Opinion ID: 1940167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Claim 5: Constitutionality of Florida's Death Penalty Statute

Text: Duncan relies primarily on two cases to support his argument that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that the jury must be fully advised of the importance of its role, and neither comments nor instructions may minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death. See id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Duncan argues that the judge's instruction of as you've been told, the final decision as to what punishment be [sic] imposed is the responsibility of the judge, violates the mandates of Caldwell. This argument is without merit. The judge's instruction is included in the standard jury instructions read prior to penalty phase jury deliberations. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11. This Court has repeatedly held that Florida's standard jury instructions fully advise the jury of the importance of its role and do not violate Caldwell.  Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 291 (Fla.1993); see also Floyd v. State, 850 So.2d 383, 404 (Fla.2002). Further, Duncan relies upon the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), to support his claim that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. This Court recently addressed Duncan's contention that the Florida death penalty scheme is unconstitutional in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070, 123 S.Ct. 662, 154 L.Ed.2d 564 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067, 123 S.Ct. 657, 154 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and denied relief. Duncan is likewise not entitled to relief on this claim. Additionally, even if Ring was applicable in Florida, Duncan would not be entitled to relief pursuant to that decision. Recently, in Doorbal v. State, 837 So.2d 940 (Fla.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962, 123 S.Ct. 2647, 156 L.Ed.2d 663 (2003), we held, Because [the prior violent felonies] were charged by indictment, and a jury unanimously found Doorbal guilty of them, the prior violent felony aggravator alone clearly satisfies the mandates of the United States and Florida Constitutions, and therefore imposition of the death penalty was constitutional. Id. at 963. As in Doorbal, the death penalty was constitutionally imposed upon Duncan in light of the fact that the trial court properly applied the prior violent felony aggravating factor.