Opinion ID: 883960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Insufficiently Connected to General Plan or Scheme

Text: The District Court also concluded that Covenant II(Q) is not enforceable because [i]t does not clearly connect the restriction to any general plan or scheme in that no statement in the Protective Covenants specifically shows how the restriction on installation of satellite dishes is connected to the stated purpose of the Protective Covenants. That purpose, as set forth above, is to maintain a uniform and stable value, character, architectural design, use and development of the property. The District Court apparently relied on Town & Country Estates in reaching its conclusion. As discussed above, Town & Country Estates involved a prior-approval covenant requiring harmony of external design. In addressing the covenant, we set forth the rules to be applied when the terms of a restrictive covenant were ambiguous; we also stated that, generally, restrictive covenants are valid if they tend to maintain or enhance the character of a particular residential subdivision. However, such covenants are enforceable only when used in connection with some general plan or scheme. Town & Country Estates, 740 P.2d at 671. In the context of the prior-approval covenant at issue, we observed that approval of plans by an architectural committee is one method which helps maintain the value and general plan of subdivision construction. We also noted that prior-approval covenants necessarily and properly include aesthetic considerations not susceptible of absolute standards. Town & Country Estates, 740 P.2d at 671. While the term harmony of external design was not per se ambiguous, we determined that it was too vague to be enforceable absent defined standards of approval. Town & Country Estates, 740 P.2d at 671. On that basis, we concluded on the record before us that neither a uniform standard of design, nor a general plan regarding `harmony of external design' existed. Town & Country Estates, 740 P.2d at 671. Our statement and application of the maintain and enhance and general plan or scheme principles in Town & Country Estates occurred in the context of a prior-approval covenant to which those principles had a substantially direct relationship. Such a context is lacking in the present case. Here, as discussed above, Covenant II(Q) is neither ambiguous per se nor vague as a result of the absence of quantifiable and objective standards of approval. Thus, the referenced Town & Country Estates principles are of limited applicability in the case presently before us. Moreover, it is clear that the Town & Country Estates principles are not ironclad rules susceptible of concrete and clear application. Covenants are generally valid if they tend to maintain or enhance the character of the property and are used in connection with some general plan or scheme. Town & Country Estates, 740 P.2d at 671 (emphasis added). To the extent the maintain and enhance and general plan or scheme principles apply in a given case, it is sufficient that the particular covenant at issue generally can be said to further, and not be at odds with, the stated purpose of the protective covenants. Such a covenant tends to maintain and enhance the character of the property and is being used in connection with a general plan or scheme, as required by Town & Country Estates. Subsequent to Town & Country Estates, we decided Hillcrest. There, the defendants had completed construction of a garage on their subdivision lot in late 1980 or early 1981; by 1987, no residence had been built and the homeowners' association filed suit contending that the garage violated a covenant restricting use of the lot to residential purposes. Hillcrest, 778 P.2d at 422. The district court concluded that the garage did not violate the covenant and the association appealed, contending that a garage by itself, without a residence, was inconsistent with the residential purposes limitation. Hillcrest, 778 P.2d at 422. In setting forth the principles applicable to our interpretation of restrictive covenants, we first cited to Town & Country Estates for the proposition that such covenants are generally valid if they tend to maintain or enhance the character of a particular subdivision; we then enunciated the principles that covenants must be construed to give their language its ordinary and popular meaning and that plain and unambiguous language will control our interpretation. Hillcrest, 778 P.2d at 422-23. We construed the ordinary meaning of the term residential purposes and concluded that a garage not used in conjunction with a residential dwelling violated the covenant at issue. Hillcrest, 778 P.2d at 423. Although we made a passing reference to the maintain or enhance principle, we did not apply it when faced with covenant language which was plain and unambiguous. Here, as in Hillcrest, we have concluded that the covenant at issue is plain and unambiguous; thus, the approach we used in Hillcrest is more directly applicable to the case presently before us than that used in Town & Country Estates. We recognize, and have stated above, that a covenant which is clearly at odds with the stated purpose of the overall covenants and the general plan for the properties subjected to those covenants cannot be enforced. The reason is that such a covenant, no matter how plain and unambiguous the language, cannot be harmonized with the overall covenants of which it is a part. In such a circumstance, interpreting and enforcing only the plain language of one covenant would violate our obligation to read the covenants as a whole rather than reading any one covenant in isolation. See Hillcrest, 778 P.2d at 422-23; Gosnay, 666 P.2d at 1250 (citation omitted). Conversely, however, we are obligated to enforce a covenant containing plain and unambiguous language wherever possible as a result of our obligation to refrain from inserting language not contained therein ( Higdem, 536 P.2d at 1189) and because covenants are generally binding, by their terms and pursuant to § 70-23-506, MCA, on each owner of property subject to the covenants. Thus, a plain and unambiguous covenant will be upheld if it is possible to harmonize it with the general plan for the property which is stated as the purpose of the overall covenants. Here, Covenant II(Q) is plain and unambiguous in prohibiting the installation of television satellite receiving dishes by individual lot or unit owners. It is not at odds with the general plan for the village of St. Marie, as stated in the Protective Covenants, of maintaining a uniform character, use and development of the overall community. Moreover, Covenant II(Q) generally can be said to further that purpose by limiting the number and location of receiving dishes. While Jarrett contends that the installation by VPI's designate of three ten-foot satellite dishes at Unit 192-A of the village of St. Marie undercuts Covenant II(Q)'s validity in some way, such installation tends to maintain the uniform character and development of the property by concentrating the installations in one location. Nothing more is required of a plain and unambiguous covenant. We conclude, therefore, that Covenant II(Q) is sufficiently connected to a general plan for the uniform and stable character and development of the village of St. Marie and that the District Court erred in concluding otherwise. In summary, the District Court erred with regard to each of the conclusions upon which it based its ultimate conclusion that Covenant II(Q) is void and unenforceable. We hold, therefore, that the District Court also erred in granting Jarrett's motion for summary judgment on that basis.