Opinion ID: 2395374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rational Connection

Text: The lay opinion testimony offered by Troopers Harrison and Karwacki was also inadmissible because of an insufficient rational connection between what the troopers actually perceived and the ultimate opinions they expressed at trial. Rule 5-701 requires that lay opinion testimony be rationally based. This precondition to admissibility contemplates that there must be a rational connection between th[e] perception and the opinion. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra, § 6254, at 135 (footnote omitted); see Smith v. Biggs, 171 Md. 528, 534, 189 A. 256, 259 (1937) (noting that not only must a witness have personal knowledge regarding that witness's testimony, but that knowledge must be sufficient to form a relevant and testimonial basis for the expression ... of an opinion). Thus, speculation and conjecture will be excluded as irrationally based. Reporter's Note, THE MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5-701-2 (H. Chasanow ed.1994); LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 2.701.4, at 187 (1994). For lay testimony to be relevant, and thus admissible, the logical connection between the evidence and the fact it is offered to prove must be supplied by a proposition of knowledge. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra, § 6254, at 137 (footnote omitted); see Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1359 (6th Cir.) (noting a factual or theoretical basis for opinion testimony is a necessary predicate to admissibility), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S.Ct. 84, 121 L.Ed.2d 47 (1992); Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 738 F.2d 126, 131-32 (6th Cir.1984) (same). Thus, the proper question for determining if a sufficiently rational nexus exists between actual perception and the subsequent lay opinion testimony based on that perception is the validity of the proposition the witness used to link perception to opinion. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra, § 6254, at 138. In this case, based on their training and experience, the troopers drew the common sense inference that the substance swallowed by Robinson looked like crack cocaine. The troopers further concluded that the substance was, in fact, crack cocaine. To testify to those conclusions in court, however, those opinions must have been both rational and reasonably certain. The conclusion that the substance seized from Robinson was in fact cocaine fails to meet this threshold requirement because the visual characteristics of crack cocaine are not unique to that substance alone. The relative abundance of counterfeit substances intended to visually resemble controlled substances is so great, that the General Assembly has made it a criminal act to possess, with the intent to distribute, any non-controlled substance intended by that person for use or distribution as a controlled dangerous substance. Art. 27, § 286B(c). For instance, as the legislative history to Article 27, § 286B indicates: The production and distribution of substances such as caffeine, phenylpropanolamine, ephedrine sulfate, and pseudoephedrine in an oral dosage form which is substantially identical to various legally manufactured controlled dangerous substances, has become an extremely serious problem.... Memorandum from the Maryland Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene to Judiciary Comm., Maryland House of Delegates, at 1 (undated) (available at the Dept. of Legislative Reference, Bill File for House Bill 622 (1981)). [16] Thus, as reflected by the legislative history of § 286B, the proliferation of counterfeit or look-alike substances is so substantial as to render the identification of suspected cocaine through sight alone a tenuous proposition at best. See People v. Jones, 174 Ill.2d 427, 221 Ill.Dec. 192, 194, 675 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1996) (Whether the untested packets in the instant case may have contained cocaine or mere look-alike substances is pure conjecture.); see also State v. Robinson, 517 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Minn. 1994). Moreover, there has been no suggestion that crack cocaine is not subject to counterfeit imitation in the same manner as other illegal substances. To the contrary, the record reflects that any number of substances can adequately mimic crack cocaine. [17] See In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 374-75, 681 A.2d 501, 503 (1996) (detailing in that case how possession of dried milk chips led to a charge of possession of a noncontrolled substance with the intent to distribute it as a controlled substance). Although the circumstances of this case might support the inference that the substance visually identified by Troopers Harrison and Karwacki was a controlled substance, the facts also fairly and substantially support the contradictory inference that the alleged contraband was a counterfeit noncontrolled substance. Hence, the proposition that crack cocaine can be identified by sight alone with reasonable certainty by a lay witness is logically unsound. [18] Accordingly, the trial court should not have admitted the lay opinion testimony of Troopers Harrison and Karwacki. State v. Conn, 286 Md. 406, 428, 408 A.2d 700, 710 (1979) ([T]he statement by the lay nonexpert witness becomes trustworthy and thus admissible only after he demonstrates a sufficient foundation for the inference drawn.).