Opinion ID: 2607111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mother's revocation of consents and participation as a party

Text: The tribe opposed the mother's appearance in the case, arguing her legal rights were terminated by an order of June 1990 after she voluntarily consented to termination of her parental rights. The trial court analyzed four separate consents (two consents to terminate parental rights, and two consents to adoption), and concluded the consents to termination and to adoption were invalid. Alternatively, the trial court held that if valid, the mother had the right to withdraw or rescind her consents, and therefore, was a proper party to the proceedings. We need not address the parties' contentions respecting each consent to resolve whether the mother had standing to participate below. We hold that none of the consents to terminate parental rights complied with ICWA's statutory formalities, and that the order of June 1990 terminating the mother's parental rights is invalid. Because the mother's parental rights were not terminated, we conclude she had standing to participate in these proceedings. Both Idaho law and ICWA contain statutes stating the formalities required for a voluntary termination of parental rights. See I.C. § 16-2005; 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). In such situations, ICWA requires a court to apply the state or federal law provision which provides a higher standard of protection to a parent's rights. 25 U.S.C. § 1921; see Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (App.1981). We hold that 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) applies here, because it offers greater protection to parents of Indian children. Unlike the state law counterpart, the federal statute requires judicial certification that the terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained: Where any parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents ... to termination of parental rights, such consent shall not be valid unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and were fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian.... 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (emphasis added). None of the mother's consents to termination of parental rights contain the required judicial certification. Even the June 14, 1990 consent to termination, which the trial court stated adhered to statutory formalities (under state law), was invalid under 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) for lack of the judge's certificate that the terms and consequences of the consent to terminate were fully explained. The trial court also ruled that the termination order of June 18, 1990 was invalid because it was conditional and did not divest the mother of all legal rights. We agree. Under I.C. § 16-2011, an order terminating the parent and child relationship shall divest the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obligations, including rights of inheritance, with respect to each other. The June 1990 termination order was conditional; it terminated the mother's parental rights only in favor of the adoptive parents. Because the mother's parental rights were never terminated, it follows that she was a proper party to the proceedings below. Accordingly, we need not further analyze whether the consents to adoption were valid. The trial court held alternatively that if the consents to adoption were valid, the mother could revoke them under 25 U.S.C. § 1916(a). Having concluded that the mother had standing irrespective of the consents to adoption, we need not reach the revocation issue.