Opinion ID: 836195
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: state decisis[36]

Text: Because I conclude that Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguous is unsupported by Michigan law, I must now determine whether it ought to remain the controlling method for discerning ambiguity in the laws of this state. I treat the definition as governed by stare decisis for purposes of analysis. Stare decisis is short for stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm. Stare decisis attempts to balance two competing considerations: the need of the community for stability in legal rules and decisions and the need of courts to correct past errors. [37] This doctrine has been part of the American legal landscape since the country's formation. [38] Alexander Hamilton wrote that, to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that [courts] should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.... [39] In the early twentieth century, Justice (then-Judge) Cardozo wrote that the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him. [40] Although any rule is only as solid as its boundaries are clear, it was not until recently that this Court formally established a test to determine when it should depart from stare decisis. In 2000, in Robinson v. Detroit , [41] the Court held that the first question in deciding whether to overrule precedent is whether an earlier decision was wrongly decided. [42] Next, according to Robinson, courts should review (1) whether the decision defies practical workability, (2) whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the decision were overturned, and (3) whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the decision. [43] Thus, Robinson enunciated a test premised on whether the questioned decision was wrongly decided, to be followed by a three-pronged analysis of whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels upholding it. Although the Robinson test was implemented as a mechanism for determining when a prior decision of the Court should be upheld, its application has proven superficial and cursory. [44] In fact, an examination of cases applying the Robinson test demonstrates that not once has the Court cited it as a basis for upholding a prior decision. [45] Robinson's statement that a wrongly decided case should invariably be overruled was a chilling signal that a conclusion that precedent has been wrongly decided is sufficient justification for overruling it. [46] These facts alone suffice to show that Robinson is insufficiently respectful of precedent. Therefore, I would modify it by shifting the balance back in favor of precedent and expanding on Robinson's list of factors to consider in applying stare decisis. I would hold that a stare decisis analysis should always begin with the presumption that upholding the precedent involved is the preferred course of action. The presumption should be retained until effectively rebutted by the conclusion that a compelling justification exists to overturn the precedent. Robinson, by contrast, contained no such presumption. Moreover, the Court's applications of Robinson suggest that such a presumption was never considered. Even if it had been initially applied, once a case was deemed to have been wrongly decided, any presumption in favor of upholding precedent disappeared. [47] I would reject this approach and reiterate that a rebuttable presumption exists in favor of upholding precedent. [48] The question arises what deference should be paid to cases in which Robinson was used to overturn existing precedent. I believe that a lower level of deference should be accorded to these cases because they represent a departure from the traditional notions of stare decisis. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, [49] the United States Supreme Court expressly addressed the distinction between consideration of well established law and cases representing a recent departure from precedent: It is worth pointing out the difference between the applications of stare decisis in this case and in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey . Casey explained how considerations of stare decisis inform the decision whether to overrule a long-established precedent that has become integrated into the fabric of the law. Overruling precedent of that kind naturally may have consequences for the ideal of the rule of law. In addition, such precedent is likely to have engendered substantial reliance, as was true in Casey itself. ([F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.). But in this case, as we have explained, we do not face a precedent of that kind, because Metro Broadcasting itself departed from our prior cases ÔÇö and did so quite recently. By refusing to follow Metro Broadcasting, then, we do not depart from the fabric of the law; we restore it. We also note that reliance on a case that has recently departed from precedent is likely to be minimal, particularly where, as here, the rule set forth in that case is unlikely to affect primary conduct in any event. [50] Furthermore, the Court stated: Our past practice in similar situations supports our action today. In United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 [113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556] (1993), we overruled the recent case of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 [110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548] (1990), because Grady lack[ed] constitutional roots and was wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent. In Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 [107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364] (1987), we overruled O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 [89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291] (1969), which had caused confusion and had rejected an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960. And in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 [97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568] (1977), we overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 [87 S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249] (1967), which was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent, and of which [t]he great weight of scholarly opinion ha[d] been critical. See also, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830, [111 S.Ct. 2597, 2611, 115 L.Ed.2d 720] (1991) overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 [107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440] (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 [109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876] (1989); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 [98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038-2041], 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) partially overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 [81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492] (1961), because Monroe was a departure from prior practice that had not engendered substantial reliance); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128-129 [86 S.Ct. 258, 267-268, 15 L.Ed.2d 194] (1965) overruling Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah, 369 U.S. 153 [82 S.Ct. 807, 7 L.Ed.2d 641] (1962), to reaffirm pre- Kesler precedent and restore the law to the view... which this Court has traditionally taken in older cases). [51] Thus, there is substantial support for applying a decreased presumption in favor of precedent when that precedent itself represents a recent departure from prior established caselaw. [52] The next inquiry should be whether there exists a compelling justification for overruling precedent. [53] A compelling justification is not a mere belief that a precedential case was wrongly decided or that the Court, as currently composed, would have decided the case differently. Rather, in determining whether a compelling justification exists, the Court should consider several evaluative criteria, none of which, standing alone, is dispositive. These criteria include, but are not limited to: (1) whether the rule has proven to be intolerable because it defies practical workability, (2) whether reliance on the rule is such that overruling it would cause a special hardship and inequity, (3) whether related principles of law have so far developed since the rule was pronounced that no more than a remnant of the rule has survived, (4) whether facts and circumstances have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification, (5) whether other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a different manner, (6) whether upholding the rule is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, and (7) whether the prior decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent. Not all of these factors will be applicable in every case. Nor is there a magic number of factors that must favor overruling a case in order to establish the requisite compelling justification. Rather, I believe that the conclusion about whether these factors support finding a compelling justification should be reached on a case-by-case basis.