Opinion ID: 1330246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Continuance for Expert Witness

Text: Appellant's sixth assignment of error is that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing a continuance in order that appellant could obtain an expert witness from North Carolina on the issue of handwriting identity. The standard to be applied concerning the present issue is found in syllabus point 4 of State v. Milam, W.Va., 226 S.E.2d 433 (1976): In a criminal case, the granting or denial of a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and the refusal to grant such continuance constitutes reversible error only where the discretion is abused. The facts indicate that on the third day of trial Mrs. Mattie Flint, appellant's mother, was called as a witness by the prosecution. She was to testify that a letter she had received was written by the appellant. The letter allegedly incriminated the appellant in the shooting of Smith. However, after taking the stand she denied that the letter was written by her son. In so doing she refused to abide by an agreement she had made with the prosecution before trial that she would testify that the letter was written by the appellant. On the fourth day of trial the appellant made it known that he too would no longer abide by his agreement not to contest the authenticity of the letter. The trial court, upon a motion by the prosecution, ordered the appellant to furnish handwriting samples. At that time the prosecution informed the appellant and the court that an expert witness would be called comparing the handwriting samples with the handwriting contained in the letter. Appellant did not make a motion at that time to secure his own expert witness. Later on the fourth day the prosecution's expert witness testified concerning the handwriting contained in the letter. On the fifth day of trial appellant moved for a continuance so that he might bring in his own handwriting expert from North Carolina. In overruling the motion the trial court stated that if the appellant had a witness who was more readily available, the appellant would be permitted a continuance in order that testimony could be heard. The appellant, however, chose not to do so. To support his contention the appellant relies upon State v. Barker, W.Va., 289 S.E.2d 207 (1982). In that case the trial court, on the first day of trial, ordered the defendant to give samples of his handwriting. The defendant then moved for a continuance, but the trial court denied the motion and proceeded with the trial. In reversing his conviction on one charge of forgery we stated that: A defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to study the evidence and prepare his cross-examination.... [W]here the State has physical evidence that is crucial to the issue of defendant's guilt and that must be subjected to scientific analysis to assist in determining the defendant's guilt, the defendant has the right to have that evidence independently analyzed. 289 S.E.2d at 209. However, we do not believe that appellant's reliance on State v. Barker, supra , is well founded. It is apparent that appellant's own action, i.e., denial of the authenticity of the letter, resulted in handwriting becoming a contested issue in the case. The appellant waited an entire day before moving for a continuance in order that a handwriting expert from North Carolina might testify. In denying the motion the trial court gave the appellant reasonable opportunity to introduce testimony from a more readily available handwriting expert. The appellant, however, chose not to do so. Once the appellant chose, during the course of the trial, to deny authorship of the letter, and if he desired to present evidence on that issue, it was incumbent upon him to secure the necessary witness without causing any undue delay in the trial. Appellant did not do so. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling.