Opinion ID: 3039812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manifest Imbalance Reflecting Traditional

Text: Segregation The majority has substantially modified the Court’s first factor. Under the first Weber and Johnson factor, the Supreme Court has required that a Title VII affirmative action program be “justified by the existence of a manifest imbalance that reflected underrepresentation of [the favored group] in traditionally segregated job categories.” Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631 (internal quotation marks ommitted); accord Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 209; id. at 212-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Our cases have consistently and faithfully applied this requirement. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 979 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Under Title VII analysis, voluntary adoption of a race-based remedy may be justified by a showing that a manifest imbalance exists, reflecting underrepresentation of [the favored group] in traditionally segregated job categories.” (internal quotations omitted)); Davis v. City & County of S.F., 890 F.2d 1438, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the same standard to a sexbased affirmative action plan). Likewise, we have consistently applied the Supreme Court’s holding that “[i]n determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking . . . race into account, a comparison of the percentage of minorities . . . in the employer’s work force with the percentage in the area labor market . . . is appropriate . . . .” Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-32 (emphasis added); accord Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-206; Davis, 890 F.2d at 1448 (“To determine whether such an imbalance has occurred, the court may compare the percentage of minorities or women in the employer’s work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population.” (emphasis added)); Higgins, 823 F.2d at 356-57 (similar). In other words, until today, two findings were required to satisfy this first factor: (1) the present existence of a manifest 19114 DOE v. KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS imbalance in a particular job category in the employer’s workforce; and (2) that this imbalance stems from historical segregation in that job category. Those separate requirements guaranteed two critical things: First, with respect to the scope of the program, they guaranteed that there was a particular goal in sight—namely, representation of the historically disadvantaged group in the employer’s workforce in proportion to its representation in the relevant labor pool. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-32, 633 n.10; Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99, 208-09. By requiring a goal based on the employer’s own practices, Weber and Johnson were willing to permit affirmative action programs without giving all employers license to discriminate in favor of any group that currently finds itself disadvantaged anywhere in the labor market. Second, those requirements ensured that there was a temporal constraint, a well-defined point after which the preference program would no longer be necessary—that is, once the “manifest imbalance” in the employer’s workforce had been corrected. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 (“The requirement that ‘the manifest imbalance’ relate to a ‘traditionally segregated job category’ provides assurance both that sex or race will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title VII’s purpose of eliminating the effects of employment discrimination, and that the interests of those employees not benefiting from the plan will not be unduly infringed.”); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (“[T]he plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.”). Moreover, an affirmative action program that correlates to an employer’s own internal practices is necessarily limited in scope and time, because correcting the “manifest imbalance” is reasonably within the employer’s control. In contrast to Weber and Johnson, the majority’s test merely requires a private school to “demonstrate that specific, DOE v. KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS 19115 significant imbalances in educational achievement presently affect the target population” in the relevant community.4 Maj. Op. at 19076. Thus, by completely eliminating any schoolbased analysis and jettisoning any historical inquiry,5 the majority rejects the constraint developed in the Title VII context that affirmative action programs must be limited in scope and duration. Indeed, the majority effectively green-lights discrimination so long as the identified group currently suffers from “significant imbalances in educational achievement.” Id. at 19079. Because such a broad and perpetual license conflicts with the Supreme Court’s consistent emphasis on the limited and temporary nature of permissible affirmative action plans, see, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475-79 (1986), I cannot endorse the majority’s new standard. See also, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (“The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a termination point ‘assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.’ ” (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality opinion)); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (noting the affirmative action plan in that case was “a temporary measure”); W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 4 It is not entirely clear what constitutes the relevant community under the majority’s new test, but it appears the majority means the state where the affirmative action program has been adopted. See Maj. Op. at 19076. For instance, in announcing its new test, the majority maintains that “the relevant population is the community as a whole,” id., but when the majority applies that test, it appears that, “[t]he relevant community in this case is the state of Hawaii,” id. at 19078. 5 Whereas the majority justifies neither purge, the second modification is particularly puzzling given the majority’s repeated suggestion that history is of particular significance in this case. See, e.g., id. at 19054-56 & n.2 (providing detailed information on Hawaiian history to “set[ ] the stage for our more particular consideration of the educational status of Native Hawaiian children”); id. at 19072 (“The question remains how best to adapt the Title VII employment framework to an educational context and to the unique historical circumstances of this case.” (emphasis added)). 19116 DOE v. KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS 407 F.3d 983, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A narrowly tailored remedial program must also include adequate durational limitations.”); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 375 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[R]ace-conscious admissions programs must be limited in time.”).