Opinion ID: 169559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Peremptory C hallenge

Text: W e first consider appellants’ contention that the government improperly removed a prospective juror, M s. M endoza, based on her race. “W e review de novo whether the [government’s] explanation [for striking a potential juror] is facially race neutral. W e then review the district court’s ruling that the [government] did not intend to discriminate under the clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The government may not use peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based solely on account of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). “H owever, [u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Here, the government explained that it was striking M s. M endoza because she was from Stilwell, Oklahoma, appeared to be very young, and had legal proceedings initiated against her due to problems paying a hospital bill. The government also indicated that it had “to start with somebody someplace and this -4- method [of jury selection] require[d it] to get rid of people.” R. Vol. 3, at 100. Additionally, the government noted that there was no indication that she was Hispanic, but only that she had retained the name of her former husband. This explanation is facially valid and race-neutral. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (holding that proffered reason need not be “persuasive, or even plausible,” but must be facially valid). Although the government did not elaborate as to why it excluded her because she was from Stilwell or experienced financial troubles, these reasons do not evince an inherent discriminatory intent. As for her age, we have held that youth is an acceptable race-neutral justification for exercising a peremptory strike. Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the government’s recognition that there was no indication that M s. M endoza was herself Hispanic demonstrates that appellants failed to show she was removed as a member of a particular racial group. See United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1498 (10th Cir. 1993) (“the defendant must show . . . that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of a particular race from the venire”). Therefore, deferring to the trial court’s unique vantage point, we conclude that the circumstances of this voir dire do not show purposeful discrimination.