Opinion ID: 2276662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The settling defendant's right to contribution.

Text: Most jurisdictions bar the settling defendant from seeking contribution if it settles for more than its proportionate share of the damages. Berg, supra, Inc. v. AmClyde and River Don Castings, Ltd., 511 U.S. 202, 211 n. 13, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 148 (1994)). There is no dispositive case law in this jurisdiction, however, and the question remains an open one. Id. at 1254 & n. 17. Judge (later Justice) Rutledge, writing for the court in McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 234, 134 F.2d 659, 665 (1943), was of the opinion that [b]y settling with the injured person [a defendant] does not surrender his [or her] right of contribution[,] and the settlement should not give the other wrong-doer an advantage. Consequently he [or she] should recover from the latter the amount necessary to equalize the payments. Accord, Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 922 (D.C.1966) (permitting settling defendant to sue for contribution or indemnification); Taylor v. Tellez, 610 A.2d 252, 253-55 (D.C.1992) (same); but cf. Rose v. Associated Anesthesiologists, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 250, 501 F.2d 806, 810 (1974) (Leventhal, J.) (rejecting McKenna and stating that settling defendants cannot equitably insist on a continuing involvement in the litigation for the purpose of invoking contribution to lessen their payment when they have no exposure to an increase in payment if contribution should be sought from them). [4] An issue that finds distinguished jurists like Justice Rutledge and Judge Leventhal taking opposing positions is obviously a difficult one, and may warrant consideration by the en banc court. Pending such consideration, however, I believe that GWU has the better of the argument. Voluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor. Autera v. Robinson, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 218, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (1969); see also McDermott, supra, 511 U.S. at 211, 114 S.Ct. 1461. I agree with GWU's contention that a rule permitting the settling defendant to seek contribution would promote the policy favoring voluntary settlement. In the absence of a right to contribution, a defendant is likely to be reluctant to be the first to settle for fear that, if he does so, he will ultimately have to pay a disproportionate share (or, as in this case, the entirety) of the judgment. Moreover, once one defendant has settled with the plaintiff, the remaining defendants will have less incentive to negotiate, for they will know that they can expect a free ride (by virtue of their pro tanto credit) to the extent that the verdict does not exceed the amount paid by the settling defendant. Contrary to the court in Rose, 163 U.S.App.D.C. at 250, 501 F.2d at 810, I do not believe that a party in GWU's position should be denied contribution because it has no exposure to an increase in payment if contribution should be sought from [it]. GWU's argument on this point is persuasive, and I quote from it at some length: .... [A]ny settlement [by the settling defendant] for more than half of an eventual verdict will unjustly enrich the defendant who stubbornly went to trial and was found liable. Equity dictates that a settling defendant be permitted to sue for contribution in order to equalize the burden on all defendants. Significantly, such a suit would not disadvantage the non-settling defendant in any cognizable way. Under no circumstances would the non-settling defendant be required to pay any more than the amount for which he was adjudged fully liable at trial. In fact, as in this case, when the verdict it less than twice the amount of the settlement, an award of contribution would require the non-settling defendant to pay no more than half of any trial verdict. A defendant who has lost a[t] trial should have no cause to complain about this result. In sum, a regime that seeks to promote settlements is fundamentally flawed if it denies contribution to a settling defendant. Instead, under a well-designed system, every defendant should know that if he settles he will be protected against the risk of owing more than the settlement amount, and he can recover some of the settlement amount in contribution if his co-defendant insists on going to trial and loses (and if the verdict is less than twice the settlement). Such a regime would create a salutary incentive to settle, rather than the incentive to delay settlement that the Superior Court's rule engenders. (Emphasis in original.)