Opinion ID: 217410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Discriminatory Discharge Claims

Text: Moore claims he was discharged in violation of Title VII because Vital was motivated by racial and sexual discrimination in discharging him. The district court correctly held that Moore could not bring these claims because he had not included them in his EEOC charge. Generally, a plaintiff may not bring claims under Title VII that were not originally included in the charges made to the EEOC. Sitar v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir.2003). But if certain claims are not included in an EEOC charge, a plaintiff can still bring them if they are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the [EEOC] charge and growing out of such allegations. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.1976) ( en banc ). To be like or reasonably related, the relevant claim and the EEOC charge must, at minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals. Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.1994) (emphasis removed). Whether Moore's discharge claims are within the scope of his EEOC charge is a question of law. Conner v. Ill. Dep't of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir.2005). Moore's discriminatory discharge claims were not like or reasonably related to the allegations in his EEOC charge. To be sure, Moore's EEOC charge shows (by checked boxes) that he was alleging sex discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation claims. But merely checking the Race and Sex discrimination boxes in the EEOC charge is not enough to make the EEOC charge like or reasonably related to Moore's discriminatory discharge claims. See Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500-01 (refusing to consider sex discrimination claim when plaintiff had not described conduct giving rise to the claim in an EEOC charge, even though plaintiff had checked the sex discrimination box). In discussing the particulars of his allegations, Moore focused almost entirely on evidence of a sexually and racially hostile work environment. He mentioned inappropriate racial and sexual language, racial and sexual insults, and inappropriate sexual behavior. He contended that management ignored his complaints of sexual and racial harassment and that Matta and Cocking thwarted his attempts to file a grievance. The EEOC charge does include two complaints unrelated to the alleged hostile work environment: that Vital retaliated against me by overloading my workload and by giving me assignments in unfamiliar and challenging neighborhoods. Notably, Moore did not assert in this narrative that he was discharged because of racial or sexual discrimination. Rather, Moore explained that he was currently on medical leave. At best, the EEOC charge can be read to allege a hostile work environment and retaliation (though not retaliatory discharge). These harassment and retaliation allegations are not like or reasonably related to Moore's discriminatory discharge claims because they are not based on the same conduct. See id. at 500-02 ([A] claim of sex discrimination in an EEOC charge and a claim of sex discrimination in a complaint are not alike or reasonably related just because they both assert forms of sex discrimination.); Conner, 413 F.3d at 678, 680 (EEOC allegation of racial discrimination based on 2001 non-promotion not like or reasonably related to claim based on 2002 non-promotion); Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) (An aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, and then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination.). Moore does not seriously argue that his discriminatory discharge claims are like or related to the allegations in his EEOC charge. Rather, he complains that he could not have included discharge allegations because he did not know he had been discharged. Moore points to no case suggesting an exception from the EEOC charge requirement when the plaintiff is confused about the underlying facts, and we decline to create one. Such an exception would run counter to a primary purpose of the requirement, which is to give the EEOC an opportunity to investigate the complaints and help the parties settle the dispute without litigation. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500; Conner, 413 F.3d at 680 (finding EEOC charge prerequisite unmet because the conduct underlying plaintiff's complaint had not occurred when she filed her EEOC charge, and, as a result, [t]here was no way for the EEOC to undertake preliminary investigation as contemplated by Title VII's statutory design). In short, the district court correctly held that Moore cannot complain of discriminatory discharge because he has not alleged such conduct in an EEOC charge. Summary judgment was proper for these claims.