Opinion ID: 4542480
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Williams

Text: Wright’s excessive-force claim against Williams, based on his brandishing of a firearm and use of the pepper spray, largely mirrors the claim against Flagg based on his similar use of a firearm and tasing, and therefore the analysis is largely the same. The discussion of the Graham factors as they relate to Williams is identical to the analysis of those factors as they concern Flagg. The severity of the crime, whether Wright was a threat to the police, and whether Wright actively resisted arrest all present questions of fact that should be decided by a jury. In Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994), we held that summary judgment was inappropriate for an excessive-force claim brought against police officers for the use of pepper spray, when it remained genuinely disputed whether the plaintiff had committed a crime, whether he posed a threat, and whether he was resisting arrest. Id. at 385–86; see also Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18 F. App’x 252, 266–68 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, as discussed, it remains genuinely disputed whether Wright had committed a crime, whether he posed a threat to officers, and whether he was actively resisting arrest. See, e.g., Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (“An officer has used excessive force when he pepper sprays a suspect who has not been told she is under arrest and is not resisting arrest.”). The body-cam footage shows that while Flagg was attempting to gain control of Wright’s right arm, Williams reached into the car with the can of pepper spray and sprayed Wright within inches of his face. Wright’s expert opined that the use of pepper spray at this close distance was unreasonably dangerous and violated nationally-accepted standards and protocols, which dictate that pepper spray “should not be used on someone closer than three feet from the canister’s nozzle.” R. 31-6 at PageID 1416. Further, this expert noted that the Euclid Police Department’s use-of-force continuum indicates that pepper spray should be used only when an individual is wrestling with or pushing an officer, not when the suspect is pulling away from an officer. This testimony supports Wright’s argument that Williams acted unreasonably in his use of the pepper spray. No. 19-3452 Wright v. City of Euclid, et al. Page 19 Furthermore, the evaluation of the reasonableness of officers’ use of force “considers the effects of their actions, as any inquiry into a violation of the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Brown, 814 F.3d at 459 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). As Wright’s expert opined, use of pepper spray at such a close proximity risks significant injury, which is not present if the officer uses the spray at a safe distance. This testimony and the other proof present a jury question as to whether Williams’s use of the pepper spray constituted excessive force in violation of Wright’s constitutional rights.
For reasons similar to those discussed above as they relate to Flagg’s use of his taser, we hold that the right to be free from being pepper sprayed when a suspect is not actively resisting arrest was also clearly established at the time of the encounter in question. See, e.g., Coffey, 933 F.3d at 589 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Drawing the line at a suspect’s active resistance defines the right at a level of particularity appropriate for a claim pursued under § 1983.”); Smith, 874 F.3d at 945 (“It was well-established [in 2014] that a non-violent, non-resisting, or only passively resisting suspect who is not under arrest has a right to be free from an officer’s use of force.”). Wright has produced evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that he had not committed a serious crime, or any crime at all; that he was not a danger to the officers or the public; and that he was not resisting arrest. Although the officers tell a different story, it should be up to the jury to determine whose story is more credible. Therefore, we REVERSE as to the excessive-force claim against Williams for deploying his pepper spray, as well as for brandishing his firearm.