Opinion ID: 2049680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: present case law

Text: There are four critical cases to consider in reviewing the position of this Court on the question whether felonious assault includes a specific intent as an element. They are chronologically: People v Doud, 223 Mich 120; 193 NW 884 (1923); People v Burk, 238 Mich 485; 213 NW 717 (1927); People v Counts, 318 Mich 45; 27 NW2d 338 (1947); People v Sanford, 402 Mich 460; 265 NW2d 1 (1978). Doud and the subsequent Burk both considered the giving or not giving of a specific intent charge. Doud required it, but the later Burk ruled it was neither required nor appropriate. Counts indirectly considered felonious assault a specific intent crime by holding evidence of intoxication was admissible to negate the required intent. Sanford, the most recent case, in considering the definition of criminal assault which is the basis of felonious assault ruled that `a simple criminal assault is made out from either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery', 402 Mich 460, 479. The significance of this holding, obviously, is that the second kind of criminal assault focuses on whether the assaultee was by defendant's acts put in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery, and, if he was, it would be immaterial whether or not the defendant intended to do bodily injury to the assaultee. Doud is a particularly interesting case in light of both Burk and Sanford as we shall develop. The critical facts in Doud were that Doud confronted men trying to put up a boundary fence, on what Doud claimed was his property, by ordering them off and showing his revolver. The case report continues: At the trial defendant was permitted to testify fully as to his intent and claimed he entertained no purpose to inflict injury. Even though such claim was refuted by his acts, demeanor and words, defendant had a right to go to the jury with what he claimed to have been his purpose. The trial judge gave the jury no instruction upon the issue of defendant's intent, although requested to do so, but charged: `The people say that he pointed the gun at Davenport; and the people say that he pointed the gun under such circumstances as imported an intent to fire his gun off. The people do not say that he did intend to (it is not necessary that they should say it or prove it), but if he pointed a gun under such circumstances that Davenport had reasonable grounds to believe that he intended to fire it off, and it was pointed at Davenport at the time, then he is guilty of the offense charged.' While the fear of one assaulted, arising from reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, threatened by another having means and ability to inflict the same, is mentioned in some of the books as proper evidence to go to the jury, we do not understand that such fear governs upon the question of the intent or purpose of an accused under this statute. We think defendant was entitled to have the following portion of his sixth request to charge given: `As to what his intention actually was you must determine that, if you are able to, from the evidence in the case, considering what he did, what he said, and what he testifies to as his intent.' 223 Mich 120, 124-125. This Court reversed and granted a new trial. In Burk, the defendant, as in Doud, was convicted of felonious assault and had requested a charge including [t]o convict the defendant, you must find that    [defendant] did intend to inflict bodily harm upon him. This Court replied, We think the instruction asked is objectionable in that it assumed that intent was a necessary element of the offense charged.    If defendant assaulted Foster with a dangerous weapon he would be guilty of the offense charged, regardless of his intent to injure him   , 238 Mich 485, 489. The conviction was affirmed. Burk did not specifically overrule Doud. In fact, it did not even refer to it. But the Burk rule is diametrically opposite the Doud rule on the necessity of charging specific intent, so Burk supersedes Doud on that point. But the trial court charge in Doud is interesting from another point of view. The charge states in part: if he pointed the gun under such circumstances that Davenport [the assaultee] had reasonable grounds to believe that he intended to fire it off, and it was pointed at Davenport at that time, then he is guilty of the offense charged. 223 Mich 120, 124-125. This charge anticipates the ruling in Sanford  `a simple criminal assault is made out from    an unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery', 402 Mich 460, 479. As quoted above, this Court in Doud said: While the fear of one assaulted, arising from reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, threatened by another having means and ability to inflict the same, is mentioned in some of the books as proper evidence to go to the jury, we do not understand that such fear governs upon the question of the intent or purpose of an accused under this statute. 223 Mich 120, 125. As a consequence, it must be recognized that the rule of law as stated by this Court in Doud as to an assault not existing if the victim is merely put in reasonable fear or apprehension of what the defendant is doing has changed, too, and Doud is overruled here also. This leaves only Counts out of line with the rule that specific intent is not an element of felonious assault. It is true that this Court in that case said: The offense charged in the information, as well as the lesser and included offense of which defendant was convicted [felonious assault], involved a specific intent as an essential element. Presumably the testimony indicating that defendant had been drinking was offered for such bearing as it might legitimately have on defendant's mental condition, and on the reason or reasons for his conduct as disclosed by the testimony of the various witnesses in the case. 318 Mich 45, 47-48. However, the opinion does not indicate that the issue whether specific intent is an element of felonious attempt was a direct issue in that case. Even if it were, at this point, we hold that the Burk-Sanford precedent supersedes. As supporting this conclusion, it is of interest that the Court of Appeals, beginning with People v Richard Johnson, 42 Mich App 544; 202 NW2d 340 (1972), has followed the rule of Burk. The Court of Appeals in Johnson said: By the clear language of the [felonious assault] statute the crime is merely a simple assault committed with a dangerous weapon. While the statute specifically excludes certain types of specific intent, the only intent that would appear to be required is the intent necessary to constitute a simple assault.