Opinion ID: 1894244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the trial court errored by failing to grant the defendant's motion for relief from the judgment based upon jury misconduct.

Text: Shortly after the Curtis letter surfaced, the defendant requested relief from the judgment. The trial court denied the motion and in doing so held (1) that there was no intrinsic or extrinsic influence by Curtis upon the jury; and, (2) there was no evidence to conclude that the jury was tampered with by Curtis. I agree with the majority that Behren's demonstration of juror misconduct during deliberations falls short of the standard required by SDCL 19-14-7. There has been no showing that extrinsic interferences have occurred during jury deliberations. But, this appeal does not center wholly around Curtis's alleged influence upon the other jury members. The misconduct of the kind Curtis exhibited prior to trial and during jury selection is not reviewed by the standards of SDCL 19-14-7. This appeal not only involves juror misconduct during deliberation, but it also involves the issue of whether Curtis should have been allowed to participate in the decision. And it is this distinction which the majority fails to address. The defendant's request for relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b) is well taken. In discussing this topic in State v. Hermann, supra at 619, the Missouri Supreme Court, after recognizing that the duty to question and preserve error on voir dire is usually the duty of counsel, noted in this exception: An exception is made to this rule so that `where it is shown that matters which might establish prejudice or work a disqualification were actually gone into on voir dire, and false answers were given, or deception otherwise practiced, the court will be permitted to consider the question on the motion for a new trial, either upon oral testimony taken at a hearing on the motion, or by affidavits'; because `the situation is closely akin to that when a new trial is sought for newly discovered evidence; and the complaining party is not to be left without a remedy for the want of a prior objection and exception, when the disqualification of the juror was one which he by due diligence could not have learned sooner. (Citations omitted) We find from the record herein there was such concealment and deception on the part of juror Michel as to make this exception applicable in this case; and we must hold this was prejudicial to defendant for the reasons stated in the above-cited cases. (Underlining added) In concluding the court stated the reason implicit in this ruling is required because: ... [D]efendant was entitled to this information, in determining which jurors to strike in using his peremptory challenges, regardless of whether or not it amounted to an absolute disqualification. Therefore, the judgment herein must be reversed. (Underlining added) In McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), prospective jurors were questioned on the topic of injuries specifically whether any members of their immediate family had ever sustained any severe injuries or had suffered for a prolonged period of time. One juror who remained silent to this question was seated as a jury member. After the verdict it was discovered that this particular juror had failed to appropriately respond and a new trial was ordered. In reversing the order for a new trial, the Supreme Court held that under Rule 61 (the same as SDCL 15-6-61) to obtain a new trial a party (1) must first demonstrate that a prospective juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire; and (2) then show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The defendant's motion for a new trial meets the criteria of Greenwood. First, Curtis failed to answer a material question. His prior conviction of mail fraud, a crime of dishonesty, had a direct bearing upon his qualifications as a juror. Under our state procedure it makes no difference whether the question was answered by questionnaire or by way of answer in voir dire. A dishonest answer to a material question under either circumstances is adequate. See, State v. Delfs, supra ; State v. Wyss, 124 Wis.2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985). Was Curtis dishonest in his failure to fill out the jury form? The top of the form required him to read and fill out both sides. He did not fill out the reverse side. He failed to use his true name. He failed to mention other litigation in Pennington County. He failed to mention his conviction for mail fraud. He attempted to extort money from the prevailing attorney. Curtis's honesty falls short of the benchmark. Next, if the true state of affairs were known, the defendant would have had a challenge for cause. Under SDCL 15-14-6(1) a juror may be challenged for cause because he does not qualify. As Curtis was potentially not qualified because of his felony conviction under federal law, he could have been challenged. It is not required in Greenwood that the court be convinced that a challenge would have been exercised. It is only required that the challenge for cause exist. I would reverse the trial court's ruling and remand the proceedings to the lower court for a new trial. I am authorized to state that MILLER, J., joins in concurring in part and dissenting in part.