Opinion ID: 1734875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rejection of Self-Defense Claim.

Text: The State further argues, however, that the jury found the equivalent of malice when it rejected White's self-defense claim. The jury was instructed that one of the elements of the crime of second degree murder was that White did not act in self-defense. Consequently, by finding him guilty of second degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected White's claim that he acted in self-defense. From that, the State goes on to conclude that the jury's rejection of White's self-defense claim, the only justification or excuse offered at trial, is the same as a finding that White acted with malice. Thus, according to the State, as self-defense and malice are mutually exclusive terms, the absence of one implies the existence of the other. In support of its theory, the State directs our attention to Carleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 N.W. 699 (1895), in which the defendant who was convicted of first degree murder complained that the jury instructions would have allowed the jury to convict him of a malicious killing even though the jury found that he had killed in self-defense. The Carleton court stated: We cannot see how self-defense and malice could combine, nor how, under the instructions, it was possible for the jury to believe they could co-exist. The jury was instructed that in order to make out a case of self-defense the shooting must be for the purpose of self-preservation, and they were also told that in order to be malicious the shooting must have been from an unlawful and unjustifiable motive. We think that these rules are correct; and to say that a shooting is in self-defense and at the same time malicious is a contradiction in terms. 43 Neb. at 407, 61 N.W. at 710. The State argues that the reason the concepts are a contradiction in terms is that when a person's actions are guided by fear for oneself, they are not guided by malice. The State also points for support to State v. Blackson, 245 Neb. 833, 515 N.W.2d 773 (1994). In Blackson, a case where malice was not included as an element in the second degree murder instruction, we affirmed a conviction for second degree murder, resting our decision in part on the fact that the trial court had instructed the jury through a separate instruction as to justification for the use of force by the defendant. But the jury's rejection of White's self-defense claim is not the equivalent of a finding of malice. While it is true that self-defense cannot coexist in a murder case with malice, the converse is not true. The absence of self-defense may coexist with the absence of malice. This is so because in order to successfully assert the claim of self-defense, one must have both a reasonable and good faith belief in the necessity of using deadly force. State v. Thompson, 244 Neb. 375, 507 N.W.2d 253 (1993). It is important to remember that malice, like intent, concerns the state of mind of the slayer. Id. It denotes a condition of the mind which is manifested by intentionally doing a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. State v. Rowe, 214 Neb. 685, 335 N.W.2d 309 (1983). Since one who acts in self-defense does so with a protective intent rather than with a criminal intent devoid of justification or excuse, such person does not act with malice and cannot be convicted of second degree murder. We have acknowledged in our prior holdings, beginning with Carleton, supra, that self-defense can negate malice. See, State v. Samuels, 205 Neb. 585, 289 N.W.2d 183 (1980); State v. Kimbrough, 173 Neb. 873, 115 N.W.2d 422 (1962). In Carleton, the defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning the temper and disposition of the victim in order to support his claim of self-defense. The court stated that in a homicide case, after the defendant has introduced evidence tending to show self-defense, evidence of the ferocity or violent disposition of the victim is admissible for the purpose of showing either `that the defendant was acting in terror, and hence incapable of that specific malice necessary to constitute murder in the first degree; or ... that he was in such apparent extremity as to make out a case of self-defense; or ... that the deceased's purpose in encountering the defendant was deadly.' Carleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 397, 61 N.W. 699, 707 (1895). Although Carleton and its progeny speak in terms of negating the malice necessary for a conviction of first degree murder, the statement is equally applicable to second degree murder. Second degree murder is distinguishable from first degree murder only in the absence of the requirement of deliberation and premeditation. State v. Payne, 205 Neb. 522, 289 N.W.2d 173 (1980). Both offenses require the State to prove that the defendant acted with malice. Thus, to the extent Blackson, supra, can be read to imply that the rejection of a self-defense claim equated to a finding that the defendant therein acted with malice, it is overruled. The White I jury was instructed that White did not act in self-defense if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he had not reasonably believed that his use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect him against death or serious bodily harm. Because the instruction thereby embodied the concepts of reasonableness and good faith belief in the single phrase reasonably believed, the jury could reject White's self-defense claim on the ground that while unreasonable, he did in fact believe in the necessity of using deadly force. The existence of such unreasonable but actual, or good faith, belief would negate the existence of malice. Thus, it becomes clear that the jury's negative finding as to self-defense in this case is not the equivalent of a finding that White acted with the requisite malice. In sum, contrary to the view of the State, the instructions as a whole failed to adequately convey to the jury that malice was a material element of second degree murder.