Opinion ID: 388147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Working Papers Exception.

Text: 140 Although the majority recognizes the full revelation purpose of an EIS, it may be read to severely delimit the application of the doctrine by the creation of an unlimited and undefined working papers exception. That exception is inconsistent with the regulations which bound the agency and with previous decisions of the courts. 141 The regulations governing the contents of an EIS at the time the instant document was prepared are found at 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1975). They were originally promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality in August 1973, 38 Fed.Reg. 20550 (1973) and remained in effect until July 30, 1979. 42 Fed.Reg. 55990 (1978). Whatever the reach of the working paper exception, the guidelines preclude the memoranda at issue from being so characterized. Two preliminary comments must be made about the effect of the guidelines. First, as to the agency the guidelines are binding. It is by now axiomatic that agencies must comply with their own regulations while they remain in effect. Memorial, Inc. v. Harris, No. 78-3169, n.14 (9th Cir. March 28, 1980). Second, these regulations are entitled to substantial deference by the courts. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 2341, 60 L.Ed.2d 943 (1979). 3 142 The guidelines do not provide for a working paper exception to the disclosure of relevant information in an EIS. On the contrary, although an EIS must be succinct and easily understood, it must alert the public to reports which underlie the conclusions in the EIS and indicate how they may be obtained. 143 Draft statements should indicate at appropriate points in the text any underlying studies, reports, and other information obtained and considered by the agency in preparing the statement including any cost-benefit analyses prepared by the agency.... In the case of documents not likely to be easily accessible (such as internal studies or reports ), the agency should indicate how such information may be obtained. 144 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(b) (1975) (emphasis added). 145 The phrase underlying studies, reports and other information  could not be broader. Clearly it would encompass a memorandum containing two tables, one comparing alternatives and the other giving a cost breakdown for several of the alternative proposals including the one actually adopted by the agency. 4 146 Given the regulations, it is difficult to rationalize the majority opinion. Certainly it cannot reasonably be argued that the memoranda in question did not contain information obtained and considered by the agency in preparing the statement. Nor did their status as internal agency documents exempt them from disclosure. The guidelines specifically provided for internal studies or reports that might not be readily available to the public. While arguendo, the information in the memo did not have to be included in the body of the EIS, the guidelines require that the EIS alert the reader by footnote or other appropriate means to the existence of the memoranda and inform the public as to their availability. This was simply not done. 147 Thus, the regulations applicable to the EIS in question simply precluded a working paper exemption which would encompass the documents in question. Moreover, the regulations are fully consonant with applicable law. 148 The majority opinion concedes, as it must, that (j)udicial enforcement of NEPA includes strict compliance with the disclosure and procedural provisions of the Act. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). This full revelation requirement is not merely a congressional fetish for information for its own sake. Full disclosure is required in order to give the public a way of checking on the validity of the (agency's) conclusions. Chelsea Neighborhood Associations v. United States Postal Service, 516 F.2d 378, 389 (2d Cir. 1975); California v. Bergland, 483 F.Supp. 465, 488 (E.D.Cal.1980). Here, where basic information (the cost breakdown) supporting the economic conclusions was never supplied, it is impossible for the public to check on the conclusions. As the appellant's brief states It is instructive to note that the individual that recommended the route selection to Mr. Bingham, Mr. Williams, candidly admitted that the EIS contained absolutely no tools with which it could be determined how the decisionmaker Mr. Bingham, selected Route D-1. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 41-42. 149 Under Ninth Circuit law the adequacy of the EIS must stand or fall on its own supporting documentation. Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d at 782. Where the agency simply does not reveal its process of decision-making (citations omitted) ... (it has) failed to make full environmental disclosure. California v. Bergland, 483 F.Supp. at 488. 150 In sum, as this Court recently said, the National Environmental Policy Act requires that all studies supporting an EIS must be available and accessible. Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d at 782; see also Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d at 1284; Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961, 94 S.Ct. 1979, 40 L.Ed.2d 312 (1974). The majority concedes the report was neither available nor accessible thus the EIS was deficient. 151