Opinion ID: 2508525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Conduct Individual Death Qualification Voir Dire

Text: Defendant claims the trial court erred in conducting group voir dire, particularly death-qualification voir dire, thereby violating his constitutional rights to due process, an impartial jury and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 17.). We conclude no error was committed. In Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, we held that [i]n order to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects [of open-court voir dire], this court declares, pursuant to its supervisory authority over California criminal procedure, that in future capital cases that portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror which deals with issues which involve death-qualifying the jury should be done individually and in sequestration. (Fns. omitted.) In People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46, we recognized that our holding in Hovey had been abrogated by Code of Civil Procedure section 223, part of Proposition 115 enacted by the voters in 1990. That section provides in pertinent part that in criminal cases, including death penalty cases, [v]oir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.) Defendant argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 223 is unconstitutional because Hovey's requirement of individual death qualification, which this court has not overruled, is constitutionally based. He is incorrect. In Hovey ... we clearly indicated that we adopted the rule pursuant to our supervisory authority over California criminal procedure and not under constitutional compulsion, and that we did so because the prejudicial effects associated with death-qualifying voir dire in open court had not been shown to be actual but only potential. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1135, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Further, defendant contends that Code of Civil Procedure section 223 did not overrule Hovey because it did not refer to that case, and because its caveat that group voir dire take place where practicable can be taken as a codification of Hovey. This was essentially the argument made by the defendant in Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91. The court in Covarrubias examined at length the language, purpose and ballot arguments behind Proposition 115 and concluded that section 223 was intended to overrule Hovey's holding that individual sequestered voir dire is required during death qualification. ( Covarrubias, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91.) We endorsed Covarrubias's holding in People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pages 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46, and do so again here. Finally, defendant claims that voir dire in his case was not practicable within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 223. [S]ection 223 vests the trial court with discretion to determine the advisability or practicability of conducting voir dire in the presence of the other jurors. ( Covarrubias v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184, 71 Cal. Rptr.2d 91.) A trial court that altogether fails to exercise its discretion to determine the practicability of group voir dire has not complied with its statutory obligation. ( Ibid. ) Our cases have suggested that group voir dire may be determined to be impracticable when, in a given case, it is shown to result in actual, rather than merely potential, bias. (See People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1135, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Defendant contends there was such indication of actual bias in the group voir dire process in the present case. In defendant's new trial motion, and again here on appeal, defendant points to the voir dire of two prospective jurors, Robert C. and Henry E., who answered affirmatively when asked [a]re your feelings about the death penalty such that in every case in which you have the opportunity to impose the death penalty you would impose it? In both cases, the trial court responded in ways that indicated the answers were inappropriate and not in conformity with the law. Defendant notes prospective jurors on the same panel whose voir dire followed Robert C. and Henry E. did not give the same unqualified affirmative response to that question. He surmises that these prospective jurors, including several persons who were seated as jurors on the case, were influenced by the trial court's responses to Robert C. and Henry E. and gave answers that conformed to law but may have been untruthful, i.e., they understated their pro-death-penalty bias. Defendant in the new trial motion sought to bolster this argument with testimony from Dr. Schoenthaler concerning the Hawthorne effect, a phenomenon observed in social science research whereby the act of observation changes the behavior of the subjects observed, as when research subjects change their behavior to conform to what they perceive as the expectations of the researchers. (See Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion (2002) 90 Cal. L.Rev. 1, 20, fn. 90.) At the threshold, the Attorney General claims that defendant did not object below to group voir dire and the issue is waived. It appears that defense counsel objected to the repetitive questioning of the death-qualification voir dire, because I think ... it's creating ... an atmosphere of guilt and death. Defense counsel did not, however, propose individual, sequestered voir dire as a solution to this perceived problem, but rather sought to have the trial court conduct death-qualification voir dire only when prospective jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty, as expressed in the questionnaire, were unclear. Defendant did not raise the issue of individual voir dire until his motion for a new trial. Defendant's claim is therefore not preserved on appeal. Even if it were, it is without merit. The possibility that prospective jurors may have been answering questions in a manner they believed the trial court wanted to hear identifies at most potential, rather than actual, bias and is not a basis for reversing a judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with group voir dire.