Opinion ID: 1172016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Marsden Hearing

Text: At the August 5, 1981, hearing in the Lassen County Superior Court on defendant's motions to dismiss the information and to suppress evidence under sections 995 and 1538.5, a discussion took place between defendant and the court wherein defendant moved to dismiss his attorney because I feel he is not competent..., doesn't have my best interest at heart.... [H]e's just not doing his job to the best of his ability, and this case is a death sentence case and I feel that it's important I have a competent lawyer to handle it. The court responded that I'm going to need more showing than that, and observed that defendant's counsel was doing a bang-up job on your behalf.... He wants to look out for your interest even when you don't want to do something.... The motion will be denied. Defendant, after being permitted to elaborate, indicated that I wanted him [counsel] to make a motion against Norman Thomas, against the competency of him being, you know, a witness, a competent witness. The court explained that the competency of witnesses is a matter to be decided by the trial judge once trial commences. The court concluded by denying the motion without prejudice to renewal before the San Bernardino County Superior Court, where the case was to be transferred. Evidently, defendant declined to renew his motion at that time. (3a) Defendant claims that the court violated the mandate of People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-124 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] because of the complete absence of any inquiry of appellant as to why he wished to discharge his lawyer. Defendant's reliance upon Marsden is misplaced. There, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to present evidence of counsel's inadequacy or incompetency. We found error, but noted that a defendant does not have the right to the appointment of new counsel absent a clear showing of inadequate representation. (4) As we stated in Marsden, `A defendant's right to a court-appointed counsel does not include the right to require the court to appoint more than one counsel, except in a situation where the record clearly shows that the first appointed counsel is not adequately representing the accused.... The right of a defendant in a criminal case to have the assistance of counsel for his defense ... may include the right to have counsel appointed by the court ... discharged or other counsel substituted, if it is shown ... that failure to do so would substantially impair or deny the right ..., but the right to such discharge or substitution is not absolute, in the sense that the court is bound to accede to its assertion without a sufficient showing ... that the right to the assistance of counsel would be substantially impaired ... in case the request is not granted, and within these limits there is a field of discretion for the court.' [Citations.] (2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) In Marsden, we also found it impossible for a court to properly exercise its discretion without first listening to [the] reasons for requesting a change of attorneys. ( Ibid. ) (3b) In defendant's case, the court did just that. Defendant informed the court why he wished substitute counsel and the court responded to each reason. Defendant's first point was his belief that his attorney was incompetent and did not have his best interests at heart. The court responded that, based on the record before it, counsel was competent and acting in defendant's best interests. Defendant's second reason was that his attorney failed to make certain motions he wished made. The court explained that the motions defendant had in mind either were not legally cognizable or were not properly before the Lassen County Superior Court in light of the venue change to San Bernardino County. Defendant's third reason was that he simply did not relate well to his attorney, who had only seen him once. But the number of times one sees his attorney, and the way in which one relates with his attorney, does not sufficiently establish incompetence. Defendant was required to show more. As Marsden recognized, the decision whether to permit a defendant to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney during the trial is within the discretion of the trial court, and a defendant has no absolute right to more than one appointed attorney. (2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) Here, the court listened to defendant's reasons for requesting substitute counsel  unlike the court in Marsden  and found that defendant had made an insufficient showing. We find no basis in this record for concluding that the court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion.