Opinion ID: 2508644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Was Daniels' Conviction of Endangering a Child Supported by Sufficient Evidence?

Text: Finally, Daniels argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of endangering a child. Daniels was charged in a single count with endangering both D.D. and Dante in violation of K.S.A. 21-3608. The jury was instructed that in order to find Daniels guilty, it must find [t]hat the defendant intentionally and unreasonably caused or permitted Dante and [D.D.] to be placed in a situation in which there was a reasonable probability that Dante and [D.D.'s] life, body or health would be injured or endangered. The Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Daniels endangered D.D. because D.D. stayed in the car and there was no evidence that he was a party to the discussion about the robbery or that he witnessed it. The Court of Appeals understandably reached a different conclusion as to whether Daniels endangered Dante, since Daniels asked Dante to participate in the robbery. Slip op. at 24. The Court of Appeals also stated that any multiple acts problem arising out of the charging of a single count of child endangerment which included factual allegations as to both Dante and D.D. was resolved because the jury was given a unanimity instruction. Finally, the Court of Appeals stated that any error was harmless because, if the jury believed that Daniels endangered D.D., it must also have believed that Daniels endangered Dante. Slip op. at 25. In her petition for review, Daniels argues this was not a multiple acts case; therefore, the fact that the jury was given a unanimity instruction was irrelevant. Daniels argues that because the evidence was insufficient to establish that she endangered D.D., her conviction must be vacated. In a multiple acts case, several acts are alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged. In such a case, the jury must be unanimous as to which act constitutes the crime. To ensure jury unanimity, either the jurors must be instructed that all of them must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt or the State must be required to elect the particular act upon which it will rely. State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 289-90, 875 P.2d 242 (1994). The problem in this case is most aptly described as duplicity: A complaint which charges two separate and distinct offenses in a single count is duplicitous. Duplicity is the joinder of two or more separate and distinct offenses in the same count, not the charging of a single offense involving a multiplicity of ways and means of action. Duplicitous charging is bad practice because it confuses the defendant as to how he or she must prepare a defense, and it confuses the jury. State v. Anthony, 257 Kan. 1003, Syl. ¶ 9, 898 P.2d 1109 (1995). In this case, Daniels was alleged to have committed a single criminal act, the planning of an aggravated robbery, which endangered both D.D. and Dante. Because there were two different victims involved, the State could have charged Daniels with two separate counts of child endangerment. The remedy for duplicity is not dismissal of the count, but rather to require the State to elect upon which act it will rely. State v. Hammond, 4 Kan. App. 2d 643, 646-47, 609 P.2d 1171, rev. denied 228 Kan. 807 (1980) (citing 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 145 [1969]). As this court explained in State v. Campbell, 217 Kan. 756, 778, 539 P.2d 329 (1975), [t]he vice of duplicity is that the jury is unable to convict of one offense and acquit of another offense where both are contained in the same count. Clearly, that was the potential problem in this case. The jury could not convict Daniels of endangering one child but acquit her of endangering the other because both offenses were contained in the same count. If the jury instruction had charged Daniels with endangering D.D. or Dante, then it would be impossible to determine which charge the jury had agreed upon. However, as instructed, we have the required assurance of jury unanimity. The jury was instructed that it must find that Daniels endangered both Dante and D.D. Since a jury is generally presumed to have followed the instructions given by the trial court ( State v. Fulton, 269 Kan. 835, 842, 9 P.3d 18 [2000]), we conclude that the jury found Daniels guilty of endangering both D.D. and Dante. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support Daniels' conviction of endangering D.D. K.S.A. 21-3608 defines the crime of endangering a child as intentionally and unreasonably causing or permitting a child under the age of 18 years to be placed in a situation in which the child's life, body or health may be injured or endangered. In State v. Sharp, 28 Kan. App. 2d 128, 135, 13 P.3d 29 (2000), the Court of Appeals concluded that there must be a reasonable probability that the harm will result or the child will be placed in imminent peril. The pattern instruction, PIK Crim. 3d 58.10, which was followed in this case, was modified to reflect this standard. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could reach the conclusion that both children were endangered. Daniels planned the participation of one minor in the crime and the other, D.D., was in the car during the commission of numerous acts which were the basis of the charges that Daniels aided and abetted and conspired to commit the crime of aggravated robbery, a crime defined by our legislature as inherently dangerous (see K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3436), including transporting the assailants to the alleyway where the aggravated robbery occurred. Affirmed.