Opinion ID: 549752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The EHA Claim

Text: 7 Congress enacted the EHA in response to the wholesale exclusion of handicapped children--particularly those who were emotionally disturbed--from education programs. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309, 108 S.Ct. 592, 596, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). The EHA provides federal funds to states that promise to provide at minimum a free appropriate public education for all handicapped children within the state. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1). Connecticut has chosen to participate in the EHA and has enacted legislation to implement the Act's requirements. See Conn.Gen.Stat. Sec. 10-76h. For handicapped children between the ages of 18 and 21, inclusive, the state need not provide a free educational placement if it would be inconsistent with state law or practice. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(2)(B). Under Connecticut law, a handicapped student already under the care of the Department retains eligibility for placement until reaching his twenty-first birthday if he remains voluntarily and the Commissioner of the Department, in his discretion, decides that the student would benefit from further care and support of the Department. Conn.Gen.Stat. Sec. 17-419(d). 2 8 The EHA imposes a number of procedural requirements on participating states in order to safeguard a student's right to education. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415; Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 182-84, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3038-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The procedural safeguards guarantee parents both an opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education and the right to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311-12, 108 S.Ct. at 597-98. 9 The EHA procedural safeguards begin with the individualized education program (IEP). The Act contains a strong focus on involving the handicapped child's parents, teacher, and a representative of the local educational agency in the formulation of an [IEP] tailored to the particular needs of the handicapped student. Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 751 (2d Cir.1987). The IEP must specify the instructional goals and objectives, any special services to be provided and criteria for progress evaluation. See Sec. 1401(19). 10 If there is any proposed change in a child's IEP, the parent or guardian must be so notified in writing, Sec. 1415(b)(1)(C), and provided with an opportunity to bring complaints about any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child, Sec. 1415(b)(1)(E). The parent or guardian then has a right to contest the matter in an impartial due process hearing conducted by the state educational agency. Sec. 1415(b)(2). During the pendency of these proceedings, the child must be allowed to remain in his current educational placement under the stay-put provision of the Act, Sec. 1415(e)(3), unless the parent or guardian otherwise agrees. 11 Any party who is aggrieved by the findings and decision of the state administrative hearing may bring an action in state or federal court. Sec. 1415(e)(2). A party may thus seek redress in the federal courts for the state's failure to provide any of the EHA procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Burr by Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071, 1076 (2d Cir.1988), vacated sub nom. Sobol v. Burr, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3209, 106 L.Ed.2d 560 (1989), reaff'd, Burr by Burr v. Sobol, 888 F.2d 258 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1298, 108 L.Ed.2d 475 (1990). This is because there is an enforceable substantive right to a free appropriate public education, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400(c); Tirozzi, 832 F.2d at 751, and such an education must satisfy the IEP requirements and other EHA procedural safeguards, Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203-07, 102 S.Ct. at 3049-51. 12 The complaint alleges that defendants terminated J.C.'s educational placement at Eagleton without complying with any of the EHA procedural safeguards, including the stay-put provision. Neither J.C.'s mother nor his surrogate parent was provided with notice of the change in J.C.'s placement and there was no IEP meeting discussing the termination. The complaint also alleges that J.C. lacked the capacity to make the termination decision on his own. 13 The district court found that the allegations of the complaint did not amount to a claim that J.C. was, as a matter of law, legally incompetent to make such a decision, since J.C. admittedly was over the age of majority when the termination decision was made, and was not an adjudicated incompetent. The district court then dismissed the EHA claim after holding that the EHA procedural safeguards such as the stay-put provision are not applicable when a legally competent adult chooses to leave an institution. 14 Appellant argues that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint because it clearly stated a claim for relief under the EHA, and the district court improperly relied on disputed facts in reaching its conclusions. Appellees contend that the district court properly held, on the record before it, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the EHA because J.C. was a legally competent adult at the time he agreed to depart from Eagleton. 