Opinion ID: 764415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the post-verdict supplemental jury instruction

Text: 22 Defendants argue here, as they did in a post-verdict motion, that judgment should have been entered on the jury's original verdict awarding no compensatory damages. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 11 (hereafter Def. Br.) (emphasis omitted). Specifically, defendants argue that Judge Cote erred in allowing the jury to deliberate a second time on plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages because (i) plaintiff waived the statute of limitations issue; (ii) there was no basis for asking the jury to reconsider its rejection of plaintiff's compensatory damage claim; and (iii) the procedure was coercive. Id. None of these objections entitle defendants to the entry of a judgment on the jury's original verdict. 23 Judge Cote rejected the claim that plaintiff waived her right to a corrected instruction. Instead, she found that plaintiff merely asked that it be given in a different form, as a post-verdict interrogatory, and not a charge during deliberations. Bonner v. Guccione, No. 94 CIV.7735, 1997 WL 362311 at  8 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1997) (Cote, J.) (hereafter Bonner I ). This finding is sufficient to dispose of defendants' claim of waiver. Moreover, even if plaintiff waived any objection to the charge, the waiver was merely of her right to obtain relief based on the error; a district court judge is not required to allow an error to go uncorrected merely because the party affected by it has made a strategic choice to forego her right to have it corrected. While the defendants question whether it was appropriate for Judge Cote to wait until after the jury returned a verdict, this argument is analytically separate from the considerations underlying the waiver rule. 24 Nor is the waiver argument aided by the procedural forfeiture cases on which the defendants rely. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, the formal procedural forfeiture rule that is most directly on point, provides that [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict. This rule is intended to prevent unnecessary new trials because of errors the judge might have corrected if they had been brought to his attention at the proper time. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 122 (2d Cir.1973); see also 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2551 at 384 (2d ed. 1994) (The necessity of a retrial is avoided when, by design or through sheer neglect, the losing party fails to object to an instruction by the court or its failure to give one at the proper time). This concern is not implicated where, as here, the trial judge corrected the error in her instruction before the jury was discharged. Moreover, plaintiff here called the error in the charge to the attention of Judge Cote before the jury retired to commence its deliberations. Bonner I at  3. Under these circumstances, she was not required to apply a strict procedural forfeiture rule. None of the cases on which defendants rely suggest otherwise. 25 In Lavoie v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir.1992), the principal case on which defendants rely, the defendant failed to timely object to an instruction that resulted in an allegedly inconsistent verdict. The claim that the verdict was inconsistent was raised for the first time on ... appeal. Id. at 54. We held that failure of the defendant to timely object precluded a challenge to the charge and to a jury's verdict [which] comports with the trial court's instructions. Id. at 55. While we acknowledged that failure of a timely objection would not deprive us of the discretion to review the judgment and order a new trial due to inconsistent special verdicts, we declined to do so in that case. Id. at 55-56. 26 Lavoie obviously implicated the policy of avoiding unnecessary retrials. Lavoie cited with favor an earlier case that held that the  'failure to bring alleged inconsistencies in the verdict sheet to the court's attention before the jury has been discharged waives the right to have the alleged inconsistencies remedied in a new trial.'  Id. at 55 (quoting United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1367 (2d Cir.1988) (emphases added)). Unlike Lavoie and similar cases, this case does not involve a failure to object that can be excused only at the cost of a retrial. Indeed, for this very reason, the district court judge may have had broader discretion to correct the error than we would have had to review it if the issue had been raised for the first time on direct appeal. Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (suggesting that, because of the unusual nature of the instant situation, where the only issue was the availability of punitive damages and where the jury's award of such damages was susceptible of rectification without further jury proceedings, the district court properly considered the issue notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to object to a charge allowing the jury to award punitive damages). 