Opinion ID: 168143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1999 and 2000 Box Elder Orders are Moot.

Text: 40 Reviewing de novo, see Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.2005), we agree with the District Court that USA-ALL's arguments relating to the 1999 and 2000 Box Elder Orders are moot. Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction. McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir.1996). Federal courts may adjudicate only actual controversies; as such a claim or appeal should be dismissed as moot when the controversy ceases to exist. United States v. Seminole Nation of Okla., 321 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir.2002). Because the BLM revoked the 1999 and 2000 orders, any controversy associated with these orders has been nullified. 41 Nevertheless, USA-ALL argues that its appeal falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine because the BLM's actions are capable of repetition, yet evading review. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982). This exception applies when: (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Disability Law Ctr., 428 F.3d at 996 (quotations and alterations omitted). There is no reasonable expectation that the BLM will re-issue the 1999 and 2000 Box Elder Orders because they have been superceded by the 2003 Box Elder Order. See Am. Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir.1997) (superceding agency opinion moots original opinion). Moreover, the 1999 and 2000 Box Elder Orders will not evade review because USA-ALL makes the same arguments with respect to those orders as it does with respect to the 2003 Box Elder Order, which this Court reviews in Part III.C-E. See id. (when superceding agency opinion is capable of review, exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply). Accordingly, the portion of this appeal relating to the 1999 and 2000 Box Elder Orders is dismissed as moot. 42 C. The BLM Complied with Procedures Mandated by FLPMA and its Action is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 43
44 USA-ALL contends that the 2003 Box Elder Order and the two Grand County restrictions must be nullified because they are de facto amendments to the Box Elder and Grand County RMPs that were issued without public notice and participation and without the BLM having first conducted an EA as required by FLPMA. We disagree. 45 Although there is some support outside this jurisdiction for an argument relating to de facto amendments, the cases of which this Court is aware have little—if any—bearing on the facts presented by this appeal. See, e.g., House v. U.S. Forest Serv., 974 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D.Ky.1997) (proposed timber sale approved on the basis of three policies that constituted significant changes to land use plan requires same public comment as land use plan itself); Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Forsgren, 252 F.Supp.2d 1088 (D.Or.2003) (narrower definition of lynx habitat which led to reduction in such habitat is significant change to land use plan and requires public comment and preparation of EIS). This Court is not aware of any authority indicating that a closure order promulgated pursuant to 43 C.F.R. §§ 8341.2 and 8364.1 constitutes a de facto amendment to an RMP, thus triggering compliance with FLPMA's public participation and EA requirements. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has specifically held that [n]othing in [§ 8364.1] or the authorizing statutory sections requires public hearings for temporary closures to vehicular use—thereby foreclosing any argument that temporary ORV closures are essentially RMP amendments. Humboldt County v. United States, 684 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir.1982). 46 Indeed, courts have consistently emphasized the distinction between the initial ORV-route-designation process reflected in an RMP—which is subject to public comment and requires the promulgation of an EA—and closures of those designated routes authorized under regulations promulgated pursuant to FLPMA, NEPA, and other statutes. For example, the Central District of California noted that: 47 The regulations took into account the amendments to E.O. 11,684 effected E.O. 11,989, 3 C.F.R. 120 (1978). See 43 C.F.R. s 8341.2. E.O. 11,989, among other things, amended E.O. 11,644 so as to require closure of ORV areas and trails whenever an agency finds that ORV use will cause or is causing considerable adverse effects. This closure standard is to be distinguished from the initial designation criteria set forth in E.O. 11,644 and mirrored in 43 C.F.R. § 8342.1. 48 Am. Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 543 F.Supp. 789, 796 n. 14 (C.D.Cal.1982) (emphasis added); see also Sierra Club, 756 F.2d at 690 (stating that 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2 creates a separate duty to close without regard to the designation process; it does not automatically become inoperative once the Secretary exercises his discretion to designate the land.); Am. Sand Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 268 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1255 (S.D.Cal.2003) (closure order under 43 C.F.R. §§ 8341.2 and 8364.1 done in accordance with FLPMA). 