Opinion ID: 806387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remaining FMLA Retaliation Factors

Text: The conclusion that Donnelly need not make the additional showing required by Zahorik does not end our inquiry. The FMLA-retaliation plaintiff must still establish 6 We note that the great majority of district courts in our Circuit that have addressed the question of tenure denial in an elementary- or secondary-school context have not applied the higher Zahorik standard in determining whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. See, e.g., Young v. N.Y. City Dept. of Educ., No. 09 Civ. 6621, 2010 WL 2776835 at  (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) (applying McDonnell Douglas, without any modification from Zahorik, to the context of high school tenure denial), Frank v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 160, 167-68 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (same), Augustin v. Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of Newburgh, 616 F. Supp. 2d 422, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same), Helmes v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 564 F. Supp. 2d 137, 147-48 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (same), But see Louis v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 705 F. Supp. 751, 756 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Zahorik where a plaintiff-principal challenged his tenure denial). 34 inter alia that “he was qualified for his position,” and that “the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent.” Potenza, 365 F.3d at 168. Donnelly has made an adequate showing in both respects to warrant a jury trial. First, as we have noted above, the ordinary standard for showing qualification is not exacting: the “qualification necessary to shift the burden to defendant for an explanation of the adverse job action is minimal; plaintiff must show only that he possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.” Slattery, 248 F.3d at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in the context of secondary-school tenure denials, when evaluating the plaintiff-teacher’s prima facie case, we do not determine whether the teacher was entitled to tenure; we simply assess whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that he held the basic qualifications to be eligible for promotion. See, e.g., Helmes v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 564 F. Supp. 2d 137, 147-48 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). Donnelly has made that showing. He held the necessary educational and licensing credentials to serve as a teacher, and he had worked as a teacher for the necessary period of time to be considered for promotion. The record indicates nothing egregious about his performance suggesting that he was manifestly unsuitable for promotion. Of the nine evaluations he received during his probationary period, Donnelly received the highest evaluation possible in six: the remaining three all occurred after the medical leave. To be sure, these evaluations included recommendations for improvement, as was standard for such evaluations, even for tenured teachers. Donnelly’s file also included two 35 questionable interactions with students that might have led the District to question his suitability as a tenured teacher. Neither the interactions with students nor the recommendations for improvement, however, establish as a matter of law that Donnelly was not qualified for his position. His basic credentials, and his record of strong performance reviews which only began to change after his medical leave, are sufficient for him to meet the qualifications standard. Second, Donnelly has also established that “the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent.” Potenza, 365 F.3d at 168. While we have never previously construed this requirement in the context of FMLA retaliation, our analysis of wrongful retaliation in other contexts – e.g., Title VII retaliation, see Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 129 (2d Cir. 2003) – suggests that such an inference can be established when there is a basis for a jury to conclude that “a causal connection [exists] between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse action taken by the employer.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010). Donnelly has amply established a basis for such a causal inference. The “very close” temporal proximity required in other employment cases is present here. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Before Donnelly’s medical leave, his teaching evaluations were extremely positive; after this leave, the evaluations deteriorated. Moreover, Donnelly presents more evidence than mere temporal proximity. The negative evaluations he received expressly 36 penalize Donnelly for his excessive absences, including those taken – assuming his eligibility – pursuant to the FMLA. That the District manifestly penalized Donnelly for absences that a jury could find were protected by the FMLA provides a sufficient basis to send the question of the District’s retaliatory intent to the jury to reach a final determination. We have never definitively applied the burden-shifting framework from the context of employment discrimination to FMLA retaliation, and we need not establish that application here, as Donnelly’s case must proceed to trial regardless of whether such a pretrial shift in burden occurs. Donnelly has presented direct evidence that his arguably FMLA-protected leave was held against him in the tenure process. That evidence clearly suffices to meet the “minimal” burden of showing a prima facie case.7 In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that we neither express nor imply any view as to the ultimate merits of Donnelly’s claim. We hold only that he has presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to decide whether the District unlawfully denied Donnelly tenure because he took a protected FMLA leave, or whether the District 7 To the extent the burden-shifting framework does apply, the District has not established as a matter of law that its decision was based on legitimate non-retaliatory grounds. We do not question the legitimacy of a school district’s goal of reducing unwarranted teacher absenteeism. But as in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, the FMLA “is violated when an employer is motivated by retaliatory animus, even if valid objective reasons for the discharge exist.” Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (1993). The District may not, in its efforts to address teacher absenteeism, violate the law with respect to those teachers who miss school for purposes Congress has specifically protected. 37 lawfully deemed Donnelly deficient in his performance and therefore unqualified for the position of tenured teacher.