Opinion ID: 1041292
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of threat; or

Text: (c) If the offense is rape m the third degree, lack of manifestation of consent; or (d) Incapacity. S.B. 3173, 43d Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1974). Senate Bill 3173 was drafted by ----------- -the -SWG-,-whose-then-V-iGe-Pre-sident--JaGkie- Griswold-Goauthored-the- reform -bill that was ultimately enacted in 1975. 16 Under some circumstances, the legislature's failure to enact an amendment may be seen as a rejection of the amendment's substance. State v. Schwab, 103 Wn.2d 542, 551-52, 693 P.2d 108 (1985). In the absence of other relevant evidence, this court might infer from the legislature's failure to enact Senate Bill 3173 that lawmakers considered and rejected consent as an element of rape. In this case, however, such an inference is unwarranted. [T]he fact or happenstance of successive drafts is not an absolute determinant of legislative intent, and presumptions based on that sequence may be negated by other evidence. Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hr'gs Bd., 85 Wn.2d 441, 449-50, 536 P.2d 157 (1975) (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Martin, 94 Wn.2d 1, 19, 614 P.2d 164 (1980). 16 Comparison of Existing Rape Law and Proposed SB 3173 (Seattle Womens Commission), 43d Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1974) (on file with Wash. State Archives); Loh, supra, at 570 n.l53. 17 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) With respect to Washington's rape laws, the totality of the relevant evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that our legislature did not intend to exclude nonconsent as an element of forcible sexual contact. The legislative record contains numerous letters, memoranda, testimonies, news articles, and other documents detailing the debates and discussions that led to the 1975 rape law reforms. See infra Parts II.B. 1-4. These documents nowhere 17 indicate any legislative intent to exclude consent as an element of rape. Rather, they reveal the legislature's significant investment in three other reforms: (1) the repeal of language implying that a victim's physical resistance was an element of rape, (2) the enactment of limits on the admissibility of evidence 17 See Materials on Proposed Revisions of the Laws Relating to Sexual Crimes, S.B. 2198, 44th Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1975) (on file with Wash. State Archives) (listing the Major Issues underlying reform debates). Indeed, where the concept of consent does appear in the legislative record, it is always treated as a question central to any rape prosecution. See, e.g., S.B. 2196 and the Committee Amendment to S.B. 2198-Revising the Law on Rape--A Discussion of Section 2, 44th Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1975) (on file with Wash. State Archives) (The bill as originally presented ... would make the past sexual behavior or reputation of the complainant inadmissible on the issue of her credibility or on the issue of consent. . . . A consent to intercourse with one person does not constitute a consent, or even a likelihood of consent to intercourse with other persons. If the word consent means anything, then it implies discretion and choice-and the right to not consent.); Written testimony of Jackie Griswold, VicePresident, SWC (1974) (discussing proposed S.B. 3173) (on file with Wash. State Archives) (In courtroom practice, much of the victim's past life may be scrutinized in the attempt to show that she consented to a single, specific act. Such practice so extends the meaning of the word consent as to make it meaningless.); Seattle Women's Comm'n, supra note 14, at 5 (We believe that the issue of consent should be determined solely from the victim's words and conduct at the time of the charged incident.). 18 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) regarding a victim's prior sexual conduct, and (3) the codification of degrees of rape.
Before the 1975 reforms, Washington defined rape as an act of sexual intercourse with a person not the wife or husband of the perpetrator committed against the person's will and without the person's consent. Former RCW 9.79.010 (1974) (repealed 1975). Sexual intercourse was considered to be against the person's will and without the person's consent if the victim's resistance [was] forcibly overcome or prevented by fear of immediate and great bodily harm ....  !d. The pre-reform law thus defined rape in terms of the victim's resistance, making an alleged victim's physical reaction a central issue in every prosecution. In many jurisdictions, courts interpreted similar statutes to require evidence of the victim's strenuous physical resistance, or at least some excuse for nonresistance, in order to sustain a conviction of rape. 18 By contrast, Washington 18 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 118 So. 2d 806, 815 (Fla. App. 1960) ('resistance or opposition by mere words is not enough; the resistance must be by acts, and . . . reasonably proportionate to the strength and opportunities of the woman ... and must be shown to persist until the offense is consummated' (quoting 22 RULING CASE LAw § 10, at 1180 (William M. McKinney ed. 1918))); Magwire v. People, 77 Colo. 149, 154, 235 P. 339 (1925) (quoting Anderson v. State, 82 Miss. 784, 35 So. 202, 202 (1903) (mere passive resistance, silent objection, on the part of the assaulted female, is [in]sufficient to 19 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) courts rejected this requirement as early as 1910, finding it to be unrealistic and impractical: While it may be expected in such cases from the nature of the crime that the utmost reluctance would be manifested, ... to hold as a matter of law that such manifestation and resistance are essential to the existence of the crime ... would be going farther than any wellconsidered case in criminal law has hitherto gone. . . . Such a test it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to apply in a given case. A complainant may have exerted herself to the uttermost limit --of her -strength, -and may-have -eontinued- to do- so till the- crime -was -- consummated. Still,. a jury, sitting coolly in deliberation upon the transaction, could not possibly determine whether or not the limit of her strength had been reached. They could never ascertain to any degree of certainty what effect the excitement and terror may have had upon her physical system. State v. Pilegge, 61 Wash. 264, 268, 112 P. 263 (1910) (quoting State v. Shields, 45 Conn. 256, 264 (1877)). Despite this relatively enlightened case law, the pre-reform statute equated nonconsent with physical resistance. Its literal terms thus permitted forced sexual penetration where the victim's resistance had been too easily overcome to justify a jury in convicting of rape); State v. Morrison, 189 Iowa 1027, 179 N.W. 321, 323 (1920) (We find no cases where a mere threat, even a threat to kill, unaccompanied by a demonstration of brutal force or dangerous weapon, is held to be a sufficient putting in fear to excuse nonresistance.); Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644, 648, 17 S. Ct. 210, 41 L. Ed 584 (1897) (mere nonconsent of a female to intercourse where she is ... not overcome by numbers or terrified by threats, or in such place and position that resistance would be useless, does not constitute the crime of rape on the part of the man who has connection with her). 20 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) 19 constitute nonconsent. A court applying such a statute might instruct a jury that it could not convict on the basis of the complainant's mere reluctance or that the 20 complainant must explain an apparent failure of adequate resistance. This problem was one of many that motivated the 1975 reforms, and the legislative history of Washington's rape law reform includes extensive testimony 21 on the need to remove resistance as an element of the rape crime. As one 19 Under this statutory regime, many defendants appealed their rape convictions on the ground that there had been insufficient evidence that the victim resisted; it should be noted, however, that such appeals were apparently rarely successful. State v. Pitman, 61 Wn.2d 675, 379 P.2d 922 (1963) (no merit in appellant's contention that evidence of resistance was insufficient as a matter of law, since victim's reason for not resisting was a question for the jury); State v. Baker, 30 Wn.2d 601, 606-07, 192 P.2d 839 (1948) Uury justified in finding that victim's resistance was prevented by fear); State v. Meyerkamp, 82 Wash. 607, 609, 144 P. 942 ( 1914) (The resistance spoken of in the statute is not one of the elements of the crime. It is evidence of the want of consent which is an element.); see, e.g., State v. Thomas, 9 Wn. App. 160, 163, 510 P.2d 1137 (1973) ([r]eluctant submission does not imply consent, Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 461, 157 A.2d 922 (1960)); nor is the extent of resistance or lack of resistance by the woman other than an item of evidence to be considered ... along with all other evidence which bears upon willingness and consent). 20 See, e.g., State v. Mertz, 129 Wash. 420, 422, 225 P. 62 (1924) Uury instructed that if the victim 'yield[ ed] her consent during any part of the act ... there is no such opposing will as the law requires to convict on the charge of rape'); State v. Williams, 85 Wash. 253, 254, 147 P. 865 (1915) (the prosecuting witness resisted [the defendant's] assault with such force as to show a want of consent upon her part [where] [s]he testified that she fought him as much as she was able; that she is afflicted with heart trouble, which prevented further resistance on her part). 