Opinion ID: 2381571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Setting Traffic Light Intervals a Discretionary Function?

Text: Under the common law, a municipality is immune from suit for decisions made pursuant to the exercise of discretion, but not for actions which are ministerial. [6] McKethean v. WMATA, 588 A.2d 708, 715 (D.C.1991); Elgin v. District of Columbia, 119 U.S.App. D.C. 116, 119, 337 F.2d 152, 155 (1964). Whether a function is discretionary or ministerial is a question going to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. District of Columbia v. North Wash. Neighbors, Inc., supra note 3, 367 A.2d at 148 n. 7. It is a determination to be made by the trial judge, not the jury, and this court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's determination of whether or not the action was discretionary. See e.g., id.; Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1537, 1539 (10th Cir.1992). However, as is the case with any de novo review, we must accept the trial court's resolution of conflicting testimony and will not disturb the factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 50 (D.C.1981) (reviewing trial court's resolution of a motion to suppress tangible evidence). [7] Further, when determining whether the act is discretionary, which determines whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court is not confined to considering only that evidence which was also heard by the jury; instead, the court may consider all evidence coming to its attention bearing on that issue. See, e.g., Matthews v. Automated Bus. Sys. & Serv., 558 A.2d 1175, 1179-80 (D.C.1989) (the court has broad discretion in determining how to proceed in finding such [jurisdictional] facts, including basing its decision on affidavits). [8] At the outset, the trial court must determine whether the act is a discretionary or ministerial function under the circumstances presented. McKethean, 588 A.2d at 715. While [c]haracterizing an act as discretionary or ministerial is not always an easy task, id., discretionary acts are generally defined as those acts involving the formulation of policy while ministerial acts are defined as those relating to the execution of policy. See id.; Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 860 (D.C.1973) (en banc) (discretionary functions are those which, if liable in tort, would pose threats to the quality and efficiency of the government). Administrative decisions which require the government to balance competing considerations are considered discretionary acts. McKethean, 588 A.2d at 715. By barring suit for such actions, Congress prevent[s] judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2764, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). To determine whether a given governmental action is discretionary or ministerial, we first determine whether it is the kind of action that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield; that is, whether the action involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-7, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1958-59, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988) (citation omitted); McKethean, 588 A.2d at 715. If the answer to this first inquiry is yes, then the action is immune from suit, unless the government has adopted a statute, regulation or policy [that] specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 1958; McKethean, 588 A.2d at 715. If such a specific directive exists which removes the otherwise unfettered discretion of the government employee, the action is ministerial, opening the government to suit if not performed correctly. Aguehounde contends that the trial court erred in finding that the setting of the clearance intervals was a discretionary act because the decision did not involve policy considerations making it the type of action intended to be shielded by immunity. He further contends that, even if setting the timing was a discretionary act, the District is not immune because the District had adopted a specific formula which its employees were required to follow in setting traffic light intervals, thereby removing any element of choice the traffic engineers may have had. It was clear to the trial court that setting traffic signal intervals is the type of function that the discretionary function rule is designed to shield. The trial court further observed that setting traffic signal intervals: involves considerations of safety not only for pedestrians but for travellers, and it involves a balancing of safety needs against the need to assure adequate traffic flow, which itself involves considerations of safety as well as commerce and convenience. Balancing these factors also requires the ascertainment of facts, such as numbers of vehicles and pedestrians, and ways in which drivers and pedestrians behave in the aggregate, which are peculiarly subject to study and expertise. Subjecting the decisions of traffic engineers to litigation and to second-guessing by jurors would deter effective government. We fully agree, and therefore hold, for the reasons relied upon by the trial court, that the timing of signal intervals involves balancing various economic, political and social considerations and is therefore a discretionary function. [9] For example, the need to accommodate pedestrians may be paramount at some intersections, but of only secondary importance at other intersections. Thus, intersections with high pedestrian traffic might call for different considerations than those appropriate at intersections where there is little or no pedestrian traffic but the interest in expeditiously moving vehicular traffic predominates. These determinations are clearly judgment calls involving the application of policy considerations as well as a knowledge of the traffic flow needs of the area where the particular intersection is located. The timing interval is therefore one calling for an exercise of discretion. Aguehounde maintains, nonetheless, that the timing of light intervals cannot fairly be characterized as a [traffic] design decision, and is thus not immune from suit under the authorities cited above. Essentially, Aguehounde contends that the design of the intersection had already been established through the decisions regarding the width of the streets, the permitted speed of the cars, and the installation of traffic lights. Consequently, he argues, the timing of the yellow light is merely an