Opinion ID: 202748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pre-Indictment and Pre-Trial Delay

Text: 120 Appellants argue that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the five-year pre-indictment delay violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process, and (2) the five-year pre-trial delay violated their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We review both claims for abuse of discretion. United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir.1986)([T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the pre-indictment delays did not violate the defendants' fifth amendment rights of due process.); United States v. Salimonu, 182 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.1999)(This circuit reviews a district court's ruling on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim for abuse of discretion.).
121 In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that statutes of limitations, which provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on prosecutorial delay, provide the primary guarantee[] against bringing overly stale criminal charges. Id. at 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Court also acknowledged that the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. Id. A prosecutor is not obliged to file charges as soon as probable cause exists, id. at 791, 97 S.Ct. 2044, and has wide discretion in delaying indictment limited only by the requirement that it not violate those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,' United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 639 (1st Cir.1980)(quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044). To show a violation of those `fundamental conceptions of justice' a defendant must prove that (1) pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and, (2) the Government intentionally delayed indictment in order to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. Picciandra, 788 F.2d at 42 (citation omitted). With respect to prejudice, a defendant must do more than allege that witnesses' memories had faded or that evidence had been lost that might have been helpful to him. United States v. Lieberman, 608 F.2d 889, 902 (1st Cir.1979). 122 Appellants have failed to meet that burden here. They assert that they suffered prejudice from the unavailability of nineteen potential defense witnesses. 35 However, we find that the unavailability of these nineteen individuals did not impair appellants' defense, either because appellants could have, but did not, obtain testimony from similarly situated individuals who were available to testify; or because appellants failed to demonstrate that the testimony of these individuals would have included exculpatory evidence. 123 Of the nineteen unavailable witnesses, appellants contend that the deaths of two individuals—Phillip Saffold and Luis Dorta—prevented cross-examination relating to reports these witnesses prepared. Saffold was an investigator who authored reports that appellants claim would have allowed them to impeach Roman Cruz, a plant manager who testified that buildings were not built at the Modules plant; however, Cruz's testimony was a minor part of the government's case against appellants and appellants' inability to impeach Cruz did not significantly prejudice them. Similarly, Dorta inspected the Transglobe and Modules sites and prepared reports that were admitted at trial; appellants emphasize that his death prevented them from cross-examining him, but do not specify how this opportunity would have helped their case. 124 Appellants claim that nine other unavailable witnesses (Gilberto Pol Segarra, Luis Acevedo Gonzalez, Jaime Sitiriche, Juan Hernández, Celestino Seneriz, Pedro Bull Nater, Francisco Susoni Lens, Jose Feliciano, and Rafael Toro Nazario) were members of the Board who could have testified to the extent of the disclosures made to the Board, in response to Lugo[]'s imprecise testimony. However, appellants offer no reason to believe that these Board members would have offered testimony contradictory to Lugo's. Moreover, appellants do not explain why they did not call as witnesses other Board members who were available to testify throughout the trial. 125 Finally, appellants contend that the remaining eight unavailable witnesses (Gilberto Mayo Aguayo, Nelson Soto Velasquez, Stephen P. Radics, Emil de Pentima, Troy Chapman, Stanley Orenstein, Hugo Lopez, and Fernando Rivera) could have testified or could have confirmed information relating to financial practices at Caguas, without offering any evidence that these individuals would, in fact, have been able to provide such testimony. 126 Similarly, appellants protest the unavailability of three sets of documents: inspection reports, commercial loan files, and miscellaneous Modules documents. With respect to the first two sets of documents, however, appellants make no attempt to establish that the reports disappeared after indictment but prior to trial. With respect to the third, appellants claim only that the unavailability of the Modules documents made it impossible to fairly cross examine [Transhore and Modules accountant Jorge] Fabrigas and that, generally, the evidence might have allowed them to refresh witness recollection and corroborate their defense. However, Fabrigas' testimony was a minor part of the trial, and these generalized objections do not establish prejudice resulting from an impaired defense. 127 Even if appellants had demonstrated some degree of prejudice from the delay, they have made no concomitant showing that the government intentionally delayed indictment to gain tactical advantage. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay.
128 The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy and public trial attaches upon arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). Thus, the time frame relevant to appellants' claim extends from the date of indictment, November 22, 1995, until the date of trial, January 29, 2001—a span of over five years. We note that appellants do not raise a claim under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, and thus their claim is based exclusively on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. 129 In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test to determine whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated. Under Barker, a court should consider: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. However, the Court identified the first factor, the length of the delay, as to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Id. The Court also has indicated that post-accusation delay approaching one year is presumptively prejudicial. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Consequently, the five-and-a-half year delay in this case creates a presumption of prejudice. 130 Under Barker, we must then consider the remaining three factors. We have described the second factor, the reasons for the delay, as `the focal inquiry.' See, e.g., United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Here, there are two main reasons for the pre-trial delay. First, the appellants filed numerous requests for continuances, some of which the district court granted, as well as many motions requiring time and consideration by the district court. 36 Second, two days before the trial was originally scheduled to begin on May 26, 1998, the government filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge assigned to the case on the ground that she had a banking relationship with Caguas that might prejudice her in the trial of the case. The district court originally denied the motion to disqualify and the government sought mandamus from this court. We denied mandamus, but noted that the judge would have been well-advised either to bow out of the case or to ask that the recusal motion be assigned to a different judge for hearing and that the government hardly can be faulted for bringing the motion. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir.1998). 37 The trial judge assigned to the case then recused herself voluntarily, resulting in a delay in the proceedings of approximately one year. In sum, the pre-trial delay arose largely from the complexity of the case and the events related to the recusal. 131 The third Barker factor weighs in favor of appellants. They raised their speedy trial objection three times during the proceedings below, and now renew that objection. 132 The Supreme Court has held that the final Barker factor—prejudice to appellants —should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The Court identified three such interests: (i) to protect oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Id. The first of these interests has no bearing here because appellants remained free prior to trial. With respect to the second interest, considerable anxiety normally attends the initiation and pendency of criminal charges; hence only `undue pressures' are considered. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d at 23 (citations omitted). Appellants allege no such undue pressure, and therefore we assign negligible weight to this interest. Finally, in our discussion of pre-indictment delay, we have already analyzed appellants' arguments that their defense was impaired. These arguments are equally applicable to the pre-trial time frame, and we find no material prejudice resulting from the delay. 38 133 The five years that elapsed between indictment and trial is a troublesome length of time. Nonetheless, our inquiry has revealed no constitutional violation. Thus, after considering the factors listed in Barker, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion to dismiss for pre-trial delay.