Opinion ID: 3045669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: guilt phase ineffectiveness

Text: The State contends that, in granting habeas relief on Reaves’ guilt phase claim of ineffective assistance, the district court failed to afford proper AEDPA deference to the Florida Supreme Court’s factual findings, particularly its determination that Reaves did not present any direct evidence of his level of intoxication at the time of the murder. Under Florida law, the State insists, Reaves’ “self-serving” statements to the police and to his experts about his cocaine 27 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 28 of 42 use on the night of the murder were not “substantive evidence” of intoxication that could support a voluntary intoxication defense. See Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679, 682–83 (Fla. 2003); Holsworth v. State, 522 So. 2d 348, 352 (Fla. 1988). The State also maintains that, despite Reaves’ assertions that he was “high” at the time of the murder, there was ample evidence he knew what he was doing when he shot the deputy, fled the scene, and evaded law enforcement, and that expert testimony about the combined effect of intoxicants and a mental condition could not support a voluntary intoxication defense under Florida law at the time of Reaves’ retrial. For those reasons, the State contends, Reaves has not only failed to show that trial counsel rendered deficient performance in not actively pursuing a voluntary intoxication defense, but has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Because we are convinced that Reaves has not carried his burden of demonstrating prejudice, we need not decide whether the district court failed to afford the required deference to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that there was no deficient performance. 9 See Windom v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 578 F.3d 9 We note, however, that the district court’s decision that there was deficient performance was based on two fundamental flaws. For one thing, the district court mistook counsel’s understandable lack of memory about what he may have been thinking at the time of the retrial, which occurred more than a decade before he testified at the post-conviction hearing, for the absence of a reasoned basis for electing not to actively pursue a voluntary intoxication defense. See Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that our binding precedent does not give the petitioner “the benefit of trial counsel’s short memory”; instead, we presume that trial counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment); Williams v. 28 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 29 of 42 1227, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because the failure to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice is dispositive . . . , there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). To prove prejudice a petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2068. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id., and the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable,” Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792 (2011). The inquiry into prejudice requires us to evaluate “the totality of the evidence—both that adduced at Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 1999) (recounting that the trial had been ten years ago, counsel had lost his case file, and he could not remember what had happened in the case, and concluding that “where the record is incomplete or unclear about [counsel’s] actions, we will presume that he did what he should have done, and that he exercised reasonable professional judgment”). For another thing, the district court’s emphasis on counsel’s failure to articulate a specific strategic reason for not focusing on voluntary intoxication as a defense placed undue weight on counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as he did. As we have explained, Strickland calls for an objective inquiry into the reasonableness of counsel’s performance and, for that reason, a petitioner must show that “no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The relevant question is whether “some reasonable lawyer” could have pursued the challenged course of action, regardless of whether the petitioner’s trial counsel actually made a deliberate, informed, and strategic decision to do so. See id. at 1315 n.16 (emphasis added); see also Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 770, 790 (2011) (“The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing strategic considerations like these as an inaccurate account of counsel’s actual thinking. . . . Strickland . . . calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.”) (emphasis added). 29 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 30 of 42 trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceedings.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 (2003) (quotation marks, brackets, and emphasis omitted). At the time of Reaves’ 1992 retrial, voluntary intoxication could be asserted as a defense in Florida to specific intent crimes such as first-degree murder, but not to crimes like second-degree murder that can be established with either general or specific intent.10 See Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 1985); Gentry v. 10 Effective October 1, 1999, Florida statutorily abolished the defense of voluntary intoxication, though that defense apparently remains available to defendants whose crimes predate that legislation’s effective date. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.051 (1999); Travaglia v. State, 864 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Florida is one of a number of states that have abolished the defense of voluntary intoxication in the past several decades, responding to statistics linking violent crime with self-induced intoxication, and to criticisms that the defense perversely rewards intoxicated behavior by reducing criminal punishment and contradicts widespread moral notions that a person who voluntarily impairs his own faculties should be held fully accountable for the consequences. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 48–50, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2018–20 (1996) (discussing the trend towards abolition of the defense and the justifications for doing so); Meghan Paulk Ingle, Note, Law on the Rocks: The Intoxication Defenses Are Being Eighty-Sixed, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 614–16, 622–26 (2002) (same); Bias, 653 So. 2d at 384 (Grimes, C.J., concurring) (urging the Florida legislature to abolish the voluntary intoxication defense and stating, “I cannot understand why a person should be exonerated of a specific intent crime simply because he drank too much”). This historical trend marks a return to the common law view, prevalent on both sides of the Atlantic until the late nineteenth century, that intoxication neither justifies nor mitigates criminal conduct. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 44–47, 116 S.Ct. at 2018–20. As Justice Story remarked nearly two centuries ago: If the prisoner was at the time of committing the offence, intoxicated, as his counsel have earnestly contended, I cannot perceive how it can, in point of law, help his case. This is the first time, that I ever remember it to have been contended, that the commission of one crime was an excuse for another. Drunkenness is a gross vice, and in the contemplation of some of our laws is a crime; and I learned in my earlier studies, that so far from its being in law an excuse for murder, it is rather an aggravation of its malignity. United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 657–58 (C.C.R.I. 1820) (Story, J.). 