Opinion ID: 2770336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count Two

Text: Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the second-degree child sexual abuse described in count two of the indictment. “A court must deem the proof of guilt sufficient if, „after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Here, appellant does not claim that the government failed to prove the elements of child sexual abuse, but rather that it proved a different offense from the one charged. 25 The jury was instructed that count two charged appellant with touching M.J.‟s breast on numerous occasions between on or about August 1, 2005, and on or about November 30, 2007, when they lived at a residence on E Street in Northeast Washington. 6 This offense was described on the verdict form as “contact between the defendant‟s hand and [M.J.‟s] breast on numerous occasions between on or about August 1, 2005 and on or about November 30, 2007 at the residence on E Street, NE.” At trial, however, M.J. testified that appellant did not touch her breast until the family moved to a residence on Shepherd Street, which other testimony indicated happened in 2009: Q: Okay. Has he ever touched you on your breast? A: Yes. Q: Where did that start happening, if you remember? 6 The indictment itself did not mention the residence on E Street. However, the trial court was concerned that the jury might convict appellant without unanimously agreeing that a particular incident of abuse occurred. As a result, the parties agreed to include the location of each incident on the verdict form to ensure that the jury reached a unanimous decision as to each specific instance of abuse. The prosecutor agreed to supply this information. 26 A: Shepherd Street. Q: Is it possible it started before Shepherd Street? .... A: No. There was no evidence from any source that appellant touched M.J.‟s breast before the family moved to Shepherd Street. We have recognized that “it is difficult for child witnesses to identify exact times, dates, and locations.” Williams, 859 A.2d at 141. For this reason, we “have consistently given prosecutors and grand juries leeway in terms of the particularity required . . . in this kind of case,” Roberts v. United States, 752 A.2d 583, 589 (D.C. 2000), and we have allowed the government to identify time periods by linking events to the locations where they occurred. See, e.g., Lazo v. United States, 54 A.3d 1221, 1227 (D.C. 2012) (rejecting defendant‟s contention that the indictment was impermissibly vague when the “prosecutor added the exact location where the sexual conduct allegedly took place” during a six-month range of time). We have also recognized that “the phrase „on or about‟ encompasses more than the days immediately before and after the date alleged in an indictment 27 or petition.” In re E.H., 967 A.2d 1270, 1274 n.6 (D.C. 2009). However, a conviction may only be sustained if the evidence establishes that the offense was committed on a date “reasonably close to the one alleged.” Id. at 1275 (quoting Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1007 (D.C. 1991)). Because we assume that the jury followed the court‟s instructions, Harris, 602 A.2d at 165, appellant was convicted of touching M.J.‟s breast between 2005 and 2007 at E Street. However, the only evidence about that specific sexual act was that appellant touched M.J.‟s breast after 2009 at Shepherd Street. The jury could not have reasonably inferred from M.J.‟s unequivocal testimony that this conduct had happened at an earlier time and in a different place. Compare In re E.H., 967 A.2d at 1274 (“Although the evidence presented at trial supports that some type of sexual abuse occurred at some unspecified time, the fact-finder would have had to speculate that there was anal penetration „on or about‟ Saturday, January 29th.”), with Lazo, 54 A.3d at 1230 (declining to reverse conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse, but remanding for further analysis, where witnesses gave confusing or inconsistent testimony, but, “depending on the trial court‟s credibility determinations, the evidence was sufficient to support that the specific acts of sexual abuse detailed in the Information occurred during the six-month period noted in the Information.”). 28 Because no reasonable jury could have found, as the government had charged, that appellant touched M.J.‟s breast at the residence on E Street at a time reasonably close to the period between August 2005 and November 2007, the government failed to prove the particular sexual contact necessary to sustain that conviction. Accordingly, we reverse appellant‟s conviction for second-degree child sexual abuse on count two of the indictment.7