Opinion ID: 1189662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The statutory amendments

Text: The language and history of the 1981 Penal Code amendments leave no question that the Legislature intended to abolish the diminished-capacity defense. The Legislature explicitly and repeatedly stated that it was doing so. Conspicuously absent, however, is any similarly clear indication the Legislature also intended to eliminate imperfect self-defense.
We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task in construing a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724 [257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406].) We must begin with the words of the statute. ( Ibid. ) Several amendments were enacted together as part of Senate Bill No. 54. Those amendments included the addition to the Penal Code of section 28, which eliminated the diminished-capacity defense, and section 29, which limited psychiatric testimony regarding a defendant's mental state. The Legislature also changed Penal Code section 189's definition of premeditation and deliberation and amended section 22 to restrict a defendant's use of evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate mental capacity. None of these amendments contains a single reference to imperfect self-defense. Rather, they show that the Legislature referred specifically to the defenses and types of evidence that were being eliminated or restricted. For example, Penal Code section 28, subdivision (b) states, As a matter of public policy there shall be no defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse in a criminal action or juvenile adjudication hearing. (Italics added.) The most reasonable inference to be drawn from the absence in these amendments of any reference to imperfect self-defense is that the Legislature intended no change in that doctrine, much less its abrogation. Penal Code section 188, the statute on which respondent primarily relies, is likewise devoid of any reference to imperfect self-defense. Before the 1981 amendments, section 188 stated: Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. The 1981 amendments did not change this language. Rather, the amendments added the following language: When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. An awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society is not included within the definition of malice. (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 6, p. 1593, italics added.) This new language clearly refers to the diminished-capacity defense. The amendment uses the same language we used before 1981 in explaining the premise that malice required an ... awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society .... ( People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, 322, italics added.) The Legislature made absolutely clear its intent to abrogate the diminished-capacity defense. There is no similar reference to imperfect self-defense in the 1981 amendment to Penal Code section 188. We decline to insert into the statute what the Legislature omitted. That is not our function. Respondent seems to suggest, however, that the doctrines of diminished capacity and imperfect self-defense were so closely related that, when the Legislature abrogated the former in 1981, it must have acted, albeit silently and perhaps inadvertently, to eliminate imperfect self-defense as well. We disagree. First, we are aware of no authority that supports the notion of legislation by accident. If respondent means the Legislature abrogated imperfect self-defense by implication, we reject that view as well. [A]n intention to legislate by implication is not to be presumed. ( First M.E. Church v. Los Angeles Co. (1928) 204 Cal. 201, 204 [267 P. 703]; Educational & Recreational Services, Inc. v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. (1977) 65 Cal. App.3d 775, 782 [135 Cal. Rptr. 594].) Second, respondent reads too much into the discussion in Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, of mental capacity, as it had been construed and applied in People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, 322. Although  Flannel [, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668] relied upon the expanded mental component of malice in formulating its imperfect self-defense doctrine, its reliance was only partial. Independent of this expanded mental component and independent of diminished capacity, Flannel regarded imperfect self-defense as a factor which  just like `the statutorily suggested sudden quarrel or heat of passion  can negate malice aforethought....' ( People v. De Leon (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 815, 822 [12 Cal. Rptr.2d 825], quoting Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 672.) The De Leon court's observation was well taken. The doctrine of imperfect self-defense had a lineage independent of the notion of mental capacity set forth in Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310. In Flannel itself, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, we traced the long development of the doctrine in California courts. ( People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53]; People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 585 [9 Cal. Rptr. 263]; Roads v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 593 [80 Cal. Rptr. 169]; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].) Indeed, 30 years before the diminished-capacity defense was allowed, a California court approved the imperfect self-defense doctrine: `[I]f the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excuse the act on the ground of self-defense, the killing is manslaughter' [citation]. ( People v. Best (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 606, 610 [57 P.2d 168].) Several other states also had approved the imperfect self-defense doctrine long before the notion of diminished capacity was approved in Conley, supra, 66 Cal.2d 310, 322. ( Allison v. State (1905) 74 Ark. 444 [86 S.W. 409]; State v. Clark (1904) 69 Kan. 347 [77 P. 287]; Commonwealth v. Colandro (1911) 231 Pa. 343 [80 A. 571]; State