Opinion ID: 533540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trade Dress Liability

Text: 3 A & E is precluded from challenging on appeal the trial judge's instruction that A & E bore the burden of proof on this issue. The instruction was jointly submitted by A & E and Zip Dee, and A & E never objected to it before it was submitted to the jury. A party who requests an instruction invites any error contained therein and, absent an objection before the instruction is given, waives appellate review of the correctness of the instruction. Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1493 (9th Cir.1986). Even if we were to accept A & E's contention that it only acquiesced in the erroneous instruction, that would not change matters. Rule 51 states: No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict.... On its face the rule is not limited to situations in which the loser actively invited the erroneous instruction, and the Ninth Circuit has never so limited the rule. See, e.g., Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.1988). 4 Deland v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1331, 1335-37 (9th Cir.1985), cited by A & E, is not to the contrary. Deland involved a challenge to a district court's submission of the issue of contract interpretation to the jury, and to the accompanying jury instruction which stated the legal standard by which the jury was to interpret the contract. The doctrine of invited error was invoked to preclude the appellant from challenging the judge's submission of the interpretation issue to the jury. As to the jury instruction, however, the court invoked Rule 51, properly without resort to the doctrine of invited error. Id. at 1337. Thus, Deland is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's approach in cases such as Benigni, 879 F.2d at 473. 5 Contrary to A & E's contention, the Ninth Circuit does not recognize a plain error exception for erroneous jury instructions. E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. General Portland, Inc., 885 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir.1989); Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 966 (9th Cir.1978). 6 A & E also waived its right to argue that the jury verdict of non-functionality, a question of fact, Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir.1988), was not supported by substantial evidence. A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1345, 1347 (9th Cir.1986); Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 50(b). Here, A & E's counsel made no motion, but remarked to the court that after Zip Dee completed argument on its motions he was going to make a motion ... for a directed verdict, too. (Our emphasis.) We have reviewed the precedents cited by A & E, but conclude they lend no support to A & E's argument that an expressed intention to move for a directed verdict satisfies the requirements of Rule 50. In addition, even if A & E had moved for a directed verdict, it would have had to state specific evidentiary deficiencies in order to preserve its right to challenge the jury verdict on appeal. Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, Inc., 806 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir.1986). Yet A & E stated no grounds for a directed verdict. 7 This court can review a jury verdict despite a party's failure to move for a directed verdict [o]nly where there is such plain error apparent on the face of the record that failure to review would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Williams v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 806 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir.1986)). This standard, however, requires an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict, Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted), a standard which cannot be met by A & E in this case.
8 The judge was not required to instruct the jury that it must consider actual confusion in determining whether confusion was likely. It would be impractical and confusing to give jurors a laundry list of factors to consider in resolving every factual dispute. Here, the judge's instruction told them that they could consider several specific factors as well as their experience as citizens of the community and the general knowledge [they] have acquired. It was within their general knowledge to recognize that actual confusion was probative on the issue of likelihood of confusion. 9 We also reject A & E's argument that the jury verdict of likelihood of confusion was not supported by the evidence. A jury verdict of likelihood of confusion is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 846 n. 12 (9th Cir.1987). Here, because of its failure to move for a directed verdict, A & E cannot undo the jury's finding unless it proves there is no evidence to support the verdict. Herrington, 834 F.2d at 1500. We conclude A & E has not met this burden.