Opinion ID: 2507905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Opinion.

Text: `It is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or employment background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long as the opinion is based on the evidence at trial. Jurors' views of the evidence, moreover, are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including their education and professional work. A juror, however, should not discuss an opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside sources. Such injection of external information in the form of a juror's own claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of an issue is misconduct.' ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1265, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225 ( Steele ), quoting In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 963, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468.) In Steele, the defendant introduced extensive evidence regarding his military training and Vietnam experience and its effect, if any, on a brain electrical activity mapping (BEAM) test. He alleged that four jurors, two with military and Vietnam experience, and two with medical experience, committed misconduct by offering their expertise to other jurors. It was alleged that two jurors `with medical experience ... told the [other jurors] that the criteria that the Doctor's [ sic ] used to establish the validity of the B.E.A.M. Test' was `inadequate' based on `what they have learned in their own experience in the medical field.' ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1260, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Another juror stated that this input `helped me because I have no experience when it comes to that type of thing.' ( Ibid. ) The trial court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and denied defendant's motion for a new trial. We agreed and first noted: To the extent the declarations stated what effect these jurors had on the deliberations, the statements are inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), which prohibits evidence showing the effect that statements or conduct [have] `upon a juror either in influencing him to assent or to dissent from the verdict.' ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1265, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) We continued: A juror may not express opinions based on asserted personal expertise that is different from or contrary to the law as the trial court stated it or to the evidence, but if we allow jurors with specialized knowledge to sit on a jury, and we do, we must allow those jurors to use their experience in evaluating and interpreting that evidence. Moreover, during the give and take of deliberations, it is virtually impossible to divorce completely one's background from one's analysis of the evidence. We cannot demand that jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in the subtle distinctions that attorneys draw, never refer to their background during deliberations.... [¶] ... In this case, the declarations do not so clearly show that the jurors crossed the line into misconduct as to have required the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. ( Id. at p. 1266, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Similarly, in the present case, the evidence presented in support of defendant's motion for a new trial does not show that Renee P. offered the jurors any basis for deciding the case other than the evidence and testimony presented at trial. No declaration suggests that she made any assertion inconsistent with the properly admitted evidence and testimony. Indeed, the remarks attributed to her in her declaration are consistent with the trial testimony of the pathologist, who expounded at length on the concept of blood flow, circulation, and the meaning of shunting. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Renee P.'s explanation of blood evidence was not misconduct.