Opinion ID: 6111134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicable Legal Authority

Text: Our assessment of this matter begins with a natural parent's constitutional right to raise his or her child without undue interference from government. The Supreme Court of the United States addressed this issue in  Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). In Troxel , Eight Justices agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent's right to raise his or her child without undue interference from government. Five Justices agreed that a fit parent is accorded a presumption that the parent acts in the child's best interests. Four Justices agreed that special factors must justify the state's intrusion, and that one of those factors is a finding of parental unfitness. This court has specifically embraced the presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child's best interests. Linder v. Linder , 348 Ark. 322 , 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002). Morris filed her petition to terminate the guardianship pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-401 (b)(3) (Repl. 2017) (the Termination Statute). The Termination Statute provides in relevant part as follows: (b) A guardianship may be terminated by court order after such notice as the court may require: ... (3) If, for any other reason, the guardianship is no longer necessary or for the best interest of the ward. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-401 (b)(3) (Repl. 2017) (emphasis added). The Termination Statute's plain language contemplates that one can petition a circuit court to terminate an existing guardianship in either of two separate circumstances: when the guardianship is no longer necessary or when termination of the guardianship is for the best interest of the ward. The Termination Statute's plain language also contemplates that the circuit court retains some level of discretion in these cases; i.e., the guardianship  may be terminated by court order under either of the statute's two prongs. This court's construction of the Termination Statute has evolved in recent years as litigants have raised new arguments concerning this provision's proper interpretation and its place alongside United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Graham v. Matheny , 2009 Ark. 481 , 346 S.W.3d 273 , this court held that one can petition to terminate an existing guardianship when either the guardianship is no longer necessary or termination is in the best interest of the ward, per the Termination Statute. However, this court added that when the ward is a minor child, [w]hat is in the best interest of the child must always be examined, without regard for which prong of the statute the petitioner relies upon. 2009 Ark. 481 , 14, 346 S.W.3d 273 , 281 (overruled by Matter of Guardianship of W.L. , 2015 Ark. 289 , 467 S.W.3d 129 ) (emphasis added). Then, in In re Guardianship of S.H. , 2012 Ark. 245 , 409 S.W.3d 307 ( In re S.H. I ), this court was presented with the issue of whether a fit parent who consented to a guardianship had the burden to prove, under Graham , both prongs of the statutory test in order for the court to terminate the guardianship. We reasoned that parents who have not been found unfit do not relinquish their fundamental liberty interest in raising their children by consenting to a guardianship. 2012 Ark. 245 , at 14, 409 S.W.3d at 316 . Accordingly, we adopted a two-step, burden-shifting procedure for when a fit parent who consented to a guardianship later moves to terminate that guardianship: A natural parent who has not been deemed unfit is entitled to the presumption that he or she is acting in the child's best interest, even after consenting to a guardianship. Therefore, when a natural parent, who has not been deemed unfit and who has consented to a guardianship, files a petition to terminate that guardianship, that parent must put forth evidence that the guardianship is no longer necessary. Once the court is satisfied  that the conditions necessitating the guardianship have been removed, the guardians shoulder the burden of rebutting the presumption that termination is in the child's best interest. Id. at 15, 409 S.W.3d at 316 . We remanded the case for the circuit court to reevaluate the case applying this procedure. When that case returned to us after remand, we clarified the test in two ways. See In re Guardianship of S.H. , 2015 Ark. 75 , 455 S.W.3d 313 ( In re S.H. II ). First, we said that a fit parent meets the burden of showing that a guardianship is no longer necessary under the statute simply by revoking consent to the guardianship. Id. at 14, 455 S.W.3d at 322 . Second, we said that the guardian can rebut this presumption by proving best interests by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Then in In re W.L. , 2015 Ark. 289 , 467 S.W.3d 129 , we did away with the burden-shifting/best interest analysis, overruling Graham and returning to the statute's plain language, which states that a guardianship may be terminated by court order ... [i]f, for any other reason the guardianship is no longer necessary or for the best interest of the ward. