Opinion ID: 1547929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wrongful Discharge and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Text: Finally, Ms. Smith claims that she was wrongfully discharged because she allegedly followed and fulfilled the policy guidelines for filing a disability form after five consecutive days of absence from employment. However, even if the record supported this contention, having established that [appellant] was an at-will employee of [appellee's], [appellee] also prevails on the wrongful discharge claim.... [because] the District of Columbia does not recognize this tort for at-will employees. Alameda, supra, 6 IER Cases at 98. Compare Sorrells, supra, 565 A.2d at 289 with Adams, supra, 597 A.2d at 34 (adopting narrow public policy exception to the at-will doctrine under which employee may sue former employer for wrongful discharge based on employee's refusal to violate statute or municipal regulation). Similarly, Ms. Smith's claim that Union Labor Life's conduct was outrageous and that appellee intentionally caused her to suffer emotional distress also fails. This complained-of conduct simply does not remotely rise to the requisite level to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C.1980) (liability may be imposed for extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly [causing] severe emotional distress to another) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As mentioned above, Ms. Smith did not file a 12-I(k) response challenging appellee's summary judgment motion and consequently, failed to point to sufficient evidence in the record that would sustain her contention. Because Ms. Smith was an at-will employee, her claim is merely one of dismissal without prior disciplinary procedures and that simply [does] not satisfy the standard for liability for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Schoen v. Consumers United Group, Inc., 670 F.Supp. 367, 379 (D.D.C.1986). The record reveals that Union Labor Life's conduct in discharging Ms. Smith did not go `beyond all possible bounds of decency and [was not] regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' Id. (quoting Waldon, supra, 415 A.2d at 1076). Furthermore, Ms. Smith's claims do not meet the narrow public policy exception to the at-will termination doctrine whereby an at-will employee may sue his or her employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee's refusal to violate the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation. Adams, supra, 597 A.2d at 34. Cf. Gray v. Citizens Bank of Washington, 602 A.2d 1096, 1096-97 (D.C.) (public policy exception does not apply to wrongful discharge claim in which at-will employee was discharged for reporting illegal activities by other employees to his employer), reinstated on denial of reh'g, 609 A.2d 1143 (D.C. 1992).