Opinion ID: 2520500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court correctly determined joint tenants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the lake property.

Text: ¶ 7 As a preliminary point, we note that summary judgment is appropriate only when it appears [from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions or other evidentiary materials] there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Flanders v. Crane Co., 1984 OK 88, 693 P.2d 602, 605; Carris v. John R. Thomas & Assoc., 1995 OK 33, 896 P.2d 522, 530; 12 O.S. Ch.2 App., Dist. Ct.R. 13(d). An order granting summary relief disposes solely of law questions and is reviewable by a de novo standard. Copeland v. Lodge Enterprises, Inc., 2000 OK 36, ¶ 8, 4 P.3d 695, 699; Brown v. Nicholson, 1997 OK 32, ¶ 5, 935 P.2d 319, 321. Additionally, as this case involves the interpretation of the probate homestead statute, 58 O.S. § 311, we note that a legal question involving statutory interpretation is likewise subject to de novo review. Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶ 2, 81 P.3d 652, 654 (citation omitted). ¶ 8 We also note preliminarily that it is uncontroverted that the lake property at issue in this case is joint tenancy property, the principle characteristic of which is a right of survivorship in the joint tenants. See In re Estate of MacFarline, 2000 OK 87, ¶ 16-17, n. 5, 14 P.3d 551, 558. Generally, upon the death of a joint tenant, the joint tenancy property do[es] not become part of the deceased joint tenant's estate, but becomes the sole property of the surviving joint tenant. Id. at ¶ 16, 558 (citations omitted). Further, by the very nature of the tenancy, title of the joint tenant who dies first terminates at death and vests eo instanti (i.e., immediately) in the survivor. Because joint tenants are seised of the whole while alive, the survivor's interest is simply a continuation, or extension of his/her existing interest. Id. at n. 5 (citing Clovis v. Clovis, 1969 OK 170, 460 P.2d 878, 881). Longstanding Oklahoma case law clearly provides that joint tenancy property passes by operation of law to the surviving joint tenants at the instant of the joint tenant's death. Bleakley v. Bowlby, 1976 OK 158, 557 P.2d 894, 897; Littlefield v. Roberts, 1968 OK 180, 448 P.2d 851, 855. Thus, pursuant to the above general rules governing joint tenancy property, upon the death of joint tenant Earl Casey, his title to the lake property terminated and vested immediately by operation of law in the surviving Joint Tenants. ¶ 9 Widow asserts her constitutional [6] and statutory homestead interest, relying primarily upon 58 O.S. § 311 as the basis for asserting Joint Tenants' interest in the lake property is subject to her probate homestead right. Section 311 provides in pertinent part as follows: Upon the death of either husband or wife, the survivor may continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead, which shall not in any event be subject to administration proceedings, except as in this title provided, until it is otherwise disposed of according to law. ... Id. (emphasis added). The statutory language expressly provides protection of the surviving spouse's homestead right as against disposition of the property via probate administration. In keeping with the plain meaning of this statute, we have determined the surviving spouse's right to occupy and live on the whole homestead is superior to rights of codevisees of interest in [the] property, whose rights are postponed during her life, or until her voluntary abandonment. Mercer v. Mercer, 1961 OK 210, 365 P.2d 554, 554 (Fifth Syllabus by the Court)(emphasis added). We have held [t]he homestead is reserved to the family if the title is in either husband or wife.... Lehman v. Tucker, 1936 OK 169, 55 P.2d 62, 63 (citations omitted). Homestead rights acquired by [n]aked possession without any title or interest whatsoever may, under some circumstances, be sufficient as against all the world except the true owners and those claiming under them. Van Meter v. Field, 1945 OK 173, 159 P.2d 546, 549 (citations omitted). ¶ 10 In this case, we note that in 1983, Earl Casey executed a warranty deed to the lake property (acquired by him prior to the marriage) and thereby conveyed the property to himself and to his children in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship at a time when the lake property did not constitute the homestead of the couple. Thus, this is not a situation in which one intentionally sought to deprive his spouse of a homestead. See Gross v. Gross, 491 N.W.2d 751, 753 (S.D.1992)(providing homestead laws are intended to prevent one spouse, in life or in death, from unilaterally depriving the other spouse of a homestead.) ¶ 11 Widow analogizes Joint Tenants' interest in the lake property to that of codevisees' interest and asserts the application of the rule in Mercer v. Mercer on the facts of this case. Joint Tenants argue this matter is distinguishable from Mercer and assert this is a case of first impression. [7] Joint Tenants cite authorities from Florida [8] and South Dakota, [9] which support the proposition that a surviving spouse has no homestead interest in joint tenancy property because the deceased owned no interest after his death to which the surviving spouse's homestead interest could attach. [10] ¶ 12 The COCA apparently agreed with Widow, as it determined that Joint Tenants' interest in this case was likewise subject to Widow's homestead right pursuant to Mercer. [11] In making this determination, the COCA ignored the critical legal distinction between property subject to probate administration proceedings, i.e., property subject to testamentary disposition, versus property held in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship. As we noted in Mercer, [s]urvivorship is the distinguishing characteristic of a joint tenancy. And it is this distinctive characteristic of survivorship which, on the death of one of the joint tenants, precludes the devolution upon his heirs of any interest in the estate held in joint tenancy. Mercer, 365 P.2d at 556 (citations omitted). Unlike property subject to probate administration, [a]s to property held in joint tenancy, there is nothing to inherit from the one dying first. The survivor takes under the original grant, his estate being simply freed from participation by the death of his former tenant. The survivor takes the entire estate to the exclusion of the heirs of the deceased. Id. (citations omitted). While the law clearly protects the surviving spouse's homestead right to possession and occupation from disposition to other heirs and/or other beneficiaries via probate administration proceedings, neither Mercer nor § 311 provide similar protection of the homestead right as against disposition to true owners by operation of law. It is the distinguishing characteristic of the right of survivorship, which leads us to a different conclusion here from that in the Mercer case. ¶ 13 Additionally, the COCA also appears to have ignored express language of § 311, which expressly provides for the surviving spouse's right to continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead, which shall not in any event be subject to administration proceedings, except as in this title provided, until it is otherwise disposed of according to law. [12] As noted above, a deceased joint tenant's interest passes by operation of law to surviving joint tenants at the instant of the joint tenant's death. We hold that upon the death of the joint tenant Earl Casey, the lake property was disposed of according to law within the meaning of § 311 when his title and ownership terminated and vested by operation of law in the surviving Joint Tenants. Further, since there was no title in either Earl Casey or Widow at the time of his death, the homestead was not reserved to the family and Widow had no homestead right of possession and occupation of the lake property. See Lehman v. Tucker, 1936 OK 169, 55 P.2d 62, 63 (citations omitted). Further, in accordance with Widow's concession that she held no title, ownership or interest other than her purported homestead right to continue to possess and occupy the lake property, we hold that Widow's homestead right acquired by naked possession alone was inferior to the interest of the true owners, the Joint Tenants, in this instance. See Van Meter v. Field, 1945 OK 173, 159 P.2d 546, 559 (citations omitted). Finally, since the lake property was joint tenancy property impressed with the distinguishing characteristic of survivorship, Earl Casey's title terminated and vested immediately in the surviving Joint Tenants upon their father's death and he held no interest to which his surviving spouse's homestead right could attach. The trial court correctly determined that Joint Tenants were sole owners of the lake property as a matter of law and that Widow had no homestead interest therein.