Opinion ID: 901745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extinguishment of an Easement

Text: [¶ 14.] DeHavens argue that the maintenance requirement in the grant is a condition subsequent. DeHavens therefore contend that by the terms of the grant, Halls' easement was forfeited [2] because they failed to maintain the easement. In granting Halls' motion for partial summary judgment, the circuit court noted that the subject easement contains no express provision for forfeiture of said easement in the event of a failure of [Halls] to maintain said easement. In reviewing this summary judgment, [w]e affirm the circuit court `[if] there are no genuine issues of material fact and the legal questions have been correctly decided.' Culhane v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 SD 97, ¶ 5, 704 N.W.2d 287, 289 (quoting Sanford v. Sanford, 2005 SD 34, ¶ 11, 694 N.W.2d 283, 287). [¶ 15.] The extent of an easement is determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired. SDCL 43-13-5. The terms and extent of an easement by grant are ascertained either by the words clearly expressed, or by just and sound construction of the easement document. [ Picardi v. Zimmiond, 2004 SD 125, ¶ 16, 689 N.W.2d 886, 890 ( Picardi I )] (citing Cleveland v. Tinaglia, 1998 SD 91, ¶ 18, 582 N.W.2d 720, 724 (quoting Salmon v. Bradshaw, 84 S.D. 500, 505-06, 173 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1969))). We look first to the language of the grant itself to discover the extent and nature of the easement agreement and its terms. Salmon, 84 S.D. at 505, 173 N.W.2d at 284 (citation omitted). We review the language used by giving terms their plain and ordinary meaning, and utilize no additional interpretation in the absence of ambiguity. Id. (citation omitted). If the terms of the agreement are specific in nature, the terms are decisive of the limits of the easement. Id. (quoting 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, § 73). We will not resolve disputes over unambiguous language by resorting to what the parties might have included in a contract. Wessington Springs Educ. Ass'n v. Wessington Springs School Dist. # 36-2, 467 N.W.2d 101, 104 (S.D.1991) (citing Raben v. Schlottman, 77 S.D. 184, 190-191, 88 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1958)). Picardi v. Zimmiond (Picardi II), 2005 SD 24, ¶ 20, 693 N.W.2d 656, 662. Additionally, clear language is necessary to create either a condition subsequent or precedent. . . . City of Huron v. Wilcox, 17 S.D. 625, 628, 98 N.W. 88, 89 (1904). Forfeitures and conditions subsequent not being favored in law, a deed will not be construed to create a conditional estate unless the language used unequivocally indicates an intention . . . to that effect. Id. [¶ 16.] In Kiser v. Warner Robins Air Park Estates, Inc., 237 Ga. 385, 228 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1976), the easement provided: Second party has the right of ingress and egress over said private driveway provided it maintains same to prevent dust and potholes. The servient estate owner claimed that the easement created a condition subsequent, and that failure to maintain the easement resulted in a forfeiture. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the easement had not been forfeited by a failure of maintenance, explaining: The breach of a condition subsequent may destroy the party's right under the contract, or may give a right to damages to the other party. Equity seeks to relieve against forfeitures where the rules of construction will allow. The words in the contract creating a condition subsequent do not provide for a forfeiture of the easement on failure of performance of the condition. They specify a duty on the owner of the dominant estate to keep the easement in repair, which is ordinarily his duty without agreement where the easement is used for the benefit of the dominant estate alone. The trial judge incorrectly held that the easement had no conditions, but did not err in holding that it had not been forfeited by failure of maintenance. Id. (citations omitted). [¶ 17.] The same is true in this case. The relevant portion of the easement only states that [s]aid roadway or access right-of-way shall be maintained by GRANTEES. . . . There is no language that expressly or implicitly provides that the easement will be forfeited if Halls fail to maintain it. The language merely specifies Halls' duty to maintain. [¶ 18.] Because there was no genuine issue of material fact and the trial court correctly decided that the easement contained no clear and unequivocal provision of forfeiture for failure to maintain, partial summary judgment was correctly granted.