Opinion ID: 1320911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equal Educational Opportunities Act

Text: The district court's finding of an EEOA violation is unreliable because the district court failed to adequately address this circuit's 1982 remand instructions. In 1982, this court questioned whether intervenors' EEOA claim could be appropriately addressed absent local school districts as parties. Specifically, we concluded that there exists little if any practical or logical justification for attempting to deal on a statewide basis with the problems presented by this case. LULAC II, 680 F.2d at 373-74. See also note 4, supra. And we remanded the action to the district court with the following instructions: [T]he language problems to be met will necessarily vary by district.... [W]hether the effect of a local language program, state-mandated or not, constitutes appropriate action to deal with language barriers faced by the students of a given school district will of necessity be an essentially local question.... We fail to see how [a question of Section 1703(f) compliance] can be properly resolved in the absence of the school district concerned or how [it] can effectively be dealt with on a statewide basis.... [W]e therefore direct the district court to determine ... what questionsif anypresented by the case are subject to resolution on a statewide basis before proceeding further on the remand that we mandate. Id. at 374. In light of this court's analysis of the evidence below, we conclude that the issues raised by intervenors' EEOA claim have not been properly addressed in the absence of individual school districts as parties. This court notes that intervenors identified fourteen LULAC members who were parents of one or more LEP students. Those parents represent, in total, twenty LEP students attending schools within three individual school districts. See also note 5, supra. Not one of these school districts is named as a party to this action or located within the Eastern District of Texas. Further, because no school district is a party to the present litigation, the issue remains as to whether the district court constitutes an appropriate district court capable of asserting jurisdiction over intervenors' claim. See 20 U.S.C. § 1708 (The appropriate district court of the United States shall have and exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted under [this statute]. (emphasis added)). The district court improperly relied on its remedial jurisdiction under the Modified Order to assert jurisdiction over intervenors' supplemental EEOA claim; thus, it failed to adequately address whether it constituted an appropriate district court pursuant to Section 1708. Congress did not define appropriate district court in the statute, and there is little legislative history or judicial precedent on the issue. We conclude that an appropriate district court is normally the district court in which a local school district, as a party to the action, is located. And once one or more local districts are added as parties in this litigation, the district court should reconsider whether it constitutes an appropriate district court for jurisdictional purposes or if the case should, instead, be handled in a forum that constitutes a proper venue for such additional parties.
This court's decision regarding the necessity of a local school district is further supported because the record below is insufficient to uphold the trial court's finding of an EEOA violation. To find a violation of, and order a remedy under, the EEOA, intervenors must establish (1) a violation of a student's rights under the EEOA, (2) that the violation stem[med] from a failure to take `appropriate action' on the part of the defendants, Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2605, and (3) that any remedial order is essential to correct [the] particular denials of EEOA rights found. 20 U.S.C. § 1712. We conclude that intervenors failed to make the requisite showing. Under the EEOA, a state may not deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by ... the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (emphasis added). Both state and local educational agencies are responsible for taking appropriate action under the statute, [11] but the EEOA leave[s] state and local educational authorities a substantial amount of latitude in choosing the program and techniques they would use to meet their obligations under the EEOA. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009-10 (5th Cir.1981). See also Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2589 (quoting Castaneda), id. at 2595 (... [T]he EEOA itself limits court-ordered remedies to those that `are essential to correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws,' (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1712, emphasis by Supreme Court)). [12] [T]he State of Texas has chosen a system of shared responsibilities between state actors and local officials in educational matters. LULAC IV, 572 F.Supp.2d at 757. Under this system, local school districts are primarily responsible for the implementation of LEP programs, while TEA is responsible for ensuring compliance with federal and state law and evaluating and monitoring the effectiveness of LEP programs. TEX. EDUC.CODE §§ 7.003, 7.021(b)(1), 7.028, 11.002, 29.062. Thus, defendants' liability under the EEOA is dependent upon the extent to which they have failed to take appropriate action in fulfilling their legal responsibilities under state law which in this case requires that they monitor and evaluate LEP programs via PBMASwhich failure has caused a deprivation of the rights of Mexican-American LEP students under Section 1703(f). To determine the appropriateness of an educational agency's action, this court has instituted a three-prong test: (1) whether the program is based on sound educational theory, (2) whether reasonable efforts are being made to implement the theory (implementation prong), and (3) whether the program, over a legitimate period of time, has achieved some success in overcoming language barriers (results prong). Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009-10. After applying the above analysis, the district court concluded that defendants' use of PBMAS in its current form fails both the implementation prong and the results prong. [13] The district court's ruling that a given defendant has or has not taken the appropriate action required of it under section 1703(f) presents a mixed question of fact and law, review of which requires us to determine whether the trial court's conclusion was adequately supported by subsidiary findings of fact which do not appear clearly erroneous. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010. Whether such essentially historic facts adequately support the conclusion presents a question of law reviewable de novo. See St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana, 142 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir.1998). [14] To the extent that the subsidiary findings of fact are premised upon an erroneous view of controlling legal principles they are entitled to no deference. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir.1980). [15]
Under the implementation prong, a court must determine whether defendants' implementation of PBMAS follow[s] through with practices, resources and personnel necessary to transform the [educational] theory into reality. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010. Essentially, this Court must scrutinize whether defendants have made a bona fide effort[ ] to make the program work. Id. According to the district court, defendants failed the implementation prong because PBMAS, as implemented, cannot effectively monitor the progress of LEP programs and students. LULAC IV, 572 F.Supp.2d at 765. The trial court identified a variety of flaws that rendered the system ineffective: (1) the absence of equality based comparisons, (2) under-identification of LEP students, and (3) the aggregation of data at the district level.