Opinion ID: 1648336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: motion for mistrial after introduction of hearsay

Text: In his first claim of error, Keen contends that the trial court improperly allowed the State to introduce hearsay evidence through Detective Amabile under the theory of explaining the police investigation. Keen argues that this was harmful error under our prior caselaw and warrants reversal for a new trial. See Wilding v. State, 674 So.2d 114 (Fla.1996); Conley v. State, 620 So.2d 180 (Fla.1993); State v. Baird, 572 So.2d 904 (Fla.1990). We must first analyze these decisions which address the substance of the matters Keen has challenged. In Baird, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of racketeering and bookmaking. See 572 So.2d at 905. At trial, an FDLE special agent was allowed to testify that he had received information that he [Baird] was a major gambler and operating a major gambling operation in the Pensacola area, in response to the prosecutor's question as to whether he had targeted Baird for prosecution. Id. On review, we rejected the State's argument that the testimony established the special agent's motive in investigating Baird because, at that point in the trial, no evidence of selective prosecution or bad motives... [by] the investigating officers had been offered by the defense. Id. at 907. We also determined: [W]hen the only purpose for admitting testimony relating accusatory information received from an informant is to show a logical sequence of events leading up to an arrest, the need for the evidence is slight and the likelihood of misuse is great. In light of the inherently prejudicial effect of an out-of-court statement that the defendant engaged in the criminal activity for which he is being tried, we agree that when the only relevance of such a statement is to show a logical sequence of events leading up to an arrest, the better practice is to allow the officer to state that he acted upon a tip or information received, without going into the details of the accusatory information. Id. at 908 (emphasis added). We ultimately found the error harmless because the testimony was only elicited prematurely; was offered to rebut Baird's contention that he was selectively prosecuted; was neither focused upon nor brought to the jury's attention again; and, finally, because the State based its case on substantial evidence properly admitted during trial. See id. In Conley, the defendant was charged with and convicted of armed burglary, three counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and armed robbery with a firearm. See 620 So.2d at 182. Testimony concerning a police dispatch report which originated when an unidentified person called the police was admitted into evidence. See id. At trial, a police officer testified that he received the call in reference to a man chasing a female down the street ... [t]he man supposedly had some type of gun or rifle. See id. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that this testimony, combined with the alleged victim's testimony, proved that the defendant carried a rifle during the criminal episode. See id. On review, we stated: Even if we were to conclude that the testimony was not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the contents of the statement were not relevant to establish a logical sequence of events, nor was the reason why officers arrived at the scene a material issue in the case. As we said in Baird, the inherently prejudicial effect of admitting into evidence an out-of-court statement relating accusatory information to establish the logical sequence of events outweighs the probative value of such evidence. Such practice must be avoided. Baird, 572 So.2d at 908; see § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1989). Conley, 620 So.2d at 183 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under this analysis, we found the police officer's improper testimony to be harmful error after recognizing the lack of corroboration as to whether the defendant used a firearm, in combination with evidence contradicting the alleged victim's testimony. See id. We found Conley applicable the following year in connection with the admission of testimony from police officers regarding conversations with a witness who later appeared to testify during the trial. See Caruso v. State, 645 So.2d 389 (Fla.1994). Specifically, we noted that Officer Raimondi said they went to [the witness] to ask her about a white male she reported having seen at midnight December 5. Officer Faby said Walker gave him a description of the man she saw, and the description matched Caruso. Id. at 395. We rejected the State's contention that the testimony was not inadmissible hearsay, noting that in Conley we held that the prejudice of out-of-court statements used to relate accusatory information but offered simply to establish the logical sequence of events outweighs the probative value of such evidence, rendering it inadmissible. Caruso, 645 So.2d at 395. Although we found error in the admission of such evidence, as in Baird, we found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the inadmissible evidence was no more than a prior consistent statement to corroborate the witness's testimony and the declarant was cross-examined on the topic, which mitigated the prejudice. See id. Most recently, in Wilding v. State, 674 So.2d 114 (Fla.1996), receded from on other grounds, Devoney v. State, 717 So.2d 501 (Fla.1998), we wrote: First, we agree that it was error to admit testimony that the lead detective in the murder investigation received an anonymous tip that named Neil Wilding in connection with the murder. During direct examination of the detective, the prosecutor asked whether the anonymous tip received by the detective gave the name Neil Wilding. The detective was allowed, over objection, to answer that it did. The detective further testified that the department began its investigation of Wilding from the tip and verified a lot of the information that we received in the tip and developed