Opinion ID: 52060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendant blasingame

Text: 12 First, Blasingame argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated, according to the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), when Bradley’s confession to Clifford Wilson, which also implicated Blasingame, was entered into evidence. Although Blasingame admits he did not object to the testimony in the district court, he nevertheless argues that he did not waive the Bruton issue because the Government failed to comply with its duty under Rule 14 to notify the district court of a potential Bruton issue. He argues that Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure imposed an implicit duty upon the Government to make the district court aware of any potential Bruton issue. Pursuant to that alleged duty, Blasingame argues that the Government’s failure to put the parties or the district court on notice that a Bruton issue existed in the case excuses his failure to object in the district court. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[b]efore ruling on a defendant’s motion to sever, the court may order an attorney for the Government to deliver to the court for in camera inspection any defendant’s statement that the Government intends to use as evidence.” The text of the rule clearly imposes a duty upon the Government to notify the court of a potential Bruton issue only after being ordered to do so by the court. Nothing in the record 13 indicates that the district court ever contemplated or entered such an order. Accordingly, since the text of Rule 14 does not impose a duty upon the Government to introduce Bruton issues absent a court order, any failure on the Government’s part to comply with this nonexistent duty cannot excuse Blasingame’s failure to object to the testimony. Because Blasingame failed to object to Wilson’s testimony at trial, he must show that the district court committed plain error by allowing a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession into evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To establish plain error a defendant must show (1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the error was prejudicial. United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). With respect to the third element, it “is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Olano, 570 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508. Further, even if a defendant established all three elements, an error should only be corrected if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Foree, 43 F.3d at 1579 (citing Olano, 570 U.S. at 736-38, 113 S.Ct. 1779-80, 123 L.Ed.2d 508). In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission of a 14 non-testifying co-defendant’s confession, which directly implicated the defendant, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, even if the jury was given instructions to consider the confession only against the co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 126, 88 S.Ct. at 1622, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. The Court explained that the credibility of these types of confessions was not only inherently suspect, but was especially unreliable when the confession could not be tested on crossexamination. Id. at 136, 88 S.Ct. at 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. Here, Clifford Wilson was allowed to testify that Bradley confessed that he and Blasingame participated in the attempted robbery. As Bradley did not take the stand, Blasingame was not allowed the opportunity to cross-examine him about these allegations. Yet, even if we assume that allowing Wilson’s testimony was error and that the error was sufficiently plain to satisfy the second prong of the plain error test, Blasingame cannot meet the hefty burden of showing that the error affected the outcome of the trial. In an attempt to satisfy the prejudice element of the plain error test, Blasingame asserts that Wilson’s testimony was the only incriminating evidence presented by a witness not cooperating with the Government. He claims that the three cooperating witnesses who implicated him were “successfully impeached” and that an eyewitness to the incident could not identify him as one of the robbers. 15 He also points to United States v. Veltmen , 6 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Morales, 477 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir 1973),2 as similar cases in which a Bruton error amounted to reversible error. Finally, he argues that the prejudice requirement is satisfied because Wilson’s testimony was by far the most damaging evidence presented. Contrary to Blasingame’s assertion, the prejudice requirement of the plain error test is not established merely because the error allowed damaging evidence to be admitted. Blasingame must show that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceeding. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2935, 162 L.Ed.2d 866 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002)) (internal citations omitted). Initially, the cases cited by Blasingame do not advance his argument as they are inapplicable to the facts of this case. In Veltman, this court reviewed a Bruton violation under the harmless error standard, not the plain error standard that is applicable here. 6 F.3d at 1501. Although both standards are similar, the harmless error standard places the burden on the Government to prove the error did not affect the outcome of the proceedings, while the plain error standard places the burden on the defendant to establish that the error did affect the outcome of the 2 Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981). 16 proceeding. Likewise, although the Morales court did review a Bruton error under the plain error standard, the case was decided before the Supreme Court established, in Olano, the specific elements and burdens of the plain error standard. The Morales court rather concluded that the improperly admitted confession amounted to plain error because the confession was one the major pieces of evidence that linked the defendant to the crime. 477 F.2d at 1316. Under Olano, a defendant must establish not only that the improperly admitted confession contributed to the outcome of the proceeding, but that without the confession the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. 570 U.S. at 734,113 S.Ct. 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508. Moreover, as the prejudice element of the plain error test heavily depends on the facts of the particular case, there can be no hard and fast rule that will apply to every case. Further, all three cooperating co-conspirators consistently told the same general story and all identified Blasingame as one of the shooters. Although defense counsel was able to point out some discrepancies in their testimonies, the cooperating co-conspirators were far from successfully impeached; any discrepancies in their testimonies were minor.3 Also, the fact that the three co- 3 Perhaps the most significant discrepancy was that Davis stated that Marbury had given him some cocaine and rum the day of the robbery and Marbury denied doing so. Mahan did admit that he lied to the Grand Jury about owning a gun; however, because both Marbury and Davis also 17 conspirators all cooperated with the Government does not, as Blasingame suggests, mean that their testimony should be summarily ignored in determining whether the district court’s error prejudiced Blasingame. Although the fact that the coconspirators were cooperating with the Government in exchange for shorter sentences may have made the jury more skeptical of their testimony, there is no evidence that suggests that the jury completely disregarded their testimony, especially considering the consistency of their statements. Further, although the eyewitness stated the man she saw was darker than Blasingame, she saw the man through the heavily tinted rear window of a vehicle and testified that she ducked immediately after seeing the gun. Given the overwhelming evidence provided by the cooperating co-defendants, who each identified Blasingame as one of the shooters, the jury likely placed little weight in her testimony. Because the trial transcript establishes that there was substantial independent evidence of Blasingame’s involvement, we find that Wilson’s testimony regarding Bradley’s confession was just another cumulative piece of evidence establishing Blasingame’s guilt. Initially, all three cooperating co-conspirators testified that Blasingame was one of the shooters during the attempted robbery. In addition, identify Blasingame as a shooter, it is unlikely that Mahan's lie had any effect on whether or not the jury believed that Blasingame was one of the shooters. 18 although Blasingame took the stand asserting his innocence, he could not affirmatively recall where he was or what he was doing the morning of the attempted robbery. Blasingame first asserted that he was working that morning, but after he could not recall where or for whom he worked, he admitted that he may have been at his home. In addition, the properly admitted remainder of Wilson’s testimony also established Blasingame’s involvement. Wilson independently testified that Blasingame was present at Mahan’s home the night before the robbery when the plans for the robbery were finalized. This testimony confirmed the testimony of all three cooperating co-defendants that Blasingame was involved in the planning of the robbery and had been present the night before when the details were finalized. As there was substantial and overwhelming evidence of Blasingame’s involvement, independent of Wilson’s testimony, Blasingame cannot meet the prejudice requirement of the plain error test.
