Opinion ID: 1742814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel ClaimImproper Bolstering of Witness's Testimony.

Text: Two elements must be established to show the ineffectiveness of defense counsel: (1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) this omission resulted in prejudice. A defendant's inability to prove either element is fatal. Generally, ineffective-assistance claims are preserved for postconviction relief proceedings to afford the defendant an evidentiary hearing and thereby permit the development of a more complete record. If the record on appeal shows, however, that the defendant cannot prevail on such a claim as a matter of law, we will affirm the defendant's conviction without preserving the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Conversely, if the record on appeal establishes both elements of an ineffective-assistance claim and an evidentiary hearing would not alter this conclusion, we will reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003) (citations omitted). The defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a police officer's alleged improper bolstering of another witness's testimony. We conclude as a matter of law that the defendant cannot prevail on this claim. B. Discussion. Newell argues on appeal that detective Moller improperly commented on the truth and veracity of a later witness, Jim McClain. This alleged bolstering occurred during defense counsel's cross-examination of Moller. Counsel questioned the detective about overtures made to McClain to assist in the prosecution of other cases. In response, Moller stated: A. No. But what I recall is . . . McClain stating, I realize I'm probably not going to get . . . I'm probably not going to get anything out of this, but I knew Kathy. She was a decent gal. She didn't deserve this. . . . Further questioning on this topic elicited similar testimony. In addition, the defense complains about the following testimony of Moller: Q. Would you believe anything he [McClain] told you? A. If it can be corroborated, yes. I'm not sayingin police work, anybody you talk with you try to corroborate what they say, whether it be a citizen off the street or somebody in the Black Hawk County jail. The defendant claims these answers were improper opinion testimony about the veracity of witness McClain, who testified for the prosecution. See State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa 1986) (holding expert cannot testify on matters `that either directly or indirectly render an opinion on the credibility or truthfulness of a witness' (citation omitted)); cf. State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1992) (holding opinion evidence may not be employed as a direct comment on the guilt or innocence of the defendant). Moller's testimony about McClain's remarks was not an improper comment on McClain's veracity, because Moller simply reiterated McClain's professed reasons for coming forward to testify. Moller did not state whether he believed these reasons were McClain's true motivation. Because there would have been no merit to an objection that the witness improperly commented on the veracity of another witness, trial counsel was not ineffective as a matter of law for failing to make this objection. See Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 134 (stating counsel has no duty to make an objection that lacks merit). We do not decide whether trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty when he did not object to Moller's second commentthat Moller would believe McClain if McClain's testimony could be corroboratedbecause no prejudice resulted from the admission of this testimony. Moller's comment was at most a lukewarm endorsement of McClain's veracity. Moreover, Moller testified that in police work, one corroborates everyone's testimony, implying that he considered McClain no more or less trustworthy than any other witness. Given the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, there is no reasonable probabilityas a matter of lawthat, but for the admission of this evidence, the outcome of the trial would have been any different. See id. (stating defendant must show `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different' (citation omitted)).