Opinion ID: 777416
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: When an Indictment is Found

Text: 14 This court generally reviews an order dismissing an indictment for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 694 (10th Cir.1993). If, however, the district court dismisses the indictment based on its interpretation of governing statutes, that interpretation is a legal determination reviewed de novo. See id. 15 The applicable statute of limitations for the indicted crimes provides that [e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed. 18 U.S.C. § 3282. 16 This court has not previously addressed the issue of when an indictment is found under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. The government submits that an indictment is found by an act of the grand jury, and not when the indictment is publicly filed or made known to the defendant. Here, the government argues that sealing of the Thompsons' indictment violated Rule 6(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 rather than the applicable statute of limitations. The government argues that this distinction is important because a violation of the statute of limitations normally does not require a showing of prejudice before dismissing the indictment, while a violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to demonstrate prejudice under harmless error analysis. 17 The defendants argue that the government violated the statute of limitations. Because the government concedes it did not seal the indictment for a legitimate prosecutorial purpose, defendants submit that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the time the indictment was sealed and the indictment is not found until its contents are made public. Dismissal of the indictment should therefore be affirmed. 18 As in any case of statutory interpretation, this court begins with the language of the statute itself. See United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir.1991). When interpreting statutory language, appellate courts examine the disputed language in context, not in isolation. See True Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir.1999). This court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole. Id. (quotation omitted). Because the statute requires that the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years of the alleged crime, cases addressing when an information is instituted may inform the meaning of when an indictment is found. 19 In United States v. Burdix-Dana, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether filing an information in the district court is sufficient to institute an information under § 3282. See 149 F.3d 741, 742-43 (7th Cir.1998). Prosecutors in that case filed an information before the expiration of the five-year statute of limitations, but did not return an indictment until after its expiration. See id. at 742. The defendant argued that the information was not instituted within the meaning of the statute because the government had not obtained a waiver of indictment, a necessary prerequisite to prosecuting on the information. See id. ; Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(b). In other words, the defendant asserted that an information was not instituted until the government could prosecute on the information within the limitations period. See Burdix-Dana, 149 F.3d at 742. In rejecting this argument, the court recognized that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) requires the government to obtain the defendant's waiver of indictment before prosecuting on an information. See id. at 742-43. The court, however, continued: 20 We do not see how [Rule 7(b)] affects the statute governing the limitation period. There is nothing in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 3282 that suggests a prosecution must be instituted before the expiration of the five year period; instead the statute states that the information must be instituted. We hold that the filing of the information is sufficient to institute it within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3282. 21 Id. at 743. In the context of an indictment, Burdix-Dana thus suggests that the closest comparable act to the filing of an information would determine when an indictment is found. 22 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(f) sheds further light on the meaning of found in 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Although the title to a statutory provision is not part of the law itself, it can be used to interpret a statute. See United States v. Glover, 52 F.3d 283, 286 (10th Cir.1995). Rule 6(f), titled Finding and Return of Indictment, provides in pertinent part: A grand jury may indict only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors. The indictment shall be returned by the grand jury, or through the foreperson or deputy foreperson on its behalf, to a federal magistrate judge in open court. Fed. R.Crim.P. 6(f). Although the rule does not itself use the term finding, the combination of the title and the text indicates that an indictment is found when a grand jury indicts. Nothing in Rule 6(f) suggests that an indictment is found when the contents of the indictment are made public or become known to the defendant. 2 Indictments are found by grand juries, not by defendants or by the courts. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 9, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887) (Being the finding of a jury upon oath, the court cannot amend [the indictment] without the concurrence of the grand jury by whom the bill is found.), overruled in part by United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138-44, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985). 23 The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3282 mentions nothing about the sealing of an indictment, nor does it include a tolling provision. The grand jury's determination of whether or not to find an indictment does not depend on whether the indictment is sealed. A decision in the Third Circuit supports this conclusion. See United States v. Michael, 180 F.2d 55 (3d Cir.1949). The appellant in Michael was charged with conspiracy and violating the Bankruptcy Act. See id. at 56. The indictment was returned before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, 3 and the district court sealed and impounded the indictment. See id. The indictment was not unsealed until after the expiration of the statute of limitations. See id. In rejecting the appellant's argument that the indictment was not found within the statutory period, the Third Circuit stated: 24 The finding of an indictment is the function of the grand jury. When an indictment has been submitted to the grand jury by the government attorney it becomes the duty of that body to find it to be a true bill of indictment and so return it to the district court, if at least twelve of the grand jurors concur in regarding the evidence presented by the government as making out a prima facie case of the offense charged. If the requisite number of grand jurors decline to find the indictment to be a true bill it is to be returned as ignored. When the grand jury has found an indictment to be a true bill and has completed its action thereon by returning the indictment, duly endorsed as a true bill by its foreman, to the district court in open session, its function has been fulfilled. The indictment has been `found' within the meaning of the statute of limitations regardless of what the district court may thereafter do or fail to do with respect thereto. 25 Id. (emphasis added). 26 This court holds that an indictment is found under 18 U.S.C. § 3282 when the grand jury votes to indict the defendant and the foreperson subscribes the indictment as a true bill. 4 Whether the indictment is then sealed is thus irrelevant for statute of limitations purposes. Accord id. at 56. 27 This court recognizes that other circuits are to the contrary and treat the statute of limitations as if it is still running even after the return of a improperly sealed indictment. These circuits have held that the statute of limitations is tolled if the indictment is properly sealed. See United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Sharpe, 995 F.2d 49, 52 (5th Cir.1993) (per curiam). The logic of these decisions necessarily compels the converse of the rule: the statute is not tolled if the indictment was sealed for an illegitimate purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Deglomini, 111 F.Supp.2d 198, 200 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (In the absence of a proper purpose for sealing, the indictment is considered to be found upon unsealing.); United States v. Rogers, 781 F.Supp. 1181, 1190 (S.D.Miss. 1991) ([W]here an indictment is sealed for an improper purpose, the indictment is not `found' until the indictment is unsealed.). Other circuits have stated these tolling rules slightly differently, albeit with the same result. See United States v. Lakin, 875 F.2d 168, 170 (8th Cir.1989) (When an indictment is properly sealed, the date of return, rather than the date of unsealing, ordinarily is the time that the indictment is found for purposes of section 3282.); United States v. Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.1987) (same). 28 The defendants urge this court to adopt this alternative approach to analyze the unsealing of indictments after the expiration of the statute of limitations. We decline the defendants' invitation. Under the defendants' proposed rule, when a sealed indictment is found depends on the propriety of sealing the indictment under Rule 6(e)(4). See Lakin, 875 F.2d at 170; Srulowitz, 819 F.2d at 40. Such a rule would necessarily render issues of repose dependent on the subjective intent of a prosecutor in accomplishing the sealing of an indictment rather than an objectively certain date. Moreover, neither the statute nor the rules suggest the date when a sealed indictment is found is in any way dependent upon the propriety of that sealing.