Opinion ID: 1930530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Wigfall's Statement

Text: Appellants contend that the judge committed reversible error in admitting defendant Wigfall's testimony that he had been discharged by Woodward & Lothrop for misappropriation. In fact, however, Wigfall's testimony that he had been fired for that reason occurred as an apparent surprise to everyone, in a manner it is necessary to describe. At trial Hillary called Wigfall as an adverse witness. During direct examination, Hillary's counsel established that Wigfall had left Woodward & Lothrop's employment in November 1988 and asked why Wigfall had left, but defense counsel objected before the witness could respond. Previously, defendants had moved in limine to exclude any reference to the fact that Wigfall was no longer a security guard at Woodward & Lothrop, anticipating an attempt by Hillary to show that Woodward & Lothrop had removed him because he acted wrongly in treating Hillary. Defendants asserted, to the contrary, that Wigfall had been transferred to a different post as a combination of declining performance and his request to be moved, and that even if he had been replaced as security guard because of the present incident, the transfer was a subsequent remedial measure, proof of which is generally inadmissible. Apparently the trial judge did not rule on the motion before Wigfall took the stand, and defendants repeated these arguments in objecting to the question by plaintiff's counsel cited above. The following exchange then took place at the bench: MR. MORRISON [defendants' counsel]: The fact that he's no longer a security guard is one of the points of our motion in limine; that that is not subject to the precaution taken by Woodward & Lothrop. That is not admissible to show liability. MR. KING: [plaintiff's counsel]: I did not know why he was no longer at Woodward & Lothrop. If he would stipulate that Mr. Wigfall was terminated, we would take a stipulation. MR. MORRISON: But it's not admissible. THE COURT: What's the basis for it? Why do you need it in, Mr. King? MR. KING: I'm trying to find out why he no longer works for Woodward & Lothrop. THE COURT: Yes, why? MR. KING: I believe Mr. Wigfall was terminated as a result of this incident. I believe he was. Now, that may have been a corrective action by Woodward & Lothrop, but that's not my purpose for raising it. My purpose for raising it is to prove that in fact Carnell Hillary was improperly treated at Woodward & Lothrop that day. MR. MORRISON: I don't think it's THE COURT: I will let you ask him. Hillary's counsel repeated the question, and asked whether it was true that Wigfall had been terminated for declining performance as defendants had asserted in their motion in limine. When Wigfall replied yes, counsel asked the question approved by the trial courtwhether Wigfall was terminated as a result of the incident with Hillaryto which Wigfall replied no. Counsel then asked Wigfall to specify the nature of the declining performance that led to his termination, and after another fruitless objection by defense counsel, Wigfall answered, I misappropriated some funds from Woodies. We need not decide whether the judge ruled correctly in allowing Hillary to pursue questioning about a subsequent remedial measure, cf. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 275 (3d ed. 1984), because Wigfall's answer made clear that his firing had nothing to do with his conduct involving Hillary. Instead we must consider appellant's argument that the effect of the questioning was to allow Wigfall's testimony to be impeachedin a case where credibility was essentialby evidence of a bad act unaccompanied by evidence of a criminal conviction. Appellants argue that D.C. Code § 14-305(b)(1) (1989) limits impeachment by other conduct to acts resulting in conviction. [10] While that is generally true, we have also recognized and applied the principle that a witness may be cross-examined on a prior bad act that has not resulted in a criminal conviction... where: (1) the examiner has a factual predicate for such question, and (2) the bad act bears directly upon the veracity of the witness with respect to the issues involved at trial. Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (stating the rule), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984); Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 323 (D.C.1990); see Pullman Co. v. Hall, 55 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1932); Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 671, 174 A.2d 122, 127 (1961); 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 982 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); C. McCORMICK, supra, § 42. In this case, it is unnatural to inquire whether Hillary had a factual predicate on which to ask whether Wigfall had been fired for misappropriation because that is not the answer Hillaryor apparently anyone elseexpected. Nevertheless, Wigfall's own answer established a sufficient basis for the conclusion that he had engaged in misappropriation. Moreover, given the trial judge's express allowance of the questioning, we cannot find bad faith by Hillary's counsel in pursuing a line of inquiry designed (erroneously, as it turned out) to link Wigfall's firing to his actions in regard to Hillary. Thus, the primary issue is whether the conduct Wigfall admitted misappropriation of employer fundsis of a kind that [bore] directly upon [his] veracity with respect to the issues at trial, in particular his defense that he had done no more than subdue an unruly and belligerent customer who refused to leave the store. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, as under the rule of Sherer, a witness may be impeached with acts not resulting in conviction if those acts are clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) (1989). Federal courts have held that conduct amounting to embezzlement satisfies this condition. See J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, ¶ 608[05], at 608-46 (1988); United States v. Schwab, 886 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1136, 107 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1990); United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir.1981). [11] We conclude that Wigfall's admission to misappropriation was probative of his truthfulness in this case. Appellants' final argument is that the judge failed to balance the probative value of the impeachment against its potential for prejudice. See Roundtree, 581 A.2d at 323. The trial judge, however, was as surprised as anyone by Wigfall's answer. In their in limine motion appellants never explained to the judge that Wigfall had been fired for misappropriation, referring only to his declining performance. When the answer came out, they did not move to strike it as overly prejudicial. In these circumstances, the judge cannot be faulted for failing to conduct a balancing he was given no opportunity to perform. [12] Nor are we persuaded by appellants' suggestion that Hillary's counsel exploited the answer so as to invite the jury to draw a forbidden propensity inferencethat because Wigfall had been discharged for misappropriation, he was likely to have stolen Hillary's money as plaintiff alleged. The only reference even colorably raising this possibility occurred during closing argument when counsel stated: We are talking about credibility. Mr. Wigfall who was hired by Woodward & Lothrop to protect its property from deprivation was fired by Woodward and Lothrop. For what? He said it himself. He took some money from Woodies. But, that's the same man that arrested this man for simply walking in the store. And he was just doing his job. Any suggestion in these statements that the jury could infer a general propensity for theft from Wigfall's confessed dishonesty is too attenuated to justify setting aside the jury's verdict.