Opinion ID: 795598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: insufficient evidence: possession in furtherance

Text: 15 Marcus Snow challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction for possession of two specifically-described handguns in furtherance of the charged drug trafficking offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, although the defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a conviction on this ground. United States v. Naiman, 211 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir.2000). The burden is heavy, in part, because we view the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the government, and we draw every inference in its favor. Id. So long as any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury's verdict will stand. Id. 16 A person may be convicted under § 924(c)(1)(A) for mere possession of a firearm so long as that possession is `in furtherance' of a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Lewter, 402 F.3d 319, 321 (2d Cir.2005). Marcus Snow does not dispute that he possessed the handguns alleged in the indictment, since he does not challenge his conviction under § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of these particular firearms. 5 At issue is whether there was sufficient evidence that he possessed the firearms in furtherance of the charged drug trafficking offenses. Snow argues that the evidence was insufficient, since it established no more than that the guns were merely present where the Government alleged drug transactions to have taken place. We find this argument unpersuasive. 17 To be sure, Snow is correct that the mere presence of a weapon at the scene of a drug crime, without more, is insufficient to prove that the gun was possessed `in furtherance of' the drug crime. United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir.2005)(emphasis in original); see also United States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C.Cir.2002); United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir.2001). Accordingly, the government cannot convict under § 924(c)(1)(A) by relying on the generalization that any time a drug dealer possesses a gun, that possession is in furtherance, because drug dealers generally use guns to protect themselves and their drugs. United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir.2000). Instead, the government must establish the existence of a specific nexus between the charged firearm and the charged drug selling operation. Finley, 245 F.3d at 203. 18 Although courts look at a number of factors to determine whether such a nexus exists, 6 the ultimate question is whether the firearm afforded some advantage (actual or potential, real or contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug trafficking. Lewter, 402 F.3d at 322. In answering this question, courts distinguish between a gun on the premises which has no reasonable relationship to the drug possession and future distribution and a weapon that is present to further that possession. Castillo, 406 F.3d at 815. Thus, while no conviction would lie for a drug dealer's innocent possession of a firearm, see United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir.2001); Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 415 (hypothesizing locked and inaccessible pistol used for target shooting or in hunting game to illustrate weapon not possessed in furtherance), a drug dealer may be punished under § 924(c)(1)(A) where the charged weapon is readily accessible to protect drugs, drug proceeds, or the drug dealer himself. Lewter, 402 F.3d at 322; Castillo, 406 F.3d at 816; Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462-63; Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 415. Undoubtedly, this is a very fact-intensive question requiring a careful examination of, among other things, where the gun was located and what else was found in the apartment, and thus well-suited to resolution by a jury. United States v. Taylor, 18 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir.1994). 19 In light of the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that this is neither a mere presence case, nor a case of mere innocent possession. Police seized the charged firearms during their raid of the 183 Sixth Street apartment rented by Marcus Snow, where they also found 180 baggies containing approximately 474 grams of crack cocaine hidden in the basement. Officers found the two loaded handguns in a bedroom dresser, one in the top drawer and one in the middle drawer, the one in the top drawer next to $6,000 in cash. There was drug packaging paraphernalia in the bedroom's closet. Photographs taken by Officer Brennan at the scene depict the bedroom as being located directly off the apartment's kitchen, where officers found scales and baggies used in the packaging and sale of crack cocaine, as well as a plate containing trace amounts of small-type white rocks later determined to be cocaine. 7 20 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could conclude that Snow's possession of the handguns facilitated or advanced the instant drug trafficking offense by protecting himself, his drugs, and his business. Castillo, 406 F.3d at 816. 8 Here, loaded handguns, illegally possessed, were found in the bedroom of an apartment where drugs were packaged and stored for sale. The guns were in close physical proximity to the paraphernalia used in the packaging and sale of crack cocaine and the trace amounts of illegal narcotics found in the kitchen. Moreover, the guns were found in the same dresser as $6,000 in cash, which a reasonable juror could conclude were drug proceeds. From the proximity between the handguns, proceeds, trace amounts of drugs, and drug paraphernalia, a reasonable juror could conclude that the person to be protected was a drug dealer and drug packaging paraphernalia, and the proceeds of drug trafficking were among the things being protected. Lewter, 402 F.3d at 323. 9 Applying the deferential standard we must when reviewing the legal sufficiency of a jury's guilty verdict, we hold that this was sufficient evidence to support Snow's conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A). 21