Opinion ID: 789130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Injury to a concrete, particularized interest

Text: 24 Appellants present a variety of alleged injuries as a result of the Secretary's selection of committee members. Appellants argue that the individual plaintiff, parent Rachelle Lindsey, has suffered three injuries as a result of the Secretary's selection of committee members: First, she was deprived of her procedural right to help shape the final rules. Brief for Appellants at 16. Second, the final rules increased the risk that her children will be denied the benefit of the best-possible education and those rules were caused by the committee selection. Id. at 17. Third, the final rules fail to require States to provide for public participation in the creation of standards and measures under the Act, and those final rules were caused by the committee selection. Id. 25 Appellants also argue that the organizational plaintiffs have suffered four injuries as a result of the Secretary's selection of committee members: First, the Secretary's apportionment of committee seats among representatives of various interests reduced their chances of serving on the committee. Id. at 16. Second, the selection excluded parent and student advocacy organizations from consideration. Id. Third, the final rules forced them to address advocacy issues on an expensive State-by-State basis. Id. at 17. Fourth, the final rules failed to require States to provide for public participation. Id. 26 Taken together, Appellants allege four basic categories of injuries: 27 (1) Injuries to Plaintiff Lindsey caused by the final rules, following selection of the committee members; 28 (2) Injuries to Plaintiff Lindsey caused by the Secretary's abridgment of her procedural rights in the selection of committee members; 29 (3) Injuries to Plaintiff Organizations caused by the final rules, following selection of the committee members; and 30 (4) Injuries to Plaintiff Organizations caused by the Secretary's abridgment of their procedural rights in the selection of committee members. 31 To organize Appellants' alleged injuries in this fashion reveals what Appellants' muddled brief obfuscates: Appellants allege two classes of injury under a Procedural Rights theory of standing. Appellants allege injuries to Appellants' procedural rights per se, and they allege injuries to their particularized interests caused by the final rules. We consider these classes of injuries in turn. 1
32 Appellants first allege that they suffered injury, as a result of the Secretary's failure to abide by the procedures prescribed by the Act, to their interest in the government's protection of their procedural rights. 33 As this Court sitting en banc described at length in Florida Audubon Society, a procedural-rights plaintiff must demonstrate standing by show[ing] not only that the defendant's acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that it is substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the essential injury to the plaintiff's own interest. 94 F.3d at 664-65. In other words, while we relax the imminence and redressability requirements, the procedural-rights plaintiff must still satisfy the general requirements of the constitutional standards of particularized injury and causation. See id. at 664. Although Appellants rely heavily on footnote 7 of Lujan in arguing procedural standing in this case, even in that case the Court required a showing that concrete interests had been invaded. 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 34 Assuming arguendo that a procedural right designed to protect a concrete interest of the Appellants has been violated here, Appellants fail to demonstrate how they suffer actual injury to a concrete, particularized interest, caused by the challenged conduct. The chain of causation between the alleged procedural violation and the concrete interest is speculative at best. See infra pages 1160-61. Unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the judicial power. Physicians' Ed. Network v. Dep't of H.E.W., 653 F.2d 621, 627 (D.C.Cir.1981) (district court's opinion expressly adopted en toto by Court) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 44, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1927, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). 35 But even more importantly, Appellants appear to misunderstand the difference between the procedural right and the concrete interest in a procedural-rights case. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 23 (The Department's denial of this right constitutes sufficient injury to support standing.). The two things are not one and the same. Appellants must show both (1) that their procedural right has been violated, and (2) that the violation of that right has resulted in an invasion of their concrete and particularized interest. [A] prospective plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant caused the particularized injury, and not just the alleged procedural violation. Fla. Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 664 (emphasis added). In Lujan the Supreme Court disclaimed Appellants' conflation of concrete interest and procedural right in unambiguous language: If we understand this [argument] correctly, it means that the Government's violation of a certain ... class of procedural duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself, without any showing that the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his interest in having the procedure observed). We cannot agree. 36 504 U.S. at 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 2143 n. 8. Appellants must allege injury beyond mere procedural misstep per se to satisfy standing in a procedural-rights case, and they fail to do so here. 37 In sum, we hold that Appellants have failed to show that the alleged procedural violation caused actual injury to Appellants' concrete interests such that they satisfy Article III's requirement of standing. Fla. Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 664.
