Opinion ID: 1867862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Policy Considerations Encircling Hodari D.

Text: ¶ 41 Justice Scalia, the author of Hodari D., gives two policy reasons in support of the Hodari D. test for seizure. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627, 111 S.Ct. 1547. First, by postponing the moment at which the protection of the exclusionary rule becomes available to an individual who flees from the police until there has been a seizure, Hodari D. encourages compliance with police orders, thereby obviating the need for police pursuits that pose risks to the public. Id. Instead of employing self-help remedies like flight, citizens should seek relief from unlawful police interference in the courts through use of the exclusionary rule and, if need be, civil rights suits. ¶ 42 Second, although Hodari D. restricts the reach of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia contends that it will have no adverse effect upon the privacy rights and liberty interests of the citizenry. See id. One purpose of the Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule is to deter illegal government activity. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶ 22, 285 Wis.2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 ( Knapp II ). Unlawful orders will not be deterred . . . by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule those [unlawful orders] that are not obeyed. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Police officers shout Stop! or Get back in that car right now, expecting to be obeyed; the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is still realized if it applies only to successful seizures resulting from these orders. Id. In short, because the majority of people confronted with a direct command will obey the command, police officers must understand that the exclusionary rule will constrain their conduct in these situations. ¶ 43 Perhaps the most powerful criticism of Hodari D. can be found in Justice Stevens' dissent. Much of the scholarly criticism of Hodari D. simply amplifies the points he makes. [14] First, Justice Stevens chastises the majority for adopting too literal a construction of the term seizure because it limits the application and protective function of the Fourth Amendment to the common law conception of arrest, which required physical contact. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 631-33, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Stevens argues that because an attempted arrest also infringes upon an individual's privacy and liberty, the Fourth Amendment should apply to unlawful attempted arrests. Id. at 631-32, 637, 111 S.Ct. 1547. ¶ 44 Second, Justice Stevens criticizes the majority decision as inconsistent with the Court's precedent in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures of oral statements obtained by electronic surveillance), and Terry (holding that the Fourth Amendment extends to investigatory stops that fall short of a common-law arrest), both of which allegedly interpreted the Fourth Amendment expansively to afford greater protection to liberty interests and privacy rights. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 633-37, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (Stevens, J., dissenting). ¶ 45 Third, Justice Stevens criticizes the majority for shifting the analysis of whether a seizure occurs from an objective analysis of how a reasonable person would interpret the police officer's conduct to the individual's reaction to that conduct. Id. at 641, 643, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Thus, police officers can create reasonable suspicion or even probable cause where there was none by coercively infringing upon the individual's right to be let alone, and waiting for an arguably suspicious reaction. [15] Id. at 645-46 & n. 18, 111 S.Ct. 1547. ¶ 46 Adding to these arguments about individual liberty, Justice Stevens maintains that the majority's decision abandons a standard that permits police officers to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 643-44, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Because of these shortcomings, Justice Stevens would reject the Hodari D. test, and instead require a court to evaluate the constitutionality of police conduct based on the conditions at the time the officer took action, when liberty is first restrained and privacy first infringed. Id. at 645, 111 S.Ct. 1547. ¶ 47 Although we recognize the strength of these critiques, we remain unconvinced that Hodari D. should be discarded. We acknowledge the potential that police officers may rely upon Hodari D. to manufacture reasonable suspicion by attempting to seize individuals in expectation that they will flee. This is not such a case. There is no indication in the record that Officer Alfredson was attempting to induce flight or other suspicious conduct. On the facts here, the concerns prompting the criticism of Hodari D. appear unwarranted. ¶ 48 We disagree that adhering to Hodari D. will leave police officers unable to determine in advance whether contemplated conduct will implicate the Fourth Amendment. Contra Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 643-44, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Hodari D. and other decisions suggest, most people will acquiesce with a police show of authority, in which case the Fourth Amendment applies and the exclusionary rule will exclude any evidence obtained in the absence of reasonable suspicion. See id. at 627, 111 S.Ct. 1547; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205, 122 S.Ct. 2105. Consequently, before initiating an investigatory stop, police officers must presume that the target of the stop will comply and the protections of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule will have full effect. ¶ 49 The exclusionary rule is the primary means by which Fourth Amendment rights are protected. Its primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Knapp II, 285 Wis.2d 86, ¶ 22, 700 N.W.2d 899. The exclusionary rule is not absolute. Id., ¶ 23. The benefits of any increased deterrence must be weighed against the substantial social costs exacted. Id., ¶ 22. The exclusionary rule applies only in contexts `where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.' Id., ¶ 23 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998)). Because a police officer cannot know in advance that a suspect will flee or not comply with a show of authority, and because a police officer must presume that people will comply with orders and thus the officer must adhere to the Fourth Amendment to prevent the exclusion of evidence, we fail to see how rejecting Hodari D. will further deter Fourth Amendment violations. The benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to situations before seizure, when a person does not comply with a police order, appear to be negligible. ¶ 50 Under Hodari D. the protection afforded by the exclusionary rule remains unless the person confronted by a show of authority chooses to abandon its protective embrace by opting for self-help flight. Under Hodari D. courts have created an incentive for people to obey police orders without creating an incentive for police to violate the Fourth Amendment. Under Hodari D. courts remain the final arbiter of whether police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, not the citizen on the street. ¶ 51 There is one additional policy consideration for following the Hodari D. test: stare decisis. Less than five years ago this court elected to follow Hodari D. Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis.2d 422, ¶¶ 30-33, 626 N.W.2d 777. Absent special justification, [16] such as a showing that our earlier adoption of Hodari D. has resulted in the widespread erosion of liberty interests, we decline to overrule Kelsey C.R. ¶ 52 Given that Young fled in response to a show of authority, Hodari D. supplies the proper analysis to evaluate when Young was seized. Applying Hodari D., we conclude Young was not seized until Alfredson physically apprehended him on the porch because Young did not submit to any show of authority prior to that moment.