Opinion ID: 601465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Common Law Indemnity

Text: 8 Walker first challenges the district court's determination that he cannot obtain common law indemnification from the District. Of course, in assessing Walker's claim, our task is to determine how the District of Columbia's courts would rule on this question. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C.Cir.1984). Undoubtedly, a primary consideration in those courts' evaluation would be the District's statute obligating it to recompense a police officer for legal fees, but not money damages, resulting from an alleged wrongful arrest. See D.C.Code § 4-143; cf. D.C.Code § 1-1215(b) (indemnifying District medical employees for money damages arising from their negligent acts or omissions). In fact, we think that the District's courts would likely find the legislative line-drawing judgment on the question of police indemnification determinative and preclusive of supplemental indemnification under the common law. Cf. Sonnenberg v. Farmington Township, 39 Mich.App. 446, 197 N.W.2d 853, 854 (1972) (indemnification of police officers is a matter of discretion); Sinclair [300 U.S.App.D.C. 93] v. Arnebergh, 224 Cal.App.2d 595, 36 Cal.Rptr. 810, 813 (2d Dist.1964) (same). 9 But, even if a District of Columbia court were to look to the common law, we conclude that it would not find that Walker was entitled to indemnification. Walker's indemnification claim rests in large part on the mistaken premise that as long as his actions were connected with his official duties, Appellant's Brief at 26, the common law requires the District to recompense him for any damages he may be forced to pay. 2 But, far from imposing an expansive duty on employers in this regard, the common law generally holds agents responsible for their own wrongs; the oft-repeated rule is that a principal is ordinarily not obliged to indemnify an agent for the agent's own tortious conduct. See, e.g., Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580, 63 S.Ct. 425, 428, 87 L.Ed. 471 (1943) (The liability of an agent for his own negligence has long been embedded in the law.); Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J.Super. 580, 166 A.2d 784, 786 (App.Div.1960) ([T]here is a general rule in the law of agency that an employer cannot be compelled to reimburse an employee for damages the employee may be obliged to pay because of personal injuries to others resulting from his own negligent conduct.); see generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 440(a) (no duty to indemnify agent for pecuniary loss or other harm, not of benefit to the principal, arising from the performance of unauthorized acts or resulting solely from the agent's negligence or other fault) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT). 10 Thus, even if he can base his claim on the common law, Walker cannot rely merely on the general allegation that his alleged misconduct was connected to his employment. Instead, he must show that his case fits within one of the narrow exceptions that has been carved out of the common law rule. Walker cites two such exceptions: indemnification is required, he notes, when an agent's authorized good faith actions result in liability for tort damages to third persons and, more generally, when it would be inequitable for indemnity not to be required. 3 But, as we show below, neither of those principles applies to Walker's situation.
11 The common law right to indemnification for authorized conduct is confined to very limited circumstances. An agent is entitled to indemnification only when she can show both that she acted in good faith reliance on a principal's direction and that she had no reason to believe that her acts were tortious. See, e.g., Hagen, 166 A.2d at 787 (exception applies only where agent is compelled to pay for doing something in good faith, without knowledge of its tortious character, and not illegal, which he was ordered and directed to do); RESTATEMENT § 439, comment g (If ... the agent, at the direction of the principal, commits an act which constitutes a tort but which [300 U.S.App.D.C. 94] the agent believes not to be tortious, he is entitled to indemnity....) (emphasis added). Thus, for example, in Castille v. Folck, 338 So.2d 328 (La.App.1976), a case that Walker cites, an agent hired to sell a horse was entitled to indemnification when, as a result of the horse owner's assurances, the agent falsely represented to the buyer that the horse had undergone a certain medical test. See id. at 333; see also Hagen, 166 A.2d at 788 (defendant entitled to indemnification for damages from co-worker's injuries if the defendant could show that his conduct was undertaken pursuant to specific instructions of employer; defendant should not shoulder the employer's obligation because he was obedient to his employer's instructions); Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 988, 990 (1924) (indemnification allowed where city engineer directed contractor to commit trespass and contractor had reason to believe that city had procured a right for him to use the land). 12 Because Walker cannot point to anything remotely like the specific direction from a principal illustrated by such cases, his conduct cannot be said to be authorized in the sense necessary to qualify for common law indemnification. There is no evidence that the District by either action or inaction approved or ratified--even tacitly--the conduct of which Walker is accused, i.e., punching a citizen without provocation during the course of an arrest. Indeed, the district court has already found that there was not even a plausible nexus between the District's policies and practices and Walker's alleged actions. Finally, even if there were evidence of authorization, Walker's claim would fail the common law test because, assuming he did hit Gaines without provocation, he could not have believed in good faith that his conduct was not tortious.
13 Walker's reliance on the equity exception to the common law rule against indemnification of an agent's malfeasance fares no better. Walker correctly states that, under some circumstances, in the District of Columbia a duty to indemnify may be implied from the relationship between the parties in order to prevent a result that is  'unjust or unsatisfactory.'  National Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Ahmadi, 596 A.2d 555, 558 (D.C.1991) (quoting East Penn Manufacturing Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C.1990)). But we note that Walker cites no precedent, either from the District or elsewhere, establishing that this somewhat nebulous principle of equity has ever been applied to require the indemnification of police officers for tortious conduct committed in the line of duty. And, as discussed above, we think it especially unlikely that a District of Columbia court would resort to such a general principle in the face of a specific statute addressing, albeit in a limited fashion, the issue of indemnification of police officers. Cf. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1271 (7th Cir.1984). 14 In the end, however, we need not decide whether the District's courts would ever find an equitable duty to indemnify police officers. Even if equitable considerations may require indemnity in some circumstances, they surely do not here. If Walker behaved in the manner that Gaines alleges, then he could not have believed in good faith that his actions were legal. In such a circumstance, we see no reason to think that a District of Columbia court would find the potential for the type of unjust or unsatisfactory result that would require indemnification.