Opinion ID: 506065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction Under the LHWCA

Text: 11 The United States attacks the district court's analysis at its inception. It contends that the court erred by failing to include the government's immunity under the FECA as one of the like circumstances that must be considered under the FTCA's private individual/under like circumstances standard. By including the FECA immunity, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8116(c) (1982), in the FTCA formula, the government maintains it cannot be analogous to a private Pennsylvania shipowner because no private shipowner possesses federal immunity from direct suit by its employees. Therefore, the government argues, if it is immune from direct suit, it is necessarily immune from a third-party suit. Eagle-Picher, meanwhile, contends that the government's argument is tautological: [i]t argues that the FTCA waives the government's immunity in all cases except where the government is immune. Brief of Appellee at 17. 12 Under the FTCA, the government consents to suit in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674. Liability is determined by the law of the place where the wrong occurred--in this case, Pennsylvania. See id. Sec. 1346(b). 13 If the United States is not subject to direct suit under Sec. 905(b) of the LHWCA, Eagle-Picher cannot maintain this third-party suit. Indeed, Pennsylvania law, which applies here, bars third-party actions against tortfeasors who are not directly liable. See Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325-28, 77 A.2d 368, 370-71 (1951); Eckrich v. DiNardo, 283 Pa.Super. 84, 88 n. 2, 423 A.2d 727, 729 n. 2 (1980). 4 Direct liability in this context stems from Congress's 1972 LHWCA amendments that permit longshore workers to not only collect workers' compensation from their employer, but to also recover from the shipowner for negligence. See Sec. 905(b); Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 165, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 1621, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). This liability applies even when the longshoreman is employed directly by the vessel owner. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 530, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 2547, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983). Hence, although a vessel owner that is also an employer is immune from suit in its capacity as an employer by virtue of the workers' compensation scheme, it is subject to suit for negligence in its dual capacity as vessel owner. 5 Third-party liability follows, the parties agree, because the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA, see Sec. 905(a), would allow third-party suits as long as they would be permitted under the applicable substantive law (i.e., Pennsylvania law). See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 196-98 & n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 1037-38 & n. 8, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983). 6 14 Under the government's theory, however, courts would never reach the point of applying the LHWCA. Instead, the government contends the FECA provides the exclusive remedy for its employees and thereby renders it immune from negligence actions that could otherwise be brought against private shipowners. Under Sec. 8116(c) of the FECA, the government pays injured employees immediate, fixed benefits without regard to fault in exchange for employees accepting the FECA as their exclusive means of recovery. See Lockheed, 460 U.S. at 193-94, 103 S.Ct. at 1036-37. At least one court has adopted the government's theory that to consider the Government as a private employer covered by the LHWCA would be to ignore the FECA as a significant aspect of the Government's circumstances. Lopez v. Johns Manville, 649 F.Supp. 149, 155 (W.D.Wash.1986). 15 The district court concluded that like any other shipyard employer in Pennsylvania, the United States, by virtue of the FTCA, would be subject to the PWCA, which provides that workers' compensation shall be the exclusive basis for liability against an employer. 7 See Colombo, 601 F.Supp. at 1127-29. The court then determined, however, that Sec. 905(b) of the LHWCA created an independent cause of action against shipyard owners. Id. at 1136. The exclusivity provision in Pennsylvania's workers' compensation law, the court observed, cannot annul the remedy offered in the LHWCA. Id. The court distinguished between shipyard owners and shipyard employers, concluding that workers' compensation immunity did not bar suits pursuant to Sec. 905(b) against an employer in its capacity as owner. Accordingly, the court explained, the LHWCA's authorization of negligence suits against shipowners provided a federal right of recovery against shipowner/employers that is superior to an employer's state immunity from suit. Cf. Sun Ship Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 724 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 2438 n. 6, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980) (state workers' compensation programs supplement federal LHWCA compensation, but if final state compensation award were less than an LHWCA award, federal law would preempt state law exclusivity provision); Purnell v. Norned Shipping B.V., 804 F.2d 248, 250 n.  (3d Cir.1986) (although state workers' compensation scheme may supplement federal benefits, it may not eliminate federal rights), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1576, 94 L.Ed.2d 767 (1987). 16 The difficulty with this reasoning is the assertion that Sec. 905(b) of the LHWCA creates a cause of action for federal employees against the United States. To be sure, Sec. 905(b) grants a harbor worker the right to bring a negligence action against his employer in its capacity as vessel owner. Colombo, 601 F.Supp. at 1136. The LHWCA, however, expressly excludes federal employees, such as the plaintiff, from its coverage. Section 903(b), which sets forth the scope of the LHWCA's coverage, states: Coverage 17 .... 18 (b) Governmental officers and employees 19 No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of an officer or employee of the United States, or any agency thereof, or of any State or foreign government, or any subdivision thereof. 