Opinion ID: 1267097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination of Community Supervision

Text: Scott contends the circuit court properly terminated his CSP because the Department may not require him to participate in the program after he has maxed out his sentence for the no parole offense. We disagree. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is a court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. State Budget and Control Bd., 313 S.C. 1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993). What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed.1992). If a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). Because Scott maxed out [4] the non-suspended portion of his sentence, with the benefit of good conduct credits, two statutes are relevant to his situation. The first provides, in relevant part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except in a case in which the death penalty or a term of life imprisonment is imposed, any sentence for a no parole offense as defined in Section 24-13-100 must include any term of incarceration and completion of a community supervision program operated by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-560 (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). The second statute, concerning individuals who max out the active part of their sentence with the benefit of good conduct credits, provides, in relevant part: Any person who has served the term of imprisonment for which he has been sentenced less deductions allowed therefrom for good conduct is considered upon release to have served the entire term for which he was sentenced unless the person is required to complete a community supervision program pursuant to Section 24-21-560. If the person is required to complete a community supervision program, he must complete his sentence as provided in Section 24-21-560 prior to discharge from the criminal justice system. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-210(E). Scott incorrectly asserts the section simply sets out the legal framework for the CSP when it is made a part of an offender's `no parole offense' sentence. The use of the words must along with the conjunction and indicate Scott's sentence for kidnaping requires a term of incarceration along with completion of a CSP. See Hodges v. Rainey, supra ; Mitchell v. Holler, 311 S.C. 406, 410, 429 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1993) (The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand a statute's operation.). In the second statute, the word unless indicates a no parole offender has not completed his sentence, when using the benefit of good conduct credits, until completing the CSP. Scott was incarcerated for approximately 90% of the non-suspended portion of his sentence and was eligible for community supervision. [5] Scott took advantage of good conduct credits to max out his 3½ year sentence. See S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-210 and § 24-13-220. Contrary to Scott's argument, § 24-13-210 does not apply only to offenders who had at a minimum served eighty-five percent of their sentences. Instead, the section applies to any no parole offender who statutorily maxes out his sentence with the benefit of good conduct credits. [6] Under § 24-13-210, Scott has not served his entire active term of incarceration until he completes a CSP. The circuit court lacked the authority to terminate Scott's CSP. On remand, the circuit court shall determine whether Scott violated the conditions of his CSP and consider any violation in accordance with S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-560(C) (Supp.2001).