Opinion ID: 867671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the board’s jurisdictional order

Text: The board likewise correctly determined that it had no jurisdiction to consider Levine’s appeal challenging the Army’s decision to remove him from his position as a Training Instructor. As discussed previously, the Army removed Levine, during his probationary period, for failing to disclose the fact that he had previously been terminated from his position as an Intelligence Specialist. Probationary employees have very limited rights to appeal to the board. See Carrow v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 626 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Bante v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 966 F.2d 647, 649-50 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In general, a probationary employee can appeal to the board only if he makes non-frivolous allegations that: (1) he was terminated based on marital status or for partisan political reasons; or (2) he was terminated for pre-appointment reasons and the agency failed to follow the procedures required by section 315.805. See 5 C.F.R. § 315.806; 8 LAWRENCE LEVINE v. MSPB Pierce v. Gov. Printing Office, 70 F.3d 106, 108 (Fed. Cir. 1995). As the board correctly determined, Levine failed to carry his burden of establishing that the board had jurisdiction over his appeal. See Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (explaining that the petitioner bears the burden of establishing board jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence). Before the board, he made no non-frivolous allegations that he was terminated based on his marital status or for partisan political reasons. The record shows, moreover, that the Army followed the procedures mandated by section 315.805 when it removed Levine from his position as a Training Instructor. See Younies v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 662 F.3d 1215, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The right to appeal under § 315.806(c) is only available to those probationary employees who qualify for, but allegedly do not receive, the termination procedures of § 315.805.”). He was provided with advance written notice of the reasons for his proposed termination, and was given fourteen days to prepare a response to this notice. Levine submitted a lengthy response, which totaled 145 pages with enclosures. After receiving this response, the Army provided Levine with written notice of its final decision to terminate him effective August 2, 2011. See Jurisdictional Order, 2012 MSPB LEXIS 3399, at -7. Levine contends that he has a “Liberty Interest that demands redress through Due Process of Law and provides [board] jurisdiction.” We disagree. A government employee who has completed his probationary period is afforded a number of protections, including, under many circumstances, the right to appeal adverse actions to the board. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Probationary employees such as Levine do not, however, have the same procedural rights and can appeal to the board only under very limited circumstances. See 5 C.F.R. § 315.803(a) (“The agency shall utilize the probationary period as fully as LAWRENCE LEVINE v. MSPB 9 possible to determine the fitness of the employee and shall terminate his services during this period if he fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for continued employment.”). We have considered Levine’s remaining arguments but do not find them persuasive. We therefore affirm both the board’s Timeliness Order and its Jurisdictional Order. AFFIRMED