Opinion ID: 1928027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury trial demand

Text: This case presents an issue of first impression in this court, and no other jurisdiction, so far as we know, has dealt with this issue in precisely this context; i.e., whether an attorney who has no agreement with his client concerning the amount of the fee to be paid, who sues the client to recover fees under a quantum meruit theory, is entitled to a jury trial. We hold that where it is undisputed that the client owes the attorney some fee for his legal representation, but there is no agreement concerning how the amount will be determined and the attorney has not informed the client of the basis of his fee, the trial court, not the jury, determines the amount of fee to be paid. In rejecting Ginberg's jury demand, the trial court relied on this court's holding in Kudon, supra, 547 A.2d at 980. In Kudon, the lessee of postal meters sued the lessor alleging tortious interference with contractual relations with the United States Postal Service. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the lessor who then sought an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the lease agreement. The lessee's request for a jury trial on that issue was denied, the trial court determined the amount of the fee to be awarded, and the lessee appealed. In affirming the trial court's rejection of the jury trial demand in Kudon, we reviewed the origin and development of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, relying on an at law and in equity distinction. We observed that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to trial by jury in suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars: [w]hile historically the [Seventh] [A]mendment was intended to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1008, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), the guarantees afforded have been interpreted to encompass . . . not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered. . . . Id. (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830)). Kudon, supra, 547 A.2d at 978. Additionally, we observed that the right to a jury trial depends on the nature of the question at issue rather than the character of the overall action. Id. (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538, 90 S.Ct. 733, 738, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970)). Where the disputed issue is legal in nature, the right to a jury trial attaches; where, however, the issue is equitable in nature, there is no constitutional right to a jury trial. See Ross, supra, 396 U.S. at 538, 90 S.Ct. at 738. In analyzing whether the controversy was at law or in equity, the Kudon court applied the three factors the Supreme Court has said should be considered in determining whether an action is legal or equitable in nature: (1) the custom before the merger of law and equity; (2) the nature of the remedy being sought; and (3) the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Kudon, supra, 547 A.2d at 978 (citing Ross, supra, 396 U.S. at 538, 90 S.Ct. at 738). First, the court concluded that an examination of the pre-merger custom indicated that traditionally, the court, not the jury, made a determination of attorneys' fees and costs. Id. at 979 (citing A.G. Becker-Kipnis & Co. v. Letterman Commodities, Inc., 553 F.Supp. 118, 123 (N.D.Ill.1982); Redshaw Credit Corp. v. Diamond, 686 F.Supp. 674 (E.D.Tenn.1988)). Second, the fact that a claim for attorneys' fees can be characterized as one for monetary damages does not compel its classification as a legal remedy. Id. (citations omitted). Third, given the court's presumed expertise . . . in matters of attorney fees, . . . [the] time and expense which would be required to educate lay jurors on those matters about which the court is presumed an expert and [] the unacceptable expense and delay of bifurcating trials in order to separate issues of liability from lawyer skills and preparedness, . . . we believe that the question of what constitutes a reasonable attorneys' fee . . . is one better left for the court. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Redshaw, supra, 686 F.Supp. at 677 (although not totally incapable of jury determination, it is better for the court to determine what comprises a reasonable attorneys' fee). In this case there is no at law factual dispute. Tauber agrees that he owes Ginberg a fee, and Ginberg concedes there was no agreement, formal or otherwise, concerning how the amount of fees would be determined. [6] In short, all that remained to be determined at trial was the amount of the fee. And, as we said in Kudon, that determination is one which sounds in equity rather than law. See Kudon, supra, 547 A.2d at 979. Therefore, we conclude, as the trial court did, that under Kudon the attorney fee dispute in this case is one that is better left for the court to decide, not the jury. Id. Ginberg challenges the reliance on Kudon on three grounds: (1) the post-judgment award of attorneys' fees to a litigant who prevailed on the merits in Kudon was essentially an equitable cleaning-up of the underlying claim; (2) Kudon 's holding is tied to the facts of that case, and therefore, distinguishable from this case; and (3) Kudon is not a general declaration of principle that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is unavailable where the claim for attorneys' fees is the issue itself, rather than ancillary to the underlying dispute, to be determined after resolution of the substantive issues. We disagree. In Kudon, the court's analysis focused on defining the circumstances where the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment attaches. Central to that holding was the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial does not apply where the issue is: What is a reasonable attorneys' fee? Id. at 978-79. That conclusion is not dependent upon the fee claim being ancillary to the underlying contract dispute. Therefore, we see no basis for limiting the holding in Kudon to attorney fee determinations that are closely related or intertwined with some other dispute. Ginberg also contends that Maddox v. Jinkens, 66 U.S.App.D.C. 362, 88 F.2d 744 (1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 699, 57 S.Ct. 929, 81 L.Ed. 1354 (1937), Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223, 83 S.Ct. 609, 611, 9 L.Ed.2d 691 (1963), and cases addressing the issue of attorneys' fees in the divorce [7] and common fund [8] context, require