Opinion ID: 2588441
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peter's Appeal Is Moot.

Text: Pointing out that the superior court, at the state's request, dismissed this case before disposition, the state argues that we should dismiss Peter's appeal of the adjudication as moot. Peter responds that the adjudication of his children as in need of aid presents a live controversy both because the judgment has prospective effect and because this case falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. A claim is moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy. [7] If the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if it prevails, there is no case or controversy for us to decide. [8] A party generally may not appeal a judgment in its favor in order to challenge an interlocutory order. [9] Furthermore, a naked desire for vindication does not save an otherwise dead controversy from mootness. [10] Peter must show either that concrete relief would be available to him if this court reversed the adjudication order or that the issue falls into one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Peter argues that because the adjudication order is separate from the order that dismissed the case before disposition, it is not moot even though an appeal of the dismissal order would be. But an adjudication is merely an intermediate ruling on the path to disposition. Once the superior court dismissed the case, the state lost the power granted it by the adjudication order to interfere with Peter's family. Thus, although the adjudication order may have been, as Peter argues, a separate order from the disposition, it is not one that has any direct legal effect on Peter after the superior court dismissed the case. Peter also argues that, even if the adjudication no longer directly affects him, its potential collateral consequences are significant enough to warrant judicial review of the adjudication. He asserts that per AS 47.10.011(10), a child adjudicated to be in need of aid because of a parent's substance abuse is subsequently presumed to be in need of aid if the parent resumes substance abuse within one year of rehabilitation. [11] He also asserts that AS 47.10.011(9) allows a child to be adjudicated in need of aid on the basis of past neglect of another child in the same household. [12] The collateral consequences doctrine allows courts to decide otherwise-moot cases when a judgment may carry indirect consequences in addition to its direct force, either as a matter of legal rules or as a matter of practical effect. [13] We have recognized the collateral consequences doctrine. In E.J. v. State , we held that a child's claim that he was improperly adjudicated to be delinquent was not moot even though the lower court later declared the adjudication of delinquency to be void ab initio. [14] We held that review of the initial delinquency determination was justified, because the child's records were easily obtainable and could be made available to school authorities, social workers, parole officers, judges imposing sentence for the commission of crimes, the military services, or prospective employers, all of whom might be influenced to the detriment of the minor. [15] Similarly, in Graham v. State , we held that the revocation of the plaintiff's driver's license was not moot even though the ninety-day period of revocation had ended. [16] We reasoned in part that the collateral consequences of a driver's license revocation may be substantial. Such a revocation can result in higher insurance rates, adverse employment consequences and other serious results. [17] Finally, in Martin v. Dieringer we held that a petition to remove a personal representative from an estate was not mooted by the fact that the estate had closed and the defendant was no longer the personal representative. [18] We reasoned that the use of the lower court's findings to dismiss a related civil action on collateral estoppel grounds prevented the controversy from becoming moot. [19] We assume for the sake of discussion that AS 47.10.011(9) and (10) potentially create collateral consequences for Peter. [20] But these consequences would not prevent us from holding that this appeal is moot. In City of Valdez v. Gavora , we adopted the practice used by federal courts in disposing of moot claims. [21] At the time, that practice required not only dismissing the appeal, but also vacating the judgment below. [22] Although the United States Supreme Court has since clarified that not all moot claims require vacatur, it has held that vacatur is especially appropriate when mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below. [23] Otherwise, the Court explained, the appellant is effectively forced to acquiesce in the judgment. [24] In other words, when a prevailing party voluntarily moots a case, without the appellant's acquiescence, the appellant, through no fault of his own, is prevented from obtaining appellate review of his claim. We agree with the United States Supreme Court that principles of equity require vacatur of the challenged order in such a case. [25] In this case, the validity of the adjudication order became moot because the state voluntarily moved to dismiss the case at disposition. The state's successful motion to dismiss prevented Peter from challenging the merits of the adjudication order on appeal. Because equity therefore requires vacatur of the adjudication order, Peter's argument that collateral consequences arising under AS 47.10.011(9) and (10) render this appeal a live controversy is unconvincing. Peter will not suffer any collateral consequences under these subsections. Peter's additional argument that the adjudication order is not moot because an adjudication carries a permanent social stigma is also unpersuasive. All the records in CINA proceedings are sealed. [26] There is no publicly available record that Peter's children were adjudicated in need of aid. Peter acknowledges that CINA proceedings are confidential but argues that this fact is irrelevant because during the course of the litigation, OCS contacted many of the people with whom [Peter] has the most contacthis health care providers, his children's teachers, and his tribe and that these people are thus aware of the child welfare proceedings against him. This may or may not be so. After all, the proceedings were not against him and indeed the essence of his challenge on the merits is that the CINA petition was based only on Martha's misconduct. But because all parties must maintain the confidentiality of all information in the court file, issuing an opinion on the merits and reversing the superior court's confidential adjudication order would not publicly remedy any possible social stigma, to the extent it exists. Because the remedy he is requesting would not redress his alleged injury, social stigma does not give Peter standing to appeal the adjudication order. [27]