Opinion ID: 752967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Imminent and Concrete Injury

Text: 79 The FHC has successfully adduced facts to show concrete injury that is certainly impending, as required by Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138. The majority concludes that the FHC would be injured if it already implemented the educational program. This is not correct. The cases are legion supporting a conclusion that the FHC is not required to actually pay for the advertising campaign before it can assert standing. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8, 108 S.Ct. 849, 855, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (holding that because it is not unduly speculative to conclude that the ordinance at issue will be enforced against members of the Association, this is a sufficient threat of actual injury to satisfy Article III); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (A plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (Plaintiff alleged that, if constructed, the power plant's operation would cause the emission of radiation. The Court held that the plaintiff's alleged injury was sufficiently concrete to confer standing.); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S.Ct. 658, 663, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923) ([O]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 864-65 (3d Cir.1990) (holding that clinics not actually blockaded by defendant organization had standing because the threat that defendants would blockade the clinics in the future was real and immediate); Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir.1990) (plaintiffs' asserted injury, that they would use the water for boating and aesthetic enjoyment if it was not polluted, was sufficient to confer standing, even though they had not used the water in its polluted state). 80 The FHC also satisfies Lujan by setting forth concrete plans for its educational program. The majority categorizes the FHC plan as the some day intentions prohibited by Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. at 2138, and suggests that the FHC has proffered no concrete plans or specifications as to when the plans will be carried out. I disagree. In Lujan, the Supreme Court suggested that had the plaintiffs actually purchased a plane ticket, their plans to observe the endangered species would not be some-day intentions. Id. Here, the plan submitted by the FHC is more extensive and expensive than the mere plane ticket in Lujan. 81 Moreover, the majority's conclusion is at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., wherein mere blueprints and building plans were sufficient to confer standing on a non-profit housing organization. 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). The housing organization in Arlington Heights planned to build low income housing to further its interest in making low cost housing available in areas where it was scarce, but its plans were thwarted when the local government denied its zoning request. The Court held that the organization's plans to build, and its related goals, were not an abstract concern and provided the essential dimension of specificity required to determine standing at trial. Id. at 263, 97 S.Ct. at 562. The situation of the FHC is analogous. The FHC plans to educate the public that discrimination based on familial status is illegal. That plan is equally specific and detailed, and therefore sufficient to confer standing.