Opinion ID: 1237820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the superior court abuse its discretion in granting the protective order relating to hiibschman's prior dwi conviction and/or prior drinking experience?

Text: The superior court prohibited the City from discovering or using evidence relating to Hiibschman's prior Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) conviction and prior drinking experience pursuant to Evidence Rule 402 [19] and 403. [20] We reverse a trial court's decision on the admission of evidence only for an abuse of discretion. Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528, 532 (Alaska), cert. denied 449 U.S. 876, 101 S.Ct. 219, 66 L.Ed.2d 97 (1980). The City believes that such an abuse occurred; it argues that the probative value of the evidence far exceeds its prejudicial effect. The City intends to use the evidence to establish that Hiibschman and her mother knew of the adverse effects the alcohol had on Hiibschman's functioning. The City claims the evidence shows Hiibschman's lack of judgment on the day of the accident, as well as her mother's own negligence in permitting Hiibschman to drink alcohol. It also shows Hiibschman's tolerance level for alcohol. [21] We hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order. While the City argues that the court's citation to Rules 402 and 403 indicates that the court found the evidence relevant under 402, but nonetheless excluded it under Rule 403... ., the sparse reference by the superior court does not conclusively support the City's interpretation. The court also may have found the evidence irrelevant under Evidence Rule 402. We conclude that the evidence does have marginal relevance. Hiibschman admits knowledge about the effects of alcohol. She has taken Freshman Health in school where she learned about the amount of alcohol that impairs one's judgment. While Hiibschman claims she did not drink enough to impair her judgment, the excluded evidence is only slightly relevant to this point. In Dyer v. State, the court of appeals said that evidence used to impeach a witness by showing that he was an alcoholic at the time of the incident about which he was testifying was only tangentially probative of how much alcohol he actually drank that particular night. 666 P.2d 438, 451 (Alaska App. 1983). Moreover, other evidence exists which suggests Hiibschman's consumption and impairment. The availability of alternative evidence goes to the probativeness of the evidence in dispute. Finally, this information is not relevant to the comparative negligence of Hiibschman's mother, for she did not give Hiibschman alcohol on the day in question. The cases cited by the City are unhelpful. This type of relevance question, requiring the balancing of prejudice and probativeness, is a fact specific inquiry. The potential prejudice, that the jury would punish Hiibschman for her prior conduct, may outweigh the evidence's marginal relevance. The superior court did not abuse its discretion. [22]