Opinion ID: 460404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the rosangel within the customs waters of the

Text: 12 UNITED STATES? 13 The appellants contend that the telephonic relay of consent by the Honduran government does not constitute a treaty or other arrangement necessary to extend customs waters beyond twelve miles. We disagree. In enacting section 955a(c), Congress contemplated that the Coast Guard would seek permission from foreign governments to prosecute foreign nationals found on foreign vessels on the high seas. Obviously, Congress did not intend that the United States negotiate formal treaties with respect to each vessel; rather Congress contemplated the precise type of consent shown in the present case. 14
15 Much of our work already has been done. In United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (11th Cir.1985), we held that Congress intended section 955a(c) to have extra-territorial effect, and that the statute did not violate international law. Romero-Galue also noted that section 955a(c) was based on the Anti-Smuggling Act. 4 16 In Romero-Galue, the panel discussed the purpose of the Anti-Smuggling Act: 17 Congress first formulated the definition of customs waters when it passed the Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 19 U.S.C. Secs. 1701-1711 (1982), to reduce the smuggling of liquor into the United States in contravention of our revenue laws. Prior to the passage of the Anti-Smuggling Act, the government could only prosecute smugglers in vessels seized within the statutory twelve-mile customs waters area; smuggling vessels could hover beyond that twelve-mile limit with impunity. The United States did have liquor treaties with sixteen nations, which allowed it to seize a treaty nation's vessel and to enforce the anti-smuggling laws if the vessel was caught within one hour's sailing distance of the coast of the United States, but these treaties were not self-executing. Absent statutory authority, the United States lacked the power to apply its penal laws to a treaty nation's vessel located outside the twelve-mile limit, yet within one hour's sailing distance from the shore. 18 Id. at 1152-53 (footnote and citations omitted). Congress therefore defined the term customs waters to include the waters within such distance of the coast of the United States as identified by treaty or other arrangement with a foreign government as an area within which the laws of the United States may be enforced. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1709(c). In addition to setting forth a definition of customs waters that allowed the enforcement of this nation's anti-smuggling laws outward of twelve miles pursuant to a treaty, Congress created the concept of a customs enforcement area. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1701. A customs enforcement area could be declared for one hundred miles around a particular vessel hovering off the coast of the United States and suspected of smuggling. A vessel is hovering if from the history, conduct, character, or location of the vessel, it is reasonable to believe that such vessel is being used or may be used for smuggling. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1709(d). There is no requirement that the vessel be within a particular distance of the United States coast. 19 In Romero-Galue we held that Congress inserted the term arrangement in its definition of customs waters in the Anti-Smuggling Act to refer to arrangements setting forth a customs enforcement area. Id. at 1153. The arrangement extends customs waters to include those within the customs enforcement area. Accordingly, when Congress adopted the same definition of customs waters for the purposes of section 955a(c), it authorized enforcement beyond twelve miles both in waters designated by treaties and pursuant to arrangements concerning specific vessels. 5 20
21 Romero-Galue did not address what may constitute an arrangement to create customs waters around a particular vessel. 6 The appellants contend that a formal, written agreement is necessary. We do not agree. First, requiring a formal agreement would be contrary to the common understanding of the statutory language. Second, the realities of enforcing narcotics laws on the high seas and the limited scope of the consent lead us to conclude that no formal agreement is necessary, and that consent may be relayed by electronic communications such as radio or telephone. 22 The statute refers to a treaty or other arrangement. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(j) (emphasis added). If the United States were relying on a treaty in the current matter, obviously we would look for some sort of compact, formally signed and solemnly ratified. Black's Law Dictionary 1346 (5th ed. 1979). However, here the United States is relying on an arrangement. Appellants point to nothing in the statute or legislative history which indicates Congress did not intend the word to be given its ordinary meaning. Nor do we know of any special meaning of the term in the context of international law. An arrangement is simply a settlement or adjustment, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 120 (1976), and the term contemplates no particular form. 23 Requiring execution of a formal agreement would defeat the purpose of the statute, which is to allow enforcement against particular vessels found hovering off the coast. Obviously, a vessel laden with marijuana would not leisurely lay at anchor just beyond four leagues from our shore while United States diplomats journeyed to Honduras, or other appropriate nation, negotiated an agreement, and awaited the approval of the proper bodies within the party nations. It is doubtful that the pride of our diplomats would be offended by this court's observation that during the course of obtaining such an agreement, convoys of vessels could journey back and forth laden with contraband. Once an agreement was in force, the smugglers could simply obtain a different vessel. 7 24 Nor would a formal agreement serve any useful purpose. All that the law contemplates is that the foreign nation give express consent to the enforcement of United States laws with respect to the particular vessel. The consenting nation's rights under international law or treaty remain unchanged, as the consent applies only to the particular vessel involved. Consent is a simple notion; it can be granted or refused, and no formal agreement is necessary to understand either option. 25 Finally, in the legislative history Congress noted that [t]he time required to obtain prior consent to board 'mother ships' on the high seas has apparently been significantly reduced, indicating that it intended to take advantage of such consent. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979). The record in this case demonstrates that such an arrangement existed. Honduras specifically consented to the United States asserting jurisdiction over the ROSANGEL. 8 26 C. No Treaty is Necessary Before the United States Seeks to Make Arrangements Regarding Vessels 27 The appellants also argue that even if the consent of Honduras satisfies the statutory requirement for an arrangement, the statute only authorizes arrangements with treaty nations. Accordingly, they argue that because no treaty between Honduras and the United States authorizes arrangements, no arrangement existed within the meaning of section 955a(c). The appellants contend that Romero-Galue supports their position. 757 F.2d at 1154. 28 This contention also fails. First it runs contrary to the statutory language. The definition of customs waters refers to treaty or other arrangement. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(j) (emphasis added). The appellants' argument would amend the definition to read treaty or other arrangement executed pursuant to a treaty. We decline to rewrite the work of Congress. Appellants point to nothing in the statute or legislative history that indicates Congress contemplated that the United States would negotiate treaties before it began to seek arrangements regarding particular vessels. On the contrary, the legislative history refers to successful initiatives to reduce the time necessary to obtain consent to board ships. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979). If Congress did not intend to take advantage of these successful initiatives until treaties were negotiated, surely Congress would have mentioned the necessity to undertake such negotiations forthwith. Appellants advance no congressional purpose, and we can think of none that such a treaty requirement would serve; if the United States can achieve its goal of arrangements without a treaty, then why would Congress require one? Such a requirement would be directly contrary to the express statement of Congress that it intended to reach all acts of illicit trafficking. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979). 29 Nor is Romero-Galue supportive of the assertion. Romero-Galue involved a telephonic relay of consent, and nothing in the opinion indicates the alleged arrangement was authorized by a treaty. Indeed the Romero-Galue court remanded for a determination of whether a treaty or other arrangement existed. 757 F.2d at 1154 (emphasis added). Accordingly we hold that nothing in the Marijuana on the High Seas Act requires a treaty before the United States may seek an arrangement. 30