Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discussion: guilt phase issues

Text: On December 14, 1993, attorney Syamak Shafi-Nia, who had been privately retained, appeared on defendant's behalf at his arraignment. Defendant was also represented at that point by Milton Kerlan. After Kerlan withdrew from the case, Robert Sheahen was substituted in to conduct the preliminary hearing. Shafi-Nia had limited experience in criminal law and described his role as being there to help defendant. Sheahen, by contrast, was a veteran criminal lawyer with death penalty experience. [3] On February 25, 1994, Shafi-Nia and Sheahen were appointed by Judge Ito to represent defendant to settle the case. Shafi-Nia was appointed pursuant to Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750, notwithstanding his lack of criminal law experience, because of his personal relationship with defendant. Judge Ito made it clear that Shafi-Nia was being appointed as second counsel because of his lesser qualifications as a criminal lawyer. On June 1, 1994, Judge Ito reappointed Shafi-Nia and Sheahen for all purposes. The case was transferred to Van Nuys where it was ultimately tried by Judge Kriegler. On November 21, 1994, defendant made a Marsden motion ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44) primarily directed at removing Shafi-Nia. He objected to Shafi-Nia's inexperience in not being a criminal attorney and definitely not qualifying for first degree death penalty cases, and also faulted Shafi-Nia for his inadequate translation of a magazine article from Farsi to English. Defendant requested a second outstanding criminal attorney with appropriate experience and expertise in death penalty cases. The trial court denied the motion, remarking, I don't think there's any need for a second attorney in this case. I think it's nice that Mr. Shafi-Nia has been here to serve the function that he was appointed to serve, but it's more than the defendant necessarily would have received. On November 29, Sheahen informed the court that Shafi-Nia had been in a traffic accident the previous day for which he was being treated, but did not request a continuance. The following day, jury selection began. Sheahen waived Shafi-Nia's presence. The court expressed its understanding that Sheahen would be handling all the jury selection. Sheahen agreed that he would be making the calls here. At the afternoon session, however, he said Shafi-Nia was his communication link to defendant and that it was very important that he be here. He acknowledged he was not unable to proceed in Shafi-Nia's absence and asked that, if Shafi-Nia could not be present, another lawyer be appointed. He conceded he had not asked the case to be put over and was prepared to go the distance on jury selection. He also acknowledged that 97 percent of the decisions in this case have been made by me, and that Shafi-Nia's learning curve had been like a fifty-pound weight that we are dragging around. Nonetheless, he said, Shafi-Nia had assisted him on the juror questionnaires. The prosecutor suggested a recess to allow Sheahen to read the questionnaires. Sheahen requested that the proceedings be adjourn[ed] until Shafi-Nia could return or, if the court declined to do so, he requested that the court appoint a new and different second counsel for Mr. Panah. The court did not rule on the request, nor did Sheahen press for a ruling. At some point, the court received a fax from Southern California Orthopedic and Medical Associates, dated November 29. It stated Shafi-Nia required bed rest for five days because of back pain due to the traffic accident. On December 1, both Sheahen and Shafi-Nia appeared. Shafi-Nia wanted more time to discuss possible settlement and asked for a 10-day continuance or, alternatively, that another lawyer be appointed for defendant. The prosecutor said he would not object to the five-day continuance requested for Shafi-Nia to recover, but would object if the continuance was sought to give the defense more time to talk defendant into taking a plea. That afternoon, Shafi-Nia's representation of defendant was again discussed. The trial court had reviewed the transcript of Shafi-Nia's appointment and observed that he had been appointed to facilitate a settlement and because of his long-standing relationship with defendant. The court remarked that the latter ground has nothing to do with this case. And I think in retrospect it has created nothing but problems for the court and the orderly processing of this case. The court also reiterated its belief that the case did not require two lawyers. It denied the request for a 10-day continuance, noting that it was giving Shafi-Nia until Monday, December 5 â the five days requested in the November 29 fax. On December 5, the court received a fax from Dr. Solomon Hakimi saying Shafi-Nia continued to have severe lower back pain and required bed rest until December 10, at which point he would be evaluated again. The defense requested a continuance. It was denied. The next day, defendant requested that the case be continued until Shafi-Nia could return or alternatively, for appointment of new counsel. Sheahen told the court he had spoken with a possible replacement, Marcia Morrissey. The court indicated it was willing to entertain this request but denied the continuance. Later that day, when the court was informed Ms. Morrissey was not available, the court said it would consider another attorney if Sheahen proposed one. At the end of the court day, the trial court noted Shafi-Nia had not appeared. It terminated Shafi-Nia's appointment and appointed William Chais in his place as second chair. Defendant thanked the court, but Sheahen objected that replacing Shafi-Nia deprived defendant of Shafi-Nia's preparation and communication skills. He also complained that Shafi-Nia remained in possession of some files. The trial court responded that it would order him to return the files. The following day, the court made the following statement to Mr. Sheahen to clarify the record: You had, in fact, requested that a new second attorney be appointed and . . . your client last week had made that request. [ķ] And I denied that request from [ sic ] the grounds Mr. Shafi-Nia was fulfilling the limited function he had been appointed to fulfill. [ķ] You repeated your request for a new second lawyer yesterday, and I took action to ensure that an experienced criminal lawyer was brought in as second chair in an exercise of my discretion. [ķ] That was not done because I felt that defendant was receiving inadequate representation or that the absence of Mr. Shafi-Nia had any impact whatever on how the trial had progressed to that point. [ķ] It was done because the case started with two lawyers, and I thought really just to continue having two lawyers would be in the defendant's best interest. Sheahen responded that the defense would have preferred a continuance and complained again that Shafi-Nia was in possession of files in the case. At the end of the day, the defense investigator informed the court that he had spoken to Shafi-Nia and arranged for the missing files to be brought to court. At the end of the guilt phase, the trial court observed that Chais had done an outstanding job, and that what he added to the trial in terms of good lawyering, coordination, and communication is far beyond what Mr. Shafi-Nia could have ever hoped to have added in this case because of his complete lack of criminal experience. Sheahen argued that Chais, who was 32 years old, lacked trial experience in murder cases and should have been given time to prepare. The court pointed out that the defense had not requested a continuance for that purpose nor had Chais ever indicated he was unprepared.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying his request for a continuance to permit Shafi-Nia to recover from his back injury; (2) removing Shafi-Nia over his objection; (3) appointing Chais; and (4) failing to give Chais adequate time to prepare. He asserts the errors were of federal constitutional magnitude. As we explain, we reject his claims. `The granting or denial of a motion for continuance in the midst of a trial traditionally rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge who must consider not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the motion.' [Citation.] In the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant, a denial of a motion for a continuance does not require reversal of a conviction. [Citation.] ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1125-1126, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384, quoting People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 972, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704; § 1050, subd. (e).) Defendant bears the burden of establishing that denial of a continuance request was an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 1003, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) There was no such abuse of discretion here, but even if there was, defendant was not prejudiced. The trial had already commenced and the respective roles of defendant's two lawyers, Sheahen and Shafi-Nia, were clearly delineated. It was understood that Sheahen would be conducting the defense at trial because, by his own admission, Shafi-Nia was not qualified to try the case. Sheahen had, at least initially, waived Shafi-Nia's presence for purposes of jury selection and even after Sheahen argued that Shafi-Nia should be present, he acknowledged that he, not Shafi-Nia, was making 97 percent of the decisions in the case. Sheahen also conceded he was able to proceed in Shafi-Nia's absence. Additionally, the continuance requests escalated from an initial request of five days, which, in effect, the court granted, to 10 days, and then, ultimately, to an open-ended request. [4] Furthermore, the trial court had reason to believe that the underlying reason for the request was not to allow Shafi-Nia to recover, but to obtain more time for defense counsel to persuade defendant to plead guilty after many months of fruitless plea negotiations. Thus, the trial court was being asked to continue a trial that had already begun to some unknown point in the future to accommodate defendant's secondary lawyer whose role in the trial, it was understood by all participants, was to have been, at best, limited. Given these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the request. Defendant argues that Shafi-Nia's status as  Harris counsel, because of his long-standing and unique relationship with defendant, rendered his participation in the trial essential. We disagree. In Harris, while affirming the general principle that an indigent defendant's choice of counsel is not a dispositive factor in the appointment of counsel, we concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected defendants' request to appoint as counsel attorneys who had represented them in prior related criminal proceedings and with whom defendants had developed a relationship of trust and confidence over a substantial period of time. ( Harris v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 799, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750.) We laid particular stress on the prior representation factor because it served to provide those attorneys with an extensive background in various factual and legal matters which may well become relevant in the instant proceeding â a background which any other attorney appointed to the case would necessarily be called upon to acquire. ( Id. at p. 798, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750.) In this case, there was no prior history of representation like that present in Harris and, unlike the attorneys in Harris, Shafi-Nia was so wholly inexperienced in criminal matters that, even in appointing him, Judge Ito made it clear he was to function as second counsel, behind Sheahen. The only basis supporting Shafi-Nia's appointment was his prior personal relationship with defendant. Fully aware of the circumstances of Shafi-Nia's appointment, the trial court concluded that he was not essential to the defense, but was, at most, a special benefit bestowed on defendant by Judge Ito. The record bears this out. Just one week before trial began, defendant specifically sought to remove Shafi-Nia because of Shafi-Nia's lack of criminal law experience and his deficiencies as a translator. [5] Additionally, the various defense requests for a continuance also alternatively requested appointment of new counsel. Moreover, lead counsel Sheahen acknowledged that Shafi-Nia's lack of criminal experience was, in essence, a dead weight on the defense. Plainly, by the time this case reached the trial stage, any value Shafi-Nia may have had to the defense was exhausted. Defendant also contends that the denial of his request for a continuance was detrimental because Shafi-Nia had been in contact with a number of potential witnesses in Iran and with defendant's German girlfriend, all of whom may have testified at the penalty phase but, ultimately, did not. This argument was not made to the trial judge at the time defendant requested the continuance and to the extent he bases his claim of error on this point, his claim is forfeited. (Cf. People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 207, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868 [whether denial of a continuance constitutes a due process violation `must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied'].) In any event, defendant fails to establish either that the testimony of these witnesses â all of them unidentified except defendant's German girlfriend â would have been anything other than cumulative to his mother's penalty phase testimony. [6] Accordingly, Shafi-Nia's asserted status as  Harris counsel did not render the denial of defendant's request for a continuance an abuse of discretion. Since there was no abuse of discretion there is thus no predicate error on which to base the [defendant's] constitutional claims. ( People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 506, fn. 2, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521.) Accordingly, we reject them as well. Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights when it removed Shafi-Nia from the case. On appeal, a trial court's removal of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1187, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811; People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 629, 194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769 [a trial court may remove defense counsel, even over a defendant's objections, in order to eliminate potential conflicts, ensure adequate representations, or prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings...].) Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in removing counsel to prevent disruption of the orderly processes of justice is to be determined under the circumstances of the particular case. ( People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 208, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868; People v. Strozier (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 55, 62, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 362.) A court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably under the circumstances of the particular case. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1185, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) In this case, given Shafi-Nia's indeterminate unavailability coupled with defendant's insistence that he was entitled to two attorneys, the trial court acted within its discretion in relieving Shafi-Nia and replacing him. Defendant advances the same arguments he raised in connection with his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance. We find them no more persuasive in this context than in the continuance context and for the same reason we reject them. Further, the cases upon which he relies are inapposite because they involve the removal of lead counsel (e.g., People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d 199, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868) or removal for reasons not present here (e.g., Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 [trial court exceeded its authority by removing counsel for incompetence].) Even if the trial court abused its discretion either by denying defendant's requests for a continuance or by removing Shafi-Nia, we would find any error harmless. Preliminarily, we reject defendant's assertion that the removal of Shafi-Nia, if error, is reversible per se. For this proposition, defendant relies on People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d 199, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868. In Crovedi, we found that the trial court denied defendant his federal and state constitutional right to counsel when it denied his request for a seven-week continuance of trial to permit his attorney to recover from a heart attack, and removed counsel, and replaced him with the attorney's law partner over the latter's protest. ( People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 201-203, 208-209, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868.) In this situation, we concluded the constitutional violation required reversal  regardless of whether a fair trial resulted. ( Id. at p. 205, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868; accord, People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 589, 186 Cal.Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145 [denial of continuance to permit counsel to associate more experienced cocounsel, after withdrawal of original, experienced cocounsel, reversible regardless of whether a fair trial resulted].) Here, Shafi-Nia was secondary counsel who had, from the beginning of his representation of defendant, disavowed any intention of trying the case, leaving that duty to Sheahen. Under these circumstances, a reversible per se standard is not required. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 952, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 [after one cocounsel withdrew, the defendant agreed to proceed with remaining counsel and nothing in the record suggests [remaining counsel] was an inexperienced attorney or was otherwise unable to assume lead counsel status; distinguishing Gzikowski ].) Defendant was represented by two competent lawyers, and nothing in the record shows he was prejudiced by Shafi-Nia's removal. Accordingly, any error, if there was error, was harmless under any standard of review. Defendant makes two additional, related claims. He asserts that the trial court erred by appointing Chais because he was unqualified to try a death penalty case and that the court erred by failing to give Chais sufficient time to prepare. These claims are forfeited because defendant did not object to the appointment of Chais on grounds he was unqualified, nor did Chais request a continuance to prepare. In any event, defendant does not demonstrate Chais rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, he fails to show any prejudice arising from his claims of error.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his three motions for substitution of counsel. ( People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden ).) He asserts that the trial court did not give him an adequate opportunity to explain his dissatisfaction with counsel, as mandated by Marsden, and that, as a result, his right to effective assistance of counsel, and other constitutional rights were denied. We disagree.
On November 21, 1994, defendant filed a letter with the court in which he lodged 15 complaints against his lawyers. [7] Upon being informed by Shafi-Nia of the existence of the letter and some of its contents, the trial court excused the prosecutor and conducted a Marsden hearing. Responding to the letter, Sheahen told the court that, based on the evidence, and his discussions with other criminal defense lawyers who had tried death penalty cases, he had tried to persuade defendant to move away from a claim of factual innocence and either plead guilty to avoid the death penalty or enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. With respect to defendant's desire for a DNA expert, Sheahen said he had explained to defendant that a DNA expert would only confirm the prosecution's serology results. He said he had told defendant the case was moving toward the death penalty, and urged defendant to plead and avoid the death penalty. And rather than do that, Mr. Panah has said, `Well, let's get a new lawyer on the case. Let's do whatever.' [ķ] And that's essentially where we are. Defendant read a statement in which he claimed a conflict of interest with counsel existed because they had failed to pursue certain matters he asserted were important to his defense. He also read the complaints he had put in his letter. In reply, Sheahen again said he had assessed the DNA question and determined that the downside of a defense examination was greater than the upside. He also stated that every important witness had been interviewed. He said he was working on a petition for writ of mandate to review denial of a disqualification motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. (See 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 713-714, 107 P.3d at pp. 822-824, post. ) He explained he had not moved to suppress certain items, including the victim's body, as defendant urged, because, as he had explained to defendant, there was no legitimate basis to suppress them. He pointed out that the defense had filed an exhaustive discovery motion and that were no grounds for a hearing because the prosecution had complied with every request made by the defense. As to defendant's request for a Franks hearing ( Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 [evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant based on an affidavit including false statements, or statements made in reckless disregard of the truth, must be suppressed]), Sheahen pointed out that such a hearing had been conducted a month earlier. Regarding the jailhouse informant to whom defendant referred, Sheahen said the district attorney had informed the defense that a cellmate of defendant's had been used to attempt to elicit incriminating statements from defendant about eliminating a witness. (See 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 721-722, 107 P.3d at pp. 828-829, post. ) Their conversations had been taped and reviewed by Sheahen. He said nothing on them was admissible in the guilt phase and if the prosecution tried to use them at the penalty phase their probative value was minimal because defendant doesn't say much of anything on these tapes. The trial court found that Mr. Sheahen has done a very, very thorough and comprehensive job in presenting the 1538.5 issues, the 402 issues, the change of venue motion, the challenge to the entire courthouse, including myself, as well as the renewed motion for change of venue or transfer of district. It found Sheahen's decision not to call a DNA expert was a sound tactical decision. When the trial court asked defendant if there were specific names of witnesses whom he believed counsel had not interviewed, defendant was unable to provide them. Sheahen stated if the case went to trial he would seek appointment of an investigator to interview any remaining witnesses. Concluding there had been no irreconcilable breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, the trial court denied the motion.
On December 5, defendant requested another Marsden hearing. The trial court excused the prosecutor. Pressed by the trial court to state his specific complaints against Mr. Sheahen, defendant complained that Sheahen had failed to adequately communicate with him, leaving most of the communication to Shafi-Nia and that Shafi-Nia's absence was having a negative effect on Sheahen's representation of him. He also complained Sheahen had failed to adequately investigate and prepare an alibi defense. Specifically, he stated that Sheahen had not talked to a professor of his who knew he had been suicidal. He also said Sheahen had failed to interview other witnesses, including Ronald Hicks, Victoria Eckstone, Adele Bowen and Bruce Cousins. He complained, moreover, that Sheahen had not investigated mental defenses or sought to suppress evidence. Defendant said Sheahen had told him he would be found guilty regardless . . . . The court interrupted and observed that Sheahen had visited defendant countless times in lockup and arranged meetings with defendant at county jail. Defendant complained, however, that Sheahen had only talked to him about taking a deal. In response, Sheahen agreed with defendant that a substantial amount of communication with him had been done through Shafi-Nia, but said he also had met repeatedly with defendant. As to defendant's complaint about suppression of evidence, Sheahen pointed out that we had a month long hearing where we moved to suppress. With respect to defendant's claim about alibi witnesses, Sheahen said defendant doesn't have an alibi witness because he was there at the scene of the crime. As to the professor defendant mentioned, Sheahen stated there were other witnesses to defendant's mental state but he might use the professor. Regarding defendant's claim about Sheahen's assessment of the case, Sheahen said, the record showed the evidence against defendant was substantial. He wanted me to use a two bearded strangers defense. That is absolutely absurd and I will not use it. [8] The trial court denied the motion. It pointed out that Sheahen cannot make up defenses where no defenses exist. [ķ] His duty is to give the defendant solid advice and do the best he can under the circumstances. [ķ] There is no doubt in my mind Mr. Sheahen has done exactly that. . . . [ķ] I find there's no conflict. No irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The following day, defendant appeared in court with a two- or three-page handwritten note and complained the trial court had cut him off before he could make his record on the  Marsden Bonin hearing. The court declined to excuse the prosecutors because it said it had heard all of defendant's claims. Nonetheless, with Sheahen's assistance, defendant was allowed to state his complaints. Defendant complained about Sheahen's failure to prepare for the penalty phase. He said he wanted his father to come from Iran for the penalty phase. Sheahen told the court he had looked into having defendant's father come but he is presently in an immigration status that precludes him from leaving Iran to come to this country. The trial court stated it was going to stand by my rulings regarding the representation given the defendant in this case.
