Opinion ID: 754070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of Roving Border Patrol Authority for Investigatory Stops

Text: 35 As discussed above, except at the border and its functional equivalents, Border Patrol agents on roving patrol may stop vehicles if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal aliens or drugs. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581-82, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Pursuant to § 287(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Border Patrol has power without warrant ... to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.... 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1998). Section 287 also authorizes the Border Patrol, without a warrant, within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States, to board and search for aliens any ... vehicle ... for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1998). Brignoni-Ponce held that this statutory authority is subject to the reasonableness requirement mandated by the Fourth Amendment. 422 U.S. at 882, 95 S.Ct. at 2580-81. In United States v. Cortez, the Supreme Court clarified that the agents' suspicion need not be confined to considerations of smuggling undocumented immigrants. 449 U.S. 411, 421-22, 101 S.Ct. 690, 696-97, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Instead, as the Court explained, the question is whether, based upon the whole picture, they, as experienced Border Patrol officers, could reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal activity. Id. 36 In making a determination of reasonable suspicion, the agents (and the courts reviewing the agents' actions) must take the totality of the circumstances into account. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 694-95. In making determinations of reasonable suspicion in this context, a court may consider several factors: 37 (1) known characteristics of a particular area, (2) previous experience of the arresting agents with criminal activity, (3) proximity of the area to the border, (4) usual traffic patterns of that road, (5) information about recent illegal trafficking in aliens or narcotics in the area, (6) the behavior of the vehicle's driver, (7) the appearance of the vehicle, and (8) the number, appearance and behavior of the passengers. 38 Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 (quoting United States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir.1992) (listing factors identified in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85, 95 S.Ct. at 2581-82)). Under this test,  'reason to believe that the vehicle had come from the border' is a vital element, although the belief that the vehicle has crossed the border is not necessary if other factors constitute reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. United States v. Pallares-Pallares, 784 F.2d 1231, 1233 (5th Cir.1986). Nevertheless, where the agents do not have reason to believe that the vehicle has come from the border, the remaining factors must be examined charily. Id. 39 B. The Totality of the Circumstances in this Case Gave Rise to a Reasonable Suspicion that Nichols was Engaged in Criminal Activity 40 Our review of the record clearly demonstrates that the totality of the circumstances the Border Patrol agents identified were clearly sufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion to dismiss, as our precedent requires. See Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 721 (The evidence presented at a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.). The agents testified: that the road in question was notorious as a popular smuggling route; that Agent Diaz had previously made arrests where he had found illegal aliens concealed in toolboxes such as the one on Nichols' truck; that Nichols was traveling north from the border area and that there was no development other than ranches within twenty miles of that intersection; that, based on their experience, Nichols' truck was uncharacteristically clean for a utility vehicle coming from a ranch in that area; that Nichols had stopped for 25 seconds at the stop sign, without looking in either direction down the road; that, during that 25 seconds, Nichols did not look at the Border Patrol agents when they shined their headlights on Nichols' truck; that Nichols' truck bore no company logo, which was also uncharacteristic of utility vehicles in that area; that Nichols was on the road about a half hour earlier than utility vehicles normally appeared in that area (although Agent Diaz admitted that this factor was borderline); that traffic at that time was very light, with Nichols' vehicle representing only the third vehicle in 45 minutes; that when Nichols finally did make the turn he was traveling at an unusually slow speed, and; that Nichols swerved off the road twice while the agents were behind him. 41 When viewed in the aggregate, these factors amount to a reasonable suspicion that Nichols was engaged in illegal activity. Although some of these factors would not alone amount to reasonable suspicion, reasonable suspicion determinations are not limited to analysis of any one factor. Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722; see also Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695 ([T]he totality of the circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken into account.). Furthermore, under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the absence of a particular factor will not control a court's conclusions. Cardona, 955 F.2d at 980. The totality of the circumstances presented by the factors in this case becomes even more convincing in light of our standard of review: we must view the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the prevailing party--in this case, the government. See Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 721; Cardona, 955 F.2d at 977. 42
43 The district court properly found that the location of the stop in this case was relatively close to the Mexican border. This Court has noted that [w]e have at times focused our inquiry initially on the question of whether arresting agents could reasonably conclude a particular vehicle originated its journey at the border. Id. at 980. As stated, where the agents do not have reason to believe that the vehicle has come from the border, the remaining reasonable suspicion factors must be examined charily. Pallares-Pallares, 784 F.2d at 1233. Consideration solely of distance may show that a vehicle is not likely to have come from the border. See Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 7 (noting that [v]ehicles traveling more than fifty miles from the border are usually a 'substantial' distance from the border); United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir.1984) (When the stop occurs a substantial distance from the border, we have found this element missing.). When finding that a vehicle did come from the border, however, the court should consider additional factors. See Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 6 (noting that this issue is resolved by an analysis of the road the vehicle was traveling on, the number of towns along the road, the number of intersecting roads and, finally, the number of miles the vehicle was actually from the border at the point of the stop). 44 In Cardona, under circumstances similar to this case, this Court held that Border Patrol agents had a reasonable suspicion to conclude the vehicle had originated its journey at the border. 