Opinion ID: 771369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of Plea as to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)

Text: 18
Rule 11(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part: 19 (c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following: 20 (1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered . . . . 21 Rule 11 places the obligation on the district judge to comply with the requirements of the rule in order to assure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. United States v. Odedo, 154 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1998). The purpose of Rule 11(c) in requiring the judge to inform the defendant in open court of the nature of the charges and other matters is to create a record complete on its face, to forestall later attacks on the plea. United States v. Smith, 60 F.3d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 1995). In this regard, [i]t is incumbent upon a district judge accepting a plea to make the minor investment of time and effort necessary to set forth the meaning of the charges and to demonstrate on the record that the defendant understands [the precise nature of the plea]. United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986). 22 At Seesing's plea colloquy, the district court asked the government to describe its proof. As to Count 2, the government stated: Testimony would indicate that during the course of dealing narcotics, methamphetamine, to David Clausen, that Frido Seesing had on him this particular weapon with the laser site [sic] . . . . As I have said, during the period of his conspiracy, Frido Seesing did deal methamphetamine, and at the time he was carrying a semi-automatic handgun that I've just described. 23 At the conclusion of the government's statement of proof for all the charges, the court addressed Seesing:You have heard the comments by the U.S. Attorney, Mr. Seesing, as to the proof they have in the event this case went to trial. Is there anything you want to change and correct or is that substantially the way events transpired? Seesing replied, Yeah, that's pretty much how it . . . . 24 The court then proceeded, count by count, to ask Seesing if he was pleading guilty as charged. With respect to Count 2, the court said, And then as to Count 2 it says that you, Frido J. Seesing, did carry or use a firearm during drug trafficking. You heard the testimony of -or excuse me, the offer of proof made by the assistant U.S. Attorney there. Do you admit or deny that? Seesing responded, Yes sir, I had it with me. It was not to threaten. 25 In Smith, the prosecution made an offer of proof as well and the defendant [u]nquestionably . . . was informed of, and admitted, the facts underlying his plea. Smith, 60 F.3d at 597. The court held, however, that an admission of the facts does not speak to the nature of the charge. `[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.'  Id. (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). 26 Section 924 (c)(1) has two components which must be satisfied. Seesing must have understood that he was pleading guilty to having (1) use[d] or carrie[d] the firearm (2) during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime. Id. It is clear that Seesing understood the carry component, as he admitted having the weapon on his person. See United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996) ([I]n order to convict a defendant under section 924(c) for `carrying' a firearm `the defendant must have transported the firearm on or about his or her person.'  (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1996))). 27 As for the second component, the district court erred in failing to state an element of the crime. As noted, the court asked Seesing, [D]id you carry or use a firearm during drug trafficking? The court left out the requirement that the use or carrying must be during and in relation to the drug trafficking. See United States v. Mendoza, 11 F.3d 126, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that in relation to is an element of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Accordingly, the requirements of Rule 11(c)(1) were not met. See United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 1992) ([T]he nature and elements of the crime to which [the defendant] was pleading guilty were not explained to him. In the absence of such an explanation, the district court did not meet its obligation under Rule 11(c)(1) . . . .); see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1976). 28 The question remains whether this error was harmless under Rule 11(h), which states: Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. There are only two ways in which the district court's error could be held harmless under Rule 11(h). 29 First, the error was harmless if Seesing's responses in his colloquy clearly indicate his awareness of the in relation to element of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h), Notes of Advisory Committee to the 1983 Amendment (listing, as one of the errors which should be held harmless, when an essential element of the crime was not mentioned, but the defendant's responses clearly indicate his awareness of that element); see also United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Advisory Committee notes). The plea colloquy does not clearly indicate that Seesing understood that the carrying of the handgun must have been in relation to the methamphetamine trafficking. His statement, It was not meant to threaten,  could suggest such an understanding, but it is by no means clear. 30 Second, the error could be harmless if, as a matter of law, the carrying of a weapon in a drug trafficking crime satisfies the in relation to element. This is not the case. See Mendoza, 11 F.3d at 128-29 (district court's failure to instruct jury on in relation to element reversible, non-harmless error); United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing conviction for failure to instruct on in relation to element) overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Thus, the Rule 11(c)(1) violation was not harmless and Seesing's plea must be withdrawn as deficient. Seesing should receive a full and complete plea colloquy before the district court.
31 Rule 11(f) states: Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. Because we hold that the district court violated Rule 11(c)(1), we need not analyze the colloquy under Rule 11(f). 32