Opinion ID: 2458490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Berry argues first that the district court erred by denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the felony-murder charge. He contends there was insufficient evidence of a causal connection between the traffic fatality and the cocaine possession charge. K.S.A. 21-3401(b) defines felony murder as the killing of a human being committed . . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436. Possession of cocaine is an inherently dangerous felony. See K.S.A. 21-3436(a)(14) (any felony under K.S.A. 65-4160); K.S.A. 65-4160(b) (person has prior conviction under this section or substantially similar offense and possesses drug listed in K.S.A. 65-4107). We note K.S.A. 21-3436 has since been amended, and K.S.A. 65-4160 has been repealed and replaced with K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-36a06. The felony-murder statute requires two causation elements. First, the death must be within the res gestae of the underlying crime, regardless of the sequence of events leading to the death. State v. Beach, 275 Kan. 603, 609-10, 67 P.3d 121 (2003) (citing State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 189-90, 14 P.3d 409 [2000]). We define res gestae in the felony-murder context as acts done before, during, or after the happening of the principal occurrence when those acts are so closely connected with the principal occurrence as to form, in reality, a part of the occurrence. State v. Jackson, 280 Kan. 541, 545, 124 P.3d 460 (2005). Second, there must be a direct causal connection between the felony and the homicide. Beach, 275 Kan. at 612, 67 P.3d 121. Our case law finds this direct causal connection exists unless an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant's act and becomes the sole legal cause of death. 275 Kan. at 612, 67 P.3d 121. In his motion to dismiss, Berry argued the fatality was not within the res gestae of the cocaine possession. He claimed the cocaine possession was complete before the death occurred. He also argued there was insufficient evidence of a causal connection because at the time Berry's car struck the victim's vehicle, the deputy had abandoned pursuit and Berry was no longer running from police. But Berry did not couch this argument in terms of an intervening or superseding event. He simply argued there was no causal connection because he claims the officer quit the chase before the killing. Berry recites no evidence to support his assertion that he was no longer running from police or that the police were no longer pursuing him. The only evidence in the record is that the officer deactivated his emergency lights and sirens in the hope that Berry would slow to a safer speed. No doubt recognizing this weakness now on appeal, Berry abandons the res gestae claim and solely argues there was insufficient evidence to make a causal connection between the cocaine possession and the fatality. And in doing so, he offers this court a different theory from what he advanced to the district court. He contends now it was his decision to evade the traffic stop that was the legal cause of the victim's death and this decision was unrelated to the cocaine possession. To support this, Berry notes he fled after the officer requested his driver's license and insinuates his effort to escape was to avoid being caught while driving on a suspended licensenot because he possessed more than 11 grams of cocaine.