Opinion ID: 1127477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Impeachment of Defense Pathologist

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly allowed impeachment of defense expert pathologist Dr. Ronald Kornblum, and that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Defendant has waived his claim under Evidence Code section 352, and his other contention is meritless. On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired of Dr. Kornblum, who was also the Los Angeles County Medical Examiner, When you work independently, I take it you don't use county time or county facilities or things like that to do your own independent work? Kornblum responded, Correct. Over defense objection, the district attorney then asked Kornblum if he had asked a relative who was an employee of the Los Angeles County Crime Lab, to have a plug from the wooden stake tested. Kornblum conceded he had done so, but that he thought the testing had occurred on a Saturday. Defense counsel argued that the relative would not be called to testify and Dr. Kornblum did not rely on the results of this testing in formulating his opinion. He did not object under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that the impeachment evidence was relevant and probative as to Kornblum's credibility. We conclude that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to demonstrate that Dr. Kornblum was not telling the truth when he initially denied using public resources to perform private work in this and other cases. Such evidence tended to show his possible abuse of the public trust to advance his own endeavors as a private expert, and apparent dishonesty in attempting initially to conceal his actions from the jury. Nor, contrary to defendant's further assertion, did the prosecutor commit misconduct in exploring this area. 3. Allocution Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to address the jury in allocution in violation of his right to due process. In fact, defendant made no such motion in the trial court. Rather, defendant sought to 1) read a prepared statement while he testified, and 2) obtain an advance ruling from the court that if he limited his direct testimony to certain topics, he would not be cross-examined about the Lingle murder. Defense counsel stated, So the court understands, ... we're not asking for anything like allocution. We're proposing that this would be part of his direct.... We're not asking him to have the ability to talk to the jury without the right of cross-examination or not under oath. The trial court later stated, when ruling on the motion: [T]his is not a situation where the defendant wants to take the stand and profess his innocence of the crime and not be subjected to cross-examination.... as I understand your offer of proof, that is not going to be the situation here. Defense counsel responded, Correct, your honor. The trial court ruled that defendant would be allowed to read his statement, and noted that the prosecution would have the opportunity to cross-examine him regarding that testimony. The court declined to issue an advance ruling regarding the scope of cross-examination. [6] (14) In any event, we have repeatedly held that a capital defendant has no right to address the penalty phase jury in allocution, immune from cross-examination by the People. ( People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1036-1037 [22 Cal. Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099]; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 583 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893]; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 511 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) Defendant asserts no reason for us to revisit that conclusion. D. Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct on numerous occasions. Most of these claims were waived, and none of them have merit. 1. Voir Dire (15) Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during general voir dire in violation of his right to an individualized and reliable penalty determination, due process, and heightened capital case due process, under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Not so. Defendant first contends the prosecutor attempted to obviate defendant's lingering doubt defense regarding the torture-murder special circumstance by informing prospective jurors during general voir dire that defendant had been found guilty of first degree murder with the special circumstance of torture, that they must accept this verdict, and that they need not concern themselves with the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject defendant's claims at the outset because he failed to satisfy the general rule requiring assignment of misconduct and request for admonition as to any of the comments by the prosecutor of which he now complains, and no exception is applicable. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 664 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) We also reject defendant's claim on the merits. We have reviewed the prosecutor's challenged comments and discern no misstatement of law and certainly no misconduct. As we have repeatedly stated, at the penalty phase, defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is established. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 66 [40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [penalty jury has no cause to deliberate further on whether any of them harbor reasonable doubt as to guilt or truth of the special circumstances].) Here, the prosecutor properly informed the prospective jurors that defendant had already been found guilty of first degree murder with the special circumstance of torture murder. Thus, their duty would be limited to the determination of penalty. The prosecutor did not intimate in any fashion that lingering doubt or doubt beyond reasonable doubt as to the truth of the special circumstance could not be considered. Indeed, both sides discussed lingering doubt in their closing arguments, and the jury was ultimately instructed on lingering doubt as to the special circumstance. We presume that the jury followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 331 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811]; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17.) Next, defendant claims the prosecutor undermined defendant's lingering doubt defense by insinuating ... that jurors should not be concerned by the many things which they would never know about the crime. Defendant waived this argument by failing to object. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) It is also meritless. We have reviewed the challenged statements. The prosecutor merely pointed out the obvious, that the prospective jurors would not be hearing from the victim, and thus would never know one hundred percent of what happened that night. He asked them if they felt unable to vote for the death penalty in a case where they still had questions about what else occurred at the event. Contrary to defendant's assertion, this statement does not invite jurors to entirely disregard any lingering doubt they might have as to the torture-murder special circumstance. Next, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly told the prospective jurors that they would choose between two sentences, death and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, free from the constraints of any legal guidelines. Defendant waived this argument by failing to object. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) It is also meritless. The prosecutor stated: Now, is there  based on that, do you think that, knowing that you are ultimately going to render an opinion or a vote as to the particular penalty, knowing that there is not going to be a specific burden of proof, that it's really going to come down to your particular judgment, is there anything about that that leaves you with a feeling that, gee, the law's not going to step in and guide me and tell me that, hey, I have to vote for death under this circumstance, so, in essence, it's really going to be placed on my shoulders; do you think you could handle a responsibility like that? We discern no misstatement of law and certainly no misconduct. Penalty phase jurors do in fact have discretion to decide whether death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the appropriate punishment. Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that the statement could have been understood to mean the jurors would be making the penalty determination free from the constraints of any legal guidelines. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) In any event, the jury was properly instructed on the guidelines applicable to making its determination. (16) Next, defendant asserts that the prosecutor attempted to condition the jurors to believe that they could or should not vote for life imprisonment rather than death, simply out of sympathy for the defendant. This claim was waived by failure to object. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) It is also meritless. The prosecutor stated: This case is a little bit different than most criminal cases in that normally a jury in a criminal trial is instructed that they are not to consider sympathy or passion or prejudice, that they are to make a finding on the facts themselves. Now, in this particular case you may consider sympathy and give or attach to it any credit or weight you believe it is deserving of. The prosecutor then inquired of various prospective jurors whether they would make a penalty decision solely on the basis of sympathy and automatically disregard any other evidence, whether they felt the task of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors was too difficult a task to handle, whether seeing the defendant in the courtroom every day would make choosing the death penalty more difficult, and whether their ability to choose a penalty would be affected by the way a defendant appeared in court. These inquiries sought to reveal prospective jurors who did not have an open mind about sentencing; none condition[ed] the jurors to believe that they could [not] or should not vote for life imprisonment rather than death, simply out of sympathy for the defendant, nor is there a reasonable likelihood that any prospective juror so understood them. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by implying that no juror should hold out for a particular penalty and hang the jury. Defendant waived this argument by failing to object. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) It is also meritless. The prosecutor stated: Although both the defense and the people are entitled to your individual verdict, before there can ever be a verdict in this case, it has to be a unanimous finding by all twelve people. So if one person gets back in that deliberation room and says, `Hey, this is my decision, and I'm going to be reading this book and when you people come around my way, let me know,' that one side is going to suffer one way  both sides are going to suffer, actually, because even though that person is rendering their individual verdict, they are not deliberating with, they're not attempting to listen to the other jurors in an attempt to reach a verdict in the case. Contrary to defendant's assertion, nothing in this statement urged the prospective jurors not to vote as they thought the evidence as a whole indicated, or that any decision would be the right one if the eleven other jurors agreed with it. Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that any prospective juror so understood the statement. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) Rather, the prosecutor simply commented on the jury's duty to deliberate in good faith in attempting to reach a unanimous verdict. 2. Opening Statement (17) Defendant contends the prosecutor committed a variety of errors amounting to misconduct during his opening statement. All of these claims were waived, and none of them have merit.