Opinion ID: 2971507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Access to Courts and the Right to a Jury Trial

Text: Plaintiff also argues that her rights to have access to courts and a jury trial have been violated by her complete inability to obtain relief for her injury. We find it unnecessary to add anything to the thoughtful analysis provided by the district court on this question: Although a right-of-access case can be established when a person can prove that a state’s judicial process does not provide an adequate procedure to remedy an alleged wrong, see Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Access to the courts . . . encompasses all the means a defendant . . . might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances alleged by him.”) (citing Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), such claims are generally recognized for civil litigants only in the context of spoliation of evidence or interference with filing a lawsuit. See [Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1263-64 (6th Cir. 1997)]. A cognizable claim can be made out “only by showing that the defendants’ actions foreclosed [a potential litigant] from filing suit in state court or rendered ineffective any state court remedy [the litigant] previously may have had.” Ibid. The argument that a state statute stiffens the standard of proof of a common law claim does not implicate this right. In this case, the plaintiff does not allege that she was unable to gain access to court to litigate her claim. Rather, she contends in essence that Section 600.2946(5) requires too much, and that the immunity it grants to drug manufacturers is too broad. These allegations do not constitute a claim of denial of access to the courts. 3 W here possible, the Supreme Court “interp rets congressional enactm ents to avoid raising serious constitutional questions,” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (citations omitted). The Michigan courts adhere to a similar principle. “A legislative enactment can be held to be facially invalid only if there are no factual circumstances under which the provision could be constitutionally implemented.” Gera v. M axw ell, et al., 456 M ich. 704 (1998) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 731, 739 (1987) n.15, Pigorsh v. Fahner, 386 Mich. 508 (1972) at 509 (we are bound, if possible, to construe statutes as to give them validity and a reasonable interpretation)). No. 03-1712 Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories Page 6 Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., No. 01-10002-BC, slip op. at 19-20 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2003). Plaintiff has failed to set forth any legally binding precedent that would warrant a reversal of the district court’s opinion in this respect.