Opinion ID: 201086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Incorporation of State Law on the Outer

Text: Continental Shelf For an entirely different reason, however, we hold that Ten Taxpayer's claims do arise under federal law. That is because Congress has explicitly incorporated state law on the outer Continental Shelf as federal law: To the extent they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter . . . , the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State, now in effect or hereinafter adopted . . . are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf . . . . All of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (emphasis added). Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court has held that federal law is 'exclusive' in its regulation of this area, and . . . state law is adopted only as surrogate federal law. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 357; see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 480 (1981) (All law applicable to the Outer Continental Shelf is -16- federal law, but to fill the substantial 'gaps' in the coverage of federal law, OCSLA borrows the 'applicable and not inconsistent' laws of the adjacent States as surrogate federal law.). The consequence for Ten Taxpayer's complaint is clear. The SMDS is a fixed structure[] erected on the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf in territory adjacent to Massachusetts. As a result, the Massachusetts statutes and regulations at issue in this case are, by federal statute, treated as federal law to the extent that they apply on Horseshoe Shoals. See Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990). In its supplemental brief,8 Ten Taxpayer opposes this interpretation of the OCSLA. It contends that § 1333(a)(2) merely specifies the rule of decision that should apply in cases brought under 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1), the provision that grants the district courts subject-matter jurisdiction to hear cases arising from certain activities on the outer Continental Shelf. Moreover, Ten Taxpayer says, the OCSLA is predominantly concerned with oil and gas exploration on the outer Continental Shelf, and the Act's incorporation of state law must be understood in that context. 8 At oral argument, the court invited the parties to file supplemental briefs directed to whether 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) supports federal subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Both parties accepted the invitation. -17- These arguments are unfounded. The text of § 1333(a)(2) is unequivocal: on the seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and on any fixed structures attached thereto, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State . . . are declared to be the law of the United States. No reference is made to actions brought under § 1349(b)(1). On the contrary, Congress's explicit reference to state criminal laws belies any suggestion that § 1333(a)(2) merely defines the rule of decision for civil actions brought under § 1349. And Congress left no doubt that it expected the federal courts to have control over the administration of adopted state laws on the outer Continental Shelf. See § 1333(a)(2) (All such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States.). Likewise, nothing in § 1333(a)(2) limits the incorporation of state law to activities involved in exploring for oil and gas.9 Nor is there any reason to infer such a limitation, as Congress had good reason to adopt state law in its entirety (except where inconsistent with federal law). Federal law is interstitial by its nature, and no other body of law applies on the outer Continental Shelf. So rather than legislate for every conceivable circumstance that might arise, Congress simply incorporated state law, thereby simultaneously retaining federal 9 We express no view as to whether other provisions of the OCSLA are so limited. That question is implicated in a related appeal pending before this court. See supra note 1. -18- control over the outer Continental Shelf and ensuring that a comprehensive body of substantive law will be available to resolve disputes. See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 480; Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 103 (1971); Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 357. We hold that Ten Taxpayer's claims, though ostensibly premised on Massachusetts law, arise under the law of the United States under § 1333(a)(2). A federal question thus appears on the face of Ten Taxpayer's well-pleaded complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, the case was properly removed. Id. § 1441(b); see Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 351 (5th Cir. 1999) (allowing removal because the plaintiff's state statutory claim was incorporated as federal law under the OCSLA); Hodges v. Shell Oil Co., No. Civ. A. 97-1573, 1997 WL 473809, at - (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1997) (same).10