Opinion ID: 1347493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: In this same vein defendants contend the trial court erred in failing to submit their requested instruction on contributory negligence.

Text: There is no need to repeat the foregoing applicable principles of law. The trial court adopted instruction 2.2 of Uniform Jury Instructions. In this regard see also Clubb v. Osborn, 256 Iowa 1154, 1161, 130 N.W.2d 648. On the other hand we condemned an instruction on contributory negligence comparable to that proposed by these defendants in Clayton v. Blair, 254 Iowa 372, 379, 117 N.W.2d 879. The instruction given sufficed. We find no error in the refusal to submit defendants' proposed instruction on this subject. V. There was also submitted to the jury an instruction on concurrent negligence. Here the trial court closely followed instruction 2.8 prepared by the Iowa State Bar Association Special Committee on Uniform Court Instructions, adapting it to the facts in the case at hand. Defendants claim the court erred in giving this instruction, contending concurrent negligence is not an issue. In large part this assignment of error has already been discussed and determined adverse to defendants. But there are additional authorities supporting our conclusion. In Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829, 834, 107 N.W.2d 682, we said:    the term `joint tort-feasors', which is commonly used, should in fact be `concurrent tort-feasors'   . Then in Mathews v. Beyer, 254 Iowa 52, 57, 116 N.W.2d 477, this court held, each person whose negligence concurs or combines to cause injury to another is liable therefor, questions as to proximate cause and concurrent negligence being peculiarly determinable by the trier of the facts. See also Hardwick v. Bublitz, 254 Iowa 1253, 1266, 119 N.W.2d 886; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 110, page 1179; and 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, section 63, page 715. Upon the basis of the evidence presented and authorities heretofore cited, we find the giving of an instruction on concurrent negligence was not only proper but required. VI. Another error asserted by defendants, closely related to the foregoing, is their claim to the effect the trial court failed to advise the jury as to the relationship between intervening cause and concurrent negligence. This is rather difficult to understand. We fail to find in the record the defendants ever took this position in objecting to the jury instructions. This court has previously held, only the grounds of objections to instructions given which were timely made upon the trial and not abondoned here, may be considered on appeal. See Rule 196, R.C.P.; Ness v. H. M. Iltis Lumber Co., 256 Iowa 588, 592, 128 N.W.2d 237; and Crist v. Iowa State Hwy. Comm., 255 Iowa 615, 628, 123 N.W.2d 424. Finally on this point it is in this jurisdiction well settled, all instructions must be read and considered together. See Tilghman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 253 Iowa 1339, 1350, 115 N.W.2d 165. Defendants have failed to cite and we find no authority supporting the claim of error here concerned. In fact the relationship between intervening cause and concurrent negligence is in this case self-evident when the instructions are read as a whole. VII. We come now to the matter of rescue. For assignment of error on this point defendants allege the trial court erred in failing to withdraw the question of rescue and in overruling their objection to instruction 22 upon that issue. The record discloses defendants' objection to this instruction was as follows: Defendants object to the giving of Instruction No. 22 for the reason that the evidence shows that there was no attempt made to rescue the defendant, Mariann Sue McCalla, by the deceased or anyone else. It is thus apparent defendants, at time of trial and on appeal, have taken the position the rescue doctrine is not an issue in this case and the court erred in submitting an instruction on it. They did not then and do not now challenge the form and content of the instruction as given. Their only claim is, the evidence did not justify giving it. In this connection Rule 196 provides in part:    [W]ithin such time, all objections to giving or failing to give any instruction must be made in writing or dictated into the record,    specifying the matter objected to and on what grounds. No other grounds or objections shall be asserted thereafter, or considered on appeal. (Emphasis supplied) See also Nizzi v. Laverty Sprayers, Inc., Iowa, 143 N.W.2d 312, 315; Oakes v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 258 Iowa 447, 138 N.W.2d 93, 99; Briney v. Tri-State Mutual Grain Dealers Fire Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 673, 688-690, 117 N.W.2d 889; and Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 845-846, 89 N.W.2d 349. So we are here strictly confined to one issue; was there sufficient evidence to justify the giving of an instruction on rescue? Rescue is another phase of intervening force. It also involves proximate cause and contributory negligence, as to which instructions were given in this case. Because of the high regard placed by the law on human life, the term rescue as here applied is sometimes referred to as the humanitarian or good samaritan doctrine. The principle of it is that one who sees a person in imminent and serious peril cannot be charged with contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in risking his own life or serious injury in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not recklessly or rashly made. In other words, in attempting to save the life of another, one is justified in exposing himself to danger in a manner that under other circumstances would deprive him of legal redress for any injury sustained. This doctrine is applied where one is injured or killed while attempting to assist and save another from imminent danger or personal injury or death. It is applicable even though no danger is actually imminent if the conduct of the rescuer is that of an ordinarily prudent person under existing circumstances. And it is not contributory negligence for a person to expose himself to danger in order to rescue another from peril if, under the circumstances, an ordinarily prudent person might so expose himself in order to save another from harm. The test is whether the conduct of the rescuer was natural or whether he acted with reasonable prudence under the peculiar circumstances then existing. In support of the foregoing see Clayton v. Blair, 255 Iowa 700, 123 N.W.2d 896; Clayton v. Blair, 254 Iowa 372, 117 N.W.2d 879; Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 19 A.L.R. 1; Gambino v. Lubel, La.App., 190 So.2d 152; Demetro v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 90 N.J.Super. 308, 217 A.2d 329; Hammonds v. Haven, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 814; Guy v. Blanchard Funeral Home, 85 Ga. App. 823, 70 S.E.2d 117; Restatement, Torts 2d, section 472; 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 124, page 83; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, sections 79-80, pages 738-739, sections 194-195, pages 874-877, sections 228-229, pages 912-915; Annos 53 A.L.R.2d 1002 and 158 A.L.R. 189; Prosser on Torts, Hornbook Series, section 49, pages 360-361; and 27 Iowa L.Rev. 2. Also, whether the conduct of the rescuer was natural under the circumstances whether he acted with reasonable prudence, is in most cases a question to be decided by the jury. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 438, 19 A.L.R. 1; Liming v. Illinios Cent. Ry. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 254, 47 N.W. 66; and editorial comment 166 A.L.R. 752. Defendants would have us adopt a narrow or restricted view and hold, as a matter of law, rescue is not an element in the case at hand. We do not elect to assume this position. Little is to be gained by adding to the acres of paper and streams of ink which have already been devoted to a discussion of the subject at hand. There is sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find, there had been a nighttime accident involving the McCalla vehicle which came to rest near the center of the highway, facing in a southeasterly direction; McComb and his companion were standing beside the stopped Ford pickup; Clara Henneman, a nurse's aide, passed this scene; Mariann's screams could be heard by her; she returned to help calm the hysterical Mariann and get her out of there; the impact of Peterman's car with the McCalla vehicle then occurred; and Mrs. Henneman was so injured as to cause instantaneous death. Under this factual situation a jury issue was created as to the rescue doctrine and the giving of an instruction on it was proper.