Opinion ID: 2321139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court Should Have Allowed Smith to Impeach Detective Morales with the Club U Investigation

Text: The prosecution did not call Detective Morales to testify, but Smith chose to call her, and there was extensive argument at trial about his motivation for doing so. The trial court ultimately determined that Smith's only purpose in calling Detective Morales was to parade her as a dirty cop and refused to let Smith question her about the ongoing witness-coaching investigation arising out of the Club U matter. Smith argues on appeal that he should have been allowed to introduce the Club U investigation as exculpatory evidence of Morales's prior bad act, under Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), and also as impeachment evidence. We reject Smith's argument that the Club U investigation was admissible under Winfield, because that case and the others on which Smith relies require evidence of a third party's prior misconduct. See, e.g., Battle v. United States, 754 A.2d 312, 315 (D.C.2000) (appellant offered proof of an earlier shooting by an unknown assailant). Smith's counsel was armed with nothing more than a letter from the prosecutor indicating that there was a pending investigation into whether Detective Morales had coached witnesses in the Club U case, which is not evidence that the detective had in fact coached witnesses. [8] Detective Morales's role in the Club U investigation was admissible, however, for impeachment purposes, and the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by precluding Smith from using it to expose her potential credibility problems and bias in favor of the prosecution. See Brown v. United States, 683 A.2d 118, 124 (D.C.1996). The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness, D.C.Code § 14-102(a) (2001); see also Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 401 (D.C. 2000), and `bias is always a proper subject of cross-examination.' Brown, 683 A.2d at 124 (quoting Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 513, 517 (D.C.1986)). A trial court's refusal to allow questioning about facts indicative of [a witness's] bias from which the jury could reasonably draw adverse inferences of reliability is an error of constitutional dimension.... Cunningham v. United States, 974 A.2d 240, 245 (D.C.2009); see also Martinez v. United States, 982 A.2d 789, 794 (D.C.2009) (The right of an accused to present a complete defense, ... rooted directly in the Due Process Clause ..., includes the guarantee of a full and fair opportunity to show that [adverse] witnesses are biased. (quotation marks omitted)). On the other hand, ... [t]he trial court may restrict [questioning] within reasonable limits to avoid such problems as harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, ... or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. (quotation marks omitted). A party must first lay a proper foundation ... before [pursuing] a line of questioning suggesting that a witness is biased. Brown, 683 A.2d at 124 (quotation marks omitted). `[T]o survive objection, the questioner must proffer some facts which support a genuine belief that the witness is biased in the manner asserted. In addition, the attorney must proffer facts sufficient to permit the trial judge to evaluate whether the proposed question is probative of bias.' Id. at 124-25 (quoting Jones, 516 A.2d at 517). `In the absence of such a factual foundation, the questioner must articulate a well reasoned suspicion rather than an improbable flight of fancy to support the proposed cross-examination.' Brown, 683 A.2d at 125 (quoting Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C.1989)). Our case law is fairly lenient in describing how th[e] requirement [of a factual foundation] may be met.... [T]he questioner must support any proposal for cross-examination with a credible statement describing the suspected cause of the bias in the witness, supported by plausible factual allegations or itself plausible within the framework of facts that neither party has contested. Brown, 683 A.2d at 125 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). We have held that a defendant's proffer is sufficient, for example, if `counsel has information from her own client, which she does not know to be false and which is not inherently incredible.' Id. (quoting Scull, 564 A.2d at 1164). To lay the proper foundation, Smith proffered information (provided by the prosecutor) that Detective Morales was being investigated for coaching witnesses in the Club U case. Based on that information, Smith's counsel asserted a genuine belief that even if [Detective Morales] had suggested anything to [Driver] ..., she's not going to admit to it right now because she's got a monkey on her back. She's not like a regular detective who doesn't have any bias, doesn't have anything [hanging] over [her] head, and can come in here and say ... [`]Yes, I strong armed him. I know his story was different. I wasn't happy with that. But by the time I had talked to him several times he gave me the version I wanted.