Opinion ID: 1677203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fines as Punishment Analysis

Text: Rather than adopt an approach that seems to apply when the sanction is only punitive in part, the better approach may be one that is more in line with the purposes of Article VI, section 14. As we stated earlier, the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause restricts the ability of a judge to impose a particular form of punishment, see Martin, 940 S.W.2d at 570, and as such, the focus of any test should be upon whether the pecuniary sanction was imposed to serve primarily as a punitive measure. Therefore, other constitutional tests that examine whether a particular sanction is punitive in purpose should provide for more meaningful analysis. This is not the first case in which we have determined whether a sanction is predominantly punitive or remedial in nature. In the context of double jeopardy analysis under Article I, section 10, we have adopted a test similar to that used in the federal courts to determine whether a second action is sufficiently punitive so as to constitute a second punishment for the same offense. See Stuart, 963 S.W.2d at 32. Under this analysis, a sanction is deemed to constitute punishment if (1) the legislative body intended that the sanction have a punitive purpose or effect; or (2) the clearest proof demonstrates that the sanction is so punitive in fact that [it] cannot legitimately be viewed as civil in nature. Id. (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996)). As one other court has phrased the essential characteristics of an identical inquiry, Thus, the determining factor of whether a sanction is criminal or civil is not necessarily the label given it by the legislature; rather a court confronted with a challenge to a nominally civil proceeding and sanction must examine whether the sanction is so punitive in effect that it can no longer be said to serve the remedial purposes of a civil sanction. State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402, 404 (Ind.1997) (citing, among others, Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288), 116 S.Ct. 2135. Upon careful consideration, we believe that the test adopted in Stuart provides a more appropriate framework in which to determine whether a monetary assessment is sufficiently punitive so as to fall within the restrictions of Article VI, section 14. This test focuses upon the intended and actual purpose or effect of the penalty itself, instead of upon the character of the proceeding in which the penalty is imposed; it does not give determinative effect to the label attached to the sanction; and it sufficiently allows remedial sanctions to be given effect, even though such sanctions may also carry some traditionally punitive consequences such as deterrence. Accordingly, we hold that a monetary sanction imposed for a municipal ordinance violation falls within the scope of Article VI, section 14 when: (1) the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender for the violation of an ordinance; or (2) despite evidence of remedial intent, the monetary sanction is shown by the clearest proof to be so punitive in its actual purpose or effect that it cannot legitimately be viewed as remedial in nature. Having adopted the Stuart test to analyze issues arising under Article VI, section 14, the State urges this Court to also adopt the seven guideposts used by the United States Supreme Court in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), to determine whether a statutory scheme is punitive in its actual purpose or effect. These factors, which were originally articulated by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), and which have since been adopted by several other jurisdictions, include, (1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (citations omitted and alteration in original). Several courts have found these factors to be of very little practical use, see, e.g., Poritz, 662 A.2d at 400-01; Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. 1201, 668 N.E.2d 738, 750 (1996), and we decline to adopt these factors for analysis under Article VI, section 14 largely because they do not adequately separate punitive penalties from those that are remedial in their actual purpose or effect. For example, although monetary penalties do not involve affirmative disabilities or restraints, this is not to say that the actual purpose of the penalty must therefore be remedial. Second, as evidenced by the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause itself, monetary penalties have been traditionally regarded in this state as punishment in some instances, but not in others. As such, this second factor reveals little as to a penalty's actual purpose or effect within any given statutory scheme. Third, examination of scienter fails the object of the inquiry, because many strict liability criminal offenses are punished by fines. Likewise, asking whether the prohibited conduct is also a crime ignores the fact that a fine can still be remedial if it serves to correct or rectify a violation. Finally, asking whether the penalty serves the traditional goals of punishment is ineffective, because, as we have recognized, deterrence is present in every monetary penalty, irrespective of whether the penalty is actually remedial in its purpose or effect. Consequently, rather than adopt these seven factors for analysis under the second prong of the Stuart test as the State urges, we conclude that the clearest proof of punitive purpose or effect is more properly established by considering whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the