Opinion ID: 1390193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The District Court's abuse of discretion

Text: As § 2254(e)(2) does not foreclose a hearing to determine whether there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over Goldblum's second petition, I turn to the question whether a hearing is necessary. The court believes not, holding that Goldblum's allegations can be resolved by reference to the state court record. This record consists of an evidentiary hearing held by the state PCRA court on the narrow issue whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the expert testimony of Dr. Cyril Wecht at Goldblum's 1977 trial. Commonwealth v. Goldblum , No. 174 WDA 2001, slip op. at 1 (Pa.Super.Ct. Oct. 24, 2002). In my view, the evidence adduced at that state court hearing is inadequate for evaluating the federal question before us, and, in adopting the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation that Goldblum's habeas petition should be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, the District Court abused its discretion by failing to require a hearing. While the PCRA court's evidentiary hearing was oriented toward a narrow issue on remand, id. at 12, the District Court was obligated to address whether Goldblum's showing of actual innocence was sufficient to overcome the jurisdictional constraints on his second petition. This entails an in-depth assessment of whether the evidence, old and new, House v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (describing the Schlup standard), that the petitioner presents would, in the aggregate, support a conclusion that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. The facts underlying the actual innocence allegation are considered `in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial.' Id. at 328, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). In making the determination, the district court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. The evidence Goldblum proffers is highly relevant to such a determination. As the court recognizes, Goldblum offers new evidence to support his actual innocence allegation, including: (1) [A] leading expert in blood spatter evidence, Dr. Wecht, who did not testify at the trial with respect to the blood spatter evidence, has offered his opinion that Miller, and not Goldblum, murdered Wilhelm; and (2) [evidence that] Miller confessed to a member of the State Board of Pardons and the attorney general of Pennsylvania that he participated along with Goldblum in the actual murder. Goldblum also proffers as new evidence the submissions from the three other forensic experts who have opined that Goldblum did not commit the stabbing. Additionally, the court identifies evidence that was already in the record that Goldblum contends is relevant to his actual innocence allegation: First, he points to the dying declaration that Wilhelm made to the police wherein he stated, Clarence Miller did this to me. Second, he distinguishes the small spot found on his shirt cuff that no witness identified positively as blood with the excessive blood found on Miller's clothes. Third, he believes that the defensive cuts on Wilhelm's hands and multiple cuts and slashes on his torso, front, back, head and face, show that this was a one-person attack on a moving target. Fourth, he alleges that there was no forensic evidence supporting Miller's contention that Goldblum began the assault by hitting Wilhelm in the back of his head with a wrench. Fifth, Miller had fresh scratches on his forearms and wrists 14 hours after the homicide while Goldblum did not have any scratches. Sixth, black vinyl gloves recovered from the scene were stained with Wilhelm's blood and had hairs consistent with Miller's arm hair. Finally, the blood spatter indicated that the blood was cast off in a left to right movement, suggesting that the killer was in the front passenger seat. (Footnotes omitted). Also of relevance to Goldblum's actual innocence allegation, as Goldblum contends and the court addresses elsewhere in its opinion, is the jury instruction at Goldblum's 1977 trial, which presented the jury with a mistaken example of accomplice liability. [28] In light of this evidence, the facts elicited at the PCRA court's evidentiary hearing are clearly inadequate to determine whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Goldblum. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. The PCRA court heard from Dr. Wecht, but declined to take testimony from three other well-credentialed forensic experts prepared to testify that the fatal stab wounds were not inflicted by Goldblum. [29] Moreover, the PCRA court, in making its factual determinations, does not appear to have considered the affidavits of these other experts. In its opinion evaluating Goldblum's ineffective assistance claim, the PCRA court expressly addresses only Dr. Wecht's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Toby Wolson's rebuttal testimony, and the trial court jury instruction on accomplice liability. The PCRA court makes no mention of the submissions of Goldblum's other experts insofar as they pertain to the merits of the ineffective assistance claim. See Goldblum, No. CC 76021267, slip. op. at 3-5. Turning to whether it erred in failing to permit Goldblum to call witnesses other than Dr. Wecht, the PCRA court states: [T]he Superior Court's opinion [remanding for an evidentiary hearing] indicates that their review was strictly confined to the issue of Dr. Wecht's testimony and remanded on that basis alone. The court will not permit the defendant to conduct a hearing on issues which the Superior Court has deliberately excluded from its opinion and order of remand. Had the Superior Court indicated that the additional witnesses were to be addressed at an evidentiary hearing, this Court would have done so. See id., slip op. at 6. Affirming the PCRA court's decision to exclude these experts, the Superior Court made plain its position that submissions by other experts were irrelevant to the issue before them: This Court did not remand for a hearing on the impact of other potential defense witnesses that were not called at trial. Goldblum, No. 174 WDA 2001, slip op. at 11. In view of the narrow scope of the Superior Court's remand, the PCRA court very likely did not err, as a matter of state law, in excluding the defense experts other than Wecht and in disregarding their submissions. However, without this evidence, the PCRA court's evidentiary hearing fails to illuminate whether Goldblum makes a sufficient showing of actual innocence. Thus, as a matter of federal law, the limited hearing conducted by the PCRA court fails to provide an adequate basis for determining whether there is subject matter jurisdiction over Goldblum's second habeas petition. Despite this manifest inadequacy, the District Court, in adopting the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation, subscribed to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was not called for. In making her determination, the Magistrate Judge indicated that the exercise of her discretion is informed by Townsend v. Sain . . ., which sets forth the following bases for holding an evidentiary hearing: (1) [T]he merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Order of May 11, 2005 (Mem. Order) at 3-4 (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745); Appendix (App.) 70-71. The Magistrate Judge concluded that [n]one of the Townsend factors require that a hearing be held here and that [i]n fact, the state court record appears to be complete, and to have provided petitioner a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims. Id. at 4; App. 71. This determination cannot be reconciled with the record. [30] The PCRA court did not conduct a hearing on Miller's confession  the very sort of substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence that, within the framework the Magistrate Judge endorses, would require an evidentiary hearing. Mem. Order at 3 (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745); App. 70. The court, in its opinion, concludes that this new evidence, at the very most, . . . further impeaches [Miller's] credibility, but this effect is not significant. I appreciate that Miller's recital that he participated in killing Wilhelm does not exculpate Goldblum, who, according to Miller, was a co-participant. But if Miller were available to testify at an evidentiary hearing, cross-examination might shed added light on the asserted participation. Possibly it would reveal that Goldblum stabbed initially, but not deeply, and then stopped; or that Miller lured Wilhelm to meet in the parked car so that Goldblum could beat him, but that only Miller had stabbed Wilhelm. Or, on the other hand, cross-examination might strengthen the state's insistence that Goldblum played a willing role in Wilhelm's murder. The point is that, without an evidentiary hearing in which Miller is required to answer questions, one can hardly be sure that the confession's impairment of Miller's credibility is not significant. The court says that it do[es] not understand why [Miller] would have a new motive to tell the truth at that late date. According to Warden Richard Gigliotti, to whom Miller confessed, Miller states that he has made peace with Jesus Christ and that he has no reason to lie because he knows due to his health that he probably will not be alive for very many years. Deposition of Richard Gigliotti; App. 330. This surely is a plausible motive, one that could account for a disposition to tell the truth now  just as the prospect of a murder conviction could account for a decision to lie at Goldblum's trial. This concern notwithstanding, Miller's confession, considered in light of the record, including the victim's dying declaration  Clarence Miller did this to me  and evidence of a oneperson attack, still could establish that no reasonable juror would have voted to convict Goldblum. Furthermore, contrary to the Magistrate Judge's determination, the record also contains material facts that were not adequately developed in the state-court hearing, which  again, within the framework the Magistrate Judge purports to adopt  would require a federal evidentiary hearing. Mem. Order at 3 (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745); App. 70. The PCRA court declined to consider submissions from Goldblum's experts other than Dr. Wecht, or to take testimony from those experts. Yet these submissions contain forensic reasons for believing that Goldblum is innocent and, significantly, reasons why a sound forensic assessment of Goldblum's innocence is possible based on the evidence available. [31] The court balances the experts' assessments  which, Wecht apart, were not developed in an evidentiary hearing  against the strength of Toby Wolson's rebuttal testimony, which was developed in an evidentiary hearing, and concludes that testimony from these experts would be tentative and amounting to speculation (quoting Goldblum, No. CC 76021267, slip. op. at 5. Given the credentials of the experts, the court's confident assumption of the nonpersuasiveness of testimony not before the court strikes me, with all respect, as unwarranted. Without a federal evidentiary hearing, the court must rely on factual determinations that were developed from an inadequate hearing and, I believe, are significantly weakened by the record when viewed in its entirety. Goldblum proffers a wealth of evidence supporting his allegations. But no court  state or federal  has held a hearing adequate to address this evidence; I therefore believe the District Court abused its discretion in failing to do so. [32]