Opinion ID: 783836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: right to contribution under title ii and the rehabilitation act

Text: 39 In considering the right to contribution, we start with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which provides: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 16 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The term program or activity includes a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education. Id. § 794(b)(2)(A). Though section 504 does not in itself provide a private right of action for aggrieved individuals, it does state that the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of federal financial assistance or federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this title. Id. § 794a(a)(2). Inasmuch as courts have held that Title VI implies a private right of action, private individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 1516, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). 40 Title II of the ADA provides: Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As in the case of section 504, Title II does not, in terms, create a private right of action. Instead, it provides that the remedies, procedures and rights applicable to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act also are applicable under Title II. Id. § 12133. 41 Neither statute explicitly provides for a right to contribution. The district court, however, found that such a right exists by applying the reasoning in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 113 S.Ct. 2085, 124 L.Ed.2d 194 (1993). UMass and Delaware State argue that Musick is inapplicable in this case, and that, under Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981), and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981), we should refuse to recognize a right to contribution. Surprisingly, it appears that no federal appellate court, at least of which we are aware, has answered the question of whether there is a right to contribution under Title II or under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
42 Preliminarily we consider whether we must determine if a right of contribution is a right of action in itself or whether it is a remedy. In an effort to distinguish this case from Northwest Airlines and other cases derived from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), in which the Supreme Court narrowed the circumstances in which a court may find an implied right of action, Temple argues that the right of contribution is a remedy. In Temple's view, we, like the Supreme Court in Musick, should decline to apply the strict test for implying a cause of action used in Cort v. Ash, Northwest Airlines, and Texas Industries because this case involves statutes that have been enforced through judicially established rights of action rather than through detailed remedial schemes. Temple argues that instead we should apply a less exacting standard based on Musick, asking only whether the availability of a right to contribution should be implied as a proper part of the liability apparatus created by the judiciary to enforce the statutes. Temple Br. at 18. Thus, by treating the right to contribution as a remedy, Temple not only seeks to avoid the Cort v. Ash analysis, but also attempts to avail itself of the principle that once a right and cause of action are established, the federal courts are empowered broadly to award any appropriate relief. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1035-36, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). 43 This argument is something of a red herring, however. To be sure, Supreme Court cases, at least since the 1970s, have referred to rights, rights of action, and remedies separately. Nonetheless, this case should not turn on our characterization of the nature of contribution as the Supreme Court has not determined whether contribution is available by clearly distinguishing among rights, rights of action, and remedies. Thus, in Northwest Airlines, the Court stated: Even though Congress did not expressly create a contribution remedy, if its intent to do so may fairly be inferred from either or both statutes, an implied cause of action for contribution could be recognized on the basis of the analysis used in cases such as Cort v. Ash .... 451 U.S. at 90, 101 S.Ct. at 1580 (emphasis added). In Texas Industries, the Court, in deciding whether to find an implied right to contribution, stated that its focus, as it is in any case involving the implication of a right of action, is on the intent of Congress. 451 U.S. at 639, 101 S.Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added). Finally, in Musick the Court refers to the right of contribution in ways that could support an understanding of the claim as either a right, a right of action, or a remedy. See 508 U.S. at 291-92, 113 S.Ct. at 2088. 44 Thus, contribution cases are unlike discrimination cases, in which the right at issue (the right to be free from discrimination) is distinct from the remedy sought (monetary or injunctive relief), in a way that makes discussion of rights, rights of action, and remedies overlap. Nevertheless, this inconsistency does not overly concern us inasmuch as the key question before us is simply whether Northwest Airlines/Texas Industries or Musick should guide us and Musick did not distinguish the former cases as right of action as opposed to remedy cases, 17 but rather did so on more analytic grounds that we will discuss shortly.
45 In Northwest Airlines, a class of flight attendants sued its employer, Northwest Airlines, Inc., under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, challenging the legality of the wage differential between pursers (who were males) and stewardesses (who were females). The plaintiff class won at trial, following which Northwest Airlines filed a separate action stating a claim for contribution against two unions that represented the employees with whom Northwest Airlines had bargained collectively in setting the employees' wages. The Supreme Court held that there is not an implied right to contribution under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98, 101 S.Ct. at 1584. 46 In Northwest Airlines, the Court explained that a right to contribution can be created in either of two ways: either Congress could have intended, explicitly or implicitly, to create such a right under Cort v. Ash, or a cause of action for contribution may have become a part of the federal common law through the exercise of judicial power to fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful conduct. Id. at 90, 101 S.Ct. at 1580. In examining the first possibility, the Court explained: In determining whether a federal statute that does not expressly provide for a particular private right of action nonetheless implicitly created that right, our task is one of statutory construction.... The ultimate question in cases such as this is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy-for example, a right to contribution-that the plaintiff seeks to invoke. Id. at 91, 101 S.Ct. at 1580 (citation omitted). Factors relevant to Congress's intent include legislative history, the underlying purpose and structure of the statutory scheme, and the likelihood that Congress intended to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies. Id., 101 S.Ct. at 1580 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088; Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-709, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953-64, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). 47 The Court then asked whether the language of the statute demonstrated an intent to create a right of contribution. Noting that neither statute expressly created such a right, the Court explained that [t]his omission, although significant, is not dispositive if, among other things, the language of the statutes indicates that they were enacted for the special benefit of a class of which the petitioner is a member. 451 U.S. at 91-92, 101 S.Ct. at 1580-81. The Court concluded, however, that it cannot possibly be said that employers are members of the class for whose especial benefit either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII was enacted.... To the contrary, both statutes are expressly directed against employers; Congress intended in these statutes to regulate their conduct for the benefit of employees.... In light of this fact, petitioner `can scarcely lay claim to the status of beneficiary whom Congress considered in need of protection.' Id. at 92, 101 S.Ct. at 1581 (citation and footnotes omitted). 48 On this point, the Court specifically rebuked the court of appeals, which had refused to apply Cort v. Ash literally in evaluating the claim of a right to contribution. Id. at 92 n. 25, 101 S.Ct. at 1581 n. 25. The court of appeals had asked, instead, whether employees could bring suit against their unions under the statutes. The Court stated that this inquiry confused the question whether the elements of a contribution claim are established in a given case-a fact the Court assumed in deciding the case and which we also assume here 18 -with the question of whether Congress intended that contribution should be available under any circumstances. Thus, [t]he Court of Appeals erred ... because it failed to focus on whether the party seeking to invoke the implied remedy is a member of a class that Congress intended to benefit. Id., 101 S.Ct. at 1581 n. 25. 49 Next, the Court considered whether the structure of the statutes might suggest that Congress intended to create a right of contribution. Noting that both statutes established comprehensive programs designed to eliminate certain varieties of employment discrimination and contained express provision for private enforcement in certain carefully defined circumstances, and provide[d] for enforcement at the instance of the Federal government in other circumstances, the Court concluded that [t]he comprehensive character of the remedial scheme expressly fashioned by Congress strongly evidences an intent not to authorize additional remedies. Id., at 93-94, 101 S.Ct. at 1581-82. The Court explained that [i]t is, of course, not within our competence as federal judges to amend these comprehensive enforcement schemes by adding to them another private remedy not authorized by Congress. Id. at 94, 101 S.Ct. at 1582. 50 Finally, the Court noted that nothing in the legislative history suggested a congressional intent to create a right to contribution. Id., 101 S.Ct. at 1582. The Court recognized that it is not uncommon in an implied right of action case to encounter such legislative silence and that, on its own, such silence is not necessarily inconsistent with an intent to create the remedy suggested. Id., 101 S.Ct. at 1582. Nonetheless, in the absence of suggestions in the statutory language or structure that Congress intended to create such a right of action, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist. Id., 101 S.Ct. at 1582. 19 51 The Court also considered the second possible source of a right of contribution, namely, federal common law. The Court noted that, except in limited circumstances such as cases involving the rights or duties of the United States or resolution of interstate controversies, the courts' power to fashion federal common law is strictly limited. Id. at 95, 101 S.Ct. at 1582. The Court distinguished Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974), in which it had found a nonstatutory right to contribution in the admiralty setting, noting that the constitutional grant of general admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts provides a basis for development of judge-made rules in the area of maritime law. Id. at 95-96, 101 S.Ct. at 1583. Finally, the Court concluded that it should not create a right to contribution where Congress had enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement. Id., 101 S.Ct. at 1584. The Court left open the question whether federal courts may have more power to fashion remedies in other areas of the law, such as under the antitrust laws, under which federal courts act more as common law courts. Id. at 98 & n. 42, 101 S.Ct. at 1584 & n. 42. 52 That same term the Court addressed a question not involved in but referred to in Northwest Airlines and concluded that the antitrust laws do not confer on federal courts the power to formulate a right to contribution where Congress has not created the right explicitly. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646, 101 S.Ct. at 2070. The Court analyzed the question of whether the antitrust laws establish a right of contribution in the same manner as in Northwest Airlines. It concluded that there was no congressional intent to create such a right, noting that there was no indication of such an intent in the language of the statute or in the legislative history. Id. at 639, 101 S.Ct. at 2066. The Court again noted that the statutes in question were not adopted for the benefit of the participants in the prohibited conduct in question. Id., 101 S.Ct. at 2066. Rather, the petitioner was `a member of the class whose activities Congress intended to regulate for the protection and benefit of an entirely distinct class....' Id., 101 S.Ct. at 2066 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37, 97 S.Ct. 926, 947, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977) (emphasis in Texas Industries )). The Court, therefore, concluded that any right to contribution could be derived only from federal common law. 53 The Court then expanded on its discussion in Northwest Airlines of federal courts' power to recognize a right of contribution as part of federal common law. The Court explained that the power to formulate federal common law is implicated in two basic types of cases: where a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely federal interests, and where Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law. Id. at 640, 101 S.Ct. at 2067. The Court found that antitrust suits, which involve the rights and interests of private parties, do not involve the duties of the federal government, the distribution of powers in the federal system, or matters necessarily subject to federal control, and, therefore, do not involve uniquely federal interests. Id. at 642, 101 S.Ct. at 2068. 54 With regard to the second type of case in which courts have the power to formulate federal common law, the paradigmatic case is Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), in which the Supreme Court read section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only as a grant of jurisdiction over certain areas of labor law but also as a grant of the power to develop common law of labor-management relations. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642-43, 101 S.Ct. at 2068. The Court noted that federal courts traditionally had broad common law powers under the antitrust laws as well. Id. at 643, 101 S.Ct. at 2068. Nonetheless, the Court held that, although Congress intended to give the courts the power to develop common law defining violations of the antitrust laws, there was no similar indication of congressional intent with regard to the provisions of the antitrust laws providing for treble damages and other remedies. Id. at 643-44, 101 S.Ct. at 2068-69. Instead, the Court held, the detailed and specific remedial provisions set forth in the Sherman Act give rise to a strong presumption that Congress deliberately omitted a contribution remedy from the statute. Id. at 644-45, 101 S.Ct. at 2069-70. The Court, therefore, concluded that the antitrust laws do not confer on federal courts the broad power to formulate the right to contribution sought here. Id. at 646, 101 S.Ct. at 2070. 55 In Musick, however, the Court followed a different course, distinguishing Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries and holding that defendants in an action under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission adopted pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have a right to seek contribution under federal law. 508 U.S. at 297, 113 S.Ct. at 2091. The Court distinguished Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, as well as the precedents on which those cases were based, as follows: 56 The federal interests in both Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines were defined by statutory provisions that were express in creating the substantive damages liability for which contribution was sought. Recognizing that the applicable statutes did not `implicate uniquely federal interests of the kind that oblige courts to formulate federal common law,' Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642, 101 S.Ct. at 2068, we asked whether Congress `expressly or by clear implication' envisioned a contribution right to accompany the substantive damages right created, id. at 638, 101 S.Ct. at 2066, or, failing that, whether Congress `intended courts to have the power to alter or supplement the remedies enacted,' id. at 645, 101 S.Ct. at 2069.... But these inquiries are not helpful in the present context. The private right of action under Rule 10b-5 was implied by the Judiciary on the theory courts should recognize private remedies to supplement federal statutory duties, not on the theory Congress had given an unequivocal direction to the courts to do so. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 737, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1922, 1926, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975). Thus, it would be futile to ask whether the 1934 Congress also displayed a clear intent to create a contribution right collateral to the remedy. [ See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 76, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1039, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992); id. at 77, 112 S.Ct. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring)]. 57 Id. at 290-91, 113 S.Ct at 2087-88. In response to the argument that the precedents on which Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries were based should control, the Court continued: 58 This argument ... would have much force were the duty to be created one governing conduct subject to liability under an express remedial provision fashioned by Congress, or one governing conduct not already subject to liability through private suit. That, however, is not the present state of the jurisprudence we consider here. The parties against whom contribution is sought are, by definition, persons or entities alleged to have violated existing securities laws and who share joint liability for that wrong under a remedial scheme established by the federal courts. Even though we are being asked to recognize a cause of action that supports a suit against these parties, the duty is but the duty to contribute for having committed a wrong that courts have already deemed actionable under federal law. The violation of the securities laws gives rise to the 10b-5 private cause of action, and the question before us is the ancillary one of how damages are to be shared among persons or entities already subject to that liability. Having implied the underlying liability in the first place, to now disavow any authority to allocate it on the theory that Congress has not addressed the issue would be most unfair to those against whom damages are assessed. 