Opinion ID: 2827591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the single criminal episode statute and the

Text: SINGLE LARCENY RULE ARE INAPPLICABLE ¶28 In merging Mr. Rasabout’s twelve convictions, the trial court relied on the single criminal episode statute, Utah Code section 76-1-401, and a case applying the single larceny rule. Mr. Rasabout urges us to adopt its reasoning. We conclude that neither the single criminal episode statute nor the single larceny rule apply here. ¶29 First, the single criminal episode statute, Utah Code section 76-1-401, is inapplicable because it does not dictate the merger of offenses. While this section provides that a “‘single criminal episode’ means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective,” there is nothing in this or the operative sections that follow mandating that a court merge offenses committed within a single criminal episode.56 To the contrary, subsection (1) of section 76-1-402 specifically provides that “[a] defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single 53 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 54 State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 30, 274 P.3d 919 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). 55 Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ¶¶ 24–26. 56 UTAH CODE § 76-1-401; see id. §§ 76-1-402 to -405. 15 STATE v. RASABOUT Opinion of the Court criminal episode.”57 And subsection (2) explicitly accounts for a situation when “conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode.”58 Additionally, while the operative sections provide specific double-jeopardy-like protections, such as protecting a defendant from being “subject to separate trials for multiple offenses,” being “convicted of both the offense charged and [an] included offense,” and being “punished [for the same act] in different ways under different provisions of [the] code,”59 none of these concerns are implicated in this case. Mr. Rasabout was convicted in a single trial of twelve separate counts of violating a single offense. Thus, the trial court’s reliance on section 76-1-401 for merging Mr. Rasabout’s convictions was misplaced. ¶30 The single larceny rule is also inapplicable here because this case does not involve larceny.60 The single larceny rule governs the aggregation of multiple thefts over a period of time when the statutory text does not otherwise provide an allowable unit of prosecution.61 In the context of theft, a statutory descendent of common law larceny, we have held that “‘[i]f there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, even though there is a series of transactions, there is but one offense.’”62 This doctrine was developed in the context of common law larceny and has been extended to larceny’s statutory progeny in this state, including theft 57 Id. § 76-1-402(1) (emphasis added). 58 Id. § 76-1-402(2) (emphasis added). 59 Id. § 76-1-402. 60 The trial court cited State v. Irvin, 2007 UT App 319, ¶¶ 14–21, 169 P.3d 798, an opinion from the court of appeals that cites our opinion in State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996). These opinions apply the single larceny rule. They also cite the single criminal episode statute for support. While the single larceny rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the single criminal episode statute often operate in proximity to one another, they are nevertheless distinct. When litigants and courts mingle them, as has been done in this case, it muddies the legal analysis. 61 Irvin, 2007 UT App 319, ¶¶ 14–21; Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645–46. 62 Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645 (quoting State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980)). 16 Cite as: 2015 UT 72 Opinion of the Court and robbery.63 But Mr. Rasabout has failed to provide us with a rationale for extending this common law doctrine outside the realm of larceny and into a statutory scheme that independently defines the allowable unit of prosecution. ¶31 In sum, we hold that the single criminal episode statute is inapplicable because Mr. Rasabout was convicted of twelve counts of a single statutory offense in a single trial. And we hold that the single larceny rule is inapplicable because this case is governed by the allowable unit of prosecution defined by the Legislature in the statute criminalizing unlawful discharge of a firearm.