Opinion ID: 1088707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial court err in certain evidentiary rulings?

Text: ¶ 91. Our well-established standard of review for the trial court's admission or suppression of evidence, including expert testimony, is abuse of discretion. We give great deference to the discretion of the trial judge. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 34 (Miss.2003). Unless we conclude that the discretion was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion, that decision will stand. Tunica County v. Matthews, 926 So.2d 209, 212-213 (Miss. 2006) (citations omitted). ¶ 91. After review of Natalie's brief, the Court discovered that while offering pertinent cites to the record, Natalie did not offer a single authority in her response to United's argument on erroneous evidentiary rulings. This omission was further recognized in United's reply brief. Due to Natalie's failure to cite any legal authority, this Court is not bound to consider her argument on this issue. This issue is not properly before the Court pursuant to M.R.A.P 28(a)(6) which states that an argument in the appellate's brief `shall contain the contentions of appellant with respect to the issue presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon.' Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 784 (Miss.2001) (citation omitted). However, for informational purposes, we will address the arguments on this issue. ¶ 93. United submits that the trial court should not have allowed the deposition testimony of two employees of United, wherein they testified to United's obligations regarding the policy. United submits the following portions of testimony were allowed in error: 1) United employee, Sam Smith, testified that Robert could not make a misrepresentation by signing the application if he had never been told that he had been treated for congestive heart failure. 2) United employee, Sandra Whitaker, testified that the only representation Robert made through the application was that the statements and answers therein were full, complete and true to the best of Robert's knowledge, and that United did not require Robert to ask his physicians whether he had any of the conditions listed on the application. ¶ 94. United argues this testimony wrongfully placed the burden on it to show that Robert made an intentional misrepresentation and that Smith was being asked to define material misrepresentation under Mississippi law. Further, United argues this testimony shows United was not entitled to cancel the policy unless it proved Robert knew he had congestive heart failure. Upon ruling on United's objection to this testimony, the trial judge stated that while Natalie could not ask these witnesses' opinions on misrepresentation under Mississippi law, he was taking the answers of these witnesses to be couched in terms of policies-insurance policy, nomenclature, and the company definitions. . . . The trial judge further ruled these employees should be able to testify to language which their company drafted. ¶ 95. Although this Court has stated, the interpretation of insurance policy language is a question of law, the trial judge was correct that this testimony merely spoke to Robert's agreement to the policy which United drafted. The testimony did not attempt to interpret the actual language of the policy. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing this testimony. ¶ 96. United further objected to the portion of testimony wherein Triplett was asked, Do you have an opinion about whether or not United American should have paid Ms. Merrill's claims? Triplett answered, I think they should have paid the lady. At trial, United objected that this was a legal conclusion and that Triplett should not be able testify that we owe the claim. The trial judge overruled the objection and stated her answer was not a legal conclusion, but a question of standards in the insurance business. The trial judge was correct in his ruling. Triplett was correctly allowed to state her opinion on this matter pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Evidence 701 and 704 and their Comments. ¶ 97. Additionally, United objected to the testimony of Triplett wherein she stated: 1) that she did not tell the Merrills about any contestability clause in the policy; 2) that United did not tell Triplett there was a contestability clause in the policy; and 3) that Triplett thought it would have been important for the Merrills to know about the contestability clause in the policy. United argues that knowledge of the contestability clause should have been imputed to the Merrills as it is the law that a person is bound by the contract, the documents that they sign. However, the Merrills did not have this information at the time they applied, as they were not issued the policy simultaneously with their application. See Stephens v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the US, 850 So.2d 78, 83 (Miss.2003)). This might be true as applied to the Merrills after they received the policy, but not as to Triplett. Triplett is an agent of United and pursuant to this Court's holding in Hollins, United is bound by Triplett acting within the scope of her authority. See Hollins, 830 So.2d at 1237. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing this testimony. ¶ 98. United further asserts Triplett should not have been allowed to testify that she was told by Parker and Associates that a claim would be paid in thirty days and that she relayed this information to the Merrills. In its appellate brief and argument to the trial court, United simply states there are relevance and hearsay violations pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 801, but fails to give any explanation as to why. United additionally reiterates its argument that the terms and conditions of the policy were clear and that the Merrills were subject to these terms. However, as an agent for United, United is bound by the information Triplett gave regarding the policy. See Hollins, 830 So.2d at 1237. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing this testimony. ¶ 99. Over the objection of United, Triplett was further allowed to testify: 1) that Parker and Associates was involved in a dishonest scheme because she did not receive any training; 2) that she was allowed to go out foot free and loose, but was accountable when things happened; and 3) that she was exploited and pushed to bring in money. United argues that pursuant to M.R.E. 401 and 403, the value of this testimony was substantially outweighed by the prejudice to United and that it was not relevant to the issues presented at trial. The questions which elicited this testimony from Triplett were asked by counsel for United. Although United argues Parker and Associates was responsible for training Triplett, Triplett was an agent for United and it was responsible for her actions. The training of agents who will solicit answers from prospective insureds which may result in material misrepresentations, is pertinent to the resolution of the issues of this case and meets the requirements of M.R.E. 701 and its comment. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the preceding testimony. ¶ 100. This Court has stated, The reviewing court may reverse a case only if, `the admission or exclusion of evidence . . . results in prejudice and harm or adversely affects a substantial right of a party.' Blake v. Clein, 903 So.2d 710, 723 (Miss. 2005) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (Miss.1999)). Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when excluding these records.