Opinion ID: 3026174
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the need to provide restitution to any

Text: victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). -20- under the sentencing guidelines when still deemed mandatory, the Supreme Court “held that an earlier version of Rule 32 required district courts to give defendants advance notice before engaging in sua sponte upward departures from Guidelines sentences.” Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 195–96 (citing Burns, 501 U.S. at 136).19 And it is also true that—although Burns was, as a formal matter, a case of rule interpretation—the Court was at pains to make clear its awareness that the Due Process Clause was close at hand.20 Ausburn would extend the Burns 19 The Court in Burns explained that: In the ordinary case, the presentence report or the Government’s own recommendation will notify the defendant that an upward departure will be at issue and of the facts that allegedly support such a departure. Here we deal with the extraordinary case in which the district court, on its own initiative and contrary to the expectations of both the defendant and the Government, decides that the factual and legal predicates for a departure are satisfied. Burns, 501 U.S. at 135 (footnote omitted). Under such circumstances, the Court chose to construe the relevant Rule 32 language then in effect to ensure “both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 137–38 (emphases in original). In 2002, at a time when the sentencing guidelines were still mandatory, Rule 32 was amended to reflect the teaching of Burns. See Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 195–96. Pursuant to that amendment, Rule 32(h) now requires that a sentencing court give “reasonable notice” to the parties “[b]efore . . . depart[ing] from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified . . . in the presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h). 20 The Court said: [W]ere we to read Rule 32 to dispense with notice, we would then have to confront the serious question whether notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process Clause. Because Rule 32 does not clearly state that a district court sua sponte may depart upward from an applicable -21- rationale to require not only advance notice of a traditional “departure” under the sentencing guidelines, but advance notice of any sentence outside the guidelines range, including one based on the sentencing court’s consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (i.e., a sentencing “variance”21). In Vampire Nation, we declined to give such a construction to Rule 32(h), concluding that (1) the rationale of Burns lacked force after Booker; and (2) application of the principles stated in Burns to sentencing variances under § 3553(a) would actually contravene the superseding principles stated in Booker. See Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 196. We explained that: [N]ow that Booker has rendered the Guidelines advisory, the concerns that animated the Court’s decision in Burns no longer apply. . . . Furthermore, the requirement of Rule 32(h) that the court specify “any ground” of contemplated departure from the Guidelines range Guidelines sentencing range without providing notice to the defendant we decline to impute such an intention to Congress. Burns, 501 U.S. at 138. But cf. id. at 146, 155 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “what the Court d[id] to Rule 32 comes closer to reconstruction than construction”). 21 An upward variance is a (post-Booker) decision to sentence above the advisory guidelines range based on the § 3553(a) factors. See Jackson, 467 F.3d at 837 n.2. An upward variance is distinguished from an upward departure, which is a decision to increase the guidelines range “for reasons contemplated by the Guidelines themselves (under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 and Ch. 5, Pt. K).” Id.; see also, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (“Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category (Policy Statement)”). -22- was designed for pre-Booker departures, which were constrained by the provisions of the Guidelines pertaining to departures. The Guidelines have now become advisory and they no longer limit the grounds a court can consider at sentencing. Thus, the Guidelines are now only one factor among many which can influence a discretionary sentence. Application of the advance notice requirement of Rule 32(h) to discretionary sentenc[ing] would elevate the advisory sentencing range to a position of importance that it no longer can enjoy. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We further observed that the proposed requirement of advance notice for sentencing variances was unnecessary after Booker: “Because defendants are aware [prior to sentencing] that district courts will consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a), we believe the element of ‘unfair surprise’ that Burns sought to eliminate is not present.” Id. (citing United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 314 (2006)). Although Vampire Nation, like Burns, was technically a rule-interpretation case, we see no reason to vary either the analysis or the result of Vampire Nation in light of Ausburn’s analogous claim, brought directly under the Due Process Clause. As noted above, due process requires reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in regard to both the factual predicate of a sentence and the potential punishments which may be imposed at sentencing. But in the common run of cases, the protections of Rule 32, combined with the general character of post-Booker sentencing, will be sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the factual predicate for his sentence, the potential penalties for his conduct—i.e., the full range of statutorily-authorized punishment—and the factors to be considered in setting those penalties. See Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 196; see also United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“After Booker, parties are -23- inherently on notice that the sentencing guidelines range is advisory and that the district court must consider the factors expressly set out in section 3553(a) when selecting a reasonable sentence between the statutory minimum and maximum.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 06-7517 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2006). As a practical matter, the advisory range continues to hold significant sway in most cases even after Booker. See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 331; Rita v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463–65 (2007). Yet a reasonable and prudent defendant must be prepared to argue for an appropriate sentence based on all of the sentencing factors22; the defendant may no longer assume that the range of potential punishment is effectively bounded by the guidelines range (as modified by any requested guidelines departures). See Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 196; cf. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (“[T]he sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply.”).23 For this reason, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Burns is without application here. The point of Burns was precisely that, under the mandatory guidelines, defendants were entitled to assume that the range of potential punishment was bounded by the guidelines range, as modified by any requested departures not yet ruled on. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 134–35. After Booker, “the element of ‘unfair surprise’ [arising from a non-guidelines sentence] that Burns sought to eliminate is not present.” Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 196. Of course, we do not foreclose the possibility that—in a particular case—a district court’s failure to provide notice before imposing a sentencing variance may present due process concerns. For example—as in the hypothetical offered by 22 See supra note 18 (listing § 3553(a) factors). 23 Rita upheld the Fourth Circuit’s use of “an appellate court presumption” that a within-guidelines sentence is reasonable. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (emphasis in original), affirming 177 Fed. App’x 357 (4th Cir. 2006). However, Rita did not require appellate courts to so presume. -24- Ausburn’s counsel at oral argument—a witness or victim representative might allege theretofore-unrevealed facts at the sentencing hearing which would, if unrebutted, clearly affect the sentencing court’s thinking, and to which the defendant could not effectively respond on short notice. Cf. Curran, cited supra note 17. But such a scenario is not before us today, and the mere possibility of such a case does not justify the broad rule advocated by Ausburn. Rather, we expect that existing procedures—such as the right to object to sentencing information at any time upon good cause and the option to move for a continuance to avoid unfair surprise—will provide an effective remedy in individual cases,24 and our appellate review is broad enough to police any violations of due process.25 Cf. Burns, 501 U.S. at 155 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[E]xisting process provides what is due without resort to [the proposed] requirement.”). In sum, we decline to adopt a constitutional rule requiring a sentencing court to give advance notice before imposing any sentence outside of the advisory guideline range.26 Further, 24 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1) (“[T]he court . . . may, for good cause, allow a party to make a new objection at any time before sentence is imposed.”); Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171, 174–75 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing considerations in granting or denying a request for continuance in a criminal case and noting that “a rigid insistence on expedition despite a legitimate reason for delay may deprive an accused of due process of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 25 See United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 507 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that denial of “a request for a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion . . . when it [is] so arbitrary as to violate due process” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 26 Of course, nothing in the above analysis should discourage a district court from giving the parties advance word of its thinking if, prior to the hearing, the court is strongly inclined to impose a sentence outside (above or below) the advisory range. Such notice, where practicable, will usually -25- because the specific facts of this case do not show that Ausburn was subjected to any unfair surprise at sentencing, Ausburn’s due process challenge must fail.