Opinion ID: 2571591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Admission of the City's Limited Use of the Easements

Text: The City, over the Sextons' objection, presented the testimony of City Administrator Courtney Christensen that, despite language in the amended petition indicating that the City would have access to the easements for 1 year, the construction phase lasted 2 weeks  January 3, 2005, to January, 17, 2005. Christensen explained that she decided to make the duration 1 year because at the time of the taking, the project had not yet been bid. This time period took into consideration the fact that the contract schedule was unknown, and the City was obligated to restore the site to its prior condition following construction. After the construction was complete, the restoration and cleanup was conducted until January 27, 2005. The trial court permitted the testimony because the court thought it put into context some of the evidence that's been introduced from the landowner. Allowing the admission of this evidence was contrary to Kansas law which provides that landowners are entitled to full compensation for the actual rights acquired by the condemnor, not the rights actually used. In re Application of City of Great Bend for Appointment of Appraisers, 254 Kan. 699, 701, 869 P.2d 587 (1994); Hoy v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 184 Kan. 70, 334 P.2d 315 (1959). The law requires the condemnor in the verified petition to describe the nature of the interest to be taken and further requires the appraisers, after receiving written instructions from the court, to view and value the land taken and to assess damages resulting from the taking. Upon completion of their work, the appraisers must file their report in the district court clerk's office. K.S.A. 26-505; K.S.A.2006 Supp. 26-506. The appraisers' report identifies the interest taken and the damages resulting from the taking. It is from this report that an appeal is taken by a dissatisfied party. Application of City of Great Bend, 254 Kan. at 702, 869 P.2d 587. The description of the nature of the condemnor's interest is of utmost importance. In Hudson v. City of Shawnee, 246 Kan. 395, Syl. ¶ 2, 790 P.2d 933 (1990), this court said that [t]he property rights taken by a condemnor are to be determined by the language in the petition for eminent domain and the appraisers' report. A condemnor bears the burden of drafting its petition to show the limitations in its taking. This same principle was affirmed in Application of City of Great Bend, 254 Kan. 699, 869 P.2d 587, where experts for the condemnor attempted to introduce evidence showing a lesser taking than was described in the petition for condemnation and the appraisers' report. While this court found no prejudice to the rights of the landowners in the admission of the evidence, we reviewed Kansas law and concluded: [O]nce the nature of the interest to be taken is identified in the [petition and] appraisers' report, parol evidence will not be admitted for the purpose of establishing a lesser interest based on the condemnor's intended use. The rights acquired, not the intended use of those rights, are the basis for assessing landowners' damages. [Citation omitted.] 254 Kan. at 703, 869 P.2d 587. The rationale for such a principle is apparent because `[i]f the landowners are not compensated in full for the full use, as set out in the [appraisers'] report, the condemnor can take the full use in the future without further compensation to the landowners.' [Citation omitted.]. 254 Kan. at 703, 869 P.2d 587; see Hudson, 246 Kan. 395, Syl. ¶ 2, 790 P.2d 933; Spears v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 203 Kan. 520, Syl. ¶ 4, 455 P.2d 496 (1969); Diefenbach v. State Highway Commission, 195 Kan. 445, Syl. ¶ 4, 407 P.2d 228 (1965). The Sextons cite Hudson, 246 Kan. 395, 790 P.2d 933, to support their contention that they are entitled to a new trial because of evidence relating to the City's use of the temporary easements for a shorter period than the 1 year described in the eminent domain petition. In Hudson, the City of Shawnee's petition for condemnation described the easement in broad terms, incorporating the use of all three driveways to the property. Even though there was evidence that at least one of the driveways was always open to the landowner and the landowner's customers, the City was prohibited from introducing evidence that the condemnor's intended use was less than the fullest use permitted under the description of its easement. The language used by the City in its petition controlled. 