Opinion ID: 1159400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: If interpreted in this manner section 13202 can be constitutionally applied to petitioner.

Text: Petitioner urges three substantive reasons to support his contention that section 13202 upon its face or as construed by the board deprived him of his constitutional rights. As we shall show, however, that section, as we have interpreted it, could constitutionally apply to petitioner. Petitioner first suggests that the terms unprofessional, moral turpitude, and particularly immoral are so vague as to constitute a denial of due process. [29] (3) Civil as well as criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear as to give a fair warning of the conduct prohibited, and they must provide a standard or guide against which conduct can be uniformly judged by courts and administrative agencies. ( Connelly v. General Constr. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [70 L.Ed. 322, 328, 46 S.Ct. 126]; Jordan v. De George, supra, 341 U.S. 223, 231 [95 L.Ed. 886, 892, 71 S.Ct. 703]; In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 796 [3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116]; Comment (1953) 41 Cal.L.Rev. 523.) [30] The knowledge that he has erred is of little value to the teacher when gained only upon the imposition of a disciplinary penalty that jeopardizes or eliminates his livelihood. (See Note (1964), 15 Hastings L.J. 339, 341.) Courts and commentators [31] have exposed and condemned the uncertainty of words such as unprofessional, [32] immoral, [33] and moral turpitude. [34] Indeed, in Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.2d 734, 740, this court recognized that the term immoral might well be unconstitutionally vague. (Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar (1957) 353 U.S. 252, 263 [1 L.Ed.2d 810, 819, 77 S.Ct. 722]. Orloff also indicated, however, that such vagueness could be resolved by a more precise judicial construction and application of the statute in conformity with the legislative objectives. ( Id. at p. 740.) In this manner we upheld in Orloff a provision authorizing the exclusion from certain public accommodations of a person of immoral character. We sustained in a similar way the term unprofessional conduct against a challenge of vagueness in Board of Education v. Swan, supra, 41 Cal.2d 546, 553-554. [35] (4) As we have explained above, the prohibitions against immoral and unprofessional conduct and conduct involving moral turpitude by a teacher constitutes a general ban on conduct which would indicate his unfitness to teach. This construction gives section 13202 the required specificity. Teachers, particularly in the light of their professional expertise, will normally be able to determine what kind of conduct indicates unfitness to teach. [36] Teachers are further protected by the fact that they cannot be disciplined merely because they made a reasonable, good faith, professional judgment in the course of their employment with which higher authorities later disagreed. (See Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 68 Cal.2d 67, 74.) [37] Petitioner secondly contends that the ban on immoral conduct in section 13202 violates his constitutionally protected right to privacy. It is true that an unqualified proscription against immoral conduct would raise serious constitutional problems. [38] Conscientious school officials concerned with enforcing such a broad provision might be inclined to probe into the private life of each and every teacher, no matter how exemplary his classroom conduct. Such prying might all too readily lead school officials to search for telltale signs of immorality in violation of the teacher's constitutional rights. ( Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 485 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 515, 85 S.Ct. 1678].) [39] The proper construction of section 13202, however, minimizes the danger of such sweeping inquiries. [40] By limiting the application of that section to conduct shown to indicate unfitness to teach, we substantially reduce the incentive to inquire into the private lives of otherwise sound and competent teachers. Finally, petitioner urges that the board cannot revoke his life diplomas because his questioned conduct does not rationally relate to his duties as a teacher. (1c, 5) No person can be denied government employment because of factors unconnected with the responsibilities of that employment. ( Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563, 572 [20 L.Ed.2d 811, 819, 88 S.Ct. 1731]; Shelton v. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 487-490 [5 L.Ed.2d 231, 236-238, 81 S.Ct. 247]; Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra, 353 U.S. 252, 262 [1 L.Ed.2d 810, 819, 77 S.Ct. 722]; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239 [1 L.Ed.2d 796, 801-802, 77 S.Ct. 752, 64 A.L.R.2d 288]; Wieman v. Updegraff (1952) 344 U.S. 183, 192 [97 L.Ed. 216, 222, 73 S.Ct. 215]; United Public Workers v. Mitchell (1947) 330 U.S. 75, 101 [91 L.Ed. 754, 773, 67 S.Ct. 556]; Scott v. Macy (1965) 349 F.2d 182 [121 App.D.C. 205]; Norton v. Macy, supra, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 & fn. 7; see 1 Emerson Haber & Dorsen, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, supra, pp. 363-364; Reich, The New Property (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733, 782.) [41] Again, however, the proper construction of section 13202 avoids this problem, for that interpretation would bar disciplinary action against petitioner unless the record demonstrated that petitioner's conduct did indicate his unfitness to teach.