Opinion ID: 2803273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Interpretation and Application

Text: When interpreting a statute, “we turn first to the text.” Conrad v. Phone Directories Co., 585 F.3d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “If the words of the statute have a plain and ordinary meaning, we apply the text as written.” Id. We also consider the statute’s broader context. Id. -6- Federal courts interpret jurisdictional statutes narrowly. Id. at 1382 (“Because of the limited and defined nature of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, we are bound to construe statutes conferring jurisdiction narrowly.”). “[I]f there is ambiguity as to whether the instant statute confers federal jurisdiction over this case, we are compelled to adopt a reasonable, narrow construction.” Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 2005). Our jurisdictional analysis focuses on two phrases in § 16(a)(1)(A)—“refusing a stay” and “under section 3.”
Section 16(a)(1)(A) permits an appeal only from an order “refusing a stay.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A). Pre-Paid argues Mr. Cahill is not appealing an order “refusing a stay” but is instead appealing an order lifting the stay the district court had previously granted. This appeal, according to Pre-Paid, falls outside the scope of § 16(a)(1)(A). We disagree. The order lifting the stay here was effectively one “refusing a stay.” Mr. Cahill sought and initially received a stay. When the district court later lifted the stay, it declined to keep the stay in effect. The court’s decision granted Pre-Paid’s request to lift the stay but also denied Mr. Cahill’s request to maintain the stay, a request Mr. Cahill made in his response to Pre-Paid’s motion to lift the stay. We cannot draw a meaningful distinction in applying § 16(a)(1)(A) between an order that refuses a request for a stay and an order that refuses a request to maintain a stay already in place. The district court’s -7- decision both lifting the stay and refusing to continue the stay was therefore effectively one “refusing a stay.” Three other circuits have equated lifting a stay with “refusing a stay” under § 16(a)(1)(A). In GEA Group AG v. Flex-N-Gate Corp., 740 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2014), the appellee moved the district court to lift an already-imposed stay, and the appellant argued for its continuation while arbitration was pending. The district court agreed with the appellee in part, partially lifting the stay to allow for limited discovery. Id. at 415. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit determined it had jurisdiction over the district court’s order: [The appellant] asked for a stay under section 3 of all proceedings in the district court. The district judge in the order that [the appellant] is appealing has granted in effect a more limited stay. His refusal to grant the complete stay that [the appellant] seeks is appealable even though the stay order is interlocutory and the appellant might not be entitled to the stay that he is seeking. Id.; see also Dobbins v. Hawk’s Enters., 198 F.3d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1999) (equating, without explanation, an order to lift a stay with an order refusing a stay); Corpman v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 907 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting it had jurisdiction to consider an order vacating a stay and reinstating a case “since the district court’s order is in essence an order refusing to stay an action under section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act”). Guided by the statute’s text and persuasive authority from other circuits, we conclude the district court’s order lifting the stay in this case was effectively one “refusing a stay” under § 16(a)(1)(A). -8-
Section 16(a)(1)(A) permits an appeal only from an order “refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). We must therefore also consider whether Mr. Cahill appeals an order refusing a stay “under section