Opinion ID: 1358073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: ClaySentencing

Text: Finally, Clay argues that because he was convicted of Count 2 under 18 U.S.C. § 924(o), he was erroneously sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The government did not reply to this argument in its brief. Clay also challenges the overall reasonableness of his 40-year sentence. We will address each sentencing issue in turn.
Count 2 charged Clay with conspiracy to use and discharge a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of § 924(o). But Clay was sentenced under § 924(c), which provides, in relevant part, that no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person. Conversely, § 924(o) does not contain any restriction on concurrent sentencing. See § 924(o) (stating that a person who conspires to commit an offense under subsection (c) shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years). Relying on § 924(c), the district court sentenced Clay to 40 years' imprisonment on Count 1, to run consecutively to Clay's ten-year prison sentence on Count 2. Only the Sixth Circuit has addressed this issue. In United States v. Stubbs, the defendant pleaded guilty to § 924(o) but was sentenced under § 924(c). 279 F.3d 402, 405 (6th Cir.2002), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Helton, 349 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir.2003). [4] On appeal, the defendant argued that he was erroneously sentenced under § 924(c) when he had pleaded guilty to § 924(o). Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that because the statutes require different levels of proof as to conduct and mens rea and call for vastly different penalties, they consequently charge different offenses. Id. at 409. That court concluded that it was plain error for the district court to sentence the defendant under § 924(c) without charging him under that statute. Id. The Stubbs case is factually analogous and legally persuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in sentencing Clay pursuant to § 924(c) because § 924(c) charges a completely different offense than § 924(o)the offense of conviction. But we also conclude that reversal is unwarranted. In addition to the above sentences, Clay was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on Count 4using a firearm to commit first-degree murder during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(j) and 1111. We have already upheld the sufficiency of the evidence on this count. See supra Part II.E. Because Clay's life without parole sentence stands as to Count 4, any sentencing error on Counts 1 and 2 constitutes harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. Blade, 336 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that any error as to sentencing on count 1 was harmless because the defendant was sentenced to life without parole on counts two through five).
Clay also argues that his 40-year sentence imposed on Count 1conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuanawas unreasonable. He cites United States v. Gillmore, 497 F.3d 853, 858-59 (8th Cir.2007), for the proposition that the district court must justify an extraordinary variance with an extraordinary or equally compelling justification. But this line of reasoning is no longer good law after the Supreme Court's decision in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The Gall Court expressly rejected any appellate rule that requires `extraordinary' circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range. Id. at 594-95; see also United States v. Braggs, 511 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir.2008) (same). In granting a variance, the district court only has to take into account the § 3553(a) factors and recognize that the Guidelines are not mandatory. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97. Here, Clay does not assert that the district court failed to take the § 3553(a) factors into account. In fact, he notes that the district court found that the safety of the public warranted an upward departure. See § 3553(a)(2)(C) (stating that to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant is a factor for the district court to consider). Clay asserts that his 40 year sentence is 615% above the high end of the sentencing guideline range. But Gall explicitly rejects the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 595. The district court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. In any event, we note that because Clay's life sentence without parole on Count 4 will remain unchanged, any error by the district court on Count 1 is harmless. See supra Part II.G.1. Therefore, Clay's sentence is affirmed.