Opinion ID: 425171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right of Self-Representation

Text: 89 While it is well established that defendants in criminal actions may, under certain circumstances, waive their Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, 68 the Supreme Court has only recently held that the Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to dispense with the services of counsel and represent themselves at trial. 69 Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at 818-21, 835-36, 95 S.Ct. at 2532-34, 2541-42. The Court found that a right of self-representation was implied by the language and history of the Sixth Amendment: 90 The Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-representation. That conclusion is supported by centuries of consistent history. 91 Id. at 832, 95 S.Ct. at 2539. See id. at 818-19, 821, 95 S.Ct. at 2532-33, 2534. The Court recognized, however, that defendants' exercise of the newly defined constitutional right to proceed pro se would necessarily involve an abandonment of the explicit Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court indicated that defendants should be permitted to exercise their right to represent themselves only if they execute a valid waiver of their right to the assistance of counsel; i.e., only if they  'knowingly and intelligently' forgo [the] relinquished benefits of counsel. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023-24, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 92 Because the exercise of the right of self-representation necessarily involves a waiver of the preeminent right to the assistance of counsel, 70 the stringent limitations established by the Supreme Court for waiver of the right to counsel necessarily define the requirements for exercise of the right of self-representation. Thus the Court's decisions establish that the mere failure of a defendant to request counsel will not result in a waiver of the right to counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Since a defendant must act affirmatively to relinquish the right to counsel, it follows that the right of self-representation is waived if not asserted; for only if the defendant asserts the right to proceed pro se will it be possible for a court to find the requisite waiver of the right to counsel. Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610-11 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 327, 50 L.Ed.2d 293 (1976). 93 Similarly, because the Supreme Court has enjoined courts to indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242, a defendant must articulately and unmistakably assert[ ] his desire to avail himself of the constitutional right to self-representation .... United States v. Bailey, supra, 675 F.2d at 1300 (emphasis added). 71 Given the strong presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, such a stringent standard for judging the adequacy of an assertion of the right of self-representation, involving as it does a waiver of the right to counsel, is entirely appropriate. 94 [A] court should not quickly infer that a defendant unskilled in the law has waived counsel and has opted to conduct his own defense. 95 Brown v. Wainwright, supra, 665 F.2d at 610. So also, a defendant who adopts equivocal positions regarding a request to proceed pro se may properly be held to have waived the right of self-representation. Id. at 611; United States v. Bennett, supra, 539 F.2d at 51. 96 In sum, defendants have a constitutional right derived from the Sixth Amendment to represent themselves at a criminal trial. However, because the exercise of that right requires waiver of the right to assistance of counsel, 72 the right of self-representation is waived unless defendants articulately and unmistakably demand to proceed pro se. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether Ciuzio presented the district court with an articulate and unmistakable demand to represent himself at his second trial. After a careful review of the record, we are convinced that he did not.