Opinion ID: 1657394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jurisdiction Based on Supplemental Motion to Discharge

Text: The next question to be considered, however, is whether the statute of limitations argument is properly before this court in this appeal. It is well established, as previously noted, that the overruling of Loyd's supplemental motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds was a final, appealable order. But while that suffices to establish appellate jurisdiction over that order, it does not confer jurisdiction on this court to consider Loyd's statute of limitations argument. [21,22] While the terms are closely related, there is an important distinction between a final judgment and a final order as that term is used in § 25-1902. A judgment is a court's final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties to an action as those rights and obligations presently exist. Custom Fabricators v. Lenarduzzi, 259 Neb. 453, 610 N.W.2d 391 (2000). An order entered by a court may affect a substantial right and be subject to review as a final order although it could not or need not be properly denominated a judgment. Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 150 Neb. 477, 35 N.W.2d 116 (1948). Cf. Akins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 428, 82 N.W.2d 632 (1957); Wunrath v. Peoples Furniture & Carpet Co., 98 Neb. 342, 152 N.W. 736 (1915). [23-25] A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 1995). But pursuant to this statute, an appellate court's jurisdiction is limited to the judgment or final order from which the appeal is taken. An appeal from a final order may raise, on appeal, every issue presented by the order that is the subject of the appeal. Tom-Wat, Inc. v. Fink, 741 N.E.2d 343 (Ind. 2001). Cf., Upah v. Ancona Bros. Co., 246 Neb. 608, 521 N.W.2d 906 (1994); In Matter of Estate of Ruediger, 83 Wis. 2d 109, 264 N.W.2d 604 (1978). But that jurisdiction does not extend to issues that are not presented by the final order, because an appellate court's jurisdiction to grant relief pursuant to § 25-1911 is limited to reversal, vacation, or modification of the final order from which the appeal is taken. In other words, while an appellate court can reverse, vacate, or modify a final order, it cannot address issues that do not bear on the correctness of the final order upon which its appellate jurisdiction is based. In the instant case, the final order at issue is the overruling of Loyd's supplemental motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. We have jurisdiction, pursuant to § 25-1911, to reverse, vacate, or modify that order. But whether or not the State's prosecution of Loyd is barred by the statute of limitations does not affect whether or not Loyd's supplemental motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds was properly overruled. Consequently, the statute of limitations question is not relevant to our analysis of the only final order we have jurisdiction to affect in the instant appeal. Loyd's timely appeal from a final, appealable order does not confer jurisdiction on this court to consider other issues that may be present in the case, but are not implicated by the final order on appeal. As Loyd's statute of limitations claim is outside the scope of our appellate review, we do not consider it.