Opinion ID: 1743598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing into evidence spann's confession.

Text: ¶ 48. Spann argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his confession in that the confession was not given voluntarily and the waiver signed by Spann was not intelligently and knowingly made. Spann argues that, never having been previously arrested for a felony conviction, he was unfamiliar with police procedures. Subsequent to the hearing on Spann's motion to suppress, the trial judge found as follows: The Court does hereby find, beyond a reasonable doubt, under the totality of the circumstances, that no coercion or threats of any type were made or used against the defendant, no physical or mental torture existed against the defendant, no promises or favors were made to this defendant, and that he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination. The Miranda Warnings were properly administered by the law enforcement prior to any interrogation and that the waiver was intelligent, knowingly and voluntarily made beyond a reasonable doubt.... The Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt and the totality of the circumstances, that the statement made by the defendant was freely and voluntarily made and is hereby ruled to be admissible. The standard of reviewing the admission of a confession is well-settled. Determining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Wright v. State, 730 So.2d 1106, 1108 (Miss.1998); Lee v. State, 631 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss.1994). There is nothing in the record indicating manifest error in the trial judge's finding that Spann's statement was voluntarily and freely given. ¶ 49. [T]he applicable standard for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice. Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907-08 (Miss.1993). When the voluntariness of a confession is questioned, the defendant has a due process right to a determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily given. Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 121 (Miss. 1989). The procedural rule of Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss.1966), requires that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing upon the accused's objection to the introduction of the confession. The State bears the burden of proving all facts prerequisite to admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss.1991); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 753. This burden is met and a prima facie case made out by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Cox, 586 So.2d at 763 (citing Agee, 185 So.2d at 673). After the State has made out its prima facie case, the defendant must rebut the State's evidence by offering testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession. Id. ¶ 50. The State clearly made out its prima facie case that the confession was made voluntarily and without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. At the suppression hearing, in accordance with the Agee rule, the State offered the testimony of Detective Rusty Keyes, the officer who took Spann's statement and the only officer present at the time the statement was made. Keyes testified that Spann's father brought him to the police station and that Spann came to the station voluntarily. Keyes stated that he told Spann and Spann's father that he would like to talk to Spann and that Spann and his father said that was fine. Keyes testified that Spann's father stated that he would like to be present at the interview, but that he denied the request because Spann was an adult and Keyes wanted to interview him on a one-on-one basis. Keyes testified that when he took Spann into his office, he read him his rights and waiver of rights. At that time, Spann signed the waiver. Keyes stated that Spann signed the waiver freely and voluntarily, that he did not promise Spann anything in return for Spann's signature, that Spann did not appear to be under any kind of mental disability, and that Spann appeared to understand fully what he was doing. Keyes testified that he advised Spann of his rights a second time during the course of Spann's statement. Keyes testified that at the time Spann made his statement, he was very calm and collected, did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, was able to talk to Keyes in an intelligent, reasonable, and rational manner, had no problem understanding or responding to anything Keyes asked him, and was promised nothing in return for his statement. When asked by Spann's attorney whether it was possible that Spann did not understand the magnitude of what was going on, Keyes responded that Spann fully understood what was happening. Spann's statement was reduced to writing and signed by Spann. Keyes testified that, after typing Spann's statement, he read the statement back to Spann at Spann's request, after which Spann signed the statement. The statement also bears the signature of a desk clerk from the police station to whom Spann swore that he was telling the truth and that the document contained his statement and his signature. ¶ 51. After the State made out its prima facie case, Spann was required to rebut the State's evidence by offering testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession. Spann offered no such testimony. Rather, Spann complains that because of his age, limited intelligence, and lack of experience in police procedure, the trial court should have found that, considering the totality of the circumstances, his statement was not given voluntarily and that he did not knowingly waive his rights. This Court has stated that age and intelligence factors are to be considered in determining whether a waiver and a confession are free and voluntary, but that they are not controlling. Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640, 644 (Miss.1979). See also Saucier v. State, 328 So.2d 355 (Miss.1976); Stewart v. State, 273 So.2d 167 (Miss.1973). There was no testimony offered by Spann at the hearing regarding the effect of his age, which was nineteen at the time of the confession, or of his alleged limited intelligence on the voluntariness of his confession. This Court has stated that the youth factor is seldom per se conclusive that a confession was not freely and voluntarily given. In re W.R.A., 481 So.2d 280, 286 (Miss.1985). Furthermore, it should be noted that, at least according to the Youth Court Act, Spann is not a youth. See Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-105(d) (defining youth as a person who has not yet reached his eighteenth birthday). Regarding Spann's assertion that his intellectual capacity hindered his ability to understand the waiver of rights and to voluntarily make a statement, though this Court has held inadmissible the confession of a defendant with an IQ of 60, see Dover v. State, 227 So.2d 296 (Miss.1969), Spann made no demonstration before the trial court that he had any diminished intellectual capacity. The only evidence that Spann might have limited intellectual capabilities was presented during the penalty phase of the trial, where the defense offered evidence that Spann has an IQ of 85. Spann offered no such evidence at the suppression hearing. ¶ 52. Spann also asserts that, because his father was not present during his interrogation, his understanding of his rights was diminished and the interrogation was coercive. Spann's assertion that he should have been allowed to have his father present during the interrogation is without merit. See Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184 (Miss.1996) (where crime is such that circuit court has original jurisdiction, age had no special bearing on defendant's ability to be questioned without a parent and voluntarily waive his rights.). See also Miss.Code Ann. § 9-7-81 (giving circuit court original jurisdiction over felonies, crimes, and misdemeanors, except such as may be exclusively cognizable before some other court). Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Spann's statement. ¶ 53. Spann does not expressly assert in his brief to this Court that his right to counsel was violated. He does, however, complain that his statement was taken by police after his lawyer may have contacted the police department. Because he did assert the right to counsel argument before the trial court in his motion to suppress and because such an alleged violation bears on the admissibility of his statement, it is briefly considered here. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel raised the inference, through its questioning of Keyes, that an attorney was called while Spann was at the station and that the attorney was on his way to the station at the time the statement was made. Keyes stated that Spann never asked for a lawyer at the time he made his statement and that Keyes knew of no lawyer that had called the station before the statement was made or during the time the statement was being made. Keyes testified that after Spann was taken to the jail, he was advised that Spann's uncle sent a message up to talk with Tracy Klein, an attorney, and that he did not know that an attorney was on the way to the station until after Spann was in jail, which was subsequent to the time the statement was taken. ¶ 54. Other than the questions asked of Keyes on cross-examination, the defense put on no evidence that an attorney had been called by any member of Spann's family, that an attorney called the station, or that an attorney was on the way to the station. In fact, Spann states in his brief to this Court that his confession took place without a lawyer present, who may have contacted the police department prior to the statement being given. Based on the failure of defense counsel to make anything more than tentative allegations regarding this issue, it is the conclusion of this Court that Spann's right to counsel was not violated.