Opinion ID: 1349059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Evidence of Intent

Text: Harassment is a specific intent crime. Iowa Code § 708.7(1)(b). Button argues he lacked the requisite mental state so that there was not substantial evidence for a jury to find intent. Intent is an elusive element of a crime. Walker, 574 N.W.2d at 289. Often, it can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Id. Here, we have a statement from Button's own mouth that he meant what he said. When Button made his first statement regarding blowing Routson's brains out while pheasant hunting, Sergeant Routson responded, You're threatening me, huh? Button answered, Yeah, I would've tried to. Button went further and later told Routson: I'm gonna remember you. This statement was followed by his second reference to shooting Routson. The jury was able to watch the videotape of this encounter and hear Button's statements in context. The jury heard Button express an extreme dislike for police officers in general. The jury also heard that all Button really wanted was to be free to gamble. At some point in the conversation, Button became very displeased that he was being held against his will and lashed out. The jury witnessed Button attempt to kick Sergeant Routson. Given this context, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Button's menacing statements evidenced an attempt to intimidate Sergeant Routson. Routson testified that he did indeed fear for his safety. Button argues that because he could not have carried out the threats, i.e., because he was in handcuffs, this fact negates their meaning. Section 708.7 does not require that the harasser have the present apparent ability to carry out the threats. Further, on this type of charge, Button would likely secure bond easily. His statement, I'm gonna remember you, suggests a plausible future, violent action against Routson. We have recognized that threats of future violence over the telephone can constitute criminally punishable language. See State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 588-89 (Iowa 1976). Clearly, regarding a threat over the telephone, there is no immediate ability to carry out the threat when the speaker is not even physically present. Similarly, in State v. Fratzke , we recognized that harassment of an officer could occur by the mere mailing of an insulting letter. State v. Fratzke, 446 N.W.2d 781, 783-85 (Iowa 1989) (reversing the harassment conviction because, although the language fell under the statute, it could be construed to have a legitimate purpose). The instant case is even more compelling because Button was nearly able to physically kick Routson after making his threatening statements. Because we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, looking at the totality of the evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to find that Button intended to threaten, intimidate, or alarm Sergeant Routson. Therefore, the intent element was supported by substantial evidence.