Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sierra Club Is Entitled to Recover Attorney's Fees from DOT and Superferry Pursuant to the Private Attorney General Doctrine

Text: DOT and Superferry argue that the private attorney general doctrine has not been adopted by this court and the circuit court erred in granting an award of attorney's fees against them pursuant to this doctrine. We disagree.
We have previously stated that [n]ormally, pursuant to the `American Rule,' each party is responsible for paying his or her own litigation expenses. This general rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions: attorney's fees are chargeable against the opposing party when so authorized by statute, rule of court, agreement, stipulation, or precedent[.] Fought, 87 Hawai'i at 50-51, 951 P.2d at 500-01. Precedent from this court has recognized the exception provided by the private attorney general doctrine, which is an equitable rule that allows courts in their discretion to award [attorney's] fees to plaintiffs who have vindicated important public rights. Courts applying this doctrine consider three basic factors: (1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, [sic] (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Maui Tomorrow v. BLNR, 110 Hawai'i 234, 244, 131 P.3d 517, 527 (2006) (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole II), 96 Hawai'i 27, 29, 25 P.3d 802, 804 (2001)). Although the private attorney general doctrine has been acknowledged by this court, we previously did not find the doctrine applicable in either of the two cases where it was considered, which cases will now be discussed.
This court first considered the private attorney general doctrine in Waiahole II, where multiple public interest parties sought an attorney's fees award against private and government parties following the partial reversal of an agency decision. Waiahole II, 96 Hawai'i at 28-29, 25 P.3d at 803-04. This court cited arguments in favor of adopting the doctrine articulated by the California Supreme Court: Although there are within the executive branch of the government offices and institutions (exemplified by the Attorney General) whose function it is to represent the general public in such matters and to ensure proper enforcement, for various reasons the burden of enforcement is not always adequately carried by those offices and institutions, rendering some sort of private action imperative. Because the issues involved in such litigation are often extremely complex and their presentation time-consuming and costly, the availability of representation of such public interests by private attorneys acting pro bono publico is limited. Only through the appearance of public interest law firms funded by public and foundation monies ... has it been possible to secure representation on any large scale. Certain firms ..., however, are not funded to the extent necessary for the representation of all such deserving interests, and as a result many worthy causes of this nature are without adequate representation under present circumstances. One solution, so the argument goes, within the equitable powers of the judiciary to provide, is the award of substantial attorneys fees to those public-interest litigants and their attorneys (whether private attorneys acting pro bono or members of public interest law firms) who are successful in such cases, to the end that support may be provided for the representation of interests of similar character in future litigation. Id. at 30, 25 P.3d at 805 (brackets removed) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313-14 (1977)). Based on this rationale, this court stated that the purpose of the private attorney general doctrine is to promote vindication of important public rights. Id. (quoting Arnold v. Dep't of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 775 P.2d 521, 537 (1989)). [22] In discussing the three prongs of the doctrine in relation to the facts of Waiahole II, this court found that the first and third prongs of the doctrine were satisfied because Waiahole II involved constitutional rights of profound significance, and all of the citizens of the state, present and future, stood to benefit from the decision. Id. at 31, 25 P.3d at 806. Ultimately, however, this court found that the private attorney general doctrine did not apply to the facts in Waiahole II because the second prong of the test, the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, had not been met. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs in Waiahole II had represented one of many competing public and private interests in an adversarial proceeding before the governmental body designated by constitution and statute as the primary representative of the people with respect to water resources[.] Id. These plaintiffs were distinguished from plaintiffs in other cases where the private attorney general doctrine had been applied, observing that unlike other cases, in which the plaintiffs single-handedly challenged a previously established government law or policy, in this case, the Windward Parties challenged the decision of a tribunal in an adversarial proceeding not contesting any action or policy of the government. Id. at 32, 25 P.3d at 807. Accordingly, this court found that the facts of Waiahole II did not qualify for an award of attorney's fees under the conventional application of the private attorney general doctrine. Id.
