Opinion ID: 2603734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A Short History of the Unruh Act

Text: Enacted in 1959, the Unruh Act secures equal access to public accommodations and prohibits discrimination by business establishments. Its predecessor, our state's first public accommodations statute, became law in 1897. [2] It consisted of two primary sections. The first section declared that all citizens were entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating-houses, barbershops, bath-houses, theaters, skating-rinks, and all other places of public accommodation or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens. (Stats. 1897, ch. 108, § 1, p. 137.) [3] The second section prohibited denying to any citizen, except for reasons applicable alike to every race or color, access to the places described in the first section or making any discrimination, distinction, or restriction on account of color or race, or except for good cause, applicable alike to all citizens of every color or race whatever.... (Stats. 1897, ch. 108, § 2, p. 137.) The two parts of the statute became sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code in 1905. (Stats. 1905, ch. 413, §§ 1, 2, p. 553.) Sections 51 and 52 remained substantially unchanged from 1923 to 1959. Although court decisions in the 1950's restricted the places of public accommodation covered by these sections, [4] they also confirmed their application to nonracial forms of discrimination. In Stoumen v. Reilly (1951) 37 Cal.2d 713 [234 P.2d 969], we held that the State Board of Equalization acted illegally in suspending the license of a bar and restaurant because it allowed patronage by homosexual persons. We stated that: Members of the public of lawful age have a right to patronize a public restaurant and bar so long as they are acting properly and are not committing illegal or immoral acts; the proprietor has no right to exclude or eject a patron `except for good cause,' and if he does so without good cause he is liable in damages. (See Civ. Code, §§ 51, 52.) ( Id. at p. 716.) Observing there was no evidence of illegality on the premises, we refused to find good cause for exclusion of homosexuals. ( Id. at pp. 716-717.) Using similar analysis, in McClain v. City of South Pasadena (1957) 155 Cal. App.2d 423, 432-433 [318 P.2d 199], the Court of Appeal construed sections 51 and 52 to prohibit unreasonable discrimination and held that a residents only restriction on access to a public swimming pool was not unreasonable. (See also Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1951) 36 Cal.2d 734, 739-741 [227 P.2d 449]; Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club (1952) 110 Cal. App.2d 340, 342-343 [242 P.2d 660] [applying public accommodations provisions of §§ 51-54 to exclusion of patrons from racetrack because of past bookmaking].) Sections 51 and 52 were substantially revised in 1959 when they became the Unruh Act. In response to court decisions restricting the places covered by the statute, section 51's list of places was deleted and replaced by a reference to all business establishments of any kind whatsoever. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1866, § 1, p. 4424.) (See generally Comment, supra, 31 UCLA L.Rev. at pp. 450-451; Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising out of Violations of Civil Rights (1965) 17 Hastings L.J. 189, 191.) In addition, the new section 51 declared that all citizens within the jurisdiction of this state were free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin were entitled to full and equal public accommodations. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1866, § 1, p. 4424.) Finally, the reference to conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens was changed to read: This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to citizens of every color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin. ( Ibid. ) Section 52 was amended to provide: Whoever denies ... or whoever makes any discrimination, distinction, or restriction on account of color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin, contrary to the provisions of Section 51, is liable for the actual damages, and two hundred fifty dollars ($250) in addition thereto.... (Stats. 1959, ch. 1866, § 2, p. 4424.) The good cause reference in the predecessor section was eliminated. In In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205 [90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992] ( Cox ), we applied the Unruh Act to an exclusion of a patron of a business establishment for reasons not involving the specific categories listed in the Act, i.e., race, color, etc. The procedural posture of the case was unusual. A habeas corpus petitioner challenged his arrest and conviction under a municipal trespass ordinance for refusing to leave a shopping center after being directed to do so by its owner, contending in part that his conduct was protected by the Unruh Act. We held that a shopping center did not have the right to exclude the customer based only on his association with a young man who wore long hair and dressed in an unconventional manner. ( Id. at p. 210.) Despite the listing of specific types of discrimination in the statute, we concluded that the Unruh Act prohibited all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise and that the listing was illustrative rather than restrictive of the kinds of discrimination prohibited by the Act. ( Id. at pp. 212, 216-217.) We qualified our conclusion by stating that businesses subject to the Unruh Act retained the right to establish reasonable regulations that are rationally related to the services performed and facilities provided. ( Id. at pp. 212; see also id. at p. 217 & fn. 13.) Post- Cox developments expanded the categories of discrimination covered by the Act. Sections 51 and 52 were amended in 1974 to add sex to the list of specifically prohibited forms of discrimination. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1193, §§ 1, 2, p. 2568.) [5] In Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721 [180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, 30 A.L.R.4th 1161] ( Marina Point ), we applied Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, to hold that the owner of an apartment complex violated the Act by refusing to rent to families with minor children. Again, we rejected the view that the Unruh Act was limited to the categories of discrimination specified in its language. (See also O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 [191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427] ( O'Connor ) [applying Marina Point to hold that a condominium development restricting residency to persons over 18 violates the Act].) Although interpreting the Act to proscribe discrimination against families with children, we took care in Marina Point to distinguish age-limited admission policies of retirement communities or housing complexes reserved for older citizens. ( Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 742.) We concluded that such policies operate as a reasonable and permissible means under the Unruh Act of establishing and preserving specialized facilities for those particularly in need of such services or environment. ( Id. at p. 743.) Reacting to our holdings in Marina Point and O'Connor, the Legislature affirmed that section 51 prohibits age discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, but enacted detailed provisions allowing an exception, under specified circumstances and within a specified time, for housing designed to meet the physical and social needs of senior citizens. (§§ 51.2, 51.3, 51.4; Stats. 1984, ch. 787, § 1, p. 2781 & Stats. 1984, ch. 1333, § 1, pp. 4681-4682.) Later, it added blindness and physical disability as categories of prohibited discrimination under the Act, subject to provisions limiting a property owner's duty to modify existing property and structures. (§§ 51, 52; Stats. 1987, ch. 159, §§ 1, 2, pp. 557-558.) As a result of the foregoing history, section 51 now provides in pertinent part: All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability. Section 52, which is designed to provide an enforcement mechanism for section 51 and other provisions of law, provides in a manner parallel to section 51: Whoever denies ... or whoever makes any discrimination, distinction, or restriction on account of sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability contrary to the provisions of Section 51 ... is liable for each and every such offense....