Opinion ID: 2640351
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Independent Standard of Review

Text: Preliminarily, defendant contends this court should employ the independent standard of review to assess whether sufficient evidence supports the hatemurder special-circumstance finding because, assertedly, First Amendment rights are implicated in this case. [12] Defendant claims the evidence of his writings, artwork, literature, and personal correspondence introduced by the prosecution to prove the hate-murder special-circumstance allegation constitutes free expression protected under the First Amendment. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. (1984) 466 U. S. 485, 499 [80 L.Ed.2d 502, 104 S.Ct. 1949], the United States Supreme Court explained that in cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court has an obligation to `make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that `the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.' (Quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 84 S.Ct. 710].) Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review `in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes' the outcome should have been different. ( Bose, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 514, fn. 31.) Because the trier of fact is in a superior position to observe the demeanor of witnesses, credibility determinations are not subject to independent review, nor are findings of fact that are not relevant to the First Amendment issue. ( Id. at pp. 499-500; Harte-Hanks [Communications v. Connaughton (1989)] 491 U.S. [657,] 688 [105 L.Ed.2d 562, 109 S.Ct. 2678].) As noted above, under the substantial evidence standard, the question is whether any rational trier of fact could find the legal elements satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. ( In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007].) Relying on Bose, we held in In re George T., that when a plausible First Amendment defense is raised, a reviewing court should independently review the entire record in determining the sufficiency of evidence supporting a juvenile court's finding that the minor made a criminal threat within the meaning of section 422. ( In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 631-634.) We explained that independent review of the constitutionally relevant facts is necessary in cases involving First Amendment issues to ensure that a speaker's free speech rights have not been infringed by a trier of fact's determination that the communication at issue constitutes a criminal threat. (33 Cal.4th at p. 632.) Independent review is employed precisely to make certain that what the government characterizes as speech falling within an unprotected class actually does so. ( Id. at p. 633.) (8) Here, there is no such line to be drawn. California's hate-murder special circumstance, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(16), provides that the punishment for first degree murder is death or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole when [t]he victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin. By its terms, this provision provides an enhanced penalty for first degree murder committed because of prohibited bias motivation and is not directed at free expression protected by the First Amendment. (See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476, 485-490 [124 L.Ed.2d 436, 113 S.Ct. 2194] [enhancement statute is properly directed at conduct committed because of prohibited bias motivation and does not punish free speech in violation of the First Amendment]; In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 725 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365] [§ 422.7, one of California's hate crime statutes, properly sanctions bias-motivated conduct and does not implicate a defendant's First Amendment rights].) Accordingly, because we conclude no First Amendment issues are implicated in this case, independent review of the evidence supporting the hate-murder special circumstance finding is not warranted.