Opinion ID: 799639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: After Passage of Section 163

Text: [5] Section 163 has temporarily modified NCLB. It provides that the term “highly qualified teacher” in NCLB 5032 RENEE v. DUNCAN includes a teacher who meets the requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 200.56(a)(2)(ii). Section 163 thus provides that an alternative-route teacher who merely “demonstrates satisfactory progress toward full certification” is “highly qualified” within the meaning of NCLB. Under Section 163, § 200.56(a)(2)(ii) is consistent with NCLB and is therefore valid. That is, so long as Section 163 remains in effect, it overrules our decision in Renee II. [6] However, by its own terms, Section 163 remains in effect only through the end of the 2012-13 school year. If Congress takes no further action, the pre-Section 163 version of NCLB will again be the law. In that event, § 200.56(a)(2)(ii) will again be invalid because its definition of “highly qualified teacher” will again be inconsistent with the statutory definition.
Neither side has contended that Congress’s enactment of Section 163 has mooted the appeal. However, we have an independent obligation to ensure that a case is not moot within the meaning of Article III. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000). Article III mandates that “there be a live case or controversy” when a federal court decides a dispute. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987). A case can be moot when a challenged statute or regulation “is repealed, expires, or is amended to remove the challenged language.” Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 658 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). [7] We conclude that the passage of Section 163 does not moot this appeal. Section 163 is, by its express terms, temporary. It took effect in December 2010, on the date of enactment, and it will expire after the 2012-13 academic year. Absent further congressional action, 34 C.F.R. § 200.56(a)(2)(ii) will again conflict with NCLB’s definition RENEE v. DUNCAN 5033 of a “highly qualified teacher.” See Renee II, 623 F.3d at 796. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a temporary halt to unlawful action does not moot a claim for injunctive relief. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 & n.4 (1983) (“[T]he case is not moot, since the moratorium by its terms is not permanent. Intervening events have not irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” (citation and quotations omitted)); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141 n.17 (1972) (holding that temporary repeal of challenged statute does not moot case); see also Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). Based on these holdings, we conclude that the temporary characterization of alternative route teachers defined in § 200.56(a)(2)(ii) as “highly qualified teachers” within the meaning of NCLB does not moot the appeal.
Requirements [8] NCLB requires the Secretary to file an annual report to Congress in which the Secretary presents national and statelevel data on compliance with NCLB goals. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(5). In their complaint, Appellants ask that the Secretary be enjoined to amend the reports previously submitted to Congress, in which he characterized alternative route teachers as “highly qualified.” Appellants ask that the Secretary be enjoined from characterizing alternative route interns defined by § 200.56(a)(2)(ii) as “highly qualified teachers” in his 2005-2006 report to Congress on that academic year. Appellants also ask that the Secretary be enjoined to “notify” Congress that his 2002-2003 report relied on the unlawful definition of “highly qualified teachers” contained in § 200.56(a)(2)(ii). [9] In Guerrero v. Clinton, 157 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1998), we held that a federal court could not redress an injury based on an allegedly inadequate report that an agency is obligated to file with Congress. Id. at 1194. At issue in Guerrero was 5034 RENEE v. DUNCAN a requirement that the President “report annually” to Congress on the impact of a compact with federal territories and the State of Hawaii. Id. at 1191. We described the report as “purely informational.” Id. at 1195. We concluded, In sum, no legal consequences flow from [the] report and it has no “determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else” that in turn produced the [plaintiffs’] injury . . . . By the same token, the report is not agency action of the sort that is typically subject to judicial review. Because it triggers no legal consequences and determines no rights or obliga- tions, no check on the substance of the report is necessary. Having requested the report, Congress, not the judiciary, is in the best position to decide whether it’s gotten what it wants. Id. at 1195 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)). [10] As in Guerrero, the reporting requirement of NCLB that Appellants seek to enforce is “purely informational.” The provision at issue, § 6311(h)(5), states, “The Secretary shall transmit annually to [two Committees of Congress] a report that provides national and State-level data on the information collected under paragraph (4).” 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(5). “Paragraph (4),” in turn, contains a requirement that the states report on seven specific metrics of academic success annually to the Secretary. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(4). This reporting requirement is of the same character as the requirement in Guerrero. See 157 F.3d at 1191-92 n.4 (stating requirement that “the President shall report to the Congress with respect to the impact of” the compact on territorial governments and Hawai’i). Nothing in NCLB provides that the Secretary’s reports to Congress have any legal consequences. As in Guerrero, we hold that Appellants’ request for injunctive relief with respect to these reports was properly denied (though on a different basis) by the district court. RENEE v. DUNCAN 5035
[11] Appellants seek attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). That statute provides: “[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-63 (1988). [12] We have interpreted the term “substantial justification” as “describ[ing] a position that has a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Timms v. United States, 742 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1984). That the Secretary did not prevail on the positions he has taken does not invoke a presumption that he was not substantially justified. Id. Assuming without deciding that Appellants qualify as a “prevailing party” under the EAJA, we conclude that the Secretary’s position was substantially justified. [13] We have issued two previous opinions in this case. In the first opinion, a split panel of this court agreed with the Secretary’s position that Appellants lack standing. Renee I, 573 F.3d at 905. We reversed our position on the standing issue, Renee II, 623 F.3d at 80, but one of us continued to agree with the Secretary’s position on standing, id. (Tallman,