Opinion ID: 1744940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: under sdcl 21-47-8, did phipps have a right to cure her defaults at any time prior to entry of judgment?

Text: Phipps first argues that SDCL 21-47-8, applies to foreclosures of short-term redemption mortgages. This statute directs dismissal of mortgage foreclosure actions if the defendant, prior to entry of judgment, brings into court the principal and interest due plus costs and disbursements. We disagree. SDCL 21-49-11 provides: Any mortgage made pursuant to this chapter on real property of an area of not more than forty acres containing therein a power of sale, upon default being made in the conditions of the mortgage, may be foreclosed as provided in chapter 21-47 or 21-48 or as provided in this chapter. Any mortgage made pursuant to §§ 21-49-1 to 21-49-10 prior to July 1, 1977 may be foreclosed as provided therein or as provided in this section. (Emphasis added.) According to the above statute, the procedures set out in SDCL chs. 21-47, 21-48, and 21-49 are alternatives. The provisions of SDCL ch. 21-47, including SDCL 21-47-8, do not apply here, as foreclosure was sought under SDCL ch. 21-49. This result is warranted by the degree of redundancy between these chapters, as exemplified by SDCL §§ 21-47-3 and 21-49-17, which both authorize the foreclosing court to enter judgment against any person other than the mortgagor who is obliged under the mortgage debt. Such redundancy is inexplicable if, as Phipps argues, the provisions of SDCL ch. 21-47 were intended to apply to foreclosure under SDCL ch. 21-49. The mortgage in question provided, at paragraph 9, that THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY DAY REDEMPTION MORTGAGE ACT GOVERN THIS MORTGAGE. The terms which were agreed upon by both parties should be complied with and enforced unless they conflict with the applicable law. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Sioux Falls v. Dardanella Financial Corp., 351 N.W.2d 460, 462 (S.D.1984). SDCL ch. 21-49 is the applicable law. These chapters, SDCL 21-47, 21-48, and 21-49, are independent and complete in themselves. See, e.g., Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 427, 92 N.W.2d 922, 925 (1958) (concerning tax statutes). No doctrine of redundancy has been mentioned or adopted by the majority; rather, this creative phrase is coined by the minority viewpoint. We fully appreciate that our duty is one of statutory construction and ascertaining underlying legislative purpose. In this instance, our case holding is that these separate chapters are independent and complete in themselves, although bearing the same title number, as in Lien, supra . This conforms to the legislative intent evident in SDCL 21-49-11, which provides that these chapters are alternatives. No new doctrine is created hereby. We affirm the trial court on this issue.