Opinion ID: 670488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breitman's Individual Challenges to Vicarious Liability

Text: 60 In addition to the challenges of both landlords to vicarious liability, Breitman also seeks to vacate the judgment against him, but on grounds pertinent only to his vicarious liability. First, Breitman challenges the basic case against him, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. He also suggests that the jury actually exonerated him by refusing to award any damages against him, and alternatively, that the jury verdict was ambiguous as to his liability.
61 Plaintiffs presented the following evidence in support of their prima facie case of discrimination by Breitman. Ronald Luckett, an African-American tester, testified that on March 6, 1987, he went to the offices of AM Realty at 10 a.m. and spoke with salesperson Carl Matos. Luckett requested a one-bedroom apartment in Midwood or Sheepshead Bay, but said that he might settle for a studio. Matos told Luckett that he had arrived too late, and that new apartment listings came in on Monday morning or Friday afternoon. However, Matos mentioned that he had a few apartments available in another area--on Argyle Road in Flatbush. Plaintiffs' expert Professor Emanuel Tobier testified later that these apartments were in a predominantly African-American and Latino neighborhood. After seeing the apartments on Argyle Road, Luckett called Matos and was again told that there were no apartments available in the areas he had requested. 62 Susan Hamovitch, a White tester, testified that she arrived at AM Realty's offices at noon on the same day. She met with James Siegel, another salesperson at AM Realty. 17 She informed him that she was looking for a one-bedroom or junior four apartment in Midwood or Sheepshead Bay. Siegel instead suggested she view an apartment in Kensington, a neighborhood which she considered comparable to Midwood. Siegel then drove with Hamovitch in her car to look at the Kensington apartment, which was owned by Breitman. After she looked at this apartment, she looked at a junior four apartment that Siegel said was available in Sheepshead Bay. Siegel did not accompany her to see this second apartment. Siegel called her the following day to inquire about her opinion of the two apartments. He called again later in the week to report that the apartment in Kensington had been rented, and to ask whether she might be interested in viewing other apartments. 63 Breitman argues that these facts did not suffice to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because the African-American tester did not apply to rent Breitman's property, nor was he rejected as a tenant. Brief of Appellant Breitman at 40. Breitman maintains that he cannot be faulted for the realty agent's failure to offer Breitman's apartment in Kensington because the tester never asked for an apartment in Kensington. Since the tester never asked, Breitman continues, there was nothing wrong with not showing him the apartment. 64 The problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that the realtor offered to show Breitman's one-bedroom apartment in Kensington to the White tester even though she also had never asked for an apartment in that area. Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act is not to be frustrated because cunning landlords can take advantage of a large array of devices to hide their discrimination. Rental housing discrimination is pervasive in large part because it is so easily disguised by rules and subtle practices or tactics of landlords and building managers. James A. Kushner, Fair Housing Sec. 3.16 at 97 (1983). One of these devices is to offer to show apartments in predominantly White neighborhoods to prospective renters who are White, even if these renters do not express any interest in those neighborhoods. By so doing, the landlord can increase the chances of renting those apartments to White tenants. Breitman's crabbed reading of the statute would effectively immunize this mechanism for racial steering from judicial scrutiny. 65 Breitman's analysis does not comport with the Fair Housing Act's broad legislative plan to eliminate all traces of discrimination within the housing field, Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir.1974). As long as a plaintiff can prove that a defendant afforded an African-American person fewer housing opportunities than a similarly-situated White person on account of race, the plaintiff has made out a case under Title VIII. See Matchmaker Real Estate, 982 F.2d at 1096 (holding realtor liable in part because its agents denied the black testers information about housing that they readily gave to similarly situated white testers); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 Yale L.J. 808, 820 (1976) (Title VIII should prevent the broker, at his own option, from selecting housing on the basis of race to show the customer.). 66 Breitman worries that if we uphold the District Court's decision against him, we will impose on landlords and realtors the nearly impossible duty of informing every prospective tenant about all available apartments, even ones in neighborhoods about which the tenant did not inquire. This fear is unwarranted. Landlords and their agents will not have to tell tenants about all apartments everywhere. They will only have to make sure that they do not provide less information to one person than to another simply on account of race.
67 Breitman also makes the somewhat remarkable claim that he should not now be before this Court because the jury actually absolved him from any liability for discrimination. Breitman finds vindication in the fact that the jury refused to award even nominal damages against him. He points out that even though the jury assessed compensatory and punitive damages against AM Realty brokers and against Jakabovitz, it declined to assess any damages against Breitman. Judge Spatt, observing that the jury verdict held Breitman liable for AM Realty's acts of discrimination but failed to award even nominal damages against him, asked the jury to reconsider its decision not to award even nominal damages against Breitman. When the jury reaffirmed its earlier decision, the plaintiffs moved to modify the verdict to award nominal damages against Breitman, and the Court granted that motion. See Cabrera, 814 F.Supp. at 277. 68 We believe that the jury's refusal to award damages against Breitman showed only that it believed that he was less culpable than the other defendants. The jury did, however, believe he was guilty of discrimination, as is evident from its affirmative responses to the following three questions: 69 1. Did the plaintiffs establish that the defendants JAMES SIEGEL and CARLOS MATOS acted within the scope of their authority and in furtherance of the business of the defendant EMANUEL FISCHLER, doing business as AM REALTY CO.? YES XXX NO ___ 70 3. Did the plaintiffs establish that the defendant EMANUEL FISCHLER, doing business as AM REALTY CO. [,] acted as an agent for the defendant BENJAMIN BREITMAN, as the Court has explained that concept to you, with regard to the incident of March 6, 1987 involving the testers RONALD LUCKETT and SUSAN HAMOVITCH? YES XXX NO ___ 71 5. Do you find that the plaintiff OPEN HOUSING CENTER, INC. established, that on March 6, 1987, RONALD LUCKETT was discriminated against by the defendant CARLOS MATOS because of his race, in violation of Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act? YES XXX NO ___ 72 These answers clearly show that (1) AM Realty acted as Breitman's agent with regard to the test conducted by Ronald Luckett and Susan Hamovitch; (2) Matos acted within the scope of his authority at AM Realty; and (3) Matos discriminated against Luckett on March 6, 1987, in violation of the Fair Housing Act. By these findings, the jury held Breitman responsible for the discrimination Luckett suffered when he sought housing at AM Realty. Moreover, it is not unheard of for juries to find a violation of a right yet decline to award any damages. See Fassett v. Haeckel, 936 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.1991); Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 563-64 (2d Cir.1991). We have said that in such a case, instead of throwing out the verdict of liability against the defendant, the trial court can direct the jury to enter an award of nominal damages. See Ruggiero, 928 F.2d at 564; Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 789 (2d Cir.1984). 73 Breitman also contends that this verdict was ambiguous because the jury might have been thinking not about his apartment in Kensington that White tester Susan Hamovitch saw on March 6, 1987, but rather the other apartment (not owned by Breitman) that she saw on that day. Even putting aside the dubious factual basis of this objection, we hold that it was waived because Breitman failed to take up the District Court's offer to modify the verdict sheet on this score before it went to the jury. See Cabrera, 814 F.Supp. at 279. We see no plain error resulting in a miscarriage of justice that would allow us to ignore Breitman's waiver of the issue. 74 Finally, Breitman contends that there were nondiscriminatory reasons for the brokers' failure to show his apartment to the African-American tester even though they showed it to the White tester. Breitman presented these reasons at trial but the jury rejected them. We see no clear error in that decision.