Opinion ID: 2625585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whiting Petroleum Income

Text: [¶ 10] Wife next challenges the district court's treatment of Husband's Whiting Petroleum income. Husband testified that he worked for Whiting Petroleum in Arkansas from 1990 until 1999. After leaving Whiting Petroleum and moving to Wyoming, he began to receive deferred compensation from Whiting and had received such compensation each year through 2004. Husband further testified that he was neither guaranteed to receive this money from Whiting Petroleum, nor did he have a right to receive it in the future. Based on this evidence, the district court stated the following in its amended decision letter: WHITING PETROLEUM INCOME: Plaintiff testified: he received incentive bonuses from this source for several years after terminating employment with the company; AND that he had no right or guarantee to future payments. Therefore the Court finds this is not an item of property that can be divided, but is evidence of [Husband's] prior years' income. [¶ 11] Wife apparently contends that this money is either akin to an oil production royalty or it is a current right to future compensation based on Husband's previous employment. Under either of these theories, Wife argues, the Whiting Petroleum income should have been included in the district court's property division. The district court, however, found that this money was never guaranteed to be paid in the future; therefore, the Whiting Petroleum income could not be divided as marital property and would, instead, be treated as income for the years it was received (i.e., 2000 through 2004). The district court then used this income to calculate child support. [¶ 12] In support of her position, Wife refers us only to 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 515 (1998) for the proposition that [c]hoses in action, rights, and other interests, the benefits of which may be receivable now and in the future, may constitute intangible personal property which are marital assets subject to equitable distribution. Wife, however, ignores the remainder of § 515 which draws a distinction between current rights to future assets, and mere expectancies. Id. We have said, [w]ith respect to future property, we think the rule must be that, when a court divides property incidental to the granting of a divorce, the court is limited by the amount of property in its hands for division and a mere expectancy is not subject to division. Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367, 370 (Wyo.1970). Referring specifically to our discussion in Storm, § 515 clarifies that [a]n expectancy is a future interest which cannot be distributed in a divorce proceeding since it may never come into being. 24 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 515; see also Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175 (Wyo.1978). [¶ 13] There was evidence in the instant case that could have supported Wife's characterization of the Whiting Petroleum income; however, there was also evidence which could have led to the conclusion that this money is merely an expectancy and, therefore, could not be divided by the district court. As is plain from the district court's amended decision letter, the district court weighed this evidence and made a finding of fact that the income was not guaranteed in the future. Based on this finding, the district court correctly determined that this money could not be divided as an item of marital property. The district court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding of fact or applying the law. Therefore, we must affirm its decision.