Opinion ID: 1657019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grim murdered the victim

Text: The majority explains this inference as follows: That the print was in blood supports a number of inferences. One reasonable inference is that Mr. Grim got blood on his thumb as he held the knife and stabbed Ms. Bradford in the chest and arm. Another inference is that Mr. Grim came into the house after the murder, but before the blood was dry, touched some wet blood, and then touched the inside of the wallet. However, we are bound to consider the inferences favorable to the State unless the contrary inference is such that it would necessarily give rise to a reasonable doubt in a reasonable juror's mind. See [ State v.] Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52, 55 [(Mo. banc 1989) ]. Maj.Op. at 412-413. I believe that the majority has, in this brief statement, misstated the law [3] and confused the word inference with the word possibility. Respectfully, I do not believe possibility has any place in a legal construct founded on reasonable doubt. An inference, as previously discussed, is a conclusion drawn by reason from facts established by proof. Draper, 156 S.W.2d at 630. The two inferences acknowledged by the majority above are not drawn from facts established by proof. Instead, they are drawn from an underlying inferencethat the print was in bloodwhich was, as just discussed, the product not of proven facts but of inferences drawn from inferences drawn from proven facts. At this point, the inference pile, barely strong enough to support the conclusion just discussed, collapses under the sheer weight of its own speculation. Thus it seems apparent to me that what the majority refers to above as inferences are not really inferences at all. They are simply two contradictory hypothesestwo possibilitiesboth of which are consistent with the evidence and either of which adequately explains the bloody thumbprint. They are what this Court condemned in Draper as supposition; that is, conjecture based on the possibility that a thing could have happened.... [or] founded on the probability that a thing may have occurred but without proof that it did occur. Draper, 156 S.W.2d at 630. [Emphasis added.] I thought that the question of whether convictions may be supported by supposition was no longer open for decision. See State v. Carter, 36 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Mo.1931) (court cannot resort to conjecture, suspicion and surmise to affirm conviction); State v. Hardy, 326 Mo. 969, 34 S.W.2d 102, 103 (1930) (It is not the province of a jury to choose between suspicions, and a verdict based upon suspicion will not be permitted to stand.); State v. Huff, 317 Mo. 299, 296 S.W. 121, 122 (1927) (jury must not be allowed simply to choose between suspicions). The majority, in an attempt to turn its reasonable theory of guilt into a reasonable inference of guilt, relies upon the totality of the circumstances in which the print was found. When the police arrived, the wallet in which Grim's thumbprint was discovered was lying in plain view on a table just inside a wide-open back door. The door had stood unguarded for not less than seven, and perhaps as many as twenty-four, hours. The outside of the wallet was stained with what we can reasonably infer to be the victim's blood. Supra at 408. Inside of the wallet was a thumbprint formed in the smallest trace of what we can reasonably infer was also the victim's blood. Supra at 408. There were two sets of shoeprints and one footprint on the floor, none of which was linked in any way to Grim. The majority explains that, to reach any of the pools of blood, someone coming along after the murder would have had to step over the body and walk into the bedroom, or would have to reach under Ms. Bradford's head or chest. Maj.Op. at 413. Why anyone would be concerned with reach[ing] any of the pools of blood is not explained by the majority. The only amount of blood that we know was on Grim's hand was the amount left behind as a thumbprint; an amount so small that its source need hardly have amounted to a pool. That Grim may have picked up this trace of blood from some other source, such as the outside of the wallet, is studiously ignored by the majority. Next, the majority makes passing reference to the fact that, since a fingerprint cannot be made in dried blood, this limits, to a certain extent, the time during which Mr. Grim might have wandered into the house and left his print. Maj.Op. at 413. The State failed to introduce any evidence of how long blood takes to dry to the point it cannot form a print. The only testimony that the blood was ever dry comes from an investigator who did not arrive on the scene until more than an hour after the crime was discovered. For all we know or may reasonably infer, the blood was still wet when the first officer got there; a time which, we are told, was seven to twenty-four hours after Ms. Bradford was killed. I can hardly see how this limits, to any extent, the time during which Grim might have left the thumbprint but not been guilty of the crimes charged. Instead, it indicates a great deal of time. The majority also remarks on the fact that the wallet was found closed. Maj.Op. at 413. Evidently, the majority finds it incredible, assuming that Grim had entered the house after the murder to steal the contents of a wallet lying in plain view from outside, that he would thumb through Ms. Bradford's wallet, close the wallet, lay it on the table, and leave without telling anyone about the crime. Id. Indeed, the majority asserts that this explanation is implausible. Maj.Op. at 413. Apparently, the majority believes it implausible that a burglar would close a wallet behind him but plausible that a killer would. What is implausible is the majority's explanation. In its resort to the totality of the surrounding circumstances, the majority inexplicably ignores the fact that, given the two sets of shoeprints, we know at least one person other than Grim was in Ms. Bradford's house after her death, and maybe two. The possibility that Grim came onto the scene after the murder but before the blood was dry is strengthened immeasurably by the State's evidence affirmatively showing that others were there. Unfortunately, the majority ignores that part of the State's case which it cannot reconcile with guilt. Ultimately, the majority reveals the true basis of its decision. After acknowledging that there are two competing explanations for the bloody thumbprint, and after ignoring the fact that the evidence provides no basis for electing between the two, the majority dismisses Grim's innocence as so unique and unusual as to be implausible. Maj.Op. at 413. This statement alone proves the fallacy of the majority's position; innocence is presumed, it is guilt which must be proven. The majority has stood the presumption of innocence on its head. So long as the State can articulate a reasonable hypothesis of guilt, one which is not inconsistent with the proven circumstances, the majority seems to indicate that the case is submissible unless, and until, the defendant's innocence appears beyond a reasonable doubt. I am of the opinion that since innocence is ordinarily presumed, the State labors under a burden of producing evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in purely circumstantial evidence cases, where the State's evidence does not preclude a plausible, innocent explanation for the circumstances, I would hold that a reasonable doubt exists as a matter of law and, thus, the case is not submissible. In the present case, the State's evidence gives rise to two plausible explanations for the circumstances shown; one guilty and the other innocent. There is simply no basis in the evidence for choosing one over the other. Not even the Dulany rule, oft-cited by the majority as urging deference to the State's position, contemplates that a reviewing court is bound to provide the evidence the State lacks by resorting to speculation. The majority, faced with an almost complete absence of evidence, seeks support in prior cases. With apparent relief, the majority remarks that its result is not entirely unprecedented. Maj.Op. at 414. The majority first cites State v. Maxie, 513 S.W.2d 338 (Mo.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1132, 43 L.Ed.2d 402 (1975), in which this Court affirmed a second degree murder conviction arising out of a gruesome double-homicide. See also State v. Lindsey, 507 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. banc 1974) (first degree murder conviction affirmed for Maxie's accomplice). In Maxie , the Court held that the State's case, based largely on fingerprint evidence, was sufficient when coupled with the defendant's testimony. The Court explained its holding, stating that, by offering testimony, the defendant has ruled out any reasonable possibility that his fingerprint was ... [made] under circumstances other than at the time of the homicide. Id. at 343. [Emphasis added.] Unlike the defendant in Maxie , however, Grim has not eliminated the innocent explanation that the print was left after Ms. Bradford was killed. The majority also cites State v. Gales, 507 S.W.2d 35 (Mo.App.1974), in which the court of appeals affirmed a single conviction for felony murder. Maj.Op. at 414. Compared to the present case, the evidence in Gales was overwhelming. There, the defendant was seen with a television and fan, which had been taken from the victim's house, and was arrested with several article's of the victim's jewelry on his person. Additionally, the defendant's fingerprints were found on the victim's jewelry box. Id. at 36-37. As noted by the majority, there was no possibility, in Gales , that the defendant came along after the killing and left his print. Maj.Op. at 414. The victim's house was found locked on the morning following the burglary and murder. Gales, 507 S.W.2d at 36. Thus, the court held that the circumstances showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the fingerprints could only have been left at the time the crime was committed. Id. at 37. Prior to today, the rule in cases relying primarily on fingerprint evidence was that fingerprints found in the place where a crime is committed, under such circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed corresponding to those of the accusedmay be sufficient proof of identity to sustain a conviction. State v. Thomas, 452 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo. 1970). [Emphasis added.] The holding in Maxie is consistent with this rule; there, the defendant eliminated any innocent explanation for his prints. Similarly, Gales is consistent with Thomas in that the short period of time before the crime was discovered, and the fact that the perpetrator left the victim's house locked, provided some basis for concluding that the defendant's print must have been left during the crime. It is unclear why the majority fails to apply Thomas to this case, especially after citing and relying on Maxie and Gales both of which expressly rely on Thomas . The State's proof fails to link Grim's print with evidence of other circumstances tending to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt Grim's theory of innocence, that he came along after the Ms. Bradford was dead. Therefore, I would hold that Thomas controls and, on that basis, would reverse.