Opinion ID: 852644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Civil Lawsuits Under the Indiana Age Discrimination Act

Text: Montgomery's suit for money damages under the IADA fails for a second reason. The IADA does not expressly authorize aggrieved employees to bring civil actions for monetary damages against their employers. Montgomery acknowledges this, but nonetheless urges this Court to recognize a private civil action under Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 260 Ind. 249, 253-54, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973). Purdue responds that recognition of a new exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will is best left to the General Assembly and that recognition of an exception here would ignore the existing administrative complaint process expressly adopted in the IADA. Section 2 of the IADA declares that it is an unfair employment practice and against public policy to dismiss from employment, or to refuse to employ or rehire, any person solely because of his age if such person has attained the age of forty (40) years and has not attained the age of seventy (70) years. I.C. § 22-9-2-2 (2004). [5] Sections 5, 6, and 7 set out an informal administrative process for investigating and resolving charges of discrimination under the Act. Section 5 requires the Commissioner of Labor to receive and investigate all charges of discrimination under the Act. If the Commissioner makes a preliminary determination that the employer is engaging in unfair employment practices, under section 6, the Commissioner is required to attempt to eliminate these practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. If voluntary compliance cannot be obtained, the Commissioner may issue a complaint and hold a hearing at which the employer may present evidence and examine witnesses. I.C. § 22-9-2-6. If the Commissioner determines that unfair practices were committed, the Commissioner is required to state findings of fact. Id. Under section 7, if the Commissioner concludes that no probable cause exists to support the charges, the Commissioner must state findings of fact in writing and issue an order dismissing the complaint. Neither the Commissioner, nor the aggrieved employee, is expressly authorized under the statute to take judicial action if the charge of discrimination is substantiated. No authority has directly addressed what remedies are available to aggrieved employees under the IADA. Our research reveals only six cases in which state or federal courts have addressed the IADA, only five of which are relevant here. On two occasions federal district courts have concluded that the IADA provides no private right of action to an aggrieved employee, [6] and two other federal cases and a state case have ruled on motions for summary judgment, dismissal, or to correct errors without addressing the question of remedies. [7] Indiana generally follows the employment-at-will doctrine that permits both the employer and the employee to terminate the employment at any time for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 2006 WL 1719928, at , 2006 Ind. LEXIS 514, at  (Ind. June 21, 2006); Sample v. Kinser Ins. Agency, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). There are limits to this doctrine, however. Frampton held that an employee who has been terminated for filing a worker's compensation claim may sue for damages. 260 Ind. at 253-54, 297 N.E.2d at 428. And McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind.1988), upheld a wrongful discharge claim for damages by a truck driver who alleged he was fired for refusing to violate Illinois state weight limits. These cases have been generalized to the proposition that an employee who has been fired for exercising a statutory right or for refusing to violate the law has a claim for wrongful discharge. Ind. Legal Encyclopedia, Employment § 45 (West 2001). Montgomery advances several arguments in support of recognition of an age discrimination exception to employment-at-will. First, he argues that the General Assembly intended to authorize private civil actions because section 2 of the IADA declares that age discrimination in employment violates public policy. General expressions of public policy do not support new exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. See McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 393. Moreover, the legislative history of the IADA does not support Montgomery's argument that the General Assembly intended to create a private cause of action for monetary damages under the IADA. As originally enacted in 1965, section 1 of the IADA defined employer to include persons employing one or more individuals, labor organizations, and the state and all its political subdivisions. Various religious, fraternal, and social groups were expressly excluded from the definition of employer. 