Opinion ID: 2444387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Hudson acted equally or more negligently than Dennis.

Text: Section 4168 requires motorists to account for potentially hazardous vehicles or conveyances on or entering the highway. Delaware tort law has long imposed a duty on motorists to use reasonable care, drive at a reasonable rate of speed under the circumstances, and slow or stop to avoid imminent danger, regardless of the posted speed limit. [15] Motorists, however, need not slow down in anticipation of danger that has not yet become apparent. [16] Although we require motorists to take greater care to protect minor pedestrians, [17] the minor still has a duty to act as a reasonable child of similar age and situation. [18] When the trier of fact must compare a child's negligence to that of an adult, Delaware courts employ a two-step analysis. First, the trier of fact determines whether the child violated a standard based on the child's age, experience, and situation at the time of the accident, and whether the adult violated a reasonable person standard of care. Second, the trier of fact apportions the negligence, but without considering the age and experience of the child. [19] We have held that the trier of fact apportions negligence only after determining duty, breach, and proximate causation. [20] The trial judge granted Old Guard's motion for summary judgment, because he found that Hudson had acted equallyif not morenegligently than Dennis. Hudson rode his bicycle at home, where he had great familiarity with his parents' driveway, the surrounding road, and mid-day traffic. That Hudson looked both ways before riding onto the road indicates that he appreciated the risks of crossing the road, and that he could have seen Dennis's car driving straight down the road on a clear day. Hudson, therefore, had the ability to appreciate his surroundings and the dangers that the situation presented. By darting onto a road with no shoulder, just moments before a car drove along a straight and familiar section of that road, Hudson failed to act as a reasonable twelve-year-old would have acted in the same circumstances. Dennis, as we have discussed, had no duty to sound her horn or anticipate Hudson's darting onto the road. She drove between five and ten miles per hour below the posted speed limit, which provided appropriate velocity guidance on a clear day. We cannot say that Dennis acted negligently under these circumstances. As she proceeded 450-600 feet, along the straightaway towards the Hudsons' house, she and Hudson had equal opportunity to see one another. Hudson controlled his decision to dart onto the road, and Dennis had already slowed her car well below a reasonable speed for a 45-mile-per-hour speed zone on a clear day. [21] Michael Hudson's presence on a lawn mower may have compromised Devin's ability to hear Dennis's car, but Devin still had ample opportunity to see her. If Hudson did stop to look both ways for oncoming traffic and Dennis saw Hudsonas each testified that they didthen Dennis might have reasonably expected him to have seen her and to continue waiting on the driveway. No reasonable juror, however, could have concluded that Dennis had a duty to do more than she did do to avoid hitting Hudsonmuch less that Dennis had acted more negligently than Hudson. Therefore, we agree that the trial judge properly entered judgment for Old Guard.