Opinion ID: 613010
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Government Prove the Narrower Conspiracy?

Text: The defendants contend that the government may not rely on a variance to reinstate their conspiracy conviction because the evidence at trial was insufficient to demonstrate a narrower conspiracy among the defendants. As noted, the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, criminalizes the conspiring of two or more people to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose. The defendants were charged under § 371's defraud clause with conspiring to defeat the IRS's proper assessment and collection of tax revenue, commonly known as a Klein conspiracy. See Goldberg, 105 F.3d at 773. To prove a Klein conspiracy, the government is required to establish both an agreement whose purpose was to impede the IRS (the conspiracy), and the knowing participation of each defendant in that conspiracy. United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir.1998). Although [v]olumes could be written on the subtle problems in discriminating `purpose' from `knowledge' and in separating the objects of a conspiracy from its more remote consequences, it is well settled in this circuit that, where the conspirators have effectively agreed to falsify IRS documents to misstate or misattribute income, . . . the factfinder may infer a purpose to defraud the government by interfering with IRS functions. Goldberg, 105 F.3d at 774. We therefore turn our attention to the evidence at trial that indicates the defendants' knowing agreement to falsify Care's tax filings. [29] The government presented no direct evidence of an agreement either among the defendants or between any defendant and an unindicted co-conspirator. Of course, this is unsurprising. By their very nature, criminal conspiracies are clandestine and inchoate, and may be completed in the brief period needed for the formation of the agreement and the commission of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 2246, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir.2010). Accordingly, the government is not required to offer proof of an express agreement. Rather, it is a well-established legal principle that a conspiracy may be based on a tacit agreement shown from an implicit working relationship. United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir.2001). As we detail below, there was sufficient evidence here of a deliberate, coordinated effort among the defendants reflecting just such a tacit agreement. The government's theory at trial was that the defendants, through a series of fraudulent Form 990 filings, intentionally concealed from the IRS the fact that Care's activities substantially advanced two non-charitable purposes: financial support of the mujahideen and promotion of jihad. During their tenure with Care, each defendant filed at least one Form 990. Muntasser signed and filed Care's Form 990s for the 1993, 1994, and 1995 tax years. He did so with considerable assistance from Waseem Yassin, an unindicted co-conspirator and an officer of both Care and Al-Kifah. For example, Yassin contacted an attorney to assist in the preparation of the forms, he provided the attorney with Muntasser's materially false Form 1023 application for tax exemption, and he gave an incomplete description of Care's activities to the attorney when that information was requested. Al-Monla had been involved with Care since 1993, became more involved in 1995, and eventually succeeded Muntasser as Care's President in 1996. The government introduced evidence that showed how, prior to becoming President, Muntasser and Al-Monla worked closely together to advance Care's non-charitable purposes. For example, the evidence showed that the two defendants jointly met with Mohammed Chehade, the executive director of GRF, to discuss the solicitation of donations and coordinating with the battalion. It also introduced a written pledge of support to the Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which was signed by Muntasser, Al-Monla, Yassin, and another unindicted co-conspirator. In 1996, the year Muntasser became president, Yassin stated in a recorded conversation that his involvement in Care was waning and that he would be handing the reigns over to someone else. Yassin subsequently provided Al-Monla with Care's financial information. Following his tenure as President, Al-Monla served as Care's Treasurer in 1998. He signed and filed Care's Form 990 for that year. Mubayyid, Al-Monla's brother-in-law, performed volunteer work for Care in 1993 and 1994 before leaving the country for several years. In 1998 or 1999, Mubayyid succeeded Al-Monla as Care's Treasurer. He signed and filed amended Form 990 returns for the 1997, 1999, and 2000 tax years. The Form 990s filed by the defendants were nearly identical, regardless of the preparer. Substantially mirroring the Form 1023 submitted by Muntasser in 1993, each return listed only the same four program accomplishments: food distribution, cash assistance to orphans and widows, medical assistance for refugees, and grants to other welfare organizations. As we explain below, however, the evidence showed that Care's day-to-day activities and objectives were markedly different than those reported to the IRS. The consistency of the misrepresentations over a span of nearly ten years and the failure of the defendants to disclose precisely those activities that were most likely to jeopardize Care's tax-exempt status provide strong circumstantial evidence that the defendants were operating under an implicit agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 665 (1st Cir.2000) (pointing to evidence of a common and continuing aim, similar methods of operation, continuity in personnel, and interdependence to prove conspiracy); cf. United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir.2009) ([I]nterdependence may be shown where one participant knows that his own success depends on the continued existence and health of the [unlawful] organization as a whole.). That the misrepresentations came from defendants who had assumed substantial leadership roles in the organization; who, in those roles, had primary authority over Care's tax filings, which were central to the fraud; and who succeeded one another in those roles, further negate the alternative possibility that any falsity was the product of separate, individual misunderstandings about the required disclosures. Cf. United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1007 (1st Cir.1984) (The jury could reasonably have disbelieved that [defendants], as cousins and as president and vice president, respectively, of a relatively small company, acted entirely independently of one another. . . . (footnote omitted)). While the above evidence demonstrates an implicit agreement among the defendants, other evidence shows that the defendants had knowledge that their Form 990 submissions were materially false. To begin with, the evidence showed that Care was a small, tight-knit organization whose members were actively and intimately involved in its cause. Its officers were volunteers whose roles were not rigidly segregated. [30] We have previously held that an organization's small size and informal structure may support a jury's inference that the organization's officers had knowledge of and voluntarily participated in a conspiracy. See United States v. Pesaturo, 476 F.3d 60, 72 (1st Cir.2007). Additionally, the evidence at trial indicated that financial support of the mujahideen and promotion of jihad were Care's primary purposes. The Al-Hussam newsletters were replete with exhortations to join the jihad or to finance the mujahideen. The Zakat Calculation Guide distributed by Care described it as imperative to give part of your Zakat to Mujahideen (which it defined as those who are going out for Jihad, fighting in the path of Allah) because the Mujahideen represent the most needy category today since they are facing a shortage of financial support. Care's website similarly contained overt solicitations for support of the mujahideen. Witnesses testified that, in addition to distributing the Al-Hussam and the Zakat guide, Care was selling books and tapes advocating jihad at the lectures of religious speakers that it hosted. Indeed, the government even introduced a recorded phone conversation between Al-Monla and the head of another Islamic charity, in which Al-Monla described Care as existing on the rear lines and financing the brothers picking apples, a reference to Care's financial support of the mujahideen. Through its solicitations, Care collected nearly two million dollars in untaxed donations. Many of the donation checks received by Care during this time expressly indicated that the funds were to be used for mujahideen, fighters, martyrs, and Jihad. Some checks specified particular countries, or even particular groups of fighters, for which the funds should be used. For example, three checks presented to the jury bore the memo lines: Bosnia mujahideen, Jihad Bosnia, and mujahideen Bosnia, 9th Battalion. During this time, Care deposited checks made out to Al-Kifah and even to Human Services Office, referring to MAK. The government introduced evidence of personal checks from each of the defendants to Al-Kifah or Care containing similar instructions. Muntasser made a donation to Al-Kifah shortly after Care's formation in April 1993 in which he indicated that the funds were Zakat for the mujahideen in Afghanistan . . . Zone 1. He subsequently made a donation to Care in which he stated that his donation was for renewing the sponsorship of the family of a martyr. Despite not being a formal officer at the time, Mubayyid made two donations to Care in 1993 for Printing of the Al-Hussam and Al-Hussam and pilgrimage. A check from Al-Monla in 1993 simply reads, Buying Bosnia. This evidence makes plain the defendants' intimate knowledge of the very activities and purposes of Care that were concealed through the submission of incomplete and inaccurate Form 990s. We are of course always wary of the dangers associated with a § 371 conspiracy. See Goldberg, 105 F.3d at 775 ([T]he defraud clause of section 371 has a special capacity for abuse because of the vagueness of the concept of interfering with a proper government function.). Its broad sweep can capture the innocent as well as the culpable. Cf. Dennis, 384 U.S. at 860, 86 S.Ct. 1840. This is not such a case. The defendants, well known to each other, succeeded each other as authority figures in a small organization that benefitted from the perpetuation of a fraudulent tax status. Given the significance of the factual misrepresentations when juxtaposed with the single-mindedness of Care's apparent mission, given the overlap among the defendants and the closeness of their working relationships, and given the consistency of the misrepresentations necessary to sustain the fraud for so long, the government's evidence sufficed to prove a narrower conspiracy to fraudulently maintain Care's tax exemption.