Opinion ID: 4524722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Florida Memo & 1986 Conviction3

Text: 3 In the district court and on appeal, Plaintiff has raised no challenge to the AAO’s determination that the Florida Memo was inapplicable to Plaintiff’s 1985 conviction. 8 Case: 19-12114 Date Filed: 04/13/2020 Page: 9 of 11 The Florida Memo addressed whether a Florida conviction for an offense that was certified by the state or local court as a “no jail” or “no incarceration” offense -- pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.994 -- constitutes a disqualifying misdemeanor for purposes of TPS. The Florida Memo noted that a “no jail” or “no incarceration” certification “fundamentally changes the maximum possible sentence for an offense by removing the possibility of incarceration for that offense.” Because such offenses are not punishable by imprisonment, they fall outside the definition of a “misdemeanor” under 8 C.F.R. § 244.1. Plaintiff contends that -- under the Florida Memo -- his 1986 conviction constitutes no “misdemeanor” because Plaintiff was sentenced only to “time served” and received no additional term of imprisonment. The AAO rejected Plaintiff’s position. The AAO noted that the purpose of Florida’s no-jail certification procedure is to allow the trial court to conduct criminal proceedings without a constitutional obligation to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. The AAO explained that “[t]he significance of the certification is its effect of removing imprisonment as a possible sentence prior to a finding of guilt, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendre.” (emphasis in original). The Florida Memo thus applies only to offenses where no possibility of imprisonment existed at the time of the original criminal proceedings 9 Case: 19-12114 Date Filed: 04/13/2020 Page: 10 of 11 -- not “to offenses where imprisonment was not actually imposed, but could have been.” The AAO determined that the record contained no evidence that a no-jail certificate (or other similar certification)4 was issued for Plaintiff’s 1986 convictions. Nor did the record contain information about whether Plaintiff was appointed a lawyer, retained his own lawyer, or waived his right to a lawyer. In short, nothing evidenced that Plaintiff -- before he entered his plea -- faced no possible sentence of imprisonment. That Plaintiff was sentenced to “time served” - - by itself -- was no proof that the trial court lacked authority to impose an additional term of imprisonment. The AAO thus concluded reasonably that Plaintiff’s 1986 convictions failed to satisfy the criteria for the exception set forth in the Florida Memo. On this record and under the deferential standard of review applicable in this appeal, we cannot conclude that the AAO’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The district court thought the AAO provided reasoned explanations for its determination that neither the New York Memo nor the Florida Memo applied to exempt Plaintiff’s 1985 and 1986 convictions. The AAO’s articulated reasons are 4 The AAO acknowledged that Rule 3.994 first took effect in 2003. To the extent no similar procedure was available in 1986, the AAO said that the Florida Memo would have no application to Plaintiff’s conviction. In considering Plaintiff’s argument, however, the AAO assumed that some similar process was available to Plaintiff. 10 Case: 19-12114 Date Filed: 04/13/2020 Page: 11 of 11 rational and supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. AFFIRMED. 11