Opinion ID: 571393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Departure Based on the Embezzlement

Text: 26 We also review the extent of the departure based on the embezzlement for reasonableness. Appellant argues that the departure in this case was unreasonable because the total sentence imposed may have exceeded the sentence he would have received had he stipulated to or been convicted of the art gallery embezzlement as part of this criminal prosecution. 13 Appellant relies on United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.1990), in which the court stated that [i]t would throw the structure of the guidelines out of kilter to say that a defendant may receive more time on a 'departure' than he could have received had he been convicted of the crimes leading the judge to depart. Id. at 1063. 27 We think appellant misconstrues both the Guidelines and the relevant precedent. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.2(c) and 3D1.1 (1989) do say that conduct to which a criminal defendant has stipulated to or been convicted of is factored into the defendant's offense level pursuant to the rules for multiple count grouping. We believe that implicit in these rules, however, is a more general premise that only conduct that is related to the offense of conviction can be the subject of an additional count of conviction within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1 (1989) or a stipulation within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c) (1989). 28 This premise is plainly evident in the case of an additional count of conviction under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1 (1989). Appellant could have been convicted of the art gallery embezzlement as part of this prosecution only if the government could have charged appellant with the art gallery embezzlement in the same indictment with the current offenses. The government could have done that, however, only if the mailbag incident and the art gallery embezzlement were of the same or similar character or ... based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). We have already concluded, however, that the art gallery embezzlement and the mailbag offenses were not part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense[s] of conviction within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (1989). 14 As Rule 8(a) is no broader than U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (1989), cf. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C.L.Rev. 495, 515 (1990) (noting that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) is coextensive with, and arguably even broader than, Rule 8(a)); United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Lawrence, 915 F.2d 402, 407 (8th Cir.1990) [292 U.S.App.D.C. 147] (same); United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.1990) (same), appellant could not have been charged with, or convicted of, the art gallery embezzlement as part of this prosecution. His hypothetical conviction for the art gallery embezzlement is thus an impossibility and therefore should not be used as a measure of the reasonableness of this criminal history departure. 29 Equally unpersuasive is appellant's argument based on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c) (1989) that by stipulating to the art gallery embezzlement that conduct would have been factored into his offense level pursuant to the rules for multiple count grouping. While there is no express Rule or Guideline limiting the scope of stipulations to other crimes for purposes of inclusion in a defendant's current offense level in the same way that Rule 8(a) limits the crimes includible in a single indictment, we believe that the structure of the Guidelines mandates the conclusion that the conduct to which a criminal defendant stipulates pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c) (1989) must be related to the offense of conviction. This is because the Guidelines assume a basic dichotomy between conduct that is related to the current offense and conduct that is part of the defendant's criminal history. Appellant's reading of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c) (1989) as permitting any stipulated offense to be included in a defendant's offense level for sentencing would fatally erase that distinction; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c) (1989) would then serve as an escape mechanism by which conduct that is appropriately considered as part of the defendant's criminal history could be factored into the defendant's offense level. While there is a certain amount of play ... in the joints in the Guidelines, United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 336 (1st Cir.1990), we do not believe that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c) (1989) could possibly have been intended to undermine the fundamental distinction between criminal history and current offenses. 15 We therefore decline to judge the reasonableness of the district court's departure on the basis of appellant's hypothetical stipulation to the art gallery embezzlement. 30 There is no escaping the fact that the categorization of conduct as either criminal history or current offense can affect the ultimate sentence imposed. This is inevitable in a sentencing guidelines scheme that requires the division of relevant conduct into these two basic categories. We recognize that this division is often a close call. But while such cases may require more careful appellate review, they do not require that we ignore this basic distinction in the Guidelines. Having already concluded that the district court did not err in treating the art gallery embezzlement as part of appellant's criminal history, we decline to conduct a further hypothetical inquiry on the premise that the district court was wrong. 31 Appellant's assertion nothwithstanding, nothing in United States v. Ferra is to the contrary. Ferra stands for the unremarkable proposition that courts should use the Sentencing Guidelines as a reference point in determining the reasonableness of a departure from the Guidelines. As the court in United States v. Allen explained with reference to criminal history departures, 32 if ... defendant's criminal history category of III significantly under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history ..., the court should look to the guideline range specified for a defendant with a category IV ... to guide its departure. 33 Allen, 898 F.2d at 203 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (1989) (Policy Statement)). Similarly, in determining the reasonableness of an offense level departure, according to Ferra, the court should treat the aggravating factor as a separate crime and ask how the defendant would be treated [under the Guidelines] if convicted of it. Ferra, [292 U.S.App.D.C. 148] 900 F.2d at 1062. 16 It was in this context that the court stated that a defendant should not serve a longer sentence based on a departure than if he had actually been convicted of the conduct that was the basis of the departure. 34 Thus, Ferra teaches not that a criminal history departure is unreasonable if the overall sentence exceeds what the sentence would have been had the defendant stipulated to or been convicted of the conduct underlying the departure as part of the current prosecution. Rather, at most it says that in departing on criminal history grounds because of conduct for which the defendant was not convicted, it would be unreasonable to increase the defendant's sentence beyond what the sentence would have been had the defendant at some prior time been convicted of the conduct at issue. In this case, however, we need not even reach the issue of whether the parameter of Ferra, so construed, defines an absolute limit on a trial court's discretion. In all probability, this appellant's sentence was not longer than it would have been had he been convicted of the art gallery embezzlement prior to this prosecution. 35 Had appellant been convicted of the art gallery embezzlement his sentence would have probably been in excess of one year and one month. See D.C.Code §§ 22-3811(a), 22-3812(a) (1981) (embezzlement of more than $250 punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 641 et seq. (1988) (embezzlement of more than $100 punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years). Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) (1989), a defendant is assigned three criminal history points for each prior sentence exceeding one year and one month. This is exactly how many points the district court increased appellant's criminal history score on account of the art gallery embezzlement. Appellant committed the mailbag fraud within two years of the art gallery embezzlement. Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (1989), two points are assigned to a defendant's criminal history for committing the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) or (b).... Had appellant in fact been convicted, sentenced and released for the art gallery embezzlement, the same two points would have been added to his criminal history score. 36 We thus ultimately find the departure based on the art gallery embezzlement to be reasonable. The district court added five criminal history points for the art gallery embezzlement, moving the appellant from criminal history category II to criminal history category IV. At offense level 11, this increased appellant's sentencing range from 10-16 months to 18-24 months. See supra, Sentencing Table. Assuming sentencing at the high end of the range, appellant's sentence was increased by 8 months on account of the art gallery embezzlement. Considering the fact that, had he been convicted of the embezzlement in a prior prosecution, he would probably have served over a year for the embezzlement in addition to an additional 8 months as part of this sentence, we cannot say that the 8 months increase was an unreasonable departure from the Guidelines on account of defendant's embezzlement of over $50,000 from his employer. We therefore find the departure based on the art gallery embezzlement was not unreasonable. 37