Opinion ID: 167739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asylum Claim Based O n Christian Religion.

Text: The IJ appears to have found M r. Bastian’s application for asylum based on religion to be timely because of a changed circumstance. See Admin. R. at 37. The changed circumstance is M r. Bastian’s conversion to Christianity, as evidenced by his baptism on September 14, 2003. Id. at 35-37. Although the opinion of the IJ is not entirely clear on the point, he seems to have assumed arguendo that there was a changed circumstance, which meant that M r. Bastian’s religion claim was not time-barred, id. at 37, and thus addressed the merits of the claim. As a result, we have jurisdiction to review M r. Bastian’s application for asylum to evade religious persecution in Indonesia. 3 W e review the IJ’s decision under a “substantial evidence standard,” Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004), asking whether the decision was “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record as a whole.” Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2002). The applicant for asylum “has the burden to prove his or her statutory eligibility for asylum by establishing that he or she is a ‘refugee.’” Krastev, 292 F.3d at 1270. A “refugee” is defined as any person who is outside the country of that person’s 3 W e note in passing the wisdom of the IJ’s decision to assume the changed circumstance and address the merits of the claim. For a judge to decide the timing of a religious conversion— specifically, in this case, to decide w hether M r. Bastian had been a Christian for many years, or a few years, or had become one at or near the time of his baptism— is to take a position on controverted questions of religious doctrine that are not properly resolved by federal courts. -5- nationality “who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Under the controlling regulations, an applicant for asylum may thus qualify as a refugee “either because he or she has suffered past persecution or because he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). The persecution “must be imposed by the government or by groups which the government is unwilling or unable to control.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, M r. Bastian was required to prove either: (1) that he “would be singled out personally for persecution” if he returned to Indonesia; or (2) that he had “a reasonable fear of persecution because of [his] membership in a group subject to a pattern or practice of persecution.” Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A )-(B). “A pattern or practice of persecution has been defined as something on the order of organized or systematic or pervasive persecution.” Woldemeskel, 257 F.3d at 1191 (quotation omitted). In the present case, the IJ denied M r. Bastian’s religious asylum claim because anti-Christian violence in Indonesia appears to be decreasing and is not -6- concentrated in the area in which M r. Bastian has lived and to which he would presumably return: W ith regard to respondent’s religious conversion, the C ourt would note that the background materials and background information submitted confirm that there continues to be violence directed at the Christian community residing in Indonesia. However, this is not a situation which apparently exists nationwide. Looking at the information in the State Department reports, the attacks against the churches not only have declined in frequency in recent years, but they occur in outlying areas and outlying islands, and do not seem to be in existence or prevalent in Jakarta, where respondent had resided prior to coming to the United States and where his family continues to reside. Though there is a strong Islamic fundamentalist movement in Indonesia, efforts to impose Sharia law nationally have not been successful . . . . Admin. R. at 38. Although the IJ did not specifically address M r. Bastian’s refugee status, these findings are tantamount to a determination that M r. Bastian failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his Christian religion. And only future persecution is before us, because no evidence suggests that M r. Bastian has previously been persecuted in Indonesia as a Christian. Having review ed the administrative record and, in particular, the State Department’s Country Report for Indonesia for 2002, id. at 265, we conclude that the IJ’s finding that M r. Bastian does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his Christian religion is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. As the IJ found, while there continues to be violence in Indonesia directed at the Christian community from various M uslim groups, the violence has been decreasing due to the government’s attempts to quell it, and, for -7- the most part, the violence has been concentrated in the outlying eastern provinces of M aluku, North M aluku, and Central Sulawesi. (W e also note that the State Department’s most recent reports, the Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 and the International Religious Freedom Report 2005, suggest that the violence has continued to abate and remains concentrated in the areas mentioned.) The record therefore supports the IJ’s conclusion that M r. Bastian would not be singled out individually for persecution and would not face a pattern or practice of persecution based on his Christian religion if he were to return to the capital city of Jakarta, the city where he resided for nine years prior to departing for the U nited States. Finally, we need not decide whether Chinese or Christian residents of Indonesia are a “disfavored group” who can establish refugee status based on a “comparatively low” level of individualized risk of future persecution. See Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 925-29 (9th Cir. 2004); but see Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 538 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the N inth Circuit’s lower standard for future persecution of members of “disfavored groups”). As discussed above, we have no jurisdiction over M r. Bastian’s claim to asylum on the basis of Chinese ethnicity. And, even if we did adopt the N inth Circuit’s lower standard for “disfavored groups” and chose to apply it to Christians or Chinese Christians in Indonesia, M r. Bastian has not shown that he, “in particular, is likely to be targeted as a member of that group.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 925. The “personal -8- connection to the general persecution” that was abundantly present in Sael, 386 F.3d at 929, is lacking in this case. W e thus have no occasion to accept or reject the “disfavored groups” approach of Sael. The petition for review is DISM ISSED as to M r. Bastian’s claim that he is entitled to asylum based on his Chinese ethnicity. The petition for review is D EN IE D as to M r. Bastian’s claim that he is entitled to asylum based on his Christian religion. Entered for the Court M ichael W . M cConnell