Opinion ID: 4541656
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the First Issue

Text: According to its explicit terms, the lead issue presented concerns the application of Protz “to the case on appeal at the time of this Court’s decision.” Id. Initially, we observe that Employer’s present arguments, and that of the amici, materially transcend this issue, the Commonwealth Court’s specific holding, and the circumstances now before the Court.6 For example, deeply interwoven into Employer’s argument throughout its brief are policy arguments militating against retroactive application of Protz to cases in which specific IRE determinations had been fully litigated prior to that decision’s issuance.7 Claimant, on the other hand, argues strenuously that “[t]he issue 6The amici supporting Employer’s position are the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry, the National Federation of Independent Business, and LeadingAge PA, which submitted a combined brief. The Pennsylvania Association for Justice has filed an amicus brief supporting Claimant. 7 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 15 (“Application of [Protz] back to the date of the impairment rating evaluation potentially would result in a monumental flood of petitions to reinstate total disability benefits to all claimants who were not barred by the statute of repose in Section 413(a) of the Act.”); id. at 30 (“Employers and insurers have litigated or managed tens of thousands of claims in reliance on the now-stricken statutory language.”); id. (“[I]f this Court were to impose full retroactivity of the [Protz] holding to the date of the examination, the outcome would culminate in an overwhelming burden on the administrative and judicial systems[.]”); id. at 44 (“The significant reach and magnitude of impact upon tens of thousands of disability status determinations compels the conclusion that . . . the holding in [Protz] should be applied prospectively only[.]”); id. at 51 (alluding to a potential “effort by the Courts to revive closed claims via retroactive application” of Protz). [J-95-2019][M.O. – Saylor, C.J.] - 9 on appeal is limited ONLY to cases that were pending on direct appeal at the time [Protz] was determined and where constitutionality was appropriately raised.” Brief for Appellee at 19 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 16 -17 & n.6, 22-23. We agree with Claimant’s position on this matter. As previously explained, the Commonwealth Court’s holding was carefully limited only to cases in which the nondelegation challenge was raised during the course of ongoing litigation over an IRE determination. Indeed, the court took great pains to emphasize the demarcation, as follows: We reiterate that our holding is limited to cases, such as this, where the underlying IRE was still being actively litigated when [Protz] was issued. The extent to which [Protz] may be retroactively applied to another factual scenario is not currently before us. Dana Holding, 195 A.3d at 642 n.9. Concomitantly, the pertinent issue accepted for review by this Court is framed in terms of the application of Protz to “the case on appeal at the time of this Court’s decision [in Protz].” Dana Holding, ___ Pa. at ___, 208 A.3d at 461. Significantly, this Court has explained that, “[t]he adjudicatory process is structured to cast a narrow focus on matters framed by litigants before the Court in a highly directed fashion,” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 605 Pa. 269, 301, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (2010), and that the holding of a judicial opinion is to be interpreted with reference to its facts. See Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 603 Pa. 399, 415, 984 A.2d 478, 488 (2009). Accord Charles W. Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 383, 404 (2018) (“The traditional and ongoing institutional function of the judiciary is resolving actual disputes between litigants in an adversary context impacting the rights and obligations of the litigating parties.”). Quite clearly, different ranges of [J-95-2019][M.O. – Saylor, C.J.] - 10 policy considerations pertain to vindicating constitutional challenges raised and preserved in continuing litigation, versus applying new constitutional rulings to cases that have become final (or in which the usually appropriate time period allowed for raising constitutional challenges to a particular ruling has otherwise passed). Only the former set of circumstances was addressed by the Commonwealth Court and is presently before this Court.8 8 Certainly the direction this Court has taken is to enforce procedural requirements such as case-specific issue preservation as a prerequisite to the application of a new rule. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hays, ___ Pa. __, ___, 218 A.3d 1260, 1266-67 (2019); accord Blackwell, 527 Pa. at 188, 589 A.2d at 1102 (foreclosing retroactive application of a judicial decision finding a constitutional defect in a statute to “transactions . . . which are now final”). However, the circumstances associated with retroactive application of Protz to cases in which the non-delegation issue was not raised during the litigation of a specific IRE determination may be more nuanced than the circumstances presented in this general line of decisions. See Womack v. WCAB (Phila. Parking Auth.), 14 C.D. 2018, slip op., 2019 WL 1200255, at -5 (Pa. Cmwlth. Mar. 13, 2019) (distinguishing Womack from the circumstances in the present case -- given that the claimant in Womack hadn’t challenged the IRE determination in issue on non-delegation grounds until years after his disability benefits had been converted to partial -- and remanding for a hearing to determine whether the claimant continued to be disabled, consistent with Whitfield v. WCAB (Tenet Health System Hahnemann LLC, 188 A.3d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)); see also id. at  (explaining that “the facts of Dana Holding are sufficiently distinguishable” and “Dana Holding cannot inform our decision here”). Notably, as well, recourse to procedural vehicles such as waiver can be viewed as a matter separate and apart from retroactivity/prospectivity analysis. See, e.g., Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1751 (1995) (“New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed.”); Findley v. Findley, 629 S.E.2d 222, 225 (Ga. 2006) (defining “full retroactivity” as “application of a newly-pronounced rule to the parties before the Court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed, consistent with res judicata and procedural bars” (emphasis added)). See generally Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. at 420-23 (opining that “[p]rocedural doctrines, such as preclusion, forfeiture, and limitations” are often applied to “mitigate the cost of legal change.”). In this case, however, procedural impediments simply are not relevant, see supra note 5, so that we need not presently assess the interrelationship of such barriers with the retroactive versus prospective application of new rules. [J-95-2019][M.O. – Saylor, C.J.] - 11 For the above reasons -- and consistent with the judicious approach of the intermediate court -- we confine our review to the circumstances of the present case, in which it is undisputed that the constitutional non-delegation challenge to Section 306(a.2) was raised in a manner that meets the legal requirements for issue preservation. See supra note 5.