['] Another detective could possibly say that[,] [one] [w]ho is not being investigated, is not on suspension. If [Detective Morales] did those things she cannot admit to it because she knows that if she admits to it here, even if it were true, she is going to be in a whole lot of trouble. She has to testify in a way that's consistent with helping the government. And helping the government means [she's] got to say that Driver was telling the truth.... [She's] got to say that even though he added to the story [she] had nothing to do with it.... Our position is that it's been offered to curry favor with the government. She can't say otherwise because she has this monkey on her back. That Detective Morales was under investigation for coaching witnesses was an undisputed fact, and it was one we believe Smith's counsel supported with a genuine belief (1) that Detective Morales's credibility could be questioned when she denied coaching Driver, and (2) that she was biased in favor of the government. We have held that the existence of an investigationand the witness's knowledge of itwould provide a motive for [the witness] to curry favor with the government. Cunningham, 974 A.2d at 241; cf. Blunt v. United States, 863 A.2d 828, 835 (D.C.2004) (where testifying witness was aware that there were pending charges against him in Maryland that the Maryland prosecutor could revive[,] [there was] a sufficient basis to require the court to permit at least some questioning about them); Scull, 564 A.2d at 1165 (holding that the witness'[s] subjective belief in the possibility of prosecution is central, and [t]o the extent that the proposed cross-examination might [have shown] or uncover[ed] a bias or motivation underlying [the witness's] testimony, it was relevant and admissible). Given that our lenient case law requires only a proffer of some facts which support a genuine belief that the witness is biased in the manner asserted, or a well-reasoned suspicion... to support the proposed [questioning], Brown, 683 A.2d at 124-25, the Club U investigationand the fact that it involved allegations of witness-coaching should not have been precluded as impeachment evidence. Smith's counsel asked Detective Morales repeatedly if she had suggested answers or provided information to Driver during the course of their interactions, and Detective Morales denied doing so. Smith's counsel argued that because of the Club U investigation, Detective Morales had both the desire to curry favor with the government by offering helpful testimony and also the motivation to deny coaching Driver, because regardless of whether the allegations of past witness-coaching were true, an admission that she influenced Driver's story would likely interfere with her chances of emerging unscathed from the pending Club U investigation. Accordingly, when Smith's counsel asked her if she had coached Driver, there existed a well-reasoned suspicion that Detective Morales would answer no, even if that was not the case. Smith therefore was entitled to impeach her credibility with both the fact and the subject matter of the investigation. Although we recognize that a trial court is given great leeway to exclude evidence if the court believes it will be unduly prejudicial, see Riddick v. United States, 995 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C.2010), here we conclude that the trial court erred in holding that the risk of prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Moreover, any risk of prejudice in revealing the substance of the Club U investigation could have been ameliorated by an instruction to the jury on the purposes and uses of impeachment evidence. See Scull, 564 A.2d at 1165 & n. 7 (Any potentiality of confusion to the jury may be eliminated by proper instructions, which we presume that the jury understands and follows.). Finally, we reject the government's claim that Smith called Detective Morales as a subterfuge. Impeachment of one's own witness cannot be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to present to the jury evidence not otherwise admissible, United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406, 1411 (7th Cir.1991), and [t]he test is whether the [questioning party] exhibited bad faith by calling a witness sure to be unhelpful to its case. Id. at 1412. Smith's defense hinged on the jury's rejecting Driver's testimony, which Smith's counsel made clear during her closing argument: The government's case rises and falls on Ahman Driver. A man who took this stand and admitted to you that on several times he lied. And yet, the government wants you to credit that man's story as the reason to convict Damon Smith. By questioning Detective Morales, Smith highlighted and confirmed that Driver's story to the police changed over time to include claims that Smith asked Driver to get him the murder weapon, later returned it, burned his clothes, confessed to dropping his hat, and admitted to the murder. We agree with Smith that calling Detective Morales helped him highlight[ ], with testimony from the government's own investigating detective, the fact that Driver had lied to investigators and ... implicated Smith only once there was a plea deal and sentencing reduction in it for him. Because Detective Morales provided information that was helpful to Smith's defense, we are unwilling to hold that Smith's counsel exhibited bad faith in calling her to testify. See Kane, 944 F.2d at 1411-12. [9] Smith should have been permitted to ask Detective Morales about the Club U investigation to expose to the jury her potential bias. By wrongly depriving Smith of the ability to challenge Detective Morales's credibility, the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion. See generally Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361-67 (D.C.1979).