Opinion ID: 1170008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Error affecting the penalty determination

Text: [25] Defendant raises several contentions relating to the penalty phase. We conclude that the judgment as to penalty must be reversed because of errors of the type condemned in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510. We set forth in the footnote the relevant voir dire of Mrs. Dawson. [16] We are unable to find that she made it unmistakably clear (1) that [she] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial ... or (2) that [her] attitude toward the death penalty would prevent [her] from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. ( Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522-523, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784-785, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) Mrs. Dawson merely stated that she was opposed to the death penalty and that her opinions on the death penalty would prejudice her. [17] We cannot distinguish Mrs. Dawson's statements from those we held to be an erroneous basis for exclusion in In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613 [73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117]. .... [A]t Saterfield's trial one prospective juror stated, `I am opposed to the death penalty,' and was thereupon excused for cause; at Anderson's trial one prospective juror in response to the question `Do you know of any reason you couldn't be a fair and impartial juror in this case?' replied, `Yes, sir, I do. I don't believe in capital punishment' and was immediately excused for cause. In neither instance had the court made it clear to that particular prospective juror that opposition to the death penalty or conscientious scruples against that penalty would be insufficient by itself to disqualify such a juror from serving....  Witherspoon held `that a sentence of death can not be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.' ( In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 617-618.) The trial court therefore committed error in excusing Mrs. Dawson, and this error requires reversal. ( In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613, 619-620.) Accordingly we need not consider defendant's allegations of further errors of the type condemned by Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510. Defendant urges additional claims of error regarding the penalty phase. Some of his contentions a majority of this court has recently rejected in In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613; others may not arise at the penalty retrial. [26] For guidance of the court, however, we consider defendant's contention that evidence of his commission of nine other robberies, for which he was never tried, introduced at the penalty phase, was inherently unfair and prejudicial, in that the offenses were not described with sufficient particularity as to time and place, proof of all of their elements was incomplete, and the court failed properly to instruct the jury upon the standard of proof required for its consideration of the other robberies. The court instructed the jury as follows: You are instructed that you may not consider such evidence in respect to any alleged crime or offense in aggravation of the penalty, unless the commission of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is presumed innocent of those crimes. The effect of this presumption is to place upon the State the burden of proving him guilty thereof beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction was proper and would have protected defendant against any deficiency in the People's proof of the other offenses. ( People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 451 [47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641]; People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 149, fn. 8 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) [27] Defendant also contends that the evidence of six of the nine prior robberies should have been excluded because it was obtained as the fruit of an improper interrogation preceding defendant's 1957 robbery conviction. The record before us fails to support this contention, and since defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence at trial he may not now urge its inadmissibility. The judgment imposing the death penalty is reversed insofar as it relates to the penalty. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.