Opinion ID: 2731284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Administrative Documents and Reports Created

Text: by the Investigator Kowack also challenges the redactions made to seventeen pages of administrative documents and reports created by the investigator. These redactions were made pursuant to Exemption 5, which protects “intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), and Exemption 6, the personal privacy exemption. According to the Turner declaration, the documents “were created by the HRM Investigator and included the identity of all employees interviewed, case background, a list of issues/allegations, an index of documents contained in the investigative file, transmittal documents, and investigative summaries, findings and recommendations.” The government redacted, among other information, “names, identifiable portions of individual statements, cellular telephone numbers, and any references to disciplinary letters issued to employees other than Kowack.” Kowack doesn’t argue that the redaction of the telephone number and names was improper, but he does challenge the withholding of the other information.
The government justifies its invocation of the personal privacy exemption only by stating that “[t]he Forest Service KOWACK V. USFS 11 applied the same balancing test as described above [with regard to the witness statements].” There isn’t a sufficient factual basis supporting the application of the personal privacy exemption to the documents created by the Investigator for the same reasons that there isn’t a sufficient factual basis supporting the application of the exemption to the witness statements. See pp. 7–10 supra. Therefore, the personal privacy exemption doesn’t justify the non-disclosure of these documents.
Nor is the Turner declaration sufficient for us to conclude that Exemption 5, the intra-agency communication exemption, applies. Exemption 5 allows the government to withhold documents that fall within a recognized litigation privilege. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001). The Forest Service invokes the deliberative process privilege, which covers “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 307 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Klamath, 532 U.S. at 8). That privilege shields from disclosure documents that are both “predecisional” and part of the agency’s “deliberative process,” and applies only if “disclosure of [the] materials would expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.” Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Assembly of the State of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992)). 12 KOWACK V. USFS Turner states that the documents are predecisional because the “assessments were developed by a subordinate employee to inform and assist the decision-maker” and “the Forest Service had made no final decision with respect to any of the allegations at issue.” Because the documents were “prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision,” the Turner declaration adequately shows that the documents are predecisional. Id. (internal citation omitted). But the Turner declaration doesn’t adequately show how the disclosure of any portion of the redacted documents would “expose ‘the [agency’s] decision-making process itself’ to public scrutiny.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Montrose Chemical Corp. of Calif. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). Turner makes clear that at least some of the redacted information includes “the factual reasons why the investigator concluded that the allegations of workplace violence and employees making threatening remarks to one another were unsubstantiated.” While facts aren’t automatically subject to disclosure, “factual material that does not reveal the deliberative process is not protected.” Id. at 1117 (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Turner doesn’t even say whether the government tried to segregate the factual information, let alone provide enough detail for us to conclude that the factual portions of the documents are “so interwoven with the deliberative material that [they are] not [segregable].” United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000). A stand-alone fact section, for example, could likely be disclosed without revealing the agency’s deliberative process, while isolated facts embedded within a subordinate’s explanation of why the allegations KOWACK V. USFS 13 were meritless may not be. Without more information, we can’t make the “independent assessment” that FOIA demands. Lion Raisins, Inc., 354 F.3d at 1079.