Opinion ID: 1451362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: death-sentencing process

Text: Before concluding my dissent, I wish to comment again on the death-sentencing process in Nevada. In Canape v. State, 109 Nev. 864, 859 P.2d 1023 (1993), this court, against my vigorous objection, categorized Nevada as a weighing state and approved an instruction that the death-sentencing jury must determine (a) Whether an aggravating circumstance or circumstances are found to exist; and (b) Whether a mitigating circumstance or circumstances are found to exist; and (c) Based upon these findings, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Id. at 877 n. 7, 859 P.2d 1032 n. 7 (my emphasis). The majority in Canape ruled that it was proper, in accordance with Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), for appellate courts in `weighing' States, to consider whether the evidence is such that the sentencer could have arrived at [ [7] ] the death sentence that was imposed. Id. at 882, 859 P.2d at 1034 (emphasis added) (quoting Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748-49, 110 S.Ct. at 1448). I assume, therefore, that it is safe to say that in a weighing state, the sentencer arrives at the death sentencing by weighing. As I argue in my Dissent in Canape, our statutes do not provide that sentencers must arrive at the death decision by way of a weighing process. The idea that Nevada is a weighing state is a judicial invention by this court; but, still, even if Nevada is proclaimed by this court to be a weighing state, it is impossible to tell from reading the Majority Opinion in Canape whether death-sentencers are supposed to arrive at the death sentence by weighing aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances, or are, instead, first to find the defendant to be death eligible and then  in its discretion ... [to] consider the sentence of death as an option. Id. at 882, 859 P.2d at 1035. As I explain in my Dissenting Opinion in Canape, it makes a very big difference as to whether the sentencer arrives at its life-death decision on the basis of having weighed aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances or engages in discretionary sentencing after first finding death eligibility. [8] Unlike Richard Canape, Gerald Lane was not subjected to a jury instruction that told his sentencing jury that  based on ... findings relating to aggravating circumstances, the sentencing jury must determine ... whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Id. at 893, 859 P.2d at 1042 (Springer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting NRS 17.554(2)(c)). On the contrary, the Lane jury was correctly instructed that after a finding of death eligibility, it was free to exercise its discretion on the life or death issue and was not required to arrive at its decision based upon any findings relating to aggravating and mitigating circumstances or by weighing these circumstances against each other. [9]