Opinion ID: 196019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Burden-Shifting Paradigm

Text: 14 The burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) [McDonnell Douglas ], and imported for use in ADEA cases, see Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 760 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994), allocates burdens of production and orders the presentation of evidence so as progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095 n. 8, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). 15 At the first stage in the McDonnell Douglas matrix, Woodman was required to make a prima facie showing that he (1) was at least forty years old, (2) met HC's legitimate job performance expectations, (3) experienced adverse employment action, and (4) since the challenged action was part of a reduction in force, that HC did not treat age neutrally or it retained younger persons in the same position. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1993); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842. The required prima facie showing is not especially burdensome, see Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir.1995); Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 15 n. 4 (1st Cir.1994), and once established, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the employer engaged in intentional age-based discrimination. Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094). As Justice Scalia stated in Hicks, the rebuttable presumption ultimately results in a required conclusion [viz., unlawful discrimination] in the absence of explanation. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2747 (emphasis added). 16 At the second stage in the burden-shifting praxis, the defendant-employer must produce sufficient competent evidence, taken as true, to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that there was a nondiscriminatory reason, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2748 (emphasis in original), for the challenged employment action, thereby displacing the legal presumption of intentional discrimination generated by the plaintiff-employee's prima facie case. Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117. Since neither credibility issues nor other factual matters in genuine dispute are to be resolved under it, the McDonnell Douglas framework ... is no longer relevant once the defendant-employer has met its burden of production at the second stage. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. The attendant legal presumption of intentional discrimination having served its purpose--that of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response--it drops out of the picture. Id. 17 At that point, the defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment cannot succeed if the plaintiff-employee, with whom the ultimate burden of persuasion remains throughout, Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 478 (1st Cir.1993), has proffered sufficient admissible evidence, if believed, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element in a prima facie case and that the employer's justification for the challenged employment action was merely a pretext for impermissible age discrimination. Id. at 479. The plaintiff-employee may rely upon the same evidence to establish both pretext and discrimination, provided it is adequate to enable a rational factfinder reasonably to infer that intentional age-based discrimination was a determinative factor in the adverse employment action. Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117-18. 18 Where the elements of a sufficient prima facie case combine with the factfinder's belief that the ostensible basis for dismissing the employee was pretextual, particularly if ... accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity, the factfinder is permitted to infer the intentional age-based discrimination required to enable the plaintiff-employee to prevail on the merits. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.) (emphasis added); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260 n. 3 (1st Cir.1994). We conclude that Woodman made out just such a case in the district court, thereby precluding summary judgment for HC.