The private attorney general doctrine was revisited by this court in Maui Tomorrow. In beginning our analysis of the Maui Tomorrow facts, we reviewed our discussion of the private attorney general doctrine in Waiahole II, and concluded that [w]e held that the doctrine did not apply under the facts of that case, but did not foreclose application of the doctrine in a future case.  Maui Tomorrow, 110 Hawai'i at 244, 131 P.3d at 527 (emphasis added). This court then applied the Waiahole II three-prong test and, as in Waiahole II, the facts did not satisfy the three prongs of the doctrine. Id. at 245, 131 P.3d 517, 131 P.3d at 528. Maui Tomorrow also focused on the second prong of the doctrine and found that unlike Waiahole II, the plaintiffs were challenging an established government policy. Id. (challenging BLNR's policy of leasing water rights without performing a required EA). The court was careful to note, however, that the policy was the result of an erroneous understanding between two state agencies, rather than actions by the State to abandon or actively oppose the plaintiffs' cause. Id.
DOT and Superferry argue that none of the private attorney general doctrine prongs are satisfied in this case. Sierra Club disagrees and argues that all three prongs of the doctrine have been satisfied. We agree with Sierra Club.
DOT and Superferry argue that no public policy was vindicated by Sierra Club's litigation because the policy underlying HRS chapter 343 was never at risk. Rather, DOT and Superferry claim that the litigation was based on an erroneous determination of DOT in applying the policy of HRS chapter 343. Sierra Club disagrees and notes that this litigation is responsible for establishing the principle of procedural standing in environmental law in Hawai'i and clarifying the importance of addressing the secondary impacts of a project in the environmental review process pursuant to HRS chapter 343. We agree with Sierra Club.
As to the second prong, DOT and Superferry argue that this litigation was not necessary to enforce DOT's duties under HRS chapter 343, and the burden on Sierra Club for bringing the action was relatively minor. They argue that (1) there were three separate organizations to share the expenses of attorney's fees and costs, (2) litigation is one of the purposes of Sierra Club, and (3) Sierra Club has received fee discounts from its attorney. Sierra Club argues that it was necessary for it to bring this action to enforce DOT's duties to the public under the Hawai'i Constitution, statutes, and the public trust doctrine. We agree with Sierra Club. Unlike Waiahole II, the plaintiffs in this case were comprised of two non-profit organizations and an unincorporated association. See Waiahole II, 96 Hawai'i at 32, 25 P.3d at 807. These groups were solely responsible for challenging DOT's erroneous application of its responsibilities under HRS chapter 343. As this court stated in Sierra Club I, [s]tated simply, the record in this case shows that DOT did not consider whether its facilitation of the Hawaii Superferry Project will probably have minimal or no significant impacts, both primary and secondary, on the environment. Therefore, based on this record, we can only conclude that DOT's determination that the improvements to Kahului Harbor are exempt from the requirements of HEPA was erroneous as a matter of law. The exemption being invalid, the EA requirement of HRS ง 343-5 is applicable. Sierra Club I, 115 Hawai'i at 342, 167 P.3d at 335. In contravention of its responsibilities under the laws of this state, DOT exempted the Superferry project from the requirements of HRS chapter 343 without considering its secondary impacts on the environment. The action brought by Sierra Club clarified DOT's responsibilities under HRS chapter 343 by challenging DOT's erroneous interpretation of those duties. This case is similarly distinguishable from Maui Tomorrow, where the challenged government policy resulted from an erroneous understanding that another state agency was to perform the duty at issue. Maui Tomorrow, 110 Hawai'i at 245, 131 P.3d at 528. In Maui Tomorrow, the duty had not been abandoned, rather it had been recognized with an assumption that it would be addressed by another agency. Id. In this case, DOT simply did not recognize its duty to consider both the primary and secondary impacts of the Superferry project on the environment. DOT was not under the erroneous understanding that another agency was considering those impacts, as in Maui Tomorrow; rather, in this case DOT wholly abandoned that duty by issuing an erroneous exemption to Superferry.
DOT and Superferry argue that Sierra Club's theory of benefit is based on the Hawaii Supreme Court decision that was supplanted by Act 2. Sierra Club argues, however, that this court's opinion in Sierra Club I provided a public benefit, because it is generally applicable law that established procedural standing in environmental law and clarified the need to address secondary impacts in environmental review pursuant to HRS chapter 343 and will benefit large numbers of people over long periods of time. Sierra Club also cites to this court's opinion in Sierra Club I, 115 Hawai'i at 343, 167 P.3d at 336, which stated: `All parties involved and society as a whole' would have benefitted had the public been allowed to participate in the review process of the Superferry project, as was envisioned by the legislature when it enacted the Hawai'i Environmental Policy Act. (Emphasis removed.) We agree with Sierra Club, and further note that with our holding today that Act 2 is unconstitutional, DOT and Superferry's reliance on Act 2 is without merit. In sum, the facts of this case satisfy all three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine. Sierra Club having met the requirements for entitlement to the benefits of the private attorney general doctrine, we adopt the doctrine. Application of the private attorney general doctrine is, however, subject to the defenses which a defendant may have, so we now turn to the respective defenses asserted by Superferry and DOT to its application.
