Opinion ID: 800126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend

Text: We review orders granting summary judgment de novo, assessing whether the motion court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001). In so doing, we construe the evidence in the 3 light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. We assume arguendo that the evidence presents a genuine issue of fact as to whether unnamed county officers evicted Murphy in the manner he describes. The question before us, however, is whether the defendants named in the complaint were entitled to summary judgment. We must determine whether, construing the contested facts in the light most favorable to Murphy, there remains any genuine issue of material fact, on “the record taken as a whole,” that would allow a “rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” with respect to the claims made against the defendants named in the complaint. Hayes v. N. Y. C. Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996), citing Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no such issue of fact between Murphy and the County. Murphy has presented no evidence that could establish the County’s liability for the actions he attributes to officers employed by the County. “There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.” Jemmott v. Coughlin, 85 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1996). In order to succeed on a suit against the County, Murphy must show that “the alleged unlawful action [was] implemented or was executed pursuant to a governmental policy or custom.” Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2007), citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The County has offered competent evidence that its policies and procedures actually prohibit execution of foreclosure warrants under the circumstances present in this case. Murphy offers no evidence to the contrary, identifying no policy or 4 practice of the County and pointing to no other cases in which actions were taken similar to those he alleges here. Thus, even accepting as true Murphy’s allegations of eviction at the hands of uniformed representatives of the County Sheriff’s office, there is no genuine issue of material fact which would allow a rational fact finder to conclude that the County could be liable under § 1983 for those actions. Much the same is true of appellees Sartori and Moss. Murphy has proffered no evidence, nor indeed has he made any allegations, of their personal involvement in or authorization of the conduct he asserts was committed by the unspecified county agents. Because “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983,” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), Murphy has presented no genuine issue of material fact as to the named defendants. Murphy also contests the bankruptcy court’s denial of leave to amend his complaint in order to add, inter alia, the two unnamed sheriff’s deputies identified as John Does #1 and #2. Murphy made the motion on November 13, 2009, more than three years after he initially filed suit, and after he had made inquiries of the Sheriff’s office regarding his allegations. We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. Grace v. Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40, 54 (2d Cir. 2000). A district court abuses its discretion by issuing a decision that “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Among permissible decisions is the determination that “the amendment would be futile,” Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., ---- F.3d ----, No. 10-4591-cv, 2012 WL 1085948, at  5 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2012), citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), or where the nonmoving party would be unduly prejudiced, see McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007). On the present record, the belated addition of unidentified defendants would be futile. As a general rule, “the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored . . . .” See Feliciano v. County of Suffolk, 419 F. Supp. 2d 302, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). That said, we have recognized that situations arise in which the identity of alleged defendants may not be known prior to the filing of a complaint. See e.g., Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 75-77 (2d Cir. 1997). In such situations, “the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants.” Id. at 75 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding it appropriate to allow plaintiffs to identify defendants as “John Doe” at the complaint stage “until the plaintiff has had some opportunity for discovery to learn the identities of responsible officials.”). Here, however, Murphy had ample opportunity, during the more than three years between the initiation of this suit and the bankruptcy court’s final decision, to discover the identity of the County’s representatives. He was unable to do so through discovery and declined to adopt the bankruptcy court’s proposal made while the motion was pending, of a way to attempt to identify any deputies involved in the alleged eviction. Allowing Murphy to add unnamed defendants at that stage of the proceedings would therefore have been futile. 6 Amending the complaint would also have been unduly prejudicial to the County. The County expended significant time and resources in an unsuccessful effort to identify potential defendants, including questioning all county sheriff’s deputies – all of whom, according to the affidavit filed by appellees, have denied participating in the alleged eviction – and reviewing files to establish that no record of such an eviction proceeding. Precluding Murphy from reopening the discovery process when Murphy had ample opportunity to pursue discovery and other investigation to identify defendants was well within the district court’s discretion.