Opinion ID: 755180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence

Text: 15 In finding the plain meaning of exclusive right to operate, the district court also determined that it did not need to consider extrinsic evidence. The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous, thereby making extrinsic evidence admissible for interpretive purposes, is a question of law and therefore subject to de novo review. Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1376 (6th Cir.1994). A court does not have the right to make a different contract for the parties or to look to extrinsic testimony to determine their intent when the words used by them are clear and unambiguous and have a definite meaning. Michigan Chandelier, 297 N.W. at 67. A contract is ambiguous if 'its words may reasonably be understood in different ways.'  UAW-GM Human Resource Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 228 Mich.App. 486, 579 N.W.2d 411 (1998) (quoting Raska v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 412 Mich. 355, 314 N.W.2d 440 (1982)). The Lac Vieux argue that if the district court did not adopt their interpretation of the phrase exclusive right to operate, then the phrase must be ambiguous. The Lac Vieux contend that the variance between their definition and the district court's definition creates sufficient ambiguity to merit the admission of extrinsic evidence. Simply claiming the contract is ambiguous does not, however, make it so. The district court was correct in determining that the terms of the consent judgment were unambiguous. 16 Even if the district court had found the terms of the contract ambiguous, it is not clear how the admission of the Lac Vieux's extrinsic evidence would have aided the process of contract interpretation. Among the extrinsic evidence the Lac Vieux propose to offer are an affidavit and testimony from an accountant, an excerpt from a brief filed by Governor Engler in a state lawsuit, and affidavits from two bankers. The accountant testified about the economic damage the Tribes would suffer from Proposal E. The Lac Vieux contend that the excerpt from the Engler brief shows that Governor Engler regarded the Tribes' obligation to pay as terminated merely with the passage of legislation allowing gambling. The bankers testified to the difficulty the Tribes would experience in getting loans in light of Proposal E. None of the evidence relates to the formation of the contract. For extrinsic evidence to be relevant, it must relate to the formation of the contract. See, e.g., Sawyer, 690 F.2d at 593 (noting that under Michigan law extrinsic evidence may be admitted in absence of facial ambiguity in order to examine circumstances surrounding formation of contract); Gary Boat Club, Inc. v. Oselka, 31 Mich.App. 465, 188 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (1971) (stating that with ambiguous contract trial court should consider the language employed, the subject matter, and the surrounding circumstances under which the parties entered into the agreement; it should effectuate the intent of the parties when the agreement was consummated); Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Sefa, 23 Mich.App. 423, 178 N.W.2d 826, 828-29 (1970) (In determining the intent of the parties where the agreed language proves ambiguous, surrounding facts and circumstances may be considered for the purpose of interpretation, and statements of the parties contemporaneous with the making of the agreement are admissible as evidence.). Post-hoc interpretations of this nature are irrelevant to the parties' intent at the time of the agreement. 17