Opinion ID: 2600380
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The OEI is subject to strict scrutiny.

Text: How the OEI impacts protected speech determines the state's burden in upholding the law's constitutionality. ACL argues that the OEI affects only the form and not the content of government speech, and that it affects neither the form nor content of citizen speech. Alakayak and Kritz respond that the OEI constitutes a content- and viewpoint-based restriction, as well as a prior restraint, both in its parts and as a whole. The latitude accorded the government to regulate speech depends upon several factors, including the circumstances involved and the nature of the speech. [109] But because the principle of content neutrality [is] at the core of First Amendment analysis, [110] we begin with this issue. It is exceedingly rare that any law restricting speech based on its content or viewpoint will be upheld, for the United States Supreme Court has stated that [c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid. [111] Such restrictions are subject to the strictest scrutiny, and only a regulation which impinges on the right to speak and associate to the least possible degree consistent with the achievement of the state's legitimate goals will pass constitutional muster. [112] Restrictions that are content-neutral, on the other hand, are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which means that they are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. [113] But even a content-neutral restriction will be subject to strict scrutiny if it imposes a prior restraint on speech. [114] A prior restraint is an official restriction imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication. [115] This stands in contrast to a punishment imposed after a communication has been made. [116] Both the federal and Alaska Constitutions look with disfavor on broad-based prior restraint rules that forbid public employees from engaging in wide categories of speech, whether related to their official duties or not; such restraints bear a heavy presumption against their constitutionality because of their chilling effect on potentially protected speech. [117] Laws prohibiting communication in languages other than English are difficult to categorize. We can readily agree with the Ninth Circuit that such a restriction affects more than conduct, because [s]peech in any language is still speech, and the decision to speak in another language is a decision involving speech alone. [118] But the question whether a law specifying that only one language may be spoken should be classified as content-based is a closer one. The OEI does not present the classic example of a content-based restriction, such as a prohibition on political protest based upon the viewpoint represented [119] or a restriction on sexually explicit television programming. [120] But clearly such a restriction affects more than the form of speech. Communication begins with language, and a non-English-speaking Alaskan could be absolutely precluded from speaking or otherwise communicating with the government by the OEI. As the Arizona Supreme Court noted when confronted with a similar question, a law forcing communication only in English bars communication itself; such a restriction cannot be content-neutral because that designation, by definition, assume[s] and require[s] the availability of alternative means of communication. [121] Thus, like the Arizona Court, we conclude that the OEI is a content-based restriction on language. [122] But the precise label we attach to the law for analytical purposes is not critical when viewed in light of the OEI's sweeping impact. The OEI prohibits speech itself: It defines a broad category of speech  speech in languages other than English  and simply forbids it. If all government communications must be in English, some voices will be silenced, some ideas will remain unspoken, and some ideas will remain unchallenged. Such a requirement harms society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas. [123] Complete speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions on time, place, or manner of expression, are particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain information. [124] Such a restriction violates the core values protected by the First Amendment and article I, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution. Because the OEI literally restricts speech itself  both oral and written communications in languages other than English  it must overcome a significant hurdle to justify its constitutionality. [125] Specifically, to withstand constitutional scrutiny the OEI must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. [126] We thus turn to the question whether the State of Alaska has a compelling interest in forbidding the use of languages other than English in the conduct of all government activities. [127]