Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: rebuttal evidence from virginia department of corrections

Text: At Burns' request prior to trial, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to a regional director of the Virginia Department of Corrections. The subpoena sought documents or records describing the daily inmate routine, general prison conditions, and security measures at the Red Onion Correctional Center and Wallens Ridge State Prison, . . . . and videotapes of those facilities. The Commonwealth moved to quash the subpoena, and after a hearing on that motion, the circuit court granted the motion. [14] During the penalty phase of his trial, Burns attempted to introduce evidence concerning the conditions at those prisons in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of Burns' future dangerousness. Burns' counsel reminded the court that subpoenas had been issued to the wardens of those two so-called super-max prisons, but since the court had indicated that it would grant a motion to quash those subpoenas, counsel had obtained newspaper articles from the Internet that discussed the security and life of a prisoner at those facilities. Burns' counsel proffered those articles as what the testimony would show. The court adhered to its prior decision and did not admit the testimony. Recognizing that this Court held in Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70, 515 S.E.2d 565, 574 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125, 120 S.Ct. 955, 145 L.Ed.2d 829 (2000), and Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873, 120 S.Ct. 177, 145 L.Ed.2d 149 (1999), that evidence regarding the conditions of prison life in a maximum security prison is not proper mitigating evidence, Burns offered this evidence, not in mitigation, but in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of Burns' future dangerousness. Burns argues that, since the only possible sentence for an accused convicted of capital murder is either the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, the prison society is the only society to which such a defendant can ever pose a continuing serious threat. Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C). Thus, according to Burns, evidence regarding the quality and structure of an inmate's life in a maximum security prison, as well as the prison's safety and security features, is relevant evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence that a defendant would commit criminal acts of violence in the future. Id. We do not agree. First, we have rejected the argument that a jury's determination, under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C), regarding whether a defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society is restricted to a consideration of only the prison society. Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 517, 537 S.E.2d 866, 879 (2000). Nevertheless, Burns contends that his proffered evidence should have been admitted to dispel the misconception that prison life includes such features as weekend furloughs, conjugal visits, and unrestricted work privileges. However, the Commonwealth offered no such evidence regarding the nature of prison life for a defendant convicted of capital murder or any other felony. Nor did the Commonwealth introduce evidence about the number of violent crimes committed in prison or the likelihood that a prisoner could escape. Instead, the Commonwealth's evidence concerning Burns' future dangerousness consisted of his prior criminal record and unadjudicated criminal acts. Thus, Burns' evidence was not in rebuttal to any evidence concerning prison life. Instead, Burns wanted to show, in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of his future dangerousness, that his opportunities to commit criminal acts of violence in the future would be severely limited in a maximum security prison. However, in Cherrix, we reiterated the principle that the United States Constitution does not limit the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.' Cherrix, 257 Va. at 309, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether Burns could commit criminal acts of violence in the future but whether he would. Indeed, Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C) use the phrase would commit criminal acts of violence. Accordingly, the focus must be on the particular facts of Burns' history and background, and the circumstances of his offense. In other words, a determination of future dangerousness revolves around an individual defendant and a specific crime. Evidence regarding the general nature of prison life in a maximum security facility is not relevant to that inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness such as that presented in this case. We also note that the cases relied upon by Burns with regard to this issue, specifically Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), and Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), are inapposite. In Gardner, the trial court imposed a sentence of death after reviewing the contents of a pre sentence report, part of which had not been disclosed to the defendant. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 353, 97 S.Ct. 1197. Skipper involved the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to introduce evidence showing his good behavior in jail while awaiting trial. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Court in Skipper noted that the relevancy of that evidence was underscored . . . by the prosecutor's closing argument, which urged the jury to return a sentence of death in part because petitioner could not be trusted to behave if he were simply returned to prison. Id. at 5, 106 S.Ct. 1669. Unlike the evidence proffered by Burns, the evidence in Skipper was peculiar to that defendant's history and background. Finally, Simmons required the giving of an instruction regarding life without parole when a defendant is parole ineligible and future dangerousness is at issue. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court's decision quashing the subpoena directed to the Department of Corrections and refusing to admit evidence about prison life in a maximum security prison in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence in this case of Burns' future dangerousness.