Opinion ID: 836476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Majority's Interpretation is an Unreasonably Broad One

Text: The majority's analysis, taken to its logical conclusion, would eviscerate the mandatory severance provision in MCR 6.120 and give trial courts unfettered discretion to deny defendants' motions to sever. Defendants would never be entitled to severance of any drug offenses because such offenses could always be deemed related. Similarly, defendants charged with criminal sexual conduct offenses would never be entitled to severance; their conduct always could be deemed part of a scheme to molest victims for the defendants' sexual gratification. Such a broad construction of the joinder rules has been appropriately criticized. For example, in State v. Denton, [32] the Tennessee Supreme Court observed that [t]he argument that sex crimes can be construed as part of a continuing plan or conspiracy merely by the fact that they are committed for sexual gratification has previously been rejected. Thus, under the majority's analysis, severance of the charged offenses would be unnecessary regardless how far apart in time and space the offenses occurred or the underlying motive for them. Such outcomes arguably would be appropriate if MCR 6.120 did not require severance when the offenses are of the same or similar character. The federal rule does not require it. As noted previously, however, our rule omits such language from its definition of related offenses. Under the appropriate interpretation of MCR 6.120, defendant's actions in this case were insufficiently linked to be treated as related and part of a single scheme or plan. The Tobey Court rejected the argument that the defendant had a single scheme to make continuous sales of drugs, because the sales were not multiple acts aimed at achieving the same goal. Presumably the defendant in Tobey was just as interested in earn[ing] money from selling drugs as was defendant in this case. However, Tobey expressly rejected finding a single scheme or plan under similar circumstances. Given that Tobey and MCR 6.120 are reconcilable, there is no basis for the majority to abandon this key holding from Tobey. Finally, I note that other states with more expansive joinder and severance rules are typically far more protective of a defendant's rights in this context than the federal rule. These states also grant defendants a mandatory right to severance of multiple offenses under certain circumstances. [33] My conclusion in this case is consistent with the broad interpretation of the right to severance that courts in jurisdictions with similarly worded rules have adopted. Moreover, such an interpretation of MCR 6.120 is entirely in accord with the language of the rule and the staff comment stating that the rule is consistent with Tobey.