Opinion ID: 2367661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant Has a Statutory Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel

Text: When a court in the District of Columbia considers the termination of a parent-child relationship, [2] the parent has a statutory right to representation by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings. D.C.Code § 16-2304(b)(1) (2001). [3] Counsel will be appointed if a parent is financially unable to obtain adequate representation. Id. For the reasons explained below, we now hold that counsel appointed to represent a parent under D.C.Code § 16-2304(b)(1) (2001) in a proceeding where the termination of the parent and child relationship is under consideration has the statutory duty to competently represent his or her client. [4] Many states interpreting similar statutes have concluded that the statutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases embodies the right to effective counsel. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex.2003). See, e.g., In re K.L., 751 N.W.2d 677, 685 (N.D.2008) (Because of the legislative directive that respondents be afforded counsel in termination proceedings, it would be absurd and meaningless to have the right to appointed counsel, but not to require counsel to be effective in this context.); In re E.H., 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah Ct.App.1994) ([T]he statute would be meaningless or illusory if it guaranteed only ineffective assistance of counsel); In re M.D.(S.), 168 Wis.2d 995, 485 N.W.2d 52, 55 (1992) ([W]here the legislature provides the right to be `represented by counsel' or represented by `appointed counsel,' the legislature intended that right to include the effective assistance of counsel.); Calkins, supra note 4, at 199 (In all but a few states, whether the right to counsel stems from a state constitutional provision or from a statute, it appears that parents have a right to effective assistance of counsel in proceedings to terminate their parental rights.); but see In re Azia B., 10 Neb.App. 124, 626 N.W.2d 602, 612 (2001) (declin[ing] to recognize the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a civil action). We need not hold that a statutory right to the appointment of counsel necessarily implies a right to the effective assistance of counsel. In this context, there is direct evidence of Congress's intent that appointed counsel perform competently. D.C.Code § 11-1103 (2009 Supp.), part of the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001, expressly provides that [t]he Superior Court shall establish standards of practice for attorneys appointed as counsel in the Family Court of the Superior Court. In response to this mandate, the Superior Court has developed Standards of Practice for CCAN Appointments. See Administrative Order 03-07 (D.C.Super.Ct., Feb. 28, 2003). These standards, which expressly apply to termination of parental rights proceedings, are intended to define the role and responsibilities of counsel and to improve the quality of representation. Id. Considering D.C.Code § 16-2304(b)(1) (2001) in conjunction with D.C.Code § 11-1103 (2009 Supp.) and Administrative Order 03-07, we hold that parents who are represented by appointed counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding have a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel. This is not the first time we have held that the poor quality of counsel's performance may provide a remedy to the client in circumstances where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply. In In re Ak.V., 747 A.2d 570 (D.C.2000), for example, we reviewed the denial of appellant's motion to file a late appeal of a finding of neglect and disposition order removing appellant's children from her custody. Id. at 571. We recognized that in a civil case the usual remedy for misfeasance or nonfeasance on the part of counsel is for the aggrieved party to bring a malpractice suit against the attorney seeking monetary damages. Id. at 576. But [t]hat course does not provide an apt remedy here, where the effect of a failure by counsel to protect the client's rights may be loss of the ability to contest a court-ordered separation of child from parent. Id. at 576-77. [W]e [were] unwilling to conclusively impute counsel's knowledge [that an appealable order had been issued] to appellant with the result that appellant's right to judicial review is lost, id. at 577, and we remanded for the trial court to determine whether there is excusable neglect justifying extension of the time for appeal. Id. at 579. On remand, the trial court found that excusable neglect existed and granted appellant's motion to extend, retroactively, her time for filing a notice of appeal. In re Am.V., 833 A.2d 493, 495 n. 2 (D.C.2003). In Williams v. United States, 783 A.2d 598 (D.C.2001) (en banc), the full court held that when a convicted defendant entitled to representation under the District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act appeals his conviction, and while the appeal is pending appointed counsel files a § 23-110 motion in accordance with Shepard [v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278 (D.C.1987)], [5] counsel has the statutory duty to take the steps necessary to effect an appeal requested by the defendant from the denial of that motion. Williams, 783 A.2d at 601. We also held that the breach of counsel's statutory duty to note an appeal in these circumstances entitles the defendant to a new opportunity to appeal the denial. Id. at 599. [6] We found this statutory duty in the Criminal Justice Act, which provides in relevant part that [a] person for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of the proceedings from such person's initial appearance before the court through appeals, including ancillary matters appropriate to the proceedings. D.C.Code § 11-2603 (2001) (emphasis in Williams ). (The reference to appeals was emphasized because, in Doe v. United States, 583 A.2d 670, 674 (D.C.1990), we previously had held that it is part of counsel's responsibility on direct appeal to consider the advisability of filing a § 23-110 motion based on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See note 5, supra. ) In Williams we also considered the Plan for Furnishing Representation To Indigents Under the District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act, particularly the requirement that [i]n cases where an appeal is available as of right, ... [and i]f requested to do so by the [defendant], counsel shall file a timely notice of appeal.... Id., Section IV, ¶ 3. Our decision in Williams was strictly limited to the issue before us, however. We did not reach the question of whether the failure to effect an appeal in these circumstances is a denial of due process of law. 783 A.2d at 604. We also reserve[d] for another case the issue of what rights, if any, a defendant may have with respect to appellate counsel's conduct of the hearing on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel made in accordance with Shepard. Id. at 600 n. 1 (emphasis in original). In that sense, we go further here by recognizing a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel throughout the representation. We have not forgotten the powerful demand for finality in adoption proceedings, In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 925 (D.C.1992), and we will have more to say on that subject when we discuss the procedures by which such claims of ineffective assistance may be raised.