Opinion ID: 2980598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: WRTA’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: Jones’s final argument is that the district court erred in granting WRTA’s motion for summary judgment. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo, 390 F.3d 890, 894-95 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party, WRTA, is entitled to judgment -9- No. 10-3985 Jones v. WRTA as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). WRTA bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). WRTA may satisfy this burden by offering affirmative evidence that negates an element of each of Jones’s claims or, as it attempts to do here, by pointing to an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claim. If WRTA satisfies its burden, Jones must then set forth the specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986). In evaluating the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Jones. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (citing Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). A mere scintilla of evidence in support of Jones’s position will be insufficient for his claims to survive summary judgment. Rather, there must be enough evidence such that the jury could reasonably find for him. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. The district court addressed each of Jones’s ADA, state disability law, Title VII, state race discrimination law, and federal retaliation claims separately. We need not do the same here. Our review of each of these claims applies the familiar tripartite burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), because Jones produces, at best, only indirect evidence of discrimination. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying McDonnell Douglas to ADA claims where only indirect evidence is presented); Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System, 355 F.3d 444, 452 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that because the elements of an ADA claim and the Ohio handicap discrimination statute are identical, our analysis of the ADA claim resolves the state law claim as well); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-804 - 10 - No. 10-3985 Jones v. WRTA (applying the framework to Title VII claims); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying McDonnell Douglas to claims of discrimination under Ohio state law generally); Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying the framework to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claims). Under McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03. At that point, the plaintiff may only prevail if he can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584 n.6 (citation omitted). Assuming, arguendo, that Jones is able to establish a prima facie case for each of his claims, he still cannot prevail. WRTA puts forth Jones’s performance record, including the April 2008 incident, as well as his failure to complete the anger management course, as legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate Jones’s employment. Jones fails, however, to produce any evidence that WRTA’s stated reasons are pretextual. In his response to WRTA’s motion for summary judgment, Jones notes only that his affidavit identified two white co-workers who allegedly engaged in physical altercations while on duty, and that neither colleague was terminated or required to undergo anger management counseling. But, as the district court noted, the circumstances surrounding the white co-workers’ employment situations are wholly unexplained. Jones does not state that these colleagues had prior incidents, as he did, that would require anger management sessions. Rather, he only states that he believed that the co-workers were “involved - 11 - No. 10-3985 Jones v. WRTA in separate physical alterations while on duty for WRTA.” This allegation, without more, is simply not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Jones also notes that WRTA should not have terminated his employment for missing the counseling sessions, because Jones believed the subsequent sessions to be optional. Whether this is true is irrelevant. We have adopted the honest-belief rule, precluding any inquiry as to whether the employer’s decision was correct or optimal. Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Svcs. Corp., 496 F.3d 587, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2007). It is only those employment decisions based on impermissible factors, such as an employee’s race or disability, that are actionable. WRTA has provided a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Jones. Jones produces insufficient evidence that would permit a reasonable juror to believe that WRTA’s decision was pretextual. The district court was therefore correct in granting WRTA’s motion for summary judgment.