Opinion ID: 2224708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the circuit court properly excluded evidence of the complainant's pregnancy

Text: The defendant argues that the exclusion of evidence of the complainant's pregnancy and her desire to obtain an abortion violated his right to present a defense under the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. He maintains that the right to confront adverse witnesses is especially important in sexual assault prosecutions since the trial often turns on the credibility of the complainant. The defendant argues that the pregnancy evidence was material for two specific reasons. First, he asserts that it is unlikely that a man would violently rape a woman who is carrying his child. Second, he argues that the complainant's desire to have an abortion which he opposed provided a motive for the complainant to make a false accusation. Finally, the defendant contends that even if his offer of proof was inadequate under sec. 901.03(1)(b), Stats., this court should nevertheless review the alleged error pursuant to sec. 901.03(4). Section 901.03(4) provides: Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the judge. Under this provision, there may be a review and a reversal of a conviction if plain error was committed. State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 176, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984). [1, 2] We agree with the court of appeals that the defendant's offer of proof was inadequate. As the court of appeals noted, an offer of proof need not be stated with complete precision or in unnecessary detail, but it should state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is urged to adopt. State v. Haynes, 118 Wis. 2d 21, 28-29, 345 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1984). The offer of proof must enable the reviewing court to act with reasonable confidence that the evidentiary hypothesis can be sustained. State v. Salter, 118 Wis. 2d 67, 74, 346 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1984). The offer of proof by the defendant did not meet these requirements. In arguing that the evidence of the complainant's pregnancy and her desire to have an abortion should be admissible on cross-examination of the complainant, the defendant conclusionally asserted only that the jury should hear about conversations that were made between [his] client and the alleged victim as to the question of abortion and the question of whether she was bearing Mr. Robinson's child prior to this alleged sexual assault. ... The defendant never explained why the jury should hear about these conversations. He never explained, until after trial, that a theory of defense was that the defendant would not assault his pregnant former girlfriend because the defendant did not want to harm a fetus he had fathered. To the contrary, the closest the defendant came to making an offer of proof indicated that there was a question whether the child the complainant was bearing was fathered by the defendant. Similarly, the defendant never explained, until after trial, that a theory of defense was that the complainant had a motive to testify falsely because she wanted to have an abortion and the defendant was trying to prevent her from obtaining one. Again, the closest the defendant came to making an offer of proof indicated only that conversations were held between the defendant and the complainant as to the question of abortion. No issue was ever raised at trial that the complainant wanted to get rid of the defendant so she could obtain an abortion without his interference. Nor did the defendant or any defense witness present evidence suggesting such. [3] We conclude, therefore, that the offer of proof by the defendant did not state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to enable this court to conclude with reasonable confidence that the evidentiary hypothesis could be sustained. Consequently, we will now address the issue of whether the exclusion of the evidence of the complainant's pregnancy and her desire to have an abortion was plain error. Plain error is error so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted even though the action was not objected to at the time. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d at 177, citing Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 191, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978). The circuit court prohibited the defendant from cross-examining the state's witnesses to elicit evidence about the complainant's pregnancy and intent to obtain an abortion. The court expressly excluded such evidence under sec. 971.31(11), Stats., which provides that in actions under sec. 940.225 evidence which is admissible under sec. 972.11(2) must be determined by the court upon pretrial motion to be material to a fact at issue in the case and of sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature before it may be introduced at trial. The circuit court held that evidence of the complainant's pregnancy at the time of the assault was not material to a fact at issue in this case because the defendant was not charged with any degree of sexual assault in which it was necessary to prove specific instances of sexual conduct to show the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, so as to be admissible under sec. 972.11(2)(b)2. [4] A circuit court's ruling on relevance will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 344-45, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983). A discretionary determination, to be sustained, must demonstrably be made and based upon the facts appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law. Additionally, and most importantly, a discretionary determination must be the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and are considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasonable and reasoned determination. It is recognized that a trial court in an exercise of its discretion may reasonably reach a conclusion which another judge or another court may not reach, but it must be a decision which a reasonable judge or court could arrive at by the consideration of the relevant law, the facts, and a process of logical reasoning. Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981). Relevant evidence is defined in sec. 904.01, Stats., as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [5] We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the defendant from questioning any of the state's witnesses regarding the complainant's pregnancy. The defendant failed to show the relevance of the evidence at the circuit court level. The circuit court's determination was the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of the record and the law relied upon were stated and were considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasonable and reasoned determination. [6] Moreover, we are not persuaded by the reasons the defendant advances before this court for finding the evidence relevant. The defendant asserts that a man would not violently rape a woman who was carrying his child. However, there is absolutely no evidence in the trial record to establish that the complainant was in fact pregnant with the defendant's child. [6] The defendant also argues that the complainant's desire to have an abortion which he opposed provided a motive for the complainant to make a false accusation. Again, the record fails to demonstrate the relevance of this evidence. The defendant did not contact the complainant for two months after the assault, giving her plenty of opportunity to obtain an abortion without his interference. Moreover, the defendant's alleged opposition would have provided no legal impediment whatsoever to the complainant's obtaining an abortion. While acknowledging the importance of the constitutional rights that the defendant raises, we conclude that his constitutional rights were not violated in this case because a defendant has no right, constitutional or otherwise, to present irrelevant evidence. State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 584, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985); State v. Droste, 115 Wis. 2d 48, 58, 339 N.W.2d 578 (1983).