Opinion ID: 776774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Value of the Illegal Gratuities

Text: 15 Canestraro also challenges the district court's determination of the value of the illegal gratuities used to determine his offense level. Section 2C1.2(b)(2)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that [i]f the value of the gratuity exceeded $2,000, increase [the offense level] by the corresponding number of levels from the table in § 2F1.1. The district court determined that the value of the gratuity attributable to Canestraro as relevant conduct was $169,750, the entire amount paid to Foggia II by Vukelic. Consequently, the district judge applied a seven-level enhancement, as prescribed by the Guidelines for gratuities exceeding $120,000. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1). 16 Canestraro argues that he should be held accountable only for the $3500 fee he received for preparing the Pine Hollow projections. He contends that he was never a true partner in the conspiracy, and that he never received any portion of the $169,750 paid to Foggia II. 17 The Sentencing Guidelines provide that relevant conduct, for the purposes of determining the defendant's offense level, includes: 18 (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and 19 (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.... 20 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). The district court found that it was reasonably foreseeable to Canestraro that Vukelic would pay $169,750 in illegal gratuities, and therefore used this sum to determine Canestraro's sentence. Whether the criminal acts of others in a jointly undertaken criminal activity are reasonably foreseeable is a question of fact, reviewable only for clear error. 2 See United States v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645, 654 (6th Cir.2001). 21 We conclude that the district court's finding was amply supported by the record. As the district court noted, Canestraro signed an agreement obligating Vukelic to pay $330,000 in gratuities, and another agreement concerning the distribution of those gratuities. The court explained that [t]he fact that he received only $3500 is not legally significant, because his participation in the agreement knowingly facilitated the payment of $169,750. J.A. at 119. Indeed, in the statement of facts accompanying the Plea Agreement, Canestraro admitted that he prepared projections for Pine Hollow [i]n order to facilitate... a contract that Foggia wanted that would require Vukelic to pay Foggia to assist in getting permits for the landfill. J.A. at 14. Therefore, the district court's factual conclusion that the full amount paid by Vukelic was both aided by and reasonably foreseeable to Canestraro was not clear error. 22
23 Canestraro next argues that he withdrew from the conspiracy at the meeting of the Foggia II partners and RSV, which he called in late Spring or early Summer of 1995. He contends that Vukelic's testimony established that he took affirmative action to disavow the conspiracy. Canestraro therefore claims that he should not be held responsible for any gratuities received after this meeting. Mr. Vukelic's testimony tended to show that approximately $76,000 to $77,000 had been paid to Foggia II at this time. Using this figure, Canestraro would have received a six-level enhancement, rather than a seven-level enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b). 24 Even if Canestraro's actions at the meeting in question were sufficient to constitute a withdrawal, this Circuit has explained that the effect of a withdrawal from a conspiracy may be eliminated if the defendant's state of mind after the act evidences continued acquiescence in the criminal activity. United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, 1085 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 397, 116 L.Ed.2d 347 (1991), and cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1061, 112 S.Ct. 943, 117 L.Ed.2d 113 (1992). Whether a defendant's subsequent actions evince a state of mind negating a withdrawal is a question of fact, and therefore reviewed only for clear error. Accord id. at 1084-85, 112 S.Ct. 943 (noting that state of mind indicating continued acquiescence was a jury question in criminal conspiracy trial). The district court found that the record shows without objection that in December of 1995, [Canestraro] called Mr. Vukelic, the payor of the gratuities, to ask for an accounting of the gratuities paid during the year. That, it seems to me, is the action of a person who is at least considering the possibility of securing his share of the gratuities paid. J.A. at 119. Canestraro does not dispute making the phone call cited by the district court, and offers no other evidence subsequent to the date of his alleged withdrawal that would tend to refute his continued acquiescence in the conspiracy. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not clearly err in its factual finding that Canestraro's actions indicated his continued acquiescence in the conspiracy.