Opinion ID: 1481116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The sanctions proceedings.

Text: On June 13, 2003, frustrated by the attempts of Messrs. Anderson and Rogers to undo the 2001 Trust, Ms. Sloan filed a motion seeking sanctions under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 against Mr. Anderson and Mr. Rogers. Ms. Sloan argued that sanctions were appropriate because (1) Messrs. Anderson and Rogers filed the guardianship petition without coming clean to the court about the existence of documents providing for Ms. Jumper's care; and (2) after the filing, and particularly after the guardianship was vacated, Messrs. Anderson and Rogers acted inappropriately by, among other things, inducing Ms. Jumper to sign documents intended to undo the 2001 Trust. After three days of hearings, the trial court granted monetary sanctions (more on the precise amount later) against Mr. Anderson and Mr. Rogers. Messrs. Anderson and Rogers appealed, and this court reversed the award, holding that sanctions under Rule 11 were unavailable due to non-compliance with the Rule's `safe harbor' provision. In re Jumper, 909 A.2d 173, 174 (D.C.2006). This court noted, however, that sanctions may be awarded in certain circumstances pursuant to the court's inherent authority, and remanded to determine whether such an award was justified. Id. On remand, in an order dated July 1, 2008, the trial court, this time acting under its inherent authority, reinstated the sanctions award. The trial court found that Anderson was impelled by animus and/or ulterior motives to initiate the guardianship proceedings, and that in turn caused the [appellants] to employ unjustified tactics to gain control over Jumper's estate documents, and drive up the cost of attorneys fees in this case. As the trial court saw it, Mr. Anderson was subsumed by animus and ulterior motives from the outset because Mr. Anderson had been disinherited from the 2001 estate documents that replaced the 1995 documents which gave Verfuth [ sic ] full discretion over Anderson's inheritance and because Anderson did not trust Verfurth which the Court, again, infers developed into animus. The court faulted appellants for alleging in the Petition  in the absence of any evidence of wrongdoing on Col. Verfurth's part  that Ms. Jumper's assets were being dissipated or wasted. After the Petition was filed, the trial court found it inexcusable, and indeed ethically questionable, for Mr. Rogers and Mr. Anderson to commandeer[] Ms. Jumper's estate documents and to initiate meetings with her without apprising Ms. Kincaid, Ms. Jumper's attorney, or Ms. Sloan. In addition, the court found that Mr. Rogers' attempt to take Dr. Schneider's deposition was an unjustified procedural maneuver that was in derogation of the rules; although the court did not specify which rule it had in mind, discovery in probate proceedings may be had only upon order of the Court, Super. Ct. Prob. R. 312, but Mr. Rogers never sought or obtained such an order. Finally, the court found dubious appellants' argument that Ms. Jumper was not mentally competent and. . . vulnerable to the suggestions of anyone  anyone, but themselves. As sanctions for appellants' conduct, the trial court awarded Ms. Sloan $19,350.04, for which sum, the court held, appellants were jointly and severally liable. The amount of sanctions represents Ms. Sloan's attorneys' fees incurred after February 15, 2003  fees that the trial court found were incurred as a result of the efforts by [appellants] going beyond the order of the Court to attempt the execution of a new estate plan. On July 8, 2008, the trial court issued an Amended Order stating that in addition to being liable to Ms. Sloan, appellants also were jointly and severally liable to Mr. Gazzola, Col. Verfurth's lawyer, in the amount of $25,745.58. (In its various writings on this matter, the trial court interchangeably stated that the award would go to Mr. Gazzola or his law firm, Quinn, Racusin & Gazzola, Chartered. For clarity's sake, we shall refer to Mr. Gazzola as the recipient of this award.) The July 8 Order does not itself explain how the trial court arrived at the $25,745.58 figure, but it is clear that the amount derives from a fee petition that Mr. Gazzola filed in March 2004. According to that fee petition, Mr. Gazzola incurred $25,745.58 in fees and expenses beginning in 2003 in fighting Ms. Ellison's fee petition and in litigating the sanctions issue. Messrs. Anderson and Rogers then appealed to this court, which appeals we consolidated for purposes of argument and decision. After they filed their opening briefs, Mr. Gazzola filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Party, claiming that he was not a necessary party for the adjudication of the appeals and that Col. Verfurth had elected not to participate in the appeals. We granted Mr. Gazzola's motion. Mr. Gazzola's withdrawal motion, however, does not make clear whether he is repudiating the award of sanctions in his favor, nor, as we shall explain below, are we able to tell from the trial court's July 8 Order the basis for the trial court's award to him. Accordingly, our opinion will discuss that aspect of the order notwithstanding Mr. Gazzola's withdrawal motion.