Opinion ID: 1678319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of the victim-impact statute and the law-of-the-case doctrine

Text: In his first trial and appeal, Kemp challenged the constitutionality of Arkansas's victim-impact statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl.1997). This court rejected his arguments and declared the statute constitutional. Kemp, 324 Ark. at 203-06, 919 S.W.2d 943. During Kemp's resentencing trial, he renewed his constitutional objections to the statute, and his motion was again rejected by the trial court. Victim-impact testimony was introduced at the resentencing hearing through two relatives of victims Robert Phegley and Cheryl Phegley. In the instant appeal from the three death sentences, Kemp reargues that the victim-impact statute is void for vagueness, facially and as applied, and is substantively and procedurally unconstitutional, pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 8. Arkansas's victim-impact statute provides, in part: In determining sentence, evidence may be presented to the jury as to any matters relating to aggravating circumstances enumerated in § 5-4-604, or any mitigating circumstances, or any other matter relevant to punishment, including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence, provided that the defendant and the state are accorded an opportunity to rebut such evidence. Further, the publisher's notes to section 5-4-602 indicate that the statute's enacting clause provided: It is the express intention of this act to permit the prosecution to introduce victim impact evidence as permitted by the United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, [reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S.Ct. 28, 115 L.Ed.2d 1110] (1991). In Payne , the United States Supreme Court overruled the per se bar to victim-impact evidence, established in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), and upheld a state's choice to permit the admission of victim-impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject. Significantly, the Payne Court noted that: the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597. In response to the appellant's renewed constitutional objections to Arkansas's victim-impact statute, the State contends that our review of these arguments is barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. We agree. We also note that we have upheld the constitutionality of the victim-impact statute on many occasions. See Noel v. State, 331 Ark. 79, 960 S.W.2d 439 (1998); Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 942 S.W.2d 231 (1997); Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943 (1996); Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995). However, because we considered and decided in Kemp's prior appeal the same constitutional arguments raised in the instant appeal, our prior decision with regard to those matters is binding in this subsequent appeal from the appellant's resentencing hearing. The doctrine of the law of the case provides that the decision of an appellate court establishes the law of the case for the trial upon remand and for the appellate court itself upon subsequent review. Washington v. State, 278 Ark. 5, 7, 643 S.W.2d 255 (1982) (citing Mayo v. Ark. Valley Trust Co., 137 Ark. 331, 209 S.W. 276 (1919)). Although we noted in Washington that the doctrine is not inflexible and does not absolutely preclude correction of error, id. (citing Ferguson v. Green, 266 Ark. 556, 557, 587 S.W.2d 18 (1979)), we have also held that the doctrine prevents an issue raised in a prior appeal from being raised in a subsequent appeal unless the evidence materially varies between the two appeals. Fairchild v. Norris, 317 Ark. 166, 170, 876 S.W.2d 588 (1994). We adhere to this doctrine to preserve consistency and to avoid reconsideration of matters previously decided. Id. Significantly, the doctrine extends to issues of constitutional law. Id.; Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 S.W.2d 242 (1991). Here, there is neither an allegation for correction of an error nor of evidence that materially varies from the prior appeal. Kemp merely reargues the merits of his former constitutional challenges to the victim-impact statute. Kemp's argument that the statute is void for vagueness and is unconstitutional, substantively and procedurally, facially and as applied, was addressed and rejected by this court in his prior appeal. Likewise, we considered and rejected Kemp's argument that the statute violates due process and the protection against cruel and unusual punishment because it does not give sufficient guidance to the jury and judge about how to consider such evidence. Pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, we hold that the appellant's arguments provide no basis for relief in the instant appeal.