Opinion ID: 1858507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the plaintiffs may hold MDOT liable for the negligence of its independent contractor, Great River.

Text: Independent contractor status ¶ 7. In Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So.2d 143, 148 (Miss.1994), this Court set forth the following definition of an independent contractor: An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. Under the general rule, the independent contractor's principal has no vicarious liability for the torts committed by the independent contractor or its employees in the performance of the contract. Heirs & Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Branning ex rel. Tucker v. Hinds Cmty. Coll. Dist., 743 So.2d 311, 318 (Miss.1999) ( Tucker ). ¶ 8. Several of the sections of the contract between MDOT and Great River, described below in relevant part, evidence the parties' intent for Great River to serve as an independent contractor: Section 104.01Intent of Contract The Contractor shall furnish all labor, materials, equipment, supplies, transportation, supervision, methods and procedures necessary to complete the work in accordance with the plans, specifications and terms of the contract. Section 104.04Maintenance of Traffic The Contractor shall keep the portion of the project being used by public traffic in satisfactory condition for traffic to be adequately accommodated. The Contractor shall be bound to the provisions of this subsection and other applicable provisions of the contract with regard to the safe and convenient passage of traffic. Section 105.10Duties of the Inspector Inspectors employed by the Department will be authorized to inspect all work and materials. The inspection may extend to all parts of the work and to the preparation, fabrication or manufacture of the materials. The inspector will not be authorized to alter or waive the provisions of the contract, to issue instructions contrary to the plans and specifications, or to act as foreman for the contractor. Section 107.10Barricades, Warning Signs & Flaggers The Contractor shall provide, erect and maintain all necessary barricades, lights, danger signals, signs and other traffic control devices . . . and shall take all necessary precautions for the protection of the work and safety of the public. . . . Suitable warning signs shall be provided to properly control and direct traffic. . . . Such warning signs shall be constructed and erected in accordance with the provisions of this contract. Section 107.17Contractor's Responsibility for Work Until release of maintenance in accordance with 105.16, the Contractor shall have the charge and care thereof and shall take every precaution against injury or damage by action of the elements or from any other cause, whether arising from the execution or nonexecution of the work. Section 618.01.2Traffic Control Plan This work also consists of complying with the contract requirements of the Department's Traffic Control Plan. The purpose of the Traffic Control Plan is to maintain through and local traffic safely through construction zones. ¶ 9. While the construction work had to comply with MDOT's specifications and the Traffic Control Plan, Great River maintained control over the performance of all aspects of the work. Additionally, MDOT inspectors had no power to alter Great River's performance, so long as the requirements of the contract were observed. Based on the clear language of the contract, we agree with the trial courts and the Court of Appeals that Great River was an independent contractor. Chisolm, 2005 Miss.App. LEXIS 560, at , ___ So.2d at ___. See also Tucker, 743 So.2d at 318 (county college not liable where airport management company found to be an independent contractor); Rolison v. City of Meridian, 691 So.2d 440, 445 (Miss. 1997) (city not liable where umpires' association found to be an independent contractor). ¶ 10. Even if a contract clearly evinces the parties' settled intent to create a principal-independent contractor relationship, when a third party is adversely affected, this Court can look beyond the contract to determine whether public policy requires recharacterization of the relationship to allow the injured party to recover. This factor was set forth by the Court in Richardson, but we noted an important caveat to its application: A necessary condition precedent for the application of this factor, however, is that the party challenging the claimed relationship will be adversely affected, and denied an adequate legal remedy. In the absence of this, the right of parties to contract as they please is a constitutionally-protected right. Richardson, 631 So.2d at 150 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 16). ¶ 11. Application of the public policy factor is unwarranted in this case. After the trial courts handed down the orders granting summary judgment in favor of MDOT, the plaintiffs settled all of their claims against Great River and voluntarily dismissed the company. Therefore, the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy available to them and have been compensated. This factor contemplates a situation where the plaintiff cannot get any recovery based on the principal-independent contractor shield. Such is not the