Opinion ID: 4352713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 3d 1208, 1212 (N.H. 2014).

Text: [¶27.] We see no due process violation in this case. Irving made only a general due process objection to the denial of his request to appear in person by mentioning that his ability to cross-examine witnesses would be limited. Further, his attorneys were personally present in the courtroom throughout the hearing, and he made no claim before the circuit court that he was unable to adequately hear, respond, or present his claims to the circuit court. Also, at the time of the hearing, he had pleaded guilty to a violent offense and was housed approximately one hour from the courthouse. Under these circumstances, Irving has failed to show either a due process violation or an abuse of discretion in denying his request to appear in person. He has also failed to show prejudice in that any purported difficulties in appearing via ITV changed the outcome of the proceeding. [¶28.] During oral argument, Irving also argued ICWA provided him additional due process rights that were violated in the temporary guardianship proceedings. Irving claimed that the “filing of the [temporary] petition was a ‘removal’ of the child” within the meaning of “ICWA statutes” guaranteeing him a due process right to a “48-hour hearing,” at which Irving would have been advised of his rights and appointed counsel. Irving does not, however, identify the ICWA provision that mandates these procedural protections in a temporary guardianship proceeding. Because of his reference to the “48-hour hearing,” we perceive his claim to be based on the ICWA obligations imposed upon the State when it removes -14- #28479 Indian children from their parents and places them into temporary custody in abuse and neglect cases prosecuted under SDCL chapters 26-7A and 26-8A. [¶29.] The “48-hour hearing” and its associated rights are creatures of State law. See SDCL chapter 26-7A. The process is implicated when a child is abandoned, seriously endangered, or when the child’s life or safety is in imminent danger and there is no time to apply for a court order. SDCL chapter 26-7A. When those circumstances are present, the child may be “remov[ed]” from his parent and “taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer[.]” SDCL 26-7A-12(2) and (4). A circuit court may also order temporary custody under similar circumstances on application of a state’s attorney, a Department of Social Services social worker, or a law enforcement officer. SDCL 26-7A-13(1). In any of these situations, the court must issue a “written temporary custody directive” to hold the child in temporary state custody. SDCL 26-7A-13. The right to the so-called “48hour hearing” arises because “[n]o child may be held in temporary custody longer than forty-eight hours . . . unless a temporary custody petition for an apparent abuse or neglect case or other petition has been filed, . . . and the court orders longer custody during a noticed hearing[.]” SDCL 26-7A-14. In these 48-hour hearings, the child’s parents must be advised of their constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to be represented by an attorney. SDCL 26-7A-30. ICWA is implicated to an extent in these hearings involving the emergency removal or emergency placement of Indian children. ICWA requires “[t]he State authority, official, or agency involved” to immediately terminate the emergency removal or -15- #28479 placement in foster care6 when it is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1922. “The State authority, official, or agency involved” must also “expeditiously initiate a child custody proceeding subject to the provisions of this [ICWA] subchapter, transfer the child to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may be appropriate.” Id. [¶30.] The text of these statutes makes clear that Irving was not entitled to the 48-hour hearing and its associated rights merely because Warrens filed a petition for a temporary guardianship. First, I.L.J.E. had not been “taken” into the State’s “temporary custody” based on a State allegation that the child was “seriously endangered in the child’s surroundings” and required “immediate removal.” See SDCL 26-7A-12(2), -12(4). Indeed, even as late as the July status hearing, Irving’s lawyer was maintaining this was neither an abuse and neglect case nor an ICWA case. Second, Warrens did not “remove” I.L.J.E. from his parents’ custody. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1922, 1903(1)(i). Rather, the child’s custodial parent placed the child in Warrens’ care and custody, and while Warrens were exercising that custodial authority given them by the child’s parent, both biological parents became unavailable to care for the child. Consequently, at the time Warrens filed their petition for a temporary guardianship, they were simply seeking to continue the custodial relationship authorized by the child’s parent. The Indian Child Welfare Act 6. ICWA defines a “foster care placement” in part as “any action removing an Indian child from [the child’s] parents . . . for temporary placement in . . . the home of a guardian[.]]” 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(1)(i) (emphasis added). -16- #28479 [¶31.] Irving finally argues the circuit court failed to properly apply ICWA in selecting the permanent guardians. ICWA “is based on the fundamental assumption that it is in [an] Indian child’s best interest that [the child’s] relationship to the tribe be protected.” Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49–50 n.24, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1609, 104 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1989). Irving points out that Warrens are not Indians, and he contends “Warrens have done little to nothing to preserve the values of the Lakota culture for I.L.J.E.[.]” He further points out that Dr. Jumping Eagle is an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, and he contends only Dr. Jumping Eagle will ensure that the child’s relationship with the Tribe is ongoing and active. Therefore, he argues that considering ICWA, it was not in the child’s best interest to appoint Warrens as guardians. [¶32.] Under ICWA, a guardianship determination requires the circuit court to consider the custodial “preferences” set forth in that Act. Members of an Indian child’s “extended family” are given first preference. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b). Although Warrens are not Indians, they are by definition “extended family” entitled to ICWA’s first preference because they are I.L.J.E.’s maternal aunt and uncle. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(2). Additionally, ICWA expert Luke Yellow Robe testified that ICWA preferences do not depend upon Indian blood and that the Oglala Sioux Tribe had no custom or practice different than the preferences in ICWA. [¶33.] In determining the suitability of a proposed guardian under both ICWA and the Guardianship Act, the circuit court must ultimately consider the child’s “best interests.” 25 U.S.C.A. § 1902; SDCL 29A-5-208. A determination of -17- #28479 best interests requires many things, including consideration of the extent to which the guardianship would “deprive[] the child of his . . . tribal and cultural heritage.” Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49–50 n.24. [¶34.] Although Irving questions Warrens’ commitment to Lakota culture and heritage and their willingness to maintain the child’s connection with his Tribe, the evidence on this issue conflicted. The circuit court recognized that Warrens had not taken “direct action” to understand the Lakota culture or heritage. But the court also found that Warrens had the ability and willingness to address the child’s Indian culture and heritage. It further found that Warrens “would promote working with [Dr. Jumping Eagle] to develop [the child’s] cultural awareness and his heritage with the Lakota Nation.” The court resolved this disputed question of fact in favor of Warrens and against Irving, a finding for which we are required to give the circuit court deference considering its ability to observe the witnesses testify and better judge their credibility. See In re Conservatorship of Gaaskjolen, 2014 S.D. 10, ¶ 19, 844 N.W.2d 99, 103. [¶35.] Ultimately, “the selection of the person to be appointed guardian is a matter [that] is committed largely to the discretion of the appointing court.” In re Guardianship of the Estate of Jacobsen, 482 N.W.2d 634, 636 (S.D. 1992). Here, the court not only considered native heritage and culture, the court also considered other best interest factors favoring Warrens, considerations that Irving does not contest on appeal. For instance, the court found that Warrens were better suited to address I.L.J.E.’s emotional needs, and it noted that Dr. Jumping Eagle never did petition for the guardianship. Considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot -18- #28479 say the circuit court clearly erred or abused its discretion in granting the guardianship to the child’s maternal aunt and uncle. [¶36.] Affirmed. [¶37.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KERN and JENSEN, Justices, and KNOFF, Circuit Court Judge, concur. [¶38.] KNOFF, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for SALTER, Justice, disqualified. -19-