Opinion ID: 1838335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ming evidence

Text: That the first stated reason by Mr. Emch was `lack of discipline'; that this Affiant requested that Mr. Emch gave examples of this purported charge and this Affiant said, `Can you give us any specific examples of what you are telling us about'; that Mr. Emch replied, `I don't have to' and continued, `I am superintendent, I'm around the school and that in itself allows me to make these judgments'; that this Affiant then stated, `Don't you feel that Mrs. Ming should have pointed out to her some specific examples because she could have some justifiable reason for what you refer to'; that Mr. Emch then replied that `there was noise in the room', and he then said that on one occasion `he walked into the classroom and students were milling all around'; that Mrs. Ming then replied that on that particular occasion the students were `having a drawing and painting exercise and that on such occasions the students are allowed to do their own creative thing'; that Mr. Emch gave no further examples, even on request; that this Affiant met in the room used by the Plaintiff, which is located next to the superintendent's office and that the walls seem to be quite thin and noise but not words could be heard through the wall; that Mr. Emch was not able to give an example of parental complaint with regard to discipline; That Mr. Emch then gave us a second reason `lack of tact'; that when pressed on this point Mr. Emch could give no incident but did say that Plaintiff was a `meddler' and `spent too much time in my office'; that Plaintiff pointed out that she had no idea that he felt this way and pointed out that he had never told her of his feeling in this regard; that there was no indication that this was ever done when Plaintiff was assigned elsewhere; that Mr. Emch replied that `You are a teacher, you are a graduate from college and I shouldn't have to tell you that'; that Plaintiff then pointed out that she was of Norwegian stock and that `I try to be friendly with everyone'; that Mr. Emch then also referred to an incident when he came into the office and found her looking in the files but she pointed out that she was looking for a catalog and then she was amazed that he found this objectionable since this was the place that these things were kept; that Mr. Emch did not dispute this point; that he also mentioned an instance of a concert where a patron of the school district had come up to the Plaintiff and complimented her for a good job and the Plaintiff replied `of course, what did you expect'; that Mr. Salveson [president of the school board] then stated, `Well, I think that we have discussed this enough and I think Mr. Emch has covered this'; That the next reason was `poor classroom technique'; that Mr. Emch could give no specifics on this; that he admitted that he had made no formal evaluations and that no one else had made such evaluations and he admitted that he had not discussed the matter with the teacher; that, rather, he said, `I am the superintendent and I am around the school'; That the next reason given was the personal life of the Plaintiff or, specifically, that of her husband; there was some reference to some unpaid bills and the fact that the Plaintiff's husband had a drinking problem; that Mr. Emch stated that he had been getting calls from a utility company in another city with regard to an unpaid bill; that Mrs. Ming stated that when she found the bill had not been taken care of by her husband, she took care of it; that Mr. Emch stated in his opinion that this problem had affected her teaching and when asked as to how he knew this, he replied, `I am the superintendent';  That Mr. Emch then stated that `It is well known that the NDEA enjoys taking on superintendents'; that this Affiant informed Mr. Emch that this was not the policy of NDEA and that `I am not a member of the staff of NDEA and I am here because I am concerned'; that the matter was then dropped; That Mrs. Ming was informed by Mr. Salveson that the board had no complaint about her music teaching but only about the manner in which she taught the 5th and 6th grade room; That to the best recollection of this Affiant this was the substance of the conversation at the meeting with the Plaintiff and the board; that none of the other members of the board spoke and they seemed inattentive to the proceedings; That this Affiant attempted to get the board to discuss with the Plaintiff the reasons for her non-renewal but that the board refused to do so except as hereinbefore set forth; that this Affiant got the impression that the board considered the hearing a formality that they had to go through and that they only wanted to get the hearing over with. [Affidavit of Robert Boyd, NDEA representative, who appeared with Mrs. Ming.] With this factual background, and keeping in mind the holdings of Hennessy summarized above, we must decide whether the first subsection of 15-47-38 gives the teachers anything at all, other than containing an admonition to the school boards to be good, coupled perhaps with an implied threat to give the teachers specific rights in the future if the school boards fail to be good. Using the facts in this case as an example of possible evils which the Legislature may have had in mind, we perhaps can find something concrete in the general admonitions and exhortations of the statute. We do not believe that the Legislature meant that school boards should have the power to refuse contract renewal to a teacher because of a dislike of the color of her hair, as one of the parties suggested they have. We believe the Legislature at least intended that the reason for nonrenewal should be a reason related in some way to the ability, competence, or qualifications of the teacher as a teacher, or the necessities of the district such as lack of funds calling for a reduction in the teaching staff, and that the reason be one that at least is capable of articulation at a meeting. The reason should not be irrelevant to teaching, as the failure of a husband to pay his bills would be, and it should not be based upon mere suspicion of misconduct unrelated to the ability of the teacher to teach, as in Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973). By citing the Fisher case, we do not mean to join in all it says, particularly as to the constitutional aspect of the case, which we have held does not exist under our statute. See Hennessy, supra, 206 N.W.2d at p. 884, citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972). Nor do we hold that the board has a burden of proof or that charges must be filed. But we do hold that it has a burden to articulate a reason and to relate that reason to teaching competence or the needs of the district, as well as to comply with the other provisions of Subsection 2, requiring the board to offer to meet with the teacher, to hold the meeting if requested, and to withhold a final decision until after the meeting. All of this surely is little enough to do in view of the remonstrances of the Legislature to be fair and decent and dignified and considerate. We believe that the foregoing minimum standards are required by the use of the words explanation, discuss, and reason in Subsection 2 of the statute. We have also considered Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Central Community School District, 349 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.Iowa 1972), cited by the teachers. We believe it is not in point, since it holds that in Iowa a teacher has a property interest in a contract  of employment, while we have held to the contrary. Hennessy v. Grand Forks School District No. 1, supra . Applying the minimum standards we have suggested to the cases before us, we find that the teachers here were given the rights provided by the Legislature, although marginally. They had their meeting with the board and the final decision by April 15. They were given reasons and there was a minimal discussion of them (even though the discussion really came down to an acceptance of the judgment of the superintendent), and the reasons (except for the bill-paying habits of Mrs. Ming's husband and one or two other trivial allegations) related to teaching competence and functions. The final decision may reflect as much, or more, on the board as on the teachers, but the decision was for the board to make. See Ferris v. Special School District No. 1, 367 F.Supp. 459 (D. Minn.1973). We note that the 1973 amendments to Section 15-47-38 contain a new provision, The determination not to renew a contract if made in good faith shall be final and binding on all parties. We do not, of course, express an opinion as to the legal effect of this new provision, since the actions before us arose under prior law. The teachers complain that the superintendent was allowed to attend the meeting and participate, even though the statute requires that the meeting shall be an executive session of the board unless the parties agree to the contrary. The parties did not agree to the contrary. We hold that allowing the superintendent to attend the meeting did not effect its character as an executive session. An executive session is one from which the public is excluded and at which only such selected persons as the board may invite are permitted to be present. Blum v. Board of Zoning and Appeals of Town of North Hempstead, 1 Misc.2d 668, 149 N. Y.S.2d 5, 8, (1956); Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Liberty Township, 5 Ohio App.2d 265, 215 N.E.2d 434, 436 (1966). We believe that the presence of the superintendent was proper and that no error was committed in allowing the superintendent to state the reasons for his recommendation that the contracts not be renewed. Such a procedure would seem to be more conducive to fairness than, for example, merely reading a statement from the superintendent in his absence. Affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and TEIGEN and PAULSON, concur. KNUDSON, J., concurs in the result and the syllabus, except Syllabus 2.