Opinion ID: 771369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Recharacterization of Letter as 28 U.S.C.S 2255 Motion

Text: 33 Pro se complaints and motions from prisoners are to be liberally construed. 3 See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) ([C]ourts must construe pro se pleadings liberally); Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1999). In this regard, we have occasionally characterized pro se prisoner motions as motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. See United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1993) (construing motion brought under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) as one under 28 U.S.C. 2255); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). 34 The rule of liberal construction and its application to 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions is for the benefit of the pro se prisoner; its rationale loses validity where it is invoked to the prisoner's disadvantage. In this case, characterizing Seesing's letter as a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion (and denying it) was to Seesing's great disadvantage as it seriously diminished the possibility of successfully filing a future, properly drafted and documented, motion. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the opportunity to file successive motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 is strictly limited. See generally 28 U.S.C. 2255 (second or successive motions may be certified only if based on newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law . . . that was previously unavailable). 35 In Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit aptly explained the pitfalls of converting a prisoner's pro se motion into a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in light of AEDPA: 36 The enactment of AEDPA, however, brings into play new considerations . . . . If a district court receiving a motion under some other provision of law elects to treat it as a motion under 2255 and then denies it, that may cause the movant's subsequent filing of a motion under 2255 to be barred as a second 2255. . . . The court's act of conversion which we approved under pre-AEDPA law because it was use ful and harmless might, under AEDPA's new law, become extraordinarily harmful to a prisoner's rights. A prisoner convicted pursuant to unconstitutional proceedings might lose the right to have a single petition for habeas corpus adjudicated, solely by reason of a district court's having incorrectly recharacterized some prior motion as one brought under 2255. 37 Id. at 583-84 (footnote omitted). 38 The court then established a procedure to prevent a pro se prisoner from being unduly barred from filing a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion when one filing has been construed assuch: 39 At least until it is decided whether such a conversion or recharacterization can affect the movant's right to bring a future habeas petition, district courts should not recharacterize a motion purportedly made under some other rule as a motion under 2255 unless (a) the movant, with knowledge of the potential adverse consequences of such a recharacterization, agrees to have the motion so recharacterized, or (b) the court finds that, notwithstanding its designation, the motion should be considered as made under 2255 because of the nature of the relief sought, and offers the movant the opportunity to withdraw the motion rather than have it recharacterized. 40 Id. at 584. 41 United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1999), cites Adams and holds that before recharacterization a district court must advise the pro se petitioner of three options: (1) have the motion ruled upon as filed; (2) if the motion is not styled as a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, have the motion recharacterized as such and heard, but lose the ability to file second or successive motions absent certification from the court of appeals; or (3) withdraw the motion and file one allinclusive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion within the one-year statutory period. 42 The procedures established by the Second and Third Circuits are similar in character to procedures this court has adopted for other types of motions filed by pro se prisoners when a district court's recharacterization could have a detrimental impact on the prisoner. For example, in Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1996), this court held: When the district court transforms a dismissal into a summary judgment proceeding it is obligated to advise pro se litigants of Rule 56 requirements and to afford [them] a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent material. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 43 It is in keeping with this court's precedent to extend the protections recognized in Anderson to the recharacterization of pro se prisoner motions as 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions. Accordingly, we adopt the procedures propounded by the Second Circuit in Adams and restated by the Third Circuit in Miller. When presented with a pro se motion that could be recharacterized as a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, a district court should not so recharacterize the motion unless: (a) the pro se prisoner, with knowledge of the potential adverse consequences of such a recharacterization, consents or (b) the dis-trict court finds that because of the relief sought that the motion should be recharacterized as a 28 U.S.C.S 2255 motion and offers the pro se prisoner the opportunity, after informing the prisoner of the consequences of recharacterization, to withdraw the motion. Under either scenario, the pro se prisoner has the option to withdraw the motion and file one all-inclusive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion within the one-year statutory period. 4 44 The sentence is VACATED and the matter REMANDED to the district court for a new plea colloquy as to Count 2 and re sentencing as to all other counts. The decision of the district court construing Seesing's June 15, 1998 letter as a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.