Opinion ID: 784866
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grand Jury Misconduct (Soto-Beníquez, Soto-Ramírez, Fernández-Malavé)4

Text: 52 One event concerning a grand jury witness underlies a number of issues presented by the defense. 53 The government used a then-cooperating conspirator, Rodríguez-López, as a grand jury witness in obtaining the original indictment on April 10, 1997. In July of 1998, the prosecution first learned that it might have been misled by Rodríguez-López. Negrón-Maldonado, who had just started cooperating with federal authorities, informed the prosecution that Rodríguez-López was not, as he had told the prosecution, present at Rivera-González's murder. When confronted with this information, Rodríguez-López admitted that he had lied to FBI investigators about being present at the murder but insisted that he had not fabricated any of his testimony before the grand jury, which did not address the Rivera-González murder. 54 Rather than disclose this information immediately, the prosecution waited and investigated. In November 1998, the government learned from a second cooperating defendant that Rodríguez-López also might have lied about his presence at several other murders, including at least one murder about which he had testified to the grand jury, that of Rivera-Pagán. On November 18, the government notified defense counsel of this inconsistency. It also insisted that Rodríguez-López, who still denied lying to the grand jury, take a polygraph test. When he failed the test on December 1, Rodríguez-López admitted that he had indeed lied during the grand jury proceedings and that he had not been present at Rivera-Pagán's murder. On December 14, the prosecution obtained a superseding indictment from the grand jury that changed Rodríguez-López from a star government witness to a defendant. The superseding indictment, which was returned 15 days before trial started, was based on the testimony of a federal agent who presented the government's evidence that Rodríguez-López had lied to the FBI. Rodríguez-López did not testify at trial. 55 Several defendants object that their convictions were irreparably tainted by Rodríguez-López's perjury before the grand jury. The trial court rejected this claim, holding that the fact that the superseding indictment was obtained and the perjured testimony was not presented at trial cured any problem. That ruling was correct. 56 The unknowing presentation of perjured testimony before the grand jury was harmless and does not warrant any remedial action. [A]s a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988); see also United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 328 (1st Cir.1995). Here, the district court specifically found that [d]efendants can hardly show prejudice when the matter was later explained to the Grand Jury and the perjured testimony has not been used in trial. We review this conclusion only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840, 110 S.Ct. 125, 107 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989). No such abuse was present here. 57 First, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment after learning of the perjured testimony, thereby demonstrating that sufficient evidence existed to indict the defendants even absent the testimony of Rodríguez-López. 58 Of even greater import, a petit jury subsequently found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged in the indictment. Such a finding demonstrates a fortiori that there was probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for which they were convicted. United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986)). As such, [a]ll but the most serious errors before the grand jury are rendered harmless by a conviction at trial. United States v. Reyes-Echevarria, 345 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2003). Only a defect so fundamental that it causes the grand jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indictment is sufficient to invalidate a subsequent conviction. Id. (quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 802, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989)). The government's unknowing presentation of perjured testimony before the grand jury is not a defect of that magnitude on these facts.