Opinion ID: 4563936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Step Act

Text: We first consider the breadth of power Congress gave the sentencing court in § 404 of the First Step Act. We review the scope of a district court’s authority de novo. United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2008). Our primary task in interpreting a statute is “to determine congressional intent, using traditional tools of statutory construction.” St. Charles Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). As always, we begin our interpretation of the statute with the plain meaning of the text. See Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013). Section 404, titled “Application of Fair Sentencing Act,” reads: (a) DEFINITION OF A COVERED OFFENSE.—In this section, the term “covered offense” means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 6 2010 . . . . that was committed before August 3, 2010. (b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed. (c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . or if a previous motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section. § 404. Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act increases the amounts of crack cocaine required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses; section 3 eliminates the mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of cocaine. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, §§ 2, 3, 124 Stat. 2372. Although the Fair Sentencing Act was passed to remedy the 100:1 crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity, its provisions applied only to those sentenced after its effective date, leaving those sentenced earlier with no relief. See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268– 69, 281 (2012); Alyssa L. Beaver, Note, Getting A Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2531, 2573 (2010). In 2018, Congress enacted § 404 of the First Step Act to provide that relief. Does this language authorize de novo resentencing or a more limited modification of a sentence? Our sibling circuits have taken different positions. On the one hand, because the First Step Act only references one other statute, the court can read it to permit imposing a reduced sentence based on “the relevant legal 7 landscape [altered] only by the changes mandated by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.” United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019). On the other hand, the text of § 404(b) may authorize a broader resentencing — one that permits not only the retroactive application of §§ 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, but also correction of other errors that affected a defendant’s sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding “that any Guidelines error deemed retroactive . . . must be corrected in a First Step Act resentencing”); United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 776 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that the First Step Act contemplates a baseline of process that must include an accurate amended guideline calculation and renewed consideration of the § 3553(a) factors). To answer this question, we proceed to review the statute’s structure, context, purpose, and history to discern congressional intent. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019); see also Jill C. Rafaloff, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1091 (1988). The structure of the Act provides little insight. Its title — “APPLICATION OF FAIR SENTENCING ACT” — suggests that the provision supports only retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. But the plain text of the sentencing provisions gives the court discretion over whether to apply the Fair Sentencing Act at all. § 404(c). It does not provide guidance on what a court should consider in exercising its discretion or the scope of its analysis in exercising that discretion.1 1 The dissent characterizes this language as “limit[ing] a sentence modification to that changed by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Dissent at 6. It 8 Further, although the term “impose” is used in § 404(b), § 404(c) describes the relevant motion as one “to reduce a sentence.” §§ 404(b), (c). This language can be interpreted as either authority for a de novo resentencing or for a more limited modification of a sentence. Congress has not guided our task by explicitly making other statutes relevant to the interpretation of § 404. Apart from making §§ 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable, the text of § 404(b) — unlike many other provisions of the First Step Act — neither incorporates nor excludes other federal statutory provisions regarding sentencing. We next consider how § 404 fits into the statutory context applicable to federal criminal sentencing in general. See Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890 (2019) (holding it axiomatic that “Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law”) (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 398 (2013)). Placing great emphasis on the authorization in § 404 to “impose” a reduced sentence, Mr. Brown argues that resentencing under § 404 requires application of “standard sentencing law that Congress was aware of while passing the First Step Act,” including “the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the current Sentencing Guidelines, and applicable case law.” Aplt. Br. at 11. The government offers a more limited interpretation, arguing that contends that the only thing that a district court may consider is the level of punishment based on the weight of crack cocaine. Id. at 2. This oversimplifies the issue. Sentencing is multifaceted; it is the result of a complex intersection of laws and factual circumstances that give legitimacy to punishment. The court has discretion over whether to impose a reduced sentence at all, which illustrates that imposing a reduced sentence is not merely a mechanical substitution of one number for another. 9 the express terms of § 404 authorize a resentencing based solely on the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. For Mr. Brown, the statute’s use of the term “impose” mandates application of § 3553 and provides a free-standing resentencing authority not bound by the restrictions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As part of the panoply of federal sentencing law, § 3582 provides an overarching policy of finality in federal sentencing and explicitly states that a “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” absent certain exceptions. § 3582(c); see Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010). Making it even more relevant, § 3582(c) is specifically addressed to courts imposing terms of imprisonment, which is the focus of most § 404(b) motions. Section 3582(a) instructs: “[t]he court, in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” § 3582(a) (emphasis added). Section 404 of the First Step Act explicitly states that no defendant is entitled to a reduction under the provision. See § 404(c). This reinforces our conclusion that § 404(b) did not demonstrate an intent to otherwise disturb the finality mandated by § 3582(c). We recognize that the First Step Act itself can operate independently as statutory authority to modify a sentence of imprisonment, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 3742(g), but such an interpretation leaves its operation unmoored from the entire body of statutory law that Congress has enacted to govern federal sentencing. Such an interpretation also fails to recognize the context in which the First Step Act was enacted and would fail to fulfill our obligation to “interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory 10 scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into a[] harmonious whole.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citation and quotations omitted). Thus, in light of our longstanding precedent on the overarching importance of § 3582(c)’s rule of finality and its limited exceptions in federal sentencing, we conclude that § 404(b)’s grant of discretionary authority to impose a reduced sentence must be accomplished through the statutory mechanism of § 3582(c)’s exceptions. This accords with the “ordinary practice” of federal sentencing: “to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already sentenced.” Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 280. It also fits with § 3582(c)(1)(B), the mechanism through which Congress empowered the First Step Act. In this case, the applicable exception is § 3582(c)(1)(B), which authorizes modification “to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute . . . .” § 3582(c)(1)(B). Because we conclude that § 404(b) operates through the mechanism of § 3582(c)(1)(B), § 404(b) provides an exception to the rule of finality only “to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute.” Id.