Opinion ID: 2173109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marriage by Estoppel

Text: Except as restricted by constitutional provisions, the inception, duration, status, conditions, and termination of a marriage in Tennessee are subject to state legislative power and control. Crawford v. Crawford, 198 Tenn. 9, 277 S.W.2d 389, 391 (1955); see Martin v. Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tenn.2000). Commonlaw marriages are not recognized in Tennessee. Martin, 19 S.W.3d at 760. Our state's legislature also prohibits bigamous marriages. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-3-102 (2005) (A second marriage cannot be contracted before the dissolution of the first.). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-306 (2005) further provides that [n]o marriage shall be valid, whether consummated by ceremony or otherwise, if the marriage is prohibited in this state. Mr. Alvares maintains the parties' marriage should be annulled because Ms. Guzman's divorce from Mr. Covarrubias had not been finalized when the parties were married and that, as a result, the parties entered into a bigamous marriage. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-119 (1996); [3] see also Emmit v. Emmit, 174 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a trial court may annul a bigamous marriage). To protect the institution of marriage in Tennessee, regularly solemnized marriages are presumed to be valid. Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tenn.Ct. App.1997). Furthermore, in cases involving a subsequent marriage, courts presume that the previous marriage ended in divorce. Emmit, 174 S.W.3d at 252. These presumptions are not conclusive and may be rebutted. See id.; Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn.App. 467, 159 S.W.2d 834, 838 (1941). As the party challenging the validity of the marriage, Mr. Alvares bears the burden of rebutting the presumptions by providing cogent and convincing evidence that the marriage between him and Ms. Guzman is invalid. See Aghili, 958 S.W.2d at 789. At trial, Mr. Alvares presented a copy of the decree of divorce between Ms. Guzman and Mr. Covarrubias issued by the Supreme Court of Jalisco on March 6, 1987, more than seven months after Mr. Alvares and Ms. Guzman were married. Both Javier Leon, an attorney in Mexico who testified as an expert witness for Ms. Guzman, and Salvador Villa Curiel, an attorney and family law professor in Mexico who testified as an expert witness for Mr. Alvares, stated that the divorce was not final until the Supreme Court of Jalisco rendered its decree. [4] Therefore, Mr. Alvares has established that when he and Ms. Guzman married, Ms. Guzman's divorce from Mr. Covarrubias was not final and she was still legally married to Mr. Covarrubias. Furthermore, there is no evidence indicating that the parties entered into a lawful marriage after Ms. Guzman's divorce from Mr. Covarrubias was final. Neither the Order of Reconciliation nor the parties' participation in a ceremony during which a priest blessed their wedding rings created a legally binding marriage. Accordingly, Mr. Alvares has rebutted the presumption that the parties' marriage was valid and has presented evidence sufficient to establish that their marriage was bigamous. We next examine whether a marriage in this case can be created by estoppel. In a case of marriage by estoppel, the marriage is presumed to be valid even though it is not technically lawful. Crawford, 277 S.W.2d at 391. Marriage by estoppel is invoked to prevent fraud as well as to preserve the rights of innocent third persons who would be adversely affected by the conduct of the parties. Id. This doctrine is applicable only in exceptional circumstances. Martin, 19 S.W.3d at 760. When one of the parties to the purported marriage seeks to invoke the doctrine of marriage by estoppel in a case against the other party to the marriage, this Court has refused to apply the doctrine when the parties entered into a bigamous marriage, regardless of either party's knowledge of the impediment. See Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227, 240 S.W.2d 521, 526-28 (1951). In Pewitt , we held that because the parties were unable to enter into a valid marriage at the time of their marriage ceremony, marriage by estoppel could not be invoked to prevent one party from denying the validity of the void marriage. Id.; see also Decker v. Meriwether, 708 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985) (holding that the prior subsisting marriage prevents the establishment of a valid subsequent marriage and thus there could be no marriage by estoppel). Although the defendant in Pewitt was aware of her prior subsisting marriage at the time of the parties' wedding and the plaintiff learned of the impediment two years prior to filing for divorce, this Court did not analyze or base our holding in Pewitt upon the knowledge of either party. This limitation on the application of marriage by estoppel is supported by statutory and case law as well as by public policy. The legislature has enacted various statutes in an effort to support the sanctity of the marriage relation and the welfare of society. In doing so, the legislature has decided that a bigamous marriage is invalid regardless of whether the parties consummated the marriage through a ceremony. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-3-102, -306. In accordance with section 36-3-102, parties seeking to enter into a subsequent marriage lack the capacity to marry until each party's prior marriage is dissolved. See Emmit, 174 S.W.3d at 251. Because bigamous marriages are prohibited by statute, such marriages are void from the beginning. See Gordon v. Pollard, 207 Tenn. 45, 336 S.W.2d 25, 27 (1960) (recognizing that a marriage prohibited by statute is void as if it had never been); Brown v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 491, 494-95 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (classifying marriages prohibited by law as void from the beginning). The parties to a bigamous marriage stand in the same relationship as if the subsequent marriage never occurred. Brewer v. Miller, 673 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984). Bigamous marriages are not recognized by the courts and cannot be ratified by the parties. Emmit, 174 S.W.3d at 251. Due to the public policy concerns involved, the State is an unofficial third party to every divorce or annulment. See Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 145, 16 So.2d 401, 404 (1944). In proceedings to annul a bigamous marriage, the State's interest is paramount to the grievances of the parties to the purported marriage. See Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 63 A.2d 743, 746 (1949). A party seeking an annulment is requesting in essence that the trial court correct the wrongful act as far as possible to prevent any future injuries to innocent persons and the State. See id. The application of marriage by estoppel to a void, bigamous marriage under these circumstances would result in the court's recognition of a void marriage that the parties cannot ratify. Furthermore, application of the doctrine would contravene Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-3-102 and 36-3-306 and the public policy of this state by condoning the bigamous marriage. We conclude that the applicable statutes, our prior case law, and the public policy of this state prohibit the application of the marriage by estoppel doctrine to void, bigamous marriages. Accordingly, the trial court erred in declaring a marriage by estoppel. [5] Ms. Guzman also seeks to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel against Mr. Alvares due to his failure to contest the validity of the marriage in the 1995 divorce action and his agreement in the Order of Reconciliation. Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party will not be permitted to take a position that is directly contrary to or inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party where the party had or was chargeable with full knowledge of the facts and where the conduct would prejudice another. Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn.1999). Judicial estoppel is not favored in Tennessee. Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975). The concerns in applying judicial estoppel between parties to a void, bigamous marriage are similar to those concerns in applying the doctrine of marriage by estoppel. Accordingly, we decline to apply judicial estoppel in this case. [6] At oral argument before this Court, Mr. Alvares conceded that if the doctrine of marriage by estoppel is not applicable, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the existence of an implied partnership between the parties. See Martin, 19 S.W.3d at 760-62; Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn.1991). Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for such a determination.