Opinion ID: 2257808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Viability of Plaintiffs' Constitutional Theory of Recovery

Text: Having determined that the Bandonis are victims, I now reach the overarching issue presented by this caseโwhether in the absence of an explicit legislative or constitutional directive creating a private right of action, a crime victim may be entitled to some form of judicial relief for the deprivation of his or her rights as set forth in the Rhode Island Constitution. [43]
Until today this Court has never required legislative creation of a private cause of action as a precondition for a damages recovery based upon the unlawful deprivation of a state constitutional right. On the contrary we have previously recognized that a cause of action would lie directly under the Rhode Island Constitution and we have permitted a monetary recovery thereunder, despite the absence of any legislative authorization for the courts to recognize such a cause of action or to provide such monetary relief. See, e.g., Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, 463, A.2d 133 (R.I.1983); E & J, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of Woonsocket, 122 R.I. 288, 405 A2d 1187 (1979). [44] Moreover, we have not previously waited for the General Assembly or for the State Constitution itself to specify a remedial mechanism before judicially enforcing state constitutional provisions by providing other forms of relief. See, e.g., Avanzo v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 625 A.2d 208 (R.I.1993) (affirming Superior Court judgment of declaratory and injunctive relief for deprivation of the plaintiffs' public-assistance benefits without due process of law as required by article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution); Pimental v. Department of Transportation, 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I.1989) (declaring that drunk-driving roadblocks violate article 1, section 6's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures). This Court's decision in Oster v. Tellier, 544 A.2d 128 (R.I.1988), serves as a further example that this Court need not await action by the General Assembly before enforcing state constitutional rights. There this Court affirmed a Superior Court judgment denying the plaintiffs' request for a specific monetary remedy for the defendants' violation of Rhode Island's equal-protection clause, id. at 129, but did so not because the court lacked the power or the authority to remedy a constitutional violation without legislative authorization but rather because the plaintiffs failed to proffer evidence to prove the monetary amount by which they were allegedly overassessed. Id. at 132. Although the instances in which this Court has recognized the possibility of a monetary recovery for a state constitutional violation have thus far been limited to takings actions brought directly under our State Constitution's just-compensation clause, until today the Court has never stated that it was powerless to do so in the absence of a prior legislative enactment authorizing a private cause of action. In both Annicelli and E & J, Inc. we addressed whether the plaintiffs had stated causes of action for injuries resulting from regulatory takings prohibited by article 1, section 16. And in both cases we recognized that a private cause of action lies directly under that constitutional provision. [45] And we did so despite the complete absence of any express legislative or constitutional authorization for allowing such a claim. [46] It is significant that the Bandonis come before this Court seeking relief for the deprivation of fundamental rights. The rights of crime victims are expressly set forth in our Constitution's Declaration of Rights, the repository of Rhode Islanders' fundamental rights. Compare In re Constitutional Convention, 55 R.I. 56, 62, 178 A. 433, 437 (1935) (referring to the enumerated rights listed in article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution as in substance and effect    fundamental rights) and R.I. Const. art. 1, preamble (declaring that the rights enumerated in article 1's declaration of rights are essential and unquestionable and that they shall be established, maintained, and preserved, and shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial and executive proceedings) with Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 870 (R.I.1997) (holding that plaintiffs seeking monetary and other relief under a constitutionally based cause of action for invasion of privacy did not state a constitutional claim because no fundamental right was involved there). Other examples abound of this Court's enforcing state constitutional rights invoked by criminal defendants despite the complete absence of any specific textual authorization in the Constitution for the Court to do so. See, e.g., Pimental v. Department of Transportation, 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I.1989) (declaring police drunk-driving roadblock to be violative of article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution, notwithstanding any indication that this provision in our Constitution was self-executing). In Pimental we did not proclaim that the defendant was required to await legislative action before raising a state constitutional defense, nor did we refuse to craft a judicial remedy vindicating his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures merely because the Constitution did not explicitly provide for our judicial review or because the Legislature had not expressly allowed us to deploy the remedy we selected to vindicate the defendant's constitutional rights. Notwithstanding the aforementioned opinions of this Court indicating that the Judiciary is not prohibited from providing monetary or other forms of relief for constitutional violations until the Legislature states that we are empowered to do so, defendants here contend that this Court should refrain from providing a remedy for plaintiffs, relying heavily on this Court's established proposition that the creation of new causes of action is a legislative function. Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996) (no private cause of action for public authority's alleged noncompliance with public works bonding statute because General Assembly could easily have exercised its power to create a cause of action    but it chose not to do so); see also Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965 (R.I. 1995); Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, Inc., 122 R.I. 429, 408 A.2d 608 (1979). However, defendants' reliance on the Accent Store Design, Inc. line of cases is decidedly misplaced when, as here, a constitutional violation is alleged. [47] The analysis in this case is predicated on the existence of an affirmative constitutional right that is expressly given to crime victims and not merely on an alleged but unexpressed right created by extrapolation from another party's statutory duty. The statute at issue in Accent Store Design, Inc. did not confer any .positive right upon the plaintiff subcontractors; rather, it only placed an express duty on governmental authorities who awarded public works contracts to require the posting of a bond. Moreover the bonding requirement was not inextricably tied to any constitutional right. In the case at bar the victims possess an affirmative constitutional right by virtue of article 1, section 23, over and beyond any express statutory rights afforded them under the Victim's Bill of Rights Act. Further, as previously noted, the constitutional right here necessarily builds upon and incorporates those earlier-enacted statutory rights. For these reasons, the Accent Store Design, Inc. decision and other statutory-based line of cases are inapplicable to the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. [48] The case at bar also differs from the line of decisions of this Court refusing to imply a monetary cause of action to enforce a statutory provision when other remedies for its violation were provided for by the Legislature. See, e.g., Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856 (R.I.1997); In re John, 605 A.2d 486 (R.I.1992); Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53 (R.I. 1980) ( Citizens II ). Those cases deal strictly with statutory rights, as opposed to constitutional ones. Where the former are involved, this Court has often deferred to the Legislature when the statute is clear and unambiguous in providing for other types of relief. Unlike statutory rights, however, constitutional rights express the will of the People and are to be protected from alteration by the will of legislative majorities. [49] In addition, in those cases the Legislature had provided adequate alternative remedial schemes to vindicate the particular rights at issue. See Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 868; In re John, 605 A.2d at 488; Citizens II, 420 A.2d at 57. In the case at bar, however, crime victims whose statutory and constitutional rights have been ignored are left without any remedy whatsoever since the Legislature has not acted to give victims remedial protection when they are deprived of their entitlement to address the court before sentencing or the acceptance of a plea bargain. I also do not believe that G.L.1956 ง 12-28-7 [50] can be relied upon for the proposition that the Legislature was well aware of the existing governmental noncompliance with the statutory rights it created for crime victims, yet it still chose not to provide such victims with a cause of action for damages. It is of critical importance to note that ง 12-28-7 purports to preclude only one type of potential relief that otherwise may have been judicially available for felony-crime victims, namely, the vacating of an otherwise lawful conviction or the voiding of an otherwise lawful sentence or parole determination. Thus the very existence of ง 12-28-7 conclusively establishes thatโnotwithstanding the absence of an express private right of action in either the State Constitution or the Victim's Bill of Rights legislationโthe General Assembly must have intended and expected that crime victims would still be able to file lawsuits and to obtain relief against those persons and entities that denied them their rights as crime victims. The reason this is so is that if the Legislature had no such intention or expectation, it would have no need or reason to enact a law excluding just one type of relief (the vacating of felony sentences, convictions, and parole determinations) from the full panoply of judicial remedies otherwise available to crime victims. I submit that the General Assembly's enactment of ง 12-28-7 makes no sense whatsoever if it had truly intended to exclude crime victims from obtaining all types of judicial relief. Rather, the more logical interpretation of ง 12-28-7 is that, knowing full well that if it failed to exclude a particular remedy such relief would otherwise still be available to crime victims, the General Assembly decided to do so and enacted ง 12-28-7 to take away just this one remedial option from the courts. If the General Assembly and/or the framers truly had intended to prevent all crime victims from having any cause of action for monetary damages, it would have been a simple matter for them to say so expressly, either in the Constitution itself or in ง 12-28-7, by inserting the language that other states have used in their constitutions (cited by the majority in footnote 6 of its opinion) when they wished to bar such relief altogether. But neither the framers nor the General Assembly chose to do so, thereby indicating that they did not wish to bar such a cause of action. What ง 12-28-7 shows is that when the General Assembly wanted to prevent courts from awarding particular kinds of relief to crime victims, it knew how to do so. But conspicuously absent from the statute's terms is any preclusion of a monetary-damages award or of any other type of judicial relief for the violation of crime victims' rights except the vacating of felony convictions, sentences, and parole determinations. Accordingly I conclude that the General Assembly had no intention by its silence to bar the courts from awarding such traditional legal and equitable remedies.
