Opinion ID: 622506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence To Convict Davis

Text: This is apparently the first appeal of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1521, part of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007. Pub.L. 110-177, § 201(a), 121 Stat. 2536 (2008). The statute provides: Whoever files, attempts to file, or conspires to file, in any public record or in any private record which is generally available to the public, any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an individual described in [18 U.S.C.] section 1114, on account of the performance of official duties by that individual, knowing or having reason to know that such lien or encumbrance is false or contains any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. Its legislative history explains that the statute is intended to penalize individuals who seek to intimidate and harass Federal judges and employees by filing false liens against their real and personal property. H.R.Rep. No. 110-218, pt. 1, at 17 (2007), 2007 WL 2199736 at . Reed and Davis conducted a recorded telephone conversation on January 5, 2010, the day Judge Hovland issued an order denying Reed's motion to dismiss the pending firearms charge. The two discussed placing UCC liens for $2.4 million in cash and $1 million in silver against federal entities. The next day, Davis electronically filed a Form UCC-1 financing statement with the Recorder of Deeds in Washington, D.C., listing as debtors, 1. U.S. District Court of North Dakota/Daniel Hovland, and 2. Acting United States Attorney, Lynn C. Jordheim. The filing immediately became a public record because the Recorder of Deeds office accepts electronically filed statements without review. At trial, an FBI agent testified that, during a January 20 interview, Davis admitted to filing this lien, threatened to file more liens, and referred to the statute prohibiting false liens as ass wipe. Testifying in his own defense at trial, Davis asserted a right to file the liens against Judge Hovland and Jordheim and stated that the liens had monetary value, but denied that the liens were intended to harm, or in fact harmed, Judge Hovland and Jordheim. The government's evidence included a May 5, 2010, Notice of Default that Reed filed with the District of North Dakota Clerk of Court demanding payment of $3.4 million and referencing the ten-digit number assigned by the Recorder of Deeds to the financing statement filed by Davis. When asked during cross-examination, What do you believe [Judge Hovland and Jordheim] owe you or Mr. Reed, Davis replied, Well, they owe me Mr. Reed. They took Mr. Reed from us on their sovereign jurisdiction. We want him back. Judge Hovland and Jordheim testified that they are not indebted to Davis. Not challenging this formidable evidence that he knowingly filed a false or fictitious lien against Judge Hovland and U.S. Attorney Jordheim in a public record and on account of their performance of duties in a pending case, Davis argues that the government nonetheless failed to prove that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1521 because the UCC-1 financing statement listed no real or personal property of Judge Hovland or Jordheim as collateral. This insufficiency contention requires us to discern what types of false or fictitious filings Congress intended to prohibit by the term lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an individual government official. When a sufficiency argument hinges on the interpretation of a statute, we review the district court's statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Gentry, 555 F.3d 659, 664 (8th Cir.2009). We of course assume that Congress intended to adopt the plain meaning or common understanding of the words used in a statute. See United States v. Idriss, 436 F.3d 946, 949 (8th Cir.2006). The words lien and encumbrance, though encompassing a wide variety of commercial and financial devices, have a universally accepted meaning in this country. A lien is a property right, usually a legal right or interest that a creditor has in a debtor's property, whether perfected or merely claimed. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 198, 127 S.Ct. 2352, 168 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007); Mead v. Mead, 974 F.2d 990, 992 (8th Cir.1992), quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(37); S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp., Ltd., 297 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir.2002); Black's Law Dictionary 941 (8th ed. 2004). Likewise, an encumbrance is a claim or liability that attaches to property, usually though not always real property. Permanent Mission, 551 U.S. at 198, 127 S.Ct. 2352; Black's, supra, at 568; UCC § 9-102(32). The act of filing does not create the lien or encumbrance. Rather, filing is a method, often the exclusive method, of perfecting a lien claim against the rights of those who assert competing claims against the property. See, e.g., UCC § 9-310(a). This confirms that Congress limited the prohibition in § 1521 to financial harassment filings that harass by claiming rights to the property of public officialsnot to all types of false public filings that might harass public agencies or officials in other ways. Thus, if Davis had filed his lien against the District of North Dakota, without naming Judge Hovland and Jordheim as debtors, he might or might not have committed some other offense, but he would not have violated § 1521. Most liens are created by a contract between the debtor and a creditor, such as a security agreement. Some arise by operation of law, such as a materialman's lien or a federal tax lien. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6321. Filing requirements to perfect a lien are prescribed by statute and vary with the type of lien. We deal here with a filing under the UCC, which has been adopted with minor variations by every State. The UCC governs the creation, attachment, and perfection of security interests, which are contractual liens within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1521. See UCC §§ 9-102(72)(A), 9-201(a), 9-203(a), 9-301. Under the UCC, most security interests are perfected by the filing of a financing statement, typically a Form UCC-1. § 9-310(a). The financing statement is sufficient if it names the debtor, names the secured party (creditor) or a representative, and indicates the collateral covered. § 9-502. An indication that the collateral covers all assets or all personal property is sufficient. § 9-504. A financing statement is filed when it is accepted by the filing office. § 9-516(a). Davis's financing statement was accepted without substantive review. The financing statement filed by Davis, which he testified was a lien, identified Judge Hovland and Jordheim as debtors. Davis filed the statement with the D.C. Recorder of Deeds. Normally, the UCC provides, a financing statement is filed in the State where an individual debtor resides, here, North Dakota. See §§ 9-301(1), 9-307(b)(1), 9-501(a). But the UCC also provides that the District of Columbia is a default debtor location. § 9-307(c). Moreover, § 9-307(h) provides, The United States is located in the District of Columbia, and the first debtor named in Davis's financing statement was a United States District Court. Thus, Davis chose a filing office whose public records would likely be searched by a party looking for adverse claims against the properties of Judge Hovland and Jordheim, such as prospective lenders, credit card issuers, and credit rating agencies. He also filed the facially suspect statement electronically and it became a public record without review. The issue raised by Davis on appeal focuses on the incoherent collateral section of his Form UCC-1 financing statement. To frame the issue, we set forth nearly all of this lengthy portion of the statement: 4. This Financing Statement covers the following collateral: Accepted for full value alleged court case #4-09-cr-00076-DLH [Reed's pending prosecution], United States District Court for the District of North Dakota; ... Michael Howard Reed ... Private Discharging and Indemnity Bond number XXXXXXXXXXX;[ [2] ] Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury; [then listed as acting agents are the U.S. Attorney General; the Department of Justice; the North Dakota Governor and Attorney General; three criminal investigators; all District of North Dakota district and magistrate judges; the District Court Clerk; Jordheim and an Assistant U.S. Attorney; and an Assistant Federal Public Defender]; HACTC Detention Center ... Rugby, North Dakota ... Jurat Affidavit of Obligation, Affidavit and Affirmation of the Facts. This UCC lien in this instant action is $2,400,100.00 USD for default of court case # 4-09-cr-00076-DLH and $1,000,000.00 (million) in sliver [sic] coinage for copyright violations of MICHAEL HOWARD REED TM [no doubt meaning trademark]. The adjustment of this filing is from Public Policy and UCC 1-104. All proceeds, products, accounts and fixtures including order(s) wherefrom are released to the debtor.... The Secured Party stands by the Treaty of 1778, 1863, The Declaration of Princess Anne 1704 In regards to Mohegan Indians v Connecticut, The Royal Proclamation of King George 1763, Declaratory Judgment ; Esens=Little Shell occupants of the land. Davis argues the government failed to prove a violation of § 1521 because this statement did not identifyor, in UCC parlance, indicateany property of Judge Hovland and Jordheim as collateral. But a lien or encumbrance by definition always concerns the property of the debtor, so we question whether the evidence would be insufficient as a matter of law on this ground if the government proved that a false or fictitious lien was actually filed in a public record and proved the other elements of § 1521 beyond a reasonable doubt. [3] We need not decide that question in this case because we conclude that a reasonable jury could find based on the collateral section of Davis's financing statement that he filed a lien against the property of Judge Hovland and Jordheim and therefore violated § 1521: First, Davis's long narrative reciting the collateral covered by the financing statement began by naming a pending District of North Dakota case being prosecuted by Jordheim's office before Judge Hovland, sufficient evidence that the lien was filed on account of the performance of [their] official duties. Second, the description identified an Obligationa debtand then recited the amount owed, $3.4 million. Next, the description named types of personal property against which valid liens can be filedsliver [sic] coinage and proceeds, products, accounts and fixtures. Finally, the description named, not a typical security agreement, but ancient treaties, declarations, and proclamations, the types of legal documents out of which liens could arise as a matter of law. The lien was actually filed and became a public record. From the perspective of third parties searching this public record for claims that might lessen the debtors' interests in their properties, the lengthy description of collateral, however incoherent, was likely to cause the financial harassment intended. No doubt the filing would not have succeeded in perfecting a priority claim to any property as a matter of commercial law. But that is not a defense. The prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1521 is triggered by the filing of a false or fictitious lien, whether or not it effectively impairs the government official's property rights and interests. Indeed, legal insufficiency is in the nature of the false, fictitious, and fraudulent liens and encumbrances that Congress intended to proscribe. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences supporting it, the evidence was sufficient to convict Davis of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1521. United States v. Ewing, 632 F.3d 412, 415 (8th Cir.2011) (standard of review).