Opinion ID: 853947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enhanced Sentence Was Improper

Text: Berry contends that the imposition of sentences of sixty years for murder and twenty-five years for arson was manifestly unreasonable. He argues the trial judge failed to articulate adequately the process by which he determined those sentences. Sentencing is conducted within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion. Sims v. State, 585 N.E.2d 271, 272 (Ind.1992). When a court engages in a balancing process between aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is obligated to include a statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-3 (West 1998); Hammons v. State, 493 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. 1986). The court's statement must identify all significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, include a specific reason why each circumstance is aggravating or mitigating, and weigh mitigating circumstances against the aggravating factors. Boyd v. State, 564 N.E.2d 519 (Ind.1991). This Court has restrained by rule its authority to review any sentence permitted by statute. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Ind.Appellate Rule 17(A)(1). We examine whether the sentence appears to be manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. App.R. 17(B). In Berry's case, the sentencing court cited two aggravating circumstances. First, it found the statutory aggravating factor that the imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. (R. at 665); Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(4) (West 1998). This aggravator, however, only supports a refusal to reduce the presumptive sentence. Walton v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind.1995). As the State concedes, a reduced sentence was not under consideration. (Appellee's Br. at 11.) This aggravating circumstance was thus unavailable to support the enhancement of both sentences. The trial court mentioned one other aggravator. After articulating the need for a stiff sentence, the judge stated that the Defendant is in need of rehabilitation which can best be received at the Department of Corrections. (R. at 665.) Justice Sullivan's response to a strikingly similar claim in Mayberry v. State was appropriate in that matter and should be applied here: [T]he trial court found the statutory aggravating circumstance that defendant was in need of correctional and rehabilitative treatment that could best be provided in a penal facility. There was, of course, no question but that defendant would be incarcerated in a penal facility; the issue here is whether the defendant should be incarcerated for more than the presumptive term. Thus, for this aggravating circumstance to justify in part an enhanced sentence, it must be understood to mean that the defendant is in need of correctional and rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by a period of incarceration in a penal facility in excess of the presumptive sentence term. The trial court gave no specific or individualized statement of the reason why this defendant was in need of correctional and rehabilitative treatment that could best be provided by a period of incarceration in a penal facility in excess of the presumptive sentence term. Cf. Robey v. State, 555 N.E.2d 145, 150-51 (Ind.1990) (discussing requirement of a specific and individualized statement of the reasons supporting an enhanced sentence). 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1270-71 (Ind.1996); see also Newhart v. State, 669 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind.1996). Because the aggravating circumstances identified by the trial judge were insufficient to support an enhanced sentence, we remand with instructions to impose the presumptive fifty-five-year murder sentence and twenty-five years for arson, each to run concurrently.