Opinion ID: 1280343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defects in Proportionality Review

Text: The argument that a comparative proportionality review acts as a check against the random and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty also assumes, necessarily, that the comparative review mechanism itself is not freakishly applied or inherently arbitrary. Such is not the case with the proportionality reviews conducted by this court. First, the court's application of comparative proportionality analysis is by no means a model of regularity. The court frequently purports to compare a defendant's death sentence with penalties imposed for similar crimes, but its analysis is simply a cursory or rubber-stamp type of review. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259, 96 S.Ct. at 2969; see, e.g., State v. Moorman, 154 Ariz. 578, 587, 744 P.2d 679, 688 (1987) (death sentence is proportional because the facts speak for themselves here); State v. Gerlaugh, 135 Ariz. 89, 90, 659 P.2d 642, 643 (1983) (this court believed that no useful purpose would be served in comparing, discussing or citing other homicide cases); Mata, 125 Ariz. at 242, 609 P.2d at 57 (court cited no cases in ruling defendant's death sentence not excessive). In other situations the court either forgets or ignores its self-imposed proportionality review requirement. In State v. Arnett, for example, we reviewed defendant's death sentence on three separate occasions and failed each time to perform a formal proportionality review. 158 Ariz. 15, 760 P.2d 1064 (1988); 125 Ariz. 201, 608 P.2d 778 (1980); 119 Ariz. 38, 579 P.2d 542 (1978); see also State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 624 P.2d 828 (no formal proportionality review), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981); State v. Bishop, 127 Ariz. 531, 622 P.2d 478 (1980) (same); State v. Ceja, 115 Ariz. 413, 565 P.2d 1274 (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977); State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978). If the fair application of our state's death penalty depends in any way on inter-case sentence comparison, this court should have honored its own proportionality review requirement as a matter of practice as well as theory. Second, the scope of the court's proportionality inquiry varies from case to case. Because Richmond did not define or describe the similar cases to which a given death sentence should be compared, see 114 Ariz. at 196, 560 P.2d at 51, the court employs different standards in different cases to assess the similarity of sentences. The most common technique is to compare a death case with cases from this and other jurisdictions in which the death penalty was imposed, including cases in which the sentence was either reversed or reduced on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 179, 800 P.2d 1260, 1287 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2044, 114 L.Ed.2d 129 (1991). This court, however, frequently modifies its approach and excludes similar cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 429-30, 799 P.2d 333, 349-50 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1404, 113 L.Ed.2d 460 (1991); State v. Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 428, 773 P.2d 983, 987 (1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1513, 108 L.Ed.2d 649 (1990); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 37, 734 P.2d 563, 579, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987); State v. Hensley, 142 Ariz. 598, 604, 691 P.2d 689, 695 (1984). We have yet to explain why one defendant is entitled to a more extensive comparative proportionality review than that afforded to another. By far the most serious defect in the scope of our proportionality review, however, is the court's unwillingness to include all first-degree murder cases. In State v. Ortiz, this court stated that it would consider all cases where the death penalty could be imposed so that the death penalty is not applied arbitrarily or capriciously. 131 Ariz. 195, 207, 639 P.2d 1020, 1032 (1981) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2259, 72 L.Ed.2d 863 (1982). In practice, however, we consider only those cases in which the court affirmed or vacated a death sentence on appeal. See State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 490, 733 P.2d 1066, 1073 (true proportionality review does not require an examination of particular types of cases), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987). [T]he court excludes from the pool of potentially similar cases to be considered for comparative purposes any first-degree murder case in which the defendant originally received only a life sentence. Pulaski, Capital Sentencing in Arizona: A Critical Evaluation, 1984 Ariz.St.L.J. 1, 51; see, e.g., Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 179, 800 P.2d at 1287 (citing no first-degree murder cases in which defendant initially received a life sentence); Comer, 165 Ariz. at 429-30, 799 P.2d at 349-50 (same). One observer concludes that doing so essentially skews the outcome of any proportionality review in favor of the death sentence. If the pool is made up only of cases in which the defendants' sentences are death, the death penalty under review will naturally be found comparatively proportionate. Note, Criminal Procedure: Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences: Is it a Meaningful Safeguard in Oklahoma?, 38 Okla.L.Rev. 267, 278 (1985). Even in its best dress, therefore, our form of comparative proportionality review cannot possibly provide what its label suggests โ a fair proportionality assessment. Despite the many problems associated with comparative proportionality review, the majority insists on its continued use, arguing that it is better to improve the court's procedures and employ every method available to reduce our errors. That argument, however, asks this court to fix a procedure that simply cannot be fixed. No matter how skilled the court becomes at comparing similar cases, comparative proportionality review will never fulfill its intended purpose because it seeks an impossible result โ complete uniformity at the end of a process that is constitutionally required under Furman to provide an individualized assessment of each defendant. Moreover, I believe comparative proportionality review simply invites appellate error by permitting this court to modify death sentences deemed otherwise appropriate by our independent review, thereby giving birth to a new class of mercy-eligible defendants whose ranks we have no way of specifying in advance. This power to reduce to life requires comparisons with records not presently before the court and opens the door to the deliberation of inappropriate sentencing factors such as sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543, 107 S.Ct. 837, 840, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (sentencing authority should not focus on extraneous emotional factors); see also Beaty, 158 Ariz. at 247, 762 P.2d at 534 (discussing the need to reduce the human element in the imposition of the death penalty). If the sentencing judge has no right to engage in such speculation or to consider his or her own subjective belief as to the appropriateness of a penalty, we have no greater authority to do so on appeal. Narrowly tailored and individualized sentencing is the hallmark of a constitutional death penalty scheme under our present jurisprudence. By expanding the range of permissible discretion on appeal, however, we move our sentencing procedures farther away from the constitutional mark and risk the same unguided, emotional results denounced since Furman. Thus, with all due respect to the majority, comparative proportionality review does not recognize our own fallibility, but compounds it by adding a subjective variable.