Opinion ID: 796977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffectiveness of Counsel for Failure to Advise

Text: 34 Shedrick first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his plea process as a result of counsel's failure to advise him about, inter alia, a potential upward departure at sentencing. According to Shedrick, a fundamental consideration for [him] in determining whether ... to accept the guilty plea was the length of sentence he could expect to receive. 35 Under the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Shedrick must demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. That is, he must prove that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 Shedrick cannot satisfy these requirements. Indeed, we have long held that an erroneous sentencing prediction by counsel is not ineffective assistance of counsel where, as here, an adequate plea hearing was conducted. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir.2003) (counsel not ineffective for allegedly promising defendant a sentence of no more than 71 months where defendant was advised in open-court colloquy of potential maximum sentence and there were no other promises regarding sentence); United States v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 492 (3d Cir.2001) ([A]ny alleged misrepresentations that [defendant's] former counsel may have made regarding sentencing calculations were dispelled when [defendant] was informed in open court that there was no guarantee as to sentence, and that the court could sentence him to the maximum.); Masciola v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir.1972) (per curiam) (holding that [a]n erroneous prediction of a sentence by defendant's counsel does not render a guilty plea involuntary where record demonstrates that a proper plea colloquy took place during which defendant acknowledged that he was aware of his maximum potential sentence). As stated in Mustafa, 37 [w]e recognize that the maximum sentence authorized by law is often so extraordinarily long that few defendants other than career criminals plead guilty with the expectation that the maximum sentence applies to them. However, all that the law requires is that the defendant be informed of his/her exposure in pleading guilty. The law does not require that a defendant be given a reasonably accurate best guess as to what his/her actual sentence will be; nor could it, given the vagaries and variables of each defendant's circumstances and offending behavior. 38 238 F.3d at 492 n. 5. 39 This case falls squarely within well-established precedent: defense counsel's conjectures to his client about sentencing are irrelevant where the written plea agreement and in-court guilty plea colloquy clearly establish the defendant's maximum potential exposure and the sentencing court's discretion. Shedrick's written, signed agreement stated that (1) he faced a maximum potential sentence of ten years' incarceration; (2) the parties were free to argue any other sentencing issues (explicitly including departures); (3) the District Court retained ultimate discretion over the sentence; and (4) there were no other agreements or promises regarding Shedrick's potential sentence. 40 The District Court repeated these facts in open court, starting the guilty plea colloquy by confirming with Shedrick that 41 most importantly, although the plea agreement states all of the agreements and understandings that exist [among] the defendant, defense counsel, and the Government, it does not recommend a set term of incarceration as binding upon this Court. Ultimately, the appropriate sentence would be left to the exercise of the Court's discretion based upon information presented by both sides and based upon a review of the Sentencing Guidelines. 42 It then confirmed that Shedrick (1) had read, signed and fully understood the plea agreement, (2) understood that there were no other promises regarding his potential sentence, and (3) had admitted the facts of the crime. The Court further advised Shedrick that the maximum potential sentence was ten years' incarceration and that it retained full discretion over the ultimate sentence. 43 Here, any erroneous sentencing information provided by defense counsel was corrected by the written plea agreement and the detailed in-court plea colloquy, both of which accurately stated Shedrick's potential sentence. Given this record, it is inconceivable that Shedrick did not know he potentially faced a maximum ten-year prison term. In fact, his allegations before our panel are flatly inconsistent with his written, signed plea agreement as well as his sworn, in-court answers during his plea colloquy. Accordingly, the District Court correctly denied Shedrick's § 2255 motion as to his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the potential for an enhancement or upward departure. 7 44