Opinion ID: 2519784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: interpretation of voters

Text: ¶ 25 On cross-appeal, Grand County challenges the trial court's conclusion that section 17-2-8 of the Utah Code requires that an annexation proposal brought pursuant to section 17-2-6(2) receive a majority of the votes of those who actually voted on the annexation proposal in the area to be annexed and in the annexing county in order to be approved. Emery County and Green River appeal the trial court's refusal to certify the result of the election in accordance with the trial court's interpretation of the statute and its determination that the annexation proposal received the required electoral approval. ¶ 26 Grand County argues that the statute should be interpreted to require that an annexation proposal brought under section 17-2-6(2) receive a majority of the votes of registered voters in the area to be annexed and in the annexing county in order to be approved. Grand County supports its position by noting that the legislature amended the language of section 17-2-8(2)(b) that sets forth the standard for approval of an annexation proposal brought pursuant to section 17-2-6(2). Prior to the legislature's amendment of section 17-2-8(2)(b) through the enactment of H.B. 49, the standard of approval for an annexation proposal brought pursuant to either subsection 17-2-6(1) or subsection 17-2-6(2) was the same majority of those voting standard. The amendment altered the language setting forth the approval standard for section 17-2-6(2) annexation proposals from a majority of those voting in the area proposed for annexation and in the county to which the area is to be annexed, Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-8(2)(b) (1999), to a majority of voters living in those two areas, Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-8(2)(b) (Supp.2001). Grand County argues that the legislature amended the language of the statute to require approval of a majority of voters living in the relevant areas in order to impose a higher standard than the majority of those voting requirement. In Grand County's view, the new language inserted by the legislature requires a majority of registered voters in the relevant areas even if those registered voters failed or chose not to vote on the annexation proposal in question. Under Grand County's statutory interpretation of section 17-2-8, the amended language of section 17-2-8(2)(b) cannot be interpreted to set the same standard of approval for an annexation proposal as the majority of those voting language in section 17-2-8(2)(a) which was left unaffected by H.B. 49's amendment. If the two phrases are interpreted as meaning the same thing, section 17-2-8(2)(a) becomes redundant with section 17-2-8(2)(b) and the change in the language was unnecessary. In other words, according to Grand County, the legislature's decision to change the language was purposeful and the change would not have been made unless some different meaning and standard was in fact intended. ¶ 27 The voting requirement associated with county annexation is constitutionally mandated and defined. See Utah Const. art. XI, § 3. The legislature has the authority to set the conditions of annexation by general law, but it does not have the authority to establish or modify the voting requirement set forth in the plain language of article XI, section 3. Because the voting requirement is constitutionally intended and described, and because the language of the statute and the constitution are identical, we interpret the constitutional language and impute that meaning to the same language used by the legislature in the statute. See Odd Fellows' Bldg. Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 114, 177 P. 214, 215 (1918); see also People ex rel. Baird v. Tilton, 37 Cal. 614, 622 (1869) (The same construction should be given to the same language used in the same connection, in reference to a similar subject matter, when used in a statute, as when used in the Constitution.); People ex rel. Akin v. The Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N.E. 349, 355 (1903) ([W]hen [a] statute is couched in the same language as the Constitution, the language of the statute will receive the same construction as that of the Constitution ....). In the case at hand, the legislature's use of the exact language of the constitution suggests that it intended the language of section 17-2-8(2)(b) and section 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A)(B) to have the same meaning and effect as the language of the constitution. See State v. Woodcock, 168 Vt. 588, 719 A.2d 32, 32 (1998). As a result, we need not address Grand County's arguments based on the interpretation of the statute or the legislature's intent in amending the language of the statute but rather focus our analysis on the meaning and interpretation of the constitutional provision. ¶ 28 As previously recited, article XI, section 3 prohibits the territory of one county from being annexed by another county unless a majority of the voters living in such territory, as well as of the county to which it is to be annexed, shall vote therefor. Utah Const. art. XI, § 3. ¶ 29 In interpreting the state constitution, we look primarily to the language of the constitution itself .... State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1997). Therefore, our starting point in interpreting a constitutional provision is the textual language itself. See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ¶ 20, 44 P.3d 756; Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 2001 UT 2, ¶ 13, 17 P.3d 1125; In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Young), 1999 UT 6, ¶ 62, 976 P.2d 581 (Stewart, J., dissenting). We need not inquire beyond the plain meaning of the [constitutional provision] unless we find it ambiguous. Casey, 2002 UT 29 at ¶ 20, 44 P.3d 756. ¶ 30 The language at issue here is clear and unambiguous. Voter is defined as a person who engages in the act of voting. Black's Law Dictionary 1571 (7th ed.1999). Under this definition, article XI, section 3 requires a majority of persons who engage in the act of voting who live in the territory to be annexed, as well as those who live in the county to which that territory is to be annexed, to vote in favor of an annexation proposal in order for it to be approved. In other words, the group of voters of which a majority is required consists merely of those who exercise the right to vote on the annexation proposal in question at the election in which the annexation proposal is offered for a vote. The number of votes cast at the ballot box itself is the basis for determining a majority, as opposed to the number of those possessing the qualifications to vote or those registered to vote in the annexing county or area to be annexed but who do not actually vote. Those citizens who fail or choose not to vote are presumed to assent to and acquiesce in the expressed will of the majority. This interpretation of the meaning and effect of the phrase majority of voters is consistent with the well-settled, general rule of American election law concerning the method of computing a majority and with the long-standing interpretations of similar constitutional language by the highest courts of our kindred states. [2] ¶ 31 Grand County's interpretation of the constitutional language would essentially read the word registered into article XI, section 3 of the constitution, and consequently, require that the number of those voting in favor of the annexation proposal be a majority of those registered to vote in the annexing county and the area to be annexed instead of a majority of those voters from the relevant areas who actually voted on the annexation proposition during the election. This would effectively allow those registered voters in the two areas who did not actually vote to be counted as votes against the annexation proposal. Such a method of computing whether a majority of voters have approved a proposition or have elected a candidate would be contrary to the plain meaning of the constitutional provision and the long-established general rule. [3] ¶ 32 Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that only a majority of those voting on the annexation proposal in Emery County and the Green River portion of Grand County needed to vote in favor of the annexation proposal for it to be approved. However, the trial court erred in not certifying the results of the election in accordance with this standard and its determination that the required electoral approval had been achieved.