Opinion ID: 2979871
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Force Against Lexus

Text: Plaintiffs allege that Solomon attacked Lexus. The district court acknowledged a distinct claim, but did not separately analyze whether qualified immunity was warranted. On appeal, 8 Defendants argue that Solomon’s entry into the car did not constitute excessive force, and even if it did, it was unintentional and accidental. As discussed previously, under Saucier, Defendants’ conduct must amount to a constitutional violation. Part of this showing is demonstrating that “the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally to violate his or her constitutional rights, such that mere negligence or recklessness is insufficient.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982)). The Supreme Court has been explicit about this requirement in the Fourth Amendment context, instructing that a “[v]iolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). As Plaintiffs themselves explain, Solomon, “unrestrained and unattended,” “exited Defendants’ car and entered Plaintiffs’ automobile without protest from either Defendant.” Negligence may be evident from Hull’s failure to adequately secure Solomon and from Melton’s failure to effectively grab Solomon as he entered the vehicle, but this is not the type of intentional or knowing contact required for a § 1983 claim. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to state a § 1983 claim for excessive force and we dismiss this issue. See generally Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 374 (determining that plaintiffs’ inability to “demonstrate knowing or intentional behavior” by the defendants “designed to violate [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights” failed to state a constitutional claim that would preclude qualified immunity). Our decision in Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2004), supports this conclusion. In Dunigan, an officer brought a police dog into a home with the intention of seizing a suspect. A woman stumbled into the dog’s defensive perimeter and the dog bit her. This court rejected her §1983 claim on the grounds that she had failed to allege a seizure cognizable under the Fourth 9 Amendment because the officer had not acted with intent. Id. at 493. Similarly, Hull and Melton did not “‘through means intentionally applied’” use Solomon to seize Lexus or exert force upon her, even though their negligence allowed the dog to come into contact with her. See id. at 492 (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 597, for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when the government intentionally restricts freedom of movement); see also Matheny v. Boatright, 970 F.Supp 1039, 1046 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that the mere presence of a police dog did not amount to a misuse of force); Thomas v. Ivezaji, No. 96-1775,1997 WL 720448 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (dismissing a § 1983 excessive force claim against an officer who had opened a door and unintentionally injured an individual standing behind it); cf. Hansen v. City of St. Paul, No. 061286, 2007 WL 4224052, at  (D. Minn. 2007) (unpublished) (holding that the accidental biting of a third party was not actionable under § 1983, even though in that case the officer had intentionally released the dog, because the dispositive inquiry under the Fourth Amendment was not whether the officer intended to release the police dog, but whether he intended to seize the injured party).