Opinion ID: 2362105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tasker Lane is a Public Way

Text: [¶ 15] The doctrine that the public-at-large is capable of acquiring a non-possessory interest in land has long been accepted in Maine. Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124, 1128 (Me.1984) (citations omitted). Such non-possessory interests commonly arise in three ways: by the statutory method of layout and acceptance pursuant to 23 M.R.S.A. § 3022 et seq., by dedication and acceptance, or by prescription. Id. at 1129; see also Longley v. Knapp, 1998 ME 142, ¶ 9, 713 A.2d 939, 942. In this case, the City claims an interest in Tasker Lane by prescription. [¶ 16] The requirements for the creation of a public way by prescriptive use parallel those for the creation of a prescriptive easement. Longley, ¶ 14, 713 A.2d at 943. The party asserting an easement by prescription must prove continuous use for `at least 20 years under a claim of right adverse to the owner, with his knowledge and acquiescence, or a use so open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be presumed.' Shadan v. Town of Skowhegan, 1997 ME 187, ¶ 6, 700 A.2d 245, 247 (quoting Jost v. Resta, 536 A.2d 1113, 1114 (Me.1988)). These elements must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Glidden, 684 A.2d at 1317. [¶ 17] The trial court concluded that the City has established Tasker Lane as a public way by prescriptive use. The court was influenced by numerous facts, including that: (1) the City has maintained and plowed the lane for well beyond the required time; (2) members of the general public could drive over the street; (3) people from nearby streets have used the lane as if it was a public way; and (4) the City paved the street. The court also found that, while the intensity of City control increased in 1995, all of the requirements for creating a public way by prescriptive use existed.
[¶ 18] Continuous means occurring without interruption. Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman P'ship, 1999 ME 111, ¶ 16, 733 A.2d 984, 993 (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 213 (2d ed.1995)). Continuous possession and use requires only the kind and degree of occupancy (i.e., use and enjoyment) that an average owner would make of the property. Id. (citations omitted). For the purposes of a public easement, however, evidence of the use of a road by the abutting landowners to access their own land is insufficient to establish the existence of a public prescriptive easement. Rather, the test of a public use is the use of the road by people who are inseparable from the public generally; it is not the frequency of the use of the number of people using the way. Id.; see also Longley, 1998 ME 142, ¶ 14, 713 A.2d at 944 (holding, [c]ontinuous public use is not determined by `the frequency of the use, or the number using the way, but its use by people who are not separable from the public generally.'). [¶ 19] There is sufficient, competent evidence in the record to support the court's finding that the City and the public's use was continuous for over 40 years, well beyond the 20 year requirement. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, ¶ 35-37, 760 A.2d 232, 245 (finding as compelling the testimony of residents regarding use of beach). Such a finding is not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 20] There must be a showing that the use of Tasker Lane by the public was under a claim of right that is adverse to the owner. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d at 1130. Under a claim of right means that the claimant is in possession as owner, with intent to claim the land as [its] own, and not in recognition of or subordination to [the] record title owner. Striefel, 1999 ME 111, ¶ 14, 733 A.2d at 991-92. [¶ 21] A use is adverse when a party ... has received no permission from the owner of the soil, and uses the way as the owner would use it, disregarding [the owner's] claims entirely, using it as though he owned the property himself.... S.D. Warren Co. v. Vernon, 1997 ME 161, ¶ 11, 697 A.2d 1280, 1283 (citation omitted). In a majority of jurisdictions, where there has been an open, unmolested, and continuous use for the prescribed period with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner, such use is presumed to have been adverse. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d at 1130 (citations omitted). [¶ 22] The record supports the trial court's conclusion that the public and the City intentionally possessed and used the lane as though they owned it, without recognition of  or subordination to  the true owner. The testimony at trial shows that the public and the City's use has been open, unmolested, and continuous for well over 20 years. The record evidence, therefore, supports the trial court's finding that the City possessed and used the parcel under a claim of right that was adverse to the owner throughout the limitations period.
[¶ 23] Acquiescence by the owner to the use is essential, and, in this regard, the acquisition of an easement by prescription differs from the acquisition of title by adverse possession. Shadan, ¶ 6, 700 A.2d at 247 (quoting Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d at 1130). Acquiescence implies `passive assent or submission to the use, as distinguished from the granting of a license or permission given with the intention that the licensee's use may continue only as long as the owner continues to consent to it.' Id., ¶ 7 (quoting Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d at 1130). Acquiescence is consent by silence. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d at 1130 (quoting Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 230, 98 A. 743, 745 (1916)). The testimony, which the court found credible, demonstrates that the owners have acquiesced to the public and City's use. The testimony shows that no one ever asked for permission to use the lane and the owners never obstructed its use until this action was commenced. The trial court did not err in finding that the owners acquiesced to the public's use of Tasker Lane.