Opinion ID: 506169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: burns' desire to represent himself

Text: 157 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), Burns contends that the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment by thrust[ing] counsel upon him and refusing to allow him to represent himself at trial. In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel includes the right to proceed without counsel when [the defendant] voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Id. at 807. Because the exercise of the right of self-representation involves a waiver of the right to assistance of counsel, United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 425 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034, 104 S.Ct. 1305, 79 L.Ed.2d 704 (1984), we have recently emphasized that the right of self-representation is waived unless defendants articulately and unmistakably demand to proceed pro se, id. at 426. 158 Our reading of the trial transcript demonstrates to us that Burns never made an unambiguous waiver of his right to assistance of counsel or, therefore, an unambiguous claim to represent himself. It is true that from time to time, in the first trial (which later ended in a mistrial due to Black's illness) and the second, and in status hearings, he expressed his desire to proceed pro se. However, although the court carefully and repeatedly explained to Burns that he had to choose between representing himself and being represented by appointed counsel, and gave Burns numerous opportunities to unequivocally assert his intention to proceed pro se, Burns never made such an assertion. Instead, he seemed to desire some sort of hybrid form of representation, whereby both he and his appointed counsel would be permitted to examine witnesses, make objections, and argue motions. While the district court would have been within its discretion in permitting this practice, Burns did not have a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to combine self-representation with representation by counsel. United States v. Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 129, 98 L.Ed.2d 87 (1987); United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d at 425. It would not be terribly cynical to suppose that Burns' equivocal requests were made more with an eye to creating an issue on appeal than for any other purpose. 159 Because Burns has gone to great lengths in his brief and at oral argument to demonstrate that he did unambiguously assert his right to represent himself, we recount the saga in some detail. At a hearing before a magistrate on December 22, 1983, Burns stated that he would like to try to represent [him]self, if at all possible. Tr. 12/22/83 at 3. The magistrate, however, after questioning Burns about his financial capacity to hire an attorney, appointed a Mr. Garber in an advisory capacity. Id. The court then left it up to Burns, Garber, and Judge Hogan to work out the precise parameters of that representation. Id. at 11. A docket entry filed January 10, 1984 reflects the appointment. Record (R.) 21. 160 Mr. Garber appeared on behalf of Burns before the magistrate later that afternoon, and addressed the court as to the bail amount and several other preliminary matters. Tr. 12/22/83 at 19-23. Over the next two weeks, Garber again filed several motions on Burns' behalf; each stated that it was filed by defendant, by and through counsel. See, e.g., R. 23, 24, 25, 44, 53. On January 13, 1984, Judge Hogan inquired of Garber whether the question of Burns' pro se status had been resolved and Garber replied, We have been having some discussions along that line. Tr. 1/13/84 at 23. Judge Hogan then specifically stated, I only want one of you trying the case in court. Id. at 24. Garber said he understood, though alluding to the possibility that he would address that maybe in another week or so. Id. 161 In February 1984, following the government's motion in opposition to the appointment of Garber as Burns' counsel, Burns filed (by and through his appointed counsel) a pleading, signed by Garber, asserting that he was in fact indigent and requesting that his appointed counsel remain on the job. R. 46. In the pleading, Burns asserted that 162 Defendant has had the assistance of counsel since arraignment, and a ... vacation of counsel appointment would seriously and adversely affect the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel. 163 R. 46 at 4. Judge Hogan denied the government's motion on February 23, 1984, ruling that appointed counsel shall continue representing Burns. R. 48. 164 Two months later at a status hearing, Burns attempted to address the court directly regarding some motions on which the court had ruled. The following colloquy then occurred: 165 The Court: Have you talked it over with Mr. Garber? 166 Mr. Burns: I'm talking to the bench. 167 Mr. Garber: He's discussed this with me, your honor. 168 The Court: You aren't pro se quite. I think Mr. Garber is appointed to represent you and I've left him in representing you despite some concerns. And I really don't want to get involved in two people trying this case. I want to get to trial. 169 Mr. Burns: Yes, your honor. 170 The Court: All right. You understand that. All right. 171 Tr. 4/24/84 at 15-16. 172 At the first trial, Garber conducted cross-examination of government witnesses and addressed the bench on motions and objections. At one point, Burns attempted to address the bench directly, and was told by Judge Hogan that he should address the court only through his attorney. The court then said to Burns, Mr. Garber is going to handle the trial, you understand that? Burns responded, Yes, sir. Tr. 5/10/84 at 104. Garber proceeded to act as Burns' attorney until the court declared a mistrial on June 13. 173 The issue next surfaced on September 28 at a status hearing when, following a flurry of handwritten motions from Burns, the lead prosecutor asked the court to resolve once and for all Burns' status, reminding all present of the court's repeated rulings that Burns could not enjoy dual representation. Tr. 9/28/84 at 41-42. Judge Hogan again questioned Garber about the pro se issue. 174 The Court: Mr. Garber, Mr. Burns? 175 Mr. Garber, you're representing Mr. Burns still, and I haven't had any indication that you're not going to continue to. 176 Mr. Garber: No, Your Honor, I haven't either. 177 Id. at 44-45. The court then stated again that he would not allow hybrid representation. Id. at 45. Burns responded that he had no quarrel with Garber's assistance, but that as he understood it, he had been granted pro se status at the initial hearing with the magistrate, and Garber had only been appointed to assist him; he wondered by what magic formula [his] pro se status ha[d] evaporated. Id. at 46. Judge Hogan again explained to Burns that Garber had been appointed as his lawyer, and that Burns could attain pro se status only by trying the case himself: 178 [M]y understanding was throughout the trial Mr. Garber was your lawyer. He tried the case. And as you said, he did an exceptional job throughout the part of the trial we did have. And it was not that he was sitting there at counsel table just helping you to ask questions, or telling you how to properly phrase the question, or telling you how to properly file a motion. That's the status of the standby-type counsel that I believe Magistrate Dwyer was addressing to you. 179 And I think that he is your lawyer, and that he's appointed to be your lawyer, and he has been working and had worked very hard as your lawyer, and continues to. And that's the way to leave it, unless he doesn't actively involve himself in the case. At that point, you become pro se, and then you're going to try the case. 180 Tr. 9/28/84 at 47. Although Burns protested that he did not want his (erroneously assumed) pro se status to completely disappear, he stated that if he was not allowed to file the motions himself, I may just have to go pro se myself. Id. at 48. The court reiterated that Burns should file motions only through his counsel, id. at 50, and agreed not to take action on the pending pro se motions until they were refiled by Garber, id. at 52. Despite this extended explanation of the choice facing him, Burns did not make a motion to proceed pro se. 181 The second trial began in January 1985, with Garber acting as counsel without objection from Burns. One month into the trial, the issue of Burns' pro se status arose for the final time. Burns addressed the court in order to state that he objected to not being allowed to proceed pro se. Tr. 2962. In response, the court stated that, You did not have a pro se status.... There has not been a motion to discharge [Garber] made by you and to go pro se yourself or to try your case. I told you one of the two of you was going to try, if you wanted to try it or Mr. Garber, but not both. Id. The court then once again put Burns to the choice: If you want Mr. Garber to be discharged and you want to take over, and that is your application, I can hear an application on that. Id. at 2963. Burns did not make a motion to dismiss Garber, or to try the case himself. 182 The tortuous history recounted above demonstrates that Burns was told several times that the court would not allow both Burns and Garber to conduct the defense, and had numerous opportunities to tell the court that he wanted to represent himself on the condition offered. Not once, however, did he do so; Burns apparently was unwilling to proceed pro se if that meant he would have to forego the considerable benefits of Garber's representation. The trial court refused to let Burns have his cake and eat it. This is not a violation of the Sixth Amendment.