Opinion ID: 1731023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: voir dire examination of jurors

Text: This issue is properly raised in the context of an adverse ruling of the trial court following an ore tenus hearing on Defendants' motions for new trial. Two points are raised: 1) relating to Juror Diggins; and 2) relating to Jurors Diggins and Weekly. Mr. Diggins did not respond to the question: Has any member of the jury panel ever been a defendant in a law suit? During the hearing on Defendants' motions for new trial, Mr. Diggins testified that a suit had been filed against him by a hospital, that his wages had been garnisheed, and that he had ended up in bankruptcy. He testified further that he was named as a defendant in a law suit arising out of an automobile accident which he settled with a cash payment to the plaintiff. By way of explanation for his failure to respond to the voir dire inquiry, Juror Diggins stated: My idea of a law suit was just like what I sat here and looked at.... [W]hat I thought it was, was go into court and defending myself; that was my idea of a law suit. That is the reason I said that. The standard against which the trial court tests alleged improper responses to voir dire inquiries is set out in Freeman v. Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 238 So.2d 330 (1970): We hold that the proper inquiry for the trial court on motion for new trial, grounded on allegedly improper responses or lack of responses by prospective jurors on voir dire, is whether this has resulted in probable prejudice to the movant. Freeman, at 286 Ala. 166. Furthermore, on appeal the trial judge's decision whether the juror's answers constituted probable prejudice is subject to review only for abuse of discretion. Freeman, 286 Ala. at 166. The Freeman decision goes on to hold: This rule comports with logic and common sense. The trial judge heard the questions posed on voir dire and answers thereto. He is in the best position to make findings on the question of probable prejudice after the testimony is developed orally, or by affidavit, on new trial motion. His conclusions are then subject to our review for abuse of discretion. Freeman, 286 Ala. at 167. Here, the trial court's decision is questionable only in the context of Juror Diggins's response to the defendant in a law suit question. The trial judge, in exercising his discretion not to grant a new trial, correctly considered the use and definition of the term law suit. While taking into consideration that law suit is clearly understood by members of the legal profession, the court was well within the bounds of its discretion to take into account that this term is subject to other interpretations by the lay person and to accept what Juror Diggins maintained was his understanding of a law suit. The second point raised under this issue relates to the failure of Jurors Diggins and Weekly to respond to the inquiry: Does any member of the jury panel have a close relativeby that, a parent, brother, sister, childwho is at this time or has been in a nursing home or an institution of that kind? The testimony of both Jurors Diggins and Weekly, at the hearing on Defendants' motions for new trial, revealed that each juror did have a relative in a nursing home at the time of the trial. We note that in both cases the relative institutionalized was a grandmother. The lawyer's voir dire inquiry, however (to which both men gave an original negative response), was qualified by the definition of close relative as a parent, brother, sister, child. In view of the narrowed scope of the question as posed, we can find no reversible error in the trial court's acceptance of the answers given by Jurors Diggins and Weekly. Moreover, the trial judge was justified in concluding that neither of these negative responses, in the context given, resulted in probable prejudice to the Defendants. Cf., Ex parte Ledbetter, 404 So.2d 731 (Ala. 1981).