Opinion ID: 58529
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mathis’s sex discrimination claim

Text: Mathis asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex 6 because he was disciplined for excessive absences when other, female co-workers received excused absences and were not similarly punished. In order to establish a prima facie case for sex discrimination under Title VII, Mathis must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the job in question; and, (4) he was treated less favorably than other “similarly situated” employees outside of his protected class.3 Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. The only prong in this analysis that the parties argued on appeal is the last: whether Mathis was treated less favorably than other “similarly situated” female employees. When evaluating “similarly situated” comparators in the disciplinary context, the “most important factors” are “the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998), modified by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). We agree with the magistrate court’s well reasoned analysis and similarly find that Mathis has not pointed to similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably under the attendance policy than he. Mathis relies on the attendance 3 There are other ways to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but Mathis has chosen to proceed under the “similarly situated” comparators prima facie analysis. See Hawkins, 883 F.2d at 982, 984-85 (discussing alternate methods of establishing a prima facie case, including the “similarly situated” analysis, use of statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination, and by demonstrating that the plaintiff was fired and was replaced by a person outside of his protected class). 7 records of three white, female co-workers to support his claims: Amy Stewart, Tammy Tiller, and Rhonda Scruggs. However, the magistrate court found that none of these women violated the policy in five of twelve months like Mathis, and therefore they cannot not serve as “similarly situated” comparators. Mathis has failed to demonstrate that any other female co-worker accrued similar absence violations and yet received different punishment. He therefore has not created a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.