Opinion ID: 1677726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Meaning of Personal Property.

Text: The term personal property is susceptible of more than one meaning. Compare In re Estate of Chadwick, 247 Iowa 1050, 78 N.W.2d 31 (1956) (personal property referred to tangible personal property) with In re Will of Scheiner, 215 Iowa 1101, 247 N.W. 532 (1933) (personal property included both tangible and intangible property). In its technical or broader meaning the term personal property includes everything that is the subject of ownership except lands or interests in lands. In re Estate of Chadwick, 247 Iowa at 1054, 78 N.W.2d at 33-34. However, it may also be used in its ordinary and popular meaning as including only goods and chattels, tangible things. Id. There is no presumption that the term when used in a will has a technical meaning rather than its popular meaning. In Chadwick we concluded that the term personal property as used in Chadwick's will meant only tangible personal property. Id. We noted that a broader interpretation of personal property which would include both tangible and intangible personal property would defeat another bequest in the will. Id. at 1055, 78 N.W.2d at 34. In contrast, in Scheiner we held that personal property as used in Scheiner's will referred to both tangible and intangible personal property. In re Will of Scheiner, 215 Iowa at 1103, 247 N.W. at 534. We reached this conclusion because the residuary clause disposed of the testator's real or mixed property only. Id. We concluded this language evidenced the testator's belief that her prior disposition of personal property effectively disposed of all her personal property. Id. Although both parties argue at length concerning the applicability of these precedents, we note that prior cases are normally of limited value in will-construction cases. In re Estate of Rahfeldt, 253 Iowa 72, 75-76, 111 N.W.2d 303, 305 (1961). The basis for this statement is that each will-construction case normally involves a fact situation peculiar unto itself. Id. at 76, 111 N.W.2d at 305. That is the case here. Though both Chadwick and Scheiner bear some similarities to the present case, this case has its own unique facts. Nevertheless, we briefly discuss the Chadwick decision to clarify our holding in that case. Lois and Roger argue that in Chadwick we held the term personal property is interpreted narrowly only when another bequest would be eliminated by using a broad definition. In the present case, a broad interpretation of the term personal property does not eliminate Thompson's bequest to the residuary beneficiaries. Approximately $129,000 would remain to be distributed under the residuary clause of the will. Therefore, Lois and Roger assert that Chadwick requires us to apply the broad meaning here and hold that personal property includes everything that is the subject of ownership except lands and interests in lands. We reject this interpretation of our holding in Chadwick. In Chadwick we interpreted the term personal property narrowly to give effect to another bequest in the will. We did not consider the converse situation such as we have in the present casewhether the term personal property may be interpreted narrowly even when not necessary to preserve another bequest. Moreover, the fact that a broad definition of the term would have nullified the residual bequest in Chadwick merely showed the testator's intent that the bequest of personal property was of tangible property only. Otherwise, the residual bequest would have been meaningless. Two principles can be gleaned from Chadwick. First the goal of interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the testator. Second we strive to give meaning to every provision in the will. Applying these principles to Thompson's will, we conclude that she intended the term personal property in paragraph two to include only her tangible personal property. Significantly, Thompson directed that unwanted personal property be given to the Salvation Army. This language is most consistent with a bequest of personal effects, clothing and household goods. In re Estate of Graham, 49 Cal.2d 333, 316 P.2d 945, 947 (1957). Thompson foresaw that Lois and Roger may not want some of this property, but recognized that a charitable organization selling secondhand goods could make use of it. Further, Thompson stated in paragraph two that her personal property included her automobile. This provision would be unnecessary if Thompson intended to use the term personal property in a broad sense. If personal property was meant to include all of Thompson's personal property both intangible and tangible, no one would doubt that the term included her automobile. However, if she used personal property in its narrow meaning, roughly equivalent to personal effects, she may have been concerned that the executors would not include her automobile in this bequest. Moreover, if Thompson intended that personal property in paragraph two of her will include both tangible and intangible personal property, it does not make sense that she bequeathed [a]ll the rest and residue of [her] estate of whatever kind and nature, both real and personal or mixed, to the residuary beneficiaries. (Emphasis added.) The inclusion of personal property in paragraph six would make no sense because she would have already disposed of her personal property in paragraph two. The court of appeals explained that Thompson was simply insuring in paragraph six that none of her property pass intestate. However, Thompson had already accomplished this by providing in paragraph two that all unwanted personal property would go to the Salvation Army or be disposed of by her executors. Lois and Roger explain the reference to personal property in the residuary clause as Thompson's effort to include the proceeds from the sale of her real property in the residuary bequest. But Iowa Code section 633.384 (1989) makes such a provision unnecessary. Section 633.384 states that the conversion of real estate to personal property does not affect the distribution of the estate under the provisions of the will. Consequently, the cash proceeds of the real estate sales would pass under the residuary clause even without the reference to personal property in that paragraph. If the reference to personal property in the residuary clause has any significance, it must refer to intangible personal property. In summary, the language used in the will and the scheme of distribution both support the conclusion that Thompson intended to give only her tangible personal property to Lois and Roger. The district court heard no evidence so the only other facts to be considered are those that appear in the pleadings. See In re Estate of Rogers, 473 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1991) (extrinsic evidence may be considered when a term in the will is ambiguous). The facts in the record do not suggest an intent contrary to the intent shown by the language of the will. When Thompson died Lois was sixty-six years old and lived in Fargo, North Dakota. Roger was eighty years old and lived in Seattle, Washington. Under our interpretation of the will, Lois and Roger will each receive almost $30,000. This amount is significantly more than the bequests made to Thompson's other nieces and nephews. There are no extrinsic facts nor is there language in the will to indicate that Thompson intended or had reason to leave the majority of her estate to Lois and Roger. We realize that our interpretation of the will gives the term personal property a different meaning in paragraph six than the same term has in paragraph two. However, we believe this is necessary to effectuate the intent of the testator. Although ordinarily the repeated use of the same term in a testamentary instrument creates an inference that the term has the same meaning wherever used, this case is one of the rare situations where this inference is overcome for the reasons discussed above. See In re Estate of Miguet, 185 N.W.2d 508, 515 (Iowa 1971) (use of same words in will ordinarily creates inference that they have the same meaning unless differently appearing in the context, or applied to different subjects). Moreover, it is inappropriate to resort to a rule of construction when to do so would be contrary to the expressed intent of the testator. Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655-56 (Iowa 1979).