Opinion ID: 77695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Violation Clearly Established?

Text: 71 The second qualified immunity inquiry is, in the context of this case, straightforward: our binding precedent clearly established, at the time of Skop's arrest, that an arrest made without arguable probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 764 n. 8 (11th Cir.2006); Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1399 (11th Cir.1998). Because Skop has shown, at least when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to her, that Brown did not possess arguable probable cause to arrest her and thus violated clearly established law in arresting her, she is entitled to have her case heard by a jury. 72 Qualified immunity is, as the term implies, qualified. It is not absolute. Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1233. The qualified immunity defense focuses on whether the law provided Officer Brown with fair warning that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); McClish v. Nugent, No. 06-11826, No. 06-11826, slip op. at 36, 2007 WL 1063337, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir.2007): 73 Although exact factual identity with a previously decided case is not required, the conduct must have been clearly unlawful in light of pre-existing law. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir.2002) ([T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law . . . gave [the officers] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional. (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (first alteration added))); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (noting that a motivating concern of this immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct). As the Supreme Court recently held, qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). 74 When an officer plainly violates the legal rights of the people he serves, and when a reasonable officer in his position had fair warning that his conduct was unlawful, § 1983 suits exist to provide a vehicle for recourse. In a false arrest case such as this one, qualified immunity protects the police from such suits, but only up to the line defined by the arguable probable cause standard — whether reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendant[] could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195. Where, as here, the resolution of disputed critical facts determines on which side of this line the officer's conduct fell, summary judgment is inappropriate. Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse the district court's entry of final summary judgment for Brown and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.