Opinion ID: 202406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kominsky's testimony

Text: 25 To explain the clear error in the district court's finding about the seatbelt, we discuss Kominsky's testimony topic by topic, focusing on its documented inaccuracies, internal inconsistencies, and implausibilities. We also note the district court's rejection of Kominsky's credibility on important issues, and the district court's stated impressions of Kominsky's character, demeanor, and professionalism.
26 On several points, Kominsky gave testimony that was later shown to be simply wrong. 27
28 Alford's car had automatic seatbelts, a point obviously pertinent to Henderson's appeal. Alford testified that the car had automatic seatbelts. The district court confirmed, after taking a view of the car, that [t]he automobile in which Mr. Henderson was riding on the evening in question does, as Ms. Alford testified, have an automatic seat belt for the front seat passenger. Kominsky, however, testified repeatedly and with certainty that the car had non-automatic seatbelts. 29 Not surprisingly, the district court probed this seatbelt issue carefully. At the first suppression hearing, the court questioned Kominsky about the seatbelt itself. 3 The district court took a view of Alford's car the next day. These were its findings: 30 The automobile in which Mr. Henderson was riding on the evening in question does, as Ms. Alford testified, have an automatic seat belt for the front seat passenger. It's a belt that attaches to the frame and, when connected, pushes away from the seat toward the windshield when the door, passenger side door, is open. If a passenger got in and sat down and closed the door, the seatbelt would automatically come back and go diagonally across his chest from his right shoulder to his left waist. There is also a lap belt that needs to be connected manually. The seat belts are black or dark gray. 31 The automatic belt can be disconnected from the door frame and will then roll down into the left-hand side of the passenger seat by the place that the lap belt, I believe, connects or starts from. 32 The district court's observations contradicted Kominsky's testimony in two important ways. First, Kominsky simply was wrong about there being a non-automatic-type seatbelt in Alford's car. Second — and even more important — Kominsky's emphatic testimony about seeing Henderson's seat belt [] on the side of the door frame, could not have been true. If the seatbelt had been connected, it would have been attached to the frame of the car, as described by the court. If it were disconnected, it would have rolled down into the left hand side of the passenger seat, also as described by the court. It was a physical impossibility for the strap to be in the position Kominsky described. As the district court itself immediately recognized: 33 I think [Kominsky] testified, and I'll have to refresh my recollection — that it wasn't an automatic seat belt. He remembered it hanging there after Mr. Henderson got out of the car. And whether it was connected or disconnected, it wouldn't have been hanging in the place that a non-automatic seatbelt hangs, in my experience. It either would have been pushed forward if it was connected or it would have been down by the left-hand waist if it was disconnected. 34 The government argues that Kominsky's testimony was not inaccurate because Alford's car had manual lap belts in addition to automatic seatbelts. This argument is unpersuasive because it parses Kominsky's testimony too finely. While Kominsky did testify that Henderson was not wearing a seatbelt across his lap, he also testified emphatically that Henderson did not have a seat belt going diagonally across his chest. Kominsky never testified that he would give a seatbelt citation to someone wearing a shoulder belt but not a lap belt. 35
36 Kominsky testified at the first suppression hearing that he had issued over a hundred seatbelt citations just in this last year. To the government, and conceivably to the district court, this was important testimony. The government placed great emphasis on the frequency of Kominsky's seatbelt citations as an explanation for the inaccuracy of his recollection about Alford's car. In light of further questioning, however, neither Kominsky's tabulation nor the government's excuse held up. Asked the same question at trial, Kominsky said that he averaged 25 citations, admitted the inconsistency, and said that he had misunderstood the question how many seat belt violations have you written in the last year? 37 As Henderson points out, the record plainly belies Kominsky's statement — and the government's argument on appeal — that he misunderstood the question before stating that he issued 100 seatbelt citations a year. In response to follow-up questions at the first suppression hearing, Kominsky reiterated that he had written 100 seatbelt citations just in the last year, and that he issued a seatbelt citation every three days. There was no confusion by Kominsky. 38 At the second suppression hearing, defense counsel again impeached Kominsky on this point — with documentary evidence that Kominsky had averaged only fifteen seatbelt citations per year. Kominsky again had an excuse: he had issued more citations but they were missing from computer records because of his bad handwriting. 39
40 Kominsky testified that Henderson was wearing a dark-colored shirt on the night of the arrest. However, documentary evidence — the inventory list from the jail where Henderson would spend the night — proved that Henderson was wearing a white shirt. The government argues that the issue is immaterial and points out that Kominsky expressed no certainty when testifying about Henderson's attire. Still, the inaccuracy about the shirt, like the inaccuracy about the automatic seatbelts and the number of seatbelt citations he had written, provides a further ground for questioning Kominsky's credibility. 41
42 Henderson points out that Kominsky's testimony was inconsistent on the obviously pertinent matter of why Kominsky either asked for (in Kominsky's view) or demanded (in Henderson's view) his identifying information. At a detention hearing that occurred shortly after Henderson's arrest, Kominsky said that he secured the identifying information for two reasons: to see if Henderson could drive Alford's car and because Henderson was not wearing his seatbelt. At the first suppression hearing, Kominsky added a third reason: he said that he sometimes asked passengers in stopped cars for their identification because: If I feel like asking everybody in the car for their license, I will. Kominsky also indicated for the first time at the suppression hearing that he could request Henderson's identifying information in order to see whether he could drive even after Henderson denied having a license in his possession. At the second suppression hearing, the other officer on the scene, Oliveira, rejected this purported justification, saying that naturally, he couldn't drive the vehicle without presenting a valid license. 43 At the second trial, after the denial of the suppression motion, Kominsky reversed course twice more, first explicitly denying on direct examination that he had any reason to ask for Henderson's identification apart from the purported seatbelt violation, and then stating on cross examination that the seatbelt violation was his primary motivation, but that [t]here's a number of reasons [] that I could ask him for his identification. The government rightly notes that this testimony at the second trial came in after the court ruled on the suppression motion, and hence cannot contribute to the clear error analysis. But the government says nothing to explain Kominsky's inconsistent testimony about his motivations before the district court made its findings. In any case, Kominsky's inability to remember consistently — at any point in the proceedings — why he demanded Henderson's identification is another negative factor in the evaluation of his credibility. 44
45 As Henderson argued at length before the district court and repeats here, even if Kominsky had a legal basis for pulling Alford over, it is implausible that the events before the stop unfolded as he testified. According to his testimony, Kominsky pulled behind a blue Nissan at the intersection of Plain Street and Waverly Park Avenue, which Kominsky testified was in Brockton, 40, 50 yards from the West Bridgewater town line. He said that the Nissan was going slower than the speed limit allowed, between 20 and 25 miles per hour. Kominsky further testified at the first suppression hearing that while driving through West Bridgewater he saw the Nissan stray across the yellow center line at least twice — and maybe as many as five times; typed the Nissan's license plate into his laptop computer (looking at the keyboard as he did); used the license plate number to search the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles database, which required the laptop to initiate a cellular phone call; waited at a minimum, 20 seconds for the computer to process the search (a search that he said often took several minutes to produce results); and, while still in West Bridgewater, received a computer report indicating that Alford, the registered driver of the car, had a suspended license. Kominsky testified that he decided to stop the Nissan while he was still in West Bridgewater, at the intersection of Plain Street and Belmont Street, but that he actually initiated the stop in East Bridgewater, because he was waiting for a moment when he would have a tactical advantage. 4 According to the undisputed testimony of Henderson's investigator, it takes no more than 49 seconds to travel at 20-25 miles per hour from the intersection of Plain Street and Waverly Park Avenue in Brockton, where Kominsky said he first saw Alford's car, to the intersection of Plain and Belmont Streets. 