Opinion ID: 510217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Friedman's Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: 193 We turn next to Friedman's claim that he was denied his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Friedman contends that his trial counsel, Thomas P. Puccio, sidestepped crucial lines of cross examination because of conflicts of interest resulting from Puccio's representation of Robert Richards, an indicted conspirator, from his representation of Melvin Lebetkin, an unindicted conspirator, and from his alleged representation of a third person, a lawyer named Harold Borg. We conclude that Friedman knowingly waived the first alleged conflict and that the other two alleged conflicts were not conflicts at all.
194 Robert Richards, formerly president of Citisource, testified for the government at trial. Before he agreed to cooperate with the government and when he gave testimony before the SEC materially different from his testimony at trial, both Richards and Citisource had been represented by Puccio and Puccio's law firm, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan. 195 Citing our decision in United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.1986), and realizing that any conviction it might obtain against Friedman would be at risk, the government moved on May 8, 1986 to disqualify Puccio. The government's motion stated that Richards had pleaded guilty to federal bribery charges and was expected to testify at trial. The motion also set forth relevant facts concerning Puccio's previous representation of Richards and stated that Puccio had also represented Melvin Lebetkin, an attorney who was being investigated for allegedly paying bribes to Manes and Lindenauer on behalf of yet another PVB vendor, the Standard Collection Agency. In a sealed affidavit, the government stated that Puccio had attempted to gain immunity for Lebetkin by proffering testimony. No such agreement, however, had been reached, although the government stated that it had continued to express an interest in obtaining one. The government speculated that Lebetkin's testimony would harm Friedman by tending to corroborate Lindenauer's testimony regarding Manes. 196 Friedman vigorously opposed the government's disqualification motion. In an opposing affidavit, Puccio questioned the government's good faith in filing the motion, suggesting that it was merely an attempt to delay the trial. Puccio emphasized that the Stroock firm had represented Richards in its role as corporate counsel to Citisource, and that [a]t no time did I confer privately with Mr. Richards or provide him personally with legal advice. Puccio's affidavit also pointed out that when the New York County District Attorney had announced on February 18, 1986 that several officers of Citisource, including Richards, were targets of investigation, Puccio had immediately recommended that each of the Citisource officers obtain independent counsel. Puccio stated as well that there was no realistic possibility that I would be either a sworn or unsworn witness at the trial. With respect to Lebetkin, Puccio stated that Lebetkin's and Friedman's respective relationships with Lindenauer are totally distinct from one another, and that accordingly no conflict of interest existed. 197 Friedman himself submitted an affidavit in opposition to the government's motion. It stated: 198 STANLEY M. FRIEDMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 199 1. I am a member of the bar of this Court and a defendant in this criminal proceeding which has been scheduled for trial before this Court on or about June 2, 1986. 200 2. In January of this year, I retained Thomas P. Puccio, Esq. to represent me in connection with criminal investigations undertaken by the District Attorney of New York County and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.3. Since January 1986, I have spent hundreds of hours with Mr. Puccio discussing this case; I have paid to Mr. Puccio substantial legal fees; I have the fullest confidence in Mr. Puccio's ability to represent me; I enjoy an excellent client-attorney relationship with Mr. Puccio. In light of the foregoing, I believe that not to be able to continue in this case with Mr. Puccio as my attorney would cause me irreparable harm. Furthermore, I would lose my right to a speedy trial. 201 4. I have read the conflict charges submitted by the United States Attorney against Mr. Puccio. I have also read Mr. Puccio's affidavit in opposition, and related documents, including the May 8, 1986 Transcript of Proceedings before this Court. 202 5. In addition thereto, I have obtained the advice of independent counsel (although I, too, am a practicing attorney) who concurs with me that there is no conflict of interest in Mr. Puccio continuing to represent me. However, if the government's position is correct, I waive the benefit of any purported conflict. 203 WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, I respectfully request that this Court deny the government's motion to disqualify my attorney, Thomas P. Puccio. 204 The district court conducted a hearing on the disqualification motion, at which the court asked both Puccio and Friedman their views on the matter: 205 THE COURT: Do you stipulate that you will not-- 206 MR. PUCCIO: Cross-examine him on that point? 207 THE COURT: Cross-examine him in any way to bring out the fact that he testified inconsistently before the SEC. 208 MR. PUCCIO: Yes, I will stipulate. I have no problem with that. 209 THE COURT: Does Mr. Friedman agree to that? 210 DEFENDANT FRIEDMAN: Yes, your Honor, I agree with Mr. Puccio's position on the cross-examination of Mr. Richards. 211 MR. ROTH [for the government]: If I could interject for a moment? Assuming we are going to try a waiver, [United States v.] Curc[i]o[,] [680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1982),] set out very explicit procedures for that. 212 THE COURT: Curcio wasn't talking about a defendant who was a lawyer and a waiver which, as I said before, if it wasn't made Mr. Puccio shouldn't be disqualified. Anybody representing Mr. Friedman who brought up this SEC testimony in light of what you said you would do when it was brought up would be a certified idiot. So I don't have to have Mr. Friedman, who is a lawyer, consult another lawyer to find out whether it is all right not to have his lawyer be a certified idiot. 213 The court denied the government's motion on May 21. 214 Friedman, who once served as an Assistant District Attorney for Bronx County, now claims that he did not validly waive any conflict of interest arising from Stroock's representation of Richards. Specifically, Friedman contends that his waiver did not meet the standards set forth by this court in United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d at 59, and United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir.1982), and that his background as a lawyer is irrelevant to the determination of whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent. We disagree. 215 In Curcio, we established procedures to be followed by trial courts in determining whether a criminal defendant has knowingly and intelligently chosen to waive his right to be represented by an attorney who is free from conflicts of interest. We noted that the first task of the trial court is to alert the defendants to the substance of the dangers of representation by an attorney having divided loyalties in as much detail as the court's experience and its knowledge of the case will permit. Id. at 888. We stated that the court must then assess whether the [defendant's] request is ... knowing and intelligent, id., and that the court may perhaps devise a variety of methods for gaining the necessary insights. Id. at 889. Nevertheless, analogizing to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, we observed that questions designed to elicit from the defendant a narrative statement of his understanding are preferable to questions designed to elicit mere 'yes' or 'no' answers. Id. We also noted that the court's inquiry in each instance should take place after the defendant[ ] ha[s] had a reasonable time to digest and contemplate the risks posed by [the conflict of interest.] Id. 216 Though we described our decision in Curcio as prescrib[ing] [a] catechism, id. at 890, we nevertheless recognized that the existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused,'  id. at 888 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (citations omitted)). Under the circumstances of Friedman's case, we have little difficulty in finding a knowing and intelligent waiver despite the departure from the full-blown Curcio catechism. First, Friedman had ample time and opportunity to digest and contemplate the risk posed by his continued representation by Puccio. The government's disqualification motion was filed nearly a week before the hearing was conducted. Friedman thus was not, like the defendants in Curcio, forced into a snap decision during a lunch break, see id. at 889, or like the defendant in Iorizzo, compelled to make a choice on the spot in the middle of a trial. 