Opinion ID: 418711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Remedies Short of Termination

Text: 26 Harris's final claim, that other remedies short of terminating appointed counsel should have been employed, is unpersuasive. Harris argues that if it is later determined that he had adequate funds to obtain counsel, the moneys expended by the government could be recovered under the recoupment provision of the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(f), see note 7 supra, and Harris could also be prosecuted for perjury for obtaining counsel through untruthful financial disclosures. As already indicated, however, in Part II of this opinion, in a perjury prosecution the burden would be on the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. also United States v. Pickney, 491 F.Supp. 82, 84 (W.D.Mo.1980) (government failed to demonstrate defendants had available funds under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(f)). And, even after a successful suit for recoupment, the government may not be able to locate and levy upon a defendant's assets. Moreover, as noted earlier, the Act specifically provides for termination of appointed counsel at any point in the proceedings, as the interests of justice may dictate, if the court determines that the defendant is financially able to obtain counsel. While Harris correctly contends that doubts as to eligibility should be resolved in a defendant's favor, a defendant must still prove that he is financially unable to obtain counsel and, if he defaults in that proof, termination is an appropriate remedy. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in choosing that remedy here. 27 We cannot close this opinion without noting the high quality of briefs and arguments on both sides, for which we are grateful. 28 Affirmed.