Opinion ID: 889317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Issue Six: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in allowing Anderson to testify at trial?

Text: ¶ 65 Peterson called Anderson as his first witness at trial. Anderson is a Montana attorney who works primarily in the area of insurance law. In his expert disclosure, Anderson stated that he would testify about industry standards which should be followed by insurance companies when handling personal injury claims in Montana. In particular, Anderson identified twelve standards on which he planned to present expert testimony. Anderson claimed these standards were followed by adjusters and insurance companies throughout Montana. ¶ 66 Prior to trial, St. Paul moved to strike Anderson's expert testimony on these standards. The District Court denied the motion, but stated Anderson would be required to lay a foundation for any expert opinion given at trial. Moreover, the court prohibited Anderson from testifying regarding opinions which constitute conclusions of law. The District Court specifically stated it would not allow Anderson to provide any opinion or analysis that applies the law to the facts of the case, or to testify as to whether St. Paul violated the UTPA in its handling of Peterson's claim. ¶ 67 At trial, Anderson testified in general about claims handling practices, his experience in the insurance field, and specifically about St. Paul's handling of Peterson's claim. Anderson based his testimony in large measure on the evidence contained in St. Paul's claims file. Anderson testified about seven of the standards of industry practice which he believed should be followed in the claims adjusting process. During his testimony, St. Paul objected to a question posed to Anderson about whether he had an opinion on whether St. Paul violated any of the industry standards he had identified. The District Court overruled the objection and cautioned the jury as follows: I'm going to allow the witness to testify to thehe's laid the foundation for the industry standards and that this is his version of those standards, and he can testify as to whether or not he believes that the insurance company comported with those standards. However, I'm going to caution the jury, I'm going to, at the end of the case, give you the law that indicates whether or notyou're going to have to apply to determine whether or not the defendant did conform with the law or not. The law may be different than these standards. So you're going to get the final instruction, which is going to tell you what the law is that you have to apply. I will allow the witness to testify and give you this information, and you're going to get an instruction in the settlement of instructions also that tells you how you can evaluate a witness' testimony and how you can apply that in making your decision, and that allows you a great deal of discretion, whether to take everything that they say or to take nothing that the expert says. The testimony is simply indicated to give you additional information that you can choose to use as you see fit. So the objection is overruled, and I'll allow the question. ¶ 68 St. Paul argues on cross-appeal that the District Court abused its discretion in allowing Anderson to testify about his industry standards for handling claims and his opinion on whether St. Paul violated any of these standards. St. Paul contends the District Court essentially allowed Anderson to testify in a manner which applied the law to the facts of the case, and that such testimony was highly prejudicial. Furthermore, St. Paul claims that Anderson's standards were not properly disclosed prior to trial. ¶ 69 As we stated in Perdue v. Gagnon Farms, Inc., 2003 MT 47, 314 Mont. 303, 65 P.3d 570, Rule 705, M.R.Evid., allows an expert to testify as to his opinions or inferences, and Rule 704, M.R.Evid., further allows an expert to present opinions and inferences that embrace the ultimate issues to be decided by the jury. We distinguish ultimate issues of fact from ultimate issues of law because legal conclusions offered by an expert witness invade the province of the jury whose duty it is to apply the law as given in the jury instructions to the facts of the case. Such expert opinions on the law can be highly prejudicial. Hart-Anderson v. Hauck (1988), 230 Mont. 63, 72, 748 P.2d 937, 943. While an expert witness may properly testify as to an ultimate issue of fact, expert opinion that states a legal conclusion or applies the law to the facts is inadmissible. Mickelson v. Montana Rail Link, Inc., 2000 MT 111, ¶ 101, 299 Mont. 348, ¶ 101, 999 P.2d 985, ¶ 101. Perdue, ¶ 28. ¶ 70 Based upon our review of the record, and given the cautionary instruction delivered by the District Court, we see no evidence that St. Paul was prejudiced. Thus, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Anderson to testify. [5]