Opinion ID: 1439733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the salvage lien

Text: The trial court held that Williams had a duty to return the PEN-49 as quickly as possible and any unreasonable holding of her was an act of conversion. Williams cites a number of cases for the proposition that because he had a salvage lien he had the right to retain possession of the vessel until either the lien was satisfied or Eckert posted sufficient bond to allow for payment of the lien. He places principal reliance on In re The Snow Maiden, 159 F. Supp. 30 (D.Mass. 1958); The Hartshorn, et al. v. 25 Cases of Silk, 11 F.Cas. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1841) (No. 6168A); The La Bruce, 14 F.Cas. 905 (Fla.Super. 1837) (No. 7963); Hightower v. Stillwell, 179 Ark. 256, 15 S.W.2d 326 (1929). While each of these cases recognizes that a salvor does have a right of possession in a salvaged vessel, no case leaves this right unqualified. A salvor can retain possession of a salvaged vessel until one of three events has occurred. As the court noted in In re The Snow Maiden, 159 F. Supp. at 33, while the salvor did not have a duty to immediately surrender the salvaged property to either its owner or the court, he would only be rightfully in possession of such property until he was tendered the fair value of his services, or security therefor, or until a reasonable time for filing a libel in rem had expired. While the first two contingencies may be satisfied by the actions of the owner of the vessel, only the salvor can file a libel in rem against the vessel. Norris, in his comprehensive treatise on the law of salvage, states essentially the same proposition. The salvor must move with reasonable dispatch to either arrange for payment or security or to libel the property for the purpose of an eventual court sale. M. Norris, The Law of Salvage, § 151 at 249 (1958) (emphasis added). Under maritime law a salvor cannot hold possession of the saved vessel indefinitely, to the prejudice of the owner. He must take affirmative action within a reasonable time to enforce his lien. What is reasonable must, inevitably, turn on the particular circumstances of the case. There may well be cases when a relatively long period of detention is warranted before judicial enforcement of the lien is initiated. For example, such might be the case where a vessel is saved far from its home port, or where the salvor has difficulty getting in touch with the owner, or where the owner's desires concerning disposition of the vessel are vague or indefinite, or where the salvor has difficulty in securing counsel to bring an action in rem against the vessel. The circumstances in the case at bar are quite different. Williams resisted Eckert's right to possession of the vessel and would not let Eckert go aboard the vessel to examine the extent of the damage or repairs. Being a fisherman himself, Williams apparently knew of the imminent salmon fishing season and of Eckert's need to have the vessel for the salmon season. Yet Williams took no action to enforce his maritime lien. In these circumstances we agree with the trial judge that Williams' conduct was unreasonable, and that it caused loss to Eckert. On the other hand, we do not view Williams' misconduct to be so serious as to require total forfeiture of the award. It is apparent that the trial court considered the relevant factors in arriving at the amount of the salvage award in this case. We will not disturb that award on appeal. [1]