Opinion ID: 658352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jill Rupley

Text: 167 Appellant Jill Rupley alleges that the prosecutor exaggerated, misrepresented, and told outright lies about the evidence against her during his closing argument and at her sentencing. No objection was raised to the prosecutor's statements on either occasion, and review is therefore for plain error. United States v. Lane, 708 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1983). 168 Our review of the transcripts reveals that any possible misrepresentations were not substantial enough to amount to plain error. Counsel are given latitude in the presentation of their closing arguments, and courts must allow the prosecution to strike 'hard blows' based on the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir.1985)) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1104, 107 S.Ct. 1337, 94 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987). The evidence presented and inferences therefrom supported the prosecutor's contention that Jill Rupley was an integral part of the Company, serving as a courier of money and methamphetamine, selling methamphetamine to students at the University of Nevada-Reno, and making personal use of the Company's substantial assets. Significantly, Rupley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on any of her six counts of conviction. 169 Rupley argues that the prosecutor improperly relied on her presence at meetings and manufacturing operations to suggest that she was involved in the illegal activity. This is a valid argument of inferences and does not constitute plain error. See United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir.1987) (While mere proximity to the scene of illicit activity is not sufficient to establish involvement in a conspiracy, a defendant's presence may support such an inference when viewed in context with other evidence.). Moreover, Jill Rupley requested and received a mere presence instruction.
170 During his closing argument, the prosecutor twice argued Jill Rupley's involvement in marijuana cultivation and distribution based on evidence that the court had limited to defendants charged in the marijuana conspiracy. The prosecutor also argued Jill Rupley's use of cocaine based on evidence that had been limited to the CCE defendants. The government concedes on appeal that this was error, but insists that it was not malicious and does not require reversal of Jill Rupley's convictions. 171 In United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 419, 121 L.Ed.2d 342 (1992), the prosecutor urged the jury in his closing argument to consider against Sherlock a hearsay statement of a nontestifying codefendant, which the trial court had ruled admissible only against the declarant. We concluded that the prosecutor's error revealed either that the trial was so complicated that not even he could apply the limiting instructions or that he understood, and intended, his misconduct. Id. at 1362. In either event, we held that the prosecutor's argument significantly prejudiced Sherlock and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion in denying Sherlock's motion for severance. 172 There is a key distinction, however, between Sherlock and this case. In Sherlock, the defense moved for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor's argument, id. at 1360; here, there was not even an objection. We therefore review only for plain error and must determine whether the prosecutor's blatant violation of the court's limiting instructions was a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979). We find no plain error here. Unlike the prejudicial statement in Sherlock, which directly implicated the appellant in the crime of which he was charged and convicted, the erroneous argument in this case was tangential at best and more likely than not harmless. It is unlikely that the prosecutor's comments on Jill Rupley's involvement with marijuana and cocaine significantly contributed to her multiple methamphetamine-related convictions. Thus, while we have no doubt that a properly raised objection to the prosecutor's argument should have been sustained, we find no basis for reversing Jill Rupley's convictions. 173