Opinion ID: 788124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Polygraph Testimony

Text: 40 The district court did not cite a specific rule of evidence to support its decision to exclude the polygraph testimony. However, we may affirm the decision based on any theory supported by the record and briefed by the parties. Forest Guardians v. United States Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir.2003). There are three rules of evidence that could potentially be invoked to support the district court's decision to exclude polygraph evidence in this case. First, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 bars expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental state. We agree that Rule 704 excludes Question 2. 3 It does not, however, affect Questions 1 and 3, as they are factual questions and do not go to mental state. 4 41 Because the polygraph evidence would come into court as expert testimony, the evidence could have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 after a Daubert hearing on the reliability of the methods used to support the polygrapher's expert opinion. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-595, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). However, as the district court did not perform a Daubert hearing in this case, this ground for exclusion may not be used. 42 Finally, any kind of evidence may be excluded if its probative value will be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. We hold that the significance of Questions 1 and 3 to the case against Ramirez-Robles, when combined with the powerful persuasive power of polygraph testimony, is sufficient to support the conclusion that the evidence was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 43
44 Ramirez-Robles contends that the district court erred when it chose not to perform a Daubert hearing on the polygraph evidence. The Daubert hearing Ramirez-Robles seeks, however, is not necessary if the proffered evidence can be excluded by Rule 403. Rule 403 and Daubert address different aspects of evidence and therefore act independently. Rule 403 requires the court to balance the probative value of evidence against its potentially prejudicial impact on the jury's perception of the case. Daubert, on the other hand, establishes a standard by which the court must evaluate expert testimony for its reliability before admitting it into court. Regardless of the reliability that a Daubert hearing may or may not have shown in this case, the polygraph testimony could have been excluded by Rule 403 if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial impact. 45 In United States v. Benavidez-Benavidez, this court recognized that distinction. In that case, the district court had excluded evidence under Rule 702 after a Daubert hearing and also, independently, under Rule 403. 217 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir.2000). On appeal the defendant claimed that the district court erred in its application of the Daubert hearing because the district court had based its Daubert exclusion on only one factor-widespread acceptance in the scientific community. This court declined to reach the Daubert issue in the case because the district court's decision to exclude the polygraph evidence could be upheld on the basis of Rule 403 alone: The district court's exclusion of the polygraph evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403 is, standing alone, sufficient. Id. This court went on to state: 46 Certainly, as able defense counsel urged at oral argument, the courts should allow science to evolve in the courtroom. However, this evolution will not come at the expense of trial court discretion in assessing whether probative value exceeds the prejudicial effect on the jury. 47 Having found exclusion of evidence proper under Rule 403, we need not reach the issue of whether the district court also properly excluded the evidence under Rules 702 or 704(b) or improperly credited the government's polygraph expert.... Once the probative value of a piece of evidence is found to be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, there is no other evidentiary rule that can make that same evidence admissible. 48 Id. Thus, the fact that the district court performed a Daubert hearing in Benavidez-Benavidez and did not do so in this case is irrelevant to the issue of whether the polygraph evidence may be excluded under Rule 403. The relevant question is whether the record supports the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403. 49
50 Rule 403 requires the exclusion of evidence, the probative value of which is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. In Benavidez-Benavidez, this court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded polygraph evidence under Rule 403 by citing the special risk that the jury might give excessive weight to the polygrapher's conclusions. Id. 51 Although never articulated in those words, the special risk of polygraph testimony was apparent to the judge and lawyers in this case. In the government's response to the defendant's Motion to Admit Polygraph Evidence, the government argued that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 704(b), because it relates to the defendant's mental state or condition, and under Rule 403, because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, citing Benavidez-Benavidez. The government added a footnote stating, The pertinent part of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... GER 5. 52 The government then argued, 53 If the court agrees that the polygraph evidence is not admissible under FRE 704 and/or FRE 403, then the court need not conduct a separate Daubert hearing to determine whether polygraph evidence is admissible as scientific evidence under FRE 702. A Daubert hearing would be quite lengthy and require substantially more preparation and briefing. As such, both parties request that the court first rule on the admissibility of the polygraph under FRE 704(b) and/or FRE 403. 54 This was the posture of the issue before the district court. 55 The district court did not articulate which basis it was using to support its finding that the evidence is excludable. The statement of the court was: 56 I understand. I used to do a lot of criminal defense work, and I was always scared to death of polygraph evidence because usually it was the Government that was trying to use it or the State. 57 I am not going to allow it. I don't want to be the first judge to allow polygraph evidence. I don't feel like setting any markers there, and it is an interesting question to submit to the appeals court. So I am going to deny the motion to admit the polygraph evidence. 58 Transcript of Pretrial Telephone Conference of November 12, 2002 at 4-5. These comments do not distinguish whether the district court was relying on Rule 403, Rule 704, or both. The district court's statements can most reasonably be interpreted as a ruling on Rule 403. As we have noted, Rule 704 relates only to Question 2, involving the defendant's mental state. The ruling of the district court excluded all polygraph testimony, which would only be justified under Rule 403. 59 In this case, the potentially prejudicial effect of admitting the polygraph evidence was high. 5 Although Questions 1 and 3 do not go to Ramirez-Robles's mental state, they deal with pivotal elements of the prosecution's case. Whereas the prosecution must build its case circumstantially, allowing the polygraph evidence would have allowed Ramirez-Robles to refute the case with his own, certified-truthful testimony. Because this case turned on the relative credibility of Ramirez-Robles as opposed to Turner, the polygrapher's testimony that Ramirez-Robles was being truthful when he said he did not own the methamphetamine that was sold and did not order it could have been very prejudicial in this case. The highly influential nature of polygraph testimony, and its place in this case, support the conclusion that the evidence was properly excluded. 60 This conclusion is bolstered by evaluating the probative value of the polygraph testimony. The polygraph questions establish ownership and possession but leave open the question of mastery over the transaction. As defense counsel noted in the pretrial conference, the jury could hear this evidence and still conclude that Ramirez-Robles was guilty. The probative value of the testimony is thus limited to two narrow issues. 61 Finally, this evidence has the potential to mislead members of the jury as well as prejudice them. Although Questions 1 and 3 go to narrow issues, the closeness of the factual details to the ultimate issue could easily have afforded a jury argument that Ramirez-Robles's answers to these questions had much broader significance in the case. 62 Because these concerns were before the district court when it made its decision, we hold that the record supports the exclusion of the polygraph evidence on the basis of Rule 403.