Opinion ID: 49414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pro Se Status

Text: Galloway argues that, by requiring him to comply with Local Rule 56.1(B)(2)(a), the magistrate judge failed to construe his pleadings liberally. Galloway contends that he highlighted a litany of discriminatory and retaliatory acts and submitted evidence in support of his claims, and argues that the magistrate judge trivialized his claims and ignored key pieces of evidence. We disagree. Although “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and” are “liberally construed,” Trawinski v. United Techs., 313 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002), pro se litigants still must comply with the procedural rules governing the proper form of pleadings. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (1993). “[L]ocal rules are 13 effective unless modified or abrogated by the judicial council of the relevant circuit.” Brown v. Crawford County, Ga., 960 F.2d 1002, 1009 n.10 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it applied the local rules. Under Local Rule 56.1 of the Northern District of Georgia, a party moving for summary judgment must include “a separate, concise, numbered statement of the material facts to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” L.R. 56.1(B)(1). The district court deems the movant’s facts admitted unless the opposing party either refutes the facts with citations to evidence or law or states a valid objection to the movant’s evidence. L.R. 56.1(B)(2)(a). Galloway was aware of and understood the local rules of the district court as he cited to them when he requested extensions of time. Under Local Rule 56.1, Galloway’s response to the statement of facts of his former employer was wholly inadequate. He did not cite any evidence in the record and did not refute the statements of fact that he denied. Even though Galloway failed to follow the local rules, the 84-page report and recommendation of the magistrate judge thoroughly addressed Galloway’s numerous claims and cited to both record evidence and Galloway’s brief. Throughout this litigation, the district court treated Galloway with leniency 14 and respect, but the court was not required to act as Galloway’s de facto counsel. The district court provided Galloway over two years to conduct discovery and granted a generous extension to respond to the motion for summary judgment filed by Galloway’s former employer. The district court treated Galloway’s pleadings liberally and did not abuse its discretion.