Opinion ID: 2630520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency to Waive Right to Counsel

Text: ¶ 76 Next, the court assistant asserts that even if the waiver was voluntary, the waiver was ineffective because Arguelles was not competent to waive the right to counsel. By asserting that Arguelles was incompetent to waive counsel, the court assistant attempts to minimize the import of the clarity manifested by Arguelles during the two colloquies regarding self representation. We cannot, however, consider the question of Arguelles's competency without considering the quality of his responses on the record. ¶ 77 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the minimum requirements for competency to waive assistance of counsel are no greater than the requirements for competency to stand trial. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). [17] Some states have established additional requirements for competency to waive counsel, see, e.g., People v. Lego, 168 Ill.2d 561, 214 Ill.Dec. 264, 660 N.E.2d 971, 973, 978-79 (1995); State v. Klessig, 211 Wis.2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716, 724 (1997); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 154, 689 N.E.2d 824, 831 (1998), while others have maintained that competency to waive counsel requires no more than competency to stand trial. See, e.g., State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 171-72 (Minn.1997); Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1336 (1995); People v. Wilder, 35 Cal.App.4th 489, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 466-67 (1995). ¶ 78 In this case, the record gives no reason to presume Arguelles was not competent to stand trial, see section I A, supra, and indeed, shows that Arguelles expressed a high degree of coherence and intelligence during the colloquies and other proceedings. We therefore see no reason to presume that he was not competent to waive counsel. Standing alone, a defendant's past history of mental illness and preference for the death penalty over life imprisonment do not establish an incapacity to knowingly and voluntarily choose to forego counsel. To hold that a defendant with any history of mental illness or a desire for the death penalty is presumptively incompetent to control his own defense would significantly burden the accused's constitutional right to represent himself. ¶ 79 Finally, the trial court in this case justifiably relied on the position taken by the defendant and his then counsel. Not only did defendant fail to raise a question about his competency, he affirmatively stated that he was competent to represent himselfand his counsel agreed. The court assistant has given us no reason, aside from observations about capital defendants in general and about Arguelles's mental health history, to disregard the statements on the record concerning competence. We therefore see no cause to question the adequacy of the trial court's ruling, based as it was on its superior fact-finding perspective, that Arguelles was competent to waive counsel.