Opinion ID: 849175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: people v. feola

Text: In Feola, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered an issue similar to that presented in this case. There before the Court was whether the crime of conspiracy to assault a federal drug officer required a criminal intent greater than that required to convict for the substantive offense. Specifically, the Court sought to determine whether the defendant had to know that the intended victim was, in fact, a federal officer. In the years before Feola there had been a split among the federal circuit courts. In a majority of the circuits, [6] the courts held that, in a conspiracy to commit a federal substantive offense, a defendant need not have knowledge of the attendant circumstances embodied in the substantive offense. For example, in United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (C.A.4, 1974), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine whether, in a conspiracy to violate the travel act, 18 USC §§ 1952, the defendant needed to have knowledge of the use of interstate facilities in order to be found guilty on the conspiracy charge. In answering this question in the negative, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that [w]hether or not certain conspirators actually anticipate the use of facilities in interest commerce when they plan their unlawful activity of gambling, bribery, etc., add[s] absolutely nothing to the dangerousness of their scheme to the public weal. Id. at 1299; see also United States v. Polesti, 489 F.2d 822 (C.A.7, 1973); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (C.A.9, 1970). Conversely, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the majority view. In United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906 (C.A.2, 1974), the court analyzed whether the defendant, in a conspiracy to transport obscene materials in interstate commerce, must have knowledge that the business would use interstate facilities. In answering this question in the affirmative, the court stated that, because specific intent is required to prove conspiracy, the proper charge requires that the element of actual knowledge be found by the jury. Id. at 910. The United States Supreme Court sought to finally resolve the knowledge issue in Feola, supra . [7] 1. The Substantive Offense To resolve the question whether a defendant must know that his intended victim is a federal officer in a conspiracy to assault a federal officer, the Court first examined the elements of the substantive offense, 18 USC § 111. In pertinent part, the substantive offense at issue in Feola stated: Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.