Opinion ID: 2622770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does WEA's Hudson process satisfy RCW 42.17.760's requirement of affirmative authorization?

Text: ¶ 16 Enacted in 1992 as part of Initiative 134 (I-134), the Fair Campaign Practices Act, § 760 restricts the ability of unions to use for political purposes the agency fees paid by employees who have not joined the union. Laws of 1993, ch. 2, §§ 1-36. RCW 42.17.760 provides: A labor organization may not use agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the organization to make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual. WEA argues that the Hudson process satisfies the requirement of affirmative authorization because it provides each individual nonmember the opportunity to object, to obtain a refund, and to prevent fees from being used by WEA, even temporarily, for political purposes. The State contends that the plain language of the statute makes clear that each individual nonmember must provide actual consent and that failure to respond to the Hudson packet does not constitute consent. ¶ 17 Prior to this suit, no court had construed the affirmative authorization requirement of § 760. The PDC, the agency charged with implementing the PDA, had not issued any regulations interpreting § 760 or brought any enforcement actions concerning § 760. In addition, despite several requests that the PDC provide guidance to labor organizations on how to comply with § 760's affirmative authorization requirement, the PDC had not given any direction. ¶ 18 In interpreting an initiative, the court looks at the voters intent and the language of the initiative as the average informed lay voter would interpret it. In re Estate of Hitchman, 100 Wash.2d 464, 467, 670 P.2d 655 (1983). Words are given their ordinary meaning. Wash. State Coalition for the Homeless v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 133 Wash.2d 894, 905, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997). If the language used is fairly susceptible to more than one interpretation, the statute is ambiguous. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Revenue, 88 Wash.App. 632, 636, 946 P.2d 409 (1997). If the statute is ambiguous, the intent of the electorate may be ascertained from the language of the initiative as well as the official voters pamphlet. State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 763, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). ¶ 19 Because § 760 does not define affirmative authorization, it is unclear whether the Hudson process satisfies the authorization requirement. The plain language seems to indicate a nonmember must provide an expression of positive authorization. Failure to respond to the Hudson packet may be considered acquiescence, but it would not fulfill the affirmative authorization requirement. The difference is that affirmative authorization seems to indicate that the member must say yes, instead of failing to say no. ¶ 20 In this case, the language of the voters pamphlet does not assist us because it also fails to clarify the term affirmative authorization and fails to identify what type of authorization was intended. Indeed, the voters pamphlet describes the requirement as individual authorization, not affirmative authorization. ¶ 21 The State admits that § 760 does not require written authorization. We agree, otherwise the statute would have so stated. Where written authorization is required in the chapter, the statute specifies written authorization. Compare the language of § 760, which forbids the use of nonmember fees in support of political activities unless affirmatively authorized by the individual, to the language of RCW 42.17.680(3), which forbids deducting a portion of an employee's wages or salaries for contributions to political committees or for use as political contributions except upon written request of the employee. RCW 42.17.680(3)(emphasis added). Where different language is used in different places within a statute, it is presumed there is a difference in intent. State v. Roberts, 117 Wash.2d 576, 586, 817 P.2d 855 (1991). Therefore, not only does § 760 not require written authorization, we presume that written authorization is not what is intended. ¶ 22 At oral argument, the State was unable to specify what form of authorization would satisfy the requirement of affirmative authorization, except to say that the Hudson process was not sufficient. The State asserts that the voters intended to provide to nonmembers more protection of First Amendment rights than is provided under the Hudson process approved by the Supreme Court. However, the State has failed to provide any evidence of such intent. The single line in the voters pamphlet concerning the agency shop fees provision does not mention either the constitution or the protection of the nonmember. The voters pamphlet's only reference to the current § 760 is the comment that under I-134, agency shop fees could not be used for political purposes without individual authorization. This bare description does not indicate what form the authorization should take or whether the Hudson process satisfies the requirement of affirmative authorization. ¶ 23 We have previously discussed the intent of the voters in passing I-134. For example, we declared that [t]he intent of the people of this State in enacting Initiative 134 can be determined from the declarations in RCW 42.17.610 and .620. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 140 Wash.2d at 637, 999 P.2d 602. Those declarations of intent indicate that the principal thrust of I-134 was to protect the integrity of the election process from the perception that elected officials are improperly influenced by monetary contributions and the perception that individuals have an insignificant role to play. Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wash.2d 245, 293, 4 P.3d 808 (2000) (Talmadge, J., dissenting). Thus, the intent of the statute is to protect the public, not individual employees. Crisman v. Pierce County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 21, 115 Wash.App. 16, 23, 60 P.3d 652 (2002). The requirement of individual authorization does not advance this intent any more than the Hudson process. ¶ 24 Where a statute is ambiguous and this court is able to construe it in a manner which renders it constitutional, the court is obliged to do so. State v. Dixon, 78 Wash.2d 796, 804, 479 P.2d 931 (1971). However, having construed the statute as requiring more than a nonresponse to a Hudson packet, we must next examine the constitutionality of § 760.