Opinion ID: 1820473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the trial court erroneously grant the state challenges for cause based on responses to voir dire questioning concerning the death penalty?

Text: The most recent pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court on this question appears in Wainright v. Witt, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). In that case the Court stated that it would continue to apply the rule of law announced in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). That rule, succinctly stated, is that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams at 448 U.S. 45, 100 S.Ct. 2526, 65 L.E.2d 589. The juror must be able to consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law. Fuselier argues that the trial court failed to consider the correct standard when it granted the state challenges of several jurors for cause. He specifically complains of the exclusion of jurors Mercer, Messemore, Sowell, Landrum, Clinton and Long. Juror Mercer testified that he did not think he could bring back a verdict of guilty with pieces of evidence missing. The reference to pieces of evidence missing was in response to the district attorney's voir dire statements that the state's case was similar to a jigsaw puzzle with pieces missing. The district attorney was trying to explain that the case against Fuselier was based on circumstantial evidence. Later, Mercer testified that he had previously stated he did not think he could be fair in a murder case. This is the total voir dire concerning juror Mercer. Juror Messemore stated,  I would have to hear the evidence before I could say for certain, but I'm not sure that I could say this man here should die ... I don't think I could. Now, if it would have been somebody I knew or something like that, you know, I could probably. But, in this case, I don't believe there is any evidence with pieces missing that I could say that this man should die. In discussing the peremptory dismissal of juror Messemore, the court stated, As I recall it, he stated that he had scruples against the inflicting of the death penalty and there wasn't any way  my notes reflect  that he could return a death penalty verdict. Juror Sowell stated: I don't know if I could with pieces missing. Mrs. Sowell also stated that she could be a fair and impartial juror. In the discussion of whether juror Sowell should be peremptorily excused, the district attorney stated, Yes, sir, she told me she could not put it aside ... the fact that he would possibly get the death penalty. That she could not give the death penalty and could not put it aside. Mrs. Sowell also stated that she could be a fair and impartial juror. Juror Landrum stated that she could be a fair and impartial juror. She did stand up when the district attorney asked Are there any of you that just could not vote the death penalty no matter what the facts or what the circumstances are? No matter what? Mrs. Landrum was never asked any questions individually after standing in response to that question. In the discussion between the attorneys and the court as to whether Mrs. Landrum should be excused, the district attorney said, She just said she could not impose the death penalty in this case. There is no evidence in the record that Mrs. Landrum made that statement other than by standing in response to the district attorney's initial question. As to juror Clinton, the defense expressly stated that it had no objection to her being excused. Juror Long stated, I don't believe there is any way that I could do it. Juror Long also stated that she had previously stated that she could not be fair in a murder trial. As can be seen from a review of the above detailed descriptions of the voir dire, the trial court clearly committed reversible error in excusing jurors Messemore and Sowell for cause. There was no indication from these jurors' comments that they would be prevented or substantially impaired in the performance of their duties as jurors, nor that they would be unable to decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law. The fact that they would be hesitant to inflict the death penalty in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence does not constitute grounds to excuse them for cause. It is apparent from a review of the record that the district attorney's analogy to a jigsaw puzzle with pieces missing was confusing and almost certain to invoke a response indicating uneasiness and uncertainty by jurors who were in good faith attempting to address what was at that time nothing more than a hypothetical moral dilemma. Without any knowledge of the strength of the state's case or the meaning of the missing pieces analogy, it is completely understandable how jurors who are fully capable of following the court's instructions and juror's oath would be led to a hesitancy to state that they can impose the death penalty. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Adams, Neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is equivalent to an unwillingness or inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court's instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the death penalty. Adams, 448 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. at 2529, 65 L.Ed.2d at 593. Absent a clear showing that the prospective juror would be unable to follow the court's instructions and obey the juror's oath, that juror's feelings regarding the death penalty do not constitute grounds for a challenge and the granting of such a challenge is reversible error. Wainright v. Witt, supra , Adams v. Texas, supra . Furthermore, the failure to fully develop any voir dire regarding Mrs. Landrum rendered her dismissal for cause error. A clear showing that a juror's views would prevent or significantly impair the performance of his or her duties requires more than a single response to an initial inquiry.