Opinion ID: 2226822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Are the Bar Actions in the 11 Points Germane?

Text: Petitioner attacks the following State Bar activities as violating his constitutional rights: (1) engaging in legislative and judicial lobbying and participating in other political activities (presumably supporting political candidates or state referendums); (2) requiring compulsory membership in the Young Lawyers Section; (3) promoting prepaid legal services; (4) supporting lawyer referral services; (5) aiding in lawyer placement; (6) maintaining a Client Security Fund; (7) promoting legal services and educating the public through pamphlets, magazines, radio and television advertisements of the availability and need of legal services; (8) funding Lawyers Wives of Michigan and Children's Charter of Michigan; (9) giving and paying for social functions, including receptions where the Supreme Court Justices are guests of honor; (10) appearing before the State Officers Compensation Commission in support of higher Supreme Court, and other judicial, salaries; and (11) selling the use of the State Bar mailing roster to commercial interests. He bases the majority of his claims on the First Amendment right to freedom of association, with an occasional reference to the First Amendment's freedom of speech, religion and privacy; [17] the Commerce Clause; [18] and various provisions of the Michigan Constitution. [19] (1) Lobbying and Other Political Activity The major complaint of petitioner is that the State Bar annually expends in violation of his First Amendment rights large sums of money for two related programs: (1) for the purpose of influencing the legislation pending before the Michigan Legislature and (2) to fund study projects by its constituent committees which result in recommendations of policies to be adopted publicly by officials and agencies of the State of Michigan through executive or legislative or administrative action. Expenditures for the various committees reviewing the Michigan Land Title Standards and Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, for the committee considering this Court's proposed Rules of Evidence, and to support the Bar's prison paralegal project are cited by petitioner as examples of improper use of Bar dues monies. There is nothing on the record to indicate Bar participation in partisan politics. But see fn 8. Petitioner maintains that the Bar may only disburse its funds for regulation purposes. As aforementioned, part I, supra, petitioner limits regulation to bar grievance activities, the expenses of the character and conduct committee, and subsidies paid to the Institute for [sic: of] Continuing Legal Education (ICLE), plus associated administrative and other overhead expenses. Petitioner argues that any other expenditure of mandatory Bar dues monies violates the First Amendment's right to freedom of association since membership in the Michigan State Bar Association is a prerequisite to the practice of law in this state. Petitioner supports his position by claiming:  Abood controls the instant case and mandates a ruling in petitioner's favor. His argument is: Conceptually, the State Bar of Michigan is a union shop.[ [20] ] This fact was implicitly recognized in Abood. He then states: The specific holding in Abood is that the employees of an agency shop[ [21] ] who object to the use of agency shop fees for political activity are entitled to a pro rata reduction in their fee assessment equal to the proportion ideological expenditures bear to the total union budget (emphasis supplied). The exact words of the Court in Abood, in pertinent part, follow: We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment. (Emphasis supplied.) Abood, supra, 235-236. (Footnotes omitted.) The significant language in the quotation from the Court's opinion is in italics, because it indicates the difference between what the Court held and what petitioner asserts. The Court proscribed expenditures of dues money for the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative, whereas petitioner speaks of ideological expenditures without any limitation. The difference, of course, is whether the ideological expenditure was or was not germane to the state's compelling interest. The significance of this distinction is emphasized by a quotation from the Abood Court as follows: An employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative.    To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But    such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress. Abood, supra, 222. It is obvious from our analysis thus far that all ideological expenditures are not necessarily in derogation of compulsory membership First Amendment rights and that the Court's critical test is whether the ideological expenditure is or is not germane to the state interest. This leaves the ultimate inquiries first, what is the compelling state interest, and second, whether the ideological expenditure is germane to that interest. We have already considered and developed the state's interest in the administration of justice and in the advancement of jurisprudence. As a consequence we have a clear concept of what the state's compelling interest is in this case. Our next inquiry therefore is whether or not the complained-of action here is germane to the administration of justice and the advancement of jurisprudence. Lawyers, as members of an ancient and honorable profession, have a duty to utilize their training and experience in rendering service to the public. [22] The state has a valid interest in drawing upon this training and experience in order to promote improvements in the administration of justice and to advance jurisprudence. [23] The better attuned the legal machinery is to the public's needs of health, safety and welfare, the better the state will be able to perform its job of protecting and serving the public. The input and feedback on proposed legislation and court rules is invaluable to the state in fine-tuning its legislative and judicial systems. [24] The State Bar's 44 standing committees and 12 special committees ensure that the collective experience of legal experts