Opinion ID: 1301441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: evidence of third-party threats

Text: Goynes claims that the court erred in excluding evidence of alleged third-party threats. Specifically, he contends that the court should have allowed him to introduce evidence of the drive-by shooting at his mother's residence and the alleged threat against him and his family on Murdertown's MySpace Web page. He argues that both pieces of evidence support his self-defense claim because they show why he reasonably feared Murdertown gang members and Lofton in particular as a member of the gang. He also argues the evidence demonstrates two additional points: why he was carrying a gun on the day of the shooting and that Lofton was the first aggressor. [3] To successfully assert a claim of self-defense as justification for the use of force, the defendant must have a reasonable and good faith belief in the necessity of such force. [3] The force used must be immediately necessary and must be justified under the circumstances. [4] This necessarily means that the defendant asserting a claim of self-defense may introduce evidence why he or she was justified in being fearful of the alleged victim or that the alleged victim was the first aggressor. [5] Here, however, Goynes is not attempting to introduce evidence of threats made by Lofton. Instead, he is attempting to introduce evidence of third-party threats made by Lofton's fellow gang members. We have not addressed the admissibility of threats which were made not by a victim, but by third parties associated with the victim. Other courts have held that evidence of third-party threats are admissible to support a claim of self-defense if there is also evidence from which the fact finder may find that the defendant reasonably connected the victim with those threats. [6] Assuming without deciding that third-party threats would be admissible in cases of self-defense, the district court did not err in excluding the testimony of the third-party threats. Goynes claims that the evidence of the alleged third-party threats shows that he reasonably feared for his life. We understand this argument to be that because Lofton's gang members had threatened Goynes' life, he was reasonable in using deadly force against Lofton. Goynes' testimony, however, does not support that conclusion. Goynes testified that he was not afraid of Lofton even though Lofton was a member of the Murdertown gang. And what most undermines Goynes' self-defense claim is his testimony that he shot Lofton not because he thought Lofton would kill him, but because he believed he was having a potentially lethal asthma attack while Lofton had him in a headlock. And remember, Goynes fired not one but four shots at Lofton as he was running away. Goynes makes two other arguments: (1) The threats also show that Lofton was the first aggressor and (2) they explain why Goynes was carrying a gun on the day of the shooting. But this evidence was before the jury even without evidence of these specific threats. First, the court allowed Goynes to testify that Lofton started the fight. And second, the court allowed him to testify that bad blood existed between Goynes' and Lofton's gangs and that Goynes had purchased the gun for his protection. So, even if Goynes had linked this evidence to Lofton, his argument fails to persuade us that he was prejudiced by the exclusion of these threats. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence relating to the alleged drive-by shooting and the alleged MySpace threat.