Opinion ID: 853814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indiana's Handgun Statute

Text: The Indiana Code section under which Henderson was charged is relatively broad. It provides that a person shall not carry a handgun in any vehicle or on or about his person, except in his dwelling, on his property or fixed place of business, without a license issued under this chapter being in his possession. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-47-2-1 (West 1998) (emphasis added). [2] The relative breadth of this language led us long ago to the conclusion that it encompasses more than moving about with a firearm attached to one's body. See, e.g., Woods v. State, 471 N.E.2d 691 (Ind.1984) (handgun hidden under dashboard was carried). The language chosen by our legislature thus never generated here an energetic textual debate such as that conducted in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998), on the meaning of the words Congress used to enhance drug-trafficking penalties when the offender uses or carries a firearm. [3] The liberality of the Indiana text has nevertheless obliged us to examine the sort of evidence adequate to demonstrate that a defendant carried the weapon. We have approached this task, and the similar question of possessing drugs, by characterizing the possession of contraband as either actual or constructive. Woods, 471 N.E.2d 691. Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item. Walker v. State, 631 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). Constructive possession occurs when somebody has the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the item. Id. We suggested in Woods that knowledge is a key element in proving intent: When constructive possession is asserted, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the contraband. This knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premise containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Woods, 471 N.E.2d at 694 (citations omitted). Proof of dominion and control of contraband has been found through a variety of means: (1) incriminating statements by the defendant, (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing, (4) proximity of the contraband to the defendant, (5) location of the contraband within the defendant's plain view, and (6) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the defendant. Carnes v. State, 480 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). Henderson was convicted of non-exclusive constructive possession upon proof of, at most, two of the above circumstances: proximity and plain view. The circumstances surrounding this case suggest a question of first impression: whether one can have constructive possession of a firearm when someone else has legal, actual, and simultaneous possession of the same weapon. We rarely encounter possession cases in which anybody on the scene actually has a lawful permit. It leads us to examine whether knowledge and proximity are always enough in instances of constructive, non-exclusive possession.