Opinion ID: 1952817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the urciolos' challenge to jurisdiction

Text: After three days of trial in the court below and the awarding of a monetary judgment in favor of John Rogers against Raphael Urciolo and Joseph Urciolo jointly, together with costs, Joseph Urciolo for the first time alleged that he had not been served with the original bill of complaint by McGinnis and Dudley, nor had he ever filed an answer to that suit, and on this premise challenged the court's jurisdiction over him. Raphael Urciolo maintained that he had not been properly served with the cross bill of John Rogers and challenged jurisdiction and joined his brother in a motion to set aside the decree filed September 29, 1969. We regret that we must prolong this opinion by discussing the merits of the Urciolos' contention of lack of jurisdiction, which the chancellor characterized as frivolous, yet, we are of the belief that the issues raised should be answered to still the possibility of continued litigation. From the record it appears that the first activity in this case after John Rogers filed his answer to the bill is a motion titled, Motion of Defendants Raphael G. Uricolo and Florence E. Urciolo to Advance or Continue Trial and contained the following language: Come now the defendants, Raphael G. Urciolo, pro se    The defendants, Raphael G. Urciolo    Among the objects of said trip are a series of lectures to be given by defendant, Raphael G. Urciolo.       The defendant, Raphael G. Urciolo, certified that he has made known to all other counsel of the matters   . (Emphasis supplied.) At this stage of the litigation, Raphael Urciolo had not been named as a party defendant and there was no obligation for him to appear in any capacity. The motion he filed to fix a trial date was not relevant to any issue of jurisdiction. This motion was filed because he obviously considered himself a real party in interest and intended to participate in the trial on its merits. There is no question but that by this motion he was seeking the assistance of the legal process of the court in his favor. We think this was a pleading within the meaning of Maryland Rule 124 a 1, and by filing this pleading he made a general appearance for himself and the others whom he purported to represent, and thus accepted the jurisdiction of the court. Eastham v. Young, 250 Md. 516, 522, 243 A.2d 559 (1968). Cf. Metropolitan Auto Sales v. Koneski, 252 Md. 145, 152, 249 A.2d 141 (1969). Subsequently, when Rogers filed his cross-claim, a copy was mailed by registered mail to Raphael Urciolo's office and its delivery was acknowledged by an employee named Cates. It appears from Raphael's testimony that Cates promptly delivered the cross-bill to him upon his return to his office. We think such service meets substantial compliance with Maryland Rule 306 c 2(b). There is no question but that Raphael Urciolo comes within the purview of the provisions of Maryland Code (1969 Repl. Vol.), Art. 75, § 96, which gives the courts of this State personal jurisdiction over nonresidents when such a person acts directly [by way of]    (1) Transacting any business in this State; [or]    (5) Having an interest in using, or possessing real estate in this State;   . Although actual delivery of the cross-claim sent by registered mail was made to his employee Cates, yet, under oath Raphael admitted prompt receipt of the letter from Cates. Therefore, there can be no question but that he had actual and timely receipt of the copy of Rogers' cross-claim and was fully apprised of its nature. Cf. Heller & Company v. Kocher, 262 Md. 471, 278 A.2d 301 (1971). Additionally, Raphael Urciolo participated fully in these proceedings for thirteen months, filing pleadings, answers, counterclaims, testifying, examining, and the like. At no time did he ever ask that the order of court authorizing service be amended, or in any other way object to or appeal from the manner of service until October 28, 1969, the next to last day before the appeal time was to expire. His challenge to jurisdiction was in the form of a motion to set aside decree not enrolled. The court denied the motion because Raphael Urciolo, prior to filing a motion, had already appealed to this Court from that portion of the decree which denied his cross-claim against Chance and his counterclaim against McGinnis and Dudley, and the appeal was still pending. He did not appeal from the decree in personam obtained against him by Rogers. The chancellor held that he was without jurisdiction to strike a judgment after an appeal had been entered, even though in this case the appeal was from only a portion of the decree. We are of the opinion that the