Opinion ID: 1100352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Different Standards

Text: As I have noted, because I believe that the ordinances do not implicate fundamental rights, the correct standard is the rational basis test. Most federal circuit courts and state supreme courts considering this particular issue have held that the proper analysis is either rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 180-81 (2d Cir.2003); Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847; Sale ex rel. Sale v. Goldman, 208 W.Va. 186, 539 S.E.2d 446, 455 (2000); People in re J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.1989); City of Panora, 445 N.W.2d at 369. Therefore, the majority's holding that strict scrutiny applies places this Court in the minority on this issue. See, e.g., Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 265 n. 60 (Alaska 2004) (applying strict scrutiny but acknowledging that precedents in other jurisdictions point toward intermediate scrutiny). In my opinion, under any standard, the ordinances survive. Below I apply (A) rational basis review; (B) intermediate scrutiny; and finally (C) strict scrutiny.
Under the rational basis test, review is limited to determining whether the ordinance in question is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. at 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637. Laws that involve neither a suspect classification nor fundamental rights are accorded a strong presumption of validity. Id. at 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637. In Bellotti, the Supreme Court noted three established state concerns in protecting the well-being of minors: the special vulnerability of children, their relative lack of ability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner, and the importance of parental authority in bringing up children. 443 U.S. at 634, 99 S.Ct. 3035. The majority outlines the purposes of both the Tampa and Pinellas Park ordinances, as expressed in the ordinances themselves. Majority op. at 1116. I will not repeat them here. The majority acknowledges that both cities have established even compelling interests. Majority op. at 1117. For the same reasons, therefore, the government interests are legitimate under the rational basis standard. The only remaining question is whether the ordinances are rationally related to those legitimate government interests. See Lane v. Chiles, 698 So.2d 260, 262 (Fla.1997) (Generally, a state statute must be upheld . . . if there is any reasonable relationship between the act and the furtherance of a valid governmental objective). At this level of review, scrutiny is deferential to the legislative decision. Courts applying rational basis review also apply the rule of statutory construction that accords legislation a presumption of validity. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc., 753 So.2d 49, 51 (Fla.2000). The rational basis test protects from court interference legislative action on most public policy decisions. The inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562. The Tampa and Pinellas Park ordinances seek to further the following interests: (1) the protection of juveniles, other citizens, and visitors from late night and early morning criminal activity; (2) the reduction of juvenile criminal activity; and (3) the enhancement and enforcement of parental control over children. See Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(B)(2) (1997); Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-26(a)(6) (1996). Even without statistical data, it is apparent that the ordinances prevent some juvenile crime arising from group or gang activity, because groups of juveniles are easily detected and can be dispersed under the curfews. See Bykofsky, 401 F.Supp. at 1256. The curfews promote the public safety and the safety of juveniles by preventing the late-night accumulation of juveniles on public streets, thereby reducing the attendant risk of criminal activity. The curfews also encourage parents to supervise and know the whereabouts of their children during nighttime hours. The assumption that the likelihood of criminal activity decreases as the amount of parental control over children increases is not unreasonable. Id.; Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(B)(1)(h) (1997) (The likelihood of criminal activity by juveniles decreases as parental control increases. Legislative incentives to shift supervision of juveniles from government to parents. . . creates a more wholesome community environment for juveniles, parents, and families.). To the extent the curfews induce parents, under the pain of imposition of a criminal penalty, to exercise their control where they otherwise might allow their children free rein and ignore their nighttime whereabouts and activities, [they are] effective in decreasing nocturnal juvenile crime and mischief and in strengthening the family unit. Bykofsky, 401 F.Supp. at 1256. For these reasons, the ordinances further the purposes expressed by Tampa and Pinellas Park. Id.; see also City of Panora, 445 N.W.2d at 369 (employing rational basis test and concluding that minors' interests in intracity movement were outweighed by city's interest in providing a prophylactic solution to the perceived problems inherent in unrestricted travel by minors); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis.2d 24, 426 N.W.2d 329, 340 (1988) (relying on Bykofsky's rational basis analysis).
Even if, as the majority holds, the ordinances implicate the fundamental rights of minors, they should be subjected only to intermediate scrutiny. This standard asks whether the ordinance is substantially related to important governmental interests. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of review, even if the ordinances implicate a fundamental right, because the ordinances govern the conduct of minors. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the rights of children are not co-extensive with those of adults. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986); Prince, 321 U.S. at 169, 64 S.Ct. 438. Therefore, although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees . . . as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability by exercising broader authority over their activities. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635, 99 S.Ct. 3035. For that reason, a lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate when evaluating restrictions on the activities of minors. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) (plurality opinion). Florida laws, like those of other states, regularly prohibit minors from engaging in the same activities as adults. See, e.g., § 322.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (prohibiting minors under 15 from driving, and 15-year-olds from driving unaccompanied by an adult); § 562.111(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (prohibiting persons under 21 from possessing alcoholic beverages); § 569.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (prohibiting persons under 18 from possessing any tobacco product); § 790.01, Fla. Stat. (2003) (prohibiting those under 21 years old from obtaining a license to carry concealed weapons); § 450.081, Fla. Stat. (2003) (limiting the number of hours that minors can work). The Supreme Court has upheld laws imposing limitations on minors that could not be imposed on adults. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 169-70, 64 S.Ct. 438 (upholding law prohibiting children from selling magazines on the street, even when accompanied by a parent or guardian, against a claim that the law violated the child's freedom of religion); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968) (upholding a ban on the sale of material to minors that would not be considered obscene for adults). Based on the state's greater authority to regulate the actions of minors than those of adults, in considering juvenile curfew ordinances many courts have employed an intermediate level of scrutiny. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541 (employing intermediate scrutiny); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847 (employing intermediate scrutiny, but noting that the ordinance would also survive strict scrutiny); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 193 (arguing for rational basis review, but noting that the juvenile curfew ordinance survives even under heightened scrutiny) (Winter, J., dissenting). In fact, when the district court first reviewed these cases, it employed the heightened scrutiny test. See J.P. v. State, 775 So.2d 324, 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ( J.P.I ); T.M. I, 761 So.2d at 1146. Under that test, it found both ordinances constitutional. As I noted above, because the majority acknowledges that the cities have established compelling interests, Majority op. at 1117, which is a higher standard than either legitimate (rational basis review) or important (intermediate scrutiny) interests, the cities necessarily have established that their government interests are important under the intermediate scrutiny standard. The only remaining question is whether the ordinances are substantially related to those important government interests. I would hold that they are. In addressing the closeness of the relationship between the means chosen (the curfew) and the government's interest, three interrelated concepts must be considered: (1) the factual premises that prompted the legislative enactment; (2) the logical connection between the remedy and those factual premises; and (3) the breadth of the remedy chosen. Ramos, 353 F.3d at 184 (citing Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 542). [11] This inquiry seeks to ensure that the municipality has studied the contours of the problem it seeks to address and legislates according to its findings. See Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir.1998) (making a similar observation in the context of an equal protection claim). However, this standard of review has never required statistical certainty about the legislature's wisdom in choosing a particular course of action. See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 849. It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204, 97 S.Ct. 451. [The] uncertain nature of remedial legislation is no reason for courts to fashion their own cures or scuttle those the legislature has provided. Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 849. With these general principles in mind, I discuss the ordinances at issue. In the case of the Pinellas Park ordinance, the city evaluated the curfew six months after its passage. [12] The study highlights Pinellas Park's juvenile crime problem before the curfew and demonstrates that juvenile crime was an issue during late night hours, particularly in the areas of burglary, trespass, and loitering. Therefore, Pinellas Park had adequate factual premises for its decision. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 544 (stating that the city did not need to produce data showing where juvenile crime occurred and that the city's data showing a substantial percentage of violent juvenile victimizations on the streets adequately supported a relationship between government's interest and imposition of a curfew). In addition, because the data indicates a late night juvenile crime problem, it follows that a curfew ordinance would constitute a remedy with a logical connection to these factual premises. A restriction on unsupervised juveniles' ability to wander the public streets during late night hours logically relates to curbing juvenile crime and preventing the victimization of minors. Finally, the curfew's breadth is best measured against the scope of its exceptions. Here, the Pinellas Park ordinance contains a laundry list of exceptions for First Amendment, employment, civic, and religious activities. Thus, the data indicates that a curfew would further the city's interest in protecting juveniles and other citizens from late night criminal activity as well as its interest in reducing juvenile crime. See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 849 (stating that the city's reliance on data such as police department records, public opinion surveys, and national crime reports entitled the legislature to speculate and conclude that keeping juveniles off the streets during late night hours would make the community safer). Thus, I would hold that the Pinellas Park ordinance passes intermediate scrutiny. The Tampa curfew, like the Pinellas Park ordinance, contains many exceptions that narrow its scope, thereby strengthening the relationship between the curfew and its goals of reducing juvenile crime and victimization. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 544-45. In other words, the exceptions help ensure that the ordinances do not sweep too broadly but instead focus on those late night activities most likely to result in crime and victimization. Id. Statistical data is not necessary to uphold the curfew ordinances under intermediate scrutiny. Common sense and practical experience are enough. See Delmonico v. State, 155 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1963) (applying strict scrutiny to substantive due process claim and emphasizing that the legislature's action must be measured against practical experience in order to determine whether [the means chosen] is in fact essential or reasonably necessary in order to achieve the statutory objective); cf. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 543 (stating that city was not required to prove a precise fit between the nature of the problem and the legislative remedy and noting that even if data indicated that minors under seventeen were less likely to commit crimes, common sense dictated that younger children were more vulnerable). An examination of the curfew ordinances' stated goals, common sense, and the curfews' exceptions demonstrates that the curfews are substantially related to the cities' stated interests.
This, the strictest standard, is the one the majority employs based on the we agree and hold language of T.M. II. Under this standard, the ordinance must promote a compelling (rather than a legitimate or important) governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). To be narrowly tailored, there must be a nexus between the stated government interest and the classification created by the ordinance. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493. Such an analysis, however, should not be strict in theory, but fatal in fact. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). In other words, application of strict scrutiny review does not automatically render a law unconstitutional. In fact, some courts have upheld juvenile curfew ordinances even under this standard. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 (assuming, without deciding, that a juvenile curfew ordinance implicated a fundamental right because the ordinance was constitutional even under strict scrutiny analysis); Treacy, 91 P.3d at 266 (concluding that taken as a whole, the ordinance is the least restrictive means available to achieve the municipality's [compelling] interests); see also Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847 (noting that the ordinance would survive strict scrutiny analysis). Others have not. See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir.1997). In at least some of the cases invalidating curfew ordinances, however, the ordinances contained fewer exceptions than the ones in this case. See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 938-39 (invalidating an ordinance that did not provide for First Amendment exception); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1067 (5th Cir.1981) (invalidating an ordinance that did not provide for First Amendment or job-related exceptions). [13] Again, the majority acknowledges that the ordinances express valid and compelling governmental interests, Majority op. at 1115-17, such as: (1) the protection of juveniles, other citizens, and visitors from late night and early morning criminal activity; (2) the reduction of juvenile criminal activity; and (3) the enhancement and enforcement of parental control over children. See Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(B)(2) (1997); Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-26(a)(6) (1996). The remaining question under this test is whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. In this regard, the curfew is in effect on weekdays from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and on Friday and Saturday nights from midnight to 6:00 a.m. Therefore, the period of the curfew itself is narrow. It covers, at most, seven hours of the day, during the precise time most school-age children will be sleeping. Moreover, because the ordinances contain a laundry list of exceptions, the curfew's scope is even more narrow. The two curfew ordinances are almost identical. [14] Both allow minors to remain in public even during curfew hours if: (1) they are accompanied by a parent or other responsible adult; (2) they are commuting to or from lawful employment; (3) they are engaged in interstate travel (Pinellas Park also includes intrastate travel with the consent of the juvenile's parent); (4) they are engaged in an activity exercising their First Amendment rights such as religious services, government meetings, and political meetings; (5) they are attending or returning from a school-sponsored function, religious function, or a civic organization function; (6) they are on the sidewalk of their own home or an adult next-door neighbor's residence with that neighbor's permission; (7) they are at an event, not provided for in the enumerated exceptions, which the city council has approved pursuant to application by a sponsor; or (8) they are married in accordance with law. Despite the many exceptions in the ordinances, the majority finds them not narrowly tailored enough. Majority op. at 1118. The majority finds two faults with the ordinances: (1) the broad coverage of both curfews includes otherwise innocent and legal conduct by minors even where they have the permission of their parents; and (2) the ordinances impose criminal penalties for curfew violations. Id. As the majority does, I discuss each of these in turn.