Opinion ID: 2589958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: silver fork's title to water intercepted in the kentucky-utah mine

Text: ¶ 39 SFPC claims title to approximately .5 c.f.s. of percolating water intercepted inside the mine based on two theories. First, SFPC asserts, by way of a diligence claim, that it is successor-in-interest to early Silver Fork residents, and the owners and employees of the Kentucky-Utah and Woodlawn Mines, who diverted and beneficially used this water prior to 1935. Second, SFPC claims it acquired title to water intercepted in the mine by adverse possession. ¶ 40 The trial court found that SFPC's 1991 diligence claim is unsupported by the evidence. The court also concluded SFPC failed to establish any of the elements of adverse possession. Ultimately, the court held that SFPC has no right to the use of waters emanating from the mine tunnel, separate and distinct from [its] interest under the contracts with Salt Lake.
¶ 41 Currently, diligence claims [17] to percolating water appropriated prior to 1935 are filed under Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17. Filing a claim under this provision constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of that claim. See Robert W. Swenson, A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II, 6 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 1, 23 (1985). However, diligence rights are expressly limited to the amount of water actually beneficially used prior to the effective date of the 1935 act. Id. at 24 (citing In re General Determination of Water Rights in the Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 6 Utah 2d 1, 4, 304 P.2d 964, 965-66 (1956)). ¶ 42 SFPC cannot claim it succeeded to the diligence rights of early Silver Fork residents because it failed to prove that the land owned by early residents who allegedly obtained diligence rights to mine waters is now owned by shareholders of SFPC, rather than other parties unrelated to SFPC. Generally, water rights are appurtenant to land on which the water is beneficially used. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-1-10 to -11 (1989). They are transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real estate, and pass automatically to a grantee of the land unless expressly reserved. See id. Silver Fork's title to waters intercepted in the mine necessarily depends on whether early Silver Fork residents acquired diligence rights to these waters before 1935 and then transferred their rights to current SFPC shareholders, or to intervening parties who thereafter transferred these rights to current shareholders. However, SFPC has presented no evidence demonstrating the succession of title between early Silver Fork residents, who may in fact have obtained diligence rights to water from the mine, and current SFPC shareholders. The only connection SFPC has shown between its shareholders and early Silver Fork residents is that they have all lived in the same general vicinity of the canyon. That connection does not suffice to establish a succession of title to property or water rights. ¶ 43 SFPC also fails to explain how it could be successor-in-interest to any company owning and operating either the Kentucky-Utah or the Woodlawn Mine. Neither SFPC nor its predecessor-in-interest, Jesse Hulse, has owned an interest in the companies operating the Kentucky-Utah and Woodlawn Mines, nor have they ever owned land through which these mines were excavated. In support of its claim, SFPC submitted an affidavit of Dilworth Nebeker, Jr., a former owner of the mine, who stated that owners of the mine granted permission to use mine water on demand and to the full extent required for mining and domestic purposes by the people in the area prior to 1935. Thereafter, verbal and written permission was granted to Jesse Hulse and SFPC to use water from the mine. SFPC also proffered a 1950 document in which owners of the mine granted SFPC permission to bury pipe and construct a small cement reservoir on mine property in order to store water from the mine for use by Silver Fork residents. However, this document did not purport to transfer to SFPC any interest in the water itself. We fail to see how permission to use water intercepted in the mine could transfer any interest in that water, even assuming the mining company owned any interest in this water to transfer. ¶ 44 At most, SFPC is successor-in-interest to Jesse Hulse. Hulse organized SFPC in 1950 as a non-profit corporation for the purpose of maintaining Silver Fork's water supply from the Kentucky-Utah Mine. However, any rights to water intercepted in the mine that Hulse may have obtained accrued after 1935 and cannot serve as the basis of a diligence claim. See Hanson, 115 Utah at 415, 205 P.2d at 260. There is no reliable evidence that Hulse or others who built cabins on the Hulse-Nielson development beneficially used water from the mine prior to 1940. In 1940, Hulse obtained authorization to excavate a ditch across U.S. Forest Service land. Only after completing the ditch in the early 1940s did Hulse begin using water from the mine. Before 1940, Hulse and other cabin owners dipped water from the nearby stream. ¶ 45 Given the lack of evidence regarding chain of title, the trial court correctly rejected SFPC's diligence claim. [18]
¶ 46 Finally, SFPC claims title to the mine water through adverse possession. [19] The elements of proof necessary to acquire a prescriptive right to water are seven years of continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse enjoyment under a claim of title with knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the prior right and at a time when the owner of the right needed the water adversely claimed. College Irr. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1989). The presumption is against the acquisition of a right by adverse use, and the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the right. See id. Under the doctrine of tacking, adverse possession may be completed by a series of possessors in privity. See, e.g., Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 225, 141 P.2d 160, 168 (1943). ¶ 47 The trial court properly rejected SFPC's adverse possession claim. Specifically, SFPC failed to prove seven years of continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse enjoyment under claim of title, beginning prior to 1939, by any party it may legitimately claim as its predecessor-in-interest. As stated above, Jesse Hulse is the only party SFPC may reasonably claim as its predecessor-in-interest. There is no reliable evidence that Hulse's predecessors made continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse use of mine water prior to 1939. In fact, as discussed at length above, SFPC's allegations that a substantial number of Silver Fork residents prior to Hulse beneficially used .446 c.f.s. of water from the mine is extremely speculative. This falls far short of the proof required to support an adverse possession claim in light of the presumption against these claims. Because Silver Fork cannot establish that its predecessors adversely used water from the Kentucky-Utah Mine prior to 1939, the trial court correctly rejected SFPC's adverse possession claim. ¶ 48 Because we affirm the trial court's determination to quiet title to waters intercepted in the Kentucky-Utah Mine in Salt Lake, and its rejection of SFPC's diligence and adverse possession claims, we do not consider SFPC's counterclaim seeking reimbursements of amounts it has paid to Salt Lake to purchase water from the mine. ¶ 49 Affirmed. ¶ 50 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice RUSSON concur in Justice STEWART's opinion.