Opinion ID: 3188458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellees’ Counterclaim

Text: a) Tuition Appellant argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for appellees on their counterclaim for unpaid tuition for the 2009-10 school year because he stated in his affidavit that the Director of Finance at St. Albans School told appellant that the $2,000 payment made on March 17, 2010 satisfied the outstanding tuition debt. We disagree that appellant‟s affidavit presents a disputed issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. The trial court ruled that appellant‟s affidavit claiming that he was told the $2,000 payment satisfied his debt of $17,990 could be disregarded under the “sham affidavit” doctrine. Under that doctrine, 49 “courts will disregard an offsetting affidavit that is submitted to withstand a motion for summary judgment when the affidavit contradicts prior deposition testimony without adequate explanation and creates only a sham issue of material fact.” Hinch v. Sibley Mem’l Hosp., 814 A.2d 926, 929 (D.C. 2003). For the doctrine to apply, “the affidavit must clearly contradict prior sworn testimony, rather than clarify confusing or ambiguous testimony, and the contradiction must lack credible explanation, such as new evidence.” Id. at 930. Appellant did not assert that Parker assured him that the $2,000 payment satisfied his debt until an August 13, 2011 affidavit, which was filed after appellees filed their motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim for unpaid tuition. The record supports that, at all times before this affidavit, appellant did not regard the $2,000 payment as satisfaction of the entire outstanding tuition. In an earlier affidavit, dated July 28, 2010, signed “under penalty of perjury,” appellant demonstrates that he and St. Albans School both understood that there was a remaining balance of unpaid tuition after the $2,000 payment; appellant even provides the terms for payment of that balance in his affidavit. Additionally, appellant‟s correspondence with the school—both before and after the $2,000 payment was made—indicates that both parties understood that appellant still had an outstanding balance for his son‟s tuition. Appellant initially was not even aware that the $2,000 payment had been made, and in informing St. Albans School that it could apply the payment to A.B.S.‟s tuition, he acknowledged the remaining amount still outstanding. Under 50 the circumstances, the trial court properly disregarded appellant‟s contradictory, uncorroborated and convenient affidavit, and granted appellees‟ counterclaim for unpaid tuition based on the uncontradicted evidence of record. b) Attorney’s Fees Appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney‟s fees to appellees, arguing that under the 2009-10 re-enrollment contract appellees were entitled to attorney‟s fees only as related to their counterclaim for unpaid tuition and not for fees related to defending against appellant‟s claims. Again, we disagree. The re-enrollment contract states that, “[i]f legal action is necessary to collect any amounts due,” appellant agrees “that the School shall be entitled to recover, in addition to such amounts, reasonable attorney‟s fees and court costs.” We have previously considered such a contractual provision and established that to determine whether a party is entitled to attorney‟s fees for amounts incurred in defending against claims made by the party opposing collection of the fees, the trial court must consider the necessity for the legal services, taking into account: “(1) whether the party requesting the fees was responsible for precipitating the litigation; (2) whether the litigation for which the party relying on the contract 51 provision recovers the fees was bona fide and made necessary by the party opposing payment of such fees; (3) whether the claim asserted by the party opposing payment of such fees was raised by way of offset in an attempt to reduce or extinguish the debt owed to the party requesting the fees; and (4) whether it was necessary for the party requesting the fees to defend against the claim of the party opposing the fees in order to collect the underlying debt or enforce the underlying contractual obligation.” Kudon v. f.m.e. Corp., 547 A.2d 976, 980 (D.C. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Applying these factors to the circumstances in this case, the trial court determined that appellees could recover attorney‟s fees incurred in defending against appellant‟s claims in addition to the fees incurred in prosecuting the counterclaim to collect unpaid tuition. The trial court considered that: (1) appellant was responsible for precipitating the litigation; (2) appellees‟ counterclaim was bona fide and made necessary by appellant‟s nonpayment of tuition; (3) appellant‟s claims, although not raised as an offset to the counterclaim, in effect related directly to the counterclaim for unpaid tuition (i.e., appellant‟s claims, if successful, would have nullified appellees‟ counterclaim); (4) it was necessary for appellees to defend against appellant‟s claims to ensure that collateral estoppel would not bar their counterclaim. As the trial court‟s determination considered the proper factors and was grounded on the facts and circumstances of this specific litigation, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court‟s decision to award attorney‟s fees incurred by 52 appellees both in connection with their counterclaim for unpaid tuition and in defending against appellant‟s claims.19