Opinion ID: 1364283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The issue to be decided and the contentions of the parties.

Text: The issue to be decided in this case is whether an employee who alleges that he was discharged on or about July 1, 1975 for filing a claim for workers' compensation and who did not file a complaint with the Bureau of Labor was entitled to maintain an action at law for compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff contends that an employee who was discharged in July 1975 for the filing of a claim for workers' compensation had a cause of action for damages under principles of common law, citing Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), and Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 63 A.L.R.3d 973 (1973). Plaintiff also cites decisions in which federal courts have found an implied cause of action under what plaintiff says are statutes similar to ORS 659.410. In addition, plaintiff contends, among other things, that his right to maintain such an action was not affected by the administrative remedies of ORS ch. 659 prior to amendment in 1977; that such remedies were limited in scope and inadequate in effect, and that there is nothing in Chapter 659 that indicates, either expressly or impliedly, that these administrative procedures are exclusive or that the remedies must be exhausted before an employee can maintain an action for damages. Defendants' responding contentions may be summarized as follows: (1) that plaintiff has no private cause of action for wrongful termination for the filing of a claim for workers' compensation; (2) that the plaintiff, having based his claim on an alleged violation of ORS 659.410 is claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice under the terms of ORS ch. 659 and, therefore, must initiate and exhaust his administrative remedies before he is entitled to file a complaint in the Oregon Circuit Court; (3) that ORS 659.410 is part of a larger administrative scheme enacted by the Oregon Legislative Assembly to deal exclusively with offenses delineated as `unlawful employment practices,'; (4) that at the time of plaintiff's discharge in 1975 ORS ch. 659 provided an adequate remedy; and that the use of the word may in ORS 659.040(1) and ORS 659.050(1) did not in any way undercut the principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted; (5) that the 1977 amendments to ch. 659 do not support plaintiff's position in that they do not provide an exclusive remedy to a person, such as plaintiff, who alleges discrimination for filing a workmens' compensation claim and do not provide for an award of either general or punitive damages in such cases; (6) that defendants' position is directly supported by the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals in Phillips v. Dept. of Rev., 23 Or. App. 748, 544 P.2d 196 (1975), and by the decision of this court in Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977); (7) that most of the cases relied upon by plaintiff, including Nees v. Hocks, supra , and Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., supra , are not in point because no administrative remedies were available to the plaintiffs in those cases, and (8) that, for these reasons, the trial court properly ruled that plaintiff's failure to initiate and exhaust his administrative remedies deprived that court of jurisdiction. [1]