Opinion ID: 64891
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garza’s National Origin Claim

Text: Under Title VII it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Garza has not provided direct evidence of discrimination, therefore, his Title VII claim based on circumstantial evidence is analyzed under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Turner, 476 F.3d at 345. Garza must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination in order for the court to deny LISD’s motion for summary judgment. Garza may establish a Title VII violation based on race or national origin discrimination creating a hostile work environment. To establish a prima facie case, Garza must prove that he (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment complained of was based on race or national origin, (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have 4 No. 08-40387 known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). Garza fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Garza is a member of a protected class–he is Mexican-American and continues to have strong ties to Mexico. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Garza, we find that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment. Garza does not, however prove that the harassment was based on his race or national origin. Garza provides numerous examples of discriminatory conduct, but does not explain how this conduct was motivated by his national origin or race. We note that this Court construes the submissions of pro se litigants broadly in deference of their status. See Royal v. Tombone, 141 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 1998). This liberal construction, however, does not alleviate Garza’s burden to present evidence in support of the claim that he suffered harassment because of his race or national origin. We find nothing in Garza’s brief that allows the Court to make this inference. In addition, Garza’s deposition testimony demonstrates that while he believed and stated that he was treated differently from other teachers, he did not attempt to argue that other Hispanics were treated differently from white employees. Garza specifically stated that he could “only account for the consequences or treatment that [he] suffered.” LSID’s counsel pressed the point and specifically asked if one of VMT principals treated Garza differently because he was Hispanic. Garza stated I cannot prove intrinsically that he treated me as inferior. All I can tell you is that because I’m from across. [sic] He knew that I was a U.S. citizen or something. But all I can tell you is that his actions reflected an unequal treatment or a disparate treatment in comparison to the rest of the faculty. We, again, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Garza, but his testimony does not demonstrate that he was harassed because of his race or national origin. Even assuming Garza was treated differently from all other 5 No. 08-40387 faculty members, that does not indicate that Garza was treated differently because of his race or national origin. Garza also fails to demonstrate that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his employment. For harassment on the basis of race [or national origin] to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, as required to support a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, it must be ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 268 (citation omitted). This Court must look at the totality of the circumstances when determining whether an environment is hostile or abusive. Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999). “To be actionable, the challenged conduct must be both objectively offensive, meaning that a reasonable person would find it hostile and abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning that the victim perceived it to be so.” Id. The Court may consider factors such as “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 268 (citation omitted). Again, drawing all reasonable inferences in Garza’s favor, the totality of the circumstances presented does not evidence a level of harassment on the basis of race or national origin that affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. The incidents complained of by Garza occurred over several years, were not severe, were not physically threatening or humiliating, and there is no evidence that the harassment interfered with Garza’s work performance. While the Court does not doubt that Garza found the conduct subjectively offensive, the conduct does not rise to the level necessary to establish a hostile work environment claim. Garza fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of national original discrimination, and we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of LISD’s motion for summary judgment based on Garza’s national origin discrimination claim. 6 No. 08-40387