Opinion ID: 2352098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scott's Presence Jenkins' Consent to Search

Text: The first issue in this appeal is whether Jenkins had authority to consent to a search of the apartment when Scott was present. The State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Jenkins' consent to search the apartment is valid. The State argues that Jenkins' consent was valid, because Scott neither countermanded her consent nor objected to the search of the apartment, pursuant to Jenkins' consent. See Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d at 1128. Scott argues that he did not have a duty to countermand Jenkins' consent. According to Scott, his mere presence invalidated her authorization. Scott bases his argument on the following language in the Matlock decision: consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person.... United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170, 94 S.Ct. at 993 (emphasis added). Jenkins, as the legal tenant, had immediate possession and control over the apartment. Nevertheless, even if Scott was only an occasional overnight guest, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Jenkins' apartment. Hanna v. State, Del.Supr., 591 A.2d 158, 164 (1991) (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990)). Neither Scott's presence, nor his expectation of privacy, however, is ipso facto determinative of whether Jenkins' consent to search was invalid. Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d at 1128-29. This Court has held that when a person with equal or greater authority to consent to a search is present, if a search is authorized by a third party, there is a duty to object. Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d at 1128-29. In this case, even though Scott was present, he failed to countermand Jenkins' consent at any time during the search. Jenkins had the authority to consent to the search of the apartment, in the absence of any objection by Scott. Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d at 1128-29. Assuming arguendo that Scott's authority to consent to a search was equal to Jenkins' authority, we hold that Scott's failure to object constituted his implied consent to the search authorized by Jenkins. Id.