Opinion ID: 164588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Total Exhaustion

Text: 29 Finally, we turn to whether Ross' entire action should be dismissed under the PLRA because he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to his medical treatment claims. The only Court of Appeals to have addressed this total exhaustion issue in a published opinion, the Eighth Circuit, has concluded that [w]hen multiple prison condition claims have been joined... § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims. 10 Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir.2000). We agree that the PLRA contains a total exhaustion requirement, and hold that the presence of unexhausted claims in Ross' complaint required the district court to dismiss his action in its entirety without prejudice. 30 In the habeas context, the total exhaustion rule is well-established. In Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 required district courts to dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus containing any claims that have not been exhausted .... leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court. 455 U.S. 509, 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). 11 31 The Court began by observing that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 did not address the question of whether Congress intended to create a total exhaustion requirement. Id. at 516-17, 102 S.Ct. 1198 ([I]n all likelihood Congress never thought of the problem.) 12 Accordingly, the Court based its decision on the policies underlying the statutory provision. Id. at 517, 102 S.Ct. 1198. Emphasizing comity principles, the Court reasoned that the total exhaustion doctrine would 1) encourage prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving states the first opportunity to review claims of error, 2) create a more complete factual record that will aid federal courts in their review, and 3) relieve district courts of the difficult task of deciding whether multiple claims are severable. Id. at 518-19, 102 S.Ct. 1198. 32 The Court next rejected the argument that the total exhaustion rule would act as a trap for unwary pro se litigants. Id. at 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198. [O]ur interpretation of §§ 2254(b), (c) provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you have first taken each one to state court. Just as pro se petitioners have managed to use the federal habeas machinery, so too should they be able to master this straightforward exhaustion requirement. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that even if a prisoner improperly submitted a petition containing one or more unexhausted claims, he or she would then be able to resubmit a petition containing only the exhausted claims. Id. 33 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the total exhaustion rule might increase the burden on federal courts. To the contrary, the Court noted that such a rule would actually promote judicial efficiency by discouraging piecemeal litigation at least to some extent. Id. Under a total exhaustion rule both the courts and the prisoners should benefit, for as a result the district court will be more likely to review all of the prisoner's claims in a single proceeding, thus providing for a more focused and thorough review. Id. 34 In determining whether the PLRA also contains a total exhaustion requirement, we follow a similar analysis. To start, the language in § 1997e(a) itself suggests a requirement of total exhaustion because it prohibits an action (as opposed to merely preventing a claim) from proceeding until administrative remedies are exhausted. 35 Further, we believe the policies underlying the PLRA point toward a requirement of total exhaustion. In the PLRA context, a total exhaustion rule would encourage prisoners to make full use of inmate grievance procedures and thus give prison officials the first opportunity to resolve prisoner complaints. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 524-25, 122 S.Ct. 983 (purposes of the PLRA); Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19, 102 S.Ct. 1198 (purposes of total exhaustion). It would facilitate the creation of an administrative record that would ultimately assist federal courts in addressing the prisoner's claims. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525, 122 S.Ct. 983; Rose, 455 U.S. at 519, 102 S.Ct. 1198. Moreover, it would relieve district courts of the duty to determine whether certain exhausted claims are severable from other unexhausted claims that they are required to dismiss. Rose, 455 U.S. at 519, 102 S.Ct. 1198. Prisoners suing under § 1983, no less than habeas petitioners, can be expected to adhere to this straightforward exhaustion requirement. Cf. id. at 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198. Finally, the total exhaustion rule will not increase the burden on federal courts, but will instead tend to avoid at least some piecemeal litigation. Cf. id. 36 The policies of the PLRA thus strongly support a reading of that statute that requires inmates to exhaust fully all of their claims before filing in federal court. If a prisoner does submit a complaint containing one or more unexhausted claims, the district court ordinarily must dismiss the entire action without prejudice. 13