Opinion ID: 2262991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Admission of Joy Watson's  3507 Statement.

Text: During the course of his interview with the police, Akhee Flonnory suggested that the police interview his girlfriend, Joy Watson. Thereafter, FBI Agent Stranahan interviewed Watson for approximately 35 or 40 minutes. As he did so, Stranahan took shorthand notes. Before trial, the defense filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling that Stranahan's proposed hearsay was inadmissible under  3507 because it was his interpretative narrative rather than Watson's actual statement. The trial judge denied this motion stating: the Court cannot conclude at this point that the Agent's rendition or recollection of Ms. Watson's statement, assuming a proper foundation is laid, will not comply with ...  3507. During the trial, the State laid the foundation for Stranahan's testimony by questioning him about how he took his notes. In an oral ruling, the trial judge concluded: Based on what I have heard I don't think it comes close to being an interpretative narrative. What I heard the agent testify to was that he had written down words said by the person that he was interviewing, which gave him certain factual information that he thought was important to be recorded. 3507 does not require that there be a verbatim recordation of everything that is said by an interview to come into evidence. As the State has pointed out, even ÔÇö and statements are permissible. Certainly in this particular case you have a trained agent who wrote down those things that he felt was important and he says that they are the words of the witness and not his interpretation of the words. So I'm going to overrule the objection. After the jury was brought back in, the State called Watson to the stand. In response to most of the State's questions, Watson responded that she could not remember. The State then called Stranahan as a  3507 witness. Stranahan read verbatim the redacted notes he took from the interview to the jury. The prosecutor then asked Stranahan if we can start from the top. In speaking with [Watson] can you tell us exactly what she was saying. [W]ith respect to the first line, what did she tell you? The defense again objected that this was interpretative narrative. The trial judge overruled the renewed objection. We review a trial judge's decision on the admissibility of a  3507 statement for abuse of discretion. [26] The defendant's interpretative narrative argument derives from Huggins v. State [27] , in which we discussed the former version of  3507: The Statute does not distinguish between written and oral statements. The Statute admits as affirmative evidence the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness. It is the statement of the declarant that is being admitted, not the interpretative narrative of the person who heard the statement. Care should be taken to guarantee that the Statute is not abused by permitting a witness, such as a police officer, to embellish the prior statement by his own interpretation, even if the embellishment is made in the utmost good faith. Obviously, the best protection in this regard is a written statement. In the case of oral statements, the best safeguard would seem to be in foundation questions establishing the time, the place and the person to whom the statement was made. These are the traditional safeguards in treating a witness fairly when impeaching him by a prior inconsistent statement. It would seem that no less a standard should be required for evidence having substantive independent testimonial value. [28] As we have previously noted, the Huggins case established that great care should be taken to avoid the embellishment of out-of-court statements which are the subject of testimony at trial. [29] Despite the defense counsel's question to Stranahan on cross-examination ÔÇö would it be fair to say that your notes or interpretive [sic] were an interpretive ÔÇö narrative of what [Watson] said to you that evening, ÔÇö and Stranahan's answer ÔÇö Maybe somewhat, ÔÇö we still cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting the evidence. Interpretative narrative is a legal term of art in Delaware, one with which Stranahan was unfamiliar when he responded to the defense counsel's question. The trial judge, who was intimately familiar with the facts of the case, could assess the demeanor of the witness, and could determine more accurately than we whether the witness was testifying to the words of the [declarant] and not his interpretation of the words. The trial judge in this case clearly took great care to avoid the embellishment of Watson's  3507 statements introduced at trial. Stranahan's answer to the defense counsel's question notwithstanding, the trial judge made a factual finding that Stranahan wrote down the words said by the person that he was interviewing, which gave him certain factual information that he thought was important to be recorded. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err by admitting Watson's statement. [30]