Opinion ID: 1759877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: VIII, IX & X. Proposed Jury Instructions: D-2, D-3, D-4

Text: ¶ 92. This Court has repeatedly reiterated the standard of appellate review applicable to questions of denial of jury instructions as follows: When considering a challenge to a jury instruction on appeal, we do not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, we read them as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Burton ex rel. Bradford v. Barnett, 615 So.2d 580, 583 (Miss.1993). Similarly, this Court has stated that [i]n determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1997) (quoting Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918 (Miss.1997)). In other words, if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results. Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 184 (Miss.2001). See Austin v. State, 784 So.2d 186, 193 (Miss.2001). See also Agnew v. State, 783 So.2d 699, 701 (Miss.2001).
¶ 93. Scott briefly contends that the trial court erred in denying proposed instruction D-2, which stated: The Court instructs the jury that a confession is not conclusive and may be of little weight or of great weight or of no weight according to the circumstances of this case; the determination of weight to be accorded a confession is for the jury to determine. ¶ 94. After a discussion on the record, the trial court denied the instruction finding that it was included in the court's instruction, C1. The trial court's instruction C1 states in pertinent part: You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but you must consider there instructions as a whole. It is your exclusive province to determine the facts in this case and consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose. The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary power but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion and in accordance with the rules of law stated to you by the court. Both the State of Mississippi and the defendant(s) have a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case and that you will reach a jury verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be.... As sole judges of the facts in this case, your exclusive province is to determine what weight and what credibility will be assigned the testimony and supporting evidence of each witness in this case. You are required and expected to use your good common sense and sound honest judgment in considering and weighing the testimony of each witness who was testified in this case. (emphasis added). ¶ 95. The record indicates the following exchange: The Court: Mr. Mellon [State], your response to D-2.... State: [W]e don't agree to that instruction. I don't know where he gets this.... [H]e's commenting on evidence there. The Court: (Court reads instruction.) Mr. Wong, where is that coming from? Defense: Diddlemeyer versus State, ... 234 Southern Second 292, a Mississippi 1970 case. Wilson v. State, 451 Southern Second, 724 a Mississippi 1984 case. Here is Diddlemeyer. State: If that's  if that's not a comment on the evidence, I don't know what would be. The Court: Mr. Wong [Defense] what is that really saying? In the absence of that instruction, wouldn't it be up to the jury, anyway. Defense: Well, how do they know what standard to apply? State: Judge, may I see C-1, your instruction C-1? And can I respond to your question, even though you did address that to Mr. Wong? ... State: You say in C-1, As sole judges of the facts in the case, your exclusive judges province is to determine what weight.... Defense: [A]nd credibility will be assigned to the testimony and supporting evidence of the witnesses in this case. And this is another instruction, and it singles out some testimony concerning the confession. I just really don't  have never heard of something that would go to that. Did he confess? Is accepting these as confessions of capital murder? ... Defense: Your Honor, Mr. Mellen put on Mr. Estes, who stated that ... Mr. Scott stated that he shot Mr. Lee and he shot as Ms. Lurline Lee. The Court: [D]oes the defendant conceive that he confessed. Defense: No, sir, but that is just what it is.... The Court: Wee, he can't confess and not confess at the same time, is what he's pointing out. Now, did he confess or not? Defense: Based on the legal definition of confession  based on Mr. Estes' statement that Mr. Scott had supposedly give, that is a legal definition of confession. The Court: So there is a concession that he confessed. Defense: Under the legal definition.... But, we have this supposedly confession made by Mr. Scott, given to an officer. The jury may think this is conclusive, but it is not. That's what the law says. This is for them to determine. He may, for example, be a true confession of all the elements of the crime, but it tells the jury what weight it is to apply to the confession: Great weight, little weight, or no weight, without telling the jury this is not conclusive of anything. State: Can I get an instruction, Judge, that a witness which the defense is calling, that that testimony is not conclusive and may not be given any weight? Can I get an instruction for every defense witness that testifies? Absolutely not. And that's what this is doing, is singling out one aspect of the case.... I think that that paragraph, which is coming out of the C-1 instruction, is a all-encompassing, so far as an instruction to the jury. This is an instruction given by the Court to tell the jury how to do this. And when you start singling out certain aspects of the case and give separate instructions on that, then that's where the errors come in. The Court: Well the Court rules that Mr. Wong is entitled to single out. But the singling out is limited to your closing argument. C-1, I agree, is all-encompassing. It says the jury shall determine the weight and credibility. And you can single out that part about the confession and say it applies even to the