Opinion ID: 894707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voir Dire Inquiry Regarding Facts in a Case

Text: Voir dire inquiry into potential juror bias and prejudice thus is proper to determine whether jurors are disqualified by statute [30] and to seek information that allows counsel to intelligently exercise their peremptory strikes. Because the statute does not define bias or prejudice, we defined them in Compton v. Henrie, using their ordinary meanings: [31] Bias, in its usual meaning, is an inclination toward one side of an issue rather than to the other, but to disqualify, it must appear that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality. Prejudice is more easily defined, for it means prejudgment, and consequently embraces bias; the converse is not true. [32] Other sources confirm that bias generally relates to inclinations, while prejudice is associated with prejudgment. [33] Although it expressly prohibits only bias or prejudice concerning parties, we recognized in Compton that the statute extends to bias or prejudice concerning types of cases. [34] A juror who is prejudiced against all medical malpractice claims, for example, is necessarily prejudiced against a party in the case, even if they have never met. [35] Although a juror may be statutorily disqualified because of a bias or prejudice against a type of claim or a general inability to follow the court's instructions regarding the law, this Court has refused to hold that statements that reflect a juror's judgment about the facts of a case as presented, rather than an external unfair bias or prejudice, amount to a disqualifying bias. In Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc ., an attorney summarized the evidence during voir dire, and then inquired of the jurors whether either party was starting out ahead. [36] The Court held that such inquiries are improper, and that a trial court should not disqualify a juror based on an answer to an inquiry that seeks an opinion about the evidence. [37] Cortez thus adopted the general rule that it is improper to ask prospective jurors what their verdict would be if certain facts were proved. [38] Fair and impartial jurors reach a verdict based on the evidence, [39] and not on bias or prejudice. [40] Voir dire inquiries to jurors should address the latter, not their opinions about the former. Cortez involved a general summary of all the evidence, and thus we did not review whether a voir dire question addressed to the weight a juror would give a relevant piece of the evidence could be objectionable. Such an inquiry, however, raises similar concerns. First, an inquiry about the weight jurors will give relevant evidence should not become a proxy for inquiries into jurors' attitudes, because the former is a determination that falls within their province as jurors. [41] Just as excluding jurors who weigh summarized facts in a particular way infringes upon the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, so too does excluding jurors who reveal whether they would give specific evidence great or little weight. [42] In both cases, questions that attempt to elicit such information can represent an effort to skew the jury by pre-testing their opinions about relevant evidence. And, when all of the parties to the case engage in such questioning, the effort is aimed at guessing the verdict, not at seating a fair jury. Second, inquiring whether jurors can be fair after isolating a relevant fact confuses jurors as much as an inquiry that previews all the facts. Lawyers properly instruct jurors that voir dire is not evidence, yet jurors must answer whether they can fairly listen to all of the evidence based only upon the facts that counsel have revealed. In responding, jurors are unable to consider other relevant facts that might alter their responses, rendering their responses unreliable. This confusion may explain in part why jurors' voir dire reactions to the evidence have not been proven to be predictors of jury verdicts: experience tells that, whatever jurors' stated opinions about particular evidence may be at the outset, they can shift upon hearing other evidence. [43] Third, previewing jurors' votes piecemeal is not consistent with the jurisprudence of our sister court. [44] In Standefer v. State , the Court of Criminal Appeals held it improper to ask jurors whether they would presume guilt if one fact was proved and no others. [45] Our sister court consistently has observed that [Q]uestions that are not intended to discover bias against the law or prejudice for or against the defendant, but rather seek only to determine how jurors would respond to the anticipated evidence and commit them to a specific verdict based on that evidence are not proper. [46] As the statutory standards for bias or prejudice in civil and criminal cases are the same, [47] voir dire standards should remain consistent. Finally, the Court's decision in Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hospital does not dictate that a trial judge must accept questions that seek to assess jurors' opinions about the weight they will place on particular evidence. In that case, we held that counsel could question jurors about bias or prejudice resulting from a societal influence outside the case  namely, tort reform. [48] In contrast, a question that asks jurors to judge the weight to be given an operative fact will not reveal whether jurors have potential external biases or prejudices that improperly skew their view of case facts. Statements during voir dire are not evidence, but given its broad scope in Texas civil cases, it is not unusual for jurors to hear the salient facts of the case during the voir dire. If the voir dire includes a preview of the evidence, we hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow questions that seek to determine the weight to be given (or not to be given) a particular fact or set of relevant facts. [49] If the trial judge permits questions about the weight jurors would give relevant case facts, then the jurors' responses to such questions are not disqualifying, because while such responses reveal a fact-specific opinion, one cannot conclude they reveal an improper subject-matter bias.