Opinion ID: 3135357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guerine, Dawdy, and the Instant Case

Text: It is clear, based on the foregoing, that the majority wishes to distance this court from the reasoning we applied in Dawdy. I cannot endorse this approach, as it erroneously suggests that Dawdy is irreconcilable with Guerine, when, in fact, Dawdy and Guerine can be applied consistently to govern the outcome of this case. The lawsuit at issue in Guerine arose from a car accident involving the individual defendant and the decedent. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 512. A boat trailer broke away from the individual defendant=s vehicle, crossed into oncoming traffic, and struck the decedent=s vehicle, killing her. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 512. The plaintiff bank, as -27- the executor of the decedent=s estate, and the decedent=s two minor sons, by their father, the decedent=s husband, filed suit in Cook County against the individual defendant for negligence and against the manufacturer of the boat trailer for product liability. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 513. The individual defendant resided in Cook County, the corporate defendant was headquartered in Mishawaka, Indiana, and the accident had occurred in De Kalb County. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 512-13, 524. The circuit court allowed the corporate defendant=s motion to transfer the action out of Cook County, and the appellate court denied the plaintiffs leave to appeal. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 513-14. In reversing the judgment of the circuit court, we held Athat a trial court abuses its discretion in granting an intrastate forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue where  the potential trial witnesses are scattered among several counties, including the plaintiff=s chosen forum, and no single county enjoys a predominant connection to the litigation.@ Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 526. The potential witnesses were Ascattered among several counties@ because they resided in Cook County, De Kalb County, Du Page County, Kane County, and Winnebago County. See Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524-25. There were various reasons why no single county enjoyed Aa predominant connection to the litigation,@ as reflected in our analysis of the relevant private and public interest factors. See Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524-25. While the accident occurred in De Kalb County, and thus gave the plaintiffs= negligence claim against the individual defendant a Alocal flavor,@ the plaintiffs= product liability claim against the corporate defendant was Aless localized.@ Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 525. Moreover, despite the accident=s occurrence in De Kalb County, Cook County clearly was more accessible to the parties. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524. The individual defendant resided there and never filed a forum non conveniens motion, and any representatives of the corporate defendant would have had to travel through Cook County on their way to either De Kalb County or Kane County, the other potential venues. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524. In addition, as we recognized in our holding, the potential witnesses were disbursed among several counties, including the county where the plaintiffs filed suit. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524-25. We distinguished Guerine in Dawdy. There we observed that, unlike in Guerine, none of the witnesses resided in the county where -28- suit was filed, and the transferee county had a predominant connection to the litigation. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 184 (AIn this case, however, none of the witnesses reside in Madison County and Macoupin County has a predominant connection to this case@). It is significant that, in addition to the fact that none of the potential witnesses resided in the county where suit was filed, on the whole they resided closer to the transferee county. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178. Furthermore, while we did not explicitly elaborate on why the transferee county had a Apredominant connection@ to the case, our reasons were implicit in our analysis of the private and public interest factors. Unlike the individual defendant in Guerine, the individual defendant in Dawdy was a resident of the transferee county. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 170, 183. In addition, unlike the mixed negligence-product liability action in Guerine, all of the plaintiff=s negligence claims in Dawdy related to the specific accident at issue, which occurred in the transferee county. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 169, 183. Moreover, the potential witnesses in Dawdy were more closely linked to the transferee county than in Guerine. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178. The grounds on which the majority distinguishes Dawdy from the instant case are unpersuasive and likely to cause confusion. First, the majority asserts that Ain Dawdy, none of the witnesses resided in the plaintiff=s chosen forum.@ Slip op. at 17. It is true that, in this case, two potential witnesses are residents of the county where suit was filed, but this distinction should make no difference in the forum non conveniens analysis. As mentioned, the fact two potential witnesses reside in St. Clair County is relatively inconsequential when considered along with the residencies of all the other potential witnesses. Here, as in Dawdy, the potential witnesses appear, on the whole, to reside closer to the transferee county than to the county where suit was filed. Second, the majority states that Ain Dawdy, the possibility of a jury view of the accident scene was a practical consideration.@ Slip op. at 17. As discussed, the possibility of a jury view of the accident scene is likewise a practical consideration in this case. Third, the majority notes that Ain Dawdy, the defendant railroad was attempting to transfer the cause to the defendant employee=s county of residence.@ Slip op. at 17. As with the majority=s statement -29- regarding the residencies of the potential witnesses, this observation ignores the broader context of the forum non conveniens analysis. The residency of a defendant is most relevant to two of the forum non conveniens factors: the interest in deciding localized controversies locally, and the convenience of the parties. As to the former factor, even though none of the individual defendants reside in the transferee county, plaintiff does, thereby offsetting the effect this distinction would have in this case on the extent of the transferee county=s local interest in the controversy. As to the convenience of the parties, the majority does not engage in a separate analysis of this factor, other than to state the obvious proposition that a defendant cannot prevail on a motion to transfer by simply asserting that the plaintiff=s chosen venue is inconvenient to the plaintiff (slip op. at 14), and to conclude that defendants failed to show they would be inconvenienced by a trial in St. Clair County (slip op. at 16). The fact of the matter is that plaintiff will suffer no inconvenience by remaining in Clinton County to litigate this case, and defendants will be equally inconvenienced by trial in Clinton County or St. Clair County. Clinton County is plaintiff=s county of residence, so even though she has indicated St. Clair County is not an inconvenient venue by filing suit there, Clinton County is similarly not inconvenient. The individual defendants reside in Macon County; Patoka, Indiana; and Hazelton, Indiana, and will have to travel comparably long distances to attend trial in either Clinton County or St. Clair County. Balancing these considerations, the convenience of the parties does not strongly favor one venue over the other. Thus, the fact that transferring this case would not, unlike in Dawdy, place it in the county of residence of one of the defendants has no bearing on this factor of the forum non conveniens analysis.