Opinion ID: 3209079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the nrc appropriately characterized its

Text: RULE AND CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVES AND MITIGATION MEASURES The parties disagree over the proper characterization of the NRC’s Rule. According to the NRC, the Rule “codif[ies] its generic determinations regarding the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel at-reactor, or awayfrom-reactor sites beyond a reactor’s licensed life for operation.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,241. The NRC contends that “the Rule is not a licensing action . . . .” NRC’s Br. 16. The States and the NRDC respond that the federal action at issue is reactor licensing. See States’ Br. 44; NRDC’s Br. 20. And because licensing is indisputably a “major Federal action[]” under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), the States and the NRDC argue that the NRC was required to prepare a complete environmental impact statement (“EIS”), including a consideration of alternatives and mitigation measures for the continued storage of spent fuel. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (“[M]ajor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” require an EIS or its equivalent.); see also NRDC v. NRC, -- F.3d --, No. 14-1225, 2016 WL 1639661, at  (D.C. Cir. Apr. 26, 2016) (same). We agree with the NRC and hold that, while the Rule is a “major Federal action” under NEPA, the NRC complied with its NEPA obligations by preparing the GEIS. Because the Rule is not a licensing action, the NRC need not have considered 9 the alternatives to licensing in the GEIS. We therefore deny the petitions for review on this issue. Under NEPA, an agency must consider both the environmental impacts of a proposed action and alternatives to that action. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Part of the alternatives analysis includes review of measures available to mitigate adverse effects. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.25(b), 1502.14(f). “[W]e review both an agency’s definition of its objectives and its selection of alternatives under the ‘rule of reason.’ . . . That is, as long as the agency ‘look[s] hard at the factors relevant to the definition of purpose,’ we generally defer to the agency’s reasonable definition of objectives.” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar (Theodore Roosevelt II), 661 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original). Furthermore, “NEPA does not require agencies to discuss any particular mitigation plans that they might put in place, nor does it require agencies—or third parties—to effect any.” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar (Theodore Roosevelt I), 616 F.3d 497, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our decision in New York I compels the result that the NRC’s Rule is a major federal action requiring the preparation of either an environmental assessment with a finding of no significant impact or an environmental impact statement. See 681 F.3d at 476. Like the NRC’s prior Waste Confidence Decision and Temporary Storage Rule, the NRC’s Rule in this case “ha[s] a preclusive effect in all future licensing decisions . . . .” Id. But unlike in New York I, the NRC has done exactly what NEPA requires for major federal actions; it prepared an environmental impact statement. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3. So long as that 10 environmental impact statement complies with NEPA, and we hold that it does, no more is required. The face of the NRC’s Rule also makes it clear that it is not a licensing action. To the contrary, the Rule “codif[ies] [the NRC’s] generic determinations regarding the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel atreactor, or away-from-reactor sites beyond a reactor’s licensed life for operation.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,241. “[T]he rule does not authorize the storage of spent fuel at any site [and] . . . reflects only the generic environmental analysis for the period of spent fuel storage beyond a reactor’s licensed life for operation and before disposal in a repository.” Id. at 56,243. Because the GEIS is only an input for future sitespecific reactor licensing and does not itself impose regulatory requirements on reactors, the NRC need not have considered the alternative of ceasing licensing in the GEIS. The NRC instead analyzes that alternative during site-specific licensing proceedings. See J.A. 1040 (“The alternative of not issuing or not renewing a nuclear power plant license is considered during the site-specific review of an individual license application.”). The NRC did consider alternatives for the only action it took in the Rule—i.e., incorporating the GEIS into future licensing proceedings. See J.A. 338-43. Furthermore, contrary to the petitioners’ claims, the GEIS discusses mitigation measures for pool fires, J.A. 1240-41, 1284-85, and pool leaks, including short-term, high-volume leaks, J.A. 838, 1394-96. It also evaluates measures such as the expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry storage casks, J.A. 973-74, 1454-55, limiting the use of high-burnup fuel, J.A. 912-19, 1246, 1258, 1339, and implementing hardened on-site storage, J.A. 1458. We find nothing in the GEIS to indicate that the NRC went astray of NEPA’s rule of reason. Regardless, because mitigation is equally relevant during the 11 life of a licensed reactor as it is during decommissioning, the NRC can defer consideration of such measures to site-specific review. See Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Commission’s deferral of decision on specific mitigation steps until the start of construction, when a more detailed right-of-way would be known, was both eminently reasonable and embraced in the procedures promulgated under NEPA.”). Regardless, “NEPA does not require agencies to discuss any particular mitigation plans that they might put in place.” Theodore Roosevelt I, 616 F.3d at 503 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our holding with respect to this issue is consistent with our decision in New York I. In that case, we held that the NRC’s prior Waste Confidence Decision was “a major federal action requiring either a [finding of no significant impact] or an EIS.” 681 F.3d at 476. Although we described the Waste Confidence Decision as “a pre-determined ‘stage’ of each licensing decision,” id., nowhere did we conclude that the NRC undertook licensing with its waste confidence rulemaking. The Rule in this case is likewise a major federal action because it has a preclusive effect on future licensing proceedings. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.23(b). But the proposition that all licensing actions are major federal actions does not imply its converse. When the NRC does make a licensing decision in partial reliance on the GEIS, it must at that time ensure that it has fully complied with NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (delineating the requirements for including alternatives in the EIS); Ctr. for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 599-600 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that the obligation to comply with NEPA “do[es] not mature until . . . there [has] been an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources” by the agency (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration 12 in original)). The NRC acknowledges as much. See Oral Arg. Rec. 40:43-41:40 (statements by the NRC that the decision whether to issue a license is site-specific and that the agency will consider mitigation measures and alternatives at that time). At this stage, we take the NRC at its word. But should the agency fail to consider a necessary aspect of the problem during site-specific proceedings, the parties might be able to challenge the final licensing decision. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (adjudicating consolidated petitions for review of “the [NRC’s] licensing of Seabrook Nuclear Power Station”); York Comm. for a Safe Env’t v. NRC, 527 F.2d 812, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (considering a challenge to “a final decision . . . to grant a license . . . for operation of a light-water-cooled nuclear reactor to be used for generating electricity”). We therefore deny the petitions for review on this issue.