Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Improprieties

Text: In assessing Marshall’s charges that the prosecutor’s actions rendered his trial unfair, we are guided by the United Supreme Court’s instructions in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), where the Court reiterated the perspective initially set forth in Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973): Before a federal court may overturn a conviction resulting from a state trial . . . it must be established not merely that the [State’s action] is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned, but that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith, 455 U.S. at 221. In Smith, the Court employed the principles set forth in Brady v. Maryland and United States v. Agurs, both of which involved a prosecutor’s nonproduction of evidence, to elucidate the standard by which prosecutorial misconduct must be measured, stressing that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith, 455 U.S. at 219. The test is whether the conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). In examining what was done and its impact, we are to look at the entire proceeding. See id. On direct appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court evaluated the 116 alleged instances of misconduct, but found only nine to be of arguable merit, of which seven have been specifically raised before us on appeal. 14 We _________________________________________________________________ 14. Two instances of the prosecutor’s conduct that the New Jersey Supreme Court found to be improper were not specifically raised and 35 agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s assessment. The seven are: i. Defense counsel questioned Marshall’s sister, Oakleigh deCarlo, about the investigators’ visit to Marshall’s home on September 21, 1984. On cross- examination, the prosecutor repeatedly discussed with her the fact that Marshall had not answered the investigators because he had retained counsel. At one point, he went so far as to say, Especially when your wife has been killed and you haven’t -- you didn’t have anything to do with it, you still run out and hire an attorney? Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 148. The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the prosecutor’s questioning as the offensive and impermissible suggestion that the retention of counsel is incompatible with innocence. Id. The trial court sustained counsel’s objection to the question, but Marshall contends that the questioning required curative action by the court.15 This is argued in Marshall’s brief at 123-127, 128, 131. ii. The prosecutor began his cross-examination of Marshall by asking him whether he had heard the reference _________________________________________________________________ argued in Marshall’s brief, and we decline to examine these on appeal. One of these instances occurred in the prosecutor’s summation, when the prosecutor referred to September 21, when investigators came to Marshall’s home to question him about Davis and McKinnon. The prosecutor’s comments, according to the New Jersey Supreme Court, violated Marshall’s privilege against self-incrimination, but were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Marshall I , 586 A.2d at 147. The other occurred when the prosecutor was cross-examining Marshall and intimated that his father-in-law was senile. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the implication . . . unsupported by any evidence in the record . . . clearly improper, and that [a] strong curative instruction by the trial court would have been appropriate. Id. at 166. We note as well that some of Marshall’s claims are stated only in general terms, and others are peppered with references to more extensive discussions in the Petition. See, e.g., App. Br. at 128, 130-31. Arguments in passing and casual statements of issues are insufficient to preserve them for consideration before us. See Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 145 F.3d 124, 133 (3d Cir. 1998) (listing cases). 15. This instance is also the subject of a separate attack as violative of Marshall’s right to counsel. 36 in his opening statement to Marshall’s owing over $300,000. When Marshall replied in the affirmative, the prosecutor stated that he was going to put some figures up here and, if you disagree, I’d appreciate it if you let me know so we can bring in the people from the banks who gave me the figures to testify. Id. at 165. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the remark improper, but harmless. The prosecutor’s statement that he would ‘bring in people from the banks to testify’ was clearly improper. It implied that the prosecutor’s characterization of defendant’s finances was accurate, and would be supported by other unidentified witnesses if contested by defendant. Id. at 165. This is raised in Marshall’s brief at 131-32. iii. Again in summation, the prosecutor vouched for McKinnon’s testimony. As the New Jersey Supreme Court said, The most critical issue at trial was the credibility of Billy Wayne McKinnon. Id. at 166. The prosecutor said: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in order to save himself, Billy Wayne McKinnon had to tell the truth. That was the deal. Because when he gave that statement, we checked it out up and down and sideways, and if we caught him in one lie -- and you heard the testimony. He waived immunity. Everything he said could be held against him. If we caught him in one lie, then he would be facing a murder charge. Id. at 167. In reviewing this statement, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted: Although the prosecutor was free to argue that McKinnon’s testimony was credible, it was improper for the prosecutor personally to vouch for his credibility or to suggest that the truthfulness of his testimony had been ‘checked out up and down and sideways,’ obviously referring to matters outside the record. Id. at 167. This is mentioned in Marshall’s brief at 131. iv. Also during his summation, the prosecutor informed the