Opinion ID: 1861790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: search issues

Text: The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the pill bottle and film tin seized from the Lincoln. Appellant argues that the trial court was in error; at the time the searching officer observed the pill bottle, appellant contends he did not have requisite information upon which to base a reasonable suspicion that appellant was violating the law. We do not agree. Officer Anderson was checking medical offices in the area because of a break-in fifteen minutes earlier. After entering a dark parking lot behind a dentist's office, he noticed a Lincoln Continental. Its motor was running but its lights were off. There were two occupants; one was positioned behind the wheel. With the information known to him at that time, Officer Anderson was justified in approaching the Lincoln to investigate what he believed, under the circumstances outlined above, to be suspicious conduct on the part of appellant. A police officer, in performing his official work, may properly question persons when the circumstances reasonably indicate that it is necessary to the proper discharge of his duties. Orricer v. Erickson, 471 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973); People v. Singletary, 268 Cal.App.2d 41, 73 Cal.Rptr. 855 (1968). A police officer has both the right and duty to make a reasonable investigation of suspicious activities even though the nature of the activities may fall short of grounds sufficient to justify an arrest or a search. People v. Martinez, 6 Cal.App.3d 373, 86 Cal.Rptr. 49 (1970). The questioning may, however, reveal a probable cause for making an arrest and a reasonable incidental search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Therefore, Officer Anderson's knowledge of the recent break-in at a medical building and his observation of the lone car in a darkened dentist's parking lot in that area justified his further investigation. These facts, in addition to the officer observing a bottle protruding from the red bandana during questioning appellant, furnished probable cause for the search of the pill bottle. The test for probable cause is simply: Were the actions of the suspect, viewed in the context of the attendant circumstances, such that they would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that the person was engaged in criminal activity? Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1969); People v. Hillery, 65 Cal.2d 795, 56 Cal.Rptr. 280, 423 P.2d 208 (1967). Here, the answer is clearly yes. As Officer Anderson questioned appellant, appellant was unable to produce neither a driver's license nor other identification. It was appellant's duty to have his driver's license in his possession and to display it to the officer. See SDCL 32-12-22, SDCL 32-12-39. Officer Anderson, who knew of a medical center break-in fifteen minutes earlier, clearly saw the pill bottle positioned on appellant's lap. Appellant's answers to questions concerning the bottle were evasive. He attempted to conceal the bottle by wrapping it in a bandana and handing it to his companion. Considering appellant's furtive movements, the break-in where it could be expected that pill bottles were removed, the location of the car, appellant's lack of identification, the pill bottle plainly visible on appellant's lapthe totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation gave rise to probable cause for the search and subsequent arrest. Gallik v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 5 Cal.3d 855, 97 Cal.Rptr. 693, 489 P.2d 573 (1971); People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269 (1963). After appellant was taken to the police car and arrested pursuant to SDCL 23-22-7, [2] Officer Grimm returned to the Lincoln to retrieve a temporary driver's license that he observed appellant holding during the initial questioning. While reaching for the license laying on the seat, Officer Grimm noticed a film tin positioned by the transmission console. He also noticed that the opened astray contained several articles, including a matchbook cover covered with numbers that appellant palmed during questioning. The tin was immediately removed from the car; the matchbook cover and computer card found in the ashtray were removed before the car was released to Mary Smith's father. This search resulting in the seizure of the film tin following the arrest was justified. The events leading up to the arrest furnished probable cause to believe that the car did contain more drugs. Once a drug had been found in the car which formed the basis of the arrest, it was reasonable to believe that there were other drugs in the car. Police having probable cause to believe that an automobile which they have stopped contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search the vehicle without a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Orricer v. Erickson, supra. See also State v. Boardman, 264 N.W.2d 503 (S.D.1978); State v. Catlette, 88 S.D. 406, 221 N.W.2d 25 (1974). Officer Grimm did not remove the matchbook cover and computer card at the time the tin was removed. These were removed after the car had been taken to a local towing lot. The officer who removed the articles did not have a warrant. Appellant believes that the seizure of the matchbook and computer card constitutes an inventory search. He urges us to follow State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976). This is not a case of inventorying the contents of a motor vehicle. Instead, we are dealing with the removal of objects in an open ashtray seen by an officer who had probable cause to search the car immediately following an arrest. The rule to be applied under the facts presented here is best stated in Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975): In Chambers v. Maroney , we held that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. There, as here, [t]he probable-cause factor that developed on the scene still obtained at the station house. 399 U.S., at 52 [26 L. Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975]. 423 U.S. at 68, 96 S.Ct. at 305, 46 L.Ed.2d at 211.