Opinion ID: 1236812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendant's age as factor in aggravation.

Text: (14) During the penalty phase argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider defendant's age, 22 at the time of the murders, as a factor in aggravation given his background and that he was very street smart by that time and that he was not a kid. Although the record reflects no contemporaneous objection, defendant now contends age can only function as a factor in mitigation and the court should have so instructed the jury. We have heretofore definitively construed section 190.3, factor (i), and remain convinced of our original rationale: The word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 674-675.) It is up to the jury to decide. That is the nature of the adversarial process. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 844 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 785 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].) Cases cited by defendant in which 22-year-old offenders were found deserving of some leniency because of their age simply illustrate that the relative significance of this factor necessarily varies with the individual and the circumstances of the particular offense. (Cf. People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 488 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] [in felony-murder case ample evidence [existed] that because of his immaturity [defendant] neither foresaw the risk he was creating nor was able to extricate himself without panicking].) Moreover, in some cases, statutory restrictions limited consideration of age to mitigation only. [24] (E.g., Hudson v. State (Fla. 1989) 538 So.2d 829, 831, fn. 5.) Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court do not compel a contrary conclusion. In Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 815 [101 L.Ed.2d 702, 108 S.Ct. 2687], the court did not address the question of age as a sentencing factor in capital crimes. Rather, it held that the federal Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment precluded execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense. ( Id., at pp. 821-838.) Whatever theoretical relevance this holding may have to our present consideration, we do not find it inconsistent with our construction of section 190.3, factor (i). [25] In Stanford v. Kentucky, supra, 492 U.S. 361, the high court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the execution of individuals who were 16 or 17 at the time of their crimes. ( Id., at p. 380 [106 L.Ed.2d at pp. 324-325].) In drawing a distinction between laws that precluded persons under 18 from engaging in various activities such as driving, drinking alcohol, and voting and those that permitted their capital punishment, the high court noted that the latter determination is individualized and that one of the individualized mitigating factors that sentencers must be permitted to consider is the defendant's age [citation]. ( Id., at p. 375 [106 L.Ed.2d at 321-322].) While we do not quarrel with this imperative, neither do we infer a constitutional limitation on the sentencing calculus. [26] While the jury must be allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence including age ( Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 608 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992, 98 S.Ct. 2954]), no rationale precludes its consideration as an aggravating factor under proper circumstances. (See, e.g., California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992 at pp. 999-1000 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1179-1180, 103 S.Ct. 3446].) In Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190], the court similarly cited youth as among the mitigating evidence available for the jury's evaluation under section 190.3. ( Id., at p. 383 [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 331].) This reference, however, does not speak to the question of whether age can operate solely in favor of leniency; it simply implies that it should when appropriate. (See, ante, fn. 24.) Here, the prosecutor argued only that the facts did not so warrant. Finally, defendant cites Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S. ___, ___-___ [117 L.Ed.2d 367, 377-383, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1135-1140] in support of his contention that the age factor set forth in the standard penalty phase instructions is vague, thereby inviting arbitrary and capricious sentencing results in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Reversal on this ground is subject to a harmless error analysis. ( Id. at 503 U.S. pp. ___, ___ [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 379, 382-383, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1137, 1140].) Even assuming the age factor to be constitutionally infirm as contended, on the record before us we find no prejudice.