Opinion ID: 2612956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issue twosimultaneous possession of cocaine by buyer and seller

Text: Bankert also claims that jury instruction number ten, stating that [t]wo or more people can have possession of a substance at the same time, and the prosecutor's related closing argument thwarted a jury determination of the possession element. He points out that no drug deal was ever consummated. It is axiomatic, he says, that during a drug transaction, a buyer and seller cannot each possess a controlled substance simultaneously. At most, Bankert avows he is guilty of attempted possession. See State v. Lopez, 100 N.M. 291, 292, 669 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1983); State v. Curry, 107 N.M. 133, 135, 753 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Ct.App.) (holding that the attempt to possess the cocaine can be inferred from defendant's attempt to pick up the package), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 132, 753 P.2d 1320 (1988). Though he made the attempt, he never had the power of dominion and control over the substance, see Sizemore, 115 N.M. at 756, 858 P.2d at 423. The threshold of a completed offense was never crossed. Thus, he argues, his felony murder conviction must fail, because the predicate felonytrafficking in cocainecannot be established. The rules that govern commercial transactions do not apply to an illegal transaction. However, by proposing the axiom that a buyer and seller cannot simultaneously possess cocaine, Bankert is asserting a defense based on commercial contract theory. He suggests that both parties cannot have legal possession of the same substance at the same time. But the law does not recognize contractual ownership of cocaine and so the concepts of buyer and seller are not operative. A contract which contravenes a rule of law is unenforceable. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. American Gen. Life Ins. Co., 111 N.M. 106, 107, 802 P.2d 11, 12 (1990) (citing General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidenberg, 78 N.M. 59, 62, 428 P.2d 33, 36 (1967)). The concepts of buyer and seller have meaning in the context of a drug deal only as indications of the direction of transfer. In a commercial transaction, during preliminary negotiations, there can be no conclusive bargain. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 (1981). But in a drug deal, both buyer and seller can exert some control over the substance during negotiations. See Bauske, 86 N.M. at 485-86, 525 P.2d at 412-13 (citing People v. Francis, 71 Cal.2d 66, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 202, 450 P.2d 591, 594 (1969) (in bank)). By willingly exercising control at any point during the transaction, the parties have committed the illegal act of possession. The act cannot be undone, even if the physical transference of the drug later becomes impossible. In this case Smith provided the cocaine, Christison weighed it in her scales, and Bankert provided funds and transportation, and tried to enforce the sale with a gun. All three simultaneously took some control over the disposition of the cocaine; all three simultaneously were in possession.