Opinion ID: 42950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ahmed’s Constitutional Claims

Text: We now address Ahmed’s claims that his equal protection and due process rights have been violated. Ahmed argues that by registering for NSEERS, he alerted the government to the fact that he had overstayed his original crewman’s visa. Therefore, he suggests that his registration for NSEERS was the ultimate cause of both DHS’s decision to initiate removal proceedings against him and the immigration judge’s decision to order his removal. Because other aliens of other nationalities were not necessarily required to register for 13 NSEERS, Ahmed argues that his equal protection rights were violated. This court has long held that “[a]liens enjoy some constitutional protections, regardless of their status,” but it has also long held that “this protection is limited by Congress’s broad powers to control immigration.” Rodriguez-Silva v. INS, 242 F.3d 243, 247, 246 (5th Cir. 2001). More specifically, this court has held “that the equal protection principles that are implicit in the . . . Fifth Amendment do not in any way restrict Congress’s power to use nationality or place of origin as criteria for the naturalization of aliens or for their admission to or exclusion or removal from the United States.” Id. at 248. In their efforts to carry out Congress’s criteria for naturalization, admission, and removal, the Attorney General and his designees have broad discretion to initiate removal proceedings against aliens like Ahmed who violate immigration laws. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-91 (1999) (stating that the “particularly demanding” standard applied to accusations of breached prosecutorial discretion is “greatly magnified in the deporation context”); Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing the clear congressional intent to protect the Attorney General’s long-established discretion to decide whether and when to prosecute, adjudicate, and execute removal proceedings and removal orders). 14 At most, Ahmed’s allegations describe only one influence upon DHS’s exercise of its discretion. The immigration judge refused to grant Ahmed a continuance because Ahmed failed to provide good cause for a continuance, and the immigration judge ruled that Ahmed was removable because Ahmed violated 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Ahmed’s registration in NSEERS had nothing to do with either decision of the immigration judge. In keeping with Congress’s clear intent and the well-established precedent of this court, we hold that the alleged impact of NSEERS on DHS’s decision to initiate removal proceedings against Ahmed does not constitute a violation of Ahmed’s equal protection rights. Cf. Zafar, 426 F.3d at 1336 (finding that a removal proceeding initiated after an alien’s registration in NSEERS was a valid exercise of discretion and not an infringement of equal protection rights). Ahmed’s due process arguments are similarly unpersuasive. Ahmed argues that the district court’s refusal to continue the removal proceedings, a refusal that prevented him from pursuing his application for an adjustment of status, violated his substantive due process rights. In so doing, Ahmed has incorrectly “presuppose[d] . . . [that he has] a constitutionally protected right to actual discretionary relief from removal or to be eligible for such discretionary relief . . . .” ManzanoGarcia, 413 F.3d at 471. This circuit has repeatedly held that discretionary relief from removal, including an application for 15 an adjustment of status, is not a liberty or property right that requires due process protection. See, e.g., Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating, in a removal context, that due process claims revolving around an alleged failure to receive discretionary relief are not based upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that eligibility for discretionary relief from a removal order is not a liberty or property interest warranting due process protection). In keeping with the well-established precedent of this court, we hold that Ahmed has failed to raise a violation of his due process rights.