Opinion ID: 1841590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The subpoena to Wahl

Text: ¶ 43. Using Justice Harlan's two-step Fourth Amendment analysis, we conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data stored on the backup tapes, and that the August 14, 2002, John Doe judge's subpoena duces tecum, as modified by the subsequent order, is overbroad. Therefore, we also conclude that execution of the subpoena duces tecum, as modified, would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. ¶ 44. The first part of the two-step reasonableness test is to assess the actual, subjective expectation of privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. The LTSB is a nonpartisan bureau designed to serve the entire legislature. The statute that created the LTSB requires that it shall at all times observe the confidential nature of the data and information originated, maintained or processed by electronic equipment supported by it. Wis. Stat. § 13.96. The legislature, in creating the LTSB, expressed its belief that it was establishing a confidential warehouse for its data storage. ¶ 45. The State maintains that the records sought are records of public officials affected by Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), which provides that at least some of the materials sought are public records and, as such, are presumed to be available for inspection. See Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 15. However, not everything a public official creates is a public record, see State v. Panknin, 217 Wis. 2d 200, 209-10, 579 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that personal notes of a sentencing judge are not public records), and we have not been apprised of the nature of each document stored on the backup tapes. Therefore, the fact that there may be some public records on the backup tapes does not undermine the LTSB's assertion that the public officials to whom the data belong have a subjective expectation of privacy in the data when it is stored by the LTSB. Stated another way, that most, or even all, of the data on the backup tapes may be obtainable through a public records request made directly to legislators, does not remove the reasonable expectation of privacy legislators have when the data is sought directly from the LTSB. ¶ 46. The more difficult question here is whether public employees' and elected officials' expectations of privacy in the electronically stored data they have created or received at work is one society recognizes as reasonable. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Not all expectations of privacy are objectively reasonable. As we have explained above, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a public employee's expectation of privacy in his office space is reasonable. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717. That privacy expectation is equally applicable even when the work space is shared by other employees. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (holding a union employee who shared an office with other union employees had a privacy interest in the office). ¶ 47. Technology clearly has changed the ways in which we work and communicate with others. The federal government recognized that changing technology required changing laws, and to address those changes, it passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). Amended as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3121-3126 (2001). The ECPA extended the privacy protections that have been given voice communications to electronic communications such as e-mail. See A Review of Legal Standards, supra, at 117 (indicating that Congress concluded that privacy was in danger of being gradually eroded as technology advanced). [16] This is a strong expression of society's expectation of privacy in electronic communications. ¶ 48. Legislators use electronic technology to compose budgets, to prepare position papers, and to draft legislation; they communicate with each other, with their staff members and with their constituents via e-mail and instant messaging. According to the LTSB, the legislative e-mail system processes more than 60,000 transactions each day. [17] Electronic assists to communication is the way in which the legislature does its work, and all of the data created is stored on the backup tapes at the LTSB. ¶ 49. These circumstancesthe way in which the legislature now does business; that the LTSB was created to serve legislators on both sides of the aisle; and the statutory directive of Wis. Stat. § 13.96 that requires that all data stored by the LTSB shall be kept confidentialsupport an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy by legislators in the data on the backup tapes. Therefore, we conclude that society has recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronically stored information on the backup tapes. Accordingly, we must determine if the subpoena issued by the John Doe judge is overbroad. ¶ 50. When we examine whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, we determine whether the government intrusion was reasonable. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). Overly broad subpoenas typically are held unreasonable in that their lack of specificity allows the government to go on an indiscriminate fishing expedition, similar to that provided by a general warrant. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625-26. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, a subpoena is equally [as] indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar [general] terms. Hale, 201 U.S. at 77. ¶ 51. Here, the subpoena requested all of the data from the computer system of an entire branch of state government in order to investigate whether a crime has been committed. It did not specify the topics or the types of documents in which evidence of a crime might be found. [18] The subpoena also did not specify any time period for which it sought records. Some of the records on the backup tapes go back to the 1970s. An open-ended time span during which the records were produced or received is unacceptable. Accordingly, the overly broad demand of the subpoena duces tecum issued here cannot pass Fourth Amendment muster, see, e.g., Hale, 201 U.S. at 76-77, and therefore, it must be quashed. ¶ 52. However, we do not conclude that all documents the John Doe judge seeks in order to investigate whether a crime has been committed are inaccessible. We do, however, require more than a generalized demand for those documents. Because it is clear that another subpoena likely will issue, and because the record before us contains neither the John Doe petition used to initiate the John Doe proceeding nor the affidavit or other showing the district attorney made to obtain the subpoena, we find it necessary to summarize the requirements of the district attorney before any further subpoena is issued. In so doing, we point out that it is the district attorney's burden to provide support to the John Doe judge for a constitutionally sufficient subpoena, as he is the party who commenced the proceeding and sought the subpoena. See Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 624-25.