Opinion ID: 6327334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Free-Speech Protections

Text: ¶10 Because section 18-9-111(1)(e) prohibits certain types of communications, it implicates the free-speech protections afforded by the United States and Colorado constitutions. See Smith, 862 P.2d at 941. Moreno invokes both constitutions, which respectively provide that “no law ‘abridging’ or ‘impairing’ freedom of speech shall be enacted.” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I; Colo. Const. art. II, § 10). Still, the right to free speech is not absolute, and the government may create, and courts have upheld, statutes proscribing certain categories of unprotected speech like fighting words, true threats, and obscenity. 3 See id.; see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010). ¶11 A statute restricting speech must be carefully crafted and narrowly drawn to carry out legitimate and constitutional legislative goals. See Smith, 862 P.2d at 941; Bolles, 541 P.2d at 82. Even if a statute aims to proscribe only unprotected 3 The government may also regulate speech outside of these traditional unprotected categories (e.g., time, place, or manner restrictions) but subject to the appropriate level of scrutiny (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations and intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations). See, e.g., Denver Publ’g. Co. v. City of Aurora, 896 P.2d 306, 308 (Colo. 1995) (holding content-neutral city ordinance proscribing direct solicitation of vehicle occupants traveling on city streets, in this case solicitation by newspaper hawkers, was narrowly tailored to advance significant governmental interest in traffic movement and safety). 7 speech, it may be struck down as facially overbroad if it substantially infringes upon constitutionally protected speech. Smith, 862 P.2d at 941; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). ¶12 These bedrock notions hold true irrespective of whether the communication occurs in person or electronically. As the Supreme Court has explained, “whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principle[] of freedom of speech . . . , like the First Amendment’s command, do[es] not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears.” Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). ¶13 Although courts often examine overbreadth and vagueness together, they are distinct doctrines that spring from different constitutional guarantees. Graves, ¶¶ 21–24, 368 P.3d at 325–26. While vagueness protection derives from the Due Process Clause and “concerns the lack of clarity in the language of a statute,” overbreadth protection derives from the First Amendment and “concerns the reach of a statute and its encroachment upon constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at ¶¶ 23–24, 368 P.3d at 325–26. When a litigant brings a facial challenge on 8 both overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we begin with the overbreadth analysis. 4 See id. at ¶ 25, 368 P.3d at 326.