Opinion ID: 2508088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jason Nault's presence in the courtroom

Text: Mainor and Harris contend that the district court improperly denied their motion in limine seeking to exclude Jason's presence during trial because Jason's presence created unfair prejudice. [41] Mainor and Harris contend that Jason's presence was unhelpful to the jury's determination of the facts and was intended solely to generate tremendous sympathy for Jason and his parents and undermine Mainor and Harris's right to a fair trial. [42] This court has never addressed whether the prejudicial effect of the jury venire's view of the real party in interest outweighs the real party in interest's right to be present at the proceedings. Other courts have reviewed this issue for an abuse of discretion. [43] The few jurisdictions that have reviewed this issue are divided on the issue of whether a plaintiff has the right to be present at his own trial. In most of the cases that have considered the issue, the trial was bifurcated into liability and damages phases, and the appellate courts concluded that the plaintiff could properly be excluded from the liability phase if his condition was so sympathetic that the other party's right to a fair trial would have been unfairly prejudiced. [44] In Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, A Division of American Home Products Corporation, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the exclusion of a plaintiff who could comprehend and aid counsel based merely on his or her physical appearance violated federal due process, but that the exclusion from the liability phase of a litigant unable to comprehend trial proceedings or aid counsel changed the focus from the litigant's physical and mental condition to the effect of such condition on the jury. [45] The Sixth Circuit set forth a two-part test to determine whether a plaintiff should be excluded from his own trial. First, the party seeking exclusion must show that the other party's presence would be so prejudicial that it would prevent the jury from performing its duty. [46] Second, if the court determines that the party's presence would be prejudicial, the court must determine whether the party can understand the proceedings and assist counsel. [47] The Sixth Circuit determined that, [i]f the court in its discretion determines that the party's presence would, indeed, be prejudicial, the court may bifurcate the proceedings into separate trials on liability and damages, excluding the litigant from the liability phase. [48] The court further noted that exclusion of a party from the damages portion of the proceedings would be improper because, while liability should not be premised on the severity of the injuries, damages certainly should be. [49] The court also noted, however, that if the injury is not due to the defendant's alleged conduct, there is no basis for exclusion. [50] In Morley v. Superior Court of Arizona, Etc ., the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by severing the liability and damages phases of a personal injury action in which the injured party was in a permanent vegetative state because the two issues were separable and because severance would avoid undue prejudice where the injured party was excluded from the liability phase but not the damages phase. [51] The Arizona court determined that a plaintiff could properly be excluded from the liability phase if his injuries rendered him incapable of contributing to or understanding the proceedings and if the plaintiff was adequately represented by counsel. [52] The court concluded that exclusion from the liability phase would be necessary if the plaintiff's mere presence would deny the defendant's right to an unbiased jury, but that [t]he plaintiff should be allowed to prove damages by the most direct evidence availablethe plaintiff's own physical condition. [53] The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, has held that an injured plaintiff who was rendered incapable of understanding the legal proceedings or assisting counsel had the right to be present at both the liability and damages phases under the Indiana Constitution. [54] The court stated that: After examining the historical development of the right to trial by jury and, in particular, its importance to the founders of this country, we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that the state constitutional right of trial by jury includes the ancillary right to be present in the courtroom during both the liability and damage phase of trial. This is so because without the right to be present, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. [55] The record reflects that the Naults sought to have Jason present during jury selection and closing arguments. Mainor and Harris sought to exclude Jason's presence entirely. At a hearing on Mainor and Harris's motion in limine, the district court ruled that Jason would be allowed to be present during jury selection but not during closing arguments. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Jason to be present during the jury selection. Article 1, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution provides, in relevant part, that [t]he right of trial by Jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever. Both Article 1, Section 8(5) of the Nevada Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibit deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A party's right to be present at his trial is not absolute but rather must be balanced against the opposing party's right to an impartial jury. Where the party's presence might elicit so much sympathy from the jury that the jury would likely disregard its duties as instructed and find for the party based on sympathy alone, the opposing party's right to a fair tribunal would be violated. We generally approve and adopt with one modification the approach set forth in Helminski because it properly balances the parties' respective rights. [56] We believe that a party should be permitted to attend his or her trial, or every segment of it if the trial is bifurcated, even though that attendance is very limited. After a hearing on the matter, the district court in this case concluded that Jason had a right to be present during jury selection, but his presence during closing arguments would only serve to engender sympathy with the jury. The district court did not abuse its discretion. First, Jason was only present for approximately ten minutes during one and one-half days of jury selection. Second, Mainor and Harris did not seek to bifurcate the trial under the Helminski test, and the issues were so intertwined that it would have been nearly impossible to bifurcate the trial. Moreover, Mainor and Harris did not cause Jason's condition, and, arguably, Jason's involuntary exclusion would have been improper because his physical condition was not related to Mainor and Harris's conduct, and the jury could appreciate that fact. [57] Third, the Naults played a videotape, without objection, of a day in Jason's life that depicted Jason shortly after the injury, when his condition was much worse. Because the videotape was likely to engender far more sympathy than seeing Jason in his current condition, Mainor and Harris waived any claims of prejudice by failing to object to the videotape. [58] Fourth, the opportunity to see Jason was relevant to Mainor and Harris's claim that Jason was likely to die soon. The difference between Jason's condition just after the incident and his current condition was relevant to show that Jason's condition had improved and that he could live much longer than initially expected. Finally, jury sympathy alone is insufficient to constitute prejudice; there must exist a likelihood that the jury will disregard its duty to follow the law as instructed and will find for the injured party solely because of his injury. [59]