Opinion ID: 709217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Two-level increase under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(b)(4)

Text: 10 Defendant claims that the District Court erred in assessing a two-point increase in offense level under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(b)(4). That section of the Guidelines, which covers Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit, provides a two-level increase [i]f the offense involved the conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury. The provision falls in the section for offense conduct under the heading specific offense characteristics. Defendant contends that this provision was meant to apply only where the risk of bodily injury results from the fraud itself and not from events that happen while fleeing from the crime. For three reasons, we agree. 11 First, in all of the cases interpreting this guideline provision, the fraudulent conduct itself created the risk of serious bodily injury. For example in United States v. Mizrachi, 48 F.3d 651 (2nd Cir.1995), the defendant's fraud consisted of buying and insuring a building and then committing arson to collect the proceeds. The risk of injury from the arson was considered part and parcel of the scheme to defraud. In United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175 (2d Cir.1994), the defendant's fraud consisted of passing himself off as a licensed physician and practicing medicine; the risk of bodily harm proceeded directly from the fraudulent practice of medicine. Similarly, in United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 428, 130 L.Ed.2d 342 (1994), the defendant physician performed unnecessary surgery to collect Medicaid payments, again the risk of bodily injury proceeding from the fraudulent scheme itself. See also United States v. Hoffman, 9 F.3d 49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1320, 127 L.Ed.2d 669 (1994) (defendant arranged slow-speed accidents, feigned injury, and submitted fraudulent insurance claims for medical bills and lost wages). The Government could cite no cases, and indeed we have found none, where the provision was applied to the risk of injury created in fleeing from the crime. 12 Second, the relevant legislative history suggests that Defendant's reading of the provision is correct. Section 2F1.1(b)(4) was added to the Guidelines after Congress directed the following: 13 [T]he United States Sentencing Commission shall promulgate guidelines, to provide for appropriate penalty enhancements, where conscious or reckless risk of serious personal injury resulting from the fraud has occurred. The Commission shall consider the appropriateness of assigning to such a defendant an offense level under Chapter Two of the sentencing guidelines that is at least two levels greater than the level that would have been assigned had conscious or reckless risk of serious personal injury not resulted from the fraud. 14 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1031 (Supp.1995), historical and statutory notes (emphasis added). 15 Finally, a different provision, U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.2, penalizes Reckless Endangerment During Flight and appears to be more suited to the present circumstances. Section 3C1.2, which falls under the heading of Adjustments for Obstruction of Justice, provides this two-level increase: If the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer ... Thus, Sec. 3C1.2 is the provision which contemplates the type of facts at issue here. 16 Even more problematic than the District Court's interpretation of Sec. 2F1.1(b)(4) is the manner in which it applied that provision to this defendant. As ordinarily happens in a sentencing case, the probation officer outlined its factual findings and suggested guidelines application in its presentence report. The District Court then adopted the recommendations of the presentence report in its judgment. In this case, however, the guideline application and supporting reasoning found in the presentence report were wrong. Unable to apply Sec. 2F1.1(b)(4) directly to the Defendant, the presentence report applied the two-level increase using Sec. 1B1.3, a relevant conduct provision which provides for offense level increases based on a co-conspirator's foreseeable behavior. The report noted that the defendant was not the driver of the motor vehicle, but that she was a willing participant in the attempt to evade arrest. J.A. at 123. It is improper, however, to attempt to expand Sec. 2F1.1 through Sec. 1B1.3 in this manner. The upward adjustment permitted by Sec. 2F1.1(b)(4) serves a specific and limited purpose, to punish those whose fraudulent behavior directly causes the risk of serious bodily injury. That purpose is not served here. Relevant conduct under Sec. 1B1.3 is a distinct concept and should not be used to broaden enhancements such as this one designed for a specific limited purpose. The presentence report improperly attempted to bootstrap an adjustment under Sec. 2F1.1 using Sec. 1B1.3, and the District Court erred by adopting this mistake in its judgment. 17 On remand, the District Court may consider whether Sec. 3C1.2 should have been applied instead of Sec. 2F1.1(b)(4). It should be noted, however, that the presentence report in this case seems to have rejected the applicability of Sec. 3C1.2, saying that there was no information that the defendant impeded or obstructed justice and that the defendant was not driving the vehicle. J.A. at 122. It also appears that the Defendant herself was the only person actually injured in the chase. Furthermore, at least one court has held that to apply Sec. 3C1.2 to a co-defendant, she must aid or abet, counsel, command, induce, procure or willfully cause the risk of injury; the reasonable foreseeability of a reckless getaway is not enough. See United States v. Lipsey, 62 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir.1995) (under coercive circumstances, defendant's entry into getaway car did not justify sentence enhancement where he either encouraged the driver to pull over or sat in silence). In this case, there is substantial evidence that Ms. Hall was acting at least in part under the control and coercion of her husband, Kenneth Hall, and application of Sec. 3C1.2 may therefore be inappropriate. 18