Opinion ID: 2614930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dog, dws and brewer's defense of statute of limitations

Text: Appellees DOG, DWS and Brewer assert that the action filed against them was time-barred. They assert that regardless of whether this Court applies the two-year limitation period for fraud or the three-year limitation period for money had and received, the action was barred because it was brought more than three years after the operative events. Hence, they argue that because the original claim was time-barred, it cannot now be saved by Section 100. DOG, DWS and Brewer were not named as parties until the action was filed in federal court in 1986. The complaint filed in federal court alleged that DOG fraudulently refused to remit revenues to Grider during 1982 and 1983, that DOG charged excessive rates in 1984 and 1985, and that DOG was involved in a conspiracy with DWS and Brewer to charge excessive rates. The federal court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and also dismissed the state claims. The federal court did not reach the question of whether these state claims were barred by the statute of limitations. DOG, DWS and Brewer assert that they were not named as parties to the original action filed in state court, and that because the federal action was filed in 1986 after the limitations period had run, these particular theories of recovery are now time-barred. Grider does not directly address this argument, but instead focuses on the question of Section 100's commencement. The state trial court did not address this question either, but dismissed, holding that the operative date for starting the Section 100 one year was the date of the federal district court's dismissal. We agree that if the original claim was time-barred, it cannot be saved by Section 100. Chandler, 741 P.2d at 863; Brown v. Hartshorne Public School Dist., 926 F.2d 959, 962 (10th Cir.1991). A claim based on fraud must be brought within two years of the discovery of the fraudulent acts. 12 O.S. 1991 § 95 (Third); Richey v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 667 F. Supp. 752 (W.D.Okla. 1986). Whether plaintiff Grider brought his 1986 federal action within that period, or within the three year period to recover money had and received, under Section 95 (Second), [4] is a factual matter to be determined by the trial court on remand. Under Chandler, only those theories of recovery arising from operative events which were not time-barred when filed on September 29, 1986 will survive a defense of limitations. Id. at 863-64.