Opinion ID: 1202658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactive Intent and Remedial Purpose

Text: Based on the mistaken notion that the presumption of prospectivity governs absent an express declaration to the contrary, the majority concludes that a retroactive intent may not validly be inferred from other sources. However, the law is precisely to the contrary. We have consistently held that the presumption applies only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent. ( In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746, italics added.) As we recently reaffirmed in Fox v. Alexis, supra, 38 Cal.3d 621, a wide variety of factors may be relevant to our effort to determine whether the Legislature intended a new statute to be given retroactive intent. The context of the legislation, its objective, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction may all indicate the legislative purpose. ( Id. at p. 629.) Two factors of particular relevance here are the history of the times and the perceived evils to be remedied by the Act. The majority laudably prefaces its discussion of Proposition 51 with a brief historical perspective. (Majority opn. at pp. 1196-1199.) The perspective provided, however, consists almost entirely of prior decisions of this court. There is, curiously, almost no mention of the dramatic context in which Proposition 51 was conceived and adopted, of the so-called liability crisis or the pitched battle among government agencies, business interests, insurers, and consumer advocates over the origins of the perceived crisis or the efficacy of Proposition 51 to alleviate it; no mention of the increasingly common multimillion dollar tort judgments or the alleged inequities of the deep-pocket rule that saddled public agencies and other institutions with damages far beyond their proportion of fault; no mention of the prohibitive insurance premiums that had forced numerous persons and entities from doctors to day-care centers, municipal corporations to corporate giants, to either go bare or go out of business; and no mention, finally, of the electorate's overwhelming approval, by a vote of 62 percent to 38 percent, of the tort-reform measure designed to mitigate this crisis, the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, or Proposition 51. An awareness of historical context illuminates more than merely the spirit of the Act; it clarifies the letter of the law, as well. The text of the Act begins with an unusually forthright statement of Findings and Declaration of Purpose. The Act sets forth three specific findings: (a) The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as the `deep pocket rule', has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that has threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other public agencies, private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher prices for goods and services to the public and in higher taxes to the taxpayers. [¶] (b) ... Under joint and several liability, if ['deep pocket defendants'] are found to share even a fraction of the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the damage. The People  taxpayers and consumers alike  ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums. [¶] (c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police, fire and other protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insurance premiums. In light of these express findings, the Act explicitly declares that its purpose is to remedy these inequities by holding defendants liable in closer proportion to their degree of fault. To treat them differently is unfair and inequitable. The Act further declare[s] that reforms in the liability laws in tort actions are necessary and proper to avoid catastrophic economic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as well as private individuals and businesses. Thus, it is clear from the plain language of the Act as well as from the context in which it was adopted, that Proposition 51 was conceived in crisis, and dedicated to the proposition that the `deep pocket rule' has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice. Its express goals were no less than to avert financial bankruptcy, to avoid catastrophic economic consequences, to stave off higher taxes and higher prices, and to preserve essential public services. In light of these express remedial purposes, the inference is virtually inescapable that the electorate intended Proposition 51 to apply as soon and as broadly as possible. When the electorate voted to reform a system perceived as inequitable and unjust, they obviously voted to change that system now, not in five or ten years when causes of action that accrued prior to Proposition 51 finally come to trial. When they voted to avert financial bankruptcy and catastrophic economic consequences, to stave off higher prices ... and higher taxes, and to preserve essential public services, they clearly voted for immediate relief, not gradual reform five or ten years down the line. A crisis does not call for future action. It calls for action now, action across the board, action as broad and as comprehensive as the Constitution will allow. It is clear that the purposes of Proposition 51 will be fully served only if it is applied to all cases not tried prior to its effective date. The law not only permits, but compels such an inference. When legislation seeks to remedy an existing inequity or to impose a less severe penalty than under the former law, the courts of this state have long held that the enacting body must have intended that the statute should apply to matters that occurred prior to its enactment. This concept found classic expression in In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, where we held, notwithstanding the statutory presumption against retroactivity, that when an amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the final date of judgment, the amendment applies rather than the statute in effect when the prohibited act occurred. ( Id. at pp. 744-745.) The amendment in question had indicated a legislative determination that the former punishment was too severe. Therefore, we reasoned, the Legislature must have intended that the new statute should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply, for to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, an objective contrary to civilized standards of justice. ( Id. at p. 745; accord People v. Durbin (1966) 64 Cal.2d 474, 479 [50 Cal. Rptr. 657, 413 P.2d 433]; Holder v. Superior Court (1969) 269 Cal. App.2d 314, 316-317 [74 Cal. Rptr. 853].) The courts have applied similar reasoning to statutes designed to remedy inequities in the civil law. In the construction of remedial statutes ... regard must always be had for the evident purpose for which the statute was enacted, and if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied.... ( Abrams v. Stone (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d 33, 42 [315 P.2d 453], italics added; accord Coast Bank v. Holmes (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 581, 595 [97 Cal. Rptr. 30].) For example, In Harrison v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 44 Cal. App.3d 197 [118 Cal. Rptr. 508], the court held that an amendment to the Labor Code which provided a cutoff date of five years for employer exposure to claims of occupational injury applied retrospectively to