Opinion ID: 1177637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extraterritorial Regulation Under Federal Law

Text: (4) We agree with the People's assertion that federal law does not prohibit California's assertion of penal jurisdiction over defendants even though at the time of their commission of the charged offenses they acted outside of California's territorial limits as defined for federal purposes. The United States Supreme Court has held that in matters affecting its legitimate interests a state may regulate the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas where no conflict with federal law is presented. ( Skiriotes v. Florida (1941) 313 U.S. 69, 77 [85 L.Ed. 1193, 1200, 61 S.Ct. 924].) More specifically, the court recognized that a state's interests in preserving nearby fisheries is sufficiently strong to permit such extraterritorial enforcement of its laws enacted for that purpose. ( Skiriotes, supra, at p. 75 [85 L.Ed. at p. 1199]; Felton v. Hodges (5th Cir.1967) 374 F.2d 337, 339; State v. Bundrant (Alaska 1976) 546 P.2d 530, 550-554; see United States v. Alaska (1975) 422 U.S. 184, 198-199 [45 L.Ed.2d 109, 121-122, 95 S.Ct. 2240].) It seems obvious that by adoption and enforcement of its control regulations California seeks to prevent the depletion of a very valuable natural resource. Fish swim. By their very nature they move freely across those arbitrary boundaries which are enacted by governmental entities for official purposes. The commercial and recreational value of California's fisheries are self-evident and are developed, both quantitatively and in their financial aspects, in the record before us. We have no difficulty in discerning in the preservation of its valuable fish population the requisite state interest for extraterritorial enforcement. Furthermore, the state laws here at issue present no conflict with federal swordfish policies because no federal rules in that field have as yet been promulgated under the FCMA. The record in this case is favorable to the penal reach of California law. Consistent with the Skiriotes rationale we observe that defendants are California citizens and residents. Both the Comanche and the spotter aircraft were based in California. California facilities were intended for use in both the landing and selling of their catch. California's interest in defendants' activities was both real and continuing. (5a) Defendants assert, however, that their convictions are invalid because the FCMA expressly forbids extraterritorial fishing regulation by a state, except in cases where the fishing vessel is registered under the laws of such State. (16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a).) Was the Comanche so registered? (6) Both federal and state governments provide various means of identifying and classifying those craft which move in the nation's navigable waters. Under federal law all domestic vessels over five net tons are subject to federal classification. Registration is an ancient term of art under the federal scheme, reserved solely for ships which are engaged in foreign trade. (46 U.S.C.A. § 11 et seq.) Those vessels which are engaged in commercial fishing from United States ports, on the other hand, must be licensed if over five net tons, and both licensed and enrolled if over twenty net tons. ( Id., §§ 251-263; 46 C.F.R. §§ 67.01-1, 67.01-5, 67.01-11, 67.01-13, 67.07-13.) All boats so documented are assigned an official number. ( Id., § 67.11-1.) The term enrollment evidences the national character of the vessel enabling it to procure a license. The license, in turn, limits the commercial use to which the craft may be put in order to prevent evasion of federal revenue laws. ( Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra, 431 U.S. 265, 272-273 [52 L.Ed.2d 304, 311-312]; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co. (1912) 225 U.S. 187, 199 [56 L.Ed. 1047, 1053, 32 S.Ct. 626].) Possession of a federal fishing license, however, does not preclude the nondiscriminatory state regulation of the licensed vessel's fishing activities. ( Douglas, supra, at p. 277 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 315]; Manchester v. Massachusetts, supra, 139 U.S. 240, 265 [35 L.Ed. 159, 167]; Smith v. State of Maryland (1855) 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74 [15 L.Ed. 269, 270-271].) (7) California provides two means of vessel classification and numbering; an identification number (CF number), and a certificate of boat registration with registration plates. (Fish & G. Code, §§ 7880, 7887.) Such registration, renewable annually upon payment of a fee (Fish & G. Code, § 7890), constitutes a state license to use the boat for commercial fishing of a specified kind. (5b) Defendants urge that because the Comanche carried United States documentation, and therefore bore no CF number, it cannot be deemed registered in California for purposes of the FCMA. We disagree. In our view, the Comanche's California registration for commercial swordfishing purposes permitted California to regulate such activities on the high seas. In our view, a contrary interpretation would render FCMA's express recognition of state extraterritorial jurisdiction (16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a)) virtually meaningless, limiting such jurisdiction to pleasure boats and those few commercial fishing vessels lighter than five net tons. We also find significance in the fact that, because the federal government has developed no swordfish regulations, the exclusion of any such state regulation would create the danger of wholly unregulated exploitation of that species in coastal waters and on the high seas, thus resulting in the possibility of substantial or, indeed, total depletion of an important natural resource. Had Congress intended by its successive enactments such a drastic curtailment of the states' Skiriotes jurisdiction, it would have said so. On the contrary, though undoubtedly aware of various state fishing registration schemes such as California's, Congress avoided all reference to the long established terms of art in the federal documentation laws, and premised continued state jurisdiction on the undefined and generic concept of local registration. As previously noted, the Comanche was licensed for commercial swordfishing. We think our broader interpretation of the term registration in FCMA prevents the anomalous result which would follow if the state's extraterritorial jurisdiction over commercial fishing was preserved as to those boats in which the state had asserted only a limited identification and record-keeping interest, but was precluded as to vessels like the Comanche which it has specifically licensed to engage in the activity of swordfishing. From the foregoing we conclude that section 1856(a), fairly read, is intended to permit a state to regulate and control the fishing of its citizens in adjacent waters, when not in conflict with federal law, when there exists a legitimate and demonstrable state interest served by the regulation, and when the fishing is from vessels which are regulated by it and operated from ports under its authority. (See Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: The Policeman's Lot (1977) 52 Wash.L.Rev. 513, 593-597, and fn. 467; cf., Northwest Trollers Ass'n. v. Moos (1977) 89 Wn.2d 1 [568 P.2d 793, 795].) We conclude that federal law does not preclude application of California's fishing laws to defendants' activities.