DOT and Superferry argue that HRS ง 607-25 provides the exclusive means of seeking an award of attorney's fees and costs for litigation involving violations of HRS chapter 343. As such, they argue that HRS ง 607-25 prevents an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine in this case. Id. We disagree. DOT further argues that the legislature chose to award attorney's fees and costs for violations of HRS chapter 343 exclusively against private parties when it enacted HRS ง 607-25. As such, DOT argues that such an award cannot be imposed against it, as a public party, pursuant to HRS ง 607-25. Finally, DOT argues that sovereign immunity prevents an award of attorney's fees against it pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine. Superferry agrees with DOT that HRS ง 607-25 authorizes an award of attorney's fees and costs against private parties for violations of HRS chapter 343; however, it argues that HRS ง 607-25 is not applicable to Superferry's actions in this case. In contrast, Sierra Club argues that: (1) HRS ง 607-25 is not the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees and costs for violations of HRS chapter 343, and (2) nonetheless, an award of attorney's fees and costs against Superferry pursuant to HRS ง 607-25 is appropriate in this case. We conclude that: (1) HRS ง 607-25 is not the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees and costs for violations of HRS chapter 343; (2) HRS ง 607-25 does not prevent an award of attorney's fees against Superferry pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine; and (3) sovereign immunity does not prevent an award of attorney's fees against DOT pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine in this case.
In broad terms, the focus of HRS ง 607-25 is civil suits that seek to enjoin parties that have been or are undertaking any development without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law from government agencies[.] HRS ง 607-25(e). [23] DOT argues that through HRS ง 607-25 the legislature authorized attorney's fees in certain circumstances for non-compliance with chapter 343, but only in litigation between private parties. DOT suggests that the plain language of the statute indicates an intention to limit any award of attorney's fees and costs for a violation of HRS chapter 343 to the circumstances defined by HRS ง 607-25. We disagree with this interpretation. HRS chapter 343 provides a system of environmental review, HRS ง 343-1, that applies to nine different categories of actions that may be undertaken by public or private parties. See HRS ง 343-5(a) (1993 & Supp. 2007). [24] Actions that fall within any of these categories require, at a minimum, an environmental assessment and may require additional stages of environmental review, as provided by HRS ง 343-5. See HRS ง 343-5. Five of the nine categories of actions defined by HRS ง 343-5(a) consider the use or any use of specific types of lands. See HRS ง 343-5(a)(1)-(5). By contrast, HRS ง 607-25 limits its scope to the acts of a private party who has been or is undertaking any development [ [25] ] without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law from government agencies[.] HRS ง 607-25(e) (emphasis added). By focusing specifically on development rather than the more general use of lands, the text of HRS ง 607-25 addresses only a subset of the actions that may lead to a violation of HRS ง 343-5. Nothing in the text of HRS ง 607-25 indicates that, despite its narrower focus, HRS ง 607-25 should provide the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees and costs against a party for a violation of HRS chapter 343. Without such explicit language, we cannot conclude that HRS ง 607-25 provides the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees and costs for a violation of HRS chapter 343.
