Opinion ID: 1161575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ferebee And Subdivision (a) of Section 136v

Text: As previously mentioned, the one case that got it right, in the view of the Court of Appeal, was a pre-Cipollone case Ferebee, supra, 736 F.2d 1529. The gist of the argument made in Ferebee was that a state's freedom under section 136v(a) to ban a pesticide outright presupposes the freedom to control the use of that pesticide by imposing tort liability on the manufacturer for injuries that could have been prevented by a more adequate label. (736 F.2d at p. 1541.) While FIFRA does not allow states directly to impose additional labelling requirements, the Act clearly allows states to impose more stringent constraints on the use of EPA-approved pesticides than those imposed by the EPA: `A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.' 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). See also Sen.Rep. No. 838 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982) [sic: 1972] reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 4021 (`Generally, the intent of the provision is to leave to the States the authority to impose stricter regulation on pesticides uses than that required under the Act.') [citations]. Given this provision, Maryland might well have the power to ban paraquat entirely. We need not decide that issue, however, to hold that, if a state chooses to restrict pesticide use by requiring that the manufacturer compensate for all injuries or for some of these injuries resulting from use of a pesticide, federal law stands as no barrier. ( Ferebee, supra, 736 F.2d at p. 1541.) Reliance upon Ferebee is misplaced because it is no longer good law. (See, e.g., Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Koppers Co., supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 608, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 257 [explaining that Ferebee predates Cipollone and ... is no longer good law]; Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., supra, 994 F.2d at p. 370 [concluding that Ferebee 's theory that damages do not impose requirements within the meaning of section 136v(b) evaporated when the Supreme Court decided Cipollone ].) Although the District of Columbia Circuit has not expressly overruled Ferebee, it has expressly acknowledged that Cipollone repudiated its central premise by explaining that damage actions can be used to enforce state regulations as effectively as other forms of preventive relief and thus damage actions must be preempted where positive enactments are preempted.... ( Waterview Management Co. v. F.D.I.C. (D.C.Cir. 1997) 105 F.3d 696, 699 [summarizing Cipollone 's holding].) Ferebee 's fundamental thesisthat liability under state law for failure to warn is not a requirement for labeling or packaging different from that required under FIFRA has been rejected by the federal courts since Cipollone as sophistry and silly, and the attempted distinction has been characterized as illusory. The MacDonalds argue ... that state common law tort judgments are not `requirements': the liable party is not `required' to change his label by a damage award, the argument goes, but may simply pay the judgment and leave the label as it is. We think this argument is sophistry. If plaintiffs could recover large damage awards because the herbicide was improperly labeled under state law, the undeniable practical effect would be that state law requires additional labeling standards not mandated by FIFRA. ( MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., supra, 27 F.3d at p. 1025.) Shaw's argument is appealing because, unlike federal regulations which firms are required to follow, common law duties may be simply ignored by defendants.... On the other hand, damages actions, just like regulatory mandates, cause companies to modify their economic decisions. It would be silly to pretend that federal lawmakers, seeking to occupy a whole field of regulation, wouldn't also be concerned about the distorting effects of tort actions. ( Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., supra, 994 F.2d at p. 370.) The Worms' argument that their state law claims are based on duties not inconsistent with those imposed by FIFRA has no merit. Because the language on the label was determined by the EPA to comply with the federal standards, to argue that the warnings on the label are inadequate is to seek to hold the label to a standard different from the federal one. Nor does it make any difference that the standard the Worms seek to apply is one imposed by the common law rather than by positive legislative or executive enactment. Any distinction between the two is `illusory.' ( Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., supra, 5 F.3d at p. 748.) When Congress intends to preempt state regulatory authority but to leave common law actions intact, it knows how to accomplish that. An example is found in the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 United States Code section 4401 et seq. Section 4406(b) of title 15 of the United States Code preempts any State or local statute or regulation regarding labeling or advertising, except billboards, while section 4406(c) provides that [n]othing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the fundamental principle that savings clauses generally should not be interpreted in such a way as to undercut or dilute an express preemption clause. `Th[e savings] clause ... cannot in reason be construed as continuing in [customers] a common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.' ( AT. & T. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. (1998) 524 U.S. 214, 227-228, 118 S.Ct. 1956, 1965, 141 L.Ed.2d 222, quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907) 204 U.S. 426, 446, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553, italics added.)