Opinion ID: 719595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Equal Protection and Tinker

Text: 109 The District argues that if it is forced to recognize the Club under the Equal Access Act, it will also be forced to abrogate its nondiscrimination rule entirely, and that the School will thereby lose the power to combat bias and discrimination. The School paints a picture of balkanized, hate-filled public schools where discriminatory clubs, formed by racists, bigots, and Nazi sympathizers, proliferate. This, says the School, cannot be what the Equal Access Act requires. 110 The Hsus suggest that this is precisely what the Act requires. In response to questioning by the district court, counsel for the Hsus stated that the Walking on Water Club could exclude African-Americans if it wanted, 876 F.Supp. at 463, and that the School might well have to recognize a group of skinheads who wanted to exclude African-Americans. 111 We reject the arguments of both parties. First, the parties disregard the influence of the Equal Protection Clause, which is a well-fortified line of defense against invidious discrimination. Second, the Tinker line of cases--which allows public schools to restrict free speech rights when student speech materially and substantially interferes with the school--limits student freedom more sharply than the parties concede. Congressional supporters of the Equal Access Act made it clear during the floor debates that the Act adopted these limitations, 28 and that they did not intend the Act to open the school doors to hate groups, cults, and proselytizers. See 130 Cong. Rec. 19,232 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (Equal Protection Clause will protect against discriminatory student groups); id. at 19,244 (Sen. Mitchell) (language of Act allows schools to bar cults and hate groups); id. at 20,941 (Rep. Goodling) (same); id. at 19,228 (Sen. Danforth) (language of Act allows schools to bar cults and proselytizers). We discuss these two types of protection in turn. 112
113 The Hsus argue that discrimination by an after-school student group that is suitably distanced from the school is a purely private action and that the Equal Protection Clause therefore does not come into play. The Hsus admit, however, that their club cannot exist without authorization from the School; indeed, the School's recognition is what the Hsus are seeking here. Thus, even though the Equal Access Act states that a school may not sponsor[ ] a club like the Hsus', 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(2), the School's grant of recognition, which the club needs in order to gain access to school facilities, authorizes and enables the club to pursue its exclusionary policy. In Amos, the state action was evident: Congress had enacted an exemption of religious groups from a generally applicable ban on religious discrimination in employment decisions. 483 U.S. at 329, 107 S.Ct. at 2865. The state action here is similar: recognition of the Club would mean an exemption for religious after-school clubs from one part of the School's nondiscrimination policy. This exemption would allow religious clubs to discriminate in a way that other clubs may not. Thus, a school's recognition of a club that discriminates does constitute state action and does implicate the Equal Protection Clause. 114 The exemption at issue in Amos, § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was challenged under both the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. After finding no Establishment Clause violation, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause challenge should be analyzed under the rational basis test: 115 [L]aws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny.... [But i]n cases such as these, where a statute is neutral on its face and motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of religion, we see no justification for applying strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test. The proper inquiry is whether [the state actor] has chosen a rational classification to further a legitimate end. 116 Id. at 339, 107 S.Ct. at 2870. Section 702 met this standard because its purpose was to alleviat[e] significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. Id. 117 Justice Brennan's concurrence discussed in more detail why the rational basis test is appropriate for state action that allows religious groups to discriminate on the basis of religion: 118 We are willing to countenance the [religious group's] imposition of [a religious] condition because we deem it vital that, if certain activities constitute part of a religious community's practice, then a religious organization should be able to require that only members of its community perform those activities. 119 Id. at 342-43, 107 S.Ct. at 2872. This passage helps explain why recognition of the Walking on Water Club does not also require the School to accommodate groups of student racists. What the Equal Protection Clause forbids is state action that implements or sanctions invidious discrimination. The use of heightened scrutiny for all cases of racial and sex discrimination implements both the suspicion that such discrimination is almost always invidious, and the policy that only the strongest reasons justify advantages based on race or sex. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1822-23, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98, 97 S.Ct. 451, 456-57, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Similar suspicion accompanies the granting of benefits by the state to one religious group but not others. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339, 107 S.Ct. at 2870. If any of these types of discrimination were present here, we would have a different case. But because religious discrimination by a religious group is vital to the group's religious mission and the ability of the group to define itself on the basis of shared faith, no great suspicion attaches to a government decision to allow it. 120 The Court in Amos was considering allowances made for a church, which of course the Walking on Water Club is not. But this Club is still a religious community that has the same need to define itself as other religious communities, notwithstanding its reliance on a public school to sanction its existence and to give it a roof. As in Amos, the state's accommodation of religious discrimination by a religious group allows the group to define and express itself in religious terms--a state motivation that is benign and a state purpose that is legitimate. In addition, state actions that allow religious discrimination only by religious groups impose no burdens on non-religious groups. Nor do such actions in any way subordinate or stigmatize non-religious groups by suggesting that they are inferior, since they have their own ways of pursuing legitimate exclusions that help them define their groups and promote their agendas. Having considered the purpose for the exemption that the Club needs from the School, and the effect of exempting the Club from the School's nondiscrimination policy, we conclude that there is nothing invidious about it. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 & n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394-95 & n. 14, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (classifications based on prejudice are generally invidious); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691-92, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (importance of stigma); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879) (same). 121 Even if a school's accommodation of a religious group is motivated by the legitimate desire to facilitate the group's self-expression, and even if that accommodation does no harm to non-religious groups, the particular type of discrimination practiced by the group may lead to a finding of invidiousness. If authorized by the School, private act of invidious discrimination by a student club also constitutes a state act of invidious discrimination. Treating one religion differently than another will almost always be invidious. But determining whether discrimination is invidious in a particular case depends on an understanding of the context that informs and characterizes that discrimination. Understanding this context requires consideration of who is discriminating. The Walking on Water Club wishes to discriminate in one respect on the basis of faith. As the district court said, this is a type of discrimination that would be unlawful for the School to engage in directly. 876 F.Supp. at 455. But the critical distinction here is that by granting the Walking on Water Club recognition on the Club's terms, the School would not be engaging in this type of discrimination directly. It would simply be letting the Walking on Water Club do it. 122 Nothing in the record or the School's arguments suggests that the Walking on Water Club insists on Christian leaders because of animus against people of other religions. Since the Club exists solely to engage in Christian praise of God, non-Christians suffer no articulable disadvantage by being unable to lead the Club's prayers and devotions. Nor is there any indication that the exclusion of non-Christians from Club leadership will subordinate or stigmatize them. Were any of these facts otherwise, the School might be justified in refusing an exemption from its nondiscrimination policy. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (IRS's refusal to grant tax-exempt status to a university with racially discriminatory admissions policies upheld using strict scrutiny analysis under the Free Exercise Clause, because of the government's fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education). 29 123 The School does not claim that any of these traditional signs of invidious discrimination are present. Instead, it argues that (i) all forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are invidious in all contexts, and (ii) allowing the Walking on Water Club to discriminate even on an innocuous basis will pave the way for noxious forms of discrimination. We reject the first argument for the reasons stated above, since the invidiousness of religious discrimination will vary depending on the surrounding context. The concern expressed in the School's second argument is unwarranted. The Equal Protection Clause and the School's nondiscrimination policy still allow the School to resist these destructive forms of discrimination, precisely because they are invidious. But since there is no invidious discrimination here, we conclude that an exemption for the Walking on Water Club is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
124 The School's power to prohibit invidious discrimination by student clubs is reinforced by a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). In Tinker, the Court held that public schools may suppress speech or expressive behavior that materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school or impinge[s] upon the rights of other students, even if the expression could not be suppressed outside a public school. Id. at 509, 89 S.Ct. at 738 (internal quotations omitted). See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S.Ct. 562, 567, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school. (internal quotations and citations omitted)). After all, one purpose of public education is to inculcate students with values that will make them better citizens: 125 The[ ] fundamental values of habits and manners of civility essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these fundamental values must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. 126 Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3163, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). 127 True, we analyze this case under the Equal Access Act, while the Tinker line of cases concerned the limits on First Amendment rights in public schools. Nevertheless, the Equal Access Act strikes the same balance that the Supreme Court has struck between First Amendment free speech rights and a public school's right to maintain order: the Act grants broad free speech rights under § 4071(a), and restricts those rights, under § 4071(c)(4), when club meetings materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school. 30 See also 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f). 128 Thus, a school may deny recognition to a student group that would otherwise be entitled to protection under the Equal Access Act, if there are grounds for concluding that recognition of the group would materially and substantially interfere with the school's overarching mission to educate its students, as this standard has been explained by Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier. Valid grounds may include a school's concerns that a club's discriminatory policies would disadvantage, subordinate, or stigmatize the excluded students, debase the morals of students who practice the exclusion, or frustrate the teaching of the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 3163 (internal quotations omitted). These values include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular, id., but also disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. 31 Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. at 3164. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519-20 (2d Cir.1977) (school can prohibit student newspaper's attempt to distribute sex questionnaire to 9th and 10th graders, because substantial basis exists for concluding that they will be subjected to peer contacts and pressures which may result in emotional disturbance), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 1491, 55 L.Ed.2d 519 (1978). 129 The School District contends that its nondiscrimination policy is the only way it can achieve an important educational objective: that students be free of any type of discrimination. Discrimination, says the District, creates multiple 'classes' of students, balkanizes the student community and breeds contempt, distrust and dissen[s]ion. But of course, high school students are subjected to discrimination and selection all the time: sports teams may be divided into girls and boys teams, some students may be allowed on the honor roll and others may not be, upper-level courses may be open to juniors and seniors but not to others, extracurricular activities may be closed to students who do not maintain a certain grade point average, see Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Ed., 12 F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (3d Cir.1993), and leadership positions in a club like Students Against Drugs may be inaccessible to students who advocate the legalization of drugs. Clearly, some types of discrimination are permissible in a high school setting, and some are not. The district court concluded that a school-recognized club that is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion likely would be disruptive to the educational mission of the school, because it would be invidious and would impinge on the rights of other Roslyn students to be free from discrimination in school. 876 F.Supp. at 462. But as we explained in section V.A., supra, religious discrimination is not automatically invidious in a religious club; and the right of other students to be free from invidious discrimination is not infringed here. As the Court said in Fraser, a school may encourage tolerance of divergent political and religious views as part of its mission to inculcate fundamental values, 478 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 3163, although this type of tolerance need not extend to highly offensive or highly threatening speech. Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. at 3163. The School does not (and we think cannot) argue that the discriminatory leadership policy of the Walking on Water Club is highly offensive or threatening. 130 It is a delicate task to supervise student discrimination and exclusion to ensure that it is consistent with fundamental values and is not invidious. Schools may encounter student religious groups that want to discriminate invidiously on the basis of religion, by excluding others out of bias or by stigmatizing those excluded. We admit that the line between invidious and non-invidious discrimination does not glow in the dark. But for better or worse, schools have had to draw that line ever since the Tinker case in 1969. 131 In doing so, public school administrators must be given a great deal of autonomy in deciding how best to run their schools: [T]he education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. at 571. We must recognize, however, that the Equal Access Act is a definite, though measured, interference in these purely local decisions. A school's conclusory statement that prayer meetings will substantially and materially impede the orderly conduct of the school is an insufficient weight in the balance struck by the Act. 32 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. at 737 ([I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.). And here, the School offers nothing beyond these conclusory assertions. Based on this record, we conclude that allowing the Walking on Water Club to guarantee that three of its prayer leaders will be Christians does not constitute substantial and material interference with the School's mission of educating and disciplining.