Opinion ID: 2972947
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motive Evidence

Text: We also conclude that the district court did not commit plain error by admitting evidence of McCullough’s motive. The motive evidence, that McCullough had entered the bar looking to shoot someone, was clearly probative of whether McCullough was carrying a gun, so McCullough’s only argument is that it was overly-prejudicial: that it may have led the jury to “decide[] the case not on whether the Appellant actually had possession, but whether the Appellant was a danger to the community.” We disagree that the motive evidence was overly-prejudicial, and we hold that the district court did not commit plain error by admitting it. McCullough first challenges the admission of Harris’s hearsay testimony that McCullough had come to the bar to take revenge on someone. McCullough’s brief refers to one statement that the court instructed the jury to ignore—that McCullough planned to “jump” another person—but he presumably intends to draw our attention to later statements in Harris’s testimony that the jury could consider—the statements discussed in section II.A.1 above. Yet we disagree that the inclusion of those statements represented plain error. Harris, after all, testified that she personally saw -6- No. 03-3519 United States of America v. McCullough McCullough with the gun, so it is unlikely that the jury thought him any more of a “danger to the community” because of evidence that he had a reason for carrying it. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury that “the defendant is only on trial for the particular crime charged in the indictment,” and that its duty was “limited to deciding whether the government has proven the crime charged.” McCullough also challenges two statements that the court specifically instructed the jury to ignore: Battle’s testimony that McCullough’s companion had stated that McCullough came to Martin’s to “shoot someone,” and the prosecution’s reminder to the jury (during its closing argument) that it had “heard testimony that [McCullough] was [at Martin’s] to take care of some business.” The district court sustained McCullough’s timely objection to—and instructed the jury to ignore—Battle’s statement. And, since the testimony that was the basis for the prosecution’s closing statement—i.e., Harris’s testimony—was not itself overly-prejudicial, neither was the mere reference to that testimony in the closing argument. Indeed, the district court reduced any prejudicial effect of the prosecution’s closing statement by instructing the jury that closing arguments were not evidence and therefore should not be considered in reaching the verdict. We conclude that the district court did not commit plain error in either instance.