Opinion ID: 1779273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dispute resolution and remedy limitation.

Text: ¶ 28. The language of the arbitration provision is unremarkable, except that it carves out an exception for disputes based on the payment of the fee. The majority finds great inequity in this exception because the majority perceives it as an advantage to Watkins. Specifically, the majority states that the arbitration clause provides an avenue for Watkins to pursue his claims in a court of law, while requiring Pitts to arbitrate. This is, I believe, an inaccurate paraphrase of the arbitration clause language, which clearly excludes from arbitration any dispute over the fee, whether Watkins brings an action to collect it, or the Pittses bring an action to avoid payment of it. Thus, the assumption that only Watkins may pursue his claim in a court of law is not grounded in the language of the arbitration clause but instead represents a conclusion reached by the majority of how things might turn out. Furthermore, the contract does not require Pitts to arbitrate, as asserted by the majority. With respect to all other claims under the contract, both parties must arbitrate. The majority strays from the record to conjure up scenarios where this might prove to be unfair. But arbitration is not unfair or less desirable in the eyes of the law just because the Pittses do not want to arbitrate in this particular case. The next customer might prefer arbitration and would, thus, enjoy an advantage. The majority, however, announces that when a party is required under the terms of a contract to arbitrate a claim, that party (in Mississippi) has been oppressed. This begs the question of whether the majority would find oppressive a provision which required the parties to arbitrate disputes over the fee, but allowed all other claims to be presented in a court. ¶ 29. The majority's analysis demonstrates the preconceived notions that settling a dispute over the fee (regardless of who brings it) in court is an advantage to Watkins and that settling all other disputes (regardless of who brings them) in arbitration is also an advantage to Watkins. These conclusions have no foundation whatsoever in the law or the record. ¶ 30. I must concede the unfortunate truth that certain words (such as unconscionability and oppression) seem to lose the limited and narrow applicability for which they were originally intended. It requires discipline to uphold as valid a contract which contains terms one believes are unfair, but not quite oppressive. The path which seems pleasing and less fraught with resistance allows a relaxing of the definition to include more this year that the last. Personal opinion might lead one to conclude that the Pittses have an unfair contract. But it is, in my view, certainly not oppressive.