Opinion ID: 844235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Rebuttal Expert Testimony

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution's expert to refute with informal, undocumented and unpublished experiments the conclusion of the defense expert that infusing fluids into the body affects subsequent blood analysis for the presence of drugs or alcohol. Defendant claims her defense that she was unable to form the mental state necessary for first degree murder was improperly undermined by the admission of incompetent testimony to minimize the evidence of intoxication. Specifically, she contends that the personal observations of Dr. Vina Spiehler of the effects of intravenous transfusions on blood-alcohol content while working at a coroner's office were based on material that failed to meet the reliability requirements of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240] ( Kelly ), [12] Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), and the evidentiary `heightened reliability' requirement in capital cases imposed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged rebuttal expert testimony.
The murders occurred between 7:12 and 7:34 p.m. on October 27, 1997. About 8:35 p.m. that evening, paramedics infused approximately three liters (3,000 cubic centimeters) of saline solution into defendant because of her loss of blood. At 8:50 p.m., blood was drawn from defendant at the hospital. That blood was analyzed and found to contain both alcohol and drugs. The results of the analysis revealed a blood-alcohol content of 0.07 percent. The level of Prozac in defendant's blood was 118 nanograms of fluoxetine per milliliter of blood, and 258 nanograms per milliliter of its metabolite, norfluoxetine. The level of Valium in defendant's blood was 0.6 micrograms of diazepam, and 0.3 micrograms of its metabolite, nordiazepam. [13] As noted in our factual summary, Dr. Clark Smith, who was board certified in addiction and forensic psychiatry, presented expert testimony on defendant's behalf. Dr. Smith reviewed Dr. Spiehler's toxicology report in which she had calculated a blood-alcohol level of 0.09 percent for defendant at the time of the murders based on the average rate of alcohol burn-off for a woman per hour. Dr. Smith disagreed with that calculation. In his opinion, Dr. Spiehler failed to account for the diluting effect the infusion of fluids into defendant's body between the murders and the drawing of blood would have had on the level of drugs and alcohol in defendant's blood. In Dr. Smith's opinion, defendant's actual blood-alcohol content at the time of the murders would have been approximately 0.19 percent and the infused fluids also would have affected the level of Valium found in defendant's blood. Dr. Smith testified that, based on his calculations, the levels of alcohol and drugs in defendant's blood would have produced a very significant effect on the brain, including affecting emotions, perceptions, judgment, and other higher brain functions. In response to an objection to the admissibility of proposed rebuttal expert testimony on the issue of dilution, the trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing regarding the proffered testimony. During that hearing, Dr. Spiehler, a pharmacologist board certified in forensic toxicology, testified that her calculations of defendant's drug and alcohol levels at the time of the murders and her opinions regarding the impact of dilution on blood-alcohol content were based on formulae from a pharmacology textbook and published literature, including the 1988 edition of Medicolegal Aspects of Alcohol Determination in Biological Specimens (Garriott edit., 1988), [14] and Goodman and Gilman's The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics (Goodman), and on her experience working in a coroner's office where she had examined before and after samples of blood-alcohol levels in 10 to 15 individuals who had received blood transfusions or intravenous fluids while being treated in the hospital. Dr. Spiehler said her observations led her to conclude there were no changes in blood-alcohol levels that could be correlated to the transfusions in those cases. At the end of the hearing, defendant objected to the proposed testimony on the basis that Dr. Spiehler's conclusions were mere observations made in a casual setting and not subject to scrutiny of peer review or outside observers rather than scientific fact. The trial court determined that Dr. Spiehler was applying her practical work experience to the academic training she had received in a manner no different than what almost any expert would . . . do on the witness stand in terms of taking his or her educational background, things that were learned in, for example, medical school and the practical application to his or her work experience. I see nothing improper about it now that I've heard her explain it, and it appears that it's just part of her training and experience working in the field. Thereafter, Dr. Spiehler testified before the jury that she formulated her calculations based on [defendant's] weight and how much water would be in her body where the alcohol goesthe alcohol follows the waterand calculated how much of an effect the dilutions would have from the fluids she was given, and [her] answer was different from Dr. Smith's. Dr. Spiehler explained that she disagreed with Dr. Smith's conclusion that the drugs in defendant's system were diluted by the saline infusion because the drugs defendant ingested don't go into the watery parts of the body, but, instead, are stored in the fat. Dr. Spiehler calculated that the dilution would have lowered defendant's blood-alcohol content by as much as 10 percent, and concluded defendant therefore would have had a blood-alcohol level of approximately 0.07 percent at the time of the shootings. [15] She said her calculations were based on principles from Goodman and her conclusions and calculations of dilution