action of the chancellor was proper. Urciolo, by filing his cross-claim against Chance and his counterclaim against McGinnis and Dudley, if he had not by his previous actions accepted the jurisdiction of the court (and we think that he had), certainly by these pleadings, did so. The chancellor lacked jurisdiction to set aside a decree not enrolled when the issue raised by the motion, i.e., lack of jurisdiction of the court, could have a bearing on the portion of the decree appealed. The appeal had not been withdrawn at the date of the hearing on the motion and we believe the following principle set forth in Tiller v. Elfenbein, 205 Md. 14, 21, 106 A.2d 42 (1954) to be apposite: We think it is a sound policy that allows the trial court, despite an appeal, to retain its control over the judgment for thirty days after its entry, and for such reasonable time thereafter as may serve the court's convenience in disposing of a motion seasonably made, as contemplated by the Rules. On the other hand the exercise of the court's power to act on the motion should not be stayed by the entry of an appeal, so as to work a postponement of the hearing of the motion, any more than the filing of the motion should postpone the time for, or hearing of, the appeal, for this would be capable of abuse, as suggested. We hold that, unless the appeal is dismissed when the motion comes on for hearing, the appellant must elect between his motion and his appeal. If the appeal is dismissed before the hearing, as in the instant case, the motion stands for hearing as though no appeal has been entered. Furthermore, in Giles v. DiRobbio, 186 Md. 258, 261, 46 A.2d 611 (1946), it was held that the trial court properly dismissed a petition to strike a judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence, after an appeal from the judgment had been entered. The Court stated that the lower court could not consider the petition after an appeal was taken to this Court. The appeal was still pending when the motion was heard. Corey v. Carback, 201 Md. 389, 405, 94 A.2d 629 (1953), and Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 111, 43 A.2d 186 (1945). With regard to Joseph Urciolo's challenge to the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that he had not been served with a copy of the bill of complaint, we first note that Deputy United States Marshal Michael Colosanto filed an affidavit of service stating that he had served Joseph Urciolo on September 2, 1965, with a copy of the bill of complaint and the order of publication in this case. Thereafter on September 14, 1965, there was purportedly filed an answer signed by Joseph Urciolo. Although this answer cannot be found in the files of the clerk of the court, nonetheless copies were mailed by Joseph Urciolo to the counsel for the various parties in the case and one of such copies was filed in the proceeding as an exhibit. The chancellor characterized Urciolo's attempted explanation as to why he had mailed this answer to counsel of record, if in fact he had not been served with the bill of complaint as legal jabberwocky. Counsel for John Rogers has in his possession a copy of that answer admittedly signed by Joseph Urciolo. This is significant because had Urciolo not been properly served it is highly unlikely that he would have signed an answer. Joseph Urciolo some four and one-half years later (March 13, 1970) attached to his motion to revise the decree, an affidavit by Colosanto, to the effect that while acting as Deputy United States Marshal he had mistakenly served Raphael Urciolo instead of his brother, Joseph Urciolo in September, 1965. On the basis of these facts we do not think the chancellor erred in his holding that: It is elementary law that a proper official return of service is presumed to be true and accurate until the presumption is overcome by proof, and the mere denial of personal service by him who was summoned will not avail to defeat the sworn return of the official process server. Weinrich v. Walker, 236 Md. 290; Harvey v. Slacum, 181, 206. This member of the court finds it inconceivable that a practicing attorney would prepare an answer to a suit against him, sign it, certify to its being mailed, and mail it if he had not been personally served with the document giving rise to such answer. Finally, with regard to Joseph Urciolo's contention that he had never been served with a copy of John Rogers' cross-bill, Rogers was granted leave by the chancellor (Feb. 13, 1970) to effect proper service upon him pursuant to Maryland Code (1969 Repl. Vol.) Art. 75, § 78, and this was accomplished. Decree affirmed, costs to be paid by Raphael G. Urciolo, Joseph J. Urciolo, Arthur J. McGinnis and Charles Dudley.