Opinion ID: 4562618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Martin’s Sentences 4

Text: Jerrod Martin was a member of a drug trafficking organization operating in Brooklyn, New York. Martin and several of his co-conspirators were arrested in June of 2003 and indicted for a number of criminal acts including trafficking 50 grams or more of cocaine base (otherwise known as “crack” or “crack cocaine”), and committing a homicide in 2003. 5 On November 1, 2005 Martin pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count Seven), and one count of using a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Ten). Martin stipulated that he would be sentenced based on having distributed 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine during the time in which the trafficking organization operated. At Martin’s plea allocution, he admitted that his organization had trafficked roughly 1.5 kilograms of crack during its tenure. 4 References to J.A. refer to the Joint Appendix, references to G.A. refer to the Government’s Appendix, and references to PSR refer to Martin’s Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report. 5 Martin has been in custody since his arrest on June 18, 2003. 8 In July of 2007, Judge Trager sentenced Martin to 150-months’ imprisonment for Count Seven and a consecutive 60-months’ imprisonment for Count Ten. 6 Under the law at the time, Martin was subject to a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence for Count Seven, and a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence for Count Ten. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006). Martin was convicted of two additional crimes while serving those two terms of imprisonment. In June of 2010, Martin pleaded guilty to an information charging a misdemeanor drug offense and was sentenced to a consecutive 12month term of imprisonment. Four years later, Martin was convicted after a jury 6 The PSR prepared for Martin calculated his guidelines range as 360-months to life imprisonment based on an offense level of 40 and a criminal history category of 3. That base offense level was predicated upon the homicide committed by other members of Martin’s drug trafficking organization, and because Martin was a leader of the organization, the PSR indicated he was accountable for that murder. Martin’s codefendants objected to the PSR’s Guidelines calculations and Judge Trager sentenced them accordingly, based only upon the drug-related count, not upon the murder count. Martin’s counsel, however, did not object to the PSR’s Guidelines calculations, and Judge Trager mentioned those calculations at his sentencing proceeding. Some of Martin’s codefendants were able to receive sentencing reductions based on subsequent changes to the Sentencing Guidelines that were applicable to their drug offenses. However, because Martin had been sentenced with reference to a murder charge, see U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 (crossreferenced by U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d)(1), which applies to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), Martin was ineligible for the same sentencing reduction because Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines did not affect Martin’s adjusted offense level. See U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 782 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 9 trial of the misdemeanor assault of a corrections officer and was sentenced to another consecutive 12-month term of imprisonment. See United States v. Martin, 704 F. App’x 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). II. Martin’s Motion for Relief Under the First Step Act In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the mandatory minimum sentence for distribution of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine from 10 years to 5 years. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2–3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). The Fair Sentencing Act also increased the threshold required to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence from 50 grams to 280 grams of crack cocaine. See id. § 2. However, the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply retroactively to defendants sentenced before the Act became effective. See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–69 (2012). In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Section 404(b) of the First Step Act permits a district court, on a motion from the defendant, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), or the Government, to “impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” 132 Stat. at 5222. 10 On March 1, 2019, Martin moved for relief under the First Step Act in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 7 When Martin made his motion, he had already spent over 188 months in prison. 8 Martin sought a reduction of his sentence under Count Seven, the “covered offense,” to 60months imprisonment, and requested that the court impose a total sentence of 120months imprisonment, which would result in his immediate release. No mention was made of Martin’s convictions for the offenses he committed in prison. The 7 Martin has attempted to receive modification of his sentence on several occasions. Although the sentences imposed by Judge Trager in 2007 were within the range stipulated to in Martin’s plea agreement, he appealed his sentence in 2008. His counsel later filed an Anders brief, and on May 5, 2008, this Court summarily affirmed Martin’s sentence and granted his counsel permission to withdraw. See United States v. Martin, No. 07-3214 (2d Cir. May 5, 2008). In 2009, Martin moved to modify his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), arguing that he was entitled to a reduction in his base offense level from 40 to 32 based on the drug quantity to which he pleaded guilty. Martin also filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on failures to