Opinion ID: 779937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Restrictions

Text: 48 The Union challenges Lincoln Center, Inc.'s policy prohibiting political speech in the Plaza both facially and as applied to Lincoln Center, Inc.'s denial of the Union's application to stage a rally in the Plaza and its refusal to permit a Union member to leaflet in the Plaza. 49 Content-based exclusions of speech in a non-public forum need only be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in relation to the forum's purpose. See N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824, 119 S.Ct. 68, 142 L.Ed.2d 53 (1998). Similarly, in a limited public forum, the government is permitted to make content-based exclusions of speech that do not fall within the category of uses to which the forum has been opened, so long as those exclusions satisfy the viewpoint-neutral and reasonableness criteria. See Bratton, 95 F.3d at 229. Thus, whether the Plaza is deemed a non-public forum or a limited public forum, the defendants' policy restricting the public's organized use of the Plaza to events having a performance, entertainment or other artistic component, though content-based, is permissible so long as it meets these constitutional criteria. 50 We conclude, as an initial matter, that the policy of limiting expressive uses in the Plaza to those that are artistic or performance-related is viewpoint neutral on its face and as applied to the Union's proposed activities, as there is no claim on appeal that Lincoln Center, Inc. discriminated against the Union based on viewpoint when it denied its application to stage a rally or prevented it from leafletting. 51 Furthermore, we conclude that Lincoln Center, Inc.'s refusal to permit political and labor-related rallies, demonstrations, and leafletting in the Plaza, and its denial of the Union's request to do the same, is reasonable. The reasonableness of the Government's restriction ... must be assessed in light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances, Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809, 105 S.Ct. 3439, and must be consistent with the [government's] legitimate interest in preserving the property for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). `Consideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved.' Lee, 505 U.S. at 687, 112 S.Ct. 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990)). Accordingly, in examining the compatibility between the prohibited speech and the particular forum, we ask whether the restrictions on speech are reasonably related to maintaining the environment that the government has deliberately created. Id. at 689, 112 S.Ct. 2711. 52 Lincoln Center, Inc.'s policy allowing only arts-related expression is consistent with the objective purpose and public use of the Plaza. The Lincoln Center complex was created as an enclave for the cultural arts. As such, Lincoln Center, Inc.'s policy as applied to the Plaza, the architectural centerpiece of the complex, reasonably furthers the City's intentions in opening this space to the public for particular uses. Indeed, permitting events of a performance-related nature serves an important public purpose in promoting the arts and establishing a community space for the public to experience artistic performances. Moreover, while the Plaza's design invites pedestrians to visit and pass through, its use by the public is also limited by the Plaza's physical location and function as a paved forecourt connecting the various arts buildings in the complex. 53 Accordingly, restricting organized public expression in the manner in which Lincoln Center, Inc. has chosen is reasonable notwithstanding the Plaza's open design. Moreover, although the defendants did not make a specific showing below with regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that rallies and picketing would cause, the fact that permitting such activities on any variety of topics would interfere with the City's mission in establishing this specialized space ring[s] of commonsense. Id. at 690, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. also Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1291 (picketing and leafletting in forecourt of performing arts complex at performance time could seriously disrupt its limited purpose as an entertainment venue). While the impact of rallies and demonstrations in the Plaza could be lessened by time, place, and manner restrictions, a government limitation on access to a limited or non-public forum need only be reasonable, not the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985); see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). 54 With regard to the Union's as-applied challenge, in May 1999, the Union requested a permit to stage a labor rally in the Plaza in support of opera concession workers whom the Union was seeking to represent. The proposed rally was to consist of approximately forty people positioned behind barricades, and was to include both picketing and leafletting. Lincoln Center, Inc. denied the Union's request, consistent with its policy disallowing political rallies and demonstrations in the Plaza, and the Union makes no claim on appeal that Lincoln Center, Inc. engaged in selective enforcement when it did so. Therefore, because the defendants' actions were consistent with its policy, which we have concluded comports with governing constitutional principles, we reject the Union's as-applied challenge to the proposed rally. 55 The Union's challenge to Lincoln Center, Inc.'s policy prohibiting leafletting in the Plaza raises a closer question, as leafletting by its nature is less disruptive than other forms of expression. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 690, 112 S.Ct. 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ([O]ne need not ponder the contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in order mechanically to take it out of someone's hand .... (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have noted on a prior occasion that [f]rom the time of the founding of our nation, the distribution of written material has been an essential weapon in the defense of liberty.... Today, ... the handbill remains important to the promise of full and free discussion of public issues. Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir.1991). In Paulsen, we struck down a ban on leafletting on the grounds of the Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum, a designated public forum, in part because distributing handbills ... is not likely ... to interfere with the mood or the quality of the Coliseum arena events. Id. at 71. In examining the compatibility between expressive activity and the Coliseum grounds, we noted that the Coliseum's premises are frequently the site of boisterous recreational activity and can comfortably accommodate a wide variety of expressive activities .... Id. at 70; see also Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89, 92 (2d Cir.) (rejecting leafletting ban in Port Authority Bus Terminal, a thoroughfare used by thousands of people each day), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 290, 21 L.Ed.2d 275 (1968); Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 703 (7th Cir.1998) (rejecting leafletting ban on outdoor sidewalks, open areas, and indoor mall of Navy Pier). 56 Similarly, in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992), the Supreme Court struck down a ban on leafletting in airport terminals. In her controlling opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that the terminals were non-public fora, but noted that in opening the airport terminals in question, the government had created a huge complex open to travelers and nontravelers alike. The airports house restaurants, cafeterias, snack bars, coffee shops, cocktail lounges, post offices, banks, [etc.]. Id. at 688, 112 S.Ct. 2711. Thus, the government had essentially opened a shopping mall as well as an airport, from which it followed that banning the distribution of leaflets was not reasonably related to maintaining the multipurpose environment that the government had created. Id. at 689, 112 S.Ct. 2711. 57 Both this Court in Paulsen and Justice O'Connor in Lee focused on the compatibility between the expressive activity in question and the objective nature of the property, together with the government's legitimate interest in restricting that activity in light of the purpose and function of the property. In applying these holdings to the present case, we note that the Plaza is far different from the boisterous grounds of Nassau Coliseum or the mall-like environment of airport terminals. Instead, the City has created a fountain plaza that serves as the centerpiece of a prominent performing arts complex, and it has sought to preserve the Plaza as an area singularly dedicated to Lincoln Center events and other artistic performances. As such, the special attributes of the Plaza distinguish it from the fora in Paulsen and Lee, and suggest that prohibiting leafletting is not an unreasonable restriction in light of the Plaza's particular and limited function and purpose. This is especially so where neighboring Damrosch and Dante Parks, and the public sidewalks surrounding Lincoln Center, provide ample alternative venues for groups such as the Union who wish to voice their views to Lincoln Center's patrons. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (finding a regulation reasonable where speakers have access to alternative channels through which they can reach their intended audience). Accordingly, we conclude that Lincoln Center, Inc.'s policy prohibiting leafletting also passes constitutional muster.