Opinion ID: 1723757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: trial counsel was ineffective in failing to subpoena leslie brown for the hearing on the motion for new trial, or, in the alternative, to ask for a continuance of the hearing.

Text: ¶ 18. On March 12, 1990, Chase filed his motion for new trial. He stated that trial counsel had: subsequently learned that at least one of the jurors had a preconceived judgment of the case and as to ultimate outcome as evidenced by the attached affidavit. In addition, this particular juror never responded accordingly upon being questioned at the voir dire and as such counsel for the Defendant never knew that this juror held these biases and Defendant was therefore deprived of a trial by a fair and impartial jury. The affidavit of Leslie Ridlehoover Brown was attached to the motion. Brown was employed as an attorney for the State Tax Commission at the time of the trial. Another employee of the Tax Commission at that time, Toxie Givens, was married to Mary Givens, who served as a juror in Chase's trial. Brown's affidavit stated in part: Givens announced that he had not had any home cooking in three days because his wife was presently sitting on the jury of a capital murder case in Copiah County. He said the defendant was going to get fried. I stated that it sounded as though he knew the guy were guilty. He replied that the guy was guilty and then reiterated that the guy was going to fry  his wife was going to make sure of it if she got the chance. He stated to the effect that they had talked about it and that they both knew he was guilty and she's gonna fry him if she gets the chance. ¶ 19. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, Mary Givens denied that she communicated with her husband during the trial; denied that she had discussed the case with her husband prior to the beginning of the trial; and denied that she had any fixed opinions about imposing the death penalty before the trial. Toxie Givens's testimony was consistent with that of his wife, and he also denied that he had made the statements contained in Brown's affidavit. Brown did not testify at the motion for new trial. Defense counsel stated that she would not appear voluntarily and he did not attempt to have her subpoenaed. The trial court found that the allegations in Brown's affidavit were meritless and denied this part of the motion for new trial. ¶ 20. In his petition, Chase alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to have Brown subpoenaed so that she could testify at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Apparently his argument is that if Brown had testified at the hearing, the trial court would have found her more credible than the Givens and would have made the opposite finding. Chase further argues that his right to intelligently use his jury challenges was violated by Givens's false answers, citing Knox v. Collins, 928 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.1991). Chase then cites numerous cases for the general rules that (1) attorneys must have latitude in voir dire so that challenges may be exercised in an intelligent manner and (2) prejudice may be shown where a potential juror answers falsely or fails to answer and the attorney can show that he probably would have exercised his challenges differently if not for the false answers. ¶ 21. The State cites Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss. 1985), and King v. State, 503 So.2d 271 (Miss. 1987), for the proposition that deference should be given to an attorney's decision to call or not to call a witness, particularly in the context of trial strategy. The Court specifically stated in Leatherwood, 473 So.2d at 970, that one valid reason for not calling a witness is that the witnesses may be unwilling or uncooperative... . ¶ 22. Under these circumstances we find that counsel was not ineffective for failure to, in effect, force Brown to appear and testify at the hearing on motion for new trial. Where a witness refuses to voluntarily appear and testify, Chase's counsel could have made a conscious strategic decision not to present such a witness, but to proceed solely with her affidavit. We also refuse to find that Brown would have been so persuasive as to shake the trial court's adoption of the unequivocal testimony of the Givens. This issue is without merit.