Opinion ID: 425171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: self-representation issue

Text: 85 At the outset we are met by Ciuzio's contention that he was denied his constitutional right to dispense with the services of counsel and represent himself at his second trial. This contention is based upon the district court's denial of a motion, filed by Ciuzio acting pro se, in which Ciuzio requested, inter alia, that the district court 86 enter its Order allowing the defendant, CIUZIO, to represent himself with assigned counsel, or in the alternative, Stand-by Counsel other than KARL PILGER. 64 87 Ciuzio asserts that the emphasized language unequivocally notified the district court that he wished to proceed pro se. Accordingly, since the district court interpreted Ciuzio's motion as a request to substitute an attorney of his own choice for Karl Pilger as appointed counsel, rather than as a request to proceed pro se, Ciuzio argues that the district court denied him the constitutional right of self-representation established by the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 65 88 We cannot agree with Ciuzio's assertion that his motion unequivocally requested that he be permitted to represent himself. Rather, considering the motion as a whole, as well as the contemporaneously filed motion for substitution of counsel, submitted on behalf of Ciuzio by Karl Pilger, 66 and the record of Ciuzio's exercise of the right of self-representation at his first trial, we conclude that the district court properly interpreted Ciuzio's motion as one for the substitution of alternative appointed counsel. Since at no point prior to his second trial did Ciuzio articulately and unmistakably assert his right to self-representation, United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 119, 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982), we find no constitutional error on the part of the district court. 67
89 While it is well established that defendants in criminal actions may, under certain circumstances, waive their Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, 68 the Supreme Court has only recently held that the Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to dispense with the services of counsel and represent themselves at trial. 69 Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at 818-21, 835-36, 95 S.Ct. at 2532-34, 2541-42. The Court found that a right of self-representation was implied by the language and history of the Sixth Amendment: 90 The Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-representation. That conclusion is supported by centuries of consistent history. 91 Id. at 832, 95 S.Ct. at 2539. See id. at 818-19, 821, 95 S.Ct. at 2532-33, 2534. The Court recognized, however, that defendants' exercise of the newly defined constitutional right to proceed pro se would necessarily involve an abandonment of the explicit Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court indicated that defendants should be permitted to exercise their right to represent themselves only if they execute a valid waiver of their right to the assistance of counsel; i.e., only if they  'knowingly and intelligently' forgo [the] relinquished benefits of counsel. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023-24, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 92 Because the exercise of the right of self-representation necessarily involves a waiver of the preeminent right to the assistance of counsel, 70 the stringent limitations established by the Supreme Court for waiver of the right to counsel necessarily define the requirements for exercise of the right of self-representation. Thus the Court's decisions establish that the mere failure of a defendant to request counsel will not result in a waiver of the right to counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Since a defendant must act affirmatively to relinquish the right to counsel, it follows that the right of self-representation is waived if not asserted; for only if the defendant asserts the right to proceed pro se will it be possible for a court to find the requisite waiver of the right to counsel. Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610-11 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 327, 50 L.Ed.2d 293 (1976). 93 Similarly, because the Supreme Court has enjoined courts to indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242, a defendant must articulately and unmistakably assert[ ] his desire to avail himself of the constitutional right to self-representation .... United States v. Bailey, supra, 675 F.2d at 1300 (emphasis added). 71 Given the strong presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, such a stringent standard for judging the adequacy of an assertion of the right of self-representation, involving as it does a waiver of the right to counsel, is entirely appropriate. 94 [A] court should not quickly infer that a defendant unskilled in the law has waived counsel and has opted to conduct his own defense. 95 Brown v. Wainwright, supra, 665 F.2d at 610. So also, a defendant who adopts equivocal positions regarding a request to proceed pro se may properly be held to have waived the right of self-representation. Id. at 611; United States v. Bennett, supra, 539 F.2d at 51. 96 In sum, defendants have a constitutional right derived from the Sixth Amendment to represent themselves at a criminal trial. However, because the exercise of that right requires waiver of the right to assistance of counsel, 72 the right of self-representation is waived unless defendants articulately and unmistakably demand to proceed pro se. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether Ciuzio presented the district court with an articulate and unmistakable demand to represent himself at his second trial. After a careful review of the record, we are convinced that he did not.
