Opinion ID: 2081910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Felony-Murder Statute

Text: Before viewing the state's evidence, however, we must determine whether the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of felony manufacture, sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance encompasses the purchase, or attempt to purchase, with intent to sell or distribute a controlled substance. Section 11-23-1 provides in part that [e]very murder    committed during the course of the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of felony manufacture, sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title 21,    is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. To sustain a first-degree felony-murder conviction, the state must establish all the elements of the relevant predicate offense as well as the fact of the murder. State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 656, 391 A.2d 1158, 1166 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see also State v. Villani, 491 A.2d 976, 980 (R.I.1985). Oliveira and Victor St. Hill argue that the felony-murder statute does not include the purchasing or possession of drugs with intent to deliver among the predicate offenses warranting a charge of murder in the first degree. They contend that under the statutory scheme in Rhode Island, possession with intent to deliver is an independent unit of prosecution, distinct from sale, delivery, or distribution. Because the Legislature did not include the statutory felony possession with intent to deliver within the enumerated felonies supporting a first-degree felony-murder charge, although it did include other identifiable drug felonies, they reason, the Legislature made clear that it did not intend that possession with intent to deliver serve as a predicate for first-degree murder. Oliveira and Victor contend, therefore, that, at most, they should have been charged with second-degree murder. The state asserts that Oliveira and Victor murdered Bolden while attempting to consummate a drug transaction that would result in their acquisition of more than $43,000 worth of cocaine, which they intended to redistribute. The state argues, however, that the language of the felony-murder statute is drafted broadly enough to include all felony drug transfers and attempted transfers otherwise prohibited by the RICSA, regardless of whether the particular felony is explicitly named in the felony-murder statute. The state posits that the manufacture, sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance language of § 11-23-1 encompasses the broader concept of transfer and thus reflects the legislative goal of criminalizing participation in every aspect of a drug transaction, regardless of the individual's role in the transaction. The state also argues that the sweeping language of § 11-23-1, during the course of the perpetration, or attempted perpetration of one of the listed drug-related transactions, also reflects the statute's broad scope. Moreover, the state asserts that the phrase or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the provisions of [RICSA] draws within its ambit all drug transfers or attempted transfers prohibited by RICSA, including possession with intent to deliver. The state also asserts that possession with intent to deliver is one of a number of drug felonies, the establishment of which could serve as a predicate offense for first-degree felony murder because, depending on the facts, it can also be charged as an attempted sale, delivery or other distribution. Thus, possession with intent to deliver is simply one substantial step that a perpetrator can take toward accomplishing the sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance. Finally, the state asserts that interpreting § 11-23-1 in any other manner would lead to an absurd result: an individual convicted of a murder occurring during the individual's acquisition of a large quantity of drugs would be guilty of second-degree felony murder, whereas the individual who sold the drugs to him would be guilty of first-degree felony murder. The resolution of this issue requires this Court to determine which predicate drug offenses can satisfy a first-degree felony murder charge under § 11-23-1. This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo, Johnston v. Poulin, 844 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I.2004), and in undertaking this analysis, we apply our well-established maxims of statutory construction. It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, [we] must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. (quoting State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I.1998)). Moreover, when we examine an unambiguous statute, `there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written.' Id. (quoting DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 253). If we discern a statutory ambiguity, this Court establishes and effectuates the legislative intent behind the enactment. State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I.2002). Of course, it is equally well established that, when confronted with statutory provisions that are unclear or ambiguous, this Court, as final arbiter of questions of statutory construction, will examine statutes in their entirety, and will `glean the intent and purpose of the Legislature from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind [the] nature, object, language and arrangement of the provisions to be construed.' DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 253 n. 1 (quoting In re Advisory to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.1996) and Algiere v. Fox, 122 R.I. 55, 58, 404 A.2d 72, 74 (1979)). When the meaning of a criminal statute is ambiguous, the policy of lenity in the construction of criminal statutes requires that the less harsh of two possible meanings be adopted. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 925 (R.I.1980)). [P]enal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the party upon whom a penalty is to be imposed[,] id. (quoting State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996)), and the defendant must be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether the act charged is within the meaning of [a penal] statute. State v. DelBonis, 862 A.2d 760, 766 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257, 1259 (R.I.1982)). Moreover, in deciding `whether [a] defendant's conduct is within the ambit of the statute,' while according the defendant `the benefit of any reasonable doubt,'    we are also constrained by the `constitutional requirement for certainty in penal statutes.' State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 644 (R.I.2003) (quoting State v. Dussault, 121 R.I. 751, 753, 403 A.2d 244, 246 (1979) and State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 115, 119, 196 A.2d 133, 136 (1963)). A penal statute must contain a description or definition of the act or conduct which comprises the offense contemplated therein stated with legal certainty. Id. (quoting Brown, 97 R.I. at 119, 196 A.2d at 136). It is well established that the state may not hold a person `criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 45, 385 A.2d 642, 643 (1978).