Opinion ID: 3029592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Torture Claim

Text: Williams claims the IJ erred in analyzing his petition for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Primarily, he claims the IJ applied the wrong standard to his claim, failed to give proper consideration to his individual circumstances, and ignored 1 Prior to the passage of the REAL ID Act on May 11, 2005, we would not have had jurisdiction to review Williams’ claims because he is an alien who was removed due to convictions for prior aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2005). 4 evidence showing that it is more likely than not that the Jamaican government will acquiesce to his torture. For the reasons described below, we reject Williams’ claims. To establish a claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture, the applicant must meet a two-part test. First, he must show it is “more likely than not” that he will be tortured if removed to the proposed country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). In assessing the probability of the applicant being tortured, the following factors are relevant: (1) “evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;” (2) “evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;” and (3) “evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, where applicable.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)-(iii). Second, he must show the torture he fears will be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). “Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” Silva-Rengifo v. Attorney General, 473 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7)). Actual knowledge by the government is not required, and an applicant may satisfy his burden by showing that “the government in question is willfully blind to such activities.” Id. (emphasis added). Williams’ argument with respect to his Convention Against Torture claim is poorly 5 organized. For clarity’s sake, we have attempted to distill the crucial points from his brief, organizing his arguments into seven contentions. We address each of these contentions below. First, Williams seems to argue that because the IJ found his testimony with respect to his fear of Charles Graham and the Crime Management Unit credible, he necessarily met his burden of proof. Credible testimony by the petitioner, however, is not dispositive on the issue of whether torture is more likely than not to occur. As 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) explains, “[t]he testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” (emphasis added). However, “[s]aying that something may be enough is not the same as saying that it is always enough; in fact, the most natural reading of the word ‘may’ in this context is that credible testimony is neither per se sufficient nor per se insufficient.” Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, the IJ found Williams’ fear of Charles Graham and his associates and the Crime Management Unit was sincere. That is, he believed Williams truly feared being harmed by Graham or the police upon returning. He further believed Williams had good reason to fear retribution by Graham. Based on other evidence, however, he did not believe Williams had good reason to fear the Crime Management Unit. Accordingly, the IJ did not commit a legal error by concluding that Williams, though credible, did not meet his burden of proof. Second, Williams argues the IJ applied the incorrect legal standard in evaluating 6 whether the government would acquiesce to Williams’ torture. This claim is based on the following statements in the IJ’s decision: “Respondent’s counsel indicated that there are vigilante organizations operating with impunity by the Jamaican government . . . and certainly the background evidence suggest[s] that is certainly accurate. However, this is not a de facto government agency out of control on the streets of Jamaica.” App. at 34 (emphasis added). Williams claims this statement is evidence that the IJ applied an overly restrictive standard to his claim, requiring him to show torture at the hands of a “de facto government agency” instead of simply “willful blindness” to torture on the part of the government. We disagree. While this isolated comment on the part of the IJ may support Williams’ conclusion, the record in its entirety demonstrates the IJ understood the standard he was to apply. The IJ specifically found no evidence that the Jamaican government “would be aware of [Williams’] likely torture and refuse[] or refrain[] from intervening to prevent [it].” App. at 33. In addition, in supporting his finding, the IJ adopts the Attorney General’s decision with respect to petitioner A-G- in Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R. In this decision, the Attorney General specifically applies a standard of “willful acceptance” on the part of the government and finds Jamaica does not “approve or ‘willfully accept’ atrocities committed against persons in [a position similar to Williams’].” Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 283. Third, Williams claims the IJ erred in relying on Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R as evidence that no one from Jamaica can ever establish a Convention Against Torture 7 Claim. Williams points to no language in the IJ’s decision that supports this claim, and, as a result, we find this claim lacks merit. Fourth, Williams claims the IJ did not appropriately consider his individual circumstances, such as the specific harm that he feared, whether that harm would occur at the hands of a government actor, or whether the harm he feared would accomplish an illicit end. We find the IJ’s decision replete with references to Williams’ specific situation. The IJ specifically notes Williams’ fear of being killed by Graham, his fear of being harmed or not protected by the police, and the basis for Williams’ fear (i.e., his cooperating with law enforcement authorities in the U.S. against Graham). Overall, there is nothing in the IJ’s decision that suggests the IJ did not fully understand or consider Williams’ unique circumstances. Fifth, Williams explains that he was shot in 2005 when he was returned to Jamaica and that the Jamaican government has not sufficiently investigated this shooting. This evidence, he claims, proves the IJ’s analysis of his torture claim was flawed. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A), however, we are not able to consider this additional evidence, as our review is limited to the administrative record of this case. McAllister v. Attorney General, 444 F.3d 178, 190 (3d Cir. 2006). Sixth, Williams claims the IJ failed to address the possibility of Williams being tortured while detained by the Jamaican government, a practice condemned in Senathirajah v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1998). The IJ explicitly addresses this 8 specific possibility twice in his decision: First, he states, “there is no evidence respondent would be held in detention upon arrival.” App. at 33. In support of this statement, the IJ discusses and attaches two exhibits to his decision. These exhibits explain that deportees are not detained for long periods upon returning. Second, he states, “there’s still no evidence the government of Jamaica would likely torture the respondent while under its custody or physical control.” Id. In support of this second statement, the IJ cites the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R. In sum, Williams’ characterization of the IJ’s decision with respect to torture during detention is unsupported. Finally, Williams claims the evidence he submitted, which included a newspaper article, a report from Amnesty International, and a report of the State Department, demonstrates the corruption of the Jamaican police and the willingness of the Jamaican government to turn a blind eye to the torture of its citizens. He claims this evidence, even when weighed against the various State Department reports relied upon by the IJ and cited by the Attorney General in Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R, should compel us to find it is more likely than not that he will be tortured with the acquiescence of the Jamaican government. Stated differently, Williams claims he met his burden of proof. Because this claim involves a “factual or discretionary determination[],” we lack jurisdiction to consider it. Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at 634.