Opinion ID: 1092213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress Defendant's Identification

Text: The defendant contends that the district court erred by finding his identification admissible as evidence of the person who gave the package to Mr. Lugo for shipment. Gentry bolsters this argument by referring to testimony given by Mr. Lugo in which Lugo stated that he was able to identify Mr. Gentry as a customer but unable to positively link the defendant with the package containing the contraband. In other words, the defendant wants his identification suppressed because he was never positively identified as the person who brought the package to Mr. Lugo for delivery. This is a factual determination for the jury and not a ground to suppress the identification. Gentry is merely claiming that he cannot be connected with the crime. The fact of the matter is that a motion to suppress is the improper procedural vehicle. The validity of the identification is not at issue. It is not a question that there was misidentification. The question is whether he can be brought to trial in the absence of a positive identification that connects him with delivery of the package. Lack of positive identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. State v. Taylor, 422 So.2d 109 (La.1982); State v. Robertson, 421 So.2d 843 (La.1982). Evidence or lack thereof is an issue for trial and is not required to sustain a bill of information. Probable cause sustains a bill of information and can be properly challenged, in criminal matters, in a preliminary examination. The issue of identification presented by the defendant here is one of sufficiency of evidence which is to be established at a trial on the merits and not on a motion to suppress. Therefore, it is this Court's conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his identification.