Opinion ID: 844251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to California's Death Penalty Law and Related Instructions

Text: Defendant argues that California's death penalty law and related instructions are unconstitutional in various respects. This court has consistently rejected similar claims, and defendant offers no persuasive reason for reconsidering these holdings. [C]ategorizing as especially deserving of the ultimate penalty those offenders who kill two or more victims in one criminal event is not arbitrary, unfair or irrational, and performs the necessary narrowing of the pool of potential offenders required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 440.) The jury's consideration of unadjudicated criminal conduct in fixing the penalty under section 190.3, factor (b), does not violate a defendant's state or federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and a reliable penalty determination. ( McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 378; Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402.) In addition, this court has long recognized that, as `[section 190.3, factor] (b) imposes no time limitation on the introduction of `violent' crimes; the jury presumably may consider criminal violence which has occurred at any time in the defendant's life.' ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 233, quoting People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 529 [268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640], quoting People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 202 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], original italics.) Also, the jury may consider evidence of juvenile violent criminal misconduct as an aggravating factor under factor (b). ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 737 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 296 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) The absence of procedural safeguards utilized by other states in the operation of their death penalty laws does not render California's law unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Citations.] As we have repeatedly concluded, `[t]he jury need not make written findings, or achieve unanimity as to specific aggravating circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance is proved (except for other crimes), that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty.' ( People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 934 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955], quoting People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568]; see People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 753 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145].) With the exception of prior violent offenses and prior convictions under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), respectively, the court is not required to instruct regarding the burden of proof or to instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase. ( People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970]; Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 370.) The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856], Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], do not affect California's death penalty law or otherwise require reconsideration of the foregoing decisions. ( Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 89; Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 167; see also People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 731.) The trial court's failure to inform the jury that there is a presumption of life does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights to due process, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, to a reliable determination of his sentence, and to equal protection of the law under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. ( Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 371; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 532 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58].) The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide intercase proportionality review. ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1187; Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1067.) Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, the death penalty law does not violate equal protection by denying capital defendants certain procedural rights given to noncapital defendants. ( People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681; see People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614].) Defendant's death sentence violates neither international law nor his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as no authority prohibit[s] a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].) Unless a defendant establishes his trial involved prejudicial violations of state or federal constitutional law, we need not consider the question whether he also suffered violations of international law. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].)