Opinion ID: 2967619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jurisdiction under the 1996 Act

Text: The Eleventh Amendment decisions thus reached preserve the sovereign immunity of the State of Maryland and its officials acting in their official capacity and bar Bell Atlantic's action against them in federal court. The private telecommunications carriers, however, do not enjoy sovereign immunity. But applicable to them, the State, as an alternative defense, challenged the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, an issue that must be decided as to the action against the private carriers even though they do not themselves challenge subject matter jurisdiction. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (appellate courts have a special obligation to evaluate subject matter jurisdiction); Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997) (subject matter jurisdiction must be considered whenever raised or even sua sponte). The State contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over enforcement decisions rendered by State commis27 sions and that therefore this action should have been dismissed. It argues that the plain language of 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) in the 1996 Act grants jurisdiction to federal district courts only to review determinations made under § 252 and that such review is for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether an interconnection agreement complies with 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252. It asserts that the language of § 252(e)(6) does not authorize federal review of State commission orders enforcing an approved interconnection agreement on the complaint of a party that the agreement has been breached. It maintains that the 1996 Act leaves jurisdiction for judicial review of such enforcement actions with State courts and that the Act did not intend to totally divest State courts of jurisdiction. Indeed, it notes that this allocation of authority is not cause for consternation because State courts have inherent authority to adjudicate claims even if they arise under the laws of the United States. Bell Atlantic argues that the enforcement of interconnection agreements that State commissions have approved as part of their responsibilities under § 252 falls within State commissions' plenary authority. It asserts that other circuits have adopted that position, as has the FCC. See, e.g., Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 804 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. At&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Worldcom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 570-71 (7th Cir. 1999); FCC Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd at 3703 (¶ 22) (1999) (agreements under §§ 251 and 252 are interpreted and enforced by the state commissions), vacated, Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 206 F.3d 1. Bell Atlantic reasons that because a State commission has implied authority under § 252 to interpret and enforce agreements it approves under § 252, any decision interpreting or enforcing the terms of an interconnection agreement is therefore a determination under § 252 that is reviewable in federal court under § 252(e)(6). See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (providing federal review of State commission determinations made under§ 252). MCI also contends that federal courts have jurisdiction over this dispute. It argues that § 252(e)(6) must be read in context and in light of the [1996] Act's structure and purpose, and that when so read, the federal jurisdiction provision does not limit review only to State commission decisions approving interconnection agreements. Rather, MCI asserts, it must be read more broadly to grant federal 28 courts responsibility for assuring that interconnection agreements are interpreted in compliance with federal law. In contrast to Bell Atlantic, however, MCI asserts that [t]he Act leaves resolution of state law claims to state courts, so § 252(e)(6) does not permit a federal court to review a State commission's enforcement action for compliance with State law. To determine the proper scope of 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), which confers jurisdiction on federal courts to review only some State commission determinations, it is necessary to understand the overall structure and purpose of the Act. This is because the 1996 Act creates a patchwork of federal and State responsibilities to manage the intended transition from the regulation of telecommunications monopolies to unregulated competition and because the establishment of such a patchwork regime appears to have been a deliberate decision on the part of Congress as a means of preserving State regulatory structures to assist in managing the transition.
Under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, telephone service was treated as a natural monopoly, and regulatory responsibility was divided between the FCC, which regulated interstate, long-distance service, and State public service commissions, which regulated intrastate service. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.§ 152(a),(b); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986). Indeed, 47 U.S.C. § 410 created a joint federal-state board to resolve regulatory jurisdictional disputes. Without reviewing here the involved history of telecommunications regulation since the enactment of the 1934 Act, it is sufficient to observe that the 1996 Act did not supplant the 1934 Act, and importantly, it did not repeal 47 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 410. Rather, the 1996 Act amended the 1934 Act, leaving much of the 1934 Act's structure in place. In amending the 1934 Act with the 1996 Act, however, Congress appears to have abandoned its hands-off approach to intrastate commerce and undertaken to impose competition in both the interstate and intrastate arenas. In addition, Congress sought to facilitate the convergence of technologies in telephone service, broadcast (radio and TV) service, cable service, satellite service, and other miscellaneous transmission services. But Congress left in place many of the traditional functions of State public utility commissions. At 29 bottom, by enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress intended to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996). By merely amending the 1934 Act and by continuing to employ the resources and expertise of State public service commissions, Congress manifested an intent not to raze the pre-1996 statutory landscape and build an entirely new statutory system. Rather, the 1996 Act partially flooded the existing statutory landscape with specific preempting federal requirements, deliberately leaving numerous islands of State responsibility. With respect to some of these State islands, the Act mandates that State commissions apply federal law within their existing State procedural structures. Thus, for example, State commissions are required to apply federal requirements in arbitrating and approving interconnection agreements. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(c), (e). With respect to other State islands, the Act actually conscripts State governmental agencies for federal purposes. See , e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(f) (mandating that State commissions conduct inquiries for the purpose of terminating rural telephone company exemptions); 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (requiring local zoning boards to apply federal procedural standards in approving the siting of telecommunications towers and facilities).5 5 Still other areas of pre-1996 State interests are completely inundated by federal preemption, such as in the area of satellite service. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303(v). In some instances, preemption in the Act is deferred and conditional, to be effected on a case-by-case approach. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (directing the FCC to issue order preempting the State commission's jurisdiction of a proceeding if the State commission fails to act to carry out its responsibility); 47 U.S.C. § 253(d) (directing the FCC to preempt _________________________________________________________________ 5 While the State of Maryland hinted in its brief that this aspect of the 1996 Act violates the Tenth Amendment and stated at oral argument that it regretted not having argued this point explicitly, whether these conscriptions of State agencies violate the Tenth Amendment is not before us. Cf. Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Nottaway County, 205 F.3d 688, 699-705 (4th Cir. 2000) (opinion of Niemeyer, J.). 30 the enforcement of any State statute or regulation that has the effect of denying a carrier the ability to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service). No generalization can therefore be made about where, as between federal and State agencies, responsibility lies for decisions. The areas of responsibility are a patchwork and the dividing lines are sometimes murky, prompting one authority to observe: In a mandatory if pro-forma gesture to the states, the Act declares that it does not implicitly preempt any state or local law. In 280 plus pages of text, however, implicit repeals are hardly needed. There is plenty of explicit language to construe, and abundant ambiguity about just who's in charge, on which issues. The new legislation's division of legal authority between federal and state regulators will likely be litigated for many years to come. Peter W. Huber, Michael K. Kellogg & John Thorne, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 1.2.12 (1996). What is certain is that Congress intended to divide responsibility, and unless it expressly provided for federal responsibility, it left pre-1996 Act assignments of responsibility in place, such as by retaining§§ 152 and 410. In § 601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act, Congress makes this point explicit: This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 143 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note) (emphasis added). For purposes of determining whether the Act assigns federal courts or State courts the task of reviewing State commission determinations, § 601(c) is consistent with well-established principles for defining federal jurisdiction and therefore is particularly apt. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, when their jurisdiction is created by statute, the statute is strictly construed. See Turner v. 31 Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) (observing that because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the fair presumption is . . . that a cause is without its jurisdiction till the contrary appears). Thus, determinations by State commissions that are not expressly designated for review in federal court are left for review by State courts, as provided by the existing law of the State that created the State commission. The structure in Maryland is typical. The Public Service Commission, consisting of five commissioners, see Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. Cos. § 2-102(a), is given broad and general powers to supervise and regulate all public service companies operating within the State, see id. § 2-113. This authority includes the power to adjudicate complaints seeking to enforce compliance with the requirements of law by public service companies. Id. § 2-113(a)(ii); see also id. § 3-102 (authorizing the filing of complaints before the commission). Any party or person who isdissatisfied with any final decision or order of the Public Service Commission may seek judicial review in the State circuit court for the county where the public service company operates or in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. See id. §§ 3-202(a), 3-204(a). Maryland law authorizes, but does not require, the Public Service Commission to be a party to any such appeal. See id. § 3-204(d). Of course, once in court, the parties are entitled to further review by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. They also may seek review from the