Opinion ID: 1682303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural/Remedial Change Versus Substantive Change

Text: In the analysis of a change in statutory law, a key determination is whether the statute constitutes a procedural/remedial change or a substantive change in the law. The rule for procedural/remedial changes, in contrast to the presumption against retroactive application for substantive changes, is as follows: Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule against retrospective operation of statutes. City of Lakeland v. Catinella, 129 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla.1961) (emphasis added). Moreover, the presumption in favor of prospective application generally does not apply to `remedial' legislation; rather, whenever possible, such legislation should be applied to pending cases in order to fully effectuate the legislation's intended purpose. Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla.1994) (citing City of Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So.2d 1027 (Fla.1986)). Finally, a statute that achieves a remedial purpose by creating substantive new rights or imposing new legal burdens is treated as a substantive change in the law. Arrow Air, Inc., 645 So.2d at 424. The primary effect of section 776.013 is to specifically incorporate no duty to retreat for certain situations when deadly force can immediately occur without needing to first retreat. The language is as follows: (3) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. § 776.013(3), Florida Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). To aid the determination of whether a person had a reasonable belief that self-defense was needed or a forcible felony was intended, section 776.013 also created the following two presumptions: [3] (1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if: (a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and (b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. . . . . (4) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person's dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. § 776.013(1),(4), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). This legislation clearly constitutes a substantive change in the law, rather than a procedural/remedial change in the law, because it alters the circumstances in which it is considered a criminal act to use deadly force without first needing to retreat. See State v. Garcia, 229 So.2d 236, 238 (Fla.1969) (As related to criminal law and procedure, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment therefor. . . . ). The duty to retreat in Florida is a product of the common law. See Weiand, 732 So.2d at 1049 (citing Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824, 827 (Fla.1965)). Although the duty to retreat has been previously qualified in Florida through case law, section 776.013 establishes a no duty to retreat rule in a broad context that had not previously existed. Prior to this legislation, case law established that a person was not required to retreat from his or her residence before resorting to deadly force in self-defense if the deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm. See Pell v. State, 97 Fla. 650, 122 So. 110, 116 (1929). Although such examples of the right to use deadly force without first retreating existed prior to the enactment of section 776.013, the broad context of this legislation (i.e. not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be) establishes that there is no duty to retreat before using deadly force in numerous other situations that the case law had not previously established. For example, the specific right of Smiley to use deadly force in self-defense in his taxi did not exist prior to section 776.013. Neither the decisional law nor the statutory law had established the right to use deadly force in self-defense in a motor vehicle. Compare Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that the castle doctrine extends to a place of business), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981) with Baker v. State, 506 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that the castle doctrine does not extend to automobiles). Moreover, this Court previously held that a new jury instruction on self-defense, which was not related to section 776.013 but did come from a statutory change in the law, was substantive. See Fla. Bar re Standard Jury Instructions Criminal Cases, 477 So.2d 985, 986 (Fla.1985) (discussing that the new jury instruction for the justifiable use of force in resisting arrest under section 776.051(c), Florida Statutes (1985), was of a substantive nature) (quoting committee report). Finally, section 776.013 is analogous to section 775.051, which abrogated the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication. Although section 776.013 created a new affirmative defense for situations in which one may use deadly force without first retreating, rather than abrogating an affirmative defense as occurred with section 775.051, the classification by this Court of section 775.051 as a substantive change in the law is analogous and applicable in the analysis of section 776.013. See Troy v. State, 948 So.2d 635, 645 (Fla.2006) (adopting the reasoning in Barrett v. State, 862 So.2d 44, 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), that although section 775.051 has procedural elements that are closely related to the substantive elements of the statute, section 775.051 constitutes a substantive change in the law). Whether a statute creates or abrogates an affirmative defense, both statutes significantly change the affirmative defenses available to defendants. For all these reasons, we conclude that section 776.013 is a substantive change in the statutory law.