Opinion ID: 1951916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Concerning Kevin Wrigley

Text: The State presented the testimony of Kevin Wrigley, who alleged that he shared a jail cell with defendant for one night, during which time defendant made several inculpatory remarks. At trial, Wrigley at first could not identify defendant. Wrigley explained that it was dark in the cell, that he spent only one night there with defendant, and that he was lying down most of the time. Wrigley asserted that defendant was talking with an inmate named James, who was the third person sharing the cell. Wrigley noted that defendant told him his name was Richard Feaster and that he was roughly the same height as Wrigley. Defense counsel requested a sidebar and objected to the admission of Wrigley's testimony, arguing that no substantial reason existed to believe Wrigley was in the same cell as defendant. Outside the presence of the jury, the court conducted an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. Wrigley indicated the person in the cell had a tattoo on his arm that said Rich, and described him as a Caucasian with short hair. Wrigley recalled that defendant said his father worked in construction, and that his bail had been raised from one million to two million dollars. He went on to recall the inculpatory statements defendant had made, including his assertions that he blew some guy's head off, that he got a couple hundred dollars, and that he wanted to see what it felt like to kill somebody. According to Wrigley, he also recalled that defendant told James, another inmate in the cell who was being released from the holding cell to return to the general prison population, that he should tell Mike Shalowski or something like that that defendant was there. On cross-examination, Wrigley admitted that I really don't remember what [defendant] looks like. The judge then excused Wrigley from the stand before entertaining argument on the matter. On his way out of the courtroom, Wrigley stated to the prosecutor that I think that's him. I think that's him sitting there, referring to defendant. The court called Wrigley back to the stand, and Wrigley explained that he previously could not see defendant seated at the end of the defense table from his vantage point in the witness stand. In allowing Wrigley to testify, the court observed that, based on its experience in that courtroom, testifying witnesses who are not positioned at the forefront of the witness stand do not have a complete view of the courtroom. The court also noted that Wrigley gave very specific information that was consistent with information about [defendant's] circumstances, and concluded that it was satisfied that there's sufficient indicia of reliability to allow this witness to testify. The jury returned and Wrigley delivered his damaging testimony against defendant. Defense counsel conducted a rigorous cross-examination, during which Wrigley's initial inability to identify defendant and the dark condition of the jail cell were highlighted. During the presentation of defendant's case, the deputy warden of the Gloucester County jail testified that, according to jail records, Wrigley had been in a holding cell on three separate dates, but no record existed indicating that defendant had ever been in a holding cell. However, both the State and defendant did stipulate that defendant was in a holding cell on November 8 and 9, 1995. According to the jail records, Wrigley had not been in holding cells on those dates. Defendant asserts that Wrigley did not provide a sufficient foundation under N.J.R.E. 602 for his assertion of personal knowledge regarding the subject of his testimony. Defendant contends that the jail records and the possibility that Wrigley learned the facts of the case from newspaper accounts rendered the testimony too unreliable to be admissible. Because Wrigley's testimony that defendant wanted to see what it felt like to kill went directly to the finding of defendant's intent to kill, defendant argues that his purposeful-or-knowing murder conviction must be reversed. Defendant also maintains that his death sentence must be reversed in any event, because the thrill-kill aspect of Wrigley's testimony poisoned the penalty phase. We find that a reasonable jury could conclude that a conversation between defendant and Wrigley occurred, and that the court's admission of Wrigley's testimony was therefore appropriate. N.J.R.E. 602 provides: Except as otherwise provided by Rule 703 (bases of opinion testimony by experts), a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. Here, any perceived inadequacies in Wrigley's testimony concern the weight it was to be accorded by the jury, not its admissibility. Wrigley described defendant's physical appearance, including defendant's Rich tattoo, and recounted what defendant told him about the murderwhich corroborated the accounts rendered by other testifying witnesses, namely Shiplee and Sadlowski. Also, after some initial difficulty, Wrigley was able to identify defendant in court as the individual with whom he had shared the jail cell. Clearly, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Wrigley's account was true. The question concerning the jail records does not change our conclusion. As the State demonstrated, those records did not indicate that defendant was ever in the jail, although both parties stipulated that defendant was in fact there. A reasonable basis therefore existed for the jury to find that the jail records were simply inaccurate as they related to defendant. Indeed, there were vulnerable areas of Wrigley's testimony, and defense counsel properly highlighted those problems for the jury. We are satisfied that the State provided an adequate foundation to support the admissibility of Wrigley's testimony and that the trial court's ruling admitting Wrigley's testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Defendant also asserts that the trial court improperly endorsed Wrigley's testimony. As noted above, Wrigley initially failed to identify defendant. However, on his way out of the courtroom, he remarked that he did recognize defendant sitting at the defense table. Wrigley explained that he did not have a full view from the witness stand due to an obstruction. The trial court agreed, observing that the view was obstructed unless a witness was sitting at the very front of the witness box. When the jury returned, the prosecutor resumed direct examination. After the court instructed Wrigley to roll his witness chair forward and lean forward, the prosecutor again attempted to have him identify defendant: Q: Now, take a good look around [for] this person who identified himself as Richard Feaster, do you see him in court? A: Yeah. Q: Okay. Where is he? A: (Witness indicates.) Q: Now The Court: You're pointing. I want to be able to say for the record who you're pointing to. The individual to your extreme left, sitting down at the table? A: Yes. The Court: Go ahead. That is the defendant. By [the State]: Q: And prior to the jury being taken out, could you see him in the courtroom? A: No. Q: Because of what? A: Cause of this, sitting back. The Court: This being the side of the bench where I'm sitting, which is an obstruction if you're sitting too far back. Go ahead.