Opinion ID: 1839936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Public-Duty Doctrine

Text: We hold that the public-duty doctrine applies in Michigan. As defined by Justice Cooley, the public-duty doctrine provides [t]hat if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages. [2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 300, pp 385-386.] Applied to police officers, the public-duty doctrine insulates officers from tort liability for the negligent failure to provide police protection unless an individual plaintiff satisfies the special-relationship exception. See Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937. Currently, the public-duty doctrine is under attack because some commentators believe that the doctrine unjustifiably creates inequitable and harsh results for plaintiffs. The doctrine has an all or nothing character that may deny a plaintiff recovery just because the tort was committed by a public, rather than a private, employee. The problems stemming from the doctrine's all or nothing character are compounded by the lack of guidance in defining which duties are public and which are specific individual duties. Partly on the basis of these concerns, some courts have abandoned the public-duty doctrine altogether. [4] See, e.g., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d 597 (1982), and Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo., 1986). While the inequitable and harsh results created by the doctrine are a significant concern when the doctrine is applied to most government employees, we conclude that the dangerous work environment inherent in police activities is a counterbalancing concern when the doctrine is applied to police officers, as will be discussed in part III of this opinion. Otherwise, there are two basic justifications for retaining the public-duty doctrine. First, the doctrine protects governments from unreasonable interference with policy decisions, and, second, it protects government employees from unreasonable liability. We agree that the public-duty doctrine serves a useful purpose by protecting governments from unreasonable interference with policy decisions. As noted by the Supreme Court of Illinois, while deciding a suit alleging that the failure to enforce the City of Chicago's housing code led to a child's injury, If the failure of the city to enforce [an] ordinance should render it liable for injuries sustained thereby, the tremendous exposure to liability would certainly dissuade the city from enacting ordinances designed for the protection and welfare of the general public, and thereby the general public would lose the benefit of salutary legislative enactments. [ Stigler v. Chicago, 48 Ill.2d 20, 24-25, 268 N.E.2d 26 (1971).] We find the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Illinois persuasive. A convincing justification for the continued recognition of the public-duty doctrine is its purpose of shielding governmental units from liability when its employees act, or refuse to act, so as to conform to a municipal ordinance and/or a state statute. Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 226, 525 N.E.2d 468 (1988). Further, tort liability should not be based on statutes and ordinances that are not traditionally relied on to impose liability or do not themselves specifically expose government employees to liability. Such liability may also deter the governmental entity from enacting protective legislation, fearing that the added cost of employee liability will eventually be borne by the governmental entity. Additionally, we note that mechanisms besides the threat of liability in negligence exist to hold employees accountable for failure to conform to statutes and ordinances. See Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn., 1995). Similarly, we agree that the public-duty doctrine is justified to the extent that it clarifies that a government employee's job title alone does not create a duty between the employee and specific members of the public. For example, police officers should not be liable for insuring the general public's welfare just because their job title lists them as police officers. Police officers should not be liable for failing to protect a member of the general public from a criminal act of which they were not aware but should have anticipated and prevented.... De Long v. Erie Co., 60 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 457 N.E.2d 717 (1983). Further, we agree that [f]or the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits. [ Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581-582, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968).] Therefore, we agree that the public-duty doctrine should shield a government employee from liability that is based solely on that employee's particular job title. In conclusion, we find that the public-duty doctrine still serves several useful purposes. The government should be protected from unreasonable interference with policy decisions. Government employees should enjoy personal protection from tort liability based on their action in conformity with, or failure to conform to, statutes or ordinances not intended to create tort liability. The job titles of government employees alone should not create a duty to specific members of the public. Therefore, we adhere to the public-duty doctrine in Michigan to the extent that the doctrine achieves these objectives.