Opinion ID: 2584947
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: California's Death Penalty Statute and Related Instructions

Text: Defendant claims California's death penalty statute and the jury instructions thereunder are constitutionally flawed for numerous reasons. We affirm the decisions that have rejected identical claims, as follows. As applied, section 190.3, factor (a), does not result in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1330-1331; People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 373 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229]; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244].) The trial court need not delete inapplicable sentencing factors from its instructions. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 801; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574; People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 164-165.) The trial court did not commit constitutional error by failing to instruct that statutory mitigating factors were relevant only in mitigation. [Citations.] Moreover, `the statutory instruction to the jury to consider whether or not certain mitigating factors were present did not impermissibly invite the jury to aggravate the sentence upon the basis of nonexistent or irrational aggravating factors. [Citations.]' ( People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 935 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955]; see People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 236 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496].) Section 190.3's use of adjectives such as extreme and substantial within the list of mitigating factors did not impermissibly limit the jury's consideration of such factors. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 801; People v. Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 934.) The failure of the court's instruction to require specific written findings by the jury with regard to the aggravating factors found and considered in returning a death sentence did not violate defendant's constitutional rights to meaningful appellate review and equal protection of the law. ( People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574; see also People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 627; People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 212 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196, 158 P.3d 763]; People v. Carey, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 136.) `[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due process of law.' ( People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212; see also People v. Carey, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 136-137.) The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to assign a burden of proof and standard of proof for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination. ( People v. Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 935; People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1066; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 573.) The jury need not agree unanimously as to aggravating factors, or make specific findings or find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist (except for other unadjudicated violent criminal activity), that such factors outweigh mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate punishment. ( People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 626-627; People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212; People v. Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 934.) Nothing in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], or Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531], casts doubt on these conclusions. ( People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 707 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 171 P.3d 2]; People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 475 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64]; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 573.) Even in the absence of an explicit instruction to the contrary, it was not reasonably likely the jury believed it was bound by the reasonable doubt instruction given during the guilt phase in deciding whether evidence can count in defendant's favor as mitigating. On the contrary, because the trial court instructed specifically that the reasonable doubt standard applied [to whether the jury could consider defendant's alleged prior unadjudicated violent criminal activity as an aggravating factor], and mentioned nothing about mitigating factors, the reasonable juror would infer that no such reasonable doubt standard applied to mitigating factors. ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754].) [19] In light of the moral and normative nature of the jury's sentencing determination, the trial court need not instruct that the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of penalty. ( People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 526 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 245, 150 P.3d 1224]; People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 868 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007]; People v. Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1136.) The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of life did not violate defendant's constitutional rights to due process, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, to a reliable determination of his sentence, and to equal protections of the laws. ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 532 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58]; see also People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 800; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 573.) The trial court properly instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88, a standard penalty phase instruction defining the scope of the jury's sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process. The instruction was not constitutionally deficient or impermissibly vague because (1) it used the phrase so substantial to compare aggravating factors with the mitigating factors; (2) it failed to instruct the jury that, if it determined the factors in mitigation outweigh the factors in aggravation, it was required to return a sentence of life without possibility of parole; and (3) it failed to inform the jury that defendant did not have the burden to persuade it that the death penalty was inappropriate. ( People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 618-619 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104], and cases cited; see also People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 800; People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1226 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981].)