Opinion ID: 2389689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING UNDER M.R.EVID. 804(b)(3)

Text: At trial, the defendant sought to introduce testimony of his girlfriend and his mother that Frank Cook had made an out-of-court statement admitting that Cook and Wesley Wentworth were involved in the robbery and the assault of the victim in the parking lot of a Portland convenience store and that Priest was not involved. Although Cook was known to the defendant and an attempt was made to subpoena Cook, no request for a continuance was made in order that Cook be located and subpoenaed to testify. Our review of a trial court's ruling under M.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) is for abuse of discretion. See State v. Barden, 432 A.2d 404, 408 (Me.1981). State v. Holt, 391 A.2d 822, 825 (Me.1978). Specifically, Priest argues that Cook's out-of-court statement was admissible hearsay under M.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) which provides in part that: (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by him against another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. M.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). In State v. Smith, 415 A.2d 553, 559 (Me.1980), we noted that the three requirements for admissibility under Rule 804(b)(3) are: 1. the declarant must be unavailable as a witness; 2. the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made a statement unless he believed it to be true; 3. the statement must be corroborated by circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness. Although there is evidence in the record to support the finding that the first two requirements are met, the trustworthiness of the evidence is in question. Priest argues that the proffered statement was corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness. The four factors supporting trustworthiness in this context are: (1) the time of the declaration and the party to whom it was made; (2) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case; (3) whether the declaration is inherently inconsistent with the accused's guilt; and (4) whether at the time of the incriminating statement the declarant had any probable motive to falsify. See Smith, 415 A.2d at 560. Priest argues that the proffered testimony is supported by other evidence, and indeed, there is other evidence corroborating the proffered testimony. The corroborative evidence, however, was not presented until after Priest's offer of proof. The trial court did not have the benefit of that testimony at the time it sustained the State's objection to the testimony. We discern no error in the court's exclusion of that evidence.