confession. Defense: All right. But, Your Honor, there's also the Court's instruction that the attorneys arguments are to help refresh your memory, and you can give it any weight or no weight that you want. The Court: That's true.... But there is a law that says you cannot otherwise single out, too. Defense: Yes, sir. I understand that. The Court: And there's another that says instructions should not be redundant, repetitive, superfluous. Defense: But I don't think this is redundant or superfluous because it does not tell them the law on confessions. State: Raymond, if you're quoting Wilson versus State, 451-7-24  Defense: Yeah. State: This only says that the Court makes a determination as to the admissibility, and the jury determines the weight and credibility. Defense: That's right. That's the support for doing that. That's a now later case. The Court: But C 1 tells them they determine the weight and credibility. And that would be telling them all over again, would it not? Defense: Well, that  we have just proposed that instruction for the Court. The Court: All right. You come up with a good one. And if it would not redundant, it would have a lot of merit. It's not wrong. It's not improper. But it's all-encompassed in C 1, the Court finds and rules. Defense: And denies? The Court: Denies. Defense: Okay. ¶ 96. In support of instruction D-2, Scott cites Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) on appeal, but not at trial, and also Wilson v. State, 451 So.2d 724 (Miss.1984). In Crane, the United States Supreme Court concluded that circumstances surrounding a confession cannot be excluded as evidence when the confession is admitted. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91, 106 S.Ct. at 2147. On appeal, Scott quotes in his brief from Wilson, as follows: The admissibility of a confession ... is to be distinguished from the issue of its credibility and its weight... `[T]he competency of a confession as evidence is for the court to decide as a matter of law, while the weight and credibility of a confession is for the jury to decide along with other testimony and physical evidence ...' Once a confession is admitted into evidence, a defendant is entitle to submit evidence and have the jury pass upon the factual issues of its truth and voluntariness and upon its weight and credibility ... [T]he jury may concluded that the confession, though found by the court to be voluntary, is untrue and not entitled to any weight ... Confessions are not conclusive and may be weighed as to their credibility under the circumstances by the jury. This is a matter for the jury and not the court. Wilson v. State, 451 So.2d at 726 (emphasis added). In Wilson, the Court defined the roles of the trial court judge and the jury when a confession is admitted. Id. The Court held that the trial court judge is to determine the voluntariness of a confession or its admissibility, and the jury is to determine the weight and credibility to assign to a confession. Id. However, this Court did not require in Wilson that separate instruction on the weight and credibility to be afforded when a confession is admitted. Id. In the case sub judice, the trial court's instruction C-1 adequately instructed the jury on its role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility to assign to all testimony and evidence presented. ¶ 97. This Court finds that the jury was properly instructed. Scott cites no authority to merit reversal.
¶ 98. Scott contends that the trial court erred by allowing instruction D-4, which stated: The Court instructs the Jury that in reaching your verdict you are to consider all of the evidence concerning the entire case and the circumstances surrounding the crime. One of the issues in this case is the identification of Kevin Scott as the perpetrator of the crime. As with each element of the crime charged, the State has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and before you may convict Kevin Scott, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of Kevin Scott. If, after considering all of the evidence concerning the crime and the witness' identification of Kevin Scott as the person who committed the crime, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the person who committed the crime, then you must find him not guilty. Identification testimony is an expression or belief or impression by the witness. You must judge its value and reliability from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime and the subsequent identification. In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following: 1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 2) Did the witness observe the defender with an adequate degree of attention? 3) Did the witness provide an accurate description of the offender after the crime? 4) How certain is the witness of the identification? 5) How much time passed between the crime and the identification? If, after examining all of the testimony and the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that Kevin Scott was the person who committed the crime, then you find Kevin Scott not guilty. ¶ 99. Scott argues that the instruction was necessary because the case hinges on whether Mrs. Lee's identification was correct ... Scott ignores all the other evidence presented at trial against Scott including his confession, the DNA evidence, possession of items that belonged to Lee and items recovered that were covered in Lee's DNA. Scott focuses solely on Lurline's eyewitness identification. Scott cites Davis v. State, 568 So.2d 277 (Miss.1990) and Warren v. State, 709 So.2d 415 (Miss.1998), in support of his position. ¶ 100. In Davis, this Court stated that the identification instruction offered could have been granted. Davis, 568 So.2d at 280-81. The Court did not state that Davis's instruction was required to be given just because their existed eyewitness identification. See id. However, this Court determined that where only a part of an identification instruction was granted, Davis was not prejudiced by the deletion. Id. The Court held that there was no adverse affect on Davis's case because Davis's guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt by the overwhelming weight of evidence. Id. at 281. ¶ 101. The defense also cited Warren on appeal and at trial. In Warren, this Court found that trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the law of identification was reversible error. Warren, 709 So.2d at 421. However, the facts in Warren and the facts here are clearly distinguishable. The Court in Warren determined that the identification instruction should have been allowed because the case turned on the identification of Warren by a single person. Id. at 421 (emphasis added). ¶ 102. Here, the record reflects that the trial court conducted an extensive eight-page examination of the defense's request for the identification instruction, D-4. The trial court concluded that the case against Scott was not based solely on the testimony of one eyewitness. Therefore, Warren is not applicable to the case at hand. ¶ 103. Scott gave a confession when arrested that he killed Lee and shot at Lurline; Officer Estes testified as to Scott's confession at trial; Scott testified that he took the Lee's automobile; Lee's DNA was found on among other things, Scott's jacket, money envelope, the Lee's automobile; witnesses established that after Scott admitted abandoning the Lee's automobile, he sought and received a ride home rather than going to the police. The evidence also reflects that Scott had wrecked his white 1988 Oldsmobile Sierra the day before he ended up taking Lee's white 1990 Oldsmobile Sierra. Clearly, Lurline's identification was only part of the evidence introduced against Scott. In fact, Scott was taken into custody based on the bloody jacket and driver's license found near Lee's abandoned automobile, not Lurline's eyewitness identification. ¶ 104. In further support of its position, the State cites Francis v. State, 791 So.2d 904, 908-09 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) and Thomas v. State, 766 So.2d 809, 811 (Miss.Ct.App.2000), in support of its position that the instruction offered by Scott on identification was not required. ¶ 105. In Francis, the Mississippi Court of Appeals determined that Warren was not applicable to require an identification instruction because the identification did not rest solely on the testimony of one eyewitness, Wilkes. Francis, 791 So.2d at 908. The court stated that Francis disclosed to Lt. Walker where the gun used to commit the robbery had been hidden and led the police to that location. Id. Therefore, the court determined no error existed in not allowing the identification instruction. Id. at 908-09. ¶ 106. In Thomas, the Mississippi Court of Appeals addressed our holding in Warren, stating: The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the failure to give an identification instruction, upon request, is reversible error where the identification of the accused rests entirely upon the testimony of a single witness. See Warren v. State, 709 So.2d 415, 420 (Miss. 1998).... Mrs. McQuillan's testimony was not the sole evidentiary basis upon which the identification of Thomas rested. Thomas's location near the crash sight of the stolen vehicle and his flight from law enforcement officers provided independent evidence of his involvement in the crimes. 766 So.2d at 811. ¶ 107. This Court finds that Scott does not establish that instruction D-4 was required given the other evidence introduced against him. The case against Scott did not rest solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness. This issue does not merit reversal.
¶ 108. Scott contends that the trial court erred in not granting proposed instruction D-3 which stated as follows: The Court instructs the jury that some degree of participation in a criminal act must be shown in order to establish liability, and proof that one has stood by at the commission of a crime without taking [sic] steps to prevent it does not alone indicate participation or combination in the wrong done, although he approves the act. ¶ 109. Scott based his proposed instruction on Cochran v. State, 191 Miss. 273, 276, 2 So.2d 822, 823 (1941). However, this case is clearly distinguishable from the circumstances in Cochran. In Cochran, the Sheriff of Attala County found beer and slot machines in a dance hall. Id. at 822. When the sheriff found beer and slot machines, he went outside to make an arrest. Id. The defendant was arrested outside the premises. Id. After the arrest, the sheriff conducted a search upon the defendant's person, finding two concealed bottles of whiskey. The defendant was prosecuted and convicted on the possession of whiskey. Id. at 822-23. The sheriff had no warrant for the arrest of appellant, and it is admitted that the officer had no probably cause at the time which would authorize the arrest for the possession of the whiskey. Id. at 823. The Court considered whether the arrest was authorized for the possession of the beer or slot machines. Id. The defendant was merely standing outside the premises as a bystander when the arrest occurred. The Court, quoting Harper v. State, 83 Miss. 402, 415, 35 So. 572 (1904), stated that some degree of participation in the criminal act must be shown in order to establish any criminal liability. Id. As the arrest on the possession of beer and slot machines was not proper, the evidence of the concealed whiskey was not admissible. Id. ¶ 110. In Branning v. State, 215 Miss. 223, 229, 60 So.2d 633, 634 (1952), a drugstore in Brooksville, Noxubee County, Mississippi, was burglarized. Id. at 633. The defendant was suspected of committing the burglary solely because he had been in the drugstore the day before the night the burglary was committed. Id. The Sheriff of Noxubee County traveled to Columbus, Lowndes County, Mississippi, to arrest the defendant. Id. The defendant was arrested, and without a warrant, a small box containing five morphine tablets was taken from the ashtray in the defendant's automobile. Id. Based on this evidence, the defendant was convicted. Id. The defendant objected to use of the evidence of his possession of the morphine. Id. at 634. On appeal, this Court, citing Cochran, reversed the conviction. Id. at 634, 637. The Court stated, [i]n the case at bar, the most that is shown is that appellant was in the drugstore some time during the day prior to the commission of the crime the night following. Id. at 634. The Court further concluded that as a matter of logic and common sense there was not reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant  committed the burglary simply and alone because he, along with others, was seen in the store during the day prior to the night the store was burglarized. Id. at 636-37. ¶ 111. In Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir.1969), the Fifth Circuit cited to this Court's holding in Cochran. Davis involved a bank robbery that occurred in Hickory Flat, Mississippi. Id. at 1096. The defendant was caught in the act of burglarizing the bank. Id. at 1098. The defendant's clothing revealed, after FBI analysis, debris that matched debris on the bank's floor at the point where the bank had been entered. Id. at 1098. In affirming the conviction, the Fifth Circuit held: In Cochran v. State, 191 Miss. 273, 276, 2 So.2d 822, 823, a case where an arrest was made on direct information that the person arrested was present, and wherein nevertheless the arrest was held to have been unlawful, for the reason that `some degree of participation in the criminal act must be shown in order to establish any criminal liability. Proof that one (was present or) has stood by at the commission of a crime without taking any steps to prevent it does not alone indicate such participation or combination in the wrong done as to show criminal liability, although he approves of the act'. Two years earlier, in Leflore v. State, 197 Miss. 337, 22 So.2d 368 (1945) ... the Mississippi Supreme Court read the other side of the coin. There a dead body, obviously dispatched by violent means, was found by the roadside. The sheriff was notified. He followed a trail of blood, broken twigs, and disturbed grass up to where it stopped at the home of the defendant. He there discovered that the yard had recently been thoroughly swept; there was blood near the front steps covered with ashes; there was a smouldering fire wherein clothing had been burned; and there were blood stained blocks concealed in a hollow tree. The Supreme Court held that probable cause existed for the arrest of the defendant without a warrant. In the case now before us it is not to be doubted that Mr. Ash and the other officers had credible information that the bank was being burglarized. Moreover, from what he observed with his own senses Mr. Ash had good reason to believe that Davis was one of those engaged in the felony. The arrest without a warrant was perfectly lawful. This being true, the officers acted within their lawful authority in removing the clothing of the defendant and subjecting it to laboratory analysis. The results were admissible in evidence, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).... The evidence was more than sufficient to establish that Davis aided and abetted the others in the commission of the bank burglary. It has long been settled that the acts of all participants in the commission of a crime are admissible against the others even though no conspiracy is charged. United States v. Messina, 2 Cir.1968, 388 F.2d 393, 394; United States v. Sears, 7 Cir.1964, 332 F.2d 199, 201 (photograph of automobiles and other objects used in the commission of a robbery and a sack dropped by one of the robbers.). Davis, 409 F.2d at 1100. ¶ 112. Cochran and subsequent cases that have discussed this Court's holding in Cochran, have all involved the question of whether probable cause existed to warrant arrest. Here, the record clearly reflects evidence of Scott's participation in the criminal acts. Scott testified that he took Lee's automobile. His fingerprints were found in the automobile. Lee's blood and DNA were found in the automobile, on Scott's jacket, among other things recovered. Scott gave a confession that he killed Lee and shot at Lee's wife, Lurline. Scott had wrecked his 1988 Oldsmobile, which was similar to Lee's 1990 Oldsmobile, the day before. Lurline identified Scott as the person who shot and killed her husband and shot at her on November 15, 1995. Obviously, this case is distinguishable from Cochran. ¶ 113. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in not granting Scott's proposed instruction D-3. Sufficient evidence of Scott's participation renders this issue without merit.
¶ 114. Scott contends that the trial court permitted improper use of victim impact evidence. However, as the State correctly points out, Scott never identifies what evidence he considered improper. Also, nothing in Scott's brief makes any reference to alleged improper testimony. [6] Without specific evidence or objection to consider, this Court finds that this issue is not properly before this Court. M.R.A.P. 28(a)(6) provides that: The argument shall contain the contentions of appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on. ¶ 115. In Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 784 (Miss.2001), Conley was convicted of capital murder in the Circuit Court of Pike County. On appeal, Conley alleged that the trial court erred in not allowing a full cross-examination of the State's witness. Id. The Court did not find any basis for the issue, stating: Pursuant to M.R.A.P 28(a)(6), this issue is not properly before the Court. Conley has failed to cite any specific instance in the record where the trial court limited his cross-examination.... Id. ¶ 116. We find that this issue is procedurally barred for failure to allege any specific error for this Court to consider.