Opinion ID: 1107764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: probability of acquittal

Text: To warrant a new trial, newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998). Newly discovered evidence meets this standard if it weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability. Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)). In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the trial court must consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible. Id. at 521 (quoting Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 916 (Fla.1991)). The assessment also considers whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly discovered evidence. Id. (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court summarily denied one of the claims now on appeal and denied the other claim after an evidentiary hearing. Because different standards of review apply to our review of these rulings, we address each claim separately.
The trial court denied the Sanchez-Velasco claim without an evidentiary hearing because it rests entirely on an affidavit containing inadmissible hearsay. In the affidavit, Sanchez-Velasco stated that Omer and Drew argued about money several days before the killing and that Omer stated immediately after the murder that he had fucked up. The affidavit further reflects that Sanchez-Velasco spent the entire day of the murder playing cards with Baez and that neither Williamson nor Omer approached Baez and asked him for a knife. The affidavit also contains Baez's statements that prison officials offered and gave him rewards in exchange for testifying against Williamson and told him what to say in his testimony. In the order denying relief, the trial court stated that it authorized a deposition to perpetuate Sanchez-Velasco's testimony before he was executed on October 2, 2002, but Sanchez-Velasco declined to testify. The court concluded that [a]lleged newly discovered evidence that would not be admissible at trial is not `evidence' and cannot `be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.' Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits denial of a successive motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing [i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. As noted above, a trial court ruling on a newly discovered evidence claim must consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible. Jones, 709 So.2d at 521. The Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would not be admissible during a retrial because it does not meet any of the criteria for admission of a prior statement by an unavailable witness under section 90.804, Florida Statutes (2006). In Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2003), this Court affirmed the exclusion from a postconviction evidentiary hearing of an affidavit by a witness who died before the hearing. In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we noted that the affidavit fell outside the four hearsay exceptions for a statement by an unavailable declarant: (1) former testimony; (2) statement under belief of impending death; (3) statement against interest; and (4) statement of family or personal history. Id. at 1062; see also Lightbourne v. State, 644 So.2d 54, 56-57 (Fla.1994) (concluding that affidavits and letter from inmates unavailable to testify in postconviction hearing constituted inadmissible hearsay). Likewise, the contents of the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit are inadmissible hearsay by an unavailable declarant. Williamson asserts that Baez's statement to Sanchez-Velasco that neither Williamson nor Omer approached Baez and asked for a knife on the day of the killing, that he was offered inducements to testify, and that he was told what to say during his testimony could all be used to impeach Baez in a retrial. The trial court did not address the use of the affidavit for impeachment, however, and Williamson does not explain how it could be used to impeach Baez under the rules of evidence. In theory, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit could be introduced under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), to impeach Baez through prior inconsistent statements (assuming he would deny that he was given money and a transfer in exchange for testifying and told what to say) and to show his bias in favor of the State. [3] See Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla.1982) (Merely because a statement is not admissible for one purpose does not mean it is inadmissible for another purpose.); Dias v. State, 812 So.2d 487, 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (A statement inadmissible as hearsay can still be admissible for another reason, such as for impeachment purposes.). However, even assuming the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the hearsay (by Sanchez-Velasco) and double hearsay (by Omer and Baez via Sanchez-Velasco) contained in the affidavit, its effect would have been negligible given Sanchez-Velasco's refusal to testify, the substantial impeachment of Baez at trial through prior inconsistent statements, and the other evidence against Williamson. Finally, the argument between Omer and Drew about money overheard by Sanchez-Velasco and Omer's statement after the killing that he had fucked up and had no money to pay Sanchez-Velasco would not have impeached Omer's trial testimony. The evidence at trial already reflected that the killing was prompted by a money dispute between Omer and Drew. Omer admitted at trial that he had decided not to pay Drew a $15 debt. Williamson suggested killing Drew because he thought Drew would stab Omer if Omer confronted Drew without a weapon. Therefore, the information in the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would have been merely cumulative on the financial motive for the killing. In sum, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would be inadmissible during a retrial as substantive evidence, would have little effect on Williamson's premeditation if admitted to impeach Baez, and would have been cumulative if admitted to impeach Omer. Thus, the motion, files, and record conclusively show that the affidavit is not such that it would probably produce an acquittal or conviction of a lesser included offense on retrial.
