Opinion ID: 4258394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: proceedings preliminary to charges

Text: Prompt Notification Of Investigation Judge White contends that Investigative Counsel failed to promptly notify her of the complaints. Specifically, she asserts that Investigative Counsel waited approximately six months from when Jones filed his first complaint to notify her. Respondent asserts that this delayed notification prejudiced her ability to dispute the allegations before the Inquiry Board, and to raise objections to Investigative Counsel’s failure to comply with time standards. Maryland Rule 18-404(e)(4) requires that Investigative Counsel notify the judge of a complaint before the completion of the preliminary investigation, which is due within 90 days of the complaint filing. It also permits the Inquiry Board to delay giving notice of the investigation to the judge “for good cause shown” by Investigative Counsel. Id. Because Jones filed his first complaint on October 20, 2014, the preliminary investigation was due to be completed on January 19, 2015. Id. (e)(6). Judge White did not receive notice until three months after that date—on April 17, 2015. In the meantime, though, on January 15, 2015, the Inquiry Board granted a 30-day extension “for good cause shown” as allowed by the same Rule, and a second 60-day extension thereafter. The minutes for the Inquiry 20 Board meeting, and the Commission’s brief, fail to articulate any explanation of the “good cause” the Inquiry Board relied upon to extend the deadline. See Md. Rule 18-405(a).19 This Court can readily understand Judge White’s frustration when she learned that the complaint was filed six months before she was given notice thereof, especially when the “good cause” extension was unclear. Judges, who hold positions of great responsibility and respect, need to be trusted by the public, and are rightfully sensitive about ethics complaints against them. Her frustration may have been compounded when she later learned that Investigative Counsel’s disposition recommendation explained that the investigation consisted merely of reviewing: (1) Mr. Jones’s complaints; (2) the recordings of the hearings held before Judge White; and (3) Judge White’s response. At oral argument, the Commission explained that there can be extensive delays in obtaining either a recording or transcript from a trial court. This, we think, would be sufficient reason to grant an extension under Md. Rule 18-404(e)(4). On the other hand, Investigative Counsel’s volume of work would probably not be sufficient, absent some unusual circumstance. There is nothing in the record to document the reason for the delay in this case. Although there is no requirement in Md. Rules 18-404 or 18-405 that the Commission document the reason for extension, it would be better practice in future cases 19 In permitting delayed notice, the judge must receive notice of the charges at least 30 days before Investigative Counsel makes a disposition recommendation to the Inquiry Board, which occurred in this case on May 19, 2015. See Md. Rule 18-405(a). Judge White did not receive notice of the complaint or the preliminary investigation until, at the earliest, April 17, 2015 (32 days prior to the disposition recommendation). In her brief before this Court, Judge White asserts that she received notice from Investigative Counsel on April 30, 2015, clearly less than required. We do not resolve this dispute as to the timing of notice. 21 to do so—thus, perhaps, avoiding a future challenge of this nature. To resolve this case, we assume that the delay was without due cause, and move on to consider the consequences of this Rule violation. Judge White contends that the delay affected her due process rights because it prejudiced her ability to defend herself even at the very early stages in the disciplinary process. We are not persuaded this is so. As we recognized in White I, 451 Md. at 648, “an accused judge is entitled to . . . notice, an opportunity to respond, [and] a fair hearing . . . .” But deviation from the Rules without infringing on these rights would not undermine this guarantee. Id. Other jurisdictions have held that due process considerations do not require a judge to receive notice of a preliminary investigation before a determination of probable cause. See Ryan v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724, 729 (Cal. 1988), modified on denial of reh’g (June 30, 1988) (judge’s due process claim rejected because, “[s]imply stated, a judge does not have the right to defend against a proceeding that has not yet been brought”); In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d 865, 874–76 (Conn. 1997) (“[T]he due process protections afforded in disciplinary proceedings . . . are inapplicable unless and until the review council brings formal charges . . . .”); In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 752–53 (Fla. 1997);20 In re Karasov, 805 N.W.2d 255, 273–74 (Minn. 2011) (“[D]ue process does not require notice of a judicial discipline investigation.”). 