Opinion ID: 835001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Statement

Text: Having concluded that defendant preserved his objection, we turn to the question whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Cameron's comment to defendants as he left the witness stand. Evidence of a witness's bias is generally admissible. OEC 609-1 (The credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence that the witness engaged in conduct or made statements showing bias or interest.); State v. Hubbard, 297 Or. 789, 796, 688 P.2d 1311 (1984) (A principle of evidence law in Oregon is that: It is always permissible to show the interest or bias of an adverse witness. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). However, our cases also make clear that, while evidence of bias is relevant and may be admitted, it is not necessarily error to exclude such evidence: Evidence relevant to the bias or interest of a witness need not always be admitted.     Where bias or interest is shown, but further questioning is objected to, the decision is within the discretion of the trial judge. Hubbard, 297 Or. at 799-800, 688 P.2d 1311. As the 1981 Conference Committee Commentary on OEC 609-1 states, although the rule permits the credibility of a witness to be attacked by evidence of conduct or statements showing bias or interest, [t]he trial judge retains discretion to control the extent to which proof of bias or interest may go. As with other evidence, where the evidence of conduct or statements showing bias is merely cumulative of other evidence of bias, the trial court has discretion to exclude it. See State v. Cox, 337 Or. 477, 487, 98 P.3d 1103 (2004), cert. den., 546 U.S. 830, 126 S.Ct. 50, 163 L.Ed.2d 81 (2005) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of victim's violent acts towards others to show defendant's reasons for fearing victim, because evidence, although relevant, would not have added greatly to the evidence already before the jury). Defendant now argues in great detail that Cameron's statement was evidence of his animosity towards defendants and was therefore probative of his bias against them. Accordingly, defendant asserts, the statement should have been admitted as evidence of bias under OEC 609-1. Although the state responds that Cameron's statement did not necessarily demonstrate any particular hostility towards defendants, it also concedes that the comment might be susceptible of such a reading. If so, the statement was at least marginally relevant to the issues at trial because it tended to show Cameron's bias. Thus, it would have been permissible for the trial court to admit evidence that Cameron had made the statement. That does not mean, however, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the comment. As noted, our cases hold that a trial court has discretion to limit evidence of bias or interest under OEC 609-1 if it is simply cumulative of other, similar evidence of bias. The state argues that Cameron's remark itself was no more probative of [his general hostility towards defendants] than other evidence received at trial. Further, according to the state, because there was ample and specific evidence of Cameron's hostility, the admission of his comment would not have substantially assisted the jury in making a decision about his credibility. [13] We agree. Defendant cross-examined Cameron extensively during the state's case-in-chief and sought to develop evidence that he was hostile towards defendants and biased against them. [14] The record reflects that, while testifying before the jury, Cameron was mocking, hostile, and uncooperative toward defense counsel, calling one of defendant's attorneys a jerk off and asserting that the attorney was trying to peg [him] in a corner. Cameron testified that, after he had decided to testify against defendants, he received a death contract in the mail, threatening him and his brother. Cameron was upset with defendants for making him (as well as themselves) look guilty by committing the murder near the band room during the time when the band in which he and they were members was scheduled to practice. Moreover, they involved him in the attempted cover-up by trying to get him to hide their bloody clothes. He thought that murdering Polin because he was a rat made little sense, when there were baby killers, child molesters, all kinds of rats in this prison bigger than him. Why not them? And Cameron was hostile to defendants because they had killed a friend: I liked [Polin].    And had I known that somebody was going to kill him, I would have g[iven] him a head's up, you know. I wouldn't let somebody just, you know, sneak attack. I mean, there'sI mean, for what? For nothing. In short, Cameron's direct testimony and his answers on cross-examination provided evidence of bias against defendants. Cameron also testified that his life in prison had changed for the worse, not for the better, after coming forward to testify against defendantstestimony from which the jury could have inferred that he now bore some level of hostility towards defendants. He said that telling the authorities about defendants had turned my life upside down and that he now was being treated like shit. Cameron stated that the defendants were doing better time than I'm doing and that he was clearly upset about being placed in a segregation unit after coming forward as a witness. He concluded that, Since I came forward on this, I have got nothing but dicked. So, you [defense counsel] are sitting over there making all of these innuendos like I am getting something or I did this [coming forward to testify] for something. I was doing fine on my own. I didn't ask them to come to me with this shit. Given the detailed cross-examination of Cameron and the other evidence that defendant adduced at trial to show Cameron's dislike of defendants and the multiple reasons that the jury should view Cameron's testimony with suspicion, we conclude that the trial court's decision to exclude what defendant now asserts is additional evidence of biasCameron's remark to defendants as he left the witness standwas within the trial court's discretion. It was not error.