Opinion ID: 901719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Other Acts

Text: [¶ 25.] Rule 404(b) as codified at SDCL 19-12-5 provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added). [¶ 26.] Pursuant to the other purposes under Rule 404(b), the trial court allowed Kostel to ask the following three questions for the purpose of determining whether Dr. Schwartz had the requisite skill and knowledge required of a neurosurgeon to read and interpret the radiographic images in this case[:] 1. Did you misread X-rays involving spinal surgeries in the 14 months prior to Ms. Kostel's surgery? 2. On how many occasions did you misread X-rays involving spinal surgeries during this period of time? 3. Did you operate at a level of a patients spine not consented to in the 14 months prior to Ms. Kostels surgery? Dr. Schwartz answered affirmatively to all three questions. [¶ 27.] Given that the list of other purposes under Rule 404(b) for which evidence of other acts may be admitted is nonexclusive, the possible uses, other than character, are limitless. State v. Wright, 1999 SD 50, ¶ 14, 593 N.W.2d 792, 798. Rule 404(b) is thus an inclusionary rule, not an exclusionary rule. Id. ¶ 13 (citing John W. Larson, South Dakota Evidence § 404.2(1) (1991)). Evidence is only inadmissible under the rule if offered to prove character. Id. (citing Larson, § 404.2(1)). [¶ 28.] Notwithstanding the inclusionary nature of Rule 404(b), the proponent of the other-act evidence has the burden of showing the relevance of the other act. SDCL 19-12-1 (Rule 401); [17] SDCL 19-12-2 (Rule 402). [18] The other-act evidence is then admissible only if the evidence is sufficient for the trial court to conclude that a jury could find by a preponderance that the other act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. Wright, 1999 SD 50, ¶ 14, 593 N.W.2d at 798 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)); See also State v. McDonald, 500 N.W.2d 243, 246 (S.D.1993) (additional citation omitted); see also SDCL 19-9-8 (Rule 104(b)). [19] When evidence is found relevant, the balance tips emphatically in favor of admission unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time or cumulative evidence pursuant to Rule 403. Wright, 1999 SD 50, ¶ 14, 593 N.W.2d at 799 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, Evidence § 8.28, at 118-19 (Rev. ed. 1998)). The party objecting to the admission of the other-act evidence then has the burden of establishing that the concerns expressed under Rule 403 substantially outweigh the probative value. Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Larson, § 403.1; (citing Jane C. Hofmeyer, A Relaxed Standard of Proof for Rule 404(b) Evidence: United States v. Huddleston, 6 Cooley L.Rev. 79 (1989))); see also Id. ¶ 15 (citing United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 757 (11th Cir.1984) (Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence), reh'g denied, 740 F.2d 979 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, Gerwitz v. United States, 469 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 440, 83 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984)). [¶ 29.] Out of the jury's presence, trial counsel argued the merits of the inclusion of evidence pertaining to the two mistakenly performed spinal surgeries conducted by Dr. Schwartz within time proximity with Kostel's. Plaintiff's counsel argued that the nature of these surgeries was relevant to the case at bar and that evidence thereof should be admitted to show the degree of knowledge and skill possessed by Dr. Schwartz. In reaching its decision, the trial court made the following assessment: The evidence is directed toward establishing a matter and issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the act. [T]he evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter at issue. [T]the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that ... Dr. Schwartz committed this similar act. [T]he probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.] [¶ 30.] The trial court ultimately limited the admissible evidence to Dr. Schwartz's testimony to the three aforementioned questions, the wording of which was precisely crafted. The parties were further instructed that Dr. Schwartz could answer each question yes or no. [¶ 31.] Dr. Schwartz's other surgeries, from which the other-acts evidence was derived, were similar in kind and close in time to Kostel's surgery. Further, by his own admission, Dr. Schwartz made mistakes during those other surgeries. From Dr. Schwartz's affirmative answers to the three questions, there was sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that the jury could find that he had made prior mistakes. Given Dr. Schwartz's defense that the expansion of the preoperative scope of the procedure was attributable to an intraoperative diagnosis of more extensive pathology requiring treatment, the evidence entered for purposes of showing his knowledge and skill was not unduly prejudicial to Dr. Schwartz. Rather, it went to establishing Kostel's claim that the two additional fusions, beyond the consented-to L4-L5, were performed in error due to his lack of competency. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Kostel to ask the three questions and admitted Dr. Schwartz's answers pursuant Rule 404(b).