Opinion ID: 173655
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gallarde's application to Sakarapanee's case

Text: Sakarapanee is not asking us to adopt the Ninth Circuit's decision by similarly interpreting INA § 315. In fact, he cannot make such an argument because his current (2005) application for naturalization does not involve that statute. Sakarapanee could have made such an argument if he were appealing his first application for naturalization that he filed in 1995, which the INS denied based on INA § 315. He failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on that application, however, and thus cannot contest the denial in this appeal. See Escaler v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 582 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir.2009) (explaining that judicial review of the denial of an application to be naturalized [ ] requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to seeking such review). Sakarapanee is thus left to argue that Gallarde, although limited to the specific language in INA § 315, should be extended to all statutes that impose a bar to U.S. citizenship based upon an alienage discharge from the Armed Forces. And USCIS applied such a bar, which is contained within INA § 329, to deny Sakarapanee's second naturalization application. A significant problem with his argument is that the language within INA § 329 materially differs from that at issue in Gallarde. There, the Ninth Circuit found the term training or service in the Armed Forces to be ambiguous. Gallarde, 486 F.3d at 1141. But that term is not contained within INA § 329. Instead, the applicable portion of the latter statute reads as follows: Any person who, while an alien or a noncitizen national of the United States, has served honorably ... in an active-duty status in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States ... during any ... period which the President by Executive order shall designate as a period in which Armed Forces of the United States are or were engaged in military operations involving armed conflict with a hostile foreign force, and who, if separated from such service, was separated under honorable conditions, may be naturalized as provided in this section if (1) at the time of enlistment, reenlistment, extension of enlistment, or induction such person shall have been in the United States ... or (2) at any time subsequent to enlistment or induction such person shall have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. The executive department under which such person served shall determine whether persons have served honorably in an active-duty status, and whether separation from such service was under honorable conditions: Provided, however, That no person who is or has been separated from such service on account of alienage ... shall be regarded as having served honorably or having been separated under honorable conditions for the purposes of this section. INA § 329(a) (emphasis in original). This passage reveals no similarly ambiguous language comparable to that interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in INA § 315. Indeed, INA § 329 plainly indicates that it applies to all service members, both enlisted and drafted. The statute specifically mentions that aliens are eligible for its provisions if they joined the Armed Forces through enlistment, reenlistment, extension of enlistment, or induction. Id. Sakarapanee tries to create ambiguity by arguing that the term separated from such service on account of alienage within the proviso of INA § 329 is unclear. Relying on this purported ambiguity, Sakarapanee urges us to extend Gallarde and rule that separated from such service on account of alienage can mean only separated from involuntary service on account of alienage. But this interpretation strikes us as illogical considering that, as discussed above, INA § 329's expedited naturalization provision applies to alien service members who enlist as well as to those who are drafted. We can envision no reason why the main body of the statute would apply to both types of service members and yet the proviso would apply only to draftees. Nothing in the statute suggests such a result. In addition, we believe that the meaning of such service is clear. The term refers back to the service discussed within the main body of the statute; i.e., to active-duty status in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States. See INA § 329(a). And, as explained above, this service covers both volunteer and drafted service members. Separation from such service on account of alienage thus logically refers to both volunteers and draftees who choose to be discharged on the basis of alienage. Accordingly, the plain language of INA § 329 defeats Sakarapanee's proffered interpretation. INA § 329 rewards alien service members who serve during periods of combat, and provides a disincentive for them to prematurely leave the Armed Forces during such periods; in other words, it serves as both a carrot and a stick. But under Sakarapanee's interpretation, the disincentive would apply only to those service members who were drafted, not to those who enlisted. Thus, an alien lawfully in the United States who initially was willing to serve but later changed his or her mind (like Sakarapanee) could promptly seek a discharge based on alienage and still be able to take advantage of INA § 329's expedited-naturalization procedures. An alien who was drafted and later discharged on the basis of alienage, however, would be ineligible for expedited naturalization under that section, even if he or she served for a longer period of time. This perverse outcome reinforces the weakness of Sakarapanee's suggested interpretation of INA § 329. Furthermore, Gallarde itself does not support Sakarapanee's argument. The court in Gallarde did not discuss what separation from such service on account of alienage means. That decision substantively addressed only the definition of the term training or service in the Armed Forces. See Gallarde, 486 F.3d at 1140-41. Moreover, Gallarde distinguished INA § 329 from INA § 315 by concluding that the citizenship bar in § 329 does apply to volunteers as well as to draftees: Congress's use in § 329 of the phrase enlistment or induction is also instructive because it demonstrates that where Congress intended to impose a disability upon aliens discharged from voluntary training or serving in the Armed Forces on the basis of alienage it did so expressly by including both enlistment, a term denoting voluntary military service... and induction a term denoting involuntary military service. Gallarde, 486 F.3d at 1143 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Gallarde, therefore, actually undercuts Sakarapanee's current argument. Accordingly, even in the Ninth Circuit, separation from such service on account of alienage continues to mean the same thing as it did before Gallarde with regard to the expedited-naturalization procedures set forth in INA § 329. Any interpretation to the contrary would make the citizenship bar of INA § 329 a meaningless anachronism because the Armed Forces are now composed almost entirely of volunteers. Applying it only to draftees would thus in effect apply it to no one. Courts generally construe statutes in a way to avoid making provisions meaningless. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (noting that the Court's duty is to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute). In sum, despite the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gallarde, we find no legal support for Sakarapanee's suggested reading of INA § 329.