Opinion ID: 2519474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 2006 amendment is a valid legislative enactment

Text: ¶ 25 Our primary duty in interpreting any statute is to discern and implement the intent of the legislature. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). The legislature's intent in enacting the 2006 amendment is clear. The 2006 amendment revised former RCW 43.135.025(6), the provision that indicates how the state expenditure limit is calculated. The 2006 amendment's language provides, [i]n calculating the expenditure limit for fiscal year 2006, the calculation shall be the expenditure limit established by the state expenditure limit committee in November 2005 adjusted as provided by this chapter and adjusted to include [certain specified appropriations]. Former RCW 43.135.025(6) (emphasis added). This language expressly adopts as the expenditure limit for fiscal year 2006 the amount calculated by the ELC at its November 2005 meeting, subject to adjustment as provided in chapter 43.135 RCW. The limit calculated by the ELC at its November 2005 meeting included the $250 million increase. The State argues that [t]his direct and explicit amendment to the statute defines the general fund spending limit for fiscal year 2006 and thereby defeats WSFB's claim. State's Opening Br. at 25. We agree. ¶ 26 We find no barrier to the legislature enacting the 2006 amendment and revising former RCW 43.135.025(6) as it did. [T]he legislature's power to enact a statute is unrestrained except where, either expressly or by fair inference, it is prohibited by the state and federal constitutions. State ex rel. Citizens v. Murphy, 151 Wash.2d 226, 248, 88 P.3d 375 (2004); accord State ex rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 138 Wash.2d 800, 809, 982 P.2d 611 (1999); State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Inst., Inc. v. Kinnear, 80 Wash.2d 175, 180, 492 P.2d 1012 (1972); State v. Fair, 35 Wash. 127, 133, 76 P. 731 (1904). `Insofar as legislative power is not limited by the constitution it is unrestrained.' Cedar County Comm. v. Munro, 134 Wash.2d 377, 386, 950 P.2d 446 (1998) (quoting Moses Lake Sch. Dist. No. 161 v. Big Bend Cmty. Coll., 81 Wash.2d 551, 555, 503 P.2d 86 (1972)). ¶ 27 Each duly elected legislature is fully vested with this plenary legislative power. `A legislative assembly, when established, becomes vested with all the powers and privileges which are necessary and incidental to a free and unobstructed exercise of its appropriate functions.' State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash.2d 194, 203-04, 191 P.2d 241 (1948) (quoting Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395 (1866)). `Plenary power in the legislature, for all purposes of civil government, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception.' Fair, 35 Wash. at 132-33, 76 P. 731 (quoting People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532, 543 (1857)). ¶ 28 Implicit in the plenary power of each legislature is the principle that one legislature cannot enact a statute that prevents a future legislature from exercising its law-making power. As this court has recognized, there is a general rule that one legislature cannot abridge the power of a succeeding legislature, and succeeding legislatures may repeal or modify acts of a former legislature. [23] Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash.2d 1, 54, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). [A]bsent contractual protection or some other form of constitutional restriction, nothing prevents one legislature from amending the work of a previous legislature. Kristen L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner: Washington's Law of Law-Making, 39 GONZ. L.REV. 447, 478 (2003-2004) (footnotes omitted). ¶ 29 The state expenditure limit is a creature of statute, as are the laws that govern its calculation. The legislature is free to amend the expenditure limit and the process by which it is calculated. The legislature exercised this prerogative when it enacted the 2006 amendment. When the legislature enacts laws, it speaks as the chosen representative of the people. Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wash.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960). It is neither our prerogative nor our function to substitute our judgment for the duly elected legislature's determination that the 2006 amendment was in the best interests of Washington State. Therefore, we are compelled to give the 2006 amendment its intended effect. ¶ 30 It is immaterial that former RCW 43.135.025(6), the target of the 2006 amendment, has its origins in an initiative. [A]n initiative measure . . . is as much a legislative act as is [a statute]. Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 469, 44 P.2d 175 (1935). When the people exercise their initiative power, they exercise the same power of sovereignty as the Legislature does when enacting a statute. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 204, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000). The people cannot, by initiative, prevent future legislatures from exercising their law-making power. [24] A law passed by initiative is as subject to the legislative power of future legislatures as is any other statute. Thus, the fact that former RCW 43.135.025(6) originated as an initiative does not impede the legislature's ability to amend that statute. ¶ 31 Nor is the 2006 amendment invalid because it operates retroactively. Unquestionably, the Legislature has the power to enact a retrospective[ [25] ] statute, unless the statute contravenes some constitutional inhibition. Lawson v. State, 107 Wash.2d 444, 454, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986). Barring a constitutional limitation, an amendment may operate retroactively if `the legislature so intended' or `it is curative.' McGee Guest Home, Inc. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 142 Wash.2d 316, 324-25, 12 P.3d 144 (2000) (quoting State v. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d 186, 191, 985 P.2d 384 (1999), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Pillatos, 159 Wash.2d 459, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007)). ¶ 32 It is undisputed that the legislature intended the 2006 amendment to operate retroactively. This intent is implicit in the language and timing of the 2006 amendment. The 2006 amendment directs the process for calculating the expenditure limit for fiscal year 2006 through an enactment that took effect in March 2006, nine months after the start of that fiscal year on July 1, 2005. ¶ 33 The 2006 amendment is also curative in nature. An amendment that `clarifies or technically corrects an ambiguous statute' is curative. McGee Guest Home, 142 Wash.2d at 325, 12 P.3d 144 (quoting In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash.2d 452, 461, 832 P.2d 1303 (1992)). The Legislature's intent to clarify a statute is manifested by its adoption of the amendment `soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act.' McGee Guest Home, 142 Wash.2d at 325, 12 P.3d 144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Cont'l W., Inc., 99 Wash.2d 555, 559, 663 P.2d 482 (1983)). The legislature enacted the 2006 amendment within months of WSFB initiating this action, and the 2006 amendment clarifies the meaning of former RCW 43.135.025(6) with respect to the fiscal year 2006 expenditure limit, the subject of that action. ¶ 34 Applying the 2006 amendment retroactively is not prescribed by separation of powers principles. [T]he legislature is precluded by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers from making judicial determinations. City of Tacoma v. O'Brien, 85 Wash.2d 266, 271, 534 P.2d 114 (1975). [S]eparation of powers problems are raised when a subsequent legislative enactment is viewed as a clarification and applied retroactively, if the subsequent enactment contravenes the construction placed on the original statute by this court. Overton v. Econ. Assistance Auth., 96 Wash.2d 552, 558, 637 P.2d 652 (1981) (citing Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976)). The 2006 amendment does not contradict a construction placed on former RCW 43.135.025 by any court. When the legislature enacted the 2006 amendment, not even the trial court had announced its construction of former RCW 43.135.025. ¶ 35 Nor is the legislature prohibited from pass[ing] a law that directly impacts a case pending in Washington courts. Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash.2d 568, 625, 90 P.3d 659 (2004). Litigation often brings to light latent ambiguities or unanswered questions that might not otherwise be apparent. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 835 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984). The legislature violates separation of powers principles by prescribing new rules to be applied to pending litigation only when doing so infringes on a judicial function by `imped[ing] upon the court's right and duty to apply new law to the facts of this case,' `dictat[ing] how the court should decide a factual issue,' or `affect[ing] a final judgment.' Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash.2d at 626, 90 P.3d 659 (quoting Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash.2d 107, 143-44, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987)). A statutory amendment that is a `facially neutral law for the court to apply to the facts before it,' [does] not violate the separation of powers. Id. (quoting Haberman, 109 Wash.2d at 144, 750 P.2d 254). ¶ 36 WSFB's contention that the retroactivity of the 2006 amendment violates due process is without merit. The legislature may not give an amendment retroactive effect where the effect would be to interfere with vested rights. Lawson, 107 Wash.2d at 454-55, 730 P.2d 1308. But WSFB provides neither argument nor authority to support its novel theory that the citizens of Washington have a vested right to vote on taxes that are expected to raise general fund revenues in excess of the expenditure limit. This court has stated: [a] vested right, entitled to protection from legislation, must be something more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand by another.  Id. at 455, 730 P.2d 1308 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Marriage of MacDonald, 104 Wash.2d 745, 750, 709 P.2d 1196 (1985)). No one has a vested right in any general rule of law or policy of legislation which gives an entitlement to insist that it remain unchanged for one's own benefit. Johnson, 99 Wash.2d at 563, 663 P.2d 482. Washington voters' statutory right to approve taxes that raise revenues in excess of the state expenditure limit is a mere expectationit is not a vested right entitled to due process protections from subsequently enacted legislation. ¶ 37 WSFB also argues that the 2006 amendment is inoperative because it violates article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution. Article II, section 37 requires legislation which revises or amends other acts to set them forth at full length; legislation which fails to do this will be held invalid. [26] Wash. Ass'n of Neighborhood Stores v. State, 149 Wash.2d 359, 373, 70 P.3d 920 (2003) (emphasis added). WSFB contends that the 2006 amendment violates this requirement because it does not amend former RCW 43.135.025(5), which establishes the ELC and grants it authority to determine the state expenditure limit. But the 2006 amendment sets forth the statute it amends, former RCW 43.135.025, in full, including section 5. See LAWS OF 2006, ch. 56, § 7. The constitutional requirements of article II, section 37 are satisfied. ¶ 38 Also citing former RCW 43.135.025(5), WSFB argues that the 2006 amendment is invalid in light of the ELC's exclusive power to determine the state expenditure limit. That is a very strong reading of former RCW 43.135.025(5), which does not restrict the legislature's own power to make decisions regarding the expenditure limit. [27] However, assuming without deciding that WSFB's proposed construction is correct, the 2006 amendment nonetheless remains valid. The 2006 amendment does not contravene the ELC's authorityto the contrary, it adopts as the expenditure limit for fiscal year 2006 the limit established by the ELC at its November 2005 meeting. ¶ 39 Finally, WSFB argues that in order for the voter approval requirement of former RCW 43.135.035(2)(a) to have any meaning, the challenged taxes must be measured against an estimated limit projected by the ELC in November 2004, because only that calculation was available prior to the enactment of the taxes. Giving effect to the 2006 amendment, WSFB further contends, will thwart the TPA's purpose to provide for voter approval of tax increases. This argument takes us full circle to the foundational principles on which this analysis is grounded. The legislature has plenary power to enact, amend, or repeal a statute, except as restrained by the state and federal constitutions. See, e.g., Murphy, 151 Wash.2d at 248, 88 P.3d 375. The state expenditure limit and the TPA are creatures of statute, which the legislature is free to amend. When it enacted the 2006 amendment, the legislature, speaking as the elected representative of the people, exercised this prerogative. Because it is not our function to substitute our judgment for that of the legislature in enacting the 2006 amendment, we give the 2006 amendment its intended effect. ¶ 40 `Principles of judicial restraint dictate that if resolution of an issue effectively disposes of a case, we should resolve the case on that basis without reaching any other issues that might be presented.' Hayden v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 141 Wash.2d 55, 68, 1 P.3d 1167 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Peterson, 133 Wash.2d 885, 894, 948 P.2d 381 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring)). We therefore decline to reach the other issues raised in this case, including (1) the validity of other legislative actions affecting the fiscal year 2006 expenditure limit and that of the ELC's actions at its November 2005 meeting, (2) the constitutionality of the former RCW 43.135.035(2)(a) voter approval requirement, and (3) the legislative and executive privileges issue.