Opinion ID: 198876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Race-based harassment

Text: 31 In his amended complaint and trial court brief, as well as in his appellate brief, Landrau asserted a claim of race-based harassment that is separable from the failure to promote and constructive termination claims. 7 See Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 463. An employee states a claim under Title VII if he alleges offensive, race-based conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment and is subjectively perceived by the victim as abusive. See id. 32 [W]hether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. 33 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 34 Unlike the failure to promote claim, Landrau's harassment claim is not time-barred. As discussed supra, he described specific episodes of mistreatment as well as ongoing harassment occurring within the 300-day limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 35 The district court stated that Landrau had not provided enough evidence to support a finding of continuous harassment, unreasonably tight supervision, or imposition of a hostile working environment. In so concluding, it referenced only the two written reprimands Landrau received after Bou became his supervisor and the break incident (in which Landrau brought co-workers to Bou to explain that he had given proper notice when he took a meal break). The court apparently did not take into account other specific aspects of the mistreatment Landrau alleged in his deposition and affidavit --including, inter alia, the verbal criticisms, the monitoring of his whereabouts, the reference to kinky hair, Bou's purported attempt to frame him, Bou's failure to accommodate Landrau's physical injury, and the complaint about his meeting with other black employees to discuss a discrimination claim -- that were not imposed on white employees. 36 There is, to be sure, some tension between Landrau's affidavit in support of his opposition to summary judgment and his deposition. In his affidavit he states that he was subjected to ongoing criticism and harassment, including Bou's almost daily verbal reprimands, weekly yelling, and heightened monitoring of his work and whereabouts. But when asked earlier to describe specific admonishments in his deposition, Landrau enumerated only the two written reprimands and the break incident. The comprehensiveness of this response, however, is rendered somewhat ambiguous by the fact that when asked whether he had received any verbal admonishments, he mentioned [t]he persecutions that I have always had, then went on to discuss the break incident. He later stated in his deposition that he did not recall other admonishments at that time. While fodder for impeachment, Landrau's statements do not involve the sort of direct contradiction that we have held fails to create a genuine factual dispute for summary judgment purposes. See, e.g., Borowiec v. Local No. 1570, 889 F.2d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 1989). 37 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we find the evidence in Landrau's affidavit and deposition, while close to the line, to be sufficient to withstand summary judgment. 8 We must, of course, consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Landrau. See Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1992). This evidence might, if proven, support a race-based harassment claim. See, e.g., Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (plaintiff alleged comments or jokes of a racial nature); Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 463 (plaintiff alleged that he was coerced into performing tasks inconsistent with his medical restriction, unlike white employees). Alleged conduct that is not explicitly racial in nature may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered along with more overtly discriminatory conduct in assessing a Title VII harassment claim. See DeGrace v. Rumsfield, 614 F.2d 796, 800 (1st Cir. 1980) (evidence of equipment sabotage and co-workers' silent treatment considered along with racially explicit notes); see also Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 563-64 (6th Cir. 1999) (sexual harassment); O'Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 701 (8th Cir. 1999). We note further that there is evidence that Landrau complained about his alleged mistreatment to Banco Popular's management, and that he suffered emotional harm as a result of the harassment. On the present state of the record, we cannot say that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning Landrau's race-based harassment claim. Thus, while we take no view on its ultimate merits, we must vacate the district court's entry of summary judgment on that claim and remand it for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.