Opinion ID: 4044873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: election instruction

Text: See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777. In his first point, Hodges argues that the trial court erred by Because the harm in this case stems from the trial court's failing to instruct the jury of the State's election. 4 The State failure to inform the jury of the State's election, we will also concedes error but argues that Hodges was not egregiously analyze any potential harm in light of the four purposes of the harmed by the trial court's error. election requirement: (1) the appellant's need to be protected from the admission of extraneous offenses; (2) the risk that 4 Because the jury acquitted Hodges of count two of the jury found the appellant guilty of the charged offense not the indictment, alleging indecency by touching Mary's because it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt but because breast, this issue relates only to count one, alleging of the admission of the extraneous offenses; (3) the risk of a indecency by touching Mary's female sexual organ. nonunanimous verdict; and (4) whether the admission of the When an indictment alleges one sexual assault, but more than extraneous offenses deprived the appellant of adequate notice one assault is shown by the evidence at trial, the State is regarding which offense to defend against. Reza, 339 S.W.3d required, upon timely request by the defense, to elect as to at 713, 715; see also Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 734– the specific incident of sexual assault that the State will use 36 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). to convict. See Phillips v. State, 193 S.W.3d 904, 909–10 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); O'Neal v. State, 746 S.W.2d 769, 772 Here, the jury charge required only that the jurors (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Following the State's election of the “unanimously agree[ ] upon a verdict,” without requiring act on which it will proceed for conviction, the defendant unanimity based on the evidence presented in the case. Thus, is entitled to an instruction charging the jury to consider the charge permitted a non-unanimous verdict. See Cosio, 353 only the elected act in deciding guilt and limiting the jury's S.W.3d at 777. Neither party mentioned the State's election consideration of all other unelected acts to the purposes during closing arguments, but neither party “added to the for which they were admitted. Duffey v. State, 326 S.W.3d charge error[ ] by telling the jury that it did not have to be 627, 630 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.), disagreed with unanimous about the specific instance of criminal conduct.” on other grounds by Reza v. State, 339 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. Id. App—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref'd); see Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 776 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). No such instruction Regarding the state of the evidence, Mary described how, was included in the jury charge in this case, and because beginning when she was nine years old, Hodges would put Hodges did not object to the lack of a proper unanimity his arm around her while they watched TV on his couch and instruction, we must evaluate the error for egregious harm. would touch her breast and her “private.” Hodges testified See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 776–77 (holding that appellant and admitted to touching Mary's sexual organ, explaining that forfeited any constitution-based jury charge claim by not Mary was the one who grabbed his hand and placed it there. objecting that charge allowed for non-unanimous verdict); The jury heard Hodges's recorded telephone conversation Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 714. with Detective Martinez, in which Hodges said that Mary had © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Hodges v. State, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2015) grabbed his hand and placed it on her sexual organ. Detective — Fort Worth Aug. 27, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for Martinez testified that sex offenders commonly blame their publication). In other words, here, if the jury found Mary's actions on their child victims. testimony about the offenses of indecency by touching her female sexual organ on several occasions was credible as We will also consider the four purposes of the election rule in to one of those occasions, then the jury likewise must have our harm analysis. See Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 715. Regarding believed that her testimony was credible as to all of them. 5 the first purpose—Hodges's need to be protected from the See Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 735; Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 716. admission of extraneous offenses—the lack of a specific unanimity instruction in the jury charge was harmless in 5 And although the jury was not convinced beyond a regard to this purpose because evidence of other extraneous reasonable doubt that Hodges committed indecency by sexual acts between him and Mary were admissible to show touching Mary's breast, a review of the record reveals their relationship and states of mind under article 38.37. See that the testimony focused on touching Mary's sexual Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37, § 2 (West Supp.2014); organ, not her breast. Mary testified generally that see Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734; Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 909– Hodges “would put his arm around me down my breast 10; Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 715. and down to my private.” Similarly, regarding the risk of a nonunanimous verdict, The risk that the jury found Hodges guilty of indecency Mary's testimony regarding Hodges touching her female by touching Mary's sexual organ based on the admission of sexual organ was general in nature; she testified that it extraneous offenses, rather than proof of the charged offense happened on his couch while watching TV and differentiated beyond a reasonable doubt—the second purpose of the between incidents only by what she was wearing on different election requirement—was low in this case. Mary herself was occasions—a big T-shirt and underwear or a T-shirt and the one who recounted the multiple acts of indecency here, jeans. We perceive little to no risk that any juror would have and she testified generally that Hodges fondled her “many believed that Mary's testimony as to the incidents of Hodges times” on his couch while they were watching television, with touching her sexual organ was credible as to one incident but the first occurring when she was nine years old. The jury was not as to another. See Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 735; Reza, 339 not persuaded by Hodges's explanation that Mary initiated the S.W.3d at 716–17. touching. As the court of criminal appeals explained in Dixon,  This case is not concerned Regarding the final purpose of the election requirement— with evidence of different activities to provide the defendant with adequate notice about which from different sources that a jury offense to defend against—when the State made its election might perceive to “add up” to the at trial, the trial court asked defense counsel if the election defendant being guilty even though was “adequate,” and defense counsel agreed. Hodges has not no individual offense was proven indicated that he was adversely affected by not receiving beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, notice of the State's election earlier in the trial. The notice the child complainant did not testify purpose of the election requirement does not weigh in favor about a number of varied incidents of a finding of egregious harm. See Duffey, 326 S.W.3d at 634 with differing details that might have (holding due process concerns not implicated when defendant incrementally added to the idea that the received timely notice of State's election upon request and defendant must have done something when counsel expressly acknowledged understanding the to provoke the plethora of stories about election and did not indicate that the defense was adversely his activities. affected). 201 S.W.3d at 735. And as we have stated before, “in cases Having considered the harm to Hodges in light of the charge, involving ‘complainant testimony of a continuing course of the state of the evidence, the parties' arguments, and the the same type of nonspecific, indistinguishable conduct over purposes of the election rule, we hold that the trial court's error a long time period, the issue is typically whether the jury in failing to instruct the jury regarding the State's election believes the complainant generally or not at all.’ ” Reza, 339 was not so egregious and did not create such harm as to deny S.W.3d at 715 (quoting Smith v. State, Nos. 02–08–00394– Hodges a fair and impartial trial. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at CR, 02–08–00395–CR, 2010 WL 3377797, at  (Tex. App 171; see also Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777; Dixon, 201 S.W.3d © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 Hodges v. State, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2015) at 734–36; Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 913–14; Reza, 339 S.W.3d State, 402 S.W.3d 252, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.2013); Sample at 717. We overrule Hodges's first point. v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref'd). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial court's