Opinion ID: 901319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Writings to Bind Burr

Text: [¶ 7.] Under the statute of frauds, a contract for the sale of land must be in writing to be enforceable. Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 2001 SD 33, ¶ 15, 623 N.W.2d 84, 88. The statute, SDCL 53-8-2, provides in relevant part: The following contracts are not enforceable by action unless the contract or some memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or his agent, as authorized in writing: ... (3) An agreement for sale of real estate or an interest therein, or lease of the same, for a period longer than one year. However, this does not abridge the power of any court to compel specific performance of any agreement for sale of real estate in case of part performance thereof.... We have stated that [t]he role of the statute of frauds is evidentiary in nature, and serves to remove uncertainty by requiring `written evidence of an enforceable obligation.' Harriman v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 2005 SD 18, ¶ 15, 693 N.W.2d 44, 48 (citations omitted). [¶ 8.] Although there is a significant dispute whether there was an agreement, for purposes of summary judgment we assume there was an oral agreement to sell the real estate. With respect to the sufficiency of writings, Hahne contends that his attorney, Aberle, personally verified all of the terms of the contract with Burr. Hahne also points out that Aberle drafted a letter forwarding a deed and certificate of value attempting to close the transaction. Hahne finally relies upon an e-mail sent by Burr's alleged agent reflecting an awareness that a sale was pending. [¶ 9.] However, Aberle's conversations are not writings, and Hahne did not produce any writing signed by Burr (or his agent) confirming an agreement to the sale of the land. This is significant because an agreement for the sale of real property is not enforceable unless the document is subscribed by the party to be charged. SDCL 53-8-2; Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D. 1985). Here, Aberle was not the agent of the party to be charged, and the e-mail, even if signed by Burr's agent, did not confirm an agreement. On the contrary, the e-mail expressly disavowed Burr's intent to sell the property. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that these conversations and writings by others were not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.