Opinion ID: 443985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 8 As an initial matter, we recognize that the district court's factual conclusions are not to be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Nor may we set aside fact findings as clearly erroneous merely because we might give the evidence a different construction. Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.1977). We have no quarrel with the factual findings, as such, of the district court. Thus, the remaining question on appeal is whether the legal conclusion drawn from the facts is correct. Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Company, 616 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014, 101 S.Ct. 573, 66 L.Ed.2d 473 (1980). In the circumstances of this case, we think it is not. 9 If it Talks Like a Duck ... 10 Under the Act, fiduciary is defined as follows: 11 Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.... 12 29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A). It is clear that Congress intended the definition of fiduciary under ERISA to be broadly construed. As was pointed out in the legislative history, the definition includes persons who have authority and responsibility with respect to the matter in question, regardless of their formal title. House Conference Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Congress, 1974 U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News 4639, 5038, 5103. Thus, fiduciary should be defined not only by reference to particular titles, such as trustee, but also by considering the authority which a particular person has or exercises over an employee benefit plan. See e.g., Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F.Supp. 1350, 1374-75 (D.Md.1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, 667 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.1982). 13 We believe that Wanda Jo exercised discretionary authority respecting the management of the plan and disposition of its assets. She repeatedly signed documents which identified her as a trustee or administrator of the plan. 4 Specifically, the 1979 transfer of land held by the Plan is a clear exercise of discretionary authority in the disposition of Plan assets. We thus disagree with the district court's conclusion that in making this transfer, Wanda Jo acted only as an agent for her husband. No evidence in the record supports such a conclusion. 5 Rather, it is apparent that, in signing documents in transferring Plan assets, Wanda Jo performed fiduciary duties as defined in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1002(21). 14 ... and Walks Like a Duck ... 15 The district court concluded that whether or not Wanda Jo was given the title trustee is not dispositive in determining fiduciary status under ERISA. We agree with this statement, insofar as it indicates that a formal appointment as a trustee is not a prerequisite to fiduciary liability under the Act. See, e.g., House Conf. Report, supra, at 5103. However, while the designation of a person as a trustee or plan administrator is not dispositive, it is certainly not irrelevant. One of the important objectives of ERISA is to provide for disclosure to plan participants and beneficiaries of information about the plan, especially the identities of those with fiduciary responsibility for the operation of the plan. See, ERISA Sec. 2(a) and (b), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1001(a) and (b). The courts and commentators agree that certain positions, such as trustee or plan administrator, inherently require fiduciary responsibilities. See, e.g., Robbins v. First American Bank of Virginia, 514 F.Supp. 1183, 1189 (N.D.Ill.1981); Little & Traikill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA; a Narrow Path to Tread, 30 Vand.L.Rev. 1, 6 (1977). Likewise, the Department of Labor has indicated that some offices of an employee benefit plan, such as trustee or plan administrator, by their very nature require those who hold them to perform fiduciary functions as described in the Act. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2509.75-8 at D-3 (1982). 16 In the present case, Wanda Jo Mercer was clearly represented as being a trustee of the Plan. A number of documents prepared over a five-year period identified Wanda Jo as a Plan trustee. Additionally, instead of having any alleged errors in these documents corrected, Wanda Jo repeatedly took actions in an official capacity as trustee. Under these facts, it would be untenable to conclude other than that Wanda Jo was a trustee with fiduciary duties to the Plan. 17 ... It is a Duck 18 We thus hold that a person who is repeatedly referred to as a trustee of an employee benefit plan, and who signs documents and takes actions regarding the Plan in an official capacity, is, as a matter of law, a fiduciary of the Plan under ERISA, with all appurtenant duties and responsibilities. This holding is in keeping with the congressional intent that those with fiduciary duties be clearly identified, and that the term fiduciary not be strictly construed. 19 As the court below held that Wanda Jo Mercer was not a fiduciary under ERISA, it made no findings regarding any liability she might have under the Act. The standards regarding fiduciary conduct are set forth in Part 4 of the Title I of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1101-1114. Under the Act, Wanda Jo may be liable for actions taken in her own right, as well as for breaches of duty committed by her co-fiduciary, Tommy Mercer. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1105 (1982). We therefore remand this action for determination of Wanda Jo Mercer's liability as a fiduciary under ERISA. 20 REVERSED AND REMANDED.