Opinion ID: 2399306
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims relating to Ramsey's testimony

Text: In his first of several claims related to Ramsey's testimony, Johnson contends that the trial court erred by permitting her to testify concerning other-crimes evidence, namely, Johnson's involvement in drug trafficking, including Ramsey's, Starks', and Izod's sale of illegal drugs on his behalf. Johnson acknowledges that such evidence, while generally inadmissible to demonstrate character attributes, see Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), may be properly admitted where it is relevant to establish motive. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). He also recognizes that the Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Combs was killed in connection with a territorial rivalry among drug traffickers. However, in a manner similar to his argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the Section 9711(d)(14) aggravating circumstance, Johnson claims that the Commonwealth's evidence was too attenuated to support the use of the drug-sale rivalry motivation as evidence of his guilt. For example, he asserts that the Commonwealth failed to establish at trial that either Ramsey or Starks was involved in a drug organization run by Johnson that had a rivalry with Combs in the vicinity of 437 Schuylkill Avenue. In particular, Johnson argues, Ramsey indicated that Starks never told her where he sold drugs for Johnson, thus diminishing any probative value of drug rivalry at the Schuylkill Avenue location. Furthermore, Johnson contends, it was not established at trial that Starks knew of any rivalry between Johnson and Combs, was part of such, or was in any manner connected to the possible motive for the victim's death. Johnson notes that the victim's drug trafficking collaborator, Cook, who summoned Starks' supplier to the scene of the killing, was not aware whom Starks would bring. Even assuming that the evidence was properly admitted, according to Johnson, the trial court erred in failing to issue a cautionary, limiting instruction during the course of Ramsey's testimony. Although Johnson acknowledges that the court did include in its general charge after the close of the evidence an admonition that the jurors should consider other-crimes testimony solely for the purpose of evidencing motive, [2] he contends that this simply could not serve as an adequate substitute for a contemporaneous charge. In this regard, Johnson emphasizes the prejudicial impact of other-crimes evidence, and the importance of Ramsey's testimony to the prosecution, particularly since the jurors twice requested to hear it repeated during their deliberations. On consideration of the above, we conclude that the Commonwealth's reliance on evidence of Johnson's involvement in drug trafficking to establish his motive was permissible under governing evidentiary precepts. Again, Appellant offers no support for his position, interwoven into several of his arguments, that the Commonwealth was bound to establish specific geographic boundaries for the activities of each of Johnson's and Combs' groups to demonstrate the fact of their competition. It is enough, in our view, that prosecution testimony showed a diversion of drug sales from Combs' group to Johnson's, knowledge on the part of both men that there was competition (albeit that Combs may not have been aware of Johnson's identity as his competitor), and Johnson's awareness that Combs was his rival. With respect to the timing of the trial court's limiting instruction, although this Court has expressed a preference that such direction should be given to jurors at the time limited-purpose evidence is adduced, see Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375, 383-84, 378 A.2d 841, 845 (1977), it has held nonetheless that a required limiting instruction may properly be given during the general charge. See id.; cf. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 563 Pa. 269, 280, 759 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2000). In light of such precedent, and particularly as Appellant did not request an instruction at the time the limited-purpose evidence was adduced, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. [3] Johnson also contends that Ramsey's testimony to the effect that Starks also sold drugs for Johnson was inadmissible hearsay. The record suggests, however, that Ramsey testified from her personal knowledge and not, as Johnson asserts, from repetition of hearsay declarations. See generally N.T., at 316-19. We recognize that trial counsel lodged various objections in an attempt to force the Commonwealth to develop a more specific foundation for Ramsey's knowledge in this regard, and that it would have been preferable for the trial court to require the additional record development of foundation. Nevertheless, in light of Ramsey's testimony as to her own involvement in Johnson's drug trade and personal knowledge of Starks, we believe that the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretionary decision making authority as concerns matters connected with the admission of evidence. See generally Commonwealth v. Billa, 521 Pa. 168, 177-78, 555 A.2d 835, 840 (1989).
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Ramsey to testify that Izod was his right-hand man in drug trafficking. The Commonwealth contends, correctly, however, that this testimony is not hearsay, since it does not involve an extrajudicial statement, but rather an observation based on Ramsey's personal knowledge of Johnson's drug-trade activities. Accord Commonwealth v. Hashem, 363 Pa.Super. 111, 153, 525 A.2d 744, 764 (1987) (quoting a trial court's observation that [i]t is hornbook law that what a person knows firsthand from his own knowledge is not hearsay (citations omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 526 Pa. 199, 584 A.2d 1378 (1991). Additionally, Appellant claims that Ramsey's testimony that she overheard conversations between Johnson and Izod about drug-sale locations, which she believed included places where Combs sold drugs, was not relevant to establish motive on account of a lack of specificity. This argument fails, since we have rejected the position that the Commonwealth was burdened with an obligation to develop a precise picture of the geographic overlap in drug sales to establish the competitive relationship between Johnson's and Combs' activities. See supra. Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from Ramsey indicating that, approximately two weeks before Combs' murder, she overheard Izod and Combs having an argument about turf, in which Combs told Izod that he was not going to let Izod take food out of our mouths. According to Johnson, the testimony was objectionable as hearsay which was not relevant to establish motive, since it was not probative of the Commonwealth's theory that Johnson killed Combs over a drug rivalry at 437 Schuylkill Avenue. Moreover, Johnson emphasizes that the statement did not involve him, but rather, reflects a conversation between Combs and Izod. Therefore, he claims, this statement cannot be attributed to or otherwise connected with him, absent some other relational evidence. In this regard, Appellant views Ramsey's testimony, and other indications in the record of Izod's affiliation with his group, as insufficient. The trial court's reasons for admitting this statement are unclear, since it did not address the matter either at trial or in its opinion. While we agree with the Commonwealth's position that the statement bears a relationship to its motive evidence, as it tends to show competition in drug sales, this merely establishes relevance, and its character as hearsay must be evaluated to determine its admissibility. The Commonwealth contends that the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; however, the statement may be read to embody the fact of competition in the drug trade, which the Commonwealth sought to prove to suggest Johnson's guilt. We conclude, however, that any error by the trial court in the admission of the statement is harmless, as it is cumulative of other evidence, in particular, Cook's descriptions from his personal observation concerning the impact of sales from the 437 Schuylkill Avenue location on his and Combs' drug trade, see, e.g., N.T., at 257, 263-64, as well as Cook's prior, unopposed testimony that Combs sought to address the issue, N.T., at 263-64. See generally Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34, 85, 748 A.2d 166, 193 (2000) (on reconsideration) (articulating the three, alternative bases on which a determination of harmless error may be predicated, including that the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted, substantially similar evidence); Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 411 & n. 20, 383 A.2d 155, 165 & n. 20 (1978) (collecting cases in which errors were found harmless on the basis that improperly admitted evidence was cumulative and its admission did not prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial).
Johnson contends that the trial court erred in admitting Ramsey's recounting of Izod's inculpatory comments to her, as follows: [W]e did them n_____s. You didn't think we would, but we did. There is not going to be a problem. In this regard, he takes issue with the trial court's conclusion that such statements qualified for treatment under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, see Pa.R.E. 803(25)(E). Citing to Commonwealth v. Zdrale, 530 Pa. 313, 608 A.2d 1037 (1992), Johnson correctly recites the requirements of the coconspirator exception: the existence of a conspiracy between the declarant and the defendant must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; the statements must be shown to have been made during the course of the conspiracy; and they must have been made in furtherance of the common design. See id. at 317, 608 A.2d at 1039. According to Johnson, however, the above remarks meet none of these requirements. Primarily, Johnson argues that the trial court's finding of a conspiracy between Izod and Appellant to murder Combs is unsupported in the evidence proffered by the Commonwealth, particularly as Johnson was not charged with conspiracy, he did not initiate the meeting that resulted in Combs' death but was summoned by Cook, and there is no evidence that Izod was ever charged with any crime in relation to Combs' death. Although Johnson's argument contains a near concession that the Commonwealth effectively demonstrated an illegal drug conspiracy ([a]t best, the Commonwealth established a conspiracy between Izod and [A]ppellant to distribute drugs), he discerns no material significance from such fact. Further, Johnson contends that the Commonwealth failed to meet the second and third requirements of the coconspirator exception (demonstration that the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the common design), particularly as Izod's comments were made after the occurrence of the shooting. Application of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is predicated on agency principleswhen the elements of the exception are established, each conspirator is considered an agent of the other, and therefore, a statement by one represents an admission by all. [4] As Johnson acknowledges, to meet the first requirement of the exception (existence of a conspiracy), the Commonwealth's burden is gauged according to a preponderance standard, and conspiracy may be inferentially established, for example, by relation, conduct, or circumstances of the parties. See Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 536 Pa. 271, 293, 639 A.2d 421, 432 (1994); Commonwealth v. Pinkins, 514 Pa. 418, 424, 525 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1987). No formal charge of conspiracy is necessary. See Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 113, 425 A.2d 387, 392 (1981); Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 426 A.2d 1111 (1981). Here, the trial court held that Ramsey's and Cook's testimony provided the Commonwealth with ample direct and circumstantial evidence that proved that Appellant, Izod, and Starks conspired to murder Combs so that they could take over his drug territory. In our view, however, the evidence of such a conspiracy is more modest than ample, although it was at least arguably sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden concerning the first requirement of the coconspirator exception. [5] However, there is little evidence that the statement by Izod made to Ramsey was made in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit murder. Generally, it has been held that, in order to satisfy the in-furtherance-of requirement of the coconspirator hearsay exception, it is sufficient for the government to establish an intent to promote the conspiratorial objective. See, e.g., United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1103 (10th Cir.1996). In a number of circumstances, however, where as here, the inculpatory statements are narrative declarations of past activity made to a non-participant in the asserted conspiracy, courts have found the essential in-furtherance-of attribute absent. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir.2000) (citing cases distinguishing statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy from, inter alia, narrative declarations); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1001 (3d Cir.1980) (distinguishing statements made to third parties from those made to coconspirators); accord United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir.1984) (observing that statements made to those who are not involved in the conspiracy are not `in furtherance' of it). See generally 23 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 990 (2002) (Generally speaking, unauthorized admissions or confessions, or casual admissions of guilt, cannot be considered in furtherance of the conspiracy or enterprise and are inadmissible. (footnotes omitted)). [6] Nevertheless, we believe that any error on the part of the trial court in articulating a basis for the admission of Izod's inculpatory remarks is harmless, since the coconspirator exception contains no requirement that the conspiracy identified as the basis for admissibility be related to the crime charged. See United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 196 (1st Cir.1999) (Subject to relevancy and similar considerations, out-of-court statements of a declarant coconspirator, if made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, regardless of whether the conspiracy furthered is charged or uncharged, and regardless of whether it is identical to or different from the crime that the statements are offered to prove[.] (citations omitted)); cf. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. at 113, 425 A.2d at 392 (This Court has extended the co-conspirator exception to admit declarations by `co-participants' in a crime even where conspiracy has not been charged or proven. (citations omitted)). [7] Here, as Johnson essentially concedes, the Commonwealth's evidence demonstrated, by a clear preponderance, a larger conspiracy between Appellant and Izod to distribute illegal drugs. Significantly, this is a conspiracy as to which the evidence demonstrated that Ramsey was not a third party, but a participant. In the course of Izod's remarks to Ramsey, he advised her of an act that eliminated a rival seller, thus promoting the objectives of the drug conspiracy, and instructed her to maintain a low profile for the time being to avoid detection in light of the expected, increased law enforcement activity. [8] Accord Johnson, 200 F.3d at 533 (noting that statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy can take a variety of forms, including comments made to inform other members about the progress of the conspiracy, to control damage to or detection of the conspiracy, to hide the criminal objectives of the conspiracy, or to instill confidence and prevent the desertion of other members).
Johnson claims that the trial court erred in granting the jurors' request for Ramsey's testimony to be read to them during their deliberations, particularly since the trial court did not issue contemporaneous, cautionary instructions. Generally, the determination whether to grant a request from jurors for a reading of a portion of the trial testimony during deliberations for the purpose of refreshing its recollection rests within the discretion of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Peterman, 430 Pa. 627, 631, 244 A.2d 723, 726 (1968). The reading of the testimony does not implicate reversible error, provided that it does not place undue emphasis on one witness's testimony. See id. at 631-32, 244 A.2d at 726. In the present case, the trial court allowed the testimony to be read only after the jury's second request and undertook considerable precautions to ensure the accuracy of the reading, such as directing that it occur on the record and instructing the jurors that their own recollection should control in the event of any inconsistencies. In addition, the court required that the testimony be read in its entirety, including the direct and cross-examinations, so that neither portion received greater emphasis. Further, the jury previously received a detailed instruction from the court that the evidence regarding Johnson's drug involvement was admitted solely for the purpose of establishing motive, see supra, which instruction the jury is presumed to have followed. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 559, 614 A.2d 663, 672 (1992). In such circumstances, we find little basis for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the jury's request.