Opinion ID: 525636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Counsel and Legal Materials

Text: 22 Pre-trial detainees have a substantial due process interest in effective communication with their counsel and in access to legal materials. When this interest is inadequately respected during pre-trial confinement, the ultimate fairness of their eventual trial can be compromised. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 531-32 (D.C.Cir.1978) (statistical disparity in convictions even when other factors are controlled). 23 Federal courts are not prison managers. Ordinarily we accord great deference to the internal administrative decisions of prison officials.    But where, as here, a prisoner alleges that a particular restriction imposed upon him by the prison officials impinges upon his exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights, it is incumbent upon us to carefully scrutinize the effect of the restrictions.    It is clear that ready access to the courts is one of, perhaps the fundamental constitutional right. 24 Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir.1973). See also, Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir.1973) (All other rights of an inmate are illusory without it   .).
25 Plaintiffs' pro se complaint alleged the following deprivation of due process rights: (1) an inadequate opportunity to consult with counsel, (2) no privacy during such consultations, (3) an inadequate law library and notarization service, and (4) the inadequate safeguarding of mail. 26 The plaintiffs alleged the following underlying facts. First, they were permitted access to a telephone for personal and legal purposes only twice a week. They were allowed only two calls, a twenty-minute phone call during the week and a ten-minute call on weekends. Affidavit of Arnold Hamilton-El at 2 (October 24, 1986); Affidavit of David Scott Hill-El at 1 (October 24, 1986); Affidavit of Tyrone Johnson-El at 1 (November 6, 1986). The only opportunity to call their attorneys was during the week; the weekday call, however, alternated each week between daytime and nighttime. Thus, they had one chance every two weeks to call their attorney's office. Furthermore, when I attempted to telephone my attorney during the day and his line was busy or my attorney was away from his office, my allotted phone call was considered made and I had to wait another two weeks for another attempt. Affidavit of Hamilton-El at 2; see Affidavit of Hill-El at 1-2; Affidavit of Johnson-El at 2 (only one long distance call allowed per month affecting opportunity to contact New York attorney regarding extradition). 27 Moreover, when counsel was reached on the phone or visited, the plaintiffs allege that private consultation was impossible. 28 The phone was brought to the tier and phone calls were made in the open. There was so much noise in the background that I would have to yell in order to be heard.    When my attorney came to the jail to discuss my defense, no conference room was made available to us. We would meet in the lobby with guards and other jail staff always within hearing. Even though we would speak in a low voice, the guards were able to overhear our conversation. 29 Affidavit of Hamilton-El at 2; see Affidavit of Hill-El at 2; Affidavit of Johnson-El at 2. 5 30 Finally, plaintiffs allege that the Jail law library was inadequate. While Jail policy allowed them one hour twice a week in the library to research and write, in fact they were only given one hour a week and went four at a time. Moreover, the Missouri codes describing the crimes they were charged with were outdated. Affidavit of Hamilton-El at 4; see Affidavit of Hill-El at 3-4; Affidavit of Johnson-El at 4. In addition, Tyrone Johnson-El alleges that restricted access to the law library was used as a punishment device to deter grievance filing. Affidavit of Johnson-El at 4-5.
31 These facts, if true, state violations of clearly established rights. Pre-trial detainees have a right to meaningful access to courts and to judicial process. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (state prisoners); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971). The City must provide its pre-trial detainees either with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. In this case, the City may have sufficiently constrained both avenues so as to violate plaintiffs' due process rights. Kelsey v. State of Minnesota, 622 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.1980). 32 The limited opportunity to consult with counsel in this case is as yet inadequately justified. [I]nmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys.    The extent to which that right is burdened by a particular regulation or practice must be weighed against the legitimate interests of penal administration   . Procunier v. Martinez, supra note 5, at 419-20, 94 S.Ct. 1814 n. 5. Here, no rationale has been offered for the Jail's particular phone system nor for counting calls as made where the attorney was not reached. Moreover, the ability of counsel to visit the Jail cannot always compensate for an inmate's initial inability to ask an attorney to visit. Worse yet, inmates who have not yet retained an attorney are obviously prejudiced if they can only make one call during business hours every two weeks. The phone system, if it is operated in this way, is patently inadequate. Compare Moore v. Janing, 427 F.Supp. 567, 576 (D.Neb.1976) (unlimited phone calls to retain an attorney and unlimited phone time with attorney of record); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.Supp. 707, 719 (N.D.Ohio 1971) (phone rights of detainees to locate and to consult with counsel); see also Lathan v. Oswald, 359 F.Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D.Md.1972). Defendant Booker grants that the phones are available on this restricted basis, but avers that the Jail is in the process of changing the phone system. Affidavit of Thomas M. Booker at 1 (July 2, 1986). This may pertain to the injunctive relief necessary but does not change our inquiry; further, we do not presume this is a concession on the merits. 33 Detainees' right to counsel and due process can also be compromised by a lack of privacy in consultations with counsel. Forcing prisoners to conduct their meetings with their attorneys in the open or to yell over the phone obviously compromises the consultation. Detainees might be hesitant to disclose names and information relevant to the attorney's investigation and necessary to the advice sought. Often pleas are changed in the months before trial based on counsel's assessment of the strength of each side's case. The right to an attorney would mean little if it did not effectively attach until the hushed whispers at the defense table the morning of trial, after counsel has selected her strategy and witnesses. Thus, as we have already stated, [i]t is clear 'that an accused does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private consultation with him.'  Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 820-21 (8th Cir.), cert. den., 433 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 2985, 53 L.Ed.2d 1099 (1977) (extensive citations omitted). 6 In this case, the plaintiffs allege that they were only allowed to meet with their attorneys in public areas of the Jail where their conversations could be overheard by guards and other prisoners. As the district court for Nebraska concluded from similar facts, [s]uch conditions impede the detainees' ability to prepare for trial, jeopardize the confidentiality of their attorney-client communications and invade their right to privacy. Moore, 427 F.Supp. at 576. See Ahrens, 434 F.Supp. at 898; Berch v. Stahl, 373 F.Supp. 412 (W.D.N.C.1974); Souza v. Travisono, 368 F.Supp. 959 (D.C.R.I.1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir.1974); Jones, 330 F.Supp. at 719 (remedy ordered). 34 Inadequate library access and facilities may compound the problem. Even if detainees actually were given one hour twice a week in the library, as the City contends but plaintiffs dispute, this is obviously inadequate to research most legal claims. Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2825, 61 L.Ed.2d 276 (1979) (forty-five minutes three times a week usually so meager as to be unmeaningful); Nickl v. Schmidt, 351 F.Supp. 385 (W.D.Wis.1972) (two hours per week insufficient); McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F.Supp. 616, 622 (D.Neb.1972) (seven hours per week unreasonable), aff'd on this ground, rev'd in part, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 483 F.2d 1067 (1973) (per curiam), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (this issue not appealed). 35 It is certainly established that access to the legal system must be meaningful. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 823, 97 S.Ct. at 1495. We think reasonable officials would recognize in light of existing law that the phone restrictions, library restrictions and the lack of privacy for communications with attorneys, if true, are unconstitutional. Existing law makes clear that access to law libraries, lawyers and the courts is required for functional reasons. The mere existence of these avenues has never discharged the duty of similar defendants. 36 We stress that we express no view as to the truthfulness of plaintiffs' factual allegations. The governing law is clearly established, however, and these allegations are specific and state violations.