1965 Ind. Acts ch. 368, § 1. The federal ADEA was enacted two years later in 1967. It defined employer as those with twenty-five or more employees. [8] The United States, corporations wholly owned by the United States, and States and their political subdivisions were expressly excluded from the definition of employer in the original version of the ADEA. Pub.L. No. 90-202, § 11(b) (1967). In 1974, amendments to the ADEA lowered the threshold number of employees for private employers from twenty-five to twenty and for the first time applied the ADEA to state and federal governmental units. Pub.L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(1)-(2) (1974). No minimum number of employees was set for a governmental entity but a minimum of twenty has been supplied by court decision. Thus, states and their political subdivisions, like their counterparts in the private sector, are not covered employers under the ADEA unless they employ at least twenty employees for twenty weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. See Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Monclova Township, 920 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir.1990); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir.1986). In 1979 the Indiana General Assembly amended the IADA to introduce the provision relevant in this case, excluding from employer any person or governmental entity which is subject to the ADEA. P.L. 206 § 3 (1979). After 1979 the IADA applied only to employment relationships not governed by the federal ADEA, i.e. public and private employers with fewer than twenty employees. See Town of S. Whitley, 724 F.Supp. at 603 (The purpose of the IADA is to provide coverage only where a plaintiff cannot proceed under the federal act.). The General Assembly's decision in 1979 to continue to provide protection under the IADA to employees working for small public and private employers does not suggest a desire to provide these employees the same remedies for unlawful discrimination as are afforded by the ADEA. First, since its enactment in 1965, the IADA has never expressly provided for enforcement through private judicial action. By contrast, the ADEA, from its inception in 1967, has specifically provided for judicial enforcement by both private litigants and the United States. The ADEA exemption of employers with fewer than twenty employees expressed a policy that the cost of complying with the ADEA and defending against ADEA suits would be excessively burdensome for small businesses. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir.1998) (reasons for ADEA's minimum employee requirement include the burdens of compliance and potential litigation costs, the protection of intimate and personal relations existing in small businesses, [and] potential effects on competition and the economy . . .). (internal quotations omitted). We think a fair reading of the IADA demonstrates a similar concern. Since 1965 the IADA has never expressly provided for private judicial enforcement, and has relied instead on administrative methods of resolution. We see nothing in the Indiana legislation to suggest that only the small employers to which it now applies should be subject to civil litigation to greater extent than the ADEA provides for larger employers. To the contrary, this enforcement scheme seeks to strike a balance between protection of employees and legitimate concerns of small businesses by limiting its enforcement mechanisms to those set forth in the statute. We find Montgomery's remaining arguments equally unpersuasive. The Indiana Civil Rights Law (ICRL), Indiana Code sections 22-9-1-1 through XX-X-X-XX, prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin or ancestry and applies to most private and public employers in Indiana. I.C. §§ 22-9-1-2, 22-9-1-3. The ICRL expressly authorizes civil suits by private litigants and sets out procedural prerequisites to bringing suit not unlike those provided by the federal ADEA. I.C. §§ 22-9-1-16, 22-9-1-17. Montgomery argues that the General Assembly intended to create an exception to employmentat-will because the IADA, unlike the ICRL, places no restrictions on civil actions by individual employees. To the contrary, we think the IADA's silence as to civil remedies, in contrast with the ICRL, reflects the General Assembly's intentional decision to provide a separate scheme for age discrimination. Discrimination is subject to broader remedies if it is based on race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin or ancestry, all of which are addressed in the ICRL. Indeed, the ICRL had been in place for four years when the IADA was enacted. Age was not simply added to the list of classes protected by the ICRL. We think this legislative history is persuasive evidence that the General Assembly chose to combat age discrimination primarily through administrative remedies rather than the broader remedies afforded by the ICRL. Montgomery also urges this Court to recognize an exception to employment-at-will based on Kimel. He cites the following passage: State employees are protected by state age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state employers, in almost every State of the Union. Those avenues of relief remain available today, just as they were before this decision. 528 U.S. at 91-92, 120 S.Ct. 631. The asterisk calls to an unnumbered footnote citing statutes from many states, including Indiana Code section 22-9-2-1, et seq. Montgomery argues that this footnote establishes that the IADA creates a private cause of action for monetary damages against state employers. As Montgomery acknowledges, the Kimel footnote is dicta addressing a provision of Indiana state law. It is not binding on this Court, and for the reasons given above we find no private money damage remedy is available under the IADA. Finally, Montgomery argues that without recognition of a private civil action, the IADA is meaningless because the Commissioner of Labor has no judicial enforcement powers under the IADA. The Commissioner of Labor is authorized to resolve allegations of discrimination through informal conciliation. We leave for another day determination whether the IADA also provides for judicial enforcement by the Commissioner of Labor under any circumstances. Today we hold only that whether broader enforcement mechanisms should be conferred upon private litigants is a policy judgment, and any change in that aspect of the IADA's remedial scheme must come from the General Assembly.