Opinion ID: 11175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Civil Banking Regulations

Text: 59 Harvard finally argues that the district court abused its discretion in permitting evidence of and various references to civil banking regulations throughout his trial. We disagree. 60 We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860, 867 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 825, 133 L.Ed.2d 768 (1996). Evidence of civil banking regulations is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's motive or intent. See id. at 866-67 (citing United States v. Cordell, 912 F.2d 769, 774-76 (5th Cir.1990)). At Harvard's trial, evidence of banking regulations tended to prove that Harvard had a motive to make false entries in order to hide the nature of the sham loan to Schapiro. Evidence that Harvard's non-disclosure of the consulting fee was in violation of civil banking regulations went toward showing Harvard's knowledge of his duty to disclose the fee and his motivation to hide his receipt of the fee. 61 The district court frequently instructed the jury regarding the regulatory evidence and guided its consideration of such evidence during the testimony of each government witness and at the end of the trial. For example, at the end of the trial, the district court instructed the jury, in relevant part: 62 You are cautioned ... that you may not find the Defendant guilty of any crime solely because he may have violated such an administrative banking regulation or because he may have violated internal bank policies. However, you may, but are not required to consider evidence of violations of administrative banking regulations as you would any other evidence in determining whether the Defendant had the required intent to commit the crime charged in the indictment. 63 R19:2000-01. 64 It is clear that the district court was mindful of the potentially prejudicial nature of the regulation evidence and the possibility that it might be confused with violations of federal criminal law. It is also clear from the record that the district court took appropriate measures to ensure that the jury did not improperly use the evidence in determining Harvard's guilt or innocence. We conclude that the district court employed the necessary measures to prevent prejudice and confusion and, in doing so, neither abused its discretion nor prejudiced Harvard's case by permitting evidence of banking regulations for limited purposes.