Opinion ID: 2159927
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Heading: The Wrongful Death Issue.

Text: Squires maintains her amendment to the petition states a cause of action by which she may seek damages for lost aid, comfort, companionship, services, society and consortium allegedly resulting from her son's premature death. The right of action for wrongful or negligent death of another was unknown at common law in this state and exists only by, and to the extent of, legislative grace. E.g., Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1973). By virtue of that grace, damages recoverable for the death of another are engendered by our survival statute, Iowa Code § 611.20 (1983), and, in the case of minor children, by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 1971). Under section 611.20 the wrongful death cause of action may only be brought by the administrator of the minor's estate. Id. at 443. A special damages provision, Iowa Code § 613.15, provides that in such an action the appropriate administrator, may recover the value of [decedent's] services and support as spouse or parent, or both, as the case may be, in such sums as the jury deems proper.... Although we have adopted a broad interpretation of services as that term is used within this section, see, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 288 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Iowa 1980), the section's very terms make compensable only such services as spouse or parent, not, as in the present case, as child. In addition, to reiterate, the cause of action under our survival statute must be brought by the administrator of the decedent's estate. See Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Iowa 1983) (spouse's wrongful death loss of consortium claim under sections 611.20 and 613.15 must be brought by administrator of decedent's estate; may not be brought by surviving spouse). Accordingly, our survival statute and associated legislation neither grant Squires standing to bring the action she seeks nor allow for the damages sought by the petition. Nor, we think, can Squires base her claim on Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 8. That rule provides that [a] parent ... may sue for the expense and actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting from ... [the] death of a minor child. We have recognized that this rule creates a separate parental right of action for damages independent of a wrongful death cause. Egan, 208 N.W.2d at 916. We employ a broad understanding of the damages available under this rule. See Wardlow, 190 N.W.2d at 448; see also Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1984) (services as used in section 613.15 and rule 8 embrace elements of common-law consortium). The rule's very language, however, limits recovery of those damages to circumstances resulting from the death of a minor child. The decedent in the case at bar, Squires' son, was eighteen years old and, consequently, not a minor. See Iowa Code § 599.1 (1983). Squires remains unpersuaded that the decisions under our survival statute and rule 8 definitively resolve her contentions. She emphasizes that in Madison we characterized our decision in Audubon-Exira as an attempt to mold the common law, rule 8 and statutory remedies into a more coherent system. 348 N.W.2d at 208. Squires contends that this characterization of our efforts in Audubon-Exira, coupled with a recognition of the liberal construction afforded the pertinent statutes and rule 8, see Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1973) (rule 8 given liberal construction), compel us to recognize a common-law right of parents to sue for consortium damages resulting from the wrongful death of an adult child. We decline to do so. Our decision in Madison, notwithstanding the above-cited language, also recognized that the common law did not grant a spouse or child the right to recover consortium damages following the death of a spouse or parent, respectively. 348 N.W. 2d at 207. We implied a similar understanding of the common law with respect to a parent's claim following the death of a child. Id. (If the person died, the only further recovery could be made under rule 8 in the case of a child....). These observations are consistent with the rule, well entrenched in this state, that wrongful death causes of action are unknown to our common law and exist only by virtue of legislation. E.g., Egan, 208 N.W.2d at 917. Our language in Madison, relied on by Squires, referred to our attempt to develop a more coherent system of the consortium remedies available for the different causes of action recognized by common law, statute and rule. It does not refer to an attempt to create causes of action unknown to those sources. Squires' claim is recognized by none of those sources, and we decline to recognize it today.