Opinion ID: 3065750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jurisdiction to Consider the Merits of

Text: Singh’s Petition for Review [20] Singh also makes a substantive due process argument that the district court should have “look[ed] to the underlying merits of Singh’s removal to determine if he has raised a substantial argument that he is unremovable” and therefore entitled to habeas relief. The district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to do so, treating Singh’s argument as a “backdoor attempt to have this Court review the underlying merits of Petitioner’s removal, which this Court cannot do [under the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 231 (2005)].” [21] The REAL ID Act “expressly eliminated habeas review over all final orders of removal,” A. Singh v. Gonzales, 4534 SINGH v. HOLDER 499 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2007), and provided that a petition for review in the court of appeals is the “sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Congress’ purpose in enacting the REAL ID Act was to “restor[e] judicial review ‘to its former settled forum prior to 1996’ ” by eliminating suits in district courts and funneling review of removal orders directly to the courts of appeals. A. Singh, 499 F.3d at 977 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 174 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 299). The REAL ID Act was thus intended to reinstate a system “abbreviat[ing] the process of judicial review,” id. at 975, by “effectively limit[ing] all aliens to one bite of the apple with regard to challenging an order of removal,” id. at 977 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (quoting Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005)). [22] Congress has clarified, however, that the REAL ID Act was not intended to “preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175. Accordingly, the general rule is that “[e]ven post-[REAL ID Act], aliens may continue to bring collateral legal challenges to the Attorney General’s detention authority . . . through a petition for habeas corpus.” Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 946; see also Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “the jurisdiction-stripping provision [of the REAL ID Act] does not apply to federal habeas corpus petitions that do not involve final orders of removal”). “We must be careful to maintain the distinction Congress made in the REAL ID Act between those challenges that [must be directed to the court of appeals in a petition for review] and those that must be retained in and decided by the district court,” so as not to unduly circumscribe district courts’ habeas jurisdiction. Nnadika v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 484 F.3d 626, 632 (3d Cir. 2007). We should also avoid the opposite pitfall, however, and recognize the lack of jurisdiction where a habeas petition “directly implicate[s] the order of removal.” Id. (discussing Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2006), as an SINGH v. HOLDER 4535 example of such a case). The portion of Singh’s habeas petition that asks us to consider the underlying merits of his removal order presents an example of this exception to the rule. [23] Although as a technical matter Singh’s habeas petition seeks relief from immigration detention without asking the court to exercise jurisdiction over his final order of removal, this portion of his habeas petition is wholly intertwined with the merits of his removal order. Singh makes the same argument in his habeas petition as he makes in his petition for review — that he is not removable because his convictions do not qualify as aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). See Haider, 438 F.3d at 910. Because this portion of his habeas petition “does nothing more than attack the IJ’s removal order,” id., we lack jurisdiction to review it other than on a petition for review. We emphasize, however, that determining when the REAL ID Act preempts habeas jurisdiction requires a case-by-case inquiry turning on a practical analysis, and that there are many circumstances in which an alien subject to an order of a removal can properly challenge his immigration detention in a habeas petition without unduly implicating the order of removal. For example, in Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 2008), we held that habeas jurisdiction existed to review a challenge to immigration detention based on the detainee’s argument that he was actually a United States citizen and therefore could not properly be held in custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which applies only to “alien[s].” Similarly, in Casas-Castrillon, we had jurisdiction to consider whether it was constitutional to detain an alien subject to removal without an individualized bond hearing evaluating his risk of flight or dangerousness. See 535 F.3d at 946. And in A. Singh, we reasoned that there was jurisdiction to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to timely petition for review because “a successful habeas petition in this case will lead to nothing more than ‘a day in 4536 SINGH v. HOLDER court’ for Singh, which is consistent with Congressional intent underlying the REAL ID Act.” 499 F.3d at 979. In each of these cases, the habeas challenge to detention had a basis independent of the merits of the petition for review. Even where the bases for the habeas petition and petition for review were related, as in Flores-Torres, the detention challenge could stand alone. Here, by contrast, this portion of Singh’s habeas challenge rests entirely on his assertion that he has presented a meritorious argument in his petition for review. He explicitly asks the habeas court to evaluate whether “the Government is unlikely to prevail in removal proceedings because [he] has raised a substantial argument that he is not removable” in his pending petition for review. Singh therefore advocates for an odd system wherein the district court would examine the arguments against removal that an alien expects to present to this court in his petition for review, and potentially release him from detention based on a prediction about what this court is likely to conclude when it decides his pending petition for review. Such a scheme would contravene Congress’ express intention to limit review of removal orders to “one day in the court of appeals.” A. Singh, 499 F.3d at 978 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175). Indeed, were we to permit habeas review that “look[s] to the underlying removal claim” as Singh requests, every alien petitioning for review of his removal order could also petition for habeas review on this basis, arguing that his detention is impermissible because he will raise a meritorious argument in his pending petition for review, and his removal is therefore not reasonably foreseeable. This result would severely undermine the streamlined system Congress sought to establish by enacting the REAL ID Act. Although we are sympathetic to Singh’s desire for judicial review at the earliest possible moment, the REAL ID Act dictates that such review must take place in the proceedings related to his petition for review, SINGH v. HOLDER 4537 rather than in the present appeal.7 Whether or not this is the optimal system as a matter of policy, it is consistent with the Suspension Clause because it provides a substitute remedy offering the same scope of review as habeas. See Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) and INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001)).