Opinion ID: 771148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions on Mental State and Physical Trauma

Text: 49 Petitioner next challenges the trial court's instructions on mental state as violative of due process. To prevail on this claim, Petitioner must demonstrate that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Cupp v. Naughten , 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). 50 The court defined mental disorder as a disease or affliction of the mind which so greatly affects the rational intellect and interferes with the mental processes that the individual is unable to function within the scope of reasonably normal and socially acceptable behavior in the community . . . . [T]he term includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional process and substantially impairs behavior controls. 51 The court also instructed the jury with the following passage from CALJIC 3.32: 52 Evidence has been received regarding physical trauma received by the defendant during or prior to the crime charged in Count 1. You may consider such evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the specific intent and, if applicable, the mental state elements of the crime charged in Count 1 . . . . 53 Petitioner argues that the first instruction violated due process because the phrase the individual is unable to function within the scope of reasonably normal and socially acceptable behavior in the community caused the jury to disregard his claim that he was temporarily insane by suggesting that he did not have a mental disorder so long as he was able to function in society as a general matter. However, the trial court also instructed the jury to consider evidence of Petitioner's mental state at the time of the crime . (Emphasis added.) In view of the latter instruction, a reasonable jury would not have thought that its inquiry into Petitioner's mental state was limited to a generalized consideration of Petitioner's ability to function in society. 54 As to the second instruction, Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider evidence of physical trauma without specifying that the jury additionally could consider evidence of sexual abuse. But in this instance the sexual abuse that Petitioner claimed to have suffered was a form of physical trauma. It is highly unlikely that the jury took the court's instruction to mean that it could consider the evidence that Petitioner had been beaten, but not the evidence that his mother had sexually abused him. 55 In short, Petitioner's arguments are too speculative to demonstrate that the challenged instructions were defective at all, let alone defective to an extent that violated due process. 56