Opinion ID: 1513630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disqualification of the prosecuting attorney

Text: Scherrer contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to disqualify the prosecutor, Sam Pope. He relies on our holding in Duncan v. State, 291 Ark. 521, 726 S.W.2d 653 (1987), to the effect that when a prosecutor takes such an active role in the investigation of a crime that he potentially becomes a material witness for either the state or the defense, it is reversible error to allow him to serve as an advocate for the state in the case. In Duncan , the prosecutor engaged in extensive interrogation of the defendant. He testified not only at a suppression hearing in support of interrogation procedures but also, in argument to the jury, he described the events during the defendant's confinement and expressed his opinion regarding a crucial element of the case. We held that in so doing, the prosecutor committed reversible error since he effectively became a witness for the state and underwrote his own credibility. Unlike in Duncan , the prosecutor did not interrogate Scherrer but merely took a statement from Ivey, a potential witness (after promising him limited immunity), which implicated Scherrer. The defense later called Pope to testify concerning this statement and the offer of immunity. Pope's actions were part of a prosecutor's routine preparation for trial. He did not take such an active role that he potentially became a material witness in the case. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to disqualify.