Opinion ID: 1399443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Validity of the Marriage

Text: Jason first contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that he and Davelynn were not validly married. Davelynn claims that the issue of the validity of the marriage was decided in the circuit court's July 23, 2004 default order. She points out that Jason took no appeal from that order and that he did not raise the issue of the validity of the marriage until nearly two years after the entry of the order, in a petition for divorce. Accordingly, Davelynn contends that Jason's arguments regarding the validity of the marriage are barred by res judicata. For his part, Jason asserts that Davelynn's paternity complaint did not address the validity of the marriage and, therefore, the default order could not have resolved the issue. Res judicata bars relitigation of a claim in a subsequent suit when five factors are present. These include: (1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based upon proper jurisdiction; (3) the first suit was fully contested in good faith; (4) both suits involve the same claim or cause of action; and (5) both suits involve the same parties or their privies. Moon v. Marquez, 338 Ark. 636, 999 S.W.2d 678 (1999). Furthermore, res judicata bars not only the relitigation of claims that were actually litigated in the first suit, but also those that could have been litigated. Id. The purpose of res judicata is to put an end to litigation by preventing a party who had one fair trial on a matter from relitigating the matter a second time. Id. This court has applied the doctrine of res judicata in the context of family law. Id. While Davelynn couches her argument in terms of res judicata, it appears that she is asserting that Jason's challenge to the validity of the marriage is barred by collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. Collateral estoppel requires four elements before a determination is conclusive in a subsequent proceeding: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) that issue must have been actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; and (4) the determination must have been essential to the judgment. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Willis, 347 Ark. 6, 59 S.W.3d 438 (2001). The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the earlier action and must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in that first proceeding. See id. Unlike res judicata, which acts to bar issues that merely could have been litigated in the first action, collateral estoppel requires actual litigation in the first instance. Id. The default judgment states that Jason was properly served, [1] and that Davelynn and Jason were not married to each other or any other persons at the time of the conception and birth. The paternity petition asserted that Jason and Davelynn were not married to each other or any other persons at the time of the conception and birth of D.P. Thus, Jason was on notice that the issue of the validity of this marriage was to be decided, and he had a full and fair opportunity to be heard. He chose not to be heard. However, the dissent states that collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments. In Arkansas, a default judgment is just as binding and enforceable as a judgment on the merits. See State v. $258,035 U.S. Currency, 352 Ark. 117, 98 S.W.3d 818 (2003). Nonetheless, the dissent asserts that collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments because a default does not actually litigate the issues. The dissent errs in its definition of actually litigated. [2] In the context of collateral estoppel, actually litigated means that the issue was raised in pleadings, or otherwise, that the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and that a decision was rendered on the issue. For example, in Bradley Ventures v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Arkansas, 371 Ark. 229, 237, 264 S.W.3d 485, 492 (2007), taking the guilty plea decided guilt to a charge of reckless burning, but taking the guilty plea did not decide the issue of Bradley's intent to commit arson with which he was originally charged. While this case does not concern a default judgment, it is similar in that it involved a plea that resolved the case without a full trial. To the argument of collateral estoppel, this court stated: The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of issues of law or fact actually litigated by the parties in the first suit, provided that the party against whom the earlier decision is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question and that issue was essential to the judgment. Bradley, 371 Ark. at 234-35, 264 S.W.3d at 490. A guilty plea or a default judgment may satisfy the requirement of collateral estoppel where the issue was essential to the judgment and was properly raised and decided by the action. Both a guilty plea and a default judgment may provide a full and fair opportunity to heard, as in the present case. Jason chose not to avail himself of the opportunity to be heard. A default judgment determines the parties' rights just as any conventional judgment or decree. See Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 606 S.W.2d 112 (1980). However, as the dissent notes, some courts in foreign jurisdictions hold default judgments are not subject to collateral estoppel because default judgments do not arise from actual litigation. But see, e.g., Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 7, 34 (2006) (California, on the other hand, accords collateral estoppel effect to default judgments, at least where the judgment contains an express finding on the allegations.). [3] The courts holding collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments also err, as the dissent does, in the definition of actually litigated. The citation of an Iowa case serves as an example of how the error arises. In Blea v. Sandoval, 107 N.M. 554, 761 P.2d 432, 435 (Ct.App.1988), cited by the dissent, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied, among other cases, on Lynch v. Lynch, 250 Iowa 407, 94 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1959), for the proposition that a default judgment has no collateral estoppel effect. In Lynch , the Iowa Supreme Court stated, Collateral estoppel is usually not available in default cases. 