Opinion ID: 318307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Department of Justice Authorization

Text: 24 The applications for authority to intercept wire communications, upon which Judge Jones acted, were filed by Assistant United States Attorney Harold Sullivan and represented that they were 'authorized by the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (Will Wilson), who has been specially designated by the Attorney General of the United States to exercise the powers conferred on him by Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code.' 25 After their appeals were perfected the appellants filed motions in this court requesting a remand, to examine the manner in which officials of the Department of Justice authorized the wire interception applications. The motions were inspired by the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, decided Jan. 12, 1972; for subsequent developments in the case see 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), and 359 F.Supp. 52 (S.D.Fla.1973). In the Robinson case the court held invalid an interception application that was not approved by the Attorney General or by an Assistant Attorney General, but rather by executive assistants or deputies of these officials. The court held that this procedure failed to comply with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2516(1) which provides in part: 26 The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications . . .. 27 See also United States v. Mantello, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 2, 478 F.2d 671 (1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3022 (Apr. 30, 1973). 28 This court denied appellants' motions to remand, without prejudice to the submission of appropriate motions in the District Court pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. Motions for a new trial were thereafter filed in the District Court and, after hearing, were denied by the trial judge. 29 At the hearing on the motions for a new trial the evidence, by way of affidavits, disclosed that Attorney General John N. Mitchell sent to Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson a memorandum captioned 'SUBJECT: Interception Order Authorization' and referring to Mr. Wilson's 'recommendation that authorization be given . . . to make application for an interception order under 18 U.S.C. 2518, permitting the interception of wire communications to and from telephone number 582-9265 . . ..' The memorandum concluded 'you are hereby specially designated to authorize Harold Sullivan to make the above described application.' The Memorandum was initialed by Mr. Mitchell. Similar memoranda were sent with respect to the applications for an extension of the wiretap on 582-9265 and for authority to intercept communications on 399-3695. Mr. Mitchell's affidavit stated that his 'memoranda of approval . . . constituted notification to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division that the discretionary action of approving each of the requests to make application to the court for an interception order had been taken by me.' The affidavit of Henry Petersen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, stated that having received the approval of the Attorney General, he signed Will Wilson's name to the letter informing Assistant United States Attorney Harold Sullivan that he was authorized to present the application to the court. Mr. Wilson did not examine any of the files but had authorized Mr. Petersen to sign his name to such a letter of authorization in every instance in which the request had been favorably acted upon in the Office of the Attorney General. 30 The District Court found that Attorney General Mitchell 'personally approved the requests for authority to apply for the interception orders in this case.' The court then 'considered the requirements of 18 United States Code, Section 2518(1)(a) that the application for an order to intercept wire or oral communications shall state the applicant's authority to make such application and the identity of the officer authorizing the application' and the court found that 'under the facts of this case' it was immaterial that Mr. Mitchell, and not Mr. Wilson, as alleged, was the authorizing officer. Accordingly the motions for a new trial were denied. 31 We agree with the district judge. He was plainly correct in his finding that the Attorney General personally approved the requests to make applications to the court for interception orders; and this personal authorization of the Attorney General complied with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2516(1). That the applications to the court erroneously stated that they were authorized by Mr. Wilson rather than by the Attorney General was an immaterial variance. Once the Attorney General personally approved the request, the actions of his subordinates were essentially ministerial; the letter purportedly signed by Mr. Wilson was 'but an act of transmittal without legal consequence to the authorization itself.' United States v. Askins, 351 F.Supp. 408, 412 (D.Md.1972); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3018 (Mar. 26, 1973); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3061 (July 28, 1972); United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3016 (Apr. 8, 1972); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed sub nom. United States v. Gray, 42 U.S.L.W. 3167 (Aug. 2, 1973); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Mainello, 345 F.Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y.1972). The record clearly fixed responsibility for the authorizations upon the Attorney General and thus fulfilled the purpose of 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(a). 4 32