Opinion ID: 200820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vagueness of the Indictment

Text: North argues for the first time on appeal that the Count Three conspiracy charge is impermissibly vague. He suggests that an overall lack of specificity, as well as some specific omissions,2 may have prejudiced him by giving insufficient notice of what he must be prepared to meet, and allowing the prosecution to guess at the facts upon which the grand jury had relied. As a result, he urges, he was deprived of his right to be tried only on charges presented to the grand jury. North does not point to any actual prejudice, but draws upon general principles culled from a number of factually distinguishable cases, including Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-70 (1962). However, the facts of each case and the 2 North essentially backs into this point, arguing that the charge is impermissibly vague unless it is construed to charge a conspiracy solely between North and Monaghan. Construing the indictment as written, to include a conspiracy with unnamed others and without specification of an overt act, he argues, renders it too uncertain. -10- particular crime charged necessarily inform any evaluation of the fairness of notice of the conduct charged by the grand jury. Tomasetta, 429 F.2d 978, 979 (1st Cir. 1970). The test is not whether in hindsight the indictment or information could have been more complete. . . but rather whether it fairly identifies and describes the offense. United States v. Allard, 864 F.2d 248, 250 (1st Cir. 1989). A perfect alignment between the indictment's charge and the offense conduct of conviction is not required. Where the defendant is convicted of narrower conduct than that charged in the indictment, there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment as long as the trial proof corresponds to an offense which was clearly set out in the indictment. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136 (1985). Here, the indictment clearly charged that North conspired with Monaghan and known and unknown other persons to possess and distribute large quantities of marijuana in and around identified cities and towns in Massachusetts during a specified two-year period. The trial proof conformed to the indictment by showing that North in fact conspired with a number of persons to buy and sell large quantities of marijuana on many occasions in the relevant time period, in and around the named places. The offense proved, as in Miller, was thus fully contained in the indictment, and no additional crime was added. Id. at 137-38, -11- 143. And North has not shown that the indictment's wording (as supplemented in the bill of particulars and in pretrial discovery), in any way prejudiced his ability either to defend himself at trial or to use the judgment as a bar to subsequent prosecutions. Id. at 138 n.5. At any rate, any possible vagueness argument was waived by the failure to object on that ground at trial. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (holding that, generally, defects in an indictment may be waived). Accordingly, we apply a plain error standard of review. Id. That ends the matter. Even if there were an error -- and we see none -- there is no reason to believe that it had any effect on North's substantial rights since he had ample actual notice of the government's case against him. There is also no reason to doubt the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Here, as in Cotton, the real threat to the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings would be if . . . despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that [defendant] was involved in a vast drug conspiracy, his conviction was reversed due to a nonprejudicial miswording of the indictment. Id. at 634. Names of Co-conspirators. North also argues for the first time on appeal that the indictment is insufficient because it did not identify by name any co-conspirators other than -12- Monaghan. But there is no requirement that an indictment specify the names of co-conspirators. The only relevant question is whether, without the names, the defendant had sufficient notice of the charged offense to prepare a defense and to know whether there was reason to plead a former acquittal or conviction. United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 717 (1st Cir. 1980). North was given sufficient pretrial notice of the names and testimony of alleged co-conspirators to enable him to prepare a defense. There was and is no legitimate double jeopardy issue. Consequently, there was no prejudice -- and no plain error. Overt act. North argues for the first time on appeal that the conspiracy count is insufficient because it fails to specify an overt act. Under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the federal crime of drug conspiracy is complete upon the making of an agreement. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1994). The conspiratorial agreement itself is the actus reus, so the government is not required to plead or prove any overt act in furtherance of a section 846 conspiracy. United States v. VegaFigueroa, 234 F.3d 744, 753 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bello-Perez 977 F.2d 664, 669 (1st Cir. 1992)); cf. United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 28 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that an agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence). Thus, no plain error attended this omission. -13-