Opinion ID: 618100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Khan‟s Claims for Relief

Text: To succeed on his asylum claim, Khan must establish “that he has suffered from past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of one of the five statutory bases: race; religion; nationality; membership in a particular social group; or political opinion.” Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2005). The BIA concluded that Khan failed to establish past persecution because he was “not appreciably harmed” during the incidents with the Taliban and because the Taliban‟s threats “were oblique and not imminent.” (R. 9.) We have recognized that concrete, highly imminent threats can constitute persecution when the petitioner also suffers harm or when the threats escalate with each incident. See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 520 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att‟y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 343 (3d Cir. 2008). But the two incidents Khan experienced were of a similar character and separated by several months. More importantly, Khan was not harmed on either occasion. Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that he suffered past persecution. See Jarbough v. Att‟y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (no past persecution when petitioner was detained by agents of the Syrian government on two occasions, who “cursed, threatened, 4 kicked, shoved, and pushed him”). The BIA‟s conclusion that Khan failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution is also supported by substantial evidence.3 To establish such a fear, “the alien [must] show that a reasonable person in his position would fear persecution, either because he would be individually singled out for persecution or because there is a pattern or practice in his home country of persecution against a group of which he is a member.” Huang, 620 F.3d at 381 (quotations omitted). Khan contends that he has established a well-founded fear that he would be persecuted by the Taliban either on an individual basis or due to a “„pattern or practice‟ of persecution of non-observing Sharia law Muslims.”4 (Pet‟r‟s Br. 28-29.) He relies on his testimony and the U.S. State Department‟s 2007 Country Report for Pakistan, the only documentary evidence that he submitted in support of his claim. We agree with the BIA that nothing in the 2007 Country Report establishes that Khan would be “subject to a particularized threat of harm” upon return to Pakistan. (R. 9.) The report establishes that Taliban militants were active in the NWFP and that “they killed security forces, government officials, tribal elders, religious leaders, and persons they accused as spies” and “bombed girls‟ schools, barber shops, hotels, and video 3 Khan‟s subjective fear is not in question since the IJ and BIA accepted his testimony as credible. 4 Khan also argues that the BIA erred in failing to consider his claim that he is a member of a disfavored group, namely, Americanized Muslims. As we have “reject[ed] the establishment of a „disfavored group‟ category,” Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 538 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005), we discern no error. 5 shops.” (R. 380.) But it does not reflect that Taliban were targeting either individuals who held pro-American views or Sunni Muslims like Khan who failed to practice Sharia law. Nor does it in any way establish that the Taliban engaged in a pattern and practice of persecuting such individuals.5 See Wong, 539 F.3d at 232-33 (“As part of a pattern or practice claim, an applicant must „establish[ ] his or her own inclusion in, and identification with, such group of [similarly situated] persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.‟”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)) (alterations in original). Moreover, the BIA properly observed that the reasonableness of Khan‟s fear is diminished by the fact that he remained in Pakistan for nearly a year after the first incident and given the absence of evidence that the Taliban has any ongoing interest in him in particular. The BIA also reasonably questioned Khan‟s fear in light of the fact that he was not harmed during the five years that he lived in Pakistan between 2003 and 2008, “despite his having adopted American ways . . . .” (R. 5.) Khan challenges that observation, asserting that the Taliban became more active at the end of 2007, which 5 The IJ did not make a finding regarding any such pattern or practice. This is unsurprising, as no such claim was presented to her. The BIA raised the issue sua sponte in its first opinion, rejecting the theory by citing Wong v. Attorney General, 539 F.3d 225, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008). On remand, Khan mentioned the theory in a cursory fashion (R. 19), but he did not develop the argument in any detail. We note that Khan does not argue that, under these circumstances, the Board erred by failing to remand to the IJ to make relevant findings of facts about the existence of any pattern or practice of discrimination. In any event, any error in this regard would be harmless. See Yuan v. Att‟y Gen., --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 1519200, at  (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2011). 6 explains why he was not approached until early 2008. But the government correctly points out that there is no information in the record to substantiate Khan‟s assertion. In sum, although Khan has demonstrated considerable unrest and turbulent conditions in Pakistan, the record does not compel the conclusion that he will be persecuted by the Taliban due to his appreciation of the United States or his failure to comply with Sharia law.6 See Konan v. Att‟y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing that “general unrest and violence will not support an asylum claim standing alone”).