Opinion ID: 3002002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unlawful Search

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. With few exceptions, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home to make an arrest or to conduct a search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). “A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 8 No. 07-2804 One exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on warrantless searches of a person’s home is a search incident to arrest, an exception first recognized in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Under this exception, police officers may, incident to arrest, conduct a plenary search of the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control, that is, “the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Id. at 763. Another such exception is the protective sweep, first described in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990). Under the protective sweep exception, officers may, incident to arrest and “as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Id. at 334. A search beyond those parameters is justified when there are “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Id.; Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086 (7th Cir. 2005). It is important to note that a protective sweep is “not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 335; Leaf, 400 F.3d at 1086. The justification for a protective sweep is to protect “the safety of police officers, who have an interest in ensuring their safety when they lawfully enter a house. That interest justifies their ensuring that the dwelling does not harbor another person who is dangerous and who unexpectedly could launch an attack.” Leaf, 400 F.3d at 1087 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). No. 07-2804 9 Mr. Peals contends that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on his claim that the defendants’ search of his garage and home was unreasonable. He submits that the warrantless search of his garage and home was not justified either as a protective sweep or as a search incident to arrest.2 He makes two specific contentions: (1) that the search was unreasonable because it exceeded the limits of the protective sweep and search incident to arrest exceptions, and (2) that the search was unreasonable because it involved K-9 units. We shall address each of these contentions. First, Mr. Peals submits that the search was unreasonable because the officers did more than conduct a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding. The evidence in the record contradicts this contention. Mr. Peals stated in his affidavit that, after the officers took him into custody, he observed Officer Brinegar and several other officers with K-9 units looking around the garage “as if [they] were searching for something.” R.77, Ex. C. In addition, Mr. Peals observed Officer Brinegar enter Mr. Peals’ house. Id. Taking these facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Peals, he has not shown that the officers conducted an unconstitutional search. His version of the events is consistent with the limitations on a valid protective sweep. The officers visually inspected the area in which Mr. Peals was arrested and entered an immediately adjoining space in which other persons might be located and from which they could launch an attack. See Leaf, 400 F.3d at 1087. Notably, Mr. Peals does not allege that any officer opened 2 It is undisputed that the officers had and executed a valid arrest warrant for Mr. Peals. 10 No. 07-2804 or otherwise manipulated anything in the garage or house, or that the limited search extended beyond a brief visual inspection of the areas immediately adjoining the garage where he was arrested. See id. Even without a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the undisputed facts show that the search conducted by the officers was reasonable as a protective sweep. See id.; see also Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Second, Mr. Peals contends that the presence of K-9 units in his garage made the search unreasonable. We cannot accept this contention. As a general rule, K-9 units trained to protect officers and apprehend suspects may accompany police officers. See, e.g., United States v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the use of a police dog to assist in effecting a Terry stop was reasonable when the person ran from the officer and ignored the officer’s orders to stop). We have also held that K-9 units trained to detect contraband do not conduct a search when they sniff in an area where they are lawfully present. Brock, 417 F.3d at 696. As we have noted earlier, the officers and the K-9 units were lawfully present in Mr. Peals’ garage. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record regarding the purpose or detection capabilities of the K-9 units. The reasonable inference therefore is that the K-9 units, which are a standard part of the Street Crimes Unit, were trained either to protect the officers and apprehend suspects or to detect narcotics.3 Without a material issue of fact on the 3 Officer Brinegar testified that the Street Crimes Unit performed special tasks, including high-risk arrests, narcotics arrests and narcotics information gathering. Tr. at 17-19. No. 07-2804 11 question of whether the K-9 units used in this search were trained to search for non-contraband items, we need not reach to resolve the question of whether, when lawfully inside of a home, the use of a K-9 unit trained to sniff for non-contraband items is a search. See id. (holding that a sniff by a dog trained to search for drugs was not a search “because it detected only the presence of contraband and did not provide any information about lawful activity over which Brock had a legitimate expectation of privacy”); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38, 40. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Mr. Peals’ claim of unlawful search.