Opinion ID: 1809082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Appeal.

Text: Before we address the substantive issues in this case, we consider the propriety of the appeal filed by the State. The State initially filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Iowa Code section 814.5 (1999). Subsequently, the State, concerned that an appeal may not have been the appropriate procedural vehicle for review, filed a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 301. Iowa Code chapter 814 governs criminal appeals. An appeal is defined as the right of both the defendant and the state to have specified actions of the district court considered by an appellate court. Iowa Code § 814.1. This statute provides that the State has the right of appeal from ( a ) An order dismissing an indictment, information, or any count thereof. ( b ) A judgment for the defendant on a motion to the indictment or the information. ( c ) An order arresting judgment or granting a new trial. Id. § 814.5(1). The Code also provides for discretionary review of specified matters not subject to appeal as a matter of right. Id. § 814.1. One of the specified matters is [a] final judgment or order raising a question of law important to the judiciary and the profession. Id. § 814.5(2)( d ). The court's discretionary power of review is exercised in like manner as under the rules pertaining to interlocutory appeals and certiorari in civil cases. Id. § 814.1(2). Citing our decisions in State v. Lekin, 271 N.W.2d 697 (Iowa 1978), and State v. Beecher; 616 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa 2000), the State contends that it has a right to appeal under section 814.5(1)(b). As noted above, this statute gives the State a right of appeal from [a] judgment for the defendant on a motion to the indictment or the information. Iowa Code § 814.5(1)( b ). In Lekin, this court held that an order sustaining a demurrer to some, but not all, counts in a trial information was an appealable final judgment where the charges were separable. 271 N.W.2d at 700. The obvious distinction between Lekin and the case before us is that the dismissal in Lekin, unlike the judgment here, occurred pre-trial. This distinction is material because the appeal as of right granted by the legislature is extended to a judgment for the defendant on a motion to the indictment or the information.  Iowa Code § 814.5(1)( b ) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this express statutory language, the State reasons that a defendant who requests merger is being granted a judgment on the count merged, and the similarity of this result to the dismissal of a count upon a pre-trial ruling justifies treating a merger decision as an appealable order as of right under section 814.5(1)( b ). We do not think the statute permits such an interpretation. The matter before us is simply not a judgment on motion to the indictment or the information so to fall within the parameters for an appeal as of right. The Beecher case also fails to support the State's argument that it has a right to appeal. In Beecher, this court granted the State's application for discretionary review of a district court's ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy. 616 N.W.2d at 535. We held that the defendant's double jeopardy claim was not ripe for review because jeopardy had not yet attached. Id. at 536. The State surmises from this holding that once jeopardy does attach, an appeal can be taken by the State as a matter of right. The State reads too much into our Beecher opinion. Beecher, dealing as it did with a pre-trial motion, simply does not address the nature of the State's appeal rights upon an adverse decision after trial. We conclude that neither section 814.5(1)( b ) nor our case law supports the State's argument that it has an appeal as of right. This conclusion does not, however, mandate a dismissal of the State's improvidently filed appeal. Our rules provide that if a case is erroneously brought as an appeal, it may proceed as though the proper form of review had been sought. Iowa R.App. P. 304; see also Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 789, 793-94 (Iowa 2001) (considering notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari). Therefore, we will consider whether discretionary review should be granted under section 814.5(2). One basis for discretionary review is [a] final judgment or order raising a question of law important to the judiciary and the profession. Iowa Code§814.5(2)( d ). We conclude that review should be granted on this basis. The appropriateness of merging second-degree sexual abuse into a conviction for first-degree burglary is a matter important to judges presiding over criminal cases and the defense lawyers and county attorneys litigating these cases. Our conclusion to grant discretionary review makes it unnecessary to consider whether review should be permitted pursuant to the State's application for writ of certiorari. We annul the writ on the basis of mootness.