Opinion ID: 406197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 8 1. What is the proper standard for reviewing the Comptroller's fashioning of a remedy? 9 2. Did substantial evidence support the Comptroller's finding that the proceeds of the loan made by the Bank to Ware were used for the benefit of Fame in violation of the lending limit imposed by 12 U.S.C. § 84? 10 3. Were the remedial measures required by the Comptroller appropriate to correct conditions resulting from the Directors' violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84? 11
12 The parties agree that a substantial evidence standard applies to judicial review of administrative findings. The parties are correct. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 13 The Comptroller has broad discretion to fashion a remedy. See Groos National Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978). Substantial evidence is required for the Comptroller's findings, but once the Comptroller finds a violation he may, within his allowable discretion, fashion relief in such a form as to prevent future abuses. Id. Similarly, he has broad discretion to cure the effect of a violation. 14 In reviewing the order that actually issued, we consider whether the affirmative action taken by the Comptroller was appropriate to correct the condition resulting from the Directors' violation of the banking laws. 4 II. THE COMPTROLLER'S FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE PROCEEDS OF THE LOAN MADE BY THE BANK TO WARE WERE USED FOR THE BENEFIT OF FAME IN VIOLATION OF THE LENDING LIMIT OF 12 U.S.C. § 84. 15 The regulation that implements the lending statute provides that (o) bligations of a corporation must be combined with any other extension of credit the proceeds of which are used for the benefit of the corporation. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1310(c)(3) (1981) (emphasis added). The issue presented by this regulation is whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the $125,000 loan to Ware, the Treasurer of Fame, was used for the benefit of the corporation. The Comptroller found: 16 The hearing record clearly discloses the purpose and use of proceeds of the Ware loan. Mr. Ware, Fame's treasurer, testified that Fame's checking account at another bank was overdrawn. Accordingly, he and Mr. Lewis, Fame's president, went to the Bank to procure another loan. The Bank's vice president and senior lending officer, Mr. Jewett, informed Lewis and Ware that the Bank could not make an additional loan to Fame or to Mr. Lewis without violating the Bank's legal lending limit. Therefore, Mr. Ware's name was used for the loan papers to borrow the money. Hearing Transcript 50-51. As agreed, the Bank put the Ware loan proceeds directly into Fame's corporate checking account. Hearing Transcript 51-52. See also Hearing Transcript 179-80, wherein Mr. Jewett testified that he knew the proceeds were going to go through Mr. Ware to Fame. On these facts, the Comptroller agrees with the ALJ's finding and conclusion that the deposit of the Ware loan proceeds directly into Fame's corporate checking account shows that the proceeds were used for the benefit of Fame. 17 The evidence of the corporation's overdrawn account, the corporation's search for another loan, the action and knowledge of the Bank's lending officer, and the deposit of the loan proceeds directly into Fame's account is substantial enough to support the Comptroller's finding. 18 Thus, because sufficient evidence supported the finding that the Ware loan was for the benefit of Fame, that loan could be aggregated with other Fame loans to calculate whether an excess loan had been made. 19 III. THE REMEDIAL MEASURES REQUIRED BY THE COMPTROLLER WERE APPROPRIATE TO CORRECT CONDITIONS RESULTING FROM THE DIRECTORS' VIOLATION OF 12 U.S.C. § 84. 20 The Directors attack the remedy sought by the Comptroller in Article II of the cease and desist order. 5 The Directors argue that (a) indemnification is an improper remedy because the Directors did not knowingly violate the banking laws; (b) if indemnification is a proper remedy, then the Directors must be allowed to reduce their liability on the illegal loans by offsetting a checking account and selling collateral, even though the legal unsecured loan remains unpaid; (c) the Comptroller lacks authority to order that collection and attorneys' fees be paid to the Bank. 21
22 In the past, violations of the excess lending rule in 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976) have been enforced through district court proceedings made possible by 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 93, which is derived from the National Bank Act of 1864, imposes liability on directors for knowingly violating or knowingly permitting violations of the banking laws. Here, however, the Comptroller, in an enforcement proceeding, is seeking to indemnify the Bank through the application of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 6 Although in effect since 1950, section 1818(b)(1) was significantly amended in 1978 to extend the coverage of cease and desist orders, which had previously applied only to a bank, to include a bank's directors. On its face, § 1818(b)(1) requires no knowledge on the part of the wrongdoer. The provision simply allows the Comptroller to take affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from any such violation or practice. 23 Defendants argue, however, that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) imports the scienter requirement of § 93 when the Comptroller seeks to impose personal liability on bank directors for exceeding bank lending limits. We need not and do not resolve that question today. Even if the knowingly standard of 12 U.S.C. § 93 applies to an 1818(b) enforcement proceeding, we agree with the Comptroller that defendants are liable here. 24 The Supreme Court has enunciated the scienter requirement of § 93: 25 Under the rule settled by familiar decisions of this court, in order for the Bank to prevail in this action it must appear not only that the liabilities of a person, company, firms, etc., to the Bank for money borrowed were permitted to exceed the prescribed limit, but that defendant, while a director, participated in or assented to the excessive loan or loans not through mere negligence but knowingly and in effect intentionally ... with this qualification, that if he deliberately refrained from investigating that which it was his duty to investigate, any resulting violation of the statute must be regarded as in effect intentional, .... 