Opinion ID: 2260480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Directing Defense Counsel to Provide the Prosecution with a Report of a Defense Psychiatrist?

Text: The Appellant argues that the psychiatric report of his own expert, Dr. Gary M. Glass, dated February 17, 1982, should not have been subject to discovery by the Commonwealth under Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(C)(2)(a): (2) Discretionary With the Court: In all court cases, if the Commonwealth files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the defendant subject to the defendant's rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to allow the attorney for the Commonwealth to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the Commonwealth's case and that the request is reasonable: (a) results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief, or which were prepared by a witness who the defendant intends to call at the trial, when the results or reports relate to the testimony of that witness, provided the defendant had requested and received discovery under paragraph B(1)(e); The record of testimony indicates that on direct examination, Dr. Glass was limited to statements regarding the Appellant's general mental state at the time of the crime and whether the Appellant was mentally capable of forming a specific intent to kill. Defense counsel did not question the witness on the particular subject of insanity under M'Naghten. On cross-examination, however, the prosecution elicited testimony on both issues of the mental state required to form specific intent and insanity. Dr. Glass testified that he believed that while the Appellant was sane at the moment of the killing, specific intent was not present. Following cross-examination, the prosecution moved successfully over objection to obtain a copy of the expert's report. The Appellant now insists that although the substance of the medical report itself does address specific intent as well as M'Naghten, the insanity issue was not brought out on direct testimony. The report, therefore, could not relate to the expert's testimony and be subject to discovery as required by the statute. Once in possession of the report, the Appellant further argues, the Commonwealth could prejudice him by revealing to the jury that his own expert had bolstered the damaging oral testimony on insanity with an existing written statement which repudiated that very defense. In rejecting the Appellant's contentions, we take special note of the fact that the psychiatric report was not introduced at trial. We conclude, in addition, that the expert's direct testimony of the Appellant's mental state regarding specific intent addressed the contents of the medical report. The insanity defense had been put on the record earlier by the Appellant. Under any sensible analysis, the psychiatrist's statement ran in an indistinguishable manner to the issue of whether the Appellant was insane under M'Naghten. That is to say that the testimony regarding mental illness directly touched and concerned the insanity problem. It makes very little sense to draw non-existent distinctions from this evidence. By employing the phrase may order, we conclude further that the statute empowers courts to use discretion in ordering discovery of such documents. In this context, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. [8] The Appellant also claims ineffective assistance of counsel in a closely-related allegation. The defense had called Dr. Swartzman as a surrebuttal witness regarding diagnosis and treatment of the Appellant's mental illness. Again, the specific issue of insanity was not mentioned. The prosecution, nevertheless, was permitted to ask questions without objection on the subject of M'Naghten, and the Appellant instantly claims error by his silent defense counsel. Although we are reviewing a citation of ineffective assistance, the claim fails for the same reason as cited above. Dr. Swartzman's testimony was bound up inseparably with the insanity defense. IV. Insufficiency of Evidence The Appellant also claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the murder, failed to prove in the same manner that he had the requisite specific intent to kill, and, additionally, that the jury's sentence itself was based on his threats to the jury rather than on the evidence. Plainly all these allegations of error are unfounded for the following reasons: a. The Insanity Issue. Our cases are uniform in holding that in a trial for murder, the Commonwealth must establish that the accused is of sound memory and discretion, knows right from wrong and appreciates the nature and quality of his act, i.e., sane under Pennsylvania M'Naghten standards. Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 499 Pa. 106, 451 A.2d 1344 (1982). Moreover, our review is limited in the sense that Psychiatric testimony, like any other evidence, is for the trier of fact to consider and to determine what weight it should be given. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 496 Pa. 428, 435, 437 A.2d 948, 951 (1981); Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 302, 280 A.2d 362, 364-65 (1977); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972). With the exception of the Appellant's own statement on the witness stand, all other testimony, including that of the defense's psychiatrist, concluded that the Appellant understood the nature of his act and knew that it was wrong. His own words uttered as he was being led from the bus affirm his sanity: I did it; I'm glad I did it; I will get ten years for it but I hope he dies. He likewise testified on his own behalf that while he knew that he had killed a man, he was driven to it by voices: Q. Did you think Mr. Tilson was a log? A. No. I didn't think he was a log. Q. After you struck him the first time, did you see any blood? A. Uh-huh. Yeah. Q. Why didn't you stop then? A. Because the voices was still telling me to keep hitting him. Q. Do you know you hit him about 15 times? A. I don't think I hit him that much, though. I don't remember how many times exactly I hit him. I know I did it until the voices let up.       