Opinion ID: 62913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Justicibility

Text: TEA, the League of United Latin American Citizens (“LULAC”), and G.I. Forum12 argue that this court lacks jurisdiction under Article III to hear this appeal. Therefore, we will first consider whether or not the appellant has “made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the [appellees] within the meaning of Art. III.” Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. In order for there to be a justiciable case or controversy under 12 LULAC and G.I. Forum had previously intervened in this civil action. United States v. Texas (LULAC), 680 F.2d 356, 372-73 (5th Cir. 1982). Because of this prior intervention they were still parties to the proceeding when the School Districts petitioned to intervene. They did not participate in the bench trial, but they did participate pretrial (e.g. they filed a motion challenging the intervention of parties other than the School Districts and a response supporting TEA’s motion to dismiss). They also filed a joint brief in this court challenging the School Districts’ standing on appeal. Since the parties jointly filed their brief, for simplicity we will refer to arguments in the brief as being from LULAC only. 8 No. 06-41347 Article III, a litigant must show that he has standing. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 752, 758 (1982). Such a case or controversy must exist throughout the litigation; in other words, the case cannot be moot. Honig v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. 592, 601 (1988). This court is “obligated to address issues of jurisdiction, including mootness, prior to addressing the merits of an appeal.” Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999). LULAC argues this case is moot because the School Districts received the relief they requested in the district court, namely, the sanctions were vacated.13 LULAC’s contention is incorrect, however, because in their complaint the School Districts sought, in addition to having the fines vacated, a declaratory judgment holding that the student transfer provisions of the Modified Order exceeded the district court’s desegregation jurisdiction on its face and as applied by TEA, a decree vacating the student transfer provisions of the Modified Order, and a permanent injunction restraining TEA from regulating student transfers under the Modified Order. The district court did not grant the School Districts any of these forms of relief, so the School Districts’ claims for equitable relief are not moot. However, we must still decide whether the School Districts have standing to seek these alternative forms of relief. In order for a plaintiff to have sufficient standing under Article III, that plaintiff must show that: he has suffered or will suffer an injury, his injury is 13 LULAC also argues that if we were to decide this case it would be an advisory opinion because there are not sufficiently adverse parties. We do not agree with this contention. TEA has a sufficiently adverse interest to the School Districts in this case because it continues to maintain that the School Districts are not entitled to be exempted from the Modified Order, the very thing the School District seeks. LULAC itself also had the opportunity to challenge the School Districts’ request for relief in its brief and at oral argument. Finally, the United States participated in all aspects of this case up until the appellate phase and it too was challenging the School Districts’ claims that they should no longer have to abide by the Modified Order. We therefore believe that there were parties with sufficiently adverse interests involved in this case to ensure a proper case and controversy. See Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1999). 9 No. 06-41347 traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and a favorable federal court decision will likely redress the injury.14 Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997). Here the School Districts’ injury is being subjected to an injunctive remedy, the Modified Order, which potentially imposes monetary fines, places them at risk of losing their accreditation, and limits their ability to accept student transfers that they would otherwise be permitted to accept under Texas law.15 What makes this case unique is that the School Districts were not a party to the original suit. If the School Districts had been a party directly bound by the Modified Order there would be no question that they had standing to challenge the Modified Order. Here the School Districts were not a party to the Modified Order, but their actions are collaterally constrained by the Modified Order because it prohibits TEA from funding student transfers to their school that exceed the one- or three-percent threshold, and without funding they cannot afford to accept such transfers. While we have found no cases directly on point, this situation is analogous to cases where this circuit has held that a third party had standing to appeal an injunction which adversely affects its interest, even when it was not a party to 14 Neither TEA nor LULAC argue that the School Districts’ alleged injury is not redressable or traceable. TEA has admitted that its only authority to impose sanctions on school districts because of student transfers flows from its obligation to implement the Modified Order, so the potential sanctions are traceable to the Modified Order. Additionally, if this court were to provide the School Districts with their requested relief, a declaration that the Modified Order should not be applied to them, their alleged injury would be redressed. Therefore, the School Districts satisfy these two prongs of Article III standing. 