Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of Evidence of Ciavarella’s and

Text: Conahan’s Conflicts of Interest Ciavarella argues that the District Court erred under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) by admitting evidence that demonstrated that he and Conahan failed to disqualify themselves in certain lawsuits over which they presided. Ciavarella argues that this evidence was not relevant, failed to assist the jury in understanding whether the payments were bribes or part of a scheme to defraud, and that even if relevant, was unfairly prejudicial.12 Even if we assume Ciavarella is correct that Rule 404(b) applies in this instance because extrinsic offense evidence is at issue,13 we find no abuse of discretion. 12 We review the District Court‟s admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion, and “the district court has significant leeway in reaching its decision.” United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994). 13 The Government maintains that the District Court correctly ruled that the evidence is “intrinsic evidence of 36 The Government sought to introduce evidence under Rule 404(b) that Ciavarella and Conahan failed to disqualify themselves or disclose their conflicts of interest in cases over which they presided involving Mericle, Powell, PACC, and WPACC as litigants. The American Bar Association‟s Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires all judges to either disqualify themselves from or disclose their interest in proceedings in which their impartiality may be questioned due to their economic interest in the subject matter in controversy. Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11 (2011). “Almost every State . . . has adopted the American Bar Association‟s objective standard . . . .” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 888 (2009).14 Ciavarella testified that though he knew of the affirmative duty to disqualify himself in certain cases, he failed to do so. Multiple attorneys that represented opposing parties in cases Ciavarella‟s guilt on the honest services fraud counts.” Gov‟t Br. at 47. “Rule 404(b) does not extend to evidence of acts which are „intrinsic‟ to the charged offense.” United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 Pennsylvania has adopted a similar rule for disqualification. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1)(c) (“Judges should disqualify themselves in a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where[] they know that they . . . have a substantial financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding . . . .”). 37 before Ciavarella against Powell or companies owned by Mericle testified about the judges‟ failure to disqualify themselves or disclose their financial relationships. When the relationships were specifically inquired about, Ciavarella downplayed them or responded angrily. In each case, there had been rulings squarely in favor of Mericle, Powell, and the juvenile detention centers. Witnesses testified that had the opposing counsels known about Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s relationships, it would have affected the counsels‟ handling of their cases. As is relevant to Ciavarella‟s argument on appeal, extrinsic evidence of other bad acts is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) if three requirements are met. First, the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, the evidence must be relevant under Rule 402; and third, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).15 Proper purposes for the evidence include “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion, which emphasizes the admissibility of other crimes evidence.” Gov’t of V.I. v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1990). 15 As a fourth requirement under Rule 404(b), evidence must also “be accompanied by a limiting instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the jury may consider it.” Cross, 308 F.3d at 320-21. 38 To determine the relevance of the Rule 404(b) nondisclosure evidence, we must consider whether it would aid in the proof of a “fact . . . of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(b). For the Government to prove honest services mail fraud, it must demonstrate, among other things, that there was a scheme to defraud, which includes any course of action to deprive another of money, property, or the intangible right to honest services through fraudulent representations reasonably calculated to deceive a person of “ordinary prudence.” United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; see also United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 325 (3d. Cir. 2010) (setting forth the elements of honest services mail fraud). Fraudulent representations include the concealment of material facts and a failure to disclose information when the defendant is under a known legal duty to disclose. Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions 6.18.1341-1 (2012); see also Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 1998). Here, the nondisclosure evidence serves a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and is relevant to proving that the payments furthered the scheme to defraud through Ciavarella‟s failure to disclose his financial relationships in cases he presided over when there was an affirmative duty to do so and by assisting Mericle and Powell with favorable rulings during trial. However, Ciavarella argues that the Rule 404(b) evidence could only be relevant to support a conflict-ofinterest theory of honest services fraud, which is no longer viable after Skilling v. United States. In Skilling, the Supreme Court held that for the honest services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, to survive constitutional scrutiny, it may only be interpreted to criminalize fraud based on bribes and kickbacks 39 and not based on a failure to disclose a conflict of interest. 130 S. Ct. at 2931-33. The bribery-and-kickback theory of honest services fraud requires “a quid pro quo, that is, a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.” United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, while the evidence of nondisclosure by itself may not constitute honest services fraud based on a conflict-of-interest theory under Skilling, we believe that where there is also evidence of bribery or kickbacks, as there was before the District Court, then the evidence may be relevant to proof of a scheme to defraud under a bribery-andkickback theory of honest services fraud. Furthermore, the District Court had instructed the jury that the Government was required to prove that the scheme to defraud must be conducted through the use of bribes and kickbacks and that a government official could breach his or her duty of honest services through the use of bribes and kickbacks. Finally, Ciavarella maintains that even if the evidence is relevant, it still should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial because it touched on the impermissible conflictof-interest theory of honest services fraud. However, there is no indication that the Government used the Rule 404(b) evidence to demonstrate a conflict of interest, and the District Court clearly instructed the jury as to the limited purpose for which it could use the evidence and that the honest services charges required proof of a bribe or kickback. Thus, contrary to Ciavarella‟s contention otherwise, the District Court was within its “significant leeway,” Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272, in admitting the Rule 404(b) nondisclosure evidence, and there was no abuse of discretion. 40