Opinion ID: 45527
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Four Identities

Text: 13
14 Although Mississippi courts have not defined explicitly the identity of subject matter, they have defined the identity of cause of action. The identities are distinct but related, and as such, examination in tandem illustrates their distinctions more readily. In older cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court referred to subject matter identity as identity in the thing sued for. Forbes v. Columbia Pulp & Paper Co., 340 So.2d 734, 736-37 (Miss. 1976); Pray v. Hewitt, 254 Miss. 20, 179 So.2d 842, 844 (1965); Campbell v. Campbell, 231 Miss. 658, 97 So.2d 527, 528 (1957). Most recently, the Mississippi Supreme Court defined subject matter as the substance of the lawsuit. Harrison, 891 So.2d at 232-33. 15 In contrast, [i]dentity of the cause of action exists when there is a commonality in the underlying facts and circumstances upon which a claim is asserted and relief is sought from the two actions. City of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc., 688 So.2d 742, 749 (Miss. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, in the res judicata context, a cause of action is a group of operative facts that entitles a petitioner to seek remedy in court. See LaVere, 895 So.2d at 835. The requirement that the litigation involve the same claim premised upon the same body of operative fact as was previously adjudicated comports with the prohibition against claim-splitting protected by res judicata. Harrison, 891 So.2d at 234. When making this notably difficult determination, Mississippi courts look[ ] past the legal bases asserted and [rely] more on the factual and transactional relationship between the original action and the subsequent action. Id. This court applies a similarly transactional approach. See id. ; see also Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir.1989) (finding that because the claims arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact, they comprised one transaction, and res judicata barred a second suit). 16 Several Mississippi cases analyzing res judicata further illustrate the relationship between the identities of subject matter and cause of action. In Lakeland Lounge, an adult-entertainment club owner sought to declare a city ordinance that regulated his business unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 688 So.2d at 744. After the federal district court declared the ordinance unconstitutional, the city filed a state action to enjoin the club owner's operations, arguing that he violated the ordinance. Id. at 744-45. The state trial court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 746. In holding that res judicata barred the state action challenging the ordinance's constitutionality, the Mississippi Supreme Court found identity of subject matter: the zoning ordinance and its constitutionality. Id. at 749. Furthermore, although the federal court cases determined the constitutionality of the [c]ity's public policy determinations involving the secondary effects of adult entertainment and the pending ordinance doctrine, the underlying issue was topless entertainment. Id. Because the underlying facts were the same, the city did not destroy the identity of cause of action by raising a new legal theory in the state action. See id. 17 In Black v. City of Tupelo, 853 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Miss.2003), the plaintiff filed suit in federal court alleging various misconduct by city police officers. After the suit was dismissed, the plaintiff filed suit in state court based on the same allegations. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the subject matter of the suits was the same: they pertained to alleged incidents within the police department. Id. at 1225. Likewise, because the allegations in the first suit were based on the same underlying facts and circumstances as in the second suit, the causes of action were also identical. Id. 18 In Little, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that res judicata barred a state wrongful death suit arising out of an explosion that killed two welders. 704 So.2d at 1338. The court determined that there was identity of subject matter because the subjects of both suits were the welders' deaths. Id. Although the prior federal suit was a products liability case premised on a design defect, while the state suit was premised on a manufacturing defect, the crucial fact [was] that [the appellants were] seeking to hold an entity liable for the deaths of the welders. Id. Moreover, the appellants relied on the same facts and circumstances alleged in the federal suit: the release of a dangerous gas that caused an explosion killing two men. Id. Thus, there was a commonality of the underlying facts and circumstances, and the second identity of cause of action was met. Id. 19 By contrast, in LaVere, the court held that there was no identity of subject matter between two actions. 895 So.2d at 895. The first action involved the administration of the estate of Robert Johnson, a blues artist. LaVere, 895 So.2d at 829-30. In the estate administration action, the trial court determined that Claud Johnson was the sole heir to the estate. Id. at 830. In a second lawsuit, two legatees of the decedent's sister's estate sued Claud Johnson, Stephen LaVere, and others, alleging conversion, fraud and breach of contract arising out of a contract between Johnson and LaVere regarding rights to certain photographs of the artist. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the subject matter of the first action was the administration of the estate, including the determination of heirship. Id. at 833. The subject matter of the second action was the ownership of the photographs and associated copyrights. Id. With respect to the identity of causes of action, the first suit arose out of the death of Robert Johnson, the opening and administration of his estate, and the determination of his heirs. Id. at 835. However, the second suit involved the alleged acts or omissions of LaVere concerning the contract. Id. These were not the same causes of action. Id. 20 In this case, Black argues that neither identity is established. She argues that identity of subject matter exists only when the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each action. Reid, 814 So.2d at 145 ([t]he primary test for comparing causes of action is whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each action.). Black urges the court to employ an analysis similar to that for subject matter jurisdiction, where different statutory bases and rights determine courts' jurisdiction. See Common Cause of Mississippi v. Smith, 548 So.2d 412, 414 (Miss.1989). Her argument is misplaced. First, Mississippi law fails to support the appellant's contention that the identity of subject matter for res judicata purposes is determined according to a subject matter jurisdiction analysis. No case discussing the identity of subject matter alludes to subject matter jurisdiction. Second, the primary right language in Reid discussed the identity of cause of action, not subject matter. 814 So.2d at 145. Third, the identity of subject matter is defined as the underlying issue before the court, not the legal basis for recovery. See Lakeland Lounge, 688 So.2d at 749. 21 Regarding the identity of cause of action, the appellant again cites Reid 's primary right or duty language to support her argument that two definitions of cause of action exist: a legal one, defined by the primary right or duty, and a factual one, defined by the transactional test discussed above. Based on her legal definition of cause of action, she contends that there is no identity of cause of action because she is vindicating different rights in her federal suit. 2 Again, Black misconstrues Reid regarding the identity of cause of action. Although Reid referred to primary right and duty as the test for a cause of action, it specifically defined the identity of cause of action as identity of underlying facts and circumstances upon which a claim is asserted and relief sought in the two actions. 814 So.2d at 145. Furthermore, because the Reid plaintiffs sought insurance coverage for their son's injuries in a prior proceeding arising out of the same accident and the same insurance policy, their subsequent action for uninsured motorist coverage raised the same cause of action. Id. Thus, Reid provides no support for Black's assertion that there is a primary right or duty test separate from the transactional test for determining a cause of action. See id.; see also Harrison, 891 So.2d at 233-34 (it is the facts giving rise to a claim and not the legal theory for the claim that defines cause of action). Black's federal suit alleged different theories of liability, which are irrelevant to the determination of identity of cause of action. See Harrison, 891 So.2d at 233-34. 22 Thus, identity of subject matter turns on a general characterization of the suit. It is the substance of the action. By contrast, identity of cause of action is defined by the underlying group of facts giving rise to a claim. In Black's case, the subject matter of both the first and second suit can be described as the sexual assault of Jane Doe. The causes of action are the underlying facts giving rise to Jane Doe's claims: her sexual assault at the hands of two boys in her unsupervised classroom. Identical factual allegations of sexual assault support the legal theories in both lawsuits. Accordingly, there are identities of subject matter and cause of action.
23 On appeal, Black contests the presence of the third and fourth identities related to parties. However, in the district court, Black expressly conceded that these identities were present, and she addressed only the first two identities when contesting the defendants' summary judgment motion. A party's concession of an issue means the issue is waived and may not be revived. Smith v. United States, 328 F.3d 760, 770 (5th Cir.2003). By conceding the issues in the district court and failing to address them, Black waived any argument regarding the third and fourth identities. See id. (parties waived issues by expressly stating in their motion for summary judgment that they conceded the issues and by failing to provide any argument on those issues). 24 Moreover, the identity of parties and identity of the quality or character of parties are satisfied. Black was the plaintiff in both suits. Both suits were brought against NPSD and the individual school officials based on NPSD's conduct and the individual officials' capacity as employees of NPSD. Therefore, identity of the parties and identity of their quality or character were established. See Little, 704 So.2d at 1339 (strict identity of parties is not required if the parties in the second suit are sufficiently connected with the first suit such that their interests would be affected as if they were parties); Black, 853 So.2d at 1225 (identities of parties and of their quality were established where police officers who were named only in the second suit are employees of the City of Tupelo, which was named in both suits); Estate of Anderson v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 674 So.2d 1254, 1257 (Miss.1996) (finding all four identities met in second suit against bank arising out of its powers as trustee, bank officers named only in second suit operated in their capacities as employees of the bank in managing the trust). Black's contention that these identities are not established because the individual defendants were sued only in their official capacities in the state suit and individually in the federal suit is without merit. Thus, all four identities were present in Black's federal action, and the district court properly dismissed her claims on res judicata grounds. 25