Opinion ID: 2383188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marlo's Liability

Text: The issue of Marlo's liability was submitted by an instruction [4] requiring findings on issues now disputed, as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 8 Your verdict must be for plaintiffs Cathy Johnson, Thomas R. Johnson, and Rebecca Johnson and against defendant Marlo Transport Corporation if you believe:       Second, Lee Brown, Jr., was operating the Kenworth Truck within the scope and course of his agency for Marlo Transport Corporation at the time of the collision, and       Acts were within the scope and course of agency as that phrase is used in this instruction if: 1. They were performed by Lee Brown, Jr. to serve the interests of Marlo Transport Corporation according to an express or implied agreement with Marlo Transport Corporation, and 2. Marlo Transport Corporation either controlled or had the right to control the physical conduct of Lee Brown, Jr. Marlo argues, vigorously, that there is no evidence that it had control over, or the right to control, Brown as he headed west with the truck. It asserts that it properly retained the proprietor of the truck, (whether Tabor, Brown, Singleton, or some combination of the three) as an independent contractor, to achieve a particular result by means chosen by the contractor, that it had no right to control the truck as to the details of operation, and that there is no basis for vicarious liability. These arguments, if sound, would result in judgment for Marlo notwithstanding the verdict. Perhaps it will be helpful first to explore the practicalities of the situation rather than the legalities. Marlo was in touch with a customer who had a truckload of steel. It was looking for a truck. Brown and Singleton had a truck provided to them by Tabor, who had leased it, and, with full authority from Tabor, were trying to locate payloads. Marlo and the truckers got together on a proposition to haul a load for Franklin Steel to Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. They did not put the details in writing but rather operated informally. Marlo was to collect from the customer, retain 25%, and remit the balance to Tabor. Nobody seemed to have the least concern about the total absence of operating authority. Now let us return to the legalities. The arrangement can best be described as a joint venture. The parties undertook a particular project, for mutual benefit and profit. It makes no difference whether the venturers are Marlo and Tabor, with Brown and Singleton considered to be servants of the venture, or whether Tabor, Brown and Singleton are to be considered as acting together on one side of the venture with Marlo on the other. A joint venture is a species of partnership. [5] The distinction between a joint venture and a conventional partnership is that the former exists for a particular, defined purpose. Although a joint venture is a consensual arrangement, no particular formalities are necessary. There may perfectly well be a joint venture for a single truck haul. [6] There is a mutual agency among the venturers for activities within the scope of the venture, and all have equal right of control. [7] Venturers, moreover, are jointly and severally liable for torts committed within the scope of the venture. [8] Marlo, then, was instrumental in launching and directing the truck journey. This is not a situation in which Marlo should be allowed to escape liability by asserting independent contractor status. Our courts have been hesitant to uphold claims for this kind of immunity. There is a distinct tendency to find that truck operators are agents or servants rather than independent contractors. [9] Marlo's case is not helped by the fact that it did not try to place the load with a regular, certified carrier, having regular routes and published tariffs, but rather did business with itinerant truckers with no semblance of operating authority. It is easier to find an independent contractor relationship when the purported contractor holds itself out to the public as having a regular and established business. [10] But the illegality of the operation is not the controlling circumstance. The usual rule holds those who engage in business for profit liable in damages, on the usual negligence principles, to those who are injured in the course of the business operations. There is no reason to relieve Marlo of this normal and usual liability. Marlo is not being held liable on a theory which was not submitted to the jury. The instruction clearly submitted agency, with its constituent elements of benefit and right of control. Marlo, of course, could not exercise effective control while the truck was on the highway but, as is usual in joint ventures, the participants had their assigned roles in the total project. No showing of right of control over and above that which follows as of course from a showing of joint venture need be made. The instruction is supported by the evidence, and the verdict was properly rendered on it.