246 Kan. at 400-01, 790 P.2d 933. The City does not disagree with the Sextons' assertion that they are entitled to compensation for 1 year's use of the easements. The City merely contends that [a]t no time did the City ever suggest that it would have the use of the easements for less than a full year. The appellee points out that the City's expert, Bernie Shaner, testified on direct examination that his appraisal testimony was predicated upon 1 year's use of the easements. Additionally, this point was emphasized by the Sextons' counsel during the cross-examination of Shaner: Q. Now, the City had full access and use of the property for that year. Correct? Have. They have. They're still using it. A. For the purposes outlined in the petition only. Q. Well if they need to go back in and redo anything, they can do it. Correct? A. Sure. But they . . . can't use it for other purposes. . . . Q. Sure. But as long as they're involved in working on their sewer there, they've got it for a year. Right? A. That's right. Yes. Although dealing with a permanent easement, not a temporary easement, Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Watershed, 193 Kan. 151, 392 P.2d 914 (1964), is instructive here. In Roberts, an easement was taken for the impounding, permanent storage, and temporary detention of certain waters. Occasionally, the entire area within the easement was covered with flood waters, but when it was not covered with such waters, the landowner was permitted to use the portion of the land within the easement which was not inundated with water. The landowner contended and presented his evidence to the jury on the ground that the condemning authority would make full use of a permanent easement and damages to the remaining acreage. The condemning authority argued it was taking only a restricted use of the condemned land, seeking to avoid the payment of compensation and damages based on the full use of the easement. 193 Kan. at 155-56, 392 P.2d 914. The trial court instructed the jury to give consideration to all the evidence pertaining to damages in arriving at an amount which you think plaintiffs are entitled and noted within the instruction that the defendant's witnesses testified that in their opinions the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages equaling the full extent of the market value of the property. 193 Kan. at 155, 392 P.2d 914. In addition, the court refused to give the plaintiffs' requested instruction that they were entitled to damages to the extent of the full market value of the property. The Roberts court stated that the commissioners' appraisal report, and only their report, was evidence of the land appropriated, the extent of the easement, and its use. 193 Kan. at 157, 392 P.2d 914. The court went on to say: The injustice that would result to the landowners is readily apparent, if a condemnor could introduce evidence as to a limited use for the purpose of reducing the amount of damages to the landowners, and later exercise the full use by virtue of the commissioners' report. . . . . The extent of the easement and the extent of the use, that is the rights required, are not questions of fact. They are questions of law to be determined from the language used in the commissioners' report. 193 Kan. at 158, 392 P.2d 914. The Roberts court concluded that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence regarding the condemnor's future intended use of the easement which varied the extent of the use set out in the commissioners' report. It further stated that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to determine the extent of the use. Instead, the plaintiffs' requested instruction, which was not given, properly stated the law. Although the Roberts court found other errors as well, it indicated that the erroneous admission of evidence was sufficient to require the granting of a new trial. 193 Kan. at 160, 392 P.2d 914. In the present case, the evidence pertaining to the City's limited use of the two temporary easements was clearly inadmissible. We, therefore, must consider whether the Sextons were entitled to a new trial. Under K.S.A. 60-261, a new trial cannot be granted based upon an error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence unless refusal to grant the new trial is inconsistent with substantial justice. If the error does not prejudice the substantial rights of a party, the error is harmless, must be disregarded, and does not afford a basis for reversal of a judgment. Smith v. Printup, 262 Kan. 587, 603, 938 P.2d 1261 (1997). In this case, there is no showing that the Sextons' substantial rights were prejudiced. In contrast to Roberts, the City did not make arguments in an attempt to reduce the award of damages, and the jury was properly instructed on the law, i.e., that the Sextons were entitled to damages for the City's use of the easements for 1 year. Moreover, the City's own expert based his valuation report on the fact that the temporary easements were taken for a period of 1 year. The jury accepted this valuation and did not further discount it for damages covering a shorter period of time. Under the circumstances of this case, the admission of the evidence was harmless. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.