Opinion ID: 1439456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intent as an Eligibility Factor and an Aggravating Factor

Text: Honken contends the district court erred in instructing the jury to weigh Honken's intent as an aggravating factor, when such intent was properly considered only as a threshold or gateway factor for death penalty eligibility. Honken argues (1) the ADAA should set forth the same punishment scheme as the FDPA, which considers intent only as a gateway factor for death penalty eligibility; and (2) the ADAA is constitutionally infirm because the ADAA fails adequately to narrow the field of defendants who may receive the death penalty. We review the district court's jury instructions for abuse of discretion, [affirming] [i]f the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury[.] United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir.2001). We review federal constitutional questions de novo. United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). To withstand constitutional scrutiny, an aggravating factor which makes the defendant eligible for the death penalty must not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder, but instead only to a subclass of murder defendants, and it must not be unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1001 (8th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Title 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) provides: The jury ... shall return special findings identifying any aggravating factors set forth in subsection (n) of this section, found to exist. If one of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section and another of the aggravating factors set forth in paragraphs (2) through (12) of subsection (n) [21] of this section is found to exist, a special finding identifying any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection (h)(1)(B) of this section, may be returned.... If an aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section is not found to exist or an aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section is found to exist but no other aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n) of this section is found to exist, the court shall impose a sentence, other than death, authorized by law. If an aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section and one or more of the other aggravating factors set forth in subsection (n) of this section are found to exist, the jury ... shall then consider whether the aggravating factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist, or in the absence of mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). Thus, [the subsection (n)(1)] factors act as both a gateway and as aggravators. If the jury does not find at least one of these factors, its consideration of a penalty of death must stop; once the jury finds an (n)(1) factor, it must later weigh that factor (along with other aggravators) against any mitigating factors. United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1370 (5th Cir.1995). The district court's instructions followed the procedure set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). In Step One, Honken's jury was instructed to consider eligibility aggravating factors, requiring a determination of whether Honken had the requisite criminal intent, as set forth in § 848(n)(1). In Honken's case, this determination required the jury to choose whether: (1) Honken intentionally killed the victims, or (2) Honken intentionally engaged in conduct intending the victims be killed. The jury unanimously determined Honken intentionally killed each of the victims. In Step Two, the jury determined the existence of statutory aggravating factors, as set forth in § 848(n). The jury unanimously found at least one statutory aggravating factor applied to each of the victims. Step Three required the jury to determine the existence of non-statutory aggravating factors. The jury found the existence of each non-statutory aggravating factor alleged. The jury was then instructed to determine the existence of any mitigating factors in Step Four. Finally, the jury was required to weigh the aggravating factors found in Steps One, Two, and Three, and the mitigating factors found in Step Four, to determine whether death was the appropriate punishment. Honken asserts the intent factors set forth in § 848(n)(1) are not really aggravators at all, but merely pre-conditions to the consideration of the death sentence. To support his argument, Honken points out, under the FDPA, intent is considered to be a gateway finding only with no further weight given to intent when weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors takes place. Honken contends the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires an interpretation of the ADAA consistent with the FDPA. Honken further claims the intent factors are constitutionally infirm because they apply to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, and do not narrow the universe of defendants eligible for the death penalty. This court has not directly addressed whether it is constitutional for intent to be considered both in terms of eligibility and also as an aggravating factor. Several other circuits have squarely rejected Honken's argument. For example, in United States v. McCullah , the Tenth Circuit observed the clear language of the ADAA provides for intent to be considered both as an eligibility factor and as an aggravating factor. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1108-09. The McCullah court reasoned: The fact that Congress changed the capital sentencing scheme for other crimes six years after the adoption of § 848(e) et seq. does not alter the plain language interpretation of § 848(e). The [FDPA] created a new capital sentencing scheme for many federal offenses, but significantly did not alter § 848(e). Even had the [FDPA] been an amendment to § 848, it would merely indicate that Congress can, and did, alter the federal capital sentencing scheme for drug conspiracies. However, this does not in any way indicate any error in the prior scheme; there is more than one proper method of structuring a capital sentencing scheme. Id. at 1109 (internal citations omitted). The McCullah court also rejected Honken's claim § 848 fails adequately to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, explaining, Congress has statutorily narrowed the field of death eligible defendants by limiting the possibility of capital punishment to homicides in furtherance of continuing criminal enterprises or other specified offenses. Thus, contrary to [defendant]'s assertion, only a small subset of all potentially death-eligible defendants are subject to capital punishment under the federal scheme, and thus the requisite narrowing is present. Id. (internal citation omitted). See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 897-98 (4th Cir.1996); Flores, 63 F.3d at 1370-71. We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits. The fact the FDPA and ADAA are similar in a number of respects does not support the conclusion the ADAA must provide exactly the same sentencing scheme and penalty phase procedure as the FDPA. Further, the ADAA indeed narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. We conclude the district court did not err in instructing the jury to weigh Honken's intent as both an eligibility factor and an aggravating factor.