Opinion ID: 382337
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Municipal Regulation of Sound Amplification

Text: 5 The power of municipal governments to regulate the use of sound amplification equipment first came before the Supreme Court in Saia v. People of State of New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948). Saia recognized that the use of sound amplification equipment within reasonable limits is an aspect of free speech protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 561-62, 68 S.Ct. at 1150. The right to communicate inherently comprehends the right to communicate effectively. The mere existence of an alternative means of expression-in this case, unamplified speech-cannot by itself justify a restraint on some particular means that the speaker finds more effective. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758 n.15, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 n.15, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1971). 6 At the same time, the Court recognized in Saia that when the exercise of First Amendment rights infringes on legitimate state interests, a city may enact narrowly drawn statutes regulating the time, place, and manner of such activities. 334 U.S. at 562, 68 S.Ct. at 1150. Courts then have the task of balancing the legitimate community interests protected by such statutes against the infringement of First Amendment rights, (b)ut in that process they should be mindful to keep the freedoms of the First Amendment in a preferred position. Id. Thus the Supreme Court in Saia invalidated a city ordinance which vested in the chief of police uncontrolled discretion to grant or withhold permits for the use of sound amplifying equipment, because such an ordinance could be used to suppress First Amendment rights far more severely than could be justified by the city's narrow interest in preserving the tranquility of the community against excessive noise. 7 Less than one year later the Court upheld a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance which prohibited the operation on city streets of any sound amplification equipment making loud and raucous noises. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). The plurality opinion again emphasized the preferred position of freedom of speech, but found that the need for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles equipped with (loud and raucous) sound amplifying devices justifies the ordinance. Id. at 89, 69 S.Ct. at 454. Although the exact nature of the original holding in Kovacs is obscured by several conflicting opinions, 5 it has been cited by the Court on numerous occasions for the principle announced in the plurality opinion: that the Trenton ordinance was a reasonable regulation of the manner in which First Amendment rights are exercised. See, e. g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2449 n.18, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771, 96 S.Ct. at 1830. 8 The judicial task in balancing such regulations against the exercise of First Amendment rights was more fully discussed in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), which involved a statute prohibiting picketing that disturbs or tends to disturb schools. The analytical starting point is that government has no power to restrict free speech because of its content, but reasonable 'time, place and manner' regulations may be necessary to further significant government interests, and are permitted. Id. at 115, 92 S.Ct. at 2302. The court must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved and require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest. Id. at 115-17, 92 S.Ct. at 2303-04. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338 (1963). The statute must represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).