Opinion ID: 814548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa

Text: We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). In light of Pride’s medical records showing chronic and substantial pain resulting from a permanent shoulder injury from a gunshot wound and a knee injury, Pride has established a genuine issue of material fact on whether he has a serious medical need. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). Genuine issues of material fact also exist on -2- whether Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa were deliberately indifferent to Pride’s medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). There is no evidence in the record showing that the Chrono Committee’s denial of Dr. Santiago’s requests for Pride was based on medical reasons. The record also does not identify the names of the doctors who were on the Chrono Committee, who purportedly denied Dr. Santiago’s requests. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Pride raises an inference that the Chrono Committee’s decision was an inferior medical opinion compared to Dr. Santiago’s. See e.g., Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding triable issue existed on deliberate indifference where a panel of doctors repeatedly denied the recommendation made by plaintiff’s treating doctor and two orthopedic surgeons that plaintiff undergo surgery); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding defendants may have acted with deliberate indifference by choosing to rely on a doctor’s “inferior” medical opinion, which was based solely on standard medical protocol, instead of plaintiff’s treating physician and surgeon). Moreover, it is undisputed that Nurse Correa was unqualified to be on the Chrono Committee. But Dr. Levin sent Nurse Correa to the Chrono Committee as his representative and Nurse Correa signed the denial on Dr. Levin’s behalf. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing -3- summary judgment for defendants because if registered nurses provided “a number of [medical] services which they [were] not qualified to perform,” this would demonstrate deliberate indifference), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Accordingly, triable issues of material fact exist on the question of deliberate indifference: (1) whether the Chrono Committee’s decision was an inferior medical opinion when compared to Dr. Santiago’s opinion; (2) whether Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa acted with deliberate indifference in denying Pride’s Second Level Review given the lack of medical reasons for the Chrono Committee’s decision; and (3) whether Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa acted with deliberate indifference when Nurse Correa attended the Chrono Committee for Dr. Levin.1