Opinion ID: 3013373
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “shut-ins” liner

Text: Citadel challenges the admission of the liner as well as the testimony about it. The District Court admitted the liner over Citadel’s objections because it found the liner relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402 to the issue of age-based animus, even if it only referred to the station’s audience and not McNulty. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. This was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the Court found that the liner was “at least as probative 2 Citadel also argues that judgment as a matter of law should have been granted on McNulty’s age discrimination claim under the PHRA because he did not exhaust his state administrative remedies before adding the claim to his federal claim. This argument is without merit, as McNulty did not file his state claim until after he had received a letter from the PHRC stating that it had closed his case and he was free to file a claim in court. As the District Court notes, McNulty never asked the PHRC to transfer or close his file, as was the case in the many state cases Citadel relies on. The PHRC apparently has a policy of closing cases when civil complaints are filed and allowing the complainant to pursue their action in court. Therefore, McNulty abided by the state exhaustion rules and was free to file his claim. 12 as it is prejudicial,” and therefore was not barred by Rule 403, which decision was also not an abuse of discretion. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. However, the Court allowed numerous WARM listeners to testify not only as to when they first heard the liner – relevant to the disputed factual issue of when the liner was first played – but also as to what they thought it meant. McNulty offered a parade of witnesses, eleven in number, who testified that they did not hear the liner until after McNulty was taken off the air, and also discussed their outrage at hearing the liner, and their belief that the liner meant WARM thought McNulty was too old and that he, like the audience, was a “shut-in.”3 Under Rule 701, non-expert opinions are “limited to those opinions or inferences which are . . . (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony of the determination of a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. An opinion is only helpful to the jury “if it aids or clarifies an issue that the jury would not otherwise be as competent to understand.” Lauria v. N’tl RR Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600 (3d Cir. 1998). We agree with Citadel that the testimony as to the meaning of the liner was erroneously admitted. The listeners’ testimony as to when they first heard the liner may have been relevant to a disputed factual issue, but their testimony as to what they thought 3 Among the statements, one witness told the jury that he was “offended” by the liner because he was a listener and did not consider himself a shut-in, and that in his opinion WARM “made it sound like Mr. McNulty was an old man who is catering to an older market.” (A486). Another witness stated that the liner “reflected poorly on Terry McNulty in that it cast him as a shut-in as well.” (A445). 13 the liner meant and how it impacted them was improper. Lay witnesses are not needed to interpret clear conversation, see United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1988), especially when the opinion goes to the ultimate issue and witnesses’ testimony distracts jurors “from their task of drawing an independent conclusion.” Hester v. BIC Corp., 225 F.3d 178, 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding inadmissible testimony by four witnesses who were not involved in decision-making process that employment decision “must have been” based on race). Here, the witnesses were not in a better position to form the opinion or make the inference, as the jury could easily understand what “not just for shut-ins anymore” meant. Furthermore, the witnesses’ testimony went to the ultimate issue, whether WARM’s action was motivated by age bias, and the witnesses usurped the jury’s task of making an independent evaluation of the evidence. This erroneous admission was not harmless. See Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 1992) (error is only harmless if it is “highly probable” that the error did not contribute to the judgment). Given that the evidence of age discrimination was entirely circumstantial, and the overall evidence presented a close case, it is probable that the jury, believing the witnesses’ views were to be considered by them as proof, relied on them, in lieu of, or at least in formation of, their own opinion regarding a key aspect of McNulty’s case. Because Citadel was prejudiced by the erroneously admitted listeners’ testimony, we will grant a new trial.