Opinion ID: 1696534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discretionary reinstatement

Text: In his second issue presented for review plaintiff maintains the trial court abused its discretion under the facts and circumstances presented. In written brief and argument plaintiff calls attention to the fact the 1965 amendment to rule 215.1 sets down two areas for reinstatement under this rule, one mandatory and the other discretionary. It is the discretionary phase of the amendment which serves as a basis for this issue. Plaintiff turns again to Rath v. Sholty, 199 N.W.2d at 335-336 for support:    Apparently the legislature, by this amendment, intended to grant trial court discretion comparable to that extended by rule 236 (setting aside default and judgment thereon) and rule 252 (vacating final judgment or order). The clause, may, in its discretion' permits no other meaning. In Johnson v. Linquist, 184 N. W.2d 681 (Iowa 1971) we not only held trial court had discretion, but was in error in failing to exercise it.    Our review in those peripheral areas in which trial court's discretion is invoked under rule 215.1, R.C.P. will be that employed in reviewing rulings under rule 236, R.C.P. The exercise of a lower court's discretion is not reviewable; it is only the alleged abuse of that power which is reviewable on appeal.    [citing authority] Generally, abuse of discretion will be found only where there is no support for the decision in the hearing evidence.    [citing authorities]. (Emphasis in the original) As stated, the evidence before the trial court showed there had been a total lack of activity on plaintiff's part in regard to this case from May 26, 1971 to May 12, 1972, when the application for reinstatement was filed. There is no showing of facts which could be held to justify this lack of attention. Plaintiff not only relies on the cases cited earlier in this opinion but also on Johnson v. Linquist, 184 N.W.2d 681 (Iowa 1971). We do not read Johnson as helping plaintiff here. In the cited case the trial court stated it was without discretion in ruling on reinstatements of dismissals under rule 215.1 and therefore overruled the motion to reinstate. Johnson was not a ruling on the abuse of the trial court's discretion but rather simply a ruling that the trial court erred in failing to exercise the discretion granted under the 1965 amendment to the rule. For a definition of abuse of discretion see Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 815-816, 77 N.W.2d 23, 32, 60 A.L.R.2d 1354. There being no evidence before the trial court to substantiate a showing of oversight, mistake or other reasonable cause it cannot be said the court abused its discretion in failing to reinstate this case. The second issue presented for review is without merit. The case is thereforeAffirmed.