Opinion ID: 1433877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Judgment of Acquittal for Insufficiency of the Evidence

Text: Defendant Guthrie finally argues that the district court erred in denying Guthrie's motions for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 3 and 4, relating to Guthrie's possession of the shotgun. Guthrie argues that the only testimony linking the Defendant to the shotgun came from Kemp and that testimony was insufficient for a conviction. Addressing a challenge regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court considers whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1030 (6th Cir.1996). We do not independently assess the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence. United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir.1999). To convict on Count 3 of the Indictment, the jury must have found that Guthrie had actual or constructive possession of the shotgun used in the offense. Kemp testified that he told Guthrie to hold the gun while he, Kemp, kicked in the door of the apartment upon arrival. Kemp further testified that during the police chase he told Guthrie to hand him the shotgun, which was under the car seat at the time. After Guthrie handed him the gun, Kemp claimed that he attempted to throw the gun out the window when it accidentally went off, firing shots into the back of a state trooper's car. We find that a rational trier of fact could have believed those portions of Kemp's testimony regarding Guthrie's possession of the shotgun beyond a reasonable doubt, and so could have relied on them alone to convict Guthrie of Count 3 of the Indictment. Count 4 of the Indictment charged Guthrie with being a felon in possession of a shotgun and a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. To be found guilty of being a felon in possession, Guthrie need not have possessed both of these firearmsone would suffice. As described above, there was sufficient evidence to find that Guthrie possessed the shotgun. But there was also sufficient evidence that Guthrie possessed the semi-automatic. At trial, Williams testified that she saw Guthrie with the .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol during the abduction. A police officer testified that he saw something thrown from the passenger side of the car during the chase. Police officers also testified that they recovered the .22 caliber pistol from the crime scene, where it was suspected to have been tossed from the vehicle. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this Court finds this evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Guthrie guilty of Count 4 of the Indictment. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in denying the Defendant's motions for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence.
Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant United States appeals a sentencing issue, arguing that the district court improperly varied from the recommended Guidelines sentence to compensate for the applicable statutory mandatory minimums and failed to provide an adequate explanation for the sentence. This Court reviews the district court's sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). A sentencing decision will only be reversed if it is unreasonable. Id. at 594. Reasonableness review considers both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 594; see also United States v. Walls, 546 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir.2008). A reviewing court: must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. After determining that the sentence is procedurally sound, the reviewing court then considers substantive reasonableness under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. At Defendant Guthrie's sentencing hearing, the Government argued for a total sentence of 40 years. The suggested 40-year sentence combined the Guideline recommended minimum 360-month sentence for Counts 1 (carjacking), 3 (possession of the sawed-off shotgun), and 4 (felon in possession with armed career criminal designation) with a 10-year statutory mandatory consecutive minimum for Count 2 (use of a firearm in a violent crime). In response, the Defendant argued that a total sentence of 25 years, the mandatory minimum, would be sufficient but not greater than necessary. The district court recognized the recommended Guidelines range to be 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court also noted that Count 2 required a mandatory consecutive minimum sentence of 10 years. Next, the district court turned to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, addressing the Defendant's history and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the public and promote respect for the law, the need for deterrence, the potential for rehabilitation, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Finally, having calculated the applicable Guidelines range and considered all the § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded: And that brings us up to the possibility of 40 years. But I'm not going to go that high. I just think that's too long. And where I'm looking at is 25 years. I amI believe that's sufficient in custody. That's a very, very, very long time. I think it takes into account everything I have to take into account. In particular, the court noted the marginal deterrent effect of a sentence over 25 years. The Defendant was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment on Counts 1 and 4 and 120 months imprisonment on Count 3, all to be served concurrently, and 120 months imprisonment on Count 2, to be served consecutively, for a total of 300 months imprisonment. With its appeal, the Government challenges the reasonableness of the district court's downward variance from the Guidelines range. The Government argues that the court effectively reduced the guidelines sentence to compensate for the statutory mandatory minimums for Counts 2 and 4. In its brief, the Government alleges that [t]he district court seemed to settle on a sentencing number (twenty-five years) that encompassed the ten-year mandatory consecutive sentence under § 924(c) (Count 2) and the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(e) (Count 4). The result, the Government argues, is that the court nullified Congressional intent about statutory mandatory minimums. First, this Court considers whether the Government preserved this issue for appeal. At the end of the sentencing hearing, when the district court asked if there were any objections, the prosecutor stated, Judge, whatever objections I've already made I won't repeat. Earlier in the sentencing hearing, the Government had expressed its position that the correct sentence based on the Guidelines and the statutory mandatory minimums was 40 years. The parties have no obligation to again raise objections already made at the end of a sentencing hearing, especially those customarily raised earlier in the proceeding such as objections to or for departures and variances. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385, 390 (6th Cir. 2008). By earlier arguing for a strict Guidelines sentence, the Government adequately preserved the sentencing issue for appeal.
In challenging the reasonableness of the sentence, the Government relies on this Court's decision, United States v. Franklin, 499 F.3d 578 (6th Cir.2007). In Franklin, we considered the re-sentencing under Booker of two defendants convicted of various bank robbery charges. The Franklin defendants faced a mandatory consecutive seven year sentence for brandishing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Franklin, 499 F.3d at 583. The sentencing court granted downward variances of 34 months and 22 months below the Guidelines range for the two defendants, explaining the decision: to some extent because I feel that adding on a mandatory seven years truly inflates the sentence.... See id. (quoting Franklin's sentencing hearing transcript). In vacating the sentence and remanding for a new sentencing, this Court examined the statutory language establishing the mandatory consecutive minimum, which states that violators of the specific provision shall be sentenced to not less than seven years imprisonment in addition to the punishment provided for the underlying crime of violence. Franklin, 499 F.3d at 583 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). We also considered the Guidelines instruction that mandatory consecutive sentences are to be imposed independently of sentences for other counts. Id. at 584 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(a), (b) and cmt. n. 2). Ultimately, this Court held the sentences to be unreasonable because [w]hen any downward variance of the guideline range is based upon the effect of a mandatory sentence, congressional intent is repudiated, just as if the mandatory sentence itself had been reduced. Franklin, 499 F.3d at 584-85. On remand, the district court was instructed to determine an appropriate sentence for the underlying crimes without consideration of the § 924(c) sentence.
In contrast to Franklin, the district court here nowhere suggested that she was trying to negate the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm during a crime of violence, as Franklin prohibits. Franklin, 499 F.3d at 584-85 (holding that any downward variance based upon the effect of a mandatory sentence repudiates congressional intent). The sentencing court in Franklin admitted to granting the downward variance from the Guidelines to some extent because I feel that adding on a mandatory seven years truly inflates the sentence. Franklin, 499 F.3d at 583 (quoting Franklin's sentencing hearing transcript). In contrast, the district court in this case gave no such explicit improper explanation. In support of its position, the Government relies on a mere inference rather than on any actual evidence. Govt. Br. at 17 (The district court seemed to settle on a sentencing number (twenty-five years) that encompassed the ten-year mandatory consecutive sentence under § 924(c) (Count 2) and the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(e) (Count 4).) (emphasis added). District courts enjoy discretion in sentencing based on their ring-side perspective on the sentencing hearing and [their] experience over time in sentencing other individuals. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349 (6th Cir.2007). Accordingly, we do not presume to read the mind of a sentencing judge, on a search for impropriety. Ultimately, after explicitly considering the correct Guidelines range in light of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court found the total advisory sentence of 40 years to be too long. While it is possible that the district court considered the effect of the mandatory sentence, in the absence of any more explicit evidence, we will not impute an improper analysis to a sentencing judge. The sentence was reasonable.
Finally, the Government argues that the district court sentenced Guthrie without providing an adequate explanation for the sentence. The sentencing court must set forth enough [of a statement of reasons] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision making authority. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). In making this argument, the Government discounts the district court's consideration of the parties' arguments, the Presentence Report, and the § 3553(a) factors. Notably, the district court commented on each of the § 3553(a) factors and their applicability to the Defendant. Engaging in these steps allows for reasonable appellate review. See United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 331 (6th Cir.2008) (holding a sentencing explanation to be adequate where the sentencing court properly calculated the Guidelines range, understood the advisory nature of the Guidelines, recited and explained all of the § 3553(a) factors, considered the factors and their relevance to the defendant, and acknowledged the parties' arguments). Based on all those considerations, the district court concluded that a 40-year sentence was too long, but that a 25-year sentence was sufficient. Regarding the final 25-year sentence, the district court explained, [t]hat's a very, very, very long time. I think it takes into account everything I have to take into account. The court, reflecting on what sentence would be just and would appropriately punish the young Defendant for the acts he committed, determined that 25 years is long enough in this particular case. The district court further explained the choice of 25 years based on the marginal deterrent value of additional punishment when the sentence was already so long. This Court finds that the district court had a reasoned basis and adequately explained its sentence of 25 years, a sentence it deemed sufficient but not greater than necessary to effectuate federal sentencing purposes. That is all the district court is required to do.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the convictions and AFFIRM the sentence.