Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Argument Regarding Intent to Kill.

Text: Defendant claims the prosecutor misled the jury about the proof necessary for intent to kill. As previously noted, the defense theory was that defendant lacked homicidal intent when he stabbed John Waltrip because the act was merely a reflexive attempt to get Waltrip away from him. Seeking to counter this theory, the prosecutor stressed that intent was not the same as premeditation or deliberation and could be a low-level process. The prosecutor gave the example of absentmindedly swatting a mosquito that alights on one's face or arm. Even if the conscious purpose is only to get rid of the mosquito, the prosecutor suggested, you probably kill him.... This is a very low-level thing. Same thing here, except the evidence is overwhelming as to what this person or as to what the defendant intended to do at the time he stabbed John Waltrip. We see nothing improper. The prosecutor merely illustrated the correct principle that if the jury found defendant's use of a lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance. The prosecutor did not suggest the jury was prohibited from viewing defendant's action as a true reflex or startle response and thus declining to find intent to kill. The jury was repeatedly instructed that in order to sustain the special circumstance allegation, it must find that defendant had the specific intent to kill a human being. The instructions also advised that while intent to kill could be shown by circumstantial evidence, such evidence could prove intent only if it cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled. (E.g., People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].)