Opinion ID: 202552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim for Rescission

Text: 6 Santa Rosa's first claim against Combo is that Combo materially breached his contract. As such, Santa Rosa contends, he is entitled to rescission of that contract. Combo responded, and the district court held, that Santa Rosa had failed to adequately plead the existence of a contract. We need not resolve the dispute over whether a contract had been sufficiently pled. 4 Even assuming that a contract between Santa Rosa and Combo existed, we find that Santa Rosa's claim for rescission would be preempted by the Copyright Act. 7 A cause of action is preempted under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), if it does not require an element beyond mere copying, preparation of derivative works, performance, distribution or display. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 847 (10th Cir.1993)). We have never squarely decided the question of whether a simple breach of contract action that only seeks damages would be preempted by the Copyright Act. 5 We need not do so today because Santa Rosa asks not for damages, but rather for rescission of his contract. As we noted in Royal v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., Santa Rosa's claim for rescission of his royalty contract presents an interesting quagmire: 8 [I]f the royalty agreement stands, then the plaintiff's sole remedy for the breach of it would be money damages — and the Copyright Act need not be construed. If, however, as plaintiff suggests, the royalty agreement is subject to rescission because of defendant's material breach thereof, then that agreement would vanish. 9 833 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1987). Because a successful claim for rescission would result in there being no `written instrument' signed by the parties, we would be required to resort to the interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) to determine ownership of Santa Rosa's recordings. Id.; see also Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 586 (9th Cir.1993) (After [an agreement is rescinded], any further distribution would constitute copyright infringement.). 10 Because Santa Rosa seeks rescission of his contract, if we were to grant him the relief that he sought, we would be required to determine his ownership rights by reference to the Copyright Act. In such a case, there is little question that we would be merely determining whether Santa Rosa was entitled to compensation because of mere copying or performance, distribution or display of his recordings. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1164. As such, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) preempts Santa Rosa's rescission claim. Once it is determined that Santa Rosa's rescission claim is preempted, his only remedy is a claim under the Copyright Act, and the court must then dismiss the [contract] claim for failing to state a cause of action. Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir.2004). Thus, we find no error in the dismissal of Santa Rosa's rescission claim.