Opinion ID: 1713798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Stipulation and Waiver

Text: Dallas testified that he received $575,000 in his settlement with Union Pacific. Of that amount, he testified that $182,000 went to satisfy legal fees; $41,000 and an additional $5,225 was apportioned for time lost and extra years needed to qualify for disability benefits from Union Pacific; and $50,000 was used to start Mill Iron S Company. Dallas argues that the balance of approximately $296,000 was for pain and suffering and, thus, could have been excluded from the marital assets and reserved for Dallas. He cites Parde v. Parde, 258 Neb. at 109, 602 N.W.2d at 663, in support of his argument: [C]ompensation for an injury that a spouse has or will receive for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability, or loss of postdivorce earning capacity should not equitably be included in the marital estate. In his brief, Dallas argues that $293,792 of the $296,000 for pain and suffering can be traced to marital assets, including real estate, personal items, money markets, and expenses related to Mill Iron S Company. As a result, Dallas argues, the marital estate received a windfall through his settlement moneys. In contrast, Lynne argues, inter alia, that by entering into the stipulation and agreement before trial in which the parties disposed of all marital property except for the tier II benefits, Dallas waived issues with respect to the nonmarital nature of his settlement proceeds, and that if Dallas wished to have certain assets designated as nonmarital, he should have litigated those issues before the court. [6] Pursuant to § 42-366, upon marital separation, parties may enter into a written agreement for the disposition of their property, and the terms of such an agreement are binding on the court unless found to be unconscionable. Parties are bound by stipulations that are voluntarily made, and relief from such stipulations is warranted only under exceptional circumstances. Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991). In this case, the parties entered into the stipulation and agreement, in which they agreed upon the disposition of all of their property except Dallas' tier II benefits. In its decree, the court specifically found that the terms of the agreement were not unconscionable, approved the agreement, and ordered disposition of the parties' property as called for within the agreement. However, as the basis of his argument that the district court erred in dividing his tier II benefits between the parties, Dallas relies on the classification and disposition of his settlement proceeds. In other words, Dallas' argument as to the disposition of his tier II benefits is based upon the allegedly unbalanced distribution of other property, the division of which he stipulated to as fair and equitable and of which the court approved. In Laude v. Laude, 600 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1999), the Supreme Court of North Dakota dealt with a similar issue. In Laude, the parties agreed to a marital property division in which the wife waived all right, title, interest, and claim to the husband's pension. In addition, the parties expressly stipulated to submit the issue of spousal support to the trial court. The trial court entered a judgment, incorporating the parties' stipulation and concluding that the wife was entitled to permanent spousal support of $800 per month, to be reduced to $300 per month upon the husband's retirement. The husband appealed the judgment, arguing that the spousal support award was an improper claim against his pension, to which the wife had waived any right. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court discussed the importance of equitable property agreements and peaceful resolutions of divorce disputes and further stated: `[T]o the extent that competent parties have voluntarily stipulated to a particular disposition of their marital property, a court ordinarily should not decree a distribution of property that is inconsistent with the parties' contract.' Id. at 850. Although the wife waived any right to the husband's pension, the court stated that the parties also agreed to submit the issue of spousal support to the trial court, including the amount to be paid and the required duration of such payments. The court concluded that although evidence at trial suggested that the husband's pension could be his sole source of income during retirement, the trial court had not awarded the wife a portion of those proceeds. Rather, the support payments could be satisfied with other income or property. Id. The court explained that the parties could have stipulated to postretirement spousal support or agreed that the husband's pension income could not be used in determining the support award; however, having left the issue of all spousal support to the trial court, the court concluded that the trial court had not erred in awarding postretirement spousal support. Id. [7] The same principles are applicable to the circumstances in the present case. Specifically, the stipulation and agreement entered into by Dallas and Lynne provided for the disposition of all of their marital property and reserved the sole issue of Dallas' tier II benefits for the district court. Therefore, the disposition of Dallas' settlement proceeds in the form of marital property was determined in the stipulation, and a court should not order a distribution of property inconsistent with that voluntary stipulation. Consideration of the classification of Dallas' settlement proceeds and whether or not those moneys were properly included in the marital estate, as justification for concluding that the tier II benefits would not be divided, is inconsistent with the stipulation settling the division of such assets. Dallas is bound by that stipulation and waived the issue of his settlement proceeds; consequently, his first assignment of error is without merit.