Opinion ID: 1852149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did Wesley Waive his Liberty Interest in Having a Relationship With Mark?

Text: Before we look at the facts of this case, we must define the nature of the efforts required by a putative father to avoid a waiver of his rights. Wesley argues that efforts by a parent to maintain consistent contact with his child are sufficient even though the association is not of a parent/child nature. We disagree. Certainly, the import of our brief discussion of waiver in Callender implied that the efforts made by a putative father to assert his rights must be parental in character. As noted earlier, we observed in Callender that a parent who did not make a serious and timely expression of a meaningful desire to establish parenting responsibility could lose his rights. Id. (emphasis added). This focus is consistent with the nature of the liberty interest at stake here. The liberty interest at issue is not merely to know the child, to visit with the child, and to give the child gifts. The interest at stake is based on the significance of the biological link. Id. at 190 (emphasis added). It is [t]he right of a parent to companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children. Id. (emphasis added). To require anything less than efforts to establish a parental relationship would be inconsistent with our case law in other situations involving child custody. For example, in In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 1995), this court affirmed an award of custody of a minor child to the child's stepfather over the objection of the child's biological father. 537 N.W.2d at 783. We held that the natural father was not entitled to custody of his daughter after the child's mother died because the father had made a voluntary and conscious choice to permit the stepfather to raise the child as his own. Id. Because the father had taken `an extended holiday from the responsibilities of parenthood,' we held that he could not take advantage of the statutory preference for parental custody. Id. at 782 (citation omitted). Similar sentiments were expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). In that case the Court held a natural father's constitutional rights were not violated when he was not given notice of his child's adoption because he had never had any significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262, 265, 103 S.Ct. at 2994-95, 77 L.Ed.2d at 627, 629. Holding that the federal constitutional protection of paternal rights depended on a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, the Court determined that for the natural father to have qualified for such protection, he should have `come forward to participate in the rearing of his child.' Id. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d at 626 (citation omitted). The Court said, The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for his child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. Id. at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993-94, 77 L.Ed.2d at 627. Turning to the facts of the present case, we agree with the district court that Wesley did not make adequate efforts to assume parental responsibility for Mark. Although he established a friendship with Mark, he made no attempt to exercise responsibility for Mark's care or custody. Not until Mark was seven years old did Wesley make regular child support payments; prior to that time, Wesley was satisfied to give Mark small gifts and trinkets. When asked at the hearing about the arrangement Wesley had with Karen to simply be Mark's friend and not to reveal that he was Mark's father, Wesley responded, [E]ventually he was going to be my son, but at the time he was very young and he lived at home with Larry and Karen and Larry was his father, so a little ... four, five, six-year-old boy doesn't understand and so I was his friend, Wes. (Emphasis added.) For more than seven years, Wesley was content to let another man raise a child that was possibly his own. He did so, not through a lack of success at asserting his parental rights, but because it served his own need to keep his affair with Mark's mother a secret. Wesley's actions in 1999 in paying support and in commencing this action were too late. The district court correctly found that he had waived his liberty interest in a parental relationship with Mark. Accordingly, Wesley has no enforceable right to assert in the present action and the case was properly dismissed. AFFIRMED.