Opinion ID: 874222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a duty owed to Cassie Jo.

Text: The Plaintiffs bring this suit under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. I.C. § 6-901 et seq. The Act abrogates sovereign immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions. Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 557, 212 P.3d 982, 987 (2009). The purpose of the ITCA is to provide `much needed relief to those suffering injury from the negligence of government employees.' Rees, 143 Idaho at 19, 137 P.3d at 406 (quoting Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 214, 723 P.2d 755, 758 (1986)). The Plaintiffs, then, must assert a tort under the common law or created by a separate statute in order to be eligible for relief. I.C. § 6-903(f) (Nothing in this act shall enlarge or otherwise adversely affect the liability of an employee or a governmental entity.). A cause of action for common law negligence in Idaho has four elements: (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Nation v. State, Dep't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007) (quoting O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005)). As the district court's summary judgment was based on the absence of a duty recognized by law, we too look only to the question of duty rather than going on to other questions such as legal causation. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994) (The non-moving party is not required to present evidence on every element of his or her case at that time, but must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party's motion.). The Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred because there were two sources from which the School District owed a duty to Cassie Jo. First, relying on the School District's common law duties and I.C. § 33-512(4), which expressly identifies a school district's duty to protect the health and morals of its students, [2] they argue that the district court erred because the School District had a duty to safeguard its students from foreseeable harms because the danger to Cassie Jo arose on school grounds and during school hours. Second, the Plaintiffs argue that by conducting an investigation of Draper two and a half years prior to Cassie Jo's murder, the School District assumed a duty to investigate competently. They contend that a competent investigation would have allowed the School District to take appropriate action to protect Cassie Jo from the danger presented by Draper and Adamcik, and by failing to conduct a competent investigation, the School District breached its duty to Cassie Jo.
The district court found that neither I.C. § 33-512(4) nor the underlying common law special relationship between a school district and its students created a duty to care for students at the time of Cassie Jo's murder, which occurred at night, off school grounds. The court, relying on Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143 (1995), stated that this Court decided that when a student is not under the care, custody and supervision of a school, it is the parent's responsibility to take steps to protect the child from foreseeable risks of harm.... We do not decide the case on those grounds. Other decisions from this Court, notably Brooks v. Logan (Brooks I), 127 Idaho 484, 903 P.2d 73 (1995), and Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (2003), have recognized that a school district may owe a duty to its students, despite the fact that injury occurred off of school grounds and outside of school hours. Brooks I involved a student who committed suicide off school grounds but had written about his suicidal tendencies in a journal as part of his English class assignments. Brooks I, 127 Idaho at 486, 903 P.2d at 75. This Court, basing its decision to remand on I.C. § 33-512(4), stated that we must assume that the negligence occurred, if at all, while Jeff was attending school and [his teacher] failed to seek help. The result of the alleged negligence is the only element that did not take place on the school grounds. Id. at 490, 903 P.2d at 79. Describing the scope of the duty, the Court stated that I.C. § 33-512(4) exemplifies the role of the state to the children in school, which is a role described as one in loco parentis.  Id. (quoting Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 588, 778 P.2d 336, 338 (1989)). While this Court later found that the school district in Brooks was immune from suit under I.C. § 6-904A, the underlying question of whether the school district owed the student a duty was settled by Brooks I. Brooks v. Logan (Brooks II), 130 Idaho 574, 944 P.2d 709 (1997). The School District argues that the holding of Brooks I was subsequently abrogated by statute with the enactment of I.C. § 33-512B. The statute provides that [n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 33-512(4), Idaho Code, neither a teacher nor a school district shall have a duty to warn of the suicidal tendencies of a student absent the teacher's knowledge of direct evidence of such suicidal tendencies. I.C. § 33-512B(1). See also Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 808, 134 P.3d 655, 659 (2006) (acknowledging that I.C. § 33-512B served to overrule Brooks I ). [3] Certainly, the passage of I.C. § 33-512B modified the Brooks holding regarding suicidal tendencies. However, we do not interpret the statute as abrogating all duties embodied in I.C. § 33-512(4) or limiting liability to injuries that occur on school grounds and during school hours. To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process.... A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 808, 89 L.Ed. 1095, 1099 (1945). The Hei case involved a sexual relationship between a student over the age of majority and a teacher. Hei, 139 Idaho at 84, 73 P.3d at 97. The Court distinguished between the claims against the school district alleging that there was negligent supervision of Hei (the student) and those claims alleging negligent supervision of Holzer (the teacher). Id. at 87-88, 73 P.3d at 100-01. The Court found that a duty existed toward the student. Id. at 85, 73 P.3d at 98 (citing Brooks I, 127 Idaho at 490, 903 P.2d at 79). However, the Court also found that only the claim based on the school district's supervision of the teacher could proceed because of the immunity conferred by I.C. § 6-904A. Id. at 87-88, 73 P.3d at 100-01. Rife is not inconsistent with the proposition that the relevant inquiry is to the location of the negligence rather than the location of the injury. The Rife Court noted that in enacting I.C. § 33-512, the legislature was addressing the need to properly supervise students during their required attendance at school, and mandating that the school district is responsible for any negligence occurring while the children are there. Rife, 127 Idaho at 846, 908 P.2d at 148. In Rife, where the relevant supervision would have occurred off school grounds and outside of school hours, the school district was under no duty to provide that supervision. Here, the Stoddarts argue that proper investigation during school hours would have prevented Cassie Jo's death, even though she was murdered off school grounds and after school hours. Based on the language of Rife, Brooks I, and Hei, we cannot say that the location of the injury is dispositive in determining whether the school district owed Cassie Jo a duty.
