Opinion ID: 1910988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony as to the Credibility of Victim

Text: This issue is pivotal to this appeal and we will address it first. When Nelson testified, State clearly asked questions that went beyond the realm of what the parties and the court had agreed upon prior to the trial. After laying a foundation as to Nelson's background and experience, State directly asked Nelson for her opinion as to victim's credibility. This called for an opinion based on expertise that went to an ultimate issue, namely, whether or not victim was credible. Raymond objected to this testimony. It is not uncommon to use an expert in cases of this nature to assist a jury in comprehending evidence presented during the trial. However, [w]e have previously held that it is the function of the jury to resolve evidentiary conflicts, determine the credibility of witnesses, and weigh the evidence. State v. Svihl, 490 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D.1992) (citing State v. Battest, 295 N.W.2d 739, 742 (S.D.1980)). This court has previously placed limitations on experts expressing their opinions as to the believability of victims of child sexual abuse. The general rule ... is that one witness may not testify as to another witness' credibility or truth-telling capacity because such testimony would invade the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness. McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590, 592 (S.D.1989); accord Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157; SDCL 19-15-2. In 1993, we did away with the Ultimate Fact Doctrine and adopted Supreme Court Rule 93-18, SDCL 19-15-4. SDCL 19-15-4 (Rule 704) states: Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. However, this does not mean all expert opinion on the ultimate issue is admissible. See Zens v. Harrison, 538 N.W.2d 794 (S.D. 1995). `[I]t is hornbook law that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given his testimony rests exclusively with the jury.' United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F.Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.1952)). Azure addresses the issue as to how Rule 704 (SDCL 19-15-4) is limited by Rule 702 (SDCL 19-15-2). SDCL 19-15-2 states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974), the court stated: [C]ompetency is for the judge, not the jury. Credibility, however, is for the jurythe jury is the lie detector in the courtroom.... It is now suggested that psychiatrists and psychologists have more [expertise in weighing the veracity of a witness] than either judges or juries, and that their opinions can be of value to both judges and juries in determining [credibility]. Perhaps. The effect of receiving such testimony, however, may be two-fold: first, it may cause juries to surrender their own common sense in weighing testimony; second, it may produce a trial within a trial on what is collateral but still an important matter. Id. at 912. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that opinion testimony on credibility is limited to character and all other opinions on credibility are for the juror themselves to form. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir.1979). There is substantial risk that the jury did not use its own common sense when they determined the credibility of victim. The cumulative effect of hearing Nelson bolstering victim's credibility and the State referring to this in its rebuttal closing argument clearly prejudiced Raymond. [5] `[E]xpert testimony particularly courts the [danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or misleading the jury] because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.' Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157 (quoting United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.1973)). In addition, no limiting instruction was given by the court in reference to the statement. In this type of case, the credibility of the victim is critical to the prosecution's case. [6] The jury in this case had the opportunity to consider this inadmissible credibility testimony. It is further obvious that the jury decided this critical credibility issue in favor of victim. This court has consistently held that a defendant is not guaranteed a perfect trial but every accused, innocent or guilty, is entitled to a fair trial. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 158; see State v. Bennis, 457 N.W.2d 843, 847 (S.D.1990). The introduction of this testimony to bolster the credibility of victim, even after the prosecutor admitted in the record that it was not admissible under settled law of this state, denied Raymond a fair trial. We have considered the other issues and, based on our above holding, we see no reason to reach them. This case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, KONENKAMP, and GILBERTSON, JJ., concur.