Opinion ID: 2996399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Downward Departure Motion

Text: Relying upon United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997), Egwaoje filed a motion for downward departure at sentencing, arguing that his deportable alien status would result in an unusual or exceptional hardship in his conditions of confinement. The district court in a summary ruling stated that it “considered and denied” Egwaoje’s motion. On appeal, Egwaoje argues that we cannot tell from this ruling whether the district court recognized it had the authority to depart, but declined in its discretion to do so, or whether it thought it lacked the authority to depart at all. Egwaoje argues that we must vacate his sentence and remand to the district court for more specific findings on his motion. This court has often stated that “discretionary decisions not to depart are not reviewable.” United States v. ChavezChavez, 213 F.3d 420, 421 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). As Egwaoje’s motion points out, we stated in Farouil that in an appropriate case, a defendant may qualify for a departure based on his status as a deportable alien. 124 F.3d at 847. Such departures are reasonable because a deportable alien’s conditions of imprisonment may be more severe, see United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2001), and because an alien must face the harsh consequences of deportation, see United States v. Bautista, 258 F.3d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 2002). We presume that district court judges know and understand the law, and we will not disturb that presumption by mere inference. See United States v. Kezerle, 99 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, the district court’s ruling may have been brief, but it was clear. The court stated that it “considered” Egwaoje’s motion before denying it. We will take that language at face value to mean that the court recognized the FarouilGuzman-Bautista line of cases granting it authority to depart, but that in considering Egwaoje’s specific request, it declined to exercise its discretion to do so. Hence, we lack No. 02-2868 17 the jurisdiction to consider the exercise of this discretion on appeal.