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-401 (b)(3) (Repl. 2017) (emphasis added). In reaching that decision, this court was concerned with the friction between the burden-shifting/best interest analysis and the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Troxel : Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children. We will not lightly intrude on this fundamental right. We have already said that a guardianship is no longer necessary once a fit parent revokes an earlier-given consent. This is because a fit parent is presumed to be acting in the child's best interest. By petitioning to terminate the guardianship and revoking consent, the fit parent, who has the child's best interest at heart, informs the court that the guardianship is no longer necessary. That is sufficient to meet the statutory requirement where the court may terminate the guardianship. In other words, a guardianship is no longer necessary per the statute when a fit parent revokes consent. The fit parent does not have to prove anything else. The statute does contain another method for the guardianship to be terminated, that is, by showing it is no longer in the ward's best interest. However, given that the legislature has created a disjunctive test, the parent can move to terminate under either prong. This ruling is consistent with the statutory text and a fit parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care, control, and custody of his or her child. Furthermore, the burden of proof does not and cannot shift to the guardians when a guardianship is terminated based on a fit parent's revocation of consent. Simply put, a fit parent's decision regarding his or her children is conclusive. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 ([S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.). 2015 Ark. 289 , at 6-8, 467 S.W.3d at 132-34 . Additionally, in a footnote, the W.L. majority addressed a concern raised by the dissent; the dissent took issue with the majority's holding that a fit parent's decision ... is conclusive, reasoning that this holding was inconsistent with the discretion afforded by the statute to a circuit court when determining whether to terminate a guardianship (See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-401 (b)(3) (Repl. 2017) (A guardianship  may be terminated by court order ... if ... the guardianship is no longer necessary or for the best interest of the ward.) (emphasis added)). The majority wrote, The dissent points out that the statute leaves the trial court with discretion even when the conditions necessitating guardianship no longer exist. This is a correct statement of the law; however, there were no other facts in front of the court that could overcome David's fundamental right to raise his child. In re W.L. , 2015 Ark. 289 , 15, 467 S.W.3d 129 , 137 at n.6. Finally, this court most recently addressed the Termination Statute in Donley v. Donley , 2016 Ark. 243 , 493 S.W.3d 762 . There, this court cited favorably to the rationale set forth in W.L. , and then remanded to the circuit court to enter an order applying the correct standard. Id. at 12, 493 S.W.3d at 769 . Acknowledging that our jurisprudence would benefit from further development on the Termination Statute analysis, we granted review in the present matter and now hold as follows. A natural parent who has not been declared unfit is presumed to act in his or her own child's best interest. Troxel , supra. This presumption is applicable when such a parent seeks to terminate an existing guardianship over his or her minor child pursuant to the Termination Statute. In this situation, parent's petition to terminate the guardianship need only inform the court that the guardianship is no longer necessary. W.L. , supra. This is an otherwise fit parent's only burden of proof; once that lack of necessity is communicated to the circuit court by a fit parent, the circuit court ordinarily would terminate the guardianship. W.L. , supra. The language contained in the Termination Statute does provide the circuit court some discretion in determining whether the guardianship should be terminated, but where the petitioner is a fit parent and the ward is the fit parent's minor child, the guardianship should only remain in place due to some circumstance that could overcome (the petitioner's) fundamental right to raise (his or her) child. W.L. , supra. We hold that a circuit court's determination that it would be in a minor ward's best interests for a guardianship to remain in place, standing alone, is insufficient to defeat a fit parent's substantive Due Process interest in raising his or her own child. There is a constitutional presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child's best interests, so where the parent has not previously been found unfit, weighing best interests at the outset of the termination inquiry is inappropriate. The mere fact that a child may have more or better opportunities with another family cannot be enough to keep that child away from an otherwise fit parent. None of this, however, should be construed to prohibit a guardian in such cases from actually raising and contesting the issue of the natural parent's fitness when the natural parent petitions to terminate the guardianship. Otherwise fit parents are presumed to be acting in their child's best interests, so the guardianship should only remain in place over the natural parent's wishes where the guardian defeats this presumption. To defeat this presumption, the guardian bears the burden of establishing that the natural parent is not fit. Importantly, whether a natural parent is fit is a very different question from whether it would be in a child's best interest to live with a natural parent or another family. Per the Troxel plurality, fitness asks whether a natural parent can adequately care for his or her children. Troxel , supra. If the natural parent is found to be unfit, then the natural parent is not entitled to the constitutional  presumption discussed in Troxel and Linder , and the circuit court accordingly has greater discretion to determine whether to terminate the guardianship based upon the specific circumstances of a given case, including the best interests of the ward. 1 , 2 Accordingly, when a parent who has not previously been determined to be unfit petitions for termination of an existing guardianship over his or her minor child, circuit courts ordinarily should only decline to terminate the guardianship where the guardian contests the parent's fitness and establishes that the parent is presently unfit. 3 Where an otherwise fit natural parent seeks to terminate an existing guardianship and the scenario described above is not implicated, the circuit court should dispose of the guardianship routinely.