Opinion ID: 880009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: The standard for reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment was set forth in Reagan v. Union Oil Company of California (Mont. 1984), 675 P.2d 953, 956, 41 St.Rep. 131, 134. The standard that an appellate court applies in reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is the same as that utilized by the trial court initially under Rule 56, M.R.Civ. P.  a summary judgment is proper when it appears `that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' This Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Downs v. Smyk (1982), 200 Mont. 334, 651 P.2d 1238, 39 St.Rep. 1786. Blue Cross claims there are no genuine issues of material fact, that the Rimrock Foundation is not a hospital and that the benefits approved at Rimrock for a state employee were under a different contract and have no bearing on what benefits are payable under the Nitschkes' contract. Blue Cross further claims the local plan is not the Nitschkes' plan, the 1981 Service Benefit Plan. According to Blue Cross the local plan is the entity Blue Cross itself. So, approved by the local plan means approved by Blue Cross of Montana. By drawing reasonable inferences in favor of Nitschkes, there appears a genuine material issue of fact concerning whether Rimrock was approved by the local plan, Blue Cross itself. There is a question of fact concerning whether the benefits sought are consistent with the provisions of the contract and thus would not be preempted by federal law. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1). The granting of summary judgment on the basis presented to us was in error and we reverse on this issue.