Opinion ID: 1840036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in placing a child back into a home to which she was violently opposed to staying and in which she was continually exposed to a man who had sexually abused her?

Text: ¶ 32. In order to determine the correct standard under which to consider the custody issues before this Court, it is necessary for this Court to first establish exactly who Tryxie's parents are in the eyes of the law. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-13 (1994) specifically provides that all parental rights of the natural parents are cut off by an adoption, except in the case of a natural parent who is the spouse of an adopting parent. However, the statute provides that such is the case unless otherwise specifically provided, which language gives rise to questions concerning the significance of this qualification. In the present case, the Agreed Decree provided that: (P)etitioner (Humphrey) acknowledges the adoption, but Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner is the natural father of the said minor child. Accordingly, the Final Decree of Adoption should be modified to the extent that Larry Joe Humphrey is recognized as the natural father of the minor child, and that Petitioners parental rights are not terminated. (emphasis added). Thus, the Agreed Decree is superficially consistent with the language of § 93-17-13 in recognizing the adoption of Tryxie by the Pannells but nevertheless reserving parental rights in favor of Humphrey. ¶ 33. It is clear, however, that a parent who is giving up a child for adoption or, as in this case, acknowledging the validity of an adoption, can not retain all of his parental rights or else the adoption is rendered meaningless. By allowing Humphrey to argue that he should be granted custody based on this State's modification of parental custody law, the Chancellor in effect placed Humphrey on near-equal footing with the Pannells as far as their right to custody of Tryxie is concerned. In Natural Father v. United Methodist Children's Home, 418 So.2d 807 (Miss. 1982) this Court declared unconstitutional the portion of Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-109 which allowed for the termination of parental rights upon a preponderance of the evidence standard. This declaration was made in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), in which said Court held that due process required that the parent's unfitness be proven by clear and convincing evidence before his or her parental rights were terminated. ¶ 34. If Humphrey had prevailed in demonstrating a material change in circumstances based on the preponderance of evidence standard, then he would presumably have been able to divest the Pannells of custody of their legal child. Such a result comes dangerously close to terminating the Pannells' parental rights on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence standard which was rejected by this Court, the Legislature, and the U.S. Supreme Court. This proceedings in the present case were admittedly not termination of parental rights proceedings, but the effect to an adoptive family of divesting them of custody of their child is sufficiently similar to raise valid constitutional concerns. ¶ 35. Of equal importance to the constitutional issues are the public-policy considerations which permeate the adoption statutes as set forth by the Legislature. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-15 (1994) provides that: No action shall be brought to set aside any final decree of adoption, whether granted upon consent or personal process or on process by publication, except within six (6) months of the entry thereof. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-21(1) (1994) provides that: The [Bureau of Vital Statistics] shall prepare a revised birth certificate which shall contain the original date of birth, with the place of birth being shown as the residence of the adoptive parents at the time the child was born, but with the names of the adopting parents and the new name of the child. These adoption statutes, including the six-month statute of limitation for challenging adoptions [5] , provide a good illustration of the intent of the Legislature that the adoption process give rise to a new relationship between the adoptive parents and child which is not subject to endless legal contests [6] . The parent-child relationship, by its very nature, requires stability and permanence, and the Legislature has clearly recognized this fact in the adoption and termination of parental rights statutes of this State. ¶ 36. In the view of this Court, the public policy considerations favoring the permanence of adoptions are inconsistent with an interpretation of § 93-17-13 which would permit the sort of post-adoption modification of custody battles which have arisen in the present case. The unless otherwise specifically provided in § 93-17-13 language must be interpreted in light of the context of the adoption statutes as a whole, and these statutes are clearly written to foster legal stability in the relationship between adoptive parents and their children. In the view of this Court, the unless otherwise provided language was intended by the Legislature to provide natural and adoptive parents with the option of entering into limited arrangements such as post-adoption visitation agreements as long as the best interests of the child would be served by such an arrangement. ¶ 37. Post-adoption visitation arrangements are permitted in a number of states, and the unless otherwise specifically provided language in § 93-17-13 would appear to permit such arrangements. The annotation found at 78 A.L.R.4th 218, Post-adoption Visitation by Natural Parent discusses a number of state court decisions which allow parties to agree to post-adoption visitation in cases in which it is deemed to be in the child's best interests. However, the ALR annotations reveal no state which allows the sort of quasi-adoption which has been implemented in the present case, nor do the parties cite any such cases. A large number of states, in fact, do not even permit post-adoption visitations on grounds that this visitation is detrimental to the relationship between the adoptive parent and child. This Court considers it improper to incidentally rule upon the propriety of post-adoption visitations in the present case, however, and we leave a ruling on this important issue to future cases when the issue is squarely before this Court. ¶ 38. This Court does conclude, however, that § 93-17-13 was not intended by the Legislature to grant a natural parent the right to weaken the legal bonds of the adoptive parent-child relationship by reserving the right to, in effect, sit and wait for the circumstances of the adoptive family to materially change and then divest the adoptive family of the custody of the child. The United States Supreme Court, as noted earlier, has placed a high constitutional value on parental rights which arise from caring and nurturing a child, and this value should also apply to adoptive parents who have developed a relationship with a child. It is undeniable that families may enter difficult situations relating to finances, health, or personal differences and these situations may constitute material changes in circumstances. Such difficulties are a fact of life, however, and they are not grounds for dissolving the familial relationship created by the adoption process and granting custody of the children to a natural parent. ¶ 39. This Court need not theorize about any potential or abstract dangers of allowing post-adoption custody battles, given that the present case serves as an all-too real example of the dangers of allowing the sort of quasi-adoption which has been implemented in the present case. The record in the present case reveals a sad history of painful litigation which has arisen following the Agreed Degree, and a great deal of the pain has been borne by Tryxie. ¶ 40. This Court accordingly holds that the portion of the Agreed Decree which recognizes the validity of the adoption yet which reserves parental rights in favor of Humphrey should not be interpreted to permit Humphrey to attempt to divest the Pannells of the custody of their adoptive child based upon a material change in circumstances. This Court nevertheless finds the remaining provisions of the Agreed Decree regarding visitation and support to be a voluntary agreement between the parties that is in the best interests of Tryxie. This Court upholds the Chancellor's ruling to continue to enforce the visitation and child support provisions of the Agreed Decree as long as the enforcement thereof is consistent with the best interests of Tryxie and as long as Humphrey complies with the support feature of the contact. ¶ 41. Although he neglected to establish a relationship with her in her early years, Humphrey clearly cares for Tryxie, as is evidenced by the legal expenses he has incurred in her behalf in spite of limited means. While the Pannells are Tryxie's legal parents in the eyes of the law, the fact remains that there is a possibility that they will not live long enough to raise Tryxie to adulthood. [7] In the event of the death of the Pannells, it would serve Tryxie's best interests for her to have been able to develop a relationship with Humphrey, who has recently shown a willingness to assume partial responsibility for her support. [8] ¶ 42. With regard to the incident which led to the present custody battle, this Court is faced with allegations of conduct which are of an extremely serious nature. At the same time, however, the allegations are not made against Tryxie's parents, but rather against South, who lives near the Pannells. The alleged incident of sexual abuse, if true, appears to be an isolated incident which has been investigated and addressed by the Chancellor and various social and law enforcement agencies. This Court does not consider it necessary to remand for additional proceedings with regard to Tryxie's legal status as the daughter of the Pannells, but we trust that the Chancellor will pay careful attention to Tryxie's progress and hold hearings with regard to her welfare if they should become necessary.