Opinion ID: 52407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: May’s Subjective Symptoms

Text: 1 We review a Commissioner’s denial of benefits to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 On appeal, May argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms. A three-part “pain standard” applies when a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). The pain standard requires “(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” Id. “A claimant’s subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies this pain standard is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, if the ALJ does not credit the claimant’s pain testimony, the ALJ “must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1561-62. Here, the ALJ partially discredited May’s allegations of disabling pain and non-exertional symptoms, such as dizziness and anxiety. In doing so, the ALJ properly applied the pain standard. The ALJ found that the medical evidence established that May had a history of fainting spells, degenerative disc disease and lumbar sprain, headaches, complaints of anxiety and somatoform pain disorder. However, the ALJ found that the clinical findings supported neither her claims of 5 the severity of her symptoms nor a condition that could reasonably be expected to cause such symptoms. The ALJ further found that May’s symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, despite repeated diagnostic tests and examinations. The ALJ noted that May’s cardiologist determined that her complaints of dizziness and lightheadedness were inconsistent with the usual presentation of her impairment, and that psychometrist Karen Wagner, psychologist Cydney Yerushalmi and psychiatrist Michael Gutman had noted that May was preoccupied with her symptoms and exaggerated their severity. The ALJ also observed that May had conceded that she could drive, dine out and shop for groceries, activities the ALJ found inconsistent with May’s assertions of disabling pain. These reasons are sufficiently explicit and adequate to partially discredit May and are supported by substantial evidence in the record. In addition to the medical evidence discussed above, medical records from May’s treating physicians indicate that May’s migraine headaches had improved, that May’s back pain and anxiety were controlled with medication, that May had not had any recurrences of syncope (fainting) and that her episodes of lightheadedness were infrequent. Contrary to May’s assertions, the ALJ did not discredit her testimony solely because it was inconsistent with objective medical evidence. In evaluating the 6 intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ considers “all available evidence,” including objective medical evidence, such as medical signs and laboratory findings, statements of the claimant and others about the claimant’s symptoms, the medical opinions of treating physicians and nontreating physicians, and evidence of how the pain affects the claimant’s daily activities and ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (c)(1), 416.929(a), (c)(1). However, the ALJ cannot reject the claimant’s statements as to the intensity and persistence of her symptoms solely because they are not substantiated by objective medical evidence 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2); see also SSR 96-7p. Here, the ALJ considered all the evidence presented, including May’s statements and medical statements by May’s treating and consulting physicians. In addition, although a claimant’s admission that she participates in daily activities for short durations does not necessarily disqualify the claimant from disability, Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1997), that does not mean it is improper for the ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities at all. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (specifically listing the claimant’s daily activities as one of the factors to consider in evaluating the claimant’s symptoms). Therefore, the ALJ properly considered May’s self-reported limited daily life activities, along with all the other evidence in the record, in concluding 7 that her testimony regarding her subjective symptoms could not be fully credited.