Opinion ID: 776162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Award of Sanctions against County of Maui

Text: 37 The County cross-appeals the district court's imposition of sanctions in response to its Rule 412 violation. The district court's award of sanctions and the amount of the award are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). In awarding sanctions against the County of Maui, the district court stated that the County was not entirely forthcoming in the way that this [matter surrounding Becraft's testimony] was presented to me.  In particular, the court cited the fact that defense counsel had previously brought two pretrial motions (both of which were denied) to permit them to introduce Rule 412 material, in conformity with the rule's requirement that motions be brought at least fourteen days in advance of trial and that an in camera hearing be held to determine admissibility. Fed. R. Evid. 412(c). As a result, in the district court's view, defense counsel knew in general that I was not sympathetic to attempts to bring in [Plaintiff]'s sexual history. And the--manner in which that side bar colloquy went forward contributed somewhat to my feeling that what was likely to come out, even if it was of a sexual nature, probably was not other sexual behavior. I had assumed, incorrectly, as it turns out, that it was going to be a comment by [Plaintiff] that Officer Becraft would discuss concerning her attitude towards Lanny Tihada. And I have already indicated that that, it seems to me, does not fall within Rule 412. 38 The district court concluded that defense counsel had been more than reckless with regard to the requirements of the Rule. The trial judge stated that counsel had demonstrated knowledge of the rule and the applicable law and recklessness in the face of such undeniable knowledge. Cf. Sheffield, 895 F. Supp. at 109 (sanctioning defendant for its callous disregard of the procedural safeguards articulated in Rule 412(c)). Although the court declined to conclude that defense counsel had acted in bad faith, it found counsel's conduct to be deserving of sanctions under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1927 and the court's inherent power. Accordingly, the district court imposed $5,000 in sanctions under §§ 1927 for attorneys' fees, and another $5,000 under the court's inherent powers to compensate Plaintiff for the emotional damage caused by the improper testimony. 39 On appeal, the County argues that the district court abused its discretion in deciding to impose sanctions under§§ 1927. Specifically, the County contends that mere recklessness is insufficient under the law to impose sanctions, and that recklessness plus knowledge adds up to nothing more than recklessness, since all attorneys are presumed to know the law. Furthermore, the County contends that absent a showing of bad faith, sanctions under the court's inherent power also cannot be justified, much less for compensatory damages to the plaintiff. 40 We are convinced that the district court clearly erred in stopping short of explicitly finding that the defendant's lawyers acted in bad faith. Given that defense counsel had had two such motions denied before trial, it is implausible that counsel was not cognizant of Rule 412's pre-trial motion requirement, or that counsel was unaware of the evident conflict between the substance of Becraft's testimony and Rule 412's terms (and Advisory Committee Notes). Defense counsel's sidebar statement to the district court just prior to Becraft's testimony--that [i]t's not going to get into any issue of sexual acts between Officer Plaintiff and this man--was highly misleading. We cannot help but conclude that defense counsel's introduction of Becraft's testimony was a knowing and intentional violation of Rule 412.
41 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1927, [a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. Here defense counsel's misconduct multiplied the proceedings by prompting the motion for a mistrial and the subsequent imposition of sanctions. Furthermore, this was done in an unreasonable and vexatious manner. 42 To be sure, our cases have been less than a model of clarity regarding whether a finding of mere recklessness alone may suffice to impose sanctions for attorneys' fees. For example, in United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983), we held that §§ 1927 sanctions require a finding of recklessness or bad faith. See also Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998) (An award of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1927 or the district court's inherent authority requires a finding of recklessness or bad faith.). 43 However, we have also held that section 1927 sanctions must be supported by a finding of subjective bad faith, which is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent. In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Lit., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, [f]or sanctions to apply, if a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not frivolous, it must be intended to harass. . . . [R]eckless non-frivolous filings, without more, may not be sanctioned. Id. Analyzed under Keegan, then, the question here becomes whether the district court's finding of recklessness plus knowledge suffices to merit §§ 1927 sanctions. 44 Our most recent pronouncement on the proper legal standard for §§ 1927 sanctions comes from the case of Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2001). In Fink, we reconciled Blodgett, Keegan and Barber by holding that recklessness suffices for §§ 1927, but bad faith is required for sanctions under the court's inherent power. Id. Hence, under Fink, we conclude that the district court's finding of recklessness plus knowledge was sufficient to justify the imposition of §§ 1927 sanctions. 8
45 We also affirm the district court's decision with respect to the sanctions awarded to Plaintiff under the court's inherent powers. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Supreme Court reinforced the longstanding principle that [c]courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. 501 U.S. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly, under our controlling cases, conduct that is tantamount to bad faith is sanctionable. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980). As we recently stated in Fink, [f]or purposes of imposing sanctions under the inherent power of the court, a finding of bad faith does not require that the legal and factual basis for the action prove totally frivolous; where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of attorney's fees. 239 F.3d at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum,sanctions are available if the court specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith. Sanctions are available for a variety of types of willful actions, including recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose. Therefore . . . an attorney's reckless misstatements of law and fact, when coupled with an improper purpose, . . . are sanctionable under a court's inherent power. Id. at 994. 46 Here, regardless of whether defense counsel's behavior constituted bad faith per se, we readily find that counsel's reckless and knowing conduct in this case was tantamount to bad faith and therefore sanctionable under the court's inherent power. If left unsanctioned, defense counsel's behavior in this case would undermine the very purpose and force of Rule 412's strictures. Thus, we believe the district court's resort to its inherent powers to sanction the County was eminently reasonable and justified. 47 To be sure, [b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. However, [a] primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. Id. at 44-45. In disingenuously circumventing both the spirit and the letter of Rule 412, we believe that defense counsel abused the judicial process, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. 48 The County argues that sanctions for compensatory damages to Plaintiff are unprecedented and beyond the scope of the court's inherent power. And yet, in Chambers , the Court delineated a broad range of situations for which a variety of sanctions were deemed appropriate, and noted that even outright dismissal of a lawsuit lies within the court's inherent power. The Court therefore reasoned that the less severe sanction of an assessment of attorneys fees was well within the court's authority as well. Id. at 43-45. Similar logic applies here, particularly given that none of the other federal rules or statutes govern the situation. See id. at 50 ([I]f in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.). 49 The imposition of sanctions . . . transcends a court's equitable power concerning relations between the parties and reaches a court's inherent power to police itself, thus serving the dual purpose of vindicating judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and making the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's [misbehavior]. Id. at 46 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The award of compensatory damages to Plaintiff for the County's misconduct therefore does not appear unreasonable in this regard. Contrary to the County's position, by imposing sanctions for the embarrassment and pain suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the improper testimony, the district court was not invading the province of the jury or providing a substantive remedy to an aggrieved party. Instead, the amount the court imposed reflected its assessment of the actual harm incurred by Plaintiff, both in terms of additional attorneys' fees and emotional and reputational damage. This was well within the bounds of the court's discretionary power.