Opinion ID: 415604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Decision to Admit the Prior Convictions

Text: 10 The district court admitted Lipscomb's eight-year-old robbery conviction into evidence under Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 609(a) states: 11 GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted ... but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 12 Rule 609(b) creates an exception to Rule 609(a) for a prior conviction which is remote in time: 13 TIME LIMIT. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines ... that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 14 In ruling that the probativeness of Lipscomb's conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect, the court knew only the name of the offense (robbery), the date of conviction (1973), and Lipscomb's age when the crime was committed (16). 10 The court did not know the details of the crime, whether Lipscomb had pled guilty or not guilty, or the sentence imposed; it had inquired but the prosecutor stated that he had no more information. 11 The court found that Lipscomb's prior robbery conviction was probative because anyone desperate enough to rob somebody ... is desperate enough to lie on the witness stand, 12 and because the Defendant's testimony will be so important to his defense. 13 The court did not discuss the extent of prejudice, but did state for the record that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. 14 15 In making this ruling based on limited information, the district court recognized the tension in our cases between, on the one hand, United States v. Crawford, 613 F.2d 1045, 1050-54 (D.C.Cir.1979) (Wald, J.), and, on the other hand, United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1208-10 (D.C.Cir.1980) (MacKinnon, J.), and United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 945-51 (D.C.Cir.1980) (MacKinnon, J.). Crawford suggested that inquiry into the facts and circumstances underlying a prior conviction was desirable and often necessary; Jackson and Lewis suggested that such inquiry was rarely necessary. The district court concluded that [t]here are two panels on the Court of Appeals and each has a different theory of this, and the most recent panel ... supports the Government's position [that detailed inquiry is unnecessary] ... and I will let it in. 15
16 The district court admitted Smith's armed robbery conviction because, as for Lipscomb's conviction, the desperate person who would commit an armed robbery would also lie under oath. 16 The court did not expressly explain why Little's robbery conviction or Green's accessory after the fact to manslaughter conviction were probative of credibility. The court did, however, state its opinion as to both Little and Green that the probative value of the convictions outweighs the prejudice to the Defendant. 17
17 The district court was unsure whether it had adequately supported its decision to admit the prior convictions, and therefore suggested that if Lipscomb were convicted, defense counsel ought to give me an opportunity to review this further on a motion for new trial. 18 Counsel did so, and the government, at the court's insistence, had by that time produced supplemental background material on the prior convictions of Lipscomb, Smith, Green, and Little. The new information showed that Lipscomb: (1) in February 1973, with two others, had robbed a man on the street, threatening him with a B-B gun, and taking $13, his hat, and his coat; (2) in May 1973, pled guilty while maintaining his innocence pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and was sentenced to three years probation; (3) then spent four months in a halfway house, but was evicted for disruptive behavior, including smuggling in a gun, and shortly thereafter was arrested for burglary; the burglary charges were dismissed on the government's motion, but Judge Penn revoked Lipscomb's probation and sentenced him to an indeterminate six-year sentence; (4) in 1976, failed to return from an unescorted furlough and was placed on escape status, but soon turned himself in; (5) while at a community care center in the District of Columbia, was arrested and convicted for several burglaries in Virginia and reincarcerated; (6) was finally released when his robbery sentence expired in November 1979. 19 18 Smith had robbed a man at gunpoint and also stolen his car; he was convicted after pleading not guilty. Little and his younger brother had robbed a man at gunpoint, with Little stating I've got a gun, punk, give me your money; he was convicted after pleading not guilty. Green had been part of a group who had robbed an 18-year-old boy; another member of the group had stabbed and killed the boy and the group then fled to Green's home. The principal in the stabbing was convicted of first-degree murder. In pleading guilty to accessory after the fact to manslaughter, he expressed no regret and explained his plea by stating all of my witnesses stood up for the government. 20 19 The district court concluded from all this that there are even stronger reasons than I knew at the time for admitting the convictions, and denied the motion for a new trial. 21 20
21 Under Rule 609(a)(1), the prosecution must show that the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. If it cannot do so, the evidence is excluded. See 120 Cong.Rec. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate, House floor manager for the Rules of Evidence) (the Conference Committee placed the burden on the proponent of such evidence to show that ... the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359-60 (D.C.Cir.1976). 22 A major subtheme in this case is the prosecution's attempt to minimize its burden of persuasion by insisting that the district court should not look behind the name and date of a conviction to determine how much probative value it has. 22 The government did not introduce any background information on the prior convictions at the first trial, stating that it had none. Moreover, during the three-week interval between the first and second trials, it made no effort to obtain any background information despite Judge Oberdorfer's request for it at the first trial. At the second trial, Judge Oberdorfer again asked for more information and the government resisted, claiming that the information was unnecessary: 23 THE COURT: Have you tried [to get the case jackets in the prior convictions]? 24 MR. CORNELL: No, I have not. 25 THE COURT: Well, see if you can. 26 MR. CORNELL: One of the reasons is we don't view it as necessary.... 27 THE COURT: ... [T]he Court of Appeals will probably have these, and I don't see any reason why I should have to-- 28 MR. CORNELL: The Court of Appeals will not have the jackets. 29 THE COURT: Well, they will if [defense counsel] puts them into the record in support of his motion for new trial. See if you can get them; not necessarily today .... MR. CORNELL: I will endeavor to get them. 23