Opinion ID: 2829984
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impugning Defense Counsel’s Integrity

Text: Reprising a claim of alleged prosecutorial misconduct from the guilt phase, defendant claims the prosecutor‘s guilt phase argument suggesting defense counsel knew his client was guilty, and that the proffered alibi defense was a sham, amplified the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor‘s subsequent penalty phase argument suggesting it was ―morally perverted to ask for leniency for somebody like [defendant].‖ Defendant argues the earlier guilt-phase misconduct ―referred forward to the penalty phase‖ such that ―the substance of the slander against defense counsel‘s integrity hovered over the entire trial.‖ Such argument, defendant contends, unfairly undermined trial counsel‘s argument in favor of mitigation and mercy ―not on the basis of evidence, but rather on the basis of an extra-evidentiary animadversion against the integrity of the defense counsel.‖ According to defendant, such criticism of defense counsel is not a recognized aggravating factor under section 190.3 (see People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 78 34 Cal.4th 1, 108 [―Any aggravating evidence not relating to the sentencing factors enumerated in section 190.3 is inadmissible in the penalty phase.‖]; see People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773–776 [first stating the rule]), and the prosecutor‘s reliance on it violated both that statute and his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.17 We agree with the People that defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object on the identified ground. We previously explained that the issue of whether the prosecutor improperly attacked the integrity of defense counsel was forfeited by counsel‘s failure to object at the guilt phase. (Ante, pt. I.B.4.b.) Although defendant attempts to tie that issue to the prosecutor‘s rhetorical question (―Isn‘t that morally perverted to ask for leniency for somebody like that?‖) during closing penalty phase argument, the prosecutor‘s question does not appear linked to the earlier comments about counsel‘s integrity. Without an objection explaining this theory of exclusion to the trial court, this matter was not properly preserved for our review. Even were we to overlook this procedural obstacle, we agree with the People that the prosecutor‘s question, either alone or in combination with earlier 17 For his Eighth Amendment claim, defendant cites Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, where the United States Supreme Court ruled that states may not, consistently with the Eighth Amendment, execute criminal offenders, even those convicted of first degree murder, who committed their crimes before their 18th birthday. In explaining its ruling, the court said: ―The Eighth Amendment guards against the execution of those who are ‗insufficient[ly] culpab[le],‘ [citation], in significant part, by requiring sentencing that ‗reflect[s] a reasoned moral response to the defendant‘s background, character, and crime.‘ California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O‘Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, the sentencer in a capital case must be permitted to give full effect to all constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.‖ (Id. at p. 603, underscoring added.) By citing and quoting this passage, defendant may be understood to argue that the prosecutor‘s argument undermined the jury‘s ability to fairly assess his proffered mitigating evidence and to reach a reasoned and moral decision on the question of the proper penalty. 79 statements made in closing argument at the guilt phase, was harmless because it was not reasonably possible the argument affected the penalty verdict. (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 525–526.)