Opinion ID: 1828214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applicabilityin general

Text: (a) Special statutory proceedings. The statutory proceedings listed in Table A are excepted from these rules in so far as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by these rules. Table A excepts Chapter 27-16 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943. This is the old juvenile court procedure that was repealed and replaced by the present Uniform Juvenile Court Act (Chapter 27-20, N.D. C.C.). The adoption of the amended Rule 52(a) has not eliminated the existence of Rule 81 and Table A. [2] Insofar as the Act and Rule are in conflict or inconsistent, the Act must prevail, because of the provisions of Rule 81. Section 27-20-56, N.D.C.C., of the Act, appears to be a return, in juvenile cases, to the old de novo statute, Section 28-27-12, N.D.C.C. It provides for a type of trial anew, giving appreciable weight to findings. As much as we would like to avoid a return to old ways and the attendant discomfiture for both appellants and trial courts, we cannot avoid the clear wording of Section 27-20-56, N.D.C.C. Such an interpretation affirms what we said in In re J. Z., supra , [3] and the general history of Federal Rule 52(a), in that there are several special proceedings in which the Federal Rule is inapplicable. Wright & Miller, supra, §§ 2571-2573. [4] We now discuss a side issue bearing on future termination proceedings. This court does not approve of a termination that is, in effect, prospective in operation. If a possibility of a correction in an existing situation exists, it would be preferable, we believe, to adjourn the hearing under a temporary order of placement without a future termination date. Upon a rehearing, if the conditions still exist, an immediate termination may then be made. A time lapse in the effectiveness of a termination order has a disruptive influence on both parent and child. It is with regret that false hopes are raised, and we should discourage continuing controversy over child custody. Our own reading of the record and the appreciable weight we give to the trial court's findings both convince us of the correctness of this decision. There is clear and convincing evidence the child is deprived and the causes and conditions are likely to continue and that by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. The decision is affirmed. STRUTZ, C. J., and ERICKSTAD, PAULSON and TEIGEN, JJ., concur. KNUDSON, J., deeming himself disqualified did not participate; JAMES H. O'KEEFE, Judge of the Second Judicial District, sitting in his stead.