Opinion ID: 700499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Text: 14 Under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance is prohibited from discriminating against any individual on the basis of handicap. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a). Federal financial assistance can be direct or indirect. Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1211 (9th Cir.1984) (citing Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984)). Herman's claim appears to raise a question of first impression, and she makes a novel argument in support of it. Neither party cites a case involving an attempted application of the Rehabilitation Act to a labor union, and our independent research has not revealed one. 15 Herman contends that the defendants are subject to the Rehabilitation Act because they receive federal financial assistance in one or more of the following ways: (1) union certification for exclusive bargaining representation granted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a federal agency; (2) federal assistance for union apprenticeship programs through the Department of Labor's regulation of those programs; (3) federal wage regulation protecting union wage rates under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. Sec. 276a; and (4) union access to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. After reviewing each of Herman's contentions, we have determined that none supports a finding of federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 16 First, we agree with the district court that NLRB certification of bargaining groups is in certain respects analogous to a federal licensing scheme. Although the NLRB certification at issue here is not formally denominated a license, we think that the analogy is a fair one. Generally a license is defined as: 17 The permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort.    Permission to do a particular thing, to exercise a certain privilege or to carry on a particular business or to pursue a certain occupation. 18 Black's Law Dictionary 829 (5th ed. 1979). 19 Through NLRB certification, a union procures the right to act as the exclusive bargaining representative for employees in the bargaining unit. As the exclusive bargaining representative, the union may also obtain monetary remuneration from those employees in the form of dues or fees. Thus, through the certification process, the union receives power, prestige, and some financial reward. In some respects, an NLRB certification is similar to a license, even though essentially it simply recognizes the status that a union earns by securing formal authorizations and votes from a sufficient number of workers. 20 Although we conclude that certification is similar to licensing and although some federal licenses may, in turn, provide benefits that are as valuable as direct financial assistance, we have previously held that receipt of a federal license is insufficient to invoke application of the Act. See Jacobson, 742 F.2d at 1212-13. In Jacobson, the plaintiff argued that Delta airlines indirectly benefitted from the licensing certification services provided by the Federal Aeronautics Administration (FAA) for pilots and aircraft. We rejected this argument because we could find no indication that Congress intended the receipt of a federal license to place an entity within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. We drew support for this conclusion from an extended analysis of the topic by the District of Columbia Circuit. See Gottfried v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144, 102 S.Ct. 1004, 71 L.Ed.2d 296 (1982). Applying our reasoning in Jacobson, we conclude that NLRB certification does not constitute federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 21 Second, we reject Herman's attempt to equate federal regulation with federal financial assistance. Herman first points to the federal regulation of apprentices. Under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 50, the Secretary of Labor is empowered to promote and regulate apprenticeship programs. Herman argues that as part of its constitution, the union has a goal to encourage an apprenticeship program and a higher standard of skill, and that in pursuit of this goal, the union participates in a joint training and apprenticeship committee in the Reno area. Because the apprenticeship program in which the union participates is regulated by the federal government, Herman argues that the union indirectly benefits in the form of a higher skilled and higher paid membership. 22 Federal regulation standing alone is not equivalent to federal financial assistance. 3 The federal government promulgates a multitude of regulations each year, and it is highly doubtful that Congress intended that every program or entity subject to one of these regulations would also be subject to the Rehabilitation Act. Although there may be cases in which a regulation sufficiently benefits an entity or program so as to amount to federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Act, the link between the benefits purportedly received by the union and the federal regulation here is simply too tenuous. 23 Similarly, we must reject Herman's Davis-Bacon Act argument. The Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. Sec. 276(a), requires that public works contractors pay prevailing wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor. Herman argues that because one of the union's goals is to secure adequate pay for its members, the Davis-Bacon Act assists it in this goal. However, wage regulation under the Davis-Bacon Act is a benefit to employees generally, and confers no direct or indirect benefit upon the union. Even if it did, the fact that one benefits from the provisions of a benign or protective federal statute does not make one a recipient of federal financial assistance. Otherwise, all persons who receive the minimum wage from private employers would be deemed to be receiving such assistance, as would most if not all corporations and other businesses. 24 Finally, we reject Herman's remaining argument, regarding federal mediation services. Herman asserts that access to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service confers an indirect federal benefit on the union. This claim is analogous to the assertion in Jacobson that commercial airlines receive indirect federal financial assistance in the form of access to weather services and air traffic control services. Id. at 1213. Like weather services and air traffic control, federal mediation services benefit the public generally by assisting the free flow of commerce. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 173. In Jacobson, our inquiry focused on whether commercial airlines benefitted from these services to a substantially greater degree than the general public. We found that commercial airlines did benefit more than the general public, but concluded that the airlines also paid for these services to a greater degree than the general public. Accordingly, we found that those services did not constitute federal financial assistance. 742 F.2d at 1213. 25 Here, the unions and employers are the direct beneficiaries of a federal service as were the airlines in Jacobson. However, while the airlines received valuable and necessary services that would otherwise have cost them substantial amounts to provide themselves, the benefits of federal mediation services are far more intangible. In the absence of federal mediation, it is not at all clear that unions or employers would seek the aid of another neutral party. Moreover, if they chose to do so, there are conciliation services available from a number of state and local agencies, as well as private organizations like the American Arbitration Association, at little or no cost to the users. More important, unlike the airlines, which all use federally subsidized weather and air traffic control services daily, an individual local union may use the services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service only on rare occasions, if at all. Such occasional use would hardly constitute a sufficient justification for invoking the label federal financial assistance. In Jacobson, the plaintiff made an extensive factual showing as to how the airlines used and benefitted from the services at issue. In contrast here, Herman has failed to offer any evidence that the defendant union ever utilized the federal agency for purposes of mediation or conciliation. 4 26 For all these reasons, no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the Act's applicability to the local. In the end, all of Herman's arguments regarding the union's receipt of federal financial assistance fall short. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim. 27