On January 3, after the guilt phase but before the penalty phase, defendant made a third Marsden motion. The trial court declined to excuse the prosecutors because defendant's complaints related to tactical decisions made during the guilt phrase. [9] Defendant complained that counsel had not argued his ring could not have made the scratches on Nicole's thigh and had not called a forensic expert to establish this point. He said counsel should have contended he had not worn the ring for a long time. Defendant also complained about counsel's failure to impeach the victim's mother and Rauni Campbell. The trial court stated that, with respect to the ring, counsel had objected to its admission and conducted cross-examination on whether it caused the scratches on the victim's body but that, in any event, it was an insignificant factor on identity, the only possible issue to which it could have been relevant. With respect to attacking Mrs. Parker's credibility, the trial court stated this was a disagreement over tactics. Regarding the cross-examination of Rauni Campbell, the trial court found defendant's complaints were conclusory and that, in any event, a tactical decision was involved. The trial court denied the motion.
A defendant is entitled to have appointed counsel discharged upon a showing that counsel is not providing adequate representation or that counsel and defendant have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result. ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1244-1245, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762.) When the defendant seeks to remove appointed counsel the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of counsel's inadequacy. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1190, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) The trial court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Ibid. ) Defendant asserts he was not given a sufficient opportunity to justify his request for new appointed counsel, that his attorney argued against him, and that the trial court improperly defended counsel. These claims are meritless. The record demonstrates that defendant was afforded the opportunity to explain the basis of his Marsden requests and to cite specific instances of counsel's inadequate performance. His complaints, however, amounted to nothing more than tactical disagreements between defendant and counsel. Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, defense counsel was not obliged to pursue futile lines of defense simply because defendant demanded them, and his refusal to do so did not justify his removal as counsel. ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754 [Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an `irreconcilable conflict'].) Furthermore, the trial court did not err in soliciting a response from defense counsel to defendant's complaints, nor was counsel arguing against him when he did so. Inquiring of counsel is necessary for the trial court to evaluate the defendant's request and for appellate review. (See, e.g., People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 205, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 854-855, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Nor did the court improperly defend counsel against defendant's complaints when it disagreed with certain of defendant's assertions. The trial court is not required to sit mute while a defendant advances patently erroneous grounds for substitution of counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 95, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) We conclude defendant failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motions and, of necessity, reject his claims of constitutional violation as well.

Defendant contends the trial court erred by declining to order a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing. [Citation.] `Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial.' ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131, 115 Cal. Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461, quoting People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 726, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) Absent substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence, the decision to order such a hearing [is] left to the court's discretion. ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 163, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.) On November 28, 1994, just before trial began, the trial court learned that Dr. Coburn, defendant's court-appointed psychiatrist, had written defense counsel expressing his doubt that defendant was competent to stand trial. According to the trial court, the letter indicated that defendant was fully aware of the charges against him but he has little understanding of the nature of the plea change and has significant impairment in his ability to rationally cooperate with counsel . . . . The court found that the letter was too vague to raise a doubt about defendant's competence. It asked Dr. Vicary, the defense psychiatric expert, and Dr. Coburn to interview defendant and assess his competence to stand trial. As part of their assessment, the court asked them to examine the November 21 Marsden proceeding transcript, calling it highly probative of whether or not the defendant understands the nature of the proceedings and can assist counsel. Defense counsel Sheahen stated that, although working with defendant had been extremely difficult and at times defendant lack[ed][a] . . . grasp of what [was] going on, he was surprised that Dr. Coburn felt there was a 1368 issue and was uncertain whether defendant's behavior amounted to incompetence. The court also observed that defendant had repeatedly assisted counsel. Shafi-Nia disagreed with Sheahen and the court, stating that he believed defendant was incompetent. After reviewing the transcript and interviewing defendant, both Coburn and Vicary opined that defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial court declined to conduct a competency hearing. Defendant contends that Dr. Coburn's somewhat equivocal statements about his competence and statements by defense counsel constituted substantial evidence of incompetence. They do not. While Coburn testified that defendant was fragile and disturbed, he also repeatedly acknowledged that defendant was not incompetent to stand trial. Moreover, defendant ignores the opinion of the other defense psychiatric expert, Dr. Vicary, who testified without reservation that defendant was competent. Nor did comments by defense counsel constitute substantial evidence of incompetence. First, defense counsel were not in agreement on the issue of defendant's competence. While Shafi-Nia claimed that defendant was incompetent, Sheahen, the more experienced criminal defense attorney, did not share this belief. Second, even if both counsel had agreed that defendant was incompetent, such opinion, standing alone, would not have been dispositive of the issue but only one factor for the trial court to consider in determining whether substantial evidence existed. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Balanced against the conflicting statements of counsel were the opinions of the experts that defendant was competent and the trial court's own observation that defendant had repeatedly assisted in his defense, including bringing and arguing his first Marsden motion. (See People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1282, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645 [a defendant's participation in his trial demonstrate[s] beyond any doubt that he was fully aware of the nature of the proceedings and able to assist counsel].) We conclude therefore that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a competency hearing. [10]
Defendant entered dual pleas of guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). Where such dual pleas are entered, section 1026, subdivision (a) (section 1026) provides for a bifurcated trial. [11] The trial court told counsel it would inform prospective jurors that defendant had entered an NGI plea. Defense counsel objected that it would be prejudicial to do so. The trial court responded: I think the jury needs to be advised of the plea and just what they're facing in this case. In the voir dire proceedings that followed, two prospective jurors were excused for cause, one because he told the court that, if the prosecution proved the defendant guilty, he could not accept an insanity defense, and the other because she did not understand the burden of proof would shift during a sanity phase. Defendant contends that informing prospective jurors about his NGI plea violated the spirit of section 1026, and various constitutional protections including the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence. Nothing in the statute, either expressly or by implication, bars the trial court from informing prospective jurors about a defendant's NGI plea, and defendant fails to articulate a basis for his claim of statutory violation. His constitutional claims are based on the premise that the jury would have been so prejudiced by having learned of his NGI plea it would have been unable to impartially determine his guilt. A similar claim was made and rejected in People v. Guillebeau (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 531, 166 Cal.Rptr. 45. There, the court remarked: As to the contention that once the jury learns of the double plea it cannot approach the question of guilt in an impartial way, it is sufficient to cite the following passage from People v. Leong Fook [(1928)] 206 Cal. 64 at page 78, 273 P. 779: `We must assume that a fair and impartial jury of intelligent men and women would obey . . . instructions and would therefore hold in reserve their ultimate finding upon the issue of the defendant's sanity until that separate issue and the evidence supporting it had, in the prescribed order of the trial, been committed to it for determination. We are not to assume that such a jury will cease to be fair and impartial as the cause progresses upon its successive issues, but, on the contrary, we must assume, in the absence of any other showing, that the jury has retained its attitude of fairness and impartiality under the changed procedure as before until the whole cause . . . has been determined.' ( Id. at p. 543, 166 Cal.Rptr. 45.) We agree with this analysis. Defendant's claim that the jury was prejudiced by learning about his double plea at the outset of trial is wholly speculative. There was no error and, necessarily, no constitutional violations.
After defendant entered his NGI plea, the trial court, pursuant to section 1027, appointed two psychiatrists to examine him, Dr. Vicary for the defense and Dr. Sharma for the prosecution. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, defense counsel informed the court that defendant was requesting appointment of a psychologist to examine him for the sanity phase. Counsel told the court defendant had declined to cooperate with Vicary or Sharma. The trial court refused to appoint a psychologist but without prejudice to renewal of the request. [12] Defendant did not renew his request. Ultimately he withdrew his NGI plea. Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to appoint a third mental health expert violated his federal and state constitutional rights, including the right to ancillary defense services as part of the right to effective assistance to counsel. ( Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319-320, 204 Cal.Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360.) His claim is without merit. As a procedural matter, defendant failed to argue in the trial court that the denial of a third mental health expert amounted to a violation of his federal constitutional rights. His constitutional claim is, therefore, forfeited. ( People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) His claim is also substantively without merit. Defendant contends that under California law, he has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of a mental health expert. Not so. Neither Ake [ v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53] . . . nor the broader rule guaranteeing court-appointed experts necessary for the preparation of a defense [citation], gives rise to a federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of a mental health expert. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 838, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) In any event, defendant received reasonable ancillary services, and there was no showing that the appointed psychiatrists were unqualified or incapable of administering the psychologist tests defendant now argues were crucial to his defense. The issue, rather, is whether a defendant's unjustified refusal to cooperate with qualified, court-appointed mental health experts required the trial court to appoint another expert. We think not. (See, e.g., People v. Messerly (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 718, 722, 116 P.2d 781 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a third mental health expert where two experts had been appointed pursuant to section 1027, had examined the defendant, were cross-examined and (n)o objections were made at the trial as to their qualifications].)
Prior to the commencement of the sanity phase, defendant sought an advance ruling from the trial court to limit the scope of cross-examination if he testified. He wanted to testify only to matters regarding his childhood and his upbringing and to preclude the prosecution from cross-examining him about the murder. The trial court declined to issue an advisory opinion regarding the scope of cross-examination in advance of hearing defendant's direct testimony. Defendant claimed the court left him no choice but to withdraw his plea, but the court refused to accept the withdrawal. Defendant began to withdraw his plea a second time, but then again equivocated, and the trial court again declined to proceed unless defendant's withdrawal was unequivocal. The prosecutor, citing People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698, argued that defendant should be allowed to withdraw his NGI plea if there was no doubt as to his sanity and the examining psychiatrists unanimously agreed he was sane. Without objection, the trial court unsealed the reports of Drs. Vicary and Sharma, and read portions of the reports into the record. The court noted that both Vicary and Sharma concluded that defendant was legally sane at the time of the commission of the offenses. Defendant was then allowed to withdraw his NGI plea. The court stated it was satisfied that defendant understood the nature of his plea and that he furthermore understood his right to a sanity phase trial, and that he has effectively and knowingly and intelligently given up that right and personally withdrawn his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to give him an advance ruling on the scope of cross-examination coerced him into withdrawing his NGI plea. He also suggests the withdrawal was involuntary because there were doubts as to his sanity. Neither claim has merit. Defendant's withdrawal of his plea was not coerced by the trial court's adverse ruling on his motion to limit the scope of cross-examination because there was no such ruling. Rather, the trial court properly declined to provide a ruling in advance of defendant's testimony. Defendant had no inherent right to a binding advance ruling which would spare him the necessity of raising specific objections before the jury. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 513, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 178-179, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Regarding his second claim, unlike People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 553, 297 P.2d 999, upon which defendant relies, there was no conflict among the experts regarding defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. (See People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1214, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698 [where there is no doubt in the trial court's mind of defendant's sanity, and the reports of the examining psychiatrists agree he was sane, defendant should be allowed to withdraw his NGI plea].) Accordingly, the withdrawal of his NGI plea was not involuntary.

Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to remove two prospective jurors for cause. Assuming, without deciding, there was error, defendant was not prejudiced in either case. One of the prospective jurors, G.B., did not sit on the jury because she was excused by the prosecution. ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 419, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) The other, L.W., was excused by the defense via a peremptory challenge, but because the defense did not exhaust its peremptory challenges, the claim of error is waived. ( People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 637, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175.) Defendant nonetheless argues he was prejudiced because the prospective jurors were not removed until toward the end of jury selection and were thus able to intermingle and influence the objectivity of those potential jurors who ultimately become members of [defendant's] panel. This is sheer speculation.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Wheeler motion ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748) based on the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove women from the jury. [13] `In [ Wheeler ] . . . we held that the use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group membership violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution. Subsequently, in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 . . . the United States Supreme Court held that such a practice violates, inter alia, the defendant's right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .' ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Women constitute a cognizable group for purposes of Wheeler. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 115, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) The United States Supreme Court has given this explanation of the process required when a party claims that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges: `[O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial [or gender] discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral [or gender-neutral] explanation (step two). If a race-neutral [or gender-neutral] explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial [or gender] discrimination.' ( Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767 [115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834].) ( People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 384, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) Defendant brought four gender-based Wheeler motions. On each occasion, the trial court concluded that a prima facie case had not been made. Only once did the prosecutor offer a comment to justify his use of a peremptory challenge. [14] When, as here, a trial court denied a Wheeler motion because it finds no prima facie case of group bias was established, the reviewing court considers the entire record of voir dire. [Citation.] `If the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the jurors in question, we affirm.' ( People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068, quoting People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Defendant concedes that the prosecution may have been justified in excusing two of the ten women on whom it used peremptory challenges, J.R. and M.C. We therefore consider only the remaining eight. Prospective Juror M.A. Prospective Juror M.A. stated on her questionnaire that she strongly agreed with the statement that [r]egardless of the evidence, anyone who intentionally kills another person should never get the death penalty. She also indicated her belief that life without possibility of parole might be worse for a defendant than death. Nonetheless, she stated she would be able to return a death sentence. She indicated further that she had had a negative experience with a police officer who gave her a traffic ticket without cause, that she or someone close to her had been the victim of a robbery and her niece had been arrested or charged with a crime. Prospective Juror G.B. Prospective Juror G.B. disclosed in camera that her daughter had been raped by a psychiatrist and the case was pending. When asked whether she could fairly listen to psychiatrists and not be upset about what had happened to her daughter, she replied, I would have to check it in his record and the credibility and see if they had any previous problems or any incidents, but it's a very heavy situation. When asked if she would rather not sit on the case because of the NGI plea, she replied, Probably so. [15] Prospective Juror J.W. Prospective Juror J.W. responded to the question about her general feelings regarding the death penalty that only God gives and takes away, but honestly, if someone close to me [was] involved, I don't know the [depth] of my [compassion.] On the statement, [r]egardless of the evidence, anyone who intentionally kills another person should never get the death penalty, she responded, [t]here is so much involved I don't know what to answer. On the other hand, when asked about a spiritual or religious belief pertaining to the death penalty, she wrote, Eye for an eye [ķ] Do not befriend a bad person. However, she agreed that life without possibility of parole might be a worse punishment than death. Prospective Juror R.M. Prospective Juror R.M. indicated it might be difficult for her to sit on the case because she had children of her own. She also responded, to a question regarding any religious or moral beliefs that would make it difficult for her to sit as a juror, with the Ten Commandments. She again referred to the Ten Commandments and Thou Shalt Not Kill, in response to the question whether she had any spiritual or religious beliefs that would have a bearing on the death penalty. Nonetheless, she also stated she had voted for the death penalty. In court, when asked to explain her reference to the Ten Commandments, she replied, One of the commandments obviously is thou shalt not kill. And there's a contradiction in my answer. I don't believe anybody should kill anyone. However, if someone is guilty of murder, it's my belief that they get what they deserve, be it life in prison or the death penalty, depending on how the jury decides to go. Prospective Juror M.S. Prospective Juror M.S. also indicated on her questionnaire that she had religious scruples that might make it difficult to pass judgment on another, also citing the Ten Commandments. She agreed somewhat with the statement that [r]egardless of the evidence, anyone who intentionally kills another person should never get the death penalty, explaining selfdefence [ sic ]. Nonetheless, she also felt that life without possibility of parole was not a severe punishment. She responded to the question about why she might or might not want to sit on the case by writing, [d]ue to my religious background and having children of my own and grandchildren I feel that it would be impossible. She also indicated she was under a doctor's care for stress. She indicated further that her ex-husband had been molested as a child, that she could not evaluate the credibility of police the same as other witnesses, believed that criminals were favored by the legal system, and would have a difficult time keeping an open mind. In court, she continued to express religious reservations about her ability to sit as a juror. Prospective Juror B.B. Prospective Juror B.B. expressed skepticism regarding the validity of psychiatric opinions and, citing her job, answered yes to the question whether she had pressing business that might cause her to wish to hurry along the decisionmaking process. She expressed dislike of the death penalty although she also felt it was necessary to deter crime and recognized that one of the commandments was [t]hou shalt not kill. She also stated she would try hard to be an impartial juror, but a child is very precious. Prospective Juror B.D. Prospective Alternate Juror B.D. indicated that she agreed somewhat with the statement that [r]egardless of the evidence, anyone who intentionally kills another person should never get the death penalty and expressed the view that life without possibility of parole would be a living Hell. She had taken college-level courses in psychology and stated that psychological tests should give insight into the defendant in deciding upon a penalty. Prospective Juror A.R. Prospective Alternate Juror A.R. had a bachelor of arts degree in psychology and sociology and was undergoing therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder. She expressed the view that life without possibility of parole was better than being put to death â at least they still have the gift of life, and that she would need to be absolutely sure before she could impose the death penalty. However, she also believed the death penalty should be enforced more than it generally is and that it is a positive. She also stated that one brother had been murdered and another had been arrested or charged with drunk driving and theft. Defendant focuses on the attitudes expressed by these jurors regarding the death penalty because this was a factor cited by the prosecutor when he explained why he excused prospective juror B.D. Defendant argues that while this may have been sufficient reason to excuse her, it did not provide support for the bulk of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. We disagree. In the first place, each of these prospective jurors expressed some reservations or religious scruples about the death penalty and, while some of them nonetheless stated they could impose the death penalty, neither the prosecutor nor the trial court was required to take the jurors' answers at face value. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 422, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Even if these reservations or scruples were insufficient to challenge a prospective juror for cause, such skepticism nonetheless constitutes a gender-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 171, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 432-433, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) This provided a nondiscriminatory reason for the prosecutor to have excused J.W., M.A., R.M., M.S., and A.R. Moreover, the prospective jurors' views on the death penalty were not the only nondiscriminatory basis for exclusion. Juror M.A., for example, also revealed a negative experience with a police officer and that a niece had been arrested or charged with a crime. Prospective Juror A.R. also had a relative who had been arrested or charged with a crime. A negative experience with police or the arrest of a prospective juror or a close relative is a gender-neutral reason for exclusion. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277, fn. 18, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 171, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Four other prospective jurors, G.B., R.M., M.S., and B.B., expressed their reluctance to sit on the jury for various reasons: G.B., because the rape of her daughter by a psychiatrist might have made it difficult to evaluate testimony by psychiatrists; R.M., because she had children of her own; M.S. stated that because of her religious background and because she had children and grandchildren it would be impossible for her to sit on the jury; and B.B. stated that concern about her job might cause her to wish to hurry along the decisionmaking process. M.S. was also under a doctor's care for stress. Because their reluctance to serve, and the reasons for it, might have impaired their impartiality or their ability to deliberate, these also constituted gender-neutral reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. We conclude, therefore, that the record suggests gender-neutral reasons for the use of peremptory challenges as to each juror excused and, therefore, affirm the trial court's ruling that no prima facie case was established. ( People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1200, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) We note, in this connection, that the Wheeler claim was particularly weak as it consisted of little more than an assertion that a number of prospective jurors from a cognizable group had been excused. Such a bare claim falls far short of rais[ing] a reasonable inference that the opposing party has challenged the jurors because of their race or other group association. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) In this light, we consider defendant's further claim that the trial court's consideration of his motion was perfunctory because it only reviewed two of the 10 juror questionnaires when the motions were made. He also contends that the trial court acted as an advocate for the prosecutor. The record is clear that the trial court read the juror questionnaires in preparation for voir dire and asked pertinent follow-up questions of some of the jurors based on its evaluation of the questionnaires. Thus, the trial court was not unprepared to rule on defendant's motions. Second, given the weakness of defendant's prima facie showing, the trial court's response was appropriate. Finally, the trial court did not act as the prosecutor's advocate either because it found, based on defendant's bare-bones allegations, that a prima facie case was not made or because it did not further inquire of the prosecutor. Absent a prima facie showing, the prosecutor was not required to offer such explanation nor was the court required to ask it of him.
A criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to be present at trial, largely rooted in the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, also enjoys protection through the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [citation] `whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defendant against the charge,' but not `when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.' ( Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745 [107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631], quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-107 [54 S.Ct. 330, 332-333, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575].) Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution applies the same standard. [Citation]. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 433, 110 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Defendant contends these rights were violated by his exclusion from an in camera proceeding during voir dire at which the prosecutor and defense counsel passed for cause and each exercised three peremptory challenges. Even if his exclusion was error, he fails to show prejudice. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 [Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair trial].) Defendant cites nothing in the record to support his generalized claim that, during this session, his attorney excused any juror whom defendant would have wanted to retain; thus his argument is speculative. Defendant's further claim that he was unable to review the prosecutor's choices is similarly unconvincing. The only ground on which the defense could have objected to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges would have been for the discriminatory use of such challenges under Wheeler/Batson but defendant fails to show that any such issue arose during the in camera session. His remaining claim, that defense counsel failed to excuse a juror who had connections to the victim and her family, also fails. The defense did not exhaust its peremptory challenges at the in camera session and could have excused the juror subsequently. That the juror was not excused cannot be attributed to defendant's absence from the in camera session.
During voir dire, in the course of questioning a prospective juror, the trial court said, You know, to be quite blunt about it, there's one thing that's not in dispute in this case. That's that an eight-year-old girl was murdered. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the trial court had prejudged the evidence by referring to the killing as a murder. The trial court denied the motion, observing, I think the point you're making is a point that, when the case is finally submitted to the jury, no juror will even remember. Nonetheless, at the prosecutor's prompting, the trial court later repeatedly told prospective jurors that it had not intended to imply a murder had occurred, but that this was a determination for the jury. Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial because its reference to murder lowered the prosecution's burden of proof. Not so. Denial of a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion and should be granted `only when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.' ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 282, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3, quoting People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 749, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) The motion should be granted only if the trial court is informed of the prejudice and it judges the prejudice to be insusceptible of being cured by admonition or instruction. ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 713-714, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) The trial court's brief reference to murder in the particular context in which it occurred was not prejudicial but, in any event, any prejudice was cured by the court's subsequent clarifications.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed statutory and constitutional error when it struck his motion to disqualify the court and all judges at the Van Nuys courthouse. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(C).) We find no error. Preliminarily, his claim is not cognizable on appeal. As set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d): The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding. As we have repeatedly held, the statute means what it says: Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides the exclusive means for seeking review of a ruling on a challenge to a judge, whether the challenge is for cause or peremptory. ( People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 271-276, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 652, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752 [where defendant failed to seek review via writ of mandate, his statutory disqualification claim is not properly before us on this automatic appeal following a judgment of death]; People v. Superior Court ( Jimenez ) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798, 802, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 50 P.3d 743; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 50-51, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Here, defendant filed a writ petition in the Court of Appeal seeking review of the denial of the disqualification motion, which the Court of Appeal summarily denied. Defendant thus received the appellate review of his statutory claim to which he was entitled. Defendant suggests that Code of Civil Procedure section 170, subdivision (d) does not provide his exclusive appellate remedy but is merely a procedural step that must be followed before he can raise the disqualification issue on appeal. Not surprisingly, he cites no authority for this construction of the statute, and our cases are clearly to the contrary. [16] Defendant's claim is also substantively without merit. Defense counsel's declaration in support of the disqualification motion made it clear that he was not asserting that the trial court was personally biased against him but, rather, that an institutional bias against him pervaded the Van Nuys courthouse because of the unusual relationship between the Van Nuys court system and the family of the deceased in this case. The basis of this allegation was that the victim's mother, Lori Parker, a paralegal or legal secretary, and her fiancé, Martin Gladstein, a criminal defense lawyer, were known to court personnel at the Van Nuys courthouse and had personal relationships with some of them, and that Gladstein had recently tried a case before Judge Kriegler, to whom defendant's case was assigned, and had access to areas of the courthouse restricted to the general public. The declaration also referred to four specific incidents to support the claim of institutional bias: (1) defense counsel had personally observed Mrs. Parker and two of her friends hold a private conference with Judge Ronald S. Coen in his courtroom, which was adjacent to Judge Kriegler's courtroom; (2) a lawyer named Larry Baker, who was a friend of both Gladstein's and Parker's, approached defense counsel outside of Judge Kriegler's courtroom and said words to the effect of `No offense, Bob, but I hope your guy dies'; (3) graffiti had been carved on a wood railing outside Judge Kriegler's courtroom that read anal sex kid must die; and (4) a bailiff involved in transporting prisoners to Judge Kriegler's courtroom had told defendant, Why don't you just kill yourself and save everybody time and money. The declaration noted that when defense counsel brought this information to Judge Kriegler, the bailiff was relieved of any duties with respect to defendant. The declaration concluded that the perception of institutional bias, local publicity, the unusual relationship to the court system of the family of the deceased, and the venom of court personnel and members of the legal community created an appearance of bias or prejudice. As early as September 24, 1994, defense counsel informed Judge Kriegler that he was contemplating bringing the motion and Judge Kriegler urged him to file it. On October 14, defense counsel again stated he would be filing a motion in the nature of a 170.1 challenging this entire building. On November 14, when the defense again raised the issue of filing the disqualification motion, the trial court pointed out that the statute required the motion be filed at the earliest possible opportunity. The motion was not filed until November 16. Upon receipt of the motion, Judge Kriegler filed a verified answer denying any bias or impartiality and stating that the motion was untimely. At the hearing on the motion, Judge Kriegler declined to refer the motion to another judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(5) but, instead, struck the motion on grounds it was untimely and without a legal basis. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4, subd. (b).) [17] Judge Kriegler's ruling was correct. `The standard for disqualification provided for in subdivision (a)(6)(C) of section 170.1 is fundamentally an objective one.' If a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the judge's impartiality, disqualification is mandated. The existence of actual bias is not required. ( Flier v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 165, 170, 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 383, fn. omitted, quoting United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 97, 104, 216 Cal.Rptr. 4; People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 336-337, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710.) The challenge must be to the effect that the judge would not be able to be impartial toward a particular party. ( Flier, supra, at p. 171, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 383.) Defendant asserts that an institutional bias on the part of other judges or courthouse personnel is sufficient to disqualify a judge as to whose impartiality no question exists. We are far from persuaded the allegations in defense counsel's declaration demonstrated a pervasive institutional bias against defendant but, in any event, nothing in the disqualification statute supports his argument. His motion really appears to have been simply an attempt to relitigate his unsuccessful motion for change of venue. The motion was also untimely. While certain specific events may not have been known to defense counsel until shortly before he filed the motion in November, specific facts to support his underlying argument of institutional bias were known to him as early as September. Thus, his failure to file the motion until the very eve of trial rendered it untimely under the statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4, subd. (b); Urias v. Harris Farms, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 415, 424, 285 Cal.Rptr. 659 [The matter of disqualification should be raised when the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification are first discovered...].)
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motions to change venue or transfer his case to another judicial district within Los Angeles County due to prejudicial pretrial publicity and courthouse bias. [18] We disagree. A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. `Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from a judgment of conviction, the reviewing court must independently examine the record and determine de novo whether a fair trial is or was obtainable.' [Citation.] `The de novo standard of review applies to our consideration of the five relevant factors: (1) nature and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media coverage; (3) size of the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and (5) prominence of the victim.' [Citation.] ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 744, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754, quoting People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1236-1237, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) Defendant brought three motions to change venue or transfer. Each was denied. We perceive no error. Only the first factor weighs in favor of granting the motion, but the nature and the gravity of the offense, standing alone, is not dispositive. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 905, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Nor, contrary to defendant's claim, does the second factor weigh in favor of the motion because we conclude the publicity was neither extensive nor prejudicial. In his pretrial motion, defendant cited 18 newspaper articles about his case that had appeared between November 22, 1993 and June 9, 1994. [19] Except for a letter to the editor, all the articles were news stories. Five reported the circumstances of defendant's arrest and the victim's death and two reported her funeral. The remaining articles reported developments in the case as it moved through the legal system. Defendant's trial did not commence until November 1994, more than a year after most of the articles had appeared, and about six months after publication of the last one. Any potential prejudice from the media coverage was attenuated by the passage of time. ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 744, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Moreover, 18 articles over a 12-month period can hardly be characterized as extensive (cf. People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1275 [51, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118 newspaper stories and 24 television stories in an 11-month period]), nor, contrary to defendant's claim, was the coverage biased or inflammatory simply because it recounted the inherently disturbing circumstances of this case and the victim's family's grief at her murder. Moreover, the fact that prospective jurors may have been exposed to pretrial publicity about the case does not necessarily require a change of venue. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 527, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) `It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 853, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906, quoting People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 750, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) Here, all of the jurors and alternate jurors who had any knowledge of the case stated they could set aside this knowledge and decide the case on the law and evidence received at trial. In this connection, it should be observed that defendant failed to use all his peremptory challenges when he accepted the jury, thus indicating that the jurors were fair and that the defense itself so concluded. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 180, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 46, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Defendant also cites three newspapers articles that appeared during his trial that were the basis of renewed motions for change of venue on December 5 and December 7, 1993. His December 5 motion was based on a newspaper article that had appeared four days earlier, while jury selection was still in process, titled Child-Murder Case Inflames Emotions. The trial court included questions about this article and determined that the prospective jurors had not been exposed to it. Defendant's December 7 motion was brought after two newspaper articles implicated defendant in a plot to kill prosecution witnesses. The trial court questioned the jurors about the article and again determined that none of them had been exposed to it. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly denied defendant's renewed motions. [20] None of the remaining relevant factors support a change of venue in this case. As to community size, the San Fernando Valley, from which the jury pool was drawn, contains over a million inhabitants and is far more populous than many counties. Therefore, the size of the community does not support a change in venue. ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 449, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968.) Defendant asserts that the victim and her family occupied positions of prominence and popularity, but the victim became known only because she was a murder victim, not because of any preexisting status. (See People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 852, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) Defendant also points out that the victim's mother was a legal secretary and her fiancé was a criminal defense lawyer who were known in the Van Nuys legal community, but nothing in the record suggests these factors had any effect on the jury pool. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 906, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Finally, despite defendant's attempt to depict himself as an outsider because of his recent immigrant status, and the victim of ethnic bias because of his Iranian origin, there was no evidence of unusual local hostility to such persons, such that a change of venue would likely produce a less biased panel. Nor was the pretrial publicity calculated to excite local prejudices in this regard. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 179, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; cf. People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129, 259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146 [pretrial publicity focused on defendant's race and his status as an outsider to the community in contrast to victim's ties to the community].) To the extent, moreover, that defendant asserts some racial or ethnic animus was at work among the jurors, his claim is belied by his failure to have exercised all his peremptory challenges. In the absence of some explanation for counsel's failure to utilize his remaining peremptory challenges, or any objection to the jury as finally composed, we conclude that counsel's inaction signifies his recognition that the jury as selected was fair and impartial. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 854, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions for change of venue or transfer.

Defendant claims that bias pervaded the proceedings, rendering them unfair. He again cites the incidents that supported his venue and disqualification motions. Not only have we already concluded that none of these incidents justified either disqualification of the trial court or a change of venue, but also defendant fails to show that any juror or prospective juror witnessed or was aware of any of these incidents. Therefore, we reject his assertion that these events had any impact on his trial. Next, defendant asserts the trial court's response to his allegation of mistreatment by jail staff evinced bias against his religious beliefs. Defendant claimed that, during the trial, jail staff entered his cell without his consent and defaced his copy of the Koran and his trial notes. When defense counsel brought this allegation to the trial court's attention, the court agreed to have its bailiff investigate and urged defendant to file a formal complaint with the sheriff. The trial court noted, in passing, that it had had the bailiff look into previous complaints made by defendant and determined they were unfounded but, nonetheless would have my deputy check into defendant's fresh complaints. Defendant contends the trial court's response was inadequate or indicative of judicial bias against him, but the trial court's actions were reasonable and responsive to his request. Defendant also asserts the trial court and prosecutor ridiculed his religion. This assertion is without merit. After the discussion of defendant's mistreatment in the jail, the prosecutor pointed out that, earlier in the trial, defense counsel expressed concern that jurors might be prejudiced against defendant because he is Muslim. He noted that the trial court had permitted defendant to bring a Koran into the court but in a place where the jurors could not see it. He observed, however, that I think it's important to note for the record the Koran, when this case started, was about two inches by three inches in size, and now he's bringing one the size of a telephone book each day when he comes into court. [ķ] I think it is important for the issue of bias and prejudice, that counsel has brought up on this record over and over, that this is a situation that is being created at this point by the defendant by bringing this book in. The court noted that defendant was also kissing the Koran while witnesses were testifying against him. I told him I thought he should sit there and quietly [ sic ] not make any overt movements during the trial that might be interpreted one way or the other by the jury. [ķ] The defendant instead is flaunting the Koran in front of the jury and has been seen by me to be kissing the Koran at various times during the trial. [ķ] So that is of record. It doesn't require any further response. There's no issue to be litigated on this. The jury was not present during this exchange and defendant made no objection to either the prosecutor's remarks or the court's response. He now argues that the trial court stif[led] his use of a spiritual guide during the proceedings. The trial court, however, despite its concern that defendant's use of the Koran might be a distraction, apparently neither prevented him from continuing to bring the book into the courtroom nor otherwise interfered with his religious practice. Defendant next complains about an incident in which the victim's mother kissed the trial judge's bailiff. The record shows that the bailiff was not a willing participant but attempted to move away from the victim's mother. It was also unclear whether any juror witnessed the incident. Furthermore, the prosecutor admonished the victim's mother to have no further contact with anyone related to the case. Defendant rejected the trial court's offer to replace the bailiff and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but suggested polling the jurors to determine whether they saw the incident. Defense counsel responded by requesting that the penalty phase be moved to another courthouse. The trial court denied the request. Defense counsel then requested that the court instruct the jury that any interaction between the victim's mother and the bailiff was improper and to disregard it. The trial court replied, She's not on trial. I'm not going to do that. [ķ] I would be happy to tell them if they saw any interaction, obviously that should play no role whatever in their determination of what happened in the case. Defense counsel rejected the trial court's proposal and declined to make any further requests. Misconduct on the part of a spectator is a ground for mistrial if the misconduct is of such a character as to prejudice the defendant or influence the verdict. [Citation.] A trial court is afforded broad discretion in determining whether the conduct of a spectator is prejudicial. ( People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1022, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342.) The incident appears to have been brief and it was not clear that any juror even witnessed it. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's mistrial motion. In the absence of any indication on the record that any juror actually observed the incident, we reject defendant's further claim that the trial court erred by failing to admonish the jury to disregard the incident. Defendant next claims that the trial court was biased against his family and supporters, as evidenced by three incidents involving his mother, and a fourth incident involving some of his supporters. During the discussion of the kissing incident between the victim's mother and the bailiff, the trial court noted that the defendant's mother was sitting in the court crying almost uncontrollably right now while my bailiff is trying to console her. As the hearing progressed, defendant's mother became more and more voluble until, according to the court, she was out of control. It ordered her removed from the courtroom. No juror was present when this occurred. Defendant argues the court's removal of his mother indicated its bias against her. We disagree. Trial courts possess broad power to control their courtroom and maintain order and security. ( People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 385, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 434, 841 P.2d 954; Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(1)-(5).) The trial court's removal of defendant's mother was a reasonable exercise of this power. The second incident involving defendant's mother occurred when the trial court was informed that she had been seen in the vicinity of the parking structure reserved for court employees. In a closed session, the trial court briefly asked her whether she had been parking there and was satisfied by her explanation that, because it was rainy and wet, she had been dropped off at the parking structure. Defendant asserts this was evidence the trial court was biased against his mother and his supporters. We disagree. The trial court's concern that a witness was parking in an area reserved for court employees was reasonable, its inquiry was brief, and it was satisfied with the explanation given. Defendant also asserts that the trial court showed its bias against his mother because it refused to order television cameras to be turned off during her testimony as requested by defendant. However, at the in camera proceeding to which he directs us, defendant did not make this request. He asked for special transportation for himself to the court because he had been spat at and taunted by other prisoners on the bus ride from the jail to the court. In passing he mentioned that some of them had said they had seen his mother on television and they're going to have somebody from their friends do something to her. At no point did he request the cameras be turned off during her testimony. Lastly, defendant claims the trial court evinced bias against his supporters because it conducted a hearing during which the bailiff charged with guarding the jury during its deliberations informed the judge that three men, apparently supporters of defendant, appeared to have been following or shadowing the jury. Out of the presence of the jury, the bailiff told the court he asked the men for identification and ran a warrant check; one of the men had three outstanding warrants. The court held him until he could be taken into custody. The court briefly addressed the other two men and admonished them not to follow the jury. Defense counsel objected to the disparate treatment of our witnesses and said he had observed the victim's mother in the cafeteria while the jury was also there. The trial court replied, The jury is deliberating, and I want to make sure the jury does its best to reach a verdict without the kind of outside influences you are concerned about. As to the presence of the victim's mother in the cafeteria, the court pointed out that there was no report that she had followed the jurors. On this record, it is clear that the trial court's action, in response to the bailiff's allegation, was intended to prevent any impairment of or interference with the jury's deliberation. We therefore reject defendant's claim of judicial bias. We further reject defendant's more global claim that not only judicial bias, but courthouse personnel bias and community bias so created an emotional atmosphere that the jury was unable to reach a fair verdict. Every incident cited by defendant either clearly or apparently occurred outside the presence of the jury and could have had no impact on its deliberations or its verdict.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights when it denied mistrial motions based on claims of inflammatory publicity. As we have previously explained, a mistrial should be granted `only when `a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.'' [Citation.] We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion and find no such abuse here. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 873, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1, quoting People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 282, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) The first incident involved a newspaper article that alleged prosecutors had reported that defendant was involved in a plot to kill a prosecution witness, Rauni Campbell. When the article was brought to the trial court's attention, the trial court inquired of the jurors whether they had had any exposure to articles or television reports about the case. None had. At the end of its inquiry, the court, which had previously ordered the jurors not to read newspapers, watch any television reports, or listen to any radio reports about the case, directed them not to read the newspaper at all, except for the sports and classified sections. Defendant engages in the unsupported assertion that the trial court's admonition was either inadequate or ineffective, but we presume the jury followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 426, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193.) Defendant's second mistrial motion was made on January 9, 1995, after defense counsel learned that the victim's mother had given a television interview in which, according to defense counsel, she demanded the death penalty for defendant. The trial court reminded counsel he had admonished the jury not to watch television reports of the case and offered to poll them. Sometime later in the proceedings, the trial court returned to the subject. The trial court said it would order the Parker family not to discuss the case with anyone, including the press, during the remainder of trial. Regarding the television report, the court stated it was hopeful that the jurors had been abiding by its admonition not to watch television. Defense counsel characterized this as wishful thinking and moved for a mistrial. The trial court admonished the victim's family but did not rule on the motion, nor did defendant press for a ruling. Again, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's admonition to avoid any publicity about the case. Accordingly, even assuming defendant has not forfeited this claim by failing to press for a ruling, we would find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion.

Defendant complains that the prosecution interfered with his attorney-client relationship because it used a jail-house informant to investigate allegations that he was conspiring to kill a prosecution witness. The claim is without merit. During a pretrial conference, an issue arose regarding the prosecutor's attempts to subpoena videotapes from three Iranian television stations that had broadcast stories in which defendant made statements about the case in phone calls to his mother, which were then aired. One of the stations had failed to comply with the subpoena and there was some discussion about how to enforce it. Defense counsel interjected, accusing the prosecution of overreaching, [and] overzealous enforcement. In the course of his remarks, he claimed that the prosecutor had ordered defendant transferred to various cells in the county jail so he can gather evidence. He asked that the subpoenas to the television stations not be enforced. The trial court rejected his request, pointing out that he had no standing regarding the subpoenas because they were directed at third parties. Defense counsel cited Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742, 157 Cal.Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818 for the proposition that when the prosecution infiltrates the defense camp, the prosecution runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment, and Mr. Panah does have standing to complain about Sixth Amendment violations, and I would submit it. The trial denied the motion to quash, observing there was not even a hint that this has anything to do with the attorney-client relationship or privilege. Then, while recognizing there's no motion before the court, it invited the prosecutor to respond to defense counsel's other allegations. The prosecutor replied that his office had received information that defendant was involved in a conspiracy to murder two prosecution witnesses and had conducted an investigation that involved obtaining court orders to tape conversations between defendant and an informant. He pointed out that the defense had been fully informed of the investigation, which had not resulted in a filing against defendant. He invited the defense to file whatever motions it deemed appropriate with respect to the investigation. Defense counsel responded, When the day is appropriate, we will notice any appropriate motion and we will litigate it with appropriate testimony, Your Honor. There was no further discussion of the point. Thus, defendant never made a motion on Sixth Amendment grounds to suppress any evidence obtained by the prosecutor's use of an informant to investigate the alleged conspiracy to kill witnesses. Indeed, no charges were ever filed against defendant arising out of the investigation, nor was any of the evidence gathered during the information used against him at trial. Moreover, defendant cites nothing in the record that controverts the prosecutor's statements either that the investigation was conducted lawfully or that all information regarding it was turned over to the defense. In fact, during the course of defendant's November 21 Marsden motion, defense counsel acknowledged having received and reviewed transcripts from the taped conversations between defendant and the informant. We therefore conclude that defendant forfeited any Sixth Amendment claim based on the prosecution's use of the informant and, in any event, has failed to show any violation of his Sixth Amendment right or that he suffered any conceivable prejudice. (See United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 365, 366, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1006-1008, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Defendant contends that the prosecutor used conversations between him and the informant to prevent defendant from gaining access to Rauni Campbell, one of the alleged targets of the conspiracy to kill witnesses. As noted below, the prosecution made Campbell available to the defense, but she declined to be interviewed by the defense. Defendant cites nothing in the record to support his claim that Campbell's unwillingness to speak to the defense investigator was related to defendant's conversations with the informant.
Defendant contends the prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment and other constitutional rights by denying him access to a prosecution witness, Rauni Campbell. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred when it refused to order Campbell to be brought before the court for a Franks hearing ( Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667); that the prosecutor prevented him from interviewing the witness before she testified; and that the trial court abused its discretion by withholding her out-of-state address from the defense out of concern for her safety. (§ 1054.7.) Under Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, a defendant has a limited right to challenge the veracity of statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause made in support of the issuance of a search warrant. When presented with such a challenge, the lower court must conduct an evidentiary hearing if a defendant makes a substantial showing that (1) the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the affidavit's remaining contents, after the false statements are excised, are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The defendant must establish the statements are false or reckless by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Id. at pp. 155-156, 98 S.Ct. 2674; People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Innocent or negligent misrepresentations will not defeat a warrant. ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 154-155, 98 S.Ct. 2674.) Moreover, `there is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit. To merit an evidentiary hearing[,] the defendant['s] attack on the affidavit must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.... The motion for an evidentiary hearing must be accompanied by an offer of proof ... [and] should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or an explanation of their absence given.' ( People v. Benjamin (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 264, 272, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, quoting People v. Sandlin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1316, 281 Cal. Rptr. 702.) Finally, [a] defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) During the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked that Ms. Campbell be ordered to testify regarding two statements made by Officer Kong in the affidavit supporting the search warrant for defendant's residence. Kong stated that as he approached the courtyard in Campbell's apartment complex, defendant fled through the courtyard apartment. Defense counsel maintained that Campbell would testify defendant did not flee but left the apartment in the normal fashion. Kong was also quoted as saying Campbell told him defendant had told her he had done something very bad. Defense counsel claimed that what Campbell actually told Kong was that defendant said they had done something very bad. The trial court found that defendant failed to meet the foundational requirements set forth in Franks and denied the motion. We review denial of a Franks hearing de novo. ( People v. Benjamin, supra, 77 Cal. App.4th at p. 271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 520.) We conclude the trial court acted properly. Defense counsel's motion was unaccompanied by any of the evidentiary material required of the moving party. [21] At most, he provided no more than conclusory contradictions of the affiant's statements insufficient for the `substantial preliminary showing' required by Franks. ( Benjamin, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 272, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 520.) He also failed to demonstrate that, even if the statements were inaccurate, they were material to the determination of probable cause. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Defendant claims that the prosecution also denied him access to Campbell prior to her trial testimony. In this connection, he challenges the trial court's order withholding her address from defendant because of concern that he had conspired to threaten her safety. His claims are without merit. At some point, apparently early in the case, there was an in camera proceeding at which the trial court granted the prosecution's request that Ms. Campbell's out-of-state address not be disclosed to defendant based on allegations that he had conspired with others to kill her and another witness. While defendant complained about his lack of access to Campbell in connection with his Franks motion, he made no attempt to compel disclosure of her address. On November 21, 1994, the prosecutor agreed to make Campbell available to the defense by phone. Two days later the prosecutor represented that Campbell had declined to speak to the defense. The defense made no response to the prosecutor's representation nor did it seek disclosure of her address or telephone number. On December 5, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Ms. Campbell would testify the next day. The prosecutor agreed to make her available to the defense. The following day, the prosecutor reported that he had introduced the defense investigator to Ms. Campbell and she had declined to speak to him. When defense counsel complained that he had been deprived of the ability to interview her, the trial court observed, [j]ust to be clear, the prosecutor several times has indicated that Miss Campbell does not want to talk to the defense. And she apparently delivered that message herself to the defense investigator today. The defense then requested her current address in order to gather information about her reputation in her current community. The prosecutor reminded the court that Campbell had been relocated to protect her based on information that defendant had been involved in a plan to jeopardize her life. He also noted that he was unaware of any efforts by the defense to have investigated Campbell's reputation in the community at the time of the offense. The trial court observed that information about Campbell's reputation in her new community, in which she had lived for only a brief time, was of minimal relevance, if any. It also observed that because she had been defendant's girlfriend, the defense had at its disposal some knowledge about her with which to investigate her reputation. Finally, it cited concerns about her security and denied the request for further discovery of her address. A defendant has a right to the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses and a right to have an opportunity to interview those witness if they are willing to be interviewed.  ( Reid v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1332, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714, italics added.) A defendant does not have a fundamental due process right to pretrial interviews or depositions of prosecution witnesses. ( People v. Municipal Court ( Runyan ) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 523, 530-531, 143 Cal.Rptr. 609, 574 P.2d 425.) Discovery of a prosecution witness's address, moreover, may be limited out of concern for the witness's safety. (§ 1054.7; In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 136, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 851 P.2d 42.) Orders under this section are subject to review for abuse of discretion. (See Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121, 1135-1136, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 149, 5 P.3d 203.) Here, the prosecution provided defendant access to the witness but she refused to speak to the defense. Her refusal does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to disclose the witness's address. On the record before us, where there appears to have been a credible allegation of potential injury to the witness, we find no abuse of discretion. In any event, since he failed to make this request until the day before Campbell testified, we fail to see how he could have been prejudiced by the denial of his motion. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that his statutory discovery rights, his right to counsel, or any other constitutional right were violated.
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by withholding a vital coroner's report, thereby violating the discovery statute (§ 1054.1) and his constitutional rights. The record discloses, however, that the report was prepared during the trial and provided to defendant at the earliest possible opportunity. On the morning of Monday, December 12, 1994, just prior to the testimony of medical examiner Eva Heuser, the prosecution provided the defense a report from Dr. Heuser, prepared on the preceding Friday, December 9, entitled Microscopic Report. The report contained Dr. Heuser's analysis of slides of tissue taken from the victim's vaginal and anal walls as well as perineal tissue. The analysis showed evidence of trauma and supported Dr. Heuser's conclusion that the injuries occurred while the victim was still alive. The prosecutor explained that on the previous Friday, in preparation for Dr. Heuser's testimony, he had her pull the slides and take a look at them in light of specific questions he had for her, and prepare a report. The prosecutor stated the report was confirmatory of the testimony Dr. Heuser had previously given, presumably before the grand jury. Dr. Heuser later testified she had intended to prepare such a report when she had first examined the slides but had forgotten to do so. The defense requested a continuance of an unspecified amount of time. The trial court denied the request, noting the defense had had access to the original coroner's report and to Dr. Heuser's grand jury testimony, and the defense could have simply have called Dr. Heuser with any questions. Later that day, in connection with a mistrial motion based on defense counsel's allegation his cross-examination had been unfairly limited, counsel returned to the report. He asserted that Dr. Heuser's conclusion that the injuries occurred premortem was new material and asked either that the defense be granted a continuance or that the report be excluded. The trial court denied defendant's motions. It reiterated its finding that the prosecution had timely disclosed the report. It also observed that, despite the court's urgings, the defense had not yet called in its expert to examine the report. Section 1054.1, subdivision (f) requires the prosecutor to disclose to the defense [r]elevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including the results of ... scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence. Such disclosure must be made at least 30 days before trial, but [i]f the material and information becomes known to, or comes into the possession of, a party within 30 days of trial, disclosure shall be made immediately.... (§ 1054.7.) Here, the trial court found Dr. Heuser's report was a new report and that disclosure was timely under the statute. Although defendant concedes it could be argued the report was turned over within a reasonable time after it was prepared, he asserts that the prosecutor intentionally delayed having Dr. Heuser prepare the report to avoid discovery. Nothing in the record supports this imputation of misconduct to the prosecution. It is settled, moreover, that the prosecution has no general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to the defense. ( In re Littlefield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 135, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 851 P.2d 42.) Therefore, the prosecution did not commit misconduct simply because it failed to ask Dr. Heuser to prepare the report sooner. Moreover, there was apparently no information in the report to which defendant did not already have access. He argues that  regardless of the content of the report he was prejudiced because the prosecutor's unexpected presentation of it to the defense hampered his ability to adequately prepare for his examination of the coroner. But defendant's failure to adequately prepare for cross-examination cannot be attributed to the belated production of a report containing information already in his possession. We conclude that disclosure of the report was timely. Necessarily, then, we reject the edifice of constitutional error that defendant constructs upon his claim of discovery violation. Defendant alternatively contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance of unspecified length. Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its denial of the continuance request and, in any event, no prejudice. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 840, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.)
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by intimidating a defense witness, Victoria Eckstone. His argues this misconduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, among other constitutional rights. `Governmental interference violative of a defendant's compulsory-process right includes, of course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution. [Citations.] [ķ] The forms that such prosecutorial misconduct may take are many and varied. They include, for example, statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of their testimony. [Citations.]' ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 835, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Ms. Eckstone testified that she believed defendant was the father of her child, had spent time with the child, and loved her. On recross-examination, she was confronted by the prosecutor with her statement to a detective that she would not allow defendant near her child. Therefore, on redirect, she testified that, during the investigation of this case, the prosecutor called her several times and, when she finally returned his call, threatened to arrest her unless she spoke to him. She testified further, I told them pretty much anything they wanted to hear as long as I wasn't going to get arrested. On further recross-examination, she acknowledged that what she was actually told by someone in the prosecutor's office was, `I guess we're going to have to come out and get you,' which she considered a threat for an arrest. She testified further that she had not intentionally lied to the prosecutor. In a bench conference after her testimony, the trial court disclosed it had received a note from the bailiff that said sheriff's deputies in the courtroom believed Eckstone might be under the influence of a controlled substance. The court said she could either be arrested or examined by a drug recognition expert or simply kept on call. The prosecutor asked she be examined because if she's under the influence of a substance, I think the jury needs to know that. The court agreed her demeanor and behavior was highly unusual, to say the least. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court ordered the examination in another part of the courthouse and outside the presence of the jury. Subsequently, the trial court reported on the record that the examination had taken place, and there was some indication of substance usage but not enough to make an arrest. We find no supportable claim of prosecutorial intimidation. The record makes clear that the alleged threat of arrest was simply a matter of interpretation on Eckstone's part. Moreover, even if the prosecutor had overreached during the investigatory part of this case, he did not interfere with defendant's Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights because Eckstone appeared and testified on defendant's behalf, not only in the guilt phase, but in the penalty phase. Thus, this case is easily distinguishable from the cases defendant relies upon in support of his argument, in which prosecutorial threats to charge a defense witness with perjury ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; People v. Bryant (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 582, 590, 203 Cal.Rptr. 733), or apprising a defense witness of his privilege against self-incrimination in an intimidating fashion ( People v. Warren (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 961, 973-974, 207 Cal.Rptr. 912), deprived the defendant of the testimony of that witness. Defendant suggests that the threat of arrest may have subtly influenced Eckstone's demeanor. This is mere speculation. We also reject his claim that prosecutorial misconduct was involved in Eckstone's detention for possible drug use. The request came not from the prosecutor or the court, but from police present in the court-room. The extent of the prosecutor's participation was his legitimate observation that whether a witness is testifying under the influence of drugs is relevant to credibility. ( People v. Viniegra (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 577, 581, 181 Cal.Rptr. 848 [It is well established that a witness may be questioned as to whether he or she has recently used, or is under the influence of, drugs].) Additionally, the detention did not prevent Eckstone from returning to testify for defendant at the penalty phase. There was no misconduct and no constitutional violation.
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing and rebuttal arguments. Defendant objected to only one of the statements he argues was misconduct, thus forfeiting his claims as to the rest. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 533, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) In any event, we find there was no misconduct but, even if there was, no prejudice. When a prosecutor's intemperate behavior is sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, the federal Constitution is violated. Prosecutorial misconduct that falls short of rendering the trial fundamentally unfair may still constitute misconduct under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the jury. ( People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a criminal defendant must make a timely objection, make known the basis of his objection, and ask the trial court to admonish the jury. ( People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 553, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) There are two exceptions to this forfeiture: (1) the objection and/or the request for an admonition would have been futile, or (2) the admonition would have been insufficient to cure the harm occasioned by the misconduct. Forfeiture for failure to request an admonition will also not apply where the trial court immediately overruled the objection to the alleged misconduct, leaving defendant without an opportunity to request an admonition. A defendant claiming that one of these exceptions applies must find support for his or her claim in the record. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 432, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) The ritual incantation that an exception applies is not enough. Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the prejudices and passions of the jury, and denigrated the presumption of innocence, when he argued that the prosecution's evidence had stripped away defendant's presumption of innocence. Additionally, he claims that the prosecutor's reference to the victim's age, height, and weight also constituted an appeal to the jury's prejudices and passions because it drew an implied contrast between her stature and defendant's. We disagree. [T]he prosecutor has a wide-ranging right to discuss the case in closing argument. He has the right to fully state his views as to what the evidence shows and to urge whatever conclusions he deems proper. ( People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 283, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Here, the prosecutor's references to the presumption of innocence were made in connection with his general point that, in his view, the evidence, to which he had just referred at length, proved defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., the evidence overcame the presumption. Defendant's further claim that the prosecutor's reference to the victim's age, weight, and height was intended to appeal to the jury's sympathies is also without merit. These were facts in evidence. The prosecutor cannot be faulted for misconduct because he referred to them, nor was he required to discuss his view of the case in clinical or detached detail. ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673 [`A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to `Chesterfieldian politeness''], quoting People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) Next, defendant cites three comments by the prosecution he claims improperly lowered the burden of proof: (1) that it was a reasonable interpretation from certain body fluid evidence that defendant and the victim were on the bed in defendant's bedroom; (2) that it was a reasonable inference from other evidence regarding defendant's habits, customs and statements to Rauni Campbell that he videotaped the crime; and, (3) the analysis of tissue paper found in the wastebasket in defendant's bathroom indicate[d] that the victim had orally copulated defendant. Defendant failed to object to any of these comments, or to seek a curative admonition, thus the claim is forfeited. ( People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 553, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) He argues that his failure to object or seek an admonition should be excused under the futility exception, but cites nothing in the record to support its application. In any event, these isolated references did not constitute an argument that defendant could be convicted on a showing of less than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but were reasonable inferences or deductions that the prosecutor could permissibly urge the jury to draw from the evidence. ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when, in response to defense counsel's claim that the prosecutor had failed to produce either fingerprint or DNA evidence, he pointed out that the defense could also have conducted these experiments. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's argument shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. Again, defendant's failure to object to this argument or seek a curative admonition forfeits the claim, and he points to nothing on the record that would excuse forfeiture. In any event, the claim is without merit. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution had neglected to collect vital evidence, such as any fingerprints on the suitcase in which the victim's body was found or DNA evidence, and suggested the reason was because it did not want to risk linking someone else to the crime. The prosecutor's argument was a proper rebuttal to these claims. ( People v. McDaniel (1976) 16 Cal.3d 156, 177, 127 Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843; see also People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 263, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107, quoting People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34, 171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213 [prosecutorial comment upon a defendant's failure to `introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses' is not improper].) Our rejection of defendant's specific claims of misconduct necessarily forecloses his additional claim of cumulative error and cumulative prejudice.