Opinion ID: 778660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Challenges to the Aggravating Factors

Text: 62 Appellants next challenge several of the aggravating factors submitted to the jury: (1) that the defendant[s] committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse of the victim, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6); (2) that Bernard is likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future which would be a continuing and serious threat to the lives and safety of others, a non-statutory aggravating factor; and (3) that the defendant[s] committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8). We address each of the aggravating factors in turn, noting at the outset that the jury found additional aggravating factors as to each defendant, and that these factors were all found unanimously. 63
64 Bernard first argues, solely to preserve the issue for further review, that the statutory especially heinous, cruel or depraved aggravating factor was too broadly defined in the jury instructions. He concedes that the instructions submitted to the jury on this aggravating factor are virtually identical to the comprehensive instructions approved by this court in other cases. See Hall, 152 F.3d at 414. Bernard's overbreadth argument is without merit. 65 Bernard also contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding regarding the especially heinous, cruel or depraved aggravating factor. As with any criminal verdict, we review jury findings of aggravating factors by asking whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 896 (4th Cir.1996) (applying Jackson rational trier of fact standard to challenges to jury findings regarding aggravating circumstances); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1107 (10th Cir. 1996) (same). 66 Bernard contends that his participation in the crime was not as a matter of law especially heinous, cruel or depraved because he was neither present nor responsible for most of the acts and events which the Government and its witnesses urged as a basis for an affirmative finding of this factor. Bernard's Brief at 50 ( emphasis added ). It is true that Bernard was not present or responsible for every act of cruelty in this criminal episode. However, the record provides ample basis for a rational juror to conclude that Bernard engaged in actions that were especially heinous, cruel or depraved as defined by the district court. Knowing what was to be done with them, Bernard bought two cans of lighter fluid from a convenience store, and he voluntarily accompanied the gang as they drove the Bagleys to the murder scene. Bernard poured lighter fluid all over the Bagleys' car while they were alive, locked in the trunk. He set the car ablaze with Stacie Bagley unconscious, but still alive, in the trunk. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of this aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 67
68 Bernard also argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that he is likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would be a threat to the lives and safety of others. Relying in part on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), Bernard contends that the fact of mandatory long-term incarceration alone weighs heavily against a finding of dangerousness in the absence of some evidence that the defendant will continue to be violent even in prison. Further, given the limited nature and extent of his personal role in the murder of the Bagleys and his lack of any substantial prior criminal history, Bernard disputes that a rational jury could find him a future danger to society. Under the above-quoted limited test for sufficiency of evidence on appeal, we find no merit in these arguments. 69 Simmons does not hold that future dangerousness is irrelevant to a jury's sentencing decision when the defendant will be imprisoned indefinitely, but instead requires that this aggravating factor be explained to the jury in the context of the defendant's ineligibility for parole. 512 U.S. at 169, 114 S.Ct. 2187. Simmons was applied correctly here, since the jury was informed that Bernard would be ineligible for parole. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected a similar Simmons argument in United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 788 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc) ([Appellant] argues that the government asserted only that he would be a danger to society but not that he would be a danger in prison. Because the jury was informed of his ineligibility for parole, we find no basis for drawing such a distinction.). In any event, the government offered proof not only of Bernard's past record but also of his potential for violence in prison. At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Richard Coons, a forensic psychiatrist, testified concerning Bernard's propensity for violence in prison. 11 Based on Dr. Coons's testimony, the horrific facts of Bernard's participation in the crimes, and ample evidence of Bernard's gang membership and criminal activities, including his participation in at least two dozen burglaries, a rational juror could find that Bernard posed a serious threat of future harm to others. 70
71
