Opinion ID: 1125010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Standard and Burden of Proof

Text: Cellier's complaint is that these statutes do not include an evidentiary standard of proof which the trial court should use to determine whether the definition of incompetency has been met. As such, Cellier contends that there is no standard of proof by which to judge when the evidence is sufficient to find a person incompetent and no method to review a trial court's determination on appeal. Thus, Cellier challenges the competency statute as unconstitutional for failing to set out a standard of proof by which competency must be measured. When a statute is challenged as unconstitutional, this court's standard of review is de novo. See State v. Fierro, 257 Kan. 639, 643, 895 P.2d 186 (1995). In support of its position that K.S.A. 22-3302 is unconstitutional for failing to provide an evidentiary standard and burden of proof, Cellier points to two United States Supreme Court cases which addressed the constitutionality of competency statutes based on their evidentiary standards. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 134 L. Ed.2d 498, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 120 L. Ed.2d 353, 112 S. Ct. 2572, reh. denied 505 U.S. 1244 (1992). In Cooper, the United States Supreme Court addressed an Oklahoma statute which presumed an accused was competant to stand trial unless the accused could prove his or her incompetency by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court noted the well-accepted rule that `the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process.' 517 U.S. at 354 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 453). The Supreme Court then pointed out that with the Oklahoma statute, a criminal defendant could prove he or she was more likely than not incompetent (preponderance of the evidence standard), but if the defendant could not prove he or she was incompetent by clear and convincing evidence, then the defendant would still have to stand trial. Thus, the Court held that requiring the accused to meet such a high evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to a preponderance of the evidence standard, violated the accused's right to due process under the 14th Amendment. The Court struck down the Oklahoma competency statute as unconstitutional. 517 U.S. at 356, 369. In Medina, the United States Supreme Court addressed a California statute which presumed an accused was competent to stand trial unless the accused could prove his or her incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court found that this statute, with its presumption of competence and preponderance of the evidence standard, did not violate due process. The Court upheld the statute as constitutional. 505 U.S. at 451-52. Since an existing evidentiary standard in a competency statute can be too high and make the statute unconstitutional, Cellier asserts that the complete absence of an evidentiary standard in a competency statute should also make the statute unconstitutional. However, Cellier concedes that a court may salvage a statute when possible by interpreting ambiguous language in a constitutional manner. Many states explicitly place the burden to prove incompetency on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Several states place no burden on the defendant at all, but require the State to prove the defendant's competency once the issue has been credibly raised by the defendant. In a number of states, the burden imposed on the defendant and/or the State to prove incompetency is unclear, as in Kansas. However, as the United States Supreme Court points out, [n]othing in the competency statutes or case law of these States suggests ... that the defendant bears the burden of proving incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. 134 L. Ed.2d at 510 n. 17. Finally, the American Bar Association places the burden of proving incompetency on the party raising the issue, and the trial court must find the defendant is competent to stand trial by the greater weight of the evidence. 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 7-4.8, p. 7-208 (2d ed. 1980). The trial court obviously used an evidentiary standard to determine if Cellier could understand the proceedings or could assist in his defense. Neither K.S.A. 22-3301 nor 22-3302 explicitly provides such a standard. Thus, the trial court must have inferred an implicit evidentiary standard within the statutes from their language and the legislative intent. This has been done before and is not improper. For instance, K.S.A. 22-3215(4) provides the procedure for suppressing a confession. This statute specifically provides that the burden of proof for proving a confession is admissible is on the prosecution. However, the statute does not enunciate which evidentiary standard the prosecution must utilize to prove that a confession is admissible. This court did not find the statute was unconstitutional simply because it failed to enunciate a specific evidentiary standard for the State to use. Instead, this court inferred an evidentiary standard implicit within the statutepreponderance of the evidence. See State v. Miles, 233 Kan. 286, 295, 662 P.2d 1227 (1983). Thus, the trial court in this case can infer an evidentiary standard within the competency statute. There are three different evidentiary standards which could be applied to K.S.A. 22-3301 and 22-3302preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt. The latter two of these three standards have been found to violate due process when included in a competency statute. See Cooper, 517 U.S. 348. The legislature would not intend to promulgate an unconstitutional statute. If at all possible, statutes are to be interpreted in a constitutional manner. The only way to constitutionally interpret 22-3301 and 22-3302 is to find that their implicit evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the evidence standard. The issue of competency to stand trial is more complicated than it appears, the reason being that the issue is frequently raised by the court itself as opposed to being raised by or on behalf of the accused or by the State. The obvious rule is that a party who raises the issue of competence to stand trial has the burden of going forward with the evidence, which will be measured by the preponderance of the evidence standard. When the court itself raises the competency issue, the court is not a party and cannot be responsible for coming forward with the evidence, but it can assign that burden to the State because both the court and the State have a duty to provide due process and to provide a fair trial to an accused. Determining the competency of an accused to stand trial is a duty that falls on both the State and the trial court. The trial court measures the evidence presented by the standard of preponderance of evidence. With a statutory presumption that an accused is sane, State v. Gilder, 223 Kan. 220, 227-28, 574 P.2d 196 (1977), it follows that there is a presumption a defendant is competent to stand trial. Using this implicit burden of proof and evidentiary standard within the competency statutes, we hold that K.S.A. 22-3201 and K.S.A. 22-3202 are not unconstitutional.