46 Everyone agrees that Alford was perfectly sober at the time of the stop. The uncontested evidence is that she was driving especially carefully because she knew that she was being followed by a police officer. Yet, according to Kominsky's testimony, he observed Alford drive the two left tires of her car across the center line of a straight street between two and five times — over a distance of three tenths of a mile. At the same time, Kominsky said, he was conducting a computer search that often took several minutes to complete. All of this, according to Kominsky, happened in no more than 49 seconds. The idea that Kominsky could observe all of this in such a short time verges on physical impossibility. 47 Attempting to blunt Henderson's demonstration of this implausibility, the government argues that Alford's testimony about the minutes leading to the stop was equally implausible. Alford said that at some point while she and Henderson were still in Brockton, Kominsky began following her. Alford testified that Kominsky was sitting at an intersection. When her car approached, he activated his cruiser's flashing lights. She stopped to allow Kominsky to pull out ahead of her, but Kominsky flashed his bright lights and then signaled for her to go ahead of him. After she passed by, she testified, Kominsky began following her. Kominsky followed for several minutes — she thought it could have been as long as twenty minutes, but stated that she was not keeping track of the time and did not know — and then pulled her to the side of the road. 48 In the government's view, Alford's statement that Kominsky may have been following her for as long as twenty minutes somehow shows Kominsky to be reliable about the minutes before the vehicle stop. This argument fails. Alford's testimony about the number of minutes Kominsky was following her was self-consciously uncertain. She only professed to be sure that Kominsky was following her for a fairly long time. Alford's testimony that Kominsky was following her for longer than he said relates a more plausible sequence of events than Kominsky's testimony. If Kominsky actually saw what he professed to see, it is virtually certain that he was following Alford for significantly longer than 49 seconds, which would mean that Alford's statement that Kominsky began following her while she was still some distance from West Bridgewater may have been correct. Indeed, the district court noted as an aside at sentencing that Kominsky might have been off on the times in his testimony about the minutes before the vehicle stop. 49
50 The district court disbelieved Kominsky on at least two important points-relating to his initial encounter with Henderson, and on another matter relating to Kominsky's ability to testify accurately about his conduct and motivations during vehicle stops. 51
52 The district court disbelieved Kominsky on the question of whether he requested or demanded that Henderson write down his identifying information. Kominsky testified that I observed that the passenger, who turned out to be Mr. Henderson, wasn't wearing a seat belt, and asked him if he had any identification on him .... He said `no, I don't have any ID on me' . . . . I then asked him if he would mind writing down [his] name, date of birth, and Social Security number on a piece of paper ... [which] he did. Kominsky said that when Henderson asked why he had to write down his identifying information, he said: You're not wearing your seat belt, sir. At that point, Kominsky said, Henderson voluntarily complied ... He picked up a piece of paper. He used my pen. He wrote down his information. Kominsky later clarified that he did not even think that there was a legal way for me to force a passenger in a stopped car to write down his identifying information in order to be cited for a seatbelt violation. 53 Alford contradicted Kominsky both as to whether he mentioned anything about a seatbelt violation to Henderson and as to whether Kominsky merely requested — rather than demanded — Henderson's information. She testified that when Henderson asked Kominsky why he needed to write down his social security number and date of birth, Kominsky responded: Just write your fucking information on the paper before I snatch you up. Alford's testimony on this point was consistent. However, Alford related Kominsky's profanity only reluctantly, after the district court told her that she was required to state Kominsky's words accurately, even if it's language we wouldn't ordinarily use. In its written findings, the district court said that after Henderson `told Kominsky that he did not have a license or any identification, 54 Kominsky instructed Henderson to write his name, date of birth, and social security number on a piece of paper. Henderson asked Kominsky why he had to provide that information. Kominsky did not answer the question, but insisted that Henderson give him the requested information. 55 Henderson I, 229 F.Supp.2d at 37 (emphasis added). The district court indicated that this finding was significant. In talking to counsel after the second suppression hearing, the district court noted its findings on these points before saying: back on [sic] October, I didn't believe everything that Mr. Kominsky said and I still don't. 56
