Opinion ID: 1708859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: WAS THE SENTENCING HEARING FOR JIMMY STRINGER FOLLOWING HIS CONVICTION FOR THE MURDER OF MR. McWILLIAMS A VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF THE MISSISSIPPI AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS?

Text: After his conviction for the murder of Mrs. McWilliams, Jimbo Stringer received a sentence of life imprisonment, as the jury could not agree on a punishment. He now argues that that verdict precludes him from receiving the death sentence for the murder of Mr. McWilliams. According to Stringer, the verdict in the first case means that the jury did not find that the death penalty was appropriate for the killing of Mrs. McWilliams. He has assumed that the jury in the second case based its death penalty on the murder of Mrs. McWilliams, which was his primary participation in the murder of Mr. McWilliams. This assumption is based on the rational jury test of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) and Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245 (Miss. 1983). He asserts that the finding of the first jury that the death sentence was not mandated for the killing of Mrs. McWilliams is a factual finding that may not be relitigated in his second trial. Thus, his claim is not so much under the double jeopardy provision as under a theory of collateral estoppel. Where the jury does not impose the death penalty, it is not required to enumerate its factual findings. Therefore, a failure to unanimously agree on the punishment does not leave the defendant with any determination of fact upon which to base a claim of collateral estoppel. This situation is not the same as that which existed in the case of Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held: [R]espondent's initial sentence of life imprisonment was undoubtedly an acquittal on the merits of the central issue in the proceeding  whether death was appropriate punishment for respondent's offense. 467 U.S. at 211, 104 S.Ct. at 2310, 81 L.Ed.2d at 171. However, in that case, the trial judge, who was the sentencer, made a specific finding that there were no aggravating circumstances. Where such findings are not specifically made, a failure to impose the death penalty in one trial should not act as an acquittal on those issues in the second trial.