Opinion ID: 694580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Doctrine of Prosecutorial Immunity

Text: 29 Though the text of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 does not mention official immunities, the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress did not intend Sec. 1983 to abrogate immunities 'well grounded in history and reason.'  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2612-13, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951)). As first outlined by the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), among the traditional official immunities that perdure is the absolute immunity for state prosecutors. The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity creates a formidable obstacle for a plaintiff seeking to maintain a civil rights action against a district attorney, as it provides that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under Sec. 1983 for their conduct in 'initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case,' insofar as that conduct is 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 995). 30 Especially in cases, such as the present one, in which a plaintiff plausibly alleges disgraceful behavior by district attorneys, the application of this doctrine is more than disquieting. Absolute immunity leave[s] the genuinely wronged ... without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427, 96 S.Ct. at 993. Nevertheless, the doctrine is well-established and has been held to be needed to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and to enable zealous[ ] perform[ance of] prosecutorial duties ... [without] the constant threat of legal reprisals. Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 656 (2d Cir.1995); see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950). 31 Still, absolute prosecutorial immunity does not necessarily thwart Pinaud's claims simply because he names individual district attorneys as defendants. Absolute immunity depends on the nature of the function performed, not [on] the identity of the actor who performed it. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 545, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); see also Ying Jing Gan, 996 F.2d at 530. When a prosecutor is engaged in administrative or investigative activities, he is entitled only to qualified immunity, and thus the individual district attorney defendants in this action are to be held absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 [only] for acts 'within the scope of [their] duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.'  Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410, 96 S.Ct. at 985); see also Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.1984) (describing the nature of this functional approach to the immunity question). 32 In its ruling below, the District Court enumerated the alleged illegal acts by the district attorneys and correctly applied this functional approach to determine whether the individual defendants were entitled to absolute immunity for their activities. 4 And, as noted before, the Court concluded that the district attorneys are covered by absolute immunity for all their alleged acts that plaintiff claims caused him injury except as to the allegation that defendants Henry and Holownia arranged to have plaintiff frequently transported from the county jail to the county courthouse (the Bullpen Therapy claim that Pinaud has withdrawn). Pinaud, 798 F.Supp. at 921. 33