Opinion ID: 373805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 55 The Company argues that the district court erred in: (I) considering events which occurred prior to September 11, 1970, the beginning of the effective statute of limitations period; (II) basing its liability finding on the Company's hiring practices, which were never at issue in this case; (III) finding Company discrimination in promotion to management and key non-management positions; (IV) finding Company discrimination in its job assignment practices; (V) awarding attorney's fees to counsel for certain class members who, according to the Company, had never become parties to the lawsuit; and, (VI) ordering the Company to remedy practices which had not been found to be discriminatory. DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
56 The Company argues that the district court erred in failing to restrict the evidence to alleged acts of discrimination occurring after September 11, 1970, the beginning of the EEOC statutory period. 21 Resolution of this issue is guided by Supreme Court pronouncements issued after the district court judgment was entered. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). According to the Company, these cases foreclose judicial consideration of prior discriminatory acts which are said to have continuing impact on alleged discriminatees. The cases, however, establish no such prohibition. 57 In Teamsters, the Supreme Court discussed the effect of section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), 22 on a seniority system which operate(d) to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. 431 U.S. at 349, 97 S.Ct. at 1862. Under the seniority system in Teamsters, lower paid city drivers who transferred to more desirable line driver jobs were required to forfeit all competitive seniority accumulated in their former positions, and to start with the lowest seniority in the line driver pool. By discouraging transfer to more desirable positions, the system perpetuated the effects of past discriminatory hiring. The government argued that such a system could not be bona fide within the meaning of section 703(h). According to the court, however, section 703(h) was designed to immunize seniority systems that allowed for the full exercise of seniority accumulated before the effective date of the Act. The court held that an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. 431 U.S. at 353-354, 97 S.Ct. at 1864. 58 The Teamsters rationale was developed further in Evans, where the Court addressed the legality of a seniority system which perpetuated post-Act discrimination. 23 In Evans, a female flight attendant was forced to resign upon her marriage in 1968, but was rehired by the airline in 1972. The attendant did not file an EEOC charge of discrimination within 90 days of her separation in 1968. 24 Recognizing that this failure barred relief based directly on the 1968 resignation, the flight attendant argued that she was the victim of a continuing violation caused by the impact of the past illegal act on her present seniority status. This continuing violation was said to have occurred within the statutory period preceding her EEOC charge of discrimination which was filed in 1973. The Court acknowledged that the airline's refusal to credit the flight attendant with pre-1972 seniority gave present effect to the past discriminatory act of forced resignation. It was not convinced, however, that the continuing effect of the past act of discrimination was sufficient to constitute a present violation of the Act: 59 Respondent emphasizes the fact that she has alleged a Continuing violation. United's seniority system does indeed have a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits. But the emphasis should not be on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present Violation exists. 60 431 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 1889. 61 The attendant in Evans based her entire claim on the present Application of a neutral seniority system which perpetuated the effects of a past discriminatory act not made the subject of a timely charge. The Court held that the operation of an otherwise bona fide and neutral seniority system is not unlawful under Title VII merely because it perpetuates post-Act discrimination that has not been made the subject of a timely charge of discrimination. 62 Neither Evans nor Teamsters foreclose consideration of prior discrimination in all circumstances. They hold only that prior discrimination, by itself, cannot make the operation of an otherwise bona fide seniority system unlawful. They do not hold, as the Company suggests, that a continuing violation can never constitute an actionable wrong; only that the Mere perpetuation of the effects of pre-Act or time barred discrimination does not constitute a present violation. See also, Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977). In Olinkraft this court noted that notwithstanding Evans, where an entire promotion system is challenged on the basis that it operates to hold plaintiffs in lower echelons, the 180 day statutory period is inconsequential in determining the admissibility of prior discriminatory acts. 63 After reciting Company employment and promotion practices occurring prior to September 11, 1970, the district court noted that such evidence is relevant and admissible to show possible plant-wide discriminatory conduct with continuing effects, the probability of the continuation of such conduct, and the relationship between past actions and present effects and actions. Citing, Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976); Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973). There is no question that, without the benefit of Teamsters or Evans, the district court overstated the test for the consideration of past discriminatory conduct. The challenged evidence was improperly considered, however, only if the district court viewed the prior discriminatory acts as constituting the actionable wrongs upon which relief was based. Dobbs v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 606 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1979); United Air Lines v. Evans. If, on the other hand, prior practices were considered relevant to show independently actionable conduct occurring within the statutory period, the district court did not err in taking the evidence into account. 25 64 Considering the district court order in its entirety in light of all the evidence before it, we conclude that the court did not improperly premise its judgment on past discrimination. The EEOC charge and class action complaint alleged the present existence of racially discriminatory employment practices. The major thrust of the complaint was directed at the promotion system still in effect at the plant. The court found discrimination not with respect to pre-1971 conduct, but in specific employment practices occurring within the appropriate statutory time frame. 26 65 One other factor should be emphasized in considering the admissibility of testimony regarding past acts of discrimination. Unlike the private suit in Evans, this action brought under challenge a broad range of employment practices which were said to affect nearly all past, present, and future black employees at the Dallas plant. Thorough and coherent consideration of the plaintiff's claims would necessarily require the recognition of various factors which carry no independent legal consequences. In reviewing class action cases of this kind, where the challenges are broad and sweeping, we are more inclined to accept the district court's assessment of the admissibility of evidence which it deems relevant. Fed.R.Evid. 403, 404; Claiborne v. Illinois Central Railroad, 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978); James v. Stockham Valves. We conclude that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of past discriminatory acts.
