Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 1053 and Propriety of Substitution of Trial Judge

Text: As noted, for reasons not disclosed on the record, Judge Fagan, who had presided over defendant's trial, was absent from court on Monday and Tuesday, August 24 and 25, 1987, while the first jury was deliberating on penalty. Without objection from either side, Judge Long substituted for Judge Fagan during those two days. On Monday, August 24, the jury returned a partial verdict, which Judge Long ordered sealed; he then excused the jury and directed it to return the following day at 9:30 a.m. Jury deliberations resumed the next day, August 25, with Judge Long presiding. That morning, after the jury announced itself unable to reach a verdict regarding the penalty for the Perez murder, and following discussion with counsel and questioning of the foreman and other jurors, Judge Long declared a mistrial on the Perez count and entered the jury's verdict of life imprisonment on the Ferguson count. Judge Long then set the matter of the Perez count for pretrial conference and trial setting on September 14, 1987. On the latter date, Judge Fagan resumed presiding over the proceedings. Defendant contends that section 1053, which permits the midtrial substitution of judges in criminal cases, [13] violates his federal constitutional right to a fair trial, and that the retrial of penalty, following the assertedly improper substitution and Judge Long's declaration of a mistrial, violated his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Defendant also contends that the substitution of Judge Long violated section 1053 in any event because no showing was made that Judge Fagan was unable to proceed, as required by the statute. We conclude that defendant failed to preserve these contentions, but even if we were to address their merits, he has not established entitlement to relief. By way of background, we explained in People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 828, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204, that [t]he notion that the federal right to jury trial is violated by the midtrial substitution of a judge has its origin in a 1915 federal case, Freeman v. United States (2d Cir. 1915) 227 Fed. 732. That case held that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury entitled a criminal defendant to 12 jurors, as well as a judge, `all of whom must remain identical from the beginning [of trial] to the end.' (Id., at p. 759.) Recently, in People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1211 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159], we mentioned Freeman and more recent authorities (Randel v. Beto (5th Cir.1965) 354 F.2d 496, 500 and fn. 5; 2 Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal 2d (1982) § 392, pp. 402-403) as providing `abstract support' for the proposition that the right to jury trial includes a trial before a single trial judge. But we concluded in Espinoza that the essential purpose of the Sixth Amendment jury trial guaranteepreventing `oppression by the Government' is served by `the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment' of laypersons [citations] at a trial presided over by a neutral judicial officer (Espinoza, at p. 829, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204) and was not implicated by the midtrial substitution of another superior court judge for the original trial judge, which was compelled by the latter's serious illness and inability to continue with the trial. (Ibid.) Defendant acknowledges our holding in People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 829, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204, that midtrial substitution of judges does not implicate the right to jury trial, but he contends section 1053 is nevertheless unconstitutional because it lacks certain procedural safeguards to protect his right to a fair trial. Specifically, he argues it violates the fair trial guarantee by failing to permit substitution only in extraordinary circumstances involving the judge's genuine inability to preside, and only after the substituting judge has certified on the record that he or she has familiarized himself or herself with the prior proceedings. According to defendant, and not controverted by the Attorney General, California is the only jurisdiction, state or federal, that permits midtrial substitution of judges without the consent of the defendant and without such safeguards. Defendant notes that in Espinoza, the record established both that the original judge was unable (due to serious illness) to proceed with the trial and that the substitute judge familiarized himself with the record of proceedings; hence, he argues, Espinoza cannot be read as dispensing with those conditions. Defendant further urges that the asserted constitutional violation is a structural error, reversible per se (see Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302), but that if we determine a harmless error standard applies, he was prejudiced by Judge Long's erroneous declaration of a mistrial and his subsequent reprosecution. At the threshold, the Attorney General argues defendant forfeited the contention by failing to challenge the constitutionality of section 1053 below. Defendant responds that we may entertain a constitutional challenge to a statute for the first time on appeal and should do so here because the enforcement of a penal statute is involved [citation], the asserted error fundamentally affects the validity of the judgment [citation], or important issues of public policy are at issue [citation]. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512; see also People v. Blanco (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1167, 1172-1173, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 [whether to address the constitutionality of a statute for the first time on appeal is a discretionary determination for the reviewing court].) We need not address defendant's constitutional challenge here. Contrary to defendant's argument, the improper substitution of a judge, unlike a biased adjudicator, does not appear to be the type of error that cannot be qualitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 308-309, 111 S.Ct. 1246.) Accordingly, under the applicable harmless error standard (see Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824), defendant would not be entitled to relief because any possible error in the substitution of Judge Long was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Long made no evidentiary or instructional rulings that would have required familiarity with the particulars of the case and, contrary to defendant's argument, we have found no error in his declaration of a mistrial on penalty as to the Perez murder count. Turning to defendant's contention that the substitution of Judge Long for Judge Fagan violated section 1053 because the record does not reflect that Judge Fagan was unable to preside (see People v. Truman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1816, 1825-1827, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 [error to substitute another judge so that presiding judge could attend to supervisorial duties]), we conclude defendant forfeited the contention by not objecting below. (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) This case perfectly exemplifies the basis for the forfeiture doctrine, for, had defendant objected, either the record would reflect why Judge Fagan was unable to preside or Judge Fagan would in fact have presided. Were the rule otherwise, defendants would be discouraged from making timely objections since, if the ultimate judgment were unfavorable, the defendant `would receive a second bite at the apple....' [Citation.] (Id. at p. 887, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) We therefore need not address the question of what kind of inability to preside satisfies section 1053. Even had the contention been preserved for appeal, for the reasons discussed above in connection with defendant's related constitutional claim, any possible error was nonprejudicial.