Opinion ID: 197434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strip Searches, Visual Body Cavity Inspections, and the Fourth Amendment

Text: 32 [I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that amendment. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). Thus, under Robinson, if the arrest was lawful, a searching officer does not need to have any further justification for performing a full body search of an arrestee. See United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 217 (1st Cir.1997). Moreover, a search incident to arrest need not occur at the scene of the arrest, but may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 1237, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). 33 However, Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an arrestee's body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest. To the contrary, any such search must still be reasonable: 34 Holding the Warrant Clause inapplicable to the circumstances present here does not leave law enforcement officials subject to no restraints. This type of police conduct must [still] be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 35 Edwards, 415 U.S. at 808 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 1239 n. 9 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). In Robinson itself, the Court noted that the search at issue, while thorough, did not have extreme or patently abusive characteristics. 414 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. at 477 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)). Later, in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), the Court explicitly stated that [w]e were not addressing in Edwards, and do not discuss here, the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate. Id. at 646 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 2609 n. 2. Robinson simply did not authorize a strip and visual body cavity search. Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991); see also Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir.1983)([T]he Robinson court simply did not contemplate the significantly greater intrusions that occur[ ] in a visual body cavity inspection.). 36 A strip and visual body cavity search thus requires independent analysis under the Fourth Amendment. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Supreme Court noted that [t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884. Rather, the evaluation of the constitutionality of a warrantless search 37 requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. 38 Id. In Wolfish, the Supreme Court applied this balancing test to a prison policy that required arraigned pre-trial detainees to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution. Id. at 558, 99 S.Ct. at 1884. Noting that this practice instinctively gives [the Court] the most pause, id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, the Court found only that visual body cavity searches can be conducted on less than probable cause. Id. at 560, 99 S.Ct. at 1885. In so holding, Wolfish did not, however, read out of the Constitution the provision of general application that a search be justified as reasonable under the circumstances. Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir.1986). 39 In applying the Wolfish balancing test to searches of the type to which Swain was subjected, courts have recognized that strip and visual body cavity searches impinge seriously upon the values that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect. These searches require an arrestee not only to strip naked in front of a stranger, but also to expose the most private areas of her body to others. This is often, as here, done while the person arrested is required to assume degrading and humiliating positions. Our circuit has recognize[d], as have all courts that have considered the issue, the severe if not gross interference with a person's privacy that occurs when guards conduct a visual inspection of body cavities. Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 887 (1st Cir.1983). The Seventh Circuit has described strip searches involving the visual inspection of the anal and genital areas as demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir.1996) ([A] strip search can hardly be characterized as a routine procedure or as a minimally invasive means of maintaining prison security. Indeed, a strip search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual.); Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 711 (9th Cir.1990)(Strip searches involving the visual exploration of body cavities are dehumanizing and humiliating.). 40 On the other side of the scales, courts must weigh the legitimate needs of law enforcement. Institutional security has been found to be a compelling reason for conducting warrantless strip and visual body cavity searches. See, e.g., Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884 (prisoner strip searches after contact visits justified because detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers). Some courts have held that a warrantless strip search may also be justified by the need to discover and preserve concealed evidence of a crime. See, e.g., Justice v. Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir.1992). But see Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1446 (strip and visual body cavity search with less than probable cause only permitted to protect institutional safety and security; search for evidence must be justified by probable cause). 41 Balancing these interests, courts have concluded that, to be reasonable under Wolfish, strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons. 1 See, e.g, Justice, 961 F.2d at 192; Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir.1989); Weber, 804 F.2d at 802; Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir.1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir.1984); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273. This court has held that the reasonable suspicion standard is the appropriate one for justifying strip searches in other contexts. See Wood, 89 F.3d at 929 (prison visitors); United States v. Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 166 (1st Cir.1991)(non-routine border searches); cf. Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 236-38 (1st Cir.1990) (officers protected by qualified immunity for warrantless strip search of arrestee where there were exigent circumstances and probable cause to believe controlled substance would be found on arrestee's person). Accordingly, it is clear that at least the reasonable suspicion standard governs strip and visual body cavity searches in the arrestee context as well. 42 Defendants, and the court below, rely upon United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296 (1st Cir.1975). In that case, the defendant, who was arrested after a sale of cocaine, was subjected to a strip search, including a visual inspection of his rectum. Id. at 299. This court approved that search as [a] post-arrest search of the person, plainly approved by Edwards, and found that a lack of individualized suspicion that the suspect was harboring evidence did not render the search unreasonable. Id. at 300 & n. 2. 43 Klein was decided before significant Supreme Court precedent in the area, and we are bound by the Supreme Court's developing doctrine. Klein predates Lafayette, decided in 1983, where the Supreme Court stated that Edwards did not answer the question of when a strip search was appropriate. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 2609 n. 2. Klein also predated Wolfish, with its explicit recognition of the invasiveness of strip and visual body cavity searches. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. at 1884. Subsequent to Klein, and sensitive to the developing doctrine, this circuit has repeatedly recognized that strip and/or visual body cavity searches are not routine, and must be carefully evaluated. See Burns, 907 F.2d at 236-37; Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 170-72 (1st Cir.1986); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir.1985); Arruda, 710 F.2d at 887. Accordingly, to the extent that Klein held that strip and visual body cavity searches are simply searches incident to arrest, and do not need to be further tested for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, it does not survive Lafayette, Wolfish, and this court's subsequent strip search decisions.