Opinion ID: 1249253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The ASUC Senate's Political Activities.

Text: For many years, the ASUC Senate has debated, adopted, and publicized resolutions on current political issues. Issues that have received the ASUC Senate's attention include, for example, gay and lesbian rights, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, gun control, draft registration, boycotts of businesses involved in labor disputes, the reelection of a United States Representative, a municipal initiative to legalize marijuana, and the treatment of political prisoners in foreign countries. The ASUC Senate also supports voter registration, draft counselling, and renters' assistance programs. Plaintiffs introduced evidence at trial to show that these programs had occasionally become channels for political activity. (8) Plaintiffs contend that the state may not compel them to finance these political activities through mandatory fees. In opposition, the Regents assert that no income from mandatory contributions has been used to support such activities. The trial court did not specifically address this issue in its statement of decision. The Court of Appeal upheld the ASUC Senate's political activities, but it did not rely on the Regents' theory that no mandatory fees have been used to subsidize them. Instead, avoiding the unresolved factual issue, the court purported to uphold the ASUC Senate's political activities as a matter of law. The court reasoned that such activities contribute[] to the educational mission of the university and that, if plaintiffs did not approve of positions taken by the ASUC Senate, there is nothing to prevent plaintiffs from seeking senate office and making their own voices heard in the senate debates. The Court of Appeal's resolution of this issue cannot withstand scrutiny. To be sure, the ASUC Senate's practice of taking and publicizing positions on political issues may have educational value for those few students who are involved. However, as already discussed, if mandatory fees are used for this purpose there is a burden on dissenting students' speech and associational rights. The Court of Appeal's analysis is incomplete because it made no effort to determine whether the purported educational benefits justify the burden. Indeed, the court betrayed a certain indifference to plaintiffs' constitutional claims in suggesting that the remedy for compelled speech lies in more compelled speech, i.e., suggesting that plaintiffs seek[] senate office and mak[e] their own voices heard in the senate debates. Of course, there would be no need to address plaintiffs' claim if it were true, as the Regents assert, that no income from mandatory fees has been used to support the ASUC Senate's political activities. However, the Regents' position seems to contradict the trial court's finding that mandatory fees were used for operation expenditures for the ASUC Senate. The Regents' position also seems to contradict the ASUC's response to plaintiffs' interrogatories. In their interrogatories, plaintiffs asked the ASUC to [s]tate what steps ASUC has taken to publicize resolutions adopted by the ASUC Senate. The ASUC answered that it had placed ads in the Daily Cal [a student newspaper]; distributed posters, leaflets and flyers; published ASUC information books; sent out press releases to major media; sponsored on-campus discussion groups, workshops and rallies; [and] placed notices on campus bulletin boards and kiosks.... These forms of publicity usually entail costs, if only for paper and ink. The Regents' assertion that mandatory fees have not been used to subsidize the ASUC's political activities could also mean that the ASUC segregates mandatory fees from other sources of income and uses the former only for nonpolitical purposes. The earmarking of funds, however, would not necessarily eliminate the constitutional problem. In Abood ( supra, 431 U.S. 209, 237, fn. 35 [52 L.Ed.2d p. 285]), the high court rejected earmarking as a remedy for constitutional violations caused by the use of mandatory fees for political purposes. Because earmarking leaves the same total amount of funds at the organization's disposal and permits the organization to spend the same amount on political activities, earmarking `is of bookkeeping significance only rather than a matter of real substance.' ( Ibid., quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn (1963) 373 U.S. 746, 753 [10 L.Ed.2d 678, 683, 83 S.Ct. 1461].) For these reasons, the Court has held in the agency-shop context that it is plainly not an adequate remedy to limit the use of the actual dollars collected from dissenting employees to collective-bargaining [i.e., non-political and non-ideological] purposes.... ( Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at p. 237, fn. 35 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 285].) In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the lower courts have not yet adequately addressed the factual and legal issues raised by the ASUC Senate's own political activities. If further evidentiary proceedings show that mandatory fees have been spent on political activities by the ASUC Senate, then the Regents shall have the burden of demonstrating that the resulting burden on dissenting students' speech and associational rights is germane to, and justified by, such activities' educational value in accordance with the principles discussed above. If the Regents do not satisfy that burden, then plaintiffs will be entitled to relief under the procedures set out in Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, 16-17 [110 L.Ed.2d 1 at pp. 15-16], and Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292, 301-310 [89 L.Ed.2d 232 at pp. 243-249]. We shall remand these issues for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein. In view of our determination that plaintiffs are entitled to relief on their claims regarding student groups and ASUC lobbying, and that further proceedings must take place on plaintiffs' claims regarding the ASUC Senate's political activities, there is no need at this stage of the proceeding to address plaintiffs' alternative claims to the same relief under article IX, section 9 of the state Constitution, section 13 of the Organic Act (Stats. 1867-1868, ch. CCXLIV, § 13, p. 254)), Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, and the federal Constitution's establishment clause (U.S. Const., Amend. I).