Opinion ID: 852208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Custodial Statement Made After Invoking Right to Counsel

Text: The defendant next contends that his custodial statements made during his videotaped interview by police the morning after the crime were improperly admitted into evidence. He asserts that he repeatedly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and did not thereafter waive this right. But police ignored his requests and continued the interrogation, resulting in the defendant providing statements that he alleges were a key element in the State's case. The defendant asserts that the admission of the interview evidence violated his right to counsel. [2] The State responds that the defendant's requests for an attorney were equivocal and ambiguous and, if not, that any resulting error was harmless. As established in Miranda v. Arizona, prior to any questioning of a person taken into custody, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706-07 (1966). If the accused requests counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384 (1981) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723). An accused's request for counsel, however, must be unambiguous and unequivocal. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2259, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098, 1110 (2010). The cessation of police questioning is not required if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1994). An accused may waive the right to counsel, if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707. A waiver that comes from the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation ... [is] not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045, 1053 (2010) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2097-98, 100 L.Ed.2d 704, 713 (1988)). As recently expressed in Shatzer: [W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.... [He] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 1219, 175 L.Ed.2d at 1053 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386). Even if an accused elects to waive his rights, such waiver may later be rescinded at any time, and [i]f the right to counsel or the right to re main silent is invoked at any point during questioning, further interrogation must cease. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2263-64, 176 L.Ed.2d at 1115. Following his arrest on the evening of the crime, the defendant was questioned at the police station by Detective Daniel Pryor of the Fulton County Sheriff's Department. The following excerpts pertinent to the claimed violation of his right to counsel are taken from the interview: [After a quick exchange of pleasantries between the defendant and Detective Pryor, the defendant stated]: Mr. Pryor I want to be cooperative ... but at the same point I'm in a situation where I feel like ... I really need an attorney to... talk with, and for me. [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: Well, and you're absolutely entitled to that sir.... I'm not going to violate your rights (inaudible) that way. The only reason I was in here, we know what happened, that's not why I was in here, I just wanted to know why. It might not be as bad as it appears, but only you know those circumstances, but you're entitled to an attorney and I'm not going to. [Defendant]: Yeah, OK. Well I mean ask me, ask me what you want to ask me. [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: Well I mean that's up to you.... I have to read you your rights because you're in custody (inaudible) ... I want to do things by the book.... Like I said, things look bad but they're not always as they look. Appellant's App'x at 389. [Defendant]: Well, believe me it's bad, you know what I mean? It's bad. [Detective]: Well, ... I won't lie to you Jim, it doesn't look good. But like I say, it may look worse than what it actually is. That's why I'm here in fairness.    Id. at 390. [Shortly thereafter, the detective advised the defendant of his rights to remain silent and to counsel before making any statement or answering any questions, including his right to appointed counsel, and the defendant acknowledged understanding them.] [Detective]: Like I said Jim things looks bad I won't lie to you based on what it looks like it looks like murder. Ok? It may not be that. There's different degrees of things. Ok? Like I say only person that knows the circumstances as to why things happened would be yourself. Id. at 391-92.    [Detective]: ... I'm straight with you, I'm straight with anybody I talk to. What good does bs-ing people do, nothing. This isn't a game. [Defendant]: And I know it's not a game I mean I understand what's happened and that's why, that's why I feel as though, you now, I need to have an attorney to deal with because this is a serious thing, you know, it's a very serious thing, I know it's a very serious thing. [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: Yes sir I understand. And I won't question you.  I'm just throwing this out here and you've asked for an attorney and you're entitled to it. Id. at 392. [The defendant then asks for a cigarette, and the detective provides one.] [Detective]: Those aren't meant to get you to talk to me... . I'm a smoker. My point, my point is this  there's a difference between murder, something that murder kind of embodies, someone planned something and then there's lesser degrees of that so. [Defendant]: I'll just tell you straight out that there was no plan. No plan whatsoever  none. And I  The weapon that was used is a uh  are we on, we're on camera? Right?    [Detective]: ... [Y]ou said something about a lawyer I don't want to ... you have the right to tell me you don't want that but I don't want to. [Defendant]: Well I want, I want to tell you that it was not a planned situation.... And uh the weapon that was used is my gun. And uh, [Allen] had, had  he's been stealing things from me for quite some time.... All I'm telling you is that it was not a planned thing.... we were angry  well I was angry with him I don't know if he was angry with me or not I have no idea so  other than that I got, really I just feel like in this situation as serious as it is that I need to consult an attorney before I say anything more. [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: And I respect that and it's your right. Part of what you just told me you wanted to tell me without the lawyer? [Defendant]: Right, exactly. Id. at 393.    [Detective]: You wanted to tell me that without the lawyer. I didn't ... [c]oerce you in any way, I want to be fair to both. [Defendant]: Other than that, just that the weapon was provided, it was not, you know, I did not bring it with me  I did not think about  I had no thoughts of [it] whatsoever. [Detective]: That's all you're comfortable with talking about [it] now? [Defendant]: Right now, yeah. Do you have any idea how long it will be before I can see an attorney? [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: [T]he jailor will be able to help you with that. I mean you're entitled to a phone call you're entitled to those things and like I said I respect your constitutional rights and we won't go any further as far as interviewing or asking questions.    [Detective]: That's where we're at right now if that's OK. We'll go from there, and uh, just relax smoke your cigarette  sit here tight and we'll figure out what's going on.... You're entitled to a phone call once you get . Id. at 394. [Defendant]: Now, you know I've watched enough LAPD and Blue and all that kind of stuff. Now if we do talk I mean what happens? I mean I don't want to `lawyer up' as they say, you know. I mean, I just like I say this is a serious thing, you know it's a serious thing. [Detective]: Yes we both know that, we're both grown adults.... There's no place to BS.... I mean you're curious as to what would happen if you wanted to talk? But then again you have to voluntarily make that decision I don't want to coerce you in any way to make any decisions. [Defendant]: Well why don't we do it this way. Go ahead and ask me questions and if I feel comfortable telling you I will tell you. You know. [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: Ok. That's fair enough. You're freely saying that you don't want a lawyer right now, you're willing  [Defendant]: I'm willing to answer questions, you know, up to a point I suppose. You know. [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: ... like I said its apparent what happened here. The man was shot.... [a]t that house. Where the activity took place? [question mark in transcript] ... If, if you're willing to share with me I guess  I'll put it this way, would it be easier for you, would it be easier for you if you, just tell me with what you're comfortable, what you're willing to tell me and we'll leave it at that right now. Would that, would that be easier Jim? [Defendant]: Well Dan I'm not sure. You know, I mean, I want to be cooperative with you  but, you know, as I said earlier I'm in a serious situation. Appellant's App'x at 395. [Detective]: Right. I understand. I mean what I was thinking it might be easier because you know the things that you're willing to answer. Maybe you could just  if it would be easier for you and me to just tell me that information and then whatever you're comfortable with. Id. at 395-96. At that point, the defendant provided a detailed explanation of the crime, concluding, and so and um  I picked up the gun and I was holding it. At one point I cocked it and looked at it and he said `do it, do it, do it, do it' and not the first time or the second time or the third time one of those times  finally, I did it. Id. at 396. The detective then expressed sympathy to the defendant for his stressful personal situation, and the interview continued.    [Detective]: Sounds like there's a lot there. [Defendant]: Seriously ... Go ahead and ask me questions ... I mean I'll waive the attorney right and I'll just go ahead and talk with you about this because of (inaudible). [Emphasis added.] [Detective]: Well listening to you I don't want to put words in your mouth and you stop me if I do that  I want this to be accurate. Id. at 398. This was the last reference relating to the defendant's request for counsel. The interview continued with the defendant providing considerable additional information about the details of the crime. Detective Pryor's interrogation style was neither threatening nor intimidating. Instead, he was respectful, considerate, and courteous during the interview. The detective's technique may have had the effect of ingratiating himself with the defendant and putting the defendant at ease, thus eliciting the defendant's willingness to provide a statement. Whether a product of the detective's natural style or a calculated technique, such an interrogation style is not inherently coercive because it does not threaten, cause injury, or evoke fear. [T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned `with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.' Berghuis, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2263, 176 L.Ed.2d at 1114 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 229 (1985))). Nevertheless, we find several instances when the defendant's right to counsel was violated during his interrogation. These relate primarily to the detective's usual response, when confronted with the defendant's invocation of his right to counsel, to acknowledge the request but then to keep the conversation going. The defendant's right to counsel was first violated at the beginning of the interview when the defendant stated, I'm in a situation where I feel like ... I really need an attorney to ... talk with, and for me. Appellant's App'x at 389. This was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. The detective understood this and acknowledged, you're absolutely entitled to that sir.... I'm not going to violate your rights (inaudible) that way. Id. But the detective did not cease further interrogation but nevertheless continued by inviting the defendant to talk more, adding, The only reason I was in here, we know what happened, that's not why I was in here, I just wanted to know why. It might not be as bad as it appears, but only you know those circumstances, but you're entitled to an attorney. Id. This precipitated the defendant to respond, Yeah, OK. Well I mean ask me, ask me what you want to ask me. Id. This statement does not constitute a valid waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for two reasons. First, the detective's failure to immediately cease all questioning until the defendant's attorney was present was in violation of Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d at 384. Once the defendant stated, I really need an attorney, Appellant's App'x at 389, the defendant's right to counsel should have been scrupulously honored. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726. Instead, the detective's ongoing conversation initiated further custodial interrogation, and the defendant's subsequent disclosures were not a product of his own initiation of communication. Pursuant to Shatzer, Roberson, and Edwards, the defendant did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Second, when this exchange occurred, the detective had not yet informed the defendant of his Miranda rights. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S.Ct. at 1626, 16 L.Ed.2d at 721. The defendant's next invocation of his right to counsel was similarly disregarded. When he declared, I need to have an attorney to deal with because this is a serious thing, Appellant's App'x at 392, the detective immediately acknowledged that the defendant had asked for an attorney and you're entitled to it, id., but nevertheless continued the interview by telling the defendant while a planned killing may be a murder, there are lesser degrees. Id. at 393. This statement, in the nature of an open-ended invitation encouraging further communication from the defendant notwithstanding his second unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel, succeeded in persuading the defendant to admit that there was no plan, and he was angry at the victim, and that the weapon that was used is my gun. Id. Even if we consider only this second invocation of the right to counsel, because the defendant's resulting incriminating statements were the product of communications initiated not by him but by police, no valid waiver existed. As soon as the defendant made these responses, he again declared, I just feel like, in this situation as serious as it is, that I need to consult an attorney before I say anything more. Id. Again, the detective responded by acknowledging the defendant's right to counsel but sought to obtain a waiver of the right from the defendant, asking him, Part of what you just told me you wanted to tell me without the lawyer? to which the defendant replied, Right, exactly. Id. In the ensuing colloquy, the detective repeatedly sought and obtained the defendant's confirmation that he had wanted to tell me that without the lawyer, and that he was not coerced in any way, and that he was comfortable with talking about [it] now. Appellant's App'x at 394. This attempt by the detective to establish the defendant's waiver of his unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel is not permitted under Shatzer, Roberson, and Edwards. The defendant's purported waiver was a result of the detective's failure to scrupulously honor the defendant's invocation of his right to counsel and was the result of police instigation, not further communication voluntarily initiated by the defendant. Immediately after this exchange, the defendant again invoked his right to counsel  now for a fourth time  stating, Do you have any idea how long it will be before I can see an attorney? Id. The detective again acknowledged the defendant's right and stated, we won't go any further as far as interviewing or asking questions. Id. The detective then engaged in further communication, but it does not appear intended to be evocative. Rather, it informed the defendant of the standard procedures that would be followed for the defendant to be able to telephone an attorney. When the defendant volunteered, Now if we do talk I mean what happens? I mean I don't want to `lawyer up' as they say, ... like I say this is a serious thing, the detective replied, I mean you're curious as to what would happen if you wanted to talk? But then again you have to voluntarily make that decision I don't want to coerce you in any way to make any decisions. Id. at 395. The defendant's subsequent statements including, Go ahead and ask me questions and if I feel comfortable telling you I will tell you, I'm willing to answer questions, you know, up to a point I suppose, and Well Dan I'm not sure. You know, I mean, I want to be cooperative with you  but, you know, as I said earlier I'm in a serious situation, id., together suggest either a voluntary waiver or at least an equivocation that would serve to undermine his invocation of the right to counsel. But such purported waiver or equivocation would not have occurred had the detective scrupulously honored the defendant's unequivocal and unambiguous invocations of the right to counsel by immediately ceasing further communications with him until an attorney was present. Instead, however, the detective prolonged the conversation and thus instigated the subsequent dialogue. This pattern occurred three times. This violates the principle that [O]nce a suspect indicates that he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel, any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the `inherently compelling pressures' and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 1219, 175 L.Ed.2d at 1053 (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681, 108 S.Ct. at 2097-98, 100 L.Ed.2d at 713). In addition, the detective's persistent resumptions of communications after the defendant's invocation of rights runs afoul of Michigan v. Mosley, which warned, To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned. 