Opinion ID: 2902093
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretext for the Rounds-Report Investigation

Text: For the Rounds-Reports Investigation, the district court concluded that Arabalo had met her burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Even so, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Denver, concluding that Denver had given a 19 nondiscriminatory reason for this investigation and that Arabalo failed to show pretext. The district court found that Arabalo had failed to identify facts that refuted Denver’s proffered nondiscriminatory basis for her termination: Ms. Arabalo does not point to evidence that other similarly-situated employees who had falsely (or, perhaps in Ms. Arabalo’s view, incorrectly) claimed to have uploaded work data were not investigated, does not contend that Major Homer’s allegations were demonstrably false (i.e. that the rounds data had been uploaded promptly), nor has she pointed to evidence that would suggest that the decision to investigate a supervisory employee with law enforcement responsibilities that appears to have falsely claimed to have ensured that rounds were being performed is a particularly implausible one. Appellant’s App’x at 524. We agree with the district court. Because Arabalo established her prima facie case for the Rounds-Reports Investigation, the burden then shifted to Denver to articulate a legitimate and nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. See Stover, 382 F.3d at 1070– 71 (applying the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test). We think that Denver met its initial burden in moving for summary judgment on the question of pretext. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Denver’s argument was that “[e]ven if Plaintiff is able to show a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, she will not be able to prove the City’s articulated reasons for the disciplinary actions taken against her were pretextual.” Appellant’s App’x at 214. In a footnote, Denver explained that “[t]he non-discriminatory reasons for disciplining Plaintiff are set forth in great detail in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2.” Id. at n.2. Exhibit 1 was a January 31, 2011, letter from Denver to Arabalo that explained why Denver was suspending her without pay for 70 days. In this letter, Denver identified the 20 “alleged misconduct upon which discipline is being contemplated.” Appellant’s App’x at 238. It discussed the false reporting allegations that Denver had begun investigating in July 2010. Denver concluded that Arabalo’s actions hurt Denver’s good name, would cause the public to lose confidence in the city, and caused Denver to question her truthfulness and good judgment. Exhibit 2 was a March 16, 2012, termination letter from Denver to Arabalo relying on her misconduct revealed in the May 2011 Misappropriation Investigation. It did not mention the Rounds-Reports Investigation or its conclusions. We think that the suspension letter—with its findings and conclusions that Arabalo had falsified her rounds reports—sufficiently met Denver’s initial burden in moving for summary judgment. After all, poor performance of job duties is “the quintessential legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for discipline. Bertsch v. Overstock.com, 684 F.3d 1023, 1029 (10th Cir. 2012). Denver’s proffered reason for Arabalo’s suspension is a sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. By citing to her suspension letter in its motion, Denver met its initial burden in moving for summary judgment on pretext. At this point, Arabalo bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s articulated reason was mere pretext. Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1307, 1312 (holding that plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that “each reason given by the employer is unworthy of credence”). A plaintiff demonstrates pretext by producing evidence of “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer 21 that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Id. at 1308 (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)). Evidence of pretext may include: (1) earlier treatment of the plaintiff; (2) the employer’s policy and practice regarding employment of protected classes; (3) disturbing procedural irregularities; and (4) the use of subjective criteria. Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002). Arabalo argued before the district court that “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that, based on this and other evidence that will be presented at trial, the [Rounds-Report] Investigation was not warranted, and the discipline imposed was excessive, especially compared to other egregious acts committed by high-ranking officials.” Appellant’s App’x at 382. However, Arabalo never disputes that the Department believed that she had lied about uploading her rounds reports. Instead, she only suggests that the Department should not have begun investigating her in the first place. Even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Arabalo, she has not produced evidence of “such weaknesses” or any “inconsistencies” in the Department’s asserted nondiscriminatory bases for her suspension sufficient to show pretext. Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1308; see also Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 464 F.3d 1164, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to refute the employer’s allegations of poor performance). While Arabalo argues that she had a reason for not submitting her reports—a computer malfunction—we do not think that this is sufficient to undermine the Department’s reason for her suspension. Arabalo never “refute[d] the facts underlying [the Department’s] proffered explanation: that she 22 submitted an e-mail claiming to have done something that she did not, in fact, do.” Appellant’s App’x at 524. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Denver on the question of pretext. b. Administrative Exhaustion for the Misappropriation Investigation Our circuit has previously held that it is a jurisdictional prerequisite that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before she may bring a Title VII lawsuit. Jones, 91 F.3d at 1399 (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a ‘jurisdictional prerequisite’ to suit under Title VII.”). But, as we discussed in more depth above, we note that our circuit has recently concluded that the verification requirement is not jurisdictional. Gad, 787 F.3d at 1038. In fact, in Gad we called into question a whole host of our circuit’s Title VII jurisdictional cases. Id. at 1039–40. We suggested that recent Supreme Court cases may limit jurisdictional requirements to those listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Id. at 1038. Again, as we did above, we need not answer whether administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional bar. Even if administrative exhaustion is only a condition precedent to suit, Arabalo still did not exhaust her administrative remedies for her claim predicated on the Misappropriation Investigation. First, we think that Denver satisfied its initial burden in moving for summary judgment on the question of administrative exhaustion. Denver identified the alleged acts of discrimination, and then argued: It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s last charge of discrimination was filed with the CCRD on October 19, 2010. Nor has Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter based on any of those claims. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s 23 Title VII retaliation claims are based on discrete acts which took place after October 19, 2010, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defense8 of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellant’s App’x at 232 (citations omitted). We think that this is sufficient to meet Denver’s initial burden on the issue of whether Arabalo exhausted her administrative remedies.9 See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24 (“The import of these subsections is that, regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.”). We thus address whether Denver was therefore entitled to summary judgment on this issue.10 8 Consistent with Gad and our other cited authorities, we conclude that Arabalo needed, as a condition precedent to her claim, to exhaust her administrative remedies for the alleged claim, that is, advise the administrative agencies of that supporting basis for her claim so that it could investigate it and decide its merits. See 787 F.3d at 1042. 9 Again, even assuming that Gad clarified the law in our circuit to hold that administrative exhaustion is a condition precedent to suit, not a jurisdictional bar, it is still Arabalo’s burden to show she satisfied the requirement. See 787 F.3d at 1035– 36. 10 In an attempt to defeat summary judgment in the district court, Arabalo argued that the continuing-violation doctrine saved her claims arising after the charge of discrimination she filed in October 2010. Arabalo has since abandoned this theory on appeal, instead relying on new theories for why the district court had jurisdiction over the Misappropriation Investigation. 24 The district court explained that “Arabalo’s CCRD charge makes no mention whatsoever of the commencement of an investigation into allegations of alleged embezzlement, and thus, the EEOC’s investigation into the issues raised in her charge would not have encompassed that issue.” Appellant’s App’x at 521. The district court expressly found “that Ms. Arabalo did not administratively exhaust any retaliation claim predicated on the May 2011 investigation into allegations that she misappropriated funds from the Foundation, and thus, Denver is entitled to summary judgment on any retaliation claim predicated on that investigation.” Id. at 522. Arabalo first argues that that Misappropriation Investigation is reasonably related to the Rounds-Reports Investigation. In response, Denver argues that each discrete act of discrimination constitutes its own unlawful employment practice for which Arabalo must exhaust her administrative remedies before the court can properly hear those claims. We agree with the district court and Denver that the Misappropriation Investigation was entirely separate from the Rounds-Reports Investigation. Arabalo has never disputed that she last communicated with the EEOC or the CCRD in October 2010. We think it unlikely that the agencies would even know about the Misappropriation Investigation based on its knowing about the Rounds-Reports Investigation. The two investigations concerned two unrelated matters. While the pleading standard on administrative exhaustion is lenient, we think it reasonable to require that Arabalo supplement her October 2010 charge with the agencies or initiate a new charge after the Misappropriation Investigation had begun. 25 Second, Arabalo argues that supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 permits jurisdiction over the claim predicated on the Misappropriation Investigation, and so the district court could have elected to ignore the administrative exhaustion requirement. Arabalo did not make this argument to the district court, and she does not ask for plain error on appeal. As such, this argument is waived. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”). Even if Arabalo had preserved this argument, it would be unsuccessful. As she admits, “[t]he Court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction has been classified as discretionary.” Appellant’s Br. at 32. She argues that “exercising ancillary jurisdiction would be the appropriate catalyst to vindicate values of economy, convenience, fairness and comity.” Id. at 34. We are not persuaded. The purpose of the administrative exhaustion requirement is to require that aggrieved parties notify the administrative agency in order to achieve the very values she identifies— economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Because ancillary jurisdiction is discretionary, we see no abuse of discretion in holding a party to her burden to exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse. Third, Arabalo argues that we should overrule Jones, 91 F.3d at 1399, and eliminate the Tenth Circuit’s rule interpreting the administrative-exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional. Yet, as mentioned, Arabalo would still lose even if administrative exhaustion was not a jurisdictional requirement but instead was a mere condition precedent—she still failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Gad, 787 F.3d at 1042. Thus, overruling Jones still would provide her no relief. 26 c. Causation for the Independent Monitor Report For the third adverse employment action, the district court concluded that Arabalo had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she could not demonstrate any causal relationship between her protected activity and the Independent Monitor’s alleged release of information about her to the media. As mentioned earlier, Rosenthal, an Independent Monitor, wrote a semi-annual “Police and Sheriff Discipline and Critical Incident Report” where he examined all the recent complaints, incidents, and discipline for Denver’s law enforcement. Supp. App’x at 688. As part of the larger report, Rosenthal examined Arabalo’s discipline following the Rounds-Reports Investigation. He was of the opinion that given Arabalo’s documented lies, she should have been demoted. Rosenthal’s report did not mention Arabalo by name. Even so, Arabalo alleges that Rosenthal released a statement to the media regarding Arabalo’s suspension, including her name and information related to Denver’s investigations against her. To us, Arabalo argues that she “never once claimed the Independent Monitor’s report was retaliatory.” Appellant’s Rep. Br. at 6. She instead challenges the release of information to the media. She says that she “was humiliated and incredibly angered by the release of this statement to the media, especially because she did in fact check the rounds.” Appellant’s Rep. Br. at 7–8. Her argument is that she “experienced extreme difficulty obtaining employment due to the damage to her reputation as a result of the allegations released to the media, which were only lodged against her because she complained about discrimination.” Id. at 8. 27 Based on Arabalo’s explanation of her argument, we need not analyze whether the district court correctly concluded that she failed to establish causation. Instead, we must address the “release of this statement to the media” and determine whether she has some legal redress available. Arabalo suggests that, because Denver supposedly had wrongly concluded that she lied about uploading her rounds report, its release of that conclusion to the media is a further aggravation of that same wrong. Given our conclusion that Denver’s conclusion that she had lied about uploading the rounds reports was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory conclusion, we certainly would hesitate to conclude that Denver could not freely release information to the public about its own poor performance without subjecting itself to liability. Because Arabalo does not dispute that Denver concluded that she lied about having submitted her rounds reports, she gives us no other reason to question the legality of the “release of this statement to the media.” We therefore affirm on this issue as part of our conclusion that Arabalo failed to show that any discipline from her rounds-report misconduct was pretextual.