Opinion ID: 1631067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instructions P-10, P-11, P-12, P-13, P-14, P-15, and P-16 and C-13

Text: ś 82. Carla contends that the trial court erred by denying jury instructions P-10 through P-16 relating to R & R's and Hunter's alleged violation of numerous FMCSRs. She argues that the trial court's denial of jury instructions P-10 through P-16 was erroneous because the evidence supported the instructions, and the FMCSR violations showed the proximate cause of Preston's death. More specifically, the trial court denied jury instructions P-10 (general failure to comply with the FMCSRs); P-11 (failure to have reflective tape); P-12 (failure to conduct a pre-trip inspection); P-13 (failure to conduct a post-trip inspection); P-14 (operating the trailer in such a condition as to likely cause an accident); P-15 (failure to inspect and repair a trailer while in defendants' control); and P-16 (failure to operate the trailer with reflective tape). Having resolved to give jury instruction C-13, the trial court refused Carla's jury instructions P-10 through P-16 and, in the denial of post-trial motion, characterized these instructions as superfluous. ś 83. As to jury instruction C-13, which was given to the jury, Carla argues that C-13 denied her the right to present multiple and separate FMCSR violations by R & R and Hunter to the jury. Additionally, Carla contends that, while C-13 instructs the jury that R & R's and Hunter's failure to comply with the FMCSRs is negligent, thereby seemingly being a negligence-per-se instruction, it then requires her to show that this negligence proximately caused Preston's death. Coupled with these arguments is Carla's further contention that the trial court erred because it prohibited her from admitting evidence of FMCSR violations via expert testimony on taillight visibility, the trailer being out of service, and failure to use reflective tape, as discussed in previous issues. ś 84. The trial court allowed jury instruction C-13, which provided: The court instructs the jury that the defendants, Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., and Anthony Q. Hunter were negligent in failing to comply with the requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. However, the fact that this court has directed a finding of negligence against these defendants does not, in and of itself, mean that these defendants are liable for the death of the deceased. Before you may find these defendants liable for the death of Preston Jimmy Utz, you must also find that such negligence, the failure of the defendants to comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, was a proximate cause and/or proximate contributing cause to the death of Preston Jimmie Utz. ś 85. In Thomas v. McDonald, 667 So.2d 594, 596-597 (Miss.1995), this Court stated: [W]here there is a statute, the statute will be the controlling law for the parties' action or failure to act. See Haver v. Hinson, 385 So.2d 605, 608 (Miss. 1980) (statutes delineate negligent conduct). Violations of statutes generally constitute negligence per se. Travis v. Hartford, 630 So.2d 337, 342 (Miss.1993); U-Haul Co. v. White, 232 So.2d 705, 708 (Miss.1970). ś 86. The Court further stated: The principle that violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se is so elementary that it does not require citation of authority. When a statute is violated, the injured party is entitled to an instruction that the party violating is guilty of negligence, and if that negligence proximately caused or contributed to the injury, then the injured party is entitled to recover. Thomas, 667 So.2d at 596-597 (quoting Bryant v. Alpha Entertainment Corp., 508 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Miss.1987)). ś 87. While Thomas provides that violations of statutes constitute negligence per se, this does not relieve a party from the burden of showing that the negligence of the opposing party proximately caused or contributed to the injury suffered by a complainant. Thomas, 667 So.2d at 596-97. Thomas states that when a statute is violated, a party is entitled to an instruction on negligence. However, in order to recover damages for an injury, that negligence (violation of a statute) must have proximately caused or contributed to the injury. Id. In other words, a violation of a statute, in and of itself, does not dictate that either (1) the violation was the proximate or contributing cause of an injury suffered by a party, or (2) recovery for damages is imminent. Granted, the FMCSRs are regulations, not statutes, nevertheless, the logic holds true for the instructions at issue before this Court. Further, jury instruction C-13 provided that R & R and Hunter were negligent for failure to follow the FMCSRs. Carla's contention that the instruction required her to prove that R & R's and Hunter's negligence proximately caused or contributed to the injury is without merit, because this requirement is supported by Mississippi law. Thomas, 667 So.2d at 596-97. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused Carla's instructions.