Opinion ID: 610906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process and Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 Claims

Text: 13 James first argues that the district court's modified supplemental instruction during jury deliberations telling the jury that he could be convicted of aiding and abetting the bank robbery even if he did not know of the robbery until Mackey exited the bank denied him his right to due process and violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 30. He contends that the instruction amounted to a new theory of liability which he was not given the opportunity to address. His arguments are not persuasive. 14 James objected to the modified supplemental instruction arguing to Judge Sprizzo that it would be extremely prejudicial and highlight the issue very unfairly to tell the jury that you have to tell them something different now. He also argued that the court was not obligated to correct its supplemental instruction because there was no direct authority from this Court and that, if it did give a modified supplemental instruction, it should also give a new instruction on the different requirements for armed and simple bank robbery. However, James never argued to the district judge that giving the modified supplemental instruction violated Rule 30, that the instruction amounted to a new theory of liability or that he was denied the right to an effective summation. James was obligated to state 'distinctly the matter to which [he] object[ed] and the grounds of the objection.'  United States v. Tannenbaum, 934 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 30). Because James did not raise before the district court the arguments he now makes on appeal, our review is limited to a determination of whether the district court committed plain error. Id.; see also United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 227-28 (2d Cir.) (even if appellants state distinctly the matter to which they object and the grounds for their objection, this does not suffice to preserve an objection for appeal absent plain error, if the grounds stated at trial are different from those raised on appeal), cert. denied sub nom. Cruz v. United States, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990). 15 We have previously stated that [i]f a supplemental charge is legally correct, the district court enjoys broad discretion in determining how, and under what circumstances, that charge will be given. United States v. Civelli, 883 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966, 110 S.Ct. 409, 107 L.Ed.2d 374 (1989). The Fourth Circuit has cautioned, however, that the effect on the trial of a supplemental instruction must be examined carefully because a defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the district court's instructions in order to be assured a fair trial. United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2860, 115 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1991). After careful examination, we conclude that Judge Sprizzo did not commit plain error in giving a modified supplemental instruction to rectify the legally incorrect supplemental charge he had previously given. 16 The district court's supplemental instruction and its modified supplemental instruction were given in response to an inquiry by the jury. Neither the government nor the defense had requested a charge on this expanded theory of liability. As the judge stated to counsel, I got no request to charge on [this]. So I am doing something at the last minute that I could have done before deliberation, before the trial even started. When the government provided the district judge with authority from four different circuits that contradicted the supplemental jury instruction, the judge properly gave a modified supplemental instruction correcting his prior erroneous statement. See Horton, 921 F.2d at 546 ([T]he trial court has a duty '[w]hen a jury makes explicit its difficulties' to 'clear them away with concrete accuracy.' ) (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405-06, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946)). 17 Contrary to James' assertion, the modified supplemental instruction did not fundamentally change the government's theory of liability. James contends that the theory the government argued to the jury was that this was a straightforward case in which James was waiting outside the bank ready to act as the getaway driver. The government did seek to convince the jury that James was a knowing participant in the crime from the onset. To do so, however, the government argued in its summation that all the evidence, including the evidence of the escape phase, showed that James knowingly aided and abetted the robbery. The government focused both on what happened after Mackey exited the bank as well as on everything that had happened earlier. This case, therefore, is distinguishable from United States v. San Juan, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.1976), relied on by the defendant. 18 In San Juan, we reversed the conviction of the defendant because the district court's instruction left open the possibility that the defendant could be held liable on a different theory than the one on which both parties had tried and argued the case. 2 As we explained in United States v. Russo, 564 F.2d 2 (2d Cir.1977): In [San Juan ] the government repeatedly made clear its theory of the case and specifically rejected the alternative theory suggested for the first time in the court's charge to the jury. As a result, we ruled that the defendant's conviction was unfair in that she was led by the unequivocal representations of the government to forego certain defenses she might otherwise have asserted. Id. at 4 n. 2. Here, as in Russo, appellant's claim of prejudice is much less compelling. Id. The government never made representations that led James to forgo any defenses he might otherwise have asserted. We conclude, therefore, that James' due process rights were not plainly abridged by Judge Sprizzo's modified supplemental instruction. 19 James also contends that Rule 30 was violated because he was not given an opportunity to reargue the case to the jury after the judge gave the modified supplemental instruction. Rule 30 requires the district judge who is trying a case to inform counsel prior to summations of his rulings on requests to charge to afford the parties an opportunity to frame their closing remarks to accord with the court's subsequent legal instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 256 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1840, 123 L.Ed.2d 467 (1993). If the Rule is violated, reversal is required where the defendant can show that he was 'substantially misled in formulating his arguments' or otherwise prejudiced. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 532, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980)). 20 James never requested the opportunity to have additional argument. Nor did he argue to the district court that his closing argument would have been different had he known the modified instruction was to be given. Having failed to request additional argument and having thereby deprived Judge Sprizzo of the opportunity to correct any potential error, his argument on appeal that Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 was violated because he was never given the chance to reargue is without merit and certainly does not constitute plain error. 21 Furthermore, even if Rule 30 had been violated, James was not prejudiced by the modified supplemental instruction. There appears to be nothing material about James' testimony or defense that would have been presented differently had the defendant known the modified supplemental instruction would be given. See Horton, 921 F.2d at 548 (Though one can always argue longer and more fully, [appellant's] arguments were sufficiently developed in the initial closing.). 22