Opinion ID: 1185641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: impoundment of the vehicle

Text: The rule in this state is that, following a lawful arrest, an officer, in the absence of an authorizing statute or ordinance, may order impoundment of a vehicle only for reasonable cause. See, e.g., State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Hardman, 17 Wn. App. 910, 567 P.2d 238 (1977); State v. Greenway, 15 Wn. App. 216, 547 P.2d 1231, review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1009 (1976); State v. Singleton, 9 Wn. App. 327, 511 P.2d 1396 (1973). Reasonable cause is to be determined by an examination and evaluation of all of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the arrest is made and the impoundment is ordered. See State v. Greenway, supra at 219. In my opinion, the defendant by his own lies and deception created a rather unusual, if not unique, situation for trooper McNett. After stopping defendant for a traffic violation, McNett asked him for his driver's license. Defendant stated he did not have his license as he had left it at home. In response to the trooper's request for some identification, he provided from his wallet a Quinault Indian Reservation employee's permit bearing the name Anthony Kimber and an Oregon temporary vehicle registration showing that name. By running a radio check on the name of Anthony Kimber, McNett discovered Kimber's description did not match that of defendant. In the passenger's compartment in the front seat area, McNett found an insurance claim application form bearing the name of Lynn Houser. Checking this name, the trooper found the description matched that of the defendant. He also discovered Houser's driver's license had been suspended. Defendant was first lawfully arrested for making an improper lane change. Later, as a result of the investigation, defendant was lawfully arrested for obstructing a public servant and driving while his license was suspended. The trooper then faced the question of what should be done with the car. Initially, Trooper McNett obtained from defendant the names of some people to whom he could release the vehicle. This procedure is consistent with the holdings in State v. Bales, 15 Wn. App. 834, 552 P.2d 688 (1976) and State v. Hardman, supra . It does not appear from the record that Anthony Kimber's name was among those proffered by the defendant. Nevertheless, McNett called several of these individuals and finally reached Timothy Moss who agreed to take charge of the car. Prior to the time when Moss arrived, McNett found the vehicle title and other information in the vehicle identifying the owner as Anthony Kimber. At this point he determined that, under the circumstances, releasing the car to anyone designated by defendant would be inadvisable and he ordered the car impounded. McNett testified that he believed the car should be held for a period of time to allow him to establish ownership. Although he had made a radio check to determine if the vehicle had been reported as stolen, the inquiry was based solely on the Oregon license plates and did not include a check of the vehicle identification number. As the trial judge observed, license plates obviously are easily switched. Defendant's sole contention in the trial court and before the Court of Appeals, and his principal contention here, was that the impoundment was not justified where there was available a local resident (Mr. Moss) who was willing to take possession of the vehicle from the officers. I agree that where the owner of a vehicle is taken into custody an effort should be made to release the vehicle to the owner's agent rather than impound it. Here, the defendant was neither the apparent owner of the car nor did he ever claim, at the scene, prior to impoundment, that he was a friend of the owner from whom he had borrowed the car. More significantly, here, the defendant misrepresented himself as the owner and provided identification from his wallet in an attempt to conceal his true identity. Under these circumstances, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with the trooper's decision not to turn the car over to Moss. I also agree and suggest the facts speak for themselves. As the prosecutor states in his brief: Imagine, if you will, explaining to the real Anthony Kimber that the State Patrol stopped his car, found it driven by Lynn Houser, who tried to claim he was Anthony Kimber, arrested Houser and then turned the car over to Houser's friend for safekeeping. In reaching its conclusion that impoundment was not based on any reasonable ground, the majority states that as a reasonable alternative, the police could have left the car parked and locked in its location on the public street. [6] The alternative which the majority now finds reasonable is based upon several assumptions which are not supported by the record. Specifically, the court assumes that the car was parked on a public street and that the defendant's arrest would involve only a temporary absence. [7] I agree with the majority that the community caretaking functions recognized in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976) would have to be expanded to apply in this case; however, the inquiry does not end there because reasonable cause must be determined on the factual circumstances of this case. State v. Greenway, supra at 219. As the court stated in Opperman: The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its own facts. Opperman, at 373, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509-10, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). This requires, of necessity, some fine line drawing and a judgmental decision based upon the facts presented. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra at 753 and State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 134, 559 P.2d 970 (1977). It is clear to me from reading the testimony of Trooper McNett and the oral opinion of the trial judge that impoundment was ordered in good faith to protect the car and its contents for the owner. Thus, there is no basis for any suspicion that it was a mere pretext for a general exploratory search of the car. Even counsel for defendant, in oral argument before this court, conceded that impoundment was not a pretext for an exploratory search of the car. Cf. State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 644-45, 374 P.2d 989 (1962); State v. Hardman, supra . Trooper McNett did what he reasonably could be expected to do in attempting to ascertain the ownership of the vehicle. His roadside inquiry left him unsatisfied. While I agree that Trooper McNett did not have probable cause to believe the vehicle to be stolen so as to justify impoundment on that ground, I believe he acted responsibly and in good faith in taking the step of impounding the vehicle for the limited purpose of ascertaining the true ownership and status of the vehicle. Although what I regard to be the care-taking function undertaken by the trooper in this case can be distinguished from the functions recognized in Opperman, such distinction is not critical. In my opinion the functions described in Opperman are not exclusive. Because of the unique factual situation created by the defendant's duplicity and the unquestioned good faith of the trooper, I agree with the trial judge and Division Two of the Court of Appeals that the impoundment here met the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness.