Opinion ID: 1267759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Appeal of the University

Text: The validity of preferential admission to professional school for minorities was before the United States Supreme Court in De Funis v. Odegaard, which involved a program at the University of Washington law school. However, after granting certiorari (414 U.S. 1038 [38 L.Ed.2d 329, 94 S.Ct. 538]) the high court determined, over the dissent of four justices, that the case was moot, and vacated the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court (416 U.S. 312 [40 L.Ed.2d 164, 94 S.Ct. 1704].) [9] The question before us has generated extraordinary interest in academia, as well as a proliferation of debate among legal writers and commentators. (See, for a mere literary sampling, Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments (1974) 22 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 343; De Funis Symposium (1975) 75 Colum.L.Rev. 483; Sandalow, Racial Preferences: The Judicial Role (1975) 42 U.Chi.L.Rev. 653; Symposium, De Funis: The Road Not Taken (1974) 60 Va.L.Rev. 917; Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination (1974) 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 723; O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education (1971) 80 Yale L.J. 699; Graglia, Special Admission of the Culturally Deprived to Law School (1970) 119 U.Pa.L.Rev. 351; Ginger (edit.), De Funis versus Odegaard and the University of Washington (1974); Cohen, The De Funis Case: Race and The Constitution, (Feb. 8, 1975) The Nation 135; O'Neil, Discriminating Against Discrimination (1975).) No fewer than 26 amici curiae briefs were filed in the United States Supreme Court in De Funis. Indeed, Justice Brennan, dissenting in De Funis from the determination of mootness, remarked that [F]ew constitutional questions in recent history have stirred as much debate.... (416 U.S. at p. 350 [40 L.Ed.2d at p. 188].) We note at the outset that a number of social scientists and anthropologists deem race to be an anachronistic concept; Ashley-Montagu has termed it mischievous and retardive. Many experts consider ethnic to be more accurate since it relates to characteristics of groups that may be, in different proportions, physical, national, cultural, linguistic, religious or ideological. Unfortunately lexicon is imprecise and until an improved taxonomy emerges we shall probably be compelled to discuss problems such as that before us in terms of race. (See, e.g., Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954) pp. xv-xvi.) We also observe preliminarily that although it is clear that the special admission program classifies applicants by race, this fact alone does not render it unconstitutional. Classification by race has been upheld in a number of cases in which the purpose of the classification was to benefit rather than to disable minority groups. Thus, such classifications have been approved to achieve integration in the public schools ( Swann v. Board of Education (1971) 402 U.S. 1 [28 L.Ed.2d 554, 91 S.Ct. 1267]; San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 950-951 [92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669]), to require a school system to provide instruction in English to students of Chinese ancestry ( Lau v. Nichols (1974) 414 U.S. 563 [39 L.Ed.2d 1, 94 S.Ct. 786]), [10] and to uphold the right of certain non-English speaking persons to vote ( Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) 384 U.S. 641 [16 L.Ed.2d 828, 86 S.Ct. 1717]; Castro v. State of California (1970) 2 Cal.3d 223 [85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 466 P.2d 244]). These cases differ from the special admission program in at least one critical respect, however. In none of them did the extension of a right or benefit to a minority have the effect of depriving persons who were not members of a minority group of benefits which they would otherwise have enjoyed. The University suggests that this distinction is not apposite with respect to the school integration decisions because the effort to integrate schools discommodes nonminorities by requiring some to attend schools in neighborhoods other than their own. We cannot accept this as a valid analogy. Whatever the inconveniences and whatever the techniques employed to achieve integration, no child is totally deprived of an education because he cannot attend a neighborhood school, and all students, whether or not they are members of a minority race, are subject to equivalent burdens. As the Supreme Court has said numerous times since Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483 [98 L.Ed. 873, 74 S.Ct. 686, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180], there is no right to a segregated education. The disadvantages suffered by a child who must attend school some distance from his home or is transferred to a school not of his qualitative choice cannot be equated with the absolute denial of a professional education, as occurred in the present case. (1a) It is plain that the special admission program denies admission to some white applicants solely because of their race. [11] Of the 100 admission opportunities available in each year's class, 16 are set aside for disadvantaged minorities, and the committee admits applicants who fall into this category until these 16 places are filled. Since the pool of applicants available in any year is limited, it is obvious that this procedure may result in acceptance of minority students whose qualifications for medical study, under the standards adopted by the University itself, are inferior to those of some white applicants who are rejected. This situation occurred in 1973 and 1974. The combined numerical rating assigned by the committee to each applicant who is granted an interview includes not only an evaluation of his academic scores but an assessment of all factors which the committee considers relevant to the successful pursuit of medical studies, such as an applicant's motives, character, and academic grades. This combined rating, with a few special exceptions, serves as the benchmark for admission. The dissent charges that the combined numerical rating of an applicant does not include all his qualifications because it does not contain one factor favorable to disadvantaged minority applicants, i.e., their race or ethnic background. This suggestion is based upon the theory of the dissent that minority status in and of itself constitutes a substantive qualification for medical study and that, therefore, the fact that the combined numerical rating of a minority applicant accepted for admission was lower than the rating of a white rejected for admission does not mean that the minority applicant was less qualified than the white student. ( Post, p. 82, fn. 11.) But this argument simply assumes the answer to the question at issue. Bakke claims that minority status is not a relevant consideration in determining whether an applicant is qualified for admission, and that admission decisions must be made without regard to the racial or ethnic background of a prospective student. To accept at the outset the premise that a minority applicant may be better qualified because of his race would foreclose consideration of the constitutional issue raised by the complaint. The rating of some students admitted under the special program in 1973 and 1974 was as much as 30 points below that assigned to Bakke and other nonminority applicants denied admission. Furthermore, white applicants in the general admission program with grade point averages below 2.5 were, for that reason alone, summarily denied admission, whereas some minority students in the special program were admitted with grade point averages considerably below 2.5. In our view, the conclusion is inescapable that at least some applicants were denied admission to the medical school solely because they were not members of a minority race. The fact that all the minority students admitted under the special program may have been qualified to study medicine does not significantly affect our analysis of the issues. In the first place, as the University freely admits, Bakke was also qualified for admission, as were hundreds, if not thousands of others who were also rejected. In this context the only relevant inquiry is whether one applicant was more qualified than another. Secondly, Bakke alleged that he and other nonminority applicants were better qualified for admission than the minority students accepted under the special admission program, and the question we must decide is whether the rejection of better qualified applicants on racial grounds is constitutional. The issue to be determined thus narrows to whether a racial classification which is intended to assist minorities, but which also has the effect of depriving those who are not so classified of benefits they would enjoy but for their race, violates the constitutional rights of the majority. [12] Two distinct inquiries emerge at this point; first, what test is to be used in determining whether the program violates the equal protection clause; and second, does the program meet the requirements of the applicable test. (2) The general rule is that classifications made by government regulations are valid if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived in their justification. ( McGowan v. Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 426 [6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399, 81 S.Ct. 1101].) This yardstick, generally called the rational basis test, is employed in a variety of contexts to determine the validity of government action (e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974) 416 U.S. 1, 8 [39 L.Ed.2d 797, 803-804, 94 S.Ct. 1536]; Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 485 [25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-502, 90 S.Ct. 1153]) and its use signifies that a reviewing court will strain to find any legitimate purpose in order to uphold the propriety of the state's conduct. But in some circumstances a more stringent standard is imposed. Classification by race is subject to strict scrutiny, at least where the classification results in detriment to a person because of his race. [13] In the case of such a racial classification, not only must the purpose of the classification serve a compelling state interest, but it must be demonstrated by rigid scrutiny that there are no reasonable ways to achieve the state's goals by means which impose a lesser limitation on the rights of the group disadvantaged by the classification. The burden in both respects is upon the government. (E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 342-343 [31 L.Ed.2d 274, 284, 92 S.Ct. 995]; Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 11 [18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1017, 87 S.Ct. 1817]; McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184, 192-193 [13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228-229, 85 S.Ct. 283].) It has been more than three decades since any decision of the United States Supreme Court upheld a classification which resulted in detriment solely on the basis of race: Korematsu v. United States (1944) 323 U.S. 214 [89 L.Ed. 194, 65 S.Ct. 193], and Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81 [87 L.Ed. 1774, 63 S.Ct. 1375], both of which were war-inspired cases that have been severely criticized subsequently. [14] The University asserts that the appropriate standard to be applied in determining the validity of the special admission program is the more lenient rational basis test. It contends that the compelling interest measure is applicable only to a classification which discriminates against a minority, reasoning that racial classifications are suspect only if they result in invidious discrimination (e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, supra, 347 U.S. 483, 494 [98 L.Ed. 873, 880]); and that invidious discrimination occurs only if the classification excludes, disadvantages, isolates, or stigmatizes a minority or is designed to segregate the races. The argument is that white applicants denied admission are not stigmatized in the sense of having cast about them an aura of inferiority; therefore, it is sufficient if the special admission program has a rational relation to the University's goals. We cannot agree with the proposition that deprivation based upon race is subject to a less demanding standard of review under the Fourteenth Amendment if the race discriminated against is the majority rather than a minority. We have found no case so holding, [15] and we do not hesitate to reject the notion that racial discrimination may be more easily justified against one race than another, nor can we permit the validity of such discrimination to be determined by a mere census count of the races. [16] That whites suffer a grievous disadvantage by reason of their exclusion from the University on racial grounds is abundantly clear. The fact that they are not also invidiously discriminated against in the sense that a stigma is cast upon them because of their race, as is often the circumstance when the discriminatory conduct is directed against a minority, does not justify the conclusion that race is a suspect classification only if the consequences of the classification are detrimental to minorities. (3) Regardless of its historical origin, the equal protection clause by its literal terms applies to any person, [17] and its lofty purpose, to secure equality of treatment to all, is incompatible with the premise that some races may be afforded a higher degree of protection against unequal treatment than others. Although there are no decisions of the United States Supreme Court directly in point, recent decisions of the high court demonstrate a marked reluctance to apply different standards to determine the rights of minorities and members of the majority. Thus, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976) 427 U.S. 273 [49 L.Ed.2d 493 96 S.Ct. 2574], the court held that title VII and section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code prohibit discrimination against all races on the same terms. Significantly, the court relied upon the broad language of these statutes, which protect any individual and all persons from discrimination. Indeed, in spite of the fact that section 1981 states that all persons ... shall have the same right in every State ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens (italics added), and that the immediate impetus for the statute upon which section 1981 was based was the necessity for further relief of the Constitutionally emancipated former Negro slaves the court found that the history of the measure justified the conclusion that it was intended to apply on equal terms to all races. [18] (1b) We come, then, to the question whether the University has demonstrated that the special admission program is necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest and that the objectives of the program cannot reasonably be achieved by some means which would impose a lesser burden on the rights of the majority. The University seeks to justify the program on the ground that the admission of minority students is necessary in order to integrate the medical school and the profession. [19] The presence of a substantial number of minority students will not only provide diversity in the student body, it is said, but will influence the students and the remainder of the profession so that they will become aware of the medical needs of the minority community and be encouraged to assist in meeting those demands. [20] Minority doctors will, moreover, provide role models for younger persons in the minority community, demonstrating to them that they can overcome the residual handicaps inherent from past discrimination. Furthermore, the special admission program will assertedly increase the number of doctors willing to serve the minority community, which is desperately short of physicians. While the University concedes it cannot guarantee that all the applicants admitted under the special program will ultimately practice as doctors in disadvantaged communities, they have expressed an interest in serving those communities and there is a likelihood that many of them will thus fashion their careers. Finally, it is urged, black physicians would have a greater rapport with patients of their own race and a greater interest in treating diseases which are especially prevalent among blacks, such as sickle cell anemia, hypertension, and certain skin ailments. We reject the University's assertion that the special admission program may be justified as compelling on the ground that minorities would have more rapport with doctors of their own race and that black doctors would have a greater interest in treating diseases prevalent among blacks. The record contains no evidence to justify the parochialism implicit in the latter assertion; and as to the former, we cite as eloquent refutation to racial exclusivity the comment of Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in De Funis : The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized. The purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for Americans.... (416 U.S. at p. 342 [40 L.Ed.2d at p. 183].) We may assume arguendo that the remaining objectives which the University seeks to achieve by the special admission program meet the exacting standards required to uphold the validity of a racial classification insofar as they establish a compelling governmental interest. Nevertheless, we are not convinced that the University has met its burden of demonstrating that the basic goals of the program cannot be substantially achieved by means less detrimental to the rights of the majority. The two major aims of the University are to integrate the student body and to improve medical care for minorities. In our view, the University has not established that a program which discriminates against white applicants because of their race is necessary to achieve either of these goals. It is the University's claim that if special consideration is not afforded to disadvantaged minority applicants, almost none of them would gain admission because, no matter how large the pool of applicants, the grades and test scores of most minority applicants are lower than those of white applicants. In support of this assertion, the University declared that in the two years before the special admission program was instituted, only two blacks and one Mexican-American qualified for admission, whereas between 1970 and 1974, while the program was in operation, 33 Mexican-Americans, 26 blacks, and 1 American Indian were admitted. [21] But this showing is insufficient to satisfy the University's burden. For there is no evidence as to the nature of the admission standards prior to 1969, when the special admission program began, and it may well be that virtually determinative weight was accorded to test scores and grades. Thus the fact that few minorities were accepted before 1969 was not necessarily the result of the absence of a preference for minorities on strictly racial grounds. We observe and emphasize in this connection that the University is not required to choose between a racially neutral admission standard applied strictly according to grade point averages and test scores, and a standard which accords preference to minorities because of their race. While minority applicants may have lower grade point averages and test scores than others, we are aware of no rule of law which requires the University to afford determinative weight in admissions to these quantitative factors. In practice, colleges and universities generally consider matters other than strict numerical ranking in admission decisions. (O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education (1971) 80 Yale L.J. 699, 701-705.) The University is entitled to consider, as it does with respect to applicants in the special program, that low grades and test scores may not accurately reflect the abilities of some disadvantaged students; and it may reasonably conclude that although their academic scores are lower, their potential for success in the school and the profession is equal to or greater than that of an applicant with higher grades who has not been similarly handicapped. [22] In addition, the University may properly as it in fact does, consider other factors in evaluating an applicant, such as the personal interview, recommendations, character, and matters relating to the needs of the profession and society, such as an applicant's professional goals. In short, the standards for admission employed by the University are not constitutionally infirm except to the extent that they are utilized in a racially discriminatory manner. Disadvantaged applicants of all races must be eligible for sympathetic consideration, and no applicant may be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by standards applied without regard to race. [23] We reiterate, in view of the dissent's misinterpretation, that we do not compel the University to utilize only the highest objective academic credentials as the criterion for admission. In addition to flexible admission standards, the University might increase minority enrollment by instituting aggressive programs to identify, recruit, and provide remedial schooling for disadvantaged students of all races who are interested in pursuing a medical career and have an evident talent for doing so. Another ameliorative measure which may be considered is to increase the number of places available in the medical schools, either by allowing additional students to enroll in existing schools or by expanding the schools. In 1974, the University received almost 40 applications for each place available, and the entering class in all the medical schools in the state in the last academic year totalled only 1,094 students. (Assn. of American Medical Colleges, Medical School Admission Requirements (1976) table 2-B, pp. 11-12.) None of the foregoing measures can be related to race, but they will provide for consideration and assistance to individual applicants who have suffered previous disabilities, regardless of their surname or color. So far as the record discloses, the University has not considered the adoption of these or other nonracial alternatives to the special admission program. Whether these measures, taken together, will result in the enrollment of precisely the same number of minority students as under the current special admission program, no one can determine. It may be that in some years there would be fewer and in some years more minorities enrolled than under the present scheme. But even if somewhat fewer minority applicants are admitted without a program which focuses on race, the University has not shown that the second major objective of the program  the need for more doctors to serve the minority community  will be appreciably impaired. This shortage is perhaps the most serious of the problems which the University seeks to correct by means of its program. According to statistics cited by the University and amici curiae, the National Lawyers Guild and the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, blacks and other races have a life expectancy of 6.3 years less than whites, their maternal mortality rate is three times higher than that of whites, and their infant mortality is almost twice as high. (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S. (1974) tables 82, 84.) We do not doubt that amelioration of this societal infirmity is one of the most urgent tasks of the medical schools and the medical profession. We question, however, whether the University has established that the special admission program is the least intrusive or even the most effective means to achieve this goal. The University concedes it cannot assure that minority doctors who entered under the program, all of whom expressed an interest in practicing in a disadvantaged community, will actually do so. It may be correct to assume that some of them will carry out this intention, and that it is more likely they will practice in minority communities than the average white doctor. (See Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role (1975) 42 U.Chi.L.Rev. 653, 688.) Nevertheless, there are more precise and reliable ways to identify applicants who are genuinely interested in the medical problems of minorities than by race. An applicant of whatever race who has demonstrated his concern for disadvantaged minorities in the past and who declares that practice in such a community is his primary professional goal would be more likely to contribute to alleviation of the medical shortage than one who is chosen entirely on the basis of race and disadvantage. In short, there is no empirical data to demonstrate that any one race is more selflessly socially oriented or by contrast that another is more selfishly acquisitive. Moreover, while it may be true that the influence exerted by minorities upon the student body and the profession will persuade some nonminority doctors to assist in meeting these community medical needs, it is at best a circuitous and uncertain means to accomplish the University's objective. It would appear that more directly effective methods can be devised, such as academic and clinical courses directed to the medical needs of minorities, and emphasis upon the training of general practitioners to serve the basic needs of the poor. [24] The University cites certain cases in support of its position. A substantial number of decisions, most of them determined under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) have upheld the right of minorities to preference in employment. (E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation, Inc. (1976) 424 U.S. 747 [47 L.Ed.2d 444, 96 S.Ct. 1251]; United States v. Masonry Cont. Ass'n of Memphis, Inc. (6th Cir.1974) 497 F.2d 871, 874, 877; NAACP v. Allen (5th Cir.1974) 493 F.2d 614, 617, 622; Carter v. Gallagher (8th Cir.1971) 452 F.2d 315, 318, 331; United States v. Ironworkers Local 86 (9th Cir.1971) 443 F.2d 544, 548, 554.) The University asserts that these decisions establish the validity of a preference to minorities on the basis of race even if the classification results in detriment to the majority. The authorities are not persuasive. In all these cases the court found that the defendant had practiced discrimination in the past and that the preferential treatment of minorities was necessary to grant them the opportunity for equality which would have been theirs but for the past discriminatory conduct. Absent a finding of past discrimination  and thus the need for remedial measures to compensate minorities for the prior discriminatory practices of the employer  the federal courts, with one exception, have held that the preferential treatment of minorities in employment is invalid on the ground that it deprives a member of the majority of a benefit because of his race. [25] ( Chance v. Board of Examiners (2d Cir.1976) 534 F.2d 993; Kirkland v. New York St. Dept. of Correctional Serv. (2d Cir.1975) 520 F.2d 420, 427-428; Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (E.La. 1976) 415 F. Supp 761, Brunetti v. City of Berkeley (N.D.Cal. 1975) H C-74-0051 RFP; [26] Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School District (N.D.Cal. 1972) 357 F. Supp. 248, 250.) [27] It is important to observe that all of these cases, with the exception of Weber, hold that it is unconstitutional reverse discrimination to grant a preference to a minority employee in the absence of a showing of prior discrimination by the particular employer granting the preference. Obviously, this principle would apply whether the preference was compelled by a court or voluntarily initiated by the employer. Moreover, Brunetti, Anderson and Weber all invalidated voluntary programs of preference for minorities. [28] Thus, there is no merit in the assertion of the dissent that there is some undefined constitutional significance to the fact that the University elected to adopt the special admission program and was not compelled to do so by court order. To the victim of racial discrimination the result is not noticeably different under either circumstance. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the University has discriminated against minority applicants in the past. Nevertheless amici curiae ask that we find, by analogy to the employment discrimination cases, that the University's reliance on grade point averages and the Medical College Admission Test in evaluating applicants amounted to discrimination in fact against minorities. Amici claim that the application of these quantitative measures by the University had resulted in the exclusion of a disproportionate number of minority applicants, that grades and test scores are not significantly related to a student's performance in medical school or in the profession, and that the test is culturally biased. In the recent case of Washington v. Davis, supra, 426 U.S. 229, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the standard for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination on constitutional grounds is not the same as the standard applicable to cases decided under title VII, and that absent a racially discriminatory purpose, a test is not invalid solely because it may have a racially disproportionate impact. Thus, the fact that minorities are underrepresented at the University would not suffice to support a determination that the University has discriminated against minorities in the past. (See also Tyler v. Vickery (5th Cir.1975) 517 F.2d 1089, 1095.) In any event, we are not called upon to decide the issue raised by amici in the present case. Neither party contended in the trial court that the University had practiced discrimination, and no evidence with regard to that question was admitted below. [29] Thus, on the basis of the record before us, we must presume that the University has not engaged in past discriminatory conduct. The University relies upon Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, supra, 384 N.Y.Supp.2d 82. There, as here, a white medical student alleged that he had been discriminated against in admission to a publicly funded medical school because of preferences accorded to black and Puerto Rican applicants in the admission program. Although the court found that the school had discriminated in favor of the minority applicants, it did not decide whether the preference was constitutional. Rather, it held that the petitioner did not demonstrate his right to relief because he had failed to show that he would have been admitted if no preference had been extended to minority applicants. The opinion contains dictum which is in conflict with some of our reasoning, but the court's holding is not at variance with our determination that the special admission program is invalid. [30] Few legal issues in recent years have troubled and divided legal commentators as much as that which we decide today. Observers of varied persuasion have demonstrated an ambivalence regarding the lawfulness and social desirability of preferential admission policies. These doubts, induced by disturbed sensibilities, are readily comprehensible. On the one hand, it is urged that preferential treatment for minorities is essential in order to afford them an opportunity to enjoy the benefits which would have been theirs but for more than a century of exploitation and discrimination by the prevailing majority. Although legal impediments to equality have been removed by the judiciary and by the Congress, goes the argument, minorities still labor under severe handicaps. To achieve the American goal of true equality of opportunity among all races, more is required than merely removing the shackles of past formal restrictions; in the absence of special assistance, minorities will become a self-perpetuating group at the bottom level of our society who have lost the ability and the hope of moving up. (Kaplan, Equal in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro  The Problem of Special Treatment (1966) 61 Nw.U.L.Rev. 363, 374.) Preferential admissions will be necessary only until minorities can compete on an equal basis, and will benefit not only the applicant who is specially treated, but also the minority community in general. [31] The persuasiveness of these arguments cannot be denied, for the ends sought by such programs are clearly just if the benefit to minorities is viewed in isolation. But there are more forceful policy reasons against preferential admissions based on race. The divisive effect of such preferences needs no explication and raises serious doubts whether the advantages obtained by the few preferred are worth the inevitable cost to racial harmony. [32] The overemphasis upon race as a criterion will undoubtedly be counterproductive: rewards and penalties, achievements and failures, are likely to be considered in a racial context through the school years and beyond. Pragmatic problems are certain to arise in identifying groups which should be preferred or in specifying their numbers, and preferences once established will be difficult to alter or abolish; human nature suggests a preferred minority will be no more willing than others to relinquish an advantage once it is bestowed. Perhaps most important, the principle that the Constitution sanctions racial discrimination against a race  any race  is a dangerous concept fraught with potential for misuse in situations which involve far less laudable objectives than are manifest in the present case. While a program can be damned by semantics, it is difficult to avoid considering the University scheme as a form of an education quota system, benevolent in concept perhaps, but a revival of quotas nevertheless. No college admission policy in history has been so thoroughly discredited in contemporary times as the use of racial percentages. Originated as a means of exclusion of racial and religious minorities from higher education, a quota becomes no less offensive when it serves to exclude a racial majority. No form of discrimination should be opposed more vigorously than the quota system. (McWilliams, A Mask For Privilege (1948) p. 238.) [33] To uphold the University would call for the sacrifice of principle for the sake of dubious expediency and would represent a retreat in the struggle to assure that each man and woman shall be judged on the basis of individual merit alone, a struggle which has only lately achieved success in removing legal barriers to racial equality. The safest course, the one most consistent with the fundamental interests of all races and with the design of the Constitution, is to hold, as we do, that the special admission program is unconstitutional because it violates the rights guaranteed to the majority by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.