Opinion ID: 1711241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ruby Hunter's Grand-Jury Testimony

Text: Key argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's admission of Ruby Hunter's grand-jury testimony. Key objected to the admission of this testimony at trial as follows: I object. He has not laid the proper predicate for the admission of that testimony. Counsel went on to argue specific grounds for the objection, including, There are things on the last page of [the grand-jury transcript] that are totally irrelevant and should not be admissible without.... That's hearsay, compounded hearsay. The State argued at trial and on appeal that Rule 803(5), Ala. R. Evid., permits a trial court to admit into evidence a past recollection recorded. The trial court admitted Hunter's grand-jury testimony over Key's objection. For a past recollection recorded to be admissible into evidence, the witness must testify: (1) That the witness personally observed the event or facts referred to in the memorandum or record and that the memorandum or record was made or seen by the witness either contemporaneously with the event or when the witness'[s] recollection of the event was fairly fresh.... (2) That the witness then knew the contents of the memorandum or record and knew such contents to be true and correct.... (3) That the witness possesses insufficient recollection, other than his testimony to the matters stated in 1 and 2 above, to enable him to testify fully and accurately. Charles Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 116.03(2) (5th ed.1996)(footnotes omitted). We need not decide whether the State laid a proper predicate for the admission of Hunter's grand-jury testimony. [7] Even if the trial court exceeded its discretion when it admitted Hunter's testimony, any error was harmless because Hunter's testimony was cumulative. See Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P. Clarence Hunter, Jr., testified to the same facts as did Ruby: that Key came to his house on the night of the incident, that he got out of bed, and that Key told him that he hurt somebody pretty bad ... [that] he had run over somebody. Joy Tolbert testified that shortly after the accident Key told her that he had backed the car over Rollo. Key argues that Ruby Hunter's testimony was not cumulative and that the improper admission of cumulative evidence should not always be regarded as harmless error. Key argues that Ruby was the only witness to testify that Key asked her to wash a pair of pants for him and that the jury may have inferred from this testimony that he was attempting to conceal evidence. Key fails, however, to demonstrate that the prosecution used Ruby's testimony to do anything other than to establish that Key hit someone with a car and then left the scene of the accident. [8] Key also cites Nettles v. State, 683 So.2d 9 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), in support of the proposition that it is not always harmless error to improperly admit cumulative evidence. Nettles does not stand for that proposition. In Nettles, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the exclusion  not inclusion  of cumulative evidence may not always be harmless error. In Nettles, Lamar Nettles, the defendant, sought to have a co-conspirator's testimony admitted under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that while the co-conspirator's testimony would have tended to incriminate Nettles on a conspiracy charge, it would have tended to be exculpatory as to the kidnapping and burglary charges. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the evidence at issue would have provide[d] the only corroborating evidence supporting the appellant's testimony about the conspiracy. 683 So.2d at 14. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, therefore, that the testimony at issue was not `merely cumulative.' 683 So.2d at 13. In this case, Ruby Hunter's testimony is merely cumulative to the testimony of two other witnesses: Clarence Hunter and Joy Tolbert. We cannot conclude that Ruby Hunter's additional testimony lent a new aura of credibility, 683 So.2d at 13, to the accounts provided by the other witnesses. Therefore, any error created by the admission of Ruby Hunter's grand-jury testimony is harmless.