Opinion ID: 195221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of ReviewA. Standard of Review

Text: Our review of a district court's interpretation of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) is plenary. Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1991). Where the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion to extend time for filing a new notice of appeal is by margin order and, therefore, without any interpretation of the rule, however, we will ordinarily review its decision to grant a Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) motion for abuse of discretion. See generally id.; cf. Ramseur v. Beyer, 921 F.2d 504, 506 n.2. (3d Cir. 1990). B. Excusable Neglect under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). As noted above, under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), notices of appeal in civil cases must be filed 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment . . . appealed from. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) provides a narrow exception whereby delinquent parties may be granted up to an additional 30 days by the district court. To avail oneself of the exception, in 6. Agents also contend that Allstate waived its challenge to the district court's ruling by filing its objection 50 days after the district court's order was issued, and, therefore, 20 days after the time prescribed by Rule 4(a)(1). Because our jurisdiction depends upon the validity of the district court's decision, however, we are not bound by this alleged procedural default. Instead, as always, we have an obligation to inquire sua sponte into [our] subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed no further if such jurisdiction is wanting. See In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1988). -5- 5 circumstances where the need for the extension results entirely from neglect attributable to appellant, as distinguished from forces beyond her control, appellant must show excusable neglect. Pontarelli, 930 F.2d at 109. As we have often stated, in order to show excusable neglect, appellant must demonstrate unique or extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., id. at 104; Rivera v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 921 F.2d 393, 396 (1st Cir. 1990). We find no such circumstances here. Agents, in their motion, explained to the district court that their tardiness was caused by a misapprehension of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)'s specificity requirement. This misapprehension, in turn, was given two explanations: (1) the names of the plaintiffs were omitted through inadvertence of counsel; and (2) counsel's failure to name the defendants was the result of counsel's plausible misconstruction of the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). Neither explanation is sufficient to meet the Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) standard. In Rivera, we explicitly held that counsel's mistaken or inadvertent failure to name the appellants in a notice of appeal does not constitute excusable neglect for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) absent unusual or extraordinary circumstances. Rivera, 921 F.2d at 396. Agents argue that the unusual or extraordinary -6- 6 circumstances in this case consist of their own plausible misconstruction of the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). We disagree. Although we do not completely discount the possibility that a plausible misconstruction of Federal Rules may, in some situations, meet the requirements of excusable neglect under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), Agents' counsel's misconstruction of the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) can hardly be considered plausible. As noted above, Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) requires that a notice of appeal specify the parties taking the appeal. In 1987, the Supreme Court stated that specify means name. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 314 (1987)(The failure to name a party in a notice of appeal is more than excusable `informality'; it constitutes a failure of that party to appeal.)(emphasis supplied). Moreover, we repeatedly have held that we lack jurisdiction over unnamed appellants. See Rivera, 921 F.2d at 395; Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 317 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc); Marin-Piazza v. Aponte-Roque, 873 F.2d 432, 433 (1st Cir. 1989); Santos- Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d 174, 176 (1st Cir. 1988). As Agents point out, we have, on one occasion, approved a finding that counsel's failure to name each appellant on the notice of appeal constituted excusable neglect. In the case of In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel -7- 7 Fire Litig., 888 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989), we upheld the district court's grant of a Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) motion where the initial notice of appeal simply stated that all plaintiffs, through the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee hearby [sic] appeal. Id. at 941. We found the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, (PSC), a team of trial attorneys representing over 2000 plaintiffs, a Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) extension to file a new notice of appeal where 1) there were an extraordinary number of plaintiffs;7 2) the PSC in its representative status existed precisely to represent all the active plaintiffs, id. at 942; and 3) the PSC had previously filed similar appeals in the same litigation without adverse consequences. Id. at 941-42. Clearly, as Agents' counsel conceded at oral argument, no such circumstances are present in the record before us. Furthermore, Agents' reliance on Lorezen v. Employees Retirement Plan of Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1990), as supporting their plausible misconstruction argument, is misplaced. In Lorezen, counsel's neglect was excused because, among other things, his plausible interpretation of the rule at issue had not been foreclosed by the circuit until the twenty-eighth day of 7. It took thirty-nine pages to list the appellants in the new notice of appeal. -8- 8 the thirty-day appeal period. Moreover, the court found that counsel's interpretation of the rule had been induced, in part, by a confusing motion submitted by opposing counsel. Again, we have no such circumstances before us. Here, counsel's misinterpretation of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) was due to nothing more than counsel's ignorance of the law, something the Lorezen court viewed as inexcusable neglect under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Id. at 232 (naming `plausible misconstructions, but not mere ignorance, of the law or rules' as one of the types of excusable neglect under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)) (quoting Redfield v. Continental Casualty Corp., 818 F.2d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis supplied). In sum, because Agents have failed, as a matter of law, to demonstrate any circumstance that the district court could have found to be unique or extraordinary, we find that the district court abused its discretion in extending Agents' time to file a new notice of appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order granting Agent's Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) extension. C. Failure to Perfect a Timely Appeal Given the invalidity of the district court's Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) extension, Agents' second notice of appeal is not timely and, therefore, is ineffective to support this appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, -9- 9 229 (1960)(holding that the time limit to file a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional). Agents' counsel argues that despite the case law discussed supra, we still have the authority, under Fed. R. App. P. 2, to suspend the filing requirements. We disagree. Fed. R. App. P. 2 states, in relevant part, that for . . . good cause shown, a court of appeals may, except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b), suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case on application of a party or on its own motion. (Emphasis supplied). Fed. R. App. P. 26(b), in turn, expressly forbids a court from enlarg[ing] the time for filing an appeal. See also Torres, 487 U.S. at 317. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to reach the merits of this action and must necessarily dismiss.8 See id. at 317 n.3 (holding that failure to comply with the technical requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) erects a jurisdictional hurdle which can never be `harmless' or waived by the court).