Opinion ID: 1389134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations

Text: Under the TVPA, plaintiffs have ten years from the date the cause of action arose to bring suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. However, the ATS does not specify a statute of limitations. When faced with this situation, courts should apply the limitations period provided by the local jurisdiction unless a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 132 L.Ed.2d 27 (1995) (quoting DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983)). Like all courts that have decided this issue since the passage of the TVPA, we conclude that the ten-year limitations period applicable to claims under the TVPA likewise applies to claims made under the ATS. See Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 778-79 (11th Cir.2005); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F.Supp.2d 115, 119 (D.D.C.2003). The TVPA and the ATS share a common purpose in protecting human rights internationally. The TVPA grants relief to victims of torture, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the ATS grants access to federal courts for aliens seeking redress from torts committed in violation of the law of nations. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Both statutes use civil suits as the mechanism to advance their shared purpose and both can be found in the same location within the United States Code. See Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1262, n. 17 (11th Cir.2006); Papa, 281 F.3d at 1012. Likewise, the justifications for the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling under the TVPA apply equally to claims brought under the ATS. Congress provided explicit guidance regarding the application of equitable tolling under the TVPA. The TVPA calls for consideration of all equitable tolling principles in calculating this [statute of limitations] period with a view towards giving justice to plaintiff's rights. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 10 (1991). We have identified five factors a district court should consider when determining whether to equitably toll the statute of limitations: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement, (2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement, (3) diligence in pursuing one's rights, (4) absence of prejudice to the defendant, and (5) the plaintiff's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. See Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir.2000). However, the propriety of equitable tolling must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. (quoting Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998)). Again, Congress has provided explicit guidance as to when to apply the equitable tolling doctrine in TVPA cases: Illustrative, but not exhaustive, of the types of tolling principles which may be applicable include the following. The statute of limitations should be tolled during the time the defendant was absent from the United States or from any jurisdiction in which the same or similar action arising from the same facts may be maintained by the plaintiff, provided that the remedy in that jurisdiction is adequate and available. Excluded also from calculation of the statute of limitations would be the period when a defendant has immunity from suit. The statute of limitations should also be tolled for the period of time in which the plaintiff is imprisoned or otherwise incapacitated. It should also be tolled where the defendant has concealed his or her whereabouts or the plaintiff has been unable to discover the identity of the offender. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 10-11 (1991) (emphasis added). Courts that have addressed equitable tolling in the context of claims brought under the TVPA and ATS have determined that the existence of extraordinary circumstances justifies application of the equitable tolling doctrine. See Arce, 434 F.3d at 1259, 1262-63 (tolling the statute of limitations under the TVPA and ATS until the signing of the Peace Accord in 1992 because the fear of reprisals against plaintiffs' relatives orchestrated by people aligned with the defendants excused the plaintiffs' delay); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1155 (11th Cir.2005) (tolling the statute of limitations under the TVPA and ATS [u]ntil the first post- junta civilian president was elected in 1990 for claims brought against a Chilean military officer); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir.1996) (tolling the statute of limitations for TVPA and ATS claims against former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos until the Marcos regime was overthrown); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1549 (N.D.Cal.1987) (holding that the plaintiff raised an issue of fact as to whether the ATS statute of limitations should be tolled for claims against an Argentine military officer until a democratically-elected government was in place). When the situation in a given country precludes the administration of justice, fairness may require equitable tolling. In such limited circumstances, where plaintiffs legitimately fear reprisals against themselves or family members from the regime in power, justice may require tolling. These circumstances, outside plaintiffs' control, make it impossible for plaintiffs to assert their TVPA and ATS claims in a timely manner. In such extraordinary circumstances, equitable tolling of TVPA and ATS claims is appropriate. In sum, we conclude that the ten-year limitations period applicable to TVPA claims also governs claims under the ATS, equitable tolling principles apply, and the existence of extraordinary circumstances provides a justification for the application of the equitable tolling doctrine.
We review a decision on the application of equitable tolling de novo where the facts underlying the equitable tolling are undisputed. Cook v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir.2007). When the facts are in dispute, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Id. Here, Carranza disputes plaintiffs' contention that facts and circumstances in El Salvador justify equitable tolling. Accordingly, we review the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Each of the acts for which Carranza was held liable occurred more than ten years before plaintiffs filed suit. However, the district court determined that the pervasive violence that consumed El Salvador until March 1994 (when El Salvador held its first national elections following the signing of the Peace Accord) justified equitable tolling of the ten-year statute of limitations. These findings of fact are supported by the record. The evidence established that widespread human rights abuses were carried out by the Salvadoran military against civilians during the country's civil war and that plaintiffs feared reprisals against themselves or their family members. Carranza held a position of power within the Salvadoran military regime. In addition, the violence associated with the civil war continued after the signing of the Peace Accord in 1992 until at least March 1994, when the first national elections were held after the civil war. Plaintiffs submitted affidavits stating that even after they arrived in the United States, they were afraid that their families in El Salvador would be subject to repression or violence by the Salvadoran military. They also stated that they did not feel that it was safe for their families in El Salvador to bring suit until many years after the end of the civil war. Given this evidence, it was within the district court's discretion to toll the statute of limitations until March 1994. Carranza argues that the district court abused its discretion in tolling the statute of limitations because plaintiffs did not introduce evidence at trial proving they feared reprisals for bringing this lawsuit, and the plaintiffs were not aware of their right to bring a legal action during the period in which they feared reprisals by the Salvadoran military. Carranza's arguments fail. First, the decision to invoke equitable tolling is a question of law. Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1334 (6th Cir.1991). The district court addressed and decided the equitable tolling issue in denying Carranza's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. As such, the issue had been resolved prior to trial and no additional proof was required. Second, equitable tolling was justified by extraordinary circumstances outside of plaintiffs' control, which made it impossible for plaintiffs to assert their claims in a timely manner. Whether the plaintiffs knew they had an actionable claim under United States law does not change the fact that at least until March 1994, the circumstances in El Salvador were not sufficiently safe for plaintiffs to seek redress in court. The district court appropriately considered the documentary evidence and witness declarations in addressing the issue of equitable tolling when it considered and denied Carranza's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding extraordinary circumstances existed justifying the equitable tolling of the ten-year statute of limitations.