Opinion ID: 781207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The union's retaliatory application of secondary pressure

Text: 35 The workers' first claim for breach of DFR rests on allegations that the union pressured Shapiro to pull its work from Sorrento in retaliation for the workers' efforts to decertify the union. The workers argue that the union acted in bad faith, failed to consult the workers, concealed their actions from the workers, and used the secondary pressure to coerce them in the exercise of their right not to join a union. The union counters that its conduct is completely immunized by a proviso to NLRA § 8(e) protecting secondary pressure in the garment industry. 36 The district court found that the union's activity was not completely immunized from DFR liability, but also found that the workers had shown no evidence of bad faith. Although we agree with the district court that the garment industry proviso does not protect the union from DFR liability, we find that, because the union was not acting in a representative role when it pulled the work from Sorrento, the duty of fair representation does not attach to its actions. We therefore do not reach the question of whether the workers presented evidence sufficient to sustain their allegations of bad faith. 37 Under most circumstances, agreements between a union and an employer to boycott another employer are prohibited by NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). Mindful of the special structure of the clothing and apparel industry, however, Congress added two provisos applicable only to that industry. The first exempts the garment industry from § 8(e)'s prohibitions; the second goes farther, providing [t]hat nothing in this sub-chapter [the NLRA] shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). As the union concedes, there are no reported decisions construing the scope of the second proviso. 38 The union argues that the plain language of the proviso precludes all lawsuits arising under the NLRA, including DFR actions, based on secondary pressure in the garment industry. The union's interpretation is incorrect. The plain language of the proviso indicates that the NLRA cannot prohibit enforcement of a secondary agreement in the garment industry. The workers do not claim that the union's agreement with Shapiro was unlawful; rather, they claim that the act of exerting external pressure on Sorrento in order to retaliate against the workers' rejection of the union violated the DFR. In other words, it is not the secondary pressure that the workers challenge, but the motivation behind it. 39 It is apparent from the legislative history that Congress never intended to immunize the union's actions against DFR claims. Instead, Congress was concerned that other parts of the NLRA—namely, § 8(b)(4) and § 8(e)—would prohibit agreements between unions and jobbers that prohibit the use of non-union contractors, which had long been used to organize the garment industry and eliminate sweatshop conditions. See, e.g., Staff of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Section by Section Analysis of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 20 (Comm. Print 1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 966 (1959) (hereinafter LMRDA History) (noting that the proviso exempts the garment industry from secondary boycott prohibitions and hot cargo provisions). 3 There is no explicit mention of NLRA § 9 nor implicit reference to the DFR in the legislative history. We therefore conclude that the proviso is intended to exempt secondary pressure in the garment industry from unfair labor practice liability—as indicated by the proviso's focus on prohibiting the enforcement of secondary agreements—but not to immunize unions from DFR liability whenever such secondary pressure is applied. 40 Our conclusion that the union is not immune from DFR liability does not compel a finding that the union has, in fact, breached its duty. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence makes it clear that the DFR is implicated because a union is acting under authority granted by statute or a collective bargaining agreement. In Breininger, for example, the Court considered whether a union's operation of a hiring hall was subject to the DFR. 493 U.S. at 85-90, 110 S.Ct. 424. The Court rejected an argument that the union was not acting in a representative capacity, finding that 41 [o]nly because of its status as a Board-certified bargaining representative and by virtue of the power ranted to it by the collective-bargaining agreement oes a union gain the ability to refer workers for employment through a hiring hall. Together with this authority comes the responsibility to exercise it in a nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory fashion, because he members of the bargaining unit have entrusted he union with the task of representing them. Id. at 87-88, 110 S.Ct. 424. In O'Neill, the Court found that contract negotiations were subject to the DFR, essentially holding that the DFR is implicated whenever the union is acting in its representative role. 499 U.S. at 77, 111 S.Ct. 1127. 42 Definitionally, however, the duty of fair representation does not apply where the union is not representing the workers in question. See, e.g., Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 481 (D.C.Cir.1983) (`[A] union ... can be held to represent employees unfairly only in regard to those matters as to which it represents them at all. ') (emphasis in original); see also Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 864 F.2d 1162, 1166 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that the duty of fair representation generally governs a union's conduct vis-a-vis the bargaining unit members when the union is representing them  (emphasis added)). This Circuit has held that a union owes no duty to union members who are not members of the bargaining unit that the union is representing. Karo v. San Diego Symphony Orchestra Ass'n, 762 F.2d 819, 821(9th Cir.1985). 43 Similarly, the Third Circuit, in a well-reasoned opinion analyzing Breininger and other Supreme Court precedent, found that the duty of fair representation is inextricably linked to the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative in the collective bargaining process or in the administration of rights under a collective bargaining agreement. Felice v. Sever, 985 F.2d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir.1993). There, the court considered whether an applicant for a police job, who had been previously employed at a union job and retained his union membership, could maintain a DFR claim when the same union, which also represented the police and had to approve funding for new hires, did not approve his application. Id. at 1223-24. The court held that he could not maintain a DFR claim because it was mere happenstance that he was a member of the union, and the union was not acting in a representative capacity. Id. at 1228-29. 44 The same reasoning applies here. It is true that UNITE-SW continued to represent the Sorrento workers even after Sorrento repudiated the CBA extension and refused to bargain with the union, but the union was not acting in its representative capacity when it sought to deprive Sorrento of work. The union could have exerted the same pressure on Shapiro to pull its work even if the workers had been successful in their attempts to decertify the union, or if the union had never represented the workers. It was not acting pursuant to any authority granted by statute as the exclusive representative of the Sorrento workers; nor was it acting pursuant to authority granted by the Sorrento CBA. 4 45 As the Third Circuit noted in Felice, [t]he thread that links Breininger and other duty of fair representation cases ... is that the union is acting in its role as exclusive bargaining representative in the collective bargaining process. 985 F.2d at 1228. Here, the union was not doing so, and no DFR liability can attach. 46 Finally, the workers also argue that the union's failure to consult with the Sorrento workers before pulling the Shapiro work violated the duty of fair representation. As the district court noted, however, [i]n light of the ... conclusion that the application of secondary pressure was not in itself a violation of the DFR, it cannot be said that a failure to consult with employees who would be adversely affected by such pressure was a violation of the DFR. The union was not acting in its capacity as representative of the Sorrento workers when it agreed with Shapiro not to send more work to Sorrento, and was not obliged to consult members of each represented unit that might be affected by the agreement. See White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 183 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that where a union seeks ratification of an agreement by its members, it must consult them and explain the agreement to them, but where such a ratification requirement is lacking ... the union has no duty to inform the members of the agreement). We find no breach of the duty of fair representation arising from the union's application of secondary pressure on Sorrento. 47