Opinion ID: 1763698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Standard for Causation of Termination

Text: PVI also argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the causal requirement for wrongful discharge under the public-policy exception. PVI claims that the trial court's failure to give its proffered instruction constitutes prejudicial error requiring reversal and remand for a new trial. Both PVI and Fleshner proposed verdict directors with different causal standards. The trial court rejected PVI's proffered instruction, which would have directed the jury to find for Fleshner if it found that her communication with the investigator was the exclusive cause of her discharge. [5] Fleshner offered two verdict directors. The first instructed the jury that the communication with the investigator was a contributing factor to Fleshner's termination. [6] The trial court rejected the instruction. The second instructed the jury that Fleshner was fired because she communicated with the investigator. [7] The trial court gave this instruction. The issue before this Court is how the jury should be instructed as to the appropriate causation standard when an at-will employee is discharged in violation of the public-policy exception.