Opinion ID: 77196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reimbursement for Private School and Related Services

Text: 73 The first issue presented in this appeal is whether C.M.'s parents are entitled to any form of reimbursement given that C.M. is currently enrolled in private school and was never enrolled in public school. For the following reasons, we conclude that C.M. would be eligible for reimbursement for tuition and related services if the School Board had denied her a FAPE. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) states: 74 If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. 75 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (emphasis added); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(c) (specifying that private preschool enrollment can be reimbursed). The School Board and ALJ in this case relied on the phrase who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency to conclude that C.M.'s parents are not entitled to reimbursement because C.M. was never enrolled in public school. Furthermore, the district court clearly indicated that C.M.'s current enrollment in private school factored into the determination that it was without jurisdiction to award relief. There are, however, two fatal flaws with this line of reasoning. 76 First, C.M. actually received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency as provided under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). As stated above, C.M. previously received AVT until the age of three through the Miami-Dade County Early Intervention Program. In addition, until the age of three, C.M. received oral motor therapy and other special education services under the authority of a public agency. Consequently, if the School Board failed to offer C.M. a FAPE, she satisfies the precondition in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) for reimbursement. 77 Second, sole reliance on the fact that C.M. never attended public school is legally insufficient to deny reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). In Burlington, the United States Supreme Court recognized the difficult decisions facing parents of children with disabilities. As the Supreme Court recognized, 78 [a] final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances come a year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has passed. In the meantime, the parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who have adequate means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials. If that were the case, the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete. 79 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370, 105 S.Ct. at 2003; see Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter By and Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14, 114 S.Ct. 361, 365, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993) (acknowledging the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington  and stating that [i]n this case, as in all Burlington reimbursement cases, the parents' rejection of the school district's proposed IEP is the very reason for the parents' decision to put their child in a private school. . . . Moreover, IDEA was intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free. To read the provisions of [the IDEA] to bar reimbursement in the circumstances of this case would defeat this statutory purpose.) (internal citations omitted). 80 Relying, in part, on the Burlington line of cases, courts have concluded that even when a child has never enrolled in a public school, reimbursement is proper if the School Board failed to offer a sufficient IEP and, in turn, a FAPE. See E.W. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade, 307 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1370 (S.D.Fla.2004); Justin G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 148 F.Supp.2d 576, 587 (D.Md.2001); Suzawith v. Green Bay Area Sch. Dist., 132 F.Supp.2d 718, 728 (E.D.Wis.2000); Hoffman v. East Troy Community School Dist., 38 F.Supp.2d 750, 761 (E.D.Wis. 1999); but see Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs. v. Taylorch, 395 F.Supp.2d 246, 249 (D.Md.2005). We find the rationale contained in Justin G. to be particularly pellucid. 81 In Justin G., the School Board argued that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) barred reimbursement because Justin was never enrolled in the public school system. Justin G., 148 F.Supp.2d at 587. We agree with the Justin G. Court that such a construction of the IDEA would produce the absurd result of barring children from receiving a FAPE because their disabilities were detected before they reached school age. Id. Furthermore, the School Board's disturbing interpretation would also place parents of such children in the untenable position of acquiescing to an inappropriate placement in order to preserve their right to reimbursement. Id. 82 We agree that forcing parents into accepting inadequate IEPs in order to preserve their right to reimbursement runs contrary to the rights recognized in the Burlington line of cases. Therefore, we conclude that parents are not required in all cases to first enroll their child in public school pursuant to an inadequate IEP in order to preserve their right to reimbursement. See id. (The Supreme Court has expressly rejected saddling parents of disabled children with such a pyrrhic victory.) (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70, 105 S.Ct. at 2003); but see Baltimore City, 395 F.Supp.2d at 250 (requiring that, in order to preserve the right to reimbursement, parents may place their child in a public school for as short a period as one day, give ten business days' written notice to the school that they are withdrawing the child, and then do so) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb)). 83 Having determined that C.M.'s parents would be eligible for reimbursement if C.M. had been denied a FAPE, we next turn to the issue of what expenses parents are potentially entitled to have reimbursed under the IDEA.