Opinion ID: 836008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application to Oregon Laws 1989, Chapter 791.

Text: Applying that test to the case before us, we begin by examining the label attached to forfeiture under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791. There is no question that the legislature intended to, and did, categorize that proceeding as civil. The statute repeatedly refers to civil forfeiture. The findings clearly express a civil intent. See Or Laws 1989, ch 791, § 1(5) ([t]he application of any remedy under this Act is intended to be remedial and not punitive). Other findings and provisions suggest, and are consistent with, remedial purposes: (1) to render the sale and manufacture of illegal drugs unprofitable by confiscating the proceeds of those activities; (2) to make those activities more difficult by confiscating the tools and property that have made those activities possible; and (3) to reimburse governments for their costs in enforcing drug laws. See Or Laws 1989, ch 791, § 1(a) and (c) (setting out findings that prohibited conduct is profitable and that conduct is facilitating acquisition and possession of property subject to forfeiture under chapter); Or Laws 1989, ch 791, § 3 (setting out types of property subject to forfeiture, i.e., controlled substances themselves, raw materials, containers, conveyances, money and things of value that are proceeds of prohibited conduct, and real property used to commit or facilitate prohibited conduct). Still other provisions suggest an intent to avoid punitive effects. See Or Laws 1993, ch 699, §§ 13-15 (providing for mitigation to prevent excessive forfeiture and providing that court shall consider, in determining if forfeiture is excessive, degree of relationship between forfeited property and prohibited conduct, whether forfeited property constitutes claimant's lawful livelihood or residence, etc.). Having established that the legislature intended to create a civil proceeding and remedy when it enacted the statutes at issue, we next examine the proceeding in light of the four factors that we have identified as relevant.
Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, does not provide for the arrest and detention of property owners, or for any other procedure with similar criminal consequences for the property owners.
The state argues that, historically, the law has viewed in rem forfeiture as a civil, rather than a criminal, action. We agree that there is strong support for that view, although the evidence is not entirely one way. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681-90, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2090-95, 40 L.Ed.2d 452, 466-71 (1974) (tracing federal view that in rem forfeitures, as opposed to deodand forfeitures, only pertain to property and treat guilt or innocence of the property owner as irrelevant); but compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 533-35, 29 L.Ed. 746, 752 (1886) (holding that proceeding to forfeit of fraudulently imported goods was quasicriminal and therefore sufficient to implicate prohibition on compulsory self-incrimination). Even if the evidence regarding the historical view of in rem forfeiture is not entirely unequivocal, it is clear that forfeiture is not an infamous penalty, the potential for which, like imprisonment, automatically marks a proceeding as criminal in nature. Neither does it appear that there are any grounds for claiming that forfeiture under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, is inconsistent with, or excessive in relation to, the statute's civil purpose. We already have noted that the forfeiture statute announces several remedial purposes, e.g., to render drug manufacture and trafficking activities unprofitable by confiscating the proceeds, to render those activities more difficult by confiscating tools and other property that facilitate the activities, and to provide resources to governments that enforce drug trafficking laws. Defendants do not deny that those purposes exist, but argue that the forfeiture scheme is unrelated to those purposes. They contend that the forfeiture of their home was personally staggering and that it is impossible to justify their $60,000 loss as necessary to cover the state's investigative and prosecutorial costs or in terms of some other nonpunitive purpose. That is the point at which defendants' procedural choices during the forfeiture proceeding become relevant. As we have shown, the statutory scheme on its face expresses a legislative intent to keep its sanctions within constitutional bounds and provides a mitigation mechanism that purports to serve that intent. To the extent that defendants' argument focuses on any alleged excessiveness of their own $60,000 loss, it is an as applied argument and foreclosed by their failure to intervene in the forfeiture proceeding and seek mitigation. We cannot presume that, if defendants had made the kind of showing in mitigation that they statutorily were entitled to make, the final outcome would have been disproportionate. To the extent that defendants are suggesting that the entire statutory scheme is excessiveand that is their burdenwe are not persuaded. Depending on the circumstances, forfeiture of an entire house or any other property that is a subject of Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, may be justified fully in terms of the remedial purposes of removing the tools of a drug manufacturer's or trafficker's trade and of confiscating profits. Moreover, the clear purpose and effect of the mitigation procedure set out at Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 699, section 13, is to ensure that forfeitures are not excessive in relation to those purposes. Although defendants in this case did not avail themselves of that procedure, its availability precludes any claim that the statute on its face provides for sanctions that cannot be justified in terms of civil purposes.
Defendants also argue that the stigma associated with forfeiture under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, marks the proceeding as criminal. Defendants argue that persons who lose their home in a drug-related forfeiture bear as much public condemnation, if not more, as persons convicted of such crimes as DUII, reckless endangering or felony driving while suspended. Defendants' comparison to DUII and reckless endangerment is not persuasive. We are searching here for a level of stigma of the individual that marks a forfeiture proceeding as criminal in nature in the constitutional sense. There may be some vague public condemnation associated with the forfeiture of a home, but that same vague condemnation also occurs when homes are lost in the context of proceedings that are indisputably civil, e.g., foreclosures or proceedings to abate a nuisance.
Defendants suggest that they have had to endure collateral consequences that flowed from the forfeiture hereforced relocation and economic devastationand that those consequences demonstrate the punitive nature of the forfeiture proceeding. But those are consequences peculiar to these defendants and, for all that we can determine on this record, are the specific results of their tactical choices. The consequences are not the result of a legislative choice to impose those particular burdens, along with forfeiture, in all cases. Indeed, assuming full participation in a mitigation hearing, it may be that no offender would have to suffer the collateral consequences that defendants have experienced.