Opinion ID: 1954604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Right of Free Speech

Text: Davis claims in Counts I and II that the prosecution commenced by DiPino violated his right to free speech, protected by the First Amendment and by Article 40. The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 463-63, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2510, 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 412-13 (1987). [T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments [, however,] have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or whatever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses. Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 446, 569 A.2d 604, 608-09, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938, 110 S.Ct. 3218, 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430, 434 (1969), the Supreme Court articulated the exception relevant to and governing this case, holding that speech directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [which] is likely to incite or produce such action is unprotected. As we have already indicated in our discussion of the crime of hindering, there is utterly no evidence in this record that Davis made his remark to King with the intent to incite or produce imminent lawless action. Nor, under the circumstances, were his words likely to incite or produce any such action against DiPino or Brumbley. Clearly, they did not, in fact, incite any hostile action.