Opinion ID: 172774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Preserve the Due Process Claim

Text: Under our jurisprudence, issues not properly raised in the trial court  including those that implicate a defendant's rights under the Constitution  are reviewed under the deferential plain error standard. See United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 744 (10th Cir.2008) (reviewing a Brady due process claim for plain error). In order to properly raise an issue in the trial court and ensure the fullest possible review on appeal, a defendant must object with specificity, drawing the trial court's attention to the precise claim advanced. The district court should not be required to guess at the defendant's potential arguments: Our precedent is clear that an objection must be `definite' enough to indicate to the district court `the precise ground' for a party's complaint.... Absent a specific objection, the district court is deprived of the opportunity to correct its action in the first instance. United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 287 (10th Cir.1977)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2881, 174 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009); see also United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir.1993) (Defendant did not raise a specific objection based on the confrontation clause at trial. Thus, we review for plain error.). In his reply brief, Robinson concedes that the issue [of disclosure of the CI's psychiatric records] may not have been squarely raised [in the trial court] under the rubric of Due Process. Aplt. Reply Br. at 2. Despite this admission, the majority asserts that Robinson did, indeed, squarely raise the due process issue in his pre-trial motion to subpoena the CI's medical records and in his post-trial motion to inspect the records. My review of these motions convinces me otherwise. Nowhere in the pre-trial motion does Robinson mention the phrase due process. The majority suggests Robinson's citation of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), should have put the district court on notice that due process concerns were at play. But Robinson cited Nixon only for the general standards governing the issuance of subpoenas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17: relevancy, admissibility, and specificity. See id. at 699-700, 94 S.Ct. 3090. And although Nixon tangentially discusses due process in the context of analyzing whether the President of the United States may assert a privilege and thereby quash a subpoena, see id. at 711-12, 94 S.Ct. 3090, this does not mean the district court was apprised of Robinson's due process claim. Merely citing a case, which may stand for many propositions of law, cannot amount to properly raising an objection with the requisite specificity to avoid plain error review on appeal. See Winder, 557 F.3d at 1136. As for the post-trial motion for inspection, there again Robinson failed to specifically apprise the district court of his due process claim. He argued that the denial of access to the records prevents counsel for Mr. Robinson from adequately arguing for a new trial. R. Vol. 1, Doc. 72 at 1. He also asserted, without explanation, that [t]o deny access to the documents is to deny the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, and his right to Due Process of Law. Id. at 2. These blanket objections are precisely the kind that lack the specificity required to preserve the precise issue ... on appeal. Winder, 557 F.3d at 1136 (quoting United States v. Bedford, 536 F.3d 1148, 1153 n. 4 (10th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1359, 173 L.Ed.2d 620 (2009)). Due process is an expansive topic, and nothing in Robinson's cursory statements suggest he was arguing for the type of relief contemplated by Ritchie. Furthermore, in Robinson's motion for a new trial, he confined his arguments to the Confrontation Clause. This shows that Robinson's general and cursory arguments in the post-trial motion for inspection  which, if granted, would purportedly have permitted him only to adequately argu[e] for a new trial, R. Vol. 1, Doc. 72 at 1  were meant to inform the more specific Confrontation Clause arguments in the motion for new trial. Thus, the post-trial motion for inspection did not specifically apprise the district court of Robinson's particular due process claim. For his part, Robinson does not suggest his pre- and post-trial motions properly raised his due process claim. Instead, he argues that two cases he submitted to the district court prior to trial, United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983), and Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.1993), placed the [district court] on notice of his due process claim. Aplt. Reply Br. at 2. These cases, however, are off the mark. Lindstrom was decided under the Confrontation Clause and Chnapkova under the relevancy standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Neither case squarely presents due process arguments or even suggests due process rights would be infringed if the court refused to provide Robinson access to the CI's psychiatric records. In sum, the record shows that Robinson's specific objections to the district court were based only on the Confrontation Clause. I would therefore review his due process claim for plain error. See United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.1998) (reviewing for plain error objections raised on different grounds in the district court); see also Redcorn, 528 F.3d at 744.