Opinion ID: 2609023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other contentions of the city

Text: Appellant argues that the testimony of appellees' expert witness was in large part hearsay, and thus admission of such testimony was error. However, appellant did not object to the testimony at the time it was given. Hearsay testimony which is not objected to is fully competent. [41] Appellant wishes this court to consider the lower court's reliance on this testimony as plain error and take note of it even though the proper objection was not made in the court below. This court has held that it will ... consider plain errors, even though not objected to below, which are so substantial as to result in injustices. [42] In the instant case, under the above standard, the admission of and reliance upon what the appellant labels hearsay testimony did not constitute plain error. [43] Appellant also urges that appellees should never have been allowed to bring their action for three reasons. First, it was barred by the statute of limitations. This involves the whole question of whether appellant acquired title by adverse possession which has been thoroughly discussed above. Alternatively, it is argued that since appellant, with the knowledge of appellees, erected valuable improvements on appellees' land, equitable estoppel should now bar appellees from claiming relief in the courts. The improvements referred to are the new lines placed on the poles in 1970. It hardly seems these could be considered improvements, and it is doubtful that appellees were aware of the new lines. In short, the argument is without merit. [44] Finally appellant mentions laches as a possible bar to appellees' action but does little else to develop this argument which we also hold to be without merit. Similarly lacking in substance are appellant's contentions that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting certain hearsay, and that he should have disqualified himself because of his obvious bias. As to the hearsay question, appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted testimony as to the statements of a dead man. This objection arises out of a mistake on the part of Nesbett who confused one Roy Nigh with Gene Silberer. Because of this confusion, Nesbett testified that it was Nigh who approached him concerning selling the land in question to the City. Nigh is now dead and was in fact dead at the time the negotiations were to have taken place. Nesbett meant to refer to Silberer, and this mistake was corrected prior to the end of the trial. The judge did sustain appellant's objection to Nesbett's testimony as to what Silberer related to him as hearsay. However, the judge properly allowed the testimony in as evidence of Nesbett's state of mind, [45] and similar testimony was subsequently given in answer to the City's questions on cross-examination. Appellant's contention that the trial judge should have disqualified himself due to alleged bias in favor of appellees centers around certain statements made by the judge. We have reviewed the judge's statements relied upon by the City and find frivolous its contention that they indicated a bias in favor of appellees. In its supplemental reply brief, appellant alleges error on the part of the trial court in denying appellant's motion for a new trial. This request for a new trial is based on what appellant calls new evidence which it contends supports and fortifies appellant's position that the use by the City of appellees' property was not permissive during the time the land was owned by the United States. The so-called new evidence consisted principally of the City's 1954 application for a special land use permit and the rejection thereof discussed previously in this opinion. We find no error in the denial of the motion. Affirmed in part and remanded in part. [46] ERWIN and FITZGERALD, JJ., not participating.