Opinion ID: 1924787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Conspiracy to Commit Carjacking

Text: The defendant argues that he was entitled to the grant of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on count 2 (conspiracy to commit carjacking). He contends (a) that insufficient evidence existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had entered into two separate conspiracies (to rob the victims and to carjack the victims) and (b) that, accordingly, insufficient evidence existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he conspired to carjack the two victims. [21] We are persuaded that defendant's contentions are meritorious. The defendant was indicted on separate counts alleging commission of the crimes of conspiracy to commit robbery (count 1) and conspiracy to commit carjacking (count 2). Conspiracy has been defined as an agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to perform a lawful act for an unlawful purpose. State v. Lassiter, 836 A.2d 1096, 1104 (R.I.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of the agreement, including proof of its existence and scope, is all that is required for a defendant to be found guilty of the conspiracy. Disla, 874 A.2d at 197. In this case, since defendant does not challenge the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding count 1 (conspiracy to commit robbery), we need only address whether or not the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding count 2 (conspiracy to commit carjacking) was warranted. Our review of the record persuades us that a reasonable juror could not properly conclude from the evidence that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit carjacking because there is no evidence of an agreement to commit carjacking that is separate from the agreement to commit robbery. With respect to situations such as this, this Court employs the United States Supreme Court's same evidence test, Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), which calls for an inquiry as to whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. In re Malik D., 730 A.2d 1070, 1074 (R.I.1999) (quoting State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 719 (R.I.1985)); State v. Davis, 120 R.I. 82, 86, 384 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1978). In the context of conspiracy charges, this same evidence test is applied in a manner that differs somewhat from the way that it is applied with respect to other criminal charges. United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir.1982). A conspiracy may constitute only one offense even if the conspiratorial agreement envisioned is based upon multiple criminal offenses or unlawful acts. State v. Giorgi, 115 R.I. 1, 4, 339 A.2d 268, 270 (1975); State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 212, 291 A.2d 425, 429 (1972). In Booth, 673 F.2d at 29, the First Circuit usefully itemized five factors that should be considered when deciding whether or not two or more conspiracy charges are, in actuality, reducible to a single conspiracy. The factors to be considered are: (1) the time during which the activities occurred; (2) the persons involved in the conspiracies; (3) the places involved; (4) whether the same evidence was used to prove the two conspiracies; and (5) whether the same statutory provision was involved in both conspiracies. Id. We shall employ the five-factor analytical approach suggested in Booth as we evaluate this aspect of the instant appeal. It is our opinion that the trial justice erred when he ruled that two separate conspiracies existed. Application of the five factors itemized in Booth has led us to conclude that the robbery and the carjacking were but two objects of the same conspiracy. First, both criminal deeds occurred over the course of the same night. Second, the persons charged in both conspiraciesGregory Floyd, Harry Burdick, Raymond Anderson, Samuel Sanchez, and defendantwere the same. Third, all of the events relating to the formation of the conspiracies transpired in downtown Providence. Fourth, the same evidence was used to prove the two conspiracies. It is only the fifth factor that weighs against a ruling that the conspiracies were, in fact, a single conspiracy, as defendant was charged under two separate underlying statutesG.L.1956 § 11-39-1 and § 11-39-2(c). Nevertheless, after carefully considering the Booth factors in their totality, we are persuaded that defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted as to count 2 (conspiracy to commit carjacking). In cases such as this, where a defendant has been charged with multiple conspiracies but only one exists in actuality, in order to safeguard the defendant's constitutional right not to be placed in double jeopardy, he or she should be sentenced with respect to only one of the counts with the other count(s) being dismissed. See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942). In view of the foregoing considerations, while defendant's conviction on count 1 (conspiracy to commit robbery) stands, we have no choice but to direct a judgment of acquittal with respect to count 2 (conspiracy to commit carjacking).