Opinion ID: 2087646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History and Development of the Plea Colloquy

Text: ¶ 52 We now turn to the plea colloquy and its history to show how the increasing duties imposed on the circuit court to ensure the defendant's understanding of the plea, have prompted an evolution in the meaning of a fair and just reason for presentence plea withdrawal. ¶ 53 More than 40 years ago, in State v. Strickland, 27 Wis.2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965), this court held that the circuit court had no duty to inquire into the defendant's understanding of his pleas during a plea colloquy. In that case, the defendant argued that his guilty pleas were not intelligently and understandingly made because the circuit court did not inquire of the defendant personally whether he had intelligently and understandingly entered his pleas. Id. at 631, 135 N.W.2d 295. Defendant's counsel asserted that federal courts, in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, interrogate the accused at the arraignment even though the accused is represented by counsel. Id. at 631 n. 2, 135 N.W.2d 295. ¶ 54 This court replied that such inquiries were unnecessary where the defendant is represented by counsel. Id. The court stated: Courts have the right to assume in such a situation that counsel has fulfilled his duty of proper representation by fully explaining to the accused the nature of the offense charged, the range of penalties, and possible defenses thereto, and satisfying himself that the accused understands such explanations, before permitting the accused to authorize the entry of a plea of guilty. There is no allegation in defendant's motion that this was not done. We deem it inadvisable to lay down a rule that trial courts must, in every case, where an accused is represented by counsel at time of entering a plea, before accepting the plea interrogate defendant to make sure that the defendant has understandingly and intelligently entered the plea. However, we recommend that such practice be adopted. Id. at 631-32, 135 N.W.2d 295 (emphasis added). ¶ 55 Four years later in 1969, this court did mandate such a practice. Ernst v. State, 43 Wis.2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969), abrogated by State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). In Ernst, this court overruled the Strickland assumption and mandated that the circuit courts follow the practice suggested in State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis.2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964). Ernst, 43 Wis.2d at 674, 170 N.W.2d 713. The court mandated that circuit courts have a duty to do the following and make a record thereof: 1. To determine the extent of the defendant's education and general comprehension. 2. To establish the accused's understanding of the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the range of punishments which it carries. 3. To ascertain whether any promises or threats have been made to him in connection with his appearance, his refusal of counsel, and his proposed plea of guilty. 4. To alert the accused to the possibility that a lawyer may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances which would not be apparent to a layman such as the accused. 5. To make sure that the defendant understands that if a pauper, counsel will be provided at no expense to him. Id. The Ernst court also added a sixth requirement that the trial judge personally determine whether a factual basis exists to support the plea. [10] Id. ¶ 56 In Bangert, we overruled language from prior cases that indicated that plea colloquy procedures are mandated by the United States Constitution. [11] However, the Bangert court did not discard the mandatory requirement that trial judges undertake a personal colloquy with the defendant to ascertain his understanding of the nature of the charge. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 260, 389 N.W.2d 12. The court viewed that duty as a statutory requirement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1). Id. ¶ 57 The Bangert court also expanded the judicial duties under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a), which requires the court to determine that the plea is voluntary. The circuit court must do more than merely record the defendant's affirmation of understanding pursuant to sec. 971.08(1)(a). Id. at 267, 389 N.W.2d 12. The circuit court must determine a defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. Id. at 268, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 58 The Bangert court also added a seventh duty for the circuit court, to inform the defendant of the constitutional rights which he will be waiving, or to ascertain that the defendant possesses such knowledge. Id. at 272, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 59 Since Bangert, the court has articulated three additional duties in the plea colloquy for circuit courts. See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶ 35, 293 Wis.2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. Thus, the duties imposed upon circuit courts during the plea colloquy have expanded significantly. Understanding that a plea of guilty is a conviction, not a mere confession, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), we require elaborate plea colloquies to demonstrate the critical importance of pleas in our system of justice. Brown, 293 Wis.2d 594, ¶ 23, 716 N.W.2d 906. ¶ 60 The effect of more elaborate and comprehensive plea colloquies is to ensure that pleas are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id., ¶ 23. The corresponding impact, however, is to make it more difficult for defendants to withdraw their pleas. Unlike circuit courts at the time of Strickland, circuit courts today are expected to develop an extensive record related to the defendant's personal understanding of the plea. This undertaking has changed the notion that guilty pleas are merely tentative until after sentence. [12] As long as circuit courts follow the court mandated and statutory requirements during plea colloquies, defendants will ordinarily have difficulty showing a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal if the reason is based on grounds that were adequately addressed in the plea colloquy. [13] ¶ 61 The evolution in the meaning of a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal tracks the policy basis for allowing the withdrawal of pleas before sentencing. This policy basis was carefully set out in Libke: The liberal rule for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentence is consistent with the efficient administration of criminal justice. It reduces the number of appeals contesting the knowing and voluntariness of a guilty plea, and avoids the difficulties of disentangling such claims. It also ensures that a defendant is not denied a right to trial by jury unless he clearly waives it. Libke, 60 Wis.2d at 127-28, 208 N.W.2d 331 (quoting United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276, 1279 (3d Cir.1970)). This rationale was repeated in Shanks, 152 Wis.2d at 288, 448 N.W.2d 264, and Shimek, 230 Wis.2d at 739, 601 N.W.2d 865. ¶ 62 A fair and just reason for plea withdrawal before sentence will always be subject to case-by-case analysis. As a general rule, a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal before sentence will likely exist if the defendant shows that the circuit court failed to conform to its statutory or other mandatory duties in the plea colloquy, and the defendant asserts misunderstanding because of it. In such a circumstance, the State may show that it has been prejudiced, in which case the court will have to decide whether the deficiency in the plea colloquy compromised the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the defendant's plea. Cf. State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis.2d 131, 139, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997). A defendant may proffer a fair and just reason, including misunderstanding and changed circumstances, based on matters outside the plea colloquy record. When the plea colloquy is sufficient, however, the defendant's fair and just reason should rely on matters outside the plea colloquy record or be able to show why it is fair and just to disregard the solemn answers the defendant gave in the colloquy. A failure to recognize the implications of a valid plea colloquy would debase[] the judicial proceeding at which a defendant pleads and the court accepts its plea. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997). ¶ 63 A fair and just reason to withdraw a plea before sentence does not depend upon either a deficient plea colloquy or the existence of a constitutionally invalid plea. Nevertheless, because a fair and just reason will nullify both a sufficient plea colloquy and a constitutionally valid plea, the court may consider whether the proffered fair and just reason outweighs the efficient administration of justice.