Opinion ID: 2630916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Is Expansion Warranted?

Text: To answer the question of whether Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine should be applied when severity levels of the same offense have overlapping provisions, we will examine the purpose of and policy underlying the doctrine. In Clements , this court explained the underlying policy as the need to avoid prosecutorial whimsy. Clements, 241 Kan. at 83, 734 P.2d 1096. This concern was repeated in Nunn, 244 Kan. at 229, 768 P.2d 268. Subsequently, in Cooper , we noted the Clements - Nunn prosecutorial whimsy concern but also observed that subsequent cases had recognized an additional due process concern, which we summarized by stating: [I]t is difficult to discern legislative intent regarding the level of punishment when two statutes that proscribe the same conduct have identical elements but differing sentencing provisions. (Emphasis added.) Cooper, 285 Kan. at 968, 179 P.3d 439. In Cooper , we noted that both concerns had been discussed in Campbell, 279 Kan. at 16, 106 P.3d 1129. In Campbell , we identified three circumstances where statutory provisions might have identical elements and we explained the differing due process implications of each situation, stating: `[I]t is useful to think about three types of situations in which a defendant's conduct may fall within two statutes. They are: (1) where one statute defines a lesser included offense of the other and they carry different penalties ...; (2) where the statutes overlap and carry different penalties ...; (3) where the statutes are identical.... `The first of the three is certainly unobjectionable. Such provisions are quite common (robbery-armed robbery; battery-aggravated battery; joyriding-theft; housebreaking-burglary), and usually are a consequence of a deliberate attempt by the legislature to identify one or more aggravated characteristics which in the judgment of the legislature should ordinarily be viewed as making the lesser crime more serious. They afford guidance to the prosecutor, but ... do not foreclose the prosecutor from deciding in a particular case that, notwithstanding the presence of one of the aggravated facts, the defendant will still be prosecuted for the lesser offense. `By contrast, the third of the three is highly objectionable. It is likely to be a consequence of legislative carelessness, and even if it is not such a scheme serves no legitimate purpose. There is nothing at all rational about this kind of statutory scheme, as it provides for different penalties without any effort whatsoever to explain a basis for the difference. It cannot be explained in terms of giving assistance to the prosecutor. Where statutes are identical except for punishment, the prosecutor finds not the slightest shred of guidance. It confers discretion which is totally unfettered and which is totally unnecessary.... `As for the second of the three categories, it clearly presents a harder case.... [I]n the overlap scheme the two statutes will at least sometimes assist the prosecutor in deciding how to exercise his charging discretion. In overlapping statutes, the focus frequently is on different types of conduct, thus giving the prosecutor at least some idea of which statute he should proceed under.' Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14-15, 106 P.3d 1129 (quoting 4 LaFave, Israel & King, Criminal Procedure § 13.7[a], pp. 95-99 [2d ed. 1999]). This case falls within the first category lesser included offensesthat is `certainly unobjectionable.' [Citation omitted.] Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14, 106 P.3d 1129. As explained in Campbell , when the legislature creates a hierarchy of degrees of an offense, it provides guidance as to the aggravating factor or factors. Nevertheless, we emphasized that this was simply legislative guidance to the prosecutor because nothing `foreclose[s] the prosecutor from deciding in a particular case that, notwithstanding the presence of one of the aggravated facts, the defendant will still be prosecuted for the lesser offense.' [Citation omitted.] Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14, 106 P.3d 1129. In other words, in charging a robbery offense, a prosecutor could ignore the use of a weapon and decline to charge armed or aggravated robbery and instead prosecute the lesser offense. Or, in a battery case, the prosecutor could ignore a more serious degree of bodily injury and charge battery rather than aggravated battery. Similarly, a prosecutor charging a violation of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 could choose to ignore the fact a victim was believed to be younger than 14 years of agethe aggravating factor in the electronic solicitation statuteand charge the defendant with a lesser offense. On the other hand, where the aggravating factor is factually applicable, the prosecutor may charge the more severe crime. This conclusion is not altered by the fact the legislature could have easily and clearly drawn the line between severity levels in K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 so there was no overlap in the defined age ranges. See, e.g., L. 2009, ch. 70, sec. 1 (amending K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 to make severity level 3 offense apply only when offender believes person being enticed or solicited is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age); K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(1) (unlawful to have sexual intercourse with a child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age). The Kansas identical offense sentencing doctrine does not require this segregation. For example, again using an example cited in Campbell, 279 Kan. at 14, 106 P.3d 1129, we have not held that an offender could never be charged with aggravated robbery because he or she could be charged with a less severe degree of robbery. Similarly, a prosecutor should not be precluded from charging an offender with the greater offense of electronic solicitation simply because the offender could be charged with the lesser offense. This is especially true where, as here, there is a strong practical rationale for giving a prosecutor discretion when potentially the only difference between one crime and another is one day on the calendar e.g., where one crime occurs the day before the victim's fourteenth birthday and the other occurs on the victim's fourteenth birthday. Moreover, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3523 clearly gives notice of the potential penalty. As the district court observed, where there is ambiguity it arises because of the potential for either section to be applied when the offender believes the victim is younger than 14 years of age. Once again, however, this ambiguity arises in every case where the facts fit several severity levels of the same crime. Even though an offender may not know how a prosecutor will exercise his or her discretion in charging, the offender knows of the potential. As Sandberg admitted at his plea hearing, he had notice that he could be sentenced under a severity level 1 person felony. In other words, there is no more discretion granted to the prosecutor in this case and no less notice of possible penalties than in other charging situations where a prosecutor must decide which severity level of the same crime should be charged. We, therefore, decline to extend Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine to the circumstances of this case and conclude it does not apply to severity levels of the same offense.