Opinion ID: 4470376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The state court’s analysis

Text: Of course, Long remains free to challenge the reasonableness of the state court’s “no impact” conclusion, and he does. The state court assessed, separately and cumulatively, (1) the Forensic Testing Reports, (2) the Master Case File, and (3) the 18 biological evidence described earlier. As to these items, Long asserts the court “erroneously construed [their] value” and “ignored the value of impeachment evidence.” Pet’r’s Br. 25. In other words, Long asks us to dissect the judgment calls made by the state court. We undertake this inquiry with the appropriate deference in mind. Again, under § 2254(d), we ask whether the state court’s materiality assessment is objectively unreasonable based on the facts or an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. We must find the state court’s decision reasonable “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on [its] correctness.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Before turning to their cumulative impact, we evaluate each item individually to identify its probative value. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10.
Long claims that in failing to disclose these reports, the State “painted a picture of a very limited forensic investigation, when in fact the forensic investigation was extensive.” Pet’r’s. Br. 10. According to Long, the negative results reflected in the reports tend to prove his innocence. And he contends that the cumulative effect of the reports with negative findings “would have bolstered and supported the arguments his counsel made,” such that “a jury would have been less likely to convict with each successive negative result.” Id. at 37–38. The state court discounted this evidence, and the state court’s determination was not unreasonable. The absence of a match is “neither incriminating nor exonerating.” Case v. 19 Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1043 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Gary v. Hall, 558 F.3d 1229, 1257 (11th Cir. 2009). The state court took this view, explaining that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. See J.A. 1357–58; cf. P.E. Kish and H. L. MacDonell, Absence of Evidence is not Evidence of Absence, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 160–64 (1996). And, as Long and the state court acknowledge, the reports’ conclusions about the hair, paint or carpet fibers, matchbooks, and shoeprint testing mirror the testimony at trial. See J.A. 1357 (“[T]he agent’s testimony at trial was consistent with his report and the jury learned everything that was contained in the report yet found the defendant guilty of all charges.”). In addition, cumulative evidence “is generally not considered material for Brady purposes.” Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the state court to discount the reports of the forensic testing actually conducted.
Long’s Master Case File contained two documents about the forensic testing requested. The first is Officer Isenhour’s request for analysts to conduct a forensic comparison of the latent shoeprint to Long’s shoeprints. This document is material only inasmuch as it confirms law enforcement testimony that the State Bureau of Investigation conducted the analysis disclosed to the jury at trial. Thus, the first request is cumulative to what was presented at trial and, in any event, has no probative value in showing Long’s guilt or innocence. The second document lists 13 items of physical evidence for testing. Long concedes that the document itself does not suggest his guilt or innocence. Instead, he argues it 20 provides impeachment evidence because it shows that Isenhour’s testimony “was false and concealed the true facts surrounding the evidence brought to the SBI lab.” Pet’r’s Br. 32. Contrary to the prosecution’s representations at trial, see J.A. 416, it suggests that the physical evidence did not remain in Isenhour’s custody at all time. Rather, he delivered the items to the State Bureau of Investigation. The state court discounted Isenhour’s report because it “merely outlines the evidence collected and examined” in the lab reports. J.A. 1358. In determining the materiality of impeachment evidence, we generally consider “the salience of the subject matter of the impeachment.” Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 561 (4th Cir. 1999). When impeachment evidence directly “relat[es] to the central issue” in the case, the prosecution’s case suffers a “more serious blow.” Id. Thus, we are more inclined to find that the evidence places the case in an entirely different light. See id.; United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998). For example, in Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether the government’s failure to disclose its promise not to prosecute a key witness in exchange for his testimony was material under Brady. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In Giglio, the government’s case depended “almost entirely” on one witness’s testimony. Id. at 154. Because, that witness’s credibility “was therefore an important issue in the case” and the impeachment evidence directly undermined that credibility, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 154–55; see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441 (finding suppressed evidence impeaching eyewitnesses to be material because “the essence of the State’s case was the testimony of eyewitnesses, who identified Kyles as [the] killer”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 In contrast, where suppressed impeachment evidence focuses on a peripheral issue, it generally fails to shed new light on the case as Brady requires. See Turner v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1885, 1894 (2017) (evidence “too distant from the main evidentiary points” fails to create a reasonable probability of a different result as required by Brady); United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 952 (4th Cir. 2010) (investigating officers dismissed for misconduct were not the only witnesses linking Petitioner with the crimes); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 272 (1st Cir. 1995). In Strickler, the Supreme Court analyzed whether suppressed documents providing grounds for impeachment of a government witness were material. 527 U.S. 263. Unlike in Giglio, the Petitioner’s guilt in Strickler did not depend on the witness at issue, so the Court reasoned that undermining one witness did not create a reasonable probability of a different result at trial given the other persuasive evidence. See id. at 292–94. Here, the impeachment value of the suppressed impeachment evidence does little to render the state court’s conclusion unreasonable. In fact, we believe most reasonable jurists would consider the impeachment evidence peripheral. Cf. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (state court decision is reasonable “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on [its] correctness”). The impeachment of Isenhour would not change the substance of the reports at issue, which do not exculpate the Petitioner, do not undermine the state’s theory at trial, and do not point to another perpetrator. The state’s case—as Petitioner acknowledges—was built on Mrs. Bost’s testimony, not Officer Isenhour’s testimony. So impeachment of Mrs. Bost would place the case in a different light, but not 22 impeachment of Isenhour about his evidence handling and management of nonexculpatory reports. 3. Records showing the collection of biological evidence Finally, we turn to the documents in Mrs. Bost’s medical records. At trial, Long did not know that an officer took custody of one test tube containing biological evidence of the rape. Nothing in the record suggests this evidence was tested using the methods available in 1976. 8 We agree with the state court’s determination that the information is immaterial. As the state court noted: “The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.” J.A. 1358 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109–10). And the Court found that “[t]here is no evidence that the materials collected from the victim’s person were ever examined by the [State].” So the biological evidence was only “potentially useful” and, at least without bad faith, not material. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 186 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, any impeachment value of the lack of testing was limited. In United States v. Cole, 293 F.3d 153, 163 (4th Cir. 2002), we explained that the suppression of 8 Some forensic analyses common today—like DNA testing—did not exist at the time of this crime. The analysis of semen at the time could only identify a man’s blood type if he secreted blood group antigens. See Pet’r’s. Br. 39–40 n.10. Today, juries may expect precise forensic analyses of biological evidence, see Dissent at 39 (“Surely there is no evidence more material in a rape case than the assailant’s semen.”), yet we must take care not transplant those expectations where “modern forensic techniques . . . of course would not have been available,” Babick v. Berghuis, 620 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2010). 23 impeachment evidence is not material when ample information exists for an effective cross examination. Long knew, of course, that Dr. Monroe had collected semen during his examination of Bost—Dr. Monroe said as much in trial testimony. He also knew the only testing done on that evidence was observation under a microscope. Long was free to point out the potential exculpatory value of additional testing. 4. Cumulative impact assessment With the above considerations in mind, we conclude our inquiry by asking whether the state court’s determination that “the cumulative effect . . . is so minimal that it would have had no impact on the outcome of the trial,” J.A. 1358–59, was “so lacking in justification that [it] was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richardson, 668 F.3d at 149 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103). This assessment requires us to weigh the strength of the government’s case against the new evidence. See Turner, 137 S.Ct. at 1893. Here, the state court analyzed the government’s evidence, concluding that it was “compelling.” J.A. 1355. The record supports the state court’s conclusion about the strength of the evidence. Mrs. Bost gave detailed descriptions of the attacker and his clothing as soon as Concord officers responded to the scene. She confidently chose Long out of a crowd and photo arrays, telling officers, “there is no doubt in my mind that [Long] is the man that raped me.” J.A. 1683. His description matched the one given at the scene. Mrs. Bost again pointed him out before the jury, and she identified his jacket and gloves as “identical” to the ones worn by her rapist. J.A. 217–18, 249–50, 1355. 24 On the other hand, as discussed above, reasonable jurists may conclude that the probative value of the new evidence is minimal. Thus, the state court’s balancing of the cumulative evidence was not unreasonable, and § 2254(d) requires us to respect this determination.