Opinion ID: 2982191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Materiality under Brady

Text: Given the improbability that the grand jury testimony contained impeachment evidence, Ross fails to demonstrate materiality under Brady and thus cannot sustain his high burden of proving that the state court’s conclusion was “unreasonable” or “contrary” to, clearly established federal law. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been revealed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. But “[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109–10. Furthermore, a constitutional violation under Brady occurs only where a prosecutor’s “omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of defendant’s right to a fair trial,” or “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 679. In determining materiality, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289–90 (quoting Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)) (internal quotation and citations omitted). When the omission is evaluated in the context of the entire record, we conclude that Ross fails to satisfy the materiality requirement under these standards. Neither Ross nor this Court can declare with certainty whether the grand jury testimony in this case contained favorable impeachment evidence, as the trial court did not conduct an in camera review, or give Ross an opportunity to inspect the transcripts. Perhaps the testimony would have - 25 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda revealed an inconsistency; however, the “mere possibility” that undisclosed evidence may have assisted the defense does not rise to the level of materiality as contemplated by Supreme Court. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109–10. There are several reasons to believe the grand jury testimony did not contain impeachment evidence. We agree with the Ohio Court of Appeals that both the parties and the court expended a substantial amount of time and effort during the trial considering Ross’s inferences that B.B. and D.D. had made prior statements about anal contact with Ross. In the end, allegations of anal rape likely came from statements made by third parties and not from the victims. Indeed, neither B.B. nor D.D. testified at trial that Ross engaged in anal contact. The evidence shows that B.B.’s mother was concerned about the possibility that Ross had attempted anal penetration. However, she stated unambiguously that B.B. denied penile-anal contact with Ross. Therefore, even if Ross had access to the transcripts, it is likely that the testimony he sought contained little, if any, impeachment value. Furthermore, Ross was not prejudiced because even if the testimony had been revealed, the result of the proceeding would not have been different. Had the grand jury testimony contained allegations of anal penetration, B.B. and D.D.’s in-court testimony regarding oral rape would have been sufficient to support Ross’s conviction. Allegations of anal penetration, whether alleged or not, do not necessarily cast doubt on Ross’s guilt with respect to the oral rape charges. Contrary to Ross’s argument that the grand jury testimony would have “undercut the prosecution’s evidence against him,” there is nothing to suggest that Ross was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to provide access to the transcript. - 26 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda In short, given that Ross has failed to establish materiality under Brady, he was not entitled to disclosure of the grand jury transcripts. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not “unreasonable” or “contrary” to Supreme Court precedent.