Opinion ID: 2018781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Our authority to issue, hear and determine original and remedial writs is derived from Article IV, Section 86, North Dakota Constitution, which provides: The supreme court shall be the highest court of the state. It shall have appellate jurisdiction, and shall also have original jurisdiction with authority to issue, hear, and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary to properly exercise its jurisdiction. . . . Concerning our jurisdiction, the legislature, in § 27-02-04, NDCC, has stated: The supreme court may exercise appellate jurisdiction only, except when otherwise specially provided by law or by the constitution. Such court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, and injunction. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in its superintending control over inferior courts, it may issue such original and remedial writs as are necessary to the proper exercise of such jurisdiction. Such court shall exercise its original jurisdiction only in habeas corpus cases and in such cases of strictly public concern as involve questions affecting the sovereign rights of this state or its franchises or privileges. [Emphasis added.] The power vested in this court to issue original and remedial writs, even upon a proper showing, is discretionary and cannot be invoked as a matter of right, and the court will determine for itself whether or not the case is within its jurisdiction. Burlington Northern v. N. D. Dist. Court, etc., 264 N.W.2d 453 (N.D.1978); State v. Nelson County, 1 N.D. 88, 45 N.W. 33 (1890). It is well-settled that the power of the court to exercise its original jurisdiction extends only to those cases in which the question presented is publici juris, wherein the sovereignty of the state, the franchises or prerogatives of the state, or the liberties of its people are affected. State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914 (N.D. 1978); Gasser v. Dorgan, 261 N.W.2d 386 (N.D.1977); State ex rel. DeKrey v. Peterson, 174 N.W.2d 95 (N.D.1970). The interest of the state must be primary, not incidental, and the public, the community at large, must have an interest or right which may be affected. State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, supra ; State v. Omdahl, 138 N.W.2d 439 (N.D.1965). See also Burke, The Prerogative Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 32 N.D.L.Rev. 199. Although, ordinarily, the attorney general institutes these proceedings as the legal representative of the interests of the state, his consent or refusal is not necessary in an action in which he is one of the parties defendant, and which concerns his alleged wrongful act and seeks to restrain it. State v. Langer, 46 N.D. 462, 177 N.W. 408 (1919). In this case the governor contends that the legislative branch has infringed upon the authority granted to him by the North Dakota Constitution to assign duties to the lieutenant governor. The case also involves the extent of the power of the governor to partially veto a bill. The constitutionality of legislative action which appears to change the scope and function of the office of lieutenant governor is involved. These are issues of public concern as they affect not only the elected officials who are directly involved, but also the delicate balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government. Accordingly, we hold this to be a proper case for this court to exercise its original jurisdiction. Our inquiry does not end here, however. We must also determine whether or not the case involves an actual controversy of justiciable nature, and whether or not the writ of prohibition is a proper instrument for determination of the significant public issues in the case. We do not act merely because an interesting legal question has been asked. See Davis v. O'Keefe, 283 N.W.2d 73 (N.D.1979). Governor Link contended that the legislature, by enacting § 1 of SB 2460, infringed upon his executive powers. He therefore attempted to veto § 1 only, permitting the remainder to become law. The attorney general advised Governor Link that he did not have the power to veto § 1 under his constitutional authority to partially veto appropriation measures and that, accordingly, SB 2460, in its entirety, became law. The questions raised are not abstract but reflect an actual controversy of a justiciable nature. The court recently exercised its original jurisdiction under § 86 of the North Dakota Constitution in an analogous case, State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898 (N.D.1977). That case, and this one, involves a high-level executive officer contending that the legislative branch has infringed upon the authority granted to him by the North Dakota Constitution. That case, and this one, are alike in seeking interpretation of a constitutional provision and in challenging the validity of a legislative act. This court, in Freed, supra, stated: Even a question of whether a matter has, in any manner, been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed to it, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota. (Citations omitted.) 251 N.W.2d at 904. We hold this case does present an actual controversy of a justiciable character and warrants our exercise of original jurisdiction. We then move to the question whether or not a writ of prohibition is a proper instrument for determination of the significant public issues in this case. Chapter 32-35, NDCC, provides the statutory authority for a writ of prohibition. Sections 32-35-01 and 32-35-02, NDCC, state as follows: 32-35-01. Definition of writ of prohibition. The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandamus. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person. 32-35-02. By whom and when issued. The writ of prohibition may be issued by the supreme and district courts to an inferior tribunal, or to a corporation, board, or person in any case, where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is issued upon affidavit on the application of the person beneficially interested. In the case of Mor-Gran-Sou Elec. Coop. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 160 N.W.2d 521 (N.D.1968), the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition against the Public Service Commission to arrest the furnishing of electric service by MDU under a temporary certificate of convenience and necessity in a designated three-county area. In denying the request for a writ of prohibition, this court held: It is not an appropriate writ to revoke an order already made, for its proper use is to prohibit the doing of something, not the undoing of something already done. Crittenden v. Municipal Court, San Diego Judicial District, 216 Cal.App.2d 811, 31 Cal.Rptr. 280 (1963); State ex rel. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So.2d 169 (Fla.1959). 160 N.W.2d at 523. In the instant case, as in Mor-Gran-Sou, supra, the act to be prohibited has, in every significant respect, been accomplished prior to the request for its prohibition (i. e., the attorney general had already issued his opinion that the attempted partial veto was void and that SB 2460 became law in its entirety) and nothing further appears to be threatened by the attorney general. Moreover, the issuance of the opinion by the attorney general does not appear to have been without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the attorney general under § 54-12-01, NDCC, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: Attorney generalDuties. The attorney general shall: . . . . . 6. Consult with and advise the governor and all other state officers, and when requested give written opinions on all legal or constitutional questions relating to the duties of such officers respectively; . . . . . 8. Give written opinions, when requested by either branch of the legislative assembly, upon legal questions; Even though we conclude here that a writ of prohibition is unavailable, we are not thereby prevented from deciding the significant issues raised in the case. Long ago we held that this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may frame its process as the exigencies require. State v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 362, 66 N.W. 234. State v. Langer, supra, 177 N.W. at 413. Since the supreme court is a court of record (see § 27-01-01, NDCC), the declaratory judgment procedure found in § 32-23-01, NDCC, is available to this court, and we will proceed pursuant thereto.