Opinion ID: 2219110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Denial of Additional Discovery of Aggravation Evidence

Text: Defendant presents an argument which is converse to his previous claim that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to meaningfully attack the State's aggravation evidence. Defendant maintains that the trial court erred by denying defendant's requests for further discovery of police reports and witness statements which the State intended to rely on in aggravation. We have previously considered the record at length as it pertains to this issue. Our decision in People v. Foster (1987), 119 Ill.2d 69, 101-03, 115 Ill.Dec. 557, 518 N.E.2d 82, is controlling on this issue. In Foster, we held that discovery is not constitutionally required at the sentencing phase. We reasoned that a defendant, at sentencing, has already been convicted and, therefore, is `entitled to fewer procedural safeguards than one who has not been convicted at all.' ( People v. Foster, 119 Ill.2d at 102, 115 Ill.Dec. 557, 518 N.E.2d 82, quoting People v. DeWitt (1979), 78 Ill.2d 82, 85, 34 Ill.Dec. 319, 397 N.E.2d 1385; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 789, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1763, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 665-66.) Furthermore, admissibility of evidence at the aggravation and mitigation phase of sentencing is not governed by the restrictive rules of evidence in effect at the guilt stage. Defendant's contention in the present case, accordingly, is unfounded.