Opinion ID: 1864214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to give special jury instructions

Text: The most serious issue presented by this appeal concerns the failure of the trial judge to give special instructions requested by the defendant which relate to the defense of insanity. (Assignment of Error No. 7, special written charge number 5.) The defense of insanity is based upon psychiatric testimony. The defendant construed it as being to the effect that the accused Milby is subject to a characterological disturbance. When this underlying mental defect is aggravated by overindulgence in alcohol, allegedly the accused may sustain an acute brain syndrome, by which he has no conscious awareness of the difference between right and wrong. Substantial lay evidence was also introduced tending to corroborate this behavior pattern. The chief defense of the case was that, except when the syndrome occurs, the accused appears to be and is a completely normal and sane individual, in control of his characterological disorder; but that, when due to alcohol (or other aggravating factor) he is unable to control his mental defect, the accused sustains a complete disruption of his mental processes, has no conscious awareness of what he is doing, and is unable to distinguish between right and wrong. The essence of the defense is that, at the time of the offense, the accused was legally insane by reason of his mental defect; even though, at the time of the trial and during most of his waking life, he was and is legally sane. To emphasize this defense, the defendant requested a special charge so that the jury could distinguish between a periodical and temporary legal insanity as contrasted with the layman's notion of permanent insanity. [1] The portion of the general charge relating to the insanity defense includes three out of the charge's total eleven pages. These general instructions were correct insofar as they went. The pertinent portion of the general charge does indicate that the insanity must relate to the time of the offense, not before or after, [2] which implicitly recognizes the defense of temporary insanity relied upon by the accused. Nevertheless, where (as here) insanity of a temporary nature is relied upon as the principal defense, it seems to us that the preferable practice would be to grant special written charges as to temporary insanity when requested by the accused, if they are wholly correct, La.C.Cr.P. art. 807 at least, if (as here) the general charge only implicitly instructs the jury as to the issue. The question is whether the trial court's failure to give this special charge as requested is reversible error. The court's general charge explicitly instructed the jury that the insanity must be proven to relate to the time of the offense not before or after, but it did not elaborate the defense of temporary insanity as requested by the accused. A close issue is presented. Ultimately, we conclude that the lack of detail of the wholly correct general charge does not require reversal: We are not persuaded that the additional requested special legal instructions in technical legal language would have so materially added to the jury's understanding of the basic issue before it, that the denial of it prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused or constituted a substantial violation of any statutory right to have the special charge given. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 921. Further, examining the final arguments of counsel, [3] we find that the issue of temporary insanity was fully and fairly argued as presented to the jury by the evidence. We therefore do not find reversible merit to this assignment. We likewise find no error in the trial court's refusal to give other special jury charges requested: Special Charge Number 1 : The defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury as to the mandatory penalty for second-degree murder, i. e., life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a period of forty years, La.R.S. 14:30.1 (1975). In State v. Blackwell, 298 So.2d 798 (La. 1974), we held that jury instruction or argument on penalties may be allowed or not, within the discretion of the trial court, because imposition of sentencing is within the province of the judge and is not a jury function. In State v. Prater, 337 So.2d 1107 (La.1976), a majority of this court agreed that the Blackwell rationale is inapplicable where, upon conviction, the trial judge must impose a mandatory sentence; and that, therefore, the trial court is required, upon request of the defendant, to charge with regard to a mandatory penalty, because then the penalty is in effect determined by the jury rather than by the judge. However, as the concurring opinion in Prater noted, this modification of the Blackwell rule only applies to cases tried after the date of finality of Prater, September 27, 1976. Since the present case was tried in June of that year, prior to such effective date, the trial court did not here abuse its discretion by refusing to charge the jury as to sentence, under the interpretation of Blackwell prevailing at the time of this trial. Special charges 2, 3, 4, and 6 contained matters sufficiently within the general charge of the trial court as to justify the trial court's refusal to give them. La.C. Cr.P. art. 807.