Opinion ID: 4548033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Costs of Therapeutic Reunification

Text: Husband next argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to be responsible for the costs of the therapeutic reunification process for Wife and 11 the children. Husband contends that because Wife, “through her own obstructionist actions caused the failure of two prior reunification efforts,” she “needs to have a stake in the game, and some sense of financial interest, (and resulting financial loss) should she once again fail to cooperate and/or successfully complete the ordered level I therapeutic reintegration process.” Husband concedes that he has the ability to pay, but argues that “fundamental fairness dictates that [Wife] must have exclusive financial responsibility” for any further reunification efforts given her responsibility for the prior failures. Wife, on the other hand, argues that it was a reasonable exercise of the trial court’s discretion “to require the party with vastly more assets and substantially more income” to pay those costs, particularly in light of the importance of reunification not just to Wife, but to the parties’ children as well. We conclude that Husband has failed to meet his appellate burden of demonstrating reversible error. See In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. ___, ___ (decided February 13, 2020) (slip op. at 8). Rather, what he asks of us is, in essence, to reweigh the equities on this issue, which is not our role on appeal. See In the Matter of Heinrich & Heinrich, 164 N.H. 357, 365 (2012). “Our standard of review is not whether we would rule differently than the trial court, but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence.” In the Matter of Braunstein, 173 N.H. at ___ (slip op. at 8) (quotation omitted). Based upon the evidence in this case, including that of Husband’s far greater financial resources, a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as did the trial court. Cf. Giles v. Giles, 136 N.H. 540, 547 (1992) (concluding that plaintiff “failed to establish that the master’s allocation of visitation costs constituted an abuse of discretion” where “[a] great deal of evidence indicated that the plaintiff’s financial condition was far stronger than the defendant’s, and far less desperate than he claimed”).