Opinion ID: 2049440
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: By the Prosecutor

Text: At the outset, it should be noted that Petitioner failed to cite a single case in his brief, other than Giglio and then only for general background purposes, for the proposition that the knowledge of the U.S. State Department should be imputed to the State's Attorney for Baltimore County or his assistant prosecutors. Instead, he argues rather baldly that the intermediate appellate court erred by concluding that the State Department's knowledge should not be imputed to the prosecutors in his case. Essential to the inquiry into whether a Brady violation has occurred is the determination of who has the obligation to disclose and of what that obligation consists. Williams, 392 Md. at 211, 896 A.2d at 982. It is well settled that under Brady and its progeny the prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, 508 (1995). This duty requires the prosecutor to make a reasonable inquiry of those in a position to have relevant knowledge. . . . Williams, 392 Md. at 226, 896 A.2d at 991. Failure to do so is appealable error. Id. The knowledge or possession of exculpatory or impeachment information is not limited to knowledge held directly by the prosecutor in the case, but has been extended to include information known by other prosecutors in the same office. In Giglio, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's office is a single entity and, accordingly, the knowledge of one prosecutor is imputed to the entire office. 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766, 31 L.Ed.2d at 109. See also Williams, 392 Md. at 211, 896 A.2d at 983 (holding that the disclosure obligation imposed by Brady does, in fact, apply to information possessed by other prosecutors in the same office.). The question we must decide is whether the Department of State's putative knowledge with respect to the elder Diallo's diplomatic status, other than as revealed in the Coffey certification, may be imputed fairly to the prosecutor in this case. Where two jurisdictions engage in joint investigations, courts generally hold that the prosecutor has constructive possession of any evidence possessed by the other party to the investigation. For example, in United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569-70 (5th Cir.1979), the federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit imputed the knowledge of state investigative agents to federal prosecutors. In that case, the Florida Department of Criminal Law Enforcement (FDCLE) paid for a witness's legal representation. Id. at 568. Upon learning of this fact after the trial, the federal prosecutor promptly informed the court. Id. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and FDCLE participated in a joint task force to investigate the crime for which Antone was convicted. Id. The court declined to impos[e] a rigid distinction between federal and state agencies. . . . Id. at 570. Instead, the court chose to adopt a case-by-case analysis of the extent of interaction and cooperation between the two governments. Id. Applying that analysis and observing that investigation was marked by [a] spirit of cooperation, the court held that based on the fact that the two governments, state and federal, pooled their investigative energies to a considerable extent, the state agents were part of the prosecutorial team. Id. at 569-70. Thus, the federal prosecutor had constructive knowledge of the agreement to pay the witness's legal fees. Id. at 570. United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298 (3d Cir.2006), is instructive also. In that case, a U.S. District Court concluded that the government's key witness in a federal prosecution expected leniency from state officials on unrelated state charges, in exchange for his testimony against Risha in a federal case and ordered a new trial. Id. at 299. The federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the trial court did not make proper factual findings and remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the prosecutor was in constructive possession of Brady material; the court offered guidance to the trial court in making the determination of the extent of cross-jurisdictional cooperation. Id. The appellate court adopted the case-by-case analysis of Antone and identified three factors to consider when determining questions of cross-jurisdiction constructive knowledge: (1) whether the party with knowledge of the information is acting on the government's behalf or is under its control; (2) the extent to which state and federal governments are part of a team, are participating in a joint investigation or are sharing -30-resources; and (3) whether the entity charged with constructive possession has ready access to the evidence. Id. at 304. In United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 285 (3d Cir.2008), the court applied the factors in Risha and held that the federal prosecutor did not have constructive possession of documents in the possession of the government of the nation of Colombia. In Reyeros, a man was arrested in Colombia for drug trafficking and conspiracy. Id. at 274, 280. The United States government sent to the Colombian government a request to interview the man using questions provided by the United States and to receive back a written summary of his answers. Id. at 280. The Colombian authorities complied with the request (in the presence of United States Custom officials), but also permitted the Customs investigators to interview the man. Id. The United States asked Colombia to extradite the witness, which he opposed. Id. He was extradited eventually to the United States. Id. When it became apparent that the witness would testify against Reyeros and several other defendants, defense counsel asked the trial court to compel the Government to obtain and produce any documents that the witness filed with the Colombian authorities to oppose extradition, under the theory that the prosecution constructively possessed any documents possessed by the Colombian authorities relating to [his] extradition because Colombia had cooperated with the