Opinion ID: 2091176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Full Back Pay and State-Offered Benefits

Text: Reier's question requires us to determine whether State-offered benefits are contemplated in the award of full back pay, as the latter phrase is used in State Personnel and Pensions Article § 11-110(d)(1)(iii). We conduct a de novo review of the ALJ's legal conclusion that benefits are not included in full back pay as the question is one of statutory interpretation and, therefore, a purely legal inquiry. Schwartz v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 534, 554, 870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005); Charles County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 295, 855 A.2d 313, 319 (2004); Spencer v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 528-29, 846 A.2d 341, 348-49 (2004); Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dep't, 369 Md. 108, 121, 797 A.2d 770, 778 (2002). The ultimate objective of our analysis is to extract and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). This process begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute. Section 11-110(d)(1)(iii) does not state expressly whether full back pay embraces benefits. Reier interprets the plain language of the statute to include benefits in full back pay for terminations because benefits are permitted for lesser disciplinary sanctions. The SDAT, on the other hand, points out that the organization and structure of § 11-110(d)(1) specifically includes benefits as part of the compensation for lesser disciplinary actions not involving a break in service, but makes no mention of benefits as part of full back pay awarded in response to an invalid termination. This, the SDAT argues, indicates that the General Assembly purposefully decided to exclude benefits from full back pay as part of the relief available to a employee successful in upsetting his or her termination, whether on a technicality or otherwise. It strikes us that the competing parties' arguments present two . . . reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute, making the statute ambiguous and subject to a more expansive investigation of the field in our quest for legislative intent. Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487 (citing Price, 378 Md. at 387, 835 A.2d at 1226). Therefore, we may employ all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal, Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487, including legislative history, prior case law, and statutory purpose. Id. (citing Melgar v. State, 355 Md. 339, 347, 734 A.2d 712, 716 (1999)). After so doing, we conclude it more likely so than not that the General Assembly meant for the phrase full back pay in § 11-110(d)(1)(iii) to encompass State-offered benefits, including insurance, leave, status, and service credit. The word full connotes a comprehensive approach to compensation such that it includes all of the incidents and benefits of State employment. [22] As we noted in Geiger II, the State personnel management system underwent a panoptic legislative revision in 1996 on the initiative of Governor Glendening. 371 Md. at 145, 807 A.2d at 44. The Governor established a Task Force to Reform the State Personnel Management System in 1995, [23] which produced on 16 January 1996 its final Report to the Governor (Task Force Report) containing findings and recommendations. Geiger II, 371 Md. at 145-46, 807 A.2d at 44-45. This report formed the basis of the subsequently introduced cross-filed bills of House Bill 774 and Senate Bill 466, later codified as the State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996 (Reform Act). [24] The Reform Act generally reflect[ed] the Task Force recommendations [25] and was passed in substantially the same form as proposed by the Task Force. Geiger II, 371 Md. at 146, 807 A.2d at 45. Thus, the General Assembly's reliance on the Task Force Report serves as guidance for our interpretation of the statute. The original draft of House Bill 774 provided that § 11-110(d)(1)(iii)2 would read full back pay, with a deduction for interim earnings from employment elsewhere or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, thus providing a set-off for mitigation of damages accrued by the wrongfully disciplined employee. An amendment was introduced in the House of Delegates to strike the set-off language, in order to have the bill track the Task Force proposal that the OAH may order back pay which will not be reduced by interim earnings from employment elsewhere and other earnings that could have been received. Task Force Report 48 (1996). The descriptive word full remained in the statute after elimination of the set-off language, evidencing that full possesses significance independent of the set-off language it had once accompanied. The SDAT essentially asks us to regard full as a meaningless vestige of the deleted set-off language. Our canons of statutory interpretation, however, forbid us to construe a statute . . . so that [a] word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006); Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2005); Mid-Atl. Power Supply Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000); Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 180, 680 A.2d 1052, 1065 (1996); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-24, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994). We look to the surrounding provisions of § 11-110(d) to harmonize the various provisions of the statute and bestow the intended meaning to the word full. Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 168-69, 848 A.2d 642, 649 (2004); Md. Green Party v. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 178-79, 832 A.2d 214, 244 (2003); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bell Atl.-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 178, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (1997). While full is not used elsewhere in § 11-110, it appears in the subsubsubsection immediately following the recitation of restored time, compensation, status, and benefits as remedies for a wrongful termination. State Pers. & Pens. Article § 11-110(d)(1)(ii). Thus, full reasonably could be construed as a blanket word encompassing the list of remedies  time, compensation, status, and benefits  offered just above it. This interpretation is in accord with related Maryland jurisprudence. Since the Reform Act was codified, Maryland courts have conflated the provisions of § 11-110(d)(1)(ii) and (iii) so as to award both back pay and benefits. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 39, 40-41, 882 A.2d 849, 856-57 (2005) (indicating that a Circuit Court had awarded back pay and benefits as well as reinstatement as relief under § 11-110(d)(1)); Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Rynarzewski, 164 Md.App. 252, 254, 883 A.2d 205, 206 (2005) (upholding an ALJ's and Circuit Court's reinstatement of a terminated employee with back pay and benefits); Dep't Public Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Neal, 160 Md.App. 496, 507, 517, 864 A.2d 287, 293, 299 (2004) (upholding an ALJ's order that an employee's termination be rescinded and the employee be reinstated with full back pay under § 11-110(d)(1)(ii) and (iii)), cert. denied, 386 Md. 181, 872 A.2d 47 (2005). Wrongfully terminated State public sector employees generally receive benefits in addition to back pay as remedies for their improper dismissal. See, e.g., Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Shrieves, 100 Md.App. 283, 296, 641 A.2d 899, 905 (1994) (stating that a Circuit Court ordered a security attendant at a state hospital be reinstated with back pay and any lost benefits); Sheriff of Baltimore City v. Abshire, 44 Md.App. 256, 257, 408 A.2d 398, 399 (1979) (indicating that the Secretary of Personnel of Maryland ordered a deputy sheriff to be returned to duty with full back pay and benefits after finding the charges for dismissing the deputy lacked proper support). Furthermore, the entire State Personnel and Pensions Article, which we consider in its entirety to harmonize the applicable statutes, Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316-17, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006) (citing Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65-66, 862 A.2d 419, 429-30 (2004)), seems to contemplate that benefits are intertwined inextricably with State employee pay. Section 2-502 establishes the State Employee Health Program, which State employees are permitted to join by virtue of § 2-507(a) in order to receive a subsidy from the State for health care insurance. While on leave with pay, § 9-103 provides that State employees do not lose their health insurance subsidy and continue to accrue seniority and leave based on the employee's regular hours. Conversely, when a State employee is in a leave without pay status with regard to his employment[,] no deductions occur, no subsidies are provided and no leave or retirement credit accrues. Corr. Pre-Release Sys. v. Whittington, 119 Md. App. 436, 439, 705 A.2d 78, 80 (1998). The State Personnel and Pensions Article also grants State employees paid annual, [26] personal, [27] and sick [28] leave commensurate with certain formulas based upon the employee's length of service or start date. What is more, under §§ 9-304 and 305, unused annual leave may be redeemed for compensation at the employee's regular rate of pay, further linking leave with pay. Also, when setting or amending State employment pay rates, § 8-104(b) requires the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management to consider, inter alia, the benefits offered to employees. The SDAT argues that the statute's use of or in structuring the categories of relief available under the statute mandates a disjunctive reading of § 11-110(d)(1). [29] As support for its argument, the SDAT points specifically to the incompatible scenario of simultaneously upholding discipline under (d)(1)(i) and rescinding it under (d)(1)(ii). The SDAT further claims that the General Assembly intentionally spurned the Task Force Report's proposal to use and/or linking the possible actions available to the OAH as listed in (d)(1) by enacting the statute with the typically disjunctive word or separating the remedies. While it is true that or is read typically as a disjunctive, see, e.g., County Council of Prince George's County v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 418, 780 A.2d 1137, 1149 (2001); Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank of Md., 341 Md. 650, 657, 672 A.2d 625, 628 (1996), such is not always the case. The term or may be read in the conjunctive when the context reasonably supports the inference that such a construction is necessary to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. We have stated previously that [i]t is well settled that the terms `and' and `or' may be used interchangeably when it is reasonable and logical to do so. Little Store, Inc. v. State, 295 Md. 158, 163, 453 A.2d 1215, 1218 (1983); see also Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 286, 493 A.2d 341, 344 (1985) (stating that courts have the authority to construe the word and to mean or as required by context in order to comply with the clear legislative intent); NORMAN J. SINGER, 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 21:14 (6th ed.2002). The reasonably inferred intent of the General Assembly here was to permit (d)(1)(ii) and (iii) to be conjunctive options. In addition to the cases cited supra conflating the remedies of (d)(1)(ii) and (iii), the language used in the Task Force Report was followed substantially by the General Assembly. The Task Force Report, in its proposals that ultimately became (d)(1), separated subsubsubsections (i) and (ii) with an or and subsubsubsections (ii) and (iii) with an and/or. We read this proposed language as evidence of the intent of the Legislature to permit either or both the rescission of a disciplinary action or the reinstatement of a dismissed employee and/or full back pay. [30] Moreover, the SDAT's attempt to distinguish the two subsubsubsections by limiting the reach of (d)(1)(iii) to break in service type disciplinary actions and (d)(1)(ii) to all lesser disciplinary actions is contrary to the disciplinary scheme outlined in § 11-104. Terminations clearly are included as a form of disciplinary action under § 11-104(6), along with the full compliment of lesser actions. Thus, it is not reasonable to parse terminations from other forms of discipline in the terms of § 11-110(d)(1)(ii) when it states that the OAH may rescind or modify the disciplinary action taken. (Emphasis added). The SDAT's attempt to segregate terminations from lesser forms of discipline would result further in an illogical and manifestly unfair administration of remedies for wrongful terminations. The SD AT's construction of (d)(1) would allow for the award of benefits to the recipients of erroneously-imposed less severe discipline, such as suspensions or the forfeiture of leave, but necessarily would preclude the award of benefits to those terminated wrongfully, the most severe administrative punishment. We do not perceive that the General Assembly purposefully chose to restore fully the time, compensation, status, and benefits lost by those wrongfully disciplined who suffer consequences of a lesser magnitude as a result of their discipline and deny that same extent of relief to those who have borne erroneously the ultimate employment sanction. Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005) (quoting Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994)) (Our interpretation of a statute should `seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.'); Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 550, 814 A.2d 469, 490 (2002) ([A]bsurd results in the interpretive analysis of a statute are to be shunned.); Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135, 747 A.2d 625, 628 (2000) (If, on the other hand, the language is susceptible to more than one meaning and is therefore ambiguous, we consider `not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment,' and, in those circumstances, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, we consider `the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.') (citations omitted); Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998) (We interpret the meaning and effect of the language in light of the objectives and purposes of the provision enacted. Such an interpretation must be reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense. In addition, we seek to avoid construing a statute in a manner that leads to an illogical or untenable outcome.) (citations omitted); Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 56, 673 A.2d 221, 229 (1996) (In reading [statutory] language, we apply common sense to avoid illogical or unreasonable constructions. . . .); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991) (quoting D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179-80 (1990), in turn quoting NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.12 (4th ed.1984)) (In fact, `unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.'); State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975) (In construing statutes, therefore, results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language, with the real legislative intention prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning.); see also NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.12 (6th ed. 2000) (It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that, when one of several possible interpretations produces an unreasonable result, that is a reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.). There is no better illustration of the necessity to reject an untenable reading of a statute to avoid absurd results than the SDAT's construction of § 11-110(d)(1) in the instant case. Over ten years have elapsed since Reier was terminated by the SDAT, during which time he has been deprived of his accrued State-offered benefits. It is wholly unreasonable that the General Assembly would intend an employee in Reier's position to be deprived of entitled benefits while permitting an employee suspended for one day be made entirely whole. Our assessment of the intent of the General Assembly in Reier's case is consistent with that body's most recent amendment to § 11-110(d)(1)(iii), [31] apparently enacted in reaction to the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Reier II. Although the subsequent amendment . . . of a statute is not controlling as to the meaning of the prior law, Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 698 n. 2, 668 A.2d 1, 5 n. 2 (1995) (quoting Am. Recovery Co. v. Dep't of Health, 306 Md. 12, 18, 506 A.2d 1171, 1174 (1986)), subsequent legislation can be consulted to determine legislative intent. Nesbit v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 78, 854 A.2d 879, 886-87 (2004) (citing Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385-387, 614 A.2d 590, 593-94 (1992)); see also Swarthmore Co. v. Comptroller, 38 Md. App. 366, 373, 381 A.2d 27, 30 (1977) ([A] subsequent `statute purporting to declare the intent of an earlier one might be of great weight in assisting a court when in doubt.') (quoting United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 480, 43 S.Ct. 197, 199, 67 L.Ed. 358, 361 (1923)). Senator Delores Kelley introduced Senate Bill 1080 on 8 March 2006, just three legislative working days after Reier II was filed on 3 March 2006. In Senator Kelley's testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on 23 March 2006, she specifically indicated that her sponsorship of the bill was motivated by the intent to codify decades of practice by administrative law judges of rescinding wrongful terminations or suspensions and restoring back pay with benefits. This practice, she noted, was disturbed by the Reier II decision which held that the Legislature could not have intended full back pay to comprise both wages and benefits. The Committee favorably reported the bill the next day and it was passed on its third reading on the following day. Senator Kelley, we note, served as a member on the same Senate Finance Committee that considered the Reform Act in 1996, containing the original § 11-110(d)(1), as the 2006 amendment. Having resolved that Reier was eligible for full back pay, including State-offered benefits, further proceedings will be necessary to identify more precisely which benefits and amounts Reier may receive. At this juncture it is only determinable from the record that Reier was not a member of the State Employee Health Program and not receiving a subsidy for health insurance under that program at the time that he was terminated. [32] Thus, he cannot receive reimbursements from the State for its share of the medical expenses he may have incurred since his termination had he been a member of the Program. See Whitlow v. City of Birmingham, 689 So.2d 107, 109 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (holding that a reinstated public employee would not have received the dollar amount of the City's contributions to her health insurance coverage, but rather she would have received the benefit of those contributions-continued health insurance coverage). JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR REMAND TO THE MARYLAND OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.