Opinion ID: 182659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Begay contends that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient to convict him of first-degree murder. Murder is defined in the relevant statute as follows: Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Premeditation is not required for all forms of first-degree murder, but it is undisputed that premeditation is a required element of first-degree murder as charged against Begay. Therefore, in this case, premeditation is the essential element that distinguishes first-degree and second-degree murder. See United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 890 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1994). Without proof of premeditation, Begay could not be convicted of first-degree murder. The jury in this case was instructed, following our circuit's model jury instructions, that Premeditation means with planning or deliberation. The amount of time needed for premeditation of a killing depends on the person and the circumstances. It must be long enough, after forming the intent to kill, for the killer to have been fully conscious of the intent and to have considered the killing. 9th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 8.89 (2003). Begay did not object to that instruction at trial and has not done so in this appeal. Premeditation can be proved by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Free, 841 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.1988). Relevant circumstantial evidence includes but is not limited to the defendant's prior relationship to the victim, the defendant's carrying of the murder weapon to the scene, and the manner of the killing. Id.; see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.7(a) (2d ed. 2009) (highlighting planning activity, motive, and the nature of the killing as probative evidence) (emphasis omitted). Whether a defendant acted with premeditation is a factual question for the jury to decide. And a jury's verdict is not to be disturbed lightly. As the Supreme Court established in Jackson v. Virginia , a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction requires us to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A unanimous en banc panel of our court recently held in United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc), that Jackson established a two-step process: First, a reviewing court must consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution. This means that a court of appeals may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering how it would have resolved the conflicts, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial. Rather, when faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences a reviewing court must presumeeven if it does not affirmatively appear in the recordthat the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution. Second, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the reviewing court must determine whether this evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow  any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This second step protects against rare occasions in which a properly instructed jury may convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. More than a mere modicum of evidence is required to support a verdict. At this second step, however, a reviewing court may not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only whether  any  rational trier of fact could have made that finding. Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164 (citations, omissions, and alterations omitted) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319-20, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781). We turn to the evidence presented at trial in this case. The first step under Nevils requires us to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, resolving conflicts in favor of the government's case. At least four pieces of evidence were relevant to whether Begay acted with planning or deliberation in killing his victims and whether there was sufficient time for him to plan or deliberate. First, the jury could reasonably infer, from Loren Clark's testimony, that Begay walked back to his truck after talking to O.C. and J.T., got a gun from under the back seat and then returned to shoot the victims. Carrying the murder weapon to the scene is strong evidence of premeditation. See Free, 841 F.2d at 325; United States v. Talbert, 710 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.1983) (If the jury determined that the killer picked up the murder weapon and carried it back seventy-five feet to [the victim's] room, its finding of premeditation was justified.); see also Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d 150, 152 (D.C.Cir.1967) ([T]hat appellant entered the apartment with a loaded gun ... permitted an inference that appellant arrived on the scene already possessed of a calmly planned and calculated intent to kill.). Leaving the scene to retrieve a weapon is even stronger evidence of premeditation because it suggests that Begay had formed a plan for committing the murders and then set about carrying it out. Second, Clark testified that Begay walked both ways between his truck and O.C.'s car. There was no evidence that he was agitated or rushed. The jury could reasonably infer that he had enough time to become fully conscious of his intent to kill and to consider the killing. Third, Clark testified that when Begay returned to O.C.'s car, he went to the passenger's side, where J.T. was sitting, even though he had initially spoken to O.C. and J.T. from the driver's side. The jury could reasonably infer that he did so to get a clearer shot at J.T. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 325, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ([T]he ... shots that killed the victim were fired at close, and thus predictably fatal, range by a person who was experienced in the use of the murder weapon.). Like the defendant in Jackson, Begay fired from close range: Clark testified that Begay was at most four feet away from the car when he fired. Finally, Clark testified that Begay did not answer when, after the shooting, Clark asked what he had done. He also testified that Begay's sister, Mecheryl, yelled something like What did you do? to Begay at that point, and Begay told her to shut up and be quiet. The jury could reasonably infer that Begay was acting with a cool mind. Cf. id. at 325, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (The petitioner's calculated behavior both before and after the killing demonstrated that he was fully capable of committing premeditated murder.). The second step under Nevils requires us to consider whether this evidence, including the inferences drawn in the prosecution's favor, was adequate to permit a rational juror to conclude that each essential element of the charge was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This second step allows us to fulfill our obligation under Jackson to identify those rare occasions in which `a properly instructed jury may convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167 (omissions and alterations omitted) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781). For example, we cannot uphold a verdict where mere speculation, rather than reasonable inference, supports the government's case. Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167 (citing Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1277-79 (9th Cir.2005)). The evidence we described in step one, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that Begay acted with planning or deliberation in shooting J.T. and that he had enough time to do so. [5] Each of the inferences we described is reasonable because it is supported by a chain of logic, which is all that is required to distinguish reasonable inference from speculation. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1277. In this case, therefore, step two is simple. Nothing more was needed for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Begay acted with premeditation. [6] Begay argues that because there was no evidence presented at trial to establish a motive on the part of Begay to kill J.T. or O.C. or to prove that Begay had a prior relationship with them, it would have been irrational for a juror to conclude that Begay premeditated the killings. But although evidence of motive or of a past relationship often helps to establish a given defendant's guilt, neither motive nor a past relationship is an element of first-degree murder. See United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.1989); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). A rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence concerning Begay's activity and the manner of killing that Begay acted with premeditation. See Free, 841 F.2d at 325; LaFave, supra, § 14.7(a). Begay does not contest the sufficiency of evidence as to any other element of first-degree murder. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support the jury's verdict and the convictions for first-degree murder.