Opinion ID: 1920706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: were strain's due process rights violated by the admission of prior bad acts evidence?

Text: At the hearing before the Board, evidence was introduced through Gregory's testimony of prior instances of Strain having sexual contact with a student. These acts occurred five to six years prior to the incident involving A.S. Strain's counsel objected to introduction of this evidence. The evidence was received for the limited purpose of corroboration of the truth and veracity of the witness who is the complaining witness. Pursuant to SDCL 19-12-5, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases of sexual contact, this court has been repeatedly held that prior bad acts evidence is admissible. State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840 (S.D.1988); State v. Sieler, 397 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.1986). In Champagne, this court held that evidence of prior sexual contact occurring four years prior to the incident being charged was admissible under the exceptions to SDCL 19-12-5. This court stated, where specific intent is an element of an offense, proof of similar acts may be admitted to carry that burden even if the defense to the charge is a complete denial. Id. at 843. This court then said, extrinsic evidence of intent is admissible in order for the state to meet its burden under a specific intent crime. Id. at 844. Although Strain's defense in this case was one of complete denial, he also claimed that any touching that might have occurred was completely innocent or inadvertent. Further, the credibility of A.S. and Strain were greatly in dispute. Gregory's testimony was probative and relevant to Strain's intent in earlier incidents of sexual contact with students under circumstances very similar to those between Strain and A.S. The evidence was further admissible under SDCL 19-12-5 to show motive, plan and lack of mistake, all of which impact on the issue of credibility. The Board was careful to limit the use of Gregory's evidence in an appropriate manner. There is no showing that the evidence was inappropriately used to prove Strain's character in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Strain next claims that Board violated his rights to due process by using this prior bad acts evidence, without setting forth those prior acts as a grounds for termination, in violation of this court's ruling in Sambo v. City of Mitchell, 427 N.W.2d 379 (S.D.1988). Strain fails to recognize the significant distinction between the use of prior incidents in Sambo and the use of prior incidents here. In Sambo, the prior acts evidence was used as one of the bases for the discharge from employment. Here, the Gregory testimony was not offered nor used as a basis for dismissing Strain. It was only offered as relevant evidence on the issues of intent and credibility which were strongly contested. Strain was discharged for having inappropriate sexual contact with A.S., not for having sexual contact with Gregory. Sambo does not apply to this case. Finally, Strain alleges that introduction of the prior bad acts evidence violated his due process rights, since he was advised of intent to introduce that evidence only one week prior to the hearing. It was undisputed that the August 27, 1986, notice of suspension did not mention the incidents involving Gregory. However, Strain was notified of the existence of this evidence on September 9, 1986, when Gregory's statement was furnished to his counsel. Following the furnishing of this statement, there was no motion for a continuance or other request for a postponement of the hearing. No objection on this ground was made at the hearing and the hearing was held on the date requested by Strain's counsel. Strain cannot now raise this issue on appeal.