Opinion ID: 2569291
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Heading: betz' claim for medical expenses

Text: Generally, the right to seek medical expense damages for an injured child belongs to the parent. Wilson v. Knight, 26 Kan. App. 2d 226, 233, 982 P.2d 400 (1999). See also Cabaniss v. Cook, 353 So.2d 784, 785-86 (Ala. 1977) (noting that the father has the right to seek compensation for medical expenses and other expenses incurred when treating a minor child's injuries); Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170, 173, 677 P.2d 483 (1983) (noting that the general rule is that the right to seek medical expenses lies with the parents of an injured minor); Lane v. Webb, 220 So.2d 281, 285 (Miss. 1969) (medical and hospital expenses of a minor are the responsibility of the parents, thereby giving the right to seek damages for medical expenses to the parents of the minor); and Bagyi v. Miller, 3 Ohio App.2d 371, 373, 210 N.E.2d 887 (1965) (noting that the right to seek damages for medical expenses and treatment of injuries belongs to the parents of a minor). The parents' cause of action for medical expenses can be shifted to the minor if: (1) the minor child has paid or agreed to pay the expenses; (2) the minor child is legally responsible for payment (emancipation, death or incompetency of the parents); (3) if the parents waive or assign their right to recovery in favor of the minor; or (4) when recovery of expenses is permitted by statute. Wilson, 26 Kan. App.2d at 234 (referring to Moses v. Akers, 203 Va. 130, 132, 122 S.E.2d 864 [1961]). In the present case, we are dealing with a waiver of the right to seek damages for medical expenses. A waiver will be considered sufficient if it protects the defendant against the danger of double recovery. Villa Ex. Rel. Villa v. Roberts, 80 F. Supp.2d 1229, 1233 (D. Kan. 2000). The waiver can either be expressed formally or implied. Lasselle, 106 Idaho at 174. This court addressed the waiver and relinquishment issue in Abeles v. Bransfield, 19 Kan. 16 (1877). In Abeles, the court considered whether a suit brought in a child's name by and through the child's parent could assert a claim for medical expenses when the common law had held that claims for medical expenses belong to the responsible parent and not the child. The Abeles court held that a parent's claim for medical expenses can be shifted to the minor child and stated: As she commenced this action in her son's name, as his next friend, and set forth in the petition said loss of time and said expenses as part of her son's damages, and asked judgment in favor of her son for such damages, it must now be conclusively presumed that she relinquished and gave to her son all claim that she might have had for compensation for such loss of time and such expenses. 19 Kan. at 20. In Cabaniss, the Alabama Supreme Court considered whether a suit brought by a minor by and through their father allowed the minor to seek damages for medical expenses. Neither the father nor the mother had filed an individual suit seeking medical expenses; however, the district court had allowed the minor's petition to be amended to make a claim for medical expenses. Although the court noted that the right to seek medical expenses normally belongs to the parent of a minor, the right to seek medical expense damages may be waived when suit is brought by the minor by and through the parent. The Alabama Supreme Court held that because the father had brought suit on behalf of his daughter and had specifically sought medical damages by amending the petition, the father had waived his right to seek medical damages and shifted the cause of action to his son. 353 So.2d at 786-87. The Missouri Supreme Court addressed this issue in Garrison v. Ryno, 328 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1959). In Garrison, the injured minor child brought suit against the defendant by and through his mother. A jury reached a verdict in favor of the minor child in the amount of $50,000. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in amending the petition to allege medical expenses as a type of damage sought by the minor child. The plaintiffs asserted that the medical damage claim was uniquely theirs and that the minor child could not assert such a claim on his own. Presumably, the parents hoped to file a suit of their own alleging medical expenses as an independent claim. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the parents had waived their right to litigate the medical expense issue individually and stated: It is basic that an injury to a minor gives rise to two causes of action, as appellants contend; that `the damages peculiar to one of these causes of action cannot properly be recovered in an action based on the other in the absence of any waiver or estoppel,' [Citation omitted] and that a parent is not bound by a judgment in his child's action merely because he acted as next friend, guardian ad litem, or guardian, `except where he has permitted the child to recover or litigate the right to damages which would otherwise belong to the parent.' [Citation omitted.] But where there has been a waiver or estoppel by the parent, the child may recover these items of damage in his own separate action. Such waiver or estoppel occurs when a parent, acting as next friend, guardian ad litem or guardian and curator of the minor child, voluntarily and affirmatively waives his rights, or with full knowledge of the contents of the pleadings and in full control of the prosecution of the minor's claims, stands by without objection and permits such a claim to be pressed for the minor and consents that the minor recover items of damage which otherwise belong to the parent. 328 S.W.2d at 564. See also G. O. Brown v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 91 Ga. App. 35, 36-37, 84 S.E.2d 707 (1954) (noting that parents normally have the vested right to seek compensation for medical expenses when their minor child is injured by another but that the right may vest in the child when the parents file suit on the child's behalf and take an active role in the litigation); Lasselle, 106 Idaho at 174 (holding that parents waived the right to seek medical expenses where they testified on their son's behalf, thereby entitling their son to file suit for his medical expenses); Smith v. Geoghegan and Mathis, 333 S.W.2d 254 (Kent. Ct. App. 1960) (holding that parents waive their claim to medical expenses when suit is brought by their minor child by and through the parents and when parents have actual knowledge of the character and extent of the damages sought by the minor child); Kentucky Service Co. v. Miracle, 246 Ky. 797, 800, 56 S.W.2d 521 (1933) (noting that parents hold the right to seek medical expense damages, but the right may be waived and shifted to their injured minor child when they have brought suit in the child's name and appeared as witnesses on the child's behalf); Lane, 220 So.2d at 285 (holding that where parent brings suit in the name of his or her minor child, the parent shifts his or her right to seek damages for medical expenses to the child and is thereafter estopped from bringing an individual suit seeking the same); Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 39-40, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957) (holding that when a parent files suit on behalf of an injured minor child seeking medical expenses as a type of damage, the parent waives the right to seek medical expenses individually and is estopped from doing so in subsequent litigation); and Hazeltine v. Johnson, 92 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding that although parents normally have the right to seek medical expenses for an injured minor child, the great weight of authority of courts have held that parents waive or relinquish the right to seek medical expense damages when they bring suit on behalf of their minor child). In the present case, Betz brought the action on behalf of his daughter seeking compensation for her injuries. Betz took an active role in the litigation and testified before the court concerning the settlement. Although the original petition filed on Betz' daughter's behalf did not specifically request damages for medical expenses, the settlement specifically noted that it encompassed a waiver of PIP reimbursement, which Betz agreed to. Betz testified at the settlement hearing and was fully aware that the settlement encompassed the PIP waiver. In this case, Betz waived his individual right to seek medical expenses and shifted them to his minor daughter when he approved the settlement in his daughter's case. Betz may not now seek medical expenses because he no longer holds a cause of action for medical expenses, which was extinguished upon settlement of his daughter's case. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing Betz' claim for medical expenses but vacate the portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion concerning Betz' causes of action for loss of consortium and loss of services. We affirm judgment of the district court dismissing Betz' case.