Opinion ID: 2793929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: intellectual-disability claim

Text: The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the execution of the intellectually disabled. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 15 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 16 of 39 2252. In Mr. Conner’s first appeal, we held that his intellectual-disability claim had never been adjudicated on the merits in state court and “no adequate [state] procedural bar preclude[ed] federal review.” Conner, 645 F.3d at 1292. As a result, “the District Court [was] not bound by AEDPA’s deferential standards in 28 U.S.C. § 22554(d) and federal court review [was] de novo.” Id.; see also Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2009) (“Because the state court did not decide whether Porter’s counsel was deficient, we review this element of Porter’s Strickland claim de novo.”). But the District Court has now held that Mr. Conner is not intellectually disabled, and we review that finding for clear error. See Holladay v. Allen, 555 F.3d 1346, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 2009). When we remanded this case, we guided the District Court in the exercise of its discretion to grant discovery or an evidentiary hearing, including instructions that it “must apply Georgia’s substantive [intellectual disability] criteria” and require Mr. Conner to prove his claim only “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Conner, 645 F.3d at 1293 & n.17. On remand, the District Court expressly acknowledged that “Georgia state law . . . govern[s] the procedure for determining whether [Mr. Conner] is [intellectually disabled] and thus ineligible for the death penalty.” The District Court specifically cited Georgia’s statutory definition of intellectual disability, O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(a)(3). 16 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 17 of 39 Under Georgia law, intellectual disability “means having [1] significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning [2] resulting in or associated with impairments in adaptive behavior which [3] manifested during the developmental period.” Id. We have recognized that Georgia’s definition of intellectual disability “essentially tracks the AAMR and APA definitions mentioned in Atkins.”6 Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The District Court initially found the “evidence sufficient to warrant further inquiry” and appointed its own “independent” expert, Dr. Thomas R. Swift, M.D., 7 to determine if Mr. Conner is intellectually disabled under Georgia law. The District Court then found that Mr. Conner showed good cause for discovery and allowed the parties to do discovery on his intellectual-disability claim, including expert examination of Mr. Conner “in accordance with the standards elucidated in [Atkins] . . . and O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(a)(3).” In the end, seven experts evaluated Mr. Conner for intellectual disability: (1) Dr. Swift (the District Court’s appointed 6 In Atkins, the Supreme Court referenced the clinical definitions for intellectual disability used by the American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) (which has since changed its name to the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disability (AAIDD)), and the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Atkins, 536 U.S.at 308 n.3, 122 S. Ct. at 2245 n.3. The Court also noted states’ “statutory definitions of [intellectual disability] are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions” of the AAIDD and APA. Id. at 317 n.22, 122 S. Ct. at 2250 n.22. 7 The District Court described Dr. Swift as a “physician of broad experience,” “a Diplomat of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Past President of the American Academy of Neurology, former Chairman of the Department of Neurology at the Medical College of Georgia (now Georgia Health Sciences University) and . . . active in many other professional organizations.” 17 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 18 of 39 neurologist); (2) Dr. Bhushan Agharkar, M.D. (Mr. Conner’s psychiatrist); (3) Dr. Stephen Greenspan, Ph.D. (Mr. Conner’s psychologist); (4) Dr. Barry Crown (Mr. Conner’s neuropsychologist); (5) Dr. Elizabeth Beck, Ph.D. (Mr. Conner’s social worker); (6) Dr. Glen King, Ph.D. (state’s psychologist); and (7) Dr. Matthew Norman, M.D. (state’s psychiatrist). All of these experts testified at the evidentiary hearing held before the District Court on May 7 and 8, 2013. Each expert’s written evaluation was admitted into evidence. Three defense experts—Drs. Agharkar, Crown, and Greenspan—all concluded that Mr. Conner has significantly sub-average intellectual functioning based on academic achievement, intelligence testing, and neuropsychological testing. 8 These defense experts relied on two IQ scores: (1) Mr. Conner’s FS IQ score of 87 on the WAIS administered by Central State Hospital in 1982; 9 and (2) his FS IQ score of 80 on the WAIS-IV administered by Dr. King in 2013. 10 8 A fourth defense expert, Dr. Beck, prepared a psychosocial history assessment of Mr. Conner, focusing “primarily on the conditions of [his] childhood and development through young adulthood.” Based on her review of background materials and collateral witness interviews, Dr. Beck opined that Mr. Conner’s life history indicated “he is an individual with significant intellectual impairments.” 9 On his 1982 WAIS test, Mr. Conner obtained a performance IQ score of 97, a verbal IQ score of 80, and a FS IQ score of 87, unadjusted for the Flynn effect or scoring error. 10 When Dr. King administered the WAIS-IV in 2013, Mr. Conner obtained a FS IQ of 80, a verbal comprehension index of 81, and a perceptual reasoning index of 88, unadjusted for the Flynn Effect or scoring error. 18 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 19 of 39 Applying the Flynn effect 11 to these test scores caused the IQ score on the 1982 WAIS to be reduced by nine points to 78, according to Mr. Conner’s experts. Similarly, the Flynn effect reduced Mr. Conner’s IQ score on the 2013 WAIS-VI by two points to 78. Finally, scoring errors on both the WAIS and WAIS-IV lowered the full scale IQ scores on both tests by one point to 77, after correcting for the Flynn Effect, according to Dr. Crown. 12 Mr. Conner’s neuropsychologist, Dr. Crown, opined, “[b]ecause Mr. Conner’s verbal skills are much weaker than his performance skills, his Full Scale IQ score on a standardized test for intellectual functioning such as the WAIS tests 11 When considering an individual’s intellectual functioning, this Court has recognized that the statistical phenomena known as the Standard Error of Measure (SEM) and the Flynn effect can be applied by a test evaluator in arriving at an individual’s final test score. Thomas v. Allen, 607 F.3d 749, 753 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Burgess v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 723 F.3d 1308, 1321 nn.15 & 16 (11th Cir. 2013). With respect to the Flynn effect in particular: An evaluator may also consider the “Flynn effect,” a method that recognizes the fact that IQ test scores have been increasing over time. The Flynn effect acknowledges that as an intelligence test ages, or moves farther from the date on which it was standardized, or normed, the mean score of the population as a whole on that assessment instrument increases, thereby artificially inflating the IQ scores of individual test subjects. Therefore, the IQ test scores must be recalibrated to keep all test subjects on a level playing field. Thomas, 607 F.3d at 753 (citations omitted). The District Court was, in its words, “extremely doubtful of the Flynn Effect.” While the experts for the defense agreed that the Flynn effect should be taken into consideration to reduce Mr. Conner’s IQ scores, the state’s expert, Dr. King, did not. Dr. King’s opinion was that there is no sound basis for the Flynn effect. However, the District Court found it unnecessary to resolve the experts’ conflicting testimony about whether the Flynn Effect exists because, even if it does and was applied, Conner’s IQ score would be 77. 12 While he rejected application of the Flynn effect, Dr. King did recognize that there was a one point scoring error in the WAIS-IV, which changed the perceptual reasoning index from 88 to 87 and the FS IQ from 80 to 79. Dr. King testified the scoring error did not change his assessment of Mr. Conner’s performance on the test. 19 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 20 of 39 will tend to be inaccurate and an overestimate of his true level of functioning.” Instead, Dr. Crown indicated that Mr. Conner’s “[v]erbal IQ score on the 1982 WAIS, corrected for the Flynn effect, is a more accurate representation of [Mr. Conner’s] overall cognitive functioning and is significantly subaverage.” Mr. Conner’s verbal IQ score on the 1982 WAIS was 70, corrected for the Flynn effect and a one point scoring error. Drs. Agharkar, Beck, Crown, and Greenspan also each testified that Mr. Conner had adaptive skill deficits consistent with intellectual disability, with onset prior to age eighteen. According to Dr. Greenspan, Mr. Conner’s history demonstrates adaptive deficits in five areas: work, home living, functional academics, social judgment, and communication. Dr. Agharkar found Mr. Conner had deficits in four areas: work, functional academics, home living, and communication. Dr. Beck testified that Mr. Conner had adaptive deficits in three areas: home living, work, and functional academics. While Dr. Crown’s evidentiary hearing testimony addressed only Mr. Conner’s impairment in social adjustment, Dr. Crown’s written report indicated he “would expect to see the kind of adaptive deficits identified by Dr. Beck and Dr. Agarkar in someone with the deficits [he] saw in [his] testing of Mr. Conner.” 20 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 21 of 39 Finally, Drs. Agharkar, Crown, and Greenspan concluded that Mr. Conner met the criteria for mild intellectual disability. Drs. King, Norman, and Swift all agreed that Mr. Conner is not intellectually disabled. Dr. King testified that he did “not find any evidence for [intellectual disability].” Rather, Dr. King explained that the pattern of test scores from the 2013 WASI-IV he administered to Mr. Conner, as well as the 1982 WAIS, is indicative “of the pattern that we get in individuals who have learning disabilities.” Dr. King emphasized that all of Mr. Conner’s index scores on the WAIS-IV were “in the 80s,” including a performance IQ score of 87. With regard to the results of the Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT) Dr. King administered to Mr. Conner in 2013, 13 Dr. King agreed that Mr. Conner’s “significantly reduced reading score and writing score . . . indicate the presence [of] both dyslexia, that is a reasoning disorder, and dysgraphia, which is a writing disorder.” Dr. King did not evaluate Mr. Conner for adaptive behavioral deficits because he understood the Georgia statute and DSM-IV to require an IQ score of 70 or below for a diagnosis of intellectual disability and “Mr. Conner didn’t reach or even get close to that,” in Dr. King’s view. 13 Mr. Conner’s standard scores on the WRAT-4 were: word reading 73; spelling 73; and math computation 84. Dr. King explained Mr. Conner’s scores in reading and spelling were two standard deviations below the mean, but he “wouldn’t have a learning disability in math.” 21 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 22 of 39 Dr. Norman concluded “with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, [that] Mr. John Wayne Conner does not meet criteria for [intellectual disability] either currently or in the past.” More specifically, Dr. Norman noted that Mr. Conner did not have an IQ score from an individually administered IQ test “approximately 70 or below.” He also found “insufficient evidence of concurrent deficits or impairment in present adaptive functioning in at least two areas.” Rather, Dr. Norman indicated Mr. Conner “currently demonstrated a history of a lack of impairments or deficits in communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.” Dr. Norman found no evidence of onset of intellectual disability before age 18. Finally, Dr. Swift concluded that Mr. Conner is not intellectually disabled. Dr. Swift noted the absence of any IQ scores less than 70. In Dr. Swift’s opinion, Mr. Conner “seemed to have normal mental and adaptive function and normal emotional and language expression.” After hearing two days of evidence, the District Court took a one-day break and then heard closing arguments from the parties. The District Court then 22 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 23 of 39 announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law from the bench. 14 The District Court began by clearly identifying the three elements from Georgia’s intellectual disability standard, citing and discussing O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(a)(3). The court correctly treated Georgia’s definition of intellectual disability and the definition from the DSM-IV “as each being the functional equivalent of the other.” The District Court properly based its rulings on the preponderance-of-evidence standard, per our instructions, see Conner, 645 F.3d at 1293 n.17. The District Court concluded Mr. Conner had not shown any of the three elements required under the Georgia statute to establish intellectual disability. Specifically, the District Court found Mr. Conner had not shown he “suffers from a significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.” “On the contrary,” the District Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Conner’s “general intellectual functioning is not significantly subaverage.” (emphasis added). Although the District Court determined that Mr. Conner’s IQ is “the level of a WAIS-IV intelligence score of 79 and has been throughout his maturity,” the District Court “agree[d] with [Mr. Conner’s counsel] that a bright line methodology cannot be employed here.” The District Court explained that determining the existence of intellectual disability “is not simply a function of 14 “In an action tried on the facts without a jury . . . the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of evidence . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). 23 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 24 of 39 intelligence or an intelligence quotient or a score on a WAIS-IV type of test. . . . It is not that simple. . . . Now while I think that the test is very important and the scoring of it is critical here, it is not the final answer.” Still, the District Court considered the IQ score “to be a very important factor,” taking into consideration that “the law of Georgia would allow some slippage . . . around the area of 70 but this WAIS score does not hover around 70. It hovers around 80.” It turns out the District Judge was prescient in his view that intellectual disability is not just a number. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001 (“Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number.”). 15 The District Court went on to find: [T]he Petitioner ha[d] not shown that the evidence supports a finding by a preponderance of the evidence or otherwise that John Wayne Conner has significant limitations or deficits in adaptive functioning in at least two of these areas. One, communication; two, self-care; three, home living; four, social interpersonal skills; five, use of community resources; six, self-direction; seven, functional academic skills; eight, work; nine, leisure; ten, health; and eleven, safety. Finally, the District Court made a finding that Mr. Conner had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence “that the conditions that he is obligated to show were manifest during the developmental period.” Although the District Court 15 This Court has ruled that the Supreme Court has not made the new rule announced in Hall retroactive to cases on collateral review for the purposes of authorizing petitioners to file second or successive habeas corpus applications under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). See In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151, 1159 (11th Cir. 2014). 24 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 25 of 39 agreed that Mr. Conner “was a troubled youth,” the judge explained “this did not equate to impairments in adaptive behavior associated with subaverage, general intellectual functioning.” On this record, we cannot say that the District Court clearly erred in any of its findings related to the three elements Mr. Conner was charged with proving in order to prevail on his intellectual-disability claim under Georgia law. “Findings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573–74, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511–12 (1985); United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1009 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Appellate courts reviewing a cold record give particular deference to credibility determinations of a fact-finder who had the opportunity to see live testimony.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). “The clearly erroneous standard is very deferential.” Madison, 761 F.3d at 1255. “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S. Ct. at 1511 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 25 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 26 of 39 We remanded this case to the District Court to give Mr. Conner a fair opportunity to litigate his intellectual-disability claim after we concluded the claim was not procedurally barred. Mr. Conner took full advantage of that opportunity by having three different defense experts evaluate him and a fourth expert develop a comprehensive psychosocial history assessment. The District Court also granted Mr. Conner an evidentiary hearing in which he was able to present his experts and subject the state’s and the court’s experts to meaningful cross examination. In short, Mr. Conner had a fair opportunity to investigate, develop, and present evidence in support of his intellectual-disability claim. As it turned out, he was not able to convince the fact-finder by a preponderance of the evidence that he is intellectually disabled. While Mr. Conner faults the District Court for relying too much on Dr. Swift, the fact remains that the assessments done by Dr. King and Dr. Norman also support the District Court’s finding that Mr. Conner is not intellectually disabled. The record demonstrates that the District Court applied the correct legal standards in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Mr. Conner’s intellectual-disability claim. The intellectual-disability determination is factintensive, requiring careful consideration of the petitioner’s intellectual functioning, adaptive skills, and age of onset, with the assistance of qualified 26 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 27 of 39 experts. Cf. Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The issue of [intellectual disability], defined by Atkins[,] . . . is fact-intensive and rests on nuanced determinations under broadly stated concepts such as limitations in adaptive functioning.” (quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Conner got that careful consideration here. Because the District Court’s finding that Mr. Conner is not intellectually disabled is plausible in light of the entire record, it is not clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74, 105 S. Ct. at 1511 (“If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”). Finally, where, as here, “there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at 1511. B. PENALTY PHASE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL To establish ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. To prove deficient performance, a petitioner must show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability 27 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 28 of 39 that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In challenging a death sentence, a petitioner establishes prejudice by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Failure to make the showing either as to performance or prejudice is fatal to a defendant’s claim. Kokal v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 623 F.3d 1331, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010). A court deciding an ineffectiveness claim need not “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. In this case, we decide only the prejudice prong because we find it dispositive in light of Mr. Conner’s instructions to counsel not to present mitigating evidence. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2007). Further, because we conclude that Mr. Conner would not be entitled to habeas relief even under de novo review, we affirm the District Court’s denial of relief under that standard without resolving whether AEDPA deference applies. 16 16 “Courts can . . . deny writs of habeas corpus under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review . . . because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if his or her claim is 28 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 29 of 39 For the Strickland prejudice analysis here, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has told us in no uncertain terms that if a competent defendant did instruct his counsel not to offer any mitigating evidence, ‘counsel’s failure to investigate further could not have been prejudicial under Strickland.’” Allen v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 475, 127 S. Ct. at 1941). “[T]he [Landrigan] rule follows naturally from Strickland’s formulation of the prejudice prong, for there cannot be a reasonable probability of a different result if the defendant would have refused to permit the introduction of mitigation evidence in any event.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The record reflects that Mr. Conner affirmatively instructed trial counsel not to present any mitigating evidence. After it had deliberated for fifty minutes, the jury found Mr. Conner guilty on all counts. Before beginning the sentencing phase of the trial, the trial court granted a brief recess for Mr. Mullis to confer with Mr. rejected on de novo review, see § 2254(a).” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2265 (2010); see also Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that we are entitled to affirm the denial of habeas relief in this manner: a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if his or her claim is rejected on de novo review. . . . [W]e have employed this approach even when it was clear that the deference afforded by section 2254(d) applied.” (quotation marks omitted)). This Court has previously affirmed the denial of § 2254 relief after conducting de novo review without resolving whether AEDPA deference applies. See, e.g., Wellons v. Warden, 695 F.3d 1202, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012); Owen v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 686 F.3d 1181, 1201 (11th Cir. 2012); Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1109–10 (11th Cir. 2012); Payne v. Allen, 539 F.3d 1297, 1317 n.18 (11th Cir. 2008). 29 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 30 of 39 Conner. When the proceedings reconvened, the court asked Mr. Mullis if he planned to present any evidence in mitigation. Mr. Mullis responded: Your Honor, I had planned on calling four witnessesCof course, the defendant, and his brother, and father, and his mother. After the verdict came in I talked to Mr. Conner in a room adjacent to the courtroom and he has informed me that he does not desire me to enter any evidence in mitigation. He does not desire to do that himself, he has told me. I have counselled him that my advice would be to do otherwise. My advice would be to put in some evidence to mitigate this. He has told me he does not desire to do that. The following colloquy then took place between the court and Mr. Conner: THE COURT: Mr. Conner, do you understand your rights to present evidence? MR. CONNER: Yeah. THE COURT: And you have instructed your counsel and you are telling the Court now that you do not want to put anything in in [sic] evidence in mitigation? MR. CONNER: That’s right. THE COURT: All right, sir. That’s your privilege. This record demonstrates that Mr. Conner prevented trial counsel from presenting mitigating evidence, and distinguishes Mr. Conner’s case from other cases where counsel was found ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation, such as Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005), and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003). See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 478, 127 S. Ct. 30 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 31 of 39 at 1942; see also Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1205 (11th Cir. 2008) (following the lead of Landrigan in “drawing a distinction between a defendant’s passive non-cooperation and his active instruction to counsel not to engage in certain conduct”). Our earlier decision in Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547 (11th Cir. 2000), is instructive here. See Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Our earlier decision in Gilreath . . . is consistent with Landrigan.”). In Gilreath, a habeas petitioner instructed his trial counsel not to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his capital trial. 234 F.3d at 549–50. This Court denied Mr. Gilreath’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim, explaining that to show prejudice a petitioner “actually must make two showings”: First, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that—if Petitioner had been advised more fully about character evidence or if trial counsel had requested a continuance—Petitioner would have authorized trial counsel to permit such evidence at sentencing. Second, Petitioner must establish that, if such evidence had been presented at sentencing, a reasonable probability exists that the jury would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Id. at 551–52 (quotation and footnote omitted). Like the petitioner in Gilreath, and because Mr. Conner instructed his attorney not to present mitigation, he must make both of these showings to prove prejudice. 