Opinion ID: 4441996
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims barred by the statute of limitations

Text: 17 ¶48. Except for five claims against Scott Favre, the circuit court applied against all defendants the statute of limitations bar with respect to JRE’s remaining claims. The statute of limitations for libel, slander, and slander of title is one year. Miss Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Rev. 2014). The statute of limitations for enumerated intentional torts is one year. Id. The catch-all statute of limitations for tort claims is three years. Miss. Code Ann. 15-1-49 (Rev. 2014). The circuit court was correct that all remaining allegations were committed outside the relevant limitations period. JRE makes several unavailing arguments in its attempt to circumvent the statute of limitations. ¶49. First, JRE points to two events that occurred within one year of the filing of the complaint: (1) July 2011: The Board of Supervisors meeting at which an attorney speaking on behalf of Cindy Favre and Jefferson Parker persuaded the Board to decline to extend the JRE/[Yacht Club conditional use permit] by claiming, in pertinent part, that [Yacht Club] was not entitled to an extension because JRE and [Yacht Club] had failed to make sufficient progress in developing the property . . . . (2) August 2011: Cindy Favre confronted a JRE contractor attempting to access the [Yacht Club] property via Nicola Road and deterred the contractor from performing services on the JRE track by claiming, without any objectively reasonable basis, that JRE invitees and licensees would be trespassing, and subject to prosecution for criminal trespass, if they attempted to access the [Yacht Club] tract via Nicola Road. JRE’s reliance on these two events is misplaced. The circuit court did not apply the statute of limitations to any claims arising from these events. As the circuit court noted, Yacht Club took possession of the property in February 2011. Claims based on allegations that occurred after February 2011 are pertinent to Yacht Club, not JRE. The circuit court correctly barred 18 Yacht Club’s claims on other grounds, namely, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, not the statute of limitations. ¶50. Second, JRE attempts to tie all the events together and to argue that the statute of limitations was tolled because the defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to obstruct development of the property, specifically, to commit conduct related to slander, defamation, and slander of title. Civil conspiracy is not a specifically enumerated claim in the plaintiffs’ complaint. But the circuit court analyzed the argument because of the plaintiffs’ general claim of “[a]ny other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action.” ¶51. The circuit court cites a case decided by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that civil conspiracy is an intentional tort that carries a one-year statute of limitations. McGuffie v. Herrington, 966 So. 2d 1274, 1278 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Gasparrini v. Bredemeier, 802 So. 2d 1062 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). The trial court noted that “[t]he facts relied [upon] for the alleged civil conspiracy are recitations of the facts alleged in the 2008 complaint.” And as the claim is “[s]imilar to the other enumerated intentional torts, any claim[s] by [p]laintiffs for civil conspiracy are barred by the one-year statute of limitations.” ¶52. This Court previously has said that the statute of limitations for a claim of civil conspiracy carries a three-year statute of limitation. Carter v. Citigroup, Inc., 938 So. 2d 809, 817 (¶ 39) (Miss. 2006) (citing Am. Bankers’ Ins. Co. v. Wells, 819 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (Miss. 2001)). See also Rankin v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 912 So. 2d 725, 726 (¶ 2) (Miss. 2005) (“Unless it is tolled, the statute of limitations on all of the claims [including civil 19 conspiracy] asserted by the Plaintiffs is three years or less and had therefore run by the time Plaintiffs filed suit.” (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15–1–49 (Rev. 2003))). ¶53. Upon review, JRE contended a conspiracy existed as early as 2007, more than three years before the filing of the complaint in this case. Specifically, JRE claimed that the defendants “have systematically conspired during a time from September 2007 to the present [filing of complaint, December 19, 2011,] to destroy plaintiffs’ business and deprive plaintiffs of the legitimate use of their property.” The record reflects—and JRE asserted—that the defendants were cognizant of such collusion. Yet, despite the defendants’ allegedly maintaining a conspiracy, the plaintiffs failed to pursue this action within the prescribed statute of limitations. ¶54. Further, JRE instituted an action seeking recovery from the defendants’ collaborations; but JRE dropped those claims when it filed its amended complaint in October 2008. JRE alleged in its September 2008 complaint that the defendants “constructed, authorized the construction of, and/or colluded in the construction of the gate across Nicola Road.” The claims seeking damages from that incident were dismissed without prejudice. But JRE and its successor did not return to court to seek damages for this claimed conspiracy until December 2011. See Koestler v. Miss. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 45 So. 3d 280, 283 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2010) (“[T]he statute of limitations ran long before the second suit was filed.”). ¶55. JRE’s complaint cites specific activities of the defendants—such as construction of the gate—as “representative” of a “systematic, joint, ongoing conspiracy to spread the false impression that plaintiffs do not have the legal right to access their property.” But the trial 20 court addressed the viability of claims stemming from those incidents. And while there may be instances when this Court can recognize an ongoing conspiracy, JRE’s conspiracy claim here fell outside the statute of limitations. The later incidents JRE cites are not sufficient to extend this conspiracy claim indefinitely.12 ¶56. Moreover, the circuit court went further and addressed the civil conspiracy claim on the merits, correctly finding that “[e]ven if the slander of title claims were not barred by the statute of limitations, the claims would still fail.” The plaintiffs alleged that “Jefferson Parker, Cindy Favre[,] and Scott Favre conspired to commit slander of title by: (1) stating that JRE’s easement was not sufficient to serve as a[n] access [point] for the condominium development, (2) placing a farm gate on Nicola Road[,] . . . and (3) claiming to own Nicola Road and/or JRE’s easement.” But, as the circuit court rightly observed, these statements and acts were “the subject of the [c]hancery [c]ourt action, Hancock County Cause No. 08-786[, and] [n]one of the issues in the suit [was] found to be frivolous.” “Communications published in due course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged and will not sustain an action for slander of title.” Mize v. Westbrook Constr. Co. of Oxford, LLC, 146 So. 3d 344, 349 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2014) (citing Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112, 117 (Miss. 1987)). “All citizens have the constitutional right to petition our courts to adjudicate honest disputes.” Id. at 350 (¶ 14). This Court affirms the circuit court’s holding that “[t]he events surrounding [the chancery court] suit may not be the basis for a slander of 12 JRE points to acts committed after February 2011; but those claims are pertinent to Yacht Club, not JRE. JRE also alleged that the defendants caused the placement of a large pile of rocks over JRE’s right of way in April 2009; but the incident was not argued on appeal. 21 title action.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting partial summary judgment regarding conspiracy. ¶57. Finally, JRE argues that the continuing tort doctrine tolled the statute of limitations on its claims because of the “continuing presence of the gate[s] and signs” that “impeded” development of the property. ¶58. This Court observes that [a] continuing tort is one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation. Humphries v. Pearlwood Apartments P’ship, 70 So. 3d 1133, 1135 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pierce v. Cook, 992 So. 2d 612, 619 (¶ 25) (Miss. 2008)). The circuit court noted correctly that “[t]he construction and continual existence of the Nicola Road gate does not constitute a continuing tort as explained in Humphries.” The Darwood Point gate was built once in 2007, not multiple times; and its continued existence after its placement does not qualify as a continuing tort. See Humphries, 70 So. 3d at 1136 (¶ 11) (“We find that the construction . . . was one event, not a repeated action.”) ¶59. The continuing tort doctrine does not apply here, because the alleged “harm reverberates from a single, one-time act or omission.” Stevens v. Lake, 615 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (Miss. 1993). Moreover, JRE did not seek damages stemming from construction of the 22 gate until December 2011 and had dismissed such claims in a lawsuit more than three years before. ¶60. Accordingly, regarding JRE, we find that the circuit court did not err by granting partial summary judgment.