Opinion ID: 1603876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arbitrary Sentencing

Text: In his first claim on appeal, Marek argues that his sentence is unconstitutionally arbitrary under Furman because (1) the State argued inconsistent theories in his trial and the trial of codefendant Wigley; (2) Marek's claim of ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel, raised in his initial postconviction motion, should be reevaluated; and (3) Florida's clemency process is inadequate. These arguments were raised in Marek's second successive postconviction motion, and the postconviction court expressly addressed the first two arguments in its order denying relief. The postconviction court did not err in concluding that the prosecutor did not pursue inconsistent theories at trial and that Marek's argument on this point was meritless. Marek's argument that his death sentence is unconstitutionally arbitrary as a result of the State taking inconsistent positions about whether Marek or his codefendant was the dominant actor in the kidnapping and murder is insufficiently pleaded, procedurally barred, and based on the record before us, without merit. Marek's inconsistent-theories argument is insufficiently pleaded under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2). Marek does not (1) explain why the facts upon which the argument is predicated were unknown and could not be ascertained by the exercise of due diligence or (2) cite to a newly established fundamental constitutional right that applies retroactively. In his direct appeal, Marek argued that his death sentence was cruel and unusual, arbitrary, and unequal in light of codefendant Wigley's life sentence. Marek, 492 So.2d at 1058. That claim on direct appeal indicates that Wigley was sentenced prior to 1986. Yet Marek did not raise this claim of inconsistent theories until the instant postconviction proceeding. Marek does not explain why the prosecutor's theory in Wigley's case could not have been discovered previously by the exercise of due diligence. Furthermore, we conclude that Marek's argument is not based on any new constitutional right. Marek asserts that in Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005), and Raleigh v. State, 932 So.2d 1054 (Fla.2006), the Supreme Court and this Court recognized that the State's pursuit of inconsistent theories against codefendants constitutes a violation of due process. Marek is incorrect. The postconviction court's order correctly notes that this Court's recent decision in Walton v. State, 3 So.3d 1000, 1005-06 (Fla.2009), forecloses Marek's argument. In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court held that the allegedly inconsistent prosecution theories could not have affected Stumpf's conviction and declined to address whether the allegedly inconsistent theories affected sentencing. 545 U.S. at 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398. The next year, in Raleigh, 932 So.2d at 1065-67, this Court rejected an inconsistent-theories claim on the basis that the State's theories were not inconsistent, without addressing whether such a due process right was established by Bradshaw. Most recently, in Walton this Court expressly held that Bradshaw did not recognize a new fundamental constitutional right that applies retroactively. Walton, 3 So.3d at 1005. See also Byrd v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S307, S307, ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2009 WL 857419 (Fla. Apr. 2, 2009) (Clearly, Stumpf did not articulate a new rule of law, and this successive postconviction claim is therefore barred.). Thus, Marek's argument is procedurally barred. Finally, Marek has not established that the State actually argued inconsistent theories. Based on the trial excerpts included in Marek's motion for rehearing filed in the postconviction court and his appellate brief filed here, Marek has not demonstrated that in different trials the State attributed specific acts to different defendants or any such direct inconsistency. [2] The postconviction court also did not err in denying Marek's argument that his previously raised claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be reevaluated under the standards enunciated in Rompilla, Wiggins, and Williams. Contrary to Marek's argument, the United States Supreme Court in these cases did not change the standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. In Rompilla, the Court expressly concluded, based on the factual record in that case, that trial counsel's failure to review the defendant's prior conviction file for mitigation evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 545 U.S. at 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456. Similarly, in Wiggins, the Court concluded that given the information trial counsel had regarding Wiggins' childhood, their failure to broaden the scope of their investigation into possible mitigating factors constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as defined in Strickland. Indeed, the Wiggins Court began its analysis by stating that Strickland established the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Finally, the Williams Court also concluded that trial counsel's failure to discover and present mitigating evidence violated Williams' rights as defined in Strickland. As the Supreme Court explained in Williams, It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Furthermore, we are not aware of any reported decision, and Marek has not identified any, adopting the view that Rompilla, Wiggins, and Williams modified the standard of review governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Moreover, Marek's argument is procedurally barred because he previously litigated this issue. In his appeal from the denial of his prior successive postconviction motion, Marek argued that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be reexamined under those cases because Judge Kaplan's partiality impaired his ability to follow these standards in evaluating prejudice in Mr. Marek's case. In his accompanying habeas petition, Marek argued that the Court's prior decision affirming the denial of [his] claim that he received ineffective assistance at the penalty proceeding is in error in light of the recent decision[s] by the United States Supreme Court in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Marek is not entitled to relitigate this issue. [3] Next, Marek argues that the postconviction court's denial of his second successive motion was erroneous because, as explained in the ABA Report, Florida's clemency process fails to correct for arbitrary factors in the capital sentencing scheme. Marek asserts that the clemency process is one-sided, arbitrary, and standardless. Again, his argument is without merit. In Rutherford v. State, 940 So.2d 1112 (Fla.2006), the defendantrelying on the ABA Reportargued that Florida's clemency process is arbitrary and capricious. This Court rejected the argument that the ABA Report requires us to reconsider our prior decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to Florida's clemency process. Id. at 1122. Moreover, Marek and the State agree that a full clemency proceeding was conducted in 1988 and that public records demonstrate that in 2008, the Governor corresponded with the Florida Parole Commission about Marek. Marek's death warrant expressly states that it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate. Previously, in Bundy v. State, 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.1986), this Court, in rejecting Bundy's contention that he was entitled to time to prepare and present an application for clemency before execution, explained that [i]t is not our prerogative to second-guess the application of this exclusive executive function. First, the principle of separation of powers requires the judiciary to adopt an extremely cautious approach in analyzing questions involving this admitted matter of executive grace. As noted in In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 So.2d 561, 562-63 (Fla.1976), [t]his Court has always viewed the pardon powers expressed in the Constitution as being peculiarly within the domain of the executive branch of government. Bundy, 497 So.2d at 1211 (some citations omitted); accord Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 253 (Fla.2001); Provenzano v. State, 739 So.2d 1150, 1155 (Fla.1999). Marek has not presented any reason that this Court should depart from these precedents.