Opinion ID: 1463584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other Sentencing Contentions

Text: Payne also makes a number of general sentencing challenges, all of which we find meritless. None of them requires extended discussion. Payne contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment of his sentencing hearing in order to present factors in mitigation of sentencing. (Payne brief on appeal at 63.) This contention provides no basis for reversal. In support of the request for an adjournment for an extended period (S.Tr.2), Payne's principal trial counsel stated that he was not prepared to present mitigating factors because he had assumed, based on this Court's holding in James, 239 F.3d 120, that sentences of life imprisonment for Payne's convictions on the murder-in-aid-of-racketeering counts were mandatory, that he believed James to be wrongly decided, and that he wished an adjournment in order to prepare mitigating factors in case either the district court or the court of appeals concluded, contrary to James, that the district court did have discretion to impose a prison term of less than life ( see S.Tr. 2-6, 13; id. at 5 (if in fact your Honor has a discretion, then I would hope the Second Circuit on appeal will determine that the case should be remanded for resentencing)). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of this adjournment request, which, in any event, has become moot, as the contention that James was wrongly decided has not been pursued on this appeal. Payne also contends that the district court failed to calculate Payne's Guidelines sentence . . . and appeared to treat Payne's guideline sentence as mandatory as opposed to advisory. (Payne brief on appeal at 63.) Neither of these apparently inconsistent contentions is supported by the record. A district court satisfies its obligation to make the requisite specific factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report. . . . It may do so either at the sentencing hearing or in the written judgment it files later. United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 275-76 (2d Cir.2004). Here, the sentencing ranges recommended by the Guidelines were computed in the presentence report on Payne (PSR) prepared by the United States Probation Department; the district judge filed with the judgment a STATEMENT OF REASONS in which he expressly stated that he adopted the PSR. Further, the record of the sentencing hearing itself suggests that the court was adopting the PSR, as the court indicated that the probation report would be amended to reflect the fact that, subsequent to the preparation of the PSR, three counts of conviction had been dismissed pursuant to Payne's Rule 29 motion ( see S.Tr. 15-16). The record at sentencing also indicates that the court considered the Guidelines. For example, a discussion of whether Payne was responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack ( see id. at 6-7, 14) plainly concerned Payne's Guidelines offense level, see Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(1) (prescribing the highest offense level for a defendant responsible for 4.5 KG or more of Cocaine Base). And the court discussed Payne's objection to an obstruction-of-justice enhancement (S.Tr.9) and adjustment ( id. at 10) clearly Guidelines terms. As to the nature of the Guidelines, the PSR, which the district court adopted in its STATEMENT OF REASONS, cited Booker and stated that although the Guidelines must be consulted, they are advisory. At the hearing, Payne's attorney himself spoke in terms of the advisory guidelines (S.Tr.6), and nothing in the sentencing transcriptor anything else in the recordindicates that the court viewed the Guidelines as anything other than advisory. With regard to the Guidelines calculation of the amount of crack cocaine for which Payne was responsible, the district court stated, I . . . find that 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine is a gross understatement of the amount involved in this offense. ( Id. at 6-7.) Payne contends that this finding constitutes a procedural error because the court did not calculate the amount of crack cocaine attributable to Payne, as opposed to the conspiracy in general (Payne brief on appeal at 64). We disagree. Payne was accountable for all reasonably foreseeable quantities of crack distributed by the conspiracy of which he was a member, see, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d at 136; Guidelines § 1B1.3 Application Note 2. According to the evidence at trial, on which the district court expressly relied ( see S.Tr. 7)and the verdict of the jury which found Payne guilty after it was instructed that in order to do so it must find that he was a member of the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment Payne was a member of the conspiracy at least during the period beginning in 1995 and continuing well into the 2000s. But even considering only the one-year period during which Payne served as Thomas's lieutenant, the district court's finding was unimpeachable. Thomas testified that as his lieutenant, Payne, inter alia, packaged the crack and delivered the packages to sellers [f]or about a year or so (Tr. 1322); that they were selling seven days a week ( see id. at 1320); and that sales averaged 62 to 125 grams of crack a day ( see id. ). Thus, considering just the one year when Payne was directly managing crack sales for Thomas, and assuming the low end of Thomas's estimate as to the quantities sold, Payne was responsible for the distribution of more than 22.6 kilograms of crack. Finally, we reject Payne's contentions that his sentence was procedurally flawed on the ground that the court failed to . . . consider 3553(a) factors (Payne brief on appeal at 63) and failed to adequately explain the sentence it imposed on Counts One, Two, Ten and Eleven, i.e., the RICO and narcotics counts ( id. at 65). In determining whether the district court has considered the appropriate factors, we do not require robotic incantations by the sentencing judge. United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 270 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 882, 127 S.Ct. 192, 166 L.Ed.2d 143 . . . (2006); [ United States v.] Crosby, 397 F.3d [103,] 113[ (2d Cir. 2005)]. In the absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, we presume that the district court has faithfully discharged its duty to consider the § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d at 264; United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 30. United States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 169, 175 L.Ed.2d 239 (2009); see, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.2005) (As long as the judge is aware of both the statutory requirements and the sentencing range or ranges that are arguably applicable, and nothing in the record indicates misunderstanding about such materials or misperception about their relevance, we will accept that the requisite consideration has occurred.). In the present case, the district court's explanation at sentencing, though sketchy, reflects explicit consideration of such § 3553(a) factors as the nature and circumstances of the offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), the kinds of sentences available, id. § 3553(a)(3), and the sentencing court's duty to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to serve the § 3553(a)(2) purposes of sentencing, id. § 3553(a). The court stated: I believed the evidence just like the jury did and this series of crimes couldn't get more serious, couldn't get more brutal, more cold-blooded, couldn't get more damaging to the community, all the drug trafficking and the murders. There is no appropriate sentence for you, sir, but life in prison. An argument can be made that this maximum sentence falls short of the need to reflect the seriousness of your crimes, but it is the maximum sentence. (S.Tr.16.) We see no indication that the district court did not consider all of the requisite § 3553(a) factors; and it plainly explained why it sentenced Payne to imprisonment for life.