Opinion ID: 1448371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: nuisance claims against a public entity

Text: Nuisance is the unreasonable, unusual, or unnatural use of one's property so that it substantially impairs the right of another to peacefully enjoy his property. The focus is defendant's unreasonable interference with the use of and enjoyment of plaintiff's land ... The unreasonable use element of nuisance balances the rights of adjoining property owners. [2] The Sewer District does not contest their plant constituted a nuisance, so we accept the implicit finding by the trial court that the plant did constitute a nuisance. In general, plaintiff in a successful nuisance case can recover the diminished value of its property, for any actual inconvenience and physical discomfort which materially affected the comfortable and healthful enjoyment and occupancy of his home, as well as for any actual injury to his health or property caused by the nuisance. [3] We reiterate the Residents only claim is that the odors caused them to lose the full use and enjoyment of their property. Absent a claim for personal injury and a waiver of sovereign immunity under section 537.600.1, recovery for nuisance is more limited when, as here, a public entity is the defendant. In Heins Implement v. Highway & Transport Commission, we noted, when private property is damaged by a nuisance operated by an entity having the power of eminent domain, the proper remedy is an action in inverse condemnation. [4] The Residents, therefore, are constitutionally entitled to just compensation from the Sewer District. Article I, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution provides, that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. If a public entity permanently damages property rights of plaintiff, then it is liable for the fair market value lost in that property. [5] The fair market value of land is what a reasonable buyer would give who was willing but did not have to purchase, and what a seller would take who was willing but did not have to sell. [6] The value compensable is only that value which is capable of being transferred from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some equivalent. [7] If the public entity only temporarily damaged the property rights of plaintiff, by contrast, the loss in market value of the property is not the proper criterion. [8] Instead, the proper measure is the diminution in value of the use of occupancy of the property for [the] period taken or damaged. [9] Usually, this value is equivalent to the rent that probably could have been obtained for such period. [10] In City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze , this Court agreed: Where land is taken, not to be held permanently, but only for temporary use, the measure of compensation is not the market value but what the property is fairly worth for the time during which it is held, and the same rule applies where property, no part of which is taken, is temporarily injured. The criterion for determining the compensation is held, in some cases, to be the rental value of the property. [11] Whether permanent or temporary the lost value of the property for the appropriate period of time must be shown. A calculation of damages is also affected by whether the odors constituted a partial taking of plaintiff's property rights. Missouri recognizes that the taking or damage of only part of plaintiff's property by a public entity may cause consequential damage to plaintiff's remaining property. [12] This consequential damage is in addition to the value of plaintiff's property actually [permanently or temporarily] taken or damaged. [13] These damages are also measured by the depreciation in value of the remaining property. [14] Recovery for a physical injury and loss of the use and enjoyment of property itself is not appropriate for an inverse condemnation claim, although such injuries may be relevant to calculating the lost value of the property. [15] Therefore, the trial court erroneously applied the law to award the Residents damages for their physical suffering and loss of the use and enjoyment of their homes apart from its effect on the market or rental value of their property. Furthermore, no evidence of any kind was presented about the value of the Residents' property. The Residents did not testify what they paid for their property interest, nor did they offer testimony from a property valuation expert. In fact, shortly after trial began the Residents expressly decided against such testimony. The only evidence showed their physical injuries and the subjective use and enjoyment they lost in their homes due to the odors. Accordingly, we also find no substantial evidence supports the damages awarded by the trial court. Consequently, we need not determine whether the odors, in fact, constituted a temporary or permanent or partial taking, nor discuss how to distinguish among these varieties or combinations thereof. Although the Residents' inverse condemnation claim is based on nuisance, compensation in this case is not determined according to the law of nuisance as recited in McCracken . [16] We hold the attempt to award damages for personal injuries in a nuisance-based inverse condemnation case for injury to property is erroneous as a matter of law. The Residents suffered physical injury, but their nuisance-based inverse condemnation claim only seeks compensation for injury to their property rights. Accordingly, they are not entitled to recover for the loss of use and enjoyment of their property caused by the odors apart from how that loss affects the overall lost value in their property rights. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. All concur.