Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Miller's RICO, Conspiracy, and CCE Convictions

Text: 140 Miller, who was convicted of, inter alia, racketeering, narcotics conspiracy, and continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), challenges his RICO conviction by contending principally that (1) criminal facilitation of murder is not a proper RICO predicate; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish either that he facilitated the murder in question or that there was a nexus between the murder facilitation and the Supreme Team enterprise; and (3) the court's calculation of his sentence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) with respect to that aspect of his RICO conviction was erroneous. He also contends that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, he could not properly be convicted of both narcotics conspiracy and CCE. We find merit only in the last contention. 141
142 RICO defines racketeering activity to include any act ... involving murder ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A). The RICO count of the indictment alleged that Miller had engaged in a number of predicate acts, including the following: 143 In or about the summer of 1987, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant GERALD MILLER, a/k/a/ Prince, believing it probable that he was rendering aid to a person who intended to commit murder, knowingly and intentionally engaged in conduct which provided such person with means and opportunity for the commission of that crime, and which in fact aided in the commission of that crime, namely, the August 6, 1987 murder of Isaac Bolden, a/k/a Just Me, in violation of New York Penal Law Sections 115.05 and 20.00. 144 (Indictment count one, racketeering act 10.) Miller argues that criminal facilitation cannot be viewed as an act involving murder because murder is an intentional and violent crime, and the New York Penal Law neither requires that the facilitator have intended that the underlying crime be committed nor classifies facilitation itself as a violent felony. This sophistic argument is far from the mark. 145 RICO provides that racketeering activity refers to any of a number of federal or state crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Its references to federal law, see id. § 1961(1)(B)-(F), are specific, citing various statutes by name or by United States Code title and section; its references to state law, see id. § 1961(1)(A), are not to chapter and verse but are instead generic, serv[ing] ... to identify generally the kind of activity made illegal by the federal statute, United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 62-63 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 134, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983). RICO was not intended to incorporate the elements of the penal codes of the various states where acts of racketeering occurred, id. at 62, but only to provide general substantive frames of reference. 146 By defining racketeering activity to include any act ... involving murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (emphasis added), Congress made it clear that the RICO defendant's act need not be murder, so long as it directly concerns murder. See generally Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1191 (1976) (defining involve to mean, inter alia, concern directly). Thus, in United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831, 105 S.Ct. 118, 83 L.Ed.2d 60 (1984), noting that Congress intended that RICO be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes, we ruled that conspiracy to murder in violation of New York's Penal Law ... is an 'act involving ' murder and therefore may constitute 'racketeering activity' within the meaning of the RICO statute. Id. at 919 (emphasis added). 147 The New York Penal Law provisions cited in the racketeering act 10 allegation against Miller are §§ 115.05 and 20.00. Section 115.05 provides that a defendant is guilty of criminal facilitation, a Class C felony, when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a class A felony [e.g., murder, see N.Y. Pen. L. § 125.25 (McKinney 1987) ], he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such class A felony. N.Y. Pen. L. § 115.05 (McKinney 1987). A Class C felony such as facilitation is punishable by imprisonment for 1-15 years. See N.Y. Pen. L. §§ 70.00 (McKinney 1987). Section 20.00 imposes liability on one who, with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, ... intentionally aid[ed] the perpetrator to commit the substantive offense. Id. § 20.00 (McKinney 1987). Such a person is punishable as a principal. See id. Practice Commentary. 148 Insofar as the underlying substantive state offense is murder, we have no difficulty in concluding that the accessorial offenses described in these state-law provisions involve murder within the meaning of RICO. Nor have we any difficulty in concluding that the conduct at issue here involved murder. Where a defendant is asked for and provides information that he reasonably knows is meant to enable the inquirer to commit a murder, he has plainly performed an act that directly concerns murder. We conclude that the criminal facilitation charge against Miller was a proper RICO predicate. 149