94 N.W.2d at 108 (emphasis added). This appears to support the dissent's position; however, upon further analysis, it is clear that Lynch does not hold that all default judgments fail to satisfy the requirements of collateral estoppel. In making the statement about collateral estoppel not usually applying to default judgments, the Iowa Court cited to Matson v. Poncin, 152 Iowa 569, 132 N.W. 970 (1911). Matson does not state that collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments. Rather, there we find that it must appear that the particular matter was considered and passed on in the former suit, or the adjudication will not operate as a bar to subsequent action. Matson, 132 N.W. at 972. The court in Matson went on to state that a matter, not embraced in the pleadings, and which was not necessarily determined in entering judgment could not have been directly in issue. Id. Thus, the phrase collateral estoppel is usually not available in default cases, really meant that collateral estoppel is not available unless the matter was raised in the pleadings, or otherwise, and directly decided. Default judgments may or may not satisfy the requirements of collateral estoppel. The question must be considered on a case-by-case basis. The issue of collateral estoppel and default judgments was also discussed in Lane v. Farmers Union Insurance, 296 Mont. 267, 989 P.2d 309 (1999) (also cited by the dissent). There, the court considered the question of whether a default judgment served as a final judgment on the merits. To decide this, the court concluded it had to determine whether the issue was actually litigated and stated a test: This analysis requires two things: first, that the issue was effectively raised in the pleadings, or through development of the evidence, and argument at trial or on motion; and, second, that the losing party had a full and fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially to contest the issue in a prior proceeding. Lane, 989 P.2d at 317. Again, as in Lynch, supra , the question is whether the issue was properly raised and whether there was a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Other courts have held that the requirement of actual litigation was met in a default judgment: A judgment taken by default is conclusive by way of estoppel in respect to all such matters and facts as are well pleaded and properly raised, and material to the case made by declaration or other pleadings, and such issues cannot be relitigated in any subsequent action between the parties and their privies.[ [4] ] In re Bursack, 65 F.3d 51, 54 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Lawhorn v. Wellford, 179 Tenn. 625, 168 S.W.2d 790, 792 (1943)). Still other jurisdictions bear out this conclusion that actually litigated means notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard rather than litigation where a matter is decided only after development and introduction of evidence by both sides. A discussion in Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors, Ltd., 375 F.Supp. 499 (D.C.Mich.1974), is helpful: Default JudgmentCollateral estoppel applies only to those issues which were `actually' or `fully litigated' in the prior action. However, this rule does not refer to the quality or quantity of argument or evidence addressed to an issue. It requires only two things: first, that the issue has been effectively raised in the prior action, either in the pleadings or through development of the evidence and argument at trial or on motion; and second, that the losing party has had `a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially' to contest the issue. The general rule therefore is that subject to these restrictions default judgments do constitute res judicata for purposes of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Overseas Motors, Inc., 375 F.Supp. at 516, quoted in In re Bush, 62 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.1995); In re Houston, 305 B.R. 111, 118 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2003); In re Foster, 280 B.R. 193, 205 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2002). In the present case, the issue of the validity of the marriage was decided in the default judgment after personal notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The determination of Davelynn's marital status was essential to the judgment in the paternity action. Davelynn asserted in the paternity action that she was not married at the time of D.P.'s conception and birth. Jason did not offer any evidence to the contrary, although he had the opportunity to do so. The circuit court declared that Davelynn was not married to Jason at the time of D.P.'s conception and birth. Thus, the issue of marital status was actually litigated. The decision of paternity was conclusive, and Jason is bound by that decision. Collateral estoppel applies in this case. To hold otherwise would undermine the finality of judgments. There is no bright-line rule. Each judgment, taken by default, or otherwise, must be examined to determine what was finally decided and whether it meets the requirements of collateral estoppel. In connection with his argument that his marriage to Davelynn was valid, Jason asserts that the adoption should be void because no home study was conducted of Davelynn and Wendell's home. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-212(b)(1)(A) (Supp.2005) states: Before placement of the child in the home of the petitioner, a home study shall be conducted by any child welfare agency licensed under the Child Welfare Agency Licensing Act, § 9-28-401 et seq., or any licensed certified social worker. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-212(c), [t]he court may also waive the requirement for a home study when a stepparent is the petitioner. Jason asserts that because he and Davelynn never obtained a divorce, Davelynn's marriage to Wendell is void; therefore, Wendell is not D.P.'s stepparent, and a home study could not be waived. There is a longstanding presumption against deliberate bigamy, Bruno v. Bruno, 221 Ark. 759, 256 S.W.2d 341 (1953), and there is a common law presumption of the validity of the second marriage, Cole v. Cole, 249 Ark. 824, 462 S.W.2d 213 (1971). The burden of disproving the validity of a marriage is on the one attacking it. Bruno, supra . Here, the only argument advanced by Jason is that the second marriage is void because he and Davelynn were still validly married, an argument that he is collaterally estopped from asserting. Jason has failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of the marriage between Davelynn and Wendell. It follows that he has failed to prove that Wendell was not D.P.'s stepparent at the time of the adoption and that a home study was required in this case.