Opinion ID: 1591751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Multiple Victims

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in enhancing the sentences on the basis that the offense[s] involved more than one (1) victim because each offense of aggravated assault necessarily involved a specific, named victim. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(3) (1997 & Supp.2001). The State agrees that application of the multiple victims enhancement factor was not appropriate in this case. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's use of this enhancement factor on the basis that there were victims in the accident on behalf of whom no aggravated assault charges were brought, i.e., Jessica and Justin Hensley. In concurring separately, Judge Joseph M. Tipton wrote that the multiple victims enhancement factor was not appropriate because each charge of aggravated assault involved recklessly causing bodily injury to a named person by use of deadly weapon. See id. § 39-13-102(a)(2)(A). Judge Tipton reasoned that application of the enhancement factor, which specifically refers to the offense, see id. § 40-35-114(3), was not appropriate because there cannot be multiple victims for any one count referring to a particular person. We believe that Judge Tipton's reasoning is more persuasive and is supported by our recent decision in State v. Lewis, in which we held that the multiple victims factor was applicable to enhance the defendant's sentence for aggravated arson. 44 S.W.3d 501, 507-08 (Tenn.2001). [6] We observed first that the enhancement factor did not duplicate the elements of the offense: [A]ggravated arson requires but one person to be present in the structure. Indeed, an aggravated arson can occur in the absence of a victim as defined above. Only a person's presence is required. There is no requirement of injury or death to the person who is present, and there is no requirement that property actually be destroyed. Therefore, none of the facts used to establish the essential elements of aggravated arson are used to establish the multiple victim enhancement factor. Id. at 508. We then concluded that the enhancement factor was appropriate for the offense of aggravated arson: We find the multiple victim enhancement factor to be appropriate for this offense. Use of the multiple victim enhancement factor is well-suited to the aggravated arson statute, which does not permit multiple convictions in spite of the fact that multiple persons were victimized by the fire. While [the defendant] could not be convicted of multiple counts of aggravated arson . . ., his sentence may reflect that he victimized multiple persons. Id. (emphasis added). In contrast to aggravated arson, separate convictions for aggravated assault may be obtained based upon specific, named victims. In this case, for example, each offense of aggravated assault involved recklessly causing bodily injury to a named person by use of deadly weapon. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(2)(A) (1997 & Supp.2001). The statutory language of the multiple victims factor, however, limits its application to an offense  involving more than one (1) victim. Id. § 40-35-114(3) (emphasis added). In short, there cannot be multiple victims for any one offense of aggravated assault committed against a specific, named victim. Moreover, application of the factor on the basis that there were individuals in the accident on behalf of whom no charges were filed is simply inconsistent with the statutory language of Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(3). Compare Lewis, 44 S.W.3d at 508. Accordingly, we hold that the lower courts erred in applying the multiple victims enhancement factor to the offenses of aggravated assault in this case. [7]