Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental State of an Actual Killer Required to Establish Special Circumstance Allegations ( Letner, Tobin )

Text: In defendants' final challenge to the guilt phase jury instructions, they contend that, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 [95 L.Ed.2d 127, 107 S.Ct. 1676] ( Tison ) and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 102 S.Ct. 3368] ( Enmund ), the trial court was required to instruct the jury that, to support a true finding regarding the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations, the evidence at trial must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who was the actual killer of the victim was, at a minimum, a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with a reckless indifference to human life. In other words, defendants claim that although it was permissible for the trial court to instruct the jury that it need not find that an actual killer had the intent to kill the victim, it was error not to further instruct the jury that the jury must, however, find that the actual killer was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless disregard of human life, that is, that he acted with a culpable mental state with regard to the killing. (37) Defendants assert that we have never squarely confronted the question. We held a decade ago, however, that [e]vidence that the defendant is the actual killer and guilty of felony murder ... establishes `a degree of culpability sufficient under the Eighth Amendment to permit defendant's execution.' ( Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1016; see also People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 632 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 794 [248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310] [The United States Supreme Court has made clear that felony murderers who personally killed may properly be subject to the death penalty in conformance with the Eighth Amendmentafter proper consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstanceseven where no intent to kill is shown. (italics omitted)].) More recently, in People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1204 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487], we rejected the claim that CALJIC No. 8.80 is constitutionally defective under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it permits a finding of death eligibility in the absence of a jury finding that the defendant either intended to kill the victim or, as a major participant in the underlying felony, exhibited a reckless indifference to human life. (See also People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 661 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87, 229 P.3d 12] [citing Young and Hayes ].) To the extent there could be any continuing doubt concerning this issue, we reiterate that the jury should not be instructed that, in order to find a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation true, it must find that a defendant who it determines actually killed the victim was a major participant in the felony, or possessed any culpable mental state specifically related to the killing of the victim, including reckless indifference to human life. Defendants' assertion to the contrary, in reliance upon the high court's decisions in Tison and Enmund, is misplaced. Those cases concerned the application of the death penalty to aiders and abettors who were not the actual killers of the victims. ( Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 138 [The question presented is whether the petitioners' participation in the events leading up to and following the murder of four members of a family makes the sentences of death imposed by the Arizona courts constitutionally permissible although neither petitioner specifically intended to kill the victims and neither inflicted the fatal gunshot wounds.]; Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 787 [We granted Enmund's petition for certiorari, [citation], presenting the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.].) The court stated its ultimate holding in Tison as follows: [W]e simply hold that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. ( Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158.) Enmund, in turn, held as follows: Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the Kerseys. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. ( Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 798.) The circumstance that the court concluded in Tison that major participation in the underlying crime coupled with reckless indifference to human life was sufficient culpability for the death penalty to be imposed upon an aider and abettor does not signify that the high court concludedor even impliedsuch circumstances are necessary in all cases to establish death eligibility, such as, for example, when the defendant is the actual killer. As our past decisions have observed, it long has been the law that proof that a defendant who is guilty of felony murder was the actual killer of the victimby itselfestablishes the degree of culpability required to impose the death penalty. Tison and Enmund, which addressed different concerns, do not alter that established principle. Indeed, those cases, viewed properly, reinforce that rule. (See, e.g., Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 149-150 [ Enmund explicitly dealt with two distinct subsets of all felony murders ...: [(1)] the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state ... [and (2)] the felony murderer who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.].) Defendants' reliance upon our decision in People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197] likewise is misplaced. In that case, we granted review ... to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal over whether a trial court has a sua sponte duty to define the phrase `reckless indifference to human life' when instructing a jury regarding a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation against a defendant who is not the actual killer. We concluded the trial courts have no such duty. ( Id. at p. 572.) Our recognition that the California death penalty law had been amended to satisfy the Tison requirement for nonkillers ( Estrada, at pp. 575-576) did not reflect a view that the death-eligibility requirements applicable to actual killers had been changed. We had no occasion toand did notaddress in Estrada the question whether, under Tison, it must be proved that an actual killer acted with reckless indifference to human life. Similarly, in relying upon the high court's decision in Hopkins v. Reeves (1998) 524 U.S. 88 [141 L.Ed.2d 76, 118 S.Ct. 1895], defendants view that case out of context, extracting from it a rule the court did not adopt. In Reeves, the court consider[ed] whether [ Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382]] requires state trial courts to instruct juries on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under state law. ( Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 90.) The United States Supreme Court criticized the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had answered that question in the affirmative, for failing to distinguish Beck on the grounds that in the circumstances at issue in Reeves, the state had not created an artificial barrier to the jury's consideration of a noncapital option, and that the trier of fact never was placed in the position of an all-or-nothing choice regarding whether to convict the defendant (in which case he automatically would be sentenced to death), or to acquit him of all charges. ( Reeves, at pp. 97-98.) The high court also disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that Tison and Enmund required that the jury make the decision concerning whether the culpability requirements set forth in those cases have been satisfied, and therefore whether lesser included offense instructions establishing some culpable mental state (other than simply the intent to commit the underlying felony) were required. The high court stated, Tison and Enmund do not affect the showing that a State must make at a defendant's trial for felony murder, so long as their requirement is satisfied at some point thereafter. ( Reeves, at p. 100.) As we have explained above, Tison and Enmund do not require that there be proof that an actual killer had any culpable mental state regarding the murderand the court's subsequent decision in Reeves said nothing that changes that principle. Accordingly, no error resulted in the present case from the absence of an instruction to the jury that, in order to sustain the special circumstance allegations as to a defendant it found guilty of felony murder and who was the actual killer, the jury also must find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with a reckless indifference to human life.
(38) Defendants contend their rights under state law and the federal Constitution were violated by the trial court's failure to order transcriptions made of all trial proceedings. Defendants point out that a total of 62 discussions between the court and counsel were made off the record during the trial, including a conference concerning the guilt phase jury instructions. Defendants are correct that the failure to record these discussions violated section 190.9, subdivision (a)(1), which requires that all conferences and proceedings in a death penalty case must be conducted `on the record with a court reporter present.' We previously have held, however, that such an error is not reversible per se; instead the defendant must demonstrate prejudice. [Citations.] ( Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 110.) Defendants have not presented a compelling reason to revisit that holding. `[S]tate law entitles a defendant only to an appellate record adequate to permit [him or her] to argue the points raised in the appeal. [Citation.] Federal constitutional requirements are similar. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require the state to furnish an indigent defendant with a record sufficient to permit adequate and effective appellate review. [Citations.] Similarly, the Eighth Amendment requires reversal only where the record is so deficient as to create a substantial risk the death penalty is being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. [Citation.] The defendant has the burden of showing the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 110-111.) Defendants have not established that the failure to transcribe the discussions at issue has prevented adequate and effective appellate review or created a substantial risk the judgment was arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, the violation of section 190.9, subdivision (a)(1), by itself, did not deprive defendants of a liberty interest under Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346 [65 L.Ed.2d 175, 100 S.Ct. 2227]. ( Rivera v. Illinois (2009) 556 U.S. ___, ___ [173 L.Ed.2d 320, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 1454] [The Due Process Clause, our decisions instruct, safeguards not the meticulous observance of state procedural prescriptions, but `the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.']; Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 121, fn. 21 [71 L.Ed.2d 783, 102 S.Ct. 1558] [We have long recognized that a `mere error of state law' is not a denial of due process. [Citation.] If the contrary were true, then `every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question.' [Citations.]].) Accordingly, defendants have not established that their federal constitutional rights were violated. Nor have they demonstrated they suffered prejudice from violation of the statute under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243], which specifies that for prejudice to be shown, it must be reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendants would have been reached in the absence of the error. (See also Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 111-112 [error in failing to transcribe conferences concerning jury instructions was harmless].)

Defendants contend the trial court erred by denying their motions to sever the penalty phases of their trials. They present essentially two reasons why the trial court's decision was erroneous: (1) the joint penalty trials allowed the prosecution to conflate the evidence against each defendant so that the prosecutor's arguments that both defendants deserved the death penalty deprived them of the constitutionally required individualized consideration of the appropriate penalty; and (2) in the course of the joint trial, each defendant presented evidence in mitigation that was potentially harmful to the other defendant, but which would not have been properly admitted as aggravating evidence had they been tried separately. In a similar vein, Letner also argues that the greater amount of aggravating evidence that was presented against Tobin had an improper spillover effect that prejudiced the jury's consideration of Letner's punishment. (39) As we previously have observed, there is an undisputed statutory preference for a joint penalty trial following a similar trial of guilt (§ 190.4). ( People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 328 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274] ( Roberts ).) The trial court must exercise its broad discretion to resolve motions to sever the penalty phases of jointly tried codefendants ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 96 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506] ( Ervin )) in a manner consistent with the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence. ( Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 605 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954]; see Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 95-96). We conclude for the following reasons that the trial court's decision in the present case not to sever the penalty phase of defendants' trial was not an abuse of discretion, and did not deprive defendants of the required individualized consideration of the appropriate penalty to which each was entitled. (40) The prosecutor did not improperly argue that the jury need not separately consider the sentence for each defendant; instead she properly argued that each defendant was equally culpable in the crimes committed against Pontbriant, and that those crimes warranted the death penalty for each defendant. To the extent either defendant's evidence might have portrayed the other defendant in a bad light, the prosecutor did not improperly exploit the defendants' respective cases in mitigation. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that it must consider separately the evidence concerning each defendant, must not consider evidence admitted for a limited purpose in favor of or against one defendant in deciding the penalty for the other defendant, and must reach a separate verdict as to each defendant. The trial court also specifically set forth in the instructions exactly which criminal activity of each defendant could be considered in aggravation, and instructed the jury that it could not consider any other criminal activity as aggravating evidence, including escape from custody, burglaries unrelated to the case, and the sale and use of narcotics. The jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions in the absence of any indication it was unwilling or unable to do so. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 461 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947]; People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1173-1174 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937]; Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 95-96.) The record demonstrates the jury did separately consider each defendant's penalty, because after several days of deliberations it notified the court that it had reached a verdict as to one defendant, but at that time was unable to reach a verdict as to the other. [33] (See Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 328 [concluding that the record and the jury's careful consideration of its penalty verdict demonstrated that the defendant received an individualized determination of culpability].) Moreover, in light of the circumstance that the jury reached a death verdict as to both defendants, we discern even less of a possibility that the jury improperly assigned culpability based upon one defendant's attempt to mitigate the seriousness of his own actions by shifting accountability to his codefendant. (See Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 96 [concluding there was nothing in the record suggesting the jury assigned undue culpability to defendant after hearing his codefendants' mitigating evidence]; cf. Foster v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1991) 827 S.W.2d 670, 683 [concluding, in a case in which the codefendant did not receive a death verdict, that reversal of the death sentence was required as a result of the accumulated errors of admitting the codefendant's mitigation evidence that was prejudicial to the defendant who did receive a death verdict].) In the absence of a showing that the jurors in this joint trial were unable or unwilling to assess independently the respective culpability of each codefendant, we can find no abuse of discretion [or violation of defendants' constitutional rights] in failing to sever the trial .... ( Taylor, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1174.) In a supplemental brief filed prior to oral argument, Letner raises another basis for claiming that the trial court erred by denying the motions to sever. Relying upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. ___ [117 L.Ed.2d 525, 128 S.Ct. 2641], he contends the denial of severance was reversible error because, by extension of the high court's holding in Kennedy, that court, in effect, overruled its decision in Tison, supra, 481 U.S. 137, discussed, ante, in part II.B.4.j., and therefore separate penalty phase trials were necessary so that the jury would be required to find which of the defendants was the actual killer. Even assuming this claim is properly before us, we must reject it because Kennedy did not overrule Tison indeed, the single citation to Tison in the court's opinion in Kennedy simply describes Tison 's holding. ( Kennedy, supra, 554 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2650].) Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937]; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp. (1989) 490 U.S. 477, 484 [104 L.Ed.2d 526, 109 S.Ct. 1917] [If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.].)
