Opinion ID: 197543
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Predicate For Guilty Plea

Text: 36 For similar reasons, we reject the further claim that the factual predicate for the guilty plea was inadequate. First, Marrero conceded that the government could prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he willingly and knowingly conspired with Flette and others to distribute ten kilograms of cocaine and that they actually distributed one kilogram to the undercover agents. The district court was entitled to credit these sworn judicial admissions. Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d at 373 ([i]t is the policy of the law to hold litigants to their assurances.). 37 The district court record further supports a finding that Marrero had the requisite culpable state of mind. The government's version of the facts stated that Marrero had received a beeper message to prepare ten jet skis, specifically noting that jet skis  meant cocaine. Marrero explicitly stated that he had read the government's version of the facts, discussed it with counsel, and acknowledged its truth. 38 Marrero nonetheless contends on appeal that the record does not indicate that he understood that the government's rendition of jet skis (as a code term for cocaine) purported to describe what Marrero, as distinguished from Flette, understood the term to mean. In addition, he now notes that there is no record evidence that jet skis was a prearranged code, and denies having known that it meant anything other than aquatic jet skis. 39 The factual predicate for the requisite mens rea may be inferred from all the evidence alluded to at the Rule 11 hearing. See United States v. Japa, 994 F.2d 899, 903-04 (1st Cir.1993) (factual predicate for mens rea met even though court failed to ask during Rule 11 colloquy, with regard to one count, whether defendants had requisite intent, where intent reasonably could be inferred from their admission of intent in relation to another count); Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 4-5 (What is critical is the substance of what was communicated by the trial court, and what should reasonably have been understood by the defendant, rather than the form of the communication.) (citations omitted). 40 Altogether aside from the fact that Marrero has not attempted to explain to us why he would have received a beeper message from Flette to prepare ten jet skis, absent any record indication or contention that either he or Flette dealt in aquatic jet skis, there is no suggestion from Marrero, plausible or otherwise, as to why the undercover agents would have offered Flette $18,000 for each jet ski. 13 More to the point, were we to postulate that the term jet skis did refer to the aquatic variety, we would be at a total loss ourselves to explain the uncontested fact that the box Flette delivered to the undercover agents contained cocaine. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court reasonably found that Marrero understood that the beeper message he received from Flette referred to cocaine, particularly in light of Marrero's Rule 11 admissions. See, e.g., supra note 13. 41 Finally, Marrero maintains that he did not understand the conspiracy charge and that once he understood it he realized he was not guilty. See Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d at 373 (assertion of innocence weighs in favor of withdrawal). He relies on notes made by Aguayo during their Rule 11 conference, indicating that Marrero had admitted that the box he left for Flette contained cocaine. Although Aguayo stated at the Rule 32(e) hearing that he had explained to Marrero the nature of the charge and that there had to be a factual basis for it, Aguayo was not asked to explain precisely how he had described the requisite factual basis. See supra p. 346. 42 We cannot permit Marrero to exploit this putative omission on direct appeal absent a fully developed record, as it amounts to a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim. See United States v. Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d 693, 697 (1st Cir.) (inadequate record precludes review of ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal; collateral review remains open), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 259, 133 L.Ed.2d 183 (1995); United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 776 (1st Cir.1994) (collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is proper forum for fact-bound ineffective assistance claim, where record is insufficiently developed for direct review), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132, 115 S.Ct. 947, 130 L.Ed.2d 890 (1995); see also United States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1997). Further factual development is plainly necessary as the present claim implicitly presumes that Aguayo rendered ineffective assistance. Although there could be little doubt that an ineffective assistance claim would lie were it made to appear that defense counsel failed to explain, prior to a Rule 11 hearing, that the defendant could not be convicted of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, unless he had knowingly conspired to distribute cocaine, we are not about to presume professional ineptitude on the part of counsel.