Opinion ID: 769263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marsalis' Batson Challenge

Text: 9 Marsalis initially argues that the court erred when it ruled that the government's peremptory strike of a prospective African-American juror based on her inattentiveness during the proceedings was proper. Specifically, Marsalis contends that the court clearly erred by failing to perform a thorough analysis of whether [the] stricken juror . . . was treated differently from similarly-situated prospective jurors, and thus, the prosecution's strike was actually based on race. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96- 98 (1986), allegations of racially-based peremptory challenges are evaluated under a three-part analysis:(1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the government exercised the challenge because of race; (2) the government must next proceed to articulate a race-neutral reason for the challenge; and thereafter (3) the court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See Morse v. Hanks, 172 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 129 (1999). Because both Marsalis and the government concede that the first two steps were satisfied, we turn our focus to the third step. United States v. Evans, 192 F.3d 698, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1999) ([T]he trial judge's finding that the government offered a race-neutral explanation . . . moots the preliminary question whether [the defendant] established a prima facie case of discrimination.) 10 Under the third step of the analysis (whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination), the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant and the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curium). Thus, [u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 1993) (brackets in original) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)). 11 The court sua sponte conducted a voir dire of the government's asserted reason for the strike and received the testimony of the assigned FBI case agent whose observation formed the basis of the government's peremptory strike. When asked to describe the inattentiveness of the stricken juror and compare her with the other jurors he had an opportunity to observe, the agent testified: 12 THE FBI AGENT: Specifically what I noticed was her . . . staring out . . . [the] window and not looking back over at the Judge when he was speaking . . . . . . . 13 THE COURT: Did this juror in terms of her attentiveness or inattentiveness strike you as acting differently from the other 13 jurors you could see in the box? 14 THE FBI AGENT: Yes, sir. I think that is why I noticed her. I had nothing else to do at the time but observe what I could, and . . . everyone else was slanted towards you even if they had to turn their chairs, and she was facing the other way, which is why I initially noticed her. 15 After considering the testimony of the case agent regarding his observations of the stricken juror and the other prospective jurors, as well as the arguments of counsel, the judge was convinced that the government's peremptory challenge was race-neutral: 16 There can be no doubt that inattentiveness is a legitimate basis for challenging a juror. If anything is required of a juror aside from impartiality, it is the willingness and ability to pay attention and retain what is seen and heard during the trial. So inattentiveness is a major objection of the most legitimate kind to a juror who displays that characteristic. . . . Considering all the circumstances, I conclude that the defendants have failed to carry their burden of proving that the government's reason for challenging [the juror] is motivated in any degree by race. 17 Contrary to Marsalis' assertions, the record is clear that the judge engaged in an exhaustive inquiry into the government's peremptory strike of the African-American juror. See Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1998). We also are convinced that Marsalis failed to carry his burden of establishing that the government's peremptory strike was motivated by race because a juror's inattentiveness during the proceedings is a valid, race-neutral basis for executing a peremptory strike. See, e.g., United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that inattentiveness is a proper race-neutral basis for striking a juror); United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that striking a juror because she appeared inattentive or uninterested did not violate Batson). Thus, in light of the court's thorough review and fact-finding, our deference to [t]he trial court's determination about the ultimate question of discriminatory intent, and the absence in the record of any evidence to support the defendant's claim, we conclude that there was no error, much less clear error, in the court's finding that the government's strike of the African-American juror was race-neutral. See Evans, 192 F.3d at 700.