Opinion ID: 176130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

Text: Sentencing for the offense of illegally reentering the United States is governed by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The base offense level for this crime is 8. See § 2L1.2(a). If the offense is committed after the defendant was previously removed from the United States after a conviction for an aggravated felonyand it is undisputed that this is true of Folkesthen an additional eight levels are added to the total offense level. See § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). If, however, the defendant has also been convicted of a crime of violence, the Guidelines instead require a 16-level enhancement. See § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). For purposes of this particular Guideline, `crime of violence' means any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, Application Note 1(B)(iii) (emphasis added). At the outset, it is crucial to take note that the words crime of violence are not defined in the same way for every part of the Sentencing Guidelines; for example, for purposes of the Guidelines section dealing with the sentencing of career offenders, crime of violence means most of the crimes listed above but also means any offense ..., punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that ... otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). In determining whether a given crime fits within the definition of the relevant predicate offenses, we take a `categorical' approach; that is, we generally look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense of conviction rather than to the underlying facts of that offense. United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). Thus, for purposes of calculating Folkes's Guidelines range, we must consider not descriptions of his actions in the PSR or elsewhere, but the statutes under which he was convictedin this case, New York's third-degree burglary statute, N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20, and the then-applicable third-degree criminal possession of a weapon statute under which Folkes was convicted in 1995, N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02(4) (repealed 2006). Under § 140.20, [a] person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein. As it happens, in Brown, we considered the same burglary statute. See Brown, 514 F.3d at 265. In that case, however, the relevant Guideline for the defendant's offense stated that crime of violence had the same meaning given to it in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). See Brown, 514 F.3d at 260. We concluded that a violation of § 140.20 could not be considered categorically a crime of violence under the burglary of a dwelling clause because [p]lainly, `building[s]' includes structures other than `dwelling[s].' Id. at 265-67. We held that § 140.20 was nevertheless a crime of violence under the relevant Guidelines in that case because it fell under § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause, as it otherwise involve[d] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id. at 268-69. We are bound by Brown 's holding that § 140.20 is not a crime of violence under a clause that defines such a crime as one involving burglary of a dwelling.  But in this case, where crime of violence is defined by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 rather than by § 4B1.2(a), there is no residual clause under which we may look to the inherent dangers of the conduct described by the statute as a basis for holding that it is a crime of violence. Section 2L1.2 does contain a different residual clause, which defines a crime of violence as any crime other than those already listed that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. (emphasis added) But however serious Folkes's actual conduct may have been, the elements of § 140.20 are that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) enter or remain unlawfully (3) in a building (4) with intent to commit a crime therein. None of these elements necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Accordingly, for purposes of sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20 does not constitute a crime of violence. The Government further concedes on appeal that it was mistaken when it argued, in the district court, that Folkes's separate firearms conviction could support the crime of violence enhancement. We agree. The relevant statute stated that [a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when [such] person possesses any loaded firearm. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02(4) (repealed 2006). We have previously held that second -degree criminal possession under New York law, as defined in N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03, is not a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See United States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2009). Under § 265.03, [a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when, with intent to use the same unlawfully against another... [h]e possesses a loaded firearm. In Gamez, we concluded that intent to use a gun unlawfully against another, an element of the offense for which he was convicted, cannot be equated with the actual, attempted or threatened use of physical force, which all involve some affirmative conduct beyond the mere possession of a gun. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that § 265.03 contains all of the elements of § 265.02(4) as well as the additional element of intent to use the firearm unlawfully against another, the reasoning of Gamez applies a fortiori to § 265.02(4) and requires us to hold that it, too, is not a crime of violence. The Government admits that the district court's error was plain, and urges us to exercise our discretion to correct it. We have no difficulty agreeing to do so. To be plain, the error must be clear or obvious ... at the time of appellate review. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 209 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir.2006)). After Brown and Gamez, it is obvious that neither N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20 nor N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02(4) could qualify as a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing under the illegal reentry guideline. [3] We have also recognized that a defendant's substantial rights are affected by any error that results in a significantly overstated Guidelines range, because the advisory Guidelines range [is] the starting point for the district court's determination of the sentence.... Gamez, 577 F.3d at 401 (finding substantial rights affected where defendant's offense level was incorrectly calculated to be 21 and should have been, at most, 13). Finally, because the district court's determination of an appropriate sentence was influenced by a Guidelines range that was more than twice the correct range, see, e.g., id., we exercise our discretion to correct the error as one that seriously affect[ed] the fairness ... of judicial proceedings. Doe, 297 F.3d at 82. That said, we are mindful that the district court believed that Folkes's criminal history category under the Guidelines understated the seriousness of his past conduct. Although the procedural error in this case is sufficiently serious to require correction, the district judge retains her authority, at resentencing, to select any appropriate sentence, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), whether or not pursuant to the Guidelines. United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150, 158 (2d Cir.2008); see also United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 194 (2d Cir.2008) ( en banc ) ([D]istrict courts have the power to impose sentences both above and below the Guidelines range.).