Opinion ID: 220260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Changing Clothes

Text: The meaning of changing clothes under § 203( o ) is a question of first impression in this circuit. As with all statutory interpretation cases, we begin with the language of the statute. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). If the statute has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, our inquiry ends. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. We conclude that the term changing clothes in § 203( o ) is ambiguous. As evidenced by the differing interpretations of several courts and the United States Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division (the Wage and Hour Division), the word clothing is susceptible of multiple meanings, particularly in the industrial labor context where specialized apparel and equipment is often worn. The other circuit courts that have considered the meaning of changing clothes under § 203( o ) have reached differing conclusions. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that donning and doffing PPE is changing clothes within § 203( o ). See Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010) (meat production workers' boots, hard hats, smocks, and hair nets), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 933, 178 L.Ed.2d 753 (2011); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614-15 (6th Cir.2010) (frozen food workers' uniforms and PPE, including hair nets, safety glasses, ear plugs, and hard hats); Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215-18 (4th Cir.2009) (poultry workers' PPE), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 187, 178 L.Ed.2d 42 (2010); Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2007) (poultry workers' PPE); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n. 3 (5th Cir.2001) (lab coats, hair covers, and shoe covers). The Ninth Circuit has reached a different conclusion, holding that meat production workers' unique PPE (for example, Kevlar gloves) is not clothes under § 203( o ). [4] Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 904-05 (9th Cir.2003), aff'd on other grounds, IBP, 546 U.S. 21, 126 S.Ct. 514. The Wage and Hour Division has repeatedly shifted its position when asked to interpret the meaning of changing clothes. The [Wage and Hour Division] issues opinion letters to explain the requirements of the FLSA and its regulations and how they apply to particular circumstances. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 395 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir.2005) (internal quotation and alterations omitted). In 1997, it issued an opinion letter determining that clothes in § 203( o ) did not encompass protective safety equipment which is generally worn over ... apparel and may be cumbersome in nature. Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act dated Dec. 3, 2007, 1997 WL 998048. The Division then reversed this position in 2002, determining upon a reexamination of the statute and legislative history, that changing clothes applies to the putting on and taking off of the protective safety equipment typically worn in the meat packing industry.... Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act FLSA 2002-2 dated June 6, 2002, 2002 WL 33941766. In 2007, the Wage and Hour Division declined to alter its interpretation in light of the Ninth Circuit's Alvarez decision. Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act FLSA 2007-10 dated May 14, 2007, 2007 WL 2066454. Then, in 2010 (after the district court issued its ruling in the instant case), the Division reverted to its previous interpretation and determined that § 203( o ) does not extend to protective equipment worn by employees that is required by law, by the employer, or due to the nature of the job. Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act FLSA 2010-2 dated June 16, 2010, 2010 WL 2468195. Having determined that changing clothes is ambiguous, we are left to resolve that ambiguity. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345, 117 S.Ct. 843. The first question is whether we must construe the term in the plaintiffs' favor. In Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960), the Supreme Court stated that exemptions to the FLSA are to be construed narrowly against the employers seeking to assert them. The Court was referring specifically to section 13 of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 213), which is titled Exemptions. The plaintiffs argue that § 203( o ) is an exemption from the FLSA, notwithstanding the fact that it is in the definitions section (section 3 of the FLSA) and not in the exemptions section. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held that § 203( o ) is not an exemption. Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir.2010); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 612; Anderson, 488 F.3d at 957; cf. Adams v. United States, 471 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that the Portal-to-Portal Act's exclusion of certain activities from FLSA coverage was not an exemption and did not need to be construed against the employer). On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit assumed, without analysis, that § 203( o ) is an exemption and must be read narrowly. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905. We conclude that § 203( o ) is not an exemption and, therefore, we do not read it narrowly or in the plaintiffs' favor. Section 203( o ) differs from the exemptions in 29 U.S.C. § 213 in three important respects. First, it is part of the definition of hours worked and is not specifically designated as an exemption. Second, § 203( o ) removes only particular discrete activities from the definition of hours worked, whereas the § 213 exemptions remove entire classes of employees from FLSA coverage. [5] Employees who are potentially affected by § 203( o ) are still entitled to the bulk of the FLSA's protections, whereas employees affected by an FLSA exemption are entitled to no FLSA protections at all. Third, § 203( o ) does not exactly remove discrete activities from FLSA coverage; it gives employers and employees the option of removing those activities from FLSA coverage through collective bargaining. We hold that clothes under § 203( o ) includes the PPE worn by the plaintiffs in this case. An expansive construction is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word clothes, and makes more sense than a construction that would differentiate between apparel and equipment designed for safety purposes and other apparel and equipment, or between non-unique and unique apparel and equipment. As a preliminary matter, we decline to defer to the Wage and Hour Division's most recent interpretation of § 203( o ) or, for that matter, any of the Wage and Hour Division's interpretations. Agency opinion letters are entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), to the extent that they have the power to persuade. Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir.2008). Where, as here, an agency repeatedly alters its interpretation of a statute, the persuasive power of those interpretations is diminished. See Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199, 1205 n. 3 (10th Cir.2004) (An agency interpretation that conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is ... entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held position.). Further, for the reasons discussed below, we do not find the agency's current position particularly well-reasoned. Accord Franklin, 619 F.3d at 614 (declining to defer to the 2010 opinion letter because the agency's position has changed repeatedly and because the court found the letter's interpretation to be inconsistent with the language of the statute). We begin our analysis of § 203( o ) with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). The ordinary meaning of the term clothes is quite broad and contemplates items or garments worn by a person. See, e.g., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford English Dictionary (2010 ed.) (defining clothes as covering for the person; wearing apparel; dress, raiment vesture); Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 214-15 ([Clothing is] covering for the human body or garments in general: all the garments and accessories worn by a person at any one time.) (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 428 (1986 ed.)). [6] The ordinary meaning of clothes would appear to encompass all the items of PPE worn by plaintiffs. Accord Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 215; Franklin, 619 F.3d at 614. PPE items are worn on and cover the body. Smocks, boots, sleeves, gloves and hats would, in other contexts (such as if worn on the street), obviously be considered clothes. Plaintiffs contend that clothes does not include PPE because PPE is designed to protect against workplace hazards, serves specialized functions, and is required by the employer or by law. Similarly, the Wage and Hour Division currently distinguishes between everyday clothes and items required by law or by the employer. We do not find this distinction particularly coherent or workable. Accord Franklin, 619 F.3d at 614 ([W]e see no reason to distinguish between protective and non-protective clothes.); Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 215 (failing to see why the term `clothes' would refer only to `ordinary' or `street' clothes, and rejecting a distinction between uniforms and protective clothes); Anderson, 488 F.3d at 956 (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that § 203( o ) did not apply to any protective clothing). Many everyday items of clothing are worn for safety or protective purposes, including shoes. Cf. Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 215 ([T]he steel-toe shoes at issue here could be reasonably classified as either `normal' clothes or `protective gear.'). An approach that excludes apparel with functional aspects from clothes is far afield from any common understanding of the word because clothes are largely functional. Further, many items of work apparel that look like or replace traditional street clothes, such as scrubs or uniforms, are required by the employer and serve a work-related purpose. See Turner v. City of Phila., 262 F.3d 222, 224 (3d Cir.2001) (explaining that § 203 provides a specific exclusion from the calculation of hours worked for clothes and uniform change time (emphasis added)). Congress specifically contemplated that the clothes being changed would be worn for work purposes because § 203( o ) discusses clothes changing at the beginning and end of the workday. See Franklin, 619 F.3d at 614 ([B]ecause the statute indicates that § 203( o ) applies to changing into clothes worn during the workday, Congress was referring to clothes worn for the workday and not simply `ordinary' clothes.). Frocks, aprons, sleeves, gloves, boots, and hard hats are clothes even though they serve specific protective or sanitary functions or are required by Butterball. Cf. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1126 n. 1 (holding that donning and doffing non-unique PPE was not work under the FLSA because it was analogous to having a baseball player show up in a uniform, a business person with a suit and tie, or a judge with a robe). In Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit made a slightly different distinction: between generic protective clothing (or non-unique PPE), such as boots, hard hats, and frocks, and unique PPE, such as mesh gloves or knife holders. 339 F.3d at 905. Certainly, unique PPE is less similar to common clothing than non-unique PPE because it does not look like or replace items that employees would normally wear outside of work. We have recognized a distinction between unique and non-unique PPE in a slightly different context. In Reich, we held that donning and doffing unique PPE was work under the FLSA, whereas donning and doffing non-unique PPE was not. 38 F.3d at 1126 ([Unique PPE] items are heavy and cumbersome, and it requires physical exertion, time, and a modicum of concentration to put them on securely and properly.). Nonetheless, we determine that the unique PPE worn by the plaintiffs in this case is clothing under § 203( o ). The plaintiffs' unique PPE is not so cumbersome, heavy, complicated, or otherwise different in kind from traditional clothing that it should not be considered clothes. Cf. Franklin, 619 F.3d at 614-15 (We recognize that there may be some heavier protective equipment than what is at issue here that is not clothing within the meaning of § 203( o ).). The unique PPE in this case consists of mesh gloves, arm guards, and knife holders. These items are quite similar to ordinary gloves, sleeves, and belts or holsters. Thus, we conclude that all PPE at issue in this case is clothing under 29 U.S.C. § 203( o ). Plaintiffs make the policy-based argument that including PPE within § 203( o ) would create a disincentive for employers or employees to use safety equipment. We fail to see how leaving the compensability of donning and doffing time to the collective bargaining process would have such an effect. Section 203( o )'s application has no bearing on whether PPE is required by law. We join the majority of the circuits that have considered the issue, and hold that clothes under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) includes the PPE worn by plaintiffs in this case.