Opinion ID: 1520697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: 5. Failure to Investigate and Prepare Alibi Defense

Text: Trial counsel did not adequately investigate the possibility of, or prepare, an alibi defense for the defendant. This was clearly a breach of trial counsel's duty to conduct an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of a given case. See Hampton v. United States, 340 A.2d 813, 817 (D.C.App.1975). The issue remains whether the defendant's purported alibi defense was substantial. The defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing and during the trial that he had been with his mother at the time of the robbery. Detective Leadman testified at trial that the defendant made a statement to him on September 19, 1975, which placed the defendant at the scene of the robbery at 4:30 p. m., on September 17, 1975. The defendant's mother testified at the evidentiary hearing that she does not remember whether her son was with her at the time of the robbery on September 17, 1975. The defendant has produced the names of no other potential alibi witnesses. Trial counsel testified that the defendant never told him before trial about the alibi witness. In view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the defendant did not have a substantial alibi defense.3 Even assuming that a substantial alibi defense existed, trial counsel's conduct did not blot it out. Defendant's mother testified that by the time the defendant was arrested on May 18, 1976, she did not remember whether the defendant was with her on the date of the robbery. Thus, even an immediate investigation by trial counsel upon his appointment eight months later on February 9, 1977, would not have revived the memory of defendant's only alibi witness. Additionally, the jury in defendant's trial did hear the defendant's version of his alibi defense. While this testimony was first brought out on cross-examination, the Court finds that this adversary context did not blot out the essence of the defendant's alibi defense. This Court deplores the evidence of trial counsel's incompetence as demonstrated by the record before it. The ruling herein should not be interpreted as an acquiescence in or approval of such incompetence.4 However, the law is clear that trial counsel's conduct must blot out the essence of a substantial defense before a new trial will be granted. This is a difficult burden and one which has not been met by the defendant. In view of the foregoing, it is, this 9th day of November, 1979, ORDERED, that the defendant's motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel be, and hereby is, denied. /s/ John R. Hess John R. Hess Judge 1 Lovasco held that in cases of pre-indictment delay, proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2048. Later federal court decisions have held that the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice even before analysis of the reasons for the delay is conducted. See, e. g., United States v. West, 568 F.2d 365, 367 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case, defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice, so the reasons for the delayapparently due to lack of communication between the United States Attorney's Office and the detective assigned the casedo not enter into the analysis. 3 Dr. O. V. Aiken, a social worker at the Lorton Youth Center, testified at the motions hearing that the defendant told her after his conviction that he was with a Mr. Michael Haywood during the robbery, but that Mr. Haywood, and not the defendant, had control of the gun. This testimony had no impact on the Court's view of the alibi defense. 4 Defendant has placed considerable reliance on the decision of Judge Stewart of the Superior Court in United States v. Sweet, Criminal No. 9994-75, W.D.L.R. Vol. 106, No. 180 p. 1677. Sweet is factually analogous primarily because it involves the same trial counsel as the instant case. In Sweet, the court held that trial counsel blotted out a substantial defense by failing to interview and call as a witness an individual who testified at the post-trial hearing that the complainant in the rape case talked with him the day after the defendant allegedly raped her. The complainant told this witness that she had made up the rape story so as to avoid an embarrassing situation. No such substantial defense was blotted out in the instant case. Rather, the government developed substantial circumstantial evidence as well as direct identification testimony implicating the defendant. Unlike Sweet, trial counsel's incompetence did not reduce the trial to a swearing contest but, instead, had little, if any, impact on the outcome of the trial. I am as displeased as the majority by the quality of representation which appellant received. So, obviously, was the trial judge. Nonetheless, the trial judge correctly applied the law to the facts. The majority is unwilling to do so. [2]