In the review of the Bandonis' claim for relief under the Rhode Island Constitution, it is useful to look to the federal courts, which have repeatedly addressed the question of whether the Federal Constitution is judicially enforceable without any express prior legislative or constitutional authorization. Central to their discussion has been the development and refinement of the doctrine arising from the landmark federal decision of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and its progeny. I acknowledge at the outset that we are not bound by the Bivens rationale because the Rhode Island Constitution is an independent source of rights. Nevertheless I deem its rationale to be directly relevant to the question of our judicial power to implement a cause of action vindicating the victims' rights provision in our State Constitution. In addition I observe that Bivens and its progeny confirm the unquestionable power of the Judiciary to entertain causes of action for monetary damages for alleged constitutional violations (hereinafter Bivens actions). But for the same reasons discussed previously, I note again that in the case at bar this Court is not so limited to recognizing a cause of action just for monetary damages. In Bivens the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights was entitled to sue federal officials in federal court and to obtain monetary damages if he were to pre-vail. 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d at 627. In so holding, the Court observed that the Judiciary had both the authority and the responsibility to be alert to adjust [its] remedies so as to grant the necessary relief' when constitutionally protected rights have been trammeled. Id. at 392, 91 S.Ct. at 2002, 29 L.Ed.2d at 624 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939, 944 (1946)). A damages remedy was held to be appropriate because it was the only possible remedy for the plaintiff. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 2011-12, 29 L.Ed.2d at 634-35 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that [for people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing). Injunctive relief would not have obviated the invasion of Bivens' Fourth Amendment rights, and application of the exclusionary rule (itself a judicially created remedy for constitutional violations) was inappropriate since they were not raising the alleged constitutional violations as a defense to a criminal prosecution. Id. In his concurrence Justice Harlan addressed the power of the Judiciary to remedy the violation of federal constitutional rights. First, he rejected the notion that the Judiciary was powerless to permit damages remedies to vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the popular will. Id. at 403-04, 91 S.Ct. at 2008, 29 L.Ed.2d at 631. Justice Harlan also deemed it the Judiciary's role to safeguard and enforce the Bill of Rights. He dismissed the notion that the Judiciary must first wait for legislative action, positing that constitutional rights are to be protected absolutely from the will of legislative majorities. [T]he judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment. To be sure, `it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'    But it must also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes. Id. at 407, 91 S.Ct. at 2010, 29 L.Ed.2d at 633. (Emphasis added.) Finally, Justice Harlan rejected the suggestion that administrative or budgetary considerations could potentially override the judicial power to protect constitutional rightsโ that is, that the Court should disallow a private damages action because increased expenditure of judicial resources would be necessitated by a new class of constitutional litigation. Id. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 2012, 29 L.Ed.2d at 635. He cautioned that limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles. Id. at 411, 91 S.Ct. at 2012, 29 L.Ed.2d at 635. After Bivens the United State Supreme Court twice recognized a cause of action for monetary redress directly under the United States Constitution. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (violation of Eighth Amendment's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (violation of Fifth Amendment's DueโProcess Clause). In particular, I find Davis illuminating for its discussion of the Judiciary's role in the enforcement of constitutional, as opposed to merely statutory, rights. In Davis the United State Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's use of a multifactor test previously laid out by the Court for determining whether a private cause of action can be implied from a federal statute. 442 U.S. at 232-33, 99 S.Ct. at 2270, 60 L.Ed.2d at 854. The Court found that the question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution. Id. at 241, 99 S.Ct. at 2275, 60 L.Ed.2d at 860. Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, thus making it entirely appropriate for Congress to determine additionally the appropriate means of enforcement. Id. In statutory-right cases the correct approach is thus whether the legislative intent informing the particular statute would permit a cause of action. However, the Davis Court emphasized that the analysis differs when constitutional rights are involved because the Judiciary is presumed to be the primary means by which constitutional rights are to be enforced. Id. The bedrock role of the Judiciary in enforcing constitutional rights also finds firm support in the origins of the Federal Constitution. When James Madison presented the Bill of Rights before Congress, he observed: [If the Bill of Rights is] incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be led naturally to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. 1 Annals of Congress 439 (1789); see also Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 335 (1996) (quoting Madison's speech in the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789). In his examination of the proposed federal government's judicial department, Alexander Hamilton declared the Judiciary to be the faithful guardians of the Constitution, protecting it against legislative invasions    instigated by the major voice of the community. The Federalist No. 78, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed.1961). Hamilton wrote that, as bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments, the Judiciary is to protect against those situations wherein the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing constitution, [act] in violation of those provisions. Id. at 527. As did Madison and Hamilton, I believe that the power of the Judiciary to enforce constitutional rights is part of its checking function against unconstitutional encroachment by other political branches. See also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178, 179 (finding that courts must declare as void acts repugnant to the Constitution and must neither close their eyes on the constitution nor allow constitutional principle to yield to the legislative act). Moreover, it is unquestionably the province of the Judiciary to fashion an adequate remedy when, as here, there is a legal right and that right has been violated. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. Id. at 163; see also R.I. Const. art. 1, ง 5 ([e]very person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in one's person, property, or character). Thus the recognition of a damages remedy in the case at bar is not only consistent with traditional notions of what it means to exercise the judicial power, but it would also be an abdication of our constitutional duty not to recognize such a legal claim because otherwise the Bandonis would be left remediless. The majority concludes its Bivens analysis by referring to several opinions of the United States Supreme Court decided subsequent to Davis and Carlson, all of which further explored the Court's pronouncement in Bivens that a plaintiffs right to sue for monetary damages directly under the Constitution could be defeated when there are alternative remedies or special factors counseling hesitation. Remarkably though, the majority neglects to indicate that none of these decisions has any applicability to the facts of this case. Recognizing a constitutional right of action in the case at bar is fully consonant with the reasoning proffered by the Supreme Court in those cases for refusing to allow Bivens suits. Indeed those cases are easily distinguishable from the case at bar because of the presence there of special factors counseling hesitation. In sum those cases involved situations in which (1) complex and well-considered administrative remedial schemes already existed to provide meaningful remedies to injured parties such as the plaintiffs, [51] (2) Congress's plenary authority over the military, including its constitutional authorization to make rules governing the military establishment, and the military's unique disciplinary structure weighed in favor of judicial deference to the Legislature, [52] or (3) an attempt to expand the category of defendants against whom Bivens actions may be brought (to include federal agencies as well as federal agents ) would have undermined Congress's prerogative to make decisions involving federal fiscal policy. [53] I discern no special factors counseling hesitation in recognizing a damages remedy here. The Victim's Bill of Rights Act creates no remedial mechanism for victims injured by the government's failure to give them their mandated notice. Although the victim does possess certain other remedies for injuries directly resulting from the acts constituting the criminal offense, [54] these potential alternative remedies address injuries different from the ones about which the Bandonis complain. Compensation or other relief for injuries the Bandonis may have sustained as a result of defendants' failure to provide them with notice and the opportunity to address the court before sentencing are distinct and separate from any remedies that they may possess for the original criminal harm they suffered. Thus, unless this Court allows the Bandonis to maintain a lawsuit for the violation of their constitutional rights as crime victims, they are remediless and their rights to address the court before sentencing are not only unenforceable but meaningless.
