Opinion ID: 1858801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breach of the Peace

Text: Madden contends that the defendants broke a lock on a gate barring access to Container's property; therefore, he insists, the repossession of the skidder was unlawful because it was accomplished by a breach of the peace. The defendants insist that the repossession was concluded peacefully and, therefore, that it was lawfully accomplished pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 7-9-503. Section 7-9-503 contains the following self-help provision for secured creditors: Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without a breach of the peace or may proceed by action. Id. (Emphasis added.) Section 7-9-503, the Alabama Legislature's enactment of U.C.C. § 9-503, codifies former law regulating repossession through self-help. Baker v. Keeble, 362 F.Supp. 355 (M.D.Ala. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 517, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1974). Neither the drafters of U.C.C. § 9-503 nor the Alabama Legislature attempted to define the phrase breach of the peace as it relates to the conduct of secured creditors seeking to regain possession through self-help. See Comment, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Codea Modern Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 Dickinson L.Rev. 351, 355 (1978). It has been suggested that the choice of the term `breach of the peace' was not inadvertent and that through the use of that phrase the draftsmen intended to build upon the prior history of the self-help remedy. Id. at 354-55. In the context of the limited privilege traditionally accorded to secured creditors to enter the land of another to reclaim collateral, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 183 (1965) is instructive. That section suggests: (1) Except as otherwise agreed, a conditional vendor ... of a thing who is entitled to immediate possession thereof ... is privileged, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, to enter land in the possession of the vendee ... for the purpose of taking possession of the thing and removing it from the land. (2) The privilege stated in Subsection (1) is also available against . . . . (b) a possessor of land who, knowing or having reason to know of the transaction, has placed the thing on the land or consented to its being placed there. Id. (Emphasis added.) Under the Restatement view, the question of the extent of the creditor's privilege turns on the reasonableness of the manner and time of the entry. Of particular relevance to the facts of this case is comment h to § 183, which states: h. Use of force. The privilege stated in this Section is one of entry in a peaceable and reasonable manner to remove the thing from the land. It does not justify the use of any force to enter, to remove the thing, or to prevent interference by the possessor. Since the conditional seller or other actor has parted freely and voluntarily with his original possession, he is not privileged to recover it by force, and must resort to his remedy at law. Compare § 101 and Comments. The actor will therefore be liable if he breaks and enters the land, as by removing a padlock. Id. (Emphasis added.) [3] Under the Restatement principle, therefore, the use of force, such as the breaking or removing of a padlock, does not comport with concepts of reasonableness and peaceableness. The principle defining the creditor's privilege in these terms is not inconsistent with the standard applied by this Court under pre-Code law, as well as under § 7-9-503, which prohibits self-help at the expense of the public peace. Under Alabama law, the secured creditor, in exercising the privilege to enter upon the premises of another to repossess collateral, may not perpetrate [a]ny act or action manifesting force or violence, or naturally calculated to provide a breach of the peace, Crews & Green v. Parker, 192 Ala. 383, 387, 68 So. 287, 288 (1915); see also Street v. Sinclair, 71 Ala. 110 (1881); Folmar & Sons v. Copeland & Brantley, 57 Ala. 588 (1877). Neither may a creditor resort to constructive force, such as threats or intimidation, Ford Motor Co. v. Ditton, 52 Ala. App. 555, 557, 295 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.Civ. App.), cert. denied, 292 Ala. 423, 295 So.2d 412 (1974); or to fraud, trickery, chicanery, and subterfuge, Ford Motor Credit Company v. Byrd, 351 So.2d 557, 559 (Ala. 1977). The phrase breach of the peace has been further defined as any situation tending to disturb the public order. Reno v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 378 So.2d 1103, 1105 (Ala.1979). It is a disturbance of the public tranquility, by any act or conduct inciting to violence or tending to provoke or excite others to break the peace, or, as is sometimes said, it includes any violation of any law enacted to preserve peace and good order. City of Akron v. Mingo, 169 Ohio St. 511, 513, 160 N.E.2d 225, 226 (1959). Consequently, actual [c]onfrontation or violence is not necessary to finding a breach of the peace. Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colorado Cent. Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 474 (Wyo. 1990). The courts of Alabama, as well as those of its sister states, have recognized that a mere trespass does not automatically constitute a breach of the peace. In Reno v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 378 So.2d 1103 (Ala.1979), agents of the creditor located the plaintiff's automobile in the parking lot of the Western Super Market in Tarrent, where the plaintiff was at work on the night shift. Id. Using a duplicate key, the agents started the automobile and drove it off the parking lot without the knowledge of the debtor. In affirming a summary judgment in favor of the creditor, this Court implicitly held that a creditor is privileged to enter the parking lot of a business open to the public in order to take possession of collateral. See Ash v. Peoples Bank of Greensboro, 500 So.2d 5 (Ala.1986) (where debtor's automobile was parked on a public street and debtor was not present when the automobile was repossessed by the creditor's agent, it was undisputed that no breach of the peace occurred); Ford Motor Co. v. Ditton, 52 Ala.App. 555, 295 So.2d 408 (Ala.Civ.App.) (where vehicle was repossessed from parking lot at debtor's place of employment without debtor's knowledge, no breach of the peace occurred), cert. denied, 292 Ala. 423, 295 So.2d 412 (1974); see also Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.1987) (under Mississippi law, repossession of vehicle from debtor's open driveway was, as a matter of law, not a breach of the peace); Oaklawn Bank v. Baldwin, 289 Ark. 79, 709 S.W.2d 91, 92 (1986) (where creditor's agent repossessed vehicle from debtor's driveway without entering any gates, doors or other barricades to reach the truck, no breach of the peace occurred); Raffa v. Dania Bank, 321 So.2d 83, 85 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975) (where vehicle was parked partially under an enclosed carport in debtor's driveway, no breach of the peace occurred, it being undisputed that no door, not even one to a garage, on the [debtor's] premises was opened, much less broken); Census Federal Credit Union v. Wann, 403 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ind.App.1980) (repossession of vehicle from parking lot of apartment building where debtor lived did not constitute breach of the peace; although secured party may not ... break into or enter into homes or other buildings or enclosed spaces it may ... take a chattel off a street, parking lot or unenclosed space). However, when the collateral is located inside fences or is otherwise enclosed, the secured creditor's privilege is considerably abridged. Rogers v. Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp., 679 F.2d 138 (8th Cir.1982) (entry onto property of third party through at least one gate to repossess machinery created issue of fact whether breach of peace occurred). The creditor's privilege is most severely restricted when repossession can be accomplished only by the actual breaking or destruction of barriers designed to exclude intruders. Thus, at least one case has held that the actions of a creditor's agents in cutting a chain used to lock a fence which enclosed the [debtor's] property to gain access to collateral constitute[d] a `breach of the peace' within the meaning of the Pennsylvania [counterpart of § 7-9-503]. Laurel Coal Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 539 F.Supp. 1006 (W.D.Pa.1982); cf. Bloomquist v. First National Bank of Elk River, 378 N.W.2d 81 (Minn.App.1985) (removing cracked window pane to gain entry constituted breach of the peace as a matter of law). These cases at least implicitly acknowledge that the likelihood of a breach of the peace increases in proportion to the efforts of the possessor to prevent unauthorized intrusions and the creditor's conduct in defiance of those efforts. The Alabama Legislature, in formulating this state's criminal trespass statutes, has apparently applied a similar rationale. For example, Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-7-3(a), provides that [a] person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree if he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or upon real property which is fenced or enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders. (Emphasis added.) Section 13A-7-4(a) provides that [a] person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises. (Emphasis added.) The Commentary to those sections states: In formulating the offense of criminal trespass, the Criminal Code recognizes the seriousness of unauthorized intrusions upon premises .... . . . . Section 13A-7-3 provides for liability if one knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property which is fenced or enclosed so as to exclude intruders. Such conduct indicates a deliberate invasion of another's property, and in many cases is the prelude to tortious or more serious criminal conduct.... The second place protected by § 13A-7-3fenced or enclosed propertymay present occasional difficulty. However, it will always be for the trier of fact to determine whether the fence or other device was `designed to exclude intruders.' At one extreme may be an eight foot fence, topped with barbed wire, obviously designed to exclude intruders. On the other hand, shrubbery that is two feet high may not be so designed, e.g., the owner's purpose is decorative rather than protective. Section 13A-7-4, criminal trespass in the third degree, is the basic dividing line between criminal and noncriminal trespass. Id. (Emphasis added.) From these sections and their commentary, it logically follows that the potential for breaches of the public peace and tranquility as a result of unauthorized intrusions on property escalates in direct proportion to the presence of fences, gates, signs, and other indicia of nonassent to entry. In light of the foregoing discussion, we are unable to conclude that the breaking of a lock to gain entrance to the premises on which collateral is located does not constitute a breach of the peace as a matter of law. Indeed, whether the actions taken by a secured creditor to repossess collateral involves excessive force or an unreasonable likelihood of a breach of the peace in light of the time and manner in which the repossession occurred is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Cf. Abernathy v. State, 42 Ala.App. 149, 155, 155 So.2d 586, 592 (1962) (whether certain conduct constitutes a breach of the peace depends largely upon the facts of each particular case and the circumstances surrounding the incident), cert. denied, 275 Ala. 691, 155 So.2d 592 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 447, 85 S.Ct. 1101, 14 L.Ed.2d 151 (1965). In this case, Madden contends that access to Container's property was blocked by a locked gate, which, he insists, Warrick forced open to gain access to the skidder. Warrick not only denies breaking the lock but also denies the existence of a fence or a gate. Viewing this conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, the plaintiff, we must conclude that substantial evidence exists in support of his claim and that there exists a genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding a judgment as a matter of law. Rees v. Peoples Bank of Greensboro, 571 So.2d 1035, 1036 (Ala.1990). Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED; APPLICATION OVERRULED. HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.