Opinion ID: 2558362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Applying the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review to the Present Case

Text: According to the Majority opinion, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motions to postpone the trial because the articulated rationales . . . failed to reasonably accommodate Petitioner's right to engage in religious conduct and to meaningfully participate in his trial. 418 Md. 231, 244, 13 A.3d 1227, 1235 (2011). That is not the abuse of discretion that I would find. Rather, I believe the trial court abused its discretion because the facts in evidence, according to the record extract, do not support the proffered rationales for denying Petitioner's motions to postpone the trial. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-508, [o]n a motion of any party . . . the court may continue a trial or other proceeding as justice may require. (Emphasis added.) Because the Rule invokes the precatory word may, we have held that the decision to grant a continuance [or postponement] lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that [a]bsent an abuse of that discretion we historically have not disturbed the decision to deny a motion for a continuance [or postponement]. Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 669, 907 A.2d 807, 816 (2006). In Gray v. State , we explained the abuse of discretion standard as follows: Abuse of discretion is one of those very general, amorphous terms that appellate courts use and apply with great frequency but which they have defined in many different ways. . . . [A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable. That kind of distance can arise in a number of ways, among which are that the ruling either does not logically follow from the findings upon which it supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its announced objective. That, we think, is included within the notion of untenable grounds, violative of fact and logic, and against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court. Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 383-84, 879 A.2d 1064, 1073-74 (2005) (quoting Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. at 628, 865 A.2d at 616 (quoting North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13-14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031-1032 (1994))). Although we are reticent (because of the highly deferential nature of the standard) to find an abuse of discretion in a trial court's denial for a request for a postponement or continuance, I would hold here that a trial court is required to make an on-the-record explanation of the reasons supporting a decision to deny. See Baumann v. Wyse, 2010 WL 114422, at , 2010 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 78, at  (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2010) (finding an abuse of discretion where the trial court gave no explanation in denying a party's motion). While the trial court, in this case, did make an on-the-record findings, I would hold that her denial is well removed from any center mark imagined by this Court and that she abused her discretion in denying the motion, not because her ruling does not flow logically from the findings upon which it rests, but rather because the record extract does not support the articulated findings upon which it rests. See Grant v. State, 414 Md. 483, 995 A.2d 975 (2010) (holding that it is an abuse of discretion for a court to exercise that discretion without preserving the evidentiary basis for its decision and finding that [t]he fact that the trial court's bases for its decision . . . are beyond our reach makes it untenable to sustain the trial court's ruling as a permissible exercise of its discretion). As mentioned supra, the trial court offered the following reasons for delaying Petitioner's motion to postpone the trial: lack of authorization from the administrative judge; busy trial calendar; lack of judges; effect on witnesses, jurors and members of the community; and delay in bringing the issue to the court's attention. At bottom, however, the judge, at various points throughout the relevant motions hearings, stated that she was willing to work around the two-day Shavuot holiday if defense counsel was able to reschedule the expert witnesses scheduled originally for those two days. For example, during the 22 May 2008 hearing on Petitioner's motion to postpone the trial, the following colloquy ensued: [JUDGE] I would ask [defense] counsel if you can contact your witnesses to see if any of them are available to reschedule. [COUNSEL] I will do that, Your Honor. [JUDGE] If enough witnesses were rescheduled so that we didn't need to sit either Monday or Tuesday I would not sit. [COUNSEL] I will certainly do that. I will contact all four of the experts. I will make my best efforts to explain the holiday situation and see what we can do. [JUDGE] [T]he Court's calendar is . . . double booked the second week of this [trial]. I at one point had five trials that Monday, we're now down to only two, this, and another malpractice trial which they are bringing in another judge to cover. But that's how, I mean, we're just double and tripled booked every week. So it is important that this trial end that second week. But if defense counsel can reschedule any of their experts, I am asking them to attempt to do that. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Respondent, in its brief, argues: By that time [May 5when Petitioner first sought redress from the Circuit Court] counsel for both of the Defendants had already begun scheduling their expert and fact witnesses to testify at trial. Incidentally, as with most medical malpractice cases, the expert witnesses were physicians or other health care providers. In order to secure these witnesses live at trial, several months notice is often required to ensure their availability. Furthermore, once confirmed, schedules are extremely difficult to adjust within a month's timeframe. In support of these contentions, Respondent cites to the record extract and the appendix in support of the above assertions. The record extract at the cited-to page, however, merely quotes Respondent's counsel as saying that I am trying to get my experts and witnesses set in for trial. Furthermore, the cited-to pages in the appendix merely show that Respondent's counsel informed the experts of the June 3 commencement of trialnot that they were either (a) officially scheduled to testify on June 9 or 10 of the trial scheduled to run through June 13; or (b) asked about their availability to testify at another time during that period. Further, while Respondent argues on appeal that [o]nly one of Respondent's experts (Dr. Geckler) could accommodate moving his trial appearance and Respondent's experts were unable to change their trial appearances, Respondent offers no citation to the record extract to support these statements. My review of the record extract proved fruitless in finding support for Respondent's appellate advocacy. While the abuse of discretion standard appreciates that [q]uestions within the discretion of the trial court are much better decided by trial courts than by appellate courts, In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586, 819 A.2d 1030, 1051 (2003), the phrase standard of review suggests that appellate courts nevertheless have some duty to review. Where, like here, the reasons upon which a trial court bases his or her denial of a motion to postpone a trial especially where the tendered and undisputed reasons for a brief postponement is the practice of genuinely held religious beliefsare not supported by an adequate evidentiary predicate in the record extract, it is my view that the judge abused his or her discretion. See United States v. Doe, 356 Fed.Appx. 488, 489 (2d Cir.2009) (Where First Amendment rights are implicated, our abuse-of-discretion review. . . is more rigorous than usual.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Agreeing with the Majority opinion that Petitioner's absence from the trial was presumptively prejudicial, I concur in the judgment. Judge MURPHY authorizes me to state that he joins the views expressed in this concurring opinion. ADKINS, J., concurring. Although the majority is correct that we should avoid addressing constitutional issues when unnecessary, I write separately because I think we should reach the constitutional issue presented here. The doctrine under which we avoid unnecessary Constitutional issues is most applicable when the constitutional issue is moot, or when there are two independent grounds on which we can resolve the case, one of which does not require constitutional analysis. This is illustrated by the cases cited by the majority. See Maj. Op. at 418 Md. 231, 240 n. 7, 13 A.3d 1227, 1232-33 n. 7 ( citing In re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 667, 967 A.2d 776 (2009) (constitutional issue was moot)); Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 578, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001) (analyzing court's order to seal courtroom under common law principle of openness); Baltimore Sun v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 659, 755 A.2d 1130, 1133-1134 (2000) (case determined on issues of conflict of laws and on charitable immunity). Unlike those cases, this appeal raises the threshold question of which of the levels of scrutiny is required for this claimed violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The level of scrutiny demanded by the Constitution depends upon whether the action at issue was an individualized government action, or a neutral action of general applicability, as explained in Employment Division, Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). This is not a separate issue which may be avoided, but a threshold question. See Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 292 (5th Cir.2001) (the opt-out policy enacted by Forney is neutral and of general application[, thus] [a]s a threshold matter . . . the [policy] survives constitutional scrutiny under Smith. ); First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423 (11th Cir.1994) (the threshold questions in analyzing a law challenged under the Free Exercise Clause are (1) is the law neutral, and (2) is the law of general applicability?); Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F.Supp.2d 528, 537 (W.D.Ky.2001) ( Smith requires a court to determine as a threshold matter whether the challenged regulation is a `valid and neutral law of general applicability[.]') vacated on other grounds by Hyman v. City of Louisville, 53 Fed. Appx. 740 (6th Cir.2002). The majority's conclusion that the refusal to postpone the trial was an abuse of discretion does not relieve of us of our obligation to identify which is the appropriate constitutional standard. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (in analyzing law targeted at homosexuals, the Court first identified rational basis as the correct level of scrutiny, and then held that the law fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.) An action is only entitled to the more deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, and relieved from higher constitutional scrutiny, if it qualifies as a neutral, generally applicable action under the threshold test. Turning to this question, I agree that the trial court's refusal to postpone was neutral and of general applicability, and not an individualized action that demands the higher scrutiny of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). On this point, I am persuaded by Judge Harrell's detailed analysis of the nature of the trial court's action, in light of Sherbert and Smith. I would therefore hold that the correct level of scrutiny is Smith's lower level of scrutiny, which means that we apply our usual standard of review when considering trial court discretionary decisions, i.e., whether the trial court abused its discretion. On this point, the majority opinion convincingly explains why the trial court's action should fail. I join the majority's analysis regarding why it was an abuse of discretion. Because I believe this discussion resolves the question, I would decline to wade into the thorny issue of whether the court's action imposes a substantial burden as Judge Harrell does. This is partly because I consider some of Judge Harrell's reasoning regarding substantial burden to be inapposite. Judge Harrell faults Neustadter for failing to raise the issue regarding his religion earlier: Had the judge's denial of his motion to postpone placed such a burden on Petitioner's Free Exercise rights (or Petitioner perceived truly such a burden), Petitioner, I suspect, would have informed the trial court at some point during the period between 24 January 2008when the final trial dates were scheduledand 6 May 2008the date on which Petitioner first and ultimately informed the trial court of the Shavuot conflict, less than a month before commencement of trial. Although I agree that a party's failure to raise such an objection timely is important, and often dispositive, that delay invokes an issue of waiver, not substantial burden. Clearly, whether or not a state action imposes a substantial burden on a party is an independent question from how adequately that party enforces his rights. [1] Furthermore, I would not address the intriguing issue Judge Harrell raises of whether the Free Exercise clause is applicable with equal force to the judicial branch.