Opinion ID: 1316031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Allowing Punitive Damages for Medical Monitoring is Consistent with Existing West Virginia Punitive Damages Law

Text: Allowing punitive damages to be recovered in connection with a medical monitoring claim is consistent with West Virginia punitive damages law. Apart from the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must prove that the defendant's misconduct caused his/her injury, and the plaintiff must receive an award of compensatory damages for such injury. See Syl. pt. 1, Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991); Davis & Palmer, Punitive Damages Law, at 7. In a claim for medical monitoring, both of these criteria are satisfied. First, we recognized in Bower that `the exposure itself and the concomitant need for medical testing constitute the injury.' Bower, 206 W.Va. at 139, 522 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d at 977 (citations omitted)). Accord State ex rel. Chemtall Inc. v. Madden, 216 W.Va. at 455-56, 607 S.E.2d at 784-85 (discussing injury in medical monitoring claim as invasion of legally protected interest due to `significantly increased risk of contracting a particular disease' (quoting Bower, 206 W.Va. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 433)). Second, a medical monitoring plaintiff is made whole when the defendant is required to pay for his/her medical examinations. Bower, 206 W.Va. at 139, 522 S.E.2d at 430. Thus, [m]edical monitoring... [is a] compensable item of damages. Bower, 206 W.Va. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 433. Accord Fried v. Sungard Recovery Servs., Inc., 925 F.Supp. 372, 374 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (Under the medical monitoring case-law, a plaintiff will only be entitled to medical monitoring if he or she can prove, through reliable expert testimony, that surveillance to monitor the effects of exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary. If a plaintiff can make such a showing, those future medical expenses are simply compensatory damages like any other medical expenses. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F.Supp. 512, 514 (D.Colo.1991) (`A medical monitoring claim compensates a plaintiff for diagnostic treatment, a tangible and quantifiable item of damage caused by a defendant's tortious conduct. Such relief is akin to future medical expenses.' (quoting Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F.Supp. 1468, 1478 (D.Colo. 1991))). Moreover, recovery of punitive damages in connection with a claim for medical monitoring in which no present physical injury is manifest but continuous medical testing is needed to determine if and/or when such physical injury will manifest itself is consistent with our allowance of punitive damages in connection with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that requires medical treatment. In Tudor v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 203 W.Va. 111, 506 S.E.2d 554 (1997), we recognized that an award for intentional infliction of emotional distress damages may have an inherently punitive component, particularly where there exists no present injury and no present treatment is required. However, where treatment is required, emotional distress damages are more akin to compensatory damages. Thus, an additional award of punitive damages is permissible and is not duplicative. In cases where the jury is presented with an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, without physical trauma or without concomitant medical or psychiatric proof of emotional or mental trauma, i.e. the plaintiff fails to exhibit either a serious physical or mental condition requiring medical treatment, psychiatric treatment, counseling or the like, any damages awarded by the jury for intentional infliction of emotional distress under these circumstances necessarily encompass punitive damages and, therefore, an additional award for punitive damages would constitute an impermissible double recovery. Where, however, the jury is presented with substantial and concrete evidence of a plaintiff's serious physical, emotional or psychiatric injury arising out of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, i.e. treatment for physical problems, depression, anxiety, or other emotional or mental problems, then any compensatory or special damages awarded would be in the nature of compensation to the injured plaintiff(s) for actual injury, rather than serving the function of punishing the defendant(s) and deterring such future conduct, a punitive damage award in such cases would not constitute an impermissible double recovery. Syl. pt. 14, in part, Tudor, 203 W.Va. 111, 506 S.E.2d 554 (emphasis added). In a claim for medical monitoring, ongoing treatment, by way of testing, is required as it is in cases in which an emotional distress plaintiff requires ongoing medical care. Thus, an award for medical monitoring is compensatory in nature insofar as it reimburses the injured plaintiff for the cost of medical testing occasioned by the defendant's wrongful conduct such that an additional award of punitive damages would not be duplicative of the plaintiff's medical monitoring recovery. This reasoning is consistent with our recognition in Bower that no recovery may be had for medical monitoring where no testing is available for the plaintiff's potential injury. See Bower, 206 W.Va. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (Medical monitoring must be available in order to be a necessary, compensable item of damages. `If no such test exists, then periodic monitoring is of no assistance and the cost of such monitoring is not available.' (quoting Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So.2d 355, 361 (La.1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Edwards v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Hosps. for Southeast Louisiana State Hosp. at Mandeville, La., 804 So.2d 886 (La.Ct.App.2001))). Despite this jurisprudential foundation to support an award of punitive damages for medical monitoring, the majority, instead, has held, in Syllabus point 5, that [p]unitive damages may not be awarded on a cause of action for medical monitoring. With this holding, the majority has essentially eviscerated any potential recovery of punitive damages not only for medical monitoring claims but also for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, effectively overruling Syllabus point 14 of Tudor. The holding announced by the majority today fails to distinguish between these two types of claims or to explain why a plaintiff who requires ongoing future medical treatment for emotional distress is entitled to an award of punitive damages but a plaintiff who requires ongoing future medical monitoring for a fatal illness is not entitled to such an award. Both plaintiffs were innocent bystanders of a defendant's tortious conduct, and, in both cases, the defendant's conduct was so egregious as to require the plaintiffs to require ongoing future medical care. Yet, the plaintiff receiving medical care to detect whether the defendant's conduct has caused him/her to develop a fatal illness is not entitled to punitive damages. This plaintiff could die as a result of the defendant's conduct, but this Court will not permit either this plaintiff, or his/her estate, to recover damages to punish a defendant who has acted `maliciously, wantonly, mischievously or with criminal indifference to civil obligations.' Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 224 W.Va. at 190, 680 S.E.2d at 821 (quoting Syl. pt. 3, in part, Jopling v. Bluefield Water Works, 70 W.Va. 670, 74 S.E. 943). Such a result is inconsistent, unfair, inequitable, unjust, and, in a nutshell, just plain wrong. The net effect of the majority's holding on the principles recognized in Tudor will be twofold. First, every plaintiff seeking medical monitoring will necessarily add a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to ensure that he/she will be permitted to seek and recover an award of punitive damages. Second, every defendant who is currently embroiled in a lawsuit in which the plaintiff has advanced a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and has been awarded punitive damages has been put on alert to appeal the punitive damages award. These defendants will then knock on this Court's door to ask that they be excused from paying punitive damages because the analogous case of Perrine v. DuPont holds that punitive damages cannot be awarded for future medical care. Although I do not believe that this upheaval of our punitive damages precedent was intended by the majority of the Court when it rendered its decision in this case, such is the practical effect of this Court's holding. Therefore, until this Court is presented with the opportunity to revisit either its holding disallowing punitive damages for medical monitoring or its holding allowing punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the availability of punitive damages remains uncertain and creates much confusion for members of the bench and the bar alike.