Opinion ID: 2331207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application of NRS 48.045(2)

Text: In this case, the district court admitted evidence of prior allegations of domestic violence following a thorough Petrocelli hearing and the issuance of an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury. Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 270, 182 P.3d 106, 111 (2008). We review the district court's decision for a manifest abuse of discretion. Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 259, 129 P.3d 671, 676 (2006). In deciding to admit the evidence, the district court relied on two Hawaii cases which held that when the victim recants pretrial accusations against the defendant, evidence of prior acts of domestic violence involving the same victim and defendant may be admissible to show the jury the context of the relationship between the victim and the defendant, where the relationship is offered as a possible explanation for the complaining witness's recantation at trial. State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 926 P.2d 194, 208 (1996); State v. Asuncion, 110 Hawai`i 154, 129 P.3d 1182, 1195 (Haw.Ct.App.2006). Hawaii is not alone in permitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under similar theories based on evidence provisions similar to NRS 48.045(2). See, e.g., State v. Magers, 164 Wash.2d 174, 189 P.3d 126, 133 (2008) ([P]rior acts of domestic violence, involving the defendant and the crime victim, are admissible in order to assist the jury in judging the credibility of a recanting victim.); Com. v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 839 N.E.2d 307, 313 (2005) (holding that the jury is entitled to consider evidence that depicted the hostile relationship between [the victim] and the defendant [in order to help] explain her recantation, so that they could adequately assess her credibility); State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 364 (Minn.1999) (admitting evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) because it served to illuminate appellant and victim's strained relationship and place the incident for which appellant was charged into proper context); State v. Sanders, 168 Vt. 60, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (1998) (admitting prior history of abuse under Vt. R. Evid. 404(b) to put the victim's recantation of prior statements into context for the jury in order to give the jury an understanding of why the victim is less than candid in her testimony so that they can decide which of the victim's statements is more reliable); State v. Frost, 242 N.J.Super. 601, 577 A.2d 1282, 1291 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1990) (admitting evidence of prior domestic abuse in order to prove the victim's state of mind in order to explain why victim stayed with defendant). Here, the victim's credibility was clearly a central issue at trial because she was the only witness to the alleged incident. An emergency room physician, paramedic, and police officer all testified that the victim told them that Bigpond punched her in the jaw with a closed fist and she fell to the ground. However, during trial the victim recanted and claimed that her husband never punched her and she just made up the story because she was mad at him. Like the above cases, the victim's prior accusations of domestic violence were relevant because they provide insight into the relationship and the victim's possible reason for recanting her prior accusations, which would assist the jury in adequately assessing the victim's credibility. See NRS 48.015 (explaining that to be relevant, the evidence must concern a fact... of consequence to the determination of the action). The first Tinch factor is satisfied because the victim's prior accusations against Bigpond were relevant and were not admitted in order to show Bigpond's propensity to commit domestic violence but to provide a possible explanation for why the victim recanted her previous statements made to law enforcement and medical personnel. The second Tinch factor is also satisfied. There was clear and convincing evidence that the alleged prior bad acts occurred. Bigpond previously pleaded guilty to punching the victim with a closed fist on July 16, 2009, and grabbing the victim by the hair, slapping her, and pushing her to the ground on November 1, 2009. Finally, the district court carefully weighed the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice, concluding that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as required by the final Tinch factor. During the Petrocelli hearing, the district court recognized that the admission of the victim's prior allegations of domestic violence would prejudice Bigpond but concluded that the importance of establishing the relationship between Bigpond and the victim outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. To minimize that prejudice, the district court restricted the victim's testimony to her prior accusations and did not admit the prior convictions. Furthermore, prior to the admission of the evidence, the district court issued a limiting instruction explaining that the evidence was only being allowed to provide [the jury] with a context of the relationship between the witness and the defendant and to give [the jury] a possible explanation for the witness's differing testimony in court at this time. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion because it adequately assessed the three Tinch factors outside the presence of the jury, see Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 259, 129 P.3d 671, 676 (2006), and gave an appropriate limiting instruction before admission of the evidence explaining the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted, see Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 270, 182 P.3d 106, 111 (2008). In reaching this conclusion, however, we caution the State that our decision is dependent upon the particular facts of this case and the use of prior act evidence ... pursuant to NRS 48.045(2) should always be approached with circumspection. Ledbetter, 122 Nev. at 264, 129 P.3d at 679-80. We affirm the judgment of conviction. We concur: HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.