Opinion ID: 2401451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard for Jury Instruction on Mitigation

Text: `As a general proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.' Bostick v. United States, 605 A.2d 916, 917 (D.C.1992) (quoting Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990)). In determining whether a defense instruction was properly denied, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, but not so favorable as to have required the jury to engage in `bizarre reconstruction[s] of the evidence.' Id. at 917-18 (quoting Adams v. United States, 558 A.2d 348, 349 (D.C.1989)). In this court, appellant argues in effect that in view of the evidence of the harsh circumstances of his existence, the trial court's instruction should have cleared the way for the jury to find that he could have been guilty of manslaughter. Relying on Brown v. United States, 584 A.2d 537 (D.C. 1990), and Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C.1990) (en banc), he urges that as a result of the trial court's rulings, [t]he jury was completely foreclosed from considering the only real issue ... whether `extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse' rendered [him] less `morally blameworthy' than those who kill in the absence of such influences. Comber, supra, 584 A.2d at 41 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 comment 5, at 53, 54 (citations omitted)). He argues that the despair and frustration that he felt (as a result of unemployment, homelessness, two handicapped sons, a long-standing relationship with their mother addicted to drugs) would negate malice and would provoke a reasonable person to suddenly lose control and kill without premeditation, without deliberation and without malice. We cannot say that appellant's proffered defense of heat of passion would have required the jury to engage in a bizarre reconstruction of the evidence. See Bostick v. United States, supra, 605 A.2d at 917-18. However, the point of departure here between appellant and the government is a heated dispute about the source of the provocation which triggers the passion leading to death. This is understandable in view of the fact that the terms provocation and mitigation which negate malice have evolved over the centuries as legal terms of art when measured as against fixed categories of factual circumstances. See generally Brown v. United States, supra, 584 A.2d at 540, discussing the development of provocation under the common law. Thus the government, embracing ancient tradition, and distinguishing Brown, supra, defines provocation as only provocation coming from the deceased victimsuggesting such categories as mutual quarrels, combat, battery, assault and adultery, and argues that provocation does not negate malice where the victim is an innocent third party. [7] On the other hand, the appellant, relying on Brown, supra, and the MODEL PENAL CODE, tells us that in the District of Columbia, the law of provocation has developed in the modern vein of confrontation with the facts of each case; [t]he test of sufficiency of such provocation is that which would cause an ordinary man, a reasonable man, or an average man, to become so aroused [as to kill another]. Brown v. United States, supra, 584 A.2d at 542 (citing Bishop v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 132, 107 F.2d 297 (1939)). The en banc pronouncements of our court in Comber v. United States, supra , do not address the specific issue before us. [8] In view of the dispute over our recognition (or non-recognition) or the MODEL PENAL CODE, we leave that issue for the en banc court. For our purposes, we need not decide here whether the claimed instructional error alone requires reversal because it is apparent that the government's use of, admittedly, illegally obtained evidence to impeach credibility and thus dampen the impact of factually mitigating (and otherwise unchallenged) testimony requires reversal.