Opinion ID: 2584893
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assertedly Improper Denial of Challenge for Cause of a Juror Who Was Biased in Favor of Imposition of the Death Penalty

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to excuse for cause Juror A.M., who served on the jury throughout the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. We are not persuaded. As an initial matter, although defendant exercised all of his peremptory challenges, he failed to express dissatisfaction with the final jury before it was sworn. Because defendant's trial occurred before our decision in People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887] ( Crittenden ), though, we will not apply the holding in that case that the failure to do so forfeits an appellate claim that the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause. ( Id. at p. 121, fn. 4; see Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 742.) As to the merits of his claim, in determining whether Juror A.M. was biased and should have been excused for cause, we apply the same standard discussed above, i.e., whether the record establishes that the juror's views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties. We defer to the trial court's findings of the true state of mind of the juror when the juror's answers were conflicting or ambiguous. ( Blair, supra, at pp. 741, 743.) Juror A.M.'s circumstances were essentially the same as those of the jurors we discussed in Blair, with one notable exception, which we will discuss below: initially Juror A.M. expressed some variation of the view that ... she would vote for the death penalty in all cases of intentional, deliberate, or premeditated murder. Nonetheless, after the trial court and sometimes the prosecutor explained that the death penalty was not mandatory if the defendant was found guilty of murder with special circumstances, but instead that there would be a separate penalty phase at which the parties would have the opportunity to present aggravating and mitigating evidence relevant to punishment, [she] expressed a willingness to consider all of the evidence and both available penalty options before deciding on the appropriate punishment. ( Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743.) The only significant difference here, upon which defendant focuses our attention, is that Juror A.M. also stated in her questionnaire with regard to mitigating evidence that she did not see why someone's past has anything to do with what they are charged with today or when they committed the crime. Similarly, during voir dire, she initially stated that she did not think she would use [background information] as a factor in my decision since I don't think it's pertinent to, you know, what's on hand, the crime.... I wouldn't take it into consideration. She agreed that it was her view that she would give such evidence no weight at all. Juror A.M. ultimately stated, however, that she could reject the death penalty in an appropriate case based on the rest of the evidence, you know, ifI don't know how. Just depending on the evidence and stuff because we have our own opinion. We have to come to a consensus about it. We have to, just other than the good things and stuff, just all the evidence brought forth to support that he wouldn't deserve. (5) Defendant argues on appeal as he did in the trial court that Juror A.M.'s statements about her view of the merit of a defendant's personal background as evidence in mitigation show that her ability to be fair and impartial and to follow the law was substantially impaired. We disagree. Juror A.M.'s statements are properly understood as explaining her then existing view of the relative weight of one particular type of mitigating evidence. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Patton v. Yount (1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 [81 L.Ed.2d 847, 104 S.Ct. 2885], [i]t is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may never have been subjected to the type of leading questions and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed, and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors represent a cross section of the community, and their education and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to express themselves carefully or even consistently. We therefore do not believe Juror A.M.'s statement that she would not take into consideration defendant's background should be read literally, but rather we interpret this comment in relation to her statement that she did not, at that time, see the relevance of such evidence. At bottom, Juror A.M. expressed strong skepticism at the abstract suggestion that the personal background of a defendant could mitigate the seriousness of having committed murder. The fact, however, that during voir dire a juror expresses a negative opinion about the persuasive valuein theoryof a certain class of mitigating evidence, does not establish that the juror's performance of his or her duty will be substantially impaired. Juror A.M. never said she would not weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence in reaching her decision; in fact, she said she would do so. Her statements concerning personal background evidence meant only that Juror A.M.a layperson who had never before been involved in a capital trialdid not at that time see the relevance of such evidence in the determination of the appropriate sentence. The fact that this preexisting view might have made it more difficult for defendant to convince Juror A.M. of the relative strength of a mitigation case that included evidence of defendant's background does not prove that she would automatically vote for the death penalty, [18] or that her belief prevented or substantially impaired the performance of her duties as a juror to follow the trial court's instructions to weigh the evidence to be offered. (Cf. People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 447 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] [A juror might find it very difficult to vote to impose the death penalty, and yet such a juror's performance still would not be substantially impaired under Witt, unless he or she were unwilling or unable to follow the trial court's instructions by weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case and determining whether death is the appropriate penalty under the law.].) As the Supreme Court of Kentucky aptly stated in similar circumstances: Voir dire examination occurs when a prospective juror quite properly has little or no information about the facts of the case and only the most vague idea as to the applicable law. At such a time a juror is often presented with the facts in their harshest light and asked if he could consider imposition of a minimum punishment. Many jurors find it difficult to conceive of minimum punishment when the facts as given suggest only the most severe punishment. Similarly, many citizens are astounded to learn that being under the influence of drugs or alcohol [or, as here, the defendant's personal background] may be considered by them as factors mitigating the punishment which should be imposed. Predictably, when asked whether they believe being under the influence should mitigate punishment, the answer is often in the negative. A per se disqualification is not required merely because a juror does not instantly embrace every legal concept presented during voir dire examination. The test is not whether a juror agrees with the law when it is presented in the most extreme manner. The test is whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict. ( Mabe v. Com. (Ky. 1994) 884 S.W.2d 668, 671.) Affording the proper deference to the trial court's assessment of Juror A.M.'s ability to follow the law and to weigh the evidence for and against the death penaltyultimately assigning whatever weight she deemed appropriate to the evidence on each sidewe conclude the trial court did not err in denying the challenge for cause, and, accordingly, defendant was not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury.