Opinion ID: 355205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: HEW Regulations

Text: 72 The majority correctly points out that HEW regulations concerning the termination of grants are confusing and that it is an exceedingly close question whether these regulations did or did not require a hearing under the circumstances of this case. By applying the doctrine of contra proferentem, the majority construes the regulations against HEW and in favor of SMHA. I believe this is wrong for three reasons. 73 First, I think it appropriate for this court to defer to the Department's interpretation of its own regulations. As far as we can tell the regulations were being interpreted for the first time, and the Department's construction is a reasonable one. 12 74 Second, I question whether the doctrine of contra proferentem should be used simply to penalize sloppy draftsmanship. The doctrine is most appropriate in situations where the non-drafting party is relatively inexperienced and has relied on the terms in dispute. In such a case, there is the danger that the more experienced drafter may be taking unfair advantage of the other party. However, these factors did not exist in the instant case. 75 Third, I believe that the Department's construction of its regulations is most consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the Migrant Health Act. The Department's construction would give a grantee a hearing whenever the grantee had a tangible financial stake in the grant funds, that is, whenever a grant was terminated in mid-term. The appellant's interpretation of the regulations, accepted by the majority, would provide a grantee with a hearing under circumstances where it had no real financial stake but only an ephemeral reputation interest to protect, that is, whenever the Department denies a grantee's application for renewal of a grant. 76 It cannot be denied that Congress enacted the Migrant Health Act to benefit migratory workers and their families and not to benefit public agencies or non-profit organizations. Indeed, it was the very self-abnegating spirit of these organizations which commended them as appropriate vehicles for accomplishing Congress' purpose. Congress might be surprised to see the spectacle of these presumably altruistic organizations squabbling over the grant funds in an attempt to vindicate ephemeral interests at the possible expense of the migrant workers themselves, the true beneficiaries of the Government's largesse. There can be no question but that expanded procedural rights for grantees under this kind of grant program would have a tendency to interfere with the delivery of health services to the program's beneficiaries by delaying, disrupting or degrading the quality of those services. For this reason I think it is important that we not broadly construe the Department's regulation as providing expansive procedural guarantees and, thereby, perhaps superordinate the interests of the grantees over those of the beneficiaries. 77 One other point on overall public policy involved here should be recognized. It is bad enough for efficient government that we must put up with entrenched bureaucracies of government employees who frequently assert that they have a constitutionally given right to perpetuate both the programs and themselves in spending government funds. It is even worse to confer upon not government agencies and persons who presumably are subject to direction by proper executive authority but to confer upon miscellaneous private organizations not within government control rights in perpetuity in programs and persons. This is really entrenching a bureaucracy when we entrench private bureaucracies which are by definition beyond effective government control. Hence, if we permit this private non-profit organization standing to sue here by recognizing its claimed ephemeral damage to reputation, and award it a hearing by rejecting the responsible Department's interpretation of its own regulations, we are in effect conferring upon organizations which are purely donee-trustees for the benefit of others a virtual perpetuity in government funds, with a right to challenge any cut-off of monies intended to be pure largesse for the benefit of persons other than this appellant. 78 First, because this rather peculiarly situated plaintiff-appellant lacks standing by the recognized constitutional requirement of injury in fact, and, second, because I would defer to the interpretation of the regulations made by both the responsible Department and the District Court, I cannot join in the majority's remand for a hearing and therefore respectfully dissent.