Opinion ID: 2791970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Educator Immunity under Georgia Law

Text: Elmore asserts that the district court erroneously concluded that Elmore’s potential immunity as an educator under Georgia law did not affect the probablecause analysis. Under the circumstances, we find that the district court did not err. Elmore claims immunity under O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001, which provides as follows: “An educator shall be immune from criminal liability for any act or omission concerning, relating to, or resulting from the discipline of any student or the reporting of any student for misconduct, provided that the educator acted in good faith.” O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001(b). Elmore’s former position as a “paraprofessional” is included in the term “educator.” O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001(a). Under Georgia law, the defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to educator immunity under Georgia law by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Pickens, ___ S.E.2d ___, No. A14A1593, 2015 WL 872224, at  (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2015); State v. Cohen, 711 S.E.2d 418, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). In making an assessment of probable cause, officers generally have no duty to resolve legal questions or to investigate possible defenses. See Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1356-57; cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2695 (1979) (“[W]e do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent.”); 14 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 15 of 25 Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[P]olice officers have no responsibility to determine the viability of a statute of limitations defense when executing a valid arrest warrant.”). For example, in Morris v. Town of Lexington, Alabama, 748 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2014), this Court recently concluded that the possible application of an affirmative defense to an assault charge did not affect whether the officers had probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, to believe that the plaintiff had committed an assault. Id. at 1325. Similarly, in Jordan, we held that a police officer did not need to consider the application of an “apparent-authority defense” before seeking the defendant’s arrest. Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1356-57. For that reason, we declined to address whether the defense “would have provided Plaintiff with a complete defense to the pertinent crime under Georgia law.” Id. Elmore cites our unpublished decision in Williams v. Sirmons, 307 F. App’x 354 (11th Cir. 2009), where we held that “in determining whether probable cause to arrest exists, an officer must consider all facts and circumstances within that officer’s knowledge, including facts and circumstances conclusively establishing an affirmative defense.” Id. at 358-59; see also Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]robable cause determinations include facts and circumstances establishing a statutorily legitimated affirmative justification for the suspected criminal act.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). According to 15 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 16 of 25 Sirmons, “if an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances which establish an affirmative defense, he or she lacks probable cause to arrest, even when the facts and circumstances establish that the person meets all elements of the offense.” Sirmons, 307 F. App’x at 359. Applying that standard in Sirmons, we concluded that the officers did not have even arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for fleeing from a traffic stop because, even though the plaintiff met all the elements of the offense, the officers knew of facts—like the facts that the plaintiff was pregnant, bleeding, in distress, and on her way to the hospital for emergency treatment—showing that the plaintiff’s flight was justified by the affirmative defense of necessity or duress. Id. at 359-60. Therefore, we held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 360. Here, however, even if we assumed that officers generally are required to consider statutory-immunity defenses in their probable-cause assessments, the application of Georgia’s educator-immunity statute was not sufficiently established in this case. The statute provides that an educator’s disciplinary actions towards students are immune from criminal liability, provided that the educator acts in “good faith.” O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001(b). “‘Good faith’ is a subjective standard: a state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose; belief that one’s conduct is not unconscionable or that known circumstances do not require further 16 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 17 of 25 investigation.” Pickens, 2015 WL 872224, at  (quotation marks omitted). Further, the existence of good faith is a question for the trier of fact. Id. Although Sauce knew that Elmore was an educator and that his alleged actions were arguably disciplinary in nature, Sauce had some reason to doubt that Elmore was acting in “good faith.” Specifically, the nurse made an allegation that “child abuse” had occurred in the classroom based on the spraying incident, and Sauce apparently interviewed a juvenile student who stated that Elmore had sprayed the student. Moreover, since Elmore altogether denied having sprayed the student, no one asserted that Elmore had sprayed the student in good faith. Based on these facts, we cannot say that facts known to Sauce conclusively established that Elmore was immune from criminal liability. In this respect, Elmore’s reliance on Cohen is misplaced. The Georgia Court of Appeals in Cohen upheld the trial court’s grant of immunity from prosecution for simple battery, under O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001, based on the trial court’s finding that the defendant acted in good faith. Cohen, 711 S.E.2d at 419-20. But the fact that Elmore engaged in similar conduct as the defendant in Cohen does not establish that Elmore subjectively acted in good faith, which is a question for the trier of fact. See Pickens, 2015 WL 872224, at . In any case, given the absence of binding precedent holding that statutoryimmunity defenses must be considered in a probable-cause determination, 17 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 18 of 25 particularly a defense that turns on the subjective intent of the party claiming immunity, we cannot say that the law was so clearly established as to have provided fair warning to Sauce that her failure to consider, or to inform the magistrate of, Elmore’s potential immunity in assessing whether probable cause existed was unconstitutional. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, 122 S. Ct. at 2515; cf. Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355 (“Of course, no police officer can truly know another person’s subjective intent.”). Indeed, even Elmore concedes that Sauce may be entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claim that Sauce should have informed the magistrate of Elmore’s potential immunity under O.C.G.A. § 20–2– 1001. C. Whether Probable Cause to Arrest Bars Elmore’s Claims In resolving Elmore’s claims, the district court concluded that the existence of probable cause to arrest Elmore for simple battery rendered his arrest constitutionally valid, despite the lack of probable cause for cruelty to children. The court relied on the well-established rule that the existence of probable cause does not turn on the arresting officer’s state of mind. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593-94 (2004). So long as the circumstances known to the officers, viewed objectively, give probable cause to arrest for any crime, the arrest is constitutionally valid even if probable cause was lacking as to some 18 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 19 of 25 offenses, or even all announced charges. Id. at 153-55, 125 S. Ct. at 593-94; Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2002). Elmore counters that the rule of Devenpeck applies only to warrantless arrests. Where, as here, an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, Elmore asserts, probable cause must be assessed independently with respect to each warrant. Thus, Elmore argues, he may maintain a claim based on the lack of probable cause to arrest for cruelty to children in the third degree even if probable cause to arrest for another offense existed. In general terms, a warrantless arrest without probable cause provides the basis for a § 1983 claim for false arrest. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004); see Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3- 4 (1st Cir. 1995) (analogizing a §1983 false arrest claim to the common law tort of false arrest). Thus, it follows that probable cause to arrest, viewed objectively, bars a false-arrest claim. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226; Lee, 284 F.3d at 119596; see also Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1990 (“The existence of probable cause . . . is an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.”). By contrast, seizures following the “institution of a prosecution,” such as an arrest pursuant to a warrant, generally serve as the basis for a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585-86 (11th Cir. 1996); 19 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 20 of 25 see also Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 4 (“As a general rule, an unlawful arrest pursuant to a warrant will be more closely analogous to the common law tort of malicious prosecution.”). This Circuit recognizes a § 1983 cause of action for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). We have held that “[t]o establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove two things: (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”6 Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). Generally, in contrast to false-arrest claims, “probable cause as to one charge will not bar a malicious prosecution claim based on a second, distinct charge as to which probable cause was lacking.” Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007) (concerning malicious prosecution under Illinois state law); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 2007); cf. Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 1998) (conviction on some charges in indictment does not preclude malicious prosecution claim based on dismissal of other charges). In Holmes, the Seventh Circuit explained the distinction in this way: when an individual is arrested, the seizure is the same whether the arrest was based on one 6 The common-law elements of malicious prosecution include the following: “(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Wood, 323 F.3d at 882. 20 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 21 of 25 or multiple grounds; but once an individual is prosecuted, each additional charge imposes additional costs and burdens. Holmes, 511 F.3d at 682-83. The district court construed Elmore’s allegations as akin to a claim for false arrest because he complained of an arrest without probable cause and identified his claim as one for “illegal arrest.” 7 Although two warrants issued, the amended complaint alleges that only one arrest occurred (“The arrest of Plaintiff was without probable cause or arguable probable cause and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, to the extent that Elmore challenged only the constitutionality of his arrest, the district court would not have erred in concluding that Elmore’s arrest was constitutionally valid because it was supported by probable cause. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153-55, 125 S. Ct. at 593-94; Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195-96; see also Marx, 905 F.2d at 1505-06; Holmes, 511 F.3d at 682 (“An arrested individual is no more seized when he is arrested on three grounds rather than one[.]”). On appeal, Elmore contends that his case is controlled by this Court’s decision in Uboh, which concerned a claim for malicious prosecution. And Elmore may be correct that he could have maintained a § 1983 maliciousprosecution claim based on the lack of probable cause to arrest for cruelty to 7 At no point in the district-court proceedings did Elmore suggest that his Fourth Amendment claim should have been construed as one for malicious prosecution. 21 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 22 of 25 children in the third degree. See Holmes, 511 F. 3d at 682-83; Johnson, 477 F.3d at 83. Accordingly, the district court arguably may have erred in failing to consider the substance of Elmore’s claim as one alleging malicious prosecution. But see Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 3 (“Even though malicious prosecution and false arrest may seem distinct enough in abstract definition, however, in a wrongful arrest case—particularly an arrest conducted pursuant to a warrant based on false allegations—the lines between the two may become blurred.”). Nonetheless, even assuming—as Elmore contends—that this Court’s decision in Uboh controls this case, the amended complaint fails to allege facts necessary to state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. As the Court in Uboh explained, “[I]n order to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the criminal proceeding that gives rise to the action has terminated in favor of the accused.” Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1004; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 (1994) (“One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.”). Here, Elmore did not allege in his amended complaint any facts establishing the common-law element of “favorable termination,” such as the charges being dropped or dismissed. Indeed, the amended complaint contains no allegations regarding a prosecution following his arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant. Cf. 22 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 23 of 25 Whiting, 85 F.3d at 583-84 (“Whiting, however is not claiming just that he was seized unlawfully or that a warrant was issued without probable cause: he says he was “maliciously prosecuted” in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”). Even if Elmore had been unconstitutionally seized pursuant to an invalid warrant, Elmore did not allege a necessary element of a common-law malicious prosecution claim. 8 See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256. Therefore, the amended complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution. Consequently, the district court did not err in dismissing Elmore’s § 1983 claim against Sauce, whether it is construed as a false-arrest claim or a malicious-prosecution claim, under Rule 12(b)(6).