150 To establish criminal facilitation of murder as a RICO predicate act, the government is required to prove not only that the defendant committed the acts described in the facilitation statute, discussed above, but also that there was a nexus between the predicate act and the criminal enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 815; United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 951 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 2018, 114 L.Ed.2d 104 (1991). That relationship is satisfied if the offense was related to the enterprise's activities, whether or not it was in furtherance of those activities, or if the defendant was enabled to commit the offense solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise. United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 815; see, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1070, 114 S.Ct. 1646, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994); United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d at 951; United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 947-48 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed.2d 662 (1988); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). 151 Miller, arguing that he did not know Nichols meant to kill Isaac Bolden and that Nichols already knew where Bolden's mother lived, contends that the government failed to prove that Miller's furnishing the mother's address actually facilitated Isaac Bolden's murder. He also argues that even if the government proved facilitation, it failed to prove that Miller's conduct was related to the business of the Supreme Team, rather than merely a personal favor to Nichols. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, a defendant bears a heavy burden. United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 548 (2d Cir.1994). In reviewing such a challenge, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Sumnicht, 823 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir.1987), crediting all inferences that could have been drawn in the government's favor, see, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d at 906; United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 64. Pieces of evidence must be viewed not in isolation but in conjunction, see, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d at 548; United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S.Ct. 1793, 90 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986); and where there are conflicts in the testimony, we must defer to the jury's resolution of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, see, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 828 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d at 616. We must affirm the conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn from the record as a whole, the jury might fairly have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, see, e.g., United States v. Skowronski, 968 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Sumnicht, 823 F.2d at 15. The weight of the evidence is a matter for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109, 109 S.Ct. 3164, 104 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1989). Miller has failed to carry his burden. 152 The evidence at trial included proof that the Nichols organization had been robbed of a substantial sum by the Bolden brothers and that Nichols asked Miller for assistance in locating them. Supreme Team security chief Ernesto Piniella testified that Miller asked him to get addresses for the Boldens and their families; Piniella contacted Ina McGriff and Ronnie Younger, the gang's accomplices in the Parole Division, who obtained the information. Notes in the two women's handwriting were found in an apartment used by the Supreme Team, showing the addresses of, inter alios, Isaac Bolden and his mother. Though there may have been some question at trial as to which of the two women provided which items of information, there was no doubt that all of the information was provided at the behest of Miller. Piniella testified that Miller then passed the information on to Nichols. Thereafter, Isaac Bolden was shot near his mother's house. The matter of whether the information provided by Miller actually assisted the murder if Nichols already knew the mother's address was merely a matter for argument to the jury. Nichols himself was in jail at the time of the murder, and the jury could easily infer that his organization needed and made use of the assistance that was requested and obtained from Miller. 153 Miller's professed lack of belief that Nichols intended to murder Bolden was also a matter for argument to the jury. The evidence at trial included proof that Miller knew of Nichols's view that the Boldens had stolen from Nichols's organization; that the Supreme Team itself had carried out numerous murders for similar transgressions; and that Miller knew from his extensive dealings with Nichols that the Nichols organization was as violent as the Supreme Team. Ina McGriff testified that when, having furnished the Bolden addresses, she saw a newspaper article reporting Isaac Bolden's murder, she asked Miller whether this was the same Bolden that I had given him the information about, and Miller just smirked. (Miller Trial Tr. at 1816.) The jury could easily conclude that Miller had considered it likely that Nichols would order the murder of Isaac Bolden once Miller provided the information as to where Bolden might be located. 154 Finally, Miller's contention that even if he did facilitate the murder, he did so as a personal favor to Nichols, rather than in connection with the Supreme Team enterprise, could also easily be rejected by the jury. There was a business relationship between the Supreme Team and Nichols's organization, which supplied the Supreme Team with cocaine. Clearly the jury was entitled to infer that Miller aided Nichols at least in part to preserve and enhance good will with one of the Supreme Team's suppliers. Moreover, even had there been no business relationship with Nichols to preserve or cultivate on behalf of the Supreme Team, the jury could have inferred that Miller had access to the public employees who could obtain the needed addresses by reason of the facts that those corrupt employees were on the payroll of the Supreme Team and he was the organization's leader. 155 In sum, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Miller criminally facilitated the murder of Isaac Bolden and did so in connection with the Supreme Team criminal enterprise.
