Opinion ID: 467627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exhaustion of Remedies Within the Military

Text: 36 The general rule requires that, before seeking to collaterally attack his court martial conviction in the civilian courts, Williams must have exhausted all remedies available to him within the military. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 1313, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975) 7 ; Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32, 71 S.Ct. 149, 151-52, 95 L.Ed. 146 (1950); see also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 29 n. 6, 96 S.Ct. 1281, 1285 n. 6, 47 L.Ed.2d 556 (1976). That is true whether Williams alleges violation of the Constitution, statutes, or military regulations. 8 37 The exhaustion doctrine is fully applicable in this case. Williams had two avenues for appealing his conviction by special court-martial. The first was through appeal to the Judge Advocate General under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 869(b) (1982 & Supp.1985): 38 (b) The findings or sentence, or both, in a court-martial case not reviewed under subsection (a) [general court-martial] or under section 866 of this title (article 66) [Review by Court of Military Review] may be modified or set aside, in whole or in part, by the Judge Advocate General on the ground of newly discovered evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdiction over the accused or the offence, error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or the appropriateness of the sentence.... 39 The second avenue for review within the military was through the Board for Correction of Naval Records, which had the power to recommend to the Secretary of the Navy action necessary to correct errors in records--including an expunging from the records, reinstatement, and back pay. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552 (1982); 32 C.F.R. Sec. 723 (1984). See Baxter v. Claytor, 652 F.2d 181, 184-85 (D.C.Cir.1981); Knehans v. Alexander, 566 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S.Ct. 1646, 56 L.Ed.2d 83 (1978). 9 As above indicated, Williams availed himself of no service-provided remedy. 40 The district court believed it had jurisdiction to review Williams' court-martial on the basis of Downen v. Warner, 481 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.1973). In Downen, which did not involve a court martial, the district court had dismissed a suit (filed under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(a)(2) and 1346(d)) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit reversed, crafting a narrow exception for cases where resolving a claim founded solely upon a constitutional right is singularly suited to a judicial forum and clearly inappropriate to an administrative board. 481 F.2d at 643. The court observed that, at least in Downen's case, there was no need to facilitate the development of a full factual record, or to encourage the exercise of administrative expertise and discretion, and to promote judicial and administrative efficiency. Id. Assignment of exclusive appellate jurisdiction to this court, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1295(a)(2), renders it unnecessary to discuss whatever may have been the appropriateness of the Ninth Circuit's approach in Downen. 41 We reject the district court's conclusory statement that Williams' pursuit of remedies within the military would be an exercise in futility as a basis for disregarding the exhaustion requirement. To the contrary: encouraging premature rushes to the federal courthouse renders futile Congress' statutory provision of remedies within the military. To arrive at the prediction that pursuit of a remedy elsewhere would be useless, a court must in effect hear the case, thus often strangling the exhaustion requirement at the outset. Beyond the purely conjectural context of many futility predictions, they tend to defeat the very purpose of the requirement, which is to give the military decision-maker a chance to determine whether a complainant's pursuit in that particular case may be meritorious and, if not, a chance to say why. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 756, 95 S.Ct. at 1312. The district court's felt need to review the Navy's policy and regulation, if otherwise appropriate, is simply premature. The concern underlying the exhaustion requirement is not whether a federal court may review the constitutionality of a military policy or regulation, but when it may do so. 42 No court martial proceedings had occurred in any of the cases relied on by the district court. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the argument for judicial intervention in those cases, it can bear no relation to cases in which remedies are available from a fully empowered body. The rationale for judicial intervention in Glines v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.1978), was rejected by the Supreme Court in reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 100 S.Ct. 594, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980). In Baxter v. Claytor, 652 F.2d 181 (D.C.Cir.1981), the court effectively enforced the exhaustion requirement, ordering the Board for Correction of Military Records to receive and consider the petition Baxter had presented to the Board. Id. at 186. 10 43 Congress having provided the extensive and elaborate system designed to achieve justice within the military, no warrant appears for judicial end-running of that system. See Rosen, Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial, 108 Mil.L.Rev. 5, 85 (1985). If the rush to the federal courthouse and bypassing the congressionally created system attempted here by Williams were permissable, Congress would be well advised to dismantle the military justice system as no longer required. 11 44 At trial, Williams' co-plaintiffs presented extensive expert testimony alleging unreliability of their urinalysis tests (testimony on which Williams seeks to rely). Insofar as that testimony relates to the facts of this case, or to Williams' allegations respecting substantive due process, it could, and should, have been developed first for review within the military. 12 Moreover, Williams' suit challenges Navy's construction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Military Rules of Evidence, matters peculiarly within the purview of the military courts. See, e.g., Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695-96, 89 S.Ct. 1876, 1883, 23 L.Ed.2d 631 (1969); Artis v. United States, 506 F.2d 1387, 1389-90, 205 Ct.Cl. 732 (1974). 45 As the Supreme Court has often reminded us, sound policy underlies the deference granted military decisions by the Federal courts. [J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93, 73 S.Ct. 534, 540, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953). The composition of the armed services is a matter within the discretion of the military. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 2445, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). The power to regulate and discipline the armed forces is constitutionally committed to the Legislative Branch by explicit grant of plenary power. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2366, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 14, provides that Congress shall have Power ... to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. The Congress is further granted the power to make all laws necessary and proper to exercise its power over the land and naval forces. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 18; see Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1858). As the Supreme Court has recently stated: 46 [I]t is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch has plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the military establishment, including regulations, procedures and remedies related to military discipline. 47 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2366, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). 48 Thus, perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981). Congress, along with the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief, has exercised that constitutional prerogative. Congress established and the President approved the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. Secs. 801 et seq. (1982 & Supp. I 1983). Congress created and the President appointed Article I military courts which are not subordinate to the federal courts, but operate under their own procedures and rules of evidence. See generally Everett, Some Observations on Appellate Review of Court-Martial Convictions--Past, Present, and Future, 31 Fed.B. News and J. 420 (1984). Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal establishment. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953). 49 Maintenance of discipline and order is of paramount concern to the military in discharging its duty to defend the United States. So vital is that concern that members of the armed forces do not enjoy the full panoply of procedural entitlements afforded citizens in civilian courts, many of which procedural entitlements are inappropriate to the military. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-01, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2365-66, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). 13 As the Supreme Court has observed, Courts-Martial are not independent instruments of justice, but remain[ ] to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969). However: 50 [I]mplicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the Code [of Military Justice] is the view that the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will perform its assigned task. We think this congressional judgment must be respected and that it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights. 51 Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313. 52 Because of the military's overriding interest in maintaining order within its own house, federal courts have properly avoided intervention and interference with respect to disciplinary actions taken by commanders or by military courts. See, e.g., Chappell, supra, 462 U.S. at 301-02, 103 S.Ct. at 2365-66; see also Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313; Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 91 S.Ct. 649, 28 L.Ed.2d 102 (1971); Dynes, supra, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 15 L.Ed. 838. The Supreme Court has stressed that [c]ivilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers. Chappell, supra, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365. One reason for that hesitancy is the fear that civilian courts will have less than complete interest, concern, and capacity for all the cases that vindicate the military's disciplinary authority within its own community. Relford, supra, 401 U.S. at 368, 91 S.Ct. at 657. The period of hesitancy stressed by the Supreme Court is at least as long as that required for the exhaustion of remedies provided within the military services. Appropriate District Court Action 53 The district court should not have dismissed Williams' complaint on the merits, but at the outset should have granted the Government's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust remedies available to him within the military. See Artis v. United States, 506 F.2d 1387, 1391, 205 Ct.Cl. 732 (1974). 14 Alternatively, the court could have stayed proceedings pending exhaustion of remedies within the military, cf. Halifax Engineering, Inc. v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 915, 917 (1979); Pine v. United States, 371 F.2d 466, 178 Ct.Cl. 146 (1967), or it could have entered a procedural order dismissing the case without prejudice to either party moving to restore it to the docket. We remand the case with instructions to vacate the judgment and to take further appropriate action consistent with this opinion. 15 54 REMANDED.