Opinion ID: 1390724
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: brown's cross appeal

Text: With respect to appellant Brown's cross appeal, he admits that under the pleadings the trial court should not have quieted the title in him as against appellee Morad without possession of her tract, but he contends that it could have been accomplished under the Declaratory Judgment Act or under Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P. The trial court used the Declaratory Judgment Act to hold for Brown against the other defendants, and Brown did move for relief under Rule 15(b), which motion was denied. As has been heretofore said, the court correctly disposed of the two main issues in the case before it, namely, that the Morad tax-based title was void and Brown's legal title was proven. This in effect quiets title, but falls short of giving Brown possession or a decree to that effect. The Declaratory Judgment Act (§ 1-1062, W.S. 1957)    is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered. In Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, supra, 179 P.2d at 780, the court noted that:    An action to quit title is essentially an action for declaratory relief. Plaintiff there brought a suit to quiet title to a severed mineral interest, but it did not allege that it was in possession, because neither party was in actual possession. The court held, inter alia: Counsel have not asked us to notice the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act    in this connection, but we think it is not improper for us to add that, after a trial of issues raised by pleadings showing a dispute over the title, we should not reverse the judgment which may be sustained under that act. In the case at Bar, Brown did and has asked us to notice the Act. We see no reason why possibly the obverse of that holding should not apply here. We do reverse the trial court in this particular to avoid multiplicity of suits, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the taking of further evidence with respect to the occupying claimant's act in the event that appellee Morad files amended pleading. Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.