Opinion ID: 2638169
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intrusion-into-Private-Matters Tort

Text: With regard to the intrusion-into-private-matters tort, under which liability may be imposed for an intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter ... in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469), the Court of Appeal found that plaintiff has identified three alleged intrusions into her zone of privacy: (1) establishing a friendship with [plaintiffs] biological mother in order to obtain personal information about [plaintiff]; (2) securing interviews with friends and family through fraudulent means; and (3) collecting and disseminating confidential information about [plaintiff] from various court files. The Court of Appeal separately analyzed each of these alleged intrusions. With regard to the initial alleged intrusion, the appellate court held that [t]he friendship between Loftus and [plaintiffs] mother is not an intrusion into [plaintiffs] private life. The court explained that [t]he subjects that [plaintiffs] mother discussed with Loftus were not private to [plaintiff] because they also obviously involved [plaintiffs] mother, and that [plaintiffs] mother has as much right to share her story with Loftus as [plaintiff] has to share the details of her life with Corwin. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that Loftus's conduct in befriending plaintiffs mother did not support a cause of action for improper intrusion. With regard to plaintiffs' claim that defendants could be held liable for improper intrusion into private matters by conducting interviews with plaintiffs relatives or friends by fraudulent means, however, the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence presented by defendant was sufficient to support the imposition of liability on this theory. The appellate court relied on a declaration of plaintiffs foster mother, Margie Cantrell, that alleged: Loftus contacted [Cantrell] in late 1997, told her she [Loftus] was working with Corwin to help [plaintiff], and requested that Cantrell come to an office to answer some questions. Cantrell stated that she accepted the invitation because she knew Corwin and she knew that [plaintiff] trusted him and because she wanted to help [plaintiff]. Cantrell further stated that when she met Loftus, Loftus welcomed her, `saying again that she was working with Dr. Corwin and was actually his supervisor in connection with his study of [plaintiff].' The Court of Appeal stated that Cantrell's declaration is undisputed evidence that [defendants] penetrated a zone of privacy which included Cantrell, who was not only a close friend and confidant of [plaintiffs] but also a mother figure to her, by misrepresenting their identity and true purpose. Appellants contend that only Cantrell has standing to pursue a claim based on these alleged misrepresentations. We agree that [plaintiff] cannot use this evidence to support her fraud claim. On the other hand, this evidence is relevant to show that [defendants] intruded into a private area of [plaintiffs] life. Indeed, this evidence actually suggests that [defendants] were aware that the information they sought was private and that it would not have been shared with them had they been truthful about the nature and purpose of their investigation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on an intrusion-into-private-matters tor t on the basis of Lotus's alleged misrepresentations to Cantrell. With respect to plaintiffs claim that defendants had engaged in an improper intrusion into private matters by obtaining private information from court records, the Court of Appeal explained that plaintiff actually had advanced two distinct arguments in this regard. First, plaintiff argued that defendants had engaged in improper intrusion in gathering information about her from documents, such as medical and [Child Protective Services] reports, which, although contained in files open to the public, were of a confidential nature. The Court of Appeal found that this portion of plaintiffs claim lacked merit, relying on our holding in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, that there can be no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff. Second, the Court of Appeal noted that plaintiff also argued that defendants had obtained private information about her from documents contained within her juvenile dependency file. Because such files are not open to the public, but rather are confidential, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendants could be held liable for improper intrusion if they improperly had obtained access to plaintiffs confidential juvenile court records. Although defendants, vigorously maintained that any medical or psychological reports they obtained came from the Stanislaus County divorce proceedinga public recordand pointed out that plaintiff had failed to adduce any evidence that defendants had accessed plaintiffs confidential juvenile court records in Solano County, the Court of Appeal, relying upon a statement in a declaration from the owner of Shapiro Investigations that one of his employees had copied `Voluminous public records at the Solano County courthouse that may have been relevant to the Jane Doe case, concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that some form of trickery or misconduct was employed to obtain confidential files in Solano County. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiffs improper-intrusion-into-private-matters claim could go forward insofar as it was based on defendants' conduct in gaining improper access to, and using information derived from, plaintiffs confidential juvenile court files.