Opinion ID: 2363437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Boundary by Estoppel

Text: ¶ 22 Boundary by estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent fraud and injustice by protecting innocent landowners who reasonably rely on representations by their neighbors regarding their shared boundary lines. [3] Our cases have noted the availability of this theory, but have never delineated its precise elements. [4] ¶ 23 In other contexts (outside the setting of a boundary dispute), we have articulated three requirements for invocation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989). We now extend these elementswith some modificationto the specific context of a boundary dispute. ¶ 24 First, where a party seeks to establish a property boundary through equitable estoppel, it must establish an affirmative statement by a neighboring landowner regarding the location of a shared boundary. In a boundary dispute case, such representation presumably will be inconsistent with [a] claim afterwards asserted, as where the party who made affirmative representations regarding the boundary seeks to establish a different boundary in subsequent litigation. ¶ 25 Requiring an affirmative representation comports with the reliance-based rationale undergirding the doctrine of boundary by estoppel: When a man has been misled by the untruth propounded by another, and acted to his detriment in reliance upon the misrepresentation, the misleading party will be estopped to show that the true facts are contrary to those he first propounded. See Douglass, 540 S.W.2d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, the requirement of an affirmative representation regarding the true boundary safeguards the important interests of record title owners against inadvertent relinquishment of their rights to properties titled in their names. ¶ 26 This articulation of the first element of boundary by estoppel consciously excludes the possibility of an estoppel that is premised on an act or omission falling short of an affirmative representation. This limitation is necessary to preserve a distinction between boundary by estoppel (which is aimed at avoiding inequities arising from reliance on affirmative representations) and boundary by acquiescence (which determines the impact of other acts or omissions). ¶ 27 The Bahrs ask us to impose another limitation on boundary by estoppel. Citing cases from other jurisdictions, [5] the Bahrs insist that estoppel should be available only where the representation in question is made by one who acts either in bad faith or with superior knowledge. While some of our sister states have adopted one or both of these as elements of boundary by estoppel, we reject them as incompatible with the reliance-based rationale underlying this doctrine. In a boundary by estoppel case, a court's attention is properly focused on the innocent party that reasonably relied upon a misstatement, not on the subjective intentions of the party that made that misstatement. ¶ 28 Second, a party seeking to invoke the doctrine of boundary by estoppel must show that it has engaged in some act in reasonable reliance on the representation of the neighboring property owner. See Tripp, 276 P. at 918. This element requires proof that the party seeking to invoke estoppel has change[d] his position on the basis of the misrepresentation of the neighboring landowner. Rautenberg v. Munnis, 108 N.H. 20, 226 A.2d 770, 772 (1967). ¶ 29 For reliance to be reasonable, the truth concerning the facts relied upon by the person claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have been unknown. Tripp, 276 P. at 918. Thus, parties invoking boundary by estoppel must have been ignorant of the true boundary between their property and the property of their neighbor. As in boundary by acquiescence cases, however, a party need not demonstrate that there was objective uncertainty regarding the true location of the boundary, see Staker, 785 P.2d at 423, though a showing of objective uncertainty would certainly reinforce a plaintiff's showing of reasonable reliance. ¶ 30 Third, the final element of boundary by estoppel is proof of injury. See Great Plains Oil & Gas Co. v. Found. Oil Co., 137 Tex. 324, 153 S.W.2d 452, 459 (1941). In evaluating whether a plaintiff's injury is sufficient to sustain an estoppel, the courts should recall the founding rationale of the doctrinethe protection of reasonable reliance interests. See Tripp, 276 P. at 918. Thus, an injury is of sufficient gravity to sustain an estoppel if it is such that it would render it unfair or unreasonable to enforce the record title boundary in the face of that injury. See James H. Backman, The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 BYU L. REV. 957, 968. ¶ 31 The Bahrs ask us to adopt additional limitationsembraced in some other jurisdictionson the nature of the injury required to sustain an estoppel. Specifically, the Bahrs contend that boundary by estoppel should be limited to cases involving a permanent improvement in reliance on a neighboring landowner's representations. [6] Because the Imuses' landscaping, koi pond, and irrigation system were not sufficiently permanent in the Bahrs' estimation, the Bahrs challenge the Imuses' entitlement to invoke boundary by estoppel. ¶ 32 We decline to adopt such a limitation on the injury element of boundary by estoppel. The question of an improvement's permanence is not susceptible to principled judicial evaluation. No improvement is literally permanent, as anything can be moved or altered with a sufficient outlay of resources. Thus, when courts speak of an improvement as permanent, they are effectively concluding that estoppel is appropriate in light of the substantiality of the plaintiff's injury. Instead of condoning an arbitrary evaluation of the question of permanence, we direct the courts of this state to inquire directly into the substantiality of the claimant's injury. ¶ 33 To summarize, to successfully invoke the doctrine of boundary by estoppel, a party must demonstrate: (1) that the record title owner or her predecessor in interest made an affirmative misstatement that a given line was the true boundary between the neighbors' properties, (2) that the innocent party took affirmative action in reasonable reliance on this misstatement, and (3) because of this affirmative action the innocent party would suffer sufficiently substantial injury that it would now be unfair or unreasonable to enforce the record title boundary. ¶ 34 Applying these elements to this case, we find that the Imuses' estoppel claim fails on the threshold first element. In this case, there was no misrepresentation regarding the true location of the boundary by either the Bahrs or their predecessors in interest. In fact, the record shows that the Bahrs' predecessors (the Wymans and Joe Carlisle) acknowledged that they did not know the true location of the boundary between their properties. Rather, there was a mutual agreement that the boundary would be located in the spot where the fence dividing the Bahrs' and the Imuses' property currently stands. Where (as here) there is mutual uncertainty regarding the true location of a dividing boundary between adjoining properties, there is no representation and thus no basis for a judgment of boundary by estoppel.