Opinion ID: 2604440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Marie L. Johnson Matter

Text: On or about September 27, 1949, the defendant was retained by Mrs. Marie L. Johnson to represent her in a divorce suit then pending in Multnomah county, wherein her husband, Joe H. Johnson, was plaintiff. At the time the business was tendered he received funds to apply on costs and retainer and shortly thereafter, $100 more. Mrs. Johnson was living in the state of Nebraska when served with summons. She initially dealt with Richard E. Person, of the firm of Person & Wilson, attorneys, practicing in Holdrege, Nebraska. Mr. Person promptly forwarded the complaint to the defendant, soliciting his services in Mrs. Johnson's behalf. Mr. Reinmiller never met Mrs. Johnson nor was she in the state of Oregon during the period while the divorce matter was pending. Except for one letter directly to Mrs. Johnson in 1952 and two letters in 1953, his communications were all with Mr. Person, with occasional copies enclosed for Mrs. Johnson. After the filing of the documents and papers hereinafter referred to, the matter was eventually set for trial on June 25, 1954, a little short of five years after it was placed in the defendant's hands for attention. At the uncontested hearing on that date, the court raised the question of jurisdiction and, in the absence of proof, continued the matter until Mr. Reinmiller could supply testimony supporting the allegation that Mr. Johnson had resided in Oregon for the statutory period. This was never done and so far as the record before us is concerned, the cause continues awaiting the required evidence of residence. Out of his professional relationship grow the following charges of the Bar Association: (1) That during the period from 1950 to April, 1954, the defendant neglected to answer communications from his client or keep her advised of the progress of the litigation; (2) That he failed to prosecute the litigation with diligence; (3) That he failed and neglected to answer communications from the State Bar and its Grievance Committee concerning the matter; and (4) That when he accepted the employment he knew that Mrs. Johnson's husband had not resided in the state for a sufficient period of time, namely, the one year necessary to give the court jurisdiction; that he failed to advise Mrs. Johnson or take any steps to bring this want of jurisdiction to the attention of the court, but proceeded, contrary to this knowledge, and set the case for trial. The defendant's answer admits the employment and the final disposition of the case as alleged, that is, he set the matter for hearing on June 25, 1954, after a delay of four years and nine months. He denies failure to answer communications, claiming as to those from the Oregon State Bar or its committee, that he has no memory or recollection concerning them. As to the jurisdictional matter, he asserts that he at no time knew that Joe H. Johnson, plaintiff in the divorce case, was not a bona fide resident of Oregon as he alleged in the divorce complaint; that he accepted such allegations as true and relied and acted on such belief. He also says he: at no time and under no circumstances did [he] attempt or intend to mislead or impose upon the court in the divorce matter. The charge in the Marie L. Johnson matter relating to defendant's knowledge of the court's want of jurisdiction because of the insufficiency of the residence of the plaintiff, Joe H. Johnson, in the divorce suit being as it is, the most serious one in this particular matter, we give it first notice. 1. The defendant in his brief asserts that there is:    no evidence in the record that Johnson was not a resident of Oregon for a year prior to filing the Complaint   . If defendant refers only to the circuit court record, he is correct. If, however, defendant is referring to the record made at the hearing before the Trial Committee, then we must disagree. We are here interested, primarily, in what Reinmiller knew about Johnson's residential qualifications and not what the court record may show. The charge made by the Bar goes to defendant's conduct in suppressing the information he had and comporting himself in the divorce matter as if such information was nonexistent. His knowledge has its origin in Mr. Person's first communication to Mr. Reinmiller. In his letter of September 21, 1949, transmitting the copy of complaint in the divorce suit served on Mrs. Johnson, Mr. Person, after observing that there are several statements in the complaint which are not correct, proceeds to point them out, including the following positive statement with reference to Mr. Johnson's allegation of residence in this state, saying: Also, he alleges [referring to the complaint] that he has been a resident of Oregon for more than one year which is not correct. Mr. and Mrs. Johnson lived in Phelps County, Nebraska, until late in 1948, at which time they moved to Denver, Colorado, and did not go to Oregon until January of 1949. Furthermore, in March of 1949 they moved to Vancouver, Washington, and lived there for a month. Mr. Person then suggests delay for the following reason: Mrs. Johnson is pregnant at this time and their third child is to be born on or about November 1, 1949, and we feel that the divorce hearing should not proceed until after the birth of this child to see whether or not the child lives and so that an allowance can be made for this third child. Again, we find Person's consciousness of the residential insufficiency when he tells Mr. Reinmiller: Mrs. Johnson does not care to object to the divorce as she realizes that it would not work for them to go back and live together