Opinion ID: 2444991
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Heading: Permissible Scope of Investigation during Routine Traffic Stops

Text: The state, relying on Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. 781, and Ohio v. Robinette, supra, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.Ct. 417, claims that, under the restrictions of Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, questioning during a routine traffic stop need not be carefully tailored to the initial purpose of the stop, so long as the stop's overall duration is not measurably extended beyond the time necessary to accomplish the tasks attendant to that reason for the stop. In response, the defendant contends that Morgan ordered him from his car at a point when the traffic stop should have ended with the issuance of the traffic ticket and the return of the defendant's papers, thus creating an independent stop for Terry purposes that improperly lacked its own separate basis of reasonable suspicion beyond the moving violation. The defendant further argues that, because Morgan had not yet issued the ticket and had retained his documentation, the defendant was not free to leave at the time Morgan asked for consent to search, thereby rendering his consent the fruit of an improper stop not supported by reasonable suspicion. We conclude that Morgan's questions, including his request for consent to search, were permissible because they did not measurably extend the duration of the traffic stop. Courts considering the constitutionality under the fourth amendment of a police officer's interaction with a motorist during a routine traffic stop apply the principles developed under the line of case law implementing the central holding of Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868. [22] See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 786; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 539-40 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2887, 174 L.Ed.2d 595 (2009); United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1099-1101 (9th Cir. 2008); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 736-37, 632 S.E.2d 645 (2006); State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (Ind. 2008). Under Terry, where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ... the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.... It is well established, however, that [t]he police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.... The authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer is narrowly drawn applying only where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.... The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.... And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620, 631-32, 899 A.2d 1 (2006). A Terry stop does not give law enforcement officers carte blanche to stop and detain citizens indefinitely or unreasonably because, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individual's [f]ourth [a]mendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion... we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts to impose a hard-and-fast time limit on Terry stops, in favor of a reasonableness inquiry where, [i]n assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.... A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. (Citations omitted.) Id., at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568. Applying this reasoning in the traffic stop context, the United States Supreme Court recently followed Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. at 100-101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, wherein it had determined that the police did not violate the fourth amendment rights of a woman detained during the execution of a search warrant by questioning her about her immigration status, [23] and concluded that [a] lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave.... An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this [c]ourt has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.  [24] (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 788; see id., at 784, 788 (concluding that passenger was seized incident to lawful traffic stop of driver and that police officer properly could frisk passenger with reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (use of trained narcotics sniffing dog around exterior of car during lawful traffic stop was permissible because it did not implicate privacy interests and the duration of the stop ... was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop); cf. 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (4th Ed.2004 & 2009-2010 Sup.) § 9.3, p. 91. Thus, questions permissible under Terry during a routine traffic stop include inquiries about whether the car or driver are carrying contraband, as well as concomitant requests for consent to search the vehicle. See 4 W. LaFave, supra (4th Ed.2004), § 9.3(d), p. 389 and § 9.3(e), p. 397, and (2009-2010 Sup.), § 9.3, pp. 91, 94 (noting that Illinois v. Caballes, supra, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, supports requests for consent to search that do not extend duration of stop). These inquiries are permissible even if they are irrelevant to the initial purpose of the stop, namely, the traffic violation, so long as they do not measurably extend the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the investigation of the traffic violation and issue a citation or warning. Consideration of that time period necessarily includes the completion of tasks attendant to the traffic stop, including a check of the driver's license, vehicle registration, and criminal history, and the writing of the citation or warning, as well as background questions about the destination and purpose of the driver's trip. United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir.2007); see also, e.g., Salmeron v. State, supra, 280 Ga. at 737, 632 S.E.2d 645 ([i]t does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of a valid traffic stop for an officer to prolong the stop to immediately investigate and determine if the driver is entitled to continue to operate the vehicle by checking the status of the driver's license, insurance, and vehicle registration [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, given that complications with respect to these tasks may well result in an extension of the time of detention without rendering it unreasonable under the fourth amendment, [w]hether a particular detention is reasonable in length is a fact-intensive question, and there is no per se time limit on all traffic stops. United States v. Olivera-Mendez, supra, at 510; see also Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 469-72, 492, 893 A.2d 1119 (2006) (upholding traffic stop wherein motorist was detained for approximately thirty minutes, even after officer already had drafted written warning, because of computer and communication problems that impeded completion of license and warrants checks, which allowed time for narcotics sniffing dog to be brought to scene). Accordingly, decisions in the wake of Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. 781, hold similarly and, in upholding the conduct of such stops as reasonable, uniformly have emphasized the de minimis nature of the nontraffic related questioning and requests for consent to search within the context of the stop as a whole. [25] See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 606 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir.2010) (per curiam) (extension of traffic stop by five to six minutes to question driver and passengers was reasonable and did not violate fourth amendment); United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 495-96 (6th Cir.2010) (adopting reasonableness standard for determining whether questioning on unrelated subjects improperly extended duration of routine traffic stop); United States v. Taylor, 596 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir.2010) (officers did not violate fourth amendment during traffic stop for seat belt infraction by questioning defendant briefly about presence of weapons, drugs, or illegal items on his person or in the vehicle and then requesting consent to search), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3485, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010); United States v. Derverger, 337 Fed.Appx. 34, 35-36 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam) ([w]e conclude without any need for further factfinding that the five minutes of questioning [about the defendant's nervous demeanor and contents of his car] did not significantly extend the time [the defendant] was detained during stop for seat belt violation); United States v. Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013-15 (8th Cir.2009) (concluding that trooper's questions about whether defendant `had guns or anything illegal in the truck' did not measurably extend stop because they were asked immediately after questioning during first four to six minutes of seventeen minute stop, related directly to stop, and delays were caused by waiting for results of background check and confirmation of consent; after defendant withdrew consent, narcotics-sniffing dog alerted presence of narcotics); United States v. Bell, supra, 555 F.3d at 538, 542-43 (officers did not improperly extend length of stop, despite their lack of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond initial violation, because K-9 officer was able to respond and effect dog sniff of car approximately twelve minutes into stop while other officer waited for results of license check, wrote speeding warning and discussed it with defendant); United States v. Cousin, United States District Court, Docket No. 1:09-CR-89, 2010 WL 338087, , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3688,  (E.D.Tenn. January 19, 2010) (during traffic stop, [a]n officer may ask a handful of questions, including asking for consent to search the vehicle, and not unreasonably detain an individual); United States v. McBride, United States District Court, Docket No. 1:09-CR-21-TS, 2009 WL 4730571, , 6, 7, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113405, , 18-20, 22 (N.D.Ind. December 4, 2009) (officer's question prior to issuing ticket about whether defendant had any dead bodies or anything in his car, followed by request for consent to search, did not violate fourth amendment because time to inquire was only approximately two minutes out of twenty-two minute stop, and therefore negligible in context of entire stop); D.A. v. State, 10 So.3d 674, 676-78 (Fla.App.) (despite having already decided not to issue summons for expired temporary registration, police officer properly asked driver whether vehicle contained anything illegal), review denied, 20 So.3d 848 (Fla.2009); Boyd v. State, 300 Ga.App. 455, 456, 458 and n. 1, 685 S.E.2d 319 (2009) (questions about driver's methamphetamine use did not violate fourth amendment despite fact that they were unrelated to purpose of stop); State v. Morlock, 289 Kan. 980, 993, 218 P.3d 801(2009) (noting that questioning of passenger did not extend stop because it took place during concededly legitimate hunt for the [rental] agreement); People v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.3d 741, 742, 925 N.E.2d 576, 898 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (2010) (per curiam) (The initial stop of [the] defendant's vehicle was permissible and the police officers' subjective motivation to investigate possible drug activity does not negate the objective reasonableness of the officers' actions.... In addition ... as a matter of law, the officers did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances to address the traffic infraction.... [Citations omitted.]). We emphasize, however, that in evaluating the duration of a traffic stop, the reviewing court still must consider the stop through the lens of the time reasonably necessary to effectuate the initial purpose of the traffic stop, and expansions of the stop beyond that time are constitutionally impermissible in the absence of an independent basis of objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 949 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1721, 176 L.Ed.2d 202 (2010); United States v. Bell, supra, 555 F.3d at 541; see also United States v. Alix, 630 F.Supp.2d 145, 157-58 (D.Mass.2009) (forty-five minute stop with multiple frisks and no reasonable suspicion to believe that driver or passenger was dangerous was unreasonable, particularly when their actions did not contribute to length of stop); People v. Burei, 391 Ill.App.3d 1, 8-9, 330 Ill.Dec. 350, 908 N.E.2d 538 (2009) (traffic stop was prolonged beyond time necessary to issue summons for cracked windshield by continuing to question defendant, eventually obtaining consent to search vehicle). Moreover, judicial review of routine traffic stops goes beyond a strict stopwatch test; reasonableness is not measured solely by the temporal duration of the stop alone but, rather, requires scrupulous consideration of the reasonableness of the officers' actions during the time of the stop. See United States %65 v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119-21 (8th Cir.2008) (traffic stop, while lasting only sixteen minutes, was unreasonably extended when questions unrelated to purpose of stop constituted the bulk of the interaction between the trooper and the van's occupants and video recording showed that off-topic questions more than doubled the time [the defendant] was detained). A review of the Appellate Court's opinion in the present case indicates, then, that it did not apply the correct legal standard, in that it relied on pre- Muehler case law, [26] and stated that, [i]n determining if a seizure has exceeded the scope of a permissible motor vehicle stop, the court must determine whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. See State v. Carcare, 75 Conn.App. 756, 767, 818 A.2d 53 (2003); see also United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 240-41 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that although initial stop of defendants' vehicle for speeding was valid, continued detention, after completing computer check on drivers' licenses and rental papers revealed clean records, was unreasonable and violated fourth amendment). [27] With respect to whether the results of the initial stop aroused further suspicion warranting a prolonged inquiry, [t]he police officer's decision ... must be based on more than a hunch or speculation.... In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. [28] (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, supra, 104 Conn.App. at 427, 934 A.2d 281; see also id., at 427-28, 934 A.2d 281 (the defendant's relevant claim on appeal relates to whether Morgan improperly expanded the scope of the stop by questioning the defendant about whether he was engaged in unrelated illegal activity and then performing a search of the defendant's person and his car, after the initial purpose for effectuating the stop had been achieved). Applying the proper legal standard to the facts of the present case, we conclude that Morgan did not measurably or unreasonably prolong his traffic stop of the defendant. In so concluding, we note that it is undisputed that the traffic stop for unsignaled lane changes was valid at its inception, and also that, under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434 U.S. at 111 and n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 330, Morgan properly ordered the defendant to step out of the car for purposes of explaining the ticket. The total relevant duration of the stop, namely, from the time that the defendant was pulled over until the time that he gave his consent to the search of the Altima, was at most fifteen minutes; indeed, the defendant was under arrest twenty minutes from the inception of the stop. See United States v. Rivera, supra, 570 F.3d at 1013-14 (when a motorist gives consent to search his vehicle, he necessarily consents to an extension of the traffic stop while the search is conducted). Moreover, during that fifteen minute time period prior to searching the defendant's Altima, Morgan engaged only in activities that themselves related directly to the traffic stop, namely, questioning the defendant about his travels, checking the defendant's license and rental agreement, performing a warrants check and then writing the ticket. Morgan asked only two brief off-topic questions concerning the presence of illegalities in the vehicle or on the defendant's person near the end of the stop, after explaining the ticket to the defendant, but before giving it to him. [29] Unlike the protracted questioning in United States v. Peralez, supra, 526 F.3d at 1120-21, which dominated the encounter in that case, these two questions in the present case did not create more than a de minimis extension of the overall stop, and therefore were permissible under Muehler and Johnson. Moreover, Morgan did not need to delay the stop in order to conduct the search, as Sutton, his backup officer, arrived while he was still in the process of writing the ticket. Accordingly, we conclude that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged and was not an illegal detention that violated the fourth amendment.