Opinion ID: 2518473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Section 1954.535 in Jurisdictions Without Rent Control Ordinances

Text: Wasatch contends that it was required to give Degrate only 30 days' notice of the termination of her tenancy, as prescribed by section 1946, rather than the 90-day notice required by section 1954.535, because the latter statute applies only in jurisdictions in which a public entity has enacted a residential rent control ordinance. However, nothing in the language of section 1954.535 suggests that it applies only in jurisdictions that have enacted rent control ordinances. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, we look to the intent of the Legislature as expressed by the actual words of the statute. ( People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 947 P.2d 808.) We examine the language first, as it is the language of the statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet. ( Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298.) It is that [statutory] language which has been lobbied for, lobbied against, studied, proposed, drafted, restudied, redrafted, voted on in committee, amended, reamended, analyzed, reanalyzed, voted on by two houses of the Legislature, sent to a conference committee, and, after perhaps more lobbying, debate and analysis, finally signed `into law' by the Governor. The same care and scrutiny does not befall the committee reports, caucus analyses, authors' statements, legislative counsel digests and other documents which make up a statute's `legislative history.' ( Ibid. ) Examining the language of section 1954.535, it is apparent that the statute does not apply only in jurisdictions with rent control ordinances, but rather applies anywhere in the state [w]here an owner terminates or fails to renew a contract or recorded agreement with a governmental agency that provides financial assistance, such as through the Section 8 program. (§ 1954.535.) It appears that the Legislature deliberately decided not to limit the reach of section 1954.535 to rent-controlled jurisdictions. Not only is there no language within section 1954.535 that explicitly limits the reach of the statute to rent-controlled jurisdictions, but the same bill that added section 1954.535 to the Civil Code also amended section 1954.53 to include such an express restriction. Section 1954.53, subdivision (a)(1)(A), as amended, plainly limits its scope to a jurisdiction that controls by ordinance or charter provision the rental rate for a dwelling or unit. Had the Legislature intended to also limit the scope of section 1954.535 in the same manner, it would have included similar language doing so. `[W]hen the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.' ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 725, 257 Cal.Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406, quoting Ford Motor Co. v. County of Tulare (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 688, 193 Cal. Rptr. 511; 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction (6th ed.2000) § 46:5.) Accordingly, we decline to interpret section 1954.535 to include a term limiting its application to rent-controlled jurisdictions. Indeed, the legislative history of section 1954.535 suggests that the 90-day notice provision was meant to address issues of statewide concern. The Senate Judiciary Committee's comment on the proposed 90-day notice provision explained the purpose of the increased notice period as follows: Proponents assert that the current requirement of 30 days notice is insufficient time for a Section 8 tenant to find replacement income and housing when the property [owner] decides to no longer accept Section 8 housing vouchers, thereby forcing the tenant to move. They assert that this proposal, requiring 90 days notice of the effective date of the landlord's termination or nonrenewal of a Section 8 agreement and freezing the tenant's rent for that period, does not impose an undue burden on the property owner. The only burden is to advise the affected tenants of the owner's decision 60 days earlier, thereby giving the affected tenants more time to prepare. This is fair, assert the proponents, given the tight market for low income housing and the unique relationship between the Section 8 tenant and his or her landlord. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7, 1999, p. 5.) The concern addressed by the Senate Judiciary Committee  that the typical 30-day notice provision would not afford Section 8 tenants enough time to find replacement income and housing, especially given a tight market for low-income rental housing  was not limited to rent-controlled jurisdictions. Likewise, the Assembly Committee on Appropriations understood Senate Bill No. 1098 to be a bill that sought to address some of the issues affecting low-income renters ... at a time when the healthy economy is pushing rent levels to new highs.... (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 8, 1999, p. 2.) This concern for low-income renters presumably extends not only to those renters in rent-controlled jurisdictions, but statewide, to all those affected by the tight housing market. Wasatch also supports its contention that section 1954.535 applies only in jurisdictions with rent control ordinances by noting the