Opinion ID: 296624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impropriety of Stay Order Issued by the District Court

Text: 8 This appeal does not present occasion to decide the merits of the civil action brought by plaintiffs or of any defense that may be interposed by the defendants in their answer. We therefore do not consider so much of the Government's brief as contends that plaintiffs' constitutional rights have not been infringed, except to say that the questions raised are not insubstantial. Compare United States v. Smith, 321 F.Supp. 424 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 8, 1971); United States v. Sinclair, 321 F.Supp. 1074 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 26, 1971). 9 The central question is the propriety of an ongoing order which suspends plaintiffs' action entirely until final completion, including ultimate appellate disposition, of the criminal case pending against some of the plaintiffs. 10 The District Court's order has operated since inception to stay this civil action by nine organizations who were not defendants in the criminal case, although they are described as having participated in various enterprises with the eight plaintiffs who were criminal defendants. 11 It further appears that this order has operated since February, 1970, to stay this civil action as to three individual plaintiffs whose connection with the criminal case was ended by the time of verdict. 6 This information is taken into account though relating to matters arising subsequent to the order. Since the information is undisputed there is no occasion to insist on a formal motion to supplement the record. Moreover the possibility of such outcome was or should have been in the contemplation of the District Court when the order was issued. 12 The Government's motion for stay presented its concern that this civil action represented an effort to circumvent orders in the criminal case which limited pretrial discovery by defendants in the criminal case. The supporting affidavit also pointed out the difficulties involved in duplication of witnesses. It was further alleged: 'If the civil case is stayed, these conflicts can be avoided, and it is possible that upon completion of the criminal trial, many of the related issues in the civil case can be stipulated between the parties.' 13 These considerations, it may be assumed, justified an order staying the civil case until completion of the trial of the criminal case. But they present no justification for a stay that (a) is applicable to civil plaintiffs who are not criminal defendants, and (b) persists until completion of all appellate and remand proceedings. The trial phase of the criminal case has come to an end but the appellate and remand phases may go on for years. The case will apparently be argued to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the spring of 1971. But its subsequent decision may lead to review by the Supreme Court. If there should be a reversal and remand, the time span of the delay and stay embraced by the District Court order may come to embrace a new trial and appeals. 14 The applicable jurisprudence appears in Landis v. North America Co., 299 U.S. 248, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936), which considered an order staying all proceedings in a suit brought by two holding companies to restrain enforcement of the Holding Company Act, pending final (including appellate) disposition of another suit, then pending in another District Court, brought by the SEC to compel enforcement. 15 Various pronouncements in the Landis opinion seem to us pertinent. They are: 16 1. A court has inherent power to stay proceedings in control of its docket,-- after balancing the competing interest. 7 17 2. 'The suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else. Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.' 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. at 166. 18 3. 'Especially in cases of extraordinary public moment, the individual may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted.' 299 U.S. at 256, 57 S.Ct. at 166. This justified a stay pending the District Court determination in the other suit-- in view of the complex facts, and novel legal problems 'of far-reaching importance to the parties and the public.' Id. 19 4. 'We are satisfied that the limits of a fair discretion are exceeded in so far as the stay is to continue in effect after the decision by the District Court in the suit against the Bond & Share Company, and until the determination by this court of any appeal therefrom. Already the proceedings in the District Court have continued more than a year. With the possibility of an intermediate appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, a second year or even more may go by before this court will be able to pass upon the Act.' 299 U.S. at 256, 57 S.Ct. at 167. 20 5. 'The stay is immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in its inception that its force will be spent within reasonable limits, so far at least as they are susceptible of prevision and description. When once those limits have been reached, the fetters should fall off.    If a second stay is necessary during the course of an appeal, the petitioners must bear the burden, when that stage shall have arrived of making obvious the need.' 299 U.S. at 257, 57 S.Ct. at 167. 21 The vitality of Landis is underscored by our recent opinion applying its principle to a case where defendants in a criminal proceeding brought a civil action to restrain infringement of their constitutional rights. McSurely v. McClellan, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 426 F.2d 664 (1970). The case at bar provides additional considerations militating against a protracted total stay in that some of the plaintiffs being stayed were not parties to the criminal case. 22 We think it evident from Landis that the stay order was immoderate in extent and hence invalid since it prohibited any proceeding or action by plaintiffs who were not defendants in the criminal case beyond the trial stage of the criminal case. 23 The improvidence of the stay granted relates not only to its duration but to its scope. The order requires a stay of all proceedings. Where related civil and criminal litigations are pending at the same time, sound discretion of the court may require that the civil action not be blocked entirely but be subject to some limitation, including, e.g., protective orders pertinent to discovery, to avoid essential unfairness or other interference with the public interest. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970); Gordon v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 427 F.2d 578 (1970). We need not consider whether such protective orders would be required in the case at bar, though we feel impelled to interject that plaintiffs' request for oral deposition is subject to restraint on sound principle of equity and public interest when information is sought from those holding high public office. Peoples v. United States Department of Agriculture, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 291, 427 F.2d 561 (1970). But even assuming that some protective orders may come to be appropriate, this does not justify a total stay of proceedings. The proceedings, when resumed, may in fact come to be simplified through the kind of stipulation the Government's motion envisaged. 24 Any protracted halting or limitation of plaintiffs' right to maintain their case would require not only a showing of 'need' in terms of protecting the other litigation involved but would also require a balanced finding that such need overrides the injury to the parties being stayed. This consideration is of particular importance where the claim being stayed involves a not insubstantial claim of present and continuing infringement of constitutional rights. No such consideration or balancing was provided by the District Court. 25 The Government's initial request for a stay was to avoid interference with another case-- a case of public importance-- and this presented strong consideration for stay. The brief to this court goes further and argues to us that the stay pending final appellate disposition of the criminal case was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion to assure 'economy of time for itself, for counsel, and for litigants and to provide proper recognition of actions in coordinate courts.' This appeal to 'economy,' even in the absence of interference with another proceeding, would prove too much. It would support a district court stay of proceedings in a case whenever the same question is involved before another court in litigation not involving the parties protesting the stay. And Landis expressly declares that such a result is not proper except in 'rare circumstances,' and then only if the issue of stay pending the appeal is separately considered after the trial and is then held to be justified on the basis of 'obvious need.' 26 It cannot be said to be unseemly or lacking in respect for a court of coordinate jurisdiction, for this court, or the District Court, to take up and decide a question of law that is pending in another circuit. First, this circuit cannot be certain that the other circuit would determine the issue. Thus, the appeal of the Chicago Trial may be disposed of without determination of the issues presented in this civil litigation. Moreover, the other circuit's decision would not be res judicata. The action in this circuit is being brought by persons not parties to the other case. As to the point that the question is of a kind that merits Supreme Court consideration, when the question is one of national importance the Supreme Court may well welcome the interim expression of views by more than one circuit. We do not say that the lower courts should reach out merely to provide a plethora of views, or should fail to explore possibilities of division of labor in the interest of efficiency in judicial administration. However, the addition of another view at the intermediate level on an issue of national consequence and highest significance provides a different focus that is not necessarily an evil but may, on the contrary, serve like a stereopticon to enhance depth perception.