59 We must confront the law in its current form. The federal courts have accepted and exercised the principal responsibility for the continuing elaboration of the scope of the 10b-5 right and the definition of the duties it imposes. As we recognized in a case arising under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), `where a legal structure of private statutory rights has developed without clear indications of congressional intent,' a federal court has the limited power to define `the contours of that structure.' Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2764, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991). As to this proposition we were unanimous. See ibid. (SOUTER, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ.); id., at 1114, 111 S.Ct., at 2768 (KENNEDY, J., joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (`Where an implied cause of action is well accepted by our own cases and has become an established part of the securities laws ... we should enforce it as a meaningful remedy unless we are to eliminate it altogether'). See also Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 737, 95 S.Ct., at 1926 (recognizing the authority of federal courts to `define the contours of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5' and `to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance'). 60 Id. at 292-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2088-89. The Court found support for its conclusions in two amendments to the securities laws, in which Congress appeared to acknowledge the judicially created Rule 10b-5 action without any further expression of legislative intent to define it. Id. at 294, 113 S.Ct. at 2089. 61 Having declined to follow Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the Court turned to the question whether a right to contribution is within the contours of the 10b-5 action. Id., 113 S.Ct. at 2089. The Court explained, however, that its task is not to assess the relative merits of the competing rules, but rather to attempt to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act. Id., 113 S.Ct. at 2090. The Court acknowledged that this exercise may appear to be not a promising venture as a general proposition, but, nonetheless, found that other specific sections of the 1934 Act to which Rule 10b-5 was analogous provided a right of contribution. Id. at 295-97, 113 S.Ct. at 2090-91. 62 Beginning with the language of section 10(b) itself, the Court noted that the text provided little guidance as to a right to contribution, but found that [h]aving made no attempt to define the precise contours of the private cause of action under § 10(b), Congress had no occasion to address how to limit, compute, or allocate liability arising from it. Id. at 295, 113 S.Ct. at 2090. The Court then compared Rule 10b-5 to the eight express liability provisions in the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and found that it was most similar to two provisions that conferred an explicit private right of action, because both provisions targeted the same danger that was the focus of section 10(b), because both had the same purpose to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities markets and to ensure full disclosure of information material to investment decisions, and because Rule 10b-5 defendants stood in a similar position to defendants in actions based on the other two provisions. Id. at 296, 113 S.Ct. at 2090-91. Because those two provisions each contained nearly identical express provisions for a right to contribution, the Court concluded: Absent any showing that the implied § 10(b) liability structure or the 1934 Act as a whole will be frustrated by finding a right to contribution paralleling the right to contribution in analogous express liability provisions, our task is complete and our resolution clear: Those charged with liability in a 10b-5 action have a right to contribution against other parties who have joint responsibility for the violation. Id. at 298, 113 S.Ct. at 2091-92.
63 Although the Court's decision in Musick may seem to have been something of a departure from the course it appeared to be setting in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, we can read the three cases harmoniously. When a statute creates a private right of action but fails to provide expressly for a right to contribution, particularly if the remedial scheme created is detailed, Congress's silence with regard to contribution weights heavily against implying such a right because there is a presumption that the silence reflects congressional intent not to create such a right. On the other hand, when courts have implied a right of action it would be futile to look for congressional intent to create a right to contribution, inasmuch as Congress did not intend explicitly to create the cause of action on which such a right would be based. Musick, 508 U.S. at 291, 113 S.Ct. at 2088. In that situation, courts have somewhat broader latitude to determine whether a right to contribution is consistent with Congress's intent in creating the right sought to be enforced. The first question we must resolve, therefore, is whether the private rights of action under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II are express or implied. 64 This question is not as easily answered as one might expect. 20 In discussing rights and remedies available to aggrieved persons, Title II cross-references the Rehabilitation Act, which in turn cross-references Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title II was enacted in 1990, while the Title VI cross-reference of the Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1978. By 1978, courts had recognized a private right of action under Title VI for at least a decade. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97, 99 S.Ct. at 1957 (finding support, in a case decided in 1979, for a holding that Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, which was modeled on Title VI, creates a private right of action from the fact that a 1967 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.1967), finding a private right of action under Title VI was repeatedly cited with approval and never questioned during the ensuing five years and by presuming both that [the members of Congress who enacted Title IX in 1972] were aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent with respect to Title IX). 65 Thus, although the remedy available to persons aggrieved by violations of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II is at root an implied one, those statutes, by cross-referencing Title VI, which already had been interpreted as creating a private right of action, arguably contain explicit provisions creating a private right of action. Indeed, the legislative history discussing Title II's cross-reference to sections 504 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act explicitly states: As with section 504, there is also a private right of action for persons with disabilities, which includes the full panoply of remedies. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 98, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 381; id., pt. 3, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 475 (As in title I, the Committee adopted an amendment to delete the term `shall be available' in order to clarify that Rehabilitation Act remedies are the only remedies which title II provides for violations of title II. The Rehabilitation Act provides a private right of action, with a full panoply of remedies available, as well as attorney's fees.). 66 Thus, Title II and section 504 are unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the antitrust laws, which spell out the private right of action available to aggrieved individuals, but are also unlike Rule 10b-5, which does not by its language contemplate any sort of private right of action. Of course, both the statutory language and the legislative history of Title II and section 504 are silent with respect to a right of contribution. The cross-reference language in both acts, therefore, could support two distinct inferences with respect to Congress's intent: either Congress intended to make available to aggrieved persons the Title VI rights and remedies in place at the time of passage of the two provisions (1978 for the Rehabilitation Act and 1990 for the ADA) or Congress intended to allow the rights and remedies under Title II and section 504 to expand and retract as the courts defined the contours of Title VI liability. 67 If the former is true, then we can say that, because reported cases had not found a right to contribution under Title VI as of 1978 or 1990 (or indeed as of the present), Congress must not have considered a right to contribution to be a part of the liability scheme of Title VI that should be incorporated into the liability schemes of section 504 and Title II. In other words, even though Congress acknowledged the private right of action under Title VI, which had been recognized by courts since at least 1967, and intended to make a similar private right of action available under section 504 and Title II, Congress could not be said to be acknowledging a right to contribution under Title VI, as the courts had not yet recognized that right. Congress likely would have included language explicitly providing for a right to contribution had it intended to expand the Title VI rights and remedies incorporated into section 504 and Title II. On the other hand, if we draw the latter reference, then we should read the cross-referencing language as an acknowledgement not of solely those rights and remedies available at the time of passage of the acts ( e.g., a private right of action but not a right to contribution) but also of the power of federal courts to define the contours of Title VI (and, therefore, section 504 and Title II) liability in much the same way a common law court might. 68 We find that Congress's decision to incorporate Title VI's rights and remedies, including those defined by courts rather than by Congress itself, into the Rehabilitation Act and Title II by simple cross-reference, without attempting to define more precisely those rights and remedies, constitutes a recognition on Congress's part of the somewhat broader role of federal courts in defining the contours of Title VI (and, therefore, section 504 and Title II) liability. Congress's use of cross-referencing language in section 504 and Title II is similar, in analytic terms, to the amendments to the securities laws considered by the Musick Court. Those two amendments made explicit reference to any cause of action implied from a provision under this title and to any private civil action implied under ... this title. Musick, 508 U.S. at 293-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2089. From this language, the Court reached the same conclusion we reach here with respect to section 504 and Title II: We infer from these references an acknowledgement of the 10b-5 action without any further expression of legislative intent to define it. Id. at 294, 113 S.Ct. at 2089. The Court used this inference to support its recognition of judicial authority to shape, within limits, the 10b-5 cause of action. Id. at 293, 113 S.Ct. at 2089. Similarly, through the cross-referencing language of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II, Congress acknowledged the private Title VI right of action implied by courts, but made no effort to define it more precisely. 21 That task, it would appear, Congress has left to us. Id. at 294, 113 S.Ct. at 2089. 69 The legislative history of the ADA lends some support to this view. In its discussion of Title III of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and, therefore, cross-references the parallel Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act of 1964, the legislative history states:  As with other titles of the bill, the Committee intends that persons with disabilities have remedies and procedures parallel to those available under comparable civil rights laws. Thus, if the remedies and procedures change in title II of the 1964 Act, ... they will change identically in this title for persons with disabilities. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 66, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 489 (emphasis added). 