Opinion ID: 196849
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Multiple Damages Under Chapter 93A

Text: 4. Multiple Damages Under Chapter 93A Paragraph 5 of section 11 provides for multiple damages where the court finds that the use or employment of the . . . act or practice was a willful or knowing violation. The Damons argue that they should have been granted multiple damages, but do not contend that the district court should have found Sun's violation sufficiently willful or knowing to require double damages.11 Instead, they base their position on the premise 11 In their statement of conclusions, the Damons do posit that we should conclude that the district court's indication that Sun was guilty of some level of bad faith or willful intent to deceive suffices to require multiple damages under section 11, para. 5. However, as they offer no support for this contention, -44- that we should essentially read into section 11 the provision of section 9 which awards multiple damages for a defendant's bad faith refusal to make a reasonable settlement offer after demand.12 Their argument relies on the fact that sections 9 we deem it waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.) ([W]e see no reason to abandon the settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990). 12 That section provides, in pertinent part: Any person receiving . . . a demand for relief who . . . makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any subsequent action, file the written tender and an affidavit concerning its rejection and thereby limit any recovery to the relief tendered if the court finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by the petitioner. In all other cases, if the court finds for the petitioner, recovery shall be . . . up to three but not less than two times [actual damages] if the court finds that . . . the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated said section two. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 9(3). By comparison, section 11 states, in pertinent part: The respondent may tender with his answer . . . a written offer of settlement for single damages. If such tender or settlement is rejected by the petitioner, and if the court finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by the petitioner, then the court shall not award more than single damages. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 11. -45- and 11 share the goal of promoting reasonable settlement offers. See International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1318 (Mass. 1983). According to this logic, to further the statute's goals we should punish defendants who are liable under section 11 and who do not offer single damages with their Answer by inflicting multiple damages on them, and reward those who do with single damages. We have previously noted that [i]t is unclear whether section 11 permits recovery of multiple damages under such a theory where bad faith is proved. Southworth Mach. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, we do not hesitate in refusing the Damons' argument. First, we note that section 9 is by its terms inapplicable to transactions between persons engaged in business, and section 11 quite simply does not include language acting as a counterpart to section 9's requirement of multiple damages where a party does not make a written tender of settlement. See id. Second, we note that, although it shares specific goals with section 9, [s]ection 11 provides a different procedure for achieving the same objectives of facilitating settlement and fixing damages. Nader v. Citron, 360 N.E.2d 870, 874 (Mass. 1977). Indeed, the Massachusetts and federal courts have consistently respected the differences in procedures between the two sections. See, e.g., Fickes v. Sun Expert, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (D. Mass. 1991); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. State Park Ins. Agency, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 376, 377 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); see also Glickman, 486 -46- N.E.2d at 742 & n.7 (refusing to analyze section 11 damages in terms of defendants' response to plaintiffs' demand letter). Whatever the merits of implying the demand letter scheme of 9 into 11, as urged by defendants, we find no support for such implication in the language and structure of 11. Nader, 360 N.E.2d at 874. Finally, we note that the district court did not find that Sun's failure to tender an offer of settlement was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated said section 2, as section 9 demands, and the Damons have not demonstrated any evidence to the contrary. Thus, even if we were to weigh Sun's failure to tender an offer into our analysis, the Damons' challenge to the court's damage award would fail. Our decision today does not clash with the SJC's decision in International Fidelity Ins. Co., despite the Damons' reliance on it. There, the SJC weighed the goal of promoting reasonable settlements in both sections 9 and 11, and found that it would be appropriate to impose independent liability against the multiple defendants in that case, as to do so would promote settlements. 443 N.E.2d at 1318. At the same time, however, the Court noted that the procedures set out in the two sections differ, despite their common goal. Id. (citing Nader, 360 N.E.2d at 870). Thus, we read International Fidelity Ins. Co. not as suggesting we read the damage provisions of section 9 into section 11, but as recognizing that their goals are similar while their methods are not. See Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., -47- 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (The remedies and procedures in 9 and 11 are related, but not parallel, and the conditions of one section should not be read by implication into the other.); Nader, 360 N.E.2d at 874 (noting that analogies, whatever their utility, do not form a basis for the judicial rewriting of statutes in refusing to read section 9's demand letter procedure into section 11). ATTORNEY'S FEES ATTORNEY'S FEES The district court awarded the Damons $40,620.40 in attorney's fees and costs. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 11 para. 6 (mandating reasonable attorney's fees and costs be awarded where the court finds a violation of 2). Sun argues that the award was not reasonable, on the basis that the hourly rates granted (specifically, the rate of $235 an hour for court appearances and depositions) were exorbitant and unreasonable, and the contingency nature of the engagement. Based on our review of the record, we do not find the court's award unreasonable.