Opinion ID: 1637538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Deed Created a Defeasible Fee or an Easement.

Text: The factual foundation for the first certified question is a deed, recorded more than twenty years prior to July 4, 1965, which contained the following language: Rt. of Way Deed [The grantors] grant and convey unto said Railroad Company, the following piece or tract of land in Cass County, in the State of Iowa, and particularly described as follows to wit: [section coordinates] One hundred feet in width, having fifty feet on each side of the center line of line of the Road of said Company, as located by the engineer of said Railroad Company for the construction of said Railroad in said Cass County; To Have and Hold the same unto said Railroad Company forever; Provided that in case said Railroad Company does not construct their road through said tract, or shall, after construction, permanently abandon the route through said tract of land the same shall revert to, and become the property of the grantors, their heirs or assigns. And the said [grantor] hereby relinquishes her right of dower in the tract herein conveyed. The federal class-action plaintiffs urge that the deed only granted an easement to the railroad company. They base that conclusion on cases such as Atkin v. Westfall, 246 Iowa 822, 826, 69 N.W.2d 523, 525 (1955), and Keokuk County v. Reinier, 227 Iowa 499, 503, 288 N.W. 676, 678 (1939), in which this court concluded that a deed which specifies that the conveyance is for uses connected with construction and operation of a railroad conveys an easement rather than a fee. We are inclined to reexamine the logic underlying those conclusions. Determining the nature of the interest conveyed by reference to the intended use by the grantee seems frivolous in matters involving narrow tracts of land acquired by railroad companies. There is but one single reason for all such conveyances irrespective of whether the deed conveys a fee or an easement. As we stated in Turner v. Unknown Claimants of Land, 207 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Iowa 1973), [o]rdinarily the parties know the tract will be used for a railway; for what other purpose would a railroad purchase a strip of land across a farm. We are satisfied that the reference in the deed to the use of the property for railroad purposes does not diminish the conveyance of all right, title, and interest of the grantor. See Iowa Code § 557.3 (conveyance passes all of the grantor's interests unless a contrary intent may be inferred from language used). Nor does the fact that the deed bore a caption or title indicating Rt. of Way Deed serve to limit the interest conveyed in the body of the deed. See Robert's River Rides, Inc. v. Steamboat Dev. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Iowa 1994) (instrument denominated as lease in title construed to be mere license). The federal class-action plaintiffs also rely on a line of cases that hold that a conveyance for right of way is presumed to grant only an easement. These cases include Brugman v. Bloomer, 234 Iowa 813, 816, 13 N.W.2d 313, 314 (1944); Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. Sioux City Stockyards Co., 176 Iowa 659, 668, 158 N.W. 769, 772 (1916); and Brown v. Young, 69 Iowa 625, 626, 29 N.W. 941, 941 (1886). To prevail under that line of cases, however, there must be some reference to right-of-way in the language defining the interest being conveyed. In McKinley v. Waterloo Railroad, 368 N.W.2d 131 (1985), we concluded that, because the deed in that case made no reference to right-of-way in either the granting clause or the habendum clause, it conveyed a fee interest subject to an executory limitation. McKinley, 368 N.W.2d at 138. We described a similar situation as follows in Des Moines City Railway v. City of Des Moines, 183 Iowa 1261, 159 N.W. 450 (1916): The conveyances under which [the railway company] occupies and exercises dominion over the 20-foot strip do not limit their legal effect to a right of way only. No mention of a right of way, either in terms or by words of necessarily equivalent meaning, is to be found in any of the deeds. In each, the owners of the tract convey, sell and quitclaim to the grantee all their right, title, and interest in the land, and not merely in the right of way.... This is none the less true because each deed embodied a statement that the land is to be used for the construction and operation of a street railway, and provides that if, in the future, it shall be abandoned for that purpose, it shall revert to the grantor.... [I]t remains true that an estate so conveyed is, nevertheless, a fee; and the grantee thereof is the owner, so long as the estate continues, and until the reverter takes place. Des Moines City Ry., 183 Iowa at 1266-67, 159 N.W. at 452-53. Our examination of the granting clause in the deed involved in the present case discloses that it grants a specified tract of land without limitation or qualification. The language in the granting clause, which states as located by the engineer of said Railroad Company for the construction of said Railroad, does not limit the property conveyed but merely incorporates by reference the engineer's construction notes as a means of describing the property conveyed. Nor does the habendum clause state any limitation on the interest conveyed. It provides that the railroad company shall Have and Hold the same ... forever. We are convinced that the deed conveyed a defeasible fee to the railroad company.