Opinion ID: 1991318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate CounselBatson Violation

Text: Of the five African-American venirepersons, four were excused for cause. Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Batson claim as to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only remaining African-American member of the venire, Warren King. The postconviction petition was accompanied by an affidavit of appellate counsel, in which counsel acknowledged that he was aware petitioner wanted him to raise the Batson issue on direct appeal, but that he had refused to do so. Counsel did not explain the basis for his decision. The circuit court dismissed this claim, concluding that after a thorough investigation of the law and the facts, appellate counsel made a strategic decision not to raise the Batson claim and that such a decision is virtually unchallengeable on appeal. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104. S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 695 (1984). Appellate counsel is not required to argue every conceivable issue on appeal. Rather, counsel must exercise professional judgment to select from the many potential claims of error that might be asserted on appeal. See People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 387-88, 222 Ill.Dec. 325, 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997). Therefore, we judge a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue a particular issue, not on the basis of what the defendant might have preferred, but under the standard set forth in Strickland. To succeed on this claim, petitioner must show that appellate counsel's failure to raise the Batson claim was objectively unreasonable and that, absent this failure, his conviction or sentence would have been reversed on direct appeal. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill.2d 401, 412, 245 Ill.Dec. 109, 727 N.E.2d 362 (2000). See also People v. Madej, 177 Ill.2d 116, 159, 226 Ill.Dec. 453, 685 N.E.2d 908 (1997) (stating that counsel's decision as to what issues to raise on direct appeal will not be questioned unless patently erroneous). Thus, if the Batson claim is completely without merit, appellate counsel's refusal to raise the issue, despite petitioner's instructions to the contrary, was reasonable. Batson established a three-step procedure to determine whether the State's use of peremptory challenges resulted in the removal of venirepersons on the basis of race. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. People v. Munson, 171 Ill.2d 158, 174, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265 (1996). Second, once such a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the State to provide a race-neutral explanation for excluding each of the venirepersons in question. Munson, 171 Ill.2d at 174-75, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265. Defense counsel may rebut the proffered explanations as pretextual. People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill.2d 274, 288, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 604 N.E.2d 877 (1992). Finally, the trial court determines whether the defendant has met his burden of demonstrating purposeful discrimination. Munson, 171 Ill.2d at 174, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265. In the present case, defense counsel objected to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to excuse King. Without waiving its objection that defense counsel had failed to establish a prima facie case, the State offered six reasons for excluding King from the jury: (1) he did not list his birthdate in the space provided on the juror questionnaire, (2) he did not appear to be paying attention during voir dire, (3) he seemed to avoid eye contact with the court and either attorney, (4) the prosecutor did not like his demeanor or body language, (5) he had an exceptionally hard time understanding the Witherspoon questions (see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)), and (6) his father died during the course of jury selection and the prosecutor had concerns about his emotional state as a result of this loss. Defense counsel argued pretext. The trial court found the reasons offered by the State to be race-neutral and nonpretextual. Petitioner argues that only two of these reasons, the confusion regarding the Witherspoon questions and the death of King's father, are objective factors. The rest are subjective assessments that should be given close scrutiny because such perceptions may easily be used as a pretext for discrimination. See People v. Wiley, 165 Ill.2d 259, 274-75, 209 Ill.Dec. 261, 651 N.E.2d 189 (1995). He also argues that the two objective reasons offered for King's exclusion from the jury were pretextual. Specifically, he notes that King's answers to the Witherspoon questions revealed no bias for or against the death penalty and that several other jurors had at least as much difficulty understanding the questions as he did. In fact, all but one of the venirepersons who were selected to serve on the jury required the court to repeat one or more of the Witherspoon questions. In addition, King was not the only member of the venire to suffer the death of a family member during jury selection. A white female venireperson also asked to be excused for half a day to attend the funeral of a family member. She was not questioned by the State about her relationship to the deceased or about any effect the death might have had on her ability to deliberate. The State did not use one of its peremptory challenges to remove her. King, however, was asked about his emotional state following the death of his father, and he stated that his ability to serve as a juror would not be affected. We have previously held that the State's exclusion of a minority venireperson based on a certain characteristic, while accepting a white venireperson who shares the same characteristic, does not necessarily show that the State's explanation is pretextual. People v. Young, 128 Ill.2d 1, 23 (1989). In Wiley, we explained: The State's purposeful discrimination is not automatically established by the mere coincidence that an excluded juror shared a characteristic with a juror who was not challenged. The excluded juror may possess an additional trait that caused the State to find him unacceptable, while the juror who was not challenged may possess an additional characteristic that prompted the State to find him acceptable to serve as a juror. [Citation.] `[A] peremptory challenge is based on a combination of traits, and a juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be accepted while another juror possessing that same negative trait, but also possessing other negative traits, may be challenged.' Wiley, 165 Ill.2d at 282-83, 209 Ill.Dec. 261, 651 N.E.2d 189, quoting Mitchell, 152 Ill.2d at 295, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 604 N.E.2d 877. In People v. Easley, 192 Ill.2d 307, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975 (2000), for example, the State offered three reasons for its peremptory challenge of an African-American venireperson. First, the prosecutor believed that the individual lied when he stated that he did not know that two of his adult children had recently been convicted of crimes and sentenced to probation. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 325, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Second, the prosecutor excluded the individual because he lived in a neighborhood that experienced street gang activity. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 325-26, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Third, the prosecutor excluded the individual because he vacillated and hesitated in his answers to questions about the death penalty, Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 326-27, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. The defendant argued that each of these reasons was a mere pretext for racial discrimination. The individual had explained during voir dire that he did not know of his childrens' convictions because they had not lived with him for 20 years. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 325, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. The prosecutor did not ask any additional questions to clarify this matter. We held that the prosecutor's conclusion that the individual was lying, without exploring the subject further by asking supplemental questions, did not lead to the conclusion that this reason was pretextual. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 325, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. As to the gang activity in the individual's neighborhood, we noted that using this fact as a basis for excluding venirepersons could result in a disproportionate impact on minority jurors. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 326, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. However, unless the prosecutor adopted this criterion with the intent of excluding minority jurors, the disproportionate impact itself would not compel a finding of pretext. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 326, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Because the State's theory of the case involved gang violence and retaliation, a potential juror's experience or exposure to an environment of gang activity was particularly relevant as a criterion for jury selection. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 326, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. With regard to the prosecutor's concern with the individual's demeanor, we noted that although demeanor is a legitimate race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, such explanations must be closely scrutinized. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 327, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. The defendant argued that the demeanor explanation was pretextual because the prosecutor accepted three white venirepersons who were equally tentative about their support for the death penalty. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 327, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. We rejected this argument, noting that the peremptory challenge of this individual was based on a combination of traits and that, although he shared this trait with three accepted jurors, they were not similarly situated because he possessed two additional undesirable traits. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 327, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. In the present case, King and one of the accepted jurors shared the single trait that each experienced the death of a family member while jury selection was taking place. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the family relationships were equally close and that both individuals were equally likely to be affected by their loss, King and the female juror were not similarly situated. He required that four of the Witherspoon questions be repeated; she asked for one question to be repeated. Nor was King similarly situated to the other jurors who asked that questions be repeated. None of them had just experienced the death of a parent. In addition, King was distinguished from the accepted jurors by the fact that he did not completely fill out his juror questionnaire. In sum, we conclude that appellate counsel's decision not to raise the Batson claim on direct appeal was reasonable. This claim was properly dismissed by the circuit court.