Opinion ID: 2336262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commonwealth's Use at Trial of Prior Counsel's Testimony

Text: Having determined that Attorney Kennedy was properly allowed to testify as to otherwise privileged communications from Chmiel in order to rebut Chmiel's allegations of ineffectiveness, we turn to the fundamental issue in this case: Was it error for the trial court to allow the Commonwealth to introduce such testimony into Chmiel's second trial? This is a question of first impression not only in this Commonwealth, but, apparently, in almost all other jurisdictions as well. [3] Before addressing Chmiel's arguments on this issue, we must determine the use that was made of the challenged testimony. As noted earlier, the Commonwealth asserted prior to trial that it would introduce the testimony for the purpose of impeaching Chmiel if he chose to testify, and in fact the Commonwealth did utilize the testimony for that purpose. Chmiel argues, however, that the testimony was effectively offered as substantive evidence since the trial court did not give any limiting instruction to the jury. [4] Review of the jury charge reveals that the trial court gave two pertinent instructions to the jury. As part of its general instructions on credibility, the court stated the following: According to the evidence some of the witnesses made a statement on one occasion which appeared to conflict or contradict their testimony given at this trial. That would be when they were on the stand and they said one thing while testifying, then they were asked about something they said regarding the same thing on a prior occasion. You may consider the evidence of this other statement in deciding whether or not to believe this witness. You may, if you choose, regard this evidence as proof of the truth of anything that the witness said in the earlier statement. Later in the charge, after having explained to the jury that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt, the court said the following: We also want to caution you that there was evidence tending to show that the Defendant made false and contradictory statements. They were testified to by various witnesses in this case. So if you believe this evidence, you may consider it as tending to prove the Defendant's consciousness of guilt. You are not required to do so. You should consider and weigh this evidence along with all the other evidence in the case. Obviously one example of Chmiel's false and contradictory statements was the varying accounts of his whereabouts contained in the testimony of Attorney Kennedy, which testimony was read to the jury by the prosecutor during his cross-examination of Chmiel. [5] Thus, the jury could fairly have found, based on the court's instruction, that such testimony constituted evidence tending to prove Chmiel's consciousness of guilt  in other words, substantive evidence. In light of this instruction, we do not agree with the trial court that Attorney Kennedy's testimony was used only for the purpose of impeachment. As the Commonwealth acknowledges, the evidence in question involved two declarants, Chmiel and Kennedy, and was therefore hearsay within hearsay, or double hearsay. If double hearsay is to be admissible, the reliability and trust-worthiness of each declarant must be independently established. Commonwealth v. Scott, 503 Pa. 624, 630, 470 A.2d 91, 94 (1983). This requirement is satisfied where each statement comes within an exception to the hearsay rule. See Commonwealth v. Galloway, 302 Pa.Super. 145, 158-59, 448 A.2d 568, 575 (1982); PACKEL AND POULIN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 806 (1987) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE]. In the present case, the Commonwealth maintains that Attorney Kennedy's testimony comes within the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule and that Chmiel's statements to Attorney Kennedy constitute party admissions, another hearsay exception. Although he does not directly address the hearsay rule, Chmiel indirectly challenges both of these assertions.
