Opinion ID: 202776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Díaz-Pastrana

Text: 12 At trial, the prosecutor asked Edna Díaz-Pastrana how she began using or trafficking in drugs. She testified that she began to sell drugs through Jaime and that [h]e was the one who would supply me with the drugs, and Jaime would get in touch with . . . At that point, defense counsel interrupted her testimony with an objection, and a bench conference ensued. The court ruled that Díaz-Pastrana's statement was not hearsay. 13 The prosecutor then asked Díaz-Pastrana: How do you know that Jaime got in contact with Orlando Malpica? Defense counsel objected. A second bench conference was called, and defense counsel argued that Díaz-Pastrana's testimony was inadmissible under Crawford. The court instructed the prosecutor to begin with questions about information the witness had from Malpica-García. The prosecutor followed those instructions, and Díaz-Pastrana testified only about her personal knowledge of and contact with Malpica-García. The defense did not object to that testimony nor is that testimony challenged on appeal. 14 To come within the parameters of the Confrontation Clause, the testimony first must be hearsay. Brito, 427 F.3d at 61. Broadly stated, hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801. In the challenged part of her testimony, Díaz-Pastrana testified about her own actions that involved Jaime. She did not testify as to any out-of-court statements made by Jaime. Therefore, the challenged testimony was not hearsay. 15 Malpica-García also contends that Díaz-Pastrana's testimony about his drug activities was inadmissible under Crawford. She testified that drug point operators, meaning those who sold drugs at the public housing project where she lived and worked, had to pay Malpica-García money, called prote, as protection from having the drug point closed down. She named the drug point operators, including Carlitos Way, who paid Malpica-García prote. 16 Defense counsel objected. At sidebar, defense counsel represented that Díaz-Pastrana's testimony that Carlitos Way was a drug point operator who paid prote to Malpica-García was hearsay because she only knew that information from Carlitos Way's wife. 2 Defense counsel objected that Díaz-Pastrana's testimony violated the Confrontation Clause under Crawford because Carlitos Way was not available to testify. The district court ruled that the testimony was admissible as a statement of a co-conspirator. On appeal, Malpica-García argues that Díaz-Pastrana's testimony about Carlitos Way was inadmissible under Crawford. 3 17 Díaz-Pastrana's testimony did not expressly include an out-of-court statement made by another declarant. If, as defense counsel asserted, her challenged testimony were based on an out-of-court statement by either Carlitos Way or his wife, rather than on Díaz-Pastrana's personal knowledge, the out-of-court statement must also be testimonial to render it inadmissible under Crawford. See United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir.2006). 18 In Crawford, the Court gave examples of the kinds of statements that would be testimonial: ex-parte in-court testimony (or its equivalent); statements contained in formalized documents (such as affidavits and depositions); and statements made as part of a confession resulting from custodial interrogation. Hansen, 434 F.3d at 100. Statements made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy are not testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Hansen, 434 F.3d at 100; United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 75 (1st Cir.2005). 19 Crawford, however, did not provide a comprehensive formulation or definition of what statements would be deemed to be testimonial. United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.2004). Following Crawford, we have held that statements are not testimonial when they are made during a private conversation, when they are not included in formalized documents or made in response to interrogation or examination, and when they are not made under circumstances in which an objective person would reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir.2004); accord Hansen, 434 F.3d at 100. Testimonial statements are generally the product of a declarant's responses to official questioning and are made in a context in which the declarant should know that they will be preserved for prosecutorial use. See United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 22 (1st Cir.2006); Brito, 427 F.3d at 60. 20 Assuming, but not deciding, that Díaz-Pastrana's testimony that Carlitos Way paid prote to Malpica-García was hearsay, the out-of-court statements were not testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. The record includes no indication that Díaz-Pastrana was repeating statements that Carlitos Way or his wife made to police, in an investigative context, or in a courtroom setting. Instead, such statements would have been made in the course of private conversations or in casual remarks that no one expected would be preserved or used later at trial. Therefore, even if Díaz-Pastrana's testimony were based on statements made by Carlitos Way or his wife, because those statements were not testimonial, the challenged testimony was not prohibited under Crawford.