Opinion ID: 3161222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, the government presented ample evidence to establish that McGill attempted to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in unlawful sex. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). McGill’s email and text message conversations with “Amy,” the fictitious mother of “Emily,” demonstrate a clear intent on McGill’s part to cause or stimulate the occurrence of unlawful sexual contact between him and Emily. See id. at 1287 (explaining that the term “induce” unambiguously means “to stimulate the occurrence of” or “cause”). McGill was aware that 13-year-old Emily would be participating in the unlawful sexual contact. In detailed messages to Amy, McGill: (1) asked numerous questions about Emily’s interests and sexual experience, what Emily would enjoy, and what would “freak her out”; (2) requested that Emily wear “sexy panties” because “[g]uys really like that” and take a shower “everywhere because we may go there”; and (3) described what he would say and do to make Emily feel comfortable and the sex acts he planned to perform with Emily when he arrived at Amy’s house. Furthermore, McGill took a substantial step towards committing the crime by driving fifty miles to the rendezvous spot (a Chevron gas station) and then to Amy’s residence, and bringing a condom. See id. at 1288 6 Case: 15-10611 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Page: 7 of 8 (finding that a substantial step was taken when the defendant’s “acts as a whole strongly corroborate the required culpability”). McGill’s argument that communications with an adult intermediary are insufficient to support a § 2422(b) conviction lacks merit. It is well-settled in this Circuit that “direct communications with a minor or supposed minor is unnecessary under the text of § 2422(b).” Id.; see also United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 912-13 (11th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). In United States v. Murrell, this Court affirmed a conviction under § 2422(b)’s attempt clause even though the defendant’s only contact was with an undercover police officer posing as an adult man with a fictitious teen daughter. 368 F.3d at 1284. The Murrell Court concluded that, by contacting the fictitious parent in order to “cause the minor to engage in sexual activity with him,” the defendant had the necessary specific intent to induce the minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity. Id. (noting that “the efficacy of § 2422(b) would be eviscerated if a defendant could circumvent the statute simply by employing an intermediary to carry out his intended objective”). Thus, under Murrell, McGill’s communications with fictitious-parent Amy were sufficient to show McGill “acted with a specific intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See id. at 1286.2 2 We note that McGill’s counsel failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at trial, which would ordinarily result in review only for a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006). Under this standard, we must affirm unless 7 Case: 15-10611 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Page: 8 of 8 For all these reasons, we affirm McGill’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. “the evidence on a key element of the offense is so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, however, we readily conclude that the trial evidence amply supported all the elements of a § 2422(b) offense under the attempt clause, and thus we need not reach any miscarriage-of-justice issue. Additionally, because the trial evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, McGill has sustained no prejudice from his trial counsel’s failure to move for a judgment of acquittal. 8