Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: denial of access to the state's files

Text: At the commencement of the PCR proceedings, defendant moved to inspect the State's entire file, arguing that he was entitled to such broad discovery because the Defendant has demonstrated that the State did not comply with its obligation to provide [pretrial] discovery and because a post conviction proceeding in a capital sentenced case is a special situation which requires the broadest of all discovery. As noted, see supra at 139, 690 A. 2d at 25, the PCR court denied that motion, ruling that such a broad discovery right is contemplated by neither the discovery provisions in our Court Rules, see R. 3:13-2 to -4, nor by our decisional law. The PCR court ruled, however, that defendant was entitled to make an application to inspect specific documents that he believed to be in the State's possession. Following that procedure, defendant requested and received from the State approximately one hundred documents. Defendant now contends that the PCR court's decision not to order the State to allow him to inspect the State's entire file denied him his right to a full and fair PCR hearing. As defendant concedes, our Court Rules concerning petitions for PCR, see R. 3:22-1 to -12, do not contain any provision authorizing discovery in PCR proceedings. Moreover, the general discovery obligations contained in the Rules Governing Criminal Practice, see R. 3:13-2 to -4, do not extend to post-conviction proceedings. Defendant relies on Rule 3:13-3(g), which refers to parties' [c]ontinuing [d]uty to [d]isclose discoverable materials. However, that obligation continues only during trial. Thus, our Court Rules do not explicitly authorize the discovery requested by defendant in this case. Similarly, defendant cannot demonstrate a constitutional basis for his asserted right to inspect the State's file. Although the Due Process Clause requires that the State provide criminal defendants with any exculpatory, material evidence in the State's possession, see Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed. 2d at 218, that Clause does not require the prosecutor to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3380, 87 L.Ed. 2d at 489; see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845-46, 51 L.Ed. 2d 30, 42 (1977) (There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one....); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212, 37 L.Ed. 2d 82, 87 (1973) ([T]he Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....). Nonetheless, our cases have recognized that, even in the absence of authorization in the form of a Court Rule or constitutional mandate, New Jersey courts have the inherent power to order discovery when justice so requires. State ex rel. W.C., 85 N.J. 218, 221, 426 A. 2d 50 (1981); see, e.g., State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 569, 206 A. 2d 359 (1965) (permitting defendant to view State's psychiatric reports on defendant); State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219, 222, 176 A. 2d 1 (1961) (permitting defendant to inspect witness's grand jury testimony); State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 605, 143 A. 2d 530 (1958) (compelling witness to submit to psychiatric examination by defendant's expert). Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that a court's inherent discovery power applies in post-conviction proceedings, and we agree fully with that determination. See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1969) (holding that federal court may authorize taking of interrogatories in support of habeas corpus petition); Gibson v. United States, 566 A. 2d 473, 478 (D.C. 1989) ([C]ourts ... may fashion post-conviction discovery procedures as may be required to give meaning and substance to the objectives of the law.); State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 1994) ([I]t is within the trial judge's inherent authority, rather than any express authority found in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to allow limited discovery [when a party is pursuing a post-conviction claim].); People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 941, 526 N.E. 2d 131, 135 (1988) (holding that courts have inherent authority to authorize taking of depositions in post-conviction proceedings). We anticipate that only in the unusual case will a PCR court invoke its inherent right to compel discovery. In most cases, a post-conviction petitioner will be fully informed of the documentary source of the errors that he brings to the PCR court's attention. Moreover, we note that PCR is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims. People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 776, 800 P. 2d 1159, 1206 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed. 2d 85 (1991). The filing of a petition for PCR is not a license to obtain unlimited information from the State, but a means through which a defendant may demonstrate to a reviewing court that he was convicted or sentenced in violation of his rights. See R. 3:22-2. Moreover, consistent with our prior discovery jurisprudence, any PCR discovery order should be appropriately narrow and limited. See, e.g., State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 256, 604 A. 2d 89 (1992); State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 28, 514 A. 2d 1287 (1986). [T]here is no postconviction right to `fish' through official files for belated grounds of attack on the judgment, or to confirm mere speculation or hope that a basis for collateral relief may exist. Gonzalez, supra, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 775, 800 P. 2d at 1205; see Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F. 3d 1485, 1493 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1230, 114 S.Ct. 2730, 129 L.Ed. 2d 853 (1994); State v. Thomas, 236 Neb. 553, 462 N.W. 2d 862, 867-68 (1990). However, where a defendant presents the PCR court with good cause to order the State to supply the defendant with discovery that is relevant to the defendant's case and not privileged, the court has the discretionary authority to grant relief. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 Rule 6(a); Lewis, supra, 656 So. 2d at 1250; Fitzgerald, supra, 121 Ill.Dec. at 941, 526 N.E. 2d at 135 (noting that good cause standard guards against potential abuse of PCR discovery process). Courts may reason by analogy to existing discovery rules, see R. 3:13-2 to -4, in designing an appropriate PCR discovery order. In the document-production context, barring exceptional circumstances, a defendant seeking to inspect State files should identify the specific documents sought for production. The PCR court may choose to view the documents in camera before determining whether to issue the requested discovery order. We have thoroughly reviewed the PCR record and exhibits in this case and conclude that the PCR court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on defendant's discovery motions. While finding that defendant was not entitled to inspect the State's entire file, the PCR court permitted him to make requests for specific items and ordered the State to turn over those items that were relevant and not work product. We endorse the use of that procedure. We are not unmindful of the State's failure to comply fully with its pretrial discovery obligations in this case. Our review of the record and defendant's PCR claims leads us to conclude that there were indeed some discoverable documents that the State did not provide to defendant before or during defendant's trial. If the PCR court had concluded that the State's nondisclosures had been willful, it would have been within that court's authority to grant defendant's motion to inspect the entirety of the State's file. Under appropriate circumstances, a PCR court may properly conclude that review of the State's file by either the defendant or the court itself is the only means to guarantee that the defendant has received all the discovery materials to which he is entitled. In this case, however, defendant has not demonstrated that those circumstances exist. The overwhelming majority of defendant's PCR discovery claims refer to documents that were either protected by the work-product privilege, largely irrelevant to the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence, or simply nonexistent. Although it appears that the State was not as meticulous as it should have been in abiding by our court rules governing discovery, there has been no showing that the State acted willfully, with malice, or with the intent to conceal discoverable evidence from defense counsel. The PCR court reached a similar conclusion. Finding defendant's motion to inspect the State's file to be overly broad, the court explained: There's no showing of any reasonable likelihood of discoverable material in the motion as constituted, and therefore, I will deny the motion without prejudice to the right of the Defendant to pursue any application for specific items. Based on the PCR court's familiarity with the practices and conduct of the parties, that court's informed sense of whether any discoverable documents remain unseen by defendant, and our own independent review of the record, we decline to disturb the PCR court's determination of the type and amount of discovery justice ... requires in this case. W.C., supra, 85 N.J. at 221, 426 A. 2d 50; cf. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161, 199 A. 2d 809 (1964) (discussing trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the `feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this is not one of the rare cases in which a blanket inspection of the State's file is appropriate. Defendant also argues that the Right-to-Know Law, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -4, and the common-law right to inspect public documents entitle him to the discovery requested in this case. We find those arguments to be without merit. Under the Right-to-Know Law, New Jersey citizens have an absolute right to inspect, copy, or purchase records `required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file' by public officials. Home News v. State, Department of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 453, 677 A. 2d 195 (1996) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2) (emphasis added). The Right-to-Know Law does not provide defendant with the right to inspect the law-enforcement files sought in this case because no law or regulation requires that such files be made, maintained or kept. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2; see River Edge Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hyland, 165 N.J. Super. 