Opinion ID: 2974916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prohibiting Use of the Bulletin Board

Text: We have in the past held that “[t]he right of self-organization includes the right to use the company bulletin board for union notices if the bulletin board has been used for other notices without any required advance authorization.” NLRB v. V & S Schuler Eng’g, 309 F.3d 362, 368-69 (6th Cir. 2002). This well-settled tenet of law has found consistent support in this Circuit and in the decisions of the N.L.R.B. See Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Waste Mgmt., Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 634 (2000) (“It has long been held that an employer violates the Act if it prohibits ‘[t]he posting of material relating to and in the course of concerted activity of its employees, while having previously allowed the posting of other miscellaneous matters by the employees.’” (quoting Vincent’s Steak House, 216 N.L.R.B. 647 (1975))). See also Benteler Indus., 323 N.L.R.B. 712 (1997); Earon Techs., Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 848 (1997); and Central Vermont Hospital, 288 N.L.R.B. 514 (1988). 10 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 We addressed a situation similar to the present case in NLRB v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 374 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1967). In that case, there was no formal policy with respect to what types of messages could be posted on the bulletin board. Id. at 152. One personnel manager testified that it was his understanding that no postings would be allowed if they were “controversial in nature,” but he knew of no instances where postings had been removed. Id. at 152-53. However, once some employees began posting pro-union materials, the company began enforcing a previously unenforced screening policy and began taking down the pro-union materials. Id. This Court concluded that such selective enforcement constituted a violation of the N.L.R.A. Essentially, we held that where a restriction was being placed on pro-union materials that had not been previously placed on other materials, even where the restriction was already in existence, selectively enforcing such a restriction constituted a violation of the Act. Id. In other words, where a company permits use of a bulletin board by “policy or practice,” such use cannot be prohibited for pro-union materials. Union Carbide Corp. 714 F.2d at 660 (emphasis added). At DynCorp, there are several bulletin boards that are used by the management and employees, but the one at issue in this case is one in the cafeteria. According to the evidence on the record, employees frequently use this board for personal postings. DynCorp alleges that the company bulletin board is for business-related use only, and that all non-work related postings are removed when they were noticed. Even so, DynCorp concedes that even when these other postings were removed, no other employee has ever been threatened with discipline or even warned by a supervisor. Further, employees testified that other nonbusiness-related postings would remain on the bulletin board for weeks at a time without being removed. Additionally, there is no evidence on 11 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 the record that a policy previously existed at DynCorp that the bulletin board was for company use only. It was only after Dawkins spoke with Turner about the pro-union materials, that Dawkins placed a sign over the cafeteria bulletin boards that read “For DynCorp Business Only.” The behavior of DynCorp up until the time Turner tried to post his flyers established a practice of allowing personal postings, and the refusal to adhere to that practice for pro-union materials amounts to a violation of the N.L.R.A. See Union Carbide Corp. 714 F.2d at 660. Thus, there is substantial evidence on the record to support the Board’s conclusion that DynCorp’s treatment of the pro-union materials was incongruent with, and more severe than, its treatment of other material posted on the bulletin boards. DynCorp alternatively argues that even if it did engage in selective enforcement, it was lawful because it selectively enforced the policy by prohibiting all notices from organizations and allowing only those notices of an entirely personal nature. To support this argument, DynCorp cites Fleming Cos. v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2003), in which a court accepted a similar argument. We are unpersuaded by this argument. While DynCorp is able to identify a court that has accepted such an argument, it is unable to identify any facts on the record of this case that indicate that all postings affiliated with an organization were removed as the pro-union materials had been. In fact, the testimony regarding what types of postings were allowed to remain on the bulletin board was that “anything and everything” was allowed. (J.A. at 202; J.A. at 328). Because there are no facts supporting the argument that DynCorp consistently enforced its policy against all flyers affiliated with organizations, this argument cannot succeed.