Opinion ID: 1652030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Defendant's Challenge to the Instructions.

Text: A. Standard of review. We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law. State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Iowa 1992). To the extent that error is based on constitutional grounds, our review is de novo. State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 558-59 (Iowa 2000). B. Preservation of error. On appeal Heemstra claims that, if the jury found he had committed willful injury, it would be permitted to find first-degree murder under the felony-murder instruction without finding the elements of deliberation, premeditation, and specific intent to kill. He further argues that, while forcible felonies may infer such elements under the felony-murder rule, that was not the case here because the act specified in the court's felony-murder instruction was not a forcible felony, as defined by section 702.11. The State counters that Heemstra failed to preserve error on his argument that pointing a gun at a person cannot be considered willful injury under the felony-murder instruction. Heemstra's trial counsel objected to the instruction by stating: By submitting willful injury as the predicate felony, it plainly permits the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree without proof of deliberation, premeditation and specific intent to kill, and additionally, by permitting the jury to infer malice from the commission of the offense of willful injury permits the jury to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder without proof of malice. We believe this objection was sufficient to alert the court to the problem inherent in the felony-murder instruction, i.e., if the jury found Heemstra pointed the gun at Lyon intending to cause serious injury and that serious injury resulted, it could find felony murder, despite the fact that the gun pointing was not a forcible felony for purposes of felony murder and without proof of willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation. The State argues that, even if the willful injury under Instruction No. 26 embrace[d] both misdemeanor and felonious assault, the error is harmless. Heemstra has always acknowledged he shot Lyon. We disagree with the conclusion that any confusion was harmless. While Heemstra admits he shot Lyon, he does not admit he shot him willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation as required to constitute first-degree murder under section 707.2(1). Further, Heemstra does not admit he shot Lyon while participating in a forcible felony under section 707.2(2) for felony-murder purposes. C. Comparison of murder alternatives. First-degree murder under Iowa Code section 707.2(1) requires proof that the murder was committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. In contrast, first-degree murder based on the felony-murder rule under section 707.2(2) does not require proof of any of these elements; they are presumed to exist if the State proves participation in the underlying forcible felony. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 270 (Iowa 1979) ([A] showing that the murder occurred in the perpetration of a felony is merely a particular statutorily prescribed method for showing the mental elements of deliberation and premeditation.). The rationale of the felony-murder rule is that certain crimes are so inherently dangerous that proof of participating in these crimes may obviate the need for showing all of the elements normally required for first-degree murder. This reduced quantum of proof in establishing first-degree murder has caused the felony-murder doctrine to be called [o]ne of the most controversial doctrines in the field of criminal law . . . . Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Felonies Are Inherently or Foreseeably Dangerous to Human Life for Purposes of Felony-Murder Doctrine, 50 A.L.R.3d 397, 399 (1973). The California Supreme Court has observed that: The felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. Although it is the law in this state, it should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve. People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (1965) (citations omitted). Because violence is the sine qua non of felony murder under Iowa's statute, as well as at common law, the felony-murder statute limits itself to felonies involving violence. Even if the acts of the defendant were considered to be willful injury, as the State argues, the question remains whether willful injury may be considered a predicate for felony murder under the facts of this case. A long line of Iowa cases have answered that question in the affirmative, but we believe we must revisit the issue and reach a contrary conclusion. Beginning with State v. Beeman, 315 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 1982), we have held that willful injury could serve as the predicate felony for felony murder because willful injury is, by statute, a forcible felony. Id. at 776-77. We discussed that theory further in State v. Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 1988): Murder is committed when a person kills another person with malice aforethought. Iowa Code § 707.1. A murder becomes first-degree murder when it is committed under any of four sets of circumstances. Id. § 707.2. Pertinent to this case, a murder is in the first degree when committed while participating in a forcible felony. Id. § 707.2(2). There is no suggestion in our statutes that forcible felony was not intended to include the crime of willful injury. One writer, critical of the Beeman line of cases, has observed: The result of [Beeman] continued since the court's decision in 1982 with mixed reviews. The use of willful injury as a basis for a felony murder charge relieves the State of its obligation to prove the murder was premeditated, deliberated, and specific intent was formed to kill. However, the other felonies must be committed independently. A murder in the first degree under the theory of premeditation, deliberation, and specific intent to kill cannot be committed without also committing the offense of willful injury. Because malice may be permissibly inferred from the underlying felony . . . conviction of murder in the first degree becomes a virtual certainty. Other jurisdictions have not followed the approach adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in Beeman. . . . . The legislature can, unintentionally, expand the felony murder doctrine by creating new criminal statutes that are felonious assaults. An example is a recent amendment to the assault chapter of the Iowa Code [(Iowa Code section 702.11(2), which provided that less serious, class D, versions of willful injury would not be considered as forcible felonies)]. Had the legislature not classified the amendment as a non-forcible felony and the courts applied the Beeman analysis, an assault resulting in a death would be classified murder in the first degree. Death is obviously a bodily injury. Premeditation, deliberation and specific intent to kill are not elements. Since assault is a general intent crime, no specific intent demonstrating an evil purpose is required. Coupled with an instruction that malice may be inferred from the commission of an assault, the application of Beeman creates an ever expanding felony murder rule. It is doubtful the legislature ever intended such a result, and one must question the court's reasoning in Beeman. 4 Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice Criminal Law (I) § 3:16, at ___ (2006) (footnotes omitted). A law review note poses several scenarios that, in the absence of sound prosecutorial discretion, could test the outer constitutional parameters of our felony-murder law under the Beeman line of cases: A woman strikes her friend intending to cause serious injury, but death results instead. A father leaves his young child alone at home knowing that the child may be at risk, and the child accidentally dies. Can the criminal justice system treat these crimes the same as willful, deliberate, and premeditated murders? In Iowa, the answer may be yes. These individuals could be guilty of first degree felony murder and face life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Kristy L. Albrecht, Iowa's Felony-Murder Statute: Eroding Malice and Rejecting the Merger Doctrine, 79 Iowa L.Rev. 941, 941 (1994) (footnotes omitted). [1] Ordinarily in felony murder based on assault, the assault causing death is considered to be merged into the murder and cannot be used as an independent felony for felony-murder purposes. As stated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, [I]n felony-murder the conduct which constitutes the felony must be separate from the acts of personal violence which constitute a necessary part of the homicide itself. Thus, although rape, arson, robbery and burglary are sufficiently independent of the homicide, . . . aggravated battery toward the deceased will not do for felony murder . . . . Commw. v. Quigley, 391 Mass. 461, 462 N.E.2d 92, 95 (1984) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 71, at 559 (1972)). This principle is illustrated by an interesting Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 438 Mass. 356, 780 N.E.2d 1237 (2003). In that case, the defendant committed two assaults with a weapon: the first was committed by brandishing the gun in the face of the victim and, at a later time, by actually shooting and killing the victim. The court held the second assault, the one that caused the victim's death, could not be considered a predicate felony because it was merged into the murder itself. The first assault did constitute a basis for felony murder. The rationale was that, [a]bsent this requirement, the assault that precedes every killing would serve as the predicate for felony-murder in the first degree, and the distinction between degrees of murder would be lost. Kilburn, 780 N.E.2d at 1240. The court in Kilburn said: While the act of shooting [the victim] clearly caused the homicide in this case, the gunman's brandishing of a pistol with the intention of arousing fear in [the victim] did not. [The victim] died of a gunshot wound; he did not die of fright. Applying the causation test for merger . . ., we conclude that, while the second of the two assaults on [the victim] merged with the murder, the first did not. Id. at 1241. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 692 N.E.2d 515 (1998), assaults by the defendant against other occupants of an apartment were independent felonies that could support felony murder, but the assault against the occupant who was killed could not because it was not an independent felony. Gunter, 692 N.E.2d at 526. The California Supreme Court reversed a felony-murder conviction under facts similar to the present case in People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580 (1969). In that case, the State attempted to use the act causing the death to establish the predicate felony. The court stated: We have concluded that the utilization of the felony-murder rule in circumstances such as those before us extends the operation of that rule beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve. To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assaulta category which includes the great majority of all homicides. This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law. Ireland, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d at 590 (quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (1965)). According to the Oregon court, [i]n order to preserve the distinctions between the degrees of murder and manslaughter, courts in other states have held that where the only felony committed (apart from the murder itself) was the assault upon the victim which resulted in the death of the victim, the assault merged with the killing and could not be relied upon by the state as an ingredient of a felony murder. State v. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 415 P.2d 766, 767 (1966).