Opinion ID: 1563434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proper Exercise of Discretion

Text: Jan alternatively asserts that the trial justice's order that required plaintiff to pay Erin from the date of his eligibility to retire was an abuse of discretion. Once again, we disagree. A trial justice's decision concerning the equitable distribution of property in a divorce action involves three phases: (1) determining which assets are marital property; (2) considering the factors set forth in G.L.1956 § 15-5-16.1(a); and (3) distributing the property. DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274, 1277 (R.I.2007); Horton v. Horton, 891 A.2d 885, 889 (R.I. 2006); Koutroumanos v. Tzeremes, 865 A.2d 1091, 1096 (R.I.2005); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138, 1141 (R.I. 2002). This Court accords deference to the factual findings made by the trial justice unless he or she has misconceived the relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d at 1277 (quoting Stephenson, 811 A.2d at 1141). Additionally, the distribution of marital assets will not be overturned unless the trial justice abused his or her discretion. Id. First, Jan attempts to distinguish this case from our decision in Furia, in which we held that when ordering the equitable distribution of the marital property, the Family Court may permit the nonemployee spouse to collect the value of a pension plan that he or she would receive if his or her spouse had retired. Furia, 638 A.2d at 553. We reasoned that the employee spouse should not have unilateral authority over the distribution date of his or her spouse's property through the timing of retirement if the Family Court decided equitably to award the nonemployee spouse a share of the pension. Id. We did not, however, hold that this method of distribution was limited to situations in which the employee spouse was not subject to a mandatory retirement date. In the present case, Jan had the power to deprive Erin of her portion of his pension benefits for five years, a significant period. In light of the trial justice's findings about the ill will between the parties, we conclude that she did not abuse her discretion in this instance. The plaintiff next argues that the trial justice's decision will work a financial hardship on him. He reinforces this assertion with a mathematical calculation illustrating that after taxes, child support, and pension allocations, his $80,000 per year incomea figure that he assumes will be reduced to less than $25,000 a year. The defendant contends that these numbers are dubious, were not presented to the trial justice, and, therefore, should not be considered by this Court on appeal. We note that plaintiff did not provide us with a transcript of the evidentiary hearings before the trial justice. The deliberate decision to prosecute an appeal without providing the Court with a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court is risky business. 731 Airport Associates, LP v. H & M Realty Associates, LLC, 799 A.2d 279, 282 (R.I.2002). Unless the appeal is limited to a challenge to rulings of law that appear sufficiently on the record and the party accepts the findings of the trial justice as correct, the appeal must fail. Id. The partial record in this appeal fails to provide us with even a suggestion that these numerical figures were brought to the trial justice's attention or argued during plaintiff's case-in-chief. Thus, in accordance with our raise-or-waive rule, we will not address this argument. See State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828-29 (R.I. 2008) (It is well settled that a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.). Finally, Jan lists two other reasons why, in his view, the trial justice's distribution order amounts to an abuse of discretion: he posits (1) that the order will effectively grant Erin more than 50 percent of the marital portion of his pension and (2) that the parties, who were fifty years of age at the time Jan became eligible to retire, were not at or near the usual retirement age. [4] In our opinion, these contentions do not warrant reversal. The trial justice undoubtedly was concerned about the parties' malevolent relationship, as evidenced by their conduct during the marriage. Moreover, Erin's job cleaning houses afforded her little opportunity for future advancement and acquisition of capital assets, whereas Jan, as a state police officer and an experienced carpenter, had a greater earning capacity. [5] We are hard-pressed to find an abuse of discretion by the trial justice, whose decision was based on the evidence in this case.