Opinion ID: 2996666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Macon County as a Necessary Party

Text: Macon County maintains that, even if the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the merits of Ms. Robinson’s claims, it is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment because it is not Ms. Robinson’s employer. Macon County urges that, given its lack of control over the parties involved in the underlying harassment, it cannot be considered Ms. Robinson’s employer for purposes of Title VII. Ms. Robinson counters that, if the facts are interpreted in the light most favorable to her, the evidence suggests that Macon County is her joint employer with the State of Illinois and, consequently, can be held liable for the harassment she endured. She further contends that, even if Macon County is not her employer, principles of estoppel prevent it from so asserting. The district court initially determined that the issue of a joint employer relationship was a question of fact, which precluded summary judgment. After the comprehensive motions for summary judgment were filed, the court found it unnecessary to rule on the issue because it held that Ms. Robinson’s substantive claims lacked merit. 13 (...continued) Finally, there does not seem to be any evidence in the record that Ms. Robinson failed to avail herself of the remedies known to her. She complained initially to Janice Shonkwiler; when provided with his number and when advised to do so, she complained to Judge Greanias. The record does not suggest that Ms. Robinson was informed of any further avenues of recourse or complaint. Consequently, there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that the Ellerth/Faragher defense is not available in the present case. No. 02-3316 41 We agree with Ms. Robinson that the question of joint liability is one that is fact-bound and that necessarily is best addressed by the district court in the first instance. However, independent of the joint employer issue, we believe that Macon County is a necessary party to this action. In Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, Illinois, 243 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Carver I”), this court certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question of which state entity was responsible for paying “official-capacity judgments in Illinois when the wrongdoer is an independently-elected officer.” Id. at 381. In that case, a sheriff had settled a Title VII action seeking damages against him in his official capacity. When the plaintiffs sought to collect the settlement from the county, the county argued that it was not responsible for the settlement amount. “We therefore respectfully ask[ed] the Supreme Court of Illinois to answer the question whether, and if so when, Illinois law requires counties to pay judgments entered against a sheriff’s office in an official capacity.” Id. at 386. The Supreme Court of Illinois determined that “[b]ecause the office of the sheriff is funded by the county, the county is therefore required to pay a judgment entered against a sheriff’s office in an official capacity.” Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 787 N.E.2d 127, 141 (Ill. 2003) (“Carver II”). After receiving the reply from the Supreme Court of Illinois, this court made the additional observation that the Supreme Court of Illinois’ answer to the question “implies an additional point of federal law: that a county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit seeking damages from an independently elected county officer (sheriff, assessor, clerk of court, and so on) in an official capacity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, 19.” Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, Illinois, 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Carver III”). 42 No. 02-3316 We believe that the implied rule from the Supreme Court of Illinois’ decision in Carver II applies with equal force in the present case. The responsibility for maintaining and funding the Macon County Circuit Court lies with Macon County. Under Illinois law, it is responsible for the payment of expenses and judgments emanating from the workings of that court. The fact that some of the parties involved are state officials, as opposed to employees of Macon County, does not alter that fiscal responsibility. See Pucinski v. County of Cook, 737 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ill. 2000) (holding that, although “clerks of the circuit courts are nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch of state government and not employees of the counties, responsibility for maintaining the clerks’ offices belongs to the counties” and therefore are subject to the requirements of the Counties Code (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, because Macon County has a financial interest in the outcome of this action, it is a necessary 14 party. 14 Macon County insists that state principles of separation of powers prevent the counties from interfering with the operations of the judiciary and therefore prevent Macon County from being considered a joint employer with the State of Illinois with respect to judicial employees. We believe that there are three fundamental flaws with this argument. First, a State’s principles of internal organization cannot frustrate federal law. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, Illinois, 243 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 2001). Second, “[i]dentification of an ‘employer’ under Title VII is a question of federal law.” Id. at 382. Finally, “the source of funds” needed to satisfy a Title VII judgment “need not coincide with the identity of the employer.” Id. Consequently, regardless whether Macon County is Ms. Robinson’s sole employer or joint employer, it still may be responsible for payment of an adverse judgment. No. 02-3316 43 D. Claims Against Judge Shonkwiler Judge Shonkwiler maintains that, even if the claims with respect to Judge Sappington and Macon County are re- versed, he nevertheless is entitled to summary judgment because he was not personally involved in the harassment and because the claims against him simply mirror those against Judge Sappington. We agree. Ms. Robinson has sued Judge Sappington only in his of- ficial capacity. As noted previously, and as Ms. Robinson’s counsel conceded at oral argument, the purpose of naming both Judge Sappington and Judge Shonkwiler in their official capacities was to impose liability on their employer, the State of Illinois. The facts that form the basis for the claims against both Judges are the same: the harassment by Judge Sappington that went unremedied by Janice Shonkwiler, Judge Greanias and Judge Shonkwiler. Ms. Robinson does not point to any facts that support independent claims of discrimination against Judge Shonkwiler; nor does she maintain that naming Judge Shonkwiler, in addition to Judge Sappington, imputes liability to any other governmental entity or provides her with additional sources that might satisfy a judgment. Consequently, because the claims against Judge Shonkwiler seek to impose liability against the same defendant—the State of Illinois—as do the claims against Judge Sappington, because the claims are based on the same facts and because they do not provide any additional resources for settlement or satisfaction of Ms. Robinson’s claims, we believe that the claims against Judge Shonkwiler and Judge Sappington are redundant. Cf. Jungels v. Pierce, 825 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a claim brought against a mayor in his official capacity and against the city were brought against “one defendant . . . not two” and observing that “nothing was added by suing the mayor 44 No. 02-3316 in his official capacity”). We therefore affirm the judgment against Judge Shonkwiler in his official capacity on this basis. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that “a party may not maintain a suit against both an employer and its agent under Title VII”).