Opinion ID: 2632630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial motion and trial decisions by the district court

Text: UNLV contends the district court erred by denying a pretrial motion to establish issue preclusion based on the UCCSN code hearing. UNLV argues that the hearing process and the subsequent appeal to the Board of Regents established that UNLV terminated Sutton with just cause. Therefore, UNLV sought to prevent Sutton from arguing at trial that UNLV did not have just cause to terminate his employment. `The general rule of issue preclusion is that if an issue of fact or law was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties.'  [19] 'The doctrine provides that any issue that was actually and necessarily litigated in [case I] will be estopped from being relitigated in [case II].' [20] Issue preclusion may apply to administrative proceedings. [21] The availability of issue preclusion is a mixed question of law and fact. However, the legal issues predominate. [22] This court performs a de novo review of whether issue preclusion is available. [23] Once it is determined that issue preclusion is available, the actual decision to apply it is left to the discretion of the district court. [24] The three part test for applying issue preclusion is: (1) the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the current action; (2) the initial ruling must have been on the merits and have become final; and (3) the party against whom the judgment is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation. [25] The issues decided during the 1999 UCCSN code hearing, and the subsequent appeal to the Board of Regents, were not identical to the issues presented in Sutton's district court complaint. The hearing panel did not consider Sutton's 1999 contract or his performance in 1999. To the contrary, the panel only heard evidence regarding events which took place in 1990 and 1991. Sutton sought relief for breach of the 1999 contract. Since the special hearing held by UNLV did not address Sutton's 1999 contract, but rather allegations dating back to 1990-91, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to apply issue preclusion.
UNLV argues the district court abused its discretion in excluding the hearing officer's report and record, which recommended Sutton's termination. The trial court excluded the report at trial under NRS 48.035. [26] The court did, however, admit the index to the special code hearing record. The decision to admit or exclude relevant evidence, after balancing the prejudicial effect against the probative value, is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the trial court's determination will not be overturned absent manifest error or abuse of discretion. [27] We conclude the district court's decision was not manifestly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
UNLV also contends the district court erred by admitting evidence at trial that was not admitted at the administrative hearing, such as Sutton's 1999 teaching performance. According to UNLV, Sutton agreed to a process by which he could be terminated, and therefore, only evidence presented at the special code hearing should have been presented to the jury. As discussed above, however, evidence at the UCCSN code hearing was limited to matters from 1990 and 1991, and Sutton was required to defend himself at the special hearing eight years after the events occurred. In contrast, Sutton's complaint in district court focused on the breach of his 1999 contract with UNLV. The 1999 contractual issues were not at issue at the UCCSN code hearing. Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting relevant evidence. [28]
UNLV contends the district court erred by allowing the jury to interpret the meaning of the Sutton I judgment. The stipulation, entered into by the parties in open court (Sutton I), required UNLV to continue [Sutton] in his employment unless and until such time as his tenure is revoked by hearing held pursuant to the university code. UNLV argues that the stipulation authorized UNLV to conduct the hearing and prevented Sutton from arguing at trial that UNLV could not conduct the hearing. We disagree. Normally, the `legal operation and effect of a judgment must be ascertained by a construction and interpretation of it,' which presents a question of law for the court. [29] However, in the instant matter, the parties' stipulation, which became a part of the judgment, was admitted by the district court at trial. Sutton sought and was denied a partial summary judgment before trial. Sutton suggested in his summary judgment motion that the UCCSN code, which was incorporated into his 1999 contract, did not permit UNLV to terminate his employment because the hearing was held more than six months after the filing of the initial administrative complaint. UNLV opposed that motion, arguing that the stipulation contained in the 1999 judgment did allow the parties to proceed with a hearing in 1999. We conclude the district court did not err by admitting the 1999 judgment into evidence. The judgment was relevant to the issue of whether the parties intended the 1999 contract as an integration of their prior stipulation. Further, the judgment was relevant to President Harter's motive in pursuing the hearing, despite the six-month rule. The jury was entitled to review the 1999 judgment in light of all the other evidence presented.