Several of our sister state supreme courts have also grappled with the question of whether monetary relief is available for state constitutional violations notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory remedy for such violations. However, none has addressed this issue in the context of an alleged violation of a victims' rights constitutional amendment. [55] Many of the courts in our sister jurisdictions have not strayed far from the Bivens doctrine. The common approach has been to focus on the presence or absence of an existing alternative remedy that would provide some form of relief to the injured party when considering whether Bivens suits are available for violations of rights guaranteed under a state's declaration of rights. [56] Other state courts have used an analytical approach involving a multiple-step inquiry. See, e.g., Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1986) (Souter, J.) (determining first whether the plaintiff's asserted interest deserves legal recognition and, if so, whether the relief requested would be an appropriate way to recognize that interest); Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 658 A.2d 924, 927 (1995) (determining first whether the specific constitutional provision is self-executing and, if so, whether monetary damages provide the appropriate remedy in light of the existence of any alternative remedial scheme). I believe that a multi-step inquiry in the mold of Shields and Rockhouse is the proper approach for determining whether monetary or other forms of relief are available for a plaintiff injured by a violation of a Rhode Island constitutional provision. First, a court should address whether there has been an alleged violation of a state constitutional provision. Next, it should determine whether the plaintiff possesses a legal entitlement to relief for this particular violation. Accordingly the court should determine whether the Judiciary has the power to authorize a cause of action for the particular plaintiff at barโ that is, whether the constitutional provision is self-executing for this type of litigant. Finally, assuming the finding of a violation of a self-executing constitutional provision, then a court must ascertain the proper remedy. It cannot address the question of [its] ability to award a particular remedy until it determines that the harm to be remedied is legally cognizable and declares the government action unconstitutional. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. Cal. L.Rev. 289, 302-03 (1995).
Applying the approach outlined above to the case at bar, I first consider whether there was a constitutional violation. Here the Bandonis allege that defendants deprived them of their constitutional and statutory rights as crime victims by, among other things, failing to provide them with a presentencing opportunity to address the court. In particular they were not, as required by article 1, section 23, given notice by defendants before sentencing of their right to address the court concerning the impact of the criminal defendant's conduct upon them. In addition they were not, as required by the Victim's Bill of Rights Act, informed of their rights to address the court prior to the criminal defendant's nolo contendere plea, to be apprised of the disposition of criminal defendant's case, to request restitution as an element of the case's final disposition, or to provide a written victim's-impact statement in connection with the criminal defendant's plea bargaining. I thus conclude that the Bandonis' complaint sufficiently pleads a constitutional violation. I next consider four criteria in determining whether article 1, section 23, is self-executing: (1) whether the constitutional provision describes a right in sufficient detail to be enjoyed, protected, and enforced as opposed to merely expressing general principles; (2) whether the provision contains a specific directive to the General Assembly requiring further legislative action for implementation; (3) whether the constitutional history of the provision indicates the framers' intended effect; and (4) whether self-execution harmonizes with the scheme of rights laid out in the Rhode Island Constitution as a whole. See Shields, 658 A.2d at 928-29 (ultimately concluding that no cause of action under state due-process clause because clause was not self-executing). First, article 1, section 23, certainly is not limited to general principles or philosophical truisms. Although it provides that agents of the state shall treat crime victims with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process, Rd. Const. art. 1, ง 23, it also establishes a specific individual right to be able [b]efore sentencing    to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim. Id. And the preamble to article 1 declares this rightโlike the others enumerated in our Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principlesโto be essential and unquestionable and of paramount obligation. R.I. Const., art. 1 preamble. [57] The majority's rationale for concluding that the constitutional right of crime victims to address the court before sentencing fails the first prong of the self-execution test is worthy of particular scrutiny because it is riddled with contradictions, nonsequitors, and objectively erroneous statements about the effect of the victims' rights amendment on pre-existing statutory law. First, we are told that crime victims' right to address the court before sentencing is not self-executing because the framers chose to model the Mctims' rights amendment from the broad contours of ง 12-28-2's Legislative Purpose provision knowing full well that other sections within chapter 28 contained more specific rights as well as the means by which these rights may be enjoyed and protected . (Emphasis added.) We are then told that this supposed fact is highly persuasive to [the majority's] conclusion that article 1, section 23, espouses only general principles and is therefore not self-executing. The problem with this contention, as the majority well knows, is that the portion of the victims' rights amendment giving crime victims the specific right to address the court before sentencing is not included in the broad contours of ง 12-28-2's Legislative Purpose provision but is instead based upon one of those other sections within [the Victim's Bill of Rights statute that] contained more specific rights, as well as the means by which these rights may be enjoyed and protected. The majority itself then points to ง 12-28-3(a)(11), as enacted by P.L.1983, ch. 265, ง 1, and ง 12-28-4, as providing the precise procedures by which crime victims can exercise their right to address the court before sentencing. Accordingly, far from embodying the unenforceably broad contours of a legislative purpose provision, the majority concedes that the constitutional language allowing for crime victims to address the court before sentencing contains all the requisite specificity needed for such a clause to be self-executing because it is modeled on the specific statutory provisions providing the precise procedures by which crime victims can exercise their right to address the court before sentencing. Nonetheless, we are still told by the majority that on the one hand article 1, section 23, is not self-executing because it was modeled on the broad contours of the legislative purpose provisions of the pre-existing Victim's Bill of Rights Act, and yet we are also told on the other hand that because this specific right to address the court was already included elsewhere in the Victim's Bill of Rights Act, this proves that article 1, section 23, was not intended to be self-executing. The majority attempts to have it both ways, but its legal analysis simply cannot withstand scrutiny. [58] The majority next claims that a closer inspection of the statute's General rights provision shows that crime victims had already been given the right to address the court prior to sentencing three years before article 1, section 23, was ever ratified. Indeed, the majority erroneously contends that article 1, section 23, provides crime victims with no additional rights beyond those promulgated by the General Assembly in 1983. But in 1983 crime victims were only given the right to address the court before sentencing in those cases where the defendant has been adjudicated guilty following a trial by jury. See P.L.1983, ch. 265, ง 1. Article 1, section 23, provided crime victims with additional rights (beyond those given in 1983) to address the court after guilty verdicts in nonjury trials and even in those cases when there is no trial at all because the defendant has pled guilty, pled nolo contendere, or is being sentenced after a plea bargain of some sort. [59] Accordingly, contrary to the majority's erroneous statements, article 1, section 23, did indeed provide crime victims with additional rights beyond those that had been promulgated by the General Assembly in 1983, and it did so with more than the specificity required for this clause to be self-executing, especially when its particular provisions are compared to the relatively general due-process, just-compensation, cruel-and-unusual-punishment, and equal-protection provisions in the United States Constitution that have already been declared to be self-executing. Second, article 1, section 23, contains no directive to the General Assembly for further enabling legislation pertaining to the right of crime victims to address `the court before sentencing. This lack of an express legislative directive weighs heavily in favor of a conclusion that this portion of article 1, section 23, is self-executing, given the specificity of the enumerated right and the constitutional history of the provision. The third criterion of the self-execution analysis calls for a review of the constitutional history of article 1, section 23. In construing constitutional amendments, we have as our primary purpose to give effect to the intent of the framers. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission), 612 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I.1992). In doing so, we properly consult extrinsic sources and the history of the times. Id. at 7-8. A close review of the Constitutional Convention's contemporaneous documentary record reveals that the critical motivating force behind the victims' rights amendment was the need for greater protection for victims of crime. See Report of the, Judiciary Committee Relating to Victims of Crime Resolution (86-140) 10 (Judiciary Committee Report), reprinted in Journal of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 1, No. 8, at 10 (May 29, 1986) (Journal). Indeed, noting that victims' rights should be made constitutional    to make then [ sic ] more enduring, the Judiciary Committee for the 1986 Constitutional Convention expressly bemoaned the fact that the existing legislative enforcement scheme for victims' rights was presently inadequate and that its lack of enforcement provisions was a major defect. Id. at 11. A historical review of the 1986 Convention's handling of the victim's rights amendment shows that the framers in fact intended for victims to have enforceable rights in the courts after the amendment was adopted. Indeed the majority's declaration that it is the undeniable conclusion that the framers intended to condition a victim's right to legal recourse upon future legislative action is contrary to what is revealed in the primary sources I have examined. The initial draft of the victims' rights amendment (Resolution 86-140) [60] expressly included an enforcement provision in addition to the specific rights identified therein: These rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof. This initial draftโincluding this recourse languageโnot only received approval from the Judiciary Committee [61] but was read in full and passed resoundingly on the full floor