Opinion ID: 1057414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Statute’s Purpose

Text: As earlier noted, in John R. Sand & Gravel, the Court identified the kinds of goals that make statutes of limitations jurisdictional: “[Jurisdictional] statutes of limitations . . . seek 88 WONG V. BEEBE not so much to protect a defendant’s case-specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, or promoting judicial efficiency.” 552 U.S. at 133. Consideration of each of the goals outlined in John R. Sand & Gravel illustrates that § 2401(b)’s broad, system-related purposes require us to find that its timing provisions are indeed jurisdictional. A. Section 2401(b) Facilitates the Administration of Claims The Court has held that § 2401(b)’s “obvious purpose” is to “encourage the prompt presentation of claims.” See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).26 The requirement that a civil action be filed within six months of 26 In Kubrick, the respondent, a veteran, was admitted to a VA hospital for treatment of an infected femur in April 1968. See id. at 113. Medical personnel irrigated the infected area with neomycin, an antibiotic, until the infection cleared. See id. Six weeks later, the respondent noticed some hearing loss. See id. at 114. In January 1969, doctors informed the respondent that it was “highly possible” that the neomycin treatment caused his hearing loss. See id. In 1972, the respondent filed suit under the FTCA, alleging he had been injured by negligent treatment at a VA hospital. See id. at 115. The VA denied the respondent’s administrative claim, which he presented after he filed suit, in April 1973. See id. at 116 n.4. The Government then filed a motion to dismiss the suit as timebarred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)’s two-year statute of limitations, on the theory that the respondent’s claim accrued in January 1969, when doctors told the respondent that his hearing loss was likely caused by the neomycin treatment. See id. at 115. The district court rejected this defense and rendered judgment for the respondent. See id. The Third Circuit affirmed. See id. at 116. The Supreme Court reversed and held that claims accrue when the individual “knows both the existence and the cause of his injury.” See id. at 113, 124–25. WONG V. BEEBE 89 a denial of an administrative claim guarantees that the civil action will commence while the denial of the claim is relatively fresh. For actions filed within that time period, the Department of Justice, which will defend the cases, will be able to access the relatively fresh memories of the administrators who denied the claim. It is also more likely that those administrators will be on the job six months after the denial of the claim than would be the case if the denial had taken place years before. B. Section 2401(b) Limits a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity The Court has held that § 2401(b) limits the waiver of sovereign immunity expressed in the FTCA. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117–18. In particular, the Court has stated: “We should . . . have in mind that the [FTCA] waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing the statute of limitations [expressed in § 2401(b)], which is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.” Id. (emphasis added). This passage clearly identifies § 2401(b) as a provision “limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity,” which is exactly the kind of broader, system-related goal that makes a statute’s time limit “more absolute.” See John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 133; Op. at 31. The majority agrees that the FTCA “is predicated on a sovereign immunity waiver.” Op. at 31. Further, the 90 WONG V. BEEBE majority admits that many of the cases upon which they rely—Auburn Regional Medical Center, Gonzalez, Henderson, Holland, and Bowles—do not involve issues of government immunity and therefore “may not raise precisely parallel sovereign immunity concerns” as are now before us. See Op. at 32 n.12. The majority is unable to deny that (1) the FTCA limits waiver of sovereign immunity and therefore meets a goal that makes statutes of limitations jurisdictional under John R. Sand & Gravel, or (2) this difference distinguishes the FTCA and § 2401(b) from other cases on which the majority tries to rely. C. Section 2401(b) Promotes Judicial Efficiency First, like all statutes of limitations, § 2401(b) “protect[s] . . . the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.” See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117. By promoting the prompt presentation of claims, § 2401(b) seeks to limit the amount of evidence lost to time and ensure that courts will adjudicate cases with complete records. See id. Second, when read together with § 2675, it is clear that § 2401(b) was intended to protect against the burdens of claims filed outside of its time prescriptions. In McNeil v. United States, the Court held that § 2675’s administrative exhaustion requirement was jurisdictional. 508 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1993). There, the petitioner filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that the United States Public Health Service had injured him while conducting experimentation on prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. See id. at 108. Four months WONG V. BEEBE 91 later, he submitted a claim for damages to the Department of Health and Human Services. See id. at 109. After the Department denied the claim, the petitioner sent the district court a letter and asked that it permit him to commence his legal action. See id. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an action commenced before satisfaction of § 2675’s administrative exhaustion requirement. See id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the petitioner had filed his action too early. See id. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that § 2675’s administrative exhaustion requirement was a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit under the FTCA. See id. at 112–13. As relevant here, it noted that “every premature filing of an action under the FTCA imposes some burden on the judicial system . . . .” Id. at 112. Similar burdens are imposed on the judicial system when actions are filed late, accompanied by claims that the court should toll the running of the statute of limitations for equitable reasons which may or may not justify the plaintiff’s tardiness. As was the case for premature filings in McNeil, “the burden may be slight in the individual case.” Id. But § 2401(b) “governs the processing of a vast multitude of claims.” Id. For that reason, “adherence to the straightforward statutory command” is the best way to promote “[t]he interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation.” Id. Because § 2401(b) serves each of the three system-related purposes identified in John R. Sand & Gravel as making statutory time limits “more absolute,” equitable tolling should not be applied here. Instead, we should hold that § 2401’s time limits are jurisdictional in nature. 92 WONG V. BEEBE