Opinion ID: 689910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence of Addiction

Text: 32 McChristian did not testify. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 33 What evidence, what evidence have you heard that's credible that Mr. McChristian is an addict? Think about that. What evidence have you heard? Do you have the medical records? What you heard was the testimony of a doctor. Dr. Terrell..... 34 .... 35 McChristian knows that his attorney is sending this doctor over for one purpose, to come and testify for him. So what is he going to do? He's going to give self-serving statements. Do we have any evidence that he's an addict? No. 36 McChristian contends that the underlined portions of these statements constituted improper comment on McChristian's failure to testify. 37 [T]he privilege against self-incrimination prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's failure to testify. However, a prosecutor may properly comment upon a defendant's failure to present witnesses so long as it is not phrased to call attention to defendant's own failure to testify. The test is whether the comment is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant's failure to testify, and is ... of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify. 38 United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1083 (9th Cir.1988) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 39 McChristian argues that, because he is the best witness as to whether he is an addict, a comment on the failure to give evidence of addiction calls the jury's attention to the fact that McChristian did not testify. See Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654, 665 (7th Cir.1987) (noting that a no evidence reference more likely refers to defendant's failure to testify when it is highly unlikely that at least a portion of the testimony could have been contradicted by anyone other than the defendant (internal quotations omitted)). McChristian contends that the reference was not harmless because it went to the heart of his primary defense. 40 We are not persuaded. Because McChristian did not object to the prosecution's remarks, the district court's failure to act against them is reviewed for plain error. See Mitchell v. Goldsmith, 878 F.2d 319, 323-24 (9th Cir.1989). In Castillo, this court refused to find reversible error in the prosecutor's remark that the defense failed to produce evidence that Castillo resided in a certain apartment. [W]ouldn't the defense call the apartment manager? the prosecutor asked. 866 F.2d at 1083. This court held that such a comment did not constitute reversible error even though it was objected to at trial. 41 In United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 1958, 95 L.Ed.2d 530 (1987), the prosecutor referred to the lack of any evidence showing that appellants tried to disassociate themselves from another witness. This court held such reference not to be plain error. 803 F.2d at 973. In this case, the prosecutor's comments were made to call attention to the lack of medical records or other credible evidence beyond McChristian's self-serving statements to Terrell. The prosecutor had cross-examined Terrell on that basis. The prosecutor's comments in this case are most like those in Castillo and Lopez. Thus, no plain error is shown. 42