Opinion ID: 1193493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Choice of Counsel

Text: The trial court did not expressly hold that the prohibition against multiple representation contained in section 16-5-204(4)(d), C.R.S.1973 (1977 Supp.), was unconstitutional. It did, nonetheless, endorse the argument that the oath requirement precluded an attorney from representing more than one witness before a particular grand jury investigation and, therefore, infringed upon the witness' right to counsel of his own choice. We disagree. It is well-established that a defendant's choice of retained counsel should not be unnecessarily obstructed. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825, 90 S.Ct. 68, 24 L.Ed.2d 76 (1969). The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, however, does not include an absolute right to counsel from a particular lawyer. United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986, 98 S.Ct. 613, 54 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 553 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 98 S.Ct. 735, 54 L.Ed.2d 761 (1978); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998, 97 S.Ct. 523, 50 L.Ed.2d 608 (1978); Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946, 90 S.Ct. 964, 25 L.Ed.2d 127 (1970). The court in Carey v. Rundle, supra , set forth the relevant consideration: Desirable as it is that a defendant obtain private counsel of his own choice, that goal must be weighed and balanced against an equally desirable public need for the efficient and effective administration of criminal justice. . . . The danger inherent in multiple representation of grand jury witnesses directly implicates society's interest in grand jury secrecy and effectiveness. As a practical matter, attorneys will rarely be able to totally eliminate what has been discovered in a prior grand jury appearance when offering counsel to a subsequent witness. Successive representation of various witnesses in a single criminal investigation will inevitably result in the accumulation of knowledge which is helpful to the witness who is called to testify last. No grand jury witness, however, is entitled to be furnished with information to assist him in the evasion of issues or the concealment of facts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the potential impairment of grand jury secrecy which is involved in multiple representation in Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affirmed on reargument, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083, 96 S.Ct. 873, 47 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976): It is also manifest in the order of the supervising judge that no two of the subpoenaed witnesses who are parties to this petition may be represented by the same counsel. This portion of the order is essential to secure the secrecy of the grand jury proceeding. We do not mean to imply that multiple representation will never be tolerated at the grand jury level. Here, however, where each witness was a potential defendant, and the Court received information that the testimony of each officer might be expected to incriminate one or more of the other witnesses, and where the extent of the possible multiple cross-involvement in criminal activity is known to the Court but hidden from the individual witnesses by the requirements of secrecy, it is inappropriate for the supervising judge to permit multiple representation. Recent court decisions which have upheld the disqualification of an attorney who has sought to represent more than one witness in a single grand jury investigation have been based upon a balancing of the interests of the witness in representation before the grand jury and society's interest in effective grand jury investigations. In re Investigation Before the February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); Pirillo v. Takiff, supra ; see Note, Supervising Multiple Representation of Grand Jury Witnesses, 57 B.U.L.Rev. 544 (1977). The court, in In re Investigation Before the February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, supra, determined that the balance may favor the denial of multiple representation in a particular case: On the whole case, we think there is a conflict of two principles. The first one is the entitlement of the witnesses to representation by an attorney in grand jury proceedings whether as a matter of federal procedural law or constitutional right. The second is the right of the grand jury to pursue its investigative functions, which includes the right of the public to every man's testimony. And not to be forgotten is the right of the courts to control their own officers, the attorneys. `When two principles come in conflict with each other, the court must give them both a reasonable construction, so as to preserve them both to a reasonable extent.' Mandujano, 425 U.S. at p. 590, 96 S.Ct. at p. 1783. (Mr. Justice Brennan concurring and quoting from United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.Cas. pp. 38, 39, No. 14692(e) (C.C.Va.1807)). We think when a conflict of interest appears from the record, as it does here, which may affect the grand jury's investigative function and may deprive the public of the testimony of a witness, that the district court, in its discretion, may take appropriate action to remove the conflict, which is all the district judge did in this case. And we think this may be done although it may deprive a witness of a particular lawyer. It does not deprive him of the right to be represented at all, and so both principles are preserved as well as may be. Our General Assembly, confronted with the potential detrimental impact of multiple representation upon grand jury secrecy and efficacy, effected a reasonable accommodation of the various interests. All witnesses before a grand jury are now statutorily entitled to counsel, although not necessarily the advice of a particular attorney. No attorney who provides counsel in the grand jury room, however, may represent more than one witness in a single investigation without grand jury permission. The prohibition against multiple representation was intended to preserve the secrecy and effectiveness of the grand jury process and was a constitutionally permissible limitation of the right to counsel.