Opinion ID: 222940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Donavan Slagg

Text: Slagg appeals the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on both the drug conspiracy count and the money laundering conspiracy count. We review such a denial de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government's favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict. United States v. Yarrington, 634 F.3d 440, 449 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Scofield, 433 F.3d 580, 584-85 (8th Cir.2006)). We will reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 924 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Espinosa, 585 F.3d 418, 423 (8th Cir.2009)), cert. denied, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 994, 178 L.Ed.2d 831 (2011). Slagg also challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial on sufficiency grounds. We review this denial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Aguilera, 625 F.3d 482, 486 (8th Cir.2010). The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, but [u]nless the district court ultimately determines that a miscarriage of justice will occur, the jury's verdict must be allowed to stand. United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir.2002).
To establish that a defendant conspired to distribute drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute the drugs; (2) that the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy. United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Jiminez, 487 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.2007)). An agreement to join a conspiracy `need not be explicit but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case,' United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, 336 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 669 (10th Cir.1992)), and [a] single conspiracy may exist even if the participants and their activities change over time, and even if many participants are unaware of, or uninvolved in, some of the transactions, United States v. Longs, 613 F.3d 1174, 1176 (8th Cir.) (quoting Donnell, 596 F.3d at 923), cert. denied, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 682, 178 L.Ed.2d 506 (2010). Further, it is not necessary to proof of a conspiracy that it have a discrete, identifiable organizational structure.... United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1357 (8th Cir.1988) (This type of enterprise, by its very nature, is a loosely knit organization.). Slagg challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on three grounds. His first two arguments relate to the threshold issue of whether a single conspiracy existed at all. In Slagg's view, the evidence presented at trial showed no more than a collection of buyer-seller transactions between the members of the alleged conspiracy. At most, Slagg maintains, the evidence showed a series of multiple, smaller conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged. And should we determine that the evidence suffices to prove a single conspiracy, Slagg then argues that the evidence is insufficient to show his participation in it. We address each of these points in turn. Slagg contends, first, that the evidence adduced by the Government supports only a finding of episodic buyer-seller transactions between members of the alleged conspiracy. We disagree because the interdependence of the enterprise's participants provides ample support for a reasonable jury's conclusion that they were working together to pursue a shared objective to `sell large quantities of drugs.' See United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 412 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Cabbell, 35 F.3d 1255, 1262 (8th Cir.1994)). Indeed, far from suggesting a series of isolated transactions, the trial record is replete with evidence that the conspirators regularly cooperated with one another, from which a jury could infer an ongoing, facilitative relationship between parties who were aware of the scope of one another's activities. See id. Amanda Harper testified that she sold distribution-quantities of methamphetamine received from Slagg to Levi Foerderer. Harper further testified that she introduced Slagg to Foerderer and helped Joseph Forrest sell methamphetamine in the Bismarck area by introducing him to people who were interested in purchasing drugs. Bob Zacher and Jared Reinisch sold and fronted methamphetamine to Dayna Engst. [3] Engst also testified that, at Reinisch's urging, she traveled with Forrest to California to procure four ounces of methamphetamine, some of which she helped sell upon their return to North Dakota. In addition, Engst testified that she sold methamphetamine for Forrest and Robert Chavez on multiple occasions. Further, Billy Crawford (who received his methamphetamine from Slagg) and Bob Zacher each sold and fronted distribution-quantities of methamphetamine to Bruce Vollmer. See United States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d 707, 720 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that evidence of distribution of large amounts of drugs over extended time period, including fronting transactions, constituted ample evidence to support a reasonable juror's finding ... [of] ongoing agreements ... for the common purpose of distributing [drugs]). On one occasion when Crawford was unavailable, he put Vollmer in contact with Slagg directly, who then provided Vollmer with three eight-balls [4] of methamphetamine. Foerderer testified that he once sold four eight-balls of methamphetamine on Bob Zacher's behalf at Forrest's request, and, like Engst, Foerderer also sold methamphetamine on behalf of Forrest and Chavez. Moreover, on one occasion, Foerderer, Bob Zacher, and Forrest pooled their money to purchase a half pound of methamphetamine from California. See United States v. Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir.2007) (combining funds to purchase methamphetamine is evidence of an agreement to distribute). In sum, we agree with the district court that a jury reasonably could conclude that the members of the conspiracy were not engaged simply in a series of isolated transactions but rather were engaged in a tacit agreement to distribute [drugs] on an ongoing basis and thus were engaged in a common enterprise. See United States v. Brown, 414 F.3d 976, 977 (8th Cir.2005). Slagg's second contention also relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the existence of a single conspiracy. He argues that, even if a jury could infer more than isolated, buyer-seller transactions from the evidence, the evidence at most supports a finding of multiple conspiracies rather than a single, overarching conspiracy. Thus, he maintains, a variance exists between the indictment and the proof offered at trial. But just as the litany of interrelated relationships recounted above could permit the jury to infer more than episodic buyer-seller transactions, so it could permit the jury to infer more than a series of multiple, smaller conspiracies. A variance between an indictment and the Government's proof at trial occurs if the Government proves multiple conspiracies under an indictment alleging only a single conspiracy. United States v. Benford, 360 F.3d 913, 914 (8th Cir.2004). Whether the Government's proof at trial established only a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is determined by the totality of the circumstances, and because it is a question of fact, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 826, 838 (8th Cir.2005). Relevant factors `includ[e] the nature of the activities involved, the location where the alleged events of the conspiracy took place, the identity of the conspirators involved, and the time frame in which the acts occurred.' Id. at 838-39 (quoting United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1571 (8th Cir.1996)). If a variance is established, reversal is warranted only if the variance infringed a defendant's substantial rights. United States v. McGilberry, 620 F.3d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Barth, 424 F.3d 752, 759 (8th Cir.2005)). The facts recited above in our discussion of Slagg's buyer-seller characterization of the enterprise are equally fatal to his multiple conspiracy position. Again, the Government's evidence largely involved the same group of individuals working with one another to conduct the same activity, distribution of methamphetamine, in the same location, Bismarck, during the time frame alleged in the indictment, 2008 through early 2009. See United States v. Cubillos, 474 F.3d 1114, 1119 (8th Cir.2007). Further, Slagg's protestations that the alleged members of the conspiracy procured drugs from various sources, sold to different customers, and (according to Slagg) competed with one another are unavailing. [T]he fact that there may have been multiple sources of [drugs] does not create multiple conspiracies.... Cabbell, 35 F.3d at 1262. Likewise, [o]ne conspiracy may exist despite the involvement of multiple groups and the performance of separate acts, United States v. Romero, 150 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir.1998)), and we have held that [d]ealers who compete with one another may be members of the same conspiracy, Roach, 164 F.3d at 412; see also Banks, 10 F.3d at 1054. Hence, we are unpersuaded that the evidence adduced by the Government supported only a finding of multiple conspiracies, and we reiterate that a reasonable jury could infer a single conspiracy from the totality of the circumstances presented at trial. See McGilberry, 620 F.3d at 885. Third, Slagg challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove his participation in the conspiracy, arguing that [a]ny agreements, if they existed, did not involve Slagg. Having determined that the jury reasonably could infer the existence of a single, overarching conspiracy, we likewise are unpersuaded by Slagg's effort to disassociate himself from the enterprise. [A] reasonable jury can find that a defendant has more than a mere buyer-seller relationship `if the evidence supports a finding that they shared a conspiratorial purpose to advance other transfers.' Donnell, 596 F.3d at 925 (quoting United States v. Parker, 554 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir.2009)). Moreover, it is settled in our circuit that [t]he evidence is sufficient to support a conspiracy where the drugs were purchased for resale, Romero, 150 F.3d at 826, and that evidence of multiple sales of resale quantities of drugs is sufficient in and of itself to make a submissible case of a conspiracy to distribute, United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Eneff, 79 F.3d 104, 105 (8th Cir.1996)). In light of these principles, we conclude that a jury reasonably could infer Slagg's knowing participation in the charged conspiracy based on evidence of his deep involvement with the members of the Bismarck network. Slagg provided Harper distribution-quantities of methamphetamine on multiple occasions, which she sold to Foerderer. Harper also introduced Slagg to Foerderer. Foerderer testified that Slagg fronted him methamphetamine and that, over the course of their business relationship, Slagg sold him between a pound and a pound and a half of the drug. See Parker, 554 F.3d at 239 (The selling group's interest in [the buyer's] sales was demonstrated further by the fact that they provided him with drugs on credit, relying on his ability to resell to secure payment to themselves.). Further, according to witness Valinda Tyndall, Slagg and Foerderer traveled to Beulah, North Dakota, to purchase between four and six ounces of methamphetamine. [5] Tyndall also testified that Slagg purchased distribution-quantities of methamphetamine from Bob Zacher. In addition, Engst testified that she received methamphetamine in quantities ranging from 3.5 grams to 7 grams over the course of six to eight months from Reinisch, who told her that he received the drugs from Slagg. Likewise, Vollmer testified that he received distribution-quantities of methamphetamine from Crawford, who received the drugs from Slagg. Moreover, on one occasion when Crawford was unavailable, he put Vollmer in contact with Slagg directly, who then provided Vollmer with three eight-balls of methamphetamine. See Banks, 10 F.3d at 1054 (observing that an important consideration in determining membership in a conspiracy is whether the actor `demonstrated a substantial level of commitment to the conspiracy, [for example] by engaging in a consistent series of smaller transactions' that further its ultimate object of supplying the consumer demand of the market (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1991))). [6] Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Slagg was a knowing participant in the charged conspiracy. [7] Hence, the district court did not err in denying Slagg's motion for judgment of acquittal and likewise did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Slagg a new trial.
We now turn to Slagg's conviction for conspiracy to launder money. Conspiring to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) requires that the defendant agreed with another person to violate the substantive provisions of the money-laundering statute.... United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 964 (6th Cir.2006); see also Pizano, 421 F.3d at 725. The charged object of the conspiracy in the present case was violation of the transaction provision of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). There are four elements to this offense: (1) defendant conducted, or attempted to conduct a financial transaction which in any way or degree affected interstate commerce or foreign commerce; (2) the financial transaction involved proceeds of illegal activity; (3) defendant knew the property represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and (4) defendant conducted or attempted to conduct the financial transaction knowing the transaction was designed in whole or in part ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. United States v. Phythian, 529 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). The financial transaction identified in the indictment was [t]he posting of $50,000 cash at the Burleigh County Courthouse ... for the bond of Donavan Michael Slagg. On appeal, Slagg challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the second and fourth elements enumerated in Phythian. First, Slagg contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the money represented proceeds of ... unlawful activity, specifically, drug sale proceeds. Proof that the funds were drug proceeds may be established by circumstantial evidence, United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir.1990), and in the present case there was ample circumstantial evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer that at least some of the funds gathered for Slagg's bail were drug proceeds. The Government presented recorded telephone conversations between Slagg and Tamara Heid, his mother, in which they discussed the sources of funds and Heid asserted I cannot go into details about anything on this, on anything with the phones, Gov't Ex. 12 at 4:54-5:00, the best thing for us to do is not even talk on the phone, Gov't Ex.14 at 1:36-1:39, I cannot talk on these phones, id. at 2:29-2:31, I'm not even supposed to be talking about anything on the phone, id. at 5:11-5:15, I'm not even supposed to say anything over the phone about what time I'm supposed to get together with anybody, Gov't Ex. 19 at 1:03-1:08, and I'm not even supposed to be talking about nothing, id. at 3:53-3:56. [8] Additionally, an unidentified male who participated in a conversation with Slagg and Heid twice expressed concern that posting the funds would cause them to disappear, Gov't Ex. 16 at 11:53-11:55, 13:18-13:33, a statement that the jury reasonably could interpret as a reference