Opinion ID: 797143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Review of Final Agency Determinations

Text: 39 Factual findings by the BIA are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Our court interprets this statutory language as a statement of the substantial evidence standard, which requires that an IJ's findings be supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record. Islami, 412 F.3d at 396; Jin Shui Qiu, 329 F.3d at 149 (Substantial evidence review in the immigration context is `slightly stricter' than the clear-error standard that the circuit courts typically apply in reviewing a district court's factual findings, yet we will `not reverse the [IJ] simply because we disagree with [his] evaluation of the facts.' (quoting Aruta v. INS, 80 F.3d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir.1996))). Where, as here, the BIA summarily affirms an IJ's decision pursuant to its streamlining regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(I), we directly review the factual and legal findings contained in the opinion of the IJ. See Dhoumo v. BIA, 416 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). 40 When reviewing an IJ's credibility findings, we afford particular deference in applying the substantial evidence standard. Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). This deference is at its highest point where an IJ's credibility determinations are based on observation of the applicant's demeanor; but it ebbs where credibility determinations are based on analysis of testimony. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2005). In reviewing an IJ's conclusions regarding credibility, we examine whether the IJ has provided `specific, cogent' reasons for the adverse credibility finding and whether those reasons bear a `legitimate nexus' to the finding. Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 74 (quoting Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.2003)). 41 Questions of law, including what quantum of evidence will suffice to discharge an applicant's burden of proof, are reviewed de novo. Islami, 412 F.3d at 396. And, an IJ's use of an inappropriately stringent standard in assessing an applicant's testimony is a legal, rather than a factual, error. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 42 Our review of decisions by the BIA is governed by the recognition that a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 2006 WL 1755289, at  (2d Cir. June 28, 2006) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943)). Stemming from this foundational principle, a denial of immigration relief stands or falls on the reasons given by the [IJ or BIA], Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 2006 WL 1776717 at  (2d Cir. June 29, 2006), because it would usurp the role of the agency for a reviewing court [t]o assume a hypothetical basis for the IJ's determination, even one based in the record, Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 400 (2d Cir.2005). Except in rare circumstances, then, the proper course ... is to remand to the agency for additional explanation or investigation. Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 61 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam)). 43 Yet agency errors do not always warrant remand, and our circuit has recently developed standards for determining whether remand of asylum or withholding claims would amount to an empty and unnecessary formality. See Li Zu Guan, 453 F.3d 129, 2006 WL 1776717 at -. We have determined that remand to the BIA is futile a) when the IJ articulates an alternative and sufficient basis for her determination; b) when her reliance on the erroneous aspect of her reasoning is substantially tangential to her non-erroneous findings; or c) when overwhelming evidence in the record makes it clear that the same decision is inevitable on remand, or, in short, whenever the reviewing panel is confident that the agency would reach the same result upon a reconsideration cleansed of errors. Li Hua Lin, 453 F.3d 99, 2006 WL 1755289 at  (relying on Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 395-401 and Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 161-62 (2d Cir.2006)). Implementing this test within the confines of Chenery requires a careful balancing, which different panels dealing with diverse fact patterns may well strike differently. See Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating, in the context of panels' differing assessments of adverse credibility findings, that [p]anels will have to do what judges always do in similar circumstances: apply their best judgment, guided by the statutory standard governing review and the holdings of our precedents, to the administrative decision and the record assembled to support it). 44 With these delicate standards in mind, we turn to the specific issues raised by Lin's petition for review. 45