66 The Company next contends that the trial court erred in basing its liability finding on hiring practices which were never at issue in this case. The Company is correct in asserting that its hiring practices were not directly in issue before the district court. The plaintiff's complaint did not allege discrimination in hiring. Hiring practices were not set forth among the contested issues of fact or law in the court's pre-trial order. Fisher's pre-trial brief acknowledged that the issue of overall hiring practices was simply not being raised in this litigation. The question then becomes to what extent has the district court based its judgment on discriminatory hiring practices of the Company. We find that with the exception of one finding and conclusion, the court correctly limited its holding on discrimination to employment practices other than hiring. Consideration of hiring practices, both before and after the applicable statutory period, is a necessary predicate to meaningful findings regarding employment practices at issue in this case. See, Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc. To fully examine the significance and impact of promotion policies on black advancement within the Company, the court properly identified the number and percentage of black employees hired at entry-level positions over a substantial period of years. The figures were not used to independently form the basis for a finding of liability against the Company. That finding, with one exception, was premised on the Company's discriminatory promotion practices and job assignments. 67 Although we find nothing improper in the court's consideration of hiring figures to substantiate its finding of discriminatory promotion practices, we believe the court erred in making specific conclusions of discriminatory hiring into management positions. According to the court, the Company demonstrated no business necessity for its policy of hiring only recent college graduates with engineering or technical degrees. Whatever the legal sufficiency of that conclusion, the issue had not been properly joined or litigated before the district court. Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the district court judgment requiring the Company to alter its hiring qualifications and other hiring practices. Hodges v. United States, 597 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1979); Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1976).
68 Citing what it calls the application of erroneous and inappropriate legal principles, the Company argues that the district court erred in concluding that the Company discriminated against blacks in promotion to management, mechanical, lab analyst, manufacturing clerical, and security guard positions. 27 69 The district court premised its conclusion on several major findings. While we agree that one of these findings has no basis in present case law, we are satisfied that the conclusion is amply supported on other legally sufficient grounds. 70 Applying legal principles then in effect, the court found that the Company does not have a bona fide seniority system within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 28 Under the law of this circuit at the time the judgment was entered, seniority systems which perpetuated the effects on incumbent employees of prior discrimination were not bona fide within the meaning of 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). 71 Since Teamsters and Evans, however, we have recognized that an otherwise bona fide seniority system is not itself illegal merely because it perpetuates the effects of pre-Act or post-Act discrimination. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1189 (5th Cir. 1978). In other words, a seniority system is no longer non-bona fide because it operates to  'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349, 97 S.Ct. at 1862. Instead, purposeful discrimination in connection with the establishment or continuation of a seniority system is integral to a determination that the system is or is not bona fide. James v. Stockham Valves, at 351. In Stockham Valves we noted four factors to be considered in determining whether a seniority system is bona fide: 72 1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all employees equally from transferring between seniority units; 73 2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bargaining units (if the latter, whether that structure is rational and in conformance with industry practice); 74 3) whether the seniority system has its genesis in racial discrimination; and 75 4) whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose. 76 Id. at 352. 77 There are no individual seniority units at the Dallas plant. Seniority for all purposes is calculated on a plant-wide basis without regard to prior job classification. The system does not lock employees into inferior jobs by requiring them to commit seniority suicide by forfeiting accumulated seniority upon advancement. See, Stockham Valves, at 348; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 344, 97 S.Ct. at 1859. Any employee may compete for any job vacancy in the plant based upon his total length of service with the Company. Moreover, as in Teamsters, there is no evidence in the record to show that the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimination or that it was negotiated and maintained for any illegal purpose. Teamsters, at 356, 97 S.Ct. at 1865. 29 78 Acknowledging that the court's order was premised on case law then in effect, we reject its finding that the seniority system was not bona fide within the meaning of 703(h) of Title VII. The system is therefore legally valid under the immunity of that provision. 79 The existence of a bona fide seniority system, however, does not shield the Company from Other illegal acts, so long as those other acts are independently actionable. Pettway, at 1189. It is well recognized that racially discriminatory promotion practices are actionable wrongs under Title VII regardless of the bona fide character of the controlling seniority system. See, Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 600 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1979); Claiborne v. Illinois Central Railroad; James v. Stockham Valves; Pettway; Teamsters. Moreover, post-Act discriminatees may receive complete retroactive seniority without attacking the Legality of the seniority system as applied to them. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 347, 97 S.Ct. at 1861. (Emphasis supplied) 80 Like the plaintiff in Clark v. Olinkraft, Fisher contends not only that the seniority system perpetuates the effects of past discrimination, but also that discrimination in promotion . . . constitutes a continuing and unlawful employment practice in violation of Title VII. Clark v. Olinkraft, at 1222; See also, Stockham Valves, at 351. 