Opinion ID: 891566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: blake's seizure of defendant was state action

Text: {21} Having determined that Blake did not have statutory authority to either detain or arrest Defendant, we now address Defendant's contention that Blake's lack of authority resulted in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The State argues that if Blake was acting without such statutory authority, she must have been acting as a private citizen, and she was therefore authorized to arrest Defendant for a breach of the peace. See State v. Arroyos, 2005-NMCA-086, ¶ 5, 137 N.M. 769, 115 P.3d 232 (Any person ... may arrest another upon goodfaith, reasonable grounds that a felony had been or was being committed, or a breach of the peace was being committed in the person's presence.); see also State v. Emmons, 2007-NMCA-082, ¶ 15, 141 N.M. 875, 161 P.3d 920 (noting that this Court has specifically declined to favor citizen's arrest for breaches of the peace, stemming from [our] concern that such an expansion of citizen power might likely lead to more breaches of the peace and encourage vigilantism). We understand the State to be arguing that if Blake was acting in her capacity as a private citizen, then there was no state action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Murillo, 113 N.M. 186, 188-89, 824 P.2d 326, 328-29 (Ct.App.1991) (The courts of New Mexico, like other jurisdictions, have accepted the long-standing rule that the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to private individuals acting for their own purposes. (footnote omitted)). We disagree. {22} It is undisputed that Blake was acting in her capacity as an employee of the Roswell Police Department when she investigated the traffic accident. She was dispatched to the scene of the accident by the Roswell Police Department, and consistent with this directive, searched for and found Defendant sitting in his truck in his driveway. However, her authority to detain Defendant is less clear. Blake admitted that she did not have the authority to arrest Defendant, but the record does not clearly reveal whether she had the authority to detain him until a commissioned officer arrived to investigate the accident and make any necessary arrests. Nevertheless, Blake stated that the Roswell Police Department employed her to do a lot of the same work that a certified officer would do, including investigating traffic accidents and crime scenes. In fact, PSAs such as Blake wear uniforms and drive marked patrol cars. {23} While on this record we cannot definitively determine that Blake was acting within the express authority granted to her by the Roswell Police Department, we nonetheless conclude that Blake's actions were state actions because she was acting as an agent of the Roswell Police Department when she detained Defendant in his driveway. Although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative, the Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). As we recently stated in State v. Santiago, to determine whether a person is acting as an agent of the government, we consider (1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his [or her] own ends. 2009-NMSC-045, ¶ 18, 147 N.M. 76, 217 P.3d 89 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We apply this same test to determine whether a seizure was state action. See United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir.1984) (applying the same factors [t]o determine whether a private person acted as a government agent in an illegal search and seizure). {24} The sole reason Blake undertook to investigate and ultimately detain Defendant was due to her employment by the Roswell Police Department and her directive to investigate the accident. Although Blake exceeded the scope of her authority in detaining Defendant while waiting for commissioned officers to arrive, the government initiated her investigation and acquiesced in its results. Furthermore, acting in her capacity as an employee of the Roswell Police Department, Blake's intentions were to assist the government in arresting Defendant for DWI. Thus, although Blake was without statutory authority to detain and arrest Defendant, she nonetheless was acting as an agent of the government when she seized him. Cf. People v. Rosario, 78 N.Y.2d 583, 578 N.Y.S.2d 454, 585 N.E.2d 766, 768-69 (1991) (non-commissioned auxiliary officers are fellow officers for the purpose of providing information for commissioned officers to make warrantless arrests that comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment). We now must determine whether her lack of statutory authority has Fourth Amendment implications. {25} Before doing so, however, we are compelled to address a conflict in our case law that arises by virtue of our holding in this case that only commissioned peace officers may seize persons suspected of violating provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code ... or other law relating to motor vehicles punishable as a misdemeanor[.] Section 66-8-124(A). In Arroyos, the Court of Appeals held that a deputy marshal acting outside of the territorial jurisdiction of his commission was authorized to detain a driver for suspected DWI, a misdemeanor breach of the peace. 2005-NMCA-086, ¶¶ 2-5, 9, 11, 137 N.M. 769, 115 P.3d 232. The Court reached its conclusion by construing NMSA 1978, Section 3-13-2 (1988), which limited the marshal's territorial jurisdiction as not divesting the officers of their common law right as citizens to make arrests or detentions. Id. ¶ 8. Arroyos did not address any provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code that might affect a citizen's authority to arrest another person for suspected violations of that statute, a matter we addressed earlier in this opinion. {26} As we explained above, the common law right to citizen's arrest for suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code and other misdemeanor motor vehicle laws has been abrogated by the Legislature. See NMSA 1978, {66-1-4.14(J) (1990, as amended through 1999) (`police or peace officer' means every officer authorized to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code); § 66-8-124(A) (No person shall be arrested for violating the Motor Vehicle Code ... or other law relating to motor vehicles punishable as a misdemeanor except by a commissioned, salaried peace officer who, at the time of arrest, is wearing a uniform clearly indicating the peace officer's official status.). DWI is a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Section 66-8-102. Therefore, citizens' arrests for DWI are not legal. To the extent that Arroyos suggests that a private citizen, including a commissioned peace officer acting outside the scope of his or her territorial jurisdiction, may make a citizen's arrest for suspected violations of motor vehicle laws, it and any other cases so holding are overruled. {27} We recognize that NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-127 (1978) suggests that the Legislature may have intended to retain citizens' common law ability to arrest for misdemeanors committed in their presence by providing that the procedure prescribed [in Sections 66-8-122 through -125] is not exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person violating these laws. However, construing Section 66-8-127 to allow citizens' arrests would render meaningless the mandate in Section 66-8-124(A) that a peace officer must make arrests for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code and other laws relating to motor vehicles that are punishable as misdemeanors. Because [w]e will reject an interpretation of a statute that makes parts of it ... meaningless[,] State v. Herbstman, 1999-NMCA-014, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 683, 974 P.2d 177, we believe that in setting forth the specific arrest procedures in Section 66-8-124, the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law right to citizens' arrests for suspected violations of motor vehicle laws. See Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 12, 14, 139 N.M. 513, 134 P.3d 800 (holding that Section 66-8-127 does not incorporate the common law misdemeanor arrest rule for offenses governed by Section 66-8-123(A), which requires the arresting officer to issue a citation and release the person from custody, because such an interpretation of Section 66-8-127 would render the mandate of Section 66-8-123(A) meaningless). Therefore, Section 66-8-127 does not operate to allow citizens' arrests for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code and other laws relating to motor vehicles.