Opinion ID: 2994334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanctions Against Mr. Vickers

Text: Mr. Vickers also appeals, arguing that the sanctions imposed against him were illegal. When reviewing Rule 16(f) sanctions, whether it is dismissal or sanctions against an attorney, we apply the abuse of discretion standard. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 642; Smith v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 165 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). In the order on the motion to reconsider, the district court ordered Mr. Vickers to pay the previously ordered $285 sanction for failure to make initial disclosures. The court further ordered Mr. Vickers to refer himself to the Missouri and Illinois attorney disciplinary agencies for failing to inform Mr. Spain of the dismissal of the case. Finally, the court required Mr. Vickers to pay $2,000 in attorney’s fees to defense counsel to defer the additional expenses and annoyance occasioned by [Mr. Vickers’s] conduct in this case. Prior to the show cause hearing, but after writing the letter, Mr. Vickers paid the $285 and referred himself to the disciplinary authorities, which left the $2,000 in attorney’s fees. Following the show cause hearing the court found Mr. Vickers in civil contempt to compel compliance with the remaining sanction of $2,000. Mr. Vickers initially argues that the sanctions were illegal because they resulted from his letter to his client which he contends was Constitutionally-protected speech and, therefore, non-contemptuous. However, Mr. Vickers fails to recognize that the sanctions were imposed not because of his letter to his client, but based on several failures and delays in the prosecution of the case by Mr. Vickers. In its July 24 order imposing the sanctions, the court expressly stated that the sanctions were based on a pattern of neglect and slovenly practice by Mr. Vickers. The July 24 order made clear that, should Mr. Vickers fail to comply with the sanctions, the court would obtain compliance through its contempt power in order that the authority and dignity of [the court] be maintained. At the show cause hearing, the court noted [t]he purpose of civil contempt is essentially to compel compliance and found Mr. Vickers in contempt of court, not based on the contents of his letter, but for his failure to pay the $2,000 in attorney’s fees that had been ordered. Given the history of delay in the record, the district court did not err in holding Mr. Vickers in contempt for failing to comply with valid, court-ordered sanctions. Furthermore, Mr. Vickers argues that the court unjustifiably ordered the show cause hearing before the five days allotted for compliance with the order had expired. However, after receiving a carbon copy of the letter from Mr. Vickers to Mr. Spain stating that he would not comply with the conditions ordered by the district court, the district judge was reasonable by concluding that Mr. Vickers would not comply within the allotted five days. In fact, at the time of the show cause hearing on August 6, 1998, Mr. Vickers had not yet fully complied with the conditions.