Opinion ID: 1159929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Xerox's Statements in Closing Argument Constitute Judicial Admissions?

Text: Mr. Hayes contends that Xerox's counsel made certain judicial admissions in closing argument about elements of damages and therefore, as a matter of law, Mr. Hayes is entitled to a new trial. Xerox claims that its statements in closing argument constituted equivocal opinion rather than judicial admissions. A judicial admission, to be binding, must be one of fact and not a conclusion of law or an expression of opinion. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 299 at 765 (1964). Most courts require the statement to be a clear, deliberate, unequivocal statement of fact, not opinion. Wieder v. Towmotor Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (E.D.Pa. 1983) aff'd 734 F.2d 9 (3d Cir.1984); Childs v. Franco, 563 F. Supp. 290, 292 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Kuzmic v. Kreutzmann, 100 Wis.2d 48, 301 N.W.2d 266, 268 (App. 1980); Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enterprises, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tex.Civ.App. 1979); George M. Eady Co. v. Stevenson, 550 S.W.2d 473, 473-74 (Ky. 1977); Hedge v. Bryan, 425 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968). In his closing argument, Xerox's counsel stated: Mr. Hayes I think he's been significantly injured. I think he has injury now. I think it may need treatment. We don't know for sure. He conceded that Xerox owed Mr. Hayes a lot of money but didn't know exactly how much since that was the jury's job. He stated that future lost wages were reasonably certain to be incurred. It's not there, not there. He did not believe there would be any future medical expenses. Counsel then started estimating how much money he felt the jury could award Mr. Hayes on each of his claims. He estimated a total of $69,000  $70,000 which included future medical expenses, loss of consortium, pain and suffering, and lost wages. Mr. Hayes argues that the above statements are judicial admissions in which counsel conceded liability for specific amounts of special damages claimed by Mr. Hayes. Since there is no law in Alaska on this issue, we must look for guidance from other courts. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has held that statements made in the context of closing arguments are not judicial admissions. The majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have determined that the opinions and conclusions of counsel in closing arguments do not amount to a binding judicial admission... . Closing arguments are matters of opinions. As stated in Sabo v. T.W. Moore Feed & Grain Company, 97 Ill. App.2d 7, 20, 239 N.E.2d 459, 465 (1968), quoting with approval Rosbottom v. Hensley, 61 Ill. App.2d 198, 215, 209 N.E.2d 655, 662 (1965): ... In the dictionary denotation, a judicial admission is a formal act of the party or his attorney in court, dispensing with proof of a fact claimed to be true and is used as a substitute for legal evidence at the trial. Black's Law Dictionary, 1944. We conclude that closing arguments of counsel are opinions only and cannot be construed as an admission of plaintiff's negligence. Kuzmic, 301 N.W.2d at 268 (footnotes omitted). Reading counsel's closing argument, we conclude that it constitutes opinion, or at best equivocal estimates, rather than clear statements of fact. Xerox conceded the fact that Mr. Hayes was injured by the accident but this issue was never in dispute. [2] The dispute focused on the extent of the injuries and the amount of damages to be awarded for them. Counsel couched his statements in the form of opinion. He phrased everything with I think, and stated that he didn't know the exact amount to be awarded and did not believe Mr. Hayes would have future medical expenses and then threw out an estimate of $70,000. His estimates were just estimates and not clear, deliberate and unequivocal statements of fact. The fact that counsel may have conceded some damages is not inconsistent with his theory of the case, since Xerox was disputing the extent or amount of each claim. See Wieder, 568 F. Supp. at 1063-64 (although counsel conceded that a third party caused the accident, this was not a judicial admission inconsistent with the theory of their case that a third party was the sole cause of the accident, relieving co-defendants of liability.) [3] We conclude that Xerox's statements during closing argument constituted opinion and not the clear, deliberate, and unequivocal statements of fact necessary for a judicial admission.