Opinion ID: 655552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation of Binkley's Examination

Text: 17 De Anda argues that the district court erred in precluding his examination of Binkley with respect to Binkley's recantation and inconsistent deposition testimony regarding the scene of De Anda's shooting. The district court noted that, in addition to Binkley's explanation of the inconsistency, portions of Binkley's deposition were shown and read to the jury. Based on the presentation of this evidence, the court found that the jury was fully informed of [Binkley's] confusion and error.... Plaintiff's attorney had made his point and the impact of the Binkley's admission was left to the jury. With regard to such decisions, we have acknowledged that a district court may exclude cumulative evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, see Davis, 927 F.2d at 1484, and that, even in the context of a jury trial, the court has considerable discretion to limit the examination of a witness, see United States v. Gomez, 846 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir.1988). 18 In this case, however, the excluded testimony was not cumulative. Binkley testified at trial that he was mistaken in his deposition about going to the scene of the shooting, that he had confused this incident with another one and that, consequently, he had never conferred with an officer or seen a gun lying near De Anda at the scene. But in his deposition, Binkley testified at some length and with considerable detail regarding what he had observed at the scene, corroborating Burgess' and Davenport's versions of incident. These facts make the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants to violate De Anda's civil rights more likely. Further, although the district court stated in its order denying De Anda's new trial motion that specific parts of Binkley's deposition were presented to the jury, the record shows that none of those portions related to Binkley's observations at the scene of the shooting. Thus, in limiting Binkley's examination, the district court impaired De Anda's ability to prove that his civil rights were violated and, specifically, for purposes of his civil rights conspiracy claim, that there may have been an agreement among the arresting officers and Binkley to violate his civil rights. See Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir.1991); Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392, 1394-95 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038, 105 S.Ct. 518, 83 L.Ed.2d 407 (1984). 19 While the district court has authority to limit the examination of witnesses, its allowing Binkley to present his explanation of the inconsistency between his deposition and trial testimony without allowing De Anda to present evidence supporting an inference to the contrary was a clear abuse of discretion. Nor can we say, based on the crucial nature of the excluded evidence, that the district court's error was harmless under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 20 AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.