70 Furthermore, Congress rejected the minority view of certain members that an amendment to Title I, which prohibits employment in discrimination and cross-references the parallel Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, should be adopted that would provide expressly for only then-existing Title VII remedies. Id., pt. 2, at 167, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 444-45. The minority members were concerned that Congress was considering the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which would amend Title VII to include punitive and compensatory damages as well as injunctive relief and backpay, and, by reason of the cross-reference in Title I, might be thought to allow such damages in cases under Title I of the ADA as well. Id. Indeed, Representative Sensenbrenner offered an amendment on the last day of debate on the ADA that would have replaced Title I's cross-referencing language with express remedial provisions permitting only injunctive relief and the award of back pay. 136 Cong. Rec. H2599-01, H2612, 1990 WL 67606. In the ensuing debate, however, many other members of Congress expressed the view succinctly expressed by Representative Edwards, namely, that the heart of the Americans with Disabilities Act is to give the same civil rights protections to persons with disabilities that racial minorities and women have. Id. at H2615 (statement of Rep. Edwards); see also, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Schroeder); id. at 2616 (statement of Rep. Glickman); id. (statement of Rep. Fish); id. at 2618 (statement of Rep. Bartlett); id. at 2620 (statement of Rep. Mazzoli). The proposed amendment subsequently was defeated and Congress approved the cross-referencing language on the theory that persons discriminated against on the basis of a disability should receive the same remedies as those subject to discrimination on the basis of race or sex. 71 Although this legislative history does not reveal explicitly Congress's view of the courts' role in defining the contours of the rights and remedies under the ADA, when taken together with Congress's implicit acknowledgment of the judicially created private Title VI right of action and failure to define that action further, it supports the inference that Congress intended to leave to the courts the task of defining the contours of liability-including the existence of a right of contribution-under Title VI, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the ADA. Of course, in turning to the question whether a right of contribution is within the contours of the private section 504 and Title II actions, we must not consider the relative efficiencies or equities of the parties' arguments, but rather must ask how the Congresses that enacted the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA would have addressed the issue had the private rights of action under those acts been included as express provisions. See Musick, 508 U.S. at 294, 113 S.Ct. at 2089-90. Unlike the 1934 Congress whose actions in enacting section 10(b) were considered in Musick, however, both Congresses in this case clearly contemplated the existence of some private right of action, even if they did intend to leave further definition of that right to the courts. That no right to contribution under Title VI had been recognized when the Rehabilitation Act and Title II were enacted and that Congress did not provide explicitly for such a right suggests that Congress did not intend for such a right to exist. We do not regard this evidence as conclusive, however, but must weigh it along with the other considerations that the Musick court identified.
72 In holding that a right to contribution was consistent with the overall structure of the 1934 act, the Musick Court considered express liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 acts and found that two of the eight express liability provisions in the 1934 act were analogous to Rule 10b-5 in structure, purpose, and intent. Because those provisions expressly created a right to contribution, the Court held that implying such a right in a Rule 10b-5 action was consistent with the 1934 act. Id. at 295-97, 113 S.Ct. at 2090-91. The Court also found relevant the fact that most courts of appeals had recognized a right to contribution in Rule 10b-5 actions for more than 20 years. Id. at 297-98, 113 S.Ct. at 2091. 73 UMass and Delaware State argue that, in considering analogous statutes, we need look no further than section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title I of the ADA, which prohibit discrimination in employment and which, because their remedies are derived from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, do not, after Northwest Airlines, create a right of contribution. Temple argues that the purpose of section 504 and Title II is not simply to prohibit discrimination but also, unlike other civil rights laws such as section 503 and Title I, to regulate recipients of federal funds and ensure that government money is not spent on programs that discriminate. Temple suggests that, because section 504 and Title II are examples of Spending Clause legislation, we should look to contract law, not to other civil rights statutes, in deciding whether to allow a right to contribution. 22 Temple Br. at 26-32. 74 In Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002), the Supreme Court held that punitive damages are not available under Title II and section 504. Relying on the contract analogy, the Court stated that [a] funding recipient is generally on notice that it is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach of contract. Id. at 187, 122 S.Ct. at 2101. The Court explained its holding in Franklin that compensatory damages are available under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, although not expressly provided, and its holding in Cannon that injunctive relief is similarly available on the grounds that those remedies are forms of relief traditionally available in suits for breach of contract. Id., 122 S.Ct. at 2101. Punitive damages, however, are not generally available for breach of contract, and the Court, therefore, held that they should not be available under Title II and section 504 either. Id. at 187-88, 122 S.Ct. at 2102. But Temple argues that contribution is different as it generally is available in suits for breach of contract. See 12 Samuel Williston, Law of Contracts § 36.14 (4th ed.1999). 