Opinion ID: 566371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: EPA Wage Discrimination Claim

Text: 24 To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that different wages are paid to employees of the opposite sex; (2) that the employees do equal work which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (3) that the employees have similar working conditions. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir.1989). Actual job performance and content, not job titles, are key. Whether two jobs require equal skill, effort, and responsibility ... is a factual determination. Id. Differences in responsibility must be substantial to be significant in the EPA context. Id. at 1209. 25 If an EPA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to provide evidence of any of the statutorily based affirmative defenses by showing that the pay disparity results from (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211. For example, the Fallon court observed that [e]mployers may prefer and reward experience, believing it makes a more valuable employee, for whatever reason. And it is not our province to second-guess employers' business judgment. Id. at 1212 (citations omitted). 7 26 In this appeal, Adams contends that the district court erred in denying its motion for JNOV on the wage discrimination claim because Everett's buying responsibilities were qualitatively and quantitatively greater and different than Plaintiff's. Appellant's Br. at 13. Adams points to Everett's larger total purchases and to the greater skill allegedly required to purchase raw materials compared to some of the items Ms. Soto purchased. Furthermore, Adams argues, even if the jury could reasonably find that Ms. Soto and Everett performed substantially similar jobs, Adams was entitled to JNOV because Everett had more formal education and greater relevant experience than did Ms. Soto. According to Adams, because experience, not sex, was the motivating factor behind any pay differential, Adams successfully rebutted Plaintiff's prima facie showing of discrimination if she made one at all. Id. at 19. 27 Our task in this appeal is not, however, to determine whether Ms. Soto established each element of her prima facie case or whether Adams presented sufficient evidence of an affirmative defense. Rather, our task is that outlined by the court in an ADEA case, Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir.1990): 28 After a trial on the merits, ... the question of whether Hybert adequately made out the elements of a prima facie case fall away, and the operative issue is simply whether, viewing the evidence in its totality, Hybert sufficiently proved that age was a determining factor in Hearst's decision to terminate him. 8 29 We thus must review the entire record, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, to determine whether the jury reasonably could have believed that Adams violated the EPA by paying Ms. Soto less than Everett. Id. at 1051 n. 1. Ultimately, we must determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. Morales v. Cadena, 825 F.2d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir.1987). In doing so, we cannot substitute our view of witness credibility for that of the jury. As the court noted in Hybert, we are particularly careful in employment discrimination cases to avoid supplanting our view of the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of both the jury (in its verdict) and the judge (in not interfering with the verdict).... 900 F.2d at 1054. 30 With these principles in mind, we cannot say that the district court erred in denying Adams' motion for JNOV on the EPA wage discrimination claim. The jury verdict implicitly rejected both conclusions that Adams proffers: (1) that Everett and Soto did not perform substantially similar jobs and (2) that Everett's college education and prior purchasing experience, rather than his sex, explained his higher salary. The jury heard substantial evidence that Ms. Soto's purchasing responsibilities, which included ordering customized parts, required at least as much skill and effort as did Everett's responsibilities. For example, William Judges, who served for a time as Ms. Soto's supervisor in Adams' Purchasing Department, testified that [t]he skill and effort required by [Ms. Soto] to purchase, for instance, custom components, would be much greater than the skill required to purchase raw materials such as metal stock, which made up much of Everett's purchases. Tr. of June 1, 1989 at 491. Judges also testified that many of the items that Everett purchased, including metal stock, were catalog items purchased from middlemen rather than from the original producers. 9 The jury also could reasonably have determined that Ms. Soto's experience at Adams, including more than one year in the Purchasing Department prior to Everett's arrival, counterbalanced his additional formal education and experience outside the firm. 10
31 Adams also contends that the district court erred in granting Ms. Soto statutory liquidated damages on the EPA wage discrimination claim. Liquidated damages are required under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) unless the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and based on reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the statute. Id. § 260. 11 When, as in this case, a district court concludes that the defendant has not carried its burden under section 260, we shall not reverse the award of liquidated damages absent an abuse of discretion. See Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 308 (7th Cir.1986). 32 Although the district court rejected in a rather conclusory manner Adams' contentions regarding its good faith and reasonable belief of lawful behavior, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion. Ms. Soto presented evidence that Adams had changed her job title from Senior Buyer to Buyer on internal company documents almost immediately after it hired Everett as a Senior Buyer at a considerably higher salary than hers. She also testified that Adams destroyed evidence of her supervisors' approval of her Senior Buyer business card. Job titles are not dispositive under the law. Nevertheless, these actions may indicate that Adams realized it would face EPA liability if it paid a male employee more than a female employee for doing substantially similar work. The award of liquidated damages therefore must be affirmed.