Opinion ID: 2663167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abuse of Sentencing Discretion.

Text: Roberts argues the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing adequately to explain a substantively unreasonable sentence. The failure-to-explain contention is frivolous. The court’s explanation of its upward variance, which took up more than three pages of the sentencing transcript, came after three victims and two of their fathers testified to Roberts’s extensive abuse of many young boys and the extreme, long-lasting emotional and psychological injuries he inflicted on his young victims. The court noted that Roberts as baseball coach, family friend, and family member had for many years “surrounded himself with young boys” and “put himself -3- in a position of authority where he would be trusted and respected by these boys so he could abuse them.” His victims were of “an age when the child was naive, and therefore most vulnerable to a person in a position of trust,” making Roberts nothing less than “a predator” whose actions “had a substantial and long-lasting impact on [the victims], on their families and on this community as a whole.” The court concluded that the guidelines range of 63 to 78 months failed to “adequately reflect[ the 18 U.S.C. §] 3553 criteria” of deterring Roberts from abusing young children and protecting society from these serious crimes. This explanation was more than sufficient “to satisfy the appellate court that [the district court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Hill, 552 F.3d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Indeed, as Roberts did not make a timely objection to the court’s explanation, we should deem the issue waived. See United States v. Krzyzaniak, 702 F.3d 1082, 1085 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013). Roberts further argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence that gave too much weight to the increased punishment authorized in the current statute and Guidelines; too little weight to his advisory guidelines range; and too little weight to mitigating factors -- Roberts’s clean criminal record, military and community service, and role as a good father and family provider. Our review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion is highly deferential. “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence -- whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range -- as substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotation omitted). As we have often stated, “a sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the section 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others,” United States v. Lozoya, 623 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). After careful review of the extensive sentencing record, we conclude there was no abuse of the district court’s wide sentencing -4- discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Borromeo, 657 F.3d 754, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2011). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ______________________________ -5-