Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Defendant's asserted incompetence to admit the two prior prison term enhancements

Text: After the verdict of guilt was returned (and one day before the trial court granted defendant's request to return to self-representation for the penalty phase of the trial), defendant waived his right to trial on the two prior prison term enhancements charged under section 667.5, subdivision (b) (establishing a one-year enhancement for each prior separate prison term served for any felony unless the defendant for five years had remained free from custody and from any new felony conviction). Defendant now asserts that the trial court erred in accepting his waiver and at that time should have entertained, and declared, a good faith doubt concerning defendant's continued competence to stand trial and to waive trial on the prior prison term enhancements. In support, appellate counsel asserts that defendant had been acting erratically during the pretrial period by improperly attempting to suppress evidence that might be offered against him and by stabbing a fellow jail inmate in the neck with a sharpened pencil, and that defendant continued to engage in inappropriate conduct at trial by twice audibly commenting during the prosecutor's closing arguments, And you hid Maurice Solvang and What about Maurice Solvang. Appellate counsel asserts that thereafter, in response to the trial court's advisements concerning defendant's waiver of rights relating to the charged enhancements, defendant was nonresponsive and argumentative. The record does not reveal any substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial or waive any of defendant's rights concerning the charged enhancements. The circumstance that defendant attempted to suppress evidence against him prior to trial suggests that defendant understood fully the charges against him and the possible consequences he faced; it does not suggest mental incompetence in any relevant respect. The stabbing incident, which had occurred approximately eight months prior to the waivers at issue, did not suggest any present incompetence to waive trial or the corresponding rights related to determination of the prior prison term allegations. The two minor interjections made by defendant during the prosecutor's closing argument, although inappropriate as a matter of courtroom decorum, actually were quite logical when viewed in context  for example, regarding the second comment, defendant was reacting to the prosecutor's argument that the failure to present the testimony of a particular witness did not mean[ ] that the People have something to hide. The response, What about Maurice Solvang, far from suggesting mental incompetence, suggests instead that defendant was attentive, adept, and involved in the proceedings, and wished to point out to the jury a perceived inconsistency between the prosecutor's comments and conduct. The transcript passages, concerning the waiver of which defendant now complains, do not support a different conclusion with regard to defendant's competence to stand trial. When asked by the court whether he understood that his waiver of trial also would waive his right to cross-examine witnesses, defendant replied: Well. I don't really understand that I have the right to confront all witnesses against me, when a case is built around a witness such as Maurice Solvang, that was given  that took the Fifth Amendment. [¶] [The prosecutor] refused to give him immunity from prosecution when he very likely is the killer, and they hide him from the jury. So I understand what the law is, and what you're saying; but I don't understand that it works quite that way. [¶] But I understand what you're saying; yes, sir. Thereafter, following defendant's express waiver of his right to confrontation and cross-examination, the court addressed defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, inquiring, Do you give up that right, sir? Defendant responded: Well, sir, I do as far as I have  I was in prison before, and now I'm not going to remain free for five years [as required by section 667.5, subdivision (b)]  but not as far as the reason for being in prison at this time. That much is true, so, yes. The court clarified that it was simply asking whether defendant was prepared to admit that the prior prison term allegations were true, in which event defendant would be incriminating himself. The court explained that it had to be satisfied [that] you give up your right to do that. After defendant conferred with counsel, he clarified that he did indeed understand and waive his privilege against self-incrimination. The court next inquired whether any threats or promises had been made to procure defendant's admission of the prior prison term enhancements. Defendant responded: Yes. The threat of death by the State of California. The threat of life imprisonment. I don't see where my admitting or not admitting one or two years is going to make a difference, since I'm already convicted of something I didn't commit. There's no sense in me arguing with this. But no, sir, no  no threats have been made. Viewed as a whole, we do not perceive in this colloquy, or elsewhere in the related transcript, evidence suggesting mental incompetence to waive rights associated with proof of the charged enhancements. Indeed, far from suggesting that defendant was nonresponsive throughout the waiver process, the record reveals instead that defendant was attentive and was reacting to both (i) the jury's verdict of guilt and (ii) what he perceived as an ironic inconsistency between the trial court's advisement that by waiving his right to trial he was giving up his right to confront witnesses against him, and his own assertion that he had been denied the right to confront witnesses by the prosecution's refusal to grant immunity to Maurice Solvang. Likewise, defendant's brief riff concerning threats made against him, as related to his admission of the enhancements, displayed an understanding of the proceedings and the general question posed, as well as an accurate perception of reality: given the minimum sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole that ensued from the jury's verdict of guilt and special circumstance finding, the sentence enhancements of two additional years were not a matter of great concern to defendant. Finally, the circumstance that defendant's responses concerning waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination initially were halting or disjointed does not detract from the subsequent waiver, nor does it suggest, as defendant now implies, a general mental incompetence to waive his rights. We conclude that the trial court did not err in accepting defendant's waiver of trial as to the two sentence enhancements.