Opinion ID: 782105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of a Defective Appliance

Text: 17 There are two recognized methods of showing that an appliance was defective:  `Evidence may be adduced to establish some particular defect, or the same inefficiency may be established by showing a failure to function, when operated with due care, in the normal, natural, and usual manner.' Myers, 331 U.S. at 483, 67 S.Ct. 1334 (quoting Didinger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 39 F.2d 798 (6th Cir.1930)). As the Myers Court elaborated, Efficient means adequate in performance; producing properly a desired effect. Inefficient means not producing or not capable of producing the desired effect; incapable; incompetent; inadequate. Id. If the plaintiff demonstrates a defect using the second method, he or she need not show an actual break or visible defect. Id. If the plaintiff establishes that the appliance functioned inefficiently at the relevant time, it is irrelevant that the appliance worked efficiently both before and after the occasion. Id. 18 Thus in Didinger, where the plaintiff demonstrated that he firmly set a hand brake which immediately gave way and failed to hold, this court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show the specific reason why the brake failed: 19 Assuming the proper setting of the [hand] brake, the fact that it did not hold demonstrates its inefficiency. As said in [ Philadelphia & R.R. Ry. Co. v. Auchenbach, 16 F.2d 550, 552 (3d Cir.1926)]: `The test of the observance of this duty (under the Safety Appliance Act) is the performance of the appliances,' and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show whether this failure to function was due to the fact that the ratchet broke loose from the brake staff, that the ratchet teeth were worn, that the dog or its rocker pivot broke, that there was too much vertical play between dog and ratchet ... or any other precise defect [ Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66, 37 S.Ct. 598, 61 L.Ed. 995 (1917)]. If the brake was properly set, as asserted, some defect must have been latent in it. Otherwise it would have held. 20 Didinger, 39 F.2d at 799. As Didinger suggests, plaintiffs may rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove their FSAA claims. Id.; see also Myers, 331 U.S. at 483-84, 67 S.Ct. 1334 (holding that conductor's testimony that brake wheel did not function like ordinary wheel and that it suddenly kicked back and knocked him to ground was sufficient to make an issue for the jury as to whether brake was defective); Anderson v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 89 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir.1937)(finding that the failure of the [sanding] apparatus to function when operated in a proper manner and under normal working conditions makes a prima facie case of insufficiency either in the air pressure or in mechanical construction. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has frequently been applied to prove, in the absence of explanation, a violation of provisions of the Safety Appliance Act.) Trial judges should not rule out plaintiffs' opinions as to why appliances functioned inefficiently, where the plaintiffs' opinions are based on their experience and perceptions at the time of their accident. See Fritts v. Toledo Terminal R.R. Co., 293 F.2d 361, 363-64 (6th Cir.1961)(holding that trial judge improperly ruled out plaintiff's opinion, based on his experience working for the railroad, that lurching of the engine was due to a worn frog); see also Myers, 331 U.S. at 483, 67 S.Ct. 1334 (holding that the plaintiff's testimony as to the inefficiency of the appliance is such substantial evidence of inefficiency as to make an issue for the jury). 21 Here, the district court held that Richards failed to present evidence of a particular defect with the train's air braking system. Richards testified, however, that based on his experience and training and his visual inspection of the train following the emergency stop, that the stop must have been caused by a defective control valve. Although Richards may not have emphatically expressed his assessment of the cause of the stop at his deposition, a jury could conclude that he was stating more than a mere assumption, as the district court characterized his testimony.