Opinion ID: 1986916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Specific Examples

Text: Case law demonstrates that specific events, such as marriage, entering the military, or leaving the parental home, do not constitute bright-line standards in determining self-emancipation. For example, the general rule is that emancipation may result from the marriage of a minor because marriage creates a relationship inconsistent with the minor's subjection to the control and care of the parent (1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children § 15:4, at 1085-86 (rev. 2d ed. 2005); 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 26 (2002)), thereby terminating the parents' support obligation. 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent & Child § 82 (2002). The reason is that the minor no longer needs parental support, having a right to support from the minor's spouse. 1 H. Clark, Domestic Relations § 9.3, at 553. However, the child, if still under the age of majority, may once again, if the marriage ends in divorce or separation, become dependent on his or her parents and may thus become `unemancipated' again. 1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children § 15:1, at 1080 (rev. 2d ed. 2005). Further, the unique facts in some particular cases established that those minors were not emancipated despite their status or position of being married. See, e.g., Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill.App.3d at 1093, 178 Ill.Dec. 176, 604 N.E.2d 432; Berks County Children & Youth Services v. Rowan, 428 Pa.Super. 448, 456-58, 631 A.2d 615, 619-20 (1993). We observe that in In re Marriage of Daniels, 296 Ill.App.3d 446, 231 Ill.Dec. 257, 695 N.E.2d 1376 (1998), a panel of our appellate court erroneously relied on Walters in concluding that marriage, by itself, emancipated a nonminor child. Marriage of Daniels, 296 Ill.App.3d at 449-50, 231 Ill.Dec. 257, 695 N.E.2d 1376. Further, the circuit court in the present case relied on Daniels in finding that Max was emancipated solely by virtue of his incarceration. However, the court in Walters actually and correctly explained that the father's obligation to pay for college expenses of his daughters terminated if they became emancipated through marriage. (Emphasis added.) Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill. App.3d at 1092, 178 Ill.Dec. 176, 604 N.E.2d 432. Regarding the father's education expense obligation for one of his daughters, the Walters court did not simply ask whether the minor was married, but rather asked whether the marriage had in fact emancipated her. The Walters court actually evaluated the relevant evidence, which established that during the minor's marriage, she never lived with her husband, but continued to reside with and receive support from the custodial parent. The circuit court in Walters declared the marriage invalid. The appellate court found that the minor's marriage was not an emancipating event that terminated the father's obligation to provide for her education and maintenance. Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill.App.3d at 1093, 178 Ill. Dec. 176, 604 N.E.2d 432. Daniels misapprehended and misapplied the holding in Marriage of Walters. Accordingly, In re Marriage of Daniels, 296 Ill.App.3d 446, 231 Ill.Dec. 257, 695 N.E.2d 1376 (1998), is hereby overruled. Likewise, entering the armed forces, by itself, is not necessarily a categorical emancipating event. Generally, enlistment in the military is a contract between the soldier and the government that effects a change in the minor's status, which the minor cannot throw off at will. Enlistment is deemed an emancipating event because when the minor enlists, the minor is removed from under the parental roof and placed under the control of the government. Consequently, the minor is emancipated so long as this service continues. Iroquois Iron, 294 Ill. at 109, 128 N.E. 289; accord Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 201, 208-09, 102 N.E.2d 764, 767-68 (1952). Accordingly, if the young person is discharged without having attained majority and returns to the parental home, he or she may revert to being unemancipated. Peters, 314 Ill. at 563, 145 N.E. 629. Nevertheless, the question of when a child is emancipated by military service so as to relieve the parent from obligations of support depends upon the facts of each case. Omohundro v. Omohundro, 8 Ohio App.3d 318, 320, 457 N.E.2d 324, 326 (1982). For example, a minor's enlistment in the Army Reserve was found not to be an emancipating event where, after a period of living on base, the minor continuously resided with the custodial parent and depended on her for shelter, food, clothing, and transportation to Army Reserve meetings. Omohundro, 8 Ohio App.3d at 320-21, 457 N.E.2d at 326-27. Similarly, a minor's enlistment in the National Guard was found not to be an emancipating event because, with the exception of his summer training and monthly weekend drills, the minor's custodial parent was still responsible for the minor's support and education. Lawson v. Lawson, 695 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ind.App.1998). Regarding leaving the parental home, this court has held that where a minor supports herself, controls her own income, and is without the control of her parents, she is emancipated and the parental obligation to support her ceases. Panther Creek Mines v. Industrial Comm'n, 296 Ill. 565, 567, 130 N.E. 321 (1921). Courts have found emancipation where the evidence established that minors, who are physically and mentally able to take care of themselves, voluntarily leave their parental homes and assume responsibility for their own care. See, e.g., Meyer v. Meyer, 222 Ill.App.3d 357, 360-61, 164 Ill.Dec. 800, 583 N.E.2d 716 (1991); In re Parisi, 140 A.D.2d 443, 528 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1988). However, courts have found that minors who moved out of their parental homes were not emancipated where, despite their desire to be independent, they continued to receive significant support from their parents. See, e.g., In re Cellamare, 36 A.D.3d 906, 829 N.Y.S.2d 588 (2007); Phifer v. Phifer, 845 P.2d 384, 386 (Wyo.1993); Marriage of Robinson, 629 P.2d at 1073. Even the minor's commission of a crime, by itself, is not dispositive of emancipation: Commission of a felony, although arguably a lifestyle choice, is not one the state wishes to encourage. If a custodial parent is willing to help a child with behavioral problems, chemical dependency problems, and criminal convictions, the courts should not hinder the providing of such help by eliminating financial assistance by the non-custodial parent. Sutton v. Schwartz, 860 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo.App.1993). Accord Trosky v. Mann, 398 Pa. Super. 369, 581 A.2d 177 (1990) (finding minor not to be emancipated despite pattern of destructive and criminal behavior including substance abuse). Several sister jurisdictions have mentioned incarceration as a possible emancipating circumstance along with marriage or entering military service. Because emancipation is the relinquishment of parental control a life style change must be viewed from the standpoint of whether it has effectively, by its very nature, terminated parental control. Lengthy incarceration could meet that test. (Emphasis added.) Sutton, 860 S.W.2d at 835; accord Garver v. Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 474 (Wyo.1999) (observing that lengthy incarceration may create an emancipation); see In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wash.2d 699, 702, 629 P.2d 450, 452 (1981) ( dicta; including incarceration in list of emancipating circumstances). We agree, and hold that lengthy incarceration is simply one of many situations in which a minor may be found to be emancipated. However, not one of those jurisdictions found that the minor was actually emancipated solely by virtue of the incarceration itself. Rather, after considering the particular circumstances in each case, those courts concluded that the particular minors were not emancipated. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Edmonds, 935 So.2d 980, 982-86 (Miss.2006); Garver, 981 P.2d at 474; Sutton, 860 S.W.2d at 835. Further, while incarceration, by itself, may not abrogate the parental duty of child support, incarceration certainly is such a change of circumstance that warrants modification of the amount of child support. See Garver, 981 P.2d at 472; In re Marriage of Van Winkle, 107 Ill.App.3d 73, 75-76, 62 Ill. Dec. 831, 437 N.E.2d 358 (1982) (superceded on other grounds by statute, as stated in In re Marriage of Hawking, 240 Ill. App.3d 419, 425, 181 Ill.Dec. 254, 608 N.E.2d 327 (1992)) (concluding that minor was not emancipated by virtue of incarceration alone, but holding that trial court erred in failing to consider parent's support modification request based on minor's incarceration); Edmonds, 935 So.2d at 986-88 (same). This survey indicates that, in the context of child support, self-emancipation does not ultimately depend on the status of the minor, e.g., whether the minor is married, a member of the armed forces, or even whether the minor is a felon or incarcerated. Rather, in determining whether a minor is self-emancipated, a court must determine whether the minor has actually moved beyond the care, custody, and control of a parent such that the minor no longer needs to be supported. The answer to this question depends on the relevant facts and circumstances of each particular case. Thus, courts should consider factors including, but not limited to, whether the minor has voluntarily left the protection and influence of the parental home, or whether the minor has otherwise moved beyond the care and control of the custodial parent; whether the minor has assumed responsibility for his or her own care, or whether the minor continues to need support; whether the minor, if self-emancipated, has become dependent on his or her parents again, thereby reverting to being unemancipated. The inquiry is whether the minor has become self-emancipated by any means other than reaching majority age. This analysis has the advantage of focusing the courts' attention on relevant circumstances and of avoiding broad generalizations which later have either to be ignored or distinguished away by disingenuous reasoning. 1 H. Clark, Domestic Relations § 9.3, at 550 (2d ed. 1987). It is traditionally stated that what constitutes an emancipation is a question of law, but whether an emancipation has occurred is an issue of fact. Iroquois Iron, 294 Ill. at 109, 128 N.E. 289; see Stitle v. Stitle, 245 Ind. 168, 182, 197 N.E.2d 174, 182 (1964); 1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children § 15:1, at 1075-76 (rev. 2d ed. 2005). We do not read this principle as prescribing two distinct standards of review. Rather, in reviewing a circuit court's ruling on a minor's self-emancipation, we discern that mixed questions of law and fact are presented. Findings of historical fact made by the circuit court will be upheld on review unless such findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, determine and weigh their credibility, and resolve conflicts in their testimony. However, a reviewing court remains free to undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted. Accordingly, we review de novo the ultimate question of whether Max is self-emancipated.