Opinion ID: 3159270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strict Liability Cause of Action

Text: Trinity and Matrix argue that the court of appeals erred in holding that Lawing was a user of the sodium bromate, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the strict liability claim, which was based on the trial court's finding that Lawing was not considered a user under section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code. Moreover, Trinity and Matrix argue that the court of appeals set forth a far too expansive definition of user for purposes of a strict liability analysis under South Carolina law. a. Standard of Review When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as that used by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Turner, 392 S.C. at 766, 708 S.E.2d at 769. Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this Court reviews questions of law de novo. Perry v. Bullock, 409 S.C. 137, 140, 761 S.E.2d 251, 252–53 (2014) (citation omitted). b. Section 15-73-10 Section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code provides that [o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer . . . . S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-10 (2005) (emphasis added).12 This section imposes strict liability upon the manufacturer and seller of a product for an injury to any user or consumer if the product reaches the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. Id.; Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 457, 450 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1994). 12 This provision, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1974, codified, nearly verbatim, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 331 S.C. 540, 545, 503 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1998). Section 15-73-10 does not define user. Instead, the General Assembly expressly adopted the comments to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second)—which discuss the meaning of user—as the expression of legislative intent for that section. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-30 (2005) (Comments to [section] 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, are incorporated herein by reference as the legislative intent of this chapter.). Comment l to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second), titled User or consumer, provides in pertinent part: In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not necessary that the ultimate user or consumer have acquired the product directly from the seller, although the rule applies equally if he does so. He may have acquired it through one or more intermediate dealers. It is not even necessary that the consumer have purchased the product at all. He may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser. The liability stated is one in tort, and does not require any contractual relation, or privity of contract, between the plaintiff and the defendant. ··· “User” includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as well as those who are utilizing it for the purpose of doing work upon it, as in the case of an employee of the ultimate buyer who is making repairs upon the automobile which he has purchased. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. l (1965) (emphasis added). Comment o, however, explains that in comment l, the American Law Institute (ALI) did not intend to express either approval or disapproval of expanding section 402A to allow recovery to those other than users or consumers. Comment o provides, in pertinent part: Thus far the courts, in applying the rule stated in this Section, have not gone beyond allowing recovery to users and consumers, as those terms are defined in Comment l. Casual bystanders, and others who may come in contact with the product, as in the case of employees of the retailer, or a passer-by injured by an exploding bottle, or a pedestrian hit by an automobile, have been denied recovery. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. o (emphasis added). We have not yet applied the comments to section 402A to determine whether a plaintiff should be considered a user under section 15-73-10. In fact, there has been only one occasion on which we have addressed the interpretation of the term user under section 15-73-10 for purposes of a strict liability claim. See Bray v. Marathon Corp., 356 S.C. 111, 116, 588 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2003). In Bray, we found that an employee who suffered an emotional injury after watching a coworker being crushed by a trash compactor was a user of the trash compactor for purposes of section 15-73-10 because she was operating the controls of the defective trash compactor at the time of the accident. 356 S.C. at 116, 588 S.E.2d at 95. Further, in line with comment o, we provided that a bystander analysis does not apply to a strict liability cause of action, stating that a user of a defective product is not a mere bystander but a primary and direct victim of the product defect. Id. at 117, 588 S.E.2d at 95. The Lawings argue that Lawing was precisely the type of user for whom any warnings on the sodium bromate should have been intended, and therefore, the comments to section 402A support reversal of the trial court's decision on this issue. We agree. As an expert at trial testified, a product's labeling is considered part of the product's package. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. h (No reason is apparent for distinguishing between the product itself and the container in which it is supplied; and the two are purchased by the user or consumer as an integrated whole.). The very purpose of warnings issued through labels on products is to provide information to people about hazards and safety information they do not know about so they may avoid the product altogether or avoid the danger by careful use. David G. Owen, Products Liability Law 621 (2d ed. 2008). Indeed, labels and other aspects of packaging are typically a user's first line of defense in assessing a product's danger, and oftentimes, the only indication that a product is a highly flammable or otherwise dangerous product. The fact that Lawing noticed the pallets of sodium bromate within the work area on the day of the fire—but failed to request their removal because he did not see a label indicating their dangerous nature—is crucial for purposes of determining whether he should be considered a user of the sodium bromate. According to Lawing's testimony, he used the sodium bromate's labeling—or the lack thereof—to evaluate the safety of the product the day of the fire. Therefore, we find that Lawing's actions fall under comment l because Lawing used the information on the sodium bromate's packaging to complete work in close proximity to the pallets of sodium bromate, and to assess the need to avoid or move the nearby sodium bromate, regardless of the fact that he did not actually handle the sodium bromate. Similar to the court of appeals, we find that Lawing was not a casual bystander with regard to the sodium bromate. See Lawing, 406 S.C. at 34, 749 S.E.2d at 137. On the day of the fire, there was the potential for Lawing to interact with the sodium bromate while completing his work in the refinery hall, especially after Engelhard employees failed to move the sodium bromate from the work area before the maintenance began. As the court of appeals stated, the examples set out in comment o illustrate that the [ALI] intended that the people to be excluded from the definition of 'user' and 'consumer' are much farther removed from the product than Lawing and his co-workers were from the sodium bromate. Id. c. Court of Appeals' Definition of User Although the court of appeals properly found that Lawing should be considered a user under section 15-73-10, we agree with Trinity and Matrix's contention that the court of appeals set forth far too broad a definition of user for purposes of a strict liability analysis in South Carolina. After citing the comments to section 402A discussing the definition of user, the court of appeals stated: Considering the comments together, we believe the legislature intended that the term “user” include persons who could foreseeably come into contact with the dangerous nature of a product. Thus, a person who examines a product for warnings and other safety information is one whom the seller intends will use that information to avoid the dangers associated with the product, and thus is a person who foreseeably could come into contact with its dangerous nature. Lawing, 406 S.C at 34–35, 749 S.E.2d at 137 (emphasis added). As evident from our application to Lawing in this case, we would not restrict the term user to plaintiffs who are injured while handling or operating the dangerous product. However, the court of appeals' expansive definition including as a user all persons who could foreseeably come into contact with the dangerous nature of a product could be interpreted as to allow a bystander employee to recover under section 15-73-10. As discussed, supra, Bray clearly prohibits bystander recovery for purposes of strict liability. See Bray, 356 S.C. at 117, 588 S.E.2d at 95. Furthermore, including a foreseeability analysis in a determination of whether a plaintiff constitutes a user under section 15-73-10 is improper. See Bray, 356 S.C. at 117, 588 S.E.2d at 96 (Because [section] 15-73­ 10 limits liability to the user or consumer, there is no need for a limitation on foreseeable victims to avoid disproportionate liability as was found necessary in the bystander setting.). A case-by-case analysis is more appropriate for courts' determination of who constitutes a user under section 15-73-10. Therefore, we hold that the court of appeals erred in setting forth its broad definition of user, and affirm as modified the court of appeals' decision on this issue.