Opinion ID: 1349463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Creating the Risk and Respondents' Relationship with Baker

Text: Edwards' final contention, with which we agree, is that Respondents owed her a common law duty because of the special circumstances presented. Arthurs, 346 S.C. at 108, 551 S.E.2d at 584 (recognizing that a duty may arise because of special circumstances). The special circumstances are Respondents' relationship with Baker and their actions in creating the risk of harm. Respondents were well aware of Baker's unrelenting violent tendencies toward Edwards. Edwards had called the sheriff's office to report Baker's harassment on numerous occasions, and the sheriff's office arranged for Edwards to stay in a hotel after one of the incidents. The sheriff's office and the County, through its agent Howland, [4] arranged the bond revocation hearing at the magistrate's office with no security present. Despite Respondents' awareness that Edwards feared Baker and was reluctant to attend the bond revocation, Respondents strongly encouraged Edwards' presence. Respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge of Baker's violent tendencies towards Edwards since the reason they were seeking to revoke Baker's bond was due to his failure to obey the no-contact order, which was issued as a direct result of his violent actions. We hold Respondents created a situation in which it was foreseeable that Baker would harm Edwards. Compare Miletic v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 339 S.C. 327, 529 S.E.2d 68 (Ct.App.2000) (holding Wal-Mart had no duty to protect a customer from a parking lot attack because Wal-Mart had no notice that the crime would occur). We hold that Respondents owed Edwards a duty solely as a result of the unique facts of this case, i.e., special circumstances. Respondents created a situation that they knew or should have known posed a substantial risk of injury to Edwards. Moreover, given Respondents' knowledge of Baker's demonstrated threats against Edwards, Respondents owed her a duty. Respondents' duty is one of due care and whether Respondents acted reasonably, negligently or grossly negligently is not before us. We do note that Respondents were not under a duty to guarantee Edwards' safety with absolute certainty. See Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center, Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 135, 638 S.E.2d 650, 656 (2006) (rejecting defendants' all or nothing approach with regard to the existence of a duty and noting that this argument confuses the existence of a duty with standards of care establishing the extent and nature of the duty in a particular case).