Opinion ID: 3011828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: This matter comes on before this court on an appeal from an order entered on April 3, 2000, dismissing appellant Kenneth Miller’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 on the ground that it was not timely. The circumstances of the case are straightforward. Miller shot and killed Carey McCrae in Philadelphia on August 26, 1984, and as a consequence a jury convicted him on October 29, 1986, in the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court of murder in the first degree and possession of an instrument of a crime. The jury subsequently set the penalty for the murder at life imprisonment following which the court imposed this sentence along with a concurrent sentence of one to two years on the possession count. Miller appealed but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his conviction on September 11, 1990. See Commonwealth 2 v. Miller, 583 A.2d 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (table).1 Inasmuch as Miller did not seek allocatur from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the direct proceedings in his prosecution ended with the Superior Court’s decision. On April 27, 1995, Miller filed a pro se petition for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 9541 (1998), in the Common Pleas Court. That court, after appointing counsel for Miller who filed an amended petition, denied him relief on September 19, 1996. Miller appealed but the Superior Court affirmed the denial of relief on August 28, 1997, see Commonwealth v. Miller, 704 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (table), and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on June 22, 1998, see Commonwealth v. Miller, 725 A.2d 180 (Pa. 1998) (table). Miller then filed a timely petition for certiorari which the Supreme Court of the United States denied on November 9, 1998. See Miller v. Pennsylvania, 565 U.S. 985, 119 S.Ct. 451 (1998). On October 14, 1999, more than one year after the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his petition for allocatur but less than one year after the Supreme Court of the United States denied his petition for certiorari, Miller filed his petition for habeas corpus. In his petition he alleged various constitutional errors which, in view of our disposition of this appeal, we need not describe. The district court referred the petition to a magistrate judge who filed a report and recommendation suggesting that the court dismiss it as untimely. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Miller’s petition by an order and memorandum dated March 28, 2000, and entered April 3, 2000. In its memorandum the court adopted the magistrate judge’s order but nevertheless explained itself why the petition was untimely. The court pointed out that under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1), a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), there was a one-year period of limitation _________________________________________________________________ 1. Miller had appealed earlier but the Superior Court dismissed this appeal as he did not file a brief. He then filed a petition for postconviction relief which resulted in his obtaining an order allowing him to appeal nunc pro tunc which he did. 3 governing a petition for habeas corpus filed by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court and that the limitation period runs from the latest of (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. The court observed that section 2244(d)(1) became effective on April 24, 1996, but noted that we provided in Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998), that there would be a one-year grace period following its enactment in cases in which a prisoner’s conviction had become final before April 24, 1996. Thus, inasmuch as Miller’s conviction became final on October 11, 1990,2 the court indicated that ordinarily he would have had until April 23, 1997, to file his petition in the district court. The court explained, however, that the April 23, 1997 date had been extended because Miller filed his state postconviction petition in April 1995, and it was pending when 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1) became effective. The circumstance that the state proceeding was pending was significant because 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2) provides that[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the _________________________________________________________________ 2. The district court stated that Miller’s conviction became final 30 days after the Superior Court affirmed it. 4 pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under [28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1).]3 The court said that section 2244(d)(2) tolling was applicable until June 22, 1998, when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allocatur and accordingly the court concluded that, absent further tolling, Miller had been required to have filed his habeas corpus petition on or before June 21, 1999, for it to be timely. In making these calculations the court did not mention Miller’s petition for certiorari. Of course, inasmuch as Miller filed his petition on October 14, 1999, it was untimely according to the district court. Finally the district court considered Miller’s contention that he was entitled to tolling beyond the period allowable under section 2244(d)(2). In this regard Miller contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling because he had been delayed in the prosecution of his petition for habeas corpus by his need to engage a private investigator. The court rejected this argument on the ground that Miller had not been diligent and thus it entered the order denying the petition. Miller then appealed and sought a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)(A) which provides that [u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court. This court denied the petition with an order reading as follows: The foregoing request for certificate of appealability is denied, as the District Court correctly concluded that the claims raised in Mr. Miller’s petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 are barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998); Stokes v. District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, no. 991493, slip op. (3d Cir. April 17, 2001). Appellees’ motion to file their response nunc pro tunc is granted. _________________________________________________________________ 3. There is no suggestion that Miller had not filed the state petition properly. 5 Miller then petitioned for panel rehearing leading us to enter an order providing that [t]he certificate of appealability is granted with respect to the issue pertaining to Stokes v. District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, 247 F.3d 539 (3d Cir. 2001), and the matter is referred to a merits panel.