Opinion ID: 2627859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: arthritis and ppds

Text: ¶ 14 Tomlinson contends that if arthritis can be a PPD, it qualifies only if it causes lack of functionality. We agree. The mere presence of degenerative arthritis that is latent, or quiescent, and not disabling is not enough to warrant reducing an industrial insurance award when the industrial injury simply `lighted up,' or aggravated the condition. Donald W. Lyle, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 66 Wash.2d 745, 746, 748, 405 P.2d 251 (1965) (reduction appropriate for a known, preexisting disabling injury or condition, and the preexisting arthritic condition of the plaintiff's employee ... was not within this classification.). The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals itself has held in a series of cases that a preexisting disability is more than a mere preexisting medical condition and must, in some fashion, permanently impact on the worker's physical and/or mental functioning. In re Norgren, No. 04 18211, at 7 (Wash. Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals Jan. 12, 2006) (quoting In re Pate, No. 90 4055, at 4-6 (Wash. Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals May 7, 1992)). ¶ 15 Tomlinson is also correct that employers take their injured employees as they find them. Thus, employers are not entitled to seek a reduction in benefits when industrial injuries light up previous injuries or when workers have a condition that does not qualify as PPD but makes them more vulnerable to injuries. Bennett v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 95 Wash.2d 531, 533, 627 P.2d 104 (1981) (citing Miller, 200 Wash. at 683, 94 P.2d 764). In Bennett, for example, the employee sought benefits for a 1973 back injury. Id. at 534, 627 P.2d 104. There was evidence that the employee's back had been weakened by previous accidents. Id. There was medical testimony that these previous injuries made the employee more vulnerable and prone to injury but that prior to the time of the 1973 injury, his functionality was unimpaired. Id. This court affirmed a jury verdict that the employee had 20 percent PPD due entirely to the 1973 accident, with no reduction for the weakened back, noting that that was appropriate when `the workman's prior physical condition is not deemed the cause of the injury, but merely a condition upon which the real cause operated.' Id. at 533, 627 P.2d 104 (quoting Miller, 200 Wash. at 683, 94 P.2d 764). If the accident had merely lit up a latent injury, then Tomlinson would not be subject to a reduction for a PPD. ¶ 16 We also agree with Tomlinson that the Court of Appeals may have misread Beyer v. Department of Labor & Industries, 17 Wash.2d 29, 134 P.2d 948, 137 P.2d 1016 (1943). Beyer was blind in his right eye before he suffered an industrial injury to the same eye requiring enucleation (removal). The statutory schedule provided for an award of $1,080 for `[l]oss of sight of one eye' and $1,440 for `[l]oss of one eye by enucleation.' Id. at 30 (quoting Rem.Rev. Stat. § 7679). The court below may have concluded Beyer was analogous to Tomlinson's case. We find it is not. Beyer does not stand for the principle that a person who loses an eye in an industrial injury may have his award reduced if he had poor vision before the injury. In Beyer, the statutory schedule listed an award for the loss of sight of one eye and then a greater award for the removal of an eye. Beyer would be analogous if Tomlinson had an amputation at the ankle and later an amputation above the knee. Beyer does not justify reducing an award for the loss of an eye just because the worker already had the impaired sight of the affected eye. ¶ 17 We have also previously rejected the argument that a worker's claim could be denied because the worker suffered from preexisting degenerative arthritic disease. In Dennis v. Department of Labor & Industries, 109 Wash.2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987), Dennis had preexisting osteoarthritis; his work involved the use of tin snips as a sheet metal worker. [2] The work aggravated his osteoarthritis, which became symptomatic and disabling. We reviewed the principles applicable to the IIA and its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment: It is a fundamental principle which most, if not all, courts accept, that, if the accident or injury complained of is the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the workman is immaterial and recovery may be had for the full disability independent of any preexisting or congenital weakness; the theory upon which that principle is founded is that the workman's prior physical condition is not deemed the cause of the injury, but merely a condition upon which the real cause operated. The worker is to be taken as he or she is, with all his or her preexisting frailties and bodily infirmities. Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 471, 745 P.2d 1295 (quoting Miller, 200 Wash. at 682-83, 94 P.2d 764 and citing Wendt v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 18 Wash.App. 674, 682-83, 571 P.2d 229 (1977)). ¶ 18 If a worker is to be taken with all of his or her preexisting frailties and bodily infirmities, it is axiomatic that older, more mature workers will often have bodies experiencing degenerative processes and feeling the effects of wear and tear over the years. It is, of course, the skill and knowledge gained by years of experience that make mature workers so valuable to their employers. A worker's PPD cannot be reduced merely because x-rays suggest preexisting degenerative arthritic changes at the time of the injury without additional evidence that the degeneration resulted in loss of functionality sufficient to make that degeneration a preexisting PPD. In sum, if an accident or injury is the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the worker is immaterial and recovery may be had for the full disability independent of any preexisting or congenital weakness because the worker's prior physical condition is not deemed the cause of the injury but merely a condition upon which the real cause operated. Bennett, 95 Wash.2d at 532-33, 627 P.2d 104 (citing Miller, 200 Wash. at 683, 94 P.2d 764). ¶ 19 RCW 51.32.080(5) provides for a reduction in benefits if the preexisting condition has already developed into a PPD within the meaning of the IIA. But a preexisting PPD is more than a mere preexisting medical condition. In re Norgren, No. 04 18211, at 7 (quoting In re Pate, No. 90 4055, at 4-6). It must, in some substantial fashion, permanently impact the worker's physical or mental functioning. The preexisting PPD's impact on function must be substantial and permanent. A preexisting condition that causes intermittent impairment of function is not a PPD for purposes of reduction of benefits. Id.