38 Appellants allege injury not only to their procedural interest, but also to their interests in education, lobbying, and other interests apart from procedural rights per se. Even assuming arguendo that their purported interests do constitute particularized, concrete interests sufficient to satisfy Lujan, see 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136, Appellants fail to demonstrate the necessary causal connection between the challenged agency action-here, the promulgation of final rules — and the alleged injury. 39 To demonstrate standing, Appellants must show a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be `fairly ... trace [able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42, 96 S.Ct. at 1926). 40 To show causation and redressability in their procedural-rights case, Appellants need not demonstrate that, but for the procedural defect, the final outcome of the rulemaking process would have been different, and that this Court's ordering the action to remedy the procedural defect will alter the final effect on Appellants' interests. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. at 2142 n. 7. In short, this Court assumes the causal relationship between the procedural defect and the final agency action. Nonetheless, Appellants must still demonstrate a causal relationship between the final agency action and the alleged injuries. 2 41 In the case of Lindsey, the agency action and the alleged injury stand at opposite ends of a long chain: (1) DOE promulgated final rules giving discretion to the States to implement their own rules for the education of children in the State; (2) the State of Illinois, in its discretion, implemented rules that were permitted but not required by DOE; (3) those rules increased the risk of improper evaluation of students and schools; (4) Lindsey's daughter's school might be improperly classified as a result (though it presently receives federal funding under the NCLBA); (5) Lindsey's daughter might thereby be harmed by improper classification. 42 Having outlined the alleged causal chain, we conclude that the connection between the beginning and end of the purported chain remains so attenuated that we cannot hold the alleged injury to be fairly traceable to the final agency rules and not the result of the independent action of the State of Illinois. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Where the necessary elements of causation and redressability... hinge on the independent choices of the regulated third party, i.e. the States, it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 366 F.3d at 938 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. at 2137) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants fall far short of carrying their burden. 43 Moreover, the Court is not convinced that the alleged injury to Lindsey is concrete and particularized. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Appellants allege direct injury styled as increased risk, in the form of giving the States the opportunity to injure Appellants' interests. This so-called injury is insufficient for standing. 44 Outside of increased exposure to environmental harms, hypothesized increased risk has never been deemed sufficient injury. 3 And even if risk were sufficient injury for standing in the non-environmental context, Lindsey would have to show that the challenged conduct has created a  demonstrably increased risk that actually threatens the plaintiff's particular interests. Fla. Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 667 (emphasis added). Here, Lindsey has hypothesized that the final agency rules have increased the risk to her interests, but she has offered this Court no actual demonstration of increased risk. 45 Indeed, were all purely speculative increased risks deemed injurious, the entire requirement of actual or imminent injury would be rendered moot, because all hypothesized, non-imminent injuries could be dressed up as increased risk of future injury. 46 With respect to the organizational plaintiffs, the causal chain between the challenged rules and the alleged injury is not so attenuated: The organizations allege that the Federal rules force them to change their lobbying strategies, a more costly form of lobbying. But while their causal chain may be more traceable than Lindsey's, it fails to bind the challenged conduct to actual injury. This Court has not found standing when the only injury arises from the effect of the regulations on the organizations' lobbying activities (as opposed to the effect on non-lobbying activities): [C]onflict between a defendant's conduct and an organization's mission is alone insufficient to establish Article III standing. Frustration of an organization's objectives is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing. Nat'l Treas. Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1429 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 47 The case before us is easily distinguished from Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). There, the Court held that an organization dedicated to promoting equal-access to housing had standing to challenge defendants' practice of steering prospective tenants away, because defendants' practice perceptibly impaired HOME's ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income home-seekers.... Id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124. Here, the only service impaired is pure issue-advocacy-the very type of activity distinguished by Havens. See id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124 (distinguishing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). 4 48 In sum, Appellants fail to demonstrate standing arising from the effect of the final rules, with respect to either the individual or organizational plaintiffs.