Opinion ID: 2592989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court erred in interpreting the cross-easement agreement

Text: ¶ 22 LGO first argues that the district court erred in interpreting the Cross-Easement Agreement as prohibiting LGO from constructing buildings on Parcel 5 and in granting summary judgment based on that conclusion. ¶ 23 There are three provisions of the Cross-Easement Agreement that are relevant to determining whether LGO has the right to construct a building on its Parcel 5 without limitation on where that building may be placed: (1) the definition of Common Areas, (2) paragraph 12, Prohibition of Barriers, and (3) paragraph 2, Composition and Use of Common Areas. ¶ 24 The district court interpreted the provisions of the Cross-Easement Agreement as being clear and unambiguous in limiting the location on which LGO could construct a building on Parcel 5. The district court was incorrect. ¶ 25 Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, we look to the language of the contract to determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. [7] We also consider each contract provision... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. [8] Where the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law. [9] Only if the language of the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. [10] We have explained that ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. [11] Additionally, [u]nder the well-established rule of construction ejusdem generis,  we determine the meaning of a general contractual term based on the specific enumerations that surround that term. [12] ¶ 26 The question presented here is whether the Cross-Easement Agreement unambiguously allows LGO to construct a building without limitation on where that building may be placed on Parcel 5. We hold that it does and address each of the provisions at issue: (1) the definition of Common Areas, (2) paragraph 12, Prohibition of Barriers, and (3) paragraph 2, Composition and Use of Common Areas. ¶ 27 The Agreement defines Common Areas as all of the areas of the parcels ... [which are] designed for use as approaches, exits, entrances, and all parking lots, ... however expressly excluding all buildings (and any building(s) constructed on Parcels 5 and 6 in the future ). (Emphasis added.) Citing this definition, LGO argues that it has the right to construct buildings on its Parcel 5, and there are no [contractual] limitations on where those buildings may be placed. [13] LGO is correct. ¶ 28 The definition of common areas is clear and unambiguous: it defines precisely what is a common area and precisely what is not. Future buildings on Parcels 5 and 6 are not. Under this definition, then, the parties explicitly agreed that buildings would be constructed on Parcels 5 and 6, and the parties placed no limitation on the location of those buildings. By excluding buildings from the definition of common areas, the parties also implicitly agreed that buildings on Parcels 5 and 6 would not be subject to the restrictions placed on the defined common areas. ¶ 29 The Trust and Café Rio contend, however, that the explicit exclusion of buildings on Parcels 5 and 6 from the definition of common areas merely ensures that buildings, unlike the Common Area parking lot and other defined areas, will not be available for unrestricted common use. It does not grant LGO carte blanch to put a building anywhere it wants, without regard for the other provisions of the Cross-Easement Agreement. The Trust and Café Rio cite paragraphs 12 and 2 as support for this conclusion. ¶ 30 Paragraph 12, entitled Prohibition of Barriers, prohibits any parcel owner from construct[ing] or erect[ing] within any of the Parcels or on the perimeter of any of the Parcels, any fence, wall, barricade, or obstruction, whether temporary or permanent in nature, which materially limits or impairs the free and unimpeded flow of vehicular or pedestrian traffic between and among the Parcels or the ability to have an unobstructed view of any of the Parcels. (Emphases added.) ¶ 31 Citing the emphasized language in paragraph 12, the Trust and Café Rio claim that [c]onstruction of a building ... in a known and declared easement area is an `obstruction.' They also argue that the unobstructed view requirement is perpetual and unchangeable, and that LGO's building would violate paragraph 12's prohibition of barriers by obstructing the view of other parcels. ¶ 32 When the provisions of the Cross-Easement Agreement are construed together, it is clear that the parties contemplated the construction of buildings and specifically indicated, as to each parcel, where buildings would be allowed and where they would be prohibited. As to Parcels 5 and 6, the definition of common areas provides for buildings on those parcels. Paragraph 2, Composition and Use of Common Areas, on the other hand, explicitly prohibits any building or other structure [from being] erected or placed upon any of the Common Areas of Parcels 1 through 4. Given this level of specificity regarding buildings, it is plain that the parties did not intend the general term obstruction to include buildings. ¶ 33 Additionally, interpreting obstruction to include buildings would eviscerate LGO's ability to construct a building on Parcel 5a right explicitly bargained and provided for. We will not interpret a general contractual term such that it renders an explicit right meaningless. [14] ¶ 34 Furthermore, under the principle ejusdem generis, the general term obstruction, as used in paragraph 12, should be construed according to the specific enumerations of fence, wall, [and] barricade, that precede it. Under this interpretive framework, the term obstruction refers to those barriers that are similar to fences, walls, and barricades. A building is not similar in character or purpose to those barriers. ¶ 35 The Trust and Café Rio also claim that LGO's building would violate paragraph 12's prohibition on any obstruction... [that] materially limits or impairs ... the ability to have an unobstructed view of any of the Parcels. The unobstructed view requirement is, however, limited to defined obstructions. As we have just explained, a building is not an obstruction within the meaning of paragraph 12. Therefore, the unobstructed view requirement does not apply to LGO's building, and this argument fails. ¶ 36 The Trust and Café Rio next claim that LGO breached paragraph 2, entitled Composition and Use of Common Areas. Referring to the definition of Common Areas that immediately precedes it, paragraph 2 provides that none of such Common Areas shall be changed in any material respect ... without the prior written consent of all Owners of the Parcels. The Trust and Café Rio contend that because LGO did not seek permission from other parcel owners prior to beginning construction of its building, LGO breached paragraph 2. This argument has no merit. ¶ 37 The limitation in paragraph 2 on altering common areas is necessarily confined to those areas defined as common. That is, owners must obtain the consent of all parcel owners before materially altering defined common areas. The common areas are defined to exclude buildings on Parcels 5 and 6. Therefore, LGO was not required to obtain the consent of all parcel owners before beginning construction of its building on Parcel 5. ¶ 38 Because the Cross-Easement Agreement unambiguously provides that LGO may construct a building on Parcel 5 without limitation as to the building's location, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Trust and Café Rio on this issue and order that summary judgment be entered on behalf of LGO. [15] ¶ 39 It necessarily follows from our holding that the district court erred in issuing the preliminary injunction and the restoration order based on its interpretation of the Cross-Easement Agreement. LGO seeks damages, and we remand for the district court to determine whether LGO suffered compensable damages related to the preliminary injunction and the restoration order, and, if so, the amount of such damages.