Opinion ID: 13425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competency of Juror

Text: 7 Soto challenges the district court's denial of her motion for new trial, claiming that a juror in her trial was unable to speak or understand English, and was therefore fundamentally incompetent to serve as a juror. Ordinarily, a litigant may challenge the qualification of a juror under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a), but such a challenge must be made before trial begins. 1 Since Soto only challenged the juror's competency months after her trial, any claim merely of statutory disqualification is too late. Without a timely statutory claim, a litigant will be entitled to relief only upon a showing that the juror was fundamentally incompetent. See United States v. Gates, 557 F.2d 1086, 1088 (5th Cir.1977); Ford v. United States, 201 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir.1953). See also United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 69 (5th Cir.1975). 8 We review the denial of a motion for new trial on an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Vergara, 714 F.2d 21, 23 (5th Cir.1983). A motion for new trial based on a juror's lack of statutory qualification (not raised before trial) should be granted only upon a showing of actual bias or prejudice. United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 69 (5th Cir.1975). Alternatively, a new trial may be granted if a juror was fundamentally incompetent. United States v. Gates, 557 F.2d 1086, 1088 (5th Cir.1977). 9 As the movant, Soto bore the burden of proving to the district court that a new trial was justified. See United States v. Geders, 625 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir.1980) ([T]he burden of justifying a new trial is fairly placed upon the defendant.); 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial § 519 (1989). It was incumbent upon Soto to show that the juror in question, juror Villalpando, was fundamentally incompetent to serve on the jury. Cf. United States v. Cashio, 420 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.1970) (holding that when a defendant moves for a new trial on the grounds that a juror is disqualified because of prejudice, prejudice is not presumed .... [and the defendant has] the burden of proving prejudice by a preponderance of the credible evidence). 10 Soto moved for a new trial on the grounds that juror Villalpando did not speak or understand English, but she never asked the court to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the level of Villalpando's English ability. As it was, however, Soto's only evidence tendered concerning the juror's alleged incompetence was an excerpt from the transcript of the voir dire conducted September 30, 1996, in a different criminal case pending before a different judge of the same court, in which juror Villalpando was called to serve on the jury panel. 11 During jury selection in this second case, Villalpando was questioned by Chief Judge Hudspeth about his understanding of English. Though Judge Hudspeth ultimately excused Villalpando from the venire pool because of his difficulty with English, this rather brief voir dire examination is not conclusive as to whether Villalpando had sufficient ability to speak and understand English so as to be able to render minimally competent service as a juror. On the one hand, Villalpando stated several times that he did not understand or speak much English and once stated that a verdict was not reached in the present case, but on the other hand, he did appear to understand the court's questions concerning his education and past jury service and he gave relatively comprehensible and responsive answers. After the prosecution challenged Villalpando, and defense counsel stated they had no objection to the challenge, Judge Hudspeth excused him, stating Might be better and safer to call someone in your place. 12 Without an evidentiary hearing in support of her motion for new trial, Soto's only tendered proof concerning Villalpando's language ability is less than complete and is not wholly compelling. Because the dialogue between Villalpando and the court in the second case is not clearly and compellingly dispositive, we hold that Soto has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for new trial.