Opinion ID: 3011995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: grace’s w-2 program

Text: We turn now to Geac’s third claim -- Grace’s use of Copy and Call commands to Geac’s W-2 program. Grace contends that the Call and Copy commands are used to access customer’s data, that such data belongs to the customer, and is not protectable. It asserts the Copy command does not modify the code and that industry practice uses the commands to interoperate two systems;10 the Copy command does not insert text from one program into another; their program remains separate in memory. Grace admitted that the installation, testing, compiling and link editing of its W-2 programs required copying Geac’s software and link editing the Geac code. Geac therefore _________________________________________________________________ 10. Defendant Grace asserts in Geac’s brief filed at trial dated April 19, 2000, it conceded that whether the call and copy commands infringe is an issue to be decided by the jury. We can find no such concession in the record to which it refers. 24 argues that these trial admissions compel the conclusion that, as a matter of Law, Grace’s W-2 programs are infringing because they contain copies of Geac’s copyright code and are derivative works of Millennium. We agree. Citing to Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 589, 564 (9th Cir. 1979), Geac further asserts that the Copyright Act does not allow an infringer to avoid liability by distributing instructions which result in copying. The Act gives a copyright owner the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C.S 106. The Act also defines a derivative work asa work based upon one or more pre-existing works [including] any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted. 17 U.S.C. S 101. Furthermore, the DBS License Agreement prohibits anyone from modifying the Millennium software code without Geac’s authorization. The M&D License Agreement permits a third party consultant, in certain instances, to modify the Geac code, but only if it satisfies the agreement’s non-disclosure and work-for-hire requirements for accessing the Geac code. Grace did not meet the License Agreements and non-disclosure requirements. Thus, Geac posits that this results in literal copy and modification of Geac’s W-2 program that constitutes a derivative work of the copied and called programs and code. We turn to Grace’s defense that its CNR W-2 program and the DBS Millennium W-2 programs are not similar and Grace, therefore, does not infringe on Geac’s copyright. Grace makes much of the government form that both generate for their customers and that this is a government form unprotected under copyright law. Of course, it is unprotected, and is not an issue. However, there is no claim that the other material in the PAYTXABR package is not copyrighted property. Grace also leans on Dr. Dewar’s testimony to support its argument that the two programs are dissimilar. Dr. Dewar found similarities in the two programs at the upper level but found them different at the lower levels.11 No further explanation is offered by Dr. Dewar as to what are the _________________________________________________________________ 11. For descriptions of upper and lower levels, see p.6, n.2, supra. 25 differences, except for a vague reference to Grace’s extraction program. The source code which speaks in human language, and is critical, is at the upper level. This infringement may not be justified on the ground that not all elements of the system were copied or that there were some dissimilarities. Grace may have rearranged some of the words in the plagiarizing program or altered or replaced one or more components in its program, but these efforts to distinguish its program from Geac’s system does not erase the literal copying of Geac’s source code; it does not surmount Reynolds’ acknowledgment that I could not have written the W-2 program without making either copies or calls to Dun & Bradstreet copy members or source code. We had occasion in one of our early cases dealing with substantial similarity wherein the defendant’s premise was that one cannot prove substantial similarity without comparing the entirety or a greater part of the work. We concluded that not in every area of copyright infringement is there a general requirement that most of each of two works be compared before a court can conclude that they are substantially similar. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1245. The source code and the object code are the literal elements of a computer program and are protected by copyright law. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1993); Cognotec Services v. Morgan Guar. of New York, 862 F. Supp. 45, (S.D. N.Y. 1994). Dr. Dewar conceded that Grace made copies of Geac’s code by its Call commands to Geac’s software when Grace compiled it W-2 program. He testified that so long as Geac’s licenses used Grace’s program, the coping through the Copy and Call commands is non-infringing because the licensee had authority to access. This is sophistry with which we do not agree. Authority to the licensee to access both programs does not give Grace the right to copy and call Geac’s copyrighted property for its own commercial and competitive purposes. As we have already explained, this infringement cannot be excused by purported industry practice. Having copied the critical source code, it is no defense to infringement that more of the system was not 26 copied or that the plagiarist’s system may have some dissimilarities from the original system. Turning to its last defense, Grace relies on Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) and Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997). This defense to the use of the Copy and Call command in Grace’s W-2 program is predicated on the doctrine of externalities, often referred to in a noncomputer literary setting as scenes a faire. The Court of Appeals explained in Gates Rubber Co. that under this doctrine, copyright protection is deniedto those expressions that are standard, stock, or common to a particular topic or that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d at 838. As related to computer programs, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Altai recognized that in many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform particular functions in a specific computing environment without employing standard techniques. 