us to hold that this attorney fee dispute sounds in law rather than in equity. The cases relied upon by Ginberg, however, are distinguishable because each involved the resolution of what were clearly at law disputes based on a contractual agreement for attorneys' fees where there were unresolved issues of fact. See, e.g., Maddox, supra, 66 U.S.App.D.C. at 364, 88 F.2d at 746; Simler, supra, 372 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. at 611. The issue in those cases, which is a classic at law determination, was whether the parties had reached agreement concerning the payment of fees, i.e., was there a contract requiring the payment of a fee to the attorney? In this case, however, there was no dispute that the attorney was owed a fee and there was no dispute that the parties had reached no agreement concerning how the amount of the fee would be determined. The only issue in this case was what was a reasonable fee under the circumstances. In Maddox, an attorney sued his client claiming she had agreed to pay him a retainer of $150, plus additional fees at specified rates. The attorney claimed he had performed $350 of additional services at those rates. The client acknowledged she was obligated to pay the $150 retainer, but denied that she had agreed to pay the additional amounts. Thus, a clear at law factual dispute was presented: did the client agree to pay the additional sums? The matter was referred to a master who found for the client, and the trial court affirmed that finding. The court of appeals also affirmed, on grounds not relevant here, but observed, in dictum, in language that Ginberg relies upon, that the attorney was entitled to sue at law for the amount he claimed to be due him . . . upon the contract for his services and he would be entitled to try such a case to the jury. Maddox, supra, 66 U.S.App.D.C. at 364, 88 F.2d at 746. Even assuming that the Maddox dictum controls, it stands for the proposition that, in resolving factual issues regarding the existence of a contract, the parties are entitled to a jury trial. See id. Thus, the dispute in Maddox was like thousands of other garden-variety contract disputes where the intent of the parties must be determined by the fact-finder in an at law proceeding. See, e.g., Rivers & Bryan, Inc. v. HBE Corp., 628 A.2d 631, 635 (D.C.1993); Fabrica Italiana Lavorazione Materie Organiche, S.A.S. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 684 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir.1982). Unlike the parties in Maddox, however, who disagreed concerning the nature of the agreement between them, Ginberg concedes there was no agreement; thus, there is nothing for a jury to resolve. The only question remaining is the amount of Ginberg's fee, and as we observed earlier, that determination is one better left to the trial court to resolve. Kudon, supra, 547 A.2d at 979; see also Redshaw, supra, 686 F.Supp. at 677. We also reject Ginberg's reliance on Simler for much the same reason. The issue there was which of the two fee retainer contracts between the parties should govern the determination of the amount of the fee to which the attorney was entitled. Simler, supra, 372 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. at 611. The client relied on the contract that was first executed, which provided that the reasonableness of the fee was to be set by the trial court. On the other hand, the attorney relied on a subsequent contract specifying that he was entitled to receive fifty percent of the recovery, under certain circumstances, as his fee. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial because the dispute was a traditionally legal one and not an action in equity. Id. The actual amount of the fee to be paid was specified by the two contracts involved, and the only question to be resolved was which contract applied. That question turned on whether the attorney obtained the client's agreement to the second contract by duress. The determination of whether agreement to a contract was induced by duress is a traditional at law factual question for a jury to decide. Sind v. Pollin, 356 A.2d 653, 656 (D.C.1976). Thus, Simler does no more than hold that when there is a factual dispute concerning which attorneys' fee contract applies to a transaction, a party is entitled to have a jury resolve that at law factual question. See Simler, supra, 372 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. at 611. Finally, Redshaw, supra, 686 F.Supp. at 674, a case cited with approval by the Kudon court, is especially instructive. Redshaw received a favorable verdict in a contract action after a trial by jury and thereafter sought an award of attorneys' fees from the court pursuant to a provision in the same contract that the jury had found should be enforced in Redshaw's favor. The defense contended that, to obtain an award of attorneys' fees, Redshaw was obligated to present evidence to the jury concerning the amount of the fee expended, which Redshaw had failed to do. The court rejected that claim, noting the jury had performed its function by resolving the facts in the legal dispute between the parties. Id. at 676-77. In doing so, the jury, in effect, also resolved, in Redshaw's favor, the threshold question of whether Redshaw was entitled to receive attorneys' fees. The court then ruled that the determination of the amount of fees was for the court to make. Id. The Redshaw court thus concluded, as we have, that the question of whether the contract provides for the payment of a fee is an at law determination, which a party is entitled to have a jury resolve if there are facts in dispute. But the determination of the amount of the fee, unless the amount is fixed by the contract, is one for the court to determine. In sum, for the reasons stated, we hold: first, the question of whether the client has agreed to pay fees to the attorney for his or her services is ordinarily a question to be resolved at law; and, the manner in which such fees are calculated is also an at law question if there is a dispute on that point between the parties. The parties are entitled to have both questions resolved by a jury if they wish. [9] Second, if a jury has resolved those questions in favor of an attorneys' fee award, or if, as here, there is no agreement concerning how the amount of fees is to be calculated, the trial court, acting in equity, determines the amount of the fee. Thus, in this case, the trial court did not err when it denied Ginberg's request for a jury trial.