Opinion ID: 66346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: October 2007 Revocation Hearing

Text: In October 2007, Diaz’s counsel filed a motion requesting that the district court resume Diaz’s revocation hearing instead of waiting until the appeal of his armed bank robbery convictions was decided. On appeal, Diaz’s counsel said she made this request because Diaz was subject to twenty-three-hour lockdown in the current detention facility and could not be designated by the Bureau of Prisons to be moved to another facility until the district court ruled on the revocation petition. In October 2007, the district court resumed Diaz’s revocation hearing. The district court addressed Diaz, but Diaz said his name was Za-El Iye. Diaz spelled his new name for the court reporter and stated, “Here this day as defendant of faith to make entry of discovery, make declaration of alienation from assumed citizenry of the United States of America, or any of our subsister states, my proclamation as a foreign bureaucratic diplomatic of a foreign nation. . . . And a sacred forfeit unto God.” In explaining the purpose of the hearing, the district court stated that Diaz 5 had now been tried and convicted. Diaz responded, “That’s not the person I am now is not who you recognize.” Diaz’s counsel stated, “[I]t is my understanding this morning that Mr. Diaz, he has requested to represent himself, and I wanted to make that known to the Court, because I have not been interjecting any sort of argument.” The district court stated that it wanted to explain to Diaz that the purpose of the hearing was to sentence him on his violation of supervised release from the Louisiana conviction and why it was important to proceed. The district court asked Diaz if he remembered the previous supervised release hearing. Diaz responded, “As I said, I am sacred, forfeited to God, St. DA I’z Naga, I & IKARA, serving up a higher elect. Okay. That’s a congregation created by the heavenly manna by God.” Diaz further stated, “I am an autonomous religious faith, living in a liberty establishment.” The district court explained that the petition to revoke supervised release needed to be resolved or Diaz would remain in pretrial release. The district court stated that the guidelines range for the supervised release violation was seventeen months’ imprisonment, which the court observed was “very small” in comparison to the 584-month sentence Diaz received on the armed bank robbery convictions. The district court stated that regardless of whether Diaz represented himself or 6 allowed Silas to represent him, it wanted to proceed so Diaz could be transferred from the pretrial facility to a regular prison with better conditions. The government noted Diaz’s appeal of his armed bank robbery convictions still was pending. The government agreed that Diaz would have to remain in a pretrial facility until the supervised release violations were resolved because the government would not dismiss the petition. The district court acknowledged that Diaz did not recognize the court’s authority over him, but stated that it was in Diaz’s best interest to be sentenced and moved to a regular facility. The district court stated it would like to proceed that day with Silas representing Diaz. Diaz stated, “According to my understanding, this hearing is to determine whether I’m to be–I, the person now, is to be sentenced or not to be sentenced.” Diaz continued with the following: I hereby invoke the supreme power of this imperial majesty by a divine right of kings and guardians, and intrinsic inalienable and natural rights, you know, of which no government or creature might infringe upon, and impede, or interfere, or prohibit the free exercise of my unalienable rights to worship, adhere, express, engage or observe any form, quote-unquote, religious opinion, or refrain from any form of, quote-unquote, religious opinion, public or private. And as is upheld in the U.S. Constitution, upheld by the First Amendment, you know, as well. So, I conclude then, professing such a sacred state to be civil death and a civil death again, and therefore, any consecutive jurisdiction or enforcement of this foreign ruling, and with that said, 7 the only remaining question is to the lady of the Court sitting in the seat of judgment, do you have any objections to these said eternal divine natural ecclesiastical, quote-unquote, religious humane intrinsic, inalienable, inherent rights of liberties, or either objection to the United States Constitution of law, abiding by the First and Ninth Amendment. Diaz then asked if the court and government objected to “these said rights and liberties.” The district court responded by asking if it could proceed to sentence him. Diaz said, “I’m asking you, anybody in this court, have any objection to my divine, eternal, natural, ecclesastical, quote-unquote, religious, humane, intrinsic, inalienable, inherent rights and liberties?” The district court commented that it did not think it could go forward. The district court again attempted to explain to Diaz that it either could sentence Diaz that day and have him transferred to another facility or send him back to the pretrial facility. Diaz responded, “Being there is no one that objects to these rights and liberties of mine, I demand I be at large.” The district court denied Diaz’s request. The district court asked Diaz’s counsel if it was her understanding that Diaz wanted to represent himself. Diaz’s counsel said that was her understanding, but the court had not ruled on Diaz’s request. The district court confirmed that it had not ruled on the request. Diaz’s counsel also requested the court to impose a concurrent sentence on any revocation because Diaz already had received a large sentence and further incarceration would not accomplish anything. In response to 8 his counsel’s request, Diaz said, “I object, ma’am. I don’t recognize no charges bearing or binding upon Iye, the person I am now.” The district court observed that it thought Diaz did a good job representing himself at trial. Diaz responded, “Are you referring to Iye or the personality of the defendant. I am Za-El Iye.” The district court stated that Diaz generally understood when it was in his interest to go forward and when it was not and that what he was doing that day was not in his interest. The district court again asked Diaz if it could proceed to sentence him so he could be moved from the pretrial detention facility. Diaz responded as follows: Ma’am, you don’t have no jurisdiction over Iye, the person I am now. Okay. And I really think you are hedging on this up to here, because, you know, the issue is that, you know, I am not the defendant. I haven’t been proven guilty of nothing. The person I am now is Za-El Iye, seen in the eyes of God, Da I Iez Match. And the evidence shows that, I submit, the government don’t have the right to infringe upon no form of religious opinion or practice by the First Amendment. The district court stated that the government has “a right to impose upon somebody that robs a bank.” Diaz responded, “I’m not here to dispute no legal fiction or legalese. I haven’t discussed it. I’m not here to dispute it or argue it.” The district court asked the government for its sentence recommendation, and the government recommended a seventeen-month sentence to run concurrently with his current sentences on the armed bank robbery convictions. The district 9 court asked Diaz if he understood that the government was not asking for any additional sentence. Diaz responded, “I don’t understand what you are insinuating.” The district court stated, “Tell you what I’m going to do. I’m going to proceed with Ms. Silas as your counsel. I’m going to find a violation of your supervised release.” Diaz objected and said, “I already represented myself,” and “I already made the record in my claim that you don’t have the right to impose upon my religious practice.” Diaz stated to the court, “You don’t have a right to impose upon a religious establishment. I have unwritten rights protected and defended by the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution. So, I mean, you know, you are breaching your own constitutional law.” The district court stated that it understood Diaz’s position, but nevertheless found that Diaz’s “bank robbery” conviction in her court was a grade A violation of his supervised release in Louisiana. Diaz said, “I’m not here to argue or dispute no legal fiction or legalese, much less hearsay, which you speak hearsay.” The district court sentenced Diaz to seventeen months’ imprisonment. Diaz asked, “Who is you? Who are you referring to?” and reiterated “I am Za-El Eye.” The district court explained that the sentence it was imposing would run concurrently with his armed bank robbery sentences. Diaz stated, “I’m not binded by that.” 10 The district court restated its finding that Diaz had committed a grade A violation and its sentence of seventeen months’ imprisonment to run concurrently with Diaz’s armed bank robbery sentences. The district court allowed Diaz to object to the court’s findings, guidelines calculations, sentence, and the manner in which the sentence was pronounced. The following exchange occurred between Diaz, Diaz’s counsel, and the district court: Diaz: Are you referring to Za-El Iye? Court: I’m referring to you. Diaz: The defender of the faith. Court: I’m referring to you. It’s your time to object. Diaz: The person now? Diaz’s counsel: Judge, for the record. Diaz: Are you referring to Iye, the person now? Court: I’m referring to you. Diaz’s counsel: Defendant objects on his previously stated grounds. Court: All right. Thank you. Diaz: The defender of the faith and the person now. Is that who you are referring to? Court: I’m referring to you. Diaz: Who is you? Court: The person sitting right in that chair. Diaz: I mean, the person sitting in this chair is innocent and outside the United States jurisdiction as a religious establishment. The district court informed Diaz of his right to appeal. Diaz objected that his name was not Diaz. The district court asked Diaz’s counsel to file an appeal on his behalf, and Silas said she would. Diaz said, “I object, I object. Again, she 11 don’t have the right to file anything on the Iye, the person now, on my behalf. I refuse to be misconstrued as being a surety to this Mr. Diaz who you are referring to. There is no Mr. Diaz present here.” Diaz’s counsel stated that it might be more appropriate for the clerk to file a notice of appeal for him. Diaz objected, and the district court said it needed to hear from his counsel. Diaz’s counsel said it was not clear that Diaz wanted her to represent him going forward. Diaz said, “It is clear. I’m representing myself.” After Diaz’s counsel further discussed the options for filing an appeal for Diaz, Diaz stated, “My question is what evidence has been presented to impose sentence on Iye, the person now, the defender of the faith. I am Za-El Iye. What evidence is there? There is none.” The district court explained that he had a conviction for bank robbery while on supervised release. Diaz responded, “Concerning this matter of my religious practice, as a religious establishment, what evidence is there presented now? I’m not arguing or disputing no legalese or any past time. I’m speaking of now, at this hearing today, the 30th of October. What evidence? There is none, right?” After the district court repeated its previous statement, Diaz stated, “This is not a bank robbery here. I said I’m not here to argue or dispute no legalese or legal fiction.” Diaz filed this appeal. 12