Opinion ID: 797525
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Discretion of District Courts To Amend Protective and Sealing Orders

Text: 66 We also believe it would have been proper for the District Court to unseal the records pursuant to its general discretionary powers. Generally, documents filed with a trial court are available for both the opposing party and the public to view. Because the government's motion concerned its obligation to turn over certain materials to the defense, it asked for permission to file its papers under seal. This meant that although the motion would be noted on the docket, the defense and public would not be able to view the filed papers or learn their contents. 67 The Court ultimately ordered the government to turn over copies of the materials to the defense but allowed it first to move for a protective order; otherwise, Wecht could have disseminated the information to the public. After briefing, the Court issued a protective order prohibiting the defense from reproducing or disseminating the records, or from disclosing their contents in open court. Upon intervention by the media outlets, the Court reconsidered the various interests at stake, and determined that the records should be unsealed and the protective order modified. The District Court determined that there was not good cause for keeping the records sealed or for preventing their dissemination. We believe the District Court acted well within its authority, and that it certainly did not abuse its discretion. 68 Courts may issue protective orders for good cause under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (noting in the civil context that it is well-established that a party wishing to obtain an order of protection over discovery material must demonstrate that `good cause' exists for the order of protection) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)). Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure. The injury must be shown with specificity. Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The good cause determination must also balance the public's interest in the information against the injuries that disclosure would cause. Id. at 787-91. 69 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir.1986), we explained that when there is an umbrella protective order the burden of justifying the confidentiality of each and every document sought to be covered by a protective order remains on the party seeking the protective order. Id. at 1122. We later stated in Leucadia that our reasoning applies with equal force when a non-party moves to intervene in a pending or settled lawsuit for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order and inspecting documents filed under seal. 998 F.2d at 166. Here, once the defense had viewed all the relevant material and the media outlets had intervened, it was proper for the District Court to consider whether there was good cause for continuing the sealing and protective orders. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790 (The appropriate approach in considering motions to modify confidentiality orders is to use the same balancing test that is used in determining whether to grant such orders in the first instance . . . .). At that stage, the sealing order prevented direct public access to the documents while the protective order prohibited defense counsel from disseminating the information to the public. 70 District courts should balance the relevant interests irrespective of whether the public has a First Amendment or common law right to the materials. In Pansy, we rejected the argument of intervenor newspapers that the public had a right of access to a settlement agreement the parties had not filed and the district court had not enforced. 23 F.3d at 782-83. But we then considered whether the district court's confidentiality order over the settlement agreement should be vacated or modified independent of the right of access doctrine. Id. at 783. We remanded on that issue, noting that the party seeking confidentiality must demonstrate good cause and that the district court must balance the interests at stake. Id. at 783-90, 792. 71 Also, in Leucadia, we refused to extend the common law right of access to civil discovery motions but noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already provided a source of law for the normative rules governing public access to discovery materials. 998 F.2d at 165. See also Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir.2002) (If ... the [district] court finds `good cause' exists to protect this information, then it must determine whether the Los Angeles Times has a right to Exhibit 8 under the common law right of access, a separate and independent basis for obtaining this information.); SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 234 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that although there was no public right of access, the district court still could reasonably conclude, in the exercise of its informed discretion, that . . . the intervention of a media enterprise for the limited purpose of gaining access to the sealed documents required the striking of a new balance between privacy rights and the interest of the general public). Although the party seeking to prevent disclosure bears the burden of demonstrating good cause, the balancing does not include the strong presumption in favor of access that occurs upon a finding of a common law right. 22 72 The District Court noted that the records had been analyzed in its various rulings and that concerns had been raised about tainting the jury pool and discouraging the use of in camera review. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the integrity of this public proceeding required disclosure of the documents, and that the government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest or good cause to justify the continual sealing. JA 44. (emphasis added). Although the District Court could have explained its reasoning more fully, we believe the opinion demonstrates that it sufficiently considered and weighed the relevant interests at stake. Unless the appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion, it is not our role to second guess the District's Courts weighing of the competing considerations. See Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (noting that the trial judge is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's decision that good cause did not justify the continuance of the sealing and protective orders. 73 C. Petition for Disqualification of the District Court Judge 74 In June 2006, Wecht filed a motion requesting that the Judge recuse himself from the case. The Judge denied the motion, and Wecht now seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the Judge's disqualification. Wecht contends that the Judge's management of the case, comments to counsel, and rulings demonstrate bias or create the appearance of bias. Specifically, Wecht argues that: 75 1. The Judge improperly engaged in ex parte communications with the government about the Orsini records. 76 2. The Judge has issued several suspect orders concerning Agent Orsini. 77 3. The Judge entered an order that effectively repealed the rules of evidence and admitted at one fell swoop over 240,000 pages of prosecution evidence. Wecht Pet. at 2. 78 4. The Judge has exhibited antagonism towards defense counsel through threats of contempt and personal attacks. 79 5. The Judge has denied defense motions without sufficient analysis or explanation. 80 6. The Judge improperly reviewed materials that were not offered into evidence at the suppression hearing. 81 7. The Judge has inappropriately borrowed case management techniques from civil law. 82 8. The Judge has prejudged the case. 83 Wecht seeks recusal of the District Court Judge under two provisions of the federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1). Section 455(a) states that [a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir.2003). Section § 455(b)(1), in relevant part, requires recusal when the Judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. We review the District Court Judge's application of these standards for abuse of discretion. In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir.1995). 84 Wecht cites to a number of judicial rulings and comments made during this case, but he does not assert that there are extrajudicial sources — defined as source[s] outside of the official proceedings — requiring the Judge to recuse himself. United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir.1994). The Supreme Court stated in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994), that [i]t is wrong in theory, though it may not be too far off the mark as a practical matter, to suggest, as many opinions have, that `extrajudicial source' is the only basis for establishing disqualifying bias or prejudice. Id. at 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147. When a party does not cite to extrajudicial sources, the Judge's opinions and remarks must reveal a deep-seated or high degree of favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Id. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147. 85 Wecht has raised a number of complaints about the Judge's remarks, practices, and rulings. We have grouped Wecht's allegations into five categories and discuss them below in the following order: the ex parte practices of the Judge; the Judge's general management of exhibits and evidentiary objections; rulings concerning Agent Orsini; the Judge's examination of materials after the suppression hearing; and the Judge's antagonism towards defense counsel. 1. Ex Parte Practice 86 Wecht first asserts that the District Court Judge improperly engaged in ex parte communications with the government about the Orsini records and otherwise inappropriately handled motions regarding the records. It is important at the outset to clarify what these communications are. Wecht has not alleged that the Judge met with government attorneys or otherwise discussed matters in the case with them outside the presence of defense counsel. Instead, Wecht complains that the government filed an ex parte motion and that the District Court issued an ex parte ruling. 87 Wecht is correct that, in general, ex parte proceedings are disfavored. However, there are a number of circumstances where ex parte applications to the court are appropriate, and Wecht appears to overlook our previous statements endorsing the in camera inspection of materials that may need to be turned over to the defense. We have, for example, stated that [t]he submission of discovery materials to the court for an in camera inspection and decision as to which materials are discoverable is commonly used when the Government's need for preserving confidentiality over the materials must be balanced with the defendant's constitutional right to evidence material to his defense. Bocra, 623 F.2d at 285. And in United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 191 (3d Cir. 1998), we held that [t]he district court's in camera inspection of [a police officer's] personnel files fully satisfied Brady's due process requirements. 88 To be fair, much of Wecht's frustration is directed at the process the District Court Judge followed in evaluating and ruling on the Orsini records. Although the government filed its application for permission to submit an underlying motion under seal, Wecht was provided with no information about the content of the motion. When defense counsel asked at a status conference the next day how he was to respond to the motion, the Court replied [y]ou are not. JA 262. Later that day, the Court issued an ex parte ruling that appears on the docket as only an order on the government's sealed motion without indicating the disposition. Certainly, the District Court could have provided Wecht with more information about the process without revealing the contents of the documents. But we fail to see any evidence of bias in the Court's failure to provide that information. 89 Two other facts undercut any suggestion of bias in the Judge's treatment of the Orsini records. First, the Judge rejected the government's argument that it need not turn over the Orsini records to the defense. Wecht argues that because the records were relevant to his April 7 suppression motion, the Judge should have ordered their immediate disclosure instead of allowing the government to move for a protective order. Perhaps the government should have applied for the protective order more quickly or the Judge should have required it, 23 but defense counsel received the documents in plenty of time to supplement the suppression motion or use the records at the June 8 suppression hearing. 24 Defense counsel would not have been able to use the information in their initial April 7 motion even had the Judge ordered immediate disclosure. 90 Second, the Judge discussed at some length the ex parte and sealing process with the parties at the May 12 status conference. The Judge listened to defense counsel's complaint that the cursory descriptions of motions to seal on the docket provided insufficient information. The Judge encouraged the government and the defense to confer and come up with an agreed upon protocol for sealing motions going forward. Later in the hearing, the Judge listened to the arguments of the media and expressed his willingness to improve the process. On May 17, the Judge issued an order establishing a new protocol that accounted for all of the parties' concerns. For these reasons, we discern no bias in how the Judge handled the government's motion regarding the Orsini records. 25 2. Management of Exhibits and Objections 91 Wecht's complaints about the Judge's management of exhibits stem from the March 1 Pretrial Order, which included schedules and deadlines for pretrial motions and discovery. Section 3(c) ordered the government to provide defendant with exhibits it intend[ed] to use at trial by April 21, while defense counsel was to preliminarily designate its exhibits by May 5. JA 48. Counsel were to meet on or before May 11 in an effort to agree upon the admissibility of joint exhibits, and jointly provide the Court with an exhibit binder and chart indicating objections to exhibits by May 15. JA 49. The Court would then address the objections at or before conferences scheduled for June 7 and 8. Id. Both the government and the defense participated in the drafting of the Pretrial Order and it was adopted with no objections from defendant. 92 Problems arose, however, on April 21 when the government provided a preliminary list of more than 1350 exhibits. The exhibits comprised more than 240,000 pages of documents in an electronic database. This was apparently far in excess of what the defense had anticipated. According to Wecht, about 300,000 pages of documents had been provided in the course of discovery, and the government had previously estimated that probably 5 percent of the exhibits would eventually be offered at trial. App. 731. 93 The government acknowledged that what they provided on April 21 was a preliminary exhibit list. Gov.App. 165. Wecht believed this did not comply with the Pretrial Order which required that the government provide exhibits it intend[ed] to use at trial. At an April 28 conference, the Judge stated that the government's production was appropriate and that he expected the parties to sit down together and draft the necessary summaries and stipulations of fact to significantly narrow the number of exhibits. Gov.App. 175. 94 In addition to the dispute over the government's compliance with the Pretrial Order, there was (and continues to be) fundamental disagreement about how long it should have taken defense counsel to review the government's exhibits. Defense counsel stated that its firm was printing out each of the exhibits and that it would be impossible to review them in the time allotted. The Court, as well as the government, wondered why printing these documents was necessary when it had been agreed that the exhibits should be scanned and provided in electronic form. Further, because the Judge personally reviewed each of the exhibits in the database, he did not credit defense counsel's statements that printing was required. While we are not in a position to resolve this dispute, we do note that more effective communication between defense counsel and the Judge might have yielded a resolution acceptable to all parties. Instead, it appears no one offered sensible suggestions as to how the Pretrial Order could be modified without affecting the trial date. 95 On May 11, the government and defense met to discuss the exhibits but the meeting did not last long and accomplished little. At the May 12 conference, defense counsel described the government's exhibits as a mess and explained that Wecht would reserve objections until he understood the basis for the [g]overnment's proffer on all of these documents. App. 763. The Judge expressed his displeasure with the failure of the parties to agree on joint exhibits and stated that, if necessary, he would go through each of the exhibits in court. He then scheduled four days of hearings in early June for this purpose and stated I do think this is the time for the [g]overnment to decide really which are the exhibits and which aren't. Gov.App. 194-95. 96 On May 15, the government submitted an exhibit list to the Court, including each of its more than 1350 exhibits, and noted that the defense had objected to all of them. The government also indicated that it consented to the admission of five of Wecht's exhibits, but set forth specific objections to thirty others. The defense did not submit any materials or specific objections to the Court, nor did they seek an extension of time to do so. It is possible, however, that defense counsel believed the discussion at the May 12 conference meant the May 15 deadline no longer applied. Immediately after counsel stated that he reserved objections until he understood the basis for each exhibit, the Court stated: Okay, fine. We will do it here in court one by one . . . . App. 763. But after the May 15 deadline passed, the Judge explained that all along he had still expected defense counsel to submit specific objections to exhibits by May 15. The Judge planned to use the exhibit chart to examine objections and make initial rulings, leaving for the June hearings only those exhibits he had questions about. 97 Though it is possible that defense counsel willfully violated the Pretrial Order, we believe it more likely that there was confusion following the May 12 conference. It appears the Judge and counsel did not communicate effectively about the exact process that was to take place regarding the government's exhibits. While defense counsel should have sought clarification of that process at the May 12 conference or subsequently in writing, the Judge should have more clearly expressed his expectations in light of the scheduling of four days of hearings in June. 98 At a minimum, we believe the Court should have sought an explanation from defense counsel for missing the May 15 deadline before issuing what appeared to be a drastic order on May 17. In that order, the Court stated that because it had not received specific objection[s] from defendant, all of the government's exhibits were admitted into evidence, subject only to possible relevancy objections . . . which may result solely from future rulings on the Motion to Suppress or any Motion to Dismiss. App. 232 (citation omitted). Wecht moved for reconsideration of this order and later for modification of the Pretrial Order. On June 14, the Judge issued an opinion that did not grant these motions, but that ruled on specific evidentiary objections submitted by Wecht one week before. 26 Wecht has characterized the May 17 order as a suspension of the rules of evidence. 99 Frankly, we think it was improper for the Judge to admit thousands of pages of materials wholesale into evidence, especially when the government had acknowledged that its list of exhibits was preliminary. If this was not the Judge's intention, he should have subsequently modified his order to clarify its scope. We believe his evidentiary order created unnecessary argument and confusion instead of advancing the goals of the pretrial order to move the case swiftly and fairly toward trial. Nevertheless, his subsequent rulings on objections make clear that he did not in fact suspend the rules of evidence. 100 It is important to note that district courts have wide discretion in the management of their cases. See, e.g., Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1982) (referring to the broad powers with respect to timing and other considerations that [the district court] has generally in the management of the cases before it as they proceed through the various stages before and during trial); Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North Am., 695 F.2d 746, 751 (3d Cir.1982) ([B]road discretion should be accorded district courts in the management of their calendars.). Further, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. While we are somewhat puzzled by some of the District Court's actions in managing exhibits, we do not believe they display bias, much less the degree of favoritism or antagonism that is required for recusal. 27