Opinion ID: 2760778
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Z.D.F.’s Limitations2

Text: Ms. Brown also contends the ALJ incorrectly analyzed Z.D.F.’s limitations in concluding that he did not meet a listing. Here again, we agree. At step three, an ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s impairments meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). 2 Ms. Brown labels her second argument as one challenging the ALJ’s decision as not supported by substantial evidence. The substance of her brief, however, contends that the ALJ incorrectly analyzed Z.D.F.’s limitations. -6- To functionally equal a listing, an impairment must result in marked limitations in two, or extreme limitations in one, of the following six domains: (i) acquiring and using information; (ii) attending and completing tasks; (iii) interacting and relating with others; (iv) moving about and manipulating objects; (v) caring for oneself; and (vi) health and physical well-being. Id. § 416.926a(a), (b)(1), (d). The ALJ concluded that Z.D.F. did not meet a listing because he had no marked or extreme limitations in any of the six domains. But the ALJ cited no evidence in reaching his conclusion for the first two domains, and he discussed only minimal evidence in reaching his conclusion for the last four domains. For the first domain, the ALJ simply stated, “The claimant has less than marked limitation in acquiring and using information.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 25. Similarly, for the second domain, the ALJ stated, “The claimant has less than marked limitation in attending and completing tasks.” Id. at 26. We need not recite the ALJ’s brief explanations for the remaining domains because his summary conclusions for the first two inhibit our review and require reversal. “The failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed is grounds for reversal.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). An ALJ, in deciding whether a claimant has marked or extreme limitations within each of the six domains, must consider the claimant’s “functional limitations resulting from all . . . impairments, -7- including their interactive and cumulative effects.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(1)(i). But we have no way of knowing whether the ALJ properly considered Z.D.F.’s limitations because the ALJ discussed none of the evidence in reaching his conclusion for the first two domains. “Such a bare conclusion is beyond meaningful judicial review.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). The government urges us to overlook the error, asserting that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Whether or not that is true, however, tells us nothing about whether the ALJ applied the proper legal analysis in concluding that Z.D.F. did not meet a listing. And if the ALJ did not employ the proper legal analysis, we cannot determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See id. (“In the absence of ALJ findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence, we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the ALJ’s conclusion that appellant’s impairments did not meet or equal any Listed Impairment, and whether he applied the correct legal standards to arrive at that conclusion.”). Accordingly, on remand the ALJ must evaluate the evidence of Z.D.F.’s limitations and make specific findings why those limitations do or do not satisfy the requisite levels of severity in each domain for purposes of satisfying the functional equivalence of a listing. -8-