Opinion ID: 2552631
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alaska's Statute of Limitations Applies to Actions Under Subsection.822(a).

Text: The defendants contend that FDIC's action is barred by the statute of limitations. FDIC responds that subsection .822(a) precludes a statute of limitations defense. [23] In advancing this argument, FDIC points to the opening language of AS 46.03.822(a): Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and subject only to the defenses set out in (b) of this section, the exception set out in (i) of this section, the exception set out in AS 09.65.240, and the limitation on liability provided under AS 46.03.825, the following persons are strictly liable, jointly and severally, for damages [and other costs associated with hazardous substance spills]. [24] Asserting that this provision's notwithstanding phrase plainly excludes all defenses to a subsection .822(a) action except those listed in subsection .822(b), FDIC argues that the provision's plain meaning precludes a statute of limitations defense. We reject FDIC's plain meaning argument, for, as we explain below, FDIC's literal reading of the notwithstanding phrase strains common sense, is contextually implausible, and is at odds with legislative history. [T]he threshold question in ascertaining the correct interpretation of a statute is whether the language of the statute is clear or arguably ambiguous. [25] Here, subsection.822(a)'s notwithstanding phrase's meaning may indeed seem clear and unambiguous. But `words are necessarily inexact and ambiguity is a relative concept.' [26] Hence, even when a statute's language meaning seems plain on its face, ambiguity may arise if applying that meaning would yield anomalous consequences. [27] FDIC's proposal to enforce subsection.822(a)'s literal meaning by categorically barring all defenses except those listed in subsection .822(b) would have the nonsensical effect of eliminating a host of generally available defenses serving vital purposes wholly unrelated to the elements or underlying purposes of a direct action arising under subsection.822(a). If enforced literally, for instance, the notwithstanding phrase would bar a defendant who had previously settled and paid a claim from defending on the basis of accord and satisfaction. A defendant who had already prevailed in an identical action by the same plaintiff could not raise the defense of res judicata. A defendant sued by a plaintiff who lacked an interest would be forbidden to claim lack of standing; one sued by a minor could not assert the plaintiff's lack of capacity; and one subjected to a claim without service of process could not raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense. The anomalies  all unavoidable consequences of adopting FDIC's proposed plain meaning  cast ambiguity on the seemingly clear language of subsection .822(a)'s notwithstanding provision. [28] Moreover, because plain meaning cannot exist in a vacuum, ambiguity is necessarily a creature of context. As the Supreme Court has stated, `in ascertaining the plain meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the particular language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.' [29] And [w]hen a statute or regulation is part of a larger framework or regulatory scheme, even a seemingly unambiguous statute must be interpreted in light of the other portions of the regulatory whole. [30] Considered in context with other relevant provisions, subsection .822(a)'s meaning is hardly plain. The notwithstanding phrase must initially be read together with other parts of section .822 to which subsection.822(a) specifically refers: subsection.822(b)'s list of defenses and the exception created in subsection .822(i). [31] The relevant language is as follows: (b) In an action to recover damages or costs, a person otherwise liable under this section is relieved from liability under this section if the person proves (1) that the release or threatened release of the hazardous substance to which the damages relate occurred solely as a result of (A) an act of war; (B) except as provided under AS 46.03.823(c) and 46.03.825(d), an intentional or negligent act or omission of a third party, other than a party or its agents in privity of contract with, or employed by, the person, and that the person (i) exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance; and (ii) took reasonable precautions against the act or omission of the third party and against the consequences of the act or omission; or (C) an act of God; and (2) in relation to (1)(B) or (C) of this subsection, that the person [discovered the release and began containment and clean up within a reasonable period of time]. .... (i) In an action to recover damages and costs, a person otherwise jointly and severally liable under this section is relieved of joint liability and is liable severally for damages and costs attributable to that person if the person proves that (1) the harm caused by the release or threatened release is divisible; and (2) there is a reasonable basis for apportionment of costs and damages to that person. [32] As can be seen, subsection .822(b) creates three defenses to subsection .822(a)'s strict liability scheme: an act of God, an act of war, or an unavoidable act of a third party. Each of these listed defenses centers on causation; each is triggered by the intervention of an outside actor, to which the law attributes the hazardous release, away from the original defendant. Hence, this specific category of defenses ameliorates the otherwise harsh effects of strict liability. So too, subsection (i) creates a specific exception that, when triggered by particular circumstances justifying the apportionment of partial responsibility to an outside actor or third party, ameliorates the harsh effects of joint and several liability. The narrow focus of these defenses has significance in its own right, because [w]here ... specific words follow[ ] general ones, [the statutory interpretation doctrine of ejusdem generis ] restricts application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated. [33] As applied to the statutory phrase at issue, then  notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and subject only to the defenses set out in (b) of this section, the exception set out in (i) of this section  this interpretive canon strongly suggests that the terms defenses and exception refer not to the entire universe of potential general defenses, but to provisions and rules outside the original legislation that specifically mitigate the effects of joint and several liability. A companion provision of Alaska's 1989 hazardous substances legislation lends further credence to this reading. The statute immediately following subsection .822  AS 46.03.823  expressly creates a partial exception to strict liability for hazardous substance response action contractors (cleanup contractors), making them liable for hazardous releases only on the basis of negligence. [34] This provision certainly qualifies as a defense to subsection .822(a)'s strict liability provision-at least in the broad sense of defense that FDIC urges us to adopt insofar as it relates to the statute of limitations. Yet because this defense is not mentioned in subsection .822(a), it necessarily conflicts with FDIC's proposed plain meaning of subsection .822(a)'s notwithstanding phrase: according to FDIC, the phrase's categorical preclusion of all conceivable defenses except those set out in section .822  subsections.822(b) and (i). To apply FDIC's plain meaning of subsection .822(a), then, would nullify the section .823 defense, rendering the provision entirely superfluous. This, in turn would clash with the rule of construction holding that, as a general rule, a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. [35] Legislation outside AS 46.03 reinforces the uncertainty generated by section .823. Just as subsection .822(a)'s notwithstanding phrase must be considered in context with the hazardous substances act as a whole, so too other relevant laws must be considered, for a seemingly unambiguous statute [may be] restricted by another act or where it must be considered in pari materia with another act. [36] In this regard, the comprehensive regime of statutes of limitations listed in AS 09.10 is particularly relevant, [37] because, as Laidlaw correctly observes, if, as FDIC suggests, § .822(a) has no statute of limitations whatsoever, it appears to be the only cause of action in Alaska with this distinction. [38] The final factor to consider in determining subsection .822(a)'s meaning is its legislative history. In our view, this factor further indicates that the legislature did not intend to exclude the statute of limitations as an available defense to a private cost recovery action. In 1989 the legislature amended section.822, using the federal CERCLA statute as a pattern. [39] Congress originally passed CERCLA in 1980, including the defense-limiting notwithstanding language that appears in subsection .822(a). [40] When first enacted, CERCLA incorporated a three-year statute for damages actions. [41] But two federal trial courts ruled that this statute of limitations did not apply to cost recovery actions under 42 U.S.C. § 9607  the CERCLA analog to subsection .822(a). [42] In 1986, evidently responding to these rulings, Congress added statutes of limitations specifically covering CERCLA's counterparts to subsections .822(a) and (j). [43] Congress codified these new statutes as separate provisions within CERCLA, and did not amend CERCLA's notwithstanding language to mention them as defenses to a cost recovery action under CERCLA. [44] Obviously, then, Congress did not consider these statutes of limitations to be included among the kinds of defenses that were limited by CERCLA's notwithstanding provision  a provision directly corresponding to subsection.822(a). When the 1989 Alaska legislature revised section .822 by incorporating many features of CERCLA, [45] it omitted CERCLA's internal statutes of limitations. FDIC argues that this omission evinces the legislature's intent to withdraw any statute of limitations defense. But the defendants respond that the Alaska legislature's omission merely reflects its awareness that, unlike federal law, Alaska law already incorporated general statutes of limitations outside its hazardous substances act that would govern a direct action brought under subsection .822(a). The defendants' view is more plausible than FDIC's. As pointed out above, it is apparent that Congress considered CERCLA's internal statute of limitations to lie outside the sphere of defenses described by CERCLA's notwithstanding provision. If we accepted FDIC's proposed view of legislative intent, then, we would have to conclude that the Alaska legislature meant to give the notwithstanding language imported from CERCLA more significance in subsection.822(a) than Congress gave it in the federal context. Since no legislative history supports this interpretation, there is no reason to suppose that the Alaska legislature intended subsection .822(a) to abrogate Alaska's general statutes of limitations. In sum, we conclude that the limiting language of subsection .822(a) does not preclude affirmative defenses, like the defense of statute of limitations, that have no inherent relation to subsection .822(a)'s imposition of joint and several strict liability for release of hazardous substances.