15 The basic issue before us is whether the state must comply with EHA procedural safeguards before it terminates the educational placement of a handicapped student, who is between the ages of 18 and 21, on the basis of the student's consent. The district court assumed that because an individual over the age of 18 who is not an adjudicated incompetent is legally competent under state law, the Department only needed J.C.'s voluntary consent in order to terminate his educational placement and the procedural requirements of the EHA no longer applied. We believe, however, that this assumption is incorrect. 16 The EHA indicates that consent is unrelated to the standard for legal competency adopted by the district court. The Act refers to children up through 21 years of age. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(2)(B). As already indicated, the parent or guardian must be notified in writing of any proposed change--which would include termination--in the student's placement, and if the parent or guardian complains of the change and seeks review of the decision, the stay-put provision becomes operative. Once that occurs, only a parent or guardian can waive that provision. Id. Moreover, the regulations issued by the United States Department of Education, pursuant to the EHA, make clear that if a state provides education to an 18- to 21-year old handicapped child--and Connecticut does, see note 2 supra--the requirements of the EHA apply. See 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.300(b)(4). 17 Thus, the statute and the relevant regulations contemplate that EHA procedural safeguards apply to an 18- to 21-year old even though there has been no adjudication of incompetency. Indeed, Congress enacted the procedural safeguards in order to guarantee parents ... an opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311, 108 S.Ct. at 597 (emphasis added). 18 Appellant points out that had there been such participation here at an IEP meeting, there could have been informed discussion of the unsuitability of Mrs. C.'s apartment, the danger to J.C. of stopping his educational program and the possibility of a trial diagnostic placement with Mrs. C. that would have preserved J.C.'s placement at Eagleton as a fall-back position. Or there could have been discussion concerning J.C.'s placement at a residential transitional living facility in the form of a group home where J.C. could begin to learn to live outside of an institutional setting. At the very least, J.C.'s surrogate parent, concerned with protecting J.C.'s interests, could have advised him that leaving Eagleton to go back to Mrs. C. was not a good idea. Such a meeting, however, was never held, and J.C. left Eagleton and moved in with his mother. Thereafter, as could have been foreseen, Mrs. C. was unable to control J.C. and lacked the skills and facilities to care for him properly. Within a few weeks the living arrangement fell apart. A family services agency placed J.C. in a structured group home, which lasted 24 hours. J.C. then moved into a homeless shelter and a series of temporary living arrangements. Finally, J.C. began supporting himself as a prostitute on the streets of Bridgeport. J.C.'s exclusion from special education without compliance with EHA procedural safeguards thus frustrated precisely what Congress sought to achieve by enacting the EHA. 19 Moreover, the EHA incorporates state substantive standards as the governing federal rule only if they are consistent with, and at least as exacting as, the EHA provisions. David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411, 422 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 1790, 90 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986); Amelia County School Board v. Virginia Board of Education, 661 F.Supp. 889, 893-94 (E.D.Va.1987). Thus, even if the Connecticut substantive standard defined consent for purposes of waiving EHA procedural safeguards in terms of legal competency, such a standard could not govern here because it would be less exacting than the federal provisions since it does not require parental involvement. 20 For the above reasons, we hold that the state must comply with EHA procedural safeguards before it terminates, on the basis of consent, the educational placement of a student. In the absence of such procedures,, the student's consent is ineffective. 3 Appellees argue that this holding may force a state to keep a legally competent adult in an educational placement against his will because of the effect of the stay-put provision, which can only be waived by the parent or guardian. Appellees argue that this conflicts with the right of an 18- to 21-year old who is legally competent to decide to leave the placement. In light of our ruling here, however, any possible conflict in this regard can only arise after the 18- to 21-year old has been properly advised before deciding whether to agree to the termination. Our holding is that the state cannot terminate an 18- to 21-year old student's educational placement on the latter's consent  unless the consent is an informed one, i.e., the EHA procedural safeguards are followed. If such a properly advised student then decides to leave, we leave open what would happen thereafter. We are not convinced that even then a conflict would exist, but we leave the resolution of that problem for another day.