Opinion ID: 3065756
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There is a “necessity”; AND

Text: 3. Such cooperation is “incidental,” rather than “systematic and routine.” Maj. Op. at 4820-21. I concede the majority’s insertion of the quoted terms into § 1357(g)(10) is quite original, which perhaps explains why no legal basis is cited for any of it. Neither does the majority opinion give us any clue from statute, regulations, or case authority as to the genesis of the key conditioning phrases “calls upon,” “necessity,” “routine,” or “systematic,” which—in their opinion—would legitimate agreement-less state intervention. Needless to say, anyone who actually reads § 1357(g)(10) will observe that none of the quoted words appear in that statute, nor indeed in any part of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”).9 8 U.S.C. 9 We strive to read Congress’s enactments in a reasonable manner. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (“Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible.”). Is the majority’s reading of § 1357(g)(10) reasonable? Imagine, for a moment, its implementation. Morning dawns at the Pima County (Tucson) Sheriff’s Office. The watch commander assembles the deputies: “Officers, in your patrols and arrests today, please remember the Ninth Circuit has told us that if you encounter aliens you suspect are illegally present in this country, you may check their immigration status with federal immigration officers, and cooperate with federal agents in their identification, apprehension, detention and removal, but only (1) if called upon by the federal authorities to assist, or (2) absent such request, where necessary, but (3) then only on an incidental basis, and (4) not in a routine or systematic basis.” Officer Smith responds: “Commander, does that mean that, unless asked by the federal officers, we cannot determine immigration status of suspected illegal aliens from federal immigration officers or cooperate to help in their removal in each case in which we have reasonable suspicion, but, on the other hand, that we can do so when necessary, but then only once in a while? When will it be ‘necessary’? Second, for every ten suspicious persons we run across, in how many Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 60 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4867 § 1101 et seq. Alas, the majority opinion does not point us where to look.10 To determine Congress’s intent, we must attempt to read and interpret Congress’s statutes on similar topics together. Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (“[U]nder the in pari materia canon of statutory construction, statutes addressing the same subject matter generally should be read as if they were one law.” (internal quotations omitted)). In light of this, I submit that a more natural reading of § 1357(g)(10), together with § 1373(c), leads to a conclusion cases are we allowed to request immigration checks and cooperate with the federal authorities without our immigration checks becoming ‘systematic’ and ‘routine,’ rather than merely ‘incidental’?” Rather than explain the content of the conditions which it invents— “called upon,” “necessity,” “systematic,” and “routine”—the majority turns up its nose at a scenario made all-too-probable by its vague limitations; limitations themselves bereft of structure for lack of citation of authority. As in the case of its refusal to refute its traducing of statutory language (see footnote 5, supra). the majority declaims the impropriety of my criticisms, rather than discuss why they are wrong. But that does not shed any light on the question likely to be asked by the Sheriff’s Deputy: “When can I detain a suspect to check his immigration status?” 10 The majority contends its interpretation of § 1357(g)(10) is supported by 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10). Section 1103(a)(10) empowers the Attorney General, in the event of a mass influx of aliens, to authorize state and local officers “to perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties” of a federal immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (emphasis added). That the Attorney General may designate state officers to exercise the full scope of federal immigration authority in such emergency situations—alone and not in cooperation with federal immigration officials— does not affect or limit state officers’ otherwise inherent authority under non-emergency circumstances “to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of [illegal] aliens,” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B), especially by seeking immigration status information which federal authorities are obligated to provide, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). Nothing in the text of § 1357(g)(10), nor of § 1373(c), requires a prior “mass influx of aliens” to allow state officers to act. No case authority is cited for this peculiar instance of statutory interpretation. Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 61 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4868 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA that Congress’s intent was to provide an important role for state officers in the enforcement of immigration laws, especially as to the identification of illegal aliens. Unless the state officers are subject to a written agreement described in § 1357(g)(1)-(9), which would otherwise control their actions, the state officers are independently authorized by Congressional statute “to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A). Moreover, state officers are authorized “to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (emphasis added).11 Of course, the majority is correct that state officers cannot themselves remove illegal aliens from the United States. The majority would read that inability as evidence of congressional intent that state officers cannot act at all with respect to other aspects of immigration enforcement that lead to removal, save on the orders of federal officers pursuant to the provisions of written agreements as set forth in 1357(g)(1)-(9). Maj. Op. at 4820. Were that so, § 1357(g)(10) would be redundant and a dead letter, save for the vague and uncertain powers which the majority limits by its newly-crafted terms “calls upon,” “necessity,” “systematic” and “routine.” We must interpret statutes in a manner to give each part of the statute meaning, if at all reasonable. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (“An interpretation of [the Commerce Clause] that makes the rest of [Article I,] § 8 superfluous simply cannot be correct.”); see also Williams v. Thude, 188 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Ariz. 1997) (“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given 11 It is ironic that while construing Section 2(B) so as to make the second sentence thereof an independent mandate to run immigration checks on all arrestees, the majority does not apply the same canon to make § 1357(g)(10) independent, especially since § 1357(g)(10) begins with the classic language of a stand-alone, independent provision: “Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement . . . .” Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 62 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4869 meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.” (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration and emphasis in original)). Further, “the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). Section 1357(g)(10) need not be interpreted at all—its plain language states that “Nothing in this subsection [8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)] shall be construed to require an agreement under this subsection in order for any officer . . . to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual.” There is no need to place restrictions on this meaning, through terms such as “calls upon,” “necessity,” “systematic,” and “routine,” because the statute’s meaning is clear and includes no such limitations. I agree with the majority that “we must determine how the many provisions of [the] vastly complex [INA] function together.” Maj. Op. at 4823. However, the majority opinion’s interpretation of § 1357(g)(10), which requires the Attorney General to “call upon” state officers in the absence of “necessity” for state officers to have any immigration authority, makes § 1373(c) a dead letter. Congress would have little need to obligate federal authorities to respond to state immigration status requests if it is those very same federal officials who must call upon state officers to identify illegal aliens. Further, there is no authority for the majority’s assertion that § 1357(g) establishes the “boundaries” within which state cooperation pursuant to § 1373(c) must occur. Maj. Op. at 4822-23. Indeed, “communicat[ions] with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual” were explicitly excluded from § 1357(g)’s requirement of an agreement with the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A). Congress intended the free flow of immigration status infor- Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 63 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4870 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA mation to continue despite the passage of § 1357(g), and so provided in subsection (g)(10). The majority’s interpretation turns § 1357(g)(10) and § 1373(c) into: “Don’t call us, we’ll call you,” when what Congress enacted was “When the state and local officers ask, give them the information.” The majority’s attempt to straight-jacket local and state inquiries as to immigration status to what “terms” the “federal government” dictates reveals the fundamental divide in our views. The majority finds the intent of “the government” decisive; I look to Congress’s intent—as required by Supreme Court preemption law. Further, to “cooperate” means, I submit, “to act or operate jointly, with another or others, to the same end; to work or labor with mutual efforts to promote the same object.” Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (Jean L. McKechnie ed., 1979). It does not mean that each person cooperating need be capable of doing all portions of the common task by himself. We often speak of a prosecution’s “cooperating witness,” but it doesn’t occur to anyone that the witness himself cannot be “cooperating” unless he is able to prosecute and convict the defendant himself. Hence, the inability of a state police officer to “remove” an alien from the United States does not imply the officer is unable to cooperate with the federal authorities to achieve the alien’s removal. The provision of authority whereby the Attorney General may “deputize” state police officers allows the Attorney General to define the scope and duration of the state officers’ authority, as well as “direct[ ] and supervis[e]” the state officers in performing immigration functions. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(9). However, this is merely one of two forms of state participation in federal immigration enforcement provided for by Congress in § 1357(g). Congress provided for another form of state participation, for which no agreement is required—states are free “to communicate with the Attorney Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 64 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4871 General regarding the immigration status of any individual,” id. § 1357(g)(10)(A), and are also free “otherwise [than by communication] to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States,” id. § 1357(g)(10)(B). This conclusion is confirmed by a close comparison of the language in each part of § 1357(g). As to the authority of the Attorney General to enter explicit written agreements, these agreements are limited to deputizing state officers to perform immigration-related functions “in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.” Id. § 1357(g)(1). Notably absent from this list of functions is the “identification” of illegal aliens. However, Congress recognized state officers’ authority even in the absence of a written agreement with federal authorities both “to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual” and “to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification . . . of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 1357(g)(10) (emphasis added). “We normally presume that, where words differ as they differ here, Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). The exclusion of illegal alien identification from the restraints of explicit written agreements under § 1357(g)(1)-(9), and the inclusion of this identification function in the state’s unrestrained rights under § 1357(g)(10), leads to the conclusion that Congress intended that state officers be free to inquire of the federal officers into the immigration status of any person, without any direction or supervision of such federal officers—and the federal officers “shall respond” to any such inquiry. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (emphasis added). Another limitation of authority inferred by the majority from § 1357(g)(10) seems to be that state authorities cannot order their officers to enforce immigration laws in every case Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 65 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4872 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA where they have reasonable suspicion to believe the laws are being violated. The argument seems to be that while “incidental” investigation—motivated solely by the individual officer’s discretion—might be permissible and not an invasion of federal immigration turf, any systematic and mandatory order to identify illegal aliens would be an incursion into a preempted area. See Maj. Op. at 4020-21; see also Oral Argument at 46:15-46:35 (“[T]he mandatory application [of Section 2(B)] is impermissible, because it takes away the discretion of the local law enforcement officer to decide whether to pursue a particular line of inquiry rather than mandated.”). This reading of the statute is as original, and therefore, problematic as is utilizing the words “calls upon,” “necessity,” “systematic,” and “routine” to circumscribe an otherwise clear statute. First, by what authority can the federal government tell a state government what orders it is to give state police officers as to the intensity with which they should investigate breaches of federal immigration law? Other than pursuant to the provisions of written agreements, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(9), I see no statutory basis for allowing the federal government to limit the effort the state can command of its officers. Rather, Congress intended the Attorney General to cooperate with state officers, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), and commanded him to answer their requests for immigration status checks, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). Second, how practical is it for a watch commander to instruct his deputies that it is up to their whims as to when they can enforce federal immigration law? C. Section 2(B)’s limited scope Next, the majority seems to believe that when a state officer (1) initiates the identification of an illegal alien by checking the alien’s immigration status with federal officials pursuant to § 1373(c), and (2) has the alien identified to him by federal authorities, the state officer has somehow usurped the federal role of immigration enforcement. Maj. Op. at 4821-22. Section 2(B)’s scope, however, is not so expansive. Section 2(B) does not purport to authorize Arizona officers to Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 66 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4873 remove illegal aliens from the United States—Section 2(B) merely requires Arizona officers to inquire into the immigration status of suspected illegal aliens during an otherwise lawful encounter. See Section 2(B). Section 2(B) does not govern any other action taken by Arizona officers once they discover an alien is illegally present in the United States. Further, Section 2(B) does not require that ICE accept custody or initiate removal of the illegal alien from the United States. Federal authorities are merely obligated to respond to the immigration status inquiry pursuant to § 1373(c). Once this occurs, federal authorities are free to refuse additional cooperation offered by the state officers, and frankly to state their lack of interest in removing the illegal alien. The federal authorities can stop the illegal alien removal process at any point after responding to the state immigration status request.12 Although it is true that Section 2(B) requires Arizona officers to detain an arrestee suspected of being an illegal alien before releasing the alien, this does little to broaden Section 2(B)’s scope. First, because this is a facial challenge, we must assume that Arizona police officers will comply with federal law and the Constitution in executing Section 2(B). Second, Arizona has built a safeguard into Section 2 which requires that Section 2(B)’s immigration status checking mechanisms be executed in a manner consistent with federal law. See Section 2(L) (“This section shall be implemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.”). Finally, it would be absurd to assume that Congress would permit states to 12 Of course, were the federal authorities to do just that—turn away the cooperation of state officials—they might be subject to criticism for not enforcing federal immigration law by failing to remove identified illegal aliens. Worse, since police departments tend to keep pesky records of communications, the exact amount of refusals of state assistance, and the future consequences of failing to remove illegal aliens, might make it into the Press, with perhaps embarrassing or impolitic results. These considerations, of course, should not affect the preemption analysis. Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 67 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4874 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA check a person’s immigration status, see 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), but would not allow the state to hold the suspected illegal alien until a response were received. The majority also finds that state officers reporting illegal aliens to federal officers, Arizona would interfere with ICE’s “priorities and strategies.” Maj. Op. at 4824. It is only by speaking in such important-sounding abstractions—“priorities and strategies”—that such an argument can be made palatable to the unquestioning. How can simply informing federal authorities of the presence of an illegal alien, which represents the full extent of Section 2(B)’s limited scope of state-federal interaction, possibly interfere with federal priorities and strategies—unless such priorities and strategies are to avoid learning of the presence of illegal aliens? What would we say to a fire station which told its community not to report fires because such information would interfere with the fire station’s “priorities and strategies” for detecting and extinguishing fires? The internal policies of ICE do not and cannot change this result. The power to preempt lies with Congress, not with the Executive; as such, an agency such as ICE can preempt state law only when such power has been delegated to it by Congress. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 442 (1990) (“It is Congress—not the [Department of Defense]— that has the power to pre-empt otherwise valid state laws . . . .”). Otherwise, evolving changes in federal “priorities and strategies” from year to year and from administration to administration would have the power to preempt state law, despite there being no new Congressional action. Courts would be required to analyze statutes anew to determine whether they conflict with the newest Executive policy. Although Congress did grant some discretion to the Attorney General in entering into agreements pursuant to § 1357(g), Congress explicitly withheld any discretion as to immigration status inquiries by “obligat[ing]” the federal government to respond to state and local inquiries pursuant to § 1373(c) and Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 68 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4875 by excepting communication regarding immigration status from the scope of the explicit written agreements created pursuant to § 1357(g)(10). Congress’s statutes provide for calls and order the calls be returned. D. Supreme Court preemption cases The Supreme Court’s decisions in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), and Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), are in accord with the view that Section 2(B) is not preempted by federal law. As the majority points out, in each of those cases, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to provide the Executive with flexibility when it enacted federal law, and that state law encroached on that flexibility. That is not the situation we face here. The majority errs by reading the flexibility Congress provided to the Attorney General in entering agreements pursuant to § 1357(g) as providing universal flexibility as to all immigration matters. Congress did just the opposite. As discussed above, Congress explicitly withheld administrative discretion and flexibility as to responses to state officers’ immigration status inquiries in both § 1373(c) and § 1357(g)(10). Federal authorities have no discretion whether they may respond to immigration status inquiries from state officials. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). State officials need not enter into a written agreement to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). Section 2(B) does not encroach on federal flexibility because Congress did not intend federal authorities to have any flexibility in providing states with properly requested immigration status information. Neither does the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence in the field of foreign relations change the conclusion that Section 2(B) is not preempted. In Crosby, Massachusetts passed a law which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from those doing business with Burma. 530 U.S. at 366-68. Three months later, Congress passed a statute Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 69 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4876 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA imposing a set of mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Id. at 368. The Court found that the Massachusetts law conflicted with several identified Congressional objectives. “First, Congress clearly intended the federal Act to provide the President with flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions against Burma.” Id. at 374. Second, “Congress manifestly intended to limit economic pressure against the Burmese Government to a specific range.” Id. at 377. “Finally, . . . the President’s intended authority to speak for the United States among the world’s nations in developing a ‘comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma.’ ” Id. at 380. Thus, the Court concluded: Because the state Act’s provisions conflict with Congress’s specific delegation to the President of flexible discretion, with limitation of sanctions to a limited scope of actions and actors, and with direction to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy under the federal Act, it is preempted, and its application is unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 388. In American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), President Clinton entered into an agreement with the German Chancellor in which Germany agreed to establish a foundation to compensate victims of German National Socialist companies. Id. at 405. In exchange, the U.S. government agreed to discourage Holocaust-era claims in American courts and encourage state and local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive mechanism for resolving these claims. Id. at 405-06. Meanwhile, California passed legislation which required insurance companies doing business in the state to disclose the details of insurance policies issued to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945. Id. at 409. The Court explained that “even . . . the likelihood that state legis- Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 70 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4877 lation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government would require preemption of the state law.” Id. at 420. The Court held California’s law was preempted: “[T]he evidence here is ‘more than sufficient to demonstrate that the state Act stands in the way of [the President’s] diplomatic objectives.’ ” Id. at 427 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 386). That is, California’s law conflicted with specific foreignrelations objectives of the Executive, as “addressed in Executive Branch diplomacy and formalized in treaties and executive agreements over the last half century.” Id. at 421. Thus, as Crosby and Garamendi demonstrate, it is not simply any effect on foreign relations generally which leads to preemption, as the majority asserts. See Maj. Op. at 4825-28. Instead, a state law is preempted because it conflicts with federal law only when the state law’s effect on foreign relations conflicts with federally established foreign relations goals. In Crosby, the state law conflicted with the degree of trade Congress decided to allow with Burma, and the discretion explicitly given to the Executive to make trade decisions. In Garamendi, the state law imposed an investigatory and litigation burden inconsistent with the rules the Executive Agreement had created. Here, however, there is no established foreign relations policy goal with which Section 2(B) may be claimed to conflict. The majority contends that Section 2(B) “thwarts the Executive’s ability to singularly manage the spillover effects of the nation’s immigration laws on foreign affairs.” Maj. Op. at 4828. First, the majority fails to identify a federal foreign relation policy which establishes the United States must avoid “spillover effects,” if that term is meant to describe displeasure by foreign countries with the United States’ immigration policies. The majority would have us believe that Congress has provided the Executive with the power to veto any state law which happens to have some effect on foreign relations, as if Congress had not weighed that possible effect in enacting Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 71 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4878 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA laws permitting state intervention in the immigration field. To the contrary, here Congress has established—through its enactment of statutes such as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(10), 1373(c), and 1644—a policy which encourages the free flow of immigration status information between federal and local governments. Arizona’s law embraces and furthers this federal policy; any negative effect on foreign relations caused by the free flow of immigration status information between Arizona and federal officials is due not to Arizona’s law, but to the laws of Congress. Second, the Executive’s desire to appease foreign governments’ complaints cannot override Congressionally-mandated provisions—as to the free flow of immigration status information between states and federal authorities—on grounds of a claimed effect on foreign relations any more than could such a foreign relations claim override Congressional statues for (1) who qualifies to acquire residency in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1154, or (2) who qualifies to become a United States citizen, 8 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq. Finally, the majority errs in finding that the threat of all 50 states layering their own immigration rules on top of federal law weighs in favor of preemption. In Buckman, the Supreme Court stated: “As a practical matter, complying with the FDA’s detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States’ tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants burdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting the FDCA and the MDA.” 531 U.S. at 350 (emphasis added). I fail to see how Congress could have failed to contemplate that states would make use of the very statutory framework that Congress itself enacted. Congress created the Law Enforcement Support Center “to provide alien status determination support to federal, state, and local law enforcement on a 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week basis.” Congress also obligated ICE to respond to all immigration status inquiries from state and local authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). In light of this, all 50 states enacting laws for inquiring into Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 72 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4879 the immigration status of suspected illegal aliens is desired by Congress, and weighs against preemption.