Opinion ID: 1355928
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Automatic Motion for Modification of the Penalty Verdict

Text: (16) In every case in which the death penalty is returned, section 190.4, subdivision (e), requires the trial judge to review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reason for his findings. Defendant argues that the court considered inapplicable factors in reaching its decision to deny modification of the penalty verdict. He further asserts that the court failed to state adequate reasons on the record for denying the motion. The court gave the following reasons for denying the automatic motion for modification of the verdict: THE COURT: In this matter the court would not modify the jury verdict, because the court believes the verdict was proper and concurred in the verdict as far as the death penalty is concerned. The court believes further, in view of the criminal record of the defendant and the circumstances of this particular crime, there would be no basis to modify. The court thinks the verdict is warranted under the circumstances, in view of the evidence produced in the trial as indicated, and the factors in trial. And further, as far as the long and distinguished record of the defendant in the criminal annals of the county, I think that the defendant has now earned the verdict the jury has given him. At the request of the prosecutor that the court indicate on the record whether you concur with the jury's finding as a matter of law that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigation factors adduced at the penalty phase of the trial, the court stated: The court will so find. We find our recent holding in People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629] controlling here. Defendant Heishman was convicted of murdering one Nancy Lugassy to prevent her from testifying in his criminal prosecution for raping her. At the postverdict sentencing hearing, the trial judge made the following record with respect to the automatic motion for modification of the penalty verdict: `[L]et me tell you how the Court feels about this personally: There was a long trial in this court, and the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. Then there was a penalty phase, and the jury came back with a definite mandate to the Court, asking and suggesting and recommending and actually naming the death penalty in this case. Now, under the circumstances, there not being any legal cause why this Court should set aside that, it is the Court's intention to go ahead and to impose the sentence, as mandated and as requested by the jury.' ( Id., at p. 199.) Heishman was formally sentenced to death. Thereafter, at the request of the prosecutor, the trial court added for the record: `Well, with respect to the entire sentence, the Court has followed its duties under Section 190.4(e) and has made a determination ... after considering and hearing all of the evidence, that the aggravated [ sic ] circumstances in this case most certainly do outweigh the mitigating circumstances.' ( Id., at p. 200.) We concluded in Heishman that the record made by the trial judge made clear that he did in fact make that independent review [of the evidence] and determination [that the verdict was not contrary to the evidence or the law] as required by section 190.4(e). (45 Cal.3d at p. 200.) We found it equally clear, however, that the judge failed to comply with the statutory mandate to `state on the record the reasons for his findings' and to `set forth the reasons for his ruling on the application and direct that they be entered on the Clerk's minutes' (§ 190.4(e)). ( Ibid. ) The question of remand for failure to state adequate reasons in Heishman, however, was complicated by the circumstance that the trial judge was deceased. We held: Unfortunately, the trial judge is no longer alive. If he were, we would remand for a new hearing on the verdict-modification application simply out of an abundance of caution, since the trial judge's familiarity with the record would enable him to review the application and state reasons for his determination with relatively little delay and expenditure of judicial resources. But since the trial judge is deceased, we consider whether his failure to state his reasons under section 190.4(e) so prejudiced defendant under the circumstances of this case as to necessitate reversal as to penalty. We conclude there was no such prejudice. ( Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 200.) The record and circumstances here are markedly similar to those in Heishman. Here the court expressly stated for the record that the verdict is warranted under the circumstances, in view of the evidence produced in the trial as indicated, and the factors in trial, and went on  albeit at the prosecutor's request  to expressly concur in the jury's finding that the aggravating outweighed the mitigating factors adduced at the penalty phase of trial. Accordingly, as in Heishman, we conclude that the trial judge did in fact independently review the evidence and determine that the verdict of death was not contrary to the law or the evidence in the case. We acknowledge that the court here indicated its further belief that in view of the criminal record of the defendant, which it characterized as long and distinguished ... in the criminal annals of the county, defendant had earned his death verdict. Insofar as no evidence that defendant had a record of prior violent criminal conduct (§ 190.3, factor (b)) or prior felony convictions (factor (c)) was ever introduced at the penalty phase, the court's reliance on such matters was improper. Nevertheless, it is clear from the trial judge's statements on the record  particularly those made prior to his mention of defendant's criminal record  that although he believed defendant's criminal history had earned him the death penalty, he had independently concluded the verdict [was] warranted under the circumstances, in view of the evidence produced in the trial as indicated, and the factors in trial. In short, we cannot, on the facts of this case, conclude the error prejudiced defendant. ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 462.) It is equally clear, however, that the trial judge failed to comply with the statutory requirement and state on the record the reasons for his findings. (§ 190.4, subd. (e); People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 200.) As in Heishman, the trial judge below is, unfortunately, now deceased. As we indicated in Heishman, were the trial judge still alive we would remand for a new hearing on the verdict-modification application simply out of an abundance of caution, since the trial judge's familiarity with the record would enable him to review the application and state reasons for his determination with relatively little delay and expenditure of judicial resources. (45 Cal.3d at p. 200.) [13] Because the trial judge is deceased, we consider whether his failure to state his reasons under section 190.4, subdivision (e) so prejudiced defendant under the circumstances as to necessitate reversal of the penalty verdict. ( Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 200.) We conclude there was no such prejudice. One aggravating factor was present: the circumstances of the present crime and special circumstance (felony-murder-robbery). (§§ 190.3, factor (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The evidence supports the jury's finding that defendant personally shot and killed his victim during the robbery; at least one of the shots having been fired execution-style at point-blank range into the victim's head. The evidence found at the crime scene, and the testimony of witnesses Johnson and Aguayo, established that Polk was lying in a pool of blood having just expired, or very near death, at the time when defendant was observed making several trips to and from the room in the apartment where the victim was found, carrying out the stereo components and television set to the victim's car. The only mitigating circumstances claimed by defendant pertained to his character and background, relevant under factor (k). None of the statutory mitigating factors (see § 190.3, factors (d) through (j)) were even remotely applicable, except perhaps defendant's relatively youthful age (25 years old). Only one witness testified in defendant's behalf at the penalty phase; his mother. She testified he grew up without his natural father in the home, that although he may have gotten into some trouble as a youth he was not a bad child and had never been to prison, that he had helped with his two younger sisters while in the household, that he had a son who was living with the child's mother in Arkansas. The trial judge's reasons for concluding that the jury's verdict of death was not contrary to law or the evidence in the case are self-evident from the record. (Cf. People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 203.) Accordingly, we find defendant was not prejudiced by the trial judge's failure to adequately state his reasons for denying the automatic motion for modification of the penalty verdict.