Opinion ID: 1429367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Vitale Entitled to a Personal Judgment Based on the Fee Arbitration Award?

Text: We answer this question in the affirmative. Bar Rule 40(t) requires the superior court to confirm an award and reduce it to judgment upon the application of a party unless either party has timely sought to vacate, correct or modify it. [2] Tabbytite advances two grounds in opposition. First, she claims that 25 U.S.C. § 82 (1994) prohibits Vitale from enforcing any personal contract with Tabbytite without approval of the Secretary of the Interior. [3] Section 82 applies to agreements made by any person with any tribe of Indians, or individual Indians not citizens of the United States.... 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1994). The application of section 82 to individual Indians currently has little, if any, force, since it is limited to Indians who are not citizens of the United States. Tabbytite makes no claim that she is not a United States citizen, and therefore she is not entitled to the protection of section 82. Second, Tabbytite presents an argument the caption of which states: The Findings of the Panel Are Based on Fraud. The entire argument presented under this caption is as follows: Ms. Tabbytite asserts that the findings of the Fee Arbitration Panel are based on incorrect information. Ms. Tabbytite asserts that Mr. Vitale waived any fee when he voluntarily withdrew from the underlying federal case cited above. She has been consistent and persistent on that point. Furthermore she is insistent that Mr. Vitale's claims are not recognizable in State Court. Ms. Tabbytite respectfully requests this Court to affirm the dismissal. Under AS 09.43.120(a) an arbitration award can be vacated if it was procured by fraud. Tabbytite's argument in her brief on appeal is an almost verbatim reproduction of the argument she made in opposition to the motion to confirm the award before the trial court. No instance of fraud is specified in this argument. Fraud, in fact, is not mentioned. Fraud, even in an initial pleading, must be averred with particularity. Alaska R. Civ. P. 9(b). It follows that a confirmation award may not be resisted merely by reciting without specificity that fraud existed. Further, at the motion stage, evidentiary support for particular fraud claims must be presented. See, e.g., Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c); McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 210, 217 (Alaska 1978). We conclude therefore that Tabbytite did not present a legally sufficient claim of fraud as a defense to the motion to confirm. Further, given her briefing as set forth above, if she had presented such a defense it would be waived on appeal because of inadequate briefing. See Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 n. 3 (Alaska 1991); State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 528 (Alaska 1980).