Opinion ID: 778748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of the Tapes of Calls from the Torrance County Jail

Text: 53 Prior to trial, the Friedmans timely moved for suppression of the tapes of Kenneth's calls from the Torrance County Jail on the grounds that the tapes were obtained without a warrant in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (Title III), and in derogation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. 54 Title III generally prohibits the intentional interception of wire communications, such as telephone calls, without judicial authorization. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; see also United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 692 (2d Cir.1996). Recordings of unlawfully intercepted communications may not be used as evidence in any trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 6 Title III excepts certain communications from its provisions, however, including communications where one of the parties has either expressly or impliedly consented to interception, see id. § 2511(2)(c), and communications intercepted through any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof ... being used by ... an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties, id. § 2510(5)(a). 55 Before the District Court, the Government argued that (1) the Friedmans impliedly consented to the recording because they were on notice that the jail recorded telephone calls, thus placing the recording within the ambit of Title III's consent exception, and (2) the recording was permissible pursuant to Title III's exception for interception by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties. The Friedmans argued that (1) Kenneth was not on notice that calls from the jail cell (as opposed to calls from the booking area) were subject to interception and, thus, did not impliedly consent, and (2) Title III's ordinary course exception did not apply because of the lack of notice. 56 The District Court rejected the Government's consent argument, holding that the notice Kenneth received from the sign implying that some phone calls would be recorded was insufficient, under our decisions in United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 692-94 (2d Cir.1996), United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir.1988), and United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 379 (2d Cir.1987), to support a finding that Kenneth had impliedly consented to the recording. See United States v. Friedman, Nos. 95-Cr-192, 96-Cr-182, 1996 WL 612456, at - (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996). 7 The District Court reasoned that, although a reasonable person could understand [the sign in the booking area] to mean that [calls other than those to attorneys] would be subject to interception, the sign in the booking area did not provide notice that calls from the jail cell also were subject to interception sufficient to support the finding that Kenneth had impliedly consented to their interception. Id. at . Compare Workman, 80 F.3d at 692-94 (finding implied consent where a sign near all prison telephones warned that calls were subject to monitoring, the inmate handbook warned that calls were monitored, and the inmate indicated knowledge that the call might be monitored and used coded language during the call). 57 The District Court agreed with the Government, however, that the recordings fell within the law enforcement exception, holding that the exception applied because (1) all calls were routinely taped (2) by law enforcement officers (3) pursuant to an existing policy and (4) Kenneth Friedman's calls were not singled out in any way. Friedman, 1996 WL 612456, at . With respect to the Friedmans' argument that, in order for recording to be in the ordinary course of a law enforcement officer's duties, notice had to be provided to those recorded, the District Court noted that many of the courts that have ruled on the law enforcement exception in this context have noted that the recordings took place pursuant to an established policy of which the inmates had notice, see id. at  (citing United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.1980)), but cited two cases — United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 291-92 (9th Cir.1996), and United States v. Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (7th Cir.1989) — as not relying on notice in holding that the exception applied. Friedman, 1996 WL 612456, at  Accordingly, the District Court held that a lack of notice does not preclude a finding that recordings are made in the ordinary course of a law enforcement officer's duties. Id. 58 On appeal, the Friedmans do not challenge the District Court's factual findings but instead argue that it erred in holding that the exception applied absent notice. 59 Although the District Court interpreted Van Poyck and Feekes as not relying on the existence of notice, the inmates in those cases did, in fact, receive notice similar to the notice the inmates received in the situations presented in Workman and Amen, in which we held that the notice received by the inmates was sufficient to support a finding that they had impliedly consented to having their calls recorded. See Workman, 80 F.3d at 693 (notice provided in signs at telephones, in orientation handbook, and in state regulations); Amen, 831 F.2d at 379 (notice provided in Code of Federal Regulations, at a lecture discussing the taping procedure, in the Inmate Information Handbook, in notices posted on the telephones, and in a form to be signed by inmates consenting to the procedure); Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292 (observing that the circumstances presented were nearly identical to those in Amen ); Feekes, 879 F.2d at 1565 (noting that significant efforts were made to notify inmates that their telephone calls (other than to their lawyers) would be monitored, including signs in both English and Spanish to this effect which were posted within four to six inches of each phone). Thus, no court of appeals has ever applied the ordinary course exception in a situation where at least one participant in an intercepted conversation had not received some notice of the possibility of the conversation being recorded. 60 Indeed, in a case decided after the District Court's ruling, the Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, expressly held that some notice was required. See Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir.), (`Ordinary course of business' is not defined in the statute, but it generally requires that the use be (1) for a legitimate business [or law enforcement] purpose, (2) routine and (3) with notice.), pet. for reh'g en banc denied, (6th Cir.2001). The dissent argued that if notice sufficed to show implied consent under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) and it was required also for the ordinary course exception of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a), then the exception was superfluous. See Adams, 250 F.3d at 992 (Krupansky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In response, the majority indicated that notice short of that required to find implied consent would satisfy the ordinary course exception; if so, the ordinary course exception would not be superfluous. See id. at 984 (Although we do not find that the statute requires actual consent for the exception to apply, we do hold that monitoring in the ordinary course of business [or law enforcement] requires notice to the person or persons being monitored. (emphasis added)). 61 We agree with the District Court and the Sixth Circuit that notice sufficient to support a finding of implied consent under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) is not required for a recording to fall within Title III's ordinary course exception. We need not decide in this case, however, whether no notice at all is required (as the District Court held) or if some notice short of that necessary to find implied consent is required (as the Sixth Circuit held) for a recording to fall within the ordinary course exception. Assuming arguendo that some notice is required, we hold that the notice that Kenneth Friedman did receive — i.e., notice that a reasonable person could understand ... to mean that ... calls [other than those to attorneys] would be subject to interception, Friedman, 1996 WL 612456, at  — was sufficient for the application of the ordinary course exception. We note that Kenneth used cryptic language, evincing his understanding of the possibility that the calls would be monitored or taped. Because, as the District Court found, the recording of the jail-cell calls was also motivated by legitimate ... law enforcement motives and routine, id. at , the recordings did not violate Title III. 62 The notice that Kenneth received is also sufficient to dispose of the Friedmans' Fourth Amendment claims related to the tapes, as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances. As we stated in Willoughby, [a]lthough pretrial detainees may have some residual privacy interests that are protected by the Fourth Amendment, the maintenance of prison security and the preservation of institutional order and discipline are `essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.' 860 F.2d at 21 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Accordingly, where a facility provides some notice to inmates that calls may be monitored, the facility's practice of automatically taping and randomly monitoring telephone calls of inmates in the interest of institutional security is not an unreasonable invasion of the privacy rights of pretrial detainees or of noninmates who receive calls from pretrial detainees. Id. at 21-22; see also Amen, 831 F.2d at 379-80 (holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights). 63