Opinion ID: 28771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Price’s ADEA Claim

Text: We agree with the district court that Price did not produce sufficient evidence of an adverse employment action to support the jury’s award of damages on his ADEA claim. The district court held that Price “did not establish a prima facie case.” Price relies on several cases, e.g., U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 103 S.Ct. 1478 (1983); Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2001), to argue that the prima facie case is no longer relevant after a case has gone to the jury. These cases on which Price relies are distinguishable because they involved elements of the prima facie case that went to proving discrimination, not injury. Aikens, 103 S.Ct. at 1481 (ultimate question was discrimination vel non); Russell, 235 F.3d at 224 (issue was plaintiff’s proof of discrimination). The McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework is primarily concerned with the plaintiff’s initial burden when attempting to prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000). A plaintiff who proves discrimination must still prove injury to recover damages. Armstrong v. Turner Indus., 141 F.3d 29 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1998) (to recover, a discrimination plaintiff will have to prove a cognizable injury, usually an adverse employment decision). It is clear from the district court’s discussion that the district court found that the employment actions Price established – his transfer and subsequent resignation – did not amount to adverse employment action. Adverse employment action is part of the prima facie showing in an ADEA case because that is normally an element that the plaintiff will have to prove in order to receive a remedy under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (under ADEA, it is unlawful for employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual” because of age); Armstrong, 141 F.3d at 560. The money damages awarded to Price by the jury verdict were compensatory damages for the loss of his job with Unocal. To support this verdict, Price had to prove that his termination was a cognizable injury caused by the age discrimination. See Armstrong, 141 F.3d at 562 (when plaintiff did not identify any cognizable and compensable injury caused by the allegedly discriminatory act, he could not recover). When, as here, a plaintiff resigned, he may satisfy the injury element by proving constructive discharge. See Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997). Because Price was transferred to another position and then resigned, a 30 constructive discharge analysis is appropriate for determining whether Price suffered an adverse employment action. Price did not request a constructive discharge jury instruction and Price did not produce evidence sufficient to support an implied finding of constructive discharge. “To prove constructive discharge, a plaintiff must establish that working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.” Id. “Stated more simply, [the plaintiff’s] resignation must have been reasonable under all the circumstances. Whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement on terms that would make the employee worse off whether the offer was accepted or not.” Barrows v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n., 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). Price did not produce evidence that his transfer from production foreman to HES coordinator created conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. Price testified that the HES job was to be at the same salary.7 Although Price asserts that the HES job was a demotion, 7 On appeal, Price asserts that he would have lost salary. However, Price testified that he understood “[t]he salary was to be the same.” He went on to state, “I also felt like that I probably wouldn’t get any more raises.” Price offered no testimonial or other evidence to prove that his salary was lower or that his 31 there was no evidence presented sufficient for a jury to reach this conclusion. Cf. Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1999) (transfer may be a demotion if the new position proves objectively worse). The HES job was not menial or degrading. Hough, Price’s co-plaintiff and a former HES coordinator, provided testimony suggesting that the responsibilities of an HES coordinator, though different in kind from those of a production foreman, were at least comparable in degree. Hough testified that he worked as a production foreman from 1979 to 1990. He then moved over to work in HES. Hough testified, “[B]eing an HES is quite different than being a production foreman. Grant you, a production foreman has to know a lot of things as far as regulations of environmental laws and safety regulations, but being responsible for all the individuals in the area where you work, it’s a whole lot different.” There is no evidence that Price’s new position was objectively worse than his old one. Although Price testified that Van Deventer made age-based comments to him at various times, there was no evidence of anything approaching “badgering” during the HES job. Price was not specific regarding the dates of Van Deventer’s comments, so it cannot be simply assumed that they occurred during the HES concern about a lack of future raises was anything but speculative. 32 job, which Price only held for a few days. The only evidence Price presented that the HES job was intolerable was his testimony as to his subjective belief that he was set up to fail in this job which would require him to get new training. That does not meet the objective “reasonable employee” standard articulated in Barrows. See Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 803 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1986). We affirm the district court’s holding that the evidence did not support an award of damages to Price.