Opinion ID: 65401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Theagene's Predisposition

Text: Predisposition focuses on whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or, instead, an unwary criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. 883 (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372, 78 S.Ct. 819). Specifically, the question is whether the defendant intended, was predisposed, or was willing to commit the offense before first being approached by government agents.  Bradfield, 113 F.3d at 522 (citing United States v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 612, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1989)). Evidence of predisposition can include, for example, active, enthusiastic participation or demonstrated expertise in the criminal endeavor. In United States v. Ogle, for example, we held the defendant was not entitled to submission of an entrapment defense, where he was a keen participant in [a money-laundering] conspiracy. 328 F.3d 182, 185-86 (5th Cir. 2003). Defendant Ogle claimed that a government informant entrapped him, but Ogle had arrived at a meeting with the informant fully prepared to discuss options for money-laundering. Id. at 186. This preparation demonstrated both expertise and enthusiasm, and Ogle failed to demonstrate any hint of hesitation or unwillingness to enter into the conspiracy. Id.; see also United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 768 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that entrapment instruction was unnecessary, in light of the defendants' demonstrated expertise in, and enthusiasm for, trafficking in hides of protected animals). A lack of predisposition can appear from, for example, lack of prior interest or experience related to the crime, significant hesitation or unwillingness, or attempts to return discussion to lawful conduct. In Bradfield, a government informant importuned defendant Bradfield approximately eighteen times to participate with him in a drug deal, before Bradfield finally acquiesced. 113 F.3d at 523. There was no evidence that Bradfield had ever shown an interest or willingness to participate in a drug deal before he met [the government informant]. Id. at 523. We held that Bradfield made a prima facie showing of non-predisposition. Id. Similar reasoning led the Fourth Circuit to vacate a conviction and remand for retrial with an entrapment instruction, in a case with facts similar in some ways to the present case. In United States v. Sligh, 142 F.3d 761 (4th Cir.1998), an IRS agent, after attending a bribery awareness course, became convinced that a taxpayer who had called her several times intended to bribe her. Id. at 764. Through multiple conversations and ultimately in-person meetings, the taxpayer never made . . . an overture [of bribery] and in fact . . . ignored [the agent's] multiple suggestions of wrongdoing and her initial suggestions of a bribe. See id. at 766-67. Nonetheless, the agent persisted until the taxpayer finally bribed her. Id. The Fourth Circuit, applying a more than a scintilla of evidence standard, held there was evidence the IRS had implanted the bribery scheme in a mind that had never contemplated bribery, and that an entrapment instruction was appropriate. Id. at 762, 767. We reject the government's central argument on predisposition, namely that Theagene's $500 token was on its face an obvious bribe, thereby conclusively establishing predisposition prior to the phone call with Geiger. Government witnesses testified that they immediately suspected bribery because it was unheard of for a taxpayer to make legitimate payments in cash through the mail. But the unusualness of sending cash does not conclusively demonstrate briberythe testimony also indicated it was unheard of for a taxpayer to attempt bribery by mailing cash to the IRS. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Theagene, a reasonable jury could conclude that the unusual cash payment did not by itself demonstrate predisposition. The remainder of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Theagene, likewise could support a lack of predisposition. Theagene testified that inept office managers caused him to fall behind in his taxes, and that he got further behind when he took time off to care for his sick brother. In response to IRS demand letters, he paid nearly $20,000 in taxes in August 2006, reportedly from proceeds of a cashed out life insurance policy. Thereafter, the IRS levied his bank accounts and accounts receivable. He testified that the levies interfered with the daily operation of his medical practice, and made it impossible for him to earn money in order to pay the remainder of his overdue taxes. In calls and letters to Geiger, he maintained that if the IRS would lift the levies, he could pay his taxes. He testified that when he prepared the letter with the postdated check, the voided check for automatic deductions, and his request to abate penalties and interest, he was concerned because the levies made his bank accounts unreliable. According to his testimony, he took $500 cash from his office safe, impromptu, and sent that in as well as a means to demonstrate good faith. He testified that he labeled the cash a token to acknowledge it was a nominal fee towards this large amount of money, but later forgot he had written that note. According to Theagene, it was not meant as a bribe. When Amezquita called, Theagene told him to apply the cash to his account. In Theagene's version of the facts, when Geiger then called and repeatedly pressed him about the $500, Theagene felt browbeaten and agreed to a meeting. He testified that he let Geiger keep the $500 because I'm not going to get into a power struggle with someone that can make my life miserable. . . I thought, well, if he wants $500 that badly, he might as well just go ahead and keep the money. Geiger's testimony lends some support to Theagene's version of events. Geiger began the October 5, 2006 phone call believing that Theagene intended bribery. But after Theagene passed up opportunities to turn the discussion to bribery even when Geiger said [t]hat's for me? Or what?Geiger began to doubt that Theagene intended bribery. Geiger's cross examination included the following exchange: Counsel: Every time you asked the doctor about the $500, in your mind, you knew it was an obvious bribe, right? Geiger: I perceived it to be a bribe, yes. Counsel: Well, if it was an obvious bribe, at what point did you say to yourself, Well, maybe this isn't a bribe. I keep asking him if it's a bribe and he keeps telling me no? At what point do you get it in your mind that maybe it's not a bribe? Geiger: That was on page 8. [. . .] Counsel: And you started thinking it was not a bribe? Geiger: That's right. At the very [. . .] bottom, sure. Counsel: So, now, we're at a point where you don't think it's a bribe? Geiger: Right. [. . .] Counsel: [W]hy did you change your mind about applying the money to his account? Geiger: Because when I told him that I thoughthonestly, I thought it was for me, he changed his tune and now he wants to meet and discuss this further. This testimony is highly relevant to predisposition. We have determined that the $500 envelope did not, by itself, conclusively establish predisposition to bribe. Yet even Geiger, who began the call believing the $500 was a bribery attempt, came to doubt it was as the call progressed. It was not until after Geiger announced his own interpretation of the $500 as a bribe that Theagene suggested they meet. Predisposition turns on whether the defendant intended, was predisposed, or was willing to commit the offense before first being approached by government agents.  Bradfield, 113 F.3d at 522 (citation omitted). A reasonable jury could agree with Geiger's reaction during the October 5, 2006 telephone call, and conclude that the call is some evidence against predisposition. There are certainly grounds to doubt Theagene's version of events. [7] Nonetheless, his story is plausible enough that the jury deserved a chance to evaluate it. The sending of the $500 envelope is, by itself, not conclusive as to predisposition, and the October 5, 2006 phone call arguably suggests there was none. In these circumstances, the predisposition analysis favors allowing a jury to determine whether bribery was on Theagene's mind before Geiger suggested it.