Superferry further contends that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs to Sierra Club against Superferry based on HRS ง 607-25. Specifically, Superferry argues that an award for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to HRS ง 607-25 was improper, because: (1) Sierra Club was not the prevailing party; (2) Superferry was not a private party who has been or is undertaking any development without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law from government agencies; and (3) Superferry falls within the safe harbor provision of HRS ง 607-25 because it relied in good faith on DOT's HRS chapter 343 exemption determination. First, as discussed previously, we conclude that Sierra Club was the prevailing party in this case. See supra Part IV.B. Second, we agree with Superferry that it was not undertaking any development without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law from government agencies during the period of litigation for which the circuit court awarded attorney's fees and costs against Superferry based on HRS ง 607-25. HRS ง 607-25(e) (emphasis added). As we agree with Superferry on its second point, we need not address Superferry's third point on this issue. The circuit court's March 27, 2008 order granting attorney's fees and costs to Sierra Club did not provide underlying findings or conclusions regarding the basis of the award for attorney's fees and costs, but simply stated The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Reimbursement of Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs [Filed on January 15, 2008], in part, based upon HRS ง 607-25 and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, and awards Plaintiffs, with the exceptions noted on the record, attorney's fees, at the hourly rate of $200 per hour, and costs, both commencing as of August 24, 2007. The total amount of attorney's fees hereby awarded is $86,270.28. The total amount of costs hereby awarded is $5,442.44. The total amount of attorney's fees and costs hereby awarded is $91,712.72. Defendants [Superferry] and [DOT] shall pay this total amount of attorney's fees and costs to [Sierra Club]. (Emphasis added.) However, on February 13, 2008, prior to issuing its order, the circuit court heard arguments from all parties on Sierra Club's motion for reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees and costs before stating: Having considered the entire record of these proceedings, the legislative and executive action that followed the appellate court opinion, and the order issued by this Court, the Court deems it appropriate to conclude that the plaintiffs should be awarded their attorney's fees and costs, both under 607-25[sic], and under the Private Attorney General doctrine. So the Court, at this time, will award fees and costs in favor of plaintiffs against defendants. Based on the record I have before me and in light of the, at least at this point, what is a record of an agency exemption determination and the earlier order of this Court, the fees and costs that this Court is going to award would be those that begin on August 24th, 2007.... So it will begin with that date. I'm not going to award fees and costs during the appellate proceedings. I will not award fees and costs for matters that occurred prior to the appellate court proceedings, at least based on the record that I have before me today. Noting that theโthere was an agency determination, as well as this Court's order granting the defendant's [sic] motion. So, fees and costs will be awarded from that date, August 24th, 2007, at an hourly rate of $200.00 per hour. There may be a variety of ways of looking at the hourly rate, in the Court's view this is a very unique situation. Schefke [sic] would appear to apply. I do realize that the plaintiffs argue that, and I am satisfied that all of those factors are met here and that the plaintiffs argue that the appropriate amount should be $300.00 per hour, but this Court concludes it should be $200.00 per hour. Superferry argues that the award against it pursuant to HRS ง 607-25 was improper because Superferry was not a private party who has been or is undertaking any development without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law from government agencies[.] HRS ง 607-25(e). Superferry argues that it was not undertaking any development that required Superferry, rather than DOT, to obtain permits or approvals to comply with HRS chapter 343. Superferry further contends that even if it had been involved in development, as contemplated by HRS ง 607-25, those activities took place prior to this court's August 23, 2007 order. Superferry argues that if the circuit court determined, for the purposes of HRS ง 607-25, that Superferry lacked approvals required under HRS chapter 343 based on this court's August 23, 2007 order, then Superferry's development activities should have occurred after August 23, 2007 as well. Superferry argues that using developments that were already constructed, as it did after August 23, 2007, does not fit the definition of development as provided by HRS ง 607-25. We agree with Superferry. Although the circuit court had discretion pursuant to HRS ง 607-25(e)(1) to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party, that award had to be made in a civil action brought by a private party against another private party that had been or was undertaking ... development without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law[.] HRS ง 607-25(e). Based on the record in this case, there is no support for the circuit court's conclusion that on or after August 24, 2007 Superferry qualified under HRS ง 607-25(e) as a private party that was undertaking ... development without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law[.] Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in awarding Sierra Club attorney's fees and costs against Superferry based on HRS ง 607-25. As established in the prior sections herein, however, we have concluded that: (1) HRS ง 607-25 is not the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees and costs for litigation involving violations of HRS chapter 343; and (2) the facts of this case satisfy each of the three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine. See supra Parts IV.C.3.a.; IV.C.2. Moreover, we see no reason not to apply the private attorney general doctrine to a private defendant. As stated by the Court of Appeals of Arizona in Arizona Center For Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 837 P.2d 158 (Ct.App.1991): We award these fees not only against the public entities among the appellees but also against the private appellees. Contrary to their argument, we do not find that the exclusive purpose of the private attorney general doctrine is to impose the cost of vindicating public rights on the public itself. Awarding [attorney's] fees against private defendants in appropriate cases will promote important public rights to the same extent as awarding fees against governmental defendants. Moreover, we find no unfairness in requiring the intervenor-appellees to share with the state the burden of appellants' partial victory in this case. The intervenor-appellees came to the state's aid to promote interests of their own that were more specific and substantial than those of members of the general public. And as the record makes quite plain, their participation added significantly to the legal effort required to prosecute appellants' claims. Id. at 173. Similarly, in this case Superferry worked hand-in-hand with DOT throughout the planning and implementation of the Superferry project and throughout this litigation, in promoting its own private business interests. Under these facts, we see no unfairness in requiring Superferry, jointly with DOT, to pay Sierra Club's attorney's fees awarded by the circuit court. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in relying on the private attorney general doctrine as a basis for its award of attorney's fees against Superferry.
DOT argues that sovereign immunity prevents the application of the private attorney general doctrine against the State. We disagree. The doctrine of sovereign immunity refers to the general rule, incorporated in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, that a state cannot be sued in federal court without its consent or an express waiver of its immunity. U.S. Const, amend. XI. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it has developed in Hawai'i, also precludes such suits in state courts. State ex rel. Anzai v. Honolulu, 99 Hawai'i 508, 515, 57 P.3d 433, 440 (2002) (footnote omitted) (citing Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 606-07, 837 P.2d 1247, 1264-65 (1992); W.H. Greenwell, Ltd. v. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 50 Haw. 207, 208, 436 P.2d 527, 528 (1968)). We have recognized the clear distinction between the effect of sovereign immunity on actions seeking prospective relief and those seeking retrospective relief, stating: [i]n previous cases, we have held that the sovereign State is immune from suit for money damages, except where there has been a `clear relinquishment' of immunity and the State has consented to be sued. [ Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578,] 607, 837 P.2d [1247,] 1265 [(1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 1277, 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993)] (citing Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 68 Haw. 192, 198, 708 P.2d 129, 134 (1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 977 (1986)). This exception to sovereign immunity can be traced to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Accordingly, we have adopted the rule in Young, which: makes an important distinction between prospective and retrospective relief. If the relief sought against a state official is prospective in nature, then the relief may be allowed regardless of the state's sovereign immunity. This is true even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury. However, relief that is tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation of ... law, even though styled as something else, is barred by sovereign immunity. Pele, 73 Haw. at 609-10, 837 P.2d at 1266 (footnotes and citations omitted). Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai'i 474, 481, 918 P.2d 1130, 1137 (1996) (holding that sovereign immunity did not bar an action seeking prospective relief for ongoing violations of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act by existing and future third party agreements). We have also previously stated that an award of costs and fees to a prevailing party is inherently in the nature of a damage award. Fought, 87 Hawai'i 37, 51, 951 P.2d 487, 501. Accordingly, to properly award attorney's fees and costs against DOT in this case, there must be a clear relinquishment of the State's immunity in this case. Bush, 81 Hawai'i at 481, 918 P.2d at 1137.
