Opinion ID: 2197269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Devices at the Crossing

Text: The final issue concerns the adequacy of the warning devices installed at the 22nd Street crossing. The plaintiffs argue that E J & E was negligent in failing to install crossing gates. According to the plaintiffs, the lack of gates rendered inadequate the warning devices at the 22nd Street crossing. A railroad has a duty to provide adequate warning devices at its crossings. ( Sheahan, 212 Ill.App.3d at 735, 156 Ill.Dec. 816, 571 N.E.2d 796, citing Langston v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 248, 75 N.E.2d 363.) As noted, the 22nd Street crossing had two sets of ground and overhead cantilever-mounted flashing warning lights, a warning bell, circular caution railroad signs and standard pavement railroad warning markings. Chris Lajcin, a signal supervisor for the EJ & E, stated in an affidavit that all warnings were functioning properly at the time of the accident. Additionally, Anderson, at his deposition, admitted to seeing the crossing lights flashing. Consequently, the record shows that the warnings existent at the 22nd Street crossing were operating properly at the time of the accident. The issue, then, is whether EJ & E owed a duty to provide additional warning devices, such as crossing gates. EJ & E argues that, as a matter of law, it owed no duty to plaintiffs to install crossing gates by virtue of the Illinois Commercial Transportation Law (Transportation Law) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 95½, par. 18c-1101 et seq.). EJ & E contends that section 18c-7401(3) of the Transportation Law (Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 95½, par. 18c-7401(3)) creates a conclusive legal presumption that the warning devices at the 22nd Street crossing are adequate and appropriate. The Transportation Law authorizes the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) to require the installation of warning devices at railroad crossings. In pertinent part, section 18c-7401(3) provides: The Commission shall have power, upon its own motion, or upon complaint, and after having made proper investigation, to require the installation of adequate and appropriate luminous reflective warning signs, luminous flashing signals, crossing gates illuminated at night or other protective devices in order to promote and safeguard the health and safety of the public. Luminous flashing signal or crossing gate devices installed at grade crossings, which have been approved by the Commission, shall be deemed adequate and appropriate. (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 95½ par. 18c-7401(3).) We interpret the relevant language of section 18c-7401(3) as providing that once the Commission has investigated a crossing and has approved the installation of a luminous flashing signal or crossing gate device, then the installation of that device shall be deemed adequate and appropriate. A conclusive legal presumption is created which prevents plaintiffs from arguing that the railroad should have installed other warning devices. See Hunter v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (1990), 200 Ill.App.3d 458, 465-66, 146 Ill.Dec. 253, 558 N.E.2d 216. Our interpretation is buttressed by the comments made by Representative Vinson, who was the House sponsor of the bill that added the language at issue. (Pub. Act 82-763, eff. January 1, 1983 (amending sections 57 and 58 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, which was the precursor of the Transportation Law).) Representative Vinson explained: The purpose of the Bill is simply to say that after the Commerce Commission has investigated and ordered the installation of a particular kind of signal, then ... that is conclusive on what kind of signal ought [to] be installed at that crossing. The railroad can install no other signal, by law, because of the order of the Commerce Commission. 82d Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, April 22, 1982, at 118. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs allege that section 18c-7401(3) cannot be applied in the instant case. According to the plaintiffs, the Commission has not yet made an investigation and determination that the warning devices installed at the 22nd Street crossing are adequate and appropriate. The plaintiffs contend that the investigation by the Commission must occur after January 1, 1986, the effective date of the Transportation Law. We disagree. The Transportation Law provides that certain devices approved by the Commission shall be deemed adequate and appropriate. By its plain language it applies to any Commission investigation and approval. It does not restrict its application to investigations and approvals that occurred after a certain date, as plaintiffs argue. The legislative history of the Transportation Law supports our conclusion. The effect of the Commission's action is explained as follows: Representative Kane: So basically, all this does is apply to the case where the Commerce Commission says that a flashing signal is okay, and a plaintiff would come along later and allege that there should be a crossing gate ... practically. Representative Vinson: That is ... in point of the numerousness of the suits, I am sure it would be, by far, the most prevalent case. Representative Kane: Is there a time limit in the Bill so that if the Commerce Commission said six years ago that flashing signals are okay, and since then, the... say the street has been improved, and it is now a four-lane instead of a two-lane. And the Commerce Commission has not been back. Does that absolve the railroad from taking the extra precaution of putting in a gate? Representative Vinson: There is no time limit in the Bill. Representative Kane: So, in that case, it would protect the railroad from that particular situation. Representative Vinson: Yes, it would protect the railroad in that situation. Representative Kane: So the railroad, when the crossing is upgraded, this would absolve the railroad from upgrading the protection. Representative Vinson: In the case you just ... you described, the railroad would be absolved. (82d Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, April 22, 1982, at 120.) In considering Representative Vinson's comments, it is apparent that the legislature intended that Commission investigations and approvals that occurred prior to January 1, 1986, would be sufficient to create the legal presumption. The record in this case establishes that the Commission has made the requisite investigation and approval pursuant to the Transportation Law. In 1965, the Commission entered an order that cantilever-mounted flashing light signals be installed at the 22nd Street crossing. The certified records of the Commission also show that, in 1981, a member of the Commission staff specifically inspected the 22nd Street crossing to determine whether crossing gates were necessary. Bernard Morris, chief railroad engineer for the Commission, stated that, as a result of the 1981 inspection, he determined that crossing gates were not necessary. According to Morris, the warning signals at the 22nd Street crossing were determined by the Commission to be adequate and appropriate. He therefore concluded that the warning devices existent at the crossing remained adequate and appropriate at the time of the accident since the Commission order from 1965 was still in effect. Having established that the Commission found the warning devices at the 22nd Street crossing to be adequate and appropriate, this determination is legally conclusive pursuant to the Transportation Law. As a result, the plaintiffs are barred from contesting the adequacy and appropriateness of the warning devices at the 22nd Street crossing. EJ & E therefore had no duty to provide additional warnings on the date of the accident. Thus, EJ & E is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the adequacy of the warning devices installed at the 22nd Street crossing.