Opinion ID: 1476696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The sufficiency of the evidence of APPW (b).

Text: Ms. Alfaro contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish her guilt of any of the three counts of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. Although her claim is premised on the notion that the telephone cord in this case was not a dangerous weapon  a notion that might strike an intelligent lay person as unrealistic  we are constrained by our precedents to agree with Ms. Alfaro. In assessing a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the fact finder to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact. Perry v. United States, 812 A.2d 924, 930 (D.C.2002) (citations omitted); see generally Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 133-34 (D.C.2001) (en banc). The court may reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if there is no evidence from which a reasonable mind might find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.2000) (citations omitted). To establish the offense of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon, the prosecution must show that Ms. Alfaro attempted to possess a dangerous weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against another. D.C.Code § 22-3214(b) (1996), now recodified as § 22-4514(b) (2001). An object is a dangerous weapon if it is known to be `likely to produce death or great bodily injury' in the manner it is used, intended to be used, or threatened to be used. Harper v. United States, 811 A.2d 808, 810 (D.C.2002) (quoting Williamson, 445 A.2d at 979). While some items, such as knives, have been held to be inherently dangerous, [a]n object which is not inherently dangerous can become dangerous by its use as a weapon. Strong v. United States, 581 A.2d 383, 386 (D.C.1990) (citation omitted). Whether something is a dangerous weapon, i.e., whether it is likely, as used, to produce the requisite injury, is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by all the circumstances surrounding the assault, and the analysis may be based on familiar and common experience. Williamson, 445 A.2d at 979 (citation omitted). Thus, an ordinary object may become a dangerous weapon when it is used to injure another person. See, e.g., ( Carl) Jones v. United States, 401 A.2d 473, 476 (D.C.1979) (furniture leg used to inflict a beating); United States v. Brooks, 330 A.2d 245, 246-47 (D.C.1974) (wooden table leg thrown at the victim). In the present case, the judge found that Ms. Alfaro used a telephone cord  a wire wrapped in insulation  on the naked skin of her three young sons in a manner to ensure that they would be hurt. The testimony of the boys established that the whipping was painful, and the looped marks of the whipping were evident on their bodies two weeks after the fact. Under the circumstances, the trial judge's conclusion that the telephone wire was a dangerous weapon cannot fairly be characterized as unreasonable. Nevertheless, the result reached by the judge cannot be reconciled with our case law. As we have noted above, a weapon is dangerous if it is known to be `likely to produce death or great bodily injury in the manner in which it is used. Harper, 811 A.2d at 810 (quoting Williamson, 445 A.2d at 979). When the object used (like the telephone cord in this case) is not a dangerous weapon per se, the prosecution must prove that the object is one which is likely to produce death or great bodily injury by the use made of it. Scott v. United States, 243 A.2d 54, 56 (D.C.1968) (emphasis in original). Although great bodily injury has not been defined in this jurisdiction by statute, it is difficult to distinguish the term from serious bodily injury. Indeed, we find it impossible, as a practical matter, to envisage a bodily injury that is great but not serious. See Arthur v. United States, 602 A.2d 174, 177 (D.C.1992) (apparently using the two terms interchangeably). The term serious bodily injury has been defined as bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental facility. D.C.Code § 22-3001 (1981) (repealed). In recent years, we have applied this definition to the term serious bodily injury in prosecutions for aggravated assault. Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 150 (D.C.1999); see also Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 917-19 (D.C.2000). Elsewhere in the District of Columbia Code, serious bodily injury is defined as bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. D.C.Code § 2-1542(11) (2001). There was no evidence presented in this case from which a trier of fact could reasonably find that the telephone cord, even when used as it was to administer vicious whippings to naked children, created a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, or the kind of extreme pain that can reasonably be compared to or equated with any of the categories of serious injury enumerated by the legislature and adopted by this court in Nixon. [13] Moreover, even if we were to assume, illogically, that great bodily injury means something less than serious bodily injury, the evidence in this case does not rise to the level of great bodily injury as that term is commonly understood. The New Mexico legislature has defined great bodily harm as an injury to the person which creates a high probability of death; or which causes serious disfigurement; or which results in permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any member or organ of the body. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-12(A) (2003). A Wisconsin statute defines great bodily harm as bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious or permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily injury. WIS. STAT. § 939-22(14) (2002). According to the Supreme Court of Indiana, great bodily harm means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises .... Froedge v. State, 249 Ind. 438, 233 N.E.2d 631 (1968); see also McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1239 n. 5 (11th Cir.2003) (using same definition of great bodily harm). Arguably, the victims' injuries in this case were not mere bruises, but in our view, they cannot reasonably be characterized as falling within the usual definition of great bodily injury, nor were they comparable to the illustrative examples enumerated in the legislation we have cited. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the prosecution failed to prove that the telephone cord was likely, when used as Ms. Alfaro used it, to inflict great or serious bodily injury. The cord therefore was not a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the APPW (b) statute, and we cannot sustain Ms. Alfaro's convictions of APPW (b).