Opinion ID: 2301631
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: M.R.Crim. P. 16

Text: [¶ 24] Whether to order a new trial as a sanction for failure to comply with M.R.Crim. P. 16 is within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Mannion, 637 A.2d 452, 454 (Me.1994). We will not characterize a trial court's decision not to impose sanctions as an abuse of discretion or an error of law unless the defendant has shown that he was in fact prejudiced by the discovery violation . . . and that the prejudice rose to the level of depriving him of a fair trial. State v. Leavitt, 625 A.2d 302, 305 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). [¶ 25] The record supports the court's findings that Gould received a copy of the crime lab report in the morning of the first day of trial, before the start of the trial. Although in some cases the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence on the morning of the trialeven if the disclosure technically occurs before the start of trialmay be inherently unreasonable pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C), this is not such a case. Here, the record establishes that Detective Haines was advised by telephone of the results from the lab on July 13, the written report was completed on July 15, and it was mailed to him on July 16. However, Haines was on vacation or sick on the days leading up to the trial and he first obtained a hard copy of the report on July 22. He immediately delivered the report to the prosecutor. The record also shows that the prosecutor provided Gould with a copy of the report as soon as he received it. The record further shows that the State did not intend to introduce the report or its substance into evidence at the trial, and that Gould knew well in advance of trial that the bed sheet had been sent to the crime lab for forensic evaluation and that a report was expected. [¶ 26] The time between Detective Haines's telephone conversation regarding the test results and the mailing of the written report was only three days, and the delay between when the report was mailed and the date Gould received it was less than one week. There is no indication that the State unreasonably delayed delivering the test results to Gould, and on the facts of this case, the timeline by which the report was provided to Gould was reasonable. [¶ 27] Gould has also failed to establish that he was prejudiced by this sequence of events. Gould had the lab report in his possession before the trial started. He neither requested a continuance so that he could have more time to analyze the results, nor raised an objection based on the timing of his receipt of the report. The court concluded that there was neither a violation of M.R.Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) nor a violation of the principles set forth in Brady  because the State did not withhold evidencea required element for a Brady violation. The court also concluded that the laboratory results were given to the Defendant both orally and in writing as soon as that evidence was reasonably available, and that both parties were at least aware of the lack of DNA evidence prior to jury selection. The evidentiary record supports these conclusions. The court's ultimate conclusion that Gould was not prejudiced by this sequence of events is sound.