Opinion ID: 1058972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issuance of Birth Certificates Under Virginia Law

Text: In its ruling, the trial court gave two reasons for granting the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment. First, the trial court held that under current Virginia law, birth certificates can only list the name of a mother and a father. Birth certificates cannot list the names of two mothers or the names of two fathers. It just cannot be done. Second, the trial court held that what [it] is being asked to do in directing the registrar to change the birth certificates, in spite of the language that the [Petitioners] try to couch their argument in, is asking [it] to recognize a status that Virginia does not accord to its own citizens. In support of this second reason, the trial court stated that Petitioners were asking it to do something which the public policy of Virginia just simply does not allow. Whether that is right or whether that is wrong, is not for this [court] to determine. It is something that needs to be addressed by the legislature, if it is addressed at all. At the outset, it is important to state what this case is not about. There was much discussion in the trial court, and some before this Court, concerning homosexual marriage. This case is about issuing birth certificates under the provisions of Virginia law; it is not about homosexual marriage, nor is it about same-sex relationships, nor is it about adoption policy in Virginia. The primary statutory provision governing the issuance of a new Virginia birth certificate upon proof of adoption, legitimation, or determination of paternity is Code § 32.1-261. When issuing a new birth certificate, The State Registrar shall establish a new certificate of birth for a person born in this Commonwealth upon receipt of the following: An adoption report as provided in § 32.1-262, a report of adoption prepared and filed in accordance with the laws of another state or foreign country, or a certified copy of the decree of adoption together with the information necessary to identify the original certificate of birth and to establish a new certificate of birth. Code § 32.1-261(A)(1). The relevant Administrative Code section promulgated to carry out this statutory provision states, The new certificate of birth prepared after adopting . . . shall be on the form in use at the time of birth and shall include the following items and such other information necessary to complete the certificate: . . . . . The names and personal particulars of the adoptive parents or of the natural parents, whichever is appropriate. 12 VAC § 5-550-330. In both of these provisions, and in the other provisions concerning adoption and the issuance of new birth certificates, the term adoptive parents or intended parents is used. See, e.g., Code § 32.1-261(A)(3); Code § 32.1-261(A)(4); and 12 VAC § 5-550-280. No definition is provided for these terms. In its brief and in much of its oral argument, the Commonwealth argued that this Court should defer to the Executive Branch's interpretation unless that interpretation is patently unreasonable and represents an abuse of discretion and that [i]t is well established that the interpretation of the agency entrusted with the administration of a statute is entitled to deference by this [C]ourt. In support of these contentions, the Commonwealth cites Department of Taxation v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 235 Va. 94, 366 S.E.2d 78 (1988); Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop., 222 Va. 270, 279 S.E.2d 400 (1981); Commonwealth v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 217 Va. 121, 225 S.E.2d 870 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 216 Va. 686, 222 S.E.2d 526 (1976); and Commonwealth v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 193 Va. 37, 68 S.E.2d 122 (1951). In Westmoreland Coal, a case involving interpretation of an assessment, we stated: The principles that control our decision here are well established. The Department's assessment is presumed to be correct and valid, and the taxpayer bears the burden to prove the assessment erroneous. 235 Va. at 99, 366 S.E.2d at 80 (citing Bluefield Sanitarium, 216 Va. at 689, 222 S.E.2d at 528-29 (1976)). In Forst, a case involving tax assessments, we recognized that the plain meaning of the statute and a long-standing Department of Taxation interpretation merited judgment in favor of the tax assessment levied. 222 Va. at 276-78, 279 S.E.2d at 403-05. In Lucky Stores, a case involving the methods used for income taxation of a multi-state foreign corporation, we held that the Department of Taxation neither misapplied the law nor abused its discretion. 217 Va. at 131, 225 S.E.2d at 877. We then added, [f]urthermore, and according the required weight to the construction of a statute by a state official charged with its administration. . . we find the interpretation . . . to be reasonable and rational. Id. at 131-32, 225 S.E.2d at 877 (citing Commonwealth v. Progressive Community Club, 215 Va. 732, 739, 213 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1975)). In Bluefield Sanitarium, a case involving a tax assessment, we discussed and affirmed the rule that a tax assessment made by the proper authorities is prima facie correct and valid and that the burden is on the taxpayer to show that such assessment is erroneous. 216 Va. at 689, 222 S.E.2d at 528-29. We noted that the construction of a statute by a state official charged with its administration is entitled to great weight. Id. In the final case cited by the Commonwealth, Appalachian Elec. Power Co., a case also involving tax assessments, the Commonwealth placed great weight on our observation that the practical construction given to a statute by public officials charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight by the courts and in doubtful cases will be regarded as decisive. The Legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such construction and when long continued, in the absence of legislation evincing a dissent, the courts will adopt that interpretation. 193 Va. at 45-46, 68 S.E.2d at 127 (citations omitted). However, the Commonwealth overlooks the immediately preceding paragraph, where we stated, It is of course true, as the brief of the Attorney General points out, that `the doctrine of administrative interpretation will not be allowed to change the plain meaning of the statute.' Superior Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 202, 206, 136 S.E. 666 [,667 (1927)]. But the disagreement here is as to whether the meaning is so plain and unambiguous as to require no interpretation. We are convinced from a consideration of the majority and dissenting opinions and the briefs of counsel that it is not. Consequently, we apply well-recognized rules for the interpretation and application of such statutes. Id. at 45, 68 S.E.2d at 126-27. In Superior Steel, we gave guidance concerning the weight to be accorded to administrative interpretation of statutory provisions: The Commonwealth makes the point that the interpretation which the Commission places on section 43 of the tax law in this case is the administrative interpretation which it has always placed upon this statute, and should, therefore, prevail here. Courts, in construing statutes, where the statute is obscure or its meaning doubtful, will give great weight to and sometimes follow the interpretation which those whose duty it has been to administer it have placed upon it. But the doctrine of administrative interpretation will not be allowed to change the plain meaning of the statute. In Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, [99-100, 24 S.Ct. 590, 48 L.Ed. 888 (1904),] the majority opinion states the law thus: Contemporaneous construction is a rule of interpretation, but is not an absolute one. It does not preclude an inquiry by the courts as to the original correctness of such construction. A custom of the department, however long continued by successive officers, must yield to the positive language of the statute. 147 Va. at 206-07, 136 S.E. at 667. A principal rule of statutory interpretation is that courts will give statutory language its plain meaning. See Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 904 (2005). Only when the statute is obscure or its meaning doubtful will courts defer to an administrative interpretation. In such circumstances, as in the tax cases cited by the Commonwealth, courts will generally give great weight to the administrative interpretations of statutory provisions. In this case, we are presented with a statutory scheme and regulations promulgated pursuant to that scheme. Neither the statute nor the regulations define adoptive parents. Stated differently, there is nothing in the statutory scheme that precludes recognition of same-sex couples as adoptive parents. The statute does not refer to a listing of a mother or a father; rather, it refers only to the undefined term adoptive parents and intended parents. The Commonwealth advances several arguments in support of its contention that issuance of a new birth certificate listing the names of the adoptive parents in these cases is not required or authorized by statute. For each of the arguments, the Commonwealth uses administrative regulations in an attempt to interpret Code § 32.1-261. The Commonwealth's first statutory interpretation argument involves 12 VAC § 5-550-100 involving a certificate of live birth and 12 VAC § 5-550-330 concerning the issuance of a new certificate after, among other circumstances, adoption. The Commonwealth reasons that a certificate of live birth provides for listing of a mother and a father and a new certificate shall be on the form in use at the time of birth. 12 VAC § 5-550-330. The Commonwealth argues that Code § 32.1-261(B) provides that [w]hen a new certificate of birth is established pursuant to subsection A of this section ... [i]t shall be substituted for the original certificate of birth. Because the statute requires substitution and the certificate of live birth provides for a listing of a mother and a father, any new certificate on the same form in use at the time of birth is inadequate to list two same-sex adoptive parents. However, the Commonwealth's restrictive definition is undermined by its own administrative regulations. The provisions of 12 VAC § 5-550-330 further require that the new certificate of birth shall include ... the names and personal particulars of the adoptive parents or of the natural parents, whichever is appropriate. Clearly, the statute, Code § 32.1-261, anticipates the listing of adoptive parents without specific restrictions. Further, the administrative regulations plainly require the listing of adoptive parents without restriction. The only perceived impediment is the Commonwealth's insistence upon utilization of a particular form adopted by the agency. Here, the Commonwealth's reliance upon a restrictive interpretation of the word substitution or substitute is misplaced. The Commonwealth insists on brief that the word substitute is a verb. We will treat it as such. To substitute means to put in the place of another; exchange. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993). The restrictive use of a particular form by the agency for live births and the administrative requirement that such a form also be used for new certificates after adoption is contrary to the ordinary and plain language of Code § 32.1-261, and the agency's own regulations, 12 VAC § 5-550-330. Nothing in the statute requires a particular form and the regulations only require that the names and particulars of the adoptive parents be placed on the form. Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that its restrictive interpretation should be adopted because it is consistent with Code § 63.2-1201, which limits the filing of an adoption petition to single individuals or to married couples. However, this case does not involve Virginia adoptions. Rather, this case involves out-of-state adoptions and the issuance of new certificates of birth for children born in the Commonwealth.