Opinion ID: 578193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indictment Defect and Ex Post Facto Clause Claim

Text: 16 Count 10 of the indictment charged the defendant with knowingly and intentionally mak[ing] or invit[ing] reliance on a false, forged, or counterfeit statement, document or thing, namely the altered checkbook of First Finance, Inc. This count tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1007 as amended in 1989. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-73, § 961(f), 103 Stat. 500. 8 However, the conduct alleged in Count 10 occurred during 1988, before Congress amended the statute. 17 Haddock argues that the conduct alleged in Count 10 was not within the scope of the prohibitions of § 1007 until after the 1989 amendment. He further asserts that because the indictment tracks the language of the 1989 amended version of the statute, the indictment fails to charge an offense that existed when the alleged conduct occurred and, therefore, the conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 18 Haddock did not object to the language of the indictment prior to trial. Instead, he raised the ex post facto claim both in his post-trial motion of February 19, 1991 and again on this appeal. Although most objections to an indictment are waived if not raised before trial, an indictment's failure to state an offense is a defect that may be raised at anytime, including on appeal. United States v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir.1987). However, the countervailing interest in judicial efficiency requires that tardily-challenged indictments be construed liberally in favor of validity. Id. 19 We have stated that [a]n indictment is not insufficient merely because it fails to recite the precise language of the statute. United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.1991). An indictment is generally sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged, putting the defendant on fair notice of the charge against which he must defend, and if it enables a defendant to assert an acquittal or conviction in order to prevent being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1530 (10th Cir.1989) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974)). We must look to the allegations in the indictment to determine whether it adequately states the elements of an offense. Id. 20 A violation of the 1988 version of § 1007 required that a defendant 1) make any statement, 2) knowing it to be false, 3) for the purpose of obtaining a loan from the FDIC or otherwise influencing actions of the FDIC. 9 Count 10 of the indictment reads in part as follows:On or about May 26, 1988, ... KENNETH E. HADDOCK for the purpose of influencing the actions of the Federal Deposit Insurance corporation, did knowingly and intentionally make or invite reliance on a false, forged, or counterfeit statement, document or thing; that is, during an audit by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation of the books and accounts of First Finance, Inc., an affiliate of the Bank of White City and the Bank of Herington, the defendant did alter or caused to be altered the checkbook of First Finance, Inc., to conceal from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation examiners payees of checks, dates of deposits, and balances of the First Finance Inc. checking account, and to conceal other facts relevant to the audit, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1007. 21 The indictment clearly states that Haddock acted knowingly and with the purpose of influencing actions of the FDIC during the FDIC's investigation of charges related to this case. The only remaining question is whether Haddock's alleged conduct constitutes a statement. 22 The indictment charges Haddock with alter[ing] or caus[ing] to be altered First Finance's checkbook to conceal payees, deposit dates, balances, and other facts relevant to the FDIC's audit. Citing Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 102 S.Ct. 3088, 73 L.Ed.2d 767 (1982), Haddock argues that the alleged alterations do not constitute a statement. In Williams, the Supreme Court--reviewing the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 to a check kiting scheme--held that the writing of a check does not involve the making of a 'false statement'  because a check does not make any representation as to the state of [the customer's] bank balance. Id. at 284-85, 102 S.Ct. at 3091. We cannot extend the reasoning of Williams to support Haddock's assertion that alterations made to selected check stubs in First Finance's checkbook do not constitute statements. These alterations were made during an FDIC investigation of which appellant was fully aware. The indictment alleges that they were made in order to hide the truth about payees, account balances, and deposit dates. The alterations--as alleged--clearly represent an attempt to communicate something different to the FDIC than what the FDIC might have found had it reviewed the checkbook without the alterations. Therefore, we conclude that the conduct alleged in the indictment does include a statement as contemplated by the language of the pre-amendment version of § 1007. 23 Because the indictment alleges each of the elements required for a violation under the 1988 version of § 1007, we conclude that the indictment adequately apprised Haddock of the charges against which he needed to defend. See United States v. Chestnut, 533 F.2d 40, 44-45 (2d Cir.) (indictment sufficiently charged an offense even though it used language from the wrong version of the statute), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829, 97 S.Ct. 88, 50 L.Ed.2d 93 (1976); United States v. Cohen, 450 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (5th Cir.1971) (same). 10 We also conclude that the indictment's charging language, viewed in tandem with the record, is sufficiently specific and descriptive that Haddock may subsequently avail himself of the form of jeopardy for future prosecution of the same offense. United States v. Bullock, 914 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir.1990). Furthermore, because the conduct alleged in the indictment constitutes an offense under the pre-amendment version of § 1007, we reject Haddock's ex post facto argument that the indictment failed to charge an offense that existed when the alleged conduct occurred. 24 Haddock argues that the district court erred by refusing to address the alleged indictment defect (including the Ex Post Facto Clause claim) when it was raised in Haddock's post-trial motion of February 19, 1991. Because an indictment's failure to state an offense is a defect that may be raised at any time, Freeman, 813 F.2d at 304, and Haddock's ex post facto argument implicates this very defect, the district court had jurisdiction to address the claim because it was raised before defendant filed a notice of appeal to this court. However, because we hold that the language of the indictment is not violative of ex post facto principles, we conclude that the district court's error in failing to address the claim was harmless.