Opinion ID: 1144859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: procedural effect of the presumption

Text: The firefighters' presumption was added to ORS 656.802 in 1961. Or. Laws 1961, ch. 583, § 1. The proponents intended to give relief to firefighters because statistical studies indicated firefighters were much more likely to suffer from heart and lung diseases due to exposure to smoke and gases under strenuous conditions. Minutes, Senate Labor and Industries Committee, HB 1018, March 8, 1961. The presumption was drafted as a disputable presumption with the intent that the presumption not be conclusive. Minutes, House Labor and Industries Committee, February 2, 1961, p. 2. In 1977, the firefighters' lobby proposed amendments to ORS 656.802 because they felt that the legislative intent was not carried out in case law. Minutes, Senate Labor, Consumer and Business Affairs Committee, SB 701, April 13, 1977, pp. 2-3. The amended statute deleted the word disputable and added the sentence that a claim could be denied only on the basis of medical or other evidence that the cause of the condition or impairment is unrelated to the fireman's employment. Or. Laws 1977, ch. 734, § 1. We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the 1977 amendment was intended to clarify rather than modify the preexisting statute. 43 Or. App. at 283, 602 P.2d 1086. The presumption remains disputable, as evidenced by the last sentence of the amended statute. The operation of a disputable presumption is described in ORS 41.310, 41.340, and 41.360: ORS 41.310: Indirect evidence is of two kinds: (1) Inferences. (2) Presumptions. ORS 41.340: A presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts. ORS 41.360: All presumptions other than conclusive presumptions are satisfactory,[ [2] ] unless overcome. They are disputable presumptions, and may be controverted by other evidence, direct or indirect, but unless so overcome, the jury is bound to find according to the presumption.   . The parties agree that these statutes describe the operation of the disputable presumption for firefighters in ORS 656.802(2). In Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Or. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944), this court examined the procedural operation of a disputable presumption. The court noted that Professor Thayer and Professor Wigmore had been exponents of the theory that when any evidence is introduced to rebut the presumption, the presumption disappears. 173 Or. at 596-597, 147 P.2d 227. The court rejected that theory and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to have the court instruct the jury as to the existence of the presumption against suicide. 173 Or. at 598, 607-608, 147 P.2d 227. The Thayer-Wigmore theory has been called the bursting bubble theory of presumptions. This theory has been soundly criticized because it gives presumptions an effect that is too slight and evanescent in light of the policy reasons for creation of presumptions. [3] Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 913 (1937). McCormick on Evidence 822 (2nd Ed. 1972). Professor Morgan advanced a theory of presumptions which challenged the Thayer-Wigmore theory. Morgan maintained that once a party established the basic facts giving rise to a presumption, the burden of persuasion on that issue shifted to the opponent of the presumption. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 906, 927 (1931); Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv.L.Rev. 59 (1933). In line with his theory, Professor Morgan in 23 Or.L.Rev. 269 (1944) criticized that aspect of the Wyckoff decision in which the court approved the jury instruction that the plaintiff had the burden of proof of death by accident and not suicide. He rightly argued that instruction contradicted the instruction that the presumption against suicide required a finding of death by accident unless the evidence of suicide has overcome the presumption. In U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Lloyd's, 239 Or. 298, 307, 382 P.2d 851, 396 P.2d 765 (1964), this court acknowledged the soundness of Professor Morgan's criticism; however, the court did not adopt the Morgan approach. The court concluded that ORS 41.360 binds the jury to find according to the presumption only when no evidence opposing the presumption has been introduced. 239 Or. at 324-325, 396 P.2d 765. That conclusion was based upon a discussion of the legislative history of ORS 41.360. The court found that the forerunner statute was extracted by Deady from Greenleaf's Treatise on the Law of Evidence. The court quoted from Greenleaf `if no opposing evidence is offered, the jury are bound to find in favor of the presumption.' (emphasis added by the court, 239 Or. at 325, 396 P.2d at 774.) Greenleaf's full sentence from which that quotation was taken follows: In this mode, the law defines the nature and amount of the evidence, which it deems sufficient to establish a prima facie case, and to throw the burden of proof on the other party; and if no opposing evidence is offered, the jury are bound to find in favor of the presumption. (Greenleaf's italics) What may have been meant by Deady and the legislature in relying upon Greenleaf is not at all clear when one looks at the full sentence rather than the last clause. We hold that in a civil case [4] the statutory scheme concerning disputable presumptions requires that when the basic facts giving rise to the presumption are established, the presumption binds the jury if there is no opposing evidence. If there is opposing evidence, the trier of fact must weigh the evidence, giving the presumption the value of evidence, and determine upon which side the evidence preponderates. [5] As noted, supra, the Court of Appeals found that the claimant established the basic facts which give rise to the presumption in ORS 656.802(2). This means that the presumption disappears only if there is evidence which establishes the nonexistence of one or more of the basic facts giving rise to the presumption. For example, if in this case the evidence established that the claimant had not been employed by a political subdivision or had not been so employed for the requisite period of five or more years, the presumption would disappear. In this case there was no evidence to challenge any of those basic facts which give rise to the presumption and it cannot be held to disappear. The presumption is established as to each disease listed in ORS 656.802(1)(b) from which the claimant suffers. In this case the Court of Appeals found that the claimant had both heart related and lung related conditions or impairments of the kind described in the statutes; therefore, to the extent that each impairment can be segregated, the presumption operates as to each. The presumption then imposes on the opponent SAIF the burden of producing opposing evidence that the cause of both claimant's lung condition and heart condition is unrelated to the fireman's employment. ORS 656.802(2) prescribes what kind of opposing evidence is required. The statute directs that denial of a claim for any condition or impairment    must be on the basis of medical or other evidence that the cause of the condition or impairment is unrelated to the fireman's employment. Most of the evidence discussed by the Court of Appeals states or implies only that claimant's condition is idiopathic, or of unknown origin. These diagnoses are simply a confession of an inability to identify a cause of claimant's impairments rather than evidence that claimant's condition or impairment is unrelated to his employment. [6] There is evidence, however, that the cause of claimant's impairments is unrelated to his employment. As noted by the Court of Appeals, a treating doctor in a letter in 1976 opined that the disease was not caused by the work. [7] The Court of Appeals held that this evidence was sufficient to eliminate the presumption. We conclude that the word eliminate in the context of the opinion was used because of that court's conclusion of law that the statutory presumption falls with the introduction of opposing evidence. (our emphasis) 43 Or. App. at 283, 602 P.2d at 1088. We do not believe that the Court of Appeals used eliminate to mean overcome as is required by the statute. The erroneous premise that the presumption, in effect, disappears completely with the introduction of opposing evidence served to misdirect the thrust of that court's inquiry as to the effect to be afforded the presumption. It will be necessary, consequently, to remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further factual determinations that court is required to make, ORS 656.298, which cannot be made by this court. Sahnow v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., supra .