Under HRS ง 661-1, [26] sovereign immunity is waived in all claims against the State founded upon any statute. HRS ง 661-1(1). In this case, the legislature has waived the State's sovereign immunity for the action underlying this case, through HRS ง 343-7. At the time Sierra Club filed its complaint, HRS section 343-7 provided: (a) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days of the agency's decision to carry out or approve the action, or, if a proposed action is undertaken without a formal determination by the agency that a statement is or is not required, a judicial proceeding shall be instituted within one hundred twenty days after the proposed action is started. The council or office, any agency responsible for approval of the action, or the applicant shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purposes of bringing judicial action under this subsection. Others, by court action, may be adjudged aggrieved. (b) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the determination that a statement is required for a proposed action, shall be initiated within sixty days after the public has been informed of such determination pursuant to section 343-3. Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the determination that a statement is not required for a proposed action, shall be initiated within thirty days after the public has been informed of such determination pursuant to section 343-3. The council or the applicant shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purposes of bringing judicial action under this subsection. Others, by court action, may be adjudged aggrieved. (c) Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the acceptance of an environmental impact statement required under section 343-5, shall be initiated within sixty days after the public has been informed pursuant to section 343-3 of the acceptance of such statement. The council shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purpose of bringing judicial action under this subsection. Affected agencies and persons who provided written comment to such statement during the designated review period shall be adjudged aggrieved parties for the purpose of bringing judicial action under this subsection; provided that the contestable issues shall be limited to issues identified and discussed in the written comment. HRS ง 343-7 (1993) (emphases added). [27] As this court noted in Sierra Club I, [HRS chapter 343] provides for judicial review at various stages of the process: (1) when no EA is prepared, (2) [when] an agency determines that an EIS will or will not be required, and (3) when an EIS is accepted. 115 Hawai'i at 308, 167 P.3d at 301 (citing HRS ง 343-7(a)-(c)). This court has stated that it is well-settled that statutory construction dictates that an interpreting court should not fashion a construction of statutory text that ... creates an absurd or unjust result. Nihi Lewa, Inc. v. Dep't of Budget & Fiscal Servs., 103 Hawai'i 163, 168, 80 P.3d 984, 989 (2003) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Dines v. Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd., 78 Hawai'i 325, 337, 893 P.2d 176, 188 (1995)). Although the text of HRS ง 343-7 does not explicitly state that suits may be brought against the State, interpreting the text of subsections (a), (b), and (c) as something other than a waiver of sovereign immunity would create an absurd result. HRS ง 343-7 specifies when judicial actions may be initiated to challenge: (1)  the lack of assessment required under section 343-5,  HRS ง 343-7(a) (emphasis added); (2) the determination that a statement is required for a proposed action, HRS ง 343-7(b); or (3) the acceptance of an environmental impact statement required under section 343-5, HRS ง 343-7(c). Under HRS chapter 343, actions initiated by both agencies and applicants require the preparation of environmental assessments. See HRS ง 343-5(b), (c). [28] More significantly, only a state agency can prepare and determine whether a statement is required for a proposed action. See HRS ง 343-5(b), (c). Similarly, the final acceptance of an environmental impact statement rests with the governor, a mayor, or an approving agency. See HRS ง 343-5(b), (c). [29] Through HRS ง 343-7, the legislature authorized judicial review of actions that can only be carried out by state agencies or political subdivisions of the State. See HRS ง 343-7. HRS ง 343-7 also provides that these lawsuits may be brought by parties, other than the agency or the applicant, who may be adjudged aggrieved. HRS ง 343-7(b), (c). This court stated in Sierra Club I that we have interpreted the adjudged aspect of this phrase to mean no more than that a party must show in a court action brought under ง 343-7(a) that they are aggrieved and must be adjudged aggrieved, in concert with a challenge to the lack of an EA statement. [ Sierra Club v.] Hawai`i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i [242,] 262, 59 P.3d [877,] 897 [(2002)] (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). No special finding is requiredโbut a plaintiff must bear the burden of establishing standing as they would in any other matter. See also Kepo'o v. Kane, 106 Hawai'i 270, 285, 103 P.3d 939, 954 (2005). 115 Hawai'i at 328 n. 40, 167 P.3d at 321 n. 40 (emphasis in original). As stated previously, this court found in Sierra Club I that Sierra Club had established procedural standing in this case. Id. at 333, 167 P.3d at 326. Accordingly, HRS ง 343-7 waived the state's sovereign immunity against actions brought to challenge: (1) the lack of an EA, (2) the determination that an EIS is or is not required, and (3) the acceptance of an EIS.
