Opinion ID: 2015681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Canvass of Votes

Text: It is for an entirely different reason that we must also reject Geer's contention that the circuit court erred in declaring Kadera the winner of the election. As previously noted, Geer claimed that (1) the Lake County clerk's office issued him a certificate of election; and (2) the canvassing board improperly reconvened more than seven days after the election. 10 ILCS 5/22-1 (West 1994). With respect to the issuance of the certificate, it is well settled that the certificate of election is merely prima facie evidence as to the result. In a proper proceeding the authorities may go behind the certificate    and ascertain the real facts. People ex rel. Woods v. Green, 265 Ill. 39, 42, 106 N.E. 504 (1914). Because issuing a certificate of election is not a discretionary function, but a ministerial task, any error or mistake on the part of the clerk's office cannot have a binding effect on the outcome of the election. [The] right to the office depends on the ballots and not on a commission. Green, 265 Ill. at 42, 106 N.E. 504. Consequently, the fact that Geer may have received a certificate of election, inadvertently or otherwise, does not automatically foreclose a court from inquiring into the real facts and determining which candidate received the highest number of votes. Geer next cites section 22-1 of the Code in support of his argument that the canvassing board lacked statutory authority to reconvene more than seven days after the election. 10 ILCS 5/22-1 (West 1994). That section, however, does not apply to this case. Section 22-1 states in relevant part: Within 7 days after the close of the election at which candidates for offices hereinafter named in this Section are voted upon, the county clerks of the respective counties, with the assistance of the chairmen of the county central committees of the Republican and Democratic parties of the county, shall open the returns and make abstracts of the votes on a separate sheet   . (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/22-1 (West 1994). Of the 17 offices thereafter enumerated, the office of precinct committeeman is noticeably absent. Thus, by its terms, section 22-1 does not advance Geer's argument that the canvassing board impermissibly declared Kadera the winner. Even if the canvassing board lacked statutory authority to reconvene, any irregularities in that regard became irrelevant after Geer filed his election contest. That is because such a contest looks beyond the actions of the canvassing board and determines for itself which candidate received the greatest number of votes. See generally Mayes v. City of Albion, 374 Ill. 605, 609, 30 N.E.2d 416 (1940). It is true that canvassing boards, as creatures of statute, derive their powers solely from a legislative grant of authority. As such, the canvassing board here had no inherent authority to reconvene after having fully discharged its duties. Donahoe v. Owens, 277 Ill. 318, 115 N.E. 552 (1917); People ex rel. Wilson v. Mottinger, 212 Ill. 530, 72 N.E. 906 (1904). Nevertheless, as noted in connection with the clerk's issuance of a certificate of election, the duties of the canvassing board are merely ministerial, and omissions or mistakes of that board can have no controlling influence on the election. People ex rel. Woods v. Green, 265 Ill. 39, 42, 106 N.E. 504 (1914); see also Wells v. Robertson, 277 Ill. 534, 539, 115 N.E. 654 (1917) (describing board's function as a mere mechanical or mathematical duty in which votes are computed and results declared). Concomitantly, the board's acts or mistakes, including its ultra vires act of reconvening 21 days after the election, have no bearing on the outcome of the election contest. Repeated decisions have firmly established the rule that the purpose of an election contest is to ascertain how many votes were cast for or against a candidate, or for or against a measure, and thereby ascertain and render effective the will of the people. Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560, 562, 66 N.E.2d 408 (1946). The unauthorized acts of a canvassing board cannot disenfranchise the electorate of its vote. To hold otherwise would allow the will of the people to be defeated if a ministerial office erred in carrying out its charge. In this case, the circuit court found that Kadera had received the highest number of votes. Geer does not dispute that Kadera received 102 out of the 167 votes cast. Consequently, under both section 7-8(b) of the Code, which provides that the candidate having the highest number of votes shall be such precinct committeeman of such party for such precinct (10 ILCS 5/7-8(b) (West 1994)), and section 7-59, which also states that the person receiving the highest number of votes of his party for precinct committeeman of his precinct shall be declared elected precinct committeeman from said precinct (10 ILCS 5/7-59 (West 1994)), the circuit court correctly declared Kadera the winner of the election. Our conclusion in this matter is based upon inveterate principles of Illinois election law. Long ago this court observed in People ex rel. Fuller v. Hilliard, 29 Ill. 413, 425 (1862), that the question in all such cases should be, whom did a majority of the qualified voters elect? Forms should be made subservient to this inquiry, and should not rule in opposition to substance. Since that time, this court has adhered to that principle. See MacGuidwin v. South Park Commissioners, 333 Ill. 58, 72, 164 N.E. 208 (1928); Mayes v. City of Albion, 374 Ill. 605, 609, 30 N.E.2d 416 (1940); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560, 562, 66 N.E.2d 408 (1946). We do not depart from that principle today. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing Geer's election contest.