Opinion ID: 1518376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Show Cause

Text: We review a trial court's denial of a motion to show cause for abuse of discretion. See Wrecking Corp. of America, Virginia, Inc. v. Jersey Welding Supply, Inc., 463 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C.1983). In arguing that the trial court erred, Pride Transport claims that (1) a judgment from a trial court that has been appealed (here the judgment of the Federal Court of Claims on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) is attachable as a sum certain and that payments made in satisfaction of that judgment were subject to the lien created by the writ of attachment; (2) Super. Ct. Civ. R. 69-I did not extinguish the writ by operation of law because it did not apply; and (3) the existence and priority of liens was for the trial court to determine in the first instance, not Cobert. Cobert responds by renewing his arguments before the trial court. Specifically, he contends alternatively that (1) no lien was perfected, and the writ was dismissed in September 1999 pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 69-I; (2) even if a lien were perfected, it would not have applied to after-acquired property, such as the present check; (3) negotiable instruments, such as the government's check, are not attachable; (4) even if a lien were perfected, it would not have applied to unliquidated or contingent liabilities, such as a judgment on appeal; and (5) even if a lien were perfected, the lien could not have superseded preexisting, superior liens. We begin by noting that Cobert's first argument is actually a conflation of two distinct arguments: (1) no lien was perfected, and (2) the writ of attachment was dismissed by operation of law. Because we agree with Cobert that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 69-I operated to dismiss the writ, we need not address either the general contention that no lien was perfected or the other specific contentions asserted here and in the trial court. We conclude that the writ was effectively dismissed in September 1999. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Cobert's motion to quash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 69-I(e), provides in relevant part: No judgment against a garnishee under D.C.Code [] §§ 16-556 ... shall be entered except by order of Court. Applications for a judgment shall be filed (1). . ., or (2) as to property other than wages as defined in D.C.Code [] § 16-571, within 4 weeks after the garnishee has filed answers to the interrogatories [,] or (3) ..., or (4) within such later time as may be authorized by the Court upon a motion made within the applicable period. If no judgment of condemnation or of recovery has been applied for or entered within the time provided by this Rule, the garnishment and attachment shall stand dismissed. (Emphasis added.) It is uncontroverted that the twenty-eight day period lapsed long before Pride Transport filed its show-cause motion with the trial court. Cobert filed his answers to Pride Transport's interrogatories on August 9, 1999, and Pride Transport filed its show-cause motion on October 26, 2001more than two years later. Applying Rule 69-I, we conclude, because no judgment was applied for or entered within the specified time period, the garnishment and attachment ... stand[s] dismissed by operation of law. Pride Transport contends, however, that Rule 69-I governs only when a judgment is entered pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-556. The relevant portion of Section 16-556 provides: Subject to the provisions of subchapter III of this chapter, if a garnishee has admitted credits in his hands, in answer to interrogatories served upon him, or the credits have been found upon an issue made as provided by this chapter, judgment shall be entered against him for the amount of credits admitted or found, not exceeding the amount of the plaintiff's judgment, and costs, and execution shall be had thereon not to exceed the credits in his hands. When the credits are not immediately due and payable, execution shall be stayed until they become due. D.C.Code § 16-556(a) (2001). Pride Transport argues that, under the circumstances, no judgment could have been entered under this provision. Assuming, without deciding, that Pride Transport is correct in that assertion, we do not agree that because no judgment could have been entered, the provisions of Rule 69-I(e) relating to dismissal of the garnishment and attachment do not apply. We know of no authority to support that claim and Pride Transport has cited none. As we said above, because no judgment was applied for or entered within the specified time period, the garnishment and attachment shall stand dismissed. Finally, Pride Transport also contends that Rule 69-I does not apply, under our holding in Household Fin. Corp. v. Training Research and Dev., Inc., 316 A.2d 850 (D.C.1973). We disagree. In Household Finance, we dealt with a situation markedly different than the one now before us. There, in addition to Section 16-556, we considered Section 16-575, which explicitly provided: If the employer-garnishee fails to pay to the judgment creditor the percentages prescribed in this subchapter of the wages which become payable to the judgment debtor for any pay period, judgment shall be entered against him for an amount equal to the percentages with respect to which the failure occurs. D.C.Code § 16-575 (1973). Observing a direct conflict between the statutory language there and that of Rule 69-I, we held that the statute superseded the rule. Here, there is no such conflict, and we decline to extend the reasoning in Household Finance beyond its application there. Cobert was therefore within his right to release the judgment check. [6]