Opinion ID: 2994747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F. Supp. 258, 272

Text: (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); but see Hizer v. General Motors Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1453, 1461 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (concluding that there appears to be no rationale for drawing a distinction between prejudgment interest and interest on delayed payment). Whatever the merits of this argument, it is not so obviously frivolous so as to require reversal of the district court’s decision that sanctions were unwarranted. See TMF Tool Co. v. Muller, 913 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (because position was not contrary to controlling authority from this court, it was not sanctionable as a mater of law)./3 Finally, the Fund asserts that Senese filed this lawsuit to harass the Fund and to gain a political advantage in union elections. Rule 11 may be violated when, even if the claims are well based in fact and law, parties or their attorneys bring the action for an improper purpose. Burda v. M. Ecker Co., 2 F.3d 769, 773-74 (7th Cir. 1993); Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 931-32. In support of its claim of bad faith, the Fund asserts that Senese deposed only the potential witnesses that had the most knowledge of union-related political matters, asked many questions in those depositions that sought political information unrelated to this lawsuit, and used information from those depositions to advance his political ends. The district court, which is in a better position than we are to judge Senese’s motives, rejected the Fund’s argument that Senese brought the lawsuit for an improper purpose. And while we might have drawn a contrary conclusion, the Fund’s evidence is insufficient to convince us that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. 2. Attorneys’ fees Under ERISA, the district court may in its discretion award attorneys’ fees to either party. 29 U.S.C. sec. 1132 (g)(1). There is a modest presumption in favor of awarding fees to the prevailing party, but that presumption may be rebutted. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 617 (7th Cir. 1995). An award of fees to a successful defendant may be denied if the plaintiff’s position was both substantially justified-- meaning something more than non-frivolous, but something less than meritorious--and taken in good faith, or if special circumstances make an award unjust. Id. at 616-17 & n.4; see also Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 207 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000)./4 We review the district court’s determination for an abuse of discretion, and will affirm if the determination has a basis in reason. Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 592 (7th Cir. 2000); Little v. Cox’s Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 644 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court denied the Fund’s motion for attorneys’ fees based on its finding that Senese’s claims were substantially justified and were not pursued in bad faith. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that there was no bad faith, and that Senese’s claims for interest were not entirely groundless. However, as we discussed above, we conclude that Senese’s claim for 1992 benefits was frivolous, and because, with respect to this claim, the basis of the court’s decision on fees was clearly erroneous, it was an abuse of discretion./5