Opinion ID: 2507746
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Incapacitation due to a serious health condition

Text: To claim the protection of the FMLA, Gregg had first to demonstrate that she was incapacitated for four or more days and unable to perform the essential functions of her employment. [13] It is evident from its decision that the court found Gregg was incapacitated by multiple health conditions from January until April 11, 1997. The superior court found that when Gregg requested leave without pay on April 11, she was clearly suffering from the cumulative effect of several health and mental conditions that constituted a serious health condition that made her unable to perform the functions of a police officer. These included the facts that [s]he was pregnant, she was recovering from injuries sustained in an automobile accident and she was going through significant mental stress. She was a victim of domestic violence and she needed time to deal with her personal issues. The court specifically found that testimony by Gregg's expert, Dr. Cynthia Dodge, who retroactively diagnosed that Gregg had suffered from post traumatic stress disorder from January to July 1997, had the strong ring of truth. Dr. Dodge based her conclusion on the traumatic event[s] of domestic violence that Gregg suffered in January of that year. Dr. Dodge explained that the symptoms of nightmare[s] ... intrusive memories... high levels of anxiety to the point of sleeplessness ... confusion, feeling overwhelmed and distressed, and a hypervigilance that Gregg reported were all consistent with a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder. The doctor further concluded that Gregg's accident injuries and pregnancy contributed to this condition. [14] Dr. Dodge's testimony is the only medical evidence that Gregg suffered from an incapacitating health condition in April 1997. The parties stipulated that Gregg did not receive treatment from a health provider in April  for either her accident injuries or emotional distress  and Gregg presented no evidence at trial to show whether or not she received care related to her pregnancy at that time. It is undisputed that the health professionals that Gregg saw in January released her back to her duties. The Municipality disputes the court's conclusion on two levels. First, it argues that, as a matter of law, Gregg cannot establish that she was incapacitated in April, when she requested further leave, because she did not obtain a contemporaneous medical provider's diagnosis that she was unable to work. Secondly, it argues that Dr. Dodge's testimony is not credible, and that therefore the trial court's finding is without basis. Based upon its reading of federal precedent, the Municipality argues that the FMLA requires a contemporaneous diagnosis of the employee's incapacity by a health care provider. It notes that Gregg was, at the time of her request for leave, technically released back to work. And it points to the fact that Gregg saw no additional doctors in April to establish that she was not entitled to the Act's protection at that time. It is true that federal courts generally require that a plaintiff base proof of an FMLA claim on a health care provider's diagnosis, at some point, that the employee cannot work (or could not have worked) because of the illness. [15] But we do not read this precedent as substituting the opinion of on-the-scene medical professionals for the ultimate judgment of the fact-finder. For one thing, an employee could, as in this case, suffer from a condition, such as post traumatic stress disorder, which is not immediately capable of diagnosis by a non-specialist. When an employee is actually incapacitated by illness, the failure to get a correct diagnosis cannot disqualify an employee from the Act's protection. To hold that a doctor must agree, contemporaneously and at all times, that the employee is unable to work, places a burden on the employee that we find nowhere in the plain text of the Act, and ignores the reality of debilitating illness. Instead, the Act allows an employer to request a contemporary diagnosis at the time it grants FMLA leave; a safeguard that balances the rights of employer and employed. [16] The Municipality did not do so. [17] While this does not obviate the requirement that Gregg show that a medical professional considered her to be incapacitated, there was substantial evidence in the record in addition to Dr. Dodge's testimony that corroborates the conclusion that Gregg was incapacitated. [18] Once the trial court accepts evidence of a medical professional, in this case Dr. Dodge, that the plaintiff was incapacitated, that finding is protected by the clearly erroneous standard. [19] The Municipality also argues that the fact that health care providers she saw in January actually released Gregg back to work should bar her claims of incapacity in April. While the health care providers that Gregg saw in January 1997 released her back to work, the court found that  possibly due to the narrow focus of their examinations  they did not fully diagnose her combination of debilitating health conditions. In fact, they were unable to determine the extent of even her knee injuries because she could not be x-rayed while she was pregnant. The court found that Gregg continued to suffer pain from her accident injuries, and neither release adequately addressed her psychological stress. We conclude from these findings that in the course of Gregg's visits to health care providers in January, the extent of her incapacity was never fully diagnosed, and, therefore, the partial releases do not bar her claim. The Municipality also disputes the factual basis of the court's decision. It asserts that Dr. Dodge's testimony was not credible because her diagnosis was retroactive; because it did not definitely establish that Gregg was incapacitated for three or more days in April; and because Dr. Dodge did not know what the functions of the job of a police officer at APD were... [she] therefore could not and did not render an opinion of whether [Gregg's] alleged post traumatic stress disorder would have prevented her from performing the functions of her police officer job. The Municipality also notes that Dr. Dodge concurred that malingering should be suspected when a litigant seeks a post traumatic stress diagnosis. We address each of these concerns with Dr. Dodge's testimony in turn. While courts have rejected retroactive diagnoses, it is generally for other evidentiary reasons, such as when the diagnosis was also speculative or given without actually examining the patient. [20] The cases cited by the Municipality do not hold that retroactive medical diagnoses may never establish an FMLA claim. Here, the superior court was in the best position to weigh Dr. Dodge's retroactive diagnosis, subject to the rules of evidence, and concluded that her opinion was credible. We will not second guess the credibility of a witness on review. The Municipality also argues that Dr. Dodge's testimony did not establish that Gregg suffered from a period of incapacity in April because Dr. Dodge did not know when the post traumatic stress disorder began nor when it ended, and so could not have testified that a definite period of incapacity existed. The Municipality is correct that Dr. Dodge could not determine the exact date when Gregg's mental and emotional stress became incapacitating. But Dr. Dodge did state that it was her opinion that Gregg suffered the symptoms of a stress disorder from January to July 1997. In this bench trial, it was the court's role to determine if this broad diagnosis, together with the other facts of the record, reasonably established that in April Gregg was incapacitated for three or more days. Finally, the Municipality asserts that Dr. Dodge was not qualified to decide if Gregg was unable to perform the duties of a police officer. Dr. Dodge admitted that she did not know the basic qualifications of a police officer, but she also testified that, in her opinion, a person suffering from post traumatic stress disorder would not be competent for police work because of the high level of symptoms. What Dr. Dodge's testimony lacked in precision on this point is supplied by other non-medical evidence in the record. Beyond Dr. Dodge's diagnosis, the facts as found by the trial court support its conclusion that Gregg was incapacitated. Significantly, Woodward, Gregg's immediate supervisor and the only department officer reviewing her case, admitted in testimony that Gregg might have required a psych evaluation before she could return to work to see if her emotional stress was affecting her judgment. The Municipality as much as admits this in its brief when it states, Based on what he had seen of [Gregg's] behavior, Woodward believed that she should have been assessed for judgment issues. Judgment is a key concern for police officers. Gregg did testify that she continued to suffer from pain from her accident injuries and saw a specialist in October 1997, when she could be x-rayed after the birth of her child. And the fact that Gregg was in an abusive domestic relationship is relevant. A reasonable person could conclude that Gregg was effectively unable to work because she fled the state to leave an abusive husband who followed her, and that she was unable to perform daily activities because she was held in a hostage situation, where her behavior was dictated by the combination of fear for her children, a high level of emotional stress, her accident injuries, and her pregnancy. [21]