Opinion ID: 2974154
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Accidental or Intentional Comments

Text: Finally, the prosecution’s comments in this case do not appear intentional because the prosecution did not repeat its improper comments. Therefore, the fourth Carter factor does not support granting Slagle’s petition. Unlike in Bates, the prosecution in this case did not use improper argument “repeatedly during summation.” Bates, 402 F.3d at 648. The prosecution also did not continue his improper conduct after successful defense objections. See id. The vouching comments were the only comments that are arguably extensive, but the prosecution may well not have realized its improper comments in the heat of argument because there was no defense objection. Moreover, the improper statements in this case do not reveal a covert strategic use, repeated for the sake of emphasis. The prosecution did not repeat any of the improper comments during the sentencing phase of trial. See id. The prosecution does not appear, therefore, to have intentionally made improper comments during Slagle’s trial. C. Conclusions from the Application of the Two-Prong Test Analysis of the four Carter factors demonstrates that Slagle’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair at either the guilt or sentencing phase. “Overwhelming evidence of guilt can oftentimes be sufficient to sustain a conviction despite some prosecutorial misconduct.” Bates, 398 F.3d at 648-49; see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 (“[T]he overwhelming . . . evidence to support a finding of guilt on all charges . . . reduced the likelihood that the jury’s decision was influenced by argument.” (citations and quotations omitted)). There can be no question in this case that the evidence of Slagle’s guilt was overwhelming. As our earlier consideration of the evidence shows, the jury had extensive evidence from which to find Slagle had the ability to form the intent to commit aggravated murder. In this case, despite the presence of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase of the trial, it was not unreasonable for the Ohio courts to hold that the jury was not influenced by the prosecution’s improper comments in finding Slagle guilty of murder. Furthermore, the improper comments during the guilt phase did not taint the sentencing phase of the trial because all of the improper comments were only minimally prejudicial. Considering that the prosecution made no improper comments during the sentencing phase of trial in which Slagle produced mitigation evidence, see Darden, 477 U.S. at 183 n.15 (“In this case, the comments were made at the guilt-innocence stage of trial, greatly reducing the chance that they had any effect at all on sentencing.”), and that only a few of the comments could even arguably directly relate to the matters at sentencing, the prosecution’s improper comments during the guilt phase of trial did not “‘constrain the manner in which the jury was able to give effect’ to mitigating evidence” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. DePew, 311 F.3d at 748 (quoting Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 277 (1998)). Moreover, any confusion was cured in ample ways. The trial court gave proper, clear instructions regarding sentencing. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 2159-62. The defense made the first and last closing arguments at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., JA 820, 840. The defense made numerous objections at the guilt phase and received curative instructions. The defense also had the opportunity to call the same experts during the sentencing phase to offer mitigation evidence. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was an approximately three-week delay between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Any cumulative effect of the improper comments was minimal during the sentencing phase of Slagle’s trial and therefore provides no basis for holding that Slagle’s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, an analysis of the pertinent factors for prosecutorial misconduct demonstrates that the Supreme Court of Ohio did not unreasonably apply federal law in determining that the prosecution’s improper statements did not render Slagle’s trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the Federal Constitution. No. 04-3490 Slagle v. Bagley Page 20