Opinion ID: 360519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction to Award Damages

Text: 28 For the reasons we have already given, we hold that the district court was correct in declaring the regulations void, enjoining their enforcement, and ordering Glines reinstated in a status that is consistent with his status before he was relieved from active duty. However, it lacked jurisdiction to award him back pay, and we must vacate that part of its judgment. 29 Under the Tucker Act, a district court has jurisdiction to award damages against the United States to a maximum of $10,000. All other monetary claims must go to the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(2). There is no such restriction on actions seeking nonmonetary relief or actions claiming that a government official acted in violation of the Constitution or of statutory authority. The reason is that in these situations Congress has either waived sovereign immunity or the doctrine does not apply. 5 U.S.C. § 702; Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-91, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 1978); 14 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3655 (Supp.1977). These doctrines justify the district court's judgment except for its award of back pay. Since the Court of Claims is without jurisdiction to grant general declaratory or equitable relief, the district court had no reason to defer to it. 28 U.S.C. § 1491; United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). 30 Congress has waived sovereign immunity when damages will be paid from the public treasury only if the claimant sues under the Tucker Act in the proper court. Glines did not plead Tucker Act jurisdiction, and in any event the district court awarded him an amount in excess of its Tucker Act authority. While a district court may give damages as an incident to a declaratory judgment, it may do so only if such relief would otherwise be within its jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202; United States v. King,395 U.S. at 3-4, 89 S.Ct. 1501. 31 Glines argues that sovereign immunity is inapplicable, and the district court therefore had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because he alleged that the regulations are unconstitutional and in violation of a statute. He cites Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., supra, in support of his position. However, he does not come within the Larson exception to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court specifically noted in Larson that a suit would still fail as against the sovereign if relief would require affirmative action or the disposition of sovereign property. 337 U.S. at 691 n. 11, 69 S.Ct. 1457. Glines' action is of this nature. His relief must come from the Court of Claims. The government, of course, could not relitigate in that forum any issues which have been decided against it here. 32 We affirm the judgment of the district court except for its award of back pay. We vacate that award and remand it to the district court with instructions either to dismiss the claim without prejudice to another action in the Court of Claims or to transfer that part of the case to the Court of Claims directly. Sherar v. Harless, 561 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1977). 33 Affirmed in part: vacated and remanded in part.