Opinion ID: 4554939
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against Elges

Text: We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Elges based on qualified immunity. Based on the facts alleged and the evidence produced, viewed in the light most favorable to Tlapanco, a reasonable juror could find that Elges violated Tlapanco’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from warrantless searches and seizures, arrest without probable cause, and malicious prosecution. These violations were of clearly established law. Elges, therefore, is not entitled to qualified immunity on these federal claims. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Elges on Tlapanco’s unlawful search and seizure claim regarding mirroring his electronic devices prior to returning the physical devices because Tlapanco provided no evidence that Elges was involved in this process.
Tlapanco argues that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Elges on his unlawful search and seizure claim. Elges is entitled to qualified immunity unless Tlapanco has shown that a reasonable jury could find that Elges violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from searches and seizures without probable cause. We hold that a reasonable jury could find that Elges’s warrant affidavit contained a false statement or omission that was made with reckless disregard for the truth, and that his statements caused a warrant to be issued without probable cause. The right to be free from searches and seizures predicated on an No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 9 officer’s reckless submission of false statements in a warrant affidavit is clearly established. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on the illegal search and seizure claim. Under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant may be issued only “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause exists ‘if the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person would be warranted in believing that an offense had been committed and that evidence thereof would be found on the premises to be searched.’” Peffer v. Stephens, 880 F.3d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996)). The officer must examine “the totality of the circumstances, recognizing both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000). “In the context of child pornography, an affidavit that connects a defendant, an offending username, and the defendant’s residence is enough to establish probable cause for a search.” United States v. Carter, 792 F. App’x 366, 368 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Elbe, 774 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2009). In the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context, “[p]olice officers are entitled to rely on a judicially secured warrant for immunity from a § 1983 action for illegal search and seizure unless the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, that official belief in the existence of probable cause is unreasonable.” Yancey v. Carroll County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989). However, “an officer cannot rely on a judicial determination of probable cause if that officer knowingly makes false statements and omissions to the judge such that but for these falsities the judge would not have issued the warrant.” Id. A plaintiff, thus, may challenge an officer’s qualified immunity defense in a civil rights case by showing that (1) the officer’s warrant affidavit contained a false statement or omission that was made either deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the false statement or omission was material to the finding of probable cause. See Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010). Once a plaintiff makes the first showing, the Fourth Amendment requires the court to “set aside the No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 10 [false] statements and include the information omitted in order to determine whether the affidavit is still sufficient to establish probable cause.” Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305. “A plaintiff shows substantial evidence of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard when, for example, he presents proof that at the time the officer swore out the affidavit, she knew of or possessed information that contradicted the sworn assertions.” Butler v. City of Detroit, 936 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 2019). It is generally the jury’s role to determine whether probable cause supported issuance of a search warrant unless the only “reasonable determination” that a jury could make is that probable cause existed. Yancey, 876 F.2d at 1243. In general, “[t]he right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s home is clearly established, as is the right to be free from searches predicated on an officer’s intentional or reckless submission of false statements in a warrant affidavit.” McCallum v. Geelhood, 742 F. App’x 985, 991 n.6 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, it is clearly established that in general (and absent a warrant exception, which is not relevant here) “a seizure of personal property [is] per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983); see also Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 543 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[S]eizures of personal property require probable cause.”). Yet because “immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” this court must not “define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (internal citations omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam). Rather, to overcome qualified immunity, the evidence must support the conclusion “that every reasonable officer in [the officer’s] shoes would have recognized” that the search and seizure were unreasonable “in the precise situation [the officer] was facing.” Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d 798, 801 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866–67 (2017). For several of Tlapanco’s claims, however, the “breathing room” granted to officers by qualified immunity is not dispositive given the facts of this case. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866 (internal citation omitted). Specifically, with regard to all of Tlapanco’s Fourth Amendment No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 11 claims against Elges except the mirroring claim, the primary issue to resolve is whether a reasonable jury could find that, when he applied for the search and arrest warrants, Elges intentionally or recklessly disregarded material facts negating probable cause. Further, while it will sometimes be possible for officers to make “reasonable but mistaken judgments” about the materiality of the information omitted, that is not true here. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866 (internal citation omitted). In this case, as described below, the information Elges left out of the warrant applications obviously negated probable cause because it demonstrated that Tlapanco was not the Kik user harassing A.F. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, Elges is not entitled to qualified immunity as long as a reasonable jury could find that his omission of this information was intentional or reckless. With this in mind, we proceed to examine Tlapanco’s Fourth Amendment claims against Elges. Elges searched Tlapanco’s apartment and seized his electronic devices pursuant to a judicially issued warrant. At summary judgment, Tlapanco must make a “substantial showing” of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Elges’s affidavit contained “a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth.” Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 517. Tlapanco seeks to rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the warrant by presenting evidence of information Elges possessed “that contradicted the sworn assertions” in his affidavit. Butler, 936 F.3d at 419. Specifically, Tlapanco provides evidence that (1) Elges knew the difference between a display name and username yet failed to confirm the username of the user threatening A.F.; (2) the Kik activity log showed that the username “anonymous” did not send the messages to A.F.; and (3) Elges possessed A.F.’s messages and a spreadsheet compiling the messages showing that the messages were sent from username “anonymousfl.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Tlapanco, while there is no indication that Elges acted intentionally or deliberately, a reasonable jury could find that Elges recklessly disregarded information in his possession negating probable cause that the username “anonymous,” and by extension Tlapanco, was responsible for hacking A.F. or sending the messages. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the statements of material fact or omissions in Elges’s affidavit were made recklessly. No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 12 First, Tlapanco points to Elges’s statements that Elges knew the difference between a username and display name on Kik yet failed to verify the username of the individual sending the messages to A.F. With this knowledge, Tlapanco argues, it was reckless not to verify the username of the individual threatening A.F. Elges sought to corroborate A.F.’s allegations by speaking to other students as well as viewing A.F.’s Kik messages and photographs on her phone and iPod. Yet, despite having access to A.F.’s devices and other means of verification, Elges did not confirm the perpetrator’s username. Elges responds that, in assuming that “anonymous” was the username and not merely the display name, he was simply relying on the information he had received from A.F. and her friends. Yet the only evidence that the children (or anyone else) ever told Elges that “anonymous” was the username is Elges’s own deposition testimony, which, in this posture, we cannot assume that a jury would credit. Indeed, a reasonable jury could find grounds in the record to question Elges’s assertion. A.F. testified that what she saw when communicating with the individual on Kik was the user’s display name, not the username, and that she did not know the username of the person harassing her. As a Kik user, A.F. was familiar with the difference between the two names and, in fact, testified that she explained the difference to the police. A reasonable jury could credit A.F.’s testimony and infer from it that she would not have told the police that anonymous was her harasser’s username. A reasonable jury could find further support for this inference in the original written statements that A.F. and a friend of hers each provided to the police, as well as Elges’s own initial investigation reports. Although these documents identify the Kik user as “anonymous,” none of them indicates that A.F. or anyone else ever told Elges that anonymous was the suspect account’s username. Second, Elges requested and received information from Kik about the user and the account activity for the username “anonymous.” Elges received Kik’s response on March 14, 2014, including IP addresses, related devices, user location, and an email address associated with the account. Kik’s response also included an activity log with the date and time, device used to access Kik, and “extra data.” DE 54-7, Kik Request Resp., PageID 1451–65. Tlapanco argues that this data “confirmed Tlapanco’s innocence [because] none of the messages sent to the victim or her friends could be traced to Tlapanco’s Kik account.” CA6 R. 23, Appellant Br., at 35. No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 13 Although the inconsistencies are not self-evident upon cursory inspection, a reasonable jury could find that an officer comparing the time and date of A.F.’s messages and those from anonymous would realize that anonymous did not send the messages. Elges failed to include or consider this exculpatory evidence in his affidavit. This omission is material as it is “the kind of thing the judge would wish to know” to determine if the alleged illegal conduct is connected to the place sought to be searched. Wesley, 779 F.3d at 433 (quoting Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 570 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Finally, as further evidence that Elges recklessly disregarded information suggesting that anonymousfl was the username threatening A.F., not anonymous, Tlapanco directs our attention to the Excel spreadsheet of A.F.’s Kik messages created by Liposky and given to Elges. Tlapanco submitted excerpted screenshots of the spreadsheet, showing that the spreadsheet includes columns for the Kik name (i.e., display name), the Kik username, and the contents of A.F.’s Kik messages. When the cells are collapsed, the content of the display name and username columns appears largely cut off. Elges testified that he “looked at the spreadsheet [but] just did not expand the [username] cell.” DE 42-2, Elges Dep., PageID 473. Elges saw the collapsed username column stating “anonymous,” but because he did not expand the cell, he “did not see the last two letters of the cell.” Id. at 474. A reasonable jury could find that Elges’s decision to not expand the cell and confirm the username of the account sending the messages— where that cell and many others appeared incomplete when not expanded—was reckless and resulted in a material omission of the correct username from the affidavit. In sum, Tlapanco presented “substantial evidence of . . . reckless disregard” rebutting the presumption of probable cause by “present[ing] proof that at the time [Elges] swore out the [search warrant] affidavit, [Elges] . . . possessed information that contradicted the sworn assertions.” Butler, 936 F.3d at 419. Specifically, while a reasonable jury could find that Elges was merely negligent, when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Tlapanco as we must, a reasonable jury could alternatively find that Elges acted recklessly. Elges did not independently verify the username despite access to devices with A.F.’s Kik messages, he possessed data showing that the username anonymous did not send the messages to A.F., and he viewed a spreadsheet that included a specific column showing the username sending the No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 14 messages was “anonymousfl.” And the warrant was based entirely on the purported connection between the threatening messages and the username “anonymous,” so it is obvious that this information was material. Elges is not entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful search and seizure claim.
Tlapanco’s next § 1983 claim is that Elges arrested him without probable cause. Whether or not the district court properly granted summary judgment to Elges on the basis of qualified immunity turns on whether a reasonable jury could find that Elges violated Tlapanco’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause. We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Elges lacked probable cause to arrest Tlapanco and that the right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established.2 We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity with respect to the wrongful arrest claim. To prevail on a false arrest claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff [must] prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). An arrest is supported by the requisite probable cause when, at the time of that arrest, “the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [she] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff] had committed or was committing an offense.” Wesley, 779 F.3d at 429 (alterations in original) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). A showing of “probable cause provides a complete defense to a claim of false arrest.” Halasah v. City of Kirtland, 574 F. App’x 624, 629 (6th Cir. 2014). 2 Because Tlapanco resided in New York, the arrest warrant was sent to Thornton in New York to effectuate Tlapanco’s arrest. Elges did not personally arrest Tlapanco. Elges was responsible for swearing out the affidavit upon which the arrest warrant relied, and no other independent investigation was carried out by the officers in New York before arresting Tlapanco. Here, Elges briefly mentioned he did not physically participate in the arrest but failed to develop any argument that these claims could not proceed on this basis, thereby forfeiting this issue. See United States v. Fowler, 819 F.3d 298, 309 (6th Cir. 2016). In an unpublished decision, this court has been willing to assume that a plaintiff can bring a false arrest and malicious prosecution claim against an officer in spite of the fact that he was not the arresting officer and there was an arrest warrant. See Garcia v. Thorne, 520 F. App’x 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2013). Because Elges has not argued to the contrary, we assume the same for this case, given Elges’s primary role in the investigation, search and seizures of the electronic devices, and swearing out the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant. No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 15 Because Tlapanco’s arrest warrant was issued by a judge, he must make a substantial showing that Elges’s sworn statements supporting the arrest warrant included “material false statements [made] either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth to establish probable cause for an arrest.” Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 517. In addition to the evidence discussed above, Tlapanco points to other exculpatory evidence gathered by Elges after the interview with Tlapanco and the search and seizure of his devices. In particular, Tlapanco provides evidence Elges knew: (1) none of Tlapanco’s devices included images of A.F. or Kik messages with A.F., and (2) Tlapanco denied soliciting or receiving images from minors. Because a reasonable jury could find that Elges’s sworn statements supporting the arrest warrant were recklessly indifferent to the truth that Tlapanco did not hack or communicate with A.F., and Tlapanco’s right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established, Elges is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. First, Tlapanco’s seized electronic devices did not contain any images of A.F. or Kik messages with A.F. The OCSO completed a forensic search of Tlapanco’s seized electronic devices including iPods, laptops, and a cell phone. According to the police log, Tlapanco’s iPod contained “numerous” explicit images. DE 44-3, OCSO Case Report, PageID 674. Most significantly, however, officers found no images of A.F. on the devices. The forensic report also included Kik messages, “but the earliest date of the messages stored on the Ipod [sic] [was] March 17, 2014.” Id. at 675. The fact that no images of A.F. were found on Tlapanco’s electronic devices provided Elges additional exculpatory evidence that Tlapanco was not responsible for hacking A.F. or sending the Kik messages. Depending on their content, the images on Tlapanco’s iPod may have given the officers probable cause to investigate and arrest Tlapanco for other crimes, but they did not provide the officers inculpatory evidence relating to A.F. The arrest warrant charged Tlapanco with computer crimes and child sexually explicit activity specifically relating to interactions with A.F. A reasonable jury could find the failure to discover any images of A.F. or Kik messages with A.F. in Tlapanco’s possession provided additional exculpatory evidence undermining any reasonable belief of probable cause. Second, Elges also interviewed Tlapanco at his apartment and Tlapanco provided a written statement. Elges argues that Tlapanco’s interview and statements connect Tlapanco to No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 16 A.F. because Tlapanco “admitted he used Kik, admitted his username on Kik was Anonymous, admitted he asked girls for nude photographs, and did not deny that he may have requested photographs from the victim.” CA6 R. 25, Appellee Br., at 37. The fact that Tlapanco used the Kik username anonymous was previously established; this fact does not provide additional support for Elges’s probable cause determination. Moreover, when viewed in context of the entire interview it is clear that Tlapanco denied allegations of receiving or soliciting nude pictures from anyone underage including A.F. The officers questioned Tlapanco about A.F., but he did not “remember doing such a thing. It may have happened, but as the officers said, it may have been a one-time thing, just feeling crazy that day. [He did not] know for sure, and without the [message] logs, [he could not] confirm that it happen[ed]. [He did] not deny[] it either.” DE 54-9, Tlapanco Police Statement, PageID 1475. Later in the statement, Tlapanco reiterated that he did not want to be “forced to admit to something [he’s] never done” and has “never received nude pictures from any one underage. [He] ha[s] asked for non-nude clothed pictures, just to put a face on the username. Anyone who has asked [him] to stop, [he] ha[s] stopped completely. [He] believe[d] that going through the [messages] log w[ould] reveal the most information.” Id. at 1476–77; see also DE 44-3, OCSO Case Report, PageID 671, 673. Elges showed Tlapanco Kik messages taken from A.F.’s phone and Tlapanco specifically stated that he did not send the messages. Viewed as a whole, Tlapanco’s statements deny any alleged solicitation or receipt of explicit pictures from minors and direct the officers to review the Kik messaging logs to verify this claim. Despite Tlapanco’s substantial showing that Elges possessed information establishing that Tlapanco did not hack A.F. nor communicate with her on Kik, Tlapanco was arrested pursuant to a warrant and therefore needs to prove: “(1) that the officer applying for the warrant, either knowingly and deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that created a falsehood[,] and (2) that such statements or omissions were material to the finding of probable cause.” Halasah, 574 F. App’x at 629. Tlapanco’s claim is weakened by the lack of documentation regarding what false statements or material omissions Elges made to secure the arrest warrant. Elges swore out the information pertaining to the arrest warrant rather than submitting an affidavit. Neither side No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 17 presented a transcript or affidavit of the testimony, so there is no record of the statements or omissions made to secure the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant itself states that Elges, as the complaining witness, filed a sworn complaint providing support for the eight criminal counts included. Tlapanco’s evidence, however, suggests that a judge would not have issued the arrest warrant if Elges had presented all relevant exculpatory information. A reasonable jury could find that Elges did not have probable cause to conclude that Tlapanco was connected to the conduct at issue, and that the judge would not have issued the arrest warrant but for recklessly false statements or material omissions by Elges. A reasonable jury could find that Tlapanco was arrested without probable cause, a violation of a clearly established right. Accordingly, Elges is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Tlapanco argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Elges on the malicious prosecution claim.3 Elges is entitled to qualified immunity unless Tlapanco has shown that a reasonable jury could find that Elges violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution and that a reasonable officer would have been aware of the violation. Because he has made such a showing, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Elges on the basis of qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim. The elements for a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, as set out in Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010), are: (1) “that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant ‘ma[d]e, influence[d], or participate[d] in the decision to prosecute’”; (2) “that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution”; (3) “that, ‘as a consequence of a legal proceeding,’ the plaintiff suffered a ‘deprivation of liberty’ . . . apart from the initial seizure”; and (4) that “the criminal proceeding 3 The concurrence points to the mislabeling of the “malicious prosecution” offense as such. Indeed, this court has noted that this label is a “misnomer,” and is better labeled as the right “to be free from continued detention without probable cause.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2006). This court has not, however, concluded that a false arrest offense and malicious prosecution offense are not separate and distinct claims. The gravamen of a so-called malicious prosecution offense, arising from the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, “is continued detention without probable cause.” Id. at 748. This offense is separate and distinct from a false arrest offense. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010). No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 18 must have been resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 308–09 (alterations in original) (first quoting Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 2007), then quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 2007)). There appears to be no dispute that Tlapanco suffered a deprivation of liberty—he was incarcerated for five weeks after his initial seizure—or that the proceeding was eventually resolved in his favor, leaving us to resolve only the first and second elements. “Under the first element, an investigating officer does not escape liability just because someone else (e.g., the prosecutor) made the actual decision to prosecute, so long as the plaintiff can show that the officer ‘influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute.’” Sampson v. Village of Mackinaw City, 685 F. App’x 407, 417 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sykes, 625 F.3d at 311–12)). “Providing reports, affidavits, or other investigative materials containing falsehoods, omissions, or misstatements to a prosecutor can constitute participation when (1) those materials formed the basis for the charge,” and “(2) the falsehoods, omissions, or misstatements were made deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Meeks v. City of Detroit, 727 F. App’x 171, 178 (6th Cir. 2018). Tlapanco provided evidence that Elges participated in and influenced the decision to prosecute. Elges requested the arrest warrant from the Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office and swore out the arrest warrant to the judge. Although the Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office authorized the arrest warrant and created the charging document, Elges supplied the reports and investigative materials forming the basis for the specific charges. The evidence shows Elges influenced and participated in the decision to prosecute. Under the second element, a reasonable jury could find that there was a lack of probable cause to prosecute Tlapanco. As discussed above, Tlapanco presented substantial evidence that Elges possessed information showing there was no probable cause to arrest and prosecute him yet recklessly omitted this information. Accordingly, Tlapanco has provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Elges violated Tlapanco’s “clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution by a defendant who has ‘made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff’ by . . . ‘knowingly or recklessly’ making false statements that are material to the prosecution either in reports or in affidavits filed to secure warrants.” King v. No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 19 Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 582–83 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Elges is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
The district court correctly determined that Elges was entitled to summary judgment on the search and seizure claims related to the copying of Tlapanco’s devices because Tlapanco provided no evidence that Elges was involved in the copying. See Burley, 729 F.3d at 619. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment on this claim.