Opinion ID: 1826501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: incapacity

Text: Diane's main argument is that [t]he record does not contain evidence that questions [her] capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning matters of residence, education, legal affairs, vocation or finance which endangers her health or safety. Therefore, she argues, the trial court's conclusion of law adjudicating [her] incapacitated is not supported by the record as a whole. To the extent that Diane's argument concedes a lack of capacity for medical treatment, by omitting medical decisionmaking from her list of capabilities, we agree that complete incapacity has not been proven. To impose a guardianship, the statute directs that the trial court first find, based on clear and convincing evidence, that [t]he proposed ward is an incapacitated person; .... NDCC 30.1-28-04(2)(b)(1). An incapacitated person is any adult person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, or chemical dependency to the extent that the person lacks capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning that person's matters of residence, education, medical treatment, legal affairs, vocation, finance, or other matters, or which incapacity endangers the person's health or safety. NDCC 30.1-26-01(2). (emphasis supplied). One early study of our limited guardianship law identified the important criteria for determining incapacity. The UPC's definition of incapacity, ... directs the attention of the court to a list of causes. This list of causes not only misdirects the attention of the court; it is also unnecessary. The cause of the proposed ward's disability is irrelevant to the determination of whether he actually needs a guardian or a conservator. The need for the appointment of either a guardian or conservator can and should be determined by examining the recent past behavior of the proposed ward, not his status.... Only behavior that actually endangers the life, health, or personal support of the proposed ward justifies the involuntary imposition of a guardianship or conservatorship. Webster, A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D.L.Rev. at 53-54 (footnotes omitted). Within the decade, this refinement, which focuses on an incapacity [that] endangers the person's health or safety, was expressly added to the statutory definition of incapacitated person. 1989 ND Laws ch. 405, § 1 amended NDCC 30.1-26-01(3) to add the phrase, which incapacity endangers the person's health or safety. A legislative proponent explained the intended effect of this 1989 change: DEFINITION OF INCAPACITY REVISIONS BREAK NEW GROUND WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON DETERMINING INCAPACITY. LANGUAGE IN THE CURRENT LAW RELIES ON A DIAGNOSTIC OR MEDICAL MODEL AND REQUIRES SHOWING THE PERSON IS UNABLE FOR VARIOUS VAGUE REASONS TO PROPERLY CARE FOR THEMSELVES. FOCUS WOULD SHIFT ON THE ABILITY OF THE WARD TO MAKE DECISIONS, AND NOT ON WHETHER THE PROPOSED WARD'S DECISIONS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE OR PROPER. THE LAW WOULD REQUIRE THE LEGAL PROCEDURES TO PROVE THE PERSON IS INCAPABLE OF MAKING DECISIONS AND FURTHER, THAT THIS INCAPACITY IS THEN LIKELY TO CAUSE SERIOUS ILLNESS OR INJURY. A GUARDIANSHIP WOULD BE AUTHORIZED FOR THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE FORM OF INTERVENTION CONSISTENT WITH THE ABILITY OF THE WARD FOR SELF-CARE AND SELF-DETERMINATION. See Hearings on HB 1480 Before the House Judiciary Committee, 51st N.D.Leg. (1989) (January 31, 1989 Testimony of Jo Hildebrant, State Long-Term Care Ombudsman). The guardianship must be limited by the effect of the incapacity on the health and safety of the individual. For its finding of incapacity here, the trial court identified only Diane's mental deficiencies since birth. Title 30.1 does not define mental deficiency. Given the relatedness of Diane's condition to the subject of title 25 on the Mentally Ill and Retarded, ..., that title further clarifies the definition. See NDCC 1-01-09 (Whenever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined in any statute, such definition is applicable to the same word or phrase wherever it occurs in the same or subsequent statutes, except when a contrary intention plainly appears.). Presumption of incompetency of a mentally deficient person is prohibited. NDCC 25-01.2-03. NDCC 25-01-01(3) defines [m]entally deficient person as any person, ... other than a mentally ill person, who is so mentally defective as to be incapable of managing that person's affairs and to require supervision, control, and care for that person's own or the public welfare. Read together, the definitions of mental deficiency and incapacity require an incapacity that endangers the person's welfare. By thus focusing upon a proposed ward's behavior, rather than upon a condition, this criterion carries out the legislative intent, expressed in NDCC 30.1-28-04(1), to preserve the maximum self-reliance and independence of the incapacitated person. NDCC 30.1-28-04(1) limits an appointment only to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated person's actual mental and adaptive limitations.... The reports of Diane's evaluations show that Diane's mental deficiencies are neither pervasive nor endangering, except for medical matters. In 1962, a psychologist reported that Diane was suited to the program for the Educable Mentally Retarded. An exhaustive vocational evaluation in 1979 showed that Diane was not anywhere near ready for vocational training, but it recommended that the best program to serve Diane's needs would be a work activity center rather than a work adjustment program. Diane's 1992 Independent Living Skills Evaluation by the Workshop concluded: Diane's major barrier in her life is her emotional instability. Diane should be encouraged to continue working on training to become more knowledgeable of social/sexual skills to focus on using them in every day life. Diane should also continue to learn how to plan an activity of her choice, arrange transportation and attend an activity. If Diane receive[s] support/treatment for her depression, she will be better able to achieve success in living completely independently in the community. Gloria Rixen, a licensed psychologist at the North Central Human Service Center, who treated Diane, testified that Diane would benefit from some assistance in making decisions affecting her access to medical services, but I do not feel that she requires a full guardian. Mary Lou Holliday, Diane's caseworker at the Center for seven years, testified: Q Based on your knowing Diane for the last eight years and your knowledge of what happens in guardianship proceedings..., is it your opinion that Diane needs a full guardianship? A No. Q Is it your opinion that Diane may need some form of a limited guardianship? A Yes. Q And in what area would you feel that? A I have grave concerns about Diane's medical condition. I think that by and large for the most part she can cho[o]se to go to a doctor and the workshop follows through with helping her take her medication. But sometimes when Diane gets so depressed, I think she has difficulty recognizing that she then needs medical help, and maybe it would be best if someone else were able to make that decision. .... Q [G]iven the three choices, no guardian; limited guardian; or full guardian, which one in your opinion would be the most detrimental to Diane's future? A Full guardianship. Q Which one would be the least detrimental? A In my estimation limited. In contrast, the Braatens emphasize Diane's heavy smoking, her relationship with an abusive boyfriend, and her recent hospitalizations for depression as evidence that Diane cannot care for herself, and the main reasons for a general guardianship. The trial court's chief concern seems to have been Diane's health and medical needs. The court may have thought to caution the guardians by suggesting that they allow Diane as much latitude as she can be given to enjoy a lifestyle as she now knows it. Still, the law commands: A grant of limited authority must specify the limitations upon the authority of the guardian or the authority retained by the ward. NDCC 30.1-28-04(5)(part). No limitations were specified in the appointment. Evidence of smoking and an unsuccessful relationship cannot be the basis for finding complete incapacity. Everyone makes bad choices or exercises poor judgment at times. The court-appointed physician reported that, after Diane's depression treatment, [s]he had good eye contact, answered questions readily and had a much improved outlook on life. With supervision, Diane should continue to do well. Far from indicating complete incapacity and the need for a general guardianship, the evidence shows that, with minimal guidance, Diane has the ability to largely live independently. Diane's behavior does, however, clearly evidence her to be so mentally defective as to be incapable of managing her medical affairs and, for that purpose, to require supervision, control and care for [her] own or the public welfare. NDCC 25-01-01(3). For example, Kathy Bartel, a service coordinator for the Workshop, testified that we would be more likely to be successful with Diane if someone were there to make decisions on Diane's behalf when she's not capable of making decisions in her best interests. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Diane is incapacitated for purposes of medical decisionmaking, but its finding of complete incapacity is not supported by convincing evidence, and is clearly erroneous.