Opinion ID: 73809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admission of facts surrounding crash during

Text: DAMAGES TRIAL Piamba Cortes has filed a cross-appeal in which she argues that the district court erred by preventing any reference during the trial on damages to the factual circumstances surrounding the crash. Piamba Cortes claims these facts are relevant to the determination of compensatory damages for mental pain and suffering. Moreover, Piamba Cortes contends that, for the same reason, the jury should have been informed of the legal determination that the pilots of Flight 965 engaged in willful misconduct resulting in the crash. The district court held that “[c]ounsel will not be permitted to make any reference in voir dire, opening statements, testimony, or closing argument to . . . [the court’s] finding of willful misconduct against American.” SR-602-4. The district court later clarified its ruling during the following colloquy with counsel: THE COURT: Counsel will not be permitted to make any reference during the course of the trial in opening statement or otherwise to the finding . . . of willful misconduct against American Airlines. You may tell them, as the Court will tell them, that the issue of liability has been settled, the only issue in this matter is the matter of damages. . . . 74 .... MR. PARKS: You have no problem, as I understand it, though, of us giving a brief overview, that the airplane crashed, without going into the facts of the case? THE COURT: Without going into the facts. I am going to tell them the airplane crashed when I begin my voir dire. MR. PARKS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: But, in any event, no details about conduct, all right? MR. PARKS: I understand that. And we do object to it but thank you. SR-7-9-10. We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, and evidentiary rulings will be overturned only if the moving party establishes that the ruling resulted in a “substantial prejudicial effect.” Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 1997). When applying an abuse of discretion standard, “we must affirm unless we at least determine that the district court has made a ‘clear error of judgment,’ or has applied an incorrect legal standard.” SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The admissibility of evidence in a federal action is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law. See Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, state law may assist in defining what evidence 75 is material to an issue, and we previously have relied upon Florida authority when identifying evidence that is material to a determination of damages under Florida’s wrongful death statute. See Hiatt v. United States, 910 F.2d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 1990). In light of the absence of federal law on this issue, we will look to Florida law for guidance.27 Florida law provides that, when computing damages for pain and suffering endured by a plaintiff, “[i]n most instances . . . evidence describing the details of an accident is logically relevant and admissible, even where liability has been admitted, to place the extent of injuries suffered by the plaintiff, as well as the degree of pain endured, in the proper context.” White v. Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148, 1152 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993). The admissibility of such evidence in a wrongful death action brought by a survivor of the decedent is not as clear. Damages for such mental pain and suffering, among other things, “must bear some reasonable relation to the facts” of the case. See Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 161 So. 85, 88 (Fla. 1935) (petition for rehearing). On at least one occasion a court has admitted evidence depicting an accident 27 At any rate, Florida evidence law governing the relevance of and prejudice created by evidence is essentially the same as the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Brown v. State, 719 So.2d 882, 887 (Fla. 1998) (observing that § 90.403 of Florida’s Evidence Code, which governs the admissibility of evidence when it presents the risk of prejudicing a party, “is in essence a restatement of Federal Rule [of Evidence] 403). 76 scene to establish the survivor’s damages for mental pain and suffering, although the court also excluded a graphic photo of the decedent because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Johnson v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 542 So.2d 367, 370 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988). Given this law, American posits, and we agree, that Florida law may permit the introduction of facts underlying a fatal accident to establish a survivor’s pain and suffering but does not require that such evidence be admitted under all circumstances. Cf. White, 624 So.2d at 1152 (facts underlying accident usually are relevant, but “the extent of information that may be received in evidence will vary depending upon the circumstances of each case”). In this case, the district court excluded not only any reference to the legal finding that the pilots of Flight 965 engaged in willful misconduct prior to the crash, but also any evidence relating to the facts of the crash. Although it appears that the evidence relating to the facts of the crash may have been admissible under Florida law, we cannot conclude that the district court’s decision to exclude this evidence constitutes an unreasonable balancing of the probative value of this evidence with its potential for undue prejudice. As for Piamba Cortes’ request to inform the jury of the legal finding of willful misconduct, this action undoubtedly would have unduly prejudiced American when compared to the value of this information in determining 77 compensatory damages. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.