Opinion ID: 2648240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Age, education, and health

Text: At trial, Harris was a forty-three-year-old high school graduate. The district court found the former CSHC CEO to be “a very bright man” who had been responsible for his company’s SEC filings. See Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (“Especially relevant to [Defendant’s] understanding of the risks of selfrepresentation with respect to the securities charges is the fact that he is an experienced stockbroker.”); see also United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding waiver from a defendant with an eleventh-grade education to be valid when he was a “sophisticated businessman”). During the second inquiry, Harris confirmed that he was in good physical health, that he was not using any medication that might impair his judgment, and that he did not suffer from any relevant physical or mental condition. Harris now points out, however, that a presentencing evaluation diagnosed him with a personality disorder with narcissistic issues. Therefore, his argument 21 Case: 12-11126 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 22 of 44 goes, he was disposed to overestimate his abilities and could not accurately assess the waiver decision, even though the district court found that Harris was “clearly” legally competent. Two Eleventh Circuit cases have reached different conclusions concerning defendants with narcissistic personality disorders who attempted to represent themselves. In United States v. McKenzie, 160 F. App’x 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished), the Court found that the defendant was competent to waive counsel despite a post-trial diagnosis when he “was well aware of the risks posed by selfrepresentation.” In Cash, by contrast, a panel of this Court found after a pre-trial diagnosis as part of a competency evaluation that, “considering the inadequacy of the district court’s colloquy with Appellant,” the Appellant’s mental problems tipped the balance in favor of finding that the waiver of counsel was neither knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. 47 F.3d at 1089. Here, unlike in Cash, the defendant had not previously been declared incompetent before trial, and the Cash diagnosis called the defendant’s legal judgment into serious doubt. McKenzie, which featured a post-trial, pre-sentence diagnosis like that received by Harris, more closely resembles this case. And, of course, each case of waiver will turn peculiarly on its own set of facts. Indeed concluding otherwise, and restricting Harris’s right to waive counsel simply because of a post-trial diagnosis of antisocial personality, would undermine 22 Case: 12-11126 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 23 of 44 the theory of informed free choice at the heart of Faretta. The Supreme Court has instructed us that the Sixth Amendment requires courts to respect the wishes of a defendant who is “literate, competent, and understanding,” and who is “voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36. “It is the defendant . . . who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.” Id. at 834. Despite the post-trial diagnosis, the first Fitzpatrick factor weighs in favor of finding a voluntary waiver by Harris -- a healthy, intelligent, middle-aged businessman well-versed in the securities field.