Opinion ID: 1586390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: what constitutes use of a motor vehicle

Text: 2. In assuming exclusive supervisory control of the Zaske truck in the congested area, was Woodrich using the vehicle? The broad and common meaning of the word use compels an affirmative answer. The use of a motor vehicle does not require that the user, or the user's agent, be its actual operator. It is common knowledge that the use of a motor vehicle may be furnished by the owner to another with or without a driver. Many decisions have in effect recognized use as going beyond the narrow meaning of the direct mechanical operation performed by the driver and as encompassing the broader concept of employing or putting the vehicle into one's service by an act which assumes at any time  with the consent of the owner or his agent  the supervisory control or guidance of its movements. [2] In conformity to these holdings, Black, Law Dictionary (3 ed.) p. 1787, defines use as follows: To make use of, to convert to one's service, to avail one's self of, to employ. We conclude that the moment Woodrich exercised supervisory control over the Zaske truck upon its entrance into the congested area, he employed the truck to carry out his own purpose of constructing a concrete pavement. 3. Without question Woodrich, as the general contractor, assumed control of the truck in the congested area with the consent of subcontractor Baker and of Zaske who owned and drove the truck. Where, as an incident of and in the furtherance of his construction work, a general contractor assumes active control or guidance of a backward movement of a truck provided by a subcontractor, and his negligence in the exercise of that control and guidance is a proximate cause of the accident, [3] the general contractor thereby participates in the operation of the truck to such an extent as to be a user of the vehicle. When the general contractor becomes legally obligated to pay damages proximately caused by such a negligent use of the vehicle, he falls within the meaning of insurance contract provisions (here found in the Indemnity, Aetna, and Milwaukee policies) which provide coverage for the insured for all sums which he shall become legally obligated to pay as damages for injuries to any person caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile. In view of our holding that Woodrich's act of assuming control and guidance of the backing movement of the Zaske truck constituted a use of the vehicle within the meaning of the above policies, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether such backing movement was a part of an unloading operation. That an assumption of control and supervision of a backing movement of a truck, separate and independent of any unloading thereof, may constitute a use within the omnibus provisions of such policies has been recognized by other courts. See, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Steenberg Const. Co. (8 Cir.) 225 F. (2d) 294.