Opinion ID: 1570621
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Trial Counsel Breach an Essential Duty?

Text: We presume performance of counsel falls within a range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995). Ondayog has the burden to rebut this presumption with evidence his trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Because timely objection to jury instructions in criminal proceedings is necessary to preserve alleged error for appellate review, State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 737 (Iowa 1988), Ondayog argues his counsel breached an essential duty by not objecting to the improper jury instructions at the time of trial. Indeed, we have previously held the failure to recognize an erroneous instruction and preserve error breaches an essential duty. See State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 379-80 (Iowa 1998). The question becomes whether there was a tactical reason for not objecting to the instruction. See State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 881-82 (Iowa 2003) (concluding trial counsel breached an essential duty by failing to object to the county attorney's questions and argument and in failing to request a mistrial because there was no tactical reason for not objecting). Courts generally presume counsel is competent and a defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95). Moreover, we must evaluate trial counsel's actions from the perspective of when the decision was madeduring the course of trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694, (A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.). Viewed from this angle, it appears Ondayog's trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous jury instruction could be deemed trial strategy. Ondayog was charged with kidnapping in the first degree, a Class A felony. Iowa Code § 710.2. If convicted of this crime, he would have been sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. Id. § 902.1. As proper lesser-included offenses, Ondayog could have been convicted of kidnapping in the third degree, or sexual abuse in the third degree, both class C felonies. See id. §§ 709.4, 710.4. Class C felonies carry a maximum indeterminate sentence of ten years and a maximum fine of $10,000. Id. § 902.9. Trial counsel representing a defendant in such a situation might purposely allow the jury to be instructed on the lesser offense of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse causing bodily injury because this crime is only a class D felony, punishable by a maximum indeterminate sentence of five years and a fine of $7500. Id. §§ 709.11, 902.9. By instructing on this lesser crime, trial counsel would give the jury the opportunity to forego the three higher offenses. If this was the strategy, it was successful. This case illustrates why we rarely address ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal and instead preserve such claims for postconviction relief. State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Iowa 2006). Because [i]mprovident trial strategy, miscalculated tactics, and mistakes in judgment do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1992), postconviction proceedings are often necessary to discern the difference between improvident trial strategy and ineffective assistance. The fact that a particular decision was made for tactical reasons does not, however, automatically immunize the decision from a Sixth Amendment challenge. That decision must still satisfy the ultimate test: whether under the entire record and totality of circumstances counsel performed competently. Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 881 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, we do not delve into trial tactics and strategy when they do not clearly appear to have been misguided. State v. Couser, 567 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Iowa 1997). In other words, we will not reverse where counsel has made a reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and strategy, even if such judgments ultimately fail. Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989); see also Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984) (we require more than a showing that trial strategy backfired or that another attorney would have prepared and tried the case somewhat differently). Since a counsel's mistake in judgment is rarely grounds for ineffective assistance, we cannot automatically assume every alleged misstep was a reasonable strategy simply because some lawyer, somewhere, somehow, under some circumstances at some time would have done such a thing. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court conceded [r]epresentation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697. Thus, a reviewing court must determine whether a reasonably competent attorney would have failed to object to the erroneous jury instruction under the given circumstances. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694 (The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.). Ondayog contends postconviction proceedings are not necessary in this case because his trial counsel admitted he may have made a mistake. [3] Ondayog contends these statements indicate his trial counsel did make a mistake, and therefore violated an essential duty. Standing alone, Ondayog's trial counsel's statements are not enough to rebut the presumption that performance of counsel falls within a range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 (stating the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (emphasis added)). This issue is preserved for postconviction proceedings where the record can be more fully developed. If Ondayog desires, his trial counsel may testify in order to more fully explain his actions. See, e.g., State v. Peck, 539 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1995) (finding the record incomplete with respect to ineffective-assistance issues and preserving for postconviction proceedings determination of whether defense counsel's failure to request lesser included offense instructions was part of an all or nothing strategy); Wycoff v. State, 382 N.W.2d 462, 472 (Iowa 1986) (after reviewing trial counsel's testimony at the postconviction trial, concluding counsel's failure to request an alibi instruction was based on his general strategy of attempting to disprove the State's evidence by showing the unlikelihood that Wycoff, although present, murdered the victim); State v. Wilkens, 346 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Iowa 1984) (after reviewing trial counsel's testimony at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, concluding trial counsel's tactical decision to concentrate on self defense rather than diminished capacity made sense). Ultimately though, the district court must determine whether trial counsel's omission was reasonable under prevailing professional norms, Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694); that is the court must apply an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.