Opinion ID: 696224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Carl A. Dawson, Jr.

Text: 19 Dawson raises a number of challenges to his convictions, three of which we discuss below. First, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict on the extortion and firearm charges. Alternatively, he asks for a new trial, claiming unfair prejudice from the testimony of an FBI agent to the effect that Dawson had not been truthful in making a statement immediately after his arrest. Finally, Dawson insists that the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal closing argument deprived him of a fair trial.a. 20 Dawson necessarily bears a heavy burden in asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. In considering such a claim, we review the record in the light most favorable to the government, and determine whether 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1449 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in Jackson)). We will reverse Dawson's convictions only if the record is devoid of evidence from which the jury could reach a finding of guilt. Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d at 1449; United States v. Rosalez-Cortez, 19 F.3d 1210, 1215 (7th Cir.1994). 21 The crux of the challenge to the extortion convictions is that there is no proof that Dawson knew of the extortion conspiracy and that he intended to join it. Because agreements to engage in criminal activity are at the heart of conspiracy law (United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 482, 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993)), a defendant's agreement to join the illegal objectives of a conspiracy must be supported by substantial evidence. United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850, 865 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 948, 1160, 130 L.Ed.2d 891, 1116 (1995); United States v. Carson, 9 F.3d 576, 587 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 135, 130 L.Ed.2d 77 (1994). Although it generally is insufficient to show that an individual was merely present when the details of a conspiracy were discussed, or when acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed, a defendant's presence, along with other evidence indicating that the presence or act was intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy, is sufficient to establish the participatory link. Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d at 1450; see also Carson, 9 F.3d at 587. And as we have said on numerous occasions, a defendant's participation in a conspiracy may be established solely by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d at 1450; United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir.1991). 22 When Dawson's argument is considered in light of these standards, it is clear that the government produced substantial evidence showing that Dawson knew of the extortion conspiracy and agreed to join its illegal objectives. Although Dawson did not accompany the group to Mississippi and was thus not present either when Johnson-Dix shot Nunnally or when Meyers first called his mother, Dawson was present at and played a key role in some of the central acts in furtherance of the extortion conspiracy. For example, he agreed to accompany Johnson-Dix to Chicago in return for $100, knowing that he would be responsible for catching a bag of money that would be tossed into the Cadillac. Dawson also knew that he had been recruited to accompany Johnson-Dix because of his size and intimidating presence. Moreover, Dawson was present at the Amoco station when Meyers called his mother and learned that she had obtained the $12,500. He also was in the Cadillac with Johnson-Dix when Agent Becknell spotted the vehicle in the vicinity of Patricia Meyers' apartment. It was Dawson who stared intently at the agent as the Cadillac passed the agent's unmarked car, and it was Dawson who appeared to point a metallic object in the agent's direction, prompting the agent to fire. When agents finally were able to stop the Cadillac, they found Johnson-Dix, Dawson, and four loaded firearms inside. Dawson subsequently admitted that one of the weapons, which had been cocked and loaded, belonged to him. 23 Dawson contends in the face of this evidence that he had no knowledge of the extortion scheme and that Johnson-Dix simply put him in the wrong place at the wrong time. The jury, however, was free to reject that explanation and to conclude from the evidence that Dawson knew of the conspiracy and had agreed to further its objectives. Dawson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence essentially would require us to reject the jury's credibility assessments and to reweigh the evidence in his favor. This we cannot do. See Carson, 9 F.3d at 587. Dawson's conspiracy and related extortion convictions are thus supported by substantial evidence. 24 Dawson's challenge to his firearm conviction fares no better. The jury found Dawson guilty of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). Dawson does not contest that the extortion offenses were crimes of violence for purposes of section 924(c)(3). He contends instead that the Taurus handgun recovered from the Cadillac had no connection to the extortion scheme. Indeed, Dawson testified at trial that he only carried the weapon to protect himself when walking his dog through the streets of Gary. It was completely fortuitous, according to Dawson, that he had the loaded gun with him on the night in question. Dawson contends, therefore, that he did not use or carry the firearm during and in relation to the extortion offenses. 