United States officials to interview [him] and by acting upon the United States' request to extradite him. Id. The Government opposed the motion, but stated that it was attempting to obtain the information from the Colombian government. Id. The District Court denied the discovery request. Id. The appellate court, applying the case-by-case analysis urged in Antone and considering the Risha factors, held that the standards had not been met. Id. at 283. The court distinguished the facts in Reyeros from those of Antone : Unlike the state agents in Antone, Colombian authorities did not function as agents of the United States government. It is true that the Colombian government acted at the request of the prosecution in permitting the federal investigators to interview [the witness]; however, beyond the initial recitation of officially propounded questions, no Colombian officials participated in that interview or any other part of the investigation. Id. The Colombian officials acted on its own behalf in asking the questions, not as an agent of the United States. Id. The court decline[d] to adopt the defendants' suggestion that a determination of constructive possession is appropriate whenever a foreign government responds to a request from the United States for investigative or judicial assistance. Id. As to the second factor, whether the two governments were acting as a team and participated in a joint investigation, the court concluded that there was not a joint investigation between the United States and Colombian governments. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the fact that the two governments did not share their investigative resources. Id. As to the third and final factor, whether the prosecutor had ready access to the information, the court concluded that the prosecution did not have access to the documents in [the witness's] Colombian court file, aside from those documents it was able to obtain from [his] attorneys in Colombia. Id. at 284. The court observed that the ability to acquire the evidence is not the determinative factor. Id. The mere fact that documents may be obtainable is insufficient to establish constructive possession. Id. To establish constructive possession, the defendant must show that the requested evidence is in the possession of people engaged in the investigation or prosecution of the case. Id. As noted previously, the defendant did not satisfy that standard and the court held that the federal prosecutor did not have constructive possession of the documents. Id. at 285. See also Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir.2002) (adopting Antone's case-by-case analysis and holding that a Georgia prosecutor did not have constructive knowledge of evidence known to Tennessee agencies, notwithstanding the fact that a Tennessee investigator was a witness in the Georgia trial, because the two states shared neither resources nor labor, Tennessee investigators did not act as agents for Georgia investigators, and the Tennessee investigators were not under the supervision of Georgia officials); United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir.1999) (where there is no indication of a joint effort between state and federal governments, state's knowledge of impeachment evidence may not be imputed to federal prosecutor). Even where two federal departments participated in a joint investigation, the Third Circuit held that the knowledge of one sovereign could not be imputed to the other sovereign. In United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir.2005), the federal Department of Labor (DOL) participated in an investigation with federal prosecutors. Notwithstanding that fact, the court held that information known to employees of a certain bureau of the DOL could not be imputed to federal prosecutors because there was no indication that the prosecution and the bureau engaged in a joint investigation or shared resources, and because the prosecution did not have any control over the bureau officials who were collecting the information. Id. Other courts that have not applied expressly the Risha factors nonetheless reach generally the same conclusion that the level of involvement in the investigation of the party with actual knowledge or possession at issue will determine whether that knowledge will be imputed to the prosecutor. For example, in Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 885 N.E.2d 769, 782-83 (2008), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts imputed the knowledge of the FBI to Commonwealth prosecutors because the prosecution was the product of a joint investigation between the Commonwealth and the FBI. Nineteen FBI agents testified at the trial. Id. at 783. The court opined that in dual sovereign situations, where a `motion [for exculpatory evidence] is allowed. . . cooperation between State and Federal prosecutors is and should be common enough so that the burden of securing Federal cooperation should be placed on the State prosecutor rather than on the defendant.' Id. at 782 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Liebman, 379 Mass. 671, 400 N.E.2d 842, 844 (1980)). See also Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 185-86 (4th Cir.2005) (noting that although the prosecutor has a duty to learn of favorable evidence known to others acting on its behalf, a county prosecutor did not have duty to learn of cases in surrounding jurisdictions where its witness, allegedly a professional snitch, testified on behalf of or cooperated with the government). In the present case, Petitioner argues that the Department of State directed the State's investigation on Petitioner's claim of diplomatic pedigree. He contends that the intermediate appellate court's decision was in error for two reasons: first, he argues that the case law relied on by the intermediate appellate court is inapt because the State Department and the prosecutor did not participate in a joint investigation. [16] That very reason, which he urges requires reversal, indicates to us that the case law is relevant and requires affirmance of his convictions. The cases discussed supra do not all involve joint investigations. For example, in Reyeros, there was not a joint investigation between the United States and the Colombian government. The court found that fact particularly relevant in determining that the prosecutor in Reyeros did not have constructive knowledge of any information known only to Colombian officials. Second, he argues, somewhat inexplicably, that the State Department was actively involved because the prosecutor, according to the Petitioner,  elicited the Department of State of the United States Government, to conduct an `investigation' of its records for a certification only on the threshold immunity issue, and on that issue the Department of State was not only actively involved; rather the erroneous certification became the evidentiary axis around which the entire proceeding revolved. It is somewhat unclear to us what he means by this statement, but we understand him to mean that the State Department was an active member of the investigation, a contradiction of his previous argument. Whatever the intended meaning of this argument, we agree with Petitioner's first contention, that the State Department and the prosecutor did not participate in a joint investigation in this case. Although different courts may apply different tests to the same question, it is clear to us that the proper inquiry is to examine, on a case-by-case basis, the extent of interaction and cooperation between the two governments. Antone, 603 F.2d at 570. We find an application of the factors enunciated in Risha plumbs adequately the extent of interaction and investigative cooperation between two governments for the purposes of the issue before us. Applying those three factors to the record of the present case, we conclude that the prosecution did not have constructive knowledge or possession of any alleged latent knowledge of the State Department with regard to Petitioner's or his father's correct diplomatic status. The first Risha factor asks whether the party with knowledge of the information is acting on the government's `behalf' or is under its `control.' 445 F.3d at 304. Here, the party purported to have knowledge of the Diallos' diplomatic status, according to Petitioner, is the United States Department of State. [17] There is no allegation that the State Department was under the control of the Baltimore County State's Attorney office. We also conclude (readily) that the State Department was not acting on the behalf of the State of Maryland. The State Department, similar to the Colombian government in Reyeros, merely was responding to a request from the State when Coffey issued her certification. Coffey was acting on behalf of the State Department, not the State of Maryland. We decline to hold, as a general proposition, that because a prosecutor asks a federal agency or official for information, all of the latent knowledge of that federal department, agency, or official may be imputed to the State. The second Risha factor similarly does not support Petitioner's argument that we should impute the State Department's knowledge to the prosecutor in the present case. This factor, closely related to whether the other party is acting on behalf of the prosecutor, considers the extent to which state and federal governments are part of a `team,' are participating in a `joint investigation' or are sharing resources.. . . Risha, 445 F.3d at 304. Petitioner attempts to paint the prosecutor's request to the State Department for a certification of diplomatic status as the forming of a team between the prosecutor's office and the State Department. He argues that because the State Department actively counsels police to contact the Department when an arrestee asserts a claim of diplomatic privilege the State Department becomes part of the investigation. The State Department was not involved in this investigation. This was not a joint investigation. The State Department only undertook in the present case to issue the Coffey certification. To argue that that fact alone transforms the two entities into a team is extreme overreaching. Furthermore, there is no allegation that the State Department and the State of Maryland pooled labor or resources in any way during the State's investigation of Petitioner. Unlike Antone, the investigation here was not marked by a spirit of cooperation. 603 F.2d at 569. We hold that the prosecutor and the State Department were not part of a team that participated in a joint investigation or shared resources. The third Risha factor also directs our holding regarding this argument. The prosecutor did not have ready access to the evidence. The prosecutor asked the State Department for a certification of Petitioner's diplomatic status. The record in this case does not suggest that the State had the ability to inspect or access easily the State Department's records. Perhaps the State could have issued subpoenas for the information, but it appears that the State, at the time the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, labored under the belief, albeit wrong perhaps, that the Coffey certification was correct. Petitioner had an equal opportunity to subpoena the State Department, or anyone else it believed was in possession of exculpatory evidence, but he did not choose that course of action. He failed to show that any suppressed evidence was in the possession of people engaged in the investigation or prosecution of [his case]. Reyeros, 537 F.3d at 284. Although we do not conclude necessarily that the prosecutor had the ability to acquire the evidence, we agree with the Third Circuit that the ability to acquire evidence is not the determinative factor where there is no showing that the evidence was in the possession of people engaged in the prosecution or investigation of the case. Reyeros, 537 F.3d at 284. Ultimately, we conclude that Petitioner's right to due process was not violated under Brady and its progeny because there was no suppression of evidence by the State. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS DISMISSING THE APPEAL IN PART VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THAT COURT AFFIRMED OTHERWISE; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.