Opinion ID: 2035999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Prematurely Released Prisoners

Text: As set forth in the seminal case of White v. Pearlman, [15] a prisoner's chance to re-establish himself and live down his past is frustrated if the prisoner is prevented from serving his sentence continuously. This is because a prisoner sentenced to five years might be released in a year; picked up a year later to serve three months, and so on ad libitum, with the result that he is left without even a hope of beating his way back. [16] Therefore, on the theory that the government should not be permitted to play cat and mouse with the prisoner, delaying indefinitely the expiation of his debt to society and his reintegration into the free community, [17] numerous courts now employ various remedies in cases involving interrupted sentences. Specifically, courts have developed three distinct theories for granting relief to a prematurely released prisoner. [18] The first theory is based on notions of due process and is often called the waiver-of-jurisdiction theory. [19] It appears that courts apply the waiver-of-jurisdiction theory when the premature release resulted from gross negligence by prison officials and lasted a long period of time. [20] In such cases, the government is said to have waived its right to reincarcerate the prisoner and thus the remedy is a complete exoneration of the prisoner's sentence. [21] The rationale is that it would be unequivocally inconsistent with `fundamental principles of liberty and justice' to require a legal sentence to be served after such an interruption. [22] The second theory, devised by the Ninth Circuit, is known as the estoppel theory and is also rooted in notions of due process. [23] Under this theory, the government is estopped from reincarcerating the prisoner when a particular set of circumstances are present. Essentially, those circumstances arise when (1) the government knew the facts surrounding the release, (2) the government intended that the prisoner would rely upon its actions or acted in such a manner that the prisoner had a right to rely on them, (3) the prisoner was ignorant of the facts, and (4) the prisoner relied on the government's actions to his or her detriment. [24] Notably, a prisoner who knew that his or her release was erroneous cannot claim to have been ignorant of the facts and therefore cannot invoke the estoppel theory. [25] Further, because the estoppel theory is rooted in due process, and because a due process challenge to executive action requires behavior that is egregious [and] outrageous, [26] the estoppel theory requires some affirmative misconduct by authorities. [27] The third and final remedy courts use in interrupted-detention cases is to grant a prisoner day-for-day credit for the time spent at liberty. [28] However, numerous federal appellate courts have held that the Due Process Clause does not require credit for the time spent at liberty in cases of an interrupted sentence. [29] Instead, credit for time spent at liberty is a common-law doctrine rooted in equity and is often called the equitable doctrine. [30] In contrast to the waiver-of-jurisdiction or estoppel theories, a prisoner is eligible for credit under the equitable doctrine when the premature release is due to simple negligence by officials. [31] By asking for day-for-day credit toward his sentence, Anderson relies solely on the equitable doctrine of credit for time spent at liberty. He does not advance an argument under the waiver-of-jurisdiction or estoppel theories, nor do we find evidence in the record suggesting that the Department committed misconduct rising to the level of a due process violation when it prematurely released Anderson. As such, today's decision focuses solely on whether Anderson is entitled to credit for time spent at liberty under the equitable doctrine. For decades, the common-law rule in Nebraska was harsh but simple: Prisoners were not entitled to credit for time spent outside the prison, regardless of the circumstances. [32] The first sign that this longstanding rule might be in jeopardy came in Texel. [33] In dicta, the Texel court observed that prisoners have the right to serve their sentences in a continuous manner, [34] a conclusion which, as noted above, is universally cited as a reason to provide a remedy in interrupted-sentence cases. [35] More recently, we had occasion to discuss credit for time spent at liberty in Tyler v. Houston. [36] In Tyler, a prisoner sought day-for-day credit for time spent out on bond while the state appealed, and ultimately succeeded in overturning, the district court's grant of habeas relief. Although we surveyed court decisions applying the equitable doctrine, we found it unnecessary to formally adopt or reject the doctrine in that case. As we explained, even jurisdictions recognizing the equitable doctrine refused to grant credit for time spent at liberty while the government appeals an adverse habeas ruling. [37] Resolving Anderson's claim requires that we finally confront questions hinted at in Texel and left unresolved in Tyler: Are prisoners in Nebraska ever entitled to day-for-day credit for time erroneously spent at liberty under the equitable doctrine, and if so, under what circumstances will such credit be forthcoming? It is to those questions that we now turn.