Opinion ID: 2634399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Properly Refused Defendant's Request to Ask Leading Questions of Defendant's Original Prosecutor

Text: During his case-in-chief, defendant called to the witness stand Steven Polacek, who, as noted, was the prosecutor assigned to defendant's case prior to trial. Defendant's purpose was to elicit testimony concerning inducements or benefits that may have been promised to Kenny Dustin in exchange for Dustin's testimony against defendant. [28] Shortly after the examination commenced, defense counsel's inquiries prompted the trial prosecutor to interpose objections that defense counsel improperly was asking leading questions on direct examination. [29] Defense counsel countered the objections with a request that the court designate Polacekโin light of his previous role as defendant's prosecutorโ as a hostile witness and on that basis permit the asking of leading questions. (See Evid.Code, ง 767, subd. (a).) [30] Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel argued: ... I can't think of a witness [who] would be more hostile than the former attorney representing the party that is prosecuting us or trying [to] kill us. The trial court sustained the prosecution's objections and denied defense counsel's request. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to designate Polacek as a hostile witness. At trial, defendant's request was based primarily upon Polacek's position as his former prosecutor. On appeal, defendant adds reference to heated exchanges between defense counsel and Polacek prior to the preliminary hearing, instances of asserted prosecutorial misconduct when Polacek failed to provide discovery in a manner deemed timely by defendant, and claims by defendant that Polacek refused to follow evidentiary leads associating Dustin with the murder. According to defendant, the trial court's ruling violated his right to due process of law, to a fair trial, to call and confront witnesses, and to a reliable penalty determination. We reject defendant's position. Evidence Code section 767 vests a trial court with broad discretion to decide when to permit the use of leading questions on direct examination. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 672, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; see also In re Burton. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 205, 227, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 86, 147 P.3d 1014; People v. Spain (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 845, 853-854, 201 Cal.Rptr. 555 [the issue is not one of constitutional dimension but instead concerns the trial court's discretion].) In any event, regardless whether we restrict our consideration to defendant's claim at trial that Polacek's position as his prosecutor rendered him a hostile witness, or additionally consider instances of hostility between Polacek and the defense relied upon by defendant for the first time on appeal, defendant was not prejudiced by the court's requirement that he examine Polacek without employing leading questions. Defendant contends that because his counsel was required to ask open-ended questions on direct examination, Polacek improperly volunteered irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial testimony that was intended to sabotage defendant. But the sole example of a damaging reply from Polacek is as follows: When defense counsel inquired why Polacek gave Dustin money, the witness responded: [T]his crime occurred February 18th of 1991.... On May 5, 1991, one of the reports that you have, there is a report of Kenny Dustin being attacked by some black individuals. His stomach was slashed and with a statement from one of those people saying let's see if you testify now, and he was robbed at the same time. He did call me following that and was scared. You know, I need some protection. Defendant claims the prosecutor improperly interjected the information that the attack was committed by African-American persons. Defendant does not explain why Polacek, a witness he claims was hostile to him, would not have taken the opportunity to interject the same reference to the assailants' race under examination as a hostile witness or under cross-examination by the prosecutor. Defendant does not contend, moreover, that he moved to strike any portion of Polacek's answers as irrelevant. Defendant essentially concedes his inability to establish prejudice. He acknowledges that [w]hile there are other examples of openended questions leading to volunteered, nonresponsive testimony, the point is not that appellant was prejudiced by those specifics, but that his counsel was hamstrung from conducting proper examination of a hostile witness by being forced to use open-ended questions.