Opinion ID: 1174625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Questioning by Prosecutor.

Text: As his final point on appeal, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because of a question that was asked defendant's former wife by the prosecutor. We disagree. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the State from making any reference at trial to defendant's use of controlled substances or to a cocaine kit that had been seized from defendant's home. However, at a pretrial hearing, defendant admitted that since his use of controlled substances was part of the defense psychologist's opinion in the case regarding defendant's mental state at the time of the killing, that defendant's use of controlled substances was therefore relevant. Defendant maintained, however, that any references to defendant's distribution of controlled substances would be irrelevant and prejudicial. The State argued that certain witnesses would testify that defendant feared that Palaske would narc him, and this testimony would be relevant to threats defendant had allegedly made against Palaske's life. The State admitted that it did not know whether this testimony would reveal that defendant's fear stemmed from his use of drugs or from defendant's distribution of drugs. The prosecutor stated that, except in the context of the threats defendant had made against Palaske, the State was not interested in introducing any allegations of defendant's drug distribution. The trial court ruled that any references to defendant's drug distribution were not probative and that the State should not bring it up. However, the court noted that its ruling did not apply to references to defendant's drug distribution in the context of threats allegedly made by defendant against Palaske. At trial, on direct examination of defendant's former wife, the prosecutor asked about defendant's drug use. The prosecutor then asked if defendant distributed those drugs to other people. The witness replied in the affirmative, and defendant simultaneously objected. After a bench conference, the trial court (on its own initiative) admonished the jury to disregard the witness' answer to the last question. On appeal, defendant contends that the asking of the question by the prosecutor was highly prejudicial and that such prejudice was not cured by the court's admonition. We disagree. In support of his argument, defendant primarily relies on State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124, 419 P.2d 966 (1966), in which this Court held that a question regarding a defendant's prior felony conviction constituted reversible error, despite the trial court's admonition to the jury. The court stated that the question had no possible place in the trial. The purpose could have been nothing other than to arouse the prejudices of the jury against [defendant]. Id. at 126, 419 P.2d at 968. Defendant equates Rowell with the instant case. However, we determine that Rowell is distinguishable. In the instant case, the prosecutor's question had a place in the trial. Arguably, the question may have been improper at that phase of the trial, but the question was likely to have been asked and the defendant's distribution of drugs inquired into at some point in the trial because of its possible relevance to earlier threats defendant allegedly made against Palaske. The earlier trial court ruling was that defendant's drug distribution would be relevant regarding these alleged threats. Thus, although the evidence regarding defendant's drug distribution might not have been proper at that point in the trial, we cannot say that it had no possible place in the trial. Id. (emphasis added). The prosecutor cannot be said to have acted in bad faith as a matter of law in asking the question when he did. Therefore, the prompt sustaining of defendant's objection and the admonition to the jury to disregard the answer cured any prejudicial effect. State v. Simonson, 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983); State v. King, 90 N.M. 377, 563 P.2d 1170 (Ct.App.1977), overruled on other grounds, 98 N.M. 527, 650 P.2d 811 (1982). Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. FEDERICI, C.J., and SOSA, Senior Justice, concur.