Opinion ID: 1154947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: conduct versus speech regulation

Text: Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., ___ U.S. ___, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992), respondents argue that Washington's malicious harassment statute is a content-based speech regulation and, thus, an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights. We do not agree that R.A.V. is controlling on the issue presented by RCW 9A.36.080(1) which we conclude regulates conduct, not speech. [2] Unlike RCW 9A.36.080(1), the statute considered in R.A.V. was, on its face, a content-based speech regulation. Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990); R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2541. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the statute by construing it to apply only to unprotected fighting words which it held were beyond the realm of constitutional scrutiny. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769 (1942)). While accepting the Minnesota court's construction, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the notion that fighting words are exempt from constitutional scrutiny. The majority opinion held that, even in the area of proscribable speech with low First Amendment value, First Amendment doctrine prohibits speech regulation on the basis of its content. Scalia called this the `content discrimination' limitation. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2545. This holding is a logical extension of the rationale in flag burning cases. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989). Under this rationale, a statute prohibiting speech based on offensive content cannot survive First Amendment challenge. The St. Paul ordinance was aimed at doing precisely this. St. Paul admittedly enacted its ordinance to inhibit certain types of symbolic hate speech. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2549. [1] [3] Unlike the St. Paul ordinance considered in R.A.V., RCW 9A.36.080(1) does not, on its face, regulate speech. Rather, the statute is aimed at criminal conduct and enhances punishment for that conduct where the defendant chooses his or her victim because of their perceived membership in a protected category. The statute punishes the selection of the victim, not the reason for the selection. It increases punishment where the perpetrator acts on particularly offensive beliefs, not the beliefs themselves. The statute is triggered by victim selection regardless of the actor's motives or beliefs. Absent prohibited victim selection, the conduct described in subsections (1)(a), (b), and (c) is punishable elsewhere in state law and in some municipal criminal codes as misdemeanor violations. However, when the victim is targeted because of perceived membership in one of the enumerated categories, then the criminal conduct is punishable as a felony. RCW 9A.36.080(3). Under subsection (1)(a), simple assault is punished as a felony when the State proves the additional element of unlawful victim selection. See RCW 9A.36.041 (assault in the fourth degree). In subsection (1)(b), proof of harassment or assault, with victim selection, constitutes malicious harassment. Guffey v. State, 103 Wn.2d 144, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984) (assault is committed by putting another in apprehension of harm); Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d 923, 925, 767 P.2d 572 (1989) (crime of telephone harassment is defined as threatening physical injury or property damage); Seattle v. Camby, 104 Wn.2d 49, 701 P.2d 499 (1985) (City must prove substantial risk of assault as an element of the crime of harassment); State v. Smith, 48 Wn. App. 33, 737 P.2d 723 (1987) (harassment proscribes only threats of bodily injury and physical confinement or restraint), rev'd on other grounds, 111 Wn.2d 1, 759 P.2d 372 (1988); see RCW 9A.46.020 (harassment). Conviction under subsection (1)(c) requires proof of victim selection along with malicious mischief. See RCW 9A.48.090 (malicious mischief in the third degree). In subsection (1)(b), the Legislature provided examples of words or conduct which may constitute malicious harassment. These examples, which include (i) cross burning, (ii) hate symbols, and (iii) oral or written communication designed to harass or intimidate, do not themselves constitute the crime unless they place another in reasonable fear of harm to his/her person or property or the person or property of a third person. Section (1) of the statute is not violated absent conduct amounting to a crime of assault, harassment, or malicious mischief coupled with prohibited victim selection. To ensure that RCW 9A.36.080(1) only applies to conduct, the Legislature specified the following exclusion: However, it does not constitute malicious harassment for a person to speak or act in a critical, insulting, or deprecatory way unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words or conduct places another person in reasonable fear of harm to his or her person or property or harm to the person or property of a third person ...[.] RCW 9A.36.080(1)(b). When the Legislature amended the statute in 1984 to add this language, it did so to clarify that words or acts must convey a threat of harm to the body or property of another person to constitute malicious harassment. Final Legislative Report 163 (1984). Thus, from both the language of the statute and the legislative history, we conclude that RCW 9A.36.080(1)(a), (b), and (c) are intended to regulate only harmful conduct. This court has upheld the constitutionality of other harassment laws where those statutes sought to regulate harmful conduct rather than the content of speech. Huff; Camby; Smith. Like the statutes under review in those cases, RCW 9A.36.080(1) specifically regulates conduct and only incidentally touches speech. Several other state courts, since R.A.V., have upheld enhancement statutes against First Amendment challenge as conduct regulations rather than speech or thought regulations. In re Joshua H., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1734, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 291 (1993); State v. Plowman, 314 Or. 157, 838 P.2d 558 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 L.Ed.2d 666, 113 S.Ct. 2967 (1993); Dobbins v. State, 605 So.2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), jurisdiction accepted, 613 