Opinion ID: 1769614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fourth Circuit

Text: The rule or standard applied in the Fourth Circuit is not entirely clear. In Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir.1959), the Court held that a deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel occurs only where the representation has been so inadequate as to make a farce of the trial. In Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.1968), the Court, while not adopting a specific standard of reasonable competence suggests that standard in the following language: The principles may be simply stated: Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial. An omission or failure to abide these requirements constitutes a denial of effective representation of counsel unless the state, on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby. Id. at 226 Without citing Coles, supra , the same court in Bennett v. State of Maryland, 425 F.2d 181 (4th Cir.1970), stated that (i)t is only in such extreme instances where the representation has been so inadequate as to make a farce of the trial that it can be said that the prisoner was deprived of his constitutional rights.