Opinion ID: 186254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impermissible inference

Text: 17 Even evidence deemed relevant under Rule 401 and not prejudicial under Rule 403 may not be used as a springboard to propound an impermissible inference. Cf. United States v. Edmonds, 69 F.3d 1172, 1176 (D.C.Cir.1995) (although evidence admitted was `damaging,' ... there was little danger of unfair prejudice [where] prosecutor never argued an impermissible inference and did not emphasize the testimony). Earle argues the prosecutor did just that in his closing argument by questioning Tun's involvement in the case prior to his retention in July 2002, despite the prosecutor's knowledge of Tun's contrary representations to the court. The Government responds that there is evidence in the record contradicting Tun's representation about both the date of his retention and the existence of the interview notes, namely, Tun's statement in his motion for continuance that there are eyewitnesses who are essential to this case [who] have yet to be ... interviewed; therefore, according to the Government, the prosecutor's closing argument was firm but fair advocacy ..., not prosecutorial error. 18 For a prosecutor's statements in closing argument to warrant a new trial, they must entail a serious error that is prejudicial to the defendant. United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 699 (D.C.Cir.1999). It is a serious error for counsel to make statements in closing argument unsupported by evidence, to misstate admitted evidence, or to misquote a witness' testimony. Id. ; see also United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir.2002) (error where prosecution propound[s] inferences that it knows to be false, or has very strong reason to doubt). 19 Here, Earle objects to the following remarks in the prosecutor's closing argument: 20 [Prosecutor]: Remember the last thing the judge did before we started here? He took judicial notice of a fact. And the fact that he took judicial notice of was that Mr. Earle and his family did not retain Mr. Tun until July the 10th of 2002. They had been trying to raise the money before for several months. Apply your common sense here. Does it make sense to you that an investigator would go out on behalf of an attorney who had not been retained, who had not been paid? 21 Mr. Tun: Objection. That is not [the] judicial notice. 22 The Court: The objection is overruled. I think the way it is phrased is admissible. Go ahead. 23 [Prosecutor]: Does it make sense to you that an investigator on behalf of a defense attorney who had not been retained, who had not been paid any money, is going to go out and start investigating a case when somebody else represents the defendant? 24 Mr. Tun: Objection. That's not in evidence. 25 The Court: Overruled. 26 [Prosecutor]: I submit to you it makes no sense. The defense witnesses, I submit to you, got together and they created this little story. The only problem is they forgot to apply a little bit of common sense. Why would a defense investigator go out and talk to them in January? I submit to you there's no good reason other than the fact that they weren't telling you the truth.... 27 During his rebuttal, the prosecutor again questioned Tun's involvement in the case prior to the date of his retention: 28 Mr. Tun would have you believe that out of the goodness of his heart, for the passion of his work, he was involved, he was doing this stuff for free.... To suggest that Mr. Tun sent out an investigator when he wasn't retained I submit to you just doesn't make sense. And your common sense tells you that, I submit to you. The statement that the judge read to you was that for several months the family had been trying to retain Mr. Tun. I ask you, is several months one? Maybe two? Maybe three? But is it seven? The judge also told you, remember one of the witnesses, I think it was two of the witnesses said that when the investigator was talking to them, the investigator was taking notes? I believe the judge advised you there are no notes. 29 The prosecutor made these statements to the jury despite having heard Tun's representations to the district court — representations neither the court nor the prosecutor ever questioned — that before he was formally retained he had visited Earle in jail in connection with this case on at least five occasion[s] from [the] beginning of February ... if not earlier. Tun further volunteered that the jail's visitor log would confirm those visits. There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that the visits did not take place or that the prosecutor ever challenged the accuracy of Tun's representations in any way, as Government counsel on this appeal acknowledged at oral argument. Tun also explained to the district court and to the prosecutor that his normal practice with regard to interviewing witnesses [was] not [to] take any notes. The district court did not question Tun's practice; on the contrary, it accepted his representation at face value. See 9/6/02 am Tr. at 9 (You don't have to explain why you don't take notes, Mr. Tun. That's not anybody's business.). And the prosecutor likewise stated, If Mr. Tun is representing to the court that there are no notes, then I'll accept that. 30 The Government claims the inferences proposed by the prosecutor were permissible because Tun's pre-trial representations to the district court contradict his objection at trial to judicial notice of the date of his retention. Here the Government is referring to Tun's July 10, 2002 motion for a continuance, in which he stated: 31 It is undersigned counsel's understanding that there are eyewitnesses who are essential to this case and that they have yet to be subpoenaed or interviewed.... Undersigned counsel will not be prepared to try this matter on July 12, 2002 due to his inability to interview, investigate and subpoena appropriate witnesses for defendant. 