Opinion ID: 1802482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Harris's Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims

Text: In Thomas v. State, 766 So.2d 860, 953 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, because the trial court's failure in that case to give a jury instruction on manslaughter did not amount to plain error, i.e., it did not or probably did not adversely affect the substantial rights of the defendant, the defendant also could not show on postconviction review that he was prejudiced, within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), by his counsel's failure to object to the failure to give a manslaughter instruction. However, in Ex parte Taylor, [Ms. 1040186, Sept. 30, 2005] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2005), we expressly rejected the reasoning that a petitioner in a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., proceeding cannot, as a matter of law, establish prejudice under Strickland, when on direct appeal the Court of Criminal Appeals has found no plain error with respect to the substantive claim. ___ So.2d at ___. In her petition for the writ of certiorari, Harris contended that the Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly rejected several of Harris's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims based on findings of no plain error on Harris's direct appeal. Harris contends that, in light of Taylor, we should reverse that court's judgment and remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of whether Harris was actually prejudiced by certain acts or omissions of her trial counsel that she contends amounted to ineffective assistance. Upon further reflection, we conclude that we improvidently granted the writ of certiorari as to Harris's no-plain-error issue. Harris contends that her counsel were ineffective 1)in failing to request and obtain appropriate jury instructions regarding accomplice testimony, 2)in failing to object to or to challenge by rebuttal several allegedly erroneous and prejudicial statements made by the prosecution during closing arguments, and 3)in failing to object to the admission of a photograph of the victim while he was alive. [2] Harris argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that her trial counsel were ineffective because, she said, they failed to request a jury charge stating that accomplice testimony must be corroborated by independent evidence that connects the defendant with the offense. Harris I, 947 So.2d at 1111. The Court of Criminal Appeals considered the merits of that claim and held that the instruction actually given by the trial court followed the substance of § 12-21-222, Ala.Code 1975, which provides: A conviction of felony cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and such corroborative evidence, if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof, is not sufficient. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals held, Harris's counsel had no ground upon which to base an objection. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling on this issue was not based solely on a finding of no plain error on direct appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals also rejected Harris's claim regarding her counsel's failure to object to the introduction of a photograph of the victim before his death based on the court's determination that Harris had failed to meet her burdens under Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.: Harris presented nothing at the Rule 32 hearing suggesting error or prejudice in trial counsel's failure to object to the pre-death photograph of Isaiah Harris. Thus, the record supports the circuit court's ruling that this claim is unsupported by any factual basis; accordingly, it fails to satisfy either the burden of proof requirements of Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., or the specificity requirements of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. Harris I, 947 So.2d at 1110. The Court of Criminal Appeals also noted that, on direct appeal, it had held that a photograph of the victim before his death was relevant and admissible to identify the victim. Harris I, 947 So.2d 1104. Because the photograph was admissible, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Harris had failed to demonstrate how her counsel's failure to object to its introduction was error or how counsel's failure to object prejudiced Harris. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling was clearly based on a ground other than a finding of no plain error on direct appeal. As to Harris's claims that her counsel failed to object to or to challenge by rebuttal several statements made by the prosecution during closing arguments, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Harris had failed to meet her burden of proof under Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., and her burden of pleading under Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. Thus, again, the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling on that issue was not based solely on a finding of no plain error on direct appeal. We granted Harris's petition for the writ of certiorari to consider her claim that several of her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments were not precluded by findings of no plain error on direct appeal. Ex parte Harris, 947 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala.2005). The Court of Criminal Appeals made alternative findings, which it concluded supported the circuit court's denial of Harris's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in her Rule 32 petition. The presence of those independent, alternative grounds pretermit consideration of the effect of the finding of no plain error on direct appeal. Because we did not grant certiorari review to consider the validity of the Court of Criminal Appeals' alternative justifications for denying Harris relief, the issue of the inconsistency of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision with Taylor is moot, and we conclude that we improvidently granted Harris's petition for the writ of certiorari on that issue. Accordingly, we quash the writ of certiorari to the extent it was granted to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in rejecting Harris's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on the basis that there was no finding of plain error on direct appeal.