Opinion ID: 884422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury regarding a parole officer's duty?

Text: The State argues that, in both giving and refusing certain instructions, the District Court failed to properly instruct the jury on the duty of a parole officer. A district court has discretion in instructing the jury and we will not reverse the court on the basis of alleged instructional errors absent an abuse of discretion. Werre, 913 P.2d at 635 (citation omitted). The State contends that the District Court erred in giving Instruction Nos. 9 and 14, both of which relate to duty. Instruction No. 9 states: Every person is responsible for injury to the person of another caused by his negligence. Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Negligence may consist of action or inaction. A parole officer is negligent if he fails to act as an ordinarily prudent parole officer would act under the circumstances. Instruction No. 14 reiterates a parole officer's duty to exercise reasonable care to control a parolee. According to the State, these instructions are incorrect statements of Montana law on a parole officer's duty because Robbins owed no duty to Starkenburg. Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the district court. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 669 (citation omitted). Thus, we review the challenged instructions to determine whether they correctly state the law on a parole officer's duty in this case. The first three sentences of Instruction No. 9 merely restate the principles of negligence contained in Montana statute and case law. For example, § 27-1-701, MCA, states that, except as otherwise provided by law, everyone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care ...[;] similarly, under § 1-1-204(4), MCA, negligence denote[s] a want of the attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or omission that a prudent man would ordinarily give in acting in his own concerns. Our cases repeatedly reiterate that, ordinarily, negligence involves the failure of an actor to use reasonable care. See, e.g., Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 670-71; Jacobsen v. State (1989), 236 Mont. 91, 769 P.2d 694. The general principles of negligence contained in Instruction No. 9 are correct statements of Montana law and, indeed, the State does not contend otherwise. The State's assertions of legal error with regard to Instruction Nos. 9 and 14 relate to the portions of those instructions which apply these general negligence principles to a parole officer. We observe at the outset that the State cites to no Montana statute or case law providing an exception for parole officers from the duty generally imposed by § 27-1-701, MCA. Moreover, parole of inmates from the Prison and the status and supervision of parolees thereafter are governed by statute in Montana. The parole of an imprisoned person involves release to the community prior to the expiration of the prison sentence imposed. See § 46-1-202(15), MCA. A prisoner while on parole remains in the legal custody of the institution from which the prisoner was released but is subject to the orders of the [Board of Pardons and Parole]. Section 46-23-215(1), MCA. The Department of Corrections retain[s] custody of all persons placed on parole and shall supervise the persons during their parole periods in accordance with the conditions set by the board. Section 46-23-1021(1), MCA. Thus, in Montana, a parolee remains in the State's custody and the meaning of custody is interwoven with defining the State's duty with regard to parolees. The legislature has not defined custody in the parole context. Custody generally is defined as judicial or penal safekeeping: control of a thing or person with such actual or constructive possession as fulfills the purpose of the law or duty requiring it.... WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 559 (1971). Similarly, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 460 (1968) defines custody as [d]etention; charge; control; possession. The term ... may mean actual imprisonment... or mere power, legal or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual possession. Interpreting §§ 46-23-215(1) and 46-23-1021(1), MCA, according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used therein, as we must ( see Werre 913 P.2d at 631), it is clear that the State continues to have control over parolees after release from the Prison. Furthermore, the State is statutorily required to supervise paroleesthat is, persons in its custody and over whom it has power and controlaccording to the parole conditions imposed. Section 46-23-1021(1), MCA. Instruction No. 9 does nothing more than apply general negligence standards to parole officers in supervising parolees. Moreover, it does so in a manner entirely consistent with applicable statutes. Similarly, Instruction No. 14 merely imposes a duty to exercise reasonable care to control a parolee who already is, by statute, subject to that control. Nor does the foreseeability component of duty weigh against the existence of a duty in this case. We recently discussed at length, and clarified, Montana law regarding foreseeability insofar as it relates to the duty element of negligence. See Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 670-72; Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp. (1996), 276 Mont. 342, 916 P.2d 122. We stated that [f]oreseeability is of prime importance in establishing the element of duty.... If a reasonably prudent defendant can foresee neither any danger of direct injury nor any risk from an intervening cause he is simply not negligent. .... [Since duty] is inherently intertwined with foreseeability, such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-to-case basis. Busta, 916 P.2d at 134 (quoting Mang v. Eliasson (1969), 153 Mont. 431, 437-39, 458 P.2d 777, 781-82). Considerations of foreseeability in the duty context are directed to the foreseeability of the risk involved with the conduct at issue. See Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 671-72. Indeed, [t]he obligation of defendants turns on whether: ... the offending conduct foreseeably involved unreasonably great risk of harm to the interests of someone other than the actor.... Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.  ... And absent foreseeability, there is no duty owed by defendants to plaintiff.... Busta, 916 P.2d at 134 (quoting Mang, 458 P.2d at 781-82) (emphasis added). In this case, the conduct at issue is Robbins' supervision of Corliss, a parolee originally convicted and sentenced to a life sentence at the Prison for an execution-style murder. Both the State and Starkenburg agree that the primary responsibility of a parole officer in supervising a parolee is the protection of society. In this regard, Robbins conceded at trial that an execution-style murderer should be supervised more closely than other types of parolees because of the potential danger posed by such a parolee. On this record, it is clear that any negligent supervision by Robbins of Corliss foreseeably involved an unreasonably great risk of harm to persons other than Robbins generally and to Farrington and those close to her in particular. Furthermore, given that Montana statutes maintain parolees in legal custody and require parole supervision in accordance with the parolee's conditions of parole, Robbins clearly had a duty to exercise reasonable care to control Corliss and prevent him from doing such harm. Finally, we take note ofand rejectthe State's sky is falling arguments in this regard. Such arguments are not based on the law and have no place in a case involving fundamental principles of law and application of controlling statutes. Moreover, a duty to exercise reasonable care when the unreasonable risk of harm in failing to do so is foreseeable is hardly an extraordinary burden; such a duty is notas the State is well awarethe equivalent of a duty to exercise 24-hour-a-day control. Considering Instruction Nos. 9 and 14 in light of general negligence principles and Montana statutes which relate to parole and impose an affirmative duty to supervise, we conclude that they correctly state Montana law regarding a parole officer's duty. The State also asserts error in the District Court's refusal of three of its proposed jury instructions based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315 and 319 (1965). The State's proposed jury instruction no. 16 states: The State does not have a duty to control or take charge of a parolee to prevent him from doing harm to a third party victim unless a special relationship exists between the parole officer and the third party victim such that the parole officer would know or have reason to know that the specific identifiable third party victim would be the object of harm by the parolee. The above-described duty exists only to specifically identifiable individuals and is not a duty to protect the public at large. Proposed instruction no. 18 provides: A parole officer has no duty to control the conduct of a parolee to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless: (a) a special relationship exists between the parole officer and the parolee which imposes a duty upon the parole officer to control the parolee's conduct, or (b) a special relationship exists between the parole officer and the third party victim which gives to the third party victim a right to protection. Finally, the State's proposed instruction no. 19 reads: A parole officer who takes charge of a parolee whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the parolee to prevent him from doing such harm. The State contends that these proposed instructions correctly state the law applicable to its duty in the present case and negate the existence of any duty because no special relationship or control existed and Robbins did not take charge of Corliss. On the face of it, these proposed instructions do not appear to be entirely consistent with either the Montana statutes governing parole or the foreseeability component of duty discussed above. In any event, however, we have not previously adopted the Restatement principles on which the proposed instructions were based and, given our conclusion above that Instruction Nos. 9 and 14 correctly state Montana law applicable to this case, we need not address them further here. The State also asserts error in the District Court's refusal of its proposed instruction no. 17. Review of that proposed instruction reveals that it is an instruction on cause in fact and proximate cause which is unrelated to the legal question of the existence of a duty in this case. The State did not present an argument regarding this instruction under any issue involving causation; as a result, we do not address it. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on Robbins' duty in this case.