Opinion ID: 1060373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Admission of Testimony of the Appellant's Prior Threats of Violence

Text: Marilyn Lee Pryor, an employee at The Golden Cue in May 1977, testified regarding statements made by the Appellant shortly after the April raid. Specifically, she stated that the Appellant remarked to her that [Watkins] should have his brains shot out. Additionally, she described events occurring immediately after the murder of Julian Watkins. Ms. Pryor related that she was questioned by Memphis Police Officers regarding the Appellant's whereabouts and was informed that she would be subpoenaed to come to court to give a statement. Later that same day, the Appellant told her not to worry about the subpoena. The following morning the Appellant arranged for Ms. Pryor to be driven to her home in Mississippi. The next day, unbeknownst to the Appellant, Ms. Pryor returned to Memphis, gave her statement, and returned to Mississippi. The State then inquired as to whether she had spoken to the Appellant after providing authorities with her statement in 1977. Over defense objection, Ms. Pryor testified that, when she later told the Appellant that [she] had testified for the State, [provided a statement], the Appellant told [her] that [she] was a stupid, cold, bitch and that [she] should have been killed, too. . . . The Appellant now complains that admission of this testimony was error. Specifically, he contends that [s]uch threats would be inadmissible under Rule 608(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence since such conduct is not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Furthermore, the testimony was highly prejudicial because allowing the jury to hear that Mr. Austin had previously threatened her would only inflame the jury and the concern substantially outweighed any probative value the testimony had. The Appellant's reliance on the Rules of Evidence is misplaced. First, we again acknowledge that, at a capital re-sentencing hearing, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background, history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i) below; and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted. . . . TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2404(c). Generally, evidence of threats against witnesses attributed to the accused is probative as being either (1) conduct inconsistent with the accused's claim of innocence or (2) conduct consistent with the theory that the making of such threats evinces a consciousness of guilt. See generally NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 4.01[13] (4th ed.2000) (citing State v. Maddox, 957 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997); Tillery v. State, 565 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978)). At the basis of the Appellant's mitigation theory was evidence tending to negate his culpability for the offense. Thus, testimony relating that the Appellant would have preferred that Ms. Pryor be killed, rather than provide testimony relating to activities surrounding the murder of Julian Watkins, was evidence probative to rebut the defense theory of mitigation and to establish residual doubt of the Appellant's guilt. Accordingly, the testimony was properly admitted and we find no error.