Opinion ID: 164700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Meeting Memo

Text: 15 Employer argues that the district court erred in refusing to admit into evidence Loritsch's memo of the January 7, 1998, meeting. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Abuan v. Level 3 Communications, 353 F.3d 1158, 1171 (10th Cir.2003). Our review is especially deferential with respect to rulings on the admission of hearsay evidence. Id. Also, we will affirm the rulings of the lower court on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning. Id. at n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for: 17 Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. — A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation... unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.... 18 To fall within this exception, a document must (1) have been prepared in the normal course of business; (2) ... have been made at or near the time of the events it records; and (3)... be based on the personal knowledge of the entrant or of an informant who had a business duty to transmit the information to the entrant. 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 803.08[1], at 803-56 (2d ed. 2002) (cross references omitted). To have been prepared `in the normal course of business,' the memorandum must have been made in the regular course of business of a regularly conducted business activity; and it must have been the regular practice of that business to have made the memorandum. Id.; see Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1090 (10th Cir.2001). Even if a document is found to meet all three requirements, it can be excluded if the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation make it untrustworthy. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). 19 Employer first tried to introduce the memo into evidence on cross-examination of Loritsch after Hertz called him to the stand in his case-in-chief. The sole foundation for admission was the following testimony by Loritsch during questioning by Employer: 20 Q. And can you identify for us, please, what Exhibit 165 is. 21 A. These are my handwritten notes regarding a meeting with Lee Hertz on January 7. 22 Q. And why did you keep these — why did you take these notes? 23 A. I think at the time I wrote those notes, I had decided that Lee was not going to be a member of the team anymore, to document that, so I could give Barry [Nelson, Employer's director of human resources,] something to help communicate to Barry what the issues were. 24 Q. Did you take these notes in the normal course of your business? 25 A. Yes. 26 Q. And do these notes accurately reflect the conversation that you had with Mr. Hertz in January 7 of 1998? 27 A. Yes. 28 Aplt.App. at 1129. Hertz objected that the memo was inadmissible as hearsay. The district court sustained the objection, observing that the memo was prepared because [Loritsch] thought he was going to fire [Hertz].... This is not a business document. Id. The ruling was clearly proper because there was no evidence that it was the regular practice of Employer for such a memo to be prepared. See Echo Acceptance Corp., 267 F.3d at 1090. 29 Employer again tried to introduce the memo when it called Loritsch to the stand. This time Employer presented a better foundation for admissibility, eliciting the following testimony from Loritsch: 30 Q .... Did you keep notes of that [January 7, 1998,] meeting? 31 A. Yes, I did. 32 Q .... Are these the notes that you kept of that meeting, Mr. Loritsch? 33 A. Yes. 34 Q. Did you keep these notes in the regular course of business? 35 A. Yes. 36 Q. And what did you do with these notes after you kept them? 37 A. I sent these — these notes to Barry Nelson. 38 Q. And why did you send them to Mr. Nelson? 39 A. At that point I had taken some time to think about what to do about the comments of that meeting and the direction that we were going. And at that time I decided it was time to terminate [Hertz]. 40 Q. Okay. And was it your regular practice to keep notes when you were dealing with employee issues, such as the ones reflected in here? 41 A. Yes. 42 Q. And do the notes accurately reflect the content of the meeting that you had with Mr. Hertz on January 7, 1998? 43 A. Yes. 44 Q. And can you tell us, please, how long after January 7 you wrote these notes. 45 A. I think it was a couple of days. There is a date on the bottom, as I recall. 46 Q. Take a look at the bottom, please. 47 A. January the 9th, two days later. 48 Aplt.App. at 1418-19 (emphasis added). The question and answer emphasized above, however, appear somewhat inconsistent with earlier testimony by Loritsch concerning his practice with respect to preparing notes. On direct examination by Hertz during Hertz's case-in-chief, the following exchange occurred: Q. After January 8, you decide to fire Mr. Hertz, yes or no? 49 A. That's correct. 50 Q. Now, there is no written notice or memo you do, is there? 51 A. I recall talking to Barry Nelson, our HR director, about that. 52 Q. Is there a written notice or memo? 53 A. Not from me. 54 Q. It's your practice to write these things up, isn't it? 55 A. No, typically, I don't write things up. 56 Id. at 1095-96. Although Employer's brief on appeal provides a quite reasonable way to reconcile Loritsch's two answers, no attempt at reconciliation was offered the district court. The district court sustained without any comment Hertz's objection that the memo was inadmissible hearsay. 57 Employer later buttressed Loritsch's foundation testimony. Human Resource Director Nelson testified that he had instructed Loritsch that any time that [the company was] dealing with serious performance issues, it was appropriate [for Loritsch] to make certain that there is documentation about what [he] discuss[ed], to follow up the meeting, to make certain he had [a] record of what was discussed during the meeting. Id. at 1542. Yet Employer made no further attempt to introduce the memo into evidence. 58 On appeal Employer argues that it established at trial, through Loritsch's testimony, that the Loritsch memo was admissible. It further points to the confirming testimony by Nelson. 