Opinion ID: 854149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims of Police Misconduct and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Text: In this appeal, Ajabu contends for the first time that the actions of the police and prosecutors were so offensive that they denied him due process of law as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this suggestion, Ajabu follows Burbine, which concluded that to the extent police deception can support a constitutional claim it is properly analyzed as a matter of due process. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 432-34, 106 S.Ct. at 1146-48. Ajabu explicitly declined to take this tack in his motion to suppress, where he asserted that his claim was more appropriately assessed under the Fifth Amendment and that Burbine in this respect was distinguishable. He contends in this appeal that he is entitled to relief on due process grounds. Assuming this argument is not waived for failure to present it below, we conclude that Ajabu was not denied his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Burbine, a public defender retained by a member of Burbine's family to represent him called the police station where Burbine was being held and asserted that she would act as Burbine's legal counsel if police wanted to question him. In response, the public defender was told that the police would not be questioning Burbine or putting him in a lineup and that they were through with him for the night. Id. at 417, 106 S.Ct. at 1139 (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, Burbine was questioned less than an hour after the lawyer's phone call and he confessed to murder. Under these facts, the Supreme Court declined to find a Fourteenth Amendment violation. However, the Court left open the possibility that a due process violation could be established under more egregious police misconduct. Id. at 432-34, 106 S.Ct. at 1146-48. Ajabu argues that the State officials' failure to inform him of Roberts's phone call prior to the interrogation in this case is more offensive than the circumstances in Burbine for two principal reasons: (1) the police and prosecutors conspired to withhold this information from Ajabu and to deny him meaningful legal advice; and (2) the prosecutors allegedly violated the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct under these facts. The evidence does show a group discussion and agreement not to tell Ajabu about Roberts's phone call. However, this was not a conspiracy with an unlawful objective. Rather, the prosecutors and police appear to have grounded their actions on their reading of Burbine. Intentional or knowing deception by an attorney might present grounds for professional discipline, but this appeal is not the proper forum for that determination. Nor does the involvement of an attorney among the State officials appear to play a role in the due process analysis. By referring to the degree of deception as the controlling factor in adjudicating a due process claim, Burbine implied that what the lawyer is told in response to the inquiry is more important than whether another lawyer assists in the deception, although that may also be relevant depending on the facts. In any event, the degree of deceit necessary to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment is simply not apparent in this case. The actions of the prosecutors and police are certainly more benign than what occurred in Burbine. A U.S. Supreme Court precedent appeared to support the decision not to halt the interrogation. And, unlike Burbine, Roberts was not told that Ajabu would not be questioned, only that the appropriate people would be informed of his inquiry. After Ajabu requested a lawyer later that day, he was not questioned further. Only then was Ajabu told that Roberts had called. We share the Supreme Court's concern for the appearance of what occurred, but Burbine itself found no due process violation on more offensive facts. U.S. Supreme Court authority is controlling on issues of federal constitutional law. Accordingly, Ajabu's claim on this point fails.