Opinion ID: 3158038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lund's Motion for Leave to Amend His Complaint

Text: Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lund's motion for leave to add an employee negligence claim under Massachusetts General Law, chapter 258 against the Town and its police chief in the wake of the verdict in favor of the individual police officers. Lund filed his initial complaint motion for a new trial. Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 427 (1st Cir. 1993). - 10 - on August 8, 2011, and did not move for leave to amend until three years later on August 9, 2014. We have frequently upheld denials of motions for leave to amend for undue delay based on far shorter periods of time. See, e.g., Calderón-Serra v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 715 F.3d 14, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2013) (just over an eleven month delay); Villanueva v. United States, 662 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (four month delay); Kay v. N.H. Democratic Party, 821 F.2d 31, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (three month delay). Appreciable delay alone, in the absence of good reason for it, is enough to justify denying a motion for leave to amend. Calderón-Serra, 715 F.3d at 20. Lund tries to justify his delay by claiming that his motion for leave to amend is being brought under Rule 15(b)(2) to conform to evidence at trial, and thus he could not have filed the motion prior to the end of the trial, never mind three years earlier. We doubt that this motion for leave to amend even gets into the Rule 15(b)(2) batter's box. Lund seeks to avoid the facts as found by the jury, not add a count that those findings support. In any event, Lund fails to satisfy the rule's requirement that the parties somehow tried this new claim by express or implied consent. There was certainly no express consent, nor is there any indication of implied consent, which can occur when a claim is actually [] introduced outside the complaint . . . and then treated by the opposing party as having been pleaded, either - 11 - through [the party's] effective engagement of the claim or through his silent acquiescence. . . . [or when] a party acquiesces in the introduction of evidence which is relevant only to that issue. Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting DCPB, Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 957 F.2d 913, 917 (1st Cir. 1992)). Lund is simply trying to plead a claim that, if valid, could have been pleaded years earlier. It was well within the district court's discretion to deny his motion for leave to amend.