Opinion ID: 1742831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The prosecutor's reference to Young and Martin as cowards.

Text: Young argues that the prosecutor's description of Young and Martin as cowards constituted misconduct. During closing argument, while describing the sequence of events surrounding the murder, the prosecutor said: Eventually, they shot [Anthony]. Right in the chest. And as he layor is standing there bleeding profusely, grasping at any straws left of life, the two cowards, Jeff and Lennell, ran out of the apartment, got into the green Cadillac, the getaway car, and left the scene, and left Curtis Anthony to die there. Character attacks during closing arguments are improper, but parties are permitted to argue reasonable inferences from the facts presented at trial. Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 328. The state concedes that in the usual case reference to a defendant as a coward would likely constitute misconduct, but argues, based on Young's introduction of evidence of his good character, that the statement was not improper. But, even if the reference to Young as a coward constituted prosecutorial misconduct, this isolated statement does not constitute prejudicial error. The reference to Young as a coward was not repeated, the jury acquitted Young of premeditated murder, and the jury was properly instructed that the arguments of attorneys were not evidence. See State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn.1994). There is no reasonable likelihood that the prosecutor's isolated reference to Young as a coward had a significant effect on the jury's verdict, and therefore, even if this reference was error, it is not reversible error.