Opinion ID: 674271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: speedy trial claims--state and federal

Text: 4 Harris first argues that the delay between his arraignment and trial violated his state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. The district court properly dismissed his state claim for lack of a federal question. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1990); Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.1991). 5 To determine if an accused's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, we look to (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) assertion of the right by the defendant; (4) prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1985). However, unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, we need not inquire into the other factors. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1350 n. 16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied by Milburn v. U.S., 474 U.S. 994 (1985). Harris was arraigned on September 7, 1982; trial began April 12, 1983, some seven months later. A delay of this length is not presumptively prejudicial for Sixth Amendment purposes. Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1350 n. 16. Thus, Harris's speedy trial claim does not entitle him to federal habeas relief, whether or not it is procedurally barred. 6