26 Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 71-72, 40 S.Ct. 82, 84, 64 L.Ed. 141 (1919) (citations omitted). 27 The Directors had knowledge of the identity of the borrowers, knowledge that all the loan proceeds were to be used by one company, and knowledge of the loan amounts and the bank's loan limits. The defendants have maintained that, because the loans were made on separate occasions, they failed to aggregate the loans. However, 12 U.S.C. § 84 requires the aggregation of loans to a single entity. Directors of a national bank operate in an area closely regulated by federal law, and cannot maintain ignorance of the law as a defense. 7 Cf. United States v. Corbin Farm Service, 444 F.Supp. 510, 519 (E.D.Cal.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (word knowingly in penalty section of federal pesticides act refers to awareness of facts, not awareness of law). 28 Since the scienter requirement of § 93 has been satisfied, whatever requirement § 1818(b) may have imported from § 93 has also been satisfied. 29 B. The Comptroller Can Properly Require that the Directors' Potential Liability of $350,000 Not Be Reduced by Recoveries Until the Legal Loan to Lewis has been Repaid with Interest. 30 The Directors' potential liability is limited to $350,000-the difference between the total credit extension to Fame ($575,000) and the amount of the legal Lewis loan ($225,000). 8 The Comptroller takes the position that the Directors' potential loss of $350,000 cannot be reduced by recoveries until the legal loan to Lewis has been repaid with interest. 31 In the instant case, the purpose underlying 12 U.S.C. § 84-protection of a bank's assets-will be furthered if the Directors are not allowed to extinguish their liability until the legal Lewis loan, which is unsecured, is fully repaid. 9 The policy of protecting bank assets would be frustrated if the Directors were allowed to make, as they did, an unsecured but legal loan to the borrower, then to use, or agree to the use of, the borrower's assets to secure further credit extensions that are illegal. Such a procedure would permit the Directors to protect themselves fully against any exposure resulting from the illegal loans while substantially increasing the risk that the bank would be unable to recover the amount of its legal loan. The fiduciary responsibility of the Directors of the bank precludes them from protecting themselves against liability at the bank's expense. The security arrangement was in derogation of that responsibility. Thus, the Directors may not use the borrower's assets to extinguish their own liability to the bank. 32 Here, the Directors ignored the recommendation of the Comptroller and the bank president's advice that the first loan to be paid off should be that of Rehbock Lewis and not Fame Furniture, since the stockholders might claim that this loan was paid to limit the liabilities of the Directors. The Comptroller's remedy is appropriate, because any other remedy could create a conflict of interest between the Bank and its Directors. 33 In light of the Comptroller's broad discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy, we conclude that the remedy he selected was lawful. It serves to protect the bank's assets, to insure that the Directors fulfill their fiduciary duty, and to prevent the Directors from insuring themselves against liability for their wrongful act at the Bank's expense. 34 C. The Remedy for Correcting Conditions Resulting from the Directors' Violation of Section 84 Properly Includes Collection Expenses on the Illegal Loans and Attorneys' Fees Paid by the Bank on Behalf of the Directors. 35 The Directors argue that the Comptroller is not authorized to award the Bank collection expenses and attorneys' fees paid by the Bank on behalf of the Directors. The Comptroller responds that he is authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) to take affirmative action to correct conditions resulting from the Directors' violation of the banking laws. Obviously the Comptroller has interpreted the Bank's collection expenses and attorneys' fees paid on behalf of the Directors as conditions resulting from the violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84. 36 The Directors argue that the collection expenses are not a condition resulting from the violation of the law: There is no evidence that but for these loans being excessive they would not have become delinquent. That argument is meritless. If the Directors had acted within the law, the excess loans would never have been made, and the problem of collection would never have arisen. 37 The Directors also argue, relying on Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct. 56, 34 L.Ed.2d 90 (1972), that the Comptroller lacks authorization to grant attorneys' fees absent a specific congressional mandate to do so. Greene, however, dealt with the power of a district court to grant attorneys' fees to third-party intervenors who sued under the National Environmental Policy Act and demanded attorneys' fees. While the power of the court to grant attorneys' fees to private parties in a suit is carefully circumscribed, that situation is entirely different from the one at bar. In the instant case, the Bank is not a third-party intervenor and is not demanding attorneys' fees. It is the Comptroller who has ordered the award to make the Bank whole for losses resulting from the Directors' violation of the banking laws. Deference is due to the Comptroller's interpretation of the law under which he operates, and he has interpreted affirmative action to correct conditions resulting from the Directors' violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84 to cover an award of attorneys' fees.