Opinion ID: 529707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Doe's Removal Claim

Text: 30 NSA asserts that Doe was dismissed for cause because he failed to meet the statutory standard of employment--eligibility for access to SCI. Govt.Br. at 17. For that reason, it contends, Doe's removal was processed in adherence with chapter 370 of the NSA regulations, which governs for cause removals. NSA points to the letter informing Doe of his proposed removal, which specifically stated that notice was being provided to Doe pursuant to chapter 370. Govt.Br. at 24 (citing J.A. at 82). Doe claims, however, that he was dismissed for national security reasons--and therefore was entitled to procedures laid out in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7532 as incorporated in chapter 371--because the letter removing him stated that his access to classified information is not clearly consistent with the national security. J.A. at 193. Doe also notes that the NSA Director's internal memorandum detailing the reasons for his removal stated that Doe is a potential security risk and that his behavior invited a risk of security exploitation. Doe Br. at 12 (citing J.A. at 191-92). Doe contends that because chapter 370 on its face is not applicable to national security dismissals, NSA violated its own regulations by not providing for a final determination by the Secretary of Defense, to which Doe would have been entitled under chapter 371. Doe Br. at 12-14. 31 The Supreme Court's decision in Carlucci bears out NSA's position. Carlucci determined that Sec. 7532 was intended to apply primarily to suspended employees in cases involving  'an immediate threat of harm to the national security ' in the sense that the delay from invoking 'normal dismissal procedures' could 'cause serious damage to the national security.'  Carlucci, 109 S.Ct. at 412 (quoting from Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546, 76 S.Ct. 861, 868, 100 L.Ed. 1396 (1956)). This language indicates that the procedures of Sec. 7532--and, by implication, of chapter 371--are available only when NSA has suspended an employee, with the intention of removing him, in order to respond to an immediate threat to national security. In such a case, normal for cause dismissal procedures could cause serious damage to national security. 32 Carlucci added another step to the process, begun in Cole, of placing limits on the definition of national security in the context of employee dismissals. In Cole, the Court considered the meaning of the term national security in the 1950 Act that vested in the heads of specified government agencies summary suspension and unreviewable dismissal powers over civilian employees whose jobs involved sensitive national security matters. The Court there explicitly chose not to construe national security in a sense so broad as to be involved in all activities of the Government, for then the relationship to the 'national security' would follow from the very fact of employment. Cole, 351 U.S. at 543, 76 S.Ct. at 866. Rather, it said, national security relates only to those activities which are directly concerned with the Nation's safety, as distinguished from the general welfare. Id. Thus, Carlucci's reading of national security to refer to a threat of immediate harm leads to a further narrowing of the range of suspension or removal situations that genuinely fall under the rubric of national security. 33 In the present case, the passage of some fifteen months from the original letter notifying Doe of his proposed removal to the actual removal suggests that NSA did not consider him to pose an immediate threat to national security. The NSA Director based his decision to remove Doe on the arguments set forth by the board of appraisal that Doe's access to classified information was inconsistent with national security. J.A. at 193. The board's decision about Doe's suitability resulted from its finding that a risk exists concerning the stability of [Doe's] character and discretion. J.A. at 106. The board supported that conclusion with reference to the alleged illegal drug use of one of Doe's companions, Doe's allegedly poor judgment vis-a-vis security in view of his liaisons with foreign nationals, and his supposed lack of enduring relationships. J.A. at 106-07. These considerations suggest the board's long-term concerns about Doe's suitability for access to classified information and do not indicate that the board believed that Doe's security clearance posed an immediate threat to national security. Thus, in view of Cole v. Young and Carlucci v. Doe, NSA acted properly in dismissing Doe according to standard for cause procedures, rather than according to national security dismissal procedures. 34 A further legal flaw in Doe's position is his presumption that NSA's failure to follow chapter 371 deprived him of very important procedural benefits. Doe Br. at 17. Doe's argument is based on the assumption that he was dismissed in the interests of national security; as a result, he claims that Executive Order 10450, which requires agency heads to apply the procedures of Sec. 7532 to all employees whose retention of employment may not be clearly consistent with national security, Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936, 937 (1949-53), entitles him to Sec. 7532 procedures as well. Doe supports his contention by pointing to this court's holding in Haynes v. Thomas, 232 F.2d 688 (D.C.Cir.1956), that the Executive Order properly extended the availability of Sec. 7532 procedures to employees not contemplated by the terms of the statute itself. Id. at 692. We consider Doe's claim concerning deprivation of Sec. 7532 benefits to be without merit. 35 In the first place, we disagree with Doe's assumption that Executive Order 10450 even applies to him. The Order mandates Sec. 7532 procedures when information comes to an agency's attention that an employee's continued employment with the agency may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. We have found, however, that NSA terminated Doe's employment for cause of promoting NSA's efficiency. Thus, by its terms, the Order is not germane to Doe's situation. 36 Moreover, in Carlucci, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988), where the Court rejected the view that Sec. 7532 would have provided more protections than the Navy's ordinary for cause removal procedures. Carlucci, 109 S.Ct. at 413 (citing Egan, 108 S.Ct. at 820, 826-27). Indeed, for cause removal procedures appear to provide more protection than Sec. 7532. Chapter 371 incorporates the structure of Sec. 7532, treating the Secretary of Defense as the head of NSA for final review purposes. Ch. 371, Sec. 2-2, J.A. at 230. Doe places significant emphasis on his claimed right to a final written statement by the Secretary of Defense. Doe Br. at 15, 17-18. While review by the Secretary is obviously of some import, it does not seem to outweigh Doe's rights under chapter 370 to full-pay status pending the outcome of his removal case; notice of the reasons for denial of access, rather than notice only to the extent that the agency head determines that national security considerations permit; and future government employment without consultation with the Office of Personnel Management, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7312. Thus, to the extent relevant, Doe's insistence on chapter 371 procedures seems both logically flawed and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
