Opinion ID: 6335605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the defendant was at least eighteen years old

Text: at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of vi- olence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony con- victions of either a crime of violence or a con- trolled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Such a designation sets the defendant’s criminal history category to Category VI, and when the offense of conviction’s statutory maximum sentence is between twenty and twenty-five years (as is the case for Major), the designation sets the offense level to 32. See id. § 4B1.1(b)(3). For Major, this resulted in a Guidelines range of 210–262 months’ imprisonment, which was adjusted to 210–240 due to the statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment for his convictions. 3 The district court sentenced Major to 240 months’ incarceration. As we have noted, Major was convicted of two prior offenses that qualify him for the career offender designation: a previous felony drug conviction and a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Major does not challenge these facts. But, he complains, he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping in 1993, over twenty-five years prior to his sentencing in this case. He also argues that the nature of that crime is unrelated 3Without the career offender designation, Major’s offense level would have been 28, his criminal history would have been Category III, and his Guidelines range would have been 97–121 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. No. 20-2829 23 to the instant conviction and that the aggravated kidnapping conviction has “no bearing” on his propensity to commit other offenses similar to the drug distribution charges at issue in this case. For support, Major points to a Sentencing Guidelines policy statement, which says that “[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). Although the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the departure provisions “obsolete,” “district courts can still take guidance from the departure provisions” and consider them “when assessing the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Bell, 887 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding Major’s arguments, the district court handed down a sentence squarely within the concededly applicable career-offender Guidelines range. Such sentences are presumed to be reasonable on appeal. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). Moreover, in “reviewing sentences for substantive reasonableness, we do not substitute our judgment for that of a district judge, who is better situated to make individualized sentencing decisions.” United States v. Porraz, 943 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2019). In fact, we will “uphold a sentence so long as the judge offers an adequate statement of his reasons consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. Here, the district court did just that. It thoroughly explained the reasons for its sentence, citing in particular the 24 No. 20-2829 following facts: Major’s prior conviction for aggravated kidnapping, his previous drug distribution conviction, the fact that he “went right back to dealing drugs” after serving a fourteen-year sentence for his drug conviction, his decision to deal in the particularly dangerous combination of heroin laced with fentanyl, his leadership role in the conspiracy, the need to protect others from him, his attempt to obstruct justice, his minimization of his own wrongdoing, and his role in the unfortunate death of A.K. Given these facts, the court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Major as a career offender and imposing a Guidelines sentence of 240 months in prison.