obtain a more favorable plea bargain, and to argue that a consecutive sentence was not required under Count Ten. See Martin v. United States, No. 09-cv-02337, Dkt. 1 (filed May 29, 2009). The district court (Cogan, J.) denied Martin’s motion for a sentencing reduction because his “guideline range was calculated pursuant to his responsibility for a drug-related homicide . . . and [the applicable Guidelines range for § 2A1.1 has] not been revised since [Martin] was sentenced.” Martin v. United States, No. 09-cv-02337, Dkt. 15 at 2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011). The court also denied Martin’s § 2255 petition. See id. at 2–3. As noted above, Martin also moved pro se to set aside his judgment under F.R.C.P. 60(b) in November of 2018. The district court denied that motion in its first ruling on Martin’s First Step Act motion. See United States v. Martin, No. 03-cr-795 (BMC), 2019 WL 1558817, at –3 (E.D.N.Y. April 10, 2019). 8Martin was imprisoned on June 18, 2003, and made his motion 15 years, 8 months, and 11 days later, on March 1, 2019. 11 Government opposed Martin’s motion, arguing that the 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base trafficked by Martin’s organization “supports application of the same statutory penalties even after passage of the Fair Sentencing Act.” J.A. 98. In April of 2019, the district court (Cogan, J.) rejected Martin’s request for a reduced sentence of 60-months for Count Seven but reduced his sentence to time served and directed his immediate release. See United States v. Martin, No. 03-cr795 (BMC), 2019 WL 1558817, at  (E.D.N.Y. April 10, 2019) (Vacated). Soon after that decision was issued, the BOP informed the district court that, because of good time credit, Martin had completed serving both terms of imprisonment imposed by Judge Trager in 2007 at some point between September and December of 2018. But Martin remained imprisoned because of the two 12-month terms of incarceration that had been imposed for crimes committed while he was in prison. After giving notice to the parties and hearing argument, the district court vacated its prior decision and denied Martin’s motion as moot. See United States v. Martin, No. 03-cr-795 (BMC), 2019 WL 2296051, at –2 (E.D.N.Y. April 22, 2019) (“Martin II”). Martin moved for reconsideration. He argued that his sentences from his various convictions are aggregated by the Bureau of Prisons and he has but one 12 sentence, one period of incarceration. Thus, his motion was not moot because imposing a reduced sentence of 188-months’ imprisonment would “result in the past 24 months being credited” to the later-imposed 12-month terms of imprisonment and in Martin’s immediate release. 9 J.A. 165–66. The district court denied Martin’s motion. See United States v. Martin, No. 03-cr-795 (BMC), 2019 WL 2289850 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2019) (“Martin III”). The court rejected Martin’s argument that he was serving “one sentence” and reasoned that the First Step Act did not empower it to retroactively impose a reduced term of imprisonment where the defendant was no longer serving that term of imprisonment. See Martin III, 2019 WL 2289850, at –4. Because the statute did not permit the district court to engage in “plenary resentencing,” the court reasoned it had no power to alter any sentence other than one imposed for a “covered offense.” See id. The district court also noted that, even if it were 9 Martin also argued that the district court could reduce Martin’s term of supervised release, and therefore his motion was not moot. The district court denied Martin’s motion in this respect. The court noted that Martin had previously requested only a modification of his term of imprisonment and thus could not create a live controversy by now expanding his request to a modification of the supervised release portion of his sentence. See Martin III, 2019 WL 2289850, at . Furthermore, the court stated that it would deny Martin’s request for a modification of his term of supervised release in an exercise of its discretion. See id. at . 13 permitted to reduce Martin’s term of imprisonment, it would exercise its discretion not to do so. See Martin III, 2019 WL 2289850, at –6. Martin timely appealed, arguing that the district court’s decision is incorrectly premised on the ground that the First Step Act does not allow a defendant to receive a reduction of an already-served sentence if he remains in custody serving consecutive sentences for unrelated offenses because all of the sentences are aggregated by the Bureau of Prisons and are to be treated as one sentence. Martin argues that the district court’s holding is “contrary to the plain language of the [First Step] Act, inconsistent with the purpose of the Act,” and contrary to other district court decisions. Pet’r’s Br. at 2–3. Martin begins by arguing that nothing in the language of the First Step Act prohibits modification of sentences that were already served, so long as a sentence was imposed for a “covered offense.” See generally id. at 13–20. Because the language of the act does not forbid the relief Martin requests, Martin argues his motion is not moot because “the imposition of a term of [time served] would give Mr. Martin credit against the consecutive misdemeanor sentences that he already incurred and is serving . . . .” Id. at 20. 14 The Government counters by arguing that Martin does not qualify for a reduction of his sentence because the quantity of crack cocaine for which he admitted responsibility “greatly exceeded 280 grams, the amount necessary to trigger the highest mandatory minimum sentence under the current version of the statute.” Resp’t’s Br. at 19. The Government also argues that, even if Martin were eligible for a reduction, the offenses for which he is currently imprisoned are not covered by the First Step Act, and that, in the alternative, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martin’s motion for relief.