implementation of the pre-existing design and thus not discretionary. This argument misapprehends established law in this jurisdiction. For example, in McKethean we held that the decision to relocate a bus stop ... is part of overall traffic and safety design, McKethean, 588 A.2d at 715 (emphasis added), and in Urow we determined that the placement of traffic control devices [is] one aspect of street design. Pace, supra, 498 A.2d at 229 (citing Urow, supra note 9, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 316 F.2d 351) (emphasis added). Nor do we find any support for our dissenting colleague's assertion that government conduct is insulated from liability only where the official  actually exercised discretion. The dissent concedes that there is no dispositive District precedent supporting that view, and in fact, to the extent it has been addressed, the contrary is true. For example, in McKethean, supra, 588 A.2d at 715, we cited with approval the observation by the U.S. Supreme Court that where there is room for policy judgment and decision, there is discretion. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). Consequently, an act is deemed discretionary where it is shown to involve policy judgment and decisions, but does not require proof that every myriad and intricate decision involved in the process required a specific balancing of policy decisions. We conclude, for the reasons relied upon in McKethean and Urow, that the timing of the signal interval is simply one element of traffic design. To view the timing of a traffic light in a vacuum would ignore the effect that the timing of one interval has on the overall traffic pattern in the District. The setting of one light affects the timing and control of traffic on the entire street and its intersections, and can thus impact the city-wide traffic flow. The decision regarding the timing of the light is thus an integral part of overall traffic flow decisions and cannot be singled out. [10] To subject one aspect of overall traffic design to judicial second-guessing would impermissibly impact the District's autonomy in regulating traffic flow. Therefore, because our authorities have squarely held that traffic design is a discretionary function and that the various aspects of such design are also discretionary, we hold that setting traffic intervals is likewise discretionary. See District of Columbia v. Pace, 498 A.2d at 229; McKethean, 588 A.2d at 715; North Wash. Neighbors, 367 A.2d at 148 n. 7. Aguehounde also contends that the light interval decision involved purely engineering calculations requiring professional expertise, but not any policy considerations, thus making it a ministerial rather than a discretionary act. This claim is premised on the proposition that, to establish immunity, the government must produce evidence that social, political or economic considerations entered into the timing of the clearance interval at Wisconsin and Fessenden. Aguehounde further argues that both common sense and expert testimony ... dictate that once a decision is made to have a clearance interval ... the interval must be set long enough to allow traffic to clear the intersection. If we were to accept Aguehounde's argument, the District would be required to justify the policy underlying each of the myriad decisions involved in traffic design. Our case law suggests, however, that the proper inquiry is not: what concerns were actually balanced in each individual act? Instead, we should ascertain whether the type of function at question is grounded in policy analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). (Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level ... but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis); Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 720-21 (4th Cir.1993) (court should examine whether decision is one which we would expect inherently to be grounded in considerations of policy and not conduct a fact-based inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the government actor's exercise of a particular discretionary function). Appellant's suggested approach of isolating each component of a decision is simply not required. See Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir.1986) (The position that agency decisions can be broken down into component parts is fundamentally at odds with the Court's teaching in Dalehite. ). Just as the length of yellow intervals is part of the overall traffic design, it is part of the overall policy of determining traffic flow in the District. See Daigle, supra, 972 F.2d at 1542 ([a] decision that is a component of an overall policy decision protected by the discretionary function exception also is protected by this exception). [11] In support of his contention that the government must establish that setting traffic intervals involved policy considerations, appellant relies on WMATA v. O'Neill, 633 A.2d 834 (D.C.1993). That reliance is misplaced. In O'Neill, the court held that a bus driver's inaction in dealing with disruptive passengers was not discretionary because there was an established policy in place indicating the safety rules the driver was to follow in such situations. O'Neill, 633 A.2d at 839. We held that WMATA was not immune from suit grounded in the alleged negligence of the driver in carrying out specific directives. Id. Aguehounde correctly reasons that this holding means that the District would not be shielded from liability for the negligence of an employee who fails to follow a set policy. Appellant misreads O'Neill, however, when he contends that it stands for the proposition that there must be evidence of policy considerations in the employee's decision-making before immunity attaches. O'Neill does no more than hold that the District would be liable where an employee fails to follow an established policy, because the existence of a set policy means all discretion has been removed from the employee, and the employee's actions would thus be ministerial. O'Neill does not hold, nor suggest, that the government must prove the specific policy considerations behind each aspect of a given action. Consequently, O'Neill does not advance Aguehounde's contention that, because setting traffic intervals may involve engineering calculations requiring professional expertise, the District is required to prove the policy considerations behind the timing decisions to establish that the action is discretionary. [12]