Opinion ID: 2670360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional error claim

Text: Odachyan contends that the district court’s antiimmigrant bias unfairly influenced the sentence. Odachyan did not bring a motion to disqualify the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144, which provides that a judge “shall proceed no further” when presented with a “timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice.” See United States v. Carignan, 600 F.2d 762, 763–64 (9th Cir. 1979). Nor does Odachyan argue for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which requires a judge to recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Although Odachyan does not identify a precise legal basis for his argument, we accept the proposition that an anti-immigrant bias in sentencing could violate constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and treat the claim as such. As the Supreme Court observed in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975), “a biased decisionmaker [is] constitutionally unacceptable.” See also Hurles v. Ryan, 706 F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (a “fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process”). The appeal waiver in the plea agreement by its terms does not preclude an argument that the sentence is unconstitutional, and we have jurisdiction to consider a claim of constitutional error in any event. United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007) (an appeal waiver will not apply if the sentence violates the Constitution). Recognizing this authority, the government does not contend that UNITED STATES V. ODACHYAN 7 Odachyan has waived his right to argue a denial of due process. In support of his argument, Odachyan cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), in which the Court held that a district court judge’s comments were sufficient to support an affidavit of bias or prejudice under the then-applicable statute (Section 21 of the Judicial Code). Defendants in that case were charged with violations of the Espionage Act during World War I, and some of the defendants had been born in Germany. The district judge who presided over the trial was reported to have said in substance prior to trial: “One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German-Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty.” Id. at 28. The Court held that the district judge should have disqualified himself in response to the defendants’ motion. Id. at 36. The episode discussed in Berger was later cited by the Court in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the only other authority cited by Odachyan in connection with this argument. In Liteky the Court affirmed a conviction and concluded that the district court did not err in denying a motion for disqualification, with the following observation: [J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as 8 UNITED STATES V. ODACHYAN to make fair judgment impossible. An example of the latter (and perhaps of the former as well) is the statement that was alleged to have been made by the District Judge in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), a World War I espionage case against German–American defendants . . . Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune. Id. at 555–56 (emphases in original). We are not persuaded that the statement by the district court in this case reflected such a “high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. “[O]nly in the most extreme of cases would disqualification on this basis be constitutionally required.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986) (explaining that a “general frustration with insurance companies” does not establish a constitutionally disqualifying bias); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 558 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I think all would agree that a high threshold is required to satisfy this standard.”). This is not an extreme case. UNITED STATES V. ODACHYAN 9 The district judge did not suggest that all immigrants are criminals at heart regardless of their culpable conduct, as had the judge in Berger. The judge in this instance was responding to Odachyan’s sentencing position. Odachyan’s supplemental sentencing memorandum highlighted Odachyan’s experiences prior to coming to the United States, including his family history and his own childhood in Armenia, his brother’s death, an earthquake, and food shortages that led to his family’s emigration, as mitigating factors in sentencing. Attached to the memo were many letters from others describing these conditions. In that context, it appears that the district court’s statement was in response to arguments made by Odachyan and was offered to explain why the district court was not persuaded by them. At most, the statement reflects a “general frustration” with the type of argument Odachyan made at sentencing. See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821. That is not enough “to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that we accord to the determinations of a judge.” Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).