Opinion ID: 806386
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bucalo’s Prima Facie Case

Text: The Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas “established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is to “progressively . . . sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981). 5 Bucalo’s brief on appeal focuses almost exclusively upon her argument that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To the extent she also argues that she is entitled to a new trial, we hold, for the same reasons set forth in this section, that the district court’s refusal to grant her a new trial was not an abuse of discretion. 13 At the first stage, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a “prima facie” case. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. The requirements to establish a prima facie case are “minimal,” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, and a plaintiff’s burden is therefore “not onerous,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. “Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” Id. at 254. At the second McDonnell Douglas stage, the presumption created by the prima facie case “places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case – i.e., the burden of ‘producing evidence’ that the adverse employment actions were taken ‘for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 50607 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). However, while the presumption “shifts the burden of production to the defendant, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’” Id. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). If the defendant satisfies its burden of production, then “the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and drops from the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At the final stage, the plaintiff then has “the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision” – a burden that “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (noting that after the presumption is rebutted the “sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 14 This framework, which was developed in the context of claims for discrimination under Title VII, applies to claims of age discrimination under the ADEA and to claims of retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA. See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2010). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff with an age discrimination claim must show “(1) that she was within the protected age group, (2) that she was qualified for the position, (3) that she experienced adverse employment action, and (4) that the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Id. at 107. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The same standards apply to claims of retaliation under the ADEA. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 141 (2d Cir. 2003). Bucalo argues at length that she “conclusively established” her prima facie cases of age discrimination and retaliation, and was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the District failed to rebut her prima facie case. Appellant’s Br. at 28. We disagree. At the outset, it is important to be clear about the consequences of a defendant’s failure to satisfy its burden of production at trial under the second step of McDonnell Douglas. As the Supreme Court noted in Hicks, “if, on the evidence presented, (1) any rational person would have to find the existence of facts constituting a prima facie case, 15 and (2) the defendant has failed to meet its burden of production,” then the “court must award judgment to the plaintiff as a matter of law” under Rule 50(a). 509 U.S. at 509. However, “[i]f the defendant has failed to sustain its burden but reasonable minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes the facts of a prima facie case, then a question of fact does remain, which the trier of fact will be called upon to answer.” Id. at 509-10. Accordingly, as we and other circuits have recognized, “disputed elements of a prima facie case must be submitted to a jury” even if the defendant fails to carry its burden of production. Hester v. BIC Corp., 225 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 381 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing appropriate jury instructions in the event “the facts of the prima facie case are disputed and the defendant has produced no rebuttal evidence”); Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir. 2002) (“If the parties dispute the facts establishing the prima facie case . . . a question of fact remains for the fact finder to decide.”); Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1283 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ven if Defendants had failed to meet their burden of production, Plaintiff’s facts in this case were contested and reasonable minds could differ as to whether he established a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Sisk v. Picture People, Inc., 669 F.3d 896, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2012) (similar).6 6 At the same time, “juries should not be charged on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), 214 F.3d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Courts – not juries – should determine whether the initial McDonnell Douglas burdens 16 The question, then, is whether the district court correctly determined that there was a genuine factual dispute for the jury to resolve regarding plaintiff’s prima facie showing of age discrimination and retaliation. We believe that it did. The District contested at trial whether Bucalo had satisfied the fourth element of a prima facie case for both her age discrimination and retaliation claims. With respect to age discrimination, to prove the fourth element of her prima facie case Bucalo was required to show that Lanier’s refusal to hire her “occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 107. As we noted in Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., in the context of summary judgment “an ADEA plaintiff who is replaced by a significantly younger worker must offer some evidence of a defendant’s knowledge as to the significant age discrepancy to support a prima facie inference of discriminatory intent.” 411 F.3d 69, 90 (2d Cir. 2005). In this case, there was some evidence in the record that Lanier was aware of such a discrepancy: The District stipulated that Lanier had reviewed the District’s legal files when he was hired in 2001, and those files contained Bucalo’s EEOC complaint, which listed her date of birth. As the district court recognized, this evidence, when coupled with Chrabolowski’s resume, which suggested that she was in her early 30s, was sufficient for Bucalo to create an issue of fact for the jury as to the fourth element of her prima facie of production have been met.”). In keeping with our precedents, the jury in this case was not charged on the McDonnell Douglas framework. Instead, the jury was asked to determine whether plaintiff had met her ultimate burden of proving age discrimination or retaliation. 17 case, and to defeat the District’s motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law at trial. However, that does not necessarily mean that Bucalo proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lanier’s refusal to hire Bucalo “occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 107. The District was still entitled to present facts to the jury calling that inference into question, and it did so by noting that Lanier had never met Bucalo, had reviewed her application two years after initially reading the District’s legal files, and could have thought that Bucalo and Chrabolowski were the same age since their resumes both suggested that they were in their early 30s. In these circumstances, we believe that “reasonable minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the evidence establishe[d]” that Lanier knew or remembered Bucalo’s age at the time he rejected her application and was therefore aware of a significant age discrepancy between Bucalo and Chrabolowski. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (emphasis omitted). Thus, this element of plaintiff’s prima facie case was disputed, and was properly submitted to the jury.7 The fourth element of Bucalo’s prima facie case for retaliation was also at the very least disputed. That element requires a plaintiff to show “a causal connection between the 7 Contrary to Bucalo’s argument on appeal, see Appellant’s Br. at 33-34, the district court’s refusal to give a special jury instruction regarding Woodman does not alter this analysis. While such an instruction may have been permissible – a question we do not reach – the issue of Lanier’s lack of knowledge of Bucalo’s age was argued to the jury, and the jury could hardly have found that Lanier intentionally discriminated against Bucalo on the basis of her age if it believed he did not know her age. 18 protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Jute, 420 F.3d at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a causal connection can be established indirectly “‘by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse employment action.’” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 110 (quoting Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001)). While we have not drawn “a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship” between a protected activity and an allegedly retaliatory action, courts in this circuit have typically measured that gap as a matter of months, not years. Gorman-Bakos, 252 F.3d at 554-55 & n.5 (collecting cases); see also Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 110 (noting that “we have previously held that five months is not too long to find the causal relationship”). In this case, the district court reasoned that the four year gap in this case did not preclude a causal inference because Bucalo was not employed by the District for that entire period, and the District took an adverse employment action against her on its first opportunity to do so. Even if the district court was correct that this evidence was sufficient to permit Bucalo to present her retaliation claim to the jury – an issue we do not reach – Bucalo’s evidence was not so strong that “any rational person would have to find” that it demonstrated a causal connection between Bucalo’s EEOC complaint and Lanier’s decision by a preponderance of the evidence. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509. The District was still entitled to – and did – argue to the jury that there was no causal connection by noting the long gap of time and that Lanier was not involved in Bucalo’s rejection in 1999. 19 Accordingly, this element of Bucalo’s case was also disputed and properly submitted to the jury for determination. Because elements of Bucalo’s prima facie case for both age discrimination and retaliation were disputed, Bucalo was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if the District was unable, by virtue of Lanier’s death, to satisfy its burden under the second stage of McDonnell Douglas.