Opinion ID: 210555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sanction of Exclusion

Text: 28 In deciding what sanction to impose, the PTO normally considers (1) the public interest; (2) the seriousness of the violation of the Disciplinary Rule; (3) the deterrent effects deemed necessary; (4) the integrity of the legal profession; and (5) any extenuating circumstances. 37 C.F.R. § 10.154(b). Bender argues that exclusion was improper because such a draconian sanction was motivated by malice, was punishment oriented, and failed to account for extenuating circumstances. 29 The PTO properly initiated disciplinary action in this matter based on improper practices conducted in the course of Bender's representation of clients that had been originally represented by Gilden and referred by AIC. After the improprieties surrounding the affairs of AIC came to light, Gilden agreed to a five-month suspension from practice to avoid formal disciplinary proceedings. That sanction was the result of a settlement agreement in which Gilden admitted to violating various regulations. Bender, however, has maintained throughout these proceedings that he has done nothing wrong. Moreover, he has continued to demonstrate a complete lack of remorse despite the clear findings, supported by substantial evidence, that Bender neglected legal matters with which he was entrusted, failed to disclose the conflict created by his financial relationship with AIC, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to justice. 30 Bender's sanction was not punishment oriented or based on malice. To the contrary, the PTO carefully evaluated and applied the factors outlined by section 10.154(b), including the extenuating circumstances that Bender identified. Specifically, the PTO considered Bender's efforts in litigating the Daniels case, the sanctions imposed in similar circumstances, and Bender's age. The PTO also noted that Bender had violated multiple regulations, that his misconduct was aggravated by specific notice from the outset that the arrangement with AIC was not resulting in adequate consideration of the inventors' needs, and that Bender refused to recognize the impropriety of his conduct or to express any remorse for his actions. The PTO ultimately concluded that Bender's failure to recognize that his conduct was improper created a likelihood that he would continue to violate the same disciplinary rules again and that, as a result, exclusion was necessary. The district court agreed. 31 Although Bender may have only had the best intentions in mind in assuming prosecution of the Gilden applications, the best of intentions cannot absolve Bender's complicity with AIC in a scheme fraught with deception and adversely affecting a large number of unsuspecting inventors. As an experienced patent practitioner, Bender had to have appreciated that the wholesale practice of filing design applications with unauthorized design embellishments in hundreds of applications was not in the inventors' interests but instead was driven by AIC's money-back guarantee. He should have known that the kind of letter he sent to his newly acquired clients fell far short of the explanation needed to address the distressed circumstances in which his clients were placed by his new employer, AIC. His letter, even though well written and perhaps sufficient as an engagement letter of a client in the first instance, only perpetuated the harm done to the Gilden applicants by treating what had previously transpired as nothing out of the ordinary when the circumstances of this entire matter—and Bender's conflicting interests in particular—were quite extraordinary. Bender's failure to appreciate that fact supports the PTO's determination that any sanction less than exclusion would not provide the necessary deterrent effect. Because we cannot conclude that the sanction of exclusion is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, we have no reason to disturb the PTO's sanction of exclusion from practice.