Opinion ID: 3160470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Suppressed Material

Text: Rodriguez was a prosecution witness at trial and testified as an eyewitness to the shooting. He was not alleged to be involved with the shooting in any way. Rodriguez testified that on the night of the shooting, he was at the apartment of a friend, Jenette Vasquez, with a number of other people, including Rosario. He testified that at some point in the evening, he heard Vasquez on the phone talking to Johnel Olmo, a friend of the victim. Rosario asked Vasquez for the phone, and Rodriguez testified that he heard Rosario tell Olmo, I'm your worst nightmare. The evening after Rodriguez testified at Rosario's trial, Edward Fogarty, Rodriguez's attorney on unrelated pending drug offenses, contacted the prosecutor's office, saying that Rodriguez believed he and the Commonwealth had an agreement involving some sort of consideration for Rodriguez's testimony. The prosecution then informed Rosario's counsel about its conversation with Fogarty. - 4 - After the issue was raised to the court, the judge held a voir dire. The Commonwealth claimed there was no agreement, and both Rodriguez and Fogarty testified that it was their understanding that there was an agreement. Rodriguez testified that the prosecutor said that she can help . . . [him] on [his] drug cases; that she won't promise [him] nothing but she'll try to do something. Fogarty testified that although there was nothing in writing, the prosecutor said something to the effect that she could help him on his case, without giving specifics. At that time, the trial judge did not make a finding regarding whether there was an agreement but said that Rosario could recall Rodriguez to the stand, where he could be questioned about his belief regarding an agreement. Rosario's counsel declined, arguing, the problem is calling the witness back in the middle of the trial after the jury has seen him and has seen that he's left. I don't think this can be corrected. Rosario's counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied because it thought that whatever prejudice that may be shown by the defendant can be rectified at this stage of the trial. The next day, Rosario's counsel requested to call Rodriguez and Fogarty to testify about their impressions of their meeting with the prosecution. He also said that he would like to disclose -- either through testimony or a stipulation from the Commonwealth -- that this information came to Rosario's counsel's - 5 - attention only the prior day. He argued that challenging the prosecutor's credibility was within Rosario's due process rights under Kyles v. Whitley. The trial court declined to allow testimony of when Rosario's counsel became aware of the possible agreement. Rosario's counsel said that [i]f the ruling of the court is that I can't get into the area that I want to get into (and I object to the ruling) then I will not call Mr. Rodriguez back to the stand. After the trial, when Fogarty was cleaning out his files, he found an unsigned document, a purported cooperation agreement dated May 1, 2000, on the district attorney's letterhead addressed to Fogarty saying, This letter confirms the agreement between your client, Louis Ramon Rodriguez, . . . and the Commonwealth . . . . It listed six terms of agreement, and it said it was from the assistant district attorney. In October 2001, Rosario filed a motion for a new trial with the SJC, which remanded it to the Superior Court. That motion was heard by the same judge who presided over the trial. She held an evidentiary hearing on the motion in November 2002. In May 2010, the trial judge denied the motion for a new trial, finding that at most, the letter confirmed that the prosecutor thought a deal was possible, not - 6 - that it corroborated the existence of an actual agreement.2 The judge also found that the new evidence did not change the fact that Rosario's counsel chose not to recall Rodriguez to let the jury know that Rodriguez believed there was a cooperation agreement. Rosario appealed to the SJC, raising a number of issues, including the denial of his motion for a new trial. The SJC found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order and, as said, affirmed. In 2012, Rosario filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Massachusetts federal district court, alleging that the trial court denied his right to due process, which the district court denied. Rosario v. Roden, No. 12-12172-DJC, 2014 WL 7409584 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2014).