Opinion ID: 1584306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Count III: Plea Bargains Requiring Charitable Contributions.

Text: In several of the cases in which Borth agreed to reduce a traffic citation to a cowl-lamp violation, the negotiated plea bargain included a requirement that the defendant make a charitable contribution to a designated entity. In three cases, the defendants were required to contribute to the Clay County Canine Fund; in another case, a contribution was made to the Clay County DARE Program. In a fifth case, the defendant was ordered to make contributions to the canine fund and to the Clay County Crime Stoppers. Iowa law allows courts to include charitable donations in a defendant's sentence under specified circumstances. Iowa Code section 907.13 permits a court to establish as a condition of probation that the defendant perform unpaid community service for a time not to exceed the maximum period of confinement for the offense of which the defendant is convicted. Iowa Code § 907.13(1). If the court imposes such a condition, the defendant, in cooperation with his probation officer and the department of correctional services, must prepare a plan to implement the community service condition. Id. This plan is submitted to the court for approval or modification. Id. § 907.13(2). One modification option available to the court is to allow the defendant to satisfy some or all of the community service obligation through the donation of property to a charitable organization other than a governmental subdivision. Id. The charitable contributions negotiated by Borth in the cases described above were not authorized by section 907.13, as he forthrightly admitted at the hearing. The defendants in these cases were not placed on probation and were not ordered to complete community service. Even if these prerequisites had been met, section 907.13 only permits the court to order contributions to nongovernmental entities. Both the Clay County Canine Fund and the Clay County DARE Program were accounts of the Clay County sheriff, a governmental entity. The Board alleged the charitable contribution required by the respondent in these cases constituted an illegal sentence. It claims Borth's negotiation of illegal sentences violated DR 1-102(A)(5), which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct 32:8.4(d) (stating it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). The Commission determined there was no statutory authority for the respondent's demand that the defendants in the cited prosecutions agree to make a charitable contribution as part of their negotiated sentences. Notwithstanding this determination, the Commission concluded the Board had failed to prove the contribution requirements injured the administration or efficiency of the judicial system. Borth contends on appeal that the Commission correctly concluded he did not act unethically in negotiating the plea bargains in question. While he acknowledges the plea agreements were not authorized by section 907.13(2), he claims that defect does not equate to an ethical infraction because he had no wrongful intent and believed at the time that the plea agreements were appropriate dispositions of the criminal charges. We first reject the argument that the Board must show the respondent knew his conduct constituted a violation of the ethics rules or that the respondent acted with an improper purpose or motive. Neither intent, knowledge, nor wrongful motive is required to establish a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5). Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 2007 WL 490915, 728 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2007) (holding attorney's good-faith belief that her conduct did not violate conflict-of-interest rule contained in DR 9-101(B) was not a defense); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 603 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Iowa 1999) (stating it was not necessary to show that the lawyer acted with bad or fraudulent intent in order to establish lawyer violated DR 5-104(A) by soliciting loan from former client); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 1998) (concluding respondent committed an ethical violation by misappropriating client's funds even though the misappropriation was not intentional given the uncertainty at the time about whether such fees were subject to trust account requirements); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Davidson, 398 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Iowa 1987) (concluding attorney committed an ethical violation despite the attorney's apparent lack of culpability where office staff error resulted in commingling of client funds for two years). In rejecting a similar defense many years ago, this court said: If all individuals are presumed to know the law and cannot use ignorance as a defense, respondent, a trained professional with the basic skills and tools to acquaint himself with the legal significance of the facts, cannot insulate himself from censure simply by claiming ignorance. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Zimmerman, 354 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Iowa 1984). Similarly, here, Borth's unawareness that the charitable contributions he negotiated were not authorized by law is not a defense to the Board's charges. We now turn to the Commission's determination that Borth's conduct was not unethical. In explaining its conclusion, the Commission observed: There is evidence in the record that this type of sentence was agreed to by other prosecutors in other counties, many with more years of experience than Mr. Borth. None of the contributions benefited Mr. Borth personally in any way. The contributions were all approved by the court and administered through the clerk of court's office. There is no question that the funds were put to their intended purpose. There is no evidence that the contributions were applied only in cases where the defendants were wealthy. We have no disagreement with the Commission's observations, as the evidence fully supports them. We are persuaded, however, that these facts do not avoid the prejudice to the administration of justice inherent in Borth's action. [T]here is no typical form of conduct that prejudices the administration of justice. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1999). Generally, acts that have been deemed prejudicial to the administration of justice have hampered the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon which the courts rely. Id. In the present case, Borth's actions facilitated the imposition of several illegal sentences. See Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 2001) (holding an illegal sentence is one not authorized by statute). Illegal sentences are void and can be challenged at any time. See State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 2000) (An illegal sentence is void and `not subject to the usual concepts of waiver. . . .' Because an illegal sentence is void, it can be corrected at any time. (quoting State v. Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Iowa 1983))). The potential use of court time to address such challenges in the cases at issue here would divert judicial resources from other matters and thereby hamper the efficient and proper operation of the courts. See Johnson, 728 N.W.2d at 211 (holding attorney's conflict of interest that resulted in numerous challenges to her participation in pending cases and the potential for many similar challenges was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). We need not wait for such challenges to be made to conclude Borth's actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice. Accordingly, we hold Borth's illegal plea agreements violated DR 1-102(A)(5).