Opinion ID: 763744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mayers

Text: 16 Mayers is a citizen of Barbados admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on July 19, 1977. On January 20, 1993, Mayers pled guilty to and was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. On November 15, 1993, the INS commenced deportation proceedings against Mayers based on his criminal conviction, pursuant to INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994), (current version codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (West 1999)). On July 7, 1994, Mayers filed for a waiver of deportation under INA § 212(c). At the first hearing to consider the waiver application, the IJ indicated that she was inclined to grant a § 212(c) waiver. A second hearing on the waiver was not held until April 30, 1996, six days after President Clinton signed the AEDPA into law. The IJ granted Mayers' § 212(c) waiver petition, and the BIA affirmed this decision. On March 17, 1997, however, the BIA reconsidered its decision in light of a new opinion by the Attorney General indicating that AEDPA § 440(d) applies to pending deportation cases. As a result, the BIA found Mayers to be statutorily ineligible for relief under § 212(c) and ordered Mayers deported. Mayers filed a petition for habeas corpus review in the district court on July 31, 1997, seeking review of the final deportation order and challenging on due process and equal protection grounds the application of AEDPA § 440(d) to his § 212(c) waiver request. 17 In contrast to Gutierrez-Martinez' petition, the district court reviewing Mayers' habeas corpus petition found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Congress has eliminated all avenues of judicial review of criminal orders of deportation, including the writ of habeas corpus in the new immigration regime. Mayers v. Reno, 977 F.Supp. 1457, 1461 (S.D.Fla.1997). The district court held that this elimination of review suffered no constitutional infirmities because [n]o judicial review [of deportation orders] is guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537, 72 S.Ct. 525, 533, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952)). In the alternative, the district court found that even if there were still some form of habeas corpus review of constitutional claims, Mayers' claim that AEDPA § 440(d) should not apply retroactively to his deportation proceedings did not rise to the level of grave constitutional error or fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 1462. The district court concluded, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction to review Mayers' claim. 18 Upon a motion by Mayers, these cases were consolidated for appeal on September 9, 1998. We therefore refer to Mayers and Gutierrez-Martinez collectively as petitioners when discussing common claims. Petitioners argue that under the new immigration schemes, the district court retains habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioners further argue that AEDPA § 440(d), which makes certain aliens ineligible for relief under the old INA § 212(c) waiver application process, should not apply retroactively to their deportation proceedings. We review de novo issues of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1281-82 (11th Cir.1998). We also review de novo the purely legal question of whether a statute's provisions apply retroactively. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1997).