placement of the statute within a chapter of the Civil Code under the heading Residential Rent Control. This court, however, has noted that [t]itle or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute. ( DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140.) Although section 1954.535 was added to the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (§§ 1954.50-1954.535 (hereinafter, Costa-Hawkins Act or Act)), the short title of the chapter does not indicate that its contents are limited to rental housing within rent-controlled jurisdictions; to the contrary, the official short title of the chapter is the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act. (§ 1954.50, italics added.) Thus, the short title of the Civil Code chapter containing section 1954.535 indicates that the chapter's contents address rental housing in general, rather than simply residential rent control. The inclusion of the words rent control in the unofficial heading, which by its nature does not alter the scope, meaning, or intent of the statute, does not persuade us that the Legislature intended to limit the application of section 1954.535 solely to rent-controlled jurisdictions. Wasatch argues, in essence, that because `[t]he words of the statute must be construed in context' ( Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 268, 284 Cal. Rptr. 718, 814 P.2d 704), if the Legislature had intended that the provisions of section 1954.535 apply in non-rent-controlled jurisdictions, the statute would have been placed, as other sections of Senate Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) were, within the appropriate non-rent-control code section. Although the Costa-Hawkins Act was initially enacted to address issues arising in rent-controlled jurisdictions (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1164 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats.1995, Summary Dig., p. 114), its terms apply to all property in California. (See, e.g., § 1954.52, subd. (a) [Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an owner of residential real property may establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or a unit....].) Moreover, the placement of section 1954.535 within the Costa-Hawkins Act occurred several years after the initial passage of the Act. Section 1954.535 was passed as part of Senate Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), which contained six parts addressing a hodgepodge of unrelated issues in landlord-tenant law. [3] Absent explicit language limiting section 1954.535 to rent-controlled jurisdictions, its placement within the Costa-Hawkins Act does not persuade us that its application is so limited. In examining the broader context of hiring rental property as addressed by title 5 of the Civil Code, it does not appear that the Legislature intended to divide the Civil Code neatly into rent-control and non-rent-control sections. The Civil Code chapter preceding the Costa-Hawkins Act contains several sections that apply to local jurisdictions that have enacted rent control ordinances. (See §§ 1947.7, 1947.8, & 1947.15.) It therefore appears that the Legislature did not intend that the Costa-Hawkins Act would contain all statutory provisions related to residential rent control. Likewise, it is not immediately apparent that we should infer the converse  especially absent persuasive evidence of legislative intent to the contrary  that all sections within the Costa-Hawkins Act are necessarily limited to residential rent control issues. Further, it is unclear that there exists within the Civil Code a more appropriate placement for section 1954.535, whether or not it deals with rent control issues, given that it deals with a federal entitlement program. We certainly do not impose a requirement upon the Legislature that it create a new chapter in order to distinguish a statutory provision from its neighbors. In placing section 1954.535 within the Costa-Hawkins Act, the Legislature ensured its proximity to section 1954.53, certain subsections of which also address government-subsidized tenancies, albeit only those tenancies within a rent-controlled jurisdiction. (§ 1954.53, subd. (a)(1)(A), (B).) It thus was logical to place both statutes addressing such government-subsidized tenancies in the same chapter. The placement of section 1954.535 alongside provisions applying exclusively and expressly in rent-controlled jurisdictions is therefore consistent with the proposition that the 90-day notice provision also applies in non-rent-controlled jurisdictions. Finally, we reject Wasatch's argument that we should conclude that section 1954.535 only applies in rent-controlled jurisdictions because of the consequences that would flow from the opposite interpretation. Specifically, Wasatch fears that the 90-day notice provision, if applied statewide, would discourage landlords from participating in the Section 8 program. Presumably, though, this concern applies equally in jurisdictions with and without rent control ordinances and therefore does not bear upon the issue of whether section 1954.535 applies outside of rent-controlled jurisdictions. For the above mentioned reasons, we conclude that the 90-day notice provision of section 1954.535 applies both in jurisdictions with and without rent control ordinances.