Opinion ID: 2626390
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense

Text: During a conference on jury instructions, the trial court advised counsel that it planned to instruct on both first and second degree murder in connection with the alleged murder of Carol. Defense counsel replied by requesting additional instructions on (1) the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense (see People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 674-680, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1; CALJIC No. 5.17), and (2) the defense of justifiable homicide based on perfect self-defense. (See §§ 197, 198; CALJIC Nos. 5.12, 5.13.) For support, counsel cited defendant's statements to police that Carol drew a knife in his car, as well as Dr. Cogan's testimony about the cuts on Carol's hand. Counsel theorized that Carol tried to kill defendant with the knife, that she cut her hand when he grabbed the knife, and that he strangled her in self-defense. Finding this scenario unduly speculative, the court refused to instruct in the requested manner. Thus, as relevant here, the jury received first degree murder instructions under both premeditation and felony-murder-rape theories. The jury also received second degree murder instructions reflecting both an express and implied malice approach. Defendant insists he offered valid theories of imperfect and perfect self-defense at trial, and that the court erred in refusing such instructions. This ruling purportedly violated his right to present a defense, to trial by jury, and to due process under the federal Constitution. An unlawful killing involving either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life constitutes voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, when the defendant acts upon an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. (See People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87-89, 91, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771, 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574; People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 679, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) In addition, a homicide is justifiable and noncriminal where the actor possessed both an actual and reasonable belief in the need to defend. ( People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 199-200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531; People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 674-675, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) In either case, the fear must be of imminent harm. `Fear of future harmno matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harmwill not suffice. The defendant's fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.' ( People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1, quoting In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) The trial court need not give such instructions on request absent substantial evidence to support them. ( In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574; see People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 684-685 & fn. 12, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) Applying these principles here, no error occurred. Aside from the inconsistent accounts defendant gave to police, there is no evidence Carol brought a knife to the murder scene. According to her husband and other witnesses, Carol never carried a knife when she went to the White Oak Inn. Also, the medical and physical evidence showed that Carolthe victim of lethal forcestruggled with her attacker and suffered defensive knife wounds. Such evidence undermines the present instructional claim by suggesting that defendant (not Carol) possessed a knife, and that Carol (not defendant) defended against its use. Even assuming the police interview constitutes substantial evidence that Carol possessed and displayed a knife the night she was killed, there is no substantial evidence of actual fear of an imminent harm sufficient to support either imperfect or perfect self-defense instructions. ( In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th 768, 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) In fact, defendant's statements affirmatively negate any such fear or belief. Defendant told police that Carol pulled the knife from her purse when a shadowy figure, perhaps her old man, appeared in front of the house. Defendant also reported that Carol held the knife down by her side after they had consensual sex and while they debated going to another bar. On the one hand, defendant worried about Carol's apparent plan to hurt somebody. On the other hand, he maintained in the face of persistent police questioning that she showed no interest in using the knife against him, and that she did not threaten him with it in any way. This evidence shows that defendant did not perceive any imminent threat of harm from the knife. Thus, an essential element is missing from defendant's claim that he could not be convicted of murder because he acted either in self-defense or upon an unreasonable belief in the need to do so. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct along such lines.