Opinion ID: 1133807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claims Against the Golf Club

Text: Against the Golf Club, the Boyces alleged trespass, nuisance, wantonness, fraudulent suppression, and conspiracy. We readily dispose of the Boyces' claim that the Golf Club fraudulently suppressed from them the existence of the license agreement in an attempt to escape any effect the Licenses may have on the marketability of the Property. For the same reasons that the Boyces' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent suppression against the Casseses are time-barred, the Boyces' claim of suppression against the Golf Club is also time-barred. See § 6-2-38, Ala.Code 1975. As of January 24, 1997, the date the Golf Club recorded the license agreement and the amendment, the Boyces were charged with constructive knowledge of that agreement and the encumbrance against the property that that agreement created. On January 28, 1997, four days after the Golf Club recorded the license agreement and the amendment, the property was conveyed to the Boyces. Pursuant to Alabama statute, this recordation is deemed constructive notice to the world of the license agreement and the amendment. Thus, the Boyces cannot now complain that the Golf Club suppressed from them the existence of the license agreement when that agreement was publicly and properly recorded four days before the Boyces purchased the property. Because they did not file their fraud claim against the Golf Club within the two-year limitations period, that claim is now time-barred. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment as to the fraudulent suppression claim against the Golf Club. We also affirm the summary judgment entered on the Boyces' conspiracy claim against the Golf Club. The Boyces alleged that the Casseses and the Golf Club conspired to withhold material information from the public, and particularly from prospective purchasers of the Casseses' property. Because we have already concluded that the Boyces' conspiracy claim against the Casseses is time-barred, for the same reasons that same claim is time-barred against the Golf Club. We next address the Boyces' claims of negligence and wantonness against the Golf Club. In their amended complaint, the Boyces alleged that the Golf Club negligently and wantonly failed to record the license agreement and the amendment until January 1997. Like fraud claims, negligence and wantonness claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See § 6-2-38, Ala.Code 1975. The Boyces did not file their action until April 2002, although they are alleging that the Golf Club acted negligently or wantonly before January 1997. The Boyces' claims of negligence and wantonness are time-barred, and the trial court properly entered a summary judgment for the Golf Club on these claims. We also affirm the summary judgment in favor of the Golf Club as to the Boyces' claims alleging trespass and nuisance. In their trespass claim, the Boyces allege that the Golf Club allowed persons attending golf tournaments and playing golf at the Golf Club to enter the Boyces' property improperly. The Boyces claim that this entry was without their permission and without any other right to enter. This trespass claim fails as a matter of law. A trespass to property is a wrong against the right of possession or entry. Jefferies v. Bush, 608 So.2d 361, 362 (Ala.1992); AmSouth Bank v. City of Mobile, 500 So.2d 1072 (Ala.1986). If a party enters property or possesses property under a legal right, entry or possession pursuant to that right cannot constitute a trespass. As stated above, the license agreement granted the Golf Club the legal right to use a portion of the Casseses' property in connection with golf tournaments held at the Golf Club and granted persons playing golf at the Golf Club the right to enter the property for certain specified purposes. Once this agreement was properly recorded, the Golf Club's rights under the agreement were preserved as against subsequent purchasers, including the Boyces. Because the Golf Club had authority to enter the property and the Boyces do not allege that the Golf Club exceeded that authority, the Boyces' claim of trespass fails as a matter of law. The Boyces also asserted a nuisance claim, alleging that the Golf Club's periodic use of their property caused the Boyces' use and enjoyment of the property to be diminished and caused them to suffer emotional distress and mental anguish. Alabama Code 1975, § 6-5-120, provides: A `nuisance' is anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage to another. The fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful does not keep it from being a nuisance. The inconvenience complained of must not be fanciful or such as would affect only one of a fastidious taste, but it should be such as would affect an ordinary reasonable man. In Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523 (Ala.1979), this Court observed that determining whether the invasion of a property interest is a trespass or a nuisance requires an analysis of the interest interfered with. If the intrusion interferes with the right to exclusive possession of property, the law of trespass applies. If the intrusion is to the interest in use and enjoyment of property, the law of nuisance applies. 369 So.2d at 529. The Court in Borland also noted that conduct that rises to the level of a trespass would, generally speaking, support a nuisance action; however, the converse is not always true. 369 So.2d at 529 n. 1. In this case, the Golf Club's legal authority to enter onto the Boyces' land would bar the Boyces' trespass claim but not necessarily bar to their nuisance claim. Although the Golf Club had the right to enter and use the Boyces' property for a limited purpose, evidence might establish that the Golf Club had exceeded that purpose to the point of intruding on the Boyces' right to use and enjoy their property. However, the Boyces did not argue this issue in their briefs, and we, therefore, cannot address on appeal their nuisance claim. See Tucker v. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist., 864 So.2d 317, 319 (Ala.2003) (`An appeals court will consider only those issues properly delineated as such, and no matter will be considered on appeal unless presented and argued in brief.' (quoting Braxton v. Stewart, 539 So.2d 284, 286 (Ala.Civ.App.1988))).