Opinion ID: 2831335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intent to Interfere

Text: To sustain a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the tenant at sufferance, by maintaining possession of the premises at issue, acted with an intent to interfere with the prospective contract between the landlord and the prospective lessee. __ S.W.3d at __; see also Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 757 (finding no tortious interference in the absence of intent to harm the plaintiff’s business relations). This Court has explained that interference is intentional “‘if the actor desires to bring it about or if he knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result.’” Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 757 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. d (1979)). We further reasoned that “‘[i]f [the actor] had no desire to effectuate the interference by his action but knew that it would be a mere incidental result of conduct he was engaging in for another purpose, the interference may be found 5 to be not improper.’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. d (1979)) (alterations in original); see also Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (“Mere participation in the transaction is not sufficient to establish an intentional action to harm [the plaintiff].”). Accordingly, in Bradford we declined to find that the defendant’s statements to police during a criminal trespass investigation constituted legally sufficient evidence of intent to harm the plaintiff’s prospective business relations with customers. 48 S.W.3d at 758. Instead, the plaintiff’s inability to do business with customers was merely an incidental result of the defendant’s efforts to end the present disturbance and protect property. Id. Similarly, when a tenant at sufferance exercises a right of possession pursuant to a court order, the landlord’s inability to lease the premises to others is necessarily “a mere incidental result of conduct [the tenant] was engaging in for another purpose”—that is, for the purpose of exercising its court-sanctioned right to possession. Id. at 757. Under such circumstances, a defendant’s good faith belief in its right to possess the property premised on court orders will likely preclude a plaintiff from establishing the heightened intent necessary to support a claim for tortious interference.5 In the present case, Coinmach remained in possession of the premises pursuant to favorable court orders obtained in the course of litigation. Under most circumstances, this would almost 5 Of course, a tenant at sufferance may have a good faith belief in its right to possession even in the absence of court orders. Under these circumstances, the landlord still carries the heavy burden of proving the tenant specifically intended to interfere with the landlord’s potential business relations. Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 757–58. The tenant’s mere intent to maintain possession will not sustain a claim for tortious interference. 6 certainly demonstrate a tenant lacked the specific intent to interfere. But here it is unclear whether Coinmach’s possession under these court orders was in good faith. Indeed, Aspenwood has put forth some evidence that Coinmach may have procured these court orders through fraud. For one, to obtain a writ of reentry Coinmach presented a sworn affidavit to the justice court that relied on the lease agreement but omitted any mention of the lease’s express provision that it was “subordinate to any mortgage or deed of trust on the premises.” Aspenwood has also presented some evidence regarding the dangerously poor condition of Coinmach’s equipment and argues that the same affidavit falsely claimed the equipment was functional. Thus, summary judgment in favor of Coinmach on Aspenwood’s tortious interference claim is not possible because there is a remaining fact issue as to whether Coinmach procured the court orders through fraud.6