Opinion ID: 2594521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instruction regarding mistaken belief in consent

Text: At trial, Honeycutt proposed a jury instruction which stated, in essence, that a reasonable and good faith belief that there was voluntary consent is a defense to a charge of sexual assault. A criminal defendant is entitled to jury instructions on the theory of his case. [20] If the defense theory is supported by at least some evidence which, if reasonably believed, would support an alternate jury verdict, the failure to instruct on that theory constitutes reversible error. [21] This court has previously indicated that Nevada law supports a defense of reasonable mistaken belief of consent in sexual assault cases. [22] We conclude that based on the wording of NRS 200.366 and our prior case law defining the proof required for sexual assault, Nevada does recognize this defense. NRS 200.366 defines sexual assault as the penetration of another against the will of the victim or under conditions in which the perpetrator knows or should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting. In McNair v. State, we concluded that the legal inquiry into the issue of lack of consent consists of two questions: (1) whether the circumstances surrounding the incident indicate that the victim reasonably demonstrated lack of consent; and (2) whether, from the perpetrator's point of view, it was reasonable to conclude that the victim had consented. [23] Thus, because a perpetrator's knowledge of lack of consent is an element of sexual assault, we conclude that a proposed instruction on reasonable mistaken belief of consent must be given when requested as long as some evidence supports its consideration. [24] Honeycutt's counsel proposed the following instruction, citing instruction 10.65 from the California Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases (CALJIC) as the sole legal authority: In the crime of sexual assault, general criminal intent must exist at the time of the commission of the sexual assault. There is no general criminal intent if the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that [the victim] voluntarily consented to engage in fellatio and anal intercourse. Therefore, a reasonable and good faith belief that there was a voluntary consent is a defense to such a charge. If after a consideration of all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant had general criminal intent at the time of the act of fellatio and anal intercourse, you must find him not guilty of such crime. However, counsel did not include the entire correct instruction based on the evidence in this case. Counsel's proposed instruction omitted the following language: However, a belief that is based upon ambiguous conduct by an alleged victim that is the product of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another is not a reasonable good faith belief. [25] The comment to CALJIC 10.65 states: In People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961], it was held that this instruction should not be given absent substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not. Further the instruction should not be given when it is undisputed that the defendant's claim is based upon the victim's behavior after the defendant had exercised or threatened force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another. Where the evidence is conflicting on that issue, the court must give this instruction, if as indicated there is substantial evidence of equivocal conduct, despite the alleged temporal context in which that equivocal conduct occurred. In such situation, the second bracketed paragraph [quoted above] should then be utilized. [26] The evidence of consent is conflicting in this case, in that the victim testified that the defendant used force and the defendant testified that, not only did the victim consent, but she initiated some of the actions. Assuming that Honeycutt was entitled to an instruction on mistaken belief of consent, the proposed instruction must correctly state the law. [27] Honeycutt's proposed instruction was not technically deficient in form, as the dissent alleges, but an incorrect statement of the law when there is evidence that the consent was achieved through threats, force and violence. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.