Opinion ID: 543195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal for State Procedural Default

Text: 21 Whether the dismissal of a habeas petition for state procedural default is a determination on the merits is a question of law. We review questions of law de novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). 22 The district court denied Howard's 1985 habeas petition because it found that Howard was barred by state procedural default from bringing each of his three claims and that he had failed to establish cause for his state procedural defaults. We have not previously decided whether the dismissal of a habeas petition on the basis of state procedural default is a decision on the merits for purposes of the successive petition doctrine. We now hold that it should be considered a decision on the merits under part two of the Sanders test. 23 The Sanders Court stated that for a court to dismiss a successive petition [t]he prior denial must have rested on an adjudication of the merits of the ground presented in the subsequent application. 373 U.S. at 16, 83 S.Ct. at 1077. While a court, in dismissing a petition because of state procedural default (and a failure to show cause and prejudice), is not determining the merits of the underlying claims, it is making a determination on the merits that the underlying claims will not be considered by a federal court for reasons of comity. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2505, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 1709-10, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976)); Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1982). Such a determination should be considered on the merits for purposes of the successive petition doctrine. 24 Though there is an absence of Ninth Circuit authority, other circuits have decided that dismissals of federal habeas petitions for failure to exhaust state remedies are not determinations on the merits for purposes of the successive petition doctrine. See Simpson v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 494, 495 (5th Cir.1973); Fuller v. Florida, 473 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5th Cir.1973); United States, Ex Rel. Senk v. Brierley, 471 F.2d 657, 659-60 (3rd Cir.1973); Krupnick v. Crouse, 366 F.2d 851, 852 (10th Cir.1966). 7 However, a dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies is distinguishable from a dismissal for state procedural default. In the former situation, the state courts have not rendered a decision regarding the merits of defendant's claims, but the opportunity is still open for the defendant to obtain a disposition on the merits of his or her claims in the state courts. After exhausting state court remedies, a subsequent federal petition for habeas corpus could be entertained while preserving the principles of federal-state comity. In the case of state procedural default, a state court has not rendered a decision regarding the merits of the defendant's claims, but the defendant has no further opportunity to obtain a disposition on the merits of his or her claims in the state courts. In a subsequent petition raising the same claims that were dismissed previously on the basis of state procedural default, the interest underlying the dismissal of the first petition, i.e., federal-state comity, is still present. See generally Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (discussing the doctrines of exhaustion of state remedies and state procedural default). 25 We conclude, therefore, that the dismissal of a federal habeas petition on the ground of state procedural default is a determination on the merits for the purposes of the successive petition doctrine. 26