Opinion ID: 449688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recovery for Emotional Disturbance under Section 402A

Text: 16 The jury awarded Martin Massicott $500,000 on his claim of physical injury resulting from emotional distress. Mintec seeks a reversal of the award, contending that a plaintiff may not recover, under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for physical injuries which result solely from emotional disturbance. Section 402A in pertinent part provides: 17 One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer ... 18 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 402A(1) (1965) (emphasis supplied). 19 Reduced to its essence Mintec's argument is that an injury resulting from emotional disturbance can never be physical harm within the meaning of section 402A. We can find nothing in the Restatement that would support Mintec's restrictive interpretation of physical harm. To the contrary, our review of the Restatement leads us to conclude that physical harm can encompass bodily injury brought about solely by the internal operation of emotional distress. Section 7 of the Restatement defines physical harm as the physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels. Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 7 (1965). No restrictions are given with respect to the cause of the bodily impairment. Moreover, section 436 of the Restatement is entitled Physical Harm Resulting From Emotional Disturbance. It is clear from this section that the drafters of the Restatement believed that emotional disturbance could cause physical harm. 20 Mintec argues, however, that section 436 is inapposite because, by its terms, it applies only to negligent conduct. While Mintec is correct that section 436 is inapplicable in the strict liability context, we may nevertheless look to that section for guidance in interpreting the physical harm requirement of section 402A. This is because the term physical harm has a common meaning as used throughout the Restatement. Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 7 (1965). It follows, then, from reading sections 7, 436 and 402A in concert that use of the term physical harm in section 402A does not preclude recovery for physical injuries resulting from emotional disturbance. 21 We are not presented here with the question whether emotional disturbance, absent any physical harm, would be compensable under section 402A. The jury was specifically instructed to distinguish between mere emotional distress and emotional disturbance that results in bodily harm. Thus in awarding damages to Massicott, the jury necessarily found that he had suffered bodily harm resulting from the internal operation of emotional disturbance. We recognize that the line between mere emotional disturbance and physical harm which results from emotional disturbance may be far from clear. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial we are guided by the comments accompanying section 436A of the Restatement: 22 The fact that [emotional disturbance is] accompanied by transitory, non-recurring phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting, and the like, does not make the actor liable where such phenomena are in themselves inconsequential and do not amount to any substantial bodily harm. On the other hand, long continued nausea or headaches may amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long continued mental disturbance ... may be classified by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental character. 23 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 436A, comment c (1965). Although this section of the Restatement is specifically applicable to cases involving negligence, it is nevertheless instructive in evaluating the seriousness of a plaintiff's emotional injuries in cases in which a comparable theory of liability is asserted. 24 We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that there is sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that Massicott suffered bodily harm as a result of his emotional disturbance. Massicott testified that he suffered from severe, incapacitating headaches, that he became weak under stress and that he suffered from insomnia and recurring nightmares. Moreover, his treating psychiatrist testified that Massicott suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome, a form of mental illness. 25 We must next consider whether, under section 402A, Mintec may be held legally responsible for the bodily harm suffered by Massicott. The term 'harm' implies no particular causal relation.... [I]t is only when the harm is legally caused by the acts or omissions of another that a person has any legal grounds for objection, or any legal rights in respect to the harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 7, comment c (1965) (definition of injury and harm). 26 In negligence cases, legal causation for bodily injuries resulting from emotional disturbance is governed by section 436 of the Restatement. It provides in pertinent part: 27 If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright .... the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability. 28 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 436(2) (1965). Had this been a negligence case, we believe that there would have been sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of legal causation under section 436(2). The evidence indicates that as the boom dropped, the hoist drum bounced along the deck where Massicott was standing. The force of the impact hurled Massicott down fifteen feet of stairs. It is thus apparent that Massicott was within the zone of danger during the accident, and Mintec does not contend otherwise. Hence, the jury reasonably could have found that Mintec, through its sale of a defective product, created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to Massicott. 29 There is no provision comparable to section 436 in the Restatement that is applicable to strict liability. As a general matter, a defendant's conduct is the legal cause of a plaintiff's injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and there [is] no principle or rule of law which restricts the actor's liability because of the manner in which [his conduct] operates to bring about the injury. Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 9, comment b (1965). In awarding damages to Massicott, the jury necessarily found that Mintec's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about Massicott's injuries. Thus, Mintec is liable to Massicott for the injuries he sustained unless some rule of law exists which would preclude its liability. The Restatement does not specifically address this issue, nor do its text and commentaries define causation in the strict liability context. Yet section 402A clearly contemplates some causal limitation on a party's ability to recover for physical harm. In determining the parameters of this proximate cause requirement, we are guided by the policy objectives of section 402A. 30 Comment c of section 402A expresses the policy justification for strict liability in tort. The basic rationale is premised upon a theory of cost spreading: 31 [P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained.... 32 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 402A, comment c (1965). The drafters of the Restatement believed that the product user should have the maximum of protection at the hands ... of those who market the products. Id. There is no apparent reason why the policy objectives of section 402A should apply with less force when the physical harm results from emotional disturbance than when the harm results from some sort of tortious impact. 33 Although it may be argued that liability should be more limited when it is imposed without regard to fault, there is little indication that such a concern would act as a limitation on the underlying policies of section 402A. The thrust of these policies is to expand rather than restrict liability, by placing the burden of the consequences of accidental injuries caused by products upon the party who is best able to bear it. 4 Accordingly, we believe that the proximate cause limitations under section 402A would be no more restrictive than similar limitations in the negligence context. We therefore conclude that a plaintiff can recover for physical harm resulting from emotional disturbance under section 402A if the requirements for legal causation under section 436 are satisfied.