Opinion ID: 71845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Supersedeas Bond Premiums

Text: The next issue for consideration is whether the district court erroneously held that premiums on supersedeas bonds are not included in the taxation of costs unless the appellate court so orders. We review the district court's decision de novo. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(a) provides that if a judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed only as ordered by the court. Fed. R.App. P. 39(a). Rule 39(e) states that the premiums paid for the cost of supersedeas bonds ... shall be taxed in the district court as costs of the appeal in favor of the party entitled to costs under this rule. Fed. R.App. P. 39(e). In order to pursue the appeal in Golden Door III, Lloyds posted a supersedeas bond. In Golden Door III, this court held that the final judgments entered on behalf of consignors must be vacated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 8 F.3d at 769. On August 22, 1994, this court issued a corrected Judgment Mandate awarding Lloyds costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this court. Lloyds thereafter filed a Verified Motion to Tax Costs seeking reimbursement for the bond premiums. Relying on Graham v. Milky Way Barges, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 18 (E.D.La.1988), the magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny supersedeas bond premiums because the Judgment Mandate failed to specifically include those costs. The magistrate judge held that when an appellate court vacates the district court's judgment on appeal, Rule 39(a) provides for costs only as ordered by the [appellate] court. Again, this court's Judgment Mandate failed to explicitly provide for supersedeas bond premiums. Moreover, the magistrate judge refused to imply the inclusion of such bond premium costs because the Judgment Mandate directed the Clerk of this court to tax the costs of appeal, while Rule 39(e) specifically provides for recovery of bond premiums in the district court. We affirm the denial of supersedeas bond premiums. It appears that this issue is one of first impression in this circuit. Rule 39(a) leaves the imposition of costs to the discretion of the appellate court where the lower court judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part or vacated. In exercising this discretion, a court must provide a specific directive. The phrase only as ordered by the court does not provide the parties with a unfettered right to all costs incurred on appeal. Rather, in cases where this court's determination does not produce closure, we must determine the relief to which the parties are entitled. Where this court's order fails to explicitly grant a class of costs, we must interpret that silence as a rejection of those costs. We find support for our position in Conway Groves, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 158 F.R.D. 505 (M.D.Fla.1994). Under the facts in Conway, this court had affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded a lower court's decision. This court had also ordered the parties to equally divide the costs of appeal to be taxed by the clerk of this court. The district court held that Rule 39(a) required the appellate court to specify the costs to be taxed on appeal. Our court's inclusion of the phrase clerk of this court precluded the district court from awarding supersedeas bond premium costs because Rule 39(e) places bond premium costs within the mandatory auspices of the district court. In contrast, the costs of briefs, appendices and copies of records undisputably fall within the ambit of the [appellate] court's order because these costs are specifically discussed in Rule 39(c). Conway, 158 F.R.D. at 506; see also Graham, 122 F.R.D. at 20. Rule 39(a) places discretion in the appellate court. A general order for the clerk of the appellate court to tax costs encompasses those costs enumerated in Rule 39(e) and does not include costs for supersedeas bond premiums.