Opinion ID: 204115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clarity of Statute

Text: The first step of Chevron requires that we focus on the statutory language. Following the counsel of Succar, we give the words of the statute their ordinary meaning unless the context of the statute suggests otherwise. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 114 L.Ed.2d 194 (1991). When the plain wording of the statute is clear, that is the end of the matter. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004). We must remember, however, that the plain meaning of a statutory provision is often made clear not only by the words of the statute but by its structure as well. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). In our view, a natural reading of the statutory provision from top to bottom makes clear that the congressional requirement of mandatory detention is addressed to the situation of an alien who is released from custody for one of the enumerated offenses. The statutory language embodies the judgment of Congress that such an individual should not be returned to the community pending disposition of his removal proceedings. Both the language and the structure of the statutory provision state this mandate in a clear and straightforward manner. As explained by one of our colleagues in the district court in Oscar v. Gillen, 595 F.Supp.2d 166 (D.Mass.2009) (Tauro, J.): The when released provision immediately follows the list of enumerated offenses, indicating that the former modifies the latter. Additionally, § 1226(c) provides that the alien shall be detained upon release regardless of whether he is subsequently arrested for the same offense, reinforcing the notion that the entire clause applies to the list of enumerated offenses immediately preceding it. Id. at 170. The Government submits, however, that when released is susceptible to another interpretation. The Government believes that the released language must embrace a broader meaning than a release from custody for an enumerated offense because the statute requires mandatory detention for individuals who are removable or inadmissible based on the commission of certain offenses, whether or not they were convicted of those offenses. See § 1226(c)(1)(A) & (D) (referring to other portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) not requiring a conviction); Saysana, 24 I & N Dec. at 605 n. 3. It elaborates that there are a variety of offenses for which an alien may be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)), but that may never give rise to a formal charge, let alone an indictment, trial or conviction (emphasis added). Appellant's Br. at 18; see also Saysana, 24 I & N Dec. at 605 & n. 3. Under these circumstances, the Government continues, aliens who committed these `offenses' would not necessarily be subject to criminal or other non-DHS custody. Appellant's Br. at 18-19. Thus, the Government concludes, because § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D) includes offenses for which aliens might not be incarcerated, when released must have a broader meaning than the offenses enumerated in the statute. We believe that this reading of the statutory language is a strained one. While it is true that a conviction is not always a necessary predicate to inadmissibility or removability, see § 1226(c)(1)(A) & (D) (cross-referencing other sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act not requiring a conviction), the plain language of the statute does not render the term when released meaningless as applied to these subsections. Individuals may be released in connection with the offenses listed without any resulting conviction and be subject, therefore, to mandatory detention, consistent with the statute. For example, an alien could be arrested and released without charges. That an alien might have committed a listed offense but never come into any form of custody from which release triggers mandatory detention does not justify a reading that attaches the serious consequences of the statute to a subsequent, otherwise wholly inconsequential, incident of criminal custody. A far more natural reading is that the when released language applies to an alien who has been detained criminally for one of the listed activities. This reading not only relates the when released to the prior language in the subsection, but it also explains the later use of terms related to criminal detention and the use of the term same offense at the end of subsection (c)(1). Indeed, if the reference to when the alien is released is read to encompass any release from any non-DHS custodial setting after the expiration of the TPCR, [3] that phrase is completely disjointed from the text that precedes and follows it. As we have noted, the preceding text specifically enumerates offenses relating to removability; the subsequent reference to the same offense is only sensibly read to relate back to the aforementioned statutorily listed offense[s]. Absent a clear direction in the text to read multiple uses of the same term to carry different meanings, we shall not do so. [4] Rather, we shall read the term uniformly throughout the provision. The Government acknowledges that it is certainly possible to interpret Congress'[s] use of the term `for the same offense' as referring to the qualifying offense, but submits that it is equally plausible that the term refers simply to the `offense' from whose custody the criminal alien is `released.' Appellant's Br. at 20 (emphasis in original). Under the Government's reading, the term same offense can refer back to any offense resulting in a release. There are two infirmities in this approach. First, the term offense, used in this way, does not appear in the statute. In essence, the Government's proposed reading untethers not only the when released language itself, but also the entire when released clause, including its reference to the same offense, from the remainder of the subsection. Second, the Government must read a separate, intervening event  post-TPCR non-DHS custody unrelated to the enumerated offenses  into the statute without any direct language to support such a reading. This reading transforms an otherwise straightforward statutory command, relating to specific offenses that Congress itself has identified as warranting special attention, into a mere temporal triggering mechanism. We see no justification in the language or structure of the statute for such a transformation. In sum, we cannot conclude that the Government's reading is equally plausible. The structure of the section makes the natural reading of this term refer to the offenses set forth in detail in subsection (c)(1)(A)-(D). [5] Leaving behind textual and structural arguments, the Government acknowledges that there is no legislative history that speaks directly to the issue of whether `when released' ... means only release from criminal incarceration for the underlying removable offense. Appellant's Br. at 21. It nevertheless notes that one prior version of the mandatory detention provision required the Attorney General to take the alien into custody upon completion of the alien's sentence for such conviction. Id. (quoting the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4470). The Government suggests that, because Congress replaced this language, it meant to divorce the custody from the specific conviction. We approach all arguments based on legislative history with significant caution. Strickland v. Comm'r, Maine Dept. of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1995) (noting that, if plain meaning does not answer an interpretive question, we next examine the legislative history, albeit skeptically, in search of an unmistakable expression of congressional intent (emphasis added)). Without citation to any relevant explanation for the change in the legislative language, we are reluctant to presume that Congress had such a singular purpose, particularly when other, perhaps more plausible, explanations for the change are also evident. As one district court has noted, In explaining the various passages of IIRIRA, the legislature stated that mandatory detention was meant to apply whenever such an alien is released from imprisonment, regardless of the circumstances of the release. House Conf. Rpt. No. 104-828 at 210-11 (Sept. 24, 1996). Presumably, with that comment, the legislature was seeking to thwart arguments by aliens that because they were subject to parole or other community supervision they could not be taken into immediate immigration detention because that would result in a violation of their imposed conditions. The Court is not persuaded that the legislature was seeking to justify mandatory immigration custody many months or even years after an alien had been released from state custody. Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2004) (adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation). In short, the speculative argument based on legislative history pales in the face of a very strong argument based on text and structure. In sum, the Government's effort to make § 1226(c)(1) ambiguous is strained. Reading the provision as a whole, we think it is clear that the when released language relates to the listed offenses in subsection (c)(1)(A)-(D).