Opinion ID: 853671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rawley's Statements while in Custody

Text: Rawley contends that the trial court erroneously admitted his statements to Sheriff Maiden because his interrogation continued after he requested an attorney and also because his waiver of rights was the result of psychological coercion by the police. More specifically, Rawley argues that because he was held incommunicado for forty-eight hours and then allowed to call only the Sheriff or Carter, who he contends was actively cooperating with the police, the police initiated contact with Rawley and effectively resumed interrogation in violation of Rawley's Miranda rights. Rawley also contends that the waiver of rights he signed before his communication with Maiden was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because of police pressure on Carter and his incommunicado detention. The State replies that the statement was properly admitted because Rawley initiated the conversation with the police after asserting his right to counsel and there were no threats or promises made to obtain his waiver of rights or his statement. The State also argues that Carter was not Rawley's spouse or even his girlfriend, and therefore any threats against her would not rise to the same level of coercion as threats against a spouse. Moreover, holding a suspect incommunicado for forty-eight hours is claimed to be justified, indeed routine, in Carroll County where courts do not sit every day. Carter's relationship to the police is controverted. Carter testified that there was none and that she contacted Sheriff Maiden at Rawley's request and was motivated to act only because I wanted to know ... if he would tell me anything, I guess I was curious.... Rawley's version of these events is slightly different. He claims that when he called Carter, she was upset and crying and told him that the police were threatening to arrest her. Rawley further claims that it was Carter's idea, not his, that he talk to the Sheriff. Although the State may have plausible support for its position as to what seems at least an unusual series of events, we need not resolve these issues because any error in admitting Rawley's statements was harmless. Violations of Miranda are subject to harmless error analysis under the standard established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): a conviction will not be reversed if the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. See Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 102 n. 8 (Ind.1997). In this case, the State presented overwhelming evidence of Rawley's guilt. Rawley threatened Renee shortly before the crime; he was near Bloomington at the time of the crime; he pawned several items taken from Renee's trailer; he sold a van belonging to Renee; and shortly after the murders, he was seen with a gun similar to the one that killed Renee. Finally, police found the murder weapon in a pond near Carter's house after Rawley told them where he had thrown it in a telephone conversation that is not challenged on Miranda grounds. Rawley argues that this evidence is not enough to establish harmless error because the outcome of the trial depended on Rawley's credibility which was destroyed by the prosecution's repeated references to Rawley's statements to Maiden. At trial, Rawley testified that he and Renee robbed a drug dealer shortly before her death and that they intended to run away together. Rawley claimed that when he returned from taking Renee's dogs to the pound he found Renee and Jenkins dead, panicked and fled. In support of his contention that admission of his dialog with Maiden irretrievably damaged his credibility, Rawley points to several items: (1) in his statement he told police the gun was in the Ohio River when actually it was in the pond near Carter's house; (2) he told Maiden he was in Indiana on Friday, but was forced to admit at trial that he did not get there until Saturday; (3) he stated that Renee gave him the van, but was forced to admit at trial that she did not; and (4) he admitted in his statement to lying to Carter about visiting Renee and to Maiden at the time of his arrest about the gun. Each of these varied from his account at trial. However, if the jury believed his testimony at trial, these minor discrepancies were explained by his unwillingness to admit to another crime, robbing the drug dealer. Overall, the inconsistencies between his statements to police and testimony at trial were minor and unlikely to affect the jury's verdict given the weight of the physical evidence. We conclude that any error in admitting Rawley's statement was harmless.