Opinion ID: 1124484
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The sufficiency of simple negligence

Text: Outside of these strict liability exceptions, though, a separate showing of simple civil negligence is both necessary and sufficient under Alaska's Constitution. Negligence, rather than gross negligence, is the minimum, not because we believe it is the necessary element of every prosecutor's case; indeed, all courts have allowed a separate showing of mental culpability to be dispensed with altogether in some circumstances. Rather, the negligence standard is constitutionally permissible because it approximates what the due process guarantee aims at: an assurance that criminal penalties will be imposed only when the conduct at issue is something society can reasonably expect to deter. [17] Partisans of the criminal negligence approach have expressed the concern that an ordinary negligence standard gives the criminal proceeding an unseemly resemblance to tort law. Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212, 224 (1985), aff'd, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575 (1987), which adopts criminal negligence as a minimum, notes that the civil law standard serves purposes unsuited to the harshness of criminal punishment. Tort aims simply to shift the economic costs of injuries onto those responsible for them. [18] Id. This desire to differentiate criminal proceedings from civil proceedings appears to drive the definition of criminal negligence. That standard is typically characterized as something more than ordinary negligence. See Andrews v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 26 Crim.App. Rep. 34 (1937) (similar lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough) (Lord Atkin). Thus the only consensus and precision available in the definition of criminal negligence is that it is not civil negligence. [19] This fear of tort standards is unfounded. In response to similar allegations that civil standards do not protect, the Michigan Supreme Court has noted that [i]t is just as much a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution to take property as it is to take the liberty of a person. People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W. 723 (1930). In other words, the same constitutional clause which governs the criminal prosecution would also govern a civil proceeding, and it is undisputed that due process is satisfied by the negligence standard in that forum. We are not persuaded that the simple or ordinary civil negligence standard is inadequate to protect Hazelwood's interests. We conclude that the Superior Court's adoption of an ordinary civil negligence mens rea standard in its instructions to the jury did not constitute a denial of due process under article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution.