Opinion ID: 2072845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: double jeopardy and due process

Text: Appellant contends that both the Double Jeopardy and Due Process provisions of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions are violated when the Commonwealth is permitted to try a defendant on two allegedly inconsistent charges for the same criminal acts. Appellant argues: Where findings of guilt on two separate offenses impliedly require mutually exclusive factual determinations, the rights of the accused to due process of law and to freedom from double jeopardy are violated. Here, in order to be guilty of HBV/DUI, the jury had to conclude that the Defendant caused a death because of an alcohol related impairment in his driving; in order to convict the Defendant of the companion charge of HBV, the jury had to conclude that the cause of death was any violation of the Motor Vehicle Code except alcohol related impaired driving. There is no justice where the Commonwealth can ask the jury to elect between two alternative causes of death. Accordingly, the Defendant should be granted a new trial, and the Commonwealth should be required to choose between a prosecution based on HBV/DUI or one based on HBV. (Appellant's Brief at 6) (emphasis added). Appellant's argument is severally flawed.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy has been held to consist of three separate guarantees: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pierce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Appellant's contention that he should not be tried for both homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle while under the influence implicates none of the above interests. Hence, his double jeopardy claim must fail in that respect. To the extent appellant also challenges retrial on the homicide by vehicle charge based upon alleged double jeopardy implications of being sentenced for both homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle while under the influence, his claim must also fail. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1931), the Supreme Court explained the scope of double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for separate offenses arising from the same transaction as follows: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. `A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.' Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182, 76 L.Ed. at 309. (Emphasis added). See also United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 105 S.Ct. 611, 83 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980). Thus, for two crimes arising from the same transaction to constitute the same offense, a comparison of their statutory elements must reveal that proof of one offense will necessarily prove the other. Illinois v. Vitale, supra . Appellant concedes that homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle while under the influence each contain an element which the other does not; hence, no double jeopardy interest is violated by imposition of separate sentences for both offenses arising from a single accident.
Appellant argues that it is unfair to make him defend against two mutually inconsistent theories of liability, i.e. Harry Kegg died as a direct result of appellant's intoxication, or Harry Kegg died as a direct result of appellant's reckless speeding. Appellant would have this Court require the Commonwealth elect before trial which theory of liability it intended to pursue. We cannot agree. Assuming for the moment that the elements of the offenses rendered the offenses mutually inconsistent, it certainly would not follow that due process would require the Commonwealth to elect to pursue one or the other theory before trial. If so, a defendant could escape conviction on one theory, by proving he was guilty under the other. Due process does not mandate such a result. Arguably, conviction of mutually inconsistent offenses would raise due process concerns after trial. While an inconsistency with regard to a conviction and a mutually inconsistent acquittal may be explained in terms of an unreviewable exercise of mercy or jury nullification powers, mutually inconsistent convictions could not be justified on such grounds. See Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 506 Pa. 461, 467, 485 A.2d 1098, 1099 (1984) (when crimes are mutually inconsistent only one sentence may be sustained); cf. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 379 Pa.Super. 589, 550 A.2d 807 (1988) ( en banc, discussing inconsistent verdicts). Nonetheless, we are faced with no such situation here. While homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle while under the influence each require proof of direct causation of the same death by different causes, the causes need not be mutually inconsistent. Succinctly, an effect may have more than one direct cause. See Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961). Multiple causes may all give rise to criminal liability so long as one does not supervene the other and each may properly be considered direct and substantial. Id., 170 A.2d at 313. Such causes may properly be characterized as substantial concurrent causes. Here, appellant was recklessly speeding and he was intoxicated. Reckless speeding forms the predicate for one conviction, intoxication forms the predicate for the other. While the theories of criminal liability may overlap with regard to the causal nexus between intoxication and the death of the victim, there is no mutual exclusivity upon which a due process claim may properly be raised. Hence, the due process aspect of appellant's first claim is without merit.