75 The Court in Barnes stated that the contract law analogy may apply in Spending Clause cases defining the scope of damages remedies, deciding whether a damages remedy is available at all, and defining the scope of conduct for which funding recipients may be held liable for money damages. Id. at 186-87, 122 S.Ct. at 2101. The principle supporting the analogy in each of these types of cases is that in Spending Clause cases `in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.' Id. at 186, 122 S.Ct. at 2100-01 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (alteration in original)). In other words, the task for courts in such cases is to define the contractual terms, that is, to hold recipients to the terms of their bargain but not to impose conditions of which the recipient could not fairly have been aware. 76 Although we may assume that a defendant in a traditional common law breach of contract case would be entitled to contribution, we share the sentiment expressed by two Justices in the 5-4 Barnes majority, namely that the contract-law analogy may fail to give such helpfully clear answers to other questions that may be raised by actions for private recovery under Spending Clause legislation.... Id. at 191, 122 S.Ct. at 2103 (Souter, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 186, 122 S.Ct. at 2101 (majority opinion) ([W]e have been careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation.... (emphasis in original)). Unlike the Court in Barnes and the cases cited therein, such as Franklin and Pennhurst, we are being asked here to formulate a right that belongs not to a member of the class Congress sought to protect, but that instead benefits solely a violator of the duties Congress created for the protection of that class. 23 This case, therefore, does not fit easily within the line of cases relying on the `traditional presumption in favor of any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right' in finding implied remedies. Id. at 185, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73, 112 S.Ct. at 1036) (emphasis in Barnes ). Because Barnes used the contract-law analogy to determine the scope of appropriate relief under Franklin, that analogy can be of only limited use to us here, where the Franklin presumption does not apply. 77 Thus, in looking for analogous provisions under Musick, we look, as did the Musick Court, to other sections of the legislation creating the cause of action sued on for guidance, not to contract law. To do otherwise, we would have to read Musick as conferring a broad common law power on the federal courts to create a right of contribution in cases involving an implied right of action as long as the court could find support for such a right in any other analogous area of the law. Musick, however, does not give the federal courts such broad power. A court must look not to any analogous area of the law, but rather to the intent of Congress insofar as the court can distill that intent from the structure and language of the legislation as a whole. In this case we, therefore, look to the rest of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for guidance. 24 78 In particular, we look to other provisions of these statutes that are close in structure, purpose, and intent to the private right of action under Title II and section 504. Id. at 295, 113 S.Ct. at 2090. In Musick, the Court found that two sections of the 1934 act are close in structure, purpose, and intent to the Rule 10b-5 action for two reasons: (1) they target the precise dangers that are the focus of section 10(b) and are motivated by the same intent to deter fraud in the securities market and to ensure full disclosure of material information; and (2) they impose liability on defendants who stand in a position most similar to 10b-5 defendants for the sake of assessing whether they should be entitled to contribution. 508 U.S. at 295-96, 113 S.Ct. at 2090-91. Looking to the other liability provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, it is clear that none are as close in structure, purpose, and intent to the private section 504 and Title II actions as the two 1934 act provisions used by the Court in Musick are to Rule 10b-5. Yet, because those provisions closest in structure, purpose, and intent to section 504 and Title II and the legislative history and structure of the statutes do not suggest that Congress would have created a right to contribution had it created an explicit private right of action for violations of either section 504 or Title II, we hold that there is no right to contribution under either of those provisions. 79 Among the declared purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was authorization of programs to develop and implement comprehensive and continuing state plans for meeting the need for providing vocational rehabilitation services to disabled persons and to provide such services for the benefit of such individuals,  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub.L. No. 93-112, § 2(1) (1973) (emphasis added); to initiate and expand services to groups of handicapped individuals ... who have been underserved in the past, id. § 2(6); and to promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in employment, id. § 2(8). The statement of purpose was amended in 1978, simultaneously with the amendments creating private rights of action by cross-reference to read: The purpose of this Act is to develop and implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living. Pub.L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(1) (1978). 80 To further this purpose, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits certain entities from discriminating against persons with disabilities. Section 501 requires all executive branch agencies and departments to submit affirmative action plans for the hiring and advancement of disabled persons and prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in federal employment. 