Opinion ID: 170713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Retaliation Claim Jurisdiction

Text: After it dismissed the discrimination claims, the district court concluded that it had no jurisdiction over Ms. Dossa's retaliation claim alone. Even though we have held that the discrimination claims were dismissed in error, thus removing the rationale for finding no jurisdiction over the retaliation claim, the question could arise on remand. Accordingly, we determine the court's jurisdiction over the retaliation claim. In finding a failure of jurisdiction, the district court reasoned that because the statute authorizing its jurisdiction over a federal employee's mixed case, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2), applies to discrimination cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), and because retaliation claims are covered by a different statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, the statutes did not confer jurisdiction over the retaliation claim. Upon examination of the relevant law, however, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction over the retaliation claim. The district court correctly noted that § 7703(b)(2) authorizes a federal employee to file suit under § 2000e-16(c) for discrimination referred to in § 2000e-16(a), based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. [3] Subsection (c) further states that an employee may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Pursuant to § 2000e-5, an employee shall not be reinstated if she was discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In turn, § 2000e-3(a) prohibits discrimination against an employee for opposing a discriminatory employment practice or because she made a charge of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Therefore, Title VII includes retaliation claims and § 7703(b)(2) authorizes judicial review of them. Other authorities support this view. Circuit courts, including this one, have addressed the merits of retaliation claims asserted by federal employees in similar contexts. In Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 180-81 (10th Cir.1993), after dismissing the plaintiff's discrimination claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, this court affirmed the district court's determination that he had not established a prima facie case of retaliation. The Williams court did not address specifically its jurisdiction over the retaliation claim, but regarded the plaintiff's retaliation claim as a discrimination claim under Title VII. Id. at 179. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's determination that a federal-employee plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliatory discharge. Doyal v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1526, 1533-35 (11th Cir.1985). The District of Columbia Circuit analyzed whether a federal-employee plaintiff had waived his Title VII claim and noted that retaliation under § 2000e-3(a) is explicitly characterized as a discrimination claim. Smith v. Horner, 846 F.2d 1521, 1524 (D.C.Cir. 1988). In addition, the applicable section of the Code of Federal Regulations states that the general policy of the United States Government prohibits employment discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap, or for opposing any practice made unlawful by [T]itle VII, the ADEA, the Equal Pay Act, or the Rehabilitation Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101(a), (b). Finally, nothing in the legislative history of the legislation authorizing judicial review of federal employees' discrimination claims indicates that Congress intended to exclude retaliation claims. Both the Senate and House Reports refer to discrimination generally, and the Senate Report specifies the anti-discrimination law as Title VII. S.Rep. No. 95-969, at 56-57 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 2723, 2778-79; H.R.Rep. No. 95-1717, at 140 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 2860, 2873-74 (Conf. Rep.). Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Dossa's retaliation claim. On remand, the district court should consider this claim, as well, granting Ms. Dossa a de novo civil action. Chandler, 425 U.S. at 863, 96 S.Ct. 1949.