Opinion ID: 883677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: malicious prosecution count i

Text: Finally, Sacco contends that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of malicious prosecution as to all defendants. She argues that the District Court erroneously concluded that she did not prove the fifth element for a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The defendants argue that a motion to dismiss on a statute of limitations grounds is not a termination in Sacco's favor; [i]t has no reflection on her innocence or guilt. Thus, defendants assert that Sacco cannot prove the fifth element of malicious prosecution and, therefore, Sacco's claim cannot stand. In order to successfully bring an action for malicious prosecution, the following six elements must be proven: (1) a judicial proceeding commenced and prosecuted against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's responsibility for litigating, prosecuting, or continuing the proceeding; (3) lack of probable cause for the defendant's acts; (4) that the defendant was actuated by malice; (5) that the proceeding terminated in favor of the plaintiff; and (6) that the plaintiff suffered damages. Davis v. Sheriff (1988), 234 Mont. 126, 130, 762 P.2d 221, 224. In the instant case, three of the above elements were discussed or referenced by the District Court in its grant of summary judgment. The other three elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution were not addressed. The District Court concluded that probable cause did exist for Dighans' application for the arrest warrant and for Sacco's subsequent arrest. On that basis the District Court, referencing Dighans' memorandum supporting his supplemental motion for summary judgment, concluded that Sacco could not satisfy the third element required for a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The District Court also determined that there was a question of fact as to element 2 but that the court's conclusion with respect to element 5 was dispositive of the summary judgment question. The District Court determined that the dismissal of the theft charges against Sacco because of the statute of limitations bar was not a termination in favor of the plaintiff and therefore, since all six elements could not be satisfied, Sacco's claim on this issue must fail. We disagree. We conclude that element 5 should be resolved in favor of Sacco. Element 5 must be proven by the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution and concerns whether the proceeding was terminated in her favor. In the instant case, the original complaint against Sacco stated that she committed the offense of theft of photo negatives/proof sheets between Oct. 19, 1989 and 28 June 1990. The Notice to Appear and Complaint was dated November 5, 1990. On January 25, 1991, the charge was amended to delete the statement commit the offense of theft of photo/proof sheets between October 19, 1989 and 28 June 1990 from High Country Independent Press, and the following statement was added  Commit the offense of theft of photograph negatives from the High Country Independent Press. After the charge was amended, any dates for the commission of the offense were deleted. Without explaining his rationale, the Belgrade City Court Judge simply concluded that the alleged theft would have had to occur prior to or on October 19, 1989, and therefore, because the prosecution had not been commenced within one year, the charge was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Sacco's motion to dismiss the charge of theft was granted on June 24, 1991. Sacco cites Miller v. Watkins (1982), 200 Mont. 455, 653 P.2d 126, in her argument that the termination of the proceedings against her were in her favor. In Miller, Watkins brought a counterclaim against Miller for malicious prosecution. Miller had approached brand inspectors contending that Watkins had stolen horses from him and the brand inspectors approached the county attorneys in Musselshell and Fergus counties with this information, resulting in charges of horse theft being filed against Watkins. The charges were ultimately dismissed with prejudice for lack of a speedy trial. In deciding Miller, we cited Lackner v. LaCroix (1980), 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695, 602 P.2d 393, 395, for the proposition that: It is not essential to maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution that the prior proceeding was favorably terminated following trial on the merits. However, termination must reflect on the merits of the underlying action ... A dismissal for failure to prosecute ... does reflect on the merits of the action.... The reflection arises from that natural assumption that one does not simply abandon a meritorious action once instituted. (Underscoring added.) Miller, 653 P.2d at 130. We agreed with the California Court that a dismissal for lack of speedy trial reflected on the merits and could be considered a termination in favor of Watkins. An analogous situation exists in the instant case. Although we disagree with the Lackner court's ultimate conclusion that dismissal because of the bar of the statute of limitations does not reflect on the merits, we agree with the rationale of that case wherein the court stated: In some instances the manner of termination reflects the opinion of the court that the action lacks merit, as where the criminal proceedings are dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence of guilt following a preliminary hearing. [Citation omitted.] In others, the termination reflects the opinion of the prosecuting party that, if pursued, the action would result in a decision in favor of the defendant, as where the district attorney seeks dismissal of the prosecution of a criminal action for lack of evidence [citations omitted] or where the plaintiff in a civil proceeding voluntarily dismisses the action [citations omitted] Lackner, 602 P.2d at 394-95. (Citations omitted.) We agree that certain terminations of proceedings reflect on the merits of the underlying action, and we conclude that, in the instant case, the dismissal of the theft charge against Sacco does reflect on the merits. The original complaint contained dates for the alleged commission of the offense of theft but the amended complaint deleted the dates because, according to the City Attorney, [w]e couldn't prove that they were actually taken during October 19, 1989, and June 28, 1990. The amendment to the complaint to delete the actual dates for the commission of the offense brought the action within the bar of the statute of limitations and ultimately resulted in the dismissal of the charge. (The deletion of the dates on the complaint meant that the only conceivable time period in which any person could have taken the photographs and proof sheets was on October 19, 1989, or before that date. Therefore, because the complaint was not filed until November 5, 1990, the one year time period for the statute of limitations for this offense had expired.) Just as in Miller, we operate under the natural assumption that one does not simply abandon a meritorious action once instituted. Miller, 653 P.2d at 130. Moreover, there is no logic in the contention that a dismissal for lack of speedy trial reflects on the merits of a case but that a dismissal because of the bar of the statute of limitations does not. In either case, one does not simply abandon a meritorious action once instituted. Miller, 653 P.2d at 130. If the original allegations were provable in the first place, the case would have been actively prosecuted within the time limitations set by the statute of limitations. The fact that the original charges could not be proven and had to be amended, with the result that the offense alleged in the amended complaint then fell outside the statute of limitations and was dismissed reflects on the merits of the original complaint. Accordingly, we conclude that the termination was in Sacco's favor and we hold that the District Court erred when it determined that Sacco could not prove the fifth element, which conclusion formed the basis for the court's granting summary judgment on the issue of malicious prosecution. We note that defendants HCIP and Sorlies concede that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the second element to be proven in a case of malicious prosecution  the defendant's responsibility for litigating, prosecuting, or continuing the proceeding. Therefore, this element must be addressed on remand as must all other elements. Moreover, because of our decision on Issue I, the third element, lack of probable cause for the defendant's acts, must also be addressed on remand. Again, we hold that the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to all defendants on the issue of malicious prosecution. REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. TURNAGE, C.J., and TRIEWEILER, HUNT, GRAY, WEBER and LEAPHART, concur.