Opinion ID: 1461962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weinfeld's Case

Text: Weinfeld, an obstetrician and gynecologist, was receiving substantial disability payments as a result of a broken neck suffered in 1994. One-half of those payments had been awarded to his former third wife as marital property pursuant to the terms of their Nevada divorce. Weinfeld's separation agreement with his former second wife provided that, if his annual income was involuntarily reduced to $250,000 or less due to his disability, he and his second wife would renegotiate his alimony obligations under the separation agreement, and failing resolution by agreement, Weinfeld could apply to a court for such a resolution. Weinfeld petitioned the Circuit Court for Howard County to reduce his alimony. The Howard County litigation involved nine hearings over three years. Three lawyers who had been representing Weinfeld in that litigation struck their appearances before trial. The ninth hearing, held on September 15, 1997, before a master and at which Weinfeld appeared pro se, was on his post-trial motion claiming a denial of due process in being required to proceed pro se at the trial. At the conclusion of that hearing the master orally placed on the record his recommendation that the plaintiff's motion to modify alimony be denied. Weinfeld, acting pro se, filed exceptions to the master's recommendations on September 26, 1997. The Circuit Court for Howard County, by an order entered October 9, 1997, dismissed Weinfeld's exceptions. That order recited the reason for the dismissal as set forth below: The Plaintiff filed exceptions ... more than 5 business days after the verbal recommendations of the Master in Chancery as required by the provisions of Rule 9-207(d) MRP ( Morales v. Morales, 111 Md.App. 628, 683 A.2d 1124 (1996)). Former Maryland Rule 9-207(d) (now Maryland Rule 9-208(f) establishing a 10 day requirement) provided in relevant part that [w]ithin five days after recommendations are placed on the record or served pursuant to section (c) of this Rule, a party may file exceptions with the clerk. Morales held that [o]nce the master orally delivers his recommendations on the record, the parties are on notice of the recommendations, and the time for filing [exceptions] begins to run. Id. at 633, 683 A.2d at 1126. Also on October 9, 1997, the circuit court entered judgment denying any reduction in alimony. Weinfeld, acting pro se, on October 21, 1997, filed a notice of appeal which he titled, Application for Leave to Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. That eight page document raised at least fifteen separate arguments attacking the decree. Weinfeld contacted Chasnoff in January 1998 concerning prosecution of the appeal from the judgment of dismissal (hereafter Appeal 1). Prior to their meeting, Weinfeld sent Chasnoff a letter dated January 8, 1998, enclosing a number of documents, including the orders dismissing exceptions and entering judgment which would be the subjects of Appeal 1. Judge Chapin made the following findings of fact with respect to Weinfeld's matter. [Chasnoff] met with Weinfeld on January 26, 1998 for approximately two hours, at which time Weinfeld retained [Chasnoff] to provide legal advice and assistance, including the preparation of a brief and oral argument for Appeal 1. A written retainer agreement was executed, which provided for payment of $25,000 to be billed at $250 per hour. Weinfeld paid $21,500 with credit cards on that date, with the $3,500 balance to be payable in seven monthly payments of $500 each. [Chasnoff] received the full $25,000 pursuant to this payment agreement. Weinfeld's understanding of the agreement was that [Chasnoff] would charge him $250 per hour, which would be deducted from the retainer and that he would receive a refund of any unearned fees. [Chasnoff] testified that he considered the $25,000 a minimum payment and earned when received. [1] Promptly upon retaining [Chasnoff], Weinfeld sent to [Chasnoff] the transcripts of the eight hearings involved in the underlying case regarding Appeal l. [2] [Chasnoff] was to prepare and file a brief for this appeal, but he never did so, despite the 100 hours or so he claims he spent in preparation thereof after filing several motions to extend. Two days before the brief was due, [Chasnoff] informed Weinfeld during a telephone conversation that he was not going to file the brief, because doing so would be a waste of time. In fact, [Chasnoff] never responded to an Order to Show Cause issued by the Court of Special Appeals on May 1, 1998. Weinfeld, however, was not aware that the failure to file the pleading would result in the dismissal of his appeal. Rather, he was under the impression that the appeal would still go forward and that [Chasnoff] would present an oral argument on his behalf. The client was not informed in writing or with enough detail to fully advise him that the appeal would be dismissed. [Chasnoff] contends that his failure to respond was due to his inability to come up with an argument, in light of the case of Morales v. Morales, 111 Md.App. 628, 683 A.2d 1124 (1996), which was controlling on the issue at hand and cited by the Court of Special Appeals in its Order to Show Cause. Petitioner asserts that a diligent review of the documents sent by Weinfeld in January or a prompt review of the court file would have brought this issue to [Chasnoff's] attention much sooner. The Court agrees with Petitioner and finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Chasnoff] failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in his representation of Dr. Weinfeld in violation of Rule 1.3, supra. In addition to Appeal 1, Weinfeld expected [Chasnoff] to protect his rights to appeal an anticipated Circuit Court ruling in the related contract case (Appeal 2). In this regard, Weinfeld delivered to [Chasnoff] a Notice of Appeal he prepared himself, and he instructed [Chasnoff] to file the notice for him while he was out of the country in February 1998. The ruling did not occur until August 7, 1998, and [Chasnoff] filed the Notice of Appeal at the last minute on September 8, 1998. Weinfeld was unaware that [Chasnoff] had filed the Notice of Appeal, and [Chasnoff] took no further action on Appeal 2. That same month, Weinfeld filed a complaint against [Chasnoff] with the Petitioner. Throughout the course of [Chasnoff's] representation of Weinfeld's appeals, Weinfeld had difficulty getting in touch with [Chasnoff]. Weinfeld sent [Chasnoff] several letters requesting answers to specific legal questions pertaining to his appeals, but [Chasnoff] did not bother to answer those letters. Weinfeld frequently tried calling [Chasnoff] to inquire about the status of his legal affairs, but his numerous messages were often unreturned. [Chasnoff] claimed that he tried to reach Weinfeld on several occasions but was unable to do so because of his client's frequent travels. Weinfeld, however, testified that he always left a forwarding phone number, address, or other method of contacting him whenever he was away. Weinfeld's version of the facts is simply more credible, particularly given the testimony of the other complainants and the fact that [Chasnoff] even ignored Petitioner's letters and phone calls. Weinfeld undoubtedly did not receive the services he paid [Chasnoff] to provide. [Chasnoff] unilaterally terminated his representation of Weinfeld with regard to Appeal 1 by deciding not to file the brief just two days before the answer to the Order to Show Cause was due.... [Chasnoff] did not give his client reasonable notice to employ other counsel regarding Appeal 1 [in violation of MRPC 1.16(d)]. In fact, Weinfeld was not even aware that his rights to appeal were lost by [Chasnoff's] failure to file the brief. This rule also requires that any unearned portion of a prepaid fee be returned to the client, however, [Chasnoff] has not refunded any portion of the $25,000 that Weinfeld paid. The Court finds clear and convincing evidence that [Chasnoff] violated Rule 1.16 as well as Rule 1.5(a), Fees.... The fee [Chasnoff] charged was not reasonable in light of the amount of work performed, the results obtained, and the complexity involved. [Chasnoff] testified that he deposited the fees paid by Weinfeld directly into his own account, as was his customary practice, because he was unaware at the time that this is a practice prohibited by [MRPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property)].... By clear and convincing evidence, [Chasnoff] also violated Rule 1.15, because [Chasnoff] did not maintain the prepaid fees in an escrow account until earned, nor did he provide an accounting to Weinfeld for these funds. Chasnoff's pro se exceptions do not meet the substance of the violations found by Judge Chapin in the Weinfeld matter, and we overrule the exceptions. In this Court Chasnoff, citing to Judge Chapin's written report, submits that he spent approximately 100 hours reviewing the transcripts, preparing and filing the motions to extend and reviewing and analyzing the law in order to address the various issues that Dr. Weinfeld had presented to him. What Judge Chapin said was that Chasnoff never filed a brief in Appeal 1 despite the 100 hours or so he claims he spent in preparation thereof.... (Emphasis added). In light of the record, we read the sentence on which Chasnoff relies to be a statement of Chasnoff's position and not a finding by Judge Chapin that Chasnoff did in fact spend 100 hours on Weinfeld's matter. Cross-examination of Chasnoff by Bar Counsel revealed that on February 27, 1998, Weinfeld faxed Chasnoff the notice from the Court of Special Appeals advising that the appellant's brief was due March 16. Chasnoff, referring to his incomplete time slips testified that he did not see himself doing too much on Appeal 1 prior to March 16. Chasnoff did not obtain the transcript of the September 15, 1997 hearing until April 15, 2000, necessitating two extensions of the time for filing Weinfeld's brief as appellant. Chasnoff's time records for April 26 reflect four entries totaling fourteen hours charged to Weinfeld. Time records for April 27 charged blocks of thirteen hours and three hours, for a total of sixteen hours. Entries for April 28 reflect two blocks of time charged to Weinfeld, each of thirteen hours. Chasnoff said the second entry was a duplication. The time records for April 29 charge a block of thirteen hours and then another block of thirteen hours, which Chasnoff testified was also a duplicate entry. The time records for May 1 charge one and one half hours for the preparation of the third brief filing extension, which moved the deadline to May 11 and a second entry on May 1 charging a block of thirteen hours for review of documents. We doubt that Judge Chapin intended his reference to a claimed 100 hours to be more than a statement of Chasnoff's position.