Opinion ID: 6984428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the historical argument

Text: I cannot close without commenting briefly upon Riley’s final argument, which is that the historical pedigree of qui tam suits compels us to conclude that qui tam relators have standing. I recognize that “[s]tanding to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1016. For that reason, and as noted in the majority opinion, the Supreme Court has on occasion permitted history to play a supporting role in its constitutional analysis. But even the dissent must concede that history alone cannot validate an unconstitutional practice. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 3335, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); see also Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1416, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). Indeed, in those circumstances in which the Supreme Court has deferred in any significant measure to historical usage, the constitutional implications of the challenged practice were debated by the adopting Congress. The practice was then employed in a manner so consistent and so free of ambiguity that the practice can fairly be said to constitute “part of the fabric of our society.” See Marsh, 103 S.Ct. at 3334-36 & n. 12. Qui tam provisions simply do not meet this threshold. As the majority points out, many of the early qui tam provisions differed substantially from the FCA provisions at issue here by merely granting an informing citizen a reward, rather than permitting those citizens to sue on behalf of an otherwise disinterested government. Moreover, and as described in the dissenting opinion, the use of the qui tam provisions has been sporadic at best. Judge Stewart’s dissent attempts to explain the distinctions drawn by the majority between the qui tam provisions at issue in this suit and their historical antecedents. His dissent also attempts to explain historical gaps in which qui tam suits were not employed. Indeed, I am impressed by the breadth of the dissenting analysis. But ultimately history, while important, is neither sacrosanct nor supreme — particularly where, as here, there is no indication that the adopting legislatures debated the constitutional questions, and the historical practice at issue has been only sporadically or incompletely employed. In the final analysis, I am persuaded that the historical credentials offered by Riley and appearing in the dissenting opinion do not justify the radical departure from fundamental and well-settled Article III jurisprudence that would be required to permit a qui tam plaintiff to sue in the absence of a particularized injury personal to the plaintiff.