25 In Smith v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2059, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that the phrase in relation to means, at a minimum, that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the [crime of violence]; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. In the context of a conspiracy to commit extortion, the during and in relation to requirement is satisfied if the firearm is in the possession or control of the defendant and its possession aids in the accomplishment of the conspiracy's objective. James, 40 F.3d at 861. Here, the evidence is certainly sufficient to prove that Dawson's possession of the Taurus handgun aided the attempted extortion. Agents found the cocked and loaded Taurus on the floor below where Dawson had been seated when the Cadillac passed the agent's unmarked car near Patricia Meyers' apartment. Moreover, the agent opened fire on the Cadillac only after he saw Dawson point a metallic object in his direction. A reasonable jury could find from this evidence that Dawson used or carried the Taurus during and in relation to the extortion conspiracy and that its presence in the Cadillac was not solely the result of accident or coincidence. 26 b. 27 Dawson next maintains that he was deprived of a fair trial when an FBI agent testified on cross-examination that Dawson had been untruthful in providing a statement to the agents immediately after his arrest. 5 When Dawson's counsel asked the agent whether Dawson had expressed a willingness to answer the agent's questions, the agent responded: Dawson was, in my opinion, telling half-truths the entire night that he was in there. (Tr. at 455.) Dawson's counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, but the court denied the motion, explaining that the agent's answer had been invited by counsel's question. We review the district court's decision on this evidentiary matter for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 26 F.3d 739, 751 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 680, 130 L.Ed.2d 612 (1994). 28 We must consider the agent's statement in the context of the line of questioning counsel was pursuing at the time. Dawson's counsel was asking Agent Roberts about his written report, which outlined the substance of Dawson's statements after his arrest. Counsel was attempting to make the point that the agent's report was silent as to whether Dawson knew of the kidnapping and attempted extortion. Once counsel was able to establish that the agent would have included anything of testimonial significance in his written report, the following colloquy between counsel and the agent ensued: 29 Q. You never even bothered to ask Carl if he knew anything about a kidnapping, did you? 30 A. That question was asked. 31 Q. What was his answer? 32 A. There was no answer to that question. He remained quiet. 33 (Tr. at 455.) Counsel attempted to discredit this response by referring back to the agent's earlier testimony that Dawson indeed had waived his Miranda rights and expressed a willingness to answer the agent's questions: 34 Q. In other words, you asked--didn't he willingly tell you, affirmatively tell you, he is willing to answer your questions? 35 A. Mr. Dawson was, in my opinion, telling half-truths the entire night that he was in there. 36 (Id.) The district court then denied counsel's ensuing mistrial motion on the ground that the agent's response had been invited by the question: 37 You asked him whether in effect [Dawson] was being cooperative. That question permitted that answer. You are trying to suggest through your question that he was cooperative and truthful, and the agent said [Dawson] was [not] telling the truth. So, there is no basis for a mistrial and you invited that answer. 38 (Id. at 456.) 39 The district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in allowing the agent's answer to stand, as we agree that the agent's answer was invited by counsel's question. It is in any event doubtful that the agent's statement had any effect on the jury's assessment of Dawson's credibility, as the agent already had testified on direct examination, without objection from Dawson's counsel, that he had told Dawson in the course of their discussions that Dawson was not being entirely truthful. (See Tr. at 456; see also Tr. at 461-63.) Dawson confirmed during his own testimony that the agent had made such a statement in the course of the post-arrest interrogation. (Tr. at 638.) The agent's statement thus did not deprive Dawson of a fair trial. 40 c. 41 Dawson's final challenge to his conviction is addressed to the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument and also relates to the credibility of Agent Roberts. Dawson's counsel intimated in his closing argument that the agent had lied in testifying that Dawson remained silent when questioned about the kidnapping and attempted extortion. The Assistant United States Attorney then countered with the following rebuttal argument: 42 But attacking a federal agent who is out there to protect individuals in society and claiming that they committed perjury on the stand, a federal offense for this one case to get this one defendant is ridiculous. They would risk their careers to get this one defendant and commit perjury on the stand. 