Opinion ID: 815370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “Experience” Prong

Text: 32 The framework articulated in Richmond Newspapers asks us to consider whether a “„place and process have historically been open to the press and general public.‟” North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 209 (quoting Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 8). This analysis begins with a review of historical practices associated with a particular place or process; this inquiry is objective. See Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1175. Thus, for example, in Capital Cities we held that “the relevant historic[al] practice in this case is not specifically that of Pennsylvania‟s [D.E.R.]” Id. Instead, after considering Richmond Newspapers, Globe and PressEnterprise, we held that “[i]n each of these cases, the Court looked not to the practice of the specific public institution involved, but rather to whether the particular type of government proceeding had historically been open in our free society.” Id. (emphasis added). To meet this objective standard, the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have drawn on a plethora of historical sources, including comments made by the Framers, practice at the English court of law, congressional procedures, relevant regulatory schemes, and court decisions. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-73; Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1068-70; North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 211-15. This wide-ranging inquiry into historical practice is not incidental; the “experience” prong sets a relatively high bar, a point we recognized in North Jersey, when we compared the tradition of open deportation proceedings to the traditions of openness discussed in Richmond Newspapers (for criminal trials) and Publicker (for civil trials), and held that “deportation hearings [do not] boast a tradition of openness sufficient to satisfy Richmond Newspapers.” North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 212-13; cf. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 n.9 (failing to find 33 “„a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country‟” (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948)); Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059 (noting that a common law right to access civil trials was “beyond dispute”). In contrast to the criminal and civil trial settings, we noted that the “tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.” North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 211. And while we acknowledged that “a showing of openness at common law is not required” and that “a 1000-year history is unnecessary,” we were quick to note our inability to dispense with the “experience” analysis “where history is ambiguous or lacking, [or] to recognize a First Amendment right based solely on the „logic‟ inquiry.” Id. at 213.18 18 During our discussion in North Jersey, we acknowledged that one of our cases — United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) — applied the “experience and logic” test without the benefit of a wellestablished tradition of historical openness. 308 F.3d at 21314. The Simone case centered on a claimed right of access to post-trial examinations of jury misconduct. 14 F.3d 833. In analyzing the “experience” prong of the Richmond Newspapers framework, we noted that “[n]either the parties nor this court have been able to find cases dating before 1980 in support of either openness or closure for this type of posttrial proceeding.” Simone, 14 F.3d at 838. While we explicitly stated in Simone that our analysis would “rely primarily on the „logic‟ prong of the test,” we acknowledged that the experience prong was fulfilled by looking to “other phases of the criminal process.” Id.; see also North Jersey, 34 In the case before us, Appellant seeks access to the polling place.19 We therefore look to see whether a tradition of openness exists for the polling place and the process of voting occurring inside. 20 Our inquiry includes not just the 308 F.3d at 214 (acknowledging the peculiar nature of Simone). 19 We reject the argument, proffered by Appellant‟s counsel, that a right of access to polling places exists because information about voters is publicly available. The access Appellant seeks is not to this information; it is to the actual process occurring within the polling place prior to casting a vote. This crucial distinction also ensures that our decision does not pertain to activities such as exit-polling. 20 Ordinarily, our case law dictates that the complaint must allege this tradition of openness. See Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1175. In the current matter, we recognize that Appellant has not directly engaged with the “experience and logic” standard and therefore the complaint is relatively devoid of any such allegations. (As our earlier discussion explains, allegations as to the practices surrounding the specific government agency, process or law at issue are not pertinent.) However, we believe it is unnecessary to remand the case back to the District Court to give Appellant an opportunity to amend its pleadings. As the forthcoming analysis will demonstrate, the Supreme Court‟s review of elections in America presents a well-rounded picture of how restrictions around polling places developed. We therefore think it would be futile for Appellant to try to amend its pleadings. 35 act of voting, but also the act of entering the polling place and signing in to vote. In light of our reasoning that the “experience” inquiry is objective, we begin our analysis with the general voting process. At this level of generality, the Supreme Court‟s plurality opinion in Burson is highly instructive. The facts and legal conclusions of the decision are immaterial for our present purposes; we are instead interested in the plurality‟s thorough exegesis on the history of voting in America. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 200-06. While a full recapitulation is unnecessary, it behooves us to engage in a brief discussion. In the colonial era, voting was conducted by voice vote — a process freely accessible to the entire public. Id. at 200 (“That voting scheme was not a private affair, but an open, public decision, witnessed by all and improperly influenced by some.”). As time went on, and the perils of public voicebased voting became apparent, the newly-formed states adopted systems based on the paper ballot. Id. Voters would craft their own ballots at home and then bring them to the polls. Id. However, the trip between the home and the poll was not a private or protected affair, and the old evils of voice-based voting resurfaced in the form of pre-printed ballots, bribery, and intimidation. Id. at 200-01 (“State attempts to standardize the ballots were easily thwarted — the vote buyer could simply place a ballot in the hands of the bribed voter and watch until he placed it in the polling box.”). Under the original ballot-based system, “[a]pproaching the polling place . . . was akin to entering an open auction place. As the elector started his journey to the polls, he was met by various party ticket peddlers „who were only too anxious to supply him with their party tickets.‟” Id. at 202 (quoting 36 Eldon Cobb Evans, A History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States 9 (1917)). In the late 1800s, states began adopting “the Australian system” of voting. Id. at 203. The new system not only placed all of the candidates on a single ballot, but it also “provided for the erection of polling booths . . . open only to election officials, two „scrutinees‟ for each candidate, and electors about to vote.” Id. at 202. The state laws differed mainly in the size of the exclusionary zone that they created around the polls. Id. (“The Massachusetts and New York laws differed somewhat from the previous Acts in that they excluded the general public only from the area encompassed within a guardrail constructed six feet from the voting compartments.”).21 “By 1896, almost 90 percent of the States had adopted the Australian system. This accounted for 92 percent of the national electorate.” Id. at 204-05. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia added that “[b]y 1900, at least 34 of the 45 States . . . had enacted such restrictions,” and that “most of the statutes banning electionday speech near the polling place specified the same distance”: 100 feet. Id. at 214-15 & n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) (collecting statutes). 21 The court noted that “[t]his modification was considered an improvement because it provided additional monitoring by members of the general public and independent candidates, who in most States were not allowed to be represented by separate inspectors.” Burson, 504 U.S. at 203-04. 37 Now, returning our focus to Pennsylvania, we note that the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates that “[a]ll elections by the citizens shall be by ballot or by such other method as may be prescribed by law: Provided, That secrecy in voting be preserved.” Pa. Const. art. 7, § 4 (emphasis added). Moreover, the provisions in § 3060 limiting access to the polling place were adopted 75 years ago. See Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, No. 320, Art. XVIII, § 1220. While we do not look specifically at whether a tradition of openness exists in Pennsylvania, we do find it relevant that Pennsylvania laws and provisions are in line with the historical development discussed by the Supreme Court above. In light of the foregoing discussion — and our earlier directive that the tradition of openness must be objectively and clearly established — we find that the historical record is insufficient to establish a presumption of openness in the context of the voting process itself. While the act of voting — and the process by which voting was carried out — began its life as a public affair, our Nation‟s history demonstrates a decided and long-standing trend away from openness, toward a closed electoral process.