Opinion ID: 200035
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Further constitutional analysis

Text: 26
27 Because we are addressing Jet Wine's theory of specific, rather than general, personal jurisdiction, we must consider whether Jet Wine's claims against BACO arise out of or are related to BACO's contacts with New Hampshire. See Daynard, 290 F.3d at 60. For the contract claim, the answer is a straightforward yes. Jet Wine's action against BACO for breach of contract arises out of BACO's alleged assumption of Jet Wine's contract with Schieffelin. That assumption, if it occurred, was a contact with the state of New Hampshire that relates intimately to Jet Wine's claim. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957) (It is sufficient for purposes of due process that [a] suit [is] based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State.). Our conclusion that BUSA's actions, which included the letter terminating Jet Wine, can fairly be attributed to BACO increases further our confidence in this point. 28 Ordinarily, the personal jurisdiction analysis for tort claims differs from that for contract claims. See Phillips Exeter Acad., 196 F.3d at 289 (describing the distinction). When, however, the tort is intentional interference with a contractual or business relationship, the two inquiries begin to resemble each other. Intentional interference with a contractual or business relationship concerning the sale of goods in New Hampshire is a contact with New Hampshire for much the same reasons that the assumption of the contract is such a contact. Cf. Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1079-80 (10th Cir. 1995) (observing that the Supreme Court's decision in Burger King, although specifically addressed to a breach of contract claim, provide[s] a useful framework for a case involving intentional interference with contractual relations). 29
30 Jet Wine must also demonstrate that BACO purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in New Hampshire. Ultimately, of course, BACO as the brand owner must surely benefit from the sale of Dewar's in New Hampshire through BUSA. 8 That ultimate benefit is not sufficient, however, to establish the personal jurisdiction of the New Hampshire courts over BACO. Instead, there must be some voluntary action that BACO has taken that should have put it fairly on notice that it might one day be called to defend itself in a New Hampshire court. See Daynard, 290 F.3d at 61 (The cornerstones upon which the concept of purposeful availment rest[s] are voluntariness and foreseeability.) (quoting Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1391) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 31 If BACO assumed the various obligations of Diageo to its distributors in the Dewar's Agreement, including Schieffelin's to Jet Wine, that was a voluntary act from which BACO should have known that it was rendering itself liable to suit in many places throughout the world. From the schedules attached to the Agreement, it knew that one of those places was New Hampshire. BACO maintains, of course, that it never did any such thing — but, as we have discussed earlier, its argument does not carry the day under the burden of proof and standard of review applicable to this case. Similarly, if BACO urged Diageo to violate its legal obligations to those distributors, that was a voluntary act for which it should have known that the distributors might well sue. When combined, those voluntary acts, which led to the ability of the Bacardi companies, including BACO, to sell Dewar's in New Hampshire and generate revenue from that sale, constitute sufficiently purposeful availment to satisfy the requirements of due process. 32
33 A court weighing the exercise of personal jurisdiction must also consider the applicability of numerous other concerns, which this circuit has named the gestalt factors. They are: 34 (1) the defendant's burden of appearing, (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies. 35 Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 150. We will review these in order. First, we acknowledge that there is some burden on BACO if it must appear in New Hampshire's courts. New Hampshire is far removed from Liechtenstein, where BACO is incorporated, and also far from the Bahamas, BACO's primary place of business. BACO is, however, an international corporation that — on the facts as we take them — does business in the United States, including through its purported agent, BUSA. It cannot wholly expect to escape the reach of United States courts. 36 Second, New Hampshire does have an interest in adjudicating this dispute. The source of the parties' dispute is a contract to which one of the parties is a New Hampshire corporation that does business in New Hampshire, and which governs the sale of liquor in New Hampshire. New Hampshire has a legitimate and constitutional interest in regulating commercial transactions that are performed within its borders, as well as in enforcing the contracts entered by its businesses and in protecting those businesses from practices such as intentional infringement with contractual relations. 37 Third, Jet Wine has an interest in obtaining relief through the New Hampshire courts, the courts of its own state. Its view of its interest is demonstrated by its choice to bring suit there. Moreover, nothing about this case suggests that those courts will have any difficulty rendering effective relief against BACO if Jet Wine tries its case there and wins. 38 Fourth, we do not see any particular interest of the judicial system as such that pushes for one jurisdictional outcome or another in this case. 39 Fifth, to the extent that this case touches on the common interests of sovereigns, those interests weigh in favor of the constitutionality of jurisdiction. BACO and the other Bacardi companies have chosen to structure their business affairs so as to take advantage of the privileges of the corporate form. Those privileges are essential to modern economic life and this court must scrupulously protect them, except in rare circumstances that this case does not present. If, however, BACO has done business in New Hampshire, directly or through an agent, or has directed its actions at New Hampshire from outside the state, it might frustrate the relevant state substantive social policies (those embodied in its contract and tort law) to insulate BACO from the legal consequences of its actions. Cf. Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir.1994) (Here, the most salient such policy is ... the discouragement of speculation in litigation. All sovereigns share both a general interest in preventing such speculation and a specific interest in respecting Puerto Rico's decision to control this activity through regulation.). On the facts as we must take them for this appeal, BACO has done those things, and must defend its actions in New Hampshire. 40 Of the five gestalt factors, three weigh in favor of personal jurisdiction and one against. Accordingly, we hold that personal jurisdiction is proper. We add a final note addressing an argument made by BACO before this court. BACO says that, because the agreements between Schieffelin and Jet Wine contain clauses consenting to the jurisdiction of the federal district courts within New York as the fora for resolving disputes, it is unreasonable to subject BACO to the jurisdiction of New Hampshire. Contractual language consenting to the jurisdiction of one forum, however, is not the same as language specifying one forum and excluding all others. Cf. Autoridad de Energia Electrica v. Ericsson Inc., 201 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2000) (reading a similar clause to be an affirmative conferral of personal jurisdiction by consent, and not a negative exclusion of jurisdiction in other courts). To whatever limited extent such nonexclusive language is relevant to our inquiry under the gestalt factors (and we do not mean to imply that even exclusive language would necessarily require a different result) it is insufficient to change the outcome in this case.