Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Compliance With Discovery

Text: Defendant next contends defense counsel's questioning of Sergeant Gray at a January 18, 1982, hearing to determine compliance with a previous discovery order was inadequate because counsel merely asked general questions and did not memorialize for the record the particular documents turned over to the defense by the prosecution. But defendant wholly fails to explain how he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged inadequacy at this hearing. d. Exclusion of Family Members From Proceedings (27) Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor successfully moved to exclude all potential witnesses, including defendant's mother and uncle. He speculates that these excluded relatives could have assisted trial counsel by observing the demeanor of witnesses, by contributing insights into the probable thinking of jurors, and by lending moral support. In addition, he claims the appearance that his family cared for him and his fate might have impressed the jury to vote for life rather than death at the penalty phase. Fundamentally, potential witnesses are subject to exclusion from the courtroom until called to testify. In any case, these asserted benefits are pure speculation. No grounds are shown for concluding that counsel's inaction prejudiced the verdicts. e. Jury Selection Defendant launches a variety of arguments by which he seeks to demonstrate that counsel provided ineffective assistance during jury selection. First, he maintains counsel should have excluded more prospective jurors based on their answers to questions concerning the death penalty. He focuses in particular on four jurors, all of whom eventually served on the jury. However, defendant relies on answers by these four jurors given during voir dire which are taken out of context. Read in context, all four jurors affirmed their willingness and ability to listen to the evidence and to follow the instructions as given by the judge. Defendant also attacks counsel's decision not to utilize nine of his peremptory challenges, claiming such failure possibly precluded raising any claim on appeal that the trial court unfairly limited questioning on voir dire. (See People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 770-771 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].) But even assuming counsel's failure to use his remaining challenges was unwise, defendant has failed to establish that the trial court committed any prejudicial error during the jury selection process. ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1082-1087 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) Defendant urges us to find counsel incompetent for failing to object during voir dire when the trial court repeatedly defined mitigating evidence as something which makes it better. However, the trial court did not purport to give an exhaustive definition of the term, and the penalty phase instructions ultimately given obviated any prejudice. Lastly, defendant asserts that counsel should have objected at voir dire when, after mentioning life without possibility of parole and death, the trial judge stated, Neither penalty has any favor as far as the law is concerned. Taken in context, however, the judge's comments clearly meant that the jury must listen and evaluate the evidence presented at the penalty phase before deciding which penalty was appropriate. In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate any grounds for reversal for ineffectiveness assistance of counsel during jury selection. f. Failure to Move to Disqualify the Trial Judge Defendant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to disqualify the trial judge after he stated that if the jury returned a death verdict, he would do my job as a judge ... and I will pronounce that sentence. We cannot discern any prejudice from the court's isolated statement without more. We note further that the People unsuccessfully sought to disqualify the trial judge the very next day for alleged bias against the death penalty. g. Section 1538.5 Motion to Suppress Defendant argues that counsel was incompetent in failing to notice the discrepancy between the number of pages in the original affidavit in support of the arrest warrant and the photocopies produced for introduction into evidence under Evidence Code section 1501. The record, however, reflects that counsel vigorously pursued the motion to suppress defendant's confession as the product of an unlawful arrest, and we would be hard pressed to find him incompetent solely for failing to notice a small notation on the cover sheet of the original affidavit. In any event, since we have already rejected defendant's substantive challenge to the denial of the suppression motion ( ante, at pp. 391-392), the requisite showing of prejudice for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has not been established. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583-584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) h. Trial Strategy Defendant maintains that counsel provided ineffective assistance by conceding defendant's guilt during his guilt phase closing argument. However, the cases defendant cites in support of this claim are inapposite. In both cases  Young v. Zant (11th Cir.1982) 677 F.2d 792, 797, and Francis v. Spraggins (11th Cir.1983) 720 F.2d 1190, 1193-1194  the defense attorneys effectively conceded their clients' guilt of the charged crimes. In contrast, here counsel told the jury it appears fairly clear by the evidence as to what happened, but he then went on to argue there was insufficient evidence to support convictions of the charged felonies. For example, regarding the burglary charge, he argued the People had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's felonious intent in entering the victim's home. Counsel also attacked the attempted robbery charge, arguing there was no evidence defendant took money from the victim. Finally, counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain the charge of rape. Clearly, counsel did not abandon the best interests of his client, but instead did his best in the face of the highly incriminating state of the evidence, which included defendant's palm prints left at the murder scene, and his full confession to the police. [I]t is entirely understandable that trial counsel, given the weight of incriminating evidence, made no sweeping declarations of his client's innocence but instead adopted a more realistic approach.... As stated in a recent case, `good trial tactics demanded complete candor' with the jury. [Citations.] Under the circumstances we cannot equate such candor with incompetence. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293.)