Opinion ID: 1919841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: effects of soca

Text: Second, J.R. has failed to meet his burden of providing the clearest proof that the effect of SOCA is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's intent. [55] Although civil commitment under SOCA does impose an affirmative restraint, restricting the freedom of dangerous mentally ill persons is a legitimate governmental purpose that has been historically regarded as nonpunitive. [56] Thus, such restraint or affirmative disability may be applied to protect the public. In the case of emergency protective custody pending the hearing before the Board, convicted sex offenders are only held upon a showing of probable cause that custody is necessary and upon a prompt evaluation by a mental health professional concluding that the subject is a dangerous sex offender. The fact that SOCA imposes an affirmative disability or restraint does not negate the Legislature's clear intent that SOCA be civil in nature. Further, the fact that a finding of scienter is not required for civil commitment under SOCA provides evidence that SOCA is indeed a civil regulatory scheme. The determination of whether one is a dangerous sex offender who must be confined is made based on a mental abnormality or personality disorder and not on a finding of criminal intent. Additionally, we are persuaded that SOCA was not meant to serve as a deterrent. Persons committed under SOCA are suffering from a mental disorder or personality disorder that prevents them from exercising control over their actions. As such, SOCA focuses on treating dangerous sex offenders and not on imposing a punishment. This is further evidenced by the fact that SOCA is modeled after and mirrors MHCA. Even though SOCA's application is limited to convicted sex offenders, SOCA does not impose liability or punishment for criminal conduct. Instead, like the Kansas Act in Hendricks, prior convictions are used for evidentiary purposes. Specifically, requiring that the subject be convicted of a sex offense provides evidence of the subject's mental condition and helps predict future behavior. [57] Additionally, SOCA is not excessive in relation to its assigned nonpunitive purpose, which is to protect the public and provide treatment to dangerous sex offenders who are likely to reoffend. [58] There is clearly a rational relation between the restriction on dangerous sex offenders' liberty and the statute's purpose of protecting the public by providing treatment for dangerous sex offenders in order to reduce the likelihood they will engage in such acts in the future. Moreover, SOCA not only requires that sex offenders receive a commitment hearing before the Board, but it also imposes a high standard of proof upon the State. To subject a dangerous sex offender to inpatient treatment, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that involuntary treatment is the least restrictive alternative. [59] Further, SOCA allows for the committed sex offender to request periodic review hearings by the Board to seek from the Board an order of discharge or a change in treatment. [60] These facts provide dispositive proof that SOCA is civil and not criminal in nature. [61] We determine that civil confinement under SOCA is reasonably related to the danger of recidivism and consistent with the regulatory objective, protecting the public from dangerous sex offenders. Finally, we reject J.R.'s argument that the Kansas Act in Hendricks is meaningfully different from SOCA because SOCA, unlike the Kansas Act, requires a prior criminal conviction for a determination that a person is a dangerous sex offender. [62] Under SOCA, persons charged with a sexual offense, but not convicted, do not fall within the definition of a dangerous sex offender. While most statutes do not limit the definition of a dangerous sex offender to only those convicted of a sexual offense, those that do have been held by other courts not to be punitive or unconstitutional. [63] Our Legislature merely limited SOCA's application to a smaller group of sex offenders. A civil commitment is not somehow transformed into a criminal proceeding simply because the Legislature has chosen to limit SOCA's application to those mentally ill persons who have actually been convicted of a sex offense. [64] J.R.'s second attempt to distinguish SOCA from the Kansas Act found to be constitutional in Hendricks is also without merit. Under SOCA, sex offenders must generally remain in jail or a correctional facility while awaiting their hearing from the Board. In contrast, sex offenders awaiting a mental health hearing under the Kansas Act are placed under the supervision of the Kansas Department of Health and Social Rehabilitative Services. However, J.R. misinterprets the Court's conclusion in Hendricks. The Court in Hendricks found it significant that the defendant was placed under the supervision of the department after the hearing by the Board confirmed that the defendant was a dangerous sex offender. [65] The Court was concerned with the conditions of the confined persons once they are actually civilly committed. The Court did not discuss the conditions of confinement pending the mental health hearing. We conclude the fact that convicted sex offenders are routinely placed in custody in a jail or correctional facility while awaiting their hearing does not override the Legislature's clear intent that SOCA be civil in nature. Because J.R. failed to prove that the effects of SOCA are so punitive in either purpose or effect to negate the Legislature's intention, we conclude that SOCA is not punitive and is indeed civil. Therefore, SOCA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses.