Opinion ID: 2303013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Application of Duty to Preserve Evidence

Text: Md.Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 8-201(j) of the Criminal Procedure Article provides, in relevant part: (1) The State shall preserve scientific identification evidence that: (i) the State has reason to know contains DNA material; and (ii) is secured in connection with an offense described in subsection (b) of this section. (2) The State shall preserve scientific identification evidence described in paragraph (1) of this subsection for the time of the sentence, including any consecutive sentence imposed in connection with the offense.[ [9] ] (3) (i) If the State is unable to produce scientific identification evidence described in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional and willful destruction. (ii) If the court determines at a hearing under subparagraph (i) of this paragraph that the failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional and willful destruction, the court shall: (1) order a postconviction hearing to be conducted in accordance with subparagraph (iii) of this paragraph; and (2) at the postconviction hearing infer that the results of the postconviction DNA testing would have been favorable to the petitioner. The statute is silent regarding whether the State's obligation to preserve scientific identification evidence is to be applied prospectively, meaning after the effective date of the statute, or retrospectively, meaning before the date of the statute's enactment. In the absence of a clear indication from the plain language of the statute, we look to the legislative history to determine the intent of the General Assembly. See Blake I, 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d at 1026. In reviewing the legislative history of § 8-201(j), specifically the State's duty to preserve scientific identification evidence, it is clear that the legislature intended for this duty to be applied prospectively. [10] Thus, we shall give effect to the legislature's intent, and we shall hold that the State's duty to preserve scientific identification evidence became effective on October 1, 2001, the date on which the statute was enacted. If the requested scientific identification evidence was lost or destroyed prior to October 1, 2001, subsection (j) does not apply and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under that portion of the statute. If the requested scientific identification evidence was destroyed on or after October 1, 2001, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether such destruction was intentional and willful, and it must provide relief to the petitioner under subsection (j) in accordance with its conclusions. Because the hearing judge's determination that the scientific identification evidence in this case was lost or destroyed prior to the effective date of the statute was not clearly erroneous, the State had no statutory duty to preserve the scientific identification evidence and Appellant is not entitled to any relief under subsection (j). When a statutory provision is ambiguous or otherwise unclear, we look to the rules of statutory construction for guidance. In Blake I, 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d at 1026, we discussed several well-settled principles of statutory construction: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. See Oakland v. Mountain Lake, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006). In ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, we give effect to the statute as it is written. See Mackey v. Compass, 391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006). If the language of the statute is ambiguous, we resolve the ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, considering the legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. See Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005). We consider both the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute and how that language relates to the overall meaning, setting, and purpose of the act. Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004). We avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005). We construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2005). The ultimate purpose of these principles of statutory construction is to ascertain the actual intention of the legislature and to give effect to that intention. Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219, 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987). This Court has held that [a] retroactive statute is one which purports to determine the legal significance of acts or events that have occurred prior to the statute's effective date. Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 123, 360 A.2d 1, 3 (1976). With regard to retrospective application of statutory provisions, in Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 714, 976 A.2d 999, 1008 (2009) (citation omitted), we held that [s]tatutes are presumed to operate prospectively; consequently, absent manifest legislative intent to the contrary, statutes may not be given retrospective or retroactive application. See also Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 555, 766 A.2d 98, 109 (2001); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406, 754 A.2d 389, 394 (2000) (maintaining that [i]n the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect (quotation omitted)). This Court has utilized a two-part analysis when determining whether a statute may be given retroactive effect: First, we must determine whether the Legislature intended the statute to have the kind of retroactive effect that is asserted.... If we conclude that the Legislature did intend for the statute to have retroactive effect, we must then examine whether such effect would contravene some Constitutional right or prohibition. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 289-90, 829 A.2d 611, 618-19 (2003). Appellant argued before the hearing judge that when [the evidence] was destroyed is immaterial. The statute does not say, destroyed prior to 2001.... It says willfully and intentionally destroyed [with] no limitation as to when. Appellant argues before this Court that [t]he statute has no requirement as to when the destruction occurred, nor that it be in bad faith or in violation of the statute; therefore, none of these showings are prerequisites to relief. Relying on the plain language of the statute, Appellant asserts that if the General Assembly had intended § 8-201(j)(3) to pertain solely to destruction which occurred after 2001, it could have said so. Appellant argues that the statute should be applied retroactively. Accordingly, Appellant suggests that this Court should determine that the scientific identification evidence from Appellant's case was intentionally and willfully destroyed, because the only evidence retention and destruction policies produced by the State at the evidentiary hearing indicate that the practice of the Sheriff's Office is to retain evidence unless the State's Attorney approves destruction. The State contends that because prior to 2001 there was no law whatsoever regarding the retention of DNA evidence following a trial, it would be nonsensical for this Court to hold that evidence destroyed prior to the enactment of the statute triggers an evidentiary sanction against the State. Referring to the underlying purpose of the statute to exonerate those who are actually innocent, the State claims, To interpret the statute as imposing a sanction to ensure compliance with the evidentiary preservation component of the law is rational; to interpret the statute as imposing a sanction to punish behavior which was perfectly lawful at the time is irrational. Arguing for a prospective application of the statute, the State maintains that the provisions of § 8-201(j)(3) do not apply to the circumstances of this case because prior to 2001, there was no statute and no common law duty to preserve evidence. Thus, according to the State and in contrast to Appellant's claims, the informal practices established by the Sheriff's Office did not give rise to a `legal duty' to preserve evidence, and ... certainly did not give rise to the legal duty contemplated in the 2008 amendment to the DNA Postconviction Act. Because the plain language of § 8-201(j), as codified, is silent with regard to retroactive or prospective application of the State's duty to preserve scientific identification evidence, we look to legislative history to determine legislative intent. Examination of the legislative history of § 8-201 reveals that the General Assembly intended for the duty of preservation to operate prospectively. Specifically, Section 2 of Chapter 418 of the Maryland Laws of 2001 states: The provisions of this Act providing for the retention and disposition of scientific identification evidence shall apply to any scientific identification evidence in the possession of the State on or after the effective date of this Act, regardless of whether the person was convicted before or on or after the effective date of this Act. 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 418, sec. 2 (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to the legislative intent, subsection (j), and any relief offered therein, does not apply to evidence that was lost or destroyed before the effective date of the statute on October 1, 2001. [11] The hearing judge's determination that the scientific identification evidence in this case was lost or destroyed prior to the effective date of the statute was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to any relief under § 8-201(j).