Opinion ID: 456271
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nevada's Open Meeting Law

Text: Nevada's open meeting law requires that 9 [e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute, all meetings of public bodies shall be open and public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of these bodies. 10 NRS Sec. 241.020(1). 11 Nevada accepts the familiar principle that [w]hen presented with a question of statutory interpretation, the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor and, if the statute under consideration is clear on its face, a court cannot go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, it can be construed 'in line with what reason and public policy would indicate the legislature intended....' 'A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.'  Robert E. v. Justice Court of Reno Township, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (Nev.1983). 12 Nevada's open meeting law includes no express exception for meetings between an agency and its counsel. Its law requires public meetings except as otherwise specifically provided by statute. Because this proviso is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, 5 the Nevada measure is ambiguous. As a result, we turn to extrinsic aids to ascertain legislative intent. 6 13 (1) Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Construction 14 In support of his contention that the legislature did not intend to leave latitude in the law for judicial recognition of an attorney-client exception, the Attorney General directs our attention to unadopted proposals, administrative construction, and alleged legislative acquiescence. Each is unpersuasive. 15 To begin with, the Attorney General suggests that the legislature's rejection of proposed amendments to the open meeting law which would have recognized an explicit statutory exemption for meetings between a public agency and its counsel permits us to infer that the legislature did not intend to permit such an exception. In this case, however, we are unable to draw such an inference. 16 We recognize that it is well-settled that the rejection of amendments offered in the course of enactment is often probative in ascertaining legislative intent. 2A Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction Sec. 48.18; Willard & MacDonald, The Effect of an Unsuccessful Attempt to Amend a Statute, 44 Cornell L.Q. 336, 341 (1958). At the same time, caution must be exercised in using the rejection by a legislature of proposed amendments as an aid in interpreting measures actually adopted. 2A Sands, Sutherland of Statutory Construction Sec. 48.18. In particular, care must be taken to distinguish unsuccessful attempts to amend proposed legislation during the process of enactment from unsuccessful attempts to amend a measure passed by a previous legislative session. Whatever aid the former may furnish in ascertaining intent, [a]ction on a proposed amendment is not a significant aid to interpretation of an act that was passed years before. Id. at 341; Willard & MacDonald, 44 Cornell L.Q. at 339. 17 Nevada's open meeting law was initially adopted in 1960; the unadopted amendments to which appellant refers were considered in 1977. Viewed as attempts to amend previously enacted legislation, these unadopted proposals are entitled to little weight. Yet even The Attorney General contends, however, that the 1977 amendments were a comprehensive revision, which justifies our treating unadopted proposals during the 1977 legislative session as we would amendments rejected during the initial session of enactment. Even if that is so, we are still not convinced that we may infer from the failure of these proposed amendments a clear and unambiguous legislative intent to bar judicial recognition of an implied exception permitting closed meetings between a public agency and counsel. 18 Although the legislature rejected amendments which would have permitted closed meetings, the 1977 amendments are unilluminated by committee or conference reports that ordinarily shed light on legislative intent. Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 306, 53 S.Ct. 350, 355, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (report makes clear that Congress rejected proposal to which it was hostile, United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 552, 41 S.Ct. 569, 570, 65 L.Ed. 1084 (1921) (Brandeis, J.) (reason for rejection of proposed amendment plain from statement of House conferees). Without such material, we feel constrained to agree with the California Court of Appeal's observation in construing rejected amendments to California's open meeting provision: [t]he light shed by such unadopted proposals is too dim to pierce statutory obscurities. Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 492. 19 Appellant's reliance upon administrative construction is also misplaced. First, although Nevada's Attorney General may have interpreted the statute as requiring public meetings between an agency and its counsel, opinions of the Attorney General are not binding upon the courts. Weston v. County of Lincoln, 98 Nev. 183, 643 P.2d 1227, 1228 (1982); Cannon v. Taylor, 88 Nev. 89, 493 P.2d 1313, 1314 (1972). Second, it is not accurate to say, as the Attorney General does, that the legislature has ma[de] the Attorney General responsible for the administration and interpretation of Nevada's Open Meeting Law. The statute simply vests the Attorney General with investigative and prosecutorial authority; whether the act has, in fact, been violated remains a determination for the courts. See NRS Secs. 241.037(1), 241.040(4). Accordingly, the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute is not entitled to the sort of deference generally accorded an administrative agency's interpretation of its own operating legislation or regulations. See Folio v. Briggs, 656 P.2d 842, 844 (Nev.1983). 7 20 The Attorney General's argument based on legislative acquiescence is no more convincing. He contends that the failure of the legislature expressly to overrule his interpretation of the statute, after having been apprised of it, is tantamount to implicit approval. As previously noted, however, the Attorney General's opinions are non-binding. Weston, supra; Cannon, supra. As a result, we cannot infer that the legislature acquiesced by failing to address a construction which, under Nevada law, need not be followed by the courts. 21 (2) Open Meetings and the Attorney-Client Privilege 22 In implying an exception to the literal dictates of the open meeting law for meetings between an agency and its counsel, the district court principally relied upon two supports. The first was a Nevada Supreme Court decision refusing, in a related context, literally to construe the law's statute's clause limiting exceptions to those otherwise specifically provided. The second was the time-honored tradition of attorney-client confidentiality. On the second ground, we affirm. 8 23 While it is true that Nevada recognizes an evidentiary attorney-client privilege which is testimonial in nature, NRS Secs. 49.015-.115, it does not follow, as the Attorney General insists, that Nevada law protects attorney-client communications only from testimonial compulsion. 9 Although the attorney-client privilege statute standing by itself is purely testimonial, when it is construed along with the Open Meeting Law its scope is ambiguous. 10 We may therefore interpret the privilege statute  'in line with what reason and public policy would indicate the legislature intended.'  Robert E., 664 P.2d at 959. As the district court observed, the rule of evidence precluding unauthorized disclosure is simply a corollary of the basic principle of attorney-client confidentiality long-recognized at common law. 11 24 Implicit in the protection against testimonial compulsion is recognition of the importance of attorney-client confidentiality. As the Supreme Court observed nearly a century ago, [legal] assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or apprehension of disclosure. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470, 9 S.Ct. 125, 127, 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888); accord Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 101 S.Ct. at 682. The Nevada cases cited by the Attorney General similarly recognize that the state's evidentiary privilege proceeds from, and is predicated upon, the need for confidentiality: Hence, for the benefit and protection of the client, the law places the seal of secrecy upon all communications made to the attorney in the course of his professional employment.... Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 345, 348 (1866). As the California Court of Appeal observed in construing California's open meeting provision, 25 [p]laintiff's do not dispute the availability of the lawyer-client privilege to public officials and their attorneys. They view it as a barrier to testimonial compulsion, not a procedural rule for the conduct of public affairs. The view is too narrow. The privilege against disclosure is essentially a means for achieving a policy objective of the law. The objective is to enhance the value which society places upon legal representation by assuring the client full disclosure to the attorney unfettered by fear that others will be informed. The privilege serves a policy assuring private consultation. If client and counsel must confer in public view and hearing, both privilege and policy are stripped of value. 26 Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 489; accord Minneapolis Star, 251 N.W.2d at 624-25. But see Laman, supra; Neu, supra. 27 In our view, Nevada's statutory rule against testimonial compulsion is simply an evidentiary manifestation of a broader, more basic principle. To construe the privilege purely as an evidentiary rule not only emasculates that rule; it ignores the reason for the rule itself. 28 Absent a supervening interpretation from the Nevada state courts, 12 we therefore conclude that Nevada's Open Meeting Law, construed against the background of Nevada's attorney-client privilege, contains an implied exception for meetings between public bodies and their counsel, subject to the limitations specified by the district court. 29 AFFIRMED.