Opinion ID: 2361257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seven-Year Period

Text: For their first point, Foxcroft Woods and Riley contend that the seven-year period for a prescriptive easement did not begin to run until February 1995 because that is when they were first entitled to block the drive. We disagree. We first discuss our standard of review in chancery cases. This court reviews chancery cases de novo on the record but will not reverse a finding by the chancery court unless it is clearly erroneous. O'Fallon v. O'Fallon, 341 Ark. 138, 14 S.W.3d 506 (2000); Slaton v. Slaton, 336 Ark. 211, 983 S.W.2d 951 (1999). A finding is clearly erroneous, when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Slaton v. Slaton, supra ; RAD-Razorback Ltd. Partnership v. B.G. Coney Co., 289 Ark. 550, 713 S.W.2d 462 (1986). It is this court's duty to reverse if its own review of the record is in marked disagreement with the chancery court's findings. Dopp v. Sugarloaf Mining Co., 288 Ark. 18, 702 S.W.2d 393 (1986) (citing Rose v. Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 679 S.W.2d 180 (1984); Walt Bennett Ford v. Pulaski County Special School District, 274 Ark. 208, 624 S.W.2d 426 (1981)). Foxcroft Woods and Riley argue that the chancery court erred in concluding that the time period for the public's prescriptive easement began to run before the Little Rock Fire Marshal gave his permission in 1995 to block the Southern Drive. The chancery court found that the running of the prescriptive easement time period began in the mid-80s, when vehicular traffic began using the Southern Drive to avoid Cantrell Road. We note on this point that all parties stipulated to the following: From the mid-1980s, the southern drive remained open, and was used by the public for ingress and egress, between Foxcroft Road on the east, and the commercial and multi-family properties to the west, on a regular basis until unattached barricades were put up in August of 1997. The argument of Foxcroft Woods and Riley apparently is that they knew that a recorded easement existed for public service, emergency, and utility vehicles. Thus, they believed they could not block the Southern Drive in any respect until they learned that the City Fire Marshal had agreed that a blockade was permissible in February 1995. This being the case, they reason that they operated under a disability to in any way interfere with the drive until February 1995. Since they operated under this disability until that time, they contend that the seven-year period for a prescriptive easement could not begin to run before that date. This argument fails under scrutiny. Even accepting the fact that a recorded easement for public service and utility vehicles was not waived until February 1995, the recorded easement did not prevent Foxcroft Woods and Riley from taking steps to limit vehicular traffic to public service and utility vehicles before that time. They could have posted signs to that effect, written letters, or taken other comparable measures, as Foxglen Associates and Hart correctly argue in their brief. They could also have gone into court to protest the public's use of the drive. Instead, they did nothing for the approximately fifteen-year period during which time the public's right to use the Southern Drive ripened into a prescriptive easement. Foxcroft Woods and Hart cite this court to Barbee v. Carpenter, 223 Ark. 660, 267 S.W.2d 768 (1954), in support of their argument, but that case is readily distinguishable. In Barbee , the Carpenter family built a fence across a city street which had never been a through street but rather had served as a cul-de-sac driveway for the Carpenter family as well as for the Barbee family who lived across the street. The Carpenter family held fee title to the cul-de-sac. The Barbee family sued under a prescriptive easement theory to force the Carpenters to remove the barricade across what had been their mutual driveway. We pointed out in our opinion that until 1940, the Carpenters' predecessor in interest to the cul-de-sac land had held defective title to that portion of his land in that the metes and bounds description was inaccurate. Thus, he was not legally in a position to protest his neighbors' use of his driveway until 1940. In the instant case, however, Foxcroft Woods and Riley were under no disability to contest the public's use of the Southern Drive. Any disability they were operating under only pertained to public service and utility vehicles. We affirm the chancery court's ruling on this point.