Opinion ID: 2265520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: search of an attorney's office

Text: We turn, then, to the pivotal issue here: is the use of a search warrant a constitutionally permissible means by which to secure the business records of a client suspected of criminal wrongdoing from the office of a non-suspect attorney? The essence of the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution, and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, is reasonableness; these provisions provide protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tann, 500 Pa. 593, 459 A.2d 322 (1983); Commonwealth v. Grabowski, 306 Pa.Super. 483, 452 A.2d 827 (1982). Hence, all Fourth Amendment requirements must be tempered by considerations of reasonableness under the circumstances. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 446 A.2d 583 (1982). The determination of reasonableness of a search frequently involves balancing the intrusion on the individual's privacy interests against the government's need to conduct the intrusion. Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa.Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985). As noted earlier, there is no question that the warrant issued here is supported by probable cause. Moreover, we have concluded that a sufficiently specific description of the premises to be searched is found therein. We must decide, then, whether the search proposed was reasonable in light of the privacy interests asserted here  the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, client confidentiality, and the criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel. The attorney-client privilege, codified at 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§ 5916 and 5928, embodies the common-law privilege universally accepted as indispensable to an attorney's professional relationship with his client. Fundamentally, the privilege is designed to foster full communication between the attorney and client. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 290 Pa.Super. 254, 434 A.2d 740 (1981). The attorney can effectively fulfill his roles as counsellor, intermediary and advocate only if, assured of confidentiality, the client is wholly free to completely and candidly disclose all the facts, favorable or unfavorable, to him. In most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, the incorporation of the common-law rule into statute has not changed the essentials of the privilege. Thus, several prerequisites to assertion of the privilege remain. As Professor Wigmore summarizes the privilege, Where legal advice of any kind is . . . sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such . . . the communications relating to the purpose . . . made in confidence. . . by the client . . . are at his instance permanently protected . . . from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser . . . except the protection may be waived. 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2292 at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961), quoted in Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 323 Pa.Super. 317, 470 A.2d 611 (1983). See also 79 Dick.L.Rev. 650 (1974-75). The attorney-client privilege is, then, somewhat limited in scope; it does not apply to pre-existing documents. Documents that could be subpoenaed from the client [6] or made the subject of a validly drawn search warrant for the client's home or office are likewise not enveloped by the privilege's protection merely by virtue of their transfer to an attorney. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976); Mehrens v. State, 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718 (App. 1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 219, 83 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984). See also, McCormick On Evidence, § 89 (3d ed. 1984). Similarly, the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits an attorney's disclosure of his client's confidences and secrets. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 provides, in part, (B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client, including his identity. (2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. (C) a lawyer may reveal: (1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them. (2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order. (3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. (4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(B) and (C) (1974). As the Code defines confidence and secret, `Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and `secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(A) (1974). Ethical Consideration 4-4 points out that the attorney-client privilege and the duty imposed by the Code are not identical. The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept unlike the evidentiary privilege exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 4-4 (1974). Nonetheless, in any analysis of the attorney-client privilege, we must recognize that our Code of Professional Responsibility provides strong support for the concept of a legally protected confidentiality for client attorney discourse. Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa.Super. 362, 370, 422 A.2d 510, 514 (1980). See also Commonwealth v. Maguigan, supra . Additional safeguards for the communications between attorney and client are provided by the work-product doctrine, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). At its core, this doctrine shelters the mental processes of an attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case. But the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2170, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), quoted with approval in Lepley v. Lycoming Cty. Ct. of Com.Pl., 481 Pa. 565, 573, 393 A.2d 306, 310 (1978). Indeed, even in announcing the work-product rule, the Hickman Court recognized that work-product principles may not preclude discovery of evidentiary material. We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had. Hickman v. Taylor, supra, 329 U.S. at 511, 67 S.Ct. at 394, 91 L.Ed. at 462. As is thus evident, the work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege, and is especially important in criminal cases. The interests of society and the criminally suspect in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each aspect of a case. As a result, Pa.R.Crim.P. 305 excludes legal research . . . records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the attorney for the Commonwealth or the attorney for the defense . . . from its mandatory discovery requirements. Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(G). A criminal defendant's right to counsel, in all critical stages of the proceeding, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Santiago v. Myers, 419 Pa. 326, 214 A.2d 206 (1965); Commonwealth v. Brocco, 263 Pa.Super. 