During the direct examination of Letner, he briefly testified concerning five letters regarding Pontbriant's murder that he wrote to fellow jail inmate Danny Payne that were part of a plan by which Payne and Letner would offer information to the prosecution in return for favorable treatment. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Letner at length concerning the letters, primarily focusing upon the inconsistencies between the letters and Letner's penalty phase testimony regarding the murder. This cross-examination was supported by a display of enlarged copies of the letters placed before the jury, and Letner's reading aloud from portions of the letters. In the first letter, Letner told Payne that Tobin decided to kill Pontbriant while Letner was out purchasing beer, but that when Letner arrived back at the house he found Tobin stabbing her in the neck. In this account, Tobin told Letner that he killed Pontbriant because she had refused his sexual advances. Letner testified that in the first letter, he did not tell Payne the truth, because he did not want to admit to being a coward and letting Tobin kill Pontbriant while he (Letner) merely watched. According to Letner's testimony, Payne did not believe this version of the murder, and Letner subsequently wrote several more letters recounting the exact truth. These additional letters generally were consistent with Letner's trial testimony. Letner, however, also wrote that he had gone to Pontbriant's house to steal her car and to have sexual relations with her so that she would give him money. He further stated that he did have sexual intercourse with her on the couch (contrary to his trial testimony), and that Tobin also had demanded to have sex with her. Pontbriant, however, became angry and threatened to call the police, which triggered a heated response by both Tobin and Letner, although it was Tobin who went to the unexpected extreme of murdering her. Letner did not mention in the letters that Tobin had threatened to kill him if he interfered. Letner testified, however, that some of the content of these letters was Payne's version of the murder, which Payne had told Letner to incorporate into the letters. Tobin twice moved for a mistrial based upon Letner's testimony introducing assertedly prejudicial information concerning Tobin that was not contained in the letters, [34] but did not object specifically to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Letner concerning the letters. Moreover, Tobin's attorney also cross-examined Letner concerning the letters. On appeal, Tobin contends, however, that the testimony elicited by the prosecutor's cross-examination concerning the letters was improper because it (1) precipitated the introduction of inadmissible hearsay, (2) violated section 352 of the Evidence Code, (3) precipitated the introduction of inappropriate aggravating evidence, and (4) denied Tobin his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Tobin, however, forfeited his appellate claims by failing to raise them in the trial court. To the extent Tobin contends that Letner's objection, based upon hearsay, to testimony concerning one of the letters was sufficient to preserve Tobin's appellate hearsay claim, he is mistaken. Even if Tobin's failure to join in the objection did not foreclose this claim, Letner's objection concerned a letter written by Danny Payne, which, as the prosecutor stated, was not offered for the truth of what Payne wrote, but for the purpose of explaining what Letner did in response, that is, write the letters regarding the murder. The trial court properly overruled the objection. Moreover, the contents of that letter have no bearing upon the issue whether the prosecution's cross-examination concerning the letters written by Letner introduced improper hearsay evidence as to Tobin. (41) In any event, Tobin's appellate claims are without merit. The prosecution's cross-examination concerning the letters explored a proper basis upon which to rebut Letner's testimony, which included the subject of the letters. ( Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 754 [cross-examination can explore a defendant's testimony in greater detail than the direct testimony, and, in general, the permissible scope of cross-examination is very broad].) To the extent this claim restates Tobin's challenge to the denial of the motion to sever the penalty phase trials, we reject such a claim for the reasons stated, ante, in part II.C.1. Use of the letters also did not violate Tobin's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, even were we to agree with his assertion that the letters were, to some degree, actually the statements of Danny Payne, who did not testify. Although Letner testified that the letter writing was supposedly part of a plan to gain leniency from the prosecution, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Payne was acting as a law enforcement agent in this process. Therefore, the statements in the letters did not constitute testimonial evidence as that term has been defined after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354], and their admission did not violate Tobin's confrontation rights. ( People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 605 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104] [holding that only testimonial statements implicate the confrontation clause, and a statement is testimonial if (1) it is made to a law enforcement officer or by or to a law enforcement agent and (2) describes a past fact related to criminal activity for (3) possible use at a later trial]; see also People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 986-987 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205] [statement made to physician at hospital for purposes of treatment was not testimonial and was not admitted in violation of Crawford ].)
(42) Defendants contend the admission at trial of evidence concerning their unadjudicated prior offenses violated their rights to due process and a reliable penalty determination because of the passage of time, the supposed unreliability of the evidence, and the circumstance that the jury that considered whether the unadjudicated offenses had been proved already had found defendants guilty of the charges in this case, thereby assertedly eroding the presumption of innocence. Assuming that this claim constitutes a challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute, and that defendants therefore may raise it for the first time on appeal, the claim nonetheless fails. We previously have concluded that the requirement that such unadjudicated offenses be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may consider them in aggravation is sufficient to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. ( People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351]; People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 368 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229]; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1060-1061 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 239 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 822-823 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481].) Defendants have not persuaded us that this conclusion is incorrect.
