Opinion ID: 2050956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Lack of Order Compelling Discovery

Text: We can dispose summarily of the Smiths' claim that the trial court's order imposing sanctions must be reversed because it was not preceded by a motion and order compelling discovery. We rejected this argument in Perry v. Sera, 623 A.2d 1210 (D.C.1993). In Perry, appellant argued that the court may not impose sanctions under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(b) unless the movant first seeks and obtains an order compelling discovery under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(a). We held that, by its terms, Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(b)(2), which provides a range of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders, does not limit itself to allowing sanctions only when an order compelling discovery under Rule 37(a) has been made. [3] Perry, 623 A.2d at 1216. Although a motion to compel under Rule 37(a) is not necessary, an order is a prerequisite to sanctions. Id. (citing Henneke v. Sommer, 431 A.2d 6, 8 (D.C. 1981)). However, an order requiring discovery to be completed by a certain date is sufficient to invoke the provisions for sanctions under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(b)(2). Id. In this case, the trial court entered a scheduling order designating dates by which the parties must complete discovery pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 26(g)(5). We held that Rule 37(b) sanctions are available for violating such discovery scheduling orders. Id. Therefore, we turn to consideration of the Smiths' remaining arguments challenging the imposition of the extreme sanctions of dismissal and default.