Opinion ID: 859212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: review of death sentences

Text: ¶69 We review the jury’s finding of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of a death sentence for abuse of discretion. A.R.S. § 13-756(A). “A finding of aggravating circumstances or the imposition of a death sentence is not an abuse of discretion if ‘there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” State v. Delahanty, 226 Ariz. 502, 508 ¶ 36, 250 P.3d 1131, 1137 (2011) (quoting State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 341 ¶ 77, 160 P.3d 203, 220 (2007)).
¶70 Boyston first argues that we should apply a less deferential abuse of discretion standard as set forth in State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n.18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n.18 (1983). We recently rejected the same argument in Cota, 229 Ariz. at 153 ¶ 91, 272 P.3d at 1044.
¶71 Boyston also contends that the abuse of discretion standard under § 13-756(A) violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the United States Supreme Court mandates “meaningful” appellate review of death sentences. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990). We have previously 34 rejected similar constitutional challenges to the statute. Nelson, 229 Ariz. at 191 ¶ 50, 273 P.3d at 643.
¶72 The jury found as to each first degree murder that Boyston had been convicted of a serious offense, A.R.S. § 13751(F)(2), and was convicted of one or more other homicides that were committed during the commission of the offense, id. § 13751(F)(8). The jury also found, as to the murders of Alexander and Timothy, that Boyston committed the offenses in an especially cruel manner. Id. § 13-751(F)(6). Boyston does not contest the (F)(2) finding, which was supported by his convictions of attempted second degree murder of Alexandria and attempted first degree murder of Shirley, but he challenges the (F)(8) and (F)(6) findings.
¶73 To prove the (F)(8) aggravator, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicides took place during a “continuous course of criminal conduct” and were “temporally, spatially, and motivationally related.” State v. Armstrong (Armstrong III), 218 Ariz. 451, 464 ¶ 67, 189 P.3d 378, 391 (2008) (quoting State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 167, 170 ¶ 15, 76 P.3d 438, 441 (2003)). ¶74 The murders all occurred within minutes of each other in or just outside Mary’s apartment; thus, they are temporally 35 and spatially related. Boyston, however, contends that there is no evidence from which the jury could conclude the three murders were motivationally related. We disagree. ¶75 The jury could reasonably conclude that Boyston committed all three murders for the reason he expressed when he entered Mary’s apartment immediately before the killings: “to take care of everyone who did [him] wrong.” He also mentioned this motivation earlier that day, exclaiming that all those he thought had mistreated him would regret it. When he later saw Shirley, he said, “Oh, I better get you, too,” and as he chased and shot her, he further expressed his motivation for the offenses, stating, “You mother fers crossed me too many times.” ¶76 Boyston then returned to Mary’s apartment and stabbed Timothy to death. The jury could reasonably conclude that Boyston killed Timothy because he was among those Boyston thought “did him wrong.” Boyston argues Timothy’s murder was motivated by defending himself from Timothy, who was fighting him. But the jury found Boyston guilty of premeditated first degree murder, and thus necessarily rejected the theory that Boyston was defending himself or acting in the heat of passion. As such, the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding the (F)(8) aggravator.
36 ¶77 To show that a murder is especially cruel, the state must “prove[] beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.’” State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 188 ¶ 25, 236 P.3d 409, 415 (2010) (quoting State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 18, 951 P.2d 869, 883 (1997)). “The entire murder transaction, not just the final act, may be considered.” State v. McCray, 218 Ariz. 252, 259 ¶¶ 31, 33, 183 P.2d 503, 510 (2008).
