Opinion ID: 1521791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fifth Amendment Inquiry

Text: Once at headquaters, Ruffin was ushered into an interrogation room. Detective Dyson testified that he had told Ruffin he was not under arrest and had read Ruffin his Miranda rights. Dyson further testified that, in response to a question, Ruffin had answered he was willing to talk and then had made an oral statement acknowledging he had stomp kick[ed] the deceased  in self-defense. The trial court concluded that Ruffin was never in custody and thus had given all statements voluntarily. We disagree with that broad conclusion; we believe that Ruffin, as a matter of law, was in custody as of the time Detective Muse gave the second Miranda warnings and began to elicit Ruffin's written statement. Infra Part IV. A. On the other hand, we agree with the trial court that Ruffin voluntarily came to the police station. The question, then, is whether Ruffin remained a volunteer at the time he gave his oral statement or instead had become subject to custodial interrogation, giving rise to Miranda rights. The analysis is essentially the same for determining whether one is `in custody' for fifth amendment purposes or has been `seized' or `illegally detained' under the fourth amendment. Gayden, 492 A.2d at 872 n. 8. Basically, the question is whether the police, by words or conduct, including a show of authority, have manifested to a suspect that he or she is not free to leave. E.g., United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040, 1045 (D.C. 1985) (fourth amendment); Calaway v. United States, 408 A.2d 1220, 1224 (D.C.1979) (fifth amendment). On this record, Ruffin's voluntary presence at the police station implied his voluntary consent to make the oral statement, which he did almost immediately upon arrival. There had been no seizure of the person at the time and thus no custodial interrogation. [17] Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress Ruffin's oral statement to the police.