Opinion ID: 1182062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: pretrial and guilt phase contentions

Text: In March 1985, defendant's counsel expressed doubt that defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings in accordance with section 1368 and appointed Dr. Charles Davis and, at defendant's request, Dr. Paul Levy to examine defendant. Dr. Levy concluded defendant was incompetent and unable to cooperate in preparing a defense; Dr. Davis observed defendant was hostile and uncooperative and expressed the view he was either feigning mental illness or suffering from a psychosis of undetermined etiology. A third expert, Dr. Hedburg, was then appointed to examine defendant; he found defendant competent to stand trial at a borderline level. The trial court denied the prosecutor's request for a jury trial on the issue of competence, but the Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate determining the People had a statutory right to jury trial. ( People v. Superior Court ( McPeters ) (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 796 [215 Cal. Rptr. 482].) In October 1985, Dr. Levy again examined defendant and, based on his four examinations of defendant in 1984 and 1985, issued a new report finding him in a state of excellent and complete remission from any overtly psychotic symptoms and mentally competent to stand trial. He found no evidence of thought disorder, psychotic process, delusions or hallucinations, organic brain syndrome, or psychological depression or anxiety. After receiving Dr. Levy's report, the trial court, at the prosecutor's request, appointed Dr. Davis to reexamine defendant. Dr. Davis issued a two-part report, the first part concerning defendant's mental state at the time of the crime and the second concluding defendant was presently competent to stand trial. At the time appointed for the hearing on the issue of competence, the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated the matter would be presented to the court for determination based on the most recent reports of Drs. Levy and Davis. Based on those reports, the court found defendant competent to stand trial and reinstated the criminal proceedings against him. (1) Defendant maintains the above procedure violated his statutory and state and federal constitutional due process rights by depriving him of a full, trial-type, adversary hearing on the issue of his competence to stand trial. To the contrary, the procedure adopted by counsel and the court did not deprive defendant of any of his rights. Section 1368 entitles defendant to a hearing on the issue of competence and he received one. Although defendant's counsel, for understandable reasons, elected to waive certain available incidents of the hearing procedure, i.e., the right to jury trial and the rights to present oral testimony and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, defendant presented evidence and received an independent judicial determination of his competence to stand trial based on the stipulated record. ( People v. Cisneros (1973) 34 Cal. App.3d 399, 406-407 [110 Cal. Rptr. 269].) Defendant cites no authority holding that submission to the court of the issue of competence to stand trial based on psychiatric reports is per se unconstitutional or a violation of statute. Because defendant had a hearing and does not show it was in any significant way incomplete or unfair, we reject his contention. [1]
Defendant contends the presumption of competence and allocation of the burden of proof under section 1369 violates his due process rights under the state and federal Constitutions. There is no merit in defendant's contention; we have squarely rejected it. ( People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881-886 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282], affd. sub nom. Medina v. California (1992) ___ U.S. ___ [120 L.Ed.2d 353, 112 S.Ct. 2572].)
(2a) Defendant filed a motion for discovery of numerous documents alleged to be in the possession of the Fresno County District Attorney's office, including writings showing the district attorney's capital charging policies, practices, and decisions. The motion also required the accumulation and presentation of a vast amount of statistical data on cases filed and charging decisions made by the district attorney over a seven-year period, including not only complaints and informations filed and case numbers of special circumstances eligible cases but a brief summary of the facts, and race, sex and age data for each defendant and wilful homicide victim. The stated object of the motion was to obtain evidence to support a defense contention that the prosecution had in wilful homicide cases followed an enforcement policy deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard, i.e., the race of the victim. (See Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 293-294 [124 Cal. Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44].) In support of his motion, defendant submitted a study conducted by the Fresno County Public Defender's office. The study purported to compare, by race of victim, those Fresno County cases in which defendants were sentenced to death or life in prison without possibility of parole with other Fresno County cases of wilful homicide. The study did not describe or analyze the facts or circumstances of any case, other than the sentence and the race of victim. For example, it did not attempt to distinguish between single and multiple homicide cases, nor did it attempt to account for nonracial factors that could have explained differences in charging and sentencing. The study purported to show that while only one-third of all wilful homicide victims in the county were White, all death or life-without-parole sentences were meted out in cases involving White victims. In a memorandum decision analyzing the evidence presented in support of the motion, the trial court ruled defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case sufficient to support the discovery sought. Its decision emphasized the absence of any factual comparison among the homicide cases presented by defendant, despite the availability of information in the public record that could have been used to make such a comparison. (3) Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system. ( McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 312 [95 L.Ed.2d 262, 291, 107 S.Ct. 1756], fn. omitted.) [C]onstitutional guarantees are met when `the mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible.' [Citation.] Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. ( Id. at p. 313 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 292].) In McCleskey, the Supreme Court held that an extensive study of 2,000 Georgia murder cases showing an apparent discrepancy in capital sentencing based on race of victim did not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process. ( Ibid. ) Many circumstances may affect the litigation of a case chargeable under the death penalty law. These include factual nuances, strength of evidence, and, in particular, the broad discretion to show leniency. Hence, one sentenced to death under a properly channeled death penalty scheme cannot prove a constitutional violation by showing that other persons whose crimes were superficially similar did not receive the death penalty. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 506 [758 P.2d 1081].) (2b) Although a defendant seeking discovery is not required to meet the standard of proof requisite to the dismissal of a discriminatory prosecution ( People v. Municipal Court ( Street ) (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 739, 748 [153 Cal. Rptr. 69]), discovery is not a fishing expedition. A motion for discovery must `describe the requested information with at least some degree of specificity and ... be sustained by plausible justification.' ( Griffin v. Municipal Court (1977) 20 Cal.3d 300, 306 [142 Cal. Rptr. 286, 571 P.2d 997].) No plausible justification was offered by the defense in this case. Defendant showed no more than the barest form of apparent disparity. His presentation ignored readily available, case-specific data that could, if favorable, have supplied a plausible justification for further inquiry. We are directed to no authority that requires the kind of wide-ranging foray sought by defendant based on such a meager showing. No right of defendant, constitutional or otherwise, was infringed by the denial of his discovery motion.
(4a) In a pretrial motion under section 1538.5, defendant contended that his constitutional rights were violated by the unlawful seizure of his gun. Police obtained the gun from defendant's cousin, Sabrina Epperson, with whom he had left it. The trial court denied the motion, ruling defendant had no standing to challenge the admissibility of the gun. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress the gun. In this post-Proposition 8 case, the issue is whether the seizure of defendant's gun from his cousin violated defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) (5) An illegal search or seizure violates the federal constitutional rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place or seized thing. ( United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 [65 L.Ed.2d 619, 628, 100 S.Ct. 2547].) The legitimate expectation of privacy must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge. ( People v. Hernandez (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 1182, 1189 [245 Cal. Rptr. 513], italics in original.) Because the historical facts concerning standing are established by uncontradicted evidence, we review independently the trial court's ruling that defendant lacked standing to challenge seizure of the gun. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) Defendant bears the burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy. ( Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 104 [65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641, 100 S.Ct. 2556].) A claim of ownership in property seized does not necessarily signify a legitimate expectation of privacy, although it is one factor to be considered in the analysis. ( Id. at p. 105 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 641-642].) Among the factors to be considered are: `whether the defendant has a [property or] possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises.' [Citations omitted.] ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 199 Cal. App.3d at p. 1189.) (4b) Applying these factors to the evidence before the trial court, we conclude defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the gun. While an overnight guest in his relatives' home, he gave the gun to his cousin Sabrina, asking her to hold it for him. She put the weapon in her own bedroom under her pillow. Although defendant owned the gun and was in the house by permission, he exhibited no concern whatever in knowing the specific place where it was to be kept; moreover, he failed to show he had any legitimate access to that place. He had no right to exclude others from his cousin's bedroom. Moreover, defendant took no precautions to maintain any privacy with respect to his gun  he parted with it voluntarily, knowing it would be kept by another person in a place both unknown to him and over which he had no control. Defendant's behavior was consistent with a desire to rid himself of the gun that had obviously become a hot item; whether he intended to do so temporarily or permanently, he clearly asserted no continuing private interest in it. Having voluntarily surrendered his gun to his cousin with no attempt to control or safeguard its location, defendant had no standing to complain when police obtained it from her. (See, e.g., People v. Martins (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 1632, 1637 [279 Cal. Rptr. 687] [no standing to challenge search of locked suitcase shipped across country in name of another person where both shipping airline and party to whom suitcase was addressed consented to search]; People v. Root (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 774, 776-779 [218 Cal. Rptr. 182] [no standing to challenge seizure of unsealed bag placed in automobile of another].) Our rejection of defendant's claim of standing also disposes of his related arguments. Defendant's assertion that his cousin was illegally arrested and coerced into surrendering the weapon is an attempt to invoke her constitutional rights; defendant lacks standing to do so. Defendant's further assertion that his trial counsel failed to develop an adequate record at the suppression hearing likewise lacks merit. (6) Defense counsel is not required to advance unmeritorious arguments on the defendant's behalf. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839]; People v. Taylor (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 720, 726 [208 Cal. Rptr. 708]; People v. Eckstrom (1974) 43 Cal. App.3d 996, 1001-1003 [118 Cal. Rptr. 391].)
