Opinion ID: 1935286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lack of Premeditation Theory

Text: Finally, Henry urges that retrial counsel failed to present the defense that Henry was incapable of forming the premeditated intent to kill Suzanne because of his abuse of crack cocaine before the murder, which exacerbated his underlying psychotic mental condition. Henry claims that such a defense was available under Gurganus v. State, 451 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1984). However, we have explained that Gurganus simply reaffirmed the long-standing rule in Florida that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible in cases involving specific intent. Chestnut, 538 So.2d at 822. As we said in State v. Bias , Gurganus stands for the principle that it is proper for an expert to testify `as to the effect of a given quantity of intoxicants' on the mind of the accused when there is sufficient evidence in the record to show or support an inference of the consumption of intoxicants. 653 So.2d at 383. Thus an expert may need to explain why a certain quantity of intoxicants causes intoxication in the defendant whereas it would not in other individuals. Id. To the extent that Henry's claim can be construed as alleging that retrial counsel should have used a voluntary intoxication defense, he fails to demonstrate error. Henry failed to present any evidence that he was actually intoxicated at the time of the offense. See Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 485 n. 12 (Fla.1998); see also Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla.1985) (We emphasize that voluntary intoxication is an affirmative defense and that the defendant must come forward with evidence of intoxication at the time of the offense sufficient to establish that he was unable to form the intent necessary to commit the crime charged.). In fact, retrial counsel testified that a defense mental health expert advised him that the defense case was weak on the issue of specific intent, and Henry did not present any evidence that the mental health experts retrial counsel contactedor anyone elsewould have testified that Henry was intoxicated at the time of the offense with or without regard to any underlying mental condition. We note, however, that we are unable to discern any difference between Henry's claim and the defense asserted in Easley v. State, 629 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), of which we disapproved in Bias, 653 So.2d at 383. We held in Bias that a psychiatrist's testimony that it was the combination of Easley's use of alcohol and drugs superimposed on her long-standing depression that rendered her incapable of formulating a specific intent to kill on the night in question, id. (quoting Easley, 629 So.2d at 1050), was inadmissible because it constituted evidence of the defendant's diminished capacity. Id. Therefore, to the extent Henry argues that the inadmissible defense of diminished capacity was available, the claim fails. The record shows that the defenses presented by retrial counsel were valid and supported by the evidence. Henry's proposed alternative theory of defense is either unsupported by the evidence (voluntary intoxication) or inadmissible (diminished capacity). Thus, Henry's entire claim amounts to no more than disagreement with retrial counsel's strategy, without offering a valid theory of his own. See Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048 (noting that [c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial counsel's strategic decisions). Because Henry has failed to establish the first prong of the Strickland, standard (deficient performance of counsel), we need not address the second prong (prejudice). See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.).