Opinion ID: 2197889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Post-Conviction Status

Text: [¶10] In his cross-appeal, James argues that, although the statutory remedy of post-conviction review has replaced the remedies available through post-conviction habeas corpus, the court erred in denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordering him to challenge his detention by DOC through a petition for post-conviction review. We disagree. [¶11] We review this issue de novo. See Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr. v. Town of Limington, 2006 ME 44, ¶ 9, 896 A.2d 287, 291 (stating that we review de novo for errors of law when the parties... do not dispute the factual findings); State v. Shepley, 2003 ME 70, ¶ 9, 822 A.2d 1147, 1150 (The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law that we review de novo. (quotation marks omitted)). [¶12] The statutory remedy of post-conviction review, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2132, was intended to fully replace and implement the constitutional right of post-conviction habeas corpus as it pertains to a post-sentencing proceeding that occurs during the course of an offender's sentence. See 15 M.R.S. § 2122. Section 2122 provides: This chapter provides a comprehensive and, except for direct appeals from a criminal judgment, the exclusive method of review of those criminal judgments and of post-sentencing proceedings occurring during the course of sentences. It is a remedy for illegal restraint and other impediments specified in section 2124 that have occurred directly or indirectly as a result of an illegal criminal judgment or post-sentencing proceeding. It replaces the remedies available pursuant to post-conviction habeas corpus, to the extent that review of a criminal conviction or proceedings [is] reviewable, the remedies available pursuant to common law habeas corpus, ... and any other previous common law or statutory method of review.... The substantive extent of the remedy of post-conviction review is defined in this chapter and not defined in the remedies that it replaces; provided that this chapter provides and is construed to provide relief for those persons required to use this chapter as required by the Constitution of Maine, Article 1, Section 10. (Emphasis added.) The plain purpose of the post-conviction review statute is to provide a single, unified system of post-conviction relief, replacing the procedural complexities of the past. Fernald v. Me. State Parole Bd., 447 A.2d 1236, 1239 (Me. 1982). [¶13] Title 15 M.R.S. § 2124 of the post-conviction review statute provides: An action for post-conviction review of a criminal judgment of this State or of a post-sentencing proceeding following the criminal judgment may be brought if the person seeking relief demonstrates that the challenged criminal judgment or post-sentencing proceeding is causing a present restraint or other specified impediment as described in subsections 1 to 3. Subsection (2) provides that one may seek post-conviction review with respect to [i]ncarceration ... imposed pursuant to a post-sentencing proceeding following a criminal judgment, although the criminal judgment itself is not challenged. 15 M.R.S. § 2124(2). A post-sentencing proceeding is defined to include an administrative action occurring during the course of and pursuant to the operation of a sentence that affects whether there is incarceration or its length.... 15 M.R.S. § 2121(2). A criminal judgment includes a judgment of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disease or defect 15 M.R.S. § 2121(1). [¶14] DOC's action in deciding to retain custody of James, despite the court's order that James be committed to DHHS custody for treatment, constitutes a post-sentencing proceeding for purposes of the post-conviction review statute. See 15 M.R.S. § 2121(2); see also Parkinson v. State, 558 A.2d 361, 362 (Me.1989) (stating that prison authorities' refusal to award work-related good time to appellant falls within the definition of a `post-sentencing proceeding' under the post-conviction review statute).