In a sworn postconviction motion filed in 1993, Omer asserted that he was coerced into pleading guilty to first-degree murder and testifying against Williamson. He claimed that his attorney negotiated the plea without his knowledge and that he was given five minutes to decide whether to accept the plea. Omer claimed he was told that if he did not sign the plea agreement, the State would sentence him to death that day and could not protect him from his codefendants. Omer also claimed that although he held Drew while Williamson stabbed the victim, he did so because he feared Williamson and did not agree of his own free will to participate, plan, or commit the act of murder. Omer testified that he did not pursue the motion and the record reflects it was denied in 1994 on several grounds, including that it was not timely filed. In his testimony during the evidentiary hearing, Omer reaffirmed his allegations of the coercive circumstances of the plea, except that he said he was never told he would not be protected from his codefendants. However, he stated that he agreed to tell the truth about the killing, including that he and Williamson had a plan to kill Drew that included a prearranged signal. Omer testified that he would have continued to pursue the motion if he thought it would help him, even though it contained falsehoods. This led to the following exchange: Q. All right. Sometimes the truth can be twisted according to how much you have to gain from what you're saying. A. I understand what you're saying, yes. Q. Is that fair to say, I mean? A. Yes. Baya Harrison, Omer's trial counsel, testified that Omer instructed him to negotiate a plea that would enable him to avoid the death penalty. Harrison said he was trying to beat Williamson's counsel to the prosecutor's office to make a deal. Harrison denied Omer's assertions that he encouraged Omer to lie under oath at Williamson's trial and that the state attorney had indicated he was the person to make the decision whether Omer received the death penalty. The trial court concluded that [t]he testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing fails to support the claim that Omer's trial testimony is now so discredited that [Williamson] probably would be acquitted on a retrial. The court also found Omer's testimony at the evidentiary hearing that there was a plan to murder Drew, and that, notwithstanding his earlier denial, he had willingly participated in that plan to be credible and persuasive. When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, this Court reviews the court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence. Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 747-48 (Fla.1998) (citing Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla.1997)). As with rulings on other postconviction claims, this Court reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. See Hendrix v. State, 908 So.2d 412, 423 (Fla.2005) (reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts in ruling on a postconviction claim that the government withheld material evidence); Gore v. State, 846 So.2d 461, 468 (Fla. 2003) (reviewing de novo the application of the law to the facts on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel); Demps v. State, 761 So.2d 302, 306 (Fla.2000) (reviewing de novo the denial of a claim that newly discovered evidence of an internal prison memo reflecting that the victim named a different inmate as the assailant rendered death sentence disproportionate in light of the life sentences imposed on codefendants). Although Omer, in his postconviction motion, recanted his trial testimony that he willingly participated in a plan to commit the murder, he retracted the recantation during the evidentiary hearing. The trial court determined that Omer was credible and persuasive during the evidentiary hearing when he reaffirmed that he and Williamson planned Drew's murder. This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on issues of fact when competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court's factual findings or on issues of witness credibility. Smith v. State, 931 So.2d 790, 803 (Fla.2006) (citing Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 921 (Fla.2004)). Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's findings crediting Omer's hearing testimony. Further, the trial court did not err as a matter of law in rejecting the assertion that Omer's trial testimony would be so discredited by the new evidence that Williamson would probably be acquitted in a retrial. The motion and evidentiary hearing testimony would constitute negligible impeachment at best. It was clear from the cross-examination that in agreeing to testify against Williamson and Robertson, the third codefendant, Omer avoided exposure to the death penalty. In addition, Omer admitted during trial that he had eighteen prior felony convictions and acknowledged he had lied to Williamson in stating that he was in prison for second-degree murder rather than sexual abuse of a child. The thrust of the new evidence, that Omer could lie to serve his own interest and had lied in his postconviction motion, would not be a revelation to jurors on retrial. Under similar circumstances, this Court affirmed the denial of a new trial in Brown v. State, 381 So.2d 690, 693 (Fla.1980). In that case, we agreed with the trial court that a witness's post trial recantation of testimony, followed by a clear retraction of the post trial statements, is not sufficient to overturn a jury verdict and sentence. Id.; cf. Duckett v. State, 918 So.2d 224, 233 (Fla.2005) (concluding that, in light of witness's refusal to testify at evidentiary hearing following recantation in post-trial interviews, it appears that she would not testify to anything new at a new trial and therefore the purported change in testimony would be unlikely to result in a new trial), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 103, 166 L.Ed.2d 78 (2006). As in Brown, the impeachment from Omer's sworn motion and postconviction hearing testimony is not such that it would probably result in an acquittal of Williamson for first-degree murder.