Opinion ID: 1044002
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Viability of Mellons

Text: Not only is the actual language of Mellons problematic, its viability is questionable in light of subsequent developments in the law. As noted by Judge David Hayes, [14] the rationale of Mellons was expressly predicated upon then Tennessee Code Annotated [section] 40-2520, which was repealed in 1979. State v. Mason, No. M2002-01709-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1114581, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. May 19, 2004) (Hayes, J., dissenting). Neither section 40-2520 nor any statute like it applied at the time Defendant committed his offenses or was tried for them. Moreover, since Mellons, the United States Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that an essential of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment [is] that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proofdefined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis added). Thus, when reviewing a convicted defendant's claim that the evidence is not sufficient to support his or her conviction, the review must be undertaken with respect to the crime of which the defendant was convicted, not the crime with which he was charged. See id. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (stating that the standard of review must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense [challenged] as defined by state law). That the proof may support conviction of a different, even a greater, offense does not obviate the constitutional requirement that the proof support each and every element of the offense for which the defendant was actually convicted. And, contrary to the Mellons Court's rationale that a defendant suffers no prejudice when convicted of a lesser offense where the proof supports a greater offense, even if the lesser is not supported by the proof, the Supreme Court in Jackson observed that [t]he power of the [jury] to err upon the side of mercy . . . has never been thought to include a power to enter an unreasonable verdict of guilty. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Also taking effect since Mellons is Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) [15] which provides unequivocally that [f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e) (emphasis added). No exception is made for lesser-included offenses erroneously charged and not supported by the proof, even where the proof may be sufficient to support the greater, correctly charged, offense. See id. Additionally, since Mellons this Court has decided the landmark case of State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn.1999), which, with its progeny, has altered dramatically the landscape of lesser-included offenses. At the time Mellons was decided, Tennessee had yet to adopt a definitive position on th[e] question of when and what lesser-included offenses should be charged. Howard v. State, 578 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tenn. 1979). The Court in Howard determined that an offense is necessarily included in another if the elements of the greater offense, as those elements are set forth in the indictment, include, but are not congruent with, all the elements of the lesser. If there is evidence to support a conviction for such a lesser offense, it must be charged to the jury. Id. (emphasis added). Howard was the defining case for determining lesser-included offense issues until 1999, when this Court decided Burns. In Burns, we adopted the following test for determining whether one offense was a lesser-included offense of another: An offense is a lesser-included offense if: (a) all of its statutory elements are included within the statutory elements of the offense charged; or (b) it fails to meet the definition in part (a) only in the respect that it contains a statutory element or elements establishing (1) a different mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability; and/or (2) a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property or public interest; or (c) it consists of (1) facilitation of the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offense in part (a) or (b); or (2) an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offense in part (a) or (b); or (3) solicitation to commit the offense charged or an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offense in part (a) or (b). Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 466-67. Additionally, we made clear that whether a lesser-included offense must be charged in a jury instruction is a two-part inquiry: first, whether the lesser offense is included in the greater under the test adopted, and second, whether a charge is justified by the evidence. The second step of the analysis adopted in Burns requires a determination of (a) whether any evidence exists that reasonable minds could accept to prove the existence of a lesser-included offense, and (b) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense. Ely, 48 S.W.3d at 722 (citing Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 467, 469) (emphases added) (citation omitted). Our General Assembly has echoed our holding in Burns with its passage of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110, which provides in pertinent part that a trial judge shall not instruct the jury as to any [lesser included] offense unless the judge determines that the record contains any evidence which reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser included offense. In making this determination, the trial judge shall view the evidence liberally in the light most favorable to the existence of the lesser included offense without making any judgment on the credibility of such evidence. The trial judge shall also determine whether the evidence, viewed in this light, is legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-18-110(a) (2003) (emphases added). With specific reference to felony murder, we determined in Ely that, as a general matter, the offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide are lesser-included offenses of felony murder. Ely, 48 S.W.3d at 721-22. However, when considering whether the trial court had erred in failing to charge the jury with any of these lesser-included offenses, we closely examined the records in Ely and its companion case of State v. Bowers to determine whether the proof supported the elements of each of these crimes. See id. at 723-25. With the elimination of the statutory support upon which Mellons relied, combined with the subsequent significant developments in our lesser-included offense jurisprudence and statutes, we are forced to conclude that Mellons does not control the outcome of this case. Rather, we hold that a court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence must determine whether each element of the conviction offense is supported by sufficient proof. If the proof does not adequately support each and every element, the defendant is entitled to a reversal of the conviction. As a more general matter, we hold that a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence where he or she is convicted of a lesser-included offense charged to the jury, whether or not the proof is sufficient to support the primary offense. To sustain a conviction of a lesser-included offense, the proof must be sufficient to support each and every element of the conviction offense. To the extent that Mellons and its progeny hold to the contrary, they are overruled. Sound policy reasons buttress our holding. Had Defendant been indicted for, and convicted of, second degree murder, his conviction would be reversed for insufficient evidence. A contrary result should not obtain from the trial court's error in charging a lesser-included offense not supported by the proof. To allow a conviction to stand when obtained as a lesser-included offense where it would be reversed as a primary offense is not only inconsistent, it is also contrary to our commitment to full, fair, and accurate jury instructions. We decline to adopt such an approach. Moreover, we agree with Judge Hayes that trial judges have the responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the jury trial which includes withholding lesser offenses from the jury when the evidence is not legally sufficient to support a conviction for such offense. Mason, 2004 WL 1114581, at  (Hayes, J., dissenting). There is no question that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on second degree murder under the facts of this case. The issue is whether the error is reversible. We conclude that it is. We acknowledge that, citing Mellons, we have stated as recently as 1996 that [i]t is well-settled that when a jury is instructed as to a lesser included offense of that charged in the indictment, a conviction of the lesser included offense may stand, even if the technical requirements of that offense are not present, if the evidence supports the greater offense. State v. Bolin, 922 S.W.2d 870, 875 (Tenn.1996). As in Mellons, however, this Court did not actually hold in Bolin that a defendant may stand convicted of a lesser-included offense where there is no proof as to an element necessary to support the lesser-included offense, even if the proof would support the greater offense. Rather, where a trial court properly instructs the jury on lesser-included offenses, and the jury thereupon convicts the defendant of a lesser-included offense, the defendant will not later be heard to complain. See Bolin, 922 S.W.2d at 875 (affirming a conviction of aggravated sexual battery charged as lesser-included offense of aggravated rape where the proof allowed the jury to believe testimony establishing sexual contact and to reject testimony establishing sexual penetration).