in many fields will be voiced in the legislative and judicial process to promote improvements in the administration of justice and the advancement of jurisprudence. [25] In this manner the Legislature and Court can better arrive at a fair, effective and efficient result. Thus the state's need in receiving input and feedback from the Bar on appropriate proposed legislation and court rules is germane to its compelling interest in promoting improvements in the administration of justice and the advancement of jurisprudence. Without more we hold that the State Bar's use of money, including some of petitioner's, to influence legislation and to fund committee study projects looking to that result is germane to the state's legitimate and compelling interest in the administration of justice and the advancement of jurisprudence with the result that such activity survives First Amendment attack and that there is nothing in Abood to the contrary. In passing, however, some comment might be in order on petitioner's misunderstanding of Abood. Abood, like its predecessors, [26] involved a labor union. The case at bar, like Lathrop v Donohue, [27] deals with an integrated bar association. While there are superficial similarities between an integrated state bar and a labor union, that is not the question. The question is whether the compelling state interest justifying intrusion on First Amendment rights is the same in both cases. The answer is an emphatic negative. In Abood the compelling state interest is achieving labor peace through collective bargaining. In an integrated bar the compelling state interest is the administration of justice. Obviously what might be germane to collective bargaining could be quite different from what is germane to the administration of justice. A labor union, for example, would at the most have indirect interest in improvement of court rules, whereas an integrated state bar could have intense interest in such rules. Further, we note that petitioner in his original brief does not maintain that he holds political or ideological views contrary to those of the State Bar. Petitioner broadens his argument somewhat in his Reply Brief, p 40, when he states: Public interest is not a unitary concept   ; the State Bar officers have their view and plaintiff has his. Plaintiff cannot be required to underwrite the expense of the former in promulgating their views. However, petitioner failed to specify even one conflicting view but noted instead: plaintiff does not seek to prohibit the State Bar from lobbying, [but] merely from spending plaintiff's money to do so. Therefore petitioner's challenges appear to be monetary rather than ideological. However, even assuming petitioner has strong ideological objections to certain State Bar positions, he is still free to voice his own views on any subject in any manner he wishes. In re Unification of the New Hampshire Bar, 109 NH 260, 266; 248 A2d 709, 713 (1968); accord, Lathrop, supra, 861 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). [28] He is not being forced to proclaim any ideological or political view. As Justice Harlan noted in his concurrence in Lathrop, supra, 859, Surely the Wisconsin Supreme Court is right when it says that petitioner can be expected to realize that `everyone understands or should understand' that the views expressed are those `of the State Bar as an entity separate and distinct from each individual.' [ In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis 2d 618, 623; 93 NW2d 601, 603 (1958)]. More importantly, petitioner has many avenues open to him to express his ideas either through the Bar or outside of it. Petitioner may or may not wish to run for election to the Board of Commissioners or the Representative Assembly (see State Bar Rules 5 and 6), but in any event he may attend their meetings, since unless specifically voted to be closed all meetings are open to Bar members. In this way he can have direct input on the two governing bodies of the Bar. Similarly if petitioner has an interest in the Michigan Rules of Evidence, Criminal Code, Land Title Standards or other legislation and rules which the Bar reviews, he may attend the committee meetings and make known his feelings. Petitioner is also free to write letters to the editor of the Michigan Bar Journal expressing his views and seeking support. If he chooses not to take part in the channels of communication within the Bar and is dissatisfied with the majority position petitioner may express and promote his views through external means such as the communications media. In sum we find that the State Bar expenditures of dues revenues to fund committees for the purpose of examining proposed legislation and court rules is germane to the state's compelling interest in promoting the administration of justice and advancement in the science of jurisprudence. When taking a position on a proposed bill, rule, or order, the State Bar, however, must confine itself to those subjects directly affecting the administration of justice or the advancement of jurisprudence. [29] Since petitioner has failed to show and we cannot find in the record any specific expenditure of Bar funds to critique or lobby for any legislative or judicial action unrelated to the administration of justice we find that petitioner's rights are not unconstitutionally infringed. (2) The Young Lawyers Section and the Right of Association Petitioner also challenges the constitutionality of the automatic membership of newly admitted attorneys in the Young Lawyers Section (YLS). He contends that such compulsory membership violates his First Amendment right to freedom of association since he is being forced to join an organization without his consent and since a part of his mandatory Bar dues supports the YLS. The State Bar argues that [n]obody is forcing petitioner to participate in the Young Lawyers Section nor to associate with other young lawyers. The Bar relies on Lathrop, supra, 827-828, where the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the Wisconsin State Bar did not, on its face, violate the right to freedom of association, noting: `[H]is compulsory enrollment imposes only the duty to pay