Opinion ID: 1440499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ex Parte Hearing

Text: Lester first argues that the ex parte hearing concerning ABC's absence from the courtroom denied him his constitutional rights of representation and confrontation. The Commonwealth concedes error, but argues that the error was harmless. Upon further research into the issue, we determine that the trial court did not err in holding the ex parte hearing in this case. Under RCr 8.28, a defendant has the right to be present at every critical stage of the trial. This right is protected not only by RCr 8.28, but also by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Section 11 of the Constitution of Kentucky. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356 (1970) ([o]ne of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial). Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 885, 892 (2000). Thus, if Lester is correct and the hearing was a critical stage, the trial court had no authority to hold the hearing and reversal likely would be required. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668 (1984). ([A] trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.) But a number of courts have held that hearings similar to the one held in the case at bar are not critical stages subject to Sixth Amendment restrictions on the trial court's inherent authority. In LaChappelle v. Moran, 699 F.2d 560, 562 (1st Cir.1983), the trial judge met in chambers with a witness to discuss why she refused to answer a particular question. The witness revealed that she was embarrassed to use a certain word and was unsure whether she could say the word in open court. Id. Neither the prosecutor nor the defense counsel was present during this conference. Id. The conference, however, was recorded. Id. At the conclusion of the conference, the witness returned to the stand and used the objectionable word. Id. at 564. On appeal, the appellant argued that the in camera hearing violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment because he was not present. Id. The LaChappelle Court rejected the appellant's argument that every in camera conference with a witness or juror is a `stage of the trial' for sixth amendment purposes, because this holding would divest judges of any discretion whatever to conduct such private conferences. Id. at 565. The Court noted that, while seldom proper in criminal trials, in very rare circumstances a trial court might determine that it is essential to confer with a juror or witness in private and on the record, even at the expense of excluding the defendant and defense counsel from the hearing. Id. It gave as an example of this, the situation where a juror or witness, having been threatened, wished to speak to the judge privately about the threat. Id. Thus, LaChappelle held that the Sixth Amendment was not implicated by the in camera hearing. Rather, it determined that the hearing was an event separate from the trial proper in which the judge sought to exercise his extraordinary powers to administer the trial in a just manner. Id. The Court then determined that the claim of error should be reviewed under a due process analysis rather than the Sixth Amendment analysis urged by the appellant. Id. In United States v. Adams, 785 F.2d 917, 920 (11th Cir.1986), the appellants claimed that an ex parte hearing violated their due process right to a fundamentally fair trial. In Adams , a prosecuting witness invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify. Id. at 919. The government then moved the trial court to compel the witness's testimony by granting him use immunity. Id. The trial court granted the motion, but the witness refused to testify and the witness was held in contempt of court. Id. Subsequently, the trial court met in chambers with the witness, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney for one of the defendants. Id. During the in-chambers meeting, the witness revealed that he was afraid to testify because he believed he would be killed by the defendant if he testified. Id. The prosecutor stated that the witness's fears were well founded and promised to enroll the witness in the witness protection program. Id. The witness agreed to testify, and the trial court purged the contempt charge when the witness took the stand. Id. The Adams Court held in no uncertain terms that an ex parte conference to discuss threats against a witness is proper. Id. at 920. The Court cautioned, however, that the trial court must carefully administer such a conference to make certain that no rights of the defendant are threatened. Id. The Adams Court then identified two elements of the procedure used by the trial court which helped to ensure that the hearing was fair: (1) at no time was the substance of the witness's inculpatory testimony discussed, and (2) the hearing was transcribed. Id. It then weighed these safeguards against elements of the proceeding that it determined troubling in order to evaluate the appellant's due process claim. Id. at 920-21. Based on the above analysis, we hold that the ex parte hearing at issue in the case at bar was not a critical stage of the defendant's trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. Therefore, we examine Lester's claim of error under a due process analysis. See LaChappelle, 699 F.2d at 565. During the in-chambers hearing in question, no aspect of Carol's testimony was discussed, much less the testimony of ABC. Further, the hearing was on the record. Finally, defense counsel was allowed to review the tape of the hearing before the jury was sworn and make any objections on the record. Thus, the trial court used a procedure that safeguarded Lester's rights. On appeal, Lester argues that, had he been present, he would have asserted his marital privilege under KRE 504 to prevent Carol from testifying. Additionally, he argues that his absence prevented him from developing impeachment testimony. The arguments are not well taken. While we doubt that Carol's testimony at the hearing was against Lester within the meaning of KRE 504, the privilege was not available to Lester under the exception of KRE 504(c)(2)(B) which provides: There is no privilege under this rule ... [i]n any proceeding in which one (1) spouse is charged with wrongful conduct against the person or property or ... [a] minor child of either. Next, we fail to see how Lester's presence at the hearing would have allowed him to develop impeachment testimony. As noted, her testimony at the hearing did not touch on the subject matter of her testimony at trial. Lester makes no argument on appeal that Carol's reluctance to honor the subpoena to produce her daughter is in any way relevant to the Commonwealth's case in chief, or to his defense. Therefore, upon review of the record of the ex parte hearing and Lester's arguments, we hold that the hearing did not violate Lester's due process rights. In conclusion, we caution that ex parte hearings such as the one held here should only occur in the rarest of circumstances and only when the trial court feels that such a hearing is necessary to ensure a just trial. When such a hearing is held, the trial court must strive to ensure that the defendant's rights are not endangered by the hearing. And, at a minimum, the hearing must be on the record, any questioning should not address the substance of a witness's trial testimony, and absent any extenuating circumstances, defense counsel should be allowed to review the record of the hearing at the earliest opportunity.