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1975). Because of the detective's failure to immediately cease further communications following the defendant's unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of his right to counsel, we cannot give credence to the defendant's subsequent apparent waiver or equivocation as to his right to counsel. As a result, the videotape and transcript of the police interview of the defendant were erroneously admitted in evidence. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). Not every error in the admission of evidence, however, requires a reversal. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). And before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 (1967). [3] The defendant's statements during the police interview contained considerable details regarding his state of mind during the killing  details not provided by other evidence. The State's first witness, Jan French, drove the defendant to his home from the bar he visited after the shooting. She had noticed blood on the defendant's pants. During the trip home, the defendant told her that he was gonna go to jail, Tr. at 324, and that I shot Allen ... he wouldn't tell me the truth and I just, I just shot him, id., and I pulled the trigger, id. at 326. After dropping off the defendant, French drove to the victim's residence to determine his condition and whether to call for medical assistance but found his lifeless body with an apparent gunshot wound to the face. Testimony of forensic pathologists showed that the fatal shot was fired from close range, possibly up against the victim's face. The blood on the defendant's trousers was found to contain DNA consistent with that of the victim. The defense's single witness testified that the victim's blood alcohol level was three times the legal limit. The thrust of the defense's final argument was that both he and the victim were intoxicated and that the evidence was consistent with an accidental shooting possibly precipitated by the victim's falling forward into the gun, and thus there was insufficient evidence to establish a knowing or intentional killing. The jury's final instructions covered two offenses, Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter. [4] The contested issue was whether the State provided sufficient evidence of the defendant's state of mind to prove Murder, a knowing or intentional killing; Voluntary Manslaughter, a knowing or intentional killing done under sudden heat; or neither. The defendant's statements during his police interview asserted that he had befriended Roy Allen Shaffer for several months prior to the crime, arranged for Shaffer to rent a home owned by the defendant's mother, paid Shaffer's rent, found him jobs, and provided him with use of a truck. But Shaffer then took and sold various items of the defendant's personal property. The defendant was angry at Shaffer as an individual who does not respect people or property or anything. No gratitude. Appellant's App'x at 410-11. The defendant's statements appeared to stress that the killing was not premeditated, stating that he did not have an advance plan, id. at 393, 397, 410; that it was nothing I thought about doing, id. at 397; that it was not an intended thing, id. at 399; that there was no malice aforethought, nothing planned, id. at 406; and that it was just a spur of the moment thing, Appellant's App'x at 407. The defendant also asserted that he asked Shaffer about various missing personal belongings and that both men were intoxicated at the time. The defendant described the fatal incident as follows: I have no idea how much money [he] has taken in  I have no idea what he sold things for  and so and um  I picked up the gun and I was holding it. At one point I cocked it and looked at it and he said do it, do it, do it, do it and not the first time or the second time or the third time one of those times  finally, I did it. Id. at 396. Later in the interview, he said, Well and you know like I said I had the gun and he kept saying `do it, do it, do it, do it, do it, do it, do it, do it, do it,' and I did it. Id. at 405. As to the key contested element, the defendant's state of mind at the time he fired the shotgun, the defendant's statements during the police interview did not merely supplement the earlier undisputed testimony of Jan French, to whom the defendant had admitted only pulling the trigger and shooting the victim. The videotaped police interview shown to the jury (and provided as a written transcript) provided the jury with significant additional evidence of the defendant's state of mind. At the time the defendant pulled the trigger, he was angry because the victim had engaged in a series of property thefts from the defendant and because the victim lacked gratitude despite the defendant's numerous acts of kindness and generosity toward the victim. And the defendant repeatedly and vividly admitted during the police interview that I did it in response to a series of taunts from the victim to do it. Such evidence significantly amplified the proof that the defendant's killing of the victim was at least done knowingly, if not intentionally. We are unable to conclude that the erroneous admission of the defendant's police interview was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus requires reversal of his conviction. The State is not, however, precluded from retrying the defendant for this offense. A reversal for insufficient evidence bars retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause, [5] but an analysis for such sufficiency includes consideration of the erroneously admitted evidence. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40, 109 S.Ct. 285, 290, 102 L.Ed.2d 265, 273 (1988). Here, although reversal is required because of trial error in the admission of evidence, clearly with that evidence, there was enough to support the jury's verdict of guilty and the resulting conviction. Id. at 40, 109 S.Ct. at 291, 102 L.Ed.2d at 273 (emphasis in original). See also Lambert v. State, 534 N.E.2d 235, 237 n. 2 (Ind. 1989). The defendant therefore may be subject to retrial.