Opinion ID: 2315948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Request to Relieve Counsel

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred by requiring one of his attorneys, Glen Vida, to continue to represent defendant during the resentencing proceeding and that that error denied him effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant points to a similar motion by Vida three years earlier in the prosecution of defendant for the murder of Betsy Bacon to establish that a communication gap had developed between Vida, his New Jersey counsel, and Louis Diamond. Diamond, a member of the New York bar, had been admitted pro hac vice to represent defendant in several murder prosecutions against him in New Jersey. Vida indicated in support of that motion that Diamond had not informed him of a guilty-plea-hearing date in connection with one of the other murder prosecutions. Vida also asserted that a dispute unrelated to the Bacon case had arisen between Vida and Diamond. The court denied the motion in respect of the Bacon murder prosecution. Vida represented defendant on the underlying prosecution through this Court's determination in Biegenwald II. Following our reversal of the sentence and remand, Vida informed the trial court that his representation of defendant had terminated and that a request had been made of the Office of the Public Defender to represent defendant in relation to the resentencing proceeding. The assignment judge held a hearing to determine who would represent defendant, at which the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: The purpose of this Proceeding is to determine Mr. Biegenwald who is going to be representing you on the remand from the Supreme Court. And I have heard conflicting stories from counsel as to who is representing you, whether it is the public defender, whether it would be Mr. Vita [sic passim] or Mr. Diamond, or Mr. Diamond alone. Who is it that you want to represent you? MR. BIEGENWALD: I originally hired Mr. Diamond. Mr. Diamond hired Mr. Vita. As far as I am concerned, they both represent me. THE COURT: All right. Because Mr. Diamond alone cannot represent you in New Jersey; because he is not admitted to practice in New Jersey. He must have local counsel from New Jersey. Mr. Vita has indicated that he wasn't representing you any more, and his employment terminated with the Supreme Court appeal. All right, anyone want to be heard? MR. DIAMOND: No, Your Honor, I stand ready to try the case if I am allowed to. THE COURT: Mr. Vita. MR. VITA: I think we have been over it already Your Honor. THE COURT: We were over it in chambers, but I think I want it on the record now. MR. VITA: Sure. My position basically is Your Honor that I think that considering the nature of the penalty that Mr. Biegenwald is facing, that he deserves counsel that are in a tight working relationship. And I don't know whether or not that is the situation. I had previously discussed it with Mr. Biegenwald. Obviously his desires will have a large impact on what occurs. THE COURT: Are you aware Mr. Biegenwald of any conflicts between Mr. Diamond and Mr. Vita? MR. BIEGENWALD: No. THE COURT: Are you satisfied to have both of them represent you on this remand? MR. BIEGENWALD: Yes. THE COURT: All right, I am of the opinion that Mr. Vita, your employment did not terminate with the decision of the Supreme Court. It is not a new trial as to the entire case. It has only been remanded on the death phase. The guilty conviction was affirmed. Accordingly, I will select a trial date and you will be of counsel with Mr. Diamond. We reject defendant's contention that the court's refusal to relieve Vida was error. The decision whether to relieve counsel is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, with a presumption against granting the request. See State v. Lowery, 49 N.J. 476, 231 A. 2d 361 (1967) (policy of courts not to relieve competent counsel absent showing of substantial cause); State v. Smith, 43 N.J. 67, 202 A. 2d 669 (1964) (same), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005, 85 S.Ct. 731, 13 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1965). We cannot find either abuse of that discretion or any resulting prejudice to defendant. Admittedly, the trial court did not explore in detail on the record the nature of the dispute between counsel. The record reflects that the court may nevertheless have been aware of counsel's differences. Furthermore, Vida's statement equivocates on whether counsel would be able to provide representation appropriate to a capital-murder defense. The court viewed the resentencing proceeding as a continuation of the original trial. That view, when combined with the lengthy history of this prosecution and Vida's extensive, five-year involvement with the defense, provides an ample basis for the court's refusal to relieve Vida as counsel. We also note that defendant never actually moved to have Vida relieved. Moreover, defendant indicated to the court that he was satisfied to have both Vida and Diamond represent him in the resentencing proceeding. Finally, we find the record devoid of any indication that Mr. Vida's participation resulted in a failure to provide effective counsel, neglected responsibilities, or a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); accord State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A. 2d 336 (1987).