Opinion ID: 2973192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Timeliness of Dunbar’s Affidavits

Text: Upon appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its findings of law de novo. Pressman v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 384 F.3d 182, 185 (6th Cir. 2004). Although we give substantial deference to the district court’s assessments of witness credibility, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), we review a district court’s application of state law—which governs this diversity case—de novo. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996); International Ins. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 86 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1996). Under Ohio law, a contractor must file mechanic’s lien affidavits within 75 days of the last day of work it performed on the contract at issue. O.R.C. § 1311.06(B)(3); King, Gilbert & Warner v. Ship Bldg. Co., 34 N.E. 436, 439 (Ohio 1893). The last day of performance cannot be extended by “tacking together” labor performed on subsequent contracts. King, 34 N.E. at 439; Talco Capital Corp. v. State Underground Parking Comm., 324 N.E.2d 762, 769 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). Furthermore, unnecessary and unsolicited tinkering and repair do not extend the last day of performance. Walter v. Brothers, 181 N.E. 554, 555 (Ohio Ct. App. 1932); Bohunek v. Smith, 172 N.E. 852, 854 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930). “The true test is whether the alleged repairs are a necessary part of the proper completion and performance of the work which the lien claimant undertook to do.” Walter, 181 N.E. at 553. Dunbar filed its mechanic’s lien affidavits on March 22, 2001, claiming to have performed meaningful work on contracts 1 and 2 as late as January of 2001. The district court determined that “any work performed after December 14, 2000, under contracts #1 and #2 was voluntary, gratuitous and without Plaintiff’s knowledge.” The court characterized the work Dunbar performed in -4- Nos. 04-4376/4377 Specialty Minerals v. Dunbar Mechanical connection with contracts 1 and 2 in January of 2001 to be “trivial,” i.e., unnecessary to the completion of the project. The district court’s factual findings are supported by the record. The district court credited the testimony of a Dunbar employee that the work conducted by Dunbar in January of 2001 was “odds and ends” and “not required to be complete to test the plant.” Various witnesses also testified that Dunbar was not asked to perform additional work after December 31, 2000 and that most of work performed by Dunbar in January of 2001 related to contracts 3 and 4. Dunbar argues that the district court’s findings are incompatible with uncontested facts. Dunbar points to its request to work during the 2000 Christmas holiday season, which took place before contracts 3 and 4 were signed. Dunbar argues that this request, denied by SMI, is evidence that work remained on contracts 1 and 2. However, Dunbar’s request to work over the holidays is wholly compatible with the district court’s findings. The district court found that some work did remain on the first set of contracts: trivial odds and ends. Furthermore, the record reflects that although contracts 3 and 4 had not been signed, informal “punch lists” had been authored detailing the relevant work. Thus, the work Dunbar sought to perform over the holidays could have related to contracts 3 and 4, consistent with the district court’s findings. In short, the district court correctly identified and applied Ohio law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s invalidation of Dunbar’s affidavits as untimely; we correspondingly affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of SMI, denying to Dunbar a judgment on the bonds. -5- Nos. 04-4376/4377 Specialty Minerals v. Dunbar Mechanical