30 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 31 of 42 State, 437 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1983). Mere use of intoxicants, however, even to the extent that they “arouse[d] passions, diminishe[d] perceptions, release[d] inhibitions or cloud[ed] reason and judgment,” was not enough to support a voluntary intoxication defense. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Cr.) 3.04(g) (1987). Instead, a defendant was required to “come forward with evidence of intoxication at the time of the offense sufficient to establish that he was unable to form the intent necessary to commit the crime charged.” Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1985) (emphasis added); see also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Cr.) 3.04(g) (1987) (providing that a defendant must be so intoxicated that he or she was “incapable of forming” the required mental state for a crime). The required mental state for first-degree murder is a “premeditated design” to kill, which requires a specific intent to kill coupled with premeditation. 11 See Fla. Ann. Stat. § 11 Florida courts sometimes phrase the voluntary intoxication inquiry in terms of whether the defendant was so intoxicated that he lacked the specific intent to kill, which could be interpreted to mean that the mental state required for first-degree murder is a specific intent to kill and nothing more. See Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 626–27 (Fla. 2006); Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 373 (Fla. 2004); Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 616 (Fla. 2003). When it has specifically focused on the matter, however, the Florida Supreme Court has clarified that the mental state required for first-degree murder is not merely a specific intent to kill but also premeditation, making premeditation the feature that distinguishes first- from second-degree murder. See Anderson, 276 So. 2d at 18 (explaining that the “specific intent to kill” may be present in either first- or second-degree murder, and that “the one essential element which distinguishes [the two] is premeditation”); Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001) (describing premeditation as “more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill”). For purposes of the voluntary intoxication defense, the question is whether the defendant was “unable to form the intent necessary to commit the crime charged.” Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 1264. Combining these threads of law with the prejudice requirement, the question before us is whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury, if presented with a voluntary intoxication 31 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 32 of 42 782.04(1)(a); Anderson, 276 So. 2d at 18 (explaining that second-degree murder requires either a general or specific intent to kill, while first-degree murder requires both a specific intent to kill and premeditation, which is “the one essential element which distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder”); Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1118 (Fla. 2005) (evaluating whether a voluntary intoxication defense to a charge of first-degree murder “could have rebutted the necessary elements of specific intent and premeditation”). Premeditation is defined as not “a mere intent to kill,” Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2011), but as a “fully formed conscious purpose to kill that may be formed in a moment and need only exist for such time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable result of that act,” Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991). There are two reasons we are convinced that Reaves has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of a different result had trial counsel actively pursued a voluntary intoxication defense with all of the evidence, including the expert testimony, that was presented at the state court evidentiary hearing. The first is that most, if not all, of the expert testimony supporting the defense would have been inadmissible at Reaves’ retrial. While the Florida Supreme Court, in affirming the denial of state collateral relief, based its decision defense, would have found that when he killed the deputy Reaves was incapable of forming the requisite mental state for first-degree murder––the premeditated design to kill. 32 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 33 of 42 on the absence of deficient performance, one of the primary reasons it articulated in support of that determination was “the law in Florida at the time” of Reaves’ 1992 retrial. Reaves, 942 So. 2d at 878. The state high court made clear that state law, as it existed at the time of the retrial, precluded a voluntary intoxication defense based on the combined effect of intoxication and an underlying mental condition that did not rise to the level of legal insanity. Id. at 880. The Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law is binding on federal courts. The district court should not have substituted its own interpretation of state law for that of Florida’s highest court. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). The United States Supreme Court has instructed us that “state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law” and federal courts “are bound by their constructions” except in rare and extreme circumstances. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 & n.11, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1886 & n.11 (1975). And we have held, in another capital murder case, that we were bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that a particular type of voluntary intoxication defense was not cognizable at the time of the petitioner’s trial. Pietri v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 641 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that “[a] state supreme court’s interpretation of its law is binding on federal courts”). That decision applies here. 33 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 34 of 42 Given the state of the law at the time of Reaves’ retrial, as conclusively construed by the Florida Supreme Court, the expert opinions of Dr. Dudley, Dr. Crown, Dr. Parsons, and Dr. Hyde would have been inadmissible because those opinions were premised not on cocaine use alone, but on the combined effect of cocaine use and an underlying mental condition, whether PTSD, brain damage, or poly-substance abuse, that did not rise to the level of legal insanity. Likewise, Dr. Mash’s conclusion that Reaves would not have been able to form the mental state required for first-degree murder was not based as much on the amount of cocaine Reaves allegedly ingested on the day of the shooting, as it was on the effect that years of chronic substance abuse had on his neurological functioning. The Florida Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence of a mental defect caused by chronic drug abuse, including so-called “cocaine psychosis,” is