Opinion ID: 178586
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Race-Neutral Explanation

Text: After the opponent of the peremptory strike makes a prima facie case raising an inference of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). The explanation does not have to be persuasive, or even plausible, because the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. As we explained in Yee v. Duncan : [S]tep two is an opportunity for the prosecution to explain the real reason for her actions. A failure to satisfy this burden to producefor whatever reasonbecomes evidence that is added to the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie showing, but it does not end the inquiry. The trial court then moves on to step three where it considers all the evidence to determine whether the actual reason for the strike violated the defendant's equal protection rights. 463 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir.2006). In the usual case, the Batson analysis takes place during or shortly after jury selection. In those cases, the prosecutor offers a contemporaneous explanation for the strike at step two. Where time has passed since the jury selection, the prosecutor may offer an explanation based on his present recollection of his reasons for striking the juror. Where, as here, time has passed and the prosecutor no longer has a present recollection of his or her reasons for striking the juror, the state may offer an explanation based on circumstantial evidence. See Paulino II, 542 F.3d at 700 (Evidence of a prosecutor's actual reasons may be direct or circumstantial, but mere speculation is insufficient.). When this occurs, we say that the state has reconstructed the prosecutor's reasons for striking the juror. During reconstruction, the state may rely on any relevant evidence, such as jury questionnaires, the prosecutor's notes or testimony of the prosecutor. As we explained in Paulino II, the court may reject a reconstructed articulation as mere speculation or accept it as properly based on relevant circumstantial evidence. See id. ([T]he district court did not err in concluding that the speculative reasons offered by the prosecutor did not constitute circumstantial evidence of her actual reasons.). But regardless of how the state offers its race-neutral justification, it is not the task of the district court at step two to assess the truth of the explanation. That is part of the step three analysis. Nor is it the district court's role to conduct its own reconstruction, based on the circumstantial evidence, of what the prosecutor would have said. At step two, the court's role is limited to determining whether the state has met its burden of production at all. [5] In this case, the government took advantage of its step two opportunity by offering relevant circumstantial evidence suggesting several race-neutral reasons for removing Ms. Casey from the jury. On this basis, the district court properly concluded that the state satisfied its burden of production at step two, which merely required it to show that the prosecutor would have articulated some race-neutral justification if asked.