Opinion ID: 885241
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bartsch v. Irvine Co.

Text: ถ 74 The Court in Bartsch accurately recounted the history of open range trespass case law. See Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 407-409, 427 P.2d at 304-305. The Bartsch Court first cited the 1874 decision Smith v. Williams , and stated that the action was brought for damages due to the trespass of cattle on plaintiff's land. Next, the Court cited the 1902 decision Beinhorn v. Griswold , and stated that in that case the doctrine of open range was further discussed and explained in another trespass action . The Court then cited to the 1923 case, Schreiner v. Deep Creek Stock Ass'n , and referred to it as another trespass action. Next, a 1959 case, Thompson v. Mattuschek , was cited for the proposition that in range country [livestock] may wander. Thompson was a trespass action brought after the defendant's cattle damaged the plaintiff's barley crop. Finally, the Court cited Montgomery v. Gehring , a 1965 decision involving a boundary dispute between private landowners where the open range doctrine was raised. The excerpted quote from Montgomery included the open range doctrine rule that [o]ne releasing his livestock onto lands where he has a right to do so is under no duty to restrain them from entering another's unenclosed land.  Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305 (quoting Montgomery v. Gehring (1965), 145 Mont. 278, 283, 400 P.2d 403, 406) (emphasis added). ถ 75 Omitting the operative terms another's unenclosed land, the Bartsch Court then reasoned that because the owner of livestock owed no general duty to prevent the livestock from wandering .... he cannot be said to be negligent if the livestock do wander โ even if such wandering takes them onto a highway right of way which runs through open range. Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305. In reaching this conclusion, not once did the Court refer to any of the open range doctrine statutes. Further, the Court did not cite to any other western-state jurisdiction's case law that had similarly extended the open range trespass doctrine to the legal relationship between livestock owners and motorists, under similar state laws. See, e.g., Kendall v. Curl (1960), 222 Or. 329, 353 P.2d 227, 231 (concluding that [i]f cattle and horses have a right to be on the road [in open range areas], their owner is not negligent in allowing them on the road). ถ 76 Subsequently, a series of decisions addressing and applying the open range doctrine to the legal relationship between livestock owners and motorists followed. See Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc. (1968), 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753; Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co. (1972), 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397; Ambrogini v. Todd (1982), 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013; Siegfried v. Atchison (1985), 219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006; State ex rel. Martin v. Finley (1987), 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497; Williams v. Selstad (1988), 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247; Yager v. Deane (1993), 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214; Indendi v.. Workman (1995), 272 Mont. 64, 899 P.2d 1085. But see Williams, 235 Mont. at 141, 766 P.2d at 249 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (stating that for their purposes, livestock containment laws have a valid application; for torts not related to their purposes, the livestock containment laws should be disregarded and the ordinary rules of negligence laws should apply). ถ 77 Amicus Montana Stock Growers Association urges this Court to recognize the rule that this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of Legislature. See Bay v. State Department of Admin. (1984), 212 Mont. 258, 265, 688 P.2d 1, 4 (stating that it is the province of courts to construe and apply the law as they find it and to maintain its integrity as it has been written by a coordinate branch of the state government). ถ 78 We agree. Substituting its judgment for that of the Legislature is precisely what the Court in Bartsch accomplished by ignoring the fundamental purpose of Montana's open range doctrine by taking a statutory body of law that pertains to one particular legal relationship and applying it to another that the statutes involved simply do not address, and, consequently, inserting an expansive no-duty rule that, to this date, has been omitted from any legislation. See ง 1-2-101, MCA (stating that [i]n the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted). ถ 79 We therefore overrule our decision in Bartsch โ as well as subsequent decisions that followed Bartsch โ to the extent that it holds that a livestock owner, pursuant to Montana's open range doctrine, owes absolutely no duty to motorists driving on public highways in open range areas. See Yager, 258 Mont. at 458, 853 P.2d at 1217; Williams, 235 Mont. at 139-40, 766 P.2d at 248; State ex rel. Martin, 227 Mont. at 245, 738 P.2d at 499; Siegfried, 219 Mont. at 16, 709 P.2d at 1007; Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 119, 642 P.2d at 1018; Jenkins, 151 Mont. at 465, 443 P.2d at 755.