Opinion ID: 1928076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Forgery and Uttering

Text: We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Zanders and Harris of forgery and uttering. D.C.Code § 22-3841(b) provides that: A person commits the offense of forgery if that person makes, draws, or utters a forged written instrument with intent to defraud or injure another. The trial judge instructed the jury that to prove forgery, the government had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the writing in question, that is, the sale[s] slip, was falsely made by the defendant; (2) the defendant falsely made the writing that is, the sales slip with the specific intent to defraud; and (3) the falsely made writing was apparently capable of effecting a fraud. . . . That is, the false writing was such that no person of ordinary intelligence could reasonably have been deceived by it. See also CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, No. 4.43. The trial judge charged the jury that to prove uttering, the government had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the writing in question, that is the sales slip, was falsely made; (2) the defendant passed or attempted to pass that sales slip to someone having represented it to be true and genuine; (3) the defendant did so knowingly; (4) the defendant acted with specific intent to defraud [another]; (5) the falsely made writing was apparently capable of bringing about a charge. See also CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, No. 4.43. Based upon the testimony of Mr. Nandwani, a jury could reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Zanders and Harris falsely signed a credit card sales slip for toiletries and sweatshirts, and presented the slip to Mr. Nandwani as true and genuine, with an intent to defraud him. See Driver v. United States, 521 A.2d 254, 258-59 (D.C.1987). Zanders claims that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the government's proof at trial with respect to the forgery and uttering charges. Specifically, he claims that the forgery and uttering counts of the indictment referred only to a credit card sales slip in the amount of $135.60, but the proof at trial also covered another sales slip in the amount of $1,000 for the gold jewelry purchased. Zanders has confounded the proof of the theft and credit card fraud counts of the indictment with those concerning forgery and uttering. The trial judge limited proof on the forgery and uttering counts to the $135.60 sales slip. There was no amendment or variance of the indictment. See Johnson v. United States, 613 A.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C.1992). [9] In instructing the jury regarding forgery and uttering, the trial court referred to the $135.60 sales slip, and the jury verdict form also mentioned the $135.60 sales slip with respect to these counts. Although the indictment charged forgery and uttering of a legal instrument having the value in excess of $250, the proof mentioned in the indictment and presented in court lowered the count to a misdemeanor. Hence Zanders and Harris were not prejudiced; indeed the type of prejudice recognized in Johnson is not present here. See Johnson, supra . [10] In short, there was no fatal variance between the indictment and the government's proof at trial.