Opinion ID: 1551069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Res Adjudicata.

Text: Appellants contend that the decree (June 16, 1910) in the state court suit brought by plaintiff, shortly after the trust agreement was made, determined that the stock dividends and other increases in the property belonged to the life tenant and not to the remaindermen. The supporting argument takes two lines. The first is that the fourth finding of that court was that Sophie Franz was entitled to all of such increases. That finding is as follows: 4. The court doth further find that under and by virtue of the terms of the will of said Ehrhardt D. Franz, deceased, the defendant Sophie Franz, during her natural lifetime, became and was and is entitled to all of the usufruct and benefit of all of the property of said deceased and to all of the income, profits and earnings thereof, in her own right and absolutely. Standing alone, this language is far from meaning that increases in the corpus of the estate, as distinguished from income therefrom, is the property of the life tenant. Nor do the words profits and earnings, used in conjunction with income, suggest such a meaning. The obvious meaning of the entire paragraph is that Sophie Franz is entitled to the revenue produced by the estate, in the nature of income. But even supposing the paragraph were ambiguous and, taken alone, might have either of the above meanings, yet the issues presented to the court and the entire decree leave no doubt. The petition therein was an attack upon the trust agreement as being contrary to the rights of plaintiff under the will because it turned over to trustees property which would, at the end of the life estate, belong to the remaindermen and in which they had a present vested interest; also, that this property was being managed and wasted by the trustees without information or accounting to the remaindermen and without being amenable to the plaintiff and the other remaindermen named in the said will by any bond or security whatever. It set forth that G. A. Buder (trustee) was denying that plaintiff had any vested interest in the said property and that plaintiff was the owner of a one-tenth vested interest in the corpus of the aforesaid property. The prayer was for cancellation of the trust agreement and delivery of the property to a receiver; that the court construe the will and determine the rights and interests of the parties named therein and whether their interests became contingent or vested at the death of the aforesaid testator; and for general relief. A joint and separate answer was filed by the trustees and other defendants (Mrs. Franz and other of her children). This answer alleged that Mrs. Franz owned absolutely considerable property which did not come from her husband's estate or which had been acquired by her out of income which was hers. Further answering: These defendants say that at the time that she executed said instrument of January 30, 1909, defendant Sophie Franz was possessed in her own exclusive right as aforesaid of certain property and had a life estate and life interest in the property derived by her from the estate of her said deceased husband, and that the object and purpose of said instrument was to transfer to her son, the defendant G. A. Franz, and to defendant Buder, all such interest, right and title as she might and could properly and lawfully convey; that she intended to convey, and by said instrument did convey, to said two named defendants all of her said life estate, and no more, in the property so derived from her said deceased husband, and the absolute title to the property owned by her in her own exclusive right; that her object and purpose was to enable said two named defendants to distribute the income of all of said property, that in which she had but a life estate and that which belonged to her absolutely, between herself and her nine children, including the plaintiff, and her two grandchildren, the minor defendants herein. That in order to accomplish such purpose, she provided that $4,000 annually should be paid to her in quarterly installments and that $2,500 annually, in like installments, should be paid to each of her said children and to the defendant Sherman H. Kleinschmidt for said grandchildren. That she expressly, however, provided that in making such distributions there should be no encroachment on or impairment of the principal assets thus conveyed to said two defendants. That she intended by said conveyance to provide, and she did provide, that on her death so much of said property as belonged to her absolutely and exclusively should be disposed of in accordance with her last will and testament and that so much of said property as was not hers exclusively and absolutely should be disposed of in accordance with the laws of Missouri in such case made and provided.    Defendants deny that said instrument attempts to dispose of any part of the estate of E. D. Franz, in contravention of his will, and deny that said defendant Buder has denied that the remaindermen have any interest in said property and has denied them or plaintiff any information to which they or he is entitled; also deny that said defendant Buder has declared that the remaindermen have no voice in the management, control or preservation of said property; but in that connection state that the said Buder has maintained, and these defendants also maintain, that the management and control and preservation of the property coming from the estate of said E. D. Franz is in defendant Sophie Franz or her grantees or assigns, during her lifetime, and that in any property acquired by her out of the income, the sole and exclusive management is in her and in her grantees or assigns, and that the remaindermen have no interest whatever in such last mentioned property. Further answering, these defendants say that defendant Sophie Franz had the power and the right to execute said instrument of January 30, 1909, as to the property in which she had a life estate, to the extent of her life interest, and had the right and the power to deliver said property to defendants Buder and Franz, to be held by them for and during the period and lifetime of the said Sophie Franz; and that as to property which belonged to said defendant Sophie absolutely and exclusively, she had the right to turn over and deliver the same to said defendants G. A. Franz and Buder without any limitation or restriction whatsoever. Further answering that part of the petition wherein plaintiff claims to have a vested interest in the property aforesaid, to the extent of at least $45,000, these defendants state that an undivided one-tenth interest in the estate left by said E. D. Franz, subject to the life estate of said defendant Sophie Franz, does not exceed the amount of $10,000; and that as a matter of fact, plaintiff has already received and accepted, by way of payments on account of his remainder interest, from defendant Sophie Franz, amounts exceeding in the aggregate $20,000. Further answering, these defendants say that none of the property whatsoever which was left by E. D. Franz, deceased, has been injured, wasted or destroyed; deny that there ever has been any threat on the part of defendant Buder or on the part of any defendant herein to injure, waste or destroy any part of said property whatsoever; deny that it is intended by said defendant Buder or by any of the defendants, to injure, waste or destroy any of said property whatsoever. On the contrary, these defendants aver that all of said property has been well and carefully preserved and is so invested and so managed that upon the death of defendant Sophie Franz and upon the termination of her life estate, any and all property in which plaintiff may then be interested will be forthcoming. Further answering, these defendants state that the defendants Sophie Franz, G. A. Franz and Gustavus A. Buder are each and all of them entirely solvent and fully able to respond to any right or claim which plaintiff herein may at any time be able to establish in the property left by the said E. D. Franz upon his decease. The answer closed with: Wherefore these defendants say that plaintiff should not now be permitted to question the right of said defendant Sophie Franz to the possession of the property given her for life by the last will and testament of her said deceased husband. In so far as the point now being discussed is concerned, the findings of the court were that the remaindermen had a vested remainder in the residuary property coming from the estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz; that Mrs. Franz was entitled to the income therefrom for life; that this property and other property, belonging absolutely to Mrs. Franz, was turned over to the trustees; that, as to the former, she conveyed to the trustees only her life interest therein and no greater or other interest but, as to the latter, she conveyed her entire title; that as to the estate property, the trustees had no power to dispose of any but her life interest; that, on her death, the estate property should be divided between the plaintiff and the children named in the will of said Ehrhardt D. Franz    in accordance with the terms and provisions of said will and her absolute property in accordance with her last will and testament, or if she should die intestate, then under the statutes of descents and distributions of the state of Missouri. The findings and decree were included in one order. The decree part followed the findings with a possible ambiguity as to a matter not pertinent to this point. From the above it is clear that no issue was presented to the court as to whether the increase in Burroughs stock or from any other property belonged to Mrs. Franz nor as to what particular property the rights of the remaindermen attached. The issue was broader and more general. It was whether there was any property to which such rights attached and whether such rights were contingent or vested. The findings and decree determined this issue by holding that there was such property (without any particularization) and that the rights of the remaindermen were vested. Appellants contend that the use of the words usufruct, benefit, profits and earnings, used in the state court decree, carry a meaning which is larger than income and cover the exchange and increases of Burroughs stock. Even if the issues in that action could justify a determination by that court of the specific interests of the life tenant  which they do not  yet the above contended result does not necessarily follow and we think should not. This estate comprised considerable other property (both real and personal) beside corporate stock and the above quoted terms might reasonably be and we think were used to cover only the various kinds of income from such varied property. As to usufruct, see 39 Cyc. 874, and citations; as to benefit, see 7 C. J. 1135, and citations; as to profits, see 32 Cyc. 585, and citations; as to earnings, see 19 C. J. 853, and citations. The second argument is that the amount of the bond ($100,000), required of the trustees by the court, is clear evidence that the court considered that amount to be the value of the remaindermen's estate and thus, indirectly at least, adjudged that the balance belonged to Mrs. Franz. The answer to this is that the court made no finding nor even hinted at the value of the remainder estate or of the entire estate turned over to the trustees and that the bond was not solely to protect the remainder interests but Mrs. Franz also, since it was required to be for the use and benefit of any and all parties interested in said trust estate. Therefore, we must conclude that there is no merit to this contention of res adjudicata.