Opinion ID: 1495900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard for admissibility of expert testimony

Text: The Board suggests the standard for admission of expert testimony is that set out in Frye and previously applied by this Court. See Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823, 828-30 (Mo. banc 1985). Frye states that, for expert testimony to be admissible, the thing from which the [expert's] deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 239 F. at 1014. Dr. McDonagh counters that, although this Court once adopted the Frye test, the relevant standard for admission of expert testimony is now either that set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), for application in the federal courts, or that set out in section 490.065. The latter statute says: 1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reasonably reliable. 4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of hypothetical questions, unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical question will make the expert's opinion more understandable or of greater assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case. Although section 490.065 on its face states that it applies in civil actions and sets out the relevant standard for admission of expert testimony in such actions, various decisions of Missouri's court of appeals since section 490.065 was enacted in 1989 have expressed confusion as to whether it is the statute, Frye , or Daubert that supplies the relevant standard for admission of expert testimony. [9] Any such confusion should have been resolved by this Court's 1997 decision in Lasky holding that section 490.065 provides the applicable standard in evaluating the admission of expert testimony in civil cases. 936 S.W.2d at 802. While Lasky did not further expressly state that to the extent that prior civil cases applied a different rule they should no longer be followed, such a holding was implicit in Lasky 's direction that on remand the trial court shall be guided by section 490.065, RSMo, in evaluating the admission of expert testimony. Id. at 801. To clarify, however, this Court expressly holds that to the extent that cases since Lasky have suggested that the standard of admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases is that set forth in Frye or some other standard, they are no longer to be followed. The relevant standard is that set out in section 490.065.
The Board alternatively argues that because the first four words of section 490.065 are in any civil action, the standard for admission of expert testimony it sets out could have no application to administrative actions such as this one. In support, the Board cites cases that have noted that administrative actions generally are tried in accordance with various rules of administrative procedure rather than in accordance with Missouri's rules of civil procedure, except to the extent that the latter have been adopted by statute for use in administrative cases. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Kansas City, 918 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo.App. W.D.1996); Dillon v. Dir. of Revenue, 777 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App. W.D.1989). The admission of expert testimony is not determined by rules of civil or administrative procedure, however, but by principles governing the admissibility of evidence. The relevant evidentiary principles are not set out in any set of rules, but rather have been developed by common law and by statute. [10] These principles govern the admission of evidence in civil and criminal cases. Cases brought before administrative agencies generally are less formal and structured than are civil proceedings in the circuit courts. That does not mean that evidentiary rules developed in civil cases have no application to administrative actions, however. To the contrary, the legislature has specifically directed that many evidentiary principles developed in civil actions be applied in administrative ones, including those regarding privilege, judicial notice, admission of writings and documents, depositions, and so forth. [11] This Court has further held that other, basic principles of evidence also apply in administrative proceedings. Thus, in Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo. banc 1977), this Court stated, [a]lthough technical rules of evidence are not controlling in administrative hearings, fundamental rules of evidence are applicable. The principle set out in Missouri Church of Scientology reiterates a principle this Court recognized at least as long ago as State ex rel. De Weese v. Morris, 359 Mo. 194, 221 S.W.2d 206, 209 (1949), in which this Court stated, [t]he fact that technical rules of evidence do not control has been considered to permit of leading questions and other informalities but not to abrogate the fundamental rules of evidence. See also State ex rel. Bond v. Simmons, 299 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Mo.App.1957) (accord). The approach set out in these cases applies here. While contested administrative proceedings are not required to follow the technical rules of evidence, the fundamental rules of evidence applicable to civil cases also are applicable in such administrative hearings. See Mo. Church of Scientology, 560 S.W.2d at 839; De Weese, 221 S.W.2d at 209. The standards for admission of expert testimony constitute such a fundamental rule of evidence. The standards set out in section 490.065 therefore guide the admission of expert testimony in contested case administrative proceedings such as this one.
The parties and the AHC seem to assume that section 490.065 and FRE 702 and FRE 703, as interpreted in Daubert , are effectively identical, and that the standard set out in section 490.065 mirrors that Daubert adopted for use in the federal courts. Daubert held [t]hat the Frye test was displaced by the [Federal] Rules of Evidence. 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. It found that FRE 702 provides a more flexible standard for admissibility focused on the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. Id. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (noting that [t]he focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate). Daubert set out a non-exclusive list of factors for consideration in determining whether the evidence in question meets the flexible standard, including: (1) whether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) `general acceptance.' Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Supreme Court summarized its holding by emphasizing the difference between Daubert and the Frye test that the federal courts had previously employed, stating: `General acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.... Id. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Few cases have interpreted section 490.065. To the extent that section 490.065 mirrors FRE 702 and FRE 703, as interpreted and applied in Daubert and its progeny, the cases interpreting those federal rules provide relevant and useful guidance in interpreting and applying section 490.065. See Giddens v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 29 S.W.3d 813, 820 (Mo. banc 2000) (The construction given by the federal courts to their rules does not control the interpretation of our state rules, even if the rules themselves are nearly identical. However, the experiences of those courts in applying rules similar to our own are illustrative). To the extent that the two approaches differ, however, the standard set out in section 490.065 must govern. The standard set out in section 490.065 is very similar to that initially adopted by the federal courts in Daubert and set out in FRE 702. Indeed, at the time Daubert was decided, FRE 702 was identical to section 490.065.1, stating, If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, except that section 490.065.1 added a preliminary phrase [i]n any civil action. [12] While the parties presume that section 490.065.3 is also effectively identical to FRE 703, review of the two rules reveals important differences. Section 490.065.3 begins by stating, The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. The first sentence of FRE 703 is identical except for minor stylistic variations. But, section 490.065.3 goes on to require that the facts or data on which an expert bases an opinion or inference must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and that these facts and data must be otherwise reasonably reliable. Sec. 490.065.3. Thus, section 490.065.3 expressly requires a showing that the facts and data are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject of the expert's testimony. The court must also independently assess their reliability. Id. By contrast, under FRE 703 whether the facts or data relied upon are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject is relevant only to determine whether the facts or data must be otherwise admissible in evidence. For this reason, unlike in Missouri, Daubert held that in the federal courts an expert need not necessarily identify the relevant scientific community, or field, in which the data and facts are accepted. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786.