Opinion ID: 626014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of the Key Fob

Text: An individual may challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment if it violates the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950-53, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)) (Harlan, J., concurring), or involves an unreasonable physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area, id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950-53 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted)) in order to find something or obtain information. Even if Detective Canas' use of Cowan's key fob to locate the car was a search or seizure, it would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception. Cowan did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his car. The Supreme Court has noted the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile, Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, 103 S.Ct. 1081, and that [a] car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain view. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974). [3] If Cowan's car were in Chicago or otherwise not present, the fob would have disclosed nothing. If the keys and car belonged to someone else and Cowan had no possessory interest in the vehicle, Cowan had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle. If the keys belonged to a car in the apartment's associated parking area, the fob merely would identify the vehicle. The officers could have obtained the identification information by conducting a background check on the car's license plates or vehicle identification number or placing the car under surveillance and waiting for the owner or for an abandonment. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (noting an individual's expectation of privacy was not violated by government surveillance and visual observation of [his] automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway). Cowan argues his privacy interest was in the key fob's electronic code. The officers did not attempt to discover the code. Pressing the alarm button on the key fob was a way to identify the car and did not tell officers anythingabout the fob's code or the car's contents. Cf. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 456 (6th Cir.2001) (deciding the mere insertion of a key into a lock to determine whether it fits is not a search); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (similar); United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir.1990) (similar). Cowan has not met his burden of articulating how Detective Canas' use of the key fob violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Monie, 907 F.2d 793, 794 (8th Cir.1990) (stating burden of proof). On the other hand, the Supreme Court recently explained Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with whether the government violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Jones, 565 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 950. We also must consider whether the government conducted a search by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area to find something or obtain information. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 951 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Jones, the Supreme Court held that attaching a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to an individual's vehicle and using that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a `search.' Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 949. The Court reached this conclusion because the government trespassorily inserted the GPS tracking device when officers attached the device to the undercarriage of the target vehicle, monitoring the vehicle for four weeks. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 948, 952. There is no trespass when the government comes into physical contact with or possession of an item when the government is authorized to do so and the mere transmission of electric signals alone is not a trespass. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 951-53. In the present case, Detective Canas did not trespass on the key fob itself because he lawfully seized it. Assuming Detective Canas' use of the key fob constituted a search or seizure, it was justified by the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). This is because the overriding societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the car and its occupants become unavailable. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). A similar interest justifies pressing a key fob button to locate a vehicle when officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or otherwise is involved in drug trafficking. Detective Canas had probable cause to believe the keysif they belonged to a vehicle parked near the apartmentwould lead the officers to an automobile containing contraband. During surveillance of the apartment, before executing the warrant, officers had observed two suspects sitting in vehicles outside the apartment. By the time Detective Canas removed the keys from Cowan's pocket and discovered they were car keys, Cowan had stated he was from Chicago. Because the officers had information linking the apartment to crack cocaine brought from Chicago, Cowan's statement and his presence in the apartment gave Detective Canas reason to believe Cowan may have driven crack cocaine to the apartment from Chicago. The officers' discovery of crack cocaine in the apartment corroborated the informant's story and bolstered Detective Canas' probable cause. Cowan was carrying car keys but claimed he arrived by bus and further claimed the keys belonged to a Cadillacwhich Detective Canas immediately recognized was false. These potential inconsistencies alerted Detective Canas to the probability Cowan was being untruthful, and gave Detective Canas further reason to suspect Cowan and his car were tied to drug trafficking. Detective Canas' actual use of the key fob was limited in time and scope and occurred in the apartment's associated parking areas. To the extent pressing the key fob button was a search and seizure, it was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement because it was based on probable cause.