Opinion ID: 2356925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Charges Against Jeffs

Text: ¶ 17 The State charged Jeffs with two counts of rape as an accomplice. The first count was alleged to have occurred shortly after Wall and Steed were married when they first had intercourse. The second count was alleged to have occurred after Jeffs refused to release Wall from her marriage to Steed and counseled her to give herself to [Steed], ... mind, body and soul. ¶ 18 These charges implicate three different sections of the Utah Code: (1) the rape statute found in section 76-5-402, (2) the consent statute found in section 76-5-406, and (3) the accomplice liability statute found in section 76-2-202. We begin our discussion with the rape statute. ¶ 19 A person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another person without the victim's consent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402(1) (2008). A rape can be committed whether or not the actor is married to the victim. Id. § 76-5-402(2). ¶ 20 To establish the required lack of consent, the State relied on three separate subsections of section 76-5-406, the statute that defines the circumstances under which an act of sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the victim's consent. The relevant sections provide: An act of sexual intercourse ... is without consent of the victim under any of the following circumstances: (1) the victim expresses lack of consent through words or conduct; ... (10) the victim is younger than 18 years of age and at the time of the offense the actor was the victim's parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian or occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim as defined in Subsection 76-5-404.1(4)(h); (11) the victim is 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age, and the actor is more than three years older than the victim and entices or coerces the victim to submit or participate.... Id. §§ 76-5-406(1), (10)-(11). ¶ 21 Because the sexual intercourse on which the charges were based was between Wall and Steed, rather than between Wall and Jeffs, the accomplice liability statute also comes into play. It provides: Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. Id. § 76-2-202. ¶ 22 Therefore, to convict Jeffs as an accomplice to rape, the State was required to establish that Jeffs, acting with the requisite mental intent, solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided Steed to have nonconsensual sexual intercourse with Wall. We analyze the jury instructions in light of these statutes to determine whether they accurately stated the State's burden. We begin with the consent instruction and then turn to the accomplice liability instruction.