Opinion ID: 2003859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Boykin Challenge

Text: In addressing the merits of Appellant's Boykin challenge, this Court concludes that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, and thus his sentence is affirmed. First, the plea agreement shows that Appellant Was informed of, and understood, his constitutional rights. Appellant (and his attorney) signed the plea, which states in pertinent part: 4. I understand that I may plead NOT GUILTY to any charge against me, in which event the Constitution would guarantee me the following rights: (a) The right not to testify against myself; (b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at which I would be represented by counsel and the Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (c) The right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses called to testify against me; (d) The right to produce any evidence, including attendance of witnesses, in my favor; (e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court. I understand that if I plead GUILTY, I waive these rights. Additionally, this signed plea stated that Appellant discussed with his attorney and understood the charges against him, the possible defenses to them, the penalties he faced, and that the Commonwealth was recommending a sentence in exchange for his plea. Appellant and his attorney also signed the Commonwealth's Offer on A Plea of Guilty, which listed the possible penalties Appellant faced, as well as the Commonwealth's sentence recommendation. Second, the trial court confirmed that Appellant understood the rights he was waiving at the plea hearing. The trial court told Appellant: You would have had the right to a jury trial on these charges. But you're giving up that right by pleading guilty here today. ... You would have had the right to call witnesses on your own behalf, you would have had the right to cross-examine any witnesses the Commonwealth would have put on at the trial, but you're giving up that right by pleading guilty. ... You would have had the right to remain silent. They couldn't have compelled you to testify against yourself at the trial. But you're giving up that right. ... You're giving up the right to appeal. If you, um, had been convicted at trial, you would have had the right to appeal this to a higher court. But you're giving up your appeal right. Appellant responded that he understood his rights. Moreover, at the end of the plea hearing, the trial court confirmed that Appellant understood the ultimate consequences of his plea. The trial court asked Appellant: With the rights we've gone over that you're waiving and the recommendation, everything to run together, so concurrent, so the, uh, total sentence would be life without the possibility of parole for twenty years. With that understanding, the rights we've gone over, is it still your desire to plead guilty? Appellant responded: Yeah. Third, at the plea hearing, the trial court confirmed that Appellant was comfortable with his attorneys' advice and that his attorneys were comfortable with his plea. The trial court asked Appellant if he had an opportunity to discuss his plea with his attorneys, whether he was satisfied with their advice, and whether their advice was consistent with his plea. Appellant answered affirmatively. The trial court also held up the signed plea, asked Appellant if his attorneys had gone over it with him, and if the signature on the plea was his. Appellant answered affirmatively to this as well. Appellant alleges only one deficiency in his plea that could render it unknowing: that he was not informed of his right to enter a blind plea and have the jury sentence him, instead of having the court sentence him according to his signed plea agreement. Appellant stresses that his signed guilty plea did not specifically inform him of this right and that nothing in the record suggests he was so informed. Indeed, Appellant is correct that the record does not show he was specifically informed that he could enter a blind guilty plea and demand that the jury fix his punishment to any sentence allowed by KRS 532.030, which includes the death penalty. However, Appellant's argument fails because Boykin does not require separate enumeration of each right waived. Fontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir.1975); accord Johnson, 103 S.W.3d at 691. Rather, as long as a defendant has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences, it is valid. Johnson, 103 S.W.3d at 691 (quotation omitted, and citing Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir.1988), and Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir.1975)). For this reason, guilty pleas are upheld even where specific rights are not enumerated by the trial court during the plea hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Stead, 746 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Taylor, 281 Fed.Appx. 467, 470 (6th Cir.2008). Here, Appellant does not offer any authority requiring the trial court to inform him of his right to enter a blind guilty plea and demand jury sentencing in lieu of being sentenced according to his signed plea agreement. Instead, Appellant cites only Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and cases interpreting that section for the proposition that he had the right to do so. Although Appellant may have had that right, the fact that it was not separately enumerated to him does not render the plea invalid, because Boykin does not require separate enumeration of each right waived. Fontaine, 526 F.2d at 516; Johnson, 103 S.W.3d at 691. And here, given the rights listed in the plea agreement, the rights listed orally in the plea hearing, and the consequences of his plea as explicitly stated in both, there is no doubt that Appellant had a full understanding of what the plea connote[d] and its consequences. Johnson, 103 S.W.3d at 691. Appellant knew that he was waiving his constitutional rights associated with proceeding to trial and that he would be sentenced to twenty years in prison without the possibility of parole. In exchange, he knew that the Commonwealth would recommend that sentence and take the death penalty off the table. This satisfies Boykin . Last, it is worth noting that Appellant's plea was made voluntarily. The trial court asked him if anybody had promised him anything in exchange for his guilty plea, other than the Commonwealth's promise to recommend a sentence. The trial court also asked him if anybody had threatened or coerced him to plead guilty. Appellant responded that nobody had. Additionally, the trial court asked Appellant if he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, as well as whether he had ever been treated for, or was presently suffering from, any type of mental illness. Appellant responded that he was not. Further, in his signed plea, Appellant affirmed that Other than [the Commonwealth's] recommendation, no one, including my attorney, has promised me any other benefit in return for my guilty plea nor has anyone forced or threatened me to plead `GUILTY.' Accordingly, there is no doubt that Appellant's plea was made voluntarily. In summary, given that the substance of Appellant's argument is that his plea was unknowing and involuntary under Boykin , this Court can reach the merits of his appeal, notwithstanding that he waived that right when he pleaded guilty. Windsor, 250 S.W.3d at 307. However, given that his plea was knowing and voluntary, it complied with Boykin , and so there is no need to vacate his guilty plea, conviction, or sentence.