Opinion ID: 151502
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether a Reduction Would Be Consistent with the Sentencing Commission's Policy Statements

Text: Although we conclude that Hameed's sentence was based on a subsequently lowered sentencing range, he is not eligible for a reduction of sentence unless such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Hameed seeks to avoid this requirement altogether. He objects that the policy statements and the guidelines in their entirety are only advisory. To be sure, district judges are free to disagree with the guidelines on policy grounds and to vary based on the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing an original sentence. Spears v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 840, 843, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The Commission's policy statements are mandatory, however, in the sentence-modification context, not by dint of the guidelines themselves but based on the plain text of a federal statute, § 3582(c)(2). See Dillon v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2690-92, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010); Gillis, 592 F.3d at 700; Perdue, 572 F.3d at 292. Hameed next exhorts us to follow our recent decision in United States v. Grant, 567 F.3d 776 (6th Cir.2009), vacated for reh'g en banc (Oct. 16, 2009), which held that district judges are not bound by the Commission's policy statements when reducing a sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). But Rule 35(b) and § 3582(c)(2) differ in a critical way: the former was amended to remove any reference to the policy statements, whereas the latter retains a clause making those policy statements mandatory. Thus, Hameed indeed must establish that a reduction of his sentence would be consistent with the Commission's policy statements to be eligible for discretionary relief under § 3582(c)(2). One such policy statement provides: A reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if (A) none of the amendments listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant; or (B) an amendment listed in subsection (c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2). Amendment 706 is among those listed in subsection (c). The issue, then, is whether Amendment 706 lowered Hameed's applicable guideline range. Amendment 706's impact is well understood, so our inquiry focuses on the question, what is Hameed's applicable guideline range? Had no mandatory minimum applied, the applicable guideline range would have been that provided by the drug-quantity guidelines under § 2D1.1, which Amendment 706 lowered. Hameed did face a mandatory minimum, however, and the government essentially argues that the mandatory minimum, which Amendment 706 did not affect, became his applicable guideline range. See Appellee's Br. at 9-10. Presumably, the government relies on U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), which provides that [w]here a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence. It is not obvious from the text of § 5G1.1(b) that a mandatory minimum automatically becomes the applicable guideline range, or that it is the only applicable guideline range that matters in the sentence-reduction context. In United States v. Jones, 569 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2009), we acknowledged that § 5G1.1 is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations: First, § 5G1.1 reasonably may be construed to support the meaning of guideline range advanced by Jones. On this view, § 5G1.1 refers to two distinct concepts: the applicable guideline range and the guideline sentence. The applicable guideline range is determined by the sentencing court based on the defendant's offense level and criminal history. When the statutory-minimum sentence is greater than the top of the guideline range calculated by the sentencing court, the statutory minimum effectively trumps the guideline range and becomes the guideline sentence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). Thus, § 5G1.1(b) contemplates a two-step process: first, the sentencing court must calculate the applicable guideline range; next, the sentencing court must determine whether the statutory minimum exceeds the top of the properly calculated guideline range. If the statutory minimum is greater than the top of the guideline range, the statutory minimum becomes the guideline sentence. On this reading of § 5G1.1(b), the guideline range does not become equivalent to, or merge into, the statutory minimum/guideline sentence. The dissent offers another reasonable reading of § 5G1.1. In the dissent's view, when there is a mandatory minimum that is above the guideline range calculated by the sentencing court, that mandatory minimum, though a single point, becomes the `guideline range.' Id. at 572. Elsewhere, we have stated that [w]here a mandatory minimum sentence exceeds the otherwise applicable Guidelines range ... it replaces that Guidelines range. Johnson, 564 F.3d at 423. Nowhere have we ruled out the possibility that there might be multiple guideline ranges applicable to a single defendant's sentencing. Ultimately, we need not resolve once and for all whether a mandatory minimum is a guideline range or whether it is always the only range that may be considered for the purposes of § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Hameed's claim fails for another reason: though § 2D1.1 surely provided a guideline range, it did not provide one that was applicable to a departure for substantial assistance under § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 in Hameed's case. In United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295 (6th Cir.2002), we held that the appropriate starting point for calculating a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) is the mandatory minimum sentence itself. Id. at 332. Here, the district judge intended to begin from the mandatory minimum but acceded to the parties' request that he take the base offense level prescribed by § 2D1.1 as his starting point. Nonetheless, the guideline range resulting from that base offense level was not applicable because it was not the correct point from which the departure should have been measured. Nor were the crack guidelines applicable in determining the extent of the departure Hameed received. In United States v. Bullard, 390 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2004), we clarified that a departure under section 3553(e) must be based solely upon the substantial assistance rendered by the defendant and that only factors relating to a defendant's cooperation may influence the extent of a departure pursuant to § 3553(e). Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The crack guidelines would not appear to be relevant in determining the value of Hameed's cooperation and setting his ultimate sentence. [4] We therefore conclude that even though Amendment 706 lowered the sentencing range that the district judge calculated under § 2D1.1 in Hameed's case, Amendment 706 did not lower an applicable guideline range as required by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Thus, a sentence reduction would not be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission and is unavailable under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).