Opinion ID: 1926278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application of the ABA Standards Initial Sanction Determination

Text: In this case, the Board found, and we agree, that Reardon's misconduct in both instances was a violation of his duty to represent his respective clients with reasonable diligence under Rule 1.3. It is undisputed that Reardon's misconduct was negligent. There is no assertion that Reardon's misconduct was knowing or intentional. Moreover, although Reardon disputes that his misconduct was the actual cause of his clients' injuries, Reardon and ODC both agree that the injury suffered by Reardon's clients was not substantial given the factual context of the respective cases. The relevant ABA Standard regarding lack of diligence, Standard 4.4, provides: 4.4 Lack of Diligence Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client: . . . 4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. The Board concluded, albeit after consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, that a six month suspension was warranted under Standard 4.42 because Reardon had engaged in a pattern of neglect and cause[d] injury or potential injury to his clients. We disagree. As an initial matter and without considering aggravating or mitigating factors, Reardon's misconduct in the Atlantic Roofing and Pierce and Miller cases did not constitute a pattern of neglect causing injury or potential injury to a client. [13] Although we specifically reject Reardon's contention that his misconduct was not the cause of the injury to his client in the Atlantic Roofing case, [14] we do not agree with the Board's conclusion that the misconduct involved in these two cases establishes a pattern of neglect. The term pattern is not defined in the ABA Standards. Nor has this Court had occasion to define the term pattern with precision in the context of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding. [15] Our prior decisions finding a pattern of lawyer misconduct involved identifiably similar instances of repeated misconduct over a period of time or involved multiple acts of intentional or knowing misconduct. [16] Although we believe that two or more acts could, under different circumstances than those presented here, constitute a pattern of misconduct, the number of acts of misconduct, standing alone, cannot establish a pattern. A pattern may be discerned from two or more recognizably consistent acts that serve as a predictor of future misconduct. Whether the acts are recognizably consistent may depend upon a combination of factors including, among other things, the temporal proximity of the acts, the number of acts of misconduct, the number of clients or cases involved, the similarity of the duties violated and the resulting injuries, and the lawyer's state of mind. In this case, the two acts of misconduct occurred closely in time and involved violations of Reardon's duty of diligence to two different clients. The actual acts of misconduct and the resulting injuries, however, are not similar. In the Atlantic Roofing case, Reardon failed to ensure that the agreement he reached on behalf of his client was reflected accurately in the stipulation he signed. This ultimately resulted in financial damage to his client. In the Pierce and Miller case, Reardon retained documents and failed to make it clear that he declined to represent them. Pierce and Miller did not suffer any damage from this misconduct, however, because they did not have a defense to the lawsuit. The Board found Reardon to be negligent in both cases. Negligence is the least culpable mental state and, thus, not as strong a predictor of future misconduct as prior acts of intentional or knowing misconduct. Considering the totality of the circumstances presented in both cases, we do not agree with the Board's conclusion that the two cases, standing alone, represent a pattern of neglect. Accordingly, as an initial matter, we find Standard 4.43 to be more applicable than Standard 4.42. Standard 4.43 recommends, in the absence of aggravating or mitigating factors, the imposition of a public reprimand when a lawyer is negligent and fails to act with reasonable diligence which causes injury or potential injury to a client. Public reprimand is a way of conveying disapproval of lawyer misconduct that does not warrant incapacitating sanctions, such as suspension or disbarment. [17] Furthermore, we find probation, in addition to a public reprimand, to be warranted in this case. Probation, as a rehabilitative sanction, is justified when a lawyer's right to practice law needs to be monitored or limited rather than revoked or suspended and when it appears that the conduct at issue is capable of being corrected. [18] And, if it is not corrected, suspension or revocation, as the case may be, should follow.