Opinion ID: 394177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Utilities

Text: 28 The PG&E case comes to us in a different procedural posture and on quite different facts. The plaintiffs, PG&E and SCE, allege direct injuries. They claim that the Warren-Alquist Act and the Nuclear Laws impose burdens on them which have caused them to cancel plans to build nuclear plants. Since the redress of these injuries would not depend upon the actions of third parties not before the court, our inquiry can be limited to a single question: whether the plaintiffs' injuries are fairly traceable to the Warren-Alquist Act and the Nuclear Laws. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261-62, 97 S.Ct. at 561-62. If the statutes directly caused the claimed injuries, we can assume for standing purposes that the injuries would be redressed by invalidation of the statutes. See Davis v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 627 F.2d 942, 944-45 (9th Cir. 1980). 29 The court below limited its grant of summary judgment for the utilities to the issue of preemption. On the issue of whether the utilities had standing, the court held a trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Although standing is usually determined on the pleadings, a trial may be held if the facts alleged to support standing are in dispute. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1616 n.31, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 n.31 (1979). A reviewing court is then bound by the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 74 n.19, 98 S.Ct. at 2631 n.19. 30 The trial court found that both PG&E and SCE had decided to include nuclear plants among their power generating facilities in the 1990's; that PG&E had planned to build a nuclear plant known as Stanislaus, for which it had filed a notice of intention with the Energy Commission; that SCE had planned to participate in the building of two nuclear plants known as Nuclear 1 and Nuclear 2; and that both PG&E and SCE had cancelled their plans in the belief that, as a practical matter, the challenged statutory provisions made it impossible for them to proceed. The court further found that PG&E and SCE would reinstate their plans to build nuclear plants if the challenged statutes were invalidated. 31 The Energy Commission contends here, as it did in the trial court, that the utilities' proposed nuclear plants would not be built even if the challenged statutes were invalidated. The Energy Commission has presented evidence showing that many planned nuclear plants have been cancelled in recent years due to federal regulatory restraints, safety concerns growing out of the Three Mile Island incident, difficulties in obtaining financing, and reduction in demand for electricity. The trial court specifically found that the utilities had considered these factors, and had nevertheless decided to proceed with their nuclear plans if the challenged provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act were struck down. 32 We cannot say that the findings of the court below are clearly erroneous. It is true, as the Energy Commission asserts, that many factors beyond the utilities' control might eventually keep the proposed plants from being built. But the utilities do not lack standing merely because they would still have to secure financing, meet the requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and comply with other regulations. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, all construction projects are subject to some extent to similar uncertainties. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261, 97 S.Ct. at 561. Because the challenged statutes stand as an absolute barrier to construction of the proposed plants, and because that barrier will be removed if the utilities secure the injunctive relief they seek, it is irrelevant that an injunction would not guarantee that the plants will be built. Id. It is sufficient that the utilities intend to proceed if the statutes are invalidated. The utilities therefore have standing to sue. III RIPENESS 33 We next consider whether any of the challenges to the statutory provisions before us are ripe for review. 34 The doctrines of standing and ripeness are closely related, in that the application of either is intended to prevent courts from becoming enmeshed in abstract questions which have not concretely affected the parties. Pence v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1978). Like standing, the ripeness doctrine is based in part upon the article III requirement that courts decide only cases or controversies. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138, 95 S.Ct. 335, 355, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). The exercise of judicial restraint, however, is an added ingredient of the ripeness doctrine by which courts can decline to decide issues which are not yet fit for adjudication. Id. Thus, while both doctrines require us to ask whether the plaintiff has suffered harm, ripeness requires an additional inquiry into whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 n.10, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). 35 In deciding whether an issue is ripe for review, we evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); see Western Oil & Gas Association v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 633 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1980); Pence, 586 F.2d at 737. 19 A challenge to a statute or regulation that has not yet been applied is generally considered fit for judicial determination if the issue raised is a purely legal one, Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515, or one which further factual development will not render more concrete. Western Oil & Gas, 633 F.2d at 808; see Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167, 171, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 1528, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967). On the other hand, if the issue would be illuminated by the development of a better factual record, the challenged statute or regulation is generally not considered fit for adjudication until it has actually been applied. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 143-44, 95 S.Ct. at 358-59; Pence, 586 F.2d at 737 & n.12. 36 With these principles in mind, we address first, the general certification scheme for electric power plants; second, the requirement that utilities acquire development rights surrounding their proposed plants; third, the requirement that utilities propose three alternate sites for their plants; and finally, the restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Laws. A. The Warren-Alquist Act
37 The certification requirement is the centerpiece of the Warren-Alquist Act's regulatory scheme. In order to decide whether to certify a proposed plant, the Energy Commission gathers information from many sources including the applicant, on a wide variety of issues. The utilities challenge the Energy Commission's power to gather such information, as well as its power to deny certification. 38 We find that the challenges to the provisions establishing this regulatory scheme, Cal.Pub.Res. Code §§ 25500, 25502, 25504, 25511, 25512, 25514, 25516, 25517, 25519, 25520, 25523, 25532, are not ripe for adjudication. On the record before us, we have no way of knowing what types of information the Energy Commission might require of the utilities, or to what purposes the information might be put. As we explain infra at pp. 920-923, the utilities' preemption claim may depend upon the reasons for which the Energy Commission requests information or, ultimately, its reasons for denying certification. We cannot presently tell whether the Energy Commission will ever deny certification, or whether such a denial might be based upon impermissible reasons. Because the issue presented requires factual development, and should not be decided in the abstract, Pence v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1978), we hold that the challenges to these sections are not ripe. 39 We also note that a delay in adjudication will not cause any undue hardship for the parties. The certification scheme, in general, does not have an immediate and substantial impact on the utilities, Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167, 171, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967); neither PG&E nor SCE has a notice of intention or application for certification pending, 20 and the threat that procedural burdens might someday be imposed or that certification might someday be denied for failure to meet Energy Commission standards is remote at best. 40 The utilities contend that the certification system precludes planning for new nuclear plants, and thus does have an immediate impact. In the utilities' view, their planning abilities are compromised by the risks that the Energy Commission will deny certification and/or the plaintiffs will be caught in a maze of conflicting decisions and requirements imposed by the Commission and the NRC. Such risks are, however, present whenever a plaintiff challenges a statute that has not yet been applied. E. g., Boating Industry Associations v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 1376, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1979). The utilities cannot establish a justiciable controversy by simply asserting that the risk of future harm causes them a present injury. As we said in Sea Ranch Association v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commissions, 537 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976), (a) case or controversy is not presented simply because a party is subject to a general regulatory process which, when applied to the specific facts developed in some future administrative proceeding, might cause a state agency to take a particular action which some court might thereafter determine to be unconstitutional. Id. at 1063 (emphasis in original). See Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1524, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967).
41 A similar analysis convinces us that the challenge to section 25528 is not ripe for review. In one sense, it presents a purely legal question: can California require a utility to acquire development rights so as to limit the population density surrounding its nuclear plants, when the NRC has not done so? Several factors persuade us, however, that the question would be better decided after the statute has been applied. 42 First, the Energy Commission may not need to exercise its power to require acquisition of development rights. The Energy Commission is directed to waive the requirement to the extent that existing land use laws maintain a safe population level. Cal.Pub.Res. Code § 25528(c). We have no way of knowing at present whether the Energy Commission will find such laws to be insufficient in any particular case. We are reluctant to rule on the constitutionality of a statute that may never be used. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 305, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2312, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). Moreover, the statute contemplates that the Energy Commission will ordinarily follow NRC standards on population density. Cal.Pub.Res. Code § 25528(b). 21 It is not clear whether the statute authorizes the Energy Commission to set standards different from those of the NRC. To date, the Energy Commission has neither interpreted the statute nor set different standards. If it did so, our preemption analysis might be affected. 43 For these reasons, and because we see no harm to the parties in delay, we hold that the utilities' challenge is not ripe. The issue must await the Energy Commission's enforcement of section 25528 in the face of an actual application for certification.
