Opinion ID: 2394154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requests for Extensions

Text: Next, Wilson contends that the Committee violated his right to procedural due process when it denied his requests for an extension to prepare a response to the initial complaint filed before the Committee. Citing McCullough v. Neal, 314 Ark. 372, 862 S.W.2d 279 (1993), the Committee contends that this issue is procedurally barred because Wilson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. According to Sections 5(E)(3) and (F)(1) of the Procedures of the Arkansas Supreme Court Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law, an attorney who has been cautioned, reprimanded, or suspended has a right to a de novo hearing before the Committee. In McCullough , we held that an attorney who failed to exercise this administrative remedy was procedurally barred from contesting the Committee's decision on direct appeal. Id. This case, however, is distinguishable from McCullough , because if the vote is to initiate disbarment proceedings, Section 5(E)(5) declares that the Committee shall file a disbarment action in circuit court and there shall be no hearing before the committee. Because Wilson did not have any further administrative remedies before the Committee, as did the attorney in McCullough , we conclude that the issue is not procedurally barred. Turning to the merits, we have previously explained that the power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the judicial department as one of the divisions of government. Neal v. Wilson, 316 Ark. 588, 873 S.W.2d 552 (1994); Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523 S.W.2d 900 (1975). Moreover, Amendment 28 to the Arkansas Constitution declares that, [t]he Supreme Court shall make rules regulating the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law. Accordingly, we have promulgated the Procedures of the Arkansas Supreme Court Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys of Law, which state in relevant part that: (1) Upon receiving information of such complaint, the attorney shall have twenty (20) days in which to file a written response consisting of an original and eight (8) copies with the Executive Director.... (2) The Executive Director is authorized to grant, at the request of an attorney, an extension of reasonable length for the filing of a response. Subsequent requests for extensions must be in written form and will be ruled on by the Chairman of the Committee. Section 5(C). On March 29, 1991, the Committee sent Wilson a letter announcing that a complaint had been filed against him. According to Section 5(C)(1), Wilson had twenty days to respond to the complaint. Instead of filing a response, Wilson's attorney sent a letter to the Committee on April 15, 1991, asking for an extension until August 30, 1991. The Executive Director of the Committee granted Wilson an extension until May 20, 1991. On appeal, Wilson argues that the Committee violated his rights because it granted him an extension for only one month instead of for the three and one-half months that he requested. According to Section 5(C)(2), the Executive Director has the authority to grant the first extension for a reasonable length of time. We hold that one month was a reasonable length of time because Wilson already had twenty days to respond, and he was represented by competent counsel who could have helped him prepare his response. On May 20, 1991, Wilson tendered a second request for an extension which was denied by the Committee Chairman. At this point, the Committee had already given Wilson one extension, thereby allowing him almost two months instead of the usual twenty days to file his response. Accordingly, we also hold that the Committee did not violate Wilson's rights when it denied his second request for an extension.