Opinion ID: 2403516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reputation for peace and good order

Text: Walter Fischer had known appellant in a professional context for over thirteen years. When counsel questioned Fischer about appellant's reputation for peace and good order, the trial judge sustained an objection to the question, ruling that the only issue with respect to Mr. Rose is whether or not he was assaulted that night and no other issue with respect to his, quote, assaultive behavior or peace and good order is relevant. Relevant evidence is `that which makes the existence or non existence of a [contested] fact more or less probable' than it would be without the evidence. Jones v. United States, 739 A.2d 348, 350 (D.C.1999) (quoting Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C.1977)). To be relevant, the evidence must be related logically to a material fact sought to be proven, and adequately probative of the fact it tends to establish. See id. A trial court's rulings as to relevance, as with other evidentiary rulings, are within the court's sound discretion and will be upset only upon a showing of grave abuse. Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C.2000) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C.1995)). The defendant in a criminal proceeding is generally allowed to raise at trial character traits which are antithetical to the charged offense. Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 642 (D.C.1982). This allows admission of evidence concerning abstract qualities which reflect one's general and permanent moral character. Id. Courts enjoy discretion, however, to exclude evidence of the defendant's specific acts or courses of conduct to show that he did not commit the particular act or acts with which he is charged. Id. at 643 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948)). The general rule in civil cases for assault and battery, on the other hand, is that the character of neither party is an issue and cannot be the subject of attack, unless it is first attacked or supported by the adversary. Phillips v. Mooney, 126 A.2d 305, 308 (D.C.1956). We have previously held, however, that in a civil action which considers whether an assault has occurred, a litigant who claims that he was not the aggressor may present evidence of his or her peaceful nature, because character is placed in issue by the nature of the proceeding itself. See id. ; District of Columbia v. Thompson, 570 A.2d 277, 299 (D.C.1990). In Phillips the court noted that  as in the instant case  each party testified that the other assaulted him and also that there was conflicting evidence as to who was the aggressor. 126 A.2d at 306. The defendant called his ex-wife as a character witness, who testified he had a peaceful temperament. See id. at 307. The court held that, although the defendant's character had not been challenged, his ex-wife's testimony about his peaceful character was nevertheless admissible because of the nature of the action: the defendant having pleaded self-defense and both parties having pleaded and testified that the other had assaulted him  put their character for peace and quiet in issue. Id. at 308. [2] Phillips was relied on in Thompson, which considered a variety of civil claims made by a former employee of the District of Columbia library system stemming from the termination of her employment. See Thompson, 570 A.2d at 299. In contention was whether the employee had been assaulted by her former supervisor, or whether the supervisor had responded to the employee's attacks in self-defense. In this context, the court concluded it was error to exclude evidence of the supervisor's peaceful character, and the employee's prior acts of violence, concluding that: In the present case, both as to Thompson's claim of assault and battery and as to Maury's counterclaim of assault and battery, neither party claimed self-defense. But, both parties claimed the other party initiated the assault. Thus, the issue at trial was, Who was the aggressor? The trial court erred by not admitting evidence of Thompson's threats and assaults of her coworkers and, further, by not admitting evidence of Maury's peaceful character. Since the evidence at trial of Thompson's and Maury's alleged assaults of each other consisted mainly of the testimony of Maury and Thompson, making the issue essentially one of credibility, the error was not harmless. It warrants reversal and remand for a new trial on the assault claims. Id. at 299-300 (citing Montgomery v. Dennis, 411 A.2d 61 (D.C.1980) (reversing and remanding where evidence corroborating appellant's testimony that he had been assaulted was excluded)). In this case, even though appellant did not claim self-defense, the trial court found that appellant had acted without provocation, i.e., that he was the aggressor. The nature of the proceeding having put appellant's character at issue, the judge erred in concluding that Fischer's testimony as to appellant's reputation for peacefulness was irrelevant. We are satisfied, however, that this error did not cause prejudice requiring reversal for abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366 (D.C.1979) (prejudice is a necessary component of abuse of discretion). While credibility was a central issue, and the trial judge eventually disbelieved appellant's version of what happened, there was evidence  apart from the excluded testimony about appellant's peaceful character  that corroborated his claim. In evaluating appellant's credibility, the judge noted that his story was consistent in that it had not changed during the pendency of the case, and that it was corroborated by his companion. See Cooper v. United States, 353 A.2d 696, 704 (D.C.1975) (noting that there was no reversible error, even though relevant and admissible character evidence was wrongfully excluded, because there was other evidence of good character, including a corroboration of the accused's story). Even so, the trial judge, as the finder of fact, found that appellant had failed to prove his case by even a preponderance of the evidence because his account was not common sense. On this record, we doubt that the trial judge would have been persuaded to the requisite level of clear and convincing evidence by the introduction Fischer's testimony about appellant's peaceful character. Thus, we conclude that the trial judge's ruling does not require reversal. [3]