Opinion ID: 1266360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parole Revocation Procedures

Text: As previously noted, petitioner's parole was twice revoked by the Youth Authority after the juvenile court had found that allegations of criminal activity contained in supplemental petitions were true. In each instance the juvenile court made no dispositional order and merely referred the matter to the Youth Authority for final disposition. Supplemental petitions are authorized in juvenile proceedings by section 777, which provides in part that an order changing or modifying a previous order by directing commitment to the Youth Authority shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition. The supplemental petition procedure is designed for situations where it is necessary to substitute a more restrictive placement because the original disposition by the juvenile court has not been effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the minor. (§ 777, subd. (a).) Typically, a section 777 supplemental petition will be required to move a minor from a foster home or juvenile hall to the custody of the Youth Authority. (See, e.g., In re Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 230 [127 Cal. Rptr. 641, 545 P.2d 1345]; In re William S. (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 944, 950 [89 Cal. Rptr. 685].) Since this modification results in a greater intrusion on the minor's liberty, a section 777 petition must contain a statement of the facts which it is alleged demonstrate a need for Youth Authority placement ( In re Donna G. (1970) 6 Cal. App.3d 890, 894 [86 Cal. Rptr. 421]) and can only be sustained after notice and hearing. (8) The supplemental petition procedure of section 777 is not an appropriate means by which to initiate revocation of Youth Authority parole. Although the juvenile court technically retains jurisdiction over a ward committed to the Youth Authority, no purpose is served by the procedure employed in this case since no order changing or modifying a previous order resulted from the hearing on the supplemental petition. Petitioner had already been committed to the custody of the Youth Authority by the juvenile court, and the court's finding that the allegations of the fourth and fifth supplemental petitions were true had no effect on his order of commitment. Examination of the statutes governing Youth Authority parole and revocation procedure indicates that the juvenile court should play no part in the parole revocation process. The Youth Authority Act provides that the board has the power to grant and revoke parole. (§ 1711.3.) The Authority may order reconfinement or renewed release under supervision as often as conditions indicate to be desirable. (§ 1766, subd. (a)(3).) Additionally, [t]he Authority may suspend, cancel, or revoke any parole without notice, and may order returned to the custody of the Authority any person committed to it who is upon parole. (§ 1767.3.) No role is specified for the juvenile court with respect to revocation of parole. The reason is clear: the Youth Authority Act contemplates that the board or its representative is to conduct the parole revocation hearing, and then itself determine whether a parole violation in fact occurred and take appropriate action with respect to revocation or continuation of parole. The juvenile court is not authorized to act essentially in the role of a Youth Authority parole revocation hearing officer, as it did in this case. Relief, if any, to which petitioner may be entitled because of defects in proceedings for revocation of Youth Authority parole can be predicated only on proceedings related to the allegations of the fifth supplemental petition, the last of such proceedings. Because petitioner's initial wardship determination and commitment to the Youth Authority are not now vulnerable to attack, and because defects in the parole revocation proceedings on violations related to the fourth supplemental petition were rendered moot for purposes of habeas corpus when petitioner was thereafter restored to parole (cf. In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179, 185, fn. 4 [113 Cal. Rptr. 89, 520 P.2d 713]), he may now attack only those defects in proceedings which resulted in his current confinement in the Youth Authority. The People assert that petitioner was not prejudiced by the procedures followed because he received all of the protections afforded at a normal administrative hearing. But petitioner had no right of appeal from the juvenile court finding (see § 800) and he was precluded from challenging before the Youth Authority the truth of matters established in court. (See Cal. Youth Authority, Board Policy Man., § 64.) Petitioner was thus bound by and foreclosed from seeking review of the findings made by the juvenile court pursuant to the unauthorized procedures initiated by the filing of the fifth supplemental petition. (9) Absent subsequent findings of misconduct made in lawfully conducted hearings the Youth Authority cannot, for any purpose, rely on misconduct charged in and found to be true by the juvenile court unless such finding results in an appealable order. (10) Notwithstanding the foregoing, it appears that petitioner is not now entitled to any relief. Since the commencement of these proceedings petitioner was again placed on parole by the Youth Authority. The only relief to which petitioner might have been entitled as the result of the failure of the Youth Authority board to make proper findings of the charged violations [9] was the right to a new revocation hearing before the board. (See In re Brown (1967) 67 Cal.2d 339, 341 [62 Cal. Rptr. 6, 431 P.2d 630].) As petitioner has been restored to parole that right has been rendered moot. The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.