Opinion ID: 2259190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expert Testimony of Examining Physician

Text: Floray next contends that the testimony of Dr. Allen DeJong should have been excluded for two reasons. Floray first asserts that Dr. DeJong's non-specific findings were not relevant under D.R.E. 401. Floray also argues that if the evidence was relevant, his conclusion that his findings were consistent with child sexual abuse was unduly prejudicial under D.R.E. 403 because it was likely to mislead the jury. Dr. DeJong testified at trial that Floray's daughter suffered from a labial agglutination that was caused by some type of irritation, most commonly caused by poor hygiene, either too much or too little. Over Floray's objection, Dr. DeJong testified that although the child had a normal sleeve-like hymen for a seven-year-old, these physical findings were consistent with child sexual abuse. Dr. DeJong also testified that although his physical examination of the ten-year-old friend resulted in normal findings, these results were consistent with sexual abuse. Dr. DeJong explained that nonviolent sexual abuse may not leave behind bruising or scarring, and for that reason, his findings did not necessarily run counter to the victims's allegations. Whether to admit evidence as relevant is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion. [15] Under D.R.E. 401, relevance is defined broadly as: evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [16] The results of Dr. DeJong's physical examination of the two child victims are probative of the truth of the allegations of abuse. The existence of any physical evidence would be relevant to verify the children's claims. Likewise, the jury would want to know the doctor's interpretation of his findings. Absent the doctor's expert opinion, the jury would not know what weight to attach to the existence of the labial agglutination, or to the doctor's failure to discover any other signs of abuse. Dr. DeJong's statements that his findings are consistent with abuse constituted an explanation to the jury that it should not disregard the claims simply because his examination could not affirmatively verify them. The doctor's testimony was relevant and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. The State conceded at oral argument in this Court, however, that some of its questions to Dr. DeJong were improperly phrased. [17] Generally when an expert offers a medical opinion it should be stated in terms of a reasonable medical probability [18] or a reasonable medical certainty. [19] Floray, however, did not object to the State leaving out the probability or certainty component of the questions. At trial, Floray objected only to the testimony on the basis of hearsay, relevance and its probative value being substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice of enhancing the credibility of the witnesses thus invading the prerogative of the jury. An objection [to the admissibility of evidence] not properly preserved at trial is generally waived for purposes of appeal. [20] Because Floray's objection was predicated on different grounds than the proper phrasing of the question, our review on that issue is limited to a finding of plain error. [21] To establish plain error the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. [22] Based on a careful review of the record, we find no plain error or abuse of discretion in the admission of Dr. DeJong's testimony. Floray had the opportunity to, and did, cross examine Dr. DeJong and elicit that his findings were just as consistent with a finding that no sexual abuse occurred and that his findings did not show that there was any physical evidence proving that either of the child-complainants had been abused. Floray's attorney asked Dr. DeJong whether, if in all of the approximately 2,000 cases where he had performed physical examinations in situations of alleged sexual abuse, his findings were consistent with sexual abuse. Dr. DeJong answered affirmatively, later explaining that sexual abuse does not necessarily leave any conclusive physical evidence. Additionally, Floray explored other possible causes of the physical findings, particularly his daughter's labial agglutination. Dr. DeJong responded in cross examination: There is no specific physical evidence of sexual abuse on either of the children, [Floray's daughter] having the nonspecific physical finding of the labial agglutination that could be caused by abuse or might be caused by other factors. And there certainly is nothing specific to link one particular individual to the sexual abuse. Dr. DeJong also noted that just being in a bathtub can cause [the labial agglutination] if you soak too long or use the wrong type of soap. Therefore, any prejudice that might have occurred by the phrasing of the question was alleviated by the cross examination conducted by Floray and there was no plain error arising from the admission of the testimony.