27 The defendants' next argument is that there was no basis for asking the jury to reconsider its rejection of plaintiff's compensatory damages claim. Def. Br. at 11. It is true that the initial verdict, which found defendants liable for creating a hostile work environment under the NYSHRL, was not necessarily inconsistent with the jury's failure to award damages. The charge, as initially given, allowed for an award of damages for a hostile work environment between September 11, 1993 and before November 24, 1993, a period during which [m]ost of the people about whom plaintiff made allegations that the jury could have interpreted as contributing to a hostile environment had left SPIN [Magazine]. Def. Br. at 26 n. 4. Under these circumstances, the jury's original verdict was consistent with the charge and the evidence. The problem is that the charge on the NYSHRL statute of limitations was wrong. 28 If the jury had been instructed properly that it could consider conduct occurring over a period of three years, instead of seventy-three days, it would have been difficult to reconcile its finding in favor of plaintiff on liability without an award of any compensatory damages. See Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 464 (2d Cir.1996) ([A] verdict of insufficient damages--i.e., where a jury finds liability and damages, yet sets damages in an amount inconsistent with any theory of liability offered at trial--is an example of a verdict that is inconsistent with the facts adduced at trial.). Indeed, in explaining her decision to resubmit the issue of compensatory damages on the NYSHRL hostile environment cause of action, Judge Cote observed that, while the jury found that defendants were liable to plaintiff on that cause of action, obviously their understanding of the statute of limitations restricted, in their mind, an assessment [of damages] to a final few months. And that may have affected similarly their decision on the amount of damages. A560. This assessment by an able trial judge, who was intimately familiar with the record, justified her decision to resubmit the issue of compensatory damages to the jury before it was discharged. See Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir.1988) (The district judge, who has observed the jury during trial, prepared the questions and explained them to the jury, is in the best position to determine whether the answers reflect confusion or uncertainty, and whether the jury will likely be able to resolve this uncertainty with proper guidance.). 29 We likewise reject the argument that the resubmission of the issues with a correct instruction violated the defendants' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. We agree that  '[g]iven correct instruction on the law and no clear disregard for that instruction on the face of the verdict, a jury verdict must remain immune from questioning by the district court.'  T.H.S. Northstar Assocs. v. W.R. Grace and Co., 66 F.3d 173, 178 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Gander v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir.1990)). This principle, which the defendants invoke, Def. Br. at 14, does not apply where a jury had been given incorrect instruction on the law. Otherwise such a verdict would be immune from appellate review. Indeed, even in criminal cases, it is the Double Jeopardy Clause, rather than the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, that insulates a verdict for the defendant from appellate review based on trial error. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975). While we need not decide here whether the Double Jeopardy Clause would prevent a trial judge from resubmitting a case to the same jury immediately after it had returned a not guilty verdict, we see no constitutional impediment to the resubmission of a civil case for purposes of correcting an erroneous legal instruction. 30 The defendants' final argument is that the post-verdict procedure was coercive. Def. Br. at 11. This argument cannot be reconciled with the language of the supplemental instruction. The jury was initially asked whether the erroneous charge had affected its verdict. After it replied in the affirmative, Judge Cote explained to the jury that it was being given some additional instructions and questions related to plaintiff's claims under the New York State Human Rights Law. Judge Cote then gave the first of her cautionary instructions as follows: 31 By giving you these instructions and questions I am not in any way suggesting what your answers should be. Remember, you are the sole judges of the facts. Your answers should be based on the facts as you find them and the law as contained in the Jury Charge as a whole as previously given to you, except as modified by the Supplemental Charge. A735. 32 Judge Cote then went on to explain the circumstances that led to the resubmission of the issue to the jury. Specifically, she told the jurors that the statute of limitations charge at the specified pages of her initial instruction was a description of the law that applies to Title VII claims. Because the charge did not explain the differences in the statute of limitations law for the Title VII and New York law claims, the jury was being given a Third Special Verdict Form. Id. 33 After explaining the form, and outlining the law with respect to the statute of limitations, and the jury's duty with respect to the claims on which it initially found for the defendants--gender discrimination and quid pro quo sexual harassment--Judge Cote addressed the hostile environment sexual harassment claims as to which the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability. She explained that this was being done so that the jurors could determine whether the erroneous statute of limitations instruction affects your award of compensatory damages on that claim. A736-37. The supplemental instruction then concluded with yet more cautionary language. Specifically, the jury was told that it should not alter its original findings unless you determine that your findings on liability, as governed by the law on the statute of limitations as I have just explained it, affect the damage award. I emphasize again that I am expressing no view on whether or not you should make an award of either Back Pay or Compensatory Damages. A737. 