Opinion ID: 1831968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

Text: McGrane does not deny the deputies had a right to arrest him in his home. The deputies had a warrant for his arrest based on an alleged violation of his probation. The Supreme Court has held an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1388, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 661 (1980); accord State v. Luloff, 325 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa 1982). Moreover, Schutz consented to the deputies entering the home. Nevertheless, McGrane argues the deputies' search of the upstairs portion of his home after he was arrested was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. We now consider the State's proffered justifications for the warrantless search.
The State argues the deputies' search of the upstairs portion of McGrane's home was a valid search incident to arrest. The Supreme Court has recognized there is ample justification for the search of an arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control. State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1999), overruled in part on other grounds by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n. 2, (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969)). The area to be searched is limited to the arrestee's grab area. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694. The purpose of such a search is to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence or gaining possession of a weapon which could be used to resist arrest or effect an escape. Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 492 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694). Thus, in order to be constitutional, [a] search incident to an arrest must be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. Id. (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1971, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413 (1970)). The search-incident-to-arrest exception does not provide authority for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694. Both parties contend we must first decide where in the home McGrane was arrested in order to determine whether the deputies' warrantless search was a valid search incident to arrest. [2] The State claims McGrane was arrested at the top of the stairs when he complied with Deputy Hepperly's order to come downstairs. According to the State, the search-incident-to-arrest exception allowed the deputies to search the upstairs area after McGrane was handcuffed downstairs. McGrane, on the other hand, contends he was not arrested until he was downstairs in the kitchen and one of the deputies handcuffed him. Under the latter theory, the upstairs portion of McGrane's home would certainly not be the immediate vicinity of the arrest. Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 492; see People v. Robbins, 54 Ill.App.3d 298, 12 Ill.Dec. 80, 369 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1977) (holding officers greatly exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest when they went upstairs and searched the defendant's room after he was restrained at the bottom of the stairs). However, we need not determine where the arrest occurred. Even if we found the arrest took place at the top of the stairs, the deputies were still not permitted to search the upstairs area because McGrane immediately left that area and remained handcuffed downstairs in the kitchen under armed guard while the search was conducted. Compare Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 493 (holding officers' search of defendant's motel room after he was arrested and handcuffed upon opening the door was not a valid search incident to arrest because he was not in the motel room at the time of the search), with State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324, 327-28 (Iowa 1977) (holding officers' search of the defendant's motel room after he was arrested and handcuffed was a valid search incident to arrest because the search was confined to the small motel room where the arrest occurred, it took place within a minute or two after the arrest, and the defendant was still in the room). The justification of a search incident to arrest is to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence or gaining possession of a weapon. McGrane had no realistic ability to get back upstairs considering his location and the fact he was restrained. The search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement must be narrowly construed and limited to accommodating only those interests it was created to serve. United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 242 (1979)). We acknowledge some courts do not require the search area to be accessible to the defendant at the time of the search. See, e.g., Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir.2001). However, this court has expressly rejected such a holding in non-vehicle situations. Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 493 n. 2. In State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992), we upheld the search of the contents of a passenger compartment of a vehicle as part of a search incident to arrest even though the defendant had been removed from the vehicle and secured elsewhere. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 678. In Canas, we confined our holding in Edgington to situations in which one's arrest involves some type of occupancy in a vehicle. Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 493 n. 2. This makes sense because we take any government intrusion into a citizen's dwelling very seriously. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d at 918 (emphasis added). Thus, we agree with the district court the deputies' initial search of the upstairs area was not a valid search incident to arrest.
The State also claims the deputies' search of the upstairs area was justified as a protective sweep or cursory safety check. The combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. We have previously found danger of violence and injury to officers to be an exigent circumstance, which may excuse the requirement of a search warrant. State v. Holland, 389 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 1986). The officers must have specific, articulable grounds to justify a finding of exigency. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 109. The reasonableness of the officers' search is based on an objectiveas opposed to subjectivestandard. Id. (citing Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 280-82). The Supreme Court has emphasized a protective sweep is not a full search of the premises: [It] may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 108 L.Ed.2d 276, 287 (1990). The State interprets Buie as recognizing two types of protective sweeps: a limited sweep of the arresting area without justification versus a more expansive search of the premises with justification. In Buie, the Supreme Court said: We . . . hold that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. at 1098, 108 L.Ed.2d at 286. The State argues the deputies' initial search satisfied either Buie prong. The first part of the statement in Buie simply acknowledges the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Officers are permitted to search the arrestee's immediate grab area for weapons and evidence without any reasonable suspicion. This search would necessarily include spaces where a person could be hidden. If a particular search does not satisfy the search-incident-to-arrest exception because the officers previously abandoned the arrest site, then the first prong of the Buie statement will not validate the search because it is limited to protecting officers from an immediate attack. We have already held the deputies' search in the present case was not a valid search incident to arrest. Thus, for it to be a valid protective sweep, the State was required to produce articulable facts which . . . would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area . . . swept harbor[ed] an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. at 1098, 108 L.Ed.2d at 286. The State offers several facts it contends would justify a reasonably prudent officer to believe individuals were present who posed a danger to them: McGrane appeared to be dealing drugs out of his home; Schutz initially lied to the deputies when asked if McGrane was home; and several people were in the home while the deputies were on the premises. We find none of these facts justify a protective sweep of the upstairs area of the home. The State offered no evidence McGrane was believed to have guns or weapons in his home. Compare Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 109 (holding officers' warrantless search of defendant's apartment was not a valid protective sweep in part because there was no evidence that guns or any other weapons were involved in the burglary), with Holland, 389 N.W.2d at 380-81 (holding officers' warrantless search was a valid protective sweep because the arresting officers knew a gun had been stolen in the burglary and the defendant's accomplice was still at large). Moreover, the State offered no evidence to suggest dangerous people may be hiding on the premises. See United States v. Kimmons, 965 F.2d 1001, 1009 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding agents had articulable facts to justify protective sweep of defendant's home immediately following his arrest for conspiracy to rob an armored car: the FBI had just apprehended two of the defendant's armed accomplices and had knowledge of fourth conspirator whose identity and whereabouts were unknown); United States v. Gilbert, 774 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.1985) (holding officers were permitted to conduct a protective sweep of defendant's home because they had information defendant might be in the company of another fugitive who was reported to be armed, a car not belonging to defendant was in front of her home and officers surveilling the home suspected movement inside). Although it may be common for drug dealers to possess weapons, suspicion of drug dealing alone is not enough to justify a protective sweep. United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting police practice of automatic protective sweeps of drug houses on assumption they are inherently dangerous); see Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1421, 137 L.Ed.2d 615, 624 (1997) (rejecting felony drug investigation exception to knock-and-announce rule). The State is still required to allege specific facts and circumstances upon which reasonable inferences could be drawn to support a reasonable police officer's belief that weapons were on the premises and that someone else could have had access to those weapons and inflicted harm. There is also no evidence to suggest the people the deputies encountered at the home were dangerous. Schutz came to the door when the deputies knocked. Although she initially lied about McGrane's presence, she eventually cooperated. Apparently, the deputies did not perceive her as a threat because they allowed her to remain in the kitchen unrestrained. At some point, a man came up from the basement and was allowed to leave. The deputies did not then do a protective sweep of the basement. McGrane's girlfriend, Rosemary, and her sister came to the house while the deputies were there. Apparently, their presence did not pose a danger to the deputies because they were allowed to enter the home and stay in the kitchen while the deputies conducted their search. In short, there was simply no evidence to find a reasonably prudent officer would believe the upstairs area harbored one or more dangerous individuals in order to justify the initial search. This situation did not involve any objective indication of fear of violence or jeopardy more than any other police encounter with persons suspected of criminal activity would involve. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 109. Deputy Ewalt even conceded at the hearing the threat level wasn't raised for [him]. He testified he saw no need to secure the home. Even if the deputies had reasonable suspicion that individuals were present who posed a danger to them, their search of the upstairs portion of McGrane's home exceeded those spaces where a person may be found. [3] Moreover, the deputies had no legitimate purpose for remaining on the premises after McGrane was arrested. A protective sweep cannot last longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36, 110 S.Ct. at 1099, 108 L.Ed.2d at 287. We agree with the district court that the deputies' search was not a valid protective sweep.
Finally, the State argues a search warrant was not necessary for the deputies' initial search because the evidence seized was in plain view. For the plain view exception to apply, police must be rightfully in the place that allows them to make the observation. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d at 918 (citations omitted). In addition, the State has the burden of proving (1) the item seized was in plain view and (2) its incriminating character was `immediately apparent.' Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 123 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 (1971)). As we have already made clear, the deputies were not rightfully in the upstairs portion of the home after McGrane was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the kitchen downstairs. Moreover, the deputies did more than simply observe evidence out in the open. Thus, the district court correctly held the plain view exception was not applicable.