Opinion ID: 2182969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allstate's Motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: [¶ 17] Allstate made two motions for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(a) and (b) [10] on Saucier's claim that it knowingly misrepresented the extent of its coverage. The court denied both motions. Allstate argues that the court erred by allowing the issue to go before the jury and by not setting aside the jury's verdict that Allstate knowingly misrepresented pertinent facts relating to Saucier's coverage. [¶ 18] A motion for a judgment as a matter of law should not be granted if `any reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a verdict for the opposing party pursuant to the substantive law that is an essential element of the claim.' Lewis v. Knowlton, 1997 ME 12, ¶ 6, 688 A.2d 912, 913 (quoting Currier v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 680 A.2d 453, 455 (Me.1996)). Furthermore, we review the denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, to determine whether `by any reasonable view of the evidence, including the inferences to be drawn therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the verdict can be sustained.' Colvin v. A R Cable Services-ME, Inc., 1997 ME 163, ¶ 6, 697 A.2d 1289, 1290 (quoting Williams v. Inverness Corp., 664 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Me.1995)). We have recently stated with regard to M.R. Civ. P. 50(b), a party seeking a judgment as a matter of law after trial has the burden of establishing that the adverse jury verdict was `clearly and manifestly wrong.' Maine Energy Recovery Co. v. United Steel Structures, Inc., 1999 ME 31, ¶ 5, 724 A.2d 1248, 1250 (quoting Townsend v. Chute Chem. Co., 1997 ME 46, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d 199, 202). [¶ 19] Taken in the light most favorable to Saucier, the facts can and do support the jury's determination that Allstate, through its claim analyst, knowingly misrepresented its obligations pursuant to the terms of its policy. The jury could reasonably conclude that the claim analyst had been directed by Allstate to disregard its policy provisions and reduce claimant's damages by the full liability limit of the underinsured's policy, regardless of the amount paid to the claimant. [11] Although the claim analyst testified that she had been instructed by Allstate that case law, specifically Mullen, had somehow abrogated the terms of its policies regarding the measure of offsets, the jury could have rejected this as a credible explanation of Allstate's approach and instead concluded that Allstate was aware of its obligations pursuant to the terms of its policy, but was simply representing otherwise to Saucier. [¶ 20] Allstate argues that the claim analyst did not consciously misrepresent the terms of Saucier's policy because she was relying on directions from Allstate and its representatives. However, this reasoning would enable an insurer to avoid liability for misrepresentations as long as the spokesperson for the company was kept ignorant of the basis of the representations. This is clearly in contravention of the statute. Allstate is responsible for the actions of all its representatives, even when one is merely repeating what another has told her regarding Allstate's policy provisions. [¶ 21] Allstate also argues that because its representations were based on its interpretation of a question of law, the jury could not have found that it knowingly misrepresented the extent of its coverage. But, as noted above, the jury was not bound to accept Allstate's explanation of its representations. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the issue of knowing misrepresentation: Knowing misrepresentation means to be aware that you are misrepresenting something. In other words, you know the policy says one thing and means one thing but you tell the insured something else . . . . And in this case, also, the question isn't who is right or wrong or whether Allstate took a position that was different from Mr. Saucier's . . . . So this has to be a knowledgeable misrepresentation and awareness that there was a misrepresentation, not a dispute as to what something says. Having been correctly instructed on Allstate's obligations pursuant to its contract with Saucier, a jury could have found that it knowingly misrepresented the extent of its coverage, notwithstanding the fact that Allstate sought to justify its representations with case law. [¶ 22] Additionally, because the meaning of policy provisions is always a question of law, Allstate's argument would, in effect, preclude any insurer from being held accountable for its misrepresentations unless the very same policy provisions had been previously construed by this Court. Until that point, the insurer could argue that its policy provisions all involved unresolved questions of law. But see Seabury Hous. Assocs. v. Home Ins. Co., 695 F.Supp. 1244, 1248 (D.Me.1988) (after finding that contract governing coverage was ambiguous, court granted defendant insurer a summary judgment on claim that it failed to pay an undisputed portion of a claim when plaintiff argued that to be disputed, claim had to be disputed in good faith: because language was ambiguous, dispute could not be in bad faith). [¶ 23] Because Allstate has failed to demonstrate that no reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a jury verdict on Saucier's claim or that the jury's verdict is clearly and manifestly wrong, the trial court properly denied both its motions for a judgment as a matter of law.