Opinion ID: 2082463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The decision as to Honaker

Text: It must be remembered that there was an actual trial in the Honaker case, unlike the situation with reference to Coffey. Bennett is squarely applicable here. In that case laying the tiles on the floor was held to be a part of the work for which the principal contractor was responsible. Honaker's employer, in his own separate capacity, was co-operating [with Miller] toward the execution of the whole of a particular work ... which the principal contractor [, Miller,] had promised to perform, the erection of a house. Honaker would have us read part of his trade, business or occupation too narrowly. He argues that because Miller does not have employees who put roofs on houses this is not part of its trade, business or occupation.... There is no question but that Miller is in the business of building and selling homes. From time immemorial shelter from the elements has been regarded as one of the necessities of life. Any structure with four walls must have a roof on it before it may be considered a house. Thus, a contention that the installation of a roof is not part of the trade, business or occupation of building homes is without merit. Equally without merit is the claim that because Miller owns the land upon which it is erecting the houses which it sells, its trade, business or occupation does not include the construction of homes. We have reiterated rules for statutory construction many times. In Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Department, 284 Md. 216, 219, 395 A.2d 1174 (1979), we quoted from Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 379 A.2d 1007 (1977), relative to statutory construction, in which latter case we cited a number of cases for each of the statements made: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent. In determining that intent the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification.... A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly.... A court may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form.... The General Assembly is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law.... Absent a clear indication to the contrary, a statute, if reasonably possible, is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.... [ Id. at 418-19.] Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330, 193 P.2d 831 (1948), cited and quoted extensively from Bennett. The court there observed: The benefits to the workmen in having sure and certain rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law against the proprietor or main contractor, as well as against the subcontractor, outweigh the occasional advantage that might accrue to him in an action at law. [ Id. at 339.] We agree. We hold Miller to be a statutory employer. The statute in question was meant primarily to protect employees, not to provide them an additional remedy for their injuries.