Opinion ID: 40104
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discretionary Function Exception to the FTCA

Text: Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal government cannot be sued in its capacity as a sovereign unless it consents to be sued. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). For the federal government to consent to be sued, Congress must waive sovereign immunity by explicitly extending to federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over a specified cause of action. Id. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity and allows private individuals to sue the federal government for the negligent torts of its employees by granting federal courts exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or -7- personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, the FTCA enumerates a number of exceptions to this waiver of sovereign immunity, including an exception that excludes from its grant of subject-matter jurisdiction claims challenging “discretionary functions” performed by government employees. The discretionary function exception covers [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis added).4 This exception also 4 Without citing to any authority, Appellants argue that the discretionary function exception cannot apply unless the government official has exercised due care. See Appellants’ Br. at 9. This argument is without merit. We have made clear that the disjunctive “or” in § 2680(a) separates two distinct exceptions to the FTCA, and that the discretionary function exception contained in the second clause of the provision applies regardless of whether the government official has exercised due care. See Buchanan v. United States, 915 F.2d 969, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1990); Lively v. United States, 870 F.2d 296, 297 (5th Cir. 1989). “The question which we must answer, therefore, is not whether the Government acted with due care but whether the Government’s conduct was the result of the performance of a discretionary function.” Lively, 870 F.2d at 297. We thus reject Appellants’ contention that USACE must establish that it exercised due care as a prerequisite for immunity from suit under the discretionary function exception. -8- extends to contractors who work to implement programs as agents of the federal government. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen contractors as agents or officers of the federal government . . . work according to government specifications, they are entitled to assert the government’s sovereign immunity in suits arising from that activity.”); see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940). To determine whether the discretionary function exception applies to a government act, a court must first decide whether the act is discretionary in nature. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991); Guile v. United States, 422 F.3d 221, 229 (5th Cir. 2005). To be discretionary, an act must “‘involve an element of judgment or choice.’” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322 (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). An act does not involve judgment or choice “if a ‘federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow,’ because ‘the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.’” Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). Second, even if the government conduct involves an element of judgment, that judgment must be “of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984); see also -9- Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23. Because the discretionary function exception is designed to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort,” it applies only to government acts that are based on public policy considerations. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813. Therefore, [w]here Congress has delegated the authority to an independent agency or to the Executive Branch to implement the general provisions of a regulatory statute and to issue regulations to that end, there is no doubt that planning-level decisions establishing programs are protected by the discretionary function exception, as is the promulgation of regulations by which the agencies are to carry out the programs. In addition, the actions of Government agents involving the necessary element of choice and grounded in the social, economic, or political goals of the statute and regulations are protected. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323. Moreover, whenever a government employee takes an action pursuant to a regulation that provides for discretion, “the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regulations.” Id. at 324. In this case, USACE’s decision to remove the city’s warning sign and J&S’s subsequent removal of the sign per USACE’s instructions fall squarely within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. First, the decision to remove the city’s warning signs as part of the larger USACE sign-replacement project was pursuant to a delegation of authority from Congress -10- and “involved an element of judgment or choice.”5 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. In his capacity as Project Sign Program Manager for jetties, groins, and breakwaters on Galveston Island, Bill Jakeway was responsible for evaluating conditions of existing signs and developing a sign plan for the area pursuant to USACE regulations giving him broad discretion in the implementation of government policy regarding public safety on USACE jetties. As 5 In the River and Harbor Act of 1894, 33 U.S.C. § 1, Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Army the authority to “prescribe such regulations for the use, administration, and navigation of the navigable waters of the United States as in his judgment the public necessity may require for the protection of life and property, or of operations of the United States in channel improvement.” Id. Pursuant to this delegation of authority, USACE has promulgated a number of regulations directly addressing jetty maintenance and public safety activities along the navigable waters of the United States. Chapter 3 of USACE Regulation No. 1130-2-520 (Nov. 29, 1996), “Project Operations Navigation and Dredging Operations and Maintenance Policies,” provides that USACE officials should maintain jetties “for their functions as navigation aids and shoreline protection structures in a manner that does not enhance or encourage recreational or other public use.” 2 R. at 548-49. Moreover, these officials “shall be responsible for determining minimum facilities for public health and safety, such as guardrails, barricades, fencing, and warning signs.” Id. This chapter provides guidance to USACE officials in implementing these policies with regard to warning signs, giving them the choice of (a) taking no action, (b) posting warning signs, or (c) denying access to the area. Id. Chapter 6 of USACE Regulation No. 1130-2-50 (Dec. 27, 1996), “Sign Standards Progress for Civil Works Projects,” further addresses the posting of warning signs for USACE officials who choose to post them, providing for the appointment of a Sign Program Manager responsible for ordering and approving new signs for civil works projects. 2 R. at 540. The Sign Program Manager follows the guidelines laid out in the USACE Sign Standards Manual, which instructs that “the appropriateness of an individual sign to a setting is to be determined by the Project Sign Program Manager on a case-by-case basis.” 2 R. at 537. -11- part of the sign replacement project, Jakeway decided to remove the city’s unauthorized warning signs that were affixed to USACE property and instructed J&S to carry out his orders. This decision was discretionary in nature and was within the discretion provided by the applicable statutes and regulations. See Guile v. United States, 422 F.3d 221, 228-31 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the United States Army’s decision to hire a health care organization to provide psychiatric services and its decision to supervise and how closely to supervise the organization’s work were discretionary in nature); ALX El Dorado, Inc. v. Sw. Sav. & Loan, 36 F.3d 409, 410-12 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the federal government’s supervision of financial institutions under the receivership of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was a discretionary function). Second, this government conduct was “of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield” because it was based on public policy considerations. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813. Jakeway’s discretionary decisions and J&S’s actions as a USACE agent6 were in the course of carrying out governmental programs pursuant to USACE regulations, and their actions were grounded in the same policies underlying those 6 Neither party disputes that J&S, as a contractor paid to perform sign replacement activities on behalf of USACE, was a USACE agent during the relevant time. USACE’s sovereign immunity protection under the discretionary function exception thus extends to J&S as well. See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564. -12- regulations: ensuring public safety in the area surrounding the Galveston Island jetties without encouraging public use of the jetties. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323.7 A suit in tort is an inappropriate vehicle to challenge these legislative and administrative policies. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322; Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813.