Opinion ID: 1834622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the limitation acts in violation of the equal protection clause

Text: In laying the foundation for this proposition, Pruett argues [s]ince the right to assistance of counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, it is clearly a fundamental interest. Thus the indigent defendant's claim that the state action (providing uncompensated counsel) impinges upon that fundamental right should be subject to intensive judicial scrutiny under traditional equal protection analysis. (BRIEF OF APPELLANT at 26) quoting Note, Uncompensated Appointments of Attorneys for Indigent Criminal Defense: The Need for Supreme Court Standards, 14 S.W.U. L.Rev. 389, 403 (1984) (footnote omitted). As to the indigent defendant, [t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). As a matter of fact, all people charged with [a] crime must, so far as the law is concerned, `stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.' Id. at 17, 76 S.Ct. at 590. The appellants assert that when court-appointed counsel is so woefully underpaid this equality does not exist. [29] Pruett and Wilson also raise a secondary argument in support of this contention. They explain that § 99-15-17 also implicates counsel's fundamental right to property and for this reason it also enter[s] the realm of strict judicial scrutiny, [where] there can be no doubt that `administrative convenience is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictate constitutionality.' City of Richmond v. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509, 109 S.Ct. 706, 729, 102 L.Ed.2d 854, 891 (1989) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1772, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). When an attorney engages in his profession (ie., criminal defense) he is exercising a constitutional right, [30] and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest is unconstitutional. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (emphasis in original). Obviously, the state has a strong interest in providing legal services to the poor, but it is neither necessary, nor permissible, for the cost of this program to be shouldered by a small group of lawyers without offending the equal protection clause. As the court in Lynch noted, a lawyer's calling is different from other licensed professionals. 796 P.2d at 1157. But, this, in no way, should allow the public to shirk the responsibility of providing right to counsel to the indigent. That responsibility can not be borne entirely by the private bar. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d at 841. While ... attorneys are not required to serve indigent defendants without compensation, the effect is similar if their overhead and out-of-pocket expenses are not covered by the compensation they receive. Id: at 844. There is no way the meager compensation allowed by the statute could cover the overhead or out of pocket expenses of counsel involved in these cases. [31] In addition to Stephan v. Smith, supra, and Cunningham, supra, other courts have found the application of stringent fee limitations similar to ours as a violation of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Lynch, supra, 796 P.2d 1150; In the Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 412-13, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); see also Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974) (due process clause). We agree with the appellants in these causes. Our statute binds attorneys to perform a gargantuan task, and it also forces them to shoulder entirely the public's burden of financing our indigent defense system. Accord BRIEF OF APPELLEE in Wilson at 48 (The burden of defending capital litigation has been placed on the private bar in Mississippi even where a public defender may have been provided for indigent defense generally). Because the appellants in these cases have provided in detail numerous reasons which justify this Court to act on this critical matter, we now put forth a remedy.