Opinion ID: 2514147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Second-Degree Murder Instruction

Text: Next, Albright argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. Albright requested the Pattern Instructions for Kansas (PIK) Crim.3d 56.03 (1999 Supp.) standard second-degree murder instruction. First-degree premeditated murder is the killing of a person committed intentionally and with premeditation. K.S.A. 21-3401(a). Second-degree murder, a lesser included offense of first-degree murder, is the killing of a human being intentionally without deliberation or premeditation. See K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-3402. However, in Albright's case, the district court found that the evidence did not support a second-degree murder instruction. We examine the merit of the district court's ruling by observing, there is [n]o duty to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense ... where the evidence as a whole, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, could not reasonably support a jury verdict on the lesser included offense. State v. Simkins, 269 Kan. 84, 90, 3 P.3d 1274 (2000). A review of the trial record supports the district court's ruling. Albright cites several cases to bolster his contention that a second-degree murder instruction should have been given. We next consider those cases, concluding that none are persuasive when compared with the facts here. In State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 904 P.2d 951 (1995), superceded by statute as stated in State v. Bedford, 269 Kan. 315, 327, 7 P.3d 224 (2000), we pointed out that the law does not presume the existence of premeditation or deliberation. 258 Kan. at 414. The question on appeal is not whether there was sufficient evidence of premeditation but whether there was sufficient evidence to require the trial judge to instruct on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. 258 Kan. at 415. We noted in Sanders that the sufficiency of an inference of premeditation is not conclusive in determining whether the evidence supported an instruction on the lesser included offense. 258 Kan. at 415. The victim in Sanders was killed late at night in her own home. There were neither signs of a struggle, nor of defensive injuries. Sanders testified about his actions that night. He denied killing the victim. If the murder weapon was taken from the kitchen drawer, the jury could have inferred that Sanders did not premeditate the killing before going to the victim's house. Either inference, premeditation or no premeditation, could have been drawn from the evidence. Sanders' first-degree murder conviction was reversed because the evidence at trial did not exclude a theory of guilt on the lesser offense of second-degree murder. 258 Kan. at 415-16. We observed in Sanders: However, the duty to instruct on a lesser included offense `does not arise unless there is evidence supporting the lesser offense.' [Citation omitted.] 258 Kan. at 413. Albright also relies on State v. Dixon, 252 Kan. 39, 843 P.2d 182 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in State v. Shannon, 258 Kan. 425, 429, 905 P.2d 649 (1995), State v. Johnson, 220 Kan. 720, Syl. ¶ 1, 556 P.2d 168 (1976), and State v. Broadus, 206 Kan. 766, 481 P.2d 1006 (1971). He opines that the jury here could have concluded that there was no premeditation. He suggests that the jury could have inferred that Barker and Albright argued over either the sale of the Impala or a cocaine deal and that, because of the argument, Albright shot Barker. He points out that Barker was also armed. According to Albright, even with the alleged admissions, there was neither an explanation for the shooting, nor why he and Barker drove to that location and got out of the car. The district court noted that the defense theory of the case was that Albright was not present and did not commit the crime. Albright argues that the mere fact that the defendant denies committing the act does not deprive the defendant of his requested instruction on the lesser included offense. We agree with Albright on this point. See State v. Coleman, 253 Kan. 335, 354-55, 856 P.2d 121 (1993). The evidence here precluded a second-degree murder conviction. A brief review of the evidence is appropriate. While Albright and Barker were at Hoffine's house on November 14, Barker took a call from Cantrell. She told him about the drug raid. When Barker got off the phone, he was angry and mentioned that his neighbor Phillips had narked. He said he ought to kill Phillips. Before they left, both Albright and Barker showed Hoffine that they carried guns. Albright said he had one of Phillips' 9-mm guns. Carolyn Barker testified that on the night of the murder, she heard Albright tell her husband that he knew Hoffine would buy his 1961 Impala that night for $2,000 cash. However, Hoffine testified that he and Barker had never talked about a purchase price. Barker and Albright had previously talked to Hoffine about the $3,300 appraised value of the Impala on the night of November 14, but Hoffine had not been interested in purchasing the car. After the murder, Albright drove the car to Hoffine's home. Hoffine agreed that it was unusual for Albright to visit him at 4 a.m. Albright then forged the title certificate, selling Barker's Impala to Hoffine for $200. Albright had returned Phillips' 9-mm gun on Saturday, the day before the murder. On Sunday, Phillips noticed that the gun was missing. After the murder, Albright told Phillips that he used the gun to kill Barker. The ammunition found at the scene of the crime was .380 caliber ammunition, which was also found in Albright's home. Albright told Phillips that he killed Barker because Barker threatened to kill Phillips and Phillips' family. In State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 109-10, 865 P.2d 1021 (1993), we endorsed the lesser degree instruction statement we made in State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 602 P.2d 1344 (1979): `In order for the evidence to be sufficient to require instructions on lesser degrees of the homicide, the testimony supporting such instructions must be offered either by the State or by the defense for the purpose of proving what events occurred at the time the homicide was committed. Contradictory statements of a witness which are offered only for the purpose of destroying his credibility and not as positive evidence to prove the matters contained in the statements are not alone sufficient to require an instruction on the lesser degrees of homicide.' 226 Kan. at 714. What evidence to support an instruction on second-degree murder was advanced by Albright at trial? At the instruction conference, Albright's counsel, arguing in support of the lesser included instruction, emphasized Exhibit number 33 and photographs that were admitted. Exhibit 33 was the exhibit of the crime scene. Counsel concluded: That bit of factual testimony that has been, and the diagram and the photograph, indicates to me that this is a situation where perhaps whomever shot David Barker occurred in an argument. You will recall Mr. Barker was armed, he had two guns, he had a sheath knife, I believe, in the back of the belt. Had a couple of pocket knives. Dr. Moots brought that out, as well as Special Agent Klamm. That ... would lead me to believe that there is some evidence, however weak, however slight, that while indeed the shooting may very well be intentional, that there was not premeditation, that this may have occurred as a result of an argument, a scuffle, I don't know. But I think if you look at those facts, you'll find that that would warrant the issuance of at least the instruction of second degree intentional. Neither Exhibit 33 nor the photographs are in the record on appeal. Albright carries the burden of furnishing a record which shows prejudicial error occurred at trial. State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 68, 936 P.2d 727 (1997). The district court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder.