Opinion ID: 1797317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Purpose and Nature of Pre-trial Diversion

Text: The self-evident purpose of pre-trial diversion is to spare appropriately selected first offenders the stigma, embarrassment and expense of trial and the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. The result contemplated is the restoration of successful divertees to useful and productive citizenship. This is a legitimate and praiseworthy objective and one that has now become the public policy of the State. While pre-trial diversion is relatively new, [6] various courts have discussed the nature of the concept. We examine some of these decisions. In People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405 (1974), the California Supreme Court held that the decision to divert is an exercise of judicial power [and] cannot constitutionally be subordinated to a veto of the prosecutor. [7] 11 Cal.3d at 65, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25, 520 P.2d at 409. The Court made this pertinent observation: The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise. 11 Cal.3d at 64, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25, 520 P.2d at 409. In a companion case, Sledge v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 11 Cal.3d 70, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28, 520 P.2d 412 (1974), the California Court held that the preliminary screening for eligibility conducted by the district attorney ... [under] standards prescribed by the statute is not judicial in character and does not violate the constitutional requirement of separation of powers. This holding is in the context of a suggested invasion upon the power of the judiciary. Further it is in the context of a statutory scheme which, unlike ours, gave no indication [that] the Legislature intended the prosecution to be interrupted for interlocutory review of this issue. 11 Cal.3d at 76, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32, 520 P.2d at 416. I agree that the action of the District Attorney under Tennessee law is not judicial, strictly speaking, and that conferring upon him the right to make a tentative determination of eligibility does not, in any sense, infringe upon the prerogatives of the judicial branch. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the concept of pre-trial diversion and of the underlying issues is State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). The principal issue there addressed was whether, in light of the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court had the power, either before or after indictment, to divert a defendant over the prosecutor's objection. 375 A.2d at 610-611. The Court held that (1) great deference should be given to the prosecutor's determination not to consent to diversion, 375 A.2d at 618; (2) the scope of review was narrow and limited; (3) the decision lies first with the program director and prosecutor; and (4) there is a heavy burden upon the defendant to overcome a prosecutorial veto. [8] In reaching these conclusions the Court considered a number of issues. First, it disposed correctly, in my view of the separation of powers issue by holding that the decision to divert a criminal defendant is a quasi-judicial function. After so doing, the Court said: Our recognition that the decision to admit or reject an applicant for pretrial intervention is an exercise of quasi-judicial power obviates our need to discuss the analogies that the parties draw between [pretrial diversion] programs and administrative agencies. Within a wholly judicial sphere we are not confronted by potential conflicts with either the executive or the legislative branches of our government; similarly, we are not faced with the need to defer to the expertise of an administrative body. (N.J. Court's emphasis). 375 A.2d at 615. [9] I regard this as a valid distinction. Even if pre-trial diversion be classified as wholly executive and nonjudicial in character, it is a procedure operating wholly within the milieu of the judicial department and the conventional separation of powers dichotomy would have no relevance. Next, the Leonardis Court asserted the authority of the courts to review prosecutorial decisions upon a showing of patent and gross abuse. But, said the Court, even absent the quasi-judicial nature of diversion, the review would be consistent with the traditional role which courts have exercised in safeguarding individuals from abusive governmental action; and the Court noted that [t]he judiciary is commonly called upon to review the rationality of decisions by other branches of government or agencies with special expertise. 375 A.2d at 615. Finally, the Court noted that diversion entails more than merely the charging function, and hence, cannot be said to fall solely within the discretion of the prosecutor. 375 A.2d at 617.