Opinion ID: 1192010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: hudson was denied his right to a fair trial, free from error, on the fraud cause of action, when the trial court granted a judgment n.o.v. on the negligent misrepresentation cause of action, without ordering a new trial on the fraud count.

Text: The trial court submitted the case to the jury on theories of fraud (Instruction No. 16a) (R.Vol. V, p. 1439-1440) and negligent misrepresentation as defined by Instruction No. 40 (R.Vol. V, p. 1465-1466) and Instruction No. 43 (R.Vol. V, p. 1469) Copies of these instructions, and a side by side comparison of Instructions Nos. 16a and 40, are in the Appendix. Instruction No. 40 was given over the objection of Hudson. (Tr.Vol. 18, p. 3229-3330). The fraud instruction and the negligent misrepresentation instruction were essentially the same, except for the element of the Defendants' knowledge of the falsity. The fraud instruction stated, that when the Defendants made the promise or representation, they knew it was false. The negligent misrepresentation instruction stated that when Lyle Cobbs and Jack Kennevick made the statement, they acted negligently. Instruction No. 43 advised the jury of a party's duty to disclose known facts. The negligent misrepresentation claims and the fraud claims as presented to the jury by the Court's instructions, are inherently intertwined and related. The trial court, in its instructions, drew two subtle distinctions between the causes of action  the burden of proof and whether or not Cobbs and Kennevick knew, at the time the representation was made, that it was false. A majority of this Court, in the earlier opinion, accurately characterized the negligent misrepresentation cause of action, as submitted to the jury, as a lesser included tort of fraud. The jury verdict in favor of Hudson on the negligent misrepresentation issue, and against Hudson on the fraud count, could have easily been accepted by those jurors who also believed that the evidence established fraud, as this finding had the same result, i.e., liability on the part of Cobbs and Kennevick. The proper standard for this Court is whether prejudice could have reasonably occurred, not whether prejudice actually occurred. Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, (Idaho App. 1989). If error was prejudicial and it reasonably could have affected the outcome of the trial, then a new trial must be granted. Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 534 (Idaho App. 1989) The jury's verdict in this case turned upon its interpretation of the subtle distinctions between the two torts. The jury concluded that Cobbs and Kennevick were grossly negligent. If the jury had not had this option, then we can only speculate as to what the result might have been. But a party's right to a fair trial, free from prejudicial error, should not be determined by speculation. See pages 5-9 of Hudson's Memorandum In Response to Memorandum in Support of Respondents' Petition for Rehearing, in which this issue is discussed in more detail. In order to provide Hudson with his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury trial, this Court, at the very least, must adhere to its original opinion filed on August 11, 1989, reverse the judgment n.o.v. and remand the case for a new trial, free from the prejudicial error made by the trial court on its own motion and over the objection of Plaintiff and Defendants.