Opinion ID: 524999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McKee's Equal Protection Claim

Text: 79 McKee maintains that a de facto policy or custom of the police officers of Rockwall, which treats victims of domestic assault less seriously than victims of nondomestic assault, purposefully discriminates against women. McKee also maintains that the actions of the officers involved in this case reflect the City of Rockwall's policy or custom and demonstrate an acceptance of the de facto policy by the individual officers. 80 The majority's holding exists in its statements that McKee has offered no evidence at all and has completely failed to adduce facts supporting her claim of gender-based discrimination. I respectfully disagree. McKee, the nonmovant, has produced summary judgment evidence short on extensiveness but long on meaning to support her claim that the city's de facto policy or custom, and the officers' individual actions, are not gender-neutral. Her evidence also allows an inference of purposeful or intentional discrimination, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), a necessary element of her claim. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 1920, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The majority does not reach the intent issue, but it is clear that the Supreme Court does not require a nonmovant to produce a smoking gun to advance past the summary judgment stage. 81
82 A broad understanding of equal protection doctrine aids one's inquiry in this complex area. The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not remove from the states and cities the ability to classify people, and accordingly treat the various categories differently. Certain classifications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm.    Classifications based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination. [citation omitted]. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). 83 [The Supreme Court's] recent cases teach that such classifications must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives, [citation omitted], and are in many settings unconstitutional. Personnel v. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. 84 To decide whether evidence gives rise to an inference of gender discrimination, one must first determine whether the official action is gender neutral, or purposefully gender-based. Since the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), a plaintiff, to utilize any sort of heightened scrutiny and thus realistically hope to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, must demonstrate that the action taken was taken in part with discriminatory intent or purpose. [Washington v.] Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on [sexually] discriminatory purposes.    When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, [ ] judicial deference is no longer justified. Arlington Heights, 97 S.Ct. at 563. 85 In many cases, a plaintiff challenges a statute and asserts that the statute is not gender neutral. See Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. Sometimes a plaintiff is not challenging the enacted, positive law, but, instead, is challenging the administration of a neutral statute. Discriminatory treatment is also subject to equal protection analysis. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). 86 Because the exact words of a statute cannot be examined in a discriminatory treatment case, one must analyze the policies, customs, attitudes, understandings and practices of the entity or persons making the alleged distinctions. Is the treatment gender neutral from the viewpoint of the persons or entity making the distinction? If so, an examining court must engage in a secondary line of inquiry and examine any alleged discriminatory impact to determine whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. In contrast, if the entity or persons making the alleged distinction understand that men and women are purposefully treated differently through their actions--which in a discriminatory application case constitutes the classification scheme--then a court can conclude that the differing treatment is, in fact, gender-based. It is not necessary to receive a signed admission from one of the state actors that the differing treatment is invidious. Covert purposes and understandings are just as constitutionally relevant as overt purposes, see Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293, and are much more likely to be the modus operandi of those persons who purposefully discriminate by their actions against others based upon invidious reasons. 87 Those who discriminate on the basis of race and gender do not usually parade down main street with their banners of bigotry unfurled. As our society continues to change, purposefully discriminatory actions occur more frequently behind closed doors and within the recesses of the mind than in the open square of public discourse. But whether on the corner square or within the dark passageways of the mind, purposeful discrimination is still invidious. 88 It is not necessary that the person or entity making an alleged illegitimate distinction be Attila the Hun. Malice and evil will are not the constitutional standards. [P]urposeful discrimination is the 'condition that offends the Constitution.' Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554. Personnel v. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. A person who acts according to stereotypical notions, can act purposefully if the person consciously intends to accomplish the action undertaken. From generation to generation we pass down ideas and beliefs about how the world works. Some of these traditions are, in fact, generalizations which are only stereotypes of how women and men are different. A person who consciously believes in the truth of the stereotype acts purposefully when the person implements the stereotype in a particular situation. This sort of purposeful action is what the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause is all about. See generally Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) (care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypical notions). Continuity of a stereotype through the generations combined with a person's action pursuant to the alleged truth, may be purposeful action on the person's part within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 89 Imagine that the Greene family gets together every Sunday evening for supper. Mama Greene every week cooks a big meal. Most of the children and grandchildren attend. This is a family tradition: Sunday supper at Mama's table. When Anita Greene, the second daughter, thinks about what she is going to do next Sunday, she has to decide if she is going to eat supper at her parents' house. Maybe one week Anita decides she has too much work to do at the office, so she telephones her mother and tells her she cannot come on Sunday. The next week arrives, and Anita decides to go and have Sunday supper with the family. When she goes over to her parents' house and eats with the family, her actions are purposeful. She is a creature of free will. Anita purposefully goes and eats Sunday supper with her family, although her motivation in part results from habit. Sunday supper at the Greene house is a tradition. 90 Traditions may reflect purposes so ingrained that particularized decision-making instance by instance becomes unnecessary. Customs, traditions, and stereotypes often guide and motivate us in choosing what path we shall follow. Such choices can nevertheless be purposeful. Such purposefulness, when it is rooted in illegitimate notions of race or gender, is the sort of action that is not neutral under the Equal Protection Clause. 91 If an action is gender-based, then it is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). The Supreme Court's decisions establish that the party seeking to ... classif[y] individuals on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification. [citations omitted]. The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'  Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).
