Opinion ID: 2689828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Sentencing Opinion

Text: In his nineteenth proposition, Campbell contends that his death sentence should be reversed because of flaws in the trial court’s sentencing opinion. The trial court noted that Campbell’s siblings, who survived the same abusive environment he did, grew up to be law-abiding citizens. Also, the court noted that many people who, like Campbell, have an antisocial personality disorder do not become criminals and can function in society. Campbell argues that such comparisons are improper. We disagree. See State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 46 433, 450, 709 N.E.2d 140, 157; State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 452, 588 N.E.2d 819, 839. The trial court stated that Campbell “has now taken the life of a second individual in cold blood, and this Court shall not give the Defendant the opportunity to take a third.” Campbell claims that this improperly gave aggravating weight to future dangerousness, which is not a statutory aggravating circumstance and therefore cannot be weighed against a defendant. We think he misreads the sentencing opinion. The trial court’s statement referred to Campbell’s prior murder conviction. That conviction is a statutory aggravating circumstance, and one that the state pleaded and proved in this case. Moreover, Campbell’s mitigation case rested largely on the likelihood of his making a good adjustment to prison life, and the court’s statement was also relevant as the negation of that mitigating factor. The trial court noted that Campbell “could offer no justification for shooting Charles Dials.” Campbell points out that mitigating circumstances do not concern culpability or legal justification; indeed, an act committed with legal justification is not a crime. However, the sentencing opinion as a whole does not give the impression that the court believed Campbell’s proffered mitigation deserved weight only if it constituted a legal justification for killing Dials. Cf. Eddings v. 47 Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 112-113, 102 S.Ct. 869, 876, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 9-10. To the contrary, the opinion carefully considered Campbell’s proffered mitigation. The trial court did err in using the word “justification.” For clarity’s sake, trial courts should avoid the word “justify” and its derivatives when discussing mitigating evidence in capital sentencing opinions. However, our independent reweighing of aggravation and mitigation can cure this verbal error. In considering Campbell’s claim that alcohol was a factor in the murder, the trial court stated that Campbell “only consumed one forty-ounce (40 oz.) bottle of beer over several hours.” Campbell interprets this as a finding that he “slowly sipped a single beer over a matter of hours” and contends that there is no evidence to this effect. However, the trial court did not say Campbell “slowly sipped” the beer. Moreover, what the court did say has support in the record. Campbell said that, after buying the beer, he sat in the K-Mart parking lot “a good 2 hours” before killing Dials. Campbell contends that the trial court considered nonstatutory aggravating circumstances: the assault on Deputy Harrison, the deliberate faking of paralysis, and the “cold-blooded, senseless” nature of Dials’s murder. The assault on Harrison was part of Campbell’s escape, which was charged as an aggravating circumstance. R.C. 2929.04(A)(3). However, the trial court 48 chose to merge the (A)(3) specification into the two felony-murder specifications. Campbell contends that the assault on Harrison and faking of paralysis thus became irrelevant. However, both facts remained relevant, because they tended to refute the defense contention that Campbell was capable of making a good adjustment to prison. As for the “cold-blooded, senseless” nature of the murder, the murder is part of the felony-murder aggravating circumstance. Hence, the nature of the murder goes to the nature and circumstances of the (A)(7) aggravating circumstance. Campbell contends that the trial court “improperly converted evidence of Campbell’s good prison behavior against him.” We disagree. The judge was explaining why he did not find that behavior impressive as a mitigating factor. Campbell’s nineteenth proposition is overruled.