Opinion ID: 1058303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mistrial For Manifest Necessity

Text: Therefore, the next issue we address is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a mistrial for manifest necessity and granting a retrial of the entire case. We review this matter for an abuse of discretion. Smith, 239 Va. at 267, 389 S.E.2d at 884. The granting of a mistrial for manifest necessity may become necessary when the jury ceases to function as a jury. When Juror D refused to continue deliberations, and in effect impeached his verdict rendered in the guilt or innocence phase, the circuit court was faced with the novel issue whether to continue a trial when juror misconduct not only affected the sentencing phase, but also the prior phase of guilt or innocence. A circuit court has the authority to discharge the jury when it determines there exits a manifest necessity to do so. Code § 8.01-361. In determining whether manifest necessity exists, a trial court is vested with broad discretion. Smith, 239 Va. at 267, 389 S.E.2d at 884. Absent a showing that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting a mistrial, this Court will not disturb the circuit court's ruling on appeal. Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 40, 393 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1990). In assessing whether manifest necessity existed, the circuit court considered the fact that Juror D refused to follow the court's instructions in two respects. First, Juror D revealed that he had not maintain[ed] his honest convictions during the guilt phase when he expressed that he did not believe the Commonwealth had proved that Prieto was guilty of capital murder after the jury had returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Secondly, Juror D refused to follow the Allen charge when he gave the circuit court a note prior to returning to the jury room after lunch which clearly stated both Juror D's belief that Prieto was not guilty of capital murder as well as Juror D's unwillingness to continue deliberations. Based on these circumstances, the circuit court made a factual determination that Juror D did not follow the Allen charge and had engaged in clear misconduct. Prieto has not assigned error to these factual determinations, which find ample support in the record. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it declared a mistrial due to manifest necessity arising out of juror misconduct, discharged the jury, and granted a retrial of the entire case.