Opinion ID: 2429565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Validity of the Enhanced Sentences for Armed Robbery

Text: In Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988), the United States Supreme Court ruled that an invalid prior conviction may not be used as an aggravating circumstance to justify the imposition of a death sentence upon a defendant. See also Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915, 930-32 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 210, 107 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989). As the Court stated in Johnson, Since [the prior] conviction has been reversed, unless and until petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge. Johnson v. Mississippi, supra, 486 U.S. at 585, 108 S.Ct. at 1986. Moreover, the Court said, the fact that petitioner was imprisoned is not proof that he was guilty of the offense; indeed, it would be perverse to treat the imposition of punishment pursuant to an invalid conviction as an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 586, 108 S.Ct. at 19. Although Johnson was a capital case, both federal and state courts have also applied the principles espoused in Johnson to cases not involving the threat of the death penalty. In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115, 88 S.Ct. 258, 262, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), for example, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is impermissible [t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of [the right to counsel] to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense. See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49, 92 S.Ct. 589, 592-93, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, in examining a challenge to a finding that the defendant was an habitual traffic offender, has also refused to allow an unconstitutional and invalid prior conviction to be used to enhance punishment upon conviction for a subsequent offense. State v. Ridley, 791 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Other jurisdictions, faced with the same issue, have followed the same rule. See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. State, 462 So.2d 637, 639 (La. 1985) (A guilty plea obtained in violation of an accused's constitutional rights is invalid, and may not serve as a basis for enhancing punishment [upon a subsequent conviction for burglary]... .). In this case, the only justification for Wallen's classification as a persistent offender was the fact that, at the time of sentencing, he had 17 prior forgery convictions. T.C.A. § 40-35-106 (1984 Supp.). Because all 17 of those convictions were later reversed for constitutional defects, Wallen must be presumed innocent of [those] charge[s]. Johnson v. Mississippi, supra, 486 U.S. at 585, 108 S.Ct. at 1986. As a result, the invalid convictions may not be used to enhance punishment upon a subsequent conviction. The trial judge properly deleted all reference to Wallen as a persistent offender with regard to the 40-year sentence. However, the trial judge refused to grant the same relief as to the life sentences. Moreover, even after setting aside the finding of persistence, the trial judge resentenced Wallen to the same 40-year term, based on his conclusion that Wallen was an especially aggravated offender. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-107(3) (1984 Supp.), an especially aggravated offense is: [a] felony committed while on any of the following forms of release status if such release is from a prior felony conviction: (A) Bail, if the defendant is ultimately convicted of such prior felony; (B) Parole; (C) Probation; (D) Work release; or (E) Any other type of release into the community under the direct or indirect supervision of the department of correction or local governmental authority. The trial judge reasoned that even though Wallen's prior illegal convictions had been reversed and could not serve to enhance sentencing upon conviction for a subsequent offense, Wallen was, at the time of the armed robberies, on parole status from what was presumably a valid conviction. As a result, the trial court held, continued designation of the defendant as an especially aggravated offender was proper. The reasoning of the trial judge is at least superficially persuasive. Clearly, an argument could be made that, regardless of subsequent rulings on the validity of the underlying offense, a defendant should be subject to enhanced punishment for commission of a crime while paroled from what is then believed to be a valid and proper prior conviction. By creating both the persistent offender and the especially aggravated offender classifications in sentencing statutes, the legislature has chosen to recognize that criminals should receive additional punishment both for persistently resorting to criminal behavior and, separately, for violating the trust bestowed upon them through the grant of early release from prison. In situations in which individuals are placed on certain release statuses, those defendants are on notice that their actions will be closely monitored and that subsequent violations of the law may result in enhanced punishment. Moreover, the prior sentences of those defendants, even if later found to be invalid, are usually only voidable, not void. As a result, until the improper sentence or conviction is overturned, it would not seem unreasonable to charge the defendant with the responsibility of conforming his conduct to the dictates of the law applicable to any other individual on early release from a prior felony conviction. But despite these sound policy reasons supporting the position that Wallen should be held responsible for the consequences of actions undertaken at a time when he believed he had been paroled from valid convictions, applicable statutory provisions and case law militate against adoption of such a policy. In Johnson v. Mississippi, supra, 486 U.S. at 585, 108 S.Ct. at 1986, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that reversal of an invalid conviction restored to the defendant the presumption that he was innocent of the prior offense. Moreover, restoration of that presumption prevents the courts from using the fact that the defendant was imprisoned for that prior offense as an aggravating circumstance in the imposition of a sentence. Id. at 586, 108 S.Ct. at 1987. Similarly, unless the presumption of innocence in criminal cases is to apply to only some, and not all, aspects of a prosecution, restoration of that presumption should prevent the courts from enhancing punishment for a subsequent crime merely because the crime was perpetrated while the defendant was paroled from an improper conviction. In other words, if the fact of imprisonment for a prior offense cannot serve as an aggravating circumstance to enhance a subsequent sentence, the fact that the defendant had served what turned out to be an unnecessary sentence and had been released from that imprisonment at the time of the commission of a subsequent crime should also not serve to enhance the later sentence. [1] The position suggested by the Johnson decision is supported further by the especially-aggravated-offender statute at issue in this case. The unique situation presented by Wallen's application can be analogized to a case in which a defendant is sentenced for a crime committed while on bail awaiting trial for an earlier offense. The invalidation of the guilty pleas entered by Wallen to the 17 prior forgery charges did not extinguish the forgery indictments returned against the defendant. Rather, as in a bail situation, the indictments remain in place pending trials on the charges raised in those instruments. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-107(3)(A) (1984 Supp.), however, a sentence for a crime committed while the defendant is released on bail may be enhanced for that reason only if the defendant is ultimately convicted of such prior felony. Such a provision recognizes that the fact of release from imprisonment on a charge that has not and cannot be proven, together with subsequent commission of an additional offense, should not serve as the basis for penalty enhancement. If the prior crime or crimes ultimately cannot be proven by the state, the defendant's freedom from incarceration on those charges should not have been granted with conditions, but rather, should have been unconditionally required. The defendant thus should not be expected to pay an additional penalty for commission of a subsequent crime solely because he or she was improperly incarcerated or placed on restricted release status in the past. It follows from this analysis that the trial court should have granted full relief as to the 40-year armed robbery sentence, setting aside the finding of aggravation as well as that of persistence, and reducing the sentence to Range I once the convictions used to enhance it were set aside as invalid. Likewise, the enhanced life sentences in the other three armed robbery cases should also have been reduced to Range I sentences, on the same ground. The ostensible impediment to relief in both instances is procedural. The majority implies that Wallen has waived his right to relief on the 40-year sentence by failing to raise it on appeal. In addition, the majority holds that, like the petitioner in Mahler , Wallen has waived his right to relief by pleading guilty to the charges for which he is now serving the life sentences.