Opinion ID: 1843000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims against Pan-Brick

Text: As correctly asserted by Pan-Brick, the only claim Enertec made against it is the claim of interference with business relations. Enertec claims that by entering into the Pan-Brick/Tri-State agreement both defendants placed it in constant breach of the licensing agreement and intended to put it out of business. It asserts that neither Pan-Brick nor Tri-State had any right to do anything in the territories licensed to Enertec regarding manufacturing or selling the panels except through Enertec. It accuses both of preventing it from producing panels. Enertec cannot overcome the hurdle of showing that Pan-Brick's actions of entering into the agreement was calculated to cause damage. Pan-Brick via the licensing agreement granted to Enertec a license to manufacture panels with its trademark. In consideration for the use of its trademark and technology, Pan-Brick was to receive royalties from the sales of the panels. Nothing in the May 21 agreement provides a motive for Pan-Brick to cause Enertec harm. As noted by Pan-Brick, it is nonsensical to contend that it would try or that it intended to destroy its license given to Enertec, Specifically, it states: Why would Pan-Brick try to destroy its only license and only manufacturer in the United States? And even if Pan-Brick were so foolish as to try to undermine its only toe-hold in this vast new market area, why would it conspire or cooperate to replace Enertec with Tri-State, of whose proposed role it had been made aware, by Enertec, long before May 21, or May 24, 1984, and with whom it easily could have contracted instead of Enertec? Pan-Brick calls our attention to Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 596, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 558 (1986). There, American manufacturers of consumer electronic products brought suit against Japanese competitors in Pennsylvania district court alleging that these competitors violated provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Robinson Patman Act, as well as other federal statutes. Particularly, it was claimed that Japanese companies had conspired since the 1950's to drive domestic firms from the American market, by maintaining artificially high prices in Japan and selling at a loss in the United States. The district court granted the Japanese companies' motion for summary judgment; the court of appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings, determining that a reasonable fact-finder could find a conspiracy to depress prices. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Specifically, the Court held that the absence of any plausible motive to engage in conduct is highly relevant to whether a `genuine issue for trial' exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. Id. 475 U.S. at 596-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1361, 89 L.Ed.2d at 559. Here, Enertec's arguments against Pan-Brick for interference with business relations are just as implausible as that of the American companies in Matsushita. Thus, no genuine issue of material fact is presented and judgment summarily disposing of the claim against Pan-Brick should be affirmed. What is more, Enertec offers no evidentiary support, nor does the record reveal any for its claim that Pan-Brick intended not to honor the licensing agreement. Enertec only sued Pan-Brick for malicious interference. On appeal, it lodges for the first time a claim for fraud against Pan-Brick [7] , but offers no support. Additionally, all of its representations concern Enertec only, not Pan-Brick. Thus, Enertec cannot, as far as Pan-Brick is concerned, overcome the hurdle imposed by Miss.R.Civ.Pro. 9(b) concerning specificity of averments constituting or alleging fraud because it makes no such statements or averments. Further, as held in McMahon v. McMahon, 247 Miss. 822, 157 So.2d 494 (1963), fraud cannot be inferred or presumed and cannot be charged in general terms. Specific facts which constitute fraud must be definitely averred. Enertec's failure to comply with both the rule and well-settled case law is fatal to its claim against Pan-Brick for fraud. Pan-Brick and Tri-State argue that Enertec's claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1991). They contend that although the statute clearly applies to the enumerated torts listed therein, the listing is not exclusive and the statute also applies to non-enumerated torts as well. Enertec argues that its action is governed by section 15-1-49. These statutes provide: § 15-1-35. Limitations applicable to actions for certain torts. All actions for assault, assault and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, or menace, and all actions for slanderous words concerning the person or title, for failure to employ, and for libels, shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. § 15-1-49. Limitations applicable to actions not otherwise specifically provided for. (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued and not after. (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. (3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall apply to all pending and subsequently filed actions. In support, the defendants rely upon Dennis v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 234 So.2d 624 (Miss. 1970), where the Court held that the statute applied to an action brought for a willful, malicious, and irresponsible ... threat of criminal prosecution... to enforce a purported civil debt. The Court reasoned that: It is clear that the Miss. Code Ann. § 732 (1956) [predecessor of § 15-1-35], which provides an inclusive listing of the recognized intentional torts is controlling in the case at bar. There can be no escape from the bar of the statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts by the mere refusal to style the cause brought in a recognized statutory category and thereby circumvent prohibition of the statute. Id. at 626. The Court held that the letter, which was the basis for the action at bar, fell within the purview of that statute under the category of menace. The Court noted that the term menace meant the same thing as threat. Thus, since the letter written by Travelers was threatening, its actions fall within the category of menace. We need not address the litany of federal cases cited by the parties, which, using Dennis as a springboard, extended the applicability of the one-year statute of limitations to other actions involving intentional torts. This Court has consistently held in many cases ... that where a statute enumerates and specifies the subject of things upon which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned or under a general clause, those not of like kind or classification as those enumerated. Southwest Drug Company v. Howard Brothers Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So.2d 776, 779 (Miss. 1975). Even a casual reading of the statute leads inescapably to the conclusion that it does not cover, and was not intended to cover, all intentional tortious conduct. Actions based on deceit and intentional damage to property are conspicuously absent. Surely such intentional wrongs were recognized intentional torts. The enumerated torts address damage to persons or their reputations exclusively. Miss Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (1972). None of them addresses actions causing damage to property, tangible or intangible. Id. [8] Thus, in Brister v. Dunaway, 149 Miss. 5, 115 So. 36 (1928) this Court held the one-year statute inapplicable to an action for alienation of affections, a tort involving the intentional interference with marital relations. See, Stanton v. Cox, 162 Miss. 438, 139 So. 458 (1932). Similarly, in Dunn v. Dent, 169 Miss. 574, 153 So. 798 (1934) this Court noted without discussion that the six-year period of limitations in the predecessor to Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 applied to an action brought for deceit by false representation as to the number of acres in a tract of land sold. In Bush v. City of Laurel, 234 Miss. 93, 105 So.2d 562 (1958), we refused to apply the one-year statute to an action in trespass. More recently, in Southern Land & Resources Co., Inc. v. Dobbs, 467 So.2d 652 (Miss. 1985), we applied the six-year rather than the one-year statute to an action for wrongful foreclosure. Clearly then, the fact that wrongful conduct is alleged to be intentional does not determine which statute controls. Dennis means no more than that the absence of a label is, similarly, not controlling. Where, as there, the conduct alleged may be fairly categorized as one of the enumerated torts, the one-year statute applies. Otherwise, it does not. We will not squeeze all intentional wrongs into the actions enumerated. Here the claims are for malicious interference with business relations and fraud. No one seriously argues that actions for fraud are covered by § 15-1-35. Dunn v. Dent, 169 Miss. at 574, 153 So. at 798-99. Pan Brick and Tri-State do claim that the malicious interference claim is barred. That claim, however, simply does not fit with any of the enumerated torts in the statute. The closest fit is with slander of title. The gravamen of that cause of action, however, is a false statement concerning ownership of property. Walley v. Hunt, 212 Miss. at 304, 54 So.2d 393. The conduct here alleged is not of the type reached by that cause of action. In sum, Enertec's claims are not time barred by application of § 15-1-35 because its claims are not fairly embodied in any of the causes there enumerated. The grant of summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and McRAE, JJ., concur. ROBERTS, J., not participating according to supreme court internal rules.