Opinion ID: 2023926
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Indiana's Statute

Text: Matheney alleges that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to preserve numerous constitutional objections to the Indiana death penalty statute. Matheney concedes that we have rejected many of his constitutional challenges, (Petitioner's Br. at 106); counsel appear to offer them in contemplation of federal appeal, ( see id. ), though many of these have also been rejected in courts of the United States. For those constitutional challenges already decided adversely to Matheney's claims, this Court does not choose to reassess its position at this time. Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775, 783 (Ind.1988). Even if we did so choose, however, it would be highly unlikely that we would find prior counsel's performance substandard for failing to make these challenges, considering we have already spoken to the contrary concerning them. Accordingly, we will address here the alleged failings of prior counsel as to constitutional challenges not already addressed adversely to Matheney by this Court. [21] (a) Finding of Probable Cause for Capital Trial Eligibility. Matheney says counsel should have argued that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(a) violates the United States [22] and Indiana [23] Constitutions facially and as applied because it allows a defendant to be subjected to a death-qualified jury without first having a neutral fact-finder determine, after an adversarial proceeding, probable cause for death eligibility. According to present counsel, studies show death-qualified juries to be more likely to vote for conviction than non-death qualified juries. Because prosecutors have discretion to seek the death penalty, Matheney argues that they can impermissibly use their discretion to impanel death-qualified juries just to increase their chances of securing a conviction in close cases or of having a jury which is more prosecution-oriented. [24] As Matheney concedes, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the use of death-qualified juries to be constitutional. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). In so doing, that court referred to death-qualified juries as impartial. Id. at 180, 106 S.Ct. at 1768. In light of this suggestion, Matheney's counsel was not ineffective for failing to claim otherwise. [25] (b) The Felony/Murder Aggravator. Matheney claims that the felony/murder aggravator in the death penalty statute violates the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions facially and as applied because it is vague, overbroad, and fails to narrow meaningfully the class of death-eligible murderers. [26] Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) provides: (b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (West Supp.1989) (amended 1993). Matheney claims that the phrase while committing or attempting to commit is vague, violating United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) (stating that criminal codes must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden). (Petitioner's Br. at 109). Other than this bald assertion, however, Matheney provides no evidence or argument as to how a person of ordinary intelligence would fail understand what it means. Without more, he offers little grounds for the claim that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to make this meritless claim. Matheney also claims that Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) is overbroad, because the majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with another crime. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 [93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-16, 37 L.Ed.2d 830] (1972). (Petitioner's Br. at 109.) Matheney's overbreadth argument, however, is confused and misplaced. Overbreadth is a constitutional doctrine primarily applied in the First Amendment context. It is designed to protect innocent persons from having the legitimate exercise of their constitutionally protected freedoms fall within the ambit of a statute written more broadly than needed to proscribe illegitimate and unprotected conduct. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612, 93 S.Ct. at 2915-16; Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-27 (2nd ed.1988). Matheney makes no argument as to what legitimate conduct might possibly fall within the felony murder aggravator, nor could he. Matheney also claims that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) violates Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), by failing to narrow meaningfully the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. Besides this assertion, the only argument Matheney makes is that the majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with another crime. (Petitioner's Br. at 109.) Matheney's argument fails for at least two reasons. First, he provides no authority for his proposition that a majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with other crimes. We would be very reluctant to find a statute, which enters our courtroom clothed with a presumption of constitutionality, Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 209, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind.1976), unconstitutional on a single, unsupported assertion of fact. Second, even if it were true that a majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with another crime, this has no specific relevance to the aggravator at issue here, which does not make the commission of any other crime an aggravating circumstance, but only the commission of certain enumerated felonies. We are unable to find Matheney's original lawyers ineffective for failing to make this claim. (c) The Lying in Wait Aggravator. Matheney argues that the lying in wait aggravator, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (West Supp.1996), is facially vague, and vague and overbroad as applied. We begin by rejecting his overbreadth challenge here for the same reason we rejected it above pertaining to the felony murder aggravator. See supra part IV.C.3(b). Next we note that we have already rejected Matheney's ineffective assistance claim regarding a challenge to the jury instructions given regarding this aggravator. See supra part IV.C.2(d). For the reasons set forth there, we reject his repeated as applied challenges here. Finally, Matheney challenges our interpretation of the lying in wait aggravator as applied in our direct appeal opinion of his case, arguing that under the language we used in summing up the facts in support of our affirmance, the lying in wait aggravator could apply to virtually any intentional killing. (Petitioner's Br. at 111.) Actually, appellate counsel argued the meaning of this statute with sufficient persuasion that it drew a dissent on this very point. Matheney, 583 N.E.2d at 1209 (DeBruler, J., concurring and dissenting). Counsel did not carry the day, but was hardly ineffective. (d) Aggravation Contentions. Matheney claims that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b), which sets out the aggravating circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty in Indiana, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and Article One, Section Sixteen, of the Indiana Constitution. He says the statute fails to state specifically that only charged aggravators may be considered by the sentencer, thus allowing, by omission, the sentencer to consider uncharged and invalid aggravating circumstances. In support of his federal constitutional claim, Matheney cites Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 2928, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992) (per curiam). Espinosa does state that the weighing of an invalid aggravating circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment, id. (citations omitted), and does find the aggravator at issue in the case [27] invalid. However, as we have observed, Espinosa and similar federal cases focus upon vagueness, not upon whether the aggravators used were among those prescribed by the applicable death penalty statute; they therefore do not appear to suggest that non-statutory aggravating circumstances are necessarily invalid. To the contrary, once statutory aggravating circumstances have circumscribed the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, the federal Constitution does not require the sentencer to ignore other possible aggravating circumstances to the extent authorized in a state's capital sentencing statute. Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 878-79, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743-44, 77 L.Ed.2d 235. Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 954-55 (Ind. 1994). Based on this assessment, we held in Bivins that a trial court's consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 955. In support of his state constitutional claim, Matheney cites Bivins, 642 N.E.2d 928, where we held that consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances violates Article One, Section Sixteen, of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 955-57. In Bivins, the trial court considered victim impact evidence and did not distinguish its findings as to the death penalty from those relating to the sentences imposed for non-capital felony convictions. See id. at 953-55. In Matheney's trial, the jury instructions clearly informed the jury that it could only consider the charged (and valid) aggravators. [28] The trial court specifically mentioned only the two charged aggravators in its sentencing statement. ( Id. at 701-02.) Thus, the fact that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b) does not specifically state that only listed aggravators may be considered is irrelevant, because Matheney's sentencer clearly considered only valid aggravators. Accordingly, Matheney's trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to make the assertion he advances here. (e) Mitigation Contentions. Matheney makes various arguments for why Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c), which specifies the mitigating circumstances a sentencer is to consider at the penalty phase of a capital trial, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article One, Sections Twelve, Thirteen, and Sixteen of Indiana's constitution. [29] The opening sentence of the section states, The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows:.... Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(c) (West Supp.1996) (emphasis added). Citing federal precedent holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering mitigating evidence, Matheney claims that the term may makes the consideration of mitigating evidence optional, thus allowing the sentencer to refuse to consider mitigating evidence. We disagree. The term may in this sentence simply means that any one of the listed mitigators following that sentence are permissible for consideration, including the catch-all provision which states, Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration. Id.; see supra part IV.C.2(e). This interpretation is the more reasonable one, particularly when viewed in light of § 35-50-2-9(e)(2), [30] which requires a jury, before it can recommend death, to consider any existing mitigating evidence in order to find it outweighed by the charged aggravator(s). Because the code section at issue, when read in the light of the other relevant sections, does not make the consideration of mitigation optional, Matheney's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make the argument advanced here. Matheney says counsel should have argued that Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(c) sets up barriers to the consideration of mitigating evidence in a capital case, first, by failing to specify that the only prerequisite to considering mitigating evidence is its relevance to the defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the crime, and, second, by failing to provide any standard of proof. As to his first claim, Matheney fails to provide any insight into why the absence of such a specification would prevent a sentencer from considering otherwise relevant mitigating evidence. Thus, this claim is waived for failing to present any cogent argument in support of it. Armstead, 538 N.E.2d at 945. As to his second claim, we reject it for the reasons stated previously in part IV.C.2(g). Matheney also claims that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c) is unconstitutional because it fails to provide an adequate definition of mitigation. The entire support Matheney provides for this contention, however, is as follows: The Supreme Court of Indiana has noted that mitigating circumstances ... include virtually anything favorable to the accused. Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817, 822 (Ind.1989). This definition of mitigation is not within the common understanding of the average juror. Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (Ind.1990) (technical and legal phrases used in instructions should be defined). (Petitioner's Br. at 115-16.) We think the breadth of this definition and the ordinary understanding of the word mitigating is such that counsel who elected not to make the present contention were acting within the scope of the Sixth Amendment promise of effective counsel. Matheney also argues that the mitigating circumstance no significant history of prior criminal conduct, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(c)(1) (West Supp.1996), is unconstitutional because the adjective significant creates an unacceptable risk that the sentencer will view the defendant's record in terms of aggravation only, thereby converting the absence of a mitigator into an aggravator. (Petitioner's Br. at 116.) We see no reason to assume that juries would make such a leap. Matheney's earlier lawyers did not fail their client by taking a pass on this contention. Matheney also argues that the mitigator The defendant was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time the murder was committed, § 35-50-2-9(c)(7), is unconstitutional because it considers only chronological age, rather than also considering the defendant's emotional and intellectual age. Matheney's only support for this proposition, however, is a single sentence: These are more accurate indicators of culpability than chronological age. See Lockett, supra . (Petitioner's Br. at 117.) This argument is deficient for several reasons. First, it cites Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), for its proposition that emotional and intellectual age are more accurate indicators of culpability than chronological age. Not only is See Lockett, supra,  without more, an entirely inadequate citation of authority, but we can find nothing in Lockett which remotely suggests that intellectual or emotional age (whatever those may mean) are better indicators of culpability than chronological age. [31] Second, even if intellectual or emotional age is something that should be considered in a particular defendant's case, such evidence could be introduced and argued under the catch-all mitigator. We cannot see how Matheney's counsel were ineffective for failing to make the claim advanced here.