Opinion ID: 427723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Consent Search of Appellees' Second Residence.

Text: 18 When the IRS searched the Jones residence on May 1, it discovered that some of the documents named in the search warrant had been moved to a second house owned by the Joneses. The IRS agents sought and received permission from Gladys Jones to search the second residence for the items listed in the warrant. On the same day, after the search of the second residence had been completed, William Jones telephoned the IRS stating that he was withdrawing the consent to search the second residence and wanted the IRS to return all documents seized there. The IRS refused. 19 In their motion pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Joneses requested the district court to suppress all evidence seized by the IRS at their second residence on alternate grounds. First, they argued that the search of the second residence was tainted by its close connection to the allegedly illegal search of the first residence, and second, they argued that the seizure of evidence from the second residence was conducted in the absence of effective consent. The district court agreed with both contentions and ordered the suppression and return of any evidence discovered there. 20 Because the district court erred in its conclusion that the search of the first residence was illegal, suppression of evidence found at the second residence is not warranted on the ground that the search of the second residence was tainted by the search of the first. We must, therefore, determine whether the district court correctly concluded that the evidence seized at the second residence should be suppressed on the independent ground that the search of the second residence was conducted in the absence of effective consent. The district court relied on United States v. Ward, 576 F.2d 243 (9th Cir.1978). 21 Ward held that a person may revoke a consent to search at any time prior to the completion of the search. The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to segregate the evidence gathered before from that gathered after the revocation of consent and did not foreclose the government from securing the material as to which the search had not been completed by other lawful means. 22 In this case, Mrs. Jones consented to a search of her second residence for certain records named in a search warrant. This search was carried out and the items named were discovered and seized before William Jones revoked the consent granted by his wife. Had the revocation of consent occurred before the IRS agents completed their search of the second residence for the documents named in the warrant, Ward would compel the conclusion that any further search of the residence for the documents subsequent to the revocation of consent would be illegal, but that is not the situation with which we are faced. The house was searched and the documents seized before the consent was revoked. 9 Accordingly, the district court erred in ordering suppression of the evidence seized at the Joneses second residence on the basis of our decision in United States v. Ward. III