Opinion ID: 171429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Zero or Limited Dropped Calls

Text: However, the Unified Government did set forth one finding [3] under the failure to show a prohibition of personal wireless services heading that is justified under the applicable Code and should be examined under the substantial evidence test. In Paragraph 1(a) of the written denial, the Board stated that the [d]rive studies indicated that there were no dropped calls in the area surveyed in stark contrast to studies submitted for other applications for cellular towers. Indicating zero or limited dropped calls seems to indicate this tower is not necessary for the convenience of the public. [4] The Unified Government argues that this conclusion is supported by T-Mobile's statements in its application. First, as Paragraph 1(a) itself states, the Unified Government relies on the fact that the drive test showed no dropped calls. Second, the Unified Government argues that T-Mobile, by stating that its customers in the targeted area averaged nearly 280 minutes of use between dropped calls while its customers in the Kansas metro core as a whole averaged nearly 310 minutes of use between dropped calls, failed to show any prohibition of service in the targeted area. Moreover, the Unified Government contends that T-Mobile's evidence showing that there were over 1,800 and 2,700 dropped calls in two separate weeks is unremarkable and provides substantial evidence for denying the application. However, the record does not show that the Unified Government had substantial evidence to support the conclusion that there were zero or limited dropped calls. The Unified Government erred to the extent that it relied upon the fact that the drive test did not show any dropped calls. The Unified Government, in asserting that the drive studies indicated that there were no dropped calls in the area surveyed, apparently relied on the statements of the Planning Director at the May 25, 2006, Board meeting, when the Planning Director stated that the drive test showed no dropped calls. However, as the record amply demonstrates and as the district court concluded, the drive test was not designed to measure dropped calls; rather, it was intended to measure the level of existing network coverage. As the drive test was not supposed to show the existence of dropped calls, the Board cannot rely upon it to show the absence of dropped calls. Therefore, because the Board's reliance on the drive test was based upon a misunderstanding of its purpose, the drive test cannot provide the substantial evidence necessary to support the Board's decision. Because it was erroneous for the Board to rely upon the drive test, the Board had no substantial basis to determine that the amount of dropped calls T-Mobile customers experienced was actually acceptable. The only other evidence upon which the Board could rely to support its conclusion was the uncorroborated assertion of the Planning Director, who stated that, in his opinion, the dropped call data provided by T-Mobile indicated that T-Mobile's service in the targeted area was pretty good. In opposition to this uncorroborated statement, T-Mobile submitted evidence stating that the number of dropped calls fell below the industry average. Accordingly, T-Mobile's evidence purporting to show significant numbers of dropped calls (which directly contravened the Board's conclusion) stands substantially uncontradicted. While it is clear from this Court's decision in Broken Arrow that substantial evidence may exist to support a decision to refuse to issue a Special Use Permit even if alternative conclusions could be drawn from the evidence, Broken Arrow, 340 F.3d at 1133, that situation is not presented here. Rather, the evidence available shows that the Board erroneously relied upon a drive test not intended to show dropped calls and upon the personal opinion of the Planning Director that the dropped call data was pretty good. A determination regarding the quality of existing service must be based on substantial, competent evidence, Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70, and that technical determination is not supported by substantial evidence where it is made solely on the adjudicator's unsubstantiated belief, see Primeco Pers. Commc'ns v. City of Mequon, 242 F.Supp.2d 567, 578 (E.D.Wis. 2003), affd, 352 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.2003). As T-Mobile's arguments regarding the existence of dropped calls stands contradicted only by an unsubstantiated opinion, there is no substantial evidence to support the Board's finding. 2. Reason Two: Not the Least Intrusive Means of Filling a Service Gap a. Absence of Support in Local Law for the Least Intrusive Means Criterion The second reason, set forth in Paragraph 2 of the written denial, that the Board proffered for denying T-Mobile's application was that [t]his particular 120 foot tower is not the least intrusive means of fulfilling a gap, if any exists, in the particular service provided by T-Mobile. Again, however, the Board erred in requiring T-Mobile to demonstrate that its proposal was the least intrusive means of filling a service gap because nothing in local law permitted the Board to impose such a requirement. No such criterion appeared in the Code at the time of T-Mobile's application. Because the Board had no basis in the Code for this criterion, the Board erred in its decision to use the least intrusive means analysis as part of its decision-making process. [5] See Broken Arrow, 340 F.3d at 1133; New Par, 301 F.3d at 398; Omnipoint Commc'ns, 173 F.3d at 14; Virginia Metronet, 984 F.Supp. at 974 n. 14. The Unified Government's frequent references to Broken Arrow and U.S. Cellular Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Seminole, Okla., 180 Fed.Appx. 791 (10th Cir.2006), are inapt. In Broken Arrow, we upheld a local board's decision to reject a tower application on the grounds that 1) the proposed site was zoned transitional, and 2) the cellular company had not demonstrated that no other tower could accommodate the proposed antenna. Broken Arrow, 340 F.3d at 1136-37. Similarly, in Seminole, we found that the local board's denial of a tower application was valid because 1) the proposal violated setback requirements, and 2) the cellular company had not offered evidence regarding the feasibility of other sites. Seminole, 180 Fed.Appx. at 801, 803-04. The Unified Government relies on Broken Arrow and Seminole to argue that the opinions of city officials regarding the feasibility of alternative sites are sufficient to constitute the substantial evidence required by the TCA. However, in both Broken Arrow and Seminole the applicable zoning code required the applicant to prove that no existing structure could accommodate the proposed antenna. See Broken Arrow, 340 F.3d at 1124; Seminole, 180 Fed.Appx. at 803-04. Here, in contrast, the Code did not require the applicant to prove that there was no other feasible alternative. Therefore, the Unified Government's argument, based on these cases, that T-Mobile had to demonstrate that another site would be less intrusive is entirely irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Unified Government sets forth several considerations under the least intrusive means heading that are justified under the applicable Code and should be examined under the substantial evidence test. b. Preference for Commercial Districts First, in Paragraph 2(a) of the written denial, the Board noted that Section 27-1252(32) of the Code created a preference for placing towers in commercial districts rather than residential districts. The Code states, In evaluating such proposed sites, commercial districts are generally preferred over those in residential districts as are sites in less restrictive residential or commercial districts generally preferred over those in more restrictive districts. Code § 27-1252(a)(32)(h). The Unified Government argues that because the proposed site has a residential rather than commercial designation, the Board had substantial evidence to support its finding that the proposed tower was not the least intrusive means of filling a gap in service. [6] However, T-Mobile argues that the Code's stated preference for commercial districts does not constitute substantial evidence because the Master Plan for the city designated the parcel as commercial and because the immediate vicinity included a church, a seminary, and an auto parts store, while there were only a few residential uses nearby. Indeed, the Staff and the Commission recognized that the neighborhood is somewhat commercial in nature and that there are only a few residential uses in the general area. The district court concluded that the Board's failure to consider the actual use of the surrounding property meant that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion. T-Mobile, 528 F.Supp.2d at 1160. The district court was correct in reaching this conclusion. It is unreasonable for the Board to claim that the property's residential zoning constitutes substantial evidence without considering contrary factual evidence. [T]he record should be viewed in its entirety, including evidence opposed to the Board's view. Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d at 494; see Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir.2002) ([A] court should view the record in its entirety, including evidence unfavorable to the state or local government's decision.). If the record contains conflicting evidence, the fact-finder must adequately explain its reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d 64, 71-72; see Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Town of Brookhaven, 244 F.Supp.2d 108, 116 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (finding that the rejection of a permit to construct a telecommunications tower was not supported by substantial evidence when the town failed to respond adequately to the contrary evidence provided by the telecommunications provider). Here, given that the Board considered the site's zoning designation in isolation without considering contrary factual evidence, the zoning designation cannot provide the substantial evidence necessary to uphold the Board's decision. c. Compatibility with Existing Uses Second, in Paragraph 2(b) of the written denial, the Board stated that it was denying the application because it was a new additional use which has no direct relation with the current use of the property. The Unified Government correctly points out that the question on substantial evidence review is not whether the Court agrees with the Board's decision, but whether sufficient evidence supports the decision so that a reasonable mind could come to the same conclusion. See Broken Arrow, 340 F.3d at 1133. Here, however, the court is not simply disagreeing with the Board's decision; rather, there is insufficient evidence to support the decision. The Unified Government argues that it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that the lack of any direct relation to the current use weighed in favor of denying the application. But this asserted reason fails for the simple fact that the Code authorizes the Board to consider compatibility with existing uses, not the directness of the relation to existing uses. Here, the Board only found that the uses were not directly related, not that the uses were incompatible. This court does not quarrel with the Board's decision that the tower is not directly related to the current use as a church. But on the evidence presented, there does not seem to be any legitimate argument that the church and the proposed tower were incompatible. On the contrary, both parties agree that the income stream would benefit the church. Therefore, there is no substantial evidence for finding the proposed tower to be incompatible with the existing use. d. Aesthetic Concerns Third, the Board stated in Paragraph 2(c) of the written denial that it was denying the application because the proposed tower is not aesthetically attractive in a residential neighborhood and would create blight in the view of the surrounding residential properties. While aesthetics can be a valid ground for local zoning decisions Section 27-279(f)(5)(d), it is only a permissible ground for denial of a permit under the TCA if substantial evidence of the visual impact of the tower is before the board. Mere generalized concerns regarding aesthetics are insufficient to constitute the substantial evidence justifying the denial of an application to construct a wireless telecommunications facility. Wichita Falls, 364 F.3d at 256; Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1219; Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 244 F.3d at 61; Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d at 495. The Unified Government argues that its aesthetic concerns are supported by substantial evidence because the Board considered a photo simulation, the flatness of the terrain, and the presence of residential neighborhoods nearby. However, the Unified Government's conclusory reference to the flatness of the terrain and the presence of nearby residential neighborhoods is a classic example of generalized aesthetic concerns. No owners of nearby properties opposed the application or voiced their concerns with the tower's aesthetic impact. Accordingly, the only evidence in the record on which the Board could have based its aesthetic decision was the photo simulation of the proposed tower. This photo simulation, in the absence of concerns grounded in the specifics of this case (such as beautification efforts, neighbor complaints, the actual character of the immediate neighborhood, etc.) does not constitute substantial evidence for the purposes of the TCA. See PrimeCo Pers. Commc'ns v. City of Mequon, 352 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.2003) (If blanket opposition to poles could count as sufficient evidence for denying an application to build an antenna, the substantial evidence provision of the Telecommunications Act would be set at naught.). Accordingly, the Board's determination that the tower would be aesthetically unattractive is unsupported by substantial evidence in the written record. 3. Reason Three: The Golden Factors The final reason that the Board provided for rejecting T-Mobile's application was that it had considered the ` Golden ' factors set forth in the staff report and for the reasons stated herein denies T-Mobile's application. The Golden factors are a set of factors suggested by Kansas courts for use by municipalities during consideration of zoning changes or special use permits. Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130, 135-37 (Kan. 1978). The Golden factors include 1) the character of the neighborhood, 2) the zoning and uses of nearby properties, 3) the suitability of the property for the uses to which it is restricted, 4) the extent to which the change will detrimentally affect nearby property, 5) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned, 6) the gain to the public health, safety, and welfare by the possible diminution of value in the developer's property as compared to the hardship imposed on the individual landowners, 7) recommendations of a permanent or professional planning staff, and 8) the conformance of the requested change to the city's master or comprehensive plan. K-S Center Co. v. City of Kansas City, 238 Kan. 482, 712 P.2d 1186, 1195 (1986) (citing Golden, 584 P.2d at 136). The Staff Report, which was relied upon by the Board, referenced the following three Golden factors as evidence supporting the denial of the application: the character of the neighborhood, the aesthetic impact of the proposed tower, and the dropped call data. Each of these factors have been adequately considered in the foregoing analysis. As outlined earlier, none of them are supported by substantial evidence. First, the nature of the neighborhood is largely commercial, and the Master Plan contemplates commercial use. Second, the generalized nature of the aesthetic concerns do not qualify as substantial evidence. Finally, the Unified Government's position with regard to the absence of dropped calls appears to flatly contradict existing evidence because the Unified Government could not point to substantial evidence in opposition to T-Mobile's testimony regarding the existence of dropped calls and the substandard nature of the existing service. Therefore, the Board's findings regarding the Golden factors are not supported by substantial evidence in the written record. AFFIRMED.