Opinion ID: 1295265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Purported Failure to Consider Jury Instruction Claims.

Text: Bao generally asserts that the district court erred in failing to consider claims relating to jury instructions which he raised in his original pro se motion for postconviction relief and which postconviction counsel had failed to pursue. Bao argues that the court should have reinstated and granted his motion for reconsideration in which he urged the court to consider the claims despite the fact that postconviction counsel had left the claims out of the operative second amended motion for postconviction relief. In the alternative, Bao argues that in light of counsel's purported deficient performance, this cause should be remanded to the postconviction court to consider the claims relating to jury instructions. We do not find Bao's arguments persuasive. In his original pro se postconviction motion, Bao made claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to secure jury instructions to the effect that Bao's intoxication could be considered in determining whether premeditation and the appropriate intent were present. After Bao filed his pro se motion, postconviction counsel was appointed and a second amended postconviction motion, which became the operative motion in this case, was filed on February 4, 2003. The second amended motion did not contain the claims relating to jury instructions, and the court therefore did not address the claims in its July 16 order denying postconviction relief. On July 25, Bao filed a pro se motion for reconsideration in which he argued, inter alia, that he was entitled to leave to amend his motion to again include the jury instruction claims. Bao asserted ineffective postconviction counsel as cause to excuse any procedural default in failing to preserve the claims. On October 16, the court dismissed the motion for reconsideration after counsel informed the court that the motion was withdrawn. On October 21, Bao filed a pro se Request to Reinstate Motion for Reconsideration Proceedings in which he asserted that counsel withdrew the motion without his consent. The court overruled the request on October 22. [10] We read Bao's arguments to be founded on an assertion that he was denied constitutionally mandated effective counsel. However, we have held that there is no constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in a postconviction action and therefore no claim for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. State v. Dandridge, 264 Neb. 707, 651 N.W.2d 567 (2002); State v. Becerra, 263 Neb. 753, 642 N.W.2d 143 (2002); State v. Hunt, 262 Neb. 648, 634 N.W.2d 475 (2001). Therefore, Bao's arguments with respect to consideration of the jury instructions claims depending on constitutional allegations of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel are without merit. [11] Bao's motion for reconsideration and his request to reinstate the motion for reconsideration after it had been withdrawn were in part requests to amend his motion for postconviction relief to include the jury instruction claims. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-852 (Reissue 1995), The court may, either before or after judgment, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, permit a party upon motion to amend any pleading, process, or proceeding by . . . inserting other allegations material to the case. . . . See, also, State v. Nesbitt, 264 Neb. 612, 650 N.W.2d 766 (2002); State v. Silvers, 260 Neb. 831, 620 N.W.2d 73 (2000). The decision to grant or deny an amendment to a pleading rests in the discretion of the court. See id. We note that § 25-852 was repealed effective January 1, 2003, and its counterpart is now found in the rules of pleading, Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 15 (rev. 2003). However, Nebraska's new rules of pleading apply to civil actions filed on or after January 1, 2003. Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 1 (rev. 2003). See Kubik v. Kubik, 268 Neb. 337, 683 N.W.2d 330 (2004). Because the petition in this case was filed prior to January 1, 2003, we continue to refer to § 25-852. The operative second amended motion for postconviction relief, which did not contain the jury instruction claims, was a verified motion signed by Bao. This fact compromises Bao's argument that postconviction counsel's purported failure to include the jury instruction claims was without Bao's permission or awareness. We further note that the jury in Bao's trial was given an intoxication instruction which stated, inter alia, You may consider evidence of alcohol use along with all the other evidence in deciding whether Linh Bao had the required intent. Considering these facts, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bao's requests to analyze the jury instruction claims after the court had ruled on the second amended motion. We therefore reject Bao's assignments of error relating to the purported failure to consider such claims.