Opinion ID: 49495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession of Firearms and Explosive

Text: Dass argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that five of the illegal firearms were in his possession and that the district court thereby erred in applying the enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) and (b)(4). First, he contends that he did not possess the two eligible firearms found in his father’s truck, which included the revolver with the obliterated serial number, because he was merely a passenger. Second, he contends that he did not possess the two other illegal firearms found in the attic of his residence because he did not occupy that room. Third, he argues that there is no evidence that he possessed the 30mm HEDP M789 round, an illegal explosive device, found in the garage of his residence. The Guidelines provide for a four-level increase if the offense involved between 8 and 24 qualifying firearms. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B). For purposes of calculating the number of firearms in this section, the court can only count those 8 firearms that were “unlawfully sought to be obtained, unlawfully possessed, or unlawfully distributed.” Id. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) cmt. n.6. The Guidelines also provide for a two-level increase if the firearm was stolen or had an obliterated serial number. Id. § 2K2.1(b)(4). “Possession may be actual or constructive, joint or sole.” United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (considering sufficiency of the evidence regarding an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction), cert. denied sub nom., 543 U.S. 937, 125 S. Ct. 324 (2004). For actual possession, the defendant must have “physical possession of or personal dominion over the thing allegedly possessed.” United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1998). For constructive possession, the defendant must have “ownership, dominion, or control over an object itself or dominion or control over the premises or vehicle in which the object is concealed.” Id. Dass primarily relies on Leonard and United States v. Pedro, 999 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1993), to support his argument that he did not have actual or constructive possession of the disputed firearms and destructive device. In Leonard, the defendant at issue was a passenger in the backseat of a station wagon. 138 F.3d at 909. After the police searched the vehicle, they discovered cocaine and a firearm hidden in the tailgate. We reversed that defendant’s conviction 9 because “[t]he record only show[ed] that [the defendant] was a passenger in the back seat of the station wagon when it was stopped” and therefore “there [was] no evidence to indicate that [the defendant] ever had ownership, dominion or control over the cocaine, the gun, or the vehicle in which they were concealed.” Id. In Pedro, two defendants were arrested in connection with a burglary of an apartment. 999 F.2d at 498. When they were arrested outside the apartment, one of the defendants had a suitcase which contained a firearm that was stolen during the burglary. Id. at 498-99. The other defendant was subsequently convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on the firearm in the suitcase. We reversed the latter’s conviction because “the record [was] devoid of any evidence of [the defendant’s] knowledge of the firearm.” Id. at 502. We reasoned that even “[a]ccepting the Government’s argument that [the two defendants] were engaged in joint burglary, it would be highly unlikely that both of the men would scour each room side-by-side, aware of what the other was picking up.” Id. Whether Dass possessed these firearms is a factual finding that we review for clear error. See Jackson, 276 F.3d at 1233. Here, there is no clear error. Dass’s reliance on Leonard and Pedro is misplaced because there is sufficient evidence that, although Dass did not own the vehicle and residence where the disputed firearms were seized, he had knowledge of the firearms and exercised 10 control over those areas. See Leonard, 138 F.3d at 909. Specifically, Dass admitted to the probation officer that he and his disabled father possessed various firearms in the attic of their residence. He also admitted that he placed explosives in the dumpster, which were similar to the 30mm round found in the garage. These admissions, coupled with the fact that both he and his father were avid gun collectors, are sufficient evidence that Dass exercised control over all the firearms in the house. See United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 454 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that defendant’s “unrestricted access to the home” allowed the jury to infer that “he exercised control over the house and therefore maintained constructive possession of the [illegal item] found at the house”). Rather than being a “mere passenger” in his father’s truck, the record also supports that Dass and his father frequented Fort Stewart in the truck to scavenge ordnance and to fire weapons. Therefore, in light of the undisputed illegal firearms that were found in his room, the accessibility of the disputed firearms in the residence and truck, Dass’s close relationship with his father, the history of their firearm collecting and joint activities in Fort Stewart, and his admissions that he owned firearms in the attic and disposed of similar explosives in the dumpster, the district court did not commit clear error when it determined that Dass had at least constructive possession of the disputed weapons and enhanced Dass’s offense level pursuant to 11 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) and (b)(4). B. Sentence Exceeding the Advisory Guidelines Range Dass also argues that his 72-month sentence, which exceeds the advisory Guidelines by 15 months, is unreasonable because (1) there is nothing to support the district court’s finding that he will likely commit more crimes and (2) he has no prior criminal history. The district court must correctly calculate the sentencing range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. Crawford, 407 F.3d at 1178-79. Once the district court has accurately calculated the Guidelines range, it “may impose a more severe or more lenient sentence” that we review for reasonableness. Id. at 1179. In crafting a reasonable sentence, the district court must consider the following: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court’s imposition of a sentence and this Court’s reasonableness inquiry are guided by the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); see also 18 U.S.C. 12 § 3553(a). A district court need not explain every § 3553(a) factor before announcing its sentence. Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. “[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient under Booker.” Id. Here, the record reveals that the district court adequately and properly considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the public, and the history and characteristics of the defendant. Further, the court correctly noted that while the advisory Guidelines are an important consideration, they did not address all of the court’s concerns, including the grave risk to which Dass exposed the public by disposing of explosives in a commercial dumpster. Notwithstanding Dass’s lack of a prior criminal history, we agree with the district court’s observation that there were “serious and peculiarly dangerous events that occurred here.” R4 at 47.