Opinion ID: 73339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brand's Conviction

Text: The CSRA criminalizes the willful[ ] fail[ure] to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State[.] 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(a). The CSRA defines a past due support obligation as any amount (A) determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living; and (B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is greater than $5,000[.] 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(d)(1). The state circuit judge's order dissolving the Brands' marriage provided that Brand was to pay Margrethe a lump sum of $3.935 million in addition to $2,500 monthly. The lump sum was for alimony, maintenance and support of [his] wife, and to provide security for the minor children in the style to which they ha[d] become accustomed. The monthly obligation was for child support. Brand's CSRA conviction was based upon his failure to comply with this order. In challenging his conviction, we construe Brand's argument on appeal as being twofold. First, Brand takes issue with the CSRA's willfulness element.7 He asserts that the underlying state 7 The remaining elements of the CSRA are satisfied in this case, i.e., Brand (1) failed to pay (2) a past due support obligation (3) with respect to children who reside in another state. See United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 482 (4th Cir.1997) (describing elements of CSRA offense), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 258, 139 L.Ed.2d 185 (1997). It is undisputed that the state circuit judge's order sought to impose upon Brand a support obligation. Brand also concedes that in excess of $5,000 of this support obligation remained unpaid for more than one court order that purported to delineate his payment obligation was so unclear that he could not reasonably have known how to comply with it, thereby making his failure to pay innocent or justifiable, rather than willful. Brand also challenges his conviction, arguing that the government's case against him was based upon an invalid state court order. Brand contends that the underlying order was not only unconstitutionally vague, but also void for failure of a condition precedent. We address each of Brand's asserted bases for reversal.
We affirm the magistrate judge's conclusion that Brand's failure to pay his support obligation under the Act was willful. Brand contends that he could not determine from the language of the state court order precisely how much he owed as his support obligation because the state circuit judge intended for the $3.935 million lump sum to serve many different purposes, only one of the many purposes was support for Margrethe and the children. Brand emphasizes that the state circuit judge failed to designate what portion of the lump sum was meant to fulfill Brand's support obligation. Brand argues that this lack of clarity rendered his compliance with the CSRA impossible and, therefore, that his failure to pay was not willful within the meaning of the Act. We disagree. To prove willfulness under the CSRA, the government had to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that [the defendant] voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 621 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1398, 140 L.Ed.2d 656 (1998). In this case, the state court order expressly and unequivocally imposed a duty upon Brand to pay at least $2,500 per month in child support. Additionally, the order explained that Brand was already in arrears for year. Finally, Brand and his children resided in different states during the relevant time period. Accordingly, the only element subject to dispute is whether Brand's violation of the Act was willful. failure to pay a previously delineated support obligation of $13,463, and that he had been ordered incarcerated because of his non-payment of this sum. The plain language of the state court order was therefore sufficient to charge Brand with knowledge of his duty in this regard. Indeed, Brand's conduct makes clear that he was aware of his support obligation. Prior to his arrest, Brand paid approximately $10,000 toward child support. He also recognized his liability in the taped telephone conversation with Margrethe. Moreover, he acknowledged that he owed child support at the time of his arrest. Notwithstanding his awareness of this obligation, Brand voluntarily and intentionally violated his duty to pay. Thus, contrary to Brand's assertion, the extent that the $3.935 million lump sum was meant to supplement his monthly child support obligation is irrelevant. Although Brand may not have known the exact amount of his total support obligation, because the state court order did not delineate how much of the lump sum award was meant for support, this did not relieve Brand of his duty to pay what he did know to be the minimum amount owing in child support—$2,500 per month. Brand would have had a stronger argument on the willfulness element had he complied with the express obligation to make monthly child support payments. This, however, he failed to do. As a result, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Brand willfully violated the state court order.
Brand asserts that the state court order forming the basis of his CSRA conviction is invalid for two reasons. First, he argues that the order is unconstitutionally vague because it did not specify the amount owing as his support obligation for purposes of his compliance with the CSRA. Second, Brand contends that the state court order was void because its language-i.e., Husband shall pay [$2,500] per month provided that the [$3.935 million] ha[s] in fact been paid (emphasis added)-indicates that Brand's payment of the lump sum was a condition precedent to his obligation to pay the monthly child support. Brand's argument in this respect boils down to the assertion that his deliberate noncompliance with the lump sum obligation relieved him of all responsibility for child support payments, thereby giving the government no basis for prosecuting him under the CSRA. Brand's collateral attack of the state court order is not cognizable.8 The language of the CSRA merely requires the existence of a past due support obligation. The Act's terms do not require that such an obligation be valid. The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994), which held that a defendant in federal sentencing proceedings has no right to challenge the validity of previous state convictions that are used as the basis for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Court observed that the statute focuses on the fact of the conviction and nothing suggests that the prior final conviction may be subject to collateral attack for potential constitutional errors[.] Custis, 511 U.S. at 490-91, 114 S.Ct. 1732. Within the context of a Tenth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of the CSRA, this court recognized that the [Act] does not require federal courts to issue, modify, or otherwise 8 Even if it were, however, his arguments are entirely devoid of merit. First, the 1992 order is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Brand. In the general sense, [v]oid for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). Brand's vagueness challenge fails for the same reasons his argument on the willfulness element fails: the plain language of the order was sufficient to put Brand on notice that he was minimally obligated to pay $2,500 per month, and his conduct following entry of the order indicates that he was aware of this duty. Second, Brand's argument that the order is void for failure of a condition precedent simply defies reason. The only interpretation of the order that makes sense is that Brand's child support payments would only be $2,500 per month if he paid the $3.935 million lump sum, i.e., Brand's failure to pay the lump sum could result in an increase to the monthly child support figure. In fact, the state circuit judge later confirmed this to be her intent during the 1996 hearing to clarify the financial distribution portion of the underlying order. consider divorce, alimony and child custody or support decrees. Williams, 121 F.3d at 620. See also United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir.1997) (the CSRA does not permit a federal court to revise the domestic relationship adjudicated by the State courts or to modify any part of a State court decree (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1327, 140 L.Ed.2d 489 (1998); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (1st Cir.1997) ([T]he CSRA comes into play only after a state court issues a child support order, and it does not authorize a federal court to revise the underlying decree.); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.1996) (same as Black ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 784, 136 L.Ed.2d 727 (1997). As our predecessor circuit reasoned in United States v. Bailey: A CSRA prosecution turns only on the defendant's violation of a state court order. It does not turn on the fairness of the order, the reasons underlying the state court's issuance of the order, the defendant's relationship with his children or former spouse, or any other matter involving relitigation of a family law issue. Moreover, there is no language in the CSRA allowing the federal court to look beyond the four corners of the state child support order or permitting the defendant to collaterally attack the state court order in federal court. 115 F.3d 1222, 1232 (5th Cir.1997) (rejecting appellant's contention that CSRA offends principles of federalism and comity), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 764 (1998).9 Further supporting our conclusion that Brand is now barred from collaterally attacking the state court order is Brand's failure to contest the order in state court. Brand did not seek modification or clarification of the order, nor did he appeal from it. For this reason, and because the state court order was the culmination of a judicial proceeding, our refusal to entertain Brand's collateral attack in this case does not implicate due process concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839-40, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987) (relying on due 9 But see United States v. Lewis, 936 F.Supp. 1093, 1101-03 (D.R.I.1996) (concluding that the CSRA does allow relitigation of the merits of the underlying state court order and reasoning that the statute was ambiguous on this point). process principles to permit defendants charged with reentering country after deportation to challenge validity of underlying deportation orders because the administrative deportation proceedings had effectively eliminate[d] the right of the alien[s] to obtain judicial review); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 482-83 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that CSRA defendant could not use Mendoza-Lopez to challenge underlying support order where he failed to directly appeal or collaterally attack the order in state court), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 258, 139 L.Ed.2d 185 (1997).