Opinion ID: 1293474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Legislative Policy.

Text: Nearly two decades ago, the legislature specifically adopted a legislative policy generally requiring a culpable mental state as a prerequisite to a finding of criminal conduct. In 1971, when the legislature passed a comprehensive revision of the Oregon Criminal Code, it expressly stated that one of the general purposes of the process was [t]o define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state that constitute each offense and limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault. ORS 161.025(1)(d). (Emphasis added.) Commenting on this provision, The Oregon Criminal Law Revision Commission (the Commission) stated: Paragraph (d) is intended to make it clear that there is a legislative policy against creating liability without fault crimes (the so-called regulatory, public welfare, public tort or absolute liability crimes), with heavy penalties. This provision should be considered in connection with Article 7 [now ORS 161.505 to 161.585] which sets up the violation classification and in connection with the general requirements for culpability set out in Article 2 [now ORS 161.085 to 161.125]. Commentary to Proposed Oregon Criminal Code § 2, 2 (1970) (the Commentary). The Commentary further states: The Commission follows the Model Penal Code in expressing a policy adverse to use of `strict liability' concepts in criminal law, whenever the offense carries a possibility of sentence of imprisonment. This position relates not only to offenses defined by the criminal code itself, but covers the entire body of state law, so far as penal sanctions are involved. As noted by the Model Penal Code commentators, in the absence of minimal culpability, the law has neither a deterrent nor corrective nor an incapacitative function to perform. They support this approach by stating: `It has been argued and the argument undoubtedly will be repeated, that absolute liability is necessary for enforcement in a number of areas where it obtains. But if practical enforcement cannot undertake to litigate the culpability of alleged deviation from legal requirements, we do not see how the enforcers rightly can demand the use of penal sanctions for the purpose. Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant's act was wrong. This is too fundamental to be compromised. The law goes far enough if it permits the imposition of a monetary penalty in cases where strict liability has been imposed.' Commentary, § 11 at 11. Having stated the general policy, the legislature turned to specifics. ORS 161.095 provides: (1) The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act   . (2) Except as provided in ORS 161.105, a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. The statutory scheme, together with the detailed commentary of the Commission, demonstrates the clear and unequivocal policy that all crimes must include a culpable mental state unless ORS 161.105 contains an exception. [2] By focusing on the exceptions to this requirement, the majority implicitly accepts the general legislative policy.