51, 396 A.2d 1371 (1979), must also be weighed in determining the reasonableness of proceeding by a warrant in this context. Not only is effective assistance of counsel a constitutional mandate, it is also necessary to an adversary system of justice. Assuredly, counsel's assistance can be made safely and readily available only when the client is free from the apprehension of disclosure. In balancing the competing interests in the instant case, it is essential to note exactly what the Commonwealth sought. As Attachment A to the search warrant indicates, the Commonwealth was interested in records of appellee's business transactions with five named hospitals. Mr. and Mrs. Gartley informed the investigating agents on July 19, 1982 that all of the items sought on the search warrant were taken to the office of Attorney James Voss following the agents' interview with Mr. Gartley on February 12, 1982. [7] The Commonwealth was not, then, seeking any of the attorney's personal memoranda or notes regarding conversations with his client but, rather, pre-existing documents. Thus, appellee may not invoke the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. Similarly, the search of his attorney's office would not have compromised appellee's constitutional right to counsel. The investigatory process is not a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes. Commonwealth v. Brocco, supra . In fact, in rejecting this contention, this Court, sitting en banc, noted, [W]ere we to adopt [the] contention that the right to counsel attaches whenever a party retains counsel to render legal advice regarding potential legal problems, the use of informants or other means of investigation would be significantly curtailed. In essence, it would permit a suspect to hide behind the sixth amendment cloak by the mere payment of a token retainer to a legal adviser. Accordingly, [this] contention is without merit. Id., 263 Pa.Super. at 68, 396 A.2d at 1379-1380. We recognize that in the course of execution of the warrant issued here, truly confidential communications may be inadvertently examined by the inquisitive investigator. Yet we hold that appellee's interest in confidentiality may not be utilized to impede a legitimate, carefully circumscribed, criminal investigation. Although the Fourth Amendment places limits on the kinds of intrusions the government may make upon individuals and their property in gathering evidence, these limitations are not intended to encourage the concealment of evidence; they are designed to promote privacy and autonomy. Any intrusion into the private communications between Mr. Gartley and Attorney Voss during the execution of the warrant would be attributable to Mr. Gartley's own conduct, resulting directly from the transfer of the records and other documents to his attorney's care. Consequently, the use of Attorney Voss' office as a haven for evidence material to an ongoing criminal investigation does not place it beyond the reach of a proper search pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause; we will not restrain the Commonwealth's efforts to obtain otherwise seizable evidence merely because it has been placed in the hands of an attorney. To hold otherwise would mean that a criminal suspect could shield evidence from discovery by the simple expedient of delivery to an attorney, a result we deem patently unreasonable. We are mindful of the need to protect the rights of innocent parties  the other clients of an attorney whose office is made the subject of a search warrant. Although, as here, a warrant may describe the items to be seized and the location of the office in which they may be found with constitutionally sufficient particularity, such searches remain extremely sensitive, in that the executing officers may unwittingly be exposed to other individuals' confidences and secrets. Nonetheless, we remain unpersuaded that the acquisition of a search warrant for a non-suspect attorney's office is per se unreasonable. Courts have consistently upheld searches of law offices where the attorney at issue was the target of a criminal investigation. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976); Klitzman, Klitzman and Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Application of the United States for an Order, 723 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir. 1983); National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1980). Moreover, language from the United States Supreme Court suggests that a search of a non-suspect attorney's office may be constitutionally permissible. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, supra , the Court, per Mr. Justice White, upheld the validity of a search pursuant to a warrant, of the offices of a newspaper. The warrant authorized the seizure of negatives, film, and photographs of an assault by demonstrators on nine police officers several days earlier. The Court initially framed the issue as the construction and application of the Fourth Amendment to the `third party' search, the recurring situation where state authorities have probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities or other evidence of crime is located on identified property but do not have probable cause to believe that the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime that has occurred or is occurring. 436 U.S. at 553, 98 S.Ct. at 1975, 56 L.Ed.2d at 534. As the Court concluded, the critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific items to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought. Id., 436 U.S. at 556, 98 S.Ct. at 1976-1977, 56 L.Ed.2d at 535. In Zurcher, the Stanford Daily contended that additional factors, derived from the First Amendment, justified a nearly per se rule forbidding the use of a search warrant and permitting only the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, where the third party involved is a newspaper. Here, the newspaper voiced a concern that the press' ability to gather, analyze and disseminate news would be seriously threatened by searches of newspaper offices for evidence of crime. In response, Mr. Justice White observed that the interests of the press were already safeguarded, by the terms of the Fourth Amendment itself. [T]he Framers took the enormously important step of subjecting searches to the test of reasonableness and to the general rule requiring search warrants issued by neutral magistrates. They nevertheless did not forbid warrants where the press was involved, did not require special showings that subpoenas would be impracticable, and did not insist that the owner of the place to be searched, if connected with the press, must be shown to be implicated in the offense being investigated. Furthermore, the prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests will be endangered by the search . . . Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant  probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness  should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices. Id., 436 U.S. at 565, 98 S.Ct. at 1981-1982, 56 L.Ed.2d at 541. Both aspects of the Zurcher holding provide analogies to the search of a non-suspect attorney's office. Since documents of purely evidentiary value  in this context, those not encompassed within the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine  can be seized, the fact that the attorney himself is not suspected of crime is not dispositive. Rather, it is enough that probable cause exists to believe that the attorney's office houses materials that can be helpful in a criminal investigation, as long as the warrant is sufficiently specific and the search avoids undue abusiveness. Furthermore, the attorney-client privilege is no more expressly mandated by the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions than is the press privilege relied upon in Zurcher. On the contrary, given the preferred place assigned to First Amendment freedoms, Wm. Goldman Theatres v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961), privileges asserted thereunder are accorded greater consideration than those statutorily prescribed. See Search of the Lawyer's Office  Court Sanctioned Threat to Confidential Communications, 32 Ala.L.Rev. 92 (Fall 1980). The attorney-client relationship, although entitled to considerable deference, is neither sacrosanct nor inviolate. Thus, in light of Zurcher, we conclude that the use of a search warrant in the instant context is not per se unreasonable.