Opinion ID: 2791770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enforcement of Immigration Laws

Text: “The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” 1 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., is the comprehensive statutory scheme governing immigration in the United States. It controls, among other things, the removal of illegal aliens found within the United States. 2 Those “[a]liens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law.” 3 Under the INA, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is “charged with the administration and enforcement of [the INA] and all other 1 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (citations omitted). 2 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 3 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 2 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens . . . .” 4 Although the Secretary of DHS is charged with enforcement of the INA, “a principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” 5 In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the concerns justifying criminal prosecutorial discretion are “greatly magnified in the deportation context.” 6 B. Challenged Executive Immigration Enforcement Programs Beginning in 2012, the Executive Branch implemented a program deferring action against the removal of what it considers low priority aliens. This class of low priority aliens are “certain young people who were brought to [the U.S.] as children and know only this country as home.” 7 This is known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program outlined in former DHS Secretary Napolitano’s directive, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” (“Napolitano Directive” or “the Directive”). 8 As outlined in the Napolitano Directive, DACA permits, on a case-by-case basis, deferred action 4 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). 5 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 6See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) (“Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. . . . These concerns are greatly magnified in the deportation context.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012) (“Napolitano Directive”), at 1, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-whocame-to-us-as-children.pdf. 8 Id. 3 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 on the removal of undocumented aliens who: (1) arrived in the United States before the age of sixteen; (2) are under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; (3) have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007; (4) are in school, have graduated from high school, have obtained a general education development certificate, or have been honorably discharged from the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; and (5) have not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety. 9 If an alien satisfies all of these criteria, then the alien may apply to have any removal proceeding deferred for a period of two years. 10 The alien must pass a criminal background check, submit biometrics, file several forms, and pay a fee. 11 Deferred action is granted on a case-by-case basis and DHS does not guarantee that relief will be granted in all cases. 12 9 Id. at 1-2. 10 Id. at 2. 11 Id.; See also Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), uscis.gov, http://www.uscis.gov/childhoodarrivals (last visited February 19, 2015). 12 Napolitano Directive at 2. In 2014 — after the initiation of this lawsuit — acting Secretary of DHS, Jeh Johnson, issued a supplemental directive amending DACA and instituting a new program granting deferred action to another class of undocumented aliens. The new program defers action against parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents that meet similar criteria found in DACA. This new program has become known as “DAPA,” Deferred Action for Parent Arrivals. Plaintiffs do not challenge DAPA’s validity. Therefore, we need not, and do not, discuss DAPA. The 2014 DACA amendments removed the age cap of 31 as of June 15, 2012, extended the period of deferred action to three years instead of two, and adjusted the date from which the alien must be continuously residing in the United States from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010. The 2014 DACA amendments are not the subject of Plaintiffs’ challenges. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, to Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Whose Parents are U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (November 20, 2014) (“Johnson Directive”), at 5, available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf. 4 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 According to Section 1225 of the INA, when an immigration officer encounters an alien who is an “applicant for admission,” the officer must determine whether the alien is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 13 An “applicant for admission” includes aliens present in the United States who have not been admitted. 14 If the examining immigration official is not satisfied that the alien is entitled to be admitted, then the officer “shall” detain the alien for a removal proceeding. 15 It is undisputed that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) only directs the Agents to detain an alien for the purpose of placing that alien in removal proceedings. It does not limit the authority of DHS to determine whether to pursue the removal of the immigrant. DACA instructs DHS officials who come into contact with an undocumented alien who meets the program’s criteria to “immediately exercise” prosecutorial discretion, on an individual basis, in order to uphold DHS’s priority removal scheme. 16 Once DHS awards the alien deferred action, the alien may apply for work authorization during the time period action is deferred. 17 13 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 14 Id. at § 1225(a)(1). 15 Id. at § 1225(b)(2)(A). 16 See Napolitano Directive at 2, which states, in pertinent part: 1. With respect to individuals who are encountered by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): • With respect to individuals who meet the above criteria, ICE and CBP should immediately exercise their discretion, on an individual basis, in order to prevent low priority individuals from being placed into removal proceedings or removed from the United States. 17 Id. at 3. 5 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 According to the Agents, even if the immigration official is not satisfied that the alien is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” DACA prohibits the agent from detaining eligible aliens for the purpose of commencing removal proceedings. The Agents read 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as requiring them to detain all undocumented immigrants they come in contact with. They contend that if they follow the statute and decline to follow DACA they will be subject to employment sanctions. The Agents also allege that following DACA will cause them to violate their oath to support and defend the laws of the United States. The State of Mississippi alleges that the beneficiaries of DACA who remain in the state will cost the state money in education, healthcare, law enforcement, and lost tax revenue. In support of this allegation, Mississippi points to a 2006 study conducted by Mississippi officials that estimates the net fiscal burden of illegal immigration as a whole at $25 million per year. C. Procedural Posture According to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, DHS began accepting DACA applications on August 15, 2012. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief eight days later, on August 23, 2012, facially attacking the constitutional and statutory validity of the DACA program. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the program violates: (1) federal statutes requiring the initiation of removals; (2) federal law by conferring a non-statutory form of benefit—deferred action—to more than 1.7 million aliens, rather than a form of relief or benefit that federal law permits on such a large scale; (3) federal law by conferring the legal benefit of employment authorization without any statutory basis and under the false pretense of “prosecutorial discretion”; (4) the constitutional allocation of legislative power to Congress; (5) the Article II, Section 3, constitutional obligation of the executive to take care that the laws 6 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 are faithfully executed; and (6) the Administrative Procedure Act through conferral of a benefit without regulatory implementation. All of the causes of action, except the third, challenge the portion of DACA that requires the Agents to exercise prosecutorial discretion and refrain from detaining certain aliens. The third cause of action challenges the employment authorization provision of DACA. Defendants filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, asserting, among other things, that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the provisions of DACA. Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have not alleged an adequate injury-in-fact that can be redressed by a favorable ruling. In opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the Agents asserted three distinct injuries: (1) a violation of their oaths of office; (2) the burden of compliance with the Directive; and (3) “being compelled to violate a federal statute . . ., on pain of adverse employment action if they do not.” The district court found that violating one’s oath is not a sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing, nor is the burden of complying with the Directive. However, the district court found that the threat of an adverse employment action if the Agents refuse to follow the Directive is a sufficient injury to support standing. The court dismissed the Agents’ third cause of action, challenging the employment authorization provisions of DACA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the Agents’ injury does not relate to that DACA provision. Plaintiffs do not challenge this dismissal on appeal. The Agents’ remaining causes of action, however, were allowed to proceed. Mississippi asserted that the cost to the state in providing support services to DACA beneficiaries is an adequate injury to support standing. The district court held that Mississippi’s allegation of a fiscal burden was too speculative because the only support the state provided for this burden was a 2006 report which estimated the annual cost of immigration six years before 7 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 the DACA program was instituted. Mississippi produced no studies or other evidence tending to establish that the DACA program would add to the state’s already existing costs. Next, the district court proceeded with the Agents’ remaining claims and conducted an evidentiary hearing on their petition for a preliminary injunction. The court did not rule on the preliminary injunction because an outstanding jurisdictional question existed as to whether the Agents had exhausted their administrative remedies before proceeding to federal court. Ultimately, the district court determined that the Agents had not pursued their remedies under the Civil Service Reform Act, and, thus, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. The court dismissed the remainder of the Agents’ claims. This appeal followed.