Opinion ID: 1854351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was there sufficient credible evidence to support the jury verdict?

Text: The jury found both parties to be causally negligent and apportioned 20 percent to the plaintiff and 80 percent to the defendant. The defendant, the appellant in this court, takes the position that there is no credible evidence to support the verdict. This court takes the position that, when a jury verdict is attacked, it will be sustained if there is any credible evidence under any reasonable view that supports the verdict. This is particularly true when, as here, the jury's verdict has been given the approval of the trial court. Schwalbach v. Antigo Electric & Gas, Inc. (1965), 27 Wis. (2d) 651, 135 N. W. (2d) 263; Cheetham v. Piggly Wiggly Madison Co. (1964), 24 Wis. (2d) 286, 128 N. W. (2d) 400. This principle applies to a jury's answers to special-verdict questions in the same manner that it does to a general verdict. Smith v. Atco Co. (1959), 6 Wis. (2d) 371, 94 N. W. (2d) 697, 74 A. L. R. (2d) 1095. The weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses are primarily determinations to be made by the finder of fact, in this case the jury; and where more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the credible evidence, the reviewing court must accept the one reached by the fact finder. Hanz Trucking, Inc., v. Harris Brothers Co. (1965), 29 Wis. (2d) 254, 138 N. W. (2d) 238. The apportionment of negligence is a matter particularly within the province of the jury, and it will not be upset except in unusual cases in which the court can find, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's negligence equaled or exceeded that of the defendant. Firkus v. Rombalski (1964), 25 Wis. (2d) 352, 130 N. W. (2d) 835. We nevertheless have disturbed the jury's determination of negligence when the percentages attributed to the parties are found to be grossly disproportionate. Brown v. Haertel (1932), 210 Wis. 345, 244 N. W. 630; Cameron v. Union Automobile Ins. Co. (1933), 210 Wis. 659, 246 N. W. 420, 247 N. W. 473; Zenner v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. (1935), 219 Wis. 124, 262 N. W. 581; Gauthier v. Carbonneau (1938), 226 Wis. 527, 277 N. W. 135. The plaintiff, however, has the burden of proof; and in the event that there is a failure of proof, as we conclude there exists in this case, the verdict can only be based on speculation and, therefore, is not entitled to the application of the rules set out above. We have stated: ... the degree of proof required must be such as will remove the ultimate facts to be found by the jury from the field of speculation and conjecture. Reichert v. Rex Accessories Co. (1938), 228 Wis. 425, 439, 279 N. W. 645. We stated in Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1933), 211 Wis. 326, 331, 248 N. W. 140: It will not do to reach a conclusion in favor of the party on whom the burden of proof rests by merely theorizing and conjecturing. There must at least be sufficient evidence to remove the question from the realm of conjecture. What then is the evidence presented by the plaintiff that would satisfy his burden of proof? The plaintiff himself was unable to testify as to the nature of the accident, and the only testimony given by the defendant was that he observed the light to be green at a distance of about 100 feet from the intersection. In his brief, the plaintiff relies on the testimony that, sometime before the accident, the defendant Greenwald was in a teen-age bar. Admittedly, that evidence is probative of the fact that he had drunk some beer and that he had appeared high while there and had left the bar in his automobile in a burst of speed with his car tires spurting rubber. However, this is far short of indicating the manner of his driving at the time the accident occurred, and there is no evidence whatsoever to link his alleged drinking at the Thirsty-I bar with the cause of the accident. We have previously said in McNamer v. American Ins. Co. (1954), 267 Wis. 494, 66 N. W. (2d) 342, that evidence of somewhat earlier conduct by a defendant is not probative of negligence in a subsequent accident. [1] As stated above, the evidence contained in plaintiff's Exhibit 1, that the light was red for the defendant and which led to the conclusion that the plaintiff had the right-of-way, was not properly in evidence and cannot form the basis of any inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. It should also be noted that the police officer's automobile-accident report stated that the intersection was controlled by automatic signals and not by flashing lights. The only evidence available is that the lights were on automatic operation and were green in favor of the defendant Greenwald. The plaintiff makes much in his brief of the fact that the plaintiff suffered a severe concussion and was unconscious for a period of four days. It is also a fact that the plaintiff claims to have no memory of the accident. He therefore asserts that, because of retrograde amnesia, it must be presumed that the plaintiff was proceeding with due care and that, if such a presumption is recognized, even though the intersection were regulated by automatic lights a person exercising due care would not have entered it against a red light. This court takes the position that, where retrograde amnesia is proved, a party so afflicted will be presumed to have exercised due care. Walter v. Shemon (1954), 267 Wis. 424, 427, 66 N. W. (2d) 160. It should be noted, however, that the assertion in this case of retrograde amnesia is based solely on the plaintiff's testimony that he was unable to recall the facts of the accident. There was not one whit of medical testimony that the plaintiff had amnesia, that the injury sustained by the plaintiff caused any amnesia, or that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, such amnesia would be the likely result of the injuries sustained. Although plaintiff's attending physician was questioned exhaustively in regard to the injuries sustained, none of the questions attempted to link the injuries to the amnesia that is now alleged. The trial judge did not instruct the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to the presumption that he was exercising due care because of retrograde amnesia, and it was proper, in the absence of some evidence in that regard, that he not do so. However, even had such evidence existed to give rise to such presumption, and we find that it does not, the presumption is a limited one. We stated in Atkinson v. Huber (1955), 268 Wis. 615, 618, 68 N. W. (2d) 447, that: ... where, in a negligence case, evidence is introduced which would support a jury finding contrary to the presumption that a deceased person or one who has suffered amnesia exercised due care for his own safety, the presumption is eliminated and drops out of the case entirely and no instruction upon that subject should be given to the jury. In Theisen v. Milwaukee Automobile Mut. Ins. Co. (1962), 18 Wis. (2d) 91, 100, 118 N. W. (2d) 140, 119 N. W. (2d) 393, we stated: This presumption is a limited one, is not evidence, and is sufficient only to place upon the other party the risk incidental to a failure to come forward with such testimony as may be in his control.... The defendant testified that the light was green, and such testimony was sufficient to rebut the presumption of due care asserted by the plaintiff. In view of the evidence of the records of the state highway commission that at the time of the accident the lights were on automatic operation, we cannot conclude that the testimony of the defendant was so inherently incredible to be insufficient to rebut the presumption of due care asserted by the plaintiff, and as set forth above we conclude that the presumption itself lacked the evidentiary basis necessary to make it an element in this case. The jury's verdict was based upon erroneously admitted evidence and mere conjecture. We conclude the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's motions to dismiss the complaint and for a directed verdict. By the Court. Judgment reversed, with directions to dismiss the complaint.