Opinion ID: 2261906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: use of demonstrative evidence

Text: The creation of the audio tape at issue was incidental to the placement of a security system installed in the C.A. Brown Company. As part of this Sonitrol security system, five microphones were placed in various parts of the building to monitor any unusual sounds that might occur in the middle of the night. If a noise rises above a preset threshold level, then the sounds are transmitted live to a monitoring console at the Sonitrol headquarters where a Sonitrol employee is on duty throughout the night. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 10, 1988, Michael Savaria (Savaria) was on duty at the Providence headquarters of Sonitrol. He testified that in the course of monitoring approximately 3700 accounts with Sonitrol, he heard a woman in trouble in or near the C.A. Brown Company in Cranston. He immediately activated a tape machine at Sonitrol, which picked up the noises from the incident as they were transmitted from a microphone installed at the C.A. Brown building, and called the Cranston police. Savaria also testified that after roughly three minutes, during which time he heard more sounds of a woman struggling, he heard a car approaching the area from which the noises were emanating. The tape recorder was deactivated and rewound when Savaria heard what he believed to be police officers on the scene. The original cassette tape was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) where it was subject to an enhancement procedure, the purpose of which was to maximize the intelligibility of the sounds and/or voices on the tape. This enhanced version of the Sonitrol audio tape was played to the court, including the jury, through individual headphones. Later, during direct examination of the victim, the enhanced version was played for the jury a second time with prosecutorial interruptions permitted at five different points. Each time the tape was stopped, the victim was asked what was occurring at that particular time. The defendant contends that the enhanced version of the tape was irrelevant and prejudicial and should not have been admitted into evidence. Additionally defendant argues that it was further error for the trial justice to allow the tape to be used a second time to conduct a demonstration during the victim's testimony. In support of these assertions, defendant suggests on appeal that the tapes are virtually useless because defendant has never contested the elements of force and coercion used during the sexual assault and because the only issue is the identity of the perpetrator, which is not evidenced by the audio tape. We do not agree with defendant's assessment of the usefulness and relevancy of the tapes. This court previously has acknowledged that sound recordings, if related to otherwise competent evidence, are admissible provid[ed] a proper foundation is laid for their admission. In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 575 (R.I. 1988) (quoting State v. Gonya, 107 R.I. 594, 596, 268 A.2d 729, 730 (1970)). It is evident from our reading of the record, which includes testimony from two Sonitrol employees and a special agent assigned to the FBI's Electronic Surveillance Unit, that a proper foundation was laid before the jury was presented with the enhanced version of the Sonitrol tape. We turn then to the relevancy of the tapes. The question of relevancy, as governed by Rules 401 through 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, is within the sound discretion of the trial justice. In re James A., 505 A.2d 1386, 1391 (R.I. 1986) (citing Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 720 (R.I. 1985)). Of particular importance in this case is Rule 403, which allows relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or by considerations of needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Nonetheless, a determination of relevancy made by a trial justice will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. 505 A.2d at 1391-92. See also State v. Neri, 593 A.2d 953, 956 (R.I. 1991); State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1386 (R.I. 1980); Aiello Construction, Inc. v. Nationwide Tractor Trailer Training and Placement Corp., 122 R.I. 861, 868, 413 A.2d 85, 89 (1980); Gaglione v. Cardi, 120 R.I. 534, 538, 388 A.2d 361, 363 (1978). The defendant maintains that the tapes are irrelevant because the use of force and coercion is undisputed in this case. We find this argument to be without merit. When the state prosecutes a defendant, it carries the burden of proving every element necessary to the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, even if some of those elements may not be disputed. Because of this burden, the state has the right to establish the existence of those elements as it deems just. See State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172, 1180 (R.I. 1987). In the case at bar, the charge of first-degree sexual assault requires a finding that the accused used force or coercion. General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-37-2(B), as amended by P.L. 1987, ch. 238, § 1. Because it is incumbent upon the state to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt, we find that the use of the audio tape offered probative evidence of such force and coercion. We believe that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting the enhanced version of the Sonitrol tape into evidence. Although what is prejudicial cannot be determined by a fixed formula, see State v. Pugliese, 117 R.I. 21, 26, 362 A.2d 124, 126 (1976), we are of the opinion that the introduction of the tape did not cause defendant to suffer any undue prejudice in light of the factual context in which the tape was admitted into evidence. Upon reviewing the record, we find that the probative value offered by the tape outweighed any prejudice suffered by defendant as it offered corroborative evidence that establishes the elements necessary to the state's case. In regard to the use of the audio tape during the state's direct examination of the victim, defendant asserts that this demonstration was a needless presentation of cumulative evidence. According to defendant, the jurors were capable of interpreting for themselves the sounds on the tape, but the state pursued this form of demonstration to evoke the jury's sympathies for the victim. We disagree. The probative value offered by this narrative exercise was to determine where each of the parties was and what each was doing at the time the tape was paused. Although the victim had already described the attack and her lack of consent on direct examination, the audiotape presentation served the same purpose as any other form of demonstrative evidence, including a diagram, a photograph, or a map. Indeed the trial justice likened this demonstration to other such forms wherein it is appropriate to have a witness identify certain items on a map or certain objects in a photograph. We therefore find that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in permitting this relevant, although somewhat disturbing, demonstrative evidence to be presented to the jury.