Opinion ID: 835830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: allegation of dishonesty

Text: We first address whether the trial panel erred in dismissing the Bar's complaint on the basis of the trial panel's legal conclusion that that rule applies only to professional conduct or conduct that otherwise is subject to criminal or administrative sanctions. DR 1-102(A)(3) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:      (3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.] We begin by noting that the text of DR 1-102(A)(3) contains no requirement that, to violate that rule, the lawyer's conduct must be subject to criminal or administrative sanctions. Although the rule does refer to professional misconduct, this court has held that the rule does not require that the lawyer be acting in his or her capacity as a lawyer. In re Coe, 302 Or. 553, 565, 731 P.2d 1028 (1987). This court has concluded that accused lawyers have violated DR 1-102(A)(3) even when their conduct did not involve the practice of law and may not have been subject to other regulation. See In re Germundson, 301 Or. 656, 662, 724 P.2d 793 (1986) (holding that lawyer's act of executing promissory note as representative of corporation when lawyer knew he had no authority to act on behalf of that corporation violated DR 1-102(A)(3)); In re Houchin, 290 Or. 433, 438, 622 P.2d 723 (1981) (holding that lawyer's act of enrolling as student in course he was teaching for purpose of preventing reduction in governmental benefits when lawyer knew that he was not entitled to receive credit as student violated former DR 1-102(A)(4)). It is true, however, that the underlying purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings  the protection of the public  helps this court to determine when a lawyer's conduct constitutes professional misconduct within the meaning of the rule. In In re Murdock, 328 Or. 18, 24-25, 968 P.2d 1270 (1998), this court stated: The purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), Standard 1.1; see In re Stauffer, 327 Or. 44, 66, 956 P.2d 967 (1998) (same). `Members of the public are entitled to be able to trust lawyers to protect their property, liberty, and their lives. The community expects lawyers to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity, and lawyers have a duty not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or interference with the administration of justice.' ABA Standards at 5. Guided by that purpose, this court examines lawyer conduct that occurs outside the scope of professional relationships, such as that of attorney and client, to determine whether the conduct jeopardizes the public's interest in the integrity and trustworthiness of lawyers. Not every lawyer misstatement poses that risk: telling the story of Santa Claus to children is an example. Instead, there must be a rational connection between the conduct that gives rise to an allegation of a rule violation and the purpose of the lawyer discipline system. That is, the accused lawyer's conduct must demonstrate that the lawyer lacks those characteristics that are essential to the practice of law. In most situations involving business communications with clients, the courts, other lawyers, and governmental entities, when an accused lawyer engages in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation that connection will be apparent. There are circumstances, however, when such a connection will not be apparent, because, although the lawyer's conduct involves the making of a false or dishonest statement, the conduct is so divorced from the realm of professional conduct that it does not necessarily speak to the lawyer's professional character. In those situations, it is necessary to identify the nexus between the lawyer's conduct and the lawyer's fitness to practice law to establish that the lawyer's conduct is of the type of conduct for which this court may call the lawyer to answer. If the evidence in a discipline case does not establish such a nexus, then the lawyer is not subject to professional discipline. The trial panel, however, did not purport to enforce a qualification of that sort when it dismissed the complaint against the accused. Instead, it confined DR 1-102(A)(3) to a lawyer's professional conduct or conduct that violates criminal laws or administrative rules. As the foregoing discussion indicates, we have declined to read into the text of DR 1-102(A)(3) the limitations on which the trial panel relied here. We turn now to whether the accused's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3). As this court previously has stated, it is this court's practice to consider only the theories that the Bar presents when analyzing an accused lawyer's conduct under DR 1-102(A)(3). See, e.g., In re Kluge, 335 Or. 326, 340, 66 P.3d 492 (2003) (considering Bar's allegation that accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) only under theories presented in its brief). Accordingly, we confine our analysis of DR 1-102(A)(3) to the theories of misrepresentation and dishonesty that the Bar argued before the trial panel and in its brief to this court. We first address whether the accused engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation. Under DR 1-102(A)(3), an affirmative misrepresentation is a knowing, false statement of material fact. In re Kumley, 335 Or. 639, 644, 75 P.3d 432 (2003). When considering an assertion that a lawyer has engaged in affirmative misstatement, our initial focus is on the truth or falsity of the fact asserted. Id. at 644-45, 75 P.3d 432. Here, the Bar alleged that the accused knowingly made affirmative false statements in the online message when he stated that the teacher had engaged in sexual conduct with students. However, at oral argument, the Bar conceded that it had not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the statements regarding sexual conduct with students in the online message were false. That concession is well taken, and we conclude that the accused did not engage in conduct involving misrepresentation. We next address whether the accused engaged in conduct involving dishonesty. We analyze the conduct that allegedly constitutes dishonesty on a case-by-case basis. In re Gallagher, 332 Or. 173, 181, 26 P.3d 131 (2001). To engage in conduct involving dishonesty in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), the accused must have acted with a mental state of knowledge or intent. See In re Martin, 328 Or. 177, 185-86, 970 P.2d 638 (1998) (stating that [t]he term `dishonesty' imports with it a notion of knowledge or intentionality and reviewing prior case law suggesting knowledge or intent is required). Under DR 1-102(A)(3), conduct involving [d]ishonesty is conduct that indicates a disposition to lie, cheat, or defraud; untrustworthiness; or a lack of integrity. Dugger, 334 Or. at 609, 54 P.3d 595. The characteristics that this court's definition of dishonesty embraces are those that reflect on a lawyer's fitness to practice law. In re Hockett, 303 Or. 150, 158, 734 P.2d 877 (1987) (Trustworthiness and integrity are key concepts in the Code of Professional Responsibility   .). Consequently, to violate DR 1-102(A)(3) by dishonesty, the lawyer's conduct must indicate that the lawyer lacks those characteristics of trustworthiness and integrity that are essential to the practice of law. The Bar argues that the accused engaged in conduct involving dishonesty when he created a Classmates.com account in the teacher's name, posted a message purporting to be written by the teacher, and led others to believe that the teacher had posted the message. The Bar asserts that the court should treat the accused, who misrepresented his identity to disseminate information, the same as a lawyer who misrepresents his identity to obtain information. See In re Gatti, 330 Or. 517, 8 P.3d 966 (2000) (finding violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) when lawyer intentionally misrepresented his identity and purpose to obtain information for use in litigation). The accused responds that the Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted dishonestly because the Bar did not show that he intended to deceive, that is, that he intended to lead others to believe that the teacher had posted the message. The accused asserts that he believed, due to the outlandish nature of the message, that anyone reading the message would understand that the teacher had not authored the message and that it was a joke. The accused also argues that, to violate DR 1-102(A)(3), the alleged conduct must reflect adversely on the accused lawyer's fitness to practice law. The accused asserts that his conduct was so far removed from the practice of law that the court should infer no adverse reflection on his fitness to practice law. We address each of the accused's assertions in turn. This court has held that intent to deceive is an element of conduct involving deceit or fraud under DR 1-102(A)(3). In re Hiller, 298 Or. 526, 533, 694 P.2d 540 (1985) (A misrepresentation becomes fraud or deceit when it is intended to be acted upon without being discovered.). However, dishonesty is a broader concept than deceit or fraud, and does not require the same level of culpability. See In re Leonard, 308 Or. 560, 569, 784 P.2d 95 (1989) (stating that dishonesty is broader concept than deceit or fraud); In re Holman, 297 Or. 36, 57, 682 P.2d 243 (1984) (The grouping of the noun `dishonesty' with the other three nouns, `fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,' might suggest that in order for conduct to involve dishonesty it must partake of some kind of deception in the sense of misleading the victim of the conduct. We do not so conclude.). As stated above, dishonesty requires a mental state of knowledge or intent. Thus, contrary to the accused's position, the Bar need not prove that the accused acted intentionally to demonstrate a violation of that rule; nor does the rule require the Bar to prove that the accused had a purpose to deceive others into believing that the teacher had authored the message. However, as we discuss in more detail below, we are satisfied that the accused acted intentionally in violating DR 1-102(A)(3) by dishonesty in this instance. Regarding the accused's second argument, as we stated above, the accused lawyer's conduct must be connected rationally to the lawyer's fitness to practice law to constitute a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) by dishonesty. However, we conclude that the accused's conduct does reflect adversely on his fitness to practice law. The accused does not dispute that it was dishonest for him to assume the teacher's identity and post a message that purported to be written by the teacher and indicated that the teacher had engaged in sexual behavior with high school girls. When he acted, the accused had heard that the teacher had engaged in an extramarital affair with a young woman who had attended the high school while the teacher worked there. The accused also knew that there were rumors in the community about that affair and rumors that the teacher had engaged in inappropriate relationships with students. Thus, the accused knew that the teacher, whose reputation was in question in at least some parts of the community, was uniquely vulnerable to the content of the message, because it pretended to be an admission by the teacher that the community rumors about inappropriate conduct were true. We conclude that, in so conducting himself, the accused engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, because that conduct indicates that the accused lacks aspects of trustworthiness and integrity that are relevant to the practice of law. By adopting the teacher's identity and posting the online message that he composed, the accused created a significant risk that his actions would affect the teacher's legal rights adversely. The message purported to be an admission by the teacher that he had engaged in socially and legally unacceptable behavior. The purported admission had the potential to harm the teacher's career and subject him to a criminal investigation. Also, the medium through which the accused chose to act increased the likelihood of that potential harm, because the Classmates.com website provided no contextual clues that the teacher was not the author of the message or that someone intended the message to be a joke. It is unreasonable, in our view, that the accused believed that anyone reading the message would view it only as a joke because of the nature of the message itself. The message was available for viewing by a wide audience of unknown persons who would not know the teacher personally and who would be unaware of other circumstances outside the message itself that would indicate to them that someone intended the message as a joke and that they should view it in that manner. The accused's conduct demonstrates a willingness to disregard the teacher's legal rights. That willingness reflects adversely on the accused's fitness to practice law, because it causes us to question whether the accused possesses the requisite trustworthiness and integrity to handle important matters involving legal rights that clients commonly entrust to lawyers. We conclude that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).