Opinion ID: 2679691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: defense-theory claims

Text: Wallace argues that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by (1) failing to present evidence that the shotgun used to kill Perrin had a “hair trigger” and (2) failing to request jury instructions regarding accident and self-defense. We will consider these claims together because they relate to the same substantive point—that trial counsel should have argued the theory that Wallace accidentally shot Perrin in a struggle over the shotgun—and they present identical procedural issues. For ease of reference, we will refer to these claims as Wallace’s “defense-theory claims.” The State argues that we may not consider Wallace’s defense-theory claims because he procedurally defaulted the claims by failing to raise them before the state post-conviction appellate court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Wallace’s counsel failed to include the defensetheory claims in his brief before the post-conviction appellate court. R. 17-12 (P.C. Appellant Br.) (Page ID #1446–64). However, counsel attached Wallace’s pro se “supplemental brief” as an appendix to his own brief because he “fe[lt] compelled to submit this document” after reviewing the relevant court rules. Id. at 15 (Page ID #1463). The post-conviction appellate court did not explicitly comment upon the appended pro se supplemental brief, instead choosing to address only the claims advanced by Wallace’s counsel. Wallace v. State, 2009 WL 3031261, at –7. Because we ordinarily “presume[] that the state court adjudicated [any] claim [presented to it] on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary,” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784–85, we must first determine whether Wallace’s 14 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton defense-theory claims were “presented” to the post-conviction appellate court through his supplemental brief. We conclude that Wallace’s defense-theory claims were not fairly presented to the appropriate state court because a Tennessee procedural rule barred consideration of his supplemental pro se brief. In Tennessee, a petitioner represented by either retained or appointed counsel may not file pro se briefs. See State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976); see also Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tenn. 2001) (barring defendants from “representing themselves while simultaneously being represented by counsel”). State courts regularly enforce this rule and decline to consider pro se filings from represented defendants. See Hill v. Carlton, 399 F. App’x 38 (6th Cir. 2010).4 Moreover, the rule is an adequate and independent state ground sufficient to foreclose the state court’s review of Wallace’s defense-theory claims. Therefore, the defense-theory claims are procedurally defaulted. See Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. Wallace argues that, notwithstanding the Tennessee procedural rule, his defense-theory claims are not defaulted because his pro se brief fairly presented the claims to the postconviction appellate court. Wallace relies heavily on Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1997). In Clemmons, the court held that a petitioner’s claim was fairly presented when, after the petitioner’s counsel refused to raise the claim in his brief, the petitioner filed a separate supplemental brief. The court reasoned that it was unclear “what else [the petitioner] could have 4 There are some exceptional circumstances in which Tennessee courts have allowed a represented defendant to file a pro se brief. See Smith v. State, 757 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). However, “[o]ccasional exceptions . . . do not call a rule’s validity into question.” Hill v. Carlton, 399 F. App’x 38, 44 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 869 (6th Cir. 2000)). 15 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton done, as a practical matter, to present the claim to [the Missouri state court] for decision on the merits.” Id. at 948. Clemmons is easily distinguishable from the instant case because “[n]o rule of court or reported Missouri case . . . specifies the circumstances under which Missouri appellate courts allow pro se briefs.” Id. at 948 n.3. Accordingly, the petitioner’s claim in Clemmons was not barred because of “a regularly applied rule of state procedural law,” and was not procedurally defaulted. Id. By contrast, Tennessee courts follow the rule that petitioners may not file pro se briefs while they are represented by counsel. Therefore, Clemmons offers no support to Wallace’s argument that his claims were not procedurally barred. Wallace makes a final argument that his supplemental brief was not truly a “pro se” pleading because it was appended to his counsel’s brief and filed by counsel. Were we to consider this argument in the first instance, we might find some merit to it. After all, Wallace’s counsel filed his supplemental brief as an appendix to counsel’s brief because he felt “compelled” to do so by court and ethical rules. R. 17-12 (P.C. Appellant Br. at 15) (Page ID #1463). However, it is not within our authority as “a federal habeas court to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Tennessee courts are at liberty to interpret Wallace’s supplemental brief as a pro se filing prohibited by state procedural rules, and it appears that they did so here. The state post-conviction appellate court did not explicitly state that it declined to consider Wallace’s supplemental pro se brief. However, it responded in detail to claims raised by Wallace’s counsel, see Wallace v. State, 2009 WL 3031261, at  (listing the seven ineffective-assistance claims raised in counsel’s brief), without even mentioning Wallace’s 16 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton supplemental brief or any of the claims raised therein. We can infer only that the court applied the Tennessee procedural rule barring consideration of pro se filings made by represented petitioners. See Hill, 399 F. App’x at 43 (concluding that a pro se petition was rejected when the Tennessee court, in denying the petition, addressed only the claims raised by counsel). We are sympathetic to the fact that Wallace faced a difficult predicament when his counsel refused to include his non-frivolous claims on appeal to the post-conviction appellate court. Nonetheless, we must conclude that Wallace’s supplemental pro se brief did not “fairly present” his defensetheory claims in a way that would allow the state court to address those claims on the merits. Accordingly, we conclude that Wallace’s defense-theory claims are procedurally barred. Once we have concluded that a claim was procedurally barred by a state rule, we may consider the claim on the merits only if the petitioner establishes cause and prejudice to excuse the default or demonstrates that his is “an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Wallace argues that the ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel constitutes cause for his failure to exhaust his defense-theory claims before the postconviction court. Generally, an attorney’s ineffective assistance in post-conviction proceedings does not qualify as “cause” to excuse procedural default of his constitutional claims. Coleman, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991). However, the Supreme Court has carved out an exception to this general rule for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when those claims may be raised for the first time only in post-conviction proceedings. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 17 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that “[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” Id. at 1320. “Initial-review collateral proceedings” provide the first opportunity for the state court to consider a particular claim on the merits because the claim could not have been raised on direct appeal. Thus, they are “in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.” Id. at 1317. The Court created this narrow exception to the Coleman procedural-default rule because “[w]hen an attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim. . . . And if counsel’s errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding do not establish cause to excuse the procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will review the prisoner’s claims.” Id. at 1316. In Trevino, the Supreme Court extended the Martinez rule to states whose procedural structure makes it “virtually impossible” for a defendant to present an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, even if there is no outright requirement that a defendant refrain from doing so. 133 S. Ct. at 1915. Tennessee’s procedural framework directs defendants to file ineffective-assistance claims in post-conviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal, and thus it falls into the Martinez-Trevino framework. Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F.3d 787, 795–96 (6th Cir. 2014). 18 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton Wallace claims that his counsel at the post-conviction appellate proceeding was ineffective for failing to raise the relevant ineffective-assistance claims. Ineffective assistance of counsel at this stage of the case cannot constitute cause to excuse the procedural default because it is not an initial-review collateral proceeding. Although Martinez and Trevino expanded the class of cases in which a petitioner can establish cause to excuse the procedural default of ineffective-assistance claims, the Supreme Court cautioned that the rule “does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. “While counsel’s errors in [other levels of post-conviction] proceedings preclude any further review of the prisoner’s claim, the claim will have been addressed by one court, whether it be the trial court, the appellate court on direct review, or the trial court in an initial-review collateral proceeding.” Id. at 1316. In the instant case, Wallace’s claims were properly presented to the post-conviction trial court, which denied all of his claims on the merits. Thus, the alleged ineffective assistance of Wallace’s postconviction appellate counsel is not cause to excuse the procedural default of his defense-theory claims, and we may not consider these claims on the merits.