Opinion ID: 2502708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Evidence to Support the ALC's Final Order

Text: Finally, Appellants contend the ALC erred in concluding the Lot was exempt from Coastal Island Regulation because it was part of Fripp Island. We disagree. The ALC found the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act [6] did not apply for three distinct and equally dispositive reasons. The ALC first determined the Lot was exempted from regulation establishing access to coastal islands under Regulation 30-12.N because Fripp Island was expressly excluded by the General Assembly's definition of coastal island in Regulation 30.1.D(11). 23A S.C.Code Ann. Regs. 30-12.N (Supp.2009); 23A S.C.Code Ann. Regs. 30-1.D(11). Regulation 30-12.N explains that the section applies to applications for permits for bridges and docks as a means of obtaining access to coastal islands. Regulation 30-1.D(11) defines a coastal island as: an area of high ground above the critical area of delineation that is separated from other high ground areas by coastal tidelands or waters. The definition of coastal island further states, in pertinent part, that: The purpose of this definition is to include all islands except those that are essentially mainland, i.e., those that already have publicly accessible bridges and/or causeways. The following islands shall not be deemed a coastal island subject to this section due to their large size and developed nature: ... Fripp Island.... Id. § 30-1.D(11). The State called as a witness Sidney C. Miller, who was duly qualified as an expert in the field of tidal datum. [7] Miller undertook a study of the Lot in order to compare the Lot's elevation to the benchmark tidal data which had previously been compiled by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Miller, in a previous employ, oversaw NOAA's project to establish tidal boundaries for South Carolina's coast. One of the points NOAA selected to benchmark was the Hunting Island Bridge (Bridge), [8] which connects Fripp Island to Hunting Island to the north. Using the data collected by the tide gauge at the Bridge, which was collected by NOAA over the course of three years and established mean high water (MHW), mean high high water (MHHW), mean low water (MLW), mean low low water (MLLW) and various other tidal datums, [9] Miller measured the elevations at the Lot. Miller's calculations revealed no portion of the Lot was below MHW or MHHW, and in fact, the lowest spot of the Lot is about a foot above mean high water. This conclusion was later confirmed by both of Risher's experts, David Youmans and Fanning, and was undisputed by Appellants. The ALC determined that because the Lot was contiguous to land agreed to by all parties as being part of Fripp Island, and no portion of the Lot was lower than the established MHW or MHHW marks, then it was also a part of Fripp Island. Based on Regulation 30-1.D(11)'s exclusion of Fripp Island from its definition of a coastal island, the ALC found the requirements of Regulation 30-12.N inapplicable. The court's determination of whether or not the Lot is a part of Fripp Island is not a legal question that is determined under the rubric of a regulation; instead, it is a finding of fact properly left within the purview of the fact finding body, and only reversible if unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. A reviewing court may reverse or modify an administrative decision if the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e) (2005). Substantial evidence is `evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached.' Southeast Res. Recovery, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 358 S.C. 402, 407, 595 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2004) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981)). [T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). In our view, the ALC's determination that the Lot is a part of Fripp Island, based on the tidal datum introduced at trial, is a reasonable one which is supported by substantial evidence. See Bursey v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 369 S.C. 176, 188-89, 631 S.E.2d 899, 906 (2006) (stating where conflicting evidence exists as to an issue, the Court's substantial evidence standard of review defers to the findings of the fact-finder). Because this issue is dispositive of OCRM's sole reason of denying Risher's permit, [10] it is unnecessary for the Court to address the remaining grounds on which the ALC based its final order. [11] See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).