Opinion ID: 1856206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mahers: Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Text: Mahers also suggests that the written report of the officer alone, without accompanying testimony, was not a sufficient basis for disciplinary action. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), we held that only some evidence is needed under the due process clause to justify a prison disciplinary action. Wilson v. Farrier, 372 N.W.2d 499, 501-02 (Iowa 1985). This standard is rather low: the `sole and only issue of constitutional substance is whether there exists any evidence at all, that is, whether there is any basis in fact to support the action taken by the prison officials.' Id. at 502 (emphasis added) (quoting Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir.1974)). In Wilson, we upheld a disciplinary action based on the testimony of a confidential informant. Id. In Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa 1986), we said that disciplinary action for illegal drug use was justified by the proof provided by urinalysis. See also Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir.1986) (short written reports on prison riot qualify as evidence); Pierce v. State, 433 N.W.2d 38, 39 (Iowa App.1988) (prison officers' written reports qualify as evidence). Under the some evidence standard applied in these cases, the officer's report on Mahers was sufficient evidence. It certainly rises above the reliability level of a confidential informant's testimony, for example.