Opinion ID: 489286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Privacy Act Exemption (d)(5)

Text: Privacy Act Exemption (d)(5) provides: 27 Nothing in this section shall allow an individual access to information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding. 28 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(d)(5) (1982). At the outset, we note that this language does not admit of any distinction between facts and deliberative processes. Unlike FOIA Exemption (b)(5), Exemption (d)(5) in no way incorporates civil discovery law, and therefore in no way incorporates the executive deliberative process privilege. Indeed, the exemption speaks of information, a term that embraces facts as easily as it does deliberative processes. The character of the attorney notes and witness statements as fact or deliberative process is irrelevant to proper analysis under this provision. To the extent that the district court held to the contrary, it was in error. 29 Ms. Martin's principal argument, however, rests on a different ground. She insists that Exemption (d)(5) does not properly cover documents compiled, as here, in anticipation of administrative, rather than judicial, proceedings. Extending the exemption to such hearings, she asserts, would eviscerate the Privacy Act by insulating a vast array of agency documentation from the Act's disclosure requirements. 30 This objection, although not without an element of truth, founders on the actual language of the exemption. The phrase civil action or proceeding plainly encompasses nonjudicial hearings of some kind; to argue otherwise is to make the words or proceeding meaningless. Ms. Martin gives us no other reasonable explanation of Congress' intent in enacting this phrase. The core issue, then, is not whether documents prepared for administrative hearings can ever come within Exemption (d)(5), but rather, what sort of administrative proceedings Congress had in mind for such protection. 31 Ms. Martin justifiably raises the alarm against exempting documents reasonably prepared in anticipation of any type of administrative proceeding. If Exemption (d)(5) shielded documents prepared for administrative hearings of any sort, the Privacy Act might indeed become a dead letter. Hearings are the bread and butter of many executive agencies, and documents prepared for those hearings comprise an enormous portion of the information Congress intended to make available to concerned individuals under the Privacy Act. See R. BOUCHARD & J. FRANKLIN, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS 39-43 (1980). 32 But OSC does not argue, and this case does not require, that we interpret Exemption (d)(5) so expansively. We merely must decide whether Congress intended the exemption to shelter documents prepared in anticipation of quasi-judicial hearings of the sort conducted by MSPB. For several reasons, we find that Congress did so intend. 33 First, the language of the exemption is strong evidence of that intent. By using the phrase civil action or proceeding, Congress unquestionably intended to protect documents prepared for actions in the district courts. Documents prepared for some types of administrative proceedings also come within this language, although the phrase does not make clear just which. Of all types of administrative hearings, quasi-judicial hearings are most like the formal civil actions Congress clearly and specifically intended to protect. MSPB's hearings are adversarial, include discovery proceedings, 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1201.72(b) (1986), and are subject to the rules of evidence. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1205(b)(1) (1982). The functions of this sort of quasi-judicial tribunal track those of the civil courts. See S.Rep. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 2723; 5 U.S.C. Secs. 1205(a)(1), 1205(b)(1) (1982). Moreover, courts of appeals review decisions of the MSPB directly, just as they review district court decisions. S.Rep. 969 at 52, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 2723; 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1207(c) (1982). It is difficult to see any functional reason to distinguish between documents prepared in anticipation of a district court action and those prepared in anticipation of proceedings before MSPB. Whatever Congress may have intended for other types of administrative proceedings, it must have intended quasi-judicial hearings to fall within the term civil proceedings. 34 Second, appellee's concern notwithstanding, exempting documents prepared in anticipation of quasi-judicial proceedings will not gut the Privacy Act. Quasi-judicial hearings are relatively rare, and the vast majority of agency records will not be associated with them. Moreover, quasi-judicial hearings--adversarial proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence and with opportunity for discovery--are an easily discernible breed. We need not fear overmuch an ever-widening set of hearings embraced by the term and protected by Exemption (d)(5). 35 Finally, the Office of Management and Budget has consistently interpreted Exemption (d)(5) to include documents prepared for quasi-judicial proceedings. See Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed.Reg. 28948, 28960 (July 9, 1975) (The term civil proceeding was intended to cover ... quasi-judicial and preliminary judicial steps....). Although the existence of this interpretation alone would not settle the issue before us, it is worthy of our attention and solicitude. In light of our overall reasoning on the scope of the exemption, OMB's interpretation makes our conclusion that much more certain. 36 For these reasons, we find that Privacy Act Exemption (d)(5) protects documents prepared in anticipation of quasi-judicial administrative hearings. The attorney notes and witness statements at issue here clearly came into being in anticipation of such a hearing, and are therefore shielded from disclosure by the exemption. Ms. Martin's demand for the documents under the Privacy Act fails.III. CONCLUSION 37 The attorney notes and witness statements disputed in this case are quintessential examples of attorney work product, and therefore fall within the protection of FOIA Exemption (b)(5) regardless of their factual or deliberative character. Moreover, because those documents were prepared in anticipation of a quasi-judicial hearing by MSPB, they come within the scope of Privacy Act Exemption (d)(5). As the documents are therefore properly exempt from disclosure under both acts, they need not be released to appellee. 38 Reversed.