Opinion ID: 1154748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alaska Equal Protection

Text: Analysis under our state equal protection clause [9] is considerably more fluid than under its federal counterpart. Instead of using three levels of scrutiny, we apply a sliding scale under which [t]he applicable standard of review for a given case is to be determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of suspicion with which we view the resulting classification scheme. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983). As the right asserted becomes more fundamental or the classification scheme employed becomes more constitutionally suspect, the challenged law is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at a more elevated position on our sliding scale. Id. at 1193. The importance of the asserted right and the suspectness of the classification scheme determine the ends-means scrutiny to be applied. Our general approach is as follows: As the level of scrutiny selected is higher on the [sliding] scale, we require that the asserted governmental interests be relatively more compelling and that the legislation's means-to-ends fit be correspondingly closer. On the other hand, if relaxed scrutiny is indicated, less important governmental objectives will suffice and a greater degree of over/or underinclusiveness in the means-to-ends fit will be tolerated. Id. (footnote omitted). In the present case, we see no reason why 15 AAC 23.615(d) warrants greater than minimal scrutiny under our state equal protection analysis. First, [a] dividend is merely an economic interest and therefore is entitled only to minimum protection under our equal protection analysis. State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 158 (Alaska 1991). Second, Amicus has provided no reason why the classification persons who have voluntarily failed to comply with the United States immigration laws [10] should receive greater than minimal equal protection scrutiny. For these reasons, we apply minimal scrutiny under our state equal protection analysis. Minimal scrutiny under our state constitution may be more demanding than under the federal constitution. As under the federal constitution, the challenged exclusion must be designed to achieve a legitimate governmental objective; however, the exclusion must bear a fair and substantial relationship to the accomplishment of the legitimate objective. [11] As discussed above, we have concluded that limiting the distribution of dividends to those who are lawful permanent residents is rationally related to legitimate objectives of the dividend program; we also conclude, for the same reasons that the limitation is fairly and substantially related to these goals. Thus, 15 AAC 25.615(d) survives rational basis review under our state equal protection method of review. We REVERSE the decision of the superior court invalidating 15 AAC 25.615(d) and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.