Opinion ID: 1660871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanity of Defendant.

Text: This case was adjudicated prior to State v. Shoffner (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N. W. 2d 458 and the test of insanity which was properly applied was that established in State v. Esser (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 567, 599, 115 N. W. 2d 505: The term `insanity' in the law means such an abnormal condition of the mind, from any cause, as to render the defendant incapable of understanding the nature and quality of the alleged wrongful act, or incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with respect to such act. Dr. R. A. Jefferson, a court-appointed psychiatrist, testified as follows:  Q .... I will ask you whether you have formed an opinion as to whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time of the alleged commission of the alleged offense on the 31st day of January, 1965. A. I have formed an opinion.  Q . What is that opinion? A. It is my opinion that Paul Edward McCarter was sane, that he understood the nature and quality of his acts, that he was not feebleminded and that he was able to confer with his counsel in his own behalf.  Q. State whether or not in your opinion, Doctor, at the time of the alleged commission of the alleged offense on the 31st day of January, 1965, the defendant had such an abnormal condition of the mind from any cause as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with respect to such alleged wrongful act. A. It is my opinion that he was able to distinguish between right and wrong.  Q. ... Have you an opinion as to whether his act of shooting on January 31, 1965, was the product of any mental disease, mental defect or mental abnormality? A. No, it was not.  Q. ... A. Yes, I think I understand and I think that I have said that in my opinion he was sane, that he did know the difference between right and wrong, but at the time of commission of the act he was in a severe emotional crisis which impaired his capacity to act upon his knowledge of the nature and consequences, full consequences of his act.  Q. And it is also your opinion, Doctor, is it not, that the defendant was not insane at the time of the crime? A. It is my opinion that he was not insane at the time of the commission of the crime. Dr. Edward Carl Schmidt, the second court appointed psychiatrist, testified as follows:  Q .... I will ask you whether you have formed an opinion as to whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time of the alleged commission of the alleged offense on the 31st day of January, 1965. A. Yes, I have formed such an opinion.  Q. What is that opinion? A. My opinion is that Paul Edward McCarter was sane on the day of the alleged offense, January 31, 1965.  Q. ... A. I do not believe that he was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the act.  Q. ... A. ... he developed this dissociated large reaction and at the time of that reaction he was not insane but his ability to determine the nature and quality of his acts was undoubtedly reduced. I don't think his ability to determine the criminality of his acts was reduced, however.  Q. It was your testimony, was it not doctor, that his ability to evaluate the nature and quality of his acts was impaired because of an emotional strain and not a generally recognized mental disease or defect, is that correct? A. Yes.  Q. What I meant to say is your conclusion predicated upon your assumption of the truthfulness of the statements that you have said are practically identical, made to you, and also in his testimony? A. Yes.  Q. Do you consider an emotional crisis a generally recognized mental disease or defect? A. No.  Q. And you do not obviously equate it with insanity? A. I do not.  Q. Since you stated he was in your opinion sane? A. Correct.  Q. So it is your opinion then that he is not mentally A. He was at that time not mentally ill. Dr. Jefferson also testified that defendant suffered from a severe emotional crisis which, on cross-examination, he ambiguously described as an abnormality. However, this testimony must be considered in conjunction with the previously cited testimony and we conclude that the trial court correctly decided that the evidence would not support a finding of such an abnormal condition of the mind as defined in Esser, supra . The defendant alleges that the testimony of the psychiatrists created more than a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity, and consequently, the burden of proof should have been shifted to the state to establish his sanity. This argument is based upon sec. 957.11 (2), Stats., [2] and Shoffner, page 420, supra. In the case presently under consideration, we again point out, the trial was to the court and not a jury. From an examination of the record, it is our opinion that the trial court correctly concluded that no reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the defendant ever arose. We determine that the trial court properly found that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.