Opinion ID: 2634388
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admitting Linda Bouffard's Testimony

Text: The prosecution's theory of robbery, robbery felony murder, and the robbery special circumstance depended in part on the taking during the homicides of Gladys's wallet containing money, checks and credit cards. Apparently to establish that the wallet was in the Bensons' home at the time of the crimes, the prosecution asked Linda Bouffard whether her mother, Gladys, ever said anything about her wallet being taken or stolen or lost or anything like that. Defense counsel objected that the question call[ed] for hearsay, and the court responded: I think if it is, it's an exception, perhaps, under a spontaneous declaration. Overruled. Defense counsel made similar hearsay objections, which the trial court also overruled, when the prosecution followed up by asking whether Gladys ever said her credit or checks had been stolen or taken or anything like that. Bouffard answered no to all of these questions. On appeal, defendant asserts this testimony was hearsay and its admission was both error under the Evidence Code and a violation of his constitutional rights. We reject defendant's argument because, as the People assert, the evidence was not hearsay. `Hearsay evidence' is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a), italics added.) Defendant is arguing that Gladys's failure to say anything about the items being missing or takeni.e., her silence regarding these mattersconstitutes a statement that was made for purposes of the hearsay rule. ( Ibid. ) However, nonverbal conductsuch as a person's silenceconstitutes a statement under the hearsay rule only if it was intended by [the person] as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression. ( Id., § 225.) Indeed, as defendant explains in his brief, regarding this issue, Gladys made no qualifying statement, spontaneous or otherwise. Because nothing suggests Gladys intended her failure to say anything about the loss or theft of her wallet, checks, or credit cards, to be a substitute for oral or written verbal expression ( ibid.), Bouffard's testimony to that effect was not hearsay. [10] ( Cf. People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 227, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452 [nonassertive responses or reactions, such as defendant's lack of reaction upon hearing news of victim's death, are not hearsay].) We also reject defendant's argument that, by rul[ing] three times in the jury's presence that what Mrs. Benson did not tell [Bouffard] about her wallet, credit cards and checks was admissible as spontaneous declarations, the trial court elevated Mrs. Benson's alleged silence ... to assertive nonconduct ... which constitutes hearsay. Even were it legally possible to find that a trial court's ruling on a hearsay objection transforms non-hearsay into hearsaya question we need not decidethe record here would not warrant such a finding. That record does not support defendant's characterization of the trial court's ruling: that Gladys's silence i.e., her failure to say anything constituted a spontaneous declaration. Rather, it reflects a ruling that if Gladys did say something to her daughter about the matters in question, those statements would constitute spontaneous declarations. Because the jury would not have understood the trial court's ruling as defendant suggests, his argument that the trial court's ruling elevated Gladys's silence into assertive nonverbal conduct fails. [11]