20 33 U.S.C. Sec. 903(b) (formerly Sec. 903(a)(2)); accord Lopez, 649 F.Supp. at 155 (LHWCA expressly excepts from coverage employees of the United States or any of its agencies); cf. In re All Maine Asbestos Litigation, 772 F.2d 1023, 1029 (1st Cir.1985) ([w]e doubt whether we can ignore an express congressional exclusion of federal workers from coverage under the LHWCA....), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1126, 106 S.Ct. 1994, 90 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986). Thus, because we hold that Sec. 905(b) of the LHWCA creates no right of action on behalf of federal employees against the United States, the FTCA waiver of immunity is not implicated. 8 21 Instead, we interpret the LHWCA in a manner consistent with Congress's express intent to extend LHWCA coverage only to private employees. Congress, in Sec. 903(b), could not have been more explicit in denying coverage to government employees. Its decision to specifically exclude federal workers from the LHWCA overrides the FTCA's more general, and indeed indirect, reference to the government's LHWCA liability. Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208, 52 S.Ct. 322, 323, 76 L.Ed.2d 704 (1932); see also Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 407, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 1753, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)); Creque v. Luis, 803 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir.1986); see generally 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction Sec. 51.05, at 499-500 (4th ed. 1984). Thus, the LHWCA's exclusion of federal employees from its coverage is an exception to the government's general waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA. 22 Any other construction of the LHWCA would subject the United States to liability for harm to its employees under a statute that from its inception has barred government employees from its coverage. See In re Maine Asbestos Litigation, 772 F.2d at 1029; Lopez, 649 F.Supp. at 155. This express congressional exclusion of federal workers from LHWCA coverage precludes Eagle-Picher from using the FTCA to accomplish indirectly what federal employees could not accomplish directly. 23 We recognize, of course, that the LHWCA's Sec. 903(b) exclusion of federal employees has been part of the statute since its enactment in 1927, see Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 258 & n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2354 & n. 14, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977); H.R.Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong.2d Sess. 2 (1927)--long before Congress codified the dual capacity shipowner negligence action in Sec. 905(b). Thus, the Sec. 903(b) exclusion could be viewed as encompassing only the workers' compensation aspect of the statute, not the subsequent statutory authorization of shipowner negligence suits. 24 Indeed, as originally enacted, the LHWCA was strictly a workers' compensation statute. Congress passed the LHWCA only after the Supreme Court held that states were powerless to extend their compensation laws to longshore workers injured on the gangplank between a ship and a pier. See Northeast Marine Terminal, 432 U.S. at 257 & n. 12, 97 S.Ct. at 2354 & n. 12 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 639, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922)). As a result, Congress devised a federal compensation system to provide traditional workers' compensation benefits to longshore and harbor workers not covered by state compensation schemes. Northeast Marine Terminal, 432 U.S. at 257-58, 97 S.Ct. at 2353-54. This rationale also explains the exclusion of federal employees, who were covered by another appropriate and sufficient form of compensation under the FECA and the Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. Secs. 2731-37 (1982). See 1A Benedict on Admiralty Sec. 30, at 2-62 to 2-63 (1987). 25 The Supreme Court expanded the remedies available to injured longshore workers in 1946 when it held that the traditional seaman's action against a vessel owner for strict liability under the theory of unseaworthiness applied with equal force to longshore workers. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946). As a result of this judicial expansion of the LHWCA, longshore workers could receive workers' compensation from their employer, and at the same time sue the vessel owner under a separate theory. 9 26 In 1972, however, Congress radically changed the scheme of things by amending the LHWCA. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 451 U.S. at 165, 101 S.Ct. at 1621. Under the amendments, longshore workers were guaranteed increased compensation payments, but no longer possessed a right to recover in strict liability for unseaworthiness. In addition, Congress codified the employee's right to sue a vessel owner in negligence; abolished an employer's obligation to indemnify the vessel owner, and extended the LHWCA's coverage to land-based workers engaged in maritime employment. See id.; Northeast Marine Terminal, 432 U.S. at 261-65, 97 S.Ct. at 2356-57 (discussing legislative history); see generally Director, OWCP v. Perini, 459 U.S. 297, 299, 313, 103 S.Ct. 634, 637, 645, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983) (discussing 1972 LHWCA amendments); Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K., 835 F.2d 490, 492 (3d Cir.1987). 27 At no point, however, did Congress address whether any of the LHWCA revisions should apply to federal employees. Significantly, although other exceptions from coverage were deleted, the exclusion of federal employees emerged unscathed from the drastic congressional overhaul of the LHWCA. For example, while expanding the category of covered employees, and thereby extending the LHWCA's coverage shoreward, Congress also removed the provision [in Sec. 903] that precluded federal recovery if a state workmen's compensation remedy were available. Northeast Marine Terminal, 432 U.S. at 263 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. at 2357 n. 21; see also Perini, 459 U.S. at 314, 103 S.Ct. at 645. Thus, Congress not only broadened the category of employees covered by the statute, it did so by eliminating the exclusion in Sec. 903(a) for employees eligible for state benefits, but not the Sec. 903(a)(2) exclusion for federal employees. 28 Viewed in this context, the 1972 amendments establish that Congress specifically intended the United States's exclusion from liability under the LHWCA to remain as a bar to all aspects of the LHWCA. Accordingly, although Sec. 905(b) would permit a private longshore worker to sue an employer/shipowner for negligence, this liability does not extend to the United States by virtue of the LHWCA's exclusion of federal employees from its coverage. 10 Since Eagle-Picher's third-party suit is based on Sec. 905(b), we hold as a matter of law that its action is barred.