Opinion ID: 1138809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Grazing Permit Regulations

Text: The majority opinion of the Court of Appeal rests on the premise that the federal government has paramount authority to determine whether an interest in real property is created in federal lands. Because title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 222.3(b) (1989) (section 223.3(b)) states that [g]razing permits and livestock use permits convey no right, title, or interest held by the United States in any lands or resources, the Court of Appeal reasoned that defendant did not possess an interest in land for the purposes of section 846. (2b) It is true that the holder of a federal grazing permit is, for the purpose of eminent domain proceedings, a licensee without compensable property rights. ( Osborne v. United States (9th Cir.1944) 145 F.2d 892, 895-896; Tidwell v. State ex rel. Herman (1973) 21 Ariz. App. 3 [514 P.2d 1260, 1262-1263]; Acton v. United States (9th Cir.1968) 401 F.2d 896, 899, cert. den. 395 U.S. 945 [23 L.Ed.2d 463, 89 S.Ct. 2018].) But section 222.3(b), relied on by the Court of Appeal, merely ensures that the holder of a grazing permit does not acquire rights in federal land which are compensable in a Fifth Amendment taking context. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; United States v. Cox (10th Cir.1951) 190 F.2d 293, 296, cert. den. 342 U.S. 867 [96 L.Ed.2d 652, 72 S.Ct. 107]; Placer County Water Agency v. Jonas (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 691, 696 [80 Cal. Rptr. 252].) Applying a recreational use immunity statute to grazing permit holders does not undermine this purpose. More specifically, applying section 846 in this case would not have the effect of limiting or restricting any right, title or interest of the United States in the land involved. As the dissent in the Court of Appeal persuasively and, in our view, correctly argued, the limitation of an interest in federal lands for purposes of avoiding compensation in eminent domain need not be extended to preclude finding a property interest for purposes of a state immunity statute. (3) California recognizes that lack of an interest in property for purposes of compensation is nonetheless compatible with a recognizable interest for other legislative purposes. For example, [t]he concept of `property interests' for taxation purposes is entirely different from that of compensable interests in eminent domain. ( Placer County Water Agency v. Jonas, supra, 275 Cal. App.2d at 698.) This concept has been applied to federal grazing permits. ( Board of Supervisors v. Archer, supra, 18 Cal. App.3d at 725-726.) More significantly, a license to do an act or acts on private property has been held to constitute a property interest for section 846 immunity purposes (see Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1987) 194 Cal. App.3d 1306, 1312-1314 [240 Cal. Rptr. 142] [license or easement to place utility poles]; O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., supra, 97 Cal. App.3d 903, 911 [license to pile dirt]), despite the fact that California eminent domain law, like federal law, declares licenses to be noncompensable in eminent domain proceedings. ( People ex rel. Dept. Public Works v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp. (1966) 245 Cal. App.2d 309, 314 [53 Cal. Rptr. 902]; People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Lundy (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 354, 358 [47 Cal. Rptr. 694]; Eastman v. Piper (1924) 68 Cal. App. 554, 560-564 [229 P. 1002].) (2c) We conclude that the Court of Appeal was in error when it found section 222.3(b) and related federal provisions to be determinative when construing section 846. The phrase interest in real property should not be given a narrow or technical interpretation that would frustrate the Legislature's intention in passing and amending section 846. ( In re Smith (1928) 88 Cal. App. 464, 467 [263 P. 555].) Rather, we believe section 846 should be construed so as to effect the intention of the Legislature in its enactment. ( Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. County of Riverside (1989) 48 Cal.3d 84, 95 [255 Cal. Rptr. 670, 767 P.2d 1148]; People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 526 [153 Cal. Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485]; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40 [127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322].) The Court of Appeal discusses the case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 145 Cal. App.3d 253, as support for the proposition that section 846 was not intended to immunize owners of interests in land not subject to closure to recreation. But Pacific Gas & Electric Co. is inapposite. In that case, plaintiff, boating on Shasta Lake, was injured when his aluminum mast came into contact with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (P.G. & E.) power lines overhanging the water. P.G. & E. owned the land over which its power lines ran, subject to a perpetual right of the federal government to overflow the property with water impounded by Shasta dam. Finding section 846 inapplicable to immunize P.G. & E., the court first held that because plaintiff's injury took place, not on the P.G. & E. land underneath the lake, but on the navigable waters of Lake Shasta, there was no entry or use of the P.G. & E. premises by plaintiff within the meaning of that statute. (145 Cal. App.3d at p. 257.) The court reasoned alternatively that because all navigable waterways are held in trust by the state for the benefit of the public, and because plaintiff as a member of the public had a right to navigate the lake in his boat, the legislative purpose of section 846 would not be served by applying the statutory immunity to P.G. & E. as against persons using the public waterways whom it had no right to exclude. ( Id. at pp. 258-259; see also Charpentier v. Von Geldern (1987) 191 Cal. App.3d 101 [236 Cal. Rptr. 233] [explaining Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra ].) However, as we have explained previously, the legislative intent in amending section 846 was to immunize owners of any interest in real property, regardless of whether the interest includes the right of exclusive possession. Thus, to the extent that the Court of Appeal in Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 145 Cal. App.3d 253, relied on P.G. & E.'s lack of a right to exclude recreational users as a basis for denying the immunity of section 846, it is disapproved. As previously discussed, the Legislature clearly intended, when amending section 846, to immunize private owners of easements and of revocable licenses from tort liability to recreational users. Although the land in question in this case is publicly owned and evidently already open to the public for recreational purposes, it does not follow that application of section 846 would fail to serve a legislative purpose. As we have seen, the Legislature in amending section 846 clearly expressed its intention to expand the statutory immunity to the holder of an interest in real property irrespective of his right to exclude the plaintiff or other third parties. (See also Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 737, 749 [140 Cal. Rptr. 905].) (4) (See fn. 3.), (2d) We hold, therefore, that the holder of a permit to graze livestock on federal lands in California is an owner of an interest in real property sufficient to come within the immunity afforded by section 846. [3]