Opinion ID: 2629286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Childhood Sexual Abuse Under Section 37-1-30

Text: {16} The United States District Court also asked us to determine [w]hether a claim alleging that government officials created a dangerous situation in which a child was sexually abused by a third party is `based upon personal injury caused by childhood sexual abuse' within the meaning of NMSA § 37-1-30. Section 37-1-30 states: (A) An action for damages based on personal injury caused by childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced by a person before the latest of the following dates: (1) the first instant of the person's twenty-fourth birthday; or (2) three years from the date of the time that a person knew or had reason to know of the childhood sexual abuse and that the childhood sexual abuse resulted in an injury ... The statute defines childhood sexual abuse as any violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-11 (2003), regarding criminal sexual penetration of a minor; NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-13 (2003), regarding criminal sexual contact of a minor; or any violation of the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, NMSA 1978, Section 30-6A-1 (1984). Section 37-1-30(B). In the case before us, the child suffered childhood sexual abuse as defined by the statute. However, the Officers argue that Section 37-1-30 does not apply because they are third parties to the sexual abuse, in essence that the section only applies to claims between the victim and the alleged perpetrator. The Officers also assert that the TCA provides the exclusive remedy for suits against governmental entities, thus Section 37-1-30 cannot govern this claim. {17} This Court is authorized to answer certified questions if the answer may be determinative of any issue in pending litigation in the certifying court.... NMSA 1978, § 39-7-4 (1997). Here, the second question presented to this Court seems to have been asked in the event that we answered the first question differently. Having answered the first question in the affirmative there is no need to answer the second question, as doing so is not determinative of any issue before the federal court here. For this reason we need not resolve any of the statutory issues raised by the parties regarding Section 37-1-30.