Opinion ID: 2507466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions Regarding Shanta Sadewater's Testimony

Text: Claiming that the prosecution's case rose and fell on Sadewater's testimony, defendant argues that the trial court's use of CALJIC No. 2.13 and its failure to give CALJIC No. 2.71.7 denied him his right to due process and his right against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. (U.S. Const., 5th, 8th & 14th Amends.) At this trial, Sadewater testified at the guilt phase as follows. She first claimed no knowledge or responsibility for the fatal shooting at Seng Heng Market, but later admitted to police her involvement. On the day of the shooting, while Sadewater and defendant were driving around, defendant told her he was waiting to hear from a friend named Twin, with whom he was going to rob a drug dealer named Reggie. Sadewater stopped at the Seng Heng Market to buy cigarettes, and when she returned to the car, defendant asked Sadewater if she was willing to hit that store, which she took to mean, rob the market. She replied she would not. On their way back towards the market, defendant said he was going to go check for himself and asked Sadewater to pull over. The shooting occurred thereafter. During his guilt-phase testimony, defendant denied robbing Seng Heng Market or shooting San. In its closing argument, the prosecution referred to Sadewater's statements to police and her testimony at her own trial, which both corroborated her testimony here. The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.13, which told the jury it may consider a witness's prior consistent or inconsistent statement for purposes of judging the witness's credibility and as evidence of the truth of the facts the witness recounted on the prior occasion. It did not give, nor did defendant request, the standard instruction on viewing a defendant's preoffense oral statements with caution. (CALJIC No. 2.71.7.) Defendant claims the failure to give CALJIC No. 2.71.7, along with the use of CALJIC No. 2.13, gave the jury a false impression that Sadewater's testimony was as worthy of belief as other witnesses who were not burdened with the same bias or motive to lie about [defendant's involvement in the crimes charged.
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to view a defendant's oral admissions with caution if the evidence warrants it. ( People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 [purpose of cautionary instruction applies to any oral statement of the defendant, whether made before, during, or after the crime].) To determine prejudice, [w]e apply the normal standard of review for state law error: whether it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant had the instruction been given. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 393, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Because the cautionary instruction's purpose is `to help the jury to determine whether the statement attributed to the defendant was in fact made, courts examining the prejudice in failing to give the instruction examine the record to see if there was any conflict in the evidence about the exact words used, their meaning, or whether the admissions were repeated accurately. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 905, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921.) The Attorney General concedes that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to view with caution defendant's preoffense statements of intent or planning to Sadewater. However, he argues the error was harmless. We agree. A defendant's simple denials about making the statements, along with uncontradicted testimony about his statements, may support the conclusion that the instructional error was harmless. ( People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 906, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921.) Here, the record reveals that defendant denied planning to meet someone named Twin, denied knowing anyone named Reggie, and denied planning to rob Reggie. Although defendant did not specifically deny asking Sadewater if she wanted to hit the market or telling her that he wanted to check out the market himself, he did deny he was with Sadewater at the time he made the alleged statements and ultimately denied robbing Seng Heng Market and fatally shooting San. Given defendant's denials, the issue was whether Sadewater was a credible witness or if she fabricated her testimony regarding defendant's admissions to her. ( See ibid. ) While failing to give CALJIC No. 2.71.7, the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on judging the credibility of a witness. Because Sadewater was originally charged as a codefendant and was convicted of being an accessory after the fact and of attempted robbery, the jury was instructed that Sadewater was an accomplice as a matter of law and that her testimony was subject to the rule requiring corroboration. (CALJIC No. 3.16.) Accordingly, the jury was also instructed to view Sadewater's testimony with distrust (CALJIC No. 3.18), [7] that her testimony must be corroborated (CALJIC Nos. 3.11, 3.12), that her felony conviction could be used to evaluate her credibility (CALJIC No. 2.23), and that prior inconsistent statements, inconsistent testimony, and willfully false testimony would all bear on credibility. (CALJIC Nos. 2.13, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.23.) With these instructions and the impeachment of Sadewater's credibility in this regard, the jury was unquestionably aware that Sadewater's testimony should be viewed with caution. ( People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 907, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921; see also People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 393, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Thus, we conclude it was not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict had it been instructed with CALJIC No. 2.71.7.
Defendant asserts that through the use of CALJIC No. 2.13, the prosecution used Sadewater's prior statements to police and her testimony at her own trial to unfairly bolster its case against defendant. He contends that CALJIC No. 2.13 impermissibly favored the prosecution because the instruction did not tell the jury it could consider Sadewater's statements for their falsity as well as for their truth, and that the instruction improperly implied the prior statements were factual because the jury could consider them as evidence. We disagree. Consistent with Evidence Code sections 1235 and 1236, CALJIC No. 2.13, which had been in use since 1979, simply informed the jury that when a witness had spoken inconsistently in the past, it may choose to disbelieve the witness's trial testimony and accept the prior statement, while if the witness had spoken consistently in the past, the jury may consider this as evidence that the witness had spoken truthfully all along. In this case, once told that the clerk had been killed, Sadewater generally gave a consistent account of the events in her statements to police, her testimony at her own trial, and her testimony at defendant's trial. Even assuming error, there was no prejudice. (See People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 905-906, 28 Cal. Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921.) In view of the jury instructions as a wholeparticularly those instructions which adequately informed the jury to view Sadewater's testimony with caution (as discussed above) we conclude that it was not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict had it not been instructed with CALJIC No. 2.13. ( People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 905-906, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921; see People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1148-1149, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321 [claims of instructional error evaluated in light of instructions as a whole].) Because any error in failing to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.71.7 was harmless, and there was no error or prejudice from the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13, we conclude there was no cumulative prejudice.