Opinion ID: 1762092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Residuary Legatees/Heirs at Law Issue

Text: We now turn to the second and final inquiry: Is the lapsed legacy controlled by the residuary clause or does it pass according to the laws of intestacy? Counsel for the heirs at law, Appellants as to this aspect of the judgment below, advance a persuasive argument which we quote in part from their brief: Section 43-1-7 of the Code of Alabama is explicit: `All property not disposed of by will must be administered and distributed, as in case of intestacy ....' This provision has been in our Code since 1852, and from the early cases of Denson v. Autrey, 21 Ala. 205, Bendall v. Bendall, 24 Ala. 295, and Banks v. Sherrod, 52 Ala. 267, to the more recent cases of Caldwell v. Caldwell, 204 Ala. 161, 85 So. 493, Trustees of Cumberland University v. Caldwell, 203 Ala. 590, 84 So. 846, Parrish v. Gamble, 234 Ala. 220, 174 So. 303, our courts have said that in view of this section, estates by implication to defeat the heirs at law of the testator are disfavored and must be based on clear evidence found in the Will itself and circumstances attending its execution, showing an intention on the part of the testator not only to deprive the heirs of their inheritance, but indicating who should take [citing, also, 36 ALR 2d 1117].  Bendall v. Bendall, supra, is perhaps the most positive expression of the law as applied to our facts. Here the testatrix left her estate equally to A and B in trust for C. A and B predeceased the testatrix. On the bill to construe the Will since the testatrix had no next of kin, the Court held that the legacies to A and B lapsed and would have gone to the next of kin; there being none, they escheated to the State rather than going to the trustee for C. We have carefully studied the referenced statute and each of the cited cases; and we believe our decision to uphold the trial Court's ruling against intestacy gives full effect to § 43-1-7 and completely accords with the intent of the testatrix rule of interpretation. Additionally, here, another much favored rule is brought into play and that is the rule that mandates a strong presumption against intestacy. See Crippled Children Foundation v. Cunningham, 346 So.2d 409 (Ala.1977). Mrs. Brightwell acknowledged her heirs at law by providing each of them with a specific bequest of $10,000. She included a residuary clause disposing of All the rest and residue of [her] property to six specifically named charitable organizations. Thus, her intent with respect to the heirs at law has been satisfied in full, and the passing of the lapsed legacy under the residuary clause prevents the operative effect of intestacy. Id. No specific intent on the part of Mrs. Brightwell to avoid intestacy need be found; this element is furnished by the rule of presumption against intestacy unless a contrary intention clearly appears. Certainly, one of the prime purposes of a residuary clause is to avoid the state of intestacy contemplated by § 43-1-7, whose language is directed solely toward [a]ll property not disposed of by will. We think the rule, as it relates to both aspects of these appeals, is well stated in Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341, 47 N.E. 422, at 423 (1897): [Where] the purpose which the testatrix had in view has failed ... it follows that the bequest must be held to have failed and to pass under the residuary clause. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, SHORES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur. BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and ALMON, JJ., not sitting.