Opinion ID: 168502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eligibility for Day Shift

Text: 24 McGowan contends the failure to reassign her to the day shift is a materially adverse action. The district court disagreed, finding her preference for the day shift a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities that was not actionable, relying on Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., supra, 164 F.3d at 532 (holding that teacher transfer not adverse). 25 The question, then, in the wake of Burlington Northern, is whether a reasonable person would be deterred from making or supporting a discrimination claim if she knew she would be denied a shift change. Here, the answer is no, because on this record the claim fails the test of materiality. While McGowan may have desired a change in shift, she identified no specific rationale for the transfer other than an undefined subjective preference for the change. In fact, the shifts offered no differences in pay and benefits, nor was the night shift more arduous. Although claiming it to be a better assignment, her stated desire for change was purely for personal reasons. Moreover, before Lollis filed his claim, Day had refused to transfer her to the day shift because she lacked the necessary administrative skills. Finally, the record does not indicate that McGowan was permanently denied a shift change. The City's legal counsel advised that the status quo be maintained during the pendency of Lollis's lawsuit, which settled several months after McGowan requested the change. Nothing in the record suggest that McGowan requested a shift change or that one was denied after Lollis's suit settled. 26 As the Supreme Court observed, reassignment of job duties is not automatically actionable. Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2417. Absent evidence of materiality, McGowan has not presented a claim for a jury. In sum, we agree with the district court that on these facts the challenged action was not materially adverse. 3