Opinion ID: 4569171
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Communication Condition

Text: As to the communication condition, Bryant contends that the condition is (1) vague, and (2) unreasonable as applied to him because it prohibits him from interacting with his brother, who is also a felon. That condition reads: You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer. App’x at 200. We address his two challenges in turn.
Bryant argues first that the communication condition should be vacated because it is vague and provides undue discretion to the probation officer. Bryant contends that it is unclear whether the communication condition would be 37 violated by, for example, incidental contacts with other convicted felons, such as by having lunch with coworkers. Bryant’s argument is unpersuasive. We have previously “upheld against a claim of unconstitutional vagueness a condition forbidding association with persons having criminal records.” United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543, 546 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1242-43 (2d Cir. 1972)). Bryant’s argument that the condition does not properly apprise him of what contacts are allowed is similarly unfounded. The Supreme Court has made clear that “incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the course of work on a legitimate job for a common employer” are exempted from conditions restricting association, Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 4 (1971); see also United States v. Doe, 802 F. App’x 655, 657 (2d Cir. 2020) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the same communication condition at issue here). Bryant argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015) supports his position. It does not. In Kappes, the Seventh Circuit held that a condition, which was very similar to the one at issue in this case, was unconstitutionally vague because it barred defendants from “associat[ing] with any persons engaged in criminal activity” and “associat[ing] 38 with any person convicted of a felony.” Id. at 848-49 (emphases added). However, the legal defect with that condition was the term “associate,” which the Seventh Circuit found vague. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the condition could be cured by changing “associate” to “meet, communicate, or otherwise interact with,” id. at 849 (emphasis added), which is almost exactly what the condition at issue here says, see Addendum to the PSR at 32 (stating that “[y]ou must not communicate or interact with” prohibited persons (emphasis added)). In sum, we see no vagueness in the condition imposed on Bryant. Accordingly, his challenge fails on that ground.
Bryant also argues that the communication condition will bar him from speaking to his brother, who is also a convicted felon. He asserts that the district court did not make the required findings in order to justify imposing a condition that prohibits contact with his brother. We agree. In United States v. Myers, then-Judge Sotomayor held that a condition restricting a father from associating with his child was, without a stronger justification in the record, unreasonable: [W]hen a fundamental liberty interest is implicated by a sentencing condition, we must first consider the sentencing goal to which the 39 condition relates, and whether the record establishes its reasonableness. We must then consider whether it represents a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to achieve that goal. Here, however, the record was inadequate on both prongs of the inquiry, allowing us neither to identify the goal to which the condition related nor to determine whether an undue deprivation of liberty occurred. 426 F.3d 117, 126 (2d Cir. 2005). The government argues that Myers is distinguishable because that case involved a parent-child relationship, whereas here the relationship is fraternal. However, we have recognized that sibling relationships are entitled to the same level of due process protection as other familial relationships. See Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 910 F.3d 40, 47 (2d Cir. 2018). Although it would be permissible in certain circumstances to restrict contact on supervised release between a defendant and an immediate family member if a sufficient showing for such a restriction is made, here the district court made no findings and provided little explanation of why this condition was appropriate. When the issue was raised below, the district court responded that “[p]robation officers just generally allow [brothers to talk]” and, if “there’s a particular conflict between members of a family and the probation officer thinks that would create a 40 pretty grave risk if there is contact between the two,” the probation officer should be able to prevent the brothers from communicating. App’x at 172-73. We recognize that a district court need not explain its reasoning when imposing standard conditions, United States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1999), which the communication condition at issue here is, see App’x at 200. However, because this condition as applied to Bryant implicates a protected familial relationship, see Gorman, 910 F.3d at 47, a more thorough justification is required, see Myers, 426 F.3d at 125-28 (remanding for further development of the record). The district court’s comments, as well as the PSR’s generic justifications for the application of this condition, are not commensurate with the burden imposed, and are thus insufficient to support the restriction of Bryant’s communications and interactions with his brother. Moreover, because a restriction regarding communications and interactions with an immediate family member implicates a liberty interest, that determination is not a minor detail that can be left to the discretion of the Probation Department. See United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that, although a district court “may delegate to a probation officer decisionmaking authority over certain minor details of supervised release,” it “may not delegate to the Probation Department 41 decisionmaking authority which would make a defendant’s liberty itself contingent on a probation officer’s exercise of discretion”); see also Myers, 426 F.3d at 130 (“[T]he district court may not improperly delegate this determination [of whether a special condition is warranted] to the probation office.”). Accordingly, we will remand to allow the district court to provide further justification for this condition as applied to Bryant’s immediate family members or to exempt such communications and interactions from the restriction.