Opinion ID: 172252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acceptance of Guilty Plea

Text: Byrum first contends the district court erred when it refused to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right. In particular, Byrum claims the district court's provisional acceptance of his guilty plea was not an acceptance as contemplated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. He argues, therefore, he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea as a matter of right. As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to the proper standard of review. On the one hand, we review the denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sandoval, 390 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir.2004). But this deferential standard of review applies only once the district court has actually accepted the defendant's plea. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(1) (permitting defendant to withdraw guilty plea for any reason or no reason before the court has accepted his plea). Since the central legal issue here is how to interpret the district court's provisional acceptance in light of Rule 11, de novo review is more appropriate. Breaux v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 554 F.3d 854, 869 (10th Cir.2009) (To the extent the appeal implicates the district court's interpretation of the Federal Rules ... we apply a de novo standard of review.); see also United States v. Jones, 472 F.3d 905, 909 (D.C.Cir.2007) (applying de novo standard of review to determination of whether a district court had accepted a defendant's guilty plea). Whatever the standard of review, Byrum has not demonstrated legal error.
Under Rule 11, the government and the defendant are permitted to negotiate and enter into a plea agreement. Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). In exchange for a guilty plea to a charged or lesser offense, the government may (1) dismiss or promise not to bring other charges against the defendant; (2) recommend or merely not oppose a defendant's request for a particular sentencing range; or (3) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate. Id. An important distinction exists, though, between a guilty plea and the underlying plea agreement. A district court can accept the guilty plea but defer acceptance of the plea agreement. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997) ([G]uilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time.). [3] Prior to the court accepting a defendant's guilty plea, the defendant is permitted to withdraw his plea for any reason or no reason. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(1). However, after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence, a defendant can withdraw his plea only if: (A) the court rejects a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(5); or (B) the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2). This appeal turns on what constitutes a district court's acceptance of a guilty plea under Rule 11(d). While we have not addressed this question directly, courts generally have applied two different approaches in resolving the issue. The first line of analysis views the district court's provisional or conditional acceptance of a guilty plea as sufficient to implicate the Rule 11(d)(2)(B) fair and just reason standard for withdrawal of the plea. For example, in United States v. Battle, the Fourth Circuit discounted a district court's use of a qualifier such as provisionally to describe its acceptance of a guilty plea. 499 F.3d 315, 321 (4th Cir.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1121, 169 L.Ed.2d 951 (2008). In that case, the district court conducted a standard Rule 11 plea colloquy and then stated that the defendant's plea of guilty is provisionally accepted pending receipt of a presentence investigation, and the court will defer final acceptance of the plea agreement and the adjudication of guilt until we've all had an opportunity to review that report. Id. at 318. After the presentence report was prepared, which recommended a lengthy sentence, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. In denying the motion, the district court applied Rule 11(d)(2)'s fair and just reason standard, determining it had already accepted his plea for the purposes of Rule 11. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding the district court had accepted the defendant's guilty plea. Id. at 321. The court noted that although Rule 11 is silent as to how a district court must signal its acceptance of a guilty plea, the acceptance of a guilty plea is intimately tied to the colloquy and Rule 11(b), and once the district court has satisfied Rule 11's colloquy requirement, there is a presumption that the court has accepted the defendant's guilty plea. Id. While it admitted that a more unambiguous statement of acceptance by the district court would have been preferable, the Battle court held that the interests of finality weigh in favor of its approach: Permitting a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for any reason or no reason in these circumstances would undermine the importance of the plea colloquy. The rules should not be interpreted to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea simply on a lark after the district court conducts a thorough plea colloquy and has made the requisite findings. During the colloquy, the defendant admits, in open court, that he is guilty and describes the circumstances of his guilt. It makes little sense to permit an unconditional withdrawal of a guilty plea after the colloquy has been conducted, especially when the district court has informed the defendant of the consequences of pleading guilty and the defendant had no reason to believe he could withdraw the plea at a later date for any reason. 499 F.3d at 321. Because the Rules are silent with respect to the formalities of a district court's acceptance of a guilty plea, the court saw no reason to require district courts to use some kind of talismanic `magic words' to effect an acceptance once the colloquy has been completed. Id. at 321-22. Therefore, by conducting a Rule 11 plea colloquy and then provisionally accepting the guilty plea, the district court in Battle had accepted, for the purposes of Rule 11, the defendant's guilty plea. Id. at 322; see United States v. Jones, 472 F.3d 905, 909 (D.C.Cir.2007) (same). In contrast, some courts hold that when a district court defers acceptance of a guilty plea, the Rule 11(d)(2)(B) fair and just reason standard is not implicated and a defendant may withdraw his plea for any reason. For example, in United States v. Shaker, after conducting a change-of-plea hearing, the district court stated: I am deferring my decision on acceptance or rejection of your plea of guilty and your Plea Agreement until after I've had an opportunity to study the Presentence Report. If your plea of guilty and your Plea Agreement are then accepted, I will so advise you. 279 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir.2002). Shortly thereafter, the defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, but the district court denied the defendant's motion, concluding he had failed to show a fair and just reason. Id. at 496-97. The Seventh Circuit reversed. It emphasized that the district court had deferred its decision on the guilty plea itself. Id. at 497. Consequently, the plea was never accepted and there was nothing for the defendant to withdraw. Id. In such a circumstance, the defendant could change his plea as a matter of right. Id. According to the court, Rule 11 creates a a process involving both the defendant and the district court which culminat[es] in the court's acceptance of the plea. Id. Until the entire plea process is completed by an acceptance of the plea, Rule 11's limitations on withdrawal are inapplicable. 279 F.3d at 497; see also United States v. Head, 340 F.3d 628, 631 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that because the district court used language indicating that the plea was not yet accepted and because the record reflect[ed] that the plea, as opposed to only the plea bargain, was not accepted at the change of plea hearing, the plea had not been accepted for Rule 11 purposes). While factually distinguishable, the cases illustrate important points. In both Battle and Jones, the district court had conditionally accepted the defendant's guilty plea and only deferred accepting the terms of the underlying plea agreements, whereas in Shaker and Head, the district court had deferred accepting the guilty plea itself. Rule 11, in fact, contemplates an acceptance of a guilty plea conditioned on the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the plea agreement. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)-(5). On the other hand, Rule 11 does not necessarily envision a deferral of a decision on the plea itself. Despite these subtle distinctions, what matters ultimately is the language of the trial court and the context in which it is used. While we prefer linguistic precision, the record must be sufficiently clear to indicate the court is accepting the defendant's guilt while withholding final acceptance of the plea package pending review of the pre-sentence report and sentencing recommendation. Rule 11 does not specify how a district court must signal its acceptance of a guilty plea; rather it provides an outline of three broad prerequisites. Before accepting a defendant's guilty plea, the court must (1) advise the defendant of the rights he or she is waiving, the nature of the charge, and the associated penalties, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1); (2) ensure the plea is voluntary, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(2); and (3) determine the factual basis for the plea, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3). These requirements inform the mandatory Rule 11 plea colloquy. We agree with Battle that permitting a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right after a district court makes the requisite findings and conditionally accepts the plea would undermine the importance of the Rule 11 colloquy. At the conclusion of the colloquy, the defendant has admitted his guilt and the facts relating to his criminal conduct. He has also been advised by the court of the consequences of pleading guilty. After a such a colloquy, a defendant has no reason to believe he can freely withdraw his plea. Further, Rule 11 does not prescribe any specific language of acceptance, and imposing a requirement on the district court to utter some talismanic words to effect an acceptance is not supported by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the case law. Notably, Rule 11 provides separate requirements for a district court's acceptance of a plea agreement. To the extent the government assents in the plea agreement to dismiss or refrain from bringing other charges against the defendant, or agrees to a specific sentence or sentencing range, a court may accept [the] agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report. Fed.R.Crim.P. 1 1(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). If the court subsequently rejects this plea agreement, it must advise the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(5). Additionally, if the plea agreement only contains a recommendation on a sentence or sentencing range, the district court must advise the defendant that he has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(B). Therefore, because Rule 11 distinguishes between an acceptance of a plea and an acceptance of a plea agreement, we must maintain that distinction in evaluating the record. We believe that this distinction is preserved by permitting a district court to accept a plea conditioned on a subsequent examination of the presentence report. Once a district court, in conducting a Rule 11 colloquy, ascertains the knowing and voluntary nature of a defendant's guilty plea and ensures there is a sufficient factual basis for the plea in the record, the exact terminology it employs to ultimately accept the plea is less significant. Although the plea itself constitutes an important concession of rights by the defendant, the court's subsequent decision on whether to accept the underlying plea agreement does not occur in a vacuum. Rule 11 expressly permits the court to examine the agreement and the defendant's PSR to determine whether the parties' bargain is justified. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(A). If the court chooses to accept the agreement, the defendant receives what he has bargained for with the government. And depending on the type of plea agreement, if the court ultimately rejects it, the defendant should either be aware he is not permitted to withdraw his plea absent a fair and just reason, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(B), or he is given a fresh opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, see Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(c)(5). In sum, we conclude where a district court conducts a Rule 11 plea colloquy and then provisionally or conditionally accepts the defendant's guilty plea pending its review of the PSR, the district court has accepted the plea for the purposes of Rule 11.