59 We are not persuaded. To begin with, we will not consider Nelson's testimony, which came after the district court's final ruling on the memo. We do not impose on trial judges the distracting burden of sua sponte reconsidering all prior evidentiary rulings as new evidence is introduced. Judges have enough to keep their minds occupied during trial without having to carry out this additional chore. As a reviewing court, we may only evaluate the trial court's decision from its perspective when it had to rule and not indulge in review by hindsight. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182 n. 6, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). A party that thinks additional evidence calls for reconsideration of a prior evidentiary ruling must therefore raise the matter with the trial judge after the new evidence is admitted. Cf. United States v. Harrison, 296 F.3d 994, 1002 (10th Cir.2002) (when objection to admissibility of evidence was originally made through motion in limine, [i]n the event of ... new evidence..., the opponent has the duty to bring the matter to the attention of the district court by renewing the objection). Here, Employer made no attempt to reoffer the memo into evidence during or after Nelson's testimony. 60 Viewing the evidence as it appeared when the district court ruled, we hold that the court was not compelled to believe that it was the ordinary course of business for Loritsch to prepare such a memo. The only evidence supporting such a finding was a one-word answer — Yes — to an artfully phrased question — [W]as it your regular practice to keep notes when you were dealing with employee issues, such as the ones reflected in here? Aplt.App. at 1418. We recognize that such questioning is common in perfunctorily establishing the foundation for the admission of documentary evidence. But this was counsel's second attempt to get the notes into evidence, after Loritsch had testified, No, typically, I don't write [these] things up. Id. at 1096. A reasonable judge could find that a necessary element of the business-records exception had not been established. 61 Moreover, the district court may have thought that the circumstances under which the memo was created made it untrustworthy. We have identified several factors that relate to trustworthiness: (1) the business significance of the document outside the litigation context, (2) the level of experience of the preparer in creating such documents, and (3) the neutrality of the preparer. See United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1995). When it excluded the memo the first time, the district court observed that it was prepared because [Loritsch] thought he was going to fire [Hertz].... Aplt.App. at 1129. Employer argues: 62 Merely because Loritsch was considering whether to recommend terminating Hertz's employment is no reason to exclude the document as untrustworthy. If it were, employers' notes and memoranda concerning their grounds for termination would be routinely inadmissible and not, as the cases show, routinely admissible. 63 Aplt. Br. at 21-22. But this argument ignores the relevance of other factors that will inform the trial judge's exercise of discretion. The district court may well have believed that the chief purpose for preparing the memo was to protect against a discrimination claim by Hertz. We note that courts have properly refused to admit purported business records because they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See Timberlake Construction Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 341-43 (10th Cir.1995). The nature of the memo, the timing of its preparation (two days after the event), and the less-than-definitive testimony by Loritsch regarding his practice in preparing such memos, all convince us that the district court would not have abused its discretion in finding the memo untrustworthy. 64 We recognize that the district court did not express any reasons for its second ruling denying admission of the memo, and its comment at the first ruling was not tied to a specific provision of Rule 803(6). Nevertheless, when, as here, the record supports a proper ground for an evidentiary ruling, we will not speculate that the district court must have based its ruling on a different, erroneous ground. The burden falls on the objecting party to obtain clarification from the district court if that party believes that the court has ruled on an improper basis. 65 Employer complains that the district court's ruling was inconsistent with its ruling admitting Loritsch's memo of a different meeting with Hertz — one that occurred on October 29, 1997, to discuss what progress Hertz had made in improving working relationships with others. Employer does not explain, however, why such alleged inconsistency in itself creates error. Perhaps Employer was simply fortunate that the other memo was admitted. We note that when the district court admitted that memo, it said, This is close enough. Aplt.App. at 1405. When the court later ruled on the January memo, it may have found that additional concerns altered the balance of considerations just enough to warrant exclusion. This was not an occasion when a court treated one party worse than another, setting a higher bar to admission of evidence for one than for the other. A party that benefited from the court's bending in that party's favor in admitting evidence cannot complain that the court later resumed an erect posture. 66 Employer also argues for reversal on the ground that it was prejudiced by the district court's remark upon rejecting the first proffer of the January memo: [The memo was] prepared because he thought he was going to fire him, so the objection is sustained. This is not a business document. Aplt.App. at 1129. Employer contends that the comment reflected adversely on Loritsch's credibility. Concerns about such remarks argue for courts not explaining evidentiary rulings in front of the jury. But we see little chance of prejudice here. There was no reversible error. 67