Opinion ID: 2336519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondent's Recent Violations

Text: On April 10, 2001, Bar Counsel filed a new petition instituting formal disciplinary proceedings against respondent. The petition contained two separate counts. In Count I (the Whitehead matter, BDN 83-00), Bar Counsel alleged that respondent had violated Rule 1.5(c) by failing to put a contingency fee agreement in writing. [2] In Count II (the Wells matter, BDN 299-00), respondent was charged with violating Rule 1.15(b) by failing to pay a health care provider from settlement funds in which the health care provider had an interest. [3] Count II also alleged that respondent had violated Rule 1.17(a) by failing to deposit settlement funds in an escrow account. [4]
In March of 1998, respondent was retained to represent David Whitehead in a malpractice action against Mr. Whitehead's former attorney. The two agreed that respondent's fee would be one-third of the recovery, but that agreement was not put in writing. After the case was settled in August of 1998, Mr. Whitehead fired respondent in an apparent attempt to avoid paying the one-third contingency fee. Respondent, however, received his fee after executing an attorney's lien on one-third of the settlement funds.
On March 13, 2000, Rudolph Wells received medical treatment at the Washington Family Wellness Center (WFWC) for injuries he received in an automobile accident. When he was treated, Mr. Wells informed the WFWC that he was represented by T. Clarence Harper. At that time, however, Mr. Harper was suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia as a result of his disbarment in Maryland. On March 14 Mr. Wells retained respondent, who had taken over Mr. Harper's law practice, to handle his claim from the automobile accident. [5] Mr. Wells told respondent that he had received medical treatment at District of Columbia General Hospital. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wells signed an Assignment of Benefits form provided by the WFWC. [6] Respondent also signed the form, which he returned to the WFWC on March 29, 2000. By signing the form, respondent agreed that he would ensure that the WFWC's bill for medical treatment would be paid from any funds received in Mr. Wells' case. Respondent testified before the hearing committee, however, that although he had signed the form provided by the WFWC, it did not put him on notice that Mr. Wells had been treated by the WFWC. [7] After he explained that he routinely received and signed assignment forms because health care providers do not provide treatment until they receive a signed form, the following exchange took place between respondent and a member of the hearing committee: Q. Mr. Bettis, knowing that you had an authorization and assignment from a health care provider, would you have routinely, prior to any disbursement, have contacted them anyway just because you had the authorization and assignment? A. No. We would not have done that since we had not heard from this Center [WFWC] in any way. Q. So the authorization and assignment is not something you would automatically call somebody just to see what the status was? A. No. Mr. Wells accepted a settlement offer of $2,600.00 on May 31, 2000. [8] Two days later, on June 2, respondent deposited the settlement check [9] in a Bank of America account entitled T. Clarence Harper & Assoc. P.C., which respondent believed to be an escrow account. In fact, however, it was not an escrow account; neither the checks used for the account nor the bank's corporate signature cards, which were signed by Mr. Harper, identified it as such. Moreover, respondent did not have signatory authority over the account, nor did he have the power to withdraw the settlement funds once they were placed in the account. [10] When the settlement funds were distributed from the account, the bill from the WFWC was not paid. After these disciplinary proceedings were instituted against respondent, the Harper firm discovered that the account used in Mr. Wells' case was not an escrow account. New signature cards were prepared and signed and new checks were printed, and by July 2000 the account was again [11] identified as an escrow account. Respondent signed a signature card as an authorized signatory on the new escrow account on September 22, 2000.