Opinion ID: 451642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: harassment or abuse?

Text: 50 Jeter argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Credit Bureau on her claim under Sec. 1692d. Section 1692d reads as follows: 51 A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: 52 (1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person. 53 (2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader. 54 (3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3) of this title. 55 (4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt. 56 (5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number. 57 (6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity. 58 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1692d. Subsections (1)-(6) do not proscribe Credit Bureau's conduct or the content of the two letters sent to Jeter. Focusing on subsection (2), Jeter claims that the letters involve [t]he use of ... language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the ... reader. 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1692d(2). However, it is clear that, when read in context, subsection (2) was meant to deter offensive language which is at least akin to profanity or obscenity. Such offensive language might encompass name-calling, racial or ethnic slurs, and other derogatory remarks which are similar in their offensiveness to obscene or profane remarks. This is in keeping with one of the purposes of the FDCPA [t]hat every individual, whether or not he owes the debt, has a right to be treated in a reasonable or civil manner. 123 Cong.Rec. 10241 (1977) (statement of Representative Annuzio, Chairperson of Subcommittee which sponsored the legislation). The language of Credit Bureau's letters is not remotely offensive. The letters contained no personal comments directed towards Jeter. Thus, subsection (2) does not encompass Jeter's claim. 59 However, Sec. 1692d is explicitly not limited to the conduct proscribed by subsections (1)-(6). This will enable the courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct which is not specifically addressed. S.Rep. No. 95-832, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1695, 1698. The district court decided, however, that it was inappropriate to characterize Credit Bureau's conduct as violative of Sec. 1692d: 60 The defendant in the present case merely threatened to institute legal action against the plaintiff. The sentence that the plaintiff objects to is the one that stated that the institution of such proceedings could possibly cause her embarrassment, inconvenience, and further expense. The Court feels that this language would not oppress or harass a reasonable consumer .... [T]he defendant in the case at bar merely pointed out to the plaintiff the potential problems she might face if a lawsuit was brought against her. These problems could possibly arise in the defense of any lawsuit. See generally, Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 1005 (N.D.Ga.1983) (letter containing general threat that debtor's credit rating would be adversely affected if he did not pay held not to violate the FDCPA). Therefore, the Court finds that a reasonable consumer would not have been harassed or oppressed by the defendant's letters and hence there was no violation of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692(D) [sic]. 61 We note that the district court applied a reasonable consumer standard to Jeter's claim under Sec. 1692d, a standard which we have rejected with respect to claims of misrepresentation and deception under Sec. 1692e. However, we cannot simply apply a least sophisticated consumer standard. Whether a consumer is more or less likely to be harassed, oppressed, or abused by certain debt collection practices does not relate solely to the consumer's relative sophistication; rather, such susceptibility might be affected by other circumstances of the consumer or by the relationship between the consumer and the debt collection agency. For example, a very intelligent and sophisticated consumer might well be susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse because he is poor (i.e., has limited access to the legal system), is on probation, or is otherwise at the mercy of a power relationship. Although the standard enunciated in Part II, supra, is not precisely applicable here, we believe that the consumer protective purposes of the FDCPA require us to adopt an analogous standard for violations of Sec. 1692d. Thus, we hold that claims under Sec. 1692d should be viewed from the perspective of a consumer whose circumstances makes him relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse. 62 That a lawsuit might cause a consumer embarrassment, inconvenience, and further expense is a true statement. Such consequences of a debt collection (or any other) lawsuit are so commonplace that even a consumer susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse would not have been harassed, oppressed, or abused by the statement in and of itself. A simple warning of embarrassment, inconvenience, and further expense does not create a tone ... of intimidation .... Rutyna v. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc., 478 F.Supp. 980, 982 (N.D.Ill.1979). Of course, Credit Bureau's statement was part and parcel of general representations which a reasonable jury could find to be violative of Secs. 1692e(5) and (10), i.e., potentially deceptive or false use of threats to recommend legal action. See supra Part III. Deception or falsehood alone, however, is wholly different from the conduct condemned in subsections (1) through (6) of Sec. 1692d. Thus, we believe that Congress did not contemplate the prohibition of deceptive conduct per se within the confines of Sec. 1692d. 63 Ordinarily, whether conduct harasses, oppresses, or abuses will be a question for the jury. Nevertheless, Congress has indicated its desire for the courts to structure the confines of Sec. 1692d. S.Rep. No. 95-832, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1695, 1698 (courts will proscribe other improper conduct which is not specifically addressed). The above discussion and a review of the case law, see, e.g., Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 591 (N.D.Ga.1982); Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F.Supp. 1218 (D.Ore.1981); In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1982), lead us to the conclusion that, even when judged by the consumer protective standard we adopt today, Sec. 1692d does not as a matter of law proscribe Credit Bureau's conduct in this case. 12 Thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Credit Bureau on this issue is affirmed.