Opinion ID: 21517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comparison with Other State Systems

Text: 28 In other state systems, it appears that an EEOC right to sue letter does not trigger the state filing periods either. See, e.g., Kelly v. Allied Healthcare Prods., Inc., 1996 WL 787420, at  n.1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 5, 1996) (observing that even though a plaintiff had received a federal right to sue letter, he had not met the prerequisite for maintaining a civil action under Missouri state law by obtaining a state letter); Oliver v. New York Tel. Co., 1993 WL 1713471, at  (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1993) (finding an EEOC letter unnecessary and irrelevant to the filing of a [New York] state law action); Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 980 P.2d 65, 69-70 (N.M. 1999) (holding that worksharing agreement between EEOC and New Mexico anti-discrimination agency was limited to initial processing of claims and that the receipt of an EEOC right to sue letter did not trigger the thirty-day state filing period). Eureka attempts to distinguish these cases by arguing that the various state agencies all have broader powers than the TCHR. While there might well be some merit to this distinction regarding the Mitchell-Carr opinion, which in reaching its holding specifically relies on the fact that the New Mexico agency has broader powers than the EEOC, Eureka's arguments about the other cases rest on distinctions without significance. Indeed, the court in Oliver based its decision on the language of the federal, not the state, statute; it reasoned that the right to sue letter contemplated in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) had nothing to do with triggering state law claims. See Oliver, 1993 WL 173471 at . And Kelly relies only on the language of the state statute, and not the breadth of the state agency's authority, tofind that the state right to sue letter is a prerequisite to a state employment discrimination claim. See Kelly, 1996 WL 787420, at  n.1. Eureka also attempts to distinguish these cases by arguing that the applicable state statutes are more explicit than the TCHRA in their identification of the state right to sue letter as the sole trigger for beginning the state filing period. But as noted in section II.B., supra, that distinction is meaningless because despite the ambiguity of the TCHRA, we conclude that the only mechanism contemplated by the statute for commencing the sixty-day filing period is the right to file a civil action letter issued by the TCHR. These cases are consistent with our conclusion that the Texas and federal letters are no more interchangeable than state and federal right to sue letters are interchangeable anywhere else. Eureka cites no cases, other than Dean and Battee, which we reject, to suggest otherwise. 29 In sum, we find no reason-statutory or otherwise-to extend the scope of the EEOC's agency relationship with the TCHR beyond the receipt and processing of initial complaints to include the commencement of the sixty-day filing period for TCHRA claims by receipt of an EEOC right to sue letter.