Opinion ID: 1316134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay: Appellant's Statement to Police

Text: As referenced in the factual recitation above, while the Appellant was being escorted out of the family home, he told police that they should ask the victim's mother about allowing the victim to drink alcohol. When the State attempted to introduce this comment into evidence at trial through the testimony of the police officer, the Appellant objected on the basis of hearsay. The trial court permitted the introduction of such evidence over the Appellant's objection. On appeal, the State contends that a party's own statement may be used against him, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the West Virginia Rule of Evidence. That rule provides as follows: Statements which are not hearsay: Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity.... Indeed, consistent with the argument of the State in this case, this Court has recognized that a statement is not hearsay if such statement is offered against a party and is his own statement, in either his individual or representative capacity. Southern v. Burgess, 198 W.Va. 518, 482 S.E.2d 135 (1996); State v. Delaney, 187 W.Va. 212, 417 S.E.2d 903 (1992). In syllabus point one of Heydinger v. Adkins, 178 W.Va. 463, 360 S.E.2d 240 (1987), this Court explained that [a] statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is his [or her] own statement, in either his [or her] individual or a representative capacity. W.Va. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). The Heydinger Court stated as follows: Rule 801(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence removes certain categories of evidence from the definition of hearsay, notwithstanding the fact that in each instance the category of evidence fits within the language of the hearsay definition found in W.Va.R.Evid. 801(c), and allows such evidence to be admitted at trial. See F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 8.4, at 466 (2d ed. 1986). 178 W.Va. at 468, 360 S.E.2d at 245. The Heydinger Court also explained that the rule is sensible from a practical standpoint. The theory underlying this evidentiary rule is that if a person's own statements are offered against him, he cannot be heard to complain that he was denied an opportunity for cross-examination. An additional justification supporting the admissibility of this class of evidence is the fact that it is inherently trustworthy. [citation omitted] Presumably, a party would not admit or state anything against his or her interest unless it was true; nevertheless, if the statement is inaccurate, the party may deny it altogether or explain why he/she made it. 178 W.Va. at 468, 360 S.E.2d at 245. Notably, the trial court in this case also evaluated this admissibility issue under Rule 804(b)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, as a statement against interest. Recognizing that the language of the rule designates this section as applicable only where a declarant is unavailable, we do not premise our conclusions on any application of this rule. As previously contemplated in a myriad of contexts, [t]his Court may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower court when it appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis for its judgment. Syl. Pt. 3, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W.Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965). One of the primary issues raised at trial in this matter was whether the victim was permitted and/or encouraged to consume alcoholic beverages immediately prior to one of the instances of sexual abuse. This matter was the subject of disputed testimony, the mother having testified that the child was not permitted to drink and the child testifying otherwise. Thus, we find that testimony referencing statements made by the Appellant as he exited the family home is permissible as an admission by a party opponent. We premise our conclusion upon application of Rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the West Virginia Rule of Evidence, finding that the evidence was properly admitted as the Appellant's own statement offered against him. We conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony at issue.