Opinion ID: 197017
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: any benefit as consideration for a

Text: violation of a known legal duty as a public servant or party official. Model Penal Code 240.1 (Bribery in Official and Political Matters). While the district court may have rightly concluded that the plaintiffs are not innocent of bribery under the Model Penal Code, we do not think that this fact counsels for the same conclusion under Rhode Island law, since the Code's own commentaries expressly recognize that the Code does not follow Rhode Island law. Part II Model Penal Code and Commentaries 6, n.2 (1980). Moreover, unlike Rhode Island's statute, the Model Penal Code provision contains no requirement that a payor act -15- corruptly. Compare R.I. Gen. Laws 11-7-4 ([n]o person shall corruptly give) (emphasis added) with Model Penal Code 240.1 ([a] person is guilty of bribery . . . if he offers, confers, or agrees to confer upon another).3 The plaintiffs argue that the Model Penal Code's omission of the term corruptly is no mere semantic distinction; rather, it represents a shift from the common law in expanding the scope of bribery sanctions for payors to situations in which the payor does not act corruptly. See generally James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 815, 824 n.41 (1988). We agree. [A] statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law meaning. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1992); United States v. Aguilar, U.S. , , 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2370 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that 3 The federal bribery and gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. 201, does not, by its terms, apply to local officials such as those involved in the instant case, 18 U.S.C. 201(a)(1), although cases have held the statute applicable where local officials administer federally funded programs. See United States v. Vel zquez, 847 F.2d 140, 142 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding deputy sheriff was a public official with respect to federal bribery statute, where county jail was under contract with federal government to supervise federal prisoners); United States v. Gallegos, 510 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (D.N.M. 1981) (ruling state government employee who worked under direct supervision of federal official in administration of federal grant program was public official for purpose of federal bribery statute). But see United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir.) (concluding city administrator who was city employee was not a public official even though he administered model cities program, for which the federal government provided 100% funding), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975). No allegation has been made that the defendants' bribery/extortion scheme was in connection with a federal contract or federal funding. -16- the term 'corruptly' in criminal laws has a long-standing and well-accepted meaning). The term corruptly adds the element of corrupt intent to the crime of bribery. See generally id. at 2370 (endorsing the proposition that [a]n act is done corruptly if it's done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method, with a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to oneself or a benefit of another person); H.R. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1961) (reporting section 201 federal bribery statute) (stating that [t]he word 'corruptly' which is also used in obstruction of justice statutes (18 U.S.C. 15031505) means with wrongful or dishonest intent). We agree that the term corruptly indicates a specific corrupt intent that differs from the Model Penal Code commentary's condemnation of an involuntary payor's conduct as manifesting a degree of cooperation in the undermining of governmental integrity that is inconsistent with the complete exoneration from criminal liability. Model Penal Code 240.1 commentary at 41. The mens rea implicated by corruptly concerns the intention to obtain ill-gotten gain; by contrast, the Model Penal Code converts the lack of willpower to stand up to abusive authority into a degree of culpability. See Lindgren, supra at 824 n.41 (stating that [t]he Model Penal Code has taken the questionable approach of making it bribery to capitulate to an extortion threat). Admittedly, to delve into questions of what is done corruptly is more difficult than to apply the -17- Model Penal Code's standard. But as one commentator has noted, [t]he best that can be said for the [Model Penal Code's bribery] provision is that it makes difficult questions of crime definition easy, but this clarity is bought at the cost of ignoring the settled law of centuries and current notions of right and wrong. Id. As a result, we must apply the common law standard of specific corrupt intent, as included in the Rhode Island statute, to the plaintiffs' story. The plaintiffs claim that they paid only to avoid adverse consequences, that their properties met the standards required for the approvals in question, and that they received nothing beyond fair treatment from payees. Examining these claims with an eye towards detecting corrupt intent, we think that a set of facts could be found from which it could be reasonably inferred that the plaintiffs did not make payments voluntarily to bring about an unlawful result, with the hope of a gain for themselves, but rather that they were the innocent victims of a criminal enterprise. As a result, we conclude that Rhode Island's bribery statute does not foreclose a conclusion that they are innocent parties. Citing United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150 (1st Cir. 1993) and United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1976), the defendants assert that we have previously held that bribery and extortion are not mutually exclusive concepts, Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1159; Hathaway, 534 F.2d at 395. However, we think these cases unavailing for three reasons. First, -18- neither deals with Rhode Island's bribery statute. Second, even if these cases compelled us to conclude that bribery and coercive extortion are not mutually exclusive concepts under the Rhodes Island statute, in the instant case a genuine issue of material fact remains as to the plaintiffs' intent in making payments, based on a reading of the pleadings in the best light for the plaintiffs. Third, and finally, Mariano, at least, involved two defendants who pled guilty to corruptly giv[ing] . . . [some]thing of value to local government officials with intent to influence or reward those officials, where the officials were part of a governmental unit that received substantial federal subsidies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2). Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1153. On appeal, both defendants challenged the district court's application of the sentencing guideline relating to bribery rather than the guideline appropriate to providing an illegal gratuity. Id. at 1159. They argued that they were victims, not perpetrators, of an extortionate scheme, and that they received nothing extra in return. Id. Applying the clearly erroneous standard of review, we concluded that the guideline analogy chosen by the district court was well within its purview, noting that when there are two plausible views of the record, the sentencing court's adoption of one such view cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. at 1160; see United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1992). In particular, we noted that the Mariano defendants could not expect the courts to -19- swallow their tale uncritically. Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1160. In this case, the district court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs' case before it had a chance to swallow, let alone digest, their story. At this stage of the game, since one plausible view is that the plaintiffs were in fact victims of coercive extortion, and since they have not pled guilty to a crime that involves corrupt intent as an element as we noted of the defendants in Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1159, we conclude that the plaintiffs in the instant case may press on with their claim. As a result, we reverse the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' federal RICO claims. Accordingly, we also reverse the district court's dismissal for lack of supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. 1367, of state RICO claims pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 7-15-2, 7-15-3 and 9-1-2.4 We remand both federal and state RICO claims for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 4 Similar to federal RICO, R.I. Gen. Laws 7-15-2(c) provides that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt. Rhode Island law also uses broad standing language that resembles that of 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) in its provision for civil liability for racketeering offenses. See R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-2 (stating that [w]henever any person shall suffer any injury . . . by reason of the commission of any crime or offense . . . he [or she] may recover his [or her] damages for such injury in a civil action against the offender) (emphasis added). -20- Because we conclude that even if RICO's civil remedies were limited to innocent parties, we would apply Rhode Island law to the question of the plaintiffs' innocence, and Rhode Island law compels a reversal of the district court's dismissal of their claims, we leave for a later time the question of whether those who are not innocent parties can be denied civil RICO remedies.