Opinion ID: 448999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admissibility of marler's statement

Text: 42 Marler contends that the district court erred in admitting his statement that he was not going in any water for any fucken [sic] PC. Marler objected to introduction of the statement because, he claimed, it was irrelevant, see Fed.R.Evid. 401, and any probative value it had was outweighed by its highly prejudicial nature, see Fed.R.Evid. 403. The court admitted the statement, finding it relevant on the issue of Marler's intent to deprive Brown of his civil rights, but gave this limiting instruction regarding its use: 43 I want to tell you that this indictment does not charge Mr. Marler with a failure to rescue but rather in the words of the indictment itself, it says: He did willfully assault Lawrence J. Brown by pushing him into the waters of Lynn Harbor and thereby deprived him of his constitutional right. 44 But you may regard this testimony that is now being offered to you for whatever other relevant purpose you think it may have, including evidence of what Mr. Marler's intentions or state of mind was during these events. 9 45 Wide discretion as to the relevancy of evidence is vested in the trial judge, both as to its probative value and its prejudicial impact. United States v. DeVincent, 546 F.2d 452, 457 (1st Cir.1976) [, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 903 [97 S.Ct. 1694, 52 L.Ed.2d 387] (1977) ]; United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 268 (1st Cir.1976) [, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909 [97 S.Ct. 1181, 51 L.Ed.2d 585] (1977) ]. United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 1237, 59 L.Ed.2d 468 (1979). We cannot say that the court below abused its discretion in admitting Marler's statement. United States v. Coast of Maine Lobster Co., 557 F.2d 905, 908 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862, 98 S.Ct. 191, 54 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). 46 To convict, the prosecution had to prove that Marler willfully violated Brown's civil rights. The requisite intent could be established by all the attendant circumstances--the malice of [the defendant], the weapons used in the assault, its character and duration, the provocation, if any, and the like. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). A juror might reasonably find Marler's statement probative on the issue of his malice toward Brown and therefore on his intent or state of mind in taking the actions he did. The court's limiting instructions, by focusing the jury's attention on the purpose behind the evidence, tend to guard against misuse of the evidence for an irrelevant, prejudicial purpose. That there was an obscenity in the statement did not make it any the less material nor so prejudicial as to have rendered it inadmissible. Cf. United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d 218 (1st Cir.1981). 47 Affirmed.