Opinion ID: 2549231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instruction Defining Intentionally

Text: Finally, Makthepharak argues that the district judge erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on the meaning of intentionally. Our standard of review on this issue is the same as that quoted above on the Allen -type instruction. Makthepharak's requested instruction defined intentionally as conduct that is purposeful and willful and not accidental. Intentional includes the terms `knowing,' `willful,' `purposeful' and `on purpose.' This language comes directly from the homicide definitions in PIK Crim. 3d 56.04(d) and conforms to K.S.A. 21-3201(b). The jury was given the following instruction from PIK Crim. 3d 54.01: Ordinarily, a person intends all of the usual consequences of his voluntary acts. This inference may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove the required criminal intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant. Makthepharak asserts that the district judge's failure to give his requested instruction was prejudicial because the jury was told the State had to prove Makthepharak entered or remained in the house with the intent to commit an aggravated battery and aggravated battery meant [t]hat the defendant intentionally caused bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon or in a manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death could be inflicted. He argues that these instructions could have confused the jury and resulted in a conviction based on his colleagues' criminal intent rather than his own. Makthepharak's proposed instruction was similar to a part of PIK Crim. 3d 54.01-A on general criminal intent. Aggravated burglary is a specific intent crime; aggravated battery is a general intent crime. State v. Bradford, 272 Kan. 523, 535, 34 P.3d 434 (2001); State v. Campbell, 30 Kan. App. 2d 70, Syl. ¶ 1, 39 P.3d 97, rev. denied 273 Kan. 1037 (2002). As discussed above, the underlying felony for the felony murder in this case was aggravated burglary, not aggravated battery. We have previously pointed out that PIK Crim. 3d 54.01-A should be used only where the crime requires a general criminal intent. State v. Yardley, 267 Kan. 37, 42-43, 978 P.2d 886 (1999). PIK Crim. 3d 54.01, on the other hand, is consistent with the principles of felony murder. We are satisfied that the instructions in this case, taken as a whole, sufficiently defined intentionally. The jury was correctly instructed on the elements of aggravated burglary, the elements of aggravated battery upon which the aggravated burglary charge was based, and the elements of felony murder. Further, the jury was instructed on aiding and abetting. The instructions, read as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury on the requisite intent for the crimes charged. The district court did not err in failing to give the defendant's proposed general instruction defining intentionally. Affirmed.