Opinion ID: 1948428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the circuit court err in preventing the appellant from taking the deposition of the appellee?

Text: As mentioned before, the defendant propounded interrogatories to the plaintiff asking for the names of any expert witnesses upon whom the plaintiff intended to rely. The plaintiff responded he had retained no expert witnesses at that time. The plaintiff then sought to depose the defendant, Dr. Wiggins, but Dr. Wiggins moved for and was granted a protective order prohibiting the plaintiff from deposing him until the plaintiff produced expert witnesses and the defendant was allowed to depose them. The motion for the protective order stated in part: To allow the Plaintiff to take the deposition of the Defendant, Christopher E. Wiggins, M.D., in the absence of any expert witnesses to testify against him to support the Plaintiff's contention that said Defendant did, in fact, deviate from the generally accepted standard of care in his treatment of the Plaintiff would serve no purpose other than to annoy, embarrass, oppress, and place an undue burden and expense on the Defendant when the Plaintiff does not have a legitimate cause of action against this answering Defendant. In granting the protective order, the court apparently reasoned that expert testimony was necessary for the plaintiff to prove his claim of malpractice. In turn, the court refused to take seriously the malpractice claim of the plaintiff until he retained an expert to substantiate the claims. The rationale behind the order was that in a medical malpractice action, negligence cannot be established without medical testimony that the defendant failed to use ordinary skill and care. Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So.2d 439, 443 (Miss. 1985); Kilpatrick v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center, 461 So.2d 765 (Miss. 1984). Following that rationale, the court issued the protective order so that the defendant would not be annoyed. Overlooked in that ruling was the fact that the plaintiff was also alleging Dr. Wiggins never received plaintiff's informed consent to amputate his entire finger. A physician is under a duty under some circumstances to warn his patient of the known risks of proposed treatment or surgery, so that the patient will be in a position to make an intelligent decision as to whether he will submit to such treatment or surgery. Ross v. Hodges, 234 So.2d 905 (Miss. 1970). See also In Re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); Reikes v. Martin, 471 So.2d 385 (Miss. 1985); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-3 (Supp. 1985). No expert testimony was required to establish what communication transpired between Mr. Cole and Dr. Wiggins. [M]atters which are within the common knowledge of laymen are exceptions to the rule that expert medical testimony is required. Hammond v. Grissom, 470 So.2d 1049, 1053 (Miss. 1985); Radiology of Tupelo, P.A. and Dr. James T. Trapp v. Cayson, 471 So.2d 375 (Miss. 1985). This Court is of the opinion that the trial judge erred in issuing the protective order for two reasons. First, the plaintiff did answer the interrogatories propounded by the defendant. Mr. Cole's answer was that no expert witnesses had been retained and that the answer would be supplemented if it became necessary. That answer was a sufficient compliance with the interrogatory. Needless to say, had the answer not been supplemented timely before trial, the expert would not have been permitted to testify. Square D Company v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327 (Miss. 1982); Huff v. Polk, 408 So.2d 1368 (Miss. 1982). Second, the plaintiff conceivably could have made out his case by the doctor's deposition without other expert testimony. See Pharr v. Anderson, 436 So.2d 1357, 1361 (Miss. 1983).