Opinion ID: 2314274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Repeat Violation

Text: In addition to charging Bethlehem with a serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1), MOSHA also cited the company for a repeated violation of that same regulation under § 40(a). As we have said, § 40(a) provides for a civil fine of up to $10,000 if an employer willfully or repeatedly violates any provision of the Act. The Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act is modeled after its federal counterpart [10] and we therefore look to federal cases for guidance. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Comm'r of Labor and Industry, 339 Md. 323, 328, 662 A.2d 256, 258 (1995); J.I. Hass Co. v. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 275 Md. 321, 330, 340 A.2d 255, 260 (1975). Section 40(a) of the Maryland Act mirrors 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) of the federal Act. [11] Neither act, however, defines repeatedly. Uniformally, the jurisdictions that have considered the question agree that a violation is `repeated' if (1) the same standard has been violated more than once and (2) there is a `substantial similarity of violative elements' between the current and prior violations, and (3) the prior citation on which the repeated violation is based has become a final order of the Commissioner. D & S Grading Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 899 F.2d 1145, 1147 (11th Cir.1990) (citing J.L. Foti Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 687 F.2d 853, 856-57 (6th Cir.1982); Dun-Par Engineered Form Co. v. Marshall, 676 F.2d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir.1982); Bunge Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 638 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir.1981); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834, 839 (4th Cir.1978); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 566 F.2d 1327, 1330, n. 5 (9th Cir.1977)). See also Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 856 (3rd Cir.1996); Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 648 F.2d 1278, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1981). We agree. During the relevant period, § 40(a) of the Maryland Act and 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) provided for a $10,000 civil fine if any employer willfully or repeatedly violated the acts' requirements. [12] A literal reading of both acts reveals that the enhanced penalty provision was aimed at violations that are either willful or repeated. George Hyman Constr. Co., supra, 582 F.2d at 839. The use of the disjunctive or suggests two alternative theories upon which an enhanced penalty may be predicated. Id. Such a construction is consistent with Congressional intent to permit enhanced penalties when employers permit violations of the same standard to occur several times, even though the employer's intent or negligence falls short of the `willful' level. Kent Nowlin Constr. Co., supra, 648 F.2d at 1281. [13] The purpose of 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), and by implication, Maryland's § 40(a), is to, inter alia, encourage employers who have previously been cited for a violation to take adequate remedial measures to prevent recurrence of the violation. 648 F.2d at 1282. Under this construction, enhanced penalties should come into play whenever an employer fails to adequately respond to a citation, Dun-Par Engineered Form, supra, 676 F.2d at 1337, regardless of whether the failure was willful.
The instant fray is joined over the parties' respective burdens of proof when a § 40(a), or a repeated citation, is challenged. Prior to the August 17, 1990 incident which gave rise to the citation(s) challenged here, Bethlehem was thrice cited for violations of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1). Citations issued on December 14, 1987 and June 17, 1990, respectively alleged that wiring on an overhead crane was frayed and dry rotted, and on the latter citation, panel wiring improperly spliced. A January 19, 1989 citation alleged that Bethlehem improperly exposed two 440-volt floor-mounted electric motors to water and chemicals. All three citations alleged that the hazards were likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees. In his opinion, the Commissioner noted that [t]he record shows that on [at least] two prior occasions MOSHA had cited [Bethlehem] for violating Standard 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) by having electrical equipment with recognized hazards. Relying on Potlatch Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1061 (R.C.1979), he concluded that [t]his is sufficient to make a prima facie case that the violation alleged here was repeat. Despite Bethlehem's argument that the conditions giving rise to the 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) hazard were so disparate from the earlier citations so as to preclude notice to Bethlehem of a repeat violation, the Commissioner opined that [t]he courts have recognized, however, that where an employer has been previously cited for a particular hazard, a subsequent citation for the same hazard is appropriately characterized as repeat, even if different conditions gave rise to the hazard. ... Accordingly, the Commissioner will affirm the violation as repeat. (Emphasis added). We disagree. The federal cases clearly hold that in order to sustain a repeated violation citation under 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), there must be a substantial similarity of violative elements between the current and prior violations. See D & S Grading, supra, 899 F.2d at 1147. The crux of the present matter is to whom falls the burden of proving substantial similarity and what is necessarily required to meet that burden. In Potlatch, a majority of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for the first time construed