Opinion ID: 1899037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Deputy Fire Chief Matthews's Prior Testimony.

Text: We turn to Hutchinson's contention that the administrative judge erred in admitting the prior testimony of Deputy Fire Chief Matthews, who testified about Hutchinson's removal in an earlier proceeding but appeared to be unavailable for the hearing that underlies the current OEA decision. Hutchinson insists that he had an absolute right to have the Administrative Judge ascertain the credibility of Deputy Chief Mat[t]hews through observation, just as she had with the other witnesses. We conclude that Hutchinson had no absolute right to exclude hearsay from the administrative proceeding, and that the prior testimony was properly admitted and considered by the administrative judge. It is settled that hearsay evidence may be admitted in administrative hearings. Administrative tribunals are not required to disregard evidence merely because it is hearsay. Gropp v. District of Columbia Bd. of Dentistry, 606 A.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C.1992) (citations and footnotes omitted). In fact, hearsay evidence can serve under some circumstances as substantial evidence on which to base a finding of fact.... Among the factors to consider in evaluating the reliability of hearsay evidence are whether the declarant is biased, whether the testimony is corroborated, whether the hearsay statement is contradicted by direct testimony, whether the declarant is available to testify and be cross-examined, and whether the hearsay statements were signed and sworn. Wisconsin Ave. Nursing Home v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 527 A.2d 282, 288 (D.C.1987) (citations omitted). Hearsay in the form of prior testimony may be admissible in judicial proceedings if the witness is unavailable to testify at the pending proceeding. See Bedney v. United States, 684 A.2d 759, 763 (D.C.1996); cf. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). We assume, without deciding, that unavailability is required for the admission of prior testimony in administrative proceedings. The only showing of unavailability in this case was the representation of an Assistant Corporation Counsel that Matthews was too sick to appear. We have demanded a more heightened showing that a witness is indeed unavailable before allowing the admission of prior testimony in a criminal homicide trial. See Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 157-58 (D.C.1986) (indicating that expert testimony as to a witness's health is necessary to demonstrate his unavailability). The rules of evidence in administrative hearings, however, are more relaxed than those governing judicial proceedings. See In re Thompson, 583 A.2d 1006, 1007 & n. 2 (D.C. 1990) (per curiam); see generally 4 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.01 (1996). Even in a judicial proceeding, a trial judge's unavailability determination need not follow a formal hearing and is not limited to admissible evidence. See 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.03[5][c] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.1997). [7] Counsel's good-faith representation that Matthews was too ill to appear was sufficient to convince the administrative judge that the witness was unavailable. Again assuming, without deciding, that unavailability is required, we see no reason to disturb the unavailability determination on appeal, given the relaxed standards applicable to administrative proceedings. The substance of Matthews's prior testimony was admissible under Wisconsin Avenue Nursing Home, supra, 527 A.2d at 288. The bulk of his testimony was corroborated by other facts in the record, viz., that Hutchinson had been deemed inefficient on two other occasions and that his disciplinary record influenced Matthews's decision to propose removal. The declarant was not only subject to cross-examination but actually cross-examined by Hutchinson when giving the prior testimony. Finally, the prior testimony was of course sworn.