Opinion ID: 1122542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prior Conviction

Text: Defendant contends that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he has a prior conviction for a crime of violence under § 13-703(F)(2). He argues that no certified copy of the conviction was entered in the record and no stipulation between the parties exists. We agree that no certified copy of the conviction was introduced. Instead, the record discloses only an FBI report disclosing that a Thomas West was convicted of manslaughter in Illinois. Defendant argues that the rap sheet is not tied to him and is hearsay. These foundational and hearsay objections were not made in the lower court; therefore, we consider them precluded absent fundamental error. State v. Allen, 157 Ariz. 165, 170, 755 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1988). However, even considering the rap sheet to be properly in evidence, we agree with defendant that the information it contains is insufficient to prove an aggravating factor under § 13-703(F)(2). We do not, however, agree with defendant's contention that there was no stipulation concerning the prior conviction. The absence of a certified copy is, perhaps, not surprising, in view of the following statement made by defense counsel at the first sentencing hearing: We are agreeable to stipulating that Mr. West has suffered a prior manslaughter conviction which satisfies the aggravation, the aggravating circumstance described in 13-703 which is that it was a crime involving violence I think is the language. We read this for what it was intended to be  a stipulation. The defendant complains, however, that he did not personally participate in the stipulation. It is well established that a defendant may be bound by his counsel's trial strategy decision to waive even constitutional rights. State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 595, 676 P.2d 615, 627 (1983). The only exception to this rule is that the defendant himself must consent to the waiver of his constitutional rights when the circumstances of the case are exceptional. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451, 85 S.Ct. 564, 569, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965) (counsel has authority to waive introduction of illegally seized evidence without defendant's consent). We do not believe a stipulation to facts that the state could easily have proved amounts to an exceptional circumstance requiring defendant's consent. The stipulation is binding until and unless it is withdrawn. A court may, of course, relieve a party of a stipulation on a motion for good cause shown, State v. Sorrell, 109 Ariz. 171, 173, 506 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1973) ( citing Gangadean v. Flori Investment Co., 106 Ariz. 245, 474 P.2d 1006 (1970)), but defendant never made such a request. Defense counsel said nothing at the second sentencing about the stipulation and did not request permission to withdraw from it. An Illinois appellate court opinion issued after the sentencing discloses that the defendant was indeed convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a crime included under § 13-703(F)(2). See People v. West, 209 Ill. App.3d 1019, 154 Ill.Dec. 724, 724-25, 568 N.E.2d 945, 945-46 aff'd, 145 Ill.2d 517, 164 Ill.Dec. 912, 584 N.E.2d 124 (1991). We encourage stipulations to narrow issues and to promote judicial economy. Id. Defendant may have had good reasons for concentrating his sentencing hearing on issues other than his prior conviction. Even if it were error for the trial court to find the aggravating factor based on the stipulation, it was invited by the defendant. See State v. Diaz, 168 Ariz. 363, 365, 813 P.2d 728, 730 (1991) (party could not complain on appeal about the giving of an instruction he himself requested). We therefore reject defendant's argument that the aggravating factor of a prior violent felony conviction was not adequately proved.