21 See, e.g., Written testimony of Jackie Griswold, supra note 17 (Aside from such relatively unusual situations as where the victim was of unsound mind, or in a stupor, or unconscious of the nature of the act, in the great majority of cases it must be shown that a woman's resistance was forcibly overcome or that her resistance was prevented by fear of immediate and great bodily harm. We thought that fear of a lesser 21 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) reform advocate put it, Why should rape victims be required to resist to the extent that they receive additional injuries when robbery victims are considered clever when they don't dispute with the robber[?] Written Testimony of Jean Marie Brough at 1, Legislative Coordinator for Seattle NOW, to the S. Judiciary Comm. (Aug. 3, 1974) (on proposed S.B. 3173) (on file with Wash. State Archives). Importantly, however, the champions of reform did not view the removal of the resistance element as tantamount to removing the element of nonconsent. On the contrary, they viewed nonconsent as the essence of the rape crime: Rape is a crime because of lack of consent. Rape statutes should therefore focus on consent and lack of consent and the amount of violence involved. Consent should not be so qualified as to make additional injury to the victim a necessity for conviction. !d. Indeed, even Wallace Loh's law review article on the 1975 reforms, upon which the Camara court ostensibly relied, rejected the argument that the reforms had eliminated the prosecution's duty to prove nonconsent: Modern statutory and decisional law do not treat force and nonconsent as separate formal elements. Indeed, if force ... is not an objective indicator of nonconsent, it is unclear how else the subjective state would be determined. degree of bodily harm might very reasonably prevent resistance. So might threats of future harm, or threats to harm another person, or threats to harm the financial situation or personal relationships of the victim.). 22 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) Loh, supra, at 552 n.43. 22 Loh's article described the reform statute's focus ... on the culpability of the actor as having important symbolic value, but not as changing the fact that nonconsent is the basic substantive element of the crime. Jd. at 557.
Rather than seeking to remove nonconsent altogether as an element of the crime, rape law reformers were primarily concerned with limiting the type of evidence admissible on that element. 23 Under traditional common law rape statutes, an accuser's sexual history was relevant to the likelihood that she consented to sexual intercourse with the accused. 24 This evidentiary regime reflected two assumptions: first, that evidence of consent on prior occasions was 22 See also Loh, supra, at 550-52 (The new Washington rape law, like other reform legislation . . . focuses more on the actor's use or threat of force rather than the victim's conduct as the external criterion of nonconsent . . . [but t]he 'common denominator' to the three degrees of rape is lack of consent. . . . Only in rape 3 is nonconsent expressly stated as an element of the crime, but absent aggravating factors and forcible compulsion, it is unclear what other objective evidence based upon 'the victim's words or conduct' the state can present as proof. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting former RCW 9.79.190(1)(a)). 23 Fact Sheet-Bill to Revise Present Rape Law at 1, S.B. 3173, 43d Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1974) (on file with Wash. State Archives). 24 Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 72, 75 (2001) (During trial, a woman's previous sexual history and encounters with the accused and third parties were used in court to determine whether the victim had a 'tendency to consent.' (citing SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 378 (1975)). 23 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) probative of a general propensity to willingly engage in sexual contact and second, 5 that an unchaste woman was not a credible witness? By the time our legislature undertook the 1975 reforms, Washington case law had substantially limited the admissibility of an accuser's sexual misconduct or chastity reputation in a rape trial. See State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 652, 132 P. 416 (1913); see also State v. Geer, 13 Wn. App. 71, 74, 533 P.2d 389 (1975) (There is ample a11;thority in Washington to support the proposition that specific acts of sexual misconduct on the part of the prosecutrix are inadmissible in rape cases as such evidence bears on neither the question of consent or credibility. (citing State v. Allen, 66 Wn.2d 641, 404 P.2d 18 (1965))). Nevertheless, reformers noted that 26 lower courts did not always observe these limits and that the prospect of a humiliating and dehumanizing trial therefore dissuaded many victims from pressing charges. 27 They argued that evidence of a victim's prior sexual behavior should be presumed inadmissible, so the prosecution need not move to exclude it. 25 Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 26 Fleck, supra note 14, at 3 (Washington case law on the appellate and supreme court level reflects a favorable attitude to the victim's situation. . . . Although most judges follow case law, some do not and a prosecutor cannot take appeal from a 'not guilty' verdict on the basis of reversible error.); see also App.: Summary of Coriflicting Rulings on the Admissibility of Evidence of the Victim's Sexual Misconduct To Affect Credibility or To Evidence Consent, S.B. 2196, 44th Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1975) (on file with Wash. State Archives). 27 Written testimony of Jackie Griswold, supra note 17. 24 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) Deborah Fleck, Intern for House Judiciary Comm., Is There a Need for Revision of the Washington State Rape Law? (1974) (on file with Wash. State Archives). The 1975 law addressed these problems. That law made evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior inadmissible on the issue of credibility. LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 2. On the issue of consent, it made the victim's sexual history inadmissible unless (1) the perpetrator and the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and . . . the past behavior is material to the issue of consent or (2) the judge determines at a closed hearing that the evidence is relevant to the issue of the victim's consent; is not inadmissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice; and that its exclusion would result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant. !d. Since 1975, the legislature has expanded these protections. Under current RCW 9A.44.020(3)(a) and (b), a defendant offering evidence of the accuser's sexual history must file a written pretrial motion, accompanied by affidavit. If the court finds that offer of proof sufficient, it must hold a hearing to determine whether any of the proffered evidence may be introduced at trial. RCW 9A.44.020(3)(c), (d).
