Opinion ID: 2085062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Arbitrariness of New York's Death Penalty Scheme Prosecutorial Discretion

Text: Defendant has also raised the issue of the arbitrariness of the death penalty statute. While in light of the disposition here, I do not come to a definitive conclusion on the issue of arbitrariness, the argument is a strong one and should be addressed. I write to highlight two aspects of this argument. Defendant claims that New York's death penalty scheme allows district attorneys to select capital defendants arbitrarily, inconsistently and discriminatorily, in violation of article I, § 5 (cruel and unusual punishment), § 6 (due process of law), and § 11 (equal protection of the law) of the New York State Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Although raised in Harris, this Court has not previously addressed this issue ( Harris, 98 NY2d at 497 n 23). Traditionally, district attorneys have enjoyed great discretion in making charging decisions. That discretion need not be disturbed by this opinion. However, notice of intent to seek the death penalty pursuant to CPL 250.40 is not the same as a charging decision. By the time this notice is filed, the defendant has already been charged and indicted for first degree murder under Penal Law § 125.27. CPL 250.40 does not provide any guidelines for when and if a district attorney should seek the death penalty. There is no provision under section 250.40 or any other portion of the CPL mandating that the district attorney set out the reason he or she has or has not sought death. The decision can be based on personal, irrelevant or even improper reasons without preserving a record for appeal. The arbitrary way in which a defendant becomes exposed to the death penalty may be in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights on both a state and federal level. The People argue that the defendant failed to allege how the statute as applied to him violates a constitutional norm ( People v Parker, 41 NY2d 21, 24 [1976]). The People call for a specific allegation. In their words, [a]ppellant only insinuates that the use of prosecutorial discretion to file a notice to seek capital punishment pursuant to CPL 250.40 resulted in his arbitrary, capricious selection as a capital defendant; he does not point to evidence in the record to support an injury in fact. Additionally, the People claim that the figures kept by the Office of Court Administration and the Capital Defender Office do not provide evidence of a per se injury. According to the figures kept by the Office of Court Administration and the Capital Defender Office, between September 1, 1995 and December 31, 2001, grand juries indicted 376 defendants for first degree murder in New York. During this same period, district attorneys filed death notices in only 43 cases. That is only 11.4% of all first degree murder indictments, according to statistics maintained by the Capital Defender Office. Without a reason being given by the People, the defendant is at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to making a specific challenge alleging improper reasoning by the district attorney. Yet the decision made by the district attorney has a direct impact on the defendant. Under the statute as written, a defendant who is allegedly aggrieved by the People's filing of the CPL 250.40 notice has no recourse and no remedy for improper reasons of the district attorney. Certainly no one would deny a defendant's challenge if he or she could prove, for example, that the reasoning behind the notice was race-based. To deny a defendant's challenge where the district attorney is allowed to conceal reasoning improperly stacks the deck against the defendant. Death is different and a defendant should be allowed to seek out and challenge the action of the district attorney. Failure to permit a challenge to the filing of the death notice stands in direct contradiction to the principles on which our legal system is founded.