Opinion ID: 2994665
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comparative Qualifications

Text: First, plaintiffs argue that the EPA’s reasons were pretextual because they were, in fact, more qualified than those employees chosen for promotion. Specifically, all four plaintiffs had been employed with the EPA for a longer period of time than any of the selectees. Moreover, several of the plaintiffs had received more service achievement awards than the selectees: Bell received more awards than any of the selectees; Prasinos and Assadi received as many awards as one selectee and more than the other three selectees; and Hill received more awards than three of the selectees. Finally, Assadi and Prasinos received perfect scores on the preliminary candidate rankings and Bell’s score, while less than two of the selectees, equaled the other two. Hill’s score, however, was less than the selectees./3 Nonetheless, the district court ruled that plaintiffs’ argument was not persuasive. According to the district court, the issue is whether the EPA honestly believed that it promoted the most qualified persons for the positions. The district court is not quite correct. At the summary judgment stage, the district court evaluates whether plaintiffs have produced evidence from which a fact-finder could infer that the employer lied about the reasons for promoting the selectees. We recently addressed a similar situation in a case involving the EPA: In sum, [the plaintiff] has presented specific evidence that calls into question the veracity of the EPA’s reason for failing to promote her: that she was not as qualified as the other candidates. Although a fact-finder at trial may conclude that the EPA honestly believed that [the plaintiff] was not as qualified, and therefore not liable, when weighing or balancing [the plaintiff’s] credentials and qualifications against those of [the selectees], it is quite evident that her qualifications not only match those of the successful appointees but may very well exceed those for the two attorneys chosen. Perdomo, 67 F.3d at 146. Just as in Perdomo, a fact-finder in the instant case could reasonably find that the EPA was dishonest when it concluded that the selectees were more qualified for the promotions than the plaintiffs were. Plaintiffs had more experience, received more performance awards, and scored at or near the top in the preliminary candidate objective rankings. The EPA cannot escape scrutiny merely by claiming that they selected the most qualified candidates. Furthermore, an internal EPA document suggests that the EPA did not select the best candidates. Plaintiffs obtained, in discovery, a memorandum written by one of the Panel members prior to any decision being made regarding one of the open Master positions. The memorandum stated: The issue of selection causes me a great concern. . . . This is the first time in my career that I cannot support an issue which is so clear in my mind and where I think others are totally out of reality. We want to select the best. . . . I cannot see that [selectees] Kathy [Kieth] and Denny [Dart] are superior to [plaintiff] Farro [Assadi]. I cannot support them because I believe they are not the best. . . . I consider Farro [Assadi] better by far than all of them and [plaintiff] Karen [Bell] better than . . . [selectee] Linda [Hamsing]. The district court rejected this evidence as inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, the district court found that the evidence did not fall within the Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) hearsay exception, allowing a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind./4 The district court rejected use of the memorandum because it found that plaintiffs--at least Assadi and Bell--were attempting to use it, not to establish the declarant’s state of mind, but to prove that they were, in fact, better qualified than the selectees. Plaintiffs were attempting to use the memo, however, to counter the EPA’s assertion that it honestly believed it was promoting the four best candidates. Plaintiffs made this argument clear in their 12M response. Moreover, the memorandum is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) as an admission by a party opponent./5 Furthermore, the memorandum provides some support for plaintiffs’ argument that the EPA’s more qualified candidates statement was dishonest. Consequently, the district court should have admitted the memorandum.