Opinion ID: 772585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Slaney's Present Complaint and its Relationship to the Tribunal's Decision

Text: 18 Keeping in mind the orbit of the Tribunal's decision, we now turn to examine Slaney's present state-law causes of action against the IAAF. Slaney raises six such claims: breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Putting aside Slaney's amorphous allegations of misrepresentations, we note that her complaints center around the claim that the IAAF violated its obligations to Slaney by using the T/E ratio as a proxy for doping in women. Thus, she alleges that the Federation failed to properly investigate her urine sample. Though Slaney does not specify how she was damaged by the implementation of the T/E test (for reasons that will become pellucid during our discussion of Slaney's state-law claims against the USOC), the answer is apparent. The implementation by the IAAF of a burden-shifting approach to proving ingestion of testosterone damaged Slaney in that, as a result, she was unable to disprove that she had committed the offense--resulting in her suspension. 6 19 We conclude that Slaney's present complaint seeks to address issues decided by the Tribunal. During the course of the IAAF arbitration, Slaney presented two positions: (1) that the IAAF's T/E ratio test for determining ingestion of exogenous testosterone was invalid, and (2) that it could not be proven that Slaney had committed a doping violation. Though Slaney attempts to limit the import of the Tribunal's decision, characterizing that decision as merely a finding that she had a T/E ratio above 6:1, it is incontrovertible that the arbitration panel went further, first upholding the T/E ratio test, and then determining that Slaney had committed a doping offense. As our inquiry above made transparent, Slaney's state-law claims against the IAAF seek deliberation on the identical issues. For example, in order to adjudicate whether Slaney's Fifth Count (negligence against the IAAF) is a valid claim, the court would be required to delve into whether the cause of action makes the prima facie case. That probing would require that the court assess whether the IAAF in fact breached its obligations to Slaney. Slaney claims that the IAAF had a duty to properly test her for drug use. Since Slaney asserts that the IAAF breached this duty by employing the T/E test, the court would de facto be required to determine whether the implementation of that test constituted a breach of the duty to properly test athletes. Of course, the court could not reach that decision without addressing the validity of the test itself. Likewise, any examination of damages would require an assessment of whether Slaney was properly found guilty of a doping offense. Thus, we accept the district court's finding that allowing Slaney's current action would undermine or nullify the Tribunal's decision. See Rudell v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 F.2d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 1986).