Opinion ID: 1421838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant divides his attack on the sufficiency of the evidence into two categories. He first calls our attention to a number of inconsistencies or discrepancies in the evidence. Miss B gave what she characterized as a guesstimate of her assailant's height. She thought he was about five feet, eight inches tall. Defendant is six feet, one inch tall. The assailant was not wearing glasses (under or over his ski mask). Defendant wears glasses. Miss B did not smell alcohol on her assailant's breath; there was evidence that the defendant had been drinking some three or more hours prior to the assault. Miss B stated that she saw stubble on her assailant's neck; defendant offered evidence that he had a full beard at that time. The State offered evidence that he did not have a full beard in November 1981, but that he had often had two or three days' growth, or stubble. All of these matters, and other similar ones to which the defendant points, were no doubt argued to and considered by the jury, and rejected by that body when it arrived at its verdict. As we noted in State v. Douglas, 230 Kan. 744, 746, 640 P.2d 1259 (1982): It is not the function of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence or to pass upon the credibility of witnesses. State v. Fenton, 228 Kan. 658, 666, 620 P.2d 813 (1980); State v. Henderson, 226 Kan. 726, 731, 603 P.2d 613 (1979). Defendant also argues that there is no direct evidence which places him at the scene of the crime. The victim did not see his face and did not testify that she recognized his voice. There was no fingerprint evidence, and no property taken was later found in defendant's possession. Even if the State's case were entirely circumstantial, however, such evidence would be sufficient. It is well established in this jurisdiction that a conviction of even the gravest offense may be sustained by circumstantial evidence. State v. Henderson, 226 Kan. 726, 731, 603 P.2d 613 (1979); State v. Steward, 219 Kan. 256, Syl. ¶ 13, 547 P.2d 773 (1976); State v. Sparks, 217 Kan. 204, 535 P.2d 901 (1975); State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 529 P.2d 90 (1974). Defendant next argues that there was no evidence of attempted penetration, therefore he cannot be convicted of attempted rape. The victim testified that while she was conscious her assailant never took off his clothes, never exposed his penis, and never tried to penetrate her sex organ with his. This argument was made and rejected in a similar case, State v. Arnold, 1 Kan. App.2d 642, 573 P.2d 1087 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 223 Kan. 715, 576 P.2d 651 (1978), where the defendant accosted a young woman on the Wichita State University campus. Apparently he knocked her down, placed one of his hands on her neck and mouth and attempted to close her mouth and choke her, told her to be quiet or he would kill her, and, while he was on top of her, attempted to turn her over on her back and placed one hand on the center of her lower abdomen. The victim, a deeply religious person, commanded her assailant to leave in the name of Jesus, and the man left. No clothing of the victim or the attacker was ever removed. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to show an intent to rape. The Court of Appeals said: We think the evidence was such  the stealth, the physical actions including the threats, the relative positions of the parties and the like  that the jury could properly have drawn the inference that defendant was bent on rape. This meets the test on appellate review. [Citation omitted]. The issue was one for jury resolution, which settles the matter on appeal. 1 Kan. App.2d at 644. Here, the assailant entered a locked home by force and stealth, cut all of the victim's clothes from her body with a knife, threw her down on a bed, inserted his gloved finger into her vagina, and said that he ought to have intercourse with her. Clearly this is sufficient evidence from which a rational finder of fact could find that the attacker intended to rape the victim. A charge of attempted rape may be established without evidence of attempted penetration. We find no merit in this argument.