Opinion ID: 687589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent as a Defense to Destruction of Government Property

Text: 40 The defendants argue that because the government gave them the Buick to be burned, the district court should have instructed the jury that consent was an absolute bar to guilt under Sec. 1361. This is an issue of first impression, and we disagree with the defendants. 41 Section 1361 authorizes the prosecution of [w]hoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property of the United States. Nowhere on its face does the statute indicate that consent is a defense, nor does it indicate that lack of consent is one of the elements that the government must prove. Moreover, the legislative history for Sec. 1361 makes no mention of consent. 42 The defendants basically challenge the government's right to use sting operations. Time and again, however, we have upheld convictions stemming from sting operations. See, e.g., United States v. Asencio, 873 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir.1989) (Offering ... willing buyers a chance to purchase what they thought was a kilo of heroin, but turned out to be dextrose plus one-half a gram of heroin neither offends due process nor occasions the exercise of our supervisory power.); United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 209-11 (2d Cir.) (international drug dealer invited by government agent to make a drug sale in the United States), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942, 104 S.Ct. 359, 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 834-47 (2d Cir.1982) (affirming convictions obtained as a result of the Abscam sting operation, where Congressmen were bribed), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 103 S.Ct. 2437, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983). 43 The defendants' reliance on United States v. Bennett, 665 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.1981), is misplaced. The defendant there was convicted of receiving, storing, and disposing of a stolen truck, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2313, and selling stolen goods, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2315. These statutes, however, expressly required that the truck and goods be stolen, and that defendant knew this. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2313 ([w]hoever receives, ... stores, ... or disposes of any motor vehicle ... knowing the same to have been stolen); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2315 ([w]hoever ... sells ... any goods ... knowing the same to have been stolen). We held that [b]ecause the concept of 'stolen' property requires an interference with the property rights of its owner, property that has been transported, sold, or otherwise disposed of, with the consent of the owner cannot be considered 'stolen' within the meaning of Secs. 2312-2315. Bennett, 665 F.2d at 22. Thus, unlike Sec. 1361, the statutes at issue in Bennett made the issue of consent material. That is not our case. 44 Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to give a charge to the jury on consent.