Opinion ID: 199356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Accommodation vis-a-vis Undue Hardship

Text: 17 Under the ADA, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant could provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. At the same time, the statute places the burden on the defendant to show that the proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. §a12112(b)(5)(A). There is a well recognized tension in the statute's allocation of burdens in this fashion. The burdens might appear to be mirror images of one another: a reasonable accommodation, it might seem, is simply one that does not impose an undue hardship. But if this were so, the statute would effectively impose identical burdens on both parties. Other circuit courts have dealt with this tension using linguistically different, but functionally similar, approaches. The first approach shifts the burden of persuasion from plaintiff to defendant, so that the burden of identifying a reasonable accommodation is only one of production. Under this approach, plaintiff's burden 18 is not a heavy one. It is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits. Once the plaintiff has done this, she has made out a prima facie showing that a reasonable accommodation is available, and the risk of nonpersuasion falls on the defendant. 19 Borkowski v. Valley Central Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The Third Circuit has expressly utilized this test in an ADA case, see Walton v. Mental Health Assoc., 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 1999), and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits use a similar approach, see Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 1999); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995). 20 The other approach, which seems to have originated with the D.C. Circuit in a Rehabilitation Act case, Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993), ostensibly keeps all burdens of proving reasonable accommodation on the plaintiff. See id. at 1186 (The burden [ ] remains with the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.). This approach is followed by the Fifth Circuit, see Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1996); the Sixth Circuit, see Hoskins v. Oakland Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 227 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2000); Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 & n.10, 1186 n.12 (6th Cir. 1996); the Seventh Circuit, see Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995); and the Eleventh Circuit, see Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285-86 (11th Cir. 1997) (also denying that reasonable accommodation and undue burden are mirror images). Nonetheless, under this approach, the plaintiff still need only make a general or facial showing of reasonableness. See, e.g., Barth, 2 F.3d at 1187 (reasonable accommodation is a method of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of cases, whereas the undue hardship inquiry focuses on the hardships imposed by the plaintiff's preferred accommodation in the context of the particular [employer's] operations (emphasis in original)), quoted in Willis, 108 F.3d at 286 n.2 andRiel, 99 F.3d at 683; Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542 (in proving reasonable accommodation plaintiff must make facial showing of proportionality to costs, whereupon employer, in showing undue burden, has opportunity to prove upon more careful consideration that costs are excessive). 21 We are reluctant to talk about the problem of the relationship between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship as one of shifting burdens. 3 We prefer to discuss the burdens of showing reasonable accommodation and undue hardship as they are allocated in the statute: the plaintiff fully bears the former, and the defendant fully bears the latter. The real issue is the quantum of proof needed to show reasonable accommodation vis-a-vis the quantum of proof needed to show undue hardship. 22 On this issue, we reject the position urged on us by the EEOC. In contrast to the basic approach followed by our sister circuits, the EEOC argues that the only burden a plaintiff has on proving reasonable accommodation is to show that the accommodation would effectively enable her to perform her job; whether the accommodation would be too costly or difficult, on the EEOC's view, is entirely for the defendant to prove. 4 We agree that proving an accommodation's effectiveness is part of the plaintiff's burden; but it is not the whole. Indeed, simply in explaining how her proposal constitutes an accommodation, the plaintiff must show that it would effectively enable her to perform her job. That is precisely what an accommodation does. But what plaintiff must show further under the statute is that her requested accommodation is reasonable. And consistent with its usage throughout the law, the concept of reasonableness here constrains the plaintiff in what she can demand from the defendant. A request that the defendant relocate its operations to a warmer climate, for example, is difficult to imagine as being reasonable. A reasonable request for an accommodation must in some way consider the difficulty or expense imposed on the one doing the accommodating. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-43. 23 Thus, we believe the best way to distinguish between the two burdens is to follow in essence the lead of our sister circuits: In order to prove reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff needs to show not only that the proposed accommodation would enable her to perform the essential functions of her job, but also that, at least on the face of things, it is feasible for the employer under the circumstances. 5 If plaintiff succeeds in carrying this burden, the defendant then has the opportunity to show that the proposed accommodation is not as feasible as it appears but rather that there are further costs to be considered, certain devils in the details. 24 Under this arrangement, the difficulty of providing plaintiff's proposed accommodation will often be relevant both to the reasonableness of the accommodation and to whether it imposes an undue hardship. Cf. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-43. Plaintiff will often need to take such difficulties into account in proving whether the accommodation is facially practicable, and defendant will of course need to provide evidence of them in attempting to prove undue hardship. Indeed, where the costs of an accommodation are relatively obvious -- where they really are what they appear to be on the face of things -- plaintiff's burden and defendant's burden may in application be quite similar, even to the extent of being mirror images. Where the burdens will significantly differ is when the costs of an accommodation are not evident on the face of things, but rather are better known to the employer. Cf. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding employer's superior knowledge as to certain matters relevant to determining extent of parties' burdens). For example, an employee's proposal that her work area be modified might be facially reasonable, but the employer may still show that, given the particular limitations on its financial resources, or other hidden costs, such accommodation imposes an undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. §a12111(10)(B). 25 In the end, it is difficult to propound language as to the content of the parties' burdens much more specific than the language of the statute. 6 Consequently, in many cases the dividing line between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship will be inexact -- but benignly so. Given the inexactness of that dividing line, wise counsel for both parties will err on the side of offering proof beyond what their burdens require. The summary judgment decisions of this court have often turned on the surprising failure by one party or the other to proffer any significant evidence in favor of their position. See, e.g., Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 649; Ward, 209 F.3d at 36-37.