Opinion ID: 2499668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The probable cause hearing

Text: ¶ 14 Mr. McCuistion does not dispute the sufficiency of the State's prima facie evidence. Instead, he argues that because he presented prima facie evidence that he no longer meets the definition of a SVP, he has both a statutory and constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. Mr. McCuistion has failed to show a physiological change or a treatment-induced change to his mental condition, as required by RCW 71.09.090(4)(b). Moreover, even if we consider evidence beyond that which is permitted by the 2005 amendments to show Mr. McCuistion has so changed, as the trial court did here, we would still conclude that the trial court correctly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. ¶ 15 The standard of proof at the show cause hearing is probable cause. Petersen II, 145 Wash.2d at 796, 42 P.3d 952. While the probable cause standard is not a stringent one, it allows the court to perform a critical gate-keeping function. Under this standard, a court must assume the truth of the evidence presented; it may not weigh and measure asserted facts against potentially competing ones. Id. at 797, 42 P.3d 952. At the same time, the court can and must determine whether the asserted evidence, if believed, is sufficient to establish the proposition its proponent intends to prove. Id. at 798, 42 P.3d 952 (sufficiency of proof by the prisoner warrants evidentiary hearing). In determining whether probable cause exists, the trial court is entitled to consider all of the evidence, including evidence submitted by the State. A trial court's determination as to whether evidence establishes probable cause is subject to de novo review. Id. at 799, 42 P.3d 952. ¶ 16 RCW 71.09.090(2)(c) requires an individual seeking an evidentiary hearing to establish probable cause to believe his condition has changed. As the trial court recognized, Dr. Coleman's declaration is nothing more than a collateral attack on the original finding that Mr. McCuistion was a sexually violent predator; it does not demonstrate change. ¶ 17 As Mr. McCuistion correctly notes, the probable cause standard bars the trial court from weighing the evidence. However, at the same time, it does not require a trial court to discredit the original verdict when presented with a contrary opinion. Thus, Dr. Coleman's disagreement with previous experts was not grounds for relitigating a settled issue, and contrary to Mr. McCuistion's assertion, the trial court did not need to weigh the evidence to reach this conclusion. ¶ 18 Similarly, staff declarations attesting to Mr. McCuistion's good behavior at the SCC do not establish probable cause to believe that Mr. McCuistion is no longer a SVP. If believed, these declarations demonstrate that Mr. McCuistion behaves appropriately in a secure and highly structured environment. They do not suggest that Mr. McCuistion no longer suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder or, alternatively, that if he continues to suffer from such a condition, it would be unlikely to cause him to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if conditionally released to a less restrictive alternative or unconditionally discharged. Moreover, these declarations speak to Mr. McCuistion's current conditionnot to a change in his condition. In sum, even when taken in conjunction with Mr. McCuistion's other evidence, these declarations are insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Mr. McCuistion's condition has changed such that he no longer meets the criteria for confinement. [5] ¶ 19 Further, the scientific studies Mr. McCuistion presented do not establish probable cause to believe Mr. McCuistion has changed such that he is no longer a SVP. The data Mr. McCuistion presented on aging and recidivism showed a significant difference in recidivism between offenders older than 50 and younger than 50; it did not demonstrate a correlation between age and recidivism within each of these subcategories. Mr. McCuistion was 45 years old at the time of the show cause hearing and thus not within the age category with lower recidivism rates. More importantly, he had aged only three years since the initial commitment order, and he has failed to demonstrate that a three-year age difference had a measurable effect on his risk of reoffending. Thus, despite Mr. McCuistion's vague assertions that he had become less impulsive with age, the evidence he presented was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that his condition had so changed. RCW 71.09.090(2)(a). ¶ 20 Likewise, his bare assertion that he no longer consumed alcohol, coupled with his failure to participate in substance abuse treatment while confined, does not establish probable cause to believe he no longer meets the criteria for confinement. In sum, we hold that the trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing comported with the statutory requirement that a full evidentiary hearing be granted only if Mr. McCuistion met his probable cause burden to show change as specified by RCW 71.09.090, both pre- and post-2005 amendments. ¶ 21 Mr. McCuistion next contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of substantive due process. Again, Mr. McCuistion is mistaken. Requiring change as a prerequisite for an evidentiary hearinga statutory requirement that pre-dated the 2005 amendmentsdoes not offend substantive due process principles. ¶ 22 Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an individual subject to civil commitment is entitled to release upon a showing that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983). However, once a fact-finder has determined that an individual meets the criteria for commitment as a SVP, the court accepts this initial conclusion as a verity in determining whether an individual is mentally ill and dangerous at a later date. Cf. Burke v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Yakima, 64 Wash.2d 244, 246, 391 P.2d 194 (1964) (court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury where there is evidence that, if believed, would support the verdict); City of Aberdeen v. Regan, 170 Wash.2d 103, 108, 239 P.3d 1102 (2010) (Collateral estoppel works to prevent litigation of issues that were resolved in a prior proceeding.). Accordingly, where an individual was found beyond reasonable doubt to be mentally ill and dangerous at the time of his commitment trial, a showing that he no longer satisfies the constitutional criteria for confinement necessarily requires a showing of change. See Laws of 2005 ch. 344, § 1 (These provisions are intended only to provide a method of revisiting the indefinite commitment due to a relevant change in the person's condition, not an alternate method of collaterally attacking a person's indefinite commitment for reasons unrelated to a change in condition.). ¶ 23 Substantive due process requires only that the State conduct periodic review of the patient's suitability for release. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. 3043. A committed person's statutory right to show his condition has so changed provides additional safeguards that go beyond the requirements of substantive due process. See id. There is no substantive due process right to a full annual evidentiary hearing based upon a mere showing of a change in a single demographic factor. See id. To conclude otherwise would lead to an endless cycle of review and rereview. ¶ 24 Indeed, this court already has upheld the pre-2005 requirement that an individual seeking an evidentiary hearing present prima facie evidence of a change in condition. In In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 39, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) ( Young I), we considered and rejected a substantive due process challenge to our SVP commitment scheme, holding that the procedural safeguards at the initial commitment hearing and the procedures for periodic review under former RCW 71.09.090 were sufficient to ensure that the commitment is tailored to the nature and duration of the mental illness. See also In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wash.2d 70, 81, 980 P.2d 1204 (1999) (Petersen I) (Our sexually violent predator statute unequivocally contemplates an indefinite term of commitment, not a series of fixed one-year terms with continued commitment having to be justified beyond a reasonable doubt annually at evidentiary hearings where the State bears the burden of proof.). ¶ 25 The statutory standard for continuing Mr. McCuistion's involuntary commitment remains unchanged by the 2005 amendments. The State must provide an evaluation on a yearly basis demonstrating that Mr. McCuistion continues to meet the definition of a SVP. Because the State concluded from its annual review that McCuistion continued to meet this definition, we hold that the trial court's order denying Mr. McCuistion's request for an evidentiary hearing comported with substantive due process requirements. Had McCuistion established probable cause to believe he had so changed under the requirements of the 2005 amended statute, he would have had a statutory right, not a constitutional right, to a full evidentiary hearing. While Dr. Coleman asserted in his declaration that Mr. McCuistion did not meet the criteria for confinement and indeed had never met these criteria, his declaration did not account for the discrepancy between his conclusion and the jury's initial finding that Mr. McCuistion met SVP criteria. Consequently, ordering a new trial on the basis of Dr. Coleman's declaration would have required the trial court to discredit the jury's initial determination, effectively allowing Mr. McCuistion to collaterally attack his commitment. [6]