Opinion ID: 1401250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: S.A. 38-1636(i)

Text: The version of K.S.A. 38-1636(i) in effect at the time of Perez' offense stated: If the respondent is prosecuted as an adult under subsection (f)(1) or (f)(2) and convicted of a lesser included offense, the respondent shall be a juvenile offender and receive an authorized disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 38-1663, and amendments thereto. (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals dismissed Perez' habeas petition after filing Melton, 25 Kan. App.2d 641. In Melton, a 15-year-old was charged with felony murder. The State sought and obtained authorization to prosecute Melton as an adult. After negotiations, Melton entered a no contest plea to second-degree murder. Melton later filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. He argued his sentence was illegal because he was convicted of a lesser included offense, and under K.S.A. 38-1636(i), he should have been sentenced under the juvenile code. The Court of Appeals reasoned: K.S.A. 38-1636 permits a juvenile to be prosecuted as an adult under certain circumstances. Interestingly, K.S.A. 38-1636(i) states that if a juvenile is prosecuted as an adult under subsections (f)(1) or (f)(2) but is convicted of a lesser included offense, the juvenile shall be a juvenile offender and sentenced pursuant to the juvenile code. Instead, Melton was charged with second-degree murder pursuant to an amended petition, which relates back to the original petition. K.S.A. 60-215(c). Accordingly, second-degree murder is the only crime for which Melton was charged. There is no lesser included offense and K.S.A. 38-1636(i) simply is inapplicable. (Emphasis added.) 25 Kan. App.2d at 642. Perez argues Melton does not apply to him. He reasons that Melton's plea to second-degree murder, a level 2 felony, distinguishes that case from his. The premise of Melton is that when a defendant is charged in an amended complaint, the amendment relates back to the original complaint under K.S.A. 60-215(c). Thus, the defendant who enters a plea to an amended complaint is convicted with the crime charged, not a lesser included offense of the crime charged. However, K.S.A. 60-215(c) does not apply to criminal proceedings. K.S.A. 60-215(c) is part of the code of civil procedure. Its application has been twice rejected in the context of a notice of appeal in a criminal case. See State v. Medina, 256 Kan. 695, 701, 887 P.2d 105 (1994); State v. Grant, 19 Kan. App.2d 686, 688, 691, 875 P.2d 986, rev. denied 255 Kan. 1005 (1994) (notice of appeal in criminal case not considered a pleading within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-215[c]). K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 22-3201(e) speaks to amendments of criminal complaints: The court may permit a complaint or information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different crime is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. We disapprove of Melton's use of 60-215(c) in the context of a criminal case. K.S.A. 21-3107(2) defines lesser included crimes. Attempted rape is a lesser included offense of rape. See K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(c) (an attempt to commit the crime charged is a lesser included crime). Because Perez was originally charged with rape but ultimately convicted of attempted rape, Perez was convicted of a lesser included offense. The legislature has directed that juveniles authorized for prosecution as adults who are convicted of lesser included offenses shall be sentenced as juveniles. The result is that Perez' adult sentence is illegal by operation of K.S.A. 38-1636(i). The State focuses on the contractual nature of a plea bargain. According to the State, Perez as a juvenile/adult deserves all the due process owing to an adult/adult. Arranging a plea agreement is one of those adult rights. A plea agreement is akin to a contract. See State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 68-69, 765 P.2d 1114 (1988) (applying contract law to ambiguous plea agreement). Both parties to the agreement are bound by its terms. We have consistently forced the State to abide by its agreements with defendants. See e.g., State v. Ratley, 253 Kan. 394, Syl. ¶ 5, 855 P.2d 943 (1993). Perez agreed to enter a plea of guilty to attempted rape, knowing he would be convicted and sentenced as an adult. We find a degree of logic in the State's argument. However, the State's rights as an adult argument is trumped by the directory language of K.S.A. 38-1636(i).