Opinion ID: 789280
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellate Counsel's Performance was Prejudicial

Text: 39 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), habeas corpus relief may be granted if the petitioner shows that, despite identifying the correct rule of law, the state court unreasonably applied it to the facts of the case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Under § 2254(e)(1), habeas corpus relief may be had where the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's factual determinations were unreasonable. 40 First, the state court found, without explanation, that Sanders's Proposed Instruction Two was an incorrect statement of the law. However, both Indiana law, Palmer, 425 N.E.2d at 644, and federal law, Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704, 95 S.Ct. 1881, require the prosecution to prove the absence of sudden heat once the issue is raised by evidence in the record. Sanders's Proposed Instruction Two correctly stated this proposition, and nowhere else in the jury instructions was the jury informed that the prosecution bore the burden of proving the absence of sudden heat to obtain a conviction for murder or attempted murder. Thus, the state court's finding that Sanders's Proposed Instruction Two was a misstatement of the law is an unreasonable determination of the facts, which does not warrant any deference from this court. See Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir.2004). 41 Second, although the post-conviction trial court identified the proper standard for evaluating Sanders's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it unreasonably applied the law to the facts of this case. Indiana law requires reversal and a new trial if the trial court rejects a proposed jury instruction that allocates the burden of proving the absence of sudden heat for a murder or attempted murder conviction. Harrington, 516 N.E.2d at 66 (finding that without the burden-of-proof instruction, the jury resolved the issue but did so ignorant of which side bore the burden of proof). If Sanders's counsel had raised this issue on direct appeal, the appellate court would have been bound by law to grant him a new trial. Because the issue not raised may have resulted in a reversal of the conviction or an order for a new trial, Lee, 328 F.3d at 901, Sanders has established that his counsel's failure to challenge the Proposed Instruction Two was prejudicial. 42