Opinion ID: 6346765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: first step act order

Text: We have appellate jurisdiction of the First Step Act Order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Lawrence, 1 F.4th 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2021). “[T]he abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions.” White, 984 F.3d at 85 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)). We review statutory interpretation questions de novo. Id. Palmer first argues, and the government concedes, that in light of White, the district court incorrectly concluded that Palmer is ineligible for First Step Act relief. The government argues, however, that remand is inappropriate because Palmer’s notice of appeal was untimely and because we can rely on the district court’s alternative holding—that even if 12 Palmer is eligible, the court would not exercise its discretion to grant relief. See App. 147–48. We disagree. We conclude that the court granted—by implication if not expressly—an extension to file the notice of appeal and because it is unclear whether the district court’s exercise of discretion started from the correct mandatory minimum post-White, we remand for clarification. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018) (“If the court of appeals considers a[] [sentencing] explanation inadequate in a particular case, it can send the case back to the district court for a more complete explanation.”).
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), the government asserts, Palmer’s pro se notice of appeal is untimely because it was due 14 days after the district court entered the First Step Act Order on July 2, 2020. It was not placed in the prison mail system until August 12, 2020—41 days after the entry of the order. The government contends that Palmer “has offered no justification for his failure to note an appeal on or before July 16, 2020,” and that we should dismiss his challenge. In rebuttal, Palmer’s appellate counsel acknowledges that the notice arrived well after the 14-day deadline but asserts that the notice was nevertheless timely because the district court implicitly granted a 30-day extension until August 16 under Rule 4(b)(4) when it treated the August 12 letter as a notice of appeal and ordered its filing. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4) (“Upon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may—before or after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice—extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(b).”). 13 We have previously “declined [an appellant’s] invitation to equate the ministerial act of docketing a tardy notice of appeal with an implicit grant of an extension of time by the district court.” United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1574 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In Long, a defendant-appellant also filed a notice after the Rule 4(b) deadline and the district court docketed the notice. Id. at 1574. Writing for the court, thenJudge Thomas reasoned: “Docketing a notice of appeal is a clerical task, and does not require the approbation of the trial judge. It thus presents no occasion for a party to make a showing of excusable neglect.” Id. It was therefore important that there was no evidence the district judge saw the notice or had an opportunity to determine whether there was excusable neglect. We remanded to the district court for it to determine whether excusable neglect existed. Id. at 1575. We noted in Long, however, that “there may be cases in which an implicit finding of excusable neglect would be less of a fiction.” Id. at 1574 n.2. For example, if “a trial judge takes some explicit action with respect to a tardy appeal, the judge at a minimum is aware of the appeal; under these circumstances, his action could arguably be construed as an implicit finding of excusable neglect.” Id. The September 3, 2020 order shows that the district judge was “at a minimum aware of the appeal”: he noted the denial of Palmer’s section 2255 and First Step Act motions, indicated that he had read Palmer’s handwritten letters by noting that they “provide[d] adequate notice that he intend[ed] to appeal” and mentioned the death of Palmer’s counsel on August 3. Order, United States v. Palmer, Cr. No. 89-36 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2020), ECF No. 510. The district judge also ordered the docketing of the letters and affixed his signature to those orders. In addition, Palmer expressed his desire to appeal on page five of one letter and across two pages of another. At bottom, the order and letters manifest the district judge’s analysis and awareness of Palmer’s situation— 14 including that Palmer was in lockdown beginning in February 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic—neither of which existed in Long. Indeed, the district judge’s confirmation that the letters provided “adequate notice” evinces a level of approbation absent from Long. Accordingly, it is clear to us that the district judge’s order “constitute[s] an implicit extension of time,” Long, 905 F.2d at 1574 n.2, and a remand for the court to do so again would waste time and judicial resources.
