Opinion ID: 778774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process Voluntariness

Text: 99 Finally, I want to register my disagreement with the en banc majority because they ignore completely and fail to address another theory upon which I believe Soffar has established his right to habeas corpus relief. That theory is the Supreme Court's long-established due process voluntariness test. This test is summarized in the Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), 12 wherein the Court stated: 100 The Court's analysis has consistently been animated by the view that tactics for eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness. 101 In over 30 different decisions, the Supreme Court refined this test into an inquiry that examines whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); and by indicating that the due process test takes into consideration the totality of the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, id. ; and by specifying that the due process test is determined by a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953). The continued viability of this due process test of involuntariness was affirmed again by the Supreme Court in Dickerson, where the Court stated: 102 We have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily. 103 530 U.S. at 434, 120 S.Ct. 2326. Furthermore, in Dickerson, the Supreme Court stated: 104 The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry but as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), [c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was `compelled' despite the fact that law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare. Id. at 433 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3138. 105 Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2336. 106 With all due respect, I suggest to my colleagues in the en banc majority that Soffar's case is one of those rare cases in which a self-incriminating statement was compelled despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities attempted to adhere to the dictates of Miranda ; but this is not the first time that our Court has been called upon to address one of these rare cases. In Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.1980), 13 Judge Reynaldo Garza, writing for the en banc majority, held that after a full review of all of the facts and circumstances, the second of two written confessions that Jurek signed was the result of factors suggesting an inescapable conclusion that the confession was involuntary. Id. at 942. In footnote 7 of his majority opinion, Judge Garza stated: 107 The precise holding of this opinion, based on an analysis of the cumulative impact of these factors, is no more or less than the following: Where a (1) mentally deficient accused, who was (2) functionally isolated from all but his interrogators (3) who was not assisted by counsel (4) and who had executed a valid confession to murder, essentially solving the crime under investigation was (5) the subject of continuing purposeful and suggestive interrogation directed (6) toward an amendment of his earlier confession to include information so minimally suggested as to amount to a prosecutorial hunch, the renewed interrogation producing (7) a confession which is facially suspect and which (8) achieves the precise result sought by the prosecutors, (9) enhancing in a manner unknown to the accused the potential penalty to that of death, a consideration which would cause any person made aware of it to pause and carefully consider the truthfulness of any additional information suggested, the risk of involuntariness is so great that the confession cannot be admitted in consistency with due process guarantees and the privilege against self-incrimination. 108 623 F.2d at 941 n. 7. 109 In concluding his en banc majority opinion in Jurek, Judge Garza stated: 110 We are mindful of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that the conviction is basic to our legal order, that men are not to be exploited for the information necessary to condemn them before the law [and] that, in Hawkin's words, a prisoner is not to be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. [568,] at 581, 81 S.Ct. [1860,] at 1867[, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)]. We are also mindful of the necessities and difficulties of effective law enforcement, in which the confession may be an essential and fair device for the protection of the public. We have found that in their efforts to secure such protection by insuring that Jurek was condemned, the law enforcement authorities ran far too high a risk of making him the deluded instrument of his own execution. 111 623 F.2d at 942. 112 I am disappointed that the en banc majority here in Soffar was either unable or unwilling to see the obvious similarities between Soffar and Jurek. Both Jurek and Soffar were, at the time of arrest, in their early twenties; neither remained in school past the seventh grade and both had difficulty holding any kind of job. The record in Soffar is overflowing with testimony that Soffar was mentally deficient just like Jurek. The record is uncontested that Soffar was functionally isolated from all but his interrogators for almost three days — a longer period of time than Jurek was. The record is explicit that Soffar did not have the assistance of counsel until after he signed his third statement. The third statement was the one presented to the jury at Soffar's trial, like Jurek's second statement. Like Jurek's two statements, Soffar's three different statements were factually and grammatically different. Finally, in Jurek, as in Soffar, there was controversy about whether or not the suspect in custody effectively asked for assistance of counsel. In Jurek, however, there was clear evidence in the record that the interrogators made further inquiry of Jurek to clarify his wishes and he expressly declined the assistance of counsel. Even so, the circumstance of Jurek's lack of assistance of counsel was a factor considered in making the judgment on the voluntariness of his confessions. 113 In addition to these similarities with Jurek, there are certain special circumstances that occurred in Soffar, which must be considered in a due process voluntariness analysis. First, in between Soffar's signing of his first statement and of his second statement, Soffar was taken to a line-up arranged for viewing by the surviving witness, Greg Garner. Garner failed to identify Soffar as the perpetrator of the robbery/murders. Obviously, Soffar did not have the benefit of any counsel being present at this line-up and the record does not indicate that the detectives conducting this line-up advised Soffar that Garner had failed to identify him. Second, after Soffar signed his second statement but before he signed the third statement, two other significant events occurred: (i) the interrogating detectives released Latt Bloomfield from custody because they did not have enough evidence to either hold or charge Bloomfield; and (ii) the arresting detectives filed felony capital murder charges against Soffar alleging that he intentionally caused the death of one of the victims while in the course of committing or attempting to commit armed robbery. Upon the filing of these formal charges, surely due process would mandate that the detectives promptly present Soffar before a magistrate judge for the purpose of apprising him of these new formal charges and for the purpose of determining his need for counsel. 14 But instead of presenting Soffar before a magistrate judge for arraignment on the murder charge, the interrogating detectives continued their interrogation and, later that same evening, Soffar signed the third statement. Soffar's first two statements respecting the offense indicated that his role was limited to being the driver of the get-away car. The third statement was a far more incriminating version of purported events in which Soffar implicated himself in the actual shootings. 114 Given all of these circumstances, I come easily to the same conclusion that Judge Reynaldo Garza reached in Jurek ; in their efforts to secure protection of the public by ensuring that Soffar was condemned, the law enforcement officers ran too high a risk of making him the deluded instrument of his own execution.