(7a) Two Black men, Carlos Brewer and Henry Freeman, were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor. Defendant objected to the challenges based on the rule of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d, 106 S.Ct. 1712]. In each case, after the objection was interposed, the trial court asked the prosecutor to place on the record his reasons for the challenges. On consideration of the reasons, the court overruled the objections, finding no prima facie case of racial discrimination had been made out. (8) Under the procedure we adopted in Wheeler, the burden of showing a peremptory challenge is not based on group bias does not shift to the prosecutor until a prima facie case of such bias has been made. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 281-283.) (7b) Although the trial court here inquired into the prosecutor's reasons for the two challenges before determining whether a prima facie case had been made, its failure to follow the prescribed procedure did not constitute error. Assuming, arguendo, a prima facie case of Wheeler discrimination was made out, the prosecutor articulated a race-neutral explanation related to the case, i.e., a specific bias as opposed to group bias for each of the challenged jurors. ( People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047].) As to Brewer, the prosecutor pointed to his statement on voir dire examination that a nickel and dime impromptu robbery might not merit the death penalty. Although Brewer later attempted to shift the emphasis from the amount involved in the robbery to the humanity of the crime, his statement afforded a basis for peremptory challenge grounded in the specific facts of this case. This case could well have been characterized as a nickel and dime impromptu robbery in the prospective juror's mind, evincing a possible bias against the death penalty. As to Freeman, the prosecutor pointed to voir dire statements that Freeman did not believe in the death penalty and would change the law to eliminate it and did not like to sit in judgment of others. Again, in a death penalty prosecution including a robbery special circumstance, the record supports the existence of a specific bias supporting the peremptory challenge. On appeal, defendant seeks to place his objection to the peremptory challenges on federal Constitution, Sixth Amendment as well as Wheeler ( supra, 22 Cal.3d 258) grounds. Having failed to raise a Sixth Amendment argument below, defendant has waived it. On the merits, he offers nothing to show a Sixth Amendment ground would justify a different result with respect to the peremptory challenges. Regardless of the legal ground asserted, the prosecutor's challenges were specifically grounded in particular facts; they evinced no group bias so as to deprive defendant of any of his rights.
When the name of Victor Pasnick, the victim's husband, was read to the jury along with other possible trial witnesses, Juror House did not admit to knowing Pasnick. After the jury was sworn but before opening statements were delivered, the trial court reported receiving a phone call from House, who indicated he had acquired some information about the case he wished to discuss. House was summoned into court and, with counsel present, stated he had learned he might be acquainted with Victor Pasnick. He revealed that he was in the process of buying a house, that Pasnick might be the seller's real estate agent, and that he had met and spoken with the agent on at least three occasions at the agent's office. The prosecutor confirmed that Pasnick was in the real estate business and there appears to be no dispute that he was the agent representing the seller in the residential purchase transaction to which House was a party. House had completed the documents necessary to close the escrow and complete the sale, had last met with the agent five weeks earlier, and there was no indication that the two would have any further dealings. In response to questioning from the court and counsel, House stated that he had not discussed the case with Pasnick, and, although he thought highly of Pasnick and initially felt this might affect his judgment, he affirmed his ability to be objective and stated he would assume Pasnick's credibility was equal to that of any other witness. Defense counsel objected to House's continued service as a juror and requested his removal and replacement with one of the four alternate jurors. Counsel was unable to articulate a specific legal basis for the objection and conceded in response to further questioning by the court that Pasnick's testimony would not be the subject of serious controversy in the case. Based on House's responses and the evidence and argument in the record, the trial court found that House had no bias, express or implied, and would be a fair and impartial juror. Defendant's motion to remove him was denied. (9a) Federal defendant contends the court's ruling violated both section 1089 and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. We disagree. Implicit in the court's finding and remarks was a determination that House's initial failure to disclose his relationship with Pasnick was inadvertent and unintentional. Defendant does not challenge this determination and, indeed, argues that the trial court was required to remove House from the jury even if his failure to disclose his business transaction with Pasnick was unintentional. Defendant is incorrect. (10) Although intentional concealment of material information by a potential juror may constitute implied bias justifying his or her disqualification or removal ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 183-184 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; People v. Blackwell (1987) 191 Cal. App.3d 925, 929-931 [236 Cal. Rptr. 803]), mere inadvertent or unintentional failures to disclose are not accorded the same effect. [T]he proper test to be applied to unintentional `concealment' is whether the juror is sufficiently biased to constitute good cause for the court to find under Penal Code sections 1089 and [former] 1123 that he is unable to perform his duty. ( People v. Jackson (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 700, 706 [214 Cal. Rptr. 346].) Whether a failure to disclose is intentional or unintentional and whether a juror is biased in this regard are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Except where bias is clearly apparent from the record, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the state of mind of a juror or potential juror on voir dire examination. ( People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 186, fn. 4; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1224.) (9b) Applying these rules, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding House's nondisclosure to be inadvertent and, further, in finding no express or implied bias on his part. In the context of voir dire examination, it is conceivable a juror might not immediately remember the name of a real estate agent with whom he had recently dealt or recognize the agent's name on a long list of witnesses. Notwithstanding his contact with Pasnick, which in any event was brief and not naturally or inevitably productive of bias, House affirmed his belief he could be fair and impartial. His candid disclosure of the contact even before the trial began further supports his determination to be a fair and impartial juror. Under these circumstances, neither defendant's Sixth Amendment rights nor his rights under section 1089 were infringed. People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 926 [200 Cal. Rptr. 77], cited by defendant, is distinguishable. In Diaz, the jury foreperson failed to disclose she was assaulted with a knife during an attempted rape and had pursued and stabbed her assailant, despite specific voir dire questions whether she had been a victim of a crime or involved in a knife fight. In view of the traumatic nature of the event and the specificity of the questions, it is highly unlikely the foreperson's nondisclosure was inadvertent.
After the trial court rejected a defense challenge for cause to prospective juror Lorenz, he was seated as an alternate. Lorenz did not participate in guilt phase deliberations, but was called on to serve at the penalty phase when a regular juror was excused. (11a) Defendant argues he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to sustain the challenge and excuse Juror Lorenz; he also maintains he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney apparently lost track of the number of peremptory challenges he had used. Neither contention has merit. As defendant observes, there was some inconsistency in Lorenz's responses to voir dire questions by the court and counsel. Lorenz recalled hearing or reading about the case. Based on what he heard or read, he stated his belief the accused was more likely to be guilty than innocent. He also stated his belief that a person was more apt to be guilty because he had been arrested and charged. On further examination, however, Lorenz affirmed several times his ability to make a decision based on the evidence and not on what he heard or read before trial. After observing Lorenz's responses to counsel's questions and asking several of his own, the trial court scrutinized the inconsistency in Lorenz's answers and expressly found him to be impartial. (12) The qualifications of jurors challenged for cause are a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. ( Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 944 [187 Cal. Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225].) `Where a prospective juror gives conflicting answers to questions relevant to his impartiality, the trial court's determination as to his state of mind is binding upon an appellate court....' ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1089 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) (11b) Although the trial court could have excused Juror Lorenz based on his answers, it was not compelled to do so. From the record, we cannot say that Lorenz's candor in admitting his reactions to pretrial information necessarily evinces bias when considered along with his assurances that he could set aside what he had read or heard and could decide the case based on the law and the evidence presented to him. There was no abuse of discretion in denying the challenge for cause. (13a) Defendant also argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he twice lost count of the number of defense peremptory challenges during the selection of alternate jurors. The record does show inquiries by counsel about the number of challenges left, including one after they were exhausted. (14) [T]o be entitled to reversal of a judgment on grounds that counsel did not provide constitutionally adequate assistance, the petitioner must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a `demonstrable reality,' not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) (13b) Assuming counsel's performance was deficient for losing track of the peremptory challenge count, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. Each of the four prospective alternate jurors challenged peremptorily by defendant expressed some strong pro-death-penalty or pro-guilt views or had direct personal or family connections with law enforcement. Defendant's suggestion that effective defense counsel aware of the count would have saved his final challenge for Juror Lorenz is pure speculation. Defendant was not prejudiced for another, independent reason. Juror Lorenz began the trial as an alternate juror; he did not participate in deliberations or the rendition of a verdict in the guilt phase. He joined the jury only in the penalty phase after another juror was excused. Lorenz's voir dire responses with respect to the death penalty were unequivocal and consistent with his obligations as a juror in a capital case. Although he professed to be in favor of the death penalty, he also believed the death penalty should not be imposed for all murders and acknowledged both the seriousness of a decision to impose the death penalty and a willingness to accept personal responsibility for that decision. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that any of Lorenz's statements regarding his beliefs as to guilt or innocence had any necessary impact on his penalty decision or the penalty verdict; thus, defendant has failed to show prejudice.
(15) Contrary to defendant's argument, the trial court properly sustained a prosecution challenge for cause to prospective juror Fries. A juror is not qualified to serve in a capital case if his or her views about the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844].) At the outset, Fries announced that his aversion to the death penalty was so strong he could never vote for it. On further questioning, he acknowledged the prospect he might vote for death if the crime were really horrid such as the murder of many children, but steadfastly maintained that, regardless of the facts, he could not vote for death in a case of robbery and first degree murder. The trial judge was in the best position to assess the depth and sincerity of Fries's expressed convictions and their likely impact on him as a decision maker. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) The record more than amply supports the court's conclusion that Fries's personal beliefs would either prevent or substantially impair his ability to follow the law in arriving at a verdict in this case.
In an effort to bolster the charge of robbery and the robbery special circumstance, the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of Linda Pasnick's habit of placing cash in envelopes as a means of earmarking funds for special purchases. Her husband, Victor Pasnick, testified to this habit, which was developed by the victim as a means of overcoming another apparent habit: compulsive spending. (16a) There was no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to admit the habit evidence. Evidence Code section 1105 provides that [a]ny otherwise admissible evidence of habit or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the habit or custom. At the foundational hearing, Victor Pasnick testified as to the victim's regular conduct under certain specified conditions, i.e., when she was paying bills of amounts owed to someone for a particular thing. According to his testimony, these conditions did not include all purchases, but did include special purchases for personal items such as clothing. (17) The question whether habit evidence is admissible is essentially one of threshold relevancy ( People v. Wein (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 79, 91 [137 Cal. Rptr. 814]); it is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 19 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) (16b) Here, there was evidence of repeated instances of similar conduct sufficient for the trial court to conclude a habit was present. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 681 [214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446].) In addition to asserting error in the admission of the habit evidence, defendant also maintains the trial court prevented him from effectively cross-examining the victim's husband on the issue of habit at the foundational hearing. Defendant cites a colloquy between the court and defense counsel wherein the court questioned the relevancy of counsel's question whether the victim had spent some of the $2,000 to $3,000 she had planned to spend on a modeling competition before the date of her murder. Initially, the court did not sustain any objection or specifically preclude any line of inquiry. Its mere inquiry was not a definite ruling against defendant's proposed examination; the absence of an adverse ruling precludes any appellate challenge. ( Haskell v. Carli (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 124, 120 [240 Cal. Rptr. 439] [failure to secure ruling waives issue on appeal].) Moreover, no abuse of discretion is shown. As the court indicated, the inquiry was of questionable relevance to the issue of the victim's habit of segregating funds in envelopes and making payments from the envelopes. Finally, no prejudice is shown. Even if the victim's husband had admitted that some of the $2,000 to $3,000 had been spent, this would not necessarily have precluded the victim from having a few hundred dollars with her in an envelope on the day of her murder.
(18a) Defendant argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression or another appropriate judicial remedy for the actions of police in discarding the envelope found on defendant's person when he was booked. Although two deputies testified defendant was in possession of an envelope containing $208.23 at the time he was booked, the envelope was apparently discarded by the booking officer pursuant to standard procedures that provided for the retention of the cash, but not its paper container. (19) In People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 512-513 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640], we held the People's duty to preserve evidence, whether grounded in the state or federal Constitution, was to be assessed following Proposition 8 in accordance with the standard articulated in California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488-489 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 421-422, 104 S.Ct. 2528]: `Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citations], evidence must possess both an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means....' ( Douglas, supra, at p. 512, italics added.) (18b) The lost envelope was of dubious exculpatory value. Although defendant asserts on appeal the production of the envelope might have shown it was not the type of envelope carried by the victim (windowed with writing on the outside showing the amount of money enclosed), at trial he testified there was no envelope. But assuming the envelope did have some exculpatory value, defendant failed to establish that value was apparent before the evidence was destroyed. The record reveals without contradiction that the envelope was discarded pursuant to standard police procedure; there is no evidence suggesting officers knew or should have known at the time of its disposal that the manner in which defendant carried money on his person would be in issue or of value to the defense.