Despite the waiver of the State's sovereign immunity by HRS ง 343-7, DOT contends that the legislature has nowhere waived the State's sovereign immunity for attorney's fees resulting from HRS chapter 343 litigation. As such, DOT argues that attorney's fees cannot be awarded against the State in this case. Id. We disagree. We addressed a similar question in Fought and determined that the State would be not be treated differently from private parties when awarding attorney's fees against the non-prevailing party in actions of assumpsit. Fought, 87 Hawai'i at 54-55, 951 P.2d at 504-05. In Fought, this court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not prevent an award of attorney's fees against DOT under HRS ง 607-14, which authorized attorney's fees awards `in all actions in the nature of assumpsit and in all actions on a promissory note or other contract in writing' and does not limit an award of [attorney's] fees to non-governmental parties. 87 Hawai'i at 54, 951 P.2d at 504 (quoting Hawaiian Isles Enters. v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 487, 493, 879 P.2d 1070, 1076 (1994)). This court reconfirmed in Fought the broad interpretation of HRS ง 607-14 that allowed an award of attorney's fees against the State where a statute did not specifically address governmental parties. The analysis in Fought further addressed and distinguished the proposition that an award of [attorney's] fees ... is precluded by the principle that statutes of general applicability do not bind the state unless their plain language expressly so indicates[,] id. at 55, 951 P.2d at 505, as was announced in A.C. Chock, Ltd. v. Kaneshiro, 51 Haw. 87, 451 P.2d 809 (1969): Thus, in Chock, there was no clear waiver of the state's sovereign immunity from suit. Were the same true here, the imposition of costs and [attorney's] fees against the DOT would obviously be prohibited. However, in contrast to the statute at issue in Chock, HRS ง 661-1(1) expressly waives the state's immunity from suit upon any contract, expressed or implied[.] When the state has consented to be sued, its liability is to be judged under the same principles as those governing the liability of private parties.... HRS ง 607-14 does not create a novel claim for relief, but merely establishes the circumstances under which the prevailing party in any action in the nature of assumpsit or on some other contract may recover the expenses of litigation as an additional element of the prevailing party's damages. Accordingly, a further waiver of sovereign immunity is not necessary in order for HRS ง 607-14 to apply to the state and its respective agencies in matters in which, by virtue of the express waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in HRS ง 661-1, the state (or any of its agencies) has become a party. Fought, 87 Hawai'i at 56, 951 P.2d at 506 (emphasis in original). The distinction identified in Fought is relevant in this case. When the [S]tate has consented to be sued, its liability is to be judged under the same principles as those governing the liability of private parties. Id. In this case, as discussed previously, there has been a clear waiver of the State's sovereign immunity from suit through HRS ง 661-1(1) and HRS ง 343-7. See Part IV. C.3.c.i. As such, DOT will be judged under the same principles as those governing the liability of Superferry for attorney's fees resulting from a violation of HRS chapter 343. As the facts of this case satisfy all three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine, DOT and Superferry are jointly liable for the attorney's fees award granted to Sierra Club pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine. [30] Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in relying on the private attorney general doctrine as a basis for its award of attorney's fees against DOT and Superferry jointly.
Superferry contends that the circuit court erred in awarding Sierra Club attorney's fees at the rate of $200 per hour, and awarding costs in the amount of $5,442.44. On the other hand, Sierra Club contends that the circuit court erred by (1) not awarding attorney's fees and costs for the period of litigation prior to the initial appeal to this court; (2) not considering or giving weight to documents presented by Sierra Club on the issue of whether DOT and Superferry relied in good faith as required by HRS ง 607-25(e)(3); and (3) not awarding attorney's fees at the rate of $300 per hour. We resolve these issues as follows. 1. The circuit court's award of attorney's fees and costs is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Sierra Club attorney's fees at counsel's regular rate of $200 per hour. The fact that counsel provided Sierra Club, as a non-profit or unincorporated environmental organization[], with a discounted hourly rate of $190 and gave additional discounts over the course of the litigation did not make the court's award unreasonable, particularly when counsel was seeking an enhanced fee of $300 per hour based upon the test for enhancement of fees established in Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai'i 408, 452-54, 32 P.3d 52, 96-98 (2001) (providing that to enhance the lodestar amount trial courts must determine: (1) whether an attorney has taken a case on a contingent basis, ... (2) whether the attorney has been able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way, ... and (3) whether other factors besides the risk of nonpayment also justify enhancement. (Internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets removed.)). 2. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs of $5,442.44 against DOT and Superferry jointly. As the prevailing party, Sierra Club was entitled to an award of all costs pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(d)(1) [31] and HRS ง 607-24. [32] However, as Sierra Club does not oppose the exclusion of $910.35 in costs that Superferry challenges as costs related to the operation of a law practice, we reduce the amount of costs awarded from $5,442.44 to $4,532.09. 3. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (a) not awarding Sierra Club attorney's fees and costs for the period of litigation prior to the initial appeal to this court; (b) not considering or giving weight to documents presented by Sierra Club on the issue of whether DOT and Superferry relied in good faith as required by HRS ง 607-25(e)(3), and (c) not awarding attorney's fees to Sierra Club at the rate of $300 per hour.