the word repeatedly, as used in 29 U.S.C. § 666(a). In so doing, the Commission stated: [t]he Secretary may establish a prima facie case of [substantial] similarity by showing that the prior and present violations are for failure to comply with the same standard. It is important to recognize that occupational safety and health standards range from those that designate specific means of preventing a hazard or hazards to those that either do not specify the means of preventing a hazard or apply to a variety of circumstances. Accordingly, in cases where the Secretary shows that the prior and present violations are for an employer's failure to comply with the same specific standard, it may be difficult for an employer to rebut the Secretary's prima facie showing of similarity. This is true simply because in many instances the two violations must be substantially similar in nature in order to be violations of the same standard. However, in cases where both violations are for failure to comply with the same general standard, it may be relatively undemanding for the employer to rebut the Secretary's prima facie showing of similarity. Potlatch, 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1063. In order to rebut such a prima facie case, the employer must show disparate conditions and hazards associated with [the] violations of the same standard. Id. The Commissioner invites this Court to adapt the Potlatch approach to the Maryland Act. We decline that invitation. As the Fifth Circuit observed in Bunge, supra, [u]nder 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d), [14] the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof, except as otherwise provided by statute. Absent a different allocation of the burden of persuasion by the substantive statute, the burden of production and persuasion remain with the Secretary, who must show the similarity of conditions associated with the present and antecedent violations. Bunge, 638 F.2d at 838. The Commissioner correctly points out that the Bunge court predicated its holding on 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d), for which there is no Maryland counterpart. This is of no moment. We have previously held that the burden of proof is generally on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an administrative body. Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm'n, 221 Md. 221, 231, 156 A.2d 657, 662 (1959). Section 556(d) coincidentally reflects in the federal Administrative Procedure Act what has long been the law of this State with respect to burdens of proof in administrative hearings. As the Commissioner acknowledges in his Reply Brief, federal law fails to make clear whether proving substantial similarity in the repeated violation context requires proving the similarity of the conditions giving rise to the hazard that the standard seeks to abate, the similarity of the hazard itself, or a combination of the two. The answer to this question requires resort to the structure of the Act itself and the purpose underlying the enhanced penalty provisions. The universe of OSHA and MOSHA rules and regulations is large and diverse. As the Potlatch Commission noted, safety standards may be quite specific, such as those that require the installation of handrails at construction sites, see J.L. Foti Constr. Co., supra, 687 F.2d at 855 n. 1, or quite general, such as those that require workplace cleanliness and sanitation. See Bunge Corp., supra, 638 F.2d at 833 n. 1. Similarly, certain of the Act's rules and regulations proscribe specific hazards, such as 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1), at issue in the instant case, which requires employers to keep electrical equipment free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees. Others simply proscribe certain conditions, the hazard being presumed. Cf. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir.1975). [15] For example, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(d)(1), which requires that [e]very open-sided floor or platform 6 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing ..., is just such a regulation, the presumptive hazard being that of an employee fall. We think the better approach is to burden MOSHA with proving substantial similarity between the conditions giving rise to the hazard in order to sustain a repeated violation under the Maryland Act. Clearly, when a rule or regulation mandates or proscribes very specific conduct, the burden is slight. A repeated violation under a very specific standard requires the present and antecedent conditions to be almost identical. If an employer is cited twice for failing to construct proper railing on a construction site, the conditions giving rise to the presumed hazard of an employee fall are going to be virtually synonymous, i.e., the failure to construct proper railings. As the rule or regulation becomes more general in character, however, the burden will concomitantly increase. Thus, although 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) proscribes electrical equipment hazards, the conditions which can give rise to such hazards may be limitless. The dissent relies heavily upon our holding in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Commiss'r of Labor and Industry, 339 Md. 323, 662 A.2d 256 (1995) (hereinafter Bethlehem I ), wherein we held that the Commissioner properly placed the burden of proof upon Bethlehem to prove that compliance with a specific safety standard was not feasible. The dissent suggests that Bethlehem I is analogous, if not controlling. We respectfully disagree for three reasons. First, although Bethlehem I addressed the relative burdens of proof between the Commissioner and the cited employer, it did so in the context of proving the feasibility of compliance with the general and specific duty clauses of the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act. See Md.Code (1991, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1991 Supp.), §§ 5-104(a)(1)-(2) & 5-104(b)(1) of the Labor and Employment Article. We there held that when an employer is cited for violation of the general duty clause, the burden falls upon the Commissioner to prove that compliance with the rule or regulation is feasible. Bethlehem I, 339 Md. at 328, 662 A.2d at 258. The same is true for an alleged violation under the specific duty clause, when the implicated rule or regulation fails to specify the means of compliance. Id. at 329, 662 A.2d at 259. Such a rule is driven by the concern that absent fair notice of what is required or prohibited, there may be a violation of due process. Id., 339 Md. at 329, 662 A.2d at 259 (and cases cited therein). When, however, a specific duty standard contains the method for abating workplace hazards, the burden of proving the infeasibility of the particular standard under the circumstances falls to the employer. Id., 339 Md. at 329, 662 A.2d at 259. In the instant case, the feasibility of compliance with 29 C.F.R. § 1910. 303(b)(1) was neither raised nor argued below. In that regard, Bethlehem I is inapposite. Second, even assuming arguendo that issue was raised below, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) fails to prescribe the method of abating workplace electrical hazards. Under our holding in Bethlehem I, the burden of proving the feasibility of compliance would have fallen to the Commissioner in any event. Finally, due process concerns aside, saddling the employer with the burden of proving the feasibility of compliance in those instances where the alleged violation was of rule or regulation prescribing a specific method of hazard abatement is perfectly consistent with the position we adopt in the instant case. Indeed, infeasibility is in the nature of an affirmative defense. As the party asserting the affirmative, the employer would naturally have the burden of proof. See Part II. B., supra. As we said in Part IV. A. supra, the purpose of the enhanced penalty provision of § 40(a) of the Maryland Act is to ensure adequate employer response to previous citations. We think it is impossible to determine the propriety of an employer's response without first considering the underlying conditions that gave rise to the violation in the first instance. In situations where the conditions prompting the present citation are so disparate from those of the antecedent violation that the employer would not be on notice that his compliance efforts are insufficient, application of the enhanced penalty provisions would serve only to punish an employer who has made a good faith effort to observe the relevant regulation and correct any deficiencies brought to its attention. We do not think that this is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting § 40(a). This is not to suggest that an employer may turn a blind eye to workplace hazards. To the contrary, a citation and abatement order apprises an employer of the necessity of corrective action and of seeking out and preventing similar hazards. §§ 36, 37 and 40. See also Dun-Par Engineered Form, supra, 676 F.2d at 1337 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 666(a), (b), and (j)). We simply here recognize that while the Act requires employers to comply with its provisions and assure, as far as practicable, a safe working environment for its employees, it does not require employer omniscience in the area of workplace safety. Cf. Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir.1975) (holding that not requiring the Secretary to establish that an employer knew or should have known of the existence of an employee violation would in effect improperly make the employer strictly and absolutely liable for all violations). We can perceive of some situations where, notwithstanding a prior citation under a particular safety standard, an enhanced penalty would no more encourage employer compliance than if the original citation had never been issued. We therefore hold that in order to establish a repeated violation under § 40(a), the Commissioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the substantial similarity between the conditions giving rise to the present and antecedent violations. A final order of the Commissioner under the same standard does not establish a prima facie case of a repeated violation in the Commissioner's favor. The burden of persuasion and burden of production remain firmly fixed upon the Commissioner throughout the administrative proceeding. Bunge, supra, 638 F.2d at 838. In light of the principles articulated in this opinion, we shall affirm the intermediate appellate's court decision to remand the repeated violation portion of the case to allow the Commissioner the opportunity to apply the correct evidentiary standard to the facts of this case and to hear more evidence if necessary. This will necessarily involve determining whether the conditions leading to Bethlehem's most recent citation for violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) were substantially similar to those for its previous violations of that same standard. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO FURTHER REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND IT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by CHASANOW, J., in which RODOWSKY and RAKER, JJ., join. CHASANOW, Judge, concurring and dissenting. I concur with the majority's holding that the Commissioner was correct in finding that the toaster oven that electrocuted Raymond Pritts had recognized hazards that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees and that this was a serious violation. My dissent is from the portion of the majority's opinion that analyzes the procedure by which a repeated violation should be determined and from the failure to affirm the Commissioner's finding that Bethlehem Steel Corporation committed a repeated violation.