Opinion ID: 1926851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial review and necessity for taking.

Text: In State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Highways v. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., Ltd., La., 350 So.2d 847 (Nos. 58,437 and 58,438, 1977), the decision in State Through the Department of Highways v. Guidry, 240 La. 516, 124 So.2d 531 (1960) was reversed. The Guidry decision had stood for the proposition that when the Department expropriates property under the quick taking statute courts may only determine the adequacy of the compensation and whether the property was taken for a public purpose. On this premise the Guidry court held that it was within the Department's discretion to determine whether there was a necessity to expropriate full ownership or merely a servitude affecting the land. The implication from the Guidry decision was that courts could not review the Department's determination. In Jeanerette we held to the contrary saying, in effect, that courts could always inquire into the validity of the taking. Jeanerette found that the rights to a permanent servitude of right of way were not for a necessary highway purpose and the order of expropriation was modified accordingly. The issue is the same in the instant case, and this Court will determine from this record whether the full ownership of the property or a servitude is required by the Department for the highway purposes to which the property is to be put. At the outset it is noted that only a right of way or servitude was acquired for the existing highway to which the three small parcels involved in this case will be added. Negotiations prior to filing suit disclosed that the Department would accept a servitude if Olinkraft would donate the right of way. When Olinkraft refused to donate the servitude, this suit was filed and full ownership is demanded. Also the certificate of the Board of Highways authorizes the taking of either a servitude or full ownership. This evidence convincingly demonstrates that a servitude would have sufficed to serve the highway purposes for which this property is being taken. But the Department asserts that full ownership is required in order that the Department may control the right of way corridor and grant permits to electric utilities, pipe lines and the like on and across its rights of way. At times electricity is needed to light the rights of way or provide power for electric pumps at rest areas and power for other unnamed facilities. On occasions in the past, it is said, the Department's right to grant permits has been questioned when only a servitude of right of way was acquired. However, the Court's attention has been called to Section 381 of Title 48 of the Revised Statutes which authorizes the director of the Department, when not inconsistent with the purposes of state highways, to issue permits for the use and occupancy of the rights of way of state highways. Inasmuch as the cited Section 381 gives the Department the right to grant permits whether its right of way is in full ownership or a servitude, its argument for full ownership instead of a servitude is unimpressive. In addition to the foregoing, the Department's evidence is to the effect that appraisers value a servitude at eighty percent of the full ownership value, thus effecting a twenty percent saving for the Department when servitudes are acquired instead of full ownership. Although this is the theory, the witness observed that it was not always the result in practice. In any event, there is no disadvantage to a servitude pricewise; in fact, a saving is more likely. On this record there is no showing which would support a taking of full ownership instead of a servitude. Thus, no highway purpose is served by insisting on the more onerous taking. The owner's right of property is not to be unduly violated when the highway purpose can be served with a modified taking. For the reasons assigned, the judgments appealed from are reversed and set aside and the order of expropriation is modified to vest in the Department a servitude of right of way to the property expropriated in lieu of full ownership. SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons. TATE, J., dissents for reasons assigned in State Through Dept. of Highways v. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., La., 350 So.2d 847 (Docket Nos. 58,437 & 58,438).