Opinion ID: 219988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preexisting Judicial Constructions

Text: This construction of the statute is supported by pre-1991 judicial constructions of § 2000e(b), the Title VII provision that also employs the phrase current or preceding calendar year. Like the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, we think the meaning of current calendar year under § 2000e(b) is relevant to the meaning of current calendar year under § 1981(a)(b)(3). See Depaoli, 489 F.3d at 622; Vance, 209 F.3d at 446. This parallel provision of Title VII, which preexisted the 1991 amendments, limits the definition of employer under Title VII to persons with fifteen or more employees during a period of weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). DM argues that the identical language in § 2000e(b) and § 1981a(b)(3) need not be construed identically because the two sections operate at different stages of a Title VII case and serve different purposes. The § 2000e(b) question comes up at the start of a case and determines whether a plaintiff has satisfied an element of stating a claim under Title VII. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). By contrast, the § 1981a(b)(3) question comes up at the end of a case and has nothing to do with whether the plaintiff stated a claim under the Act. DM argues that the purpose of § 1981a(b)(3) is to avoid jury verdicts that would -13- drive employers into bankruptcy, and argues that this purpose is best served by its interpretation of that provision.6 Contrary to DM's assertions, § 2000e(b) and § 1981a(b)(3) have in common a purpose to prevent ruinous verdicts against small employers. In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003), the Supreme Court noted that Congress's decision to limit the definition of an employer in Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes to a person with fifteen or more employees reflected its intent to limit both liability and the costs of compliance and litigation for very small firms. Id. at 444 & n.3, 446-47. It is true that § 1981a(b)(3) provides protections even for larger employers, but at the very least it shares a common purpose with § 2000e(b) with respect to small employers. In addressing larger employers, moreover, § 1981a(b)(3) effectuates a notion that employers should not be liable for ruinous awards consistent with the narrower limitation in § 2000e(b). When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the phrase current or preceding calendar year had been construed in 6 DM quotes from comments of Senator Dale Bumpers during the Senate floor debate prior to passage. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15,479 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991). These comments evidence a concern about protecting small employers, but they do not convey information about the separate issue of when to measure the size of an employer. Further, the views of individual members of Congress are not dispositive on issues of statutory interpretation. See Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 522 n.12 (1994). -14- the Title VII context. Although there was no Supreme Court decision on point at the time, there was ample case law construing current calendar year under § 2000e(b) as the year of the discrimination. See, e.g., Davis v. W. Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.2d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 1986); McGraw v. Warren Cnty. Oil Co., 707 F.2d 990, 991 (8th Cir. 1983); Dumas, 612 F.2d at 979 n.4, overruled on other grounds by Larkin v. Pullman-Standard Div., Pullman, Inc., 854 F.2d 1549, 1569 (11th Cir. 1988); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Komorowski v. Townline Mini-Mart & Rest., 162 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that [c]ourts consistently have held that the phrase 'current calendar year' refers to the year in which the alleged discrimination occurred, and citing cases, including cases prior to the 1991 Act). The understanding of a term employed by Congress is ordinarily determined as of the time of enactment. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1064. Terms that have acquired a specialized meaning in the legal context must be accorded their legal meaning. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 615 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). Congress is presumed to know judicial interpretations of statutory terms as of the time it amends statutes. See id. at 615-16; Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979). In addition, under normal rules of statutory construction, identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. -15- Dep't of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994) (quoting Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that Congress used the same terminology in the 1991 amendments as in § 2000e(b) makes it quite likely, under normal canons of statutory interpretation, that it intended to adopt the year of discrimination as the current year in § 1981a(b)(3). As the Fourth Circuit has noted, the two provisions are interdependent. See Depaoli, 489 F.3d at 622 (Reading §§ 1981a(b)(3) and 2000e(b) together, it becomes apparent that the reason § 1981(b)(3) provides no damage cap for employers with less than 15 employees is that such employers are presumed to be exempt from Title VII's requirements by virtue of § 2000e(b).). Indeed, if the current calendar year under § 2000e(b) referred to the year of the discrimination and the current calendar year under § 1981a(b)(3) referred to the year of judgment, employers with more that fifteen employees at the start of the litigation but less than fifteen employees at the time of judgment could be liable for uncapped damages. See id. at 622. This could not be Congress's intent given its stated interest in protecting small employers from ruinous awards. See Wells, 538 U.S. at 444 n.3, 446-47. -16-