Opinion ID: 200511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: voir dire on attitudes toward blacks

Text: Defendant argues the district court refused to ask the venire a question about possible bias. Counsel requested that the court inquire: The defendant in this case is black/African American. Does the fact that he is black make you think it is more likely that he is guilty of the crime he is charged with here today? The court declined, relying instead upon less specific questions crafted to solicit responses indicating wider potential bias. For example, the court asked, Are any of you sensible of any bias or prejudice whatsoever with respect to the case to be tried? Do any of you know any reason why you do not stand indifferent to this case? Do any of you know any reason why you ought not be called to sit as jurors in this case? Although the court directed all the parties to stand at the outset of voir dire and the prospective jurors were aware Defendant is black, he contends these measures were insufficient. Because two of the three government witnesses were white, counsel argues the court’s refusal to ask the specific question about racial bias resulted in Defendant’s inability to determine whether racial prejudice would affect the jury. Thus, Defendant was left without an adequate basis upon which to exercise his peremptories and challenges for cause. -4- Defendant first relies upon Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1981), in which the Court instructed, In the federal court system, we have indicated that under our supervisory authority over the federal courts, we would require questions directed to the discovery of racial prejudice be asked in certain circumstances in which such an inquiry is not constitutionally mandated. (citation omitted). He cites other cases relating to the proper role of voir dire in removing prospective jurors who will not be able to be impartial and the necessity to uncover biases that would justify their exclusion. He adds, in this case, questioning about racial bias was necessary to accomplish the task. Indeed, there was a potential for white against black bias in Gillenwater’s testimony indicating “a threat of violent conduct by a black man directed against white police officers.” The government responds the court did not err because its “inquiry probed potential racial and other prejudice in a manner at least as likely to reveal such bias or prejudice as would the question about race that Webb had requested to be asked at voir dire.” The prosecution maintains that the venire, which had been introduced to Webb at the outset, could see he is black. Thus, the government urges, the court’s questions about any prejudice, “coupled with its instruction that members of the venire should answer in the affirmative even if they ‘may’ or ‘might’ harbor such prejudice, were more than sufficient to probe the racial animus of potential jurors,” citing United States v. Brown, 938 F.2d 1482, -5- 1485-86 (1st Cir. 1991)(the mere fact a defendant is black does not trigger a need for a special question). The court’s repeated general questions about possible bias and its instruction to respond if there was a possibility of bias in a potential juror’s mind were sufficient, the government argues. After all, it notes, as the Court observed in Rosales-Lopez, there is “little reason to believe” a potential juror who did not respond to a general question on possible bias “would have answered affirmatively a question directed narrowly at racial prejudice.” 451 U.S. at 193 n.8. This issue must be judged under an abuse of discretion standard in which trial courts are given wide latitude. Brown, 938 F.2d at 1485. “The trial judge’s function at this point in the trial is . . . to reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor, evidence and responses to questions.” Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188 (citations omitted). Therefore, a reviewing court, in recognition of this role, confers great latitude upon the trial judge’s choice of questions. Moreover, “[a]buse of discretion” is a phrase which sounds worse than it really is. All it need mean is that, when judicial action is taken in a discretionary matter, such action cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless it has a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. -6- Schubert v. Nissan Motor Corp, 148 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1998)(quoting In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954)). Judged in this light, we are hard pressed to find any abuse of discretion here. As the Supreme Court has instructed: In our judgment, it is usually best to allow the defendant to resolve this conflict by making the determination of whether or not he would prefer to have the inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice pursued. Failure to honor his request, however, will be reversible error only where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, we recognize the importance of Mr. Webb’s concern. Doubtless, it was the district court’s motivation to protect Defendant against possible racial contamination of the jury’s deliberations by suggestion. Yet it was, after all, Defendant’s obvious choice. He must have assumed the potential reward was worth the risk his question posed. The inquiry he offered was appropriate and without an inflammatory purpose. Even though it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to ask that question, the court could have asked it without harm. Brown, 938 F.2d at 1485. “[T]he wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant.” Id. (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1976)). -7-