as husband and wife so we don't care to raise this jurisdictional requirement as to the one year unless that is the only means that you can get his attorney to hold off hearing until after the birth of their third child. But preceding that statement is his pointed confession that I am not familiar with Oregon practice, thus leaving the ultimate procedural considerations solely to Mr. Reinmiller's judgment. This statement of Mr. Person's attains more significance when we later examine his letter of July 6, 1953, which Mr. Reinmiller relies upon heavily for exoneration on the jurisdictional question. Mr. Reinmiller made prompt acknowledgment on September 27, 1949, in which he says: I appreciate your statement on the residence matter and you are correct in that. Later, in the same letter, he gives weight to the conclusion by saying:    he hasn't been a resident of this State long enough and is attempting to obtain a divorce through fraud. (Emphasis ours.) He goes on to suggest to Mr. Person in the letter of September twenty-seventh the procedures to be followed and the amounts to be sought for support and attorneys' fees pendente lite, saying he will shortly prepare and send papers for Mrs. Johnson's signature. This he did. We find that Mrs. Johnson, on the eighth of December, 1949, executed the affidavit to support her motion for monetary aid, as prepared by Reinmiller, and that a copy thereof attached to the motion for a show-cause order was served on Mr. Edwin Lewis, the attorney representing her husband, Joe H. Johnson. Although substantial portions of the record in the Johnson divorce case were separately introduced, there is nothing before us indicating that the entire record was put in evidence. No part of it includes the motion for an order to show cause nor any order based thereon. However, Reinmiller, in response to a query from a member of the Trial Committee as to whether or not an attempt had been made to secure such an order, replied: Yes, there was an order and we attempted personal service, but we were unable to get him to be served personally, that is, referring to the plaintiff [Joe H. Johnson], and service was had upon his attorney. Thus we find Reinmiller seeking for his client the pendente lite relief provided by ORS 107.090, notwithstanding that at the time of the application he well knew neither plaintiff nor defendant had resided in this state for a year preceding the filing of the complaint in the Johnson case. 2. The fact that he was unsuccessful in locating the plaintiff Johnson for service of the order does not, in our opinion, exonerate Mr. Reinmiller from trifling with the court in order to attain ends apparently not in the contemplation of the statute. That he had then no expectation of challenging the jurisdiction of the court, as he was then amply fortified to do, finds confirmation in the fact that on June 22, 1951, he filed Mrs. Johnson's answer and cross-complaint as prepared and signed by him and verified by Mrs. Johnson in Nebraska on May 28, 1951. The answer so filed in behalf of Mrs. Johnson admits as true the allegation of her husband's complaint respecting the term of his residence in Oregon prior to the filing of his complaint. There is nothing in the record up to that time that justified Mr. Reinmiller in believing that the statements above quoted from Mr. Person's letter of September 27, 1949, concerning the plaintiff's alleged residence in Oregon were untrue or that Mrs. Johnson had repudiated all or any part of them. Apparently, the defendant was then prepared to hope he could avoid the jurisdictional question by Mrs. Johnson's admission unless raised by the court on its own motion. If he could, by silence, hurdle that matter, he was prepared to seek a decree of divorce for his client, as indicated by her cross-complaint and the hearing had on June 25, 1954. 3, 4. If he entertained any doubt about the truth of the residential history of the plaintiff, as disclosed by the representations in the first letter he received, then, rather than accept as true Mr. Johnson's allegation of residential qualification merely because Johnson verified his complaint under oath, it was Reinmiller's clear duty to inquire and satisfy himself whether or not Mrs. Johnson was prepared to furnish proof which would overcome the force of her husband's allegation; or, if still in doubt, to answer with a plea in abatement, thereby forcing the issue for judicial determination; or to decline to serve Mrs. Johnson if success in doing so would require withholding facts which, if known to the court, would defeat its right to jurisdiction or if later learned might impair the validity of its divorce decree. Moreover, eager as Mrs. Johnson may have been for a divorce, she was entitled to know the possible and dangerous consequences of seeking a divorce in a court obviously without power to grant it if the suppressed truth came to light. We perceive that an honest disclosure to her certainly would have avoided the delays now complained of and placed her in a position where she might have long before obtained a divorce in the state of her residence. Very shortly after the filing of Mrs. Johnson's answer and cross-complaint, Mr. Reinmiller prepared, pursuant to stipulation, a deposition for Mrs. Johnson based on interrogatories covering her testimony in support of her cross-complaint. This was apparently done to save her the expense of coming to Oregon when the suit was set for trial. We note that it included no questions concerning her knowledge of Mr. Johnson's residence. The absence of a question intended to develop that point indicates to us that Mr. Reinmiller still had faith in what Mr. Person reported to him in his letter of September 27, 1949, and did not want to disclose it to the court, hoping that by admitting the allegation of residence found in the complaint the court might overlook the issue and grant his client a decree. The interrogatories prepared by the defendant or someone in his office, acting under his direction, were sent to Mr. Person on July 10, 1951, for Mrs. Johnson's attention. The deposition was executed and returned directly by her or someone in her behalf to the clerk of the court but without notice to Mr. Reinmiller. It was filed by the clerk on November 2, 1951. But the matter of her divorce remained quiescent so far as Mr. Reinmiller was concerned from July 10, 1951, until June 23, 1954. On the latter date Mr. Reinmiller made inquiry for the first time concerning the whereabouts of the deposition. It was then he discovered its presence in the court files; whereupon he had the suit set for hearing on June 25, 1954. Mr. Reinmiller's excuse for this long lapse of interest will later be referred to. On that day, the plaintiff defaulting, the court proceeded to hear the testimony in behalf of Mrs. Johnson on her cross-complaint. This consisted solely of her deposition. After its presentation, the court on its own motion asked: How about the jurisdiction question? to which Mr. Reinmiller replied: Your Honor, I know of that    I know that he [the plaintiff husband] lived here in Eastern Oregon, and that he has been out of the State since that time, but he did live here for a year and did have residence here at that time.    (Emphasis ours.) The judge then indicated that if Mr. Reinmiller would supply evidence of plaintiff's year of residence before filing his complaint in 1949, the court would hold the matter open to give him the opportunity. On June 28, 1954, Mr. Reinmiller reported to Mr. Person that a hearing had been had on June twenty-fifth, adding: I have everything in order for the decree to be granted, except for testimony regarding the jurisdiction of our court. This matter should be handled by a further deposition of Mrs. Johnson to the effect that Mr. Johnson was a resident of Oregon for more than one year prior to the filing of his divorce complaint. (Emphasis ours.) He further suggests that Mr. Person prepare the supplemental deposition and says that unless she does so the decree would not be granted. This advice in the light of the information which Mr. Reinmiller had up to that time concerning Mr. Johnson's want of residental qualifications, was tantamount to an invitation to Mrs. Johnson under the guidance of Mr. Person to commit perjury in order to obtain a divorce. It is very evident that Mr. Person and Mrs. Johnson refused to be parties to such an enterprise, for the supplemental deposition drawn in Nebraska makes no reference to Mr. Johnson's residence in Oregon, as requested by Mr. Reinmiller, but, to the contrary, speaks only of her residence as being in the State of Nebraska prior to and since September of 1949. This was sworn to on August 11, 1954, and filed in the divorce matter on August twentieth of that year. Nothing has transpired in the divorce suit since. We now turn to the defense tendered by the defendant in justification for this course of conduct respecting the jurisdictional question in the divorce case. He places his greatest reliance upon Mr. Person's letter of July 6, 1953. He points to a sentence therein, reading: It would seem that there is no reason why you couldn't go ahead out there and get the divorce since the case is at issue and the Court has jurisdiction. He represents that this was an assurance to him that Johnson had been, in fact, a resident of Oregon for the required time. He also claims like assurance from Mr. Lewis as Johnson's attorney. But Mr. Lewis, called as a witness for defendant, claims he had no information on the subject beyond his client's statement that he had lived here a year before filing his complaint and that he knew nothing about the man until he had solicited his services in the divorce matter. Moreover, and more important, we think, is Mr. Lewis' testimony that the first time Mr. Reinmiller discussed the question of Mr. Johnson's residence with him was After the hearing, after the hearing on the deposition in court. This would mean sometime after June 25, 1954, and when Reinmiller was apparently looking for someone who could support his then dangling case. We are of the opinion that his reliance on the Person letter of July 6, 1953, is a mere pretense and afterthought conjured up after this charge was made against him by the Bar for the reasons which follow: (1) The letter of that date is one revealing both Person's and Mrs. Johnson's impatience with the defendant's delay, then a matter of nearly four years and was designed to induce action; (2) Person at the very beginning of his relationship with Mr. Reinmiller, as we have earlier pointed out, indicated I am not familiar with Oregon practice and his entire correspondence with defendant subsequent thereto indicates that he was continually relying entirely upon Mr. Reinmiller's knowledge of Oregon law and practice; (3) Person had a right to assume from Reinmiller's activities in the case prior to July 6, 1953, by reason of the motion to show cause and the preparation of the answer and cross-complaint for Mrs. Johnson, that Johnson's claim of residence was correct as the result of new facts accumulated in Oregon by Mr. Reinmiller. He also had a right to assume that Reinmiller had changed his viewpoint as to the controlling law in Oregon on the jurisdictional question; and (4) We note, too, that Mr. Reinmiller after receiving Mr. Person's reference to the court having jurisdiction, made no inquiry of Mr. Person to ascertain what new evidence, if any, Mr. Person had which would warrant the reference to jurisdiction as made by him. To take a Nebraska attorney's statement on jurisdiction in Oregon as a correct exposition of the Oregon law, knowing, as Reinmiller did, that the Nebraska attorney had disclaimed any knowledge of Oregon practice, and to accept it without further inquiry is too ridiculous and absurd to persuade this court to accept his claim of Mr. Person's assurance as an exoneration of his conduct thereafter. An attorney is an officer of the court (ORS 9.010). His duties as such are found in ORS 9.460 where, among other things, it is provided in subsection (3) that he shall: Counsel or maintain such actions, suits, or proceedings or defenses only as may appear to him legal and just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense. And subsection (4) reads that he also shall: Employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never seek to mislead the court or jury by any artifice or false statement of law or fact. Both of the foregoing subsections are embodied in the prevailing Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the Oregon State Bar in 1935 and approved by this court the same year (See § 27, sub (3) and (4)). Wilful violations of any provision of ORS 9.460, supra, are made grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys by ORS 9.480(4). 5. We are of the opinion that in the matter of the jurisdictional question raised in the divorce suit, the defendant has not only violated his obligation to his client Mrs. Johnson, his correspondent counsel Mr. Person, of Nebraska, and the courts of this state, but in so doing has transgressed his duty as an attorney and officer of the court as laid down in subsections (3) and (4) of ORS 9.460, supra. The defendant's primary excuse for want of diligence in the prosecution of the litigation in the Johnson divorce matter is that he expected to be notified when Mrs. Johnson had executed the interrogatories, which he had prepared and which were sent to her in July, 1951, and which were, in November, 1951, sent to the clerk of the court, but through inadvertence of Mrs. Johnson or Mr. Person, without direct notification to Mr. Reinmiller. He did not think to make any inquiry of the clerk until June 23, 1954, a lapse of nearly three years after the defendant had mailed them to Mr. Person. Meantime, he lacked interest or diligence sufficient to cause him to make inquiry of the Nebraska attorney or his client concerning the whereabouts of the deposition. This he did by letter to Person dated June 23, 1954. This, by strange coincidence was the very day he discovered Mrs. Johnson's deposition reposing in the court files. Had his interest in her affairs been what it should have been, the hearing had in June, 1954, might have been had in 1951. During the period from 1950 to April, 1954, we find that he addressed only four letters to Mr. Person; of the two in 1951, one enclosed the answer and cross-complaint for Mrs. Johnson's signature and one in July of that year the deposition previously referred to. In 1953, according to the record, Mr. Person had but one letter from Mr. Reinmiller. This advised him that Reinmiller had written to Mrs. Johnson in response to Mr. Person's request of August 8, 1953, that he do so and tell her the status of the case. This we assume is his letter to Mrs. Johnson, dated August twenty-third. We find no more letters to Person from that date until June 23, 1954, which was his belated inquiry concerning the Johnson deposition which he found the same day at the courthouse. As to Mrs. Johnson, he wrote her but three letters in the same period; one on September 2, 1952. This only to tell her he had been out of his office about a month on business and more recently on a minor leg injury. He adds that I will check with the court tomorrow and if everything is in order will take default immediately. He added that he would write after checking with the court. We find nothing disclosing that he ever wrote to Mrs. Johnson again until August 11, 1953, when he explains his delay in answering her letter of July 6, 1953, was because he had been in Nebraska attending the burial of his mother, but nothing explaining the status of the case. His next and last letter to Mrs. Johnson was that of August 21, 1953. He informed her that he had written to her a week before (very possibly referring to his letter of August eleventh, above mentioned) but giving her nothing more than that he expected to be in the East a few days on business, and will return to the office shortly, and will conclude your business. The three letters to Mrs. Johnson above referred to, as well as several to Mr. Person, were in response to their indicating impatience with Mr. Reinmiller's delays and requesting information as to when the matter could be concluded. We note that none of them carries any inquiry from Mr. Reinmiller, except his letter to Person, of June 23, 1954, concerning the status of the interrogatories which he mailed in 1951. We think the evidence justifies the conclusion that the defendant neglected to answer, at least in terms of the inquiries made, the communications received either from Mrs. Johnson or Mr. Person during the period from 1950 to April, 1954, or keep them sufficiently advised of the progress of the litigation. Inasmuch as during the course of the trial the State Bar abandoned their charge respecting Reinmiller's failure and neglect to reply to communications from the Bar and Grievance Committee, no comment on that charge is necessary.