955 F.2d at 980. In Cardona, the vehicle, a mid-size passenger car, was between 40 and 50 miles from the border and was uncharacteristic of normal traffic for that road, which consisted mainly of ranch trucks and hunting jeeps. Id. Finally, the vehicle in Cardona was traveling in an easterly direction, and the towns serviced by the western direction of the road were all on or very near the border. Id. 45 In light of Cardona, and common sense, the Border Patrol agents in this case clearly had reason to believe that Nichols was coming from the border. Nichols was only about 30 miles from the border, while Cardona, and other cases have considered proximity to the border to be a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion when the stop occurred up to 50 miles from the border. See id.; see also Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 7. Here, the agents testified that the only development within 20 miles of the intersection consisted of ranches which, due to the agents' past experience, the cleanliness of Nichols' vehicle, and the lack of a company logo, the officers considered unlikely points of origin for Nichols' truck. In other words, here, as in Cardona, the agents reasonably noticed that the vehicle in question was uncharacteristic of normal traffic for the particular road involved. 46 Furthermore, as in Cardona, the existence of some towns between the border and the intersection at issue does not defeat a determination of reasonable suspicion. In Cardona, we engaged in the following analysis: 47 Here, the vehicle was between 40 and 50 miles from the border. The road is a rural, two-lane highway with approximately 90% of its traffic consisting of ranch trucks and hunting jeeps. The vehicle, a mid-size passenger car, was traveling in an easterly direction, and the towns serviced by the western direction of the road are all on or very near the border. We hold that under these facts the agents had a reasonable suspicion to conclude the vehicle had originated its journey at the border. 48 Cardona, 955 F.2d at 980 (emphasis added). At the suppression hearing in this case, Judge Kazen, one of our most able trial judges, specifically pointed out, in relation to the Border Patrol agent's testimony: 49 If you look at the map and the familiarity that we all have with that area, I mean, we're taking about a kind of nowhere land. 649 really comes from nowhere in particular. It's just a little ranch road that ... a south Texas ranch road that, generally, a Houston utility vehicle, at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, has noting to do there at all unless it's ... unless it's the typical type of vehicle that is there ... stationed there from these oil companies, working the ranches there, and I take it what the gentleman is saying is that those trucks they know because they generally have all of their logos and insignias about what oil company they are and what they're doing there. So here comes a whistle clean, white Houston utility truck at five something in the morning, coming north on 649, which is, as I say, coming essentially from nowhere and going essentially nowhere, and then has this sort of odd conduct at the intersection. 50 (emphasis added). Later in the hearing, while admitting the Border Patrol agent's hand-drawn diagram of the area in question, Judge Kazen continued: 51 For the record, I always keep it here on the bench, 'cause I've done some [sic ] many of these. I keep a state map of this whole area ... and, you know, a map is a map and you sort of take judicial notice of what all those intersections are. 52 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, in Ornelas v. United States: 53 [A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. 54 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 55 In light of this standard, our holding in Cardona, and Judge Kazen's noted consideration of his own knowledge of the area and the Border Patrol agent's experience, as well as his consultation of a map of south Texas, we find that Judge Kazen did not err by finding that the factor of proximity to the border contributed to reasonableness of the Border Patrol agents' suspicion. Although a reasonable conclusion of proximity to the border does not alone constitute reasonable suspicion for a Border Patrol stop that is not at the border or its functional equivalent, this vital element contributes significantly to the reasonableness of the Border Patrol agents' suspicion. See Pallares-Pallares, 784 F.2d at 1233 (holding that, where agents do not have reason to believe that vehicle came from border, the remaining factors must be examined charily); see also, e.g., Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 6 (This Court considers the fact that a vehicle may have recently crossed the border as a vital element in making an investigatory stop.); Cardona, 955 F.2d at 980 (We have at times focused our inquiry initially on the question of whether arresting agents could reasonably conclude a particular vehicle originated its journey at the border.); United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.1980) (finding no reasonable suspicion where it was pure speculation on part of agents to opine that defendant's journey originated at border). 56
57 Nichols accurately points to Fifth Circuit precedent holding that avoidance of eye contact is entitled to no weight, see United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th. Cir.1993); Cardona, 955 F.2d at 983 n. 9; however, the record reflects that the Border Patrol agents were more concerned with Nichols' overall behavior at the stop sign than they were with his eye contact, or lack thereof. It is beyond dispute that Border Patrol agents may consider the behavior of a vehicle's driver in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop that vehicle. See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 (The driver's behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion.); Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 723 (defendant's use of load car--lead car driving pattern, commonly used by drug smugglers, contributed to reasonableness of Border Patrol agents' suspicion); Cardona, 955 F.2d at 981 (considering, in reasonable suspicion analysis, that vehicle slowed its speed considerably and began weaving shortly after agents began following it). 58 Here, Nichols' behavior at the stop sign obviously adds to the reasonableness of the Border Patrol agents' suspicion. Nichols stopped at the intersection for a full twenty to thirty seconds. The Border Patrol vehicle was in plain view less than 15 feet away from Nichols' vehicle. A street light initially illuminated the Border Patrol vehicle, and the agents illuminated Nichols' truck with their headlights as Nichols approached the intersection. The Border patrol agents observed that, not only did Nichols avoid making eye contact, but he also did not even look in their direction when they illuminated their headlights, nor did he look in either direction down the road as if to see which way to go. Instead, Nichols simply stared straight ahead into the brush. 59 Agent Diaz's testimony makes it clear that it was not merely Nichols' avoidance of eye contact that contributed to the agents' suspicions, but his overall behavior while at the stop sign for an unusual period of time: 60 Q. What did this person do when you illuminated the cab with your headlights? 61 A. Well, he didn't acknowledge us at all. I mean, that seemed kind of strange. 62 Q. What do you mean by he didn't acknowledge you? 63 A. He came up to the stop sign and just ... it seemed like he parked there, you know, maybe twenty or thirty seconds and just kept staring forward, which there's nothing but brush. He never turned to see which way he was going to turn to or head to. 64