786 F.2d at 59; see id. at 55-57. Second, Friedman's affidavit stated that he had read the government's submissions and Puccio's response and that he had consulted with independent counsel. He had thus clearly been alerted to the substance of the dangers of representation by Puccio. Finally, Friedman was a lawyer who had already devoted hundreds of hours to the preparation of his defense. We therefore conclude without difficulty that his waiver was knowing and intelligent. We emphasize, however, that departures from the procedures outlined in Curcio and Iorizzo may be justified only in unusual circumstances, such as those in the instant case. 217 With respect to the alleged conflict of interest involving Puccio's representation of Lebetkin, Friedman contends that Puccio cross-examined Lindenauer in a truncated fashion and declined any cross-examination of Sandow in order to avoid the possibility that either witness might give public testimony incriminating Lebetkin. Puccio, however, did ask Lindenauer about the amount of the bribes he received from Lebetkin's firm, Standard Collection Agency. Although Friedman notes accusingly that Puccio mention[ed] Lebetkin's company only in passing and never mention[ed] Lebetkin himelf, we fail to perceive, and Friedman fails to explain, what purpose any further questioning about the subject would have served. The questions about Standard Collection Agency were relevant only to show Lindenauer's propensity to take bribes and to test Lindenauer's memory of corrupt transactions. Puccio's representation of Lebetkin could not have affected other aspects of Puccio's cross-examination of Lindenauer. 218 As to Puccio's failure to cross-examine Sandow, Sandow's testimony did not incriminate Friedman and mentioned him only in passing. Sandow's testimony primarily concerned Shafran, and thus only Shafran's lawyer bothered to cross-examine. Moreover, very little of Shafran's cross-examination of Sandow concerned Sandow's dealings with Lebetkin. In view of the marginal relevance of Lebetkin and Standard Collection Agency to this case, let alone to Friedman's guilt, we fully agree with Puccio's original assessment that a lawyer representing both [Lebetkin and Friedman] would not be required at a joint trial to take contradictory positions in defending both of them. In sum, with respect to Puccio's representation of Lebetkin, Friedman has failed to show either an actual conflict of interest, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), or a lapse in representation, Iorizzo, 786 F.2d at 58 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1708), that together would constitute a denial of his sixth amendment rights.
219 Friedman's last claim of ineffective assistance arises out of a curious incident. One week before opening arguments at the trial, the government revealed to the district court and to Friedman that one of its witnesses, Dr. Jerome Driesen, had surreptitiously tape-recorded a meeting attended by Puccio and another attorney, Harold Borg, on June 3, 1986. Dreisen, who at the time of the June meeting was cooperating with federal authorities, engineered the recording with the assistance of the FBI. According to the government, the meeting had been arranged after Borg had offered to help Driesen obtain secret information about an investigation being conducted by a Queens County grand jury. According to Puccio, the meeting had been arranged because Puccio, who needed material with which to impeach Lindenauer, had been told that Driesen, a forensic psychiatrist and long-time friend (and accomplice) of Lindenauer, believed that Lindenauer was mentally imbalanced. 220 At the recorded meeting, Puccio and Borg attempted to persuade Driesen that it was in Dreisen's interest to provide Puccio with information impeaching Lindenauer. They told Driesen that they had heard that, as the result of Lindenauer's testimony, Driesen had been named in a sealed indictment by the Queens grand jury. Though he feigned ignorance, Driesen, who had signed a cooperation agreement with the Queens County District Attorney, already knew that he had been indicted. Borg and Puccio argued that the Queens County indictment might never be unsealed if federal prosecutors were unsuccessful in building the instant case around Lindenauer. Puccio accordingly asked Driesen throughout the meeting whether Lindenauer had severe emotional problems and whether Driesen knew other things that might help Puccio undermine Lindenauer on the witness stand. 