Opinion ID: 223154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 8 This Court reviews a claim of prosecutorial misconduct de novo, as it is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006). 28 On appeal, Wainwright makes sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments only as to his convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count 1) and conspiracy to carry and possess a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 3).9 We address each argument in turn.
To prove a Hobbs Act conspiracy, the government must show “that: (1) two or more persons agreed to commit a robbery encompassed within the Hobbs Act;[10] (2) the defendant knew of the conspiratorial goal; and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in helping to accomplish the goal.” United States v. To, 144 F.3d 737, 747-48 (11th Cir. 1998). “Presence with conspirators alone, however, or close association with them, is not by itself sufficient proof of participation in a conspiracy.” Id. at 748 (quotation marks omitted). Because Wainwright’s argument is focused on the government’s alleged failure to prove 9 While Wainwright’s brief appears to assert generally that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, he has offered argument only on the conspiracy counts. Therefore, he has abandoned argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on any of the other counts of the Superseding Indictment. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 821 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1511 (2011). 10 “The Hobbs Act prohibits [robbery], and attempts or conspiracies to [rob], that in any way or degree obstruct, delay, or affect commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce.” United States v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). For purposes of the Hobbs Act, robbery is defined as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). 29 conspiracy, the question here is really whether the government showed “(1) an agreement between the defendant and one or more persons, (2) the object of which is to do either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.” United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006). To prove a conspiracy, “[t]he government is . . . not required to demonstrate the existence of a formal agreement, but may instead demonstrate by circumstantial evidence a meeting of the minds to commit an unlawful act.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[p]roof that the accused committed an act which furthered the purpose of the conspiracy is an example of the type of circumstantial evidence the government may introduce to prove the existence of agreement.” Id.11 Wainwright’s cursory argument on appeal is that the evidence against him “was that he merely associated with Smith and Richitelli; that they spoke on their phones; and that he gave Smith a ride.” Furthermore, “[t]here was simply 11 “We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we make all inferences and credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Chirino-Alvarez, 615 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “We will uphold a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1026 (11th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, “we assume that the jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict.” United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009). 30 insufficient evidence for the jury to infer knowledge and/or find participation by [Wainwright] . . . .” Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could readily find that Wainwright conspired with Smith and Richitelli to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Smith expressly testified that Wainwright conspired with Smith and Richitelli to rob Cherico with a gun. Smith testified that Wainwright assisted with surveillance and planning the robbery, picked him up at Richitelli’s house to drive him to the Pembroke station (the last pick-up station) to commit the robbery, put the gun in the car the day of the robbery, and corresponded with Richitelli about the courier’s whereabouts. Copious amounts of corroborating testimony and evidence, including cell phone records, supported Smith’s story and contradicted Wainwright’s story. Because we assume that the jury makes credibility inferences in support of its verdict, United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009), we must assume that the jury in this case credited Smith’s testimony, not Wainwright’s. Furthermore, if the jury disbelieved Wainwright’s testimony, it was entitled to use that testimony as substantive evidence of Wainwright’s guilt. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 745 (11th Cir. 2008). 31 Given the record before us, there was clearly sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Wainwright did in fact conspire to commit Hobbs Act robbery. 2. Conspiracy to Carry and Possess a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence There is also ample evidence to support Wainwright’s conviction for conspiracy to carry and possess a firearm in relation to Hobbs Act robbery. To sustain Wainwright’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (o), “the government must show that, . . . [Wainwright] used, carried, or possessed a firearm in furtherance of [a] conspiracy.” United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). “To establish constructive possession, the government must show that the defendant exercised ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm or the vehicle concealing the firearm.” Id. To show that the possession of the firearm was in furtherance of the crime, “[t]he government must also establish some nexus between the firearm” and the offense. Id. Finally, “under § 924(c), a defendant may be liable for a co-conspirator’s possession if possession was reasonably foreseeable.” Id. No one disputes that there was a gun in the car Wainwright was driving. Smith expressly testified Wainwright put the gun in the car. Even without Smith’s 32 testimony, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Wainwright constructively possessed the gun—namely, Soubasis’s testimony that he found the gun in the car Wainwright was driving. See id. at 1234 (establishing constructive possession requires government to show defendant exercised ownership, dominion or control over vehicle concealing firearm). And, as discussed above, there was sufficient evidence to show that Wainwright conspired to commit Hobbs Act robbery. There was also sufficient evidence at trial to establish that Wainwright and his co-conspirators planned to use the gun to further the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy. They were caught with the gun a mere half-mile from the Sunoco station they intended to rob. Smith also testified that he and his co-conspirators planned for Smith to use the gun to confront Cherico and take the car and money from him. Thus, the government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer that the gun was in Wainwright’s car in furtherance of the robbery conspiracy. AFFIRMED. 33