Opinion ID: 2320057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Complaints of Christine Serabian and George E. Meng, Esquire.

Text: MRPC 1.1 requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client, and to exercise the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. Respondent violated MRPC 1.1 when he failed to appear at at least one client meeting, arrived an hour late each to two of the mediation sessions, and participated unprepared in the second mediation session. As this Court has stated, such actions do not reflect the thoroughness or preparation that the legal profession demands, and constitute a violation of MRPC 1.1. See generally Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ficker, 319 Md. 305, 315, 572 A.2d 501, 509 (1990) (holding that it is a violation of Rule 1.1 when the attorney appears in court unprepared or fails to appear completely). Furthermore, such neglect is a clear violation of MRPC 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 83, 753 A.2d 17, 31 (2000) (We have held that failure to be punctual in a scheduled court appearance is `not only detrimental to the administration of justice but also constitute[s] discourteous conduct degrading to the tribunal.') (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Howard, 282 Md. 515, 523, 385 A.2d 1191, 1196 (1978)). Steinberg likewise violated MRPC 1.3, which requires that a lawyer act with reasonable diligence and promptness in his representation of Ms. Serabian. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 522, 823 A.2d 651, 661 (2003), we held that failure to deliver a client's file after termination of the representation, despite repeated requests from the client, is a violation of Rule 1.3. Steinberg's representation was terminated in February 2004 and, despite numerous requests from Ms. Serabian for the file, Respondent did not return her papers until much later. During that time, Ms. Serabian needed the file to represent herself in the ongoing litigation. She suffered significant set-backs in her efforts to overturn the sanctions imposed upon her due to the omissions of Respondent. Additionally, Steinberg's inexcusable six-month delay in withdrawing formally from the court case, after his representation was terminated, demonstrates a lack of requisite diligence and promptness. MRPC 1.4 requires a lawyer to comply promptly with reasonable requests from the client for information, to explain on-going matters to the extent reasonably necessary to allow a client to make informed decisions, and to keep the client informed about the status of pending matters. Respondent here failed to explain adequately the outcome of the mediation sessions. Most significantly, the record shows that Respondent presented the contents of an offer made by opposing counsel to Ms. Serabian's brother, [31] but failed to communicate the contents of the offer to Ms. Serabian. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 784 A.2d 516 (2001), we held that the attorney violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) by explaining the status of the case and the consequences of dismissal to one of his clients, but not to the others in the group he was representing. [32] In other words, we held that keeping one client reasonably apprised of the status of the case to the exclusion of another affected client, is a violation of MRPC 1.4. Harris, 366 Md. at 396-97, 784 A.2d at 527-28. Additionally, we held that the attorney violated Rule 1.4(a) by not keeping the client reasonably informed as to the status of the client's pending case, which included the failure to relay a settlement offer made by the client's insurance company. Harris, 366 Md. at 399, 784 A.2d at 529. Respondent likewise violated Rule 1.2 by his actions. This Rule requires that a lawyer abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of the representation and whether to settle matter, and also requires the lawyer to consult with the client as to the means by which the objectives may be achieved. Respondent further violated Rule 1.4 by failing to communicate on at least two occasions the status of depositions. Steinberg, on the eve of the 13 November 2003 deposition, cancelled the scheduled deposition, falsely citing as a justification Ms. Serabian's refusal to appear. Notwithstanding this direct misrepresentation, Steinberg did not communicate the cancellation to Ms. Serabian, evidenced by her showing up, unaccompanied by her counsel, at opposing counsel's office to be deposed on 13 November. The record shows that Steinberg and Mr. Meng rescheduled the deposition for 22 January 2004. While Ms. Serabian knew she would be deposed sometime in January, Respondent did not communicate the final date to his client, also a violation of Rule 1.4. Respondent violated