Opinion ID: 2054150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: effect of family court proceeding

Text: Relying upon Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537-38, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1790, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 360 (1975) (requiring juvenile-transfer proceedings to take place prior to the initiation of criminal adjudicatory proceedings), defendant also contended that the double-jeopardy clause bars the state from prosecuting defendant in the Superior Court following his participation in a waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing in the Family Court. We disagree. The double-jeopardy clause applies only to proceedings that are `essentially criminal.' Breed, 421 U.S. at 528, 95 S.Ct. at 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d at 355. Thus, when the objective of a proceeding is punishment, jeopardy will attach so as to prohibit a second prosecution for the same violation. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398, 58 S.Ct. 630, 632, 82 L.Ed. 917, 921 (1938). Application of these principles convinces us that jeopardy did not attach at defendant's Family Court waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing conducted pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1, as enacted by P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2, and ch. 18, § 2. Under § 14-1-7.1, the hearing in Family Court did not subject defendant to the risk of punishment, but served to determine whether probable cause exist[ed] to believe that the offense charged ha[d] been committed and that the    [defendant] ha[d] committed it. Section 14-1-7.1(a). In contrast, the transfer hearing at issue in Breed actually amounted to an adjudicatory proceeding, the objective of which was to determine whether the juvenile had committed a criminal violation, the possible consequences of which included incarceration. Breed, 421 U.S. at 521, 529, 95 S.Ct. at 1781, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d at 351, 355. Moreover, the Rhode Island Family Court's waiver provisions fully satisfy the express mandates of Breed, which require only that state determinations of whether to transfer juveniles out of Family Court precede the commencement of proceedings that could culminate in an adjudication that [they] ha[ve] violated a criminal law and in a substantial deprivation of liberty. Id. at 537-38, 95 S.Ct. at 1790, 44 L.Ed.2d at 360. [3] Under § 14-1-7.1, the Family Court's determination of probable cause must be made prior to the initiation of proceedings in the appropriate adult court. The double-jeopardy clause is not, therefore, a bar to the prosecution of the defendant in Superior Court subsequent to the defendant's waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing in the Family Court. We conclude, therefore, that retrial of the defendant on the second-degree-murder charge is not violative of the prohibition against double jeopardy. Consequently, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, and the papers in the case are remitted to the Superior Court.