Opinion ID: 3178942
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Independent DNA Expert 3

Text: 3 On appeal, the Respondent argues that this COA is erroneous because it expands Petitioner’s argument beyond the claim he presented to the district court. In particular, the Respondent asserts that Petitioner challenged his trial counsel’s failure to call a specific DNA expert, Coffman, before the district court, but the COA presents the question of whether counsel was ineffective for not retaining any DNA expert. However, “the time for scrutinizing the COA has long since passed,” as we have reached the point of considering the appeal. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Were we to entertain belated challenges to COAs, 7 Case: 14-12981 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 8 of 12 Petitioner first argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to obtain an independent expert to challenge the reliability of the State’s DNA evidence. He contends that testimony from such an expert would have made the jury view his case in a different light because the expert would have testified that the State’s experts violated their own protocols and procedures. Petitioner has not disputed any facts, and therefore any claim for relief must be based on whether the state court’s ruling was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The Florida court denied Petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim because it was too speculative to warrant relief. Although the court did not cite to any governing federal law, the court’s rationale does not contradict any clearly established federal law. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (concluding that § 2254(d) does not require the state court to cite to a Supreme Court decision, so long as the state court’s reasoning does not contradict any Supreme Court decisions). “It is well established that the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland is the controlling legal authority to be applied to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” Sullivan v. DeLoach, 459 F.3d 1097, 1108–09 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). Where a petitioner raises an ineffective assistance claim we effectively would add another layer of complexity to the already complicated regime for postconviction relief.”). 8 Case: 14-12981 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 9 of 12 based on counsel’s failure to call a witness, the petitioner carries a heavy burden to show prejudice “because often allegations of what a witness would have testified to are largely speculative.” Id. (quotations omitted). Here, Petitioner did not provide any evidence to support his conclusory assertion that an expert would testify that the DNA evidence was unreliable due to flawed laboratory methodology and protocols. Although Petitioner asserted that Coffman was available to testify, he provided no evidence showing that he had actually contacted Coffman, or any other expert for that matter. Nor did Petitioner ever allege that Coffman or any other expert had actually reviewed the evidence in his case. Without some specificity as to the proposed expert’s testimony, any assertion that an expert would testify consistently with his claims is mere speculation and does not entitle him to habeas relief. See id. Accordingly, the Florida court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.