Opinion ID: 2563933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Venue in San Mateo County for the Gleason Homicide

Text: Defendant contends the indictment was facially deficient because it failed to allege facts establishing that San Mateo County was a proper county in which to try the Gleason homicide charges. She claims that therefore the indictment must be quashed, her conviction for Gleason's murder must be reversed, and the special circumstance findings and death sentence must be set aside. Defendant further contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that San Mateo County had territorial jurisdiction over those charges, and that conducting her trial in that county violated her Sixth Amendment right to be tried in the district in which the crime was committed. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) Gleason was killed in Santa Clara County. The indictment alleged that acts preparatory to the commission of the burglary, robbery, and murder of Gleason occurred in San Mateo County and that property taken in the commission of those crimes was brought into San Mateo County. In overruling defendant's demurrer, the trial court concluded that the indictment sufficiently alleged that venue was proper in San Mateo County. [5] Defendant contends the foregoing allegations in the indictment were insufficient because the charging document failed to allege specific facts, including the nature of the preparatory acts she engaged in and the fruits of the homicide that were brought into San Mateo County. Defendant urges that the absence of more specific allegations violated the pleading requirements of California law. (§ 959.) She further contends the absence of specific allegations violated her federal constitutional right to be adequately informed of the nature of the accusation against her. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) (21) The trial court's ruling was correct. An indictment may employ ordinary and concise language without any technical averments or any allegations of matter not essential to be proved. (§ 952.) The offense may be alleged in the words of the enactment describing the offense . . . or in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he [or she] is accused. ( Ibid. ) An indictment is sufficient if it contains[,] in substance, a statement that the accused has committed some public offense therein specified ( ibid. ) and if it can be understood [t]hat the offense charged therein is triable in the court in which it is filed (§ 959, subd. 5). Generally, an offense is triable in the county in which a crime was committed. (§ 777.) If a crime was committed in part in one county and in part in another county, venue is proper in either. (§ 781.) Under section 781, a public offense may be tried in a jurisdiction in which the defendant made preparations for the crime, even though the preparatory acts did not constitute an essential element of the crime. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 385 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) Section 952 specifically provides that the crime itself may be alleged in the words of the statute that defines it. There is no reason why allegations related to venue need be more specific. In support of her assertion that the allegations of the indictment must include specific facts, rather than blanket conclusions, defendant relies upon cases that are inapposite. In Ball v. United States (1891) 140 U.S. 118, 136 [35 L.Ed. 377, 11 S.Ct. 761], the high court relied upon common law requirements that an accusatory pleading in a homicide prosecution specify the time and place of deathfacts that were critical to the determination of the trial court's jurisdiction. In People v. Wakao (1917) 33 Cal.App. 454 [165 P. 720], the defendant was charged with criminal libel, which at that time could be tried in the county in which the complaining witness resided when the defamatory statements were circulated. The information alleged that defamatory statements were published in a newspaper circulated in Sacramento County, but did not allege that the complaining witness resided in that county. Thus, the critical allegations were missing entirely from the accusatory pleading. The Ball and Wakao cases clearly are distinguishable from the present case and are not authority for the proposition that an indictment must allege specific facts demonstrating that venue is proper. A simple allegation that an offense was committed in a particular county ordinarily is sufficient. (See, e.g., People v. Berg (1929) 96 Cal.App. 430, 432 [274 P. 433] [statement that murder was committed in the County of Los Angeles sufficient to allege venue].) Even when the crime is committed in part in one county and in part in another, the allegation is sufficient if it asserts the basis for venue in general terms, without alleging specific facts. (See, e.g., People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 281 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160] [information alleged that crime was committed in part in Contra Costa County and in part in San Francisco County]; People v. Tolbert (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 685, 689 [222 Cal.Rptr. 313] [information sufficiently alleged venue for sexual offenses even though it did not specify in which county they were committed, because sexual offenses were alleged to be connected to a kidnapping, which was alleged to have commenced in San Joaquin County].) Thus the indictment in the present case was sufficient in alleging that acts preparatory to the commission of the crimes occurred in San Mateo County and that property taken in the commission of the crimes was brought into San Mateo County. (22) Furthermore, to the extent defendant contends that the allegations in the indictment were insufficient to afford her a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present a defense, we note that notice is provided not only by the accusatory pleading but also by the transcript of the preliminary hearing or the grand jury proceedings. ( People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317-318 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]; accord, People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 557 