Opinion ID: 2973161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conviction on Count IV

Text: Jenkins challenges his conviction on Count IV of the second superseding indictment, which charged him with carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony–specifically, the interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. The statute under which he was convicted, 18 4 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), states that a person who “carries an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States . . . shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years.” Jenkins argues that the carrying of the explosives that violated this section was “merely incidental” to the underlying crime, which was the theft of the explosives. This argument has two distinct points. In essence, Jenkins’s first point is that he should not be convicted under § 844(h)(2) for carrying the explosives during the commission of another felony because he had to commit the other felony in order to steal the explosives in the first place, and his conviction under § 844(h)(2) therefore constitutes double jeopardy. Jenkins premises this argument on his claim that the predicate felony here is the theft of the explosives. This premise is obviously false, inasmuch as the indictment explicitly charges Jenkins with carrying the explosives during the commission of the offense of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. Furthermore, Congress has unequivocally stated that punishment under § 844(h)(2) must run consecutively to punishment for the felony in which the explosive was used or carried: “. . . nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the felony in which the explosive was used or carried.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). Where Congress has shown its clear intent to punish two offenses separately, a defendant’s cumulative punishment for the same conduct that violates two statutes does not constitute double jeopardy. See United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2002). Jenkins’s second point is that Congress did not intend to punish the theft of explosives under § 844(h)(2), because it made the theft itself a specific crime. The intent of this section was to punish the use of explosives to further another crime, he argues, and the government was required to, but 5 did not, show that the explosives were used to further the commission of the underlying crime. The circuits differ in the way they interpret the statute. In United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986), the defendants were convicted of a violation of § 844(h)(2) for carrying explosives while committing the felony of possessing firearms. Id. at 1177. The defendants appealed, claiming that the government had shown no specific connection between the carrying of the explosives and the commission of the felony. Id. The court began its examination of the issue by noting that no court had explicitly decided whether the statute requires the government to prove a connection between the carrying of the explosive and the underlying felony. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 586 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir. 1978), United States v. Tiche, 424 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (W.D. Pa. 1977), United States v. Pliskow, 354 F. Supp. 369, 370 (E.D. Mich. 1973)). The legislative history of the section provided only that Congress’s intent was to strengthen federal laws regarding the illegal use, possession, and transportation of explosives and that § 844(h) was to carry with it the “stringent provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 relating to the use of firearms and the unlawful carrying of firearms to commit, or during the commission of a Federal felony.” Id. at 1178 (citing H.R. No. 1549, 91st Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4046). Both parties in Rosenberg and the court itself therefore looked to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in interpreting § 844(h). Before 1984, § 924(c) provided that “[w]hoever . . . uses a firearm to commit any felony . . . or . . . carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony . . . .” is guilty of an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1983). The section was amended in 1984 to provide that, “[w]hoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a firearm” is guilty of an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1984). 6 The Rosenberg court noted that the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Steward, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985), had held that the amendments to this section did not change the meaning of the section and that the “carry” language had always meant “carry in relation to.” Id. (citing Steward, 779 F.2d at 539-40). Rosenberg did not find the Steward court’s rationale persuasive and noted simply that the legislative history was insufficient to support any finding as to why Congress modified § 924(c) in that manner, that Congress did not similarly modify § 844(h), and that “Congress’s decision to amend § 924(c), but not § 844(h), is, at best, open to a multiplicity of interpretations.” Id. The court then returned to the plain language of § 844(h) and found that the section, “by its terms only requires that the government show that the defendant unlawfully carried an explosive ‘during the commission of any felony.’” Id. Noting that it was not proper for the court to “declare that the crime defined by § 844(h)(2) has more elements than those enumerated on the face of the statute,” the court said that Congress was free “to add a relational element to § 844(h)(2) . . . in the same manner that it added a relational element to § 924(c),” but until it did so, the Third Circuit would “hold that § 844(h)(2) has no relational element.” Id. at 1179. The Fifth Circuit, however, in United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991), said that, although “[a] defendant need not brandish, point, or discharge a weapon to ‘carry’ or ‘use’ the weapon,” a jury can conclude that the defendant “carried” the weapon for the purposes of § 844 “[i]f the weapon was available to facilitate the crime or if it ‘emboldened’ a defendant in his offense . . . .” Id. at 151. The court then found that the jury verdict was supported because, [i]f [the defendant] had needed to terrorize [the victim] further to ‘persuade’ her to accompany him, the bomb was readily available. [The defendant] knew that [the victim] had been frightened previously by his reference to explosives and could be coerced easily if he chose to display the bomb. The evidence was sufficient to 7 support the jury’s conclusion that the bomb facilitated the kidnapping and established an offense under § 844. Id. In United States v. King, 230 F.3d 1364 (Table), 2000 WL 1277815 (8th Cir. 2000), the court first upheld a jury conviction for possessing an illegal firearm and then stated that it also rejected the defendant’s “claim that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for carrying explosives while committing a felony, for once the jury found that he possessed an illegal firearm, his conviction for carrying explosives followed as of course.” We think that Rosenberg and King correctly interpret the statute. Because § 844(h) does not contain the “in relation” language that § 924(c) does, but rather defines the offense as “carr[ying] an explosive during the commission of [the] felony,” the plain language of the statute does not require a relational element. We therefore affirm Jenkins’s conviction on this count.