Opinion ID: 853754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Actual Evidence Test: Were Separate Offenses Established at Trial?

Text: As previously noted, the examination of the evidence presented at trial was an integral component of the double jeopardy analysis employed in those decisions of this Court immediately following the adoption of our Double Jeopardy Clause. We preserve this component, the actual evidence test, as a separate consideration to be used in analyzing the same offense issue in a claim under the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause. Even if the first consideration, the statutory elements test, does not disclose a double jeopardy violation, the actual evidence test may. Under this inquiry, the actual evidence presented at trial is examined to determine whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts. To show that two challenged offenses constitute the same offense in a claim of double jeopardy, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense. [46] This second test in our Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause same offense analysis differs significantly from federal jurisprudence under Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182, 76 L.Ed. at 309. The Blockburger test has nothing to do with the evidence presented at trial. It is concerned solely with the statutory elements of the offenses charged. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 n. 12, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2093 n. 12, 109 L.Ed.2d 548, 564 n. 12 (1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (second emphasis added). [47] At oral argument, the State asserted that, because the number of statutes and offenses has grown exponentially since our Indiana Constitution was ratified, and because Blockburger provides a clear, bright-line double jeopardy test, we should adopt Blockburger to govern our state Double Jeopardy Clause. On the other hand, the defendant argued that this Court should adopt the manner in which the offenses are charged analysis. We disagree with both, believing the original application of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause to be broader than these two approaches. In the present case, the evidence presented at trial establishes the following facts. On August 31, 1996, many people were at a lake area consuming alcohol and using drugs. The defendant noticed that one of those present, Jeff Koenig, appeared to possess a considerable amount of money. The defendant, along with Koenig and two other men, got into an automobile apparently to drive to another party. The automobile stopped on a bridge, and the men exited the vehicle, ostensibly to relieve themselves. When Koenig exited the vehicle, he was hit from behind with a beer bottle and knocked to the ground. The three men repeatedly kicked and beat him. Two of the men then held Koenig down while the third took Koenig's billfold from his pocket. After his billfold was removed, Koenig was pushed over the side of the bridge. The men left Koenig and returned to the party, bragging about what they had just done. The defendant contends that the evidence of the beating prior to the robbery forms the basis of both convictions. We note, however, that the evidence presented at trial also demonstrated that, after the defendant and his companions beat Koenig and took his billfoldthus completing the robberythey then pushed Koenig off the bridge. While this post-robbery conduct could potentially indicate a subsequent, factually separate battery justifying a separate conviction, there was no actual evidence to prove the element of resulting bodily injury from this separate conduct. [48] From the evidence presented, we find that the defendant has demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the jury to establish the essential elements of robbery were also used to establish the essential elements of the class A misdemeanor battery. Application of the actual evidence test thus discloses that convicting and sentencing the defendant on both of these offenses violates the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause. When two convictions are found to contravene double jeopardy principles, a reviewing court may remedy the violation by reducing either conviction to a less serious form of the same offense if doing so will eliminate the violation. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ind.1993) (affirming reduction of class C felony battery to class B misdemeanor battery to avoid double jeopardy). If it will not, one of the convictions must be vacated. In the interest of efficient judicial administration, the trial court need not undertake a full sentencing reevaluation, but rather the reviewing court will make this determination itself, being mindful of the penal consequences that the trial court found appropriate. In the present case, the crime of robbery does not exist in a form less serious than the class C felony, for which the defendant was convicted. But a lesser form of battery could result, a class B misdemeanor in the absence of the element of resulting bodily injury, instead of the class A misdemeanor, for which he was convicted. Even if considered in this reduced class, however, there is a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the jury to establish the essential elements of robbery would also be used to establish battery as a class B misdemeanor. Because both convictions therefore cannot stand, we vacate the conviction with the less severe penal consequences and leave standing the robbery conviction.