Opinion ID: 1210141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Error in Excluding Jurors Unwilling to Impose the Death Penalty

Text: Defendant finally contends that the exclusion during the guilt trial of four jurors who were unwilling to impose the death penalty made the jury guilt prone. [17] He requests an evidentiary hearing to develop the argument that empirical evidence is now available [citing Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a `Death Qualified' Jury on the Guilt Determination Process (1971) 84 Harv.L.Rev. 567] indicating that a jury from which persons who would never vote to impose the death penalty are excluded is a `hanging jury' with regard to determination of guilt [i.e., more likely to convict]. Similar requests were made in People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 747-749 [102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121], People v. Robles, supra, 2 Cal.3d 205, 219, In re Arguello (1969) 71 Cal.2d 13, 16 [76 Cal. Rptr. 633, 452 P.2d 921], and In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 620-621 [73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117], and were rejected for various reasons. (9) We must again reject the contention not only because of our decision in People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d 628 but because we are not willing to accept as decisive the conclusion of the Jurow study that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction. Defendant simply fails to establish the validity of such a claim. [18] The judgment, insofar as it provides for the penalty of death, is modified to provide a punishment of life imprisonment and as so modified is affirmed in all other respects. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d 628.)