Opinion ID: 71642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Owned, Supported, Controlled, or Managed by a Religious Association

Text: 21 Section 703(e)(2) of Title VII provides as follows: 22 [I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or religious corporation, association, or society, ... 23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 24 Samford says that, even if its refusal to allow Plaintiff to teach at the divinity school were not covered by the religious educational institution exemption, it is entitled to an exemption as an educational institution substantially owned, supported, controlled or managed by a particular religion or religious corporation, association, or society. Samford argues for a flexible interpretation of Section 703 and points to Samford's historical ties with the Convention, the fact that the Convention is the single largest contributor to the university, and that its Board of Trustees requires it to report to the Convention on all budgetary and operational matters. Plaintiff, on the other hand, says Samford is not owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a religious association because (1) the Convention no longer appoints trustees and (2) only seven percent of its budget comes from the Convention. Neither side cites precedents interpreting Section 703, and we are aware of no precedent that speaks to the issue of what it means to be owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a religious association. See e.g. Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351, 357 (7th Cir.1986) (Posner, J., concurring) (Is the combination of a Jesuit president and nine Jesuit directors out of 22 enough to constitute substantial control or management by the Jesuit order? There is no case law pertinent to this question; the statute itself does not answer it; corporate-control and state-action analogies are too remote to be illuminating; and the legislative history, though tantalizing, is inconclusive.) (internal citations omitted). 25 Section 703 is written in the disjunctive and requires only that a college be--in whole or substantial part--owned, supported, controlled or managed by a religious association. Without addressing the other possibilities, we conclude that Samford is in substantial part supported by the Convention. 26 Substantial is not defined by the statute. But the word substantial ordinarily has this meaning: Of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; veritable. Something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal. Synonymous with material. Black's Law Dictionary, 1428 (6th ed. 1990) (internal citations omitted). Continuing support annually totaling over four million dollars (even in the abstract, no small sum), accounting for seven percent of a university's budget, and constituting a university's largest single source of funding is of real worth and importance. This kind of support is neither illusory nor nominal. So, the Convention's support is substantial. We hold--as an alternative to our Section 702 holding--that Samford qualifies as an educational institution which is in substantial part supported by a religious association and that the exemption protects Samford in this case.