Opinion ID: 867208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Ferrero's Uncharged Acts

Text: ¶ 25 The court of appeals correctly held that the trial court erred by failing to subject several categories of other act evidence to Rule 404(c) screening because it was offered to show the defendant's propensity to commit the charged acts. For example, the trial court, presumably relying on Garner, permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence that on the ride to Ferrero's house on the night of the first charged offense, Ferrero told the victim to pull down the victim's pants and underwear and expose himself. The victim acceded to Ferrero's demands because Ferrero threatened to leave him on the side of the road if he did not comply. When they arrived at Ferrero's house, the victim talked with Ferrero's mother and played computer games for at least thirty minutes while Ferrero showered. The victim then joined Ferrero in bed, at which time Ferrero completed the first charged act. ¶ 26 The State offered the exposure evidence to show that Defendant had the emotional propensity to engage in sexual misconduct with the victim, and the jury was instructed that the evidence could be used for that purpose. The evidence is facially governed by Rule 404(c) because it involves an uncharged sex act offered to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged. The evidence is therefore exempt from Rule 404(c) screening only if the uncharged act was truly intrinsic to the charged act and thus not an other act. ¶ 27 The evidence of this uncharged act does not fit within our narrow definition of intrinsic evidence. The two acts were qualitatively different and constituted two separate instances of sexual abuse. Thus, under the first prong of our definition, forcing the victim to expose himself does not directly prove that Ferrero later committed the charged sexual offense. The second prong which requires that the act occur contemporaneously with and directly facilitate the charged actis equally unavailing. Although forcing the victim to pull down his pants in the vehicle may have facilitated the charged act by weakening the victim's defenses, it did not occur contemporaneously with the charged act. The acts were separated by at least thirty minutes, during which time the victim talked to Ferrero's mother and played computer games. ¶ 28 The forced exposure is therefore not intrinsic to the charged act. Because the evidence was offered to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of that act without screening it under Rule 404(c). [5]