Opinion ID: 1227141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: scott's cross-appeal

Text: In his cross appeal, Scott claims that the fee awarded by the trial court was excessive. He argues that because Wheeler presented no new evidence on remand from the first appeal, no evidence exists to support the conclusion that Wheeler is entitled to any fee in excess of the amount that Scott had already paid Wheeler for the services, $54,275.37. The instructions given to the trial court in the Conclusion of the original appeal did not require the trial court to hear new evidence concerning the setting of attorney fees. Wheeler, 777 P.2d at 399-400. This Court ordered, A reasonable attorney's fee should be determined on remand is accordance with an appropriate balancing of the Burk and Oliver's factors discussed herein. Wheeler, 777 P.2d at 400. Scott does not show how the trial court failed to follow this Court's instructions upon remand. Scott's own expert testified in the first hearing the $75,500.00 was a reasonable compensation. Wheeler, 777 P.2d at 397. This Court has now determined that there was not error in the trial court's redetermination of the number of hours for Wheeler and his associates and has set a fee based upon the hourly rate to which Scott contractually agreed. Finally, Scott appeals the amount awarded for attorney's fees and costs for Wheeler, as prevailing party in the remand hearing, in the amount of $14,059.75 for attorney's fees and $1,349.00 for expenses. Scott argues that because Wheeler failed to receive the full amount for which Wheeler prayed, Wheeler is not entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to 12 O.S. 1981, § 936 as the prevailing party. [9] He also argues that if Wheeler is awarded attorney's fees Wheeler is not entitled to fees that are nearly sixty percent of the amount awarded. [10] Scott bases his argument that Wheeler is not entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party upon policy. He states that § 936 suggests a policy designed to discourage the wrongful refusal to repay a debt owed by allowing the creditor to recover the costs incurred in judicially enforcing the creditor's rights. But Scott asserts that this policy is only served where litigation establishes that the creditor is entitled to the full amount or nearly the full amount claimed. Scott concludes that if the debtor were justified in withholding payment of a substantial portion of the amount claimed, the objective of discouraging the wrongful refusal to pay is not realized. Scott cites no case to support his argument. There is case law to the contrary. In Hicks v. Lloyd's General Ins. Agency, 763 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1988), the plaintiff/appellant, Hicks, sued for $186,000.00 for breach of an employment contract. The defendant/appellee, Lloyd's General Insurance Agency filed two formal offers to allow judgment to be taken in the amounts of $6,863.00 and $15,000.00. After a trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $6,750.00. Both parties sought attorney's fees. The trial court awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees of $5,400.00, which fees were assessed up to the time the defendant made his first offer, and awarded the defendant attorney's fees of $12,760.00, which were assessed from the first offer until judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorney's fees to the defendant, but this Court granted certiorari, vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Court cited the American Rule and the policy behind it [11] as the rationale for the holding that the defendant was the prevailing party where it had offered more in settlement prior to trial than the plaintiff had been awarded in judgment. The policy behind allowing the award of attorney's fees was to encourage settlement and to discourage the bringing of frivolous claims. Scott maintains in his Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant that Wheeler is not entitled to an amount over the $54,275.37 [12] previously paid to Wheeler by Scott. Scott's own expert witness testified that $75,500.00 was reasonable compensation. Robert L. Wheeler, Inc., 777 P.2d at 397. Wheeler is the prevailing party as the trial court awarded a $24,243.00 judgment to him. In part II of this opinion, we have increased the amount awarded by the trial court. Wheeler is entitled to that attorney's fee as the prevailing party. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of the prevailing party fee awarded.