Opinion ID: 1658248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the cumulative effect of the misconduct of the district attorney deny kelly a fair trial?

Text: In this assignment of error, the appellant sets forth a variety of incidents occurring during the trial. Some of the conduct was objected to and some was not. In Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981), this Court stated that a failure to make an objection at the time of trial precluded the defendant from raising the issue on appeal. For this reason, we discuss only those assignments of error in which a contemporaneous objection was made at trial to the district attorney's conduct. Kelly alleges that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the district attorney repeatedly cross-examined him about his conversations with his attorney. The record shows that the prosecutor asked Kelly how many times had he gone over his story with his attorney, and had his attorney given him any advice about his testimony. Kelly contends that this was an unwarranted invasion of the attorney-client privilege. For authority, the appellant cites 97 C.J.S. Witnesses, Sec. 283(g), (j), which states that a party may refuse on the ground of privilege to state whether he communicated certain facts to his attorney, and the client may not be required to divulge the advice which his attorney gave him. The attorney-client privilege relates to and covers all information regarding the crime received by the attorney in the course of his representation of the client. Barnes v. State, 460 So.2d 126 (Miss. 1984). Only the client may invoke the privilege. Id. at 131. In the instant case, since the privilege was not invoked, and no objection was made to the line of questioning by the defense attorney, Kelly's testimony effectively served as a waiver. In addition, the line of questioning used by the district attorney was not unduly prejudicial, and was harmless error at best. The appellant next asserts that questions concerning the use of his testimony against his brother were totally irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The defense counsel objected to this line of questioning and the trial judge sustained this objection. The state contends that since defense counsel did not request that the jury be instructed to disregard, the trial court did all that appellant requested and, therefore, no error resulted. Clanton v. State, 279 So.2d 599, 602 (Miss. 1973). The proper procedure to be followed was stated by this Court in Whitlock v. State, 419 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss. 1982). After the sustaining of an objection, if counsel is not satisfied or feels that the admonition of the trial judge is ineffective, defense counsel should then move for a mistrial. Id. at 202-03. Since this procedure was not followed, no reversible error was committed. At one point in the trial, the following exchange between the district attorney and Kelly occurred: Q. So, the whole time you were in there, you intended to steal with them armed and the only time you changed your mind is when you couldn't find anything to steal and then you left. Right? A. Right. Q. Now, you have told us that all you were guilty of was just breaking and entering. Do you know that you just admitted armed robbery? BY MR. EVANS: Your Honor, I object to him telling the jury that he has just admitted to armed robbery. He has not admitted to armed robbery. BY THE COURT: Sustained. Based on the cross-examination above, appellant contends that the question Do you know that you just admitted to armed robbery? was prejudicial misconduct. An analogous case is Lavender v. State, 378 So.2d 656 (Miss. 1980), where the prosecutor stated Thank you for your confession. The Court held that making this statement, although error, was not reversible error in and of itself. Id. at 658. In the case at bar, while the question should not have been asked, such misconduct is not enough to constitute reversible error. Appellant also contends that the prosecutor expressed his personal belief during the closing argument when he stated, We want him adequately punished. We are asking for life imprisonment. We are entitled to a trial too. And he's entitled to get the punishment he deserves. Defendant's objection was overruled, and defense counsel then moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the defense attorney had opened the door to this area during appellant's closing argument. The district attorney's statements appear to be proper and are, at the most, mildly prejudicial. See Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1983) (prosecutor's statement in closing argument of murder trial that ... we have got to let people know what the people of Harrison County stand for. was held acceptable.)