Opinion ID: 1802346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the administratrix's actions are void.

Text: ¶ 37. The Estate argues that Price's actions as administratrix were valid and should be upheld by this Court. Even if the appointment of Price as administratrix were declared void, the Estate argues that Price's acts as administratrix would not be invalid. The Estate contends that the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court did not transfer a nullity since it closed the Estate. At the same time, letters of administration were issued in the Leflore County Chancery Court effectively opening the Estate in Leflore County. The chancellor then ratified Price's actions performed while under the authority of the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court. ¶ 38. The Estate relies on a number of Mississippi cases where this Court ratified the actions of administrators and administratrixes. [2] The Defendants contend that none of the cases upon which the Estate relies, concern failed jurisdiction. We agree. All of the Estate's cases concern the ratification of an administrator's actions when dealings with third parties. As such, all the Estate's cases are distinguishable from the jurisdictional issue before the Court today. ¶ 39. The Estate also argues that Methodist Hosp. of Hattiesburg v. Richardson ( Richardson II ), 909 So.2d 1066 (Miss. 2005), is controlling and allows for a reasonable time to substitute pursuant to M.R.C.P. 17. [3] In Richardson II, this Court referenced Richardson v. Methodist Hospital of Hattiesburg, 807 So.2d 1244 (Miss.2002) ( Richardson I ), in which this Court affirmed a circuit court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of hospital on the issue of wrongful death, yet allowed a claim for a survival action. Richardson II, 909 So.2d at 1068. On remand, the circuit court granted the hospital's summary judgment motion claiming that the real party in interest, the Estate of Vivian Wheeless, was not a party to the actions as an estate had never been opened. Id. Three days after the circuit court decision, Richardson filed a petition in the Lamar County Chancery Court to open an estate for Wheeless and to appoint Richardson as administratrix. Id. Thereafter, Richardson filed an amended complaint with the circuit court. Id. at 1068-69. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, which was the issue this Court addressed on interlocutory appeal in Richardson II. The hospital's motion for summary judgment claimed, in part, that the Estate of Wheeless was a stranger to the litigation. Id. at 1069. This Court held that pursuant to M.R.C.P. 17, the real party in interest joined the suit within a reasonable time after objection. Id. at 1073. Therefore, the Estate asserts that like Richardson II, the Leflore County Chancery Court Estate of Eva Boles was substituted as the real party in interest. ¶ 40. The Defendants distinguish Richardson II from the case today. The Defendants assert that the underlying difference in Richardson II was that this Court did not have to address whether the plaintiff was the proper party or whether the case was properly filed. Here, the Defendants argue that the appointment of the administratrix and the opening of the Estate were void ab initio, therefore, as a matter of law Price had no authority to file the wrongful death action in Leflore County Circuit Court in 2002. In addition, the Defendants claim that the real party in interest is the Estate of Eva Boles, however, the Estate is null and void since it is void ab initio. As for M.R.C.P. 17, the Defendants argue that substituting the Estate into the Leflore County Circuit Court action is not permissible because the action was initially brought be one lacking capacity to bring the suit, unlike the plaintiffs in Richardson II. Consequently, the Defendants maintain that substitution cannot cure the deficiencies in the case. ¶ 41. Richardson II is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Richardson II, there was never an issue of whether the Wheeless estate was filed in the wrong county. Initially, Richardson, the daughter and an heir, filed a wrongful death claim individually and on behalf of her siblings with no separate wrongful death claim on behalf of the Estate of Wheeless. Richardson II, 909 So.2d at 1067. No estate was open at the time that Richardson filed the lawsuit. Id. When this Court found that there was a survival claim, the hospital challenged the ruling on remand asserting that the real party in interest, Wheeless's estate, was never opened by Richardson. Id. at 1068. After opening an estate, the circuit court permitted Richardson to amend the complaint in the pending action to add Wheeless's estate. Id. at 1068-69. This Court found that Richardson properly ratified and joined the action by amending the complaint within a reasonable time. Id. at 1070. ¶ 42. In contrast to Richardson II, the Estate filed the initial estate matter in the wrong chancery court, therefore, the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court Estate was void ab initio. In keeping with this logic and the fact that the Estate was void, Price had no authority to file the lawsuit in Leflore County. Price also was not a wrongful death beneficiary pursuant to statute. The fact that the Tallahatchie County Chancery Court later transferred the case to Leflore County is of no consequence and cannot ratify the Leflore County Estate nor the filing of the circuit court action. Price never had the authority to file the lawsuit in Leflore County on behalf of the void Tallahatchie County Estate. Therefore, no actual or legitimate Estate ever existed and accordingly there was never a legitimate plaintiff in the Leflore County Circuit Court action. We find that the action was filed by a void estate through an administrator whose appointment also was void.