Opinion ID: 2994827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dawg Life as an Enterprise

Text: Taylor, Stork, and Wafford challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions for engaging in an enterprise of racketeering activity. An enterprise is defined as any partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. sec. 1959(b)(2). This definition of enterprise is the same as that used in the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1961(4). See United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1335 (7th Cir. 1996). Under sec. 1959, the government may prosecute not only conduct under RICO that constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with an enterprise, but also for violent crimes which, in part, permit a defendant to maintain his position in a RICO enterprise. Id. Therefore, cases decided under sec. 1961(4) may also be used to determine what constitutes an enterprise under sec. 1959. Id. For a RICO conviction, the government must prove both the existence of an ’enterprise’ and the connected ’pattern of racketeering activity.’ United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). As the Court clearly explains, The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. 18 U.S.C. sec. 1961(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. Id. Defendants argue that although there may have been sufficient evidence to show that Dawg Life was at most a group of people who get together to commit a pattern of racketeering activity. . . . the government was required to present additional evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that this group of people constituted an enterprise. Defendants rely on United States v. Korando, which noted that while the statutory definition of enterprise includes enterprises that exist solely in order to carry out illegal activity, the enterprise needs to be something more than just the pattern of racketeering activity. Otherwise, two statutory elements--enterprise and pattern--would be collapsed into one. 29 F.3d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). However, we also stated in Korando that the hallmark of an enterprise is structure, with the enterprise having a structure and goals separate from the predicate [criminal] acts themselves. 29 F.3d at 1117 (citations omitted). We also noted that RICO applies not only to formal enterprises but to informal ones like criminal gangs. Id. In this case, the jury instructions defining enterprise and racketeering activity clearly distinguish the elements needed for the two separate charges. An enterprise, as that term is used in these instructions, includes any group or individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. An enterprise can include a group of people associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. This group may be associated together for purposes that are both legal and illegal. In considering whether a group is an enterprise, you should consider whether it has an ongoing organization or structure, either formal or informal, and whether the various members of the group functioned as a continuing unit. The hallmark of an enterprise is structure; there must be some structure that is amenable to consensual or hierarchical decision- making, though there need not be much. A group may continue to be an enterprise even if it changes membership by gaining or losing members over time. The government must prove that the group described in the indictment was the enterprise charged, but need not prove each and every allegation in the indictment about the enterprise or the manner in which the enterprise operated. Final Jury Instructions, p. 9. Racketeering activity includes any act or threat involving robbery, or dealing in a controlled substance. The indictment alleges that the Dawg Life Gang engaged in acts involving robbery in violation of Indiana criminal law, and the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealing, buying, selling or otherwise dealing in controlled substances in violation of federal law. Under Indiana law, robbery consists of the knowing or intentional taking of property from another person or from the presence of another person by using or threatening the use of force on any person, or by putting any person in fear. Federal law prohibits the knowing manufacturing, importing, receiving, concealing, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in controlled substances. Manufacture means to produce or prepare; import means that the substance in question was brought from a point outside the United States into the United States. Final Jury Instructions, p. 10. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, it is clear from the record, including testimony from admitted Dawg Life gang members, that the government presented more than sufficient evidence that the Dawg Life gang was an enterprise. Dawg Life was a long- established street gang operating on the southeast side of South Bend and was involved in the sale of illegal drugs. It was an ongoing organization with members who functioned as a continuing unit. There was a definite structure with a distinct ranking of members. There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that there was a type of hierarchical decision-making based on testimony as to one member being voted out the gang, one member being appointed to a higher level, of lower-ranking members going to higher-ranking members for drugs, and of higher-ranking members controlling the pooling of money for lower-ranking members. The continuity of an informal enterprise with differentiated roles amongst the participants provides the necessary structure to satisfy the statutory requirements of an enterprise. Korando, 29 F.3d at 1117-18 (citation omitted). Defendants incorrectly argue that the structure evidence collapsed into the evidence of racketeering activity. As we noted in Rogers, the language of Turkette does not require the enterprise to have a purpose separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity. 89 F.3d at 1336 (emphasis in original) (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). We held that the Court in Turkette was merely emphasizing that proof of an enterprise is separate and apart from proof of a pattern of racketeering activity. Thus the two elements are separate and apart, and ’the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce . . . .’’’ Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 538). [I]t would be nonsensical to require proof that an enterprise had purposes or goals separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 1337. [T]he fact that a single individual may engage in a pattern of racketeering activity without, of course, comprising an enterprise adequately illustrated the inherent and logical distinction between the two elements. Id. The district court properly instructed the jury on the elements as to enterprise and racketeering activity; that an enterprise required elements beyond the racketeering activity acts of dealing in controlled substances. The evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Dawg Life was an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.