Opinion ID: 4110601
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant’s Alleged Property Interest

Text: The Supreme Court has noted that property interests “may take many forms.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). However, [t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He 11 must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Id. at 577. Generally, a “claim of entitlement” is not viable when a government agency wields significant or unfettered discretion in determining whether to award or rescind a particular benefit or when an individual lacks an objective basis for believing that he is entitled to retain a benefit. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 265–67 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Indeed, we have held that an individual has no “cognizable property interest” in the renewal of a license or certification where the applicable agency “regulations explicitly permit the agency to not renew an examiner for any reason deemed appropriate by the Administrator.” Fried, 78 F.3d at 692; see also Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that failure to renew a particular designation did not implicate a protected property interest where agency regulations stated that such designation was “a privilege granted by the Administrator” and that it was “not the right of every qualified applicant to be granted” such a designation). The regulation at issue in this case, CNETINST 1533.9K, is similar to the regulations at issue in Fried and Lopez. As noted above, 1533.9K, Article 404(e)(5), permits the Navy to revoke a NJROTC instructor’s certification if, “upon consideration of [his or her] conduct, performance, and evaluations . . . continued certification . . . is not in the best interests of the program.” Given this language, it is plain that the Navy has retained expansive authority and discretion to determine whether an individual should be allowed to remain in the NJROTC program as an instructor. The language 12 certainly does not suffice to establish that an instructor’s position creates a protected property interest. Appellant attempts to bypass the difficulty posed by the regulation by claiming that the property interest implicated in this case is his employment at Pearl High School, not his certification as a NJROTC instructor. See Reply Br. for Appellant at 10–11. He points to now-defunct language from a Louisiana statute which provided that individuals would “automatically become . . . regular and permanent teacher[s] in the employ of the school board” after serving three years as a probationary teacher. Id. He thus argues that the state statute provides him with a protected property interest because he was an employee of Pearl River and taught there for more than three years. Id. It is noteworthy that, in 2012, the Louisiana legislature amended this statute to remove the language upon which Appellant relies. H.B. 974, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2012). Even if this language were still good law, however, Appellant could not rely on a Louisiana statute to diminish the Navy’s considerable discretion in determining whether to revoke his NJROTC certification. The state law does not control Navy determinations regarding who will serve as NJROTC instructors. And without certification, Appellant cannot serve as a NJROTC instructor at Pearl River High School or at any other school. In sum, on the record in this case, we hold that Appellant has not demonstrated a property interest that was infringed by the Navy’s revocation of his certification.