Opinion ID: 2588262
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Heading: A Party May File in the Superior Court a Petition for Writ of Mandate Contesting the Validity of a Challenge to a Magistrate.

Text: As explained further below, a party to an action may generally challenge a judge peremptorily under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), enacted in 1984, provides the exclusive means for seeking review of a ruling on a peremptory challenge to a judge. ( People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036.) That subdivision provides: The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc, § 170.3, subd. (d), italics added.) Here, defendant sought review in the superior court, not the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that only it could consider the challenge and, accordingly, the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. We disagree. Judge Pastor, although a judge of the superior court, was acting as a magistrate in this matter. The superior court generally has jurisdiction to review matters involving a magistrate. Accordingly, the superior court is an appropriate court of appeal in a writ proceeding involving the disqualification of a magistrate. Article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution grants superior courts and their judges original jurisdiction in mandamus proceedings concurrently with this court and the Courts of Appeal. A superior court may exercise this jurisdiction by issuing writs of mandamus to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person .... (Code Civ. Proc, § 1085, subd. (a).) A magistrate is generally considered inferior to the superior court. (See People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 666-669, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609.) The Legislature has generally provided for superior court review of the magistrate's rulings. (Pen.Code, §§ 871.5 [superior court may review magistrate's dismissal of action], 995, subd. (a)(2) [superior court may review whether magistrate legally committed defendant].) We see no reason why the Legislature would want to require the parties, in effect, to skip over the superior court in matters involving the disqualification of a magistrate when that court otherwise reviews that magistrate's rulings. In enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), the Legislature sought to ensure that the parties, through a petition for a writ of mandate, receive `as speedy an appellate determination as possible.' ( People v. Hull, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 273, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036.) Litigating questions regarding the qualifications of a magistrate in the superior court furthers this goal; requiring the parties to seek review in the Court of Appeal would hinder it. As defendant notes, requiring a party to litigate the validity of a challenge to a magistrate in the Court of Appeal could result in the parties litigating the validity of the magistrate's order simultaneously in both the superior court and the Court of Appeal. If a party unsuccessfully challenges the magistrate, who then either holds the defendant to answer the charge or dismisses the action, the validity of the challenge would have to be litigated in the Court of Appeal while the correctness of the magistrate's order would be litigated in the superior court. In attempting to ensure speedy appellate determination of judicial challenges, the Legislature can hardly have intended such a result. In the past, courts have at least assumed the superior court was a proper forum to litigate the correctness of a challenge involving an inferior court. In Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 188, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148, for example, the People contested the refusal of a municipal court judge to accept a peremptory challenge by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court. No one questioned the propriety of that procedure, and we eventually reviewed the matter on the merits. Although Solberg was decided before the Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), we see no indication the Legislature intended to modify this procedure. We have no doubt that when the Legislature refers to the court of appeal, often, perhaps generally, it means the intermediate Courts of Appeal. But here it added the qualifying term appropriate. In this specific context, it is appropriate for the court that normally reviews the rulings of a challenged judge also to review issues involving the validity of that challenge. The Legislature has otherwise provided for superior court review of a magistrate's orders. (Pen.Code, §§ 871.5, 995.) Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court, and not just the intermediate Courts of Appeal, is an appropriate court in which to contest the grant or denial of a motion to disqualify a magistrate. The fact that Los Angeles County recently unified its municipal and superior courts does not affect this result. Proposition 220, enacted in 1998, permitted the voluntary unification of the municipal and the superior courts. As a result, a majority vote of both the superior court judges and the municipal court judges could abolish the municipal courts within a county and establish a unified superior court for that county. ( Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 763, fn. 2, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 3 P.3d 286; In re Ramirez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1315-1316, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 229.) Los Angeles County unified its courts in January 2000, before the events of this case. ( In re Ramirez, supra, at p. 1316, fn. 1, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 229.) However, although all trial court judges in Los Angeles County are now superior court judges, they do not always act in the role of a preunification superior court judge. Not all procedures for local appeal that used to exist between, for example, the municipal court and the superior court have been abolished. Superior court judges may still, generally at least, review actions of other superior court judges who were acting in a role that the superior court would have reviewed before unification. (See generally Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 763, fn. 2, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 3 P.3d 286; In re Ramirez, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1316-1318, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 229.) We need not here consider all statutory changes that resulted from unification or what exceptions may exist to this general principle, but we see no indication the Legislature intended to change the previous procedures whereby the superior court reviews a magistrate's actions. (Pen.Code, §§ 871.5, 995.) Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court remains an appropriate court of appeal for questions involving the disqualification of a magistrate under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), even after court unification.