Opinion ID: 780711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Attorney Work Product Doctrine

Text: 7 The attorney work product doctrine, now codified in part in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 16(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides qualified protection for materials prepared by or at the behest of counsel in anticipation of litigation or for trial. Both distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), the work product doctrine permits discovery of documents and tangible things prepared by or for counsel in anticipation of civil litigation only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials ... and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3). In the context of a pending criminal prosecution, the doctrine is even stricter, precluding discovery of documents made by a defendant's attorney or the attorney's agents except with respect to scientific or medical reports. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(2). 8 It was in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), that the Supreme Court first recognized the work product doctrine as essential to the proper functioning of our adversarial system. 9 In performing his various duties ... it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.... This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways — aptly though roughly termed... as the work product of the lawyer. Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served. 10 Id. at 510-11, 67 S.Ct. 385; see also United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir.1998) (stating that work product doctrine is intended to preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop legal theories and strategies `with an eye toward litigation,' free from unnecessary intrusion by his adversaries (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 511), 67 S.Ct. 385). Although the doctrine is most frequently asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, the Supreme Court has characterized its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system as even more vital. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160. For precisely this reason, we have entertained work product challenges to grand jury subpoenas even though neither Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) nor Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(2) strictly applies in that context. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175; In the Matter of Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated October 22, 1991, and November 1, 1991, 959 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir.1992) (hereinafter  In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Paul Weiss) ). 11 In so doing, however, we have been mindful of the fundamental maxim, recognized [f]or more than three centuries... that the public ... has a right to every man's evidence, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950) (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 64 (3d ed.1940)); accord Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-10, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), and that this right is [n]owhere ... stronger than in the context of a valid grand jury subpoena, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d at 186 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C.Cir.1982)). It is, moreover, well established that the party invoking a privilege bears the burden of establishing its applicability to the case at hand. See, e.g., United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that party invoking attorney-client privilege bears the burden of establishing all of its elements); United States v. Construction Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473-74 (2d Cir.1996) (rejecting attorney-client and work product privilege claims where party failed to establish the essential elements). The burden is a heavy one, because privileges are neither lightly created nor expansively construed. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090; see also United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d at 214 (holding that when privilege interferes with public's right to evidence, it must be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle (internal quotations omitted)). Instead, privileges are recognized only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); accord Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 9, 116 S.Ct. 1923. 12 As we previously have made plain, and as Judge Chin correctly recognized, the principle underlying the work product doctrine — sheltering the mental processes of an attorney as reflected in documents prepared for litigation — is not generally promoted by shielding from discovery materials in an attorney's possession that were prepared neither by the attorney nor his agents. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Paul Weiss), 959 F.2d at 1166-67 (rejecting work product claim with respect to telephone company records in possession of former attorneys of criminal target). Thus, the work product doctrine does not extend to documents in an attorney's possession that were prepared by a third party in the ordinary course of business and that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of any litigation anticipated by counsel. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202.