Opinion ID: 2550813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Juror Jeffery Bryan

Text: Defense counsel argues that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause against Jeffery Bryan, who according to the defense, has views about the death penalty that substantially impaired him from performing his duties as a juror. During voir dire, Mr. Bryan, who actually served on the panel as the 12th juror selected after defense counsel had exhausted its peremptory challenges, stated that after determining there were aggravating circumstances in a case, he would be very hesitant to impose a life sentence. In his jury questionnaire, Mr. Bryan stated he would always vote to impose the death penalty when a defendant is found guilty of murder and is eligible for the death penalty. [8] He also stated that in circumstances such as those presented in the instant case, where the defendant killed multiple people, he could not imagine anything that would sway him from voting to impose a death sentence. He further stated that he could not consider a life sentence in any case of an intentional murder. Specifically, Bryan told defense counsel, Well, if you're going to ask me for an example, I can't think of any example right off the top of my head. I can't think of where life would be appropriate when they've taken a life. And I'm trying to be as straight forward as I can. However, Mr. Bryan also stated that he might consider a life sentence if there was a mitigating circumstance that warranted it. The following exchange took place: [Counsel]: But what if he [a defendant] was undergoing some extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time. Bryant: I could see where I might consider not the death penalty if that's what your question is. I could see that there would be a possibility of me not choosing death. I just have to lookhear the exact case and I know in my heart what I needed to do as soon as I heard it. I justyou mean in general? [Counsel]: Uh-huh (yes). Bryan: That's about as general asjust about as specific as I can get, you know. I mean, I'd have to hear what it was. [Counsel]: Okay, but Bryan: Because you said I'd have to weigh these things myself and everything else has to be weighted. I have to weigh it as I hear it, I guess. I'm a pro-death penalty person. I mean, I'll admit that. But I would say that there's not I'm not a hundred percent anything. I'd have to hear before I'd say which way I'd go. What did I say in my questionnaire? The record demonstrates that Mr. Bryan stated that he was a pro-death penalty person, but he also stated that he was not a hundred percent anything. He stated in his questionnaire that if a defendant is found guilty, he would always vote to impose the death penalty. Mr. Bryan also admitted that is the way he felt at the time. He further stated: Bryan: . . . But when I think about it, I guess there could be situations where I'd have to consider that the death penalty might not be appropriate all the way. . . .    [Counsel]: Then you've got [as a written response] penalty of death is justified in all cases where more than one person has been killed by a criminal act. And you have yes. Bryan: What? [Counsel]: The penalty of death is justified in all cases where more than one person has been killed in a criminal act? Bryan: Yeah. Like somebody from a tower or something picking people off. That kind of thing. [Counsel]: So do you still feel that way that a penalty of death is justified Bryan: In that particular situation, if they've killed several people. I can't think of anything that would change that, any mitigating, aggravating or whatever legal term it is for it that would change my mind about that. [Counsel]: About somebody killing more than one person? Bryan: Yeah, more than one person. [9] Voir dire examination of Mr. Bryan closed in the following exchange with defense counsel: [Counsel]: [I]f a person intentionally takes somebody else's life, do you feel under that circumstance that they forfeit their right to their own life? Bryan: Yes. I would have to say yes. [Counsel]: Considering the fact that that is what you believe, how . . . could a life sentence ever be justified when somebody intentionally murders somebody? Bryan: Well, if you're going to ask me for an example, I can't think of any example right off the top of my head. I can't think of where life would be appropriate when they've taken a life. And I'm trying to be as straightforward as I can. At first glance, Mr. Bryan's responses appear almost identical to those of juror Robert Payne in State v. Robertson , a case in which this Court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's cause challenge of Payne. 92-2660 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278. When counsel asked Payne if he would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant was convicted of both counts of first degree murder without regard to any mitigating evidence, Payne answered in the affirmative. Id., 92-2660 at 6, 630 So.2d at 1282. Although Payne also said he would be able to apply the law as given to him by the court, this Court held: [I]t was clear that Mr. Payne would automatically vote for the death penalty in the case of a double murder. That a prospective juror can conceive of certain situations where he might vote for life imprisonment rather that [sic] for death is inconsequential where that same juror has clearly stated he could only vote for the death penalty in the case before him. Id., 92-2660 at 7, 630 So.2d at 1283. The facts in Robertson are distinguishable from the instant case because Mr. Bryan never stated he would automatically impose the death penalty. More importantly, Mr. Bryan specifically said on at least two occasions he would consider mitigating evidence before deciding on the appropriate penalty. Mr. Bryan's statements during voir dire bear a closer resemblance to those of a juror in State v. Carmouche, 01-0405 (La.5/14/02); 872 So.2d 1020. In Carmouche, the defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to grant his challenge for cause regarding prospective juror Larry Guidry. During voir dire, Guidry stated he believed no one has the right to do