Opinion ID: 389304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 17 The issues to be decided on this appeal are: (1) whether the trial court erred in interpreting the definition of the word process in section 1.2.1 of the Commission's rules and regulations as requiring a finding that Republic Steel's steel-making procedure constitutes three distinct processes rather than a single process as urged by the Commission; and (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to impose penalties and injunctive relief. 18  Before considering the Commission's definition of the word process, we note that a regulation should be construed to give effect to the natural and plain meaning of its words. Diamond Roofing, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976). 19 Section 1.2.1 of the Commission's rules and regulations defines process as:Any action, operation, or treatment of materials, including handling and storage thereof, which may cause discharge of an air contaminate into the atmosphere, but excluding fuel burning and refuse burning. 20 The first phase of the steel-making process is dubbed charging where scrap metal and molten metal are placed in the BOF vessel. Scrap metal and molten metal are unquestionably materials used in the steel-making process. Process as defined by section 1.2.1 includes handling and storage of materials. Giving effect to the natural and plain meaning of the phrase handling of materials, we find that the placing of molten and scrap metal into the BOF vessel is a material handling procedure within the meaning of section 1.2.1. Therefore, the charging phase of the steel-making process is encompassed by the definition of the term process under section 1.2.1. 21 The second phase is the actual steel-making or blow phase of the steel-making process. During this phase, oxygen is injected into the molten metal to convert it into steel. Process as defined by section 1.2.1 encompasses treatment of materials. As we noted earlier, molten and scrap metal constitute materials used in the steel-making process. Treatment is not defined by section 1.2.1. Under the normal usage of the word, 6 however, injection of oxygen into molten metal constitutes treatment of materials. 22 The final phase, tapping, occurs when the molten steel is poured from the BOF vessel. As noted above, the term process as defined by section 1.2.1 includes handling of materials. In our view, the tapping phase, like the charging phase, constitutes a material handling procedure. Surely, under the plain meaning of the term process in section 1.2.1, oxidized molten metal is handled when it is poured from the BOF vessel. 23 After considering the Commission's definition of the word process, we find that the charging, blow, and tapping phases of the steel-making process constitute one process under section 1.2.1 and not separate and distinct processes as urged by Republic Steel. 24 Our decision is buttressed by the fact that during the past seven years, the Commission has interpreted the three phases of steel-making to constitute one process. Where an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is reasonable, it must stand even though it may not appear as reasonable as some other. E. g. Homan and Crimen, Inc. v. Harris, 626 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1980). In light of section 1.2.1's definition of the word process, we consider reasonable the Commission's interpretation that the three phases of the steel-making process constitute one process. II 25 Our finding that the three phases of steel-making constitute one process under section 1.2.1, necessarily means that Republic Steel was not in compliance with section 4.4.1 in 1978. The next question, therefore, is whether the trial court erred in failing to impose civil penalties and to grant injunctive relief. The trial court, in refusing to order civil penalties and grant injunctive relief relied on the attitude and laudable efforts of Republic Steel in continuously trying to improve the level of emissions. Finding that the imposition of sanctions was within the sound discretion of the court, the trial court refused to order sanctions. 26 We agree with the trial court that sanctions are not warranted in this case. Republic Steel, since 1972, has continuously sought to improve the level of emissions created during the steel-making process. In 1976, Republic Steel's electrostatic precipitator was only able to capture emissions created during the blow phase of the steel-making process. The emissions generated during the charging and tapping phases passed uncontrollably into the atmosphere. As a result, the Commission was able to test the effectiveness of Republic Steel's electrostatic precipitator only in so far as it captured emissions during the blow phase. The results of the May, 1976 test indicated that the particulate emissions generated during the blow phase were within the allowable limits of section 4.4.1. Even in light of these positive test results, Republic Steel voluntarily experimented with new equipment which captured emissions created during the charging and tapping phases of the steel-making process. With this new equipment incorporated into Republic Steel's pollution control system, a stack test, conducted at the request of the Commission, indicated that the emissions generated during the three phases of the steel-making process were not within the allowable limits of section 4.4.1. It would be a travesty of justice to impose sanctions on this company which voluntarily updated its equipment to capture emissions generated during all three phases of the steel-making process, where using its original equipment the tests would have only considered emissions generated during one phase of the steel-making process. In addition, at least one of the test runs in 1978 suggested compliance with section 4.4.1. 27 Moreover, the May, 1979, stack test indicated that the particulate emissions generated during all three phases of the steel-making process were well within the allowable emission rates set out in section 4.4.1. 28 Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impose sanctions and grant injunctive relief.