Opinion ID: 1297634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jury selection/guilt phase

Text: In his first assignment of error, the only issue in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial not treated as a preservation issue, the defendant contends that the State exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude three minority jurors on the basis of race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude a juror solely on account of his or her race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d at 83. The Supreme Court established a three-part test to determine if a prosecutor has impermissibly excluded a juror based on race. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88; State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 15, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991). If the defendant succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for each challenged strike. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88; State v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18, 31, 431 S.E.2d 755, 763 (1993). Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 405 (1991). In the case sub judice, the prosecutor, at the trial court's request, offered race-neutral explanations for each peremptory challenge to which the defendant objected. Because the purpose of the prima facie case is to shift the burden of going forward to the State, the State's offer of race-neutral explanations renders it unnecessary to address whether the defendant met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. We proceed, therefore, as if the prima facie case had been established and turn our attention to the State's reasons for peremptorily challenging prospective jurors Segers, Hairston and Clavijo. With regard to prospective juror Segers, the prosecutor provided the following explanation: Judge, we felt that Ms. Segers in her response to the death penalty questions, she stated that the death penalty was simply an option and that [we] felt that she was not absolutely unequivocal on her ability to impose the death penalty. That she leaned her body language that she was leaning away from the entire jury selection process.... [H]er body language was the worst of any of the jurors as she was leaning away trying to get as far away from the table as possible. Then she had no responses to the group questions when we would ask questions of the group. That she would just remain silent and not participate in the selection. With regard to prospective juror Hairston, the prosecutor explained: Your Honor, we noted that on Ms. Hairston's juror questionnaire that she was ... a nurse. That ... we did not want those folks with an absolute nurturing type of personality. We also note that she didn't understand on literally every question that we asked that all other eleven jurors answered almost immediately [and] she was evasive in her answers. She had difficulty following the questions and that she repeatedly asked me to repeat the questions. That at the first time that I talked about whether one could sign their name on the death penalty verdict, she looked shocked.... That when we tried to explain things to her, she looked puzzled and she couldn't apparently understand when I talked about some of the issues that some of the other jurors were able to grasp. Finally, with regard to prospective juror Clavijo, the prosecutor explained: Judge, we felt that sheon her questionnaire she put that she had only been employed for four months and that she had only lived in this county for four months. That she was single. That she had not voted in an election since 1989. We felt that she didn't have a sufficient stake in the community to warrant for the State sitting on a death penalty case. In order to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecution must articulate legitimate reasons which are clear, reasonable and related to the particular case to be tried. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 254, 368 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110, 109 S.Ct. 3165, 104 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1989). The prosecutor's explanation need not, however, rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. Furthermore, if not racially motivated, the prosecutor may exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of legitimate hunches and past experience. Robinson, 330 N.C. at 17, 409 S.E.2d at 297. The prosecutor stated that prospective juror Segers failed to respond to his questions and that he believed that she was not unequivocal in her ability to impose the death penalty. The prosecutor stated that prospective juror Hairston seemed puzzled and had difficulty understanding his questions and the issues of the case. Moreover, prospective juror Hairston did not fit the prosecutor's profile of the type of juror he wanted on the jury. The prosecutor stated that prospective juror Clavijo was excused due to her lack of roots in the community, coupled with her marital status and short employment history. Although none of these reasons would justify an excusal for cause, each reason is clear, reasonably specific and related to the particular case to be tried. The prosecutor is not required to provide an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839 (1995). At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866-67, 114 L.Ed.2d at 406. The defendant argues that discriminatory intent is shown by the fact that the State accepted some white jurors with the same or similar backgrounds to minority jurors who were excluded. For example, the defendant argues that the State accepted three jurors who were nurses yet excused prospective juror Hairston presumably because she was a nurse. Although it is proper for the trial court to consider whether similarly situated white veniremen are accepted as jurors, the defendant in this case takes a single factor among several articulated by the prosecutor and attempts to match it to a passed juror exhibiting the same factor. This approach fails to address the factors as a totality which when considered together provide an image of a juror considered ... undesirable by the State. State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 501, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1990). When considered in this light, we believe that the State has met its burden of coming forward with neutral, nonracial explanations for each peremptory challenge. Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court's finding was deficient because it failed to determine whether the defendant had proven purposeful discrimination, the third step in a Batson challenge. We disagree. Following the prosecutor's explanations, the trial court made the following finding: Well, the Court will find that based on the questions asked and the jurors interviewed, the defendant has failed to establish a prima facie pattern of discriminatory use of challenges on behalf of the district attorney but out of an abundance of caution the Court has asked the district attorney to articulate reasons and the district attorney has articulated valid reasonable and satisfactory reasons for his use of challenges which are totally aside from race and the Court will deny the challenge under Batson. The trial court clearly found that the defendant failed to establish a Batson claim and specifically denied the defendant's challenge. Common sense, therefore, dictates that the trial court determined that the defendant failed in his effort to show purposeful discrimination, even without specifically stating so for the record. This assignment of error is therefore overruled.