Opinion ID: 2132850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Vagueness of Section 726.6A.

Text: Defendant urges that the statutes under which she was convicted of multiple acts of child endangerment are void for vagueness. She focuses her argument on the provisions of section 726.6(1)(a) and (e), which define the type of conduct on which the present charge was based. Section 726.6(1)(a) provides that a person commits child endangerment if that person knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a child or minor's physical, mental or emotional health or safety. Section 726.6(1)(e) provides that a person commits child endangerment when that person knowingly permits the continuing physical or sexual abuse of a child or minor. Defendant asserts that these statutory definitions are both vague and overbroad and would allow prosecutions for taking a child hang gliding or scuba diving. To withstand a due process challenge based on vagueness, a penal statute must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and provide an adequate standard for those who administer the law. State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1991); State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987). A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its meaning is fairly ascertainable by reference to a common and generally accepted meaning. State v. Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Iowa 1975). We considered a vagueness challenge to section 726.6(1)(a) in State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 2001). Resorting to dictionary definitions, we upheld the statute as a reasonable description of the prohibited conduct based on the nature of this crime. We are convinced that the same conclusion should be drawn with respect to section 726.6(1)(e). A Nebraska court in State v. Crowdell, 234 Neb. 469, 451 N.W.2d 695, 695 (1990), has accurately observed: As a matter of practicability for general application, child abuse statutes, by virtue of the nature of their subject matter and the nature of the conduct sought to be prohibited, usually contain broad and rather comprehensive language. Crowdell, 451 N.W.2d at 699. We uphold the application of the statute in the present prosecution against defendant's claim of unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth.