Opinion ID: 6344300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rehaif Claim

Text: In the event all counts are not dismissed on Speedy Trial Act grounds, Adams urges us to vacate at least his felon-inpossession convictions based on the Court’s failure to instruct the jury consistent with Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Because he did not object to the omission of “knowledge of status” as an element at trial, we review for plain error.15 Adams must meet “three threshold requirements”: (1) there was an error; (2) that error was plain; and (3) it affected his “substantial rights.” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2096 (quoting 15 Adams’s related argument that the omission of the “knowledge-of-status” element from the indictment and jury instructions was structural error, requiring automatic reversal, is foreclosed by our precedent and that of the Supreme Court, which do not count Rehaif errors among the “highly exceptional” constitutional errors considered structural. Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2099–100 (2021) (failure to charge “knowledge of one’s felon status” or to instruct the jury on that element does not require automatic vacatur of a conviction because those errors do not “affect the entire framework within which the proceeding occurs.”); United States v. Boyd, 999 F.3d 171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[F]ailing to include [the knowledge-of-status] element in the jury instruction was not a structural error that requires automatic reversal.”). 26 Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904–05 (2018)). And even then, we may exercise our discretion to grant relief only if “the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 2096–97 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–36 (1993). The parties have appropriately focused their arguments on the third prong: whether the Rehaif error in the District Court’s jury instructions affected Adams’s “substantial rights.”16 As the Supreme Court explained in Greer, the relevant question is whether “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that [Adams] would have been acquitted” had “the District Court . . . correctly instructed the jury on the mens rea element of [his] felon-in-possession offense[s].” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)). As to that question, the Court cautioned that defendants face “an uphill climb” because “[i]f a person is a felon, he ordinarily knows he is a felon.” Id. at 2097. Greer, in effect, created a presumption that the “knowledge-of-status” element is satisfied whenever a § 922(g)(1) defendant is, in fact, a felon. To overcome that presumption, the defendant must make a “sufficient argument . . . on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon,” and the appellate 16 In this case, the first two prongs are easily satisfied. The District Court’s failure to instruct the jury on § 922(g)’s “knowledge-of-status” element was erroneous, and that error was plain after Rehaif. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (“[I]t is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration.”). 27 court “must [then] determine whether the defendant has carried the burden of showing a ‘reasonable probability’ that the outcome of the district court proceeding would have been different” if the jury had been properly instructed after hearing that evidence. Id. at 2100. In making that determination, the appellate court is not bound to consider only what the government offered in evidence at the trial but can examine “the entire record,” including the defendant’s pre-sentence report. Id. at 2097–99. In light of Greer, Adams cannot establish plain error. The presumption of knowledge applies to Adams because, at the time he organized his straw-purchaser scheme, he had been convicted of four felonies in three separate prosecutions, and, at trial, he entered an Old Chief stipulation, acknowledging those prior convictions. See id. at 2098. On the trial record before us, he cannot overcome that presumption. Adams’s primary argument is that he is akin to the hypothetical defendant in Rehaif who might not know he is a felon because he was convicted of an offense “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” but “sentenced only to probation.” 139 S. Ct. at 2198 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because he never served more than 364 days in custody for any of his prior convictions, he contends that he similarly lacked “knowledge of status.” Adams, however, was not sentenced to probation; rather, he was charged and convicted on, not one, but four felonies and was sentenced to nearly a year in prison for one of them. With that history, it strains credulity that Adams did not know he was a felon. In any event, the Supreme Court’s far-flung hypothetical in Rehaif is not enough, without more, to 28 surmount the “uphill climb” necessary to overturn his felon-inpossession convictions. Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097. Unfortunately for Adams, what “more” there is only cuts the other way. The trial record makes clear that Adams devised his straw-purchaser scheme precisely because he knew he was a felon who could not lawfully possess firearms. And straw purchasers described how he vetted them for their clean criminal records, coached them on how to answer each question on the ATF forms (including one regarding prior felony convictions), and explained that they would be subject to criminal background checks. See, e.g., J.A. 418, 517, 613, 653–54, 725, 876. In short, while the Supreme Court acknowledged that “there may be cases in which a defendant who is a felon can make an adequate showing on appeal . . . that he did not in fact know he was a felon when he possessed firearms,” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097, this is not such a case. Because Adams has failed to show there is a “‘reasonable probability’ that he would have been acquitted” if the jury had been properly instructed, id, his Rehaif claim fails on plain error review.