Opinion ID: 1678482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the appellant as a news gatherer had a right of access to the scene of this airplane crash beyond the general public's right to access

Text: The appellant advances two principal arguments why news gatherers as surrogates for the general public should have a right of access to emergency sites. First, the appellant argues that the first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right to gather information. Second, the appellant argues that art. I, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution protects the right of the press to gather information. [10] We will first address the appellant's first amendment argument. It has generally been held that the first amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972), citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). [11] The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17. Therefore, in Zemel, the United States Supreme Court sustained the government's refusal to validate passports to Cuba even though that restriction rendered less than wholly free the flow of information concerning that country. Id. at 16. The Court noted: There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right. Id. at 16-17. Similarly, in Branzburg, the United States Supreme Court stated that [n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded.... Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684-85. Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private organizations. Id. at 684. The United States Supreme Court continued its discussion of this issue in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). In Pell, the Court upheld a state regulation which prohibited press interviews with specific prisoners. The Court held that [n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public. Id. at 834. The Court noted the first and fourteenth amendments bar government from interfering in any way with a free press. The Constitution does not, however, require the government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally. Id. Finally, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978), an opinion joined by three justices stated that there is an undoubted right to gather news from any source by means within the law, but that affords no basis for the claim that there is a first amendment right of special access to information not available to the public generally. See also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82. The Houchins opinion noted, The fact that the Court relied upon Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), in both Branzburg, 408 U.S., at 684 n. 22, and Pell, [417 U.S.] at 834 n. 9, further negates any notion that the First Amendment confers a right of access to news sources. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11. The appellant contends that Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), has overruled sub silentio the Branzburg ruling that the media has no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crimes and disasters when the general public is excluded. We disagree. In Richmond Newspapers, then-Chief Justice Burger wrote that absent an overriding interest, the first amendment requires that a criminal trial must be open to the public. Id. at 581. The Court was addressing in Richmond Newspapers the right of the public and the press to attend courtrooms which have long been open to the public. In the case before this court, however, the appellant is seeking to obtain special access to the scene of an airplane crash beyond the public's right to access simply because he is a news gatherer as opposed to an ordinary citizen. Consequently, we hold that the Richmond Newspapers decision is inapplicable to the situation before this court and that the Branzburg ruling has not been overruled sub silentio. The dissent concedes that the United States Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional protection for news gatherers' access to an accident scene, yet the dissent notes that in certain circumstances the Court has recognized that particular institutions have allowed the press greater access than the public to serve as a surrogate for the public. Dissenting opinion at 559-560. It is interesting to note the particular facts of the two cases the dissent cites as support for its proposition. In Richmond Newspapers, as described above, the Court dealt with the issue of the right of access to courtrooms. In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 847 (1974), the Court was dealing with the right of access to prisons. The dissent fails to note that there is a difference between an institution allowing news gatherers priority of access on its own accord, in a setting in which the institution may closely control and monitor access, and this court mandating access in an emergency situation. Even the appellant concedes that [a] right of access to trials does not necessarily imply a right of access to emergency scenes. [12] Our interpretation of the preceding United States Supreme Court cases leads us to the conclusion that under the first amendment, the appellant has an undoubted right to gather news from any source by means within the law. [4] However, the appellant does not have a first amendment right of access, solely because he is a news gather, to the scene of this airplane crash when the general public has been reasonably excluded. [5] The appellant's second argument is that art. I, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides a basis for a news gathers right of access to the scene of an airplane crash beyond the general public's right of access. The appellant, however, has failed to offer any precedent which would support his contention. In addition, on the basis of the record before us, we are not inclined to recognize such a right because news gatherers were not denied access to the crash site of Midwest Express Flight 105 on September 6, 1985. While the appellant was disregarding Detective White's orders and penetrating into the nonpublic restricted area of the airport, other news gatherers were assembling in the airport director's office at the airport, pursuant to the General Mitchell Field Media Guide. At 4:30 p.m., the airport director held a briefing which lasted approximately 15 minutes. Immediately thereafter, the director took media representatives directly to the crash site to take photographs or film the scene. Therefore, given the fact that news gatherers were given access to the scene of this airplane crash, we are not inclined to rule on the issue of whether a news gatherer has a right of access to the scene of an airplane crash under the Wisconsin Constitution beyond that of the general public's right of access. Furthermore, the needs and rights of the injured and dying should be recognized by this court as having preference over newly created rights that the dissenting justices would give to a news gatherer who is simply concentrating on trying to beat out his competition and make his employer's deadline. As the circuit court so aptly noted in its memorandum decision, in an emergency situation [t]he injured and dying are entitled to receive the immediate and full attention of rescue workers. Law enforcement personnel should not be required to needlessly occupy themselves with persons who have a personal interest not related to restoration of order or with rescue attempts. The defendant, here, chose to disregard the government's efforts to establish order, set himself and his interest above the law, diluted law enforcement efforts to assist those in need, and by so doing elevated his own interest and concerns above the welfare of the persons involved in the tragic accident and the government's efforts in its law enforcement concerns. In conclusion, we affirm the decision of the circuit court finding the appellant guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of City of Oak Creek Municipal Ordinance Sec. 9:947:01. In addition, we hold that sec. 9:947:01 as applied in this case is not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, we hold that the appellant as a news gatherer had no first amendment right of access to the scene of this airplane crash, under the circumstances described above, beyond the general public's right to access. By the Court. The decision of the circuit court is affirmed. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). The state has a significant interest in keeping people away from the site of an accident or crime to expedite assisting victims, to preserve evidence or to protect the public from injury. This state interest, however, is not at issue in this case. The record shows that the defendant was not interfering with or obstructing emergency personnel and that neither he nor other observers were in danger. The issue in this case is whether the defendant's refusing to obey an officer's command to leave the accident scene constitutes the offense of disorderly conduct as defined in the Oak Creek ordinance. I conclude it does not. Moreover, I conclude that this court should acknowledge that a representative of the news media may function as a proxy for the public in certain situations where public access is limited.