Opinion ID: 612655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: dismissal of the habeas petition

Text: Because “the District Court ruled on [the] habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing, our review of its decision is plenary.” Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009). In other words, “we review the state courts‟ determinations under the same standard that the District Court was required to apply.” Id. Federal courts may not grant relief on a habeas claim that was “„adjudicated on the merits‟ in state court unless the adjudication „resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States‟ or „was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.‟” Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). In this case, the PCRA court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing, at which the petitioner‟s trial counsel testified about his strategy. Ultimately, that court held that petitioner was not entitled to forensic testing and that his trial lawyer‟s decision to 5 forego such testing did not amount to ineffective assistance. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed, petitioner had “failed to show good cause why the discovery should be permitted. [He] failed to explain why trial counsel had not previously undertaken to request this discovery. Likewise, . . . . [he] failed to question his trial counsel at the PCRA hearing to determine why counsel did not seek blood testing of both [himself] and Morris at the time of the original trial and trial counsel did not explain his inaction in the Affidavit that [petitioner] submitted to the PCRA court.” Chambers III, 807 A.2d at 889 (affirming PCRA court‟s decision as to guilt phase). Accordingly, the merits of the petitioner‟s claims have been adjudicated. See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 115 (“to qualify as an „adjudication on the merits,‟ the state court decision must . . . . have preclusive effect”). We therefore may not disturb the state court‟s ruling unless it was clearly contrary to established federal law or unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100. We are obliged to “be deferential to counsel‟s tactical decisions, not . . . employ hindsight, and . . . give counsel the benefit of a strong presumption of reasonableness.” Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1493 (3d Cir. 1994). When analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we may “„address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.‟” Id. at 1495 (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). 6 To establish that his lawyer‟s performance was deficient, petitioner first “must show that . . . . counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the „counsel‟ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment. Second, [he] must show that . . . . counsel‟s errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial . . . whose result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Petitioner “has not made a substantial showing that the district court erred in concluding” that his lawyer‟s performance was constitutionally deficient. Deputy, 19 F.3d at 1495. He has failed to demonstrate that the decision not to seek forensic testing amounted to the absence of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The record shows that counsel focused on the lack of physical evidence linking Chambers to the crime, both during the original trial and at the second sentencing hearing following remand. Giving counsel the benefit of the doubt, as we must under Strickland, we cannot conclude that this was ineffective assistance. Whatever counsel may have gained by testing was and remains speculative (and thus, the claim fails under Strickland) and may well have inculpated Chambers, in which case there was an affirmative, strategic reason not to seek it.5 See, e.g., Rice v. Hall, 564 F.3d 523, 525-26 5 We need not address the second prong of Strickland, see 466 U.S. at 697 (“there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”); however, petitioner has not demonstrated that the jury would have reached a different conclusion if trial counsel had pursued the forensic evidence sought. We discuss this further in Section II, infra. 7 (1st Cir. 2009) (trial attorney was not ineffective for failing to obtain forensic testing of crime scene artifacts where lack of forensic evidence presented by state was used to raise doubts about defendant‟s guilt and there was no “likelihood that the result of forensic testing would have been exculpatory”).