Opinion ID: 2075877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: evidentiary rulings during penalty hearing

Text: Following Dawson's convictions, the State represented that, during the penalty hearing, it intended to introduce: (1) expert testimony about the origin and nature of the Aryan Brotherhood, (2) testimony that Dawson referred to himself as Abaddon, had the name Abaddon tattooed in red ink across his stomach and that the name means one of Satan's disciples or angel of the bottomless pit, [24] (3) photographs of Dawson's body depicting his tattoos, and (4) a picture of the swastika that Dawson painted on the wall of his prison cell. Dawson's counsel renewed the objections originally raised, in part, by the motion in limine. The defense argued that none of the evidence proffered by the State should be admitted during the penalty phase because it was inflammatory and irrelevant. Dawson's counsel also renewed the argument that if the State were allowed to introduce this evidence, Dawson's First Amendment rights of freedom of association and freedom of religion and his right to due process would be violated. After considering the parties' arguments, on the issue of whether evidence concerning the nature of the Aryan Brotherhood and Dawson's membership in that organization would be relevant during the penalty proceeding, the Superior Court stated: Well, I will narrow the issues to some extent. [I] find that membership or the act of joining an organization of any particular kind, whether it be the Aryan Brotherhood or the Boy Scouts of America can be probative of character, at least to some extent. The real issue before the Court is whether the probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. So let's focus the argument that way. Immediately after this preliminary ruling, all of the attorneys requested a recess. Following the recess, the parties executed a stipulation describing the Aryan Brotherhood, and the State agreed not to call an expert witness to explain the origin and nature of that organization. The stipulation, which was received as evidence without further objection, read: The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware. In addition to admitting the stipulation into evidence during the penalty hearing, the State called Detective Joseph Huttie (Huttie) to testify, with the aid of a photograph, that Dawson's right hand bore a tattoo with the name Aryan Brotherhood printed above and below a black and red diamond shaped symbol. In this appeal, Dawson's counsel argues that no evidence concerning the Aryan Brotherhood should have been admitted during the penalty hearing. According to Dawson's counsel, after the Superior Court's adverse preliminary decision that evidence concerning the Aryan Brotherhood would be relevant to Dawson's character, counsel was forced to enter the stipulation in order to guarantee that a relatively sterile description of the Aryan Brotherhood would be presented to the jury. Dawson's counsel submits that the stipulation simply characterized that organization and that the objection to the admissibility of any evidence about the Aryan Brotherhood was never withdrawn. Over objections by Dawson's counsel, the Superior Court also ruled that the State would be permitted to introduce evidence of Dawson's use of the nickname Abaddon and what that name means during the penalty hearing. Huttie testified that, when Dawson was arrested, a photograph was taken showing the name Abaddon tattooed across Dawson's stomach. Huttie also testified that Webster's dictionary defines Abaddon as angel of the bottomless pit. Patty Elizabeth Dennis (Dennis) also testified concerning the name Abaddon during the penalty hearing. She stated that while at the Zoo Bar on the night of December 1, 1986, Dawson introduced himself to her as Abaddon and told her that the name meant one of Satan's disciples. After an inquiry as to the relevance of the swastika evidence to Dawson's character, the Superior Court ruled that the swastika evidence could not be introduced by the State at the penalty hearing without leave of the court. Following that determination, the State never sought to introduce any evidence concerning swastikas. Consequently, the question of whether such evidence could have been admitted is not in issue. In a penalty hearing for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree, the sole issue is whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. The jury is called upon to make an individualized determination with respect to the appropriateness of the death penalty, based on the defendant's character and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). Admissible evidence includes matters relating to any mitigating circumstances and to any aggravating circumstances. 11 Del.C. § 4209(c). A jury in a capital case may consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances under the death penalty, and may take into account all specific circumstances of the crime and the defendant. State v. White, Del.Supr., 395 A.2d 1082, 1089 (1978); Deputy v. State, Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 581 (1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1589, 94 L.Ed.2d 778 (1987). Accordingly, a very wide range of evidence is admissible in a penalty hearing. Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 104 (1984), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 198, 78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983). In this appeal, Dawson challenges the Superior Court's determination that evidence regarding the Aryan Brotherhood and the name Abaddon would properly be admissible as relevant to his character during the penalty hearing. During the penalty hearing, the State contended that Madeline Kisner's murder was in keeping with the incorrigible nature of Dawson's character. The State argued that Dawson's life demonstrated an almost complete rejection of the rules which govern a civilized society. The State sought to prove its contention about Dawson's character in several ways. The State presented evidence of Dawson's extensive criminal history. [25] That history revealed Dawson's repeated convictions for various crimes, resulting in a lifetime of almost continuous incarceration, beginning with Dawson's confinement