32 There is no contradiction here. As Earle correctly points out, Tun was merely stating that he himself had not yet interviewed the witnesses. His request for a continuance says nothing about whether his investigator had done so. Nor is there any reason to doubt that an attorney would want to interview his witnesses personally before putting them on the witness stand even though his investigator had already spoken to them some months before. 33 Based upon the record in this case, the prosecutor clearly had every reason to doubt, and no good reason to support, the inferences he propounded to the jury in his closing arguments. We therefore hold the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor to make those statements over Tun's repeated objection. 34 Despite that error, we must still determine whether Earle suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial. Watson, 171 F.3d at 700. We look specifically at the following three factors: (1) the severity of the prosecutor's misconduct; (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct; and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the improper remarks. Id., quoting United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1026 (D.C.Cir.1998). 35 The first and second enumerated factors are easily applied to the facts of this case. The prosecutor's closing argument, by suggesting Tun's investigator had not interviewed defense witnesses early in 2002, contrary to the testimony of three defense witnesses, called into question the credibility not only of those witnesses but that of Tun himself; he put Tun in the position of having to defend his credibility and to argue to the jury — as he did at some length — that he had worked on the case before he was formally retained. Thus did the prosecutor make this collateral issue central to the defendant's case. And his doing so may well have affected the outcome, for the jury sent a note to the court asking: How did the investigator locate the witnesses? We cannot imagine that question would have arisen but for the prosecutor's suggestion that Tun, the investigator's employer, had not been involved in the case when the witnesses testified the investigator had interviewed them. 36 With respect to the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, there simply was none. On the contrary, the district court overruled Tun's several objections to the prosecutor's impermissible comments. 37 Whether this is otherwise a close enough case for these errors to undermine our confidence in the verdict is itself a nice question. On the one hand, two police officers testified that they saw Earle throw a gun into a yard while he was running away from them. And three officers testified that they had seen Earle enter the Kwik Mart. On the other hand, three defense witnesses testified that they saw the individual who was running from the police and that it was not Earle. These conflicting accounts could have left a reasonable jury with doubts about the identity of the fleeing suspect. Indeed, the jurors in this case appear to have harbored such doubts: They submitted two questions to the district court specifically and pointedly directed to the question of identity. They asked: Were there any fingerprints on the narcotics bag? (referring to the bag found inside the convenience store); and How does no fingerprints play in this case (gun)? 38 Finally, as Government counsel again acknowledged at oral argument, there was an objective physical fact tending both to favor Earle's description of events and to draw into question that of the Government, namely, the undisputed presence of Earle's girlfriend at the Kwik Mart at the time of his arrest. She testified that she and Earle had been out for dinner and had stopped at the Kwik Mart on their way home together. If Earle was in the Kwik Mart only because he was seeking to evade police officers who had been chasing him through the streets, then it seems passing strange that his girlfriend also happened to be at the store when he was arrested. Yet the Government did nothing at trial to cast doubt upon her testimony to that effect. On the contrary, one officer testified: I remember a female out there.... I think the female is the one we gave the prisoner's property to. 39 For the foregoing reasons, we are left with grave doubt as to whether the prosecutor's impermissible inferences about Tun's involvement before his formal retention did not affect the jury's verdict. Watson, 171 F.3d at 700. Accordingly, we are constrained to hold the error was not harmless.