Opinion ID: 172065
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantially Different Evidence?

Text: Even if we could say the Antrobuses's evidence was new, we still must ask whether it is unquestionably so different that it justifies departing from the district court's previous decision. In their current petition, the Antrobuses claim they can show that Hunter knew Talovic said something to the effect that he wanted a gun to use to rob a bank. But the district court's initial decision was explicitly premised on an assumption that Hunter at least believed Talovic wanted the gun to rob a bank. We cannot say that this difference is so substantial that it unquestionably calls into doubt the district court's initial ruling. As early as their initial motion seeking victim status, the Antrobuses argued from media reports that Talovic made statements to Hunter about wanting the gun to rob a bank. They also argued that this must be true because the government's indictment expressly charged that Hunter  knew and had reasonable cause to know that [Talovic] intended to carry or otherwise possess, or discharge or otherwise use the handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.  Dist. Ct. Doc 1 (Indictment) at 2 (emphasis added). In response to these arguments, the district court noted the absence of evidence supporting the Antrobuses' claim, but nonetheless proceeded on the assumption that Hunter surmised that Talovic might use [the gun] to rob a bank. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, at 10 (Jan. 3, 2008 order). It held, however, that [e]ven if Hunter believed that Talovic may commit a crime with the handgun, id. at 8, Hunter could not have reasonably foreseen the horrific nature of Talovic's plans. Later, the district court went a step further, clarifying that, in reaching its decision, it had assumed the alleged statement that Talovic told Hunter he would use the gun to commit a bank robbery was made. See Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, at 3 (Jan. 8, 2008 order). The new evidence that the Antrobuses seek to introduce adds little to this mix. The government's appellate brief in Hunter states merely that Talovic said something to the effect that he might rob a bank, and the Antrobuses suggest that its other witnesses will only confirm the point. Most generously, then, the Antrobuses' new evidence demonstrates only that Hunter knew  rather than just surmised, Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, at 10 (Jan. 3, 2008 order)  that Talovic intended to rob a bank. But that is not so substantial a difference as the Antrobuses insist. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), to surmise is to suspect, suppose, or imagine that something is true. By comparison, to know something is just to believe it to be true with a greater degree of moral certainty  or, as the OED puts it, with assurance and on... an adequate objective foundation. OED, entry for know, v. (quotation omitted). How sure Hunter was about his belief that Talovic intended to rob a bank is a question of degree and the petitioners have not shown that the answer to this question radically changes the proximate cause analysis as a matter of law. Neither have they even attempted to do so in their briefs before us. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the Antrobuses' new evidence is unquestionably so different that it justifies departing from the district court's initial decision. To be sure, we highlighted the difference between surmise and knowledge in Antrobus I. See 519 F.3d at 1125-26 & n. 1. As we stated then, the scope of proximate cause in firearm sales cases is not well-developed and is evolving, and it is at least conceivable that the difference between surmise and knowledge could prove meaningful in a proximate cause analysis. Id. But that is no longer the question before us. We are not writing on a clean slate about the law of proximate cause. Unless principles of finality are meaningless, the present petition poses the Antrobuses with a much higher hurdle than they faced, and failed to clear, in Antrobus I. The issue now is not whether Hunter's knowledge, as opposed to his surmise, about Talovic's intentions would make a difference in a proximate cause analysis. Rather, it is whether the gap between knowledge and surmise is so substantial that it unquestionably warrants reopening this litigation. Like the district court, we cannot say that it does in light of the lengthy and extensive history of this dispute, the district court's representation that it assumed Hunter's belief in Talovic's intent to rob a bank when making its original decision, the absence of any case law in this circuit contrary to the district court's proximate cause analysis, and the existence of extra-circuit case law supporting its view. See id. (also noting the more than seven-month gap between gun sale and crime, the very different nature of the crime actually committed from that Talovic allegedly told Hunter he might commit, and the lack of Talovic's juvenile status at the time of the crime, among other things).