Opinion ID: 76149
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of a single, overarching conspiracy

Text: 37 Anderson argues the evidence presented at trial fails to prove a single, overarching conspiracy encompassing the bid-rigging, as alleged in the indictment. He asserts that the negotiations on the contracts were wholly separate and that the Government failed to present evidence of rigging or attempting to rig all three bids. The Government responds that the evidence presented at trial was in accord with the allegations of the indictment and that a reasonable jury could have found a single conspiracy on the evidence presented at trial. Two issues are thus before the Court: 1) the substantive aspect of whether the government indeed established a single conspiracy, and 2), the procedural aspect of whether there is a material variance between how Anderson was charged and what the government's evidence established at trial. 38 Anderson's main argument is that the government's evidence failed to establish and the jury wrongly found a single overarching conspiracy. This Court narrowly reviews this argument: We may reverse a jury's finding that a single conspiracy existed only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could not permit reasonable jurors to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,' that there was a single conspiracy. United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 337 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Brito, 721 F.2d 743, 747 (11th Cir.1983)). Three relevant factors determine whether a single conspiracy existed: (1) whether there was a common goal, (2) the nature of the scheme, and (3) the overlap of the participants. U.S. v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1349 (11th Cir.1999). No material variance exists if a reasonable fact finder could have found the existence of a single conspiracy. Id. 39 We conclude that a reasonable jury could have found a single conspiracy on the facts of this case. First, the common goal of the overarching bid-rigging scheme was to steal from the United States by inflating the winning bids. The written agreement on the first contract, 20A, shows a common goal among the conspirators to reciprocate on future contracts, including Contract 29, the third contract in this case. 40 Second, Anderson's alleged comments to Johnny Ollis about the Frankfurt Club of bidders implies a group of individuals involved in a single enterprise. Additionally, those involved in the scheme by which the bids were rigged worked in a consistent manner on all three contracts. Schmidt contacted the participating pre-approved bidders and arranged a meeting in Frankfurt. The representatives of the bidders agreed which company would win the bid and what the others would receive for bidding high. The bid prices were raised to accommodate the higher anticipated profits as well as the losers' fees. 41 Finally, although the participants were different in each meeting, there was substantial overlap. Schmidt clearly had a leading role in all three negotiations. This Circuit permits the finding of a single conspiracy where a key man directs the activities, coordinating the individual efforts of various combinations of people. United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d at 337. The jury also had testimonial evidence that Anderson himself was present during the rigging of the bids on all three contracts. Although some of the evidence presented at trial may be less than credible, as Anderson argues, the weight of the evidence considered as a whole is sufficient to support the jury's finding that the bid-rigging scheme was a single, overarching conspiracy. 42 Because we hold that a reasonable fact finder could have found the existence of a single conspiracy, we necessarily conclude that no material variance existed between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. See Chastain, 198 F.3d at 1349.