Opinion ID: 1885403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Whether VKS was dedicated by implication or otherwise to use as a public airport.

Text: ¶ 50. We now turn to consider whether legal authority to close VKS was absent. Falco argues, and the circuit court ruled, that the land constituting VKS was dedicated by implication to use as an airport, and that the Board thus acted illegally in closing VKS. ¶ 51. Section 61-5-9 states in pertinent part that every municipality may by sale, lease or otherwise, dispose of any airport, air navigation facility or other property... acquired pursuant to the Municipal Airport Law. Moreover, § 21-17-1 is a general statute empowering municipalities to purchase and hold real estate ... and to sell and convey any real and personal property owned by it. ¶ 52. The Municipal Airport Law, presently codified as §§ 61-5-1 to 61-5-49, was in place when the City of Vicksburg bought the land on which VKS is located, and Falco has not alleged that the purchase was not pursuant to the Municipal Airport Law. ¶ 53. Falco instead argues that the Board was not authorized to close VKS, because for a municipality to dispose of property, the property must no longer be needed by the public for the purpose for which it was intended. The lengthy block quote with which Falco backs up this assertion includes the statement that political subdivisions cannot dispose of public property, unless with the formal sanction of the State. Am. Oil Co. v. Marion County, 187 Miss. 148, 156, 192 So. 296, 298 (1939). The formal sanction of the State has been demonstrated by §§ 61-5-9 and 21-17-1. ¶ 54. The other Mississippi case relied upon by Falco is City of Louisville v. Hull, 292 So.2d 177 (Miss.1974), in which we recognized the notion of dedication by implication. Id. at 179. The plaintiffs had argued that Louisville had dedicated by implication a plot of land for use as a public park and that the city was thus prohibited from erecting a building on the park site. Id. at 178. We stated that proof of such implied dedication must be clear, satisfactory and unequivocal, but did not enlarge on what would constitute such proof. The fact that the city had used portions of the land in question for various purposes was held dispositive of any implied dedication even of the portion which continued to be used for a public park. Id. at 180. Hull has not been cited by this or any other court since it was handed down, so today is our first opportunity to interpret it. ¶ 55. Confining our review to the bill of exceptions, we fail to see any clear, satisfactory, and unequivocal evidence of such an implied dedication. Indeed, part of the land bought for VKS has been used for a golf course at least since 1971, which apparently brings the present facts into line with Hull. ¶ 56. The fact that the city originally purchased the VKS land for use as an airport is irrelevant under Hull, since the city in that case originally purposed to use the land as a park. Id. at 178 (certificates of indebtedness issued `for the purchase of a public park'). Nor is it important that Falco and others continue to use VKS; the park in Hull was being used as a park up to the city's decision to erect a building on it. ¶ 57. Thus, we do not find clear, satisfactory and unequivocal proof of implied dedication in the present case. The circuit court erred in finding otherwise.