Opinion ID: 2395334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Secret Taping

Text: We now turn to respondent's statements denying that she secretly taped conversations. Fortunately, resolution of this matter is not complicated by the same problems of interpretation and subjective intentions that we confronted earlier. One of the allegations considered at the VACJ hearings was Judge Gretkowski's claim that respondent secretly taped conversations and meetings. Although she admitted one instance in which she secretly taped a meeting, respondent otherwise flatly denied the allegation. During her statements and testimony at the VACJ hearings, respondent repeatedly defended herself against this charge: Except for one incident which you will hear about tomorrow I have never, ever taped an individual without letting them know first that I have taped. . . . . [Attorney]: Judge, at any other time since you have been an Assistant Judge have you secretly taped any meetings? [Respondent]: Never. . . . . And I want to tell you that in no way, shape or form did I ever, ever alter any tape; in the same way I am telling you I have never taped a conversation where I didn't think the person knew that I was taping. Ironically, respondent herself produced the evidence that suggests that she did, in fact, secretly tape a conversation. At the VACJ hearing, respondent submitted a number of transcripts of meetings and conversations that she had taped, presumably because the discussions related to the various allegations covered at the hearings. One transcript recorded a conversation between respondent and Probate Judge Susan Fowler. Judge Fowler testified before the Board that she was not aware that this conversation had been taped. Based on this testimony and the content of the tape recording, the Board found the first of the above statements to be false, deceptive, and misleading. The Board did not make such a finding with respect to the other two statements. [5] Obviously, respondent does not dispute that she taped the conversation, nor does she dispute that she never orally told Judge Fowler that their conversation was being recorded. She argues, however, that her tape recorder was on her desk in plain view during the meeting, and that she reasonably assumed that Judge Fowler knew that the tape was running. She also emphasizes that she voluntarily produced the transcript of the meeting at the VACJ hearings, where she was defending herself against the charge that she taped people secretly  an action that makes little sense unless she thought that Judge Fowler was aware of the taping. Overall, however, the evidence leads us to conclude that respondent secretly taped the meeting. The tape begins while respondent and Judge Fowler are walking upstairs together, although respondent's transcription does not reflect this part of the conversation. Respondent explains this by saying that she must have accidentally turned on the tape recorder, which was in her pocket, and that she did not realize what had happened until she later listened to the tape. This claim is not credible. If respondent did not know the recorder was already running, she would have had to turn the recorder on  or attempt to do so  when she and Judge Fowler reached the office. At that point she would have realized that it was already running. Respondent's claim is also at odds with Judge Fowler's testimony that she did not see a tape recorder during the meeting. Because of the conflicting testimony, we must weigh the credibility of the witnesses  a task made more difficult by the fact that this Court did not hear the witnesses firsthand. The Board, which was in the best position to evaluate the witnesses, found Judge Fowler's testimony to be credible. We agree. Unlike respondent, Judge Fowler had no stake in these proceedings and thus no motive for dishonesty. Moreover, the tangible evidence  that is, the contents of the tape  supports Judge Fowler's account. First, neither respondent nor Judge Fowler mention the tape recorder during the conversation. We consider it highly unlikely that Judge Fowler would have noticed respondent remove the tape recorder from her pocket and set it on the desk, and make no comment. Second, Judge Fowler spoke rather freely during the conversation, discussing the sensitive topic of possible legal action against respondent. Again, we think it unlikely that Judge Fowler would have spoken in this way had she known the conversation was being recorded. For these reasons, we accept as true Judge Fowler's testimony that she did not see a tape recorder during the conversation. According to Judge Fowler, upon entering the office she looked around the room and on respondent's desk for a tape recorder, because she had been advised [that respondent] taped meetings. She did not see one, although she did recall that the room was not unpacked and quite cluttered. It is nearly impossible to square this testimony with respondent's claim that she removed the tape recorder from her pocket and placed it on her desk. We would have to believe that, as the two women continued to converse with no noticeable break in the conversation, respondent removed the tape recorder from her pocket, fiddled with it, and set it on her desk  yet Judge Fowler observed nothing. Judge Fowler also testified that the last part of the conversation took place in the hallway, not in the office. According to Judge Fowler, after respondent signed some vouchers for computers for the probate court, Fowler left the office and began walking down the hallway to the elevator. Respondent then came out of her office and down the hall, seeking to ask Judge Fowler a few more questions about possible legal action against respondent. Judge Fowler testified that at this point respondent stood very close to her, and appeared intense, anxious, and agitated. She also testified that no tape recorder was visible while they spoke in the hallway. According to respondent, this final exchange occurred in her office, not in the hallway. As evidence, she points to the brief pause in the conversation, arguing that Judge Fowler would not have had time to walk from the office to the elevator during those few seconds. Regardless of how far down the hallway Judge Fowler walked, however, the tape supports Fowler's testimony that she left the office and respondent followed and called after her. Standing alone, each of respondent's explanations  that the early part of the conversation was taped by accident, that she had the tape recorder in plain view on her desk, and that Judge Fowler was mistaken about the conversation in front of the elevator  might be plausible. Strung together, however, the overall story is simply not credible. We are asked to believe that after respondent met Judge Fowler on the way upstairs, the tape recorder in her pocket accidentally turned on; that upon entering the office, respondent took out the tape recorder and attempted to turn it on, then set it on the desk without being observed by Judge Fowler, even though Judge Fowler was looking for a tape recorder; and that Judge Fowler's detailed and clear recollection of the conversation in the hallway was entirely mistaken. The inescapable conclusion is that respondent taped the conversation between Judge Fowler and herself without letting Judge Fowler know, either by telling her or by placing the tape recorder in plain view. We therefore find that respondent knowingly made false statements at the VACJ hearings. All three statements quoted above are inconsistent with respondent's surreptitious taping of her meeting with Judge Fowler. Unlike the Board, we see no meaningful differences among the statements. Although phrased differently, each statement was essentially a denial of the allegation that respondent had taped other people without their knowledge. Based on the facts found above, respondent must have known that these denials were false. Cf. In re Carver, 192 Wis.2d 136, 531 N.W.2d 62, 68 (1995) (judge disciplined for denying that defendant had contacted court or asked for special treatment, where evidence showed that defendant had written to judge and asked for his assistance). We agree with the Board that making these false statements violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct.