Opinion ID: 1779107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: State's Destruction of Physical Evidence

Text: Dufour asserts that the State committed fundamental error by destroying exculpatory physical evidence, specifically hair found on a stick at the crime scene. Dufour contends that the hair was potentially exculpatory evidence because testing revealed that the hair did not come from Dufour or the victim and therefore it would show that someone other than Dufour killed the victim. Dufour argues that the State's bad faith is established by the destruction of this evidence in violation of a court order. The loss or destruction of evidence that is potentially useful to the defense violates due process only if the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police or prosecution. See Guzman v. State, 868 So.2d 498, 509 (Fla.2003); see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (holding that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law). This Court has previously recognized that [u]nder Youngblood, bad faith exists only when police intentionally destroy evidence they believe would exonerate a defendant. Guzman, 868 So.2d at 509. Youngblood explained that the presence or absence of bad faith for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. 488 U.S. at 57 n. , 109 S.Ct. 333; see also Guzman, 868 So.2d at 509. Dufour argues that bad faith exists because the State destroyed evidence it had determined through testing to be exculpatory, in violation of a court order to preserve the evidence. Dufour has not shown that the hair sample would have in fact exonerated him or that the State ever believed it might. The testimony presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing does not indicate that the prosecutors or police in this case destroyed evidence believing it had evidentiary value. One of the prosecutors, Dorothy Sedgwick, testified during the evidentiary hearing that she did not recall anything about the existence of a stick or about being contacted about the stick after Dufour's trial. Frank Tamen, another prosecutor in Dufour's case, also testified that he did not recall anything about a stick being evidence in the case. In addition, Diane Payne, the lead detective in Dufour's case, testified that she was the person in charge of the items that were taken into custody in Dufour's case. She testified that, even though documents indicated that she had authorized the destruction of the stick, she had no recollection of the destruction. Based on this testimony, Dufour has not shown that any State actor intentionally deprived him of evidence which the State actor believed to be exculpatory. [B]ad faith exists only when law enforcement officers intentionally destroy evidence they believe would exonerate a defendant. Guzman, 868 So.2d at 509. Therefore, Dufour's claim of bad faith destruction of evidence fails.