Opinion ID: 1816197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proper standard of prooffair preponderance of evidence.

Text: It is well settled that in forfeiture actions for violation of municipal ordinances, where the violation involves an ordinance which has no statutory counterpart, the required burden of proof is that of other civil actions, a mere preponderance of the evidence. [1] On the other hand, in those cases involving an ordinance which has a statutory counterpart, thereby making the conduct a criminal act under a parallel statute, the burden of proof is that of clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence often referred to as the middle burden of proof. [2] Thus our specific inquiry must be to ascertain whether there is a statutory offense which parallels the keeping of a disorderly house charge made against the defendants. Defendants in this case were originally charged with and found guilty of keeping a disorderly house in violation of the ordinance of the City of Cudahy. The Cudahy ordinance obviously distinguishes a disorderly house from a house of ill fame or place for the practice of fornication. This court, in Hawkins v. Lutton, [3] when interpreting an ordinance which also distinguished a disorderly house from a house of ill fame or place of prostitution stated: . . . The trial court held that a house could not be considered a disorderly house unless it was a house of ill fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution, assignation, fornication, gambling, etc., . . . The ordinance is clearly directed against disorderly houses and places, independent of the question whether they are houses of ill fame, or places resorted to for the purpose of prostitution, etc., or for the resort of persons of ill fame or ill name or dishonest conversation, or common prostitutes. A house the inmates of which behave so badly as to become a nuisance to the neighborhood is esteemed, at common law, a disorderly house, and so of one which is kept in such a way as to disturb or scandalize the public generally, or the inhabitants of a particular neighborhood, or the passers-by. . . . And it seems that a complaint for keeping such a house may be maintained by proof that only one person in the neighborhood or community was disturbed or annoyed, if the acts done were of such a nature as tended to annoy all good citizens. [4] Hence, the premises may be a disorderly house without being a place of prostitution or gambling. [5] There appears to be no statute dealing with the type of activity here involved. Nor is there a statute specifically dealing with disorderly houses, as does the Cudahy city ordinance, with the possible exception of secs. 280.09 and 280.10, Stats., [6] declaring premises used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution to be nuisances and providing for the bringing of an action for abatement and the permanent enjoining of the scandalous activities therein. The statutes prohibit keeping a place of prostitution [7] or a gambling place, [8] and further provide penalties for those possessing obscene materials, [9] including motion pictures, [10] and for perform[ing] in any lewd, obscene or indecent performance. [11] However, defendants were not charged with conduct which would also constitute a violation of any of these statutes, and the evidence presented clearly would not sustain such a charge. We conclude, therefore, that since the specific conduct involved in this forfeiture action does not constitute a crime under the statutes in addition to a violation of an ordinance, the burden of proof properly required of the City of Cudahy in this case is the ordinary civil standard of the preponderance of the evidence. To require, as did the trial court, that the City establish the violation by the middle burden of clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, was error.