Opinion ID: 1172674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: recording of appellant's custodial statements and rcw 9.73.090

Text: (7) Whether Appellant's statements to Palm Springs, California police, which were recorded without his knowledge as permitted by California law, violated Washington's Privacy Act, RCW 9.73 et seq., and thus were inadmissible in Washington courts. Appellant claims his recorded statements should have been suppressed because they violated either or both RCW 9.73.030 and .090(1)(b)(i) and because the Palm Springs, California police officers were agents of the King County Police Department. Washington's Privacy Act, RCW 9.73 et seq., is designed primarily to protect private persons from public dissemination of illegally obtained information. [134] This Court has concluded that RCW 9.73.090 is specifically aimed at the specialized activity of police taking recorded statements from arrested persons, as distinguished from the general public. [135] In State v. Rupe, this Court again confirmed that RCW 9.73.090, unlike RCW 9.73.030, applies specifically to individuals who have been arrested. [136] Appellant made his statements to Palm Springs police officers after his arrest. Thus RCW 9.73.090, and not RCW 9.73.030, initially would be applicable in this case. [137] RCW 9.73.090(1) provides in pertinent part: (1) The provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 shall not apply to police, fire, emergency medical service, emergency communication center, and poison center personnel in the following instances: . . . (b) Video and/or sound recordings may be made of arrested persons by police officers responsible for making arrests or holding persons in custody before their first appearance in court. Such video and/or sound recordings shall conform strictly to the following: (i) The arrested person shall be informed that such recording is being made and the statement so informing him shall be included in the recording; (ii) The recording shall commence with an indication of the time of the beginning thereof and terminate with an indication of the time thereof; (iii) At the commencement of the recording the arrested person shall be fully informed of his constitutional rights, and such statements informing him shall be included in the recording; (iv) The recordings shall only be used for valid police or court activities. The Palm Springs police officers recorded Appellant's statements. This is standard practice for Palm Springs police in serious felony cases. [138] But they did not inform Appellant of the recording. It is not disputed that they could record Appellant's statements without his consent under California law. [139] But if this were done in Washington, it most probably would be in violation of RCW 9.73.090(1)(b). Our concern then becomes whether evidence lawfully obtained by police authorities in California should be suppressed in a criminal case in Washington State if similar action by Washington authorities would be in violation of Washington law. Appellant claims State v. Gwinner, [140] State v. Mollica [141] and State v. Johnson [142] support the argument that his recorded statements to California police should have been suppressed. Those cases addressed a question similar to this one, that is, whether evidence lawfully obtained by federal agents under federal law is admissible in Washington criminal proceedings when similar action by state authorities would violate the Washington Constitution. Those cases are at least pertinent to the issue in this case. In Gwinner, the Court of Appeals, Division One, adopted the principle that evidence independently obtained by federal officers in compliance with federal law, but in violation of state constitutional guarantees, is admissible in Washington state criminal proceedings. [143] In that case a Washington detective telephoned a federal officer with information on the defendant, who was suspected of carrying drugs. Federal officers arrested the defendant as he was walking to his automobile. They also conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle, permissible under federal law but impermissible under Washington Constitution article I, ง 7. The search yielded cocaine, the evidence defendant sought to suppress. In determining the evidence was admissible, the court in Gwinner looked to State v. Mollica, [144] a New Jersey case which addressed the same question. The court in Mollica traced the history of the silver platter doctrine, which developed when federal standards for searches and seizures were more protective than many state standards. [145] Because of the different standards, federal courts adopted the principle that any evidence independently obtained by state officials could be given to federal officials on a silver platter. [146] The court concluded that under federalism principles, state constitutions do not dictate federal action, [147] and no legitimate state interests would be furthered by forbidding transfer of criminal evidence from federal to state authorities when the evidence was lawfully obtained by the former. [148] Employing the silver platter doctrine, the court thus determined such evidence need not be suppressed if the federal officers acted without the assistance or cooperation of the state officers. [149] The key element of the silver platter doctrine requires that the officers of the federal jurisdiction not act as agents of the forum state jurisdiction nor under color of state law. [150] To determine whether the federal authorities are acting in such a manner, the courts consider, among other things: [A]ntecedent mutual planning, joint operations, cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance between federal and state officers may sufficiently establish agency and serve to bring the conduct of the federal agents under the color of state law. On the other hand, mere contact, awareness of ongoing investigations or the exchange of information may not transmute the relationship into one of agency. [151] The court in Gwinner found the contact between the Washington detective and the federal agents to be a mere transfer of information by telephone. [152] There was no evidence that the detective requested the federal officers to search the defendant's car or that the detective knew beforehand they would do it. The court held no agency relationship existed between the federal officers and the state. Thus the conduct of the federal officers was not under color of state law and the evidence was not suppressed. In Johnson, the Court of Appeals, Division Two, reached a different conclusion than Gwinner on the same question because the federal authorities did not independently obtain the evidence at issue. In Johnson, state and federal officers worked together in investigating and arresting the defendants, a Washington couple. The court found numerous contacts between the state and federal authorities: (1) a Washington detective went with federal officers to investigate the defendants' property; (2) the detective helped federal officers verify information; (3) state authorities took pictures of the defendants' property at the request of federal authorities and gave the photographs to them; (4) both state and federal authorities executed the warrant to search defendants' property; (5) evidence seized from the defendants' property was turned over to the state; and (6) the husband was turned over to the state of Washington after his arrest. The court concluded the federal authorities acted with the cooperation and assistance of state authorities and this conduct triggered state constitutional protection. [153] The reasoning of Gwinner, Mollica and Johnson leads to the preliminary conclusion that whether Appellant's recorded confessions should be suppressed depends upon the answer to the question whether the Palm Springs police were agents of this state, as defined under those cases, or whether the Palm Springs police merely acted with the cooperation and assistance of King County police, as interpreted in Johnson. The Palm Springs police arrested Appellant and questioned him concerning events surrounding the injuries to Ms. Susan J. Schnell in California. During the initial interview, Appellant asked the officers to tell the King County police to come and talk with him. He articulately and unhesitatingly described in great detail the events surrounding Ms. Holly C. Washa's death and told them her body would be found in the trunk of a 1985 Oldsmobile parked in space 266 at the Budget Parking lot next to Shumsky's Restaurant near the Seattle-Tacoma Airport. After the interview, the officers contacted the King County Police and told them about the information Appellant had given. After locating the 1985 Oldsmobile as Appellant directed and finding Ms. Washa's body in the trunk, the King County police contacted the Palm Springs Police Department and asked them to get a statement from Appellant. The Palm Springs police told Appellant about the King County police request and asked if he was willing to give a statement. Appellant explained what he would say and then told them Okay, you can let them know that I'm willing to cooperate up there.... [154] The State correctly points out that the facts here are more similar to Gwinner than to Johnson. In Gwinner, the Washington state detective merely contacted the federal officers with information about the defendant. The detective did not ask them to search the defendant's automobile and did not know beforehand they would conduct the search. In this case, the State simply telephoned Palm Springs police and asked them to get a statement from Appellant. The King County police did not tell the Palm Springs police what to ask or how to conduct the interview. Nor did they know the Palm Springs police would record Appellant's statements. Appellant contends the Palm Springs police were cooperating and assisting King County police by questioning him about the Washington incidents. But the pertinent question is whether King County police cooperated with and helped Palm Springs police so extensively that the latter did not independently obtain Appellant's statements. When compared to Johnson, the facts here do not support a conclusion that King County police were cooperating [with] and assisting the Palm Springs police. The King County police merely telephoned Palm Springs police and asked them to question Appellant. Unlike in Johnson, in this case there was no collaborative effort between the two police departments in obtaining statements from Appellant. Appellant's argument that his recorded statements should have been suppressed under Gwinner, Johnson and Mollica is thus not convincing. [155] The Palm Springs police lawfully and independently recorded the statements under California law. Those statements were therefore admissible at trial, even though similar action in Washington might have been in violation of RCW 9.73.090(1)(b). Appellant does not identify any state interest to be advanced by suppressing the recorded statements. No Washington state officer violated RCW 9.73 and no one's privacy interests protected by the statute were infringed. As suggested by the State, suppression of the statements would serve only to keep highly probative and lawfully obtained evidence from the jury. The State asks this Court to adopt and affirm the reasoning of State v. Mayes [156] in resolving the question whether evidence lawfully obtained in another state should be admissible in Washington state, even if similar action by officers in this state would violate Washington law. In Mayes the Court of Appeals, Division Two, concluded the Privacy Act, RCW 9.73, did not apply to evidence obtained by police officers of another state within that state and according to its laws. Mayes acknowledged that Washington has no criminal jurisdiction over actions having no effect in this state. [157] In State v. Williams this court noted the Mayes decision was based upon the doctrine that a state legislature's enactment of a privacy statute creates a privacy expectation only for individuals who are within the borders of that state. [158] Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. [159] However, the court noted in Williams it had not yet addressed the validity of that doctrine. [160] This Court in In re Teddington declared the Gwinner decision correctly held that evidence independently and lawfully obtained by federal officers acting pursuant to federal law may be transferred to state authorities for use in a Washington State criminal proceeding. [161] We agree with the conclusion reached in Mayes and rule that RCW 9.73 does not apply to Appellant's statements taken by Palm Springs police and lawfully recorded without his knowledge or consent.