Opinion ID: 75689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Weaver’s Sentence

Text: Weaver also appeals her sentence contending that the district court erroneously determined the amount of loss. We do not address that issue because Weaver knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal her sentence except under certain circumstances not relevant to this appeal.21 An appeal-of-sentence waiver provision is enforceable if the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish the waiver’s validity, the government must show either that (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the provision during the plea colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant fully understood the significance of the waiver. Id. Here, the waiver provision was referenced during Weaver’s Rule 11 plea colloquy and Weaver agreed that she understood the provision and that she entered into it freely and 20 Even Weaver seems to agree with this conclusion. More specifically, Weaver states in her brief that “misapplication . . . is a term of art that . . . means conversion. . . . The term ‘fails to refund’ carries no such inherent definition.” 21 Specifically, the provision provides that Weaver had “expressly waive[d] the right to appeal [her] sentence, directly or collaterally, on any ground except for an upward departure by the sentencing judge or a sentence above the statutory maximum or a sentence in violation of the law apart from the sentencing guidelines.” We review de novo the validity of an appeal-ofsentence waiver provision. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993). 26 voluntarily. Thus, her waiver is valid. The exceptions to her waiver do not apply because there was no upward departure by the district court, her sentence is not above the statutory maximum, and her sentence does not violate the law apart from the sentencing guidelines.