Opinion ID: 27055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Immunity for Police Chief Crum

Text: As explained above, when the district court addressed Chief 39 Gros, 2000 WL 1842421, at . 40 The district court correctly observed that, “[b]ecause plaintiffs’ action against Chief Crum...in [his] official capacit[y] is the same as a suit against the City, the motion, and the court’s decision today, also apply to [Chief Crum] in [his] official capacit[y].” (Citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). Our affirmance of the summary judgment in favor of the City therefore has the concomitant effect of affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Appellants’ claims against Chief Crum and Lieutenant Bender in their official capacities. 15 Crum’s qualified immunity defense, it held that he was entitled to qualified immunity for Appellants’ hiring policy and training and supervision policy claims, but was not entitled to qualified immunity for the claims premised on his hiring of Officer Rogers. Chief Crum appealed the denial of qualified immunity, and in April 2000, we reversed that denial, holding that Crum was not deliberately indifferent in connection with his hiring of Rogers. At that time, we declined to address Appellants’ cross-appeal of the grant of qualified immunity to Chief Crum on the hiring policy and training and supervision policy claims. We turn now to Appellants’ appeal of those two district court rulings. As a threshold matter, Chief Crum insists that Appellants did not perfect the appeal of the grant of qualified immunity to him because their notice of appeal referenced only the district court’s December 2000 Memorandum and Order, the sole focus of which was the City’s municipal liability. He argues that the Appellants’ notice of appeal is insufficient to revive their interlocutory crossappeal over which we refused to exercise jurisdiction in April 2000. In October 2001, a panel of this court denied Chief Crum’s motion to dismiss Appellants’ appeal on precisely the same grounds as he re-urges now. The October ruling implicitly found that Appellants have properly perfected the appeal of the grant of qualified immunity to Chief Crum. Although we are not bound by the 16 motions panel’s determinations on such questions,41 we do agree with that panel’s ruling. The district court’s December 2000 memorandum opinion and order disposing of the Appellants’ municipal liability claims against the City was referenced in a final judgment entered by district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b) in January 2001. That judgment states, in relevant part: For the reasons set out in a memorandum opinion and order filed December 12, 2000, and the court by prior judgments having dismissed all other claims in this case against all defendants except defendant Eric Rogers (“Rogers”), individually, it is ordered and adjudged that plaintiffs’ actions against all defendants, except defendant Rogers, are dismissed with prejudice.... Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and directs the clerk of court to enter this as a final judgment. [Emphasis added.] Appellants’ notice of appeal, in turn, states: Notice is hereby given that [Appellants] hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Court on December 12, 2000.... Said Order of the Court was made final and appealable by entry of a Rule 54(b) Judgment signed by the Court on January 8, 2001.... It is true that Appellants’ notice of appeal refers only to the December 2000 memorandum opinion and order, and not to the February 1999 opinion and order in which the district court granted summary judgment to Chief Crum and Lieutenant Bender based on qualified immunity. We nevertheless conclude, on these facts, that 41 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 190 F.3d 375, 378 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999). 17 Appellants have perfected their appeal of the February 1999 ruling. In Trust Co. of Louisiana v. N.N.P., Inc.,42 responding to an argument that an issue had not been preserved for appeal, we observed: We have held that where a party designates in the notice of appeal particular orders only (and not the final judgment), we are without jurisdiction to hear the challenges to other rulings or orders not specified in the notice of appeal. But we have not applied this “specify-all-orders” approach to notices of appeal from a final judgment. Rather, we have held that an appeal from a final judgment sufficiently preserves all prior orders intertwined with the final judgment.... ... Moreover, we have also suggested that if a party mistakenly designates the ruling from which he seeks to appeal, the notice of appeal is liberally construed and a jurisdictional defect will not be found if (1) there is a manifest intent to appeal the unmentioned ruling or (2) failure to designate the order does not mislead or prejudice the other party. In United States v. Lopez-Escobar, 920 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1991), we stated that if both parties briefed the issue that allegedly was not preserved on appeal —— as is the case here —— and if the opposing party suffers no prejudice, we have jurisdiction to hear challenges to the unenumerated orders.43 The instant case is replete with factors advanced by the Trust Co. court as militating in favor of exercising jurisdiction. First, Appellants did appeal from an order that was designated as a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Second, despite Chief Crum’s argument to the contrary, the issue of his qualified immunity is “intertwined” with the issue of municipal liability in 42 104 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 1997). 43 Trust Co., 104 F.3d at 1485-86 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 18 this case, as the foregoing discussion44 demonstrates. Third, Appellants certainly did exhibit a “manifest intent to appeal the unmentioned [February 1999] ruling” when they attempted to crossappeal it to this court at the same time Chief Crum raised his appeal. And, fourth, Chief Crum has suffered no prejudice by Appellants’ failure to designate the February 1999 order expressly in their notice of appeal, as is made abundantly clear by both parties’ briefing of the issue. We therefore reject Chief Crum’s arguments and turn to the merits of Appellants’ appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Chief Crum based on qualified immunity. In its clear and careful opinion, the district court first assured itself that the Appellants had actually stated an appropriate claim against Chief Crum under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court described the contours of a proper § 1983 supervisory liability claim as follows: A government official cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978). Instead, he can be held liable only if he was personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of an individual’s constitutional rights, or if there was a causal connection between his wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987); Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986). Because Gros and Sikes only allege that Officer Rogers 44 I.e., the district court’s examination of Chief Crum’s actions for deliberate indifference and objective reasonableness, in the context of municipal liability and qualified immunity, respectively. 19 directly violated their constitutional rights, the court must determine whether Chief Crum...[is] liable as Officer Rogers’ supervisor[]. To succeed on a claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor engaged in wrongful conduct, (2) a causal link exists between this wrongful conduct and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights, and (3) the wrongful conduct amounts to deliberate indifference. See Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating that deliberate indifference standard applies to all cases alleging a constitutional violation). A supervisor engages in wrongful conduct when he either (1) fails to train or supervise his subordinates or (2) implements a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of a citizen’s constitutional rights. See Smith, 158 F.3d at 911-12; Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 199 (5th Cir. 1996); Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304; Mathis v. Cotton, 1997 WL 457514, at  (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 1997) (Solis, J.). Further, a supervisor acts with “deliberate indifference” when he disregards a known or obvious consequence of his action. Board of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Ok. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1391 (1997).... For an official to act with deliberate indifference, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and also draw the inference. Smith, 158 F.3d at 912 (quoting [Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)]).45 The court concluded that the Appellants stated a § 1983 claim against Chief Crum (1) when they alleged that through various unconstitutional policies and decisions, he was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights in improperly hiring Officer Rogers and thereafter in failing adequately to supervise and train him; and (2) when they alleged further that Chief Crum’s deliberate indifference caused violations of their constitutional 45 Gros, 1999 WL 102800, at  (emphasis added). 20 rights. Having established that the Appellants had stated a proper § 1983 claim, the court next considered Chief Crum’s defense of qualified immunity, by engaging in the familiar two-pronged inquiry: (1) Had Appellants alleged the violation of a clearly established right, and, if so, (2) were Chief Crum’s actions objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.46 In considering the first question, the court concluded that Appellants had alleged the violation of the clearly established rights to be free from false arrests, unreasonable searches and seizure, sexual harassment, and sexual assault, and that Chief Crum’s duties regarding those rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. The court then considered the second question of the qualified immunity test, whether Chief Crum’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question. We have recounted the substance of that analysis in our review of the court’s ruling on municipal liability, above. Our de novo review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the district court’s analysis leads us to affirm the district court’s conclusions that Chief Crum’s conduct at the time of the alleged constitutional violations was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at that time. Even 46 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 21 the claim that is perhaps the most compelling —— that Chief Crum had actual knowledge of “unprofessional behavior” of GPPD officers towards citizens, including the use of excessive force, but did nothing to remedy the problem —— received explicit attention by the district court: Gros and Sikes contend that Chief Crum is liable because he was aware that GPPD officers were acting inappropriately toward citizens. They point to previous complaints and incidents in which officers verbally and physically abused citizens and used excessive force. Plaintiffs have failed to identify the particular deficiency in the officers’ training program. Instead, Gros and Sikes merely assert that GPPD never taught “civil rights” to its officers. This conclusory contention is insufficient, however, to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Chief Crum was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights through his failure to train officer Rogers. See [City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989)] (noting that lesser standard of fault and causation would open defendants to unprecedented liability under § 1983 and would result in de facto respondeat superior 47 liability). Our de novo review of these issues confirms the correctness of the district court’s sound analysis, and compels us to agree that, as to all claims, the district court correctly concluded that Chief Crum’s actions were objectively reasonable. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity for the § 1983 supervisory liability claims asserted against him.48 47 Gros, 1999 WL 102800, at  (internal citations to the record omitted). 48 It is not altogether clear whether Appellants have appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Lieutenant Bender based on qualified immunity. They do appear to argue, obliquely, that Lieutenant Bender could be held liable for 22