Opinion ID: 158450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Forest Service act in an arbitrary and capricious manner and/or abuse its discretion when it permanently reduced McKeen's previously permitted numbers?

Text: Pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a), the Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to cancel or suspend a grazing permit or lease [for National Forest System lands] for any violation of a grazing regulation or of any term or condition of such grazing permit or lease. Accord 36 C.F.R. § 222.4(a)(4). Section 558(c) of the APA generally requires, however, that before such a cancellation or suspension may take place, the permittee be given notice of his or her noncompliance and an opportunity to cure. [7] See Anchustegui v. Dep't of Agric., 257 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir.2001) ([Section] 558 applies to a grazing permit.); accord Buckingham v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Agric., 603 F.3d 1073, 1084-85 (9th Cir.2010); cf. Smithsfork Grazing Ass'n v. Salazar, 564 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2009) (assuming arguendo that grazing permits are licenses and permittees are licensees under § 558(c)). Section 558(c) does not, however, require that a [permittee] be apprised of precisely what action the agency will take because of his conduct. Lawrence v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 759 F.2d 767, 773 n. 13 (9th Cir.1985). Rather, it only requires notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may warrant the action. Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). In his complaint, McKeen requested [a] declaration that the [Forest Service's] October 8, 2002 and May 22, 2006 decisions to permanently cancel 25 percent of [his] term grazing permit were not supported by the evidence. Aplt.App. at 32. In his subsequent briefing to the district court, McKeen alleged that the Forest Service acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, abusing its discretion, when it did not provide [him] with due process prior to permanently cancelling 25 percent of his grazing permit. Id. at 83. In addressing McKeen's arguments, the district court limited its inquiry to whether the Forest Service complied with § 558(c). Ultimately, the district court concluded that the Forest Service did comply with § 558(c) before cancelling 25 percent of McKeen's previously permitted numbers and that [t]he [Glenwood] District Ranger's decision not to increase the number of livestock permitted on the allotment in May 2006 [8] [was] not properly before the Court because .... the APA authorizes courts to compel agency action [pursuant to] 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)[] only when an agency has failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take. Id. at 218-19 (quotation, citation and emphasis omitted). On appeal, McKeen re-urges his due process argument, requesting that the cancellation of 25 percent of his grazing permit be overturned in light of the fact that [t]he [Forest Service] acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, abusing its discretion, when it did not provide [him] with due process prior to permanently canceling 25 percent of his grazing permit. Aplt. Op. Br. at 39. McKeen argues that [w]hat the district court did not acknowledge... was that after each of the[] ... allegations [of non-compliance leading up to the October 2002 permit cancellation], the [Forest Service] found that [he] was in compliance with his permit. Id. at 32. And thus, that it is incongruent to find that any earlier alleged violationswhich were obviously cured, as [he] was later found in complianceprovided notice sufficient to justify a 25% cut of [his] permit. Id. at 33. As previously noted, however, the Glenwood District Ranger and McKeen agreed to a new term grazing permit in February of 2004. Thus, the declaratory relief which McKeen seeks relates only to a now superseded permit. Concerned that these circumstances may preclude us from granting McKeen any effective relief, we ordered McKeen to show cause why we should not dismiss this issue as moot. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 587 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir.2009) ([W]e offer opinions only when doing so `will have some effect in the real world.' (quoting 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.1, at 751 (3d ed. 2008))). We consider mootness as a threshold issue because Article III delimits the jurisdiction of federal courts, allowing us to consider only actual cases or controversies. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). [T]he crucial question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When it becomes impossible for a court to grant effective relief, a live controversy ceases to exist, and the case becomes moot. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). McKeen argues that his request for declaratory relief from the Glenwood District Ranger's cancellation of his previously permitted numbers is not moot because he contends that if we determine that the October 8, 2002 action was unlawful, we have accordingly determined that the basis for the 2004 permit is unlawful, and that as a result, the Forest Service would be required to create a new term permit which was not based on the unlawful cut in permitted numbers. See Aplt. Resp. to Show Cause at 9-10. We disagree. Simply put, because McKeen has not administratively appealed the terms of the permit to which he agreed in February of 2004, he is precluded from seeking judicial review of said terms or of the Forest Service's basis for imposing them. See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 579 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir.2009) rh'g en banc granted on other grounds, 597 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir.2010) (Claims not properly raised before an agency are waived .... (quotation and citation omitted)); see also 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) (requiring administrative exhaustion before a plaintiff may file suit against the Secretary of Agriculture, the Department of Agriculture, or any agency, office, officer, or employee of the Department); cf. 36 C.F.R. § 251.101 (It is the position of the Department of Agriculture that any filing for Federal judicial review of and relief from [an administrative] decision ... is premature and inappropriate, unless the appellant has first sought to resolve the dispute by invoking and exhausting the [administrative appeals] procedures....). McKeen contends that even if we are precluded from setting aside the permit to which he agreed in February of 2004, his claim is nonetheless justiciable because it fits into the mootness exception for issues which are capable of repetition, yet evading review. This exception preserves the justiciability of an issue where: (1) the duration of the challenged conduct is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. See Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.2005) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. To begin, we disagree with McKeen's suggestion that if his case is moot, the path will be cleared for a District Ranger to simply issue a new term grazing permit any time actions related to an older permit [are] challenged. See Aplt. Resp. to Show Cause at 12. A District Ranger cannot issue a superseding grazing permit at any time he or she sees fit. Rather, the Forest Service may only propose a superseding permit to an existing permittee and request the permittee's acquiescence. If the permittee is unwilling to acquiesce, the Forest Service must wait and propose a new permit when the existing permit expires, or must revoke the existing permit in accordance with its statutory and regulatory powers, such as the powers detailed in of 36 C.F.R. § 222.4. [9] Thus, McKeen's ability to seek meaningful judicial review of the cancellation of his previously permitted numbers was not unilaterally foreclosed by the issuance of a new permit in February of 2004. Rather, McKeen acquiesced in the cancellation, even if under protest. Moreover, in order for McKeen's alleged injury to be truly capable of repetition, yet evading review, he must demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the Forest Service will, in the future, take an action which relates to his permit so close in time to the expiration of that permit that he will be precluded from seeking effective judicial review. He has failed to do so. Indeed, in light of the fact that McKeen seems to misunderstand the limitations on a District Ranger's ability to issue a superseding permit, see Aplt. Resp. to Show Cause at 13 (It is not unreasonable to believe that [the Forest Service] could take action against a term grazing permit and then immediately issue a new term grazing permit which relied upon the administrative action. (emphasis added)), he has made no credible suggestion that the Forest Service is likely to subject him to similar actions in the future. In sum, we have no power to set aside the term grazing permit McKeen and the Glenwood District Ranger agreed to in February of 2004 and thus, any declaration regarding the cancellation of McKeen's prior permitted numbers would be of no effect in the real world. Thus, this issue is moot. [10] See Wyoming, 587 F.3d at 1250; see also Wallace v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 169 Fed.Appx. 521, 523-24 (10th Cir.2006) (concluding that a plaintiff's challenge to a BLM decision which affected an expired BLM grazing permit was moot). Further, McKeen's claim does not fit into the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment with respect to this issue and remand with instructions to dismiss the issue as moot. See Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir.2009) (When a case becomes moot on appeal, the ordinary course is to vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to dismiss.).