Opinion ID: 170411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Framework for Wrongful Detention

Text: A hodgepodge of state and federal law governs the timeliness of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute of limitations is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Federal law, however, determines the date on which the claim accrues and the limitations period starts to run. Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1095. State law governs any tolling of that period, Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269, except that federal law might also allow additional equitable tolling in rare circumstances, Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1099-1100. Neither party has provided a tolling argument to this court, and the New Mexico statute of limitations is three years. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8. The issue left for this appeal is the date that Mr. Mondragón's claims for wrongful detention accrued, a question of federal law conforming in general to common-law tort principles. Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1095. We have held that a plaintiff who claims that the government has unconstitutionally imprisoned him has at least two potential constitutional claims. The initial seizure is governed by the Fourth Amendment, but at some point after arrest, and certainly by the time of trial, constitutional analysis shifts to the Due Process Clause. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (10th Cir.2004). If he has been imprisoned without legal process he has a claim under the Fourth Amendment analogous to a tort claim for false arrest or false imprisonment. If he has been imprisoned pursuant to legal but wrongful process, he has a claim under the procedural component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause analogous to a tort claim for malicious prosecution. [3] These torts are only analogies because § 1983 suits ultimately rest on the Constitution, not on state (or federal) common law. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1285-88. However, these analogies guide us in applying rules for the accrual of a cause of action. Both Fourth Amendment claims and due process claims for unconstitutional imprisonment are subject to special federal rules of accrual. As the Supreme Court explained in Wallace, the statute of limitations for a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest or imprisonment begin[s] to run . . . when the alleged false imprisonment ends. 127 S.Ct. at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted). The false imprisonment ends for these purposes either when the victim is released or when the victim's imprisonment becomes pursuant to [legal] process  when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges. Id. (emphasis omitted). Thus, either the date of release or the date of sufficient legal process starts the statute of limitations running for the Fourth Amendment claim. After the institution of legal process, any remaining constitutional claim is analogous to a malicious prosecution claim. The Supreme Court has not yet explicitly decided whether such a claim exists in these circumstances under the Fourth Amendment or the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 1096 n. 2 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270-71, 275, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion)); see also Albright at 275-76, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Scalia, J., concurring). This Circuit, however, has held that the Constitution permits due process claims for wrongful imprisonment after the wrongful institution of legal process. [4] Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1285-86. We also held that a due process claim for malicious prosecution arises only once the original action, whatever form it has taken, has been terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1294. Because the statute of limitations does not start running before the elements of a claim are satisfied, the statute of limitations for this due process claim cannot start until the plaintiff has achieved a favorable result in the original action. [5] In summary, two claims arise from an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment as analysis shifts from the Fourth Amendment to the Due Process Clause. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1285-86. The period of time between an unlawful arrest and the institution of legal process forms one constitutional claim, arising under the Fourth Amendment. That claim accrues when the plaintiff is released or legal process is instituted justifying that imprisonment. The period of time between the institution of that process and its favorable termination  through acquittal, habeas corpus, voluntary dismissal, etc.  forms a second claim, arising under the Due Process Clause. That claim accrues, at the earliest, when favorable termination occurs.