156 In determining Miller's sentence for his RICO conviction, the district court looked to the Guidelines offense level for aiding and abetting first-degree murder, see Guidelines §§ 2X2.1, 2A1.1(a), which prescribed a sentence of life imprisonment. Miller challenges the court's use of the aiding-and-abetting guideline, arguing that since the state offense of murder facilitation does not require an intent that a murder occur, see N.Y. Pen. L. § 115.10 (McKinney 1987) (It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal facilitation that ... [t]he defendant himself ... did not act with the intent required for the commission of the underlying offense), aiding and abetting murder has a higher scienter requirement than facilitation of murder and hence was an inappropriate frame of reference. We disagree. 157 For a defendant convicted of a RICO offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, the Guidelines base offense level is the higher of 19 or the offense level that would be applicable to the defendant's underlying racketeering activities. See Guidelines § 2E1.1. The commentary to § 2E1.1. states that [i]f the underlying conduct violates state law, the offense level corresponding to the most analogous federal offense is to be used. Id. Application Note 2; see also Guidelines § 2X5.1 (for an offense for which no guideline expressly has been promulgated, sentencing court must apply the most analogous offense guideline; if there is no analogous guideline, the court is to proceed with due regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Since the determination of an analogous guideline involves the application of a guideline to the facts of a case, ... 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) mandates that we give 'due deference' to such applications by the district court, rather than review them de novo. United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 968 n. 6 (2d Cir.1996). A sentence imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline will only be reversed if it is plainly unreasonable. Id. at 966 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)). 158 In the present case, the district court noted the substantive difference between criminal facilitation, described in New York's § 115.05, and the federal offense of aiding and abetting; but it found that aiding and abetting was the closest offense dealt with by the Guidelines and was especially close to the offense described in New York's § 20.00: 159 [O]n the surface of it intending to murder someone is a different crime than facilitating the murder without any intention yourself of killing the victim. .... However, if you're talking about which guideline most closely resembles the offense of conviction, given the fact that there was charged not only the facilitation but also violation of Section 20 of the New York Penal Law, which is virtually [the same as our] aiding and abetting, I think .... [t]he guideline that most closely resembles the offense of conviction in this case, given the facts of this case and the level of Mr. Miller's knowledge relative to Bolden, is the aiding and abetting of a murder. 160 (Miller Sentencing Transcript at 15.) 161 We can see no basis on which to disturb the district court's conclusion that, on the facts of this case, aiding and abetting provided the most appropriate analogy. 162
163 Finally, Miller contends that the district court erred in entering a judgment of conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, as that conspiracy was a lesser included offense of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, of which he was also convicted. He contends that convicting him on both counts constitutes multiple punishment for the same offense, which violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Given the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rutledge v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996), ruling that [a] guilty verdict on a § 848 charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy violative of § 846; conspiracy is therefore a lesser included offense of CCE, id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1250, the government concedes, and we agree, that Miller's conviction for narcotics conspiracy should be reversed, and that count of the indictment against him should be dismissed. 164 Although the former practice of this Court, when a defendant had been convicted of both offenses, was to instruct the district courts to combine the conviction[ ] on the lesser offense[ ] ... with the conviction on the greater offense, United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir.1984), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 757 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830, 106 S.Ct. 97, 88 L.Ed.2d 79 (1985), leaving the defendant convicted of two offenses but punished for only one, the Supreme Court in Rutledge instructed that instead, one of the convictions must be dismissed, see --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1250-51 (remanding for dismissal of one of the counts). Accordingly, we remand for the district court to dismiss the narcotics conspiracy count against Miller. 165 Miller also argues that his CCE conviction too must be set aside because the narcotics conspiracy was an impermissible predicate for CCE. We reject that contention. A lesser included § 846 conspiracy may serve as a predicate offense for a § 848 CCE conviction. See United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 748-52 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985). The decision in Rutledge did not purport to alter this principle. In Rutledge itself, the § 846 conspiracy was a predicate for the CCE count, see --- U.S. at ---- n. 2, 116 S.Ct. at 1244 n. 2, and that Court remanded for dismissal of only one of the two convictions, id. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1250-51. Accordingly, the CCE conviction is affirmed.