Opinion ID: 888159
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Ranchers Possess Constitutionally Protected Property Interests

Text: ¶ 137 The Constitution protects, but does not create, property interests. Seven Up Pete, ¶ 26; Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 164, 118 S.Ct. 1925, 1930, 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998). Rather, property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001, 104 S.Ct. at 2872 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Seven Up Pete, ¶ 26; Germann, ¶ 27. Critically, the term property, as used in Article II, Section 29, contains only one qualifier: [p]rivate. It is not otherwise restricted to any particular type of property. Rather, by its terms, the constitutional requirement of just compensation applies broadly to [p]rivate property. ¶ 138 Notably, the term private property, as used in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, encompasses a wide variety of interests. It includes real property, personal property, and intangible property. Huntleigh, 525 F.3d at 1377-78. It also `denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.' PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2041 n. 6, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (brackets in PruneYard ) (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 359, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945)). Property interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive, Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572 n. 32 (Fed.Cir. 1994), and the Takings Clause is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess, General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378, 65 S.Ct. at 359. ¶ 139 The premise underlying these open-ended definitions of property is that the term is not frozen in time to the conceptions of property existing in 1791, but rather takes its meaning from contemporary understandings. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated as much. See e.g. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2901, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (noting the Supreme Court's traditional resort to ` existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law' to define the range of interests that qualify for protection as `property' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (emphasis added)). There is no reason to construe the term property in Article II, Section 29 differently. Nothing in the text or history of this provision and its predecessor (Article III, Section 14 of the 1889 Constitution) suggests that the meaning of property and the rights associated with ownership are limited to the conceptions existing in 1889 or 1972. To the contrary, given that the term is only qualified by the word private, the reasonable conclusion is that property in Article II, Section 29 (as in the Fifth Amendment) takes its meaning from contemporary understandings. ¶ 140 The Montana Code defines property broadly. It is not simply land, a fence, a car, or some office furniture. It is anything that a person has the right to possess and use to the exclusion of others. Section 70-1-101, MCA. By way of example, property interests exist in all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual delivery, all domestic animals, all obligations, such products of labor or skill as the composition of an author, the goodwill of a business, trademarks, and signs, and rights created or granted by statute. Section 70-1-104, MCA. Nothing in Montana property law, however, suggests that the meaning of property depends on arbitrarily drawn lines or rigidly constrictive tests devised by the federal courts. The Court's adoption of such tests in Kafka ( see Kafka Opinion, ¶ 46)  thereby restricting the definition of property under Article II, Section 29 to those interests which satisfy the standards created by courts of some other jurisdiction not accountable to Montanans  is indefensible. ¶ 141 In the present case, the Ranchers seek just compensation for the taking or damaging of several property interests: their alternative livestock business, inventory, and equipment, which includes fixtures, facilities, and the alternative livestock. The State, the Sportsmen, and the Court do not dispute that these are compensable property interests; however, before proceeding to the question of whether a part or a whole of these interests has been taken or damaged for public use, I note the following considerations regarding the Ranchers' businesses. In the same way that the opportunity to pursue employment is a necessary incident to the fundamental right (under Article II, Section 3) to pursue life's basic necessities, Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 299, 911 P.2d at 1172, the opportunity to operate one's business as a going concern is a necessary incident to the fundamental right (also under Article II, Section 3) to acquire, possess, and protect property. Indeed, operating one's business as a going concern is, like employment, the vehicle by which many Montanans pursue life's basic necessities; and the property interests associated with a going business are, therefore, entitled to the highest level of protection by this Court.