Opinion ID: 2369105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Listing Contract Case

Text: This case involves a more concise factual background. The complainant, an incorporated improvement association, charged that Manning-Shaw had used an illegal listing contract in violation of Section 224(o) [of Art. 56], supra. The offending clause in the contract read: The owner reserves the right to withdraw the property from said agent at any time after six months. But it is understood that this [a]greement is not revokable while any negotiations are pending for sale or exchange of the property. And if the property is sold or exchanged subsequently to any party with whom said agent has been negotiating, the commission will be paid to said agent. In their answer to this charge, the brokers claimed that even if the contract was not proper  in that it did not provide for a definite termination date without notice from either party as the statute requires  the violation was not wilful. In refutation of that claim the former secretary of the commission testified that Bernstein had been to his office sometime during the year 1956, primarily on another matter, and that, while he (the secretary) could not recall having seen a Manning-Shaw listing contract without an expiration date, that he was certain that he had warned them that all listing contracts must have a termination date since it was his policy to tell everyone who asked him about the matter that a definite expiration date must be included in order to comply with the law. Bernstein admitted that his firm knew that the law had been recently changed to require a termination date. The commission found that the brokers had knowledge that their listing contract did not comply with one of the provisions of Section 224(o) [of Art. 56]. When the appeal from the commission in this case reached the court below, the brokers applied for leave to present additional material evidence. The court ordered that such evidence be taken in open court. It was to the effect that Shaw had sent the commission samples of their listing contracts and other forms in a letter dated January 19, 1957, in connection with a complaint dealing with a different matter, the inference being, we assume, that the commission had not then or thereafter objected to the legality of their listing contract. In this case [Listing Contract], the brokers now contend that their listing contract was a good one and that the statute does not require the use of words termination or terminate if that part of the contract binding on the seller is in fact terminated by the language used, which they insist their contract did. They further contend that the order of the commission suspending their licenses for this technical violation was arbitrary and capricious since the violation had harmed no one. The short answer to these contentions is that the statute specifically requires that a listing agreement must contain a definite termination date without notice from either party [emphasis added] and that since there was a clear-cut violation of the statute, the suspension of the licenses, under the existing facts and circumstances, was not either arbitrary or capricious. The trial court found that there was competent, material and substantial evidence in the entire record as submitted including the de novo evidence taken in open court  not overcome by countervailing evidence  to support the commission's finding of fact and conclusion of law to the effect that the brokers had violated one of the provisions of Section 224(o) [of Art. 56]. We agree. Since the order of the lower court in the Listing Contract Case was proper, it will also be affirmed. Orders affirmed in both cases, the appellants to pay the costs.