Opinion ID: 2823810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause

Text: Â¶50Â Â Â Â Â Last, we consider whether the amended DMSA violates the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution because it treats out-of-state attorneys differently from attorneys who are Colorado residents. We conclude that it does not. Â¶51Â Â Â Â Â The Commerce Clause provides that â[t]he Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.â U.S. Const. art. I, Â§ 8, cl. 3. It âprohibits economic protectionismâthat is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.â New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988). âWhere the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.â Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see, e.g., Thorpe v. State, 107 P.3d 1064, 1072â73 (Colo. App. 2004) (finding no Commerce Clause violation where statutes provided a sales tax refund to full-year state residents but not part-year state residents or nonresidents because statutes had only an incidental burden on interstate commerce and did not limit or restrict the ability to access Colorado markets). Â¶52Â Â Â Â Â The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that â[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.â U.S. Const. art. IV, Â§ 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984) (explaining that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of residency). The practice of law falls within the ambit of this clause. See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279â81 (1985) (holding that the New Hampshire Supreme Courtâs ruling that limited bar admission to state residents violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause). But the Privileges and Immunities Clause âis not an absolute.â Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,396 (1948). âIt [bars] discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States,â but not âdisparity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it.â Id. Â¶53Â Â Â Â Â The DMSA does not implicate either constitutional concern. As explained above, under C.R.C.P. 205.1(2), an out-of-state attorney who satisfies the ruleâs requirements can be âan attorney licensed to practice law in this stateâ and thus exempt from regulation under the amended DMSA. In addition, the amended DMSA is facially neutral. It does not differentiate between attorneys on the basis of residency because Colorado law licenses do not depend on residency. An out-of-state, nonresident attorney can apply for a license to practice law in Colorado, provided that the attorney has not been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction. 13 Finally, any burden on out-of-state attorneys who want to practice in this area is incidental. They can still conduct debt-management services, provided that they comply with the DMSA or associate with a local attorney and satisfy the pro hac vice requirements to appear before a court. See C.R.C.P. 205.1, 205.3. Â¶54Â Â Â Â Â Because the amended DMSA does not benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors or otherwise favor residents over nonresidents, itdoes not violate the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution.