Opinion ID: 1709055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In all cases of layoff the principle of straight seniority by department shall be observed and length of service shall govern.

Text: (c) The employer will, whenever possible, give at least seven (7) days notice prior to layoff to the employees affected together with a list of the names of said employees to the union. The city, on the other hand, proposed an offer of settlement that would eliminate the definition of layoff included in the prior contract and have nothing in the contract restricting the layoff decision. The ultimate language adopted was developed by the arbitration panel itself. [1] The rationale for including such a clause with its compromise language was supposedly to protect the police officers from retaliatory layoffs due to the union's lack of cooperation in fiscal matters. The Court of Appeals noted the reason given for the inclusion of this clause and stated that: [w]e do not perceive the language as restricting the basic legislative choices of the city in providing municipal services, and we conclude that the award was within the power of the arbitration panel. Local 1277, Metropolitan Council No 23, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Center Line, 91 Mich App 337, 342; 283 NW2d 741 (1979). In fact, the Court of Appeals found that, given the previous contract between these parties, the clause actually expanded management rights. The layoff clause in the prior agreement was interpreted to totally prohibit layoffs solely for economic reasons, while the new clause merely stated that layoffs had to be made in conjunction with layoffs in other departments. Id. In deciding whether or not the Act 312 arbitration panel had the authority to order the inclusion of the layoff clause, it is necessary first to analyze Act 312 itself. As stated in MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31), the act intended to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of [interest] disputes. Compulsory arbitration in police and fire disputes was seen as a necessary tradeoff for the prohibition against striking. The legislative intent of Act 312 has been discussed on numerous occasions, see Detroit v Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, supra , and Metropolitan Council No 23, AFSCME v Oakland County Prosecutor, 409 Mich 299; 294 NW2d 578 (1980), and was succinctly summarized by Justice COLEMAN in Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local No 412, IAFF v Dearborn, 394 Mich 229, 278-279; 231 NW2d 226 (1975). [2] She stated: PERA procedurally requires the parties to meet at the bargaining table and confer in good faith with an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement. It does not mandate agreement. If the parties fail to agree on one or more mandatory subjects, an `impasse' situation is reached and the employer may take unilateral action on an issue consistent with its final offer to the employees' representative. The duty to bargain is then suspended until there is a change in the surrounding conditions or circumstances. In the private sector `impasse' often results in a strike. The employees refuse to accept the unilateral conditions imposed by the employer and withhold their services as a bargaining weapon. In the public sector strikes are prohibited but nevertheless occur. If the public employees do strike, the public employer may resort to the courts in order to return the labor situation to the status quo. By the time that court relief is obtained, however, the public may well have been left for a long period without the services and protection of the striking employees. When policemen engage in a strike, the community becomes immediately endangered by the withdrawal of their services. Likewise, our case law has often focused on the fact that fire fighters have a distinct and crucial employment relationship with a public employer. The Legislature, with knowledge of the vital character of police and fire services and with reference to the specific recommendations of the Governor's Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations (February, 1967) moved to foreclose strikes to police officers and fire fighters by enacting 1969 PA 312. (Footnotes omitted.) The manifest intent of Act 312 is clear. The exact scope of the arbitration panel's authority, on the other hand, is not so easily discerned from the words or intent of the act. While Act 312 does not specifically delineate the scope of the arbitration panel's authority, it can be inferred from an analysis which considers the public employee relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq., and Act 312 together. As stated in § 14, Act 312 was clearly intended to supplement PERA. MCL 423.244; MSA 17.455(44). Council No 23 v Oakland County Prosecutor, supra, 409 Mich 320; Alpena v Alpena Fire Fighters Ass'n, 56 Mich App 568, 575; 224 NW2d 672 (1974), overruled in part, Detroit v DPOA, 408 Mich 483, fn 65. Under § 15 of PERA, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. (Emphasis added.) MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15). This language is identical to that of § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 USC 158(d), and, thus, federal precedents are helpful in exploring the issues at hand. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 53; 214 NW2d 803 (1974). Those issues that fall into the category of wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment are deemed to be mandatory subjects of bargaining. 391 Mich 54-57. In contrast, permissive subjects of bargaining are those subjects that fall outside the scope of those designated as mandatory subjects. The parties are not required to bargain over them, but they may do so voluntarily. Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674, 679-681; 246 NW2d 831 (1976). A third category of bargaining subjects is illegal subjects. Illegal subjects will not be enforced even if the parties agree to bargain over such issues. [3] In general, Michigan has adopted the federal courts' approach as to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining and thus has used the phrase other terms and conditions of employment. See Central Michigan University Faculty Ass'n v Central Michigan University, 404 Mich 268, 277; 273 NW2d 21 (1978), and Van Buren Public School Dist v Wayne Circuit Judge, 61 Mich App 6, 27; 232 NW2d 278 (1975). The distinction between a mandatory and a permissive subject of bargaining is a very significant one. In the private sector, parties are required to bargain in good faith regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining. Also, a party may insist to impasse on such a subject and resort to economic weapons in order to achieve its demand. When a permissive subject is involved, however, neither party is obligated to discuss the subject, nor can a party insist to impasse on that subject. NLRB v Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp, 356 US 342, 349; 78 S Ct 718; 2 L Ed 2d 823 (1958). In the public sector, regardless of the subject nature, the parties are prohibited from striking. MCL 423.202; MSA 17.455(2). Nonetheless, the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects plays a vital role in the bargaining dynamics of the public sector. [4] It is only with respect to mandatory subjects that there is a duty to bargain under § 15 of PERA. [5] MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15). In spite of the differences between the public and private sector with regard to economic weapons, it has been held in numerous Michigan decisions that federal precedent in distinguishing between mandatory and permissive subjects is relevant and persuasive. Central Michigan University, supra; Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n, supra; Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist Board of Education, 393 Mich 616, 636; 227 NW2d 736 (1975); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 54; 214 NW2d 803 (1974). Therefore, it is useful to look to federal law as well as Michigan law for guidance to determine whether the layoff provision at issue in the instant case is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The distinction drawn between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining is significant in determining the scope of the Act 312 arbitration panel's authority. Given the fact that Act 312 complements PERA and that under § 15 of PERA the duty to bargain only extends to mandatory subjects, we conclude that the arbitration panel can only compel agreement as to mandatory subjects. It would be inconsistent to conclude that the arbitration panel can issue an award on a permissive subject when the parties do not even have a duty to bargain over such a subject. To hold otherwise would grant the Act 312 arbitration panel a free hand to compel agreement on any matters, even those beyond wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. It is clear that the Legislature, while interested in foreclosing strikes in police and fire departments and providing an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes did not intend for the arbitration panel to have unbridled authority. [6]