Opinion ID: 2999862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Authentication of Tapes

Text: Eberhart next argues that the district court erred by admitting Government Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 10, a number of tape recorded conversations between Eberhart and Bolden and between Eberhart and Tommy. Eberhart contends that the government did not properly authenticate the tapes and that the tapes contain inadmissible hearsay. Eberhart concedes that he made no objection to Exhibits 7 and 10 and that, as a result, we should review their admission for plain error. He does maintain, however, that he properly objected to the improper authentication of Exhibits 6 and 8. The government disagrees. At trial, Eberhart explained his objection to Exhibit 6, a tape recording of four December 16, 1998 phone calls between Bolden and Eberhart, as follows, “The objection to the tape is based on the fact that there was no adequate foundation in terms of showing that the tape-recording equipment had been tested and functioning properly.” R. 63. With regard to Exhibit 8, a recording of Eberhart and Bolden’s conversation outside Kentucky Fried Chicken, Eberhart made a general foundation objection. Neither of these objections sufficiently advised the district court and the government that Eberhart was contesting the authentication of the tapes. A “foundation” objection is “simply a loose term for preliminary questions designed to establish that evidence is admissible” and is not usually specific enough to preserve an alleged error on appeal. See A.I. Credit Corp. v. Legion Ins. Co., 265 F.3d 630, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barker, 27 F.3d 1287, 1292 (7th 12 No. 05-2366 Cir. 1994). Moreover, an objection concerning whether the recording equipment was functioning properly would not have alerted the district court to Eberhart’s current objection that the tapes were not true and accurate recordings of the December 16 and 17, 1998 conversations between Bolden and Eberhart. See United States v. Westmoreland, 312 F.3d 302, 311 (7th Cir. 2002). Consequently, we review the admission of Government Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 10 for plain error, which requires Eberhart to demonstrate an error that was obvious, affected his substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004). Before a tape recording may be properly admitted at trial, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires the government to offer “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the [tape] in question is what its proponent claims.” We have said that this requires the government to show by clear and convincing evidence that the proffered tape is a true, accurate, and authentic recording of the conversation between the parties. Westmoreland, 312 F.3d at 311. It may do so by establishing the chain of custody or by offering testimony of an eyewitness that the recording accurately reflects the conversation he or she witnessed. See United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 1989). District courts are given wide latitude to determine whether the government has met its burden, as is generally the case with evidentiary rulings. Id. The district court did not err by admitting Government Exhibits 6 and 7. Agent Foley testified that he listened to Bolden’s half of the December 16 and 17 conversations as they occurred and that the recordings accurately portrayed what Bolden said during those conversations. He also testified that he recognized the second voice on the recordings as Eberhart’s. Though Agent Foley did not listen to Eberhart’s half of the conversations as they occurred, his No. 05-2366 13 testimony sufficiently established the tapes’ authenticity by clear and convincing evidence. Just as a court may admit a tape recording despite a gap in the chain of custody, see United States v. Rivera, 153 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1998), a court may admit a recording where a witness testifies that he only heard half of the recorded conversation. What the witness did not hear goes to the evidentiary weight of the recording, not to its admissibility. Id.; United States v. Brown, 136 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Merely raising the possibility (however hypothetical) of tampering is not sufficient to render evidence inadmissible.”). The same reasoning requires us to conclude that the district court did not err by admitting Government Exhibit 10, which was a tape recording of a number of telephone conversations between Eberhart and a person the government claimed was his supplier. Agent Foley testified that he listened to Eberhart’s half of the conversations as they occurred and that the recordings accurately portrayed what Eberhart said during those conversations. This testimony sufficiently supported the district court’s admission of this exhibit. The admission of Exhibit 8, however, is more problematic. The government offered scant evidence that the tape played at trial was the one that recorded Bolden and Eberhart’s conversation outside the Kentucky Fried Chicken. Because of an equipment malfunction, the agents only heard “a very short” portion of the conversation as it occurred, and none of the agents testified about the tape’s chain of custody. The only evidence concerning the tape’s authenticity was Agent Glynn’s testimony that he equipped Bolden with a recording device before the conversation with Eberhart, that he removed the recording device after the conversation, and that the voices on the tape were Bolden’s and Eberhart’s. Though we question whether this is clear and convincing evidence that Government Exhibit 8 truly and accu14 No. 05-2366 rately recorded the conversation that occurred between Eberhart and Bolden, the plain error doctrine requires Eberhart to show that the error was obvious and that it affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993); United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The error must be clear under current law.”). He has not satisfied either requirement. Indeed, he has not cited (and we have not found) any decision in which we have held that a tape recording was not properly authenticated at trial. In addition, our previous rulings indicate that district courts have broad discretion in determining whether tape recordings have been authenticated. See United States v. Welch, 945 F.2d 1378, 1383 (7th Cir. 1991). Consequently, the error was not obvious. Nor has Eberhart established that the admission of Government Exhibit 8 affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Even without the contents of this recording, the government had strong evidence that Eberhart conspired to possess cocaine. It offered the phone calls between Bolden and Eberhart, Eberhart’s presence at the meeting with Bolden outside Kentucky Fried Chicken, Eberhart’s confession, phone calls between Tommy and Eberhart, and tools of drug-dealing found in the garage where Eberhart said that Tommy stored his drugs. Given this evidence, the admission of Government Exhibit 8 was not plain error. Eberhart also argues that the statements on the tapes were inadmissible hearsay. The Court rejects the argument. Eberhart’s statements were admissions, which the district court properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). Bolden and Tommy’s statements were not hearsay because they were admitted, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to place Eberhart’s statements in context. See United States v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 929-30 (7th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). No. 05-2366 15