Opinion ID: 2405691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Law of Other Jurisdictions

Text: The traditional common law rule is that the possessor of land is under no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of purely natural origin upon his land. Nichols v. Sitko, 157 Ill.App.3d 950, 109 Ill.Dec. 903, 510 N.E.2d 971 (1987); Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So.2d 231, rev. denied, 399 So.2d 1142 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 57 (5th ed. 1984); William J. Appel, Annotation, Liability of Private Landowner for Vegetation Obscuring View at Highway or Street Intersection, 69 A.L.R.4th 1092 (1989). The term natural condition of land means a condition that is not in any way the result of human activity. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840(1) cmt. a (1979); see generally Prosser, supra; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363 (1965). Ornamental shrubs are the result of human activity. The nonliability for failure to remedy natural conditions originated in times when much land remained uncleared and any duty placed upon a landowner to cut or remove vegetation on his property would have been an onerous one. William J. Appel, Annotation, Liability of Private Landowner For Vegetation Obscuring View at Highway or Street Intersection, 69 A.L.R.4th at 1098. Historically, the consideration most frequently invoked to support the rule of nonliability for natural conditions was that it was merely an embodiment of the principle that one should not be obligated to undertake affirmative conduct to aid or protect others. Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal.3d 358,178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121 (1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314 (1965); see generally, James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases 47 Nw.U.L.Rev. 778, 800-09 (1953); Dix W. Noel, Nuisances from Land in Its Natural Condition, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 772, 796-97, and n.102 (1943). This rule rested on the common law distinction between the infliction of harm and the failure to prevent it, or misfeasance and nonfeasance. Misfeasance was determined to exist when a defendant played some part in the creation of a risk. Nonfeasance occurred when a defendant failed to intervene on a plaintiff's behalf. Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal.3d 358, 178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121 (1981). Proponents of the rule of nonliability for natural conditions argued that a defendant's failure to prevent a natural condition from causing harm was mere nonfeasance. A natural condition of the land was by definition, they argued, one which no human being had played a part in creating. Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d at 1122; see Dix W. Noel, Nuisances from Land in Its Natural Condition, 56 Harv.L.Rev. at 773. Therefore, no basis for liability existed because a duty to exercise reasonable care could not arise out of possession alone. Since there was no special relationship between the possessor of land and persons outside the premises, there could be no liability. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314, cmt. f (1965). Conversely, a defendant's failure to prevent an artificial condition from causing harm constituted actionable misfeasance. Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d at 1126. Thus, the general rule has always been that a defendant has a duty to prevent an artificial condition from causing harm. The Restatement of Torts, in the material section, states this general rule as follows: § 364. Creation or Maintenance of Dangerous Artificial Conditions. A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm, if (a) the possessor has created the condition, or (b) the condition is created by a third person with the possessor's consent or acquiescence while the land is in his possession, or (c) the condition is created by a third person without the possessor's consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe after the possessor knows or should know of it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 364 (1965). The general rule is that one owes a duty of ordinary care for the safety of others, unless a statute or rule of law provides otherwise. No statute or rule of law provides immunity for a possessor of land who maintains an artificial condition on his or her land. The holding in this case should be that the defendant possessors of land are not immune. The majority opinion circumvents the issue in part because it discusses at length cases that involve purely natural conditions. That is not the condition that is before us. It simply is not necessary for us to decide whether to follow those states and the District of Columbia that apply ordinary negligence principles in determining a possessor's liability for harm caused by a natural condition. See Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal.3d 358, 178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121 (1981), listing thirteen jurisdictions following that rule. Similarly, it is not necessary for us to decide whether to follow other jurisdictions that have begun applying ordinary negligence principles only in urban locations. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 363(2) and cmt. a (1965). We need only decide the case before us, and it involves maintenance of ornamental shrubs in an urban location.