Opinion ID: 6327563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Standing or Subject Matter Jurisdiction”

Text: Barrio next argues that the “the district court believe[d] it lack[ed] standing or subject matter jurisdiction to address [certain claims] because they were either outside the applicable policy statement in Section 1B1.13 or abandoned in administrative remedies exhaustion.” Aplt. Br. at 3, 11–13. Specifically, Barrio claims that the district court impermissibly felt bound by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and failed to consider his COVID-19 allegations. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. 1. As to Section 1B1.13, the record shows that the district court knew it was not bound by Section 1B1.13. The district court acknowledged that Section 1B1.13 “do[es] not boast the exclusive authority to define . . . the statutory phrase ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons.’” ROA, Vol. 1 at 265 (quoting McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043). The district court instead remarked that Section 1B1.13 “guide[d], but d[id] not confine, [it] in its analysis of extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a sentence reduction.” Id. The district court merely looked to the Section 1B1.13 commentary for guidance in formulating an independent definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” and district courts are permitted to use Section 1B1.13 for guidance. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 938 n.4 (explaining that “it would hardly be an abuse of discretion for a district court to look to the present policy statement for guidance”); United States v. Carr, 851 F. App’x 848, 853–54 (10th Cir. 2021) (noting that district courts may look to the Section 1B1.13 commentary for guidance as long as they still exercise independent authority and discretion when determining “extraordinary and compelling reasons”). 12 Appellate Case: 21-6103 Document: 010110663352 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 13 As to any claims “abandoned in administrative remedies exhaustion,” Barrio’s only claim that the district court found to be unexhausted was his allegation regarding COVID-19. See ROA, Vol. 1 at 262 n.2. Despite the lack of exhaustion, the district court still considered his COVID-19 allegation. Id. But the district court ultimately rejected it as a reason for changing its analysis because Barrio had been fully vaccinated and thus “his danger of serious illness while in custody is drastically reduced.” Id. Such a conclusion is not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hald, 8 F.4th at 939 n.5 (collecting district court cases and observing that access to vaccination, as well as prior infection and recovery from COVID-19, “would presumably weigh against a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons”). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by looking to Section 1B1.13 for guidance and rejecting Barrio’s COVID-19 argument.