Opinion ID: 2257808
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fourth Criterion

Text: Finally, our conclusion that the victims' rights amendment is not self-executing must harmonize with the scheme of rights established in [our] constitution as a whole. Shields, 658 A.2d at 928. As the Bandonis correctly point out, there are no provisions in the Rhode Island Constitution relating to crime victims' rights other than article 1, section 23. Nevertheless, the Bandonis argue that failure to create a cause of action for monetary damages will violate article 1, section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution. [14] The Bandonis contend that this provision provides that whenever there is a recognized right, whether statutory or constitutional, there must also be a corresponding remedy for its abridgment. This Court, however, has never held that violating a recognized right requires monetary damages. Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, this fact alone would not necessarily support a claim for damages. See Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198, 1206 (1979); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (1996); Shields, 658 A.2d at 930. See also Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and, Defenses, ง 7.05[1], at 7-14 (1995) (court may provide injunctive or declaratory relief, as opposed to the specific remedy of damages). Instead we have stated on numerous occasions that article 1, section 5, forbids the total denial of access to the courts for the adjudication of a recognized claim. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195, 200 (R.I.1984) (statute requiring personal-injury claim to be commenced within ten years of the date product was first purchased, regardless of the date of injury, completely denied the plaintiff access to court). In addition, this Court has previously observed that `[a]lthough, in a free government, every man is entitled to an adequate legal remedy for every injury done to him, yet the form and extent of it is necessarily subject to the legislative power.' In other words, the constitutional provisions are not self-executing, and require legislative assistance. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 36, 73 A. 97, 106-07 (1909) (quoting In the Matter of Nichols, 8 R.I. 50, 54 (1864)). Although we applaud the Legislature and the constitutional framers for their efforts to provide crime victims with specific rights, principles of judicial restraint prevent us from creating a cause of action for damages in all but the most extreme circumstances. The extensive discussion that we have given to this issue alone indicates the enormous danger of judicially creating a cause of action when both the constitutional framers and the members of the General Assembly had the same opportunity to create a remedy and yet declined to do so. Instead we are of the opinion that the creation of a remedy in the circumstances presented by this case should be left to the body charged by our Constitution with this responsibility. See R.I. Const. art. 6, sec. 1 (The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry this Constitution into effect). In this forum the myriad complex issues presented by the imposition of liability can be fully debated .in public. We are mindful of the difficulty in attempting to impose tort liability on judges and prosecution officers who enjoy immunity, as well as the difficulty in defining the scope of liability for state officials who are responsible for complying with the victim's rights statute. Notwithstanding the departure from blind adherence to the concept of sovereign immunity, which has been accomplished through both legislation and judicial decisions, the concept of judicial and prosecutorial immunity remains alive and well: [T]here has been a decided reluctance in all jurisdictions that have considered the question to impose liability upon the state for certain activities conducted by its agents and servants.    It would be unthinkable, for example, to hold the state liable for a wrong decision of its courts or the implementation of a particular state program. Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 628, 390 A.2d 350, 354-55 (1978). Thus, even though we acknowledge the prerogative of the Legislature to fashion a remedy for victims who are ignored by the courts or who are treated unfairly by the state's prosecution officers, we also recognize the complexity inherent in addressing these questions considering the nearly four hundred years of unbroken adherence to the doctrine of judicial immunity. Joseph R. Weisberger, The Twilight of Judicial IndependenceโPulliam v. Allen, 19 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 537, 547 (1985). Our holding today, however, should in no way be construed by those charged with informing crime victims of their rights that this Court considers these rights to be inconsequential or that this Court minimizes the importance of the officials' obligation to comply with the statute conscientiously. Cf. Yang v. State, 703 A.2d 754 (R.I.1997) (parole board acted properly in rescinding its vote after hearing from crime victims). Indeed, the Constitution expresses the will of the people, and failure to abide by its words will surely have ramifications beyond the judicial arena. In addition the day may well come when the Legislature provides some sort of remedy, monetary or otherwise, for this precise scenario. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. ง 13-4437 (Supp. West 1997) (implementing victims' rights constitutional mandate by enacting legislation that crime victims have a cause of action for damages). Under our form of government, however, the function of adjusting remedies to rights is a legislative responsibility rather than a judicial task, and up until the present time the Legislature has not provided a remedy for those instances in which officials fail to inform crime victims of their rights. See Henry, 30 R.I. at 37, 73 A. at 107. The immortal words of Chief Justice Marshall ring true, particularly in this case: it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [slay what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 (1803). But inaction upon the part of the legislature, however long continued, can not confer legislative functions upon the judiciary. Henry, 30 R.I. at 38, 73 A. at 107. Therefore, notwithstanding our appreciation of the efforts of the General Assembly and the delegates to the 1986 Constitutional Convention and our sympathy for the Bandonis, we are, of the opinion that if a cause of action for damages that are due to an official's failure to apprise crime victims of their rights is created, it must originate from the floor of the General Assembly and not from the bench of the Supreme Court.