Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Policies Justifying Declaration of a Mistrial, and Retrial, over Defense Objection

Text: Despite these significant considerations weighing against declaration of a mistrial over defense objection, a defendant does not have an absolute right to dismissal of an indictment simply because a judge aborts the first trial without defense consent. It is readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant's consent would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from government harassment which such a mechanical rule would provide. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480, 91 S.Ct. at 554. Rather, `a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.' Id. (quoting Wade, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 837). For this reason, when courtroom errors or other developments at trial make a just judgment impossible, the public's interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system will outweigh the defendant's right to obtain a judgment, and the court may terminate the trial without the defendant's consent and without foreclosing reprosecution. Justice Story first articulated in Perez the standard a trial court must apply in determining whether circumstances warrant a mistrial over defense objection: We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580 (emphasis added). Although Justice Story instructed that a trial court may exercise a sound discretion in applying this standard, he nonetheless advised that the power to terminate a trial without the defendant's consent ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes. Id. Accordingly, the manifest necessity standard in Perez is a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option [to continue with a trial] until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557. To satisfy this command, a trial court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether a trial development gives rise to a `high degree' of necessity to terminate the trial. Braxton, 395 A.2d at 769 (quoting Arizona, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 831). Although this standard does not require demonstration of absolute necessity, Braxton, 395 A.2d at 769, the reasons for aborting a trial must be sufficient to override the defendant's double jeopardy interests. Id. A mistrial without defense consent is therefore justified `only in very extraordinary and striking circumstances,' Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (quoting United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed.Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D.Mass. 1815) (No. 14858) (Story, J.)), where it becomes impossible for the jury to reach an impartial verdict, or there is improper conduct of such a nature that a conviction would likely be reversed on appeal. Somerville, 410 U.S. at 464, 93 S.Ct. at 1070; United States v. Bristol, 325 A.2d 183, 186 (D.C.1974). [7] Second, even when there is a high degree of necessity that would ordinarily justify a mistrial, the trial judge must determine whether an alternative measure  less drastic than a mistrial  can alleviate the problem so that the trial can continue to an impartial verdict. See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487, 91 S.Ct. at 558; Coleman v. United States, 449 A.2d 327, 329 (D.C.1982). While the trial judge need not adopt an alternative that runs directly counter to a legitimate state policy, Somerville, 410 U.S. at 469, [8] 93 S.Ct. at 1073, the judge should not resort to a mistrial when some other course of action can mitigate or cure the trial prejudice and thereby accommodate both the defendant's interest in retaining a particular jury and society's interest in just and defensible judgments.