(20) Defendant also challenges the admission of evidence that defendant was in possession of the white envelope containing $208.23 at the time he was booked. Initially, defendant failed to object to admission of this evidence in the trial court and has therefore waived the issue on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 962 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240].) Moreover, the evidence was properly admitted; therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. One officer testified that he was fairly positive the money was in an envelope and that standard booking practice was to discard such an envelope and use a jail envelope to keep any cash found on a prisoner's person. Another officer testified defendant had a regular, white letter-sized envelope in his right hand when he entered into the booking area and was clutching it, claiming it was his money. Defendant's various arguments about this testimony, e.g., that it was not sufficiently certain and did not include evidence that the envelope was marked with an amount and a type of purchase, went to its weight rather than its admissibility. They were properly addressed to the jury. None of defendant's arguments establishes any statutory or constitutional infirmity in the admission of such relevant circumstantial evidence. (21) Defendant's argument that the testimony violated the best evidence rule also fails. That rule applies only when the contents of a writing are at issue, not merely the existence of a physical object. (Evid. Code, § 1505; see People v. Whittaker (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 303, 309 [115 Cal. Rptr. 845]; People v. Daniels (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 36, 46 [93 Cal. Rptr. 628].) Moreover, even assuming content was at issue, the envelope was not in existence at the time of trial. Neither the police nor the prosecution destroyed it with fraudulent intent. Testimony may be adduced to prove the content of a lost writing. (Evid. Code, §§ 1501, 1505.)
(22) Defendant charges the prosecutor with various acts of misconduct during the guilt phase. At the outset, we observe that defendant failed to object to any of the asserted acts of misconduct at trial or to make any motions to strike, for mistrial, or for other appropriate relief in response to the prosecutor's acts. Because no incident cited by defendant was impervious to correction by a timely admonition, defendant has waived his right to challenge the alleged misconduct on appeal. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) Moreover, each of defendant's charges of misconduct is either without merit, nonprejudicial, or both. (23) First, defendant contends that the district attorney recalled the booking officer as a witness for the sole purpose of drawing a defense objection and creating the appearance that defense counsel was preventing the jury from hearing evidence harmful to defendant, i.e., that an envelope had been listed under miscellaneous property on the booking inventory list. There were other, equally plausible reasons for recalling the officer, including some vagueness in the officer's prior testimony as to his recollection of the contents of the inventory. Significantly, neither defense counsel nor the court drew the inference now suggested by defendant on appeal. The record does not reflect any suspicion of misconduct on their part. Moreover, as a result of the recall of the officer, defendant was able to emphasize a fact beneficial to his case  that there was no notation on the inventory list referring to a white envelope. There is no basis for defendant's assertion that he was prejudiced by the recall of the officer. (24) Second, the prosecutor cross-examined defendant about his financial situation at the time of the murder. In response to one of the prosecutor's questions, defendant denied that he had ever borrowed money from his cousin Robert. The prosecutor presented defendant with a statement, purportedly given by Robert to a prosecution investigator, in which Robert stated defendant had borrowed money from him; the prosecutor then asked whether the statement refreshed his recollection. There is no indication of any bad faith on the prosecutor's part; indeed, the existence of the investigator's statement suggests the prosecutor had a good faith basis to question defendant's denial of ever obtaining loans from Robert. Assuming the prosecutor's tactic to be an attempt to introduce inadmissible hearsay, any error could have been cured by a timely defense objection and admonition; because no such objection was made, any alleged misconduct was waived. ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 531-532 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) Moreover, the challenged cross-examination was brief; defendant points to nothing in the record to show the prosecutor dwelled on the issue either in further examination or in argument. No prejudice appears. (25) Third, Lorita Adams, a dressmaker who made clothes for the victim, testified at trial that the victim was scheduled to come in for a fitting on a Tuesday, the day after her murder. Adams further stated she planned to have garments ready for the victim to purchase at that time. Adams's testimony thus suggested a possible reason for the victim's carrying cash in an envelope on the day of her murder. Defendant points to differences between Adams's trial testimony and her preliminary hearing testimony, in which she stated she would not have had the garments finished by Tuesday, but would have needed until Thursday to complete them; based on the differences, he charges the prosecutor with deliberate presentation of false and misleading testimony. The differences in Adams's testimony do not suggest prosecutorial misconduct. Initially, the record does not reveal that perjured testimony was knowingly presented by the prosecution. ( People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 473-474 [110 Cal. Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298]; In re Imbler (1963) 60 Cal.2d 554, 560 [35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6].) Moreover, the critical issue was whether the victim, not Adams, anticipated that one or more garments might be finished and was therefore carrying money in an envelope to pay for them. On that issue, there was uncontradicted testimony that the victim was to wear the garments made by Adams in a fashion show the Friday of the week she was killed; that she was scheduled to come in for a fitting of the skirts on Tuesday; and that if she decided to wait while Adams hemmed the skirts, she would have paid for them then and taken them with her. Based on this testimony, the jury could have inferred a belief on the part of the victim that the garments might be finished on Tuesday and ready to pick up at that time. Finally, defense counsel was given ample opportunity to impeach Adams's testimony and to rebut this inference with other evidence. Neither prosecutorial misconduct nor prejudice appears. For the reasons stated above, none of defendant's rights, including without limitation his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments, was violated by the conduct of the prosecutor.