34 The foregoing instruction plainly refutes defendants' complaint that the procedure employed by Judge Cote was coercive. Nor is there any merit to defendants' contention that the jury was re-instructed on the state statute of limitations in a manner that improperly emphasized the decision not to award any compensatory damages. Def. Br. at 18. The defendants do not cite any language in the charge that has this effect. Indeed, the charge is a model of clarity and fairness. The only objectionable language is in a later response to a note from the jury on a question added to the Verdict Sheet to clarify the jury's intent with respect to its original award of back pay on the Equal Pay Act cause of action. In the course of responding to the questions, defendants allege that [t]he court repeatedly reminded the jurors that they were not permitted to award damages for back pay under Title VII, focusing the jury's attention on the fact that they had not awarded any damages on the hostile environment claim. Id. (citing A603-06). 35 Our review of the record cited by defendants simply does not support the claim that Judge Cote's response to the jury note focus[ed] the jury's attention on the fact that they had not awarded any damages on the hostile environment claim. Id. Nor was any objection taken by the defendants on this ground. On the contrary, it was the plaintiff who objected to this charge, A601, complaining bitterly that we have been tremendously prejudiced because the jury was told four times that they can't give back pay for sexual harassment hostile work environment, but was not told that they are entitled to give her compensatory damages for that. A606. Judge Cote, accepting the advice of defendants' counsel, declined to reinstruct the jury that it was entitled to award compensatory damages. A607. 36 Defendants' claim that the verdict was coerced is undermined even further by the verdict itself. The jury did not change a single one of its findings on the issue of liability on the three causes of action that were resubmitted, and it declined to make any additional award of back pay. More significantly, defendants impliedly concede that the evidence at trial provided a rational, if not a compelling, basis for the jury to draw the distinction it ultimately did between the Title VII hostile work environment cause of action (on which it did not award any damages) and the comparable NYSHRL cause of action on which it awarded $90,000 in compensatory damages. Def. Br. at 26 & n. 4. 37 Unable to establish any actual coercion, defendants are reduced to arguing for a per se rule that would treat post-verdict submissions such as the one made here ... [as] inherently coercive and improper. Def. Br. at 18. The two cases upon which they rely, however, do not bear any resemblance to the present case. McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.1978), is the first of the two. After the jury there returned a special verdict form which answered no on the question of liability (wrongful discharge), but then proceeded to award damages, the district judge resubmitted the case to the jury. The Fourth Circuit held that resubmission was improper because the jury had already made an unequivocal finding of no [liability] and the rest of the verdict was therefore meaningless ... surplusage. Id. at 871. In McCollum, however, there was no dispute that the judge's instructions had been legally sound; rather, the decision turned on the fact that once the jury found in favor of the defendant on the issue of liability, any damage award was improper. Unlike McCollum, the jury here found that the defendants were liable to the plaintiff for creating a hostile work environment, and there was good reason to believe that the failure to award damages was due to an erroneous instruction. Moreover, the procedure followed in McCollum--unlike that employed here--created a substantial risk of coercion. Indeed, in Manufacturers Hanover v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., where we affirmed the district judge's post-verdict interrogatories regarding the legal basis of the verdict, we distinguished McCollum as a case which was  'tantamount, in its effect, to a direction to the jury.'  801 F.2d 13, 26 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting McCollum, 579 F.2d at 871). The procedure followed here does not fit that description. 38 Perricone v. Kansas City S. Ry., 704 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir.1983), the second case on which the defendants rely, is equally distinguishable. Perricone was a negligence case in which the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $105,000, but also found that his injuries were 70 percent attributable to his contributory negligence. The trial judge immediately instructed the jurors that he had failed to advise them, as he should have, that a finding in excess of 50 percent contributory negligence precluded any recovery by the plaintiff. The judge then told the jury that, if you would like to reconsider your verdict, in view of this information, then the Court will give you the privilege of doing so. Id. at 1378. The jury was directed to return to the jury room to decide what you wish to do in this regard without any of the cautionary instructions of the kind given here. Id. After fourteen minutes of deliberation, the jury returned the same damage award, but reduced to 50 percent Perricone's contribution to his injury. 39 Because of the defendant's failure to object, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirm[ed] ... the resubmission of the case to the jury, id. at 1382, although it did hold that there was a substantial risk that the jury may have concluded that it [was] being told that its finding of 70 percent contributory negligence was unsound, id. at 1378. We agree with this assessment of the procedure followed in Perricone. Nevertheless, we do not agree that a post-verdict resubmission automatically warrants reversal. Indeed, defendants concede that post-verdict instructions are appropriate where an erroneous instruction is noticed for the first time after the verdict has been returned. Def. Br. at 13 (citing Auwood v. Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884, 891 (2d Cir.1988)). If such a resubmission is not coercive in that context, or in other contexts in which it is permitted, see, e.g., Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir.1988); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 803 (2d Cir.1983), we fail to see why it should be deemed coercive here. 40 United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom. Fernandez v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 174, 142 L.Ed.2d 142 (1998), a criminal case, is close enough to the present case to warrant mention. Just prior to receiving a note from the jury that it had reached a verdict, the district court judge there realized that he failed to define reasonable doubt. Instead of taking the verdict, he gave a supplemental charge defining reasonable doubt and sent the jury back to consider its verdict. Id. at 226. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was prejudiced by the delay in giving the curative instruction. We held that, because the trial court's first charge was sufficient and legally correct, appellant was not entitled to any curative measures, timely or otherwise. Prejudice may not be found therefore from the manner in which the trial court took such measures. Id. at 227. The supplemental charge here did not clarify an earlier correct instruction. Instead, it cured an erroneous one. Nevertheless, we are equally confident that [p]rejudice may not be found ... from the manner in which the trial court took such measures. Id. 41 While we conclude that the procedure followed here does not warrant the entry of a judgment based on the initial verdict, we add these additional words with the benefit of hindsight that appellate judges enjoy. Judge Cote should have followed her original instinct to correct the error in her instruction as soon as it was brought to her attention. The jury had barely begun its deliberations when she proposed to do so, and there is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have been prejudiced if a corrected charge had been given at that time. Delaying the correction of an instruction implicates the concern articulated in Perricone that, however the resubmission is explained, there remains the risk that the jury will infer that the judge is conveying her unhappiness with the verdict. 42 Delay also invites other problems. In the present case, for example, the district court judge initially agreed with the defendants that the hostile work environment cause of action was not affected by the erroneous statute of limitations instruction. On this basis, she asked the jury only whether its verdict in favor of the defendants on the quid pro quo sexual harassment and gender discrimination causes of action was affected by the erroneous instruction. After the jury responded that the charge affected the verdict on those causes of action, the district court judge changed her mind about the hostile work environment cause of action and concluded that it should be resubmitted as well. 43 This led to a second verdict in which the jury did not change its verdict on the two causes of action which it had expressly indicated had been affected by the erroneous instruction, and to an altered verdict on the cause of action as to which no prior inquiry had been made regarding the effect of the erroneous statute of limitations instruction. This sequence, as Judge Cote aptly observed, exquisitely complicated the problem created by the delay in correcting her instruction, A559, and would have made this a closer case if the language of the resubmitted instruction was drawn with less care and if the final verdict did not appear to be entirely rational in light of the evidence and the charge. 44 Because unforeseeable complications are inevitable when an erroneous instruction is not corrected until after a verdict is returned, an error in the charge should be corrected as soon as practicable after it is called to the judge's attention. Such prompt corrective action is also consistent with the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 which, notwithstanding its purpose of avoiding unnecessary retrials, requires an objection to be made before the jury retires to consider its verdict. These considerations suggest the rule that the procedure followed here should be reserved for the rare case where the error in the charge is noticed only belatedly and where it cannot be corrected promptly without seriously prejudicing the rights of the aggrieved party. 