Opinion ID: 163473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ex Post Facto Clause Violation

Text: 23 Mr. Heredia-Cruz argues that his sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Specifically, he believes the trial court violated the constitution by enhancing his base offense level for a 1987 alien smuggling conviction that was not considered an aggravated felony at the time. Mr. Heredia-Cruz's argument is foreclosed by United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996) and United States v. Aranda-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir.1996). 24 Effective November 1, 1997, the Sentencing Commission amended USSG § 2L1.2(b) by deleting the definition of aggravated felony and directing the user to the definition at § 1101(a)(43). USSG App. C, Amend. 562 at 411-13 (1997). That section defines aggravated felony to include offenses related to alien smuggling. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N). Mr. Heredia-Cruz believes that the sentencing court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by treating his 1987 conviction, which predated the effective date of the guideline amendment, as an aggravated felony. 25 The Ex Post Facto Clause is intended to restrain legislatures and courts from arbitrary and vindictive action and to prevent prosecutions and punishment without fair warning. United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 96 (10th Cir. 1994). In order for a violation of the Clause to occur, a law must apply to `events occurring before its enactment' and must `disadvantage the offender affected by it.' United States v. Aranda-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Gerber, 24 F.3d at 96). This Circuit has held that the sentencing enhancement in § 2L1.2 does not unconstitutionally punish a defendant for a felony conviction that occurred before enactment § 2L1.2 or its relevant amendments because the defendant is being punished for the illegal re-entry, not the underlying aggravated felony. Aranda-Hernandez, 95 F.3d at 983; Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d at 1001. Though Mr. Heredia-Cruz was disadvantaged by the aggravated felony enhancement, the relevant event triggering the enhancement was his unlawful presence in the United States on April, 5, 2000, not his 1987 conviction for alien smuggling. At the time of his unlawful presence in the United States, the Sentencing Guidelines unambiguously contemplated that convictions for crimes related to alien smuggling would be treated as an aggravated felony, regardless of the date of conviction. As such, the trial court did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying the aggravated felony enhancement in this case. 26 Mr. Heredia-Cruz contends that these decisions are not controlling because they predate the 1996 statutory amendment and the 1997 guideline amendment that expanded the term aggravated felony to include offenses relating to alien smuggling. Our holdings in Aranda-Hernandez and Cabrera-Sosa are not limited to specific Congressional or Sentencing Commission amendments. Instead, the holdings establish a framework for evaluating all ex post facto challenges under § 2L1.2. Thus, Aranda-Hernandez and Cabrera-Sosa are controlling and compel us to reject his argument. 27 Mr. Heredia-Cruz admits that he cannot successfully challenge his conviction or sentence by resort[ing] to the Ex Post Facto Clause  in light of this precedent, but believes the facts warrant a downward departure. As noted above, the trial court exercised its discretion to deny Mr. Heredia-Cruz's motion for a downward departure on these grounds and we lack jurisdiction to review that decision. Mr. Heredia-Cruz further argues that these facts justify the application of the rule of lenity. The Sentencing Commission's decision to define aggravated felony by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), however, makes clear that it intended felony convictions for alien smuggling to be subject to the enhancement and, therefore, the rule of lenity has no application in this case. United States v. Castro-Rocha, 323 F.3d 846, 851-52 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that rule of lenity did not apply because reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) made clear that 8-level enhancement under the 2001 version of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) applied to state felony convictions for simple possession).