Opinion ID: 723914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Sentencing Decision

Text: 10 In denying Nunez a downward adjustment under § 3E1.1, the district court apparently relied on two grounds. First, Nunez delayed his guilty plea for six months, until five days before the scheduled trial, thereby presumably leaving the government no alternative but to prepare for trial. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(g)) (court considers timeliness of defendant's manifestation of acceptance of responsibility) (Nov. 1994). Second, the court noted that during the six-month delay, Nunez had offered inconsistent versions of the relevant events. 5 See id. comment. (n.1(a)) (court considers whether defendant truthfully admitt[ed] the offense comprising the offense of conviction.). Since a guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to a downward adjustment under § 3E1.1, see id. comment (n.3) (guilty plea and truthful admission are significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility but may be outweighed by [inconsistent] conduct of the defendant ...), normally a trial court's decision to deny a § 3E1.1 adjustment would be affirmed on these grounds. Id. comment. (n. 5) (The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.). 11 The district court made other statements during the sentencing hearing, however, which are reasonably understood to indicate that the court declined a § 3E1.1 adjustment on an independent ground; that is, Nunez' purported inability or ongoing refusal to disclose the names of other collaborators. As the precise import of the district court's statements in this regard is critical, we recite its statements at length. 12 After describing, as incredible, Nunez' initial story that he had been abducted by armed strangers, see supra p. 3, the district court observed: 13 A defendant who accepts responsibility must do more than that when he's involved in a conspiracy and where [ ] human life is involved. He must come forward and identify and help authorities get the other people. He has stated time and time again that he doesn't know these other people. 14 Now, he spent with these people some hours in an apartment, planning a crime. He drives around ... cruising in the rear seat while he is telling the public and the Court that he was forced ... to sit on the front seat with the gun pointed at him. When he stepped out of the car, the other ... unidentified male got out of the car with a gun. Now, we don't know whether [Nunez] was wearing [or] carrying the gun, or the other people [were], ... because the track record of this defendant is that he cannot be believed. 15 And therefore for those reasons I'm not accepting the two-points downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. I don't think the defendant has done that. When he comes forward and identifies the other people, if he does that, then that might be a different story. But he's protecting others and that's why he has done all these things. 16 Tr. at 39-40 (emphasis added). Later, once again after discussing Nunez' inconsistent versions of the relevant events on June 7, 1994, the district court observed: 17 [In his second version,] Nunez rode in the rear seat. So there was no one pointing a gun at him. And for four hours, if he tells the court and the authorities that he hasn't ---- he cannot recognize those two ---- at least those other two individuals, I'm not going to buy that.... Nunez turned several items [of the victim's property] over to those who he had originally met at the apartment. Again, how could he say that he cannot identify those people? He is protecting them. And I know it. I'm pointing to the defendant. 18 Tr. at 43-44. Nunez responded: I'm afraid. The court did not respond. 19 Later, in summarizing its guidelines sentencing calculations, the district court added: 20 The defendant has not identified ---- although the court finds that he can ---- the other individuals who participated in the crime. These are considered to have been elements of a strategy to manipulate the judicial proceedings, among other things, towards establishing a tailor-made plea agreement conditioned on his own terms, failing to yield to this sort of bargain, and this occurred at the beginning where the defendant said I'll plead guilty if I get X type of sentence.... A defendant qualifies for a [§ 3E1.1] reduction when he truthfully admits the conduct comprising the offense of conviction and does not falsely deny or frivolously contest relevant conduct that the Court has determined to be true and also does not keep to himself the identity of other coconspirators. 21 Tr. at 46-47. After defense counsel objected to its consideration of the informer criterion, the district court responded: 22 [M]y point is that if anyone commits a crime with one or more persons, knowing those persons, does not come forward to the authorities, giving the names of those persons, then you cannot have a full acceptance of responsibility because that entails precisely a catharsis, a full remorse by disclosing the whole thing, being truthful and not concealing any information how to identify ... these defendants. I have to say that for defendant's benefit that there is a section 5K in this statute. There's a Rule 35. You have one year to think about it ... and to cooperate with the authorities. But I'm not saying that if you do that I will reconsider, but your counsel knows better than I that ---- ... what I mean.... All I'm ---- all I'm saying, counsel ---- I want to make the record clear ---- is that there is what is called a downward departure. I ruled that there is no departure, either upward or downward, right? ... Very well. And I am saying that there is what is called a downward departure, and that's up to the defendant to avail of that of himself, punto, without anything else.... I'm not saying he is getting life because of that. I'm saying that there is that provision in the statute and Rule 35. 23 Tr. at 53-55 (emphasis added). 24 Nunez characterizes the latter explanation for refusing a § 3E1.1 adjustment as an error of law, in that the district court relied upon an eligibility criterion relevant exclusively to § 5K1.1 departures for substantial assistance to [law enforcement] authorities, see U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. 6 See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 15 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir.1994) (§ 3E1.1(a) focuses on the defendant's sincere remorse for his own conduct, not his assistance in incriminating others; a defendant's degree of assistance in the prosecution of a codefendant is relevant only to his entitlement for a departure for substantial assistance under § 5K1.1); see also Vance, 62 F.3d at 1157-58; United States v. Leonard, 50 F.3d 1152, 1158-59 (2d Cir.1995).