Opinion ID: 1647946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Consent of Owner.

Text: We also agree with the court in its conclusion that death terminated consent to use the vehicle. In Moritz, 437 N.W.2d at 898, we reviewed the weak inference of consent that accompanies the admission of ownership. We affirmed a summary judgment where uncontradicted evidence established the owner had not consented to the operation of the vehicle. 437 N.W.2d at 903. [N]or would an owner be liable who is incapable of consenting to the use of his auto by another. Lind v. Eddy, 232 Iowa 1328, 1334, 6 N.W.2d 427, 430 (1942). It is obvious that a deceased owner cannot consent to the use of an automobile and that any prior consent given by the owner would terminate upon death. This same conclusion was reached in Frankel v. Allied Mutual Liability Insurance, 288 Mass. 218, 219-20, 192 N.E. 517, 518 (1934). In Frankel, title to the vehicle was in the name of the deceased at the time of the accident and the operator had consent to operate the vehicle prior to the death of the owner. As the owner was not living when the accident occurred, permission could not be given by him to operate the automobile at the time and place of the accident. The permission given by the owner in his lifetime came to an end upon his decease. Id. Accordingly, the district court's summary judgment resulting in the dismissal of the suit against the Kisner estate is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HARRIS, J., dissents.