Opinion ID: 1862662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: can a lower court consider extrinsic evidence when determining the validity of a deed, absolute in form and unambiguous on its face?

Text: The validity of the Warranty Deed conveying the subject property from Lester Hester to Eretta and Hildon is contested for the first time on appeal. The issue was not broached at trial, and the chancellor made no findings in that regard. Eretta's pleadings state only the following: Your Counterclaimant shows that her father gave her the property set out in Paragraph III of the Complaint [the 10.7 acre tract] and because of the personal intimate relationship between her and Hildon Shaw, that she placed the name of Hildon Shaw on the deed for the sole purpose of passing to him upon her death in the event she predeceased him. Your Counterclaimant shows that Hildon Shaw paid a few hundred dollars to her father, however, it was not for the purpose of acquiring a one-half interest in and to the property. Your Counterclaimant shows that they are not owners of an undivided one-half interest and that the amount of money Hildon Shaw contributed would only be for a small part of the value if it were to be considered part of the purchase price of the property. Your Counterclaimant owns the property subject to the survivorship rights of the Plaintiff. The pleadings do not allege that Lester Hester executed the deed as a result of undue influence, nor do they seek to have the conveyance set aside. In fact, Eretta's pleadings affirmatively assert that she owns the property by virtue of the deed she now attacks. One of the most fundamental and long established rules of law in Mississippi is that the Mississippi Supreme Court will not review matters on appeal that were not raised at the trial court level. Estate of Myers v. Myers, 498 So.2d 376, 378 (Miss. 1986); accord R & S Development, Inc. v. Wilson, 534 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1988); Strait v. Pat Harrison Waterway Dist., 523 So.2d 36, 41 (Miss. 1988); Methodist Hospitals of Memphis v. Marsh, 518 So.2d 1227, 1228 (Miss. 1988); Estate of Johnson v. Adkins, 513 So.2d 922 (Miss. 1987); Bailey v. Collins, 215 Miss. 78, 60 So.2d 587, 589 (Miss. 1952). The Court in Adkins, addressing an analogous matter, stated the following: In the trial below, appellant did not plead or raise at any point the ... question of undue influence and fiduciary relationship. That issue is assigned, argued and presented for the first time on appeal. It is elementary that this Court will not review on appeal those issues which were not raised in the court below. Adkins, 513 So.2d at 925. In the instant case, Eretta has asserted an entirely different theory on appeal than the one she pursued at trial. In the lower court, she affirmed the deed by which she acquired her interest in the subject property; on appeal she seeks to have it set aside. In Strait, this Court ruled: On appeal, a party must pursue the same legal theory advanced in the trial court. Estate of Johnson v. Adkins 513 So.2d 922 (Miss. 1987). In Bailey v. Collins, 215 Miss. 78, 60 So.2d 587 (1952), the Court said: Appellant has now chosen in this Court an entirely different line of battle from that chosen in the court below, and we think the theory of the case as now presented on this appeal is not properly before us for review. 215 [Miss.] at 83, 60 So.2d at 589. As this contract claim is for the first time on appeal, it is procedurally barred and will not be addressed by this Court. Strait, 523 So.2d at 41. To determine the validity of the conveyance from Hester to Eretta and Hildon would require this Court to do what it has no power to do  to sit as a trier of fact ab initio. See Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So.2d 416 (Miss. 1985) (Supreme Court sits as an appellate court and not as a trier of fact ab initio ). We hold, therefore, that Eretta has waived her right to contest the validity of the conveyance by which she received her interest in the property.