Opinion ID: 173641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Presley Applied

Text: At the outset we acknowledge, and in fact commend, the district judge in the present case for her actions in trying to insulate the jury from improper influences. For striving to achieve this goal we certainly cannot fault the trial court. However, as is apparent from a reading of Presley, there are higher constitutional values which cannot be overlooked absent exceptional circumstances, conditions which are not presented by the facts of this appeal. We are constrained to say, however, that we are somewhat taken aback by the government's silence in failing to come to the court's aid during the course of this incident, which ended with the total barring of the public from the jury's voir dire. The government's intervention in suggesting alternatives to this extreme outcome might very well have saved us all the need for repeating this exercise. As can be seen by our recitation of the facts in Presley and in this case, both proceedings are strikingly similar in content: (1) they both involve criminal trials, thus making the public trial requirement of the Sixth Amendment de rigueur; (2) they both involve the total exclusion of members of the public (actually members of the defendant's family) from the jury voir dire process; (3) in both cases the trial court, following its usual trial management procedures, wanted to keep the jury panel within its physical control inside the courtroom's limited space; (4) in both cases the trial court was concerned with the defendant's family members intermingl[ing] (i.e., being elbow to elbow) with prospective jurors, because of their perceived close proximity to the jurors in the crowded courtroom; (5) in both cases the trial court stated that there was no room for the public in the audience area of the courtroom; (6) in both cases the trial judge indicated that there was no need for the defendant's relatives to be present during the voir dire; (7) in both cases the trial court stated that the public would be allowed into the courtroom once the trial started; and (8) in both cases the trial court was not proactive in seeking alternative solutions to totally barring the public during voir dire. There is at least one other important fact in the present case which reinforces Appellants' claims of error when compared to the circumstances of Presley : as Agosto's counsel pointed out to the trial judge, there was space available in the courtroom, which with appropriate flexibility by the district court would have allowed some members of the public to be seated during jury selection, while at the same time insulating the jury from contamination by extraneous influences. There were also other options available to the court: it could have seated members of the public as members of the venire were excused, irrespective of whether the request was renewed by counsel for the defense, or it could have admonished the members of the venire and the public against inappropriate conduct, if this concern existed. And of course, if despite such measures it still considered that the closing was required by the circumstances, it was required to substantiate its actions by specific findings in support thereof. [3] We need not belabor the point. This case falls far short of meeting the requirements of Presley and Owens for allowing the exclusion of the public from a criminal trial, and thus we must vacate Appellants' convictions and remand the case for a new trial. On these facts, we need not consider whether, as the government contends, there may be circumstances where a courtroom closure is so trivial that it does not require a new trial. Cf. Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir.2009). It is appropriate that we add one last observation. We have previously held, in the context of courtroom closures, that the Waller standard applies to [the exclusion of] family members [just as it applies] to the general public. Owens, 483 F.3d at 62; see Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871, 876 (1st Cir.1997)([A] trial court need [not] go beyond the already stringent requirements of Waller before removing a defendant's family members from the courtroom.). Therefore, when considering the balance of factors supporting closure, courts should not minimize the importance of a criminal defendant's interest in the attendance and support of family and friends. To say the least, this support is ineffective in absentia.
Because this matter is before us after jury verdicts of guilty, this court reviews the evidence de novo, considering all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with the verdict, and avoiding credibility judgments, to determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2008)(internal quotation marks omitted).