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1992); People v. Mulqueen, 155 Misc.2d 632, 589 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Dist. Ct. 1992); People v. Miccio, 155 Misc.2d 697, 589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Crim. Ct. 1992). In Plowman, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a statute similar to RCW 9A.36.080. The court read R.A.V. to distinguish laws directed against the substance of speech from laws that are directed against conduct. Plowman, at 168. The court determined that the Oregon statute was directed against conduct because it was not directed against the substance of any speech. Plowman, at 168. The court noted that in R.A.V., the Court expressly did not rule on the constitutionality ... of a statute like the one that we consider here. Plowman, at 168. The Florida District Court of Appeals in Dobbins held that its enhancement statute did not run contrary to R.A.V. because [i]t is only when one acts on such [hate-based] opinion to the injury of another that the statute permits enhancement. Dobbins, at 924. Thus, any speech implicated by the statute was sufficiently tied to criminal conduct to prevent the erosion of free speech. Dobbins, at 924. Similarly, in Mulqueen, the New York District Court distinguished between statutes regulating criminal conduct and those regulating speech. Again, in Miccio, the New York Criminal Court held that its statute did not run contrary to R.A.V. because of a criminal conduct requirement. In R.A.V., [conversely,] the activity of the defendant became criminal only when his actions amounted to the specifically proscribed fighting words. Miccio, 155 Misc.2d at 701. In Joshua H., the California Court of Appeal reviewed a juvenile court finding that a youth had assaulted an individual because of his sexual orientation thereby violating the California equivalent of RCW 9A.36.080(1). Like the defendant in this case, the defendant in Joshua H. argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it punished racist beliefs protected by the First Amendment. The court reasoned: While we agree that bigotry is a protected class of expression, we disagree that the hate crime statutes punish bigotry. Rather, they punish the discriminatory act of selecting a crime victim based on his or her race or other status. Joshua H., 13 Cal. App. 4th at 1743. The California Court of Appeal held that the statute was directed at conduct, not speech, and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. These courts all agreed that the enhancement statutes in question were directed not at speech, but at conduct, and that they punished not thought or belief, but rather victim selection. This tight nexus between criminal conduct and the statutes sufficiently protected free speech guaranties. Only two states have overturned enhancement statutes under R.A.V. State v. Wyant, 64 Ohio St.3d 566, 597 N.E.2d 450 (1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S.Ct. 2954 (1993); State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis.2d 153, 485 N.W.2d 807, rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993). [2] In both Wyant and Mitchell, the courts reviewed statutes similar to RCW 9A.36.080(1). Those courts reasoned that even though the statutes punished selection of victims, the real intent of the Legislature was to punish bigotry. This, the courts said, could not be done without offending the First Amendment. Wyant, at 576 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35, 52 L.Ed.2d 261, 284, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1799 (1977)); Mitchell, 169 Wis.2d at 166-67. Both the Wyant and the Mitchell courts distinguished enhancement statutes from Title VII provisions. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII). They reasoned that enhancement statutes constituted the outright criminalization of subjective bigoted thought. Mitchell, 169 Wis.2d at 177. Title VII, conversely, did not punish the defendant's actual motive per se, but rather, punished only the objective act of discriminatory treatment. We are not persuaded by this distinction of Title VII from victim selection statutes. As Justice Bablitch stated in his dissent in Mitchell, it is pure sophistry to distinguish Title VII from such statutes. Mitchell, 169 Wis.2d at 184 (Bablitch, J., dissenting). One cannot make a sound argument that the government can make discrimination in the hiring process illegal, but it cannot criminalize discrimination in selecting a victim for a crime. [4] We find that the malicious harassment statute is similar to the various antidiscrimination laws governing employment practices, public accommodation, and housing. Such laws punish discriminatory acts committed because of the victims' protected status and are directed at discriminatory conduct rather than discriminatory thought or speech. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 2000a, 2000e-2, 3601 et seq. Title VII is not concerned with discriminatory thought. It operates whether the employment action is based on xenophobia, intolerance, or fear of losing other bigoted customers. While the employment decision may reflect some bias, Title VII is only concerned with the act of discriminating in employment practices against a person because of his or her minority status. The Supreme Court has held that the object of antidiscrimination laws is not to punish employers' motives or speech, but to guard against employment practices that operate as `built-in headwinds' for minority groups. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432, 28 L.Ed.2d 158, 91 S.Ct. 849 (1971) (good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem discriminatory employment practices). Congress directed the thrust of the Act [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. Griggs, at 432; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36, 52 L.Ed.2d 396, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (1977). Likewise, RCW 9A.36.080(1) concerns not bigoted speech or thought, but rather the act of victim selection. As Justice Stevens stated in his concurrence in R.A.V., [c]onduct that creates special risks or causes special harms may be prohibited by special rules. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring). RCW 9A.36.080(1), like Title VII, punishes discriminatory conduct, not the reason for the discrimination. Thus, penalty enhancement statutes, like antidiscrimination laws, regulate conduct rather than speech.