Opinion ID: 2994924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: Therefore, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED /1 In her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Ms. Ouska named Odie Washington, then the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, as the Respondent in this action. Subsequently, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c), Gwendolyn Thornton replaced Washington as the Respondent; Thornton was later replaced by the present Respondent, Lynn Cahill-Masching. For ease of reference, we shall refer to the Respondent in this opinion as the State. /2 The structure of the convenience store where Te worked was described in detail by John Redmond, a forensic investigator and evidence technician for the Chicago Police Department, who arrived at the store soon after the murder to investigate the scene. See R.7-4 at 102C-103C. The store contained a customer area that patrons entered when they passed through the front entrance. A dividing wall separated this customer area from the rear portion of the store, and there was a small window in the dividing wall where customers received service from store workers, such as Te. The wall included a door that led to the rear of the store; when police arrived after the murder, this door was open, but there was no sign of forced entry. Te’s body was found in the rear portion of the store, approximately 25 feet from the door located in the dividing wall. /3 Ms. Ouska’s trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the police’s search of this bag of clothing. The Appellate Court of Illinois noted that Ms. Ouska voluntarily gave this bag to the police and ruled that the failure of her counsel to file a suppression motion did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. See R.1, Ex.A at 11-12. The validity of this search is not disputed by the parties on appeal. /4 For example, the prosecution noted that the first time that [Martinez’s] name ever pops up to . . . any type of law enforcement personnel, is when she opens her mouth on the stand two and a half years after the murder. R.7-2 at E-70. /5 The district court presumed that Ms. Ouska was not given Miranda warnings during her visit to the police station and observed that there was no contention that this visit, occurring after her release from the hospital, was a custodial interrogation. R.18 at 11 n.1. The court also assumed that Ms. Ouska was given Miranda warnings when she surrendered to police on May 28, 1992. See id. at n.2. The parties do not challenge those assumptions on appeal. /6 The district court denied Ms. Ouska’s request for a certificate of appealability as to each of the issues she raised. See R.22. If a district court declines to issue a certificate, this court may issue one. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 2253(c); Fed. R. App. Pro. 22(b)(2). /7 Some courts of appeals require that, in order to expand the issues in a certificate, a party must present explicitly the request by motion to the court of appeals; others, as we have done, treat a notice of appeal as an implicit request to amend the certificate. See Jones v. United States, 224 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). These courts also seem not to distinguish, as we have not, between cases where a court of appeals considers expanding a district court’s grant of a certificate and cases such as this, where a court of appeals is asked to expand a certificate that the circuit court itself has granted. See, e.g., Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Hiivala v. Lambert, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000); Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998). /8 We also note that when Ms. Ouska made her initial request to this court for a certificate, she did so as a pro se plaintiff. /9 The circuits are divided regarding the proper answer to this issue. See, e.g., Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282-83 (6th Cir.) (explaining the circuit split), cert. denied, Bagley v. Combs, 121 S. Ct. 623 (2000). Most recently, the Sixth Circuit joined this court, and the First and Tenth Circuits, in holding that the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates that defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. See id. at 283 (explaining that [i]n a prearrest setting as well as in a post- arrest setting, it is clear that a potential defendant’s comments . . . might be used in a criminal prosecution; the privilege [against self-incrimination] should thus apply). /10 In Hernandez, the silence that was used against the defendant involved his refusal to say anything to police after being placed under arrest, but before the Miranda warnings were read to him. See 948 F.2d at 322. Therefore, unlike Ms. Ouska’s situation here and the situation in Savory, the alleged Fifth Amendment violation in Hernandez did not involve pre-arrest silence. However, we explained in Hernandez that the Fifth Amendment violation at issue there was distinct from the type of violation that Ms. Ouska now claims with respect to the use of her post-arrest silence. See 948 F.2d at 323 n.4. We noted that the latter claim was addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), which barred the use of a defendant’s silence after Miranda warnings were given, explaining that it constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Ms. Ouska’s pre-arrest silence claim involves the use of her silence before Miranda warnings were given, it implicates our decision in Savory regarding the privilege against self- incrimination, not the rule of Doyle. /11 In Davenport, the defendants were not placed under arrest and were not in custody, but were read their Miranda rights. See 929 F.2d at 1171. /12 The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois states that when first asked at the station about the knife found under her bed, Ms. Ouska said she did not want to talk and left the station. R.1, Ex.A at 5. The district court opinion reiterates this fact. See R.18 at 3. Detective Shields, in his testimony, similarly confirms that, when first asked a question about Te’s murder, Ms. Ouska refused to answer any questions about it and then left the police station. See R.7-8 at 16C. For her part, Ms. Ouska also testified that immediately upon being confronted with the knife and asked about the murder, she refused to answer any further inquiries and requested her lawyer. See R.7-3 at D-170. She then went on to state that Detective Shields continued to question her for [s]ix to seven hours more, before she was able to get a ride home from the station. Id. at D-171. She was asked no follow-up questions during her testimony as to what, if anything, she said to the detective during this additional questioning. Ms. Ouska’s description of events appears to conflict with the detective’s claim that Ms. Ouska left the station right away after being confronted with questions about Te’s death. Yet regardless of this discrepancy as to how long Ms. Ouska was questioned, neither she nor the detective asserted that after being first interrogated about the murder, Ms. Ouska did anything but decline to answer any and all questions related to it. Her reply brief clearly states that Ouska did not continue her conversation with the detective after invoking her Fifth Amendment right and that she did not pick and cho[o]se questions she wished to answer or attempt to convince the detective to terminate the investigation. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10. As there is nothing in the record to contradict this explanation, we accept it as true for purposes of this opinion. /13 Here, Ms. Ouska relies on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for her failure to object. As we discuss in Section II.D of this opinion, an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under that test, an individual must show: (1) that her counsel’s performance was deficient, such that under the circumstances, it was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. We are aware of the continuing ambiguity as to whether a finding of prejudice under Strickland would be sufficient to establish prejudice for the purposes of Wainwright v. Sykes’s cause and prejudice analysis. See Fern v. Gramley, 99 F.3d 255, 259 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996); Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1259 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992). We need not resolve this issue today because it is clear that under any formulation of prejudice, Ms. Ouska cannot prevail. /14 Ms. Ouska later testified that the lottery printout did not belong to her. /15 The Appellate Court of Illinois described this medal of Saint Benedict as uncommon. R.1, Ex.A at 10. This conclusion appears to have been drawn from the testimony of Rev. Charles Dahm, the pastor of a nearby Catholic church where Te attended Mass on most mornings. Father Dahm described the medal as not a common medal. R.7- 5 at A-190. Ms. Ouska disagrees with the characterization of the medal as unique. /16 In her testimony, Ms. Ouska claimed that she had never seen the Saint Benedict medal or the green pencil and that they were never in her possession at any time. /17 Our certificate of appealability limited Ms. Ouska’s Strickland claim to the issue of whether her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecution’s use of Ouska’s post- arrest silence. Order of Dec. 21, 1999 (emphasis added). However, even if Ms. Ouska’s request to expand the certificate to include a claim regarding the use of her pre-arrest silence, see supra Section II.B, also constitutes an implicit request that her ineffective assistance claim be similarly broadened to account for the failure of her trial counsel to object to the use of that silence, we would not find reason to do so. Due to the weight of the evidence supporting her guilt, we do not think that Ms. Ouska can make a substantial showing that her Sixth Amendment rights were violated under Strickland’s standard, even taking into account the failure to object to the use of her pre-arrest silence. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 2253(c)(2).