Opinion ID: 2998862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disbursement to Mr. Byrne

Text: Turning to subject matter jurisdiction, we begin by discussing the district court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Byrne’s claim. As an intervenor, Mr. Byrne bore the burden to establish the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. See TIG Ins. Co. v. Reliable Research Co., 334 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, he offered no basis for subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court did not ask for any. On appeal, he explained that he was entitled to payments for property taxes he had previously paid, as well as for “use and occupancy” of the property-- both because Mr. Anglezis’ mother continued to live on the property and because Mr. Anglezis unnecessarily drew out the litigation. On limited remand, after the district court asked him what the substantive and jurisdictional bases for his claim were, Mr. Byrne asserted that he intervened under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) and that his intervention was proper because his “interest in this litigation does not affect the original diversity of the parties herein, since his interest comes into being through the enforcement of prior orders of this Court.” Unfortunately for Mr. Byrne, however, his assertions simply fail to establish federal jurisdiction. Because Mr. Byrne is a non-diverse party and intervened as a plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) in a case in which the only basis for jurisdiction was diversity, his action must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b); TIG Ins., 334 F.3d at 634. Mr. Byrne concedes that his intervention was permissive rather than as of right. Even construing supplementary jurisdiction broadly, permissive intervention requires an independent basis for jurisdiction, which is lacking here. See Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1319 (7th Cir. 1997); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 1984); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1917 (1986 & Supp. 2005). This leaves the question of the legitimacy of the district court’s order, distributing funds to Mr. Byrne. The district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter that order. We therefore direct the district court to ensure the money’s return to Mr. Anglezis. See Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219 (1891) (“[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.”); see also In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1994) (ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming order of restitution for void judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)). Nos. 03-3471 & 03-4192 Page 9