We consider, first, Chmiel's claim that the Commonwealth's use of Attorney Kennedy's testimony violated Section 5917 of the Judicial Code, which reads as follows: Whenever any person has been examined as a witness, either for the Commonwealth or for the defense, in any criminal proceeding conducted in or before a court of record, and the defendant has been present and has had an opportunity to examine or cross-examine, if such witness afterwards dies, or is out of the jurisdiction so that he cannot be effectively served with a subpoena, or if he cannot be found, or if he becomes incompetent to testify for any legally sufficient reason properly proven, notes of his examination shall be competent evidence upon a subsequent trial of the same criminal issue. For the purpose of contradicting a witness the testimony given by him in another or in a former proceeding may be orally proved. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5917. As noted earlier, Section 5917 codifies, in the criminal context, the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. See PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 804.1. This Court has held that in order for a witness's prior testimony to be admissible pursuant to Section 5917, the defendant against whom the testimony is to be admitted at a subsequent proceeding must have been afforded a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the first proceeding. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 538 Pa. 297, 311, 648 A.2d 315, 322 (1994); Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 531 Pa. at 588, 614 A.2d at 687. This requires, essentially, that the issue remain the same in both proceedings.... This requirement is in accord with the common law rule that the issues in the first proceeding and hence the purpose for which the testimony was there offered, must have been such that the present opponent (or some person in like interest) had an adequate motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony now offered. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 234 at 491 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, §§ 1386-88 (3rd ed.1940). Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 449 Pa. 599, 601 n. 3, 296 A.2d 768, 770 n. 3 (1972) (additional citations deleted). Addressing Section 5917's predecessor statute, the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, § 3, 19 P.S. § 582, the wording of which was in pertinent part identical to that of Section 5917, this Court interpreted the statute as requiring that the issues at both proceedings be substantially the same. Velasquez, 449 Pa. at 601, 296 A.2d at 770. [6] Chmiel does not dispute that Attorney Kennedy was examined as a witness in a criminal proceeding before a court of record, or that he has since died. He contends, rather, that the ineffectiveness hearing did not address the same criminal issue as his subsequent trial on homicide charges. According to Chmiel, the issue at the evidentiary hearing was Attorney Kennedy's effectiveness at the first trial, and such issue does not imply the commission of a crime or the threat of criminal punishment; the issue at the second trial, in contrast, was Chmiel's guilt or innocence of three charges of murder in the first degree. Therefore, Chmiel argues, it cannot be said that the hearing afforded him a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Attorney Kennedy on the issue that was fundamental to his second trial. We disagree. The issue at the second trial, as at the first, was Chmiel's guilt or innocence of three charges of first-degree murder. The issue at the evidentiary hearing was Attorney Kennedy's effectiveness in defending Chmiel against those charges at the first trial. Central to both issues was Chmiel's credibility: Was he to be believed when he testified concerning his whereabouts on the night in question? As Attorney Kennedy's testimony on this issue was decidedly negative, Chmiel's motive for cross-examining Attorney Kennedy is readily apparent. The fact that Attorney Kennedy would not face criminal punishment if found to be ineffective is, as to this issue, irrelevant. It was not the significance of the hearing to Attorney Kennedy that mattered, but the significance of the hearing to Chmiel. If Chmiel succeeded in demonstrating prior counsel's ineffectiveness with respect to the investigation of alibi witnesses, his own desire to take the stand, or any of the other asserted grounds, he would obtain a new trial (as, indeed, he did on the ground of failure to request an accomplice instruction). A new trial would afford him not only a second chance for acquittal but also, failing that, a second chance at a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. It was therefore in Chmiel's interest to impeach or disprove Attorney Kennedy's testimony concerning each and every allegation of ineffectiveness. Indeed, a more compelling motive for effective cross-examination is difficult to imagine. Therefore, as Chmiel had both the motive and the opportunity to cross-examine Attorney Kennedy at the evidentiary hearing, Section 5917 did not bar the admission of Attorney Kennedy's testimony at Chmiel's second trial. Chmiel cites this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mangini, 493 Pa. 203, 425 A.2d 734 (1981), for the proposition that countervailing principles may preclude the admission of prior recorded testimony even though such testimony was otherwise admissible under Section 5917. The issue in Mangini was whether the testimony of a currently unavailable witness, given at the defendant's first trial, could be introduced at the defendant's second trial, where the second trial had been made necessary by prior counsel's ineffectiveness in failing either to request a competency hearing for the witness in question or to object to his competency on the record. This Court held that the testimony could not be so utilized, as the use in the present trial of the very testimony which has been indelibly stamped with prior counsel's ineffectiveness is offensive to our sense of justice and the notion of fair play. Id. at 210, 425 A.2d at 738. Chmiel asserts that the same result is required here. In Mangini, however, this Court cautioned that our holding today is not a per se rule requiring exclusion of any testimony from a prior trial wherein trial counsel had been ineffective. Id. at 212, 425 A.2d at 739. The Court explained that, to the contrary, the resolution of a similar claim in a different case would require an examination of [a]ll of the factual variables. . . to determine if the ineffectiveness so tainted the testimony sought to be introduced as to affect its reliability or to otherwise render its subsequent use unfair. Id. at 212, 425 A.2d at 738 (footnote omitted). In the present case, prior counsel was found to have been ineffective at the first trial only because he did not request a particular jury instruction. Counsel's failure in that regard did not taint the evidence offered at the first trial. In any event, it was not testimony from the first trial that was introduced at the second trial, but prior counsel's testimony from the evidentiary hearing. Although prior counsel's ineffectiveness made such hearing necessary, it did not taint the testimony offered there. [7] Thus, neither case law nor logic warrants the extension of Mangini to the present situation.
