Opinion ID: 1584008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: open meetings actclosed session

Text: The relators first argue that pursuant to the Open Meetings Act, all communications during a validly convened closed session are privileged. Relating to closed sessions, the Open Meetings Act provides in part that [a]ny public body may hold a closed session by the affirmative vote of a majority of its voting members if a closed session is clearly necessary for the protection of the public interest or for the prevention of needless injury to the reputation of an individual and if such individual has not requested a public meeting. The subject matter and the reason necessitating the closed session shall be identified in the motion to close. [8] As an initial matter, with regard to our interpretation of public meetings laws, we have stated that public meetings laws are broadly interpreted and liberally construed to obtain the objective of openness in favor of the public. [9] Provisions permitting closed sessions and exemption from openness of a meeting must be narrowly and strictly construed. [10] Insofar as the relators argue that all communications during a closed session are privileged, such argument is in error. We find no language in the Open Meetings Act that would support the assertion that the Legislature intended to create an absolute privilege for all communications occurring while a public body is in a closed session. Unlike other Nebraska statutes where the Legislature expressly created discovery privileges, the Open Meetings Act is notably silent in this regard. For example, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 71-7903 (Reissue 2003), relating to peer review committees, provides that [t]he proceedings, minutes, records, and reports. . . are privileged communications which may not be disclosed or obtained by legal discovery proceedings . . . . Another example is found in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-2933(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006), which states that a mediation communication is privileged. . . and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence. As is evident from these, and other similar statutes, [11] when the Legislature intends to create a discovery privilege, it does so with clear and unambiguous language. In view of the fact that the Open Meetings Act contains no language relating to a closed session discovery privilege, we conclude that no such privilege exists in Nebraska. Our conclusion is also based on the fact that if these communications were privileged solely because they occurred during a closed session, a private litigant would be left without the ability to challenge the validity of the public body's actions during a closed session. To determine whether a public body, in a closed session, has acted outside of its authority, a private litigant must have access to those communications by means of a legitimate discovery request. To conclude otherwise would, in essence, immunize a public body from any challenge relating to the propriety of its closed session. We recognize that under certain circumstances, allowing a public body to enter into a closed session, away from the public view, serves to protect the public's interest. However, we do not conclude that granting a litigant access to communications of a closed session, by way of a limited, legitimate discovery request, will harm the public interest. In dealing with a discovery request relating to information from a closed session, a trial court may increase its supervision of the discovery process to ensure that sensitive or confidential information is protected through the creation of an appropriately tailored protective order. Furthermore, our determination that there is no absolute discovery privilege for communications that occur during closed sessions does not necessarily mean that all communications during closed sessions are discoverable. All other recognized evidentiary privileges are still applicable. Thus, although there is no absolute privilege for closed session communications, to the extent the communications implicate other evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the communications are protected. We further note that our conclusion is in accord with the reasoning of cases from other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. For example, in Springfield Local Sch. v. Assn. of Pub. Sch., [12] the Ohio Court of Appeals explained that under Ohio's version of the Open Meetings Act, there is no absolute privilege to be accorded discussions held in executive session but a trial court, in its discretion, may limit discovery. The court further stated: Although these provisions [of the act] suggest a strong policy against public disclosure . . . the provisions protect only against access to the general public. They do not necessarily protect against disclosure in the course of litigation upon a proper discovery request, if the information is otherwise discoverable. [13] Thus, we conclude that there is no absolute privilege for communications made during a closed session. However, to the extent those communications implicate other recognized privileges, the communications are protected.