Blasingame next argues that the district court erred when it allowed the Government to introduce into evidence a photograph of his torso, which showed his tattoo and a gunshot wound. Mahan, one of the cooperating co-conspirators, testified at trial that in order to help identify the person he knew to be “Pat,” he 19 described to authorities a scar that “Pat” had on his stomach. Agent Fonseca also testified that Mahan had described “Pat’s” scar and tattoos and recounted Mahan’s description of the scar for the jury. Over Blasingame’s objection, the district court admitted a photograph of Blasingame taken at the time of his arrest that depicted a similar scar and numerous tattoos for the purpose of showing that “Pat” was Blasingame and to corroborate Mahan’s identification of the defendant as one of the two masked gunmen who shot the victim. Blasingame argues initially that the photograph is not relevant and should not have been admitted into evidence. He asserts that the Government’s proffered reasons for introducing the photograph are not valid. In the alternative, Blasingame argues that even if the photograph is relevant in some way, the prejudicial impact of the photograph far outweighed any probative value it had. We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for a clear abuse of discretion and will only reverse an erroneous ruling if it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1119 (2002). District courts have broad discretion in admitting relevant evidence. United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1117 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583,585 (11th Cir. 1987)). Thus, “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 20 probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” is generally admitted. See FED. R. EVID. 401. In contrast, a district court’s discretion under Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence because it would be unfairly prejudicial is limited. Finestone, 816 F.2d at 585. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an extraordinary remedy that should be utilized sparingly. United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 785 (11th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, because the balancing test under Rule 403 should favor admissibility, this court views the evidence “in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Id. at 785 (citing Finestone, 816 F.2d at 585). Blasingame first argues that the photograph was not relevant and that the reasons proffered by the Government for its introduction are not valid. Blasingame argues that Mahan had known him for over ten years and therefore the photograph was not needed to prove his identity. Because Mahan’s testimony clearly shows that he initially identified the shooter as “Pat,” the Government used the photograph to show that “Pat” was actually Blasingame. Blasingame also contends that because Mahan did not describe the scar and tattoos to the jury, there was no evidence to show whether the photograph was consistent with Mahan’s description of the scar and tattoos. Agent Fonseca, however, recounted Mahan’s description of the scar for the jury. Thus, the photograph was admitted to allow the jury to see 21 whether the scar in the photograph matched “Pat’s” scar that Mahan described to Agent Fonseca. Blasingame also asserts that if the photograph was relevant he was unfairly prejudiced by it because a jury would be persuaded that a man with a gunshot wound and graphic tattoos would likely be involved in a conspiracy to commit an armed robbery. Blasingame argues that any probative value the photograph may have had was outweighed by its obvious prejudicial effect. Blasingame relies on United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that the photograph’s probative value was eclipsed by its prejudicial impact. Here, the probative value of the photograph of Blasingame’s scar and tattoos was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Although Mahan had known Blasingame for over ten years, it is clear from his testimony at trial that he described Blasingame as “Pat” when he initially spoke to authorities. Further, Blasingame tried to distance himself from Mahan and the other coconspirators by claiming that Mahan and he were not in the same social circle or friends. Blasingame further testified that Mahan was a liar who had falsely incriminated him. Therefore, the photograph was used by the Government to show that Blasingame was the person identified by Mahan as “Pat” and to further corroborate Mahan’s identification of Blasingame as one of the two masked 22 gunmen who shot the victim. Blasingame’s reliance on Thomas is mistaken. In Thomas, the district court allowed the prosecution to admit a photograph of defendant’s gun tattoo for the purpose of showing that the defendant approved of guns in order to refute the defendant’s contention that he did not possess the firearm in question. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the tattoo of two crossed revolvers had no probative value because the tattoo only showed that because the defendant had a pair of guns tattooed on his forearm, he was the kind of person who was likely to possess guns. Id. The facts of the present case are strikingly different. Here, unlike the photograph in Thomas, Blasingame’s photograph had significant probative value. As already discussed, the photograph was used to identify “Pat” and corroborate Mahan’s identification of Blasingame. Any unfair prejudice Blasingame may have experienced from the photograph does not overcome the photograph’s probative value. Moreover, given the presumption of admissibility under Rule 403, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the photograph to be admitted.