Opinion ID: 848709
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: investigation and strategy

Text: Rather than apply this deferential standard of review, Justice KELLY has twisted the law to place the burden on the defense counsel to defend his chosen strategy. In fact, Justice KELLY goes further and holds that, because defense counsel's strategy was not ultimately successful, it cannot even be considered reasonable. Ante at 692. In so holding, Justice KELLY completely ignores counsel's testimony in the hearing held pursuant to People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973). Justice KELLY concludes that [counsel here was not] disregarding one possible, alternate theory of defense in favor of a better one.... Ante at 695. This conclusion is not supported by the record evidence. Defendant's trial counsel, David I. Goldstein, testified at the Ginther hearing. Goldstein expended twice his normal resources on this case: although he customarily used only one investigator for each case, he assigned two investigators to defendant's case because the witnesses were so uncooperative. Justice KELLY'S assertions that counsel had information readily available to him and failed to contact most of the persons whose names defense had provided for his own defense, ante at 693, are misleading and unfounded. Goldstein testified at length regarding his difficulty in finding any defense witnesses who would cooperate. In fact, as stated below, Goldstein provided documentary evidence of his repeated attempts to contact potential defense witnesses and the many ways those attempts were rebuffed or ignored. He stated that the investigators finally interviewed the older sister's grandfather, uncle, and defendant's girlfriend, but only after considerable effort. The witnesses, particularly defendant's girlfriend, would not return calls or keep scheduled appointments. He offered physical exhibits, including interviews notes and office records, to support this testimony. The defense witnesses defense counsel was able to contact even ignored a trial subpoena, forcing him to obtain a material witness warrant to ensure their presence at trial. Defense counsel could not force the possible defense witnesses to cooperate; he was limited by the witnesses' marked refusal to cooperate. The defense theory was that defendant did not commit the crime. At the time of the trial, Goldstein did not believe that establishing the accident was going to be a problem because the older sister had acknowledged the bicycle accident. Until the trial began, Goldstein was not aware that the older sister was denying the bicycle accident: A. I didn't think we needed to prove that the accident occurred because I didn't think the occurrence of the accident was in dispute. Q. Did you, did, the nature of the injury was in dispute, however? Wasn't it? A. The nature of the injury, but not the accident itself.[ [2] ] Goldstein testified that he did not consider it important to the defense to obtain eyewitnesses to the accident because of the older sister's admission and because a layperson observing an accident can't testify as to the extent of injuries. He stated that he already had witnesses to testify about the amount of blood: [P]roving the existence of the ... accident was not significant. We had [the uncle]. We had the, we had the statement of the girl. [The uncle] saw the blood. Nobody was disputing the bleeding. So proving that was not ... a critical issue. The critical issue was relating that to the, to the charge.... And a ... lay witness can't do that. Goldstein explained that, given the anticipated testimony of Dr. Bond of a credible report of sexual abuse, he did not feel it was necessary to interview or call eyewitnesses to the bicycle accident: If the doctors are going to testify that the bicycle accident did not cause that injury, what's the point of proving that there was an accident? He explained that he made the tactical decision to not contest the medical experts because he could not find any medical experts who would testify for the defense without having examined the older sister at the time of the injury. Justice KELLY implies, ante at 693 n. 7, that the fact that defense counsel was unable to find any doctors to testify should somehow have prompted some further inquiry regarding the cause of the older sister's injuries. This mischaracterizes Goldstein's testimony at the Ginther hearing. Goldstein did not testify that he could not find a doctor who could conclusively determine the cause of the older sister's injuries; rather, he testified that he could not find any doctor who could form any opinion because the doctors had not had an opportunity to personally examine the older sister. I fail to understand how the fact that no doctor would testify without personally examining the older sister should have prompted further inquiry in the cause of the accident on the part of defense counsel. Rather, because he could not find any medical experts to testify, Goldstein was unable to choose any trial strategy that involved contradicting the prosecution's medical experts. Further, Goldstein testified that one of the defense strategies was to argue that the older sister had a habit of making things up. Thus, when the prosecutor opened with the statement that the older sister was now denying there was an accident, he felt it strengthened the defense: But you know, ... since our position was the girl was a liar, I welcomed [the prosecutor] getting up and saying that the girl had lied. He testified: A. Our, the tactical decision was made that our main thrust was that this girl was a liar. That if she was, if she was in fact sexually assaulted it wasn't by Bill Grant. Q. And would have trying to attack the conclusions of the doctor or fight about a bicycle accident, would that have detracted from the defense that the victim was a liar? A. It could of, it could have. I mean obviously I can't read a jury's mind. But it could have. Q. But in your mind, it would have been a tactical decision to pick one defense and keep hitting that rather than a shotgun? A. Well, our defense all along was, we don't know if she was sexually assaulted or not. But if she was, it wasn't Bill Grant. You know, that we, that we didn't know whether she was or she wasn't because she had, she had a tendency to lie. But in any case, it wasn't Bill Grant. Thus, he specifically considered the effect of the older sister's contradictory testimony and chose, as a matter of strategy, to highlight the inconsistencies and use it to the defense's advantage. Goldstein also testified that he knew of the existence of the mother of the boys who allegedly witnessed the bicycle accident before trial and knew that she had witnessed the older sister's injury. He stated, however, that he was not aware that the boys claimed they had witnessed a bicycle accident until he received a letter from their mother after the trial. He explained that he did not interview or call the boys' mother because, as far as he understood it, her testimony was that she saw the bleeding, and he already had two witnesses who testified they saw the bleeding. Further, Goldstein stressed that because the defense theory was that even if the older sister had been sexually assaulted, it was not by defendant, so establishing the existence of a bicycle accident was not crucial. In short, defense counsel explained that: (1) he strategically chose to focus on two themes  that whatever had happened to the older sister, defendant was not involved, and that the older sister was a liar; (2) he made the further strategic decision not to pursue a theory that would have required presenting evidence regarding the existence of the bicycle accident, on the grounds that the conflicting stories strengthened the theory that the older sister was a liar and could possibly distract the jury from his chosen trial strategy; and (3) he chose to not interview the contested witnesses because their testimony was either irrelevant to his defense (whether the bicycle accident had actually happened) or cumulative (the extent of the older sister's injuries). Defense counsel further testified that he chose his defense strategy after considering that he could not present any medical testimony to rebut the prosecution's medical testimony that the older sister's injuries were consistent with sexual assault. It is clear that defense counsel did not interview the contested witnesses because, at the time he was preparing for trial, he had no reason to think those witnesses would enhance his chosen trial strategies. Further, it is clear that defense counsel did not interview the witnesses during the trial because he believed that the older sister's testimony that she had lied about the bicycle accident only strengthened his defense. Justice KELLY'S failure to acknowledge such trial strategy is puzzling. Justice KELLY also fails to acknowledge or apply the deferential standard required by Strickland. Rather than shunning hindsight and reviewing counsel's actions from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the circumstances, Justice KELLY summarily concludes that defense counsel was ineffective because his strategy did not prove successful. This holding cannot be squared with our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. [T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a range of reasonably competent advice and a reliable result. It does not guarantee infallible counsel. People v. Mitchell, 454 Mich. 145, 171, 560 N.W.2d 600 (1997). Further, Justice KELLY gives only lip service to the fact that defense counsel was not preparing for a trial in which the sole count was the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge. Rather, defense counsel had to prepare a defense that addressed all three charges against defendant. He was repeatedly frustrated in his investigatory efforts by lack of cooperation from the ostensible witnesses. He did not have the benefit of perfect hindsight, nor did he have unlimited time and resources. Rather, he had to make his own reasonable professional judgments regarding the limitations on investigation, including the reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Strickland, supra at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052.