Opinion ID: 741883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Commencement of Willie Edwards's Involvement in the Organization

Text: 37 Finally, Willie asserts that the evidence fails to support the district court's holding that he participated in the conspiracy as early as February 1989. This is also a factual determination that we review for clear error. Therefore, Willie argues that the district court should not have increased his criminal history category pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) and (e). Section 4A1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines instructs a district court to: 38 (d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status. 39 (e) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) [for a prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year] or (b) or while in imprisonment or escape status on such a sentence. If 2 points are added for item (d), add only 1 point for this item. 40 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) and (e). Willie had been released from confinement in a state prison on February 24, 1987, and transferred to probation status until January 24, 1989. (PSI at 6.) Although Willie, in his brief, states that his part in the conspiracy did not commence before February 1989, at trial, the judge found otherwise and stated that Willie's involvement in the conspiracy began as early as February 24, 1988, during his period of probation, and continued until at least September 1990. 6 Thus, the sentencing court increased his criminal history category by three points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) and (e). At oral argument Willie's counsel asserted that he was only involved in the conspiracy between August and October of 1990. Not at all coincidentally, this is the time period in which the FBI wire tap was in place and numerous conversations were recorded in which Willie discussed and arranged the sale of narcotics for the drug conspiracy. We agree with the trial judge's finding that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Willie's involvement in the conspiracy commenced within one year of his release from state prison. 41 Willie states several reasons, without supporting case law, why he believes the district court clearly erred in reaching its determination that he was on parole when his involvement with the conspiracy began. Initially, he complains that the only evidence the Government presented, which supports the sentencing court's finding that he participated in the narcotics conspiracy any time prior to 1990, was the testimony of Lorri at his sentencing. Lorri repeatedly testified that, although, she did not know the exact date that Willie started selling drugs for Lee, she was certain that it was within less than a year from the time that he was released from prison. Willie states that the fact that he was employed as a laborer at National Briquette Corporation in East Chicago, Indiana from December 1, 1987, to November 17, 1989, is unrefuted evidence that Lorri's testimony was erroneous. Apparently, it is Willie's argument that because he had a job during this time period he would have been unable to participate in the narcotics conspiracy. We find this argument to be unpersuasive. Additionally, Willie asserts that he was not involved with the conspiracy while he was on probation, because if he had been it would have likely been discovered by the probation department. Once again, we hold that this argument is without merit, for unfortunately all criminal activities are not discovered by the probation officer assigned to a particular defendant. 42 In closing, Willie asserts that, 43 [t]he more accurate interpretation of Willie's involvement in the conspiracy was an escalation over time as Willie became more and more hooked on the heroin and that his involvement did not ever reach the level claimed by the [G]overnment because Lee Edwards would never have allowed that level of involvement. 44 In support of this contention, Willie's counsel at sentencing solicited testimony from Lorri on cross-examination in which she revealed that she was personally snorting about seven to eight hundred dollars worth of heroin a day, that this drug use affected her ability to remember dates, and that Willie's involvement in the drug conspiracy was a progression starting with him receiving heroin at no cost and then some time later beginning to sell drugs for Lee. Willie is essentially attacking the district court's credibility determination with respect to the testimony of Lorri. We will not reassess a district court's credibility determination. House, 110 F.3d at 1286. We defer to the sentencing court's credibility determinations because the presiding judge while listening to the witnesses' testimony is in the best position to observe, weigh, and evaluate a witness' verbal as well as nonverbal behavior. United States v. Pitz, 2 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.1993); see United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1497 (7th Cir.1993). 45 Even if Willie explicitly argued that Lorri's testimony was so self-serving that it would be clearly erroneous to credit it, 7 such an argument would be without merit. House, 110 F.3d at 1286. [T]he witnesses' motives for testifying do not render their testimony inherently unreliable. United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir.1995); see United States v. Crockett, 82 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir.1996) (upholding decision of district court to credit testimony of coconspirator). 46 As this court has held countless times, sentencing judges are fully capable of considering the motivations of witnesses in weighing conflicting evidence and, because they have had an opportunity to assess the demeanor of the witnesses, are in a better position than this court to make credibility determinations. For this reason, arguments which simply urge a reassessment of a district court's credibility determination are wasted on an appellate court. 47 House, 110 F.3d at 1285-86 (citations omitted and quoting United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989) (finding that court did not commit clear error in crediting testimony of an admitted liar, convicted felon, large scale drug-dealing, paid [G]overnment informant)); see also United States v. Crockett, 82 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir.1996) (stating that testimony of admitted drug user was not unreliable because in determining credibility, drug use is a factor that can be weighed). Thus, the district court did not commit error in crediting the statements of Lorri and determining that Willie became involved with the drug trafficking conspiracy by at least February 1988. Accordingly, the sentencing court's imposition of the three-level criminal history category enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) and (e) was proper.