. As indicated above, that timeliness question is crucial, for if the petition for review was not timely, and we were limited to reviewing § 5-513 applicability on appeal from the Superior Court  and found it applicable  we would not have jurisdiction to reach the next question: whether DHCD's refusal of the requested show cause hearing entitled petitioner to a remand to DHCD for that purpose. The most orderly way to proceed at this point, therefore, is to resolve the § 5-513 applicability issue as though on appeal from Superior Court. If § 5-513 is applicable to removal of petitioner's sign, we can then address the timeliness of the petition for review and the attendant consequences for the parties attributable to DHCD's alleged refusal to grant a show cause hearing.
Petitioner argues in his brief that § 5-513 is inapplicable because the legislative history demonstrates its purpose was to assist the District of Columbia in the abatement of `nuisances and conditions dangerous to life and to health' where the owner of the property upon which the life or health-threatening nuisance exists is a nonresident or is otherwise outside the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, or else is without funds to abate the nuisance (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 24, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1906) (accompanying H.R. 4461 which became D.C.Code § 5-513)). The District, stressing the broad language in § 5-513 italicized above, replies in its brief that the language of the statute on its face . . . manifestly covers the instant situation, and its plain meaning cannot be defeated by an attempt to show inconsistent legislative intent. We do not subscribe to the District's proposition that legislative history can never be used to limit what may appear to be the plain language of a statute. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1983) (en banc). Recently, however, apropos of the District's argument, we did reaffirm that this court `must first look at the language of the statute by itself to see if the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning,' for `the primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used.' Id. at 753 (citations omitted). Thus, a court should look beyond the ordinary meaning of the words of a statute only where there are `persuasive reasons' for doing so, id. at 755 (citation omitted), such as the statutory language having only superficial clarity or, if literally applied, causing absurd results, or creating an obvious injustice, or violating the legislative purpose. Id. at 754. Given the broad scope, and thus arguably the superficial clarity, of the language used  the District's right to correct any condition which exists . . . in violation of law or any regulation  coupled with the significant intrusion against one's property authorized by § 5-513(a), we deem it appropriate to review the legislative history. Having done so, however, we are not persuaded that § 5-513 is limited to abatement of nuisances and conditions dangerous to life or health. We hold that § 5-513 grants the District authority, through DHCD (note 12, supra ), to enforce compliance with a valid order revoking a sign permit. We agree with petitioner that the need for a mechanism to abate various nuisances not specifically covered by D.C. Code §§ 5-604 through 5-608 (1981) and by other laws, especially those for which the responsible persons were not reachable by court process, was the principal purpose underlying enactment of § 5-513. H.R. Rep. No. 24, supra (letter of Dec. 5, 1905 from Henry B. MacFarland, President, Board of Commissioners, District of Columbia, to Hon. J.W. Babcock, Chairman, Committee on the District of Columbia, House of Representatives). However, the legislative history, while referring to particular nuisances addressed by other statutes, does not define or detail the nuisances or other conditions encompassed by § 5-513's broad language. Furthermore, although not elucidating the breadth of their concerns, both the House Report and the MacFarland letter referred to a bill to provide for the abatement of nuisances . . . and for other purposes.  Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Finally, unlike § 5-604, referring to nuisance[s] dangerous to life and limb, the bill (now § 5-513) referred more generally to any condition . . . in violation of law or of any regulation, without limitation to conditions endangering life or health. Without reviewing the legislative history, this court has emphasized the all-encompassing scope of this statutory language, noting that the District is granted sweeping remedial and enforcement authority in D.C.Code 1973, § 5-313 [now § 5-513]. District of Columbia v. North Washington Neighbors, Inc., 367 A.2d 143, 146 (D.C.1976) (§ 5-313, read in conjunction with applicable regulations, authorized District to repair property owners' water pipes and assess cost against the property served), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823, 98 S.Ct. 68, 54 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977). Nor, despite the drafters' expressed concern, is the enforcement power of § 5-513 limited by the statutory language or the case law to the property of owners not personally reachable through court process. See id.; Masszonia v. Washington, 321 F.Supp. 965, 967 (D.D.C.1971), appeal dismissed, 155 U.S. App.D.C. 159, 476 F.2d 915 (1973). Were we to limit the reach of § 5-513 to undefined nuisances, compare § 5-604 (listing particular dangerous nuisances), we would foster endless litigation over the applicability of a statute that we believe Congress more prudently intended to provide as an elastic catchall for any condition which exists on or has arisen from real property that violates any law or regulation. The several nuisance statutes referred to in the legislative history, all of which taken together had not proved broad enough to cover the variety of situations requiring a remedy, suggest that Congress finally adopted a comprehensive approach. We perceive no congressional intent to engraft an unspecified limitation on the sweeping remedial and enforcement authority inherent in the general language used in § 5-513. North Washington Neighbors, Inc., supra, 367 A.2d at 146. Such a limitation would force courts to evaluate whether particular land use regulations, or their enforcement, seek to protect against dangerous or noxious, or merely unsightly, conditions  a distinction that, even in the case of a sign too high off the ground, would not always be easy to make. There is far greater opportunity for absurd results overall from a variety of judicial efforts to resolve whether a particular condition is a nuisance covered by the statute than from judicial application of the clean line drawn by the general language of the statute itself. Finally, the property owner's opportunity to show cause . . . why he should not be required to correct such condition precludes any argument that there will be obvious injustice from the general availability of § 5-513 to enforce violations of laws and regulations affecting real property. In summary, we conclude that the broad language of § 5-513 is clear. Its application to enforcement of revoked permits will not cause absurd results or obvious injustices. Nor, given the statutory language and the legislative history, read in conjunction with D.C.Code § 5-604 (1981), will DHCD's use of § 5-513 in this context violate the legislative purpose. We find no persuasive reasons for ignoring the plain language of the statute. We hold that the District of Columbia, through DHCD, has authority to invoke § 5-513 here, if necessary, to enforce revocation of petitioner's permit. [14]
