Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appropriateness

Text: Section 16-11-103(6)(a) requires us to determine the appropriateness of the defendant's death sentence, with regard to the nature of the offense, the character and record of the offender, the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was based. Taking into account each of these factors, we conclude that the death sentence in this case meets our propriety review under section 16-11-103(6)(a). Turning first to the nature of the offense, we stress that the crime underlying the death sentence was exceptionally brutal. Harlan repeatedly raped Maloney, a woman much smaller and weaker than he, over the course of approximately two hours. Once she escaped him, the defendant pursued her and Creazzo  whom the defendant permanently injured  until he was able to kidnap Maloney. Harlan then beat Maloney severely, causing several skull and facial fractures as well as other injuries. After rendering her wounded and helpless, the defendant killed his victim with a gunshot wound to the head. Moreover, our examination of the offense's nature shows that the prosecution proved at trial three statutory aggravating factors. As to the subsection (5)(g) aggravating factor regarding death caused during the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from a class 1, 2, or 3 felony, the evidence showed that Harlan attempted to murder Creazzo and kidnapped Maloney before killing her. This evidence also supports the subsection (5)(d) aggravating factor regarding the intentional killing of a person kidnapped by the defendant. Finally, in support of the subsection (5)(j) aggravating factor regarding the commission of the crime in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, the evidence showed that Harlan severely and repeatedly abused Maloney before killing her. His actions clearly were conscienceless and unnecessarily torturous. See Davis, 794 P.2d at 176-77. In light of the duration during which the defendant terrorized his victim and her would-be rescuer; the degree of violence he inflicted on Maloney before her death; and the extent to which she suffered, we conclude that the nature of the defendant's offense is comparable to cases in which we have upheld the propriety of a death sentence. See id. at 212-13; Rodriguez, 794 P.2d at 969-70. As to the defendant's character and record, several factors distinguish this case to some extent from those in which we have upheld the propriety of a death sentence. See, e.g., Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 764-65. On several occasions, including while exercising his right of allocution at trial, the defendant has expressed remorse and compassion for his victims and their families. The defendant did not have an extensive prior criminal record and sentencing phase evidence suggested he would not pose a significant threat of violence to others if sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite these positive features of the defendant's character and record, our independent consideration of the relevant features of the record establishes that, in light of the exceptionally brutal nature of the events leading to Maloney's murder, the death sentence is appropriate. Looking now to the public interest affected by the imposition of a death sentence in this case, it is not our role to concern ourselves with the morality of the death penalty or whether the execution of a human being contributes to the welfare of society. See id. at 765. Rather, we consider whether overwhelming evidence establishes that the person facing the death penalty [is] the perpetrator of the crime and that the trial and sentencing proceeding [was] fundamentally fair. See id. Moreover, we will not permit a death sentence in a case where there is a close issue concerning the identity of the murderer or in a case where new evidence someday could reveal that the wrong person has been convicted. Id. Here, the defendant admitted killing Maloney; there is, in addition, no reason to question his identity as her murderer. Moreover, overwhelming evidence was presented at trial to clearly establish Harlan's guilt for the first degree murder of Maloney. As for the fundamental fairness of the trial and sentencing proceeding, we have expressed reservations about the fairness of certain aspects of these proceedings. See supra Part II.A; see also infra Part V.B. Nevertheless, we determined that none of these concerns individually warrants reversal of the death sentence. Viewing the trial as a whole, under the separate and additional review mandated by section 16-11-103(6)(a), we find no further grounds upon which to conclude that the defendant suffered a fundamentally unfair trial. Therefore, our independent review, under section 16-11-103(6)(a), of the factual circumstances of this case, leads us to affirm the jury's finding that a death sentence is an appropriate punishment for Harlan's first degree murder of Maloney.