Opinion ID: 1928036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Bedroom Incident

Text: Greene also asserts that he was prejudiced by his belated discovery during jury deliberation that the so-called bedroom incident was not the basis for Count I of the indictment. He contends that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial, sua sponte, and in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to counts II through X. We disagree. Our review of the record discloses that Greene discovered the alleged variance not during jury deliberation, but earlier, when he moved for an acquittal at the close of the evidence. However, he did not move for a mistrial on the ground of prejudicial surprise at this time or later, during jury deliberation, nor did he at any time move to strike the testimony of the bedroom incident as prejudicial or ask for a limiting instruction. [2] The record further reveals that he did not move for a judgment of acquittal with respect to Count I after the victim testified in the State's case-in-chief only as to a touching in the bedroom, which was clearly insufficient to establish the alleged gross sexual misconduct. In view of Greene's failure to take advantage of these opportunities to cure the alleged prejudice, we conclude that he did not preserve the error, if any, for review. Assuming the failure to object was a tactical decision, Greene cannot now argue that he was misled, or that he was prejudiced by the court's failure to order, sua sponte, a mistrial. [3] We must accordingly review his belated contention under the obvious error standard of Rule 52(b) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me.1981). In view of the trial court's ruling resolving any doubt with respect to Count I in Greene's favor by acquitting him thereof, we find no obvious error. We further reject his contention that the acquittal on Count I rendered the evidence insufficient to prove Counts II through X beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding it is highly probable that the confusion underlying Count I did not affect the judgment on the remaining nine counts. See Delong, 505 A.2d at 807-808; True, 438 A.2d at 467. Review of the record demonstrates that the jury had before it ample evidence that eight acts of sexual misconduct and one incident of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon had occurred in addition to the bedroom incident. Greene therefore takes nothing on these points on appeal.