Opinion ID: 1889175
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Were Vega-Lara's Prior Statements Admissible as Substantive Evidence?

Text: The State argues that the district court erred when it refused to admit Vega-Lara's statements as substantive evidence under the catchall hearsay exception in Minn. R. Evid. 807, or as non-hearsay under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). The State then cites Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.1985) for the proposition that any Dexter problem that may arise when a prosecutor calls a witness and is permitted to use a prior statement for impeachment purposes is resolved if the prior statements admitted for impeachment purposes were also admissible as substantive evidence. See id. at 42-43. According to the State's argument, if Vega-Lara's statements were admissible as substantive evidence, there was no reversible error. While we may have said in Ortlepp that there is no Dexter problem if the impeachment evidence was also admissible as substantive evidence, we have never said that such an event would resolve concerns under Mitchell. But, as indicated above, we did state in Black that the admission of a refusing witness's prior statement reduced the unfair prejudice to the defendant because the prior testimony made it so [t]he jury was not left to speculate as to what [the witness's] testimony might have been. 291 N.W.2d at 212. If Vega-Lara's prior out-of-court statements were admissible substantively under Rules 807 or 801(d)(1)(A), that fact may affect whether Morales was unfairly prejudiced by the State's questioning of Vega-Lara. Therefore, we address the State's claim that Vega-Lara's testimony was admissible as substantive evidence under Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 807. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. Prior statements must meet all the requirements under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) in order to be admissible as substantive evidence. We conclude that Vega-Lara's prior testimony cannot be admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because Vega-Lara was not subject to cross examination at Morales's trial concerning the statement[s]. Rule 801(d)(1) requires that a witness be `testable about the statement, meaning that he must be reasonably responsive to questions on the circumstances in which he made it.' State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 206 (Minn.2003) (quoting 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 404, at 175 (2d ed.1994)). Vega-Lara answered one question on cross-examination but was otherwise completely unresponsive. He refused to answer all other questions regarding his prior testimony. For example, counsel for Morales asked Vega-Lara, Did you testify at your own trial that the planning was done by Mr. Morales in order to place the blame on Mr. Morales instead of yourself? And Vega-Lara responded, Refuse to answer. This answer, like all but one of Vega-Lara's answers, was not reasonably responsive to the question asked. See Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 206. Accordingly, we conclude that Vega-Lara was not reasonably responsive to the questions regarding the circumstances in which he made his prior statements, and therefore, his prior testimony was not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Having reached this conclusion, we need not address the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Therefore, we hold that Vega-Lara's prior statements were not admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). The State argues that Vega-Lara's testimony was also admissible as substantive evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 807. Rule 807 is the residual exception to the rule against admitting hearsay. It provides: A statement not specifically covered by rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing, to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it.... Minn. R. Evid. 807. Here, we conclude that Vega-Lara's prior statements do not have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as the statements intended to be covered by Rules 803 and 804. While Vega-Lara's statements were made under oath, he was testifying at his own trial and had much to gain from bending the truth and implicating others in the crime. Thus, the State has failed to show that Vega-Lara's statements were sufficiently reliable to overcome the general prohibition against admitting out-of-court statements. Additionally, as the district court noted, there were notice issues with respect to the admission of Vega-Lara's prior testimony under Rule 807. The State sent a transcript of Vega-Lara's prior testimony to Morales on July 20, 2007, and Morales knew Vega-Lara was on the State's witness list. But there was no pretrial notice that the State would seek to introduce Vega-Lara's prior testimony as substantive evidence under Rule 807 or any other hearsay exception. The State moved to admit a transcript of Vega-Lara's prior testimony as substantive evidence near the close of trial. We conclude that Vega-Lara's prior testimony was not admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 807. Nor was it admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the Dexter problem created when the State called Vega-Lara as a witness and used his prior testimony was not resolved. Similarly, the unfair prejudice to Morales caused by the State's questioning of Vega-Lara, a refusing witness, was not reduced. For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the State's examination of Vega-Lara, an accomplice witness who refused to testify, was prejudicial to Morales to such an extent that it denied Morales a fair trial. Under Mitchell, such unfair prejudice is reversible error. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.