Opinion ID: 2308960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intervention in BZA Proceedings

Text: Twenty-one individuals sought leave to intervene at the second hearing. [8] BZA Chairwoman Carrie Thornhill asked each of these persons to identify himself or herself for the record and to state the basis for requesting intervention. At first Chairwoman Thornhill intimated that persons living within 200 feet of the property would be allowed to intervene. [9] After these individuals had identified themselves and announced their opposition to the granting of a variance, however, Ms. Thornhill suddenly declared that no one would be permitted to intervene and that the ANC is expected to represent the interests of all of those persons, and that [way] we would not need to have all of those persons testify. In its order the BZA gave a different rationale for its decision not to permit any of the twenty-one citizens to intervene: The Board polled the audience at the public hearing to determine whether intervenor status should be afforded to anyone present. There were no written requests for intervenor status submitted to the Board. The twenty-one members of the audience who spoke gave their names and addresses and expressed opposition to the proposed facility based on their perception of what effect the operations would have on the surrounding area.... No one expressed a view as to whether the proposed use meets the requirements of Subsection 801.7(j) of the Zoning Regulations. The Board, therefore, decided that intervention would be inappropriate and that the Advisory Neighborhood Commission could adequately represent the views of the residents. Petitioners Franklin and Brown contend that the BZA improperly refused to allow them to intervene, thereby violating the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA), D.C.Code §§ 1-1501 to 1-1510 (1992). [10] They argue that this refusal significantly prejudiced their ability to participate in the hearing because it rendered them unable to present rebuttal evidence or to cross-examine witness, which they could have done if intervention had been granted and they had been accorded status as parties. [11] The applicant responds that the BZA correctly refused to permit intervention because the affected petitioners did not submit a written request to intervene before the beginning of the second hearing. The regulation governing intervention in proceedings before the BZA grants the BZA substantial discretion in deciding whether, and to what extent, it will allow an individual or group to intervene in matters coming before it. It provides: At the time of the hearing on the appeal, the Board may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, permit persons who have a specific right or interest that will be affected by action on the appeal to intervene in the appeal for such general or limited purpose as the Board may specify. 11 DCMR § 3315.12. But the broad discretion which this regulation gives to the BZA must be exercised reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously. See Glenbrook Road, supra note 10, 605 A.2d at 39. In this case, we conclude, the BZA's action was unreasonable. It announced a standard by which intervention would be permitted, and then, when confronted with persons meeting that standard, it abruptly decided not to permit intervention by anyone. The law requires more. See Dankman v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics, 443 A.2d 507, 513 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (once an agency adopts a given procedure, it must adhere to that procedure); accord, e.g., Macauley v. District of Columbia Taxicab Commission, 623 A.2d 1207, 1209 (D.C.1993) (agencies must adhere to their own regulations); Allied Security, Inc. v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 621 A.2d 824, 827 (D.C.1993) (same); Vaughn v. United States, 598 A.2d 425, 433 (D.C.1991) (same); Hanson v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 584 A.2d 592, 595 (D.C.1991) (same). The justifications advanced in the BZA's order for its decision not to permit anyone to intervene do not mitigate the error. First, the order makes no reference to Chairwoman Thornhill's original suggestion that persons living within 200 feet of the property could intervene, an omission which supports petitioners' assertion that Ms. Thornhill's sudden change of mind was arbitrary and capricious. Second, the order indicates that petitioners' failure to file a written request to intervene was a further basis for the decision, but there is nothing in the record to show that the need for such a request was announced in advance of the hearing so that anyone wishing to intervene could submit one. Moreover, the regulations do not require such written requests. Third, the order implies that petitioners were given an opportunity to express their views despite being denied status as intervenors. The record demonstrates otherwise: petitioners were asked to give only their names and addresses and to state how far they lived from the property. Chairwoman Thornhill specifically told them, We are not asking you to give your statement now. Finally, the order suggests that petitioners' failure to state why the proposed use did not fall within section 801.7(j) affected the determination of their right to intervene, but they were never informed that they had a right (or a duty) to make such a statement before the BZA ruled against them. For these reasons, we hold that the BZA's failure to establish and adhere to a procedure by which persons seeking to intervene could reasonably attempt to do so was arbitrary and capricious. See Dankman, supra, 443 A.2d at 513. The proper course would have been for the BZA to announce clearly, at the outset of the hearings or earlier, whether intervention would be permitted and, if so, under what conditions  and then to follow that announced procedure. We hold also, however, that the BZA's error was harmless. The purpose of the hearing was not to decide whether to grant a variance to the applicant but, rather, to determine whether a variance was necessary at all. The applicant's appeal therefore required the BZA only to resolve a narrow legal question, namely, whether the proposed use was permissible as a matter of right under applicable zoning regulations for C-M districts. Because this court reviews the BZA's resolution of that legal question essentially de novo, [12] we hold that petitioners' exclusion from the case did not infringe their rights in these limited circumstances.