Opinion ID: 204313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interpretation of the TDRA

Text: Our method of statutory interpretation is well established: Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. See United States v. Ron Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). When the plain meaning of a statutory provision is unambiguous, that meaning is controlling. Id. at 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026. To determine the plain meaning of a statutory provision, we examine not only the specific provision at issue, but also the structure of the statute as a whole, including its object and policy. See Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 405 (9th Cir.1983). If ambiguity exists, we may use legislative history as an aid to interpretation. See id.; Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir.1992). Children's Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Belshe, 188 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir.1999) (parallel citations omitted). Here, moreover, the language of the new statute, when compared to the language of the former statute, provides a firm basis for decision. Beginning with subsection (c)(1) of 15 U.S.C. § 1125, Congress provided that the owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who . . . commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (emphasis added). When referring to the junior mark, Congress did not authorize an injunction against another person who commences use of the mark; use of the definite article the clearly would have signaled that the junior mark had to be the same as the senior. Instead, Congress employed the indefinite article a, which indicates that any number of unspecified, junior marks may be likely to dilute the senior mark. Turning to the language of subsection (c)(2)(B), the TDRA defines dilution by blurring as the association arising from the similarity between a mark and a trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Congress did not require an association arising from the substantial similarity, identity or near identity of the two marks. The word chosen by Congress, similarity, sets forth a less demanding standard than that employed by many courts under the FTDA. This analysis of the language of the statute, and our comparison of this language with the now-repealed statute, are further supported by Congress's decision to employ, in subsection (c)(2)(B), a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors to determine when dilution has occurred. Congress's implementation of such a methodology is simply not compatible with a determination that identity, near identity or substantial similarity are necessary to constitute a threshold showing for relief under § 1125(c). Indeed, Congress chose instead to make the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark, id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added), to be the first of the six (or more) relevant factors to be considered. No doubt, similarity has a special role to play in the implementation of the new statute's multifactor approach. After all, dilution by blurring is defined by the statute as an association arising from the similarity between a mark . . . and a famous mark. Id. § 1125(c)(1)(B). It is also the first factor listed in the multifactor approach. Nevertheless, Congress's decision to make degree of similarity one consideration in a multifactor list strongly suggests that it did not want degree of similarity to be the necessarily controlling factor. Finally, we believe that it is significant that, in adopting the TDRA, Congress decided to re-write 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), as opposed to altering discrete wording or subsections. This action suggests that Congress did not wish to be tied to the language or interpretation of prior law, but instead crafted a new approach to our consideration of dilution-by-blurring claims. [10] Thus, the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) does not require that a plaintiff establish that the junior mark is identical, nearly identical or substantially similar to the senior mark in order to obtain injunctive relief. Rather, a plaintiff must show, based on the factors set forth in § 1125(c)(2)(B), including the degree of similarity, that a junior mark is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark. Our interpretation of the TDRA is compatible with the case law of the only other court of appeals to have addressed squarely the question whether the requirement of identity or substantial similarity survives the TDRA. In Starbucks, the company brought a federal dilution claim against Wolfe's based on its use of the term Charbucks in connection with one of its coffee blends. The district court found that the marks were not substantially similar and that `[t]his dissimilarity alone is sufficient to defeat [Starbucks's] blurring claim.' Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 107. The Second Circuit disagreed. It acknowledged that, pre-TDRA, it had required plaintiffs to show that the marks were `very' or `substantially similar' before they could prevail on a federal dilution claim. Id. (quoting Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir.2004)). This was no longer the case under the TDRA, the court explained: The post-TDRA federal dilution statute, however, provides us with a compelling reason to discard the substantially similar requirement for federal trademark dilution actions. The current federal statute defines dilution by blurring as an association arising from the similarity between a mark . . . and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark, and the statute lists six non-exhaustive factors for determining the existence of an actionable claim for blurring. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Although similarity is an integral element in the definition of blurring, we find it significant that the federal dilution statute does not use the words very or substantial in connection with the similarity factor to be considered in examining a federal dilution claim. Id. at 108. Furthermore, the court continued, in addition to leaving out any modifier for similarity, Congress also employed specific language that cannot be reconciled with a requirement of substantial similarity; the court stated: [O]ne of the six statutory factors informing the inquiry as to whether the allegedly diluting mark impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark is [t]he degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Consideration of a degree of similarity as a factor in determining the likelihood of dilution does not lend itself to a requirement that the similarity between the subject marks must be substantial for a dilution claim to succeed. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 111 n. 18 (2d Cir.2010) (We have recently explained that under the [TDRA] the similarity between the famous mark and the allegedly blurring mark need not be `substantial' in order for the dilution by blurring claim to succeed.). [11] Although we did not speak directly to the issue in Visa International, we believe that our decision in that case is consonant with the interpretation of the TDRA that we adopt here. In Visa International, we reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Visa on its trademark dilution claim. We noted that likelihood of dilution is a factual inquiry generally not appropriate for decision on summary judgment. Visa Int'l, 610 F.3d 1088, 1089. We pointed out that Congress had enumerated factors courts may use to analyze the likelihood of dilution, including the similarity between the two marks and the distinctiveness and recognition of the plaintiff's mark. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iv)). Evaluating these factors, we determined that [t]he district court was quite right in granting summary judgment to Visa. Id. at 1092. In essence, we considered the evidence in light of the factors set forth in § 1125(c)(2)(B). We identified similarity as one of the factors a court should consider and, notably, did not mention a requirement that the marks be identical or nearly identical. Most importantly, we took the degree of similarity into account along with the other § 1125(c)(2)(B) factors in determining whether dilution was likely to occur. In short, although not addressing the issue now before us head-on in Visa International, we applied the methodology that we have described here and made no reference to a requirement of identity or near identity of the marks. [12]