Opinion ID: 780418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Individual Death Qualification

Text: 77 We now turn our attention to the death qualification of the potential jurors. The defendants urge this Court to hold that the trial court in the present case failed to conduct a searching voir dire on this issue, and that the Court failed to strike for cause jurors who suggested in their responses to the Court's questions that they might not be impartial. We do not agree with the defendants' contentions. 78 The standard for the exclusion of a venireman on the basis of his inability to consider a death-penalty verdict properly was articulated in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The Supreme Court stated that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Id. at 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770. In its opinion, the Court stated that this standard did not change the ability of a court to excuse a juror who states that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence presented to the Court or that [his] attitude toward the death penalty would prevent [him] from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Id. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770. 79 In a later case the Court noted that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). Even a juror who has stated that he does not believe in the death penalty might be able to sit as a juror if he can follow the trial judge's instructions and consider fairly the imposition of the death sentence in a particular case. Id. at 44-45, 100 S.Ct. 2521 (citing Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969)). Moreover, bias does not have to be evident from voir dire with `unmistakable clarity' because many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made `unmistakably clear.' Kinder v. Bowersox, 272 F.3d 532, 543 (8th Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). 80 In their briefs, the defendants provide many examples of potential jurors that they feel the Court should have struck for cause, or improperly struck for cause, because of these individuals' willingness vel non to sentence the defendants to death. We will again include only a sample of these examples in our discussion in order to analyze the defendants' arguments, paying close attention, first, to those individuals who served on the jury in this case. 81 The first inquiry that the Court made with regard to the death penalty was in the juror questionnaire. Each person was asked: 82 4. How would your feelings about the death penalty affect you if you served as a juror in a case and had to choose between the death penalty and a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole? (Please read all of the statements, take some time to think, and then mark all of the choices which you believe describe your feelings.) 83 a. I am opposed to the death penalty, and I will never vote to impose the death penalty in any case, no matter what the facts. 84 b. I am opposed to the death penalty, and I would have a difficult time voting to impose the death penalty. 85 c. I am opposed to the death penalty, but could vote to impose the death penalty if I believed that the death penalty was called for in light of the facts and the law in the case. 86 d. I have no definite opinion for or against the death penalty. I could vote to impose the death penalty, or I could vote to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, whichever I believed was called for in light of the facts and the law in the case. 87 e. I am in favor of the death penalty, but I could vote for a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole if I believed that sentence was called for in light of the facts and the law in the case. 88 f. I am strongly in favor of the death penalty, and I would have a difficult time voting against the death penalty. 89 g. I am strongly in favor of the death penalty, and I would vote for the death penalty in every case in which the person charged is eligible for a death sentence. 90 h. None of the statements above correctly describes my feeling about the death penalty. 91 41. Please describe your feelings about the death penalty in your own words. How strong are those feelings and how long have you had them? 92 Appellee's Addendum A 11. 93 The Court inquired further into the jurors' views during the individual death penalty qualification. It is with these individual interviews that the defendants are most concerned. 94 The defendants first contend that juror number 7, Jaqueline Craig, should have been struck for cause. Ms. Craig stated in her questionnaire that she had no definite opinions either for or against the death penalty and that she could vote to impose either punishment. Tr. 67. Ms. Craig also stated in her questionnaire that she believed an individual should be responsible for their actions and that evidence would have to show an intent to murder for the death penalty to be imposed. Id. When questioned further on this matter, she stated that she believed that she could vote for either punishment after considering any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and that she would not automatically vote one way or the other if she found that a murder had been intentionally committed. Tr. 68. We see no error in the Court's failure to strike Ms. Craig, who ultimately served on the jury. Ms. Craig did not indicate that she would favor one penalty or the other, and she did not state that she would be unable to follow the procedure outlined by the Court. 95 The defendants also argue that juror number 10, Linda Watson, should have been removed by the Court for cause. Ms. Watson also served on the jury in this case. First, we note that the defendants did not move to strike Ms. Watson following her qualification. Ms. Watson stated in her questionnaire that she was in favor of the death penalty but she could vote for life imprisonment. Tr. 80-81. She also stated in her questionnaire that she would vote for the death penalty if the evidence prove[d] it. Tr. 81. When the Court asked Ms. Watson if she could follow the process of evaluating the mitigating and aggravating factors and consider both options of punishment, she stated [y]es. Id. Again, we do not believe that the Court erred in failing to strike Ms. Watson. She clearly indicated that she could consider both options as to punishment. 96 The defendants in this case moved to strike numerous other prospective jurors who they felt would be inclined to vote for a sentence of death, rather than life imprisonment without parole. After reviewing the individual questioning of all veniremen, we shall discuss only the denials by the Court that are potentially of most concern. 97 The Court denied the defendants' motion to strike juror number 33, Judy Schott. Ms. Schott stated in her questionnaire that she was in favor of the death penalty but could vote for a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if [she] believe[d] the sentence was called for in light of the facts and the law in the case. Tr. 170. She also stated, if a person deliberately planned to commit a murder they deserved the death penalty because [she did] not believe a taxpayer should have to keep these people alive. Id. When asked if a person committed a murder with premeditation, ... would [she] feel that under those circumstances that [she] would automatically vote for the death penalty, she stated that she would be inclined to, yes. Tr. 171. When she was asked again, if a person was convicted of murder that [she] would not be able to consider both forms of punishment and that she would automatically vote for one form or the other, she replied, [n]o, I don't believe I would automatically vote one way or the other. Id. The Court then inquired into her feelings regarding the taxpayers' burden of keeping someone in prison. She stated that she was not sure if that would be a consideration when determining the appropriate form of punishment. When asked a second time if she thought the expense of keeping someone in prison would make it difficult for her to vote for life in prison, she stated, [n]o. Tr. 172-73. 98 Similarly, juror number 74, Joseph Terranella, juror number 97, Samuel Goth, and juror number 106, Lee Gabbert, all expressed strong feelings in favor of the death penalty. Mr. Terranella stated in his questionnaire that he was strongly in favor of the death penalty and would have a difficult time voting against it. Tr. 345. He also stated that he believe[s] there is biblical support for the death penalty. Id. Mr. Goth stated in his questionnaire that he was strongly in favor of the death penalty and would vote for it if a person was eligible. Tr. 443. He also made the remark, [i]f they took somebody else's life, knowingly was doing it, I don't feel like they should live either. Tr. 445. Mr. Gabbert noted in his questionnaire that he believed in an eye-for-an-eye and those that take lives on purpose should pay the price. Tr. 473. Moreover, when the Court asked Mr. Gabbert if there was an intentional murder committed you would then believe that the punishment automatically should be imposition of the death penalty, he responded, [p]robably in most cases, yes, sir. Tr. 474. 99 However, each of these jurors ultimately stated that they could follow the procedure outlined by the Court and weigh all mitigating and aggravating circumstances before imposing punishment. For example, Mr. Terranella responded affirmatively to the Court's question of whether he could vote for either form of punishment. Tr. 347. Mr. Goth also responded, yes, there would be circumstances where [he] would feel the appropriate punishment would be life imprisonment. Tr. 445. Similarly, Mr. Gabbert responded, [y]es, sir, I think I could, yes, sir, when asked if he could consider life imprisonment as punishment for someone found guilty of committing intentional murder. Tr. 475-76. 100 We do not believe that the Court abused its discretion in failing to strike particular persons on the basis of their view on capital punishment. Each of the potential jurors ultimately stated that he could consider life imprisonment without parole as a possible punishment, and that he could follow the procedure as instructed by the Court. This holding is consistent with our decision in Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 F.3d 749 (8th Cir.1998). In Ramsey, we found no error when a trial court failed to strike two potential jurors who stated that they were capable of voting for either the death sentence or life imprisonment without parole but then indicated that their tendency would be to lean towards the death penalty. Id. at 758. Because the two jurors had responded that they would be able to consider either sentence and would not impose either sentence automatically after hearing the Court's statements about aggravating and mitigating factors and the necessity of the prospective jurors' ability to follow the instructions, we upheld the Court's decision that they were qualified to sit as impartial jurors. Id. Compare Hatley v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir.1993), in which we held that the trial court properly excluded a potential juror who stated that she would automatically vote for life imprisonment. 101