Opinion ID: 1202533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: corpus delicti of first degree murder

Text: Defendant's thirteenth point is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the allegations of aggravating circumstances contained in each of the charged homicides. The informations under which defendant was charged alleged that the homicides were aggravated because they occurred during the commission or attempted commission of kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or sexual abuse of a child; because they were committed to silence a witness; or because they were committed in an especially heinous manner. Defendant twice brought a motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstances. He argued that since aggravation is an element of the corpus delicti of first degree murder and since the State had insufficient evidence of aggravation aside from defendant's confession, the circumstances should have been dismissed and the charges reduced to second degree murder. The court denied the motions. This Court has ruled that a confession is insufficient to support a conviction absent independent evidence of the corpus delicti of the charged crime. [157] To satisfy this doctrine, the State need only present evidence that the injury specified in the crime occurred and that it was caused by someone's criminal conduct. [158] The corpus delicti of murder has two components: (1) proof that the victim is actually dead, and (2) proof that the death was caused by criminal means. [159] In State v. Cooley, [160] we reiterated that the State had to establish the corpus delicti by clear and convincing evidence. [161] Defendant's contention that aggravating circumstances alleged in a first degree murder indictment or information are part of the corpus delicti of the crime ignores our definition of that term. [162] Defendant, however, argues that this Court has never addressed the issue of whether the corpus delicti of first degree murder differs from that of second degree murder. He further contends that the intent to commit a homicide must be proved by evidence independent of a defendant's confession or admission. We affirm the following language from State v. Petree: [163] In this case, the injury in the first part of the definition [of the corpus delicti] is the death of a human being. As for the second requirement, it is unnecessary to show cause of death or to provide evidence on the specific degree of homicide. The State need only present evidence that the death resulted from criminal conduct rather than by accident or from natural causes. The criminal agency causing death may be proved by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. People v. Miller, 71 Cal.2d 459, 78 Cal. Rptr. 449, 459, 455 P.2d 377, 387 (1969). That was done in this case. The concealment of the skeletal remains and the unnatural position of the body provided sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Phyllis Ady died from criminal activity. [164] This passage demonstrates that the intent to commit murder need not be proven by evidence independent of a defendant's confession and supports our decision to follow the majority view that aggravating circumstances are not part of the corpus delicti of first degree murder. Because there was clear and convincing evidence that the five boys died by criminal means, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion.