Opinion ID: 1882225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Career Offender Statute

Text: Worthy claims that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to a double durational departure pursuant to the career offender statute (COS). See Minn.Stat. § 609.152 (1996). The relevant portion of the COS provides: Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, and the judge is imposing an executed sentence based on a sentencing guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence, the judge may impose an aggravated durational departure from the presumptive sentence up to the statutory maximum sentence if the judge finds and specifies on the record that the offender has more than four prior felony convictions and that the present offense is a felony that was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct. Id. subd. 3. In this case, the court noted on the record that Worthy's prior felony convictions include: (1) possession of a dangerous weapon in 1972; (2) possession of a controlled substance in 1988; (3) receiving stolen property in 1990; (4) receiving stolen property in 1995; and (5) attempted third degree burglary in 1995. Because Worthy's current felony conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree burglary was part of a pattern of criminal conduct, the court sentenced Worthy to a 64-month prison term, which is a double durational departure from the presumptive term. Worthy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a double durational departure because his 1972 conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon is too old to be used for purposes of the COS. Worthy's argument fails under the plain language of the COS which only requires that the offender [have] more than four prior felony convictions. Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3 (emphasis added). The COS does not impose a time limit for includable prior convictions. Indeed, the very term career necessarily implies that the convictions may span over one's lifetime. Therefore, the sentencing court did not err. In conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a continuance; in refusing to provide a substitute attorney; in determining that Worthy and McKinnis validly waived both their right to counsel and their right to be present; or in failing to reappoint the dismissed attorneys. It is Worthy and McKinnis alone who are responsible for the nature of their trial. While the state must reasonably permit criminal defendants to secure legal representation and to remain present in the courtroom, it need not force competent defendants to do so against their will. Reversed.