Opinion ID: 1961619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: credibility of the informer

Text: A search warrant may only be issued on the basis of probable cause. This Court has repeatedly held that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. State v. Richards, 357 So.2d 1128, 1130 (La.1978); State v. Smith, 350 So.2d 1178 (La.1977). If an essential element in establishing probable cause required by Article 162 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure is hearsay information, then the magistrate must follow the two-pronged test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), in determining whether or not probable cause existed. The two requirements of the Aguilar test are: (1) the affiant must state the basis for his belief that the information is trustworthy, and (2) the affidavit must also state the underlying circumstances which show that the informant was in a position to observe facts as reported. Thus, under Aguilar, the affidavit must demonstrate that the informant is credible and that the information is reliable, i.e., that the informant was in a position to know what he or she reported. There is no question in this case that the second requirement is met since the affidavit reflects that Ms. Lodice's knowledge of the existence and location of the drugs was based upon her own personal observation. In a similar case, this Court held: The reliability of the information reported is sufficiently established by the informant's direct personal observation and actual participation in the sale of marijuana. ( State v. Mena, 344 So.2d 357, 358 [La.1976]) While defendants' claim that the affidavit does not sufficiently establish the credibility of the informant presents a more interesting question, it is also without merit. Relator urges this Court to hold that where the informant is named in the affidavit, the first requirement of Aguilar v. Texas does not apply. However, we find it unnecessary to decide this question since we hold the affidavit sets forth sufficient facts to establish the credibility of the informant under this Court's recent decision in State v. Mena, supra . In Mena, the affidavit set forth the following facts: The police arrested Jimmy Samson and found him in possession of one pound of marijuana. Samson told the police he had bought the substance from a man named Jose and showed the police the residence where the purchase was made. Police investigation revealed that Jose Mena resided at the apartment pointed out by Samson. Samson also identified Mena from a picture shown to him by police as the man who sold him the marijuana. In addition, Samson told police that he had seen numerous other packages like the one he had purchased at Mena's residence when he was there. In Mena, we held that the affidavit satisfied the first prong of the Aguilar test: The credibility of the informant is established by two factors. First, the informant's report that Jose lived at the specified address was corroborated by the affiant's independent investigation. Second, the informant's admissions, included in the affidavit, that he purchased marijuana from defendant Jose Mena, as well as his photographic identification of Jose Mena, constituted declarations against penal interest because they supplied evidence against him of guilty knowledge, an essential element of the crime of the possession of a controlled dangerous substance. State v. Knight, 298 So.2d 726 (La.1974) and cases cited therein. ( State v. Mena, 344 So.2d at 358) Two of the three elements which existed in Mena to demonstrate the credibility of the known informant are present in the instant case, plus an additional element which we feel is even more valuable than the photographic identification in Mena. First, Ms. Lodice's statement that she participated in smoking marijuana with the defendants constituted a declaration against penal interest. The United States Supreme court in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971), a case involving a confidential informant who had made inculpatory statements to police upon which a search warrant was based, reasoned: Common sense in the important daily affairs of life would induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit these statements. People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibilitysufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search. (403 U.S. at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2082) We believe the informant's credibility was enhanced by her admission to having participated in the smoking of marijuana at the defendants' apartment. Second, as in Mena, the informant's statements were partly corroborated by independent investigation by the police. Investigation established that a car located in front of the apartment where the alleged activities occurred, and which Ms. Lodice identified as belonging to the defendant Welsh, was, in fact, registered to Welsh. The fact that part of her story was true tended to make her other allegations more credible. The third factor which tends to establish the credibility of the informant is the fact that the affidavit stated that the informant is available and ready to testify in Criminal District Court against these two subjects, Maurice Welsh and Sandy Smith. This Court has never before addressed this point. The Supreme Court of Virginia in McNeill v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 200, 191 S.E.2d 1 (1972), rendered this perceptive analysis when faced with similar language in an affidavit seeking a search warrant: [T]here was added to the statement concerning reliability a most unusual allegation, one we have not seen in all the search warrant cases we have examined. That allegation was that the informer was `willing to testify in court.' This added allegation served two purposes. First, it established that the informer was an ordinary citizen discharging his public duty to assist the police, rather than a paid informer or one seeking favor for himself. Second, it gave weight to the statement about the proven reliability of the informer and entitled the magistrate to credit his story. It is true, as the defendant argues, that the allegation that the informer was `willing to testify in court' did not bind him to testify. But the average citizen knows that when he does appear in court he must take an oath to tell the truth, he faces a charge of perjury for testifying falsely, and he may be confronted with prior inconsistent statements when cross-examined. With this beforehand knowledge, when one expresses a willingness to testify in court and stand by what he has told the police, an aura of credibility is added to his story which establishes its probability. (191 S.E.2d at 3) We find the above reasoning transcends state jurisdictional lines and adopt it as our own. We conclude, therefore, that the affidavit more than adequately established the credibility of the informant. In doing so, we are mindful that common sense must guide magistrates and courts in testing search warrants, State v. Mena, supra at 358, and that [a] policeman's affidavit `should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest' . . . but, rather, must be judged by the facts it contains, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 579, 91 S.Ct. at 2080. We believe the fact that the affidavit disclosed the identity of the informant, that it contained declarations against the informant's penal interest, that some factual allegations were independently corroborated by police investigation, and that the informant unconditionally expressed a willingness to testify in criminal court to the facts she alleged, are sufficient to justify a reasonable person to conclude the informant was credible in the case before us.