jury, The bulk of that insurance was taken out in twelve- month period before Maria Marshall’s death. I don’t care if it’s accidental; I don’t care if it pertains to getting killed in a car on a Thursday only. That 37 insurance was in effect, and he has the audacity to get up here and talk about contestability clauses, to give you the impression that he’s not going to get any of that money. He’s already received six hundred thousand dollars, and I can guarantee you, ladies and gentlemen, if you acquit this defendant, the checks will be in the mail within a week. Make no mistake about it. Id. Counsel objected, and after the prosecutor finished, moved for a mistrial in part on the basis of the prosecutor’s representation. The court denied the motion, but did issue a curative instruction. [T]he prosecutor’s assertions that defendant had ‘already received six hundred thousand dollars’ and that ‘I can guarantee you if you acquit this defendant, the checks will be in the mail within a week,’ were obviously mischaracterizations of the testimony, and, as such, highly improper. Id. at 168. This is discussed in Marshall’s brief at 132. v. The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized as among the most inflammatory portions of the prosecutor’s summation the prosecutor’s reference to the testimony of Marshall’s sons: And he has the audacity to bring in his three boys to testify. That’s obscene. And I’m not being critical of them, because I would probably do the same thing. To put his boys on that witness stand is obscene, and for that there’s a place in hell for him. He will use anybody, he will say anything and he will do anything, including his own family, to get out from under. And that’s Robert Oakley Marshall. Make no mistake about it. Id. at 169. The trial court refused to grant a mistrial in response to these comments, but did give a curative instruction, which the New Jersey Supreme Court noted could have been more forceful, but . . . was adequate to ameliorate any significant prejudice to defendant. Id. The prosecutor’s comments [about Marshall’s having his sons testify on his behalf] were not merely ‘forceful and graphic,’ they were inflammatory and highly emotional, possessing the capacity to anger and arouse the jury and thereby 38 divert them from their solemn responsibility to render a verdict based on the evidence. Id. This is discussed in Marshall’s Brief at 128-29. vi-vii. In reviewing both the guilt and penalty phase, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that [w]here . . . the victim’s character has no bearing on the substantive issue of guilt or the penalty to be imposed, the prosecution may not comment on the evidence in a manner that serves only to highlight the victim’s virtues in order to inflame the jury. Id. at 170 (quoting State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1203 (N.J. 1988). Two of the prosecutor’s statements-- one in his guilt phase closing, and one in his penalty phase statement -- crossed that line. I didn’t know Maria Marshall, but I know and you know that she loved her boys. I know and you know that she loved her husband. For eight months that lady knew that his afternoons were spent in the arms of another woman. She continued to cook for him, she continued to clean his clothes, she continued to keep the house clean, she continued to make love with him, because she loved him. She wanted to start all over. She wanted to give him a second chance. She had a right to live her life in full, to watch her boys continue to grow, to watch them graduate from school, to get married and have families of their own, but he tossed it all away because of his desperation and his greed. And that is Robert Oakley Marshall. Id. at 169-70. I really cannot think of anything more heinous in our society than to, you know, hire somebody to kill somebody else, let alone a family member; in this case, your wife. . . . . Maria Marshall had no prior criminal history. Maria Marshall was civic-minded, and this defendant did not give her the option of thirty years. Id. at 171. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the guilt phase argument within the category of inappropriate argument 39 but much more circumscribed and far less emotional than those it had found improperly diversionary. Id . It thus concluded that the remarks were harmless. As to the penalty phase comments, the Court concluded: Although the prosecutor was free to depreciate the significance of defendant’s mitigating evidence, the argument that the victim could claim the same qualities relied on by the defendant is diversionary, focusing attention away from the mitigating evidence and emphasizing the lack of justification for the homicide. We find the argument inappropriate, but have no doubt that this isolated statement in the prosecutor’s brief closing argument did not have the capacity to affect the jury’s deliberative process. Id. This is discussed in Marshall’s brief at 133-34. In reviewing the claims of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal for post-conviction relief, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that Marshall had characterized two additional comments in the prosecutor’s opening statement as misconduct. The Court concluded that, after review, all of the claims were: entirely without merit and do not warrant extended discussion. Indeed, many of defendant’s claims are mere restatements of claims rejected by this Court on defendant’s direct appeal. In respect of most of the claims in this category, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutorial conduct in question was improper. In the remaining instances, defendant has not established that the State’s misconduct was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 73 (internal citations omitted). The District Court found that -- with regard to each of the claims of prosecutorial misconduct Marshall raised before it -- the conclusions of the New Jersey Supreme Court were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. See Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 779-82. 40