81 The district court found that the Company had committed present and continuing violations. This conclusion was premised not only on the court's finding that the seniority system was not bona fide, but on its finding that the Company engaged in active discrimination in granting promotions to certain positions. Because the record supports the latter finding, the district court's erroneous determination as to the bona fide nature of the seniority system does not affect the outcome. 30 82 When plaintiffs assert that they have been victims of the disparate impact of illegal promotion practices, proof of discriminatory motive is not required under Title VII. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, at 473; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Once the plaintiffs have demonstrated the racially adverse impact of promotion practices and tests, it becomes the Company's burden to prove job relatedness or business necessity. Scott v. City of Anniston, Alabama, 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). 83 We find ample record evidence to demonstrate the disparate impact of Company promotion policies. As noted, while blacks comprise 14.7% Of the total work force, they are marked by their conspicuous presence in the lower echelons of the employee hierarchy. See Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., at 1222; Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975). When this action was filed, one of the sixty-three company managers was black, none of the twenty-two lab analysts was black and none of the security guards was black. At the time of judgment, one of twenty-nine clerical workers was black, and one of seventy-six mechanics at the plant was black. The Company asserts that these figures are insufficient to support a prima facie case, without competent evidence to show the percentage of black workers in the community possessing the necessary skills and qualifications for the underrepresented positions. Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977); Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc., 607 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1979). In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court approved the use of comparative statistics showing a narrow labor pool defined by those qualified for employment to particular jobs available. The court explained: 84 When special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value. 85 Id. at 308 n. 13, 97 S.Ct. at 2742 n. 13. 86 Mindful of Hazelwood, we nevertheless find the plaintiff's statistics adequate to establish a prima facie case. First, a prima facie case may be shown without evidence of qualifications where the inference of discrimination is supported by a compelling level of racial underrepresentation in a sizeable work force. Jones v. Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Inc., 512 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975); See e. g., United States v. Hayes International Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). In Hayes International Corp., we noted that when substantial underrepresentation is shown as compared with general population figures, the burden of proving lack of qualifications is on the Company. Moreover, the usefulness of statistics of this nature varies with the surrounding facts and circumstances, which either support or undermine the inference of discrimination offered by the statistics. Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc., at 691; United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971). The Company's entry level hiring policy is a distinctive circumstance in this case supporting the inference of discrimination. When a company adopts a policy and practice of hiring in at low level unskilled jobs and promoting to upper-level positions based upon training received and skills developed at the plant itself, it cannot convincingly challenge the prima facie showing under the Hazelwood qualifications dicta. Where skills are commensurate with company training, we will approve statistical comparisons between racial make-up in key positions and racial composition in the total work force. See, James v. Stockham Valves, at 341; Scott v. City of Anniston, at 901. Because the statistics support the district court finding of adverse impact upon black employees, the burden shifted to the Company to explain the racial disparity by proving job relatedness. Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc.; Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), Vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977). Advanced promotion at the plant was premised on two company practices found objectionable by the district court the administration of qualifying tests for certain positions and the application of the total assessment program. 87 Qualifying Tests. 88 Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice: 89 for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 90 When an examination has been shown to affect a racially disparate impact, the employer must prove that the test is job related. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co. The employer does not meet his burden by establishing merely a rational basis for the test. It must be validated by a demonstration that the examination is appropriate for the selection of qualified applicants for the job in question. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247, 96 S.Ct. at 2051; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). 91 The district court found that the Form C-M Test, 31 when used in promotion to manufacturing clerical positions, and the Form P-M Test, 32 as employed in the promotion to management positions, had not been proved to be professionally developed ability tests within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Both tests were designed in the personnel research department of the Procter & Gamble Company, Cincinnati, Ohio. 92 The Company has not met its burden to show validation of these tests for the purposes cited. A validation study for the Form C-M Test relating to selection to manufacturing clerical jobs was conducted in 1975. The district court noted, however, that the study found no statistical or practical significance in the correlation of test scores and job performance for blacks. 33 No criterion-related validation study was shown to support the use of the Form P-M Test. The court found that the test lacked content validity for the majority of job factors deemed most significant for the performance of supervisorial duties. 34 In the absence of any company showing that the tests had been properly validated, the district court did not err in concluding that the exams had not been shown to be professionally developed ability tests under section 703(h) of Title VII. 93 Total Assessment. 94 Once a prima facie case of discriminatory Practices has been shown, it becomes the employer's burden to demonstrate the job performance validity of its practices. Scott v. City of Anniston, at 901; Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc.; Washington v. Davis. This, the Company has not done. As the district court noted, ratings on what counts factors such as desire to do the work well, working well with others, and learning the work involve substantial subjectivity. Moreover, management performance appraisals, experience forms, and scheduled interviews also provide a mechanism for subjective analysis. As the court explained, these promotional tools provide raters the opportunity to choose which events to emphasize or omit. Under total assessment, all bidders for promotion must be reviewed and assessed by management personnel at the supervisory level. 95 Against this backdrop, the district court found that when this action was instituted in 1974, no black person had ever been a supervisor at the Company plant. Nor had any black manager participated as a rater in total assessment for promotion. At the completion of the trial, no black had acted as a rater in total assessment for promotion in which a final selection had been made. In light of these and other factors, 35 the court concluded that total assessment was not a valid method for evaluating qualifications for promotion. We agree. This court has recognized that promotion systems utilizing subjective evaluations by all white supervisors provide a ready mechanism for discrimination. Hamilton v. General Motors Corp., 606 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1979); Accord, James v. Stockham Valves; Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). The significant underrepresentation of blacks in supervisory level management positions, provides an adequate basis for the district court's invalidation of the Company's total assessment program. 96 Having discredited the two major mechanisms upon which advanced promotions were premised, the district court found discrimination in promotion to key company positions. We sustain the district court finding of discrimination in promotion to mechanic, lab analyst, manufacturing clerical, security guard, 36 and management positions.
97 Having carefully reviewed the evidence offered to show discrimination in assignment to the slide handler position, we find no error in the district court's conclusion. 37
98 On April 1, 1976, the district court held a hearing to consider entry of a proposed consent decree. In response to notice of the proposed decree, fifty-two members of the certified class appeared through separate counsel at the hearing. These class members objected to the entry of the proposed consent decree. After hearing arguments from Fisher, the Company, and the objectors, the court disapproved the proposed consent decree and set this action for trial. Prior to trial, the court ordered that an attorney other than Fisher's could represent the objectors in this class action and need not formerly intervene. The Company now challenges the award of reasonable attorney's fees to the objectors attorney. According to the Company, the objectors are not prevailing parties to this suit within the meaning of section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Section 706(k) provides: In any action or proceeding under this (Title) the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee . . .. We have often declared that an award of attorneys' fees and its calculation in a Title VII action are matters left for the sound discretion of trial judges. Claiborne v. Illinois Central Railroad, at 155; Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), perceived two equitable considerations supporting the award of attorney's fees to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs: 99 First, as emphasized so forcefully in Piggie Park, (Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968)) the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. 390 U.S. at 402, 88 S.Ct. 964. Second, when a district court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law. 100 Id. at 418, 98 S.Ct. at 699. 101 In light of the public rights involved, the award should be in such an amount to insure that attorneys will undertake representation in this type of case. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., at 447. 102 We are satisfied that under the broad discretion vested in the court by virtue of section 706(k), the district court was justified in granting attorney's fees to the objectors. The objectors were plaintiff class members who performed a valuable service for the class of which they were a part. In opposing the consent decree in a case in which the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed at trial, the objectors benefited their class and helped to vindicate the important public rights protected by Title VII. The court permitted the objectors to participate in the trial of this cause through their own counsel, without having to formally intervene. The better practice would have been for the trial court to have formally recognized and certified the objectors as a sub-class, and we conclude that this is what in fact, though informally, occurred here. Since this is so, we do not disturb this award. We note, however, that in following this course under the circumstances of this case we in no sense countenance any general or unsupervised proliferation of class representation. Here the matter was called to the court's attention and passed on by it, albeit informally. In the normal case, a certified class is assumed to be sufficiently harmonious and unified in interest that one set of attorneys can and should represent it adequately; and just insofar as those attorneys fail to do so to such an extent that additional counsel must appear, the first set must be viewed as having performed inadequately.
103 Finally, the Company argues that the district court erroneously attempted to remedy practices not found to be discriminatory. As noted, the court ordered the Company to prepare a proposed plan in conformity with the court's conclusions. The proposed plan has been withheld pending the outcome of this appeal. In this opinion we have dealt with the Company's challenges to those conclusions, and note simply that the court's directions regarding the plan shall be modified to meet the scope of this decision. AFFIRMANCE AND REMAND 104 The district court's judgment with respect to the bona fide nature of the Company's seniority system, and the practices relating to hiring into management, is vacated. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 105 AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part.