Opinion ID: 195991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature of Equity. Beyond the relevant case

Text: 2. The Nature of Equity. the victim of discrimination whole.), aff'd, 767 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1985); Thurber v. Jack Reilly's Inc., 521 F. Supp. 238, 242- 43 (D. Mass. 1981) (exercising equitable discretion to deduct unemployment benefits from the plaintiff's back pay award), aff'd, 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); see also Crosby v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 624 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D. Mass. 1985) (predicting in an ADEA case that the First Circuit will likely allow district courts to exercise discretion in tailoring back pay awards to account for collateral benefits). 7To illustrate this point, we remind the reader that, while front pay is fully within the district court's discretion, back pay is a presumptive entitlement of a plaintiff who successfully prosecutes an employment discrimination case. Compare, e.g., Wildman, 771 F.2d at 615 with Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 461 U.S. 920 (1983), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). 14 law, our decision is informed by the nature of equity itself. In particular, the abstract imposition of a black-or-white rule regarding the relevance of collateral benefits, even if otherwise desirable, would simply not comport with the essential character and function of equitable discretion. And, though modern civil practice for the most part merges equity with law, equitable discretion remains a salient part of our legal system. See Ralph A. Newman, Equity and Law: A Comparative Study 50-53 (1961); see also Roscoe Pound, Introduction to Newman, supra, at 10 (suggesting heightened importance of principles of equitable discretion in applying legal precepts and remedies). Historically, equity powers emerged in response to the rigidity of the common law, especially the impersonal generality of the remedies it afforded. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 518-19 (1983); Peter C. Hoffer, The Law's Conscience: Equitable Constitutionalism in America 8-16 (1990). As Lord Ellesmere put it: The Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances. Earl of Oxford's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (1615). Hence, [t]he Office of the Chancellor is . . . to soften and mollify the Extremity of the Law . . . . Id. Because the hallmarks of equity have long been flexibility and particularity, the imposition of a rigid rule, pro or con, concerning the interrelationship between collateral benefits and 15 front pay (an equitable remedy) would be incongruent with the historic and essential conception of equity. In contrast, a rule that confers latitude upon the district court to handle the interface between collateral benefits and front pay differently in different cases is fully consistent with this storied heritage. For these reasons, we conclude that the decision as to whether to tailor a front pay award to take into account collateral benefits is, and must be, within the equitable discretion of the nisi prius court. On much the same basis, we do not believe that this discretion is rigidly circumscribed by the source of the collateral benefits.8 We consider the source of a collateral benefit to be informative, but not dispositive. That is to say, because the district court's decision about whether it should or should not tailor a front pay award to dovetail with certain collateral benefits is discretionary, we think it follows that 8The parties attach great significance to the source of the benefits. The Service argues that the collateral source rule is peculiarly inappropriate here because both the front pay and the collateral benefits emanate from the same source the federal government. Lussier sees no such special relationship. He advocates that we judge the parcel not by its wrapping, but, rather, by its contents, and asseverates that the post office is an independent entity distinct from other federal agencies, such as the Veterans Administration. In his view, therefore, the front pay and the collateral benefits do not derive from the same source, and there is all the more reason to apply the collateral source rule simpliciter. Since the district court's discretionary decision in this case is sustainable without regard to the source of the benefits, we need not decide the precise relationship between the post office and other parts of the federal apparatus. 16 the defendant's status as the source (or not) of the collateral benefit comprises, at the most, one factor of many within the mailbag of discretionary considerations. Here, too, the nature and function of equity jurisprudence guide our reasoning. To be sure, equity is not blind to the reality of events. The fact that the payer of damages and the dispenser of a collateral benefit are one and the same, or that they are linked in some economically meaningful sense, tends to make the deployment of the collateral source rule less attractive. See Smith v. OPM, 778 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the collateral source rule may lack force when the collateral source is the defendant), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986); Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d at 591 (similar); Olivas v. United States, 506 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1974) (similar); see also 2 Dobbs, supra, 8.6(2), at 491. It is nonetheless easy to imagine scenarios in which the totality of equitable considerations favors the rule's strict invocation regardless of any affinity between payer and dispenser. To recognize a mechanical same-source exception to the rule would deny district courts the discretion to weigh these other considerations and, thus, would offend the logic of equity. Accordingly, we decline the parties' invitations to view the source of a collateral benefit, without more, as determinative of whether the benefit should be taken into account in fashioning a front pay award.