Opinion ID: 1035568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Name Defendants in the EEOC Charge

Text: As a general rule, a plaintiff “may only sue an entity for violating civil rights statutes such as Title VII . . . if it named the same entity in its prior EEOC charge.” Szoke v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 398 F. App’x 145, 153 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Knafel v. Pepsi–Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 899 F.2d 1473, 1480–81 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This rule is, however, susceptible to a “limited exception” where there exists a “clear identity of interest” between the party named in the EEOC charge and the unnamed party that was actually sued. Szoke, 398 F. App’x at 153–54. The named-party rule serves two goals: “First, the charge serves to notify the defendant of the discrimination claim alleged against him. . . . Second, by naming the charged party and bringing him before the EEOC, that person is able to participate in conciliation efforts directed at securing voluntary compliance with the Act.” Romain v. Kurek, 836 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1987). “The 3 Plaintiff has not appealed the district court’s dismissal of her THRA claims. 4 No. 12-6309 ‘identity of interest’ exception acknowledges the reality that laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process of filing a charge with the EEOC, and accordingly prevents frustration of the remedial goals of Title VII by not requiring procedural exactness in stating the charge.” Id. We have adopted two tests for determining whether the identity of interest exception applies. Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 177 F.3d 394, 411 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Szoke, 398 F. App’x at 153–54. Under the Seventh Circuit’s test from Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, “an identity of interest exists when the unnamed party possesses sufficient notice of the claim to participate in voluntary conciliation proceedings.” Alexander, 177 F.3d at 411; see Eggleston, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir. 1981). Under the test set forth by the Third Circuit in Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., we look to four factors to determine the relationship between the named and unnammed parties: (1) Whether the role of the unnamed party could through reasonable effort by the complainant be ascertained at the time of the filing of the EEOC complaint; (2) Whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named [party] are so similar as the unnamed party’s that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC proceedings; (3) Whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party; (4) Whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be through the named party. Romain, 836 F.2d at 246 (alterations omitted); see Glus, 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3rd Cir. 1977). Compliance with the named-party rule is part of a plaintiff’s obligation to exhaust her administrative remedies with the EEOC before filing suit. See Romain, 836 F.2d at 245. “Failure 5 No. 12-6309 to exhaust administrative remedies . . . is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving this failure.” Lockett v. Potter, 259 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Luedtky v. Berkebile, 704 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 75 (1998)). We, however, are reluctant to dismiss complaints based on affirmative defenses at the pleading stage and before any discovery has been conducted. Pfeil v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 671 F.3d 585, 599 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Courts generally cannot grant motions to dismiss on the basis of an affirmative defense unless the plaintiff has anticipated the defense and explicitly addressed it in the pleadings.”). In fact, we only address affirmative defenses on Rule 12(b)(6) motions where “‘the plaintiff’s own allegations show that a defense exists that legally defeats the claim for relief.’” Marsh v. Genetech, Inc., 693 F.3d 546, 554–55 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 at 713 (3d ed. 2004)). That is not the case here. Plaintiff has alleged that each individual Defendant is a “coowner/operator of the . . . Holiday Inn Express Southwind,” (R. 32, Am. Compl., at PID# 147), and this Court has held that there may be an identity of interest between a corporation and its owners. See, e.g., Romain, 836 F.2d at 244–45; cf. Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cnty., Tenn., 326 F.3d 747, 759–60 (6th Cir. 2003). But, at this stage, the record is insufficiently developed to allow us to conduct the identity-of-interest analyses under Eggleston and Glus. Some, potentially limited, discovery is necessary before it may be determined whether Defendants have a “clear identity of interest” with the party named in Plaintiff’s EEOC charge. Therefore, it was error for the district court to have dismissed Plaintiff’s Title VII claims at this stage in the litigation. 6 No. 12-6309