Opinion ID: 487476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gustavo Alvarado

Text: 24 In what is clearly a change in position from that taken before the trial court, counsel for Alvarado argues on appeal to this court that the facts established by the government support a finding of actual knowledge, not deliberate avoidance or lack of knowledge. 1 We agree. 25 The government claims that the evidence it presented at trial established a plethora of suspicious circumstances that represented not only conscious avoidance, but strong and persuasive proof of the existence of a conspiracy between the defendants to import cocaine which could only have been unknown to the defendants because of deliberate ignorance. (Emphasis in original). The government points to the following evidence: 26 1. Alvarado and Oqueli were the last passengers off the plane and the last to pass through the prescreening and control points. The government argued at trial that defendants were hoping that the customs inspectors would be less diligent. 27 2. Alvarado retrieved and carried from the luggage carousel, not his luggage, but two suitcases belonging to codefendant Oqueli. 28 3. Alvarado appeared nervous and trembling during his contacts with customs officers. 29 4. Alvarado had two airplane tickets, one of which he used to fly home on Varig Airlines and was paid for with cash, and a valid, but unused, Japanese Airline ticket. Alvarado testified that Oqueli gave him the Varig ticket. Oqueli denied giving the ticket to Alvarado. 30 5. Alvarado made inconsistent statements to customs officials about the purpose of his trip. He told the inspector at prescreening that he was returning from Rio de Janeiro alone after a one-week vacation. After his arrest, he told DEA agents he had been on a ten-day trip to Rio for a medical conference. At trial, he testified that he went to Rio with Oqueli to price leather for a contemplated import/export business. 31 6. Alvarado appeared to avoid opening the black suitcase which contained the cocaine. After he was requested to obtain the keys to open the black suitcase, he presented keys that fit the brown suitcase, not the black one. He readily agreed to open the brown suitcase. 32 7. Alvarado made inconsistent statements regarding the ownership of the black suitcase. At the secondary search area, he claimed ownership of both the black and brown suitcases and presented the appropriate baggage claim tags. He further stated that he had set the combination on the black suitcase when he purchased it. Later, when he was given a crowbar to force open the black suitcase, he stated that the suitcase was Oscar's, not his, and that he was not responsible for its contents. 33 8. After forcing open the black suitcase with a crowbar, Alvarado immediately turned pale even though there was no cocaine yet visible. 34 9. Alvarado allegedly made a post-arrest statement that he agreed to carry the black suitcase as a favor for a friend and, upon his return to the United States, his friend would give him $5,000 as a gift for carrying the suitcase. 35 Most, if not all of these facts, point to Alvarado's actual knowledge of the cocaine and his attempt to prevent its discovery. Facts number three and eight, his nervousness and turning pale, by themselves, could support either theory--either that he knew, or was afraid to find out. However, when combined with the other facts, these two facts strongly support actual knowledge. The government's strongest evidence of conscious avoidance is Alvarado's alleged post-arrest statement that a friend promised him $5,000 as a gift if he delivered the black suitcase. See United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 651 (9th Cir.1982) (deliberate ignorance instruction proper where defendant was given an airplane ticket, clothing, and a substantial amount of cash to deliver a suitcase to Mr. Tom upon arrival in the United States). However, the evidence on whether this statement was actually made is, at best, contradictory. Even if the statement was made, this fact alone, in light of the other evidence in the case, did not justify the Jewell instruction. 2 Because there is insufficient evidence for a trier of fact to reasonably conclude that Alvarado purposely contrived to avoid learning of the presence of the cocaine, it was inappropriate for the district court to give the Jewell instruction. See Garzon, 688 F.2d at 609.