Opinion ID: 4556656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As explained above, the “district court is authorized to modify a defendant’s sentence only in specified instances where Congress has expressly granted the court jurisdiction to do so.” United States v. Baker, 769 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110, 1124 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[Section] 3582(c) acts as a jurisdictional limitation on the ability of district courts to alter previously imposed sentences of imprisonment.”). Here, both defendants rely on the second of these exceptions, § 3582(c)(1)(B), where a reduction is “expressly permitted by statute.”6 Jurisdiction under § 3582(c)(1)(B) is limited by the express 6 Although there was some dispute below as to which exception applied to 2018 FSA motions, all parties now agree that the proper exception is that found in § 3582(c)(1)(B). 10 terms of the statute permitting modification—here, that of the 2018 FSA. The 2018 FSA limits both the court’s actions and the movant’s eligibility for relief.7 As to an offender’s eligibility to move for relief, the 2018 FSA has minimal requirements. The 2018 FSA allows a court to reduce a sentence imposed for a “covered offense,” defined as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the [2010 FSA], that was committed before August 3, 2010.” § 404(a). Thus, to be initially eligible for relief, an offender must have been convicted of and sentenced for (1) a violation of a federal criminal statute, (2) the penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the 2010 FSA, and (3) that was committed prior to August 3, 2010. Although the bar for eligibility is low, the 2018 FSA places two limitations on the court’s ability to entertain a 2018 FSA motion. “No court shall entertain” a 2018 FSA motion if (1) an offender’s sentence for the covered offense was previously imposed or reduced in accordance with section 2 or 3 of the 2010 FSA, or (2) the court has already denied a previous 2018 FSA motion “after a complete review of the motion on the merits,” § 404(c). These limitations essentially ensure that offenders 7 Neither an offender’s eligibility to move for relief nor the court’s discretion to grant it is restrained by the U.S.S.G.’s advisory guideline range, in contrast to a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See § 3582(c)(2) (permitting reduction only “if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (Sentencing Commission policy statement prohibiting a court from reducing a sentencing below the new guideline range unless the original sentence was also below the guideline range). 11 only get one bite of the apple. An otherwise eligible offender who meets either of these limitations is rendered ineligible for relief under the 2018 FSA. Mannie and Maytubby were convicted of violating federal criminal statutes, for which they were sentenced according to the statutory penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (for Mannie) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (for Maytubby). The penalties in both subsections were modified by section 2 of the 2010 FSA. 2010 FSA § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372. Both Mannie and Maytubby committed these crimes prior to August 3, 2010, the effective date of the 2010 FSA. Neither Mannie nor Maytubby has previously brought a 2018 FSA motion, and neither sentence was imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the 2010 FSA. Therefore, both Mannie and Maytubby are eligible for relief under the 2018 FSA, and § 3582(c)(1)(B) gives the court statutory jurisdiction to entertain their motions.