Opinion ID: 804585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tello

Text: Tello elected to plead guilty to the RICO conspiracy charge set forth in Count Two in a written plea agreement. In his plea agreement, he also acknowledged responsibility for two crimes committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy: (1) the July 2002 shooting attack on rival Mexican Posse gang members Rene Carmona, Daniel Carmona, and Pedro Gaona; and (2) the October 2004 sexual assault on a minor female. The first of these incidents was among the predicate acts of racketeering attributed to Tello in Count One of the indictment (the substantive RICO charge) but the second was not. Tello argues that his guilty plea (and thus his conviction) is invalid because the sexual assault charge referenced in his plea agreement was not one of the predicate acts of racketeering identified in the indictment. Tello assumes that the predicate acts of racketeering attributed to him in Count One became part of the RICO conspiracy alleged in Count Two and served to delineate the parameters of that conspiracy. His plea agreement, however, acknowledged only one of the three predicate acts attributed to him in Count One and added a second that was never mentioned in the 12 Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 indictment. Thus, in Tello’s view, there was a disparity between the RICO conspiracy alleged in the indictment and the one described in his plea agreement, with the result that he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy different from the one with which he was charged. Although Tello does not use the term “constructive amendment,” his argument is, in essence, a contention that the plea proceeding (including both the plea agreement and the change-of-plea hearing) constructively amended the conspiracy charge and thereby violated Tello’s Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury on all charges for which he is held to answer. U.S. C ONST. amend. 5; see United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140, 105 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (1985); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S. Ct. 270, 273 (1960); United States v. Haskins, 511 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2007).2 Tello believes his guilty plea is invalid by reason of the disparity, and he seeks 2 Because the plea agreement omitted mention of two of the predicate acts mentioned in the indictment, one might argue that the omission constituted a narrowing of the charged conspiracy and thus a variance from the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Rosin, 892 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1990) (variance narrows charges in indictment, whereas constructive amendment broadens bases for conviction by establishing offense not fully contained within indictment). However, because the plea agreement also references a predicate act not alleged in the indictment, and because it is Tello’s contention that he pled guilty to an offense distinct from the one with which he was charged, we view the constructive amendment doctrine as the one most appropriate to the argument Tello is making. Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 13 to have his plea and conviction set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. Because Tello failed to raise this issue below and did not ask the district court for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, our review is for plain error. E.g., United States v. Perez, 673 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Griffin, 521 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2008). Under the plain error standard of review, we will reverse the district court’s judgment only if we find: (1) an error or defect (2) that is clear or obvious (3) affecting the defendant’s substantial rights (4) and seriously impugning the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Perez, 673 F.3d at 669 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 2010)). In the present context, a plain error is one that raises a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty absent the error. E.g., Griffin, 521 F.3d at 730. To understand why Tello’s argument fails, it is necessary to appreciate the distinction between the substantive RICO charge set forth in Count One of the indictment—to which Tello did not plead guilty—and the racketeering conspiracy charge set forth in Count Two—to which he did plead guilty. Count One alleged a violation of section 1962(c). That section of the statute makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern 14 Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 of racketeering activity . . . .” In short, section 1962(c) makes it a crime to operate or manage an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961, 963-64 (7th Cir. 2000) (construing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993)). The statute in turn defines a pattern of racketeering activity to require at least two acts of racketeering activity committed within a ten-year period. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). To be guilty of the substantive 1962(c) offense, then, an individual must, among other things, participate in two or more predicate acts of racketeering. § 1962(c); see Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 62-63, 118 S. Ct. 469, 476 (1997); United States v. Flemmi, 245 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 93 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Vaccaro, 115 F.3d 1211, 1220 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 155354 (11th Cir. 1995). Count Two, by contrast, charged Tello with conspiring to conduct the affairs of the Latin Kings through a pattern of racketeering, in violation of section 1962(d). Whereas subsections (a) through (c) of section 1962 are aimed at substantive RICO offenses, subsection (d) is aimed at the unlawful agreement to commit one of the substantive offenses identified in the preceding subsections, see United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1484 (7th Cir. 1993); and in this case, Count Two alleged that Tello and his codefendants had conspired to violate subsection (c). In order to establish Tello’s guilt on Count Two, it was not necessary to show that he Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 15 actually conducted the affairs of the Latin Kings, or participated in the conduct of those affairs, through a pattern of racketeering activity comprising at least two predicate acts of racketeering. That would have been the proof necessary to establish Tello’s guilt on Count One, which alleged a substantive RICO offense. But the section 1962(d) conspiracy provision, unlike section 1962(c), is not a substantive RICO offense. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d at 1484; see also United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1991). It punishes the agreement to commit such an offense. Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 731 (7th Cir. 1998), modified in other respects by Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 965; Glecier, 923 F.2d at 500. A section 1962(d) conspiracy charge thus does not require proof that the defendant committed two predicate acts of racketeering, Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63, 65-66, 118 S. Ct. at 476, 478, that he agreed to commit two predicate acts, ibid., or, for that matter, that any such acts were ultimately committed by anyone, id. at 63, 118 S. Ct. at 476 (noting that section 1962(d) includes “no requirement of some overt act or specific act”); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 959 (7th Cir. 1996). Tello’s appeal fails to recognize this distinction. His argument, focused as it is on the difference between the predicate acts referenced in the indictment and those identified in his plea agreement, presumes that proof of at least two specific predicate acts of racketeering that he committed (or agreed to commit) was a prerequisite to his conviction for racketeering conspiracy under section 1962(d). This is the very presumption that the Supreme Court in Salinas described as 16 Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 “wrong.” 522 U.S. at 63, 118 S. Ct. at 476. In order to convict a defendant under section 1962(d), the government need only prove that he agreed that some member(s) of the conspiracy would commit two or more predicate acts, not that the defendant himself committed or agreed to commit such acts. United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 776 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65-66; 118 S. Ct. at 478), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1051, 1054, 1612, 1986 (2012); United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Glecier, 923 F.2d at 500 (“Neither overt acts nor specific predicate acts that the defendant agreed personally to commit need be alleged or proved for a section 1962(d) offense.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[S]ection 1962(d) [is] broad enough to encompass those persons who, while intimately involved in the conspiracy, neither agreed to personally commit nor actually participated in the commission of the predicate crimes.”), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1336-37 (7th Cir. 1996); DeGuelle v. Camilli, 664 F.3d 192, 204 (7th Cir. 2011); Goren, 156 F.3d at 731. Tello’s understanding of RICO conspiracy is one that improperly attempts to import the requirements of the substantive offense set forth in subsection (c) of the statute into the conspiracy offense identified in subsection (d), by demanding that each named defendant agree to commit at least two predicate acts of racketeering himself. Those acts in turn would become essential elements of the charged conspiracy, thus giving rise to the type of argument Tello is making in this appeal. But Tello’s understanding would sever section 1962(d) from Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 17 its roots in traditional conspiracy law. See Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 497. Ordinary conspiracy principles require only that the conspirators embrace a common criminal objective. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. King, 627 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, the agreed-to goal would be that the affairs of the enterprise would be carried out through a pattern of two or more racketeering acts committed by some member or members of the conspiracy. See Quintanilla, 2 F.3d at 1484-85; see also Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 967 (defendant must knowingly agree to perform services of a kind which facilitate the activities of those who operate the enterprise). Requiring an agreement by each conspirator to commit two predicate acts himself would require a degree of personal involvement in the offense that is unprecedented in conspiracy law. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 497-98. Indeed, by making the commission of two or more predicate acts by each conspirator an essential element of the offense, Tello’s understanding of RICO conspiracy would essentially require that a defendant commit the substantive RICO offense set out in subsection (c) of the statute, and thereby render the conspiracy offense set out in subsection (d) a nullity. Glecier, 923 F.2d at 501; see also Quintanilla, 2 F.3d at 1485. That result would be inconsistent with traditional principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337 (2007); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2001). Having in mind the basic distinction between a charge of a substantive RICO violation under section 1962(c) 18 Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 and a conspiracy charge under section 1962(d), we turn our attention to what was alleged in the conspiracy charge set forth in Count Two of the indictment against Tello and his codefendants, and then we will compare those allegations to the facts that Tello admitted in pleading guilty. Our review of Count Two and Tello’s guilty plea necessarily must focus on the essential elements of RICO conspiracy, for it is only a divergence between allegations and proof as to those elements that will result in a constructive amendment of the charge. See Miller, 471 U.S. at 136, 105 S. Ct. at 1815 (“A part of the indictment unnecessary to and independent of the allegations of the offense proved may normally be treated as ‘a useless averment’ that ‘may be ignored.’ ”) (quoting Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 602, 47 S. Ct. 531, 534 (1927)); United States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857-58 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In general, either an amendment or a variance will be allowed to stand if it does not change an ‘essential’ or ‘material’ element of the charge so as to cause prejudice to the defendant.”); see also United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1027 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Williams, 798 F.2d 1024, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1986). For an indictment to adequately set forth the elements of a racketeering conspiracy, it need only charge—after identifying a proper enterprise and the defendant’s association with that enterprise—that the defendant knowingly joined a conspiracy, the objective of which was to operate that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Glecier, 923 F.2d at 500. Here, Count Two of the indictment alleged, in relevant part: Nos. 10-2677 & 10-2933 19 5. At various times relevant to this Indictment, the defendants named in Count Two and others known and unknown, were members and associ- ates of the Latin Kings, a criminal organization whose members and associates engaged in acts of violence, including murder, attempted mur- der, robbery, extortion and distribution of con- trolled substances, and which operated principally on the south side of Milwaukee.