Opinion ID: 1631680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The forthwith requirement.

Text: ¶ 8. This Court in Poindexter v. Southern United Fire Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 964, 966-67 (Miss.2003), set out the well-established standard of review for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as follows: A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) raises an issue of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim. Sennett v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 757 So.2d 206, 209 (Miss.2000) (citations omitted). See also Page v. Univ. of S. Miss., 878 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Miss.2004) (We apply a de novo standard when reviewing the granting of a Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion); Roberts v. New Albany Separate Sch. Dist., 813 So.2d 729, 730 (Miss.2002); Arnona v. Smith, 749 So.2d 63, 65-66 (Miss.1999). As such we sit in the same position as the trial court. In Gulledge v. Shaw, 880 So.2d 288, 292 (Miss.2004) this Court held: Our standard of review in considering motions to dismiss is well-settled. The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure raises a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Black v. City of Tupelo, 853 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Miss.2003). To grant such a motion, there must appear to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that could be proved in support of the claim. Little v. Miss. Dep't of Human Servs., 835 So.2d 9, 11 (Miss.2002). Thus, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Id.
¶ 9. The Mississippi Code permits an election candidate to contest a ruling by the election committee to the circuit court. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 states in relevant part: When and after any contest has been filed with the county executive committee, or complaint with the State Executive Committee, and the said executive committee having jurisdiction shall fail to promptly meet or having met shall fail or unreasonably delay to fully act upon the contest or complaint, or shall fail to give with reasonable promptness the full relief required by the facts and the law, the contestant shall have the right forthwith to file in the circuit court of the county wherein the irregularities are charged to have occurred ... a sworn copy of his said protest or complaint, together with a sworn petition, setting forth with particularity wherein the executive committee has wrongfully failed to act or to fully and promptly investigate or has wrongfully denied the relief prayed by said contest, with a prayer for a judicial review thereof. (emphasis added).
¶ 10. The trial court held: The term forthwith is not specifically defined in the statute, but has been judicially construed to mandate prompt filing of a petition in the Circuit Court by the aggrieved party. The term has been interpreted to mean as little as four days (e.g., Shannon v. Henson, 499 So.2d 758 (Miss.1986)) or as many as forty-one days ( Smith v. Deere, 195 Miss. 502, 16 So.2d 33, 35 (1943)), depending on the circumstances of the case. Pearson v. Parsons, 541 So.2d 447, 450 (Miss.1989). The trial court then set-out the arguments by Brown and Cook. The argument by Cook was that his case was similar to Smith because Cook filed his petition less than 41 days after the decision by the Democratic Executive Committee. See Smith, 195 Miss. 502, 16 So.2d at 33. The trial court held: A review of Smith v. Deere reveals that the factual scenario in that case is unlike the instant action. In Smith v. Deere , the petitioner's delay in pursuing his action in Circuit Court was attributed, in part, to his need to obtain a Writ of Mandamus from the Circuit Court, and other intervening circumstances, which reasonably delayed the filing of the petition. In the instant matter, no intervening circumstances are alleged which modified that substance of Cook's basis for protesting the primary election. Cook argued that it took more time than he had anticipated to obtain the two required signatures from disinterested attorneys, which is a requirement for proceeding with the petition in Circuit Court, and that the conducting of his own independent investigation slowed the filing of his petition. However, the Court finds that the petition filed with the Committee and the petition filed with this Court do not evidence a new or independent investigation of any elaborate nature subsequent to the adverse decision by the Committee which would have delayed the filing of a petition for nearly forty (40) days. Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court finds that this matter was not filed forthwith as that term is defined in the law of this State, and the instant petition is therefore dismissed.
¶ 11. This Court's interpretation of the term forthwith in the context of the statutory language of Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 and its application to the set of facts before this Court today are the essence of this case. We find that the facts of this case favor Brown and affirming the trial court's ruling dismissing Cook's petition for judicial review pursuant to M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) because he failed to timely file the petition. In this instance, Cook's filing of the petition 39 days after the Quitman County Democratic Executive Committee conducted the hearing on September 4, 2003 was not forthwith as required by the statute. ¶ 12. This Court has ruled on this issue in the past. There has never been an exact number of days determined as a minimum to meet the forthwith requirement. Instead, this Court has upheld the well-established and long standing principle stated in Pearson v. Parsons, 541 So.2d 447 (Miss.1989). In Pearson, this Court held: This Court has held on several occasions that the term forthwith connotes no specific fixed time limit. Rather, its meaning depends upon consideration of the surrounding facts and circumstances and varies with each particular case. Smith v. Deere, 195 Miss. 502, 507, 16 So.2d 33, 35 (1943); Turner v. Henry, 187 Miss. 689, 695-96, 193 So. 631, 632 (1940); Harris [ v. Stewart, ] 187 Miss. [489] at 502-04, 193 So. [339] at 342 [(1940)]. Pearson, 541 So.2d at 450 (citing Shannon v. Henson, 499 So.2d 758, 764 (Miss.1986)). Indeed, this Court has upheld the forthwith requirement in a number of cases. In Shannon, 499 So.2d at 764, this Court interpreted four days as forthwith. In Harris, 193 So. at 341, this Court held that seven days between the committee decision and the filing of the petition for judicial review was forthwith pursuant to statute. Also, in Pearson, 541 So.2d at 450, this Court upheld 13 days (nine working days) between the committee decision and filing of the petition for judicial review as meeting the forthwith requirement. Thus far, the maximum time between a committee decision and the filing of the petition for judicial review deemed to meet the forthwith requirement by this Court was forty-one days. Smith v. Deere, 195 Miss. 502, 16 So.2d 33, 35 (1943). ¶ 13. However, this Court has determined delays of less than forty-one days between a committee decision and the filing of the petition for judicial review to not be forthwith. In Turner, 193 So. at 632, this Court held that twenty-six days did not meet the forthwith requirement. This Court stated [t]wenty-six days, in our opinion, was stretching `forthwith' too far. Id. ¶ 14. Cook argues that the facts of this case demonstrate that he met the forthwith requirements of the statute. Cook first asserts that examination of the ballot boxes are necessary to determine whether to file an election contest. Part of Cook's argument pertains to the 12 day statutory period for requesting and viewing the ballot boxes and taking into consideration the required three day notice period to the other candidate. This issue was addressed above. In Weeks, this Court strictly construed the 12 day statutory limitation to review ballots and held that it has no authority to extend the statutory time frame. Weeks, 115 So.2d at 300. ¶ 15. Cook asserts that his petition alleges absentee voting fraud and the Committee's refusal to investigate the fraud. Cook also argues that he was forced to conduct his own investigation. He claims that the trial court appeared to have excluded a composite exhibit concerning an absentee ballot for Lee Edward Louis. Cook argues that this was relevant because on September 29, 2003, Lee Edward's sister swore that no one in his family requested a ballot for him and it had bearing on the forthwith requirement. In this vein, Cook also argued that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. He argues that the correct standard is set-out in Pearson and the meaning of forthwith is determined by taking the surrounding facts and circumstances into consideration. Pearson, 541 So.2d at 450 (citing Shannon, 499 So.2d at 764). Further, Cook argues that the jurisdictional affidavits from independent counsel were executed on October 10, 2003, and the surety bond was executed on October 13, 2003. Cook filed the judicial petition on October 13, 2003. ¶ 16. Brown argues that Cook failed to comply with the 12 day statutory requirement for viewing ballots pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-911. Further, Brown asserts that Cook failed to file his petition for judicial review in a forthwith manner to contest the election. Brown also claims that this case is distinguishable from Smith. Additionally, Brown claims that the petition to contest the primary election and the petition for judicial review contain the same information. Brown argues that even if all the allegations in Cook's petition could be proven or taken as true, Cook failed to timely file the petition. Finally, Brown argues that this statutory violation could not withstand the M.R.C.P. 12 scrutiny and was properly dismissed. ¶ 17. As stated previously the trial court ruled, in part: However, the Court finds that the petition filed with the Committee and the petition filed with this Court do not evidence a new or independent investigation of any elaborate nature subsequent to the adverse decision by the Committee which would have delayed the filing of a petition for nearly forty (40) days. ¶ 18. We find that this case is distinguishable from Smith. See Smith, 195 Miss. 502, 16 So.2d 33. In Smith, the second primary election was held on August 24. Id. at 507, 16 So.2d at 35. The committee met on August 25 and the request to examine the ballot box was made on August 30, notice of hearing was made on September 3, a petition for writ of mandamus was filed on September 4, a petition for judicial review was made on October 14, the hearing was conducted on October 21 and the decision rendered on October 22. Id. The election was to occur on November 2. Id. at 506, 16 So.2d at 34. Smith's petition for a writ of mandamus was not disposed of on the date of the hearing for the petition for judicial review nor the final decision date. Id. The Court cited a number of delays, those mainly being various committee rulings against Smith. Id. ¶ 19. Here, Cook failed to request and view the ballots within the 12 day time frame. Also, his petition before the committee and the petition for judicial review do not demonstrate any substantially different basis for the petition or new investigation. There was no evidence of further action or obstacles to filing the petition for judicial review, the required attorney affidavits and surety bond in a more timely manner. Unlike Smith, there was no pending petition for a writ of mandamus, no pending motions and no litigation of any kind during the 39 day period between the Quitman County Democratic Executive Committee hearing on September 4, 2003, and the petition for judicial review with the Circuit Court of Quitman County on October 13, 2003. Accordingly, we find that the issue is without merit.