Opinion ID: 522863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to instruct on difference between payor and payee

Text: 70 Felci complains that in several respects the court failed to distinguish between payors and payees in its charge by not adding certain requirements in order to find a payee, such as Felci, guilty. Felci failed, however, to properly object to these instructions. Felci's failure to object in a timely fashion means we examine the instructions for plain error only. The reason for giving post-instruction objections was illustrated in this case. The district judge did in fact correct one instruction after an error in it was pointed out. 71 We note first that the two subsections criminalizing receipt of payments and the payment of them are in all substantive respects identical. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395nn states (emphasis added): 72 (b) Illegal remunerations 73 (1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives ... 74 (2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration.... 75 This is strong evidence that Congress meant the crimes to have the same elements for payor and payee. See, e.g., Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 229, 98 L.Ed.2d 188 (1987). 76 There are two basic contentions raised by Felci. The first is that the government must prove that the payee actually performed the improper acts for which he was paid. We disagree. The government need not show that one accepting a payment for an illegal purpose actually carried through on his promise. See e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2544, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972) (under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201, acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the statute, not performance of the illegal promise); see also United States v. Gjieli, 717 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir.1983) (under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201, there is no need to show that the person accepting the bribe could actually effect the object of the bribe), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 601 (3d Cir.) (under Hobbs Act, a bribe is still illegal even if the bribee might have, without the bribe, made legally and properly the same recommendation on the basis of available information), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982). 77 Second, Felci contests the district court's use of the word recommending rather than the full statutory language of purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing or ordering. 23 The court repeatedly used phrases such as: arranging for or recommending; to recommend; to arrange for or recommend. The evidence was that Mundy, the hospital CEO, had final authority to award the contract; the bid committee was only to recommend a choice. Because of this, the government tried the case on a recommendation theory and that was how the judge instructed the jury. 24 There was no plain error in the judge's instruction.