221 Each time the topic of discussion turned to Lindenauer, however, Driesen--who had been instructed by the FBI not to discuss either Lindenauer or the Friedman case with Puccio--would change the subject, otherwise act unresponsively, or give Puccio answers that were inconsistent with the testimony he later gave at trial. For example, at several points during the meeting, Driesen would avoid discussing Lindenauer by asking Borg and Puccio whether it would be possible to obtain firmer information about the Queens County investigation. At other points, Driesen would answer inquiries about Lindenauer with responses such as You're asking me to what? I, uh, to say that he has severe emotional problems? and I don't know what it is you want me to say about Lindenauer. At one point, in response to a direct question from Puccio, Driesen denied having any connection with Lindenauer's and Manes's attempt to acquire an ownership interest in a psychiatric hospital in Queens through extortion. At trial, Driesen testified to the contrary, and stated that he had pleaded guilty to state misdemeanor charges in connection with the scheme. At least twice during the meeting, Puccio stated that all he wanted was to know the truth about Lindenauer. Puccio also asked Driesen if the room in which they were meeting, Driesen's office, was bugged. 222 Toward the end of the meeting, after Borg had pulled Driesen aside, Driesen told Borg: 223 What? Look who's talking. Look, listen to me for a second HAROLD, just lemme talk for one second. Uh, my feeling is, my feeling is that he [presumably Puccio] wants me to say things that are uh, that are not true, and I am uh, I don't know if this whole thing isn't bullshit, I don't know if the whole thing is bullshit HAROLD, I, don't [unintelligible] get me, tell me, questions, give me the questions, give me the answers, give me the uh, uh, what does an indictment have, it has numbers on it, gimme the numbers of the indictment, show me something that is true, HAROLD, because this is bullshit. I think that I'm being, how do I know that I'm not just being scared by him to make his case? 224 After an unintelligible response from Borg, the FBI's tape reveals that Driesen then asked Borg: [W]hat does he want me to say? According to the transcript, Borg's reply was: [unintelligible] not interested in that right now. And the last portion of the transcript of the tape reads as follows: 225 HB [Borg]: Who's the [unintelligible] 226 JD [Driesen]: What, yeah, bugged. Goodnight. 227 (BACKGROUND NOISES). 228 JD: Who is it? 229 (BACKGROUND NOISES). 230 JD: You see, you see two tricky guys playing chess? You see, uh, lemme shut everything off, lemme shut this off. 231 KS: This is Special Agent KEN ST. GERMAIN, the sound that [unintelligible] 232 JD: That's uh, running. Put it off, it's running. I think it's got a pause button. 233 KS: [unintelligible] 234 JD: I don't, anybody ... 235 KS: [unintelligible] 236 KS: The time is now 11:14 P.M., June 3, 1986, and I'm going to deactiviate this recorder. 237 JD: [unintelligible] Whoever said he's not a sharp guy, PUCCIO, uh, did you, did you see us pussyfooting in there? 238 KS: Yeah. 239 JD: What does he want me to say? And, you know, he wants me to say he's crazy? 240 (END OF CONVERSATION). 241 At the September 24 hearing, which was held in camera, Puccio expressed his outrage at his having been taped by the government. He accused the government of having tried to set me up, an understandable reaction in light of the fact that some of Driesen's responses might readily be interpreted as inviting Puccio to suborn perjury. The United States Attorney, Rudolph W. Giuliani, denied this accusation, claiming that [t]he subject of this investigation was Mr. Borg, not Mr. Puccio. Giuliani claimed that the government had been investigating Borg for obstruction of justice and had been also seeking to determine how Borg had acquired secret information about the state grand jury testimony of the government's star witness, Lindenauer. Puccio, however, stated that Driesen's indictment had been leaked to the press by the Queens District Attorney and was all but common knowledge. Giuliani further stated that although 242 there was a period of time in which Mr. Borg was representing that Mr. Puccio could do things which under one interpretation could be considered to be improper or criminal[,] [w]hen we reviewed that tape we came to the conclusion that there was no such conduct, and closed, even if you want to call it that, any investigation of Mr. Puccio. And that's months ago. 243 Giuliani explained that the government had revealed the existence of the tape because Driesen might be called to testify, and that while [w]e don't think it bears on the trial [or is] relevant to cross-examination, the government thought it would be fair for [Puccio] to know [about the tape] when he cross-examines Mr. Driesden [sic]. Judge Knapp expressed his view that the tape was irrelevant to the trial. After Puccio vowed that he would complain to the Director of the FBI, the matter was seemingly dropped. 