Opinion ID: 213921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Voluntary Departure Under Threat of Deportation Establishes a Break in Continuous Residence

Text: As the BIA explained in its order, [A]n alien seeking cancellation of removal has the burden of proof to establish that he is eligible for the relief sought. If, as a matter of law, Ramos-Torres was not eligible to receive LPR status in 1993, then he could not, and therefore did not, lawfully acquire itabsent which he is not eligible for cancellation of removal. [9] The key issue before us, therefore, is whether Ramos-Torres's 1982 voluntary return to Mexico under a threat of deportation (which the BIA refers to as an administrative voluntary departure) interrupted his continuous residence in the United States such that he has never been eligible for LPR status. Ramos-Torres putatively obtained LPR status under the amnesty provision of the IRCA, which requires that the alien applicant establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed under this subsection. [10] The IRCA further states: [A]n alien shall not be considered to have resided continuously in the United States, if, during any period for which continuous residence is required, the alien was outside the United States as a result of a departure under an order of deportation. ... [11] The Attorney General may provide for a waiver, in the discretion of the Attorney General, of the periods [of continuous residence] in the case of an absence from the United States due merely to a brief temporary trip abroad required by emergency or extenuating circumstances outside the control of the alien. [12] Ramos-Torres's primary argument both to the BIA and in his petition here is that, for purposes of the IRCA, his voluntary departure under the threat of deportation is not the same thing as a departure under an order of deportation. Notwithstanding the fact that both are departures, argues Ramos-Torres, Congress knew the difference between voluntary departure and deportation, so a voluntary departure should not break continuous residence the way that deportation does under the statute. Both the BIA and the government rely on our analysis in Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft. [13] There, we held that an administrative voluntary departure, like that of Ramos-Torres, interrupts continuous presence for purposes of a related INA provision. [14] We pointed to the obvious and compelling fact that voluntary departure, with its attendant understanding that the alien will cease his illegal presence, is not consistent with continuous presence. [15] We did not understand a voluntary departure to be different by nature whether offered at the end of the immigration proceedings or earlier at the border.... When the Attorney General grants voluntary departure, the alien cannot later claim that he did so while continuing his continuous presence for use in a future adjudication for discretionary relief. [16] We also considered a regulation that the Attorney General had issued in the context of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, which stated outright that `a period of continuing physical presence is terminated whenever... the alien has voluntarily departed under threat of deportation.' [17] Although not mentioned by either party, Mireles-Valdez is distinguishable because that case addressed continuous presence, whereas the controlling statute here requires continuous residence. [18] The Supreme Court has said in the past, in the context of a statute being amended to replace continuous residence with continuous presence: Had Congress been concerned only with `non-intermittent' presence or with the mere maintenance of a domicile or general abode, it could have retained the `continuous residence' requirement. Instead, Congress expressly opted for the seven year `continuous physical presence' requirement. [19] The requirement of maintaining continuous residence, therefore, although not as strict as the requirement of continuous physical presence discussed in Mireles-Valdez, is nevertheless based on the same principles. For example, it is no stretch to argue, along the lines of Mireles-Valdez, that voluntary departure, with its attendant understanding that the alien will thereby cease his illegal presence, is equally inconsistent with continuous residence. As the Supreme Court has held, The obvious purpose of deportation is to terminate residence. [20] Consequently, a voluntary departure in lieu of deportation has the same purpose of terminating residence, which is still inconsistent with fulfilling a continuous residence requirement. Ramos-Torres directs us to the Ninth Circuit cases of Pedroza-Padilla v. Gonzales [21] and Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith [22] to support his proffered distinction between voluntary departure under threat of deportation and a departure under order of deportation. If anything, however, both cases cut against his argument. In Pedroza-Padilla, the alien was ordered deported from the United States in 1984, [and] was given until January 5, 1985 to depart voluntarily, but failed to depart until March 27, 1985. [23] Agreeing with the Administrative Appeals Office, the Ninth Circuit held that the alien's March 1985 voluntary departure rendered him ineligible for legalization because he had not resided continuously in the United States since at least January 1, 1982. [24] In Espinoza-Gutierrez, the alien had departed, without receiving advance permission from the INS, for a four-day trip to his hometown in Mexico to check on some property for his parents while his application for LPR status was pending. [25] The Ninth Circuit examined whether this trip interrupted the LPR requirement that he have been physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. [26] Consequently, the analysis in Espinoza-Gutierrez is distinct from ours today because that case involved both a different provision and a different type of departure. [27] As the Ninth Circuit clarified, [H]e was not subject to a deportation hearing, nor is he subject to an order of deportation. He was the subject of an exclusion proceeding [upon reentering the United States after his four-day trip]. [28] As a general matter, in fact, the Ninth Circuit has embraced reasoning contrary to that urged by Ramos-Torres, concluding that a voluntary departure does not differ from a deportation order vis-à-vis interruption of continued presence: An administrative voluntary departure under the statute is something that occurs with the permission of the Attorney General in lieu of removal proceedings.... While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing presence so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief. [29] The decisions of the Ninth Circuit, therefore, do not lend support to Ramos-Torres's argument. Ramos-Torres also asserts that Congress intended the remedial provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, targeted exclusively and specifically at illegal aliens, to be generously construed in order to relieve applications of unintended consequences, and points to the waivers of absence provided for by the statute. But again, the waivers of absence are only provided in the Attorney General's discretion for brief temporary trip[s] abroad required by emergency or extenuating circumstances. [30] In contrast, the record here confirms that (1) Ramos-Torres signed an order of voluntary departure, agreeing to return to Mexico, and (2) his criminal sentence suggested that he was not to reenter the United States for three years. His trip was not brief or temporary; neither was it required by an emergency or the type of extenuating circumstances excused by the Attorney General. Such a departure is equally significant, under threat of deportation or under an order of deportation, [31] and either breaks an alien's continuous residence to the same extent. The inescapable fact is that Ramos-Torres left the United States for an unknown period of time after agreeing that he would not illegally return to the United States for at least three years. He did not briefly depart for reasons of emergency or extenuating circumstances; rather, he departed because he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to three years of probation, which required his departure from the United States. The LPR provision at issue here falls into a subsection of the INA entitled Absences caused by deportation or advanced parole. [32] Ramos-Torres's absence was surely caused by the imminence of his deportation, even if deportation proceedings had not yet commenced against him. Consequently, his voluntary departure in lieu of deportation interrupted his alleged continuous residence as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. In sum, there are no compelling indications that the BIA incorrectly concluded, as a matter of law, that Ramos-Torres was ineligible for LPR status based on his 1982 voluntary departure from the United States and that he is now ineligible for LPR cancellation of removal.