Opinion ID: 3169926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garage Entry

Text: ¶22 It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). Indeed, '[i]t is axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶28, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 5 However, after Dumstrey was arrested, a search occurred when he consented to the blood draw at the hospital. As Dumstrey does not challenge the blood draw on McNeely grounds, we need not address it. Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections from nonconsensual, warrantless blood draw). 10 No. 2013AP857-CR 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984)). Given this heightened Fourth Amendment protection, where police effectuate a warrantless arrest inside of a home, the State must prove that the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances. Ferguson, 317 Wis. 2d 586, ¶¶19-20. ¶23 The protection provided by the Fourth Amendment to a home also extends to the curtilage of a residence. Martwick, 231 Wis. 2d 801, ¶26; State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 183, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990), abrogated, in part, on other grounds by State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, ¶42, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775. [T]he curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a [person's] home and the privacies of life and therefore has been considered part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless entry for arrest also has been reasoned to extend to places where the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent located on public campgrounds such that warrantless arrest of inhabitant requires exigent circumstances). We consider both constitutional contentions in turn. 11 No. 2013AP857-CR
¶24 Prior to undertaking a case specific curtilage analysis, however, it is necessary to first discuss existing Wisconsin and Supreme Court law with respect to the Fourth Amendment's protection of a home's curtilage. Dumstrey points us to Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 633, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974), in support of the proposition that common space in the basement of an apartment building is clearly within the curtilage of the home. In Conrad, we considered whether the police conducted an unconstitutional search when they excavated a dead body approximately 450 feet from the defendant's house on his 40 acre farm. Id. at 620-21. We rejected any trespassory, curtilage analysis in favor of a reasonable expectation analysis and held that there was no unconstitutional search because the defendant harbored no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area of his property in question. Id. at 633-34. ¶25 In so holding, we relied on the Supreme Court's Katz decision, wherein the Court held that a search need not result from a physical trespass in order to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. Rather, a search may be unconstitutional in an area where a person holds a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 352-53, 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). ¶26 We stated in Conrad that [t]he importance of Katz is . . . that it foretold the possibility that, even in a place traditionally thought to be an area protected by the [F]ourth [A]mendment, protection would not be afforded in the absence of 12 No. 2013AP857-CR a subjective intent to exercise a reasonable expectation of privacy. Conrad, 63 Wis. 2d at 627. Based on this proposition, we stated that Katz modified the previous curtilage analysis and effectively held that there could be no unconstitutional search of curtilage unless the defendant also held a reasonable expectation of privacy in that same area. Id. at 630-31. As further support for this proposition, we cited a previous opinion, Watkins v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 514, 208 N.W.2d