Opinion ID: 1842460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other claims on appeal

Text: We briefly discuss Arbelaez's other claims. These are (A) denial of his motion to disqualify the trial judge; (B) denial of his motion to exclude the testimony of a death row mental health counselor; and (C) denial of his supplemental claims based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).
After we remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez moved to disqualify the trial judge, Leslie B. Rothenberg. He alleged that the judge's comments in a separate capital case, that of Gerardo Manso, Manso v. State, 704 So.2d 516 (Fla.1997), raised a reasonable fear that Arbelaez would not receive a fair and impartial hearing. Manso had alleged in his own disqualification motion that Judge Rothenberg stated that if found competent to proceed, the Defendant would be getting a jolt of electricity which the undersigned takes to mean a sentence of death. Judge Rothenberg granted Manso's disqualification motion, but later denied Arbelaez's motion as legally insufficient. Arbelaez appeals that denial. Whether a motion to disqualify the judge is legally sufficient is a question of law we review de novo. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087 (Fla.2004); Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 842 (Fla.2002). Such a motion will be deemed legally insufficient if it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of the movant that he will not receive a fair hearing. Arbelaez, 775 So.2d at 916 (citing Correll v. State, 698 So.2d 522, 524 (Fla.1997)). A mere subjective fear [ ] of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986). The primary consideration is whether the facts alleged, if true, would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. Id. Arbelaez failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a well-grounded fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before Judge Rothenberg. Nothing in Arbelaez's motion directly linked the judge's alleged comment in the Manso case to Arbelaez. Although the comment certainly evinced a predisposition regarding the outcome of Manso's case  namely, that Judge Rothenberg intended to impose a sentence of death  the comment did not, on its face, evince a predisposition about all capital cases or show a personal bias or prejudice against Arbelaez simply because he was a capital defendant. Arbelaez, 775 So.2d at 916 (citing Tafero v. State, 403 So.2d 355 (Fla.1981)). Arbelaez essentially argues that Judge Rothenberg was biased toward all capital defendants. As we stated in Maharaj v. State, 778 So.2d 944 (Fla.2000), however, such serious allegations of judicial bias cannot be left to surmise from differing interpretations. Id. at 952. Arbelaez also asks us to revisit the denial of his previous, unsuccessful motion to disqualify Judge Rothenberg. See Arbelaez, 775 So.2d at 916. He argues that, in light of the recent allegations in the Manso case, Judge Rothenberg's tough-on-crime judicial campaign and her prosecutorial background have taken on new meaning. We decline Arbelaez's request. Nothing about Judge Rothenberg's judicial campaign or prosecutorial background has changed over the past four years. The trial court's denial of Arbelaez's recent disqualification motion, like its denial of his initial disqualification motion, was proper.
Before the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez sought to exclude the testimony of Lisa Wiley, an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections who provided mental health services to Arbelaez while he was on death row. Arbelaez argued that Wiley's testimony would violate his Fifth Amendment rights because Wiley interrogated Arbelaez in prison without administering Miranda [1] warnings or obtaining his consent to her testimony. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Miranda requirements did not apply and that Arbelaez had waived any relevant privilege. Wiley testified at the evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion, arguing that Wiley's testimony violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because Arbelaez failed to raise his Fourteenth Amendment claim before the trial court, it is procedurally barred. See, e.g., Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1990). We reject Arbelaez's Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims on the merits. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment does not apply once the defendant's sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final, which describes the circumstances under which Arbelaez met with Wiley on death row. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999) (citing Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513, 81 S.Ct. 260, 5 L.Ed.2d 249 (1960)) ([W]here there can be no further incrimination, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege.). Similarly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to critical stages of the prosecution, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), not to postconviction meetings after the defendant has been fully prosecuted. Even if Wiley's testimony at the evidentiary hearing had violated Arbelaez's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, we would conclude that those violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court did not rely upon Wiley's testimony in reaching its decision to deny postconviction relief.
We remanded this case to the trial court solely for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Arbelaez's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue penalty phase mitigation evidence. After the hearing but before a ruling, Arbelaez attempted to supplement his rule 3.850 motion with arguments based on two recent Supreme Court decisions, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). The trial court rejected the supplemental motion as beyond the scope of our remand. We review such decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. See Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 916 (Fla.2000). Although we recognize that it might have been more efficient for the trial court to hear Arbelaez's Ring and Atkins claims during the remand, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to hear them. The trial court was justified in adhering strictly to our instructions on remand and dismissing the supplemental motion. For purposes of efficiency, however, we note that Arbelaez's Ring and Atkins claims would certainly fail on the merits. Contemporaneously with the conviction for first-degree murder, the jury also convicted Arbelaez of kidnapping. Id. at 911. That conviction became the basis for one of the aggravating factors the trial court found. See Arbelaez, 775 So.2d at 912. This Court has repeatedly dismissed arguments under Ring where one of the aggravating factors is a previous or contemporaneous conviction. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 886 So.2d 965 (Fla.2004); Douglas v. State, 878 So.2d 1246 (Fla.2004); Doorbal v. State, 837 So.2d 940, 963 (Fla.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962, 123 S.Ct. 2647, 156 L.Ed.2d 663 (2003). Arbelaez cannot feed Atkins through Ring. He contends that, after Atkins, the absence of mental retardation is now an element of capital murder that, under Ring, the jury must consider and find beyond a reasonable doubt. We have rejected such arguments. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla.2002) (rejecting the defendant's Atkins claim on the ground that the trial judge had found the defendant not to be mentally retarded). Other state supreme courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619-21 (2003); Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 148 (Miss.2003); State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 860 n. 35 (La.2002). Arbelaez has no right under Ring and Atkins to a jury determination of whether he is mentally retarded. [2]