Opinion ID: 2483089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissible Testimony or Inadmissible Hearsay

Text: Defendant's first point for review is that the State presented inadmissible hearsay evidence to the jury that linked defendant to the carjacking of Rose Newburn's Dodge Intrepid. Detective Cardo testified that he was on his way to a burglary when there was a series of flash messages sent over the radio. When a crime happens and someone flees the scene, a responding officer will give out a flash of either a person fleeing the scene or a vehicle fleeing the scene so that other units in the area can look for this person or vehicle. Cardo's testimony continued as follows: Q. [Assistant State's Attorney] When you receive[d] that flash message, what information did you receive? [Defense counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: Objection overruled. The jury can regard this matter only not for the truth of the matter asserted in it, but only to show what the officer did when he did it next, if anything. Q. Thank you. What information did you receive? A. [Officer Cardo] There's flash message initially of a hit-and-run incident, and they gave a description of a green Dodge Intrepid with a plate of Mary, Sam, Victor four, three, and that vehicle had fled the scene of the accident. Q. That Mary, Sam, Victor, that's `MSV'? A. That's correct. Q. Now did you receive any other flash messages after that? A. Yes. Q. What was that? A. A message was sent that that vehicle was taken in a carjacking and a shooting from Ford City Mall. Defendant contends that the State sought to establish defendant's identity as the killer by showing a string of offenses in which he was involved beginning with the car jacking and murder. He argues that Cardo should have testified that he received a message to look for a green Dodge Intrepid and that it was not necessary to explain why he was looking for it. Defendant argues that Cardo's testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted ( People v. Tenney, 205 Ill.2d 411, 432-33, 275 Ill.Dec. 800, 793 N.E.2d 571 (2002); People v. Rogers, 81 Ill.2d 571, 577, 44 Ill.Dec. 254, 411 N.E.2d 223 (1980)) and testimony about an out-of-court statement which is used for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement is not hearsay ( People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 173, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947 (1991) (and cases cited therein)). We note initially that the flash messages described in Cardo's testimony did not mention anyone's identity or that there had been a murder. It is clear that the State did not present Cardo's testimony to prove the truth of the statement that that vehicle was taken in a carjacking and a shooting from Ford City Mall. The trial court had already instructed the jury that the similar testimony from the prior flash message was to be considered only to show what the officer did when he did it next, if anything. Cardo testified after Southward and Harrison, both of whom had already recounted that they saw defendant in the green Intrepid and Southward testified as to defendant's vehicular hijacking and shooting of Rose Newburn. We find that the flash messages were not improperly offered to link defendant to the carjacking and shooting. The admission of an out-of-court statement that is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to explain the investigatory procedure followed in a case is proper (see, e.g., People v. Jones, 153 Ill.2d 155, 160-61, 180 Ill.Dec. 68, 606 N.E.2d 1145 (1992)) and to show that the police officers had probable cause to arrest on the basis of the communication (see People v. Louisville, 241 Ill. App.3d 772, 781, 182 Ill.Dec. 148, 609 N.E.2d 682 (1992)). Because Cardo was not part of the initial investigation, the admission of the flash messages explained the course of the investigation, the subsequent actions of the police officers, which included a high-speed chase, a car crash into a CTA elevated-train pillar, a foot chase, and the basis for placing defendant under arrest. Defendant cites In re Guttierrez, 71 Ill. App.3d 537, 28 Ill.Dec. 43, 390 N.E.2d 25 (1979), and People v. Jura, 352 Ill.App.3d 1080, 288 Ill.Dec. 318, 817 N.E.2d 968 (2004), in support of his contention that the flash messages contained inadmissible hearsay. However, these cases are distinguishable. In re Guttierrez involved a flash message that was broadcast of an offender who was a male white, Mexican, 5 feet 5 inches in height, wearing dark trench coat and ski mask. In re Guttierrez, 71 Ill.App.3d at 538, 28 Ill.Dec. 43, 390 N.E.2d 25. The appellate court held that the trial court's substantive reliance on the flash message was improper, in particular since there was no other evidence that the offender was Hispanic and that the evidence was clearly offered to prove both that respondent made the statement and the verity of its contents. In re Guttierrez, 71 Ill.App.3d at 541, 28 Ill.Dec. 43, 390 N.E.2d 25. In Jura, the appellate court held that the testimony admitted had the effect of proving the matter asserted, that the defendant was the individual who committed the offense, and that it failed to satisfy any other relevant, nonhearsay purpose. Jura, 352 Ill.App.3d at 1088, 288 Ill.Dec. 318, 817 N.E.2d 968. Defendant finally asserts that admitting testimony of the flash messages violated his sixth amendment right to be confronted by witnesses against him. See U.S. Const., amend. VI. The confrontation clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369 n. 9, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, 197 n. 9 (2004). As we found earlier, the testimony of the flash messages was admitted into evidence for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted and the jury was so instructed by the trial court.