Opinion ID: 2637438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Temporary Takings Standards

Text: We defer to the trial court's findings of fact and conduct de novo review of its legal conclusions. See E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. 455 Co., 3 P.3d 18, 22 (Colo.2000). As the name suggests, inverse condemnation is the mirror-image of an eminent domain proceeding; the property owner brings such an action when the taker does not institute an eminent domain proceeding. Trinity Broad., Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 921 (Colo.1993). In Trinity Broadcasting, we stated that: Inverse condemnation is the taking of private property for public or private use, without compensation, by a governmental or public entity which has refused to exercise its eminent domain power. Inverse condemnation proceedings are appropriate where the underlying activity warrants condemnation pursuant to the entity's eminent domain power. Id. (citations omitted). Article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution provides that property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation. Inverse condemnation and eminent domain actions both proceed under this provision. See City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 178 (Colo.1993). When the government takes private property for a public purpose, it must pay just compensation. See Keller v. Miller, 63 Colo. 304, 310, 165 P. 774, 777 (1917). Just compensation reflects the value of the landowner's lost interest, not the taker's gain. See Williams v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 195, 199, 363 P.2d 171, 173 (1961). [T]he owner must be put in as good position pecuniarily as if the property had not been taken. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379, 65 S.Ct. 357, 360, 89 L.Ed. 311, 319 (1945). In an inverse condemnation action, the landowner has the burden of proving the taking and the amount of compensation due. See Troiano v. Department of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 491, 463 P.2d 448, 451 (1969). Temporary takings require payment of just compensation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388, 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 266 (1987). The basic measure of compensation in a temporary taking case is the fair rental value of the property during the period of the taking. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1438, 93 L.Ed. 1765, 1773 (1949); 9 Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 34.03[3], at 34-60 (rev.3d ed.2000) [hereinafter Sackman]. A temporary taking differs from a permanent taking in two key respects. First, once the period of the taking expires, the landowner's legal interest and occupation of the property is reestablished. Second, the taking is for a definite period of time. Thus, the landowner has no right under the Just Compensation Clause to insist that a `temporary' taking be deemed a permanent taking. First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 317, 107 S.Ct. at 2387, 96 L.Ed.2d 265. The determination of value of temporary occupancy can be approached only on the supposition that free bargaining between petitioner and a hypothetical lessee of that temporary interest would have taken place. Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 7, 69 S.Ct. at 1438, 93 L.Ed. 1773; see also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255-56, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236, 1244-45 (1934) (holding that the highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable ... in the reasonably near future determines the market value of the property). In light of these standards, we now examine the issue of land use restrictions and how they affect the determination of fair rental value in a temporary taking case.