Opinion ID: 4357302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Belief of Marriage

Text: Boyce next argues that she was prevented from presenting a complete defense because the district court precluded her from testifying that she believed she was informally married to Rogers. Such claimed errors are typically reviewed de novo, 14 but the government contends that this objection by Boyce was either waived and unreviewable or not properly preserved, and therefore is reviewable only for plain error. “[W]aiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” 15 Waived arguments are “entirely unreviewable.” 16 At the pretrial hearing, Boyce’s trial counsel made clear that the two “were not legally married,” and when asked by the court whether he was planning to claim that they were common-law married, he responded, “No, I’m not.” Boyce thereby waived the argument that she and Rogers were in fact in an informal marriage. 13 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. 14 Skelton, 514 F.3d at 438. 15 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 16 United States v. Ceballos, 789 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 2015). 7 Case: 17-51128 Document: 00514784264 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/07/2019 No. 17-51128 Boyce, however, filed a pretrial memorandum in which she argued that she should be allowed to “articulate why she believed she was in an informal marriage” because it would illuminate whether she harbored the intent to defraud Rogers and whether she willfully misstated her income on her tax returns. The district court determined that this theory would not be allowed to come before the jury, but that Boyce would be allowed to testify that the two lived together and managed a household together. This ruling was repeated at trial. Its effect was to preclude testimony from Boyce that she believed they were informally married under Texas law and evidence that might support this belief. This objection was properly preserved. The Constitution guarantees defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. 17 The Federal Rules of Evidence guide the inquiry, and the district court’s decisions under those rules are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 18 Analysis of whether a potential error in this context was harmless resembles the previous analysis of alleged Confrontation Clause violations. 19 The district court excluded this evidence because it believed it was “not a legal theory” or a defense to the crimes for which Boyce was indicted. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 gives trial courts discretion to exclude evidence if the danger that it will confuse the issues or waste time substantially outweighs its probative value. 20 Here, the probative value of this testimony was negated by Boyce’s own testimony and other evidence produced at trial. Boyce testified that she was engaged to be married to Rogers, and her tax forms show that she filed as “head of household” instead of “married.” Her trial counsel also elicited testimony from both parties about the seriousness of their relationship. The 17 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). 18 Skelton, 514 F.3d at 438. 19 Id. at 445 n.7. 20 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 8 Case: 17-51128 Document: 00514784264 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/07/2019 No. 17-51128 district court did not abuse its discretion, and Boyce was able to present a complete defense.