72 A far more difficult question is presented by both appellants' challenge to this aggravating factor. Appellants contend that the statutory pecuniary gain aggravating factor, see 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8), does not apply to this case and that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's findings on this factor. 12 73 The district court followed the language of § 3592(c)(8) when it instructed the jury to determine whether each defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. The court further instructed the jury that [t]he phrase `pecuniary value' means anything of value belonging to Todd A. Bagley or Stacie L. Bagley in the form of money, property or anything having economic value. The jury unanimously found the existence of this factor as to Bernard and Vialva. 74 Citing United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1263 (10th Cir.2000), Appellants argue that Congress intended to reserve application of the pecuniary gain factor to scenarios where the expectation of pecuniary gain is from the actual killing [i.e., a murder-for-hire scenario] and not just the underlying felony [i.e., a robbery]. Appellants argue that Congress did not intend for the pecuniary gain factor to apply in every case in which the defendant acquires something of pecuniary value as a result of his involvement in a homicide. Instead, application of the pecuniary gain factor is limited to situations where the murder itself was committed as consideration for, or in the expectation of, anything of pecuniary value. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1263, 1264 (finding jury instruction erroneous where it failed to specify the `offense' to which it referred was the homicide, not the underlying robbery, and thereby failed to impose a necessary limitation.). 75 We agree with Appellants, and the Tenth Circuit, that the application of the pecuniary gain aggravating factor is limited to situations where pecuniary gain is expected to follow as a direct result of the [murder]. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1263 (citation omitted). Thus, this aggravating factor is only applicable where the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder itself was committed as consideration for, or in the expectation of pecuniary gain. See Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir.1996) (discussing analogous pecuniary gain factor under Arizona death penalty statute, and explaining that [t]he State needs to prove at sentencing that the killing was done with the expectation of pecuniary gain. Even if it is true that under many circumstances a person who kills in the course of a robbery is motivated to do so for pecuniary reasons, that is not necessarily so.). 76 In light of this limitation, the evidence is legally insufficient to support application of the pecuniary gain factor in this case. Appellants were not hired to commit the offense of murder, and they did not commit the offense as consideration for pecuniary gain. Nor did Appellants commit the offense of murder in expectation of pecuniary gain. The government argues that the murders in this case were a necessary step in finishing the car-jacking plan, and were therefore committed in expectation of pecuniary gain. The motivation for the murders, however, was unrelated to pecuniary gain. Instead, Appellants sought to prevent the Bagleys from reporting their crimes to the police. Since no pecuniary gain was expected to flow directly from the homicide, this aggravating factor should not have been considered by the jury in weighing whether to impose the death penalty. The evidence is insufficient to support application of the pecuniary gain factor on the basis of the facts presented by this case. 77
78 We must next consider the effect of the invalid pecuniary gain aggravating factor on Appellants' death sentences. The FDPA provides that courts of appeals cannot vacate death sentences on the basis of errors that are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2). Harmless-error review of a death sentence may be performed in at least two different ways. An appellate court may choose to consider whether absent an invalid factor, the jury would have reached the same verdict, or it may choose instead to consider whether the result would have been the same had the invalid factor been precisely defined. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. at 402, 119 S.Ct. at 2109 (citations omitted). 13 Applying the first of these methods, we conclude that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 79 Elimination of the invalid pecuniary gain factor from consideration leaves two statutory aggravating factors as to Bernard and three statutory aggravating factors as to Vialva. The jury unanimously found the existence of the especially heinous, cruel or depraved and substantial planning and premeditation aggravating factors in their consideration of Bernard's sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6) and (9). In addition to these, the jury unanimously found the existence of the single criminal episode aggravating factor in regard to Vialva's sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(13). The jury also unanimously found three non-statutory aggravating factors for both appellants: that they were likely to commit future acts of violence; that they caused injury, harm and loss to the families of the victims; and that they murdered the Bagleys for the purpose of preventing the victims from providing information to the police regarding the crime. In the government's closing argument to the jury in the sentencing phase, the pecuniary gain aggravating factor received less attention than any of the other aggravating factors. During the sentencing phase testimony, the government focused on the especially heinous, cruel or depraved nature of Appellants' crime and the harm done to the victims' families. Again, the pecuniary gain factor was not emphasized. The jury's findings of at least five other aggravating factors regarding each appellant, and hardly any mitigating factors, 15 compel the conclusion that the erroneous submission of the pecuniary gain factor was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We are confident that the jury would have imposed the same sentences even if the pecuniary gain factor had not been submitted for their consideration.