Opinion ID: 1349274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: assessing credibility of evidence

Text: During the in camera hearing, the State moved to overrule Sanchez-Lahora's motion to introduce evidence of his alleged relationship with the victim because State v. Hopkins, 221 Neb. 367, 377 N.W.2d 110 (1985), indicated that Sanchez-Lahora had failed to meet his burden in adducing evidence other than his allegation. The court agreed this was the standard and also informed Sanchez-Lahora's counsel that if the court found that he had met his burden under Hopkins, then the State would be given an opportunity to present further evidence. These statements indicate that the court apparently believed its role was to assess the credibility of the evidence presented by the defendant. In State v. Hopkins, supra , the defendant did not admit to having sexual relations with the victim on the night charged. Rather, he stated he was too drunk to remember the events. Thus, he presented no evidence showing consent for the prosecuted act, and we were not presented with the issue whether the trial court should weigh the credibility of the evidence adduced at the in camera hearing under § 28-321. Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. State v. Neiss, 260 Neb. 691, 619 N.W.2d 222 (2000); State v. Hernandez, 259 Neb. 948, 613 N.W.2d 455 (2000). In its petition for further review, the State argues that Sanchez-Lahora's evidence is not credible and urges this court to adopt the standard in Holloway v. State, 695 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.App.1985) (two-judge panel), affirmed on other grounds 751 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (en banc) (concluding that victim's reputation for being prostitute was not material to fact at issue). In Holloway, the Texas rape shield statute in effect at the time of the offense was quoted in relevant part: Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct may be admitted [in sexual assault cases] only if, and only to the extent that, the judge finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value. 751 S.W.2d at 867 n. 2. In Holloway v. State, supra , the defendant sought to present evidence of the victim's reputation for being a prostitute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the evidence, based on its conclusion that the trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and as such he may accept or reject any part or all of the testimony given. 695 S.W.2d at 117, citing Bellah v. State, 653 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). However, the State neglected to inform this court that this ruling was specifically rejected by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In Holloway v. State, 751 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that the case relied upon by the Court of Appeals for its holding dealt with a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the defendant's confession. See Bellah v. State, supra . Deciding whether a confession was voluntarily and knowingly made by the defendant and therefore admissible is an established preliminary question requiring the trial court to weigh the credibility of witnesses on this factual issue. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (applying preponderance standard to question of voluntariness). Accord State v. Lopez, 249 Neb. 634, 645, 544 N.W.2d 845, 854 (1996) ([t]here is no question that the State has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's statement was voluntary and not coerced). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized, however, that [a] rule of admissibility such as [the rape shield statute] is `not concerned with the weight of the evidence.' Holloway v. State, 751 S.W.2d at 870. Not only was the wording of the statute different in Holloway, but the reasoning the State asks us to adopt was specifically rejected on appeal. Instead, we turn to the history of rape shield legislation for guidance on the trial court's role in assessing the credibility of the evidence presented at the in camera hearing. All states now have some form of a rape shield statute or rule of evidence. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 Cath. U.L.Rev. 709 (1995) (citing statutes or rules of evidence for 48 states). See, also, Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 13-1421 (West Cum.Supp.2000); Utah R. Evid. 412. The main purposes served by § 28-321 were set out in State v. Hopkins, 221 Neb. 367, 377 N.W.2d 110 (1985), and, in particular, include preventing the use of the victim's past sexual behavior with persons other than the defendant to infer consent by the victim to the prosecuted act or to undermine the victim's credibility. Most state statutes are patterned after rule 412 of the federal rules of evidence. See State v. Hopkins, supra , citing 1A John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 62 n. 11 (Tillers rev.1983). When federal rule 412 was originally enacted in 1978, it included the following language: [I]f the relevancy of the evidence which the accused seeks to offer in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for such purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-540 § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046, 2047 (1978) (amended, Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-690, § 7046(a), 102 Stat. 4395, 4400 (1988)). Some states patterned their rape shield statute after the original federal rule and still incorporate this provision. See, e.g., D.C.Code Annot. § 22-4122(B)(b)(2) (Michie 1996); Haw. R. Evid. 412, Haw.Rev. Stat. § 626-1 (1993 & Cum.Supp.2000); Idaho R. Evid. 412(c)(2); Iowa R. Evid. 412(c)(2); Miss. Evid. Rule 412(c)(2); N.C. R. Evid. 412(d). The statutes containing this provision arguably authorize the trial court to make factual findings on the issue of consent before admitting the evidence of past consensual relations between the defendant and the alleged victim. However, federal rule 412 was amended in 1994 to delete the language from subsection (c) that authorized the trial court to make factual findings before admitting the evidence permitted under the rule. The action was based upon the advisory committee's concern that the provision was causing confusion over whether a trial court could exclude evidence of past consensual sexual relations between the victim and the defendant if the trial court did not believe that such acts had occurred, raising substantial constitutional concerns. See Fed.R.Evid. 412, Notes of Advisory Committee ([s]uch an authorization raises questions of invasion of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments). Nebraska enacted its rape shield statute in 1977 and amended it in 1984, but in both instances, the Nebraska Legislature chose not to include the judicial determination provision found in the original federal rule 412(c)(2). Because the Nebraska rape shield statute is patterned after federal rule 412, see State v. Hopkins, supra , citing Introducer's Statement of Intent, L.B. 79, Judiciary Committee, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 26, 1983), we conclude that the Legislature rejected any fact-finding role for the trial court by omitting this language from the Nebraska statute. We find no language in § 28-321 that permits the trial court to weigh the credibility of a defendant's allegations of past consensual sexual conduct with a victim. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the question of the credibility of Sanchez Lahora's factual account of his alleged history with the victim is for the jury to decide. AFFIRMED.