Opinion ID: 183027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary NEPA discussion

Text: Plaintiffs' first claim is that the BLM failed to take a hard look at the environmental consequences of the proposed regulatory changes, and that the BLM's approval of the 2006 Regulations was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious. See Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir.2010). We review the regulatory changes together in considering whether the BLM violated NEPA. An agency considering major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment has an obligation under NEPA to prepare an EIS that in form, content and preparation foster[s] both informed decision-making and informed public participation. Native Ecosystems Council v. United States, 418 F.3d 953, 958 n. 4, 960 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The hard look must be taken objectively and in good faith, not as an exercise in form over substance, and not as a subterfuge designed to rationalize a decision already made, Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1142, and the final EIS must include a discussion of adverse impacts that does not improperly minimize negative side effects. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir.2006), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 375, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). [G]eneral statements about possible effects and some risk do not constitute a hard look absent a justification regarding why more definitive information could not be provided. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the BLM failed to address concerns raised by its own experts, FWS, the EPA, and state agencies. For example, the BLM offered no reasoned analysis whatsoever in support of its conclusion which is in direct conflict with the conclusion of its own experts and sister agency, FWSthat there will be no environmental effect caused by both the across-the-board reduction in public involvement in management of grazing on public lands and the elimination of public input into particular management decisions. Similarly, the BLM never seriously considered the concerns raised by FWS and the California Department of Fish and Game among others that the 2006 Regulations weaken the ability of the BLM to manage rangelands in a timely fashion. As FWS explained in its comment, in the west, environmental, and therefore, vegetation changes happen stochastically, rapidly, and often involve extremes, and it is important for BLM range professionals to respond immediately and to the extent necessary to avoid a change in range condition from which it may take decades to recover. AR 68062. The BLM's Final EIS also does not address the consequences of increased construction and private water rights on public rangeland, despite concerns expressed by its own expert scientists that the present ability of BLM to hold water rights to benefit wildlife, particularly fish has been significant. Instead of a serious response to FWS's concerns and an analysis and consideration of the various delays and impediments in the BLM's stewardship of public rangelands, as required by NEPA, the Final EIS downplays the environmental impacts of the 2006 Regulations. The BLM, invoking notions of efficiency, justifies the reduction in public participation and the elimination of the Fundamentals of Rangeland Health as enforceable standards by stating that the 2006 Regulations are anticipated to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of grazing administration. Final EIS at 4-23. The Final EIS does not address the environmental consequences of a mandatory five-year delay in implementing reductions of ten percent or greater in active use on a permittee's grazing land, but rather speculates that this delay would often result[] in improved cooperative relations and management between BLM and the permittee or lessee. Id. at 4-25. While diplomacy with permittees or lessees of public rangelands is certainly a worthy goal, it is no substitute for the BLM's obligations to comply with NEPA and to conduct a studied review and response to concerns about the environmental implications of major agency action. See Earth Island Inst., 442 F.3d at 1159 (explaining that the final EIS must include a discussion of adverse impacts that does not improperly minimize negative side effects). While we recognize that NEPA is a procedural statute, which exists to ensure a process, not to mandate particular results, Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell, 599 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), part of the procedure required is that an agency in its Final EIS address any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and shall indicate the agency's response to the issues raised. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b). This disclosure requirement obligates the agency to make available to the public high quality information, including accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments and public scrutiny, before decisions are made and actions are taken. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir.2003) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)). When an agency, such as the BLM, submits proposed regulatory changes for public comment and then offers no meaningful response to serious and considered comments by experts, that agency renders the procedural requirement meaningless and the EIS an exercise in form over substance. See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1142. Here, the BLM gave short shrift to a deluge of concerns from its own experts, FWS, the EPA, and state agencies; the BLM neither responded to their considered comments objectively and in good faith nor made responsive changes to the proposed regulations. Id. [P]ublic scrutiny [is] essential to implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b), and the BLM was required to assess and consider ... both individually and collectively the public comments received during the NEPA process and to respond to such in its Final EIS. Id. § 1503.4(a); see Center for Biological Diversity, 349 F.3d at 1167 (holding that the agency in that case violated NEPA when it failed to disclose and discuss responsible opposing scientific viewpoints in the final statement). We therefore conclude that the BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a hard look at the environmental consequences of the proposed regulatory amendments. In