Opinion ID: 1393514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Modification of Stepparent's Child Support Obligation

Text: Michael moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Civil Rules 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) and AS 25.24.170. Civil Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part: [T]he court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; ... . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, ... or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the date of notice of the judgment... . Alaska R.Civ.P. 60(b). This court will not overturn the superior court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion absent an abuse of discretion. Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 645 (Alaska 1989). Michael argued below for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) because it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. [6] Wright and Miller state that this provision requires some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable. 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863, at 207 (1973). Additionally, some courts have held that the change in conditions must not have been reasonably foreseeable when the judgment was entered. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. Schaller, Inc., 157 Ind. App. 125, 299 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1973). While the rule should be liberally construed to achieve substantial justice, final judgments should not be lightly disturbed. Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.1981) (citing 7 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 60.19, at 237-39). In Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905, 89 S.Ct. 1745, 23 L.Ed.2d 218 (1969), then-Judge Blackmun wrote: [M]odification is only cautiously to be granted; . .. some change is not enough; ... the dangers which the decree was meant to foreclose must almost have disappeared; ... hardship and oppression, extreme and unexpected, are significant; and ... the movant's task is to provide close to an unanswerable case. To repeat: caution, substantial change, unforeseenness, oppressive hardship, and a clear showing are the requirements. Id. at 813. Michael alleges several changed circumstances. First, his affidavit states that [s]ince the time of the dissolution, my income has changed drastically and I have not been able to afford to pay child support for both Tisha and Robert. While a drastic change in income may qualify as a substantial change in circumstances, Michael provides no supporting evidence of such a change. He states in his reply brief that when he was transferred from Alaska he lost his 25% tax-free COLA and his generous Alaska living allowance. He also states that he has remarried and has two children born of this second marriage. However, he does not make any specific showings of the extent to which his income has decreased in relation to his expenses. He simply did not provide the trial court with sufficient evidence of changed economic conditions to warrant modifying his support obligation. [7] Michael also points to Helen's remarriage to Mr. Roberts as a substantial change in circumstances. He argues that [s]ince 1988, she has had another source of support for Tisha. Again, Michael fails to provide any specific evidence demonstrating how much Helen's situation has improved, if at all, and how much Tisha's need for child support has decreased. [8] Furthermore, under the general rule in Alaska regarding stepparents, as provided in Burgess, Mr. Roberts would be under no obligation to support Tisha. [9] Michael further points to his inability to claim Tisha as a dependent for tax purposes since 1989 as a change in circumstances. However, this inability is merely another symptom of his admitted arrearages on his support obligation. Michael has simply not provided sufficient evidence of inequity in the judgment's prospective effect to warrant relief under 60(b)(5). Relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(6) is inappropriate when a party takes a deliberate action that he later regrets as a mistake. Hartland, 777 P.2d at 645. Here, Michael deliberately agreed to support Tisha but now regrets the consequences. Furthermore, this court has held that clause (6) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances not governed by the preceding clauses, and that [t]ime-barred relief under the first five clauses is not allowed under clause (6). Id. In this case, Michael is essentially alleging a mistake. [10] Post-judgment relief for a mistake is governed by Civil Rule 60(b)(1), and is time-barred if not brought within one year. Michael cannot assert 60(b)(6) as a means of avoiding this time limitation. [11] In Lowe v. Lowe, 817 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1991), this court identified four factors, in the context of a property division, which constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6): (1) the fundamental, underlying assumption of the dissolution agreement has been destroyed; (2) the parties' property division was poorly thought out; (3) the property division was reached without the benefit of counsel; and (4) [the asset in controversy] was the parties' principal asset. Id. at 458-59 (citing Schofield v. Schofield, 777 P.2d 197, 202 (Alaska 1989)). This court granted relief under 60(b)(6) in Lowe because the dissolution petition provided that the husband would have primary custody of the children, when in fact the wife had primary custody after the dissolution. There is no such destruction of an underlying assumption of the dissolution petition in this case. The parties contemplated that Helen would have custody and Michael would have visitation rights and pay child support. Nowhere in his briefs does Michael argue that the fundamental assumptions have changed. He argued below that the Schofield factors apply in this case because, had the parties consulted with counsel, he would not have agreed to support Tisha. Even if this were true, it would not evidence the destruction of a fundamental assumption. As Wright & Miller state: The broad power granted by clause (6) is not for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made. A party remains under a duty to take legal steps to protect his own interests. Wright & Miller, § 2864, at 214. It is true that the parties were not represented by counsel. If, as Michael alleges, he would not have agreed to support Tisha if he had known he was under no legal obligation to do so, then this factor is relevant. However, Michael did not convince the superior court that he was in fact mistaken as to his legal obligation. Furthermore, even if he were mistaken, the failure to hire counsel by itself would not cause us to grant relief under 60(b)(6). See Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) (father's pro se status in trial court did not warrant relief from child support obligation under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(7), the equivalent of Alaska R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6)). A further reason for denying relief here is that the court must consider[] whether relief under clause (6) will further justice without affecting substantial rights of the parties. Wright & Miller, § 2864, at 213. Here, terminating Michael's support obligation would substantially affect Tisha's rights. Michael has not shown that, when his interests are balanced against the interests of the child, it is not inequitable for him to continue paying child support. Finally, motions under either 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6) must be made within a reasonable time. Here, there is no indication that Michael moved for relief from judgment within a reasonable time. Michael simply gives no reason for his seven year delay in filing a Civil Rule 60(b) motion other than an unsubstantiated claim of a decrease in his income. There is no evidence of circumstances beyond his control which prevented him from asking for relief. Cf. Propst v. Propst, 776 P.2d 780 (Alaska 1989) (reversing a denial of 60(b)(5) relief where husband's delay in seeking relief was based on wife's agreement not to raise passage of time to defeat a motion to modify child support award, and where the Child Support Enforcement Division falsely represented that it would not enforce the order). In a similar factual situation, the Indiana Court of Appeals reached a similar holding regarding postjudgment relief. Toller v. Toller, 176 Ind. App. 322, 375 N.E.2d 263 (1978). In Toller, the stepfather made no express agreement to support his stepchild, but he was present at a hearing before the order requiring him to support his stepchild was entered. Id. 375 N.E.2d at 264. The stepfather failed to object to the court order. Over two years after the date of the dissolution, he filed a 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The court found that the stepfather did not file this motion within a reasonable time under the circumstances, and therefore affirmed the denial of the motion. Id. 375 N.E.2d at 265. Cf. Gill v. Gill, 211 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1973) (indicating that Rule 60(b) relief may be appropriate where a support order against a stepfather is obtained by fraud or deceit). For the foregoing reasons, we find that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Michael's motion for relief under Civil Rule 60(b).
Alaska Statute 25.24.170 allows for modification or termination of child support. [12] This court has held that the moving party must show that a modification or termination of child support is justified by a material and substantial change in circumstances occurring subsequent to the original order. Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289, 291 (Alaska 1979). The movant must make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 292 n. 9. The court must consider both the needs of the children as well as the needs and financial abilities of both parents. Id. at 292. A child support order may be modified notwithstanding the fact that it was based on a separation agreement or stipulation signed by the parties. Id. at 291-92. The question whether to modify an existing child support order rests in the sound discretion of the superior court. Propst, 776 P.2d at 782. As discussed with respect to Rule 60(b), Michael has failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in this case. He has not made a specific showing of how much his income has decreased in relationship to his expenses, nor has he shown how much, if any, Tisha's need for his support has decreased. Cf. Curley, 588 P.2d at 292-93 (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to reduce the amount of support from $200 to $100 per month per child, where the husband's income declined from $1,815 to $1,400 per month.). Another shortcoming in Michael's evidence is that he fails to show why the alleged change in financial circumstances justifies modification of his support obligation to Tisha but not to Robert. [13] The fact that Michael seeks relief from only his support for Tisha indicates that his motion is based more on a desire for relief from his allegedly contractual obligation than on any material change in circumstances. Because he has not met his burden of proving a material change in circumstances, Michael is not entitled to modification of the child support award under AS 25.24.170. [14]