Opinion ID: 2613958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Conspiracy Instructions

Text: Although defendant was not charged with conspiracy, defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed below that the court should instruct the jury with CALJIC Nos. 6.10.5 (conspiracy and overt act  defined  not pleaded as a crime charged), 6.11 (conspiracy  joint responsibility) and 6.24 (determination of admissibility of coconspirator's statements). [37] (25a) Defendant presently contends the court committed prejudicial error in giving these instructions, particularly with respect to those instructions permitting criminal liability for the declaration of coconspirator. The Attorney General argues that because defense counsel failed to object to the admission of Garcia's question into evidence, and because counsel affirmatively consented to the conspiracy instructions, defendant may not now complain that the instructions were given. We agree that counsel's consent to the instructions bars appellate review (see People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 658 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80] [counsel invited error where he requested reading of challenged penalty phase instruction]), but will address the merits of defendant's claims since he additionally contends that counsel was ineffective. In challenging the instructions, defendant once again asserts that, apart from accomplice Ontiveros's statements, the only evidence suggesting an intent to rob was Garcia's [?]donde la tienes? question. Defendant posits that since he himself never said anything to indicate an intent to rob or steal, the jury could not have found him guilty of attempted robbery, burglary, felony murder or the special circumstances unless it acted on the conspiracy instructions given by the court which allowed it to attribute Garcia's utterance to him as a coconspirator in a plan to rob or steal. [38] Defendant evidently contends that these instructions lacked foundation because an alleged conspiracy to rob or steal had not been sufficiently established by independent proof from some source other than the statements of alleged conspirators. (See People v. Murphy (1943) 60 Cal. App.2d 762, 773 [141 P.2d 755].) If the conspiracy instructions had not been erroneously given, defendant claims, the jury would not have found against him. It is firmly established that evidence of conspiracy may be admitted even if the defendant is not charged with the crime of conspiracy. ( People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 790, citing with approval People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 396, 404 [168 Cal. Rptr. 702]; People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1174 [81 Cal. Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259, 39 A.L.R.3d 541].) Once there is proof of the existence of the conspiracy there is no error in instructing the jury on the law of conspiracy. ( Ibid. ) To determine whether there was sufficient proof of a conspiracy in this case, we apply the following rules. (26a) Although the existence of the conspiracy must be shown by independent proof [citation], the showing need only be prima facie evidence of the conspiracy. [Citation.] The prima facie showing may be circumstantial [citation], and may be by means of any competent evidence which tends to show that a conspiracy existed. [Citation.] ( People v. Jourdain, supra, 111 Cal. App.3d at p. 405.) Furthermore, the independent proof required to establish the existence of a conspiracy may consist of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 444 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610]; People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal. App.3d 224, 312 [190 Cal. Rptr. 211].) (25b) We find that accomplice Ontiveros's testimony at trial, standing alone, provided prima facie evidence of a conspiracy. In addition, we find that the existence of a conspiracy was sufficiently established through Zavala's testimony of the events taking place at the apartment. (26b) Evidence is sufficient to prove a conspiracy to commit a crime if it supports an inference that the parties positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to commit a crime. [Citation.] The existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy. [Citations.] ( People v. Cooks, supra, 141 Cal. App.3d at p. 311.) (25c) From what Zavala witnessed and testified to, the jury could reasonably infer that the two male assailants agreed and coordinated with each other and with Ontiveros to forcibly gain access to the apartment for the purpose of robbing or stealing from the brothers. The two assailants gave and took instructions from each other, with Garcia acting on defendant's commands to finish Zavala and to get out before the police arrived. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that the trial court properly instructed on the principles of conspiracy. A fortiori, counsel's failure to object to the challenged instructions did not amount to ineffective assistance. Because no error appears, we reject defendant's related claims that delivery of the conspiracy instructions violated his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial by jury, and reliable guilt, special circumstance and penalty determinations. We also reject defendant's claim that admission of Garcia's statement deprived him of his right to confront Garcia. ( People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 290-291 [82 Cal. Rptr. 161, 461 P.2d 361] [admission of statements under California's coconspirator exception to hearsay rule not violative of federal confrontation clause]; People v. Earnest (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 734, 743-744 [126 Cal. Rptr. 107].) Finally, we reject defendant's state and federal constitutional claims based on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that: (1) a finding of the existence of a conspiracy involving defendant cannot be had on uncorroborated accomplice testimony; and (2) the requisite corroboration cannot be supplied by the declaration of a conspirator. The first proposed instruction misstates the law. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 444 [The existence of a conspiracy may be proved by uncorroborated accomplice testimony; corroboration of accomplice testimony is needed only to connect the defendant to the conspiracy.].) The second inappropriately attempts to merge the corroboration of accomplice rule with the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.