Opinion ID: 1851850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Total Contempt Sentences Exceeding Statutory Maximum Improper

Text: In MCLA 767.19c; MSA 28.959(3), the Legislature has provided, inter alia, that witnesses before the citizens' grand jury, after a grant of immunity, may be punished to the extent provided in that statute, for refusal to answer any questions before the grand jury concerning any matter or thing of which the witness has knowledge concerning matters before the grand jury. (Emphasis added.) It is conceded that all episodes of contempt in the instant case involve refusals to answer identical or similar questions involving the same subject matter. Plaintiff urges this Court to rule that, regardless of the common subject matter, the episodes of testimonial refusal here were separate events creating, accordingly, independent and separate instances of contempt. Cf. In re Ward, 295 Mich 742; 295 NW 483 (1940); In re Spalter, 31 Mich App 458; 188 NW2d 67 (1971). Defendants contend, on the other hand, that the various episodes constitute one continuing offense in an area of refusal carved out by the recalcitrant witnesses in the first instance of questioning. Cf. Yates v United States, 355 US 66; 78 S Ct 128; 2 L Ed 2d 95 (1957). There is no need to resolve this aspect of the case. Whether we are talking about one continuing or two separate instances on these facts, the statute on point, MCLA 767.19c; MSA 28.959(3), is, in either case, applicable. It provides that refusal to answer any questions concerning a given matter or thing subject to grand jury scrutiny is punishable by the prescribed penalties. The statute makes no mention of the chronology of the questioning or whether the questions were asked on one, two, or three different occasions; the reference in the statute is entirely to the focus of the questioning, i.e., was it about a given matter or thing. If so, it is covered by the statutory penalties. To hold otherwise  to hold that MCLA 767.19c; MSA 28.959(3) permits each occasion identical or similar questions are asked of a recalcitrant witness on multiple occasions, to be independently punishable by a maximum incarceration of one year to be served in consecutive terms, is, effectively, to abrogate the statutory maximum penalty provisions, thereby rendering contemnors' sentences potentially infinite. Witnesses could be continuously shuttled back and forth before a grand jury, creating multiple instances of contempt, without reference to the fact that the improper act is, in each instance, the same. [2] The language of the statute gives no support to such a position nor will we ascribe to the Legislature such a bizarre and unreasonable intent. Further, we can see no relevant significance to the fact that the first episodes of contempt occurred during the regular term of the citizens grand jury while the second set of contempts fell during a meeting of the same grand jury sitting in recalled session pursuant to MCLA 767.7a; MSA 28.947(1). It is clearly erroneous to contend that we are talking about two different grand juries. [3] The procedural stage at which a grand jury is operating has no relevance to its extraordinary powers to compel testimony through grant of immunity and, conversely, to its power to seek punishment of witnesses for refusal to testify. In other words, the citizens' grand jury, by virtue of its gathering in recalled session, is not thereby invested with a clean slate in order to start the process of investigation completely over again. Recall of the grand jury can only lawfully be accomplished in order to conclude business commenced, MCLA 767.7a; MSA 28.947(1), or, at the request of a convicted contemnor in order to purge himself of    contempt, MCLA 767.19c; MSA 28.959(3). In sum, we find that the Legislature has enacted in MCLA 767.19c; MSA 28.959(3) a maximum statutory penalty of $10,000 and/or incarceration for one year in cases of testimonial contempt arising out of neglect or refusal to answer questions involving the same or similar subject matter before a grand jury lawfully sitting either in regular or recalled session with such subject matter properly before it. [4] IV  Conclusion We do not intend, nor, we are confident, did the Legislature in its enactment of MCLA 767.19c; MSA 28.959(3), to condone nor lessen the gravity of the offense of contempt before a citizens' grand jury. The result of the instant contempts has apparently been to stifle almost entirely an important and significant investigation. We would point out as well that the Legislature, in enacting this statute, actually increased the penalty involved for this crime by extending possible imprisonment past the expiration date of a citizens' grand jury's term. [5] Whether the present statutory penalties for contempt provide sufficient deterrent from refusal to testify, having in mind the human equation is for the Legislature not the Courts to determine. The Legislature has spoken in the instant case after balancing the harm done to society with the protection of individual liberties. Its message with respect to the punishment involved is clear  the maximum permissible incarceration for this conduct arising from a single citizens grand jury, in regular and/or extended session, is one year, no more. The courts have no inherent authority to push beyond that legislative prescription. Defendants, having served more than one year already, are accordingly discharged.