Opinion ID: 2449997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether violence was employed

Text: The question is not whether violence occurred in the incident under consideration but whether the decision not to transfer the case can stand absent a finding that violence was employed by Justin Green. Jacob Stanley obviously died a most violent death. Although an information alone may be sufficient evidence of the serious and violent nature of the crime alleged to support an order denying the motion to transfer, Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 136, 913 S.W.2d 779 (1996); Hamilton v. State, 320 Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995); Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 855 S.W.2d 948 (1993); Vickers v. State, supra ; Walker v. State, supra , the information in this case does not allege the employment of violence. Justin Green is charged with having recklessly caused Jacob Stanley's death. Recklessly is defined or described by Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-202(3) (Repl.1993) as follows: A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances or a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. To employ means to make use of. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 810 (1993). The State does not intend to prove that violence was employed by Justin toward Jacob Stanley, and the order of the Trial Court contains no such finding. Seriousness alone is not a sufficient basis to refuse the transfer. See Holmes v. State, 322 Ark. 574, 911 S.W.2d 256 (1995). Thus, evidence in support of applying factor (1) to justify refusal to transfer is incomplete, and factors (2) and (3) weigh in favor of transfer. True, as mentioned above, the Trial Court need not have given equal weight to each of the statutory factors for deciding whether to transfer, but in this instance application of them, no matter how they are weighed, points decidedly toward juvenile court. Reversed and remanded for orders consistent with this opinion. JESSON, C.J., and GLAZE and CORBIN, JJ., dissent.