Opinion ID: 1037689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Increment

Text: The parties do not dispute that the Kulluk is a “major source” under Title V and, thus, subject to that title’s permitting requirements. Further, the parties agree that our analysis of § 7661c(e) must focus on the EPA’s interpretation of “applicable increment . . . requirements.” It is also undisputed that the Kulluk is not a “major emitting facility” under the PSD. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). If it were, then the parties agree that 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)(A) would require a preconstruction increment analysis under the EPA’s interpretation set forth in the EAB Decision. Although the Kulluk is not a “major emitting facility,” Alaska Wilderness argues that § 7661c(e) (and the other relevant statutes) unambiguously support its position. Alaska Wilderness argues that § 7661c(e) mandated a preconstruction increment analysis for the Kulluk, because increments have been established for the Kulluk’s operating region. The EPA maintains that § 7661c(e) did not require an increment analysis for the Kulluk. The EPA argues that 10 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. EPA whether increment requirements are “applicable” under § 7661c(e) (which incorporates the PSD by reference) is a function not only of geography, but also a function of whether the PSD would require an increment analysis for the specific source if it were stationary. Thus, EPA argues, the Kulluk does not trigger the analysis requirement, which the PSD imposes only if required by the state SIP or if the source is a “major emitting facility” under 42 U.S.C. § 7475.
A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243, 1253 (9th Cir. 2007); A-Z Int’l v. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Putnam Family P’ship v. City of Yucaipa, 673 F.3d 920, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A statute is ambiguous if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). Accordingly, we “begin with the plain language of the statute.” Ariz. Health, 508 F.3d at 1249. Section 7661c(e) is ambiguous in its use of the term “applicable.” To give content to this term, Section 7661c(e) expressly incorporates and relies on “Part C of subchapter I of [Chapter 85].” 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(e). One Part C provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7473, sets forth increment standards generally and makes clear that permissible increment levels are established by geographic area. However, § 7473 does not specify how increments apply to minor, temporary ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. EPA 11 sources like the Kulluk. Section 7473 is also silent as to preconstruction increment analysis and imposes no preconstruction requirements on any source. As such, Alaska Wilderness cannot rely on § 7473 to support its argument that § 7661c(e) unambiguously compels a geography-based reading of the term “applicable.” Two other Part C provisions impose increment requirements based on source rather than geography. First, 42 U.S.C. § 7471 incorporates any increment requirements set forth in the governing SIP, making clear that they apply to the sources covered under those state plans. Second, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)(A) imposes increment analysis requirements on “major emitting facilities.” Under these sections, and Alaska’s SIP, no increment requirement would apply to a minor PSD source like the Kulluk if it were stationary. Accordingly, because Part C provisions support a source-based reading of “applicable,” but allowable increment levels are determined by geographic area, § 7661c(e) is ambiguous.1 We reject Alaska Wilderness’s argument that the EPA’s interpretation renders the different permitting provision of 1 Section 7661c(e)’s express reliance on Part C demonstrates that we cannot, as Alaska Wilderness urges, read § 7661c(e) to unambiguously impose increment requirements over and above those created by Part C. By contrast, the parties do not dispute that § 7661c(e) imposes substantive NAAQS requirements on temporary sources. However, this does not support Alaska Wilderness’s increment argument; it only demonstrates the section’s ambiguity. The NAAQS that § 7661c(e) references do not incorporate another provision like Part C to determine which requirements are “applicable.” Thus, Part C’s failure to clarify the interplay between geography and source brings ambiguity to § 7661c(e)’s reference to increment, but has no bearing on the NAAQS. 12 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. EPA § 7661c(a) absurd or superfluous by redundantly applying state SIP requirements. Section 7661c(a), with a broad brush, states that any permit must include conditions to assure compliance with the requirements of the chapter, including SIP requirements. Section 7661c(e) performs a more specific function—setting forth which requirements apply to temporary sources. As such, § 7661c(e) does not duplicate § 7661c(a), even under the EPA’s reading. In fact, using Alaska Wilderness’s logic, § 7661c(e)’s incorporation of any portion of Part C would be redundant, because Part C is already part of the “chapter” covered by § 7661c(a). Clearly this is not the case. Thus, § 7661c(a)’s reference to SIPs does not foreclose the EPA’s interpretation, and Alaska Wilderness cannot resort to § 7661c(a) to clarify § 7661c(e)’s ambiguity.
If an agency interprets an ambiguous statute and “fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design, we give [that] judgment controlling weight.” Ariz. Health, 508 F.3d at 1249 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the EPA’s interpretation is consistent with Congress’s “revealed design” as evidenced by § 7661c(e)’s plain language.2 In fact, the EPA arguably proffers the more reasonable reading of § 7661c(e) and Part C, given § 7471’s 2 Alaska Wilderness cannot rely on § 7661c(e)’s legislative history to support its argument that § 7661c(e) unambiguously compels its geography-based interpretation. Any attempt to invoke § 7661c(e)’s legislative history is inconsistent with Alaska Wilderness’s claim that the statute is unambiguous. If the statutory language were truly as clear as Alaska Wilderness argues, “reference to the legislative history would be both unnecessary and inappropriate to illuminate unambiguous text.” REDOIL, 716 F.3d at 1162–63. ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. EPA 13 and § 7475(a)(3)(A)’s imposition of increment analysis requirements by source, and given the absence of any such requirement imposed by area under § 7473. Thus, we defer to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation.