Opinion ID: 2807047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reconsideration of Pre-Trial Ruling

Text: and Denial of Request for Recess A circuit court is vested with the authority to modify its own in limine rulings: “Once a trial judge rules on a motion in limine, that ruling becomes the law of the case unless modified by a subsequent ruling of the court. A trial court is vested with the exclusive authority to determine when and to what extent an in limine order is to be modified.” Syl. pt. 4, Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995). Syl. Pt. 2, Adams v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 214 W.Va. 711, 591 S.E.2d 269 (2003). “[J]udges in ongoing proceedings normally have some latitude to revise their own earlier rulings.” Tennant, 194 W.Va. at 113, 459 S.E.2d at 390. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, a pre-trial “ruling is subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in [a party’s] proffer. Indeed even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984). 10 In the case sub judice, the circuit court explained that the evidence and theories presented by the plaintiff at trial went beyond what the court had previously anticipated based upon the plaintiff’s pre-trial representations. Accordingly, the circuit court acted within its discretion when it changed its pre-trial ruling on this basis. Sometimes, “[t]he role and importance of the disputed evidence, its fit with the other evidence in the case, and even the precise nature of the evidence may all be affected by, or at least clearly understood within, the context of the trial itself.” Tennant, 194 W.Va. at 112, 459 S.E.2d at 389. The plaintiff asserts that he was surprised by this ruling, but the record reflects that he was placed on notice at the beginning of trial that the defendant might seek reconsideration of the in limine ruling if certain evidence was offered. Upon hearing the additional arguments at the beginning of trial, the trial court left the issue open by saying, “[l]et’s see how things go[.]” Because the plaintiff chose to present the additional evidence and theories of liability, he opened the door for the court to reconsider its pre-trial ruling and admit the 911 call into evidence.5 5 Any claim of surprise can be directly attributed to the parties’ attempt to “try” this case before the trial by virtue of filing motions in limine. The 2014 Comment to Rule 103 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence discourages motions in limine on the admissibility of evidence “until the trial court has been given adequate context, and the evidence is sufficient to permit the trial court to make an informed ruling.” Although this comment was adopted after this case went to trial, it is nonetheless instructive. Once the circuit court heard the evidence and theories of liability at trial, it was able to put the 911 call into its proper context and determine that the call was admissible. 11 The plaintiff also argues that in reliance on the pre-trial ruling, he “forewent the opportunity to subpoena any witnesses who were present at the accident scene to refute or explain the statement made by the 911 caller, and he did not question the investigating officer about the mysterious caller.” However, he fails to identify these other witnesses or describe the nature of their anticipated testimony. Indeed, no such persons were listed in the plaintiff’s written witness disclosure. Certainly, if there were known eyewitnesses to the accident, they would have been called to testify at trial regardless of whether the 911 call was excluded. The emergency responders and Officer Miller arrived after the collision and thus would not have firsthand knowledge of who had the green light or whether either party was driving in an unsafe manner. Moreover, when the trial court reconsidered its prior ruling, the plaintiff had not yet rested his case. Thus, he could have sought the opportunity to call additional witnesses or recall Officer Miller, but he did neither. The plaintiff’s request for a mid-trial recess was for the sole purpose of securing time to search for the 911 caller. There was nothing, however, to prevent the plaintiff from searching for the caller before trial. Furthermore, the plaintiff was forewarned at the beginning of trial that his additional theories of liability could make the 911 call admissible. It is well-settled that “[a] trial court has considerable discretion as to matters involving the length of a recess or temporary adjournment of a trial.” Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Richey, 171 W.Va. 342, 298 S.E.2d 879 (1982). Likewise, we have said that “[o]rdering a 12 recess or temporary adjournment is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Dupuy v. Allara, 193 W.Va. 557, 564, 457 S.E.2d 494, 501 (1995) overruled on other grounds by Pleasants v. Alliance Corp., 209 W.Va. 39, 543 S.E.2d 320 (2000). We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s request for a mid-trial recess.