Opinion ID: 2314882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: B: Right to be Present

Text: Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in reinstructing the jury in his involuntary absence, despite the fact that his counsel waived his presence, and that he was thereby prejudiced. Cases in this jurisdiction have held that reinstruction constitutes a stage of the trial for the purposes of Super.Ct.Crim. Rule 43(a). [16] Wade v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 356, 358-59, 441 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (1971); [17] see Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823, 826 (D.C.1988) (refusal to permit defense counsel or defendant to read jury note violates Rule 43 entitlement to presence at every stage of the trial). The government concedes that appellant had a Rule 43 statutory right to presence at reinstruction here. Further, this Rule 43 right is arguably reflective of a protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requiring constitutional knowing and intelligent waiver by appellant himself. Wade, supra, 142 U.S.App.D.C. at 359 & n. 10, 441 F.2d at 1049 & n. 10 (suggesting without deciding that Rule 43 assimilates constitutional safeguards at reinstruction stage); see Kimes v. United States, 569 A.2d 104, 108, 110 (D.C.1989) (defendant constitutionally guaranteed personal right to presence at `any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his [or her] presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure') (citation omitted); Harris v. United States, 489 A.2d 464, 469 n. 5 (D.C.1985) (defendant has constitutional right to be present at every stage of his trial, including all communications between the judge and jury, which is personal and may be violated even where defense counsel present).