Opinion ID: 1202753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Point 5. Vagueness

Text: The basic element of the doctrine of vagueness is a requirement of fair notice. Laws should give the ordinary citizen fair notice of what is and what is not prohibited. People should not be required to guess whether a certain course of conduct is one which is apt to subject them to criminal or serious civil penalties. Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 290 (Alaska 1978); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974). VECO argues that the definition of group is so amorphous and uncertain as to be unconstitutionally vague. The Act provides that a group  a combination of two or more people acting jointly who take action, the major purpose of which is to influence the outcome of an election (AS 15.13.130(3))  which makes a contribution or expenditure must register and file periodic reports. In our view this definition imparts fair notice that the VECO plan is included, and is not unconstitutionally vague. VECO relies on the Circuit Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.1975), which held that the phrase for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 878. Buckley is an instructive case but it does not support VECO's position. The court of appeals struck down section 437a of the Federal Election Campaign Act because it found the phrase purpose of influencing the outcome of an election too broad. The court found that Congress intended that the language of 437a not be narrowed by use of the adjective major before purpose because Congress intended section 437a to be broader than another section of the Act which had been narrowed in prior cases by reading in the word major before purpose. Id. at 874. Since the Alaska statutory definition of group includes the major purpose requirement, the Buckley case supports the proposition that our statutory definition is not unconstitutionally vague.