92 McKee asserts that the City of Rockwall has a custom, practice, understanding or policy of treating domestic assault cases involving female victims less seriously then assault case involving strangers, thus denying her the equal protection of the law because such a custom or policy is an unconstitutional gender-based form of discrimination. McKee further maintains that the individual officers in this case have demonstrated through their actions similarly unconstitutional discrimination based upon gender. 93 The officers' decision not to arrest Streetman does not facially appear, at first glance, to be based upon considerations of gender. The officers did not state that they do not arrest domestic abuse suspects who beat women. If they had said this, of course, then the nonarrest of Streetman, assuming there was authority to arrest him, would on its face lead to the conclusion that gender discrimination entered into the nonarrest decision. Smoking guns, as I have discussed, are not required. Thus whether a reasonable jury could make factual findings from which one could infer that gender discrimination exists in this case depends on whether the attitudes and decisions of the Rockwall police concerning arrests in domestic violence situations, and in this case in particular, is supported by McKee's summary judgment evidence. 94 McKee presents two pieces of evidence which could permissibly lead to the inference that purposeful gender discrimination entered into the decision not to arrest Streetman: (1) the Chief of Police's statement; and (2) McKee's story of what happened to her. 95
96 The affidavit of McKee's mother states that: Within one or two days of the assault upon my daughter, my husband Roy McKee and I had a conversation with Chief Beaty of the Rockwall Police Department. During that conversation we asked the Chief why Harry Streetman had not been arrested when our daughter first called the police and reported his assault upon her. The Chief responded that his officers did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial. 97 The Chief's statement explicitly distinguishes between men and women. According to the Chief, it is women who will not file charges, and it is women who will drop the charges prior to trial. The Chief concludes that because women act like this, police officers do not like to arrest their domestic assaulters. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.1988) (reversing district court dismissal of equal protection claim in domestic assault case; remarks of officers strongly suggest ... an animus against abused women); compare Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 857 F.2d 690, 696-97 (10th Cir.1988) (summary judgment for defendant on equal protection claim reversed with respect to classification scheme of domestic/nondomestic violence, affirmed with respect to gender-based claim because plaintiff presented no evidence of either adverse impact or discriminatory purpose); see also Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1030 (3rd Cir.1988). 98 The Chief's compacted but crucial statement is central to this case. Under our classification-based equal protection jurisprudence, whether a female plaintiff falls into a class of domestic abuse victims, or female domestic abuse victims, may determine the appropriate level of scrutiny a court conducts for her claim. The police chief's statement (did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved ...) should be enough for McKee to move beyond summary judgment on her gender-based claim. 99 The labels domestic violence or domestic assault tend to hide the gender of the victims in such cases. Numerous scholarly studies have recognized that women are primarily the victims of domestic abuse. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 n. 1 (D.Conn.1984) (quoting Leeds, Family Offense Cases in the Family Court System: in 29 out of every 30 such cases the husband stands accused of abusing his wife); see Comment, Battered Women, 95 Yale L.J. 788 (cited in note 1, supra ). Our equal protection jurisprudence requires evidence of a classification; judicial notice will not do. 100 McKee has offered such evidence. When the Chief states--that women, not men, are the victims in domestic assault cases--the plaintiff hurdles a barrier which is extremely difficult to ascend. This supplies the understanding that domestic assault affects women. A general observation of our society confirms what the Chief easily recognizes, that is that women are the victims in domestic violence situations. 4 A Texas statute is a good example of the observation that women particularly suffer from violence in the home. The assault statute, Tex.Penal Code Sec. 22.01 was amended in 1979 to include the underscored words: A person commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including his spouse.... The Texas legislature felt it was necessary to make it explicit that husbands cannot beat their wives. Presumably, before the Texas legislature made this clear, some people thought, and probably still think, that it is acceptable for husbands and boyfriends to beat their wives and girlfriends. 5 See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 (D.Conn.1984) (quoting from scholarly writings which set forth that at common law, husbands were permitted to beat their wives, within limits). 101 Women in their homes are vulnerable to the men with whom they live. Women's vulnerability is heightened by a police officer's hesitancy and sometimes refusal to invade the space of privacy which surrounds the family or unit of people living together. The Texas legislature has attempted to address and refute the historical belief that the curtilage of a man's home is sacrosanct. A man's home is his castle indeed. The officers' dislike affects women. 102 The Chief voices the sentiments and purposes of the officers he commands by stating that his officers did not like to make arrests.... The buried feeling among his officers, according to the Chief's statement, which we must take as true, is that women are responsible for the officers' disinclination to make arrests in domestic assault situations. This blaming of the victim operates to deprive women of the protection of the police from assault based upon their status as women. The majority states that a dislike is not a policy, and one officer's dislike [is not] binding on another. The majority's construction of the evidence against nonmovant is inappropriate. A trial may demonstrate that a dislike and a de facto policy are one and the same. The Chief is certainly competent to discuss whether a particular action or response in a given situation is a custom or de facto policy of the officers he commands. The Chief's statement creates an issue of fact concerning the discriminatory treatment of women in domestic assault situations. This evidence should be enough for plaintiff to survive summary judgment concerning the viability of her equal protection claim. 103
104 The officers' interaction with McKee constitutes evidence that, when coupled with the Chief's statement, would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of McKee's equal protection claim. Again, because this is case is presented in the posture of defendants' motions for summary judgment, we must treat plaintiff's evidence as true. 105 In her affidavit, quoted above, McKee informed the officers that Streetman had beat her, and that she feared that he would do so again because he had threatened her. McKee states: The officers present refused to drive me to my parents' home and refused to arrest Mr. Streetman. Instead, they said that I was exaggerating the threat Mr. Streetman posed to me and suggested that I talk matters out with him.    They also indicated that after I had calmed down I probably would not want to file a complaint. At this time, Mr. Streetman threatened to burn my belongings if I went to the station [to file a complaint]. The police did not respond. (emphasis added). 106 The treatment McKee received calls to mind the archaic and stereotypical usage of the word hysteria. The Oxford English Dictionary, finally published in 1933 after 70 years of compilation, defines hysteria as follows: 1. Path[ological] A functional disturbance of the nervous system, characterized by such disorders as anaesthesia, hyperaesthesia, convulsions, etc., and usually attended with emotional disturbances and enfeeblement or perversion of the moral and intellectual faculties. The OED goes on to state: Women being much more liable than men to this disorder, it was originally thought to be due to a disturbance of the uterus and its functions. The officers' accusation that McKee was exaggerating the threat, and their suggestion that after she calmed down, she would not want to file a complaint, remind me of the mores of the century preceding even my birth. 107 In the linguistic history of our society, it is common to find women referred to as hysterical; it is uncommon to find references to hysterical men. Two thousand years of Western Civilization's stereotypes are not easy to undo from the hearts of its people. McKee probably was upset. Such a response is extremely rational and understandable if Streetman had beat her and threatened her physical safety to the point of death, and the police stood by and did nothing to protect her. 6 There is nothing hysterical about such a response. In contrast, Streetman threatened in the officers' presence to burn her belongings. The officers, who are all male, treated McKee's expressions in a condescending manner, while not responding to Streetman's threat. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.1988) (officer's comment that he did not blame plaintiff's husband for hitting her because of the way she was 'carrying on'  suggests an animus against women). 108