Opinion ID: 4533869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges Under Gunter Step Two

Text: Jackson next contends that the District Court committed plain error when it denied his request for an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility without first allowing the Government to explain why it had stipulated to a reduction. 3 This argument, too, is easily dispatched. The record clearly belies any assertion that the District Court was unaware of either the Government’s stipulation to a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility or the Government’s position on the appropriateness of such a reduction. Indeed, not only did Jackson raise this issue in his sentencing memorandum, the District Court addressed the issue with Jackson’s counsel at the pre-sentencing hearing. Moreover, the first page of the PSR, which the District Court expressly adopted, states that “the parties agreed that Jackson should receive a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility[] but noted they understood that such a reduction was at the discretion of the [District] Court.” PSR at 1. Accordingly, any suggestion that the record is unclear as to whether the District Court was aware of, and properly considered, the 3 Because Jackson failed to object to the District Court’s procedural errors, we apply plain error review. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[U]nless a relevant objection has been made earlier, a party must object to a procedural error after the sentence is pronounced in order to preserve the error and avoid plain error review.”). Jackson concedes this point. 10 Government’s recommendation for an offense level reduction is without merit. We therefore find that the District Court did not commit any error—and certainly not plain error—in rejecting Jackson’s request for such a reduction. Jackson also argues that the District Court failed to state how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in reaching his sentence and rejecting his arguments for a belowGuidelines variance. We have explained: “With respect to the applicable § 3553(a) factors, the court need not discuss and make findings as to each of them if the record makes clear it took the factors into account in sentencing and gave them meaningful consideration.” United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). Here, the District Court merely stated that it had “considered” the § 3553(a) factors. But “[a] mere recitation of the factors and a statement that counsel’s arguments have been considered is insufficient.” Friedman, 658 F.3d at 362. Jackson argued that he deserved a downward variance so that he could be released at a young enough age to earn money after his release to repay his victims. The District Court neither responded to that argument nor cited any particular § 3553(a) factor in explaining its sentence. 4 This constitutes an error that is “clear or obvious” and “affect[s] [Jackson]’s substantial rights.” Lee, 612 F.3d at 178 n.6. The District Court’s statement that it had considered 4 Instead, the District Court merely stated that the duration of Jackson’s financial schemes and the extensive financial injury to his victims warrants imposing a withinGuidelines sentencing. 11 the § 3553(a) factors was insufficient to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).