Opinion ID: 987114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 2004 and 2008 Amendments

Text: 4 The legislature again revised the identity theft statutes in 2004 and 2008. On both occasions, the legislature added language that appears inconsistent with the inclusion of corporations as victims of identity theft. In 2004, the legislature enacted a biometric matching system to reduce fraudulent issuances of driver's licenses and state identification cards. LAWS OF 2004, ch. 273, § 1. The legislature indicated that [t]he most common method of 4 The legislature also amended the identity theft statutes in 2003, but only to reorganize criminal provisions ... to clarify and simplify the identification and referencing of crimes. LAWS OF 2003, ch. 53, § 1. 12 No. 86772-1 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) accomplishing identity theft ... is by securing a fraudulently issued driver's license. /d. In light of this concern, the legislature ordered the Department of Licensing to create a biometric matching system to allow every person applying for an original, renewal, or duplicate driver's license or identicard the option of submitting a biometric identifier. 2004 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 58th Wash. Leg., at 120. Given the focus on biometric data to prevent identity theft, the legislature was again concerned only with natural persons as victims of identity theft. In 2008, the legislature again revised the identity theft statutes to allow a person who has learned or reasonably suspects that his or her financial information or means of identification has been unlawfully obtained to obtain a police incident report. LAWS OF 2008, ch. 207, § 2. The final legislative report pointed out that identity theft victims must have police reports to freeze their credit, to place longterm fraud alerts on credit reports, and to obtain records of fraudulent accounts from merchants. 2008 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 60th Wash. Leg., at 171. The legislative history also discloses that the amendment requiring a police report was partially responsive to a Federal Trade Commission survey showing that 19 percent of persons surveyed indicated that police refused to take their report of identity theft. /d. The focus on consumers obtaining a police report again demonstrates that the legislature viewed natural persons, not corporations, as the direct victims of identity theft. From 1999 to 2008, the legislature enacted or amended identity theft laws with a focus on everyday consumers-i.e., natural persons-who were victimized by identity theft. This belies the majority's holding that the legislature intended to 13 No. 86772-1 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) include corporations as identity theft victims. We should interpret RCW 9.35.020(1) as excluding corporations from the class of persons victimized by identity theft. IV. At the very least, the identity theft statute is ambiguous, requiring the application of the rule of lenity Even if the legislature did intend to include corporations as victims of identity theft, it did not do so clearly enough to support criminal liability in this case. '[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.' State v. Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 711, 107 P.3d 728 (2005) (quoting United States v. Universal C./. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S., 218, 221-22, 73 S. Ct. 227, 97 L. Ed. 260 (1952)). If a criminal statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and, absent legislative intent to the contrary, the rule of lenity requires us to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant. State v. Coucil, 170 Wn.2d 704, 706-07, 245 P.3d 222 (2010) (citing State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600-01, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). Assuming for the sake of argument that it is reasonable to interpret the identity theft statute as including corporations within the class of victims, the statute is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations-one that includes corporate victims and one that does not. This renders the statute ambiguous. The rule of lenity would thus apply, requiring that we interpret the identity theft statute in Evans's favor. For 14 No. 86772-1 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) this reason as well, RCW 9.35.020 must be interpreted to exclude corporations as victims of identity theft.