Opinion ID: 2172904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of the Pleadings and Proof

Text: The city next contends that the order issued by the court below is beyond the scope of the relief requested and that, therefore, it was improper. The basis for this argument is appellants' belief that the court was confined to the specific prayer for relief contained in appellee's complaint, i.e., that the city appropriate sufficient funds to meet its normal cost for 1966 and 1967. [19] Admittedly, the order entered goes beyond this specific prayer by requiring the city to make sufficient appropriations to place its retirement system on the actuarially sound basis dictated by the Charter  the city was ordered to make sufficient provision for both normal cost and interest on unfunded accrued liability. See footnote 2, supra. We must begin by noting that the city certainly was not misled by Dombrowski's complaint; it knew that the concept of actuarial soundness embodying both normal cost and unfunded accrued liability was in issue. Not only was the city prepared with expert testimony on this point, but the complaint clearly put this matter in issue. Paragraph 9 of the complaint pleads § 2-308 of the Charter, the section requiring city council to adopt an actuarially sound retirement system. Paragraph 12(e) then alleges: In order for a public pension system to be `actuarially sound,' as that term is properly defined, there should be contributed to the system each year both (i) the `normal cost' of the system and (ii) an amount equivalent to the interest which would have been earned by a deposit equivalent to the `unfunded actuarial liability' of the System. Finally, paragraph 30 adds: It is estimated that the proposed amendments to the Municipal Retirement System Ordinance [amendments which were subsequently passed] will add at least $8 million to the `normal cost' to the City of its Municipal Retirement System for the year 1967, making the total `normal cost' of said System in 1967 approximately $28.6 million. (In addition to the City's `normal cost' for 1967 of $28.6 million, if Bill No. 2318 is adopted [it was], the amount equivalent to the interest on the `unfunded actuarial liability' of the System for 1967 is not less than $16.9 million, which would require a minimum City contribution in 1967 of not less than $45.5 million to make the Municipal Retirement System `actuarially sound' as that term is properly defined with respect to public pension systems.) The city's contention that the court was powerless to render an order beyond the relief specifically prayed for gives no effect to the general prayer for relief also contained in the complaint, i.e., to grant such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances. Given this general prayer, we believe that the court below could shape its order to fit the pleadings and proof and that its requirement that the city obey the Charter's command was proper. As early as 1868 this Court recognized that under a general prayer for relief an equity court may grant such relief as is agreeable to the case pleaded and proven even though the relief granted differs from the specific relief prayed for. Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 155, 167 (1868). This doctrine has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See, e.g., Christian v. Johnstown Police Pension Fund Association, 421 Pa. 240, 245-46, 218 A. 2d 746, 749-50 (1966); Meth v. Meth, 360 Pa. 623, 62 A. 2d 848 (1949). Furthermore, we have stressed in many cases the similarity between equity proceedings and the function performed by a common pleas court when it entertains a mandamus action. [20] For example, Hotel Casey Company v. Ross, 343 Pa. 573, 582, 23 A. 2d 737, 742 (1942) contains the following: Although. . . [mandamus] is granted by the law side of the court, equitable principles largely govern its issuance. . . . See also Taggart v. Board of Directors of Canon-McMillan Joint School System, 409 Pa. 33, 40, 185 A. 2d 332, 336 (1962). A more recent expression of this view is contained in Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417, 429, 211 A. 2d 503, 509 (1965): Although granted by the law side of the court, mandamus is essentially equitable in nature, requiring the application of equitable principles. Combining these two principles  the power of an equity court to grant relief differing from that specifically requested when the complaint also contains a general prayer and the similarity between the principles operative in equity and those applying in mandamus  we fail to see why a mandamus court should not also possess the power to grant relief which differs from that specifically requested. To hold otherwise, as the court below noted, would be to insist that a mandamus court may not grant the relief that the pleadings, proof and the law require. [21] Since equitable principles control the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we believe that equitable principles equally allow the trial court to enter an order which differs from the specific relief requested.