44 We find that section 25503, requiring a utility to include at least three alternate sites in its notice of intention, is ripe for review. 22 Unlike the other challenged provisions, the validity of this section is unlikely to depend upon the factual setting in which it is applied. The section applies unequivocally to any utility wishing to submit a notice of intention. Its operation is in no way hypothetical or speculative. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143, 95 S.Ct. 335, 358, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). We therefore see no reason to delay adjudication until a utility actually submits a notice of intention containing less than three sites. Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect. Id.; see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n.7, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124 n.7, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977). B. The Nuclear Laws 1. Sections 25524.1 and 25524.3 45 The challenges to these sections do not present justiciable controversies. Section 25524.1(a) bars only nuclear plants which require fuel rod reprocessing, and no such plants are currently being planned. 23 The Energy Commission has specifically concluded that fuel rod reprocessing is not currently required, either by the federal government or by existing technology. In the Matter of Implementation of Nuclear Reprocessing and Waste Disposal Statutes, Nos. 76-NL-1, 76-NL-3 at 2-3 (ERCDC Jan. 25, 1978). Section 25524.1(a) therefore has no present effect and poses no concrete threat to the utilities. 46 Section 25524.1(b) requires the Energy Commission to determine the adequacy of nuclear plants' spent fuel storage capacity. The Energy Commission intends to make such a determination on a case-by-case basis, as the statute requires. In the Matter of Implementation of Nuclear Reprocessing and Waste Disposal Statutes, Nos. 76-NL-1, 76-NL-3 at 5 (ERCDC Jan. 25, 1978). Although an Energy Commission committee report at one point recommended requiring all nuclear plants to provide a specified amount of storage space, see Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, Status of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, Spent Fuel Storage and High-Level Waste Disposal 113 (ERCDC Draft Report Jan. 11, 1978), the Energy Commission has not adopted such a requirement. Because we cannot know whether the Energy Commission will ever find a nuclear plant's storage capacity to be inadequate, we hold that the challenge to section 25524.1(b) is not ripe for review. 47 Section 25524.3 imposed a moratorium on certification of nuclear plants pending submission of a certain report to the California legislature. Such a report was adopted by the Energy Commission on September 13, 1978. In the Matter of the Determinations of the Commission Pursuant to Public Resources Code Section 25524.3, No. 76-NL-2 (ERCDC Sept. 13, 1978). The record provides no support for the lower court's finding that this report was not submitted to the legislature, and a member of the Energy Commission has testified that it was so submitted. We conclude that the challenge to section 25524.3 is moot. 2. Section 25524.2 48 Although sections 25524.1(a) and 25524.3 pose no present barrier to the development of nuclear power in California, we cannot say the same of section 25524.2. This section imposes a moratorium on the certification of new nuclear plants until the Energy Commission has found, and has informed the legislature, that a federally approved method of nuclear waste disposal exists. The Energy Commission has not made the required findings. Section 25524.2 therefore remains in effect, and bars the certification of any new nuclear plants in California. 49 Section 25524.2 does not have any immediate impact on the utilities; they may continue to submit notices of intention and applications for certification for their proposed nuclear plants, and the Energy Commission must still receive and process the notices and applications even though the required findings have not been made. Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 25524.2(d). No plants may be certified until the findings are made, but the utilities concede that their proposed plants are many years from being eligible for certification. 50 Nevertheless, we conclude that the challenge to section 25524.2 is ripe for adjudication. The issue before us is a purely legal one, and our ability to deal with it would not be enhanced if we were to delay review. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81-82, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634-35, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). Postponement could, moreover, work substantial hardship on the utilities. On the one hand, they could proceed with their plans in the hopes that, when the time for certification came, either the required findings would be made or the law would be struck down. This would require massive expenditures over a number of years, expenditures that quite possibly could not be recovered unless the plant were eventually certified. Alternatively, the utilities could abandon their plans to use nuclear power, with the result that no challenge to section 25524.2 would ever be ripe. 51 We see no need to place the utilities in such a quandary. Since consideration of the underlying legal issues would be no easier in the context of a specific certification proceeding, we hold that the issues are ripe. We accordingly turn to the merits of the utilities' preemption claim as it relates to sections 25503 and 25524.2. 24 IV PREEMPTION 52 When a state statute is challenged under the supremacy clause, U.S.Const. art. VI, cl. 2, our inquiry is directed to whether Congress intended to prohibit the states from regulating in such a manner. We start with the assumption that the states' police powers were not to be superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947); accord, e. g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). 53 Congress's purpose is most clear, of course, when the federal statute at issue explicitly prohibits state regulation in the same field. E. g., Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 530-31, 97 S.Ct. at 1312. When the federal statute contains no such prohibition, congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from the nature of the federal regulatory scheme, e. g., Ray, 435 U.S. at 163, 98 S.Ct. at 997; City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 1859, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973), or from the subject matter being regulated, e. g., Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. at 1152; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63, 61 S.Ct. 399, 401-02, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Congressional intent to preempt must, however, be unambiguous. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1219-20, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). An intent to preempt cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the federal statute is detailed and complex, see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60, 96 S.Ct. 933, 938, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976); New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 2514, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973), or because the state legislation touches an area of predominantly national concern, e. g., De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-55, 96 S.Ct. at 935-36; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 94 S.Ct. 1879, 40 L.Ed.2d 315 (1974). 54 Even if Congress did not intend to preempt all state legislation in a given field, a state law must be held invalid to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. For example, a conflict will be found where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-43, 83 S.Ct. at 1217-18, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. at 404. Accord, Ray, 435 U.S. at 158, 98 S.Ct. at 994; Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 525-26, 97 S.Ct. at 1309-10. Once again, however, the presumption operates in favor of the validity of the state law; courts are not to seek out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exist. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446, 80 S.Ct. 813, 817-18, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960); see Rice, 331 U.S. at 237, 67 S.Ct. at 1155-56. A. Congressional Intent to Preempt 55 1. Division of federal and state authority in the Atomic Energy Act 56 To determine whether Congress intended to preempt states from regulating nuclear power in the ways California has chosen, we start with an examination of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has been reviewed extensively elsewhere, see, e. g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147-52 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035, 92 S.Ct. 1307, 31 L.Ed.2d 576 (1972); Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear Moratorium Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 392, 394-410 (1976), and need only be summarized briefly here. 57 This country's exploration of the peaceful uses of nuclear power began shortly after World War II, with passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 274, 60 Stat. 755. The 1946 Act transferred responsibility for the development of nuclear power from the military establishment to the civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 25 but left the federal government with complete control over all nuclear materials and facilities. This federal monopoly ended with passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which allowed private industry to participate for the first time in the development of nuclear power. The 1954 Act authorized private industry to conduct research and build commercial reactors, under licenses from the AEC. There were no immediate commercial applications of nuclear power at the time the 1954 Act was passed, but Congress believed that nuclear power at a competitive price was at least on the horizon. S.Rep.No.1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1954) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3456, 3458. 58 Two sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are significant in determining how Congress intended to divide regulatory responsibility between the states and the federal government. Section 271, 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976), provides that nothing in the Atomic Energy Act shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the (Nuclear Regulatory) Commission. This section was included in the 1954 Act to ensure that electricity produced by nuclear plants would be subject to the same regulatory authority as electricity produced by any other means. See 100 Cong.Rec. 12015, 12197, 12198, 12199 (1954) (remarks of Sen. Hickenlooper & Sen. Humphrey); H.R.Rep.No.567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1965) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2775, 2779. 26 The states' existing authority to regulate utilities was to remain unchanged. As Senator Hickenlooper, the floor manager of the Senate bill, explained: 59 We take the position that electricity is electricity. Once it is produced it should be subject to the proper regulatory body, whether it be the Federal Power Commission in the case of interstate transmission, or State regulatory bodies if such exist, or municipal regulatory bodies. We feel that there is no difference and that it should be treated as all other electricity which is regulated by the public. 60 .... 61 (Section 271) is designed to keep the regulatory authority exactly as it is now, traditionally and under the law. 62 100 Cong.Rec. 12015 (1954). 63 By 1959, Congress recognized that a more precise line needed to be drawn between the regulatory authority of the AEC and that of the states. Section 274, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976), was added to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in an attempt to draw such a line. See S.Rep.No.870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1959) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2872, 2873-74, 2878-80. Section 274 authorized the AEC to turn over to particular states the regulatory responsibility for radioisotopes and other less hazardous nuclear materials. The AEC and its successor agency, the NRC, retained sole responsibility for regulating certain more hazardous activities, including the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility, i. e., nuclear plant. § 274(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1); see § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc) (1976). Subsection (k), however, provided that (n)othing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. § 274(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k). 