Maryland Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Against this general background of the 1996 Act and its patchwork of federal and State responsibility, we now turn to 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252, which govern whether actions to review State commission determinations on the enforcement, as distinct from approval or rejection, of interconnection agreements for local service are to be routed to federal courts or left to State courts. Section 252(e)(6) of Title 47 provides in relevant part: In any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section [§ 252], any party aggrieved by such 32 determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the [interconnection] agreement . . . meets the requirements of section 251 and this section [§ 252]. Because it is clear that this section provides for direct federal court review of State commission determination[s] made under this section [§ 252], we need only identify what determinations a state commission is authorized to make under § 252 to ascertain the scope of federal jurisdiction. Determinations made pursuant to authority other than that conferred by § 252 are, by operation of § 601(c) of the 1996 Act, left for review by State courts. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 note. Section 251 of Title 47 lifts monopolistic barriers against insurgent or competing telecommunications carriers by mandating interconnection agreements among carriers and by imposing a duty on carriers to agree to terms that promote seamless service to consumers. Section 251 also directs the FCC to promulgate regulations to implement the section, at the same time commanding it to preserve State regulations that are consistent with § 251. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(3). Section 252, entitled Procedures for negotiation, arbitration, and approval of agreements, creates the procedural framework for implementing the commands of § 251. Section 252 defines two separate courses leading to the formation of interconnection agreements -- one by negotiation (including mediation) and the other by compulsory arbitration. Agreements arrived at through negotiation must be submitted to the appropriate State commission, whichshall approve or reject the agreement, with written findings as to any deficiencies. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(1); see 47 U.S.C.§ 252(a). But the State commission may only reject a negotiated agreement if it finds either that (1) the agreement discriminates against a nonparty telecommunications carrier or that (2) the agreement is not consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2)(A). Section 252(e) also permits State commissions to impose State-law requirements in its review of interconnection agreements. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(3). Any party aggrieved by the State commission's determination approving or rejecting a negotiated agreement may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to test the agreement against the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6). 33 And § 252(e)(4) makes this limited federal review exclusive, stating that [n]o State court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of a State commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under this section [§ 252]. If an agreement cannot be reached through negotiation or mediation under § 252(a), a party may petition the State commission for compulsory arbitration, setting forth the specific issues upon which agreement cannot be reached. The State commission is directed to arbitrate and resolve the disputed issues, including those raised in the response to the arbitration petition. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(4). In conducting the arbitration, the State commission is required (1) to ensure compliance with § 251, (2) to establish rates for interconnecting services, and (3) to provide a schedule for implementation of the interconnection agreement. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(c). Once the disputed issues are thus resolved through compulsory arbitration, the entire agreement is submitted to the State commission for approval or rejection. But unlike an agreement reached through negotiation, where the grounds for rejection by the State commission are limited to discrimination and inconsistency with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, an arbitrated agreement is reviewed by the State commission for compliance with the more comprehensive requirements of § 251 (establishing multiple interconnection requirements) and § 252(d) (establishing pricing standards). Finally, as with the State commission's determination approving or rejecting a negotiated agreement, any party aggrieved by the State commission's determination approving or rejecting an arbitrated agreement may bring an action in an appropriate federal district court, again to determine whether the agreement . . . meets the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6). In short, § 252(e)(6) confers jurisdiction on federal courts to review State commission determinations made under§ 252 to determine whether the agreement . . . meets the requirements of section 251 and this section [252]. While this federal jurisdictional provision authorizes review of § 252 arbitration determinations ultimately leading to the formation of interconnection agreements, in the final analysis, the State commission determinations under § 252 involve only approval or rejection of such agreements.6 6 With respect to negotiated agree_________________________________________________________________ 6 We note that the FCC recently ruled that the Virginia State Corporation Commission, by declining jurisdiction to interpret or enforce an 34 ments in particular, the federal review is narrower. The only determination that can be made by the State commission under § 252 on a negotiated agreement is a determination to approve or reject it, and when the agreement is approved by the State commission, then there is a question whether there can be any party aggrieved to seek review in federal