540, 545, 398 A. 2d 912 (App.Div.) (holding that no law required that results of law-enforcement official's investigation into alleged criminal offense be maintained or kept, and thus such results were not subject to Right-to-Know Law), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 58, 404 A. 2d 1157 (1979); Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Borough of Seaside Heights, 246 N.J. Super. 62, 67, 586 A. 2d 870 (Law Div. 1990) (holding that no law required that police reports be maintained or kept and thus reports were not subject to Right-to-Know Law). The common-law right to inspect extends to any document `made by public officers in the exercise of public functions' and thus encompasses a far broader range of documents than the Right-to-Know Law. Board of Educ. v. Department of the Treasury, 145 N.J. 269, 279, 678 A. 2d 660 (1996) (quoting Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222, 386 A. 2d 846 (1978)). However, although the common-law right to inspect documents extends to a wider pool of public records than does the Right-to-Know Law, ... the right itself is a qualified one. Home News, supra, 144 N.J. at 453, 677 A. 2d 195. Specifically, before a claimant is granted access to the document in question, the claimant's common-law right of access must be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure. Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 46, 660 A. 2d 1163 (1995). That interest in nondisclosure consists primarily of the need to maintain the confidentiality of the information sought, id. at 48, 660 A. 2d 1163, a concern that is especially important in the context of a pending criminal proceeding. As the Appellate Division has explained: The receipt by appropriate law enforcement officials of information concerning the existence or occurrence of criminal activities is critical to the uncovering and the prosecution of criminal offenses, and is thus crucial to effective law enforcement. In order that the flow of such information be not impeded or cut off, the law has long treated the information as confidential and privileged against disclosure, thereby protecting witness security, the State's relationship with its informants and witnesses, and other confidential relationships, among other things. [ River Edge Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra, 165 N.J. Super. at 543-44, 398 A. 2d 912.] See also Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 107, 505 A. 2d 958 (1986) (discussing government's need to conduct [investigative] affairs with skill, with sensitivity to the privacy interests involved, and in an atmosphere of confidentiality that encourages the utmost candor); Nero, supra, 76 N.J. at 225, 386 A. 2d 846 (Confidentiality is vital not only because it serves to protect government sources of information, but also because it enhances the effectiveness of investigative techniques and procedures. (citations omitted)). In our view, the policies that inspire the common-law right of inspection of public documents are different from the considerations that govern discovery in criminal proceedings. The interests at stake in criminal proceedings require a different analysis and a balancing of different interests. The appropriate analysis and balancing of interests is reflected in our criminal discovery rules. See R. 3:13-2 to -4. Moreover, we note that no court in this State has relied on the common-law right to inspect in granting a criminal defendant discovery beyond that authorized by the Rules Governing Criminal Practice. We endorse that result and hold that the common-law right to inspect public documents may not be invoked in a pending criminal case by a defendant seeking discovery rights beyond those granted by Rule 3:13-2 to -4. See State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St. 3d 420, 639 N.E. 2d 83, 89, 92 (1994) (reversing prior interpretation of state records law that allowed criminal defendants to use records law to obtain discovery in addition to that provided by criminal procedure rules, because prior practice brought about interminable delay and chaos in criminal trials and state's discovery rules had virtually been rendered meaningless). Defendant attempts to differentiate this case from pending criminal proceedings on the ground that, on this appeal, defendant is seeking collateral, post-conviction review. Defendant suggests that his case is closed because it is no longer at trial or on direct appeal, and that he is therefore entitled to invoke the common-law right to inspect. However, the fact that defendant seeks a new trial on this appeal belies the claim that his case is in any sense closed. Moreover, the fact that there is no Court Rule explicitly governing post-conviction discovery does not render the common-law right to inspect an alternative basis for obtaining discovery materials in this pending PCR case. The proper approach is for courts to reason by analogy to existing discovery rules in fashioning appropriate discovery orders in PCR cases. We thus conclude that the post-conviction nature of these proceedings does not entitle defendant to the discovery he seeks. Whether a criminal defendant's case is at trial, on direct appeal, or on PCR review does not alter the defendant's inability to invoke the common-law right to inspect in an effort to obtain additional discovery. See also Nero, supra, 76 N.J. at 225, 386 A. 2d 846 (`[E]ven inactive investigatory files may have to be kept confidential in order to convince citizens that they may safely confide in law enforcement officials.' (quoting Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974))).