Opinion ID: 52838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery Regarding McLean

Text: Reed first seeks a COA on his claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for discovery of files regarding contact between the prosecution and the informant McLean. A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of course. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997). The habeas petitioner is entitled to discovery only where good cause is shown. Id. The Supreme Court has held that good cause is shown where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969). On November 30, 2004, the district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing, at Reed's request, on the subjects of the Dallas County district attorney's office's knowledge of McLean's alleged perjury and the existence of any agreement between McLean and the Dallas County district attorney's office. [3] McLean had recanted his testimony against Reed in an unsolicited sworn statement sent to the Dallas County district attorney's office in 1986. Before the hearing, Reed sought discovery of state files pertaining to McLean. Specifically, Reed sought discovery of files regarding McLean in the possession or control of the Dallas County district attorney's office, sheriff's office, and police department, and multiple named individuals who were employed by the Dallas County police department, sheriff's office, or district attorney. The government opposed this request. Reed also requested records pertaining to McLean from the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, which the government did not oppose. In a December 23, 2004 order, the district court granted Reed's motion for discovery to the extent the motion is unopposed and denied it [t]o the extent the motion is opposed. The district court explained that [p]etitioner has already obtained significant information on the subjects requested, and the Court is of the view that further prehearing discovery is unnecessary for Petitioner adequately to present his case on the limited subject matter of the hearing. In its July 26, 2005 opinion denying Reed's habeas petition, the district court went into greater length regarding Reed's claim that McLean testified in exchange for promises by the district attorney's office. The district court credited the testimony of the former district attorney, Knox Fitzpatrick (Fitzpatrick), that he had no agreement with McLean to give McLean favorable treatment in exchange for testimony against Reed and that he believed McLean's testimony to be truthful. The district court further found that McLean's testimony was not credible and of little probative value. Regarding Reed's evidence of letters from McLean to Fitzpatrick asserting the existence of a deal between them, the court found that McLean's assertion of a deal in his correspondence was not truthful and was an attempt to manipulate Fitzpatrick into assisting him. Regarding Fitzpatrick's subsequent efforts to assist McLean in obtaining a transfer to a different facility, the court concluded that Fitzpatrick's intervention for McLean is equally consistent with an assistant district attorney who was advised that a cooperating witness was in physical danger as a result of his cooperation. The district court also addressed whether the district attorney's office knew that McLean's testimony was false. While the district court conceded that Reed makes a persuasive case through expert medical testimony that the substance of McLean's testimony of Reed's confession was false, the court found that [t]he medical evidence now suggesting that McLean's testimony was false was not available to Fitzpatrick or the District Attorney's office at the time of Reed's trial. As a result, the court found that the record before it establishes clearly that Fitzpatrick and the District Attorney's office believed that McLean's testimony regarding Reed's confession was true. Reed now argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying discovery of the state's files where such discovery was opposed by the state. Reed claims that his request targeted information directly relevant to his claims that McLean perjured himself with the knowledge of the government and in exchange for government promises. Reed proposes that the content of the communications could show the existence of a bargain for McLean's testimony against [Reed] and how the substance of McLean's allegations against [Reed] were developed. Moreover, Reed argues that he has made a sufficient demonstration that McLean's testimony was perjurious, and that the district attorney's office knew this fact, to satisfy the good cause requirement. Reed further contends that he has also presented sufficient evidence that the district attorney's office made promises to McLean in exchange for his testimony. Reed notes that by holding an evidentiary hearing on the subject of McLean's testimony, the district court implicitly found that Reed met a higher standard than is required for obtaining discovery. The state responds that reasonable jurists would agree that the district court properly denied Reed's discovery request. The state contends that Fitzgerald was subjected to a vigorous cross-examination by Reed at the evidentiary hearing, even in the absence of the documents sought. The state further argues that Reed's contention that there might have been documents out there proving that [the] State knew that McLean's veracity was questionable is speculative, at best. We agree with Reed that reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Reed's discovery request. See Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir.2000). Reed has a strong argument that he has satisfied the good cause requirement necessary to obtain discoverythat is, that he has put forth specific allegations that show reason to believe that [he] may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09, 117 S.Ct. 1793. Reed relies on Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), where the Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution for the prosecution to knowingly use perjured testimony. This court has held that a conviction must be set aside where the petitioner has demonstrated that (1) the witness gave false testimony; (2) the falsity was material in that it would have affected the jury's verdict; and (3) the prosecution used the testimony knowing it was false. May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir.1992). False evidence is deemed material for this analysis if there is any reasonable likelihood that [it] could have affected the jury's verdict. Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th Cir.1996). Since there is clearly a reasonable likelihood that McLean's statements that Reed had confessed to the Wadle murder could have affected the jury's verdict, there can be no doubt that McLean's testimony was material. Accordingly, if McLean lied on the witness stand regarding Reed's confession and the district attorney's office, and if the district attorney knew that McLean was lying, Reed should be entitled to habeas relief. Reed's allegations suggest that if the facts are fully developed, he may be able to demonstrate an entitlement to relief on this bases. First, Reed has made and supported a specific allegation that the district attorney knew that McLean lied regarding Reed's confession. As the district court acknowledged, Reed has produced medical evidence that suggests that the substance of McLean's testimony of Reed's confession was false. Specifically, McLean testified that Reed told him that Wadle was using a tampon at the time of the murder, which prevented Reed from completing a sexual assault. The report by the doctor who examined Wadle for rape within hours of her assault, however, made no mention of a tampon. The doctor has subsequently declared that he would certainly have noticed and made note of a tampon if one had been present during the examination. The report that did note the presence of a tampon was the autopsy report created following Wadle's death, nine days after her assault. Based on the autopsy report, Reed concludes that Wadle had only begun her menstrual period shortly before her death. Reed asserts that the autopsy report provides further evidence that Wadle would not have been wearing a tampon at the time of the assault. The district court concluded that this evidence did not imply that the district attorney's office was aware that McLean's testimony was false. The district court stated that [t]he medical evidence now suggesting that McLean's testimony was false was not available to Fitzpatrick or the District Attorney's office at the time of Reed's trial. This statement appears to be incorrect: the report by the doctor who examined Wadle for rape was almost certainly available to the district attorney at the time of Reed's trial. Moreover, assuming McLean was lying, there is reason to wonder how he decided to introduce the tampon into his account. Reed raises a plausible theory: that the district attorney's office, erroneously relying on the autopsy report, coached McLean to mention the tampon to bolster its claim that Reed committed murder in the course of committing aggravated rape. Reed has also made and supported a specific allegation that the district attorney had made promises to McLean in exchange for his testimony, and that therefore the district attorney knew that McLean was lying when he testified that no such promises had been made. [4] Reed cites letters from McLean to Fitzpatrick asserting the existence of a deal between them in relation to Reed's case. Reed also points to letters that Fitzpatrick wrote to the Texas Department of Corrections on McLean's behalf regarding a possible transfer. The district court correctly noted that McLean is not entirely credible, and that Fitzpatrick's acts are consistent with a desire to protect a cooperating witness. Still, reasonable jurists could debate whether Reed's evidence is sufficient to show good cause for further discovery. Moreover, Reed points to contact McLean had with the Dallas County police department in suspicious proximity to McLean's transfer to Reed's cell and to the dramatic reduction in the amount of jailtime McLean was offered in exchange for his guilty plea (from thirty years to fifteen years). Because reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Reed's discovery request for state files concerning McLean, we grant a COA to Reed on this issue.