of the Constitutional Convention. [62] After passage on the convention floor Resolution 86-140 was referred to the Committee on Style and Drafting, where its text was altered and the recourse language noted above was dropped. An annotated draft of the 1986 State Constitution contained in the original papers of the 1986 Constitutional Convention (and dated contemporaneously with the Committee on Style and Drafting's alteration of Resolution 86-140) reflects the various alterations of the committee and further indicates that the Committee on Style and Drafting merely  clarified language  in Resolution 86-140. [63] When Resolution 86-140 was returned in the following days to the full convention floor as amended by the Committee on Style and Drafting, it immediately thereafter obtained final passage by a vote of the delegates but only after the delegates were assured that the style committee's changes were made only for the economy of language. See Proceedings at Constitutional Convention 62 (June 26, 1986) (Proceedings). [64] Thus the minutes of the Constitutional Convention themselves reveal that the removal of the enforcement and recourse-in-the-law language from the initial draft was not intended to alter the substantive meaning of Resolution 86-140 as approved by the delegates and by the Judiciary Committee before it was referred to the Committee on Style and Drafting. Rather when the amended Resolution 86-140 was presented to the full constitutional delegation minus the enforcement and recourse language, its introduction was prefaced with this very telling remark: This resolution on victim rights was redrafted for the economy of language and it now reads as follows. Proceedings at 62 (June 26, 1986). (Emphasis added.) The amendment was then read and it passed without any objection. Thus, it is clear that Resolution 86-140 was not amended with the intent to preclude victims from obtaining recourse in the law for any denial of their rights. Rather, it is evident that the framers voting for final passage did so under the assurance they received that the substantive meaning underlying the initial draft they had approved so overwhelmingly prior to the Committee on Style and Drafting's alterations was still intactโthat is, that victims' rights still shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof. [65] To support its position, the majority relies upon language it excerpts from a Judiciary Committee report (published prior to final passage of the victims' rights amendment) to the effect that specific provisions for enforcement [should be left] to the General Assembly. However, this commentary was directed to the draft Resolution 86-140 that included the explicit enforcement and recourse-in-the-law language previously discussed. Thus the committee's comments do not indicate an intention to preclude judicial relief but only that more specific enforcement provisions would be left to the Legislature. [66] The majority also contends that when the Committee on Style and Drafting deleted the recourse-in-the-law language from Resolution 86-140, it did so by substituting the clause and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide. I disagree that there was any substitution of one clause for the other. Rather, the other-compensation clause was inserted in that part of the victims' rights amendment concerning the financial compensation that crime victims shall be entitled to receive for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime. Thus the placement of this clause in that portion of the amendment's text (pertaining to crime victims' remedies for losses inflicted by the criminal) shows that that clause had nothing to do with that portion of the amendment concerning what compensation or other relief may be afforded to crime victims whose presentencing rights to address the court have been violated by the government. [67] Next, even if the majority was correct in its conclusion that this other-compensation clause was intended by the framers to be substituted for the recourse-in-the-law clause in Resolution 86-140, there is even more reason to conclude that this substitution was not intended to effect a substantive change in the enforceability of the amendment. First, the fact that the language change occurred in the Committee on Style and Drafting rather than in the Judiciary Committee or in some other substantive committee of the Convention strongly suggests that it should be construed as a style change and not as a change in the substance of the amendment. Second, the delegates of the Convention were told before they voted on the amendment that the changes were for the economy of language and not for purposes of revising any substantive provision that they had already approved in passing Resolution 86-140. Third, and most significant of all, the text of the other-compensation clause is consistent with providing crime victims with a judicial remedy to compensate them for the violation of their constitutional right to address the court before sentencing of the criminal who injured them. As much as the majority might be loath to admit it, the Judiciary is part of the state that is expressly referenced in this amendment. Thus the majority erroneously assumes that the words other compensation as the state may provide refers solely to what the General Assembly may enact as, legislation. But when I last looked, both the Executive and the Judiciary were still branches of the state. Accordingly, especially when this matter is considered in light of what the amendment was intended to accomplish for crime victims and of the professed economy-of-language purpose for the Style and Drafting Committee's changes to Resolution 86-140, it appears to me that the insertion of the other-compensation clause and the deletion of the recourse-in-the-law language were not intended to preclude the Judiciary from enforcing the victims' rights amendment without prior legislative approval to do so. Moreover, a further review of the Judiciary Committee report reveals that the committee members did not intend to preclude victims from obtaining judicial relief for violation of their constitutional rights. In the report the committee noted that it was considering three different proposals for a victims' rights constitutional amendment. It ultimately decided to accept Resolution 86-140 (with its recourse-in-the-law language discussed above) because it steers a middle course between one proposal merely outlining a simple right to be present and to be heard at all stages of judicial proceedings and another more detailed proposal that (among other things) encouraged the establishment of community-based programs to rehabilitate offenders and provided for a victim's right to compensation within two months after his or her expenses or losses were incurred. See Judiciary Committee Report at 1, reprinted in Journal at 10 (May 29, 1986). Indeed, Resolution 86-140 staked a middle ground between these two other proposals because not only did it contain an explication of victim rights butโat that timeโit also included a general enforcement provision without the more specific details of the third proposal. Because Resolution 86-140 already provided for victims' recourse in the law for any violation of their rights, the Judiciary Committee was merely providing that the General Assembly could refine and provide further enforcement mechanisms by which victims could seek recourse in the courtsโa proposition that it had already accepted in approving Resolution 86-140. [68] Thus this constitutional history strongly indicates that the framers' primary reason for enacting this amendment was to assuage concerns about the lack of enforcement for victims' rights under the existing statutory scheme and it shows that the amendment was adopted so that victims' rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof. Accordingly I believe that by denying a private right of action to crime victims, this Court is imposing remedial roadblocks to enforcement that were not contemplated by the framers and which have the effect of totally frustrating their avowed purpose in drafting this amendmentโnamely, to mandate enforcement of victims' rights. Finally, with regard to the fourth and last criterion for determining whether article 1, section 23, is self-executing, I note that there are no other more specific provisions in the Rhode Island Constitution that provide the requisite protections for crime victims. Cf. Shields, 658 A.2d at 929 (finding state constitutional due-process clause was not self-executing because other constitutional provisions provided recourse for state interference with property rights). In fact, the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Convention reveal that the victims' rights amendment was enacted precisely because such rights could not be linked with any other existing constitutional provision. See Proceedings at 62 (June 26, 1986); Journal at 11 (May 29, 1986). Having shown that article 1, section 23, is self-executing-that it was not intended to require any further action of the General Assembly before it would become enforceableโI next address the appropriate remedy here. Mindful that our duty is to review the Bandonis' complaint only to determine whether they have stated a cause of action for some form of relief, I observe that the Bandonis' ultimate entitlement to any remedy or remedies will depend on the facts of the case as they are developed at trial. If plaintiffs are successful, [i]t will be a matter for the trial judge to craft the necessary relief. Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992). Moreover, some rights may require greater or lesser relief to rectify a constitutional transgression. Id. 413 S.E.2d at 291. Nevertheless, I conclude that fashioning a remedy for a constitutional violation is consistent with the Judiciary's general power to remedy violations of specific legal duties. When a legislative [or constitutional] provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 874A, at 301 (1979). Indeed, State Bills of Rights Provisions are exceptionally amenable to enforcement by a section 874A type action because they tend to be phrased as declarations either of positive rights or of limitations on government, but without simultaneously specifying a `civil remedy' for their breach. J. Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and Defenses ง 7-5(c), at 420 (2d ed.1996) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly I would not foreclose the possibility of a monetary-damages award to the Bandonis provided that they are able to establish that their damages were proximately caused by the alleged victims' rights violations. [69] However, as our sister state courts have done in Shields and Rockhouse, I think we should proceed cautiously in making such a determination, and I would not necessarily permit such relief if (unlike the situation here) the General Assembly had enacted an alternative remedial scheme or if there were any other factors counseling hesitation. I also note in passing that other forms of relief may be appropriate, based upon the facts alleged in the Bandonis' complaint. [70] However, these are decisions that should be made in the first instance by the Superior Court. In short I believe that the Bandonis' complaint states a claim under our Constitution for which relief in the form of damages as well as other possible equitable remedies may be available, and I would remand this claim for further proceedings.