Opinion ID: 889885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standards for Sentencing Authority

Text: ¶ 39 We have said that district courts are afforded broad discretion in criminal sentencing. State v. Herd, 2004 MT 85, ¶ 18, 320 Mont. 490, 87 P.3d 1017; see also State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶¶ 14-15, 353 Mont. 111, 220 P.3d 25 (McGrath, C.J., specially concurring) (explaining why [s]entencing discretion by necessity must be very broad). However, we have also cautioned that this broad discretion is not without limitation. Herd, ¶ 18; accord State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44, ¶ 17, 355 Mont. 286, 228 P.3d 1109 (The broad discretion granted to district courts to impose sentencing conditions is not without limit.). The reason is that [a] district court's authority in sentencing a criminal defendant is defined and constrained by statute, and the court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. Hicks, ¶ 41. Hence, while a district court has broad discretion in imposing sentence, that discretion must first be conferred by a legislature and must then be exercise[d] . . . within a statutory range. Garrymore, ¶ 29, 145 P.3d 946 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 40 Authority to impose a particular sentence cannot be inferred. To the contrary, we have emphasized that a term of sentence must be specifically and explicitly authorized by a specific grant of statutory authority. Burch, ¶¶ 23, 36 (emphasis added). Also, we have acknowledged the fundamental canons of statutory construction which state that [i]n interpreting such statutes [governing a sentencing judge's authority to impose a sentence], our role is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is required. Burch, 123 (quoting State v. Kroll, 2004 MT 203, ¶ 17, 322 Mont. 294, 95 P.3d 717). ¶ 41 Correspondingly, we have rejected the notion of residual sentencing authority. See e.g. Burch, ¶¶ 22-36. Likewise, we have rejected the proposition that sentencing authority is inherent. In White, for example, we observed that the State approaches this issue from the wrong perspective, asking whether the statute limits the court's sentencing authority. District courts do not have inherent authority to impose criminal sentences except as limited by statute. To the contrary, it is well-established that . . . a district court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. White, ¶ 22 (emphasis added). ¶ 42 In short, the threshold question in all cases involving a challenge to a term or condition of sentence is whether that term or condition is specifically and explicitly authorized by a specific grant of statutory authority. The question whether the district court abused its discretion, or whether the term or condition is reasonable, does not enter into the analysis until a specific grant of authority to impose the term or condition has been located somewhere in the Montana Code Annotated. Cf. Burch, ¶ 29 ([A] district court's authority is determined by statute, not administrative rule.). ¶ 43 From the oral pronouncement of sentence, it appears that the District Court relied on § 46-18-202(2), MCA, as authority for the sexual offender treatment condition. The State also cites this statute, plus two others: § 46-18-201(4)(o) and § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA. None of these statutes, however, contains a specific grant of authority for a sentencing judge to impose conditions on a prisoner's parole eligibility.