Opinion ID: 3200388
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality; General Considerations

Text: {¶ 16} Generally speaking, in construing the Constitution, we apply the same rules of construction that we apply in construing statutes. Miami Cty. v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 223, 110 N.E. 726 (1915). Therefore, the intent of the framers is controlling. State v. Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio-3206, 811 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 14. To determine intent, we must begin by looking at the language of the provision itself. State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward, 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 520, 644 N.E.2d 369 (1994). “Where the meaning of a provision is clear on its face, we will not look beyond the provision in an attempt to divine what the drafters intended it to mean.” Id. at 520-521. Words used in the Constitution that are not defined therein must be taken in their usual, normal, or customary meaning. State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 651 N.E.2d 995 (1995); see also R.C. 1.42. If the meaning of a provision cannot be ascertained by its plain language, a court may look to the purpose of the provision to determine its meaning. See Castleberry v. Evatt, 147 Ohio St. 30, 67 N.E.2d 861 (1946), paragraph one of the syllabus. 6 January Term, 2016