Opinion ID: 4180003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Schultz v. Pritts “Adverse Effects” Test13

Text: Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), is widely considered to be the bellwether case regarding conditional uses and special exceptions in the state of Maryland. See Loyola Coll. in Md., 406 Md. at 87, 956 A.2d at 186; see also Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC, 403 Md. 523, 551, 943 A.2d 1192, 1208 (2008) (noting that “some have called [Schultz v. Pritts] the seminal case in the Maryland law of special exceptions.”). In Schultz, we concluded that our precedent establish[es] that a special exception use has an adverse effect and must be denied when it is determined from the facts and circumstances that the grant of the requested special exception use would result in an adverse effect upon adjoining and surrounding properties unique and different from the adverse effect that would otherwise result from the development of such a special exception use located anywhere within the zone. Howard County incorporated the Schultz test in HCZR §131.B.2, which requires 13 the Board to determine that “[t]he proposed use at the proposed location will not have adverse effects on vicinal properties above and beyond those ordinarily associated with such uses.” 18 Schultz, 291 Md. at 15, 432 A.2d at 1327. We held that the appropriate standard to be used in determining whether a requested special exception use would have an adverse effect, and therefore, should be denied is whether there are facts and circumstances that show that the particular use proposed at the particular location proposed would have any adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such a special exception use irrespective of its location within the zone. Id. at 22-23, 432 A.2d at 1331 (citations omitted). In Loyola Coll. of Md., we clarified that the language in Schultz regarding “adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated” with a conditional use is best understood in the context of the local legislature’s intent. We determined that [t]he local legislature, when it determines to adopt or amend the text of a zoning ordinance with regard to designating various uses as allowed only by special exception in various zones, considers in the generic sense that certain adverse effects, at least in type, potentially associated with (inherent to, if you will) these uses are likely to occur wherever in the particular zone they may be located. In that sense, the local legislature puts on its ‘Sorting Hat’ and separates permitted uses, special exceptions, and all other uses. That is why the uses are designated special exception uses, not permitted uses. The inherent effects notwithstanding, the legislative determination necessarily is that the uses conceptually are compatible in the particular zone with otherwise permitted uses and with surrounding zones and uses already in place, provided that, at a given location, adduced evidence does not convince the body to whom the power to grant or deny individual applications is given that actual incompatibility would occur. Loyola Coll. in Md., 406 Md. at 105-06, 956 A.2d at 197-98 (footnotes omitted). We also noted the alleged adverse effects “must be more than mere annoyance[]” because by classifying such uses as special exceptions or conditional uses, the legislature assumes that those uses will include some adverse impacts. See Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 542, 814 A.2d 469, 485 (2002). 19 Because special exceptions and conditional uses are legislatively-created, we have repeatedly held that “they enjoy the presumption of correctness and are an appropriate tool for the exercise of a local government’s police powers.” Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 272 Md. at 542-43, 814 A.2d at 486 (citations omitted); Schultz, 291 Md. at 11, 432 A.2d at 1325; see also Anderson v. Sawyer (“Sawyer”), 23 Md. App. 612, 617, 329 A.2d 716, 720 (1974) (“The conditional use or special exception is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that, as such, it is in the interest of the general welfare, and therefore, valid.”) (citations omitted); Mills v. Godlove, 200 Md. App. 213, 230, 26 A.3d 1034, 1044 (2011) (“Because the allowance of a special exception use is part of a comprehensive zoning regulatory scheme that is itself accompanied by the presumption that it promotes public safety, health, and morals, it stands to reason that this broader presumption accompanying the zoning ordinance itself generates the specific presumption of compatibility associated with the inclusion in the ordinance of those uses that may be allowed through the grant of special exceptions.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although there is a legislative presumption that a conditional use is valid, the applicant still bears “both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether the [conditional use] should be granted” and must persuade the Board “‘by a preponderance of the evidence that the special exception will conform to all applicable requirements.’” See Attar v. DMS Tollgate, LLC, 451 Md. 272, 286, 152 A.3d 20 765, 774 (2017) (quoting Loyola Coll. in Md., 406 Md. at 109, 956 A.2d at 199).14 The applicant is not required, however, to affirmatively establish that the proposed use will be a benefit to the community. Schultz, 291 Md. at 11, 432 A.2d at 1325; Sawyer, 23 Md. App. at 617, 329 A.2d at 720 (citations omitted). “If the applicant shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public interest, he [or she] has met his [or her] burden.” Schultz, 291 Md. at 11, 432 A.2d at 1325. Any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is material, but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance, in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, then a denial of the conditional use would be arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. Id. 14 We also noted in Attar that “[w]hile an applicant for a [conditional use] bears both the burden of persuasion and of production, the concurrent presumption in favor of a [conditional use] applicant is not a mutually exclusive evidentiary burden.” 451 Md. at 286, 152 A.3d at 774. We explained, quoting the Honorable Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.’s opinion in Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 694 A.2d 150 (1997), that: [A] presumption does not necessarily shift the burden of persuasion. Rather, it merely satisfies the burden of going forward on a fact presumed and may satisfy the burden of persuasion if no rebuttal evidence is introduced by the other side. … Stated differently, the party favored by the presumption is not relieved of the requirement of presenting evidence to establish a prima facie case as to those issues for which he bears the burden of proof if the adverse party sufficiently rebuts the presumption. In such instances, the presumption merely enhances the probative value of other evidence adduced. Attar, 451 Md. at 287, 152 A.2d at 774 (quoting Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. at 564, 694 A.2d at 157) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 Thus, Schultz and its progeny established that if a conditional use applicant demonstrates compliance with the prescribed standards and requirements set forth in the relevant statute or regulation, then there is a presumption that the use is in the interest of the general welfare, a presumption that may only be overcome by probative evidence of unique adverse effects. Absent such probative evidence, it is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal for the Board to deny the conditional use application. See Schultz, 291 Md. at 15, 22-23, 432 A.2d at 1327, 1331 (citations omitted). A. The Board Is Not Required to Identify the “Ordinary or Inherent Adverse Effects” of a Funeral Home The second question presented for our review asks whether the Board satisfied the Schultz “adverse effects” test “when it failed to conduct an analysis based on the ‘ordinary or inherent adverse effects’ of a [f]uneral [h]ome[.]” Petitioners argue that to satisfy the “adverse effects” test in Schultz, the Board was required to determine what the ordinary or inherent adverse effects of a funeral home were. In support of this view, Petitioners rely on the decision in Mills v. Godlove,15 where the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the zoning board “did not sufficiently discuss the adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with a storage yard.” 200 Md. App. at 239, 26 A.3d at 1049. 15 In Mills, the applicants sought a special exception and variance allowing them to continue to park paving equipment on their property, which they had been doing for seven years prior to filing the application without issue. 200 Md. App. at 217-18, 26 A.3d at 1036-37. The zoning board initially approved the application, but on judicial review the circuit court reversed the board, concluding that the board’s findings were insufficient. Id. at 220-21, 26 A.3d at 1037-38. On remand, the board again approved the applicants’ application, but on judicial review, the circuit court again reversed the board, holding that there was insufficient analysis of the inherent adverse effects associated with an equipment storage yard. Id. at 222-23, 26 A.3d at 1039. 22 Petitioners contend that the case at bar is analogous to Mills because the Board did not identify or determine what the ordinary or inherent adverse effects of a funeral home might be. Instead, Petitioners argue that the Board merely offered the general premise that it “begin[s] with the realization that virtually every human activity has the potential for adverse impact. Zoning recognizes this fact and, when concerned with conditional uses, accepts some level of such impact in light of the beneficial purposes the zoning body has determined to be inherent in the use.” Petitioners acknowledge, however, that the Board considered “noise, dust, fumes, odors, lighting, vibrations, hazards or other physical conditions” as “potential adverse impacts.” In contrast, Donaldson argues that the Board properly considered the adverse impact of the proposed funeral home, including evaluation of: (1) the noise, dust, odors, lighting, vibrations, and fumes; (2) the adverse environmental impact; (3) the adverse impact related to cultural sensitivities; (4) the adverse impact related to structures, walls, and fences; (5) the adverse impact related to parking areas, loading areas, driveways, and refuse areas; and (6) the adverse traffic impacts. See HCZR §131.B. Donaldson also contends that Mills was not intended to create a formulaic approach that required the Board to first identify all of the adverse impacts generally associated with a funeral home and then systematically deconstruct or refute such adverse impacts to arrive at the Board’s ultimate conclusion. Instead, Donaldson argues the Court’s holding in Mills was based on its assessment that the zoning board’s conclusions “were insufficient because it merely presented conclusions without pointing to any evidentiary basis.” 200 Md. App. at 236, 26 A.3d at 1048. Donaldson avers that the purpose behind requiring detailed 23 findings of fact and conclusions of law in the decisions and orders of an administrative agency is to permit a party to the proceedings “to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision” and to “permit meaningful judicial review of those findings.” Harford County v. Earl E. Preston, Jr., 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991). Donaldson argues that ultimately, the test is whether the Board’s decision regarding adverse impacts was carefully evaluated and sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review, which it contends, the Board did. We agree. In Schultz, we recognized that in designating a conditional use, the local legislature “considers the variety of possible uses available, examines the impact of uses upon the various purposes of the zoning ordinance, determines which uses are compatible with each other and can share reciprocal benefits, and decides which uses will provide for coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the district.” Schultz, 291 Md. at 22, 432 A.2d at 1330. Based on this balancing process, when the legislative body determines that the beneficial purposes that certain uses serve outweigh their possible adverse effect, such uses are designated as permitted uses and may be developed even though a particular permitted use at the particular location proposed would have an adverse effect above and beyond that ordinarily associated with such uses.