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171]; People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 399, fn. 5 [309 P.2d 456].) In addition, a defendant may learn further critical details of the People's case through demurrer to the complaint or pretrial discovery procedures. ( People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 317.) In the present case, defendant was entitled to and did receive a copy of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings. (§ 938.1.) Additionally, in its opposition to defendant's demurrer and motion to set aside the indictment, the People described in detail the specific facts upon which they relied to establish that venue was proper in San Mateo County. Defendant does not contend that these materials were insufficient to afford her adequate notice of the factual basis for the allegation of proper venue in San Mateo County. Defendant alternatively contends that even if the indictment was sufficient, the evidence presented to the grand jury and at trial was insufficient to establish that venue was proper in San Mateo County. Before trial, the court denied defendant's motion under section 995 to set aside the indictment, finding that the transcript of the grand jury proceedings established that sufficient preparatory acts were committed in San Mateo County because, while in that county, defendant made arrangements for the ride to Palo Alto, took a duffle bag from her San Mateo County home containing items to be used in the Palo Alto burglaryincluding a gun, a screwdriver, a pair of gloves, and keysand brought the proceeds of the crime home to San Mateo County. Evidence of these same preparatory acts was presented at trial. As a preliminary matter, the People urge that defendant, by declining to seek a jury instruction on this issue, forfeited any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support venue. (See People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1110, fn. 18 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598] [the defendant, who did not propose a jury instruction on venue or provide authority to the trial court supporting the giving of such an instruction, could not complain on appeal of the absence of such an instruction].) In the present case, after the jury returned its guilt phase verdicts, the trial court noticed that it had failed to instruct the jury on venue and proposed that jurors be called back to decide that issue. [6] The prosecution contended that defendant already had forfeited her right to a jury determination by failing to request an instruction on venue. Defense counsel indicated that counsel did not wish to submit the issue to the jury at that time, and consequently it was not submitted to the jury. We need not decide whether defendant forfeited her right to challenge venue because, in any event, the evidence clearly was sufficient to establish venue in San Mateo County. As noted above, when the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory. (§ 781.) Pursuant to section 781, an offense may be tried in a county in which the defendant made preparations for the crime, even though the preparatory acts did not constitute an essential element of the crime. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 385 [Humboldt County had jurisdiction over a murder committed in Los Angeles County, because the defendant went to Humboldt County to obtain weapons for the purpose of killing the victim in Los Angeles County].) The evidence established, and the trial court found, that defendant committed preparatory acts in San Mateo County when she collected the items she planned to use to commit the crimes, including gloves, a screwdriver, a key, and a gun, from her home in San Mateo County, and made arrangements there to be transported to Palo Alto. Defendant suggests these preparatory acts are insufficient because there is no evidence defendant was planning to commit a murderas opposed to a burglary, theft, or robberyat the time she made these preparations in San Mateo County. Nevertheless, if preparatory acts occur in one county, those acts vest jurisdiction over the crime even though the intent may have arisen in another county. ( People v. Bismillah (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 80, 86 [256 Cal.Rptr. 25].) Furthermore, defendant does not assert that the burglary and the robbery were improperly charged in San Mateo County. When property taken in one jurisdictional territory by burglary . . . [or] robbery . . . has been brought into another, . . . the jurisdiction of the offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory . . . . (§ 786, subd. (a).) Defendant brought property taken during the Palo Alto (Santa Clara County) burglary and robbery back to her home in San Mateo County. The murder was part of the same transaction as the robbery and burglary, and those offenses were requisite to the consummation of the murder. (§ 781.) Force was used against Gleason in furtherance of the robbery, and her murder served to eliminate her as a witness to the robbery and burglary. Consequently, the murder was properly tried in San Mateo County as well. In this respect, the present case is analogous to People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1116-1119 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572], in which we held that San Bernardino County had jurisdiction to try the defendant for the attempted murder of a police officer that occurred in Riverside County. The defendant in Gutierrez kidnapped a woman in San Bernardino County and, while driving through Riverside County, was stopped by a police officer for a traffic violation. Defendant shot at the officer, and a gun battle ensued. We concluded that San Bernardino County was a proper venue for trial of the attempted murder of the police officer, because the defendant had attempted to kill the officer in order to avoid detection or arrest for the kidnapping, which began in San Bernardino County. Because San Bernardino County had jurisdiction over the kidnapping, it had jurisdiction over the attempted murder as well. ( Id. at p. 1118.) Similarly, in the present case, San Mateo County had jurisdiction over the robbery and burglary offenses and, because the killing occurred in connection with those crimes, it had jurisdiction to try the murder charge as well. [7]