Opinion ID: 756460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seizure of Patterson's Honda

Text: 19 Patterson first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the items seized from his Honda. Patterson argues that probable cause did not exist to seize the vehicle and that even if probable cause existed there were no exigent circumstances preventing the officers from obtaining a search warrant. 20 A district court's finding of probable cause is reviewed de novo. United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir.1996). The reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 21 The district judge stated in his oral order denying the motion to suppress that there was very thin evidence of probable cause to search the vehicle because there were no guns or money unaccounted for. The judge found, however, that there was probable cause to seize the vehicle as an instrumentality or evidence of the crime. 22 Patterson bases much of his argument regarding the alleged lack of probable cause on cases involving corroborated and uncorroborated statements made by informants. What Patterson fails to address is that the informant in this case was a co-participant in the robbery. A review of cases from this and other circuits reveals that courts generally apply a different standard to a co-participant than to other, more typical informants. See Craig v. Singletary, 127 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that a co-defendant's confession is sufficient to be the basis for probable cause); United States v. Lim, 984 F.2d 331, 337 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that probable cause for an arrest existed where the defendant had been observed acting nervous after deboarding a plane, his co-defendant indicated that drugs found on him belonged to the defendant and a flight itinerary carried by the codefendant implicated the defendant); United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331, 1332-33 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that probable cause existed where there was a significant amount of evidence to link a suspect to a bank robbery, the most damaging being the implicating confession of his co-defendant); Thomas v. Leeke, 393 F.Supp. 282, 286 (D.S.C.1975) (noting that police had probable cause to charge an individual with robbery based on his co-defendant's admission to the police that the two of them had robbed a particular store). 23 The case most analogous to the one at bar is Craig v. Singletary. 127 F.3d 1030. In Craig, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that the requirements for probable cause were satisfied based on the testimony of a co-perpetrator. The Craig court held that when a codefendant has admitted guilt to the core crime, there is enough indication of reasonably trustworthy information to meet the requirement of probable cause. Id. at 1045. The court held that this was true even where the confessing co-defendant suggests that the other codefendant committed a more serious or blameworthy act than the confessing co-defendant. Id. 24 Perhaps the most important aspect of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Craig is the underlying reasoning for its holding. The Craig court stated that, because for the past forty years it has held that the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator or accomplice is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be anomalous for it to hold that the confession of a codefendant is insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 1044-45. 25 This Circuit has also held that the testimony of a co-defendant standing alone and uncorroborated is sufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Burns, 990 F.2d 1426, 1439 (4th Cir.1993) (calling this proposition settled law); United States v. Clark, 541 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir.1976) (Although the testimony of an accomplice should be examined with care and received cautiously, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even though uncorroborated, if it convinces a jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.). This Court agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that it would be contradictory to allow a defendant to be convicted based on the uncorroborated testimony of his co-perpetrator while refusing to find that the same statement would be sufficient to support probable cause. 26 Furthermore, this Circuit has stated that when an informant is giving testimony in hopes of being treated favorably, there is an indicia of reliability because the individual has nothing to gain from lying. United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 699 (4th Cir.1991). The Supreme Court has noted that an informant's statement has an indicia of reliability when it is self-incriminating: 27 Common sense in the important daily affairs of life would induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit these statements. People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility--sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search. 28 United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); see also United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 48-49 (2d Cir.1982). These assertions would hold true for a co-defendant just as they would for an informant. 29 A co-participant would, of course, have to be able to give accurate information about what happened during the crime and leading up to it. Beyond that, however, unless it is incredible or contradicts known facts to such an extent [that] no reasonable officer would believe it, a co-defendant's confession that he and the suspect committed the crime, Craig, 127 F.3d at 1045-46, and used certain instrumentalities, supplies probable cause for arrest and seizure. Accordingly, the Court holds that there was probable cause to seize Patterson's Honda based on Greene's statement that Patterson participated in the robbery with him and that the two of them used Patterson's vehicle as transportation during the robbery. 30 Patterson contends that even if there was probable cause to seize the Honda there were no exigent circumstances excusing the warrant requirement. Patterson relies heavily on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held unlawful the seizure of a defendant's car from his driveway. This case differs from Coolidge in that Patterson's car was parked on a public street. Other jurisdictions have held that a vehicle which has been used in a robbery may be seized without a warrant as evidence or as an instrumentality of a crime, particularly when it is parked on a public street. United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 491 (9th Cir.1985) (We now hold that the existence of probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place.); United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir.1973) (Alternatively, seizure and subsequent search of the automobile can be justified on the ground that the car itself constituted evidence or an instrumentality of the crime, was parked in a public way knowingly exposed to the public, and thus was subject to impounding by law enforcement agents with probable cause to believe that it could be used in a trial of the suspects.). The inventory search policy of Guilford County, North Carolina, where the robbery took place, permits such a seizure as well: 14.3.3 Vehicles Used in Criminal Activity 31 When an officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a crime or was used in a criminal act, he will have the vehicle towed and stored as evidence. 32 Moreover, this case can be distinguished from Coolidge based on timing. In Coolidge, the officers had been investigating the defendant for weeks before going to his residence and knew that they would want to seize his car. Id. at 471, 91 S.Ct. 2022. The Sixth Circuit made this distinction in its ruling in United States v. Shye: 33 We do not rely on the movability of automobiles to justify this warrantless search, but instead on the existence of exceptional circumstances which because of the imperative time excuse obtaining prior judicial approval in very narrowly defined situations. The lengthy pre-seizure surveillance in Coolidge, as well as the forced removal of the suspect's wife from her house and the stationing of police guards at the dwelling, established lack of need for immediate action by police. 34 473 F.2d at 1065 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court holds that it was not necessary for the police to obtain a warrant to seize the Honda in this case.  35