Opinion ID: 1388553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: competence phase issues

Text: As mentioned earlier, defendant was found competent to stand trial in a separate proceeding held after the guilt verdict was rendered but before the penalty trial began. Defendant, acting in propria persona, immediately filed a notice of appeal from the competence determination in the Court of Appeal. We eventually transferred that appeal here, and consolidated it with the instant appeal from the death judgment. No appellate briefs were filed below. Defendant raises certain challenges to the competence proceeding in the automatic appeal. (15) We conclude that the verdict finding defendant competent is a nonappealable, interlocutory ruling. It may be reviewed on appeal only from a final judgment in the underlying criminal proceeding. ( People v. Fields (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538, 541-542 [42 Cal. Rptr. 833, 399 P.2d 369, 16 A.L.R.3d 708]; see §§ 1237, subd. (a), 1370, subd. (a); see also Vardas v. Estelle (5th Cir.1983) 715 F.2d 206, 208, cert. den. 465 U.S. 1104 [80 L.Ed.2d 133, 104 S.Ct. 1603] [no constitutional right of direct appeal from a competence determination].) Hence, we will dismiss the interlocutory appeal and consider defendant's competence phase challenges as part of the appeal from the death judgment.
Defendant argues that evidence offered in his case-in-chief on competence was erroneously excluded under the attorney-client privilege. His claim lacks merit. The guilt verdict was returned in October 1984. Judge Smith presided at both the guilt and penalty trials. In November 1984, before the penalty trial began, defense counsel Barnett and O'Malley appeared before Judge Knight and moved for a competence hearing. Barnett said he question[ed] defendant's ability to make intelligent and effective choices, and to cooperate in his own defense. Without comment, Judge Knight granted the motion. Criminal proceedings were suspended and psychiatrists were appointed to examine defendant. Attorney Digiacinto was appointed to represent defendant at the competence phase. The competence hearing took place over a three-day period in June 1985. A new jury was empaneled. Temporary Judge Browning presided at the hearing pursuant to the oral and written stipulation of the parties. At the start of the hearing, Digiacinto called trial counsel Barnett to the witness stand. The following events occurred outside of the jury's presence: the prosecutor objected to Barnett's testimony on grounds he might reveal confidential communications in violation of defendant's attorney-client privilege. The court deferred ruling on the issue and allowed Barnett to answer preliminary questions. When ultimately asked for his opinion on defendant's present competence to stand trial, Barnett said he could not answer unless defendant personally waived the attorney-client privilege and possibly the doctor-patient privilege. The court asked defendant whether he understood Barnett's answer. Defendant said, yes. The court explained that, in order to answer questions about defendant's mental condition, Barnett might be required to disclose privileged communications. Defendant twice replied that he would not waive the privilege. The court then advised defendant that his decision might prevent Barnett from giving favorable testimony in defendant's behalf, but that the court did not actually know what Barnett would say. The court asked defendant whether he wished to consult privately with Digiacinto. Defendant said, yes. After the meeting, the court again asked defendant whether he understood that he had the right to prevent Barnett from disclosing confidential conversations or knowledge obtained through defendant or mental health experts. Defendant indicated that he did. The court asked defendant whether he waived the privilege. Defendant said, no. Digiacinto made the following statement: I find myself ... between a rock and a hard place. [¶] [T]he only evidence which could be [ad]duced on [defendant's] behalf is Mr.Barnett's testimony. Not having that testimony is in effect a deprivation of [defendant's right to a competence] hearing. At the same time, how can anybody [with] a Bar card advise him otherwise [?] (Italics added.) The court then sustained defendant's assertion of the privilege. It noted that because defendant is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving his incompetence, he is presumed, ergo, to have the mental ability to form a reasoned opinion as to whether to waive his privilege or not. (See § 1369, subd. (f).) [24] The jury returned to the courtroom. The defense rested. The prosecution called the two court-appointed psychiatrists, Drs. Small and Bryan. Both testified that they had recently examined defendant and found him mentally able to understand the proceedings and assist counsel. A deputy sheriff also described defendant's excellent behavior in jail over the preceding year. The jury found defendant competent to stand trial. (See § 1367.) [25] (16) Defendant argues that the court erred in presuming him competent to assert the attorney-client privilege over Digiacinto's objection. Defendant insists that by granting the motion for a competence hearing, the court implicitly expressed a doubt as to his competence. (See § 1368, subd. (a); [26] see also People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518 [58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942] [due process mandates a § 1368 hearing where there is substantial evidence of incompetence].) Such doubt, defendant argues, rendered him presumptively incapable of personally deciding whether to exercise any right or privilege during the competence phase. Defendant relies primarily upon People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489 [174 Cal. Rptr. 684, 629 P.2d 485] ( Samuel ), which reversed a criminal conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support an earlier competence verdict. On a separate point, Samuel observed that counsel had waived any objection defendant might otherwise have made to admission of an illegally obtained confession at the competence trial. Samuel assumed that defendant's attorney must play a