Opinion ID: 2339470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Sources and Nature of Duty Owed to Stapleton

Text: As mentioned, defendants concede the existence of a duty owed to Stapleton. Their memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion stated that they have found no Kansas caselaw on the question, but they nevertheless concluded there was consensus on jail authorities owing inmates a duty of reasonable care. In response, plaintiffs directed the district court to K.S.A. 19-1919 and Bukaty v. Berglund, 179 Kan. 259, 267, 294 P.2d 228 (1956). In their view, these Kansas authorities supported the existence of a duty to treat inmates with humanity and to provide medical attention. The district judge concluded that defendants owed Stapleton a duty of reasonable care. He relied upon the general rule from Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 1210 § 2(a), which states: In accordance with the general rule that a duty of reasonable care is owed by prison or jail authorities to a prisoner to keep him safe from unnecessary harm, the courts which have considered the question under annotation have generally recognized that if such authorities know or have reason to believe that the prisoner, unless forestalled, might do harm to himself or to others, reasonable care must be used by those authorities to assure that such harm does not occur. The district judge did not mention or interpret K.S.A. 19-1919. When this case reached our Court of Appeals, the panel cited Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1964) to support the existence of a custodian's legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent those in custody from harming themselves. Thomas, 40 Kan. App.2d at 954-55, 198 P.3d 182. The panel also evaluated numerous Kansas cases in which a custodial relationship was determined to be a special relationship imposing a duty of care. Thomas, 40 Kan.App.2d at 951-54, 198 P.3d 182 (citing Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 263 Kan. 143, 947 P.2d 31 [1997]; C.J.W. v. State, 253 Kan. 1, 853 P.2d 4 [1993]; Washington v. State, 17 Kan. App.2d 518, 839 P.2d 555, rev. denied 252 Kan. 1095 [1992]; Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 675 P.2d 57 [1984]). And the panel cited two federal cases predicting that Kansas would apply this duty of care to prison suicide cases. Thomas, 40 Kan.App.2d at 955, 198 P.3d 182 (citing Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 262 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1185-87 [D.Kan.2002]; Griffin v. United States, 2000 WL 33200259 [D.Kan.2000] [unpublished opinion]). The Court of Appeals placed no reliance on K.S.A. 19-1919. This court has looked to K.S.A. 19-1919 in earlier cases to identify a source of the duty owed by custodians to persons in their custody. The statute provides in relevant part: All prisoners shall be treated with humanity, and in a manner which promotes their reform. In Wesley Med. Center v. City of Wichita, we said that [i]t has long been the statutory law of Kansas that it is the duty of all keepers of jails and prisons to treat their prisoners with humanity. K.S.A. 19-1919, which specifically so provides, was enacted as a part of the General Statutes of 1868 in Chapter 53, Section 19. 237 Kan. 807, 809, 703 P.2d 818 (1985). Forty-five years earlier, in Pfannenstiel v. Doerfler, a negligence action against a county jail for failure to provide medical care to a prisoner, this court held that the plaintiff established a cause of action because [i]t is the duty of a sheriff or other officer having lawful custody of a prisoner to treat the prisoner properly, and, as the statute (G.S.1935, 19-1919) says, `with humanity.' 152 Kan. 479, 483, 105 P.2d, 886 (1940). K.S.A. 19-1919 and these cases place a positive duty upon [custodians] to furnish medical attention to a prisoner in custody who is in need of medical attention. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. at 810, 703 P.2d 818. Although we have not previously drawn an explicit, direct connection between the K.S.A. 19-1919 duty to treat a prisoner with humanity, including the provision of needed medical attention, and the potential for custodian liability for a prisoner suicide, this connection has been established in Kansas federal court. Claims arising from a jail suicide are considered and treated as claims based on the failure of jail officials to provide medical care for those in their custody.' See, e.g., Estate of Sisk, 262 F.Supp.2d at 1175 (quoting Barrie v. Grand County, 119 F.3d 862, 866 [10th Cir.1997]). Further, a majority of courts [in other jurisdictions] hold that the sheriff or other officer owes a duty to the prisoner to keep him safely and to protect him from unnecessary harm, and it has also been held that the officer must exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the life and health of the prisoner. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 353 § 2[a] (citing series of cases including: Smith v. Miller, 241 Iowa 625, 628, 40 N.W.2d 597 [1950] [sheriff owes general duty to prisoners to save from harm; sheriff liable for negligence causing injury, death]; City of Topeka v. Boutwell, 53 Kan. 20, 20, 35 P. 819 [1894] [duty of keepers of jail to treat prisoners humanely]; O'Dell v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 265, 30 N.W.2d 906 [1948] [sheriff bound to exercise control, management of jail to degree of care necessary for reasonably adequate protection of prisoners]; City of Belen v. Harrell, 93 N.M. 601, 603, 603 P.2d 711[1979] [jail custodian has duty to exercise reasonable, ordinary care for protection of life, health of person in custody]). With these authorities as our foundation, we now hold that K.S.A. 19-1919 is one source of defendants' duty to Stapleton and others like him in their custody. Another potential source of the duty at the heart of this case, as our Court of Appeals recognized, is Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4). It identifies certain special relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to aid or protect, saying the following: One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other. Comment d to this subsection explains that [t]he duty to protect the other against unreasonable risk of harm extends to risks arising out of the actor's own conduct and that [t]he duty to give aid to one who is ill or injured extends to cases where the illness or injury is due to . . . the negligence of the plaintiff himself. Comment e further explains that the duty owed is only . . . to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances and that [t]he defendant is not liable where he neither knows nor should know of the unreasonable risk, or of the illness or injury. We have previously acknowledged the duty of a custodian to protect a person in custody under this Restatement provision. In C.J.W. v. State , this court relied upon § 314A(4) as the source of the defendant custodian's duty when the plaintiff alleged that a fellow inmate sexually assaulted him while both were confined at a juvenile facility. C.J.W., 253 Kan. at 8, 853 P.2d 4. We said: There are several sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which appear applicable to the case before us. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1964) sets forth certain special relations which may give rise to a duty on the part of one person to protect another. It provides, in part, that one who is required by law to take custody of another under circumstances which deprive that person of the normal opportunities for protection is under a duty to protect the person taken into custody against unreasonable risk of physical harm from others. C.J.W., 253 Kan. at 8, 853 P.2d 4. Until the decision of the Court of Appeals panel in this case, however, Kansas courts have not considered whether § 314A(4) is implicated when a prisoner harms himself or herself rather than suffering injury at the hands of a third party. The Kansas federal district court has predicted the outcome on this question: Kansas courts would . . . impose a legal duty on a custodian to take reasonable steps to prevent the individual from injuring himself. Estate of Sisk, 262 F.Supp.2d at 1186. The Sisk case arose from the suicide of Scotty Ray Sisk while he was incarcerated in the Detention Center in Shawnee County. District Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara determined that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A established the duty owed to Sisk. The conclusion in Sisk rested on a previous unpublished decision, Griffin v. United States , in which federal (now Chief) District Judge Kathryn H. Vratil noted: It appears that Kansas courts have not decided whether persons who exercise custody over others have a duty to protect them from injuring themselves. The Kansas Supreme Court has recognized that a custodial relationship is a special relationship which gives rise to a duty of care to third persons. See, e.g., Cansler v. State of Kansas, 234 Kan. 554, 560-65, 675 P.2d 57, 63-66 (1984) (state had duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent inmates from harming others); P.W. v. Kansas [Dept. of SRS], 255 Kan. 827, 832, 877 P.2d 430, 434 (1994) (special relationships include persons with custody of another). In so ruling, the Kansas Supreme Court has cited the rules set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314A, 316-320 (1965). See Cansler, 234 Kan. 554 at 564, 675 P.2d at 66; P.W., 255 Kan. at 832, 877 P.2d at 434. Griffin v. United States, 2000 WL 33200259, at  (D.Kan.2000). Our P.W. v. Kansas Dept. of SRS case, 255 Kan. 827, 877 P.2d 430 (1994), cited by Judge Vratil, involved an allegation of negligence against Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) and the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) for failing to revoke or suspend the license of a day care center, or to take other corrective actions, where plaintiffs alleged violations and abuses by the owner-operators of the center. In it, we identified Section 314A, although not its particular subsection (4), as the provision establishing a special relationship between custodians and persons in their custody. P.W., 255 Kan. at 832, 877 P.2d 430. We ultimately concluded, however, that the duty we identified under the Restatement was not implicated, because KDHE and SRS, the plaintiffs, and the third party did not fit into the special relationships set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314A, 316-319, and 320. See P.W., 255 Kan. at 833, 877 P.2d 430. We believe this case is the right one in which to extend our § 314A(4) analysis, and we therefore hold that it constitutes an alternate source of the duty owed by defendants to Stapleton. Defendants had a duty to protect Stapleton against unreasonable risk of harm, including risk arising out of his own conduct. This duty did not make defendants guarantors of Stapleton's safety. But it imposed upon them the obligation to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, a duty triggered if they knew or should have known of an unreasonable risk to Stapleton's safety. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A, comments d and e; see also Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 1210 § 2[a] (courts which have considered the question . . . have generally recognized that if [jail or prison] authorities know or have reason to believe that the prisoner, unless forestalled, might do harm to himself or to others, reasonable care must be used by those authorities to assure that such harm does not occur). We now turn to the evidence in the record on whether the actual or constructive knowledge necessary to support a trigger of defendants' duty existed here.