Opinion ID: 674660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order Denying the Defendants' Younger Abstention Motion

Text: 14 The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.... 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1991). A district court's decision is appealable under Sec. 1291 only when the decision ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1136, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). When Younger abstention is applicable, the district court must dismiss the action. Partington v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116, 120 (9th Cir.1989) (internal quotation omitted), rev'd and vacated in part on other grounds, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.1991). 15 A district court order abstaining under Younger and dismissing the case ends the litigation. It is a final appealable order. Id. In contrast, the district court's order in the present case that it will not abstain under Younger and dismiss the case is not a final decision foreclosing further proceedings. Rather, it ensures that litigation will continue in the District Court. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 275, 108 S.Ct. at 1136. Simonich argues that although the district court's order is not a final order, it is nevertheless immediately appealable under the collateral-order exception to Sec. 1291 set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). 16 In Cohen, the Court recognized a small class of decisions appealable under Sec. 1291 although not terminating the underlying action. Id. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1226-27. Pursuant to Cohen, we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a district court's interlocutory order if the order (1) conclusively determine[s] the disputed question; (2) resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (footnote omitted). 17 In Gulfstream, the Supreme Court applied the first prong of the Cohen test and held a district court's refusal to stay or dismiss federal proceedings, pursuant to the abstention doctrine established in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), is not an immediately appealable order. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 278, 108 S.Ct. at 1137. The Court noted that while an order granting a Colorado River stay  'necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case' ... an order denying a motion to stay or dismiss an action pursuant to Colorado River ... leads to a different result. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 277-78, 108 S.Ct. at 1137 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 18, 103 S.Ct. 927, 938, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)) (emphasis added). When a district court denies a motion to stay or dismiss under Colorado River, it 18 does not necessarily contemplate that the decision will close the matter for all time. In denying such a motion, the district court may well have determined only that it should await further developments before concluding that the balance of factors to be considered under Colorado River ... warrants a dismissal or stay.... Thus, whereas the granting of a Colorado River motion necessarily implies an expectation that the state court will resolve the dispute, the denial of such a motion may indicate nothing more than that the district court is not completely confident of the propriety of a stay or dismissal at that time. 19 Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 278, 108 S.Ct. at 1137. 20 The factors a district court considers in adjudicating a motion to abstain under Younger differ substantially from those a court considers in adjudicating a motion to stay proceedings in federal court under Colorado River. In deciding whether to grant a stay request under Colorado River, a district court considers, among other factors that may be relevant, the relative comprehensiveness, convenience and progress of the state court and federal court actions. See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 569-70, 103 S.Ct. 3201, 3214-15, 77 L.Ed.2d 837 (1983). By applying the Colorado River factors, a district court that refuses to stay proceedings in federal court can monitor the development of the state and federal court proceedings. In so doing, its perspective of refusing to grant a Colorado River stay may change over time. See Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 278, 108 S.Ct. at 1137. 21 Deciding whether to abstain under Younger involves different factors. In making this determination, a district court considers whether there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, whether the state proceeding implicates important state interests, and whether there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise federal constitutional challenges. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521. In the Younger context, these factors are static. A district court's perception of the appropriateness of abstaining will not be affected by the progress of the state court proceeding. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 & n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1697, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts.). When abstention under Younger is appropriate, 22 a district court cannot refuse to abstain, retain jurisdiction over the action, and render a decision on the merits after the state proceedings have ended. To the contrary, Younger abstention requires dismissal of the federal action. 23 Beltran v. State of California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir.1988). 24 Here, the district court refused to abstain under Younger. This was a conclusive determination of the particular issue in dispute--whether to abstain under Younger. The first prong of the Cohen collateral-order test is satisfied. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376-77, 101 S.Ct. 669, 674-75, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Lutz v. Secretary of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir.1991) (regarding the conclusive nature of factual and legal determinations). 25 The second prong of Cohen's collateral-order test is also satisfied: the question of Younger abstention plainly presents an important issue separate from the merits. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 12, 103 S.Ct. at 935 (discussing the second prong in a Colorado River decision). 26 The third prong of Cohen, however, is not satisfied. Only in the limited class of cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual's claims has the Court found an interlocutory order appealable. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). See also, Firestone, 449 U.S. at 377-78, 101 S.Ct. at 675-76; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552-53, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978) (jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal appropriate only where the legal and practical value of [an asserted right] would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial). The Court has permitted interlocutory appeals prior to criminal trials where a defendant claims a violation to his constitutional right to bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951), or that he will be subjected to double jeopardy. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). The Court has not, however, permitted interlocutory appeals of pretrial discovery orders, Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 91 S.Ct. 1580, rulings on attorney conflict of interest, MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, or orders involving class certification. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469, 98 S.Ct. at 2458. 27 Simonich argues that if review of the district court's refusal to abstain under Younger is left to the end of this litigation, the interference--a federal trial and decision on the underlying merits--will have already occurred [before federal appellate review is possible] and the issue will effectively be moot. We reject this argument. 28 On appeal from a final judgment, a court of appeals can review a district court's refusal to abstain under Younger, without implicating the mootness doctrine, even though the district court has decided the merits of the case and all state proceedings have been completed. See, e.g., Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782-83; Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, 108 S.Ct. 1109, 99 L.Ed.2d 270 (1988). Thus, Simonich's Younger claim will not be lost if the district court renders a final decision on the Tribes' federal claims. 1 Because Simonich's Younger claim can be reviewed adequately on appeal from a final judgment, the third prong of the Cohen collateral order test is not satisfied. 29 We conclude we lack jurisdiction under Sec. 1291, and under the Cohen exception, to hear Simonich's appeal of the district court's interlocutory order denying Younger abstention.
30 Simonich argues the district court's order denying his Younger motion is appealable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under Sec. 1292(a)(1) to hear appeals from district court orders that have the practical effect of granting ... injunctions and have 'serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence[s].'  Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 287-88, 108 S.Ct. at 1143 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 996-97, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). 31 Simonich does not explain, and we do not perceive, how the district court's refusal to abstain under Younger has the effect of an injunction. Cf. Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 416-17 (9th Cir.1992). Moreover, Simonich has not shown any serious harm or irreparable consequences by our refusal to entertain his appeal at this time. Federal Land Bank v. L.R. Ranch Co., 926 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir.1991).
32 Simonich's fallback position is that even if we lack jurisdiction to entertain his appeal of the district court's order refusing to abstain under Younger, we should issue a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651 (1991), 2 and compel the district court to abstain. 33 The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States Dist. Court, 915 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir.1990). Only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power will justify the issuance of the writ. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 289, 108 S.Ct. at 1143 (internal quotations omitted). To issue the writ, we must be firmly convinced that the district court has erred. Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at 1279 (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, the party seeking mandamus must establish that its right to issuance of the writ is  'clear and indisputable.'  Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 289, 108 S.Ct. at 1143 (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384, 74 S.Ct. 145, 148, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953)). 34 In Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.1977), we adopted five objective principles, United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.1984), to guide our determination of whether to issue a writ of mandamus. We consider whether 35 (1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires. 36 (2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal. 37 (3) The district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. 38 (4) The district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules. 39 (5) The district court's order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression. 40 Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654-55. 41 In analyzing these principles--which are sometimes referred to as the Bauman factors--no single factor is determinative and all five need not be satisfied. Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at 1279. In fact, the five factors  'are not meant to supplant reasoned and independent analysis by appellate courts'.... Rather, they 'serve only as a useful starting point, an analytic framework for determinations regarding the propriety of mandamus relief.'  Harper, 729 F.2d at 1222 (quoting In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir.1982), aff'd sub nom. Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191, 103 S.Ct. 1173, 75 L.Ed.2d 425 (1983)). See also Star Editorial, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 7 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir.1993). 42 Here, the first two Bauman factors are not applicable. Simonich has an adequate means to obtain the relief he desires by direct appeal, and he will not be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal. 43 With regard to the fourth and fifth factors, there is no showing that courts frequently err in applying the Younger doctrine, and although the issue raised by the district court's order--whether Younger is applicable in the present circumstances--is one of first impression, it is a fact-specific inquiry with limited application beyond this case. Cf. Harper, 729 F.2d at 1222. 44 The third factor is more troubling. We recently stated: [I]t is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, is dispositive. Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1551 (9th Cir.1994). Having made this statement, we went on to examine whether the other factors in the mandamus calculus indicate that the writ should issue to correct the district court's errors. Id. See also Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir.1989) (examining all of the factors although the district court clearly erred). 45 In Survival Systems of the Whittaker Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 825 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 774, 98 L.Ed.2d 861 (1988), we stated: Although several indicators are specified for consideration in Bauman, one factor is determinative in this case. When the district court's order is correct as a matter of law, it is obvious that the writ of mandamus should not be issued. Id. at 1418. 46 In the present case, whether the district court's ruling is correct as a matter of law is a question that can be resolved on appeal from a final judgment. Suffice it to say at this juncture in the proceedings we are not persuaded the district court clearly erred in refusing to abstain under Younger. 47 Younger abstention is proper where (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings, (2) that implicate important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise federal questions. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521. 48 Contrary to the district court's conclusion, there was an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Although the state complaint was filed after the federal complaint, no proceedings of any substance had occurred in the federal action before the Tribes filed their state complaint. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-50, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2291-92, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (no substantial proceedings where criminal charges filed after the filing of the federal complaint, but before any federal hearings); Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir.1987) (Whether the state proceedings are 'pending' is not determined by comparing the commencement dates of the federal and state proceedings. Rather, abstention under Younger may be required if the state proceedings have been initiated 'before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.' ) (quoting Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349, 95 S.Ct. at 2292). The first prong of the Younger abstention doctrine is satisfied. 49 With regard to the second and third prongs, the ongoing judicial proceeding in Montana state court implicates important state interests, see United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.1984), and there will be an adequate opportunity in that proceeding to raise federal questions. See Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 2-4-704(2) (1991). 50 At first blush, it would seem the district court should have abstained under Younger. However, here, the ongoing state proceeding is a civil action. Civil-Younger abstention has been upheld only where a party seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction for the purpose of restraining state proceedings or invalidating a state law. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1402 n. 5 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom. Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252, 104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984) (considering whether a federal district court had jurisdiction over the declaration of Indian water rights on a reservation). See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 772 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir.1985). 51 We are unaware of any decision upholding civil-Younger abstention where the plaintiffs sought relief similar to that sought here. The Tribes do not seek by their federal court action to restrain any ongoing state proceeding. Although they assert the Montana Water Use Act cannot be used to regulate their water rights, they do not argue the Act is facially unconstitutional or invalid. Rather, they contend they are constitutionally exempt from the Act's provisions. Whether Younger abstention is appropriate in these circumstances is unclear. But see Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1986) (abstention is warranted whenever there exists an important state interest). 52 In sum, the first two Bauman factors are not applicable, facts to support the fourth and fifth factors do not exist, and our consideration of the third factor leaves us unconvinced the district court's order refusing to abstain under Younger was clearly erroneous as a matter of law. 53 We conclude Simonich's right to issuance of a writ of mandamus is not clear and indisputable, and we decline to issue the writ. 54