Opinion ID: 1931267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State's Confession of Error

Text: The state does not contest defendant's assertion, and indeed concedes that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted. We have held, however, in State v. Smith, 797 A.2d 1073 (R.I.2002) (mem.), that [i]n future cases wherein the state moves to sustain a defendant's appeal and to vacate a judgment of conviction, the state's motion shall be accompanied by a confession of error specifically denoting the error asserted as a basis for reversal. Further, in any such case, this Court reserves the right to assign the motion to the argument calendar for the Court's independent consideration of the asserted error, because the state's concession that a conviction should be vacated `does not automatically govern an appellate court's disposition of an appeal.' Id. at 1073 (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 85 F.3d 59, 60 (2d Cir.1996) and cases cited therein). We note that here, the state first confessed error in its pre-briefing statement and reiterated the confession in its full brief. In Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 62 S.Ct. 510, 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942), the United States Supreme Court ruled with respect to the government's confessions of error that [t]he public trust reposed in the law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error when, in their opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent. But such a confession does not relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function. The considered judgment of the law enforcement officers that reversible error has been committed is entitled to great weight, but our judicial obligations compel us to examine independently the errors confessed.    Furthermore, our judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties. Id. at 258-59, 62 S.Ct. 510. Furthermore, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), the Supreme Court expressed that [i]t is the uniform practice of this Court to conduct its own examination of the record in all cases where the    [state] confesses that a conviction has been erroneously obtained. We conclude, therefore, that despite the state's confession of error, we are obligated to conduct a thorough, independent review of the evidence. Conspiracy is an agreement by `two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to perform a lawful act for an unlawful purpose.' State v. Lassiter, 836 A.2d 1096, 1104 (R.I.2003) (quoting State v. Mastracchio, 612 A.2d 698, 706 (R.I.1992)). Once an agreement has been made, no further action in furtherance of the conspiracy is necessary to find a defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy. Id. (citing State v. Romano, 456 A.2d 746, 757 (R.I.1983)). The state must prove the existence and scope of the conspiracy charged beyond a reasonable doubt.    We previously have recognized that there seldom will be direct evidence of an explicit agreement to commit an unlawful act, and that the existence and scope of a conspiracy often must be `inferentially established by proof of the relations, conduct, circumstances, and actions of the parties.' Id. (quoting Mastracchio, 612 A.2d at 706); see also State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1084-85 (R.I.1981). In Ahmadjian, evidence supported the defendant's conviction on drug and extortion charges. We held, however, that the record is devoid of any evidence that establishes, either directly or inferentially, that [defendant] had knowledge of any weapons transactions. None of the conversations about weapons testified to    occurred in [defendant's] presence. Although we have concluded that a conspiracy to sell drugs in large amounts raises an inference of conspiracy to coerce the collection of debts arising from such sales, we cannot say that the involvement in drug sales raises an inference of agreement to traffic in weapons also. One agreement does not encompass the other. To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom must show that the conspirator knew the scope of the agreement. In the absence of such proof, the conspiracy charge may not stand. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d at 1085 (citing State v. Giorgi, 115 R.I. 1, 4-5, 339 A.2d 268, 270-71 (1975); State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 212-13, 291 A.2d 425, 429 (1972)). (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in the present case, there is insufficient evidence to support the contention that defendant entered into an agreement with Kenner that the latter would resell the drugs defendant had just sold to him. There was no evidence of any previous contacts between defendant and Kenner suggesting a conspiracy, nor was there sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the quantity of drugs involved was more than Kenner required for his personal use. Because the evidence presented was capable of supporting reasonable inferences that were inconsistent with guilt, the state failed to meet its burden of proving the conspiracy count beyond a reasonable doubt. We have recognized that the existence and scope of a conspiracy often must be `inferentially established by proof of the relations, conduct, circumstances, and actions of the parties.' Lassiter, 836 A.2d at 1104 (quoting Mastracchio, 612 A.2d at 706). Circumstantial evidence, indeed, may be sufficient to support a conviction. Rodriguez, 798 A.2d at 437 (citing State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1117-18 (R.I. 1990)). This is true only, however, as long as the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented to the finder of fact constitutes proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Otero, 788 A.2d at 473). In the present case, we find that the state failed to establish that defendant entered into any agreement that went beyond a singular sale of a quantity of drugs small enough to fit into a person's hand. Even in the light most favorable to the state,    giving full credibility to the state's witnesses, and draw[ing] therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt, id. (quoting Otero, 788 A.2d at 475), the evidence in this case does not support a charge that defendant entered into a conspiracy with Kenner to sell drugs. Consequently, the trial justice committed error in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count.