Opinion ID: 1362827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Denying Chase's Request for a Forensic Expert?

Text: Under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), [c]ounsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain . . . expert . . . services necessary for adequate representation may request them. After conducting an inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, if the court finds that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court . . . shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. Id. The decision to grant or deny a request for services under the Criminal Justice Act will be overturned on appeal where the district court has committed an abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1580 (9th Cir.1990).
Upon a timely request by an indigent defendant, [t]he statute requires the district judge to authorize[expert] defense services . . . in circumstances in which a reasonable attorney would engage such services for a client having the independent financial means to pay for them. United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir.1973). The court's inquiry into the necessity of services must be specific to the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir.1980). In a drug case, the sentence depends primarily on the quantity of narcotics that the court attributes to the defendant. U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1, 3D1.2(d), ch. 5 Pt. A. Therefore, from the perspective of defense counsel, formulating a theory of drug quantity is critical. In this case in particular, the only disputed issue was the quantity of methamphetamine produced at the Twilight location, where no methamphetamine was found, so the determination of drug quantity demanded a scientific calculation. Chase reasonably requested the appointment of an expert in forensic chemistry to assist his attorney in formulating a theory of the quantity of methamphetamine and to rebut that of the government's expert. On appeal, the government asserts that defense counsel's cross examination of Rienhardt proved to be sufficient and therefore Chase had no need to hire his own expert. Essentially, the government argues, because Rienhardt agreed with defense counsel's calculation100 boxes of pseudoephedrine yields forty to sixty grams of methamphetamine[t]here was nothing for an outside expert to prove. This argument misses the point. While there appears to be no dispute that 100 boxes of pseudoephedrine can produce approximately forty to sixty grams of methamphetamine, the value of the empty boxes as an indicator of the lab's production capacity is hotly contested. The government's expert offered no opinion as to the best available method for estimating drug quantity. The appropriateness of relying on the glass flask, the empty boxes, or some other method is by no means settled, and a defense expert could have informed that discussion. Although the burden of proof of drug quantity lies with the prosecutor, Chase had a right to put on a defense, and to retain an expert if a reasonable attorney would[have] engage[d] such services for a client having the independent financial means to pay for them. Bass, 477 F.2d at 725. [T]he Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness requires that the basic tools of an adequate defense . . . be provided to those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has long recognized . . . that . . . justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. Id. at 76, 105 S.Ct. 1087. In this case, Chase had a right to hire an expert who could have produced his or her own investigation, interpretation, and testimony. Id. at 80, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Additionally, the aid of an expert could have made the cross-examination of Rienhardt more effective. Informed by an expert, Chase's attorney could have asked Rienhardt more specific questions about the formula he used, flaws in that formula, and any additional factors that he should have considered. The attorney could have posed more sophisticated inquiries concerning the literature and experience upon which Rienhardt based his opinion, whether he was familiar with other literature in the field, and whether he would have conceded that other estimation methods might be preferable to the one he had used in this case. The absence of a cross-examination informed by scientific knowledge was highlighted when the district judge asked Rienhardt to play the role of a defense expert. The court asked the government's expert to attack the validity of his own position: THE COURT: All right. Now, if you were asked to attack the method you used, how would you do it? THE WITNESS: If I was going to try to refute what I said? THE COURT: Challenge what you said? THE WITNESS: . . . I don'tI couldn't attack myself. . . . Clearly, both the defendant and the court would have benefited from the services of a defense expert. [4] At least one other circuit recently recognized the necessity of a defense expert in a sentencing hearing involving methamphetamine estimation. See United States v. Hardin, 437 F.3d 463, 470 (5th Cir.2006). In Hardin, the defendant-appellant asserted that bones were a methamphetamine byproduct, which should not have been included in a narcotics calculation. Id. at 466. The Court of Appeals ruled that the district court had erred in denying funds for a defense expert to testify on [this] disputed factual issue regarding [quantity,] the primary issue [in the defendant's] sentence determination. Id. at 470. The Fifth Circuit held that the district judge's denial of the motion for appointment of a chemical expert when necessary to respond to the government's case against [the defendant], where the government's case rest[ed] heavily on a theory most competently addressed by expert testimony, constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 468 (citations and quotation omitted). The Court of Appeals ordered the district judge to appoint the requested expert and to re-sentence the defendant after taking expert testimony. Id. at 471. [5] In the case before us, the district court denied Chase's motion to hire an expert on the basis that its estimation of drug quantity did not depend on a finding that Chase used the 5,000-milliliter flask. However, the court did not clarify how it reached its estimate if not for the assumption about the flask, and, indeed, the record specifically reflected that the court estimated a production of 500 to 750 grams of methamphetamine [b]ased upon the information [] contained in the Rienhardt [letter]. Given this record, the district court's explanation for denying the motion to hire an expert was unreasonable.
An appellate court will overturn a district court's denial of a request for an expert only where the defendant has demonstrated prejudice. United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1980). The prejudice cannot be merely speculative; it must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The harm in this case is clearly demonstrated. The district court explicitly relied on the government's expert testimony to estimate a drug quantity of 600 grams, including 500 grams from the Twilight location. Based on that quantity and a downward adjustment of one level to account for any margin of error, the court assigned Chase a base offense level of thirty. With a three-level adjustment for Chase's acceptance of responsibility, this resulted in a level of twenty-seven, and, under criminal history category II, Chase received a Guidelines range of seventy-eight to ninety-seven months for the drug charges. U.S.S.G. ch. 5 Pt. A. The court adopted the Guidelines recommendation and sentenced Chase to seventy-eight months of imprisonment (not including the sentence for the gun charge). Chase argued at his sentencing hearing that a more plausible estimate of his production at the Twilight location was forty grams of methamphetamine. Had Chase been permitted to retain an expert who provided testimony substantiating this estimate, and had the district court credited that testimony, Chase's responsibility would have fallen within the range of fifty to 200 grams (forty grams from the Twilight location plus 109 from the Mount Avenue location), producing a base offense level of twenty-six. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7). Given Chase's acceptance of responsibility, Chase would have had an offense level of twenty-three. In contrast to the seventy-eight months of imprisonment assigned, the sentencing range for an offense level of twenty-three is fifty-one to sixty-three months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5 Pt. A. Even if the judge had sentenced Chase to the maximum time within the Guidelines for level twenty-three, the sentence would have been sixty-three months. The assigned prison term exceeds this amount by over a year. [A]ny amount of actual jail time has . . . significance. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001). Therefore, Chase has demonstrated prejudice. For the foregoing reasons, the district court abused its discretion in denying Chase an opportunity to retain an expert, and Chase was prejudiced by this error.