Opinion ID: 1902359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kent County Sheriff Law Enforcement Activity Only Maryland Vicariously Liable

Text: The first issue presented is whether Kent County is vicariously liable in this case for Knapp's negligent conduct. That question was addressed in a similar context by the United States Supreme Court during the pendency of this appeal. [3] The predicate for the ultimate holding in McMillian was a crucial axiom of American federalism: the States have wide authority to set up their state and local governments as they wish. [4] In McMillian, it was recognized that the importance of counties and the nature of county government have varied historically from region to region, and from State to State. [5] Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court noted that it is entirely natural for the role of county sheriffs to vary from State to State. [6] Consequently, in McMillian, it was concluded that there is no inconsistency created by court decisions that declare sheriffs to be county officers in one State, and not in another. [7] In this appeal, we are guided by two precepts that were identified in the McMillian opinion. First, the question is not whether Deputy Sheriff Knapp acts for the State of Maryland or Kent County in some categorical, `all or nothing' manner. [8] Thus, we are not seeking to make a characterization of sheriffs or deputy sheriffs from Maryland counties that will hold true for every type of official action they engage in. [9] The question we address is only whether Deputy Sheriff Knapp represents the State of Maryland or Kent County when he acts in a law enforcement capacity? [10] The second precept identified in McMillian is that the answer to the first question must be determined by an analysis of the law of Maryland. In McMillian, the United States Supreme Court held that the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official's function under relevant state law. [11] In response to the concern that state and local governments will manipulate the title of local officials in a blatant effort to shield local governments from liability, the United States Supreme Court noted that the state law answer must be found in the actual functioning of a governmental official and not simply labeling. [12] Thus, in the context of determining vicarious liability in the public sector, with regard to the relationship between intrastate governmental entities, the matter is a legal question that must be answered in accordance with the law of each sovereign state. [13] In accordance with McMillian, we have analyzed the law of Maryland with regard of the facts of this case. The common law office of sheriff existed when Maryland was a colonial state and had ancient Anglo-Saxon origins. [14] Since 1776, the elective office of sheriff has been provided for in every Maryland Constitution. [15] In Rucker v. Harford County , the highest court in the State of Maryland held unequivocally, as a matter of Maryland law, that county sheriffs and deputy sheriffs who are engaged in law enforcement activities are officials and/or employees of the State of Maryland, rather than the county. [16] In Rucker, a civilian bystander was struck by a bullet fired during a police chase that involved the Maryland State Police and the Harford County Sheriff's Deputies. The injured bystander filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging common law negligence and a violation of federal rights. The defendants named in the Rucker law suit included Harford County, each of the deputy sheriffs involved in the chase, and the Superintendent of the Maryland State Police. In Rucker, the deputy sheriffs moved to dismiss the portion of the complaint seeking damages under federal law on the ground that they were employees or officials of the State of Maryland. Since the issues presented were controlled by Maryland law, the United States District Court of Maryland certified the following question to the Maryland Court of Appeals: Whether the Sheriff or Deputy Sheriffs of Harford County are employees of the State of Maryland or of Harford County? [17] In response to that certified question the Court of Appeals held: as a matter of Maryland law, the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs of Harford County are officials and/or employees of the State of Maryland rather than of Harford County. The role of a sheriff as a State constitutional officer whose duties are subject to control by the General Assembly leads us to the conclusion that sheriffs are State rather than local government employees. Because a deputy sheriff, functions as the alter ego of the sheriff and exercises the same authority, we reach the same conclusion with respect to deputy sheriffs. [18] The holding in Rucker came at a time when the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA) did not specifically include sheriffs or deputy sheriffs under its coverage. In 1990, in an emergency measure passed by the Maryland legislature, the Maryland Torts Claim Act was amended to specifically include a sheriff or deputy sheriff as State personnel. [19] The Maryland Court of Appeals has since relied on Rucker and this amendment to the MTCA to conclude that: [i]t is clear ... that under Maryland law the Sheriff and deputy sheriffs ... are State employees .... Therefore, to the extent that ... any purported agency of [the] County are named as defendants based on a theory that they are liable as employers for the alleged negligence of the ... County deputy sheriffs, the judgment [of dismissal for those county agencies] in their favor was correct. [20] In McMillian, the United States Supreme Court held that the public sector question of vicarious liability between a state and its political subdivisions is an issue of state law, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the titles of local officials have been manipulated in a blatant effort to avoid liability. [21] There is no evidence of such manipulation here. [22] We have concluded that, under Maryland law, the State of Maryland alone is vicariously responsible for Kent County Deputy Sheriff Knapp's negligent conduct because it occurred during the course of his law enforcement duties, while he was operating a motor vehicle within the State of Delaware. Therefore, the judgments entered against Kent County must be reversed.