Opinion ID: 6317039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prescriptive rights

Text: ¶18 At common law, a party acquired a prescriptive right in another's real property upon: (1) an adverse use hostile and inconsistent with the exercise of the titleholder's rights; (2) which was visible, open, and notorious; (3) under an open claim of right; and (4) was continuous and uninterrupted for twenty years. See, e.g., Ludke v. Egan, 87 Wis. 2d 221, 230, 274 N.W.2d 641 (1979). With respect to public utilities such as WEC,9 the legislature supplanted the common law with Wis. Stat. § 893.28(2). See § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979. Under § 893.28(2), a public utility establishes the prescriptive right to continue [its] use of rights in another's real property upon [c]ontinuous use of [those] rights . . . for at least 10 years. ¶19 Both the common law and § 893.28(2) require that the use be continuous for a set period. But the statutory text diverges from the common-law elements in three significant ways. First, the statute omits any mention of the use being adverse or hostile and inconsistent with the exercise of the titleholder's rights. The parties agree the statute omits that 9 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.28(2) applies to, in addition to certain utility cooperatives, all domestic corporation[s] organized to furnish telegraph or telecommunications service or transmit heat, power or electric current to the public or for public purposes. There is no dispute that WEC is such a corporation, which also falls under the statutory definition of public utility. See Wis. Stat. § 196.01(5). 10 No. 2019AP2090 language so as to allow permissive uses, such as licenses, to ripen into prescriptive rights. See Williams v. Am. Transmission Co., LLC, 2007 WI App 246, ¶¶9-15, 306 Wis. 2d 181, 742 N.W.2d 882. Second and also undisputed, the statutory vesting period is reduced from 20 to ten years. Finally, § 893.28(2) contains no mention of the use being either visible, open, and notorious or under an open claim of right. ¶20 The parties dispute the meaning of the legislature's omission. WEC urges that the omission demonstrates legislative elimination of these two requirements. Bauer counters that the legislature would need to be more clear, unambiguous, and peremptory than mere silence to abrogate those common-law requirements. See, e.g., United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2021 WI 44, ¶15, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317. Alternatively, WEC suggests that those two requirements are mere subparts of the adversity element, such that when the legislature eliminated the adversity element it simultaneously eliminated both visible, open and notorious and under an open claim of right. Bauer responds that these requirements are all conceptually distinct. ¶21 With respect to the claim-of-right requirement, context makes clear that § 893.28(2) necessarily abrogated it along with the adversity element. As Bauer concedes, the legislature drafted § 893.28(2) to allow a permissive use to ripen into a prescriptive right. See Williams, 306 Wis. 2d 181, ¶¶9-15. But an open claim of right is the exact 11 No. 2019AP2090 opposite of a permissive use. See Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 231 (evidence of express permission rebuts the claim-of-right presumption). The legislature, then, necessarily had to remove both the adversity and claim-of-right requirements to allow a permissive use to ripen into a prescriptive right. This conclusion makes sense in light of the common view that a claim of right is a subpart of the larger adversity requirement. See, e.g., Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 797 S.E.2d 387, 392 (S.C. 2016); 28A C.J.S. Easements § 43; John W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land § 5:8. ¶22 The same cannot be said about the visible, open, and notorious requirement. Such a use is not inherently inconsistent with a permissive license. That said, we need not and do not address whether § 893.28(2) still requires a visible, open, and notorious use because, as explained below, regardless of how we might answer that question our ultimate conclusion in this case remains the same. See, e.g., Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15.