Opinion ID: 1984560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: iii(c prohibition of ncaa bylaw 19.8 restitution

Text: We note some disagreement among the parties as to the nature of the trial court's ruling with respect to NCAA Bylaw 19.8. Lasege argues that the trial court prohibited the NCAA from imposing restitutionary sanctions only during the pendency of the temporary injunction. As the bylaw itself allows the NCAA to seek restitution only if the temporary injunction is dissolved, we disagree with this characterization. The language of the order also suggests otherwise: The Court also understands that U of L fears that Bylaw 19.8 could be enforced against it. That bylaw permits sanctions to be imposed by the NCAA against member schools if the Court order should be set aside or reversed in some manner. This Court has never seen such an agreement between members of an association that allows sanctions for turning to the courts for assistance when a perceived wrongdoing exists. See Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n v. Hopkins Co. Bd. of Educ., Ky.App., 552 S.W.2d 685 (1977); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 908 F.2d 972 (6th Cir.1990). The judicial power of this Commonwealth cannot be thwarted by members of an association such as the NCAA. Craft v. Commonwealth, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 150 (1961). Consequently, this court declares that the NCAA Bylaw 19.8 is invalid because it prevents parties from availing themselves of the protections of the courts. In context, therefore, the trial court's order that the NCAA and its members are hereby ordered to take no action to prevent or interfere with the University of Louisville's ability to abide by this Order by attempting to enforce NCAA Bylaw 19.8 declares an NCAA Bylaw invalid within the Commonwealth of Kentucky and insulates U of L from restitutionary sanctions for allowing Lasege to participate as a member of its intercollegiate men's basketball team. At the outset, we observe that the trial court's order gives no indication that it engaged in a CR 65.04 analysis before enjoining the NCAA in this regard, and that reason standing alone would require us to vacate this portion of the injunction. It appears that the trial court included this prophylactic measure, at U of L's urging, simply to facilitate its other order by permitting U of L the risk-free right to allow Lasege to play basketball. In any event, we can find no interest which would justify such injunctive relief. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited the NCAA from seeking NCAA Bylaw 19.8 restitution. By becoming a member of the NCAA, a voluntary athletic association, U of L agreed to abide by its rules and regulations. NCAA Bylaw 19.8 is one of those regulations, and it specifically provides that the NCAA can attempt to restore competitive equity by redistributing wins and losses and imposing sanctions upon a member institution which allows an ineligible player to participate under a subsequently-vacated court order, even if that order requires the institution to allow the player to participate. As the Indiana Supreme Court recently noted when addressing an identical issue concerning the Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA)'s restitution rule, such contractual risk allocation is no stranger to the courts: Contracts frequently allocate risks of unfavorable litigation results. For example, contracting parties agree that should a judgment, order or settlement prohibit a party from enjoying the benefits of the agreement, that party shall have no further obligations with respect to the contract. Doctors and attorneys purchase insurance so as to protect themselves from the consequences of lawsuits. Couples may sign prenuptial agreements dictating what is to occur should a trial judge determine that the prenuptial agreement is unenforceable. Such agreements show no disrespect to the courts. We presume that the judgments of our trial courts are correct and validbut sometimes they are wrong. If a school wants to enjoy the benefits of membership in the IHSAA, the school agrees to be subject to a rule that permits the IHSAA to require the school to forfeit victories, trophies, titles and earnings if a trial court improperly grants an injunction or restraining order prohibiting enforcement of IHSAA eligibility rules. Such an agreement shows no disrespect to the institution of the judiciary. Member schools voluntarily contract to abide by the rules of the organization in exchange for membership in the association. One of those rules is the Restitution Rule. Undeniably, the Restitution Rule imposes hardship on a school that, in compliance with an order of a court which is later vacated, fields an ineligible player. On the other hand, use of an ineligible player imposes a hardship on other teams that must compete against the teams fielding ineligible players. While schools will contend that is unfair when they have to forfeit victories earned with an ineligible player on the field because they complied with a court order, competing schools will reply that it is unfair when they have to compete against a team with an ineligible student athlete because a local trial judge prohibited the school or the IHSAA from following the eligibility rules. The Restitution Rule represents the agreement of IHSAA members on how to balance those two competing interests. The Restitution Rule may not be the best method to deal with such situations. However, it is the method which the member schools have adopted. And in any event, its enforcement by the IHSAA does not impinge upon the judiciary's function. [18] In fact, contrary to the belief of the trial court the concept of risk-free injunctive relief is unheard ofCR 65.05 requires the party in whose favor the injunction is granted to post a bond [19] and wrongfully enjoined parties may recover compensatory damages. [20] Here, U of L and the other NCAA members reached an agreement as to how competitive equity should be restored in the event of an erroneous court determination regarding a player's eligibility, and the trial court simply released U of L from that obligation. The trial court's belief that the NCAA's Restitution Rule thwarts the judicial power is simply without foundation. NCAA Bylaw 19.8, like the Restitution Rules enforced by many state high school athletic associations does not purport to authorize interference with any court order during the time it remains in effect, but only authorizes restitutive penalties when a temporary restraining order is ultimately dissolved and the challenged eligibility rule remains undisturbed in force. [21] The authority of the courts is thus in no way compromised, and NCAA Bylaw 19.8 merely allows for post-hoc equalization when a trial court's erroneously granted temporary injunction upsets competitive balance. If the trial court's preliminary conclusions carry the day, and a student-athlete's eligibility is confirmed by final determination, no restitutionary remedy is warranted or appropriate, and NCAA Bylaw 19.8 provides for none. The trial court's curt conclusion that NCAA Bylaw 19.8 prevents parties from availing themselves of the protections of the courts does not disclose the basis for this opinion. Perhaps the trial court believed that NCAA Bylaw 19.8 would deter aggrieved student-athletes from seeking judicial redress because of fears that their efforts would only hurt their teams in the long-run. Perhaps the trial court believed that the bylaw created a disincentive for NCAA member institutions to allow players whose eligibility has not yet been finally adjudicated to play in games or other athletic events. Neither conclusion would justify the trial court's order. The decision to seek injunctive relief will always involve a calculated risk on the part of the plaintiff, and those with meritorious claims will decide to proceed. Rather than changing the rules in the middle of the game, trial courts should consider the possibility that an erroneous decision could result in restitutionary sanctions against a student-athlete's institution when they balance the equities. We recognize that the Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion in one paragraph in Hopkins a case in which the parties did not seek discretionary review in this Court. For the reasons explained above, we find this conclusion unsound, and we overrule Hopkins to the extent that it holds that injunctive relief prohibiting a voluntary athletic association from seeking agreed-upon restitutionary sanctions is appropriate. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the temporary injunction which prohibits the NCAA from potentially pursuing NCAA Bylaw 19.8 restitution.