Opinion ID: 526089
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statement made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy

Text: 15 Mr. Garlington also maintains that the district court's rejection of his sixth amendment claim was erroneous since the state failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. He asserts that it is unclear whether the statement was made to him or to Ms. Amos, and he contends that the statement cannot be interpreted as furthering the conspiracy or assisting the conspirators to achieve their objectives. 16 Our review of the proceedings in the district court reveals that Mr. Garlington did not present this particular argument to the district court. Although Mr. Garlington recognized that, in order to satisfy the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, a statement must have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy, see R.28 at 8-9 (Petitioner's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment), 5 he did not argue that failure to prove the in furtherance element precluded application of the coconspirator exception in this case. Rather, he maintained that the Appellate Court of Illinois' finding that Mr. Key's statement satisfied the coconspirator exception was flawed in two other respects: (1) the court required only a prima facie showing that a conspiracy existed, rather than proof by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) the court improperly relied on hearsay evidence in finding that a prima facie showing had been made. See R.28 at 9. Mr. Garlington argued that his right to confrontation had been violated since the nonhearsay evidence presented by the state failed to show either the existence of a conspiracy or his participation in a conspiracy. Id. at 9-11. The state's alleged failure to show that the statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy, however, was not argued before the district court. In addition, in concluding that Mr. Garlington's sixth amendment right had not been violated, the district court's memorandum opinion did not discuss the in furtherance element of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See Mem. op. at 9-13. 17 Ordinarily, Mr. Garlington's failure to present this argument to the district court would constitute a waiver of the argument. We have repeatedly held that a party that fails to press an argument before the district court waives the right to present that argument on appeal. See, e.g., Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden v. Ellis, Inc., 849 F.2d 264, 271 (7th Cir.1988), Heller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 833 F.2d 1253, 1261 (7th Cir.1987). 6  'It is a well-established general principle that a litigant cannot present to this court as a ground for reversal an issue which was not presented to the trial court and which it, therefore, had no opportunity to decide. '  Holleman v. Duckworth, 700 F.2d 391, 394-95 (7th Cir.) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.) (quoting Desert Palace, Inc. v. Salisbury, 401 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir.1968)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 834, 104 S.Ct. 116, 78 L.Ed.2d 116 (1983). The fact that the general issue of the applicability of the coconspirator exception was before the district court would not normally be enough to allow Mr. Garlington to assert on appeal his newly raised argument based specifically on the in furtherance requirement of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Mr. Garlington raised specific arguments as to why the coconspirator exception was not applicable; the in furtherance issue was not among them. The district court was not required to investigate the pleadings and evidence for additional arguments that might support Mr. Garlington's petition; it was Mr. Garlington's responsibility to raise the arguments that he seeks to use now on appeal. See Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 800 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2832, 100 L.Ed.2d 933 (1988); Libertyville Datsun Sales v. Nissan Motor Corp., 776 F.2d 735, 737 (7th Cir.1985). 18 The state, however, does not contend that Mr. Garlington has waived this argument. Indeed, at oral argument the state expressly declined to argue that Mr. Garlington had waived the in furtherance issue. We have recognized that a defense of waiver can itself be waived by not being raised. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 746 n. 33 (7th Cir.1988), petition for cert. filed, Feb. 17, 1989; United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2022, 100 L.Ed.2d 608 (1988); United States v. Owokoniran, 840 F.2d 373, 373-74 n. 1 (7th Cir.1987); Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092, 107 S.Ct. 1303, 94 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987); Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 565 (7th Cir.1986). Because it is our practice to consider only those arguments presented to us, we cannot conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that Mr. Garlington has waived the in furtherance issue by failing to raise that issue in the district court. See Andrews v. United States, 817 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 n. 1 (7th Cir.) (petitioner raised issues in Sec. 2255 petition that he had failed to raise on direct appeal; because the government failed to make a waiver argument, court declined to address waiver issue) (A state may waive reliance on waiver by its inattention to the issue.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 166, 98 L.Ed.2d 120 (1987). 7 Therefore, we shall address the merits of the contention Mr. Garlington has presented to us on appeal. 19 Despite the state's insistence that the in furtherance issue is properly before the court on appeal, the state has provided us with little reasoned argument explaining exactly how Mr. Key's statement furthered the objectives of the conspiracy. We find this omission troubling. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) requires that, in order to be admissible, a coconspirator's statement must have been made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is a limitation on the admissibility of coconspirators' statements that is meant to be taken seriously. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note (explaining that, while Rule 801(d)(2)(D) takes a broader view of agency than does the coconspirator exception, the agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already established); J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 801(d)(2)(E) at 801-236 to -237 (1988) ([S]ome courts construe this aspect of the rule so broadly 'that anything related to the conspiracy is found to be in furtherance of its objectives.' This, of course, is precisely the result the Advisory Committee sought to avoid by retaining the 'in furtherance' requirement.) (quoting Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 920, 985 (1959)). If the state hopes to use coconspirator's statements without running afoul of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause, it should be prepared to satisfy each of the elements of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule--including the in furtherance requirement of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 20 A coconspirator's statement satisfies the in furtherance element of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) when the statement is part of the information flow between conspirators intended to help each perform his role. United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir.1988). Statements that further the objectives of a conspiracy can take many forms, including statements made to recruit potential coconspirators, see United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 356, 98 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987); statements seeking to control damage to an ongoing conspiracy, see Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d at 499, statements made to keep coconspirators advised as to the progress of the conspiracy, see United States v. Potts, 840 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1987); and statements made in an attempt to conceal the criminal objectives of the conspiracy, see United States v. Kaden, 819 F.2d 813, 820 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 985-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983). However, mere idle chatter, narrative declarations, and superfluous casual conversations do not constitute statements in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d at 499; Potts, 840 F.2d at 371; Weinstein's Evidence, supra, p 801(d)(2)(E) at 801-235, 801-238 to -240. 21 In order to satisfy the in furtherance requirement, a coconspirator's statement need not have been exclusively, or even primarily, made to further the conspiracy. Shoffner, 826 F.2d at 628. Moreover, a court may conclude that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy even though  'the statement [was] susceptible of alternative interpretations.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 383 (7th Cir.1978)). The requirement is satisfied so long as  'some reasonable basis exists for concluding that the statement furthered the conspiracy.'  Id.; see also United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1412 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam) (statement is in furtherance of the conspiracy if the statement can reasonably be interpreted as encouraging a co-conspirator or other person to advance the conspiracy, or as enhancing a co-conspirator or other person's usefulness to the conspiracy), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 108, 102 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988). In addition, [w]hether a particular statement tends to advance the objectives of the conspiracy can only be determined by examination of the context in which it is made. Weinstein's Evidence, supra, p 801(d)(2)(E) at 801-240 to -241 (footnotes omitted). 22 A reasonable basis does exist for concluding that Mr. Key's statement, [w]e're going to take care of him, furthered the objectives of the conspiracy. As then-Judge Kennedy explained in United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir.1981), [s]tatements of reassurance ... are in furtherance of a conspiracy. In Mason, a federal agent posing as a cocaine buyer asked a conspirator about the continued viability of the conspirator's source. In response, the conspirator explained that his supplier could not have been scared off. The court concluded that the sensible interpretation of this utterance [was] that it was to calm and reassure [the buyer], and as such it was in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. 8 The statement at issue in this case was made by Mr. Key just after he and Mr. Garlington had emerged from the bedroom where Mr. Hentley was apparently being beaten. Although Mr. Key's statement may be open to alternative interpretations, it can reasonably be characterized as an attempt to calm and reassure Mr. Garlington and to bolster his confidence that the goal of the conspiracy could be achieved. Such a statement may have made it more likely that Mr. Garlington would carry out his role in the conspiracy. Characterized in this way, the statement did further the objectives of the conspiracy. This characterization of the statement is reinforced by the fact that, after Renell Hentley had been killed, Mr. Key said to Mr. Garlington, I told you we would take care of him. Tr. at 48. 9 This reference to the earlier statement suggests that the earlier statement had been intended to reassure Mr. Garlington that the conspiracy's goal could be achieved. Because the participation and in furtherance elements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) have been satisfied, Mr. Garlington's sixth amendment challenge to the admission of Mr. Key's statement must be rejected.