Opinion ID: 151874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sra

Text: By the 1970s, the medical model was falling out of favor. [9] Congress had come to reject the medical model's core premisethat prison sentences could rehabilitate offendersas well as its unfair results. Offenders who committed the same crime served wildly different sentences because of the district courts' unfettered discretion and because the Parole Board determined how much of a sentence would actually be served. [10] See S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221. To address the vices of the medical modelmainly unwarranted sentencing disparityCongress enacted the SRA, which codified the traditional purposes of sentencing as the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). [11] These factors mapped onto punishment, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation, respectively. Unlike under the medical model, however, rehabilitation was no longer the dominant concern; in fact, while rehabilitation could be a relevant factor in sentencing, it could not drive a prison sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (directing that the court, when considering a prison sentence, recognize that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation). Congress feared that allowing the district court to fashion a sentence based on these purposes in each individual case would perpetuate the unwarranted sentencing disparity that plagued the medical model. Congress therefore created the United States Sentencing Commission (the Commission) and tasked it with devising sentencing guidelines that would dictate offenders' sentences. The new model had three main goals: (1) honesty, (2) fairness, and (3) proportionality. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 1A1.1(3) (Nov. 1, 2009) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738, 767, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). [12] To achieve honesty, Congress abolished parole and replaced indeterminate with determinate sentencing. Judges sentenced offenders to fixed terms and offenders served the full prison sentence imposed. [13] To achieve fairness, Congress severely curtailed the district court's discretion to fashion a sentence by requiring that, in typical cases, the court impose a sentence within the range identified by sentencing guidelines. To achieve proportionality, Congress replaced the theory that sentences should be imposed primarily to rehabilitate offenders with the theory that sentences should be no harsher than necessary to serve the four traditional purposes of sentencing. The Sentencing Commission's Guidelines and the courts' role in sentencing were to reflect these goals. The rest of this subpart explains how the SRA divided the roles in sentencing between the Commission, the district courts, and the courts of appeals, respectively.