37 Doe presents several additional arguments to demonstrate that NSA wrongfully applied the chapter 370 regulations when it should have applied chapter 371 instead. He draws support from the language of chapter 370, the Supreme Court's assumptions in Carlucci, and the convening of a board of appraisal to deal with his situation. 38 Doe argues that the for cause procedures of chapter 370 are by their own terms inapplicable to national security-based dismissals. 6 Doe Br. at 18-20; Doe Reply Br. at 11. The interpretation advanced in Carlucci that such removals require an immediate threat of harm suggests that chapter 370 procedures are unavailable only if they could cause serious damage to national security. 109 S.Ct. at 412. As we have seen, the record supports NSA's assertion that Doe was dismissed because of long-term unsuitability for access to SCI and not because he posed an immediate security threat. Thus, the national security exception to chapter 370 is no more applicable to Doe than are the provisions of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7532. Doe's submission that the exception to chapter 370 totally defeats NSA's case, Doe Reply Br. at 11, is, therefore, without merit. 39 Doe further contends that the Supreme Court opinion in Carlucci can be read only as assuming that Doe's termination was one in the interest of national security. Doe Reply Br. at 9. Although Doe may be correct about the Court's assumptions, Doe admits that Certiorari [w]as [g]ranted on [o]nly the [n]arrow [i]ssue of [w]hether the [p]rocedures of 5 U.S.C. 7532 [w]ere [m]andated in [t]his [c]ase. Id. at 5. The Court's determination that Sec. 7532 procedures were not mandated for Doe is not at all inconsistent with our separate finding now--on an issue that was not before the Supreme Court--that Doe's dismissal was for cause and therefore did not implicate Sec. 7532. 40 Finally, Doe argues that by its actions NSA in fact utilized the national security criteria of chapter 371 rather than the for cause criteria of chapter 370. Id. at 11. He claims first that NSA never applied the efficiency of the service standard of chapter 370. Our discussion above indicates that this claim is too weak to provide a basis for relief. Although none of the communications by NSA to or about Doe employed the language of efficiency, the thrust of the board of appraisal's findings concerns Doe's judgment and his suitability for access to SCI. Clearly, Doe could not promote NSA's efficiency if he did not have access to the confidential information necessary for his job. 41 As an additional support for his argument that NSA actually was applying chapter 371, as it incorporates Sec. 7532, Doe points to NSA's use of a board of appraisal, provided for under chapter 371 but not under chapter 370. Doe Br. at 20. NSA responded that the board provided an additional protection voluntarily accorded [Doe] and did not require final determination by the Secretary of Defense as provided by chapter 371. Govt.Br. at 30. Unlike security clearance revocations, employment dismissals do not require the NSA Director to call upon boards of appraisal. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 832(b). It is incongruous for Doe to maintain that NSA's use of the board entitled him to procedural protection that as a matter of law is less substantial than the safeguards he received under chapter 370. See Carlucci, 109 S.Ct. at 413.
42 The bulk of Doe's arguments discussed above are based on the presumption that NSA inappropriately applied the regulations of chapter 370 rather than the regulations of chapter 371. Doe additionally claims, however, that NSA violated chapter 370 by failing to provide proper notice. Doe Br. at 20-22; Doe Reply Br. at 3-5. We now consider this contention. 43 Chapter 370 entitled Doe to written notice for his removal stating the specific reasons for the proposed action. Ch. 370, Sec. 3-5a, J.A. at 67. 7 Doe maintains that NSA denied him notice on the grounds that NSA's letter informing him of his proposed removal and NSA's final decision memorandum were inconsistent. The former referred to four liaisons with foreign nationals as evidence of Doe's willful disregard of agency security regulations, J.A. at 82, while the latter, which Doe never saw until litigation commenced, referred to his admitted record of well over 100 other similarly casual (and hence indiscriminate (and promiscuous)) homosexual acts. J.A. at 192. Doe argues that NSA never gave him reason to suspect that his lifestyle violated NSA regulations and would provide cause to withdraw his access to SCI. Doe Br. at 21. 44 We do not find Doe's claim persuasive. The letter informing Doe of his proposed removal referred to his indiscriminate involvement with foreign nationals and noted NSA's grave uncertainties about Doe's judgment, discretion, and personal reliability. J.A. at 82-83. The board of appraisal's report, which Doe received, focused on Doe's stability and emotional maturity, rather than on his homosexuality. J.A. at 106-08, 118. NSA's decision memorandum referred to Doe's indiscriminate pattern of activity, J.A. at 192, about which the NSA Director learned in part as a result of Doe's voluntary psychiatric examination and his rebuttal evidence. Chapter 370 specifically permits NSA's Director to consider the employee's reply in reaching his final termination decision. Ch. 370, Sec. 3-7, J.A. at 68. Thus, NSA's evidence and arguments went directly to the issues of Doe's stability and maturity, which NSA had raised in the original letter proposing his removal. Although Doe complained that he was never shown NSA's decision memorandum, access to that document would not have provided any further protection: Doe was afforded a full opportunity, which he exercised, to respond to the removal proposal. Thus, Doe's contention that NSA did not comply with the notice requirements of chapter 370 is without merit.