Opinion ID: 183984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: A.2.b. Scope of Seizure of Hard Drives

Text: Pursuant to Deetz's consent, the officers searched the house and seized six computer hard drives. Stabile argues that even assuming Deetz validly consented to this search and seizure, the seizure of six entire hard drives was unreasonable because it was unconstitutionally overbroad. Stabile notes that by seizing six entire hard drives, the Government also seized personal emails and other information not related to financial crimes. Therefore, according to Stabile, the Government's failure to segregate data on-site (at Stabile's house) renders this seizure unconstitutionally overbroad. The Government defends the seizure on the grounds that Deetz did not limit the scope of her consent, that evidence of financial crimes could be found anywhere on any computer hard drive, and that the practical considerations of investigating and seizing electronic evidence counsel against on-site data collection. We agree with the Government and reject Stabile's argument. The seizure of the six entire hard drives was reasonable. First, except for the restriction as to financial crimes, Deetz did not limit the scope of her consent in any way. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (requiring explicit limitation on consent). Second, a broad seizure was required because evidence of financial crimes could have been found in any location on any of the six hard drives, and this evidence very likely would have been disguised or concealed somewhere on the hard drive. See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir.2006). Third, as a practical matter, [w]hen a search requires review of a large collection of items, such as papers, `it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.' United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519-20 (4th Cir.2010) (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976)). Finally, Stabile argues for an on-site search requirement, but the practical realities of computer investigations preclude on-site searches. For example, a hard drive search requires a controlled environment. United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir.2000). Computer searches are also time consuming and require trained forensic investigators. See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir.1999). In short, such on-site searches would be fraught with difficulty and risk, United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir.2006), and cannot be rushed by a cursory on-site search. [8] All these reasons suggest that the seizure of the six entire hard drives was reasonable. Lastly, although Stabile attempted to revoke Deetz's consent when he returned home later on the day of the search by stating I take it [Deetz's consent] back to the investigating agents, this revocation is ineffective. Stabile could not revoke Deetz's consent to search the house because Stabile was not physically present at the time Deetz consented. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515. Nor can Stabile revoke Deetz's consent to the seizure of the shared hard drives because Stabile had relinquished his privacy in the hard drives, King, 604 F.3d at 137, and thus assumed the risk that a third party could consent to their search or seizure, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. 988.