inadmissible under state law for the purpose of establishing a voluntary intoxication defense. See Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 252 (Fla. 2004) (noting that the Florida Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence of “metabolic intoxication” due to persistent drug use is inadmissible at trial to prove a lack of specific intent); Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 62–63 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that evidence of a defendant’s “dissociative state” resulting, in part, from a long history of alcohol abuse and “the residual effects of a two-week alcoholic binge” would not have been admissible during the guilt phase of the defendant’s trial); Street v. State, 636 34 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 35 of 42 So. 2d 1297, 1301 (Fla. 1994) (holding that, because the defendant was not raising an insanity defense, the trial court properly refused to permit a defense expert to testify that the defendant was suffering from “the mental infirmity of cocaine psychosis” at the time of his offense). Even Dr. Weitz, who claimed that he could describe the independent effects of the 1.75 grams of cocaine and alcohol Reaves allegedly consumed before the shooting, largely premised his opinion on the interplay between cocaine and Vietnam Syndrome, which he characterized as a “critical factor” in accounting for Reaves’ actions. Thus, with the possible exception of some limited parts of Dr. Weitz’s testimony, the opinions of Reaves’ experts would, as a matter of Florida law, have been inadmissible to demonstrate that he was incapable of forming the premeditated design to kill that is required for first-degree murder. The second reason we are convinced that Reaves has failed to carry his burden of proving a reasonable probability of a different result if a voluntary intoxication defense had been pursued is all of the evidence showing that he not only was capable of formulating a premeditated design to kill the deputy, but also actually did so. His undisputed actions and statements before and after the murder prove that he possessed the presence of mind to make a conscious and purposeful decision to kill the deputy, which negates a voluntary intoxication defense. Reaves told the officers who questioned him that he had shot the deputy because he 35 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 36 of 42 believed that, as a convicted felon, he was facing a mandatory sentence for unlawfully possessing a firearm, and he did not want to go back to prison. Those facts, which are not contradicted by any evidence, prove that Reaves’ actions were deliberate and motivated by a desire to avoid going back to prison. There is also the fact that he fired his weapon at the deputy seven times and hit him four times. See Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999) (explaining that, under Florida law, premeditation may be inferred from “the nature of the weapon used, . . . the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted”) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Reaves had the presence of mind and mental capacity to immediately flee the area of the shooting, hide in the woods, and take other evasive action in order to avoid a sizeable police manhunt as he traveled seven miles on foot. And as soon as he arrived at Hinton’s home he showered and changed his clothes. Reaves’ ability to later recall the incident in considerable and vivid detail is more evidence weighing against a voluntary intoxication defense. See Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d 359, 367 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that a defendant’s detailed confession about the circumstances of his crime “substantially undermined the viability of a voluntary intoxication defense”). The single most damaging piece of evidence presented at the retrial was Hinton’s testimony (read into evidence) about Reaves’ explanation for why he had 36 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 37 of 42 killed the deputy. He recounted to Hinton how, as the deputy was pleading for his life, Reaves had told him, “One of us got to go, me or you.” That is an articulation of a premeditated design to kill, pure and simple. Hinton also testified that Reaves appeared to be in full control of faculties as he described the incident. Hinton’s uncontradicted testimony, particularly about what Reaves told him, proves that Reaves was “conscious of the nature of the act he [was] about to commit and the probable result of that act,” which rules out a finding that he was too intoxicated to form the intent required for first-degree murder. See Asay, 580 So. 2d at 612.12 Even assuming that Reaves’ experts would not have been precluded from testifying at the retrial, none of them was able to adequately explain how Reaves could have been unable to form a premeditated design to kill in light of his statement to the deputy that he was going to shoot him because one of them had to go. Having heard the evidence presented at the retrial, including Reaves’ repeated references to being “high” on cocaine at the time of the shooting, and having received an instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication, the jury concluded that Reaves was guilty of first-degree (premeditated) murder. We are not persuaded that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have 12 Although Hinton’s 1999 affidavit, in contradiction to his 1987 trial testimony, described Reaves as “all strung out” and “out of his head” after the shooting, that affidavit has no bearing on the question of prejudice. It did not even exist until seven years after the retrial. Despite the prosecutor’s and the trial court’s best efforts, Hinton refused to testify at the 1992 retrial, which led to the introduction of his trial testimony. Cf. Wlliamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Counsel cannot be said to be ineffective for failing to call an unavailable witness.”). 37 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 38 of 42 reached a different result had counsel actively pursued a voluntary intoxication defense. As the Florida Supreme Court aptly pointed out, Reaves’ actions indicate that he “knew what he was doing.” See Reaves, 942 So. 2d at 880. Unlike the district court, we are not convinced that Reaves’ actions were bizarre, at least not bizarre enough to support a finding that he lacked the ability to form a premeditated design to take the deputy’s life. The decision by Reaves, who was out of coins, to dial 911 for help in securing a cab was ill advised in light of the fact that he was a felon in possession of a firearm. His decision to immediately hang up may indicate that he realized that was not a wise course of action. But people sometimes make bad decisions and do stupid things. While a defendant’s decision to kill a police officer to avoid arrest and a jail sentence is a bad decision, a stupid decision, an immoral decision, and a criminal decision, it is not bizarre enough to establish that Reaves lacked the ability to form a premeditated design to kill. Because Reaves has failed to carry his burden of proving that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense, the district court erred in granting federal habeas relief on his guilt phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It should have denied relief on that claim.