Opinion ID: 600721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Seek Timely Rehearing

Text: Section 19 of the Natural Gas Act states: 15 Any person, State, municipality, or State commission aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in a proceeding under this chapter to which such person, State, municipality, or State commission is a party may apply for a rehearing within thirty days after the issuance of such order.... No proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be brought by any person unless such person shall have made application to the Commission for a rehearing thereon. 16 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1988) (emphasis added). It goes on to provide that [n]o objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure to do so. Id. 717r(b). Thus, the FERC appears to argue that when petitioners, who were parties to the Settlement Order, did not seek review of these issues within the thirty-day statutory period, the provisions became final and unreviewable. 17 Although a petition for rehearing of a FERC order cannot be filed beyond the statutory period, there are limited circumstances in which certain issues addressed in the order might later be open to challenge. See Cities of Batavia v. FERC, 672 F.2d 64, 72 n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1982) (While a petition from an agency order cannot be filed after the statutory time period for filing has run, it may be that some of the issues that might have been raised in that appeal are so inextricably linked to a subsequent agency opinion on another aspect of the same case, that those issues may be raised in a timely appeal from the second opinion.) (emphasis in original). For example, we permit such a challenge when the first order's effect on the party was unclear at the time, that is, when its lack of clarity led the party justifiably to misinterpret its effect on that party, Kansas Cities v. FERC, 823 F.2d 81, 86 (D.C.Cir.1983), and accordingly, not to seek review. Thus, in Kansas Cities, we permitted a challenge by two municipalities that had not appreciated the consequences of the FERC's ambiguous first order until a later order made clear what the Commission intended. The Kansas Cities petitioners' timely appeal from the second order permissibly reached issues addressed in the first. 18 We believe the same result obtains here. Viewed in hindsight, and through the lens of the FERC's subsequent orders, we can find in the Settlement Order sufficient notice to alert the wary customer that the terms of its allocation were subject to change. But disregarding the enlightenment and clarification provided by the FERC's later orders and its brief to the court, we find the Settlement Order too ambiguous fairly to constitute a bar to petitioners' claims. 19 The Settlement Order included several statements that could have led a reasonable customer to misinterpret the nature of the Order's changes. The Order stated the FERC's intention to protect the quality of the service provided to existing preferred customers. Petitioners argue that this did not alert them to the dramatic change in the status quo. Further, the Order stated that the FERC ha[d] found nothing that indicates Florida Gas' existing approved curtailment method is unduly discriminatory. Again, petitioners took this to signal the continuation of the existing curtailment plan. Although the FERC did instruct FGT to clarify its tariff provisions to distinguish when its capacity curtailment provisions, as opposed to its scheduling provisions, would be in effect, petitioners did not read this call for clarification as signalling a change. The FERC's statement that the curtailment provisions would be in force only after scheduling has taken place and only after an unexpected loss of capacity has occurred could reasonably have been read to encompass situations broader than the FERC intended. To corroborate their claim of ambiguity, petitioners note that the FERC's Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement herself had expressed uncertainty about whether the FGT's use of curtailment procedures had violated the Settlement Order and suggested that FGT request a tariff clarification from the Commission. 20 We do not suggest that the FERC was deliberately ambiguous or obtuse. To the contrary, we have no reason to doubt that the FERC's order was issued with the good faith intention to put all parties on notice of the terms of the settlement. As may happen, however, with an order of this complexity, there were sufficient ambiguities to make us question the fairness of holding that the petitioners were put on notice of the content and scope of the changes in the FGT's policies. 21 The policy requiring timely filing of motions for reconsideration is one of fairness to the [regulatory agency] and to parties affected by the order; only a perversion of that policy could be used to cut off the rights of a party that filed its application in good faith, as soon as it could reasonably have become aware of the import of the earlier order. 22 Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976). Therefore, we hold that petitioners' claims are not barred by the statutory period for rehearing.