Opinion ID: 169226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Framew ork

Text: Jordan’s theory of defense pits two evidentiary values against each other: (1) the admission of relevant evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 401, against (2) the exclusion of prejudicial, misleading, and confusing evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 403. The bar for admission under Rule 401 is “very low.” M cVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1190. This is because the degree of materiality and probativity necessary for evidence to be relevant is “minimal” and must only provide a “fact-finder with a basis for making some inference, or chain of inferences.” Id. W hile the burden is low, it does not sanction the carte blanche admission of whatever evidence a defendant would like. The trial judge is the gatekeeper under the Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 requires courts to “exclud[e] [even relevant evidence] if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Such circumstances might arise when evidence suggests to the jury that it should “render its findings on an improper basis, comm only . . . an emotional one,” and when “circumstantial evidence would tend to sidetrack the jury into 7 consideration of factual disputes only tangentially related to the facts at issue in the current case.” M cVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotes and citations omitted). W hen proffered evidence deals with a defense theory of an alternative perpetrator, additional considerations arise. As the Supreme Court recently noted in reviewing the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute that excluded thirdparty guilt evidence, “[e]vidence tending to show the commission by another person of the crime charged may be introduced by accused when it is inconsistent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his ow n guilt; but frequently matters offered in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack such connection with the crime that they are excluded.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1733 (2006) (Third-party guilt evidence may also be excluded “w here it does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime . . . [such as w here it is] speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant’s trial.”). Our most recent exploration of the alternative perpetrator evidence was in United States v. M cVeigh. There, we explained, A lthough there is no doubt that a defendant has a right to attem pt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else did the crime, a defendant still must show that his proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the asserted “alternative perpetrator.” It is not sufficient for a defendant merely to offer up unsupported speculation that another 8 person may have done the crime. Such speculative blaming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion, and it invites the jury to render its findings based on emotion or prejudice. 153 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, courts may properly deny admission of alternative perpetrator evidence that fails to establish, either on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, a non-speculative “nexus” between the crime charged and the alleged perpetrator. In M cVeigh, we upheld the district court’s ruling to exclude evidence the defense claimed would link a white-supremacist, anti-government organization to the Oklahoma City bombing. Id. at 1188. M cVeigh proffered testimony from an undercover agent in the organization that (1) it harbored similar anti-government view s to M cVeigh’s, (2) some members expressed vague threats to bomb targets in Oklahoma, and (3) an alleged identification of the composite sketches released after the bombing. Id. at 1192. The district court found the evidence relevant under R ule 401, but excluded it under Rule 403. Id. at 1188. W e agreed with the district court’s order. First, we held that the proffered testimony’s “highly generalized and speculative nature” greatly diminished its probative value. Id. at 1191. Second, in light of the lack of a probative nexus between the extremist group and the Oklahoma City bombing, we found that the testimony would lead to the “confusion of the issues” because the government would be forced to put on a “side trial” to disprove the nebulous allegations of the 9 group’s involvement in the bombing. Id. Third, we concluded the evidence would threaten “unfair prejudice” because “it would invite the jury to blame absent, unrepresented individuals and groups for whom there often may be strong underlying emotional responses.” Id. at 1192. In balancing relevance and prejudice, we concluded the evidence’s low probative value did not outweigh the substantial chance of prejudice and confusion, tipping the scales in favor of exclusion. W ith this background, we turn to Jordan’s theory of defense.