Opinion ID: 882130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Renunciation of Succession

Text: The effect of the Disclaimer executed by Jeri Griffin is governed by § 72-2-101, MCA, entitled Renunciation of succession. The statute allows an individual to renounce his or her right to succession by filing a written renunciation (a) describing the property or interest renounced; (b) signed by the person renouncing; and (c) declaring the renunciation and the extent thereof. Section 72-2-101(1), MCA. Unless the transferor (decedent here) of the interest has otherwise provided, the property or interest renounced devolves as though the person renouncing had predeceased the decedent. Section 72-2-101(4), MCA. The parties do not argue, nor will we determine, the effect of subsection (4) of the statute on the purported Disclaimer in favor of the son in this case. Rather, our decision here is based on the filing requirements of the statute. In particular, the statute provides that [i]f the circumstances that establish the right of a person to renounce an interest arise as a result of the death of an individual, the instrument must also be filed in the court of the county where proceedings concerning the decedent's estate are pending or where they would be pending if commenced. Section 72-2-101(3), MCA. The plain language of the statute requires that the disclaimer be filed, thus filing of the disclaimer is a condition precedent to an effective renunciation. See e.g. Matter of Estate of Griffin (Okla. 1979), 599 P.2d 402, 406; Matter of Estate of Brewington (1981), 110 Mich. App. 672, 313 N.W.2d 182, 186. Furthermore, there can be no waiver of a right to succession where there is no intent to waive. Faught v. Estate of Faught (Tenn. 1987), 730 S.W.2d 323, 326. Here the Disclaimer of the surviving spouse's interest was filed simultaneously with the second instrument cancel[ing], revok[ing], rescind[ing], and withdraw[ing] the renunciation. Thus, at the time the alleged Disclaimer was to be given legal effect the surviving spouse did not intend to renounce her interest. We hold that the District Court correctly concluded that the Disclaimer was void as a matter of law. Thus, any factual issue concerning the surviving spouse's knowledge of the value of the decedent's business is rendered immaterial for purposes of summary judgment. See Rule 56(c), M.R. Civ.P.; Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (1988), 233 Mont. 113, 117, 760 P.2d 57, 60; Cereck v. Albertson's, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 411, 637 P.2d 509, 511.