Opinion ID: 76188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trip to Fort Myers

Text: 31 Nothing in the record reflects that Sheriff Lee was aware of or had approved of Garnto's trip to Fort Myers for the Fourth of July weekend. 8 More important, even assuming arguendo that Sheriff Lee implicitly condoned Garnto's trip, such an act was not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Lewis, 118 S.Ct. at 1716 ([O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be `arbitrary in the constitutional sense') (quotation omitted). 9 The record does not reflect that Defendants suggested, or even condoned, the idea that Garnto should drive while intoxicated. Although Garnto had two previous convictions for driving while intoxicated, the convictions had taken place ten years earlier. Neither does the record reflect that Garnto indicated to Agent Eads and Officer Notaro that he, in the group involved, would be the person driving to or around Fort Myers. The record actually reflects that Garnto traveled to Fort Myers in a car that belonged to one of his companions. A fatal automobile collision caused by Garnto's drinking and driving was not an extremely great risk in deciding to allow Garnto, with others, to travel to Fort Myers Beach for the weekend: Defendants did not violate the Federal Constitution when the decision was made. McClendon, 305 F.3d at 326; Brown, 318 F.3d at 479. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that this conduct was so conscious shocking that it violated the Constitution. 32 In summary, we, in circumstances such as these, are unwilling to expand constitutional law to hold police departments responsible for the tortious acts of their confidential informants. No decision by Defendants in this case involved such an obviously extremely great risk that Garnto would become intoxicated and then drive an automobile and then crash into another automobile causing serious injury as to shock the conscience. We conclude that the district court properly determined that Plaintiffs failed to establish a substantive due process violation. 10 Appeal No. 01-16032 33 Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its discretion by denying their motion for relief from judgment in the light of the newly discovered evidence and proof of fraud upon the court. 34 We review the district court's order denying relief under Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir.1999). 35 For the court to grant relief based upon newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2), a movant must meet a five-part test: (1) the evidence must be newly discovered since the trial; (2) due diligence on the part of the movant to discover the new evidence must be shown; (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material; and (5) the evidence must be such that a new trial would probably produce a new result. Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir.2000). A motion for a new trial under Rule 60(b)(2) is an extraordinary motion and the requirements of the rule must be strictly met. Id. Finality is a virtue in the law. 11 36 To obtain relief from a final judgment based upon fraud under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse party obtained the verdict through fraud, misrepresentations, or other misconduct. See Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000). The moving party must also demonstrate that the conduct prevented them from fully presenting his case. See id. 37 In support of their Rule 60(b) motion, Plaintiffs submitted (1) proffered testimony from Garnto that Agent Eads had provided him $200 drinking money for the weekend; (2) an affidavit from Ralph Cunningham, the Chief Investigator for the Office of the State Attorney for the Twentieth Circuit of Florida, stating that Garnto was being used as a confidential informant by both HCSO and the DEA as part of a joint drug task force and that HCSO had a financial stake in any forfeited assets that resulted from the task force operation; (3) a memo from an HCSO corporal, David Harrison, stating that he had withheld information from the victims' investigator; and the (4) depositions of Agents Eads and Magno revealing the full scope of the arrangement between HCSO, DEA, and the Fort Myers Police Department. 38 We first consider Garnto's testimony, which was given at Garnto's criminal trial after the district court had granted summary judgment in this civil case. Even assuming that Garnto's testimony is newly discovered, we conclude that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the substance of this information. After the collision, an investigator for Plaintiffs obtained a statement from Garnto; they submitted the statement to the district court before summary judgment was granted. It was when Defendants later attempted to depose Garnto, that Garnto invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. 12 Before summary judgment was granted, it was only Defendants who were complaining about insufficient information from Garnto. 39 At a time when Defendant's motion for summary judgment was pending and a trial in this case was looming in the future, Defendants moved to strike Garnto from Plaintiffs' witness list on the grounds that Defendants had no opportunity to depose Garnto. Plaintiffs opposed the motion pointing out that Defendants — and Plaintiffs — had access to other statements Garnto provided to the police after the accident. In district court, Plaintiffs noted that Defendants could seek an extension of the discovery cutoff or a stay of the civil proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal charges against Garnto if Defendants felt the statements Defendants had were not enough. 13 Plaintiffs never sought to stay the summary judgment proceeding. Before summary judgment was granted, Plaintiffs never indicated dissatisfaction with the information they had in hand from Garnto. 40 In this context, Plaintiffs have no right to relief from the district court's entry of summary judgment based upon this newly discovered evidence. Before the entry of summary judgment, Plaintiffs could have sought to depose Garnto, or, in the alternative, request a continuance pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), until after Garnto's criminal trial. Plaintiffs instead chose to rely upon the statement obtained by their investigator. They cannot now persuasively complain that Garnto had additional evidence of which they were unaware and which might have helped them to avoid summary judgment. See Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir.2002) (concluding that Plaintiff not entitled to relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2), where Plaintiff knew of witness and chose not to seek extension for discovery or further investigation); see also Parrilla-Lopez v. United States, 841 F.2d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir.1988)(concluding that deposition testimony was not new evidence where plaintiff decided not to depose witness due to expense). Neither did the district court abuse its discretion by denying relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3). It was Plaintiffs' tactical decisions, not fraud by Defendants, that prevented Plaintiffs from fully presenting their case. See Taylor v. Texgas Corp., 831 F.2d 255, 259-260 (11th Cir.1987). 14 41 The remainder of Plaintiffs' newly discovered evidence, including the affidavit of Ralph Cunningham, the depositions of Agents Eads and Magno, and the Harrison memorandum, is not evidence that would change the outcome of the case. See Toole, 235 F.3d at 1316. This evidence seems pertinent only to whether Garnto was a county or federal confidential informant at the pertinent time. Plaintiffs also have failed to demonstrate why they could not have obtained this information before the entry of summary judgment. 42 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs' motion for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2) & (3).