Defendants contend the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating, at the conclusion of her closing argument to the jury: Lastly, ladies and gentlemen, remember this proverb. Remember that Jesus forgave the thief on the cross next to him, who, by his own admission was justly condemned. He gave the thief a place in paradise. But the thief still had to die for his crimes. In the name of the [P]eople of the State of California, I ask you to return the death penalty. (43) A prosecutor may not cite the Bible or religion as a basis to impose the death penalty. [Citations.] On the other hand, we have suggested it is not impermissible to argue, for the benefit of religious jurors who might fear otherwise, that application of the death penalty according to secular law does not contravene biblical doctrine [citations], or that the Bible shows society's historical acceptance of capital punishment [citation]. ( People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1169 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4] ( Zambrano ).) We have recognized that biblical references made by attorneys in argument to the jury are improper if they would tend to convince the jury that their verdict should be based upon legal or other principles apart from what is stated in the trial court's instructions. ( People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 261 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107] [[t]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may `diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and ... imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions.' [Citations.]].) [35] Defendants failed to object to the statement, or to request that the jury be admonished to follow the law as set forth in the court's instructions rather than a biblical proverb. Because we cannot assume that an objection and admonition would have been futile or ineffective, defendants have forfeited their appellate claim of misconduct. ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1169; People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1209 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262] ( Slaughter ); People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1105 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020].) In any event, the prosecutor's biblical reference did not constitute prejudicial misconduct. In Zambrano, we concluded that, although the prosecutor prefaced his religious remarks by explaining he was attempting to allay any concerns a juror might have that voting for the death penalty would be contrary to biblical teachings, his actual remarks went beyond addressing that concern and instead asserted that the Bible demanded that the death penalty be imposed when a defendant has committed murder. The prosecutor quoted Genesis chapter 9, verse 6 (`whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for in [H]is image did God make man') ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1168), and told the jury that this stood for two concepts: `The first is that capital punishment for murderers is necessary to preserve the sanctity of human life, and second being it is man's obligation to do it.' The sanctity of life, the prosecutor continued, does not forbid, but demands, the death penalty for murder, because a lesser penalty `means that the taking of life is not that serious an offense.' [¶] The prosecutor followed with other biblically attributed quotes on a similar theme: `He who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death'; `You shall not make reparations for the soul of a murderer who deserves to die, and he shall be put to death'; `Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord'; `The ruler bears not the sword in vain for he is a minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.' ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1168-1169.) We assumed the prosecutor's comments went too far, but concluded that the defendant had suffered no prejudice. ( Id. at p. 1170.) Defendants contend the prosecutor's biblical reference in the present case, which constituted her penultimate statement to the jury, was improper because it (1) contrasted the seriousness of defendants' offenses with those of the thief who was crucified, implying that defendants were more deserving of a death sentence, and (2) lessened the significance of a death verdict by implying that defendants could be forgiven for their crimes in the afterlife, and might be more likely to obtain such forgiveness if they were sentenced to death. The Attorney General, on the other hand, asserts that the prosecutor's comments might be viewed as simply contrasting the concepts of secular accountability and religious forgiveness, and that the brief biblical reference, which followed the prosecutor's extensive arguments regarding why, under the applicable statutory law, the death penalty was justified, would not have been interpreted by the jury as an argument that the Bible or religion afforded reasons to impose this sentence, or lessened the jury's responsibility in weighing a death verdict. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecutor's biblical references overstepped the proper bounds of penalty phase argument, we conclude they do not require reversal of defendants' judgments. In the present case, as in Zambrano, the prosecutor's biblical comments `were part of a longer argument that properly focused upon the factors in aggravation and mitigation.' ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) Moreover, in contrast to the comments at issue in Zambrano, the prosecutor here did not tell the jury that the Bible makes it man's duty to impose [the death penalty] to preserve the sanctity of human life. ( Ibid.; see also Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 296-298 [concluding that prosecutor's biblical references, which included stating that under Judeo-Christian religious doctrine capital punishment for murder is necessary in order to preserve the sanctity of human life, and ... only the severest penalty of death can underscore the severity of taking life, were not prejudicial]; Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1211 [similar argument was not prejudicial].) Although the biblical reference in the present case came at the end of the prosecutor's argument and therefore might have been somewhat more prominent in the minds of the jurors than if it had fallen somewhere in the middle of that argument, if the statement crossed the line of improper argument it did so by a much narrower margin than in other cases in which we have found the error harmless. For these reasons, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to defendants had the prosecutor not made the biblical references. (See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 466-467.)