¶78 As to both Alexander and Timothy, Boyston argues that their suffering was not objectively foreseeable because he was in a “PCP blackout” and a “dissociative state which resulted in delusions, hallucinations and psychosis.” In support, Boyston cites evidence of PCP intoxication introduced in the penalty phase. But Boyston did not introduce any evidence of PCP intoxication during the aggravation phase. Although some evidence presented in the guilt phase suggested that Boyston was “super high” from smoking PCP the night before the murders, and the jury could properly consider that evidence in reaching its aggravation-phase verdicts, see A.R.S. § 13-752(E), (I), several witnesses testified that he seemed normal at the time of the murders. We cannot conclude the jury abused its discretion in finding the (F)(6) aggravator. 37
¶79 George Newton testified that, after he heard gunshots in Mary’s apartment, Alexander came outside and said of his first gunshot wound, “George, it hurts.” Alexander walked about ten feet from the door before falling on his face. Boyston followed him outside and, saying “I might as well finish you right now,” fired two shots into Alexander’s back. ¶80 The medical examiner, Dr. Vladimir Shvarts, testified that Alexander had three through-and-through gunshot wounds: two in the back that exited through the chest, and one through the arm near the elbow. Each of the gunshot wounds was in an area where there were pain receptors. Detective Olson, an expert in bloodstain patterns, testified that blood drops found inside the apartment and leading to bloodstains outside were “consistent with [Alexander] dropping the blood from his right arm.” ¶81 The jury could reasonably find that Boyston shot Alexander in the arm at close range inside the apartment and that Alexander suffered significant physical pain from that wound. See State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 34, 859 P.2d 131, 144 (1993) (finding victim endured physical pain when he lay on the ground with a gash in his head for at least eighteen seconds and possibly as long as two to three minutes before being killed). The jury could also reasonably conclude that Boyston 38 knew or should have known that he had caused such pain, as he followed the wounded and staggering victim outside, where he shot him twice more in the back.8 Thus, the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding the (F)(6) aggravator established for the murder of Alexander.
¶82 Witnesses described Boyston coming out of Mary’s apartment fighting with Timothy, then pulling out a knife and stabbing him several times. Two witnesses testified that they heard Timothy yelling for help. ¶83 Dr. Shvarts testified that Timothy received nine stab wounds and several abrasions in various parts of the body, each of which would have caused pain. Three stab wounds to Timothy’s chin and neck were non-fatal, as were two to the upper back. Four stab wounds were to the chest, one of which was fatal. The fatal wound was almost 3.5 inches deep and penetrated the pericardium and the heart. Dr. Shvarts testified that the wound likely would have been fatal within a few seconds to minutes, but could possibly have taken up to twenty minutes to cause Timothy’s death, depending on how quickly he lost blood. Dr. 8 Boyston’s argument that the state must present evidence that the defendant actually knew the victims would suffer pain misstates the law, as the state must prove merely that the defendant “knew or should have known that the victim would suffer.” McCray, 218 Ariz. at 259 ¶¶ 31, 33, 183 P.2d at 510 (emphasis added). 39 Shvarts could not opine how long it would have taken Timothy to become unconscious. But Timothy’s hands were covered with blood, which, as Dr. Shvarts testified, indicated he likely used his hands to try to stop the bleeding. ¶84 From the evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Timothy suffered physical pain while being stabbed to death and that Boyston knew or should have known of that. Timothy “had ample opportunity not only to feel pain, but also to contemplate his impending death.” State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 388 ¶ 62, 224 P.3d 192, 204 (2010). Indeed, Timothy’s cries for help and his attempts to stop his own bleeding show that he was not only experiencing physical pain, but also mental anguish. See id. (concluding that the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding especial cruelty when the victim was stabbed twentyone times and died by bleeding to death while choking on his blood). Thus, the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding the (F)(6) aggravator established for Timothy’s murder.
¶85 Boyston alleged thirty-four mitigating circumstances, including diminished mental capacity, troubled family background, PCP intoxication, love and support of his family, impact of execution on his family, and remorse. The State presented evidence to rebut many of those mitigating factors. The jury did not find the proffered mitigation sufficiently 40 substantial to call for leniency. See A.R.S. § 13-751(C), (E). E. Evaluating penalty phase for abuse of discretion ¶86 We will overturn a jury’s imposition of a death sentence only if “no reasonable jury could have concluded that the mitigation established by the defendant was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Cota, 229 Ariz. at 153 ¶ 95, 272 P.3d at 1044 (quoting Morris, 215 Ariz. at 341 ¶ 81, 160 P.3d at 220) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of independent review, we have said that “[t]he (F)(8) multiple homicides aggravator is extraordinarily weighty.” State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 184 ¶ 81, 140 P.3d 950, 967 (2006). In light of that aggravator as well as the (F)(2) and (F)(6) findings, even if we assume Boyston proved each of his alleged mitigating circumstances, the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding the mitigation insufficient to warrant leniency. See A.R.S. § 13-751(C).