Opinion ID: 3013817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attempted Reckless Endangerment

Text: People v. Kassebaum, 744 N.E. 2d 694, We do not disagree with previous 698 (N.Y. 2001) (emphasis added) BIA decisions concluding attempt offenses (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 110.00). Yet can be crimes involving moral turpitude. by its very nature acting recklessly is See, e.g., Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. inconsistent with the mens rea required for 536, 545 (BIA 1992) (stating “[t]here is no attempt. A person cannot intend to distinction for immigration purposes in commit a criminally reckless act. He or respect to moral turpitude, between the she either acts recklessly or does not. commission of the substantive crime and Addressing the statute at issue in our case, the attempt to commit it” (citation the New York Appellate Division agreed omitted)). We also take no issue with with this sentiment, concluding that the previous BIA decisions that it cannot go “ c ri m e o f a t te m p t e d reckle s s behind a valid final record of conviction endangerment is nonexistent since it is a — i.e., that the BIA cannot examine the nonintent offense.” People v. Trepanier, particular facts of a case. See, e.g., Matter 84 A.D. 2d 374, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1982) (affirming the lower court’s decision 1992). In its opinion in this case, however, to dismiss the indictment as to this charge). the BIA glosses over the peculiar conflict Further, New York courts have concluded between attempt crimes and recklessness.6 in other contexts that the concept of an Under New York law, a “person is atte mpte d r e c kl e s s n es s c r im e is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime nonsensical. See, e.g., People v. Terry, when, with intent to commit a crime, he 104 A.D. 2d 572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (stating “one cannot legally be found guilty of attempted murder in the 5 We also reject Knapik’s second degree by reckless conduct”). contention that his conviction is The only contrary authority in New distinguishable from manslaughter or York is People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150 assault with a deadly weapon because the (1967). Foster was charged with reckless endangerment statute does not manslaughter in the first degree and require injury to an individual. With ultimately pled guilty to attempted regard to reckless acts, moral turpitude manslaughter in the second degree. On inheres in the conscious disregard of a appeal, Foster argued his conviction had substantial and unjustifiable risk of severe no basis in law and violated due process. harm or death. Knapik’s good fortune in The New York Court of Appeals rejected not injuring or killing anyone does not this argument, concluding that Foster change the quality of his actions. knowingly accepted his plea “in 6 satisfaction of an indictment charging a As noted previously, we exercise crime carrying a heavier penalty. In such de novo review in resolving this issue. 7 case, there is no violation of defendant’s Cir. 2002) (quoting Drakes v. Zimski, 240 right to due process.” Id. at 153. F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2001)). 7 This means, in the context of our case, that the Our case, how eve r, is elements of the underlying offense must distinguishable from Foster. The concern necessarily establish that all convictions driving Foster was manipulation of the involve moral turpitude. Wilson, 350 F.3d state criminal process — i.e., a defendant at 381-82. See also Michel, 206 F.3d at may not induce a plea agreement, receive 263; Okoroha v. INS, 715 F.2d 380, 382 a reduced sentence and then challenge his (8th Cir. 1983).8 Attempted reckless or her conviction. See id. at 153-54 (“The defendant declined to risk his chances with a jury. He induced the proceeding of 7 which he now complains. . . . While there Valansi, like Wilson (see note 4 may be question whether a plea to and accompanying text), is an aggravated attempted manslaughter is technically and felony, not moral turpitude, case. logically consistent, such a plea should be 8 In an opinion issued the same day sustained on the ground that it was sought as the opinion in this case, we engaged in by [the] defendant and freely taken as part an extensive analysis of the categorical of a bargain which was struck for the approach as applied in aggravated felony defendant’s benefit.” (emphasis added)). cases. See Singh v. Ashcroft, No. 03- In contrast, Knapik’s plea did not decrease 1532, __ F.3d __ (3d Cir. Sept. __, 2004). the level of the charged offense or subject Singh noted that while most prior Third him to a less severe sentence. He was Circuit cases had employed the “formal charged with first degree reckless categorical approach” from Taylor v. endangerment and he pled guilty to United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) — a t t em p t e d f i r st d e g r e e r e c k l es s which focuses exclusively on the statutory endangerment. More importantly, we are elements of the underlying offense — not reviewing a due process challenge to a others deemed it permissible to look state court conviction; we are assessing the beyond the statutory elements of the immigration implic ations of that underlying offense. conviction. As noted previously, the moral In reconciling these cases, Singh turpitude inquiry is categorical. De Leon- delineated two situations in which the R eyn oso, 293 F.3d at 635; formal categorical approach properly may Rodriguez-Herrera, 52 F.3d at 239-40. be abandoned. The first is when the terms Under the categorical approach, we have of the statute on which removal is based cautioned against going “beyond the invites inquiry into the facts of the offense as charged and scrutiniz[ing] the underlying conviction. For example, underlying facts” of a case to determine Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. whether a crime involves moral turpitude. 2004), and Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 214 (3d 225 (3d Cir. 2003), concerned 8 U.S.C. 8 endangerment is not a crime involving moral turpitude because, categorically § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which defines an speaking, the concept makes no sense. aggravated felony as an offense that Attempt (necessarily requiring intent to “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss commit a crime) is inconsistent with to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” recklessness (which, by definition, implies In both cases, however, the relevant acting without intent). Terry, 104 A.D. 2d criminal statute did not include a “loss at 573; Trepanier, 84 A.D. 2d at 380. Put greater than $10,000” element. See differently, we cannot say that a conviction Nugent, 367 F.3d at 168 n.2 (quoting 18 for attempted reckless endangerment Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3922(a)); Munroe, 353 necessarily involves moral turpitude F.3d at 226 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20- without also abandoning the categorical 4). Nonetheless, both Nugent and Munroe approach.9 found it proper to examine the amount of loss established. See Nugent, 367 F.3d at 175 (noting the parties had “stipulated that convicted is divided into discrete Nugent’s state conviction was based on a subsections, and (2) it was unclear from bad check amounting to only $4,831.26”; the BIA’s decision which subsection it Munroe, 252 F.3d at 226 (looking to the believed Hamdan was convicted under and indictment and record of conviction). which subsections implicated moral turpitude). The second exception to the categorical approach is when the Examination of these cases further underlying criminal statute is written in the supports our position in this case. Both disjunctive (i.e., the statute criminalizes Nugent and Munroe dealt with a provision similar but legally distinct conduct) such of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), that some, but not all, convictions under not relevant to the moral turpitude inquiry. the statute place the alien within the And unlike the statutes at issue in Valansi removal category for im migra tion and Hamdan, New York’s reckless purposes. Valansi was such a case. 278 endangerment statute is written neither in F.3d at 214-17 (in entering plea for the disjunctive nor in subsections. embezzlement of monies from her Accordingly, the Government has supplied employer bank, petitioner avoided (and we can think of) no principled reason admitting that she intended to defraud, not to apply the formal categorical thus not qualifying as an aggravated felony approach. for removal purposes). See also Hamdan, 9 98 F.3d at 187-89 (granting the petition for While the Government does not review and remanding for further ask us specifically to abandon the examination of the record of conviction categorical approach in cases such as ours because (1) the Louisiana kidnapping (i.e., when it counsels against deportation), statute under which Hamdan was that would be the effect. Under the 9