Opinion ID: 4195158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for JAML

Text: Next, Toyota argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for 4 Stilson’s notes indicated that one of his tests revealed sticking at a temperature of 150 degrees Fahrenheit, but he testified at trial that sticking was observed at temperatures of 160 or 165 degrees Fahrenheit. -16- JAML de novo. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 516 (8th Cir. 1999). In so doing, we “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [the plaintiffs] without making credibility assessments or weighing the evidence.” Arabian Agric. Servs. Co., 309 F.3d at 482 (quoting Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 2001)). We will “uphold a jury verdict unless we conclude that a reasonable jury could not have found for that party.” Knutson v. Ag. Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 2005). “State law governs the substance of . . . diversity-based products liability actions.” Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 2008). To make out a cause of action for products liability based on a design defect under Minnesota law, the plaintiffs were required to prove: (1) the Camry was in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defective condition existed when the Camry left Toyota’s control; and (3) the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co. Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 623 n.3 (Minn. 1984). “Proximate cause exists if the defendant’s conduct, without intervening or superseding events, was a substantial factor in creating the harm.” Thompson v. Hirano Tecseed Co., Ltd., 456 F.3d 805, 812 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing Minnesota law); see Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996).5 Toyota argues that, even assuming Stilson’s opinions and the OSI evidence were properly admitted, the plaintiffs failed to prove that a defect existed or that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of the accident. We disagree. The plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the 1996 Camry contained a design defect. A significant portion of this evidence is 5 The district court instructed the jury that, in order to recover on the basis of a design defect, the plaintiffs had to prove that the “defective condition in the car was a direct cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.” The court instructed the jury that a “‘direct cause’ is a cause that had a substantial part in bringing about the accident.” Neither party challenges the district court’s instruction. -17- discussed in detail above. For example, the plaintiffs presented Stilson’s expert testimony, supported by tests he conducted pursuant to Toyota’s recommended protocol for thermal testing. Cf. Fireman’s Fund, 394 F.3d at 1058–59 (insufficient evidence of defect and causation when expert failed to propose a specific defect or conduct testing in accordance with industry standards); Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 521 (expert not qualified to testify to conclusions as to product failure given inexperience with the relevant products). Stilson told the jury that he concluded that the susceptibility of the throttle pulleys to heat-induced sticking constituted a defect and explained in great detail the bases for his conclusion. Additionally, the plaintiffs offered Lee’s testimony and that of his wife, explaining that Lee attempted to apply the brakes to no avail and that the car continued accelerating on its own; evidence that Toyota had failed to conduct standard heat-related safety testing on the 1996 Camry’s throttle mechanism; and OSI evidence. The plaintiffs also presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the throttle defect was “a substantial factor in creating the harm.” Thompson, 456 F.3d at 812. Stilson described the components housed beneath the dust cover that generated heat, and explained that other parts would transmit heat to the throttle pulleys. He also noted that heat from components outside the throttle— namely the exhaust manifold and ambient heat—likely entered and got trapped under the dust cover, subjecting the pulleys to additional heat. Stilson explained that there was a “high probability” that heat would remain trapped under the dust cover for a period of time because there was little opportunity for ventilation. He opined that the pulleys overheated, stuck together, and ultimately caused the accident at issue in this case. Toyota sought to refute the plaintiffs’ theories of defect and causation through the testimony of its expert, Steven MacLean. MacLean did not dispute the fact that the relevant throttle pulleys would expand and stick if subjected to a temperature of 165 degrees Fahrenheit, or that the dust cover containing the pulleys was only seven -18- inches away from the 900 degree exhaust manifold. Instead, he asserted that Lee’s vehicle never reached the temperature necessary to cause sticking. MacLean testified that he drove a 1995 Camry in a route simulating Lee’s. During this simulation, the temperature in the test Camry never reached 165 degrees and the throttle pulleys did not bind together. MacLean opined that the accident was, therefore, not caused by the alleged defect. Toyota argued alternative theories of causation, including that the accident was caused by a dirty throttle body or by pedal misapplication—both of which the plaintiffs attempted to discredit. Toyota argues that MacLean’s testimony, combined with the fact that the one test Stilson performed with the cruise control lever in the unmodified position did not result in a stuck throttle, mandates the conclusion that a reasonable jury could not have found that Lee’s Camry ever got hot enough for the throttle pulleys to stick. As a result, according to Toyota, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the alleged defect caused the accident at issue here. The jury heard testimony from two qualified experts with competing opinions regarding the cause of the accident. Both of them testified extensively about their respective theories of defect and causation and both were subjected to lengthy and detailed cross-examination. See Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 2014) (“As long as the expert’s scientific testimony rests upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known’ it should be tested by the adversary process with competing expert testimony and cross-examination, rather than excluded by the court at the outset.” (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)). Though Toyota disagrees with Stilson’s opinions and conclusions—including his explanation that moving the cruise control lever did not affect the validity of his testing—“questions of conflicting evidence must be left for the jury’s determination,” Bonner, 259 F.3d at 930 (quoting Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1995)), and we will not reweigh the evidence, Arabian Agric. Servs., Co., 309 F.3d at 482 (citation omitted). The jury’s verdict was not based on “sheer speculation,” and instead is supported by reasonable inferences drawn from the plaintiffs’ evidence. Rients v. Int’l Harvester Co., 346 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Viewing the evidence in the light -19- most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that verdict, we conclude that this evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that the Camry’s design defect was the proximate cause of this accident. See Bednar v. Bassett Furniture Mfg. Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 737, 739–40 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on causation when plaintiff offered evidence of what level of toxin is generally harmful and expert testimony that the plaintiff was exposed to harmful level); cf. Rients, 346 N.W.2d at 362 (insufficient evidence of causation in product liability case when uncontroverted evidence established numerous other potential causes).