Opinion ID: 1755229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The meaning of Custody for Purposes of the Ryce Act

Text: Hale next argues, citing section 394.925, Florida Statutes (1999), that the Ryce Act does not apply to him because when the civil commitment petition was filed he was not in custody for a sexually violent offense. We first clarify that this case is controlled by the original version of the Act contained in sections 916.31-.49, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), not the 1999 version. The amended version, sections 394.910-.931, Florida Statutes (1999), did not become effective until May 26, 1999. See ch. 99-222 §§ 3-24, at 1374-87, Laws of Fla. The State filed the civil commitment petition against Hale on April 5, 1999. Therefore, the original version of the Act, effective January 1 through May 25, 1999, applies. Section 916.45, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), provides: Applicability of act.  Sections 916.31-916.49 apply to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 916.32(8), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense in the future. Sexually violent offense is defined in section 916.32(8) as follows: (8) Sexually violent offense means: (a) Murder of a human being while engaged in sexual battery in violation of s. 782.04(1)(a)2.; (b) Kidnapping of a child under the age of 16 and, in the course of that offense, committing: 1. Sexual battery; or 2. A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the child; (c) Committing the offense of false imprisonment upon a child under the age of 16 and, in the course of that offense, committing: 1. Sexual battery; or 2. A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the child; (d) Sexual battery in violation of s. 794.011; (e) Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of the child in violation of s. 794.011; (f) An attempt, criminal solicitation, or conspiracy, in violation of s. 777.04, of a sexually violent offense; (g) Any conviction for a felony offense in effect at any time before October 1, 1998, which is comparable to a sexually violent offense under paragraphs (a)-(f) or any federal conviction or conviction in another state for a felony offense that in this state would be a sexually violent offense; or (h) Any criminal act that, either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings under ss. 916.31-916.49, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated. Hale apparently concedes that at some point he was convicted of one of the offenses enumerated above. He argues only that at the time the petition was filed, he was in custody on a nonenumerated offense  dealing in stolen property. In considering Hale's argument, we first look at the statutory language itself. As we have repeatedly stated, the intent of the legislature must guide our analysis, and that intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. See Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 471 (Fla.1995). The Act applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense. . . as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense in the future. Thus, the person in custody must have been convicted of a sexually violent offense. The statute says nothing about whether the person must be currently incarcerated for that same offense. The statute does not state that it applies to all persons currently in custody for a sexually violent offense and it does not otherwise link the current incarceration to the sexually violent offense. Other sections of the Act, when read together with section 916.45, lead to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the Act apply only to persons currently incarcerated for sexually violent offenses. A sexually violent offense is defined to include a federal conviction or a conviction from another state. See § 916.32(8)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). As the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently reasoned: A person in custody in Florida, whose only conviction for a sexually violent offense is from another jurisdiction, would not be in custody for a sexually violent offense. The non-Florida sentence for the sexually violent offense could be running concurrently, could have been completed, or could be consecutive to the Florida sentence. Under none of those scenarios would the current incarceration be as a result of the sexually violent offense. Tabor v. State, 864 So.2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Therefore, reading sections 916.45 and 916.32(8)(g) together, we conclude that the Act applies to all persons who are currently incarcerated and who at some point in the past have been convicted of a sexually violent offense. Such a reading of the Act give[s] effect to all statutory provisions and construe[s] related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. See Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992). We find that the Ryce Act does not require that the respondents current incarceration be for a sexually violent offense.