Opinion ID: 6108757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Burlington's Motion to Dismiss

Text: The final issue in this case involves Burlington's motion to dismiss the Koopmanns' non-declaratory claims pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but it later granted Burlington's motion for summary judgment on those claims. In its final judgment, the trial court awarded $26,190.00 in attorney's fees to the Koopmanns under the loser-pays provision of Rule 91a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7. The Koopmanns challenged the summary judgment on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed as to the unjust enrichment (money had and received) and negligence claims, but as discussed above, reversed on the breach of contract claim. 9 542 S.W.3d 643 . The Koopmanns did not appeal that ruling, and thus the court of appeals' judgment affirming the summary judgment is final and not before us. Burlington now asks this Court to hold that the trial court erred in denying Burlington's motion to dismiss, even though the trial court ultimately granted Burlington summary judgment on those claims. Burlington argues that because it made the same arguments against those claims in its motion to dismiss as it did in its later, successful summary judgment motion, the trial court erred in not dismissing the claims earlier. Therefore, Burlington asserts, it was error for the trial court to grant the Koopmanns attorney's fees under Rule 91a because Burlington was the prevailing party as to those claims. The Koopmanns respond that Burlington's motion to dismiss was filed late as to all but the negligence claims, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3 (requiring that a motion to dismiss be filed within sixty days after the first pleading containing the challenged cause of action), and the trial court did not err in its denial because those claims were not frivolous. Burlington disagrees, asserting that its motion was timely because the Koopmanns' first attempt at alleging these claims was unintelligible. In the alternative, Burlington asserts that the court of appeals should have at a minimum ... reverse[d] the fee award against [Burlington] and [ ] remand[ed] the case for an allocation of fees and costs among the prevailing parties as to the Koopmanns' negligence claims. 10  Rule 91a provides that a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. It also requires that, except in actions involving the government, the court must award the prevailing party on the motion all costs and reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred with respect to the challenged cause of action in the trial court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7. Here, the trial court denied Burlington's Rule 91a motion but later rendered summary judgment on the Koopmanns' non-declaratory claims. Apparently, Burlington is not satisfied, because it asks us to hold that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. We decline to do so. First, Burlington's argument that it is the prevailing party under Rule 91a because it later won on summary judgment as to these claims is unpersuasive. Rule 91a provides that a party who files a motion to dismiss is due attorney's fees when it prevails on the motion-not on a later summary judgment motion asserting there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. Further, it is irrelevant that the arguments Burlington made in its motion for summary judgment were the same as those it asserted in its motion to dismiss because a motion to dismiss is decided on the plaintiff's pleadings. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6 (except in determining attorney's fees, the court may not consider evidence in ruling on the motion and must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59); City of Dall. v. Sanchez , 494 S.W.3d 722 , 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). Finally, if we were to grant Burlington's request and hold that the trial court erred in denying its motion, this would effectively require us to vacate or overrule the trial court's summary judgment of these claims in Burlington's favor. We cannot do so when the court of appeals' affirmance of the summary judgment is final and not before us. We note that Burlington could have challenged the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss at the time it was denied. See, e.g. , In re Essex Ins. Co. , 450 S.W.3d 524 , 526 (Tex. 2014) (reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss on a petition for writ of mandamus); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups , 429 S.W.3d 752 , 753-54 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss under a permissive interlocutory appeal). It chose not to. We reject Burlington's argument that it is entitled to recover attorney's fees as the prevailing party on the motion under Rule 91a when Burlington received an adverse ruling on that motion, did not challenge the ruling at that time, and later prevailed on its motion for summary judgment, which became final when it was not appealed to this Court.