case here. ¶ 12. The plaintiffs cite numerous cases wherein this Court found summary judgment in favor of MDOT to be premature. However, in each of those cases, the negligent actions or omissions were attributable to MDOT alone, and not to an independent contractor. See Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Cargile, 847 So.2d 258, 269 (Miss.2003) (question remained whether state itself exercised ordinary care in failing to eliminate a large pool of standing water on the highway); Leflore County v. Givens, 754 So.2d 1223, 1227-28, (Miss.2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Easterling, 928 So.2d 815, 820 (Miss.2006) (question remained whether county itself exercised ordinary care in the discretionary placement of its warning signs); Jones v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 744 So.2d 256, 264 (Miss.1999) (question remained whether MDOT itself knew about its failure to place a stop sign at a T-intersection). [1] Therefore, these cases are inapposite. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to Great River's status as an independent contractor. The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) ¶ 13. The plaintiffs devote large portions of their briefs to discussing MDOT's alleged violations of the MUTCD and arguing that MDOT's noncompliance with certain provisions constitutes, in essence, negligence per se. Thus, the plaintiffs contend that MDOT can be held liable for their injuries despite Great River's status as an independent contractor. The plaintiffs heavily rely on the following sections of the MUTCD: MUTCD § 1A-2 The Manual presents traffic control device standards for all streets and highways open to public travel regardless of type or class or the governmental agency having jurisdiction. MUTCD § 1A-3 The responsibility for the design, placement, operation and maintenance of traffic control devices rests with the governmental body or official having jurisdiction. . . . [T]raffic control devices placed and maintained by state and local officials are required by statute to conform to a State Manual which shall be in substantial conformance with this Manual. . . . Under authority granted by Congress in 1966, the Secretary of Transportation has decreed that the traffic control devices on all streets and highways in each State shall be in substantial conformance with standards issued or endorsed by the Federal Highway Administrator. Based on this language, the plaintiffs conclude that responsibility for the design, placement, operation, and maintenance of traffic control and warning devices rested ultimately with MDOT, and not with Great River. ¶ 14. This Court has often held that the provisions of the MUTCD may be considered by a jury as nonconclusive evidence of negligence. However, the plaintiffs would have us radically alter that standard and use language found in the MUTCD to establish, as a matter of law, that MDOT is responsible for the torts of its independent contractor, Great River. Although Mississippi has not adopted the MUTCD, its provisions and guidelines are advisory in nature to a finder of fact. They have no significance, however, with respect to questions of law. Highway 61 has been designated a state highway and is, therefore, under the jurisdiction of the Mississippi Transportation Commission for construction and maintenance. Miss.Code Ann. § 65-3-3 (Rev.2001). ¶ 15. Alleged violation of a provision of the MUTCD is one fact to be considered in determining whether a defendant violated the standard of care. See Donaldson v. Covington County, 846 So.2d 219, 223 (Miss.2003); Jones v. Panola County, 725 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1998). The MUTCD becomes a tool for assessing a breach of duty only after a legal duty has already been established. It cannot be used to create a legal obligation under Mississippi law. Therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that MDOT's alleged violations of the MUTCD do not constitute negligence per se, and the plaintiffs cannot use the MUTCD as a method of circumventing Great River's independent contractor status to hold MDOT liable. Potential non-delegable duty to protect the public's safety ¶ 16. The general rule that a principal is not liable for the torts of its independent contractor has two notable exceptions. The first is that a principal can be held liable for injuries to a third party `caused by the failure of an independent contractor to exercise due care with respect to the performance of work which is inherently or intrinsically dangerous.' Spruill v. Yazoo Valley Oil Mill, Inc., 317 So.2d 410, 413 (Miss.1975) (quoting Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir.1958)). The second exception applies where the principal has a non-delegable duty. City of Laurel v. Upton, 253 Miss. 380, 395, 175 So.2d 621, 626 (1965). However, because the plaintiffs did not present either of these arguments, we shall not consider them. King v. State, 857 So.2d 702, 717 (Miss.2003) (possible error waived for failure to make argument in support of the issue). ¶ 17. The plaintiffs may not hold MDOT liable for the negligence of its independent contractor, Great River. The trial courts properly granted summary judgment in favor of MDOT on this basis.