Opinion ID: 1191562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandatory Alcohol Abuse Screening Sessions

Text: Finally, the Commission found that Biggins does not and has not ordered the statutorily required alcohol abuse screening sessions in the majority of DUI cases coming before him. See A.R.S. § 28-692.01(A). Biggins testified that he does not always order the screening because 90-95% of his DUI cases involve transients (out-of-towners) who would not complete the screening anyway. Biggins' failure to order the mandatory screening is an abuse of judicial discretion. The statute states that a judge shall order a person convicted of a [DUI violation] to complete an alcohol abuse screening session. Id. (emphasis added). It is possible that most, if not all, DUI offenders who are ordered to complete the mandatory screening would not obey the order. Nevertheless, the legislature has seen fit to require the screening and it is not within Judge Biggins' authority to ignore the statute. Despite Biggins' clear abuse of discretion in this matter, we do not find that his actions constitute an ethical violation for which he is subject to sanction. The disciplinary process should not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re Haddad, 128 Ariz. at 492, 627 P.2d at 223. In Haddad we cited, with approval, Standard 3.4 of Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement adopted by the American Bar Association in 1978. This standard provides that [i]n the absence of fraud, corrupt motive, or bad faith, the commission should not take action against a judge for making findings of fact, reaching a legal conclusion, or applying the law as he understands it. Claims of error should be left to the appellate process. We do not find that Biggins acted fraudulently, with a corrupt motive, or in bad faith in failing to order the alcohol abuse screening sessions. We do not find that Biggins failed to order the screening as an accommodation to DUI offenders; the testimony of two county prosecutors supports the conclusion that Biggins treated DUI offenders and the state impartially in the cases heard by him. Rather, Biggins testified that he did not order the screening for transients because he believed they would probably ignore such an order. Because we do not find that Biggins acted in bad faith, this disciplinary proceeding is an improper forum in which to raise claims of error in Biggins' application of the law. Any complaints the State may have had with regard to Biggins' sentencing procedures in DUI cases should have been addressed through the appeals process. Although at this time we do not find that Biggins' sentencing procedures violated any ethical rules, as a result of this opinion Biggins is on notice that he has a duty to order alcohol abuse screening as part of the sentence for every DUI conviction he hears, regardless of whether he thinks the order will be obeyed. Consequently, if Biggins continues to disregard the statute by failing to order the screening, the Commission may, in the future, bring ethical charges against Biggins on the basis that he is acting in bad faith in failing to apply the law.