Opinion ID: 880020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain Compensatory Damages

Text: The Bank contends that the compensatory damage award of $104,790.75 is not supported by sufficient credible evidence. The attack on the compensatory award is two-pronged: 1) that the amount included for excessive interest paid by the Weinbergs is wrong on its face, and 2) that the amounts awarded for crop loss and other expenses are speculative. Although the compensatory award by the jury is in the nature of general damages and is not broken down as to the items used by the jury to compute the award, it seems clear from the record that the compensatory award was based upon the amounts claimed by the plaintiff as items of damage, which the jury awarded to the Weinbergs in full. The Weinbergs claimed an item of $33,158.17 as the amount of excess interest over and above 9.5 percent that they paid to the Bank on loans up to the credit line amount of $137,533.40. The Weinbergs produced as part of their case the testimony of Donovan Kelley, a Billings CPA, who on the behalf of Weinbergs examined the Bank's loan liability ledger for the Weinberg loan and computed the amount of interest over and above 9.5 percent during the seven year period of the relationship on a credit line of $137,533.40. Kelley produced Exhibit 15 which showed that the total interest charged on the liability ledger amounted to $126,249.86, and that the total interest that should have been paid at the rate of 9.5 percent amounted to $93,091.69. On those figures, Exhibit 15 shows an excess of interest charged on the liability ledger of $33,158.17. The Bank contends that Exhibit 15 shows that on May 27, 1983, there was a negative balance under Kelley's computations in favor of the Weinbergs of $7,916.67 and that this is the amount of interest overcharged to which the Weinbergs are entitled, and not the $33,158.17. The Bank contends the figure of $33,158.17 includes the approximate $25,000.00 which the Weinbergs owed to the Bank, and which the Weinbergs never paid. They therefore contend the interest figures should be reduced by at least the amount of the unpaid indebtedness. There are several difficulties with the Bank's argument on this item. First, in oral testimony, Kelley testified that the $33,158.17 figure was the amount of excess interest paid by the Weinbergs. The Weinbergs themselves testified that in their calculations they had paid at least $25,000.00 in excess interest. Secondly, the Bank's argument equates the negative balance on the principal of the debt to the overcharge of interest. Exhibit 15 demonstrates on its face that the negative balance is arrived at after the application to the principal indebtedness of the amounts recovered in liquidation of the Weinberg assets. In addition, on Exhibit 15, Kelley added to the balance due on November 14, 1982, the expiration date of the FmHA guaranty, and the accrued interest as part of the principal of the loan. Thirdly, the testimony of Kelley that the amount of excess interest was $33,158.17 was not controverted during the trial either by crossexamination or other testimony except a minor reference to the negative balance. The second prong of the Bank's attack on the compensatory damage award relates to amounts apparently included within the general award: loss of three years' calf crops, $42,532.99; loss of 1983 barley crop, $7,349.00; and, loss of three years' hay production, $21,750.00. The Bank contends that the evidence is insufficient to justify such awards and that they are at best speculative. The basis of these awards to the Weinbergs apparently stems from their testimony which was accepted by the jury. They testify that they were induced by the Bank to enter the original loan agreement, on representations by the Bank officers that they would be extended a line of credit up to the credit ceiling amount at an interest rate of 9.5 percent over the seven year life of the agreement. The next year they were told by the Bank that they had to sign a new note each year in order to remove the escrow requirement first imposed. Although the Bank officers testified that at that time the Weinbergs had a choice, in reality their choice was either to sign the new notes or to lose the financing on their farming operation entirely. Thereafter, they signed new notes, sometimes in blank, which were filled in by the Bank. Evidence shows that the Bank breached its agreement, and its implied duty of good faith by failing to extend a line of credit in accordance with the Contract of Guarantee, charging interest in excess of the agreed upon rate which eventually amounted to an excess interest payment of $33,158.17. They testified that the Bank's conduct inflated their indebtedness, requiring them to liquidate their holdings as required by the Bank. In 1983, they were still eligible for an extension of refinancing through the FmHA, but they were informed in writing by FmHA that their eligibility for that loan was subject to your guaranteed loan with Farmers State Bank of Worden being settled. Other lenders also refused Weinbergs financing unless they had settled with the Bank. Because the Bank required liquidation, they were forced to sell off their entire cattle herd, their farm machinery and equipment, they were unable to buy fertilizer, and properly take care of the crops in those three years. Without detailing the same in this Opinion, their evidence calculated for the jury, the value of the calf crops that they would otherwise have raised, and the crops they could have raised and sold. Although the Bank contends that the calf crop amounts were gross amounts and not net amounts, the evidence of these losses appears to be reasonably computed. Montana law regarding the review of the sufficiency of the evidence has been oft repeated. When examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. Kukuchka v. Ziemet (Mont. 1985), 710 P.2d 1361, 42 St.Rep. 1916; Anderson v. Jacqueth (Mont. 1983), 668 P.2d 1063, 40 St. Rep. 1451; Gunnels v. Hoyt (Mont. 1981), 633 P.2d 1187, 38 St.Rep. 1492; Rock Springs Corp. v. Pierre (1980), 189 Mont. 137, 615 P.2d 206; Groundwater v. Wright (1979), 180 Mont. 27, 588 P.2d 1003; In Matter of Estate of Holm (1979), 179 Mont. 375, 588 P.2d 531. The Jury is in the best position to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses. Rock Springs Corp., supra. Questions of fact are for the jury to resolve and should not be taken from the jury when reasonable men might draw different conclusions from the evidence. Heen v. Tiddy (1968), 151 Mont. 265, 269, 442 P.2d 434, 436; § 26-1-202, MCA. Rock Springs Corp., supra. When there is conflicting evidence, the credibility and weight given to the evidence is the province of the jury and not this Court. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Girton (Mont. 1985), 697 P.2d 1362, 42 St.Rep. 500; Gunnels v. Hoyt, supra; Holm, supra; In Re Carrols' Estate (1921), 59 Mont. 403, 196 P. 996. This Court has repeatedly stated that it will not disturb the jury's verdict if the evidence provides reasonable grounds for different conclusions. Gunnels v. Hoyt, supra; Payne v. Sorenson (1979), 183 Mont. 323, 599 P.2d 362; Adami v. Murphy (1945), 118 Mont. 172, 164 P.2d 150. If there is substantial credible evidence supporting a jury verdict it cannot be overturned on the basis of insufficiency. Anderson v. Jacqueth, supra; Brogan v. Blanchard (1982), 200 Mont. 399, 650 P.2d 1390; Gunnels v. Hoyt, supra. In Nicholson v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (Mont. 1985), 710 P.2d 1342, 1348-9, 42 St. Rep. 1822, 1830, we held, substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, Evidence may be inherently weak and still be deemed substantial, and substantial evidence may conflict with other evidence. Anderson v. Jacqueth, supra, citing Gunnels v. Hoyt, supra; In Matter of Estate of Holm, supra. Section 26-1-301, MCA, provides that the testimony of one credible witness is sufficient to prove any fact. Accordingly, we affirm the compensatory award in this case.