Opinion ID: 573067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Against Detective Furtado

Text: 11 Appellant bases her claim against Furtado upon her right to be free from an unreasonable body cavity search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on less than probable cause. Appellant's claim against Furtado necessarily turns on whether (1) appellant had a right to be free from manual body cavity searches under the circumstances of this case, and (2) whether a reasonable official in Furtado's position would have realized that the search violated appellant's rights, either because the search was unreasonable per se or the warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe appellant was hiding drugs in her vagina. 3
12 Appellant claims the search of her vagina as authorized by the warrant was unreasonable by its very nature. Appellant argues that the severity of the intrusion into her privacy and security interests far outweighed any rational governmental interest in conducting the search and that the search was, therefore, unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 13 In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of evidence obtained through a warrantless, non-consensual blood test of an alleged drunk driver. In so doing, the Court noted:[W]e reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 14 Id. at 772, 86 S.Ct. at 1836. 15 Nine years later, the Court refused to allow nonconsensual surgery to be performed on a criminal defendant in order to remove a bullet that would allegedly have been inculpatory. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). Compelled surgical intrusion into the body, wrote the Court, implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if it is likely to produce evidence of the crime. Id. at 759, 105 S.Ct. at 1616. Determining the reasonableness of the intrusion, the Court stated: 16 [D]epends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. In a given case, the question whether the community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate one admitting of few categorical answers. Id. at 760, 105 S.Ct. at 1616. 4 17 The Supreme Court has upheld visual body cavity searches of inmates, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and proffered the appropriateness of visual and manual cavity searches of border entrants, provided the proper level of suspicion attaches. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3310 n. 4, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (declining to rule what level of suspicion is required for body cavity searches at the border). 18 The First Circuit has expressed its revulsion for body cavity searches not supported by probable cause. See Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir.1985) (Body cavity searches are 'demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission,'  representing the greatest personal indignity. (citations omitted)); Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 173 (1st Cir.1986) (body cavity searches of female inmates involving touching, conducted in a non-hygienic atmosphere and in the presence of male officers, ruled a clear violation of the inmate's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches). 19 We have not, however, heretofore examined the issue of whether a body cavity search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. Other Circuits have visited the question, and upheld visual body cavity searches when supported by probable cause and conducted by police officers. See Salinas v. Breier, 695 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 835, 104 S.Ct. 119, 78 L.Ed.2d 118 (1983) (Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police officers with probable cause to believe that a controlled substance is hidden in a person's rectum or vagina, without first obtaining a warrant and without obtaining the services of a doctor under sanitary conditions, to require the person, without the use of force, to bend forward deeply at the waist so as to expose her rectum and vagina to visual inspection.); Security & Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82, et al v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 208 (2nd Cir.1984) (Visual body cavity searches of corrections officers may be conducted after first securing a search warrant based on probable cause). 20 The present case differs from these cases in that the search warrant here anticipated a physical rather than merely a visual inspection of appellant's vaginal cavity. Even though the warrant did not specify whether the search was to be limited to visual inspection or extend to physical examination, the requirement that the search be conducted by a physician at Morton Hospital anticipates a manual or physical probe. 21 The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767, 86 S.Ct. at 1834. Because the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the pivotal inquiry is whether this particular physical search of appellant's vagina was reasonable. The test for reasonableness is not subject to precise definition or mechanical application. Each individual case requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights the search imposes. Reviewing courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884; see, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977). 5 22 The invasion here was extreme, constituting a drastic and total intrusion of the personal privacy and security values shielded by the fourth amendment from unreasonable searches. Searches of this nature instinctively give us cause for concern as they implicate and threaten the highest degree of dignity that we are entrusted to protect. 23 On the other side of the balance, the need for the search was also great. Society's interest in the prevention and punishment of drug trafficking weighs in favor of intrusive searches in certain instances. In the present case, other, less intrusive means of investigation and prosecution may have been available. However, given the circumstances as a whole, the existence of other means of investigation and prosecution in this case does not render the vaginal search unreasonable. The need for this particular search may have been necessary to enable the police to discover whether appellant was trafficking in drugs which she kept hidden in her vagina, as specifically alleged in the affidavit for the warrant. 24 The warrant directed that the search be conducted by a physician at Morton Hospital. For hygienic and safety reasons, these precautions seem necessary when warrants authorizing manual body cavity searches are executed. At least where there are no exigent circumstances present, the severity of the personal intrusion manifested by these searches would indicate that they be conducted by a doctor in a private and hygienic setting and in a medically approved manner. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1836. 25 In consideration of the balancing factors enunciated in the Schmerber/ Winston/ Bell line of cases, we conclude that appellant did not have a clearly established constitutional right to be free from a manual body cavity search conducted by a licensed physician, in a private and hygienic setting and medically approved manner, pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause. The search was not unreasonable by its very nature within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
26 We turn next to appellee Furtado's defense of qualified immunity. In assessing the Supreme Court's rulings regarding qualified immunity in Harlow and Anderson, see note 3 supra, this court has established the applicable standard of qualified immunity for police officers conducting arrests pursuant to warrants. Officers performing arrests pursuant to warrants are not absolutely immunized by virtue of an intervening Magistrate's approval, but are entitled to a broad ranging qualified immunity:Applying the standard of official immunity enunciated in Harlow [see note 3 supra ], we hold that only where an officer is constitutionally negligent, that is, where the officer should have known that the facts recited in the affidavit did not constitute probable cause, will liability attach. Where the sufficiency of the facts fall into the grey area appropriate for judicial determination, submission of the affidavit to a magistrate will insulate the officer from liability. 27 Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 721 (1st Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). 28 In affirming our holding, the Supreme Court said: 29 The Harlow standard is specifically designed to avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment, and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal. Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized ... Only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable will the shield of immunity be lost. 30 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). 6 31 Under this analysis, it is not necessary for us to decide whether Furtado's warrant affidavit established probable cause. 7 Even if probable cause for the search of appellant's vagina were not established, and we do not so rule here, the application was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. See note 1, supra. Nor is it obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue. At the very least, officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, and the facts in the affidavit fall into the grey area appropriate for judicial determination. 8 A reasonable police officer could have concluded that there was probable cause to search appellant's vagina for concealed drugs. Accordingly, we rule that appellee Furtado was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity and AFFIRM the district court's granting of summary judgment as to him. 9 32