Opinion ID: 2533998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court properly denied HLFPD's demand for a jury trial as untimely under I.R.C.P. 38(b).

Text: The district court denied HLFPD's demand for a jury trial under I.R.C.P. 38(d), finding that the demand was untimely. According to I.R.C.P. 38(b), a party must demand a jury trial on an issue not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. If a party fails to demand a jury trial within this timeframe, the right to a jury trial is waived. In addition, I.R.C.P. 38(d) states that, [a] waiver of trial by jury is not revoked by an amendment of a pleading asserting only a claim or defense arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. In re Kaiser Steel Corp. states that, [w]here there are multiple parties, the last pleading by any party on a common issue will determine the time for jury demand. 911 F.2d 380, 388 (10th Cir.1990). Kaiser Steel involved the timeliness of the defendant's jury trial demand that was filed in its answer. Cases relied upon by HLFPD only discuss situations involving a defendant's last pleading. The State maintains that the original parties should not be able to request a jury after any party intervenes. No case holds that the last pleading is an intervenor's pleading. This argument is persuasive for purposes of determining the timeliness of an original party's demand for a jury trial. An intervenor has a right to demand a jury trial upon intervention because, unlike the existing parties in the suit, it has not had the opportunity to assert that right. U.S. v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Country Club Garden Owners Assoc., Inc., 159 F.R.D. 400, 404-05 (E.D.N.Y.1995). In California Mobile Home, the United States asserted the plaintiff's claims of violation of the Fair Housing Act against the defendants. Cal. Mobile Home Park, 107 F.3d at 1375. Three years after the case began, plaintiff moved to intervene. Id. at 1376. The district court had held that her demand for a jury trial in her intervenor's complaint was untimely. Id. at 1377. The circuit court disagreed, holding that her demand for a jury trial was timely, and should have been granted. Id. at 1378. The court in California Mobile Home adopted the reasoning of the Country Club court, which recognized the unfairness of denying an intervenor the right to demand a jury. The court stated that: [I]n a typical case a jury demand in a subsequent complaint is untimely unless new material issues are raised .... [T]his rule has been applied in situations where the parties remain the same. After intervention, the parties to the litigation have changed. Indeed, intervening parties have full party status in the litigation commencing with the granting of the motion to intervene. Id. While the court found that the plaintiff-intervenor should be allowed to demand a jury trial, it was careful to limit the holding to guarantee an intervenor's, and not the original parties, right to demand a jury upon intervention. Id. at 1378 n. 2 (We hold only that where the court grants an intervention of right, the intervenor's right to demand a jury trial is not waived under Rule 38(d).). Therefore, because the State as intervenor did not demand a jury, no jury was required in this case. HLFPD argues that its Amended Complaint so changed the nature of the case that its right to demand a jury trial was revived. In City of Pocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372, 679 P.2d 647, 649 (1984), this Court held that, [a]lthough it is true that an amended or supplemental pleading which raises a new issue revives the right to demand a jury trial as to that new issue, where a pleading raises no new issues, the right to demand a jury trial is not revived. I.R.C.P. 38(d) states that, a waiver of trial by jury is not revoked by an amendment of a pleading asserting only a claim or defense arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. Though HLFPD's Amended Complaint was the first pleading filed after the case was certified as a class action, and it expanded the factual allegations and claims, especially with respect to the claims implicating the SIF's investment practices, the foundation of HLFPD's allegations remained unchanged. As this Court indicated in Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 71, 878 P.2d 762, 770 (1994), where an amended pleading raises no additional wholly distinct issues for trial, the right to demand a jury trial is not revived. HLFPD's demand for a jury trial in its Amended Complaint was untimely. The demand was not made within 14 days of the relevant last pleading (the SIF's Answer to the original complaint), and the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Amended Complaint did not change the nature of the case to such an extent that the right to demand a jury trial was revived.