Opinion ID: 1987047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is an Affirmative Agreement an Element of the Offense?

Text: As an alternative argument, Schmidt contends the State should be required to prove an affirmative agreement existed to sustain a conviction for prostitution. As previously stated, section 725.1 prohibits a person from sell[ing] or offer[ing] for sale the person's services as a partner in a sex act. Iowa Code § 725.1. Nowhere in the statute do the words agree or agreement appear. The power to define a crime lies with the legislature. State v. Durgin, 328 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa 1983). The ultimate goal in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Foster, 356 N.W.2d at 550. When a statute's terms are unambiguous and its meaning is plain, this court will not second-guess legislative intent. See State v. Bond, 493 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Iowa 1992). Statutory words should be given their ordinary meaning unless it is clear that a different meaning was intended or such a construction would defeat the manifest intent of the legislature. Id. Schmidt is essentially requesting that this court legislate an additional requirement to the offense of prostitutionthat there be an affirmative agreement between the parties. This evinces more than what the legislature has defined. Agree is defined as to indicate willingness: CONSENT. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 43 (1976). Offer is defined as to present for acceptance or rejection: hold out: TENDER, PROFFER. Id. at 1566. These terms are not synonymous and would defeat the clear intent of the legislature to criminalize only an offer or a sale. Accordingly, we reject Schmidt's argument that the State must prove there was an affirmative agreement to prevail on a prostitution charge. The legislature clearly could have included such a requirement, but did not.