45 While all three members of the panel agree that the error in the charge here should have been corrected as soon as it was noticed, Judge Jacobs would reverse the judgment and reinstate the original verdict, because the supplemental instruction that was administered invited the inference that the judge wanted the jury to award Bonner damages on her NYSHRL cause of action. Infra at ----. Because we agree that there is always a risk that the procedure followed here may lead the jury to infer that the judge is suggesting her unhappiness with the verdict, we have adopted a prophylactic rule to avoid the risk. The violation of such a rule does not, however, provide a basis for the automatic reversal of the judgment. 46 On the contrary, we have come a long way from the time when all trial error was presumed prejudicial. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-10, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). The harmless error rules adopted by the Supreme Court, Fed.R.Civ.P. 61, and by Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, embody the principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for 'error' and ignore errors that do not affect the substantial fairness of the trial. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553, 104 S.Ct. 845. This means that, [i]f, when all is said and done, the conviction is such that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). 47 Particularly apposite here are our cases involving intrusive interrogation and commentary by trial judges that always carry a risk of suggesting that the judge favors one side over the other. In criminal cases, where our willingness to accept the risk of prejudice is presumably less than in civil cases, we have held that this Court's role is 'not to determine whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.'  United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 343 (2d Cir.1993) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir.1985)). Only recently, we suggested that we will upset a judgment in a civil case on the basis of a judge's improper remarks if the judge expresses [his] opinion on an ultimate issue of fact in front of the jury or [argues] for one of the parties. Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 98 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Causey v. Zinke (In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia ), 871 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir.1989) (alteration in original)). 48 The error in this case does not come close to approaching this standard. Judge Jacobs acknowledges that [t]he trial record discloses no agenda on the part of the district judge other than to elicit the true verdict of the jury under a sound statement of the law, without influence or manipulation by the court, infra at ----, and we have already set forth in detail the considerations that persuade us that the risk of prejudice in this case is sufficiently insignificant as to render the error harmless. Indeed, when asked at oral argument what prejudice the defendants had suffered by post-verdict resubmission of the issue of liability, defendants' counsel asserted only that they were prejudiced because they were deprived of the right to a judgment on the first verdict returned by the jury. This is a separate argument that we have already considered and rejected on its merits. On the assumption that the defendants did not have a vested right to the entry of a judgment based on the answers to the first verdict sheet, we decline to presume that the delay in recharging the jury was prejudicial. 49 Moreover, we also take issue with the remedy Judge Jacobs would afford the defendants. While we would characterize it as an abuse of discretion, we need not quarrel here with Judge Jacobs's suggestion that, once the court allowed the jury to render its verdict under the erroneous charge, the court lacked discretion at that point to direct further deliberations guided by an amended charge. Infra at ----. Nevertheless, it is hardly clear that reinstatement of the original verdict is necessarily the appropriate remedy. In Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 820-21 (2d Cir.1990), we rejected the argument that even if the first and second [special] verdicts are inconsistent, we may not properly take into account anything the jury found in the second verdict, because it was error for the district court to have even submitted it to the jury [after the initial verdict was returned]. Instead, we held that [w]hether or not it was error for the district court to have submitted the second verdict, we cannot give effect to one jury finding directly contradicted by another the very next day. Id. at 821. Under these circumstances, [e]ven if the district court should not have allowed the jury to make the latter finding, the entry of a judgment based on the initial special verdict was unwarranted. Id. Instead, we ordered a new trial. The defendants here do not seek a retrial. Because the delay in correcting the instruction was harmless, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether it would accord with justice or reason to order the entry of judgment based on a verdict that resulted from an erroneous legal instruction.