Opinion ID: 3010606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pre-Trial Competency Hearing

Text: We will first consider Leggett's claim that the district court erred in declining to conduct a competency hearing before the trial began. Since we must decide whether the district court properly applied the standard for determining the necessity of a competency hearing, our review is plenary. United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 766 (3d Cir. 1987). We note that, if the proper legal standard has been applied, factual findings regarding competency are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 (3d Cir. 1989); Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 766 n.4. Fundamental to an adversarial system of justice is the precept that a person whose mental condition is such that [the person] lacks the capacity to understand the nature and the object of the proceedings[,] . . . to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing [a] defense may not be subjected to a trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). The conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). In keeping with this unwillingness to try incompetents, we have a statutory directive providing that a criminal defendant whose competency is in question may 5 be subjected to a competency hearing. 18 U.S.C. S 4241(a).3 If neither the defendant nor the government moves for such a hearing, the trial court may do so on its own motion. Id. To do so, however, the trial court must have reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is presently suffering from an impairment resulting in mental incompetency. Id.; see also Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 766-77 (holding that court must have reasonable doubt as to defendant's ability to grasp proceedings to order a competency hearing); United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1290 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that district court must have  `reasonable cause to believe' the defendant [is] incompetent) (quoting 18 U.S.C. S 4241(a)); United States v. George, 85 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a finding of reasonable cause dictates whether a court conducts a competency hearing); United States v. Lebron, 76 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1011 (1996); United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 414 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1375 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's denial of motion for competency hearing based on absence of reasonable cause to doubt defendant's competency); United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's denial of motion for psychiatric examination due to absence of reasonable cause to doubt defendant's competency). A defendant is competent to stand trial if (1) the defendant has the  `present ability to consult with [defense counsel] with a reasonable degree of rational _________________________________________________________________ 3. Section 4241 states in pertinent part: At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. 18 U.S.C. S 4241(a). 6 understanding'  and (2) the defendant has a  `rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings.'  Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (quoting Dusky v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 766-77; Lebron, 76 F.3d at 31; Nichols, 56 F.3d at 410; United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, 489 (1st Cir. 1994). In determining whether a defendant satisfies this two-prong test, a court must consider a number of factors, including: evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, [the defendant's] demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. However, due to the vicissitudes of all cases, a court must be cognizant that [t]here are . . . nofixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for [a competency hearing]. Id. There is no predetermined formula for making a finding of reasonable cause. A court must simply look at the unique circumstances of the case and decide whether the defendant (1) has the capacity to assist in her or his own defense and (2) comprehends the nature and possible consequences of a trial. If either prong is not met, a court has reasonable cause to order a competency hearing. We will now consider whether Leggett satisfied these criteria. Leggett argues that his inability to assist in his own defense was evident from the July 26 pre-trial hearing at which he sought the dismissal of Byrd, his then-trial counsel. At that hearing, Byrd expressed her concern that Leggett's recalcitrance impeded her ability to mount a defense when she stated, I do question whether he has an ability to assist his counsel, which is [a] prong of the competency evaluation. Nonetheless, Byrd emphasized that she was not formally moving for a competency evaluation. During the hearing, moreover, Leggett gave no indication that he would be incapable of assisting in his defense. Although he was at times obstreperous, he did demonstrate an ability to serve his own interests before the court. Over the course of the hearing, Leggett -- without the assistance of counsel -- cross-examined two witnesses, one of whom was Byrd. Furthermore, he made sure he preserved on the record any court ruling he perceived to be in error. For example, when the district court refused to appoint counsel for the pre-trial hearing, Leggett responded, I want to cite 7 that as error. I object to that. Leggett even feigned ignorance of basic courtroom procedure in a thinly veiled effort to support his contention that the district court erred in not appointing counsel. When the district court asked Leggett whether he understood that he could not interrupt a witness who was trying to answer a question, Leggett declared, No, I don't understand that because I'm not a lawyer. . . . And you told me I couldn't have no lawyer so I'm doing the best I can. Based on Leggett's handling of the hearing, the district court concluded, [I]t seems to me from what he said today, he's on top of this case extremely. And I don't know how a client could be more assistive, if there's such a word . . ..  