Opinion ID: 184817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Carry Jury Instruction

Text: Joseph's objection to the carry instruction demands moreattention. As this court's discussion of Evans in Joseph'sdirect appeal demonstrates, our circuit law has previouslydefined carry by focusing on present access and control. See supra p. 5; see also United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176,181 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (the weapon must be convenient ofaccess and within reach); United States v. Anderson, 881F.2d 1128, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (challenge to the samecarry definition as given at Joseph's trial almost frivolousunder plain error standard).6 Joseph argues that Muscarellov. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998), added a furtherrestriction on the meaning of carry, requiring that a gun bephysically conveyed by the defendant.7 In Muscarello, the Court upheld carry convictionsagainst a defendant who kept a gun in his locked glove__________ 6 For simplicity we refer herein to our circuit's previous definitions of carry as the Evans definition, recognizing that othercases have employed variations on the Evans language. 7 This argument was not raised at trial, on direct appeal, orbefore the district court on the s 2255 motion because Muscarellowas decided by the Supreme Court after the district court ruled onthe s 2255 motion. The government argues that Joseph has procedurally defaulted this claim by not raising it earlier and that hemust therefore demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Joseph asks us to apply the much laxer harmless errorstandard under the supervening-decision doctrine. In United States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1998), thecourt examined procedural default issues in the s 924(c)(1) contextin great detail, but ultimately found it unnecessary to resolve them. We do likewise. Even under the standard Joseph requests andwhich is most favorable to him--harmless error--the convictionsurvives. See id. at 74. Harmless error review of a jury instruction cannot cause a reversal in the absence of error and, as weexplain, Muscarello does not render the carry instruction improper. compartment as he drove to a drug sale and two defendantswho stored guns in the trunk of the car they rode in to a drugsale. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1914. The Court recognized that the word 'carry' has many different meanings. Id.; see also id. at 1915 (referring to the twenty-sixth definition of carry in the Oxford English Dictionary). Its holding, hence, was confined to determining that the word'sprimary meaning, involving conveyance and moving, created a proper basis for a conviction under s 924(c)(1). Thatmeaning, it held, was satisfied by placing firearms in aninaccessible part of a car which the defendants drove or rodein. Given the vehicular situation it was addressing, it is notsurprising that the Muscarello opinion repeatedly emphasizedthe centrality of the concept of conveyance to its decision. Indeed, it was only the fact that the inaccessible guns hadbeen hidden in a moving vehicle that gave credence to itsconclusion that the defendants were carrying them. Fromthis emphasis, however, Joseph would have us conclude thatproof of personal conveyance is a necessary element of anyconviction under the statute's carry prong. But the Courtnever suggested that the meaning it applied in Muscarello isthe only one that Congress intended to reach by makingcarry a part of the statute. To the contrary, Muscarelloexplains that a gangster might 'carry' a gun (in colloquiallanguage, he might 'pack a gun') even though he does notmove from his chair. Id. at 1915-16. The statute would besatisfied in this non-conveyance scenario because of an alternative meaning that suggests support rather than movementor transportation.... Id. at 1915. Our Evans definition of carry is satisfied by proof ofdominion and control and ready accessibility to a gun duringa drug crime. That definition may vary in some aspects fromthe support-based definition cited in Muscarello, but againMuscarello does not state that its support example is theonly legitimate variation from personal or vehicular conveyance that satisfies the statute. Language in Muscarello iscited by Joseph for the proposition that either physical pos- session or conveyance in a vehicle is a prerequisite to carrying: The question before us is whether the phrase carries a firearm is limited to the carrying of firearms on the person. We hold that it is not so limited. Rather, it also applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Id. at 1913-14. We think the better contextual reading ofthis passage is that the Court was simply setting up acontrast between a circumstance that everyone would agreeamounts to carrying and the facts of the Muscarello case inorder to illuminate the precise issue it was confronting. Thus, what Muscarello tells us is that conveyance-based andsupport-based definitions are proper under the statute, but itcertainly does not tell us that all other definitions--such asthe Evans formula--are improper, especially as applied to thefacts of this case. We note especially the Court's endorsement of the term's application to the placement of the gun ina location which allows the person to accompany it in itsjourney. If, as here, the gun is in a tote bag rather than aglove compartment but the defendant accompanies it nonetheless and maintains dominion over and access to it, surelythe Court's concept of carrying is satisfied. Moreover, there are other indications in Muscarello thatthe Evans definition would meet the Court's approval. TheCourt looked to the purpose of including carry in thestatute, explaining that Congress sought to combat the'dangerous combination' of 'drugs and guns,'  id. at 1916(quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993)),and to persuad[e] a criminal to leave his gun at home. Id.From these perspectives, surely Congress would want toreach those whose employment of firearms satisfies the carry definition given at Joseph's trial (to bear on or aboutone's person, or to be convenient of access or within reach). Employing Muscarello's phrasing, [i]t is difficult to say that,considered as a class, such people are less dangerous, or less deserving of punishment, than those who carry handgunson their person. Id. at 1916-17. The Court also stated that '[c]arry' implies personal agency and some degree of possession.... Id. at 1917. Our Evans definition meets theserequirements. We conclude that the only change in the definition ofcarry in our circuit worked by Muscarello is an expansion. When a firearm is not carried under the still valid Evansdefinition, a conviction may now be obtained if the defendantconveys the firearm by car within the meaning of Muscarello. Joseph argues less strenuously that, even if the jury instruction in his case does not conflict with Muscarello for lackof a personal or vehicular conveyance requirement, the instruction still allowed an unlawful conviction for what theSupreme Court called transporting a firearm. In definingtransport, the Court explained that it implies the movement of goods in bulk over great distances, pointing to theuse of a parcel delivery service as an example. See id. Inthat example, the Court noted that only the truck driver has'carried' the package in the sense of 'carry' that we believeCongress intended. Id. The Court also distinguished thetwo terms carry and transport by noting that  '[c]arry'implies personal agency and some degree of possession,whereas 'transport' does not have such a limited connotation.... Id. Given the trial court instruction's emphasis onaccess in defining carrying, no conviction based on transporting would have been allowed. We therefore hold that the carry instruction in Joseph'strial was proper. Because there was no error, the convictionsurvives this challenge.