982 F.2d at 709 (quoting 3 Nimmer S 13.03[F][3], at 13-65). That is because a programer’s freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry. Id. at 709-10; see also Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375. Thus, for these reasons certain content of the allegedly infringed program that might have been dictated by external factors may not be subject to copyright protection. Altai, 982 F.2d at 710; Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838. The Court in Mitel agreed, stating that thetraditional copyright doctrine [of scenes a faire has been extended] to exclude from protection against infringement those elements of a work that necessarily results from external factors inherent in the subject matter of the work. Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375. The rationale is rather straightforward: Because those external factors dictated the creation of the 27 allegedly infringed work, it is lacking the originality that is the sine qua non for copyright protection. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838 (citing Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). Both Altai and Mitel clearly held that in determining aspects of the program not entitled to protection because of external factors, we examine the program from the viewpoint of the creator. Altai, 982 F.2d at 714; Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375. The Mitel court pointedly noted that the focus is on the factual circumstances and the external factors surrounding the author of the infringed program. Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375; see also Control Data Sys., Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (D. Minn. 1995) (The question to be examined is whether external factors limited the choices available to the [allegedly infringed] programmers, not whether external factors may somehow limit the choices of [the alleged infringing work’s] programmers.). Dr. Dewar made it clear that he was advancing his own theory, explaining: So my understanding of the process of determining for myself whether I consider something infringement, is that if something is dictated by the requirement of intraoperability, then that is an external factor that is not protectable. Explaining further, he testified: [I]n modern computing, the notion of intraoperability is fundamental. And the idea of writing programs which are designed to work with licensed copies of other programs, a fundamental part of computing, one of which everyone has a PC, . . . taking advantage of. And consequently it is exactly expected to, according to industry standard and practice relating to intraoperability, you will find two programs to design, to work and to interoperate, and in the same manner will have the same calls. Dewar’s testimony regarding external factors, including interoperability, is wholly misplaced. As Dewar admitted on cross-examination, he focused on externality from the viewpoint of Grace’s W-2 program, not Geac’s. He looked at externalities from the eyes of the plagiarist, not the eyes of 28 the program’s creator. As explained, in determining whether certain aspects of an allegedly infringed software are not protected by copyright law, the focus is on external factors that influenced the choice of the creator of the infringed product. Altai, 982 F.2d at 714; Mitel , 124 F.3d at 1375. What is telling is that Grace makes no effort to explain this fundamental error on the part of Dewar except to urge that external factors and interoperability are important concepts in proving that no infringement occurred. Furthermore, Dewar here simply offered no testimony regarding what parts of Geac’s program were dictated by external factors and therefore not protected. He therefore concluded: My opinion, there’s no infringement. His explanation ignores completely that Geac’s Millennium program was designed and developed not for the purpose of working with personal computers but solely for business customers’ specific human resource problems. Under his theory, the Copyright Act is superfluous and the License Agreements become a bundle of straw. Dewar’s explanation of the need to interoperate two programs, and industry practice and custom, do not justify unauthorized accessing and copying Geac’s copyrighted code. The Court in Mitel specifically rejected the analysis of the district court in that case which focused on whether external factors such as market forces and efficiency considerations justified the copying. Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that achieving total computability with independently developed application program . . . is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged). We also reject the doctrine of externalities, including interoperability, as justification for using the Copy and Call commands to access Geac’s copyrighted software in violation of the License Agreements and the Copyright Code.