Opinion ID: 794242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Indictment and Subsequent Proceedings

Text: 17 Temple was charged in a two-count indictment dated July 17, 2003. In Count One, she was charged with a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 in that she, as an employee of the IRS, 18 acting in connection with the revenue laws of the United States, did willfully oppress a person under color of law, to wit, the defendant unlawfully, willfully and knowingly threatened two New York City Police officers, who were arresting her for aggravated harassment and other charges, to wit, she threatened that she would initiate an IRS audit of their tax returns as a way to seek revenge. 19 In Count II, Temple was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 in that she 20 unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate and interfere with a person designated in 18 U.S.C. § 1114 while engaged in and on account of the performance of official duties, to wit, EVA C. TEMPLE left a threatening message on the voicemail of the Internal Revenue Service officer handl[ing] her termination from IRS employment and thereafter sought to have the defendant's IRS employee identification confiscated. 21 Following her conviction on both counts by jury verdict on July 14, 2004, Temple moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. She moved in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. In a written opinion, the District Court granted the Rule 29 motion as to Count One and denied both motions as to Count Two. See United States v. Temple, 342 F.Supp.2d 233, 236 (S.D.N.Y.2004). In its analysis of the Count One conviction, the District Court observed that the government is required to prove three elements to establish a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(1): [F]irst, at the time of the acts alleged, the defendant was an officer or employee of the United States; second, the defendant was acting in connection with a revenue law of the United States; and third, the defendant willfully oppressed a person under color of law. Id. at 238. The District Court determined that there was no dispute as to the first element — that Temple was an employee of the IRS. Id. The District Court determined as to the second element that a reasonable jury could have found that Temple was acting in connection with the revenue laws because her threat to the detectives involved IRS audits. Id. With respect to the third element, the District Court determined that willful oppression under color of law was not established. Id. at 239. 22 With respect to the government's failure to establish the third element, the court reasoned as follows: 23 Although Temple clearly acted willfully and in an attempt to interfere with the detectives' efforts to arrest her and transport her to the precinct, her actions were not clothed with authority and she was not acting under color of law in any meaningful sense. Her tantrum was not part of the performance of any actual or pretended duty, and she was not empowered — actually or even apparently — to punish the officers for arresting her. 24 To the contrary, Temple had no power or authority, and it was clear in the circumstances here that she did not. Indeed, she had already been placed under arrest and handcuffed. She engaged in an incoherent outburst and eventually was treated as an emotionally disturbed person: a police department emergency services unit was summoned, and the Unit considered using a Taser gun to subdue her. The officers were laughing at Temple and eventually they took her to a psychiatric hospital for evaluation and treatment. Throughout this series of events, Temple called one of the detectives by the wrong name. 25 Id. at 240. 26 In further support of its conclusion that no reasonable jury could have found that Temple willfully oppressed the detectives under color of law, id. at 239-40, the District Court noted the following factors: that Temple was on notice that the IRS was proposing to remove her from service; that she had been previously disciplined for other incidents; that her employment was therefore precarious even prior to her arrest; and that there was nothing in the record to show that her employment as a program analyst enabled her to initiate audits of tax returns. Id. at 240. 27 In its discussion of the Count Two conviction, the District Court enumerated four elements that require proof by the government: 28 first, the targeted individual was a federal officer or employee; second, the defendant forcibly assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimidated, or interfered with the federal officer or employee; third, the defendant acted knowingly and willfully; and fourth, the federal officer or employee was engaged in the performance of his official duties or that the assault or interference occurred on account of the performance of his official duties. 29 Id. at 241. Finding no dispute as to the first, third, and fourth elements, the District Court focused on the second element. Id. Noting that an immediate threat of force is sufficient to meet the forcible requirement of the second element, the District Court framed the issue as follows: Ultimately, the issue is whether the government's evidence showed that Temple forcibly intimidated or interfered with Petherbridge in or because of the performance of his duties. That turns, in part, on whether the voicemail left by Temple posed an immediate or imminent threat to Petherbridge. 30 Id. at 242. 31 In finding that the requirement was met, the District Court determined that the words I'm gonna fuck you up were an expression of an immediate or imminent threat of harm in view of the surrounding circumstances. Id. These circumstances included the following: that the message tone was angry and harsh; that there was a sense of immediacy in Temple's voice; that Temple knew the location of Petherbridge's office and had the ability to gain access to it; and that the telephone call was made on the same day that Temple presented her expired IRS credentials to a bank. Id. The District Court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found that Temple might very well have been in the building or across the street or somewhere else nearby, waiting for Petherbridge to leave work at the close of the business day, when she placed the telephone call. Id. The District Court also found it significant in this regard that Petherbridge actually was intimidated by the voicemail, id., and that Temple's actions were clearly of the type the statute was designed to protect, id. at 243. 32 On December 15, 2004, the District Court sentenced Temple on Count Two, a Class A Misdemeanor, to time served (imprisonment for approximately seven weeks), supervised release for one year, and a mandatory assessment of $25.00.