Opinion ID: 2778011
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ICA Opinion

Text: On November 29, 2013, the ICA issued its published opinion. State v. Alangcas, 131 Hawaiʻi 312, 318 P.3d 602 (App. 2013). In determining whether a statute is overbroad, the ICA concluded it must “consider whether it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally-protected conduct.” Id. at 316, 318 P.3d at 606. The ICA considered Alangcas’ argument that HRS § 707756 could be violated by a person who innocently uses an - 11 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER electronic device to communicate with a person under eighteen, agrees to meet that person, and travels to the agreed meeting place at the agreed time, all without a criminal intent. The ICA held that this argument “ignores the language in subsection (b) of the statute that requires that these otherwise ‘innocent’ acts be done with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of certain, specified, felonies.”12 Id. at 317, 318 P.3d at 607. Thus, the ICA concluded that “[w]hen the statute is read as a whole, it is clear that only criminal conduct is proscribed.” Id. In response to Alangcas’ argument that HRS § 707-756 is overbroad because it requires criminal intent for only the second element, the ICA noted that “because the statute requires all three paragraphs of the statute to be read together, only behavior done with the requisite criminal intent is proscribed, 12 In this passage and others in its opinion, the ICA appears to interpret the felonious intent set forth in subsection (b) of the statute to apply to all of the conduct elements. See also id. at 318, 318 P.3d at 608 (“[T]he statute plainly criminalizes conduct . . . that is coupled with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony.”). Yet, the ICA Opinion also seems to suggest a contrary interpretation— that the felonious intent of HRS § 707-756 only applies to the agreement element and not to the communication and traveling elements. The ICA Opinion states that the offense “sufficiently identifies the mens rea for each of the acts which together constitute the criminal offense.” Id. at 317, 318 P.3d at 607; see also id. at 326, 318 P.3d 616 (“A plain reading of the statute makes clear that HRS § 707–756 only attaches culpability when a defendant intentionally or knowingly communicates with a minor, agrees to meet the minor with the intent to promote or facilitate a felony, and then intentionally or knowingly travels to the agreed upon place at the agreed upon time.”). - 12 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER i.e., conduct that occurs with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony.”13 Id. The ICA concluded that “[s]uch a prohibition does not broadly sweep in innocent electronic communications with minors.” Id. The ICA next addressed Alangcas’ vagueness challenge. Id. at 320, 318 P.3d at 610. The ICA held that the reference in HRS § 846E-1 to convictions in other jurisdictions was “merely redundant” and the “criminal prohibition is clear.” Id. at 321, 318 P.3d at 611. The ICA determined that the reference in HRS § 846E-1 to “comparable” offences was not vague because a “person of ordinary intelligence can easily understand that a comparable offense is an equivalent one.” Id. However, the ICA found that the word “exceeds,” as used in the Catch-all Clauses of HRS § 846E-1, was unconstitutionally vague because the statute and its legislative history provided no guidance for determining whether an offense exceeded the enumerated ones. Id. at 325, 318 P.3d at 615. Nonetheless, the ICA concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to Alangcas because “before a law may be held to be unduly vague, in violation of due process, it must be demonstrated that the law is impermissibly vague in all its applications.” Id. The ICA held that Alangcas engaged 13 See supra note 12. - 13 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER in conduct that was clearly proscribed by the statute and that he could not “complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Id. In response to Alangcas’ argument that the word “communicates” in the statute is undefined and fails to distinguish between “conduct that is calculated to harm and that which is essentially innocent,” the ICA held that “when read in conjunction with the rest of the statute, the meaning [of ‘communicates’] gains even greater clarity” and provides “much less leeway” to police in their enforcement of the statute and gave the “general public . . . a much better understanding of just what conduct is prohibited.” Id. at 326, 318 P.3d at 616. The ICA concluded that HRS § 707-756 “is not unconstitutionally overbroad and/or vague as applied to Alangcas, and the Circuit Court did not err in denying Alangcas’ motion to dismiss the indictment on that basis.” Id. Lastly, the ICA rejected Alangcas’ argument that HRS § 707-756 violated the dormant commerce clause, concluding that it “does not concern interstate commerce, and, therefore, scrutiny under the Commerce Clause is not appropriate.” Id. at 328, 318 P.3d at 618. On January 14, 2014, the ICA issued its judgment on appeal affirming the circuit court’s orders. - 14 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER