Opinion ID: 2006639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Weight of the Evidence of First Degree Felony Murder

Text: Defendant claims that his conviction for first degree felony murder based on either the shooter or the commander theory was against the weight of the evidence because the evidence proved, at most, that he was an ordinary accomplice and was guilty of second degree intentional murder ( see Penal Law § 125.25 [1]; § 20.00). The standard of appellate review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal trial, of course, is whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial ( Cahill, 2 NY3d at 57, quoting People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People, as we must ( People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417, 420 [1995]), we conclude that there is certainly a valid line of reasoning by which a rational person could have reached the conclusion of the jury and that defendant's guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. [15] In this capital case, in which a death sentence has been imposed, moreover, we are constitutionally required to review the facts (NY Const, art VI, §§ 3, 5; People v Davis, 43 NY2d 17, 36 [1977]). Our inquiry here is distinct from our traditional appellate review for legal sufficiency. We recently reiterated that weight of the evidence review recognizes that `[e]ven if all the elements and necessary findings are supported by some credible evidence, the court must examine the evidence further' ( Cahill, 2 NY3d at 57, quoting Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Thus, [i]f based on all the credible evidence a different finding would not have been unreasonable, then the appellate court must, like the trier of fact below, `weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony.' If it appears that the trier of fact has failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded, then the appellate court may set aside the verdict (69 NY2d at 495 [internal citations omitted], quoting People ex rel. MacCracken v Miller, 291 NY 55, 62 [1943]; Cahill, 2 NY3d at 58). Of course, [g]reat deference is accorded to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor (69 NY2d at 495). When an appellate court performs weight of the evidence review, it sits, in effect, as a `thirteenth juror' ( Cahill, 2 NY3d at 58, quoting Tibbs v Florida, 457 US 31, 42 [1982]). We must be sure that the evidence is of such weight and credibility as to convince us that the jury was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ( Cahill, 2 NY3d at 58, quoting People v Crum, 272 NY 348, 350 [1936]). With these standards in mind, we conclude that the evidence amply supports the first degree murder conviction. There is no question that defendant engineered and carried out the armed kidnapping of Matos, that defendant decided to kill him, handcuffed him, led him down to the basement, and that Matos died of an intentional gunshot wound to the head. No matter which version of defendant's story the jury credited, it was justified in finding that defendant was squarely in charge of the kidnapping and shooting of Matos.