Opinion ID: 196508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reliance on Perjured Testimony

Text: 47 Gary contends that his conviction was somehow tainted by allegedly perjurious testimony that was elicited in his first trial. Specifically, he contends that Officer John Arzoomanian of the North Providence Police Department committed perjury at the first trial when testifying as to why he did not fingerprint the firearm that was seized from Gary. In Gary's first trial, in response to a question on re-direct examination as to why he did not attempt to recover fingerprints, he answered: As far as the size of the gun--the surface of the weapon, also the people involved in the case both had gloves on. (emphasis added). On re-cross, Arzoomanian hedged: 48 Q. And you didn't bother to attempt to lift a print in this case because this man had gloves on; is that your testimony? 49 A. Well, there were gloves found at the scene and gloves found in the vehicle also. 50 At the second trial, however, Arzoomanian testified that after the arrest, but before the first trial, he learned that the gloves actually belonged to rescue personnel. He explained: You asked the reason why I didn't print the weapon. I said because he had gloves on. And I found out later, he didn't. At that point, the evidence was handled by too many people. As Gary's counsel ably emphasized during cross-examination, Arzoomanian's testimony in the two proceedings was inconsistent. Gary asserts that Arzoomanian therefore committed perjury. 51 Arzoomanian's testimony in the second trial did differ in a troubling way from that given in the first trial. His explanation of the inconsistency is weak because at the first trial he testified that Gary actually had worn gloves at the time of arrest--not that he mistakenly believed at the time of arrest that Gary was wearing gloves. However, it is axiomatic that inconsistent testimony is not per se perjurious. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 93, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (A witness testifying under oath or affirmation [commits criminal perjury] if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory.) (emphasis added). The defendant neither asked the trial court to make any findings of perjury, nor moved for a mistrial on that basis. We decline defendant's invitation to make a finding of willful intent to provide false testimony based solely on an inconsistency. 52 Moreover, because Gary's first trial did not result in a conviction, he was not prejudiced even if Arzoomanian testified falsely. Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 7, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565 n. 7, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ([A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). Here, there is neither a conviction nor any evidence that indicates that the prosecution intentionally used perjured testimony. The first trial ended with a hung jury, and Gary received a second trial at which he was fully able to impeach Arzoomanian with his inconsistent testimony at the first trial. In order to bootstrap an allegation of prejudice stemming from Arzoomanian's testimony, Gary argues that his second trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. This suggestion that double jeopardy prohibits a second trial because of the unknowing presentation of purportedly perjured testimony by a prosecutor is wholly unsupported by case law. 53 Indeed, courts have held that prosecutorial misconduct must rise to an egregious level for double jeopardy to bar a retrial. A defendant cannot be retried only where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken ... to prevent an acquittal that [he] believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct. United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (retrial after defense moves for mistrial barred by double jeopardy only where the conduct giving rise to the successful motion ... was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial); United States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714-15 (1st Cir.1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant's successful motion for mistrial does not trigger double jeopardy). In this case, there is absolutely no evidence to buttress a finding of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct, and, at worst, Arzoomanian's alleged perjury related to a collateral matter. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit Gary's second trial and subsequent conviction.