31 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 32 of 39 On the record before us, we cannot say that Mr. Conner has shown “a reasonable probability that—if [he] had been advised more fully about character evidence or if trial counsel had requested a continuance—[Mr. Conner] would have authorized trial counsel to permit such evidence at sentencing.” Id. at 551. Mr. Conner does not argue that trial counsel should have requested a continuance. Rather, Mr. Conner contends “there is a reasonable probability that prepared and informed defense counsel would have been able to persuade Mr. Conner to change his mind after ‘full and careful’ consultation, as Mr. Conner did after habeas counsel investigated and consulted with Mr. Conner as to the significance of the available mitigating evidence.” But Mr. Conner has not shown a reasonable probability that he would have authorized trial counsel to present the mitigating evidence he now offers. Apart from the fact that he allowed postconviction counsel to investigate and present mitigation evidence, Mr. Conner has pointed to no direct or circumstantial evidence (such as postconviction testimony or an affidavit from Mr. Conner himself) that he would have allowed trial counsel to present mitigating evidence. Mr. Conner’s willingness to allow the presentation of mitigating evidence in postconviction proceedings, without more, does not show a reasonable probability that he would have allowed trial counsel to present mitigation at the time of his 32 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 33 of 39 capital sentencing. See Allen, 611 F.3d at 763 (“Allen’s willingness to present mitigation evidence today, however, does nothing to alter his steadfast desire at the time of his trial to seek the death penalty instead of life in prison.”). Because Mr. Conner has not shown prejudice under Gilreath’s first prejudice prong, we need not consider Gilreath’s second prejudice prong. 17 Mr. Conner is not entitled to habeas relief on his penalty-phase ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. C. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT The final issue we must consider is “[w]hether the District Court erred in determining that the state court’s decision—that the prosecutor’s closing arguments were not so egregious as to require reversal—was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.” “To find prosecutorial misconduct, a two-pronged test must be met: (1) the remarks must be improper, and (2) the remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant.” United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). To satisfy the second prong, the prosecutor’s improper remarks must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S. Ct. 17 See Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Because both parts of the test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the court need not address the [first] prong if the defendant cannot meet the [second] prong, or vice versa.” (internal citation omitted)). 33 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 34 of 39 2464, 2471 (1986) (quotation marks omitted); see also Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1366 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “habeas relief is due to be granted for improper prosecutorial argument at sentencing only where there has been a violation of due process, and that occurs if, but only if, the improper argument rendered the sentencing stage trial fundamentally unfair”). In determining whether arguments are sufficiently egregious to result in the denial of due process, we have considered the statements in the context of the entire proceeding, including factors such as: (1) whether the remarks were isolated, ambiguous, or unintentional; (2) whether there was a contemporaneous objection by defense counsel; (3) the trial court’s instructions; and (4) the weight of aggravating and mitigating factors. Land v. Allen, 573 F.3d 1211, 1219–20 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Romine, 253 F.3d at 1369–70). Mr. Conner argues that the prosecutor improperly injected evidence of his personal experience in seeking the death penalty and relied on materially inaccurate and prejudicial evidence in closing argument. During the guilt phase of Mr. Conner’s trial, the prosecutor told the jury that he had practiced criminal law for seven years; that as district attorney he had prosecuted nine murder cases; but that he had never sought the death penalty until Mr. Conner’s case. Mr. Conner’s counsel objected. The trial court sustained the objection and gave the jury a curative instruction not to consider the penalty before deciding guilt or innocence. 34 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 35 of 39 During the penalty-phase closing argument, the prosecutor once again expressed his personal belief, that Mr. Conner deserved to be sentenced to death: As I told you, I have never previously sought the death penalty in any murder case, but I tell you, I am seeking it now, and I am asking this jury to go back to that jury room and return a verdict, or a decision to send John Wayne Conner to the electric chair. Mr. Conner did not object to the prosecutor’s penalty-phase closing and no curative instruction was given. Although Mr. Conner did not present his prosecutorial-misconduct claim on direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court sua sponte reviewed the arguments of counsel to ensure that the sentence of death was not imposed “‘under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.’” Conner, 