Opinion ID: 145311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stockbridge's Motion to Intervene

Text: Stockbridge appeals from the district court's denial of its motion to intervene in the Oneida County litigation as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). [9] We review the district court's denial of a Rule 24(a) motion for abuse of discretion. Brennan v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.2001). Rule 24(a)(2) states: On timely motion, the [district] court must permit anyone to intervene who ... claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) is granted when all four of the following conditions are met: (1) the motion is timely; (2) the applicant asserts an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that without intervention, disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; and (4) the applicant's interest is not adequately represented by the other parties. MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 471 F.3d 377, 389 (2d Cir. 2006). Stockbridge sought to intervene for the sole purpose of seeking dismissal of this case insofar as it relates to the parcels of land that are allegedly part of the Stockbridge reservation. The ground for dismissal that Stockbridge proposed to assert was that Stockbridge is a necessary and indispensable party which enjoys sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be forced to join this action. In its absence, the suit cannot proceed and must be dismissed as to all Oneida County lands situated within the 1788 Stockbridge treaty reservation. Stockbridge Mot. to Intervene at 2, Oneida County, dated November 25, 2005. In other words, Stockbridge asserts that it is a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1), but that joinder is not feasible as a result of Stockbridge's immunity from suit, and dismissal is therefore warranted under Rule 19(b) because Stockbridge is an indispensable party under that rule. Rule 19(a), governing Required Joinder of Parties, and Rule 24(a)(2), covering Intervention of Right, [10] which Stockbridge asserts its claim here, are intended to mirror each other. MasterCard, 471 F.3d at 390. Rule 19(a) requires parties to be joined if joinder is feasible and if the parties are necessary to accord complete relief among existing parties, Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1)(A), or if, under specified circumstances, disposing of the case without that party might (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest, Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1)(B). [11] [I]f a party is not `necessary' under Rule 19(a), then it cannot satisfy the test for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). MasterCard, 471 F.3d at 389. Stockbridge argues that it is a necessary party under both Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) because disposing of this matter in its absence might as a practical matter impair or impede Stockbridge's ability to protect its interest relating to the subject of the action, Stockbridge Br. at 8, and might also leave the County subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations, id. at 48. [12] But under either theory, Stockbridge must first show that it claims an interest relating to the subject of the action. Fed. R. of Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). As explained in MasterCard, 471 F.3d at 390, and discussed above, Rule 24 requires a similar showing if Stockbridge is to establish the ability to intervene as a matter of right. The district court determined that Stockbridge lacked an interest in the instant litigation and therefore denied its motion to intervene. Oneida County, 432 F.Supp.2d at 292. We agree. [F]or an interest to be cognizable under Rule 24(a)(2), it must be direct, substantial, and legally protectable. An interest that is remote from the subject matter of the proceeding, or that is contingent upon the occurrence of a sequence of events before it becomes colorable, will not satisfy the rule. Brennan, 260 F.3d at 129 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Stockbridge's purported interest in this case stems from the fact that it is currently involved in litigation in which it is asserting that a portion of the land at issue here is in fact part of the Stockbridge reservation. See Stockbridge-Munsee v. State of New York, No. 3:86-CV-1140 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1986). [13] Stockbridge is therefore concerned that the present litigation could hinder its efforts to protect its property interest in that land. The parties to this litigation do not, however, purport to put at issue the boundaries of the OIN's or Stockbridge's reservation. Nor, with the exception of the OIN's claims under state law, do the Tribe's arguments so much as touch on the issue of the continued existence of the reservation irrespective of its boundaries. We think that Sherrill's rejection of the unification theory, 544 U.S. at 214, 125 S.Ct. 1478, under which the OIN argued that it had unified fee and aboriginal title and may [therefore] assert sovereign dominion over the parcels, id. at 213, 125 S.Ct. 1478, has taken the question of the reservation boundaries off the table for purposes of this appeal. What is relevant now is the OIN's assertion that it is immune from suit even if it does not have sovereign control over the land in question. The Counties' contrary assertion is that they can foreclose on land owned by the OIN irrespective of whether it is now or ever was part of the tribe's reservation. Stockbridge's interest in this litigation is therefore remote at best, because these assertions are unrelated to the question of reservation boundaries. [14] Finally, we note that the manner in which we decide this appeal also renders minimal the likelihood that Stockbridge will be prejudiced by its failure to be allowed to intervene. [15]