Opinion ID: 2371675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Discovery Violation and Its Significance

Text: Rule 26 (b)(4) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to disclose, in their answers to interrogatories, the relevant `facts known and opinions held' by the expert witnesses whom they expect to call at trial. Gubbins v. Hurson, 885 A.2d 269, 276-77 (D.C.2005). The pretrial disclosure requirement of Rule 26(b)(4) applies only to facts and opinions that the expert `acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial.' Id. at 277 (citing Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 657 (D.C. 1985)). The Rule imposes no obligation to disclose where the `information was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because [the expert] was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit.' Id. (citations omitted). While Ms. Burke did not list Dr. Staples by name in her Rule 26(b)(4) statement, she did reserve[] the right to seek expert testimony from any health care provider identified in [her] medical records, which implicitly included Dr. Staples. Even so, however, the statement did not disclose the substance of Dr. Staples's anticipated expert testimony; in particular, the statement did not mention the opinions Dr. Staples expressed at trial when he was asked to compare the December and July MRI scans. Appellants argue, and it appears uncontested, that Dr. Staples formulated those opinions in anticipation of trial and not while acting as Ms. Burke's radiologist or Dr. Goodman's consultant, because the first time Dr. Staples remembered comparing the two scans was at his deposition. Thus, though the point is a subtle one, in admitting Dr. Staples's comparison testimony without recognizing that its substance should have been disclosed in Ms. Burke's Rule 26(b)(4) statement, the trial court may have committed an error of law. [5] See Gubbins, 885 A.2d at 278. Nonetheless, the primary purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) is to prevent unfair surprise and concomitant prejudice. See Gubbins, 885 A.2d at 279. Although appellants contend otherwise, Dr. Staples's comparison testimony neither surprised nor materially prejudiced them. Since Dr. Staples had signed the July 2000 MRI report, and Dr. Goodman recalled reviewing the July films with him, it was entirely predictable that he would be asked about the significance of those films in light of the earlier MRI scan that he himself had interpreted. More important, Dr. Staples's comparison testimony merely reiterated what he previously had said at his deposition. Not only were appellants well aware of the deposition testimony, but also Ms. Burke specifically designated it as potential evidence in the parties' joint pretrial statement. Having objected to the deposition testimony then only on the ground that it would be cumulative of testimony provided in open court, appellants are in no position to complain that Dr. Staples's testimony in open court surprised them. Their objection implies that they expected him to testify as he did. In point of fact, moreover, his comparison testimony added little of consequence to Dr. Staples's interpretations of the December and July MRI scans individually (to which appellants did not object at trial), and it was replicated by the other medical experts who testified at trial. Given the absence of surprise and unfair prejudice, we conclude that Ms. Burke's presumed violation of Rule 26(b)(4) does not entitle appellants to a new trial. See R. & G. Orthopedic Appliances & Prosthetics, Inc. v. Curtin, 596 A.2d 530, 540 (D.C.1991) (adopting harmless error requirement for appellate review in civil cases).