Opinion ID: 2537905
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and the effect of provocation on defendant's premeditation and deliberation

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of murder and attempted murder, and failing to instruct that provocation was a circumstance reducing first degree murder to second degree murder. We find no error. The jury was instructed that, in order to find defendant guilty of premeditated first degree murder or premeditated attempted murder, it must find an intent to kill on the part of defendant that was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation. (CALJIC Nos. 8.20, 8.67.) It was also instructed that cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation. (CALJIC Nos. 8.20, 8.67.) Second degree murder was defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation. (CALJIC No. 8.30.) The jury was also instructed on assault with a deadly weapon as to Montoya. The court refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and related principles, including CALJIC Nos. 8.40 (defining voluntary manslaughter), 8.42 (defining a sudden quarrel or heat of passion and provocation), 8.43 (the effect of a cooling period), 8.44 (no particular emotion alone constitutes heat of passion), 8.50 (distinguishing murder and manslaughter), 8.72 (defendant given the benefit of any reasonable doubt on whether the crime was murder or manslaughter), and 8.73 (jury may consider whether evidence of provocation not sufficient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter had any bearing on whether defendant killed with premeditation and deliberation). (ง 192.) (9) `The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal request.' ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].) Conversely, even on request, the court `has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense unless there is substantial evidence to support such instruction.' ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) This substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by ` any evidence ... no matter how weak,' but rather by evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. ( People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970].) On appeal, we review independently the question whether the trial court failed to instruct on a lesser included offense. ( People v. Cole, supra, at p. 1215.)