Opinion ID: 842726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: tomac i

Text: In TOMAC I, I dissented from the majority’s decision to acquiesce to the approval of the compacts by resolution. I continue to believe that TOMAC I was wrongly decided. The compacts, in my judgment, constitute legislation under the test adopted by this Court in Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103; 611 NW2d 530 (2000). Because they are legislation, the Legislature and the Governor were required to approve the compacts by the legislative process set forth in the constitution. This method was not followed. Accordingly, the first reason that the present amendments of the LTBB compact are unconstitutional is simply because the compact itself was never constitutionally enacted. Moreover, as I sought to explain in TOMAC I, the amendment procedure in the compacts violates the 6 Separation of Powers Clause, because this procedure allows the Governor to amend legislation. In TOMAC I, the critical issue was whether the compacts themselves are legislation, and are thus subject to constitutional requirements for the enactment of legislation. In Blank, this Court adopted a four-factor test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Immigration & Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919; 103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 (1983), to determine whether governmental action constitutes legislation. I applied these factors in evaluating the compacts in TOMAC I and concluded that the compacts were legislation.1 The four factors are (1) whether the compacts at issue “‘had the purpose and effect of altering . . . legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative branch,’” Blank, supra at 114; (2) whether the Governor’s action in negotiating the compacts and the Legislature’s resolution vote on the compacts supplanted legislative action; (3) whether the compacts involved determinations of policy; and (4) whether Michigan’s Constitution explicitly authorizes the Legislature to approve these compacts by a resolution vote even if they otherwise constitute “legislation.” [TOMAC I, supra at 378 (opinion by Markman, J.).] 1 The majority rejects the application of the Blank framework, stating that “this Court already explained its position and addressed the flaws in Justice Markman’s rationale in TOMAC I, supra at 318-333.” Ante at 9 n 2. Indeed, the majority concluded in TOMAC I that the Blank framework was “not relevant because the compacts [did] not constitute legislation.” TOMAC I, supra at 378 n 9 (opinion by Markman, J.). However, as I responded at the time, “the very point of utilizing the [Blank] framework is to determine whether the compacts constitute legislation.” Id. (emphasis in original). The majority does not even purport to apply the Blank framework to the amendments to the compact. 7 For the reasons elaborated upon in TOMAC I, the compacts between the state and the tribes constitute legislation. Concerning the first Blank factor, the compacts alter the legal rights of persons outside the legislative branch, because Indian casino gaming was illegal in Michigan under state and federal law before the enactment of the compacts. Under 18 USC 1166(a), in the absence of a compact, “all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.” See TOMAC I, supra at 379-381. Because casino gaming would be illegal on Indian lands under this provision if state law prohibits such gaming, it was necessary in TOMAC I to determine whether Michigan law prohibits Indian casino gaming in the absence of a compact. In fact, Michigan law generally prohibits casino gaming. MCL 750.301. Casino gaming in Michigan is only allowed pursuant to the Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act, MCL 432.201 et seq., which does not apply to “[g]ambling on Native American land,” MCL 432.203(2)(d). Further, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, class III gaming,2 like that allowed in this case, is lawful on Indian lands only if the gaming 2 “[C]lass III gaming” is defined as “all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.” 25 USC 2703(8). “[C]lass I gaming” is defined as “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” 25 USC 2703(6). “[C]lass II gaming” is defined as “bingo” and “card games” that are either “explicitly authorized by the laws of the (continued…) 8 is “conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . .” 25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C). Therefore, under both federal and state law, casino gaming by these tribes would have been illegal in the absence of the compacts. Moreover, the compacts require local units of government either to create a local revenue sharing board to receive a percentage of tribal gaming profits or to pay for the additional municipal burdens created by the casinos, such as increased costs for public services. TOMAC I, supra at 382. Regardless of which option is chosen by local units, the compacts impose new duties on government. The compacts therefore alter the legal rights and duties of persons outside the legislative branch by permitting the tribes to operate casinos, and by requiring local units of government to undertake certain actions. Concerning the second Blank factor, passage of the compacts by resolution supplanted legislative action. Because federal law dictates that state laws apply within Indian reservations in the absence of a compact, 18 USC 1166, the sole alternative method for allowing Indian gaming in this state would have been through an alteration of state law. As I earlier explained: [I]n the absence of a compact, if the Legislature wanted to make gambling on Indian land lawful, the only way it could do that would be by either changing the gambling laws that are generally (continued…) State” or “not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State . . . . ” 25 USC 2703(7)(A). However, class II gaming does not include “any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack,” or slot machines. 25 USC 2703(7)(B). 9 applicable within the state or by changing the reach of the [Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act]. Changing those laws would, it cannot seriously be disputed, require “legislation.” [TOMAC I, supra at 384.] With regard to the third Blank factor, enactment of the compacts involved numerous policy determinations, of which “the most significant . . . was the initial decision to make lawful what was otherwise unlawful-- casino gambling on the subject Indian lands.” Id. at 385. Other considerations, including how many casinos to allow, what the gambling age should be, what percentage of “net win” the tribes should be required to pay to the state, whether to extend the state employment security act and workers’ compensation benefits to casino workers, and who should enforce the rules and regulations of the compacts, are all significant policy decisions. Id. Concerning the final Blank factor, the Michigan Constitution does not allow the passage of legislation by resolution, except in specified instances that were not relevant in TOMAC I.3 Because each of the Blank factors suggests that the Indian gaming compacts are legislation, I concluded in TOMAC I that the compacts must be approved by the regular constitutional process of enacting legislation. Under the Michigan Constitution, “[a]ll legislation shall be by bill . . . .” Const 1963, art 4, § 22. The constitution requires that “[n]o bill shall become a 3 See Const 1963, art 4, §§ 12, 13, and 37; art 5, § 2; art 6, § 25. 10 law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house.” Const 1963, art 4, § 26. Once the Legislature approves a bill, it is then presented to the Governor. If the Governor signs the bill, the bill is enacted into law. Const 1963, art 4, § 33. If the Governor does not sign the bill, the Governor may return the bill to the Legislature with her objections. Id. The Legislature may enact the bill despite the Governor’s objections if two-thirds of the members of each house vote for the bill. Id. If the Governor does not return the bill, and the Legislature continues in session, the bill “shall become law as if [the Governor] had signed it.” Id. After a bill becomes law, the constitution specifies how a law may be amended: “The section or sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.” Const 1963, art 4, § 25. Under these constitutional provisions, in order to enact legislation, a bill must be passed by both houses of the Legislature and then either approved by the Governor or, if vetoed, by two-thirds of each house of the Legislature. To amend a law once created, those sections amended must be reenacted by the same process. Because the Legislature approved the compacts by resolution, and such compacts are legislation, the compacts were not validly approved under the constitution. By approving the compacts, the majority in TOMAC I established the first provision of the “casino exception” to representative government: the Legislature may approve an Indian gaming compact by resolution, and is not 11 required to abide by the regular legislative process established in the state constitution. A second issue presented in TOMAC I concerned the constitutionality of the amendment provisions in the compacts. Although the Court in TOMAC I remanded this issue to the Court of Appeals, I addressed it because I believed that it was ripe for our consideration. Under the compacts, the Governor possesses amendatory authority; such authority allows the Governor, on behalf of the state, to unilaterally modify the compacts. However, as already noted, the Michigan Constitution requires that an amendment of legislation-- including an Indian gaming compact-- be effected through the reenactment of the pertinent sections of the statute. Const 1963, art 4, § 25. This reenactment must occur by the constitutional method for the passage of legislation. The exercise of the legislative power of amendment by the executive violates the provisions of the Michigan Constitution that establish the procedure for enacting and amending legislation, as well as the Separation of Powers Clause, which states: “The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Therefore, in TOMAC I, I would have held the amendatory provision of the compacts unconstitutional and would not have remanded to the Court of Appeals. 12