Next, Chmiel argues that, under this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992), Attorney Kennedy's ineffectiveness hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial because it was based on the attorney's notes of his conversations with Chmiel. We disagree. The decision in Lively followed from the lead case of Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986), which held that prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness may be used as substantive evidence where the declarant is a witness at trial and available for cross-examination. While acknowledging the traditional view that such statements were hearsay if offered for truth and, as hearsay, were too unreliable to be admitted as substantive evidence, this Court nevertheless concluded that since the witness in question would testify in court, where she would be under oath and subject to cross-examination, the acknowledged dangers of hearsay were largely nonexistent. Id. at 128-29, 507 A.2d at 69. Lively limited the rule of Brady by holding that a prior inconsistent statement of a non-party witness may be used as substantive evidence only if it was given under highly reliable circumstances: 1) under oath at a formal legal proceeding; 2) reduced to a writing signed and adopted by the declarant; or 3) recorded verbatim contemporaneously with the making of the statement. Id. at 471, 610 A.2d at 8. In the present case, Chmiel contends that Attorney Kennedy became a non-party witness for purposes of the second trial. Chmiel argues that because he did not adopt Attorney Kennedy's notes in any fashion, and in fact denied making the statements attributed to him by Attorney Kennedy, the notes themselves would be inadmissible. Therefore, he asserts, Attorney Kennedy's testimony should be inadmissible as well. The principles of Brady and Lively are not relevant, however, unless the matter at issue involves the prior inconsistent statement of a non-party witness. Here, however, Attorney Kennedy made no prior inconsistent statement; only his testimony from the evidentiary hearing was utilized at Chmiel's second trial. Therefore, Attorney Kennedy cannot be the non-party witness for purposes of a Brady-Lively analysis. Moreover, his recorded testimony, as noted earlier, was admissible under the former testimony exception as codified in Section 5917. Chmiel did make prior inconsistent statements, in the form of his statements to Attorney Kennedy; and those statements were effectively allowed into evidence at his second trial. Chmiel, however, was not a non-party witness. To the contrary, he was the defendant, and his statements to Attorney Kennedy were admissible under the hearsay exception for party admissions. Commonwealth v. Sherard, 456 Pa. 505, 508, 321 A.2d 372, 373 (1974); see also Galloway, 302 Pa.Super. at 158, 448 A.2d at 575. [Party a]dmissions . . . are admissible because it is fair in an adversary system that a party's prior statements be used against him if they are inconsistent with his position at trial. In addition, a party can hardly complain of his inability to cross-examine himself. A party can put himself on the stand and explain or contradict his former statements. PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 805 (footnotes omitted). In sum, as the reliability concerns underlying Brady and Lively are not present here, the Brady-Lively precedents pose no barrier to the admissibility of Attorney Kennedy's testimony.
Chmiel argues that even if the Commonwealth's use at trial of Attorney Kennedy's testimony surmounted the statutory and common law bars to admissibility, it cannot overcome the hurdle of constitutionality. Among the constitutional rights violated by the use of such testimony, Chmiel contends, was the right, guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution [8] and Article I, Section 9 [9] of the Pennsylvania Constitution, to confront the witnesses against him. Although the hearsay rules and the federal Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, the overlap is not complete. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that `a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination.' Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965)). In Roberts, the Supreme Court explained that [t]he Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. Id. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538. First, it establishes a rule of necessity: in the usual case, the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. Id. Second, once the declarant is shown to be unavailable, the Clause requires that the declarant's statement be shown to bear adequate indicia of reliability if it is to be admitted into evidence. Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. (footnote omitted). While it is thus within the realm of possibility that an otherwise admissible out-of-court statement could run afoul of the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, Chmiel has failed to demonstrate that this has occurred in the present case. The witness in question was unavailable; the witness's testimony met the requirements for admissibility set forth in Section 5917 of the Judicial Code, including the requirement that Chmiel be given a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness; and Chmiel's statements to the witness came within the recognized hearsay exception for party admissions. As Chmiel's argument for inadmissibility under the federal Confrontation Clause is not distinguishable from his argument for inadmissibility under Section 5917, his reliance upon the former is without merit. Chmiel also maintains, correctly, that this Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause of our state Constitution as being more stringent than its federal counterpart. Commonwealth v. Louden, 536 Pa. 180, 187, 638 A.2d 953, 956-57 (1994); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 527 Pa. 472, 478, 594 A.2d 281, 283-84 (1991). He does not assert that Section 5917 violates the state