Opinion ID: 2416795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal and State Civil Rights Act s

Text: As mentioned previously, in addition to his constitutional arguments, Ford also claimed that the Commission had violated his civil rights. Thus, we must now decide whether a litigant must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing a civil rights action under either the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark.Code Ann. §§ 16-123-101 to 108 (Supp.1997) or the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have never previously addressed this issue. However, section 16-123-105(c) of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act provides that: When construing this section, a court may look for guidance to state and federal decisions interpreting the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended and codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as in effect on January 1, 1993, which decisions and act shall have persuasive authority only. Thus, we must look to the Federal Civil Rights Act and the cases interpreting it in order to find a resolution to this important issue of first impression. The United States Supreme Court has held that a litigant is not required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing a civil rights action in federal courts. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), the United States Supreme Court extended this holding to civil rights actions that are filed in state courts. However, all three cases are distinguishable from the facts at hand because in those cases the state actor had already deprived the petitioner of his or her civil rights at the time that the lawsuit was filed. See Felder, supra (claim that police officers had beaten and arrested the petitioner); Patsy, supra (claim that Florida International University had denied the petitioner employment due to her race and gender); McNeese, supra (claim that the Illinois school district had failed to desegregate the public schools). In the case before us today, it is uncontested that the Commission has not yet suspended or taken Ford's hunting and fishing licenses. In fact, the Commission agreed to hold the suspension in abeyance pending the outcome of Ford's action in circuit court. Simply put, the Commission has not yet taken any final action that would arguably amount to a civil rights violation. Similar to this case, in Williamson Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), the respondent filed a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which it alleged that the Williamson County (Tennessee) Regional Planning Commission had unconstitutionally taken its property. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the case was not yet ripe because the commission had not yet taken any final action. Id. Particularly applicable to the case at hand, the Court further explained in Williamson that: The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct, however, from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 243[, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416] (1980); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F.2d 903, 908 (C.A.3 1982). See generally 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.6 (1984). While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decision maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. Patsy concerned the latter, not the former. Id. As in Williamson , the Commission has not yet taken any final action that could arguably amount to a deprivation of Ford's civil rights. Thus, Ford's claims under either the Arkansas Civil Rights Act or the Federal Civil Rights Act are not yet ripe for judicial review. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.