Opinion ID: 612988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prejudicial Surplusage in the Indictment

Text: Finally, O'Connor challenges the district court's decision not to redact certain portions of the indictment before sending it to the jury room. At the close of evidence, the parties disagreed over the form of the indictment the court would provide to the jury. The caption of the indictment identified O'Connor's codefendants, and she asked the court to redact their names as prejudicial surplusage. The government objected to removing the codefendants' names because the jury might speculate about why the key participants in the scheme  whose involvement had been the subject of much of the trial testimony  were not included as defendants in the caption. The judge denied O'Connor's request and let the unredacted form of the indictment go to the jury. The judge did, however, issue a cautionary instruction telling the jurors not to speculate [about] why any other person whose names you may have heard during the trial or who was named in the indictment in this case as a defendant is not currently on trial before you. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that [u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may strike surplusage from the indictment or information. FED.R.CRIM.P. 7(d). The court's decision on a Rule 7(d) motion turns on considerations of relevance and prejudice. United States v. Peters, 435 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir.2006) (Surplusage should not be stricken unless it is clear that the allegations are not relevant to the charge and are inflammatory and prejudicial. (quotation marks omitted)). We review the denial of a Rule 7(d) motion to strike for abuse of discretion. United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir.1988). We find no abuse of discretion here. The identity of the codefendants was relevant to the charge against O'Connor. Their names had been repeated often during the trial, and this information was important to provide the jury with a more complete picture of the scheme. The link between O'Connor and her codefendants was central to the case, so leaving their names in the indictment's caption caused no prejudice. Finally, the court issued a cautionary instruction warning the jury that the indictment was not evidence and that O'Connor's association with her codefendants was not sufficient by itself to prove her knowing participation in the scheme. See United States v. Marshall, 985 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir.1993) (cautionary instructions can mitigate the risk of prejudice). O'Connor raises two additional Rule 7(d) arguments for the first time on appeal, both unavailing. She claims that a paragraph in the indictment referring to the total loss caused by the fraudulent scheme was prejudicial surplusage. We disagree. The amount of the fraud was relevant and had been placed in evidence during the trial. The evidence of the loss amount  about $6 million  approximated the $6.2 million loss alleged in the indictment. O'Connor's final argument is that some parts of the indictment described facts that pertained only to the involvement of others in the scheme but erroneously and prejudicially implied her participation. But the wire-fraud count against her incorporated by reference the entire fraudulent scheme. Accordingly, the parts of the indictment she claims were irrelevant were actually included in the charge against her. The form of the indictment that went to the jury did not contain irrelevant and prejudicial surplusage. AFFIRMED.