Opinion ID: 2584390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Deliberative Process Privilege, Generally

Text: [¶ 11] As with the perhaps better known presidential privilege, [3] the deliberative process privilege is intended to promote the flow of information within the executive branch of government. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore A Treatise on Evidence, 1312 (2d ed.2010). While the presidential privilege is a narrow conditional privilege for communications involving the President, his advisors, and their White House staff, the deliberative process privilege applies more broadly to intergovernmental communications by executive officials in general. Id. at 1336. [¶ 12] The deliberative process privilege was first recognized in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 38, 157 F.Supp. 939 (1958). After the government sold three aluminum production plants to Reynolds Metals, Kaiser sued claiming the government breached the most favored purchaser clause of the parties' contract. Id. at 941. Kaiser sought production in discovery of a document which the government refused to produce on the grounds it contained opinions rendered to the agency head by a member of his staff that did not reflect the position of the agency, and its disclosure would discourage agency staff from giving candid advice and impede effective agency administration. Id. at 943. In deciding whether the government properly withheld the document, the court of claims began by noting that the question of whether or not, or to what extent, there is a `privilege' against the discovery of information in the possession of the Government is an unsettled question. Id. at 945. Referencing a public policy of open, frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning administrative action, the court of claims concluded that confidential intra-agency advisory opinions ... belong to that class of governmental documents that are privileged from inspection as against public interest. Id. at 946. [¶ 13] The privilege first recognized in Kaiser came to be known as the deliberative process privilege. Courts have characterized it as a common law doctrine established by a long line of cases. Sprague Electric Co. v. U.S., 81 Cust.Ct. 168, 462 F.Supp. 966, 971 (1978); Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Colo.1998). [4] After Congress enacted the 1966 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the federal courts generally construed it as incorporating the deliberative process privilege by way of § 552(b)(5), which provides in language nearly identical to § 16-4-203(a)(v), that a government is not required to disclose inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87, 93 S.Ct. 827, 836, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). [¶ 14] Despite the cases interpreting FOIA, the original draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not include a provision incorporating the deliberative process privilege. Imwinkelried, supra, at 1337. In fact, Congress rejected a later revision to the FRE recognizing the privilege. Id. Thus, the FRE approved by Congress in 1975 did not include any codification of the deliberative process privilege and the privilege remains a creature of case law. [¶ 15] In Mink, one of the leading FOIA cases recognizing the privilege, a Congresswoman sought production of recommendations a departmental under-secretary made to the President concerning the advisability of a scheduled underground nuclear test. The President denied the request in part on the basis of FOIA Exemption 5. Citing Kaiser, 157 F.Supp. at 946, the Court stated: [T]he legislative history of Exemption 5 demonstrates that Congress intended to incorporate generally the recognized rule that confidential intra-agency advisory opinions... are privileged from inspection. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86, 93 S.Ct. at 836. The Court quoted Congressional reports reflecting that in discussing Exemption 5, legislators were concerned that it would be impossible to have any frank discussion of legal or policy matters in writing if all such writings were to be subjected to public scrutiny and efficiency of Government would be greatly hampered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all Government agencies were prematurely forced to `operate in a fishbowl.' Id. at 87, 93 S.Ct. at 836. Concluding that Congress intended Exemption 5 to incorporate the deliberative process privilege, the Court remanded the case for determination of whether the documents fell within the privilege. [¶ 16] Since Mink, the question of whether particular records are exempt from public inspection on the basis of the deliberative process privilege incorporated within FOIA has been addressed by numerous federal circuit and district courts. See, for example, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2004); Grand Central P'ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir.1999); K.L. v. Edgar, 964 F.Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D.Ill.1997). Among the reasons given for recognizing the privilege in the context of FOIA's Exemption 5 are that the privilege protects the flow of ideas within government agencies, allows candid discussion and free exploration of ideas and improves governmental decision-making by taking official deliberations out of a fishbowl. Id.; Sun-Sentinel Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 431 F.Supp.2d 1258 1277 (S.D.Fla. 2006). The United States Supreme Court reiterated the rationale for the privilege within the context of FOIA's Exemption 5 most recently in Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-9, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 1066, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001): The deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance the quality of agency decisions by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the Government. [¶ 17] In recent years, some state courts have adopted the rationale of FOIA cases to support incorporating the deliberative process privilege within their state's public records laws. See, e.g., Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Univ. of Maryland, 382 Md. 151, 854 A.2d 1220, 1227 (2004); City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.2000); City of Colorado Springs, 967 P.2d at 1051; Capital Info. Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 33-34 (Alaska 1996); Gould v. New York City Police Dep't, 89 N.Y.2d 267, 653 N.Y.S.2d 54, 675 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y.Ct.App.1996); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 1325, 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240, 248-49 (1991). Other state courts have declined to recognize a deliberative process privilege within their state statutes. State of Illinois ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 184 Ill.2d 521, 235 Ill.Dec. 435, 705 N.E.2d 48, 53 (1998), concluding that in light of the range of competing policies underlying the deliberative process privilege, its adoption should be left to the General Assembly, and Sands v. Whitnall School Dist., 312 Wis.2d 1, 754 N.W.2d 439, 458 (2008), declining to recognize the privilege because state statute requires common law privileges not originating in the constitution to be adopted by statute or court rule and state laws reflect a strong policy of transparency and access. [¶ 18] This Court has not addressed the issue of whether the deliberative process privilege is incorporated within the WPRA. However, we have addressed the WPRA, and the policy behind it, in a number of cases. In Laramie River Conservation Council v. Dinger, 567 P.2d 731 (Wyo.1977), this Court noted the similarities between FOIA and § 16-4-203(b)(v) and held that the policy behind the WPRA, like that behind FOIA, is one of disclosure, not secrecy, meaning the exemptions are to be narrowly construed. Id. at 733. The Court said: The legislature of this state has stressed the importance of making available to the public agency records. Id. The Court stated further: With some necessary exceptions, recognized by Wyoming's records and meetings acts, state agencies must act in a fishbowl. Id. at 734. See also, Allsop v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 2002 WY 22, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d 1092, 1095-96 (Wyo.2002), reiterating that the WPRA speaks to the philosophy of disclosure and, with some necessary exceptions, requires state agencies to act in a fishbowl. [¶ 19] In Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785 (Wyo.1983), this Court emphasized that the public's business should be open to the public whenever possible and [t]he courts, legislature, administrative agencies, and the state, county and municipal governments should be ever mindful that theirs is public business and the public has a right to know how its servants are conducting its business. Id. at 791. We cautioned that newspaper, television and radio are the eyes and ears of the people and the citizenry must have access to what public officers and employees are doing unless disclosure would cause legally recognized harm. Id. We cited the WPRA and the open meetings statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-11-101 to 9-11-107 (1977) renumbered as Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-401 through 16-4-408 (LexisNexis 2009), as examples of legislative intent to maintain an open and accountable government. Sheridan Newspapers, 660 P.2d at 792. We said statutes relating to public access to public records should be liberally construed and that any doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure. Id. at 793. Unless withholding public records is authorized by statute, we said: The language of the [WPRA] imposes a legislative presumption which says that, where public records are involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the public policy, the public interest and the competing interests of those involved. Id. at 796. [¶ 20] In Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050 (Wyo.1994), we reiterated our prior statements that the WPRA is intended to promote disclosure, not secrecy. Quoting Norman J. Singer, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 60.01 (5th ed.1992), we concluded legislation requiring disclosure of information is considered remedial, and [r]emedial statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy. The policy that a remedial statute should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the remedial purpose for which it was enacted is firmly established. Id. at 1052. We said: [A]n open and accountable government is particularly important with respect to the expenditure of public funds. Members of the public have a legitimate interest in the operation of the county hospital and in the amount the community is spending to attract health care providers. Id. at 1056. And: Given the overriding public interest in the full disclosure of information of expenditure of public finds, any legislative restriction on the disclosure of such public information must be expressly textual. Id. [¶ 21] Citing these cases, the Newspaper asserts recognition of the deliberative process privilege within the WPRA would be contrary to Wyoming's longstanding policy in favor of open and accessible government. The Newspaper contends there is no language in the WPRA incorporating the privilege and for this Court to conclude otherwise would require reading words into the Act. The Newspaper further contends the deliberative process privilege is largely a creation of federal case law interpreting FOIA, which although persuasive in some instances, is not binding on this Court when considering Wyoming law. While conceding that language in the federal law is nearly identical to language contained in the WPRA, the Newspaper asserts there are two important differences