Opinion ID: 1378832
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial and appellate counsel provided Hill with effective assistance.

Text: To state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction, petitioner must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's errors were so severe that they rendered the verdict unreliable. Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 353, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
Hill claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate and pursue the possibility that Hill was mentally incompetent to stand trial or an insanity defense at trial due to his traumatic childhood and mental retardation. We conclude this assertion is wholly without merit. The test to determine whether one is mentally competent to stand trial is whether that person is not of sufficient mentality to be able to understand the nature of the criminal charges against him, and because of that insufficiency, is not able to aid and assist his counsel in the defense interposed upon the trial or against the pronouncement of the judgment thereafter. NRS 178.400(2); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 788-89, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960); Melchor-Gloria v. State, 99 Nev. 174, 179-80, 660 P.2d 109, 113 (1983). At the evidentiary hearing in this case, both Hill's trial attorneys testified that Hill did not appear to be mentally incompetent, even though they were aware that his intelligence quotient (IQ) was only 68, categorizing Hill as mildly mentally retarded. Hill's primary counsel spoke with him on several occasions, and the attorney never felt the need to investigate whether Hill was competent. He further testified that Hill assisted counsel during the trial, and they spent much time discussing trial strategy without any problems communicating. Hill's second counsel also testified at the hearing that Hill was able to grasp what was going on and could appreciate the gravity of the murder charge. Moreover, for the purposes of the petition for post-conviction relief, Hill's new counsel consulted with two psychiatrists who examined Hill. Each doctor reported that both at the time of the trial and the evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition, Hill had the capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings and the penalty imposed. They opined that Hill had the mental competence to assist counsel. Further, they concluded that Hill was able to form a specific intent to take a life and suffered from no extreme emotional distress which would suggest support for an insanity or diminished capacity defense. We further note that Hill's trial counsel retained a psychologist to examine Hill to provide mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing. The psychologist did not report any concern about Hill's ability to appreciate the nature of the proceedings. Accordingly, Hill has presented no evidence whatsoever, other than a low IQ, that he was either mentally incompetent to stand trial or that he met the standard for an insanity defense at the time of the murder. Therefore, we conclude that Hill's trial counsel cannot be deemed incompetent to have failed to pursue such avenues.
After Marshall's arrest, he gave voluntary statements implicating Hill as the perpetrator of the sexual assault and murder of Altonia. At trial, the prosecutor questioned the police officer who took the statement. For foundational purposes, direct examination revealed to the jury that Marshall made a statement; however, the content of that statement, namely that Marshall blamed Hill for the sexual assault, was not disclosed. Further, at closing arguments in the guilt phase, the prosecutor again made clear that Marshall had made a statement, but that the content was not in evidence. Although prior to trial, Hill's counsel ensured that Marshall's statement would not be admitted, they did not object when the references to that statement were made. Hill now contends that his trial attorneys were ineffective by allowing their client to be tried and sentenced on the basis of inadmissible, patently prejudicial evidence, in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Hill alleges that the jury inferred that Marshall implicated Hill and, therefore, used this as evidence of Hill's guilt. Further, citing Schrader v. State, 102 Nev. 64, 714 P.2d 1008 (1986), Hill contends that the prosecutor's reference to matters not in evidence was improper and his counsel was ineffective because no objection was lodged. We note again that the specific contents of Marshall's hearsay statements were never admitted into evidence. This was due to the successful efforts of Hill's counsel to exclude these potentially prejudicial accusations. Only the fact that Marshall made statements existed was known to the jury. Therefore, we conclude that no Bruton violation occurred. Moreover, a careful review of the record has failed to disclose any reference to Marshall's statement that would lead the jury to believe that Marshall blamed Hill for the sexual assault and murder. Accordingly, we conclude Hill's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to this claim has no merit.
Hill alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the death penalty on the ground that it is cruel and unusual punishment to execute mentally retarded persons, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution. He further avers that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Hill had an IQ of 60 as a child and a full scale IQ of 68 as an adult; therefore, he is mildly mentally retarded. Furthermore, he is illiterate and functions at the mental age of an eleven-year-old. Hill acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338-40, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2957-58, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), rejected the notion that executing a mentally retarded person amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Nevertheless, Hill asserts that due to the growing trend of state legislatures prohibiting such executions, this court should adopt such a standard. Hill has failed to provide any authority that proscribes imposing the death penalty on mildly retarded persons based on constitutional grounds. Given the brutality of these crimes, Hill's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings, and the fact that his statements to the police confirm his knowledge of the difference between right and wrong, we conclude that the imposition of the death sentence in this case does not offend any constitutional proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment. We defer to the sentencing body's determination that Hill deserves the death penalty despite his low intelligence. Therefore, Hill's counsel was not ineffective for failure to challenge the death penalty on this basis.