Opinion ID: 1498122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 24-301(j)

Text: Appellant's final argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the government had the burden of proving appellant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge to the jury was framed in accordance with the provisions of D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(j), which requires the accused to establish his defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. [63] Appellant argues that such a requirement violates the constitutional guarantees of both due process and equal protection. We disagree. A similar due process challenge recently was rejected by us in Shanahan v. United States, D.C.App., 354 A.2d 524 (1976). See United States v. Greene, 160 U.S.App. D.C. 21, 489 F.2d 1145 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 190 (1974); see also United States v. Naples, 192 F.Supp. 23, 39 (D.D.C.1961), rev'd on other grounds, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 307 F.2d 618 (1962). Nevertheless, because of the importance of the issue and the possibility that there may be some misunderstanding of the impact upon it of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), we supplement the views expressed in Shanahan. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for first-degree murder under an Oregon statute which required the accused to establish his insanity defense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In rejecting petitioner's due process challenge, the Court noted that while Oregon alone imposed such a high standard, 20 other states required that the accused establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. [64] It concluded ( id. at 799, 72 S.Ct. at 1007): We are . . . reluctant to interfere with Oregon's determination of its policy with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of insanity since we cannot say that policy violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice. We believe that the burden imposed by § 24-301(j) plainly falls within the holding of Leland, and conclude that that case is dispositive of appellant's due process claim. It has been suggested, however, that the subsequent cases of In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra , have cast doubt upon the present validity of the principles announced in Leland. In Winship, the Court invalidated a New York procedure which permitted a youth, charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, to be adjudicated a juvenile offender upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court declared (397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073): Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional statute of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In Mullaney (which was decided after oral argument in the instant case), the Court sustained a due process challenge to Maine's statutory requirement that an individual charged with murder must prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce the degree of the homicide to manslaughter. The Court observed that the consequences of conviction were significantly different depending upon the presence of such mitigating circumstances, and concluded that the principles of Winship could not be circumvented merely by the happenstance definition of the necessary elements of a particular offense. 421 U.S. at 697-99, 95 S Ct. 1881. In United States v. Greene, supra , the circuit court flatly rejected the argument that Winship had undermined the Court's previous recognition of local autonomy regarding the procedure for affirmative defenses. [65] The Greene court sustained the constitutional validity of § 24-301(j) on the grounds that criminal responsibility does not require proof of sanity, stating (160 U.S.App.D.C. at 31, 489 F.2d at 1155): [S]ince sanity is not one of the elements of felony murder but lack of sanity may be interposed as a defense, Congress may with propriety enunciate the standard of proof required of the party asserting this affirmative defense, i.e., proof by a preponderance of the evidence. That is the situation, at last unless and until Leland is overruled. [66] See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. at 705, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Phillips v. Hocker, 473 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 93, 95 S.Ct. 1916, 36 L.Ed.2d 401 (1973); People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976). We do not read Mullaney as requiring a different result. Cf. James v. United States, D.C.App., 350 A.2d 748 (1976). The critical distinction between the Maine rule which the Court found to be constitutionally objectionable and the instant statute is that while the former operated to create a functional presumption of the higher degree of mens rea, in the District of Columbia the issue of insanity is not to be considered by the trier until after it has concluded that the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the charged offense, including the requisite intent. [67] Thus what is at issue here is not the degree of culpability (and hence the severity of the possible punishment), but rather, given the government's satisfactory showing of a complete offense, whether the wrongdoer should be excused and the punishment set aside in favor of possible therapeutic confinement. Cf. Ashe v. Robinson, 146 U.S. App.D.C. 220, 222, 450 F.2d 681, 683 (1971). Moreover, the two situations are further distinguished by the fundamental difference between the concepts of mens rea and insanity, to which we have addressed ourselves above. Writing in concurrence in Mullaney, Mr. Justice Rehnquist found the principles of Leland consistent with the Winship rule, and further explained (421 U.S. at 705-06, 95 S.Ct. at 1893): Although as the state court's instructions in Leland recognized . . . evidence relevant to insanity as defined by state law may also be relevant to whether the required mens rea was present, the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime. For this reason, Oregon's placement of the burden of proof of insanity on Leland, unlike Maine's redefinition of homicide in the instant case, did not effect an unconstitutional shift in the State's traditional burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all necessary elements of the offense. We reiterate our conclusion in Shanahan v. United States, supra , that the burden imposed by § 24-301(j) does not offend the principles of due process. [68] Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). Appellant's equal protection claim also is without merit. The alleged infirmity arises from the fact that the statute fails to distinguish between federal and local offenses, and apparently conflicts with the rule adopted for federal tribunals in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895). As we have indicated, we have no doubt as to Congress' authority to displace the Davis standard. See note 68, supra. Appellant's reliance on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L. Ed.2d 467 (1972), is misplaced, as here the disputed provisions were applied in a District of Columbia tribunal to the local offense of murder. We perceive neither the constitutional significance of the asserted variance between federal and local law, nor any basis upon which appellant is able to assert the suggested constitutional defect. We find no violation of appellant's equal protection rights in the application of § 24-301(j).