Opinion ID: 627222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: LaCour, Tobin, and Pickens raise different arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying some of their convictions. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Chirino-Alvarez, 615 F.3d at 1346. Thus, all reasonable inferences and credibility determinations are drawn in favor of the government. See id.
Tobin was convicted of Count 3 and Count 11, both of which charged him with distribution of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Tobin argues that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions for these counts because FedEx shipping documents related to those counts did not include tracking numbers or other proof of delivery. We reject this argument. The CSA defines the term distribute to mean to deliver. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11). In turn, the term deliver is defined as encompassing the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance. . . . Id. § 802(8) (emphasis added). Here, evidence of Jive Network's own records showed that the orders that Tobin approved were shipped. This was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that there was an attempted transfer of the controlled substance. Id. [17]
Pickens was convicted of Count 21, which charged him with distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). According to Pickens, the uncontroverted evidence showed that he dispensed the drug charged for a legitimate medical purpose and in the usual course of his professional practice. Pickens emphasizes that prior to joining Jive Network, he also used online questionnaires and prescribed medication without having a face-to-face visit with a patient. Pickens suggests that as a result, his conduct as part of Jive Network was consistent with his usual course of professional practice. We are not persuaded. Pickens does not assert that his conduct was consistent with the standards set by the state where he was practicing. Rather, he emphasizes that his conduct prior to and while he was with Jive Network was the same. This is not a reasonable view of the phrase the usual course of his professional practice. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). Under Pickens's theory, if a physician was a drug pusher prior to the events for which he was convicted, then he would be absolved of criminal liability for his continued drug pushing. As the Eighth Circuit has stated, [t]his cannot be the law. United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d 639, 649 (8th Cir.2009). If we were to accept Pickens's argument, we would allow an individual doctor to define the parameters of his or her practice and effectively shield the practitioner from criminal liability despite the fact that the practitioner may be acting as nothing more than a large-scale pusher. Id. at 648-49 (quotation marks omitted).
LaCour states that he is challenging his convictions for Counts 32 through 52, but his arguments reach only Count 32 and Count 52. First, LaCour suggests that the evidence was insufficient to show that he attempted to conceal the funds that he received in connection with Jive Network. The only count that requires an element of concealment is Count 52, which charged LaCour with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Contrary to LaCour's assertion, there was evidence showing that the day after he married Tina Morris, he asked her to open a bank account in her name and that during that discussion, LaCour mentioned that the government had seized some of his funds. There was also evidence that the funds deposited into the account that Ms. Morris opened had been withdrawn by LaCour from another account after the government's execution of a search warrant. LaCour also suggests that a scheme must be complex in order to satisfy the element of concealment. But this is not necessarily so. Indeed, we have never limited criminal liability under [18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)] to cases involving a long series of transactions. Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1130. We have said that even one transaction can be enough. Id. The key to a conviction for concealment money laundering is a purpose . . . to conceal. United States v. Naranjo, 634 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir.2011). A decision to create complex arrangements may be helpful to show such an intent. Id. at 1209. But it is not necessary. See id. Here, the evidence that LaCour withdrew the funds after the government had executed a search warrant provided a sufficient basis for the jury to find that LaCour sought to conceal those funds from the government. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain LaCour's conviction under Count 52. LaCour also argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for Count 32, which charged him with conspiracy to engage in monetary transactions in criminally derived property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). To obtain a conviction under this count, the government was required to prove that 1) there was an agreement to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and that 2) Jude LaCour knowingly and voluntarily participated in that agreement. See United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 856 (11th Cir.2006). LaCour asserts that there was not enough evidence to demonstrate that there was an agreement between him and his father, Jeffrey LaCour, to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and that his conviction must be set aside in light of our decision in United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.2006). In Johnson, we found that there was not enough evidence to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) because there was no evidence establishing that [the defendant's alleged co-conspirator] conspired with him to commit money laundering. Id. at 1295. LaCour's reliance on Johnson is misplaced. There, we pointedly observed that the government had alleged that the defendant had only one other co-conspirator. Id. at 1294 n. 7 (noting that the government did not allege that the defendant had conspired with other persons known and unknown to commit money laundering). Under those circumstances, the lack of evidence that the defendant's alleged co-conspirator had agreed to violate the law was fatal. See id. at 1295-96. Here, in contrast, the government alleged that LaCour agreed not only with his father, but also with others, both known and unknown, to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that there was such an agreement. The evidence showed that Jive Network repeatedly transferred substantial amounts of money to LaCour Medical, a company owned by Jeffrey LaCour, apparently for a weekly consulting fee of $25,000. LaCour has not suggested to us that the jury was given an explanation of the nature of the consulting work that was purportedly done by LaCour Medical or of the reasons for the amount that was charged. Thus, the jury was presented with evidence of repeated, and unexplained, transfers of substantial amounts of money from Jive Network to LaCour Medical. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that there was an agreement to launder criminally derived funds. See United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1364 (11th Cir.2009) (noting that an agreement can be proven by circumstantial evidence).