Opinion ID: 2677209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Similarity and Wrongful Copying

Text: To determine whether two works are substantially similar – and thus whether any copying was wrongful – we usually apply the “ordinary observer” test and ask whether “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.” Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted). Often, however, a work’s aesthetic appeal will be due largely to unprotected elements. In these cases, we “must be more discerning, [and] ignor[e] those aspects of a work that are unprotectable” as we apply the test, lest we conflate mere copying with wrongful copying. Id. (internal quotation marks 12 As always, we review dismissals for failure to state a claim and grants of summary judgment de novo. See Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine & Trading Inc., 697 F.3d 59, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2012). We have frequently said that because substantial similarity is a fact‐intensive question, it is generally an issue reserved for a jury. Nonetheless, “we have recognized that a court may determine non‐infringement as a matter of law[,] . . . either because the similarity between two works concerns only non‐copyrightable elements of the plaintiffʹs work, or because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are substantially similar.” Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 12 omitted). Here, there is no doubt that Plaintiff’s designs, although copyrightable, are replete with uncopyrightable elements. What aspects of Zalewski’s designs are protectable? A fundamental rule of copyright law is that it protects only “original works of authorship,” those aspects of the work that originate with the author himself. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Everything else in the work, the history it describes, the facts it mentions, and the ideas it embraces, are in the public domain free for others to draw upon. It is the peculiar expressions of that history, those facts, and those ideas that belong exclusively to their author. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, any author may draw from the history of English‐speaking peoples, but no one may copy from A History of the English‐Speaking Peoples.13 Any artist may portray the Spanish Civil War, but no one may paint another Guernica.14 And anyone may draw a cartoon mouse, but there can be only one Mickey.15 13 A History of the English‐Speaking Peoples is a four‐volume history written by Sir Winston S. Churchill. 14 Guernica is a painting by Pablo Picasso depicting the bombing of the Basque village Guernica during the Spanish Civil War. 15 Of course, copyright protection for works by Churchill, Picasso, Disney, and every other artist last only as long as the limited term Congress grants. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (permitting congress to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”) (emphasis added); 7 U.S.C. §§ 301– 305 (setting the terms for copyrights). 13 Numerous doctrines separate protectable expression from elements of the public domain. For example, the doctrine of “scènes‐à‐faire” teaches that elements of a work that are “indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic” – like cowboys, bank robbers, and shootouts in stories of the American West – get no protection. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980). Similarly, the “merger doctrine” instructs that some ideas can only be expressed in a limited number of ways – single words or colors for example. When expression is so limited, idea and expression “merge.” Expressions merged with ideas cannot be protected, lest one author own the idea itself. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967). The central question of this case is how to apply these and related doctrines to separate the protectable from the unprotectable in architectural works. Defendants urge us to chart a different course. They view Plaintiff’s designs as a compilation of various architectural features that individually and collectively do not merit copyright protection. They rely on the Eleventh Circuit case of Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 2008), and the Supreme Court’s doctrine governing “compilations” set out in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). 14 In Feist, plaintiff asserted a copyright in its telephone book. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344. Although the book was comprised of individually un‐copyrightable facts – people’s phone numbers – plaintiff argued that the compilation and arrangement of those facts should nonetheless be copyrightable to protect its investment in creating the phonebook. Id. If its work could be freely appropriated, plaintiff argued, there would be no incentive to create similar works in the future. Id. at 353. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that a copyright could subsist in an arrangement of individually un‐ copyrightable elements, but emphasized that the Copyright Act requires works to be “original.” Id. at 358; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Thus, in order for a compilation or arrangement to be worthy of copyright protection, the arrangement itself must be original. The Supreme Court held that standard compilations, like the Feist plaintiff’s alphabetical listing, get no protection. In Intervest, the Eleventh Circuit applied this doctrine to architecture. It held that all copyrighted works are either “creative, derivative, [or] compiled,” that is original, variations on an original, or compilations of unoriginal material. Intervest, 554 F.3d at 919 n.3. According to Intervest, each kind of work gets varying levels of protection. Id. The court then relied on the similarity between the statutory definitions of “compilation” and “architectural work” to conclude 15 that architectural works fall into the “compiled” category, and are thus entitled to only a “thin” copyright based solely on their “arrangement and coordination” of unoriginal and uncopyrightable elements. 554 F.3d at 919. On facts similar to those here, the Intervest court held that any copying of the plaintiff’s house designs went only to standard architectural features arranged in standard ways. In other words, any copying was not wrongful. Id. While we agree with the outcome in Intervest, we disagree with its reasoning. “Creative,” “derivative,” and “compiled” may be useful concepts in some cases, but we reject the idea that works always fall neatly into one of these categories. Every kind of work at some level is a compilation, an arrangement of uncopyrightable “common elements.” Id. No individual word is copyrightable, but the arrangement of words into a book is. No color is copyrightable, but the arrangement of colors on canvas is. Likewise, doors and walls are not copyrightable, but their arrangement in a building is. Some architectural designs, like that of a single‐room log cabin, will consist solely of standard features arranged in standard ways; others, like the Guggenheim, will include standard features, but also present something entirely new. Architecture, in this regard, is like every art form. 16 Moreover, we see little support in the statute for Intervest’s use of categories. Although the statutory definitions of “compilations” and “architectural works” both speak of an “arrangement” or “to arrange” and refer to “standard features” or “preexisting material,” architectural works and compilations are not the only works that are defined with reference to their discrete – and perhaps uncopyrightable – elements. 17 U.S.C. § 101.16 For example, the statute defines “Literary works” as “words, numbers, or other . . . symbols” arranged in “books, periodicals” or other media; “Sound Recordings” as “a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds”; a “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions”; and “Motion Pictures” and “Audio Visual works” as “series of related images.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. As we have explained, the merger doctrine will often render these discrete elements un‐copyrightable. Softel v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Commc’ns, 118 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining 16 Additionally, the definitions of “architectural work” and “compilation” have little else in common. The statute defines an “architectural work” as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. A “compilation” is a “work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id. 17 that “the words that constitute a literary work are not copyrightable, yet . . . a collection of words” may be).17 Labeling architecture a compilation obscures the real issue. Every work of art will have some standard elements, which taken in isolation are un‐ copyrightable, but many works will have original elements – or original arrangements of elements. The challenge in adjudicating copyright cases is not to determine whether a work is a creative work, a derivative work, or a compilation, but to determine what in it originated with the author and what did not. Intervest fails to do this. It compares the floor plans of the two houses, “focusing only on the narrow arrangement and coordination” of what it deems “standard . . . features” and intuits that there was no copying of the arrangement. 554 F.3d at 921. But it fails to provide any analysis of what made a feature “standard” and unprotectable. Hence, we find it of little assistance here. 17 The legislative history also supports this view. When Congress added architectural works to the list of copyrightable subject matter, it made clear that it wanted architectural works analyzed no differently than other works and differentiated between architectural works that present “original design elements” and those that do not. H.R. Rep. No. 101–735 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6952. Intervest contravenes Congress’ intent by treating architectural works differently than other works and failing to determine what in architecture – beyond mere arrangement – is copyrightable. 18 Courts should treat architectural copyrights no differently than other copyrights. This is what Congress envisioned, and it is an approach we have employed before. H.R Rep. No. 101–735 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951. In Attia v. Society of the New York Hospital, 201 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1999), for example, the plaintiff had been retained by New York Hospital to design an expansion of its facility over FDR Drive. The hospital rejected his preliminary sketches, but ultimately went with a similar design by another firm. The plaintiff admitted that his drawings were “preliminary and generalized” “outline[s]” of “concepts.” Id. at 55–56. Although there were some similarities between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s designs, there were also significant differences. Thus, we held that any copying went to unprotected ideas, “concepts,” rather than concrete expression. Id. In Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Development Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 2010), on a similar set of facts, we held that copying of “architecture that was light, airy, [and] transparent,” as well as design parameters and “generalized notions of where to place functional elements,” went only to ideas and not protected expression. Finally, in Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Engineers LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 468–69 (2d Cir. 2002), we held that although a construction site preparation plan was preliminary in the sense that it pertained 19 to the early phases of construction, it was extremely detailed and thus more than a mere idea. Determining the boundaries of copyright protection in non‐traditional areas of creative expression, like architecture, is not something new. A number of our cases have applied copyright doctrines in other unusual contexts. In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), for example, we had to determine for the first time what elements of a computer program are protectable. To do so, we simply applied the usual copyright doctrines of merger, public domain, and scènes‐à‐faire to these new circumstances. Id. at 707. For example, we held that the merger doctrine would apply when “efficiency concerns . . . so narrow the practical range of [coding options] as to make only one or two forms of expression workable . . . .” Id. at 708. Similarly, we applied the doctrine of scènes‐à‐faire because “in many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program . . . without employing standard techniques.” Id. at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, we held that coding dictated by mechanical specifications, industry design standards, market demands, and usual programing practices also did not get copyright protection. Id. at 710. 20 All of these principles apply equally well to architecture. Efficiency is an important architectural concern. Any design elements attributable to building codes, topography, structures that already exist on the construction site, or engineering necessity should therefore get no protection. There are scènes‐à‐faire in architecture. Neoclassical government buildings, colonial houses, and modern high‐rise office buildings are all recognized styles from which architects draw. Elements taken from these styles should get no protection. Likewise, there are certain market expectations for homes or commercial buildings. Design features used by all architects, because of consumer demand, also get no protection. Our prior architecture cases support this approach. In Sparaco, we held that there can be no copyright in a plan insofar as it merely represents the topography of a building site. 303 F.3d at 467. Topography is an un‐ copyrightable “fact.”18 In Attia we recognized that “generalized notions of where 18 We do not doubt that topography will often inspire, or indeed require, original architectural solutions that will be worthy of copyright. Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater is a prominent example. There may also be original ways of representing existing topography. The topography itself, however, is uncopyrightable. If two architects submit competing bids for the same project, one cannot assert that the other’s design infringed his copyright because their designs include reference to the same topography or share similarities dictated by that topography. One expects competent 21 to place functional elements, how to route the flow of traffic, and . . . methods of construction” are un‐protectable. 201 F.3d at 55. Architects cannot claim that good engineering is original to them – or at least can get no copyright protection for it.19 Finally, in Gaito Architecture, we held that there is no copyright in a building plan’s design parameters. 602 F.3d at 68. Constraints placed on an architect by the way her client plans to use the building do not originate with the architect.