Opinion ID: 1819311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Character Evidence Regarding James and Richard Hitchcock

Text: Hitchcock argues that his guilt-phase counsel was ineffective for opening the door to admission of negative character evidence about Hitchcock and for failing to secure admission of negative character evidence about his brother, Richard Hitchcock. In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Hitchcock must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency caused prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To be deficient, the attorney's performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1048 (Fla.2000). The standard for prejudice is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been differentthat is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1048. Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004). First, Hitchcock argues that Charles Tabscott, his guilt-phase counsel, was ineffective because Tabscott put Hitchcock's reputation at issue and thereby allowed negative character evidence about Hitchcock to be introduced. Tabscott called several witnesses to offer evidence of Hitchcock's good character. In response, the State called Judy Hitchcock, the victim's mother, who testified that Hitchcock physically attacked his ex-girlfriend and that he did not have a good reputation. The State also called Richard Hitchcock who testified that Hitchcock stayed in trouble all the time when he lived in Arkansas. Hitchcock asserts that his counsel was ineffective because the testimony of the defense witnesses was not entirely positive and the testimony of Judy Hitchcock, Richard Hitchcock, and Hitchcock's ex-girlfriend was devastating to his defense. Hitchcock argues that had counsel adequately consulted with him regarding the likely testimony of the witnesses, counsel could have avoided opening the door to prejudicial testimony. [8] The circuit court denied this claim. The circuit court concluded that [d]efendant's allegations lack sufficient credibility or in the alternative, they are conclusively refuted by the record for the reasons which follow. The circuit court then recited a list of actions taken by counsel during trial that indicated that he did prepare for trial and that he did consult with Hitchcock regarding his defense. The circuit court held that Judy Hitchcock's testimony that Hitchcock physically attacked his girlfriend did not prejudice Hitchcock because the girlfriend later testified that there was no reason to be afraid of [Hitchcock]. The circuit court did not specifically address Judy Hitchcock's testimony that Hitchcock did not have a good reputation and Richard Hitchcock's testimony that Hitchcock was frequently in trouble. We agree that Hitchcock is not entitled to relief on this claim. During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Tabscott testified that he was familiar with the concept of opening the door to character evidence. When asked whether he may have opened the door at trial, Tabscott responded: I suppose twenty-six years later you could review the transcript and say that. But I remember that we were in a very desperate situation which as I recall Mr. Hitchcock had confessed to murdering and raping a thirteen year old child. And I think we were in a position of doing whatever we could to number one, try to get the jury to feel that there was reasonable doubt as to guilt and number two, save him from the death penalty. So if you call that opening the door, I suppose it's possible that a door was opened. I certainly would not have developed these witnesses on my own. It would have come from Mr. Hitchcock. The record indicates that Tabscott made a strategic decision to put Hitchcock's character at issue. In light of Hitchcock's initial confession, defense counsel essentially had no choice but to put Hitchcock on the stand to explain his recantation, thus putting Hitchcock's credibility and, indirectly, his character at issue. Defense counsel offered testimony by friends and family to bolster Hitchcock's credibility and reputation. Counsel is not ineffective for adopting reasonable strategies, even if in retrospect those strategies appear unadvisable. See Patton v. State, 878 So.2d 368, 373 (Fla.2004) (finding counsel's decision to limit use of voluntary intoxication defense in order to disassociate defendant from drug abuse was reasonable and not ineffective); Howell v. State, 877 So.2d 697, 705 (Fla.2004) (A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052)). Second, Hitchcock argues that Tabscott was ineffective because he failed to successfully present incriminating evidence showing that his brother Richard had committed acts of violence against other young female family members that were strikingly similar to the murder of Cynthia Driggers. Again, we find no basis to reverse the trial court because the record refutes Hitchcock's claim. Hitchcock's defense was that Richard committed the murder. Tabscott attempted to introduce evidence regarding Richard's violent tendencies in support of this defense theory. Specifically, he attempted to ask Brenda Hitchcock (now Brenda Reed), Martha Hitchcock, James Hitchcock, and Fay Hitchcock whether they had known Richard to be violent. The State objected on relevance grounds, and the trial court sustained the objections. Later, counsel asked to proffer the testimony of these witnesses to demonstrate their relevancy: My proffer will be to the effect, that I will call members of the family that I previously called to establish that they do know Richard Hitchcock to have a violent nature, and a violent reputation. And also, that Richard Hitchcock had made sexual advances towards two sisters. They would so testify, Brenda Hitchcock and Martha Hitchcock. The trial court denied the proffer and refused to admit the testimony. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence. See Hitchcock I, 413 So.2d at 744 (holding that testimony regarding Richard's alleged bad acts and violent propensities was not admissible as impeachment evidence and too attenuated to be relevant to whether Richard committed the murder). Since counsel did attempt to introduce the incriminating evidence about Richard, the question of deficiency revolves around how much counsel could have been reasonably expected to push for the admissibility of that evidence. Hitchcock argues that the evidence regarding Richard's sexual violence would have been admissible under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), had counsel argued this point, because it would have proved Richard's motive to kill the victim, his bias in testifying against his brother, and his modus operandi in acting violently against young women. Hitchcock argues that Richard's conduct reflects a clear pattern of claiming ownership over young female family members, including a tendency to become violent and choke the women when they did not submit. Hitchcock's argument fails because this Court did not hold that Williams rule evidence could be used by defendants to incriminate other suspects until 1990, long after Hitchcock's trial. See Rivera v. State, 561 So.2d 536 (Fla.1990); State v. Savino, 567 So.2d 892 (Fla.1990). This Court has consistently held that trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law. Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1053. A defendant's ability to exploit the Williams exception had not become an established aspect of Florida law at the time of Hitchcock's trial. Thus, Tabscott's performance did not fall below the objective standard of prevailing professional norms, and Hitchcock is not entitled to relief on this claim.