Opinion ID: 720696
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was Instruction 9 Constitutional Error?

Text: 25 A. Standard of Review. 26 We review de novo whether an instruction violates due process by creating an unconstitutional presumption or inference. United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir.1994). 27 B. The Merits. 28 Instruction 9 allows, but does not mandate, a jury to infer recklessness solely from proof of excessive speed. The inference is therefore permissive. See Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir.1992) (finding this instruction is permissive), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052, 113 S.Ct. 975, 122 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993). Permissive inference instructions are disfavored because they tend to take the focus away from the elements that must be proved. Warren, 25 F.3d at 900 (Rymer, J., concurring). 29 Permissive inference jury instructions are constitutional, however, so long as it can be said 'with substantial assurance' that the inferred fact is 'more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.'  Schwendeman, 971 F.2d at 316 (quoting United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc) (citing Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 166 n. 28, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2229 n. 28, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)). If, on the other hand, the inference relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, then the inference violates the Due Process Clause. Ulster, 442 U.S. at 156, 99 S.Ct. at 2224. A permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (citing Ulster, 442 U.S. at 157-63, 99 S.Ct. at 2224-28). 30 In Schwendeman, a case directly on point, we held that an identical jury instruction was constitutional error. 971 F.2d at 316. There, the prosecution presented evidence that Schwendeman had been drinking at a local tavern for two hours before driving away in his pickup truck with several passengers. Id. at 315. Schwendeman admitted that he had been driving 37 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone. Id. A passenger testified that Schwendeman swerved all over the road, purposely trying to hit potholes. Id. Eventually, he lost control of the truck and hit a telephone pole. Id. 31 While noting there was plenty of evidence to support Schwendeman's conviction for reckless driving, the court held that Schwendeman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be granted. Id. at 314. Although it is certainly true that excessive speed is probative of a jury's determination of recklessness, here we cannot say with substantial assurance that the inferred fact of reckless driving more likely than not flowed from the proved fact of excessive speed. Under Ulster County, the instruction was constitutionally deficient. Id. at 316. 32 Although acknowledging that the identical instruction was found to be constitutional error in Schwendeman, the state argues that in this trial the instruction was not error. See Warren, 25 F.3d at 898 (we determine the constitutionality of a permissive inference instruction on a case-by-case basis). It attempts to distinguish Schwendeman by arguing that in the case before us, recklessness did flow more likely than not from excessive speeding, because Hanna was driving faster than Schwendeman. Moreover, the state suggests that other instructions prevented the jury from isolating speed as the only basis upon which to determine guilt. We reject these arguments. 33 It may be true, that at some point recklessness would more than likely flow from proof of sheer excessive speed. However, as Hanna noted, the evidence presented at trial conflicted. 871 P.2d at 137. Instruction 9 permitted conviction based solely on Hanna's admission that he had been driving slightly in excess of the speed limit. It is unclear whose version of facts the jury accepted: the government's version that Hanna was driving between 80 to 118 m.p.h.; or Hanna's version that he had initially been driving 75 m.p.h., but had slowed to around 60 m.p.h. immediately before the accident. 34 The Washington Supreme Court concluded with substantial assurance that the presumed fact of reckless driving was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution's evidence that Hanna had been driving between 80 to 100 m.p.h. Hanna, 871 P.2d at 140. However, because this is not a sufficiency of the evidence case, as the dissent noted, This is not the proper inquiry. Id. 871 P.2d at 142 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The gap in this logic is that the court had to assume that the jury accepted the prosecution's version of the evidence. Even if the jury accepted Hanna's version, however, the same verdict could have been rendered. The Washington Supreme Court was not concerned by this because, to the extent the jury did not believe the government's evidence, the jury could have rejected the inference. Id. 871 P.2d at 140. Again, the key is that the jurors only could have rejected the inference; however, they were also perfectly entitled to accept the inference as well. Thus, even if the jury believed that Hanna had only been going slightly over the speed limit, Instruction 9 invited the jury to convict Hanna of vehicular manslaughter and vehicular assault. 35 Moreover, other instructions did not cure Instruction 9's defect. Generally, permissive inference instructions are acceptable if other instructions condition, qualify or explain them. See, Warren, 25 F.3d at 899 (discussing qualifying phrases that preserve the constitutionality of permissive inference instructions). However, [a] passing reference to consider all evidence will not cure [a] defect where a jury is entitled to convict by focusing on a few isolated facts. Id. (citing Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d at 299-300). 36 In the case before us, the jury was entitled to convict based on a single unqualified jury instruction. Instructions 1, 8 and 13 merely include general admonishments to weigh all of the evidence. They do not, however, specifically qualify Instruction 9. By focusing the jury on the evidence of speed alone, the challenged instruction erroneously permitted the jury to find an element of the crime of which Schwendeman was convicted without considering all the evidence presented at trial. Schwendeman, 971 F.2d at 316. As in Schwendeman, the jury here could have convicted Hanna without considering all relevant evidence. Warren, 25 F.3d at 899 (citing Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d at 299-300). 37 Although there was substantial evidence to support Hanna's conviction, Instruction 9 permitted the jury to convict based only on Hanna's admission of speeding. Yet, speeding alone, cannot support a conviction for vehicular manslaughter and vehicular assault. To be convicted of these crimes, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hanna drove in a reckless manner; Instruction 9 relieved the government of this burden. Accordingly, we hold that Instruction 9 is constitutional error. 38