We agree with the district court's conclusion that Leggett seemed more than capable of assisting in his own defense. His exchanges with the district court manifested a working knowledge not only of trial tactics but also of the importance of underscoring potential errors on the record as grounds for appeal. In similar cases, other courts of appeals have interpreted a defendant's ability to participate in court proceedings as a sign of competency. In United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1997), a defendant argued that a district court erred in denying a motion for a competency examination because the defendant allegedly suffered from a  `split personality.'  The court of appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the defendant took notes, conversed with counsel, and reacted reasonably to the admission of evidence. Id. These actions supported the Sovie court's conclusion that the defendant was a knowing participant in his defense. 122 F.3d at 128. In Williams, the court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit confronted the same issue when a defendant appealed from a district court's denial of a motion for a mental examination to determine competency. 998 F.2d 264-67. Although the trial record showed that the defendant tended to become  `extremely agitated'  and incoherent, the Williams court affirmed the district court's decision. Id. at 265-66. Despite the defendant's unruly behavior at trial, the court of appeals concluded that he was rational and able to assist his attorney, id. at 266, based on the 8 following: (1) the defendant had advised [counsel] to file certain motions, including the motion for a mental examination; (2) a short period before moving for a mental examination, the defendant had been handling pro se a custody case involving his son; and (3) in connection with the custody case, the defendant had filed numerous coherent briefs [in a] state court, challenging its jurisdiction over him. Id. at 265. Leggett appeared to be just as able to contribute to his defense as the defendants in Sovie and Williams. His untoward antics aside, he made a clear effort at the hearing to present arguments and evidence favorable to his position. There was no reason to believe that he would not act with the same purpose of mind once the trial itself began and he had the services of counsel at his disposal. In fact, Leggett's desire to have Byrd discharged was at least partially grounded in what he considered poor strategic decisions on her part and her failure to get him copies of various evidentiary documents.4 It would have indeed been oxymoronic if the district court had ruled sua sponte that the defendant could not aid in his defense because he had too keen an interest in that defense. Leggett's reasons for seeking Byrd's discharge stemmed from his relationship with that particular lawyer and did not seem indicative of a general incapacity to consult with any lawyer. Accordingly, the district court allowed Byrd to withdraw and appointed Gardner in her place. The district court advisedly refrained from reading a competency issue into the mere incompatibility of a defendant and one particular lawyer. The clarity and zeal with which Leggett pursued Byrd's discharge gave the district court no reasonable cause to believe that he was unable to assist counsel in his defense. See George, 85 F.3d at 1438 (affirming district court's denial of defendant's motion for psychological evaluation since defendant was  `lucid,'   `articulate'  and  `intelligen[t]' ); Morgano, 39 F.3d at 1374 (affirming district court's denial of defendant's motion for competency _________________________________________________________________ 4. Leggett mainly disagreed with Byrd on matters relating to jury selection and adjustment of the trial's start date. He also maintained that she had not obtained copies of various memoranda such as reports from Dr. Karten, the prison's chief psychologist. 9 hearing in case where, in defense counsel's judgment, defendant had been helpful and more cooperative than the average criminal defendant in assisting in preparation for trial). We will next consider whether the district court had reasonable cause, at the July 26 pretrial hearing, to believe that Leggett did not have a rational and factual understanding of the hearing and of the pending trial.5 Leggett points to portions of the hearing's transcript in which he rants about his mental impairments as evidence that he could not grasp the nature and consequences of the proceedings. At several points, Leggett mentioned that he has brain damage and suffers from schizophrenia.6 Without even discussing the self-serving nature of these comments, what precious little probative value they had was undercut by Leggett's own admission that his impairments did not affect his comprehension of legal concepts, such as waiver: [A]nyway, I knew exactly, you know, what it-- what it is to waive a right. You know, this is not my first time in court. You know, I'm not stupid. I'm [sic] may suffer from a little brain damage, a little schizophrenia, but I ain't never been stupid. I understand what waiving _________________________________________________________________ 5. We note, initially, that Byrd stated that she did not question Leggett's competency with regard to understanding the nature of the charges, what goes on in court [or] the function of the prosecution, the function of defense and the function of the Court. While her statements alone are not dispositive of the issue, they strongly bolster the conclusion that Leggett fully understood his situation. See United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1374 (7th Cir. 1994) (defense counsel's averment that defendant had ability to understand and participate in proceedings casts grave doubt on the defendant's incompetency). 6. Both Leggett and the government make reference to the testimony of several mental-health experts concerning Leggett's mental condition at the time of his attack on Troutman at the prison. Such evidence, however, is irrelevant for our purposes because it sheds little light on Leggett's mental condition at the time of the pretrial hearing on July 26, 1995 -- over one year after the assault on Troutman. See United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1290 (6th Cir. 1996) (defendant's assertion of mental incapacity at time of offense does not permit or require examination of competency for trial). 10 your rights is. You know, I understand what a knowing and intelligent and knowing and voluntary waiver is. Thus, Leggett's argument is betrayed by his own articulation of an axiom generally observed by courts: i.e.,  `[i]t does not follow that because a person is mentally ill [that person] is not competent to stand trial.'  Davis, 93 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Newfield v. United States, 565 F.2d 203, 206 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Nichols, 56 F.3d at 412 (It is well-established that some degree of mental illness cannot be equated with incompetence to stand trial.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Williams, 998 F.2d at 266 (observing that certain mental disabilities, such as minor neurosis or slight retardation, may not render a defendant incompetent to stand trial). If the mental illness does not deprive the defendant of the ability . . . to understand the proceedings . . . rationally as well as factually, Nichols, 56 F.3d at 412 (citation omitted), then the illness is irrelevant for the purposes of determining competency. Although a trial court may consider a defendant's history of mental illness, it must properly focus[ ] its inquiry [on the defendant's] mental state at the time of the [proceedings]. Morgano, 39 F.2d at 1374 (citation omitted). That is, the defendant must not only suffer from a mental impairment but must also be presently unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings. 18 U.S.C. S 4241(a). Nothing that Leggett said or did during the July 26 hearing suggested that he lacked the requisite understanding. A self-proclamation of mental illness hardly qualifies as proof of incompetency, especially when coupled with a textbook recitation of the necessary elements of a legal waiver. Courts have considered behavior far more extreme than Leggett's rants to be insufficient to warrant a sua sponte competency hearing under section 4241. The facts in Lebron strongly mirror those of the present case. In Lebron, the defendant, like Leggett, had a lengthy history of psychiatric disorders, and was diagnosed as a possible schizophrenic. 76 F.3d at 30. At a change-of-plea hearing, the defendant threw a pitcher of water at several case investigators. Id. at 31. Neither side moved for a 11 competency hearing and, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court should have ordered a competency hearing sua sponte due to his irrational and outrageous behavior in the courtroom. Id. at 32. In affirming the district court's judgment of sentence and rejecting the defendant's argument, the court of appeals for the First Circuit expounded, Such behavior may be uncontrolled, manipulative, or even theatrical. It is not determinative of competency. Agitated or violent courtroom antics alone do not mandate a finding by the trial court of reasonable cause. Id. (citing United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also Nichols, 56 F.3d at 413 (affirming district court's finding that defendant's unusual behavior -- i.e., getting down on all fours and putting his head to the floor -- was  `all calculated fakery' ). Clearly, Leggett's declarations of mental illness were no more generative of reasonable cause than was the defendant's sudden paroxysm in Lebron. Just as we do not want to encourage defendants to fabricate symptoms of mental disorders (e.g., violent acts in court) to raise doubts about their competency, we also do not want to require  `district courts to order competency hearings sua sponte in every case where a defendant has some history of psychiatric treatment and, even vaguely, mentions the problem.'  Lebron, 76 F.3d at 33 (quoting HernandezHernandez v. United States, 904 F.2d 758, 760 (1st Cir. 1990)). Leggett merely mentioned that he had been diagnosed in the past as having psychiatric problems. Such statements, standing alone, did not give the district court reason to believe that Leggett did not grasp the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him. Based on this reasoning, we conclude that the district court did not have reasonable cause to believe that Leggett (1) was incapable of consulting with an attorney and assisting in his defense or (2) did not understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him.7 _________________________________________________________________ 7. We note that, although the district court held a competency hearing after the trial and determined that Leggett was competent to appear for 12