Opinion ID: 1345171
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandatory Tolling

Text: Saunders argues that his petition was timely filed because the limitations period for his petition for habeas corpus should have been tolled for the thirty-day period during which he could have filed a motion for reconsideration of denial of leave to appeal his post-conviction challenge, even though he did not actually file such a motion. We reject this argument. The AEDPA one-year statute of limitations begins to run, as relevant in this case, on the date on which Saunders's state conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The statute provides that the limitations period shall be tolled for the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). It is clear from the statutory language that the possibility of filing an application for post-conviction relief is not enough to toll the limitations period; instead, an application must be properly filed and pending. Id. We have previously held that a state court petition is `pending' from the time it is first filed until [the time it is] finally disposed of and further appellate review is unavailable under the particular state's procedures. Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1999). In Bennett, we held that a § 440.10 motion is pending for purposes of AEDPA at least from the time it is filed through the time in which the petitioner could file an application for a certificate for leave to appeal the Appellate Division's denial of the motion. Id. Bennett did not address whether the § 440.10 motion should also be considered to be pending during the time in which a petitioner couldbut did notfile a motion for reconsideration of the state court's denial of the § 440.10 motion, and we have found no other case addressing this issue. In Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 2000), we held that a coram nobis petition ceases to be pending on the date it is denied by the Appellate Division because [w]ith the filing of the Appellate Division's coram nobis order, the door of the New York Court of Appeals [is] closed and further appellate review unavailable. [1] Id. at 9. That decision suggests, but does not expressly hold, that the post-conviction motion would not be considered pending during the thirty days in which the petitioner could have filed, but did not file, a motion for reconsideration. The Court came closer to addressing this issue in Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, in which we considered arguendo whether the existence of a thirty-day period during which a motion for reconsideration could be filed meant that a coram nobis petition should be considered pending for an additional thirty days after it was denied. 255 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2001). We ultimately determined it was not necessary to answer that question, but noted in dicta that a decision that the petition was still pending during that period would be in some tension with our holding in Geraci that a coram nobis motion ceases to be pending on the date it is denied by the Appellate Division. Id. at 74 n.8 (quoting Gerac i, 211 F.3d at 9). Similarly, we have held that the AEDPA limitations period is not tolled during the time in which a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court could have been filed with respect to a state collateral motion, Smaldone, 273 F.3d at 138, even though the limitations period is tolled during the time in which a defendant could file a petition for certiorari seeking direct review of the state court conviction, Williams, 237 F.3d at 151. This is because the timing-related language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) expressly provides that the limitations period begins to run on the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,  whereas § 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling only during the time in which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to a pertinent judgment or claim is pending.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1-2) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit has held that the fifteen-day window for filing a motion for rehearing after the denial of leave to appeal does toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2004). We are persuaded, however, that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), as construed by our precedents, compels the conclusion that the one-year AEDPA limitations period is not tolled by the thirty-day period in which the petitioner could have filed, but did not file, a motion for reconsideration of the New York State court's denial of his post-conviction motion under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10.
Saunders contends that the statute of limitations must be tolled for the five-day period of time allowed by New York law to account for the delay in receiving service by mail. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2103(b)(2). Alternatively, he argues that Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) compels tolling, for the same reason. These arguments fail because they are precluded by our holding in Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 2000). [2] We held in Geraci that statutory tolling for the purposes of AEDPA ends with the filing of the state court's final order, and expressly rejected Geraci's argument that his coram nobis petition remained pending until he received notice of the state court's order. Id. at 9. In Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, we affirmed that decision and applied its rule to a significantly longer delay between filing and mailing, of three months. Id. at 155 n.2 ( Geraci ... ruled that the statutory tolling provision of the AEDPA limitations period ended upon the entry of a state court's order, rather than its subsequent receipt.). Service-by-mail rules affect the date upon which the order is deemed to have been served, not the date upon which it is considered filed. Because this Court has held that a motion ceases to be pending for the purposes of AEDPA on the date of filing, Saunders's argument is without merit.