Opinion ID: 538506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegations of fraud.

Text: 32 As its second line of defense River Villa alleges fraud on the part of Landry, Sidney Fazio, and A. Larry Tullos, Sun Belt's former president. River Villa alleges that Landry fraudulently misrepresented the number of properties that it would receive in the property exchange in order to induce the partners to execute the powers of attorney. River Villa's allegations that it was defrauded by Fazio and Tullos are extrapolated from the fact that the two were convicted, and Fazio was sued by FSLIC, as a consequence of an unrelated transaction involving different companies, for making false entries to conceal violations of the loan-to-one-borrower rule. The district court found that River Villa had presented no summary judgment evidence of fraud to preclude a ruling in favor of FSLIC. River Villa argues that its allegations presented a genuine issue of material fact that should have vitiated summary judgment, at least until further discovery could be had. 10 33 Any issue of fact arising out of River Villa's allegations of fraud is rendered nugatory by the D'Oench doctrine as expanded in Langley v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 108 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987). 11 In Langley, the Supreme Court, interpreting 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e), held that misrepresentations therein constituted conditions to payment of a note and were precluded by the concerns underlying D'Oench and its codification from being asserted against the FDIC as a defense to its recovery on a debt. Following Langley, we have held that misrepresentations to borrowers cannot be asserted as a defense to recovery by FSLIC on facially unqualified loan documents. See Murray, 853 F.2d at 1255; Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Lafayette Invest. Properties, 855 F.2d at 198. 34 River Villa argues, nonetheless, that its partners were victims of fraud in the factum, which, it contends, Langley recognized as an exception to the D'Oench doctrine. This argument is misdirected, both legally and factually. Langley concerned misrepresentations that amounted to fraud in the inducement. We previously have declined to read dictum therein as creating an exception to D'Oench for allegations of fraud in the factum. See Templin, 867 F.2d at 242. Were we to assume the existence of such an exception, however, the fraudulent acts alleged by River Villa would not be fraud in the factum; they would constitute fraud in the inducement. Fraud in the factum occurs when a party signs a document without full knowledge of the 'character or essential terms' of the instrument. Templin, 867 F.2d at 242 (citation omitted). 12 River Villa does not allege, nor could it, that its partners did not know that they were signing powers of attorney in favor of Landry. Rather, it maintains that Landry lied to the partners to induce them to sign what they admittedly knew to be powers according Landry broad discretion. Such clearly falls within the scope of Langley.C. River Villa's Motion to File a Compulsory Counterclaim 35 Finally, River Villa contends that the district court erred in refusing to grant its motion for leave to file a compulsory counterclaim alleging misrepresentation in connection with the property exchange and loan transaction. The district court denied the motion as untimely. We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in so ruling. River Villa offered this motion six months after moving for summary judgment, five and one-half months after the FSLIC moved for summary judgment, six weeks after the court's ruling on these motions, and almost three years after Sun Belt first filed suit. The motion was untimely filed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(f); Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.1976). 36 The judgment of the district court is in all respects AFFIRMED.