Opinion ID: 884980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Police officer's duty to protect third persons from one who is in his or her custody or control

Text: ¶ 25 In Phillips, this Court confronted the issue of whether police officers owed a special duty to Phillips to protect him from the dangerous actions of an intoxicated driver who collided with Phillips only two hours after having been detained and questioned by police officers concerning an unrelated incident. During this detainment and questioning, police officers noticed beer cans in the driver's vehicle and smelled alcohol on his breath. However, the officers reported that the driver was polite and cooperative, and did not appear to be in a state of extreme intoxication. Believing that probable cause was absent, the police officers did not arrest the driver for DUI. Phillips, 233 Mont. at 250-51, 758 P.2d at 773-74. ¶ 26 Phillips brought an action for negligence against the City of Billings alleging that the police officers owed him a duty to control the potentially dangerous actions of the driver. As support for his allegation, Phillips cited § 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter § 319) which provides: One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. We rejected Phillips' argument, stating that imposition of a duty under § 319 depends on the ability to control the third person. We added, absent probable cause, no duty existed. Phillips, 233 Mont. at 252, 758 P.2d at 774-75. ¶ 27 Stephen interprets Phillips as setting forth the rule that if probable cause exists, there is a duty to protect. He arrives at this rule by extracting the above phrase, absent probable cause, no duty existed and stating it in the converse. We note that the District Court interpreted Phillips the same way. In its order granting summary judgment, the court cited Phillips for the proposition that once probable cause is established, the ability to control under [§ 319] is established and a greater duty may be imposed by a special relationship. In applying what he claims to be the Phillips rule to the instant case, Stephen argues that probable cause existed to arrest Trina for DUI and, therefore, Officer Driscoll owed a duty to protect her from danger. We reject Stephen's argument for several reasons. ¶ 28 First, we do not agree with Stephen's interpretation of Phillips. If any rule can be gleaned from Phillips, it is that imposition of a duty to protect under § 319 depends on whether the police officer takes charge of the alleged dangerous person. See § 319 Restatement (Second) of Torts (One who takes charge of....). In charge of is defined as in the care or custody of. Black's Law Dictionary 685 (5th ed.1979). The term custody is defined as immediate charge and control ... actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual possession. Black's Law Dictionary at 347. Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the words takes charge of, as we must, see Werre v. David (1996), 275 Mont. 376, 385-86, 913 P.2d 625, 631, we determine that the special duty described in § 319 arises not when probable cause exists, as Stephen suggests, but when the police officer takes a person into custody, or exerts some legal or physical restraint on his or her liberty. Although the Court's statement absent probable cause, no duty existed was technically correct, a more accurate statement of the law is absent a custodial relationship, no duty existed. ¶ 29 Our rejection of Stephen's argument is further buttressed by the fact that Montana law does not impose on police officers an absolute duty to arrest once probable cause exists. Rather, a police officer's authorization to arrest is permissive. Section 46-6-311, MCA, states: [A] peace officer may arrest a person when a warrant has not been issued if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person is committing an offense or that the person has committed an offense and existing circumstances require immediate arrest. (Emphasis added.) Courts in other jurisdictions have held that liability [can] not be predicated on a peace officer's failure to restrain a drunk driver, where, since the officer had discretion to enforce drunk driving laws in the manner he deemed appropriate in the circumstances, he had no absolute, certain, or imperative duty to anyone in that regard. See 48 A.L.R.4th at 334, § 5(citations omitted). Thus, even if there exists probable cause to arrest, an officer is under no duty to arrest and, therefore, no § 319 duty to protect arises simply by a determination of probable cause. A § 319 duty to protect arises only when a police officer actually makes an arrest, or otherwise takes possession or custody of an individual. ¶ 30 Finally, aside from Stephen's erroneous interpretation of Phillips, we believe that Stephen's reliance on Phillips is misplaced. Under § 319, a police officer's duty to protect is owed to third persons, not to the person with whom the officer has a custodial relationship. In Phillips, the plaintiff argued, though unsuccessfully, that under § 319 the police officer owed a duty to protect him, a third person, from the dangerous actions of the intoxicated driver. That is not the case here. Rather, Stephen argues the opposite. He argues that Officer Driscoll owed a duty to protect Trina from the dangerous actions of third persons. Under these circumstances, we determine that Phillips is distinguishable from and inapplicable to the instant case. ¶ 31 We need not reach Stephen's argument that probable cause existed to arrest Trina for DUI because, as discussed above, probable cause is not the determining factor for imposition of a special duty under § 319. For this reason, and upon the foregoing, Stephen's argument that Officer Driscoll owed a special duty to protect Trina because there existed probable cause to arrest her for DUI is without merit.