Applying this legal framework, the question remains whether the district court here accepted Byrum's guilty plea as required by Rule 11. Byrum contends the plea colloquy manifests no unequivocal Rule 11 acceptance of his plea and that therefore he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea for any reason. We disagree. The district court properly conducted the necessary Rule 11 colloquy, ascertaining that Byrum knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty: [Court]: Are you pleading guilty voluntarily and of your own free will? [Byrum]: Yes, Your Honor. [Court]: Has anyone threatened or coerced you to get your guilty plea today? [Byrum]: No, Your Honor. ... [Court]: It appears that the plea agreement in this case is a simple exchange of promises in return for your plea to Count 5 of the indictment. The government will agree to dismiss the remaining counts at time of sentencing. This agreement is entered on the basis of a recommended sentence of 15 years and both you and the government are waiving your right of appeal if that sentence is imposed. That right of appeal is an important right. What that means, if I should make an error of law in this case at sentencing or otherwise, you are waiving or giving up your right to take that error to a higher court and ask that it be corrected. You're also giving up your right to file a habeas corpus petition in the future and ask that I correct any error. Do you understand that and is it your intent to waive that right? [Byrum]: Yes, Your Honor. [Court]: With regard to the recommended sentence, do you understand and appreciate that I can refuse to accept that agreement after I've read the presentence report? [Byrum]: Yes, Your Honor. [Court]: And you understand that if that happens, you will again be standing before me on a plea of not guilty, it will simply vitiate this whole proceeding? Do you understand that? [Byrum]: Yes, Your Honor. R., Vol. II at 10-14 (emphasis added). Then the court elicited the factual basis constituting Byrum's criminal conduct and guilt. [Court]: I will remind you that you are under oath and subject to the penalties of perjury and I'll direct ... [the prosecutor] to ask questions necessary to establish a factual basis to the charge. [Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor. As to Count 5 of the indictment, in June of 2007, did you use a minor to engage in conduct lasciviously displaying her genitalia? [Byrum]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: Did you know that the girl was under 18 years of age? [Byrum]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: Was your purpose to produce a picture of the minor engaging in conduct lasciviously displaying her genitalia? [Byrum]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: And do you admit that the camera used to make the picture was manufactured outside the state of Oklahoma? [Byrum]: Yes. Id. at 14-15. Finally, the district court explained it would accept Byrum's guilty plea, conditioned only on the court's subsequent review of the PSR to ensure the parties' agreement did not deviate from the sentencing goals. The court stated: I find, based on your clear and responsive answers to my questions and those of counsel, that you are competent to enter this plea. That you do so voluntarily and knowingly, that is with full understanding of the rights that you are giving up. I am not going to accept the plea until I review the presentence report and am satisfied, as I mentioned earlier, that the plea agreement in this case does not undermine the goals of the sentencing guidelines. I will accept it provisionally subject to that review. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). As is evident, the court conducted a thorough colloquy and provisionally accepted Byrum's plea. While the court's language could have been more precise, the bottom line is plainthe district court accepted Byrum's guilty plea as contemplated by Rule 11 subject only to its review of the PSR. Byrum's effort to parse the district court's explanation is ultimately unpersuasive. The district court, after ascertaining Byrum knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and placing the circumstances underlying Byrum's criminal conduct on the record, was concerned that the parties' agreed-upon sentence may frustrate the sentencing guidelines' goals. Rule 11 permits the court to delay acceptance of the plea agreement and examine Byrum's PSR for exactly this purpose. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(A). Notably, the court also informed Byrum that should it reject the sentencing agreement, his guilty plea would not be accepted, thereby giving Byrum an unfettered right to withdraw his plea. See Fed.Crim. R.P. 11(c)(5)(B). Ultimately, the district court language, although ambiguous at first glance, sufficiently indicated the court's acceptance of Byrum's guilty plea. Rule 11 does not prescribe any specific language of acceptance. Byrum's argument could easily have been avoided had the district court chosen a more unambiguous statement such as I accept your guilty plea or I therefore find you guilty. And Rule 11 allows for the unequivocal acceptance of a plea while still reserving in the district court the right to reject the underlying plea agreement. Though the district court here did not make such an unequivocal statement of intent, on this record we are convinced the court accepted Byrum's guilty plea.