Opinion ID: 4170668
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiters’s Burden

Text: To establish prejudice under Strickland, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”23 Greiner v. defendant received a fair trial with the benefit of effective representation.” Id. Indeed, even the district court recognized that the trial court “found there was no testimony establishing that medical testimony about Waiters’s level of intoxication would have changed the jury’s finding.” Id. at 15. With respect, the dissent obfuscates the record. 23 Puzzlingly, the dissent relies on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and not on Strickland, to argue its case, apparently on the theory that if the prosecution had suppressed the medical evidence, we would surely agree that prejudice had been established. But the prosecution did not suppress the evidence, and so this is not a counterfactual we need (or should) address. The Strickland prejudice inquiry partly “finds its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. But the dissent errs in concluding that Brady and Strickland prejudice are, as a result, necessarily identical in their application. As our learned predecessor astutely observed, “words are chameleons, which reflect the color of their environment,” Commissioner v. Nat’l Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.), such that “identical language may convey varying content,” Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015). Thus, rather than look to a body of case law separate from that which governs the claim at issue here, we conclude that under well‐established precedent specific to 29 Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 319 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (explaining that the deficient performance must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, and thus the chance of an alternate result must be “’substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 112); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (explaining that the required level of prejudice falls between the deficiencies having “some conceivable effect” and “more likely than not alter[ing] the outcome in the case”). Moreover, we have said that where a conviction is “supported by overwhelming evidence of guilt,” habeas relief on the ground of ineffective assistance is generally not warranted. Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 204 (2d Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying habeas relief on this basis). This is because a verdict or conclusion with ample record support is less likely to have been affected by the errors of counsel than “a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Strickland—and particularly to claims raised in a § 2254(d) petition—the state trial court’s determination that Simons’s conduct did not prejudice Waiters’s defense was not objectively unreasonable. 30 Waiters’s theory of prejudice hinges on New York Penal Law § 15.25, which provides that “evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged.” Intoxication, however, “is not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge,” People v. Sirico, 17 N.Y.3d 744, 745 (2011) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 15.25), and “the general rule is that an intoxicated person can form the requisite intent to commit a crime,” People v. Alston, 42 A.D.3d 468, 469 (2d Dep’t 2007) (quoting People v. LaGuerre, 29 A.D.3d 820, 822 (2d Dep’t 2006)).24 Under New York law, “it is for the trier of fact to decide if the extent of the intoxication acted to negate the element of intent.” Id. (quoting LaGuerre, 29 A.D.3d at 822). And while a “relatively low threshold” exists to demonstrate entitlement to an intoxication charge, even a charge may not be warranted, despite the defendant’s substantial use of intoxicants at the time of an alleged crime, where “the uncontradicted record evidence . . . supports the conclusion that his overall behavior on the day of the incident was purposeful.” Sirico, 17 N.Y.3d at 746; see also People v. Beaty, 22 N.Y.3d 918, 921 (2013) (noting no intoxication charge was warranted, even 24 The question is thus not, as the dissent suggests, whether Waiters was extremely intoxicated, whether his intoxication affected his aim, or even whether he had a diminished ability to form the requisite intent. Rather, it is whether, with the benefit of the disputed evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found that Waiters’s intoxication rendered his actions unintended. 31 though the defendant might have consumed alcohol before committing the crimes alleged, where “the evidence established that [the] defendant’s conduct was purposeful”). All the charges of which Waiters was found guilty required specific intent. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.25(1) (requiring “intent to cause the death of another person”), 110.00 (requiring “intent to commit a crime”), 120.10(1) (requiring “intent to cause serious physical injury to another person”).25 Waiters thus contends that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney’s allegedly deficient performance—as is relevant here, Simons’s failure to call a medical expert—the jury would not have found that Waiters harbored the requisite intent to commit his crimes. He further contends, as he must, that the state court’s conclusion to the contrary was sufficiently unreasonable such that “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.” See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. For the following reasons, Waiters is incorrect. 25 The charge of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, which the jury did not reach, did not require specific intent. See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(1); People v. Parrilla, 27 N.Y.3d 400, 405 (2016) (indicating that a defendant “need only knowingly possess a firearm” to violate the statute). 32