Opinion ID: 2626474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of Former RPC 1.8(h)

Text: ¶ 17 Greenlee argues that former RPC 1.8(h) does not extend to settlement with former clients of potential malpractice claims where no actual claim is made or proved. He argues that at the very least, former RPC 1.8(h) should be given only prospective application to cover such scenarios. The Bar disputes Greenlee's interpretation, urging this court to uphold the Board. Both the Board and the hearing officer below found that former RPC 1.8(h) includes settlement of potential malpractice claims even where no actual claim is made or proved. For reasons that follow, we hold that former RPC 1.8(h) does include settlement of potential malpractice claims even where no actual claim is made or proved. ¶ 18 Former RPC 1.8(h) states that a lawyer shall not: make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith. There is no disciplinary case in Washington interpreting former RPC 1.8(h). ¶ 19 The Washington Board of Governor's established an Ethics 2003 Committee to review the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) changes made by the ABA. The Board reviewed the Ethics 2003 Report, made additional revisions, and submitted recommended amendments to this court. By order of December 2004, this court approved the proposed amendments for publication. But this court had not yet adopted any of the Board's proposed amendments at the time of the events at issue in this case. One of the proposed revisions was a restructuring of former RPC 1.8(h) to conform to the MRPC equivalent: (h) A lawyer shall not: (1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement; or (2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith. ABA & BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:127 (2003). ¶ 20 Whereas Washington former RPC 1.8(h) provides that a lawyer shall not settle a claim for such [malpractice] liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate, newly adopted subsection (h)(2) provides that a lawyer shall not settle a claim or potential claim . . . unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel. The adopted change to RPC 1.8(h), to specifically include settlement of potential malpractice claims, seems to indicate that settlement of potential claims did not fall within the ambit of former RPC 1.8(h). ¶ 21 As indicated above, there is no disciplinary case in Washington interpreting former RPC 1.8(h). Court decisions construing identical provisions from other states, cited by the parties in this case, appear to be in conflict. ¶ 22 Greenlee relies upon In re Douglass, 859 A.2d 1069 (D.C.2004), which squarely addressed whether District of Columbia RPC 1.8(g), analogous to ABA MRPC 1.8(h), precluded the release of potential claims of liability for services already rendered, and likewise clearly defined the term prospective. As to the first clause, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed a finding that the term prospectively, strongly suggests that the Rule was intended to reach lawyers who insist that clients sign malpractice liability releases at the beginning of the representation. Id. at 1072 n. 7. By contrast, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the second clause addresses the situation where the lawyer attempts to settle an actually existing claim (even a claim that has not been filed in court) for malpractice liability. Id. at 1083. That court stated that its analysis is supported by ABA MRPC 1.8(h). See id. at 1083 n. 3. ¶ 23 Greenlee likewise points to In re Fazande, 864 So.2d 174 (La.2004). In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held the first section of Louisiana RPC 1.8(h) contemplates prospective agreement made at the beginning of the representation, whereas the second section prohibits a lawyer from settling a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client or former client `without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.' Id. at 180 (quoting LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra, § 51:1104). The Louisiana Supreme Court went on to state that the latter section suggests the requirement of written notice is triggered upon the actual settlement of malpractice liability, as opposed to mere negotiations toward a settlement. Id. ¶ 24 The Bar, however, insists that the section from Douglass that Greenlee relies upon is dicta. The Bar argues the District of Columbia Court of Appeals nowhere states that RPC 1.8(h) applies only if a malpractice claim has already been filed and that it also makes clear the second clause of the rule would apply to a claim that has not been filed in court. See Douglass, 859 A.2d at 1083. Also, the Bar argues that Fazande does not stand for the proposition that a malpractice claim must have already been filed for former RPC 1.8(h) to apply. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the requirement of Louisiana RPC 1.8(h) was never triggered under the circumstances of that case. Fazande, 864 So.2d at 180. ¶ 25 The Bar suggests that we instead look to In re Carson, 268 Kan. 134, 991 P.2d 896 (1999), on which the hearing officer relied. See CP at 27-28. In that case, a former client was advised by the judge to consult independent counsel before signing the mutual release, but the client did not do so. Carson, 268 Kan. at 136, 991 P.2d 896. The Kansas Supreme Court held that [i]t does not matter that no actual claim existed when the waiver was signed. Id. at 143, 991 P.2d 896. ¶ 26 Greenlee counters that Carson does not relate to waivers for services already rendered where there is no basis for a claim of malpractice. Br. of Attorney Greenlee at 13. Greenlee claims Carson is distinguishable because the attorney in that case had ample reason to conceal his conduct, whereas Greenlee contends that he himself had no awareness of any wrongdoing. He cites the hearing officer's concession that Greenlee believed in good faith that his work on the personal injury case was not negligent. Thus, he was not trying to cover up negligence he knew existed. CP at 39 n. 16. ¶ 27 Also pertinent here is this court's recent decision in In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Haley, 156 Wash.2d 324, 338, 126 P.3d 1262 (2006). We were confronted with an attorney acting pro se who was subject to sanctions for violation of RPC 4.2(a) for his contacting a party who was represented by counsel. This court found a dearth of case law from this state construing the rule at issue. Id. at 336, 126 P.3d 1262. We observed that conflicting authorities interpreting the rule existed at the time the attorney subject to discipline engaged in the conduct at issue. Id. at 336-37, 126 P.3d 1262. As a result, we held RPC 4.2(a) impermissibly vague in its application to the attorney subject to discipline, and therefore insisted that the interpretation of the rule as prohibiting attorneys acting pro se to contact a party represented by counsel would be applied prospectively only. Id. at 338, 126 P.3d 1262. Arguably, considerations similar to those in Haley are present in this case, suggesting only a prospective application of former RPC 1.8(h) as prohibiting attorneys from settling with former clients of potential malpractice claims where no actual malpractice claim was ever raised or established. ¶ 28 To be sure, former RPC 1.8(h) does not require a claim to actually be filed for the second section of the rule to apply. The rule does apply if an unfiled claim clearly exists, which could be filed at a future time. ¶ 29 One of the primary purposes of attorney discipline is the protection of the public from attorney misconduct, and disciplinary rules should be interpreted to advance that purpose. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against McGlothlen, 99 Wash.2d 515, 522, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983). As a general matter, the rule seeks to protect unrepresented clients when a lawyer seeks release of liability in situations where the lawyer's interests either directly conflict or have the potential to directly conflict with the client's interests. ¶ 30 Accordingly, this court holds that former RPC 1.8(h) includes settlement with former clients of potential malpractice claims where no actual malpractice claim was ever raised or established. Attorneys should advise the client or former client in writing to obtain the advice of independent counsel prior to signing a release of any claims the client or former client has or may have against the lawyer. ¶ 31 We do not find the decisions of other states to be particularly helpful to this case. As the Supreme Court of this state, this court will interpret its own rules. ¶ 32 As an initial matter, it is inappropriate to demand that the RPC's literal terms cover every conceivable particular instance of conduct. To be sure, the words of the rule have primacy, and this court cannot countenance rulings tantamount to ex post facto laws. But where an RPC lays down a rule or principle for application in particular cases with enough specificity to satisfy due process and vagueness concerns, this court is reluctant to allow attorneys to escape discipline through an overreliance upon prospective-only applications. ¶ 33 Furthermore, there is a crucial difference between Haley and this case. Haley involved an attorney who was asserting a right of self-representation. 156 Wash.2d 324, 126 P.3d 1262. Haley involved consideration of the extent to which RPC 4.2(a) related to the exercise of that right. Id. Prospective application of our interpretation of RPC 4.2(a) was more appropriate in light of an attorney's right of self-representation. Here, by contrast, Greenlee was not acting in furtherance of any specific right. Attorneys do not have a positive, protected right to instruct or request former clients to sign waivers of potential malpractice claims.