Opinion ID: 6317122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identification of Crouch on the video

Text: Crouch next argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Matthew Wheat, the lead detective on the case, to identify Crouch as the person shown on Bryant’s surveillance video. Crouch argues that this testimony improperly went to the ultimate issue in the case and invaded the 2 KRS 438.210 makes it illegal to “willfully and maliciously prevent[], obstruct[] or delay[] the sending, transmission, conveyance or delivery in this state of any message, communication or report through any telegraph or telephone line, wire or cable.” 7 fact-finding function of the jury. Before reaching the merits of his argument, however, we must determine whether this issue was properly preserved.3 Prior to trial, Crouch filed a motion in limine to prevent any witness from identifying Crouch as the person shown on Bryant’s surveillance video. The trial court granted Crouch’s motion as it related to law enforcement—ruling that no law enforcement witnesses could identify Crouch on Bryant’s surveillance video. However, when Det. Wheat identified Crouch during his testimony at trial, Crouch failed to make a contemporaneous objection. Crouch asserts that his motion in limine was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that a contemporaneous objection was necessary. Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedures (RCr) 9.22 requires that a party make a contemporaneous objection to preserve an issue for appeal. This rule was modified, but not repealed, by Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 103(d), which states, “A motion in limine resolved by order of record is sufficient to preserve error for appellate review.” MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Ky. 2014). We have repeatedly held that “while a motion in limine is a proper means for bringing evidentiary issues to the trial court’s attention, the contemporaneous objection rule was still alive and well.” Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.3d 601, 611–12 (Ky. 2020) (citing Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 20–21 (Ky. 2005)). “[T]he critical point in 3 Although Crouch argues that this issue was preserved, he also seeks palpable error review if we find it unpreserved. 8 preservation of an issue remains: was the question fairly brought to the attention of the trial court.” Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d at 331 (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 722–23 (Ky. 2004)). In Allgeier, the trial court made a pretrial ruling that a certain piece of evidence could only be admitted to impeach a witness’s credibility but did not specifically address whether the evidence could be used as substantive evidence. Id. at 330–31. However, during the trial, the evidence was used for substantive purposes and no contemporaneous objection was made. Id. We concluded that the issue was not properly preserved, stating, “Having established in advance of trial the parameters for which admissible evidence may be used, the trial judge cannot be expected to then infallibly recognize the point at which those evidentiary boundaries have been crossed, and respond sua sponte with an unsolicited ruling.” Id. at 332. Although the admissibility of the evidence for substantive purposes was not as clearly decided in Allgeier as was the limitation in this case, our analysis and reasoning do not change. In Allgeier, we explained, “A jury trial is a difficult and often complex undertaking. Like intricate machinery, it has many moving parts. The presiding judge is required to monitor those parts throughout the trial, remaining simultaneously attentive to a number of ongoing concerns.” Id. Just as in Allgeier, we cannot expect the trial judge in this case to “infallibly recognize the point at which those evidentiary boundaries have been crossed, and respond sua sponte with an unsolicited ruling.” Id. Accordingly, we hold that any objection to Det. Wheat’s 9 identification of Crouch on the surveillance video was not properly preserved for our review. See also Long v. Commonwealth, 2010-SC-000801-MR, 2011 WL 6826377, at  n.3 (Ky. Dec. 22, 2011) (“[A] party obviously may not obtain a successful pretrial ruling, acquiesce to the breach of the ruling at trial by failing to object to the violation, and then blithely claim preservation based upon the pretrial ruling. KRE 103(d) does not excuse a party from its duty to contemporaneously bring errors to the trial court's attention in the event the pretrial ruling is violated.”). Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Little v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Ky. 2008). A trial court abuses its discretion only where its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). However, because this issue is unpreserved, we will only reverse if it rises to the level of palpable error and affects the substantial rights of a party. RCr 10.26. “For an error to rise to the level of palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable. Generally, a palpable error affects the substantial rights of the party only if it is more likely than ordinary error to have affected the judgment.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Ky. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Even then, relief is appropriate only “upon a determination that manifest injustice resulted from the error.” RCr 10.26. 10 Crouch points to two specific statements made by Det. Wheat which Crouch claims were an improper identification of him. In the first, Det. Wheat testified, I was 100% convinced, there was no doubt in my mind at that point that Mr. Crouch was the person that we had seen on those cameras. At that time, I responded to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office and presented these facts to an attorney, and an arrest warrant was typed up for two counts of burglary second. That was then presented to a district judge, and that warrant was signed and issued for his arrest that afternoon. Crouch argues that this particular identification was unfairly bolstered and made more prejudicial by Det. Wheat’s testimony regarding the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the district judge. He asserts that Det. Wheat’s testimony allowed the jury to infer that both the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the district judge agreed with Det. Wheat’s conclusion that Crouch was the person in the video. The second statement made by Det. Wheat about which Crouch complains is: “This is the surveillance video that we obtained from Mr. Bryant, which shows Mr. Crouch as he extends his arms to climb over Ms. Waddell’s fence.” Crouch argues that Det. Wheat’s identification of him was further and unfairly bolstered by Det. Wheat’s additional testimony. Det. Wheat testified that another detective from the Bowling Green Police Department, Det. Tim Buss, who has a specialty in digital investigations, agreed that Crouch was the person shown in Bryant’s surveillance video. In fact, Det. Buss’s testimony at trial was not that explicit. 11 Finally, Crouch argues that Det. Wheat further bolstered his own improper testimony by stating that he was “very confident” from early in the investigation that Crouch was the suspect and that he had “no doubt in [his] mind” that Crouch was the person shown in Bryant’s surveillance video. Crouch argues that the cumulative effect of this testimony made it so that Det. Wheat’s improper identification of him was not harmless and resulted in