Opinion ID: 890239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stipulations as to Premarital Property

Text: ¶25 Bill argues that Laurie’s pleadings and stipulations constitute judicial admissions as to the exclusion of premarital property from the marital estate. “A judicial admission is ‘an express waiver made in court by a party or its counsel conceding the truth of an alleged fact.’” In re Marriage of Hart, 2011 MT 102, ¶ 14, 360 Mont. 308, 258 P.3d 389 12 (quoting Bitterroot Intl. Sys., Ltd. v. Western Star Trucks, Inc., 2007 MT 48, ¶ 41, 336 Mont. 145, 153 P.3d 627). A judicial admission can take place at any point during the litigation process, and to be binding, such an admission must be an unequivocal factual statement. Hart, ¶ 14 (citations omitted). “A judicial admission has a conclusive effect upon the party who makes it, and prevents that party from introducing further evidence to prove, disprove, or contradict the admitted fact.” Bitterroot Intl. Sys., ¶ 41 (citation omitted). ¶26 In Laurie’s proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution filed before trial, she listed the following properties as Bill’s premarital assets based upon agreement of the parties: the blue cabin, time share, 1502 S. Sixth Street rental property, 440 Blaine Street rental property, 1530 Reserve rental property, JKW Investments/Quality Properties, Solomon IRA, Putnam IRA, and Piper IRA. Further, on the attached proposed allocation table, Laurie did not even list these as distributable assets. In her supplemental proposed findings filed post-trial, Laurie designated the same properties as Bill’s premarital assets. On the allocation table attached to her supplemental findings, Laurie listed these properties but designated them, and their value of $2,872,140, as “Separate Premarital.” Further, she subtracted this amount from her calculation of the total value of the marital estate. Thus, Laurie’s post-trial filings 13 calculate the “Total Marital Estate” as nearly $4.5 million, not the $7.2 million she uses on appeal.4 ¶27 Laurie’s written submissions were supplemented by various statements she made during trial. She testified that the Solomon IRA, Putnam IRA, Piper IRA, and the 440 Blaine property were Bill’s premarital assets. She said she was not making any claim to the blue cabin, JKW Investments or Quality Properties and that Bill should retain the timeshare, the 1502 S. Sixth property, and the 440 Blaine property. At one point, Bill’s counsel asked Laurie’s counsel if the 1530 Reserve property was stipulated as premarital property, but Laurie’s counsel disagreed. However, Laurie’s post-trial filing changed positions, stating the parties “have agreed that this property [1530 Reserve] should be awarded to Bill as his premarital property,” which the District court accepted. ¶28 Laurie responds that Bill mischaracterizes the stipulations made at trial. She points to the statement made by her counsel with regard to the stipulation on JKW: MR. REEP [Bill’s counsel]: And, Mr. Scott, we have a stipulation that JKW, the asset JKW, is indeed a premarital asset, do we not? MR. SCOTT [Laurie’s trial counsel]: Premarital. I just want to be clear about the stipulation on the premarital. I’m not conceding that it’s not part of the marital estate pursuant to the statute but it’s certainly premarital. 4 There appears to have been a mathematical error in this filing, which was then continued in the court’s Decree. In Laurie’s filing, the figure for the value of Bill’s premarital property (excluded from the estate) was understated when carried over to her final calculations, which affected the stated value of the total estate. While Laurie’s filing values the marital estate at approximately $4.56 million, the correct amount calculated from her figures should have been approximately $4.16 million. 14 MR. REEP: Okay. I guess my question is a little more direct than that. Do we have an agreement that that is not a distributable asset in this dissolution proceeding? MR. SCOTT: We have a stipulation that Laurie’s not making a claim to it. (Emphases added.) Laurie also references a statement she made during cross examination that she was asking the District Court to give her some of Bill’s premarital property and argues, that “[a]ny stipulations that certain property was ‘premarital’ were not stipulations that they should be excluded from . . . the marital estate.” However, Laurie’s filings certainly contradict that argument. Her allocation tables excluded the value of premarital properties from the estate’s value or excluded those properties from the list of distributable assets. She suggested that certain property “should be awarded to Bill as his premarital property.” While she points to a distinction made at one point by her counsel that “premarital” property did not necessarily mean “it’s not part of the marital estate,” that distinction was not maintained by Laurie throughout the litigation and, in fact, she commonly excluded premarital properties from her calculations altogether. “‘It is improper to raise an issue upon appeal as to a question of law or fact after the parties have entered into a stipulation as to that law or fact.’” In re Marriage of Prevost, 225 Mont. 116, 118, 731 P.2d 344, 345 (1987) (citation omitted). We cannot fault the District Court’s determination of the distributable estate in this complicated matter, given the filings which Laurie gave it to consider. She is bound by those filings which essentially allocated to Bill certain premarital properties from the distributable marital estate. 15