Opinion ID: 2791670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: strong’s claims

Text: A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Strong’s Conviction for Aiding and Abetting the Carjacking Strong claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aiding and abetting a carjacking. We have already stated the applicable standard of review for sufficiency-of-theevidence challenges. With respect to aiding and abetting, we have held that the “defendant [must] in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate[] in it as something he wishes to bring about, and that he seek by his action to make it succeed.” United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 533–34 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc), we rejected defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for aiding and abetting a carjacking in violation of Michigan law. Id. at 534. In reaching this decision, we pointed to a number of factors that made the carjacking in Davis different from that in Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2006), where we sustained the defendant’s challenge to the 16 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al. sufficiency of the evidence. We noted, for instance, that “there was no evidence that Brown arrived at the scene with the perpetrator,” while “Davis arrived at the scene with Washington [the principal], raising a compelling inference that they were previously acquainted.” Id. at 533. In addition, “the behavior of Brown and Davis before and during the carjacking differed significantly. Brown engaged in no overt acts to indicate that he was involved in the crime,” while Davis stood watch by a restaurant window. Id. “Another key difference between [Davis] and Brown is that Davis fled the scene in the stolen vehicle.” Id. Davis was also found breaking down the car for parts when police later apprehended him. Id. Although we are cognizant that Davis involved a state carjacking statute which came to our court on habeas review (therefore requiring us also to apply AEDPA deference to Davis’s claim), we find its analysis nonetheless instructive. Indeed, each factor discussed in Davis appears to point in the government’s favor here. At trial, Hall testified that he saw Banks and Strong walk down the street together, with both men approaching him in concert. R. 84 (Trial Tr. at 395) (Page ID #607). Hall described Strong as standing “between the driveway and the front of the house,” where “[h]e could see the back of the house and he could see the front of the house.” Id. at 400 (Page ID #612). Strong was not, in other words, a passive observer—he positioned himself so that he could have a full view of any passers-by. Strong’s lookout role ended when Banks retrieved Hall’s keys, at which point both Strong and Banks got into Hall’s Lexus and drove off, together. Police arrested the two men soon afterwards, while they were driving the same car. 17 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al. We are unconvinced by Banks’s statement, given to officers after arrest and introduced by these officers at trial, that Strong “didn’t have anything to do with this. He was telling me to stop and pull over.” R. 85 (Trial Tr. at 636) (Page ID #848). Taken alone, this statement might have turned Strong’s claim into a closer call. See, e.g., Brown, 441 F.3d at 352 (noting that “[t]he state [had] offered no evidence that Brown had ever met the gunman prior to arriving at the gas station, that Brown possessed a weapon or handed one to the gunman, or that Brown knew that the gunman was going to commit a robbery and carjacking”). Strong, however, also made a number of phone calls from jail. During these calls, “he discussed how these events would show people on the outside that he now meant business and how he would avoid these charges or evade the charges because . . . Banks was going to take the charges for him because there was no point in both of them being in custody.” R. 87 (Strong Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 15) (Page ID #1050). Strong further described events during the police chase and “essentially suggested … that th[e] lady [they ran into] caused the accident.” Id. at 56 (Page ID #1091). Strong did not challenge the admission of these calls into evidence at trial, and does not now challenge their admissibility on appeal. The district court concluded, based on the facts described above, that “[t]his is not a case where any reasonable person, any person whose mind is open to the evidence can find differently than the jury found.” Id. at 25 (Page ID #1060). We agree. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Strong’s § 924(c) Conviction Next, Strong contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aiding and abetting the brandishing and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al. in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). To prove aiding and abetting under § 924(c), the government must show both an affirmative act and intent. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014). The affirmative-act requirement is met easily here. “[T]he commission of a drug trafficking (or violent) crime is—no less than the use of a firearm—an essential conduct element of the § 924(c) offense.” Id. at 1247 (internal quotation marks omitted). Carjacking is a violent crime, and we have already determined that the evidence was sufficient to find Strong liable for aiding and abetting that crime. Many of the facts discussed above also go to intent. Strong and Banks walked towards Hall together, and Strong served as a lookout while Banks approached Hall with weapons drawn. Strong might have wanted Banks to use only the taser but, “if a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun was displayed or used by a confederate, the jury can permissibly infer from his failure to object or withdraw that he had such knowledge.” Id. at 1250 n.9. Strong continued to participate by fleeing with Banks, and then, after his arrest, boasting about his actions. These facts were sufficient to satisfy the intent and affirmative-act requirements. C. Application of Cross-Reference Provision for Attempted Murder Finally, Strong argues that the district court improperly cross-referenced his felon-inpossession conviction with attempted murder. On this point, because Strong is not contesting his conviction for felon-in-possession, see Strong Appellant Br. at 24 n.8, the district court properly looked first to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, which prescribes base offense levels for that offense. However, “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with the 19 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al. commission or attempted commission of another offense,” see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c), we are, as we did with Banks, to look at § 2X1.1(a), which instructs us to apply “[t]he base offense level from the guideline for the [other] substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty.” The other “substantive offense” here is attempted murder, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, not because Strong attempted to murder Hall, but because Banks attempted to murder Hall. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, “the base offense level” for “cross references in Chapter Two” “shall be determined . . . in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), [by] all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). In other words, for Strong’s felon-in-possession conviction, the district court held Strong to the base offense level of attempted murder, because (1) he possessed a gun, and (2) he possessed this gun “in connection with the commission” of Banks’s attempted murder of Hall, which was, according to the district court, a reasonably foreseeable act in furtherance of the carjacking. Our review of this conclusion requires us to tackle three separate but related issues. First, we must determine whether the district court properly invoked the cross-reference and relevantconduct provisions—i.e., whether the firearm that Strong used or possessed was “in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c). We 20 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al. review this decision de novo. United States v. Tocco, 306 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2002). Second, we must examine whether the district court clearly erred in finding Banks’s decision to shoot at Hall to be reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the carjacking. Id. Third, we must find that the district court made particularized findings on the record (1) that the decision to shoot at Hall was within the scope of the agreement between Strong and Banks and (2) that the decision to shoot was foreseeable to Strong. See United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 399– 400 (6th Cir. 2002). We answer the first question in the affirmative. Although the district court determined that Banks shot at Hall, we have held before that “the use of a firearm in related conduct can trigger § 2K2.1(c)(1)’s cross reference to § 2X1.1’s enhancement provision even if the weapon used in the enhancement conduct is not the same as the weapon used in the offense conduct.” United States v. Howse, 478 F.3d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 2007). “[T]he district court may apply Guidelines § 2K2.1(c)(1) [so long as] it finds a clear connection” between the firearms in question. United States v. Settle, 414 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 2005). That clear connection has been demonstrated here. Strong was convicted of possessing a revolver which was found at the scene of his arrest, along with Banks’s semi-automatic pistol. Although a close call, we also think that the district court did not clearly err in finding Banks’s decision to shoot at Hall to be reasonably foreseeable to Strong and in furtherance of the carjacking. Our conclusion is guided by Commentary from the Guidelines, which states that “the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable 21 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al. conduct of others in furtherance of that criminal activity, are not necessarily identical.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2. To illustrate this point, the Guidelines provide us with the following example: [T]wo defendants agree to commit a robbery and, during the course of that robbery, the first defendant assaults and injures a victim. The second defendant is accountable for the assault and injury to the victim (even if the second defendant had not agreed to the assault and had cautioned the first defendant to be careful not to hurt anyone) because the assaultive conduct was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature of the offense). Id. We find this situation analogous to the facts here. Both Strong and Banks approached Hall, with Banks carrying a loaded gun. Banks also carried a taser; presumably, Banks would use the taser first, but would use the firearm if things got out of hand. When things did in fact get out of hand, Banks shot at Hall, and left after believing that Hall had been shot. Given both the nature of this crime (the federal carjacking statute requires defendants to act “with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm”) and the facts specific to this case, we think that Banks’s attempted murder of Hall was reasonably foreseeable. Finally, we believe that the district court made findings on the record that were sufficiently particularized. Under Campbell, “a district court must make two particularized findings: (1) that the acts were within the scope of the defendant’s agreement; and (2) that they were foreseeable to the defendant.” 279 F.3d at 399–400 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court clearly made findings with respect to foreseeability. See R. 87 (Strong Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 7) (Page ID #1042) (“The fact is that this [the shot at Hall] was a clearly foreseeable act.”). And, although the district court could have done a better job of outlining its reasoning with respect to scope, we think its findings here were also sufficiently particularized. 22 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al. It noted, for instance, that “[t]he defendants went to the location with a plan.” Id. Although “we’ll never know exactly what it was,” part of “[t]he plan was clearly to confront Hall and to take things.” Id. After a brief scuffle, Hall “made the decision to try to get away, and Banks discharged the firearm. The evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that the firearm was discharged in an effort to stop Hall and that it was unsuccessful, but he didn’t know that.” Id. at 8 (Page ID #1043) (emphasis added). The district court also concluded elsewhere at sentencing that the evidence was sufficient to convict Strong of carjacking, a crime that, by definition, requires an intent to cause serious bodily harm. We have previously upheld a defendant’s sentencing enhancement where the defendant’s partner brandished a gun and shot an off-duty security officer during a robbery, see United States v. Brown, 55 F. App’x 753, 754 (6th Cir. 2003), a crime similar to carjacking. See also United States v. Williamson, 530 F. App’x 402, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Brown and noting that defendant’s conduct can demonstrate agreement to engage in robbery and that brandishing of weapon during robbery was reasonably foreseeable). Thus, under the circumstances described above, we hold that the district court complied with Campbell’s particularized-findings analysis. We recognize the tension in subjecting Strong to a base offense level for a crime that the principal (Banks) has not even been convicted of committing. We recognize also that the interplay between these provisions resulted in Strong’s receiving a substantially higher base offense level than he otherwise would have received. But, after careful review, we hold that the district court properly applied each Guidelines provision against Strong. 23 Nos. 13-6536/14-5168, United States v. Strong et al.