Decided five months after the district court issued its First Step Act Order, White provides our Circuit’s framework to evaluate First Step Act motions. See 984 F.3d at 85–93. First, under section 404(a), the court must determine whether a defendant is eligible for relief—that is, whether the movant committed a “covered offense,” defined as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . , that was committed before August 3, 2010.” First Step Act § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222. In White, the district court had determined that even though the appellant-defendants were “eligible” for relief, relief was “not ‘available’” because, “[according to] judge-found drug quantities,” the statutory penalties for certain counts were not modified by section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. 984 F.3d at 92. We reversed, holding that there is no “availability test” and that in assessing eligibility, the district court “cannot determine, using judge- or jury-found drug quantities, what effect the Fair Sentencing Act ‘would have had’ on a defendant’s sentence.” Id. at 86–87. As occurred in White, the district court here used judge- found drug quantities to determine that Palmer was not eligible for section 404 relief. As described above, supra at 6, section 15 2(a) of the Fair Sentencing Act increased the threshold quantity in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) necessary to trigger certain mandatory minimum penalties. See 124 Stat. at 2372. The Super CCE offense incorporated those threshold quantities by requiring the involvement of “at least 300 times the quantity of a substance described in subsection 841(b)(1)(B).” 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(A) (1988). With the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, 8,400 grams—rather than 1,500 grams— became the minimum triggering quantity to support a Super CCE offense. See Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a), 124 Stat. at 2372 (noting increase from 5 to 28 grams in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Accordingly, as the government agrees, Palmer’s Super CCE offense is a “covered offense” and the district court, which did not have the benefit of our decision in White, incorrectly gauged Palmer’s section 404 eligibility because “whether an offense is ‘covered’ does not depend on the actual drug amounts attributed to a defendant.” 984 F.3d at 86. Second, under section 404(b), a “court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. Put simply, once a defendant is considered eligible, the district court exercises its “broad discretion” to decide “whether it should reduce the sentence.” White, 984 F.3d at 88 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also First Step Act § 404(c) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”), 132 Stat. at 5222. White also spells out what considerations are relevant in assessing whether to grant a sentence reduction. Relying on Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), we began 16 by noting the remedial purpose of the First Step Act, including that it and the Fair Sentencing Act “are strong remedial statutes, meant to rectify disproportionate and racially disparate sentencing penalties.” White, 984 F.3d at 90. We then agreed with the Seventh Circuit: to further the goal of the First Step Act, a “district court may consider all relevant factors when determining whether an eligible defendant merits relief under the First Step Act.” Id. (quoting Hudson, 967 F.3d at 611). We specified that certain factors, including “new statutory minimum or maximum penalties; current Guidelines; postsentencing conduct; and other relevant information about a defendant’s history and conduct,” ensure that a sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to fulfill the purposes of [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hudson, 967 F.3d at 609). We stressed the importance of post-sentencing conduct, id., before noting that on remand in that case, the district court must “give proper consideration to the sentencing factors outlined in [section] 3553(a),” id. at 93; see also Lawrence, 1 F.4th at 43–44. Consideration of the section 3553(a) factors in White was “especially important” given the “complexity” of the record. 984 F.3d at 90.3 Finally, 3 As we noted in White, “[e]very circuit court that has examined the issue has held that a district court may, or must, consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors when passing on a motion for relief under section 404 of the First Step Act.” 984 F.3d at 90 (citing United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 784 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 323–26 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 322 n.7 (5th Cir. 2019)). White is nonetheless slightly opaque as to whether section 3553(a) factors may or must be considered in all cases. See id. at 90–91 (district courts “may consider all relevant factors” and section 3553(a) factors are “especially important” in cases with “complex[]” records), 93 (district court to consider section 3553(a) factors on remand). Subsequently, in Lawrence, we characterized White as having issued a directive that district courts “must consider ‘all relevant factors[,]’ 17 the district court’s sentence reduction decision “must be procedurally reasonable and supported by a sufficiently compelling justification.” Id. at 91 (quoting United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 784 (6th Cir. 2020)); see also United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 2021) (adopting reasonableness review). Palmer challenges the district court’s treatment of the “relevant factors.” Primarily, he argues that the district court erred by using the wrong statutory minimum sentence in deciding whether to grant relief. Once again, White is instructive. In determining the “new statutory minimum” penalty that sets the lower bound of the district court’s discretion “to impose a sentence ‘as if section 2 . . . of the Fair Sentencing Act [was] in effect,’ the court must use the revised penalty range now applicable to the drug amount in the original statute of conviction.” White, 984 F.3d at 86. For spearheading a crack cocaine network, a jury convicted Palmer of the Super CCE offense, a statute of conviction originally involving at least 1,500 grams of crack cocaine. Plainly, that amount is smaller than the 8,400 grams necessary to trigger the Super CCE threshold under section 2(a) of the Fair Sentencing Act. 124 Stat. at 2372. The 1,500-gram including not only the sentencing factors outlined at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but potentially also ‘new statutory minimum or maximum penalties; current Guidelines; post-sentencing conduct; and other relevant information about a defendant's history and conduct.’” See Lawrence, 1 F.4th 40, 43–44 (quoting White, 984 F.3d at 90, 92–93). In Lawrence, the “sole and narrow question” was whether a First Step Act movant is categorically entitled to allocute before the district court rules on a section 404 motion for sentence reduction. See id. at 42, 46. Because the section 3553(a) factors were not necessary to the allocution holding, the directive is likely dicta. 