Opinion ID: 772486
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Mastrangelo and Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) Contain a Subject Matter Limitation

Text: 49 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), made effective December 1997, codified the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine as an exception to the hearsay rules by permitting the admission of hearsay statements offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); see also United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2000). Under Rule 804(b)(6), a party forfeits the right to object on hearsay grounds to the admission of a declarant's prior statement when the party's deliberate wrongdoing or acquiescence therein procured the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note to subdivision (b)(6); cf. Miller, 116 F.3d at 668 (holding that neither the existence of an ongoing proceeding nor a finding that the defendant's intention was to prevent the declarant from testifying is required to admit the declarant's out-of-court statement). 50 By its plain terms, Rule 804(b)(6) refers to the intent of a party to procure the unavailability of the witness, and does not, as Dhinsa contends, limit the subject matter of the witness' testimony to past events or offenses the witness would have testified about had he been available. See Emery, 186 F.3d at 926 ([Rule 804(b)(6)] contains no limitation on the subject matter of the statements that it exempts from the prohibition on hearsay evidence.). This interpretation is supported by the underlying purpose of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine -- that a defendant may not benefit from his or her wrongful prevention of future testimony from a witness or potential witness. Id.; see also Cherry, 217 F.3d at 815 (To permit the defendant to profit from [wrongful] conduct would be contrary to public policy, common sense and the underlying purpose of the confrontation clause.) (quotation marks omitted); White, 116 F.3d at 911 ([W]here a defendant has silenced a witness through the use of threats, violence or murder, admission of the victim's prior statements at least partially offsets the perpetrator's rewards for his misconduct.); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73; Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202 (A defendant cannot prefer the law's preference and profit from it,... while repudiating that preference by creating the condition that prevents it.) (footnote omitted). Adoption of Dhinsa's proposed limitation would limit the proof against him -- the very result that the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine seeks to remedy. See Emery, 186 F.3d at 926. Further, we have declined to read in such a limitation in our pre-Rule 804(b)(6) decisions dealing with Mastrangelo evidence, permitting statements made by the declarant to be admitted where the murder of the declarant was one of the charged offenses. See, e.g., Miller, 116 F.3d at 667-69 (hearsay statement of murdered drug supplier made to his wife); Thai, 29 F.3d at 814-15 (hearsay statement of murdered store owner made to police); cf. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279 ([A] defendant who wrongfully procures a witness's absence for the purpose of denying the government that witness's testimony waives his right under the Confrontation Clause to object to the admission of the absent witness's hearsay statements.); Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 (A defendant who procures a witness's absence waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness.) (emphasis added). Because Rule 804(b)(6) was intended to codify the waiver-by-misconduct rule as it was applied by the courts at that time, see Ochoa, 229 F.3d at 639; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 815; White, 116 F.3d at 913, it is reasonable to conclude that Rule 804(b)(6) did not intend to create a subject matter limitation where one did not previously exist. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 816 (We... read the plain language of Rule 804(b)(6) to permit the admission of those hearsay statements that would be admissible under the constitutional doctrine of waiver by misconduct.); cf. Estate of Gloeckner v. C.I.R., 152 F.3d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 1998); Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996). 51 In sum, based on the plain language of Rule 804(b)(6) and the strong policy reasons favoring application of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine to prevent a party from profiting from his wrongdoing, we hold that Rule 804(b)(6) places no limitation on the subject matter of the declarant's statements that can be offered against the defendant at trial to prove that the defendant murdered the declarant. 52