Opinion ID: 1160930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severability of Valid and Invalid Provisions

Text: We therefore conclude Proposition 5 is inconsistent with the anticasino provision of section 19(e), insofar as it authorizes what would amount to proscribed casinos. Of course, a statute that is invalid as inconsistent with the California Constitution is not ineffective and inoperative to the extent that its invalid parts can be severed from any valid ones. (See, e.g., Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 821-822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) An invalid part can be severed if, and only if, it is grammatically, functionally and volitionally separable. ( Id at p. 821, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) It is grammatically separable if it is distinct and separate and, hence, can be removed as a whole without affecting the wording of any of the measure's other provisions. ( Id at p. 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) It is functionally separable if it is not necessary to the measure's operation and purpose. (See id. at pp. 821, 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) And it is volitionally separable if it was not of critical importance to the measure's enactment. ( Id. at p. 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) Although Proposition 5 and its model tribal/state compact both contain severability clauses (Gov.Code, § 98004, model compact § 14.0; id., § 98007), and although Proposition 5's invalid parts authorizing what would amount to proscribed casinos are grammatically separable, the invalid provisions are not functionally or volitionally separable from the remainder of the model compact or from Proposition 5 as a whole. First, the model compact as a whole is inseparable, both functionally and volitionally, from the compact's authorization of casino gambling. Without the provisions authorizing the operation of tribal gaming terminals and grandfathered class III card games, tribal gaming facilities would remain authorizedbut without resolution of the chief conflicts over class III Indian gaming that prompted the measure's circulation and passage. By the measure's own declaration, its authorization of gaming, including that authorized in the model tribal/state compact, was intended to be comprehensive, that is, to resolve the uncertainties regarding class III gaming, including tribal gaming terminals and class III card games, in an efficient and cost-effective way. (Gov.Code, § 98001, subd. (b).) It would not be such if it should prove to resolve nothing about these gaming activities. Nor can the compact as a whole be considered volitionally separate from its authorization of casino gambling. The scope of authorized gambling was of critical importance to the enactment of the measure, including its offer of a model compact ( Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247), because the scope of gambling was of critical importance to the measure itself. Even apart from Government Code section 98004, which sets forth the model compact, and Government Code section 98006, which separately but in parallel fashion authorizes tribes to operate casinos prohibited by section 19(e), almost all of the measure's remaining provisions are functionally dependent on the existence of a model compact and the authorization of casino gambling. Setting aside the title (Gov.Code, § 98000), findings ( id., § 98001), severability clause ( id., § 98007), grant of gubernatorial signing authority ( id., § 98008), guide to construction ( id., § 98010) and amendability clause ( id., § 98012), none of which could function separate from the measure as a whole, all the remaining sections of the measure except section 98005 concern the model compact or the gambling authorized under the compact and Government Code section 98006. ( Id., §§ 98002, 98003, 98004, 98006, 98009, 98011.) The first sentence of Government Code section 98005, as well, concerns the model compact. The second, and final, sentence of section 98005, however, deals with a functionally separate subjectthe State's waiver of immunity from suit in disputes arising out of negotiations for new or amended tribal/state compacts other than the measure's model compact. It provides as follows: Without limiting the foregoing, the State of California also submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any action brought against the state by any federally recognized California Indian tribe asserting any cause of action arising from the state's refusal to enter into negotiations with that tribe for the purpose of entering into a different Tribal-State compact pursuant to IGRA or to conduct those negotiations in good faith, the state's refusal to enter into negotiations concerning the amendment of a Tribal-State compact to which the state is a party, or to negotiate in good faith concerning that amendment, or the state's violation of the terms of any Tribal-State compact to which the state is or may become a party. (Gov.Code, § 98005.) The consent to suit contained in the final sentence of Government Code section 98005 is functionally separable from the measure's authorization of casino gambling and its model compact. It concerns neither the scope of gambling permitted to tribes nor the implementation of the model compact but, rather, the resolution of future disputes concerning the negotiation, amendment and performance of compacts different from Proposition 5's model compact. In significant part, it would affect the resolution of any dispute arising out of the course of future negotiations for compacts tribes may seek in lieu of the compact invalidly offered in Proposition 5. The final sentence of section 98005 is also volitionally separable from Proposition 5's authorization of casino gambling and its model compact. The enactors of Proposition 5 sought, among other things, to expedite and remove obstacles from the process of reaching tribal/state agreements on class III gaming. (Gov.Code, § 98001, subd. (b).) They sought to do so within the framework of IGRA. ( Id., subd. (a).) As part of its framework for negotiating class III gaming compacts, IGRA provides for a tribal action in United States District Court against a state that has refused to negotiate for a compact or has failed to do so in good faith. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).) The tribal remedy provided by Congress lost its effectiveness, however, with the United States Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, supra, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252, to the effect that state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits in federal district court by Indian tribes against states to enforce legislation enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause and, hence, that, in the absence of a state's consent to suit, the Eleventh Amendment renders invalid IGRA's purported grant to such court of jurisdiction. The final sentence of section 98005, in providing the state's consent to such a suit, is obviously intended to restore to California tribes the remedy provided in IGRA. Because doing so will tend to effectuate and expedite IGRA's process for achieving class III Indian gaming compacts, one of the express goals of Proposition 5, we are confident the enactors of Proposition 5 would have approved this portion of the measure even if they had known the remainder could not constitutionally be given effect. The final sentence of Government Code section 98005 also survives the other challenges petitioners make to Proposition 5's validity: It is not beyond the people's initiative power as failing to enact a statute; subject to constitutional limitations, a statute may define the scope of the government's immunity to suit. (See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 [Federal Tort Claims Act]; Gov.Code, §§ 810-997.6 [California Tort Claims Act].) It does not impermissibly infringe on the Governor's executive power, as waiver of immunity is not an exclusively executive function. (See ibid. ) It is not preempted by IGRA, as it is consistent with and furthers the purposes of IGRA. (Because all other provisions of Proposition 5 are invalid under section 19(e) or are inseparable from such invalid provisions, we need not address petitioners' remaining challenges as they concern Proposition 5 in general.)