Opinion ID: 4525400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Continuing Jurisdiction

Text: {¶ 11} R.C. 4123.52(A) provides, “The jurisdiction of the industrial commission    over each case is continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified.” This continuing jurisdiction is limited and may be invoked only when there is evidence of “(1) new and changed circumstances, (2) fraud, (3) clear mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or (5) error by [an] inferior tribunal.” State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 454, 458-459, 692 N.E.2d 188 (1998); see also Tantarelli v. Decapua Ents., Inc., 156 Ohio St.3d 258, 2019-Ohio-517, 125 N.E.3d 850, ¶ 15. {¶ 12} In Belle Tire at ¶ 24, this court explained: R.C. 4123.512[(A)] authorizes a claimant or an employer to appeal an order of the commission to a court of common pleas when the order grants or denies the right to participate in the workers’ compensation system.    Once the right to participate for a specific condition is recognized, no subsequent rulings in the 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO proceeding are appealable except one that terminates the right to participate. (Emphasis added.) An appeal to the court of common pleas must be initiated within 60 days after the date that the commission’s decision was received. R.C. 4123.512(A). {¶ 13} In this case, the Tenth District held that if a commission order involves the right to participate and is therefore appealable to the court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512(A), the commission’s ability to exercise its continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 ceases 60 days after the order was issued, regardless of the existence of any of the five criteria set forth above. 2019-Ohio2579 at ¶ 4, citing State ex rel. Prayner v. Indus. Comm., 2 Ohio St.2d 120, 206 N.E.2d 911 (1965); Todd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 Ohio St.2d 18, 417 N.E.2d 1017 (1981); State ex rel. Gatlin v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 246, 249, 480 N.E.2d 487 (1985). The commission and Vitas argue that in so holding, the Tenth District erred. Neitzelt does not defend the Tenth District’s specific holding and instead argues that after the 60-day period to appeal elapsed, the matter is res judicata but may be reopened on a showing of one of the five criteria justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction. She argues that Vitas failed to establish any of those criteria in this case. {¶ 14} We hold that under the plain language of R.C. 4123.52(A), the commission did not abuse its discretion by invoking its continuing jurisdiction in this case after the time for an appeal under R.C. 4123.512(A) had passed. The Tenth District’s conclusion to the contrary was error, as the authority it relied on— dicta in Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin—failed to account for the difference between an administrative agency’s inherent authority to reconsider its decisions until the time for an appeal has passed and the commission’s express statutory authority 6 January Term, 2020 under R.C. 4123.52(A) to exercise jurisdiction over cases before it on a continuing basis.
{¶ 15} R.C. 4123.52(A) contains a clear and broad grant of continuing jurisdiction to the commission. The statute incorporates some temporal limitations: it provides that no modification, change, finding, or award shall be made “with respect to disability, compensation, dependency, or benefits” after five years from (1) the date of the last payment of medical benefits or compensation, (2) the date of injury if no benefits have been paid, or (3) the date of death. R.C. 4123.52(A). But R.C. 4123.52(A) does not prohibit the commission from exercising continuing jurisdiction over appealable issues after the time for an appeal under R.C. 4123.512(A) has expired. {¶ 16} In Indus. Comm. v. Dell, 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N.E. 669 (1922), this court was asked to determine whether, under former G.C. 1465-86—a prior but materially identical version of R.C. 4123.52(A)—the commission had properly exercised continuing jurisdiction over a right-to-participate decision that had been made one year earlier and that was appealable to the court of common pleas. Dell at 390-394; see also former G.C. 1465-90 (predecessor section to R.C. 4123.512(A)).1 This court observed that G.C. 1465-86 contained a clear, unambiguous, and general grant of power to the commission to revoke an award based on facts affecting the claimant’s right to participate. Dell at 396, 398. We held: By authority of the continuing jurisdiction conferred by section 1465-86, General Code, the Industrial Commission may 1. In 1917, G.C. 1465-90 provided only a 30-day window in which to file an appeal to the court of common pleas. See Indus. Comm. v. Patterson, 12 Ohio App. 180, 31 Ohio C.A. 261 (8th Dist.1918). 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO revoke an award theretofore made, upon ascertainment of any facts going to the basis of the claimant’s right, whenever in its opinion such revocation is justified. (Emphasis added.) Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Under this rule, we concluded that the commission had acted within its authority when it exercised its continuing jurisdiction over the appealable issue in Dell. Id. at 399. {¶ 17} The current statute grants continuing jurisdiction to the commission in language that is as broad, clear, and unambiguous as it was in 1922. The version of G.C. 1465-86 at issue in Dell stated, “The powers and jurisdiction of the [commission] over each case shall be continuing, and it may from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion may be justified.” The current version of R.C. 4123.52(A) states, “The jurisdiction of the industrial commission    over each case is continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified.”2 {¶ 18} No less now than in 1922, the plain language of R.C. 4123.52(A) grants the commission broad authority to exercise its continuing jurisdiction, regardless of the availability of an R.C. 4123.512(A) appeal. The commission may exercise its continuing jurisdiction whenever one or more of the five criteria justifying it is established, subject to (1) the temporal limitations set forth in R.C. 4123.52(A), (2) the rule that the filing of an appeal or an action in mandamus terminates the commission’s continuing jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Rodriguez v. 2. The phrase “from time to time” was dropped from the statute in 1953, when the General Code was recodified as the Revised Code. 1953 Am.H.B. No. 1, Section 1, R.C. 4123.52. But at that time, the legislature specifically stated that its intent was to not make any substantive changes to the law. Former R.C. 1.24, 1953 Am.H.B. No. 1. 8 January Term, 2020 Indus. Comm., 67 Ohio St.3d 210, 213, 616 N.E.2d 929 (1993), and (3) the rule that the commission must exercise its continuing jurisdiction within a reasonable amount of time given the facts of each particular case.3 Under this standard, the Tenth District erred by finding that the commission abused its discretion simply because it exercised its continuing jurisdiction more than 60 days after it had allowed the L4-L5 disc herniation as part of Neitzelt’s claim.
{¶ 19} The cases cited by the Tenth District in support of its erroneous conclusion have their root in a 1962 liquor-control-board case, Diltz v. Crouch, 173 Ohio St. 367, 182 N.E.2d 315 (1962). In Diltz, this court held that the liquor-control board had jurisdiction over its decisions until the institution of an appeal or the expiration of the time for an appeal. Id. at 369. In so holding, this court distinguished orders of the commission from orders of the liquor-control board, stating: Undoubtedly the General Assembly can confer on the Board of Liquor Control a continuing jurisdiction over its orders as it has done in the case of the Industrial Commission. Section 4123.52, Revised Code. But until that action is taken by the General Assembly, this court is not disposed to find in the legislative enactment something that the legislative authority has not provided for. 3. We have generally held that the last requirement means a reasonable amount of time after the discovery of the facts justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 16, 2002-Ohio-7035, 780 N.E.2d 1012, ¶ 14; State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 207, 631 N.E.2d 138 (1994); State ex rel. Gordon v. Indus Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 469, 472, 588 N.E.2d 852 (1992), citing Gatlin, 18 Ohio St.3d 246, 480 N.E.2d 487. Neitzelt does not argue that the time was unreasonable, and Vitas acted within ten days of Dr. Rozen’s report. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Emphasis added.) Id. at 370. {¶ 20} The cases that the Tenth District cited, however, overlooked this distinction and restated Diltz’s holding in cases involving the commission. This court’s opinion in Prayner, 2 Ohio St.2d 120, 206 N.E.2d 911, consisted of one sentence: “The Industrial Commission has control over its orders until the actual institution of an appeal therefrom or until the expiration of the time for such an appeal.” And this court’s opinion in Todd, 65 Ohio St.2d at 19, 417 N.E.2d 1017, repeated Prayner’s mistake. And in Gatlin, this court held, “Regardless of the existence of a legislatively prescribed court appeal, the Industrial Commission has inherent power to reconsider its order for a reasonable period of time absent statutory or administrative regulations restricting the exercise of reconsideration.” (Emphasis added.) 18 Ohio St.3d at syllabus, 480 N.E.2d 487, citing Todd. Thus, each of these cases overlooked Diltz’s distinction between an administrative agency’s inherent power and the commission’s express statutory power. {¶ 21} Moreover, in Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin, the statements implying that the commission would lack control over its order after the time for filing an appeal were unnecessary to those decisions. Prayner and Todd both involved exercises of continuing jurisdiction that occurred within the 60-day appeal period. Prayner at 120 (affirming the denial of a request for writ vacating the exercise of continuing jurisdiction); Todd at 20. And Gatlin involved an exercise of continuing jurisdiction over an issue that was not appealable to the court of common pleas. Id. at 247-249. {¶ 22} We distinguish as dicta and disapprove the statements in Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin regarding the commission’s ability to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over appealable issues after the time for an appeal to the court of common pleas has expired. See Denison Univ. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 2 Ohio St.2d 17, 28, 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965) (distinguishing and disapproving dicta, while overruling holdings in other cases). 10 January Term, 2020