20 In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 752–53 (Fla. 1997), involved a judge who claimed that her due process rights were violated when the disciplinary authority failed to give her notice of an investigation. Specifically, the judge argued that she was prohibited from 22 This rule applies to the judicial discipline process in Maryland as well. In terms of due process, Judge White had sufficient opportunity, even before the filing of public charges, to defend against the misconduct allegations made by Jones, and she took advantage of that opportunity, filing extensive written objections with the Commission before public charges, and afterwards, a motion to dismiss the charges, with a hearing thereon, as well as a full-fledged defense on the merits. Further, Respondent does not offer any explanation of what she would have done during those 90 days ending with April 17, 2015, to enhance her defense against the charges. We can see no due process violation.21 Investigative Counsel’s Communications With The Inquiry Board And The Commission Judge White objects to several instances of so-called “ex parte” communications between Investigative Counsel and the Inquiry Board or Commission. The Inquiry Board discussed Respondent’s case with Investigative Counsel, but without Respondent’s counsel, at its meetings in 2015. Investigative Counsel advised the Inquiry Board of her conversations with Respondent’s attorneys, yet Respondent’s attorneys were not present during these meetings. After the Inquiry Board issued its report to the Commission, presenting witnesses before the disciplinary authority found probable cause to issue charges against her. The court rejected this claim, relying on the principle that “due process is met when one is given notice of proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, and proceedings are essentially fair.” Id. 21 Notably, Md. Rule 18-404(6) accords to the Commission the discretion as to the remedy for Investigative Counsel’s failure to comply with the time limits for completing the preliminary investigation. See id. (“For failure to comply with the time requirements of this section, the Commission may dismiss any complaint and terminate the investigation.”). In this mandamus action, we do not review the Commission’s decision for an abuse of discretion. 23 Investigative Counsel was present when Respondent’s case was discussed at the Commission meetings. Again, Judge White’s attorney did not attend these meetings. Respondent contends that Investigative Counsel’s communications with the Inquiry Board and Commission resulted in prejudice to her because she had no way of knowing that her submissions to the Inquiry Board and Commission were presented accurately and she could not refute any assertions made by Investigative Counsel. As the Commission argues, the Rules plainly contemplate ongoing communications and coordinated activity between Investigative Counsel, the Inquiry Board, and the Commission. Specifically, the Rules permit Investigative Counsel to take several actions without notice to the judge. Investigative Counsel must “inform the Board or Commission that the preliminary investigation is being undertaken.” Md. Rule 18-404(e)(1). Investigative Counsel can also apply to the Inquiry Board for an extension of the time for completing the preliminary investigation and must report the results of the preliminary investigation to the Inquiry Board. Id. (e)(6), (f). Investigative Counsel must also “report and make recommendations to the Commission as directed by the Commission.” Md. Rule 18-402(d). Indeed, the Maryland Constitution authorizes the Commission to investigate, as well as hear charges. See Md. Const. art. 4, § 4B(a). We have previously examined the unique role of the Commission. In In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 677 (1973), we considered two judges’ contentions that they were denied a fair process “because the Commission acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury in . . . [a judicial discipline] proceeding.” We ultimately recognized that judges are not denied a fair and impartial process merely because the Commission operates as both 24 investigator (through Investigative Counsel) and decision-maker in judicial discipline cases. Id. at 678–79. Diener’s recognition that a quasi-judicial body may determine probable cause and continue to adjudicate the matter, without creating impermissible bias or prejudice, is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as well as other cases from this Court. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52–58 (1975) (“It is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure . . . does not violate due process of law.”);22 Public Serv. Comm’n v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 92 (2005) (“We are unwilling to assume the apparent premise of . . . [the] argument that some kind of blind pride of authorship or hubris of power renders an administrative decision-maker ipso facto unable to assess fairly and objectively arguments that his or her decision should be revisited, changed, or abandoned.”); see also Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929, 946 (Miss. 1997) (bifurcated judicial disciplinary process presented “no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias . . . than inheres in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate.”). Indeed, Judge White cites no authority holding to the contrary. 22 We have previously recognized that due process provisions in the Maryland and Federal Constitutions have the same meaning and therefore, Supreme Court decisions interpreting due process claims function as authority for determining Maryland’s due process requirements. See, e.g., Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 27 (1980). 25 By modifying our Rules of Procedure, we have taken steps intended to reduce the potential that the Commission would learn of unfairly prejudicial information in its role as investigator. At the Commission’s request in 2007, we created the Inquiry Board—which would monitor investigations by Investigative Counsel, and submit a report and recommendation to the Commission that filtered out any inadmissible evidence regarding a pending case. See Md. Rule 18-404(j)(2) (“The information transmitted by the Board to the Commission shall be limited to a proffer of evidence that the Board has determined would be likely to be admitted at a plenary hearing.”) (emphasis added); see also Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 157th Report, 239 (2006); 157th Report of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure: Hearing, Court of Appeals of Maryland (2007) (testimony of Sally D. Adkins, former Chair of the Comm’n on Judicial Disabilities). We did not, however, undertake to insulate the Commission entirely from its constitutionally authorized power to investigate, conduct hearings, and issue reprimands. See Md. Const. art. 4, § 4B. We always bear in mind, that, absent violation of a Federal constitutional right, we are constrained by the Maryland Constitution and the General Assembly’s legislative mandates. White I, 451 Md. at 634–37, 646–47; In re Diener, 268 Md. at 688–89. The Commission was accorded the authority and obligation to investigate, initiate prosecutions, and make decisions. Md. Const. art. IV, § 4B(a)(1)–(2). To override a decision on the merits of a complaint by the Commission because it also made 26 preliminary decisions in its oversight of Investigative Counsel would, we think, run afoul of the Maryland Constitution and the General Assembly’s legislative intent.23 Our own precedent also constrains us. We rejected an argument similar to Judge White’s in Diener. 268 Md. at 679 (“It is well settled that a combination of investigative and judicial functions within an agency does not violate due process.” (cleaned up)). Before any finding of sanctionable conduct or discipline, Judge White appeared and presented her defenses—both at the hearing on her motion to dismiss and at the evidentiary hearing. We conclude that her lack of any personal appearance before the Commission, 23 We also conclude that the Commission’s oversight of Investigative Counsel does not offend the requirement, in administrative law, that agencies maintain “ethics walls” dividing adjudication processes from an agency’s investigatory processes. See Jeff Bush & Kristal Wiitala Knutson, The Building and Maintenance of “Ethics Walls” in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 24 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges 1, 15–18 (2004) (explaining best practices for administrative agencies when separating adjudicatory and investigatory functions of an agency). Regardless of the hearing official’s employment or fiscal relationship with a party agency, the hearing official should exercise independence of action, decision, and judgment to protect the due process rights of parties and achieve a legally correct result in a case. The hearing official’s maintenance of decisional independence from agency management and programs is crucial. Id. at 15. The Commission’s preliminary communications with Investigative Counsel do not prevent the Commission from rendering a fair and impartial judgment after a hearing on the merits of the Commission’s charges. Furthermore, the Commission is not beholden to Investigative Counsel’s recommendations because the Commission, and not a superior agency head with authority over the Commission, appoints Investigative Counsel. Id. at 2–6. 27 prior to her charging, did not violate the Rules and did not prevent her from being accorded a fair proceeding. Respondent made a request to appear before the Commission, but her request was denied.24 Md. Rule 18-404(l) (Commission may authorize a judge, upon a written request to “appear before the Commission on terms and conditions established by the Commission.”). Nevertheless, she was given an opportunity to present written objections to the Inquiry Board’s report. She did so and the Commission reviewed her objections. Her correspondence with Investigative Counsel was always forwarded to the Inquiry Board or the Commission for review. Most vitally, Judge White was afforded an opportunity, as required by the Rules, to appear before the Commission after the issuance of charges. Md. Rule 18-407(f). Disclosure Of Inquiry Board Report The Inquiry Board did not fully comply with the directions in the 2007 Rules concerning the Inquiry Board, and Judge White claims foul play. She points to the failure to promptly send her a copy of the Inquiry Board’s report regarding her case. See Md. Rule 18-404(j)(4). Respondent views the delay as prejudicial—claiming that it prevented her from filing objections with the Commission to contest the Inquiry Board’s recommendation of a finding that she committed sanctionable conduct and that she receive a reprimand. 24 There is no record that Respondent or her attorneys requested an informal meeting with the Inquiry Board, and Judge White does not argue that she did. See Md. Rule 18404(i) (“The [Inquiry] Board may meet informally with the judge for the purpose of discussing an appropriate disposition.”). 28 The Rules require the Commission to promptly transmit a copy of the Inquiry Board’s report to both Investigative Counsel and the respondent judge. Id. The judge and Investigative Counsel then have the opportunity to file objections with the Commission. Id. (k). After reviewing the Inquiry Board’s report and any timely objections, the Commission can then proceed by dismissal, private reprimand or deferred discipline, 25 or by filing public charges. See Md. Rules 18-406; 18-407(a). The Inquiry Board submitted its report to the Commission on December 11, 2015, but no copy was sent to Judge White. The report was not sent to Respondent until January 12, 21 days later, after she requested the report upon being notified that charges would be filed. This was a clear violation of the Rule—Judge White should have been given a chance to file objections to the Inquiry Board’s report prior to the Commission’s finding of probable cause. Md. Rule 18-404(k)–(l). Upon learning of the mistake, the Commission agreed to reconsider the matter after Respondent filed a written response to the report, although it denied her a personal appearance. Respondent then filed extensive objections, which the Commission reviewed before it proceeded to file public charges. A special meeting was called on March 2, 2016 for the Commission to reconsider the case in light of Respondent’s objections. It did so, with Investigative Counsel, but not Judge White or her attorney present (other than through the papers they filed), and the Commission voted again to find probable cause and proceed with public charges. 25 Both a warning, a private reprimand, and a “deferred disciplinary agreement” can be rejected by the judge, in which case, the Commission must choose to proceed with public charges under Md. Rule 18-407 or dismiss the matter. 29 Yet another aspect of this dispute is that when the Commission sent Judge White the Inquiry Board’s report, it declined to send Investigative Counsel’s May 19, 2015 memorandum, which was an attachment thereto. Judge White challenged that, when filing this mandamus action, she still had not seen that memorandum. The Commission maintained that the memorandum was attorney work product and therefore confidential. The attorney work product doctrine protects from disclosure “the work of an attorney done in anticipation of litigation or in readiness for trial.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396, 407 (1998). “When confronted with the work product doctrine, courts must balance the need for efficient litigation through liberal disclosure against the attorney’s responsibility to be a zealous and protective advocate . . . .” Id. An attorney’s “strategies, theories, and mental impressions” are attorney work product. Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 168 Md. App. 50, 93 (2006), aff’d, 397 Md. 37 (2007). Based on the Commission’s assertion of privileged work product, we decided to conduct an in camera inspection of Investigative Counsel’s memorandum. Order, Matter of White, Misc. No. 5, Sept. 2016 Term (Md. Ct. App. June 2, 2017). Upon that examination we found no confidential information regarding the complaints against Judge White or Investigative Counsel’s “strategies, theories, and mental impressions.” Accordingly, Investigative Counsel had no reason to withhold the memorandum because it was not subject to attorney work product protection. See Forma-Pack, 351 Md. at 407; Gurland, 168 Md. App. at 93. Although we sympathize with Judge White’s vexation regarding Investigative Counsel’s repeated rejections of her request to review the memorandum, we struggle to 30 understand how disclosure of the memorandum, or earlier transmission of the Inquiry Board report would have bolstered her ability to defend against the complaints. In an attorney discipline case from the Supreme Court of Vermont, a review board (operating like the Commission), adopted one version of a preliminary discipline recommendation, and then a second version, without allowing the respondent attorney an opportunity, guaranteed by the Vermont rules, to respond to the second version. In re Illuzzi, 616 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1992) (per curiam). There, the court concluded that the respondent attorney was entitled to a rehearing on the second version of the recommendation. Id. at 235. The court reasoned that these circumstances denied the attorney an opportunity to address the issues raised in the subsequent report. Id. But here, the Commission had already revisited the issue of probable cause after Judge White had an opportunity to respond to the Inquiry Board’s report. Judge White provides no authority for her position that the Commission’s improper delay in forwarding of the Inquiry Board’s report violated her right to a fair proceeding. Her only argument is that the delayed transmission impaired her ability to adequately respond to the Inquiry Board’s conclusions in the report. This assertion ignores the fact that, after prematurely determining the issue of probable cause, the Commission reconsidered her case after reviewing her objections and still found probable cause. This is not a violation of due process. See Wilson, 389 Md. at 92. Without a due process violation in this mandamus action, we have no jurisdiction to second-guess the validity of the Commission’s reconsideration of the probable cause question in light of the objections and memorandum filed by Judge White’s counsel. 31