Opinion ID: 1201753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The record reveals that K-Mart was not actually aware of the specific water spill involved in this incident. One of K-Mart's employees testified that she walked past the area of the spill twelve times, the last time being one minute before Rhodes fell, without noticing any liquid foreign substance on the floor. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of actual notice of this specific danger. There was, however, evidence from which the jury could find that K-Mart, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the foreign substance on the floor. Rhoades testified to the existence of the foreign substance on the floor where she fell. K-Mart's employee passed this area one minute before the accident. If the substance was there, she, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have observed it; or perhaps it was spilled sixty seconds before the incident; or perhaps there never was any slippery substance on the floor at all. That was for the jury to determine. How long the spill had been on the floor is unknown and impossible to prove. Rhoades could do no more than present the facts available to her. She argues that the fact that the lid and straw were dry when discovered one-half hour after her fall infers that the foreign substance had been there a long time and should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable care, so that K-Mart had constructive notice of the substance. Surely that was some evidence from which the jury could infer that the foreign substance had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time to infer constructive notice. The circumstances described in the testimony may also be sufficient to suggest a reasonable probability that there would be soda and/or water spills, thus precluding the requirement that actual or constructive noticed be demonstrated. In Buttrey we quoted the Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning for this rule: However, when the operating methods of a proprietor are such that dangerous conditions are continuous or easily foreseeable, the logical basis for the notice requirement dissolves. Then, actual or constructive notice of the specific condition need not be proved. Buttrey, 620 P.2d at 553 (citations omitted) ( quoting Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 494 P.2d 839, 840 (1972)). In Jasko, the operating methods, which made the dangerous condition involvedslipping on a slice of pizzaeasily foreseeable, were: (1) a pizza counter located in the store which sold a high volume of pizza slices on waxed paper, (2) testimony that the store was often cleaning pizza spills off a slippery floor, and (3) that customers stood in the aisles eating their pizza slices. Jasko, 494 P.2d at 840. Based upon this operating methods rule, the Colorado court reversed a directed verdict because the defendant's operating methods raised issues concerning defendant's negligence. Id., at 840-41. This operating methods rule has been commonly invoked in other jurisdictions. See generally, Annotation, 85 A.L.R.3d (1978); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888, 892-93 (1983) (provides explanation of the three different interpretations of this rule). More specifically, New Mexico's highest court invoked the doctrine in reversing a JNOV where the plaintiff slipped and fell while walking down a store's stairs after stepping on some gum. Mahoney v. J.C. Penney Co., 71 N.M. 244, 377 P.2d 663 (1962). There, the testimony revealed that no one could say how long the gum had been present, but the store's manager of six years stated that he had previously seen gum on the stairs on several occasions and that the presence of gum on these particular stairs was a common occurrence. Id., 71 N.M. at 249, 377 P.2d at 666. Additionally, a Washington appeals court reversed summary judgment granted to a self-service restaurant in another slip-and-fall case where the evidence revealed that the plaintiff fell after slipping on a liquid-like substance near the self-service line for food, which tended to be a greasy area due to spills. Ciminski v. Finn Corp., Inc., 13 Wash.App. 815, 537 P.2d 850 (1975). That court concluded: [A]n owner of a self service establishment has actual notice that his mode of operation creates certain risks of harm to his customer. Since a self-service operation involves the reasonable probability that these risks will occur, these risks are foreseeable. Thus, it is not necessary to show actual or constructive notice of the specific hazard causing injury, and it becomes the task of the jury to determine whether the proprietor has taken all reasonable precautions necessary to protect his invitees from these foreseeable risks. Id., at 854. Like the circumstances in Jasko, Mahoney, and Ciminski, the circumstances in this case may be such that it was reasonably probable that soda or water would be spilled in this area and thus that risk was foreseeable. One of K-Mart's employees testified that, in her ten months of employment, she had found soda and water on the floors on three or four occasions prior to this incident and had in fact slipped herself. Other testimony revealed that a medium sized cup and a straw and lid were located near a thin stream of water in the aisle where Rhoades fell. Also, the store manager testified that this store had two separate places where a customer could purchase beverages. In addition, the floors of this store were waxed despite a K-Mart safety publication specifically stating that non-waxed floors were the least slippery and that liquid on waxed floors caused instability. Under these circumstances, it may be foreseeable that beverages would be spilled on these waxed floors causing slippery conditions. Therefore, whether Rhoades demonstrated constructive notice and the question of whether K-Mart acted reasonably under the circumstances was for the jury. K-Mart argues that, even if Rhoades did not have to prove actual or constructive notice, the evidence demonstrated that K-Mart exercised reasonable care under the circumstances because its employee had passed down the aisle and had seen no spill one minute before Rhoades' fall. However, whether K-Mart's inspection proceduresemployees looking for spills while performing other dutieswere sufficient to meet the standard of ordinary care under these circumstances was a question of fact for the jury. Thus it was error to direct a verdict.