25 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) The most significant substantive change accomplished in the 1975 reforms was probably the division of rape into three degrees. Under the old law, a defendant charged with rape faced a minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment. LAWS OF 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 154, § 122. The pre-reform statute did not distinguish between the rape crime's degrees of seriousness, 28 and reform advocates believed that this led juries to exercise their nullification power where a crime was less than the most brutal attack. 29 Prosecutors apparently shared this belief and were inclined to charge or accept pleas to a lesser offense, such as assault. 30 28 Id. at 2. 29 See Fleck, supra note 14, at 15 (One element all four proposed revisions have in common is the division of rape into degrees with graduated sentences, on the theory that convictions may be achieved for less aggravated rapes which might otherwise be acquittals.); Written testimony of Jean Marie Brough, supra note 13, at 2 (convictions would be more reasonably gained if there was a general lowering of penalties to fit the severity of the crime); Seattle Women's Comm'n, supra note 14, at 6 (we recommend that there be degrees of rape which will take into account the variety of elements which may enter into the crime, affecting its degree of seriousness, in order to avoid some of the most glaring defects of the plea bargaining system so that rape can be reduced to a lesser degree of what it actually is-rape-rather than to euphemism). 30 Loh, supra, at 558; see also Ron Clark, King County Prosecutor's Office, Testimony at Senate Hearing of the Rape Statute, S.B. 2196, 44th Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1975) (Jan. 21, 1975) (on file with Wash. State Archives) (third degree rape [which is in] the Women's Commission bill and not the Bar bill would be preferable in that it would identify a sexual intrusion which might be classified under the Bar bill ... as assault). 26 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) The reform statute addressed this problem by codifying three degrees of rape. 31 Under the current statute, first degree rape is characterized by the commission of a simultaneous burglary or kidnapping, the use of a weapon, or the infliction of serious physical injury/ 2 and is punishable by a minimum of three years' incarceration. 33 Rape in the second degree encompasses sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion under circumstances not constituting rape in the first degree, 34 sexual intercourse with a victim who is physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, 35 and sexual intercourse characterized by the victim's vulnerability and dependence on the perpetrator for certain care or services. 36 Rape in the third degree encompasses sexual intercourse under circumstances not constituting rape in the first or second degrees, where the victim clearly expressed a lack of consent or the perpetrator made a threat of substantial unlawful harm to the victim's property rights. RCW 9A.44.060(1 ).
In developing the 1975 rape law reforms, Washington's legislature relied heavily on Michigan's example. Loh, supra, at 552-53. Michigan was one of the 31 LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 4, ch. 247 § 2. 32 RCW 9A.44.040(1 ). 33 RCW 9A.44.045. 34 RCW 9A.44.050(1)(a). 35 RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b). 36 RCW 9A.44.050(c)-(e). 27 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) first states to reform its rape laws, and its victim protections are considered among the strongest in the nation? 7 The reform statute Michigan enacted in 1974, which replaced the term rape with the term criminal sexual conduct, 38 eliminated corroboration and resistance requirements and included a highly restrictive rape shield law? 9 Michigan's reform statute also omits any reference to the alleged victim's consent in its basic definitions of criminal sexual conduct. 40 In spite of this omission, Michigan courts have not relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving nonconsent. 41 Rather, they have reasoned that consent 37 David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1225 (1997); Julie Homey & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & Soc'y REV. 117, 121-23 (1991); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 nJ (1987). 38 MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 750.520a-750.5201. 39 Bryden, supra note 37, at 1225. 40 In Michigan's Criminal Sexual Conduct statute, references to the alleged victim's consent appear only in the provision criminalizing sexual contact between a health care professional and his or her patient. The victim's consent is expressly disallowed as a defense where [t]he actor is a mental health professional and the sexual contact occurs within 2 years after the period in which the victim is his or her client or patient and not his or her spouse. MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 750.520e(l)(e). 41 See, e.g., People v. Bayer, 279 Mich. App. 49, 67, 756 N.W.2d 242 ('Although the statute is silent on the defense of consent, we believe it impliedly comprehends that a willing, noncoerced act of sexual intimacy or intercourse between persons of sufficient age who are neither mentally defective, . . . mentally incapacitated, . . . nor physically helpless, ... is not criminal sexual conduct.' (quoting People v. Khan, 80 Mich. App. 605, 619 n.5, 264 N.W.2d 360 (1978))),judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 482 Mich. 100, 756 N.W.2d 77 (2008). 28 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) 42 negate[ s] the elements of force or coercion and that the prosecution must therefore disprove consent beyond a reasonable doubt wherever the defendant 43 produces evidence sufficient to put the issue in controversy. To the extent that Michigan's reform statute appears to remove nonconsent as an element of criminal sexual conduct, courts have recognized that this is only because it is redundant to require the prosecution to prove nonconsent where it is clearly implied by the use of force (i.e., the perpetrator's use of a weapon or commission 44 of the rape during a burglary or kidnapping). 42 People v. Waltonen, 272 Mich. App. 678, 689, 728 N.W.2d 881 (2006) (citing People v. Stull, 127 Mich. App. 14, 19-21, 338 N.W.2d 403 (1983) (In the context of the [Criminal Sexual Conduct] statutes, consent can be utilized as a defense to negate the elements of force or coercion.)). 43 People v. Thompson, 117 Mich. App. 522, 528-29, 324 N.W.2d 22 (1982). The only exception to this rule occurs where force or coercion is not an element of the crime charged, and the statute does not otherwise expressly provide for the defense of consent. See, e.g., Waltonen, 272 Mich. App. at 686-87 & n.2, 689 (rejecting consent defense in the context of statute criminalizing sexual penetration [that] occurs under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony (quoting People v. Pettaway, 94 Mich. App. 812, 815, 290 N.W.2d 77 (1980))). Waltonen criticized Thompson's reasoning, but it did so only because force and coercion are not elements of crime with which the defendant in Thompson was charged. Waltonen, 272 Mich. App. at 688-89. Waltonen did not question Thompson's assertion that, where force or coercion is an element of the charged offense, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving a colorable claim of consent. Id. 44 The authors of Michigan's reform statute recognized that it was redundant to require proof of nonconsent where it was clearly implied by the facts of the alleged crime. Khan, 80 Mich. App. at 619 n.5 ('If actual force or threat of force sufficient to meet the force requirement can be shown, it is redundant to also require a separate showing of nonconsent as part of the case in chief. . . . This is the approach of the reform legislation.' (quoting Virginia Nordby, Legal Effects of Proposed Rape Reform 29 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence)
The Camara court correctly noted that Washington's postreform rape laws expressly focus on the perpetrator's rather than the victim's conduct. However, that court incorrectly inferred that this shift in focus had eliminated consent as an element of sexual intercourse or contact by forcible compulsion. Camara, 113 Wn.2d at 640. There is no support for this inference in the legislative history. On --~~--------------- ~-------- - - - - - - - - - - - ------ - ----~-------~---~~---~-- - -- --- the contrary, the history of rape law reform in Washington indicates that reformers viewed nonconsent as the gravamen of the rape crime. The changes these reformers sought and achieved limited the evidence admissible on the question of consent, but did not lessen the prosecution's duty to prove nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, because consent negates the element of forcible compulsion, they could not have done so without violating the due process guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment.