Opinion ID: 1160851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boykin-Tahl and Sumstine

Text: In Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, the defendant was charged in Alabama with five counts of robbery. Represented by court-appointed counsel, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The trial record was silent on the question of whether the defendant was aware of the constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty. Although the state supreme court affirmed the conviction, the United States Supreme Court reversed; the court explained that to ensure the plea was made intelligently and voluntarily, the record must show the defendant was made aware of three constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront the witnesses against him, and the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. The high court held that an intelligent and voluntary waiver would not be presumed from a silent record. In Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449, this court explained that, in light of Boykin, each of the three rights mentionedself-incrimination, confrontation, and jury trialmust be specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit of and waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea. ( Id. at p. 132, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449.) As explained, ante, Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d 909, 206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904, permits a criminal defendant to challenge the validity, in his present trial, of a prior felony conviction on Boykin-Tahl grounds. Although to enhance a criminal defendant's sentence with a prior conviction that was itself obtained in violation of the Constitution is unconstitutional ( Burgett v. Texas, supra, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319), it is not unconstitutional with the exception of denial of counsel claimsto require a defendant to litigate the validity of the prior conviction in a separate proceeding, such as on habeas corpus. ( Custis, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 497, 114 S.Ct. 1732; Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 966, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 928 P.2d 572.) Our decision in Sumstine thus was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d 204, 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15, that it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity, and we are therefore of the view that, if the issue is properly raised at or prior to trial, it must be determined by the trial court. ( Id. at p. 215, 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15, italics added.) We not only reaffirmed that policy decision in Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 920, 206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904, we again did so in Curl, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 1302, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292. Sumstine directed trial courts to follow the following procedure: When a defendant makes sufficient allegations that his conviction, by plea, in the prior felony proceedings was obtained in violation of his constitutional Boykin-Tahl rights, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the prosecution bears the initial burden of producing evidence that the defendant did indeed suffer the conviction. The defendant must then produce evidence to demonstrate his Boykin-Tahl rights were infringed. The prosecution then has the right to rebuttal, at which point reliance on a silent record will not be sufficient. ( Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 923, 206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904; see People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 256, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643 [evidence of trial judge's `habit and custom' of taking proper waivers relevant]; People v. Soto (1996) 46 Cal. App.4th 1596, 1605-1607, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 [defendant's conclusory allegations insufficient to warrant a hearing]; People v. Johnson (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 978, 983, 266 Cal.Rptr. 221 [defendant failed to produce evidence his constitutional rights were violated].) We explained the process in more detail in Curl, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1292, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292. In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292.) Accordingly, the People need only make a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant suffered the conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292.) The Attorney General argued in Sumstine that this procedure, requiring as it did the holding of an evidentiary hearing, would be unnecessarily time-consuming and that `[t]o explore matters other than the easily determined fact of representation by, or waiver of, counsel couldand no doubt wouldrequire a lengthy recess of the trial in order to procure witnesses and other evidence with the resultant possibility of frequent declaration of mistrials.' ( Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 6, 206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904, quoting People v. Vienne (1973) 30 Cal. App.3d 266, 272, 105 Cal.Rptr. 584.) We disagreed: To prevent such lengthy interruptions we required courts to put on the record the questioning of the defendant concerning his Boykin/Tahl rights in order to preserve `a record adequate for any review that may be later sought.' ( Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709; italics added.) If a proper record existed, Boykin/Tahl claims could as easily be determined as right to counsel claims. ( Sumstine, supra, at p. 919, fn. 6, 206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904.) In short, we expressly considered in Sumstine the People's ease of administration argument and found it wanting. Normally, principles of stare decisis would require we adhere to the rule in Sumstine, at least in the absence of persuasive evidence the policy judgment on which it is based has proved false as an empirical matter, or that post- Sumstine authority from the United States Supreme Court or this court casts doubt on Sumstine 's reasoning. (See, e.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296-297, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1141, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) The Attorney General does not argue that Sumstine motions have proven to be an undue burden on the trial courts in the ensuing 15 years. He does contend, however, that superseding legal authority justifies reevaluation of the policy bases of our Sumstine decision. He relies primarily on People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315 ( Howard ). As we explain, the Attorney General's reliance on Howard is misplaced.