303 S.E.2d at 272 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(1)). In its review, the Georgia high court noted that counsel should not “go outside the facts appearing in the case and lug in extraneous matters as if they were a part of the case,” and that “[w]hat the law condemns is the injection into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial matters which have no basis in the evidence.” Id. at 276 (quotation marks omitted). The George Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s closing argument to be improper because “[t]he portion of the prosecutor’s argument referring to his prior criminal experience and the frequency with which he had sought the death penalty was not supported by any evidence and, moreover, was not relevant to any issue in 35 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 36 of 39 the case.” Id. The court held, however, that the remarks were “not so prejudicial or offensive and do not involve such egregious misconduct on the part of the prosecutor as to require reversal of appellant’s death sentence on the basis that it was impermissibly influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.” Id. We agree with the Georgia Supreme Court that the prosecutor’s closing arguments were improper. But we must defer to its determination that the arguments were not constitutionally infirm unless Mr. Conner can show that the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d)(1). Our precedent requires us to conclude that Mr. Conner cannot make this showing. In Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), we found that “the prosecutor’s assertion that he sought the death penalty rarely and that he had made the careful judgment that this case warranted it” was improper, but we concluded that “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances . . . th[is] argument[] did not render the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 1503. We observed that a “‘prosecutorial expertise’ argument” is “troubling . . . because of [its] tendency to mislead the jury as to its role.” Id. But we explained that our decision in Gates was controlled by our previous analysis of “prosecutorial expertise” arguments in Brooks v. Kemp, 36 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 37 of 39 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016, 106 S. Ct. 3325 (1986), aff’d on remand, 809 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). See Gates, 863 F.2d at 1503. In Brooks we recognized that “[t]he discussion of the prosecutor’s practice of seeking death only in a few cases during the past years was improper” because it “was unsupported in the evidence and, at best, irrelevant.” Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1410. In fact, we cited directly to the Georgia Supreme Court’s analysis of the prosecutor’s arguments in Mr. Conner’s case in support of this conclusion. See id. (citing Conner, 303 S.E.2d at 276). Nevertheless, we held that the “prosecutorial expertise” argument, while troubling, did not render the sentencing fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1413–14. In reaching this conclusion, we explained that “[t]he prosecutor did not simply state that he had selected this case from among the mass of cases; rather, he expressly laid out before the jury his reasons for selecting this case.” Id. at 1414. As such, “the jury could . . . determine for itself the validity of each underlying factor and the degree to which each factor indicated that death was appropriate.” Id. We also explained that the arguments of the prosecutor and defense counsel and “[m]ost importantly,” “the judge’s instructions . . . unambiguously placed the sole responsibility [for deciding whether to impose the death penalty] on the jury.” Id. 37 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 38 of 39 In Mr. Conner’s case, as in Brooks, the arguments of counsel and instructions of the judge “unambiguously placed the sole responsibility on the jury.” See id. For example, in concluding his charge to the jury, the trial judge stated: “Whatever the penalty to be imposed, within the limits of the law as I have instructed you is a matter solely for you members of the jury to determine.” While we recognize that here, unlike in Brooks, the prosecutor did not set out his reasons for selecting this case to pursue the death penalty, we nevertheless conclude that, like in Gates, “the court’s instructions to the jury, and the totality of the sentencing proceedings, made absolutely clear to the jury the proper role of the jury in the sentencing proceedings.” Gates, 863 F.2d at 1503 n.11. Finally, with respect to the prosecutor’s closing argument at the guilt phase of the trial, we observe that the trial judge sustained defense counsel’s contemporaneous objection and gave the jury a curative instruction. See Land, 573 F.3d at 1219–20 (explaining that contemporaneous objection by defense counsel and the trial court’s instructions are among the factors to be considered in determining whether prosecutorial “arguments are sufficiently egregious to result in the denial of due process”). We conclude that the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision on this issue neither was contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 38 Case: 13-13928 Date Filed: 04/15/2015 Page: 39 of 39