Opinion ID: 147419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nattah's motion for leave to join Secretary Harvey

Text: Nattah challenges the district court's denial of his motion for leave to join former Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey. Under FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(1), a plaintiff may amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, anytime before being served with a responsive pleading. [2] FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(1)(A) (2007). In this case, none of the defendants filed an answer to Nattah's complaint. L-3 filed a motion to dismiss, but a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for the purposes of Rule 15. James v. Hurson Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C.Cir.2000). Because Nattah therefore was entitled as a matter of right to amend his complaint to add Secretary Harvey as a defendant, it was error for the district court to refuse to consider the claims he added. See id. However, not all such errors require remand. See id. [A] district court need not be made to reconsider an amended complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or that would otherwise fail as a matter of law. . . . [N]o remand is necessary if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. We therefore consider whether the amended claims against Secretary Harvey would survive a motion to dismiss. Nattah brings several claims against Secretary Harvey: violation of the Geneva Convention (Count III); slavery (Count V); right to travel (Count VI); and violations of international law (Count XIX). The district court held Nattah's claims against Secretary Harvey would not survive a motion to dismiss because the Government is immune from suit and has not explicitly waived immunity, Nattah, 541 F.Supp.2d at 231. The court's reasoning overlooks section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, waiving sovereign immunity for claims seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority. For each claim brought against Secretary Harvey, Nattah seeks injunctive, declaratory, and equitable relief in addition to monetary relief. First Am. Compl. at 84-88. Moreover, as the federal Appellees concede, Nattah's claims are made against the Secretary in his official capacity. See Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 102 (D.C.Cir.1984) (With respect to claims for non-monetary relief, the 1976 amendments to § 702 of the [APA] eliminated the sovereign immunity defense in virtually all actions for non-monetary relief against a U.S. agency or officer acting in an official capacity.); see also Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C.Cir. 2006). Sovereign immunity therefore does not protect the Secretary from Nattah's non-monetary claims. The only other defense the federal Appellees raise to Nattah's claims against Secretary Harvey, albeit halfheartedly, is that Nattah's pleadings are insufficient. Fed. Appellees Br. at 17. They argue his pleadings are vague and do not establish any basis for any claims against the Secretary. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951-54, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Although Nattah does not mention Secretary Harvey by name in each individual count of his amended complaint, we conclude his pleadings are sufficient. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5 (stating Nattah brings Counts III, V, and VI against all defendants), 237 (stating Army Intelligence officers were aware Nattah would not voluntarily go into Iraq), 269 (stating the United States Military denied Nattah's right to travel), 355 (stating defendant Harvey violated Nattah's rights by requiring him to violate international law). Because Nattah's non-monetary claims against Secretary Harvey would survive a motion to dismissat least on the grounds relied upon by the district court and the federal Appelleeswe remand for further proceedings on those claims.