Opinion ID: 785675
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The type of relief sought (or appropriate) for Plaintiffs' claims

Text: 26 The district court did not consider the question of relief in the present case, 2 and so this Court must be the first to examine it. Plaintiffs argue that for their claims they seek non-contractual damages: They ask neither for damages nor specific performance, but to enjoin the USPS from acting outside its authority. (Petitioners' Br. at 25.) 27 Defendant cites Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. United States, 780 F.2d 74 (D.C.Cir.1985), in an apparent attempt to argue that the type of relief alone is not dispositive. Defendant states that [e]ven though IR sought only declaratory and injunctive relief..., the court followed the framework of Megapulse ... concluding that the source of rights at stake was essentially contractual and IR could not avoid the jurisdictional bar of the CDA. (Respondent's Br. at 29.) 3 28 If Defendant cites Ingersoll-Rand as an illustration of a case in which the (contractual) source of rights trumped the (non-contractual) relief requested, then Defendant is mistaken. In Ingersoll-Rand, the plaintiff had a contract to supply air compressors to the Air Force, but the Air Force terminated the contract. 780 F.2d at 75. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent the Air Force from soliciting new bids — thus, the plaintiff sought to prevent the Air Force from replacing the plaintiff's contract. Id. The court concluded that essentially the plaintiff was seeking contractual relief, in the form of specific performance of the Air Force's contract with the plaintiff. Id. at 79-80 (we find that the essence of I-R's claim is a request for specific performance of the original contract. From the outset, I-R has requested an order reinstating the original award of the contract.). 4 29 Nor does another case cited by Defendant, Campanella v. Commerce Exchange Bank, 137 F.3d 885 (6th Cir.1998), prove relevant to the relief requested in the present case. In Campanella, the plaintiff was due payment on a contract to which the Small Business Administration was a guarantor. Id. at 888. Two of the plaintiff's claims were to enforce payment, i.e., to seek specific performance of a contract where payment was due — it was so clear that the relief requested for these claims was contractual that the plaintiff did not even contest this point. Id. at 888, 889 (describing the claims for rent and fees in commercial transactions as two straight contract claims), 891-92 (stating that the plaintiff did not dispute that two of the claims were contract claims). Another claim, based on quantum meruit, was clearly attempting to enforce a contract, as well. Id. at 892 (The equitable doctrine of quantum meruit is based on an implied promise on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff as much as he reasonably deserved to have for his labor.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). These circumstances are not similar to those in the present case. 30 By contrast to Ingersoll-Rand and Campanella, it is difficult in the present case to characterize as essentially contractual any of the relief sought or otherwise appropriate. Plaintiffs had contracts with Defendant which, through Amendment 3, appear to contain terms binding Plaintiffs to purchase fuel from the parties to the Exxon contracts. But Plaintiffs do not seek specific performance of this contract. In fact, Amendment 3 is the apparent cause of Plaintiffs' frustration. Thus, as in the Megapulse case itself (from which the legal standard was adopted by this Court), It is actually the Government, and not Megapulse [the plaintiff], which is relying on the contract.... Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 969 (D.C.Cir.1982); see also id. ([the plaintiff] does not claim a breach of contract, ... it seeks no monetary damages against the United States, and its claim is not properly characterized as one for specific performance....). The government seeks to enforce Amendment 3, to the frustration of Plaintiffs. 31 Perhaps it could be argued that Plaintiffs really seek specific performance of the original, unamended contracts thus — the case would be similar to Ingersoll-Rand, in which the court determined that the plaintiff sought specific performance of the original contract. 780 F.2d at 79-80. But the original, unamended contract did not contain any terms guaranteeing Plaintiffs freedom to choose fuel suppliers. If anything, the original, unamended contract contained language stating that so long as it adjusts the contract price accordingly, Defendant has the right to dictate which fuel suppliers Plaintiffs use. 5 This case contrasts with the Ingersoll-Rand case, which dealt with a narrow set of facts relating to competitive bidding — as explained in issue II, below, the facts and the court's rationale are distinguishable from the present case, and one relevant part of Ingersoll-Rand is not good law in the D.C. Circuit. On the issue of relief requested, the present case is more analogous to Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 133 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.1998), which is described below; in that case, the plaintiffs challenged the government's termination of a contract, but nevertheless, the court determined that the CDA did not bar the claims. Id. at 3-4. 6 32 Although the relief requested does not initially appear to be contractual, the RMI Titanium/Megapulse test demands a consideration of both relief and the source of rights upon which each claim is based. Thus, before reaching any final conclusions, the source of rights must be considered for each claim. 33