Opinion ID: 4551702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Clarke

Text: A police officer violates the Fourth Amendment if the amount of force he uses in effectuating an arrest is “‘objectively [un]reasonable’ in light of the facts 10 and circumstances confronting” the officer. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). A determination of whether the force used was reasonable “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. “[I]n light of the fact-specific nature of the inquiry on an excessive force claim, granting summary judgment against a plaintiff on such a claim is not appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In denying qualified immunity to Officer Clarke, the district court explained that it “cannot say as a matter of law that the amount of force used by Officer Clarke was objectively reasonable,” Special App. at 11. This conclusion rests on the existence of factual disputes—over Lennox’s attempt to flee and the extent of any physical resistance, as well as the force used by Officer Clarke in effectuating the arrest—that bear on “whether the force used by Officer Clarke was reasonably related to the nature of Lennox’s resistance.” Id. We pause here to review briefly 11 the record facts (both undisputed and, where disputed, in the light most favorable to plaintiff) relevant to each issue. As to the nature and extent of Lennox’s resistance, it is undisputed that in the moments before Officer Clarke brought Lennox to the ground, Officer Clarke had already handcuffed Lennox. Officer Clarke asserts that Lennox tried to pull away from him after he handcuffed her. It is true that Lennox testified that she felt like she tried to pull away from Officer Clarke while she was handcuffed, but she also said that she felt as though she could not do so because Officer Clarke was too strong and that he had no problem controlling her. Testimony that someone felt like she tried to do something but also felt as though she could not does not equate to testimony that she, in fact, did that thing. At this stage in the proceedings we must read Lennox’s testimony as contradicting Officer Clarke’s assertion. This is particularly so because Lennox also testified that “[w]hen [Officer Clarke] grabbed me, there was no movement, I couldn’t move my arms and I had bruises from that,” App. at 199, and she expressly denied that she attempted to flee from Officer Clarke. On the record before us, a reasonable jury could find that Lennox was not physically resisting arrest before she was brought to the ground. 12 There also exist disputes of fact over how much force Officer Clarke used to maintain control over Lennox once she was handcuffed and secured on the ground. See Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The fact that a person whom a police officer attempts to arrest resists, threatens, or assaults the officer no doubt justifies the officer’s use of some degree of force, but it does not give the officer license to use force without limit.”). Officer Clarke denied that he put his body weight on Lennox once she was on the ground, testifying that Lennox “wasn’t being that physically difficult to deal with” at that point. App. at 137. According to Lennox’s version of events, however, Officer Clarke put his full body weight on her, kneeling on her back, and slammed her head into the ground, notwithstanding the fact that she had already been handcuffed and positioned face down. There is also no evidence compelling a conclusion that Lennox physically resisted Officer Clarke once she was handcuffed and on the ground. On this record, a jury could find that Officer Clarke used unreasonable force on an individual who was not resisting arrest and who was secured in such a manner that she posed no threat to public safety. Officer Clarke asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions, even viewed in the light most favorable to Lennox, did not violate “clearly 13 established” law. The operative question thus becomes whether it was clearly impermissible on July 22, 2016 under the circumstances presented for a police officer to use the force that a jury could find Officer Clarke used—that is, when the handcuffed arrestee was not actively resisting arrest—to take down that arrestee, kneel on top of her with his full body weight, and slam her head into the ground. Courts are cautioned not to define clearly established law at “a high level of generality,” and “police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152, 1153 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is not to say that there must be “a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established,” but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. at 1152 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam)). Years before the incident at issue here, we took note of the “well established” principle “that the use of entirely gratuitous force is unreasonable and therefore excessive.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 99 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010). In Tracy, we presumed that “no reasonable officer could have believed that he was entitled to use pepper spray gratuitously against a restrained and unresisting arrestee,” id., an act we held could constitute excessive force. We have noted that, 14 under Tracy, “[i]t is clearly established that officers may not use a taser against a compliant or non-threatening suspect,” Muschette ex rel. A.M. v. Gionfriddo, 910 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2018), even though the precise method of excessive force used in Muschette had not been explicitly proscribed. Id. at 69 n.1 (explaining that “[a]lthough in 2013 there were relatively few excessive force cases involving a taser, novel technology, without more, does not entitle an officer to qualified immunity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And we have not limited potential findings of excessive force to situations where officers were using equipment like pepper spray or tasers. See, e.g., Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing to grant summary judgment in favor of a police officer who allegedly shoved a handcuffed arrestee headfirst into a police car, causing her to strike her head on a part of the car); cf. Muschette, 910 F.3d at 69–70 (citing with approval Garcia v. Dutchess County, 43 F. Supp. 3d 281, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), for the proposition that using “‘significant’ force against arrestees who no longer actively resisted arrest or posed a threat to officer safety” is a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation in the Second Circuit). On July 22, 2016, it was therefore clearly established by our Circuit caselaw that it is impermissible to use significant force against a restrained arrestee who is 15 not actively resisting. Jones v. Treubig, 963 F. 3d 214, 225 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Before the incident at issue here in April 2015, it was clearly established in this Circuit that it is a Fourth Amendment violation for a police officer to use significant force against an arrestee who is no longer resisting and poses no threat to the safety of officers or others.”); cf. Brown v. City of New York, 862 F.3d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 2017) (upholding grant of qualified immunity to officers who used force against an actively resisting, non-handcuffed arrestee and distinguishing cases where force was found impermissible because police were either not attempting to overcome resistance to arrest or the arrestee was already secured). As Muschette suggests, and as we have recently explained in great detail in Jones v. Treubig, this is true despite differences in the precise method by which that force was conveyed. Because a reasonable jury could find that the force used by Officer Clarke was significant and that Lennox was not resisting when such force was used, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that Officer Clarke did not violate clearly established law. The district court thus properly denied Officer Clarke qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings, and we affirm this denial without expressing a view as to Officer Clarke’s ultimate entitlement to judgment in his favor after factual disputes are resolved. 16