Opinion ID: 6316025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Tort Claims Act’s Emergency Exception

Text: We first address whether the Masperos’ claims fall within the Texas Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2). If they do, then Section 101.021(1)(A) of the Act does not waive the City’s immunity from those claims regardless of whether they would otherwise fall within the scope of that waiver. 3 Under Section 101.055, the Act: does not apply to a claim arising . . . from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Id. § 101.055(2). The plaintiff bears the burden of negating Section 101.055’s applicability. See City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 672 (Tex. 2006). The Masperos do not dispute that Officer Kory was responding to an “emergency situation.” Therefore, even if the Masperos’ claims satisfy the requirements for waiver of immunity under Section 101.021(1)(A), the Act “does not apply,” and the City thus retains immunity, if the Masperos failed to raise a fact issue that either (1) Officer Kory’s pursuit violated the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency response or (2) the pursuit was reckless. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2). 3 Section 101.021(1)(A) of the Tort Claims Act waives immunity for: (1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if: (A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment[.] TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(A). Based on the structure and language of the pertinent statutory provisions governing emergency response, the distinction between these inquiries largely collapses in this case. Specifically, under Texas Transportation Code Section 546.006, a driver of an emergency vehicle must drive “with appropriate regard for the safety of all persons” and is not relieved of “the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.006 (emphasis added). The Masperos argue, however, that Officer Kory violated applicable “laws and ordinances” in two respects independently of whether her conduct was reckless. First, the Masperos contend that the following actions transgressed SAPD Procedure 609: (1) pursuing an individual who is not a known felony offender (other than for evading arrest); (2) engaging in and continuing the pursuit of Rodriguez without affirmative authorization from a supervisor; (3) initiating and continuing a highspeed chase through school zones; 4 and (4) engaging in a pursuit when the “benefit of apprehension” did not “outweigh[] the risk to the officer or the public.” 5 However, a police department’s internal policies, in and of themselves, are not “laws” or “ordinances.” See BLACK’S LAW 4 In considering whether a pursuit should continue, Procedure 609 requires officers to consider nearby “[s]chool zones or areas where large crowds gather.” 5 Procedure 609 states, “Officers engage in a vehicular pursuit only when the benefit of apprehension outweighs the risk to the officer or the public.” The Masperos point to testimony from Sergeant Scaramozi at Rodriguez’s criminal trial, in which counsel asked whether “the benefit of apprehension in this case [was] outweighed by the risk to the officer or the public” and Scaramozi responded, “Not in my opinion.” DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “law” as “[t]he aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative action,” and defining “ordinance” as “[a]n authoritative law or decree; specif., a municipal regulation, esp. one that forbids or restricts an activity”); Roche v. City of Austin, No. 03-17-00727-CV, 2018 WL 3978333, at  (Tex. App.—Austin, Aug. 21, 2018, no pet.) (“A police department’s internal policy or procedure is not a ‘law’ or ‘ordinance’ for purposes of waiver of immunity pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.055(2).”). Indeed, Procedure 609 explicitly states that it is not binding law; rather, it “establishes guidelines for officers in situations necessitating the use of emergency vehicles.” Therefore, even if the evidence raises a fact issue as to Officer Kory’s alleged noncompliance with Procedure 609, such noncompliance does not by itself amount to a violation of “laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2). The Masperos further argue, however, that Officer Kory’s failure to comply with department policy does amount to a statutory violation in one specific respect. They cite Transportation Code Section 546.003, which states that “the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle engaging in conduct permitted by Section 546.001 shall use, at the discretion of the operator in accordance with policies of the department or the local government that employs the operator, audible or visual signals.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.003 (emphasis added). SAPD Procedure 609 requires officers to activate their sirens for emergency calls unless they have received “on-air authorization from a supervisory officer,” and as noted, some evidence indicates that Officer Kory’s siren was not activated when the collision occurred and that she did not receive authorization for that conduct. Accordingly, the Masperos reason that by violating Procedure 609 in this manner, she also violated Section 546.003. We disagree. Section 546.003 applies to officers while “engaging in conduct permitted by section 546.001,” not while engaging in pursuit of a fleeing suspect. Id. Section 546.001 in turn enumerates specific conduct that would otherwise violate various traffic laws, including “proceed[ing] past a red or stop signal or stop sign,” “exceed[ing] a maximum speed limit,” and “disregard[ing] a regulation governing . . . movement or turning in specified directions.” Id. § 546.001. Reading these provisions together, they require officers to employ sirens, consistent with department policy, when they are driving in a way that would violate those laws. While Officer Kory does not deny speeding earlier in the chase, the AVL records show that she was driving below the speed limit once she exited IH-35 and proceeded toward Rodriguez on the access road. No evidence indicates that Officer Kory was engaged in any of the conduct enumerated in Section 546.001 after exiting the highway and before the collision. At that point, Section 546.003 did not govern her use of lights or siren. Moreover, Officer Kory’s use of her siren is inconsequential for purposes of Section 101.055. Section 101.055(2) requires a causal nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the government employee’s reckless or illegal action. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2) (stating that the Act does not apply to a claim “arising . . . from the action of an employee . . . if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action”) (emphasis added). The Masperos fail to explain how their injuries arose from Officer Kory’s alleged failure to use her siren. It is undisputed that she had activated her emergency lights, and the crash report indicates that Rodriguez veered into the Masperos’ lane to move around another vehicle. Any suggestion that the siren would have prevented the collision, particularly given the extreme recklessness of Rodriguez’s conduct, is speculation at best. Therefore, the evidence that Officer Kory failed to use her siren does not foreclose the Act’s emergency exception. Accordingly, the exception applies unless a fact issue exists as to whether Officer Kory acted “with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Id. The court of appeals held that the Masperos presented sufficient evidence to raise such a fact issue, citing the following facts: (1) Officer Kory drove well above the speed limit, including while taking exits, and mimicked Rodriguez’s reckless driving; (2) Officer Kory disregarded Procedure 609, which required her to obtain authorization for the pursuit; (3) the benefit of apprehending the suspect did not outweigh the risk to the public; (4) Officer Kory failed to terminate the chase even when she knew she could not catch Rodriguez; and (5) Officer Kory did not activate her siren during the chase. 628 S.W.3d at 484. The court concluded that these actions indicated that “Officer Kory acted with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others” and was knowingly apathetic to the high risk of injury inherent in the pursuit. Id. Under the Transportation Code, reckless driving consists of driving a vehicle in “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.401(a). In Tarrant County v. Bonner, we explained that this standard requires “conscious indifference,” or “subjective awareness of an extreme risk.” 574 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. 2019). Further, recklessness reflects more than a “momentary judgment lapse” and instead “requires a showing that the driver committed an act he knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury.” Perez v. Webb County, 511 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (citing City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1998)). In this context, we recognize we must tread carefully. On one hand, all high-speed car chases involve obvious risk of serious injury to bystanders. 6 Yet, we have long recognized that fleeing suspects may pose an even greater danger to the community. See Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 99 (Tex. 1992) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e recognize that police pursuit is often important and necessary in apprehending criminals posing a danger to our society,” but we cannot “conclude that all chases are reasonable no matter what the circumstances.”). Law enforcement must retain discretion to assess and balance these risks using reasoned judgment. Id. Here, Officer Kory had specific instructions to stop Rodriguez and had reason to believe he was transporting drugs as part of a larger drug- 6 The Masperos’ expert report presented several statistics, including that “41% of urban police pursuits will end in an accident” and “33–34% of police fatalities will be innocent bystanders.” trafficking operation. 7 She did not chase him into an obviously dangerous area or force him to crash. The Masperos and the court of appeals emphasize that early in the chase Officer Kory was speeding and swerving. 628 S.W.3d at 484. But these acts in isolation are insufficient to bypass the emergency exception. First, a police officer’s speeding and swerving during a pursuit are not inherently reckless actions. Exceeding the speed limit is part and parcel of a police chase. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Scott v. Harris, to hold otherwise is to incentivize fleeing criminals to drive as recklessly as possible. 550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007) (“[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger. . . . Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red lights.”). Moreover, no evidence suggests that the speeding itself was a cause of the crash. Officer Kory was still pursuing Rodriguez at the time of the collision, but by that point she had significantly slowed down. Finally, Officer Kory’s other actions during the chase indicate that she engaged in some degree of risk assessment. She slowed down at intersections even when she temporarily lost sight of Rodriguez’s vehicle. Additionally, she communicated with Sergeant Scaramozi throughout the chase, and she never disregarded or ignored any 7The City’s expert report states that officers were instructed to “detain suspects leaving the ranch in an attempt to positively identify them and whether they were involved in the reported drug distribution network.” instructions to modify or terminate the pursuit. These facts do not suggest that Officer Kory’s actions generated “extreme risk” beyond that which is inherent in high-speed pursuits. Bonner, 574 S.W.3d at 902. They also do not raise the inference that she “reckless[ly] disregard[ed]” the increased danger generated by her actions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2). In fact, by slowing down at intersections, she demonstrated intent to minimize potential harm, even at risk of letting Rodriguez get away. In sum, we hold that pursuant to Section 101.055’s emergency exception, the Tort Claims Act “does not apply” to the Masperos’ claims. Id. Therefore, the Act does not waive the City’s immunity from suit.