Opinion ID: 1184689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: beyond corporate limits availability

Text: Appellant contends that even should the City be empowered to ordain relative to the smaller fireworks, the corporate limits language contained in § 35-10-205 prevents the City from making the Ordinance effective within two miles outside the city limits. In 1953, at the time of the original enactment of the predecessor of § 35-10-205, such was certainly the case. However, legislative action [3] since that time has changed the restriction. In 1965, a new Municipal Code was enacted (Ch. 112, S.L. of Wyoming 1965). Section 3 thereof provided in pertinent part: (a) All cities and towns have the following powers which may be exercised by their governing bodies:       (26) To regulate, restrain or prevent the storage, use and transportation of gunpowder, high explosives, tar, pitch, resin, coal oil, benzine, turpentine, hemp, cotton, gasoline, nitroglycerine, petroleum or any product thereof, fireworks and other combustible or explosive material within the corporate limits, or within a given distance thereof.  (Emphasis added.) Obviously, the provision in the later enacted statute giving power to regulate fireworks within a given distance of a city is not consistent with the provisions of § 35-10-205 which limits the exercise of such power to the city limits. The two statutes cannot stand together. To the extent of the inconsistency, § 35-10-205 was repealed. Repeals by implication are not favored.    What must be shown is that the latter statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two cannot stand together   . Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 582 P.2d 67, 73 (1978). See Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 (1977); and Hutchins v. State, Wyo., 483 P.2d 519 (1971). In 1980, the Municipal Code was revised. One of the purposes of the revision as stated in the title to the act (Ch. 38, S.L. of Wyoming 1980) was to eliminate duplicative language. Section 3(a)(26) of Ch. 112, S.L. of Wyoming 1965, was then revised to read as now set forth in § 15-1-103(a)(xxviii), W.S. 1977: (a) The governing bodies of all cities and towns may:       (xxviii) Regulate or prevent the storage, use and transportation of any combustible or explosive material within the corporate limits or within a given distance thereof. Appellant argues that § 15-1-103(a)(xxviii) and its similar predecessor are unconstitutionally vague because the words within a given distance are not sufficiently specific. Standing alone, such words may be unconstitutionally vague. See Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, supra. However, we must again consider the statutes in pari materia. If legislative intent can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the statute will not be declared inoperative. A statute cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.    People v. Klufus, 1 Misc.2d 828 149 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1956).    Other statutes may also be drawn upon as sources from which to clarify how a statute will work, in order to save it from invalidity on grounds of uncertainty. 1A Sutherland on Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1972), § 21.16, p. 96. In addressing a contention that a statute relative to school district reorganization was void, in that it is vague, incomplete and indefinite, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:    `For the purpose of learning and giving effect to the legislative intention, all statutes relating to the same subject must be compared and so construed with reference to each other that effect may be given to all the provisions of each, if it can be done by any fair and reasonable construction. It must be presumed that the several statutes relating to one subject are governed by one spirit and policy, and that the Legislature intended the several statutes to be consistent and harmonious. Where two acts in pari materia are construed together and one of them contains provisions omitted from the other, the omitted provisions will be applied in a proceeding under the act not containing such provisions, where not inconsistent with the purposes of the act.'    People ex rel. Killeen v. Kankakee School District No. 11, 48 Ill.2d 419, 270 N.E.2d 36, 37-38 (1971), quoting from Ketcham v. Board of Education, 324 Ill. 314, 317, 155 N.E. 332, 333 (1927). See Reed v. State, Miss., 199 So.2d 803 (1967); King v. Cook, 297 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Solomon v. North Shore Sanitary District, 48 Ill.2d 309, 269 N.E.2d 457 (1971); and Gould v. Barton, 256 S.C. 175, 181 S.E.2d 662 (1971). Section 15-3-202(b), W.S. 1977, reflects that which was enacted as part of the new Municipal Code in 1965 (Ch. 112, § 171, S.L. of Wyoming 1965) and continued in the 1980 revision (Ch. 38, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming 1980): (b) The mayor has such jurisdiction as may be vested in him by ordinance: (i) Over all places within five (5) miles of the corporate limits of the city for the enforcement of health, or quarantine ordinance and regulation thereof; and (ii) In all matters excepting taxation within one-half (1/2) mile of the corporate limits of the city. The provisions were in the same enactment which use the words within a given distance thereof, now part of § 15-1-103(a)(xxviii), supra. The legislative intent was therefore expressed relative to the ability of a city to ordain for a distance of five miles beyond the city limits for health purposes. The fact that the statute referred to the mayor as the enforcing officer and that the City in this case operates under a city manager form of government is of no consequence. The particular section was with reference to all first-class cities. The legislative intent would obviously not be served if the statute were interpreted to mean other than the enforcement of it is to be by the chief executive officer of the city. See § 15-4-204, W.S. 1977. In any event, appellee has a mayor, as do all cities operating under the city manager form of government. See § 15-4-201, W.S. 1977. The jurisdiction conferred by § 15-3-202(b), W.S. 1977, can be exercised by him, if need be. Accordingly, for health purposes, a city may make an ordinance effective for a distance of five miles beyond the city limits. There may be a question on a case-by-case basis as to whether or not the true purpose of an ordinance is one related to health. In this case, that question is not before us inasmuch as the parties stipulated in the trial court: 2. That the action taken by the governing body in its adoption of Enrolled Ordinance No. 619 was in good faith and in the interest and preservation of the public health, safety and general welfare. (Emphasis added.) The City was authorized by § 35-10-205 to ordain a provision more restrictive than that provided by state law relative to the use, sale, etc., of fireworks. The within the corporate limits of the city limitation contained in such section was amended by § 15-1-103(a)(xxviii) to authorize application of the Ordinance to an area within a given distance of the City limits. Considering the statutes in pari materia the given distance intended by the legislature was that set forth in § 15-3-202(b)(i), W.S. 1977, i.e., five (5) miles    for the enforcement of health    ordinance and regulation thereof. Affirmed.