Opinion ID: 1649918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Requirement of Security for Future Support Payments

Text: The appellant next contends that the trial court's order to deposit $10,000 of the $21,000 paid to him in satisfaction of his mortgage lien in trust as security for the future payment of child support, was in effect amending a property division and therefore the court exceeded its jurisdiction in amending the property division. See: sec. 247.32, Stats. 1975. [10] We find this contention to be without merit as the court did not change the intent of the original divorce decree or require the appellant to reconvey property previously granted to him pursuant to the divorce judgment, but only required the appellant to put up money as security for the future payment of his support obligations. In its decision, the court stated: Now, the third point is whether or not any money should be sequestered for the benefit of these children. I don't think I'd necessarily be doing a disservice to the defendant [Matthew Poehnelt] by requiring him to put up some money. I'm not saying that he can't have the interest and earnings off of it, but I'm going to order that [$]10,000 of the [$]21,000 be placed in trust. [7] Sec. 247.30, Stats. 1975, [11] authorizes trial courts to require that sufficient security be provided to insure the full payment of support orders for minor children according to the judgment of divorce. See also: Caldwell v. Caldwell, 5 Wis.2d 146, 92 N.W.2d 356 (1958). Moreover, a trial court is empowered, if necessary, to modify the provision for security at any time. See: Beck v. First National Bank in Oshkosh, 244 Wis. 418, 12 N.W. 2d 665 (1944). Thus, in view of the above statute, case law and the fact that the defendant had been unable to accumulate any savings, combined with his past arrearage in temporary child support, the trial court was authorized to require the appellant to provide sufficient security to insure future payment of support. [8,9] This court has stated that the matter of ordering security for child support is a question to be determined by the trial court in the exercise of its inherent discretionary powers. Caldwell v. Caldwell, supra . In Caldwell, the parent obligated to pay support gave the court grounds to suspect that he might fail to accept his obligation of child support payments and thus the court found it to be a proper case . . . in which to require the husband to give security for the support of the minor child. Id. at 164. On appeal, our concern in this case is whether the trial court could conclude from the appellant's past performance in the payment of support that he could not be relied on to keep up his obligation until some legal force was exerted on him. Foregger, supra . The policy supporting the requirement of security is to insure the timely payment of support obligations without the necessity of resorting to contempt proceedings. Id. In this case, there was evidence that the defendant had been in arrears in his temporary support payments pending the final adjudication of the divorce action. [12] Therefore, we hold that, based on the defendant's history of arrearage in the payment of temporary child support and his inability to accumulate any savings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the appellant to provide security for the payment of the modified child support obligation.