18 amount, however, nonetheless qualifies for the baseline CCE offense, which has no minimum drug quantity threshold. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). That offense includes a twenty-year mandatory minimum. Id. Twenty years, then, is the correct mandatory minimum for a district judge to use in deciding whether to “impose a reduced sentence” for Palmer’s CCE offense under the First Step Act. First Step Act § 404(b), 124 Stat. at 5222; accord White, 984 F.3d at 86 (using drug quantity in statute of conviction, rather than greater amount attributable to defendant’s conspiracy, to determine mandatory minimum). At the end of the key paragraph addressing the mandatory minima, the district court stated that “Palmer faces no disparity between the mandatory minimum he was sentenced under and the one he would have faced ‘if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time.’” App. 147. But there should be a disparity; Palmer was sentenced under the Super CCE statute and received the mandatory life sentence that he is currently serving, rather than the twenty-year mandatory minimum he would have faced using the drug quantity in the statute of conviction, as mandated by White. It is therefore unclear if the district court correctly applied “the legal requirements governing review of motions for reduced sentences under section 404(b) of the First Step Act.” White, 984 F.3d at 92.4 We recognize that the district court may have used the judge- or jury-found drug quantities attributable to Palmer’s CCE to conclude that he exceeded the 8,400-gram threshold and therefore would have received a life sentence even under the higher threshold. Cf. id. at 88 (“The court may consider 4 As the government acknowledged at oral argument, “when a court is making a discretionary determination, it has to understand what it’s choosing between.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 35:5–35:7. 19 both judge-found and jury-found drug quantities as part of its exercise of discretion.”). Indeed, it is possible that the district court implicitly recognized the twenty-year mandatory minimum by initially acknowledging earlier in the paragraph its discretion to lower Palmer’s sentence from life without parole. But such an inference conflicts with the court’s later statement that there is “no disparity” because the mandatory minimum is life. Given the anchoring effect of using the incorrect mandatory minimum sentence, see id. at 87, and the importance of mandatory minima to sentencing, see Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 112–13 (2013), we remand for the district court to clarify the “new [mandatory] minimum . . . penalt[y],” White, 984 F.3d at 90 (quoting Hudson, 967 F.3d at 609); see also United States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262, 275 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (remanding when district court “may have applied” incorrect mandatory minimum); United States v. McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (remanding for clarification because record was unclear and “law was in flux” and noting “we will not search for error when” remand “will better serve the ends of justice”).5 As for the remainder of the district court’s analysis, the district court properly acknowledged the remedial purpose of the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act and explicitly 5 Palmer also argues that the jury-found quantity of 1,500 grams is the only factual finding of a drug quantity in the case and that, in exercising its discretion, the district court should not have considered the “100 to 200 kilo[gram]s of crack” cocaine referenced by the original sentencing judge, App. 19, nor the 150 kilograms referenced in the Presentence Report. The district court was operating without the benefit of White’s instruction to consider jury- or judge-found facts, 984 F.3d at 88, and we will leave it to the district court to address in the first instance whether the quantities qualify as “judge- found” under White. 20 considered two of the section 3553(a) factors, App. 147–48, which are “especially important” in “complex[]” cases like this one, see White, 984 F.3d at 90–91. Although “there is no requirement that sentencing courts expressly list or discuss every Section 3553(a) factor,” United States v. Knight, 824 F.3d 1105, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2016), “express acknowledgment of” the relevant factors and “mitigation arguments is of course helpful and encouraged,” see United States v. Pyles, 862 F.3d 82, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2017), especially if there is no record of a hearing on the First Step Act motion for relief.6 Because the district court ruled without the benefit of White and because the “new statutory minimum” frames the district court’s exercise of discretion, cf. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 198–99 (2016) (detailing anchoring effect Federal Sentencing Guidelines have on “district court’s discretion” (citation omitted)), we do not opine on the adequacy of its consideration of “relevant factors” other than the “new statutory minimum,”7 White, 984 F.3d at 90 (citation omitted). 6 In White, we did not have the benefit of a hearing transcript and remanded in part because the district court order “fail[ed] to mention” relevant mitigation arguments and rehabilitation evidence. 984 F.3d at 93. 7 Palmer argues that the district court did not adequately consider his post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence. As the district court acknowledged, App. 148, Palmer provided letters from family members and friends, id. at 37–39, 42, 56, 59, as well as unacknowledged evidence from prison officials and prison records detailing enrollment in a number of rehabilitative classes and programs, see id. 44–55, 57–58, 60–78, 111–15. On the other hand, Palmer’s prison disciplinary record lists over twenty incidents leading to sanctions, including at least six violent incidents. See id. 117–18. 21