Opinion ID: 197922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Policy-Based Discretion.

Text: Having confirmed the existence of discretion on the compliance officers' part, what remains is to examine whether that discretion is grounded in policy a question that none of the prior panels reached. We believe that it is. The plaintiff contends that the discretionary function defense is doomed because the United States failed to adduce any evidence to support the proposition that OSHA inspectors' actions are grounded in policy. This argument lacks force. When a function is discretionary, there is a presumption that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion.Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. Hence, the United States has no burden of production; it may rest, as it did here, on the Gaubertpresumption. The plaintiff next endeavors to overcome the Gaubertpresumption by pointing to trial testimony by OSHA employees and noting that they purportedly failed to articulate policy justifications for their actions. But Gaubert requires only that a government agent's actions be susceptible to policy analysis, and insists that courts must disregard analyses that rely on subjective intent to determine whether a discretionary choice is policy-driven. See id. at 325. Because the plaintiff offers no concrete challenge to the position that OSHA compliance officers' actions are policy-driven, the Gaubert presumption remains intact. Even beyond the presumption, we believe that the discretion granted to OSHA inspectors is deeply rooted in policy considerations. The OSH Act's purpose is to provide for a satisfactory standard of safety, not to guarantee absolute safety.See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion) (discussing legislative history); Donovan v. General Motors Corp., 764 F.2d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1985) (same); cf. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Industrial Union and stating, in the context of nuclear regulation, that an adequate protection standard need not, and almost certainly will not be a level of zero risk). A corollary to this observation is that OSHA may legitimately devote its limited enforcement resources to monitoring workplaces and working conditions that pose the most serious threats to worker health and safety. OSHA has done so in part, for example, by adopting inspection priorities and an administrative plan to govern programmed general inspections. See, e.g., Industrial Steel Prods. Co. v. OSHA, 845 F.2d 1330, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing OSHA site selection criteria for programmed inspections). The function of an OSHA compliance officer is an integral part of OSHA's enforcement policies. When conducting inspections under the auspices of an administrative plan, OSHA compliance officers are expected to study the layout of the facility they are about to investigate, to review its health and safety records, and to interview employer and employee representatives during the inspection about working conditions. One might expect that as a result of such study, OSHA inspectors will make daily judgments about what risks and safety issues most urgently require their attention. At bottom, OSHA inspectors must visit numerous workplaces, all of which present different challenges and issues, and they simply cannot be expected to inspect every item in every plant. The day-to-day decisions made by compliance officers thus further OSHA's enforcement policy of ensuring adequate safety in workplaces with a view toward efficient and effective use of limited enforcement resources, and are thus grounded in policy.Cf. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 331-33 (explaining that day-to-day decisions of thrift regulators were grounded in policies underlying thrift regulation statutes). We are not persuaded by the plaintiff's contention that all inspections ought to be painstakingly comprehensive because individual companies rely on OSHA inspections to improve their health and safety conditions. The OSH Act, in no uncertain terms, places primary responsibility for workplace safety on employers, not on the federal government. See 29 U.S.C. 654(a); Reich v. Simpson, Gumpertz & Heger, Inc., 3 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993).