Opinion ID: 1932303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zone of tranquility as a basis for departure

Text: Appellant argues that the court of appeals erred by creating a new zone of tranquility departure factor, an improper extension of the aggravating zone of privacy factor justifying an upward departure where the crime occurs in a victim's home or curtilage. See State v. Winchell, 363 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn.1985); State v. Kindem, 338 N.W.2d 9, 17-18 (Minn.1983); see also State v. Morales, 324 N.W.2d 374, 376-77 (Minn.1982); State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 146 n. 3 (Minn.1982). Although the court of appeals emphasized that it did not equate a public playground with a crime victim's home, appellant asserts that the court's rationale was the same and was discarded by this court long ago in State v. Mortland, 399 N.W.2d 92 (Minn.1987). In Mortland, the trial court imposed an upward departure in a criminal sexual conduct case in part on a finding that the crime occurred in a seemingly safe neighborhood park close to the victim's home (which the trial court referred to as within the victim's zone of privacy). 399 N.W.2d at 95. The court of appeals affirmed that the park was within the victim's zone of privacy. Id. at 95 n. 2. We disagreed: There may be something about sexually assaulting a child in a neighborhood park that makes the assault more serious, but referring to a public park as within a victim's zone of privacy is to extend the concept of zone of privacy too far. Id. Appellant relies on this language to argue that we have rejected a public park as an aggravating factor to justify an upward durational sentencing departure. The state, on the other hand, views Mortland as supportive of the proposition that a park location increases the seriousness of the offense. It asserts that the court of appeals decision here was a straightforward recognition that a park is like a homea place where one reasonably would have a lower expectation of being the victim of a crime. See, e.g., Back, 341 N.W.2d at 274, 277 (The victim was a totally innocent person who was in a place [the porch of her home] where she had every right to expect she was safe. ) (emphasis added). The state goes on to argue that it was appropriate for the district court to recognize the park location as a place where the victim had a right to expect to be safe, and that expectation justified an upward departure from the presumptive sentence. We disagree. Although we have clearly recognized the commission of a crime in the victim's zone of privacy as justifying a more severe punishment, see Kindem, 338 N.W.2d at 17-18, we have with equal clarity rejected the inclusion of a public park in that zone. See Mortland, 399 N.W.2d at 95 n. 2. While the lower courts are not limited exclusively to the aggravating factors set forth in the guidelines, see Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.D.2. (indicating that the list of aggravating factors provided in the guidelines is nonexclusive), a judicially-created factor must have sufficient definition to be applied in other circumstances. The zone of privacy factor, for example, has generally been limited to a victim's home and curtilage. See Winchell, 363 N.W.2d at 750. The zone of tranquility factor has no such definition. At its outer limits, it is where one would feel serene, at peace, or tranquila subjective state, so ephemeral that in the context of a departure from the guidelines, it has little meaning. A place of tranquility for one person might well be a place of stress and anxiety for another. But even if we were to adopt such a factor, it is debatable whether a public park would meet the standard, as judicial notice may be taken that parks are often the scene of serious crimesperhaps for their characteristics of privacy and remoteness, ironically the same characteristics that might create a sense of peace and tranquility. We also note that it is not unreasonable to conclude that the legislature deliberately chose not to differentiate between various locations of drive-by shootings with regard to punishment when other subdivisions within Minn.Stat. § 609.66 refer specifically to crimes committed in a park. Compare id., subd. 1a(b)(1) (authorizing a more severe penalty for a nondrive-by reckless discharge of a firearm when committed in a park zone) with id., subd. 1e (outlining penalties for a felony drive-by shooting without consideration of location).