Question: Do you understand that you killed a man tonight? Answer: Yeah. I understand and I'm glad. Now, did you tell the police that? A. I probably did, yeah. Q. Were the voices telling you to tell them that then? A. Yeah, it was. Q. Question: Were you trying to kill the guy when you hit him with the axe? Do you remember that question? A. Yeah, I remember.       Q. Do you remember the police giving you an opportunity to say what you had to say on the tape? A. Yeah. I was doing a lot of singing and whatnot on that tape. Q. You were? A. Uh-huh. Q. You didn't say on that tape anything about voices, did you? A. No. I don't think so. There was indeed adequate evidence from which to conclude that the Commonwealth had borne successfully its burden of proving the Appellant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. [9] b. The Specific Intent Issue The Appellant urges us to conclude that his mental illness made it impossible for him to form specific intent, and, in the alternative, that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Weinstein, supra, 499 Pa. at 115, 451 A.2d at 1348. We need not pause again for any lengthy review of our standing recognition that evidence of mental illness can be introduced in first degree murder cases in an effort to negate the specific intent to kill. Most recently, our law on this subject has been summarized in Commonwealth v. Terry, 513 Pa. 381, 521 A.2d 398 (1987). We agree, as well, that such evidence was admitted properly in that it dealt with the topic of cognitive functions necessary to formulate specific intent under the Weinstein test, supra, 499 Pa. at 114, 451 A.2d at 1347. The point at issue here, however, is whether the Commonwealth established the existence of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt. On the record before us, we have determined that the Appellant's complaint is without merit. We concur with Dr. Richard Swartzman, the hospital psychiatrist, who testified that a man certainly may be diagnosed as psychotic and remain a psychotic. That does not mean that he cannot form the intent to do something. We repeat that it does not follow from the mere existence of a personality disorder, therefore, that there has been an impairment of the cognitive functions necessary to form specific intent. Terry, supra, 513 Pa. at 396-397, 521 A.2d at 405-406. We ground our definition of specific intent in the last analysis on the assumptions of law  rationality, free will, and choice. As a legal concept of specific intent for this crime, we mean that the killer plans and carries out the act to advance his own desire and that he knows the act will result in the death of another. Weinstein, supra, 499 Pa. at 117, 451 A.2d at 1349. Expert testimony as to the existence of specific intent in this case comes down to the fact that with the lone exception of the Appellant's own psychiatrist, Dr. Gary M. Glass, all other medical testimony concluded that the intent to kill definitely was present. Additionally, we have the objective fact that the killer struck his victim approximately fifteen (15) times while brandishing his hatchet. As noted above, at the scene he exclaimed also that I did it and then proceeded to confess to the authorities that he had intended to kill the victim because he thought the victim was provoking him. Taken as a whole, such testimony is unambiguous and conclusive as to the existence of specific intent. The Commonwealth met its burden of proof. In viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the jury was justified in disbelieving his defense. Commonwealth v. Christy, 511 Pa. 490, 515 A.2d 832 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 107 S.Ct. 2202, 95 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987). c. The Extra-Evidentiary Basis of the Verdict The Appellant insists that the jury's sentence was predicated on a fear that he would carry out his death threats against them rather than on the factual evidence. This allegation stems from the following statement made to the jury upon the customary invitation by the court as the jury prepared to deliberate his sentence: [10] THE COURT: Mr. Tatum, I just want to state for the record that your client is  You can explain to your client that if he wishes to make a statement  MR. TATUM: He does. THE COURT:  He can do so. MR. TATUM: He does. THE COURT: All right. (Pause) THE DEFENDANT: I'll give you one chance to kill me. You better take it now because if I ever get out I'll kill everyone of you.... That's my statement. MR. TATUM: I just want to add one other thing. I am continuing to raise the question of this defendant's competency to be involved in this trial from the beginning to now. THE COURT: It's  your objection is noted on the record and objection overruled. I think that completes our proceeding here. The jury is now directed to return again to the jury room to decide on the sentence. THE COURT CRIER: Everybody remain seated while the jury leaves the room. (Whereupon, the jury returned to the deliberation room to deliberate on a sentence at 12:37 p.m.) (N.T., 3/6/82, pp. 18-19.) Initially, we insist that the integrity of the jury system cannot allow a defendant to benefit from his own wrongs. In his opinion, the trial judge properly cited the legal maxim that a person cannot make his condition better by his own tort. To reward such conduct surely would amount to an affront to the judicial system by opening the door to all defendants who, facing a losing trial, would engage in similar conduct in anticipation of receiving relief. We emphasize in this appeal that the Appellant offers no independent proof beyond mere conclusions that the jury was swayed as a matter of fact. We are confronted, instead, with the circular argument that the sentence itself and the speed with which the jury arrived at a sentence (twenty-eight minutes) speak for themselves, i.e., the severe nature of the sentence can mean only that the jury was controlled by the threat and decided to eradicate its source in the interests of personal safety. That argument must fail. There is simply no reason advanced in this appeal to distrust the validity of the jury's finding. The jury was polled individually, and no evidence whatsoever exists to raise even the barest suspicion that the jury was motivated by such fear.