This Court has previously recognized a duty by school districts to take reasonable steps to guard against foreseeable harms faced by their students. Brooks I, 127 Idaho at 490, 903 P.2d at 79 (Idaho Code § 33-512(4) creates a statutory duty which requires a school district to act reasonably in the face of foreseeable risks of harm); see also Sherer, 143 Idaho at 491, 148 P.3d at 1237 ([S]chools are obligated to exercise due care and take reasonable precautions to protect their students....); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 472, 716 P.2d 1238, 1244 (1986) ([T]he school district had a statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to protect its students from ... danger. A breach of that duty constitutes negligence.). This case requires this Court to determine whether the scope of this general duty should be extended to require that a school district take reasonable steps to prevent a violent criminal act against a student by a fellow student away from school grounds and not in connection with a school-sponsored activity. In Rife, this Court considered the question whether to extend the duty of care against the risk of reasonably foreseeable harm to a student while a student is in the custody of a school district to include a duty to see that students travel safely to and from school. 127 Idaho at 846, 908 P.2d at 148. In declining to impose such a duty, this Court stated: Determining whether a duty will arise in a particular instance involves a consideration of policy and the weighing of several factors which include: [T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved (citations omitted). Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 361, 695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985). With respect to the foreseeability of the harm, this Court has stated: [F]oreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each case. Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. Sharp [v. W.H. Moore, Inc.], 118 Idaho [297,] 300-01, 796 P.2d [506,] 509-10 [(1990)] (citing, inter alia, Isaacs, supra ). 127 Idaho at 846-47, 908 P.2d at 148-49. In light of the lack of foreseeability of this crime and the enormous burden that would be imposed upon school districts if we were to find that a duty exists in this case, we conclude that no duty attached to the School District under these circumstances. Although we reach this conclusion, we do not suggest that the injury sustained in this case was minor. We are fully conscious of the enormous loss suffered by the Stoddart family as a result of the brutal murder of Cassie Jo. Rather, despite the enormity of the harm involved in this case, our decision turns on the related considerations of foreseeability and the burdens a contrary decision would impose on school districts. Normally, the foreseeability of a risk of harm, and thus whether a duty consequently attaches, is a question of fact reserved for the jury. Hayes v. Union Pac. R. Co., 143 Idaho 204, 209, 141 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2006); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 601, 944 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1997); Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. Foreseeability is most commonly addressed when considering the question of proximate causation. See e.g. Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1041, 895 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Ct.App.1995) ([T]he legal responsibility element of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of the defendant's negligent act the plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's conduct.). However, in view of the district court's holding that the School District did not owe a duty of care to Cassie Jo under the circumstances of this case, and our acknowledgment that a school district generally owes a duty of care to protect its students from foreseeable risks of harm, we must determine whether the general duty attached, that is, whether injury sustained in this case was reasonably foreseeable. [W]hen the undisputed facts can lead to one reasonable conclusion, this court may rule upon the issue of foreseeability as a matter of law. Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 412-13, 546 P.2d 54, 58-59 (1975) (citing Munson v. State, Dept. of Highways, 96 Idaho 529, 531 P.2d 1174 (1975)). We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the danger to Cassie Jo was not foreseeable. There is nothing in the record that suggests that the School District received information during the 2004 investigation of Draper's and C.N.'s threat of a Columbine-style shooting that would provide notice that two and a half years later one of the two students involved would commit a murder that was not, in fact, a school shooting, but rather a prelude to a planned Columbine-style attack. We do not suggest that school districts have no duty to take appropriate action, whether by school officials or by contacting law enforcement, when school officials become aware of specific information that a student or students may be the target of a violent crime, even if that crime does not occur on school grounds. However, whatever duty the School District owed to its students in 2004 did not include the duty of indefinitely monitoring Draper, which is effectively what the Plaintiffs are now arguing. In weighing the factors identified in Rife, we simply cannot impose such an enormous burden on school districts. Nor did any duty arise, as the Plaintiffs argue, upon receiving the report and note from S.C. in 2006. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the Plaintiffs, S.C. relayed her concern that Adamcik and Draper had been exchanging notes that she viewed as threatening and provided a note that asked when are we going to do this? The notes did not identify Cassie Jo as the potential victim of a crime. Despite the terrible tragedy that occurred in this case, we are unable to conclude that Cassie Jo's murder was foreseeable, absent the benefit of hindsight. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's conclusion that the School District did not have a duty to take steps to prevent Cassie Jo's murder. [4]
Plaintiffs also argue that the School District assumed a duty to competently investigate Draper in 2004. If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner. Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843, 875 P.2d 937, 940 (1994) (citing Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990)). The Plaintiffs argue that the School District assumed a duty by conducting the investigation of Draper two and a half years before Cassie Jo's murder. When a party assumes a duty by voluntarily performing an act that the party had no duty to perform, the duty that arises is limited to the duty actually assumed. Martin v. Twin Falls School Dist. No. 411, 138 Idaho 146, 150, 59 P.3d 317, 321 (2002). The Plaintiffs' claim is without merit. [P]ast voluntary acts do not entitle the benefited party to expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the absence of an express promise that future assistance will be forthcoming. Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001). The investigation of the 2004 threats was not part of the assistance that would have been necessary to prevent Cassie Jo's murder. To the extent that there was an assumption of a duty by way of the investigation in 2004, that investigation concerned the threat by Draper to commit a school shooting then, with C.N. The School District did not assume an ongoing duty to monitor Draper's potential involvement in a future school shooting, much less a crime that might be committed away from school grounds. We therefore find that the School District did not assume any duty connected to the injury suffered by the Plaintiffs.