Opinion ID: 2341882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Ring v. Arizona and Apprendi v. New Jersey

Text: Ring and Apprendi entitle a capital defendant to a jury determination of the facts on which eligibility for a death sentence is predicated. In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455 (2000), the Supreme Court held that regardless of the labeling by a State, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court made clear that the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict? Id. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365, 147 L.Ed.2d at 457. In Ring, the Supreme Court held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional because under that statute, a judge, rather than a jury, was required to determine the existence of an aggravating factor, thereby making the factual findings prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty following a jury determination of a defendant's guilt of first degree murder. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d at 576-77. The Court held that the Arizona statute violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Id. The Court expressly overruled Walton in favor of Apprendi's Sixth Amendment approach, reasoning that [c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Id. at 589, 122 S.Ct. at 2432, 153 L.Ed.2d at 564. The Court concluded that the Arizona statute was invalid because the enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' and therefore the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d at 577 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 n. 19, 147 L.Ed.2d at 457 n. 19). Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion in Borchardt that Apprendi has no application to death penalty sentencing proceedings, the Supreme Court applied the Apprendi holding that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be `expose[d] ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.' Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89, 122 S.Ct. at 2432, 153 L.Ed.2d at 564 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. at 2359, 147 L.Ed.2d at 450). The Ring Court pointed out that every fact that the legislature requires before death may be imposed be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reiterated that the dispositive question... `is one not of form, but of effect.' Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. at 2439, 153 L.Ed.2d at 572 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365, 147 L.Ed.2d at 457). The Court stated: If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.