Opinion ID: 1744586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: dismissal of wadman

Text: As the result of Wadman's refusal to sign the disciplinary notices, Lant sent Wadman the following notice: You are hereby suspended as an employee of the City of Omaha and member of the Omaha Police Division for a period of fifteen (15) days pending consideration of my recommendation that you be terminated from City employment. This action is taken because of: On October 1, 1986 you were given a direct order by the undersigned to sign and deliver three letters notifying certain individuals that disciplinary action was being taken against them. You were advised by the undersigned that you should sign the letters but were free to indicate thereon, in writing, your disapproval of same and reasons therefor. You were further advised that same was a direct order, yet you nonetheless refused to obey. Your conduct has been deemed to constitute insubordination. This action is taken because of your violation of Section 23-291(f) of the Omaha Municipal Code, and because your actions reflect discredit upon the service and are a direct hinderance to the effective performance of City government functions. Under Omaha Mun.Code, ch. 23, art. III, § 23-291(f) (1980), insubordination is good cause to subject a police officer to disciplinary action, but the ordinance fails to define or otherwise characterize insubordination. After a hearing, the city personnel director dismissed Wadman from employment. At the hearing in his appeal to the Omaha Personnel Board, Wadman, through his lawyer, detailed his position: Boyle's and Lant's proposal was improper in Wadman's view, and he would not set his name down beside the words by order of. As Wadman put it, he would not sign a lie. It would have been a lie, if he pretended authorship of Lant's document. He does not have a duty to lie for Mr. Lant, direct order or no, and to refuse to do so was not insubordinate. The Omaha Personnel Board, unanimously upholding Wadman's dismissal, found that Wadman was insubordinate in his refusal to comply with Lant's directive concerning the disciplinary notices to Mitchell, Dunning, and Infantino, which the personnel board described as a reasonable and lawful order from Lant to Wadman. In his petition in error, Wadman alleged several procedural deficiencies concerning the composition of the personnel board, which, according to Wadman, rendered the personnel board incapable of legally determining the validity of the charges against Wadman. Also, Wadman claimed that the personnel board's decision was erroneous, unsupported by evidence, and unsupported by the law because Lant's order to Wadman concerning the disciplinary notices was unreasonable and Wadman's conduct in refusing to sign the disciplinary notice did not cause any discredit to the OPD or hinder the effective performance of City government. Finally, in his petition Wadman acknowledged that he lacked authority to order discipline, but concluded: Nevertheless, the Mayor and the department head `ordered' [Wadman] to sign as author of an order, and purportedly discharged him for insubordination when he ethically refused the ultra vivres [sic] order. Although Wadman did not expressly allege that his signing the disciplinary notices would have been the exercise of authority improperly delegated by Lant, the district court found that, as the result of an absence of guidelines or standards specifying the conditions under which the delegated discretion could be exercised, there was no valid delegation of the safety director's authority to discipline members of the police department and concluded that there is no competent evidence to sustain the decision of the Personnel Board upholding the termination of the Police Chief for insubordination. The district court reversed the dismissal order of the personnel board and entered judgment that Wadman be reinstated to his position as police chief with payment of benefits and wages withheld during his suspension and on account of his dismissal from employment.