constitutional provision, however, but only that the procedure at issue in this case did not meet the requirements of Section 5917. In Section III.A, supra, we have found that argument to be meritless. Moreover, as this Court observed in Ludwig, we have recognized exceptions to the constitutional right to confrontation . . . only in those instances in which the accused has already had the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him face to face. Id. at 480, 594 A.2d at 284. Chmiel had such an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, this issue requires no further consideration. Chmiel also argues that the use of Attorney Kennedy's testimony at his second trial violated his Fifth Amendment right to be protected against compelled self-incrimination. [10] He contends that through the compelled disclosure of the statements that he had made in confidence to Attorney Kennedy, Kennedy became Chmiel incriminating himself. At first blush, Chmiel's argument appears to be contradicted by case law. The defendant in Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. 486, 447 A.2d 250 (1982), chose to testify at his first trial but to remain silent at his second trial. At the second trial, the Commonwealth, over the defendant's objection, was permitted to admit into evidence certain portions of the defendant's testimony at earlier proceedings, including the first trial, to show that he had made conflicting statements and thus to imply consciousness of guilt. This Court affirmed, explaining that [t]he fact that [the defendant] exercised his right of silence during the second trial did not insulate him from the consequences of his earlier testimony. It has long been recognized that testimony from an earlier trial may be introduced in the prosecution's case against a defendant regardless of whether that defendant takes the stand or not in the second proceeding. Id. at 497, 447 A.2d at 256 (citations omitted). As the Superior Court had held in Commonwealth v. House, 6 Pa.Super. 92 (1897), [A defendant] cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, but if he gives it voluntarily he cannot object to having it used against him. His constitutional privilege, as far as that testimony is concerned, is waived, and cannot be reclaimed in any subsequent trial of the same indictment. Id., 6 Pa.Super. at 104, quoted with approval in Boyle, 498 Pa. at 498, 447 A.2d at 256. Of similar import, although involving a different privilege, is the case of Commonwealth v. Santiago, 541 Pa. 188, 662 A.2d 610 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1053, 116 S.Ct. 722, 133 L.Ed.2d 674 (1996). The defendant in that case argued that the trial court had erred in admitting psychiatric testimony, introduced in his first trial where insanity was the defense, into his second trial, where he did not assert such a defense. Citing its earlier decision in Boyle, this Court concluded that because Appellant voluntarily waived the psychiatrist-patient privilege, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5944, by pursuing an insanity defense in his first trial, he may not reclaim the privilege in a subsequent trial. Id. at 197-98, 662 A.2d at 614 (footnote omitted). These decisions imply that, absent other considerations, a right or privilege once waived is always waived and that the defendant who waives a right or privilege cannot thereafter object to the use that is made of the formerly privileged communications. Although Chmiel did not waive his attorney-client privilege directly, he did so indirectly for the purpose of demonstrating his prior counsel's ineffectiveness. The Commonwealth argues that the evidence that resulted from such waiver no longer retain[ed] its privileged character once it was disclosed in open court for third parties to hear. Chmiel argues, however, that another, crucial consideration was present in this case: his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. He asserts that it is precisely because he chose to exercise his right to effective counsel by challenging his former attorney's performance that he ended up in a quagmire of repercussions. One such repercussion, he maintains, was the violation of his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. Does a defendant really have a right to effective assistance of counsel, he asks, if, by challenging his attorney's performance, he runs the risk of having his confidences used against him at a second trial? In effect, Chmiel posits that, if the trial court's ruling is affirmed, a defendant who was represented by ineffective counsel will face a constitutionally impermissible choice: he can challenge the effectiveness of prior counsel, at the risk that the confidences which will be disclosed in the process will be admitted against him at a second trial; or he can ensure that his statements to prior counsel remain confidential, at the cost of forgoing any possibility of a new trial at which he would be effectively represented. The importance of the right to counsel requires that we give careful consideration to Chmiel's argument. For at least thirty-five years the right to counsel has been recognized as a fundamental right, one that is essential to the goal of ensuring that every criminal defendant receives a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Moreover, [i]t is axiomatic that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Kale, 331 Pa.Super. 