Opinion ID: 1158944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is the terry case applicable here?

Text: It is to be noted that the United States Supreme Court stated that Terry involved the issue of protective search for weapons and 392 U.S. at page 29, 88 S.Ct. at page 1884, said: Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. Thus, I believe Terry does not set up guidelines to determine the reasonableness of a temporary detention because as specifically stated the United States Supreme Court did not intend to cover that point and the decision was strictly on the issue of protective search as noted above. Therefore, in my opinion, this court errs in using the guidelines set up in Terry to justify protective search to justify temporary detention for investigatory purposes here. Also, may I ask, what is the guideline which states an intrusion upon personal liberty must be reasonable and based on something more substantial than inarticulate hunches, and that reasonableness is to be judged by an objective standard, namely, whether the facts known by the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate? Yes, it may sound good and legalistic but it sets up no definite standard. [2] To me, under such a guideline an officer may justify any action he takes if he is a good talker. Further, I do not believe Terry is applicable here. What was the criminal activity of a violent nature involved here? The tip to the police was that there might be illegal traffic in guns or jewelry. This information does not in any way denote a criminal activity of a violent nature. Of course, the guns may later be used in commission of a crime; however, from the information available to the officers, how can this court say that the State was able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts that a crime involving violence was being or to be committed? The crime suspected was the illegal possession of firearms. I do not believe that such offense involves a high degree of potential violence. In my opinion Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), decided on the same day as Terry, is closer to the facts of this case. There, the Brooklyn police observed Sibron conversing with six or eight known narcotics addicts. He observed Sibron enter a restaurant and talk to three more known addicts. At this point, the police approached Sibron, told him to come out of the restaurant and upon searching him on the sidewalk found narcotics. The United States Supreme Court held that the search was unlawful because the officer was seeking narcotics rather than acting from fear of his own safety. I believe Sibron v. New York, supra , provides a clear factual contrast to Terry v. Ohio. In both Terry and Sibron the court emphasizes the reasonableness of a police officer searching a suspect when he is justified in believing the person whom he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others. [3] While Terry did not address itself to the stop or seizure [4] Sibron did mention that If [the officer] lacked probable cause for an arrest, however, his seizure and search of Sibron might still have been justified at the outset if he had reasonable grounds to believe that Sibron was armed and dangerous. [5] Of course, Sibron, also focused on the search because no incriminating evidence arose to justify the stopping of the suspect. But assuming that for a stop to be reasonable [6] there must be the same grounds as for a protective pat down then in deciding this case a comparison of Sibron and Terry should be made. In Terry the Court felt that the reasonable suspicion that the suspects were about to commit a daylight robbery was enough to make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed. [7] However, in Sibron, the Court felt it abundantly clear that the officer was only searching for narcotics and those circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable fear of life or limb. [8] The Court also noted that the officer never even contended that he acted to protect himself. [9] Therefore, the court felt that there was not available particular facts from which [the officer] reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous. [10] The record in this case does not support the inference that Goudy was armed and dangerous within the meaning of Terry and Sibron. In the first place the investigation involved a transaction in contraband goods (Tr. p. 5). This brings it within the Sibron situation of possession of narcotics and not within the Terry situation where an imminent armed robbery was suspected. The police stated they saw the rifle. This is the only possible link with Terry but is very weak because unlike Terry there was no indication that the suspect was presently dangerous to the officer or others. There is no indication in the record the police stopped the car to prevent a violent crime from occurring. It should be also noted that Justice Harlan concurred in both Terry and Sibron on the grounds similar to those expounded by this court, i.e., that the short investigatory detentions without probable cause may be constitutionally permissible. But unlike in Terry, where he felt such a stop was justified, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868, in Sibron he felt the stop of Sibron was not permissible, 392 U.S. at 73, 74, 88 S.Ct. 1912, even though New York Code Criminal Procedure, § 180-a, authorized an officer to stop a person short of an arrest where the officer reasonably suspected that the person stopped is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony. Thus, under Sibron, the evidence should have been suppressed. I would reverse.