dues' (367 US 827-828, quoting 10 Wis 2d 237 with approval). We agree with the State Bar that there is a definite professional/justice system interest in the integrating of young and new lawyers into the practice of law, and in dealing with the very special problems of these new professionals. Such a structure benefits not only the new attorney, but safeguards the public interest in the maintenance of the highest standards in the practice of law. Petitioner argues that newly admitted lawyers know more general, substantive law and are better attuned to the most modern currents of thought in the law than experienced practitioners. It is obvious, however, that most new attorneys necessarily have a substantial gap of practical knowledge and experience. Despite the trend to expose law students to various clinical experiences, law schools still emphasize traditional textbook courses, reasoning that the student will acquire the necessary practical and procedural knowledge after being admitted to the Bar. We take judicial notice that a person is not automatically transformed from a struggling student to a skilled legal practitioner upon completion of the Bar admissions ceremony. The Young Lawyers Section can help the new attorney bridge the gap between law school and the practice of law. Helping young attorneys find their way through the maze of rules, regulations and laws in turn helps the legal system run effectively and provides for a better distribution of legal services to the public. If petitioner feels that he does not require this valuable aid he is free to disassociate himself from the section: automatic membership does not mean that it is compulsory. [30] Petitioner, therefore, cannot constitutionally complain that the State Bar uses a portion of its general fund to support a section which is composed of young lawyers who voluntarily give their time and energy to sponsor seminars and programs to train the new attorney. Thus we find that ensuring that the legal system runs smoothly and efficiently is germane to the state's compelling interest of promoting improvements in the administration of justice. (3) Prepaid Legal Services (4) Lawyer Referral (5) Lawyer Placement (6) Client Security The use of mandatory dues revenues for sponsoring Lawyer Referral, Prepaid Legal Services, Lawyer Placement and the Client Security Fund is also challenged by petitioner. His primary argument against such expenditures is that they do not constitute a public purpose and have not been authorized in accordance with the provisions of Const 1963, art 4,  30. [31] Petitioner insists that [t]he use of State Bar dues monies to enhance the income producing opportunities, employability, and to guarantee trustworthiness of practitioners (via Client Security Fund), is thus invalid as not for a public purpose. [32] A secondary argument raised by petitioner is the all-inclusive charge that the First Amendment right of association prohibits any use of mandatory Bar dues revenue for non-regulation purposes. As to the first argument that the expenditure of Bar funds for the challenged activities is not for a public purpose we note that petitioner's analysis of the purpose of the Bar program is inadequate. Except perhaps for the Lawyer Placement Service, none of the programs were instituted nor are presently conducted primarily for the benefit of attorneys even though, admittedly, some attorneys may benefit incidentally. Lawyer Referral and Prepaid Legal Services [33] were created in order to make legal services more accessible to that segment of the population, which studies have shown runs roughly around 70 percent, who do not consult lawyers for one reason or another, partly out of fear of the unknown and of how much lawyers would charge (testimony of Michael Franck, Executive Director of the Michigan State Bar). See Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350, 370, fn 22; 97 S Ct 2691; 53 L Ed 2d 810 (1977). Similarly the purpose of the Client Security Fund is not to insure attorneys for malpractice but to protect the public by reimbursing victims of a defalcation either by clients of lawyers or by a lawyer acting in a fiduciary capacity. [34] Therefore Lawyer Referral, Prepaid Legal Services and the Client Security Fund clearly constitute a permissible public service, rather than a private or local service, within the meaning of Const 1963, art 4,  30. As to petitioner's First Amendment argument relative to these services, since they either provide legal assistance to those who would otherwise be without it or protect those who do employ lawyers, the relationship to the administration of justice is clear and hence germane to a compelling state interest. The Lawyer Placement Service presents a closer issue. For a fee of $5 any attorney, newly admitted or an experienced practitioner, may register with the Placement Service for up to 12 months, or until employment is secured. Employers searching for attorneys with certain qualifications are charged a $10 registration fee. The Placement Service acts as an information clearinghouse, gathering application forms and job descriptions and passing the collected information on to the registrants. Petitioner objects to the State Bar subsidizing the postage, printing, staff and building space of the Placement Service. He perceives this service as being a private purpose within the meaning of Const 1963, art 4,  30 since at any one time it only benefits a relatively few attorneys. Petitioner claims that Lawyer Placement is just another unnecessary service of the Bar which he is being unconstitutionally compelled to support in violation of his First Amendment right of freedom of association. Lawyer Placement provides a necessary and useful service for the legal profession and the general public. By providing a focal point for the gathering and dispersal of employment information, the Bar program aids attorneys and society in efficiently utilizing legal skills and services. Placing attorneys where legal services are required aids in the administration of justice. As a consequence, Lawyer Placement, which facilitates locating attorneys where needed, is germane to the administration of justice.