29 U.S.C. § 791. Section 503 requires all federal contractors to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified persons with disabilities. Id. § 793. Finally, section 504 prohibits any program or activity receiving federal funds from discriminating against persons with disabilities. Id. § 794. From 1973 to 1978, the federal courts generally began to recognize a private right of action under section 504, but not under section 501, while the courts were split on the question whether a private right of action existed under section 503. See Smith v. United States Postal Serv., 742 F.2d 257, 259 (6th Cir.1984). In 1978, Congress amended the act to create private remedies for violations of sections 501 and 504 in order to clarify the confusion in the lower courts. Id. Congress, however, did not create a right of action under section 503 with the 1978 amendments, and every court of appeals facing the question since has held that an implied right of action does not exist under that provision. See 2 Americans With Disabilities: Practice and Compliance Manual § 8:272 (2003) (compiling cases from every court of appeals). 81 Section 501 is, therefore, the only other liability provision in the Rehabilitation Act that is even arguably similar to section 504. While the analogy is not perfect, the two sections share the basic goal of protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination, much in the same way as the statutes at issue in Musick shared the common goal of deterring fraud and ensuring full disclosure of material information. Furthermore, defendants in a section 501 action stand in a position similar to defendants in a section 504 action in that the two sections impose direct liability on defendants for their own acts as opposed to derivative liability. See Musick, 508 U.S. at 296, 113 S.Ct. at 2090. But section 501 does not provide for a right to contribution, nor does any court appear to have recognized a right to contribution in a section 501 action. 25 Indeed, there is no provision of the Rehabilitation Act that appears to contemplate the existence of a right to contribution. 82 More importantly, section 501 rights and remedies are derived from Title VII, which, under Northwest Airlines, does not create a right of contribution. Thus, inasmuch as Congress took no action in 1978, when it created private rights of action by cross-reference under sections 501 and 504, to create a right to contribution, and because no such right explicitly or implicitly exists in section 501 or any other section of the Rehabilitation Act, we are unable to infer that Congress in 1978 would have created such a right had it crafted a more explicit private remedial scheme for violations of section 504. Thus, we reach our conclusion that there is no right to contribution under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 83 Similarly, nothing in the ADA counsels in favor of recognizing a right to contribution for violations of Title II. The ADA's goals are familiar: (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the federal government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment and provides that rights and remedies available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are available under Title I. Id. § 12117. Title II prohibits discrimination by a public entity. Id. § 12132. Rights and remedies available under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are available under Title II. Id. § 12133. Finally, Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations. Id. § 12182. Rights and remedies available under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are available under Title III. Id. § 12188. 84 Although all three titles have similar purposes, that is, to eliminate discrimination in the sphere each one covers, Title I is more analogous to Title II than is Title III because Title I defendants stand in a position similar to Title II defendants for reasons comparable to those we discussed above with respect to defendants under sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. On the other hand, Title III defendants cannot be liable for money damages. Id. § 12188(a); Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir.2002). Title I does not provide for a right to contribution nor does any court appear to have implied such a right. Furthermore, under Northwest Airlines, contribution is not available under Title VII. Even were we to consider Title III as another possibly analogous provision, neither Title III nor Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 appears ever to have been held to create a right to contribution. Thus, we reach our conclusion that there is no right to contribution under Title II of the ADA. We, therefore, will reverse the district court's orders of November 7, 2001, and March 6, 2002, appealed at No. 02-3236, with respect to UMass and Delaware and remand the matter to the district court to dismiss the contribution claims against them under both section 504 and Title II. 85 We close with a final observation. In this case, we hold that Temple cannot have a right of contribution from UMass or Delaware State and, as Bowers has not sued them directly and there are no other claims pending against them, they will be dismissed from this action. But at this time we cannot be certain as to how the proceedings will go forward (beyond the case being dismissed as to all three third-party defendants) and we, therefore, cannot know whether Bowers will recover judgments against the defendants and, if so, whether the damages recovered will be duplicative and, indeed, how the district court will submit the case to the jury or, in the absence of a jury trial, itself calculate damages if Bowers establishes that the defendants are liable. Thus, we want to make clear that we do not intend to bar a party satisfying a judgment from seeking reimbursement in part from other judgment debtors. It may be that the district court will avoid the possibility that recovery against defendants will overlap by separating Bowers's case against the various defendants so that damages against a liable defendant are ascertained individually. But we cannot be sure that this can or will be done, though surely it would be desirable to do so. In any event, we do not intend by this opinion to preclude the district court from entertaining arguments and granting relief to a party satisfying a judgment for which more than one defendant is responsible by allowing it to make a recovery from other defendants on some principle provided it is consistent with this opinion.