Opinion ID: 2997941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Obstruction of View and Failure to Install/

Text: Maintain Signs The plaintiffs also challenge the dismissal of their negligence claim against the County to the extent that the district court found the evidence of obstruction of view and failure to maintain signage at the crossing insufficient to survive summary judgment. On the obstruction-of-view claim, they contend that photographic evidence of the CR 400 crossing does not clarify where the County’s right-ofway terminates and the railroad’s begins, creating a question of fact that precludes summary judgment. They also argue that the district court improperly premised its ruling on Sheryl Bechard’s testimony that she had observed the 12 No. 04-2780 signs and was familiar with the crossing when the court had not yet resolved the issue of her competence to testify. Finally, as to this claim, they assert that the district court erred in holding that the County was immune under Indiana’s governmental immunity statute, IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3. A negligence claim under Indiana law requires: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant in relation to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty or, in other words, a failure on the part of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requisite standard of care; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff resulting from that breach. Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Ind. 1990). The district court concluded that the summary judgment record was insufficient to create an issue of fact on the plaintiffs’ claim that the view of the railroad tracks was obstructed by vegetation or that the County was negligent with respect to the presence and/or maintenance of signage at the crossing. The court noted the complete lack of evidence that vegetation obstruction was a cause of the accident, that any signs were damaged or missing, or that any alleged deterioration in the pavement markings was a cause of the accident. Setting aside the dispute about Sheryl Bechard’s competence to testify, the plaintiffs have not cited to record evidence tending to show vegetation overgrowth at the crossing or that vegetation-obstructed view was a cause of the accident. See Justice v. CSX Transp., Inc., 908 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing the duty to prevent visual obstructions at railroad crossings and causation in obstruction-of-view negligence claim under Indiana law). Nor have they cited any record evidence to support their claim that the County failed to install or maintain stop signs and pavement markings, or that the absence or deterioration of this signage was a cause of the accident. To the contrary, photographs of the crossing in the record—albeit undated photographs—show visible stop signs and no vegetation obNo. 04-2780 13 structions to the view of the tracks from the road. Summary judgment on this aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim against the County was appropriate.2 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. A true Copy: Teste: ________________________________ Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 2 As we have noted, the district court held in the alternative that the County was immune from suit under Indiana’s governmental immunity statute, IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3 (2005). Because we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ negligence claim against the County for obstruction of view and failure to install/maintain signage is factually insufficient to survive summary judgment, we do not address the immunity issue. USCA-02-C-0072—7-22-05