v. Swift (1926) 53 N.D. 916 [208 N.W. 388]; State v. Foutch (1896) 95 Tenn. 711 [34 S.W. 423]; State v. Kidd (1918) 24 N.M. 572 [175 P. 772]; Hartfield v. State (1936) 176 Miss. 776 [170 So. 531].) [2] Put simply, as the De Leon court, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th 815, correctly observed, Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, had two independent premises: (1) the notion of mental capacity set forth in Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, 322, and (2) a grounding in both well-developed common law and in the statutory requirement of malice (Pen. Code, § 187). The 1981 amendments make clear the Legislature intended to eliminate the notion of diminished capacity. Thus, that part of the reasoning in Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, is no longer valid. But, Flannel's other premise was not affected by the amendments. Third, despite the discussion in Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, of mental capacity, neither that opinion nor the other cases approving imperfect self-defense could have misled the Legislature into reasonably believing that the doctrine was the same as, or even inextricably bound up with, the diminished-capacity defense. We made clear in Flannel that the two doctrines were not coextensive: We disagree that the doctrine of unreasonable belief is necessarily bound up with or limited by the concepts of either heat of passion or diminished capacity.  ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 677, italics added.) The Legislature was, of course, aware of Flannel and thus knew that we had noted the difference between the two doctrines. We are not persuaded the Legislature would have attempted to eliminate imperfect self-defense by referring only to the diminished-capacity defense in the amendment to Penal Code section 188. (We subsequently reiterated the distinction between the two doctrines when we concluded in People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103 ( Saille ), that the Legislature had abrogated the diminished-capacity defense. Concerning imperfect self-defense, we observed,  This doctrine has no application to the facts before us .... ( Id., at p. 1107, fn. 1, italics added).) (3) Fourth, even if we had not emphasized the difference between the two doctrines, that difference would have been patent, and we assume the Legislature would have understood this. The two doctrines relate to the concept of malice, but the similarity ends there. Unlike diminished capacity, imperfect self-defense is not rooted in any notion of mental capacity or awareness of the need to act lawfully. To the contrary, a person may be entirely free of any mental disease, defect, or intoxication and may be fully aware of the need to act lawfully  and thus not have a diminished capacity  but actually, although unreasonably, believe in the need for self-defense. Put simply, an awareness of the need to act lawfully does not  in fact or logic  depend on whether the putative victim's belief in the need for self-defense is correct. A person who actually believes in the need for self-defense necessarily believes he is acting lawfully. He is thus aware of the obligation to act lawfully. A defendant could assert one doctrine even though the facts did not support the other. The diminished-capacity defense could be  and often has been  asserted when self-defense was not an issue; and, conversely, imperfect self-defense could be raised when there was no claim of diminished capacity. (1c) In short, respondent fails to persuade us that the doctrines of diminished capacity and imperfect self-defense were so closely related that the Legislature believed its elimination of diminished capacity also would abrogate, silently but necessarily, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. The Legislature did not refer to imperfect self-defense. The language added to Penal Code section 188 by the 1981 amendments did not eliminate imperfect self-defense. The question then is whether Penal Code section 188's pre-1981 definition of malice mandates a finding of malice (and thus murder) when a person kills with an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense against imminent death or great bodily injury. Section 188 states, It [malice] is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. (Italics added.) This inartful language leads to two conflicting views of Penal Code section 188's definition of express malice. Defendant contends the word unlawfully modifies the word intention so that the statute requires an intent to act unlawfully or, put in everyday language, the defendant must have a wrongful intent. Taking a different view, respondent construes the definition of express malice to mean that unlawfully refers not to the defendant's intent, but only to whether the act is later found to be unlawful. That is, the defendant need not have intended to act unlawfully. Rather, he need only to have intended to kill. Even if he intended to act lawfully, he had express malice and thus committed murder if the killing is later found to be unlawful. We believe defendant's construction of the statute is the more reasonable. Respondent's approach substitutes an unlawful consequence for an unlawful intent. This view also reverses the normal way in which malice and murder are understood. As respondent would have it, if a person kills someone lawfully, the killer has no malice, but if he kills someone unlawfully, he has malice. Of course, whether the killing is unlawful is the ultimate question and can be determined only with hindsight. Thus, under respondent's view, the defendant's mental state at the time of the killing will depend on whether the killing is later determined to be unlawful. The defendant's intent would become  not a fact to be determined  but the result of a determination of whether he acted unlawfully. [3] We also reject the suggestion that we previously decided in Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103, that Penal Code section 188's definition of express malice does not require an intent to act unlawfully. This reads too much into Saille. It quotes a Court of Appeal decision that, in turn, relies on another Court of Appeal decision for the proposition that, `The adverb unlawfully in the express malice definition means simply that there is no justification, excuse, or mitigation for the killing recognized by the law.' ( Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1115, quoting People v. Bobo (1990) 229 Cal. App.3d 1417, 1440-1441 [271 Cal. Rptr. 277], citing People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 1259, 1268 [252 Cal. Rptr. 913].) Respondent asserts this observation is inconsistent with the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. Not so. In its very next sentence after the one quoted in Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 1115, the Bobo court, supra, 229 Cal. App.3d at page 1441, explained, Thus, in the wake of the 1981 legislation, voluntary manslaughter encompasses only an intentional killing resulting from a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (with adequate provocation), and perhaps a killing arising from an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend.  ( Bobo, supra, 229 Cal. App.3d 1417, 1441, italics added.) Even the Bobo court itself did not suggest that its view of section 188's express malice definition would necessarily prohibit imperfect self-defense. Indeed, the court made clear it was not suggesting as much. The passing reference in Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103, to this equivocal observation in Bobo, supra, 229 Cal. App.3d 1417, is too slender a reed on which to base the conclusion that Saille decided the issue now before us. Indeed, the Saille court made clear it was not deciding this issue: That [imperfect self-defense] doctrine applies to reduce an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter when a person kills under an honest [i.e., actual] but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury. ( People v. Flannel [, supra ,] 25 Cal.3d 668, 674-680 [citation].) This doctrine has no application to the facts before us, and we do not decide whether it has been affected by Proposition 8 and the 1981 legislation.  ( Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1107, fn. 1, italics added; see also People v. De Leon, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th at p. 822 [noting our disclaimer in Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1107, fn. 1, that we were not deciding the continued validity of imperfect self-defense].) Perhaps most important, even though we are not persuaded by respondent's view of Penal Code section 188, we acknowledge the inherent ambiguity in the statute's definition of express malice. `When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted.' ( People v. Stuart (1956) 47 Cal.2d 167, 175 [302 P.2d 5, 55 A.L.R.2d 705], quoting People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401]; In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250, 256 [339 P.2d 553].) Because the language of section 188's definition of express malice is, at the very least, reasonably susceptible to the construction asserted by defendant, we adopt that construction. [4]
Because there is ambiguity, we may properly also look to the legislative history of the 1981 amendments. ( Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 830 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 679, 843 P.2d 624].) That history, though not unequivocal, leads to the same conclusion. We have not found a single reference to eliminating imperfect self-defense or even a clue that doing so was considered by the Legislature. Time after time, those involved in the legislative process made clear the purpose was to eliminate the diminished-capacity defense. For example, an extensive analysis of the amendments by the Legislature's Joint Committee for the Revision of the Penal Code was titled: The Diminished Capacity Defense: Why Senate Bill 54?, and the committee explained, The recent cases of Dan White in San Francisco and Richard Chase in Sacramento, brought to the public's attention an area of long standing controversy, the defenses of diminished capacity and insanity in criminal prosecution.... [¶] It [Senate Bill No. 54] would repeal the defenses of voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity. (Joint Com. for Revision of the Pen. Code Rep. (Sept. 3, 1981) p. 1 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.).) The same joint committee explained to the Governor's office that [t]he defenses of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, and irresistible impulse are repealed.... (Letter from Joint Com. for the Revision of the Pen. Code to Governor's Deputy Legal Affairs Sect., Sept. 4, 1981, italics added.) There was no suggestion of eliminating imperfect self-defense. To the contrary, the same analysis stated that to reduce murder to manslaughter, except in the delusional self-defense kinds of cases, there will have to be a showing of provocation, the traditional basis of manslaughter, to reduce murder to manslaughter. ( Ibid., italics added.) The Governor's staff held the same view, explaining that Senate Bill No. 54 makes a number of substantive and procedural changes relative to the general issue of diminished capacity defenses... [and is] an attempt to change the focus from the defendant's general capacity to form a given mental state to the ultimate question of whether the defendant in fact actually had the required mental state. (Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 54 by Governor's Legal Affairs Sect., pp. 1-2, italics in original.) As explained above, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense is based on the defendant's actual intent, not his capacity to form a particular intent. Many other references to diminished capacity could be noted but would be unnecessary because the point is clear. The extensive analyses of the legislation by both its supporters and its opponents are replete with discussions of the need and desire to abolish diminished capacity. But there is no discussion, not a single mention, of also eliminating imperfect self-defense.