Opinion ID: 2636144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hall's Asserted Liberty Interests

Text: Yet, as we have discussed, even though due process does not demand that a probation violation warrant be executed before an alleged violator is released from custody after having served the sentence for an unrelated felony conviction, an earlier resolution may be necessary if the alleged violator can show an infringement of a liberty interest. This raises the question of the possible remaining constitutional limits. In this context, post- Moody, courts have adopted various approaches to determine if a delay in executing a violation warrant violates due process. See 2 Cohen, §§ 24:22 to 24:24. One approach is the one traditionally used in Kansasa showing that prejudice has resulted from the delay. See 2 Cohen, § 24:23; see also State v. Wonders, 27 Kan.App.2d 588, Syl. ¶ 5, 8 P.3d 8, rev. denied 269 Kan. 940 (2000) (no due process violation unless prejudice to the defendant is shown by the delay, or there is an indication that the violation has been waived by the government). While the other approaches include other factors, prejudice caused by the delay is always an important factor. 2 Cohen, §§ 22:22 to 24:24. We see no persuasive reason to create a different test for this circumstance than the prejudice test Kansas courts have utilized in other contexts. Therefore, we examine whether Hall was prejudiced by the delay. In this regard, Hall and the Court of Appeals raised several considerations. Hall raised an argument of potential prejudice in his letters to the district court when he complained the detainer prevented him from participating in rehabilitation programs in prison. The Supreme Court rejected this basis in Moody, 429 U.S. at 88-89 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 274 and Hall has not established why a different result should be reached under Kansas law. As with the federal procedure, Kansas corrections officials have discretion in determining what programs will be available and who will qualify for those programs. As such, a liberty interest does not arise. See Schuyler v. Roberts, 285 Kan. 677, 175 P.3d 259 (2008). The Court of Appeals found potential prejudice because of the emotional anxiety attached to waiting to learn of the outcome of the revocation motion. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this created a right to due process. A defendant incarcerated for a reason other than the delay in the hearings cannot properly attribute his anxiety at being incarcerated-or the prejudice it implies-to the hearing delays. State v. Benjamin, 182 Vt. 54, 929 A.2d 1276, 1283 (2007). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, Hall knew he had violated his probation because he was convicted of crimes committed while he was on probation, and he knew the Saline County sentence was consecutive to the McPherson County sentence. Also, there has been a suggestion that Hall might receive a concurrent sentence and the delay would eliminate the possibility. This suggestion has no merit because it was not possible for Hall to receive a concurrent sentence. First, the sentence in Saline County was ordered by that judge to run consecutively. The judge hearing the McPherson County revocation motion did not have jurisdiction to modify that sentence. Furthermore, because Hall committed the Saline County crimes while on probation in McPherson County, a consecutive sentence is mandatory: Any person who is convicted and sentenced for a crime committed while on probation, assigned to a community correctional services program, on parole, on conditional release or on postrelease supervision for a felony shall serve the sentence consecutively to the term or terms under which the person was on probation, assigned to a community correctional services program or on parole or conditional release. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-4608(c). Thus, it was well established that Hall could not serve concurrent sentences. A final consideration is one raised in Moody, i.e., the possibility the delay would impair the ability to present evidence. Even though Hall admits his violation, the prejudice may arise if there is an actual loss of evidence regarding mitigating circumstances that would be presented to influence the court regarding disposition. See United States v. Williams, 558 F.2d 224, 227 (5th Cir.1977) ([I]n revocation cases, even if the prisoner admits the violation, he may be prejudiced if delay has impaired his ability to present evidence of mitigating circumstances that might affect the decision to incarcerate him and the conditions of incarceration.); Parham v. Warden, 172 Conn. 126, 134, 374 A.2d 137 (1976) (To establish that a delay has produced a denial of due process, the person arrested must show that actual significant prejudice to him has resulted.). Again, Hall failed to show or even argue that he has suffered actual prejudice in his ability to offer a defense. See, e.g., Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755, 761-62 (10th Cir.1981) (holding that, absent showing of prejudice, delay in holding revocation hearing on parole revocation warrant does not violate parolee's due process rights). Therefore, this approach to due process affords Hall no relief. Hall offers no other potential liberty interest. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, Hall has failed to establish prejudice or otherwise establish that a liberty interest was infringed. Consequently, the district court correctly determined that the State did not have to execute the warrant and immediately conduct a hearing on the motion to revoke probation. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Hall's probation. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the district court's revocation of Hall's probation is affirmed.