Opinion ID: 2352739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alternate Killer and Brady Material

Text: Appellant's weightiest claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were that his trial lawyer had failed to adequately present what we have described as an alleged alternative perpetrator or aaltperp theory, [75] i.e., the theory that another person had killed the victim, and that his lawyer failed to ask for exculpatory material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, [76] which would have included evidence as to the possibility that another person killed the victim. Appellant reiterates these allegations under his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that the Commonwealth had a duty to turn over this information. For support of these claims, Appellant discusses various factual allegations in the RCr 11.42 motion, including the following: (1) that the victim's relatives engaged in drug dealing and other criminal activity on his property; (2) that the victim's girlfriend had threatened to kill him and was looking for someone to commit murder on her behalf; (3) that someone broke into the victim's house after his death and tampered with his belongings; (4) that Appellant's house, which was owned by the victim and which contained property, including illegal drugs, belonging to the victim's children, was burned down only one week after his arrest; (5) that there was evidence, in the form of empty bank bags and money wrappers, that a large amount of money had been stolen from the victim; (6) that weapons other than Appellant's pocket knife had been used to kill the victim; (7) that a drug report existed that showed that Appellant had benzodiazepine in his blood; (8) that fingerprint results from the victim's home were inconclusive; (9) that the victim was in dire need of a large amount of money to pay his taxes; (10) that the victim's family members had threatened to kill him and his girlfriend; and (11) that a bloody note was found on the victim's dining room table and that the note had the address of a woman named Anna Matthews, who Appellant claims has a long criminal history, who was allegedly at the victim's house the day he was murdered, and who left the state shortly after the crime. Perhaps the most troubling bit of evidence that Appellant discusses is an audiotape that he claims was made by the police at the time of his arrest before they made the videotape of his confession. Appellant claims that this recording contains his statement to the police that someone else went to the victim's house with him on the night of the murder. Appellant's attorney knew of this audiotape and asked that it be turned over. The prosecutor asked the police to procure the tape and turn it over, but they appear to have never followed through. The tape was not presented at trial. Appellant claims that many of these facts were learned from Eddie Mott, a private investigator who had been hired by the victim's family to look into the crime. Appellant states that Mott knew the victim's family had doubts about Appellant's involvement in the murder, that the victim's family had the tape recording of Appellant made at the scene, that Mott had played the tape for the police, that the police never provided a copy of the tape to Appellant's trial lawyer, and that the trial lawyer knew about the tape but did not try to get a copy of it. Appellant also claims that he has no memory of the night of the murder because he was experiencing an alcohol-induced blackout. The trial court dismissed most of these claims by noting that they were speculative or unsupported by other evidence. With regard to the audiotape, the trial court specifically noted: This is apparently the same tape Mills claimed earlier in his RCr 11.42 motion had been given to Detective Partin by Mott. Here, Mills says Detective Partin never got the tape, although it was `clearly exculpatory.' Mills has not provided this Court a copy of the tape or a transcript of the tape. Mills has not provided Eddie Mott's report or an affidavit of Eddie Mott. This claim is speculative. The trial court addressed Appellant's Brady claim by noting that his claims ... are not based on information in the record. If Appellant's factual claims about the evidence regarding another possible killer, especially the claims regarding the motives and identities of specific persons, are correct, then it is likely that Appellant's lawyer's performance was not reasonably effective. It is also reasonably likely that if such evidence existed and had been presented at trial, then the outcome would have been different. Furthermore, presentation of an aaltperp theory implicates the fundamental right to a fair opportunity to present a defense [77] implicit in the Due Process Clause, which we have noted includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused, i.e., an alleged alternative perpetrator (`aaltperp') committed the crime. [78] As such, Appellant sufficiently pled ineffective assistance of counsel both as to his lawyer's failure to pursue such a theory and failure to request Brady material. Furthermore, if such Brady material was in the hands of the prosecution, then another constitutional violation occurred. Appellant's factual claims in this regard were more specific than many of the other claims, and, by their very nature, could not be disproved by the record. The trial court admitted as much by requiring in many of these instances that Appellant prove his contentions with extrinsic evidence, e.g., in the form of a report or an affidavit, rather than disproving his claims with facts in the record. In doing so, however, it appears that the trial court, [i]nstead of examining whether the record refuted the allegations raised, ... focused on whether the record supported the allegations, which is the incorrect test when addressing the question of whether an evidentiary hearing to resolve issues raised in an RCr 11.42 motion is required. [79] This is not to say that Appellant's claims necessarily require reversal of his conviction. After all, Appellant did confess to the killing on video. And we recognize that [e]ven in a capital case, an RCr 11.42 movant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. [80] But given the facts that Appellant has alleged, under the two-part test as to the necessity of an evidentiary hearing, i.e., a showing of entitlement to relief and an issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record, we must hold that Appellant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to his alternate killer and Brady material ineffective assistance of counsel claims and his prosecutorial misconduct claims. If the trial court is correct that Appellant's claims are speculative, then he will not be able to prove his claims at the evidentiary hearing, and the trial court can address them summarily. But if there is any truth to the aaltperp theory, or even if another person was present (and possibly was the primary perpetrator of the crime), there is a reasonable probability that presentation of such evidence to the jury could have changed the outcome, at least in regard to sentencing. We also note that although Appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the trial court is not required to allow a retrial in the context of that hearing. Appellant is not even allowed to engage in discovery. [81] Appellant will be allowed to prove his claims not disposed of in this opinion and nothing more.