Opinion ID: 1297518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vacation of Sentence

Text: The State's second issue on appeal is whether the PCR judge erred in vacating Singleton's sentence and imposing a life sentence as a remedy, where the effect of the decision is to judicially commute a sentence in violation of Article IV, Section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution. The first step in this analysis is to examine the order issued by the PCR court. In his discussion of remedy, Judge Thomas L. Hughston, Jr. stated that, based on the evidence, Singleton was not likely to ever regain competence. The judge then concluded that the appropriate remedy was to commute Mr. Singleton's death sentence to one of life imprisonment. At the outset, the judge's use of the word commute is disturbing, but the reader must look further in the order. In his Conclusion the judge orders: [f]or the reasons set forth above, I conclude that applicant is incompetent to be executed. As a result of his incompetency, his sentence of death is vacated, and he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment. [Emphasis added]. The PCR judge vacated the sentence of death and then reimposed a new sentence. This was not done as a matter of clemency, but as a remedy which the PCR judge found was supported by the evidence in the record. The State argues that the General Assembly provided in S.C.Code Ann. § 17-25-370 (1976) that an execution must be carried out unless stayed by order of the Supreme Court or respite or commutation of the Governor. The State posits that this statute, along with the exclusivity of the Governor's commutation powers, precludes a court sitting in post-conviction relief from commuting a sentence of death. South Carolina's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 et seq. (Supp.1990), establishes a civil proceeding that enables a prisoner to challenge the legality of his detention. In S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-20(b) (1986), the remedy available to a PCR court is: not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them. Id. The procedural difficulty here is that, although in the nature of PCR, the hearing was held solely to determine the competency of an inmate awaiting execution. The State cites the cases of Gilstrap v. State, 252 S.C. 625, 168 S.E.2d 88 (1969) (assuming all allegations are true, the relief to be granted on PCR is remand), and Young v. State, 250 S.C. 476, 158 S.E.2d 764 (1968) (a void indictment did not entitle defendant to release), as limitations on the court's ability to vacate a sentence and reimpose a new sentence in PCR proceedings. Both cases, although distinguishable on the facts, offer some guidance. In Gilstrap and Young, the applicants for post-conviction relief were seeking release from incarceration as a remedy, whereas, on the present facts, there is no such request; yet in both cases, we established the parameters for the appropriate remedy on PCR. Here the granted relief appears to be beyond the scope of an appropriate remedy on PCR. The PCR judge did not commute the sentence, but in vacating the sentence, he erred. The order of the court was not a grant as a matter of grace in the fashion of a commutation, but it does ignore several relevant considerations. The first consideration is that the judge based his order on the assumption that Singleton was hopelessly insane, and that no cure for his illness was possible. Perhaps under the scope of our current psychological knowledge, this is true; but there is always a potential for change. To carve out a remedy which ignores the ebb and flow of medical science is to create a rule which potentially could be impossible to live with in years to come. The second consideration is that the remedy employed by the PCR judge exceeds the range of options available under post conviction relief. The court certainly has the power to vacate a sentence, and under some circumstances, the vacation of a sentence may be the only appropriate remedy. Where a defendant has been falsely tried and convicted of a crime and the true perpetrator is discovered at a later date, then a clear cut remedy is to vacate the original sentence. No such circumstance exists here; and without this predicate, the vacating of the sentence is not justified. Recognizing that competency to be executed is not a common issue raised in PCR proceedings, the available remedies still should not venture beyond those normally granted to other PCR applicants. Here the more important questions, under these unusual circumstances, are: (1) what is the correct remedy; and, (2) what procedures must be followed to implement the proper remedy.