Opinion ID: 444672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: viability of the indictment

Text: 10 Perkins claims that the indictment is fatally defective because it fails to contain all of the elements of the offenses charged. This issue was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss made on the first day of the trial. Perkins correctly points out that Count One of the indictment fails to identify the judicial proceeding that Perkins allegedly conspired to obstruct and Count Three fails to allege how Perkins' grand jury testimony obstructed justice. Although we find that the indictment was poorly drawn, we hold that neither of these omissions renders the indictment invalid; thus, the indictment is not subject to dismissal. 11 The validity of an indictment is determined from reading the indictment as a whole and ... by practical, not technical considerations. United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (citations omitted). 8 The test is not whether the indictment could have been framed in a more satisfactory manner but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional standards. United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 219 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 1788, 60 L.Ed.2d 240 (1979). 9 These standards are set out in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974): 12 Our prior cases indicate that an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or a conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. 13 Id. at 117, 94 S.Ct. at 2907 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 at 812 (11th Cir.1984). 14 Count One fails to state that the conspiracy to obstruct justice related to a grand jury investigation. Abundant case law supports the proposition that it is not necessary to allege in the conspiracy count all of the elements of the offense that is the object of the conspiracy with the same technical precision as would be necessary in a substantive count. See, e.g., Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81, 47 S.Ct. 300, 301, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927); United States v. Clark, 649 F.2d 534, 539 (7th Cir.1981); United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 917 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964, 100 S.Ct. 451, 62 L.Ed.2d 377 (1979). Appellant does not claim to have been misled at any time as to what proceeding allegedly was obstructed. The ambiguity arises because the overt acts listed refer to both the Grand Jury and the FBI investigations. 10 Such an ambiguity, however, will not render an indictment invalid. The Third Circuit dealt with a similar situation in United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 (3d Cir.1979). The Shoup indictment alleged that the defendants conspired to obstruct justice by impairing, obstructing and impeding the lawful functions of the United States Department of Justice. Id. at 960. The case involved an investigation conducted by the United States Attorney's office and a Federal Grand Jury to determine the cause of widespread malfunctioning of voting machines. The court stated: 15 We conclude that the failure of the indictment to allege specifically that Shoup conspired to impede a federal judicial investigation did not deny him his Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a Grand Jury for this specific charge. The indicting grand jury found probable cause to believe that Shoup impeded the investigation conducted by the United States Attorney. The investigations by the United States Attorney and the Grand Jury into alleged voting fraud were conducted jointly. Our conclusion that, under these circumstances, obstruction of the United States Attorney's inquiry is equivalent to an impairment of the federal grand jury's investigation is a legal determination. Consequently, the interpretation of the indictment as sufficiently alleging that Shoup obstructed justice would not usurp the indicting Grand Jury's function of determining probable cause. 16 Shoup also has been adequately informed of the nature of the charges against him as required by the Sixth Amendment. The indictment charged obstruction of justice, cited specifically to Sec. 1503, and alleged that Shoup impeded the investigation conducted by the United States Attorney. Shoup was thereby apprised both of the acts on which the Grand Jury based its charge and that the prosecution had to prove that he conspired to obstruct the operations of the judicial body. Therefore, despite the less-than-perfect draftsmanship, the indictment gave Shoup sufficient notice of the nature of the charges to enable him to defend against them. 17 Id. at 960-961 (footnotes omitted). The appellant in the present case, like Shoup, was adequately advised of the nature of the proceeding that he was allegedly obstructing. Further, any ambiguity could have been clarified by requesting a bill of particulars. United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d at 221. 11 18 Count Three does not state how Perkins' Grand Jury testimony obstructed justice nor does it label the testimony false and/or evasive. Perkins relies on United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 48, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979), which states that the government must, and in this case did, charge in the indictment and prove at trial that the testimony had the effect of impeding justice. Id. at 204. The Griffin court's statement was not intended to set out the prerequisite to a valid indictment under section 1503, but rather, referred to whether evasive and/or false testimony could constitute an obstruction of justice. As the government points out, a more instructive decision is United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1978). In Haas, the indictment alleged that the defendant obstructed justice by communicating information to a grand juror, without specifying what information was communicated. The Fifth Circuit upheld the indictment, stating: 19 Defendant contends, however, that the indictment fails to state what was communicated. While the bare allegation in the indictment of the communication of information is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, it does not appear to meet fully the Government's obligation to permit a defendant to prepare a defense. In such a situation, a bill of particulars is an appropriate method of seeking such information. The function of a bill of particulars is to cure omissions of details that might enable the defendant to prepare his defense .... Norris v. United States, 152 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 850, 66 S.Ct. 1118, 90 L.Ed. 1623 (1946). 20 Id. at 221. The present case is somewhat different in that the indictment states what Perkins said and that his statements obstructed justice, but not how the statements obstructed justice. Nevertheless, the indictment did adequately inform Perkins of the charges against him. He should have sought any clarification through a bill of particulars. Hence, we find this ground without merit.