injuries incurred prior to the amendment's effective date. After reviewing the procedural morass, delays and expense attendant upon the former law, the court concluded that the remedial purpose of the law required a retrospective application notwithstanding the absence of language in the statute manifesting such an intent: [T]he amended legislation was designed and introduced for the purpose of ameliorating the procedural morass which has faced the board in multiple defendant cases. Thus, it is clear that the purpose of the amendment was to remedy an immediate situation which was imposing undue delay and expense upon litigants and hardship upon disabled employees ... [ T ] he object of that legislation will not be effectuated unless the board is permitted to apply the amendment retrospectively as well as prospectively. We conclude that it was the intent of the Legislature that it be so applied. ( Id. at pp. 205-206, italics added.) Like reasoning also supported the decision in City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 550 [90 Cal. Rptr. 843], where the court held that an amendment to the Government Code which relaxed the procedural standards governing local zoning proceedings applied retroactively. It reasonably appears that the Legislature enacted section 65801 as a curative statute for the purpose of terminating recurrence of judicial decisions which had invalidated local zoning proceedings for technical procedural omissions. [Citations.] This legislative purpose would be fully served only if the section were applied ... regardless of whether the offending procedural omission occurred before or after the section's enactment.  ( Id. at pp. 557-558, italics added.) In Andrus v. Municipal Court (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 1041 [192 Cal. Rptr. 341], the issue was whether an amendment that repealed the statutory right to appeal from an extraordinary writ proceeding in the superior court challenging an action in the municipal court, applied to appeals filed before the effective date of the legislation. Though the language of the amendment was silent as to intent, the court concluded that the obvious goal of the amendment ... suggests the logic of retroactive application. ( Id. at p. 1046, italics added.) The former statute, the court noted, provided broader appellate review of relatively trivial matters in the municipal court than was accorded an accused in the superior court. Therefore, [t]o deny retroactive application to the amendment, the court concluded, is to subscribe to the notion that the Legislature desired to postpone the demise of a procedural loophole which was inequitable to defendants accused of more serious offenses, [and] placed unnecessary and redundant burdens on the appellate courts.... We find that proposition absurd. ( Id. at p. 1047, italics added.) It is, therefore, a fairly prosaic rule which holds that a retrospective intent may be inferred from a specific and compelling remedial purpose. The question before us is whether such an inference is justified in this case. As noted earlier, Proposition 51 was designed with the express intent to remedy ... inequities in the existing rule of joint and several liability, inequities which threatened grave and imminent harm to the public weal. Indeed, such reform was necessary, the Act declared, to avoid catastrophic economic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as well as private individuals and businesses. (Italics added.) If this was not language evocative of the logic of retroactive application ( Andrus v. Municipal Court, supra, 143 Cal. App.3d at p. 1046), then nothing is. To deny retroactive application to the Act would infer an intent to postpone the repeal of a rule which its drafters expressly condemned as inequitable and unjust. Indeed, it would infer an intent to perpetuate that rule in potentially thousands of actions that accrued prior to the Act's effective date. Instead of a fair and uniform system of liability, it would infer that the drafters intended a dual system of justice, where the courts would apply a reformed rule of joint and several liability to one set of defendants, and a discredited, inequitable rule to another. I find that proposition patently untenable as well as unjust. Nevertheless, the majority insists that a retroactive intent may not be inferred from a clear and compelling statement of remedial purpose. The reason, according to the majority, is that [m]ost statutory changes are ... intended to ... bring about a fairer state of affairs and therefore almost all statutory provisions and initiative measures would apply retroactively rather than prospectively. (Majority opn. at p. 1213.) Furthermore, the majority asserts, this court rejected a similar argument nearly 40 years ago in Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388 [182 P.2d 159]. Neither of these contentions withstands scrutiny. Aetna concerned the retroactivity of an amendment to the Labor Code that increased workers' compensation benefits. In support of a retrospective application of the law, the injured workers relied on the statutory mandate that provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are to be liberally construed to extend their benefits to injured workers. (Lab. Code, § 3203.) We rejected the workers' argument, however, holding that a retrospective intent could not be implied from the mere fact that the statute is remedial and subject to the rule of liberal construction. (30 Cal.2d at p. 395.) The doctrine of liberal construction and the presumption of prospectivity, we noted, were merely two canons of construction, and [i]t would be a most peculiar judicial reasoning, we observed, which would allow one such doctrine to be invoked for the purpose of destroying the other. (30 Cal.2d at p. 395.) Aetna therefore stands for the simple proposition that one general canon of construction (that workers' compensation provisions are to be liberally construed) does not supersede another (that statutes are presumed to apply prospectively). The case at bar bears no resemblance to Aetna. Here the evidence relating to remedial intent consists not of abstract principles unrelated to the statute at issue, but of clear and unmistakable statements of particular remedial purposes in the Act itself, and of similar indications implicit in the history of the Act. The cases and authorities previously cited not only permit, but demand that we examine these expressions of remedial purpose for whatever clues they may provide on the question of retroactivity, and nothing in Aetna, supra, 30 Cal.3d 388, indicates otherwise. There is equally little merit to the majority's assertion that the Act's remedial purposes are irrelevant because many statutes could be described as remedial. The argument suggests that courts are powerless to weigh the probative value of the evidence of remedial purpose in each case, and decide whether an inference of retrospective intent reasonably and logically follows. Indeed, that is precisely the sort of function which courts perform daily. Moreover, the purpose here was not merely remedial; it was to remedy a crisis. The question before us is whether, from that purpose, it may reasonably be inferred that the Act should apply to all cases not tried prior to its effective date. The evidence and our prior decisions overwhelmingly demonstrate that the answer to that question is yes.