Opinion ID: 3014817
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strength of Reasons for Withdrawal

Text: Wilson argues that he should have been able to withdraw his guilty plea because he was coerced into signing a package plea agreement. Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge must address a defendant about to enter a plea of guilty to ensure that the defendant understands the law of his crime in relation to the facts of his or her case, as well as his or her rights as a criminal defendant. Wilson contends that his Rule 11 plea colloquy was deficient because the District Court judge did not specifically ask him if he had been coerced into signing the plea agreement or ask him if his plea was part of a package. withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d). Because the substance of the rule has not changed, precedent referring to Rule 32 continues to be authoritative. 6 If Wilson were able to prove that his guilty plea was coerced by his co-defendants, arguably that would have been a reason to have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea. However, Wilson makes no such allegation. In a pro se motion to the court to withdraw from his plea agreement, Wilson stated only that “[t]heAUSA [sic] pit my co-defendants against me as when she offerred [sic] this plea agreement because it was contingent on my acceptance in order for it to be given to my codefendants. And since they were facing a much severe sentencing [sic] than myself this place me [sic] in a[ ] compromising position.” App. at 98a. The fact that Wilson was motivated by a desire to assist his co-defendants in avoiding trial did not show coercion nor did it negate the voluntariness of his choice. In moving to withdraw his guilty plea, Wilson argued that his plea was involuntary because it was part of a package plea. In denying Wilson’s motion to withdraw for that reason, the District Court stated: “In package plea arrangements, the prosecutor offers a benefit or detriment to all (the defendant and third parties) in order to persuade the entire group to plead guilty.” App. at 107a (citing United States v. Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)). The District Court explained its ruling denying Wilson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea by focusing on the relevant issue - voluntariness vel non. The Court stated: These arrangements obviously carry the risk that co-parties will exert pressure on the defendant to accept a plea that is against his or her personal interest. . . . If a plea is entered under coercive circumstances, it is unconstitutional and invalid. . . . But package plea agreements such as the one at issue here are not per se unconstitutional. The government is entitled to condition the benefits of a plea agreement on acceptance by codefendants, and a defendant is entitled to accept the burdens of a plea based on a desire to assist others. . . . [T]he dispositive question in these cases, as in all others, is whether the defendant entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. 7 The plea colloquy conducted by the court in this case reveals that defendant understood the consequences of his plea and had not been improperly pressured by the government or his co-defendant. App. at 107a-08a (citations omitted). This court recently addressed the voluntariness of “package pleas” in United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2005). Hodge had argued that his Rule 11 plea colloquy had been deficient because the court did not know that his plea agreement was linked to that of his brother. We vacated Hodge’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because the Government had violated the terms of the plea agreement by recommending life imprisonment at sentencing despite its agreement not to make any recommendation. In discussing the issue Wilson raises here, i.e., the effect of a package deal, we reviewed the colloquy for plain error, the standard required in United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002), and determined that the court’s colloquy with Hodge was not deficient.3 Recognizing that “determining voluntariness in package deal situations is an especially delicate matter,” we provided “guidance to . . . assist future district courts considering such pleas.” Hodge, 412 F.3d at 489. We stated: [T]he parties must notify the district court that a package deal exists and state to the court on the record the specific terms of that deal. . . . Once a court has been told of a package deal, special care should be exercised during the Rule 11 plea colloquy to ensure that the defendant is pleading voluntarily. 3 In Vonn, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who fails to object to Rule 11 error must carry the burden of showing on appeal that the error was “plain, prejudicial, and disreputable to the judicial system.” Hodge, 412 F.3d at 488 (quoting Vonn, 535 U.S. at 65). 8 Id. at 491. Wilson relies on Hodge for his claim that his plea colloquy was deficient because the District Court did not know that the plea was part of a package deal before accepting Wilson’s plea and did not take special care to determine that the plea was voluntary. The Government responds that the District Court did know that the plea agreement was part of a package deal. Moreover, it argues that because Hodge was decided after Wilson’s sentencing, it was explicitly directed at “future district courts considering [package] pleas,” id. at 489, and could not have been followed by the District Court here. We agree.4 Because Wilson’s Rule 11 colloquy shows that the District Court took care to determine that Wilson’s plea was not coerced, that Wilson entered a plea of guilty of his own free will, and that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, we conclude that the colloquy was not deficient.5 Enforcement of Wilson’s waiver of appeal will not result in a miscarriage of justice. His colloquy was not marred by error and he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. Accordingly, he is bound by the waiver, and that waiver deprives 4 At oral argument, counsel for Wilson contended that Kentucky v. Griffith, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), required that the procedures mandated in Hodge be applied retroactively. We have held that “Griffith should be confined to constitutional rules of criminal procedure and thus does not require retroactive application of new procedural decisions not constitutionally grounded.” Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1987). Because the procedures adopted in Hodge are not mandated by the Constitution, we decline to apply them retroactively. 5 Inasmuch as Wilson does not claim innocence and offers no valid reasons for withdrawal of his plea, we need not reach the issue of whether such a withdrawal would have prejudiced the Government. See, e.g., Jones, 336 F.3d at 255, Martinez, 785 F.2d at 115-16. 9 us of jurisdiction.6 Because Wilson waived his right to appeal, we will dismiss Wilson’s appeal. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. 6 We need not decide on this direct appeal the effect of the provision in the plea agreement waiving the right to take a collateral appeal. Although this court has not addressed that issue, the Government argues that such waivers have been enforced in other circuits. See e.g., United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding “that a waiver of collateral attack rights brought under § 2255 is generally enforceable where the waiver is expressly stated in the plea agreement and where both the plea and the waiver were knowingly and voluntarily made.”); Mason v. United States, 211 F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488-89 (6th Cir. 1999)(same); United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding an express waiver of postconviction proceedings, including proceedings under § 2255, because court could “see no principled means of distinguishing such a waiver from the [enforceable] waiver of a right to appeal”).