Opinion ID: 2188128
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inevitability of Restraints at Wrinkles's Trial

Text: Wrinkles requests permission to assert his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel dropped a crucial ball by permitting him, without objection, to be visibly restrained in front of the jury. As I understand the claim, it is not principally a claim that the stun belt Wrinkles wore was necessarily more prejudicial than shackles. Rather the claim is that counsel failed to object to any form of shackling, essentially deferring without objection to a perceived policy of the judge to insist on restraints in high profile cases. It is clear that counsel raised no objection to restraints, and equally clear that under governing federal constitutional precedent at the time of Wrinkles's trial, a defendant was not to appear before the jury in restraints without an individualized determination that the restraints were necessary for safety or order in the courtroom or to prevent escape. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); Coates v. State, 487 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. Ct.App.1985), overruled on other grounds by Hahn v. State, 533 N.E.2d 618 (Ind.Ct. App.1989) (the facts and reasoning supporting the trial judge's determination that restraints are necessary must be placed on the record). When Wrinkles appealed his conviction to this Court in 1997, he raised multiple issues, none of which challenged either the use of the stun belt in particular or the need for any form of restraint. Wrinkles I, 690 N.E.2d at 1158-73. Wrinkles's first petition for post-conviction relief in 2001 did assert ineffective assistance of counsel, citing both failure to object to the belt and failure to object to any form of restraint. The post-conviction court denied relief, principally based on its finding that Wrinkles had not established that the belt was visible. On appeal of that judgment, we held that it was not ineffective assistance to accept the stun belt over shackles because the belt was thought to be less visible and therefore less likely to affect the jury's perception of Wrinkles as a dangerous person. Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195. This decision was held to be a tactical or strategic call within counsel's discretion, and not substandard performance. In Wrinkles II we also addressed the claim of ineffective assistance for failure to object to any restraint. We did not resolve that claim on the basis of lack of prejudice due to lack of visibility. Rather, we held that an objection to wearing restraints would not have been sustained by the trial judge even if made. Id. In other words, Wrinkles would have appeared in restraints even if his counsel had objected and triggered a hearing as to particularized circumstances. Although we stated this as a reason why Wrinkles's counsel had performed adequately, it is relevant to both the performance and prejudice prongs of a Strickland claim. Subsequently, in considering a similar issue in an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief in another death penalty case, we described our Wrinkles II holding as rejecting Wrinkles's claim of ineffective assistance for lack of proof of the prejudice prong. Stephenson v. State (Stephenson II), 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1036 (Ind.2007). Stephenson II misdescribed what Wrinkles II said, but I believe Stephenson II was correct in describing the issue raised by Wrinkles's failure to object to any restraint as a failure to prove prejudice. If there was no reasonable probability that an objection would have led to a restraint-free trial, there was no prejudice from counsel's failure to object. We were correct in Wrinkles II in rejecting Wrinkles's claim only if we were correct that Wrinkles's appearance in restraints was inevitable if an objection had been lodged. As to the performance prong, as Judge Springmann pointed out in ruling on Stephenson's subsequent habeas petition, if an objection had been made and the trial judge overruled it without an individualized determination, we would have been obliged to reverse and order a new trial. Stephenson v. Levenhagen (Stephenson III), No. 3:07-CV-539-TS, 2009 WL 1886081, at  (N.D.Ind. July 1, 2009) (quoting Stephenson II, 864 N.E.2d at 1038 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705)). It was therefore inadequate representation to accept the trial court's policy without objection, if there was a reasonable probability that an objection would have been successful. By successful, I mean an objection would have produced a hearing at which no particularized need was established, so either no restraints would have been ordered or the presumption of prejudice from visible restraints would have dictated a reversal. Indeed, we so held in Stephenson II in evaluating Stephenson's claim of ineffective assistance for failure to object to restraints. 864 N.E.2d at 1033. [3]