Opinion ID: 844251
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of defendant's battery and robbery in the high school cafeteria

Text: The prosecution offered the following evidence as proof defendant had committed a robbery and battery. On December 11, 1984, 17-year-old defendant bought some beef jerky in the cafeteria of a continuation school in the Banning Unified School District. Upon discovering that the jerky was stale, he told the cashier that he wanted his money back. The cashier refused to refund his money because he had opened the packaging. Defendant then threatened to take a box containing money that the cashier kept in front of her. She replied, If you do, you'll go to jail . . . go ahead. Defendant took the box and started to walk out of the cafeteria. When a teacher stopped him in front of the exit door, defendant shoved the teacher, took the money box, and exited through the door. Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of robbery. He further contends that the incident did not amount to an act involving the degree of force or violence necessary for its admission under factor (b), and was not relevant to the penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He is wrong on both counts.
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the cafeteria incident under factor (b), because it was insufficient to prove the elements of robbery. Specifically, he argues that the cashier consented to his taking of the money box and that he did not engage in conduct amounting to force or fear. (23) Robbery is `the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.' (§ 211; see People v. Scott (2009) 45 Cal.4th 743, 749 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 213, 200 P.3d 837] . . . .) A defendant who does not use force or fear in the initial taking of the property may nonetheless be guilty of robbery if he uses force or fear to retain it or carry it away in the victim's presence. ( People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 256, 264 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 179 P.3d 917]; People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 27 [194 Cal.Rptr. 909].) ( People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1349 [115 Cal.Rptr.3d 228].) That is, [a] robbery is not completed at the moment the robber obtains possession of the stolen property. The crime of robbery includes the element of asportation, the robber's escape with the loot being considered as important in the commission of the crime as gaining possession of the property. . . . [A] robbery occurs when defendant uses force or fear in resisting attempts to regain the property or in attempting to remove the property from the owner's immediate presence regardless of the means by which defendant originally acquired the property. ( People v. Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 27-28.) (24) A robbery cannot be committed against a person who is not in possession of the property taken or retained. [Citation.] Possession may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] `A person who owns property or who exercises direct physical control over it has possession of it, but neither ownership nor physical possession is required to establish the element of possession for purposes of the robbery statute.' [Citation.] `[T]he theory of constructive possession has been used to expand the concept of possession to include employees and others as robbery victims.' [Citation.] [¶] . . . [A]ll employees on duty have constructive possession of their employer's property and may be separate victims of a robbery. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.) In addition, persons other than employees may be robbery victims if they have a `special relationship with the owner of the property such that the victim had authority or responsibility to protect the stolen property on behalf of the owner.' [Citation.] Formulated another way, the question is whether the prospective victim `may be expected to resist the taking.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) Preliminarily, we address defendant's contention that because the cashier told him to go ahead and take the money box, she consented to the taking. To the contrary, the record reveals that defendant obtained the money box without her consent. When he complained to the cafeteria cashier about his stale beef jerky and requested a refund, she responded that she could not refund his money because he had opened the food packaging. Clearly unhappy with the manner in which the cashier resolved his complaint and her refusal to refund his money, defendant then decided that he would refund his money himself by taking the money box. Only after he told the cashier of his intent to do so did she relinquish her possession of the box and surrender it, warning defendant that if he took it, he would go to jail. There was no consent. Next, evidence that defendant thereafter pushed the teacher stationed at the exit door of the cafeteria before he escaped through the door rendered his taking a robbery. Even if this on-duty teacherwho presumably was positioned at the door to monitor activities in the cafeteriadid not have actual possession and control of the cashbox, the teacher had constructive possession of the property. We have confirmed that, regardless of their specific responsibilities, on-duty employees have constructive possession of their employer's property for purposes of a robbery. ( People v. Scott, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 752, 754.) No reason appears to exclude school employees from this sound principle. Thus, defendant's act of shoving the teacher out of his way in his effort to escape the cafeteria with the money box completed a robbery of the teacher. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1349-1350; People v. Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 27-28.)
In the alternative, defendant contends that, if the evidence of the cafeteria incident was insufficient to prove that he robbed the teacher but sufficient to prove he battered her, the battery did not involve the degree of force or violence required for admission under factor (b). We disagree. Whether [defendant's] acts were serious enough to be given weight in the penalty determination is a matter for the jury to decide. ( People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 369 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229].) Because the jury was properly instructed to consider this circumstance, there was no error in admitting the evidence.