Opinion ID: 1279018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: void-for-vagueness doctrine

Text: The void-for-vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applications. State v. Caddy , 262 Neb. 38, 628 N.W.2d 251 (2001), citing United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 137 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1997). A statute is vague if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. State v. Frey , 218 Neb. 558, 357 N.W.2d 216 (1984). Due process of law requires that criminal statutes be clear and definite. State v. Pierson , 239 Neb. 350, 476 N.W.2d 544 (1991). A crime must be defined with sufficient definiteness and there must be ascertainable standards of guilt to inform those subject to the statute as to what conduct will render them liable to punishment, and the dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. Id. A crime and its elements must be so clearly expressed that an ordinary person can intelligently choose in advance what course of conduct he or she may lawfully pursue. Robotham v. State , 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992). The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. State v. Faber , 264 Neb. 198, 647 N.W.2d 67 (2002). Because § 28-703 does not define minor, it does not define the crime of incest with a stepchild with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can be certain what conduct is prohibited. As Johnson notes, Nebraska statutes, including criminal statutes, give varying definitions of when a person is a minor. The Court of Appeals recognized that [t]he age of majority is set at different ages for different purposes. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-508.01 (Reissue 1995) (for purposes of personal service, minor is person under 14 years of age); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-443 (Reissue 1995) (in regard to prohibition of delivery of drug paraphernalia to minor, minor is person under 18 years of age who is at least 3 years younger than actor); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-805 (Reissue 1995) (debauching minor prohibits nonminor from debauching morals of boy or girl under age of 17); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1418 (Reissue 1995) (prohibiting use of tobacco by minor under age of 18); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 53-103(23) (Cum. Supp. 2002) (for purposes of Nebraska Liquor Control Act, minor means any person under 21 years of age, regardless of marital status). State v. Johnson , 12 Neb. App. 247, 257-58, 670 N.W.2d 802, 812 (2003). Despite this multitude of definitions, the Court of Appeals concluded that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2101 (Reissue 2004), which defines minor generally as a person under 19 years of age, defined minor for purposes of § 28-703. The opinion of the court endorses that conclusion, although that conclusion does not command a majority of this court. Because of the varying definitions of minor in Nebraska statutes, I do not believe that the use of the word minor in § 28-703 was sufficiently definite to give the ordinary person notice of whether sexual conduct involving a stepchild between the ages of 16 and 19 was prohibited. Although the Court of Appeals and the opinion of the court have articulated plausible reasons to choose the definition provided in § 43-2101, there is nothing in § 28-703 or elsewhere that would alert the ordinary person that such was the definition of minor for purposes of § 28-703. Indeed, the Court of Appeals and the opinion of the court could have used the definition from one of the criminal statutes, such as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-805 (Reissue 1995) (debauching or depraving morals of minor, defined as under age 17) or Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1) (Reissue 1995) (criminalizing adult's sexual conduct when actor is age 19 or older and victim is under age of 16), and stated reasons for such a selection that would have been just as persuasive as the reasons they have given for selecting the definition from § 43-2101. The Court of Appeals relied, in interpreting § 28-703, upon the familiar proposition that in reading a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. See State v. Aguilar , 268 Neb. 411, 683 N.W.2d 349 (2004). However, the issue in this appeal is not what the Legislature may have intended to dorather, the issue is whether the Legislature's intent, whatever it may have been, was successfully translated into a statute that effectively defined the line between lawful and unlawful conduct. But beyond that, other familiar maxims of statutory interpretation support contrary conclusions. The Court of Appeals cited the proposition that `[an appellate court], in construing a statute, looks to the objects to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purposes to be served, and places upon the statute a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. .. .'  (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Johnson , 12 Neb. App. at 258, 670 N.W.2d at 812-13. Accord, e.g., Mathews v. Mathews , 267 Neb. 604, 676 N.W.2d 42 (2004). But it is also a fundamental principle of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant, and it is well understood that it is not for the courts to supply missing words or sentences to make clear that which is indefinite, or to supply that which is not there. See, State v. Hochstein and Anderson , 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001); State v. Jansen , 241 Neb. 196, 486 N.W.2d 913 (1992). Simply stated, § 28-703 is meaningless unless a definition of the word minor is imported from another statute, and our familiar maxims of statutory interpretation are of little assistance in determining which definition, if any, is to be applied. But more to the point, § 28-703 provides nothing that would suffice to inform the ordinary citizen which definition was applicable. I recognize that difficulty in determining the meaning of the language of a statute does not automatically render it unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. See State v. Sodders , 208 Neb. 504, 304 N.W.2d 62 (1981). But when a court could reasonably give conflicting definitions to a term used in a penal statute, the statute does not give an ordinary citizen adequate notice of prohibited conduct because the citizen cannot know which definition the court will choose. While this court could authoritatively articulate a meaning for § 28-703, that determination could not be applied retroactively, as the opinion of the court would hold, unless such application provided fair warning to the defendant. See State v. Ehlers , 252 Conn. 579, 750 A.2d 1079 (2000), citing Dombrowski v. Pfister , 380 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1965). All crimes in Nebraska are statutory in nature, State v. White , 256 Neb. 536, 590 N.W.2d 863 (1999), and Nebraska's statutory scheme has not provided fair warning to the defendant of what conduct is prohibited under § 28-703. I am aware, as noted by the opinion of the court, that courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that the failure to define the word minor, under the respective statutory schemes presented in those cases, did not render those statutes unconstitutionally vague. See, State v. Duggar , 806 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); State v. Young , 37 Ohio. St. 3d 249, 525 N.E.2d 1363 (1988), reversed in part on other grounds sub nom. Osborne v. Ohio , 495 U.S. 103, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 109 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1990); State v. Jackson , 280 N.C. 563, 187 S.E.2d 27 (1972); People v. Vassar , 207 Cal. App. 2d 318, 24 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1962). However, those conclusions are not persuasive in the instant case. In each of those cases, the court found that the term minor could be defined by reference either to the common law, as in Duggar and Jackson , or to a civil statute that the court determined to be of general application, as in Young and Vassar . While that reasoning may have merit, it is not applicable to the circumstances of this case. As previously noted, the Nebraska statutes contain several provisions that define the term minor for specific purposes. While the court argues, as did the Court of Appeals, that § 43-2101 provides an applicable definition, I am not persuaded, for the reasons previously explained, that the ordinary citizen would have had sufficient reason to expect that definition, as opposed to any other, to be lifted from another chapter of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and used to provide clarity to an otherwise indefinite penal statute. Because we assume that people are free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may act accordingly. See State v. Frey , 218 Neb. 558, 357 N.W.2d 216 (1984), citing Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972). Section 28-703, however, contains no definition for a critical term and provides no indication what definition, if any, is to be applicable. It does not meet the requirements of due process and is unconstitutionally vague. Johnson's conviction, pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague statute, was plain error.