court. With respect to any determination made by a State commission that is not a § 252 determination, judicial review is left for review as specified by State law for review of State commission actions. Again, this conclusion is confirmed by § 601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act, which states that the Act is not to be construed to modify, impair or supersede . . . state, or local law unless expressly so provided in [the 1996 Act], 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (emphasis added), and by the general principle that we should not infer a grant of federal jurisdiction unless Congress manifests its intent to confer jurisdiction. In this case, an interconnection agreement was voluntarily negotiated and reached between Bell Atlantic and MCI. The agreement was submitted to the Maryland Public Service Commission, which approved the agreement, and no party challenged that approval. It would appear therefore that there has been no § 252 determination left for review in the federal courts by virtue of§ 252(e)(6). The only _________________________________________________________________ existing interconnection agreement, had fail[ed] to carry out its responsibility under [§ 252], which, under§ 252(e)(5), directs the FCC to preempt the jurisdiction of the State commission to act in that proceeding. See In the Matter of Starpower Communications, LLC Petition for Preemption of Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corporation Commission Pursuant to Section 252(e)(5) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 00-216, CC Docket No. 00-52 (June 14, 2000) (Starpower Communications ). Because Starpower Communications interprets the meaning of State commission responsibilities under § 252 in the context of a State commission's failure to take action, rather than in the context of State commission determinations which are reviewable in federal court under § 252(e)(6), we find that this ruling does not bear on this case. Federal court jurisdiction to review State commissions could reasonably be interpreted to be more narrow in scope than the FCC's duty to act in place of a State commission that failed to act. 35 determination that the State commission made under § 252 was to approve the agreement and no party now seeks to review that determination; indeed, no party was thereby aggrieved. Only after the agreement was negotiated and approved did MCI file a complaint with the Maryland Public Service Commission, taking the position that telephone calls made to local exchanges for connection to the Internet were local calls subject to reciprocal compensation under the terms of MCI's interconnection agreement with Bell Atlantic. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (imposing duty of reciprocal compensation on telecommunications carriers); 47 C.F.R.§ 51.711 (elaborating on the duty of reciprocal compensation). That ISP-bound calls were subject to reciprocal compensation was also a position maintained by more than 30 State public service commissions across the country. Bell Atlantic, however, argued logically that a telephone call initiated to an ISP, even though through a local exchange, was nevertheless an interstate call because it did not terminate locally. Therefore, it argued, under its interconnection agreement with MCI, such calls were not subject to reciprocal compensation. The Maryland Public Service Commission, however, ruled against Bell Atlantic, and Bell Atlantic appealed the State commission's decision to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. The State court affirmed the commission's decision, and no further appeal was taken. In ruling against Bell Atlantic, the Maryland Public Service Commission noted that if the FCC were to issue a ruling that declared calls to Internet service providers to be interstate calls, it would revisit its decision. The FCC did thereafter declare that ISP-bound traffic was interstate, not local, traffic, and therefore that such calls were not subject to reciprocal compensation, as provided for in 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). See FCC Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd 3689, vacated, Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 206 F.3d 1. Within a week of the FCC's ruling, Bell Atlantic returned to the Maryland Public Service Commission, requesting that it review its earlier decision in light of the FCC's ruling. By a vote of three to two, the Maryland Public Service Commission again rejected Bell Atlantic's position, asserting State authority to decide whether the parties had agreed in their interconnection agreement to treat ISP-bound traffic as local and stating that in any event the commission had authority to require reciprocal compensation even if the parties did not so agree. It reasoned that because ISP-bound calls were 36 treated as local traffic when the parties reached agreement, it was their intent to continue to treat them that way in the agreement. Following this decision by the Public Service Commission, Bell Atlantic sought review in federal court, invoking as the basis for its jurisdiction § 251(e)(6), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (general federalquestion jurisdiction). Bell Atlantic argues vigorously that State commissions have authority to interpret and enforce interconnection agreements that they approve under § 252. It maintains that this authority falls within State commissions' plenary authority, citing Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d at 804, as well as the FCC Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd 3689. The Maryland Public Service Commission and MCI do not disagree. While Bell Atlantic suggests this authority is implicitly conferred by § 252, it would appear that explicit authority is provided by both the 1934 Act and Maryland law. See 47 U.S.C.