Opinion ID: 1302804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis of legislative history

Text: The defendants in these two cases urge us to apply the plain meaning rule in deciding the applicability of the recreational use act to the facts in their respective cases. They assert that the language used by the Legislature is purposely clear and capable of application without interpretation. [11] Thus, in their view, no judicial interpretation or construction is permitted if the statute is clear and unambiguous. Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v Bd of Ed, 413 Mich 1; 317 NW2d 529 (1982). While defendants correctly note that judicial interpretation is unnecessary if the statute is clear, in construing a statute, this Court must read the language of the statute in light of the general purpose to be accomplished. Amendatory acts are not to be considered in isolation, but are to be construed in the context of the act which it is designed to amend. Fowler v Chiropody Bd, 374 Mich 254, 257; 132 NW2d 82 (1965); Conrad v Nall, 24 Mich 275, 277 (1872); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 478; 208 NW2d 469 (1973). See People v Gilbert, 414 Mich 191, 205; 324 NW2d 834 (1982). Our first task, therefore, is to ascertain the question of legislative purpose. The act, as amended by 1964 PA 199, § 1 and 1974 PA 177, states the purpose as: AN ACT restricting suits by persons coming upon the property of another for certain purposes; and to declare the limited liability of owners of property within this state. More than forty states have adopted recreational land use laws [12] which limit the liability of private landowners whose lands are used for outdoor recreational activities, such as those enumerated in the Michigan recreational land use statute. Although most states were encouraged to enact such laws by virtue of a model act promulgated in 1965 by the Council of State Governments, [13] Michigan's Legislature had the foresight to protect its landowners more than a decade earlier. It is reasonable to assume that the Michigan statute has the similar general purpose of similar acts in other jurisdictions: to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes. [14] This purpose was discussed in Thomas v Consumers Power, 58 Mich App 486, 495-496; 228 NW2d 786 (1975), when the Court stated that it perceived a legitimate state objective in promoting tourism and in opening up and making available vast areas of vacant but private lands to the use of the general public. [ [15] ] [Emphasis added.] Accord Thone v Nicholson, 84 Mich App 538, 543; 269 NW2d 665 (1978); Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 475; 326 NW2d 810 (1982). By the terms of the statute as enacted in 1953, it applied only to those who were hunting, fishing, or trapping. Reference to the history of the act demonstrates that the Legislature only intended to limit a landowner's liability where others fished, hunted, or trapped upon his land. Later, as increased leisure time allowed our society to expand its inclination for outdoor recreation, the Legislature expanded the scope of the statute in parallel fashion. The activities added in 1964 were logical extensions of the original act. Yet, the Legislature, by adding the term outdoor gave a more restrictive meaning to the statute than the original recreational use. In the context of the more specific words, the term outdoor connotes more than a mere inside-outside distinction. [16] The last amendment in 1974, in adding two more enumerated activities  motorcycling and snowmobiling  shows no intent to change the common law. The additional change in the 1974 amendment to or any other outdoor recreational use from the 1964 or other similar outdoor recreational use appears to have allowed expansion of the list of activities to include new and novel outdoor recreational activities without creating a laundry list. We do not see this legislative response as an indication that the Legislature intended a major restructuring of Michigan's common-law premises liability. The legislative history of the recreational land use statute and its two predecessor statutes, as well as other interpretative aids, also indicate that the Legislature intended the act to apply specifically to certain enumerated outdoor activities (fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling) which, ordinarily, can be accommodated only on tracts of land which are difficult to defend from trespassers and to make safe for invited persons engaged in recreational activities. The commonality among all these enumerated uses is that they generally require large tracts of open, vacant land in a relatively natural state. This fact and the legislative history of the RUA make clear to us that the statute was intended to apply to large tracts of undeveloped land suitable for outdoor recreational uses. Urban, suburban, and subdivided lands were not intended to be covered by the RUA. The intention of the Legislature to limit owner liability derives from the impracticability of keeping certain tracts of lands safe for public use. The same need to limit owner liability does not arise in the case of recreational facilities which, in contrast, are relatively easy to supervise and monitor for safety hazards. As our analysis reveals, Michigan's recreational use statute redirected the focus of landowner liability from the status of the user of the property, making the purpose of going on the land and the character of land central to the determination of the owner's liability. [17] Accordingly, we have determined the applicability of the statute in these cases with that same focus in mind, as opposed to the status-of-the-user focus applied by the lower courts when emphasizing the status of the plaintiffs as social guests.