Opinion ID: 2262255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employment-at-Will In New Jersey

Text: Until today, New Jersey courts have remained in the minority and have followed the English view as enunciated in Willis v. Wyllys Corp., supra, 98 N.J.L. 180, 119 A. 24. In Willis, plaintiff received an offer letter in which the employer quoted the salary in annual terms, just as in Bernard's case. The letter stated: Dear Mr. Willis  Confirming the arrangements made with you at our conference last Tuesday we engage your services as Assistant Comptroller in Charge of Factory Accounting with a salary at the rate of $7,500.00 per year, with the understanding that if the connection proves satisfactory the salary, beginning with January 1, 1921, will be at the rate of $9,000.00 per year. In further confirmation of our arrangements it is understood that the company will pay the expenses of moving your household effects from Cleveland. I hope that you managed to make your train and arrived home safely, and I am looking forward to seeing you next Monday, the 12th inst. Very truly yours, (signed) A. Luery, Comptroller [emphasis added.] Willis commenced work on July 12, 1920. At the end of February, 1921, the company fired Willis, without cause. Willis sued for damages claiming that the company had hired him for one year. Defendant countered that plaintiff was an employee at will. The Court concluded that the letter alone, viewed as the entire contract, established a year-long term of employment. 98 N.J.L. at 181, 119 A. 24. Significantly, the Court noted that defendant had proposed and paid for plaintiff's move from Cleveland, which would indicate a desire to establish some degree of permanent employment. Id. at 182, 119 A. 24. At trial the court allowed Willis to show that the letter was in pursuance of an oral conversation in which he claimed that there was a definite proposition and agreement of hiring by the year. Id. at 181, 119 A. 24. However, although the Court of Errors and Appeals considered only the letter agreement, it ruled that any error in the consideration of that parol evidence was harmless. Id. at 182, 119 A. 24. After examining the letter agreement, the Court found a year-to-year contract. Although the Court recognized that most American jurisdictions had adopted the American view establishing employment-at-will, it found that prior New Jersey cases had adhered to the English view. Accordingly, it ruled that the trial court would have been justified in instructing the jury that the offer letter had established a hiring by the year. Our courts have reviewed numerous employment cases in the seventy years since Willis; however, no court in fifty years has explicitly discussed Willis. [1] In Dennis v. Thermoid Co., 128 N.J.L. 303, 25 A. 2d 886 (E. & A. 1942), the Court explicitly recognized Willis' validity, and held that the facts supported the conclusion that defendant intended to hire plaintiff for one year. As in the Willis case, plaintiff in Dennis had moved from across the country to assume a new position. The Court noted that Dennis had family and friends in Dallas, and after much persuasion had agreed to move. The Court found that it was obvious that the parties did not consider the move temporary since the plaintiff had given years of faithful and unstinting work to the defendant company [and] [h]e was disposing of his home, moving his family to a strange city and undertaking new work in an unknown territory. Id. at 304, 25 A. 2d 886. In addition, like the Wyllys Corporation, Thermoid Company had agreed to pay all of plaintiff's moving expenses. Based on these facts, the Court found that not only did the contract guarantee employment for one year, but if the employment continued for a day after the first year, the contract guaranteed an additional year's work. Id. at 305, 25 A. 2d 886. Defendant persuasively argues that because there was not one shred of evidence of any detrimental reliance, such as plaintiff having to move across the country, his case is more analogous to the more recent case of Hindle v. Morrison Steel Co., 92 N.J. Super. 75, 223 A. 2d 193 (App.Div. 1966). In Hindle, the court held that in the absence of an explicit contract, employment is generally at-will and subject to termination with or without cause. Id. at 81, 223 A. 2d 193. The Hindle court, without citing Willis, concluded that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that his employer had established a fixed term of employment, rather than one at-will. 92 N.J. Super. at 81, 223 A. 2d 193. Like Bernard, Hindle had argued that the company had hired him at an annual salary and paid him annual bonuses, thereby establishing year-to-year employment. However, the court, not impressed by the plaintiff's argument, found that the stating of salary and benefits in annual terms does not, standing alone, rebut the presumption of employment-at-will. Id. at 82, 223 A. 2d 193. Instead, the court looked to the surrounding circumstances, including industry practice, and determined that the plaintiff had failed to provide evidence to show that the defendant had hired him for a specific length of time. Ibid. (citing Dennis v. Thermoid Co., 128 N.J.L. 303, 25 A. 2d 886 (E. & A. 1942)). More recently, this Court has definitively established employment-at-will as the prevailing doctrine in this state, though we have recognized exceptions. In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A. 2d 505 (1980), we ruled that unless employers act contrary to a clear mandate of public policy, they may discharge at-will employees for any reason. Id. at 72, 417 A. 2d 505. See also Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 609 A. 2d 11 (1992) (holding that oil company's firing of employee who failed random urine screening did not violate clear mandate of public policy). We have also ruled that provisions in a company's employment manual, distributed to and relied on by employees, may contractually bind the company to its terms, even if the employment was for an indefinite term and thus, would otherwise be at-will. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, supra, 99 N.J. at 285-86, 491 A. 2d 1257. Thus, we found that absent a prominent and clear disclaimer in the employee manual, a court could enforce an implied promise that an employee could be fired only for cause. Id. at 285-86, 491 A. 2d 1257. Finally, in Shebar v. Sanyo Business Sys. Corp., supra, 111 N.J. 276, 544 A. 2d 377, we reinforced our view that under the New Jersey common law, employers have been able to terminate at-will employees for cause or for no cause at all provided that the firing does not offend public policy. Id. at 285, 544 A. 2d 377; Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra, 109 N.J. at 192, 536 A. 2d 237. Although we warned that not every relinquishment of a prior job or job offer would constitute consideration sufficient to overcome the at-will presumption, we held that in Shebar's case, a reasonable jury could make such inferences based on the facts surrounding that case. 111 N.J. at 289-90, 544 A. 2d 377.