Opinion ID: 6351647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney Fees Under Section 13-17-102

Text: ¶30 First, we review a trial court’s decision to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, though we review the legal conclusions that predicate that decision de novo. In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 17, 364 P.3d 494, 496 (quoting In re Marriage of Gallegos & Baca-Gallegos, 251 P.3d 1086, 1087 (Colo. App. 2010)). ¶31 We recognize that “[b]ecause dissolution proceedings under article 10, title 14 are civil, it is permissible for a district court to award attorney fees under . . . section 13-17-102.” In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1377 (Colo. 1997). The district court may award attorney fees, in this context, only when it concludes that the action is “substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” § 13-17-102(4) (“The court shall assess attorney fees if . . . it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action . . . that lacked substantial justification . . . .”). ¶32 Because we conclude that Stepfather has standing to petition for an APR pursuant to section 14-10-123(1)(c), the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees based on its conclusion that Stepfather’s petition was substantially frivolous. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s award of attorney fees to Respondents. 16