Opinion ID: 1855302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error in reinstating jurors against whom mr. humphrey attempted to exercise peremptory challenges

Text: ¶ 49. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the following criteria whereby a defendant could establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination during jury selection, based solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. [He] is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice which permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that the facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Walters v. State, 720 So.2d 856, 865 (Miss. 1998). ¶ 50. The burden then shifts to the State to come forward with a raceneutral explanation for challenging the jurors. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1296 (Miss.1994). Finally, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge. Walters at 865. We accord great deference to the trial court in determining whether the offered explanation under the unique circumstances of the case is truly a raceneutral reason. [A] trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons... will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 558 (Miss. 1995). This perspective is wholly consistent with our unflagging support of the trial court as the proper forum for resolution of factual controversies. Id. ¶ 51. During jury selection the prosecution made a Batson challenge to some of Humphrey's peremptory strikes. Humphrey asserts that the trial court was in error in requiring him to give race and gender neutral reasons for his peremptory challenges against jurors 13, 56, and 82, and that because no prima facie case of gender or race discrimination was established for his challenges, the trial court erred in requiring him to establish non-discriminatory reasons because no pattern of discrimination was established. Humphrey further asserts that as to these three jurors he did establish non-discriminatory reasons for his peremptory challenges. Humphrey is a black male. ¶ 52. The State exercised three peremptory challenges, against two white males and one white female. The defense asserted a gender discrimination claim and as a result the court instructed the State to show its reasons for the challenges, though it did not expressly find that the defense had made a prima facie case. The court found the reasons given by the State to be non-discriminatory. These actions by the trial court were not objected to by the defense and are not at issue on appeal. The defense then identified its peremptory challenges. After the defense had announced nine of its twelve challenges, the State asked the trial court to require Humphrey to defend the challenges on the basis of both gender and race. The record reveals the following circumstances surrounding this request: MR. WILLIAMS [the prosecutor]: Your Honor, inasmuch as there has been a challenge on the basis of gender and race to the State's challenges, we move the Court to do it also. THE COURT: All right. Give me the race gender neutral reason starting with ___ MR. WALKER [Humphrey's attorney]: I'll be glad to, Your Honor. ¶ 53. At this point the court heard the reasons for the challenges. The peremptory strikes exercised by Humphrey against the nine jurors prior to the State's Batson challenge were against numbers 5 (white female), 11 (white male), 13 (white female), 16 (white male), 45 (white female), 56 (white male), 73 (white male), 82 (white female), and 89 (white male). The trial court allowed six of these challenges, finding them to be gender or racially neutral. The record does not reveal that the trial court explicitly found that the State had made a prima facie case under Batsonand its progeny. However, this Court has emphasized that the question of whether the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose is a factually intensive inquiry which gives rise to a highly deferential standard of review. Henley v. State, 729 So.2d 232, 240 (Miss.1998). Nothing in the record suggests that from the facts and relevant circumstances the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in determining there was enough of a prima facie case for discrimination to permit the reverse Batson challenge against Humphrey's strikes against the nine white jurors. Once the objecting party has made a prima facie showing that peremptory strikes are being exercised on the basis of race, the burden then shifts to the party exercising the strikes to offer a race neutral reason for the challenge. Taylor v. State, 733 So.2d 251, 257 (Miss.1999). ¶ 54. The asserted reason for Humphrey's strike against juror 13 was that she failed to respond to a question asking if she believed life in prison without parole is worse than death. No other reason was offered. The trial court stated that no jurors were to be dismissed solely because of a lack of a response to a question and that, if no other reason was offered, she would be reinstated. It is worthy of note that none of the jurors responded to that particular question. This reason was not clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and there was no error in reinstating juror 13. ¶ 55. A peremptory challenge was made by Humphrey against juror 56(D-6). The reason offered for the challenge was that the juror had a slight hearing problem, and because he had knowledge of pretrial publicity about the case. The trial court noted that the juror in question had not mentioned a hearing problem during voir dire. The juror had listed a slight hearing problem on the back of his questionnaire. With regard to the pre-trial publicity the court responded that the defense was not in the position to raise issues about pre-trial publicity when the night before Humphrey's attorney had granted an interview to the local television station. This case received widespread publicity, and many of the veniremen had read newspaper articles about it. The trial court found these reasons insufficient to justify a peremptory challenge and asked the defense if it had any other reasons. No other reasons were given, and the trial court denied the challenge and reinstated the juror. These reasons were not clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and there was no error in reinstating juror 56. ¶ 56. Humphrey also made a peremptory challenge against juror 82(D-8). The stated reasons for the strike were knowledge of pretrial publicity and that he also did not respond to the question about whether life in prison without parole is worse than death. Absent any other reasons advanced by the defense for the challenge, this juror was also reinstated. Again the reasons given for reinstatement do not appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Absent any showing of clear error on the part of the trial court, or any showing that the reasons given by the trial court were against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and in light of this Court's deference to the trial court as the proper forum for resolution of factual controversies, these assignments of error are without merit.