Opinion ID: 790335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expunged Iowa Conviction

Text: 5 Townsend argues the expunged third-degree burglary conviction should not have been counted in calculating his criminal history score, because expunged convictions are excluded from criminal history under section 4A1.2(j) of the Guidelines. We review de novo the district court's construction and interpretation of Chapter Four of the Guidelines, and we review for clear error the district court's application of Chapter Four to the facts. United States v. Holland, 195 F.3d 415, 416 (8th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). Decisions regarding offenses counted in a criminal history calculation are factual determinations subject to clear-error review. United States v. Paden, 330 F.3d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir.2003). Under the advisory Guidelines, the district court still may make factual findings in the court's sentencing assessments. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.); United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 757, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (The [] approach, which we now adopt, would ... make the Guidelines system advisory while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's real conduct-a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its Guidelines system to achieve.); United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 80 (1st Cir.2005) (Under Booker, a judge may do such fact finding in determining the Guidelines range. Nothing in Booker requires submission of such facts to a jury so long as the Guidelines are not mandatory.). The sentence imposed must not be unreasonable. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 765-66. 6 Congress has the constitutional authority for establishing and implementing sentencing goals. The Guidelines reflect the will of Congress and a Congressional desire for uniform and fair sentencing. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (noting one purpose of the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) is to establish sentencing policies for the federal criminal justice system that provide certainty and fairness in sentencing and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities); Id. § 994(f) (directing the Commission, in promulgating the Guidelines, to promote the purposes set out in section 991(b)(1), and to pay particular attention to the requirements of subsection 991(b)(1)(B)); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A (policy statement) (stating Congress' sentencing objectives are an effective, fair sentencing system sought through honesty in sentencing[,]... uniformity in sentencing[, and] proportionality in sentencing); Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 757, 767. Thus, our court must give the will of Congress, as represented in the Guidelines, due deference. 7 Under the Guidelines, courts are to add criminal history points for each prior sentence, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, except for certain misdemeanors and petty offenses for which criminal history points are added or not according to § 4A1.2(c), United States v. Martinez-Cortez, 354 F.3d 830, 831-32 (8th Cir.2004). A diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo contendere, in a judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered[.] U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f). These prior adult diversionary dispositions are counted if they involved a judicial determination of guilt or an admission of guilt in open court [,] ... reflect[ing] a policy that defendants who receive the benefit of a rehabilitative sentence and continue to commit crimes should not be treated with further leniency. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 9 (emphasis added). The Guidelines recognize various jurisdictions have different procedures by which prior convictions can be set aside or defendants pardoned for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law: Sentences resulting from such convictions are to be counted. However, expunged convictions are not counted. Id. cmt. n. 10 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j)). Unfortunately, the Guidelines do not expressly define the term expunged, United States v. Hines, 133 F.3d 1360, 1362 (10th Cir.1998), but expunged convictions under section 4A1.2(j) appear to be those (1) reversed or vacated due to legal errors or later-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, or (2) ruled constitutionally invalid. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 6. 8 The Iowa deferred judgment statute provides that, upon a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty, or a special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered, the court, [w]ith the consent of the defendant, ... may defer judgment and may place the defendant on probation upon conditions as it may require.... Upon fulfillment of the conditions of probation and the payment of fees imposed..., the defendant shall be discharged without entry of judgment. Iowa Code § 907.3-907.3(1). The Iowa method of keeping records of deferred judgments is provided by statute: Upon a defendant's discharge from probation, if the judgment has been deferred, the court's criminal record of the deferred judgment is expunged. However, the record maintained by the state court administrator, as required by section 907.4, is not expunged, and expunction under section 907.9(4) is not absolute. See Iowa Code § 907.9(4). Court administrators are required to keep records of deferred judgments. These records are exempt from public access, but are available to judges, court clerks, and county attorneys. Iowa Code § 907.4. 9 The United States Supreme Court has analyzed the subject Iowa statute. In Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 108 & n. 4, 112-15, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983), the Court considered whether Iowa's expunction provisions nullified the defendant's prior conviction for purposes of a federal statute. In concluding expunction does not alter the previous conviction's legality and does not mean a defendant was innocent of the prior crime, the Court observed, [e]xpunction in Iowa means no more than that the State has provided a means for the trial court not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects under state law. Id. at 115, 103 S.Ct. 986. 10 Federal law, not state law, determines whether a prior sentence is counted for criminal history purposes. United States v. Morgan, 390 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir.2004). [A] state's use of the term `expunge' is not controlling in determining whether a conviction is properly included in calculating a defendant's criminal history category. Hines, 133 F.3d at 1363; see also Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 111-12, 103 S.Ct. 986 (observing that whether one previously was convicted, as the term is defined under a federal statute, is a question of federal law, although the predicate offense is defined under state law, mak[ing] for desirable national uniformity unaffected by varying state laws, procedures, and definitions). Thus, when determining whether a conviction is expunged under the Guidelines, a court must examine the basis for the expunction. Hines, 133 F.3d at 1363-64. According to the First Circuit, expungement within the meaning of the Guidelines's structure is best determined by considering whether the conviction was set aside because of innocence or errors of law. United States v. Dubovsky, 279 F.3d 5, 8-9 (1st Cir.2002) (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j)); see also United States v. Nicolace, 90 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir.1996) (holding prior narcotics conviction, which had been set aside pursuant to federal statute, was properly included in calculation of criminal history category). 11 The Iowa deferred judgment is more properly considered a diversionary disposition that result[s] from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo contendere,  U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f), because it follows only a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty, or a special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered, Iowa Code § 907.3. Additionally, the Iowa Supreme Court has addressed the practical effects of expunction of deferred judgments. In State v. Moore, 569 N.W.2d 130, 131-32 (Iowa 1997), the court considered whether a deferred judgment expunged under section 907.9 is considered a prior plea or guilty verdict. Id. at 130-31. The defendant urge[d] the effect of the expungement [was] to make the deferred judgment as if it never occurred. Id. The court first considered the statutory language to determine the legislative intent, finding it clear the legislature did not intend to expunge all records of a deferred judgment and did not exonerate the person of the conviction. Id. The Iowa court observed that, [i]mplicit in the permanent record kept by the state court administrator is the existence of a plea or verdict of guilty. Id. If there had been no plea or verdict of guilty, a deferred judgment never would have been entered. Id. The court concluded that, while the Iowa legislature intended expunction of the deferred judgment would make the record unavailable to the public, the legislature also intended the record of the deferred judgment still would be available to courts and county attorneys. Id. at 131-32. Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled the district court properly used the defendant's prior deferred judgment for operating while intoxicated (OWI) to enhance the defendant's punishment for a subsequent OWI, declaring the statute does not mandate expunction of the state court administrator's record, nor does the statute exonerate a defendant granted a deferred judgment. Id. at 130, 132. 12 We conclude Townsend's Iowa state-court conviction for third-degree burglary was not expunged due to constitutional invalidity, innocence, or a mistake of law, as required under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 6. Instead, the conviction was exempted from public access to permit Townsend a clean start and to restore some civil rights. The sealing of Townsend's record from public access did not constitute expunction for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j), and the district court properly counted the prior conviction in determining Townsend's criminal history category.