Opinion ID: 1200787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.

Text: The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1979) (the Act) provides: Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. The state does not contend that this record presents an express Congressional or Constitutional exception to the Act. Neither does the state assert that the use of the Army Drug Suppression Team either by the Anchorage police or by the Army itself was not wilful. [2] Furthermore, the state does not contend that the Army was not used as a posse comitatus or otherwise.  [3] 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Emphasis added). Rather, the state argues that the military assistance in this case was not regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature and therefore not violative of the Act. This contention is inept. The use of military personnel for surveillance or as undercover agents is direct participation in violation of the Act, 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1988), and 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(3) (1990). 10 U.S.C. § 375, a corollary to the posse comitatus act, [4] requires [t]he Secretary of Defense [to] prescribe such regulations as ... ensure that any activity (including ... the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army .. . in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law. Pursuant to this statute the Secretary has specifically prescribed 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(3): (3) Restrictions on Direct Assistance. Except as otherwise provided in this enclosure, the prohibition on the use of military personnel as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws prohibits the following forms of direct assistance: ... . (ii) A search or seizure. ... . (iv) Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as informants, undercover agents, investigators, or interrogators. The Posse Comitatus Act, its related statutes and regulations thus do not require that civilians be coerced or intimidated by a show of military force, as the state contends; neither does the Act absolve military participation which stops short of permeating or pervading the operation. [5] Rather, the Act applies equally by its terms to cases where civilian authorities use elements of the military as a matter of convenience, or to play bit-roles in state investigations. In sum, Army personnel may not provide direct assistance as prohibited in 10 U.S.C. § 375 and 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(3) unless otherwise authorized by law. The state cites no such authorization here. The state's implicit reliance upon a regulation expressly limited to indirect assistance is patently inadequate to authorize the direct assistance in this case. See 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(7)(ii) (approving indirect assistance which does not subject civilians to the exercise of military power that is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature). Neither may the military's direct participation be excused, as the state contends, because the Army has a strong interest in preventing the introduction of illegal drugs onto military installations. [6] The Act requires more than strong or valid [7] motivations: absent the specific authorization of Congress, the military execution of civilian laws is excused only if such actions are taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(i) (emphasis added). The state does not here allege, nor did the superior court or court of appeals conclude, that the primary purpose of this investigation was to further a military function. The state thus misconstrues, and the superior court and court of appeals have misapplied, the law upon these facts. [8] It simply is not a military function to enforce state criminal statutes against civilians in a city hotel. That the Army has a significant, valid, and of course independent [9] interest in the health and safety of its personnel does not establish a military function to serve that interest by using elements of the Army to execute civilian laws. The challenge of the Act is to recognize the distinct spheres of influence of civil and military authority, between which both soldiers and civilians often pass. Only a primary military purpose, construed expressly at the expense of all competing civilian law enforcement purposes, [10] justifies military intrusion into the civilian sphere. [11]