Opinion ID: 2582375
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith

Text: Ordinarily, when evaluating claims advanced under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, it [is] necessary to examine whether or not the activity interfered with by the state was motivated by and rooted in a legitimate and sincerely held religious belief, whether or not the parties' free exercise of religion had been burdened by the regulation, the extent or impact of the regulation on the parties' religious practices, and whether or not the state had a compelling interest in the regulation which justified such a burden. Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai`i 217, 247, 953 P.2d 1315, 1345 (1998) (brackets in original) (citing State ex rel. Minami v. Andrews, 65 Haw. 289, 291, 651 P.2d 473, 474 (1982)); accord Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19, 92 S.Ct. 1526. Nevertheless, in Smith, the United States Supreme Court distinguished governmental regulations of general applicability, holding that they are, under certain circumstances, immune from claims or defenses raised under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. See discussion infra. Specifically, the Smith Court addressed the issue whether applicants may be denied unemployment compensation benefits based upon an Oregon statute disqualifying persons terminated for work-related misconduct, if the misconduct relied upon as the basis for disqualification is the religiously motivated ingestion of a substance prohibited by Oregon's controlled substance law. The Smith Court first reiterated the well-settled notion that religious beliefs are beyond the reach of permissible governmental regulation, to the extent that government may neither compel nor preclude acquiescence in a particular belief as such. 494 U.S. at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.). Moreover, although attendant conduct does not enjoy the same degree of immunity, id. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (Laws . . . are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . .) (Quotation marks omitted.) (Some ellipses in original and some added.) (Citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878).), governmental regulation that targets the religious motivation behind such conduct would not pass constitutional muster. To wit, a State would be prohibiting the free exercise of religion if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. Id. at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (quotation marks omitted) (brackets removed). Respondents, however, desired to expand the analysis one step further in seeking to preclude interference with religiously motivated conduct by a governmental regulation that does not target the religious motivation behind the conduct and that is concededly constitutional as applied to other persons seeking to engage in such conduct for nonreligious reasons ( i.e., recreational purposes). Id. at 878, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court pointed out that previous opinions have upheld neutral and generally applicable laws against constitutional challenges based upon the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, citing such cases as Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (rejecting a claim that laws prohibiting polygamy could not be enforced against those whose religion commanded the practice), Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940) (Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.), Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (holding that child labor laws may constitutionally be applied to preclude a mother from causing her children to distribute literature on the streets in spite of her religious motivation), Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion) (upholding Sunday-closing laws against the claim that such laws burdened the religious practices of those whose religions precluded them from working on other days), Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (upholding conscription against a claim asserted by persons who opposed the war on religious grounds), United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (rejecting a claim for a religious exemption from social security taxes on the ground that the Amish faith prohibited participation in governmental support programs), and Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (rejecting a claim that the payment of income taxes burdened the free exercise of religion by making participation in religious activities more difficult). Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-80, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court acknowledged that it had, in the past, upheld First Amendment challenges to the application of neutral and generally applicable laws to religiously motivated conduct, but only in such cases where the free exercise clause was implicated in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press . . . or the right of parents . . . to direct the education of their children. . . . Id. at 881, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court concluded that Reynolds and its progeny plainly controll[ed] inasmuch as Oregon's controlled substances law was neutral, generally applicable, and did not implicate other core constitutional concerns. Id. at 882, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Respondents also argued that even though exemption from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in [ Sherbert ]. Id. at 882-83, 110 S.Ct. 1595. However, the Court expressly rejected the application of the Sherbert test to a generally applicable criminal law. Id. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court reasoned as follows: The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development. Lyng [ v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451[, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534] (1988) ]. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is compelling  permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, to become a law unto himself, Reynolds [, 98 U.S. at 1671-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. Id. at 885, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (footnote omitted). [6] Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, concluding that [b]ecause respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug. Id. at 890, 110 S.Ct. 1595.