Opinion ID: 2796506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Testimony Disclosing Redacted

Text: Information Invoking Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E)(i), DeMarco argues that the district court abused its discretion in permitting Agent McCune to testify to information contained in a redacted portion of the HELOC agreement (“Government Exhibit Line of Credit Records”). We outline the relevant facts below. In 2010, approximately two years prior to trial, the government provided DeMarco with discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Included with this discovery was a redacted copy of the HELOC agreement that Suarez entered into with Bank of America for $250,000. The version of the HELOC agreement turned over to DeMarco listed the borrower’s name as “Michael Suarez” but had the borrower’s address redacted. In an unredacted version of this document, the borrower’s address is listed as 235 Milwaukee Avenue, Vernon Hills, Illinois—the address of the Chase Bank where DeMarco worked. During DeMarco’s cross-examination of Suarez, defense counsel asked Suarez whether everything in the HELOC agreement was listed under his name and address. After Suarez confirmed this to be the case, defense counsel asked Suarez if he recalled receiving notifications concerning where the HELOC proceeds had been disbursed. Suarez denied receiving any such notifications and went on to testify that the address listed as the borrower’s address on the HELOC agreement was the address of the Chase Bank where DeMarco worked. Following the completion of Suarez’s testimony, No. 14-1526 13 defense counsel requested, for the first time, that the government provide him with an unredacted copy of the HELOC agreement. The government located an unredacted copy of the agreement and showed it to defense counsel. The government then called Agent McCune to the stand. The government asked Agent McCune to disclose the address that appeared in the redacted portion of the HELOC agreement in order to rebut the implication that Suarez’s address was listed as the borrower’s address and to corroborate Suarez’s testimony that he had not received notifications regarding distribution of the HELOC proceeds. DeMarco objected and, following a lengthy exchange between the district court and defense counsel, the court permitted Agent McCune to testify that the address listed as the borrower’s address in the redacted portion of the HELOC agreement was indeed the address of the Chase Bank where DeMarco worked. DeMarco claims that the government violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E)(i) by using the redacted information in its case-in-chief, since he was not provided with an unredacted copy beforehand. But DeMarco was provided with a redacted copy of the agreement more than two years before the start of trial and at no point during that period did he request an unredacted version. Since DeMarco intended to argue at trial that Suarez’s address appeared on the HELOC agreement as the borrower’s address, he should have requested an unredacted copy of the agreement to confirm that this fact was supported by the evidence. By failing to do so, DeMarco proceeded at his own peril. Indeed, defense counsel twice admitted during the post-objection colloquy with the district court that it was his “mistake” that he did not seek to 14 No. 14-1526 obtain an unredacted copy of the HELOC agreement during his trial preparation. DeMarco cannot fail to use due diligence and then, after eliciting incriminating testimony, seek to argue that the government violated its discovery obligations. Moreover, it is hard to see how DeMarco could have been “unduly surprised” with respect to the redacted information since he completed the HELOC documents and supplied the address.