Opinion ID: 2010891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request for Continuance at Sentencing

Text: Citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), Wheeler argues that the government had unlawfully withheld exculpatory information, specifically, the fact that the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) had been investigating Sergeant Fred Johnson, Brittainy Johnson's father, because of his failure to call the police or file a report about the robbery until after Taylor's murder. Wheeler then contends that the trial court abused its discretion when, at the sentencing, it denied his request for a continuance, as well as his motion to compel discovery, to obtain more information about that investigation. [44] It appears that counsel filed these motions in anticipation of timely seeking a new trial or filing a collateral attack. Wheeler stresses that evidence of Sergeant Johnson's investigation and eventual suspension by the IAD would have provided strong impeachment of a critical government witness in light of Johnson's testimony at trial that his failure to report the robbery caused him no problems at the police department. The record confirms, to the contrary, that Sergeant Johnson's testimony was not false. An affidavit provided by Sergeant Anthony Langley of the IAD states that although the lead homicide investigator in Wheeler's case had contacted a supervisor at IAD in 2003 to express his concerns about Sergeant Johnson's conduct in the matter, IAD did not pursue an investigation in 2003 because there had been no specific information or evidence that implicated Sergeant Johnson at that time. The first and only formal M.P.D. investigation of his conduct in connection with the homicide occurred shortly after Wheeler's trial ended in February 2005. Sergeant Langley conducted that investigation in the spring and summer of 2005 (when he learned about the 2003 information outlined above) and filed his final report in July 2005. After further disciplinary proceedings in this matter in 2005 and 2006, Sgt. Johnson's service with the M.P.D. was terminated in May, 2006. Wheeler challenges the particulars of Langley's affidavit. According to counsel on appeal, Wheeler was indicted in February 2004 and thus the homicide investigation was over. Counsel then argues that either the police had been investigating Sergeant Johnson earlier than the Langley affidavit indicated, and thus that Johnson had lied at trial, or the investigation commenced in 2005, as Sergeant Langley wrote, and the police deliberately undermined Mr. Wheeler's right to a fair trial by holding off on formal investigation until after Sgt. Johnson had testified and there was a guilty verdict. With all respect due, counsel's alternatives amount to considerable speculation. There is no reason to believe that Sergeant Langley was lying under oath. Furthermore, even if we assume the truth of counsel's second alternative, that the government deliberately delayed the investigation of Sergeant Johnson until after Wheeler's trial was over, there is no basis, other than counsel's guess, for believing that Johnson was aware of that ploy. In any event, Wheeler is incorrect in suggesting that defense counsel had been unable to impeach Sergeant Johnson's testimony at trial. No one disputes that Sergeant Johnson should have reported the robbery, and that his failure to do so came to light during the trial. In fact, Sergeant Johnson admitted before the jury that IAD was monitoring him as a result of his failure to report the robbery. The jury, therefore, had information casting a shadow over Sergeant Johnson's credibility and possible bias in favor of the government. Accordingly, even if the government had delayed the investigation for the alleged tactical purpose and Sergeant Johnson had been aware of that fact, Johnson's testimony would not have greatly assisted the defense. His acknowledged awarenessperhaps from the aborted 2003 activitythat he was being monitored for his behavior at the time of the killing supplied much of the impact that Wheeler hoped to develop through discovery. All things considered, therefore, we can perceive no abuse of trial court discretion in refusing to continue Wheeler's sentencing and in denying his motion to compel discovery.