Opinion ID: 1430307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Intending Natural and Probable Consequences.

Text: Gipson next contends that the superior court committed reversible error when it gave the second paragraph of the following instruction, Instruction No. 25: Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It rarely can be established by any other means. While witnesses may see and hear and thus be able to give direct evidence of what a defendant does or fails to do, there can be no eyewitness of the account of the state of mind with which the acts were done or omitted. But what a defendant does or fails to do may indicate intent or lack of intent to commit the offense charged. It is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. In determining the issues as to intent, the jury is entitled to consider any statements made and acts done or omitted by the accused, and all facts and circumstances in evidence which may aid determination of state of mind. Gipson argues that the second paragraph of the foregoing instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of specific intent. In Menard v. State, 578 P.2d 966, 968-70 (Alaska 1978), we condemned the giving of the following instruction, commonly referred to as the Mann charge, [1] due to the likelihood that it might be interpreted to mean that the defendant must prove his lack of intent: It is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. So unless the contrary appears from the evidence, the jury may draw the inference that the accused intended all the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from any act knowingly done or knowingly omitted by the accused. Thus interpreted, the instruction could result in an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof. As conceded by Gipson, Menard makes it clear that the objectionable part of the instruction given in that case was the phrase, so unless the contrary appears from the evidence. The instruction given by the court in the instant case contained no such phrase. Nevertheless, Gipson argues that in cases such as his, where a finding of specific intent is required, such an instruction may still result in an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof, arguing that, [W]ithout specific direction otherwise, the jury would be inclined to require a defendant to overcome the inference even without a direct instruction to that effect. We believe Gipson's argument is without merit. Instruction No. 25, as we read it, did nothing to shift the burden of proof. All it did was inform the jury that there were permissible inferences that could be drawn from acts knowingly done, or knowingly omitted, by the defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the instruction was proper. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).