Opinion ID: 463225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restraint or Coercion

Text: 9 Fines imposed on representatives may constitute prohibited coercion because the effect of the discipline may be to deprive an employer of the services of his representative. ABC, 437 U.S. at 433-437, 436 n. 36, 98 S.Ct. at 2435-2438, 2437 n. 36. The general rule of ABC was announced in the context of an ongoing strike, and this court has held that when a union does not represent or intend to represent the complaining company's employees there can be no Section 8(b)(1)(B) violation when a union disciplines members even if they are designated bargaining representatives. NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 714 F.2d 870, 871-72 (9th Cir.1980) (Chewelah ). We believe Chewelah controls and is dispositive of the issue in this case. 10 The central question is whether the union demonstrated an intent to represent the employees of the nonsignatory employers. This is a factual inquiry reviewable by the substantial evidence standard. Sonoma Vineyards, 727 F.2d at 862. Both parties agree that the Union did not have a collective bargaining relationship with Nutter or Royal. They disagree about whether it intended to represent their employees. The Union argues that it demonstrated a lack of intent to represent Nutter and Royal employees when it filed a disclaimer of interest on September 15, 1981. The Board held the Union demonstrated an intent to represent evidenced by the Union business manager's testimony that at the time the Union dissolved its collective bargaining relationship with the multi-employer group NECA, it wanted to bargain with a new association comprised of some former NECA members. Thus the Board attempted to distinguish Chewelah and found the Union's purpose in imposing the fines on its members was to force employers out of NECA and into bargaining with the Union on a different basis. 11 Although this factual inference is entitled to deference as peculiarly the kind of determination that Congress has assigned to the Board, ABC, 437 U.S. at 432, 98 S.Ct. at 2435, even a deferential standard does not require us to accept an inference we find logically insupportable. We cannot follow the Board's leap from a general statement of organizing interest made in September 1981 and fines imposed in November and December 1982 to a conclusion that the Union thereby engaged in a course of conduct designed to cause the 'good' employer-members of NECA to abandon NECA multi-employer bargaining and to bargain on a single employer basis or to form a new association in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B). We hold that where a Union has filed a disclaimer of interest, and has made no subsequent organizing efforts, its discipline of members fully a year after the termination of the bargaining relationship between the Union and the employers cannot reasonably be construed as an effort to restrain or coerce the employer. We require some evidence of specific overt acts such as picketing, handbilling, making statements of interest to the employers, or passing out opposition cards to find a desire to represent these particular employees. 1 Here there was no evidence of such an intent, but only a stale general statement, made at the time the collective bargaining relationship with NECA was terminated, that the Union would like to bargain with a new association. Since we might posit that a generalized desire to bargain is an essential characteristic of all unions, we require something more to support a specific finding of intent to represent.