Opinion ID: 1773633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the persistent felony offender conviction place the movant in double jeopardy?

Text: To clearly understand the movant's argument, we quote from his brief as follows: K.R.S. 532.080 dictates the use of separate proceedings for the determination of guilt on the primary and persistent felony offenses. It is within this distinction that the present Kentucky statute is constitutionally infirm. In his reply brief the movant more succinctly states his attack as follows: Appellant merely argues that the particular mechanism chosen by the Kentucky State Legislature to more severely penalize persistent felony offenders is violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that    nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb   . The procedure by which a person charged with being a persistent felony offender is tried is found in KRS 532.080(1), which provides as follows: Persistent felony offender sentencing.  (1) When a defendant is found to be a persistent felony offender, the jury, in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment assessed under KRS 532.060 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall fix a sentence of imprisonment as authorized by subsection (4) of this section. When a defendant is charged with being a persistent felony offender, the determination of whether or not he is such an offender and the punishment to be imposed pursuant to subsection (4) of this section shall be determined in a separate proceeding from that proceeding which resulted in his last conviction. Such proceeding shall be conducted before the court sitting with the jury that found the defendant guilty of his most recent offense unless the court for good cause discharges that jury and impanels a new jury for that purpose. This statute was adopted by the regular 1974 session of the Kentucky General Assembly as part of the Kentucky Penal Code (Ch. 406, p. 831, p. 873) and became effective January 1, 1975. Insofar as KRS 532.080 is concerned, it had for its purpose the homogenizing of the treatment of recidivists with the new penal code and uniform proceedings dealing with persistent felony offenders. We have held, and it is universally recognized, that a person who is a persistent felony offender has attained a status. Sweeny v. Commonwealth, Ky., 442 S.W.2d 598 (1969). Having attained a status, the persistent felony offender is subject to treatment afforded others in that status and which is inapplicable to those not of that status. The facts necessary to be proven to secure and uphold a conviction on the primary offense are separate and distinct from those necessary to be proven to sustain a conviction as a persistent felony offender. It is impermissible to present to the jury facts upon which a person charged with being a persistent felony offender was initially tried and convicted. Berning v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 443 (1978). The movant argues that the sentencing for persistent felony offenders is the imposition of additional punishment to that fixed by the jury on a prior conviction. There is no additional punishment imposed by a persistent felony offender conviction, merely a more severe punishment. KRS 532.080 does not create or define a criminal offense. It recognizes a status and, in a proceeding separate and apart from the initial trial, fixes a penalty which is to be imposed rather than the one fixed by the jury on the initial trial. A bifurcated trial such as KRS 532.080 requires is designed to eliminate any unfair influence which the facts necessary to sustain a primary conviction may disclose. In Brickey Kentucky Criminal Law. Sec. 29.04, pp. 333, 334, it is stated: The Penal Code requires a bifurcated proceeding when the defendant is charged with being a persistent felony offender. Severance of the issues of guilt of the felony with which the actor is presently charged and of determination whether or not he is a persistent felony offender, is designed to remedy the potential prejudice and confusion which could result from considering the defendant's present culpability in light of his past conduct.    KRS 532.080 provides for a more severe penalty for persistent felony offenders than the penalty which had been fixed by the trial jury on the primary conviction. When we consider the actual mechanism required by KRS 532.080, we find that in truth and in fact no sentence is actually imposed pursuant to the primary conviction prior to the second step in the bifurcated proceeding. The trial jury, if it finds an accused guilty on the primary charge, then proceeds to fix his punishment. The second trial, which is the second step in the bifurcated proceeding, submits to the jury the question of whether the accused is a persistent felony offender. If the jury finds the accused guilty, it then fixes the penalty as designed by statute. Then and only then does the court proceed to enter a judgment sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment. On the other hand, if a person charged and tried with being a persistent felony offender is found not guilty, then and in that event the sentence fixed in the trial of the primary offense is imposed. Although not a white horse case with the instant action, the same principle of constitutional law as declared in Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 32 S.Ct. 583, 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912), is applicable and dispositive of this issue. Graham was convicted for more than one felony offense under an alias name. Thereafter, in a separate proceeding he was tried and convicted of being a habitual criminal. The Supreme Court of the United States found no fault with that bifurcated procedure. We find no fault with the bifurcated procedure provided for in KRS 532.080. It does not place the movant in double jeopardy. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. All concur.