Opinion ID: 2423786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Collateral Estoppel to this Case

Text: [¶ 22] Having concluded that the Fee Arbitration Panel's determination was an adjudication for purposes of the application of collateral estoppel, we consider the extent to which the Panel's factual findings in this case have preclusive effect with respect to Emerson's remaining legal malpractice claim against Perry and K & P. [¶ 23] At oral argument, Emerson alluded to two possible legal theories to support her remaining malpractice claim: (1) Emerson and Perry/K & P entered into an oral agreement or contract that Emerson would not pay her own attorney fees and that her fees would be paid by her ex-husband as part of the divorce settlement, but Perry/K & P failed to incorporate a provision to that effect into the settlement; and (2) as part of effective representation of Emerson in her divorce matter, Perry and K & P should have incorporated a provision into the divorce settlement agreement requiring Emerson's ex-husband to pay her attorney fees, but they negligently failed to do so. [¶ 24] As discussed above, collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating factual issues already decided if the identical issue necessarily was determined by a prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Efstathiou, 2009 ME 107, ¶ 7, 982 A.2d at 342 (quotation marks omitted); Macomber, 2003 ME 121, ¶ 22, 834 A.2d at 138-39. In order to resolve the fee dispute between Emerson and Perry/K & P, the Fee Arbitration Panel necessarily was required to make factual findings as to whether Emerson agreed to pay attorney fees to Perry/K & P and whether the fees charged to her were reasonable, and Emerson had the opportunity and incentive to litigate this issue. See M. Bar R. 9(g)(13). [2] Thus, Emerson's contract-based theory is barred by the fee arbitration adjudication. [¶ 25] Emerson's other theory in support of her legal malpractice claim is, in essence, a claim that Perry/K & P did not advocate zealously enough for her interests. She asserts that Perry/K & P committed legal malpractice by negligently failing to include a provision in her divorce settlement agreement requiring her ex-husband to pay her attorney fees. This claim involves some factual determinations that, to the extent the Fee Arbitration Panel made them, were not necessary to the panel's resolution of the fee dispute at issue before it. Accordingly, Emerson would not be barred by collateral estoppel from litigating factual issues relating to that theory of her claim. However, Emerson is barred from pursuing that theory of her claim because she did not designate an expert witness to address the issue. [¶ 26] Expert testimony is required in a legal malpractice claim to establish the appropriate standard of care and whether an attorney breached that standard of care, except when the breach or lack thereof is so obvious that it may be determined by a court as a matter of law or is within the ordinary knowledge of laymen. Pitt v. Frawley, 1999 ME 5, ¶ 9, 722 A.2d 358, 360-61; Jim Mitchell & Jed Davis, P.A. v. Jackson, 627 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Me.1993); see also Garland v. Roy, 2009 ME 86, ¶ 19, 976 A.2d 940, 946 (discussing the elements of a legal malpractice claim). The appropriate standard of care, and whether Perry/K & P breached a duty of zealous representation to Emerson by negotiating a divorce settlement that did not include a requirement that Emerson's ex-husband pay all of her attorney fees, is not obvious or within a layman's common knowledge and would have required expert testimony. As represented at oral argument, the marital estate at issue in this case was substantial. Understanding the calculations, negotiations, and strategy involved in resolving the terms of a complex divorce settlement, and understanding how a provision requiring Emerson's ex-husband to pay her attorney fees would have fit into or altered that divorce agreement, would require the assistance of expert testimony. See generally Pitt, 1999 ME 5, ¶ 9, 722 A.2d at 360-61. [¶ 27] Emerson did not designate an expert with respect to her legal malpractice claims. The court previously had properly entered a summary judgment in Perry and K & P's favor with respect to all of Emerson's malpractice claims that required the designation of an expert. Because the theory that Emerson has advanced herein is such a claim, it was subject to the court's March 2009 grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of Perry and K & P and no longer is a viable basis for Emerson's legal malpractice claim. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.