Opinion ID: 2633412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the district court err in granting young's motions in limine?

Text: On September 16, 29, and 30, 1997, Young filed motions in limine seeking court orders excluding certain evidence. Those motions were heard on October 1 and 9, 1997, and the district court issued its memorandum decision and order granting the motions on November 21, 1997. Because the order dismissing the case was a final judgment, I.A.R. 11(c)(4), this Court may also consider prior interlocutory orders that would otherwise not be appealable. In re Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho 452, 716 P.2d 1224 (1986); I.A.R. 17(e). The State challenges only two categories of evidence excluded by the order granting the motion in limine.
In 1996 criminal charges were filed against Young in Wyoming alleging that he engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with his adopted daughter. Those charges were based upon an incident in which Young took his adopted daughter home from school when she developed hives from an allergic reaction. Upon arriving home, he had her take off her pants and underwear, and he then rubbed lotion on her vagina for about twenty minutes. The State of Wyoming and Young entered into an agreement to defer prosecution in that case if Young would do certain things, including apologizing to his adopted daughter for allowing her to sleep with him and for rubbing her private parts with lotion and being evaluated by a mental healthcare professional agreed upon by the Uinta County Attorney's Office. In compliance with that agreement, Young underwent a psychological evaluation. As part of his motions in limine, Young asked the district court to exclude any evidence relating to this evaluation or the resulting report. The district court held that the report was privileged under Idaho Rules of Evidence 503, 517, and 519, and that the child-related communications exceptions in Rules 503 and 517 did not apply in this case. The interpretation of the rules of evidence is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 736, 947 P.2d 409 (1997). The district court ruled that Rule 519 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence barred admission of Young's psychological evaluation, report, or therapy. For that rule to apply, the psychological report and the statements made during the evaluation and therapy would have to be communications made in connection with a proceeding for research, discipline, or medical study conducted by an in-hospital medical staff committee or medical society for the purpose of reducing morbidity, or improving the standards of medical practice or health care in the State of Idaho. I.R.E. 519(a)(4)(A). There is absolutely nothing in the record indicating that any communications made between Young and the psychologist who evaluated him, or between Young and any therapist, would be covered by Rule 519. The district court also ruled that the communications were covered by Rules 503 and 517 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and that the child-related communications exceptions in those rules did not apply. Rule 503 provides for a physician and psychotherapist-patient privilege, and Rule 517 provides for a licensed counselor-client privilege. Rule 517 would not apply because the licensed counselor must be licensed in the State of Idaho pursuant to Title 54, Chapter 34, Idaho Code, or reasonably believed by the client so to be. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the therapist who treated Young in Wyoming was either licensed in Idaho or reasonably believed by Young to be licensed in Idaho. Even if he were, Rule 517 would not exclude relevant evidence in this case. Rules 503 and 517 both provide an exception for child related communications, which provide as follows: There is no privilege under this rule in a criminal or civil action or proceeding as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the physical, mental or emotional condition of or injury to a child, or concerning the welfare of a child including, but not limited to the abuse, abandonment or neglect of a child. (I.R.E.503(d)(4)). There is no privilege under this rule: .... In a criminal or civil action or proceeding as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the physical, mental or emotional condition, of or injury to a child, or concerning the welfare of a child including, but not limited to the abuse, abandonment or neglect of a child. (I.R.E. 517(d)(3)). The district court ruled that the above exceptions did not apply to counseling where a patient is earnestly trying to recognize and solve personal problems and a child is not in immediate or pending danger concerning his or her welfare. Neither exception includes any provision limiting its application in cases where the defendant is earnestly trying to recognize and solve personal problems, nor does either exception require that the child be in immediate or pending danger concerning his or her welfare. Both exceptions by their terms apply to a communication relevant to an issue concerning ... the abuse . . . of a child. If Young made any communication to his psychologist or counselor that is relevant to an issue concerning the allegation of sexual abuse that is the basis of the charge in this case, such communication is not privileged under either Rule 503 or Rule 517 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The district court's order to the contrary is reversed.
As part of his motions in limine, Young asked the district court to exclude evidence of three contacts Young had with his adopted daughter after he was charged in this case. These contacts occurred at a Wal Mart store, at a Smith's grocery store, and at the Evanston High School in Evanston, Wyoming. At the time, as a condition of his release on bail, Young was prohibited from having contact with his daughter. The district court found that these contacts were not relevant to any issue in the case. Because the determination of relevance is a question of law, our review of that issue is de novo. State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997). On appeal, the State does not argue that these contacts are relevant. It argues that Young did not provide sufficient evidence regarding the contacts for the district court to be able to conclude that they are not relevant. Although Young mentioned these incidents in his memorandum submitted in support of his motions in limine, neither party argued or mentioned these incidents during the hearing on the motions in limine. The State did not argue that they were relevant, nor did the State present or allege any facts showing that they were relevant. Error may not be based upon a ruling that excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer of proof. I.R.E. 103(a)(2). Absent an offer of proof or anything in the record showing that any of these contacts are relevant, the State has not preserved this issue for appeal. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212 (1997). As this Court stated in the first appeal in this case, [M]otions in limine seeking advance rulings on the admissibility of evidence are fraught with problems because they are necessarily based upon an alleged set of facts rather than the actual testimony which the trial court would have before it at trial in order to make its ruling. State v. Young, 133 Idaho 177, 179, 983 P.2d 831, 834 (1999). An order granting a motion in limine is not a final order. The trial court can reconsider the issue at any time. If the State believes that any of these incidents are relevant to this case, it can certainly ask the district court to reconsider the issue at a time when it can make a factual presentation showing such relevance.