Opinion ID: 597849
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Younger

Text: Abstention 20 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state disciplinary proceedings and to have the proceedings declared unconstitutional. Defendants respond that the district court properly abstained under Younger. 21 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding unless the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate. Id. at 45, 91 S.Ct. at 751 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243, 46 S.Ct. 492, 493, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926)). The Supreme Court extended Younger to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2377, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208-09, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). 22 In Middlesex, a case similar to the present appeal, a lawyer challenged disciplinary proceedings of the New Jersey Bar Association by filing suit in federal court. He contended that the proceedings violated his First Amendment rights. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 427-29, 102 S.Ct. at 2518-20. The Court held that the federal district court correctly dismissed the case based on Younger. As part of its analysis, the Court enunciated a three-part inquiry for the application of Younger abstention to state bar disciplinary hearings: 23 [F]irst, do state bar disciplinary hearings within the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. 24 Id. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521 (emphasis omitted). The similarities between the present appeal and Middlesex demand that we likewise abstain in this case. 25 As to the first question, the Middlesex Court found that the New Jersey State Constitution vested the power to govern and discipline the bar in the New Jersey Supreme Court and that the New Jersey proceedings were judicial in nature and the first prong of Middlesex was satisfied. Id. at 433-34, 102 S.Ct. at 2522. Similarly, Ohio's constitution vests original jurisdiction in its supreme court over [a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the practice of law. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). Thus, the proceedings are within the constitutionally-prescribed jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ohio. 26 Further, like the New Jersey proceedings, the Ohio disciplinary proceedings are carried out by committees which are arms of the Ohio Supreme Court. A Grievance Committee reviews an initial complaint and investigates to decide if a prima facie case of improper conduct exists; if so, a formal hearing is held. The supreme court ultimately decides what discipline should be given. Cf. id. at 425-27, 102 S.Ct. at 2518-19. Thus, the Ohio procedures are judicial in nature and the first prong of Middlesex is satisfied. 27 Regarding the second prong of the Middlesex test, the Court found an extremely important [state] interest in maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses. Id. at 434, 102 S.Ct. at 2522. Indicative of that interest was the very fact that the New Jersey Bar Association, an agency of the state, was involved as a defendant in federal court and the initiator of state proceedings. Id. at 434-35, 102 S.Ct. at 2522-23. Here, the Ohio defendants were also involved in federal litigation to protect Ohio's role in maintaining the integrity of its legal profession. As in New Jersey, regulation of the legal profession is of great importance to Ohio and the second prong is satisfied. 28 In evaluating the third prong of its analysis, the Court stated that [s]o long as the constitutional claims of respondents can be determined in the state proceedings and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, the federal courts should abstain. Id. at 435, 102 S.Ct. at 2523. The Court found that the New Jersey proceedings provided the respondent with the opportunity to present his constitutional claims by answering the complaint against him and raising the issues to the committees and the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Id. at 435-36, 102 S.Ct. at 2522-24. Like the respondent in Middlesex, plaintiffs had the opportunity to present their constitutional claims in their answer to the complaint against them. 4 29 Plaintiffs allege bad faith and harassment on the part of the Grievance Committee. First, they argue the proceedings harass civil rights attorneys, thereby impairing federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts showing a concerted effort to discipline only civil rights attorneys. Second, they argue the proceedings were brought in bad faith because of past conflicts in litigation with members of the Grievance Committee. This argument is without merit. The very nature of our adversarial legal system requires attorneys to oppose each other during litigation in order to represent zealously the interests of the client. Since the bar association is a self-governing body, it is inevitable that attorneys who have disagreed in prior matters will eventually be called on to discipline each other. Absent specific facts demonstrating bad faith by the Committee, we find that the third Middlesex factor requires abstention. 5 30 Finally, plaintiffs argue that Middlesex is inapplicable because the conduct which violated the state disciplinary rule in Middlesex arose in a state court case based on state law whereas the present conduct arose in a federal court case based on federal law. This argument is also without merit. Federal courts have the inherent authority to discipline attorneys practicing before them and to set standards for their conduct. See Stone v. Philadelphia and AFSCME Dist. Council 33, Local 159, No. 86-1877, 1986 WL 13483, at  4 (D.Pa. Nov. 25, 1986); International Business Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279 n. 2 (3d Cir.1978). Nevertheless, we know of no authority, and plaintiffs have cited none, stating that federal disciplinary standards preempt states from disciplining attorneys for improper acts performed in federal courts. 6 Younger abstention is appropriate in this instance.