Opinion ID: 1870584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: virile share apportionment of liability

Text: As previously noted, the applicable law issue contains a second facet: whether the allocation of fault among the defendants who are found to be solidarily liable should be based on pre-Act law or comparative fault law. [31] The argument raised by the applicants in the companion Champagne case is that regardless of what law we determine applies to plaintiffs' causes of action, a separate determination must be made regarding the law to be applied to defendants' contribution rights; consequently, they argue a finding that precomparative fault law applies to plaintiffs' causes of action does not preclude a finding that defendants' contribution rights are governed by comparative fault law. Stated differently, they argue that contribution is separate and distinct from the underlying tort and that the law in effect at the time the contribution claim comes into existence applies. [32] Relying upon this Court's holding in Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 243 La. 271, 142 So.2d 796 (1962), they argue, supported by the district court, [33] that the defendants' contribution claims came into existence not at the time of the tort, but at the time of plaintiffs' judicial demand, and as plaintiffs' judicial demand was made years after Act 431's effective date, comparative fault law applies in this case. Conversely, INA argues, supported by the Third Circuit, that the same law that governs plaintiffs' causes of action must govern defendants' contribution rights as contribution is based on subrogation. In a similar vein, plaintiffs concede the Third Circuit's holding that pre-comparative fault law (virile share) governs the apportionment of liability among defendants in this kind of case is correct, but argue that this holding enunciates a new rule that should not be retroactively applied to this case as to do so would be unfair. In finding comparative fault law applicable to the defendants' contribution claims, the trial judge in Champagne relied upon the Fifth Circuit's holding in Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 528 So.2d 716 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So.2d 475 (La.1988). In Cajun, supra, the Fifth Circuit, relying on this court's holding in Brown, supra, held that a contribution claim arises at the time of judicial demand. Construing the term event in Act 431, [34] the Fifth Circuit found that the event which triggers the third party claim in contribution is judicial demand against an alleged tortfeasor. 528 So.2d at 723 (emphasis supplied). Finding that the event at issue occurred after Act 431's effective date, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's contribution claim against the alleged joint tortfeasor was governed by comparative fault law, relying upon two federal decisions: Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976 (5th Cir.1985), reh'g denied, en banc, 758 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.1985), and Martin v. American Petrofina, Inc., 785 F.2d 543 (5th Cir.1986). In reversing, the Third Circuit relied upon its recent holding in Lebleu v. Southern Silica of Louisiana, 554 So.2d 852 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1989), writs denied, 559 So.2d 489-91 (La.1990), which was decided about one month after the jury trial in the instant case. Lebleu held that the 1976 amendment to the workers' compensation law could not be applied retroactively to bar a defendant's third-party action for contribution against executive officers where plaintiff's claim for silicosis injury arose prior to 1976, but plaintiff's suit and the third-party demands were not filed until 1984 and 1985. Lebleu expressly rejected the federal court's holding in Ducre, supra, relied upon by the district court in Champagne, as wrong in overlooking our civil law concept that subrogation of a tort victim's rights to a tortfeasor against other joint tortfeasors arises at the time of the tort. The subrogated tortfeasor steps into the victim's shoes, giving him the substantive right to file a procedural claim for contribution against other joint tortfeasors. Cole, 588 So.2d at 385. The Third Circuit also relied upon this court's holding in Perkins v. Scaffolding Rental and Erection Service, Inc., 568 So.2d 549 (La.1990). In Perkins, the Third Circuit noted, this court cited Lebleu with approval in support of its holding that a defendant does not have an independent right to contribution, but is only subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff. Cole, 588 So.2d at 385. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the defendants' contribution claims were governed by pre-comparative fault, virile share principles. 588 So.2d at 384-85. [35] As alluded to earlier, one of the reasons prompting our granting of these applications was to resolve this clear conflict among not only our state courts of appeal, but also among our state and the federal courts on this issue. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the Third Circuit's position is correct, and that the contrary positions set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Cajun and by the federal courts in Ducre and Martin are incorrect. Insofar as Cajun is inconsistent with our holding herein, it is overruled. The current conflict among the various courts can be traced to a confusion over when a defendant's right to assert a contribution claim arises. Indeed, this confusion can be traced to a misunderstanding of this court's holding in Brown, supra . The issue in Brown was whether the defendant could assert a contribution claim under the then newly amended LSA-C.C. Art. 2103 and the procedural rules governing third-party practice. Before the 1960 amendment to former LSA-C.C. Art. 2103, a prerequisite to enforcing the right to contribution was a solidary judgment against both tortfeasors. [36] The problem with this rule, however, was that it made the plaintiff the lord of his action because it permitted the plaintiff not only to select which joint tortfeasor to sue, but also to determine whether the selected tortfeasor would be entitled to seek contribution from a joint tortfeasor. Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 22 La.L.Rev. 818, 820 (1962); Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in Louisiana, 5 Loy. L.Rev. 151 (1950). In an attempt to cure this inequity, the legislature in 1954 enacted the Third-Party Practice Act, which was intended to permit a defendant-tortfeasor to join another joint tortfeasor whom, for whatever reason, the plaintiff had chosen not to sue. This enactment, however, was met with judicial hostility. In Kahn v. Urania Lumber Co., 103 So.2d 476 (La.App. 2d Cir.1958), the Second Circuit construed the Third-Party Practice Act as merely procedural and as affording the defendant no substantive right to enforce contribution. Indeed, Kahn, supra, stood for the proposition that `there is no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors unless and until they have been condemned in a judgment in solido, and then only in favor of the joint tort-feasor who has paid the damages awarded.' Perkins, 568 So.2d at 551. To legislatively overrule Kahn, supra, the legislature in 1960 amended former LSA-C.C. Art. 2103 to change the time when a contribution claim could be asserted, allowing a defendant to seek contribution against a joint tortfeasor who had not already been cast in judgment. The effect of this amendment on a defendant's contribution claim filed after the amendment, but arising out of an accident that occurred before the amendment, was the issue before this court in Brown. The court of appeal in Brown had concluded that the amendment was substantive and therefore could not be retroactively applied. Reversing, this court concluded that the only rights created at the time of the tort, which occurred prior to the amendment, were those between the injured party and the joint tortfeasors. We further stated that it is only after judicial demand has been made on one of two or more solidarily obligated tort feasors that he can have any possible interest in seeking contribution. Brown, 142 So.2d at 798 (emphasis supplied). Seizing upon the words judicial demand, highlighted in the above excerpt from Brown, supra, the First Circuit in Lanier v. T.L. James & Co., 148 So.2d 100, 104 (La.App. 1st Cir.1962), construed Brown, supra, as holding that the rights of joint tort feasors as between themselves (contribution) arise from judicial demand and not on the date of the commission of the tort. Id. [37] Propagating this misunderstanding of Brown, supra, the federal Fifth Circuit in Ducre, supra, held that a tortfeasor's cause of action for contribution against its cotortfeasor, where they are liable in solido, arises, not when the tort occurs but when judicial demand by the injured party is made upon one of the co-tortfeasors. 752 F.2d at 987-88. Further, the federal courts reaffirmed this position in Martin v. American Petrofina, Inc., 785 F.2d 543, 544 (5th Cir.1986). [38] A proper understanding of the effect of the amendment to former LSA-C.C. Art. 2103 is set forth in Perkins, supra . Perkins holds that although the amendment to former LSA-C.C. Art. 2103 changed the time when a demand for contribution could be procedurally asserted, [i]t did not affect the substantive basis for seeking contribution set forth in article 1804 [LSA-C.C. Art. 2103's successor], which is subrogation to the rights of plaintiff. 568 So.2d at 551 (citing Lebleu, supra ). Indeed, as the Third Circuit noted in Lebleu, supra, the effect of the amendment was merely that the defendant was no longer at the mercy of the plaintiff's whim as to whether plaintiff may or may not bring in other defendants in the suit. 554 So.2d at 856. While neither the amendment to former LSA-C.C. Art. 2103, nor the jurisprudence, resolve the issue of when the right to contribution arises, one commentator provides a logical, consistent approach, which we adopt: [T]he substantive right of action for eventual contribution vests at the time of the delict. This construction would explain how the third party practice is available to the joint tortfeasor sued. Thus the joint tortfeasor has a right of action from the time of the tort, but the cause of action matures only on payment. Thus at the time of the delict there is vested one cause of action and two rights of action: the injured party has a right of action and cause of action in tort against the joint tortfeasors; the joint tortfeasors as between themselves have a right of action or title to sue for contribution which includes the right to use the third party practice. If one of the tortfeasors pays in excess of his virile portion his vested interest or right of action matures and he acquires a separate cause of action for contribution against his fellow tortfeasor. This reasoning does not contradict the Brown decision. The right of action for contribution in Brown did not vest at the time of the tort because the amended Article 2103 was not yet in effect. On January 1, 1961, the right of action for contribution did vest, along with the right to use the third party practice. The cause of action for contribution will not accrue or mature, however, until payment of an excess of the virile portion. Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: Louisiana's Past, Present, and Future, 37 Tul.L.Rev. 525, 532 (1963). We, therefore, conclude that at the time of the tort, obligations arise not only between the injured party and the tortfeasors, but also among the tortfeasors themselves. Id. at 543. Applying these principles to the instant case, we find that the Third Circuit correctly determined that the contribution rights among the defendants in this case are governed by the same law applicable to the plaintiffs' direct claims. Based on our finding above, we conclude that the allocation of fault among defendants is governed by pre-Act, virile share principles. We now address plaintiffs' argument that even though the Third Circuit correctly held that pre-comparative fault law governs contribution rights among defendants in this kind of case, this new rule should not be retroactively applied in this case. In support of this argument, plaintiffs rely on the theory enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), and adopted by this court in Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So.2d 418 (La.1979), that a judicial decision will be given nonretroactive application when certain factors are present. In Lovell, we enumerated these factors [39] and, applying these factors, we declined to retroactively apply our holding that the alimony statute (former LSA-C.C. Art. 160) was unconstitutional, reasoning that to do so would have an impact on innumerable divorced persons that had relied on the constitutionality of that rule. In the cases in which courts have declined to give retroactive effect to judicial decisions, the courts have clearly articulated that the principle being announced was one overturning a firmly entrenched rule. Lovell, supra ; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 609 F.2d 727, 735-36 (5th Cir.1979), aff'd, 450 U.S. 455, 101 S.Ct. 1195, 67 L.Ed.2d 428 (1981). For instance, in Lovell, supra, we clearly articulated that [o]ur decision [was one] establish[ing] a new principle of law by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants have relied. 378 So.2d at 422. Similarly, the federal Fifth Circuit in Kirchberg, supra, declined to apply its decision invalidating the community property law head and master concept retroactively, citing two reasons: (i) the concept had been part of Louisiana law since 1808, and (ii) retroactive application could produce substantial inequable results. 609 F.2d at 735-36. Such is not the case here. Rather, as the Third Circuit correctly concluded, this decision does not change the law; it simply correctly interprets the Civil Code articles on contribution. Cole, 588 So.2d at 385. [40] There is no showing that plaintiffs relied to their detriment on clear past precedent or that any inequity is imposed by application of the correct rule of law to the facts of this case.