Opinion ID: 2443972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge to the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the District of Columbia to Adjudicate Child Support

Text: We begin with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as it implicates the court's power to adjudicate child support in this matter. Wallace argues that the District of Columbia did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate [Upson's] Petition for an original support order where neither the mother, the father nor the child were residing in the District of Columbia when the action was commenced. Wallace contends that Upson's support petition was properly dismissed by Magistrate Judge Diaz for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in her September 29, 2005 order, and therefore, Associate Judge Beck erred in her December 13, 2005 order vacating Magistrate Judge Diaz's order. Thus, Wallace argues, each of the orders of pendente lite child support were erroneous as a matter of law. [12] Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Keeton v. Wells Fargo Corp., 987 A.2d 1118, 1121 n. 5 (D.C.2010). As an initial matter, we note the inconsistent, and often confusing, representations by Wallace as to his place of residence during this lengthy litigation. In his September 22, 2004 Answer to Upson's initial petition filed in the Superior Court on August 16, 2004, requesting child support, Wallace responded to Upson's statement of the District's jurisdiction by stating that he was not required to admit or deny the jurisdictional allegation. Then, a few lines later, he denied that he was a bona fide resident and domiciliary of the District of Columbia, and has been for more than six months prior to the filing of this action. In the same filing, as part of his counterclaim for custody, [13] however, Wallace stated that [h]e has practiced law and has lived in the District of Columbia for more than twenty-five years preceding the filing of this Counterclaim. [14] It was not until May 16, 2005, in his Amended Motion to Dismiss, that Wallace affirmatively contested the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Court to make a child support determination, alleging that none of the parties were residents of the District. In that Motion, Wallace claimed for the first time that he was a resident of Florida. When Associate Judge Beck vacated Magistrate Judge Diaz's September 29, 2005 order dismissing Upson's petition for support for lack of jurisdiction, and remanding the case for findings on the parties' residences, Wallace stated that he was a resident of Maryland. Ultimately, Magistrate Judge Diaz accepted Wallace's latest assertion and found that Wallace had been a resident of Maryland since March 23, 2004. Against this backdrop of Wallace's seemingly opportunistic representations regarding the place of his residence, we conclude that his claim challenging the District's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over the instant child support matter was properly rejected by the trial court. As a general rule, subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and an objection may be raised by the parties or by the court at any point in the litigation. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(h)(3); B.J.P. v. R.W.P., 637 A.2d 74, 78 (D.C.1994). However, [t]he purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on territorial considerationsa fair characterization of the asserted defect herehas been held to be analytically similar to improper venue; it does not go to the power of the court to adjudicate the case, and may be waived if not asserted in [a] timely fashion. [15] Id. at 78-79. Statutes that impose territorial constraints on the court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction require[] the court to have a geographical relationship to a particular `thing' or `status,' in addition to the competence to adjudicate the type of claim at issue[.] Id. at 80-81 (internal citation omitted) (Ferren, J., concurring). The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), codified at D.C.Code §§ 46-301.01 to -309.01 (2009 Pocket Part), governs matters of child support in the District of Columbia, and specifies territorial jurisdictional limitations on a court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction. See DeGroot v. DeGroot, 939 A.2d 664, 670 (D.C.2008) (UIFSA attempts to clarify the methods of `establishment, enforcement, or modification of support orders across state lines.') (citation omitted); D.C.Code §§ 46-302.04 & -302.05 (2001) (codifying §§ 204 & 205 of the UIFSA and referring to jurisdiction and continuing, exclusive jurisdiction). Although the UIFSA never speaks explicitly of subject matter jurisdiction, the terms that it does usejurisdiction and continuing exclusive jurisdictionare simply alternative ways of referring to subject matter jurisdiction and its territorial limitations. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205 comment (2001), 9 U.L.A. (Part IB) 194 (2005) ([I]f all the relevant personsthe obligor, the individual obligee, and the childhave permanently left the issuing State, the issuing State no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify the exercise of jurisdiction to modify its child-support order.); Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 50 Va. App. 257, 649 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2007) (As the official comment makes clear, [§ 205] provides that when a court loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its prior child support order, it has no subject matter jurisdiction to modify that order.); Sharp v. Sharp, 336 N.J.Super. 492, 765 A.2d 271, 277-78 (App.Div.2001) (UIFSA has engrafted into our child-support jurisprudence the concept of `continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,' which establishes which forum has subject-matter jurisdiction over the issue of child support.) (citation omitted); Spencer v. Spencer, 10 N.Y.3d 60, 853 N.Y.S.2d 274, 882 N.E.2d 886, 891 (2008) (Because the father still resides in Connecticut, that state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order [under the UIFSA] and New York does not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify that order.). McLean v. Kohnle, 940 So.2d 975, 980 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (Because the Virginia court maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the UIFSA, Mississippi does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Kohnle's petition for modification[.]). Thus, we hold that under the UIFSA, territorial jurisdiction is waivable, and any challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court based on territorial limitations in child support proceedings must be raised at the outset of the litigation. See B.J.P., supra, 637 A.2d at 78-79. Here, Wallace did not contest the Superior Court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction in his answer and counterclaim and thus failed to timely challenge the exercise of jurisdiction by the District of Columbia Courts. He argues in his brief on appeal that he `suggested' the lack of jurisdiction by explicitly denying the critical jurisdictional allegation of the Petition at the very outset of the proceedingand before a single hearing was held. Despite Wallace's characterization of his actions as a timely objection, he did not in fact deny Upson's jurisdictional allegation in his answer and counterclaim. Rather, he asserted that Upson's jurisdictional statement was an allegation that he was not required to admit or deny. Wallace also made contradictory statements in his submission to the courtboth denying that he was a bona fide resident and domiciliary of the District of Columbia, and stating that [h]e has practiced law and has lived in the District of Columbia for more than twenty-five years preceding the filing of this Counterclaim. We are satisfied that any suggestion asserted by Wallace was not sufficient to apprise the trial court of a challenge to its jurisdiction. Wallace only affirmatively challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in his May 16, 2005 Amended Motion to Dismiss, exactly nine months after Upson filed her petition for support, and approximately one month after the mother and child moved from Virginia to the District. Therefore, Wallace has waived the argument. Moreover, even assuming that Wallace did not waive his claim of lack of jurisdiction, the March 2, 2005 filing by Wallace in the Virginia Court did not divest the Superior Court of jurisdiction, as he argues on appeal. Under D.C.Code § 46-302.04, which codified § 204 of the UIFSA: (b) A tribunal of the District may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state if: (1) The petition or comparable pleading in the other state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the District for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the District; (2) The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the District; and (3) If relevant, the other state is the home state of the child. Wallace's first filing in Virginia was a Verified Petition for Child Custody and Visitation in March of 2005, which was submitted approximately six months after he filed his answer and counterclaim to Upson's support petition. The District properly continued to exercise jurisdiction over the support matter pursuant to D.C.Code § 46-302.04 because, even assuming Wallace's Virginia petition requesting custody was a comparable petition to Upson's District of Columbia petition seeking support, (1) the Virginia petition was filed well after the expiration of time for filing a responsive pleading in the District, and (2) Wallace did not timely challenge the exercise of jurisdiction by the District, as we have discussed above. Thus, we conclude, in these circumstances, that the Superior Court of the District of Columbia properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this child support matter.