Opinion ID: 2424191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ability to Perform

Text: Potomac Creek's second alternative ground for affirmance, that Stanford did not show that it was ready, willing, and able to perform, is also unavailing. As of trial, Stanford had demonstrated that it not only was ready, willing, and able to perform its obligations under the Preliminary Agreement, but that it had fully performed: Stanford had negotiated with Potomac Creek, conducted due diligence, and signed the Definitive Agreement. Judge Braman found that Stanford was at that time willing to concede all four of the remaining issues left unresolved in the Declaration, see supra note 5, and that Stanford could obtain the necessary financing to complete the transaction from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, with which it had an established relationship. Potomac Creek's argument on appeal that Judge Braman's finding was stale by the time of Phase II, and that Stanford did not then provide current assurances that it could perform, ring hollow when one considers that Potomac Creek's argument to Judge Hedge was that she lacked authority to grant specific performance, not that Stanford could not satisfy its end of the bargain. Having decided that an order of specific performance directed to Potomac Creek was not legally available to enforce the Preliminary Agreement, Judge Hedge did not address whether Stanford was able to conclude the transaction. The question whether Stanford is now able to perform the Definitive Agreement is a determination that the trial court will need to take into consideration in deciding whether to grant specific performance of the Preliminary Agreement by ordering Potomac Creek to sign the Definitive Agreement.