Opinion ID: 71643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Apprendi/Booker

Text: Senegal argues that the district court improperly applied a sentence enhancement based on its finding that Mason suffered life-threatening injuries from the shooting. Senegal asserts that without that finding, the district court would not have calculated his Federal Sentencing Guidelines range as 360 months to life for Counts 3 and 7,8 and that because the jury did not make the determination as to the extent of Mason’s injuries, his sentence violates the rules set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Because the district court had statutory authorization to impose a life sentence for these two Counts, Senegal’s argument fails. Apprendi held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. Once the jury’s findings establish the statutory maximum, however, the district court can make findings as to 8 Senegal’s argument regarding the district court’s determination that Mason suffered life-threatening injuries does not appear relevant to Count 3, which charged Senegal with carrying, using, and brandishing a firearm during the UFCU robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2. Because § 924(c)(1)(A) gave rise to both counts, the following analysis applies equally to both, although Senegal’s reasoning seems relevant only to Count 7. 24 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 25 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 additional information that would cause it to impose a higher or lower sentence within the statutorily authorized range. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. . . . For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”). We have held that “[p]ost-Booker, a district court may sentence a defendant on facts not established by either a guilty plea or jury verdict, as long as the [facts] ha[ve] been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Valles, 484 F.3d 745, 760 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 264 (5th Cir. 2006)(citation omitted)). The statute giving rise to Counts 3 and 7 provides that using a firearm during a crime of violence results in penalties “in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Specifically, § 924(c)(1)(A) instructs the district court to impose “not less than 5 years” for using or carrying a firearm, “not less than 7 years” for brandishing a firearm, and “not less than 10 years” for discharging a firearm. We have held that “in the absence of a statutory maximum penalty, the maximum penalty when a term of not less than a certain number of years is provided, means that the maximum is life imprisonment.” United States v. Sias, 227 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2000). Because § 924(c)(1)(A) has no maximum penalty, the district court had statutory authorization to impose life sentences on Senegal for Counts 3 and 7. The district court concluded that Mason suffered permanent or life threatening injuries, looked to the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and applied the four level increase authorized under § 2A2.1(b)(1)(A). This increase resulted in a recommended sentence of 360 months to life, and the district court did not plainly err by choosing a sentence at the upper limit of the suggested range. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A 25 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 26 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 discretionary sentence imposed within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” (citing United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006))).