Opinion ID: 4579005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deference Under AEDPA

Text: Generally, habeas claims arising from state courts are gov‐ erned by AEDPA, under which “a federal court may grant ha‐ beas relief after a state‐court adjudication on the merits only when that decision (1) ‘was contrary to, or involved an unrea‐ sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as de‐ termined by the Supreme Court of the United States;’ or (2) ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 476–77 (7th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2)). Gage argues that we should not apply AEDPA deference for two reasons: first, because the state appellate court mis‐ stated and misapplied Strickland’s prejudice standard, and second, because it based its decision on an unreasonable de‐ termination of the facts. No. 19‐2002 9 As an initial matter, the state contends that Gage forfeited these challenges because he did not raise these issues before the district court. “A party generally forfeits issues and argu‐ ments raised for the first time on appeal.” Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2019). While “we have discretion to decide issues of law not argued in the district court … that discretion should be used sparingly.” In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 714 (7th Cir. 2015). Gage contends that we should exercise this discretion because he was pro se, the issues are fully briefed, and it is in the interests of justice. Nonetheless, even if we considered the merits of Gage’s chal‐ lenges to AEDPA deference, they fail. First, Gage takes issue with the Wisconsin Court of Ap‐ peals’ formulation of Strickland’s prejudice standard. Under Strickland, the prejudice prong requires the petitioner to “af‐ firmatively prove prejudice,” such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability suﬃcient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated that to prove prejudice, a defendant must “show that the attorney’s errors rendered the resulting conviction unreliable in light of the other evidence presented.” Gage I, 365 Wis. 2d at ¶ 10 (emphasis added). The parties agree that this misstates Strickland but disagree about whether the state appellate court’s analysis nonetheless reflects a correct application of the prejudice standard. When a state court misstates Strickland’s prejudice prong, AEDPA deference may still apply if its analysis “focused on whether the proﬀered testimony could have aﬀected the out‐ come, which is the correct inquiry under Strickland.” Carter, 10 No. 19‐2002 819 F.3d at 944; Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 F.3d 329, 360 (7th Cir. 2011). This is true even when the incorrect recitation seem‐ ingly places an additional burden on the petitioner. Carter, 819 F.3d at 944. In Carter, for example, the state court incorrectly recited the prejudice standard as requiring the defendant to show the result of the proceeding was unreliable or funda‐ mentally unfair. Id. We nonetheless applied AEDPA deference to the state court’s determination that prejudice was lacking because “its analysis focused on the probable impact of the proﬀered testimony on the outcome.” Id. at 945; see also Floyd v. Hanks, 364 F.3d 847, 852–53 (7th Cir. 2004) (state court’s rec‐ itation that “when errors do not make the result of the trial unreliable, they do not cause prejudice” did not render the decision of the state court contrary to Strickland where the “ac‐ tual analysis of Floyd’s counsel’s conduct properly consid‐ ered whether the counsel’s actions aﬀected the outcome of the trial”). Here, the state court’s analysis focused on the consistency between Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony at the postconviction hearing and H.R.G.’s testimony at trial, which can reasonably be interpreted as “whether the proﬀered testimony could have aﬀected the outcome,” or its likely impact on the verdict. See Carter, 819 F.3d at 944. The state court noted that Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony did not undermine H.R.G.’s testi‐ mony in any significant way. Thus, despite the incorrect reci‐ tation of the prejudice standard, the state court’s decision is not “contrary to” Strickland. Second, Gage contends that the Wisconsin Court of Ap‐ peals based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts if it “rests upon fact‐ No. 19‐2002 11 finding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence.” Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634, 649 (7th Cir. 2015)). In particular, Gage criticizes how the state appellate court characterized Josh’s testimony about the sleeping arrange‐ ments in the basement when it stated that “the brother’s testi‐ mony that he ‘usually’ slept on the couch and sometimes slept in the bedroom does not contradict the victim’s testimony that each of the siblings sometimes slept in the bedroom and sometimes slept on the sectional couch with the pullout bed in the living room area.” Gage I, 365 Wis. 2d at ¶ 11. Gage claims this summary misstates Josh’s testimony because he testified that H.R.G. usually slept on the couch—and while it was possible she slept in the bedroom a few times, he did not specifically remember her doing so. While the state court’s finding that Josh and H.R.G. both testified that they “usually slept on the couch and sometimes in the bedroom” may not have been correct, it was not an un‐ reasonable interpretation of the testimony. See Collins v. Gaetz, 612 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2010) (under the “unreasonable de‐ termination of the facts” standard, “a state court’s factual finding is never unreasonable ‘merely because the federal ha‐ beas court would have reached a diﬀerent conclusion in the first instance’”). Gage disagrees with the state court’s charac‐ terization of how consistent Josh’s testimony about the sleep‐ ing arrangements was with H.R.G.’s. But the state court’s de‐ scription of the testimony was not unreasonable because both Josh and H.R.G. testified that they slept either on the bed or on the couch, and Josh acknowledged it was possible that H.R.G. slept in the bedroom a few times. Thus, the state court’s determination that Josh’s testimony did not contradict 12 No. 19‐2002 H.R.G.’s does not ignore the clear and convincing weight of the evidence. Because Gage’s challenges fail, we analyze the state appel‐ late court’s decision under the deferential standard set forth in AEDPA.