Opinion ID: 2518484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The automobile exclusion bars coverage in the instant case because Muramoto's injuries arose from the use or operation of an automobile. [8]

Text: In the context of an automobile insurance coverage clause, this court has applied the following three-factor test to determine whether injuries arose from the use or operation of a motor vehicle: The first factor [is] whether the ... motor vehicle was an active accessory in causing [the] plaintiff's injuries.... The second factor [is] whether there was an independent act breaking the causal link between use of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted.... The third factor [is] whether the injuries resulted from use of the vehicle for transportation purposes[.] Chock v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 103 Hawai'i 263, 267-68, 81 P.3d 1178, 1182-83 (2003) (citing AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co. v. Estate of Caraang, 74 Haw. 620, 640-41, 851 P.2d 321, 330-31 (1993) (citing Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 877-79 (Minn. 1987))). See also HRS § 431:10C-103 (Supp. 2004) (providing in relevant part that, for purposes of Hawaii's Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, `Operation, maintenance, or use with respect to a motor vehicle' includes occupying, entering into, and alighting from it, but does not include ... [c]onduct in the course of loading or unloading the vehicle, unless the accidental harm occurs in the immediate proximity of the vehicle[.]). [9] Because the phrase arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any . . . `auto' has the same meaning in the context of an automobile coverage clause as it does in a CGL automobile exclusion clause, we use this same three-factor test to determine whether injuries arose from the use of an automobile for purposes of applying the CGL automobile exclusion. Applying this three-factor test to the instant case, we conclude that Muramoto's injuries arose from the use or operation of an automobile and are therefore excluded from coverage. The first factorwhether the van in which Muramoto was traveling was an active accessory in causing his injuriesweighs in favor of Northfield. Muramoto's wheelchair tipped over while the van was moving, causing him to be pinned in the corner of the van; he was injured when the driver tried to assist him from this position. As this court has stated, The use of an automobile naturally includes getting in and out of it. [10] Wong Chee v. Yee Wo Chan Co., 26 Haw. 785, 801 (1923), overruled on other grounds, Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc., 63 Haw. 642, 647-49, 636 P.2d 721, 724-26 (1981). See also 8 Lee R. Russ and Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d, § 119:47 at 119-68 (1997) (The insuring term `use or operation' encompasses more than just driving a vehicle, and includes all activities necessarily part of driving the vehicle, such as getting in and getting out.). [11] Even though Muramoto was injured after the van had stopped moving, the van was an active accessory in causing his injuries. The second factorwhether there was an independent act breaking the link between use of the vehicle and Muramoto's injuriesdoes not clearly weigh in favor of either party. The van was stopped, such that the driver's negligence in unbuckling Muramoto could be seen as an independent act that was separate from the use of the van for transportation purposes (particularly because Muramoto appears to have suffered all of his injuries from his fall, rather than being injured by the tipping of his wheelchair and having those injuries exacerbated by the driver's subsequent actions). However, Aloha State was in the business of transporting passengers in automobiles, and Muramoto's injuries occurred while he was being transported in an automobile; therefore, the driver's act in releasing Muramoto's buckle is not particularly independent from the use of an automobile. The third factorwhether Muramoto's injuries resulted from use of the van for transportation purposesclearly weighs in favor of Northfield as well, as Muramoto was injured while traveling as a passenger in an Aloha State van. See Wong Chee, 26 Haw. at 801 (The use of an automobile naturally includes getting in and out of it.); 8 Couch on Insurance 3d, § 119:47 at 119-68. Applying these three factors, we conclude that Muramoto's injuries arose out of the use or operation of an automobile. Consequently, the CGL automobile exclusion bars coverage in the instant case and the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Northfield.