additional information. The detective went on to explain that the police interviewed Wilding's family and friends. The State maintains that this testimony was properly admitted because, given the fact that it took four years to arrest Wilding for the murder, the testimony was relevant to show the logical sequence of events regarding the murder investigation. We cannot agree. While it might have been permissible to allow the detective to testify that police began the investigation because of a tip or information received, this testimony clearly went beyond that authorized in State v. Baird, 572 So.2d 904 (Fla.1990).... We recognize that the information received in the tip in this case was not detailed to the jury to the same extent as was the information received in Baird. However, similar evils are involved in both cases. As noted by the Third District Court of Appeal in Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 411 So.2d 384 (Fla.1981) (footnote omitted), where the inescapable inference from testimony [concerning a tip received by police] is that a non-testifying witness has furnished the police with evidence of the defendant's guilt, the testimony is hearsay, and the defendant's right of confrontation is defeated, notwithstanding that the actual statements made by the non-testifying witness are not repeated. In this case, even though the detective never specifically repeated what the informant told him, the clear inference to be drawn from the testimony was that the informant had implicated Wilding in the murder and the information received was reliable because it had been verified by police who talked to Wilding's family and friends. Thus, the jury was led to believe that an unidentified person, who did not testify and was not subject to cross-examination, had given the police evidence of Wilding's guilt, evidence that upon investigation proved to be reliable. Even if the testimony was offered simply to show the logical sequence of events regarding the murder investigation, its probative value clearly was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. As a general rule, the investigation leading to the defendant's arrest is not at issue in a criminal trial. Placing information before the jury that a non-testifying witness gave police reliable information implicating the defendant in the very crime charged clearly could affect the verdict. More importantly, because Wilding could not cross-examine the unidentified witness, admission of this testimony violated his confrontation rights. Unlike the testimony relating the information received from the informant in Baird, this testimony was not merely elicited prematurely. Baird, 572 So.2d at 908 (it was error to admit testimony relating information received from informant because the testimony was elicited before State's motive for investigating defendant was put in issue on cross-examination). In this case, the only issue the testimony could have gone to other than to establish the sequence of events leading to the investigation was Wilding's identity as the killer. Moreover, almost immediately after the testimony concerning the steps taken to verify the anonymous tip, the detective testified that in an attempt to locate Wilding, the department secured air time with America's Most wanted. Defense counsel immediately objected, moved for a mistrial, and pointed out that the fact that Wilding had been the subject of an America's Most Wanted episode had been the subject of a motion in limine. The fact that Wilding was the subject of this widely viewed television program clearly was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. When this error is considered in combination with the testimony about the anonymous tip linking Wilding to the murder, neither error can be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). This is particularly true in light of the fact that members of the jury were already discussing their concern about Wilding, whom they now knew had been the subject of America's Most Wanted, having access to their personal information. Thus, on this record, we cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that these errors affected the verdict. DiGuilio. Wilding, 674 So.2d at 118-19 (emphasis added). As was well articulated by the court in Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), it is impermissible for the State to have the benefit of statements from mystery witnesses or sources without the defendant having the right of confrontation and cross-examination. In short, the insidious diminution of the precious rights of confrontation and cross-examination, through some literal application of the rule against hearsay, cannot be tolerated. Id. at 856. With that background in mind, a review of the relevant testimony of Detective Amabile in this case demonstrates: Q: When did you first get involved in investigating [Anita Keen's] disappearance or death? A: I became involved in the case in August of 1984. Q: At that point, what had been the status of the investigation? A: The case had remained open and it was classified only as a missing persons case. Q: Why did you begin to investigate the case at that time? A: The office had received information from two insurance companies that they had received information that the case was not a missing persons case, but a murder. Q: As a result of receiving that information, then, what did you do in the reopening of the investigation? A: The initial call to the office entailed that a Patrick Keen [8] . . . . Q: Without telling us what you said, first of all, I would like to know, do you know Patrick Keen? A: Yes, I do. Q: Have you met Patrick Keen? A: Yes, I did. Q: And without telling us what was said during this period of time in August of '84, did you talk to Patrick Keen? A: Yes, I did. Q: And do you know what Mr. Keen's relationship was to Michael Keen? A: Yes, I do know. Q: And what was that relationship? A: They are brothers. Q: Now, as a result of talking to [Patrick Keen], did you pursue your investigation in this case? A: That is correct. Q: Tell us what you did? [9] . . . . Q: Where did your investigation take you from that point? A: I then made contact with a gentleman by the name of Kenneth Shapiro. (Emphasis added.) Based on this exchange, we conclude that our reasoning in Wilding is directly on point. The challenged comments in this case are similar to the first error cited in Wilding, if not more blatant, because here we do not have an unidentified informant but two life insurance companies and the defendant's own brother. To be sure, this case lacks such a prejudicial conjunction as the America's Most Wanted issue in Wilding. Nonetheless, without an opportunity for cross-examination, the unmistakable link drawn between the insurance companies ... receiv[ing] information that the case was ... a murder, Patrick Keen, the defendant's own brother who did not testify, and Shapiro, the State's key witness, comprises a uniquely prejudicial relationship from which the jury could have most certainly inferred that the life insurance companies had investigated this case and had evidence that Anita had been murdered, and that Patrick Keen had information that his brother was guilty of murder. The inescapable inference from this hearsay material was that the investigation had produced evidence that Anita's disappearance was in actuality a murder. Considering the sources of the information, such an inference would tend to bolster Shapiro's corresponding testimony. This is especially so because Detective Amabile testified shortly thereafter that this chain of events and information received led to the preparing of an arrest warrant for the defendant, Michael Keen. This case closely parallels Wilding in that the clear inference to be drawn from [Amabile's] testimony was that the insurance industry with its resources had investigated the disappearance and discovered a murder, that Keen's own brother had implicated him in the murder, and that the information received was reliable because it had been verified by police who talked to [Shapiro]. Wilding, 674 So.2d at 119. As a result, the jury was led to believe that [the insurance companies and defendant's brother], who did not testify and [were] not subject to cross-examination, had given the police evidence of [Keen's] guilt, evidence that upon investigation proved to be reliable. Id. Because Wilding is squarely on point with regard to this type of testimony, we must next determine whether the error here was properly preserved and the standard of review we should apply in our analysis. Here, the State argues that the subject matter of the testimony challenged was not hearsay because it was not elicited to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only to show a sequence of events. We reject such contention. First, this Court clearly instructed in Baird, reaffirmed in Conley, and confirmed in Wilding that an alleged sequence of events leading to an investigation and an arrest is not a material issue in this type of case. Therefore, there is no relevancy for such testimony to prove or establish such a nonissue. When the only possible relevance of an out-of-court statement is directed to the truth of the matters stated by a declarant, the subject matter is classic hearsay even though the proponent of such evidence seeks to clothe such hearsay under a nonhearsay label. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999); Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) (holding that where the only relevance of an out-of-court statement is to prove the truth of the matter asserted it is hearsay and is not rendered admissible when the non-hearsay purpose is not relevant). Second, facts concerning the purported determination by insurance companies after investigation that this case involved a murder, not an accident, were used by the State during closing argument for substantive support not sequence of events purposes. Thus, regardless of the purpose for which the State now claims the testimony to have been directed, the evidence was in fact used to prove the truth of the content rendering the content of the statement hearsay. See Conley (holding that regardless of the purpose for which a party claims it has offered evidence, when an out-of-court statement is used as evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, such statement constitutes hearsay and falls within no recognized exception). Next, with the predicate of this Court having previously announced on numerous occasions that the admission of this type of evidence is inherently prejudicial, it must be determined if this issue has been properly preserved for review and the standard of review applicable for proper determination. Initially, although the sequence of events in the investigation leading to an arrest was not a material issue in this case, the preliminary question directed to Detective Amabile as to why an investigation was revived was not facially objectionable upon the basis of clearly calling for hearsay testimony. Had the detective simply referred to the event (phone call or tip), without blurting out the hearsay content (insurance company investigation determined that a murder had occurred), a hearsay objection would not have been appropriate. As we cautioned in Baird, if the relevance was only directed to a sequence of events, the officer could state no more than the existence of a tip or generally that information had been received. The misdirection of the issue did not terminate with the detective's initial statement, but the State then immediately proceeded to connect the inadmissible accusatory information to Keen's brother and then immediately to Shapiro and then to Keen. As soon as the State proceeded to create a nexus between Keen's brother and the insurance investigation which had concluded that a murder had occurred, an objection was voiced and a request for mistrial was submitted and denied. This Court has repeatedly admonished that the admission of this type of evidence is inherently prejudicial as can be seen in Wilding, Conley, and Baird. Here, the improper evidence was injected into the proceedings by the State's witness, an experienced detective, selectively volunteering inappropriate matters to a jury. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the events here are similar to those considered by this Court in Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925 (Fla.1990), in which a witness, in response to cross-examination by defense counsel, volunteered inadmissible facts concerning a prior unrelated collateral crime and wrong of the defendant by referring to the defendant as a prior convict. As in the present case, the defendant in Czubak did not receive an adverse ruling as to the initial admissibility of the inappropriate evidence. However, a motion for mistrial submitted after the inappropriate evidence had been volunteered was denied just as occurred in the present case. In Czubak, this Court specifically stated the admission of the evidence of an unrelated collateral crime (which consisted of referring to the defendant as a convict) was presumptively harmful. The Czubak court then proceeded to reverse the conviction by applying the standard that such error could be considered harmless only if it could be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict could not have been affected by the error. In the present case, the inadmissible matter was injected by the State through volunteered testimony of an experienced detective. The nature of the inadmissible materials here consisting of very harmful hearsay evidence indicating that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged is far more egregious and harmful than the admission of material directed to an unrelated collateral wrong. Additionally, preservation of the issue for review in this case is identical to the posture of the case in Czubak. We conclude that the standard applied in Czubak should be applied here under these particular circumstances. The Czubak decision was predicated upon principles announced by this Court in Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903 (Fla.1981), and Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1989). The Straight court recognized that the admission of evidence concerning an unrelated collateral wrong is presumptively harmful and the Castro court applied the DiGuilio [10] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review. This Court applied these two principles of law in Czubak under circumstances identical to those involved in the present case. This trilogy of cases applies here and would require a new trial. We conclude that the State's position would create an unacceptable approach which would permit the State to receive the benefit of volunteered hearsay testimony directed to the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged. This type of evidence simply should not have been permitted, and when the motion for mistrial was made after such evidence came before the jury, a mistrial should have been granted. For these reasons, the State's analysis of the hearsay issue cannot be accepted under these circumstances. In this case, the jury could have legitimately relied on Shapiro's extensive testimony, the circumstantial evidence of the two insurance policies on Anita Keen, and Michael Moran's testimony. However, we should not ignore the direct relationship between the erroneous introduction of the out-of-court statements and Shapiro's devastating testimony, especially where the credibility of the two principals to the crime was the key issue in the case. Keen, 504 So.2d at 401 (acknowledging that the real jury issue in this trial centered on the credibility of Shapiro versus the credibility of Keen). The out-of-court statements produced by the State provided a strong foundation that bolstered and supported Shapiro's detailed account of the planning and execution of Anita's murder. In essence, the State was able to present three witnesses for the price of one, with the bonus that only Shapiro testified and was subject to cross-examination. Patrick Keen never took the stand, nor did the insurance company representatives who forwarded the information that this was not a missing persons case, but a murder. [11] The State repeatedly reminded the jury during closing argument that claims for life insurance benefits were pending against the insurance companies with Keen having filed a petition to have Anita presumed dead to collect benefits. This line of argument, of necessity, inherently flowed from the State's theory of this case which was predicated upon a homicide to obtain life insurance proceeds. In the concluding moments of the State's rebuttal argument, the jury's attention was again directed to the investigating detective being advised by the insurance company that Anita Keen's disappearance was a homicide, not an accident. The closing argument was certainly less detailed than Detective Amabile's testimony, but the jury was again informed of the out-of-court statement that Keen had engaged in the criminal activity for which he was being prosecuted. Cf. Baird, 572 So.2d at 908 (finding similar error harmless where challenged testimony was only elicited prematurely, rebutted a defense contention, and was not brought to the jury's attention again, and because State relied on properly admitted evidence). The closing argument, however brief, related the same highly prejudicial elements placed before the jury by Amabile's testimony, i.e., the insurance companies obtained information that Anita's death was a murder not an accident. Although it was unstated during the closing argument that the information came from Patrick Keen, that point had been unambiguously made during Amabile's testimony. This was highly prejudicial with no countervailing probative value. See Wilding, 674 So.2d at 119 (reciting general rule that the investigation leading to the defendant's arrest is not at issue in a criminal trial). Thus, this evidence was hearsay, it was not relevant, and its probative value was far surpassed by its prejudicial impact. These factors all lead to the inescapable conclusion that the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.