Opinion ID: 3150894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: In both the State’s brief and at oral argument, the State places great emphasis on the classification of the violation of § 28-813.01 as a “general intent” or “specific intent” crime. The State argues that violation of § 28-813.01 is a “general intent” crime and that the Court of Appeals inaccurately classified it as a “specific intent” crime.7 The State is concerned that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 28-813.01 requires the State to prove, in a child pornography case, that the defendant intentionally “sought out” child pornography and “exclude[s] from the statute’s reach any person who comes into possession of child pornography unintentionally but nevertheless decides to keep it.”8 6 State v. Lasu, 278 Neb. 180, 768 N.W.2d 447 (2009). 7 Memorandum brief for appellee in support of petition for further review at 6-9. 8 Id. at 9. -5- Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. MUCIA Cite as 292 Neb. 1 We do not believe the classification of the violation of § 28-813.01 as a “general intent” or “specific intent” crime is helpful in determining what the statute requires. These terms have been the source of considerable confusion, perhaps because of the inconsistent definitions given to these terms over time.9 Indeed, the Court of Appeals and the State appear to define these terms differently. The Court of Appeals used the terms “specific intent” and “general intent” to distinguish between an intent to possess child pornography and an “intent to possess files that, unbeknownst to the defendant, turn out to be child pornography.”10 The State, on the other hand, appears to use the term “general intent” the way the Court of Appeals used “specific intent,” and uses “specific intent” to mean that a defendant must have intentionally sought out files depicting child pornography in order to have violated § 28-813.01. We return to the language of § 28-813.01(1), which provides: “It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct . . . which has a child . . . as one of its participants or portrayed observers.” The issue faced by the Court of Appeals, and the issue we face today, is the meaning of the phrase “knowingly possess.” [2] In reading a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.11 Section 28-813.01 makes no reference to the intentional seeking of child pornography, and the State mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals’ opinion as “interpreting § 28-813.01 to require proof that the defendant intentionally sought out files 9 See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e) (2d ed. 2003) (citing courts’ various definitions of “general intent” and “specific intent”). 10 State v. Mucia, supra note 1, 22 Neb. App. at 830, 862 N.W.2d at 96. 11 State v. Huff, 282 Neb. 78, 802 N.W.2d 77 (2011); State v. Lasu, supra note 6. -6- Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. MUCIA Cite as 292 Neb. 1 depicting child pornography.”12 Although the Court of Appeals did note that “the State was unable to adduce direct evidence that Mucia intentionally sought out child pornography files,” the Court of Appeals never indicated such evidence was required.13 Instead, the Court of Appeals held that “§ 28-813.01 requires sufficient proof that [Mucia] had the specific intent to possess child pornography.”14 The Court of Appeals stated that despite the lack of direct evidence that Mucia intentionally sought out child pornography, “the evidence [actually adduced] circumstantially supports a conclusion that Mucia knowingly possessed child pornography.”15 In reaching the conclusion that a conviction under § 28-813.01 requires proof of the “specific intention to possess child pornography,” the Court of Appeals stated it was unable to locate any Nebraska cases on the question but found State v. Schuller16 instructive. In Schuller, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant had knowingly possessed child pornography. The defendant admitted to purposefully searching the Internet for child pornography, downloading child pornography, and watching child pornography before deleting it. Despite the defendant’s efforts to delete the files, remnants of the files remained on his hard drive at the time it was confiscated. We applied the common-law principle of constructive possession, which “may be proved by mere ownership, dominion, or control over contraband itself, coupled with the intent to exercise control over the same,”17 and explained that the 12 Memorandum brief for appellee in support of petition for further review at 9 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis supplied). 13 State v. Mucia, supra note 1, 22 Neb. App. at 832, 862 N.W.2d at 98. 14 Id. at 830, 862 N.W.2d at 96 (emphasis supplied). 15 Id. at 832, 862 N.W.2d at 98 (emphasis supplied). 16 State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014). 17 Id. at 511, 843 N.W.2d at 635. -7- Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. MUCIA Cite as 292 Neb. 1 remnants of the files on the defendant’s hard drive, coupled with the fact that he “repeatedly searched for, downloaded, viewed, and deleted child pornography,”18 constituted knowing possession, not merely viewing. We acknowledged there was “no question that [the defend­ ant] knowingly possessed those files,”19 because his confession confirmed he acted knowingly. But we emphasized that the defendant “did not simply click on an innocuous banner advertisement and end up at a child pornography Web site”20; he knowingly downloaded them. In response to the defendant’s argument in Schuller, that downloading alone could not be sufficient evidence of possession, we said: [W]e agree that just because child pornography was downloaded onto a computer does not necessarily mean that there was knowing possession. Take, for example, a person who was legally browsing adult pornography online but mistakenly clicked on a link leading him to a child pornography Web site, which he immediately closed. The record shows that, in such a situation, child pornography would be downloaded to the computer’s “cache” folder as temporary Internet files, through no further action by the user. In such a case, the person would not be guilty of knowingly possessing child pornography—he neither downloaded the files knowingly nor constructively possessed them, because there was no intent to control them.21 We then explained that such was not the case in Schuller. We have previously said that the meaning of “knowingly” in a criminal statute commonly imports a perception of facts 18 Id. at 509, 843 N.W.2d at 633. 19 Id. at 512, 843 N.W.2d at 635 (emphasis in original). 20 Id. at 511, 843 N.W.2d at 635. 21 Id. at 514, 843 N.W.2d at 636. -8- Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. MUCIA Cite as 292 Neb. 1 required to make up the crime.22 That evidentiary standard has been routinely used in cases where a defendant has been charged with possessing contraband other than child pornography. For example, we have said that a person knowingly possesses a controlled substance when he or she knows of the nature or character of the substance and of its presence and has dominion or control over it.23 We see no reason for a different standard when the contraband is child pornography. [3] Accordingly, we hold that a person knowingly possesses child pornography in violation of § 28-813.01 when he or she knows of the nature or character of the material and of its presence and has dominion or control over it. The means or methods of exercising dominion or control over an electronic image may well differ from those typically applicable to physical contraband. But we need not address such questions in the case before us. We note that Mucia does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding that Mucia knowingly possessed child pornography. We therefore do not question that finding.