Opinion ID: 782204
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Lee Factors

Text: 90 The question, then, is whether the requirement of an additional objection was firmly established and regularly followed in these circumstances. The Supreme Court has noted that the contemporaneous objection rule rests on the general principle that an objection which is ample and timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and therefore sufficient to preserve the claim for review. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) (quoting Douglas, 380 U.S. at 422, 85 S.Ct. 1074). Like the Lee and Osborne courts, that overall principle, along with the three factors relied upon in Lee, guides our judgment in this case.
91 In reaching the conclusion that the procedural bar was inadequate in Lee, the Supreme Court relied in part upon the fact that the lack of compliance with the procedural rule at issue was not mentioned in the trial court as a reason to deny Lee's motion for continuance. This rationale — whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court — is less applicable in this case because the lack of a contemporaneous objection would not, almost by definition, be mentioned by the trial court. Thus this factor does not weigh as heavily in favor of Cotto as it did for Lee. 92 However, as to whether perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court's decision, there are similarities between the circumstances in this case and Lee. Here, the trial court was certainly aware of defense counsel's desire to cross-examine Echevarria, given counsel's statement that to not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background ... is really totally completely unfair at the beginning of the Sirois hearing, and the court's own written and oral ruling precluding such cross-examination at the close of the hearing. Cotto was precluded from cross-examining Echevarria because the trial court determined that cross-examination would serve no truth-seeking purpose, and because the trial court concluded that our prior decision in Aguiar indicated that Cotto had forfeited any opportunity to cross-examine Echevarria through his misconduct. Thus, if defense counsel had repeated her pre-hearing objection, that it would be unfair to not allow cross-examination of Echevarria altogether, after the trial court's ruling, there is no reason to believe that the trial court would have changed its mind. 13 93 On the other hand, the likely impact of a timely objection involves a certain degree of speculation. Indeed, the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to give the trial court a clear opportunity to correct any error. Although requiring an additional objection after the trial court made its waiver ruling may not have changed matters, it is possible that defense counsel, either before the hearing began or during the course of the hearing, could have argued to the trial court that Aguiar did not stand for the proposition that cross-examination of a testifying witness was forfeited through misconduct. Through argument, or perhaps a request for an opportunity to brief the issue, the trial court may well have come to a different conclusion. Therefore, although we agree with petitioner's basic argument that this is not a case where a party failed to apprise the trial court of the ruling sought, we do not think that this factor weighs as heavily in Cotto's favor as it did for the petitioner in Lee.
94 New York's preservation rule, codified at N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 470.05(2), specifies that: 95 [f]or purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a ruling or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or proceeding is presented when a protest thereto was registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same. Such protest need not be in the form of an exception but is sufficient if the party made his position with respect to the ruling or instruction known to the court, or if in response to a protest by a party, the court expressly decided the question raised on appeal. 14 96 In analyzing the adequacy of the claimed procedural bar, we look to the statute and caselaw interpreting New York's statutory preservation rule in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Lee, 534 U.S. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877 ([N]o published Missouri decision directs flawless compliance with [the state procedural rule] in the unique circumstances this case presents.); Arce v. Smith, 889 F.2d 1271, 1273 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 2185, 109 L.Ed.2d 513 (1990) (analyzing New York cases to determine whether the claim raised by the petitioner is not regularly the subject of a procedural default in New York). 97 Respondent cites several New York cases, and our own opinion in Garcia, in support of the proposition that New York's contemporaneous objection rule is firmly established and regularly followed in these circumstances. Petitioner cites several New York cases in support of the opposite conclusion. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that petitioner has the better of the argument. 98 Respondent contends that the issue here is whether after the court has issued its ruling on the merits and announced the relief it was awarding the moving party, New York regularly requires a complaint about that relief [granted] to preserve the claim that the relief ordered was wrong. In support of such a requirement, respondent primarily cites several Appellate Division cases involving Hinton hearings, state proceedings to determine whether the courtroom should be closed, either completely, or to certain individuals, during the course of trial. See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 290 A.D.2d 304, 736 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1st Dep't 2002); People v. Williams, 287 A.D.2d 337, 731 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1st Dep't 2001); People v. Lanhorn, 283 A.D.2d 254, 724 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 2001). Respondent also argues that the circumstances here are very similar to those in Garcia, a case also involving a Hinton hearing. 99 We conclude, however, that these cases are distinguishable. In Garcia, we relied on the fact that the defendant had failed to put the trial judge on notice as to what the defendant now claims he wanted — in that case, the presence of his mother's companion in the courtroom — and so failed to preserve his claim. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 80-81. Similarly, in the Appellate Division cases cited by respondent, the defendants expressed no dissatisfaction with the relief ordered. Here, in contrast, before the Sirois hearing even began, defendant made clear his position on the preclusion of cross-examination: [T]o not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background ... is really totally completely unfair. Given Lee 's case-specific inquiry, we conclude that the cases cited by respondent do not control here, where the trial court could not have doubted that counsel wanted to cross-examine Echevarria. 100 Further, other New York cases interpreting the scope of CPL § 470.05(2) undercut respondent's claim. Since our decision in Garcia and the Court of Appeals' decision denying Cotto's direct appeal, the Court of Appeals has held that, under similar circumstances to those presented in this case, an issue of law is preserved even if it is not specifically raised by the defendant so long as the trial court expressly rules on the issue following an earlier objection. In People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486, 719 N.Y.S.2d 202, 741 N.E.2d 876 (2000), the Court of Appeals reached the merits of a probable cause issue, decided by the trial court at the close of a suppression hearing. In so doing, the court specifically held that contrary to the People's contention, the issue of probable cause to arrest is preserved for our review because, in its written decision denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court `expressly decided' the question in response to a `protest by a party.' Id. at 491 n. 2, 719 N.Y.S.2d 202, 741 N.E.2d 876 (citing CPL § 470.05(2)). 101 Intermediate appellate courts in New York have followed the same principle. See, e.g., People v. Ayala, 142 A.D.2d 147, 157, 534 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1011 (2nd Dept 1988), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 422, 554 N.Y.S.2d 412, 553 N.E.2d 960 (1990) (in case where protest was made by the government, issue pressed by defense on appeal was still preserved because a question of law is preserved if the point was expressly decided by the trial court in response to a protest, even though the protesting party overlooked that argument when making the protest) (quoting Preiser, Supp. Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 470.05, 1988 Pocket Part, at 5) 15 ; People v. Seabrook, 241 A.D.2d 325, 326, 659 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464 (1st Dept 1997) (defense counsel's motion to share responsibilities with counsel for co-defendant preserved issue of law as to all parts of ruling despite failure to specifically object); People v. Duncan, 177 A.D.2d 187, 190-91, 582 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849-50 (4th Dept 1992) (defendant's litigation of Batson hearing preserved issue of law as to ruling on prosecutor's peremptory challenges); People v. Johnson, 144 A.D.2d 490, 491, 534 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (2d Dept 1988) (defense objection to the admissibility of photographs preserved issue of law as to whether they were admissible under collateral evidence rule, even though the ground was not specifically raised at trial). In short, CPL § 470.05 and the governing New York caselaw does not indicate that Cotto was required to make an additional objection after the litigated hearing in order to preserve his confrontation claim for appellate review.
102 In evaluating whether Cotto substantially complied with CPL § 470.05, Lee, 534 U.S. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877, we return to the asserted state interest behind the contemporaneous objection rule — to ensure that the parties draw the trial court's attention to any potential error while there is still an opportunity to address it. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691; see also Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of New York (1994), Book 11A, CPL 470.05, at 12 [hereinafter Practice Commentaries] ([T]he rules ... are best understood in the context of the purpose for requiring a protest, which is to call the trial court's attention to the claimed error while there still is time to correct it.). The Supreme Court has recognized that contemporaneous objection rules of this kind serve [] legitimate state interest[s] in ensuring that judges are promptly alerted to errors at trial, see Garcia, 188 F.3d at 78, and we in no way question the importance of that interest here. However, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that Cotto's conduct at trial served the purpose underlying the rule, and therefore CPL § 470.05(2)'s essential requirements ... were substantially met in this case. Lee, 534 U.S. at 385, 122 S.Ct. 877. 103 First, we again note that before the Sirois hearing even began, defense counsel indicated that a total bar on cross-examination was unfair. Although defense counsel did not (and was not required to) use the specific words Confrontation Clause, it is well established, and certainly no secret to criminal law practitioners and judges, that cross-examination of testifying witnesses is mandated by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Moreover, defense counsel then spent three days, in the middle of trial, litigating the Sirois hearing in order to challenge the prosecution's contention that Cotto had forfeited his confrontation rights through misconduct. At this point, it seems difficult to argue that defendant had not made his position with respect to the ruling known to the court. CPL § 470.05(2). Indeed, the litigation of the hearing itself was an assertion of Cotto's right to confront Echevarria. As the Court of Appeals dissent put it, [i]t should be clear ... that defense counsel did oppose the prosecutor's efforts to admit the out-of-court statements into evidence, arguing that the evidence that defendant threatened the witness was not clear and convincing and protesting the loss of the right of cross-examination. Thus, in accordance with CPL § 470.05, defendant made clear what ruling was desired. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 84, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 104 Despite these ample and timely indications of the alleged federal error that no doubt caught the attention of the trial court, Osborne, 495 U.S. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691, respondent argues that defendant failed to make his position sufficiently clear. After the court's ruling, defense counsel asked only for clarification of the bounds of cross-examination of the police officers, who were about to testify, and it is the lack of continued objection at this point, according to respondent, that is fatal to petitioner's claim. 105 We must disagree. Like the Court in Lee, our inquiry is guided by the realities of trial — namely, that defense counsel's final query came (1) after the conclusion of a three-day hearing to consider whether Cotto had forfeited his confrontation right and hearsay objections with respect to Echevarria; (2) after a prior, explicit objection to the preclusion of cross-examination; and (3) with the awareness that two police officers were about to take the stand and provide the first, and only, testimony that an eyewitness had identified Cotto as the shooter. Thus, like the Court in Osborne, we ask whether anything would be gained by requiring Cotto's lawyer to object a second time, and similarly answer the question with a firm `no.' See Lee, 534 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 877 (discussing Osborne ). In sum, although the assertion of the state procedural bar here is not as egregious as in Lee, we conclude that unyielding application of the general rule in the circumstances of this case, given Cotto's substantial compliance with CPL § 470.05, would disserve any perceivable [state] interest. 534 U.S. at 381, 122 S.Ct. 877. 106 Finally, we note that Cotto's compliance with New York's preservation rule here was arguably literal, and not just substantial. In 1986, the last clause of CPL § 470.05(2), beginning or if in response..., was added by the Legislature to  further broaden the circumstances under which a protest during a criminal trial or proceeding will be sufficient to preserve the question of law for subsequent appellate review. Practice Commentaries, at 11 (emphasis added); see also L. 1986, c. 798, § 1 (reprinted in 2 McKinney's 1986 Session Laws of New York 1882). As the Practice Commentaries further point out, this amendment means that a question of law is now preserved if the point was expressly decided by the trial court in response to a protest, even though the protesting party overlooked that point when articulating the protest. Id. at 11. 107 Here, as described above, the prosecution asked that Echevarria's out-of-court statements be admitted, and the defendant opposed this request — a protest by a party. Then, after the parties litigated the Sirois hearing, the trial court made an oral and written ruling, in which it expressly decided the question raised on appeal, whether defense counsel would be able to cross-examine Echevarria. Therefore, the question of law appears to have been preserved, even if the protesting party had overlooked that point when articulating the protest. Id. 16 Even before the 1986 amendment, it seems that the issue would have been preserved because the point was not overlooked, and defense counsel did make her position with respect to the ruling ... known to the court. CPL § 470.05(2). 17 108 Moreover, even if Cotto did not satisfy either of these two grounds for preservation, a third ground in § 470.05(2) was plainly met. Under § 470.05(2), regardless of whether any actual protest thereto was registered, a party who has either expressly or impliedly sought or requested a particular ruling or instruction, is deemed to have thereby protested the court's ultimate disposition of the matter. (emphasis added). Certainly, counsel's statement that it would be really totally completely unfair to not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background constitutes an implied request to be allowed to cross-examine Echevarria. 109 Nonetheless, as respondent quite correctly points out, Cotto's noncompliance with CPL § 470.05 has already been decided as a matter of state law by New York's highest court. Our task is not to determine whether that ruling was correct, but to determine its adequacy to preclude federal habeas review. That is a federal question, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence demands that we independently consider the degree to which § 470.05 was complied with to determine whether federal habeas review should be precluded. 110 After considering that question, we conclude that once a party has made his position known to the court, the law does not require [him] to make repeated pointless protests after the court has ruled. People v. Mezon, 80 N.Y.2d 155, 161, 589 N.Y.S.2d 838, 603 N.E.2d 943, 946 (1992). At a minimum, such a practice is not firmly established and regularly followed in the circumstances presented in this case. We therefore conclude that the New York Court of Appeals' application of the contemporaneous objection rule to this situation is inadequate to preclude federal habeas review of this claim. 18