Opinion ID: 1205096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Defense Challenges for Cause to Three Prospective Jurors

Text: During jury selection, defendant challenged three prospective jurors for cause. The trial court denied the challenges, and defendant later used peremptory challenges to prevent those persons from serving on the jury. When the jury was finally seated, defendant had five peremptory challenges remaining. (1) He now urges that denial of his challenges for cause was reversible error under the federal and state Constitutions and former section 1073. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 423-424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851, 105 S.Ct. 844]; U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, งง 1, 7(a), 15, 16; see also former ง 1073, repealed by Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, ง 33, p. 4155.) In order to obtain relief on appeal for denial of a challenge for cause, defendant must show that the ruling affected his right to a fair and impartial jury. Because defendant exercised peremptory challenges to remove the three prospective jurors whom he had unsuccessfully challenged for cause, none of the three compromised the impartiality of his jury. Therefore, he cannot claim error under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, based on the trial court's denial of those challenges for cause. ( People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 954 [277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950]; see Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 87-89 [101 L.Ed.2d 80, 89-90, 108 S.Ct. 2273].) Defendant argues that the loss of the peremptory challenges he used to excuse the three prospective jurors prejudiced him. We cannot agree. Defendant had five peremptory challenges remaining when he accepted the jury. He expressed no dissatisfaction with the jurors selected and did not request additional peremptories. (See People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1088 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) Defendant's belated recitation of dissatisfaction with the jury is speculative. Consequently, he fails to demonstrate that he was harmed by the denial of his challenges for cause. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1247-1248 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) (2) Defendant contends he was justified in not exhausting his peremptory challenges due to the method of jury selection employed in his case. The parties stipulated to the use of the struck system instead of the more standard jury box method. Under the version of the struck system used in this case, prospective jurors filled out questionnaires and were individually questioned and challenged for cause. Next, prospective jurors were randomly assigned numbers establishing the order in which they would be further questioned and called to sit as jurors. They then were questioned in groups of 16 and subjected to challenges for cause. Finally, the remaining prospective jurors were seated in the jury box in the previously assigned order and the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. A prospective juror who was excused was then replaced with the next person on the list. Thus, based on earlier voir dire the parties were familiar with the attitudes of each member of the panel when they were called upon to exercise their peremptory challenges. Defendant contends he should not have been required to exhaust his peremptory challenges because he knew, when the 12th juror was chosen, that there were at least 5 remaining people on the panel who were objectionable to him. He does not persuade us. Whichever method of jury selection is used, exhaustion of peremptory challenges is a prerequisite to a claim of error in the denial of a challenge for cause. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 185 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949] ( Morris ).) The difference between the struck and jury box systems bears no relationship to the requirement that a defendant exercise peremptory challenges to exclude jurors he believes to be biased against him. Regardless of the system of jury selection, a party's failure to exercise available peremptory challenges indicates relative satisfaction with the unchallenged jurors. Having so indicated in this case, defendant cannot reasonably claim error. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 964-967 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214] ( Ashmus ).) Defendant criticizes Morris and Ashmus, and cites decisions to the contrary from other jurisdictions, but does not persuade us that we erred. Defendant also contends Morris and Ashmus are factually distinguishable from this case. In essence, he argues he had fewer peremptory challenges remaining and so was more disadvantaged vis-a-vis the prosecution than the defendant in either of those cases. He cites no authority for the point, and we assign it no weight. Defendant also makes much of the fact that he exercised all four of the peremptory challenges allotted him in the selection of the four alternate jurors. As defendant sees it, this โ together with the fact that one prospective juror whom defendant had unsuccessfully challenged for cause was third in line to be summoned to the jury box after the alternates were sworn โ meant that defendant knew he would be unable to improve the composition of the jury with the five challenges remaining to him. However, had he exhausted his five remaining peremptories in the selection of regular jurors, presumably he would have been granted an additional four challenges for the selection of alternates. It would be sheer speculation to assume that had defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges and made use of the additional challenges granted him in the selection of alternates, he would have been forced to trial with a jury unsatisfactory to him.