Opinion ID: 1205031
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on consideration of multiple special circumstances.

Text: (31) Defendant contends the trial court failed to give an instruction on multiple special circumstances as required by our decision in People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433]. In Harris, the plurality opinion stated that in a case where overlapping special circumstances are found to be true, the risk arises that a jury may give undue weight to the mere number of special circumstances found true. To avoid that risk, in those cases involving a single act or an indivisible course of conduct with one principal criminal objective, the jury should be instructed that although it found several special circumstances to be true, for purposes of determining the penalty to be imposed, the multiple special circumstances should be considered as one. ( Id., at p. 66, plur. opn. by Broussard, J.) A majority of this court subsequently held to the contrary in People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 765-768. In Melton we concluded that it is constitutionally legitimate for the state to determine that a death-eligible murderer is more culpable, and thus more deserving of death, if, as in the Melton case, he not only robbed the victim but committed burglary in order to facilitate commission of the robbery and murder, because these offenses involve violations of distinct interests, each of which is relevant to a determination of the seriousness of the crime. ( Id., at p. 767.) The decision in Melton has been applied in subsequent cases to reject similar claims based upon Harris. (E.g., People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 691-692 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84]; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 529 [273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561]; People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d 315, 357-358.) Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention. In his supplemental brief, defendant contends that Melton also requires that the jury receive instruction that the acts providing the bases for the special circumstances (rape and burglary) may not each be weighed more than once in the penalty determination, that is, both under the circumstances of the crime and as special circumstances (pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a), and the instruction patterned thereon). ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 768.) Although defendant urges that the trial court has a sua sponte duty to so instruct, we have indicated only that upon defendant's request such an instruction should be given. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214]; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 224 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 768.) Moreover, we have observed that in the absence of any misleading argument by the prosecutor or an event demonstrating the substantial likelihood of double-counting, reversal is not required. ( People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d 152, 224; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 768-769.) In the present case, the prosecutor did not suggest the offenses other than murder be considered dually as special circumstances and as acts making the murder more heinous; he simply underscored the facts showing the brutality of the acts.