Opinion ID: 12443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Privacy expectations; Obtrusiveness

Text: 39 Of course, the fact that special needs are present does not alone resolve the matter. The privacy interests of the party searched must also be weighed in the balance. [W]hether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Acton at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2390 (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires consideration of, inter alia, whether the individuals' expectation of privacy is decreased and the relative obtrusiveness or otherwise of the search. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2396 (Taking into account all the factors we have considered above--the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search ...). Dr. Pierce's status as a student-employee in the emergency medicine residency program diminished her legitimate expectations of privacy vis-a-vis the search at issue. The employee's expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. O'Connor at 717, 107 S.Ct. at 1497. [I]t is plain that certain forms of public employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to ... personal searches. Von Raab at 671, 109 S.Ct. at 1394. And, as the Court said of Customs employees required to carry firearms or interdict illegal drugs, so also with those similarly situated to Dr. Pierce, [b]ecause successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly on their fitness. Id. Unlike most private citizens or governmental employees in general, such employees reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Id. 10 40 Moreover, the intrusiveness of the search here was entirely minimal. There is no evidence that anyone observed, listened to, or otherwise monitored the excretion of the urine sample. The record suggests that Dr. Pierce excreted the sample alone in a bathroom with the door closed. There is certainly nothing to the contrary, or even to suggest that anyone listened at the door. 11 Moreover, Dr. Pierce took the urinalysis at Pathlab, an independent laboratory that she had hand picked herself, 12 without Dr. Smith (or anyone else) being aware that she was going to undergo (or had undergone) such a test, much less at Pathlab, until she turned over the completely negative results to him. There is no evidence that she disclosed to Pathlab any personal medical information, such as what prescription medications she was using. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1394-95 n. 2. There is no evidence that the urinalysis was used to look for, or that its results reflected, anything other than the presence or absence of drugs, such as whether Dr. Pierce was epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Acton, 515 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2393. The results of the test were negative for drugs, and thus, so far as the evidence shows, nothing else about Dr. Pierce was disclosed thereby. Moreover, had the results been positive, Dr. Pierce could have elected not to disclose them. 41 Finally, other circumstances of the test also point to nonintrusiveness. Dr. Pierce did not take the test until approximately nine days after Dr. Robert Smith had requested that she undergo a test as arranged for by him. This factor was deemed important in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 313, 319, 91 S.Ct. 381, 384, 387, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (six days advance notice of requested home visitation of AFDC welfare recipient factor in finding of Fourth Amendment reasonableness), which was cited with approval in this respect in Von Raab at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1394 n. 2. And, as noted, the test was not undertaken for law enforcement purposes, law enforcement personnel were not involved, and there was no threat of force and no potential criminal or civil penalty for refusing. All these factors were deemed important in Wyman v. James. Id. at 317-27, 91 S.Ct. at 386-90. Dr. Pierce was orally threatened by Dr. David Smith with dismissal from the residency program if she did not ultimately undergo a drug test arranged by Dr. Robert Smith. However, only the dean of the medical school had the authority to dismiss her (and any dismissal by the dean was subject to suspensive appeal); and, in any event, Dr. Pierce never underwent the test contemplated by the Drs. Smith. Dr. Pierce was never tested by anyone acting for any governmental agency or official; and, the wholly noninvasive private test she underwent was not one commanded, requested, or anticipated by any state actor. 42 All in all, the search here intruded only in the absolutely most minimal way on Dr. Pierce's Fourth Amendment interests; certainly less so than did the searches in Acton, Von Raab, and Skinner. In Chandler, the Court observed that the Georgia testing permits a candidate to provide the urine specimen in the office of his or her private physician; and the results of the test are given first to the candidate, who controls further dissemination of the report, labeled this as relatively noninvasive, and stated therefore, if the 'special need' showing had been made, the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1303. 13 Here, there is plainly no more intrusiveness than in Chandler, if, indeed, as much. 43