Opinion ID: 758055
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court erred in admitting the statements of Bailey as a co-conspirator.

Text: 15 2. The district court erred in failing to grant an acquittal on Count 1 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting the same). 16 3. The district court erred in failing to grant an acquittal on Counts 3 and 4 (possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting the same). 17 4. The district court erred in failing to grant an acquittal on Count 7 (carrying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime). 18 5. The district court erred in refusing Herndon's request to question a juror who during deliberations revealed for the first time that he may have had prior business dealings with Herndon. 19 As to the first issue concerning the admission of Bailey's statements as a co-conspirator, this court has previously held that a district court's factual findings made in the course of analyzing Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir.1992). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). On the other hand, we review the district court's ultimate decision to admit the co-conspirator's statements into evidence pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) de novo. Gessa, 971 F.2d at 1261. 20 As to the next three issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Herndon's convictions on Counts 1, 3, 4, and 7, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir.1986). 21 For the reasons set forth in the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Herndon's Motion for New Trial (entered on January 17, 1997), we find that the district court properly admitted Bailey's statements pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and concur in its rulings as to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Herndon on Counts 1, 3, 4, and 7. No jurisprudential purpose would be served in repeating the district court's well-reasoned discussion of these first four issues herein. 22 On the other hand, we find that the district court erred in refusing Herndon's request to question the juror who remembered during deliberations that he may have had prior business dealings with Herndon. After learning of the relationship, defense counsel requested an opportunity to interview the witness for possible bias. The court rejected counsel's request and ordered the jurors to continue deliberating. Specifically, the district court stated, I'm not going to withdraw the case, and this is my judgment. After conferring with Herndon, defense counsel refrained from moving for a mistrial. Counsel explained that without knowing the relationship between the juror and Herndon, the defense could not make a good faith motion for a mistrial based on juror bias. See United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir.1990) (A defendant may move for a mistrial where there is a legitimate claim of seriously prejudicial error. (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding the defense's request, the district court refused to permit a hearing.
23 The government argues that the district court's denial of Herndon's motion for a new trial should be reviewed for plain error because Herndon failed to move for a mistrial. Under the plain error standard of review, this court will reverse the lower court only if it finds that the trial was  'so infected with error' [that] the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it. United States v. Glover, 846 F.2d 339, 344 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Hook, 781 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 (6th Cir.1986)); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (providing a thorough discussion of the plain error analysis). 24 Herndon, on the other hand, argues that the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The abuse-of-discretion standard of review may be applied only when the district court was on notice of the alleged error. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277, 1281 (6th Cir.1987) ([I]mplicit in our use of the abuse of discretion standard ... is a recognition that the trial judge ... was on notice of an objection to the use of [the] testimony.). It is axiomatic that the district court must first have an opportunity to exercise its discretion before this court can review the same for possible abuse. Id. (observing that an objection is the only way an abuse-of-discretion standard of review could be properly used). In this case, defense counsel made an objection, placing the district court on notice that Herndon desired to interview juror # 1. Despite defense counsel's failure to make a motion for mistrial, the district court was on notice of Herndon's objection and exercised its judgment in rejecting the same. Consequently, we will review the district court's denial of Herndon's motion for a new trial under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
25 Having considered the proper standard of review, we must now determine whether the influence on juror # 1 was internal or extraneous. Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits a juror from 26 testify[ing] as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 27 FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (emphasis added). 28 In Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987), the Supreme Court provided examples of both internal and extraneous jury influences. Examples of internal influences include the behavior of jurors during deliberations, the jurors' ability to hear or comprehend trial testimony, and physical or mental incompetence of a juror. Id. at 118, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (citing United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1974)). The Court noted that the internal processes of the jury generally constitute internal influences. Id. at 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739. In contrast, Tanner gave the following as examples of extraneous influences: a juror in a criminal trial who had previously applied for a job in the district attorney's office (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)), a bribe attempt on a juror (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954)), and newspaper articles and media attention (citing United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir.1972)). Id. at 117-18, 107 S.Ct. 2739. 29 In the instant case, the government argues that juror # 1's recollection that he might have had previous business dealings with Herndon constitutes an internal influence. In support of its argument, the government analogizes the present case to United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120 (6th Cir.1995). The juror in Rigsby believed that she might know some of the witnesses in a criminal trial. Id. at 122. Defense counsel had not questioned the jurors during voir dire about their knowledge of the witnesses. When the juror brought her knowledge to the attention of the judge and parties, defense counsel never unequivocally requested the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and did not make a motion for a mistrial, but counsel did suggest that the district court inquire about which witnesses the juror knew. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). The district court did not conduct such an investigation, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant challenged the district court's failure to investigate. This court affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that no further inquiry into the juror's knowledge of any of the witnesses was necessary because the juror's statement was tentative, defense counsel failed to clearly object, and the trial was in an intimate rural community. Id. at 125. The Rigsby court failed to state whether the potential influence on the juror was deemed internal or extraneous. 30 While the government contends that the Rigsby court must have implicitly found that the influence on the jury was internal because it did not require a hearing, we find it unnecessary to resolve that question because of the many distinctions between Rigsby and the present case. While the main similarity is the tentative knowledge of the juror in question, the allegation in the instant case is that the juror was familiar with a party rather than a witness. The testimony of both Herndon and Stone, moreover, indicates that the juror may have had a negative experience during his interaction with Herndon. The Rigsby court also relied on the likelihood that in small communities a juror may know someone testifying at the trial. In the instant case, however, there was apparently no problem in selecting jurors who were not familiar with Herndon. In addition, defense counsel in Rigsby did not unequivocally request a hearing, whereas Herndon specifically requested a hearing and an opportunity to interview the juror. Finally, counsel in Rigsby failed to ask the jurors during voir dire whether they were familiar with any of the witnesses, while in the instant case the jurors had been asked whether they knew Herndon. 31 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), held that a juror in a criminal trial who had submitted a job application to the local district attorney's office was influenced by extraneous information. The Court held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Id. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940. A new trial will not be necessary every time a question of juror partiality is raised. Id. at 217, 102 S.Ct. 940. Where a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised, however, a Remmer hearing is necessary to provide the defendant with the opportunity to prove actual bias. Id. In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), a juror was offered money in exchange for a favorable verdict. The Court held that a hearing was required to determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not [they were] prejudicial. Id. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450. 32 In United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.1984), a case factually similar to the case at bar, a juror failed to reveal during voir dire that he had served on a committee with the defendant and thus personally knew him. After the trial was completed, several jurors expressed doubts to defense counsel about the guilty verdict. Other jurors commented that the juror in question was especially committed to return a 'guilty' verdict. Id. at 1529-30. The district court in Perkins conducted a hearing and interviewed the jurors. After the hearing, the district court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated that [e]xtrinsic evidence, evidence that has not been subject to the procedural safeguards of a fair trial, threatens such constitutional safeguards as the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel. Id. at 1533. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit, after considering all of the evidence introduced concerning the juror's statements, determined that the extraneous information might have influenced the verdict. It therefore remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 1534. 33 From Tanner, Smith, and Perkins, we distill the principle that an extraneous influence on a juror is one derived from specific knowledge about or a relationship with either the parties or their witnesses. This knowledge or relationship is such that it taints the deliberations with information not subject to a trial's procedural safeguards. These types of influences, moreover, may well deny the litigants their constitutional right to have the case heard by a fair and impartial jury. We thus conclude that juror # 1's recollection that he may have had prior business dealings with Herndon raises such concerns and constitutes an extraneous influence. Such an extraneous influence in the instant case has all the more potential for harm because the juror's putative knowledge relates to a party rather than to a witness.
