Opinion ID: 2977983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Section 411(c)(3) of the Act provides, in relevant part: If a miner is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust disease of the lung which (A) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram [i.e., x-ray], yields one or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter in diameter) and would be classified in category A, B, or C in the International Classification of Radiographs of the Pneumoconioses by the International Labor Organization, (B) when diagnosed by -4- No. 08-3909 Maynard v. Eastern Coal Co. biopsy or autopsy, yields massive lesions in the lung, or (C) when diagnosis is made by other means, would be a condition which could reasonably be expected to yield results described in clause (A) or (B) if diagnosis had been made in the manner prescribed in clause (A) or (B), then there shall be an irrebuttable presumption that he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis[.] 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3). The enabling regulation for section 411(c)(3) similarly provides that the irrebuttable presumption of total disability, entitling a miner to benefits, may be established through chest x-ray, biopsy or autopsy, or other means of diagnosis in accordance with acceptable medical procedures. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.304(a)-(c). Section 413(b) of the Act directs that “in determining the validity of claims under this part, all relevant evidence shall be considered . . . .” 30 U.S.C. § 923(b). We have held that, although the statute and regulation list the three methods of establishing complicated CWP in the disjunctive, and although any of the three may be sufficient to support a finding of complicated CWP, an ALJ must take into account all of the relevant evidence and determine whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding of complicated CWP. Gray, 176 F.3d at 388-90.
“[W]e review the Board’s decision to ensure that it ‘did not commit a legal error or exceed its statutory scope of review of the ALJ’s findings.’” Caney Creek Coal Co. v. Satterfield, 150 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. McMahon, 77 F.3d 898, 901 (6th Cir. 1996). “Our review of the Board’s legal conclusions is plenary; the Board may set aside an ALJ’s factual findings only if they are not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Therefore, we inquire whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions. See Gray, 176 F.3d at 387. “We should not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that -5- No. 08-3909 Maynard v. Eastern Coal Co. of the ALJ.” Id. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Wolf Creek Collieries v. Dir., OWCP, 298 F.3d 511, 519 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). C. The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 1. The ALJ was entitled to rely on doctors who did not diagnose simple CWP As mentioned above, in one of its earlier opinions the BRB affirmed Judge Huddleston’s conclusion that the x-ray evidence supported a finding of, at the very least, simple CWP. On appeal, Maynard argues that presence of simple CWP became law of the case, making it improper for Judge Levin to credit the opinions of physicians who had not diagnosed Maynard with simple CWP. Despite its statement that the x-ray evidence supported a finding of simple CWP, the BRB’s remand in its May 20, 1998 opinion specifically directed the ALJ to consider the notations and reports of physicians who believed that the abnormalities in Maynard’s lungs resulted from healed granulomatous disease. Thus, the BRB’s ruling not only permitted the ALJ to consider such opinions but required him to do so. Furthermore, Judge Huddleston’s conclusion that simple CWP was present was based only on x-ray evidence (he purported to rely on blood-gas studies, as well, but the BRB rejected his conclusions), and the BRB found that Judge Huddleston had erred in failing to consider other medical-opinion evidence. The BRB clearly did not intend to foreclose Judge Levin from taking into account the opinions of doctors who believed that granulomatous disease accounted for the abnormalities on Maynard’s x-rays. Although Judge Levin was not required to discredit doctors who opined that Maynard did not have CWP, Judge Levin did try to give effect to the BRB’s affirmance of the presence of simple -6- No. 08-3909 Maynard v. Eastern Coal Co. CWP by reducing his reliance on certain doctors who failed to diagnose that condition. The manner in which he reduced his reliance on certain doctors but not others appears to have been inconsistent. For example, Judge Levin discredited Dr. Vuskovich’s medical opinion because he had not diagnosed simple CWP, stating “I give little weight to his opinion . . . because the Board has found that Claimant does have simple pneumoconiosis, a condition related to coal mine employment which Dr. Vuskovich was unable to detect.” (JA 507.) However, Judge Levin failed to similarly discount the medical opinions of other doctors who had also concluded that simple CWP was not present. Eastern Coal has not provided any explanation for Judge Levin’s apparent inconsistency, and we can discern none, but any error is harmless, because, as described below, substantial evidence supports