Opinion ID: 1595830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 921.141(5)(l), Florida Statutes (2004)

Text: Smith next asserts that the statutory aggravating circumstance that the victim of the murder was under twelve years of age is unconstitutional. Smith contends that this circumstance is overinclusive and operates as an automatic aggravator because the statute requires neither that the defendant know the victim's age nor that the State demonstrate that an age-based vulnerability played a role in the homicide. We disagree. The instant challenge presents an issue of first impression because, although similar challenges have previously been asserted, this is the first case in which such an issue has been properly preserved. See Stephens v. State, 975 So.2d 405, 426 (Fla. 2007) (appellate counsel not ineffective for failure to challenge the constitutionality of section 921.141(5)( l ) where trial counsel did not object during trial); Lukehart v. State, 776 So.2d 906, 925 (Fla.2000) (constitutional challenge to section 921.141(5)( l ) procedurally barred where defendant failed to object during trial to the jury instruction on constitutional grounds). The constitutionality of a statutory aggravator is a pure question of law and is, therefore, subject to de novo review. See Troy v. State, 948 So.2d 635, 643 (Fla. 2006). We reject Smith's constitutional challenge with regard to this aggravating circumstance. As argued by the State, this aggravator narrows the class of individuals who are subject to the death penalty because only a percentage of murder victims are under twelve years of age. See Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 138 (Fla. 2001) ([T]o be constitutional, an aggravating circumstance must `not apply to every defendant convicted of murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder.' (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994))). With regard to the contention that section 921.141(5)( l ) violates due process because it does not require the State to establish that Smith targeted the victim based upon her age, this assertion is also without merit. In Woodel v. State, 804 So.2d 316, 325 (Fla.2001), this Court considered the constitutionality of section 921.141(5)(m), which establishes an aggravating circumstance for consideration when the victim of the capital felony is particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability. We previously upheld the constitutionality of this statute in Francis and further noted in Woodel that the finding of this aggravator is not dependent on whether the defendant has targeted his or her victim based on the age or disability of the victim. See 804 So.2d at 325. We similarly conclude that to find the existence of the under twelve aggravating circumstance, the State need not demonstrate that the defendant targeted the victim based upon her age. See also United States v. Minerd, 176 F.Supp.2d 424, 447 (W.D.Pa.2001) (rejecting claim that aggravator did not apply because defendant did not select the victim based upon her age where in the plain language of the statute the aggravator refers to the age or physical characteristics of the victim, and not to whether she was targeted because of those qualities). Finally, although the under twelve aggravator does not expressly require that the victim be particularly vulnerable, the absence of these words in section 921.141(5)( l ) does not render this subsection constitutionally deficient. The Legislature has the discretion to deem all children under the age of twelve vulnerable and, at times, has even equated young children with vulnerable adults. See, e.g., §§ 39.908(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) ([r]eporting suspected abuse of a child or a vulnerable adult as required by law); 393.0673(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (The agency may revoke or suspend a license or impose an administrative fine ... if: ... (b) The Department of Children and Family Services has verified that the licensee is responsible for the abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child or the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult.); ch. 85-53, Laws of Fla. (preamble) (WHEREAS, children are in need of special protection as victims or witnesses in the judicial system as a result of their age and vulnerability ....); see also Leon v. State, 498 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (All children under the age of twelve are, by definition, children of tender age who are particularly vulnerable to acts of child abuse.). We hold that section 921.141(5)( l ) is constitutional.