Opinion ID: 581378
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conclusivity.

Text: 72 We next examine the conclusivity that a declaratory judgment would have on the legal relationship between the parties. Because much of the power granted to a corporate board of directors by the challenged statute would apply only if certain events and conditions arise, which may never happen, the district court determined that the second Step-Saver factor also weighed in favor of finding plaintiffs' complaint nonjusticiable. 73 According to plaintiffs, the district court's reasoning is based on a faulty premise, because the harm suffered by plaintiffs had already occurred and was continuing. Yet, as we have noted, the harm plaintiffs allege they have suffered because of the enactment of Act 36 does not make their complaint justiciable. Plaintiffs also contend that because their complaint presents a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Act 36, it is not necessary to postpone judicial review until it can be applied to a particular set of circumstances. Although we agree that it is not clear judicial review of Act 36 would benefit from further factual development, we are not persuaded that this makes up for the absence of a live controversy here. 74 As we have discussed, where the question presented is predominantly legal, such as one of federal preemption, the need for factual development is not as great. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. at 201, 103 S.Ct. at 1720; Employers Ass'n of New Jersey v. New Jersey, 601 F.Supp. 232 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir.1985) (table). But plaintiffs raising predominantly legal claims must still meet the minimum requirements for Article III jurisdiction. See Office of Communications of the United Church v. FCC, 826 F.2d at 105. ([T]he presence of 'a purely legal question' is not enough, of itself, to render a case ripe for judicial review, not even as to that issue.). Otherwise, plaintiffs could circumvent the case or controversy requirement by artfully pleading their constitutional claims. 75 Plaintiffs rely on Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Department of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836, 103 S.Ct. 81, 74 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). That case involved a Commerce Clause challenge to the constitutionality of federal legislation prohibiting the distribution of natural gas to residential users for outdoor lighting. At the time the action was filed, the statute had not been enforced against plaintiff natural gas distributors. Moreover, it was unclear how, and indeed whether, any of the states planned to enforce the legislation. 76 Nevertheless, the court of appeals hesitantly found the plaintiffs' challenge ripe for judicial review. Id. at 1363 n. 7. According to the court, the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claim is unlikely to change in substance or in clarity by virtue of an actual prosecution. Id. at 1364 n. 7. The court also noted that the plaintiffs are now, and will in the future be the most appropriate parties to raise the Commerce Clause objection. Id. The plaintiffs were the entities against whom fines will be levied for noncompliance, if and when the Act is enforced. Id. 77 Although we agree with the rationale of Atlanta Gas Light Co., we believe it is inapplicable here. The statute in that case had an immediate effect on the plaintiffs; it prohibited them from distributing natural gas to residential users and subjected violators to the threat of civil fines. By contrast, Act 36 has no such present impact on plaintiffs here. That is, it does not direct them to act or not act, or prevent or hinder them from acting in any particular manner to their detriment. Likewise, the Act does not subject plaintiffs to the threat of civil enforcement if they continue their activities. In short, unlike the plaintiffs in Atlanta Gas Light Co., plaintiffs here have not demonstrated that the hardship of postponing judicial review would be particularly great. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1516. 30 78 Ultimately, we are not persuaded that the facial nature of plaintiffs' predominantly legal claims makes up for the contingent nature of their complaint. As we have noted, plaintiffs' complaint is partially contingent on the existence of a takeover attempt which would trigger Act 36. SWT Acquisition Corp. v. TW Services, Inc., 700 F.Supp. 1323, is instructive. As we have discussed, that case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Delaware anti-takeover statute. Among other things, the plaintiff argued that the statute was preempted by the Williams Act. The action was dismissed for lack of ripeness, because the plaintiff had not yet made the tender offer it alleged the statute unconstitutionally deterred. Id. at 1330. See also Illinois ex rel. Barra v. Archer Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935, 942 (7th Cir.1983) (dismissing Supremacy Clause challenge to Illinois Strikebreakers Act for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of contingent nature of plaintiff's complaint). 79 Finally, plaintiffs maintain that a declaratory judgment would be conclusive, because it would establish that plaintiffs have been deprived of their property rights under Act 36. But, as we have discussed, although the need for a concrete set of facts is not as great where the issue is predominantly legal, the opposite is true in the takings context. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 294-95, 101 S.Ct. at 2370. This is the case here. 80 Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment challenge to Act 36 is predicated on the fiduciary duties provision. According to plaintiffs, this provision constitutes a fundamental change in the ownership interests of plaintiffs. However, because plaintiffs have not pointed to any instance where defendants have acted under this provision to plaintiffs' detriment, there is no means of assessing the change in the ownership interests effected. As the Supreme Court noted in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2565, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986), [a] court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes. 81 In sum, by its nature a declaratory judgment will almost always have some conclusive effect. But the conclusivity that a ruling on the constitutionality of Act 36 would have at this time does not make up for the lack of a live controversy here. Plaintiffs raising predominantly legal claims must still meet the minimum requirements for Article III jurisdiction. Because of the contingent nature of plaintiffs' complaint, we are not persuaded that these requirements have been satisfied here. Therefore, although a declaratory judgment here would be conclusive in some respects, we do not believe this alone makes plaintiffs' complaint justiciable. 82