Opinion ID: 2632549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Boilerplate Allegations

Text: Defendants complain first that the affidavit included boilerplate discussion of the limitations of traditional investigative techniques and failed to identify any ways in which the investigation into this drug trafficking conspiracy differed from drug trafficking conspiracies generally. Although it is true that `[generalities, or statements in the conclusory language of the statute, are insufficient to support a wiretap application' ( U.S. v. Cline (10th Cir.2003) 349 F.3d 1276, 1280-1281), the affidavit here did not simply reiterate conclusory language. It instead analyzed with particularity the limitations of each alternative investigative technique in achieving the goals of this investigation. That many of those limitations are common to most drug conspiracy investigations does not necessarily preclude a finding of necessity. ( U.S. v. Thompson (8th Cir.2000) 210 F.3d 855, 859.) In cases of this nature, the same reasons for futility of certain investigative techniques will frequently recur. But the fact that drug investigations suffer from common investigatory problems does not make these problems less vexing. ( U.S. v. Milton (8th Cir.1998) 153 F.3d 891, 895.) There is thus no requirement that the government establish that an individual narcotics investigation differs in some particular way from an ordinary narcotics investigation. Necessity is a function of the specifics of the case, not its uniqueness. If a seemingly `ordinary' drug investigation requires a Title III wiretap, and the government establishes that necessity with the particulars of a given investigation, no more is needed. The ordinariness of the investigation does not preclude a finding of necessity for the use of wiretaps to further the investigation. ( U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at pp. 5-6.) Defendants' reliance on United States v. Kalustian (9th Cir.1975) 529 F.2d 585, which contained some contrary language in suppressing electronic surveillance evidence in a gambling investigation, is misplaced. There, no mention was made of the defendants or the particular circumstances to be investigated. ( United States v. Tufaro (S.D.N.Y.1983) 593 F.Supp. 476, 489.) Hence, Kalustian teaches no more than that an affidavit composed solely of conclusions unsupported by particular facts gives no basis for a determination of compliance with the necessity requirement. ( United States v. Spagnuolo (9th Cir.1977) 549 F.2d 705, 710; see also United States v. Williams (D.C.Cir.1978) 580 F.2d 578, 588 [distinguishing Kalustian as involving generalized and conclusory statements that other investigative procedures would prove unsuccessful].) By contrast, the affidavit here described with particularity the problems with conventional investigative techniques, including those posed by the fact that the identity of the user and the location of Target Telephone # 1 were unknown. Defendants' reliance on U.S. v. Blackmon (9th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 1204, in which a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit suppressed the fruits of a wiretap in a narcotics investigation, is likewise unconvincing. In that case, the panel majority found that the affidavit contained material misstatements, including untrue claims that surveillance of Blackmon had been attempted and had failed and that cooperating informants possessed only limited knowledge concerning the scope of the criminal enterprise, and omitted any discussion of the potentially successful use of informants, including one who had special access to Blackmon. ( Id. at p. 1209.) Because of these defects, the court elected to review the affidavit, purged of its misstatements, de novo, without deferring to the judicial finding of necessity below. ( Id. at p. 1211 (dis. opn. of Wardlaw, J.); see U.S. v. Yeje-Cabrera (1st Cir.2005) 430 F.3d 1, 8 [distinguishing Blackmon ].) Here, however, we have found (and defendants have conceded) that the judicial finding of necessity below should be reviewed deferentially and that the affidavits contain no material misstatements or omissions. Inasmuch as the Ninth Circuit has subsequently explained that its holding in Blackmon was premised on a finding that the affidavits supporting the wiretap applications were plagued by material misstatements and omissions ( U.S. v. Fernandez (9th Cir.2004) 388 F.3d 1199, 1237), we do not find Blackmon persuasive here. ( U.S. v. Canales Gomez (9th Cir.2004) 358 F.3d 1221, 1225 [distinguishing Blackmon on the ground that [n]o such misstatements are alleged in this case]; accord, U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at p. 6.)