Opinion ID: 797070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boykin's State-Law Claims

Text: 30 1. Van Buren Township Defendants — a) false arrest; b) false imprisonment; c) malicious prosecution; d) intentional infliction of emotional distress. 31 As discussed previously, we agree with the district court that Officers Hayes and Harrison had probable cause to arrest Boykin. And because all of Boykin's state-law claims against the Van Buren Township defendants are premised on a lack of probable cause, D. Ct. Op. at 23-25, we agree that they must fail. For example, under Michigan law, a false arrest or imprisonment is an arrest or imprisonment without legal justification, i.e., without probable cause. Lewis v. Farmer Jack Div., Inc., 415 Mich. 212, 327 N.W.2d 893, 901 (Mich.1982). The elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution require, among other things, an absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding. Rivers v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 100 Mich.App. 824, 300 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Mich.Ct.App.1981). And a viable intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim requires a showing of extreme and outrageous conduct. Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594, 374 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Mich.1985). In the context of an arrest made by police with probable cause, such a showing would seem very difficult absent additional allegations of outrageous behavior not made here. See, e.g., supra note 2. 32 2. Meijer Defendants — a) false arrest; b) malicious prosecution; c) intentional infliction of emotional distress; d) negligent hiring, training, and supervision. 33 Even though the district court opined that the Meijer defendants were not state actors for § 1983 purposes, it nevertheless considered whether Chaney and Youmans had probable cause to set in motion Boykin's arrest. Importantly, the Chaney/Youmans probable cause determination, which was based on Chaney's observations of Boykin in the store, is completely distinct from the Hayes/Harrison probable cause determination, which was based on the reliability of the tip received from Chaney and subsequent confirmation of relevant details. As to this former probable cause determination, the district court reasoned as follows: 34 Chaney saw Plaintiff pick up a drill, walk through an unattended lane, put the drill in a bag without paying and leave. Probable cause must be assessed based on the facts and circumstances known to Chaney at the time he took action against Plaintiff. The information known to Chaney when he asked Youmans to call the police indisputably suggested that the drill was stolen. 35 D. Ct. Op. at 21 (citation omitted and emphasis added). 36 Boykin contends that Chaney should not have rushed to judgment and placed a call—first to his partner, Youmans, and then to the Van Buren Police Department—without further investigation, based on two important observations: (1) Chaney saw Boykin place the drill into a bag with other items, and (2) Chaney saw Boykin take this bag from an open lane attended by a cashier. The district court rejected Boykin's first argument, noting that it is immaterial for probable cause purposes whether or not there were other items in the bag. Id. at 22. As to the second argument, the district court reasoned as follows: 37 [C]ontrary to Plaintiff's suggestion that Chaney saw from where Plaintiff retrieved the bag, Chaney testified that he did not see where Plaintiff got the bag, because his view of Plaintiff was partially obstructed for two or three seconds, during which time Plaintiff walked past a lane attended by a cashier to the empty lane through which he exited. There is no evidence which suggests that Chaney was ever under the impression that Plaintiff had any contact with the cashier in the open lane. Therefore, there is no merit to Plaintiff's assertion that he should have known to question the cashier. 38 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 39 We disagree with the district court's interpretation of the record, and especially with its conclusion that there was indisputable evidence suggesting Boykin had stolen the drill. The critical pieces of evidence, it seems to us, are the deposition of Mr. Chaney, viewed in conjunction with the Meijer surveillance videotape, which captured Mr. Boykin's movements as he went through the closed checkout lane with the drill and then walked to the cashier at the adjacent open checkout lane to retrieve his bag. Relevant portions of Chaney's deposition are recounted below: 40 A: I didn't observe where he took the bag from. 41 Q: Okay. If you were in constant surveillance [of Boykin], how did you not see where he took the bag from? 42 A: There was approximately a two-second gap, two-three-second gap between the time he went through the lane and he walked towards the door. 43 Q: Okay. A gap in your observation? 44 A: Yes. 45 Q: Okay. How far away from him were you? 46 A: Approximately 20-30 feet maybe. 47 Q: Can you explain to me where the gap occurred? 48 A: It was just due to customers blocking my view. That was in the lane farther down closer towards me that was open. 49 [. . .] 50 Q: Okay. Could you still see his head? 51 A: Yes, I could. 52 [. . .] 53 Q: So do you think that — I guess what I'm asking is when you indicated to me today that, you know, your surveillance was broken and you weren't sure where he got the bag from, do you still maintain that you couldn't see him or do you think you just couldn't really remember today? 54 A: I couldn't see him. 55 Q: Okay. All right. 56 A: Well, I couldn't see his hands rather. 57 Q: You said — 58 A: I could — 59 Q: — you could see his head? 60 A: Yes. 61 Q: So you could basically see where he was at? 62 A: Yes. Correct. 63 Chaney Dep. at 31-32, 34, 71-72. 64 As Chaney's testimony reveals, he was fully aware that Boykin had moved through a closed checkout lane with drill in hand, then had walked to the end of an open checkout lane, from which he emerged, magically, with a bag (or bags) in hand. It is not entirely clear whether, when Boykin reemerged into Chaney's line of vision, he had already placed the drill in the bag, or whether he did so only as he was walking out of the store. But neither is it relevant to the probable cause inquiry. What is relevant, and very important, is that Chaney knew Boykin had proceeded with his allegedly stolen drill to the back end of an open checkout lane, which had a cashier present. Chaney testified that he could not see Boykin's hands. In other words, absent proof to the contrary we must believe that he was unable to ascertain exactly when or where Boykin picked up the bag. But Chaney admitted he could see Boykin's head throughout the entire incident, and if he could see Boykin's head, then a reasonable juror could conclude that he should also have been able to see that Boykin was standing immediately next to—in fact, facing and making eye contact with, for a period of time — the cashier in the open lane. This is confirmed by the Meijer surveillance videotape, which clearly shows Boykin approach the cashier and take his bag after she acknowledges him. 65 Chaney's deposition testimony and the Meijer in-store surveillance tape therefore undermine any indisputable conclusion that Chaney had probable cause to think Boykin had committed retail theft. 4 Contrary to what the district court ruled, there is evidence tending to show that Chaney should have been aware of Boykin's interaction with the cashier in the open lane. Chaney at the very least knew that Boykin had taken his drill to within a few feet of a cashier (certainly odd behavior for a shoplifter, when he could simply have avoided the cashier by walking straight out the closed checkout lane), and the videotape evidence would seem to indicate that if Chaney could see Boykin's head, there is no reason he could not also have seen the cashier's head right next to Boykin's. 66 Consider a completely different scenario: A customer goes into a Meijer store to buy a carton of eggs. Let's say these are free-range, hormone-free, organically-raised eggs, and they cost $5, just like the drill in this case. As the cashier is scanning the customer's items, she realizes that one of the eggs is cracked, so she rings them up, but then directs the customer to get a new carton after he has paid. The customer pays, leaves the bags containing his other groceries on the counter by the cashier, and picks out an unbroken dozen. After quickly snatching the new carton, he walks through a closed checkout lane adjacent to the one where he paid (because the open lane is blocked by other customers and their shopping carts), comes around to where the cashier is standing, places his eggs in his waiting bags with the cashier's approval, and departs. This is not a bizarre hypothetical; it actually happens all the time. And yet under the district court's logic, no reasonable juror could find that the Meijer security guards lacked probable cause to detain (or effect the arrest of) the organic-egg patron. The law of probable cause cannot require such a result. 67 In sum, and in contrast to the district court, we find that there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Chaney had probable cause to effect Boykin's arrest for shoplifting. We therefore reverse the district court on this point, and discuss the consequence of this reversal below. III 68 Boykin's § 1983 claims against the Van Buren Township defendants were properly dismissed on probable cause grounds, see Part II-A-1, and his § 1983 claims against the Meijer defendants were properly dismissed because there was no state action, see Part II-A-2. We thus AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants with respect to Boykin's § 1983 claims. We also AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of Van Buren Township defendants with respect to his state-law claims. 69 As for Boykin's state-law claims against the Meijer defendants, however, we REVERSE the district court's dismissal and REMAND for further consideration in light of this opinion. In particular, we find that a triable issue exists as to whether security guards Chaney and Youmans had probable cause to suspect Boykin of shoplifting. We . . . leave to the district court to determine whether it is proper to exercise its discretion at this point to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice, now that no federal law claims remain and [we suspect] there is no diversity of citizenship. Nails v. Riggs, 195 Fed.Appx. 303, 313 (6th Cir.2006).