Opinion ID: 754754
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Pickering/Connick balance

Text: 60 As noted earlier, we must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the expressive activity that the Plaintiffs contend motivated Molina's failure to rehire them constituted comment on a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 992. While speech need not touch on a matter of public concern to possess First Amendment protection, 61 when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. 62 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Therefore, if the Plaintiffs' expressive activity cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for [Molina's failure to rehire them]. Id. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684. 63 We determine whether the Plaintiffs' expressive activity in this case constituted speech on a matter of public concern based upon its content, form, and context ... as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 992. The Plaintiffs testified that they engaged in a wide variety of political activity in support of Hillegeist. Fortenberry testified that he went to numerous political functions in support of Hillegeist and that he walked door-to-door campaigning for him. Leach testified that he walked door-to-door campaigning for Hillegeist and that, approximately once per week, he drove a truck with Hillegeist signs on the sides. Skinner testified that he placed Hillegeist signs in his yard and a Hillegeist bumper sticker on his van. He also testified that, when asked about the election, he would state his opinion that he considered Hillegeist to be the person most qualified for the sheriff position. Evans testified that he walked door-to-door campaigning for Hillegeist, put up Hillegeist signs, and participated in two fundraisers for Hillegeist. Rosas testified that he put up Hillegeist billboards, walked door-to-door campaigning for him, and wore Hillegeist paraphernalia. Brady testified that he made and put up Hillegeist signs, wore Hillegeist shirts, and spoke with people at the county fair in support of Hillegeist. Chamblee testified that he organized a barbecue cook-off in support of Hillegeist at the county fair and that he wore a Hillegeist shirt and cap at this event. He also testified that he polled for Hillegeist on election day. 64 The County does not claim that the above conduct did not constitute expressive conduct subject to First Amendment protection. However, the County contends that the expressive conduct did not constitute a comment on a matter of public concern because the Plaintiffs supported Hillegeist merely to promote their own job security; they did not support him based upon political ideology or concerns, or party affiliation. The County contends that this is evidenced by the fact that many of the Plaintiffs had worked at the sheriff's department for a number of years under a number of sheriffs and, during each sheriff's election, these Plaintiffs unfailingly supported the incumbent. 65 [T]here can be no question that ... campaigning for a political candidate ... relate[s] to a matter of public concern. Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 885 (5th Cir.1995). The fact that the Plaintiffs may have been motivated to support Hillegeist out of a concern for their job security does not change our conclusion that their public displays of support for Hillegeist related to a matter of public concern. In Kinsey v. Salado Independent School District, 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.1992), this court considered en banc a claim that the school board suspended the plaintiff superintendent because he supported a political slate of incumbent board members who were defeated in the most recent election. See id. at 990. The losing slate supported the plaintiff's continued superintendency, and the winning slate opposed it. See id. In applying the Pickering /Connick balancing test, the plurality concluded that, [n]otwithstanding [the plaintiff's] interest in retaining his position as superintendent, his speech and association involved matters of great public concern--the performance of elected officials. Id. at 995. Kinsey thus indicates that the fact that the Plaintiffs may have been motivated by self-interest rather than abstract political ideology does not indicate that their expressive activity in support of Hillegeist did not address a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court recently confirmed the correctness of this conclusion in O'Hare when it stated that one's beliefs and allegiances ought not to be subject to probing or testing by the government. O'Hare, 116 S.Ct. at 2358. We conclude that the Plaintiffs' speech related to a matter of public concern, and we therefore proceed to the determination of whether the Plaintiffs' interests in their expressive activities in support of Hillegeist outweighed the County's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. 66 We have read Pickering, as expounded in Connick, to require a comprehensive but flexible analysis--a balance which weighs the particular aspects of the government's interest in effective service and the plaintiff's interest in freedom of speech that arise in each fact situation. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1016. We have read the Supreme Court precedent applying Pickering to indicate that a number of factors are relevant in balancing the interests of the individual against those of the state, including the following: (1) the degree to which the employee's activity involved a matter of public concern; (2) the time, place, and manner of the employee's activity; (3) whether close working relationships are essential to fulfilling the employee's public responsibilities and the potential effect of the employee's activity on those relationships; (4) whether the employee's activity may be characterized as hostile, abusive, or insubordinate; (5) whether the activity impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers. See Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 112 (5th Cir.1992); Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 760 (5th Cir.1988). 6 We have also concluded that, in cases involving public employees who occupy policymaker or confidential positions ..., the government's interests more easily outweigh the employee's (as a private citizen). Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 994; see also Vojvodich, 48 F.3d at 885. In this case, these factors militate strongly in favor of a conclusion that the Plaintiffs' political interest in political activity in support of Hillegeist outweighed the County's interest in efficiency in the services that it provides through its employees because any negative impact that the Plaintiffs' activity could have had on the efficiency of the sheriff's department was minimal, if their activity could have created any such impact at all. 7 67 The Plaintiffs' political activities in support of Hillegeist all took place while the Plaintiffs were off-duty. Their activities consisted of positive statements in support of Hillegeist rather than negative statements about Molina; 8 in no sense could their actions be characterized as hostile, abusive, or insubordinate. When asked at trial if he was aware of any negative statements about him made by the Plaintiffs, Molina responded that he was aware of none. In sum, this is a case of subordinate[s] who ... expressed a reasoned preference for another superior; it is not a case of subordinates who blackguarded [a superior's] honesty and ability up and down the county. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1017; see also Matherne, 851 F.2d at 761. 9 68 Furthermore, assuming that the Plaintiffs' former positions in the sheriff's department could be considered policymaking positions, 10 such a conclusion is not dispositive of our balancing inquiry. See Vojvodich, 48 F.3d at 884. As the Supreme Court observed in Branti, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the public office involved. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287; see also Vojvodich, 48 F.3d at 884. Indeed, the Branti court expressly observed that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential position. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. The record in this case strongly supports a conclusion that the Plaintiffs did not fall within the exceptional class of public servants of whom political allegiance may be demanded. Garcia v. Reeves County, 32 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir.1994). 69 At trial, Molina testified as follows regarding the necessity of having individuals who supported him politically in the positions occupied by the Plaintiffs:Q: Now, sir, wouldn't it be fair to say that it is your testimony that whether somebody supported Sheriff Hillegeist or whether they supported you would have nothing to do with the decision as to whether they were retained, demoted, transferred or let go? Correct? 70 A: That is correct. 71 Q: In other words, you didn't feel like you needed to have political--your own political supporters in any positions in the sheriff's department, correct? 72 A: That is correct. 73 ... 74 Q: Okay. Now, would it be fair to say that for the position of lieutenant you did not have to have a person in that position to support you in a sheriff's election campaign? 75 A: No one needed to support me. 76 Q: Including lieutenants, correct, sir? 77 A: That is correct. 78 Q: In other words, you ought to be able to work with-as sheriff of Fort Bend County, you ought to be able to work with a lieutenant who had supported Sheriff Hillegeist, correct? 79 A: Yes. 80 Q: In fact, you ought to be able to work with, as sheriff of Fort Bend County, somebody who actively supported Sheriff Hillegeist, correct? 81 A: Yes, sir. 82 Q: So, in going through the decisions that you made, all the personnel decisions that you made--hiring, firing, demotions, et cetera--none of those--in none of those decisions was the political support of Hillegeist or you ever a factor at all? 83 ... 84 A: It was never a factor. 85 Not only does this testimony indicate that the Plaintiffs, none of whom occupied a position higher than lieutenant in the sheriff's department chain of command, did not occupy positions for which political affiliation is an appropriate employment criterion, it also indicates that their political activity in support of Hillegeist had little if any potential for undermining close working relationships within the sheriff's department or for impairing discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers within the department. We therefore conclude that the Pickering /Connick balance weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs and that Molina therefore was not privileged to decline to rehire them based upon their political support for Hillegeist. 86