Having resolved (initially by way of the appeal from Superior Court) DHCD's authority to use § 5-513 enforcement powers, we turn to the timeliness of the petition for review, in order to determine whether petitioner is still entitled to a DHCD show cause hearing (if he wants one, given the valid revocation of his permit). Although petitioner filed an extraneous appeal to the BAR (Part IV.A., supra ) on February 12, 1982, his appeal was denied on February 16, and he filed a petition for review in this court on February 17. Under our rules, a petition for review is timely if filed within 15 days from the date of having been given formal notice of the order or decision sought to be reviewed. D.C.App.R. 15(b). Thus, the petition will be timely only if petitioner received formal notice from DHCD, within the meaning of Rule 15(b), on February 8, 1982, the date on which DHCDafter several earlier, similar communications  informed petitioner for the last time (by letter of February 5) that it would immediately contract for removal of the sign. The District takes the position that petitioner was obliged to file a petition for review within 15 days of DHCD's August 29, 1980, letter directing petitioner to remove the sign or face further enforcement action. That argument is belied by the fact that DHCD did not formally order removal of the sign, with notice of the required opportunity to show cause, until September 30, 1980. On October 10, 1980  within the 21 days DHCD had given petitioner to remove the sign or to show cause why he should not be required to do so  petitioner's counsel wrote DHCD that his September 24 letter to DLII (copy to DHCD) shows cause. Counsel asked for a meeting. Petitioner and his counsel then began negotiations with District officials, resulting in the November 17, 1980, compromise and settlement of both the revocation and enforcement issues. When that agreement broke down and DHCD sent a final notice on November 30, 1981, petitioner replied on December 4, requesting resolution of the matter by the administrative and/or judicial process  in effect a request, after the compromise settlement had failed, for the formal show cause hearing to which petitioner was entitled under § 5-513. Instead of agreeing to that request, DHCD replied on February 5, 1982, that petitioner had failed to appeal the DLII revocation, he had committed himself to take the sign down, the District had kept its part of the November 17, 1980, agreement, and the District, accordingly, could contract for removal of the sign immediately. In effect, therefore, DHCD  having agreed to toll the § 5-513 enforcement process through the informal show cause negotiations timely instituted by petitioner  declined petitioner's timely request to exercise his § 5-513 right to show cause at a contested case hearing under the DCAPA, preferring to hold petitioner to his compromise and settlement of November 17, 1980. Final agency action, for purposes of triggering a petitioner's obligation to seek judicial review within the prescribed time, is a definitive statement of the agency's position, having the force of law, such that it will have a direct and immediate effect on one's day-to-day business and the affected party will learn that immediate compliance is expected. Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, 711 F.2d 279 at 286 (D.C.Cir.1983). DHCD's directives of September 30, 1980 and of November 30, 1981, met those criteria but for the fact that, after the first, DHCD immediately entertained a protracted, informal show cause negotiation process. When that process broke down, DHCD refused, after its November 30, 1981, directive, to grant petitioner the show cause hearing that he promptly requested on December 4. Having instituted formal enforcement procedures once again on November 30, 1981, DHCD was required to afford petitioner that hearing. Petitioner properly expected a timely, lawful response to his December 4 letter. We cannot fault him for not petitioning for review until after DHCD's February 5, 1982, reply. It was DHCD's refusal of the hearing that created a contested case. See Capitol Hill Restoration Society, supra, 287 A.2d at 104-06. Under the circumstances, we conclude that DHCD's final agency action  the formal notice of the order or decision sought to be reviewed, within the meaning of D.C.App.R. 15(b)  was not taken until February 5, 1982 (received by petitioner on February 8), making timely, within 15 days, the February 17, 1982, petition for review.
It follows that, because petitioner requested, but did not receive, the show cause hearing at DHCD to which he was entitled, we must remand the case to DHCD for a contested case hearing on the question whether  despite a valid revocation of petitioner's sign permit  he can show cause why DHCD should not proceed to remove the sign pursuant to D.C.Code § 5-513 (1981). It may be that, confronted by the valid revocation of his permit, petitioner will find no reason to pursue a show cause hearing and, as the District suggests (note 9 supra ), will voluntarily take down the sign. However, petitioner was denied a hearing to which he had a right. On remand, he may advance some basis for persuading DHCD that it should not proceed, despite our holdings that the permit revocation was valid and that DHCD has § 5-513 authority. Thus, we perceive no basis for declining to afford him the remand option, in effect staying the proceedings until that time. Because, as it turns out, we have jurisdiction by way of a timely petition for review to consider both DHCD's authority to invoke § 5-513 enforcement procedure and DHCD's application of § 5-513 to petitioner, we can rule solely on the basis of that petition. Thus, we affirm the Superior Court's dismissal of the complaint. [15]