statutory scheme truly envisions the pecuniary sanction as serving to remedy or to correct a violation. Examination of the role of the penalty within its particular statutory scheme is important, because, unlike analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause, see Browning -Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 492 U.S. at 275, 109 S.Ct. 2909 the focus of Article VI, section 14 is upon the punitive nature of the sanction, not upon the personal impact of the punishment to the defendant. Accordingly, in those cases in which a pecuniary sanction was originally intended to be remedial, courts should further examine the actual purpose or effect of the sanction within the context of its entire statutory scheme to determine whether the sanction truly functions as a remedial measure. D. APPLICATION TO CITY OF CHATTANOOGA v. DAVIS Applying this framework of analysis to City of Chattanooga v. Davis, our first inquiry is to determine whether the intended purpose of the monetary sanction imposed for reckless driving is to punish violations of the law. Because [t]he rules of statutory interpretation are [also] used when interpreting an ordinance, Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn.2000); see also Loggins v. Lightner, 897 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994), we determine the intent and purpose of an ordinance primarily from the language used. We also endeavor to read an ordinance as a whole and in conjunction with [its] surrounding parts. See State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995); see also 421 Corp. v. Metropolitan Gov't, 36 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (stating rule in terms of interpreting a zoning ordinance). Examining the relevant textual provisions of the Chattanooga City Code, little doubt can exist that the intended purpose of the penalty imposed on Davis for reckless driving was to punish for the violation of the ordinance. Chattanooga City Code section 24-13(b) sets forth the penalty for reckless driving: Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon the first conviction by a fine of not less than five dollars ($5.00), on a second conviction by a fine of not less than ten dollars ($10.00), on a third conviction by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) and on all subsequent convictions by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00). As the plain language of the ordinance shows, the intended purpose of the penalty is to punish the offender, and the language does not otherwise suggest any remedial purpose to be served by the fine. The ordinance further provides that the penalty is to be applied only after a conviction of the offense, further indicating that the sanction is intended to punish. Indeed, as this ordinance well illustrates, no more persuasive evidence of an intent to punish may be found except through express language to this effect. This conclusion does not end our inquiry, however, because the Chattanooga City Court imposed the fine of three hundred dollars under section 1-8(a) of the City Code, instead of imposing a fine pursuant to section 24-13(b). [17] Chattanooga City Code section 1-8(a) provides that [w]herever in this Code or in any ordinance or rule or regulation promulgated by any officer of the city under authority vested in him by law or ordinance, any act is prohibited or is declared to be unlawful or a misdemeanor, or the doing of any act is required, or the failure to do any act is declared to be unlawful, the violation of any such provision of this Code or any such ordinance, rule or regulation shall be punished by a monetary penalty and forfeiture not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00). Again, the intended purpose of this provision, plain on its face through the language used, is clearly to punish the offender for the violation of an ordinance. Although a monetary penalty can be imposed for remedial purposes in some circumstances, we find no such apparent purpose or intent present in this section. Rather, as applied to the offense of reckless driving in this case, the clearly intended purpose of the City Council in enacting the fine was to impose punishment. In its analysis of Chattanooga City Code section 1-8(a), a majority of the judges on the panel below concluded that the City Council's choice of language in this section was insignificant. Citing Barrett v. Metropolitan Government, the intermediate court stated that the [t]he fact that the City chose to use the language `punished by a monetary penalty' does not alter the civil nature of the penalty imposed. We agree that the language of section 1-8(a) does not affect the character of the proceedings in which the fine is imposed. However, the character of the proceedings is largely irrelevant to the substantive analysis under Article VI, section 14, and because we hold today that the initial inquiry under the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause is whether the legislative body intended the sanction to serve a punitive or a remedial purpose, express statements of that intent are especially relevant. Therefore, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, the use of the term punished in section 1-8(a) is particularly relevant because it strongly indicates that the pecuniary sanction was intended by the City Council to constitute a punitive measure. Considering both sections 24-13(b) and section 1-8(a), we conclude that the clear and predominant intention in imposing a fine for reckless driving is to punish the defendant for the violation of that ordinance. [18] Assuming