Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excluding Exculpatory Evidence

Text: Setiawan maintains that the district court improperly excluded evidence supporting his defense that Cascote, rather than Setiawan, killed Teton. First, Setiawan argues that the district court improperly excluded hearsay testimony admissible under the statement-against-interest exception. Second, Setiawan argues that the district court erred by striking a witness's testimony following the witness's refusal to answer the prosecution's questions on cross-examination. We review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Monserrate-Valentín, 729 F.3d 31, 52 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Baskin, 424 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2005).
Setiawan wanted Luis Rivera-Melendez (Rivera), a codefendant who had pleaded guilty, to testify that he was present at Teton's murder and that Cascote, not Setiawan, was the killer. But Rivera invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify. The district court ruled that Rivera's testimony risked selfincrimination and deemed Rivera unavailable as a witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1). Setiawan then attempted to call a defense attorney, Miriam Ramos-Grateroles (Ramos), who had been present when Setiawan's attorney interviewed Rivera in prison. Ramos testified - 15 - outside the jury's presence that Rivera told Setiawan's counsel that he witnessed Cascote shoot Teton at a drug point. Setiawan argued that Ramos's testimony relaying Rivera's out-of-court statement was admissible under the statement-against-interest exception because the statement placed Rivera at a drug point, exposing him to criminal liability. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The district court excluded the statement. The court reasoned that Ramos's testimony would be inherently unreliable because she would not be subject to cross-examination about the drug-trafficking conspiracy or the murder. The court's ruling did not depend on either criterion relevant to admitting evidence under Rule 804(b)(3), namely, that the hearsay statement must be against the out-of-court declarant's interest and the statement must be corroborated. See id. The court's basis for excluding the hearsay statement i.e., that Ramos would not be subject to cross-examination about the conspiracy or murder -- was improper. In-court witnesses who relay hearsay statements are never subject to cross-examination about the substance of out-of-court statements. The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude hearsay statements generally, see Fed. R. Evid. 802, in large part because of an opponent's inability to cross examine the in-court witness on the substance of the out-of-court statement. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994). The Rules provide exceptions to admit certain hearsay - 16 - statements, however, because either the substance of the statement, see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) (statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment), or the way the declarant makes the statement, see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (excited utterance), provides a measure of reliability sufficient to warrant admission, even though neither the out-of-court witness nor the in-court witness is subject to cross-examination on the statement's substance. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598–99. Additionally, when the district court excluded the testimony because it was inherently unreliable, the court usurped the jury's role. Reliability and credibility of in-court witnesses are matters for the jury to determine. See, e.g., United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1300 (1st Cir. 1997). In fact, we have rejected precisely what occurred in this case. In United States v. Seeley, this court agreed with a Second Circuit decision holding that Rule 804(b)(3) does not require the trial court to make a special assessment of the credibility of a witness who relays an out-of-court declaration against penal interest. See United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir. 1983)). Undoubtedly, a district court may exclude evidence on grounds other than credibility, see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 403, but credibility of in-court witnesses is exclusively the jury's province, see Seeley, 892 F.2d at 3. As a result, the district court improperly excluded - 17 - Ramos's testimony when it concluded the testimony would be inherently unreliable because the government would not be able to cross examine her about the murder or conspiracy. The district court erred by excluding testimony that should have been admitted under Rule 804(b)(3).
Setiawan's attorney also called David Colon-Geigel (Colon), a coconspirator, as a witness to rebut the murder accusation. In response to questioning from Setiawan's attorney, Colon explained that he was Cascote's right-hand man, that Cascote is the godfather of his oldest son, and that Colon sold drugs for Cascote. Colon also testified that he witnessed Cascote shoot Teton and that Flow, the government's only purported eyewitness to the murder, was not near the site of the shooting. After Setiawan's attorney finished questioning Colon, the three other defense attorneys each asked whether their clients had any role in the drug trafficking in La Perla; Colon responded that none of them did. On cross-examination, the government asked about Colon's drug-trafficking activities and the defendants' involvement. Then, the government asked further questions about other members of the conspiracy who had been indicted in this case and pleaded guilty, including Flow who had testified that Setiawan shot Teton. Colon answered the questions. When the government began asking - 18 - about unindicted members of the conspiracy, Colon refused to answer the questions: Well, what happens is I don't want to be talking like this. I don't want to incriminate anyone else. After dismissing the jury and summoning Colon's attorney, the judge and attorneys reconvened, at which point the prosecutor explained that he planned to show Colon one hundred photographs and seven videos to probe his knowledge of the conspiracy generally covering the unindicted coconspirators. The government requested that the district court strike Colon's entire testimony because he was refusing to answer questions about the conspiracy. With his attorney present, Colon was asked by the district court about what questions he intended to answer: The Court: Sir, you testified and you stated that you were not going to testify anything further relating to any other defendant but these four defendants. The Witness: Yes. The Court: Is that still the case? The Witness: I am not going to testify. In a bench conference, Colon's attorney stated that [Colon] has stated clearly that he [wa]s going to refuse to testify to any further questions. The district court continued to discuss the question whether Colon's testimony should be stricken. Colon's attorney apparently left the courtroom. The district court then asked Colon two more questions: - 19 - The Court: So that means that you are not going to answer any questions as to Setiawan? The Witness: No. The Court: And that means that you are not going to answer any further questions as to any further defendants that are here? The Witness: I would answer questions if I wasn't asked questions regarding people that are not present here. Colon's statements were ambiguous about whether he was refusing to answer questions about only unindicted coconspirators or also questions involving Teton's murder. Even Colon's no answer to the first question regarding Setiawan is unclear whether he meant to say he would or would not answer questions about him. Nonetheless, the district court ordered Colon's testimony stricken, subject to reconsideration if Colon's attorney allows him to talk. The attorney for Colon later reappeared and stated that I went to the cellblock and I spoke with David Colon Geigel. He reiterated his position to testify about anyone. This representation did little to clarify Colon's intention and appeared inconsistent with Colon's last statement that I would answer questions if I wasn't asked questions regarding people that are not present here. Nevertheless, the district court made no further effort to clarify the scope of Colon's refusal. Despite the ambiguity of Colon's refusal, the district court granted the government's request to strike his testimony. - 20 - The court initially reasoned that attorneys for the defendants other than Setiawan opened the door to the conspiracy questions. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that Setiawan's attorney's having asked Colon about Cascote and Colon's responses opened up all questions related to the conspiracy, because Cascote was a leader of the conspiracy. Further, the court explained, even the murder-related questioning opened the door for cross-examination about the entire conspiracy because the murder was part of the conspiracy. On this basis, the district court struck Colon's entire testimony, including his direct testimony about Teton's murder.3 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to present a defense, but that right is subject to the government's legitimate interest in testing the truth of testimony offered by the defense through cross-examination. United States v. Bartelho, 129 F.3d 663, 673 (1st Cir. 1997). Therefore, [a] trial judge may strike a witness's direct testimony if he flatly refuses to answer cross-examination questions related to the details of his direct testimony. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But if the prosecution asks about collateral matters - - matters that are not of consequence to the case -- the district court should protect the defendant's right to present his defense, 3Striking the entire testimony, the district court instructed Setiawan's attorney: I am sorry. Appeal the ruling. There you have a very good potential appeal issue. - 21 - if possible. Id. (citing United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304, 310 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Morla-Trinidad, 100 F.3d 1, 5 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996)). In certain circumstances, a district court may strike a witness's testimony in its entirety, rather than merely restricting the scope of cross-examination. See, e.g., United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993). But here, unlike in De La Cruz, effective government crossexamination about Teton's murder would not have been seriously impaired if the prosecutor was not allowed to ask Colon about nearly one hundred other coconspirators who had no relation to the murder-related testimony. The prosecutor could still inquire about Colon's relationships with Setiawan and Cascote and Colon's version of events on the night of the murder. Colon's testimony presented the district court with a challenging situation. Before the government was able to finish cross examining Colon about Teton's murder, Colon stopped answering questions. As discussed earlier, it is unclear from the record whether Colon was refusing to answer questions covering unindicted members of the conspiracy, a matter collateral to Teton's murder, or broader questions concerning the murder. While the murder was part of the conspiracy, the extent of the conspiracy and the participation, or lack thereof, of hundreds of coconspirators constitute issues collateral to the - 22 - murder. In other words, the murder is within the scope of the conspiracy, but the conspiracy is not within the scope of the murder, and the coconspirators' participation is not of consequence to the resolution of the issue[] of who murdered Teton. United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 231 (1st Cir. 1997). Because the record was unclear whether Colon was refusing to answer questions relating only to such collateral issues, the district court clearly erred by striking Colon's testimony without ascertaining whether his refusal pertained to the murder or not just collateral matters relating to unindicted coconspirators. See Bartelho, 129 F.3d at 673.