Opinion ID: 1443313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nathan Clanton

Text: Nathan Clanton was charged, in a two-count indictment, with distributing five grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was arraigned on December 19, 2006, and pled not guilty. On January 30, 2007, he pled guilty to count one pursuant to a written plea agreement. On April 3, 2007, at the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Clanton, following the applicable guidelines range, to 212 months' imprisonment, five years' supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. The court dismissed count two of the indictment. On appeal, Clanton makes two arguments: (1) that his sentence is unreasonable and the crack/powder cocaine disparity reflected in the guidelines does not comport with the statutory purposes of sentencing; and (2) that his misdemeanor battery offense, for which he was subject to over one year in prison under Wisconsin's habitual offender statute, should not qualify as a predicate offense under the career offender provisions of the guidelines. His ratio argument will be discussed below. With respect to his second argument, Clanton argues that he does not qualify as a career offender. He claims that the court should not have counted the battery as a felonyinstead of looking at the punishment with the recidivism enhancement, the court should have looked at the maximum punishment for the base offense. Our review is only for plain error, since Clanton raises this issue for the first time here on appeal. Our decision in United States v. Bissonette, 281 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.2002), flatly forecloses Clanton's argument. Clanton admits as much and cites Rodriquez, a Ninth Circuit case, in which, at the time of briefing, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari. United States v. Rodriquez, 464 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.2006), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 33, 168 L.Ed.2d 808 (2007). The case dealt with the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), under which a state drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as `a serious drug offense' if `a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law' for the `offense.' United States v. Rodriquez, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1783, 1786, 170 L.Ed.2d 719 (2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)). The question before the Court was whether the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law is the 5-year ceiling for the first offenses or the 10-year ceiling for second or subsequent offenses. Id. at 1787. In May the Court issued its decision, finding [i]n sum, a straightforward application of the language of ACCA leads to the conclusion that the `maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law' in this case was 10 years. Id. at 1788. Given this conclusion, Rodriquez does not help Clanton, Bissonette unquestionably governs the case, and we need not address the issue any further.