greater role in making fundamental choices for him, and cannot be expected to seek approval of strategic decisions made in the course of obtaining and presenting proof of incompetence.... [I]f counsel represents a defendant as to whose competence the judge has declared a doubt sufficient to require a section 1368 hearing, he should not be compelled to entrust key decisions about fundamental matters to his client's apparently defective judgment. (29 Cal.3d at p. 495.) We have not relied on this dictum in the decade since Samuel was decided. (But see Shephard v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 23, 30-31 [225 Cal. Rptr. 328]; People v. Bolden (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 375, 379-380 [160 Cal. Rptr. 268].) And, Samuel did not confront the presumption of competence in section 1369, subdivision (f). We recently upheld this statutory presumption against a due process claim that it unfairly requires a defendant who might be incompetent to shoulder the burden of establishing his condition. ( People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881-885 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282].) [27] Whatever the continuing validity of Samuel, supra, 29 Cal.3d 489, it certainly does not apply here. First, no unequivocal objection to application of the privilege was made below. After defendant consulted with Digiacinto and refused to waive the privilege one last time, Digiacinto essentially told the court that both he and Barnett had no choice but to respect defendant's decision. [28] Hence, the point has not been preserved for appeal. In addition, nothing in the appellate record suggests that defendant's refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege was the product of impaired or defective judgment. ( Samuel, supra, 29 Cal.3d 489, 495.) Contrary to Justice Kennard's view of the record in this case, the trial court obviously ordered a competence hearing in an overabundance of caution, and not because it was statutorily or constitutionally compelled to do so. ( People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 283, fn. 10 [61 Cal. Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228] [discretion to grant hearing].) The court never expressed a doubt as to defendant's competence on the record. (See People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340-1341 [248 Cal. Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260]; People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 540-541 [244 Cal. Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769].) And, no evidence of incompetence was introduced before or during the competence hearing. (See People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 91-92 [184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 648 P.2d 578, 23 A.L.R.4th 476]; People v. Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 283.) Defendant's statements to the court about the attorney-client privilege were coherent and precise, and strongly suggested that he was capable of deciding whether to assert it. No error occurred. [29] In any event, defendant was not prejudiced by the court's decision to sustain the privilege. Both psychiatrists concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial, and neither one diagnosed him as suffering from a serious mental disorder. It is not reasonably probable that Barnett's uncorroborated lay opinion would have convinced the jury otherwise. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
(17) On cross-examination by defendant, both psychiatrists testified that they had never appeared as witnesses in the penalty phase of a capital trial and knew little about the evidence typically admitted therein. (See § 190.3.) Over the prosecutor's relevance objection, the witnesses were asked whether they had considered the seriousness of defendant's crimes, the possibility that a wide range of evidence might be introduced, and the possibility that a death sentence might be imposed before declaring defendant competent. Dr. Small explained that such considerations did not affect his determination that defendant was able to understand the proceedings and communicate rationally with counsel. Dr. Bryan said that, while the severity of possible sentences might increase defendant's mental strain during trial, he (Bryan) had taken this fact into account before finding defendant competent. After the People rested, defendant called an attorney, John Balliet, to the stand. Outside of the jury's presence, defendant argued that Balliet was an expert in California death penalty law and would testify about the kind of cooperation needed between a capital defendant and counsel, and the varieties of evidence admissible at the penalty phase. The prosecutor argued that Balliet's testimony was irrelevant because section 1367 does not differentiate among types of crimes or trials in defining competence. The court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant now argues that the court abused its discretion and violated his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. In defendant's view, Balliet's testimony should have been admitted because it deeply undermined the prosecution's mental evidence. We disagree. Both psychiatrists made it clear that the concerns Balliet might discuss did not affect their assessment of defendant's mental capacity to stand trial. And, nothing in the offer of proof indicated that Balliet would describe the particular facts or complexities of this case. The court could reasonably conclude that the probative value of Balliet's testimony was low, while the risk of undue delay and jury confusion was high. No error occurred.
(18) Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the following trial court errors casts fatal doubt on the reliability of both the competence and death verdicts: (1) placing the burden of proof of incompetence upon defendant, (2) sustaining the attorney-client privilege so as to preclude testimony by trial counsel Barnett, and (3) excluding rebuttal testimony by Attorney Balliet concerning the nature of a penalty trial. As we have explained, the court did not err in making these rulings. Defendant's sweeping claim of prejudice fails.