Opinion ID: 3026538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discriminatory Employment Termination2

Text: To demonstrate age discrimination under the ADEA when there is no direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must first present circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case as outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff must show by a preponderance of evidence that (1) she was a member of the protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position in question, (3) she suffered from an adverse employment decision, and (4) she was replaced by someone sufficiently younger to create an inference of age discrimination. Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 190 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1999). In a reduction of workforce context, the last element of the prima facie case has been slightly modified to require that the plaintiff show that the employer retained someone similarly situated who was sufficiently younger to create an inference of age discrimination.3 2 We will analyze all of Lula’s claims under the framework of the ADEA because her claims under Title VII and PHRA apply the same analysis. See, e.g., Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999); Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1 v. Commonwealth, 609 A.2d 804, 805 (Pa. 1992). 3 Although Lula also alleges that the issue of whether workforce reduction occurred in the Ohio District is a genuine issue of material fact, Lula does not dispute that NetApp’s workforce reduction was company-wide. Thus, the issue of whether or not a workforce reduction occurred in the Ohio District is immaterial. 5 Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 250 (3d Cir. 2002). Once the plaintiff is able to establish all the elements of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med. Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2000). In light of the legal standards set forth above, Lula alleges that the District Court erred in its application of the fourth prima facie element – that the employer retained someone similarly situated. Citing to Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 511 (3d Cir. 1996), Lula seems to contend that because of the uniqueness of her situation, she could not and should not have been required to provide evidence of someone similarly situated. However, Lula’s reading of Marzano is incorrect. Marzano stands for the proposition that when an employee has established a prima facie case, an employer may challenge it by showing that the employee is not similar to these individuals because of some unique characteristic. The plaintiff must first, however, have shown that the employer retained someone similarly situated. A careful review of the record shows that, even after discovery, Lula has not demonstrated that someone similarly situated was retained while she was fired. Therefore, as she failed to establish this element of the prima facie case for demonstrating discrimination in a workforce reduction context, the District Court properly granted summary judgment against her.