Opinion ID: 1391760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The decision by the Board of Commissioners to reject the tax refund was made in the transaction of county business.

Text: In 1975 and 1976 ORS 203.200 provided: The decisions of the county court made in the transaction of county business shall be reviewed only upon the writ of review provided by the civil procedure statutes. [7] ORS 203.120 lists 16 items of county business, none of which specifically include tax refunds. Petitioner contends that ORS 203.200 and ORS 203.120 must be read together, with the result that county business for the purposes of ORS 203.200 must be held to include only those items listed in ORS 203.120 and that ORS 203.200 thus does not apply to this case and does not limit petitioner to the writ of review. In Russell v. Crook County Court, 75 Or. 168, 145 P. 653, 146 P. 806 (1915), this court considered the question of whether county business is limited to those items now listed in ORS 203.120 and held (at 177, 145 P. 653, 146 P. 806): It is further contended that this order, not being county business, was beyond the power of the court to make at the instant session, and that the definition of county business in Section 937, L.O.L., is exclusive. While, in our opinion, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises assumed, yet, in the opinion of the writer, county business which is such in fact cannot be constitutionally limited or excluded from the functions of the County Court sitting with a collective membership. The Constitution provides, in effect, as already shown, that three persons may constitute the County Court for the transaction of `county business.' The statute provides for the election of two persons to sit with the county judge in the transaction of `county business.' It is fair to presume that, when the framers of the Constitution used this term, they meant to include all business pertaining to the county as a corporate entity, and, if this be so, it is not in the power of the legislature to limit its meaning by definition. Petitioner would distinguish Russell as having no relevance here because it concerned an entirely different point, namely, whether the county could be restricted in its activities to the functions listed in ORS 203.120 and that it is of no help in deciding whether the two statutes    should be construed together in deciding what items of county business were referred to in ORS 203.200. We agree that the two statutes must be read together, and that the term county business must be given the same meaning under both statutes. We believe that it follows, however, that just as the question of what is county business is not limited by the items listed in ORS 203.120 for purposes of deciding what business can be transacted by the county, neither is the meaning of that term for the purposes of ORS 203.200 limited by the items listed in ORS 203.120. The question remains whether the rejection by the Board of Commissioners of petitioner's tax refund was a decision that was made in the transaction of county business for the purposes of ORS 203.200. This court recently considered that question, although in a different context, in Strawberry Hill 4-Wheelers v. Benton Co. Bd. of Comm., 287 Or. 591, 601 P.2d 769 (1979). At page 600 this court cited previous decisions in cases involving claims against counties for payment of money, including Crossen v. Wasco County, 10 Or. 111 (1882), in which this court held (at 114) that: The `decisions' given or made in the transaction of county business, referred to in section 875, which can only be reexamined by writ of review under the subdivisions of section 870, are judicial in their nature or character, and concern public affairs. In Strawberry Hill this court went on to say (at 601-2, 601 P.2d 769) in referring to previous cases decided by this court: While all their `decisions ... in the transaction of county business' were made reviewable `only upon the writ of review,' see ORS 203.200, the court understood `decisions' to mean what would today be called administrative adjudications, but not `ministerial' actions or the kind of discretionary choices of policy that could be described as `legislative.' In our opinion, the denial of a claim for a tax refund is such an administrative adjudication as to be properly subject to writ of review under ORS 203.200.