Opinion ID: 2972456
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Civil disability

Text: Deja Vu also claims that the civil-disability provisions included in the resolution violate the First Amendment. The current resolution states that an application will be denied if “[t]he applicant or any person named in the application for an initial or renewal permit to operate an adult cabaret” has been convicted of or pled guilty to (1) a violation of Ohio Revised Code § 503.53(C) within the past five years, or (2) a sex offense covered by Ohio Revised Code § 2907 within the past three years. Resolution No. 00-22 § (F)(2)(e) and (f). Ohio Revised Code § 503.53(C) prohibits certain sexual conduct from taking place within an adult cabaret, including restrictions on the display or touching of the entertainers’ breasts, buttocks, or genitals. Along with sexual assaults and prostitution, Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.02-.34 also prohibit public indecency, disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, pandering obscenity, and compelling the acceptance of objectionable materials. Because the civil-disability provisions implicate the behavior of “[t]he applicant or any person named in the application,” Deja Vu claims that the ability to operate an adult cabaret is conditioned on the criminal record of not only the applicant, but also on the record of the owners, partners, and employees of the business. In evaluating whether the civil-disability provisions are permissible, the district court applied the four-part test outlined in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The district court focused on (1) whether the civil disabilities actually further the asserted governmental interest, and (2) whether the burden imposed by the provisions is greater than necessary to accomplish its purpose. Union Township relied upon two studies that specifically focused on the adverse secondary effects of adult cabarets. After reviewing these studies, the district court concluded that the civil-disability provisions “further[] an important or substantial interest in the protection of public safety.” The district court then decided that the civil-disability provisions do not “unduly restrict the right of persons in Union Township to express an erotic message and leaves available the alternative avenue of expression.” (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 587 (1991)). On appeal, the defendants contend that Deja Vu does not have standing to challenge the civil-disability provisions because “it has not yet applied for a permit and there is no allegation that Nos. 00-4420/4529 Deja Vu of Cincinnati v. Union Township et al. Page 14 the person or entity applying for the permit is subject to either of the[] disability provisions.” To have constitutional standing necessary to maintain a lawsuit, “(1) a plaintiff must have suffered some actual or threatened injury due to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant; (2) the injury must be ‘fairly traceable’ to the challenged action; and (3) there must be a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress or prevent the plaintiff’s injury.” Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., 274 F.3d at 389. Deja Vu claims that it has standing on this issue because Jane Roe II, a female dancer who performs at Deja Vu, was “convicted in April 1997 of an offense substantially equivalent to Ohio Revised Code [§] 2907 (obscenity and various sexual offenses).” After the district court issued its decision, however, the original resolution was amended so that the employment restrictions now apply only to those individuals who have committed § 2907 sex offenses within the last three years. Resolution No. 00-22 § (F)(2)(e). Jane Roe II’s 1997 conviction is thus insufficient to give Deja Vu standing to challenge the civil-disability provisions. For the same reason, neither the 1989 obscenity conviction of John Doe I, who has a two-percent ownership interest in Deja Vu, nor the 1992 obscenity conviction of John Doe II, who is employed by Deja Vu as a disc jockey, is sufficient to establish Article III standing for Deja Vu. Moreover, Union Township points out that the resolution no longer requires the disclosure of employees in the application or provides for the revocation of a license based upon prior criminal convictions of employees. The original resolution provided that “[a]n application for an initial permit to operate an adult cabaret shall contain . . . [t]he full name, residence address, date of birth, and social security number of each person employed by the adult cabaret . . . .” Resolution No. 9915 § (D)(5)(f). This requirement was eliminated, however, from the new resolution. Resolution 0022 § (D). Although, as noted above, the resolution still requires a licensee to maintain a list of employees with the Clerk, Resolution No. 00-22 § (M)(3), employees are no longer “named in the application for an initial or renewal permit to operate an adult cabaret.” Id. § (F)(2)(e)-(f). As a result, the civil-disability provisions do not apply to employees. The criminal record of Jane Roe II or any other employee is therefore insufficient to subject Deja Vu to a permit denial or revocation based on the civil-disability provisions. Deja Vu has thus not alleged sufficient injury in fact to establish Article III standing on this issue. We recognize that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). In the present case, however, Union Township eliminated the challenged provisions even though the district court held that there was a substantial likelihood that the provisions were in fact valid. This is in contrast to the more typical situation presented by Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., in which the municipality amended its ordinance only after certain provisions were voided by the district court, and where the municipality “repeatedly expressed its intention to reenact those portions of the Ordinance judged unconstitutional . . . at the earliest opportunity.” 274 F.3d at 387. Under those circumstances, this court held that the amendments did not moot the issues on appeal. Id. In the present case, the civil-disability provisions in question were not held unconstitutional by the district court, and Union Township has not announced an intention to reenact those provisions if the issue is dismissed as moot. The principle announced in Mesquite is therefore inapplicable. See Ky. Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 645 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that “the City’s announced intention to reenact the unconstitutional ordinance if the case was dismissed as moot” was “[c]ritical to the Court’s decision” in Mesquite). Deja Vu still contends, however, that the civil-disability provisions are unconstitutional because “the rapid turnover of entertainers and others in this industry insures that this issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review . . . .” See Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, Nos. 00-4420/4529 Deja Vu of Cincinnati v. Union Township et al. Page 15 498 U.S. 466, 473 (1991). This argument focuses on the transient nature of employment by adult cabarets. But, as noted above, the resolution no longer requires the disclosure of employees in the application or provides for the revocation of a license based upon any prior criminal convictions of employees. The fact that Jane Roe II committed a sex crime more than three years ago is thus irrelevant to the determination of whether Deja Vu has standing. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Deja Vu does not have standing to challenge the resolution’s civil-disability provisions.