Opinion ID: 303595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Statute Applied to the Case at Bar

Text: 78 We reach a different result here from that of the Matson court majority, one additional reason being the different consequences we envisage following from our interpretation of the statute. The Ninth Circuit decision was partly based on a fear that: 79 . . . [T]o leave enforcement of antitrust policy in [merger and acquisition] cases to the FTC, the Department of Justice and the courts would apply the full and unconditional force of the antitrust laws to such agreements contrary to the intent of the Shipping Act that industry considerations must be taken into balance in judging industry arrangements. 50 80 We take a different view. If the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission attacks a shipping industry merger or acquisition in the courts as contrary to the antitrust laws, the Maritime Commission should be free to intervene on behalf of the industry viewpoint. The inadequacy of vesting the Maritime Commission with jurisdiction to weigh industry and antitrust considerations in merger or acquisition situations is evident from the case at bar, in which: 81 (1) No hearing was held, even though Section 15 itself recognizes that a hearing is appropriate in all cases other than those of a purely routine nature, which have an impact on commerce that the Commission finds is de minimis, 51 and those of a restrictive nature where the applicant for approval . . [satisfies] the burden of demonstrating the need for anticompetitive restraints. . . . 52 The sale of all Oceanic's assets to Pacific Far East, however, can hardly be said without a hearing to have a de minimis impact on competition. On the other hand, with no hearing, it was hardly possible for the applicants to meet satisfactorily all the objections to anticompetitive restraints Seatrain might have raised. 82 (2) No record was developed by the Commission, detailing its weighing of the antitrust and industry considerations. 83 (3) There is no possible way this court could review the FMC's consideration here of, inter alia, the antitrust implications of Oceanic's sale of all its assets to Pacific Far East. The weighing of the importance of governmental action contrary to antitrust policy and the opportunity for judicial review were two of the relevant criteria we enumerated in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., supra, for determining to what extent Congress has knowingly adopted a policy contrary to or inconsistent with the previously established antitrust laws . . . . 53 84 In contrast, full opportunity for a hearing, with participation of all interested parties, creation of a record, and full appellate court review, would be possible in an original action on this proposed sale in the U. S. District Court. Again, we intend no implication on the merits of any antitrust question which may be here involved, nor do we suggest that it is incumbent on any antitrust enforcement agency to challenge this sale contract. We do hold that it is not the Federal Maritime Commission which has the duty to approve or disapprove the type contract made the subject of this litigation. 85 In view of our finding that the Federal Maritime Commission lacks jurisdiction under Section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916 to approve arrangements of the type involved here, which do not require the continued existence or participation of the parties in such arrangements, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other issues presented by this appeal. The decisions of the Commission approving Agreement No. 9903 and denying a petition to reopen are accordingly vacated, with the Commission directed to remove this agreement from its docket. 86 So ordered.