Opinion ID: 1179846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permissibility of Denial of Plea Offer

Text: Defendant next attacks the district attorney's decision to deny the plea offer on the ground that it was purely haphazard and not a part of a coherent, systematic policy. According to defendant, the decision was haphazard for two reasons: There were no particular standards concerning when a plea bargain should be offered in any given case and [t]he decision whether to extend a plea offer was left up to each individual deputy. According to defendant, the district attorney candidly admitted that his overriding concern was the emotional health and welfare of the victim's parents. He did not have a systematic policy concerning plea bargains, but left the decision to his deputies on an individual basis. This is precisely the type of ad hoc decision making condemned in State v. Freeland, [295 Or. 367, 667 P.2d 509 (1983) ]. Defendant misreads the record. Both Lasswell and Lee testified that at the time defendant proposed his plea offer the policy of the office was that there would be no plea bargaining once a defendant was charged with aggravated murder. Lee and Lasswell made the decision to charge defendant with aggravated murder because the facts of the case fit one of the aggravated murder categoriesmurder after escapingand because the facts of the case were strong. The factors on which the prosecutors relied in charging defendant with aggravated murder were permissible. See State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 137-38, 786 P.2d 161 (probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime of aggravated murder is a sufficient reason to charge that crime). The prosecution's no-plea-bargaining policy was based at least in part on both Lee's and Lasswell's interpretation that, under former ORS 163.150, it was impermissible to plea bargain in capital murder cases. Lee testified that when this [case] happened we had decided as a policy that we would not be plea bargaining capital murder cases and that [policy] was based upon the statutory scheme itself which set out what seemed to us to be a pretty limited category of offenses that fit capital murder upon decision that the people's legislative will that those should be capital murder cases and upon a judgment that within the office we did not feel that trading the threat of killing somebody for a guilty plea was an appropriate tactic for the prosecutor's office to be using. It seems to me we did a lot of thinking about what our policy would be in death penalty cases though this came up pretty quickly after the law took effect. [6] (Emphasis added.) Generally, a decision by the district attorney whether or not to engage in plea negotiations is subject to judicial scrutiny. State v. Buchholz, 309 Or. 442, 446, 788 P.2d 998 (1990); State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 139, 786 P.2d 161; State v. Freeland, supra, 295 Or. at 370, 667 P.2d 509. In deciding whether to offer a plea bargain to a defendant, a district attorney must exercise discretion in a manner that adheres to sufficiently consistent standards to represent a coherent, systematic policy. State v. Freeland, supra, 295 Or. at 375, 667 P.2d 509. A rational no-plea-bargaining policy, consistently applied, is permissible. Id. at 376-77, 667 P.2d 509. Here, the decision not to plea bargain in aggravated murder cases was based on rational and proper grounds, including a [g]enuine legal question as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of bargaining certain offenses. Defendant's contention that each of Lasswell's deputies made his or her own plea bargaining policy is not supported by the record, at least with respect to death penalty cases. In State v. Buchholz, supra, 309 Or. at 447, 788 P.2d 998, this court held that [t]he standards expressed in ORS 135.415 are consistent standards representing a coherent, systematic policy for purposes of exercising prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining. Defendant asserts that in this case the district attorney did not comply with those statutory standards. The list of reasons in ORS 135.415, see supra note 5, is non-exclusive. State v. McDonnell, supra, 310 Or. at 105, 794 P.2d 780. The statute provides that the district attorney may take into account, but is not limited to the statutory considerations. (Emphasis added.) [Victims of crimes and their families] potentially play an important role in the plea negotiation process. District attorneys legitimately may consult with them. Id. The district attorney, however, may not permit victims or their families to control the plea agreement decision. Id. at 106, 794 P.2d 780. We conclude that the Douglas County District Attorney's no-plea-bargaining policy in aggravated murder cases does not violate that statute. In any event, on remand, Lasswell analyzed this case in terms of the factors listed in the statute and concluded that defendant would not have been offered a life sentence. As noted, the trial court believed him, and the record supports that finding. In light of the record on remand, we conclude that the district attorney's decision not to enter into a plea bargain was constitutionally permissible. Defendant, therefore, has not established a factual predicate for asserting any alleged violation of Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. See State v. Walton, 311 Or. 223, 251-52, 809 P.2d 81 (1991) (defendant did not attempt to show that the district attorney's decision to seek aggravated murder indictment was prompted by any improper motive or reason); State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 140, 786 P.2d 161 (district attorney's actions were not haphazard, not based on class discrimination, animus to defendant or to his attorney, or on concerns collateral to fair prosecution); State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 606, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990) (same). For the same reasons, we conclude that defendant has not shown any violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. See State v. Freeland, supra, 295 Or. at 370, 667 P.2d 509 (the clauses are sufficiently similar that compliance with Article I, section 20 usually will also satisfy the 14th amendment); State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 243, 630 P.2d 810, cert. den. 454 U.S. 1084, 102 S.Ct. 640, 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981) (for most purposes analysis under Article I, section 20 and under the federal equal protection clause will coincide).