57 On the important question of whether Kominsky said anything about a seatbelt violation while speaking with Henderson and Alford, the district court also specifically sided with Alford's testimony over Kominsky's. Kominsky testified that he told Henderson, after he asked why he had to write down his information, You're not wearing your seatbelt, sir. 58 The district court found, to the contrary, that when Henderson asked Kominsky why he had to provide that information[,] Kominsky did not answer the question. Later, speaking to counsel, the district court summarized the testimony on this issue and its finding: Mr. Henderson says: `Why do I need to give you that?' And according to Kominsky he says `because you're not wearing a seat belt.' You don't find that in my [first decision on the motion to suppress]. On an issue directly relevant to Kominsky's insistence that Henderson was not wearing a seatbelt, the district court's finding was contrary to Kominsky's testimony. 59
60 The government avers that the district court made no finding as to whether Kominsky actually used the profanity Alford ascribed to him. However, the district court orally indicated that it found Alford's testimony more credible than Kominsky's on this point as well, stating after hearing Bellas's account of Kominsky's language at the second suppression hearing that my sense [is] that Officer Kominsky, you know, was not, well, was not likely to have been, you know, quite as polite in talking to Mr. Henderson as he [] described in his testimony. Whether or not the district court credited every word of Alford's quotation of Kominsky, the important point is that the district court again rejected Kominsky's credibility on an issue closely related to his insistence that Henderson was not wearing his seatbelt. 61
62 The district court also disbelieved Kominsky's account of his interactions with Bellas, the high school student who testified that he had twice been stopped by Kominsky while driving on Plain Street from his school in Brockton to his home in East Bridgewater. According to Bellas, the first time he was stopped, Kominsky approached the car and said: I smell marijuana. And he asked me how much marijuana had I smoked in the nighttime. Bellas denied having smoked marijuana. There is no indication that he had. Kominsky did not even perform any kind of sobriety check. Bellas testified that Kominsky then ordered him out of the car, told him that he was going to jail if he did not say where he was hiding marijuana, and then searched him in a very physical manner. Kominsky took off Bellas's shoes and unbuckled his pants, and did the same to Bellas's friend, a young man named Carlos Gomes Pereira, who was riding as a passenger. Then, Bellas said, Kominsky ransacked the car, throwing his schoolbooks and homework into the street, and pulling up the carpet. Lieutenant Rogers, the second-ranking officer on the West Bridgewater Police (subordinate only to Kominsky's father, the Chief), later confirmed that Bellas's belongings had been thrown into disarray and that the carpet had been dislodged. After completing his search and finding no contraband, Kominsky left Bellas's belongings in the street and told him he could go. Bellas went home, and the next day his parents took him to the police station and filed a complaint. Rogers, who investigated, told Bellas and his family that he had been the victim of a profile stop. Noting Rogers's comment and documents in evidence indicating that Kominsky stopped minority drivers at a higher rate than their proportion of the local population, Henderson argued to the district court that the profile remark suggested Kominsky's possible motive in stopping their vehicle and in investigating Henderson. Henderson and Alford are African-American. 63 Kominsky also pulled Bellas over a second time in the same area, purportedly to cite him for having a muffler that was too loud. The car was towed for unrelated reasons. Rather than giving Bellas a ride home, Kominsky made Bellas walk. When Bellas's father complained again to Rogers, Rogers went to the tow yard with Bellas, found that the car's muffler was not loud, and voided the citation that Kominsky had issued. Kominsky admitted that he had stopped Bellas and searched him, and that he had not given Bellas any citation pursuant to the first stop. But Kominsky denied that he had been unduly aggressive during that stop or that he had asked about marijuana instead of asking Bellas for his license and registration. 