Opinion ID: 1160343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: duty of care of a common carrier

Text: It is not disputed that Skyways owed plaintiffs' deceased a duty of care. The controversy on appeal concerns the nature of that duty. Plaintiffs submitted the following proposed instruction to the court: Common carriers owe a duty of utmost care and the vigilance of a very cautious person toward their passengers. They are responsible for any, even the slightest, negligence, and are required to do all that human care, vigilance and foresight reasonably can do under all the circumstances. The instruction was not given; instead, the court instructed the jury regarding duty of care as follows: Negligence is the doing of some act which a reasonably prudent person would not do; or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do, when prompted by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. It is, in other words, the failure to use ordinary care under the circumstances in the management of one's person or property, or of agencies under one's control. Ordinary care is not an absolute term, but a relative one, that is to say, in deciding whether ordinary care was exercised in a given case, the conduct in question must be viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, as shown by the evidence in the case. The court indicated that its decision was based on Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1964), which it interpreted as abolishing varying degrees of care in Alaska. Patterson involved an injury to a child by an automobile. The plaintiffs sought instructions pertaining to: duty to maintain proper lookout, duty to look out for children playing in or near the streets, higher duty of care owed by persons dealing with children, and higher duty of care of operators of motor vehicles toward children. [6] We found no error where the trial court followed an instruction which defined negligence as the want of such care as an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person would exercise under like circumstances [7] with an instruction applying the standard to the operator of a motor vehicle. We did not require mention in the instructions of any greater care due a child since the record disclose[d] that ... the jury was made fully aware that the case involved a six-year old child playing on the street where the accident occurred. [8] We held: ... there are no degrees of care as a matter of law and in the absence of any statute to the contrary, the trial judge need only instruct the jury that the defendant is required to exercise toward the plaintiff ordinary care under the circumstances. Although there is no Alaska statute to the contrary, we believe that a general duty of due care instruction is inadequate with respect to common carriers transporting passengers for hire. [9] Singular treatment of common carriers is deeply rooted in common law and retains continuing validity in public policy. [10] Airline passengers are completely at the mercy of the carrier and are entitled to assume that the highest degree of care is being taken for their safety. To the extent that Patterson may foreshadow a different result, we decline to follow it in this instance. To buttress its position, Skyways relies on Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977), which abrogated the distinctions between trespassers, licensees and invitees and imposed a general duty on landowners to exercise reasonable care in view of all the circumstances. Webb is inapposite to the present situation. Different policy considerations were involved in abrogating the trespasser-licensee-invitee distinctions than are involved in the present case; and the result in Webb was an overall broader degree of responsibility imposed on landowners, while here responsibility would be decreased if only ordinary care were required. Further, it is notable that California has continued the higher standard of care as to common carriers [11] after it abrogated the trespasser-licensee-invitee distinctions. [12] Skyways cites no case in which the higher degree of care imposed on common carriers has been abandoned. Indeed, the rule has been repeatedly reaffirmed. [13] We hold that the superior court erred in denying plaintiffs' proposed instruction. [14]