Opinion ID: 1870501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: is there official and good faith immunity?

Text: Officers and agents of the State of Mississippi are clothed with defenses not available to ordinary citizens. When such an individual is named as a defendant in a civil action our law directs that they enjoy qualified public official immunity. An official has no immunity to a civil action for damages if his breach of a legal duty causes injury and (1) that duty is ministerial in nature, or (2) that duty involves the use of discretion and the governmental actor greatly or substantially exceeds his authority and in the course thereof causes harm, or (3) the governmental actor commits an intentional tort. Beyond that, a government official has no immunity when sued upon a tort that has nothing to do with his official position or decision-making function and has been committed outside the course and scope of his office. McFadden, 542 So.2d at 877; Starnes v. Vardaman, 580 So.2d 733, 737 (Miss. 1990); Region VII, Mental Health v. Isaac, 523 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Miss. 1988) (immunity extended unless performing merely a ministerial function); Grantham v. Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 224 (Miss. 1988). The ministerial/discretionary distinction remains intact in this State. McFadden, 542 So.2d at 877. Qualified public official immunity is not absolute immunity. The immunity is limited and applies only when the official is engaged in a discretionary decision-making role. It does not apply if the action is merely ministerial. Davis v. Little, 362 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1978). While there is no flexible rule to distinguish whether an act is ministerial or discretionary, the most important criteria is if the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the condition specified, not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion, the act and discharge thereof is ministerial. McFadden, 542 So.2d at 877; Region VII, Mental Health v. Isaac, 523 So.2d at 1017; Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922 (1935). Here the deputies were not exercising discretionary authority in searching the Barretts' home. The deputies were acting under a search warrant which gave them the authority to search and set out the parameters in which the search should be carried out. Both federal and state law protects individuals from unreasonable searches. In carrying out the search warrant the deputies were performing a ministerial function. The discretionary function, determining the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, had already occurred. The execution of the search warrant was a ministerial act and required no discretionary decision-making, aside from the places in the house to search, on the part of the deputies executing the warrant. As the execution of the search warrant was a ministerial act, the deputies who executed it are not shielded from liability by qualified immunity. The deputies argue that qualified or good faith immunity can only be abrogated upon a showing of a lack of good faith belief that the conduct was lawful; that the conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known; or that wilful wrongs or malicious acts were committed. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.1981); Grantham v. Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d at 225, citing Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d 689 (Miss. 1984). However, this argument made by the deputies puts the cart before the horse, as it assumes that the deputies were already clothed in qualified immunity. They were not. The action they took was not discretionary but ministerial and immunity did not extend to them.