Opinion ID: 2621198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Policies and interests

Text: I think that the court's opinion foundationally errs in describing Alaska's interests and its fundamental policies.
These errors originate in misconceptions about the purpose of statutes of limitations. The court's opinion asserts that statutes of limitations, in addition to avoiding stale claims, serve a second fundamental policy: ensur[ing] an adequate opportunity for filing a claim prior to the statutory bar. [12] I disagree with that proposition because I think that the relevant statute of limitations has no purpose of ensuring an adequate time for filing suit. No doubt the legislature set statutory deadlines that it thought would give claimants an adequate opportunity to investigate possible claims and file suit. But a conclusion that two years is adequate is not the same as a conclusion that anything less is inadequate. Adopting a maximum time differs from guaranteeing a minimum time. Statutes of limitations have the purpose of preventing stale claims. [13] This purpose serves public interests, [14] even though these deadlines inevitably benefit defendants at the expense of plaintiffs. This purpose does not guarantee an unalterable minimum time for suit. It does not explicitly or implicitly address the parties' ability to agree to a reduced period. And no other purposes recognized by us or commentators guarantee some minimum time for filing a personal injury lawsuit. [15] In support of the ensuring proposition, the court's opinion cites Johnson v. City of Fairbanks , where we invalidated a city charter provision that imposed a 120 day notice-of-claim requirement as a precondition for tort suits against the city. [16] We reasoned that the notice requirement violated the statewide legislative policy of providing a uniform limitations periods for victims of tortious conduct. [17] Johnson is unpersuasive authority for the proposition that parties violate public policy by entering into a written contract requiring suit within one year of injury. Johnson did not involve contracting parties. It concerned a city's authority to unilaterally impose requirements on persons asserting tort claims against it. [18] Those requirements denied those claimants a remedy in the state courts unless the claimants first did things the state did not require them to do to commence suit. [19] Requiring claimants to give the city a written pre-suit notice of claim was itself alien to the state's scheme for beginning litigation. And the notice deadline, 120 days, was unreasonably short by any standard. Johnson establishes that the state's political subdivisions cannot unilaterally alter the legislative and judicial norms and rules which govern interactions between themselves and individuals to whom they owe a duty of care. I do not read it as holding that the statutes of limitations set a minimum time for filing suit that cannot be reduced by agreement. And such a holding would represent a marked departure from what commentators say and what this court has said about the purpose of the statutes of limitations. [20] Establishing the existence of a fundamental policy requires much more. The commentary to Restatement § 187 states that a fundamental policy may be embodied in a statute which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is designed to protect a person against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power. [21] The Maryland statute at issue in General Insurance Co. of America v. Interstate Service Co. [22] provides an example. It expressly stated that contractual time limitations provisions in insurance contracts were `against State public policy, illegal and void....' [23] But our statutes contain no comparable general prohibition, and AS 09.10.070 does not prohibit parties from contracting for a shorter limitations period. Johnson is far too tangential to be a basis for divining a fundamental Alaska policy that would have the effect of reading the statutes of limitations as guaranteeing a minimum time for suit. Moreover, our general legal principles do not support a conclusion that Alaska policy would be offended by enforcing a contractual limitations provision. We have approvingly quoted Professor Corbin's observation that it is not against the public interest [for parties to] agree upon a shorter time limit than that fixed by statute if the time agreed upon is not so short as to be unreasonable. [24] We quoted Professor Corbin at length on this topic: Although the parties can not at the time of contracting effectively bargain not to plead the statute or that the time for suit shall be longer than that allowed by statute, it is not against the public interest that they shall then agree upon a shorter time limit than that fixed by statute if the time agreed upon is not so short as to be unreasonable in the light of the provisions of the contract and the circumstances of its performance and enforcement. Such time limits in insurance policies have often been held valid. These agreements are not at all inconsistent with the purposes underlying the statute of limitations. Those purposes are to prevent the bringing and enforcement of stale claims, involving extra danger of fraud and mistake, unless the debtor has expressed a voluntary assent within the statutory period. An express provision fixing a shorter limit merely hastens the enforcement; and it is not made invalid by being included from the beginning in the contract to be enforced. If held invalid, it must be on the ground that the terms are unconscionable and that unfair advantage has been taken of a claimant whose bargaining position was inferior. [25] This passage is important for at least two reasons. First, it discusses the avoidance-of-stale-claims purpose and says nothing of any possible fundamental legislative policy of setting a minimum time for suit. Because the dispute in Fireman's Fund concerned an insurer's attempt to reduce the claim period by contract, [26] one would expect that we would have recognized the existence of a fundamental policy ensuring a minimum time for suit in that case if we had thought that such a policy existed. Second, this passage recognizes that enlarging, but not reducing, the statutory period may offend the only recognized statutory purpose. [27] To support the existence of the fundamental policy it perceives, the court's opinion also relies on an alleged legislative policy choice. [28] The court reasons that contract terms altering the statutory period necessarily run the risk of unbalancing the legislature's carefully measured policy choice, and asserts that upholding such terms through an uncritical application of another state's contract law would violate public policy. [29] This perception of a carefully measured policy choice seems to rest on the opinion's erroneous assumption, discussed above, that Alaska's statutes of limitations set minimum times for bringing suit. Further, the balance the legislature actually struck bears little resemblance to the balance the court's opinion perceives. Our statutes contain several provisions which can enlarge the time for suit by delaying the running of an applicable limitations period for specific reasons. [30] None of those reasons applies here. It is significant that the legislature has not prohibited parties from contracting to reduce the applicable statutory limitations period. [31] If the legislature had believed that contractual terms would pose a threat to the balance it struck, one would assume that it would have prohibited any contracted-for reduction. Nor do our cases evidence a carefully balanced legislative scheme that forbids such a deviation. So far as I know, this court has not previously mentioned a notion that the statutes of limitations reflect a balanced legislative scheme that sets both maximum and minimum times for suit. And in addressing limitations issues, we have adopted various legal principles as part of Alaska's common law without bothering to discuss their potential for unbalancing any possible carefully measured legislative policy choices. [32] Further, allowing contracting parties to agree to a shorter limitations period does not conflict with the purpose underlying statutes of limitations, encouraging promptness in the prosecution of actions to avoid the injustice which may result from the prosecution of stale claims. [33] An express provision fixing a shorter limit merely hastens the enforcement. [34]
The court's opinion also asserts that Alaska has an undeniably strong interest in establishing uniform filing deadlines. Uniform deadlines promote predictability for plaintiffs, defendants, and other interested parties alike. [35] I think that any Alaska policy favoring a uniform standard for commencing suit is not so fundamental that it overrides the parties' contractual choice. Common law [36] and statutory exceptions [37] abound in Alaska. Although these exceptions relax statutory limitations periods, they demonstrate that there is no uniform standard. Circumstances in each case can affect the time for beginning suit. [38] Shifting decisional law has also contributed to the uncertainty about what limitations period governs, [39] and about when the applicable statute begins to run. [40] No greater uncertainty arises when contracting parties agree to reduce the time for suit to a specific period. But assuming Alaska actually has a strong interest in establishing uniform filing deadlines, it would be satisfied by consistently applying the statutory limitations periods to like classes of claims absent an agreement by the parties to be bound by a different limitations period. [41]
It is irrelevant that uniform deadlines may promote predictability. Predictability is a byproduct of statutory deadlines, not a purpose. Moreover, predictability does not weigh against contractual deviation. By agreeing to particular terms, contracting parties adopt their own predictable limits. Consider a tour contract between an out-of-state tour operator and an out-of-state tourist. The parties' access to the terms of their written contract in the event of injury is superior to their access to the subtleties of the statutory and case law of the state where the injury occurs. The contract thus enhances predictability. Nor would it appear that Alaska institutionally has any interest in being able to predict when a suit must be filed so long as those most interested have contracted for terms known or readily knowable to themselves. Nothing said in the cases the court cites to demonstrate this interest's existence intimates that it outweighs the interests of contracting parties in changing those deadlines. Nor does enforcing the claim deadline defeat party expectations. There is no reason to think that a Florida resident touring Alaska has any pre-contract or pre-injury expectations about how much time Alaska's statutes and case law would give her to file suit in the event of injury. And after injury, one would expect a Florida resident to read her tour contract even before researching Alaska (and Washington) statutory and decisional law.
The court also relies on Alaska's interest in ensuring that fair compensation is available for personal injuries occurring in Alaska. [42] It asserts that Alaska has an interest in providing negligence victims access to a legal system that affords them a fair opportunity to seek redress from the negligent party. [43] I agree that Alaska has those interests. [44] But they are irrelevant to the narrow choice-of-law issue presented here. The contract did not prohibit Long from asserting a tort claim against Holland America. It did not limit the damages she could seek. Because the one-year claim period is not legally inadequate, it does not limit fair compensation or access to the courts. Compare a complete waiver of any cause of action, or contract terms that would prevent third persons from obtaining any compensation from one of the contracting parties. Alaska's interest does not outweigh an interest in allowing parties to contract in ways that affect the procedure for asserting a tort claim without depriving a claimant of a fair opportunity to be made whole. And it does not outweigh Washington's interest. The court's opinion may imply that there is an enhanced public interest in giving personal injury claimants the full statutory period in which to sue. But that interest is not offended if they agree by contract to a shorter, but still reasonable, deadline. Nothing about personal injury claims alters this conclusion. Indeed, personal injury and other personal interest plaintiffs are disfavored with the shortest limitations periods in Alaska. [45] That the period for commencing contract suits is longer than the period for commencing personal injury suits suggests that no fundamental policy recognized by the legislature favors personal injury plaintiffs. And notably the court's opinion does not discuss whether the one-year claims time limit afforded Long a fair opportunity to seek redress for her injuries.
The third interest, deterring negligent conduct, is also irrelevant. Refusing to enforce the parties' bargain as written and Washington's interest in enforcing their bargain will at best only marginally help deter negligent conduct in Alaska, and enforcing their bargain will not encourage negligent behavior. Despite such contract terms, tour operators have ample incentive to avoid negligent conduct because they must anticipate that their negligent conduct may threaten persons to whom the contract does not apply, or that their passengers will simply file timely suits. [46]