Opinion ID: 2996636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Establishment Clause Violation

Text: The Establishment Clause provides that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court developed a threepart test in order to discern whether Congress has violated the Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The DOC argues that RLUIPA violates only the second part of the Lemon test in that the statute impermissibly exalts religion by creating a right for religious prisoners that is not needed to remove a Free Exercise violation and a right that runs counter to a reasonable penological interest—maintaining prison order and security. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that “the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.” Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (upholding exemption of religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition of religious discrimination in employment). With respect to the second part of the test, “[f]or a law to have forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.” Id. at 337 (emphasis in original). Thus, “there is ample room under the Establishment Clause for benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 334) (internal quotation marks omitted). No. 02-3572 13 The DOC argues that RLUIPA creates rights in favor of religious inmates while excluding non-religious inmates and ignoring the State’s right to administer its correctional system as it sees fit. When the “government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 338. Borrowing from the Ninth Circuit again, we too adopt the position that RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause just because it seeks to lift burdens on religious worship in institutions without affording corresponding protection to secular activities or to non-religious prisoners. RLUIPA merely accommodates and protects the free exercise of religion, which the Constitution allows. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069 (citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.). Finally, a provision of RFRA nearly identical to the one at issue in RLUIPA has been held constitutional under the Establishment Clause by this Circuit and several others. In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 862-63 (8th Cir. 1998); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The reasoning behind RFRA’s validity under the Establishment Clause applies with equal force to RLUIPA’s constitutionality. The requirements of RLUIPA cannot fairly be said to amount to government advancement of religion through the government’s own activities or influence. RLUIPA seeks to remove only the most substantial burdens States impose upon prisoners’ religious rights, while giving States’ penological interests due consideration. The statute does not promote religious indoctrination, nor does it 14 No. 02-3572 guarantee prisoners unfettered religious rights, and not every challenge under RLUIPA will be deemed valid.4 Because the enactment of RLUIPA does not exalt be- lief over nonbelief, the statute also does not create rights for religious inmates that do not exist for non-religious inmates. The DOC argues that RLUIPA is problematic because its “accommodation” of religious property somehow increases the overall quantity of personal property that inmates are entitled to possess. RLUIPA, however, does not unnecessarily extend the limit the DOC imposes on the amount of religious property an inmate can possess in his cell. We see nothing in the statute’s provisions prohibiting the DOC from requiring the removal of a nonreligious item should an inmate wish to possess a religious item to which RLUIPA entitles him. And, we sincerely doubt that courts will increase exponentially the amount of religious property to which inmates are entitled by virtue of RLUIPA’s protections (thereby mandating the State to allow prisoners to exceed any limit on personal property) in light of States’ interests in maintaining order and security. It happens in this case, however, that the DOC appeals only the district court’s determination as to the constitutionality of RLUIPA, ignoring how the court resolved the merits of Charles’ claim for prayer oil. Accordingly, we find that Congress did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by its 4 In fact, Charles’ claim that the DOC violated RLUIPA by allowing him to celebrate only one religious feast per year was rejected by the district court because the court found that, although the restriction created a substantial burden to Charles’ religious rights, allowing only one feast for each “umbrella religion group” was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest for prison order and security; a decision Charles does not appeal to this Court. No. 02-3572 15 enactment of RLUIPA. There being no independent constitutional bar to the statute, it remains a valid exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause authority, and the district court’s decision to award summary judgment in favor of Charles on his prayer oil claim under RLUIPA is AFFIRMED. A true Copy: Teste: ________________________________ Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit USCA-02-C-0072—10-30-03