Opinion ID: 2676403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Summit Directive

Text: The essence of Petitioner’s argument is that the Summit Directive must be vacated because it violates EPA’s “Regional Consistency” regulations without purporting to amend those regulations. We agree. As noted above, the applicable regulations state in clear terms that it is EPA’s regulatory policy to “assure fair and uniform application by all Regional Offices of the criteria, procedures, and policies employed in implementing and enforcing the act” and to “[p]rovide mechanisms for identifying and correcting inconsistencies by standardizing criteria, procedures, and policies being employed by Regional 16 Office employees in implementing and enforcing the act.” 40 C.F.R. § 56.3(a), (b) (emphasis added). The regulations also provide that officials in the regional offices “shall assure that actions taken under the act . . . [a]re as consistent as reasonably possible with the activities of other Regional Offices.” Id. § 56.5(a)(2) (emphasis added). And they specifically apply to officials in EPA headquarters who are responsible for developing the policies governing the implementation and enforcement of the CAA. Id. § 56.2. EPA argues that these regulations “targeted particular aspects of the Act that presented consistency problems” but do not “require that EPA officials maintain perfect uniformity in the application of criteria, procedure and policies in implementing and enforcing the Act.” Br. for Resp’t at 35. In support of this reading, EPA points out that section 56.4 requires the Administrator to ensure uniform enforcement of Parts 51 and 58, which pertain to state implementation plans and air quality monitoring programs not at issue in this case. Id. Thus, according to EPA, because the Summit Directive did not violate these “specific regulatory obligations,” id. at 36, the directive cannot be said to violate agency regulations. EPA’s argument attempts to prove too much. It is true that section 56.4 states that “[t]he Administrator shall include, as necessary, with any rule or regulation proposed or promulgated under Parts 51 and 58 of this chapter mechanisms to assure that the rule or regulation is implemented and enforced fairly and uniformly by the Regional Offices.” 40 C.F.R. § 56.4(a). But the references to “Parts 51 and 58” in section 56.4 in no way dilute the broader “Regulatory Consistency” mandates found in sections 56.1, 56.2, 56.3, and 56.5, which are not limited to Parts 51 and 58. Section 56.5, for example, states without limitation that EPA’s regional officials will “assure that actions taken under 17 the act . . . [are] carried out fairly and in a manner that is consistent with the Act and Agency policy as set forth in the Agency rules and program directives,” and that these actions “[a]re as consistent as reasonably possible with the activities of other Regional Offices.” Id. § 56.5(a)(1), (2). The regulations also state that “[a] responsible official in a Regional Office shall seek concurrence from the appropriate EPA Headquarters office on any interpretation of the Act, or rule, regulation, or program directive when such interpretation may result in inconsistent application among the Regional Offices of the act or rule, regulation, or program directive.” Id. § 56.5(b). These regulations, taken together, strongly articulate EPA’s firm commitment to national uniformity in the application of its permitting rules. And there is no indication that EPA intended to exempt variance created by a judicial decision. EPA responds that the “general policy statements in Part 56” should not be read “as mandating that EPA adopt the interpretation of the circuit court that first addresses a legal matter.” Br. for Resp’t at 36. “It is absurd,” according to EPA, “to suggest that EPA would have used a general policy statement to constrain as important an agency function as its discretion to independently assess the dictates of the statutes and regulations it is charged with administering.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). EPA’s overblown characterization of Petitioner’s position is misguided. Any problems that EPA now faces as a result of Petitioner’s action are attributable to the agency’s decision to issue a directive that is plainly contrary to the agency’s own “Regional Consistency” rules. EPA seems to assume that under Petitioner’s position, the agency would be limited to one course of action – follow the Summit Petroleum decision in all regions of the country. But there are several other 18 alternatives that might be available to EPA that would not violate its uniformity regulations. First, EPA might be able to revise its regulations for aggregating emissions from multiple facilities, so as to require aggregation when facilities are functionally interrelated, rather than “adjacent.” Second, EPA could have appealed the Sixth Circuit decision in Summit Petroleum to the Supreme Court, which it did not do. See Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“When an agency honestly believes a circuit court has misinterpreted the law, there are two places it can go to correct the error: Congress or the Supreme Court.”). And, finally, EPA might also revise its uniformity regulations to account for regional variances created by a judicial decision or circuit splits. EPA contends that, because the Act allows review of EPA’s regional actions by different circuits, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), the CAA contemplates divergence between circuits and, thus, permits the agency to apply varied standards in different circuits. In support of the claim that the Act and its regulations allow regional variance resulting from decisions in different circuits, EPA invokes the doctrine of intercircuit nonaquiescence. Br. for Resp’t at 30-31, 36 (citing Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“[A]fter one circuit has disagreed with its position, an agency is entitled to maintain its independent assessment of the dictates of the statutes and regulations it is charged with administering, in the hope that other circuits, the Supreme Court, or Congress will ultimately uphold the agency’s position.”)); see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (referring to agency’s “right to refuse to acquiesce” in decisions of circuit courts). EPA contends that “[t]o compel an agency to follow the adverse ruling of a particular court of 19 appeals would be to give that court undue influence in the intercircuit dialogue by diminishing the opportunity for other courts of proper venue to consider, and possibly sustain, the agency’s position.” Br. for Resp’t at 31 (quoting Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 764 (1989)). We need not determine whether the CAA allows EPA to adopt different standards in different circuits. Since EPA’s regulations preclude the Summit Directive by requiring uniformity, there is no need for us to address whether the Act does. The doctrine of intercircuit nonaquiescence does not allow EPA to ignore the plain language of its own regulations. As noted above, “[an] agency is not free to ignore or violate its regulations while they remain in effect.” U.S. Lines, Inc., 584 F.2d at 526 n.20. Therefore, an agency may not refuse to acquiesce if doing so violates its own regulations. Section 56.3 not only states that EPA will establish uniform criteria for implementing the Act, but also identify and correct inconsistencies in such criteria. 40 C.F.R. § 56.3(b). This implies that EPA was obligated to respond to the Summit Petroleum decision in a manner that eliminated regional inconsistency, not preserved it. EPA’s current regulations preclude EPA’s inter-circuit nonaquiescence in this instance, and the Summit Directive is therefore contrary to law.