Opinion ID: 1660668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Specific Intent and Jury Instruction on the Law of Principals

Text: In Assignment of Error No. 3, the defendant claims that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove he had the required specific intent to kill the victims. His argument is twofold. First, he argues that the state's evidence was purely circumstantial and insufficient to prove that he was the masked shooter, as no witnesses (other than Arthur Darby, a coperpetrator turned state's witness) identified him as the shooter. Second, he argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the law of principals and thereby empowered the jury to convict him based solely on the defense theory that he stayed in the 4-Runner while Zannie Neal and Arthur Darby murdered the victims. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).... [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 requires that assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This statutory test works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate whether all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury. State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La. 1986). To convict the defendant of first degree murder, the prosecution was required to prove: 1) that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victims during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an aggravated burglary; (2) that the defendant was engaged in the attempted distribution, exchange, sale or purchase of a controlled dangerous substance; and 3) that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1), (4), (7). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189, 192-93 (La.1975); State v. Martin, 92-0811, p. 3 (La.App. 5th Cir.5/31/94), 638 So.2d 411, 413-14. Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177, 190 (La.1992); State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369, 373 (La.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103, 101 S.Ct. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981); State v. Procell, 365 So.2d 484, 492 (La.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2164, 60 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1979). The question before this Court is not so much whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove the shooter's specific intent (clearly an offender who uses a high powered assault rifle and shoots indiscriminately through a door at a group of people specifically intends to kill the victims), but whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. To that end, the primary evidence that the defendant was the shooter is the trial testimony of the defendant's uncle, Arthur Darby. The defendant alleges that Darby murdered the victims and then falsely implicated the defendant to avoid the death penalty; in support, the defendant notes that Darby admitted on cross-examination that he would do anything and say anything to avoid the death penalty. As explained previously, Arthur Darby testified that on the night of March 31, 1998, he was asleep at home when his nephews, Jarrell and Zannie Neal, awakened him and told him they needed his assistance in collecting an overdue drug debt. According to Darby, when they arrived at the Hurst residence, the defendant exited the 4-Runner with an AK-47 and he and Zannie went inside the residence. Moments later, Darby heard gunshots and the defendant (still carrying the AK-47) and Zannie Neal came running back to the vehicle. Darby further testified that as they fled from the scene the defendant said the nigger was down bad for trying to play him, but now he crying like a little bitch. Although the defendant did not testify, his position at trial was that he used the AK-47 to shoot at sheriff's deputies while fleeing the murder scene, but that he did not shoot the victims. He instead claims that he waited in the 4-Runner while Arthur Darby and Zannie Neal went inside the house and that Darby shot the victims. To support his version of events, the defendant points to the following testimony: 1) Claudette Hurst described the shooter as a tall, thin person dressed in black clothing; 2) a deputy sheriff stated that when arrested the defendant was wearing a light brown pair of khaki pants; and 3) Darby admitted wearing a black sweater and blue jeans the night of the murder, described himself as rather thin, and acknowledged that the defendant was not skinny or thin. As a general matter, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the state is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Smith, 430 So.2d 31, 45 (La.1983); State v. Brady, 414 So.2d 364, 365 (La.1982); State v. Long, 408 So.2d 1221, 1227 (La.1982). However, positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. See State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988) (generally, one witness's positive identification is sufficient to support the conviction); State v. Ford, 28,724 (La. App.2d Cir.10/30/96), 682 So.2d 847, 849-50, writ denied, 99-0210 (La.5/14/99), 745 So.2d 12. In the instant case, the jury heard Hurst's description of the offender and the witnesses' testimony regarding the defendant's and Darby's clothing and physique, but, nevertheless, accepted Darby's testimony implicating the defendant. The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness; thus, a reviewing court may impinge on the fact finder's discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. Mussall, 523 So.2d at 1310 (La.1988). Moreover, though Darby testified pursuant to a favorable plea agreement, the jurisprudence in Louisiana generally holds that an accomplice is qualified to testify against a co-perpetrator even if the prosecution offers him inducements to testify; such inducements would merely affect the witness's credibility. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945); State v. Jenkins, 508 So.2d 191, 194 (La. App. 3d Cir.1987), writ denied, 512 So.2d 438 (La.1987); cf. State v. McCullough, 98-1766 (La.App. 3d Cir.12/29/98), 737 So.2d 49, writ denied, 99-0259 (La.2/26/99), 738 So.2d 590 (testimony of co-defendant, who pled guilty to reduced charge of manslaughter, against other defendants in first degree murder trial did not violate the public bribery statute). As the United States Fifth Circuit has found, a conviction may be based even on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or of someone making a plea bargain with the government, provided that the testimony is not incredible or otherwise insubstantial on its face. United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405 (5th Cir.1991). In the instant case, defense counsel had knowledge of Darby's agreement with the state and its terms; and though counsel cross-examined Darby about it at length in an effort to undermine his credibility, the jury apparently determined that he told the truth about his and the defendant's involvement in the murders. Concerning the principals instruction, as a general matter, a trial judge has the duty to instruct jurors as to every phase of the case supported by the evidence whether or not accepted by him as true, and that duty extends to any theory... which a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence. La.C.Cr.P. art. 802; State v. Marse, 365 So.2d 1319, 1323 (La. 1978); cf. State v. Johnson, 438 So.2d 1091, 1097 (La.1983) (defendant not entitled to negligent homicide instruction because that defense [not] fairly supported by the evidence and charge must be supported by the evidence); State v. Henry, 449 So.2d 486, 488 (La.1984) (same). The law of principals states that all persons involved in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, are equally culpable. See La. R.S. 14:24. However, the defendant's mere presence at the scene is not enough to concern him in the crime. State v. Schwander, 345 So.2d 1173, 1174-75 (La.1977). Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime may be said to be concerned in its commission, thus making them liable as principals. State v. Knowles, 392 So.2d 651 (La.1980). A principal may be connected only to those crimes for which he has the requisite mental state. State v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722 (La.1980). The facts of the present case warranted the principals instruction because the evidence indicates that the defendant was involved in the commission of the instant offenses along with two other people. Darby's testimony and the defendant's actions while fleeing the scene prove that the defendant knowingly participated in the planning and/or execution of the crime. Accordingly, this assignment lacks merit.