Opinion ID: 1807154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the commission have primary jurisdiction?

Text: When this controversy was before us in 1963, [26] we held that the circuit court should not have granted the state's demurrer to the respondent's fifth affirmative defense, which asserted that the state should be denied equitable relief because of its failure to follow its own rule [27] requiring it to grant an applicant a hearing before denying him a tall-structure permit. We said: ... The rule contemplates that there shall not be a final denial of an application without a hearing, and the statute provides for judicial review. It seems to us that the commission should have held its hearing long before the answer was served. If, upon hearing, the commission had determined that the permit should issue, that fact would not have excused past violations [for erecting a tower before getting the permit], for which defendant would remain liable for criminal penalties, but would have obviated need for injunctive relief. Had the commission decided, after hearing, to deny the application, the state would have had better standing to seek equitable relief than it does after long delay. This is a civil action to enjoin a continuing violation as a public nuisance. We think that unless the proof at the trial shows that tower is, by reason of exceeding the height allowable without a permit, so substantial a hazard to air traffic that the application was foredoomed to denial at a hearing, the failure of the commission to hold a hearing might, in the discretion of the court, deprive the state of equitable relief. [28] The cable company interpreted this language to mean that it was too late for the commission to hold a hearing and that the circuit court must decide if the commission should be denied equitable relief. When the commission subsequently notified the respondent that a hearing would be held, the respondent withdrew its application for a permit and refused to participate. The hearing went ahead as scheduled, but only the commission presented evidence. The commission held that the tower was a hazard to air traffic and denied the permit. The trial court, however, agreed with respondent's interpretation of the second Chippewa Cable Case, and made an independent finding that the tower was not so substantial a hazard as to foredoom defendant's application to denial had a prompt hearing been held. He indicated that he would deny injunctive relief on that basis, even if this court overruled his interpretation of the jurisdictional standards of sec. 114.135 (7), Stats. The state contends that the second Chippewa Cable Case did not foreclose the possibility of a hearing on defendant's application for a permit prior to the trial. It further contends that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies and that the commission should be the primary judge of the substantiality of the hazard to air traffic caused by the tower. This court treated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in Wisconsin Collectors Asso. v. Thorp Finance Corp. [29] Involved there was a suit alleging that one of Thorp's collection practices was a subterfuge to avoid the licensing provisions of sec. 218.04 (11), Stats. Thorp demurred, claiming that the circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction because the commissioner of banks had primary jurisdiction and had failed to exercise it. The circuit court held the matter in abeyance while taking testimony in the case and then found that the commissioner had primary jurisdiction and directed him to determine the dispute. This court recognized that agencies are designed to give uniformity and consistency to their fields of special knowledge, and that their expertise and flexible procedure make their fact-finding a valuable public function. We did not think, however, that the fact that the agency had jurisdiction ousted the circuit court from its subject-matter jurisdiction. ...The standard, in our opinion, should not be power but comity. The court must consider which course would best serve the ends of justice. If the issue presented to the court involves exclusively factual issues within the peculiar expertise of the commission, the obviously better course would be to decline jurisdiction and to refer the matter to the agency. On the other hand, if statutory interpretation or issues of law are significant, the court may properly choose in its discretion to entertain the proceedings. The trial court should exercise its discretion with an understanding that the legislature has created the agency in order to afford a systematic method of fact-finding and policy-making and that the agency's jurisdiction should be given priority in the absence of a valid reason for judicial intervention. [30] We held, however, that the circuit court abused its discretion by referring the matter to the commission after holding an extensive trial. The trial court should have gone ahead and made findings and conclusions based on the record before it. In Best v. Humboldt Mining Co. [31] the United States Supreme Court held it proper for a federal district court to permit the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior to determine the validity of mining claims, even though the United States had instituted an action for possession of the land involved. The decision was based on the special competence of the agency in the field. [32] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies even where the administrative agency is incapable of giving the relief sought. On the question of whether the doctrine applies to problems or relief which are beyond administrative jurisdiction, the theory seems reasonably clear. The test is not whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts; the test is whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency. Because of the purpose of the doctrine to assure that the agency will not be by-passed on what is especially committed to itand because resort to the courts is still open after the agency has acted, the doctrine applies even if the agency has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. [33] The United States Supreme Court so held in Far East Conference v. United States. [34] That was an action by the United States to enjoin antitrust violations. The supreme court ruled that resort must first be had to the shipping board for a determination of whether the agreements involved were unjustly discriminatory and, therefore, unlawful, even though the board had no power to grant injunctive relief. Here, the state contends that the question of the extent of the hazard created by respondent's tower is one which requires application of the commission's expertise on aeronautical safety, and the fact that the commission has no power to issue an injunction is inconsequential. It further contends that the only method for review of the agency's finding that the hazard was too great to allow a permit was by the procedure of ch. 227, Stats., [35] and that because the defendant failed to seek such review, it cannot challenge the finding. Underwood v. Karns [36] is in point. There a writ of mandamus was sought to compel the commissioner of the motor vehicle department to reinstate petitioner's driver's license. Sec. 344.03, Stats., provides that review of the commissioner's decision to revoke may be had within ten days in the manner provided in ch. 227. We refused mandamus because petitioner had an adequate remedy at law. We said that: ... Where a statute relating to an administrative agency provides a direct method of judicial review of agency action, such method of review is generally regarded as exclusive, especially where the statutory remedy is plain, speedy, and adequate. [37] The state's contention that respondent is precluded from relitigating the question of the hazard caused by its tower is correct, unless the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is inapplicable. The respondent asserts that the doctrine does not apply because prior to the hearing the application for a tower permit was withdrawn and, as a result, the commission had no jurisdiction to hold the hearing on the hazard created by the tower. The respondent misunderstands the scope of the commission's jurisdiction. The power and authority of the commission to determine whether a permit for a structure should be issued is limited only by the height of the structure. [38] Application for a permit is not necessary to give the commission subject-matter jurisdiction. Since there was subject-matter jurisdiction and the commission provided adequate notice of the hearing, respondent's withdrawal of his application did not affect the proceedings. However, because this court, in the second Chippewa Cable Case, indicated that it was too late for a hearing before the commission, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply. We said there that the commission violated its own rule by not granting defendant a hearing, and that ... unless the proof at the trial shows that the tower is ... so substantial a hazard to air traffic that the application was foredoomed to denial at a hearing, the failure of the commission to hold a hearing might ... deprive the state of equitable relief. [39] This case presents one of the valid reasons for judicial intervention mentioned in Wisconsin Collectors Asso. v. Thorp Finance Corp. [40] The circuit court did not err in permitting respondent to present evidence bearing on the extent of the hazard created by the tower or in proceeding to make an independent determination of whether the tower was so substantial a hazard to air traffic as to be foredoomed to denial at a hearing.