Opinion ID: 2355739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amount of Attorney Fees

Text: Anderson argues that, even if the water court correctly awarded attorney fees and costs to Sebesta and Pursell, it erred in determining the amount. He argues that the water court erred because it did not provide a detailed description of the factors in section 13-17-103, C.R.S. (2010) and that the amount that they awarded was not appropriate. Section 13-17-103 mandates that, in determining the amount of an attorney fee award, the court shall specifically set forth the reasons for the award and the amount of the award and, in so doing, shall consider specific enumerated factors. Although the trial court may not make conclusory statements that a claim lacks substantial justification, it is only required to discuss the relevant factors of section 13-17-103. In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1379 (Colo.1997) (citations omitted). If none of the factors are specifically at issue, then the trial court is under no obligation to issue specific findings with regard to those factors. See Parker v. Davis, 888 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Colo.App.1994) (citing Sullivan v. Lutz, 827 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Colo.App.1992)). Here, the water court did not make a bald assertion as to why Anderson's Motion to Enforce was substantially frivolous. Instead, it discussed why the Final Decree controlled over the injunction. This statement that the injunction was no longer valid was sufficient for a finding that the Motion to Enforce it was without merit. [7] With regard to calculating the dollar amount, the water court also acted correctly. To calculate a reasonable fee, a trial court shall start by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the matter by a reasonable hourly rate. Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 386 (Colo.1994) (citations omitted). In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the trial court should look at the rates charged by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation in light of community standards in a reasonable community. Id. at 386-87 (citations omitted). Anderson argues that the relevant community was Pueblo, Colorado, not Denver, Colorado, and that the rate for one of Sebesta's attorneys should be discounted accordingly. He relies in part on Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir.1983) overruled on other grounds by Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987). That case, however, does not support his proposition. Ramos dealt with a civil rights claim brought by a prisoner in Cañon City, Colorado. Id. at 550. The Tenth Circuit stated that the case could be handled by reasonably competent trial lawyers in Denver or any other metropolitan area. Id. at 555 (emphasis added). We believe that it was appropriate for the water court to choose Denver as the relevant community and to honor a reasonable rate charged by a Denver attorney.