Opinion ID: 654203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Verbal Threshold Requirements (Tumolo v. Brogan ONLY)

Text: 72 At the time of the accident, appellant Tumolo was employed as a musician which required prolonged periods of sitting and standing. Due to the accident, Tumolo stated that he could no longer sit or stand for extended periods of time. This substantially affected his usual and customary activities associated with his job. 73 Following the accident, Dr. Castel treated Tumolo for injuries associated with the accident. On February 20, 1992, Dr. Castel examined Tumolo based upon continued complaints of pain in his neck and back allegedly caused by the accident. In his report, Dr. Castel stated that: 74 he does have fairly good range of motion in the neck and back but he definitely continues to have tenderness and SPASM in the muscles in the upper thoracic region, especially on the right, as well as the trapezius muscles and upper back muscles. 75 [A]s a result [of] the injuries sustained in an automobile accident of 1/7/89, Mr. Tumolo has been left with a significant limitation of use of the upper musculoskeletal system as described above in that he is unable to perform many of the duties that are required of him in his occupation. This condition has been present for over three years and I would again conclude that the disability is of a permanent nature at this point. 76 (emphasis added). 77 In order to determine whether appellant Tumolo met the requirements of the verbal threshold, the court must answer two questions. Oswin II, 609 A.2d at 423. First, we must determine whether Tumolo's injury would, if proven, meet the requirement(s) encompassed within one of the nine statutory categories under N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 39:6A-8(a). Id. If so, we must then decide whether the evidence before the court on a motion for summary judgment demonstrates a material dispute of fact regarding the nature and extent of [Tumolo's] injuries. Id. Upon an affirmative finding of both requirements, the court must submit the question to the jury to resolve the nature and extent of the injuries. Id. at 417. 78 A plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for non-economic loss unless he or she has sustained a personal injury which falls within one of the exceptions enumerated in N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 39:6A-8(a). Appellant Tumolo states that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Brogan and holding as a matter of law that Dr. Castel's diagnosis did not prove his injuries were serious enough to fall within these categories. Tumolo argues that he suffered injuries falling within, at a minimum, categories seven and eight of N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 39:6A-8(a). 21 79 Under categories seven and eight, a plaintiff must show a serious injury. 22 To establish a serious injury, appellant must submit objective, credible evidence that could support a jury finding in his or her favor rather than upon plaintiff's proofs ... based solely on subjective complaints of pain. Oswin II, 609 A.2d at 429; see Granowitz v. Vanvickle, 264 N.J.Super. 440, 624 A.2d 1047 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1993). Under Oswin II, and Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570, 441 N.E.2d 1088 (N.Y.1982), plaintiff must show a nexus between the injury and the disability.... [Further,] a plaintiff must show that 'the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.'  Oswin II, 609 A.2d at 429 (quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 250 N.J.Super. 461, 470, 595 A.2d 522, 527 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1991) (Oswin I )); see Siriotis v. Gramuglia, 254 N.J.Super. 223, 228, 603 A.2d 154, 157 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1991). 80 Applying the reasoning of Oswin II to the instant matter, Tumolo contends that he suffered a serious and permanent type of injury supported by objective, credible evidence that fits into the statutory verbal threshold. Tumolo alleges that the district court disregarded the doctor's examination and his objective findings of spasm. A determination that Tumolo suffers permanent spasms, he argues, is a real, objective medical finding. In view of Tumolo's occupation as a musician, Tumolo submits that he made a prima facie case to support the conclusion that, under the exceptions to N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 39:6A-8(a), he suffered a serious injury to allow him to recover for non-economic losses. We disagree. 81 First, Tumolo failed to establish a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member under exception number seven. In order to demonstrate an injury under this exception, Tumolo must present competent evidence raising triable issues as to whether [his] injury [is] both permanent and consequential. Kordana v. Pomellito, 121 A.D.2d 783, 784, 503 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 848, 508 N.Y.S.2d 425, 501 N.E.2d 33 (1986) (emphasis added). Appellant's self-serving allegations are entitled to little weight, and are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. See Oswin II, 609 F.2d at 428-29; Zoldas v. Louise Cab Corp., 108 A.D.2d 378, 382, 489 N.Y.S.2d 468, 472 (N.Y.App.Div.1985). 82 In Oswin II, the pivotal issue upon which a court could find permanence of an injury was whether the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life. 609 A.2d at 429. Applying that reasoning to the case sub judice, Dr. Castel's February 20, 1992, lone report is inadequate to raise any genuine issue of material fact showing serious impact on appellant's life. The New Jersey Legislature sought to guard against a finding of 'serious injury' when plaintiff's proofs are based solely on subjective complaints of pain. Id. Here, the doctor's only finding was tenderness and spasm. A finding of spasm may be sufficient to constitute objective, credible evidence in some cases, however, in this case, Tumolo has simply not shown enough. The mere mention of the word spasm and of what basically amounts to a conclusory paraphrasing of the statutory language cannot by itself defeat a summary judgment motion. Id. at 430. Finally, appellant's doctor admitted that Tumolo had a fairly good range of motion in his neck and back. 23 83 Applying the Licari standard, the New York Appellate Division has granted summary judgment in cases where a plaintiff has proven far more than Tumolo has demonstrated in the instant case. See, i.e., Guzzardi v. Crawford, 106 A.D.2d 750, 483 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (plaintiff suffered from minor lumbar strain and a cerebral concussion and had worn neck and back supports); Padron v. Hood, 124 A.D.2d 718, 719, 508 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (N.Y.App.Div.1986) (plaintiff suffered a cerebral concussion, scolistic deformity of the thoracic spine, cervical sprain and lumbosacral sprain). 24 Here, appellant has failed to set forth any evidence of inability to perform, or limitation of performing, any such activities. 25 Consequently, the district court's determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the injuries had a serious impact on Tumolo's life was correct. 84 Furthermore, Tumolo failed to establish a significant limitation of use of a body function or system under exception number eight. The limitation under this category need not be permanent. However, the injury must relate to a body function or system. Function is defined as the normal and specific contribution of any bodily part ... to the economy of a living organism. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 921 (1986). System is defined as an [o]rderly combination or arrangement, as of particulars, parts, or elements into a whole.... 26 Tumolo's injury affects neither a function nor system as defined herein. 85 A significant limitation must be more than minor, mild, or slight. See Oswin II, 609 A.2d at 428; Licari, 57 N.Y.2d at 236, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 573, 441 N.E.2d at 1091. Not all restrictions amount to significant limitations. See Palmer v. Amaker, 141 A.D.2d 622, 529 N.Y.S.2d 536 (N.Y.App.Div.1988) (no significant limitation was found where plaintiff suffered from lumbar and cervical sprains as well as a knee sprain and a mild limitation of motion of the thoraco-lumbrosacral spine); Grotzer v. Levy, 133 A.D.2d 67, 68, 518 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (N.Y.App.Div.1987), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 611, 523 N.Y.S.2d 495, 518 N.E.2d 6 (1987) (the court did not consider plaintiff's injuries significant where she suffered some restriction in the motion of her neck and lower back); and Kordana, 121 A.D.2d 783, 503 N.Y.S.2d 198. Here, the neck and back are only parts of a greater system, not an individual system. The limitation must relate to the overall system being examined. None has been shown here. 86 In summary, Tumolo was obligated to establish a prima facie case to meet the verbal threshold. Tumolo failed to show a genuine issue of material fact to support the contention that his injuries were serious or that his loss of use of any bodily organ, member, function, or system was permanent or significant. Oswin II, 609 A.2d at 423. Thus, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of appellee Brogan was proper.