Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comment on failure to present mitigating evidence

Text: During closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed the various aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered in determining penalty. In urging the jury to find that the aggravating factors outweighed those in mitigation, the prosecutor stated in relevant part: I suggest to you that there is no evidence of that [sympathetic] nature. I mean you can grope as you might but you haven't heard it because itโit just does notโdoes not exist.... You have abundant evidence of aggravating factors, including the crime itself and the evidence you heard during the penalty phase. I suggest to you, you have no evidence that would mitigate the enormity or the gravity of this particular crime.... I suggest to you there are no mitigating circumstances. Defendant asserts the prosecutor's statements were an impermissible comment on his failure to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106. Because defense counsel neither objected to the prosecutor's remarks on this or any other basis, nor requested an admonition from the trial court to cure any perceived harm, defendant's claim has not been preserved on appeal. ( People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 719, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) It lacks merits in any event. Under the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution, a prosecutor is prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on an accused's invocation of the constitutional right to silence. Directing a jury's attention to a defendant's failure to testify at trial runs the risk of inviting the jury to consider the defendant's silence as evidence of guilt. ( Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. at pp. 614-615, 85 S.Ct. 1229; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1019, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) The prosecutor is permitted, however, to comment on the state of the evidence, including the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call witnesses. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Defendant asserts the prosecutor's reference to the nonexistence of mitigating evidence was a comment on his failure to testify because it suggested that the only person who could have provided such evidence, defendant, did not do so at the penalty phase. This is a strained reading of the prosecutor's remarks. The prosecutor did not impermissibly argue to the jury that the People's evidence was uncontradicted or unrefated because defendant failed to take the witness stand. (See, e.g., People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 438, 459-60, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133.) The prosecutor's remarks were not directed, expressly or impliedly, at defendant's invocation of the right to silence at the penalty phase. Rather, they concerned the dearth of mitigating evidence, a proper subject for argument. (See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 443, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000 [no error under Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, where prosecutor merely pointed out lack of mitigating evidence supported his argument that balance of aggravating and mitigating factors favored sentence of death].) Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the prosecutor's remarks as an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Although defendant did not take the witness stand at the penalty phase, he did testify in his own behalf during the guilt phase, and the jury was given the standard instruction that its penalty determination was to be based on all of the evidence received during the entire trial. Nothing in the prosecutor's remarks suggested that defendant's testimony at the guilt phase could not be considered as mitigating evidence for purposes of determining penalty. Given defendant's testimony and the proper scope of the prosecutor's comments, we conclude there was no Griffin error or other misconduct. Defendant further contends the prosecutor's summation to the jury impermissibly treated the absence of mitigating factors as an aggravating factor, in violation of People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861. Davenport cautioned prosecutors against arguing that the absence of mitigating evidence should itself be considered a factor in aggravation because such argument was likely to confuse the jury as to the proper meaning of aggravation and mitigation under section 190.3. ( People v. Davenport, supra, at pp. 288-290, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) A prosecutor may, however, properly point out to the jury the lack of evidence in support of a mitigating factor. ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 144, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559.) Because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's remarks now being challenged, the issue has not been preserved for appeal. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1064, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Even if properly before us, the claim lacks merit. The prosecutor never stated or suggested that the nonexistence of mitigating evidence was itself an aggravating factor. ( Id. at p. 1063, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Fairly read, and as previously discussed, the prosecutor's remarks expressed the view that the evidence of aggravating factors, coupled with the dearth of mitigating evidence, supported a penalty of death over life imprisonment. There was no impropriety in the argument.