Opinion ID: 1194845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Review of Judicial or Quasi-judicial Decisions Only

Text: At common law, only judicial or quasi-judicial decisions were reviewable under the writ of certiorari, and not legislative, discretionary, or ministerial acts. FERRIS, supra, at 181-82. See also Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417, 421 (Fla.App.1960) (It is settled in this state that common law certiorari is limited only to review of judicial or quasi-judicial orders of administrative boards, bodies or officers.); States Land Imp. Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 231 Ill. App.3d 842, 173 Ill.Dec. 285, 286, 596 N.E.2d 1164, 1165 (1992) (common law writ of certiorari is an available means of judicial review of final decisions of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions); North Carolina Cent. Univ. v. Taylor, 122 N.C.App. 609, 471 S.E.2d 115, 117 (N.C.App.1996) (common law writ may issue from a superior court to an inferior body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers); Davison v. Carr, 659 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn.1983) (common law certiorari is available where the court reviews an administrative decision in which that agency is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity); Delaware Barrel & Drum Co. v. Mayor and Council, 54 Del. 205, 175 A.2d 403, 404 (Del.Super.1961) (common law writ of certiorari lies to reviews acts which are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, and does not lie to review acts which are administrative or legislative in nature); Order of St. Benedict in Portsmouth v. Town Council, 83 R.I. 500, 120 A.2d 329, 329 (1956) (common law writ of certiorari is used ordinarily to review only the alleged illegal actions or decisions of an inferior judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal); State v. Albritton, 251 Ala. 422, 37 So.2d 640, 642 (1948) (At common law and under the practice in most jurisdictions, the writ of certiorari will lie to review only those acts which are judicial or quasi judicial in their nature. It does not lie to review or annul any judgment or proceeding which is legislative, executive or ministerial rather than judicial. The writ does not lie to review the action of an inferior tribunal or board in the exercise of purely legislative functions.) (quoting 10 Am.Jur. § 10 at 533); People ex rel. Smith v. Hoffman, 166 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 187, 190 (1901) (common law writ of certiorari issued to correct errors of law affecting the property or rights of the parties, and to test the validity of official action judicial or quasi-judicial in character); Quesenberry v. Road Comm'n, 103 W.Va. 714, 721, 138 S.E. 362 (1927). The Legislature duplicated the common law writ's limitation to judicial or quasi-judicial decisions in the statutory writ: A writ of review shall be granted by any court, except a municipal or district court, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. RCW 7.16.040. We have construed the statute to include quasi-judicial decision-making in addition to judicial functions. Buttnick v. City of Seattle, 105 Wash.2d 857, 860, 719 P.2d 93 (1986). See also State ex rel. New Washington Oyster Co. v. Meakim, 34 Wash.2d 131, 134, 208 P.2d 628 (1949) (writ of certiorari (the statutory writ of review) may be invoked for the purpose of reviewing judicial acts, and does not lie to review or annul judgments or orders which are legislative, executive, or ministerial rather than judicial). Thus, before deciding whether to issue the constitutional writ of certiorari, our courts must determine if the decision to be reviewed qualifies as a judicial or quasi-judicial decision. We most recently articulated our four-part test for such determinations in Raynes v. City of Leavenworth, 118 Wash.2d 237, 244-45, 821 P.2d 1204 (1992): (1) whether the court could have been charged with the duty at issue in the first instance[. The duty at issue in this case is a determination of whether to require an EIS. This duty is an administrative, not a judicial, decision made in the context of the administration of the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).]; (2) whether the courts have historically performed such duties[. The determination of whether to require an EIS stems from SEPA, and did not exist before the enactment of SEPA. Courts have not, therefore, historically performed such duties.]; (3) whether the action of the municipal corporation involves application of existing law to past or present facts for the purpose of declaring or enforcing liability rather than a response to changing conditions through the enactment of a new general law of prospective application[. At issue here is an administrative decision in a procedural context. SEPA is essentially a procedural statute to ensure that environmental impacts and alternatives are properly considered by decision makers. SORE v. Snohomish County, 99 Wash.2d 363, 371, 662 P.2d 816 (1983). Thus, by its very nature, SEPA decision making does not involve judicial functions and is not concerned with enforcing liability.]; (4) whether the action more clearly resembles the ordinary business of the courts, as opposed to those of legislators or administrators. [The Snohomish County Council here reviewed an appeal from a hearing examiner's determination regarding plat applications. Such matters are not the ordinary business of the courts.] Raynes controls. The Rayneses opposed a proposed zoning amendment that would have allowed recreational vehicle (RV) parks as a conditional use in a tourist commercial district. They appealed the city administrator's determination of no significant environmental impact to the Leavenworth City Council. The City Council denied the Rayneses' SEPA appeal and passed the proposed zoning ordinance amendment. The Rayneses then sought review of the City Council's decision under both the common law writ of certiorari and the statutory writ. In considering whether the statutory writ was available, we had to determine whether the City Council's decision was quasi-judicial. We said: No clear line can be drawn between judicial, legislative and administrative functions of local decision-making bodies. Judicial actions have no single essential attribute. Instead, a number of factors are important to the determination. If a given proceeding of a decision-making body has a sufficient number of relevant characteristics, it may be considered quasi judicial in nature. Id. at 243, 821 P.2d 1204. An analysis under the four-part Raynes test compels the conclusion the action of the Snohomish County Council was not quasi-judicial. Here, the action of the Snohomish County Council in requiring the EIS was more clearly administrative than quasi-judicial. Thus, the writ does not lie.