Opinion ID: 2801555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ADA Redondo's Absolute Immunity Defense

Text: That leaves only ADA Redondo's appeal of the denial of his absolute immunity defense to the federal claims against him. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment based on his absolute immunity defense. The district court rejected that defense on the merits, based solely on the finding that [e]vidence in the record suggests that [ADA Redondo] offered Díaz-Colon an asthma therapy machine in exchange for her testimony. ADA Redondo's initial argument for reversing the district court's finding against him is that the 2001 testimony of Díaz upon which the court relied will not be admissible at trial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), because Díaz will not appear to testify. This argument seems to be quite a stretch given that Díaz's sworn 2001 testimony confessing to and describing her elaborate perjury had a great tendency . . . to expose [Díaz] to civil or criminal liability, and was thus most likely admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A); see also United States v. Jiménez, 419 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2005); Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 575 (7th Cir. 2012). Additionally, even if the argument had some hope of success, it is not clear that immunity as an affirmative defense and resurrect the claim at trial.). Rather, we hold only that these defendants both below and on appeal have waived any ability to secure summary judgment in their favor. -12- we could consider it given the interlocutory nature of this appeal. Compare Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 575 (no review of evidentiary issue on interlocutory appeal); and Ellis v. Washington Cnty., 198 F.3d 225, 229 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); with Mersch v. City of Dallas, 207 F.3d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 2000) (reviewing evidentiary issue). Ultimately, we need not rule on this evidentiary argument or examine more closely our jurisdiction even to consider such an argument on interlocutory review. Rather, we turn to and rely on a second argument that Redondo advances for reversing the summary judgment denial on its merits.12 That argument challenges the district court's conclusion that, if ADA Redondo did what Díaz says he did (offer her an asthma therapy machine in exchange for her testimony), his immunity as a prosecutor would not protect him. The basic principles applicable to assertions of absolute prosecutorial immunity are set forth in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009). See also Knowlton v. Shaw, 704 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2013). Prosecutorial immunity applies to conduct 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Deciding where to draw the line between such immunized prosecutorial advocacy and conduct that is, for example, 12 We do note that the undifferentiated structure of defendants' appellate briefing, the jumbling together of all the defendants, and the lack of any helpful table of contents or argument headings came close to causing us to consider this argument waived as well. -13- exclusively investigative or administrative is not always easy. See, e.g., Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2005) ([T]he Supreme Court has resisted any attempt to draw a bright-line between advocacy and investigation). Nevertheless, our task in this case is made somewhat easier by the district court's uncontested finding that ADA Redondo did not participate in, or advise the police in connection with, the investigations of the murders. This finding rules out the possibility that ADA Redondo had anything to do with inducing Díaz to give the false statements that implicated plaintiffs in the unsolved crimes. Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993) (no immunity for fabricating evidence before probable cause established); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991) (no immunity for giving advice to police during investigation). Instead, his involvement was limited to his actions as a prosecutor in connection with preparing the Commonwealth's evidence at trial. And it has long been clear that absolute immunity bars a damages action against a prosecutor for presenting testimony at trial even if the prosecutor knows that the testimony is false. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31 & n.33. The assertion in this case that the prosecutor not only presented false testimony, but also offered something of value to induce a trial witness to testify creates no basis for concluding that the conduct was any less intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal proceeding. Id. at 430. Preparing -14- trial witnesses is at the core of what a prosecutor qua prosecutor does, and the trial itself is the quintessential judicial proceeding. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (immune tasks include the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial). Prosecutors regularly prepare and present testimony by witnesses to whom the government has offered inducements to secure their cooperation. Disclosure requirements and due process principles provide some protection to criminal defendants from abuses of this practice. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ([I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1935) (per curiam)). It is another thing altogether, though, to provide wrongfully charged individuals with a private damages remedy against prosecutors when cooperating witnesses lie. If prosecutors could be sued civilly every time any such witness claimed a wrongful inducement to lie, prosecutors might well be exposed to numerous such suits. Weighing the costs and benefits to the public interest of such an exposure to civil liability, the law bars such claims when they arise out of the prosecutor's work in a criminal proceeding. See Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 344–45 (3d Cir. 1989). See generally, Van -15- de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (discussing policy reasons for shielding prosecutors). In a last-ditch effort, plaintiffs' counsel argued that ADA Redondo's participation on the prosecution team defeated absolute immunity, presumably by making him liable for the misconduct of others in the previous procuring of the false statements. Adopting this approach would render prosecutors vicariously liable in all cases involving improper actions since, at some point, a prosecutor is always a member of the prosecution team. Such an exponential increase in potential liability plainly conflicts with the purpose of affording prosecutors absolute immunity, to insulate prosecutorial discretion and resources from the threat of litigation. Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 345; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424–25. Absolute immunity therefore shields ADA Redondo from having to stand trial for the malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims under section 1983.