Opinion ID: 2657694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mitchum and Elgin

Text: Based on these legal principles, this Court now must decide the question that the Federal Circuit itself refused to resolve, i.e., whether or not Semper ―could litigate a due process claim‖ for equitable and declaratory relief ―in a district court action‖ filed pursuant to § 1331. Semper, 694 F.3d at 96. In addressing this rather complex question, we begin with our opinion in Mitchum. 17 In Mitchum, three current or former employees of the Pittsburgh VAMC filed a § 1331 action ―against VAMC administrators [for equitable and declaratory relief], claiming among other things, that the administrators had violated the employees‘ First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for making statements intended to secure improvements for VAMC patients.‖ Mitchum, 73 F.3d at 31. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that ―the plaintiffs could not assert such claims in federal court but were instead required to pursue available administrative remedies.‖ Id. ―Because Bush and the other Supreme Court decisions on which the defendants rely concern the recognition of non-statutory damages remedies rather than injunctive and declaratory relief,‖ this Court (in an opinion by then-Judge Alito) reversed. Id. We noted that ―all three appellants could have pursued administrative remedies to vindicate the alleged violations of their First Amendment rights.‖3 Id. Based on our discussion 3 Specifically, one plaintiff (Krumholz, the Staff Assistant to the Associate Director) enjoyed the protections of the CSRA itself, which allowed him to file an allegation of a prohibited personnel practice with the MSPB‘s Office of Special Counsel (―OSC‖) and to obtain review by the MSPB. Id. at 31-32. ―A final order or decision is subject to judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.‖ Id. at 32 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(h), 7703(b)). Krumholz initially filed an administrative complaint under this CSRA process, but it was dismissed because he had already commenced his action in the district court. Id. at 32 18 of Fausto, Schweiker, and especially Bush, we admitted that ―a good argument can be made that a federal employee who has meaningful administrative remedies and a right to judicial review under the CSRA or another comparable statutory scheme should not be permitted to bypass that scheme by bringing an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.‖ Id. at 34. ―Several courts of appeals have so held, and these have much to recommend them. See, e.g, [Saul, 928 F.2d at 843]; Stephens v. Dep‘t of Health and Human Services, 901 F.2d 1571, 1575-77 (11th Cir. 1990); [Lombardi, 889 F.2d at 926].‖ Mitchum, 73 F.3d n.2. The other two plaintiffs (Mitchum, the former Chief of Medical Services, and Webb, Assistant Chief Nurse for Special Projects) were subject to a different statutory scheme (and neither the parties nor this Court expressed any opinion as to whether their grievances could have been presented to an appeals board and then to the Federal Circuit under this scheme or whether their claims had to be pursued through internal administrative channels or pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement). Id. at 32 & n.3. The Mitchum plaintiffs sought various kinds of injunctive and declaratory relief from the district court, ―including an order directing the defendants to cease and desist from retaliation, harassment, and reprisal; an order directing the removal of certain documents from the plaintiffs‘ files; and an order directing the appointment of a permanent community-based board of overseers to monitor the operations of the facility.‖ Id. at 33. ―Webb and Krumholz also sought reinstatement to their prior positions.‖ Id. 19 at 34 (footnote omitted). In two other instances, the respective circuit courts either reserved judgment or found that a party could not obtain injunctive relief for minor personnel actions. Id. at 34 n.5 (citing Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 528 (4th Cir. 1991); Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1984)). However, the D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case filed by an unsuccessful job applicant who claimed he had been rejected due to his First Amendment activities. Id. at 34. The original panel in Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1 (D.C Cir. 1986), ―held that Bush defeated the applicant‘s Bivens claim for damages but permitted him to seek the equitable remedy of reinstatement.‘‖ Mitchum, 73 F.3d at 35 (quoting Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11). The full D.C. Circuit reaffirmed the panel‘s decision on the damages claim and (while it did not rehear the reinstatement claim) indicated that equitable relief was appropriate. Id. (discussing Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d