Defendants contend the trial court erred by denying their requests to instruct the jury regarding the probability that the sentence it chose in its verdict would be carried out. Each defendant requested slightly different instructions, both of which, as we shall explain, properly were refused by the trial court. (44) We have long held that the standard jury instructions, which the trial court gave in the present case, adequately inform the jury of the meaning of the sentences that are legally permissible when the jury has found that a defendant has committed special circumstance murder. (See, e.g., Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 527-528; Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 270; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1176-1177 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384].) At the same time, courts often have been faced with the issue of deciding the appropriate response when there is concern that the jurors may contemplate the possibility that the sentence they choose might not be carried out because of future actions by the courts, the Legislature, or the Governoreither the concern that the defendant nonetheless will be released from prison if the sentence is life without the possibility of parole, or the concern that he or she will not actually be executed if the sentence is death. In People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430] ( Ramos ), we disapproved of the so-called Briggs Instruction that informed the jury that `a sentence of confinement to state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole may in [the] future after sentence is imposed, be commuted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of parole by the Governor of the State of California' ( id. at p. 150), because the instruction was seriously and prejudicially misleading and ... invite[d] the jury to be influenced by speculative and improper considerations. ( id. at p. 153). In a concluding footnote, we addressed the question whether any instruction regarding the subject of commutation of the sentence should be given. We stated: When the jury raises the commutation issue itselfeither during voir dire or in a question posed to the court during deliberationsthe matter obviously cannot be avoided and is probably best handled by a short statement indicating that the Governor's commutation power applies to both sentences but emphasizing that it would be a violation of the juror's duty to consider the possibility of such commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. [Citation.] [¶] When the issue is not expressly raised by the jury, it is a close question whether it is preferable for the court to give such a cautionary instruction on the assumption that some jurors might otherwise be aware of the possibility of commutation and improperly consider it, or whether such an instruction is simply more likely to bring the matter to the jury's attention and, as a practical matter, be difficult to follow. We therefore concluded that when (as in the present case) the jury does not raise the issue, the trial court has no duty to give an instruction concerning the subject on its own motion, but must do so if the defendant requests one. ( Id. at p. 159, fn. 12.) (45) In the wake of Ramos, we have addressed numerous claims of error arising from the trial court's refusal to give defense-requested jury instructions that sought to convey to the jury that it should not consider the possibility that some future event might prevent the fulfillment of the sentence it imposes. One clear rule that has emerged from the cases is that, although the trial court generally must give an instruction when the defendant requests one, the trial court is not required to do so on its own motion, and of course it should not give an instruction that is incorrect. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251] [It is of course virtually axiomatic that a court may give only such instructions as are correct statements of the law.].) Further, we have held that [i]t is as incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of death or life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out as it is to suggest they need not take their responsibility as seriously because the ultimate determination of penalty rests elsewhere. ( People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 130 [246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37] ( Thompson ); see also People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 994-996 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214] ( Ashmus ).) In the present case, the trial court therefore properly refused to give the following instruction requested by defendant Tobin: A sentence of life without possibility of parole means that MR. TOBIN will remain in state prison for the rest of his life and will not be paroled at anytime. A sentence of death means that MR. TOBIN will be executed in the gas chamber. We reiterate that such an instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. (See People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 53 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664]; Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 130-131.) We must acknowledge that our cases have displayed some inconsistency concerning instructions akin to the following one requested by Letner: You are to presume that if a defendant is sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, he will spend the rest of his life in state prison. [¶] You are to presume that if a defendant is sentenced to death, he will be executed in the gas chamber. In Ramos, we suggested that an appropriate instruction would consist of a short statement indicating that the Governor's commutation power applies to both sentences but emphasizing that it would be a violation of the juror's duty to consider the possibility of such commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. ( Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 159, fn. 12.) In Thompson, after holding that a trial court should not instruct the jury that the sentence inexorably will be carried out, we suggestedin what we described in Ashmus as dictum ( Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 995)that a correct statement of the law to be given upon the defendant's request would instruct the jurors that whether or not there were circumstances that might preclude either the death penalty or life without possibility of parole from being carried out, they should assume it would be carried out for purposes of determining the appropriate sentence for this defendant .... ( Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 131.) Subsequently, some defendants requested instructions that omitted the whether or not part of our statement in Thompson and simply would have told the jury, in a manner similar to Letner's proposed instruction, that the jury must assume that the sentence it imposes will be carried out. In People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 250 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302] ( Fierro ), we concluded that such an instruction, as compared to one that incorrectly tells the jury that the sentence it chooses inexorably will be carried out, was not similarly misleading, and, as we have previously observed [in Thompson ], should have been given. Some of our decisions, however, also appear to have concluded that telling the jury to assume the sentence will be carried out is misleading and incorrect. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 172 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980] [the trial court properly refused to give an instruction that the jury must assume a sentence of death meant defendant would be executed, while a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant `[defendant] will spend the rest of his life confined in state prison and will not be paroled at any time']; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 75-76 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118] [rejecting claim that trial court had a duty on its own motion to instruct the jury that it must assume a death sentence will be carried out, because such an instruction misstates the law].) We also have concluded that a proposed instruction that would have told the jury that a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole means the defendant never will be released on parole, and that therefore the jury `must assume in determining penalty in this case defendant will not be released from prison ever,' was incorrect. ( People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 524-525 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521].) More recently, in People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 967 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277], we addressed a claim that the trial court erred by giving, at the defendant's request, an instruction providing: `[I]f you find that a verdict of death is appropriate, you must assume that such penalty will be imposed,' without giving a similar instruction regarding a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. We concluded the trial court did not err in so instructing the jury regarding a death verdict, because although it would be erroneous to instruct the jury that if it returns a death verdict, the sentence of death will inexorably be carried out[,] the trial court may give such an instruction at the defendant's request. ( Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 967; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 647 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691, 181 P.3d 1035] [observing that to instruct the jury that it must assume that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole means the defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his or her life is inaccurate because it fails to acknowledge that the Governor retains the power of commutation].) (46) It appears that the apparent tension among our decisions regarding this subject stems from the evolution of the instructions that we have reviewed, which have not always reflected the basic purpose to be served by such instructions. As we observed in Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 155, a jury should not consider matters that are both totally speculative and that should not, in any event, influence [its] determination. Accordingly, the purpose of an instruction to the jury concerning the possibility that the punishment it selects will or will not actually be carried out is to inform the jury that such speculation concerning possible future eventsof which no evidence has been presented at the trialis improper and should not play any part in the jury's deliberations regarding the appropriate penalty. Telling the jury that it should assume or presume that the sentence will be carried out obscures the purpose of the instruction. Such an instruction also is misleading in the sense that, although other presumptions and assumptions that juries are instructed to consider have their bases in logic and experience, a presumption or assumption that the sentence will be carried out is, in fact, contradicted by the real possibility, of which some jurors may be aware, that the sentence will not be carried out. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err by refusing to give Letner's proposed instruction. In the future, if in a particular case the parties and the trial court decide that an instruction on this issue would be appropriate, the court might instruct the jury as follows: It is your responsibility to decide which penalty is appropriate in this case. You must base your decision upon the evidence you have heard in court, informed by the instructions I have given you. You must not be influenced by speculation or by any considerations other than those upon which I have instructed you. (47) Even to the extent we might conclude, in light of our decisions in cases such as Fierro, that in the present case the trial court's failure to give the instruction requested by Letner was error, any such error was harmless under any standard. [A]bsent any evidence to suggest that the jury was confused about the issue or concerned that [defendants'] sentence[s] would not be carried out, the failure to so instruct cannot be deemed prejudicial. ( Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 250.) There was no evidence of jury confusion or concern in the present case, nor do we accept defendants' arguments that empirical studies establish that jurors typically are confused or concerned with these questions even when they do not expressly bring up the issue. (See Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 487.) We also have rejected repeatedly the contention that the absence of an instruction concerning the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates a defendant's federal constitutional rights under the high court's decisions in Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154 [129 L.Ed.2d 133, 114 S.Ct. 2187] and similar cases. ( Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 187.)
