Opinion ID: 157359
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Multiple-Object-Conspiracy Issues

Text: Appellants point out that the jury returned general verdicts on Count One of the indictment, which charged a multiple-object conspiracy involving (1) LSD, (2) methamphetamine, (3) cocaine, and (4) marijuana, listed in the conjunctive. Appellants argue that because the government did not prove each of the four objects alleged in the indictment, various errors infected the jury’s deliberations and verdicts. First, appellants allege error in the court’s instruction to the jury regarding a multiple-object conspiracy. Over objections by defense counsel, the court instructed the jury “that when an offense is charged in the conjunctive, the offense may be proven in the disjunctive.” R. Vol. 25, Tr. at 2020. The court continued: Thus, in order for you to find the defendants guilty of Count One of the superseding indictment, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of these four purposes were objects of such conspiracy, but you need not find that all of these purposes were objects of such conspiracy. You must, however, unanimously agree on which object or objects of the conspiracy the defendants agreed to violate. R. Vol. 25, Tr. at 2021. -23- Appellants argue that both Count One of the indictment and this instruction erroneously aggregated four separate crimes, and that this instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to convict them on theories for which there was not sufficient evidence. These arguments are precluded by Griffin v. United States , 502 U.S. 46 (1991), which upheld a general verdict based on a similar instruction and indictment. The appellant in Griffin was charged with a conspiracy involving two objects, and the district court instructed the jury that it needed to find proof of only one object in order to convict. The Court upheld a general verdict rendered after this instruction, stating that the failure to give an instruction eliminating the unsupported ground was not reversible error. Id. at 56-57, 60. We think the case before us is indistinguishable. See also United States v. Bell , 154 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 1998). Appellants next argue, without citing legal authority, that the district court erred in refusing to require the jury to arrive at special verdicts, one for each of the four illegal substances in the indictment. Appellants contend further, again without legal support, that the court improperly denied motions for acquittal as to the LSD, cocaine, and marijuana portions of the indictment. Based on our reading of Griffin , we do not think the district court was required to treat each substance separately in ruling on motions for acquittal or in submitting verdict forms to the -24- jury. In Griffin the Court appeared to endorse similar practices, but refused to require them: Indeed, if the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury’s consideration. The refusal to do so, however, does not provide an independent basis for reversing an otherwise valid conviction. Griffin , 502 U.S. at 60.