§ 152(b); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. Cos. § 2-113. The critical question is not whether State commissions have authority to interpret and enforce interconnection agreements -- we believe they do -- but whether these decisions are to be reviewed by State courts or federal courts. As we have noted in our analysis of §§ 251 and 252, § 252(e)(6) does not expressly confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review State commission orders enforcing negotiated interconnection agreements. And federal jurisdiction is not to be presumed or implied. Rather, it must result from a specific congressional grant, and when a statute confers jurisdiction to federal courts, we read it strictly. See Turner, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 11. The statute conferring jurisdiction on federal courts in this case -- 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) -- authorizes federal review only of determinations made by State commissions under § 252. Moreover, the scope of federal court review under that authorization is only to determine whether an interconnection agreement complies with the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. In this case no question has been raised whether the interconnection agreement between Bell Atlantic and MCI meets the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. The parties voluntarily negotiated the agreement and the Maryland Public Service Commission approved it. 37 Moreover, even now, no party asserts that any term or provision of the agreement is illegal. Thus, no determination made by the Maryland Public Service Commission under § 252 is being reviewed. The only § 252 determination made by the Public Service Commission was its approval of the interconnection agreement, and that approval is not being reviewed. The dispute in this case arises from the ongoing administration of an approved agreement. While this dispute was properly brought before the Maryland commission and decided by it -- both because of the commission's supervisory and regulatory authority over public service companies operating in Maryland and because of the 1934 Act's general assignment of responsibility to State commissions -- the commission's decision was not a § 252 determination and therefore was not reviewable in federal court by virtue of § 252(e)(6). Thus, although the State commission may have had jurisdiction to administer and enforce interconnection agreements, review of such decisions by the commission is taken to the State courts as determined by the State review procedure preserved by the 1996 Act. See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. Cos. §§ 3-202(a), 3- 204(a). In resolving the jurisdictional question in this case by carefully respecting Congress' division of responsibilities between federal and State spheres, we do not, we believe, adversely impact the national policies promoted by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. On the contrary, with a view to thousands of approved interconnection agreements that are now in place, Congress appropriately recognized the benefit of employing the vast resources and expertise of State public service commissions to resolve ongoing disputes arising from the administration and interpretation of interconnection agreements. The disputes may amount to tens of thousands of cases. While the lack of uniformity on the question in this case-- whether ISPbound calls are local traffic subject to reciprocal compensation -- is generating substantial litigation nationally, the 1996 Act's deliberate choice to preserve pre-1996 procedural structures nevertheless provides a mechanism for working out that difficulty. Indeed, the FCC has already acted within its rulemaking authority to provide a uniform position that ISP-bound calls are not subject to reciprocal compensation. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d); FCC Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd 3689. And while that ruling is currently being revisited, see Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 206 F.3d 1, inevitably a uniform federal position will emerge, provid38 ing guidance to the various State commissions -- and the courts that review them -- for enforcing interconnection agreements and their provisions for reciprocal compensation. But any resolution of this dispute that would require us to ignore the language of § 252(e)(6) would modify the complex structure created by Congress and only exacerbate the frustration developing from a lack of uniformity. The statutory language provides unifying mileposts for the courts, and we must be guided by them. Because the Maryland Public Service Commission's determination in this case was not a § 252 determination, its review is expressly not covered by § 252(e)(6). Accordingly, review of the determination must be obtained from State courts, which, it need not be said, are under no lesser obligation than federal courts to apply governing federal law. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). Bell Atlantic and MCI argue that this understanding of the scope of jurisdiction conferred by § 252(e)(6) conflicts with rulings made by other circuits and, more importantly, with two statements made by the Supreme Court in a footnote to its opinion in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366. However, neither source of authority provides persuasive support for the position urged by Bell Atlantic and MCI. To date, four circuits have directly confronted the jurisdictional question presented here -- whether § 252(e)(6) authorizes federal court review of commission actions enforcing interconnection agreements -- the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.7 7 And only the Fifth and Tenth Circuits conducted any relevant analysis. The Seventh Circuit stated simply, Decisions of state agencies implementing the 1996 Act are reviewable in federal district courts, without providing analysis to support this broad statement in the context of a suit challenging a commission's interpretation or enforcement actions. Illinois Bell, 179 F.3d at 570 (quoting an earlier order in the same case that _________________________________________________________________ 7 The First Circuit acknowledged that it was not clear whether § 252(e)(6) permits federal judicial review of State commission actions that are not approvals or rejections, but did not decide the issue. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd., 189 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1999). 39 was similarly devoid of jurisdictional analysis, see Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Worldcom Techs., Inc., 157 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 1998)). And the Eighth Circuit, in dictum and without analysis, first stated its belie[f] that the enforcement decisions of state commissions would . . . be subject to federal district court review under subsection 252(e)(6). Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d at 804 n.24. This statement appeared in a footnote in a section of analysis that the Supreme Court held the Eighth Circuit should not have reached because the issue was not ripe for review. See Iowa Utils. , 525 U.S. at 386. Then later, it simply deferred to the FCC in finding jurisdiction. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Connect Communications Corp., 225 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit held that federal court jurisdiction extends to review of state commission rulings on complaints pertaining to interconnection agreements and that such jurisdiction is not restricted to mere approval or rejection of such agreements. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 208 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2000). In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that § 252(e)(6) could be read literally to limit federal review of State commissions to decisions approving or disapproving, or arbitrating, an interconnection agreement. Id. at 479. But the court rejected that reading because it concluded, We do not think so narrow a construction was intended. Id. The court then reasoned that assignment to State commissions of plenary authority to approve or disapprove these interconnection agreements necessarily carries with it the authority to interpret and enforce the provisions of [such] agreements. Id. Thus, it concluded, an enforcement action, as an implied State commission power under § 252, is a determination reviewable in federal court. See also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Brooks Fiber Communications of Okla., Inc., 235 F.3d 493, 497-98 (10th Cir. 2000). But finding such implied federal jurisdiction conflicts directly with§ 601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152 note, and with the well-established principle that federal jurisdiction must be found in an explicit grant from Congress. As the analysis above demonstrates, the State commission authority to enforce interconnection agreements derives not from the grant of authority in § 252(e)(1) to approve or reject interconnection agreements, but from the residual authority of State commissions and courts conferred by 47 U.S.C. § 152 and by State law, and preserved by the 1996 Act. 40 Bell Atlantic and MCI also place great stress on two statements made by the Supreme Court in footnote 6 of its opinion in Iowa Utilities. See Iowa Utils., 525 U.S. at 378-79 n.6. In the first, the Court stated that the question in this case is not whether the Federal Government has taken the regulation of local telecommunications competition away from the States. With regard to the matters addressed by the 1996 Act, it unquestionably has. Id. This remark, which was directed at the suggestion that the FCC lacks rulemaking authority with respect to the regulation of local competition, does not resolve the question before us. The statement surely cannot mean that the Act deprived the States of all regulatory authority in the field because this would be inconsistent with the statute itself. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.§§ 152 note, 251(d)(3), 252(e)(3), 253(b), (c); see also H. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 126, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 137 (Section 252(e) preserves State authority to enforce State law requirements). At most, this statement advances the unremarkable proposition that, where the 1996 Act speaks and conflicts with State law, the latter must yield. But the supremacy of federal law can be vindicated in State court as well as federal. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386. In the second footnote statement relied upon by Bell Atlantic and MCI, the Court observed that under the views expressed in both the majority and dissenting opinions, if the federal courts believe a state commission is not regulating in accordance with federal policy they may bring it to heel. Iowa Utils., 525 U.S. at 379 n.6. Again this must be true, as far as it goes. But it does not go so far as to constitute a jurisdictional ruling. The Court could not have meant to suggest that a federal court has jurisdiction under the Act to review any State commission action whenever the court feels the commission is not acting in accordance with federal policy. On the contrary, the statement presupposes the statutory scope of existing federal jurisdiction and describes its effect; it does not purport to define that scope or extend it. In context, the statement would be just as sensible if the modifier federal were removed. The Court was merely emphasizing that the invocation of what might loosely be called `States' rights,' id., was out of place because the issue before the Court was not whether fed41 eral law applied, but whether it should be applied with deference given to the FCC's interpretations. At bottom, 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) authorizes federal court review only of State commission determinations madeunder this Section [§ 252], leaving all other review to State courts in the manner that it existed before the 1996 Act. And State commission orders administering and enforcing interconnection agreements are not § 252 determinations. They are routine State commission determinations made by State commissions within their retained powers, and accordingly they are reviewable only by State courts in accordance with State law that the 1996 Act has preserved.