Opinion ID: 214784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Calculation of Sentencing Guidelines, Using Tucker's Prior Conviction for Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect as a Conviction for a Crime of Violence

Text: We review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court's application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion, and the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.2008) (italics omitted). We review de novo a district court's determination that a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d 738, 740 (9th Cir.2007). We use an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court's determination about whether a particular item is sufficiently reliable to be considered at sentencing. United States v. Pinto, 48 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir.1995). Here, the district court properly used the modified categorical approach to determine whether Tucker's prior conviction for Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect qualified as a crime of violence. See United States v. Contreras-Salas, 387 F.3d 1095, 1096-97 (9th Cir.2004). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the use of this approach in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1273, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010): When the law under which the defendant has been convicted contains statutory phrases that cover several different generic crimes, some of which require violent force and some of which do not, the modified categorical approach that we have approved, Nijhawan v. Holder, [___ U.S. ___] 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 [174 L.Ed.2d 22] (2009), permits a court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial recordincluding charging documents, [and] plea agreements. . . . Id. When using the modified categorical approach, we look to the factual description in the charging document to determine whether the crime to which a defendant pled guilty constitutes a crime of violence. See e.g., Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603, 610 (9th Cir.2008); Contreras-Salas, 387 F.3d at 1097-98. Tucker argues that the district court improperly relied on the PSR's description of the incident giving rise to his Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect conviction, pointing to the district judge's comments during sentencing about facts contained in the PSR but not in the Information. For example, the district judge stated that Tucker had beaten the child with a belt, and referenced the red marks on the child. However, the court twice clarified that it was relying only on the Information when calculating the applicable guidelines. The issue thus is whether the Information for Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect compels a finding of a crime of violence under the modified categorical approach. On first read, the language in the Information by permitting [Child] to be placed in a situation where he might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering might be problematic, as it could describe a non-violent crime. However, this possibility is foreclosed by the closing, qualifying phrase in the Informationby repeatedly attempting to strike the [Child] about the body with a beltwhich clarifies that Tucker personally attempted to strike the child, rather than placed the child in a position where he might be struck by someone else. Tucker's attempt to equate the Information in this case with the one in Contreras-Salas is not persuasive. In Contreras-Salas, the Information covered two defendants, described several ways in which the offense could have been committed, and used the conjunction and/or. Contreras-Salas, 387 F.3d at 1098 n. 2. Here, by contrast, the description of factual violence at the end of the Information makes it clear that Tucker pleaded guilty to his own volitional, violent conduct. The Information cannot be fairly read as allowing an alternative scenario whereby Tucker could have pled guilty to an offense that did not involve Tucker himself striking the child. Tucker also takes issue with the district court's assumption that the Information provided was the same charging document referenced in the plea agreement. However, Tucker does not offer any factual allegations suggesting that the Information submitted in the certified record was not the same Information to which Tucker pleaded. As the district judge noted, the charge of Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect was the same in the Information as in the Guilty Plea Agreement, both documents were certified copies from the Clerk of Court, and there was no evidence to suggest they were fabricated. Tucker did not point to a different Information that applied to his guilty plea, or otherwise suggest a reason why the Information being referenced might be inapplicable or unreliable. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the Information and concluding that Tucker pleaded guilty to the violent crime described therein. See United States v. Strickland, 601 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that the district court properly considered a docket sheet when applying the modified categorical approach because there were sufficient indicia of reliability and the defendant had not offered any reasonable ground for questioning the document).