Opinion ID: 1695079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Statements to Officer Langraf

Text: ś 97. Snow's argue that two statements made to Officer Langraf at the Rankin County Correctional Facility also should have been suppressed. The record reflects that Mississippi Highway Patrol Officers, Andy Langraf and Larry Luke, attempted to question Snow after he arrived at the Rankin County Correctional Facility. They videotaped the explanation of rights to Snow to which he indicated that he did not want to give an interview without his lawyer present. [11] The officers testified they then shut down the interview and left the interrogation room. At the suppression hearing, the testimony on the matter was as follows: Q: Okay. After you shut the interview down, what did you do then? A: Myself and Investigator Luke stood up. We walked outside of the interview room and stood right outside the door of the interview room, and I was standing there, and I started talking to a Mendenhall police officer and questioning about the clothing of Eric Snow, had we found the clothing yet andâ you want me to go further? Q: Yes, sir. A: Okay I was standing there questioning about the clothing, and all of a sudden, Eric Snow volunteered, spoke out, said `I'll tell you where my clothesâ where I dropped my clothes.' Q: All right. Were you directing these comments about the clothes to Mr. Snow? A: No, sir. I was out of the room about two to three feet away.    Q: What did you do then? A. I turned and went back to the interview room and I looked at him. I was standing over him, and I just said, Where? And he proceeded to tell me. Q: All right. Where did he tell you? A: He said across from where the car was at across the road. There was little cleared out spot. Go through the cleared out spot down across the fence out in the field a little ways. He said when you get to the water, that's where I dropped them, in the water. Q: All right. And did you at that time attempt to question him any further. A. No.     Q: Okay. Did you then relay this information to other officers that Mr. Snow had given to you? A: Yes, sir. I immediately left the interview room and went to the telephone and called the Mendenhall P.D. and let the dispatcher know it to relay it on to some officers out that could have been on the search to try to go retrieve the clothes. Q: And were the clothes later recovered? A: Yes, sir, they were. Q: Okay. And after you gave this information to the Simpson County authorities over the phone, what did you then do? A: Went back over towards the interview room and was standing there and turned back around and looked at Eric Snow and asked him a question. Q: What did you ask him? A: I asked him, What about the gun? Where did you get the gun? Q: And what, if anything, did he say? A: He looked down at the floor and proceeded telling me. He said there was a holsterâ a black holster sitting on the arm rest. He took the gun out of the holster, put the holster up under the armrest, and then he wouldn't make any more statements. (emphasis added). ś 98. The trial court suppressed Snow's response to the gun question, but denied his motion as to the statements concerning the location of his clothes. This was error, Snow argues, because the testimony regarding the discovery of his clothes constituted fruit of the poisonous tree. Although Officer Langraf terminated questioning after Snow invoked his right to a lawyer, he continued to talk about the missing clothes with at least one (1) other police officer within earshot of Snow. He then immediately left the interview room and called the Mendenhall Police Department, in order to get this information to the dispatcher there. This was a ploy, he charges, similar to that of Officer Wood and the statements should have been suppressed. ś 99. The trial judge's ruling was that Snow had volunteered this information, and therefore the statement was admissible. The statement itself, however, was not introduced at trial. Another officer of the Mendenhall Police Department, rather, testified that he found the clothes near the scene of the crime. The State agues, therefore, that Snow didn't establish that the clothes were found as the result of the statement made to the Officer. The officer's actions, furthermore, were not the extreme coercion which existed in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) as Officer Langraf was conversing with another officer and was not even considering Snow at the time. It was Snow, clearly, the State argues, who initiated the conversation. ś 100. While it is well established that an accused person can waive his right to counsel by initiating conversation with law enforcement, Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 632 (Miss.1996), included in the inquiry is whether statements were made in response to the functional equivalent to interrogation. [12] United States v. Barlow, 839 F.Supp. 63 (D.Me.1993). Courts considering whether a conversation between officers in the suspect's presence is the functional equivalent to interrogation, examine whether the comments were directed towards the accused and were designed to elicit a response. Innis, itself, for example, raised the issue and the Court found that the conversation between the officers was nothing more than a dialogue between them, to which no response from the respondent was invited. The police did not carry on a lengthy harangue in the presence of the suspect, the comments were not particularly evocative, and nothing suggests that they were aware that the suspect was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children. While it may be said that the defendant was subjected to a subtle compulsion, it was not established that the suspect's response was the product of actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-05, 100 S.Ct. at 1690-91. See also United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir.1997) (not functional equivalent of interrogation when agent, in suspect's presence, asked other agents if suspect had invoked right to remain silent as question was attendant to custody); Barlow, 839 F.Supp. at 64-68 (words and actions of federal agents, who stood comparing handwritten notes found in defendant's house during search with copy of letter that they had brought with them to house, were not functional equivalent of interrogation; officers' discussion was not directed towards defendant, since agents had their backs turned toward defendant and were four to six feet from defendant.). People v. Jumper, 113 Ill.App.3d 346, 69 Ill.Dec. 314, 447 N.E.2d 531 (1983) (finding no response was invited where an officer, in defendant's presence, informed another officer that the defendant had attacked him, and defendant made an incriminating response that was admitted). ś 101. Because their comments were not directed toward Snow and they stood at the door, approximately two feet away with their back towards him, we cannot conclude that the trial court's ruling was erroneous. See Barlow, 839 F.Supp. at 67. Snow's statement, I'll tell you where my clothesâ where I dropped my clothes, thus, was voluntary. With regard to his response to Officer's Langraf's question, Where? this could be considered a follow-up to clarify what was said as it was asked in response to a voluntary statement. [13] Some courts have held that police officers asking follow-up questions merely continue the flow of a conversation initiated by the defendant. [14] When, at some point, an officer's follow-up question begins to exert pressure it becomes interrogation made to confirm a defendant's guilt and should cease. [15] Other courts appear to suggest that officers should inform the suspect of his or her Miranda rights before asking follow-up questions to a voluntary statement, adhering closely to Innis. The reasoning being that once the officers reasonably suspect that incriminating information will be forthcoming, Miranda warnings must be given. [16] We do not find it necessary to decide the admissibility of this statement because the statement itself ultimately, was not admitted in trial.