Opinion ID: 78513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: motion to amend judgment

Text: When the instant cases were transferred to the Southern District of Florida, they were docketed as tag along cases to the main case, No. 00-MD-1334 (the 1334 docket). In July 2002, the district court administratively closed the tag along cases. Over the next five and one-half years, all motions and pleadings pertaining to the tag along cases were filed solely on the 1334 docket. During this time, Plaintiffs' counsel filed various motions, briefs, reports, and other documents on the 1334 docket. Anthem filed motions to dismiss on July 16, 2003, and Plaintiffs filed responses to these motions. On August 21, 2003, the district court stayed all tag along cases. In October 2007, the district court denied all pending motions without prejudice with instructions to refile. Anthem refiled its motions to dismiss on November 9, 2007, and Plaintiffs filed responses. On January 26, 2008, the district court entered an order on both the 1334 docket and in the tag along cases directing the parties in tag along cases to file all documents only on the docket of the tag along case. On February 7, 2008, the court entered an order on the 1334 docket directing all counsel to file an appearance in the docket of all tag along cases in which they were involved. Plaintiffs' counsel did not file appearances in the tag along cases as directed. On February 19, 2008, the court entered an order on both the 1334 docket and in the tag along cases denying all pending motions and directing counsel to file status reports on the dockets of the tag along cases. Plaintiffs' counsel received the order by electronic notification through the 1334 docket, but erroneously filed status reports on the 1334 docket rather than in the tag along case. Finally, on April 14, 2008, the court entered an order in the tag along cases reopening the cases and setting a briefing schedule for motions to be filed in those cases. Because Plaintiffs' counsel had not filed an appearance in the tag along cases, Plaintiffs' counsel did not receive electronic notice of this order. Anthem refiled its motions to dismiss for a for a third time on April 30, 2008. Plaintiffs' counsel did not receive electronic notification of the motion, but they did receive a paper copy of the motion, which Anthem served by mail. When Plaintiffs failed to respond to Anthem's motions, the district court entered an order granting the motions and dismissing the case. Plaintiffs filed motions to vacate the judgment on June 16, 2008, ten days after the district court entered the orders of dismissal. Plaintiffs argued that their failure to respond to Anthem's motions was excusable neglect due to their counsels' belief that they were receiving all electronic filings from both the 1334 docket and the tag along dockets and were unaware that Anthem had refiled its motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs explained that they mistakenly believed that prior appearances and a motion to appear pro hac vice had functioned as appearances in the tag along cases. The district court denied the motion. It reasoned that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the January 26, February 7, February 19, and April 14 orders and failed to respond to Anthem's motion, even though Plaintiffs' counsel received three of the orders electronically and received a paper copy of the motion by mail. The court concluded that these circumstances did not constitute excusable neglect. Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order upon a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Rule 60(b) motions are directed to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will set aside the denial of relief from such motion only for abuse of that discretion. Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 849 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996). Excusable neglect is generally an equitable inquiry based upon the particular circumstances of the case. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1495, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). In Pioneer, the Court held that an attorney's inadvertent failure to timely file a proof of claim can constitute excusable neglect under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1). Looking to other rules for guidance on the meaning of excusable neglect, the Court considered Rule 60(b)(1) and observed that for purposes of Rule 60(b), `excusable neglect' is understood to encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence. Id. at 394, 113 S.Ct. at 1497. The Court identified four factors pertinent to the determination: the danger of prejudice to the [opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on the judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. Id. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498. This Court applied the Pioneer factors in Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir.1996), holding that the plaintiff's counsel's late filing of a request for a trial de novo following a non-binding arbitration award was excusable neglect. The delayed filing resulted from a miscommunication between the plaintiff's lead counsel and his associate who handled the arbitration while the lead counsel was on vacationeach had assumed that the other had filed a demand for trial de novo. Id. at 849. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to find excusable neglect. We noted that the Pioneer factors weighed in favor of excusable neglect because the defendant was not prejudiced by the late filing. Id. at 850. We also observed that although the error was within counsel's control, the miscommunication was attributable solely to negligence. Id. Finally, there was no indication that the delay was the result of bad faith, i.e., an attempt to gain a tactical advantage through the late filing. Id. In this case, the district court abused its discretion because it did not even consider the Pioneer factors. See Cheney, 71 F.3d at 850. Instead, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs' counsel's error was not excusable because counsel failed to comply with a series of orders. But as Plaintiffs note, their failure to respond to Anthem's motions was a result of their single failure to file appearances on the tag along dockets as directed by the February 7 order. In other words, while it is true that Plaintiffs violated the January 26 and February 19 orders by filing their status reports on the 1334 docket rather than in the tag along case, those violations did not lead to Plaintiffs' lack of knowledge that Anthem had refiled its motions. Through an affidavit of counsel, Plaintiffs explained to the district court that they had filed several previous appearances and mistakenly believed that they were receiving ECF notifications for filings in all cases, including the tag along cases. It was counsel's erroneous assumption, rather than purposeful disregard of the district court's order, that led to the failure to respond. [12] Anthem argues that the district court properly denied Plaintiffs' motion because counsel failed to read or understand the district court's orders. While it is true that this circuit recognizes that an attorney's misinterpretation of the law does not constitute excusable neglect, see Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 998 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that attorney's misunderstanding of the plain language of a [court] rule cannot constitute excusable neglect such that a party is relieved of the consequences of failing to comply with a statutory deadline); Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion where counsel's interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P 6(e) was contrary to case law), Plaintiffs' counsel's error is properly characterized as a mistake of fact rather than a mistake of law. For that reason, the facts in this case are more like those in Cheney, where [t]he reason for the delayed filing was a failure in communication between the associate attorney and the lead counsel, 71 F.3d at 850, than those in Advanced Estimating System, Inc. or Cavaliere. Turning to the Pioneer factors, we conclude that they all weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs relief. First, in spite of Anthem's arguments to the contrary, there is no discernable prejudice to Anthem as a result of the delay. The delay was brief. Plaintiffs filed their motions only ten days after the district court entered the orders granting Anthem's motions to dismiss and only seven days after counsel first learned of the district court's order. Anthem contends that it is prejudiced because it expected to win the motions, which would have concluded the litigation. But the inquiry is whether prejudice results from the delay, not from having to continue to litigate the case. See Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc., 181 F.3d 1198, 1202 (noting that Blue Cross of Wisconsin admitted that it had not suffered any prejudice from Walter's delay); Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir.2000) (There is no prejudice to the plaintiff where the setting aside of the default has done no harm to plaintiff except to require it to prove its case.). Second, there is no reason to conclude that allowing Plaintiffs to file their untimely response to Anthem's motion would adversely affect the judicial proceedings or impose an additional burden on the district court. As noted, Anthem filed its motion three times and Plaintiffs responded twice. Given Plaintiffs' record, it was to be expected that Plaintiffs would respond to Anthem's third motion and that the district court would eventually rule on the merits. Anthem incorrectly states that the district court would have had to adjudicate the motion for a third time, but the district court never addressed the merits; instead, it dismissed the motions without prejudice. Certainly the district court would have to commit resources to deciding Anthem's motion if it considered Plaintiffs' late response, but this is typically the case for any motion for relief from judgment. Third, the reason for the delay was counsel's erroneous assumption that its previous appearances had been filed in the tag along cases and that it was receiving all ECF filings as well as local counsel's failure to notify Plaintiffs' Connecticut counsel that they had received the motion by mail, presumably due to the same erroneous assumption that Plaintiffs' Connecticut counsel was receiving the ECF filings and saw the motions. While counsel certainly could have done more, there is no indication that they acted willfully. Finally, there is no suggestion in the record that Plaintiffs exhibited a lack of good faith in failing to file an appearance on the tag along dockets or in not responding to Anthem's motion. On the contrary, Plaintiffs' active record in the litigation clearly shows that Plaintiffs' counsel intended to respond to all of Anthem's motions and that its failure to do so was careless, but excusable, conduct. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by not finding excusable neglect under the Pioneer factors and failing to grant Plaintiffs' motion.