Opinion ID: 2271140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Instruct on Facilitation to Assault.

Text: Although the trial court properly instructed the jury on first-degree assault under a complicity theory [44] as a lesser-included offense of attempted murder, we reverse Hall's first-degree assault conviction because the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on facilitation to assault as a lesser-included offense of complicity to assault despite the existence of evidence to support such an instruction. While Hall objected to a first-degree assault instruction, he requested that a facilitation to assault instruction be given if the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree assault. Defense counsel did not actually tender a facilitation instruction. But Hall's counsel argued that evidence Hall drove Hodge to the victim's home and provided the gun to Hodge [45] but did not intend that anyone be hurt was sufficient evidence to support a facilitation instruction. [46] The trial court declined to give a facilitation to assault instruction, stating it was not warranted under the facts and the statute (KRS 506.080(1)) defining facilitation as follows: A person is guilty of criminal facilitation when, acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in fact aids such person to commit the crime. The trial court offered Hall's denial of knowledge that Hodge would assault the victim as one reason why it refused to instruct on facilitation to assault. But the trial court also more generally suggested that it was denying the instruction based on the facilitation statute and the testimony, stated that it had been unable to craft a facilitation to assault instruction that fit the proof presented, and asked whether defense counsel had prepared a facilitation instruction to tender. Although perhaps the trial court focused on Hall's denial of knowledge that Hodge intended to assault Turner as negating the required mental state for facilitation, the trial court may have also had concerns about whether the evidence showed that Hall provided the means and opportunity for Hodge to commit the assault and, thus, could satisfy the forbidden-act requirement of facilitation. The Commonwealth argues the trial court properly denied a facilitation instruction because in Hall's trial testimony, (1) he denied knowing of Hodge's intent to assault anyone and (2) he denied providing the gun to Hodge. The Commonwealth cites Smith v. Commonwealth [47] as authority for the proposition that a facilitation instruction should be denied when the defendant denies knowledge of the principal co-defendant's intent to commit the crime. [48] But we distinguished Smith as a case with a lack of sufficient evidence to support facilitation in Chumbler v. Commonwealth [49] We indicated in Chumbler that even where a defendant denied knowledge of a principal co-defendant's intent to commit the crime, the defendant may be entitled to a facilitation instruction where the jury could infer the defendant's knowledge from the defendant's conduct. [50] Despite Hall's denials of knowing of his co-defendant's intent and of providing a gun to his co-defendant, there was evidence to support an instruction on facilitation to assault. A jury was not obligated to accept Hall's denial of knowledge of Hodge's intent to assault or his denial of providing the gun to Hodge. [51] In the alternative, a jury could infer Hall's knowledge of Hodge's intent to assault from Hall's admitted knowledge Hodge possessed a gun when entering the premises to rob Jackson. And a jury could believe other witnesses' testimony that Hall provided Hodge with the gun [52] and could also consider the fact Hall admittedly drove Hodge to the scene of the crime to conclude that he provided a means or opportunity for Hodge to commit the assault without intending to promote the assault. So there was evidence that would support instructing the jury on facilitation to assault. It is possible a reasonable jury could find Hall not guilty of assault by complicity and, yet, find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall was guilty of facilitation to assault; so an instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included offense of complicity to assault was warranted. [53] The jury could infer knew Hodge would commit assault because Hall knew Hodge took a gun into the residence to commit the robbery and find Hall provided a means or opportunity for Hodge to commit assault by driving him to the residence or providing a gun, even if a jury did not find all the requisite elements of complicity to assault. [54] Although we sympathize with the trial court's difficulty in ruling upon the request for a facilitation instruction without the benefit of a tendered facilitation instruction to clarify how the evidence might show that the requisite elements of facilitation are fulfilled, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Hall's request for an instruction on facilitation to assault.