Opinion ID: 1787114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Smith's claims are barred by res judicata.

Text: ¶ 21. Moreover, even if the circuit court had jurisdiction to review Smith's claims, such claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. This Court addressed a situation identical to Smith's in Hood v. Mississippi Dep't of Wildlife Conservation, 571 So.2d 263 (Miss.1990). The Mississippi Department of Wildlife Conservation (DWC) terminated Hood after he was convicted of a crime. Hood, 571 So.2d at 265. Hood appealed the termination decision to the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board (EAB), which affirmed his termination. Id. Hood did not seek judicial review in the circuit court after exhausting his administrative remedies. Id. Hood instead filed an action in the chancery court seeking both reinstatement and money damages. Id. The chancery court dismissed Hood's claims, holding that his appellate remedy was adequate and exclusive. Id. The Court held that the statutorily prescribed employee appeals procedure was a vehicle through which a former state employee could assert, and ultimately appeal, his various claims. [1] Id. at 267. This Court held that, Because every claim Hood asserts was available to him before the Employee Appeals Boardand before the Circuit Court thereafter, had he chosen that route, we hold Hood's remedy at law plain, speedy, adequate and complete. Because that remedy has been exhausted, Hood's claim is barred under elementary notions of res judicata. Id. at 268. ¶ 22. Under Mississippi law, res judicata or collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of administrative decisions. In Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 437 So.2d 388 (Miss.1983), this Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to administrative proceedings. Id. Further, this Court has held that [o]nce an agency decision is final and the decision remains unappealed beyond the time to appeal, it is barred by administrative res judicata or collateral estoppel. Zimmerman v. Three Rivers Planning & Dev. Dist., 747 So.2d 853, 861 (Miss.App.1999). The holding in Hood dictates that the doctrine of res judicata precludes not only further litigation of claims that were actually raised in a prior proceeding, but also any claim that could have been raised in the earlier suit. Hood, 571 So.2d at 267-69. Smith's claims are likewise barred by res judicata because he did not properly appeal the PARB's decision. ¶ 23. Smith's second contention, that the statutory appeals process could not provide a meaningful remedy, is without merit. Smith claims that the PARB violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow his attorney to actively participate in the PARB hearing. Smith argues that since his attorney was essentially gagged at the hearing ... an adequate record could not be made. Thus, Smith asserts, trial de novo is the only meaningful way to obtain justice. Smith maintains that his position is that this is not an appeal but a direct attack upon the Appellee's hearing process in the instant case, and that [t]his would include matters outside the record. ¶ 24. Smith's argument fails for three reasons. First, the PARB transcript clearly indicates the limited role allowed Smith's counsel. Therefore, the PARB record is sufficient to address any alleged constitutional flaw. At the beginning of the hearing, Gene Hartley, the University's Director of Human Resources, read a statement informing the participants that, [i]t is noted that counsel is only to assist the parties who will present their own cases. The hearing transcript also provides the following statement made in response to an attempt by Smith's attorney to speak: BY MR. LUCKETT (Smith's attorney): I read the report that he faxed me that said he was suffering from some sort of stress. I don't remember BY MR. HARTLEY: Could I ask you not to speak for him. ¶ 25. Second, Smith failed to contemporaneously object to the hearing process before the PARB. In United Cement Co. v. Safe Air for the Env't, Inc., 558 So.2d 840 (Miss.1990), an environmental group, SAFE, appealed a decision by the Mississippi Department of Natural Resources Permit Board. SAFE was granted a full evidentiary administrative hearing before the Permit Board, which designated a Special Assistant Attorney General to sit with the Board as hearing officer. Id. at 841. After the Permit Board reaffirmed its earlier decision, SAFE appealed to the chancery court, charging that it had been denied due process of law because the hearing officer was a Special Assistant Attorney General and that the attorney representing the Mississippi Bureau of Pollution Control was also a Special Assistant Attorney General. Id. This Court reversed the chancery court, holding in part that: SAFE admits having knowledge of the identity of the hearing officer as an Assistant Attorney General well before the hearing and in time to object if any legitimate objection existed. It made no objection before the Board and proceeded through the hearing without objection. We are of the opinion that it waived any real or supposed objection it might have had by this conduct. Id. at 843. The State argues that any other result would give Smith and other aggrieved employees an incentive to hold any objections and adduce less than all of the evidence, and then rely upon the flaws in the process or the inadequate record to obtain trial de novo. ¶ 26. Third, this Court has held that the appeals process is adequate to address alleged constitutional flaws in the appeals process. In Hood, a terminated employee filed an action in the chancery court charging, among other things, that the DWC had violated rights secured to him under state and federal constitutions. Hood, 571 So.2d at 266. The chancery court dismissed Hood's claims, holding that his appellate remedy was adequate and exclusive. Id. On appeal, this Court addressed the issue of whether the statutory appeals process was adequate to assert a denial of constitutional rights. Id. at 265, 268. This Court held that the Employee Appeals Board and the circuit court on appeal had the ability to adjudicate Hood's breach of contract and constitutional claims, and stated that: The remedial process provided such employees [2] necessarily vests the employee's department, agency or institution, and ultimately the EAB, with full authority to hear not only the merits vel non of any charge of inefficiency or other good cause, but also any other matter of fact or law the employee may assert affecting his employment. The more relaxed administrative appellate process before the EAB is quite conducive to a full airing of the employee's constitutional claims. Because every claim Hood asserts was available to him before the Employee Appeals Boardand before the Circuit Court thereafter, had he chosen that route, we hold Hood's remedy at law plain, speedy, adequate and complete. Id. at 268. Every claim Smith now asserts could have been addressed before the PARB and the circuit court on appeal, had Smith filed a writ of certiorari.