Opinion ID: 1560059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Superior Court's Assessment of the Foregoing

Text: At the probation violation hearing in June of 2005, defense counsel argued that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant had violated his probation. Counsel emphasized that defendant had offered an explanation for his proximity to the Merrells' residence on November 16, 2004. Defense counsel acknowledged that both Amanda and Mr. Merrell interpreted defendant's comment about Mr. Merrell's residence as constituting some sort of threat, and she also acknowledged that they took it very seriously. However, while not casting any doubt on the sincerity of those subjective reactions of Amanda and Mr. Merrell, defense counsel argued that those reactions did not constitute a basis for a finding of a violation of probation. [5] Defense counsel also argued that [e]ven if the [c]ourt finds that [defendant] has been non-compliant with the counselors,    that alone is not enough to pull his probation and send him to jail. She asserted that Mr. McCarthy should be granted another opportunity to return to counseling with different counselors. As to the discovery of underwear in defendant's coat, defense counsel asserted that that allegation did not constitute a failure to keep the peace and be of good behavior. She argued that, although defendant's possession of the underwear was not in good taste, it was nonetheless her position that such possession did not constitute a probation violation. That is not, defense counsel argued, what not keeping the peace and being of good behavior means; she then asserted that the prosecution had not met its burden of providing a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which the court could find that defendant had violated the terms of his probation. The state, for its part, maintained that the combination of factual allegations adduced at the hearing amounted to proof of a probation violation. With respect to those allegations, counsel for the state contended as follows: [I]ndividually they are a lot less than they are when you add all of them up. When you add up the drive-by, when you add up the girl's underwear, when you add up his complete abrogation for any responsibility for attending the sex offender counseling, his poor progress and his abusive behavior, verbally assaultive behavior when he is at the counseling,    it adds up to something substantial. After reviewing the testimony that had been brought forth during the hearing, the hearing magistrate first addressed the issue of the underwear found in defendant's overcoat. The magistrate stated that this fact, in and of itself, did not constitute a failure to keep the peace and be of good behavior, and he said that [i]f that was the only reason Mr. McCarthy were before the [c]ourt, the [c]ourt would have to say that I find no violation. The magistrate next addressed the drive by incident, again observing that such an incident alone would not rise to the level of a failure to keep the peace and be of good behavior. The magistrate went on to state, however, that the combination of driving past Mr. Merrell's house a day after he was asked to leave counseling, [6] his failure to pay for counseling, and his phone call informing the counseling office that he had driven past Mr. Merrell's house raises a serious question in any mind about why Mr. McCarthy was in Barrington that day. The magistrate then concluded that such a combination of allegations merited a reasonable inference that his attendance at the home of the parties certainly was an attempt to threaten these counselors   . The magistrate referred to the conduct as an implied threat. In the judgment of the magistrate, the most important aspect of Mr. McCarthy's behavior, as it related to finding him to be a violator, was his failure to remain involved with his counselor. The magistrate found that this failure, combined with the above-discussed shortcomings, rose to the level of a failure to keep the peace and be of good behavior. The magistrate concluded that the state had satisfied [him] by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant had violated the terms of his probation. After stating that he was taking into consideration defendant's age (he was sixty-nine at the time of the probation violation proceedings) and his poor health, the magistrate ruled that defendant should serve six years of the seventeen years remaining on his suspended sentence.