Opinion ID: 2640942
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maintaining the Distinction Between Intent and Probability

Text: ¶ 38 We also caution courts to remain cognizant of the distinction between intent and probability. Helf urges us to reject the intent to injure standard and instead adopt the substantially certain standard, arguing that an actor need not actually intend harm in order to commit an intentional tort if harm is substantially certain to result. Helf's primary argument against the intent to injure standard is that it would insulate employers from the consequences of their intentional, wrongful acts so long as the actor does not intend to bring about the harm although it is substantially likely to occur. ¶ 39 We decline to adopt the substantially certain test for two reasons. First, Helf fails to recognize that it is the Act, not the intent to injure standard, that insulates employers and fellow employees from liability for injuries or accidents that are likely, but not certain, to occur. These injuries are the product of negligence and, as such, are covered by the exclusive remedy provision. Whether the social benefits of this system outweigh the concerns articulated by Helf is a question for the legislature. ¶ 40 Second, Helf conflates probability with intent, suggesting that intent may be imputed where a high probability of injury exists because the employer knew that harm was substantially likely to occur sometime to some employee. Adopting this standard would unravel the structure of the Act. Almost every form of employment bears some risk of injury. Employers willing to expend the time and effort could sit down and calculate with some specificity the number of employees likely to be injured on the job in a year. In fact, these types of calculations inform insurance decisions and OSHA regulations. It does not make sense that a risk calculation, which is intended to expose the likelihood of an uncertain or unexpected event, could transform an unexpected or uncertain event (an accident) into an intentional injury. Such an approach would ignore the intent requirement altogether. ¶ 41 We agree with the South Dakota Supreme Court, which has carefully maintained the distinction between intent and probability in intentional tort cases. More than knowledge or appreciation of risk is required to establish intentional conduct. The known danger must cease to become only a foreseeable risk which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid (ordinary negligence) and become a substantial certainty. [57] In Fryer v. Krantz, the court concluded that an injury was unintentional because it was not a matter of when [the injury] would happen (a certainty), it was a question of if it would [happen] (a probability). [58] Thus, to demonstrate an intentional injury in South Dakota, the plaintiff must show that the employer had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and that the employer still required the employee to perform. [59] This approach maintains the distinction between intent and probability by focusing on whether the actor knew or expected that injury would occur to a particular employee performing a specific task in determining whether an injury was intentional. It does not focus on whether an injury was substantially certain to occur to an unknown employee at some future timean inquiry driven by probability, not intent. ¶ 42 Other courts have failed to maintain the distinction between intent and probability. For example, Ohio courts determine whether an injury is substantially certain to occur in order to evaluate whether the injury is intentional and they occasionally resort to statistics to determine the likelihood that the injury will occur. [60] We agree with the South Dakota Supreme Court that such an approach blur[s] the line between cases involving only negligent or reckless conduct and those involving true intent to injure. [61] ¶ 43 We therefore hold that the intent to injure standard requires a specific mental state in which the actor knew or expected that injury would be the consequence of his action. To demonstrate intent, a plaintiff may show that the actor desired the consequences of his actions, or that the actor believed the consequences were virtually certain to result. But a plaintiff may not demonstrate intent by showing merely that some injury was substantially certain to occur at some time. For a workplace injury to qualify as an intentional injury under the Act, the employer or supervisor must know or expect that the assigned task will injure the particular employee that undertakes it. In other words, the employer must know or expect that a specific employee will be injured doing a specific task. In these situations, the knowledge and expectation that injury will occur robs an injury of its accidental character, moving it out of the realm of negligence and into the realm of intent.