244 The tape recording surfaced once again as an issue during trial, however, on October 23, the day before Driesen originally was scheduled to testify. Puccio expressed the view that if Driesen's credibility were brought into question, Friedman should be allowed to present evidence that Driesen had lied during the recorded meeting when asked about Lindenauer and the instant case. But because Puccio, as a witness to that meeting, could not bring that out, Puccio argued that Driesen's testimony should be excluded in light of the government's failure to try to disqualify Puccio once it had decided to use Driesen's testimony. See, e.g., United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 34-35 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1074-75 (2d Cir.1982). Giuliani responded by arguing that Driesen wasn't lying.... He was doing precisely what he was instructed to do by the FBI, which was not to get into discussions about Geoffrey Lindenauer or the case. Giuliani also stated shortly thereafter that Driesen lied in the sense he was a cover, undercover agent, [in] the way an undercover agent is instructed to lie, but that of course we didn't instruct Driesen to lie. Judge Knapp concluded that even if Driesen would lie in that situation, that fact would have at most a piddling impact upon Driesen's credibility. 245 On October 28, 1986, just before Driesen took the stand, Puccio again argued vigorously for the exclusion of Driesen's testimony on the ground that the recorded conversation constituted valuable impeachment evidence that Friedman could not use. In particular, Puccio speculated that Driesen, for reasons of his own, had lied to them [the government] when he said that Harold Borg was going to supply him or talked about supplying him with Grand Jury material. The district court, however, rejected Puccio's arguments, observing that the Driesen tape doesn't strike me ... as very persuasive impeachment. The court added that I think you would be foolish to bring it out.... But you made a beautiful record. 246 From these curious facts now comes a curious appellate claim: In a convoluted attempt to invoke our decision in United States v. Iorizzo, Friedman asserts that Puccio may have been representing Borg while representing Friedman during the trial in this case. According to an affidavit filed by Friedman in the district court in conjunction with a motion subsequent to this appeal for a new trial, Puccio had represented Borg in a criminal investigation at one time. Whether that representation continued through the trial of the instant matter is not clear. 247 However, even assuming that Puccio had represented Borg at the pertinent time, and that cross-examination of Driesen with regard to the June 3 meeting would have been adverse to Borg's interests (an heroic assumption), we fail to perceive a conflict of interest. Specifically, we fail to see either (1) how the taped meeting could have been used to bolster Friedman's defense or (2) how the existence of the tape or of the taped meeting itself could have affected Puccio's conduct of that defense. Any attempt to use the Driesen tape was obviously fraught with risk for Friedman and would have surely been, as Judge Knapp put it, foolish. Driesen's credibility would not have been damaged by evidence of dissembling when he was operating under the FBI's instructions. Instead, cross-examination of Driesen about the events of June 3 would likely have done nothing except bring to the jury's attention the fact that the government had at one point decided to investigate Friedman's lawyer. If that fact would have had any effect on the jury, it probably would have prejudiced the defense. 248 Moreover, even the most cursory examination of the record reveals a much sounder reason for Puccio's failure to cross-examine Driesen than a supposed conflict of interest. Cross-examination was unnecessary. A number of far more cogent impeaching facts were elicited by the United States Attorney in his direct examination of Driesen. Specifically, Driesen had pleaded guilty to federal and state charges relating to his friendship with Lindenauer. He had in the recent past habitually used cocaine. He had also served as the psychiatric consultant to Lindenauer's sham clinic and had allowed Lindenauer, whom he knew held only a phony Ph.D., to use his office to treat patients. In addition, Driesen's testimony, which largely recounted conversations with Lindenauer about Manes, was cumulative. All defense counsel thus simply made light of Driesen's testimony by not even bothering to question him. Accordingly, we conclude that the Driesen tape would have been of no use to Friedman's defense, and that there was thus neither an actual conflict of interest nor a lapse in Puccio's representation of Friedman. 249