15 While the district court’s order held that TEA can no longer deny the School Districts funding for unapproved transfers as long they continue to fall within the sparsity adjustment (applicable to districts with 90 to less than 130 students, see note 11 supra), there is no guarantee that their enrollment will not exceed the sparsity adjustment in the future. In fact, Harrold enrolled 129 students for the 2003-2004 school year and Samnorwood enrolled 134 students during the 2004-2005 school year. Additionally, the Modified Order instructs TEA to revoke the accreditation of school districts that continue to enroll a transfer student that exceeds the three-percent rule after ten days of being informed that the transfer student is ineligible. This mandate of the Modified Order would apply whether or not the school falls within the sparsity adjustment. 10 No. 06-41347 the litigation. See United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 445 F.3d 771, 780-81 (5th Cir. 2006) (judgment creditors had standing to challenge a restraining order that affected their ability to execute on assets, even though they were not a party to the case where the restraining order was entered), approved in this respect en banc, 493 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Castillo v. Cameron County, Tex., 238 F.3d 339, 349 n.16 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the state of Texas had Article III standing to appeal an injunction even though it was a nonparty because the injunction adversely affected its interests); Charga v. San Antonio Light Div. of Hearst Corp., 701 F.2d 354, 358-60 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that newspapers and reporters had standing to appeal a court order closing a pretrial bail reduction hearing at the request of a criminal defendant).16 In each of these cases, this court held that the challenging party had standing because the equitable relief granted by the district courts placed a burden on the challenging party which gave them a personal stake in the litigation. The case before us is no different.17 The Modified Order, and TEA’s 16 Other circuits have held that there was standing in similar circumstances. See United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[N]on-parties who are bound by a court’s equitable decrees have a right to move to have the order dissolved, . . . and other circuits have held that where a non-party is purportedly bound by an injunction, the non-party may bring an appeal rather than face the possibility of a contempt proceeding.”); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 94 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding standing for nonparty where injunction confronted nonparty “with the choice of either conforming its conduct to the dictates of the injunction or ignoring the injunction and risking contempt proceedings”); In re Piper Funds, Inc., Institutional Gov’t Income Portfolio Litig., 71 F.3d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1995) (“A nonparty normally has standing to appeal when it is adversely affected by an injunction.”). 17 That the School Districts intervened in this longstanding case to challenge the Modified Order and its application rather than attempting to enter litigation at the appellate phase, as in the cited cases, is of no significance to the question of standing. A party must have standing at all points of the litigation. Honig v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. 592, 601 (1988). So if the adverse affects of the equitable relief were sufficient to provide standing to the parties to appeal in the cited cases, similar adverse affects from the Modified Order are sufficient to give the School Districts standing when they intervened in the district court and now to appeal the decision of that court. 11 No. 06-41347 regulations to enforce it, impose severe penalties if the School Districts fail to adhere to TEA’s reporting requirement or accept a transfer that trips the oneor three-percent rule.18 The School Districts also expend time and resources complying with the Modified Order every time they seek to accept a transfer student. Finally, the Modified Order effectively prohibits the School Districts from doing something that they contend they are permitted to do under Texas law and the United States Constitution: accept as many transfer students, of any race or ethnicity, as they wish if they do so in a nondiscriminatory manner. In two school districts that rely on transfer students for their financial viability, this is not a consequence to be ignored. For these reasons, the Modified Order presents a real adverse impact on theses schools, and therefore, they have standing to challenge its application to them.19 At its core standing is about ensuring that a party with a sufficiently strong interest is the one who brings a cause of action. See Baker v. Carr, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703 (1962) (The question of standing is whether the party seeking relief has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions?”); see also Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 (1968) (“[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a 18 Although the monetary fines have been lifted in this case, TEA is free to impose the fines for not reporting in the future and if either school falls outside the sparsity adjustment they are again subject to fines for violating the three-percent rule. 19 If we were to hold that the School Districts did not have standing in this case, their only available recourse would be to violate the Modified Order and wait to be sanctioned. We have not required this of parties under a district court’s equitable power in the past. See Castillo v. Cameron County, Tex., 238 F.3d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the fact that a party could be found in contempt for violating the court order in the future was a sufficient injury to provide standing for a pre-enforcement challenge to the decree). 12 No. 06-41347 particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.”) Here the school districts are challenging whether the Modified Order can properly be applied to them. We can think of no better party to raise such a claim than the School Districts themselves.