Opinion ID: 1762225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is application of the amended statute prohibited?

Text: Relator contends that applying the amended version of section 632.498 violates the prohibition against retrospective laws in article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution. [6] This Court reviews Relator's constitutional claims de novo. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. banc 2006). Statutes are presumed to be valid and will not be found unconstitutional unless they clearly contravene a constitutional provision. Id. Because retrospective laws are barred, the Court presumes that statutes operate prospectively unless legislative intent for retrospective application is clear from the statute's language or by necessary and unavoidable implication. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App.2002). The prohibition against retrospective laws prevents laws that impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, but no one has a vested right that the law will remain unchanged. Doe, 194 S.W.3d at 850, 851 (internal citations omitted). [A] vested right `must be something more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of existing law.' Id. at 852 (quoting Fisher v. Reorganized Sch. Dist., 567 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. banc 1978)). A law is not retrospective simply because it relates to prior facts or transactions but does not change their legal effect, or because some of the requisites for its action are drawn from a time antecedent to its passage, or because it fixes the status of an entity for the purpose of its operation. Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc. v. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Comm'n, 702 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo. banc 1985). A retrospective law is: [O]ne which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. It must give to something already done a different effect from that which it had when it transpired. Doe, 194 S.W.3d at 850 (quoting Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. v. Turney, 235 Mo. 80, 138 S.W. 12, 16 (1911)). In Doe , appellants argued that the affirmative obligation for them to register as sex offenders based solely on pleas and convictions preceding the effective date of Megan's Law [7] violated the prohibition against retrospective laws. Id. at 838. Doe found that application of the registration requirement operated retrospectively insofar as it looked solely at [appellant's] past conduct and used that past conduct not merely as a basis for future decision-making by the [S]tate, but to require appellants to fulfill a new obligation and duty based solely on pre-act offenses. Id. at 852. Doe is distinguishable from Relator's complaints about the amended version of section 632.498. Unlike the requirements at issue in Doe , section 632.498 does not look at past conduct. The retrial hearing to determine whether Relator can be released under section 632.498 will evaluate his current condition. The jury will be tasked with determining if, at the time of the retrial, Relator remains a SVP. Contrary to Relator's assertions, the amendments to section 632.498 are prospective in nature, not retrospective. Further, contrary to Relator's arguments, application of the amended version of section 632.498 to his retrial is not prohibited because it would impose conditions on his release if he prevails on retrial. Imposition of conditions on the terms of Relator's release would relate to future acts, not those in the past, and would limit his future conduct. Relator's contention that he had a vested right in the availability of unconditional release because he filed his petition under the former version of the statute is without merit. Relator had no vested right that the law would remain unchanged. At the time the law was amended, Relator had never obtained release or been assured any future release would be unconditional.