Opinion ID: 162747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review For Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Under AEDPA

Text: 96 In his briefs in the direct appeal of his criminal conviction, Mr. Le raised all but one of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 12 The opinion in Le I reveals that the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the federal law we discuss below. See Le I, 947 P.2d at 556. Therefore, we can only grant habeas corpus relief to Mr. Le on this issue if, in addition to his counsel's unprofessional errors, we determine that the Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably—rather than merely incorrectly— applied the Sixth Amendment law. See Thomas, 218 F.3d at 1219-20 (applying AEDPA). 97 To succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish two elements. He must prove first that counsel's performance was deficient— in other words, the petitioner must show that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not acting as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, a petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, depriving the petitioner of a fair trial with a reliable result. See id. 98 To succeed under the first prong, a petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct was constitutionally effective. See Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir.1999). Specifically, a petitioner must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks omitted). For counsel's performance to be constitutionally ineffective, it must have been completely unreasonable, not merely wrong, so that it bears no relationship to a possible defense strategy. See Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1459 (10th Cir. 1995)). 99 Under the second prong, a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If the alleged ineffective assistance occurred during the guilt stage, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability the jury would have had reasonable doubt regarding guilt. See id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel occurred during the sentencing phase, this court considers whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In assessing prejudice, this court examines the totality of the evidence, not just the evidence helpful to the petitioner. See Boyd, 179 F.3d at 914. This court may address the performance and prejudice components in any order, but need not address both if [petitioner] fails to make a sufficient showing of one. Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1292-93 (10th Cir.1998); see also Davis v. Executive Dir. of Dep't of Corrections, 100 F.3d 750, 760 (10th Cir.1996). 100