Opinion ID: 2533775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Recovery Under the Loss Theory

Text: As we explained in Argonaut, The distinction between liquidated and unliquidated damages is closely linked to [the now obsolete] `penalty theory' of prejudgment interest. Argonaut, 474 So.2d at 215. Because loss theory forecloses discretion in the award of prejudgment interest, Argonaut, 474 So.2d at 215, it is irrelevant that the trial court described the damages in the present case as unliquidated. Here, Bosem requested purely pecuniary damages of lost profits of at least $300,000, of which he was awarded under $100,000 for the unauthorized use of his likeness. Accordingly, even before the trial court calculated the amount of damages, the amount was ascertainable and not speculative. Historically, plaintiffs in personal injury cases have not been entitled to prejudgment interest[, because a]s we explained in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Percefull, 653 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla.1995), damages in personal injury cases are too speculative to liquidate before final judgment. Amerace Corp. v. Stallings, 823 So.2d 110, 113 (Fla.2002). In Jackson Grain Co. v. Hoskins, 75 So.2d 306, 310 (Fla.1954), we explained that the reason for not allowing prejudgment interest from the date of loss in personal injury actions was that an exception to the allowance of interest has been made in personal injury cases because of the speculative nature of some items of damage, such as mental anguish, and the indefiniteness of items such as future pain and suffering. Amerace, 823 So.2d at 116 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson, 75 So.2d at 310). Thus, it has long been the law in Florida that in contract actions, and in certain tort cases, once the amount of damages is determined, prejudgment interest is allowed from the date of the loss or the accrual of cause of action. Id. at 116 (citing Jackson, 75 So.2d at 310; Zorn v. Britton, 120 Fla. 304, 162 So. 879, 880 (1935)). In all cases, either of tort or contract, where the loss is wholly pecuniary, and may be fixed as of a definite time, interest should be allowed as a matter of right, whether the loss is liquidated or unliquidated. ... [T]he plaintiff will not be fully compensated unless he receive, not only the value of what he has lost, but receive it as nearly as may be as of the date of his loss. William B. Hale, The Law of Damages, § 67 (2d ed.1912) (emphasis added). For the reasons expressed above, we find that the Fourth District incorrectly reversed the trial court's award of prejudgment interest. We therefore quash the district court's decision. We decline to address the other issues raised by Bosem in this review proceeding. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., recused.