Opinion ID: 2264916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Beneficiary Form

Text: In addressing appellant's request that a constructive trust be placed on all remaining proceeds of Bolle's estate, we first note that appellant's election of a constructive trust as a remedy in wholly inappropriate. Generally, a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for combatting unjust enrichment. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3 (1973); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 77 et seq. (1987); V. SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 461 et seq. (1989). While appellant is correct that for this court to employ this remedy, the inequitable conduct in question need not rise to level of actual fraud, Hertz v. Klavan, 374 A.2d 871, 873 (D.C.1977), we will apply it for the purpose of preventing humans from being successful in shady bits of behavior. Id. (quoting 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 594, at 567 (1974)). In Hertz, this court imposed a constructive trust where the appellant guilefully obtained his ninety-four-year-old aunt's signature on a deed to her house conveying the property to him. At the time she signed the instrument, the aunt was in the hospital facing imminent death, and she could neither read nor write English. Moreover, the property had previously been designated as part of an estate to provide scholarships for orphans overseas. See also Gray v. Gray, 412 A.2d 1208 (D.C.1980); Harrington v. Emmerman, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 186 F.2d 757 (1950); Mandley v. Backer, 73 App. D.C. 412, 121 F.2d 875 (1941). Here, there is no evidence that Hume acquired her right to the life insurance proceeds by guile, deceit or subterfuge. Furthermore, appellant's argument fails as a result of the clear language of Bolle's insurance designations. On two separate occasionsNovember 29, 1986 and April 8, 1988Bolle, an attorney, filled out beneficiary forms. On the latter occasion, he designated Jeffery Hume Bolle (a.k.a. Jeffery Elizabeth Hume) in the space provided for Name of Primary Beneficiary. In the space provided for Secondary Beneficiary, he designated Susanna Thayer Bolle. He left blank both the space following the caption Special Provisions and the space provided for any assignation of Change of Beneficiary. No other beneficiaries were named, nor were any other additions made. [5] Therefore, given that Hume was unequivocally designated beneficiary, her right to take is protected unless there is convincing evidence to the contrary. Mayberry v. Kathan, supra, 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 55, 232 F.2d at 55. Notwithstanding these stipulations, appellant urges that the trial court erred for failing to consider Bolle's intent and motive when he executed the designation of beneficiary on April 8, 1988, his feelings at the time toward his wife and the break-up of their marriage, and his expressed intent to leave everything to his sister. An insurance policy as issued and accepted is prima facie the contract of the parties. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Abramson, 530 A.2d 1202, 1210 (D.C.1987) (quoting 13A J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7608, at 304 (1976)). As the policy is a legally enforceable agreement, once again our inquiry requires the application of the parol evidence rule to the objective law of contracts. See Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 967 (D.C.1984). While the beneficiary form lacked any explicit merger clause, where the contract is one of insurance, the commentators are unanimous in their position that the contracts are to be construed as integrated. See 19 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D (Rev. ed.) § 79:126, at 101 (1983): The applicability of the parol evidence rule to the contract of insurance is sometimes stated in terms of an irrebuttable presumption, namely, that when a policy of insurance, properly executed, is delivered and accepted, it must be conclusively presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement for insurance by which the parties intended to be bound, and therefore, to be the final form of their binding agreement. See also 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7385, at 134 (1976). [I]f a policy is plain and unambiguous, the court will construe it without reference to any acts or conduct of the parties thereto which evince their interpretation of such contract. [6] As such, [t]he intent of the parties as expressed in their contract is controlling and parol evidence is not admissible to show an intention contrary to that expressed in an unambiguous written contract. 19 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D (Rev. ed.) § 79:129, at 105. An intent different from that clearly expressed in the application and policy cannot be established by parol so as to modify the interests of the beneficiaries as so stated. Id. This position is reinforced in this jurisdiction by this court's reluctance to look behind the clearly unambiguous language of a life insurance contract. Where a party seeks to reform a designation of beneficiary, we have held that as the law of this jurisdiction presently stands, for a change-of-beneficiary designation to be effective, if not strictly in compliance with the terms of the policy, it must be evidenced in some form of writing. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Abramson, supra, 530 A.2d at 1211 (citations omitted.) We followed Cohn v. Cohn, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 171 F.2d 828 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962, 69 S.Ct. 892, 93 L.Ed. 1114 (1949), in which the court of appeals was faced with conflicting evidence whether a policy naming the parents of a deceased naval officer was changed to name his wife. There, the court held that any change in the formally designated beneficiaries of these policies be evidenced by some unmistakable proof that the decedent did actually make the change. Id. at 220, 171 F.2d at 830 (emphasis supplied). More recently, in Estate of Bowden v. Aldridge, supra , an action brought to determine the lawful beneficiary of life insurance benefits and other funds, we held that a separation and property agreement does not divest a former spouse of her interest as a designated beneficiary absent ` convincing evidence ' that it was intended to deprive the named beneficiary of that interest (citing Mayberry v. Kathan, supra note 2, 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 55, 232 F.2d at 55 (emphasis supplied)). Here, the trial court correctly declined to admit the parol evidence which would have altered the plain reading of the beneficiary form. We, therefore, need not reach the question whether or not the evidence rose to the level of convincing or unmistakable.