to the risk that the money would be seized as drug proceeds. Further, Harper testified that Slagg, a drug dealer, did not have a legitimate job and that she, Heid, and Taylor (also a drug dealer) discussed who owed [Slagg] money when considering how to gather the funds to post Slagg's bail. See United States v. Herron, 97 F.3d 234, 237 (8th Cir.1996) (From the evidence substantiating the appellants' drug-trafficking activity and their lack of any legitimate source of income, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the wired money constituted drug proceeds.); Blackman, 904 F.2d at 1257. Thus  based on the pointedly guarded telephone conversations, Slagg's drug-dealing activities and otherwise unemployed status, and the conversation regarding collecting the necessary funds from people who owed Slagg money  we conclude that a jury reasonably could find that the money used to post Slagg's bail derived, at least in part, from proceeds of unlawful activity. Second, Slagg argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knew that the bail-posting transaction was designed in whole or in part ... to conceal or disguise a listed attribute of the money. Interpreting the analogous transportation provision of the money laundering statute, which prohibits the transportation of certain criminal proceeds into or out of the United States knowing that such transportation... is designed in whole or in part ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the funds, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), the Supreme Court held in Cuellar v. United States that the statute's design element requires proof that the purpose  not merely effect  of the transportation was to conceal or disguise a listed attribute of the funds. 553 U.S. 550, 567, 128 S.Ct. 1994, 170 L.Ed.2d 942 (2008); see also United States v. Williams, 605 F.3d 556, 564-65 (8th Cir.2010) (finding Cuellar 's holding applicable to the transaction provision of the money laundering statute). [9] Thus, the Government must show that concealment is an intended aim of the transaction, Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 564, 128 S.Ct. 1994, whether from direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 484 (1st Cir.2005); see also Blackman, 904 F.2d at 1257. Relying on Cuellar, Slagg contends that the evidence presented at trial permits a reasonable finding only that the sole purpose of the agreement was to bail him out of jail. Were this the case, we would agree that the transaction would not violate the money laundering statute, as we repeatedly have held that the money laundering statute may not be so broadly construed that it becomes a `money spending statute.' United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Herron, 97 F.3d 234, 237 (8th Cir.1996)); see also United States v. Rockelman, 49 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir.1995). However, the evidence in this case permits a jury reasonably to infer that Slagg knew that the transaction also was intended, at least in part, to conceal the money's listed attributes. In one of the recorded telephone calls Slagg, Heid, and an unidentified male discussed the risks in bringing the bail money to the county courthouse. The unidentified male informed Slagg that it's a matter of waiting for somebody to bring it [the money] into there [the courthouse], Gov't Ex. 16 at 1:31-1:37, and characterized the risk of delivering the money as the only problem right now, id. at 3:14-3:16, and the one thing impeding bailing Slagg out of jail, id. at 3:55-3:56. When Slagg suggested that somebody ... come bring it [the money] here, the unidentified male responded, I'm worried about that [the money] just disappearing then. Id. at 13:18-13:33. The unidentified male also remarked, I don't want it the other way [i.e., posting the bail rather than using the funds to retain an attorney] and it all to disappear. Id. at 11:53-11:55. No more than seventeen minutes after the conclusion of his conversation with Heid and the unidentified male, Slagg had a conversation with Harper, who informed him that Derle Marchus, the bail bondsman, said he would do it for a thousand dollars. Gov't Ex. 17 at 2:04-2:08. Slagg replied that everything is there. But they just don't have nobody to post it. Id. at 4:36-4:40. From these conversations, a jury reasonably could infer that Slagg knew that his cohorts planned to conduct the transaction in such a way as to conceal or disguise the nature, ... the source, the ownership or the control of the money and reduce the risk of the money's disappearing  that is, later being seized as drug proceeds. See § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); see also Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d at 483 (remarking that evidence of intent to disguise or conceal can derive from circumstantial evidence, like the use of a third party to disguise the true owner, or unusual secrecy.); cf. United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir.1998) (observing that a common type of money laundering is the use of [unlawful] proceeds to buy assets in another person's name). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Slagg's motion for judgment of acquittal and that it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Slagg a new trial on this basis.