155, 161, 480 A.2d 291, 294 (1984) (emphasis added) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, if a defendant in Chmiel's situation chooses not to seek the effective representation to which he is entitled because he fears that the price of success will be his compelled self-incrimination, through the testimony of prior counsel, upon retrial. The rationale underlying the attorney-client privilege suggests that there is reason for such concern. The purpose of the privilege is not to further the fact-finding process, but to foster a confidence between attorney and client that will lead to a trusting and open dialogue. Sims, 513 Pa. at 374, 521 A.2d at 394; Maguigan, 511 Pa. at 125, 511 A.2d at 1334. As explained by Professor Mechem in his treatise on the law of agency: The purposes and necessities of the relation between a client and his attorney require, in many cases, on the part of the client, the fullest and freest disclosures to the attorney of the client's objects, motives and acts. This disclosure is made in the strictest confidence, relying upon the attorney's honor and fidelity. To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance. Based upon considerations of public policy, therefore, the law wisely declares that all confidential communications and disclosures, made by a client to his legal adviser for the purpose of obtaining his professional aid or advice, shall be strictly privileged;  that the attorney shall not be permitted, without the consent of his client,  and much less will he be compelled  to reveal or disclose communications made to him under such circumstances. Sims, 513 Pa. at 373-74, 521 A.2d at 394 (quoting 2 MECHEM ON AGENCY § 2297 (2d ed.1914)); Maguigan, 511 Pa. at 124-25, 511 A.2d at 1333-34 (quoting same); Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 462 Pa. 138, 148, 338 A.2d 584, 589 (1975) (quoting same). It has been suggested that the reluctance of clients to disclose unfavorable information to counsel is even more pronounced in the criminal field. In criminal cases, the difficulty of obtaining full disclosure from the accused is well known, and would certainly become an absolute impossibility if the defendant knew that the lawyer could be compelled to report what he had been told. 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (4th ed.1992). The critical importance of the attorney-client privilege to the administration of the criminal justice system is indicated not only by its ancient lineage, but also by its codification in statute. [T]he existence of a statutory privilege is an indication that the legislature acknowledges the significance of a particular interest and has chosen to protect that interest. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 529 Pa. 268, 282, 602 A.2d 1290, 1298, cert. denied, 504 U.S. 977, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992). Given the concerns that mandate recognition of an attorney-client privilege, it is not unrealistic to suggest that use of testimony of prior counsel as in this case would have a chilling effect on defendants' exercise of their right to the effective assistance of counsel. Knowing of the possibility that his counsel may ultimately be required to testify against him, [11] a defendant may decide that counsel cannot be trusted with the most damaging information concerning his case; or he may decide not to challenge counsel's effectiveness, fearing that his ability to mount a successful defense at a second trial has been fatally undermined by the admissibility of his communications to prior counsel. The fundamental unfairness of requiring a defendant to choose either of those options is illustrated by the present case: the situation that such a choice seeks to avoid  the admission at a second trial of prior counsel's evidentiary hearing testimony  has occurred precisely because prior counsel was shown to have been ineffective. Arguably a defendant can avoid such an undesirable result by limiting his disclosures to his attorney, or by raising only such ineffectiveness claims as will not lead to the disclosure of incriminating statements. Such argument, in our view, presupposes an unrealistic degree of foresight on the part of the defendant and unreasonably restricts his ability to prepare an adequate defense. Accordingly, we hold that the policy inherent in the legislative recognition and judicial enforcement of the attorney-client privilege, as it implicates a defendant's exercise of the right to the effective assistance of counsel and to freedom from compelled self-incrimination, restricts the use as well as the scope of permitted disclosures. Just as an attorney may not respond to allegations of ineffectiveness by disclosing client confidences unrelated to such allegations, so the client confidences properly disclosed by an attorney at an ineffectiveness hearing may not be imported into the client's subsequent trial on criminal charges. The trial court's decision to the contrary in the present case was error. Such error was not harmless unless the Commonwealth is able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 409, 383 A.2d 155, 164 (1978). On this record, the Commonwealth cannot do so. Martin Chmiel testified that David Chmiel confessed to having committed the murders; David testified that he did not commit the murders but that he believed that Martin had done so. Although the record contained circumstantial evidence to support Martin's testimony, the credibility of the principal witnesses was nevertheless crucial. The damaging effect of Attorney Kennedy's testimony on the credibility of David Chmiel is beyond dispute, and the admission of such testimony was therefore not harmless. Our decision requires that we vacate the judgment of sentence imposed upon David Chmiel and remand for a new trial. In doing so, we note that there is little difference as far as the Constitution is concerned between permitting prior inconsistent statements to be used only for impeachment purposes, and permitting them to be used for substantive purposes as well. Green, 399 U.S. at 164, 90 S.Ct. at 1938 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). Given the extremely prejudicial nature of a defendant's prior inconsistent statements as testified to by the defendant's former counsel, we conclude that to ask the jury to consider former counsel's testimony for the purpose of impeachment but not as substantive evidence would be to ask the impossible. Accordingly, Attorney Kennedy's testimony shall not be utilized for any purpose at retrial. The judgment of sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.