Opinion ID: 42668
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invalid under Chevron Step One

Text: 27 In Succar, the First Circuit, performing a Chevron step one analysis, considered the statutory text and the context of the statutory scheme to determine that Congress had spoken clearly to aliens' eligibility for status adjustment and that the regulation's additional limitation on the eligible class was inconsistent with that congressional determination. 394 F.3d at 29. The First Circuit later referred to the statute's legislative history to confirm its reading of the statute. Id. at 32. 28 In its plain-language review of the statute, the Succar panel found that Congress had defined certain categories of aliens who were eligible to apply for adjustment of status, . . . and refined the definition by specifically excluding certain aliens from eligibility. Id. at 24. Because of the express pronouncements in § 1255 regarding eligibility for status adjustment, the First Circuit held that Congress unambiguously reserved to itself the determination of who is eligible to apply for adjustment of status relief. Id. The regulation's limitation on parolees' eligibility conflicts with the statute's plain language, according to the Succar court. 29 When the First Circuit considered the context of the statutory scheme, it drew two conclusions. The Succar court first determined that the exclusion of parolees in removal proceedings renders ineligible most of the class that Congress rendered eligible by including parolees. Id. at 26. Second, the court stated that the congressional choice to delegate to the Attorney General some circumscribed discretion over the ultimate decision of who is granted adjustment of status is not authorization for discretion in other areas. Id. (footnote omitted). These conclusions compelled the court to deem the regulation invalid. 30 The first conclusion was based, in part, on the court's factual understanding that most arriving alien parolees are placed in removal proceedings. Id. at 18. This representation was made to the court and not disputed by the Attorney General. Id. at 21. Also, the court noted that an applicant for admission who cannot demonstrate admissibility clearly and beyond a doubt must be placed in removal proceedings. Id. at 27 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). This view of the operation of the INA as a whole and of the practical effect of the regulation led the Succar court to find that the regulation's carve-out improperly subsumed the congressional grant of eligibility to the parolee class of aliens. 31 The First Circuit's second conclusion— addressing the Attorney General's discretion— was a response to the argument that the Attorney General may exercise his discretion by rulemaking rather than case-by-case adjudication pursuant to Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 121 S.Ct. 714, 148 L.Ed.2d 635 (2001). In Lopez, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation of the Bureau of Prisons (the Bureau) categorically denying early release for certain prisoners as an appropriate exercise of the Bureau's discretion. 531 U.S. at 233, 121 S.Ct. 714. The authorizing statute in question in Lopez eliminated a class of prisoners from eligibility for early release and left the release determination of other prisoners to the discretion of the Bureau. Id. at 238-41, 121 S.Ct. 714 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B)). The Court determined that, aside from excluding a class of prisoners from eligibility for the reduction in sentence, Congress ha[d] not identified any further circumstance in which the Bureau either must grant the reduction, or is forbidden to do so. Id. at 242, 121 S.Ct. 714. Because the Bureau ultimately was vested with discretion to decide on the prisoners' release, the Court held that the Bureau was within its authority to exclude categorically classes of prisoners by rule: The Bureau is not required continually to revisit `issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding.' Id. at 244, 121 S.Ct. 714 (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983)). The First Circuit distinguished Lopez, asserting that, in the statute at issue in Lopez, Congress had been silent and that was not the case with respect to the INA. Succar, 394 F.3d at 29. Accordingly, the Succar, court deemed the Attorney General's resort to rulemaking contrary to the plain language of the statute. Id. 32 Having concluded that the text and statutory structure conflicted with the regulation, the Succar court reviewed the INA's legislative history. Congress, the First Circuit determined, intended to eliminate unnecessary trips out of the United States in order to be eligible to apply for admission. Id. at 33-34 (discussing S. REP. No. 86-1651 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3125). Based on this review of the legislative history, the First Circuit concluded that the regulation actually recreated a problem that Congress intended to eliminate when enacting the statute because, under the regulation, parolees subject to removal would have to leave the country to become eligible to adjust status. Id. at 34. As the legislative history confirmed its understanding of the statute's language and context, the First Circuit declared 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) invalid under Chevron step one and vacated the BIA's removal order. Id. at 34, 36. The Ninth Circuit, in Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 668 (9th Cir.2005), expressly adopted and followed Succar. 33