Opinion ID: 1698910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: evans

Text: In Evans, the majority opinion of the Third District refused to recognize a duty on the part of the landowners to maintain their property free of unsafe obstructions to the views of motorists and others who might be endangered by the obstructions. [11] In a dissenting opinion, Judge Schwartz challenged the majority's duty analysis: In my judgment, the facts of this case raise a triable issue as to whether the defendant-landowner breached a duty of care which should be, and in fact has been, recognized by the law of Florida. That duty is the one referred to, albeit in a negative fashion, in Hardin v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 128 Fla. 631, 175 So. 226 (1937), which is cited by the court. At 175 So. at 228, it was said: there is no liability on the part of a landowner to persons injured outside his lands (which includes persons on adjacent highways), unless the owner has done or permitted something to occur on his lands which he realizes or should realize involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others outside his land, and therefore imposes on him, as an owner or possessor of the land, the duty of abating or obviating the use or condition from which the risk is encountered. See, Cook v. Martin, 330 So.2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1976). The majority suggests that the imposition of liability in this case would be improperly contrary to the traditional rule that the owner of land is under no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of purely natural origin upon his land and impose upon a landowner for the benefit of motorists using a public street the duty to maintain his property so that the motorist's view of intersecting traffic is not obstructed. I disagree with this position. In the first place, it was affirmatively alleged and demonstrated below that at least part of the obstruction to view was caused by the existence of large trailers, vans, construction equipment, and outdoor toilets near the intersection. If negligently created or permitted to exist, this decidedly non purely natural defect, see, 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363 Comment b (1965), would give rise to liability under the firmly established principle embodied in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 364 (1965): Creation or Maintenance of Dangerous Artificial Conditions A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm, if (a) the possessor has created the condition, or (b) the condition is created by a third person with the possessor's consent or acquiescence while the land is in his possession, or (c) the condition is created by a third person without the possessor's consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe after the possessor knows or should know of it. [note 1] [note 1] It is significant that Hardin cites the original version of this section of the Restatement with approval. 175 So. at 227. As to the natural condition caused by the growth of weeds, the supposed rule of non-liability is based upon a notion concerning the right to the unrestricted use of one's land which was founded upon conditions in an overwhelmingly agricultural society and which has therefore long outlived its raison d'etre. See, e.g., Roberts v. Harrison, 101 Ga. 773, 28 S.E. 995 (1897). I see no reason in modern-day life for a blanket rule of law insulating a landowner under all circumstances from responsibility for entirely foreseeable consequences, see, Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 386 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1980), caused by a negligent failure to eliminate obstructions from his property. As several modern decisions have indicated, I would hold that, on the present record, a jury question has been presented on this theory of the case as well. See, Wisher v. Fowler, 7 Cal. App.3d 225, 86 Cal.Rptr. 582 (1970); Salomone v. Boulanger, 32 Conn.Supp. 115, 342 A.2d 61 (Super.Ct.1975); 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts s 363(2) (1965), and caveat and comment on subsection (2); compare, Rodgers v. Ray, 10 Ariz.App. 119, 457 P.2d 281 (1969), questioned in Hall v. Mertz, 14 Ariz.App. 24, 480 P.2d 361 (1971). The Florida case cited by the court for its contrary conclusion, Bassett v. Edwards, 158 Fla. 848, 30 So.2d 374 (1947) does not involve an action against the landowner at all. More important, it embodies concepts of proximate causation, intervening cause, and contributory negligence which no longer obtain in our state. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., supra ; Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973); see, Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979) (liability for intersection accident arising from negligent maintenance of traffic control device). Finally, the court states that reversal entails the right in every intersectional collision case for the motorists to charge and litigate before a jury whether the jury thinks the landowner's use of his land is reasonable. So be it. Subject, as in every case, to appropriate superintendence by the court when there is no liability as a matter of law, the determination of whether reasonable care has been exercised in a specific situation is just what juries do and what, under our system, they are for. See, Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So.2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Every day, juries decide whether a landowner has negligently maintained his premises so as legally to cause injury to persons located on the property. I do not believe that the Republic would fall if they were allowed to make the same decisions as to persons on the adjoining highway. Evans, 391 So.2d at 233-34 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). We conclude that the views expressed by Judge Schwartz are consistent with those we subsequently expressed in McCain and are helpful to our analysis of the issue presented to us today. We note that other courts have sometimes applied the same McCain like reasoning advocated by Judge Schwartz to certain motorist obstruction cases and imposed a corresponding duty on landowners under the particular circumstances presented. For instance, in Hamric v. Kansas City S. Ry., 718 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.Ct. App.1986), a case dealing with an obstructed view of both drivers as a result of tall and thick stands of weed growing on the side of the road, the court wrote: We hold this case should be governed by the rule that the owner or occupier of premises abutting a highway has a duty to exercise reasonable care not to jeopardize or endanger the safety of motorist[s] using the highway as a means of passage and the owner or occupier is liable for injuries that proximately resulted from his negligent acts in this respect. Id. at 918; see also Zapata v. Kariyaparambil, 1997 WL 566222, at  (applying same rule to landowners whose trees blocked the view of a stop sign and resulted in an accident). Similarly, in Langen v. Rushton, 138 Mich.App. 672, 360 N.W.2d 270 (1984), the plaintiffs alleged that the owners of a shopping center had allowed various trees to grow on a median of the shopping center's entrance which obstructed the view of oncoming traffic and contributed to the accident at issue. Relying on the rule that landowners must maintain their land so as not to injure users of abutting streets, the court found it was  entirely foreseeable that a serious accident [could] occur between a customer entering or exiting from the parking lot and a highway motorist. Id. at 273. Therefore, the court concluded that as a matter of law, defendant ha[d] a duty to the traveling public to provide motorists leaving its parking lot with an unobstructed view of oncoming traffic. Id. at 275. Again, in Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill.2d 42, 153 Ill.Dec. 259, 566 N.E.2d 1365 (1991), the court applied a McCain analysis before ultimately concluding that a landowner owed no duty to maintain his property in such a manner that his driveway would be visible to travelers on an adjacent roadway. See Ziemba, 153 Ill. Dec. 259, 566 N.E.2d at 1368; see also Guy v. State, 438 A.2d 1250, 1255 (Del.Super. Ct.1981) (holding that in action where plaintiffs alleged that the condition of adjacent property interfered with the safety of travelers upon the roadway by allowing tall growths of vegetation to obstruct the view of an intersection, a question of fact arose as to whether the defendants realized or should have realized that planting corn up to the shoulder of the road would involve an unreasonable risk of harm).