MRPC 1.5(c), regarding contingency fees, when he failed to memorialize the fee agreement in a writing signed by the client. Implicit in this failure is the absence of memorialization of the method by which the fee was determined, the percentage(s) that would have accrued to the Respondent in the event of settlement, and an allocation of responsibility for the litigation expenses. MRPC 1.8 mandates that a lawyer shall not enter an agreement with a client that limits the lawyer's liability for professional negligence, unless the client is represented independently. The hearing judge found that Respondent sought to have Ms. Serabian, without the assistance of independent counsel, execute a release of any malpractice claims during their 5 October 2004 meeting. He neither advised her of the desirability of obtaining counsel, nor allowed her to do so. The findings of fact indicate that when she entered the room, the Release in Full was sitting on the table, ready to be signed. This is a violation of MRPC 1.8. MRPC 1.16 requires a lawyer to withdraw from a case if the client terminates the representation. The testimony from Ms. Serabian and Mr. Meng indicates that Respondent's representation was terminated in February 2004. Both Ms. Serabian and Mr. Meng repeatedly requested that Steinberg withdraw from the caveat proceeding, but the motion to withdraw was not filed until 13 August 2004. Steinberg, therefore, violated MRPC 1.16 when he failed to withdraw in a timely fashion despite Ms. Serabian having terminated his representation of her. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131, 153, 825 A.2d 430, 443 (2003) (holding that the attorney violated Rule 1.16(a)(3) when she failed to strike her appearance after the client terminated the representation). Respondent also violated MRPC 3.2 and 3.4. From 12 March 2003 (the date on which Mr. Meng made initial contact) through the date of his actual withdrawal, Steinberg engaged in a pattern of delay which included unreturned phone calls, unanswered letters, cryptic excuses for lack of communication, and failure to comply with reasonable requests to depose his client, Ms. Serabian. Mr. Meng, in particular, attempted to contact Respondent on numerous occasions. The vast majority of those calls went unreturned and often resulted in the scheduling of hearings or meetings without Steinberg's cooperation or input. Respondent's behavior also displayed an unwillingness to comply with discovery, in violation of MRPC 3.2 and 3.4. The Petition and complainants' testimony show that Respondent twice contacted Mr. Meng in order to cancel on the eve of both scheduled deposition dates. The first cryptic excuse given was that of a sick relative who required medical attention. The second was the misrepresentation regarding Ms. Serabian's refusal to attend the 13 November 2003 deposition. Respondent's actions not only prolonged litigation to an unreasonable degree, in violation of MRPC 3.2, but also violated Respondent's duty imposed by MRPC 3.4(d) to comply with proper discovery requests from opposing counsel. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 255, 263-64, 849 A.2d 423, 431, 436-37 (2004) (holding that an attorney violated MRPC 3.2 and 3.4(d) when he failed to appear for deposition); see generally Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. West, 378 Md. 395, 401-03, 836 A.2d 588, 591-92 (2003) (finding that respondent violated both MRPC 3.2 and 3.4(d) when neither he nor his client appeared for deposition). [33] Additionally, the record shows that Meng attempted to contact Respondent on several occasions in February, March, and in June in order to procure Steinberg's formal withdrawal from the caveat case. It was not until 8 June that he was able to speak with Respondent, at which time Steinberg again made a misrepresentation as to his having filed the motion to withdraw. MRPC 4.1 prohibits a lawyer from making false statements of material fact to third persons. This includes misrepresentations made to clients, opposing counsel, or any other third person. Throughout his representation of Ms. Serabian, the record reveals several instances where Respondent made misrepresentations. The most glaring is the misrepresentation made to Mr. Meng regarding the 13 November deposition, when Respondent told opposing counsel that his client refused to be deposed. Ms. Serabian testified at the ex parte hearing that she did not make such a statement. A second major misrepresentation followed Steinberg's discharge, when he informed both Ms. Serabian and Mr. Meng that he had filed a motion to withdraw. He did not file actually until months later. These actions further violate MRPC 8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, or which constitutes a material misrepresentation.