Opinion ID: 1783612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fundamental Precepts of First Amendment Review

Text: The United States Supreme Court has adopted (as in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence) a means-ends analysis or balancing approach in assessing the validity of state action which burdens a citizen's exercise of free speech. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51, 81 S.Ct. 997, 1005-07, 6 L.Ed.2d 105 (1961), re'hg denied, 368 U.S. 869, 82 S.Ct. 21, 7 L.Ed.2d 69 (1961), and other cases cited herein. Under this approach, the State's purpose and the means used to achieve that purpose must be sufficiently related to justify any limitation upon free speech, although the extent to which a reviewing court will probe that means-ends relationship is dependent upon the context in which the State action operates and the burden which it imposes. See Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 2571, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3448, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). For example, regulation of speech which does not focus upon the particular content of the speech sought to be regulated, but rather which seeks only to limit the time, place, or manner of speech in a non-public forum is subject to a less exacting standard of scrutiny, and the fit between the ends sought and the means used to achieve such regulation must merely be reasonable for it to survive judicial scrutiny. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) ( plurality opinion ) (postal walkway is a non-public forum, and therefore reasonable, content-neutral regulation is constitutionally permissible). See also Thornburg v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). However, LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(3) and (4), [12] which forbid the distribution of campaign literature and political advertising, are not content-neutral restrictions. Rather, these subsections of the statute, as construed by this Court, operate to prohibit all political speech, albeit only within prescribed boundaries. Schirmer, supra, 608 So.2d at 649. Such content-based [13] regulation of speech is subject to strict scrutiny, particularly when that regulation takes aim at political speech, a category of speech to which the First Amendment `has its fullest and most urgent application.' Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989), quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S.Ct. 621, 625, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1164, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (a content based restriction on political speech in a public forum ... must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-785, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1420, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) ( citation omitted ) ([i]n the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue). Indeed, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of (the First) Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). Accordingly, for a challenged statute to survive strict scrutiny it must be shown that the statute is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). See also Simon & Schuster, Inc., supra, at 117-18, 112 S.Ct. at 509. This case offers a slight variation upon the strict scrutiny formula, however, because the affected interests include not only the State's interest in regulating elections and the citizen's interest in free speech and expression, but also the citizen's right to vote without being harassed or intimidated. Thus, this case requires that the defendant's right to free speech be reconciled with separate concerns which also possess a constitutional dimension. [14] Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1521-1522, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (Court balancing free speech rights of trial participant's against an accused's right to a fair trial). Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has addressed this clash of freedoms in the case upon which all of the courts which previously entertained this dispute relied in reaching their respective decisions, namely Burson v. Freeman . [15]