Opinion ID: 2064646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law Applicable to Waiver

Text: The seminal case on waiver of the right to counsel, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), defined waiver as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, id. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, and cautioned that any such waiver must be intelligent and competent. Id. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019. Throughout the years since Johnson, the Supreme Court, in varying formulations, has consistently reaffirmed this precept. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (the accused must `knowingly and intelligently' forego those relinquished benefits); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513, 82 S.Ct. 884, 888, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (accused must intelligently and understandingly waive the assistance of counsel); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 727, 68 S.Ct. 316, 325, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (waiver must be entered competently, intelligently, and with full understanding of the implications); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) (accused may waive counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open) In Faretta, supra, as in the present case, the defendant-appellant unquestionably had expressed a desire to represent himself. Contrary to the present case, however, the trial judge in Faretta concluded that the defendant had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel, id., 422 U.S. at 809, 95 S.Ct. at 2529, ruled that he had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense, id. at 810, 95 S.Ct. at 2529, appointed the public defender to represent him, and rejected his request to act as co-counsel. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment. Recalling its dictum in Adams, supra, that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel implied a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help, id., 317 U.S. at 279, 63 S.Ct. at 241, the Supreme Court held that the right to represent oneself is constitutionally guaranteed, provided that the accused knowingly and intelligently elects to forego the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. If a defendant gives such a valid waiver, it follows, according to Faretta, that a state cannot constitutionally force a lawyer upon him. Id. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Citing the waiver requirements of previous decisions, Johnson, supra ; Adams, supra ; Von Moltke, supra, the Court elaborated that a defendant expressing a desire to go forward pro se should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' Faretta, supra at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 ( citing Adams, supra, 317 U.S. at 279, 63 S.Ct. 236). The Court's emphasis that the record. . . establish the waiver is important. A number of years earlier, the Court had faulted a reviewing court's acceptance of a trial judge's finding of waiver that was not evident from the transcript. Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver. [ Carnley v. Cochran, supra, 369 U.S. at 516, 82 S.Ct. at 890.] See Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019; Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 277-79 (1st Cir. 1976); Stepp v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 1975); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123, 95 S.Ct. 809, 42 L.Ed.2d 824 (1975); United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 188 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351, 355, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617, 334 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1975). Thus, the burden is not on a defendant-appellant to show that the waiver was less than knowing or intelligent; the burden is on the government to show from the record that the statements or circumstances at the time of the putative waiver demonstrate that the appellant intelligently and understandingly waive[d] the assistance of counsel. Carnley v. Cochran, supra, 369 U.S. at 513, 82 S.Ct. at 888. Given, therefore, that the trial court is charged in the first instance with the serious and weighty responsibility to ensure that the trial of an accused is conducted with solicitude for his essential right to have the assistance of counsel, Monroe v. United States, D.C.App., 389 A.2d 811, at 816 (1978), the question becomes: what steps must a trial court take  and the record reflect  to assure that the waiver of one's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, inherent in the desire to proceed pro se, is knowingly and intelligently made, such that a trial court will not encounter reversal for accepting the defendant's decision? Initially, we acknowledge that the right to counsel and its counterpart  the right to proceed pro se  put the trial court in a difficult position. If a defendant asks for self-representation, the court risks reversal for denying the request ( Faretta ) or granting it ( Dujanovic ). The only way to avoid the risk, therefore, is for the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023. Justice Black has made clear how carefully and precisely such an inquiry should be. To be valid such waiver [of counsel] must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances . . . . [ Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra, 332 U.S. at 724, 68 S.Ct. at 323 (plurality opinion).] We are aware of no court which has held that a waiver, to be valid, must emerge from a colloquy between trial judge and defendant covering every factor specified by Justice Black. The courts have perceived his list as a catalog of concerns for trial court consideration, not as a prescribed litany of questions and answers leading to mandatory reversal in the event that one or more is omitted. See Spanbauer v. Burke, 374 F.2d 67, 71-73 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 861, 88 S.Ct. 111, 19 L.Ed.2d 127 (1967). It is clear, nevertheless, that absent virtually the complete inquiry prescribed by Justice Black, the appellate courts cannot uphold the finding of a valid waiver unless the inquiry of record is buttressed by a compelling case of circumstantial evidence that the pro se defendant knew what he or she was doing. For example, in United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 2652, 49 L.Ed.2d 388 (1976), the court upheld a finding of waiver, based on less than in-depth inquiry, when the record made clear that a defendant had had many experiences with the court system, that he made his decision to proceed pro se after 12 days of trial with assistance of counsel, that counsel remained at his side, that these circumstances evidenced considerable knowledge of the consequences of acting pro se, and that defendant's waiver of counsel accordingly was in part a strategic ploy. Similarly, in United States v. Rosenthal, 470 F.2d 837, 845 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 2298, 36 L.Ed.2d 975 (1973), where the court noted that the specific factual background may in some instances excuse the judge's failure to give explicit warning and advice regarding the waiver of counsel, the court stressed that defendant-appellant previously had been through an earlier trial involving similar factual and legal issues, and that counsel remained at his side while he went forward pro se. We are reluctant to hold that a specific list of inquiries must be covered in every case. We conclude, however, that except for the unusual case, the conviction of a pro se criminal defendant will be vulnerable to reversal unless the trial court has followed a script covering the questions specified by Justice Black in Von Moltke, supra . Further, in cases where a defendant insists on acting as his own lawyer without a member of the bar present to advise, the trial court's script, in anticipation of other dangers and disadvantages, Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, should make a defendant aware of major pitfalls, such as the consequences of taking (and not taking) the stand, inadequately conducting voir dire, and failing to make objections to evidence and to jury instructions. [10] Obviously, the Constitution does not require a trial judge to give an insistent pro se defendant a short course in criminal law and procedure; a defendant's technical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. Id. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. The Constitution, however, does require the kind of interchange (including references to a defendant's background and experience) which, on the record, gives an appellate court confidence that the pro se defendant knew the possible adverse consequences of his or her decision and consciously accepted the risk. [11]