Opinion ID: 2594735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effectiveness of Defense Counsel at Pretrial Proceedings

Text: Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered inadequate representation, in violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. The Attorney General argues that because defendant was representing himself, he may not allege ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally it is true that a defendant who elects to be his own attorney may not thereafter seek a reversal of his conviction based on incompetent representation. ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834-835, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.) But as we noted earlier, the two court-appointed attorneys acting as defendant's cocounsel retained control over pre-trial and trial proceedings. As to those aspects of the representation over which counsel retains control, counsel remains responsible for providing constitutionally effective representation and the defendant may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1142, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142,1164, fn. 14, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730.) Because defendant here is challenging the adequacy of his counsel's performance in the trial court, he may raise that claim on appeal. Citing well-established law, we recently reiterated that a defendant claiming ineffective representation must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient when measured against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice to defendant in the sense that it `so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 636, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80.) ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Because after a conviction it is all too easy to criticize defense counsel and claim ineffective assistance, a court must eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight by indulging a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' [Citations.] ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) With these principles to guide us, we address defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, failure to move to dismiss the arson special-circumstance allegation, and failure to maintain confidentiality in requesting defense funds.
Defendant faults his counsel for not cross-examining arson investigator Jakubowski at the preliminary hearing. He argues that such examination would have disclosed that the flammable liquid used to set the fire at the house of murder victim Litovich was placed only on the bed next to the victim's body, not in other parts of the room. Defendant asserts that this disclosure at the preliminary hearing would have enabled the defense to move to strike the arson-murder special circumstance on the grounds that no structure or property was burned with felonious intent independent of the intent to kill the victim. When, as here, a defendant after conviction asserts error at the preliminary hearing, the defendant must show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941.) Defendant here has not attempted to show prejudice separate from the trial proceedings. (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 923, fn. 19, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395.) Accordingly, we will not consider his claim of error at the preliminary hearing independent of our evaluation of alleged trial error discussed below. (See post, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 520-522, 6 P.3d at pp. 182-184.)
Section 987.9 allows an indigent defendant in a capital case to seek court funds for, among other things, the hiring of investigators. Under the statute, the fact that an application has been made and the contents of the application shall be confidential. ( Ibid.) As relevant here, the first of two defense requests sought investigative funds for an amount not to exceed $1,000. The second request sought reimbursement for $775.43, based on the defense investigator's efforts to contact certain witnesses whose names and addresses were listed in the funding request. Defendant argues that both requests violated section 987.9 because they were not filed as confidential applications. A violation of section 987.9 is not reversible per se, however. The defendant must show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the violation. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1133-1134, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Here, defendant has not made such a showing.