Opinion ID: 867266
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: (F)(6) Jury Instructions

Text: ¶ 26 Chappell argues the aggravation phase jury instructions failed to sufficiently narrow the (F)(6) aggravator. That aggravator is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). This vagueness, however, may be remedied with appropriate narrowing instructions. State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 310 ¶ 28, 160 P.3d 177, 189 (2007); see also State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 352-53 ¶¶ 109-14, 111 P.3d 369, 394-95 (2005). We review de novo whether jury instructions correctly state the law. State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1, 16 ¶ 85, 213 P.3d 150, 165 (2009). ¶ 27 The jury instructions given here are materially identical to instructions approved in our previous cases. [6] See, e.g., State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 308 ¶¶ 28-29, 166 P.3d 91, 99 (2007) (upholding instruction that [t]he victim ... be conscious for at least some portion of the time when the pain and/or anguish was inflicted); Andriano, 215 Ariz. at 505-06 ¶¶ 40-41, 161 P.3d at 548-49 (same); Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 ¶ 111 & n. 19, 111 P.3d at 394-95 & n. 19. Contrary to Chappell's assertion, we have never required that the mental or physical pain used to establish the (F)(6) aggravator be extreme or above and beyond the pain inherent in the manner of death itself. See, e.g., Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 310-11 ¶¶ 29-33, 160 P.3d at 189-90; Andriano, 215 Ariz. at 511 ¶ 67, 161 P.3d at 554. The instructions here adequately narrowed the aggravator and Chappell has failed to establish error.