Opinion ID: 1158507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reconsolidation of the Trials

Text: On November 16, 1990, Grannis moved to sever his trial from Webster's. At a hearing on the motion, the state conceded that it was unprepared to argue the issue and told the court that [a]s far as severance goes, if [Grannis's counsel] believes that the circumstances warrant a severance, I have no objection. Grannis's counsel argued that severance was necessary because statements attributed to Webster were very damaging to Grannis. Webster's counsel objected to the severance because he thought that a joint trial was favorable for Webster's defense. At that time, Webster could not have known that the trial court would admit Grannis's prejudicial pornographic photographs into evidence. The trial judge granted Grannis's severance motion over Webster's objection. On April 22, 1991, after the completion of discovery, the state moved to reconsolidate the trials of Grannis and Webster. The state argued that reconsolidation would save time and money because the co-defendants would not present antagonistic defenses, the evidence against them was identical, and many witnesses were from out of state. Grannis argued that Webster would probably not testify at a joint trial, and therefore Grannis would be denied the chance to cross-examine Webster about the incriminating statements that he made to Baker and Lopez. [2] Webster was not present at the hearing on the motion. The trial court granted the state's motion to reconsolidate, provided that the state agree not to introduce any statements made by Webster that facially incriminated Grannis. Grannis now contends that reconsolidation of the trials was reversible error. When two or more defendants have been joined for trial, rule 13.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires a court to sever the trials of defendants on motion of a party if necessary to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of any defendant of any offense. The decision to grant or deny a severance motion is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Cruz, 137 Ariz. 541, 544, 672 P.2d 470, 473 (1983). In making that decision, the trial court must balance the possible prejudice to the defendant against interests of judicial economy. Cruz, 137 Ariz. at 544, 672 P.2d at 473. When, as here, a defendant challenges the trial court's failure to grant a severance, he must demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial court was unable to protect. Id. Cases have generally held that a defendant is prejudiced to such a significant degree that severance is required when: (1) evidence admitted against one defendant is facially incriminating to the other defendant, see Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-26, 88 S.Ct. at 1621-22; (2) evidence admitted against one defendant has a harmful rub-off effect on the other defendant, see State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547, 555-56, 698 P.2d 1266, 1274-75 (1985); (3) there is a significant disparity in the amount of evidence introduced against each of the two defendants, see Lawson, 144 Ariz. at 556, 698 P.2d at 1275; or (4) codefendants present defenses that are so antagonistic that they are mutually exclusive, see State v. Kinkade, 140 Ariz. 91, 93-94, 680 P.2d 801, 803-04 (1984), or the conduct of one defendant's defense harms the other defendant, see Cruz, 137 Ariz. at 545-46, 672 P.2d at 474-75. Sometimes, however, a curative jury instruction is sufficient to alleviate any risk of prejudice that might result from a joint trial. See State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 68, 859 P.2d 169, 178, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 609, 126 L.Ed.2d 574 (1993). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Grannis's motion to sever because Grannis has failed to show that he suffered substantial prejudice from the joint trial. Grannis's case does not fit into any of the 4 categories mentioned above. First, both Grannis and the state agree that none of the evidence admitted against Webster facially incriminates Grannis. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-26, 88 S.Ct. at 1621-22 (holding that admitting the confession of co-defendant, which incriminated both co-defendant and Bruton, into evidence at joint trial violated constitutional rights of Bruton). Johnny Baker and Eva Lopez testified about statements made by Webster indicating that he had killed someone, but none of Webster's statements implicated Grannis in the murder. Furthermore, the witnesses were admonished to exclude from their testimony any statements that Webster made about Grannis. Second, Grannis suffered no rub-off effect. Severance is rarely granted when a defendant alleges that the jury's unfavorable impression of his co-defendant, against whom evidence is properly admitted, will influence the way the jurors view the defendant himself. Lawson, 144 Ariz. at 555, 698 P.2d at 1274. To determine if a rub-off problem exists, the court must ask whether the jury can keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him. Lawson, 144 Ariz. at 556, 698 P.2d at 1275, quoting United States v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 464-65 (11th Cir.1982). Grannis contends that Webster's statements to Baker about how he enjoyed committing the murder were so horrible that they rubbed off on Grannis and turned the jury against him. We conclude that these statements did not prejudice Grannis to such an extent that he was entitled to a separate trial. Although the statements reflected negatively on Webster, they also exculpated Grannis. Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the statements pertaining to the murder were attributable solely to Webster and not to Grannis. In this case, the jury was capable of keeping the evidence separate because the issues were not complex, the evidence was not complicated, and the judge instructed the jury as follows: There are two defendants. You must consider the evidence and the charges against each defendant separately. Lawson, 144 Ariz. at 556, 698 P.2d at 1275; see also State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525, 532-33, 698 P.2d 1244, 1251-52 (1985). Third, there was no significant disparity in the amount of evidence offered against Grannis and Webster. See Lawson, 144 Ariz. at 556, 698 P.2d at 1275. Even if such a disparity exists, severance is required only if the jury is unable to `compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants.' United States v. Singer, 732 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1984), quoting United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 525 (8th Cir.1977). This was not the case here. Grannis's testimony and the physical evidence placed both Grannis and Webster at the scene of the crime. Grannis's fingerprints were found on Richard's front door and on a beer bottle in Richard's house. Webster left a palm print on the wall near where Richard's body was found. Furthermore, after the murder Grannis sold the victim's car, and Webster bragged to a friend that he had killed someone. Based on this record, we conclude that the evidence was not so disparate that the jury was incapable of compartmentalizing the evidence as it related to Grannis and Webster. See Singer, 732 F.2d at 635. Fourth, Grannis and Webster did not present antagonistic defenses. Defenses are mutually antagonistic if in order to believe the core of the evidence offered on behalf of one defendant, [the jury] must disbelieve the core of the evidence offered on behalf of the co-defendant. Cruz, 137 Ariz. at 545, 672 P.2d at 474. In State v. Kinkade , for example, each co-defendant alleged that the other fired the fatal shot, so this court reversed their convictions and sentences and remanded for separate trials. 140 Ariz. at 94, 680 P.2d at 804. In this case, Webster alleges that he killed Richard in self-defense, and Grannis contends that he was not present during the murder. There is nothing contradictory about these defenses, so the jury could easily believe all the evidence offered on behalf of each defendant. Finally, we cannot say that the actual conduct of Webster's defense prejudiced Grannis. In Cruz, we required a retrial and a severance because Cruz's co-defendant elicited testimony on cross-examination that Cruz had links to organized crime and had hired people to commit murder. 137 Ariz. at 546, 672 P.2d at 475. Nothing so damaging to Grannis was elicited in the course of Webster's defense. Despite our conclusion that denial of a severance was not reversible error under the circumstances, the trial judge presiding on retrial must carefully consider this issue if either defendant raises it again. Our decision here is based on the evidence presented and the strategies employed at trial. In further proceedings, changes in trial strategy will require a reevaluation of the severance issue. Finally, if Grannis and Webster are tried together again, a more extensive curative instruction telling the jury to consider the evidence against each defendant separately would be in order. See Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 68, 859 P.2d at 178; Wiley, 144 Ariz. at 532-33, 698 P.2d at 1251-52.