Opinion ID: 3021007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court’s Admission of Evidence

Text: Lastly, Federal Kemper argues that the District Court erred in admitting a death certificate from India, and in allowing the expert testimony of Dr. Linda Himmelberger, a forensic dentist. These admissions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Merritt Logan, 901 F.2d at 359. Federal Kemper asserts that the death certificate was not authenticated, as required 8 by the Federal Rule of Evidence. Plaintiff argues that the admission was proper under Rule 901, which provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). That Rule also provides that, as to public records or reports, the admissibility requirement is satisfied by “[e]vidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office . . . is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.” Rule 901(b)(7). In May 2004, a deposition was taken in India of Madhav Mewar Guru, who testified that he works in the Devaprayag town area committee, which maintains the official death records for the area. Guru stated that he issued the death certificate for Mrs. Sampathachar according to protocol. He noted that the executive officer is supposed to issue the certificate, but that when the executive officer is not present, he issues the certificate. Based on this evidence, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the death certificate. As for the forensic dentist, Dr. Himmelberger testified at trial that a tooth count performed during the post-mortem examination of the body was not reliable, and also stated that there were certain similarities between the teeth in the post-mortem photos and Mrs. Sampathachar’s teeth as seen in her dental records. Federal Kemper argues that the District Court should have excluded Dr. Himmelberger’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Supreme Court has interpreted that rule to require the trial court to 9 make a preliminary determination as to proffered expert testimony “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [] whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). The District Court determined that Dr. Himmelberger’s testimony was admissible under that standard and would be useful to the jury. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.