Opinion ID: 2812867
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vaimili’s Absence Was Voluntary.

Text: Vaimili was present in court on June 21, 2010 when the jury was selected and the parties and jurors were instructed to 20  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  return two days later. Vaimili, who was released on bail, failed to return when trial resumed on June 23, 2010. Trial counsel could not explain Vaimili’s absence, representing that he had spoken with Vaimili on June 22 because they planned to later meet, but that Vaimili failed to show and thereafter did not return any of trial counsel’s phone calls. After issuing a bench warrant and ordering the forfeiture of Vaimili’s bond, the circuit court continued the trial for five days. On June 28, 2010, Vaimili’s whereabouts were still unknown — trial counsel informed the circuit court that Vaimili still had not contacted him and that the bail bond company had not been able to locate Vaimili. The circuit court also noted that it received several phone calls from a bail bond company employee indicating she was seeking assistance from law enforcement authorities to help locate and apprehend Vaimili. The court continued proceedings for another twenty-one days to July 19, 2010. On that date, Vaimili remained absent, and defense counsel argued that trial should not proceed without Vaimili as the State “ha[d] not met its burden to show that [Vaimili] [wa]s voluntary[ily] absent.” Specifically, defense counsel suggested, “[f]or all we know, your Honor, [Vaimili] may have been hurt or . . . deceased.” Through the court’s colloquy with defense counsel, it was established that defense counsel’s last successful contact with Vaimili was on June 22, which was 21  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  the day after jury selection. Further, all of defense counsel’s subsequent attempts to contact Vaimili by phone at a number provided by Vaimili — including the most recent efforts one to two weeks before July 19 — were unsuccessful. Defense counsel also stated that the head of the company that posted bail for Vaimili informed him that she could not reach Vaimili at that same provided number, and that she was searching for Vaimili on the mainland. Thus, for almost a month, Vaimili had no contact with his attorney or bail bond person, the minimum two individuals he should have had contact with given that he was released on bail and was last informed that trial was to resume on June 23, 2010. Moreover, these events unfolded after (1) the court previously received testimony in April 2010 by the court clerk that Del Rio had informed her that Vaimili had forfeited bail and would need to be retrieved from San Francisco, and (2) Vaimili failed to appear on time for proceedings the morning of June 15, 2010. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the ICA, when conducting its de novo review, did not err in “conclud[ing] that there was sufficient evidence to show that Vaimili was voluntarily absent.” The trial court had issued a bench warrant to secure Vaimili’s return, yet local authorities were unable to locate him. The trial court also provided a significant amount of time for Vaimili to reappear and contact his attorney or bail 22  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  bond person, which he did not do. Moreover, the telephone number provided by Vaimili, when dialed, indicated that Vaimili “would not take any calls at that point in time,” see supra note 7, which does not support defense counsel’s position that Vaimili may have been injured or deceased. As the ICA noted, “[a]lthough the . . . [c]ourt did not know the precise reason for Vaimili’s failure to appear, the record provides compelling evidence that Vaimili had absconded” and therefore was voluntarily absent. 2. For the Purposes of HRPP Rule 43, Trial “Commences” before the Selected Jury Is Sworn. HRPP Rule 43 is the successor to HRCP Rule 43, which in turn was modeled on Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”). See Caraballo, 62 Haw. at 322 n.12, 615 P.2d at 99 n.12; Matias v. State, 73 Haw. 147, 149, 828 P.2d 281, 283 (1992). HRPP Rule 43 states in relevant part: “The further progress . . . of the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present, . . . is voluntarily absent after the . . . trial has commenced[.]” HRPP Rule 43(b)(1). This portion of HRPP Rule 43 is substantially similar to the version of FRCP Rule 43 after which HRCP Rule 43 was patterned. Compare HRPP Rule 43(b)(1), with FRCP 43(b)(1) (1975 and 1995 23  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  amendments) (“The further progress of the trial . . . will not be prevented and the defendant will be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present at trial . . . is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced.”). Since 1995, FRCP 43 has not changed substantively; only stylistic edits were made in 2002 to promote clarity and consistency. See FRCP 43(c)(1)(A) (“A defendant who was initially present at trial . . . waives the right to be present . . . when the defendant is voluntarily absent after the trial has begun . . . .”). See State v. Okumura, 58 Haw. 425, 570 P.2d 848 (1977). As with the federal rule after which it was modeled, HRPP Rule 43 “refers not to the commencement of jeopardy but to the commencement of trial.” United States v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600, 603 (1st Cir. 1972). Thus, although jeopardy attaches after an empaneled jury is sworn, see State v. Quitog, 85 Hawaii 128, 141, 938 P.2d 559, 572 (1997), that does not mean an empaneled jury must be sworn before trial “commences” for the purposes of HRPP Rule 43. Rather, federal courts have consistently held that for purposes of FRCP Rule 43, trial “has begun” or “commenced” when jury selection begins, not when the selected jury is sworn in. See, e.g., Miller, 463 F.2d at 603 (“With regard to a defendant’s presence at trial, the trial commences ‘at least’ 24  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  from the time that the work of impaneling jurors begins.” (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884)); United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Krout, 56 F.3d 643 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Camacho, 955 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1992); Government of the Virgin Islands v. George, 680 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1982); Miller, 463 F.2d 600); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011). Indeed, “[a] felony defendant has a right to be present at jury selection because the trial begins no later than voir dire.” Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). These federal cases are persuasive given HRPP Rule 43’s origins in FRCP Rule 43. Moreover, the plain text of HRPP Rule 43 supports the conclusion that jury selection is not a proceeding separate from trial. See HRPP Rule 43(a) (“The defendant shall be present . . . at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury . . . .”) (emphasis added); State v. Rauch, 94 Hawaii 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000) (stating that statutory construction begins with “language contained in the statute itself”). As such, we agree with the foregoing line of federal cases interpreting FRCP Rule 43, and hold that for the purposes of HRPP Rule 43, trial “commences” when prospective jurors are administered an oath prior to voir dire, at any authorized location for court proceedings. 25  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  3. The Okumura Balancing Test Applies to Voluntarily Absent Defendants Such as Vaimili. We further clarify that when a defendant has not expressly requested — and been granted — permission to leave an on-going trial,9 but is otherwise voluntarily absent, the trial court must still engage in the balancing test outlined in Okumura, 58 Haw. 425, 570 P.2d 848, before determining whether to proceed with the trial: “[T]he narrow discretion given to the trial judge to proceed with the trial should be exercised only when the public interest clearly outweighs that of the absent defendant.” (quoting United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santoro v. United States, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972)). Thus, a defendant’s right to confront his accusers is balanced against factors such as (1) “the time and expense caused by [a] defendant’s efforts to defeat the proceedings by his departure or flight,” Okumura, 58 Haw. at 430, 570 P.2d at 852 (citation and quotation marks omitted); (2) “the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defendant present,” United States v. Benavides, 9 Our ruling in Caraballo, 62 Haw. 309, 615 P.2d 91, is not disturbed. In that case, the defendant, through counsel, twice requested and was granted, permission to leave the trial while it continued to proceed. See Caraballo, 62 Haw. at 321 n.11, 615 P.2d at 99 n.11. The first instance was prior to the empaneling of the jury, and the second instance was during the testimony of a witness. See Caraballo, 62 Haw. at 320 & nn.8, 9, 615 P.2d at 98 nn.8, 9. In these circumstances, we held that the defendant’s requested, voluntary absence from trial, with no record that the defendant also requested that trial be continued until his return, “operates as a waiver of his right to be present and the trial may continue as if he were present.” Caraballo, 62 Haw. at 323, 615 P.2d at 100. 26  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  596 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1979); (3) “the difficulty of rescheduling,” Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210; (4) the “inconvenience to jurors,” Benavides, 596 F.2d at 140; and (5) harm to the State’s case, Okumura, 58 Haw. at 430, 570 P.2d at 852. Here, Vaimili was present at the start of trial, when a jury and alternate jurors were selected. Despite Vaimili’s absence when trial resumed on June 23, 2010 and was later continued to June 28, 2010, the court did not hastily proceed with trial, but instead continued proceedings again for an extra twenty-one days due to Vaimili’s disappearance. Cf. Benavides, 596 F.2d at 140 (concluding the trial court abused its discretion when it proceeded with trial after providing only a one-day continuance for defense counsel to locate his clients). Yet, even with the extension of time, no indication was given as to when Vaimili would return. Vaimili did not contact anyone related to the case, his attorney and bail bond person could not reach him, and authorities could not locate Vaimili after a bench warrant issued. Thus any further delay to proceedings in order to await Vaimili’s return was foreseeably indefinite, as there was “no reasonable probability he could be located shortly.” United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 1983). Based on these circumstances, the public interest clearly outweighed Vaimili’s interest. The purpose of HRPP 27  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  43(b)(1) is to prevent a defendant from “defeat[ing] the proceedings by voluntarily absenting himself after the trial has been commenced in his presence.” FRCP 43 advisory committee’s note (1944 adoption). Vaimili’s disappearance for nearly a month stymied all reasonable efforts by the court to permit him to be present at the remainder of his trial. The delay caused by Vaimili’s absence and lack of contact had already required the replacement of one juror, with an indefinite delay potentially requiring the dismissal of additional jurors, thereby wasting the time and expense already spent for trial. Accordingly, the circuit court did not violate Vaimili’s right to be present at trial. The ICA did not err in concluding that the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion in proceeding with the trial without Vaimili.