Opinion ID: 202454
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Raised by Ramos

Text: Ramos makes two claims. First, Ramos argues that the trial was flawed because jury selection violated the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court's decisions in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), requiring that juries be selected from a pool representative of the community at large. Ramos argues that the jury pool was flawed because it did not include persons who lived in public housing. Second, Ramos argues that his sentence was flawed under Apprendi, 530 U.S. 366, and United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2005), because the jury did not find that Ramos was individually involved in the distribution of five kilograms of cocaine and thus the court could not sentence him using the maximum penalty set by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
We review de novo a district court's rulings of law. United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999). The district court denied Ramos' motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury pool was unfairly composed. In order to establish a claim that the jury selection process violates the constitutional requirement that the jury be selected from a pool representative of the community at large, the challenging party must establish: (1) -20- that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. United States v. Benjamin, 252 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). The burden is on the challenging party to establish a case of unconstitutional underrepresentation. United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1994). Ramos has presented no evidence that would establish any one of the three prongs of the Duren test. As for the first prong, Ramos admits that there is no case law supporting the argument that public housing residents are a distinctive group. Ramos argues that public housing residents form a distinctive group because the Department of Housing and Urban Development restricts eligibility for public housing. This argument is clearly insufficient -- it would allow a defendant to make a constitutional claim out of the fact that a jury pool lacked a person from any group that limits its membership. See United States v. Lynch, 792 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986) ([I]f this grouping qualifies as a 'cognizable group' for purposes of Duren v. Missouri analysis, it is hard to see what grouping will not similarly qualify. The result could soon be that any defendant showing that the venire deviated statistically from -21- a perfect community cross-section would have established a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment.). Furthermore, Ramos has presented no evidence that the representation of public housing residents in the jury pool is unfairly or unreasonably disproportionate. Counsel for Ramos told the court that he estimated that public housing residents formed between 30% and 40% of Puerto Rico's population but offered no support for this contention. Ramos now uses the population of just one of ten public housing projects in Caguas, a town of 142,161 residents, to conclude that 10% is a fair estimate of the proportion of the population of Puerto Rico living in public housing. No reasonable person would find this evidence sufficient to establish that, because a jury pool of fifty-six persons had no public housing residents, they are unfairly or unreasonably underrepresented in juries. Lastly, Ramos presents no evidence that there has been a systematic exclusion of public housing residents. To the contrary, as the Government points out, the Jury Plan for the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico forms its jury pool from voter registration lists, a method previously upheld by this court. See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 573 (1st Cir. 1970) (It has become well-established that voter registration lists are appropriate for use in jury selection systems.). Jurors are also required to be United States citizens, at least eighteen -22- years old, and residents of Puerto Rico for at least one year, none of which would suggest systematic exclusion of public housing residents. Last, jurors are required to be proficient in English, a requirement we have held to be justified by the overwhelming national interest served by the use of English in a United States court. United States v. Aponte-Suárez, 905 F.2d 483, 492 (1st Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we do not find that Ramos has sustained his Sixth Amendment claim regarding jury selection.
We review the legal conclusions of a sentencing court de novo but apply a clear error standard to the factual determinations of the court. United States v. Mateo, 271 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2001). Ramos argues that his sentence violates the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, as interpreted by United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.2d 518, 525 (2d Cir. 2005), because the jury did not make an individualized finding that he was involved with more than five kilograms of cocaine.12 Specifically, Ramos argues that, 12 Because he was sentenced as a career offender, Ramos does not make the argument, as González did, that his sentence was flawed under Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d 101. Under Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1, a career offender, such as Ramos, convicted of an offense for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment, such as conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, is assigned an offense level of 37. Based on an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI, the sentencing guidelines recommend a sentence range of 360 months to life imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5A. Thus, unlike González, for whom sentencing required an individualized determination of drug quantity under U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3 and 2D1.1(c), the determination of Ramos' sentence was based solely on his prior criminal history. -23- because the jury did not find that he was individually involved with all five kilograms of cocaine, the maximum sentence should be dictated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c), which provides a maximum sentence of twenty years for the distribution of any amount of a controlled substance. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court stated that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury. 530 U.S. at 490. A jury found Ramos guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Section 846 provides that a person found guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine shall be subject to the penalties for the offense that was the subject of the conspiracy. Thus, regardless of the amount of cocaine that he was individually involved in distributing, Ramos was subject to the penalty imposed for the conspiracy-wide amount of cocaine. After extensive testimony by multiple witnesses about the precise quantities of cocaine that passed through the Las Malvinas drug point on a weekly basis, the jury found in its special verdict that the conspiracy involved the distribution of five or more kilograms of cocaine. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(1), the maximum penalty for the distribution of five or more kilograms of cocaine is life imprisonment. Accordingly, life imprisonment is also the maximum penalty for participation in a conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Ramos was sentenced to 365 months of -24- imprisonment for his participation in the conspiracy. Because Ramos' sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty, there can be no Apprendi error. See United States v. Johnstone, 251 F.3d 281, 285 (1st Cir. 2001) (No Apprendi violation occurs, however, when the district court sentences a defendant below the statutory maximum.). The district court sentenced Ramos to 365 months of imprisonment because it found that Ramos was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and the sentencing guidelines recommended a sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment. As we have stated previously, a sentence that is less than the statutory maximum penalty does not violate Apprendi even if a fact determined by the court under a preponderance standard lengthens the sentence imposed. Johnstone, 251 F.3d at 285; see also Vaughn, 430 F.2d at 525 ([D]istrict courts' authority to determine sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence endures and does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.). Accordingly, Ramos' claim of improper sentencing is meritless.