Opinion ID: 313507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the common issues of law

Text: 22
23 Without hearings, the student plaintiffs were suspended for periods ranging from six school days to six weeks. They contend that they could not constitutionally be suspended from classes without some type of hearing. See Pervis v. LaMarque Independent School District, 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). See also Stricklin v. Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 297 F.Supp. 416 (W.D.Wis.1969). 24 The requirement of a prior hearing will depend primarily on the nature of the penalty imposed, the extent to which the underlying facts are in dispute, and the need for swift action to preserve order and discipline within the school. The courts have disallowed expulsions and long-term suspensions unaccompanied by hearings which comport with the standards of due process of law. Pervis, supra; Williams, supra; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). But brief suspensions without a hearing have been more readily tolerated. Linwood v. Board of Education of City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972); Dunn v. Tyler Independent School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), and cases cited therein at 145. 25 Brief suspensions are often justified by the interest of school officials in maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning. The injury caused to assaultive and disruptive students by brief suspensions is minimal compared to the danger posed to the normal functioning of an educational institution by the continued presence of such students. Linwood, supra; Dunn, supra. 26 Plaintiffs in the present case have taken the position that no student may be suspended for any period of time without a prior hearing. We reject that as a rule of law. Whether the suspensions handed out to Lockridge or the Brown children were of such duration that a due process hearing was required at some point is a question not before us, the parties having agreed to withdraw this problem of line drawing from the court's consideration. We therefore find no error in the district court's refusal to find that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated in this regard. 27
28 The plaintiffs challenge the disciplinary regulations as unconstitutionally vague. It is not clear to what extent the void for vagueness doctrine applies to school disciplinary regulations. Compare Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167-168 (7th Cir. 1969) with Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1087-1089 (8th Cir. 1969). See also Linwood, supra. 29 [But] all [courts] seem to agree that the same specificity is not required in college rules as is necessary in criminal statutes. Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1971). 30 See also Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 898 (E.D.Ill.1970): 31 [G]reater flexibility may be permissible in regulations governing high school students than college codes of conduct because of the different characteristics of the educational institutions, the differences in the range of activities subject to discipline, and the age of the students. 32 Under no view could the regulations as applied to these individual plaintiffs be regarded as too vague. Chapter 4, Section A, Paragraph 12 of the Regulations of Portland School District No. 1 provides: 33 A pupil whose presence is seriously detrimental to the best interests of the school may be suspended or expelled in accordance with administrative rules and procedures established by the Superintendent. (Emphasis supplied.) 34 Disciplinary Procedures in the Portland Public Schools, as promulgated in a bulletin from the office of the Superintendent, December 3, 1969, further provide: 35 Abuses that most often . . . necessitate disciplinary action that may range from a conference with a teacher to an expulsion or exclusion are: 36