64 The district court found Bellas's testimony more credible than Kominsky's. In its oral remarks after the second suppression hearing, after calling attention to the fact that it didn't believe everything that Mr. Kominsky said, the district court stated: in fact, I'm not inclined to believe his rendition of events with Bellas either. If I had the Bellas case in front of me it wouldn't be that hard. In its written findings, the district court stated that: the court finds Christopher Bellas's testimony concerning Kominsky's conduct when Bellas was stopped to be more accurate than Kominsky's version of events. Henderson II, 265 F.Supp.2d at 116. Again, the district court discredited Kominsky on an important issue even though the only evidence contrary to Kominsky's testimony was the testimony of a driver whom he had stopped. 65
66 In at least two ways relevant to the question of whether Kominsky's testimony about Henderson's seatbelt was accurate, Kominsky's testimony was contradicted by other police officers. As the government points out, the district court did not explicitly resolve these contradictions. However, these contradictions are relevant to our inquiry, and, with respect to at least one of them, the district court did, in effect, reject Kominsky's account. 67
68 Oliveira contradicted Kominsky as to whether Kominsky used profanity while arresting Henderson. When the suppression hearing was opened for the final time, the parties informed the district court that Oliveira would testify that Kominsky used profanity during Henderson's arrest. (He did so testify at the second trial.) Kominsky, on the other hand, testified that he was polite throughout the encounter. The government now argues that this matter is immaterial because Oliveira's testimony did not occur until after the final decision on the motion to suppress. This argument is misleading. The district court knew that Oliveira would contradict Kominsky before it finally denied the motion. In fact, defense counsel presented the district court with the government's e-mailed statement that: Oliveira stated [in a pretrial conversation with the government] that he recalls in essence that Officer Kominsky used some form of the f___ word when asking Mr. Henderson to get out of the vehicle. 69 The district court declined to hear Oliveira's testimony in person before reconsidering the suppression motion for the final time because I don't need to hear any more to have a low regard for Officer Kominsky as a law enforcement officer. 70
71 Kominsky also was contradicted on the important question of whether his shift supervisor on the night of Henderson's arrest, who considered himself Kominsky's mentor, provided Kominsky with an opportunity to fabricate his recollection that Henderson was not wearing a seatbelt. As we discussed above, Kominsky testified that he made a statement about the purported seatbelt violation while talking to Henderson at the scene. As already noted, the district court rejected this account. No other witness testified that Kominsky said anything about a seatbelt violation before returning to the police station. Oliveira testified that Kominsky said nothing about a seatbelt to him at the scene. Kominsky did not actually write a seatbelt citation until he returned to the station. The district court expressed interest in this sequence, telling defense counsel: I told you that I'm interested in knowing what happened back at the station and whether there was any discussion about the ticket. Ordinarily, I don't call witnesses. But don't you want to ask [his shift supervisor] that? 72 Philip Tuck, who was Kominsky's direct supervisor on the night of Henderson's arrest, testified at the second suppression hearing, largely at the district court's urging. Defense counsel said: I do not have any intention of calling Sergeant Tuck, immediately before the remarks by the district court above. After the district court again asked: do you want to call Sergeant Tuck? defense counsel agreed to call the witness, responding: I'm happy — yes, your Honor, I'll put him up on the stand. In the end, after some questioning by both counsel, the district court examined Tuck itself, at some length. 5 73 Tuck said that he felt a certain fondness for Kominsky and watched out for him. Tuck testified that when Kominsky returned to the station with Henderson, he asked him why he had stopped Alford's vehicle and why he had asked Henderson to get out of the car. We reproduce that testimony in part: 74 THE COURT: When Mr. Henderson was arrested, did you have some discussion with Mr. Kominsky about the law with regard to when you could properly ask a passenger for identification? 75 TUCK: I believe I asked him his reason for having Mr. Henderson get out of the vehicle. 76