Opinion ID: 2332043
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Division Must Prove Allegations by a Preponderance of the Evidence at CANRB Hearing.

Text: The next question is what standard of proof the division must meet at the CANRB hearing to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process. At the time Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's names were placed in the Central Registry, an alleged perpetrator's name was required to be listed once a division investigator found probable cause to believe they had committed child abuse or neglect. Sec. 210.110(2). Probable cause exists when the available facts would cause a reasonable person to believe a child was abused or neglected when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. Sec. 210.110(10). Similarly, once Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's appeal reached the CANRB, if it found the allegations of neglect were supported by evidence of probable cause and were not against the weight of the evidence, sec. 210.152.4, the CANRB left their names in the Central Registry, without inquiring whether the alleged abuse or neglect could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. [12] A probable cause standard does not require a fact finder to balance conflicting evidence. Thus, it is ill suited to the determination of whether an individual has abused or neglected a child, for abuse frequently involves private conduct for which there is no supporting evidence or objective eyewitness. Questions about whether abuse occurred are, therefore, often resolved by means of subjective determinations of credibility. As the probable cause standard does not require a balancing of available evidence, it leaves the ultimate assessment open to the subjective values of the fact finder, thereby magnifying the risk of erroneous fact finding. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). An equally important problem with the probable cause standard is that it places the brunt of the risk of error, if not the entire risk of error, on the alleged perpetrator. Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d at 594; cf. Cavarretta , 214 Ill.Dec. 59, 660 N.E.2d at 258 (requiring use of preponderance standard so that the child protection agency and the subject share the risk of error, rather than have the accused bear the brunt of the risk). Due process requires the use of a standard of proof that reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Since the interests of both parties involved in this case are substantial, it is unacceptable that one party should bear the majority of the risk of error. For these reasons, a number of other courts have rejected statutes similarly permitting listing of persons in child abuse registries based on application of only a probable cause or a credible evidence standard at the agency level. For instance, Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003-04, found that a credible evidence standard was insufficient to meet due process requirements because it required less than a preponderance of the evidence. Similarly, Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d at 593-95, rejected a probable cause standard, which required a showing of information `that would justify a reasonable person to believe that a child' was abused. [13] This Court, too finds that the use of the probable cause standard during a CANRB proceeding does not provide constitutionally sufficient safeguards. Due process requires a CANRB to substantiate a report of child abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence before an individual's name can be included in and disseminated from the Central Registry. [14] The Act as amended requires such proof in cases arising after August 28, 2004; it mandates a balancing of all the evidence so that one party does not bear a disproportionate share of the risk of error, Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (parties should share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion), thereby negating the concerns presented by the probable cause standard and properly safeguarding the rights of alleged perpetrators. The Act as applied below and as is applicable to all cases arising before August 28, 2004, does not. The provisions of the Act allowing for inclusion of Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's names in the Central Registry and dissemination of those names based on a probable cause standard and without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard violated the women's liberty interests and are constitutionally invalid.