Opinion ID: 1453231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Raise a Batson-type Challenge

Text: The real issue here concerns Span's argument that the trial judge erroneously ruled that a defendant must be a member of a cognizable minority group before he may raise a Batson -type challenge. [4] A review of Batson, as well as case law before and after it, is necessary to a complete understanding of the problem. Prior to Batson, the issue of discriminatory peremptory challenges was controlled by Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). In Swain, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause. 380 U.S. at 203-04, 85 S.Ct. at 826-27. The Court, however, also sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical right to use peremptory challenges without judicial control. The Swain Court thus refused to scrutinize a prosecutor's action in an individual case. 380 U.S. at 221-22, 85 S.Ct. at 836-37. Rather, the Court stated that a defendant could demonstrate a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination if he showed that a prosecutor in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries... . 380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 837. Therefore, under Swain, a defendant was required to demonstrate continual systematic removal of minorities from venires to prevail on an equal protection challenge. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Court removed the requirement that a defendant demonstrate systematic discrimination. In Batson, the Court recognized, The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. 476 U.S. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718. Since the decision in Swain, the Court had recognized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.  476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (emphasis in original). Based on this change and underlying concerns about racial discrimination in any given case, the Court removed the impediment imposed by Swain. The Court stated: These principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. [559] at 562, 97 L.Ed. 1244, 73 S.Ct. 891 [at 892 (1953)]. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. ... . Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption  or his intuitive judgment  that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24 (citations omitted). Batson allowed an individual defendant to attack the allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges of a prosecutor in a particular case. However, the Batson court stated that the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the removed veniremen are members of the defendant's race. 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. On its face, Batson appears to impose a standing requirement which prohibits a defendant of a race different from the stricken venireman from raising an equal protection challenge. In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990), a majority of the Court held that while a white defendant has standing to raise a sixth amendment fair cross-section/impartial jury challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory removal of Afro-Americans from his jury, the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement cannot be interpreted to prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges. [5] However, five members of the Court, Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, stated that a defendant situated in the same position as Holland (i.e., a white defendant challenging the exclusion of minorities from the jury) would also have standing under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause to raise a claim of discriminatory peremptory challenges (i.e., a Batson -type claim). [6] In Powers v. Ohio, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may raise a Batson -type equal protection challenge to the allegedly discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge without regard to the sameness of the race of the defendant and the excluded prospective juror. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated: If the defendant has no right to object to the prosecutor's improper exclusion of jurors, and if the trial court has no duty to make a prompt inquiry when the defendant shows, by adequate grounds, a likelihood of impropriety in the exercise of a challenge, there arises legitimate doubts that the jury has been chosen by proper means. The composition of the trier of fact itself is called in question, and the irregularity may pervade all the proceedings that follow. ... . ... To bar [a defendant's] claim because his race differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury service. 111 S.Ct. at 1371-73. The majority further stated that Batson 's emphasis on racial identity between the defendant and the excluded prospective juror was not inconsistent. The Court explained: Racial identity between the defendant and the excused person might in some cases be the explanation for the prosecution's adoption of the forbidden stereotype, and if the alleged race bias takes this form, it may provide one of the easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a conclusive showing that wrongful discrimination has occurred. 111 S.Ct. at 1373-74. Powers clearly eliminated any standing requirement which Batson imposed and held that a defendant of any race may challenge the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges on equal protection grounds. [7] This Court has not considered the standing issue in either of its two previous Batson -type cases. In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) ( Cantu I ), the Court stated verbatim the Batson criteria for establishing a prima facie case. The first criterion was not an impediment to the standing of the defendant to raise a Batson challenge, however, because the defendant was a member of the same racial group as the excluded juror. In Cantu I, a majority of the Court concluded that the defendant had established a prima facie case of discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, and on that basis, the case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the exercise of the peremptory challenge violated the defendant's right to equal protection under Batson. 750 P.2d at 597. Subsequently, in State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989) ( Cantu II ), which involved the same defendant, this Court held that the prosecutor's motivation in exercising the peremptory challenge, as determined by his explanation after remand, was indirectly related to the juror's race. The Court held that the prosecutor's challenge was racially motivated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. 778 P.2d at 518-19. Discriminatory peremptory challenges harm the individual criminal defendant and the juror who is the subject of discrimination, and they are an affront to the judicial system. Despite the longstanding tradition of restricting judicial interference in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the judiciary cannot be a party to the discriminatory use of the challenge. The discriminatory peremptory challenge of a minority juror simply because a prosecutor believes that the juror's race may influence the juror's decision in the case is offensive regardless of the defendant's race. The assumption that a minority juror cannot fairly hear a case because of his or her race or ethnic origin simply has no place in the American system of justice. Such an assumption is antithetical to the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Based on our analysis of the issue and Powers, we hold that no standing requirement exists which requires the defendant to be of the same race as the challenged juror. Therefore, the trial court was in error when it concluded that Span must be of the same race as the stricken juror in order to raise a Batson -type challenge.