Opinion ID: 2409450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the language of reed v. wylie reexamined

Text: As noted above, a dispositive sentence in our first opinion in Reed v. Wylie regarding near surface deposits stated: ... the surface estate owner must prove that, as of the date of the instrument being construed, if the substance near the surface had been extracted, that extraction would necessarily have consumed or depleted the land surface. 554 S.W.2d at 172. This was construed by the concurring and dissenting opinions to the first Reed opinion, [1] and by the court of civil appeals upon this appeal, to mean that the movant for summary judgment must prove that the only method of removal of the lignite was by surface destructive methods. Our first opinion in Reed also strongly states that we reaffirm the holding and the writing in Acker v. Guinn .  The problem here involved was not before the court in Acker. The undisputed facts in Acker were that the iron deposits in the vicinity of the land in question  must be mined by a process known as the open-pit or strip-mining method. The soil and other materials overlying the ore are first removed by bull-dozing, and the ore is then dug out with power shovels. 464 S.W.2d at 351 (emphasis here added). Since the undisputed facts were that the iron deposits in Acker must have been removed by open pit or strip mining methods, the opinion was written to address those facts. The opinion in Acker also referred to a law review article by Dean Eugene Kuntz, noting that it was entirely sound, which says, regarding the general intent of the parties to the grant or retention of minerals: The manner of enjoyment of the mineral estate is through extraction of valuable substances, and the enjoyment of the surface is through retention of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface, and these respective modes of enjoyment must be considered in arriving at the proper subject matter for each estate. 464 S.W.2d at 352. The thrust of Acker is not addressed to the word must,an agreed fact, but the surface-destructive method of removal of the deposit: ... there is nothing in the deed even remotely suggesting an intention to vest in the grantee the right to destroy the surface. 464 S.W.2d at 353. The rule for near surface lignite, iron or coal, therefore, is that if the deposit lies near the surface, the substance will not be granted or retained as a mineral if it is shown that any reasonable method of production would destroy or deplete the surface. As we read Acker , and as stated in the concurring opinion in Reed, and as stated in the dissent in Reed, the controlling factor is the close physical relationship of the substance to the surface itself. 554 S.W.2d at 181. That portion of Reed which would require that the near surface substance must be removed by surface destructive methods is overruled. Second, the first opinion in Reed holds that since the general intent of the parties is to be determined by the instrument executed, the lignite must have been strip mined as of the date of the instrument. That created a fact question as to the state of the art of removal of the substance upon some particular date in the past. The older the instrument, the more difficult the proof would be. The parties would have to employ an expert, or experts, who could testify as to the state of the art as of the date of the execution of the instrument. It might result in the ownership of the substance on adjacent tracts being different depending upon the testimony of experts as to the state of the art at the date of the instrument. This rule had, and would have, a very unstabilizing effect upon land titles. Acker made no such requirement. After an introductory paragraph setting out the instrument and the date of its execution in 1941, the opinion nowhere says that there must have been proof of surface destructive methods of removal in 1941. Instead, the opinion repeatedly used the present tense. The agreed fact was that the substance must be strip mined, and are recoverable.... [2] As pointed out in the dissent in Reed, the general intent of the parties was not that the surface not be destroyed only in 1941, but thereafter as well. 554 S.W.2d at 181-182. So, as above, we return to Acker . That part of the Reed opinion which required a fact finding that the surface must have been destroyed as of the date of the instrument is overruled. The test now is whether any reasonable method, including such a method as of the date of this opinion, of removal of the lignite, coal or iron will consume, deplete or destroy the surface. The strip mining method of removal used in Reed is a reasonable method as a matter of law for the purposes of this holding. Third, the opinion of the court of civil appeals on this appeal construed our first opinion in Reed to require that the deposit must outcrop, or be at the surface of, the particular tract in question, however small. This would require a trial as to every lot or plot in a large area of East Texas. Again referring to Acker , which we reaffirmed in Reed, the Acker opinion, after the first and introductory paragraph, nowhere refers to the land in question. The discussion in Acker refers to an area of East Texas and refers to the iron ore deposits which generally conformed to the earth's surface. The Acker opinion states that at some places, the deposits are at the surface, and in others the soil and other materials overlying the ore are first removed ... We have reexamined the record in Acker , and the only summary judgment proof in this regard is an affidavit by Acker which states in pertinent part: I have seen and know of many such deposits of commercial iron ore in Cherokee County, Texas; That such deposits exist, and which I have seen, within a mile of the 68½ acre tract of land described in Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Petition on file herein. The deposits of iron ore, in many instances, appear in cuts through hills along the highways and roadways of Cherokee County, Texas. [Emphasis added] The proof in this record satisfied that requirement as a matter of law: an outcropping in a creekbed on the particular tract and another outcropping within half a mile; that is, the substance was at the surface in the reasonably immediate vicinity. The same would be true if the substance had been near the surface. A deposit which is within 200 feet of the surface is near surface as a matter of law. [3] And finally, from the amicus briefs filed herein, it appears that our Reed opinion did not make clear the ownership of the same substance which is at or near the surface which may extend to, or be found at, greater depth. We affirm that holding in Reed ; but to restate the rule for clarity, it is this: if the surface owner satisfies the tests set out above, and establishes ownership of the substance at or near the surface, he or she owns the lignite, iron, or coal beneath such land at whatever depth it may be found.