Opinion ID: 49000
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonableness of Search of 7608 Scenic Brook Drive

Text: 21 Garrison next counsels us to examine whether the execution of the warrant violated [the defendant's] constitutional right to be secure in his home. 480 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013. In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the police did not violate Garrison's rights, because as soon they discovered that there were two separate units on the third floor and therefore were put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously, they ceased to search that unit. Id. at 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013. The Court wrote that [i]f the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's apartment. Id. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013. In this case, the district court concluded and the government now maintains that Garrison squarely supports the officers' actions in executing their search of 7608 Scenic Brook Drive. When, upon arriving at the house, the officers learned that it contained three residences, the officers confined their search to areas used by Perez. This, the government argues, is exactly what Garrison prescribes. 22 As Perez points out, however, this case is not precisely like Garrison. In this case, the discovery of additional residents of 7608 Scenic Brook Drive also altered the calculation of probable cause against Perez. The discovery of the two other housemates should have alerted the police to the possibility that one of the other housemates might have been using the IP address in question at the time of the illicit transmissions. The existence of wires traveling into each of the bedrooms added support to that possibility. Indeed, once the officers learned of the additional residents, the situation resembled one that Garrison explicitly declined to address: 23 We expressly distinguish the facts of this case from a situation in which the police know there are two apartments on a certain floor of a building, and have probable cause to believe that drugs are being sold out of that floor, but do not know in which of the two apartments the illegal transactions are taking place. A search pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of the entire floor under those circumstances would present quite different issues from the ones before us in this case. 24 480 U.S. at 89 n. 13, 107 S.Ct. 1013. Here, the officers faced a situation in which they knew that 7608 Scenic Brook Drive contained three residences, and had probable cause to believe that unlawful transmissions were made from one of the residences, but did not know which residence. Garrison does not assist us in resolving this problem. 25 Perez maintains that when the officers acquired information that altered the probable cause determination, they had a duty to present this information to the magistrate. Because they did not do so, he claims, their search of his premises was unreasonable. There are no Fifth Circuit decisions that directly address this issue. Perez relies on United States v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir.1984), where the Second Circuit declared that when a definite and material change has occurred in the facts underlying the magistrate's determination of probable cause, it is the magistrate, not the executing officers, who must determine whether probable cause still exists. Therefore, the magistrate must be made aware of any material new or correcting information. 26 When this decision is read in full, however, it becomes clear that Marin-Buitrago does not support Perez's position that the evidence from his residence must be suppressed. Therein, the Second Circuit indicated that the evidence resulting from the search should be suppressed only when the new information brought the level of probability below what was necessary for probable cause. Thus the court stated that [i]n determining on this appeal whether the affidavit still supports a finding of probable cause after the inclusion of [the new information], we must assume the role of the issuing magistrate. Id. at 895. After concluding that [e]ven with the supplemental information, the affidavit clearly establishes, by a fair probability, that the search would produce evidence of narcotics, and that therefore the warrant for the search . . . was supported by probable cause at the time it was executed, the court upheld the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at 896. 27 The Sixth Circuit has reached the same result through slightly different reasoning. In United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 933 (6th Cir.1990), the Sixth Circuit commented that: 28 The Supreme Court has emphatically cautioned that in the absence of urgent circumstances officers should not rely on their own discretion, but should instead resort to a neutral magistrate, to determine whether probable cause to conduct a search exists. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). . . . Although Johnson 's admonition speaks specifically to the situation in which officers conduct a warrantless search, we think it is equally applicable to cases in which officers possess a warrant but are alerted to circumstances which affect the probable cause for its execution. 29 Addressing the case before it, the Sixth Circuit stated that [b]ecause no exigent circumstances are presented by the facts of this case, the officers should have refrained from the second search until a neutral magistrate determined that probable cause continued to exist. Id. However, the court went on to declare, citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), that [n]otwithstanding the officers' failure to [return to the magistrate], the fruits of the second search are not to be suppressed if this court finds that a neutral magistrate would have determined that probable cause existed. Id. Concluding that a neutral magistrate apprised of the new information would still have found that probable cause existed, the court declined to suppress the fruits of the search. Id. at 934. 30 In the instant case, the new information acquired by the police was that Perez's house contained two other residences in addition to his own. Because the IP address in question was registered in Perez's name, and because the two other individuals living in Perez's house maintained separate residences, there was still a fair probability that Perez was the party responsible for the illegal transmissions. This court has held that the requisite `fair probability' is something more than a bare suspicion, but need not reach the fifty percent mark. United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir.1985)); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (stating that probable cause does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false). Accordingly, we find that even in light of the new information regarding Perez's housemates, probable cause still existed for the search of Perez's premises. As a result, the district court did not err by refusing to suppress the fruits of the officers' search of Perez's premises. 31 B. The district court did not err in enhancing Perez's sentence based on his possession of images depicting prepubescent minors and images depicting sadistic/masochistic conduct 1. Standard of Review 32 Perez objected at trial to the enhancement of his sentence for possession of images depicting prepubescent children and images depicting sadistic or masochistic conduct. The nature of his objection was that because he had not been indicted for or pled guilty to possessing these materials, any increase in offense level on this basis would be a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. At Perez's sentencing hearing, his lawyer characterized these objections as  Booker objections. On appeal, however, Perez objects to these sentencing enhancements on the basis that there is insufficient proof that he intended to possess materials of this nature. 33 Because Perez did not argue before the district court the specific objection that he now raises, we analyze his claim under the plain error framework set out by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Under plain error review, we may overturn a district court decision only if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002)). If all three conditions are met an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 2. Applying Plain Error Review 34 Relying on United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir.1995), Perez argues that the Fifth Circuit requires that the government prove intent to possess images depicting prepubescent children or sadistic/masochistic conduct to obtain sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.2(b)(1) and 2G2.2(b)(3). Addressing sentencing enhancements under these provisions, the Kimbrough court stated that the trial court heard sufficient evidence ... to conclude that Kimbrough intentionally ordered and possessed child pornography which depicted prepubescent minors or minors under the age of 12, or, at the very least, had reckless disregard of the age of the performers and that the trial court heard sufficient evidence at trial to conclude that Kimbrough intentionally ordered and possessed pornography which depicted sadistic or masochistic conduct. 69 F.3d at 734. We can conclude from these quotations that this circuit requires a showing of either reckless disregard or intent for sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.2(b)(1) and 2G2.2(b)(3). 35 Perez argues that language used by the district court indicated that the court used a strict liability theory in assessing whether the enhancement provisions applied to Perez. The language used by the district court in discussing these enhancements at Perez's sentencing hearing is ambiguous. But even if the district court did commit error, this error did not affect Perez's substantial rights, for there is sufficient evidence to support the enhancements under the correct standard. 36 Perez admitted that he possessed and collected child pornography. He was able to direct the officers searching his home to compact discs that contained child pornography. At least one such compact disc had file folders labeled kiddie porn. The Attorney General's office reviewed only a portion of the approximately 4000 compact discs seized from Perez, and still found an estimated 2500 images of child pornography. Numerous of these images involved either prepubescent children or sadistic/masochistic conduct. While Perez claims that he did not look at most of the child pornography files he downloaded, he admits having seen some of them. Moreover, the downloaded files often had file names that summarized their images, implying that Perez could have been aware of the contents even without viewing each image. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that Perez either intended to possess prepubescent and sadistic/masochistic images or had reckless disregard for his possession of them. We therefore affirm the district court's enhancement of Perez's sentence.