what defendant did and death is the only appropriate penalty for killing three people, two of whom are children. Carmouche, 01-0405 at 14, 872 So.2d at 1031-32. This Court held: We recognize that Mr. Guidry's indication that death is the only appropriate penalty where the defendant kills three people, two of whom are children, is similar to that in Robertson, where the juror indicated that death is the only appropriate penalty for double murder. In Robertson, however, the juror repeatedly made it clear that he would automatically vote to impose the death penalty in a case of a double murder regardless of any mitigating evidence, and the juror was never sufficiently rehabilitated. In this case, the court's questioning of Mr. Guidry reveals Mr. Guidry's impartial position that, even if the defendant were found guilty, he would not vote for the death penalty if he did not believe it was merited. Id., 01-0405 at 16, 872 So.2d at 1033 (internal citation omitted). Similar to the juror in Carmouche, Mr. Bryan did not state he would automatically impose the death penalty if the defendant was found guilty of both charges of first degree murder in this case. Instead, Bryan repeatedly stated he thought the death penalty is justified when more than one person has been killed. This is an important distinction because Mr. Bryan did not state the death penalty was the only appropriate penalty when more than one person is killed or that he would not consider a life sentence if the defendant were found guilty of both charges. Mr. Bryan merely indicated he could impose the death penalty under the facts of this case, not that he necessarily would impose it. Although Mr. Bryan could not provide an example of when a life sentence would be appropriate when someone has intentionally killed another person, this statement alone does not show Mr. Bryan was unwilling to consider mitigating evidence or impose a life sentence under the facts of this case. After listening to the entire exchange, the trial court ultimately denied defendant's cause challenge of Mr. Bryan, finding that Mr. Bryan demonstrated a willingness to refine his views after being examined and after being advised of certain rules of law. The court observed Mr. Bryan as being no different . . . from any other who walk in here with particular attitudes that they had . . . at home. The court noted that he realized that this is serious business and he will consider to the mandates of the law. The court also noted that during voir dire, Mr. Bryan seemed to wake him up, and he said to himself, hey, wait a minute. Let me think about that. The court denied defense counsel's cause challenge based on the evidence presented. After reviewing the entire voir dire, we submit that Mr. Bryan's answers indicate that he would abide by the law. He stated more than once that he would consider the mitigating circumstances prior to determining whether to impose a sentence of death. While Mr. Bryan appears predisposed to the death penalty, he did state he would consider mitigating circumstances. This Court has upheld denials of challenges for cause in such situations. See State v. Broaden, 99-2124, pp. 11-12 (La.2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 358, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122 S.Ct. 192, 151 L.Ed.2d 135 (2001) (cause challenge properly denied for juror who was not unwilling to consider a life sentence and would not automatically vote for the death penalty); State v. Miller, 99-0192, pp. 18-19 (La.9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396, 408, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1196, 149 L.Ed.2d 111 (2001) (prospective jurors who expressly agree to consider both life and death sentences and to consider any mitigating evidence are not properly excused for cause); State v. Lucky, 96-1687, p. 6 (La.4/13/99), 755 So.2d 845, 850, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1023, 120 S.Ct. 1429, 146 L.Ed.2d 319 (2000) (denial of cause challenge upheld for juror who stated that he was predisposed to the death penalty and that the mitigating evidence would have to be substantial for juror to recommend life sentence); State v. Chester, 97-2790, p. 14 (La.12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276, 1285, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 826, 120 S.Ct. 75, 145 L.Ed.2d 64 (1999) (no abuse of discretion for denying cause challenge for juror who stated that in an appropriate case she could return a life sentence); State v. Hart, 96-0697, pp. 7-10 (La.3/7/97), 691 So.2d 651, 656-58 (approving denial of cause challenge against juror who believed that the death penalty for an intentional killing ought to be the law, but agreed to abide by the judge's instructions and to consider both life and death sentences). We find that having a personal preference for the death penalty does not render a juror unfit for service on a capital jury if he indicates he would not automatically vote for the death penalty and could consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a sentencing verdict on the basis of the evidence presented at trial. State v. Higgins, 03-1980, pp. 30-31 (La.4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1238-39; State v. Lucky, 96-1687, p. 6 (La.4/13/99), 755 So.2d 845, 850. This Court has stated that [a] trial court's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of discretion, even when the juror has voiced an opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, if the juror, on further inquiry or instruction, demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Lucky, 96-1687 at p. 6, 755 So.2d at 850. In the instant case, Mr. Bryan did not demonstrate an unconditional willingness to impose a death penalty under any and all circumstances. See State v. Dunn, 01-1635, p. 17 (La.11/1/02), 831 So.2d 862, 876 ( quoting State v. Chester, 97-2790, p. 15 (La.12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276, 1285-86). Here, the trial court determined that Mr. Bryan could be fair and consider mitigating circumstances. On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the challenge for cause as to Mr. Bryan. This argument lacks merit.