Opinion ID: 672300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proposals 43 and 45

Text: 40 Proposals 43 and 45 deal with the reduction in rank or removal of an Agency employee because of deficient performance. Proposal 43 defines performance-based disciplinary actions to include reduction-in-rank decisions. Proposal 45 outlines several due process procedures (including a specific period during which an unsatisfactory employee is given the opportunity to improve) that the Agency must follow before taking a performance-based disciplinary action. Further, proposal 45 provides that the minimum improvement required to avoid disciplinary action must be reasonably attainable. Unsatisfactory employees must be informed of these rights in writing. 41 The Authority found proposal 43 to be consistent with law and thus negotiable. As to proposal 45, the Authority found much of it negotiable. However, the Authority ruled that the Union could not require that the minimum improvement necessary to avoid demotion or discharge be reasonably attainable, because, in some circumstances, that standard could be something less than acceptable performance. We hold that each proposal is nonnegotiable in its entirety. 42 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (CSRA), if an agency wished to remove or demote an employee for poor performance, it had to do so through Chapter 75 of the FSLMRS, which provides the mechanism for taking adverse action against an employee. Under Chapter 75, adverse action can be undertaken, only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7513(a) (1988). Over time, this standard evolved into a significant obstacle to removing inefficient employees, and Congress became concerned about its effect on the quality of public agencies: 43 The patchwork of statutes, regulations, rules, and judicial restrictions [that had] built up over time had conspired, in effect, to tie the hands of the personnel managers. The [i]nordinate procedural requirements and unreasonable standards were condemned [by Congress]. S.REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 reprinted in 1978 [U.S.C.C.A.N.] 2762. The temptation was to keep an unsatisfactory worker on the payroll rather than go through the protracted hassle of discharging him, with no guarantee that the effort would be successful. This happened too often, and the public suffered. 44 Lisiecki v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 769 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed.Cir.1985) (reviewing the legislative history of the CSRA), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1514, 89 L.Ed.2d 913 (1986). 45 In response to this problem, Congress amended Chapter 43 of Title V (governing the evaluation of public employee work performance) when it enacted the CSRA, and provided a basis independent of Chapter 75 for demoting and removing employees for unsatisfactory performance. See Lovshin v. Department of Navy, 767 F.2d 826, 834 (Fed.Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 1523, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986). Under Chapter 43, as amended, an employee who is rated unsatisfactory may be reduced in grade or removed without being subject to the substantive and procedural requirements of Chapter 75. Additionally, Congress strengthened management's hand by lowering its burden of proof when Chapter 43 actions are appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701(c)(1)(A). Id. (A Chapter 43 action is ... more narrowly reviewable by the board than a Chapter 75 case in which an agency must establish the facts underlying an adverse action by a preponderance of the evidence.). 46 While acting to empower agencies to deal with unsatisfactory employees, Congress was careful to protect the rights of employees affected by performance-based actions. It provided several due process procedures with which an agency must comply before taking action under Chapter 43. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 4303(b)(1) (1988). 4 Thus, Congress obviously intended to strike a delicate balance between the rights of management to eliminate poor performers and the rights of affected employees to procedural protections. 47 The Union's attempt to add to the procedural side of this equation in this case impermissibly frustrates the dominant intent of [Congress] ... 'to simplify and expedite procedures for dismissals of Federal employees whose performance is below the acceptable level within a comprehensive framework for performance evaluation.'  Lisiecki, 769 F.2d at 1564 (quoting S.REP. NO. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2732). Indeed, proposal 45 would represent a large step back toward the problems inherent in performance-based actions arising under Chapter 75, and would substantially hamper management's ability to deal with unsatisfactory performers within the Agency. This is best illustrated by the proposal's requirement that only reasonably attainable performance improvements serve as a basis for performance-based discipline. As the Authority itself found, such a standard would interfere with management's rights by protecting from discipline those employees who are performing unacceptably if their performance improves to a 'reasonably attainable' level under a performance improvement plan.... Negotiability Order, J.A. 477. Finally, we agree with the Agency that requiring it to provide a written performance improvement plan any time it wishes to demote or dismiss an employee, impermissibly curtails its discretion to discipline employees through either Chapter 75 or Chapter 43. The Agency should be free to take such actions through Chapter 75, which does not require a performance improvement plan, and accept as a consequence the procedural obstacles and heightened burden of proof attendant to actions under that Chapter. For the reasons discussed, we hold that proposals 43 and 45 (in its entirety) are nonnegotiable.