Opinion ID: 618806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Apology Letter

Text: This court reviews the admission of the apology letter for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1156. The admission of 404(b) evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. See United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1316 (10th Cir. 2009). “A harmless error is one that does not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial; nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” Id. (quotation omitted). Notwithstanding the deference owed to district court evidentiary rulings, after reviewing the record this court concludes the district court abused its discretion in admitting Vaughan’s apology letter. Nonetheless, in light of the overwhelming evidence tending to establish Vaughan’s guilt, the evidentiary error was harmless. Under the third prong of the Huddleston test, even relevant evidence submitted for a proper 404(b) purpose should not be admitted if it fails the Rule 403 balancing test. Mares, 441 F.3d at 1159. Rule 403 provides: “The court may -12- exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” During the bench conference on Vaughan’s objections to the admission of the apology letter, the parties disagreed over to whom the letter was addressed. The government proffered that the letter was addressed to the Grand Junction tellers and to all other tellers who worked at banks Vaughan admitted robbing. Vaughan argued the letter was addressed to tellers generally, including those involved in bank robberies the district court ruled were inadmissible under Rule 404(b). The district court allowed the apology letter to be admitted, but instructed the government not to go any further than saying the letter was written to “the tellers.” The apology letter, like the other evidence of the Grand Junction robbery, should have been admissible only to show the identity of the Salina robber through a modus operandi theory. Vaughan had confessed to the Grand Junction robbery, and the government presented substantial testimony, including accounts from three modus operandi witnesses, a Grand Junction police officer, and an FBI Agent, which developed similarities between the two robberies. The apology letter developed no such similarities. Its probative value was therefore minimal. The dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, on the other hand, were substantial because of the possibility jurors would infer -13- the letter constituted a confession to the Salina robbery. Because the apology letter does not survive the Rule 403 balancing test under the third prong of the Huddleston test, it should not have been admitted. Although the admission of the apology letter was error, this court has no grave doubt as to whether its admission had a substantial effect on the outcome of the trial. See Parker, 553 F.3d at 1316. The evidence presented against Vaughan at trial was overwhelming. It included four eyewitnesses who gave consistent descriptions of the Salina robber, one of whom identified Vaughan out of a photo lineup and at trial. Further, the admissible modus operandi evidence was highly persuasive as to the identity of the Salina robber. Even if the letter had not been admitted, the outcome likely would have been the same. Reversal on the basis of the admission of the apology letter is therefore inappropriate.