Opinion ID: 2429047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Problem Two

Text: The second problem in Brady was that the funds were expended solely for the benefit of parochial school students. Just as before the Brady decision, the Fiscal Court transportation subsidies are exclusively expended for the benefit of private and parochial school children under Resolution 34. While the Appellees contend that Brady merely held that payment of the subsidy funds directly to private and parochial schools was permitted and that the Fiscal Court's total exclusion of public school children was entirely discretionary and permitted under Brady , I disagree. Both Appellees argue that the Fiscal Court's decision to exclude all public school children and any elective public educational programming is not fatal. They contend that KRS 158.110 mandates that the Board of Education provide transportation to all public school children attending public school who do not live within a reasonable walking distance to the nearest school. Therefore, according to Appellees, these children would never be the intended recipients under KRS 158.115. However, the clear language of KRS 158.110(1) states that boards of education may provide transportation from their general funds or otherwise for any pupil of any grade to the nearest school .... (Emphasis added.) The words  must provide appear nowhere in the plain language of the statute. Consequently, the statute is clearly discretionary, and not mandatory in nature. Appellees also acknowledge that some public school children who have chosen to attend a public school other than the school designated by the Board of Education are not being provided with bus transportation because it would not be economically feasible to establish service. Thus, we can only conclude that Appellees' contention that the cost of public school transportation ... is already fully funded by [over twenty-four million in] tax dollars is simply not correct.