Opinion ID: 3046278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Market-Participant Exception

Text: The County next claims that it is immune from dormant Commerce Clause strictures under the market-participant exception. “[W]hen a state or local government enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints of the [dormant] Commerce Clause.” White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208, 103 S. Ct. 1042, 1044 (1983). “The limit of the marketparticipant doctrine must be that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further.” South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2245 (1984) (plurality opinion). We agree with the district court that the market-participant exception does not apply because the County does not provide stevedore services. See Fla. 70 Case: 11-10475 Date Filed: 12/28/2012 Page: 71 of 81 Transp. Serv., 757 F. Supp. 2d at 1281. A state or local government may take advantage of the market-participant exception only if the government is a proprietor of goods or services in the relevant market. For example, in Smith v. Department of Agriculture of the State of Georgia, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980),46 this Court considered a challenge to a Georgia regulation providing Georgia residents priority space assignments at a state-owned farmers market. We rejected Georgia’s argument that the market-participant exception saved this regulation because Georgia “neither produce[d] the goods to be sold at the market, nor engage[d] in the actual buying or selling of those goods.” Smith, 630 F.2d at 1083. Similarly, in South-Central Timber, a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected Alaska’s claim that it acted as a market participant by requiring the in-state processing of timber cut on Alaska lands. 467 U.S. at 98, 104 S. Ct. at 2246. In that case, the Supreme Court plurality concluded that Alaska was a regulator because, inter alia, Alaska did not actually participate in the timber-processing market. Id. Likewise, the County’s ordinance gives the Port Director the authority to grant or deny stevedore permits to private parties. These private parties may not 46 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981. 71 Case: 11-10475 Date Filed: 12/28/2012 Page: 72 of 81 provide stevedore services at the Port of Miami without a Port-issued permit. But neither the County nor the Port itself provides or purchases stevedore services. Rather, the County’s only relationship to the stevedore market is through permitting, which, as illustrated by the County’s permit ordinance, is intended to serve the County’s interests of safe and efficient port operations rather than any proprietary or commercial interest. See Miami-Dade County Code § 28A-6.4(c).