Opinion ID: 184247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Steward’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal

Text: We first address Steward’s claim that the district court erred by declining to grant her motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) to dismiss her ADA claim and remand her action to state court. We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Publ’g, Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009). In considering whether the district court abused its discretion, we consider “the defendant’s effort and expense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, and whether a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant.” Ibid. (quoting Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994)). Steward made her motion in January 2008, over fourteen months after this lawsuit was commenced, four months after Chrysler filed its motion for summary judgment, three months after briefing on Chrysler’s motion was completed, and two months after the district court held a hearing on that motion. That Chrysler had expended significant resources in defending this action by that point is clear. Steward offers no good reason why she waited so long to move for dismissal. Consequently, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by not granting her motion.