Opinion ID: 4437281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Text and Structure of the Regulation

Text: We begin with the text and structure of § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii). “A regulation should be construed to give effect to the natural and plain meaning of its words.” Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 366 F.3d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Crown Pacific v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 197 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999)). Section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) requires an employer to “identify and evaluate the respiratory hazard(s)” in the workplace. The dictionary defines “hazard” in relevant part to mean “a thing or condition that might operate against success or safety: a possible source of peril, danger, duress, or difficulty.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1961) (emphases added); see also Oxford English Dictionary Online (defining hazard as “a physical object which is regarded as a source of potential difficulty or danger”) (last visited July 30, 2019) (emphasis added). Consistent with this definition, the Secretary has interpreted § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) to require evaluation of respiratory hazards whenever there is “potential” for overexposure of employees. The Commission disagreed with this interpretation of § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii). Under the Commission’s interpretation, § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) is triggered only if a respirator is “necessary to protect the health” of employees under § 1910.134(a)(2). The sole purpose of PIZZELLA V. SEWARD SHIP’S DRYDOCK 17 § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii), according to the Commission, is to enable the employer to choose the correct respirator. The Commission wrote, “This requires the Secretary to show there was a significant risk of harm necessitating the use of respirators.” See Weirton Steel Corp., 20 BNA OSHC 1255, 1259 (No. 98-0701, 2003). A “significant risk of harm” exists if “a reasonable person familiar with the circumstances surrounding an allegedly hazardous condition . . . would recognize a hazard warranting the use of protective equipment.” See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 7 BNA OSHC 1291, 1295 (No. 76-4990, 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 659 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1981). More specifically, as we noted above, respirators are “necessary” under the Secretary’s regulations if the exposure level for a specified air contaminant exceeds OSHA’s maximum permissible exposure limit for that contaminant. 29 C.F.R. §1910.1000(e). The Commission gave two reasons for its reading of § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii). Neither is persuasive. First, the Commission wrote that the word “the” before “respiratory hazard(s)” “plainly presumes that such hazards are present and directs the employer to assess them; the provision does not state that the employer must evaluate the workplace for such hazards.” (Emphasis in original.) The Commission is not correct that § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) “presumes that [respiratory] hazards are present.” Section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) requires employers to both “identify and evaluate the respiratory hazard(s) in the workplace.” (Emphasis added.) The word “identify” indicates that, contrary to the Commission’s analysis, the regulation applies even where an employer does not already know of hazards in the workplace. And, the fact that employers must “identify 18 PIZZELLA V. SEWARD SHIP’S DRYDOCK . . . the respiratory hazard(s) in the workplace” indicates that in some circumstances, employers carrying out such duty will identify no such hazards. In light of the clear meaning expressed by the term “identify,” the Commission’s dispositive reliance on the regulation’s use of the word “the” was improper. Where, as here, there are better indicators of a regulation or statute’s meaning, we have rejected excessive reliance on the distinction between definite articles such as “the” and indefinite articles such as “a” and “any.” See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2009); City of Ketchikan v. Cape Fox Corp., 85 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016); NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 227–28 (3d Cir. 2013). Second, the Commission placed great weight on the location of § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) in the subsection titled “Selection of respirators,” “alongside provisions that deal exclusively with either respirator selection factors or respirator specifications.” To start, “the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947). Further, it not unreasonable to include a provision requiring employers to assess whether it is necessary to select a respirator within a subsection on the “selection of respirators.”