Opinion ID: 2520411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Schriner's Guilty Plea Plain Error

Text: [¶21] Hall contends that the district court committed plain error in allowing the admission by the State in its case-in-chief of evidence of Schriner's plea of guilty to the crime of operating a clandestine laboratory. The record is clear that her plea was not to the same crime as that with which Hall was charged. Rather, it was for separate and distinct conduct that occurred at another time and another place. [3] [¶22] We apply this standard of review to these circumstances: We have long held that when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstances, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other. Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo.1979). The vitality of this rule is amply demonstrated by Kwallek. There, when a contemporaneous objection was lodged with respect to a conspirator's testimony, this Court had no difficulty holding that admission of that guilty plea evidence constituted prejudicial error presaging reversal of Mr. Kwallek's conviction and remand for a new trial. Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1376. As Capshaw points out, Mr. Justice Jackson clearly explained the basis for this unequivocal rule: It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790, 800 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion). In short, there can be no doubt that the appellant's right to a fair trial embraces his right not to be convicted, in whole or in part, upon the guilty pleas of his conspirators. Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1996). Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 911-12 (Wyo. 2000). [¶23] Here, our analysis need not progress beyond the fact that Schriner's testimony was that she had entered a plea of guilty to a crime, identical in nature to Hall's, but one which had occurred at a wholly separate time and place. To the extent there was any initial confusion about whether her crime involved the same circumstances as that of Hall's crime, that matter was fully clarified for the jury. Moreover, from the outset of this case Schriner's guilty plea and her very favorable deal with the State was at the heart of Hall's defense. We conclude that no error occurred with regard to this issue.