Opinion ID: 166595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Muessig and Nga Tran

Text: 15 Muessig and Nga Tran each argue that the government did not present enough evidence to support their convictions. We review the record de novo for sufficiency of the evidence and uphold a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Nguyen, 413 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.2005). In conducting this review, we accept the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence without weighing the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Sapp, 53 F.3d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir.1995). 16 Section 841(c)(2) imposes criminal penalties on [a]ny person who knowingly or intentionally ... possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance[.] 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Neither Muessig nor Nga Tran contest that they knowingly distributed pseudoephedrine, or that pseudoephedrine is a listed chemical. They deny only that they had reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. 17 We have recently held in interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 841 that it is 18 not sufficient for the government to prove that the defendant knew, intended, or had reasonable cause to believe that the substance would be abused or would be used illegally. Nor is it sufficient for the government to prove that the defendant was negligent or reckless with respect to the risk that the ephedrine or pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. The government must prove the defendant was aware, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the substance would be used for the specific purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine. 19 United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1288 (10th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). In other words, there must be a showing of actual knowledge, or something close to it that the precursor drugs would be used to manufacture controlled substances. Id. 20 We find that the evidence was sufficient to prove this element of the crime as to both Muessig and Nga Tran. Muessig 21 Muessig argues a jury could not conclude she either knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine she sold would be used to make methamphetamine. According to Muessig, the evidence, at best, shows that she had been told that selling large quantities of the drug could get her in trouble, but that she never had been told or knew that the drug could be converted into methamphetamine. 22 At trial, DEA Agent Gary Lawson testified that a person using pseudoephedrine for its intended purpose and taking the maximum dosage per day would require two years to consume the 3024 tablets Muessig sold to Wenthold over a two-week time period. Tr. at 127-128. Thus, as a preliminary matter, a reasonable jury could infer from this fact that Muessig knew that the pseudoephedrine was not being used for its ordinary medicinal purpose. Other evidence established that Muessig had reasonable cause to believe the pseudoephedrine would be used for illicit purposes. For example, when Wenthold visited her store on April 6, 2001, Muessig stated that she was afraid and asked whether Wenthold was affiliated with the FBI. Furthermore, Muessig refused to sell the pills before first calling Nga Tran and receiving Wenthold's assurances that he had indeed purchased large quantities of pseudoephedrine pills in the past. 23 On top of this foundational evidence, the government produced additional evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer culpability. First, the evidence disclosed that Muessig had knowledge about the illicit uses of pseudoephedrine. At trial, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Gary Lawson testified that after her arrest, Muessig admitted that (1) Nga Tran's sister, Anna Nguyen, a licensed pseudoephedrine distributor, had informed Muessig of pseudoephedrine's illegal uses and that Muessig knew drugs were made from pseudoephedrine; and (2) Muessig knew large-quantity sales were a red flag, because she said [d]on't sell too much, don't sell too much. You have to be careful. The police will get you in trouble. Tr. at 131-32. Although Muessig denied in her trial testimony that she knew pseudoephedrine was used to make controlled substances, or that Anna Nguyen had told her that pseudoephedrine could be used to manufacture illicit substances, given Lawson's testimony the jury could have concluded otherwise. On appeal, we may not resolve conflicting evidence or weigh the credibility of witnesses; the credibility determination is for the jury at trial. See United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir.1997). 24 Muessig replies that no evidence was ever presented to show she received formal notice that the sale of pseudoephedrine for use in the manufacture of methamphetamine could expose her to criminal liability. However, formal notice, whether from pseudoephedrine distributors or the government itself, is not a required element of § 841(c)(2). Such notice is merely additional evidence that is typically employed to establish knowledge under the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 413 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant's receipt of warnings from his pseudoephedrine distributors was relevant to intent); Truong, 425 F.3d at 1290 (finding no evidence that defendant was aware of the illegal uses of pseudoephedrine, because no relevant conversations with undercover agents, statements by the defendant, or official warnings were indicated in the record). 25 In other words, whether Muessig received official notice of the illegal uses of pseudoephedrine is irrelevant in light of the other evidence produced at trial. Evidence of knowledge need not come in the form of an ex ante official notice about the illegal uses of pseudoephedrine. A reasonable jury could infer from Muessig's conduct and admissions that she had reasonable cause to believe the pseudoephedrine would be used to make controlled substances. Accordingly, taking the evidence as a whole, we believe a reasonable jury could have found Muessig guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Nga Tran 26 Nga Tran argues that the trial testimony was insufficient to prove she knew that the pseudoephedrine pills would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. The question, again, is the link between the large-scale sales of pseudoephedrine and the actual knowledge or intent (or, in this Circuit, something `akin to actual knowledge') that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, Truong, 425 F.3d 1290. On this record, we conclude that a jury could indeed find such knowledge. 27 To begin, Nga Tran testified at trial that she received prior notice that large-scale sales were illegal. Distributors had informed her that customers should not be allowed to purchase large quantities of pseudoephedrine tablets, and that such sales were unlawful. In fact, her sister, Anna Nguyen, was one of the distributors who supplied Sonny's and Smoke for Less. On two occasions Tran told Wenthold that he scared people, and she expressed concern about being set up by the police as a result of Wenthold's conduct. Wenthold testified that he made his purchases in cash (in excess of the retail value) and acted upset with Tran when she tried to charge him tax on the purchases. In short, the record shows Nga Tran knew that the transactions with the undercover police were illegal. 28 In order to establish guilt under the statute, however, the government must also show Nga Tran knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. The government's evidence supporting this element is found in both Wenthold's and Tran's testimony. Wenthold testified that on June 30, 2000, he had a conversation with Tran regarding his plans to use the pseudoephedrine for manufacturing. When asked if he ever mentioned to her that an illegal substance would be made with the pills, Wenthold answered, yes, on the first occasion that I bought from her on 29th Street. Tr. at 104. Describing the conversation at issue, Wenthold stated that he offered to trade some of the stuff that we were making with the pills. I told her it would keep her up for days and she wouldn't need any sleep and she could work very hard. She told me she wasn't into that kind of stuff. Tr. at 53, 104. In her own testimony at trial, Tran was asked whether the agent told her he would cook methamphetamine with the pills. She answered, I don't remember that he tell me, or not; maybe he do, but I do not know what does that mean or I didn't know anything about that. Tr. at 187. Finally, Wenthold testified (and the videotapes clearly showed) he informed Tran he liked to cut the bottoms from the pseudoephedrine bottles, and that he did not like receiving pills in packets because they required him to punch out the individual pills. 29 Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Nga Tran knew the pseudoephedrine sales were illegal and were to be used to manufacture controlled substances. We therefore find the government established sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). 30