Opinion ID: 537652
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delchamps' Claims

Text: 33 Delchamps contends that the district court erroneously awarded Deloach front pay, or future lost earnings, rather than reinstating Deloach. This determination is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005, 106 S.Ct. 525, 88 L.Ed.2d 457 (1985). 34 Reinstatement is generally the preferred remedy for a discriminatory discharge. Hansard, 865 F.2d at 1469. However, front pay may be awarded if reinstatement is not feasible. Id. The district court specifically found that reinstatement was not a realistic alternative. The court reached this determination after noting that Delchamps had decided to terminate Deloach rather than demote him due to the morale problems that would ensue. It then concluded that after trial there [was] less likelihood than ever that plaintiff could be a satisfactory employee with defendant. The court also noted that because Deloach had been replaced, reinstatement would disrupt the employment of others. As these are permissible bases for awarding front pay, we find no abuse of discretion. See Goldstein, 758 F.2d at 1449 (front pay appropriate when discord and antagonism between the parties would render reinstatement ineffective as a make-whole remedy). 35 In determining the front pay award, the court noted that an award for any longer than five years was too speculative and found that $215,000 would adequately compensate Deloach. Delchamps initially argues that an award compensating the plaintiff for five years is too speculative and therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion. To support this argument, Delchamps points out that many courts have awarded front pay for only up to three years. See, e.g., Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir.1987) (two years); Snow v. Pillsbury Co., 650 F.Supp. 299 (D.Minn.1986) (three years); Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 649 F.Supp. 647, 664 (N.D.Ind.1986) (two years), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir.1987). However, as a prospective make-whole remedy, front pay at best can only be calculated through intelligent guesswork. Sellers v. Delgado College, 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1986). [W]e recognize its speculative character by according wide latitude in its determination to the district courts. Id. We find that an award covering a five year period was within the court's discretion. 36 Delchamps further contends that even if front pay over a five year term is appropriate, the award is excessive. It is unclear exactly how the court arrived at the $215,000 award. The court noted that plaintiff's expert Donald Cornwell projected that the present value of front pay lost 3 was $245,000 if calculated to age sixty-two, which covers a thirteen year period, and $308,000 if calculated to age sixty-five, which covers a sixteen year period. The court also noted that Deloach's 1985 salary was $54,000. The award may constitute an adjustment of the present value of front pay lost. If so, it is excessive because a straight percentage adjustment of either calculation to reflect a five year award would be under $100,000. Alternatively, the award may have been based upon the 1985 salary--multiplied times five years ($270,000), and then discounted to present value. If so, it is erroneous because it does not include deductions for interim earnings. Since discrimination remedies are compensatory rather than punitive, Hansard, 865 F.2d at 1469, Deloach's present salary should be deducted from his previous salary to avoid a windfall, Blum v. Witco Chem. Co., 829 F.2d 367, 374 (3d Cir.1987). Accordingly, we vacate the front pay award and remand for determination of the proper award. We note additionally that Deloach is entitled to prejudgment interest on the front pay award that the district court finds appropriate. Giancontieri v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 767 F.2d 1151, 1159 (5th Cir.1985).