Opinion ID: 1918563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Corroborative Facts

Text: The final determination concerning a prisoner's risk of recidivism rests with the Parole Board, not psychiatrists, social workers or psychologists. Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. at 36, 711 A. 2d 260. The ultimate decision is a legal one, not a social science one, even though it is guided by expert testimony. Cf. In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 59, 679 A. 2d 634 (1996) (role of medical testimony in commitment proceedings). We have said the courts should take care not to abdicate [their] decision-making responsibility to experts. In re Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 87, 685 A. 2d 1252 (1996). This principle applies with equal force to administrative agencies. Administrative agencies bear the ultimate responsibility for the decisions they render. In that context, it is at least arguable that the expert testimony I have described may not, standing alone, serve as a sufficient basis to support the Parole Board's denial of Trantino's release. The record, however, contains facts tending to corroborate the experts' opinion that Trantino is a dangerous person likely to recidivate if granted parole, because he is deceptive, manipulative and lacks empathy for others. It is true that many of these incidents are dredged from Trantino's dark past and perhaps were inflated in importance in the Parole Board's written determinations. Consideration of these various incidents separately, which is Trantino's thesis here, may show no one in itself is sufficiently meaningful. But in combination, and coupled with Trantino's psychological history and current mental state, they tend to corroborate the experts' prognostication of danger. First, there is Trantino's convenient amnesia concerning his role in the commission of the crimes. In our earlier opinion, we noted the presence in the record of evidence that Trantino's memory loss is consistent, long-standing and genuine. Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 154 N.J. at 35, 711 A. 2d 260. We also observed that the record contained evidence tending to show that Trantino's acceptance of responsibility for his crimes was sincere and legitimate. Ibid. I am satisfied that these statements did not foreclose the Parole Board from revisiting the subject, as the majority asserts. In a variety of circumstances and factual settings, appellate courts are often presented with records containing substantial evidence supporting inconsistent theses. As I pointed out earlier, it is not our job to pick and choose which thesis is accurate. That role is ordinarily performed by trial judges and administrative agencies, and we are bound to defer to their conclusions if they are reasonable. The Parole Board found that Trantino's inability to recall the circumstances of the crime was feigned, and that his abstract, obtuse and convoluted acknowledgment of guilt was not meaningful. There is substantial support for that conclusion in the record. It is to be recalled that Trantino's defense at trial was voluntary intoxication. State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. 358, 362-63, 209 A. 2d 117 (1965). Trantino testified that he took two Dexedrine pills and consumed a considerable quantity of liquor on the day of the homicides. Id. at 362, 209 A. 2d 117. He denied any recollection of the slaying of the officers, saying he recalled only a loud explosion followed by a confusion of wild sound and light within which his accomplice appeared to be a devil. Id. at 362-63, 209 A. 2d 117. The prosecution presented strong evidence debunking Trantino's claim that he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs when he killed the victims and that he could not recall the events in question. For example, although Trantino disavowed awareness of the homicides, the getaway driver, Patricia MacPhail, who helped him flee to New York City, testified that he told her he had murdered the policemen to help his accomplice, Frank Falco, who was wanted for murder. Id. at 363, 209 A. 2d 117. At the time of the trial, voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining whether the defendant in fact performed the mental operations which the prosecution was required to prove to elevate murder in the second degree to murder in the first degree. Id. at 369, 209 A. 2d 117. Also at the time of trial, the proof necessary to convict a defendant of first degree murder was far more substantial than that necessary to prove first degree murder under current laws. The State then was required to establish premeditation, deliberation and wilfulness in the execution of the design to kill. State v. Hudson, 38 N.J. 364, 369, 185 A. 2d 1 (1962). In any event, the jury was instructed accordingly, and the verdict of murder in the first degree express[ed][its] rejection of [Trantino's] testimony and the expert opinion resting upon it. State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. at 369, 209 A. 2d 117. In the resulting appeal, Trantino's principal emphasis was on his claim that the killings were the result of a drug-induced psychotic episode that he could not precisely recall. Id. at 370, 209 A. 2d 117. In rejecting that argument, Chief Justice Weintraub wrote: There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Trantino knew what was going on and what he was doing. He did not menace Sergeant Voto until the officer discovered the gun. From what defendant told Patricia MacPhail, the jury could find he feared that arrests would follow discovery of the gun and that Falco would have to face a murder charge in New York. Trantino's own testimony as to events immediately before and immediately after the killings could be found to be inconsistent with the claim of alcoholic stupor at the time of the killings. He knew there was something to run from, and although he says he does not know what it was, the jury could conclude, as Mrs. MacPhail's testimony revealed, that defendant knew he had killed the policemen. In fact none of the witnesses who were at the tavern, nor a milkman from whom defendant sought a ride shortly after the murders, supported the claim of alcoholic prostration. Id. at 371, 209 A. 2d 117. The point to be stressed here is that a jury, having the opportunity to see and hear Trantino testify, rejected the claim that he could not recall the events in question. To put it more bluntly, the jury viewed Trantino's claim of a drug-induced psychotic episode, and saw nothing but the heart of darkness. Trantino's later attempts to accept responsibility for the crimes while denying any recollection of the shootings merely resurrected a claim earlier considered and rejected by a well-informed jury. No amount of historical revisionism can change that basic fact. Beyond this, the Parole Board could reasonably have questioned the accuracy of our statement that Trantino's memory loss is consistent, long-standing and genuine. Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 154 N.J. at 35, 711 A. 2d 260. In point of fact, Trantino has wavered in his claim of amnesia. At his postconviction relief hearing in 1967, for example, Trantino testified unequivocally that he did not kill the victims. At his parole hearing in 1980, Trantino recounted that he was innocent of killing the policemen, noting that he had left the tavern before the crimes were committed. Trantino repeated that version when he testified at his parole hearing in 1982. Trantino's failure to come to terms with the brutal crimes he committed is important for several reasons. I do not doubt that a sentence should not be enlarged because a prisoner continues to insist he is innocent. But the greater demand is that the Parole Board take into account the man and his prospect for recidivism. The aims of punishment are several, State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 199-202, 162 A. 2d 851 (1960), but the hope is that the sentence, mild or severe, will reshape the offender. In assaying the prospects for recidivism, the Parole Board must look to the man as well as to the offense, and it is here that the inmate's attitude toward the truth is highly relevant. In a variety of contexts, we have recognized that a candid acknowledgment of guilt is the first sign of redemption. See State v. Poteet, 61 N.J. 493, 497, 295 A. 2d 857 (1972); State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 275, 245 A. 2d 181 (1968), rev'd in part, Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 2278, 29 L.Ed. 2d 859 (1971); State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 260, 229 A. 2d 636, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830, 88 S.Ct. 96, 19 L.Ed. 2d 89 (1967). Trantino's bland acceptance of responsibility while claiming amnesia is neither candid nor redemptive. It is instead both manipulative and deceptive. I leave the question of moral blameworthiness to the philosophers. I, instead, point to Dr. Berrill's opinion that Trantino's alleged inability to recall the crimes constitutes strong evidence of continued pathology. Trantino was also disingenuous in his testimony regarding his relationship with his first wife, Helene. Trantino admitted that he was less than an ideal husband, having had sexual intercourse with another woman during the couple's honeymoon and thereafter engaging in a series of extramarital affairs. He testified that he struck Helene three or four times in the course of the marriage, but he confidently assured the Parole Board that she would not characterize his conduct toward her as abusive. He was wrong. In her statement to New York parole authorities, Helene maintained that Trantino often beat her. Helene recounted that she submitted to Trantino sexually because of her fear as to what he would do if she were to refuse his demands. Trantino also either minimized or lied about the significance of his 1956 strong-armed robbery of the dentist's payroll and the injuries inflicted upon the victim. This incident again indicates Trantino's penchant to mitigate his involvement in crime. It also suggests his inability to appreciate the impact of his conduct on others. Concededly, these events took place many years ago. They nevertheless are relevant because they contribute to the composite picture of the whole man, his current mental state, and his prospects for the future. They have resonance not in the fact that they occurred or in the prospect that they will be repeated if Trantino is released. Rather, this evidence confirms Dr. Berrill's opinion that Trantino is dangerous because he cannot appreciate how his conduct affects others. It also confirms the fact that Trantino was less than truthful in his testimony before the Parole Board. Perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the Talbot Hall incident. The simple fact remains, however, that those present at the scene were able to discern a crack in Trantino's veneer, a side of his personality that he otherwise kept hidden. Trantino must have known that he was under a microscope. Yet he refused to complete the psychological testing. Moreover, Trantino either minimized or lied about the incident in his testimony at the Parole Board hearing. Finally, Trantino exhibited a significant lack of empathy in his preliminary decision to write another book pertaining to the killings. The majority's interpretation of this incident as disclosing Trantino's reformation is belied by the record. Obviously Trantino has a First Amendment right to publish another book. However, the concern lies not with the publication itself, but with Trantino's failure to recognize that such action may cause further emotional trauma to the victims' families. As noted by the Parole Board, Trantino's disregard for the feelings of the victims' families tended to corroborate Dr. Berill's findings that Trantino lacks the capacity to understand how his actions affect others. In light of this evidence, I do not believe that the Parole Board went wide of the mark in finding that there is a substantial likelihood of recidivism if Trantino is released. Resolution of these issues by the Parole Board required a reconciliation of competing social values. The interest of public security was at war with the concern for Trantino's personal freedom. Believing that the interest of public safety was paramount, the Parole Board sought to alleviate the tension between these values by denying Trantino's release. I cannot fairly say that the Parole Board was wrong.