Opinion ID: 2175635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Inquiry Made by Houde to Officer Carchia

Text: The defendant moved prior to trial to suppress Officer Carchia's testimony that defendant had asked him to inquire whether there were any warrants outstanding for his arrest. In support of the motion to suppress, defendant's attorney pointed out that the motivation for this request was that Houde's girlfriend, Sheila Brown, had filed a complaint against defendant for assault. Although the parties ultimately stipulated before the jury that such a complaint had been filed by Brown against Houde on October 4, 1987, the trial justice denied the motion to suppress and allowed Officer Carchia to testify concerning this inquiry on the ground that it was relevant on the issue of defendant's consciousness of guilt. The defendant argues to us, as he did to the trial justice, that the existence of another plausible explanation for the inquiry reduced the probative force of this testimony to a level where its relevance was outweighed by its prejudice to defendant in requiring him by way of explanation to admit that he had been charged with another crime. In holding that the evidence was admissible, the trial justice was following Rules 402 and 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 402 states generally that all relevant evidence is admissible. Relevant evidence has been defined as evidence that tends to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without such evidence. Capezza v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp., 118 R.I. 1, 371 A.2d 269 (1977). It is important to note that the trial justice did not consider this conversation between Officer Carchia and Houde in isolation. He considered this inquiry in combination with the telephone call made by Houde to Duffy and with the statement made by Houde to James Silverthorn, the manager of Dunkin Donuts. Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states that evidence may be excluded even though relevant if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. In the case at bar the trial justice considered these elements and nevertheless determined that Carchia's testimony on this conversation was relevant. We have often stated that the determination of relevance, materiality, and admissibility of offered evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial justice. Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716 (R.I. 1985); Kelaghan v. Roberts, 433 A.2d 226 (R.I. 1981); State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381 (R.I. 1980). This court will not disturb the determination of a trial justice on these issues unless he or she has clearly abused such discretion. Gelinas, 417 A.2d at 1386. Our examination of the testimony and the record in this case discloses no abuse of discretion. This evidence was clearly relevant on the issue of consciousness of guilt, particularly when viewed in combination with other statements made by defendant on the same evening. The existence of another possible explanation for Houde's inquiry concerning a warrant should not have affected the admissibility of the evidence but might be considered by the jury in regard to its weight. The trial justice called the stipulation relating to the assault complaint to the attention of the jury and further cautioned the jurors that they were not to draw any unfavorable inferences against defendant as a result of the existence of this complaint. He properly allowed the jurors to assess the weight of this evidence in all the surrounding circumstances. In so doing, he acted well within the bounds of his discretion and committed no error.