(48) Tobin contends the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights by not giving, on its own motion, instructions concerning accomplice testimony, in light of the circumstance that Letner testified at the penalty phase of the trial. This claim parallels Letner's guilt phase claim that the trial court should have given similar instructions during the guilt phase of the trial based upon Tobin's testimony, a claim that we addressed, ante, in part II.B.4.b. In both the guilt and penalty phases of trial, the court ordinarily must instruct the jury sua sponte with CALJIC No. 3.18 [(to view an accomplice's testimony with care and caution)] when out-of-court statements to police by accomplices are admitted into evidence. [Citations.] We have recognized an exception, however, when the penalty phase accomplice testimony relates to an offense of which the defendant has already been convicted. ( People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1223 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981].) Even in the event the failure to give accomplice-testimony instructions was error (that is, if the exception mentioned in Carter did not apply in the present case because Tobin contested the extent of his culpability ( ibid. )), any error in failing to give such instructions was, as with Letner's guilt phase claim, harmless under any standard. The jury obviously discounted Letner's testimony, because it also sentenced him to death despite his testimony that Pontbriant was the victim of a murderous rampage by Tobin, which Letner had tried to prevent. In addition, there was adequate corroboration of Letner's testimony to the extent it incriminated Tobin. Tobin already had testified that he was at Pontbriant's house that night; he was found in the victim's car after the murder, and he fled with Letner to Iowa. A rational juror could find that this testimony, plus the physical evidence found at the house and in the car, implicated Tobin in the crimes.
Defendants raise a number of constitutional challenges to California's death penalty law that, as they acknowledge, have been rejected repeatedly by this court. They provide no persuasive reason why we should reexamine our prior decisions. As we recently observed in People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 938 ( Alexander ): [W]e reiterate that the death penalty statutes adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty, are not impermissibly vague or overbroad, and do not result in an `arbitrary and capricious' or `wanton and freakish' penalty determination. [We] also have held that the statutes do not require that the prosecution carry the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase, that the jury make written findings or reach unanimous decisions regarding aggravating factors, or that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the aggravating factors have been proved, (2) the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or (3) death is the appropriate sentence. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428] do not render the statutes invalid; neither does Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]. [Citation.] There is no violation of the equal protection of the laws as a result of the statutes' asserted failure to provide for capital defendants some procedural guarantees afforded to noncapital defendants. The statutes are not invalid because they permit the jury to consider in aggravation, under section 190.3, factor (b), evidence of a defendant's unadjudicated offenses. ( Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 198.) The use in the statutes, and in the standard jury instructions, of terms such as `extreme,' `substantial,' `reasonably believed,' and `at the time of the offense' in setting forth the mitigating factors does not impermissibly limit the mitigation evidence or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination. The statutes, as translated into those standard jury instructions, adequately and properly describe the process by which the jury is to reach its penalty determination. There is no need to instruct the jury at the penalty phase (1) regarding a burden of proof, except as to section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), or the absence of a burden of proof, (2) regarding the meaning of the term `mitigation,' (3) that mitigating factors can be considered only in mitigation, (4) that if the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence, the jury must impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, or (5) that the jury is not required to impose the death penalty even if it finds the aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence. The trial court need not omit from the instructions any mitigating factors that appear not to apply to the defendant's case. ( Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 938.) There is no requirement that the trial court or this court engage in intercase proportionality review when examining a death verdict. A sentence of death that comports with state and federal statutory and constitutional law does not violate international law or norms, or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 938-939.)
Defendants contend the cumulative effect of the asserted errors they have raised on appeal requires reversal of their convictions and sentences, even if none of the errors is prejudicial individually. We reject this claim. In those few instances in which we have found error or assumed the existence of error, we have concluded that any error was harmless. In combination, these errors do not compel the conclusion that defendants were denied a fair trial.
The judgment as to each defendant is affirmed in its entirety.