Opinion ID: 792662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Biological Mothers Versus Biological Fathers

Text: 15 The University provides biological mothers with the option of using up to six weeks of accrued paid sick leave after birth. Although only women are eligible to receive this benefit, the policy does not necessarily present gender-plus discrimination. If the leave given to biological mothers is granted due to the physical trauma they sustain giving birth, then it is conferred for a valid reason wholly separate from gender. If the leave is instead designed to provide time to care for, and bond with, a newborn, then there is no legitimate reason for biological fathers to be denied the same benefit. Thus, the primary question for us to consider is whether the leave given to biological mothers is in fact disability leave. 16 Johnson relies heavily on the Parental Leave Policy's introductory statement which says its purpose is to permit parents who have care giving responsibilities to have time off to spend with a child newly added to the family .... Johnson also draws our attention to an Informational Guide produced by the University which states: leave is for the biological mother to recover from childbirth and to spend time with the newborn child .... Although these purpose statements cloud the issue, they are not part of the operative language of the policy. 3 The sentence that actually confers the benefit at issue states: Biological mothers are entitled to leave for any period of pregnancy-related temporary disability, to be charged against accrued sick leave. This policy language does not allow mothers to use accrued sick leave after their period of disability has ended. Thus, the period away from work constitutes disability leave, even though mothers are likely caring for their newborns during this period. Allowing biological mothers pregnancy-related disability leave on the same terms as employees with other disabilities is not only permissible, but is required by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Pub.L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.2076 (1978). 17 Johnson argues that the University's paid maternity leave cannot be interpreted as disability leave because the University does not require proof of a disability when the leave taken after giving birth is six weeks or less. We reject this argument because it is not unreasonable for the University to establish a period of presumptive disability so that it does not need to review medical records for each and every employee who gives birth. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the University provided testimony that a six-week period of disability after childbirth is supported by medical evidence. Although Johnson submitted Embree's affidavit claiming that she was fully recovered from childbirth after four weeks, he has offered no medical evidence indicating that the general period of recovery is less than six weeks. For all of these reasons, we find that the policy's provisions distinguishing between biological mothers and biological fathers are not facially invalid. 18 Johnson also contends that even if these provisions are facially valid, they are discriminatory as applied. He claims that Embree was given four weeks of medical leave and then two weeks of paid parental leave, but that his request to take any paid leave was denied. Embree's affidavit asserts that she decided to take four weeks of medical leave and then an additional two weeks of partial leave for the exclusive purpose of spending time with and caring for [her] newborn child. Embree's affidavit also contends that she made the reasons for her requested leave known to a supervisor. 19 In considering this motion for summary judgment, we must assume that Embree's assertions are accurate because we take the non-movant's evidence as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir.1999). Embree's reasons for requesting leave are not at issue, however. We are only concerned with the University's motivation in granting the leave. The University required Embree to obtain a medical release before she voluntarily returned to work on a part-time basis four weeks after giving birth. 4 Johnson contends that this release proves that the subsequent two weeks of part-time leave granted to Embree were for caregiving purposes and not disability leave. This argument fails to consider the possibility of partial disability leave. In the fifth and sixth weeks after giving birth, Embree worked only ten hours per week. Furthermore, she worked from home. Thus, it is not a reasonable inference to assume that Embree demonstrated that she was medically cleared to return to work full-time without any restrictions, but was then still allowed to continue to take paid leave. 20 Even if we assume that the University did allow Embree to use accrued sick leave solely for the purpose of caring for her newborn, Johnson cannot establish that the policy was improperly applied to him in a discriminatory fashion. To demonstrate that the University's stated reasons for treating Johnson and Embree differently are pretextual — and that Johnson's gender was the real reason he was discriminated against — Johnson would have to show that he was treated differently than a similarly situated female employee. Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir.2005). At the pretextual stage of the analysis, the test for determining whether employees are similarly situated to a plaintiff is a rigorous one. Id. In this stage, the plaintiff must show that the employee who was treated differently was similarly situated to him in all relevant respects. Id. The same requirement applies to equal protection claims. To establish a gender-based claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the appellants must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate that they have been treated differently by a state actor than others who are similarly situated simply because appellants belong to a particular protected class. Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir.1996). 21 Johnson and Embree are not similarly situated. They had different job responsibilities, worked in different departments and reported to different supervisors. Most significantly, Johnson was a full-time employee and Embree was a part-time employee. Generally, part-time employees are not similarly situated to full-time employees. See Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 244 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir.2001). Furthermore, even if Embree and Johnson were similarly situated from an employment perspective, at the time Embree allegedly received parental leave for caregiving purposes, she was only a month removed from childbirth. Even if Embree was medically released to begin working from home on a part-time basis, the fact that she had recently gone through the physical trauma of labor is a distinguishing characteristic between her and Johnson. Accordingly, Johnson's as applied challenge to the biological mother classification fails. 22 Johnson urges us to find that the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution provides broader protection than the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. His argument relies on Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2004), in which the Iowa Supreme Court found that different tax rates on the slot machines of racetracks and river boats violated the Iowa Constitution even though the United States Supreme Court had ruled that the differing tax rates did not violate the United States Constitution. Although the Iowa Supreme Court noted that the federal constitutionality of a law is not binding on whether the law violates the Iowa Constitution, such a conclusion was deemed to be persuasive. Id. at 5. For the reasons already discussed, we believe that even if the Iowa Supreme Court conducted an independent analysis of this policy under its state constitution, it would also uphold the policy.