Opinion ID: 1767825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ark R. Crim P. 3.1

Text: We will now address whether the facts of this case are sufficient to justify a Rule 3.1 stop and detention. Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (2007) provides: A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct. An officer acting under this rule may require the person to remain in or near such place in the officer's presence for a period of not more than fifteen (15) minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the circumstances. At the end of such period the person detained shall be released without further restraint, or arrested and charged with an offense. Id. See also Dowty v. State, 363 Ark. 1, 210 S.W.3d 850 (2005). Reasonable suspicion is defined as a suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite to justify a lawful arrest, but which give rise to more than a bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion. Dowty, 363 Ark. at 11, 210 S.W.3d at 856 (citing Ark. R.Crim. P. 2.1 (2004)). Whether there is reasonable suspicion depends on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police have specific, particularized, and articulable reasons indicating the person may be involved in criminal activity. Id. at 11, 21 S.W.3d at 856-57 (citing Smith v. State, 343 Ark. 552, 39 S.W.3d 739 (2001)). In addition, the Arkansas legislature has codified factors to be considered when determining whether an officer has grounds to reasonably suspect a person is subject to detention pursuant to Rule 3.1. These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) The demeanor of the suspect; (2) The gait and manner of the suspect; (3) Any knowledge the officer may have of the suspect's background or character; (4) Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what he or she is carrying; (5) The manner in which the suspect is dressed, including bulges in clothing, when considered in light of all of the other factors; (6) The time of the day or night the suspect is observed; (7) Any overheard conversation of the suspect; (8) The particular streets and areas involved; (9) Any information received from third persons, whether they are known or unknown; (10) Whether the suspect is consorting with others whose conduct is reasonably suspect; (11) The suspect's proximity to known criminal conduct; (12) The incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood; (13) The suspect's apparent effort to conceal an article; and (14) The apparent effort of the suspect to avoid identification or confrontation by a law enforcement officer. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-81-203 (Repl.2005). Appellee asserts that the facts in this case are insufficient to justify the stop because the information that was used came from an anonymous individual. The above factors include any information received from third persons, whether they are known or unknown. In Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728, 912 S.W.2d 917 (1995), a confidential informant told a detective that two males driving a black 1989 Ford Ranger pickup with Oklahoma tags were selling crack cocaine and told the detective where the vehicle was parked. We said that while there was minimal evidence to show the reliability of the informant in that case, the detective had been able, in the past, to confirm the veracity of some of the information provided and was aware that the informant had worked with other detectives on cocaine cases. We held that this evidence of reliability, combined with the accuracy of the informant's information and the detective's testimony regarding the area's reputation for drug traffic, was enough to give the officers specific, particularized and articulable reasons indicating the person or vehicle may be involved in criminal activity. Id. at 735, 912 S.W.2d at 921 (citing Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982)). We further held that the information provided by the informant was sufficiently detailed that, when combined with all other factors, it gave the officers a legal basis for the stop. Id. Here, Officer Lane testified that he knew the informant; therefore, the tip was not anonymous. Lane testified that he first had contact with the informant in 2002 and found the information he had received at that time had been accurate and truthful. Further, the information given to Lane by the informant in the instant case matched the descriptions of Appellee and his vehicle. Therefore, the evidence of the informant's reliability combined with the accuracy of the informant's information was enough to give the officers specific, particularized and articulable reasons indicating the person or vehicle may be involved in criminal activity. See Kilpatrick, supra . In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the officers had reasonable suspicion, and therefore a legal basis, to stop Appellee's vehicle. [2]