Opinion ID: 478407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Lopez's Conspiracy and Racketeering Convictions

Text: 23 The jury found Lopez guilty of Count 13, assaulting a postal carrier in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2114, but the court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. Lopez claims that this acquittal requires that his conspiracy and RICO convictions be reversed because it is impossible to determine whether the jury relied on Count 13 as the overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy and as one of the two predicate acts necessary to show a pattern of racketeering. 24 A conspiracy conviction must be reversed if the trial court instructs the jury that it need find only one of the multiple objects alleged in order to convict of conspiracy in a case in which the reviewing court holds any one of the supporting counts legally insufficient. United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 566-68 (9th Cir.1978). Here, the district court instructed the jury that it could convict under the conspiracy count if it found a conspiracy to commit either of the objects alleged in the indictment. However, in granting Lopez's motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court did not find one of the objects of the conspiracy was legally insufficient. 25 Count One charged that appellants conspired to obstruct the movement of gold in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951, and to steal registered parcels containing gold from the United States Postal Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1708. It is not disputable that the conduct alleged in Counts 4 and 8, for the Wilkinson and Wildberg robberies, charged violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951. Similarly, the conduct alleged in Counts 2, 3, 11, 12, and 14, for theft and receipt of stolen mail, charged violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1708. The evidence was not legally insufficient as to either object of the conspiracy and, therefore, this case is not controlled by Carman and DeLuca. 26 In granting the judgment of acquittal on Count 13, the district court simply concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Lopez committed one alleged overt act, the postal carrier assault. This conclusion does not affect the jury's implicit finding that Lopez, Vlahovich and Nadir made an agreement to commit an illegal act. Moreover, as discussed above, the jury convicted Lopez of several other overt acts. 27 Once the government establishes that a conspiracy exists, evidence of only a slight connection is necessary to convict a defendant of knowing participation therein. United States v. Arbelaez, 719 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255, 104 S.Ct. 3543, 82 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 115 (9th Cir.1979). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support Lopez's conspiracy conviction, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Reese, 775 F.2d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir.1985). Viewed in this manner, there was sufficient evidence to show that Lopez conspired with Nadir and Vlahovich. Therefore, we affirm Lopez's conspiracy conviction. 28 Lopez relies on United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669-70 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 1217, 59 L.Ed.2d 456 (1979), in arguing that the judgment of acquittal on Count 13 requires reversal of his RICO conviction. Brown held that if a defendant is charged with multiple predicate offenses, the evidence must be sufficient to prove all of them if the reviewing court cannot determine which specific offenses the jury relied upon in reaching its verdict on the RICO count. See United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 227 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 157, 78 L.Ed.2d 145 (1983). 29 This circuit has not adopted the rationale of Brown, and other circuits have affirmed RICO convictions even though the appellate court determined that there may have been insufficient evidence of a substantive offense which also was charged as a predicate act. See United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 348 (5th Cir.1981); modified, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965, 104 S.Ct. 404, 78 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105, 95 S.Ct. 775, 42 L.Ed.2d 801 (1975). However, even assuming that the rationale of Brown is sound, reversal of Lopez's RICO conviction is not required. 30 The RICO count charged Lopez with nine predicate acts based upon five substantive offenses: the Wilkinson and Wildberg robberies, the two extortions and the mail carrier assault. The jury convicted Lopez of all five substantive offenses. The judgment of acquittal on Count 13 arguably invalidates one of the predicate acts upon which the jury may have relied in convicting Lopez under RICO. However, the verdict shows that the jury found Lopez committed the eight other predicate acts. The only question is whether the jury found Lopez committed at least two of those predicate acts in the conduct of a RICO enterprise. 31 The RICO count alleged that Vlahovich committed eight predicate acts; these were the same predicate acts alleged against Lopez, excluding the mail carrier assault invalidated by the judgment of acquittal. The jury convicted Vlahovich of violating RICO based solely on his involvement in the Wilkinson and Wildberg robberies and the two extortions. Therefore, the jury must have found that at least two, if not all, of the eight predicate acts occurred in the conduct of a RICO enterprise. Since both Lopez and Vlahovich were convicted of the four substantive offenses which correspond to the eight predicate acts alleged against them in the RICO count, and the jury convicted Vlahovich of violating RICO, we hold as a matter of law that the jury must have found that Lopez committed the requisite number of predicate acts to establish a RICO violation and that those acts occurred in the conduct of a RICO enterprise. Lopez's RICO conviction is affirmed.