49 Moreover, this exemption of OHV travel restrictions from the resource management planning process reflects the realities of public land management and allows the BLM to timely comply with its statutory mandate to take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). Because the RMP revision process is much more time-consuming than enacting a temporary closure order, the BLM could not effectively respond to resource degradation only through the formal planning process. In this way, the BLM's exercise of its authority to address resource degradation—whether done pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 8342.1(a) or 43 C.F.R. § 8364.1—is not de facto planning. Rather, it is a lawful discharge of the BLM's duty, independent of the planning process, to prevent undue degradation of resources. 50 2. An Emergency Is Not Required Before the BLM May Close Lands to ORV Use, and Its Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 51 USA-ALL also argues that there was no substantial evidence supporting a finding of an emergency, which it contends is necessary before the BLM may place ORV restrictions on the public lands. This contention is completely without merit. The regulation authorizing the challenged orders does not use the word emergency, nor does it contain any language from which a requirement of an emergency could be inferred. See 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2; see also Am. Sand Ass'n, 268 F.Supp.2d at 1254 (holding that no emergency is necessary under FLPMA for the BLM to issue ORV closure orders). Rather, the BLM's authority under 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2 is tied to the existence of considerable adverse effects that are being caused by or will be caused by ORV use, and our review of the record convinces us that substantial evidence supports such a finding in this case. For this reason, we also disagree with USA-ALL's contention that the BLM's explanation as to why it issued the closure orders is implausible. D. NEPA 52 Next, USA-ALL appears to argue that because NEPA requires preparation of an EA prior to the promulgation of an RMP, see State of Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir.1998), NEPA similarly requires preparation of an EA prior to the amendment of an RMP. We have just held, however, that the closure orders at issue are not amendments. Accordingly, we reject this argument. 4 53 In addition, for the first time before this Court, USA-ALL maintains that NEPA compliance is necessary for the closure of public transportation routes, which it apparently understands Utah's wilderness areas to be. This issue, however, was not presented to the District Court; therefore, we do not consider it further. See Cummings, 393 F.3d at 1190. E. NDAA 54 The District Court properly dismissed USA-ALL's claims under the NDAA for lack of standing. A party must first have standing before its claim may be adjudicated on the merits. The standing inquiry requires us to consider both constitutional limits on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sweetwater County v. Geringer, 297 F.3d 1108, 1111 (10th Cir.2002). There is no dispute that USA-ALL meets the requirements of constitutional standing. 55 With respect to prudential standing, federal courts have long recognized that a plaintiff must satisfy the following prudential principles: (1) the plaintiff generally must assert his or her own legal rights; (2) the court must refrain from adjudicating generalized grievances most appropriately addressed by one of the other branches of government; and (3) the plaintiff's complaint must fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question. Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1450-51 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quotation omitted). The zone of interests test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision. Id. at 1452. The burden to establish prudential standing is on the plaintiff bringing the action. See id. at 1450. 56 In our view, USA-ALL has not demonstrated that its interest in using the public lands for ORV and other recreational activities fall within the zone of interests protected by the NDAA. Therefore, USA-ALL may not challenge the BLM's action as violating the NDAA. F. Factory Butte 57 Finally, we conclude that the District Court properly concluded that USA-ALL lacked standing to challenge BLM-issued signs encouraging, but not requiring, ORV users to stay on particular routes on land designated as open. According to USA-ALL, its members have refrained from traveling away from those particular routes because they fear that the BLM will retaliate by closing those areas if those members fail to comply with the BLM's request. The possibility of a mandatory closure, however, is far from imminent, and therefore USA-ALL has failed to allege an injury in fact for purposes of standing. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 821-22 (10th Cir.1999).