Opinion ID: 1436386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before proceeding to the merits of the appeals, we consider, sua sponte, whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal in No. 17140. See Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai`i 494, 499, 880 P.2d 169, 174 (1994). Under Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) 4(a)(1) (1985), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. The circuit court entered final judgment in favor of Jolly Roger on March 29, 1993. Saranillio filed her notice of appeal on May 28, 1993. Therefore, under HRAP 4(a)(1), without more, Saranillio's notice of appeal would appear to be untimely, denying us jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Independence Mortgage Trust v. Glenn Constr. Corp., 57 Haw. 554, 555, 560 P.2d 488, 489 (1977) (per curiam) ([i]t is well established that a timely filing of the notice of appeal is a prerequisite to this court's jurisdiction). HRAP 4(a)(4), however, qualifies the operation of HRAP 4(a)(1) in cases where so-called tolling motions are made. It provides in pertinent part: If a timely motion under the [HRCP] ... is filed in the circuit ... court by any party: ... (iii) under [HRCP] Rule 59 ... to alter or amend the judgment ..., the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying ... such motion. On March 19, 1993, Saranillio filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to HRCP 59(e), which was permissible as a motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Gossinger v. Association of Apartment Owners of Regency of Ala Wai, 73 Haw. 412, 425, 835 P.2d 627, 634 (1992). Because Saranillio's notice of appeal was filed fourteen days after the entry of the order denying her motion for reconsideration, the notice would appear to be timely under HRAP 4(a)(4). Again, however, there is a catch. HRAP 4(a)(4) expressly requires that the tolling motion be timely. HRCP 59(e) provides that [a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.  (Emphasis added.) Saranillio filed and served her motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1993, ten days before entry of the judgment from which she appeals. The question, then, is whether her motion was timely. [1] We hold that it was. HRCP 59(e) does not require that a motion be served after the entry of judgment; it imposes only an outer time limit on the service of a motion to alter or amend the judgment, requiring that it be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. A motion served before the judgment is entered falls within that time constraint. Cf. 6A Moore's Federal Practice § 58.05[2], at 58-61 to 58-62 (1993); 9 Moore's Federal Practice § 204.12[4], at 4-95 (1993) (tolling motions, including motions made under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59, may be made either before or after the entry of judgment). Thus, we hold that Saranillio's motion for reconsideration, having been served ten days before the entry of the final judgment, was timely. The only remaining question is whether Saranillio filed her notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. Saranillio filed her notice of appeal on May 28, 1993, fourteen days after the circuit court entered the order denying the motion. However, the circuit court entered final judgment in favor of Jolly Roger on March 29, 1993. The entry of final judgment, coming while Saranillio's motion for reconsideration was pending, might be taken as an implicit denial of the motion for reconsideration. If it were, the time for filing a notice of appeal would have commenced on March 29, 1993, and Saranillio's notice would therefore be untimely. We recognize that there may be situations where a court specifically intends for the entry of a final judgment to operate as an implicit denial of a pending motion for reconsideration. HRAP 4(a)(4), however, assures parties that if they make a timely tolling motion, the time for appeal does not commence until entry of the order denying the motion. We think that a plain and fair reading of HRAP 4(a)(4) requires that the order denying the motion must specifically and expressly deny the tolling motion. Thus, under HRAP 4(a)(4), an implicit denial of a tolling motion, such as by the entry of a final judgment while a motion for reconsideration is pending, is insufficient to trigger the time for filing a notice of appeal. The time for appeal in No. 17140 commenced on May 14, 1993, when the circuit court entered its order denying Saranillio's motion for reconsideration. Because Saranillio filed her notice of appeal on May 29, 1993, we hold that her appeal was timely and that we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal in No. 17140.