Opinion ID: 762018
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the owner and operator of ... a facility,

Text: 32 (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 33 (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 34 (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such persons.... 35 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 36 Second, the facility is indeed a facility as defined by § 101(9) of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)). 6 See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 514. 37 Third, there is a release or a threatened release of hazardous substances at the facility. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). 38 Fourth, the plaintiff incurred costs in responding to the release or threatened release (response costs). See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 514; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). 39 And fifth, the costs incurred conform to the National Contingency Plan. 7 See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 514; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) & (B). 40 Once the plaintiff establishes these elements, the defendant is strictly liable for the presence of the hazardous substances unless it succeeds in invoking one of the statutory defenses set forth in § 107(b) (42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)). 8 It is not a defense that the particular hazardous substance attributable to a specific defendant is not linked to the plaintiff's response costs. See Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 514; Alcan, 990 F.2d at 721; United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir.1992). 41 Although not heretofore raised in these proceedings, a serious problem meets Prisco's case at the threshold. Where a party seeking to recover response costs is itself a potentially responsible party within the meaning of § 107(a) (42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)), he or she may not bring suit for full cost recovery under § 107 as Prisco has. Such a plaintiff is limited instead to an action for contribution from other potentially responsible parties under CERCLA § 113(f)(1) (42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)). See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-25 (2d Cir.1998). Prisco, being the owner at all relevant times of the Prisco landfill, has the characteristics of a potentially responsible party within the meaning of § 107(a)(2). Accordingly, although the issue appears to have gone unnoticed until now, it seems that Prisco's CERCLA claim should not have proceeded under § 107 but, if at all, only under § 113(f)(1). 42 This raises the question whether the dismissal of Prisco's CERCLA claim therefore should be affirmed on the grounds, not argued here or below, that it was improper from its inception, or the claim should instead be construed to be one under § 113(f)(1) although not pleaded or tried as such. The question need not be resolved, however. The elements of an action under § 113(f)(1) are the same as those under § 107(a). Id. at 427-28; see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Because we find that the district court correctly determined that Prisco failed to establish the elements of a § 107 claim, the same result necessarily would obtain even were we to construe the claim as one for contribution under § 113(f)(1).