Opinion ID: 2041888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: contractual estoppel.

Text: Plaintiffs further contend defendants Parr and McCarthy are estopped from contesting validity of the 1970 regulation because they voluntarily entered into teaching contracts with full knowledge of the above discussed sexually discriminatory provisions contained therein. But in State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Iowa 1971), we said: It is well established, laws having for their purpose the legitimate protection of health, safety, morals and welfare of the people are not constitutionally prohibited. And where, as here, state legislation addressed to that end is reasonable and appropriate, all contracts are subject thereto. See also 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 257; 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 330. Certainly § 105A.7 was enacted for the beneficent purpose of preventing employment-related sex discrimination. It therefore follows the teaching contracts entered into by Parr and McCarthy could not lawfully differentiate on the basis of sex. In effect, however, that is exactly what they did. To this extent, those contracts are of no force or effect. See Cornick v. Southwest Iowa Broadcasting Co., 252 Iowa 653, 656-657, 107 N.W.2d 920 (1961). We therefore conclude neither Mrs. Parr nor Mrs. McCarthy is estopped from asserting the illegality of their respective contracts. See City of Tyndall v. Schuurmans, 74 S.D. 566, 56 N.W.2d 693, 698 (1953); 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 232; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 279.