Opinion ID: 4554486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: Applying § 2423(a) within Puerto Rico On appeal, as she did below, Cotto first argues that her case should never have gone to trial because § 2423(a) does not apply to the conduct she was charged with — transporting a minor within Puerto Rico to commit a sex crime. In the fifty states, that section only applies if the defendant transported the victim in interstate or foreign commerce. In Cotto's view, the same is true in Puerto Rico, which is (since 1952) a self-governing Commonwealth vested with state-like autonomy. United States v. Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d 339, 340, 348–50 (1st Cir. 2016) (first quote quoting Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 - 10 - (2016)). In fact, she reminds us, in Maldonado-Burgos, we held that another section of the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. § 2421(a), which penalizes transporting anyone in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States to commit a sex crime) did not apply to travel within Puerto Rico. 844 F.3d at 349–50. Cotto urges us to read § 2423(a) in the same way. If she's right, then the judge should have dismissed the indictment, which never alleged Cotto took YMP beyond Puerto Rico. On the other hand, the government insists the plain text of § 2423(a) (which covers the transportation of a minor in any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States to commit a sex crime) shows that unlike its more general cousin, § 2423(a) covers intra-Puerto Rico transportation. Despite Cotto's objections, we have to agree with the government. Cotto has this much right though: given its promise to grant Puerto Rico state-like status, we don't lightly conclude that Congress intended to exercise a police power — like the power to define, prosecute, and punish local crime — in Puerto Rico that the law elsewhere reserves for state governments. See Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication - 11 - of its victims.). In this case, however, the plain words of the Protect Act (which amended § 2423(a) to specifically add the word commonwealth), compel that conclusion. So unlike § 2421(a), § 2423(a) applies to a defendant who transports his or her victim wholly within Puerto Rico. Like any question of statutory interpretation, whether and how a statute applies to Puerto Rico depends not only on the words in the statute, but also the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed. Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d at 347 (quoting Cordova, 649 F.2d at 38). So here, as in Maldonado-Burgos, Puerto Rico's transition into a self-governing Commonwealth sets the stage for our analysis. Id. at 340–41. To start then, we'll retrace that historical current and reinforce the strong tug it exerts against the government when it claims that a federal law regulates conduct in Puerto Rico that the law doesn't reach in the states. See id. at 342–43 (citing Cordova, 649 F.2d at 42). With that background in place, we'll come back to the statute's text. Puerto Rico's Commonwealth Status under Federal Statutes Before Puerto Rico became a commonwealth, that is, for its first fifty-four years as a United States territory, its internal affairs were almost entirely subject to the command of Congress, Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39, and a local government largely run by federal appointees, see Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. - 12 - Starting in 1900 (under the Foraker Act), [t]he U.S. President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed the governor, supreme court, and upper house of the legislature, although the Puerto Rican people elected the lower house themselves. Id. Over time, Congress gave the Puerto Rican people limited selfgovernment over local affairs but kept a firm grip on levers of colonial control. See Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39. In 1917, the Jones Act granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship and the right to elect both houses of the local legislature. See Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. But the U.S. President still appointed the territory's most powerful executive and judicial officers (including the governor, the attorney general, the commissioner of education, and the justices of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court);5 and federal law required the Puerto Rican legislature to report all its acts to the federally-appointed governor and to Congress, which could veto them. See Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39; Jones Act of 1917, §§ 12–13, 34, 40, 39 Stat. 951, 960–61 (Mar. 2, 1917). Moreover, in cases of conflict, Congressional statute, not Puerto 5 In 1947, Congress amended the Jones Act to let Puerto Ricans elect the governor and granted that Governor the power to appoint all cabinet officials, but the United States President retained the power to appoint (with Federal Senate confirmation) judges, an auditor, and the new office of Coordinator of Federal Agencies. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1660 (2020) (citing Act of Aug. 5, 1947, ch. 490, §§ 1, 3, 61 Stat. 770, 771). - 13 - Rico law, would apply no matter how local the subject. Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39 (citing the Jones Act, §§ 37, 57, 39 Stat. at 964, 968). The tectonic plates shifted in 1950, which marked a significant change in the relation between Puerto Rico and the United States. Id. That year, under mounting pressure from Puerto Rico's leaders and the international community, Congress authorized Puerto Rico to call a convention to draft its own constitution, which would take effect when ratified by popular referendum in Puerto Rico and approved by Congress. See Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. 600, § 1, 64 Stat. 319 ([F]ully recognizing the principle of government by consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.). Two years later, when Congress approved the new constitution, it repealed the inconsistent provisions in the Jones Act and rechristened the remainder the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act (the PRFRA), which (along with the U.S. Constitution) is now the cornerstone of the island's legal relationship with the federal government. See id. §§ 4, 5, 64 Stat. at 320. Puerto Rico thus emerged from the process a new kind of political entity, still closely associated with the United States but governed in accordance with, and exercising self-rule through, a popularly ratified constitution. Sánchez Valle, 136 - 14 - S. Ct. at 1874. Or as we've put it, Puerto Rico's status changed from that of a mere territory to the unique status of Commonwealth: the name the new constitution and the statute approving it gave the new polity. Cordova, 649 F.2d at 41; see P.R. Const. art. I, § 1 (The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is hereby constituted.); Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. 447, 66 Stat. 327 (approving the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico). The Puerto Rico constitutional convention chose that label (commonwealth) because in the delegates' view, it reflected Puerto Rico's legislative autonomy in local matters. Cordova, 649 F.2d at 40. As the convention explained: the single word 'commonwealth', as currently used, clearly defines the status of the body politic created under the terms of the compact existing between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States, i.e., that of a state which is free of superior authority in the management of its own local affairs but which is linked to the United States of America and hence is a part of its political system in a manner compatible with its federal structure. P.R. Const. Convention Res. 22 (P.R. 1952). Congress ratified that understanding when it approved the Puerto Rico constitution and passed the PRFRA, acts which (according to the Supreme Court) relinquished [Congress's] control over [Puerto Rico's] local affairs and granted the island a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by the States. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874 (quoting Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, - 15 - Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 597 (1976)); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974) (holding that Puerto Rico was a State under the federal statute requiring that a three-judge panel convene to consider any challenge to a state statute; reasoning that the Commonwealth, like a state, is sovereign over matters not ruled by the [U.S.] Constitution, unlike a territory whose local affairs are subject to congressional regulation); Cordova, 649 F.2d at 40 (reviewing the 1950–52 legislative history and concluding that Commonwealth represents the fulfillment of a process of increasing self-government over local affairs by the people of Puerto Rico and an end to its subordinate status). And in 1953, the executive branch assured the United Nations that Public Law 600, the PRFRA, and the Puerto Rico constitution gave the new commonwealth the authority to respond to Puerto Rican voices free from federal interference with matters of local government.6 6 In 1953, the U.S. State Department, seeking to have Puerto Rico classified as a self-governing territory (which freed the United States from certain international obligations with respect to the island), wrote in a memorandum to the United Nations that Congress ha[d] agreed that Puerto Rico shall have, under [its] Constitution, freedom from control or interference by the Congress in respect of internal government and administration, subject only to compliance with applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the [PRFRA] and the acts of Congress authorizing and approving the Constitution, as may be interpreted by judicial decision. Cordova, 649 F.2d at 40–41 & n.28. And it assured the - 16 - In at least one way, these broad brushstrokes exaggerate the rights the 1950–52 Acts granted Puerto Rico and its people. Under the U.S. Constitution, Puerto Rico is still a Territory, meaning that Congress (acting under its power to make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2), may treat Puerto Rico differently from the States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions. United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Harris, 446 U.S. at 651– 52); Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 805 F.3d at 344 (holding that the limits of the Tenth Amendment do not apply to Puerto Rico because it is still constitutionally a territory and its powers are not 'those reserved to the States' but those specifically granted to it by Congress under its constitution (quoting U.S. Const. amend. X)). Before 1952, we held (following Supreme Court precedent) that Congress may use that power under the Territory Clause to regulate purely local crime or other internal affairs in Puerto Rico that Congress could not reach in the states. See members that [t]hose laws which directed or authorized interference with matters of local government by the Federal Government ha[d] been repealed. Id. at 41 n.28. Presidents Truman and Kennedy made similar statements in other official memoranda. See id. at 40–41 (quoting President Truman's recognition, in transmitting the draft constitution to Congress, that its approval would vest full authority and responsibility for local self-government . . . in the People of Puerto Rico). - 17 - Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44, 45 (1st Cir. 1945). We assume (because Cotto does not dispute) that even after 1952, Congress may still regulate such intra-Puerto Rico conduct, even if doing so would break the promises it made that year. See below at 68-70; United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1172–75 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that the Court in Harris reaffirmed the existence of Congress's post-1952 plenary power over Puerto Rico pursuant to the Territory Clause, and the PRFRA is not a true compact but merely an Act of Congress that does not bind future Congresses). But see Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1677–83 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that, to the contrary, the 1952 legislation may well have been a compact that may place limits on Congress's power to regulate Puerto Rico).7 In other words, we need not decide whether the 1952 legislation restricts Congress's power to legislate in Puerto Rico. Rather, this case requires us [only] to answer a question of congressional intent, Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d at 345: what did Congress mean to do when it amended § 2423(a) to include the 7 Thus, in case there's any room for doubt, we need not and do not decide that the 1952 legislation constitutes a compact between the United States and Puerto Rico that differs from a regular statute; and we do not suggest that there is some basis other than the Territory Clause on which Congress may criminalize illicit transportation within Puerto Rico that does not affect interstate commerce. Contra below at 70. - 18 - word commonwealth? So for present purposes, what's important is that Congress's commitment in the PRFRA to give Puerto Rico statelike autonomy in its local affairs, see Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874, has at least the force of federal statute, see Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d at 1174–75 (Torruella, J., concurring), subject to repeal only by an express statement or clear implication in later legislation, see Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1677 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009)). That commitment (as we and the Court have construed it) forms the backdrop against which Congress now legislates when it comes to Puerto Rico and informs Congress's intent when it does so. Jusino Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 214 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2000). Cordova/Maldonado-Burgos That background plays an especially critical role when, as here, we're asked to construe another federal statute to intervene more extensively into the local affairs of postConstitutional Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of a state. Cordova, 649 F.2d at 42. In such cases, we ask whether the Act's framers, if aware of Puerto Rico's current [post-]constitutional status, would have intended it to be treated as a 'state' or a 'territory' under the Act. Id. at 39. That assumption comes with a corollary: that, if the enacting Congress was aware of Puerto Rico's commonwealth status and long road to attaining it, - 19 - it would have acted with an intent to fulfill [its] promise to grant Puerto Ricans state-like self-rule free from the selective intervention of a federal government they do not elect.8 Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 44. With that pledge in mind, we do not read statutes to treat Puerto Rico in one way and the states in another unless the language of [the] particular statute or some other compelling reason in its structure, context, or legislative history demands that result. Id. at 42 (anchoring that rule in § 9 of the PRFRA, 48 U.S.C. § 734, which we read to advise[] us with uncharacteristic bluntness that [Congress] does not intend a generally applicable statute to regulate Puerto Rico to the full extent allowed by the Constitution unless it either specifically singles out Puerto Rico or imposes similar regulations on the states); see also Cordova, 649 F.2d at 42 (holding that there would have to be specific evidence or clear policy reasons embedded in [a] statute to demonstrate that Congress meant it to regulate more local conduct in post-Constitutional Puerto Rico than it does in the states).9 8 Despite Public Law 600's peon to government by consent, Puerto Rican residents do not have voting representatives in Congress, which can nonetheless regulate them; and to boot, they cannot vote for President. See Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 596 (1st Cir. 2010). 9 Cordova established this framework in holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to restraints on trade or commerce taking place wholly within Puerto Rico. 649 F.2d at 42. - 20 - In Maldonado-Burgos, we applied that test to § 2421(a) (which bans the transportation of any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States to commit a sex crime) and held that after 1952, that section no longer applies to travel wholly within Puerto Rico. 844 F.3d at 346–47. The government had indicted a man who transported an 18-year-old woman with a severe mental disability within Puerto Rico to engage in unlawful sexual activity. Id. at 340. The district court dismissed the indictment. Id. On appeal, the government argued that the statute applied to Puerto Rico as a Territory or Possession and covered transportation within it, as we'd held in 1945. See id. at 342–43 (citing Crespo, 151 F.2d at 45 (holding that it could not be doubted that [§ 2421(a)] applie[d] to transportation within Puerto Rico, which was a territory within the meaning of the Act)). The government urged that despite the intervening developments, Crespo still controlled. We disagreed; rather, we held that Cordova blazed a trail we had to follow. Id. at 340. As in Cordova, we asked the question Crespo hadn't answered: whether the Mann's Act framers, if aware of Puerto Rico's post-Crespo transformation from a [mere] United States territory to the 'self-governing Commonwealth' it is today, would have intended it to be treated as a 'state' or 'territory' under the Act. Id. at 340, 347 (first quoting Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874; then quoting Cordova, - 21 - 649 F.2d at 39). Reviewing the statute's text, legislative history, and the government's policy arguments (that human trafficking is a pervasive problem in Puerto Rico), we nonetheless found no specific evidence or clear policy reasons embedded in § 2421(a) to show that its framers would have meant to federalize the prosecution of local crime in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. at 347–50. Thus, we concluded that § 2421(a) reaches only transportation 'in interstate or foreign commerce' with respect to the island. Id. at 350. In other words, § 2421(a) reserves for Puerto Rico (as it does for states) the decisions of when to prosecute, and how severely to punish, illicit transportation that occurs wholly within its borders. Section 2423(a) In this case, Cotto urges us to extend Maldonado-Burgos and hold that § 2423(a) also requires cross-border travel and doesn't apply to drives from schools to motels within Puerto Rico. As we outlined in Maldonado-Burgos, however, § 2423(a) defines a separate crime against a distinct class of victims (minors) and uses language different from § 2421(a)'s to identify the transportation covered. Id. at 351, n.11. Most damning, in 1998, Congress amended § 2423(a) to cover illicit transportation in any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. Id. at 350 n.10 (quoting the Protect Act, Pub. L. No. 105–314, § 103, - 22 - 112 Stat. 2974, 2976) (emphasis added).10 When it did so (we must assume), Congress was well aware of Puerto Rico's [commonwealth] status, id. at 347, of Cordova, and of the parade of decisions in which the District of Puerto Rico had exempted 'intracommonwealth' activities from several important statutes which, by their terms, appl[ied] to 'intra-territory,' but not to 'intrastate,' activities, Cordova, 649 F.2d at 38 & n.6, 42 (listing decisions holding that the Federal Firearms Act, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, and the Sherman Act did not apply to wholly local activity in Puerto Rico). See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1072 (2020) (explaining that courts normally assume that Congress is 'aware of relevant judicial precedent' when it enacts a new statute (quoting Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010)).11 Against that background, 10 The Protect Act also amended § 2423(a) to increase the maximum penalty for violating that section and added enhanced penalties for repeat offenders. See Pub. L. 105–314, 112 Stat. at 2974. 11 Of course, being one circuit among many, we might not normally assume that Congress has our caselaw in mind when it enacts legislation. As other circuits have recognized, however, given our jurisdiction over appeals from the District of Puerto Rico, our decisions have an outsized impact on how federal law applies to Puerto Rico. See Rodríguez v. P.R. Fed. Affairs Admin., 435 F.3d 378, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (adopting our reasoning in Jusino Mercado and considering us the court most expert on Puerto Rico's status); see also United States v. Laboy-Torres, 553 F.3d 715, 719 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (according our decisions concerning the application of federal statutes to Puerto Rico great weight). In addition, by 1998, Cordova (which was authored by then-Judge Breyer), had been around for a while, and the Supreme Court had - 23 - there's only one plausible reason for the amendment: to remove any doubt that § 2423(a) applied to the transportation of minors in non-state commonwealths like Puerto Rico. See United States v. Medina-Ayala, 906 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.P.R. 2012) (concluding that [t]here could hardly be a clearer [indication] of purpose than the specific addition of the word 'commonwealth' to the existing language of the Mann Act).12 In her effort to resist that conclusion, Cotto makes two main arguments. First, she suggests that Congress must expressly call out Puerto Rico in the statute before we can read it to treat the island differently from the states. But nothing in the PRFRA, Cordova, or Maldonado-Burgos lets us disregard Congress's cited it with approval to describe Puerto Rico's commonwealth status. See Rodríguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (citing Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39–42). 12 Four states (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky) and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), all share the same commonwealth prefix. But Cotto concedes that § 2423(a) doesn't cover transportation wholly within any state. And for good reason, she does not argue that Congress added the word commonwealth to single out the CNMI, which enjoys an arguably even stronger presumption than Puerto Rico's that Congress does not selectively intervene in its local affairs. See U.S. ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that when Congress pass[es] legislation with respect to the CNMI that cannot also be made applicable to the several States[,] the Northern Mariana Islands must be specifically named therein for it to become effective in the Northern Mariana Islands (quoting U.S.-CNMI Covenant, Pub. L. 94–241, § 105, 90 Stat 263, 264 (Mar. 24, 1976))). - 24 - clearly-expressed intent because it failed to use those two magic words.13 To the contrary, both decisions sought to effectuate the intent of the lawmakers expressed in the words of the statute and the circumstances under which [they] were employed. Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d at 347 (quoting Cordova, 649 F.3d at 38). In those cases, unlike here, it was far from clear that the operative text of § 2421(a) and the Sherman Act (reaching conduct in any territory or possession of the United States) was meant to reach intra-commonwealth activity. And there was another, plausible way to read that text: to apply only to preconstitutional Puerto Rico and other territories that hadn't achieved state-like status. To resolve the ambiguity, we relied on a background assumption about Congress's intent — that absent specific evidence or clear policy reasons to the contrary, 13 Some laws — including the covenant between the CNMI and the United States — do say that Congress must recite certain words before its legislation can encroach on local sovereignty (among other sensitive areas). See De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d at 753–54 (quoting U.S.-CNMI Covenant, Pub. L. 94–241, § 105, 90 Stat 263, 264 (Mar. 24, 1976)). Per our higher-ups, statutes that require Congress to use such express references or magical passwords really create less demanding interpretive requirement[s] because they can't compel courts to disregard [ ] the will of a later Congress conveyed either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 274 (2012) (first quoting Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); then quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908)). So whether the 1952 Act could have required Congress to say Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs implicates another question not briefed here: whether that legislation was more than an ordinary statute that Congress may repeal without Puerto Rico's consent. - 25 - Congress would have meant to treat the Commonwealth like a state. Maldonado-Burgos, 844 F.3d at 350 (concluding based on the clear congressional intent to grant Puerto Rico state-like autonomy that the [Mann] Act's framers, if aware of Puerto Rico's current constitutional status, would have intended it to be treated as a 'state' and not a territory under § 2421(a) (quoting Cordova, 649 F.3d at 39) (relying on a general Congressional intent to grant Puerto Rico state-like autonomy to reach the same conclusion under the Sherman Act)); see also Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 42 (explaining that was reasonable to assume Cordova's default rule . . . inform[ed] Congress's intent) (emphases all added). But, when Congress has made its [contrary] intent clear, courts must give effect to that intent, even if it defies our settled expectations. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 328 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2019) (Absent [a] constitutional challenge, when [we're] confronted with a clear statutory command . . . that is the end of the matter. (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)). So when a statute like § 2423(a) clearly means to reach more conduct in Puerto Rico than it does in the states, we have to enforce it as written, even if it doesn't single out Puerto Rico in so many words. See Dávila-Pérez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 467–68 (1st Cir. 2000)(construing the words Territory or Possession outside the continental United States, in light of - 26 - the statutory context and legislative history, to cover Puerto Rico); cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 510 U.S. 452, 460, 467 (1991) (explaining that despite the rule that Congress must speak unmistakably clearly to intrude on traditional state prerogatives, the statute at issue did not have to mention [state] judges explicitly to regulate their qualifications as long as it was plain to anyone reading the Act that it cover[ed] judges). Cordova doesn't license us to nullify Congress's commonwealth amendment; so we have to enforce its only reasonable meaning. As her fallback, Cotto points to another clause in the Protect Act, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 104(a), 112 Stat. at 2976, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2426, which triples the maximum penalty for offenders who violate the updated Mann Act (§§ 2421–24) after being convicted of a prior sex offense under State law. Section 2426(b) provides that in this section, the term State includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. There you have it, says Cotto: by defining commonwealth[s] as states, § 2426(b) shows that Congress meant to treat Puerto Rico like a state in § 2423(a). But § 2426(b) defines commonwealth[s] as states only for the purposes of § 2426 — to broaden the reach of the repeat-offender penalties. So Cotto can't use § 2426(b)'s definition to narrow § 2423(a)'s plain meaning. Her concession that Congress used the term commonwealth to refer to Puerto Rico - 27 - elsewhere in the Protect Act only bolsters our conclusion that it did the same in § 2423(a). See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (We presume that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single statute.). So, like every federal judge in District of Puerto Rico to have addressed the question, we hold that § 2423(a) applies to the transportation of a minor within Puerto Rico for the purpose of committing a sex crime.14 Given that conclusion, the district court did not err in denying Cotto's motion to dismiss the indictment or her motions for judgment of acquittal based on the lack of evidence that she took YMP outside Puerto Rico.15 14 See Santiago-Rivera v. United States, No. Cr. 14-742, 2019 WL 3365846, at  (D.P.R. July 25, 2019); United States v. GreauxGomez, 254 F. Supp. 3d 329, 332 (D.P.R. 2017); United States v. Montalvo-Febus, 254 F. Supp. 3d 319, 329 (D.P.R. 2017); United States v. Montijo-Maisonet, 254 F. Supp. 3d 313, 315 (D.P.R. 2017); United States v. Mercado-Flores, 109 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475 (D.P.R. 2015), adhered to, 124 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.P.R. 2015), and vacated on other grounds, 872 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2017); Cotto-Flores, 2016 WL 5818476, at –3; Medina-Ayala, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 22. 15 Cotto also urges that insofar as the statute covers transportation within Puerto Rico, it is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress's power under the commerce clause. But Congress does not plainly lack plenary power under the Territorial Clause to criminalize certain intra-jurisdictional activity in [Puerto Rico] simply because it may not do so under the Commerce Clause within the fifty states. United States v. Ríos-Rivera, 913 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding the district court did not plainly err in upholding § 2423(a) as a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Territory Clause); Harris, 446 U.S. at 651–52 (holding that Congress may rely on the Territory Clause to treat Puerto Rico differently from the States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions). Cotto does not address - 28 - Sufficiency of the Evidence Cotto next argues that the government failed to prove that Cotto transported YMP anywhere (nevermind outside Puerto Rico). And even on our reading, the government had to prove that Cotto transport[ed] YMP in [the] commonwealth as an element of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). So as she sees it, even if we view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict (as we must), the government's evidence lacked enough bite for a reasonable jury to find that the government proved each of the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. TancoBaez, 942 F.3d at 15 (quoting United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 200 (1st Cir. 1999)). If Cotto is right, then she'd be entitled to a judgment of acquittal, not just a new trial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, (1978) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient). Her problem is that YMP testified in clear terms that Cotto picked him up at La Casa de Abuela and drove him to the Motel these precedents or argue that § 2423(a) oversteps Congress's power to make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Nor does she develop any argument that the statute, as we've interpreted it, lacks a rational basis (which would violate the Equal Protection Clause) or violates a U.S.