Opinion ID: 1439056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of MAI 31.24 to MHRA Employment Discrimination Claims

Text: Previously, MHRA discrimination analysis has focused on determining if a challenged employment decision was motivated by an illegitimate purpose. See, e.g. Midstate, 679 S.W.2d at 845 (looking at whether the defendant employer's conduct was motivated by an invidious purpose or whether it was based on a legitimate and rational consideration). Citing MAI 31.24, however, Daugherty argues that his claims should have survived summary judgment because he alleged genuine issues of material fact as to whether age or disability were contributing factors in the City's termination decision. The application of MAI 31.24 at the summary judgment stage of MHRA employment discrimination claims is an issue of first impression for this Court. MAI 31.24 states: Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant (here insert the alleged discriminatory act, such as failed to hire, discharged or other act within the scope of Section 213.055, RSMo) plaintiff, and Second, (here insert one or more of the protected classifications supported by the evidence such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disability) was a contributing factor in such (here, repeat alleged discriminatory act, such as failure to hire, discharge, etc.), and Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damage. [unless you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction Number (here insert number of affirmative defense instruction) ]. MAI 31.24 (6th Ed. Supp.2007) (bolded emphasis added). This Court finds that the contributing factor language used in MAI 31.24 is consistent with the plain meaning of the MHRA. Analyzing summary judgment decisions under the standards set forth in MAI 31.24 is appropriate because a plaintiff has no higher standard to survive summary judgment than is required to submit a claim to a jury.