Opinion ID: 789371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Court's Inherent Authority to Interpret Ambiguities in its Judgments

Text: 21 Spallone argues that we must reverse the district court's order of December 4, 2003, because the court had no authority to modify or correct the sentence of time served imposed on April 18, 2002. To be sure, a court may not resentence a defendant unless expressly mandated by this court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2106, or pursuant to the strict conditions established by Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 or 36. See United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342, 346-49 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Gangi, 45 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir.1995); see also United States v. Handa, 122 F.3d 690, 691 (9th Cir.1997). This limiting principle prohibits a court from altering a judgment that is clear on its face, even if not reflective of the court's actual intent. See United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d at 347. But where an order or judgment is unclear, a court retains inherent authority to interpret ambiguities. 22 The law has long recognized that the mere construction of a decree involves no challenge of its validity. St. Louis. Kan. City & Colo. R.R. Co. v. Wabash R.R. Co., 217 U.S. 247, 250-51, 30 S.Ct. 510, 54 L.Ed. 752 (1910). Thus, if a judgment is clear and unambiguous, a court must adopt, and give effect to, the plain meaning of the judgment. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 93 (West 2004). But, if the judgment is ambiguous, the reviewing court must construe its meaning, and in doing so may resort to the record upon which the judgment was based. Id. Indeed, the power to construe a court decree is essential to its enforcement. See SEC v. Hermil, Inc., 838 F.2d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir.1988) (Included in a district court's power to administer its decrees is the power to construe and interpret the language of the original order.). 23 In this case, we conclude that Judge Hurley's December 4, 2003 order did not exceed the court's authority. The order does not attempt to resentence Spallone or to correct a perceived error in Judge Mishler's April 18, 2002 order granting Rule 35(b) relief. Rather, the December 4, 2003 order properly clarifies an ambiguity in the April 18, 2002 order with respect to the term sentenced by reasonably construing that term, in light of the totality of the circumstances, to mean that only the sentence of incarceration in defendant's judgment of conviction was reduced. 24