Opinion ID: 2538024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impact on the 1988 Trial

Text: Based on this record, we conclude that the State's use of Smith's testimony was immaterial in the guilt phase of the 1988 trial, but was material in the penalty phase. With respect to the guilt phase, the State has met its burden of showing that Smith's testimonyincluding both his description of the details of the crimes and his play like he was crazy statementwas harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the defense conceded that Johnson had committed the killings but claimed that he was insane at the time because of his drug use. Because Johnson conceded that he had committed the killings, the State's use of Smith's testimony concerning the details of the crimes was immaterial as to Johnson's guilt. And second, because of the circumstances of these killings, the State's use of Smith's play like he was crazy statement was also immaterial as to Johnson's guilt. Under the insanity standard, Johnson was required to show either that he did not know what he was doing or the consequences, or that he did not know that what he was doing or the consequences were wrong. [15] Yet the circumstances of the killings display a degree of awareness on the part of Johnson that belies his claim of not knowing what he was doing or not knowing that what he was doing was wrong. The insanity standard thus posed a virtually insurmountable hurdle for the defense, regardless of Smith's play like he was crazy statement. With respect to the penalty phase, on the other hand, we conclude that the State has not met its burden of showing that Smith's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The penalty phase jury was the same jury that had sat through the guilt phase proceeding and had heard Smith's testimony concerning Johnson's role in committing the crimes and his plan to play like he was crazy. The jury had also heard the prosecutor's final closing argument in the guilt phase wherein he emphasized Smith's play like he was crazy statement, twice: THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counselor. The State may at this time make its final closing. MR. ATKINSON: Thank you, Your Honor. If it please the Court. Counsel. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. He could play like he was crazy [when he was doing all this], and they would send him to the crazy house for a few years, and that would be it. February 1981, the words of Paul Johnson. . . . . There is no dispute in the evidence that Mr. Smith, in fact, was in jail with Mr. Johnson during February and March of 1981. It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Johnson trusted Mr. Smith, and gave him not only the facts of his case in the police report, so that Mr. Smith could read them to him, but talked to him about the events. And it's an undisputed fact that throughout that time period, February and March of 1981, Mr. Smith made note of what was said. Now, counsel suggests to you that you should not believe Mr. Smith because he has a motive to lie. . . . . Well, Mr. Smith does, from time to time become a snitch, and apparently each time he goes to the police and provides them facts, they find those fact of sufficient interest and dependability that they act on those facts, and they reward him for what he has done, and they're willing to believe him the next time he comes forward. It would be kind of hard for a jailhouse snitch to do much to help himself if every time he went to the police when he needed help, and provided them with information about crimes or criminals, he got it wrong, he made mistakes, the information wasn't any good. But more importantly, ladies and gentlemen, as with every witness, including Mr. Smith, you look at what they had to tell you, and you come to a conclusion as to its truth. Paul Johnson did not see [defense expert] Dr. Afield until August of 1981. There would be nothing in the police reports [of Johnson's crimes, which Smith read to Johnson], I suggest to you, that could ever tell Mr. Smith in February of 1981 that this statement would be important to anybody. But it was one of those that Mr. Johnson made, and Mr. Smith remembers it still: He could play like he was crazy [when he was doing all this], and they would send him to the crazy house for few years, and that would be it. (Emphasis added.) Further, the penalty phase jury was specifically instructed that it should base its advisory sentence not just on the evidence that was presented in the penalty phase but also on the evidence that was presented in the guilt phase, which included Smith's testimony and notes. In his opening statement to the penalty phase jury, the prosecutor stated that the State planned to rely entirely on the testimony and exhibits that it had already presented in the guilt phase, which again included Smith's testimony and notes. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Johnson's aunt and two uncles and three of the mental health experts who had testified in the guilt phase. After closing arguments, the judge instructed the jury with respect to the following mental health mitigating circumstances, both statutory and nonstatutory: Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider, if established by the evidence, are as follows: One, the crimes for which the defendant is to be sentenced were committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Two, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired. Three, the capacity of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Four, at the time that the crimes were committed, the defendant was under the influence of drugs. Five, at the time of the crimes, the defendant suffered a disorder of drug dependency which contributed to his committing the crimes. The judge gave the following instruction concerning the burden of proof for mitigating circumstances: A mitigating circumstance need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the defendant. If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists, you may consider it established. The jury then deliberated and returned death recommendations for each of the murders, but the recommendations were nonunanimous on each count: a vote of eight to four for the murder of Evans, a vote of nine to three for the murder of Beasley, and a vote of nine to three for the murder of Burnham. The judge sentenced Johnson to death on all three counts based on several aggravating circumstances [16] and no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Although Smith's testimony appears to be damaging to the defense in general, it appears to be far more consequential with respect to the death sentences than the convictions. Unlike the situation in the guilt phase, where the rigorous nature of the insanity standard and the circumstances of the killings posed a virtually insurmountable hurdle for the defense, the situation in the penalty phase presented a far different scenarioa scenario where Smith's impermissible testimony and notes reasonably may have moved the tipping point. First, the proposed mental health mitigating circumstances posed a lower hurdle for the defense to overcome than the insanity standard, for the defense needed to show only that at the time of the killings Johnson was under the influence of extreme mental or emotion disturbance, or his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, or he was under the influence of drugs, or he suffered from a disorder of drug dependency that contributed to his committing the crimes. This was an entirely different scenario from the guilt phase, where the defense had to show that Johnson was insane. Second, the burden of proof for mitigating circumstances is a more forgiving burden for the defense than the burden of proof for insanity, for jurors must only be reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists in order to consider it established, regardless of the State's showing. Third, unlike the situation with respect to the insanity defense, the facts of these killings are not necessarily inconsistent with the proposed mental health mitigating circumstances, for Johnson conceivably could have proceeded with the killings in a deliberate manner and yet still have been under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or operating with a substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, or operating under the influence of drugs, or suffering from a drug dependency that contributed to his commission of the crimes. In fact, all the mental health experts that testified in the penalty phase attested to this. And finally, the proposed mental health mitigation was extensive, consistent and unrebutted. Unlike the situation in the guilt phase, where the State presented its own mental health experts in rebuttal, the testimony of Johnson's mental health experts in the penalty phase was unrebutted. Dr. Gary Ainsworth, a psychiatrist, testified that at the time of the crimes Johnson was severely intoxicated on amphetamines, that he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was somewhat impaired, and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Dr. Thomas McClane, a psychiatrist, testified that at the time of the crimes Johnson was substantially intoxicated on amphetamines, that he suffered from amphetamine-induced delirium, that he was under extreme mental and emotional disturbance, that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired, and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. And Dr. Walter Afield, a psychiatrist, testified that at the time of the crimes Johnson was very heavily intoxicated on amphetamines, that he exhibited symptoms of amphetamine-induced delirium, that he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, that his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired, and that his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Smith's testimony was material in the penalty phase in two respects. First, Smith's statements concerning the details of the killings may have reinforced in jurors' minds the deliberate nature of the killings and thereby caused jurors to discount the proposed mental health mitigation. Specifically, Smith provided details of the killings that emphasized their cold-blooded nature and that were not provided by any other State witnesses. Smith alone testified that Johnson said the following: that he set the cab on fire to destroy his fingerprints; that he lured Beasley to the back of the car by telling him that he had lost his billfold; that he forced Beasley to his knees before shooting him in the head; and that the death of the deputy was all in the line of duty. And second, Smith's play like he was crazy statement may have contributed to a conclusion, in the eyes of jurors, that the proposed mental health mitigation was inapplicable to Johnson, for this statement makes it appear as though Johnson had decided beforehand to trick his own mental health experts and feign mental health issues in order to evade punishment for the killings. Again, jurors may have discounted the proposed mental health mitigation, which was extensive, consistent and otherwise unrebutted, because of this statement. We note that despite the damaging testimony of Smith, the jury at Johnson's 1981 trial recommended death by the slimmest of marginsa seven-to-five vote. [17] The jury at Johnson's 1988 trial also recommended death by a nonunanimous vote on each count: eight to four, nine to three, and nine to three. Had Smith's testimony been suppressed in 1981, the outcome of either trial might have been different. In sum, based on this record, we conclude that the State's use of Smith's testimony was immaterial in the guilt phase of the 1988 trial but was material in the penalty phase, for the State has failed to show that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the [death sentences]. Guzman, 941 So.2d at 1050. We also conclude that the State's due diligence argument is without merit. [18]