Opinion ID: 3039321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existing Ninth Circuit Precedent

Text: [4] Until recently, it was well established in this circuit that crimes involving the reckless use of force could be crimes of violence. For example, in United States v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000), we interpreted the very statute at issue here and concluded it satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 16(a): A conviction under § 13-1203(A)(1) may be based on reckless conduct, which Ceron-Sanchez argues does not constitute violent conduct. However, in order to support a conviction under § 13-1203(A)(1), the reckless conduct must have caused actual physical injury to another person. Therefore, the use of physical force is a required element of § 13- 1203(A)(1). Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1172-73. We held that crimes of recklessness could be crimes of violence even though we recognized there is an element of voli- 7 Our standard of review is de novo. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Because the BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C. § 16 and has no special expertise regarding the interpretation of that criminal statute, we do not defer to the BIA’s interpretation of that provision.”); Singh, 386 F.3d at 1230 (“We reject the . . . assertion that we owe ‘substantial deference’ to the Attorney General’s interpretations of general state and federal criminal statutes.”). 17862 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES tion inherent in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)’s requirement that an offender “use” physical force “against” another person. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2001). Our reasoning was that recklessness “requires conscious disregard of a risk of a harm that the defendant is aware of.” Id. at 1146. On similar grounds, we held that offenses requiring “criminal negligence” could be crimes of violence. See Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001). By contrast, we held that crimes of simple negligence lacked the volitional element necessary for crimes of violence. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1145. Recently, however, we cast doubt on our cases distinguishing recklessness and criminal negligence from simple negligence. In Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2005), a Mexican citizen and national had previously been convicted under California law of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Id. at 1219. Although this conviction required a minimum culpability of “gross negligence,” an IJ found the underlying offense to have been a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and ordered the alien’s removal. LaraCazares, 408 F.3d at 1219. The BIA affirmed, citing our cases holding that crimes of criminal negligence and recklessness could be crimes of violence. Id. We reversed on the basis of Leocal. Id. at 1222. In Leocal, the Supreme Court held that driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) cannot be a crime of violence if the statute defining the offense “reach[es] individuals who were negligent or less.” 543 U.S. at 13. Rejecting the government’s argument “that Leocal add[ed] nothing to our analysis in Trinidad-Aquino and [did] not extend to gross negligence,” we held that gross negligence “does not constitute the kind of active employment of force against another that Leocal requires for a crime of violence.” Lara-Cazares, 408 F.3d at 1221. Although the facts of Lara-Cazares did not require us to discuss in detail the implications of Leocal for crimes of criminal negligence or recklessness, we concluded that Leocal FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17863 abrogated our holdings in Park and Ceron-Sanchez. See id. at 1222 (“To the extent that our decision in Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001), and the cases there cited [including Ceron-Sanchez] support a contrary result, we conclude that they are no longer good law in light of Leocal.”). Nonetheless, shortly after deciding Lara-Cazares, we relied on Ceron-Sanchez to hold a crime of recklessness—seconddegree assault under Washington law—a categorical crime of violence. See United States v. Hermoso-Garcia, 413 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J.). In doing so, we failed to distinguish Lara-Cazares or Leocal. See id. [5] Because our existing precedent is inconsistent, we must examine the reasoning of Leocal to decide the present case.