Opinion ID: 2575790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issue 5: Did the district court violate double jeopardy in applying the K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(b) aggravating factor to impose Kirtdoll's hard 50 sentence?

Text: Finally, Kirtdoll argues that the district court impermissibly used the conduct from his aggravated battery convictions as the sole aggravating factor to support his hard 50 sentence, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights protect against . . multiple punishments for the same offense. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis added.) State v. Hanson, 280 Kan. 709, 712, 124 P.3d 486 (2005). As stated, this court has de novo review of constitutional questions. Oliver, 280 Kan. at 707. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4635(a), the statute in place at the time of Kirtdoll's crimes, provides for court imposition of the hard 50. It states in relevant part: [I]f a defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree based upon a finding of premeditated murder, the court shall determine whether the defendant shall be required to serve . . . a mandatory term of imprisonment of 50 years or sentenced as otherwise provided by law. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4635(b) directs the sentencing court to consider aggravating circumstances listed in K.S.A. 21-4636 when making the determination. Here, the district court relied upon. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(b) as the aggravating factor for imposing the hard 50 sentence, i.e., whether [t]he defendant knowingly or purposely killed or created a great risk of death to more than one person. Kirtdoll asserts that he is being punished twice because the same conduct was used to not only increase his parole eligibility from 25 years to 50 years on the murder conviction but also to sentence him to two 41-month sentences on the aggravated battery convictions. The State responds that the aggravated battery statute, K.S.A. 21-3414 (caused great bodily harm to another person) and K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(b) (knowingly or purposely . . . created a great risk of death to more than one person) proscribe different conduct. It argues that when Kirtdoll fired the gun in the crowded nightclub, he created a great risk of death to everyone near Yates. The fact that he also caused great bodily harm to both Claiborne and Willmore did not negate the risk of death to the other individuals on the dance floor. The district court's statements at sentencing demonstrate similar logic: I believe that as far as the Hard 50 issue goes, that there is no question that there is a lot of testimony to support this. That you fired several shots into a crowded dance floor and there was really no issue about that. There was no issue about the fact that Mr. Yates was dancing with a lot of girls out on this dance floor. And it was a packed nightclub, and it was a packed dance floor. Consequently, it is clear that the district court used the firing of the shots into a crowded dance floor as the statutory aggravator, irrespective of whether the shots actually injured anyone, i.e., constituted aggravated battery. Accordingly, Kirtdoll was not sentenced twice for the same offense, aggravated battery, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses. Affirmed.