Opinion ID: 3053391
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Taylor’s Categorical Approach

Text: Under the categorical approach first articulated in Taylor, an offense is an aggravated felony if “the full range of conduct covered by the [criminal statute] falls within the meaning” of the relevant definition of an aggravated felony. Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002)). Thus we must decide whether section 459 categorically describes an attempted theft offense under Taylor. The generic definition of “theft offense” as it is used in section 1101(a)(43)(G) of the INA is “a taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.” Penuliar, 528 F.3d at 611 (citing United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). [2] We have not previously stated a generic definition of “attempt” for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U), although we have sometimes made references to that aggra13608 NGAETH v. MUKASEY vated felony category. See, e.g., Rebilas v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 2008); Kharana v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1280, 1282 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); Li v. Ashcroft, 399 F.3d 892, 896 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004). In the sentencing context, we generically define “attempt” as containing two elements: “(1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct, coupled with (2) an overt act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime.” United States v. Morales-Perez, 467 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006). This definition is consistent with that used in the immigration context by the Second and Seventh Circuits, see Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d at 465; Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2001), and we employ it here. [3] In this case, then, section 459 describes an attempted theft offense if it criminalizes an intent to commit a theft offense, of the sort generically defined by Penuliar and earlier cases, coupled with an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the offense. Applying this definition, we hold that section 459 does not categorically define an attempted theft offense. It “reaches both conduct that would constitute an aggravated felony and conduct that would not.” See Penuliar, 528 F.3d at 608; Ye, 214 F.3d at 1133. We need not look far to so determine. Section 459 may be violated by an attempt to commit a crime other than theft — for example, by breaking into a vehicle with the intent to commit arson. Obviously, such a crime has nothing to do with attempted theft. “[W]here, as here, the state statute plainly and specifically criminalizes conduct outside the contours of the federal definition, we do not engage in judicial prestidigitation by concluding that the statute ‘creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime.’ ” Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 127 S. Ct. 815, 822 (2007); see also Vidal, 504 F.3d at 1082. In sum, section 459 does not categorically define an attempted theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(U). Cf. Morales-Perez, 467 F.3d at 1222. NGAETH v. MUKASEY 13609