Opinion ID: 2640085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: vincent's liability

Text: ¶40 Daines asks us to reverse the trial court's directed verdict in favor of Vincent on all claims against Vincent personally. Reviewing the evidence and testimony presented at trial in a light most favorable to Daines, we agree with the trial court's ruling that Daines failed to present competent evidence that Vincent was acting in anything other than a representative capacity for ASC in his dealings with Daines. ASC was, at all pertinent times for the purposes of this case, a Utah limited liability company. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act indicates that no organizer, member, manager, or employee of a company is personally liable . . . for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-601 (2007). Additionally, we have held that where an agent has signed a contract in a personal capacity, that is, executed it in a manner clearly indicating that the liability is his alone . . . he must fulfill. Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 74 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah 1938). It follows then that Vincent, as the chairman of ASC during negotiations with Daines, can be held personally liable for a signed contract only if he executed the contract in a manner clearly indicating that the liability was his alone. Id. ¶41 We begin with an analysis of the MOU, which represents the starting point of any agreement that Daines had with ASC. Daines drafted the MOU and included a signature line for Vincent directly under the heading ASC. Because the MOU expressly states that Vincent would sign on behalf of ASC, it is apparent that Daines recognized that he would be dealing with ASC through Vincent and not with Vincent in his individual capacity. The initial term sheets, which include compensation for Daines in accordance with the MOU, also indicate that Vincent was acting on behalf of ASC. The term sheets are also clear on the fact that any compensation that Daines would receive for his introduction of ASC to [the] project would come from WVSC once formed and not from Vincent personally. Furthermore, the agreement for eight shares, according to Daines, came about as a renegotiation of the terms of compensation originally considered under the MOU. Daines' testimony of the events of the renegotiation reflects his continued understanding that Vincent was acting on behalf of ASC on December 13, 2000. The pertinent section of Daines' testimony on direct examination reads: Q: So what was Mr. Vincent's reaction to your conversation with him, to you telling him how uncomfortable you felt? A: His reaction was, Well, I think we can take care of this if you come on our side of the table and you get a share. Even if we are to assume, in a light most favorable to Daines, that Vincent's first we is a reference to Vincent and Daines, it is apparent that Vincent's invitation to Daines to come on our side of the table is a reference to ASC's position in the negotiations. Daines' testimony confirms his original understanding that Vincent was acting on behalf of ASC during their negotiations. Therefore, we affirm the directed verdict of the trial court.