Opinion ID: 2028172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Terms of Probation.

Text: A professional licensing board's authority to impose sanctions against those it licenses is extremely broad. See Board of Dental Examiners v. Hufford, 461 N.W.2d 194, 202 (Iowa 1990). The purpose of statutory licensing schemes is to protect the public health, safety and welfare of the people of Iowa. Id.; see also Burns I, 495 N.W.2d at 700. We therefore construe licensing statutes liberally to carry out that purpose. See Hufford, 461 N.W.2d at 202. The gist of Burns' assertion that the board abused its discretion in imposing conditions on her probation is that there is not enough evidence that she has a drinking problem to justify requiring her to receive treatment. We determined in Burns I that substantial evidence supports the board's finding of habitual intoxication. Burns I, 495 N.W.2d at 701. She also attempts to reargue her constitutional claims by asserting section 147.55(4) is too vague to provide guidelines for determining appropriate sanctions. Our decision in Burns II determined the statute's constitutional validity. We cannot find the board abused its discretion in requiring Burns to undergo inpatient treatment or in ordering any of the other conditions of her probation. An abuse of discretion is synonymous with unreasonableness. Frank v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 386 N.W.2d 86, 87 (Iowa 1986). Unreasonableness is defined as action in the face of evidence as to which there is no room for a difference of opinion among reasonable minds or not based on substantial evidence. Id. (citation omitted). There is ample evidence that Burns has an alcohol problem. See Burns I, 495 N.W.2d at 699-700. As a health care provider, Burns' problem with alcohol poses a serious concern for public health and safety. See id. at 701. The board shoulders the responsibility of protecting the public interests when it regulates professional nursing services. Id. at 700. When the licensing board is made up of members of the profession they are licensing, the court should not second guess the board's discretion to determine what conditions should be attached to probation. Cf. Meads v. Iowa Dep't of Social Servs., 366 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Iowa 1985) (in fashioning remedies, courts should defer to agency expertise rather than declare rights of the parties in the first instance). The authority to set terms of probation is subsumed in the board's broad authority to suspend or revoke a nursing license. See Hufford, 461 N.W.2d at 202. There is no need to make specific findings to support the conditions of probation. Id. Other jurisdictions also give great deference to a licensing authority's discipline of the professionals it licenses. See, e.g., Massa v. Department of Registration & Educ., 116 Ill.2d 376, 385, 107 Ill.Dec. 661, 666, 507 N.E.2d 814, 819 (1987) (court defers to agency sanctions unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.); Ahsaf v. Nyquist, 37 N.Y.2d 182, 184, 371 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707, 332 N.E.2d 880, 881 (1975) (licensing body has authority to punish licensees unless the measures are shockingly unfair); Yurick v. Commonwealth, 43 Pa.Commw. 248, 252, 402 A.2d 290, 292 (Commw.Ct.1979) (court will not substitute its own judgment if the penalty is reasonable). In light of the public health and safety concerns posed by a nurse with an alcohol problem, the board's imposition of stringent terms of probation designed to assure the health and safety of both nurse Burns and the public was not unreasonable. The district court's decision that Burns' constitutional claim was precluded by the decision in the declaratory judgment action is affirmed, but its decision that the board abused its discretion by imposing inpatient treatment and aftercare as a condition of her probation is reversed. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.