Opinion ID: 2540605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nunley waived his statutory and constitutional right to jury sentencing when he pled guilty, and this waiver remained valid even though it came before Ring.

Text: Although not raised by Nunley, and thus waived, the district court asked this Court to address the following question: If the right to have a jury determine his punishment did not exist when petitioner was originally sentenced to death, but this right was subsequently established by Ring and found to be retroactive by the Missouri Supreme Court in Whitfield, is petitioner's waiver still valid? Nunley v. Bowersox, No. 99-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2010 WL 4272474 (W.D.Mo. order entered October 18, 2010). The dissent also raises this question. These questions misconstrue the record of this case. The waiver remained valid. See State ex rel. Taylor, at 645-52 (Taylor, Nunley's accomplice, pleaded guilty prior to Ring and Whitfield, and this Court held that the defendant's waiver remained valid.). When Nunley originally pled guilty in 1991, he knew he could be sentenced by a jury if he desired. Missouri statutes recognized the right to be sentenced by a jury if the defendant went to trial. See section 557.036.2, RSMo 1991; section 565.006.1. In addition, at his plea hearing, the trial judge explained to Nunley that he could be sentenced by a jury if he had a jury trial. The judge explained these rights in constitutional, not statutory, terms: Q: Do you understand that by pleading guilty today you're waiving or giving up a certain number of constitutional rights that you would have if you went to trial? A: Yes. Q: Do you understand that at that trial you would have the right to a trial by a judge or a jury? A: Yes. . . . Q: Do you understand that if you went to trial and you were found guilty of these charges that you would then start the second phase of the trial, which would be the sentencing phase by the jury; do you understand that? A: Yes. Q: By waiving that, you're not going to be sentenced by a jury. Do you understand that? A: Yes. . . . Q: It is still your desire to plead guilty today? A: Yes, it is. (Emphasis added). At his subsequent motion to withdraw his plea, Nunley confirmed this understanding, but he strategically chose to plead guilty in order to avoid jury sentencing: Q: Did you think about your case before you entered your plea? A: Yes. Q: Okay, in fact you had a number of discussions with your attorneys before you entered your plea, didn't you? A: Yes . . . Q: And they in essence told you the evidence against you was overwhelming, didn't they? A: Yes. . . . Q: And that was something you took into consideration when you entered your plea of guilty, wasn't it? A: Yes. Q: And you knew you had the right to a jury trial? A: Yes, sir. . . . Q: And you were explained how the State would present aggravating circumstances and your attorneys would be presenting mitigating circumstances, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And when you talked about this with your attorneys before you entered your plea, it was brought out the fact that a jury who saw this evidence would be outraged, wasn't it? A: Yes, my attorney did mention that. Q: And, in fact, you yourself were afraid that if you went before a jury, they very well may sentence you to death, weren't you? A: Well, I really made the decision on the advice of my attorneys. Q: Well let me ask you this, sir, based upon the discussions you had with your attorneys, your review of all the evidence, and the fact that you were guilty, you understood there was a strong likelihood that if you went before a jury, they were going to sentence you to death, weren't you, sir? A: Yes, sir. Q: And so then you started discussing your other options. You said, well, one option would be to go before a judge, right? A: Yes. Q: But in order to go before a judge, you would have to waive all of your constitutional rights and you would have to plead guilty and that judge would sentence you, correct? A: Yes. . . . Q: So as I understand it at the time you entered your guilty plea, you did that because you, in fact, were guilty; you knew the evidence against you was overwhelming. You were afraid to go in front of a jury because they might sentence you to death, and you thought [the original trial judge] was a good judge to be in front of, is that a fair statement? A: Yes. The record supports that Nunley knew he had a right to be sentenced by a jury, but he preferred to be sentenced by a judge. The record also makes clear that this right was described to him in constitutional terms. Nunley's waiver of jury sentencing was not an adverse consequence of pleading guilty, it was what Nunley wanted. As Judge Dierker noted in his post-conviction relief memorandum, At no time did [Nunley] wish to go before a jury for any purpose, much less for sentencing. The key fact is Nunley's knowledge of the ability to be sentenced by a jury. Neither Apprendi, Ring, nor Blakely created a right to be sentenced by a jury that Nunley did not already have or understand, it just provided the United States Constitution as an additional source of this right. The fact that Ring provided an additional source of this right after Nunley pled guilty does not make Nunley's waiver unknowing. Moreover, as noted above, Nunley testified that he was giving up constitutional rights by pleading guilty. The dissent argues that Nunley waived his statutory right to jury sentencing, but asserts that Nunley could not waive his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to impose the death penalty before the Supreme Court recognized that right. In support of its argument, the dissent borrows arguments raised by Nunley's accomplice, Michael Taylor, in a separate writ of habeas corpus proceeding heard by this Court. Following Taylor's argument (not Nunley's), the dissent cites Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005). In Halbert, a Michigan statute provided that a defendant who pled guilty or nolo contendere could appeal only by leave of the court, and indigent defendants would only be provided assistance of counsel in certain situations. Id. at 610, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Halbert pled nolo contendere. Id. at 614, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The Court described circumstances in which counsel may be appointed, but did not expressly state that, absent such circumstances, counsel would not be provided. Id. at 643 fn. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The trial court set the defendant's sentences to run consecutively. Id. at 615, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The defendant requested appellate counsel, but the trial court, and subsequently the court of appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court, denied his request. Id. at 615-16, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The United States Supreme Court found that Michigan's practice violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 610, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Michigan argued that the defendant waived the right to appointed appellate counsel by entering a plea of nolo contendere. Id. at 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The Court disagreed, At the time he entered his plea, [the defendant], in common with other defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to appointed appellate counsel he could elect to forgo. Id. It then noted that the trial court did not tell [the defendant], simply and directly, that in his case, there would be no access to appointed counsel. Id. at 624, 125 S.Ct. 2582 (citing Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004)). The present case is distinguishable from Halbert. Unlike the trial court in Halbert, which did not expressly state that, absent such circumstances, counsel would not be provided, the trial court in this case did explicitly tell Nunley, simply and directly, that he would not be sentenced by a jury if he pled guilty, and the trial court explained these rights to Nunley in constitutional terms: Q: Do you understand that by pleading guilty today you're waiving or giving up a certain number of constitutional rights that you would have if you went to trial? A: Yes. Q: Do you understand that at that trial you would have the right to a trial by a judge or a jury? A: Yes. . . . Q: Do you understand that if you went to trial and you were found guilty of these charges that you would then start the second phase of the trial, which would be the sentencing phase by the jury; do you understand that? A: Yes. Q: By waiving that, you're not going to be sentenced by a jury. Do you understand that? A: Yes. . . . Q: It is still your desire to plead guilty today? A: Yes, it is. (Emphasis added). He understood that he could be sentenced by a jury if he wanted, but he strategically chose to be sentenced by a judge because he feared that a jury would sentence him to death. In addition, Halbert is distinguishable from this case in that Nunley received what he wantedjudge sentencingwhile the defendant in Halbert waived a right to his detriment. Nunley pled guilty and waived jury sentencing because the evidence against him was overwhelming and he feared that a jury would be outraged and would sentence him to death. Q: Well let me ask you this, sir, based upon the discussions you had with your attorneys, your review of all the evidence, and the fact that you were guilty, you understood there was a strong likelihood that if you went before a jury, they were going to sentence you to death, weren't you, sir? A: Yes, sir. Q: And so then you started discussing your other options. You said, well, one option would be to go before a judge, right? A: Yes. Q: But in order to go before a judge, you would have to waive all of your constitutional rights and you would have to plead guilty and that judge would sentence you, correct? A: Yes. . . . Q: So as I understand it at the time you entered your guilty plea, you did that because you, in fact, were guilty; you knew the evidence against you was overwhelming. You were afraid to go in front of a jury because they might sentence you to death, and you thought [the original trial judge] was a good judge to be in front of, is that a fair statement? A: Yes. (Emphasis added). The trial court gave Nunley what he desiredjudge sentencing. Nunley never wanted jury sentencing until after the trial judge sentenced him to death. As Nunley explained in his January 26, 1994 hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea: Q: Last time, you put all of your eggs in one basket with the judge, the judge sentenced you to death, and now this time you want to try a different approach, correct? A: Yes . . . Q: You gambled on the judge route, you lost, and now you want to try the jury route, isn't that a fair summary? A: Yes, sir. Nunley cannot strategically plead guilty and waive jury sentencing in order to be sentenced by a judge knowing he had the right to jury sentencing and then claim that his constitutional rights were violated when he received his request. Nunley's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.