Opinion ID: 795465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Political Affiliation As a Criterion for Employment

Text: 19 Allen argues next that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to whether political affiliation was an appropriate criterion for his employment. We review this ruling de novo. Semien v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 436 F.3d 805, 809 (7th Cir.2006). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court considers evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On appeal, there is no disagreement between the parties as to whether Allen was fired for political purposes. The only issue is whether his political affiliation was an appropriate criterion for his former position as the IDOT Bureau Chief of Accounting and Auditing. 20 A public employee may be dismissed on the basis of their political affiliation where the nature of his job makes political loyalty a valid qualification for the effective performance of their position. Riley v. Blagojevich, 425 F.3d 357, 359 (7th Cir.2005); Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 355 (7th Cir.2005). We have previously held that such political loyalty may be demanded where the employee's position involves the making of policy and thus the exercise of political judgment. Riley, 425 F.3d at 359 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980)). If a position `authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation, it will be found to involve policymaking. Kiddy-Brown, 408 F.3d at 355 (quoting Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir.1981). Additionally informative is the degree of discretion and responsibility exercised in the position. See Riley, 425 F.3d at 363; Selch v. Letts, 5 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir.1993). Before we may address the constitutionality of the defendants' demand for political loyalty for Allen's position, however, we must first determine what evidence to consider. 21 In evaluating whether the Bureau Chief job was one for which political affiliation was an appropriate criterion, we focus on the inherent powers of the office as presented in the official job description. Riley, 425 F.3d at 360-61 (citing Meeks v. Grimes, 779 F.2d 417, 419 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1985)). 2 We only look past the job description where the plaintiff demonstrates some systematic unreliability. Id.; Pierson v. Blagojevich, 437 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2006). This approach is necessary to prevent excessive litigation in the turnover between opposing political administrations and to deter incumbent public employees from protecting their jobs by simply neglecting particular responsibilities. Riley, 425 F.3d at 361. 22 Allen argues that we must look beyond his official job description to consider the tasks he actually performed. To reach this point on summary judgment, however, he must provide specific facts demonstrating that the description was unreliable and unauthoritative. See id. He must show, for example, that the description has been manipulated in some manner by officials looking to expand their political power. Id. Practically, we look to see how the description was created and when, and how often, it was updated. Id. The job description before us, for Bureau Chief, Accounting and Auditing, is dated June 1, 1985. The document bears no outward indications of having been recently manipulated to be suddenly drawn within the realm of policymaking. Moreover, at no point in this litigation has Allen suggested that the description is unreliable. Contrarily, Allen relied on the official description himself to argue that, when viewed in the light most favorable to his case, the Bureau Chief position was not one requiring political loyalty. Plaintiff's Br. at 15-16. Given this implicit acceptance, we look solely to the job description to determine if political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement, thus warranting summary judgment for the defendants. See Pierson, 437 F.3d at 588. 23 In reviewing Allen's job description, we see that his former position has broad discretion and authority over IDOT accounting and auditing. The Bureau Chief is responsible for establishing fiscal control procedures, directing internal and external audits, and informing management of possible problems in expenditures or fiscal agreements. In directing these concerns and possible solutions to his superior, the Director of Finance and Administration, the Bureau Chief has considerable input into government decisionmaking and the implementation of goals stemming from that process. 24 Additionally, the effective and reliable execution of the Bureau's audit function is of great political value. The Bureau Chief oversees the formulation of audit policies, procedures, and special examinations. These audits are conducted on both the internal functions of the IDOT and the Department's contracts with third-parties. The audits ensure the Department's efficient operation and the reliability of its financial data. The effective implementation of this policy has great impact on the administration's public reputation. See Selch, 5 F.3d at 1046 (holding subdistrict superintendents of Indiana Department of Highways exempt from First Amendment employment protections because of the significant representative role their work played in relation to the political administration). The Bureau Chief is then responsible for coordinating IDOT audits with the Federal Highway Administration, as well as communicating with the Illinois Auditor General and Legislative Audit Commission on Departmental audits. External audits such as these have the potential to cause great embarrassment for the administration if it is revealed that the Department is not operating in a fiscally efficient manner. See Auditor: IDOT Reorganization Costs Taxpayers, CHICAGO BUSINESS, Mar. 8, 2006 at http://www.chicagobusiness. com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=19785. 25 Further, the Bureau Chief serves an important role in representing the IDOT in a larger political context. One of the [m]ajor challenges of the Bureau Chief's job is to respond to legislator questions on fund expenditures in their districts. In Selch, we held that similar communications with public officials regarding highway expenditures required political sensitivity, thus demonstrating a need for political loyalty. 5 F.3d at 1046-47. 26 Allen claims, however, that when viewed in a light most favorable to his claim, the job description demonstrates that political affiliation is an inappropriate hiring criterion. He directs our attention to the fact that the Bureau Chief is constrained by [s]tate and [f]ederal regulations, Departmental rules and regulations, and the general goals and objectives established by the Secretary. Defendants' Br. at A3. Because his actions had to comport with the Secretary's goals, he argues, he was not in a position to formulate policy that would result in the kind of principled disagreement addressed in Kiddy-Brown. But, if the inability to set goals contrary to those of one's superior was the test for determining the appropriateness of considering political affiliation in government hiring, no employee under the governor would be found exempt from First Amendment protection. Instead, we look to the ability to offer input into government decisionmaking. In creating and implementing Department accounting and audit policies, reviewing third-party agreements and proposing changes to the content of these agreements, Allen did indeed have the requisite input to exempt him from the First Amendment's protection. Selch, 5 F.3d at 1046; Wilbur v. Mahan, 3 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir.1993). We find that when viewed in the light most favorable to Allen, the job description presents no genuine issue of material fact as to the whether political affiliation was an appropriate hiring criterion for the position of Bureau Chief of Accounting and Auditing.