Opinion ID: 304012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Judicial Proceeding

Text: 7 Beale's complaint was filed in the district court on January 12, 1971. It alleged that Beale was a member of a class composed of black citizens in or about the Miami area who have been discriminated against by the defendants with respect to employment solely on account of race or color. It continued that the defendants have pursued and continue to pursue a pattern or practice and custom or usage of racial discrimination which has deprived and tended to deprive the plaintiffs and members of their class of the same right to make and enforce contracts, and the same right to enjoy property as it is enjoyed by white persons. According to the complaint, the defendants had implemented their racially discriminatory policies in numerous ways, among them being: (1) by subjecting black employees to harsher discipline than white employees; and (2) by failing and refusing to take such affirmative steps as may be necessary to correct the effects of their past racially discriminatory practices. Alleging district court jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42, U.S.C., Sections 1981-1988, Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1343, and Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1331, the complaint sought injunctive relief against the named defendants and their subordinates prohibiting continuance of racially discriminatory practices against the class represented by Beale, seeking damages in excess of $10,000.00 to the members of that class, and reinstating Beale with back pay. Trial by jury was demanded under Rule 38, F.R.Civ.P. One additional discharged black postal employee moved for leave to intervene. If the trial judge acted on that motion before the dismissal, we do not find his order in that respect in the record before us. 8 On April 8, 1971, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The defendants' motion was granted, with prejudice, on April 28, 1971. Beale filed his notice of appeal April 30, 1971. On September 3, 1971, he advised this Court that the Board of Appeals and Review had on August 25 sustained the decision to terminate his employment.II. THE CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 9 Although the district court did deal in terms with the complaint's request for injunctive relief against the defendants' allegedly racially discriminatory practices, we are of the opinion that such relief is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This holding is compelled under our decision in Blaze v. Moon, 5 Cir. 1971, 440 F.2d 1348. 10 Blaze, supra, was a suit by a former temporary employee of the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The complaint named the Corps and its Houston, Texas, District Engineer as defendants and charged that the Corps engaged in the practice of hiring blacks for temporary jobs only, reserving its permanent positions for white applicants. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction by reason of sovereign immunity, 1970, 315 F.Supp. 495. We affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, citing Judge (now Mr. Justice) Blackmun's opinion for the Eighth Circuit in Gnotta v. United States, 1969, 415 F.2d 1271, cert. denied 1970, 397 U.S. 934, 90 S.Ct. 941, 25 L.Ed.2d 115. 11 Conceding the undetermined possibility that various branches of the former United States Post Office did indeed practice racial discrimination with respect to department employees, the district court was without power to consider such a request for relief in the absence of a specific grant of jurisdiction from Congress to afford antidiscrimination injunctive relief. 6