97 Ciuzio contends that he presented the district court with an unequivocal demand to represent himself at his second trial, relying solely on the following request contained in his motion filed pro se with the district court: 98 The defendant, CIUZIO, respectively requests that this Court enter its Order allowing the defendant, CIUZIO, to represent himself with assigned counsel, or in the alternative, Stand-by Counsel other than KARL PILGER. 73 99 The district court treated Ciuzio's motion as one requesting it to replace Karl Pilger with an alternative assigned counsel of Ciuzio's choosing, and denied the motion. 74 We believe the district court correctly interpreted Ciuzio's motion as one for substitution of counsel. 100 The clear thrust of Ciuzio's motion was to substitute an attorney of his own choice, Orlando attorney Dennis Salvagio, for the attorney appointed by the district court, Karl Pilger. The motion averred that Ciuzio lacked confidence in Pilger and recited in considerable detail the reasons for his lack of confidence. 75 The motion recommended appointment of Salvagio, indicating that he was qualified and willing to serve as Ciuzio's counsel, provided that the district court authorized payment of attorneys' fees in excess of the maximum allowed by statute. 76 Asserting that the Constitution mandates that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to counsel of his own choosing, Ciuzio, in his prayer for relief, requested only 101 that this Court enter its Order Allowing the defendant Assigned Counsel of his own Choice .... 77 102 Considering the motion as a whole, it was reasonable for the district court to interpret the language relied on by Ciuzio as indicating that Ciuzio wished to avail himself of the services of appointed counsel, but wished to substitute Salvagio for Pilger. Certainly Ciuzio's request to represent himself with assigned counsel ... other than KARL PILGER, 78 when made in the context of the described motion, fell far short of an unmistakable assertion that he wished to dispense with the services of counsel and proceed pro se. 103 We find additional support for the district court's view of Ciuzio's motion in the record of Ciuzio's exercise of his right of self-representation at his first trial. Prior to that trial, Ciuzio requested that the district court allow him to represent himself and submitted, pro se, a memorandum in support of his request. 79 In that memorandum, Ciuzio cited Faretta and stated correctly that 104 [t]he right to represent oneself in conducting his own defense in a criminal case is established ... by both the Sixth Amendment ... as well as statute. 80 105 Noting that he ha[d] made an unequivocal request to represent himself and was aware of the disadvantages of proceeding to trial without counsel, Ciuzio asserted that the district court must grant [his] motion to proceed pro se. 81 Concluding that, under the circumstances, it had no alternative, the district court granted Ciuzio's request to represent himself. 82 106 Without question, Ciuzio's memorandum in support of his request to proceed pro se at his first trial articulately and unmistakably asserted his right of self-representation. Thus, when considering the motion filed by Ciuzio prior to his second trial, the district court was necessarily aware that Ciuzio was capable of clearly asserting his right of self-representation if he wished to do so. That Ciuzio's motion made no reference to the constitutional right of self-representation, or to Faretta, was a telling indication that Ciuzio was not asserting his right to proceed pro se. 83 107 There are other compelling indications that Ciuzio's motion was not intended to assert his right of self-representation. For example, although the district court granted Ciuzio's request to represent himself at his first trial, Ciuzio permitted Pilger, who had been appointed standby counsel, to conduct his entire defense. 84 This fact suggests that at some point Ciuzio reconsidered his decision to proceed pro se and decided to avail himself of the assistance of counsel, perhaps when confronted with the realities of a complex conspiracy trial. 85 Whatever the reasons for Ciuzio's reliance on Pilger, the district court could properly consider his apparent abandonment of the right of self-representation at his first trial as an indication that Ciuzio's motion only requested to substitute appointed counsel. Likewise, the district court could look to the motion for substitution of counsel filed by Pilger on behalf of Ciuzio a mere three days prior to Ciuzio's motion 86 as a reliable statement of Ciuzio's wishes at the time. Brown v. Wainwright, supra, 665 F.2d at 611-12. Pilger's motion sought only to substitute Salvagio as Ciuzio's appointed counsel, and gave absolutely no indication that Ciuzio had any interest in representing himself. 87 108 We therefore conclude that the record in this case overwhelmingly supports the district court's reading of Ciuzio's motion as a request for substitution of counsel. That interpretation results from a natural and reasonable construction of Ciuzio's motion, and is consistent with the clear import of the motion for substitution of counsel filed by Pilger, as well as the record of Ciuzio's exercise of his right of self-representation at his first trial. The language relied on by Ciuzio, when viewed in the context of this record, cannot reasonably be characterized as an unequivocal assertion of the right of self-representation. 88 Since Ciuzio failed to articulately and unmistakably assert his right to represent himself at his second trial, thereby waiving that right, we reject his contention that he was denied the right of self-representation.