presently that the General Assembly has granted the Chattanooga City Council authority to enact punitive sanctions in excess of fifty dollars, [19] we have been unable to locate any statute that confers upon the Chattanooga City Court the power or authority to empanel a jury for this purpose. In fact, our research confirms that only courts of general jurisdiction have the power to empanel a jury to determine facts or to impose punishment. Therefore, irrespective of any city ordinance to the contrary, the discretion of the Chattanooga City Court to impose punitive monetary sanctions is necessarily limited by Article VI, section 14 to fines not exceeding fifty dollars. Accordingly, we affirm the reduction of the appellant's fine to that amount. See Huffman v. State, 200 Tenn. 487, 501, 292 S.W.2d 738, 744 (1956) (stating that reduction of the fine on appeal is the proper remedy for a violation of Article VI, section 14), overruled on other grounds, State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tenn.1980); Christian v. State, 184 Tenn. 163, 165, 197 S.W.2d 797, 797-98 (1946) (stating that reduction is the proper remedy for a violation of Article VI, section 14, unless it was impossible for a Court to impose even the minimum statutory fine without the intervention of a jury). [20] The judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue is affirmed as modified. [21] E. APPLICATION TO BARRETT v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT As in Davis, our first inquiry in this case is whether the fines imposed for violations of the Metropolitan Code of Laws were predominantly intended to serve as punishment. The provision authorizing monetary sanctions for Barrett's five violations of the Code of Laws is section 16.04.172(A), which, at the time of the violations, provided in relevant part as follows: Whenever in this title, or in any rule, regulation or order promulgated by any officer or agency of the metropolitan government under authority duly vested in the officer or agency by this title, or if any act is prohibited or is made or declared to be unlawful or an offense or a misdemeanor, or the doing of any act is required, or the failure to do any act is declared to be unlawful or an offense or a misdemeanor, where no specific penalty is provided therefor in this title, the violation of any such provision of this title or such rule, regulation or order, shall be punishable by fine in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. As can be seen in the plain language of this provision, which is not materially different from section 1-8(a) of the Chattanooga City Code, the intended purpose of these sanctions is to punish violations of the Code of Laws. Indeed, more persuasive evidence of a punitive purpose can hardly be derived except through the Council's own expression that the fine is used to punish that which is made unlawful, prohibited, or made or declared to be a misdemeanor. Nevertheless, in February 1999, the Metropolitan Council passed a resolution to clarify its intention as to the purpose of the penalties imposed by the Code of Laws. In relevant part, this resolution reads as follows: Any place in the Metropolitan Code of Laws where the term it shall be a misdemeanor or it shall be an offense or it shall be unlawful or similar terms appear in the Metropolitan Code of Laws to denote that certain conduct is in violation of a Metropolitan Government ordinance, it shall mean it shall be a civil offense. Anytime the word fine appears in a penalty provision of the Metropolitan Code of Laws, it shall mean a civil penalty. The preamble clauses of the resolution expressly recognize that the then-present language of the Code of Laws was inconsistent with the nature of a civil penalty and inconsistent with the nature of the assessment. The Metropolitan Government now contends that this Court should give effect to this new language because it represents the true intention of the Metropolitan Council as to the purpose of the sanctions involved. In previous cases, we have given some interpretive weight to subsequent amendments that purport to clarify the original intentions of the legislative body. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Crawley, 6 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tenn.1999); Ashe v. Leech, 653 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tenn.1983). The general rule applied to analysis of clarification amendments has been well-articulated by the Court of Appeals: A mere change in phraseology does not indicate a change in construction of the statute; but a material change in the phraseology of a statute is generally regarded as a legislative construction that the law so amended did not originally embrace the amended provisions, and this is particularly true if it follows soon after controversies have arisen as to the interpretation of the original act, and intervention of judicial decisions may be a material element in determining the effect of an amendment. State Bd. of Examiners for Architects & Engineers v. Weinstein, 638 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982). Using this rule as our guide, this case presents an admittedly close question as to whether the ordinance changes are so material as to negate the Council's intention to clarify existing law. Nevertheless, because Article VI, section 14 initially gives some deference to the stated intention regarding the purpose of the penalty, we will, for purposes of this case only, resolve our doubt in favor of finding that the Metropolitan Council intended for the Code's monetary penalties to serve remedial purposes.