Opinion ID: 652792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Leon Standard

Text: 7 Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. A corollary to the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule, has been developed by the courts as 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police officers from violating the Fourth Amendment's constraints on search and seizure, id. at 918-19; however, it is not constitutionally mandated that courts exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).  'Evidence is not suppressed when a police officer relies in objective good faith on a faulty but facially valid search warrant.'  United States v. Carter, No. 92-1956, 1993 WL 193627 at  4 (quoting United States v. Malin, 908 F.2d 163, 166 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990). Thus in Leon, the Supreme Court created the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for situations in which law enforcement officers obtain evidence while relying in good faith upon a facially valid search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Leon held: 8 In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. 9 Id. at 926. Accordingly, a reviewing court may question whether the affidavit was knowingly or recklessly false, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), whether the magistrate acted in a neutral and detached manner, Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964), 5 or whether an affidavit provide[s] the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239; Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-15. 10 Thatcher claims this evidence should be suppressed because (1) Judge Pro Tem Huerte failed to act as a detached and neutral magistrate as he was unfamiliar with procedures for inssuance of a warrant; and (2) deputy prosecutor Diekhoff acted recklessly in obtaining the warrant and thus she lacked an objectively reasonable basis for believing the warrant was properly issued. 11 1. Judge Pro Tem Huerte did not abandon his detached and 12 neutral role 13 Thatcher contends that Huerte's inexperience as a judge forced him to rely on Diekhoff for advice which biased his actions involving the issuance of the search warrant causing him to become a rubber stamp in the hands of the prosecution. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court observed that a magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by the reviewing courts.'  Id. at 236 (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419). Even if a judge routinely authorizes the issuance of search warrants based on boilerplate affidavits, it still might be difficult for a litigant to establish how the municipal judge abandoned her neutral and detached role in evaluating warrant applications. United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 997 (7th Cir.1988). See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 n. 14. 14 We are in agreement with the district court that Huerte, despite his inexperience and failure to follow the accepted procedures, did independently determine that probable cause existed for issuance of the search warrants. The record reflects that (1) Huerte was acting in the capacity of a detached and neutral judicial officer, not merely as another law enforcement officer, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-54 (1971); (2) that he listened to deputy prosecutor Diekhoff's oral explanation of probable cause; (3) that he read the warrant; and (4) that he signed it. While we certainly do not condone the practices employed in this case, we do not agree that the district court was clearly erroneous in holding that Judge Pro Tem Huerte acted in a neutral and detached manner when issuing the search warrant. See United States v. Rome, 809 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir.1987) (upholding the district court's refusal to suppress evidence even though the magistrate committed procedural errors in granting the search warrant). 15 2. The Police officers were neither dishonest nor reckless 16 in obtaining the warrant 17 Thatcher claims on appeal that for the purposes of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Diekhoff should be characterized as a law enforcement officer, and that she acted recklessly when offering her proof of probable cause to the judge. Because Thatcher failed to raise this argument before the district court, we review the challenge under the plain error standard. This court defines plain error as an error that resulted in an actual miscarriage of justice, which implies the conviction of one who but for the error would probably have been acquitted. United States v. Baltrunas, 957 F.2d 491, 495 (7th Cir.1992) (internal quotations omitted). 18 As previously stated, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to curb abuse of the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court has limited its use to situations in which it will effectively deter future violations by police officers. In Leon, the Court stated that the suppression of evidence would not serve as a check on judicial conduct involving the issuance of warrants, but it would deter police from conducting hasty searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment: The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather that to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. The police officers in the case before us conducted a thorough investigation, reported their information to the deputy prosecutor, and received a facially valid warrant which they had no reason to question. We refuse to hold that a plain error occurred merely because Diekhoff, acting in good faith in her role as deputy prosecutor, made a mistake by failing to inform Judge Pro Tem Huerte that the proceeding needed to be recorded. We do not agree with the petitioner's argument that suppressing the evidence in this case would act as a deterrence to law enforcement. See id. The error in this case was the judicial officer's failure to follow the procedures, not the police officers' violation of any Fourth Amendment rights, thus the district court's decision denying Thatcher's motion to suppress the evidence is 19 AFFIRMED.