Opinion ID: 2974154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Direct and Post-Conviction Review

Text: Slagle brought twenty-five assignments of error to Ohio’s Eighth District Court of Appeals, but that court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See State v. Slagle, No. 55759, 1990 WL 82138 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 1990). On appeal, Slagle challenged the prosecutorial misconduct at trial, see id. at  (listed in the appendix to the opinion as assignments VI and IX), and during the penalty phase, see id. at  (listed as assignment XVI). He also argued that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel during both phases of his bifurcated trial. See id. at  (listed as assignment XIV). The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed his conviction in 1992. See State v. Slagle, 605 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 1992). With respect to the issues presented for appeal, the state supreme court held that improper comments, if any, by the prosecution did not render “the trial fundamentally unfair.” See No. 04-3490 Slagle v. Bagley Page 6 Slagle, 605 N.E.2d at 925. The state court divided the comments that Slagle challenged into three categories: (1) questions by the prosecution to which defense counsel did not object, (2) questions by the prosecution to which defense counsel did object, and (3) comments, including those to which defense counsel did and did not object, made by the prosecution during closing argument. See id. at 924-27. The state court reviewed for plain error the “approximately seventeen statements and questions” to which defense counsel did not object. See id. at 925. The court first determined that there was no plain error and then stated that “these comments did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.” See id. As for the questions to which defense counsel objected, the state court held that there was no error, and “[t]o the extent that the prosecutor may have crossed the line, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See id. at 926. Finally, the state court considered the challenged comments made in closing argument. The court stated, “Appellant objected to a number of these allegedly improper comments.” See id. The state court then held that “while some of the remarks made by the prosecutor may have been somewhat improper, the argument as a whole did not taint the fairness of [the] trial.” See id. Slagle then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, but the Supreme Court denied his petition. See Slagle v. Ohio, 510 U.S. 833 (1993). After he had exhausted his direct appeals, Slagle sought post-conviction relief in Ohio state courts. The trial court denied his motion to vacate or set aside judgment and/or sentence pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21. See App. to Request for COA, Vol. II, Exh. O. The state appellate courts also denied relief. See State v. Slagle, No. 76834, 2000 WL 1144947 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2000); State v. Slagle, 739 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio 2000). The state court of appeals, in 1994 and 2002, denied Slagle’s motions to reopen his direct appeal pursuant to Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B). See Journal Entry (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1994) in App. to Request for COA, Vol. II, Exh. R; State v. Slagle, No. 55759, 2002 WL 1335630 (Ohio Ct. App. May 29, 2002). The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. See State v. Slagle, 651 N.E.2d 937 (Ohio 1995) (per curiam); State v. Slagle, 779 N.E.2d 1041 (Ohio 2002) (per curiam). On December 21, 2001, Slagle filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for federal postconviction relief in the district court. Slagle initially brought six challenges, but he later amended his complaint to include a seventh challenge that expanded the grounds for his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court denied all of his claims without granting an evidentiary hearing. The district court decided not to engage in a procedural default analysis that the State advocated. Addressing the merits, the district court held that the state courts’ disposition of Slagle’s prosecutorial misconduct claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law and that the State’s reference to nonstatutory aggravating factors during the penalty phase of the trial was at most harmless error. The district court also held that any error in the jury instructions during the guilt and penalty phases did not entitle Slagle to relief. Finally, the district court held that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel at either the guilt phase or penalty phase of the trial, or on appeal. The district court granted a COA on four issues. The first issue is whether Slagle’s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the prosecution’s assault on Slagle’s character, statement of facts outside of the record, reference to nonstatutory aggravating factors, denigration of defense witnesses and counsel, and vouching for prosecution witnesses. The second issue is whether defense counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase of trial for failing to object to various prosecutorial actions, statements, and evidence. The third issue is whether defense counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to object to the prosecution’s reference to nonstatutory aggravating factors. The final issue is whether Slagle’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to address trial counsel’s decision not to object to the State’s closing arguments at both the guilt and sentencing phases. No. 04-3490 Slagle v. Bagley Page 7 On January 7, 2005, this court refused to extend Slagle’s COA to include any other claims. See Slagle v. Bagley, No. 04-3490 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2005) (order). Slagle petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to review this court’s denial of an extended COA, but the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari on April 18, 2005. See Slagle v. Bagley, 544 U.S. 982 (2005). Therefore, we will consider the four issues certified for appeal by the district court.