(26) Defendant maintains the evidence of the crime of robbery and of the robbery-murder special circumstance was insufficient to sustain the jury's findings of guilt. To the contrary, there is substantial evidence sustaining the verdict. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]), the substantial, credible evidence at trial included the following: While the victim's car was waiting at a fast-food, take-out stop, defendant approached her. He sought money from her in a manner that induced fear and caused her to tremble. Later, defendant went to his car, removed a gun from the glove compartment, and approached the victim a second time. Defendant leaned his head and shoulders well inside the open driver's side window and remained there for 30 to 45 seconds. He shot the victim three times from the driver's side, then walked away and returned, shooting her twice from the passenger side. At the time of his booking, defendant was in possession of an envelope containing $208.23. The victim's practice was to segregate money in envelopes for special purchases. Defendant points to various alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the evidence and urges many of the same inferences he argued to the jury. It was within the province of the jury as the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the available inferences. ( People v. Ozene (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 905, 910 [104 Cal. Rptr. 170].) Although the evidence of robbery-murder was not conclusive, the jury could infer that defendant had the opportunity to steal (he leaned into the victim's car), did steal (he was found in possession of an envelope with money), and killed his victim to accomplish his crime. Both the actual taking of property and the intent to steal are established by substantial, although not uncontradicted, evidence. This evidence is sufficient to sustain the robbery conviction and the robbery-murder special circumstance. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 575-579.) Significantly, defendant does not challenge the admission of Pasnick's spontaneous statement that defendant approached her and asked for money in a manner that caused her to fear for her safety. Nor does he raise any issue with respect to the further evidence that Pasnick had cash in her hand when defendant first approached her and failed to obtain her money. Even if defendant took no money from Pasnick, the jury could infer that defendant's decision to get his gun, and his return, armed, to Pasnick's car where he leaned through the driver's window, all constituted an attempt to commit robbery. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude, at a minimum, that Pasnick's murder was carried out in the course of an attempted robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i).)
Defense counsel introduced defendant's wallet, as it was found by defendant's brother in the glove compartment of defendant's car after his arrest. (27) Defendant argues the admission of the wallet constituted prejudicial error and ineffective assistance of counsel because the wallet contained business cards of a prison services counselor, a deputy probation officer, a deputy public defender, and two private attorneys. The cards, defendant maintains, caused the jury to link him with the criminal justice system. Defendant himself was responsible for the admission of his wallet in evidence. Its admission was not inadvertent; the defense obviously wanted the wallet placed before the jury with its contents as they existed at the time of his arrest. Defense counsel, representing to the court that he had intended to do so earlier, moved to have the wallet introduced into evidence after both sides had rested and the jury was deliberating. Tactical reasons for introduction of the wallet are apparent. For example, the wallet might have served to corroborate defendant's otherwise unsupported testimony as to the wallet's existence and location or as to defendant's practice of carrying cash on his person rather than in the wallet. Under these circumstances, the introduction of the wallet itself was not error. Even if error, it was clearly invited error and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 931 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) As to the business cards in the wallet, assuming defense counsel or the court erred in allowing them to remain where they were, defendant was not prejudiced. The business cards did not demonstrate defendant was a convicted criminal, let alone what offenses he had committed. In a case in which defendant's guilt was established by the testimony of numerous eyewitnesses as well as corroborating physical evidence, and in which defendant's credibility was undermined by his own inherently improbable testimony denying any connection with the murder of Linda Pasnick, there is no reasonable possibility the jury's verdict was based on a few business cards. Because the result would have been no different in the absence of the supposed error, neither counsel's performance nor the court's ruling requires reversal. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-694, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217.)
(28) In view of the prosecution's theory that defendant took money from Linda Pasnick that she kept in an envelope or a red wallet (which was not located after her murder), defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury sua sponte in the words of CALJIC No. 17.01 that defendant could be found guilty only if the jurors agreed he committed the same act or acts. The act at issue was the single act of taking money from one victim on one occasion within a matter of at most a few minutes, an act that the jury was instructed was a necessary element of the crime of robbery. It was not necessary for the jury to agree as to whether the money was kept in the purse or in the envelope before it was stolen. Therefore, the instruction was not required. (See People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311 [261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121]; People v. Mitchell (1986) 188 Cal. App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal. Rptr. 438]; People v. Kent (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 207, 212 [178 Cal. Rptr. 28].)
(29) At the request of the prosecutor, the trial court instructed the jury that it need not agree on the theory on which it found defendant guilty of first degree murder (i.e., premeditated murder or felony murder while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery). Defendant's contention that this instruction deprived him of due process and his right to jury trial by allowing a less-than-unanimous verdict is contrary to established law and is rejected on that basis. ( People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 194-195 [107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956]; see also Schad v. Arizona (1991) 500 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 111 S.Ct. 2491].) In any event, any alleged error is harmless. The jury's findings of robbery and the robbery-murder special circumstance signify unanimous agreement with a first degree felony-murder theory. ( People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 669 [238 Cal. Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752]; People v. Stowe (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 1605, 1620 [234 Cal. Rptr. 184].)
(30) After both sides rested in the guilt phase but before final arguments, the trial court directed defendant and defense counsel to go before another judge of the superior court to permit a sealed statement to be made for the record regarding defendant's decision to testify on his own behalf. The ostensible purpose of this procedure was to preserve for appeal the contemporaneous views of defendant and trial counsel with respect to defendant's testimony at the guilt phase. In the course of a colloquy about the procedure, the trial court expressed concern about defendant's testimony in light of evidence of his drug and alcohol use. Although the procedure adopted by the trial court was somewhat unorthodox, defendant has demonstrated neither error nor prejudice under the circumstances of this case. Neither the trial judge nor the jury heard any aspect of the in camera proceeding before the other judge. Contrary to defendant's argument, the trial judge's desire to preserve the record without becoming enmeshed in the attorney-client relationship between defendant and his counsel did not give rise to a sua sponte judicial duty to hold a hearing on the effectiveness of counsel or the mental state of defendant. There is no evidence defendant was acting irrationally. (See, in contrast, Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 180 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 118, 95 S.Ct. 896].) Finally, defense counsel's decision to put his client on the stand at the guilt phase was not so clearly improvident as to give rise to an inference that counsel was not acting in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) There is no showing defense counsel either failed to advance an available defense, advised his client to give false testimony, or otherwise acted or failed to act in a manner that adversely affected the defense.
(31) Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective in closing argument because counsel conceded defendant's presence at the scene of the crime (thereby repudiating defendant's alibi testimony) and proferred a statutorily abolished defense of diminished capacity. We disagree with defendant's assessment of counsel's performance. Going into final argument, the prosecution had presented an extremely strong case against defendant. Five eyewitnesses identified him as the murderer or placed him at the scene of the crime. One of those witnesses, a Der Wienerschnitzel employee, had waited on him about once a week and remembered him because of his habit of harassing service employees by changing his orders. Defendant's gun, which contained his own fingerprint, was the murder weapon. Defendant's cousin had testified against him, recounting defendant's own statements and actions, which both placed him at the scene of the crime and showed his consciousness of guilt in fleeing from police after he returned there. Defendant then testified on his own behalf, denying he was even present and suggesting someone had somehow planted his fingerprint. Defense counsel had only one realistic chance  to discredit the robbery evidence  and faced the likely prospect that defendant's own testimony had destroyed his credibility beyond rehabilitation. From a tactical point of view, it was, to say the least, an uphill battle. In light of the evidence, counsel elected to concede his client's presence at the scene (a fact no one but defendant disputed) and to explain his client's contrary testimony as a failure of recollection. Defendant's testimony provided support for the strategy: he professed failure of recollection numerous times while on the stand. Counsel attacked the robbery and robbery special-circumstance charges, maintaining defendant did not have the requisite intent to steal and did not in fact steal. These arguments were proper and related to the elements of the crimes as disclosed in the instructions given to the jury. Under these circumstances, we cannot say counsel was constitutionally ineffective in his attempt to make the best of a bad situation. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) Unlike People v. Diggs (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 958, 970-971 [223 Cal. Rptr. 361], relied on by defendant, there is a plausible tactical explanation for the defense argument in this case, as we have shown. In addition, as the People observe, counsel's contention that defendant lacked the specific intent to rob was not an improper attempt to proffer a defense of diminished capacity, but a proper argument on an element of a charged offense. Moreover, defendant fails to show prejudice in light of the evidence against him. Defendant does not establish that he was deprived of any potentially meritorious defense nor does he show to a reasonable probability that the result would have been different in the absence of any alleged ineffectiveness. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-689 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 693-695]; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 215-218.)