Opinion ID: 2313338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Trial Judge's Action Proper

Text: Hudson final argument is that the trial judge erred in permitting the prosecutor to educate Detective Skinner on how to testify as an expert. At the conclusion of defense counsel's voir dire, the trial judge stated to the prosecutor: Here's the dilemma. And I am going to give you some time to work through the dilemma. The State has decided in this case to not separate out the chief investigating officer from their expert witness. That raises ... concerns and issues because this officer has some legitimate interest in this case. He was the person who made the arrest. Most of the time, when we have officers who testify as experts, it's not the chief investigating officer.... This officer clearly has the training and experience and the knowledge to be able to give those opinions. The problem that I have with his testimony ... is that he is intermingling what he knows about the case, with his independence as an expert. And starts using words, I've arrested. When I arrested him, he had $20 and $50 bills.... And so all of the sudden he takes it out of the realm of being an expert who is independently using factors that [are] being given.... These are the lines that have been drawn. He does not quite know them yet. So I am going to give you [time] to talk with him and discuss with him how he can testify as an expert, independent expert, based upon factors that he has evaluated in the case; as to why, based upon these factors, this case is reflective of one in which the defendant is distributing or intending to distribute versus personal possession. When Detective Skinner resumed his testimony before the jury, the defense again raised an objection to his qualifications as an expert witness and the court's actions in taking a recess, the trial judge responded: As to the opportunity for the State to speak with the witness, it became clear to the Court that I wanted to ensure that before the testimony was given to the jury, so that the defendant would not be prejudiced by what the witness was going to say, that the State had an opportunity to have clearly advised this witness what was expected from an expert, and to give him 15 minutes to have a brief conversation with him because of the unique situation of this being the investigating officer. It is a practice that I would discourage.... So under that, I wanted to make sure that there was a clear delineation of his role as chief investigating officer versus his role as an expert. And if I did not do that, I was concerned that the line may blur to the detriment of the defendant. So I do not believe anything that the Court has done at this juncture, one, is not appropriate, or two, wasn't done with the hope of making the proceeding as fair as possible.... After the recess, Hudson identified no inappropriate comments by Detective Skinner during his testimony before the jury. Instead, Hudson argued that it was improper for the trial judge to give the State an opportunity to educate Detective Skinner on his role as an expert witness, because that was akin to allowing the State to remove and rehabilitate [any] State's witness who has not testified to [the State's] satisfaction. The record reflects that was neither the purpose, nor the result, of the trial judge's action. The trial judge stated that he allowed the State to educate Detective Skinner about the role of an expert witness so that the defendant would not be prejudiced by what the witness was going to say and with the hope of making the proceeding as fair as possible. The record reflects that the trial judge did not permit or encourage the prosecutor to rehabilitate the State's expert. Rehabilitation implies that Detective Skinner was not qualified or that his qualifications had been questioned by conflicting evidence or testimony. Prior to the recess, however, the trial judge had ruled that Detective Skinner was qualified to testify as an expert, stating that he clearly has the training and experience and the knowledge to be able to give those opinions. The trial judge's action in taking a recess was intended to avoid undue prejudice to Hudson by avoiding any mixture of Detective Skinner's fact testimony regarding his charging decision and his expert testimony regarding Hudson's intent to deliver. Therefore, we conclude that Hudson's final claim also is without merit.