Opinion ID: 1059140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney

Text: In his tenth assignment of error, Powell contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney and his office from prosecuting Powell on the new indictment. Powell asserts the grossly offensive personal attacks on the Commonwealth's Attorney in Powell's October 21, 2001 letter, created a direct conflict of interest because the Commonwealth's Attorney had a personal stake in the outcome of this case. This is so, Powell contends, because the personal attacks in his letter undoubtedly led [the Commonwealth's Attorney] to have feelings of animosity towards Powell. The Commonwealth responds that the Commonwealth's Attorney represented to the trial court that he could impartially prosecute the case and that it was a matter within the trial court's discretion to determine whether to disqualify him. We agree with the Commonwealth. The due process rights of a criminal defendant under both the Virginia and United States Constitutions are violated when a Commonwealth's Attorney who has a conflict of interest relevant to the defendant's case prosecutes the defendant. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 394, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (1985); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir.1967). However, the question whether there is a conflict of interest is dependent upon the circumstances of the individual case, and the burden is on the party seeking disqualification of the prosecutor to present evidence establishing the existence of disqualifying bias or prejudice. The determination whether the evidence supports a finding of a conflict of interest is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Lux v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 561, 569, 484 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1997). The issue may arise where the prosecutor has had an attorney-client relationship with the parties involved whereby he obtained privileged information that may be adverse to the defendant's interest in regard to the pending criminal charges. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 15 Va.App. 684, 694, 426 S.E.2d 837, 842 (1993). A second situation is where the prosecutor has some direct personal interest arising from a financial interest, kinship, or close friendship such that his objectivity and impartiality are called into question. See, e.g., Cantrell, 229 Va. at 391-94, 329 S.E.2d at 24-27. Neither of these circumstances applies to the present case. Beyond these categories of clear and direct conflicts of interest and ethical bars to a particular attorney prosecuting a particular defendant, there is the broader consideration of whether, on the facts of a particular case, the adversarial nature of the judicial process has resulted in such enmity toward the defendant on the part of the prosecutor that it will overbear his professional judgment in seeking fairly and impartially to see justice done. See Lux, 24 Va.App. at 569, 484 S.E.2d at 149. As the United States Supreme Court has observed in a related context, `[i]mpartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence.' Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2nd Cir.1943)). We are of opinion that the same can be said of the prosecutor's role. The adversarial nature of criminal prosecutions unsurprisingly tends to engender some level of friction between the prosecutor and the defendant in difficult cases, especially where, as here, the defendant seems intent on showing his contempt and disrespect for the prosecutor. However, merely demonstrating a history of one-sided acrimony between the defendant and the prosecutor is insufficient to establish a conflict of interest or prosecutorial misconduct with respect to an otherwise proper prosecution. See, e.g., Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir.1995). If such were not the case, a defendant would have an incentive to deliberately incite such enmity. The evidence must reflect that the prosecutor is acting not within the dictates of the law, but has strayed outside those parameters in furtherance of a personal animus against the defendant. Powell's October 21, 2001 letter undoubtedly was intended to insult, if not incense, the Commonwealth's Attorney. But, the trial court was within its discretion to accept the Commonwealth's Attorney's assurance that it had not had an effect on his professional judgment in seeking fairly and impartially to see justice done. Moreover, nothing in the Commonwealth's Attorney's conduct of the trial evinces any lack of such professional judgment on his part. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Powell's motion to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney.