Opinion ID: 2547313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Extensions Are Available Under Section 73-4-10

Text: ¶ 34 Section 73-4-10 states that the district court may extend, upon due cause shown, the time for filing any other pleading, statement, report or protest. Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that the power to grant an extension applies only prospectively. ¶ 35 The State Engineer argues, however, that only prospective extensions can be granted because the district court's jurisdiction is limited to those objections that were filed within the ninety-day objection period. In essence, the State Engineer contends that if a claimant fails to file within ninety days of receiving the proposed determination, the court overseeing the general adjudication lacks jurisdiction to address any claim raised by that claimant, including a request for a time extension. ¶ 36 In support of this assertion, the State Engineer first points to sections 63-30d-401 and -402 of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-401, -402 (Supp.2004). Those sections require a claimant to file a notice of claim with a governmental entity before an action against that entity or its employee may commence. Id. If a notice of claim is not filed within one year after the claim arises, a jurisdictional defect is created, precluding suit. See Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (Complying with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit....). The State Engineer next refers us to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, which requires a party seeking to appeal a final order to file a notice of appeal within thirty days after judgment is entered. Utah R.App. P. 4(a). Failure to do so deprives the court of jurisdiction. See Glezos v. Frontier Invs., 896 P.2d 1230, 1232-34 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (concluding that the court had no jurisdiction to hear a cross appeal due to an untimely notice of appeal). The State Engineer contends that the notice of claim and notice of appeal situations are both analogous to the extension mechanism found in title 73. The parallels he draws are inapposite. While it is true that sections 63-30d-401 and -402 and rule 4 impose a jurisdictional roadblock [10] in situations where a litigant fails to timely file a required pleading, no such jurisdictional roadblock exists in the general adjudication context. ¶ 37 The State Engineer cites United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, 79 P.3d 945, and In re San Rafael River Drainage Area, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992), to support his jurisdictional argument. Neither case directly addresses the question presented in this appeal. In United States Fuel, we held that a district court sitting outside the general adjudication must refrain from exercising jurisdiction over a dispute between participants in the general adjudication when the outside claim is based on contentions made in an untimely objection filed in the general adjudication. 2003 UT 49 at ¶ 18, 79 P.3d 945. In fact, United States Fuel contains dicta that suggests the conclusion we reach today: Unless and until [United States Fuel] sought and obtained leave of court in the general adjudication to excuse its tardy objection, [the defendant] was entitled to judgment perfecting the state engineer's proposed [determination]. Id. at ¶ 17 (emphasis added). We went on to state that [t]o this day, [United States Fuel] has not sought to have its untimely objection accepted in the general adjudication. Id. at ¶ 18. Thus, in United States Fuel we held only that a court outside the general adjudication is denied jurisdiction over claims related to an untimely objection; we did not directly address whether the district court overseeing the general adjudication was denied jurisdiction and, in fact, implied that the general adjudication court would have jurisdiction. ¶ 38 In re San Rafael River stands for a similar proposition. In that case, we concluded that an expedited hearing within a general adjudication could not be pursued when the claim was based on an untimely objection. 844 P.2d at 290-91. However, as in United States Fuel, there is no language in the opinion suggesting that the claimant was foreclosed from petitioning the district court for an extension of the objection time period. ¶ 39 Both the plain language of section 73-4-10 and our prior case law reveal that the district court overseeing the general adjudication may hear petitions for an extension of the ninety-day objection period at any time before a final judgment on the matter is entered. Consequently, GRCC may still petition the district court, even at this late date, for an extension to the objection time period. However, before the district court can grant such a request, GRCC must show due cause excusing its failure to file the objection within the ninety-day objection period.