Opinion ID: 602233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Four Level Increase for Use of a Dangerous Weapon

Text: 135 Wilson contends the district court erred in increasing her base offense of aggravated assault under the Sentencing Guidelines by four levels for use of a dangerous weapon (a steak knife). Wilson argues that because the use of a dangerous weapon was already taken into account in classifying the crime as an aggravated assault, increasing the base offense for the use of a dangerous weapon constitutes impermissible double counting. We review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir.1992). 136 It is true that the use of a dangerous weapon is counted twice in assessing the offender's base level under the Guidelines. First, the use of a dangerous weapon elevates a simple assault to an aggravated assault. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment. In addition to setting a base offense level for aggravated assault, the Guideline also includes a graduated adjustment schedule. This adjustment schedule instructs the sentencing court to increase the base offense level in accordance with the degree to which the weapon was involved in the assault. For example, if a firearm was discharged, the base offense level increases by five levels; if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, a four level increase applies; and if the weapon was brandished or its use merely threatened, the base offense level increases by three levels. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2). 137 Wilson urges this court not to follow the graduated adjustment schedule, because its application results in impermissible double counting. We disagree. Without application of the adjustment schedule, a defendant convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon would receive the same base offense level, regardless of whether he or she discharged a firearm, or simply brandished or threatened the use of a weapon. Such a failure to consider the degree to which the weapon was actually involved in the assault would defeat the Guidelines' fundamental goal of proportionality in sentencing. United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir.1992). 138 Wilson's reliance on United States v. Brown, 943 F.2d 35, 35-36 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam) in support of her argument that double counting is prohibited when the increase in offense level is predicated on an element of the offense, is misplaced. In Brown, the defendant received consecutive sentences for bank robbery and for use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. We held that the base offense level for the bank robbery conviction should not have been enhanced for the use of a firearm, since the use of the firearm was already considered in setting the base offense level for that felony, and the sentences for the two crimes were consecutive. Id. at 35. We based our holding entirely on the comment to section 3D1.1, prohibiting double counting when imposing consecutive sentences for these crimes. Id. The comment to section 3D1.1 states, In the case of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), [use of a firearm in commission of a crime of violence] the specific offense characteristic for weapon use in the primary offense is to be disregarded to avoid double counting. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1, comment. No such prohibition against double counting appears in section 2A2.2. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in upwardly adjusting Wilson's base offense level for use of a dangerous weapon.