Opinion ID: 1921772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Appointment of Commissioners.

Text: On the question of whether the tract is partitionable in kind, there was evidence to the effect that it was feasible to divide it into two parcels, one to be allotted to the Burnhams subject to the company's easement and the other to the Lees subject to a right of way to and from the public road. Because the Burnhams and Lees did not want partition, they produced testimony to the effect that the tract could not be divided into thirty-five parcels so as to give each of the parties having an interest therein his or her aliquot share without loss or injury, but other than a mere statement that the zoning regulations and the topography of the land would prevent partition in kind, there was no evidence as to why it could not be so divided had they desired partition into aliquot shares. Furthermore, there is nothing in the pleadings, other than a general denial, to indicate whether the Burnhams and Lees actually opposed partition, but the record as a whole leaves no doubt that they object to partition in kind whether it be into two parcels or thirty-five. However, a mere objection by dissentient parties without more is not a good reason for denying partition. In seeking a division of the tract into two parcels, the company bases its claim to partition in kind on two premises. First, it insists that since the Burnhams are under compulsion to sue for partition on behalf of the company they are precluded from objectiong to a division of the tract into two parcels, and secondly, that the Lees are estopped from objecting to a fair and equitable partition because they are precluded from taking advantage of their protracted silence and acquiescence. In seeking to require the company to institute condemnation proceedings in a court of law to perfect its defective title to the easement, the Burnhams and Lees contend that a court of equity is not the proper forum because a partial partition cannot be had without the consent of all the parties in interest. While it is true that partition in kind may not be defeated except upon a showing of loss or injury to the parties, Thruston v. Minke, supra ; Rowe v. Gillelan, 112 Md. 108, 76 Atl. 500 (1910); Hardy v. Leager, supra , there is no doubt that in this country the weight of authority is to the effect that there may not be a partial partition in kind without the consent of the parties concerned. In Gaither v. Fraser, 289 Ky. 308, 158 S.W.2d 434 (1942), a partial partition was allowed when it did not imperil the interest of other owners. In other jurisdictions partial partition without consent has been allowed under permissive statutory provisions. See, for instance, Poundstone v. Everly, 31 Pa. 11 (1854); Eddie v. Eddie, 138 Mo. 599, 39 S.W. 451 (1897); Baldwin v. Foster, 157 Cal. 643, 108 Pac. 714 (1910); Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 67 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. App., 1933); Feamster v. Feamster, 123 W. Va. 353, 15 S.E.2d 159 (1941); Mello v. Mello, 322 Mass. 68, 76 N.E.2d 9 (1947); Newson v. Johnson, 255 S.W.2d 33 (Ky., 1953). Maryland, along with the majority, seemingly requires consent if there is to be a partial partition. This is so because [t]he object of partition is a division of the property between the several co-tenants so as to put an end to the co-tenancy, and to vest in each person a sole estate in a specific part or allotment of the property. Dugan v. Baltimore, supra, at p. 6. We agree that the Burnhams are precluded from objecting to the partial partition sought by the company. Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leech, supra . But we do not agree that the Lees are estopped from so objecting. We have held in several recent cases that mere silence, standing alone, does not generally have the effect of an estoppel. See, for instance, Alvey v. Alvey, 220 Md. 571, 155 A.2d 491 (1959); Mohr v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 216 Md. 197, 140 A.2d 49 (1958), and the cases therein cited. In the Alvey case we said if the acquiescence alleged is to constitute an estoppel, it must be shown that the classical elements necessary to establish an estoppel in pais are present. We find no evidence in this case to support the claimed estoppel. However, that does not mean that the company is not entitled to partition in kind if it is feasible. Under the express provisions of § 154, supra, any tenant in common generally has the right to secure separate enjoyment of his interest either by partition or by sale and a division of the proceeds. Gunter v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228, 49 A.2d 454 (1946). The evidence as to partitionability was meager, it is true, but the weight of such as was produced was to the effect that the tract might feasibly be divided in kind between the Burnhams and the Lees. Other than the unsupported assertions that it was not divisible, there was no substantial evidence that partition was impossible. A court may not assume without clear and convincing proof that an unimproved tract of land is not susceptible of partition. Cf. Watson v. Godwin, 4 Md. Ch. 25 (1851), where it was held, in the absence of sufficient proof that a sale would be to the interest and advantage of all the parties, that the case should stand over so that the bill for a sale could, by amendment, be converted into a bill for partition. In the case at bar, since there was a possibility that the tract could be partitioned in kind without loss or injury, the chancellor should have appointed commissioners to ascertain whether the land was susceptible of partition, and in so doing should have instructed them that a right of way may be reserved for equality and that the court may award a sum of money to be paid for the same purpose. In Johnson v. Hoover, 75 Md. 486, 492, 23 Atl. 903, 905 (1892), it was held that [t]he right of partition in kind was an undeniable right if feasible. See also Campbell v. Lowe, supra (1856); Tomlinson v. McKaig, 5 Gill 256 (1847). Clearly, the chancellor should not have dismissed the bill. In its bill, the company also prayed for a sale of the tract subject to its easement in the event partition in kind was not feasible, but both sides chose to ignore that possibility. There is, therefore, no question before us on this appeal with respect to a sale and an equitable division of the proceeds should partition in kind be impracticable without loss or injury; nor is there a corollary question as to who should justly compensate the Lees for the depreciation, if any, caused by or resulting from the burden created by the granting of the easement. For the reasons hereinbefore assigned, the order of the chancellor must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Order reversed and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, the appellees to pay the costs.