Opinion ID: 160831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 10 On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, amended by Act of Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656. IIRIRA dramatically changed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), in particular limiting the availability of judicial review of removal orders. Because the petitioners' deportation proceedings were not commenced on or after IIRIRA's effective date, April 1, 1997, most of the new provisions do not apply to them. 2 IIRIRA 309(c), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. 1101 note. The INS argues, however, that one jurisdictional provision, INA 242(g), applies to the petitioners and forecloses any judicial review, including habeas review, in this case. INA 242(g) provides: 11 Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter. 12 8 U.S.C. 1252(g). This provision applies without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings. IIRIRA 306(c)(1), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. 1252 note. Because INA 242(g) applies to past and pending deportation proceedings, it clearly applies to the petitioners' claims. 13 The question we must therefore resolve is whether INA 242(g) precludes judicial review of the petitioners' constitutional claims regarding their motions to reopen under 8 C.F.R. 3.2(c)(3)(iii). The INS argues that INA 242(g) forecloses judicial review because the petitioners' claims concern decisions by the Attorney General to adjudicate cases and execute final deportation orders, two of the three discrete actions covered by INA 242(g). Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). The Supreme Court has held, however, that INA 242(g) is not a zipper clause foreclosing all deportation claims. Id. Interpreting the provision narrowly, the Court has said that many decisions fall outside the three discrete actions by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Id. The Court provided examples of such decisions, including the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order. Id. (emphasis added). 14 A decision refusing to reopen a removal order is analogous to a decision refusing reconsideration of that order, which is listed among the Supreme Court's examples of decisions not covered by INA 242(g). Both a motion to reconsider and a motion to reopen involve requests for relief from removal decisions rendered by an immigration judge or the BIA. Indeed, both decisions are covered by the same regulation, 8 C.F.R. 3.2, which is entitled Reopening or reconsideration before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Several of the regulation's subsections establish procedural rules applicable to both kinds of decisions. See 8 C.F.R. 3.2(a), (d)-(i). In light of the two decisions' close relationship and the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of INA 242(g), we hold that a decision regarding a motion to reopen falls outside INA 242(g)'s jurisdictional limitation. The INA does not therefore preclude our review of the petitioners' claims. 15 Furthermore, our decision in Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000), supports our conclusion that we have jurisdiction over the petitioners' claims that 8 C.F.R. 3.2(c)(3)(iii) is unconstitutional. In determining whether we had habeas jurisdiction, we held that two permanent provisions, including INA 242(g), precluded judicial review of certain discretionary decisions by the Attorney General but did not preclude review of claims that challenge the validity and constitutionality of the statutes authorizing the continued detention of removable aliens. Greene, 204 F.3d at 1052. Although the petitioners in this case are not being detained, they are in custody for habeas purposes because they are subject to final deportation orders. Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir. 1994) ([T]here is general consensus that an alien whose liberty is restricted pursuant to an order emanating from the INS is 'in custody' for purposes of satisfying the prerequisites for habeas review.); Mustata v. Dep't of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1021 n.4 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding a final deportation order places an alien constructively in custody because of the specialized meaning those words have in the context of an immigration-related habeas petition). Because the petitioners are clearly challenging the validity and constitutionality of the statutes governing their final deportation orders, our reasoning in Ho v. Greene is apposite: statutes, such as INA 242(g), restricting judicial review of discretionary decisions do not preclude review of claims challenging the constitutionality of those statutes. 16 We therefore exercise jurisdiction under the general habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. 2241, which permits the granting of a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3); see also Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting that alien may seek habeas review under both the INA and 28 U.S.C. 2241). In holding we may exercise habeas jurisdiction, we emphasize we do so pursuant to 2241 and need not therefore grant a certificate of appealability as is required in some habeas cases. Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996); accord Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680, 681-82 (5th Cir. 1997).