-Puerto Rico compact. As such, we cannot conclude in this case that Congress lacked the authority to regulate illicit transportation within Puerto Rico. See Ríos-Rivera, 913 F.3d at 43–44. - 29 - Oriente to have sex. Cotto urges that YMP's testimony can't sustain her conviction because she impeached him extensively; another student (called by the defense) testified that he saw YMP get into a white car (Cotto's car was gray) that day, and on cross, YMP admitted he lied to his mom and school staff about where he'd disappeared to. But Cotto skates over the evidence that she herself urged YMP to lie in order to hide their relationship from his mother and school officials (and for obvious reasons). See above at 6. Of course, the jury didn't have to find YMP lied at trial simply because he'd fibbed to protect her two years earlier. Anyway, when testing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not assess the credibility of trial witnesses or resolve conflicts in the evidence, United States v. Gaudet, 933 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 66 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000)); that is a role reserved for the jury. United States v. Kanodia, 943 F.3d 499, 505 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Robles-Alvarez, 874 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2017)). And based on the evidence the government presented, the jury was well within its rights to credit YMP's story of being carted off by Cotto, which school staff (testifying that Cotto left school early that day too), the WhatsApp messages, and the motel records corroborated. - 30 - Jury Instructions Third, Cotto faults the judge for instructing the jury about the crime of sexual assault under Puerto Rico law. Although we need not reach this issue, since we ultimately remand for a new trial, we address it to provide guidance on remand. See Swajian v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 F.2d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1990). To recap, to show Cotto violated § 2423(a), the government had to prove she transported YMP in Puerto Rico with intent that [he] engage in . . . sexual activity for which [someone] can be charged with a criminal offense (stress added). And the judge told the jury precisely that, both before the trial (in a set of preliminary instructions) and after the close of evidence. He then explained: Under the laws of Puerto Rico, criminal sexual activity includes the following conduct: One, when a person performs or provokes another person to perform an oral-genital act or vaginal or anal sexual penetration, whether genital, digital, or instrumental, if the minor has not yet reached the age of 16 at the time of the event; or, number two, when a person purposefully, knowingly or recklessly, without consummating the conduct defined in the point above, submits another person to an act that tends to awake, excite, or satisfy the passion or sexual desires of the suspect, if the minor has not yet reached the age of 16 at the time of the event. Though the judge didn't name them, he was describing the offenses of sexual assault and lewd acts under Puerto Rico law, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, §§ 4770, 4772. He followed up by reminding the - 31 - jury that the government need not prove Cotto committed those crimes; only that she intended to do so. Cotto argues that these instructions about Puerto Rico crimes unnecessarily confused [the jurors] by implicitly telling them to convict based on sexual assault instead of transportation of a minor, which she calls a fatal flaw in the trial that unfairly tipped the scale in favor of conviction. We test such preserved claims of instructional error under a two-tiered standard: we consider de novo whether an instruction embodied an error of law, but we review for abuse of discretion whether the instructions adequately explained the law or whether they tended to confuse or mislead the jury on the controlling issues. United States v. Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The instructions here correctly stated the law, and Cotto gives us no reason to think they may have thrown off the jury. To know if Cotto intended to commit sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the jury had to know what kind of sexual activity constitutes a criminal offense in Puerto Rico. See United States v. Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (upholding the judge's decision to instruct the jury on the offense of sexual assault under Puerto Rico law in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), which prohibits enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity for which - 32 - any person can be charged with a criminal offense, because where a federal prosecution hinges on an interpretation or application of state law, it is the district court's function to explain the relevant state law to the jury (quoting United States v. FazalUr-Raheman-Fazal, 355 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 2004)); United States v. Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 663 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2011) (reasoning that [i]n order for the jury to determine whether the defendant violated § 2422(b), it had to be instructed on Puerto Rico law). So, as the government notes, every circuit (including ours) with a pattern jury instruction for offenses using the phrase sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense tells the district court to insert the allegedly intended criminal offense into the instruction and, in most cases, to describe its elements.16 In this case, as in the cases just cited, following that convention was not an abuse of discretion. Testimony by Two-Way Television However, Cotto's last challenge spells the end of the government's winning streak. Specifically, she argues that the judge violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront YMP in person 16 See First Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions § 4.18.2422(b) (instruction for enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)); Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions § 2.91 (for enticement of a minor under § 2422(b)); Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions § 16.10 (for § 2423(a)); Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for § 2423(a); Eighth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 6.18.2423A (for § 2423(a)). - 33 - when he permitted YMP to testify remotely through two-way CCTV. See above n.4 (describing the procedure). We'll start with the legal framework governing this claim before we explain how the judge misapplied it here and why the slip warrants a new trial. Law on Tele-Testimony In the ordinary case, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution gives the defendant the right physically to face the witnesses who testify against her. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017, 1021 (1988) (holding that placing a screen in front of two child witnesses to block their view of the defendant while they testified against him violated the Sixth Amendment). The idea is that insisting that witnesses testify in the presence of the person [they] accuse helps ferret out the truth and lowers the risk of wrongful conviction. Id. at 1020. As the old wisdom goes, it is more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' Id. at 1019 (A witness 'may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man, or woman, whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts.' (quoting Zechariah A. Chafee, Jr., The Blessings of Liberty 35 (1956)). And, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly under the gaze of the defendant and jurors who can see the fibber's demeanor with their own eyes. Id. (explaining that the Constitution prescribes face-to-face confrontation as the best way to confound and undo the false - 34 - accuser and reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult, even if it might upset honest victims who take the stand to implicate the guilty). But, like the presumptions that underpin it, the constitutional right to unscreened in-person confrontation has its limits. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844, 849 (holding that defendants do not have an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial). The state also has a compelling interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment. Id. at 852 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). So, in sexual abuse cases, when necessary to elicit a minor victim's testimony without subjecting him or her to further trauma, at least where such trauma would impair the child's ability to communicate, the court may allow the minor to testify from another room through CCTV — that is, as long as the minor still testifies under oath, subject to live cross-examination, and the judge, jury, and defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he or she testifies. Id. at 851, 857. The requisite finding of necessity, however, must . . . be a case-specific one: The trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the [CCTV] procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness - 35 - who seeks to testify. Id. at 855. That entails two key findings: first, that the minor would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant (since otherwise, (s)he could testify in less intimidating surroundings with the defendant present); and second, that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than . . . mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify. Id. at 856 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Maryland statutory procedure challenged in Craig (as the state court applied it) allowed testimony by CCTV if testimony in the presence of the defendant would cause the child to suffer[ ] serious emotional distress such that the child could not reasonably communicate. Id. at 858. The Supreme Court held that standard passed constitutional muster. Id. After all, where face-to-face confrontation causes significant emotional distress in a child witness, there is evidence that [it] would in fact disserve the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal. Id. at 857 (citing, among other things, the Brief for American Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, Maryland v. Craig, 1990 WL 10013093, at 18–24 (1990) (APA Brief) (discussing empirical evidence that a defendant's physical presence can influence child sex abuse victims to give less accurate, detailed, and complete testimony)). In Craig's wake, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b), which sets out alternatives to in-person testimony in child sexual - 36 - abuse cases. See Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–647, § 225, 104 Stat. 4789, 4798 (Nov. 29, 1990). Among other things, the statute allows minor victims in such cases to testify from a room outside the courtroom by twoway CCTV if the court finds on the record that the child is unable to testify in open court in the presence of the defendant . . . because of fear. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(i). Since Cotto raises both statutory and constitutional challenges (and neither party distinguishes the two), we'll assume that the statute requires at least what the Sixth Amendment does. In other words, to satisfy § 3509(b)(1)(B)(i), the judge has to make a specific finding that if the minor testified in the presence of the defendant — even in a less intimidating environment — (s)he'd feel fear so severe that [(s)he] could not reasonably communicate. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856, 858. Thus, a generalized finding that the child suffers from fear [is not] enough to trigger closed-circuit testimony; the fear must be related to the prospect of testifying in the presence of the defendant. 136 Cong. Rec. H13288-02, H13296 (Oct. 27, 1990) (Statement of Rep. Edwards); accord United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 887–88 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that Congress intended § 3509(b)(1)(B) to codify[] - 37 - the requirement in Craig that the child be unable to testify in open court due to the presence of the defendant).17 Whether the trial judge made specific findings sufficient to permit the use of closed-circuit television testimony . . . is a legal issue that we review de novo: that is, without deference. United States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2004). When the judge makes the required findings, however, we review them for clear error, United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991)), meaning we must defer to the judge's findings unless after whole-record review — we have 'a strong, unyielding belief' that the judge got the facts wrong. United States v. Rivera-Carrasquillo, 933 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Toye v. O'Donnell (In re O'Donnell), 728 F.3d 41, 17 Since neither party makes an issue of them, we've made two more assumptions here. First, we assume without deciding that the test announced in Craig (which involved one-way CCTV through which the witness couldn't see the defendant) also applies to the twoway CCTV procedure, as most circuits have held. Compare United States v. Carter, 907 F.3d 1199, 1207–08 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018) with United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1999). Second, we assume (also without deciding) that the Supreme Court's later decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which overruled a key case Craig relied on, did not modify Craig itself. See Carter, 907 F.3d at 1206 n.3 (holding that while Craig and Crawford stand in 'marked contrast' in several respects, 'Crawford did not overturn Craig' (quoting United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 492–95 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring)). - 38 - 45 (1st Cir. 2013)). That doesn't mean we let the findings stand whenever there's some evidence to support them. As the Court has put it, [a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction the judge made a mistake. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) (emphases ours). But as long as the judge's finding is plausible, we may not reverse it even if we're sure that had [we] been sitting as the trier[s] of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence differently. Id. at 573–74. So meeting the clear error standard is no easy task; it's not enough that a finding strikes us as possibly or even probably wrong. Díaz-Alarcón v. Flández-Marcel, 944 F.3d 303, 312 (1st Cir. 2019). It has to be wrong with the force of a [five] week old, unrefrigerated, dead fish. Id. (quoting O'Donnell, 728 F.3d at 46). The bar is high for a reason. When we review a transcript on appeal, we weren't there to see the testimony unfold live; unlike the trial judge, we didn't see [the] witnesses face-to-face or appraise in person their demeanor and inflection. United States v. Pérez-Díaz, 848 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Guzmán-Batista, 783 F.3d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 2015)). We can't see the distress on someone's face, or hear the stress in their voice, by reading their words in 12- - 39 - point Courier New. And unlike us, trial judges listen to witnesses and gauge their credibility for a living. DíazAlarcón, 944 F.3d at 311 (quoting Taglieri v. Monasky, 907 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2018)). So unless objective evidence . . . contradicts a witness's story, or it's so internally inconsistent or implausible that no reasonable factfinder would credit it, Pérez-Díaz, 848 F.3d at 38 (quoting Guzmán-Batista, 783 F.3d at 937), a judge's choice to believe a witness can 'virtually never be clear error.' Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1478 (2017) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575). With that high standard in mind, we turn to YMP's inchambers testimony and the judge's findings based on it. YMP's Testimony About a week before trial, the government filed a motion to have YMP testify by two-way CCTV under § 3509(b). Cotto opposed the request, arguing that remote testimony wasn't necessary and would violate the Sixth Amendment. The court tabled the matter until the day before YMP was set to testify. When the time came on the fifth day of trial, the judge called a recess and interviewed YMP in his chambers with his mother and both sides' lawyers. To begin, there were several rounds of questions: first from the government (e.g., Q: [H]ow do you feel [about] testify[ing] in open court? A: Very bad.), then the defense, - 40 - which sought to paint YMP as a high-functioning scholar-athlete unaffected by Cotto's alleged crime: he had decent grades in school (YMP agreed) and played on a traveling baseball team. But on redirect, the government got back to the issue at hand. The AUSA (that is, the attorney for the government) asked: [AUSA]: How would you feel about seeing [Cotto] in court today? A: Bad, uncomfortable. [AUSA:] How bad and how uncomfortable? A: Too much. The Court: Would you be able to testify? YMP: No. At that point, Cotto's lawyer jumped back in; he pointed out that everybody is uncomfortable as a witness, and YMP had spoken in public before — he'd given interviews on sports radio. YMP admitted he had. But on the radio (YMP added), he'd been talking about baseball; he hadn't had to discuss this case. So the government followed up: How would you feel if you were in that same radio station speaking about what is happening today in court? Very, very, very bad, said YMP. Then, the defense attorney stepped in once more: [Defense Counsel]: And you feel bad because you don't want to talk about personal things; is that correct? A: Yes. - 41 - [Defense Counsel]: But if you are compelled to do it and you have to testify, you will do it? A: If I am compelled I wouldn't do it either. [Defense Counsel]: If you are called as a witness for the prosecution, would you be conversant in answering her questions truthfully in open court? A: No. The Court: Why? YMP: Because it's uncomfortable. The Court: Well — Cotto's lawyer cut in again: had the prosecution ever explained [t]hat it is a normal process for you to testify as a witness at trial? YMP was confused. What do you mean, 'at trial'? he asked. That's when the judge painted the picture. At a trial, he explained: The Court: . . . there is a jury, and your mother and your father will be present, your lawyer will be present, the judge will be present, and the defendant . . . Yaira Cotto, she is entitled to be there. She is not going to be asking questions, but she is entitled to be there. YMP: That wouldn't be the best. The Court: Well, would you be able to testify? That's the issue. YMP: No. The Court: So you would not testify? YMP: No. [Defense Counsel]: May I ask something? Why? Why can't you do that? - 42 - A: Because, no, I don't feel comfortable. The Court: And why would you feel not comfortable? YMP: Because I don't want to see her. I don't want to be there. The Court: Would that cause you to lose your tongue? Is that what you're telling me? YMP: Yes. The Court: Why? YMP: Because I don't want to testify with her there. I don't want to be uncomfortable. At that point, the judge dismissed YMP and his mother to confer with the lawyers. So counsel, the judge leveled (quoting from Craig), mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify is not enough, but it has to be serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate. On that score, the judge was skeptical: YMP seem[ed] to be in the middle[.] So the lawyers skirmished over whether YMP expressed fear of testifying or just discomfort or some reluctance to do so. The judge noted that YMP had a change of face when he stated, kind of annoyed, that he did not want to testify against her. The defense clapped back that that per se doesn't mean fear — and even if YMP felt fear, it would have to come from Cotto, and he hadn't said that he feared her. The judge responded that [t]he fear can be fear to testify before a jury, fear to testify before other people, and - 43 - fear to testify before the judge. There's many fears involved. It's fear. Moving on, the judge had his clerk pull out a dictionary to find synonyms for fear and asked the interpreter how he'd translate them. Then, he called YMP back in to get more specifics. Using those synonyms for fear, the judge asked YMP if testifying in this case [would] subject you to distress? (YMP said yes), cause you to become agitated? (yes), cause you . . . great distress? (yes), and cause you some sort of apprehension or alarm? (yes). The Court: And do you think — above all, do you think that this is fear that you would be — be causing yourself? YMP: Yes. The Court: So all of those that I just stated, which is the one that really causes you to not be able to testify? YMP: Seeing her, standing there; that I have never been there. The Court: Have been where? YMP: In the court. On re-cross, Cotto's lawyer took aim at YMP's testimony that seeing [Cotto] standing there caused him fear. He pointed out that in a statement YMP wrote for investigators two years earlier, YMP didn't write that he was afraid of Mrs. Cotto. No, YMP admitted. - 44 - [Defense Counsel]: Because you didn't feel afraid of her; is that correct? A: No. [Defense Counsel]: And today you don't feel any fear for her either? A: I am not afraid, but I do feel uncomfortable when I see her. . . . [AUSA]: How would you feel if you have to testify in front of Mrs. Cotto today in court? A: Super bad, as I said before. [AUSA]: And when you say super bad, could you describe to the judge, what does that mean? A: That I am going to feel nervous, anxious. [AUSA]: Do you want to see Ms. Cotto? A: No. . . . The Court: Does that bring fear to you by the fact that she is there? [YMP]: Yes. Unsatisfied, Cotto's lawyer followed up a final time: [Defense Counsel]: What type of fear? Explain to us what type of fear can come to you. A: I don't want to see her because I don't feel good when I see her. I don't want to see her and — I don't want to see her. [Defense Counsel]: Is that it? That's all the — [AUSA]: Do you fear her looking at you? - 45 - A: Not necessarily. [AUSA]: What exactly do you fear? [Defense Counsel]: Let the record reflect that he has remained silent. The Court: No, let the record also reflect that he's become red in the face. [Defense Counsel]: He is blushing. The Court: Of course, he is blushing. Fine. [Defense Counsel]: Okay. But does that mean fear? [AUSA]: Yes. Yes. [Defense Counsel]: He hasn't answered, Your Honor. The record should reflect that it's been almost 20 seconds and he hasn't answered. The Court: He's been getting red. [AUSA]: Let the record reflect, Your Honor, that we are talking with a 16-year-old minor. The Court: He is still a minor. All right. Do we have any further questions? They didn't. Back in court, the judge granted the government's motion. To start off, the judge f[ound] that [YMP] demonstrated reluctance to testify and [had a] frightened demeanor, as he physically flushed (his face became red), his body choked, he started moving his legs, and expressed that his chest was tight on his left side by moving his right hand to his chest. After describing YMP's testimony and noting that the face-to-face - 46 - confrontation requirement is not absolute but not easily dispensed with (quoting Craig), the judge then concluded: As such, the Court determines that there is a necessity to protect the welfare of this particular child witness who has demonstrated physical effects of fear as the Court asked specific questions using different synonyms of the word fear, as the victim stated to the Court on every synonym used that he would either not testify or was reluctant to testify in the presence of the defendant in accordance with the requirements of [§] 3509. (emphasis ours). When the trial resumed, YMP testified by twoway CCTV. Our Take Cotto argues that the judge failed to make the specific findings § 3509(b) and Craig together require, and even if he made the needed findings, the evidence didn't support them. Like Cotto, we doubt that YMP's testimony was sufficient to justify the use of CCTV. But we need not decide that issue — because in our view, the judge's use of the wrong legal standard and inadequate factual findings, set against the inconsistencies and gaps in the evidentiary record, warrant a new trial in this case. As we said up front, § 3509(b) and Craig together demand more than a general conclusion that CCTV is necess[ary] to protect the welfare of the witness; they demand (as relevant here) a specific finding that the minor could not reasonably communicate in the defendant's presence because of fear. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856; 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b); see, e.g., Garcia, 7 F.3d at - 47 - 888 (affirming use of CCTV based on judge's finding that because of [her] fear of the defendant, the victim's testimony would not be open, complete, and substantially helpful to the jury if she testified with him present). Here, the judge made no such finding. Instead, his explicit findings concluded only that [YMP] demonstrated reluctance . . . to testify and demonstrated the physical effects of fear when the judge asked specific questions using various synonyms for it (which YMP answered affirmatively). But those specific questions were about testifying in this case generally; they did not ask YMP how he felt about Cotto, specifically. So the judge did not find that Cotto frightened YMP or that her presence (as opposed to the daunting courtroom setting) would make him unable to testify. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b); see Craig, 497 U.S. at 857–58 (explaining that [t]he question of whether a child is unavailable to testify . . . should not be asked in terms of inability to testify in the ordinary courtroom setting, but in the much narrower terms of the witness's inability to testify in the presence of the accused). As such, the judge did not resolve the issues Craig made critical. See United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding the trial court's finding that [the child's] fear of the defendant was only one reason why she could not testify in open court was inadequate because it did not find that [her] fear of the defendant was the dominant reason she couldn't testify) (citing Turning Bear, 357 - 48 - F.3d at 737 (holding the trial court's finding that a combination of factors frightened the victim came up short because it failed to separate out the effect on [the victim] of [the defendant's] presence)). The judge's remarks earlier in the hearing clue us in to why he failed to make the needed findings. During the brief intermission in questioning, the defense pointed out that the government had to show where [YMP's] fear comes from (i.e., Cotto herself) and argued that YMP did not fear Cotto (I have a statement from him here saying he is in love with the teacher, not that he feared her, he proffered). But the judge dismissed that argument, saying (incorrectly) that the fear can be fear to testify before a jury, fear to testify before other people, and fear to testify before the judge, as long as it was fear. In other words, he overlooked Craig's demand for a showing that YMP feared the presence of the defendant and not just the courtroom generally. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856. Without that showing, CCTV may not have been necessary, since YMP could reasonably have testified in less intimidating surroundings with Cotto there. Id.18 The judge's misreading of Craig, and resulting failure to 18 For example, if the judge believed that the combination of the courtroom and the defendant's presence would interfere with YMP's testimony, he could have considered closing the courtroom to the public or permitting non-essential observers to watch from an overflow room. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e) (allowing the court to - 49 - make the needed findings, undermines his conclusion that CCTV was necessary. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) ([I]f a district court's findings rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis.). Wait a second, says the government. In his oral decision, the judge noted YMP testified that he felt 'greatly distressed and uncomfortable about testifying in court before the Defendant.' Appellee's Br. at 38. And he also said that YMP stated that he would be unable to testify if he were in front of the defendant, not just in the courtroom generally. But as the government implicitly concedes, while the judge may have noted that YMP made those statements, he didn't find that either of them were true. So, given the judge's earlier misstatement of the legal standard, we can't conclude he was adopting YMP's statements wholesale as his own findings of fact — at least not in this case, where YMP's testimony about his feelings toward Cotto, specifically, was equivocal at best. close the courtroom to all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case if opencourt testimony would cause substantial psychological harm to the child or would result in the child's inability to effectively communicate and the order is narrowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest); Craig, 497 U.S. at 852 (explaining that the court may exclude the press and public from the courtroom where the trial court makes a case-specific finding that closure of the trial is necessary to protect the welfare of the minor (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608–09)). - 50 - Indeed, a firm finding on the key issue — whether YMP felt frightened and unable to testify because of Cotto, and not just the crowded courtroom — was especially needed on this shaky record. On that critical point, YMP never gave a clear answer. Twice, it's true, the judge asked YMP if he [w]ould . . . be able