Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions on Unadjudicated Criminal Activity

Text: The notice of aggravating evidence the prosecution filed before trial included the attempted rape of de Maderos in Guatemala. In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court indicated to counsel that it did not intend to instruct the jury on any elements of this offense because the issue for the jury to decide was whether they're convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either did or attempted to use force or violence in an illegal manner upon another person. Defense counsel, however, asked that the jury receive the instruction on attempted rape. The trial court informed counsel that if it gave an instruction on attempted rape, it also would instruct the jury on assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder. It reasoned that if the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt the alleged conduct was an attempted rape, it could nonetheless consider the conduct under section 190.3, factor (b), as either an assault with a deadly weapon or an attempted murder. Over counsel's objection that only the attempted rape instruction should be given, the trial court instructed the jury on attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted murder. The court then denied counsel's request for instructions defining battery and brandishing a weapon. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder. He argues that he was entitled to rely on the particular offense alleged by the prosecutor in his notice of evidence in aggravation (e.g., attempted rape) in presenting his defense without having to defend against additional related offenses during trial. Not so. Evidence of prior violent conduct is admitted under section 190.3, factor (b), to enable the jury to make an individualized assessment of the character and history of the defendant to determine the nature of the punishment to be imposed. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 544, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) The probative value of this evidence lies in the defendant's conduct that gave rise to the offense. ( Ibid. ) The prosecution's notice that evidence will be presented regarding a specific violent crime or crimes should alert counsel that evidence of all crimes committed during the same course of conduct may be offered, and, therefore, substantially complies with the notice requirement of section 190.3. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 70, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388.) Here, defendant does not complain that he was unaware of the multiple offenses potentially arising out of the attack on de Maderos, nor could he. Defendant's investigator interviewed de Maderos more than a year before trial. She related that defendant pointed his machete at her throat and threatened to rape and kill her. Therefore, because the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder were also committed as part of the same course of conduct as the attempted rape, the prosecution substantially complied with the notice requirement under section 190.3. ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 70, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388.) Defendant, moreover, has not shown any prejudice. Generally, in the absence of any showing that a delay in the notice affected counsel's trial strategy, the appropriate remedy for a violation of the notice requirement would be to grant a continuance as needed to permit defendant to prepare a response. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 956-958, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Defendant did not request a continuance nor did he otherwise indicate he was unable to prepare a defense. ( Id. at p. 958, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Accordingly, defendant's claim fails.