Opinion ID: 2426901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Girod's Sentencing Enhancements

Text: Because Girod did not object to her sentence on the grounds of an incorrect sentencing enhancement before the district court, our review is for plain error. United States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706, 709 (5th Cir.2009). Plain error exists when: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Id. (quoting United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 358-59 (5th Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If all three conditions are met an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 709 n. 4 (quoting United States v. Ellis, 564 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir.2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court reviews a district court's interpretation and application of the guidelines de novo. United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir.2008).
USSG § 3B1.4 provides for a two-level enhancement for using a minor to commit the offense. The application notes to § 3B1.4 explain that using includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting. USSG § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1. The district court enhanced Girod's sentence by two levels under § 3B1.4 for using her underage children to complete fraudulent Medicaid forms. At sentencing, the district court stated that it relied on Scott's testimony that Girod used her children to create the false PCS time sheets. Girod argues that Scott's testimony did not show that Girod directed her children to falsify Medicaid forms but rather that it was that Scott, Girod, and Girod's children all sat together and copied the false forms, and that Scott did not testify that Girod directed her children to complete the forms. Scott testified that she, Girod, and two of Girod's children were in the kitchen filling out false PCS forms. Girod and her two children were already filling the forms out when Scott arrived and sat down to help. She testified that they all copied off of other forms or old papers. These false PCS forms were then submitted to ANBNO. This is more than enough to support the district court's finding that Girod used her minor children to commit the charged offenses. See United States v. Mata, 624 F.3d 170, 175-77 (5th Cir.2010) (explaining the case law). Scott testified that Girod's children were much more than mere passive observers of Girod's criminal acts; rather, Girod took some affirmative action to involve her minor children in actively creating fraudulent PCS time sheets. Id. at 176.
Finally, Girod challenges her two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice for lying to investigators. Girod argues there is no evidence she impeded the investigation because the agents investigating her had completed most of their investigation before they interviewed her and they came to their interview armed with documentation to confront her if she made statements contrary to what the agents believed happened. In essence, Girod argues no harm, no foul: that, by the time she made her (admittedly) false statements, the investigation had so progressed that her false statements did not hamper the investigation. This argument lacks merit. Section 3C1.1 also provides for a two-level enhancement for attempted obstruction or impeding justice. There does not seem to be any dispute that Girod made false statements, and that these statements at a minimum reflected her attempt to impede the investigation. Furthermore, the commentary to § 3C1.1 states that [t]his adjustment also applies to any other obstructive conduct in respect to the official investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense where there is a separate count of conviction for such conduct. USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4. Girod was convicted of making three false statements to federal investigators regarding whether ANBNO employees provided PCS services to her children and whether she received kickbacks for signing-off on the false PCS sheets for her children, and these convictions formed the basis for her § 3C1.1 enhancement. While Girod points to commentary note 4's example of covered conduct (G), which includes providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, note 4 is equally clear that its list of covered conduct is non-exhaustive and that, as explained above, the enhancement also applies when there are separate convictions for obstructive conduct. USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4. We accordingly affirm Girod's sentence.