Opinion ID: 3201085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of Willfulness

Text: “When analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.” McCray v. United States, Nos. 12-CF-1778, etc., 2016 WL 932657, at  (D.C. Mar. 10, 2016) (quoting Medley v. United States, 104 A.3d 115, 127 n.16 (D.C. 2014)). “[I]t is only where the government has produced no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that the court can reverse a conviction.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Medley v. United States, 104 A.3d at 127 n.16). Section 23-1327 (b) contains a permissive inference that “[a]ny failure to appear after notice of the appearance date shall be prima facie evidence that such failure to appear is wil[l]ful.” Id. To be “willful,” a defendant‟s failure to appear in court must be “knowing, intentional, and deliberate, rather than inadvertent or accidental.” (Sterling) Evans v. United States, No. 14-CM-1209, 2016 WL 1078259, at  (D.C. Mar. 17, 2016) (quoting Trice, 525 A.2d at 181). Judge Richter‟s jury instruction used this definition of “willfulness.” 13 If a defendant believes that special circumstances make his failure to appear not willful, he bears the burden of bringing that evidence before the jury. Raymond v. United States, 396 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C. 1979). However, “[i]f the jury rejects [the defense evidence], the statutory inference remains in the case and provides a sufficient basis for a verdict of guilty.” (Sterling) Evans, 2016 WL 1078259, at  n.4 (second alteration in original) (quoting Trice, 525 A.2d at 182). Contrary to appellant‟s argument, “[t]he mere presentation of a defense does not dispel the statutory inference or cause it to drop out of the case, . . . for the jury is always free to accept or reject the defense evidence.” Trice, 525 A.2d at 182. Appellant undisputedly received notice that he was required to be in court at 11:00 a.m. on February 21, 2014, and failed to appear. By presenting this prima facie evidence, the government triggered the permissive inference of willfulness. See D.C. Code § 23-1327 (b). Ms. King testified that she and her investigators “kind of baby” Mr. Wilkins and tried to help him get to court on time because he “falls asleep a lot, he has all these mental health problems, he has a lot of issues.” But she offered no details, and appellant did not call a medical doctor to testify that appellant had been diagnosed with or treated for a sleep disorder. Nor did 14 appellant himself explain why he had been unable to appear by 11:00 a.m. on February 21. Appellant might have had a persuasive defense to the willfulness element for the period from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. if he had presented evidence that a sleep disorder or other genuine obstacles prevented him from appearing on time. But see (Sterling) Evans, 2016 WL 1078259, at  n.8 (“If the trial judge construes appellant‟s testimony about memory lapses to mean that they were a „normal event‟ for him, then, upon crediting that testimony, the court might infer, from appellant‟s failure to verify what he remembered, that he willfully disregarded the order to return to court” as required); see also Smith v. United States, 583 A.2d 975, 979 (D.C. 1990) (“[A] defendant undoubtedly has an obligation to act diligently with respect to returning as required for a further court proceeding . . . .”). Presented with this evidence (or lack thereof), it was the role of the jury to determine whether it credited appellant‟s version of the circumstances or whether it inferred willfulness from his knowledge and failure to appear. See (Sterling) Evans, 2016 WL 1078259, at  n.4. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we cannot say that “the government has produced no 15 evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” McCray, 2016 WL 932657, at .