Opinion ID: 1505109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plain Feel Exception.

Text: We begin our analysis by noting that the question of whether Teagle acted properly in patting down Jones is not before us. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that Teagle had a right to go to Jones's residence to serve the EPO and that Teagle had a right to engage in a protective pat down of Jones based on the EPO's allegations of violence. [10] Since Jones did not file a protective cross-motion for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' ruling, the propriety of the pat down itself and Teagle's conduct before the pat down are not properly before us. [11] The only question that is properly before us is whether the Court of Appeals concluded correctly that the search in this case was not valid under the plain feel doctrine. Under our settled jurisprudence, [i]t is fundamental that all searches without a warrant are unreasonable unless it can be shown that they come within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must be made pursuant to a valid warrant. [12] Among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the doctrine of plain view and its corollary, plain feel. Under the plain feel doctrine, [w]hen a police officer lawfully pats down the outer clothing of a suspect and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there is no violation of privacy beyond that already permitted by the pat down search for weapons. The warrantless seizure of such materials is justified under the same principles expressed in the plain view doctrine. [13] Seizing upon the immediately apparent requirement, the Court of Appeals found that the plain feel exception was inapplicable because [p]rior to inspecting the pill bottle removed from Jones's pocket, the officer had no way to know whether or not Jones had a valid prescription for the medicine in the bottle, thus the contraband nature of the item was not readily apparent. The Court of Appeals's focus on the immediately apparent requirement was proper because both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that the incriminating nature of an object seized under both the plain view and the plain feel exceptions must be immediately apparent. [14] But, as we recently noted, [t]he interpretation of `immediately apparent' has presented reviewing courts with significant difficulty. [15] And despite the courts' inability precisely to define immediately apparent, it is clear that the phrase immediately apparent does not alter the fundamental issue: whether an officer contemporaneously has probable cause to believe that the object being felt is contraband, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. [16] [P]robable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contextsnot readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. [17] Thus, in order to determine if probable cause has been shown, the principal components a reviewing court must examine are the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause. [18] Thus, as evidenced by the use of the adverb immediately to modify the adjective apparent, probable cause must be met at the time the officer touches the item in question and post-touching conduct cannot be used retroactively to find probable cause. [19] Although an appellate court must defer to the findings of fact made by a trial court, as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed [de novo] on appeal. [20] Since the trial court made no real findings of fact in this case, our review is completely de novo. Our review of Minnesota v. Dickerson and Crowder compels us to find that Teagle's search of Jones does not fall within the plain feel exception. In each of those cases, as in the case at hand, the criminal nature of the item discovered during a plain feel search was not readily apparent until the item was moved or manipulated by the officer. In Dickerson , two police officers observed a person leaving a known crack house. Once the person saw the police, he turned and walked in the opposite direction. Their suspicions aroused, the officers stopped the person and conducted a pat down. During that pat down, the officers discovered a small lump in the suspect's jacket pocket. After squeezing and sliding the lump, the officer decided that the lump was cocaine. The Supreme Court held that the search was not justified under the plain feel doctrine because the illegal nature of the lump was only apparent after the officer manipulated it, meaning that it did not satisfy the immediately apparent requirement for plain feel searches. [21] Similarly, in Crowder , a known drug dealer was seen in an area known for drug trafficking. When the person saw the police, he walked away from them. The officers engaged in a pat down and felt what the officer believed could have been a small bindle of drugs. We ultimately held that the search was not justified under the plain feel exception because the incriminating nature of the bindle was not readily apparent during the pat down. [22] Applying Dickerson and Crowder to the case at hand compels a finding that the search of Jones does not fall within the plain feel exception. In many respects, the facts in those cases are more compelling than those found in this case because, unlike those cases, there is no suggestion in the sparse record that Jones's residence or neighborhood were either high-crime areas in general or were known specifically as being narcotics-trafficking hotspots, nor is there any indication that Jones himself was suspected of being a drug trafficker. As did the suspects in Dickerson and Crowder , Jones began to walk away once he noticed the presence of authorities. But even if Jones's retreat from Teagle is considered to be a flight, that flight, in and of itself, is insufficient to establish probable cause. [23] Next, we note that there is nothing inherently illegal or incriminating about leaning into a car window while talking to the driver of a vehicle. Such an action could only have been potentially incriminating if Teagle had testified that based on his training and experience, drug dealers frequently lean into car windows to facilitate drug transactions. However, the record contains no such observation by Teagle, nor does it contain anything showing Teagle's level of experience and training in narcotics interdiction. Finally, and most importantly, like the objects felt by the officers in Dickerson and Crowder , the incriminating nature of the object in Jones's pocket was not obvious until the object was manipulated or moved. As noted by the Court of Appeals, [p]rior to inspecting the pill bottle [after it was] removed from Jones's pocket, [Teagle] had no way to know whether or not Jones had a valid prescription for the medicine in the bottle, thus the contraband nature of the item was not readily apparent. There is nothing inherently incriminating about carrying a pill bottle in one's pocket. Moreover, although we certainly do not endorse Jones's false statement to Teagle that there was nothing in his pocket, such a dishonest answer is certainly less incriminating than being seen walking from a known crack house, as in Dickerson , or being a known drug dealer standing in the precise location where an anonymous caller had told the police the suspect used to sell drugs, as in Crowder . Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Hatcher , [24] we recently rejected the Commonwealth's analogous claim of plain view under facts more incriminating to the suspect than those found in this case. In Hatcher , police responded to an anonymous claim of an allegedly abandoned minor. When they arrived at the home in question, an adolescent eventually opened the door, at which time an officer saw a pipe sitting on a table. Based on his training and experience, the officer believed the pipe was used to smoke marijuana. Because the pipe could have been legally used to smoke tobacco, however, the officer did not know the pipe was drug paraphernalia until he entered the room, picked up the pipe, and then smelled marijuana. [25] We held that the search was not valid under plain view because [a]lthough the pipe appeared suspicious to Officer Carr, further investigation was required to establish probable cause as to its association with criminal activity, and thus it simply was not immediately incriminating. [26] In the case at hand, there was no testimony from Teagle stating that his training and experience caused him to believe the pill bottle in Jones's pocket was contraband. And, furthermore, a pill bottle is frequently and commonly used for legal purposes, unlike the special pipe in Hatcher , which the officer testified was widely used to smoke marijuana. [27] Thus, because the unique facts of this case are less incriminating than those we found not to constitute plain view in Hatcher , we cannot accept the Commonwealth's argument that Teagle's search of Jones falls under the plain feel exception. In summary, the minimal facts in the record do not support a finding that the search in this case falls under the plain feel exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision on this point.