Opinion ID: 1347857
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Can Erdman Claim Remedial Eligibility?

Text: Erdman argues that 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) renders her eligible for FMLA leave regardless of how many hours she worked because Nationwide failed to notify her of her eligibility. The version of § 825.110(d) in effect at the time of Erdman's dismissal stated: [i]f the employer fails to advise the employee whether the employee is eligible prior to the date the requested leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligible. In spite of the plain language of § 825.110(d), the District Court rejected Erdman's argument, citing decisions from courts of appeals that have invalidated the regulation as expanding FMLA eligibility beyond the statutory language. See, e.g., Brungart v. Bell South Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir.2000); Dormeyer v. Commerica Bank, 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000). Erdman cites no authority to support a contrary conclusion, but she urges us to disagree with our sister circuits and uphold the regulation. We find persuasive the Seventh Circuit's analysis of this question in Dormeyer : Although the Department of Labor has, like other administrative agencies, the authority to issue regulations to carry out the duties that Congress has assigned to it in [the FMLA], it has no authority to change the Act. But that is what the regulation tries to do. It does not address an interpretive issue that the statute leaves open, and so the principle of the Chevron case is not in play. The statutory text is perfectly clear and covers the issue. The right of family leave is conferred only on employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours in the previous 12 months. Yet under the regulation a worker who had worked 8 hours before seeking family leave would be entitled to family leave if the employer neglected to inform the employee promptly that he or she was ineligible. And this regardless of whether the employee had incurred any detriment as a result of the employer's silence. 223 F.3d at 796 (internal citations omitted). For the reasons stated in Dormeyer, we hold that the version of § 825.110 in effect at the time of Erdman's dismissal was invalid. By requiring one to work at least 1,250 hours in the previous twelve months, Congress has defined those who are entitled to FMLA leave. The remedial eligibility provision of § 825.110(d) purported to give otherwise non-eligible employees a cause of action for an employer's failure to respond to an application for FMLA leave in contravention of the statute. Our conclusion is consistent with the recent amendment to § 825.110, which removed the remedial eligibility provision in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that a remedial eligibility provision in 29 C.F.R. § 825.700 was invalid for similar reasons. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 96, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002) ([Section] 825.700(a) effects an impermissible alteration of the statutory framework and cannot be within the Secretary's power to issue regulations `necessary to carry out' the Act.); 73 Fed.Reg. 67,394, 67,942 (Nov. 17, 2008) (The final rule [] adopts the proposed changes in paragraphs (c) and (d), deleting the `deeming' provisions. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ragsdale, the Department believes that it does not have regulatory authority to deem employees eligible for FMLA leave who do not meet the 12-month/1,250-hour requirements, even where the employer fails to provide the required eligibility notices.). Accordingly, Erdman cannot assert FMLA eligibility under § 825.110(d); she can only be deemed eligible if the jury finds that she worked the requisite number of hours. [2]