Opinion ID: 1213719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Oral Promises of Continued Employment

Text: Yeager maintains that he has presented evidence to the district court that supports the existence of an implied contract and rebuts the at-will presumption. In support of this proposition, Yeager posits two arguments. First, Yeager claims that he was repeatedly promised that his employment would continue until retirement unless he was terminated for cause. [4] Secondly, he asserts that written promises of continued employment were made in the employee handbook. Yeager's assertion that oral promises were made to him are uncorroborated, [5] but must be accepted as true in resolving a motion for summary judgment against him. Thus, we must resolve whether an employee's uncorroborated assertions that oral promises were made assuring his continued employment are enough to overcome the presumption of at-will employment. This is a matter of first impression in Nevada. However, other jurisdictions have addressed the conflict between oral representations of long-term employment and the employment at-will presumption. In Virginia, mere oral promises or assurances of job security are insufficient to rebut an at will presumption. Sullivan v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 708 F. Supp. 750, 751 (E.D. Va. 1989) (citing Addison v. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, 236 Va. 233, 372 S.E.2d 403, 405 (1988)), aff'd, 896 F.2d 547 (4th Cir.1990). In Utah, general assurances of an ongoing working relationship are not sufficiently definite so as to rebut the at-will presumption. Evans v. GTE Health Systems, Inc., 857 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 878 P.2d 1153 (Utah 1994). In Washington, an employee remained an at-will employee despite repeated oral promises that he would retain a supervisory position as long as job performance met a certain level; such promises were not sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to the existence of an enforceable promise of continued employment in a specific job. Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58 Wash.App. 261, 792 P.2d 545, 548 (1990), review denied, 116 Wash.2d 1021, 811 P.2d 219 (1991); see also Smoot v. Boise Cascade Corp., 942 F.2d 1408, 1410-11 (9th Cir.1991). Other courts examine whether the alleged oral contract was supported by consideration. Maietta v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1344 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 960 (3d Cir.1991) (oral representation made to employee that he would not be fired except for cause did not convert his at-will employment into an employment contract providing for termination only for just cause, absent evidence that the alleged representation was made to induce employee to reject a specific job offer); Alter v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., 234 N.J.Super. 409, 560 A.2d 1290 (Ct.Ch.Div.1989) (alleged lifetime contract between casino operator and former employee lacked consideration additional to services incident to employment, and thus was not enforceable). Another court examined whether the oral representation was specific enough to constitute an offer. Goodkind v. University of Minnesota, 417 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 1988) (an employer's general statements of policy do not meet the contractual requirements for an offer). Essentially, Yeager wants this court to find that a contract for long-term employment existed based merely on his uncorroborated assertions that oral promises were made to him. However, if an employee could overcome the presumption of at-will employment merely by asserting that uncorroborated promises were made, then obituaries for the presumption should be written. Other than Yeager's self-serving assertions, the record is bereft of any evidence that Harrah's entered into a long-term employment contract with Yeager. The dissent claims that we are imposing special restrictions on an employee who is making a wrongful termination claim. In a sense we are, and it is because we must define the quantum of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption of at-will employment. In doing this, we must balance conflicting principles, the unfettered right to sue against the continued viability of the employment at-will presumption, and the special interests of both employer and employee. We are not dealing just with a contractual cause of action but with one that squarely clashes with the employee at-will presumption that is part of Nevada law. Our responsibility is to state, in a case-by-case basis, what evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption. This supporting evidence to overcome the employment at-will presumption can take a variety of forms, the employer's handbook or correspondence, the employer's personnel practices or witnesses to the specific employment contract. None of these types of evidence supports the employee's claim in this case as we explain. This case is not the first time we have denied a worker's claim that he was a for cause employee because he did not produce corroborating evidence. In Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 105 Nev. 417, 777 P.2d 366 (1989), we stated: Vancheri testified that it was his understanding that the employment was for a fixed period. He failed, however, to offer any independent evidence indicating the terms of an employment contract. Id. at 421, 777 P.2d at 369. The dissent's claim that we are establishing a corroboration requirement for the first time is simply in error. In short, an employee alleging the existence of a long-term employment contract must supply some corroboration that a contract has been formed specifically with that employee. Uncorroborated assertions, alone, do not overcome the presumption of at-will employment.