Opinion ID: 518137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Homicides where the killing is the result of self-defense;

Text: 29 3. Homicides where the claimant was insane or under the influence of drugs or alcohol (to the extent that he or she was unaware of the nature and consequences of the act) when he or she killed the WE. 30 Social Security Administration Program Operations Manual System (POMS), GN 00304.115. See also Social Security Law and Practice, Part 4 Sec. 29:93 (Lawyers Co-operative 1987). 31 In defining intentional homicides for purposes of applying 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.305(b), the Secretary's guidelines expand on the traditional meaning of an intentional state of mind in order to exclude from disqualification only: 1) accidental homicide (involuntary manslaughter might fall within this exception); 2) justifiable homicide (generally self-defense); or 3) excused homicide (insane or influenced by intoxication). Thus, while disqualification would obviously result from any murder conviction because murder requires a specific intent that the wrongful conduct will result in another's death, for our purposes the guidelines also include within their definition of an intentional homicide the commission of an act which [the actor] knows could result in the death of the [wage earner] even though the [insured's] death is not actually desired. Thus, a conviction for the indifferent performance of a voluntary act that the actor knows is potentially fatal to another, even if the death of the other is not specifically intended, disqualifies the actor from eligibility for survivor's insurance benefits. 32 The Secretary properly adopted the ALJ's recommendation to deny benefits pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.305(b) because Davis' second-degree manslaughter conviction falls within the regulation's definition of an intentional homicide. Kentucky defines wanton conduct as awareness of and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death may result from a particular course of conduct. The conduct for which Davis was convicted falls within the Secretary's definition of intentional and it was neither capricious nor unreasonable for the Secretary to have defined such conduct as intentional in order to ensure that convicted killers do not benefit from the deaths of insured wage earner victims. 33 AFFIRMED.