after somebody gets intravenous fluids were based on a chapter in Garriott. When the prosecutor asked if her personal experience in the field confirmed what [she had] read in the literature, Dr. Spiehler replied, Yes. I actually have looked at samples from people who had transfusions in the hospital, and I was able to look at samples taken before they got the transfusion and afterward. And my experience has been sometimes the values go up, sometimes they go down, and sometimes they stay the same, the alcohol values. She added that she had not relied on the most recent edition of Garriott's textbook. Dr. Smith testified on surrebuttal that Dr. Spiehler's testimony did not alter his opinion. He conceded that, if dilution did not occur based upon the infused saline in this case, Dr. Spiehler's calculations of defendant's blood-alcohol level at the time of the murders would be accurate; but he testified that his theory of dilution affecting blood-alcohol levels is correct and recognized in the scientific literature. Dr. Smith added that shock, including shock following a gunshot wound, could affect the absorption of drugs and alcohol into the blood. He suggested the effects of shock might apply here because defendant at one time had no measurable blood pressure or pulse.
A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates. (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) Evidence Code section 801 provides that, [i]f a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: [¶] (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and [¶] (b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion. (6) The trial court's determination of whether a witness qualifies as an expert is a matter of discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse. [Citation.] `Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility.' [Citation.] ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 321-322 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374]; accord, People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) (7) Defendant first contends the trial court was required to apply the Kelly rule governing the admissibility of expert testimony based on new scientific techniques. Under Kelly, the admissibility of expert testimony based on a new scientific technique is a two-step process: (1) the reliability of the method must be established, usually by expert testimony, and (2) the witness . . . must be properly qualified . . . . [Citations.] Additionally, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case. [Citations.] ( Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.) Defendant claims Dr. Spiehler founded her opinions on highly questionable `experiments,' and that her testimony regarding them did not meet the Kelly requirements. Kelly does not apply here. [A]bsent some special feature which effectively blindsides the jury, expert opinion testimony is not subject to Kelly []. ( People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1157 [265 Cal.Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698] ( Stoll ); see also McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351, 372.) No aspect of Dr. Spiehler's testimony or research involved a new scientific technique. She based her calculations of defendant's drug and alcohol levels at the time of the murders on principles from textbooks and literature in her field. She then testified that her observations while working at the coroner's office confirmed what she had read in the literature regarding the effect, if any, of intravenous fluids on alcohol levels in blood. We agree with the People that Dr. Spiehler simply observed and relied upon comparative alcohol values in a series of cases where samples were available both before and after blood transfusions, and that her medical observations did not involve a new scientific technique. Kelly was designed to insulate the jury from expert testimony premised on methods that carry [a] misleading aura of scientific infallibility ( Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1157), but no reasonable juror would have given unquestioned deference to Dr. Spiehler's medical opinion testimony regarding the analysis of alcohol and drug levels in the blood, a practice well known in science and the law. We have never applied the Kelly [] rule to expert medical testimony, even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness, or even the diagnosis of an unusual form of mental illness not listed in the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association [citation]. ( McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 373.) Defendant's attempt to distinguish Stoll is unavailing. In Stoll, we held the trial court erred when it applied Kelly to exclude a psychologist's opinion testimony based on an interview and professional interpretation of standardized written personality tests. ( Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1163.) In part, we determined that Kelly did not apply because it was not based on a technique new to science or the law. ( Id. at p. 1157.) We did distinguish the testimony of a learned professional art  from the science triggering Kelly concerns ( id. at p. 1159), explaining that admission of testimony based on new science presented dangers when the unproven technique or procedure appears in both name and description to provide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury ( id. at p. 1156). The challenged medical observations made by Dr. Spiehler present no such danger. Defendant's attempt to distinguish People v. Bui (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1187 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 908], fails as well. In Bui, the Court of Appeal declined to apply Kelly to expert testimony about methamphetamine blood levels and their correlation to driving ability because the expert's methodology was generally accepted in the scientific community. It reasoned that `[t]he Kelly test is intended to forestall the jury's uncritical acceptance of scientific evidence or technology that is so foreign to everyday experience as to be unusually difficult for laypersons to evaluate.' ( Id. at p. 1195, quoting People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 80 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525].) Dr. Spiehler's challenged testimony did not involve new scientific technology nor does it raise concerns under Kelly. Defendant mischaracterizes Dr. Spiehler's testimony as describing experiments. Dr. Spiehler testified that she simply looked at samples taken from individuals before and after they had transfusions and compared the results of both samples. (8) Defendant next contends Dr. Spiehler's testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b). In support of her contention that Dr. Spiehler's testimony lacked the required foundation, defendant relies on People v. Willis (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 379 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 235], which detailed the foundational requirements for dog scent identification evidence, and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Zuckerman (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1113 [234 Cal.Rptr. 630], which involved property valuation testimony that failed to meet statutory requirements for property valuation. Those two cases did not address medical expert opinion testimony and do not directly support defendant's claim. In support of her claim that Dr. Spiehler's opinion was not based on material reasonably relied on by other experts in the field, defendant relies on People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713] and Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 122]. In Gardeley, we held the trial court did not err by allowing gang expert testimony based on hearsay, personal investigations, and discussions among colleagues. We found the expert's opinion reliable, and recognized that, [s]o long as [the] threshold requirement of reliability is satisfied, even matter that is ordinarily inadmissible can form the proper basis for an expert's opinion testimony. [Citations.] ( Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Although Gardeley did not involve medical opinion testimony, its reasoning supports the conclusion that Dr. Spiehler's opinion testimony was reliable and admissible. Though Kelley involved medical opinion testimony, the expert there did not disclose what he relied on in forming his opinion under Evidence Code section 802. ( Kelley, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 523-524.) Here, by contrast, Dr. Spiehler disclosed the basis for her opinion, and her opinion was founded on information on which an expert may reasonably rely. The fact that Dr. Spiehler did not rely on the latest edition of Garriott does not render her testimony inadmissible. Although a later edition omitted the article on which Dr. Spiehler relied, she testified it was omitted in the subsequent edition because the textbook's editor could not locate the article's author for approval. Defendant now objects that Dr. Spiehler's explanation for the omitted article is inadmissible hearsay, but she forfeited the objection by failing to raise it at trial. ( People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765]; Evid. Code, § 353.) In any case, the article itself did not provide a calculation; it merely provided suggestions to experts on how to talk to a jury. At the pretrial hearing, Dr. Spiehler testified the article gives [an expert] a way of talking through [a difficult question in court] that a layperson might understand, rather than going into the scientific basis, which would be found in Goodman and Gillman. Defendant next complains that Dr. Spiehler's explanation regarding the omitted article defies common sense because it is unlikely that a well-known medical professional would suddenly disappear, and, [e]ven if this were true, and the medical data remained valid, why not simply publish it in the subsequent edition, rather than omit it? Defendant was entitled to attack Dr. Spiehler's credibility regarding the claimed basis of her opinion, but questions regarding the validity or the credibility of an expert's knowledge go to the weight of such testimony, not its admissibility. ( People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 322.) Defendant did question Dr. Spiehler's conclusions and the foundation of her opinions through cross-examination, and additionally presented her own expert as a surrebuttal witness on the issue of dilution. We are convinced that Dr. Spiehler's testimony explaining the basis for her opinion was permissible under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (a), and that her opinion testimony regarding the effect of dilution on alcohol and drug levels in blood was properly admitted under our state rules related to the admission of expert opinion testimony. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 138-139.) (9) Defendant next contends there is a heightened reliability requirement of expert testimony in capital cases under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We disagree. In People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1229 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015], faced with the same claim when a defendant objected to admission of an expert's testimony, we reiterated that `[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a capital defendant's constitutional rights.' (Quoting People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1035.) In any event, despite defendant's contention, she has not established that Dr. Spiehler's testimony was so unreliable as to violate due process and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (10) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Spiehler to provide the jury with her expert medical opinion testimony in rebuttal.

Defendant contends the trial court erred during the penalty phase by admitting evidence that she had smeared feces on the face of her nephew. Defendant claims admission of that testimony violated section 352 of the Evidence Code as well as her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and her right to heightened reliability in a capital case under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution. We conclude the evidence was properly admitted. Before the evidence of the feces incident was admitted, defendant had introduced evidence to show that she was a good mother. That evidence presented defendant as someone who consistently acted lovingly and protectively towards her children by hugging and kissing them, keeping them well groomed and well fed, taking them to medical appointments, and exhibiting pride in them. Linda Michele Smith, defendant's sister, later testified that she had been speaking with defendant on the telephone when defendant, whom Linda described as an immaculate housekeeper, told her she had found a soiled pull up diaper that her nephew had stuffed between his bed and an adjacent wall. Defendant told her sister that she got really mad, made him smell the soiled diaper, and then rubbed the feces in his face. After Smith got angry about how defendant had treated her nephew, defendant said she had not rubbed the feces in his face, that she had just meant I made him smell it. Linda testified she did not believe defendant's partial retraction. During closing argument in the penalty phase, the prosecutor explained that the evidence that defendant had rubbed feces from her nephew's soiled diaper in his face was offered to rebut the testimony that [defendant] was a good mother. (11) Evidence Code section 352 provides: The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative [citation] [only] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome' [citation]. ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) `The prejudice which . . . Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.' [Citations.] `Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of prejudging a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.' ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704]; accord, People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11] ( Doolin ).) The potential for such prejudice is decreased when testimony describing the defendant's uncharged acts is no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses. ( People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) We apply an abuse of discretion standard to review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under section 352. ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 805 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938].) Defendant's initial claim that her statements were inadmissible hearsay is meritless. The trial court concluded the statements fell under the hearsay exception for admissions of a party (Evid. Code, § 1220), and, implicit in its ruling was a finding that the statements were sufficiently reliable to be admitted in the penalty phase of defendant's trial. We are convinced that Smith's testimony provided substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, even under the heightened reliability standard set forth in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 96 S.Ct. 2978]. We therefore next address defendant's section 352 claim. The trial court had excluded evidence of the feces incident under Evidence Code section 352 during the guilt phase of defendant's trial on the basis that issue was collateral to the guilt of defendant for the deaths of her four children and was redundant on the issue as to whether defendant disliked her nephew. In that context, the trial court found the prejudicial effect of the potentially disturbing testimony that a woman would spread feces on a child more prejudicial than probative given the People's theory. (12) However, at the penalty phase, once defendant raised the subject of her ability to parent, the trial court properly recognized that the prosecution was entitled to respond and introduce specific evidence of defendant's conduct that contradicted defendant's assertions. ( Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1173 [In light of [a defense witness's] portrayal of defendant's religious recommitment, the prosecution could impeach her testimony with acts tending to contradict that impression.]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1211 [240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301] [If the defense chooses to raise the subject it cannot expect immunity from cross-examination on it.].) Defendant's attempt to distinguish Ramos and Gates based on the fact that those cases involved cross-examination of a defense witness fails. Our focus is on the scope of admissibility of relevant rebuttal character evidence in response to either party's introduction of character testimony, and a defendant has no right to mislead the jury through one-sided character testimony during either the guilt or penalty trial. ( People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 578 [247 Cal.Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306].) Prejudice for purposes of Evidence Code section 352 means evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant with very little effect on issues, not evidence that is probative of a defendant's guilt. ( People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 842 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820].) Here, as the trial court recognized, although the proffered evidence of the feces incident was potentially disturbing, that evidence was highly probative as impeachment evidence regarding defendant's portrayal of how the children were treated in the home. Defendant's claim to the contrary, the prosecution's proffered rebuttal character evidence was sufficiently specific and was related to a particular . . . character trait defendant offer[ed] in [her] own behalf. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 792, fn. 24 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) As explained above, `[e]vidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because it undermines the opponent's position or shores up that of the proponent. The ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant.' ( Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 438.) In Doolin, the court concluded the challenged evidence was directly relevant to impeach defendant's own testimony and that of his witnesses. Although evidence of [defendant's rape of D.] and [his] mistreatment [of his girlfriend] is unpleasant, it paled in comparison to the testimony from four witnesses that defendant tried to kill them. ( Id. at p. 439.) Similarly, here, where the charged offenses included four counts of first degree murder based on defendant having killed her four children, admission of evidence that defendant had mistreated her nephew once by rubbing his face in feces did not create an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.' ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724.) Considering all of the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct, and that the admission of the challenged evidence did not violate due process or fail to meet the Eighth Amendment requirement of heightened reliability. ( Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 305.)
(13) Section 190.3, factor (a) permits the jury, in determining the penalty, to take into account the circumstances of the crime[s] of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. Crime scene reconstruction expert Rod Englert appeared at the penalty phase as the prosecution's first witness. Defendant contends his crime scene reconstruction testimony was inadmissible factor (a) evidence, violated the heightened requirement of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and was more prejudicial than probative within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 and the due process clause of [the] Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As we explain, defendant's claim has no merit. Evidence depicting the `circumstances of the crime' generally is admissible at the penalty phase. ( People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 188 P.3d 580]; see Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1164.) The trial court's discretion to exclude such evidence at the penalty phase is more circumscribed than it is in the guilt phase. ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130].) Defendant concedes that, [h]ad Englert's testimony been confined to bullet trajectories, etc., it may have been marginally relevant and therefore admissible. However, she complains that, in addition to such relevant testimony, Englert provided unduly inflammatory evidence by editorializing about [defendant] pausing to reload the gun while the boys cowered in fear and by making speculative comments about the sequence of the shootings and the boys' state of mind. After holding an extensive Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the admissibility of the challenged crime scene reconstruction evidence, the trial court determined the expert would provide some helpful information regarding the sequence of the shots fired, how the errant bullets entered into the equation, and regarding the other bullets that were fired in the bedroom of the three boys. The court added that the expert would shed some light on other areas that were not covered by the medical examiners' testimony and going directly to the circumstances of the crime, which is obviously relevant at the penalty phase. After expressly weighing the probative value of the proposed testimony against its potential for prejudice, the trial court found the evidence admissible. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Defendant's claim that Englert's testimony before the jury was unduly inflammatory is belied by the record. For example, defendant claims Englert testified that, while defendant reloaded her gun, Brigham and Matthew cowered on the lower bunk. However, while Englert used the word cowering out of the presence of the jury during the Evidence Code section 402 hearing regarding the admissibility of the proffered reconstruction evidence, he did not use that word during his actual testimony. Similarly, during his penalty phase testimony before the jury, Englert did not use the word huddling, as defendant suggests. Instead, he testified that, based on the physical evidence of the crime scene, Brigham and Matthew were very close together when they were shot. Again, despite defendant's claim to the contrary, Englert did not testify before the jury that Matthew scramble[d] to the other end of the bed; Englert simply stated that, once Brigham had been shot but Matthew had not been hit, Matthew move[d] to the opposite end of the bed and bent over. [16] Similarly, there was no testimony that Brandon was slumped over, as defendant claims. Instead, Englert testified Brandon was shot in the left temple, he went down and onto the floor, and that the second shot was fired into the back of [his] neck. Similarly, the expert's testimony that Austin was in a defensive posture when shot was not unduly inflammatory or unduly chilling, as defendant claims; Englert gave his straightforward expert opinion that Austin had pulled his knee up and close to [his] head in a defensive posture, putting a barrier between himself and the shots that were being fired at him with the knee up because stippling could not get on his knee with his knee in a flat position. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence provided by Englert was not based on speculation. Based on his extensive training and experience, as well as on an examination of the premises and a thorough review of the police and medical reports in this case, Englert presented testimony regarding bullet trajectories, stippling, and the relative positions of the multiple victims and the shooter that was sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 801.) That evidence was relevant, probative, and not unduly prejudicial. (See, e.g., People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 643-644 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363] [deputy medical examiner's penalty phase testimony regarding relative positions of the victims and the shooter was admissible].) Englert's testimony that defendant fired at the height of Austin's head three times, that one shot missed to the right of Austin, one missed to the left, and one struck him in the face, provided the jury with probative evidence regarding defendant's determination to shoot Austin in the head and provided the jury with one basis to consider whether the death penalty was appropriate in this case. Evidence that defendant reloaded her gun in the boys' bedroom was similarly probative on the issue of penalty. Finally, nothing in the record of the expert's testimony supports defendant's claim that the reconstruction evidence did not meet the heightened reliability requirement of the Eighth Amendment. At trial the defense left unchallenged Englert's testimony that, based on the disciplines on which he relied and the facts of this case, his expert opinion is within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty as what occurred in that residence and the sequence it occurred in. The testimony was presented in a dispassionately objective manner and did not create an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.' ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724.) Accordingly, we find no violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert crime scene reconstruction testimony at the penalty phase to show the circumstances of the crime under factor (a) of section 190.3.
Defendant offered the testimony of James Esten, a former employee of the Department of Corrections, to testify as an expert as to the conditions of confinement should defendant be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The defense proposed to introduce photographs taken at Valley State Prison for Women that depicted areas where defendant most likely would be housed if sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The defense also proposed to have Esten testify regarding the conditions of confinement. The trial court excluded the testimony as irrelevant. Defendant contends that ruling violated section 190.3 as well as her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. (14) We have previously held that evidence of the conditions of confinement that a defendant will experience if sentenced to life imprisonment without parole is irrelevant to the jury's penalty determination because it does not relate to the defendant's character, culpability, or the circumstances of the offense. [Citations.] Its admission is not required either by the federal Constitution or by Penal Code section 190.3. [Citations.] ( People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 632 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788]; see also People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 794-795 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 220 P.3d 820].) Based on our prior decisions, we conclude the trial court did not err by excluding the proffered testimony regarding the conditions of confinement that defendant would experience if sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. [17]
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excluded proffered mitigating evidence that she had been sexually molested by her cousin and father, as well as evidence that she helped a fellow inmate at the jail infirmary obtain needed medical attention. She contends that, [i]n contrast, the [trial] court admitted evidence of an alleged incident at the jail where [she] supposedly became angry during an organized game and made threats to a fellow inmate and a jail staff member. Defendant claims these rulings lacked balance allowing inflammatory hearsay in aggravation and denying, as unreliable, important mitigating evidence. We note that defendant contends that her penalty phase jury should not have been precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of her character that would permit the jury to return a sentence less than death. She relies on a capital case, Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 99 S.Ct. 2150], to argue that this court should dispense with traditional state rules of evidence when the death penalty is involved. In Green, although the statement was not otherwise admissible, the Supreme Court permitted the admission of a declaration against penal interest that the declarant shot the victim after ordering Green to leave because it was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial and substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability. ( Id. at p. 97.) We have repeatedly rejected the broad reading of Green v. Georgia that defendant urges. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 980-981 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103].) Here, as in Weaver, we conclude the proffered mitigating evidence bore no special indicia of reliability, so the rule [set forth in Green v. Georgia ] did not require the trial court to dispense with the hearsay rule. ( Weaver, at p. 981.) (15) Under our state rules of evidence, defendant had a right to present reliable mitigating evidence at her penalty trial. ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 238 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145]; see also Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 96-97.) With regard to defendant's attempt to introduce evidence that she was molested by her cousin Greg while she was a teenager, the trial court sustained an objection for lack of foundation after defense counsel asked Greg's father, Don, if an inappropriate relationship had developed between Greg and defendant while defendant was living with Don's ex-wife Rose. The objection was properly sustained because Don had testified moments earlier that he wasn't involved, with defendant, Greg, or Rose at the time in question, he didn't see them much at that time, and he didn't pay much attention to what they were doing. The trial court also excluded as unreliable hearsay the proffered statement by a career counselor that defendant had said she was molested by her father. The trial court reasoned that the statement was unreliable because defendant had confided in many people, including her psychiatrist and her psychologist, that she had been molested by a number of other people, but not her father, and because defense counsel conceded that defendant never had indicated that she had been molested by her father to any of the mental health professionals who interviewed her. In this instance, we agree with defendant that the fact she did not make the proffered statement to mental health professionals did not make the statement inadmissible. Nonetheless, we conclude any error in excluding the statement was harmless given the limited probative value of the proffered evidence. With regard to the proffered medical assistance mitigating evidence, there was no eyewitness available to describe what happened during the incident in which a jail nurse assertedly did not respond to an inmate's request for medical assistance and defendant helped the inmate obtain the necessary medical attention. The proffered evidence was in an investigative report written by a doctor who was not present during the alleged incident. When defendant's attorney gave the trial court that report, he noted that he expected a hearsay objection from the prosecutor. The trial court excluded the proffered testimony because it did not fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule and was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted during defendant's penalty trial. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel could have laid a foundation that the proffered report fell within the official record exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1280), [18] we conclude any error in excluding the report was harmless as its probative value as mitigating evidence was not substantial. (16) While [e]xclusion of hearsay testimony at a penalty phase may violate a defendant's due process rights if the excluded testimony is highly relevant to an issue critical to punishment and substantial reasons exist to assume the evidence is reliable ( People v. Phillips, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 238), we conclude the excluded evidence in question, namely the proffered statement by a career counselor that defendant had said she was molested by her father and the investigative report regarding defendant helping an inmate obtain medical assistance, was not highly relevant ( ibid. ). We next conclude the trial court properly admitted evidence from defendant's jail records to impeach defense witness James Esten's expert opinion that defendant would not be a danger to others in the future if sentenced to prison. Esten had interviewed defendant and reviewed her jail records. After Esten characterized a fight in which defendant was involved at Las Colinas Detention Facility in San Diego County as one in which she was confronted by another inmate and retaliated appropriately in defending herself by beating up that inmate, Esten was impeached by parts of the jail record that suggested it was defendant who confronted the other inmate, who spat at defendant in response. Esten also was impeached by parts of the jail record that described defendant as vindictive, full of loathing, and antisocial, and parts of the jail record that indicated, while defendant was playing a game with another inmate, defendant said she might hit the bitch and then threatened to hit a staff member who was refereeing the game. Finally, Esten was impeached by the part of the jail record that indicated that defendant had threatened to kill Eric and the women who had accompanied Eric to the children's funeral if they came to her preliminary hearing. Esten testified that none of this impeachment evidence changed his opinion regarding defendant's future dangerousness. (17) The prosecution is entitled to impeach a defense expert's testimony with acts that tend to contradict his opinion [s]o long as the People ha[d] a good faith belief that the acts or conduct about which they wish to inquire actually took place. ( People v. Siripongs, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 578; see also Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1173.) Nothing in the record suggests otherwise. We conclude the trial court properly admitted the challenged evidence to impeach Esten's expert opinion testimony regarding defendant's future dangerousness. Here, as in Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 439, [i]n the interest of complete review, we note that even if we were to assume evidentiary error, any error would be harmless, whether assessed under the federal constitutional ( Chapman [ v. California (1967)] 386 U.S. [18,] 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]) or state ( People v. Watson [(1956)] 46 Cal.2d [818,] 836 [299 P.2d 243]) standard of review. We conclude there is no reasonable possibility that admission of the excluded proposed mitigating evidence and the exclusion of the admitted impeachment evidence in aggravation would have altered the jury's penalty verdict in light of the overwhelming evidence that defendant deliberately murdered her four innocent young children out of vengeance and hatred toward her most recent boyfriend and the father of two of her sons.
Defendant claims the cumulative effect of the various errors that occurred during her trial requires reversal of her murder convictions and the death sentence, even if no error was individually prejudicial. Having found only minor harmless errors during defendant's trial, we reject her claim of cumulative effect.
Defendant contends various features of California's death penalty statute and related standard jury instructions violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, parallel provisions of the state Constitution, and prevailing international law. We have rejected each of those challenges in the past. (See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 208-209 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62]; People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303-304 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451].) We reaffirm our prior holdings. The statutory special circumstances that qualify a defendant for the death penalty (§ 190.2) are not unconstitutionally overbroad. ( People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 304 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 236 P.3d 1035]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545].) California homicide law and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 406 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342]; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1058 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596].) Factor (a) of section 190.3, which permits the jury to consider [t]he circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 589 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 236 P.3d 312]; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1366 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 157 P.3d 950]; see also Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 974-980 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) The instruction that tells a jury to consider whether or not (§ 190.3) certain mitigating factors were present does not impermissibly invite the jury to aggravate on the basis of nonexistent or irrational aggravating factors. ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568].) The use in the sentencing factors of such restrictive adjectives as extreme and substantial in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), does not act as an unconstitutional barrier to the consideration of relevant mitigation evidence. ( People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 305.) Neither unanimity nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required for the jury's findings on the aggravating factors in this case. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 566 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].) The reasonable doubt standard does not apply to the jury's determination that death is the appropriate penalty, and the jury should not have been instructed as to the burden or standard of proof in selecting the penalty to be imposed. ( People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 964 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736].) `Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856], Apprendi v. New Jersey [(2000)] 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], or Ring v. Arizona [(2002)] 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], affects our conclusions in these regards.' ( People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 362 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 537, 207 P.3d 2]; see also People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 506 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 247 P.3d 886].) The federal Constitution does not impose on the prosecution a burden of proof as to penalty, and the state need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt whether aggravating circumstances exist, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 533 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947].) The federal Constitution does not require that the jury be unanimous as to which aggravating factors apply. ( People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 628 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78].) The instructions were not defective in failing to require that the jury provide express findings regarding the presence of aggravating factors. ( People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 200 P.3d 879].) Nothing in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, or its progeny, requires a different result. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 534.) Our state death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to require intercase proportionality review or disparate sentence review. ( People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 305; People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 970 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277]; see also Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 560-561 [161 L.Ed.2d 1, 125 S.Ct. 1183].) Defendant's sentence does not violate international law. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 539.) Our death penalty law does not deprive capital defendants of equal protection by denying procedural safeguards to capital defendants that are afforded to noncapital defendants. ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 913 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981].) Finally, we reject defendant's claim that, when viewed as a whole, our sentencing scheme fails to provide a meaningful or reliable basis for selecting the relatively few offenders subjected to capital punishment. Having concluded that none of defendant's challenges to our state's capital sentencing scheme have merit, we reject this general claim as well.
We affirm the judgment.