Opinion ID: 1981273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Compulsory Counterclaim Argument.

Text: Robert argues that the Herald's claim, arising out of the same accident, was a compulsory counterclaim and that it lost its right to pursue the claim when it failed to assert it as a counterclaim in the original suit. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 29. The Herald responds that any such claim was speculative at that point, not mature within the meaning of rule 29, and therefore not a compulsory counterclaim. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 29 provides in part: A pleading must contain a counterclaim for every cause of action then matured, and not the subject of a pending action, held by the pleader against any opposing party.... (Emphasis added.) The district court's view that the Herald's claim for contribution was mature at the time of the original suit was based on its reading of Franke v. Junko, 366 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa 1985). In Franke, which involved a cross-petition for contribution, we noted the general rule to be that a right of contribution does not accrue until a disproportionate payment of damages has been made. But, we also noted a well-recognized exception to that rule: A defendant may cross-petition for contribution in the original action and have the right to contribution determined, even though it could not actually be enforced until payment by the cross-petitioner. Franke, 366 N.W.2d at 540. We also noted that this principle had been incorporated in the statute now found in Iowa Code section 668.5 (1985). Section 668.5(1) provides: A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or any of them. It may be enforced either in the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution is each person's equitable share of the obligations, including the share of fault of a claimant, as determined in accordance with section 668.3. (Emphasis added.) In the present case the district court reasoned that, if the right of contribution in Franke had ripened sufficiently to allow a cross-petition under rule 34, it must be mature enough to be a compulsory counterclaim under rule 29. We do not agree. The language of the respective rules is different; rule 34 does not require that a right be mature, while rule 29 does. To be mature, we believe, the right must be presently enforceable, not merely determinable. As Franke notes, a claim for contribution is not enforceable until a disproportionate payment has been made. 366 N.W.2d at 540. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b), the federal permissive counterclaim rule, also requires a claim to be mature. Cases decided under that rule have held that suits for contribution are not mature and therefore not proper subjects for permissive counterclaims. See, e.g., Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir.1970); Scherza v. Home Indemnity Co., 257 F.Supp. 97, 98 (D.R.I.1966); Slavics v. Wood, 36 F.R.D. 47 (E.D.Pa.1964). See generally 6 Wright & Miller Federal Practice & Procedure § 1411, at 56-57 (1971). These cases under the federal rule, turning on maturity of the claim, are persuasive in interpreting our own rule with similar language. We conclude it was error for the court to dismiss the claim for contribution on the ground it was a compulsory counterclaim.