Opinion ID: 2599089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: When this appeal was filed, it presented the jurisdictional issue of whether a sanction order against an attorney in a criminal case is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. However, as discussed infra, this court no longer needs to address the collateral order doctrine in the present case. In criminal cases, appeals are governed by HRS § 641-11 (1993), which states in pertinent part, Any party deeming oneself aggrieved by the judgment of a circuit court in a criminal matter, may appeal to the supreme court, subject to chapter 602 in the manner and within the time provided by the Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure. The sentence of the court in a criminal case shall be the judgment. Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(b) (1999) sets the time for taking an appeal in criminal cases and provides that [a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, sentence, or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. In the present case, Ostendorp filed his notice of appeal from the November 30, 1999 sanction order on December 8, 1999. Final judgment was filed on April 27, 2000. Although Ostendorp's notice of appeal was filed before entry of judgment, pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b), his notice of appeal is deemed filed on April 27, 2000, the date final judgment was entered. As a general rule, an appeal from a final judgment in a case brings up for review all preceding interlocutory orders in the case. State v. Hirano, 8 Haw. App. 330, 332, 802 P.2d 482, 484 (1990) (citing Kahalewai v. Rodrigues, 4 Haw.App. 446, 667 P.2d 839 (1983)). Thus, Ostendorp's notice of appeal was timely filed, and this court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal pursuant to HRS § 641-11 and HRAP Rule 4(b). Therefore, this court need not determine if the sanction order was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.