Opinion ID: 889869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search authorized by probation officer

Text: ¶ 41 While we have held that a search of a probationer's effects may be conducted without a search warrant, we have also held that the search must be authorized by the probation officer. See State v. Meza, 2006 MT 210, ¶ 29, 333 Mont. 305, 143 P.3d 422 (As a general matter, searches of parolees conducted by police officers are permissible with the consent of the parole officer. (emphasis added)); see also State v. Boston, 269 Mont. 300, 305, 889 P.2d 814, 817 (1994); State v. Burke, 235 Mont. 165, 766 P.2d 254 (1988); State v. Burchett, 277 Mont. 192, 921 P.2d 854 (1996). `[T]he probation officer must be able to supervise the probationer [or parolee], and upon his judgment and expertise, search the probationer's [or parolee's] residence or cause it to be searched.' Boston, 269 Mont. at 305, 889 P.2d at 817 (emphasis added) (quoting Burke, 235 Mont. at 171, 766 P.2d at 257). ¶ 42 In this case, the officers had every opportunity to call Officer Pinnick before initiating the second search of the fanny pack. Their failure to secure Officer Pinnick's authorization prior to the second search of the fanny pack cannot be justified after the fact by the inevitable discovery doctrine. Such an after-the-fact authorization from a probation officer is similar to the after-the-fact consent to search we held improper in Ellis. ¶ 43 In that case, law enforcement officers had the victim fill out a form giving officers permission to search her father's residence after the officers had already searched it and seized various items. Ellis, ¶ 45. We stated in that case that this after-the-fact consent was ineffective because `to be valid and qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement, a consent must precede a search.' Ellis, ¶ 45 (quoting State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 216, 951 P.2d 971, 980 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hendricks, 2003 MT 223, 317 Mont. 177, 75 P.3d 1268). We further stated that `to be lawful, a search and seizure must be justified from the beginning.' Ellis, ¶ 45 (quoting Hubbel, 286 Mont. at 216, 951 P.2d at 981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). ¶ 44 Inevitable discovery applies when the investigatory procedures were already in progress prior to the illegal search. Ellis, ¶ 55 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (two hundred volunteers were already searching the area where the defendant had abandoned his victim's body before the defendant gave an illegally obtained statement about the exact location of the body); State v. Adkins, 2009 MT 71, 349 Mont. 444, 204 P.3d 1 (imminent probation search of residence inevitably would have led to discovery of drugs); State v. Lacey, 2009 MT 62, 349 Mont. 371, 204 P.3d 1192 (defendant's computer containing images of defendant sexually abusing his girlfriend's minor daughter was not searched based on girlfriend's consent, but pursuant to a federal search warrant); Dickinson, ¶¶ 3-7 (upon speaking with the occupants of a hotel room on another matter, officers observed through the open door the presence of weapons; the officers first secured the room and the weapons before applying for a search warrant); State v. Notti, 2003 MT 170, 316 Mont. 345, 71 P.3d 1233 (multiple DNA databases matching the defendant to another crime were already established before the search)). ¶ 45 Here, the evidence seized from Pearson's fanny pack was not the inevitable product of a legal probationary search already in progress. The District Court's reasoning to the contrary assumes a post-search authorization can cure the illegality of the search, but the inevitable discovery doctrine is not meant to justify law enforcement's decision to not follow proper procedure. ¶ 46 The State argues here that it would have searched the fanny pack legally had they not already searched it illegally. We stated in Ellis that [a]llowing the introduction of evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case would `amount to the unacceptable assertion that police would have done it right had they not done it wrong.' Ellis, ¶ 57 (quoting State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 84 P.3d 456, 469 (2004)); see also State v. Topanotes, 76 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Utah 2003) (the argument that `if we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it right' . . . is far from compelling) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir.1992)).