Opinion ID: 1435226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The New Evidence Would Have Opened the Door to Prejudicial Information

Text: There is another reason why the failure to introduce the post-conviction evidence was not prejudicial. Had Morales's counsel called the witnesses in question, the door would have been opened to information damaging to Morales. With the door opened, the State would have been permitted under both federal and state law to introduce evidence to rebut the mitigation testimony of the witnesses in question. The United States Supreme Court has explained that sentencing courts have long exercise[d] a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist [them] in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). With this in mind, the Supreme Court has held that due process is not violated merely because a sentencing court considers a defendant's past criminal behavior that did not result in a conviction. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (holding that a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence); cf. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) (holding that a sentencing court may consider the underlying conduct that gave rise to an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence). Under Ohio's statutory sentencing scheme, a capital defendant can introduce mitigating evidence pertaining to such factors as the history, character, and background of the offender. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (1981) (stating that the jury is to weigh against the aggravating circumstances, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and background of the offender). The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the State, at the penalty stage of a capital trial, may introduce and comment on evidence rebutting the existence of any statutorily defined or other mitigating factors first asserted by the defendant. State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, 263 (1995); see also id. at 262 (Once lawfully inserted into the sentencing considerations, admissible evidence is subject to fair comment by both parties.). So if, for example, a defendant introduces evidence of his history as mitigating evidence, the State could introduce rebuttal evidence as to this mitigating factor, and thus counter the proposition that the defendant's history is mitigating. See State v. Raglin, 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 699 N.E.2d 482, 490 (1998) (following Gumm for the proposition that [t]he prosecution was entitled to introduce relevant evidence rebutting the existence of any statutorily defined or other mitigating factor first asserted by the defense, and holding that [t]he testimony of the state's rebuttal witnesses was . . . relevant to rebut mitigating evidence that had been offered by the defense that appellant was remorseful for the killing[ and] that he would help or benefit others while serving a term of life imprisonment). Much of the damaging evidence that could have been introduced by the State is detailed in the social history report produced by Rick Ruffin, a mitigation specialist for the Ohio Public Defender Commission. Had the witnesses in question testified regarding Morales's history, character, or background, the jury would have learned that when Morales was growing up, he was disciplined by his father, but the discipline had little effect on Morales. According to Morales's cousin, it was like [Morales] didn't learn how to not get spanked. He just didn't care if he got spanked. He would cry, then get meanand take it out on others. He would bully them. (J.A. 707.) Morales also often stole money from his parents and SSI checks from his mentally retarded older brother to buy drugs and alcohol. (J.A. 709.) He stole bicycles and car radios. While intoxicated he threw bricks through windows, cut telephone wires, wrecked cars, punched trees, and got into many fights. (J.A. 709.) While Morales's father was hospitalized for kidney problems, Morales was arrested for intoxication and weapons charges. (J.A. 709.) Morales and his cousin Mike drank in excess and lost the family truck because he was drunk; on another evening, Morales passed out in a hobo camp and could not drive home. (J.A. 709-710.) Morales continued to drink excessively after returning from Cleveland, and committed two assaults against women. (J.A. 710.) One incident involved Morales pushing Louise Vasquez down to the ground and ripping her blouse, and, according to Vasquez, Morales raped her. (J.A. 711.) Morales was incarcerated for a year because of this incident. (J.A. 710.) On another occasion, Morales slapped Yolanda Trevino. (J.A. 711.) According to Ricky Sanchez, a friend of Morales from Cleveland, nobody in the neighborhood trusted Morales because his behavior was so unpredictable. On one occasion Sanchez's group of friends had to pull Morales off an unconscious opponent because they were afraid he would kill him. (J.A. 711.) Sanchez stated that [w]hen Joe started to fight, it was hard to stop him. (J.A. 711.) With regard to his relationship with the Trevinos, on one occasion Morales cut the Trevino family's telephone line; on another, he threw a brick through the their window; and on yet another occasion, Morales chased Toby Trevino with a knife. (J.A. 711.) Had Morales's counsel put Morales's history, background, or character at issue, these instances of Morales's prior bad actswhich include many instances of violence and cruelty, and an allegation of rapecould have been introduced by the State. And this information, once heard by the jury, could only reinforce Morales's violent nature in the eyes of the jurors. This Court has commented that it is far from true that bad testimony beats no testimony at all. Something . . . is not always better than nothing given the risk that every positive argument by a defendant potentially opens the door to a more-harmful response. Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 809-10 (6th Cir.2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). That the presentation of the post-conviction evidence would likely cause Morales more harm than good should militate against a finding of prejudice. [3] This Court's precedents are consistent with this conclusion. In Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir.2006), this Court concluded that a capital petitioner was not prejudiced from his counsel's failure during the penalty phase to present the testimony of certain family members in order to portray the petitioner's troubled background, including his experiences with drugs and alcohol at an early age, his history of violent behavior, his experience with racial prejudice, and the influence of his alcoholic, philandering father. Id. at 530. The Carter court found that any non-cumulative testimony from the petitioner's family members would not have been mitigating, noting that their affidavits describe a relatively stable, although imperfect, family environment, with no allegations of physical or sexual abuse of [the petitioner]. Id. at 531. As another reason for declining to find prejudice, the Court stated that had the family members' testimony been admitted, the prosecutor would have been free to extract testimony of [the petitioner's] criminal history, his history of drug use and alcohol abuse, and his notoriously quick temper and violent character. Id. The Carter court concluded that [g]iven the lack of mitigating evidence available in this case and the likelihood that the testimony of [the petitioner's] family members would have done more harm than good, [not calling the petitioner's family members] was a sound decision. Id. at 532. Importantly, the Carter court noted that the Supreme Court has found more limited investigations into a defendant's background justified where any evidence presented would have a `double edge.' Id. at 532 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). Carter also noted that this Court has declined to find deficient performance in a defense counsel's strategic decision to limit testimony about [the defendant]'s past in order to prevent `opening-the-door' to evidence of [the defendant]'s criminal background[.] Carter, 443 F.3d at 532 (quoting Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, 286 n. 6 (6th Cir. 2005)). Also instructive is Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 254-55 (6th Cir.2005). In Moore, this Circuit again failed to find prejudice regarding a capital petitioner's claim of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel. The Moore petitioner, like Morales, claimed that his counsel should have presented, for purposes of mitigation, additional testimony concerning the petitioner's various problems that began to emerge during childhood, including impulsiveness, poor judgment, behavior control, anger, and harmful emotional attachment to others. Moore, 425 F.3d at 254. One potential witness included a psychologist who would have testified to the severe neglect and physical abuse that [the petitioner] endured, nearly forty moves to foster homes and institutions, an alcoholic mother and abusive father, and that [the petitioner] and his siblings were left home alone for extended periods of time, and relatives observed the children eating dog food and asbestos because there was no food in the house. Id. at 266 (Martin, J., dissenting). According to the court, much of the evidence described by the new evidence was presented at sentencing, and the evidence cast [the petitioner] as an easily angered, impulsive, out-of-control emotional leech with poor judgment. Moore, 425 F.3d at 254. The Moore court concluded that introducing more evidence of this background, as [the petitioner] desired, would likely have made him look even worse to the jury. Thus counsel's failure to seek or present more background evidence was not even deficient performance, let alone prejudicial. Id. In Foley v. Parker, 488 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir.2007), which the majority mistakenly cites as distinguishable, the capital petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to fully investigate his background and failing to produce any mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial. The Foley petitioner contended that various individuals, namely six family members, five friends, and a school teacher who had not seen him since the 1970s, should have been called to testify on his behalf as mitigation witnesses. Id. at 382-83. The Court acknowledged that some of their testimony could be considered mitigating, in that the petitioner was described as nice, giving, loving, sweet, a good family man, and a hard worker. Id. at 383. However, the Court held that the petitioner did not establish prejudice given that much of the post-conviction evidence was either not mitigating or distinctly negative, specifically the evidence that [s]everal witnesses mentioned [the petitioner's] penchant for violence, a description difficult to reconcile with the positive accounts but consistent with the crimes the jury knew [the petitioner] had committed. Id. at 383. In Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir.2007), which the majority also mistakenly cites as distinguishable, the capital petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to interview and present additional testimony from an ex-girlfriend, his step-father, and two siblings, who would have testified that the petitioner grew up in a relatively stable home where rules were enforced, and basic needs were met. The Durr court held that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice because: (1) the post-conviction evidence was cumulative of that already presented; and (2) had the petitioner's former girlfriend testified, the prosecution could have introduced rebuttal evidence concerning [the petitioner's] treatment of other women, including [the petitioner's] rape convictions. Id. at 436 (citing Raglin, 699 N.E.2d at 490). Thus, as in Carter, Moore, Foley, and Durr, the defense counsel's failure to present allegedly new mitigation evidence cannot possibly be deemed prejudicial. As in these cases, the additional testimony would have made Morales look like a violent and out-of-control drunk who presents a danger to society.