Opinion ID: 2602376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in its Rulings on Evidence Relating to the Deceased's Alleged Practice of Inhalant Abuse

Text: {25} Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) limiting evidence regarding Peek's inhalant abuse to opinion or reputation testimony; and (2) not allowing the defense to impeach witness Montaño regarding prior inconsistent statements. Impeachment, according to the State, would have necessarily involved highly prejudicial testimony that went beyond Montaño's opinion or Peek's alleged reputation. {26} Defendant sought to introduce evidence revealing that Peek's de facto guardian, Montaño, believed Peek had inhaled or huffed flammable petroleum products on previous occasions. Defendant sought to introduce this opinion to bolster his theory that Peek's death could have resulted from his inhalation of the gasoline, either from accidental ignition of liquid gasoline on Peek's clothing or accidental ignition of gasoline vapors. Defendant argues that such evidence was also necessary to rebut the State's contention that the gasoline on Peek's body had been purchased by Defendant with the intention of pouring it on the decedent and setting him on fire. {27} During a hearing on evidentiary motions, Montaño indicated he based his belief that Peek had huffed in the past on the following: (1) the failure of Peek, who did not own a car, to explain the presence of diesel fuel treatment in his apartment one or two months prior to his death; (2) an occasion in which Peek smelled of starter fluid; and (3) Montaño's impression that Peek had been evicted from a previous apartment for huffing. Montaño reported his observations to a Farmington police officer on the day of Peek's death. He also told the same officer that while he had never actually witnessed Peek huffing, his observations led him to suspect that Peek did engage in that activity. At the pretrial hearing, Montaño testified about his opinion that Peek used inhalants. {28} The trial court ruled the evidence of Peek's huffing of petroleum products was highly relevant, and, therefore, admissible under Rule 11-404(A)(2), as a pertinent character trait. Thus, the court allowed Defendant to introduce this evidence through reputation or opinion testimony under Rule 11-405(A) NMRA 2001, which provides in pertinent part, [i]n all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. {29} Defendant argues he should have been allowed to present evidence of Montaño's specific references to Peek's alleged petroleum product inhalant abuse under Rule 11-405(B). He argues such evidence went to an essential element of his defense that Peek's death was accidental and the result of the deceased's own actions. Rule 11-405(B) NMRA 2001 provides that [i]n cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct. When Rule 11-405(B) is not applicable, evidence of character is limited to reputation or opinion. See NMRA 11-405(A). {30} Evidence of Peek's alleged huffing was not necessary to satisfy any legal element of a defense. Accident does not appear to be a recognized affirmative defense in New Mexico. In Munoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 15, 126 N.M. 371, 970 P.2d 143, this Court held that since a defendant did not bear the burden of proof that the decedent caused a fatal crash, the defense's accident theory was not an affirmative defense, but rather one of many ways in which the defense may attempt to cast doubt on the State's case that the accused caused the death at issue. We believe that same analysis is applicable to the case before the Court. Accordingly, the trial court properly limited testimony concerning Peek's alleged penchant for huffing inhalants to reputation or opinion evidence under Rule 11-405(A). We therefore affirm the trial court on this portion of this issue. {31} We next address the trial court's refusal to allow Defendant to impeach Montaño by asking him specifically about his personal knowledge of Peek's use of inhalants. When asked at trial about Peek's reputation for huffing petroleum products, Montaño responded that he did not know whether Peek had such a reputation. Defendant argues Montaño's testimony implied that his knowledge of Peek's drug habits was limited to the decedent's abuse of alcohol. This testimony was inconsistent with what Montaño told a Farmington police officer shortly after the fire, as well as with his statements at the pretrial hearing. Specifically, Montaño stated that he understood Peek had been evicted from an apartment because of his inhalant abuse. This statement clearly implicates Peek's reputation for huffing. It is not, however, proper to impeach Montaño's statement about Peek's reputation with Montaño's personal knowledge. Consequently, Montaño's statements regarding the fuel additive bottle and Peek's smelling of starter fluid were properly excluded. The trial court doubted Montaño's truthfulness, but refused to allow impeachment. The court reasoned that because evidence of specific instances of huffing would tend to devalue Peek's life, such evidence would be more prejudicial than probative. See Rule 11-403. {32} A witness's prior inconsistent statement about material matters is admissible at trial to impeach the witness, but admission of such evidence must meet the balancing test of Rule 11-403. State v. Davis, 97 N.M. 130, 133, 637 P.2d 561, 564 (1981). Importantly, the trial court determined that evidence of Peek's alleged reputation for huffing flammable liquids was highly probative. We agree with the trial court. Both of the State's fire experts testified that possible accidental causes of a fire must be ruled out before it can be concluded it was intentionally set. Since fire investigation, according to the experts, sought to eliminate all accidental causes before considering intentional ignition, the defense was denied an essential opportunity to present a reasonable, logical explanation for the presence of flammable liquid on Peek's body. The absence of any testimony concerning Montaño's previously stated suspicions and interactions with Peek rendered an accidental fire scenario considerably less plausible. Although evidence of inhalant abuse may carry some prejudice, we believe it is doubtful the jury would have concluded that Peek somehow deserved his fate simply because he engaged in such practices. {33} This situation is distinguishable both from cases in which the State seeks to introduce prior bad acts of an accused merely to show a general conformity with his alleged character, [2] and from cases in which any party seeks to introduce testimony from a witness with prior bad acts for similar purposes. We acknowledge the State's right to be free of unfair prejudice. However, in this case, the impact of the prejudice would not have been heavy. The decedent was not a witness and his credibility was not at issue. Under these circumstances, the probative value of the impeachment evidence outweighed the risk of prejudice; however, the trial court's balancing under Rule 11-403 properly accorded weight to the probative value of the evidence. In the light of the fire experts' conclusions, the value of the excluded evidence would have been especially probative. Once it was clear that Montaño would contradict the opinion he had expressed both to the local police officer and during the pretrial hearing, the trial court was in error in weighing the impeachment evidence as being more prejudicial than probative. We conclude that the trial court's refusal to allow the impeachment of Montaño with his prior inconsistent statements was an abuse of discretion. The great prejudice of this error to Defendant is clearly illustrated by the State's use of the presence of gasoline on Peek's body as evidence of intent by Defendant to murder the deceased. The trial court's exclusion significantly affected Defendant's fundamental right to present a defense. Accordingly, we reverse on this portion of the issue. On remand, we note that the trial court should be mindful of the requirement of Rule 11-801(D)(1)(a) NMRA 2001 that prior inconsistent statements be made under oath.