Opinion ID: 885003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failures to follow statutory requirements

Text: ¶ 46 Gordon asserts that the District Court sentenced him without adequate consideration of his minimal role in the crime as compared with that of Grimes, his fear of Grimes, and his crucial role in assisting law enforcement. On these bases, Gordon contends that the court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors as required by § 46-18-101(3)(d), MCA, and failed to ensure that the punishment fit his crime as required by § 46-18-101(2)(a), MCA. He also argues that the District Court failed to clearly state the reasons for the sentence as required by § 46-18-102(3)(b), MCA. We disagree. ¶ 47 With regard to Gordon's argument that his role in the aggravated kidnapping offense was relatively minimal, his handwritten notes in the plea agreement with the State as to the facts forming a basis for his guilty plea to that offense include the following: I committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping by knowingly and purposely and without lawful authority restraining Mike Fox by secreting him in a place of isolation by using physical force. at [sic] that time, my purpose was to facilitate the felony of theft and flight. I also put Mike Fox in the trunk of the car at a time when I knew he could well be alive when I also knew that the below zero temperatures would cause him physical injury. The morning we left the Rocker Inn, I heard Mike Fox in the trunk and knew he was alive. I did not contact the authorities or aid in Mike Fox's rescue from Burley [sic] Grimes. Gordon's own notes hardly reflect a minimal role in the aggravated kidnapping. In addition, the District Court observed that both Grimes and Gordon brutalized and kidnapped the innocent Fox, held him against his will and confined him in the trunk of his vehicle for over 16 hours in sub-zero temperatures. Furthermore, the court expressly consideredand rejectedthe testimony from Gordon's expert at the sentencing hearing to the effect that Gordon played a minor role in Fox's kidnapping, finding that Gordon's participation in [the kidnapping] is equal to that of Grimes. On this record, it is clear that the District Court adequately considered Gordon's evidence that his role in the aggravated kidnapping was minimal compared to Grimes'; it was required to do no more. It is equally clear that the District Court considered the punishment it imposed commensurate with the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense as required by § 46-18-101(2)(a), MCA. ¶ 48 Gordon also contends that the District Court failed to consider his evidence that his participation in the criminal venture resulted from his fear of Grimes. It is true that the court did not specifically address the fear factor in either its oral pronouncement of sentence or written judgment and sentence. It also is true, however, that the evidence before the court in that regard was conflicting: Dr. Stratford reported that Gordon was fearless, while Dr. Sachsenmaier opined that Gordon's kidnapping-related acts arose from his dependency on, and fear of, Grimes. Gordon's counsel candidly conceded that the extent of Gordon's fear could not be known. The court was not obligated to accept Dr. Sachsenmaier's testimony. Moreover, § 46-18-101(3)(d), MCA, requires only that judges retain discretion to consider mitigating circumstances. Thus, even if the court accepted Dr. Sachsenmaier's opinion regarding Gordon's fear of Grimes, it was not required to use that opinion to mitigate Gordon's sentence. ¶ 49 Next, Gordon contends that the District Court did not consider his significant cooperation with law enforcement officials throughout the case. It is true that the court did not expressly state that it had considered Gordon's cooperation, but Gordon cites to no authority requiring the court to itemize each piece of evidence presented and either accept or reject it. Nor was the court required to state its reasons for deviating from the application of [the offered mitigating evidence] at sentencing, Gordon's unsupported argument to the contrary notwithstanding. That § 46-18-101(3)(d), MCA, requires judicial discretion to consider mitigating circumstances simply does not translate into a requirement that sentencing courts accept all evidence offered in mitigation and either use all such evidence to mitigate a defendant's sentence or explain why it did not do so. Moreover, the State clarified that it had considered Gordon's cooperation in entering into the plea agreement containing the 80-year imprisonment recommendation ultimately adopted by the court. ¶ 50 Finally, Gordon argues that the District Court's sentencing findings were insufficient under the § 46-18-102(3)(b), MCA, requirement that the sentencing court clearly state for the record the reasons for imposing the sentence and under State v. Stumpf (1980), 187 Mont. 225, 609 P.2d 298, and State v. Goulet (1996), 277 Mont. 308, 921 P.2d 1245. Again, we disagree. ¶ 51 The District Court's reasons for the sentence imposed were clearly stated. They included the nature of the offense and degree of harm caused, Gordon's criminal history and lack of rehabilitative prospects, the protection of society and the necessity of making Gordon responsible and accountable for his acts. Section 46-18-102(3)(b), MCA, requires no more. ¶ 52 Nor do the cases on which Gordon relies support his contention that the District Court's findings were insufficient. In Stumpf, the sentencing court apparently provided no rationale for the 3-year sentence it imposed. Stumpf, 187 Mont. at 226, 609 P.2d at 298-99. As a result, the defendant's entitlement to know why the particular sentence was imposed was not met and, indeed, this Court was left to guess at why the trial court had made its decision. Stumpf, 187 Mont. at 226, 228, 609 P.2d at 299. In Goulet, the sentencing court stated both orally and in its written sentence that the defendant's sentence was imposed at the recommendation of the prosecutor and the probation officer, and that it had taken into account the defendant's prior record and long history of contact with the legal system as a juvenile. We held that the court's statement of reasons for the sentence was sufficient to comply with both § 46-18-102(3)(b), MCA, and Stumpf. Goulet, 277 Mont. at 310, 921 P.2d at 1246. Here, the District Court's statement of reasons for Gordon's sentence was more extensive than that at issue in Goulet and, as a result, we conclude that the District Court complied with the statutory requirement of a clear statement of its reasons for imposing the sentence. ¶ 53 In summary, then, we hold that the District Court did not fail to comply with statutory sentencing requirements in sentencing Gordon.