Opinion ID: 2629938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Private Nuisance and the Common Enemy Doctrine

Text: ¶ 19 The only issue properly before the appellate courts is Grundy's private nuisance action against the Bracks  and whether the common enemy doctrine applies to bar that action. ¶ 20 The Court of Appeals held that the Bracks were entitled to prevent damage to their property from the vagrant surface water once confined in Puget Sound, even when a neighbor may be injured by their defense. Grundy, 116 Wash.App. at 636, 67 P.3d 500. We disagree. ¶ 21 In its strictest form, the common enemy doctrine allows landowners to dispose of unwanted surface water in any way they see fit, without liability for resulting damage to one's neighbor. Currens v. Sleek, 138 Wash.2d 858, 861, 983 P.2d 626 (1999). ¶ 22 Washington courts first articulated the doctrine more than a century ago: [S]urface water, caused by the falling of rain or the melting of snow, and that escaping from running streams and rivers, is regarded as an outlaw and a common enemy against which anyone may defend himself, even though by so doing injury may result to others. Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 78, 44 P. 113 (1896). [7] ¶ 23 As the Court of Appeals points out, the Cass court specifically mentioned seawalls: If a land-owner whose lands are exposed to inroads of the sea, or to inundations from adjacent creeks or rivers, erects sea-walls or dams, for the protection of his land, and by so doing causes the tide, the current, or the waves to flow against the land of his neighbor, and wash it away, or cover it with water, the land-owner so causing an injury to his neighbor is not responsible in damages to the latter, as he has done no wrong, having acted in self-defense, and having a right to protect his land and his crops from inundation. 14 Wash. at 79, 44 P. 113 (quoting Edward P. Weeks, The Doctrine of Damnum Absque Injuria Considered in Its Relation to the Law of Torts 3, 4 (1879)). The same authority is later quoted in Harvey v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 63 Wash. 669, 675, 116 P. 464 (1911). But neither case concerned protection of land from the sea. Instead, the Cass and Harvey courts were presented with overflow from rivers. The mention of seawater in these cases is obiter dictum and is, therefore, not controlling. State v. Potter, 68 Wash.App. 134, 149 n. 7, 842 P.2d 481 (1992) (Statements in a case that do not relate to an issue before the court and are unnecessary to decide the case constitute obiter dictum, and need not be followed. (emphasis added)). ¶ 24 Further, we have specifically characterized surface water as follows: The chief characteristic of surface water is its inability to maintain its identity and existence as a body of water. It is thus distinguished from water flowing in its natural course or collected into and forming a definite and identifiable body, such as a lake or pond. Halverson v. Skagit County, 139 Wash.2d 1, 15, 983 P.2d 643 (1999). Storm-driven waves in Puget Sound remain part of a definite and identifiable body of water when splashing onto waterfront property. They do not satisfy the Halverson court's definition of surface water. ¶ 25 Washington courts have neither characterized storm-driven waves as surface water nor applied the common enemy doctrine to seawater. We decline to do so here.