Opinion ID: 2220056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty Act

Text: The second part of defendant's attack on his sentence consists of various arguments that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Defendant first argues that the statute is unconstitutional because the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 104-22, 104-26) improperly exempts from subjection to the death penalty those who need special assistance to stand trial. In our initial opinion in this case, we held that defendant waived this claim by failing to raise it in any of his post-trial motions. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for rehearing in which he cites People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill.2d 448, as authority for the proposition that his claim should not have been deemed waived. We need not address the question raised in defendant's petition for rehearing, however, because even if we assume without deciding that defendant's claim has not been waived, defendant would not prevail on the merits of his claim. This court has previously rejected the argument that the statute is unconstitutional in exempting persons in need of special assistance from the death penalty (see People v. Ashford (1988), 121 Ill.2d 55, 90; People v. Perez (1985), 108 Ill.2d 70, 94-95), and we decline to reconsider these prior decisions. Defendant next argues that this court should reconsider its holdings in those cases in which it has upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute against claims that the statute violates the eighth-amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because it does not contain adequate safeguards to prevent arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences. Defendant acknowledges that this court has rejected claims of unconstitutionality based upon: overly broad prosecutorial discretion ( People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 531), inadequate comparative proportionality review ( People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508), absence of written findings by the sentencer ( People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342), inadequate pretrial notice of aggravating factors ( People v. Davies (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1), absence of a requirement to find that death is the appropriate sentence ( People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378), and language in the statute allegedly allowing the sentencer to place the burden of proof upon the defendant ( People v. Del Vecchio (1985), 105 Ill.2d 414). The defendant's sole ground for reconsideration appears to be that a single justice of the United States Supreme Court, with whom a second justice concurs, has dissented from denials of certiorari in a number of our cases, and has stated in these dissents that the Illinois statute is unconstitutional. (See Albanese v. Illinois (1985), 471 U.S. 1044, 1045, 85 L.Ed.2d 335, 335-36, 105 S.Ct. 2061, 2062 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari ); Gacy v. Illinois (1985), 470 U.S. 1037, 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 799, 799, 105 S.Ct. 1410, 1410-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari ); Eddmonds v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 894, 895-98, 83 L.Ed.2d 207, 207-10, 105 S.Ct. 271, 271-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari ); Jones v. Illinois (1983), 464 U.S. 920, 920-21, 78 L.Ed.2d 264, 264-65, 104 S.Ct. 287, 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari ).) While opinions joined in by two Supreme Court justices may have some persuasive value, they are not, without more, adequate ground for reconsideration of binding precedent. Therefore, we decline to reconsider our prior holdings. The final ground upon which defendant urges us to hold the death penalty statute unconstitutional is that the statutory aggravating factors used to qualify persons convicted of murder for the death penalty under the Illinois death penalty act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a), (b)) are the same aggravating factors, with one exception, as those used to qualify persons convicted of murder for sentences of life imprisonment under the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)). Therefore, defendant argues, the statutory aggravating factors do not adequately circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and thus do not prevent death sentences from being imposed in an unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious manner. However, while defendant's appeal was pending, this court rejected this same argument in People v. Shum (1987), 117 Ill.2d 317, 373-74, People v. Lego (1987), 116 Ill.2d 323, 352-53, and People v. Whitehead (1987), 116 Ill.2d 425, 463-65. For the reasons stated in those cases, we similarly reject defendant's argument here. We are aware of the opinion of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, filed April 29, 1989, in the case of the United States ex rel. Silagy v. Peters, No. 88-2390. In that case the court held the Illinois death penalty statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1) unconstitutional. In passing on Federal constitutional questions, State courts and lower Federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy the same position. Until the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken, State courts are not precluded from exercising their own judgments on Federal constitutional questions. Because lower Federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over State courts, decisions of lower Federal courts are not conclusive on State courts, except insofar as the decision of the lower Federal court may become the law of the case. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods (7th Cir.1979), 432 F.2d 1072; see also City of Chicago v. Groffman (1977), 68 Ill.2d 112; People v. Stransberry (1971), 47 Ill.2d 541.