Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Penalty-Phase Jury Charge

Text: On appeal, defendant argues for the first time that the penalty-phase jury charge was fatally deficient in two respects. First, he notes that the court failed to define purpose when instructing the jury on the escaping apprehension aggravating factor. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f). Second, he contends that the charge failed to instruct the jury that it could not double-count evidence in support of multiple aggravating factors. Although the court did not define purpose in its instruction on the avoid apprehension factor, this omission was not plain error. See R. 2:10-2. Three days earlier, the court defined purpose six times in the guilt-phase charge. Cf. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 385, 700 A. 2d 306 (noting, in upholding penalty-phase charge that omitted definition of purpose, that purpose had been defined repeatedly during the guilt phase). In addition, the prosecutor discussed purpose in both his penalty-phase opening statement and summation. Cf. ibid. (noting defense counsel's discussion of purpose during penalty-phase summation). Given the repeated reference to and definitions of the terms, the jury almost certainly knew what `purpose' meant and presumably applied it faithfully during its penalty-phase deliberations. Id. at 385-86, 700 A. 2d 306. We find no error in the court's failure to instruct the jury not to double-count evidence in support of more than one aggravating factor. The court correctly informed the jury that its process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors was a qualitative one. The weighing process, the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors is not mechanical or numerical in nature. You do not count factors, you consider them qualitatively. The answers depend upon your exercise of careful and considered judgment. One aggravating factor may be found to outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt numerous mitigating factors. Similarly, many aggravating factors may be found not to outweigh a single mitigating factor. Essentially, it's a matter addressed to your human judgment as mature people. You make a decision based upon qualitative judgment as to what the appropriate penalty should be. When it's here, the prosecution uses the same evidence or some of the same evidence in seeking to prove multiple aggravating factors, and you found multiple aggravating factors have been proved by the same evidence. It's particularly important to remember that you may not simply compare the number of aggravating factors against the number of mitigating factors. Rather  remember that in such an instance you're considering the same facts more than once, because the same facts are being used to prove more than one aggravating factor. So, I think that is fairly sensible. You have to consider the factors, you don't in any way count the number of factors and compare three aggravating factors against three mitigating. It's a qualitative analysis. But if more than one aggravating factor is based upon the same facts, then you want to be aware that under these you only really need one set of facts, and it may mean that the aggravating factors have less weight than may otherwise be the case. The charge comports with our prior holding that the trial court should advise the jury that it should not simply compare the number of aggravating factors against the number of mitigating factors, that it is considering the same facts more than once, and that it should be cognizant that the same facts are being used to prove more than one aggravating factor. This result permits the jury to consider the evidence relevant to each aggravating factor, and should prevent it from giving undue weight to the number of factors when one aspect of the defendant's conduct supports multiple aggravating factors. [ Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 176, 548 A. 2d 887]. Properly instructed, the jury was not precluded from using the same evidence to find multiple aggravating factors. Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 287, 619 A. 2d 1208; Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 176, 548 A. 2d 887.