addressing the new monitoring requirement, the Final EIS concludes that the impact on the agency will be minimal because only 16 percent of the allotments evaluated during the last five years failed to achieve standards and conform to guidelines. Final EIS at 4-26. The BLM, however, currently monitors and has data on only a third of the total allotments. Final EIS at 4-24. Having no monitoring data on the vast majority of the land the BLM monitors, and offering no corroborating scientific evidence, the assertion that the 16 percent finding is representative is unsupported. See Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757, 763-64 (9th Cir.2007) (explaining that we generally defer to an agency's expertise in the methodology of the agency's studies but a result that is not rationally connected to the best available scientific evidence receives no such deference). Furthermore, even if we credit the BLM's estimate that 16 percent of all BLM grazing does not meet the Standards and Guidelines, 16 percent of all BLM public rangelands still amounts to over 25 million acres. The Final EIS does not consider the environmental impact on the over 25 million acres of affected public rangelands of the requirement, under the 2006 Regulations, that monitoring data be collected by the agency prior to bringing an enforcement action. By failing to consider the impact of the 2006 Regulations on over 25 million acres of affected public rangelands, the BLM entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, and, therefore, its no effect conclusion was arbitrary and capricious. The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375. Furthermore, the BLM failed to consider the combined and synergistic effects of the proposed amendments. See Or. Natural Res. Council, 492 F.3d at 1132 (explaining that one of the specific requirements under NEPA is that an agency must consider the effects of the proposed action in the context of all relevant circumstances, such that where several actions have a cumulative ... environmental effect, this consequence must be considered in an EIS (quotation marks omitted)). For example, the reduction of public participation in various grazing management and permitting decisions is logically compounded by the increased difficulty in maintaining interested public status as to a given allotment in the first place. Similarly, the dual changes of reducing the data that must be considered when monitoring an allotment, and permitting enforcement actions to be brought only where there is available monitoring data, combine synergistically to reduce enforcement significantly. Furthermore, phased in reductions of corrective measures, delayed corrective actions, and the requirement that monitoring data be available before corrective action is taken each delays enforcement and impedes agency responsiveness. Together, the effects of these changes are even more dramatic, resulting in greater delay and greater environmental impact. As the BLM's own experts noted, these cumulative delaying tactics could result in a protracted 7 year period for full implementation and change and therefore would result in long-term, adverse impact upon wildlife resources. AR 68008. We agree with the district court that the BLM violated the procedural requirements of NEPA and failed to take a hard look when it failed to consider the combined effects of the 2006 Regulations. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir.1990) (NEPA requires that where several actions have a cumulative or synergistic environmental effect, this consequence must be considered in an EIS.). Finally, we note that the Final EIS offers no reasoned explanation for the BLM's change of policy from the 1995 Regulations. [A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The Supreme Court has said, in considering an agency's decision to change its regulatory policy, [i]f Congress established a presumption from which judicial review should start, that presumption ... is ... against changes in current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record. Id. at 42, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (emphasis in original). [T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Id. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the BLM decreased its regulatory authority over rangeland management, decreased the role of the public in overseeing that management, and granted permittees and lessees increased ownership rights. These changes are inconsistent with the 1995 Regulations and discordant with the lessons learned from the history of rangeland management in the west, which has been moving towards multiple use management and increased public participation. The BLM itself acknowledges in the Final EIS that public input helps identify environmental impacts. As the district court pointed out, when the BLM enacted the 1995 Regulations the BLM recognized with respect to public participation that: Experience has shown that the greater and more meaningful the participation during the formulation of decisions and strategies for management, the higher the level of acceptance and thus the lower the likelihood of a protest, an appeal, or some other form of contest. W. Watersheds Project, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1313 (quoting 60 Fed.Reg. 9894, 9924 (1995)). Nonetheless, the BLM makes substantial reductions in the avenues for public input because, as the BLM explains, such input is at times inefficient and redundant. Appendix FEIS at 37. The BLM's rationale falls short of the requirements of NEPA and the APA. The BLM has failed to consider relevant factors, failed to articulate a rational connection between the facts put forth by agency experts and the choices made, and changed course from current policy without a reasoned explanation. In short, the BLM's Final EIS has not provided a full and fair discussion of the environmental impacts of the proposed regulatory changes, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1, impairing both the ability of the BLM to reach a reasoned decision and the ability of the larger audience to play an effective role in the decisionmaking process. See Dep't of Transp., 541 U.S. at 768, 124 S.Ct. 2204. Therefore, we conclude that the BLM has failed to take a hard look at the environmental impacts of the 2006 Regulations as required by NEPA, and its conclusion in the Final EIS that the proposed action would have no significant environmental impact is arbitrary and capricious under the APA. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has called the ESA the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978). The ESA reflects a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the `primary missions' of federal agencies. Id. at 185, 98 S.Ct. 2279. The heart of the ESA is section 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Section 7(a)(2) requires a federal agency to insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by the agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir.2009). Section 7(b), a procedural component of the ESA, requires a federal agency to complete formal consultation with FWS if the agency determines that any action on its part may affect any listed species or critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)-(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a); see Cal. ex rel. Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1018. Here, the BLM concluded that the proposed 2006 Regulations would have no effect on endangered or threatened species or their critical habitat and, therefore, did not consult with FWS. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1447-48 (9th Cir.1996). The BLM explained in the Final Rule that none of these eighteen administrative changes will have an effect on listed or proposed species or proposed or designated critical habitat.... Thus ... the BLM has fulfilled its obligations under section 7 of the ESA and has determined that the proposed revisions will have no effect on listed or proposed species or proposed or designated critical habitat. Final Rule, 71 Fed.Reg. 39402. Plaintiffs contend that the BLM violated the ESA by failing to consult with FWS before approving the 2006 Regulations. Plaintiffs challenge the BLM's failure to consult under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). The citizen-suit provision allows individuals to bring suits to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under authority thereof. Id.; see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997); Washington Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir.2005). The citizen-suit provision is a means by which private parties may enforce the substantive provisions of the ESA against government agencies. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 173, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Because Plaintiffs's claim is available under the ESA, this court looks to the ESA and not to the APA. See id. at 164, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (determining first whether citizen-suit provision of ESA applied and then applying APA to remaining ESA claims); Coos County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 531 F.3d at 802 (determining that if a plaintiff can bring suit against the responsible agencies under a citizen suit provision, this action precludes an additional suit under the APA (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)). Because ESA contains no internal standard of review, section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, governs review of the BLM's actions and the normal `arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' standard applies. Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 609-10 (9th Cir.1984); see also Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir.1988). Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that the BLM's no effect finding was arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, that the BLM's determination that consultation was not required was not in accordance with law. The minimum threshold for an agency action to trigger consultation with FWS is low, and we conclude that the regulatory amendments herewhich affect 160 million acres of public land, home to hundreds of special status specieshandily meet that threshold. To determine whether the BLM's no effect determination was arbitrary and capricious, we must decide whether the BLM considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 105, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983)). A federal agency must initiate formal consultation if its proposed action `may affect' listed species or critical habitat, and [a]ny possible effect, whether beneficial, benign, adverse, or of an undetermined character, triggers the formal consultation requirement. 51 Fed.Reg. 19,949; see Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1018-19 (9th Cir.2009). The BLM's decision to forgo consultation with FWS must be reversed if the BLM entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency. The Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 987 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The sheer number of acres affected by the 2006 Regulations and number of special status species who reside on those lands alone suggest that the proposed amendments may affect a listed species or its critical habitat. The BLM's grazing regulations affect roughly 160 million acres of public lands, home to hundreds of special status species. Indeed, because of the sheer number of special status species present on those 160 million acres, the BLM lists the names of all the special status species in the West in the Final EIS. Final EIS at Appendix 1. The list includes over 300 special status species: 30 species of birds; 49 species of fish; 39 species of mammals; 137 species of plants; 8 species of snails; 10 species of crustaceans; 6 species of reptiles; 15 species of insects; and 11 species of amphibians that are endangered, threatened, or candidate species in the West. Id. (containing a 35 page table that lists identified special status species). Presumably and logically, the BLM listed these speciesover 300 because many of them are found on the affected 160 million acres. Still, the BLM maintainscontrary to the experts' reportsthat the regulatory changes will not affect so much as one special status species, animal or plant, or its habitat. Furthermore, we find it significant that FWS, the agency that is primarily responsible for protecting endangered species, and that has what we have previously referred to as the more appropriate expertise, concluded that the 2006 Regulations would affect status species and their habitat. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1388 (9th Cir.1987). FWS explained that [w]ild ungulates, sage-grouse, neotropical migrant birds, pygmy rabbits, and various raptors are all influenced by the presence and distribution of livestock in the western sagebrush-steppe ecosystem, and [t]he proposed revisions seek to change the ways livestock will be managed spatially and temporally. AR 68069. FWS identified the greater sage-grouse and its habitat as being particularly vulnerable to the extension in the amount of time the BLM would take to make needed grazing changes. AR 68059. FWS was most concerned that public coordination is not required for renewal or issuance of grazing permits/leases and the 2006 Regulations provide for private ownership of water on public lands. AR 68060, 68071 (noting that [t]here is no more important resource for fish and wildlife in the arid west than water). As FWS explained, [p]ublic input is an important component of ensuring [a] complete and accurate analysis, and [i]mproperly managed permits or leases could have negative effects for listed and sensitive species. AR 68060. With respect to the change in water ownership, FWS reasoned that private water users seeking exclusive control of a water source on public lands for livestock grazing purposes would reduce habitat quality (for wildlife) and that this would have a slow, long-term adverse effect on wildlife as a whole and biological diversity in general. AR 68070 (quoting the Bureau of Land Management, Rangeland Reform '94: Final Environmental Impact Statement (1994)). Not only FWS but also the BLM's own scientists advised the agency that Section 7 consultation was necessary. One scientist, an ARC-DEIS team member and BLM wildlife biologist for 30 years, concluded that we are definitely in a `may affect' situation and should therefore consult. AR at 68227. The lead representative from the BLM's Fish and Wildlife Program concluded that consultation was a no brainer, and a BLM fisheries biologist concluded that [s]everal of the regulation changes within the proposed action are likely to adversely affect listed species..., which triggers the need to consult with FWS. AR 68193. Plaintiffs also submitted extra-record material in the district court supporting their may affect argument. Intervenors argue that this court may not look to extra-record material in conducting a review under the ESA. As we explained in Washington Toxics Coalition, the APA applies only where there is no other adequate remedy in a court, 5 U.S.C. § 704, andbecause the ESA provides a citizen suit remedythe APA does not apply in such actions. 413 F.3d at 1034. Therefore, under Washington Toxics Coalition we may consider evidence outside the administrative record for the limited purposes of reviewing Plaintiffs' ESA claim. See id. at 1030, 1034. Erick Campbell, a wildlife biologist for the BLM since 1976, submitted a declaration in support of Plaintiffs' ESA claim. Decl. of Erick Campbell ¶¶ 3-4. Campbell wrote the terrestrial special status species sections for the ARC-DEIS. Id. Campbell warned that direct grazing impacts include livestock consumption of palatable special status plants and direct trampling of special status species, such [as the] desert tortoise, and concluded that the cumulative effects resulting from all these [proposed regulatory] changes will be significant and adverse for wildlife and biological diversity in the long-term. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. Robert House, a Certified Fisheries Biologist and Aquatic Scientist with over 35 years of professional experience with FWS and BLM, submitted a lengthy declaration detailing the effects the 2006 Regulations would have on ESA listed salmonids. Decl. of Robert House ¶¶ 1-2. He concluded that the proposed grazing regulation changes as set forth in BLM's Final EIS `may affect' and, further, are `likely to adversely affect' listed and special status fish species and their current and potential usable aquatic and riparian habitat. Id. ¶ 9. Kathleen Fite, who has a Master's degree in Biology and was employed for 9 years as a Senior Wildlife Technician with the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, filed a declaration stating that the affected public lands are home to hundreds of species of birds and wildlife, including many threatened, endangered and special status species such as the bald eagle, Greater sage-grouse, pygmy rabbit, Columbia spotted frog, desert tortoise, golden eagle, Southwestern willow flycatcher, Mexican spotted owl, burrowing owl, ferruginous hawk, Swainson's hawk, and a variety of migratory birds. Decl. of Kathleen Fite ¶¶ 5-7, 22. Kite detailed the effect that over-grazing has on the habitat of these species, including causing erosion and destruction of the native plant community. Id. at ¶ 31-33. She also pointed out that the 2006 Regulations create incentives to build more range improvements, which will affect vital habitats for native species such as sage-grouse, desert tortoise, and pygmy rabbit. Id. ¶¶ 104-05. In sum, there is resounding evidence from agency experts that the eighteen amendments to the BLM's grazing regulations, i.e. the 2006 Regulations, may affect listed species and their habitat. The requirement that a federal agency considering action consult with FWS is triggered under the ESA if that proposed action may affect listed species. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1018. In 1995, the last time the BLM amended its grazing regulations, it consulted with W. Watersheds, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1306. Nevertheless, here the BLM concluded, without rational basis, that the 2006 Regulations would not affect listed species or their habitat and that the amendments were purely administrative. As evidenced by the expert declarations, the 2006 Regulations are not purely administrative. They alter ownership rights to water on public lands; increase the barriers to public involvement in grazing management; and substantially delay enforcement on failing allotments, in ways that will have a substantive effect on special status species. Although our review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential, it does not condone a `clear error of judgment.' Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project, 161 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851). Because the BLM failed to consider relevant expert analysis or articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, we conclude that the BLM's no effect finding and resulting failure to consult were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the BLM's obligations under the ESA. See National Ass'n of Home Builders, 340 F.3d at 841.
Plaintiffs also challenged the 2006 Regulations under FLPMA. In enacting FLPMA, Congress declared that it is the policy of the United States to manage the public lands `in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air, and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.' Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1075 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8)). With regard to public participation, FLPMA directs that: In exercising his authorities under this Act, the Secretary, by regulation, shall establish procedures, including public hearings where appropriate, to give ... the public adequate notice and an opportunity to comment upon the formulation of standards and criteria for, and to participate in, the preparation and execution of plans and programs for, and the management of, the public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1739(e). The parties do not dispute that under § 1739(e), the BLM must provide avenues for public input in the planning and management of the public lands. It is not obvious, however, whether the 2006 Regulationslimiting input and eliminating it entirely from certain management decisionswere in direct and unreasonable disregard of that statutory requirement. Intervenors argue that in resolving that question, the district court erred when it did not afford the 2006 Regulations Chevron deference. Intervenors further argue that the regulations do not eliminate public participation (a result Intervenors concede FLPMA forbids), but rather simply alter the circumstances of public participation. We agree as to the former, Chevron analysis was required, and reserve judgment on the latter. The district court erred when it failed to apply the analytical framework set out in Chevron to the BLM's interpretation of its authority and obligations under FLPMA, as expressed by the 2006 Regulations. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778; see, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1014 (applying Chevron deference to FLPMA claim). Under Chevron, the district court was required to determine whether the elimination of public comment as to certain management decisions (but not others) and the changed definition of interested public under the 2006 Regulations were in disregard of FLPMA's unambiguous language; or, alternatively, whether FLPMA's public participation requirement is ambiguous and the BLM's interpretation reasonable. See Webb v. Lujan, 960 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir.1992) (We must uphold an agency's construction of a statute if it is consistent with the unambiguous language of Congress, or if the statute is ambiguous, if it is reasonable.). Because the district court failed to apply Chevron, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs on this claim. Although we may affirm the district court's summary judgment ruling on any grounds supported by the record, the issues we would be required to decide under Chevron to resolve the Plaintiffs's FLPMA claim are not adequately briefed or argued by the parties. See Trustees of S. Cal. IBEW-NECA Pension Trust Fund v. Flores, 519 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir.2008) (remanding an issue to the district court where the district court had not considered it and the parties had not adequately briefed it on appeal). For example, if FLPMA's requirements with respect to public participation are indeed ambiguous, Chevron analysis in this instance would require a determination of whether the BLM's interpretation of its own authority was reasonable. We are not in a position to make such a determination based on the information provided by the parties and found in the record. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to vacate the court's judgment regarding the FLPMA claim and to remand this claim to the district court for further consideration under Chevron in the first instance. [9]
The BLM violated both NEPA and the ESA. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as to these claims, and we affirm the district court's permanent injunction enjoining the BLM's 2006 Regulations. [10] See Wash. Toxics Coal., 413 F.3d at 1034 (It is well-settled that a court can enjoin agency action pending completion of section 7(a)(2) requirements.); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir.2002) (explaining that effectuating Congress' clear intent [in passing the ESA] required issuance of an injunction (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978))). [11] Because the district court failed to consider Plaintiffs' FLPMA claim under the framework and with the deference set forth in Chevron, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on this claim. AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.