Opinion ID: 2977994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: “markedly hostile”

Text: As an alternative to showing differing treatment, in the commercial establishment context, the plaintiffs can also establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that they received service in a “markedly hostile manner . . . [that] a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.” Christian, 252 F.3d at 872. In determining whether a defendant’s actions rise to the level of being markedly hostile, courts consider whether the conduct is: “‘(1) so profoundly contrary to the manifest financial interests of the merchant and/or her employees; (2) so far outside of widely-accepted business norms; and (3) so arbitrary on its face, that the conduct supports a rational inference of discrimination.’” Id. at 871 (quoting Callwood, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 708). The Hotel urges that this test cannot be met because its staff always treated the plaintiffs courteously and respectfully. But the present record would support a jury finding that, over a three-month period in 2004, the plaintiffs made numerous attempts to enter into a contract with the Hotel to host their wedding reception. To this end, the plaintiffs made numerous walk-in visits and telephone calls, filled out Inquiry Forms, put two separate ten-day holds on their desired reception date, and three times offered in-person to pay the $1,200 deposit and sign the contract, which would have required them to spend a minimum of $12,000 in food and beverages through the Hotel for the reception. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it is possible to construe the Hotel’s complete failure to consummate the transaction as “‘contrary to No. 08-2024 Keck v. Graham Hotel Sys., Inc. Page 10 [its] financial interests’” and “‘outside of widely accepted business norms.’” Christian, 252 F.3d at 871 (quoting Callwood, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 708). This finding permits an inference of discrimination sufficient to state a prima facie case. Id. at 872. V. THE HOTEL’S NONDISCRIMINATORY JUSTIFICATIONS The Hotel claims that its name change caused confusion and required the alteration of all signs and promotional materials containing the Crowne Plaza logo. The District Court accepted this justification as a basic reason for the Hotel’s conduct. Specifically, the District Court found that the Hotel “changed ownership,” underwent a “transition” in “management,” and survived an “extraordinary corporate transition,” all resulting in “tumultuous and admittedly unique business circumstances.” Keck, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 739, 741, 743. The record below establishes that the termination of the franchise agreement did not result in any turnover in the Hotel’s ownership, management, or lower-level staffing — a fact freely conceded by the Hotel during oral argument. The facts on this issue create a material issue of fact as to the reason for the Hotel’s conduct. The fact of the vacations and temporary lack of a Wedding Specialist also create a material issue for the jury because they account for but a small portion of the roughly three months that the plaintiffs claim they spent actively pursuing a contract. The same is true of the fact that the plaintiffs’ visits were unscheduled given the allegation that this was prompted by the Hotel’s repeated failure to schedule a meeting with the Wedding Specialist, despite Mrs. Keck’s numerous requests to that effect. The Hotel’s justification based on the busyness of the new Wedding Specialist may account for some of the Hotel’s conduct, but a jury could find that it does not explain away its lack of communication during the month of September. This was a month in which Mrs. Keck visited the hotel three times (twice when the Wedding Specialist was present), repeated her request to pay the deposit and sign a contract, and placed a ten-day hold on her desired wedding date. The jury could also conclude that the Hotel’s proffered justifications are not the real reasons for its actions because of the experiences of the testers from the Fair No. 08-2024 Keck v. Graham Hotel Sys., Inc. Page 11 Housing Center. The experiences of testers have been held probative on the question of discriminatory intent. See Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1975). The Hotel challenges the relevance of these visits in that they occurred after the plaintiffs had ceased contact with the Hotel, but the jury may find that this point hurts the Hotel’s case. That three of four tests may reveal evidence of discriminatory treatment after the “period of unique business upheaval” had passed may suggest to the jury that the alleged “business upheaval” was not the real reason for the plaintiffs’ “poor service” and inability to secure a contract. Although the plaintiffs’ counter-arguments and references to testing data do not necessarily disprove the Hotel’s justifications, they rebut them sufficiently to survive summary judgment. See Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 2007). There is a genuine issue of material fact in this case as to whether the plaintiffs were victims of bad timing and just slipped through the proverbial cracks, or whether the Hotel denied them the right to enter into a contract because of their race. For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s opinion and order granting the Hotel’s motion for summary judgment is reversed, and the plaintiffs’ claim against the Hotel is remanded for trial.