Opinion ID: 149023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Supervised Release Statute Grants Federal Courts the Authority to Order Restitution as a Condition of Supervised Release for Any Criminal Offense

Text: Despite its expansive terms, the Probation Statute does not, on its own, grant courts the authority to order restitution as a condition of supervised release. That authority comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (the Supervised Release Statute), which extends the reach of the Probation Statute to supervised release. The version of the statute in effect at the time of Batson's indictment, which is essentially identical to the one currently in effect, provides in pertinent part that [a] court may order, as a further condition of supervised release . . . any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and any other condition it considers to be appropriate. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(d) (West July 2008). [5] Thus the district court's authority to order restitution as a condition of supervised release is just as broad as its authority to order restitution as a condition of probation. Accordingly, the Supervised Release Statute, together with the Probation Statute, unambiguously authorizes federal courts to order restitution as a condition of supervised release for any criminal offense, including one under Title 26, for which supervised release is properly imposed. In reaching this conclusion, we note that nothing in the text of the VWPA or the MVRA remotely indicates that Congress sought by those acts to constrain the preexisting authority of federal courts to order restitution. That pre-existing authority had evolved from the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed 1987), and was maintained in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), which contains the Probation Statute. See Pub.L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a), (b)(1)-(2)). We had also recognized the authority of courts to order restitution not limited to specific offenses as a condition of probation. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 735 F.2d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir.1984) (In criminal tax cases, a district court may rely on [the FPA] to condition probation on the defendant's restitution of his outstanding tax liability.); cf. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932) (The [FPA] authorizes courts of original jurisdiction . . . to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem best.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither the VWPA, enacted in 1982, nor the MVRA, enacted in 1996, disturbed this well-established authority. The VWPA merely added to it; the VWPA permitted courts, for the first time, to order payment of restitution independent of a sentence of probation. The MVRA merely added a congressional mandate requiring an order of restitution for defendants convicted of certain crimes. It did not repeal the SRA, which Congress had enacted more than a decade earlier, and its text does not diminish the long-standing authority of federal courts to order restitution as a condition of probation. Finally, § 5E 1.1(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), while not controlling, calls for restitution as a condition of probation or supervised release if the offense is not an offense for which restitution is authorized under [the VWPA] but otherwise meets the criteria for an order of restitution under that section. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5E1.1(a)(2) (2008). Promulgated nearly nine years prior to the enactment of the MVRA, § 5E1.1(a)(2), originally designated § 5E4.1(a), was plainly intended to bridge the gap between the VWPA and the many offenses beyond its purview. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5E4.1(a) (1988) (Restitution shall be ordered for convictions under.. . [the VWPA], and may be ordered as a condition of probation or supervised release in any other case.); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C and 383 (1991) (explaining that the aim of section 5E1.1, which had been amended in 1991, is to require [rather than permit] restitution as a condition of probation or supervised release for offenses not set forth in [the VWPA]). Accordingly, we hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2), which grants federal courts broad discretion to order restitution as a condition of probation, and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which extends that grant to supervised release, authorizes federal courts to order restitution as a condition of supervised release for any criminal offense, including those set forth in Title 26, for which supervised release is properly imposed.