Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Standards for As-Applied Review

Text: On as-applied review of the notice requirement of due process, courts ask whether the challenged statute, as written, provides notice sufficient to alert `ordinary people [as to] what conduct is prohibited.' Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d at 224 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855). This test does not demand `meticulous specificity' in the identification of proscribed conduct. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (noting that such standard would come at cost of flexibility and reasonable breadth (internal quotation marks omitted))). Rather, it requires only that the statutory language `conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.' Id. (quoting Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951)). Similarly, with respect to the due process concern of arbitrary enforcement, a statute certainly will not be deemed unconstitutionally vague if `as a general matter,' it `provides sufficiently clear standards to eliminate' such a risk. Id. (quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 494 (2d Cir.2006)). But even `in the absence of such standards,' a statute will survive an as-applied vagueness challenge if `the conduct at issue falls within the core of the statute's prohibition, so that the enforcement before the court was not the result of the unfettered latitude that law enforcement officers and factfinders might have in other, hypothetical applications of the statute.' Id. (quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d at 494). Applying these principles to this case, we identify no unconstitutional vagueness in § 2339B as applied to Sabir's case.