Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Tannis Curry

Text: Bryant contends the trial court erred in permitting testimony that he told Tannis he had put the bomb in Keith Curry‘s car and would continue to try and kill him. Gwendolyn Derby testified that she overheard Tannis repeating Bryant‘s statements to a hairdresser. He argues his statements were protected by the confidential marital 91 communications privilege. (Evid. Code, § 980.)40 The trial court properly found the statements were not ―made in confidence‖ as required by the statute. As an initial matter, Bryant was statutorily authorized to assert the confidential marital communications privilege even though a third party testified about the contents that Tannis disclosed to someone else.41 Evidence Code section 980 provides that one spouse may prevent both the other spouse and another person from testifying about the communication. Evidence Code section 912, subdivision (b), provides that a waiver of the privilege by one spouse does not prevent the other from claiming the privilege. (See North v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 301, 310.) On appeal, Bryant attempts to recast the trial court‘s ruling as based on erroneous legal conclusions that (1) the privilege was inapplicable because Bryant and Tannis were not living together when the statement was made, or (2) that exceptions to the privilege applied because Bryant‘s statements ―criminally victimized‖ Tannis, 42 or were made in furtherance of a crime.43 The attempts fail. The court‘s comments reveal that it did not base its rulings on the exceptions. Nor did the court fail to recognize the privilege outlives the marriage. Instead, the court properly found Bryant‘s statement was not ―made in confidence,‖ as the statute requires. The court repeatedly stated this view in 40 Evidence Code section 980 provides: ―Subject to Section 912 [concerning waiver of a privilege] and except as otherwise provided in this article, a spouse (or his guardian or conservator when he has a guardian or conservator), whether or not a party, has a privilege during the marital relationship and afterwards to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a communication if he claims the privilege and the communication was made in confidence between him and the other spouse while they were husband and wife.‖ 41 Tannis denied both that Bryant made the statement and that she repeated it to others. 42 Evidence Code section 985. 43 Evidence Code section 981. 92 various ways: (1) ―So it sort of stretches the imagination that a statement, if one was made to Tannis Curry indicating [Bryant‘s] continued desire to kill Keith Curry, was something that he hoped for her to keep a secret or expected would remain confidential‖; (2) ―assuming that [there was] a valid marriage, the court will rule that there was no . . . reasonable expectation by either party that this would be a privileged [communication]‖; (3) ―I don‘t think that one could reasonably expect to keep that information private, a direct threat evidencing a plan by Mr. Bryant to kill somebody. [¶] I am all for marital bliss. But one would not be able to expect any spouse in any marriage to keep that secret, a plan to kill somebody. That would . . . enable her boyfriend to then be killed‖; (4) ―It is not a confession but a confession coupled with a statement of present intention to do harm to that person or in fact kill him. [¶] That is not the kind of statement that anybody would expect to remain private. If they did, especially when given to the estranged wife, that would not be a reasonable inference to draw — that you would expect that she would not warn this guy at least.‖ The other circumstances mentioned were factors the court considered in assessing whether the statement was made in confidence, not, as Bryant argues, independent, and legally erroneous, reasons to reject assertion of the privilege. As to the merits of the ruling, there was no error. ―To make a communication ‗in confidence,‘ one must intend nondisclosure [citations], and have a reasonable expectation of privacy [citation].‖ (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 654.) ―As a general matter, the claimant of the confidential marital communication privilege has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to sustain the claim. [Citation.] He is aided by a presumption that a marital communication was made in confidence. (Evid. Code, § 917.) The opponent has the burden to prove otherwise [citation] by a preponderance of the evidence [citation].‖ (Id. at p. 655.) Here, the presumption was adequately rebutted. Bryant presented no evidence that he actually intended nondisclosure. Given that the statement was a threat to murder the current lover of his estranged wife, any expectation of confidentiality would have been unreasonable. 93 Moreover, the circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference that Bryant affirmatively intended Tannis to convey the threat to Curry to extinguish the relationship. (See People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 [concluding in similar circumstances that the defendant ―had no desire that the threats be kept secret[;] [t]he purpose of the threats to [the spouse] was to terrorize her into curtailing her relationship with [the victim]‖].)