Opinion ID: 1947466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Courts' and Parties' Intent

Text: Differing philosophies about the effect the trial courts' and parties' intent should have on how Mafrige applies has created the most confusion and inconsistency. The courts of appeals have taken three approaches. Some courts apply a bright-line test, holding that a Mother Hubbard clause or other finality language always renders an order final for appeal purposes, regardless of any evidence of contrary intent. E.g., Preston v. American Eagle Ins. Co., 948 S.W.2d 18, 20-21 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no writ) (holding that summary judgment purported to be final despite fact it was entitled partial summary judgment); cf. In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding) (As Mafrige and Inglish make clear, the intent of the trial court is not the controlling consideration in determining whether a judgment is final.). Other courts modify this approach, looking only within the four corners of the order and giving effect to any evidence of contrary intent found there. E.g., Rodriguez, 5 S.W.3d at 763-64 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (Looking within the four corners of the summary judgment order, the plain language of the Mother Hubbard clause did not, and could not, purport to grant or deny any more relief than the relief which [the defendant] sought.); Midkiff, 996 S.W.2d at 416 (looking to order as a whole to conclude that summary judgment order containing Mother Hubbard clause did not purport to be final). Finally, despite our holding in Inglish that the trial court's intent is irrelevant in this context, other courts still refuse to apply Mafrige if there is evidence of contrary intent anywhere in the record. This usually occurs when the parties and court treat an order as interlocutory by continuing with the litigation rather than appealing the erroneous order. E.g., Lowe, 1 S.W.3d at 823-24 (holding that summary judgment could not be final where the record reflected that there were parties who did not participate in the summary judgment proceeding); Carey, 982 S.W.2d at 558 (relying, in part, on court's and parties' treatment of order containing Mother Hubbard clause as interlocutory to conclude judgment was not final). The Court's solution to this problem is as confusing as the rule it seeks to supplant. It appears to reject the bright-line approach Mafrige espouses and instead adopt a rule combining the second and third approaches. First, the Court notes that an order is final for appeal purposes if it unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable. 39 S.W.3d at 205. It also explains that [i]f the language of the order is clear and unequivocal, it must be given effect despite any other indications that one or more parties did not intend for the judgment to be final. 39 S.W.3d at 206. From these statements, the Court's new rule walks and talks a lot like a bright-line Mafrige rule, with magic language establishing finality. However, the Court also states that [t]o determine whether an order disposes of all pending claims and parties, it may of course be necessary for the appellate court to look to the record in the case. 39 S.W.3d at 205. This sounds more like a pre- Mafrige rule, where a court must look to the record and the order to determine if an order actually disposes of all pending parties and issues. Because of the lower courts' confusion and disagreement about the role of intent in determining finality, I am convinced that the Court has not provided a workable rule that clearly defines that role as it applies to determining summary judgment finality.