Opinion ID: 571296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Hernandez

Text: 8 Mr. Hernandez asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his confidence in his attorney was compromised by government conduct during plea bargaining.
9 During initial plea bargaining, the government sought Mr. Hernandez's testimony against Mr. Parrish and offered to recommend a sentencing departure in return for cooperation. Mr. Hernandez's attorney told the government that Mr. Hernandez would not cooperate because he feared for his family. 10 Mr. Hernandez's attorney and the government then negotiated a plea agreement under which the government agreed that sentencing for the conspiracy would be based on only one kilo of cocaine. In the agreement, the government gave no assurances that it would not immunize Mr. Hernandez in order to obtain his testimony against Mr. Parrish. However, his attorney advised him that, if he pled guilty pursuant to the agreement, he would not have to testify. 11 Mr. Hernandez signed the agreement and pled guilty. The government then announced that it would seek to immunize Mr. Hernandez and compel him to testify against Mr. Parrish. Mr. Hernandez was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, but the court refused to dismiss the indictment. Mr. Hernandez went immediately to trial, was found guilty and, with the government's acquiescence, was sentenced for one kilogram of cocaine (the sentence level promised in the plea agreement). Mr. Hernandez was tried together with Mr. Parrish and did not testify against him.
12 Mr. Hernandez submits that the conduct of the government in attempting to immunize him when they knew he had entered a plea of guilty based upon non-cooperation interfered with the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Appellee's Br. at 8. Mr. Hernandez argues that he was not advised effectively by his attorney when the attorney incorrectly reported to him the terms of the plea agreement. He further submits that permission to withdraw the plea did not correct the situation because his confidence in his counsel had to have been compromised. This lack of confidence, he argues, meant that counsel's assistance was also ineffective during trial. Mr. Hernandez contends that the only remedy for the alleged constitutional violation is dismissal of the indictment. 13 Mr. Hernandez relies on Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir.1979). In Cooper, the government withdrew its offer of a plea agreement after defense counsel had communicated it to the defendant and the defendant had instructed his attorney to accept it. The Fourth Circuit determined that the government's failure to honor its plea proposal violated the defendant's right to due process and to effective assistance of counsel. Cooper, 594 F.2d at 18-19. The court stated: 14 Because prosecutors are required to conduct plea negotiations through defense counsel, the government's position and communications in plea discussions are necessarily mediated to the defendant through his counsel. For this reason, not only the credit and integrity of the government but those of his counsel are involved in a defendant's perception of the process.... To the extent that the government attempts through defendant's counsel to change or retract positions earlier communicated, a defendant's confidence in his counsel's capability and professional responsibility, as well as in the government's reliability, are necessarily jeopardized and the effectiveness of counsel's assistance easily compromised. At the very least, these Sixth Amendment considerations add a heightened degree of obligation to the government's fundamental duty to negotiate with scrupulous fairness in seeking guilty pleas. 15 Id. Although in Cooper there was no suggestion ... of deliberate abuse of the assumed opportunity freely to make and withdraw plea proposals as a means of testing the wills and confidence of defendants and their counsel or of deliberate harassment, the court ordered the remedy of specific enforcement of the plea proposal, to the extent then possible. Id. at 20.
16 At the outset, it is important to focus upon the precise nature of Mr. Hernandez's claim. He does not claim that the government broke a promise or deliberately misled his attorney during the plea bargaining. He simply claims that the prosecution knew that his attorney had bargained on the basis that the government would not seek to immunize Mr. Hernandez. It is also important to note that Mr. Hernandez certainly can claim no prejudice from his initial guilty plea. Although the government had not reneged on any promise--a situation for which the possible remedies would have included specific enforcement of the government's promise or permission to withdraw the guilty plea 2 --the district court prudently permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea. Nevertheless, he achieved the two objectives that he sought in the plea negotiations: he was sentenced in the same range applicable under the plea agreement, and he did not testify against his co-defendant, Mr. Parrish. However, Mr. Hernandez asserts that, in this case, additional relief is necessary. Specifically, he asserts that it is necessary to remedy an undermining of his faith in his counsel and the consequent deprivation of effective assistance of counsel by dismissal of the indictment against him. 17 The basic principles that must guide our decision are well-established. Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1983). In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). These are circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046 (footnote omitted). Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Prejudice has been presumed from direct state interference with counsel's decision making process. 3 18 It is clear that the government's alleged conduct does not constitute direct interference with counsel's assistance and therefore does not raise the presumption of prejudice to which the Supreme Court referred in Cronic. Nor were circumstances such that although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660, 104 S.Ct. at 2047. Moreover, Mr. Hernandez's reliance on the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Cooper is to no avail. In Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-10, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-48, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983), decided under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court overruled Cooper to the extent that Cooper held the plea agreement enforceable even before the defendant relied on it by pleading guilty. See also Plaster v. United States, 789 F.2d 289, 292-93 (4th Cir.1986) (recognizing the impact of Mabry on Cooper ). The Court also left little doubt that it disapproved of Cooper's Sixth Amendment analysis: 19 Respondent suggests that the prosecutor's withdrawal of the initial offer undermined his confidence in defense counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This argument is simply at odds with reason.... We fail to see how an accused could reasonably attribute the prosecutor's change of heart to his counsel any more than he could have blamed counsel had the trial judge chosen to reject the agreed-upon recommendation, or, for that matter, had he gone to trial and been convicted. 20 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 510 n. 10, 104 S.Ct. at 2548 n. 10 (1983); see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 363 (3d Cir.1980) (loss of faith in attorney because of unsuccessful plea bargaining is not enough to violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right absent detrimental reliance). Consequently, Mr. Hernandez is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate prejudice--a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Mr. Hernandez points to no facts to show that he was prejudiced during the course of the trial or even during the plea bargaining itself. Although Mr. Hernandez claims that his confidence in his counsel was compromised, he has the same counsel representing him in this appeal. See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d at 19 n. 9 (replacement of defense counsel a strong indication of a loss of confidence). Consequently, he is entitled to no relief--and certainly not to the relief he seeks, dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) (absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate).