Opinion ID: 3209685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Custom Link, Custom Linking Relationship,

Text: and Link Term The district court construed “custom link” as “a link the user can define using a chosen term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original database files”; “custom linking relationship” as “a linking relationship the user can define using a chosen term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original database files”; and “link term” as INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 7 “a term chosen by a user that can be displayed as a link to a file specified by the user whenever the user encounters the term in the plurality of files.” Claim Constr. Order at 26–27 (emphases added). Indacon raises a single issue with respect to the constructions of “custom link,” “custom linking relationship,” and “link term” (collectively, “the link claim terms”), and does not make any distinct arguments for these individual claim terms. Specifically, Indacon objects to the district court’s constructions of the link claim terms to the extent they exclude creation of a link for less than all instances of a defined term, disputing the district court’s construction that allows each instance of the defined term to be identified and displayed as a link. We disagree and adopt the district court’s constructions of the link claim terms as being limited to allowing each instance of a link term to be identified and displayed as a link. Facebook argues that the link claim terms have no accepted meaning in the art. We agree with Facebook that these terms have no plain or established meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art. As such, they ordinarily cannot be construed broader than the disclosure in the specification. Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent such an accepted meaning [in the art], we construe a claim term only as broadly as provided for by the patent itself.”). The specification explains that “[t]he link module enables association of any selected link term with any of the plurality of files in the selectable database.” ’276 patent col. 5 ll. 62–64 (emphasis added). The specification repeatedly demonstrates that all link terms are capable of being identified and displayed as a link. See, e.g., id. col. 11 ll. 29–32 (“[W]hen a link term is encountered in a file or document, the link term is indicated or otherwise highlighted so that the user can select the indicated link term to jump to the linked file.”) (emphases added); id. col. 30 ll. 22–26 (“A user can instruct the database index 8 INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. generator to insert custom links by entering a custom link word in a New Custom Link Word edit box and then entering a path and name of a file or document to which all such words should link in the File to Link To edit box.”) (emphasis added); id. col. 30 ll. 34–37 (“[W]henever a user encounters the custom link word in any document displayed in the document view window, except the corresponding file to link to file, it is set off from surrounding text.”) (emphases added). Thus, we agree with the district court that, consistent with the teachings of the specification, the link claim terms are properly construed as allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified and displayed as a link. The prosecution history provides additional support for the district court’s constructions of the link claim terms. In distinguishing prior art, the patentees stated: Applicants’ invention provides a user with a linking control panel in which the user can designate a specific file to be linked with every instance of a specified word (and any associated alias terms) in the database. After the index is generated, the program displays every instance of that custom term (and its alias terms, if any) as a hyperlink to the designated file. . . . These innovations distinguish Applicants’ invention from [the prior art]. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1182–83 (emphases added). The patentees then summarized the differences between “Applicants’ Invention” and the prior art, explaining that their invention “[e]nables user[s] to associate all instances of a specified word with a specific file.” J.A. 1186 (emphasis added). Facebook argues that these statements in the prosecution history, consistent with the specification, provide further evidence that the patentees understood the invention as limited to allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified and displayed as a link. But, to the extent INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 9 these claim terms might otherwise have a broader meaning in the art, Facebook argues in the alternative that the prosecution history evidences a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope. We agree that the patentees’ description of their invention during prosecution as allowing every instance or all instances of designated terms to be linked to a file bolsters the district court’s constructions. Because the link claim terms lack a plain or ordinary meaning in the art, and because the specification suggests limiting the scope of these claim terms to allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified and displayed as a link, we need not determine whether the patentees’ statements during prosecution rise to the level of clear and unmistakable disclaimer. In response, Indacon argues that because the references to “every instance” in the prosecution history were not the “critical contrast that applicants were trying to make over the cited reference,” these statements cannot form the basis for disavowal. Appellant Reply Br. 12 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As explained above, we need not find disclaimer where the specification does not permit a broader interpretation of these claim terms and the terms otherwise lack an ordinary meaning in the art. Moreover, “the interested public has the right to rely on the inventor’s statements made during prosecution, without attempting to decipher whether the examiner relied on them, or how much weight they were given.” Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, the patentees repeatedly described their invention both in the specification and the prosecution history as allowing “every instance” or “all instances” of a defined term to be identified and displayed as a link. J.A. 1182–83, 1186. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in limiting the link claim terms as such. Finally, Indacon argues that claim differentiation precludes the district court’s constructions of the link claim 10 INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. terms because certain claims recite linking instances while other claims recite linking all instances of the link terms. Specifically, Indacon points, on the one hand, to claims 2 and 9, which recite “wherein the link module is operable to link instances of the one or more text strings in the selected files” (claim 2) and “wherein the step of defining the linking relationships includes . . . linking instances of the one or more text strings in the selected files” (claim 9). ’276 patent col. 35 ll. 20–21, col. 37 ll. 29– 32 (emphases added). In contrast, Indacon points to claims 14 and 15, which both recite “automatically generating links between all instances of the link term within the plurality of selected source files and the designated file.” Id. col. 38 ll. 65–67, col. 40 ll. 1–3 (emphasis added). Importantly, however, all of claims 2, 9, 14, and 15 are independent claims, and we have declined to apply the doctrine of claim differentiation where, as here, the claims are not otherwise identical in scope. See World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp., 769 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Further, “[a]lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot enlarge the meaning of a claim beyond that which is supported by the patent documents, or relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.” Fenner, 778 F.3d at 1327. Thus, we adopt the district court’s constructions of the link claim terms. “Custom link” is properly construed as “a link the user can define using a chosen term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original database files”; “custom linking relationship” is properly construed as “a linking relationship the user can define using a chosen term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original dataINDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 11 base files”; and “link term” is properly construed as “a term chosen by a user that can be displayed as a link to a file specified by the user whenever the user encounters the term in the plurality of files.”