Opinion ID: 2183369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hair Length Regulation

Text: In addition to his challenge against the Department's facial hair regulation, Kennedy also contends that he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex as the Department applied two distinct hair length regulations for male and female employees. The language provided in the Department's hair length regulations for male and female employees are the same except for the portion which has been highlighted in the regulation relating to female employees. The regulations provide: a. HairUniformed Male Employees: Hair shall be neat, clean, and trimmed to present a tapered and groomed appearance. It shall not be of such length and/or bulk that it prevents the uniform cap or safety helmet or hard hat from fitting securely on the head. Hair on the sides of the head may touch the top of the ears but not extend over the ears nor cover any portion of the outside surface of the ear. Hair on top of the head shall be neatly groomed. Hair on the back of the head may touch but shall not extend over the shirt collar. The hair shall be groomed so that when the head is covered the hair does not fall below the eyebrows nor interfere with a proper seal of the air-mask facepiece. b. HairUniformed Female Employees: Hair shall be neat, clean, and styled to present an attractive, groomed appearance.... Hairpins that are inconspicuous, hairpieces, or wigs may be used to comply with these regulations. Article XXI § 20 of the District of Columbia Fire Department Order Book (emphasis added). During the administrative hearing, it was the position of the Departmental management that long hair posed a safety hazard in that it was susceptible to snagging and to being singed or burned. Testimony was adduced which recalled incidents where a firefighter's hair had been singed. This position was countered by testimony which indicated that, while fighting fires, hair is concealed under the firefighter's helmet and any excess length is covered by the ear flaps and the collar of the firefighter's coat. In addition, an optional Nynex hood was available for purchase which would provide an extra layer of protection for those concerned firefighters. Moreover, the only time a firefighter's hair was singed was when that firefighter's helmet became dislodged and his hair became exposed. Significantly, everyone testifying agreed that female firefighters are not in danger of singeing or burning their hair if they follow the guidelines by pinning or covering their hair. Once pinned or covered, the evidence indicated that it is safe for a female firefighter to enter a burning building because her hair is completely covered by her helmet. The hearing examiner concluded that the Department's hair-length regulations were not uniformly and equally applied to persons within the defined classes. However, in reaching this conclusion, he failed to propound any significant findings of fact in support. In contrast to the carefully crafted findings regarding facial hair, the examiner's findings as to hair length are conspicuously sparse. One fatal consequence of these sparse findings is that it deprives this court of the benefit of the basis for the hearing examiner's decision that the Department's hair length regulations are discriminatory. From the record, this court is unable to discern whether the hearing examiner's conclusion that the grooming regulations were discriminatory was grounded on the finding that the Department's hair length regulation for male employees was neither uniformly nor equally applied within the class of male employees, or on the finding that the regulations were not uniformly and equally applied in comparison to female employees. The record does not supply this answer and we are proscribed from fill[ing] the gap by making [our] own determination from the record. See RosExpress, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 602 A.2d 659, 661 (D.C.1992). By omitting the necessary nexus between the testimony at the hearing and the conclusion of discrimination, the hearing examiner has deprived this court of a basis from which to decide error. It is fundamental that `[w]e must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.' 2101 Wisconsin Assocs. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 586 A.2d 1221, 1224 (D.C.1991) (quoting United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. & Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511, 55 S.Ct. 462, 467, 79 L.Ed. 1023 (1935)). Here, we are forced to make a leap from the unassimilated, often contradictory testimony in the record, Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, supra, 402 A.2d at 42, to the conclusions of law without benefit of elaboration of the continuum between testimony and final decision. Id. We have repeatedly admonished administrative agencies [to] specify the precise findings and conclusions which support their decisions. Brewington v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals and Review, 287 A.2d 532, 534 (D.C.1972). Here, this admonition has gone unheeded. Accordingly, we remand the case for further findings on the issue of hair length. See Colton v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 484 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C.1984).