Opinion ID: 1516975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rehearing within one month of an earlier denial

Text: As indicated previously (footnote 2), the zoning ordinance of the City of Saco provides that an appeal for a variance, once heard by the Board and denied, shall not be heard again by the Appeals Board unless 2 years have passed since the last hearing on the matter. The Superior Court interpreted the ordinance literally on that score and held that the Gheewallas should not have been afforded a second hearing in the matter. In this, there was error. The construction of zoning ordinances is a question of law for the court. Singal v. City of Bangor and Nite Owl, Inc., Me., 440 A.2d 1048 at 1051 (1982). Even in the absence of an express prohibition in a zoning ordinance, the general rule is that a board of zoning appeals or board of adjustment may not entertain a second application for a variance concerning the same property after a previous application has been denied, unless a substantial change of conditions had occurred or other considerations materially affecting the merit of the subject matter had intervened between the time of the first adjudication and the subsequent application. See Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 275, 278-79, 129 A.2d 619, 621 (1957); Russell v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Tenafly, 31 N.J. 58, 155 A.2d 83, 88 (1959); Fisher v. City of Dover, 412 A.2d 1024, 1027 (N.H.1980). Thus, this principle applies only when the subsequent application for a variance seeks substantially the same relief as that sought in the previous one. And it is for the administrative agency, in the first instance, to decide whether the requested relief in both applications is substantially the same. Its determination will be disturbed only if its discretion was abused. Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 129 A.2d at 621. The reasons underlying the rule consist in providing finality to proceedings before the appellate zoning authority, giving protection to the integrity of the zoning plan, immunizing board decisions from change at the whim of agency personnel and shielding its members from possible improper influences, and, finally, stabilizing property interests and sparing property owners the harassment which repetitive variance requests would undoubtedly generate. See Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra ; Fisher v. City of Dover, supra ; In re Crescent Beach Association, 126 Vt. 140, 224 A.2d 915 (1966). Should the ordinance's prohibition against a rehearing or subsequent application for the period of two years from a previous denial of a request for a variance on the same property be interpreted to bar absolutely for that period of time any request for a variance notwithstanding the existence of substantial changes in the use to be made under the later proposal from that advanced in the previous hearing, then a serious question respecting the constitutionality of that part of the ordinance would arise because of substantial deprivation of property without compensation or abuse of the police power. While herein it is not necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of this zoning ordinance as interpreted by the Superior Court, yet in construing an ordinance, as in the case of the construction of statutes, if the ordinance is susceptible of either of two interpretations, we should adopt the interpretation which would tend to sustain its constitutionality. See Warren v. Municipal Officers of Town of Gorham, Me., 431 A.2d 624, 630 (1981); Inhabitants, Town of Boothbay v. National Advertising Company, Me., 347 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1975); In re Stubbs, 141 Me. 143, 39 A.2d 853, 156 A.L.R. 400 (1944); Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 15 A.2d 287 (1940); State v. Brown, 119 Me. 455, 111 A. 760 (1920). Therefore, we construe the ordinance to mean that a subsequent application for a variance will be barred within the two-year period from a previous denial if it seeks substantially the same relief as that sought in the previous one, but that, if the new proposal is materially different from that of the prior variance request, then the general rule will apply and the board of zoning appeals or adjustment has the power to entertain the request and adjudicate the matter under the changed circumstances, notwithstanding the seemingly absolute facial time-bar of the ordinance. In Peterson v. City Council for City of Lake Oswego, 32 Or.App. 181, 574 P.2d 326 (1978), the court held that an ordinance prohibiting the resubmission of an application for a zoning variance within six months from the date of a previous denial did not bar consideration of the new application, where the new plan contained significant changes in setbacks and in the dimensions of the proposed building. [4] In the instant case, the Zoning Board of Appeals implicitly found that the new proposal substantially differed from the previous planned construction in that the building would be set back from Surf Street twenty-two (22) feet instead of ten (10) feet as previously requested and from Spring Street fifteen (15) feet instead of ten (10) feet; also, the building itself was reduced to reasonable limits from what the Board had previously considered excessive use of space not contributing to living accommodation, in that the deck on the front had been eliminated, five (5) feet had been cut from the width of the house and the back porch had been shortened by two (2) feet. We cannot say that the Zoning Board of Appeals was clearly wrong and abused its discretion in finding that the new building proposal on this undersized lot was substantially different from the one previously submitted and turned down. The objectionable features of the old plan had been removed and the Board had full authority to entertain the new application, notwithstanding the two-year prohibition of the ordinance.