Opinion ID: 368287
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal for actual prejudice to defendants

Text: 57 Even in the absence of a per se rule of dismissal, dismissal of the indictment might be justified if defendants suffered actual prejudice from the Government attorney's appearance on the witness stand and subsequent failure to disqualify himself. However, the district court found no such prejudice in this case, and we agree that there was none. 58 The district court concluded, based on its examination of pertinent portions of the record, that the Government attorney's presentations from the witness stand on August 15, 1977, and September 6, 1977, did not amount to independent substantive evidence: 59 (A) fair reading of the transcript of August 15, 1977, reveals, and the Court so finds, that he was acting . . . as an attorney; explaining a proposed indictment; identifying the parties named in the indictment; reviewing evidence presented to the Grand Jury which supported the indictment. 60 It is clear that he was not then . . . giving material or substantive evidence. 61 . . . (the September 6 'testimony') was the supplying or explaining to the Grand Jury the indictment which they would be asked to return that same day. There is an explanation as to how the various dates used in the indictment were arrived at. 62 The basic structure of the examination was that, starting with each overt act in the conspiracy, to ask Mr. Taylor how the particular date was arrived at. 63 Reading the transcript as a whole, it appears to this Court that he was in fact summarizing evidence which the Grand Jury had had presented to it by other witnesses. 57 64 Our reading of the pertinent portions of the grand jury transcripts bears out the district court's above-quoted conclusion that the Government attorney's testimony added no new material evidence. Although the testimony summarizes contestable substantive evidence, it focusses primarily on the structure of the proposed indictment. We need not decide whether such testimony falls within exceptions (1) and (2) of DR 5-101(B) in the ABA Code, as relat(ing) solely to an uncontested matter, or relat(ing) solely to a matter of formality. It is enough for present purposes that this testimony could not have had independent material significance in the jurors' minds when they considered whether they wanted to indict defendant. 58 65 This case is in this respect distinguishable from the facts of the Treadway case on which appellants chiefly rely. There the prosecutor-witness provided independent substantive evidence which was needed to prove a material element of the offense charged in the indictment; 59 here the testimony discloses that it was merely a summary of prior evidence. Furthermore, it was alleged in Treadway that the prosecutor's testimony was inaccurate in several respects. 60 Defendants here do not allege that the prosecutor falsified or distorted any substantive facts underlying the indictments to which defendants later pleaded Nolo contendere. We are also satisfied that the testimony was phrased in neutral terms, without possibility for inflammatory effect. 66 In sum, although Treadway was decided on the basis of a per se rule of dismissal, it is factually distinguishable from this case because here it is possible to ascertain that no actual prejudice to defendants could have resulted from the prosecutor's testimony. For this arguable injury to the grand jury process, it appears at this time that more appropriate remedies exist than a windfall dismissal for unharmed parties. 61 67