Opinion ID: 1184098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Court Erred in Overruling Objection to Haydel's Four Signed Statements on Grounds of Coercion.

Text: (1a) Defendants contend that the court erred in admitting, over objection on the ground of coercion, Haydel's four signed statements since they were extracted from him by the security officers through promises and trickery and through psychological duress, emanating from the enforced detention of his wife and child. The People argue that there was no state action which would invoke the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution since the statements were elicited by private persons and that in any event the statements were voluntary. (2) The use in a criminal prosecution of involuntary confessions constitutes a denial of due process of law under both the federal and state Constitutions. ( Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 623-624, 92 S.Ct. 619]; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-386 [12 L.Ed.2d 908, 920-921, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205]; People v. Sanchez, 70 Cal.2d 562, 571 [75 Cal. Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74]; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [6 Cal. Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R. 2d 1418].) (3) Involuntary admissions are also inadmissible ( People v. Underwood, 61 Cal.2d 113, 120 [37 Cal. Rptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937]; People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 169-170 [346 P.2d 764]), and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires exclusion of coerced admissions if they are sufficiently damaging. ( Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 ...; but cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 162-163, footnote 5....) [2] ( People v. Atchley, supra, p. 170.) (1b) In People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 293 [332 P.2d 97], wherein the defendant was beaten and threatened with violence by civilians and confessed to the police shortly thereafter, this court in holding the confession inadmissible stated in part, No valid grounds for distinction are to be found in the fact that the coercion in this case was inflicted by civilians, and not the police. Decisions holding that confessions are inadmissible because they were rendered under conditions of threatened mob violence by civilians against an accused clearly imply such conclusion. [Citations.] The prohibition which bars the use of involuntary confessions is not only designed as a regulation of the conduct of police officers, but also to insure that an accused's right to a fair trial is protected. [Citation.] (4) The absence of volition condemns an enforced confession. Due process requires that it be given voluntarily and without promise of immunity or reward. (See also Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) p. 109, fn. 2.) (1c) The foregoing reasoning in People v. Berve, supra, 51 Cal.2d 286, 293, likewise appears applicable where the confession is not only coerced by, but also made to, civilians, and cases in a number of jurisdictions have concluded that an involuntary confession, whether made to law enforcement officers or private persons, is inadmissible. ( People v. Frank, 52 Misc.2d 266 [275 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571-572]; State v. Ely, 237 Ore. 329 [390 P.2d 348, 349]; Fisher v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 379 S.W.2d 900, 901 et seq.; see State v. Christopher, 10 Ariz. App. 169 [457 P.2d 356, 358].) Thus whether or not the security guards here were private persons, the People's argument that there was no state action which would invoke the due process clause cannot be upheld. We turn next to whether Haydel's four written statements were shown to have been voluntarily made. (5) Before confessions or admissions may be used against a defendant the prosecution has the burden of showing that they were voluntary and not the result of any form of compulsion or promise of reward, and it is the duty of a reviewing court to examine the uncontradicted facts in order to determine independently whether the statements were voluntary. (Italics added; People v. Underwood, supra, 61 Cal.2d 113, 121; in accord, People v. Sanchez, supra, 70 Cal.2d 562, 571-572.) (6) `If an individual's will was overborne or if his confession was not the product of a rational intellect and a free will, his confession is inadmissible because coerced. These standards are applicable whether a confession is the product of physical intimidation or pyschological pressure....' ( Townsend v. Sain ... 372 U.S. 293, 307 ..., quoting from Reck v. Pate ... 367 U.S. 433, 440 ...; and Blackburn v. Alabama ... 361 U.S. 199, 208....) (7) In determining whether the defendant's confession is the product of a rational intellect and a free will, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession must be taken into account. ( People v. Sanchez, supra, 70 Cal.2d 562, 572; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-227 [36 L.Ed.2d 854, 860-863, 93 S.Ct. 2041].) (8a) It does not appear from the uncontradicted evidence that Haydel's first written statement was involuntary. The questioning before that statement was of short duration and Haydel was a mature individual with three years of college. (See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 [22 L.Ed.2d 684, 693, 89 S.Ct. 1420].) He had retired as a master sergeant after 23 years in the military and held a supervisory position at the store. Although Haydel testified that Kinney told him The only way you're going to get your wife and baby out is if you sign [the first statement], Kinney denied having made any promises to Haydel, and when asked, Did you tell him that ... you'd let his wife off or let the child go home or anything like that?, Kinney replied, No, I did not. Haydel further testified that Kinney denied him permission to call an attorney and that he was also refused permission to call the police. Kinney and Pennock testified to the contrary. Such conflicting evidence will not be reweighed on appeal. (See People v. Carr, 8 Cal.3d 287, 296 [104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513]; People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal.2d 71, 85 [14 Cal. Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13].) Before Haydel signed the first statement his wife had been arrested, but the arrest was made after she and Haydel were caught in the act of taking the store's merchandise without paying for it. This is not a case where officers restrained the defendant's wife without having any grounds for her arrest and released her many hours later as soon as the defendant confessed (see People v. Trout, supra, 54 Cal.2d 576, 584), nor a case in which a confession was coerced by a threat to arrest a near relative ( People v. Shelton, 151 Cal. App.2d 587, 588 [311 P.2d 859]; see People v. Matlock, 51 Cal.2d 682, 697 [336 P.2d 505]). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the first statement was signed about 2 p.m., i.e., about an hour and a half after Haydel's arrest, and that the police were not called until nearly 6 p.m., and it does not appear that Haydel was taken before a magistrate during that period. (9) Penal Code section 847 provides: A private person who has arrested another for the commission of a public offense must, without unnecessary delay, take the person before a magistrate or deliver him to a peace officer.... (Italics added.) Penal Code section 849 provides: When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or a private person, the person arrested, if not otherwise released, shall without unnecessary delay, be taken before the ... most accessible magistrate.... (Italics added.) A delay of even a few hours may be unnecessary. (See Dragna v. White, 45 Cal.2d 469, 472 [289 P.2d 428]; Vernon v. Plumas Lumber Co., 71 Cal. App. 112, 115-118 [234 P. 869].) (8b) Even if the initial one and a half hour delay was unnecessary and the detention therefore illegal, this would not ipso facto render Haydel's first written statement involuntary but merely would be a circumstance to be considered in determining the issue of voluntariness. ( In re Walker, 10 Cal.3d 764, 779 [112 Cal. Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129]; People v. Kendrick, supra, 56 Cal.2d 71, 85; People v. Bashor, 48 Cal.2d 763, 765 [312 P.2d 255]; Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 3, 10 [291 P.2d 929]; see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) pp. 454-455.) We conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling the objection on the ground of coercion to Haydel's first written statement. (10) With respect to the second statement, i.e., the consent to search, Haydel testified that Kinney told him his wife and child could go if he would sign that statement and that Pennock also kept telling him if he wanted his wife and son out to sign the statements. Kinney and Pennock testified to the contrary, and we will not reweigh that conflict (see People v. Carr, supra, 8 Cal.3d 287, 296; People v. Kendrick, supra, 56 Cal.2d 71, 85.) However, as we shall see, it appears from uncontradicted evidence that the consent to search was involuntary. It appears without dispute that before the consent to search was signed Haydel requested that his wife and son be allowed to accompany them to the house for the search, that it was not until after Haydel signed that document he realized his request would not be granted, [3] and that during the afternoon Haydel asked several times when his wife and child would be released. [4] It is thus apparent that Haydel was concerned about his wife and child and anxious to have their detention terminated. The detention of Mrs. Haydel, as well as that of Haydel, was illegal when he signed the consent to search (see Pen. Code, §§ 847, 849), as was conceded by the Attorney General at oral argument. As heretofore appears it was about 2:45 p.m. when Haydel signed the consent to search, i.e., about 2 hours and 15 minutes after his arrest. No reason was shown why the police could not have been called by that time. It was only after Haydel had acceded to the security officers' requests that he sign the first three statements (and perhaps the fourth statement) that the police were finally called. Even though the security officers had obtained the first signed confession from Haydel they persisted in their efforts to secure from him still another signature on another statement and they continued to keep the Haydels in separate rooms. It was not until after Haydel signed the consent to search that he was permitted to talk to his wife again. As heretofore appears, about 45 minutes elapsed between the time Haydel signed the first statement and the time he signed the second statement, and the psychological pressure on him to cooperate in the hope of freeing his wife and child undoubtedly increased with the passage of time. [5] The uncontradicted portions of the record thus disclose that the consent to search was obtained in an atmosphere of substantial coercion (see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 [10 L.Ed.2d 513, 520, 83 S.Ct. 1336]), created by the actions of the security officers. We are satisfied that the consent to search was the product of psychological coercion and involuntary. The third and fourth statements in our opinion were likewise the product of psychological coercion and involuntary. The court thus erred in overruling the objection to Haydel's second, third, and fourth statements.