43 (Tr. at 1370.) Dawson's counsel objected, contending that there was nothing to suggest that the agent would be risking his career by lying. The district court overruled the objection and allowed the argument to stand. Dawson now contends that the prosecutor's argument was improper and that it deprived him of a fair trial. Although we agree that the government's argument was improper, we find that it did not so infect Dawson's trial that it deprived him of due process. 44 Our cases set out a two-part test for assessing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. First, we consider the prosecutor's disputed remarks in isolation to determine whether they are improper. If they are, we then consider the remarks in the context of the entire record and assess whether they had the effect of denying the defendant a fair trial. Smith, 26 F.3d at 753; United States v. Badger, 983 F.2d 1443, 1450 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2391, 114 S.Ct. 76, 124 L.Ed.2d 293, 126 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). In that regard, we look to 45 the nature and seriousness of the statement; whether the statement was invited by the conduct of defense counsel; whether the district court sufficiently instructed the jury to disregard such statements; whether the defense could counter the improper statement through rebuttal; and finally, whether the weight of the evidence was against the defendant. 46 United States v. Severson, 3 F.3d 1005, 1014 (7th Cir.1993); see also Badger, 983 F.2d at 1450. 47 When considered in isolation, the prosecutor's statement, which vouched for Agent Roberts' credibility and speculated that the agent would risk his career by testifying falsely, was certainly improper. See Badger, 983 F.2d at 1451 (improper for prosecutor to ask jury during rebuttal argument whether agent would risk his job, reputation, pension, and criminal charges in making up false statements); United States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 731 (7th Cir.) (clearly improper for prosecutor to argue that agent had no reason to lie and to risk his career and reputation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903, 108 S.Ct. 245, 98 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987). We therefore must consider the statement in the context of the entire record to determine whether it deprived Dawson of a fair trial. We note in that regard that Dawson's counsel had no opportunity to counter the statement, as it was made in the government's rebuttal argument, and that the district court overruled an objection to the remark and allowed it to stand. The government contends, nonetheless, that even if the remark was improper, it was invited by the closing argument of Dawson's counsel. The government also maintains that the comment was harmless in any event when considered against the weight of the other evidence implicating Dawson in the extortion conspiracy. 48 Under the invited response doctrine, if defense counsel strikes the first blow, we will not necessarily reverse a conviction if the prosecutor attempts to even the scales by making a reasonable but otherwise improper response. See Severson, 3 F.3d at 1014; Badger, 983 F.2d at 1452. This doctrine, however, does not give the government license to respond in kind to what it deems an improper argument by a defendant's counsel, for as the Supreme Court has made clear, two improper arguments--two apparent wrongs--do not make for a right result. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Instead, the issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor's 'invited response,' taken in context, unfairly prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 12, 105 S.Ct. at 1045; see also Smith, 26 F.3d at 755. We do not believe the prosecutor's statement had that effect here. 49 First, we can agree that the prosecutor's remarks were invited. During his own argument, Dawson's counsel directly challenged Agent Roberts' credibility: 50 There were no questions in that sanitized statement prepared by the agent, and there were no notations of Carl's numerous denials that he testified to whenever they would ask him about extortion. Why do you think he left out the denials? I don't know why he left them out. But if you believe what he says, Carl stared [at] him blankly when he asked him about extortion or kidnapping rather than saying, No, I didn't do it. I had nothing to do with it. I don't know anything about it. 51 Is that a fair process, ladies and gentlemen, to put that agent on the stand and expect us to believe that that's what the post arrest statement of Carl was really like? 52 (Tr. at 1289-90.) The prosecutor apparently found it necessary after this attack to bolster the agent's credibility, and he went so far as to suggest that the agent would have no motive to risk his career by lying in this single case. When those arguments are considered in light of the entire record, we do not believe that the prosecutor's improper remark deprived Dawson of a fair trial. See Badger, 983 F.2d at 1452; Swiatek, 819 F.2d at 731. The arguments we have highlighted essentially joined a central issue in Dawson's case--whether the jury should believe Agent Roberts or Dawson's own exculpatory testimony at trial? The jury apparently did not find Dawson to be a credible witness, but the weight of the evidence against him indicates that the jury's finding cannot be attributed solely to the prosecutor's improper remark during closing argument. It thus did not deprive Dawson of a fair trial.