Opinion ID: 1978007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presence of counsel at execution of search warrant.

Text: The record indicates while a warrant search of defendant's home was in progress two attorneys arrived, one being counsel who represented defendant at trial. Defendant made a motion in limine which was actually a motion to suppress evidence of the attorneys' presence and all questions relating thereto, on grounds it would serve no relevant, material or legitimate purpose and would cast aspersions upon the request for counsel at that time. Resisting, the prosecutor argued, inter alia, the arrival of two attorneys on the scene while the search warrant was in progress is indicative of some awareness on the part of the defendant that what he had in his possession was stolen property. Defense counsel responded it should not be the law of Iowa that the exercise of right to counsel is evidence of guilt, intent, or wrongful state of mind. Trial court granted the motion only in forbidding mention of the other attorney's name. Subsequently a captain in the sheriff's office was permitted to testify, over the objection it was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, that defendant's attorney and another lawyer appeared while the search party was present at the Nelson residence. In argument here the State abandons the rationale this evidence of recourse to counsel was evidence of guilt. It alleges trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in permitting the testimony as a part of the res gestae of the case and to show the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the search warrant. As a second argument the State asserts admission of the evidence was harmless error. The record does not reflect the attorneys said anything or that their conduct, apart from the fact of their presence, was in any way noteworthy. If, as the State now intimates, testimony concerning their presence was not offered to raise an inference of defendant's guilt, its relevancy to any issue in the case is indiscernible. We need not conclude whether defendant's universally recognized privilege to have a lawyer in attendance during a procedure which might ultimately affect his life and liberty did in this instance rise to a constitutionally protected right to counsel. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). In either event, the court should not penalize him by allowing the State to show the presence of the lawyers when such evidence could have no purpose other than to raise an inference of guilt in the jurors' minds. As a matter of public policy, neither trial court rulings nor our decisions should unnecessarily discourage lay persons from seeking advice acid assistance of counsel in important and serious legal procedures. This position finds support in United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 442-445 (D.C.Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 154, 38 L.Ed.2d 104 (1973); Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965); People v. Hansard, 245 Cal.App.2d 691, 53 Cal.Rptr. 918 (1966); People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 227-228, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418, 239 N.E.2d 351, 352-353 (1968), and People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 423-425, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467-469, 235 N.E.2d 439, 442-443, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827, 89 S.Ct. 90, 21 L.Ed.2d 98 (1968). State's theory the phrase res gestae talismanically opens the door to extraneous and prejudicial evidence has been thoroughly and adversely laid to rest in State v. Oppedal, 232 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1975.) Neither are we convinced admission of the above evidence was harmless error. The errors discussed in this division and division I compel reversal. As the case must be remanded for new trial we briefly discuss defendant's other assertions of error.