Opinion ID: 2997126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Welsh’s Search of Moore’s Jacket

Text: Moore next argues that Welsh exceeded the scope of his consent to a “pat-down” search when Welsh reached inside Moore’s inner jacket pocket and retrieved the crack that led to Moore’s indictment and conviction for possession of crack with intent to deliver. Moore argues that he consented only to a “pat-down” search rather than a full search of his clothing. The magistrate judge disbelieved Moore’s version of the events, and instead credited Welsh’s testimony that Moore had consented to a thorough search, not limited to a protective search for officer safety. The district court adopted the magistrate’s findings in holding that the full search was consensual, and thus the Fourth Amendment did not require suppression of the drugs (or any subsequent statements Moore made). If Moore indeed consented to the search, Welsh needed no warrant or probable cause to conduct it.3 Schneckcloth v. 2 (...continued) We therefore make no finding as to this issue and note only that, on the facts presented, Moore’s argument that his consent was coerced appears to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holdings in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991) and United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002). 3 We note that after the officers discovered that Moore had supplied them with false information, the officers, at a minimum, had (continued...) 8 No. 02-2802 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating that “one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause is a search conducted pursuant to consent”). Here, the issue boils down (as it often does) to a credibility contest between Moore and Detective Welsh. The magistrate and the district court chose to believe Welsh, and Moore faces a demanding standard of review in trying to convince us that both the magistrate and the district court were wrong. United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (a court’s credibility determinations should be upheld unless it credits “exceedingly improbable testimony”); see also United States v. Gillaum, 355 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying same standard of review to credibility determinations of