Opinion ID: 2622179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: case law interpreting utah's tolling statute

Text: ¶26 Our cases have consistently adhered to the plain language of the tolling statute. We have held in a number of cases that Utah's tolling statute should be interpreted literally, so that where a defendant is absent from the state, the statute of limitations will toll as to that defendant for that period. [19] In other cases, where by statute an agent is appointed within the state to receive service of process on behalf of a defendant, we have held that a defendant is not absent from the state and therefore the statute of limitations will not be tolled. Yet, even those cases are in harmony with the tolling statute's plain-language application. ¶27 In Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, [20] we held that the defendant's seven-year absence from the state tolled the applicable statute of limitations. [21] We determined that the tolling statute applied even though the defendant's wife continued to reside in Utah during the defendant's absence. [22] We concluded that the statute of limitations runs only during the time the [defendant] is openly in the state and immediately on his leaving it the statute . . . ceases to run until his return. [23] We gave effect to the literal meaning of the tolling statute-if after the cause of action accrues he depart from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. [24] ¶28 In Gass v. Hunting, [25] we followed Keith-O'Brien's literal interpretation of the tolling statute. [26] Our Gass decision is concise and straightforward, holding that the defendant's absence from the state tolls the eight-year statute of limitations and concluding that the tolling statute is clear. [27] ¶29 In Snyder v. Clune [28] and Lund v. Hall, [29] we held that a nonresident motorist's absence from the state did not toll the statute of limitations where by statute an agent is appointed within the state to receive service of process on behalf of nonresident motorists. [30] These cases concerned the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act (the Act), which authorizes substitute service of process on a nonresident motorist by serving the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. [31] Rule 4(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows that personal service may be made upon a defendant by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. [32] These two cases are entirely consistent with Keith-O'Brien and Gass. The Act statutorily appoints an agent to receive service of process within Utah for nonresident motorists. In a legal sense, therefore, the defendants in these cases are not absent from the state because their agent is present and service can be effected within the state. Thus, Utah's tolling statute will not toll the statute of limitations in nonresident motor vehicle cases that fall within the Act. But in cases not involving a statutorily appointed agent, or not involving an agent within Utah, an out-of-state defendant is deemed absent from the state and the tolling statute tolls the applicable statute of limitations. ¶30 Larson contends that Snyder initially departed from the plain language of the tolling statute and that Lund overruled our decision in Keith-O'Brien. He focuses on the following language that we used in Lund: We . . . hold that under section 78-12-35 the statute of limitations will not be tolled when a defendant is out of the state, as long as he is still amenable to service of process in the state of Utah. [33] ¶31 Larson argues that Lund's holding is broad and is not explicitly limited to cases that fall within the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act. Thus, Larson urges us to apply this precise language in the case before us. He maintains that he has always been amenable to service of process pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute and therefore the tolling statute should not apply in this case. Larson also notes that in Lund we cited with approval two cases that held the statute of limitations was not tolled where a defendant was amenable to service of process by virtue of the state's long-arm statute. [34] ¶32 Further, Larson points out that in Lund, in the paragraph following our broad holding, we stated that [our] position is consistent with the majority of states which hold that the statute of limitations will not be tolled against a defendant who leaves the state after the cause of action arose but who is still amenable to process within the state. [35] Once again, Larson argues that this statement is broad and suggests that in Lund we aligned ourselves with the majority position. Indeed, in Lund we proceeded to elaborate on the majority view, recognizing that it likely best served the purposes of both the tolling statute and the statute of limitations. [36] ¶33 We reject Larson's characterization of our holding in Lund. First, in Lund, we did not expressly overrule Keith-O'Brien or Gass. Before we rendered our holding, we stated that [o]ur decision in Snyder is applicable here. [37] We continued, Even if [the defendant] had departed from the state, he was still subject to service of process pursuant to the nonresident motor vehicle act. Thus, under our [prior] decision in Snyder, section 78-12-35 would not operate to toll the statute of limitations. [38] This language limits Lund to the plain-language application we established in Snyder for cases involving the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act. In Snyder, we held that a nonresident motorist was not considered absent from the state under the tolling statute because the Act appoints an agent within the state to receive service of process and therefore the applicable statute of limitations will not be tolled. [39] ¶34 Second, we noted in Lund that in Keith-O'Brien, Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., [40] and Gass, we held that the tolling statute tolls the applicable statute of limitations where a defendant leaves the state, thus setting apart our Lund decision as an alternative to this general outcome. [41] ¶35 Third, Justice Howe's concurring opinion in Lund expressly limited Lund to its facts. [42] He maintained that a purpose-driven discussion of the tolling statute in a broader sense should be pursued only when that question is actually posed to the court. [43] He stated that the discussion in Lund should be limited to those cases that involved the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act. [44] We are inclined to agree with Justice Howe's approach. ¶36 Ultimately, our well-settled precedent controls in this case. All of our previous decisions apply the plain language of the tolling statute. In Keith-O'Brien and Gass, we held that the tolling statute tolls the applicable statute of limitations where a defendant leaves the state and is thus absent. In Snyder and Lund, we held that the tolling statute does not toll the applicable statute of limitations where a defendant leaves the state because the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act expressly provides an agent to receive substitute service of process and therefore, in a legal sense, a defendant is not absent from the state. These latter two decisions are limited to cases that fall within the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act. Therefore, because Olseth's claim does not invoke the Act, we apply a straightforward application of the tolling statute to her claim. As a result, in this case the tolling statute does toll the four-year statute of limitations even where Larson was amenable to service of process pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute.