Opinion ID: 6348604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The court’s failure to issue an order pursuant to § 60-6,197.01 when imposing the 2010 sentence is something McAleese 5 State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018). See State v. Greer, 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021). 6 State v. Chojolan, 288 Neb. 760, 851 N.W.2d 661 (2014). - 247 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. McALEESE Cite as 311 Neb. 243 could have brought to the attention of the county court at the time of sentencing or could have assigned as error on direct appeal. 7 He did neither. Instead, 9 years after his criminal judgment became final, McAleese filed a motion asking the sentencing court to reopen his criminal case, vacate his sentence, and impose a “corrected” sentence. McAleese directs us to no statutory authority for such a motion, and we are aware of none. [3-5] We have long recognized the general rule that where a criminal procedure is not authorized by statute, it is unavailable to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. 8 And we have said that when an unauthorized motion is filed in a criminal case, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate it. 9 Similarly, we have said that when a collateral attack on 7 See, e.g., State v. Sikes, 286 Neb. 38, 834 N.W.2d 609 (2013) (defendant convicted of driving under influence, third offense, assigns error to sen­ tencing order that required ignition interlock device and continuous alcohol monitor during 15-year license revocation); State v. Hense, 276 Neb. 313, 753 N.W.2d 832 (2008) (State files error proceeding to challenge sen­ tencing court’s failure to impose 15-year license revocation as required by statute when sentencing one convicted of operating vehicle during period of revocation). 8 See, State v. Melton, 308 Neb. 159, 953 N.W.2d 246 (2021) (holding post­ judgment motion to modify nonprobationary sentence is not authorized by criminal procedure statutes and thus is not available in criminal pro­ ceeding); State v. Dunster, 270 Neb. 773, 707 N.W.2d 412 (2005) (holding court lacked jurisdiction over postjudgment motion to vacate death sen­ tence because motion not statutorily authorized and same relief could be requested in legislatively authorized procedure such as postconviction motion); State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 186, 595 N.W.2d 917, 925 (1999) (holding Legislature “has not enacted a procedure for asserting second-tier challenges to prior plea-based [driving under the influence] convictions, and thus, unless such a procedure is constitutionally mandated, it ‘is unauthorized and, therefore, unavailable under Nebraska criminal procedure’”); State v. Miller, 240 Neb. 297, 481 N.W.2d 580 (1992) (holding motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict allowed in civil proceedings, but unauthorized in criminal proceedings). 9 See, Melton, supra note 8; Dunster, supra note 8; Miller, supra note 8. - 248 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. McALEESE Cite as 311 Neb. 243 a criminal judgment is not raised in a recognized proceeding, the court lacks jurisdiction over the claim. 10 Here, the county court concluded that it lacked “legal authority” to reopen the criminal case or vacate and correct the sentence, and on that basis, it denied the motion. On appeal, the district court agreed that the county court lacked jurisdiction to vacate and correct McAleese’s sentence, which had long ago become a final judgment, and therefore, it affirmed the county court’s order denying the motion. We likewise conclude the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion filed by McAleese, as there is no recognized criminal procedure which authorizes a sentencing court to reopen a criminal case after the judgment has become final in order to vacate and correct an alleged sentencing error. Whether McAleese’s motion is viewed as an unauthorized motion to modify a sentence 11 or as an unauthorized collateral attack on his criminal judgment, 12 the sentencing court had no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion, and the district court did not err in affirming the county court’s order based on a lack of jurisdiction. For the sake of completeness, we note that McAleese contends that his 2010 sentence was “void, at least in part, due to its failure to comply with . . . § 60-6,197.01.” 13 We soundly reject this characterization. [6] It is well-established that a criminal judgment is void when the court rendering it lacks jurisdiction or a legal basis 10 State v. Rodriguez, 288 Neb. 714, 850 N.W.2d 788 (2014). See Dunster, supra note 8. 11 See, e.g., State v. Irish, 298 Neb. 61, 902 N.W.2d 669 (2017) (holding district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider defend­ ant’s postjudgment motion seeking to reduce license revocation period in sentencing order). 12 See State v. Barnes, 303 Neb. 167, 927 N.W.2d 64 (2019) (affirming denial of 2018 motion requesting jail credit on 1994 sentence, because district court had no statutory authority to consider collateral attack on sen­tence which was erroneous but not void). 13 Brief for appellant at 15. - 249 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. McALEESE Cite as 311 Neb. 243 to impose judgment. 14 Here, there is no dispute that in 2010, the sentencing court had jurisdiction over McAleese and had subject matter jurisdiction over the crime for which he was sentenced. The alleged sentencing error raised by McAleese does not pertain in any respect to the court’s jurisdiction to impose the sentence. Instead, it involves only the court’s failure to issue an order pursuant to § 60-6,197.01 when it imposed the sentence. This alleged error or irregularity is not one which rendered the judgment and sentence void, 15 and McAleese’s claim to the contrary is meritless. 14 See Sanders v. Frakes, 295 Neb. 374, 888 N.W.2d 514 (2016). See, also, Gray v. Kenney, 290 Neb. 888, 863 N.W.2d 127 (2015); Peterson v. Houston, 284 Neb. 861, 824 N.W.2d 26 (2012); Rehbein v. Clarke, 257 Neb. 406, 598 N.W.2d 39 (1999); In re Carbino, 117 Neb. 107, 219 N.W. 846 (1928); Keller v. Davis, 69 Neb. 494, 95 N.W. 1028 (1903); In re Ream, 54 Neb. 667, 75 N.W. 24 (1898). 15 See, Barnes, supra note 12, 303 Neb. at 170, 927 N.W.2d at 67 (explaining “[a] sentence outside of the period authorized for a valid crime is errone­ ous only; it is not a void sentence” and “failing to give credit for time served, while erroneous, does not render the sentence void”); State v. Ratumaimuri, 299 Neb. 887, 911 N.W.2d 270 (2018) (finding incorrect determination that Sex Offender Registration Act applies is error that does not void application of act); Meyer v. Frakes, 294 Neb. 668, 676, 884 N.W.2d 131, 138 (2016) (holding “failure by the court to impose a sentence inside of the mandatory statutory limits for a valid crime is erroneous only; it is not a void sentence subject to collateral attack”); State v. Woodruff, 205 Neb. 638, 641, 288 N.W.2d 754, 757 (1980) (“[a] sentence to imprisonment which exceeds the maximum statutory period is merely erroneous and not void”); Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66, 231 N.W. 510 (1930) (sentence for less than minimum prescribed by statute is erroneous, but not void); McElhaney v. Fenton, 115 Neb. 299, 212 N.W. 612 (1927) (sentence in excess of statutory period was erroneous, but not void); In re Fanton, 55 Neb. 703, 76 N.W. 447 (1898) (same). See, also, State v. Gunther, 271 Neb. 874, 716 N.W.2d 691 (2006) (sentence imposed pursuant to unconstitutional statute is erroneous, but not void); State v. Conover, 270 Neb. 446, 703 N.W.2d 898 (2005) (same); State v. Rouse, 206 Neb. 371, 381, 293 Neb. 83, 89 (1980) (explaining that “[a]n indeterminate sentence imposed for a crime, where not authorized by statute, is erroneous but not void”); State v. Alford, 6 Neb. App. 969, 578 N.W.2d 885 (1998) (same). - 250 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. McALEESE Cite as 311 Neb. 243