Opinion ID: 164559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Recuse Under Plain Error Review

Text: 28 On appeal, the Langs argue that the district judge should have recused herself because: (1) prior to serving on the bench, she worked for the United States Attorney's Office in Utah, where she became friends with Mr. Walz, the prosecutor in these cases; (2) her husband worked as an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in the same office as Mr. Walz at the time of trial and sentencing; (3) she met with Mr. Walz's wife and mother-in-law in her chambers during a recess in the trial; and (4) Mrs. Lang stole the documents in question while working in the same courthouse as the district judge. 29 Title 28, section 455(a) of the United States Code provides that [a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Under this standard, [t]he trial judge must recuse himself when there is the appearance of bias, regardless of whether there is actual bias. Bryce v. Episcopal Church of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir.2002). The test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. Id. (internal quotations omitted). As such, we consider the totality of the circumstances when reviewing such claims, disregarding the judge's actual state of mind, purity of heart, incorruptibility, [and] lack of partiality. Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir.1995). 30 Considering this claim under plain error review, we need not reach the troubling issue of whether the district judge erred in refusing to recuse herself, nor whether the judge's decision affected the Langs' substantial rights, because the error here — if any exists — does not satisfy the final prong of plain error review. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ([W]e need not resolve [this issue], because even assuming respondents' substantial rights were affected, the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.). 31 We admit that this conclusion seems counter-intuitive given the purpose and plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). On its face, it appears that a judge's failure to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned[,] 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), would seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings[,] Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotations omitted). In fact, using language similar to that contained in Olano, legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) states that Congress drafted it to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 871, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 93-1453, at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355). 32 Nonetheless, our holding follows the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence interpreting the fourth prong of Olano, which strictly defines when courts can find this prong satisfied. In Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), the district judge erroneously concluded that he, rather than the jury, should determine the materiality of Mr. Johnson's allegedly false statements. Neither party objected at trial. On appeal, the Johnson Court found that the district court's failure to give the issue of materiality to the jury violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544. Nevertheless, the Court held that the error did not seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings because of the overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted record evidence of materiality. Id. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (On this record there is no basis for concluding that the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such as this which would have that effect.). 33 In Cotton, the district court enhanced Mr. Cotton's sentence based on the amount of drugs sold, even though the indictment did not mention drug quantity. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 628, 122 S.Ct. 1781. The government conceded that the indictment's failure to allege the quantity of drugs sold by Mr. Cotton violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781. Nevertheless, the Cotton Court held that this error did not satisfy the fourth prong of Olano because the overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted record evidence supported the drug quantity finding. Id. at 633, 122 S.Ct. 1781. While agreeing that the Fifth Amendment grand jury right serves a vital function in our judicial system, the Court found this no less true of the Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury, which ... did not, however, prevent us in Johnson from applying the longstanding rule that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal ... cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right.... Id. at 634, 122 S.Ct. 1781. As in Johnson, the Cotton Court found that the harmful effect of reversing a sentence supported by overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence superceded any impact on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings from the district court's Fifth Amendment violation. Id. 34 In light of Johnson and Cotton, we find that the purported error here does not satisfy Olano 's fourth prong. In Johnson and Cotton, the Supreme Court found that violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not overcome the threat ... to the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings that would result from reversing convictions supported by overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence. Id. (internal citations omitted). Any error in this case derives not from a constitutional violation, but from a statutory transgression. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948) ([M]ost matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.); Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (7th Cir.1985) (recognizing that statutes mandating recusal for actual bias have constitutional bases, unlike those that require recusal for a mere appearance of bias or prejudice). In light of Johnson and Cotton 's refusal to find that constitutional violations satisfy this test, we hold that statutory errors, such as the one alleged here, do not satisfy the final prong of Olano when there is overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence of defendant's guilt. 35 Because such evidence of the Langs' guilt exists here, we deny their § 455 appeal. As stated above, the Langs were convicted of five different offenses. The government presented overwhelming evidence at trial to support these charges. Given this evidence and the paucity of contrary testimony in the record, we find that the government provided overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence of the Langs' guilt on all charges. 4 Accordingly, we find that the district judge did not commit plain error in failing to recuse herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).