Opinion ID: 806484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim Against the Officers

Text: The district court found that the Officers were protected from Gray’s claims by qualified immunity. An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity when, 5 Case: 12-10817 Date Filed: 08/13/2012 Page: 6 of 9 acting in his discretionary capacity, he violates clearly established constitutional or federal law of which a reasonable person would have known. See Koch v. Rugg, 221 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000). When responding to Pompelia’s call, the Officers were acting in their discretionary capacity as law enforcement officers. Therefore, our analysis focuses on whether Gray’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to support a claim that the Officers violated clearly established law. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 838–39 (11th Cir. 2010). We decide whether the facts alleged in the Complaint show a violation of clearly established law by “(1) defining the official’s conduct, based on the record and viewed most favorably to the non-moving party, and (2) determining whether a reasonable public official could have believed that the questioned conduct was lawful under clearly established law.” Koch at 1295–96 (footnote omitted). “A warrantless arrest is constitutionally valid only when there is probable cause to arrest.” Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976)). An officer has probable cause to arrest if the “arrest is objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004). An arrest is objectively reasonable when “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy 6 Case: 12-10817 Date Filed: 08/13/2012 Page: 7 of 9 information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed . . . an offense.” Id. (emphasis added). An officer may not “conduct an investigation in a biased fashion or elect not to obtain easily discoverable facts.” Id. at 1229 (finding that information that could be uncovered by searching a truck for drugs and interviewing available witnesses constituted “easily discoverable facts”). Although an officer is not required to eliminate every theoretical possibility, an officer may not “turn[] a blind eye to immediately available exculpatory information.” Id. at 1229 n. 10. Here, the Officers must show that they had probable cause to arrest Gray for criminal damage to property. In Georgia, criminal damage to property in the second degree occurs when a person “(1) Intentionally damages any property of another person without his consent and the damage thereto exceeds $500.00; or (2) Recklessly or intentionally, by means of fire or explosive, damages property of another person.” O.C.G.A. § 16-7-23. The Officers only basis for asserting probable cause to arrest Gray was Pompelia’s claim that Gray caused $5,600.00 worth of damage to his property. Gray alleges in her Complaint that she carefully removed Pompelia’s property from her house and did not damage any of his property. She further alleges that at the time of her arrest Ferdarko knew that at least some of the property that Pompelia claimed was damaged was not actually 7 Case: 12-10817 Date Filed: 08/13/2012 Page: 8 of 9 damaged. Assuming that this is true and drawing all inferences in favor of Gray, as we must, the Officers knew of exculpatory evidence and “failed to investigate both sides of the story.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1229. The Officers, after learning that some of the property was not damaged, were no longer justified in relying solely on Pompelia’s claims. At that point, a reasonable officer would, at the very least, further investigate to see if Gray had actually damaged any property. This is especially true when the investigation into the allegedly damaged property only required the Officers to ask Pompelia to show them his damaged property. See id. It is a reasonable inference from the Complaint that the Officers had reason to believe that Pompelia was not providing “reasonably trustworthy information.” Therefore, the Officers did not have probable cause to arrest Gray until they verified some of Pompelia’s statements. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.2