Opinion ID: 184204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: B Fairly Traceable

Text: Although I disagree with the majority and find that the district court's opinion should be affirmed because Barnum's allegations do not meet the first prong of the test for standing, I proceed to the second prong: whether the alleged injury is fairly traceable to EPA's conduct. Here, the majority opinion only analyzes Barnum's second theory of harmthat the inclusion of Redwood Creek on the Section 303(d) listing will directly cause a decrease in property valueand concludes that this prong of the standing test is met. I also disagree with the majority on this prong of the standing inquiry. I will address both of Barnum's theories of harm independently, since each is based on a distinct causation chain.
The fairly traceable prong of Lujan 's standing test does not require that the defendant directly cause the plaintiff's injury or even that the defendant's conduct be the last link in the chain of causation. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). However, an injury is not fairly traceable if the injury results from the independent action of some third party not before the court. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). In determining if the injury alleged is fairly traceable to EPA's conduct, the Court must consider whether EPA's action had some determinative or coercive effect upon the state of California that produced Barnum's injury. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169, 117 S.Ct. 1154. The district court found that while California Forestry Regulation § 898 imposed requirements on Barnum, the injury was not fairly traceable to EPA's actions because it required the independent intervening action of a third party, the state of California. The district court's conclusion is correct. In Bennett v. Spear , a group of ranchers and irrigation districts sued the Fish and Wildlife Service to invalidate a Biological Opinion that found a water project threatened species protected by the Endangered Species Act. 520 U.S. 154, 158-59, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). The Court concluded that the injury was fairly traceable to the Fish and Wildlife Service because the Biological Opinion had a powerful coercive effect on the action agency since the statutory scheme presupposed that the Biological Opinion would play a central role in the action agency's decision-making process, and action agencies very rarely choose to engage in conduct that the Service has concluded was likely to jeopardize an endangered species. Id. at 169, 117 S.Ct. 1154. The Court found that the Biological Opinion in Bennett had direct and appreciable consequences. Id. at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154. The current suit is distinguishable, because EPA's Section 303(d) listing does not have a similarly powerful coercive effect upon California's regulatory bodies. As previously described, while the CWA establishes procedures for the states to identify polluted waterbodies and to set water quality standards, the statutory scheme gives the states broad discretion in implementing their plans. Although Section 303(d) requires the California Water Boards to identify impaired waters and to establish total maximum daily loads, Section 303(d) does not direct or require the California Department of Forestry to enact or to enforce Section 898 or to use any specific means to accomplish the TMDL. Moreover, and further undercutting Barnum's position, Barnum's injury is most directly traceable to California's regulations, not EPA's. California enjoys broad discretion to regulate Redwood Creek as it sees fit within the statutory scheme established by the CWA. EPA's approval of the Section 303(d) listing has no determinative or coercive effect upon California's enactment, implementation, or enforcement of its Forest Practice Rules. California independently chose to condition application of one of its Forest Practice regulations on Section 303(d) listing. But more importantly, California alone decides what, if any, restrictions to place upon Barnum's operations. Thus, I find that, under its first theory of harm, Barnum fails to meet the fairly traceable prong of the Lujan test as any alleged harm is caused not by EPA, but by the independent action of the state of California.
The majority opinion analyzes Barnum's second theory of harm, finding this prong of the standing inquiry is met because Barnum sufficiently sets forth a causal connection between the alleged injury-in-fact (decrease in property value) and EPA's action. I disagree. The majority concludes that Barnum's bare allegation that EPA's approval of California's decision to include Redwood Creek in the Section 303(d) list is sufficient to establish causation. Although the majority seems to rely heavily upon two declarations submitted by Barnum in support of its motion for an amended complaint, neither of these declarations supplement Barnum's allegations in any appreciable way. Rather, each simply repeats the allegation that EPA's decision to approve California's Section 303(d) listing caused a decrease in property value. Neither the proposed amended complaint nor the foresters' affidavits addresses the fatal flaw in Barnum's allegations. Although Barnum alleges that the Section 303(d) list directly caused a decrease in its property value, Barnum never actually asserts a plausible allegation that the decrease in property value is caused by the actions of EPA. [4] The majority spends several pages struggling to distinguish this court's prior decision in San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno., 98 F.3d 1121. I disagree with that analysis and would rely upon San Diego County; I think that case is sufficiently related and should be seen as precedent. First, similar to San Diego County, a multitude of factors affects Barnum's alleged harm. At best, Barnum alleges that the listing by EPA is one factor, among many, that might affect the value of its property. Many factors, such as California state regulations, other federal regulations, market forces, or even natural events, affect the value of Barnum's property. Specifically, timber harvesting in California is subject to numerous state regulations unrelated to the EPA listing. [ See E.R. at 9 (California's forestry rules comprehensively regulate [Barnum's] conduct irrespective of Redwood Creek's Section 303(d) listing) (citing Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 4581-82; Cal.Code Regs. tit. 14 §§ 897, 911-29).] Importantly, the factual setting is quite similar to that in San Diego County, where both federal and state statutes banned the manufacture, sale, and distribution of certain assault weapons. 98 F.3d at 1124. As in San Diego County, other factors much more directly affect the property value of this property. This uncertain impact weighs strongly against a finding that causation is met. Second, and more importantly, in concluding that EPA listing sufficiently affects property values to meet the causation requirement, the majority opinion incorrectly characterizes the Section 303(d) listing as a regulatory restriction[] on one property that affect[s] the uses to which a second property can be put. Majority at 900. This description leads to the seemingly natural conclusion that the listing more directly affects the property value. However, this claim is simply not truethe listing does not impose any direct regulations. Any future regulations imposed on nonpoint sources of water pollution in Redwood Creek would be enacted, if at all, by the state of California, and not by EPA. Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128-29. Any injury to Barnum would only occur should California establish a temperature or sediment TMDL for Redwood Creek and adopt that plan in a manner that affects Barnum's property. The injury to Barnum, if any, would be traceable to California, rather than EPA. Indeed, this circuit previously acknowledged that the CWA leaves to the states the responsibility of developing plans to achieve water quality standards if the statutorily-mandated point source controls will not alone suffice, while providing federal funding to aid in the implementation of the state plans. Id. California [chooses] both if and how it would implement the [ ] TMDL. States must implement TMDLs only to the extent that they seek to avoid losing federal grant money; there is no pertinent statutory provision otherwise requiring implementation of § 303 plans or providing for their enforcement. Id. at 1140 [5] ; see also Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir.2005) (Congress clearly intended the EPA to have a limited, non-rulemaking role in the establishment of water quality standards by states.) (citation and internal quotation omitted); Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1026-27 (11th Cir.2002) (Georgia has the primary authority and responsibility for issuing permits and controlling nonpoint source pollution in that state. It also has both the authority and the duty to compile the list of limited segments (the § 303(d) list), and establish TMDLs for each waterbody on the list.). A break of this magnitude in the causal chain would lead to the failure of a cause of action in the tort context, and it is also fatal here. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (injury must not be the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court) (citations and internal quotations omitted); San Diego County, 98 F.3d at 1130 (holding that standing not met where harm is the result of independent third party not before the court). The majority opinion seeks to distinguish San Diego County by stating that the plaintiffs in that case failed to demonstrate a causal connection because they provided no evidence attesting that the federal government's actions actually did cause an increase in the prices . . ., whereas here, Barnum alleges that the Section 303(d) listing directly caused a decrease in the property value of its property. Majority at 900. However, as explained, the current claim fails for the same reason. If the value of Barnum's property actually decreases, it is not because of EPA's conduct, but rather because the listing indicates that the property may be subject to California state environmental regulations. California, not EPA, enacts and enforces regulations related to nonpoint sources. Thus, any decrease in property value related to the Section 303(d) listing results from the possibility of future state, not past federal, action. Therefore, as I find that neither of Barnum's theories of harm established the requisite causal connection to show that the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of EPA, I would affirm the judgment of the district court on this ground.