Opinion ID: 1057579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: the alleged cumulative effect of multiple errors

Text: In the event that we do not find that any of the errors he has raised are alone sufficient to warrant a reversal of his convictions and sentences, Mr. Hester insists that the cumulative effect of the many errors that were committed during the trial requires a reversal of both his capital conviction and sentence. While the concept of cumulative error is not unknown in Tennessee jurisprudence, [83] it has not received the attention here that it has received in other states. The United States Constitution protects a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial; it does not guarantee him or her a perfect trial. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). We have reached the same conclusion with regard to the Constitution of Tennessee. State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tenn.2000). It is the protection of the right to a fair trial that drives the existence of and application of the cumulative error doctrine in the context of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1258 (11th Cir.2009); United States v. Castaldi, 547 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir.2008); State v. Perry, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Idaho 2010); State v. Lively, 697 S.E.2d 117, 136 (W.Va.2010). However, circumstances warranting the application of the cumulative error doctrine to reverse a conviction or sentence remain rare. Vick v. State, 314 Ark. 618, 863 S.W.2d 820, 825 (1993); State v. Magallanez, 235 P.3d 460, 475 (Kan.2010). The cumulative error doctrine is a judicial recognition that there may be multiple errors committed in trial proceedings, each of which in isolation constitutes mere harmless error, but which when aggregated, have a cumulative effect on the proceedings so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a defendant's right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th Cir.1988); State v. Perry, ___ P.3d at ___; State v. Duffy, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807, 816 (1998). To warrant assessment under the cumulative error doctrine, there must have been more than one actual error committed in the trial proceedings. State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d at 605 (appendix); see State v. Guy, 165 S.W.3d 651, 667 (Tenn.Crim.App.2004); State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 397 (Tenn.Crim.App.2003); see also United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir.2002). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit provided the following useful general insight into the nature of the considerations regarding the aggregation of errors that deprive a defendant of a fair trial: Of necessity, claims under the cumulative error doctrine are sui generis. A reviewing tribunal must consider each such claim against the background of the case as a whole, paying particular weight to factors such as the nature and number of the errors committed; their interrelationship, if any, and combined effect; how the [trial] court dealt with the errors as they arose (including the efficacy  or lack of efficacy  of any remedial efforts); and the strength of the [State's] case. The run of the trial may also be important; a handful of miscues, in combination, may often pack a greater punch in a short trial than in a much longer trial. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir.1993) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir.2005); Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d at 825. The errors committed in Mr. Hester's trial do not lend themselves to being aggregated to show that he failed to receive a fair trial in either the guilt or capital sentencing phase. [84] Accordingly, we find no basis on this record to conclude that cumulative error prevented Mr. Hester from having a fair trial.