Opinion ID: 77301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: What Congress Has Done Differently

Text: 34 At the outset of our discussion, we note that the new pandering provision allays certain concerns voiced by the Court in Free Speech Coalition. First, the Court's primary objection to the CPPA's pandering provision was that pandered materials were criminalized for all purposes in the hands of any possessor based on how they were originally pandered. 41 By moving the pandering provision from the definitions section to a stand-alone status, and using language that targets only the act of pandering, the new provision has shifted from regulation of the underlying material to regulation of the speech related to the material. This remedies the problem of penalizing individuals farther down the distribution chain for possessing images that, despite how they were marketed, are not illegal child pornography. 35 With respect to its legislative findings for the PROTECT Act, Congress largely abandons the secondary effects and market deterrence justifications found wanting by the Court in Free Speech Coalition, although it does reiterate the need to ensure that the result of Ferber —driving illegal child pornography from the books-helves —is extended to extinguish the open and notorious trafficking in such materials on the Internet. 42 Congress instead focuses primarily on beefing up its findings that technological advancements since Free Speech Coalition have increased the prosecutorial difficulties raised by the ready availability of technology able to disguise depictions of real children (proscribable under Ferber ) to make them unidentifiable or to make them appear computer-generated (defensible under Free Speech Coalition ). 43 36 Finally, the PROTECT Act provides a new definition for child pornography, which in addition to real child images includes (1) any digital or computer-generated image that is indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, 44 and (2) a visual depiction that has been created or modified to appear as an identifiable minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 45 The PROTECT Act also amended the general obscenity statute to define a new category of unprotected synthetic child pornography that incorporates, in part, the Miller definition. That law now prohibits the production, distribution, receipt or possession, in an interstate commerce setting, of (1) obscene visual depictions of any kind that depict a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and (2) any visual depiction that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in certain enumerated hard core acts and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 46 Thus a virtual depiction of a minor involved in any of the expressly listed acts is outlawed even where only one of the three Miller prongs is explicitly satisfied. 47 Because the materials Williams possessed were unquestionably depictions of real children, these new virtual child pornography definitions are not directly at issue in this case, but the limitations of their reach have implications regarding Congress's purpose for enacting the pandering provision, as we discuss below. For example, the definitions do not capture innocent pictures of children that pedophiles view, collect, and trade as dirty pictures. And it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will find acceptable the PROTECT Act's truncation of the Miller obscenity standard with respect to child pornography.