Opinion ID: 795530
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Use of Caliph's Statements at Trial

Text: 68 The defendants argue that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause for the district court to admit the statements of their co-defendant, Caliph, against them without allowing them the opportunity to cross-examine him. They contend that the district court improperly considered Caliph's statements to FBI agents that the paintball activities were intended to be training for jihad overseas, and that the trainees obtained AK-47-style weapons because that was the type of weapon used in combat overseas without allowing them the opportunity to cross-examine Caliph on that point. Specifically, they argue that the district court improperly used Caliph's statements against them, even though they were supposed to be admitted only against Caliph. For the following reasons, we hold that, to the extent that the admission of these statements was in error, the error was harmless. 69 The Supreme Court has recently held that, under the Sixth Amendment, testimonial out-of-court statements, such as those made during police interrogation, are inadmissible against a defendant unless that defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Defendants argue that Caliph's statements were testimonial because they were the result of police interrogation, and that they were admitted without the defendants having the opportunity for previous cross-examination. The government responds that defendants waived their right to cross-examine Caliph over these statements because they did not affirmatively ask the court to retain Caliph for cross-examination before he was acquitted. 70 We do not reach the question of whether Caliph's statements were admitted in violation of the Sixth Amendment because, to the extent that any error occurred, it was harmless. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139-40, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (noting that Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless error analysis). Under harmless error analysis, if the government can demonstrate that the alleged error did not affect the defendants' substantial rights, we will not overturn the conviction on the basis of that error. United States v. Rodriguez, 433 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir.2006). 71 The district court expressly found that Caliph's statement was cumulative of other testimony, including at least three or four other witnesses who essentially said the same thing. J.A. 3268. The court also expressly noted that Caliph's testimony was not the main piece of evidence on which it relied for its characterization of the paintball group and that [t]here was tons of other evidence besides the statement of Caliph. J.A. 3269. The court concluded that the admission of Caliph's statement was harmless in light of the other evidence on the same issue. Id. Our independent review of the record confirms that Caliph's statements were duplicative of a wealth of other evidence and that the defendants' convictions and sentences would not have differed had Caliph's statements not been admitted. See, e.g., J.A. 3178-80 (statement of Yusuf Wells, an outside observer of the paintball activity expressly found credible and reliable by the district court, indicating that paintball was a means of training); Id. at 3180 (statements of other witnesses saying same). We therefore reject defendants' argument that the admission of Caliph's statements constitutes reversible error. 72