Opinion ID: 2392725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimonial Legerdemain

Text: The primary factual dispute in the defendant's trial was whether or not the defendant was driving the vehicle at the time of the crash. The defendant contended that he was not the driver. To buttress its case that the defendant was the driver, and that the defendant was therefore guilty of DUI causing death, the prosecutor asked Officer Tiong, one of the investigating police officers, why the defendant had been arrested for driving the vehicle. The officer testified that he had received information from the nurse from marks she observed [on the defendant]. The prosecutor then asked the police officer What kind of marks? to which the officer testified that [the nurse] observed that there was what appeared to be seat belt marks going up the left area down to the lower right area which showed the possibility of wearing a seat belt in the driver's side. The defendant strenuously objected to the officer's testimony as hearsay. In response to the objection, the prosecutor told the judge that the officer's testimony regarding the nurse's statements to him were not hearsay because the nurse who made the statements would personally testify at trial. [1] The prosecutor's assurance that the nurse would testify later in the trial was obviously offered to give the trial court the impression that any risks inherent in the officer's hearsay testimony would be ameliorated by the fact that the declarant of the hearsay statement was to appear at trial and be subject to crossexamination. See State v. Jessica Jane M., 226 W.Va. 242, 249, 700 S.E.2d 302, 309 (2010) (the declarant's later appearance at trial ameliorates any hearsay or confrontation objection). The prosecutor's assurances to the trial court were, however, little more than testimonial legerdemain, i.e., notwithstanding the prosecutor's assurances to the trial court that the nurse would testify, the nurse never appeared or testified at trial. Consequently, the defendant could not ask the nurse if she made the statement to the police officer, much less cross examine the nurse on the accuracy of her observations. The State now argues, in its brief on appeal, that the nurse was under subpoena to testify at the trial, but defied that subpoena by not appearing. However, there is no evidence of this in the record and no evidence that the prosecutor made any real effort to secure this witness's testimony. There is no evidence showing the prosecutor checked with the witness as to her trial appearance, or checked the morning that the trial began as to her attendance. If the prosecutor assures a trial judge that a witness will testify, then the prosecutor has a duty to present the witness. The admission of the nurse's hearsay statement is not an instance concerning the introduction of a relatively harmless matter, but instead went to the very core of a key issue in dispute. Why would a jury only deciding guilt or innocence need to know why the police arrested the defendant? Why the police officer arrested the defendant was not relevant to any issue in the case. The jury's sole duty was to decide whether the defendant was the driver of a vehicle at a time when he was legally impaired and, if so, whether the defendant's drunk driving caused the death of another person. In other words, the reasons why the police officer arrested the defendant had no bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence. The only valid reason for asking a police officer why he arrested a person is to establish probable cause for the arrest. Probable cause is decided by the court out of the presence of the jury, or by a Grand Jury. The petit jury only decides guilt or innocence, not whether the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant in the first instance. One of our leading cases addressing hearsay issues that arise when police officers testify as to the background of their investigations is State v. Maynard, 183 W.Va. 1, 393 S.E.2d 221 (1990). In Maynard, Justice Workman, writing for an unanimous Court, correctly noted that evidence as to why a defendant became a suspect is not admissible because it is not relevant to a fact of consequence in a criminal trial. Id., 183 W.Va. at 5, 393 S.E.2d at 225. Justice Workman recognized in Maynard that an appellate court can find this type of hearsay, even if improperly admitted, to be harmless error. As a general proposition, I agree with that conclusion. However, I strongly disagree with that conclusion whereas in the case before usthe hearsay goes to the very heart of a much contested issue in the trial. In such instance it cannot be harmless. The mere fact that a co-defendantwho may have been the drunk driver, and who received a very favorable plea deal to testify against this defendanttestified that the defendant was the driver does not make it any less harmless, because that co-defendant's testimony is suspect as a result of the plea deal and a desire to not be held accountable as the driver of the vehicle. Similarly, the fact that a lab technician drawing blood also testified that he saw bruising on the defendant does not make it any less harmful that the out-of-court statements of a nurse a medical professional were introduced saying that the defendant's bruising was left to right, and indicated a driver's side seat belt. While the majority opinion finds this testimony harmless, I would not. Why the police officer arrested the defendant was not an issue for the jury, it was not relevant to any issue being presented to the jury, and it was highly prejudicial to the defendant's case.