Opinion ID: 2060520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are Specific Benefits a Type of Compensation?

Text: First, we are not persuaded by Rison's contention that § 28-35-58's reference to compensation applies only to weekly indemnity benefits. Rather we conclude that the unqualified term compensation as employed by the General Assembly in § 28-35-58 includes all types of compensation available under the WCAexcept medical benefits, which are expressly exempted. In making this determination, we are guided by the long-established tenet of statutory construction that when the language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, no room for statutory construction or extension exists, and we are required to give the words of the statute their plain and obvious meaning. In re Sabetta, 661 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.1995) (quoting Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I.1991)); see also Thibault v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 111 R.I. 381, 384, 302 A.2d 755, 757 (1973) (noting that clear and unambiguous language is diapositive of issues under the WCA). We must also bear in mind that given the WCA's remedial nature, any ambiguities in the statute generally must be construed liberally in favor of the employee. See Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764, 772, 263 A.2d 681, 685 (1970). Black's Law Dictionary broadly defines compensation as remuneration or satisfaction for injury or damage of every description (including medical expenses).` Black's Law Dictionary 283 (6th ed.1990). Rison points to our decision in Jones v. Grinnell Corp., 117 R.I. 44, 47, 362 A.2d 139, 141 (1976), in support of his, argument that despite the usual broad scope of the term compensation, this court has assigned it a narrower meaning within the context of the WCA. In Jones, the court noted that the word `compensation,' when employed in our Workmen's Compensation Act [as it was then known], encompasses a wide variety of benefits. It includes payments for the loss of earning capacity, a limb, hearing, or sight; support of dependents; disfigurement; and the payment of medical and funeral expenses. Jones also noted that specific compensation awarded under § 28-33-19, although a type of compensation, could also be conceived of as damages intended to repay an employee for a bodily loss. Jones, 117 R.I. at 47, 362 A.2d at 141. Jones thus distinguished specific compensation from weekly benefit payments that compensate for a lost opportunity to earn wages. Id.; see also Moniz v. Providence Chain Co., 618 A.2d 1270, 1272 (R.I.1993) (noting that Jones sets out a clarification of the general conception that benefits under the WCA are compensation). Although Jones grappled with the question of when an injury had reached an end result for limitations purposes, and accordingly is of limited assistance here, Jones `s description of the nature of § 28-33-19 benefits is accurate as far as it goes. However, to say that specific-compensation benefits are more akin to tort damages than are weekly benefits is not to say that specific compensation is not compensation as that term is used in § 28-35-58. Moreover, § 28-33-19 is entitled Additional compensation for specific injuries (emphasis added), a designation it has carried since the WCA's original formulation in 1912. Indeed, it has maintained this title through the 1956 codification of our General Laws and up to and including the present version of the statute. See G.L.1956 § 28-33-19 (1956 enactment) (entitled Additional compensation for specific injuries); P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 12 (entitled Additional compensation for certain injuries). The first sentence of § 28-33-19 provides that benefits thereunder shall be paid in addition to all other compensation (emphasis added)begging the inference that § 28-33-19 benefits are just another type of workers' compensation. Section 28-33-1, the first section of the relevant chapter, entitled `Workers' CompensationBenefits, provides that employers subject to chapters 29 to 38 must pay compensation to employees covered by the WCA. Such an inclusive use of the term, which certainly embraces § 28-33-19 benefits, establishes the tenor of its usage for subsequent sections. The disputed section itself echoes this understanding, stating that the section applies when compensation is payable under chapters 29-38 of this title. Section 28-35-58. But perhaps the most convincing factor from an interpretive standpoint is that § 28-35-58 explicitly excludes medical expenses from the scope of its suspension-ofcompensation mechanism. Following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, we can infer that the Legislature, having specifically exempted the payment of medical expenses from the suspension applicable to other forms of WCA compensation, similarly would have mentioned § 28-33-19 benefits had it intended to exempt them from § 28-35-58 as well. Indeed, the Legislature did precisely that in § 28-33-17, in the context of cost-of-living adjustments, by explicitly providing, This section shall apply only to payment of weekly indemnity benefits to employees    and shall not apply to specific compensation payments for loss of use or disfigurement or payment of dependency benefits or any other benefits payable under the Workers' Compensation Act. Section 28-33-17(f)(6). Thus the term compensation as it appears in § 28-35-58 must be taken to include specific compensation as well as weekly indemnity benefits. Our conclusion in this regard is reinforced by an examination of the context and purpose of the pertinent statutory provisions. This court has consistently held that lw]hen charged with the duty of statutory construction, one must read the language so as to effectuate the legislative intent behind its enactment.' Sabetta, 661 A.2d at 83 (quoting Gilbane Co. v. Poulas, 576 A.2d 1195, 1196 (R.I.1990)). Pursuant to the Legislature's 1985 amendment of § 28-35-58, an injured employee is entitled to receive both damages and compensation without having to give up one type of award entirely if he or she receives any monetary benefits from either potential source of recovery. The amendment obviously sought to provide employees with a statutory right to obtain both types of monetary reliefa right that had been denied to them under the prior version of the WCA as interpreted in Travis. On the other hand, there is no indication that the Legislature intended the amendment to confer a windfall on the employee. Were we to accept Rison's proposition that § 28-35-58 does not apply to specific-compensation awards, employees would be allowed to obtain not only both types of benefits (tort damages and workers' compensation) but also a double recovery for the same injuries. Because we conclude that this is not what the General Assembly intended when it amended § 28-35-58 in 1985, we reject this interpretation of the statute.