Opinion ID: 2782886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Everett’s Consent to Provide DNA Samples

Text: Turning to Everett’s case, we address the Florida Supreme Court’s decision as to the November 19 DNA samples and then as to his November 27 confession. As to the DNA consent, Everett has not demonstrated that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision—that the request for consent to collect DNA samples did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights—“was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any However, based on the McNeely majority’s analysis and purported following of Schmerber and related precedent, we do not read McNeely as abrogating, even in part, Schmerber. In any event, Everett consented to the DNA sample, and this appeal does not involve a Fourth Amendment claim. 63 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 64 of 87 possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. First, although Everett twice invoked his right to counsel under Miranda while in custody, the Florida Supreme Court correctly concluded that the appointment of counsel was not required except for interrogation. Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1284; see Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485-86, 101 S. Ct. at 1885 (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked . . . .”). Simply put, the police officers were not forbidden contact with Everett that did not amount to interrogation—that is, express questioning or words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit a verbal incriminating response. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90; Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 380-82, 130 S. Ct. at 2259-60. Indeed, the Supreme Court excludes from the definition of “interrogation” those police communications “normally attendant to arrest and custody.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90. Second, the Florida Supreme Court also reasonably concluded that the request for DNA consent did not amount to interrogation. Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1286. The privilege against self-incrimination extends only to compelled testimonial communications, which are those communications that relate a factual 64 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 65 of 87 assertion or disclose information. Doe, 487 U.S. at 207, 210, 108 S. Ct. at 2345, 2347. Thus, neither the furnishing of consent to collect DNA, nor the DNA evidence itself, is testimonial or communicative. See id. at 210, 108 S. Ct. at 2347. In addition, DNA collection by police is not interrogation of a suspect because it is not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating verbal response. Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the request for DNA consent— even though it followed Everett’s invocation of his right to counsel under Miranda—did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. 16 We recognize that Everett argues that once he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda the police were prohibited from having any further communication or dealings with him without counsel present. The cases relied on by Everett in support of this argument—Edwards, Mosley, Roberson, and Innis—provide no indication, and certainly do not clearly establish, that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel extends beyond interrogation or that police must cease all further communication with a detained individual in the absence of an attorney after he invokes his right to counsel. Rather, the Supreme Court in these cases consistently 16 To the extent that Everett’s contends that service of the arrest warrant constituted interrogation, we summarily conclude that the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that the service of the warrant did not amount to interrogation. Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1286. Sergeant Tilley’s service of the arrest warrant was part of routine police procedure normally attendant to custody, and Tilley would not reasonably have expected service of the arrest warrant to elicit an incriminating response, as a response from Everett was not even required. Cf. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S. Ct. at 1690 (reasoning that a conversation was merely “a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from the [defendant] was invited”). 65 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 66 of 87 held only that interrogation must cease in such circumstances. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680-82, 108 S. Ct. at 2097-98; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885; Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91; Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n.10, 96 S. Ct. at 326 n.10. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Roberson specifically noted that the police officers in that case were free to have communications with the defendant that did not constitute interrogation even after he requested counsel. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687, 108 S. Ct. at 2101. Contrary to Everett’s allegations, there is no record evidence that the police asked Everett any questions about the Bailey homicide when Officer Murphy gave Everett the DNA consent form to sign. And it was Officer Murphy in Alabama, and not Sergeant Tilley, who gave Everett the DNA consent form to sign. At oral argument, Everett’s counsel stressed that Sergeant Tilley testified in his deposition that, when Tilley asked Officer Murphy to collect Everett’s DNA samples, Murphy indicated that he was already planning “to go back and talk to [Everett]” concerning another case unrelated to the Bailey homicide investigation. However, no record evidence establishes that Murphy actually approached Everett to discuss the unrelated matter or in fact said something to Everett concerning that unrelated 66 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 67 of 87 matter. Instead, the record shows only that Murphy approached Everett simply to ask for Everett’s consent to provide DNA samples. 17 In sum, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent in determining that a request for consent to collect DNA samples from a defendant in custody who has invoked the right to counsel was not an interrogation, did not procure any testimonial communication, and did not run afoul of Miranda and its progeny. See Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1285-87.