Opinion ID: 814980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Procedural and Substantive

Text: Reasonableness of Castro’s 60-Month Sentence Under Count Nine Finally, Castro argues that, when it imposed a sentence that varied upwards by nearly 50 percent above the highest sentence recommended by the guidelines, the District Court produced a sentence that was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. According to Castro, the Court did not adequately explain why such a harsh sentence was necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of sentencing, considering all the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case, and the Court did not adequately account for Castro‟s lengthy record 31 of good works.10 In response, the government supports the sentence as well justified in light of numerous statements by the District Court explaining the reasons for the sentence given. We agree that the sentence was well explained, but, given the flawed inclusion of Count Three in the sentencing calculus, the overall sentence must be reassessed. Despite our well-known procedure for reviewing criminal sentences,11 the District Court‟s upward variance is 10 Castro‟s arguments in this regard are not foreclosed by his appellate waiver because the waiver contains an exception for “claims that … the sentencing judge, exercising the Court‟s discretion pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), imposed an unreasonable sentence above the final Sentencing Guideline range.” (App. at 128.) 11 Our review of a criminal sentence “proceeds in two stages.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). First, we review the sentence for procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If there was procedural error, “our preferred course is to remand the case for re-sentencing, without going any further.” United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010). Second, if there was no procedural error, “we review for substantive reasonableness, and „we will affirm [the sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 32 unreviewable at this juncture, because, in calculating Castro‟s “combined offense level” for “multiple counts” using the method supplied by § 3D1.4 of the sentencing guidelines, the Court arrived at an offense level that was one level higher (20 instead of 19) than would have resulted if the conviction on Count Three had not been included. That in turn led to a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months instead of 30 to 37 months. “[G]iven the importance of a correct Guidelines calculation both to the sentencing process that district courts are required to conduct and to our ability to carry out reasonableness review, the use of an erroneous Guidelines range will typically require reversal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f).” United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008). Our reversal of Castro‟s conviction under Count Three accordingly necessitates a remand for resentencing solely for Castro‟s guilty plea on Count Nine. See id. at 211, 214 (“[A] correctly calculated Guidelines range will often be a necessary precondition of our reasonableness review. Where a district court begins with an erroneous range, it will be difficult for us to determine that it fulfilled its duty to consider the Guidelines and reason through to the ultimate sentence,” because “the correct computation of the Guidelines range and any departures therefrom serves to clarify the basis for the sentence imposed and thus facilitates reasonableness review.”). We note with appreciation the District Court‟s thorough and thoughtful accounting of the aggravating and provided.‟” United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568). At both stages we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). 33 mitigating circumstances in this case and its explanation for why it concluded that an upward variance was necessary to accomplish the legitimate aims of sentencing.12 Despite that exemplary handling of the always difficult work of crafting and explaining an appropriate sentence, we must nevertheless remand for resentencing because we cannot conclude with confidence that, had the District Court operated from the 12 For example, the Court specifically acknowledged much of Castro‟s good character, including that, “[w]ith perhaps one or two exceptions, I have never received as many letters attesting to a defendant‟s good character and urging leniency as I have in this case,” which showed that, “[c]learly, he has the support and respect of many people in this community and elsewhere.” (App. at 225.) The Court also recognized that Castro “has shown contrition for what he has done” and “is sincere in saying that he is sorry.” (App. at 228.) Despite Castro‟s “many good works, particularly with children” (App. at 225), the Court expressed deep concern over Castro‟s willingness to use “force and violence.” (App. at 227; see also id. (“I can‟t emphasize this enough, if force and violence had been used, someone could have been killed.”).) But “most troubling” to the Court was that Castro was a police officer, and police officers “are held to a much higher standard.” (App. at 230.) The Court felt “a compelling need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, particularly to deter others in law enforcement who may contemplate illegal conduct.” (App. at 229.) After considering the mitigating and aggravating evidence, the Court found that the nature of Castro‟s conduct and the tremendous damage caused by that conduct outweighed the positive aspects of Castro‟s history and character, and called for a higher sentence. 34 correct guidelines range (30 to 37 months instead of 33 to 41 months), it would still have given a 60-month sentence. See Langford, 516 F.3d at 215 (“[T]he improper calculation of the Guidelines range can rarely be shown not to affect the sentence imposed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). On remand, the District Court is “free to make its own reasonable application of the § 3553(a) factors” and ultimately may choose “to reject (after due consideration) the advice of the Guidelines” and impose the same sentence. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 113 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). But it must consider the correct guidelines range.