Opinion ID: 1948910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Evidence: Adoption of the 1986 Labor Agreement

Text: Mr. Pitt argues that the evidence in the record is insufficient to establish that the FOP and the DOC intended for the Teamsters Union contract to continue `in force after 1990, at least so far as its arbitration and mediation provisions were concerned.' He maintains that the evidence of record, taken as whole, establishes that: (1) [n]o employee firing cases were arbitrated between the FOP and DOC in the entire period surrounding [his] case, (2)[t]he President and Vice President of the FOP believed that [his] case was not required to be submitted to binding arbitration under the Teamsters['] contract, but should be heard by the OEA, and (3) the DOC has argued in multiple tribunals other than the [OEA] that corrections officers were not entitled to arbitration or other remedy, but were required to appeal their firings to the OEA. Mr. Pitt contends that the Superior Court averted its eyes from this evidence as a whole and instead erroneously relied on one documentthe 1997 MOU between FOP and DOC. We review the Superior Court's affirmance of an administrative agency ruling in the same manner as if the ruling came to us directly from the agency. Pitt I, supra, 819 A.2d at 958 (quoting Hahn v. University of the District of Columbia, 789 A.2d 1252, 1256 (D.C.2002)). In such a review, this court examines the administrative record to determine if there has been procedural error, if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the action of the agency, or if the action is in some manner otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id. Where the government employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that includes exclusive grievance procedures, those procedures may supersede otherwise available statutory provisions for OEA review. Id. at 958 (citing District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep't v. Pinkard, 801 A.2d 86, 91 (D.C.2002)). Similarly, [a]n expired collective bargaining agreement may continue in effect if the parties continue to act as if they are performing under it. Id. at 958 (citing Hahn, supra, 789 A.2d at 1258-59). Alternatively stated, [w]hen a contract lapses but the parties to the contract continue to act as if they are performing a contract, the material terms of the prior contract will survive intact unless either one of the parties clearly and manifestly indicates, through words or through conduct, that it no longer wishes to continue to be bound thereby, or both parties mutually intend that the terms not survive. Id. (citing Hahn, 789 A.2d at 1258). On remand, the sole issue decided by the OEA and the Superior Court was whether the OEA had jurisdiction over Mr. Pitt's appeal. See generally Pitt I, 819 A.2d at 958-59. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the OEA's remand decision. In May 1997, the FOP and the Department executed an MOU to address the current backlog of current arbitration cases. (Emphasis added). The MOU stated: Any backlogged arbitration case, which has been reviewed and discussed but not settled pursuant to time-tables set forth in the Joint Systematic Case Review Agreement, and any amendments thereto, shall require the [Department] and [FOP] to execute a written Statement of Non-Settlement; and within twenty (20) days of the execution date of any Statement of Non-Settlement, the case involved may be filed as an appeal with the Office of Employee Appeals by the [FOP]. The purpose of this MOU is not to change the contract but rather to provide a process to manage the backlog of grievable matters under the contract. (Emphasis added). An employee's grievance reaches the arbitration stage only after the employee follows the first four steps of the grievance procedure outlined in the 1986 labor agreement. When the Department decided to terminate Mr. Pitt, it sent him a notice informing him of his right to appeal [the] decision in accordance with the Labor Management Agreement and Mr. Pitt, in accordance with the agreement, appealed his termination by following the first four grievance steps. In an affidavit submitted to the OEA, the Vice Chairman of the FOP in 1997 explained that the MOU was negotiated to allow employees to file their unresolved grievances before the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), and noted that even though the labor management agreement negotiated by the Teamsters had expired, [s]till, the FOP filed grievances with the DOC. In addition, we agree with the OEA and the trial court that the June 30, 2000 letter from the District of Columbia to the FOP, as well as the MOU and the actions of the parties, suggest that the 1986 labor agreement was still in effect in 2000. The letter titled Re: Termination of Collective Bargaining Agreement between the District of Columbia and the Fraternal Order of Police/DOC, states: Please be advised that the collective bargaining agreement between the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and the employees of the Department of Corrections expired on September 30, 1988. This letter serves as notice that the District therefore intends to terminate the Agreement, effective September 30, 2000. Although the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired, the language of the MOU, and the conduct of Mr. Pitt, the FOP and the Department illustrate that they continued to act as if they were performing under it. Pitt I, supra, 819 A.2d at 958 (citing Hahn, supra, 789 A.2d at 1258-59), thereby foreclosing Mr. Pitt's appeal to the OEA. Id. at 958 (citing Pinkard, supra, 801 A.2d at 91). On this record, we conclude that the OEA's decision to dismiss Mr. Pitt's appeal for lack of jurisdiction was supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court properly affirmed that decision. [5]