weighing heavily against recognition of the privilege in the WPRA context. First, § 16-4-203(b) requires the custodian of the public record to weigh the public interest in withholding the record against the state's policy of open government while FOIA contains no similar requirement. Second, while FOIA's legislative history indicates Congress expressly anticipated that some sort of governmental privilege would apply through Exemption 5, there is no indication the Wyoming Legislature considered the deliberative process privilege when it adopted the WPRA. In fact, the Newspaper points out, when the legislature enacted the WPRA in 1969, Mink had not yet been decided and Kaiser, a pre-FOIA decision, was one of only a few cases recognizing a privilege applicable to governmental decision making. The Newspaper also urges this Court to consider the reasoning of other states which have refused to adopt the deliberative process privilege because it is detrimental to the search for truth central to our adversary process. Sands, 754 N.W.2d at 458. In the event we recognize the privilege, the Newspaper insists this Court narrowly tailor it to the specific purposes of § 16-4-203(b)(v). [¶ 22] The State contends the district court correctly concluded the WPRA encompasses the deliberative process privilege, thereby allowing government officials to withhold documents that would not be available to a private party in litigation with the agency. The State directs our attention to federal and other state court decisions interpreting virtually identical statutory language that have recognized the privilege. The State correctly points out that federal and state case law is saturated with explanations of how the deliberative process privilege encourages frank and honest communication. The State asserts the same compelling state interests leading to recognition of the deliberative process privilege in other states are present in Wyoming rendering the district court's holding appropriate and correct. The State notes this Court has stated that parallel language between a Wyoming statute and federal statute makes it appropriate to examine persuasive authority, particularly federal cases. Sublette County Rural Health Care Dist. v. Miley, 942 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Wyo. 1997). [¶ 23] The issue the parties ask this Court to decide is an important and complex one. Reflecting the importance of public access to information, we have quoted the writings of two of this Country's founders, Thomas Jefferson: The people are the only censors of their governors; ... give [the people] full information of their affairs through the channel of the public papers, and to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people; [W]ere it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. And James Madison: A Popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it is but a Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and the people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. Houghton, 870 P.2d at 1057. Other writers have addressed the importance of evidentiary privileges. In his two-volume, 2000 plus page treatise, Imwinkelried begins by stating: [P]rivilege law is arguably the most important doctrinal area in the law of evidence.... [It] concerns extrinsic social policy. From society's perspective, the rules governing privileges can be justifiably viewed as the most important evidentiary doctrines. Imwinkelried, supra, at 3. [¶ 24] The complexities involved in determining whether the WPRA incorporates the deliberative process privilege are apparent from the foregoing discussion of its development. From the plain language of the WPRA, it is clear the legislature intended public records to be open for inspection by any person unless exempted from public inspection by the WPRA or other law. There is no language in the WPRA expressly stating that documents may be withheld from the public on the basis of the deliberative process privilege. We are not aware of, and the State does not cite, any other Wyoming statute or court rule incorporating the privilege. [¶ 25] Like the federal courts' interpretation of FOIA Exemption 5, the State argues the basis for the privilege is found in § 16-4-203(b)(v), which exempts from disclosure if contrary to the public interest interagency or intraagency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency. The WPRA contains no provision explaining what the legislature meant by documents which would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency. Pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, however: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any party. (Emphasis added). If § 16-4-203(b)(v) is read in conjunction with W.R.C.P. 26(b), it would appear that privileged inter- and intra-agency memoranda are exempt from disclosure under the WPRA. By statute, Wyoming recognizes six privileges, including attorney-client, physician-patient, priest- or clergyman-confessor and husband and wife. [5] There is no reference in the statute to a deliberative process privilege applicable to inter-agency or intra-agency communications. [¶ 26] The State contends the deliberative process privilege is incorporated into § 16-4-203(b)(v) by virtue of the English common law which the legislature adopted in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 (LexisNexis 2009). [6] The Wyoming judiciary likewise has adopted the common law with respect to privileges by way of WRE 501. [7] The State further asserts this Court has the authority to determine what the common law is. See Briefing.com v. Jones, 2006 WY 16, ¶¶ 12-14, 126 P.3d 928, 935-36 (Wyo.2006); Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801, 806 (1947). [¶ 27] In a line of cases spanning sixty years this Court has stressed that it will recognize the common law as modified by judicial decisions, accepting the interpretation that best fits the time and this jurisdiction. Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Wyo.1990), citing In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677, 681 (1940). We have expressed a reluctance to recognize, or continue recognition of, a common law rule that had its genesis in a social, economic and political climate entirely foreign to Wyoming in current times. Id. Thus, when deciding whether to accept a particular common law rule, we evaluate whether developments in the law are consistent with our policies and precedent. Id. at 1173. [¶ 28] The State asserts the deliberative process privilege existed in 1607 English common law as a derivative of the crown privilege; therefore, the legislature necessarily adopted the deliberative process privilege when it adopted the common law. We disagree. Any crown privilege had its genesis in a social, economic and political climate entirely foreign to Wyoming in 2010. Moreover, as the State concedes, there was no statute or common law principle in 1607 granting a right to inspect the king's records. [¶ 29] The State contends, irrespective of English common law, the deliberative process privilege is part of this Country's common law by virtue of Kaiser and its progeny. Because the legislature and this Court have adopted the common law, the State asserts, we must construe § 16-4-203(b)(v) together with the common law as recognized in Kaiser, meaning agency records are exempt if they are pre-decisional and deliberative and would not be available by law to a private party in litigation. The State cites to other federal and state court decisions that have taken this approach. [¶ 30] The Newspaper argues the rationale other courts have given for recognizing the deliberative process privilege in the context of public records has been rejected by this Court as contrary to Wyoming's policy of open government. In addition to this Court's interpretations of the WPRA, the Newspaper cites the legislature's amendment to the Public Meetings Act. The Newspaper argues the legislature affirmed its position that open government is better government when it amended the definition of meeting in § 16-4-402(a)(iii), to include discussion, deliberation [and] presentation of information. 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws 207-08 (emphasis added). With the amendment, meetings previously closed to the public because they were deliberative and did not involve final action such as a vote, came within the definition of meetings that must be open to the public. The Newspaper cites this Court's recent statement that this legislative change clearly indicates the intent to ensure agency deliberations occur during a public meeting. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bldg.Code Bd. of Appeals, 2010 WY 2, ¶ 16, 222 P.3d 158, 164 (Wyo.2010). [¶ 31] As the foregoing discussion reflects, deciding whether or not the WPRA incorporates the deliberative process privilege requires consideration of Wyoming statutory law and legislative intent, this Court's previous pronouncements concerning the WPRA, the common law, federal law interpreting FOIA and the degree to which the latter sources should influence our interpretation of state law. Given our conclusion, discussed in the next section, that the documents at issue in this case would not fall within the privilege in any event, we decline to decide whether the WPRA incorporates the privilege. A decision by this Court today that the WPRA would, in the appropriate case, incorporate the deliberative process privilege would have no effect on these litigants in this case and would be merely advisory. See, e.g., Voss v. Goodman, 2009 WY 40, ¶ 5-7, 203 P.3d 415, 418 (Wyo.2009) (stating courts cannot issue advisory opinions or adjudicate hypothetical questions). Moreover, it is axiomatic that in applying any evidentiary privilege, a court must consider the nature of the particular documents in the context of the litigation and assure the protection provided is as limited as it can be. This is especially true with regard to this privilege in light of the potential for its abuse by agencies and the clear legislative preference for making governmental records public. A case in which the documents at issue are not the kind of confidential intra-agency opinions protected by the privilege and, therefore, must be released for public inspection does not provide the appropriate circumstance for this Court to establish the parameters of the privilege in the event we were inclined to recognize it under Wyoming law. [¶ 32] To quote Imwinkelried, supra, at 3-4: It is no secret that in selecting cases to decide, the [United States] Supreme Court tends to choose cases that potentially have a significant social impact. Since World War II, privilege cases have had a prominent place on the Court's docket. For example, privilege rulings have figured in many of the major constitutional confrontations between branches of government, including Watergate during the Nixon Administration, Iran-Contra during the G.H.W. Bush Administration, the battle between President Clinton and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, and the efforts to obtain the records of Vice President Cheney's National Energy Policy Development Group during the G.W. Bush Administration. It should come as no surprise then that since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Supreme Court has handed down more decisions relating to privilege law than concerning any other part of the Federal Rules. Given the importance of privilege law, and this State's clear legislative policy favoring open and accessible government, we will wait to decide whether the WPRA incorporates the deliberative process privilege when we are presented with a case in which it is shown that the records sought to be disclosed would fall within the privilege. In the meantime, if the legislature wishes to expressly incorporate the deliberative process privilege in the WPRA, we presume it will act to do so.