34 After determining that the alleged influence on juror # 1 was extraneous, we must now consider what actions are required of the district court to investigate the allegation. Outlining the procedure for considering a question of juror bias, this court has explicitly held that the burden of proof rests upon a defendant to demonstrate that unauthorized communications with jurors resulted in actual juror partiality. United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir.1984). In addition, this court warns that [p]rejudice is not to be presumed. Id. In United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.1988), this court extrapolated the following four points from Pennell: 35 (1) when a defendant alleges that an unauthorized contact with a juror has tainted a trial, a hearing must be held; (2) no presumption of prejudice arises from such a contact; (3) the defendant bears the burden of proving actual juror bias; and (4) juror testimony at the Remmer hearing is not inherently suspect. 36 Id. at 95-96; see United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir.1985) (When possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judge's attention he has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment.). 37 Another key point in Shackelford is that [a] trial court's refusal to permit an evidentiary hearing may constitute abuse of discretion when the alleged jury misconduct involves extrinsic influences. Id.; see United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1439 (11th Cir.1984) (A party claiming that an improperly influenced jury returned a verdict against him must be given an opportunity to prove that claim.) (quoting United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 457 (5th Cir.1980)). 38 In the instant case, Herndon alleges that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to question a juror who was potentially influenced by extraneous information. While the district court did not permit Herndon to question the juror, it allowed him to make a record during the sentencing hearing about the potential relationship between Herndon and the juror. During this testimony, Herndon and Stone testified that a security system salesperson attempted to sell the Roadhouse an overpriced security system. They both recalled that the same salesperson proceeded to drink heavily and was ejected from the bar for disorderly conduct. In addition, they both testified that only one security salesperson ever attempted to sell a system to the Roadhouse. After this testimony, defense counsel renewed his previously rejected motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion without initiating a hearing or conducting an investigation. 39 We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying Herndon a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias. See United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423 (6th Cir.1993) (remanding the case for a new trial and finding that the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias because the judge did not ask the jurors whether their exposure to a transcript containing unredacted portions of video depositions would affect their ability to be impartial, even though the judge interviewed each juror to find out how the transcript was used). 40 As stated above, the district court has a duty to investigate this type of claim, and if the allegation is of an extraneous influence, then the district court should have conducted a Remmer hearing. While this court affords broad discretion to the district court in determining the type of investigation necessary to determine juror bias, the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove the same. United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir.1985) (Since the trial judge is in the best position to determine the nature and extent of alleged jury misconduct, his decision on the scope of proceedings necessary to discover misconduct is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.). While the government argues that the trial judge did provide a hearing by permitting Herndon and Stone to testify at the sentencing hearing, the record clearly indicates that the judge was not conducting an investigation of the allegation. The judge simply permitted Herndon to make a record for the purpose of appeal. Permitting the defense to make a record for appeal does not discharge the district court's duty to investigate claims of juror misconduct. 41 The government's additional claim that defense counsel could have subpoenaed the juror is not convincing. The district court had already denied a defense request to interview the juror, and the record indicates that the purpose of the hearing scheduled on February 18, 1997 was for sentencing, rather than for a meaningful Remmer hearing. 42 Finally, the district court, in its Memorandum Opinion and Order, abused its discretion in relying on the assurance of impartiality contained in the note passed to the judge, in part because the author of the note was not juror # 1. Instead, the jury foreman wrote the note to the court, stating that juror # 1 could remain unbiased. Only the juror who actually experienced the extraneous influence can vouch for his or her ability to be impartial. But even if juror # 1 had written the note himself, this would still have been insufficient to ensure his impartiality without further inquiry. In the present case, the judge not only failed to adequately investigate the allegation of juror partiality, but the juror never personally assured the court of his impartiality.
43 Having concluded that the district court abused its discretion by denying Herndon the opportunity to question juror # 1, we must still consider the impact of this error on Herndon's right to a fair trial. Because the risk of prejudice is so great when a jury is tainted with extraneous information, we believe that Herndon should have the opportunity to establish whether prejudice existed. Accordingly, we vacate Herndon's conviction and sentence and remand the case for a Remmer hearing in which Herndon will have an opportunity to prove actual bias. See, e.g., United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1502 (10th Cir.1990) (vacating a sentence and remanding a case for a hearing to determine whether an attorney's conflict of interest prejudiced the defendant, and instructing the district court to grant a new trial if prejudice is found or reinstate the conviction if no prejudice is found); McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 659-60 (6th Cir.1981) (remanding a case after the jury reached a verdict for further proceedings to determine if defendant was prejudiced as a result of a juror's omission of relevant information during voir dire).