Opinion ID: 65111
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusivity of Wind Damage

Text: The Kodrins’ homeowner’s policy insured their home and its contents against wind damage, but did not provide coverage for damage caused by flooding. Policies of this sort are common and have been much-litigated in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and other recent storms. We have held that a homeowner may recover under such a policy only when wind is the exclusive cause of the damage.11 The Kodrins insist that Louisiana courts do not read the provision so restrictively; rather, that they hold that coverage under a homeowner’s policy is available if flooding is not the “proximate or efficient cause” of the damage.12 We acknowledge the existence of tension between the relevant case law of this circuit and that of the Louisiana intermediate courts, 9 Id. at 363-64. 10 Wright v. Ford Motor Co., 508 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 Bilbe v. Belsom, 530 F.3d 314, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007), to Louisiana law). The policy provision here at issue — called an “anti-concurrent cause” provision — bars recovery when wind and water act together or in sequence. Id. 12 Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 964 So. 2d 463, 477 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact that flood waters contributed to the damage or washes the property away does not compel a finding that flood damage was the efficient or proximate cause of the total loss.”), vacated in part on other grounds, 983 So. 2d 66 (La. 2008); see also Best v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 969 So. 2d 671, 675 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, § 153:17). The Kodrins reliance on Roach-Strayhan-Holland Post No. 20, American Legion Club v. Continental Insurance Co. of New York is misplaced. 112 So. 2d 680 (La. 1959). The case interpreted a policy providing wind damage coverage following a windstorm and rejected consideration of the contribution of other factors, such as building decay, to the damage. Id. at 683. Although the policy contained a water damage exclusion, the exclusion was not at issue, indeed the court noted that the windstorm policy was “not otherwise limited or defined.” Id. 5 No. 08-30092 consolidated w/08-30169 but we are bound by our own precedent.13 Moreover, in this case, we view the distinction as being of little import. First, the divergent interpretations of this court and the Louisiana courts matter mainly when two forces, such as flood and wind, act together to cause damage. Here, there is no role for such a middle ground: Neither party maintained that wind and flood acted in some combination, only that one or the other caused all the damage. As a result, the jury’s only options were 100 percent wind or 100 percent flood.14 It was not presented with facts on which to determine that some combination of the two forces caused the damage, and it was not asked to decide on such a basis. Second, our holding in Bilbe creates a stricter rule than the Louisiana appellate court’s Landry holding and thus is more favorable to State Farm — indeed, State Farm asserts that under Bilbe we must reverse. When we apply Bilbe, however, the jury instructions survive, so that even if we could consider Landry, we would not need to reach the issue. Thus, following Bilbe, the Kodrins could recover under their homeowner’s policy only if the jury should find that wind alone, and not flooding at all, caused their loss. Conversely, if the jury 13 See, e.g., FDIC v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1998) (addressing instance of intervening contrary state appellate court decisions); see also First Nat’l Bank of Durant v. Trans Terra Corp. Int’l, 142 F.3d 802, 809 (5th Cir. 1998) (decision of state intermediate court is a “datum for ascertaining state law,” which must be considered by, but is not binding on this court). In this case, Bilbe was decided in 2008 after both Landry and Best. 14 State Farm contends that the jury was left to contemplate that a wind-driven storm surge might have destroyed the home and, thus, to determine incorrectly that wind coverage was permissible. See, e.g., Bilbe, 530 F.3d at 317 n.3 (“The classic example of such a concurrent wind-water peril is the storm-surge flooding that follows on the heels of a hurricane’s landfall.”). In Bilbe, the plaintiff sought coverage under her homeowner’s policy based on the contention that Hurricane Katrina’s winds drove the storm surge that inundated her home. Finding “storm surge” to be essentially synonymous with “flooding,” the court affirmed the denial of coverage. Id. at 316. In the instant case, we find no merit in State Farm’s assertion: The Kodrins maintained that a pre-flood tornado, not a wind-driven storm surge, destroyed their home. 6 No. 08-30092 consolidated w/08-30169 should find that flooding destroyed the home, the policy’s exclusionary clause would bar recovery.15 State Farm claims that the wording of the jury instructions vitiated the effect of the policy’s flood exclusion by failing to make clear the all-or-nothing requirement of the homeowner’s policy — as outlined in Bilbe. After stating that the Kodrins had the burden to prove that their claim was covered by the policy, the district court instructed the jury: State Farm argues that it properly refused payment to the Kodrins based on its determination that the damage to plaintiffs’ property was caused by water, which falls under the flood exclusion in plaintiffs’ homeowner’s policy, and not by wind. Under Louisiana law, State Farm bears the burden of proving the applicability of any exclusionary clause contained in its insurance policy by a preponderance of the evidence. If you find that State Farm has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the property damage claimed by the Kodrins was caused by a non-covered peril, such as flooding, then State Farm is not liable to plaintiff for any damages under the policy. State Farm complains that this instruction did not allow the jury to reach a third conclusion, viz., that both wind and flood contributed to the damage and that, if this were the case, the Kodrins could not recover at all. We are satisfied that the jury instruction correctly and unambiguously recited the law applicable in this case: If flood caused the damage “then State Farm is not liable.” Again, neither State Farm nor the Kodrins contended at trial that a combination of wind and flood destroyed the Kodrins’ home. State 15 It is important to distinguish between this dispute over which force totally destroyed a home and cases in which the parties disagree as to the causes of various damaged elements of a home. Distinct elements of damage would have to be considered separately. Flooddamaged carpets, for example, would not bar recovery for a wind-damaged roof. 7 No. 08-30092 consolidated w/08-30169 Farm insisted that flooding was the sole cause; the Kodrins were equally insistent that wind was the sole cause. The district court correctly observed that a complicated instruction addressing the combination of the two forces would be likely to do more harm than good, causing confusion by attempting to address a fact pattern not before the jury. As the parties claimed only that either wind alone or flood alone destroyed the home, it is they, not the court, who left the jury no way to find that the damage was caused by some combination of the two.