Opinion ID: 2328202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Summary Judgment for the District Defendants

Text: In District of Columbia v. Thompson, 570 A.2d 277 (D.C.1990) ( Thompson I ), this court has prescribed the standards for determining whether allegedly defamatory statements by a District official are immune from suit. [8] The court must conduct a two-part inquiry to determine whether the official's statement (1) falls within the outer perimeter of the official's duties, and (2) involves discretionary rather than ministerial activity. Id. at 294-97. If both conditions are satisfied, absolute immunity will be established. The reason why absolute immunity is available for discretionary official acts is clear: to ensure that when public officials exercise discretion in carrying out their duties, concern about tort liability will not inhibit the fearless, vigorous and effective administration of policies of government. Id. at 295 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)). As to the first criterion, we have said that actions which have more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to [the official's] control or supervision qualify as falling within the outer perimeters of the official's duties. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1020. [9] In this case, there can be no question that Deputy Chief Wilson's communications with reporters about Operation Recovery were within the outer perimeters of his duties as Deputy Chief of Police for the Sixth District and as the highest ranking officer at the scene. [10] The fact that the planning documents for Operation Recovery show that another police officer was assigned responsibility for handling press inquiries generated by the operation can only be understood as an effort to assure police/press contact; it did not purport to be exclusive or in any way to preclude Wilson, as head of the operation, from communicating with the press in his official capacity. The second Thompson I criterion for absolute immunity i.e., that the challenged official action be discretionary, not ministerialcreates a balancing test in which society's concern to shield the particular government function at issue from the disruptive effects of civil litigation is balanced against the vindication of private injuries otherwise compensable at law. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1021; see Thompson I, 570 A.2d at 297. [11] This court in Thompson I, as adopted in Moss, see supra note 8, specified four factors for use in applying the balancing test: (1) the nature of plaintiff's injury, (2) the availability of alternative remedies, (3) the ability of the court to judge fault without unduly invading the executive function, and (4) the importance of protecting particular kinds of official acts. Id. (citation omitted). Applying the Thompson I factors to the facts in this case, we note that Kendrick presumably suffered some injury to his reputation, but his economic losses are either minor or highly speculative. [12] See Beard, 587 A.2d at 198. Kendrick's allegations of physical injury, moreover, are conclusory and unsupported by medical records or expert evidence. [13] As to the second factorthe availability of alternative remedieswe note that Kendrick did not have an administrative remedy as an alternative to judicial action. See Thompson I, 570 A.2d at 297 (noting that Thompson had alternative administrative remedies through OEA and PERB); see also W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 1064 (5th ed. 1984) (describing alternative remedies as administrative remedies). [14] The third Thompson I factorconcern about undue invasion of the executive functioncuts very much in favor of absolute immunity. If courts were to have responsibility for deciding whether the statements of police officials about ongoing investigations are false and defamatory, they would be second-guessing details of judgments police officials have to make in conducting sensitive and difficult investigations while those officials also are attempting to keep the public adequately informed. Court scrutiny of this difficult balance, where public safety issues are implicated, is likely to be overly intrusive, amounting to an invasion of the executive function that Thompson I indicates should be avoided. Finally, the last factor i.e., the importance of protecting particular kinds of official actsalso militates in favor of concluding that Wilson's press activities were discretionary. The public interest requires that police officials be free to comment about ongoing police activity on matters of public concern. Just as court scrutiny of official statements to the press could unduly interfere with judgments the police must make in investigating crime, such scrutiny, as already indicated in reference to the third Thompson I criterion, could also unduly interfere with the public's opportunity to know what is happening to police investigations. In sum, three of the four Thompson I factors cut in favor of absolute immunity. Taken together, these factors clearly support the conclusion that Wilson's communications with the press comprised discretionary activity. Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that the District defendants undertaking discretionary actions within the outer perimeter of official dutieshad absolute immunity from suit and thus properly granted them summary judgment.