as a juvenile at the age of thirteen. The State argued that Dawson's selection of the name Abaddon was  like his career of crime  characteristic of the persona chosen by Dawson. The State argued that Dawson's decision to join a prison gang, while he was incarcerated as an adult, was  like his escapes  characteristic of his lawless nature and his denouncement of rehabilitation while incarcerated. The Superior Court ruled that Dawson's use of the nickname Abaddon was relevant to his character. The record supports that decision. Dawson identified himself as Abaddon. Dawson signed a postcard with that name. He had that name tattooed across his stomach. Dawson introduced himself to Dennis as Abaddon, and explained his understanding of that name to her. What Dawson thought the name Abaddon meant and how it is commonly understood by others was relevant to his character because it was a reflection of how Dawson viewed himself and how he wanted to be viewed, even within hours after Madeline Kisner's murder. [26] Cf. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846, 859 (1989). The Superior Court ruled that evidence of Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood, as well as the nature and the origin of that group, was relevant to Dawson's character. The record also supports that decision. Dawson identified himself as a member of the prison gang known as the Aryan Brotherhood by having its name and logo tattooed on his body. Dawson's affiliation with this type of organization was not only indicative of how he identified himself and how he wanted to be identified by others, but again was characteristic of his lawless nature and rejection of rehabilitation during his incarceration. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). Dawson argues that even if the evidence about the Aryan Brotherhood and the name Abaddon were relevant to his character, the use of that evidence against him during the penalty proceeding violated his rights of free speech and association. U.S. Const. amend. I; Del. Const. art. I, §§ 5 and 16. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S.Ct. 1238, 16 L.Ed.2d 321 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 6 L.Ed.2d 836 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961). Additionally, Dawson argues that by improperly injecting race and religion into his trial, his constitutional right to due process was violated. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 105 S.Ct. 2727, 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985); Weddington v. State, Del.Supr., 545 A.2d 607, 615 (1988); Brokenbrough v. State, Del. Supr., 522 A.2d 851 (1987). The State denies that it presented any issue of race, religion or political affiliation to the jury in violation of Dawson's rights. During the penalty phase of Dawson's trial, the jury had to decide whether Dawson should be executed or imprisoned for the rest of his life. Before recommending a death sentence, it was mandatory for the jury to find that the State had proven the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor. In Dawson's case, the jury found that the State had proven three statutory aggravating factors. [27] The jury was also required to make an individualized determination of whether Dawson should be executed or incarcerated for life, based upon Dawson's character, his record and the circumstances of the crime. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. at 2744; Blystone v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989); State v. White, Del.Supr., 395 A.2d 1082 (1978). Because of the duty to be performed during a penalty hearing, it is desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2939, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Nevertheless, a death sentence based upon consideration of `factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant' would violate the Constitution. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382, 105 S.Ct. 2727, 2733, 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985) (quoting Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S. at 885, 103 S.Ct. at 2747). However, [p]unishing a person for expressing his views or for associating with certain people is substantially different from allowing ... evidence of [the defendant's] character [to be considered] where that character is a relevant inquiry. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d at 859. Dawson's character was relevant to the jury's determination of whether he should be executed. Lockett [ v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)] and Eddings [ v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) ] reflect the belief that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant. Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 841, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987). During the penalty hearing, the evidence the State presented to the jury regarding the Aryan Brotherhood and the name Abaddon properly focused the jury's attention on Dawson's character. [28] The State did not offer that evidence in order to improperly appeal to the jurors' passions and prejudices concerning race, religion, or political affiliation. Cf. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984); Weddington v. State, Del. Supr., 545 A.2d 607 (1988); Brokenbrough v. State, Del.Supr., 522 A.2d 851 (1987); Hooks v. State, Del.Supr., 416 A.2d 189 (1980). The State's evidence, briefly defining the Aryan Brotherhood and the name Abaddon, was presented in a manner which did not shift the jury's attention away from the issue of Dawson's character. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). The context of the State's evidence was necessary to explain Dawson's view of himself and how he wanted to be viewed by others. [29] Id. We hold that the evidence relating to the Aryan Brotherhood and the name Abaddon was properly considered by the jury during the penalty hearing. That evidence was relevant to Dawson's character. Its admission did not violate Dawson's constitutional rights. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 105 S.Ct. 2727, 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984); Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); State v. White, Del.Supr., 395 A.2d 1082 (1978).