Opinion ID: 170512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Is Gilson's death sentence disproportionate to his offense?

Text: In his third issue on appeal, Gilson argues that his death sentence violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment because it is disproportionate to his offense. In support of this proposition, Gilson asserts that the jury did not find he had a direct role in Shane's death, and that his crime [wa]s one of omission, or failing to act. Aplt. Br. at 58. Under these circumstances, Gilson argues, imposition of the death penalty, unique in its severity and irrevocability, is `excessive in relation to the crime committed' in violation of his constitutional rights. Id, (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977)). a) Clearly established Supreme Court precedent Our first task is to determine the clearly established federal law applicable to this claim. The Supreme Court, in several cases, including Coker, as well as Enmund and Tison, has outlined general proportionality standards for imposition of the death penalty. Under those standards, a punishment is `excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861. A punishment might fail the test on either ground. Id. Furthermore, these Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. Id. To this end, attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted. Id. b) OCCA's application of the proportionality standards In connection with its analysis of Gilson's Enmund/Tison arguments on direct appeal, the OCCA addressed and rejected Gilson's proportionality arguments, stating as follows: Finally, [Gilson] argues the death penalty is constitutionally disproportionate to the crime of permitting child abuse murder. He contends the death penalty is excessive as: (1) it does not contribute to the goals of punishment and results in needless imposition of pain and suffering, and (2) the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977). In discussing the constitutionality of the death sentence for a defendant who did not kill, the Supreme Court in Enmund stated: In Gregg v. Georgia [428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)] the opinion announcing the judgment observed that [t]he death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders. (citation omitted). Unless the death penalty when applied to those in Enmund's position measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592, 97 S.Ct. at 2866. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798, 102 S.Ct. at 3377. The Supreme Court stated that neither the deterrent nor the retributive purposes of the death penalty were advanced by imposing the death penalty upon Enmund as the Court was unconvinced that the threat that the death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be taken. Id., at 458 U.S. at 798-799, 102 S.Ct. at 3377. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon the fact that killing only rarely occurred during the course of robberies, and such killing as did occur even more rarely resulted in death sentences if the evidence did not support an inference that the defendant intended to kill. Id., at 458 U.S. at 799, 102 S.Ct. at 3377-78. As for the principle of retribution, the Court stated the heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender. As for retribution as a justification for executing Enmund, we think this very much depends on the degree of Enmund's culpability-what Enmund's intentions, expectations, and actions were. American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention-and therefore his moral guilt-to be critical to the degree of [his] criminal culpability, (citation omitted), and the Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing. Id., at 458 U.S. at 800, 102 S.Ct. at 3378. Enmund was the driver of the getaway car in an armed robbery of a dwelling. The occupants of the house, an elderly couple, resisted and Enmund's accomplices killed them. The result in Enmund did not turn on the mere fact that Enmund was convicted of felony murder. It is important to note how attenuated was Enmund's responsibility for the deaths of the victims in that case. In the present case, [Gilson] was convicted of first degree murder by child abuse by the commission of the child abuse or in the alternative first degree murder by child abuse through the willful permitting of child abuse. 21 O.S. 1991, § 701.7(C). We have determined the evidence is sufficient to support either of the alternative ways to commit first degree murder under the statute. The offense of willfully permitting child abuse murder requires a knowing and willful permitting of child abuse to occur by a person authorized to care for the child. Child abuse does not always result in death, but death is the result often enough that the death penalty should be considered as a justifiable deterrent to the felony itself. Children are the most vulnerable citizens in our communities. They are dependent on parents, and others charged in their care, for sustenance, protection, care and guidance. Depending on age and physical development they tend to be more susceptible to physical harm, and even death, if unreasonable force is inflicted upon them. Within this context, legislative action to address the specific crime of child abuse murder is legally justified. Applying the death penalty to this situation wherein [Gilson], willfully, purposefully and knowingly allowed the-victim to be abused to the extent that death resulted, when he was in a position to have prevented that abuse, certainly serves both the deterrent and retributive purposes of the death penalty. The threat that the death penalty will be imposed for permitting child abuse which results in the death of the child accentuates the responsibility a parent or person charged with the care and protection of a child has to that child and will deter one who permits that abuse. As for retribution, [Gilson]'s personal culpability in this situation is high. The situation is quite different from that where the child abuse occurs and the individual is not aware of the abuse. [Gilson]'s responsibility for the death of the victim was not so attenuated as was that of Enmund who merely waited in the car while the victims were shot and had no knowledge of or immediate control over the actions of his co-defendants. [Gilson]'s personal participation in permitting Coffman to abuse the victim to the extent that death resulted was major and substantial, and there was proof that such participation was wilful [sic] and knowing. Therefore the death penalty is not excessive retribution for his crime. Accordingly, we find the requirements of Enmund and Tison have been met, and the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for the crime of first degree murder by permitting child abuse in these circumstances. This assignment of error is denied. Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 922-24 (internal paragraph numbers omitted). c) Gilson's challenges to the OCCA's proportionality review Gilson asserts three general challenges to the OCCA's proportionality review. First, he argues there is a glaring lack of historical or precedential support for imposing the death penalty upon him. Aplt. Br. Br. 62. Indeed, he argues, there appears to be no precedent whatsoever for executing a defendant for a crime based on permitting or failing to prevent another's commission of an offense; nor is there precedent for executing a defendant where there is no actus reus.  Id. Historically, Gilson argues, absent a legal duty to act, failure to act to prevent a crime has constituted no offense at all, let alone a capital one. Id. Second, Gilson argues there is no precedent for imposing death based on a state criminal statute which does not require, and a jury determination which fails to find, the defendant was a participant in the offense. Id. at 64. Third, and finally, Gilson argues that imposition of the death penalty based on an offense of permitting makes no measurable contribution to the goals of punishment. In support of this argument, Gilson asserts that [t]he trial produced no proof [he] committed any acts resulting in harm, nor intended any harm be inflicted (by another), upon the children, and thus the threat of execution is unlikely to deter the inaction required to sustain the conviction. Id. at 67 (italics in original). Relatedly, Gilson asserts that executing a defendant to avenge a killing he had no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring the criminal gets his `just deserts.' Id. at 68-69. The problem with Gilson's arguments is that there is a complete disconnect between them and the actual circumstances of his case. For example, while we might well agree that there is little, if any, historical or contemporary support for imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who merely fails to act to prevent a crime, and who had no intention of committing or causing the death of the victim, those are not the circumstances presented here. [8] In Tison, the Supreme Court made clear that proportionality review takes into account not merely the findings necessarily inherent in the jury's verdict, but also any Enmund/Tison findings subsequently made by the state trial or appellate courts. The OCCA's Enmund/Tison findings regarding Gilson's active and significant participation and his reckless indifference to human life effectively equated Gilson with the two petitioners in Tison and thereby allowed the OCCA to essentially incorporate Tison 's own proportionality review, including the Court's conclusion that imposition of the death penalty in such circumstances was proper. Thus, we are not persuaded that the OCCA's proportionality review was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.