Opinion ID: 2296081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ko's constitutional contentions.

Text: Before addressing the more difficult statutory issues which Ko has presented to us, I turn briefly to his constitutional arguments. I conclude, and my colleagues agree, that Ko has not preserved these contentions for appeal and that, in any event, they are lacking in merit. Ko did not raise any constitutional issue in the trial court, and the decision whether to entertain his constitutional arguments on appeal is entirely discretionary. In re S.K., 564 A.2d 1382, 1384 n. 2 (D.C.1989) (per curiam) (citations omitted). This court ordinarily declines to consider constitutional contentions which are being presented for the first time on appeal unless the alleged constitutional shortcoming in the proceedings was so plain that the judge should have ruled on it notwithstanding the litigant's failure to raise it. Id. There was no such obvious constitutional defect here. We have stated that a qualified interpreter must be neutral and detached. Barrera v. United States, 599 A.2d 1119, 1130-31 n. 13 (D.C.1991). As the Supreme Court of New Jersey explained in State in the Interest of R.R. Jr., 79 N.J. 97, 398 A.2d 76, 86 (1979), an interpreter should be an individual who has no interest in the outcome of the case. This is so because the danger that a primary witness' message will be distorted through interpretation is compounded when the interpreter is biased one way or the other. Notwithstanding the need to assure impartiality, however, the courts have declined to adopt a per se rule disqualifying an employee or servant of the government from interpreting for the defendant. See, e.g., Chee v. United States, 449 F.2d 747, 748 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Holton, 227 F.2d 886, 897 (7th Cir.1955); Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Disqualification, for Bias, of One Offered as Interpreter of Testimony, 6 A.L.R.4th 158, 175-77 (1981 & Supp.1996); Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Right of Accused to Have Evidence or Court Proceedings Interpreted, Because Accused or Other Participant in Proceeding Is Not Proficient in the Language Used, 32 A.L.R. 5th 149, 451-62 (1995 & Supp.1996). Decisions respecting the appointment of interpreters are confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge. In re Q.L.J., 458 A.2d 30, 31-32 (D.C.1982) (per curiam). That discretion has been held to extend to the determination whether a law enforcement officer may be designated as the defendant's interpreter. See, e.g., State v. Cimini, 53 Wash. 268, 101 P. 891 (1909); La Count v. State, 237 Ga. 181, 227 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046, 97 S.Ct. 753, 50 L.Ed.2d 761 (1977); State v. Coria, 39 Or. App. 507, 592 P.2d 1057, 1059, review denied, 286 Or. 449 (1979). [18] If a pernicious incentive to assist the prosecution cannot be automatically attributed even to a police officer, then the fact that interpreters in this case were paid by the United States Attorney's office, standing alone, did not render them constitutionally ineligible. Accordingly, there was no violation of Ko's constitutional rights, either under the doctrine of separation of powers or under the Due Process Clause.