64 The parties' dispute centers on these sections. The utilities argue that section 274(c) gives the NRC sole authority to regulate, for all purposes, the construction and operation of nuclear plants. With regard to the three-site requirement and moratorium provision now before us, the utilities assert that section 274(c) authorizes the NRC to delay licensing of any further nuclear plants until a method of waste disposal is developed, or to require utilities to submit alternate sites for their proposed plants. Since section 274(c) gives the NRC the power to regulate in this manner, the utilities argue that it necessarily takes away the states' power to regulate. 65 We think the preemptive effect of section 274(c) is considerably narrower, since it must be read in conjunction with sections 271 and 274(k). Section 271 preserves the states' traditional authority over electrical utilities, and thus permits the states to decide whether additional power plants are needed. The states can also require the submission of accounting data, regulate rates, and the like. Congressional intent with respect to these powers is clear: the states are permitted to treat nuclear plants exactly as they would all other power plants. See 100 Cong.Rec. 12015-16, 12197-200 (1954). 66 Congressional intent with respect to section 274 is nearly as clear. Both the hearings on section 274 and the report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy demonstrate Congress's intent to assert exclusive federal control over the radiation hazards associated with nuclear materials. 27 Limited regulatory authority may be turned over to the states pursuant to section 274(b), but section 274(c) requires the NRC to retain full regulatory control over matters concerning radiation hazards. See, e. g., Federal-State Relationships, supra note 27, at 488-97; Letter from A. R. Luedecke to Senator Clinton P. Anderson, reprinted in Federal-State Relationships, supra note 27, at 500; S.Rep.No.870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1959) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2872, 2879. However, we find no indication in section 274 or elsewhere in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that Congress intended to preempt any state regulation other than that involving radiation hazards. On the contrary, section 274(k) specifically allows the states to regulate for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. The committee report explains that (t)his subsection is intended to make it clear that the bill does not impair the State authority to regulate activities of the AEC licensees for the manifold health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation protection. S.Rep.No.870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1959) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2872, 2882. Although section 274(c) gives the NRC sole authority to regulate the construction and operation of (nuclear power plants), the specific non-preemption language contained in sections 271 and 274(k) must control the general language of section 274(c). We therefore conclude that Congress intended to preempt only state regulation of radiation hazards associated with nuclear power, 28 and not state regulation for other purposes. 29 67 We find support for our reading of the statute in the consistent position of the NRC, the AEC, and the courts, that states are permitted to regulate in such areas as economics and the environment. The AEC originally asserted that environmental considerations were the exclusive concern of the states, and could not be taken into account during AEC licensing proceedings. New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Commission, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962, 89 S.Ct. 2100, 23 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969); see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 531 & n.10, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1205-06 & n.10, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). In New Hampshire v. AEC, for example, the AEC argued that it did not need to consider the possibility that a proposed nuclear plant would cause thermal pollution, because no licensing action on its part relieved a licensee from any obligation to comply with state authorities ... which do have jurisdiction to deal with thermal effects of power plant discharges. 406 F.2d at 173. The court upheld the AEC's position, and the AEC continued to disregard environmental considerations until the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976), required it to take environmental issues into account. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (D.C.Cir.1971). 30 68 Economic considerations have similarly been regarded as outside the purview of the AEC and the NRC. The court in Cities of Statesville v. Atomic Energy Commission, 441 F.2d 962, 975 (D.C.Cir.1969) (en banc), remarked that the AEC concerns itself not with economic feasibility but with practical development and application of (nuclear) energy. And in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 550, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1215, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978), the Supreme Court cited section 274(k) for the proposition that (t)here is little doubt that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies are empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for power.... The (Nuclear Regulatory) Commission's prime area of concern in the licensing context, on the other hand, is national security, public health, and safety. See State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Service Commission, 562 S.W.2d 688, 698-99 (Mo.App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866, 99 S.Ct. 192, 58 L.Ed.2d 177 (1978) (The federal government regulates how nuclear power plants will be constructed and maintained; the State of Missouri regulates whether they will be constructed.) 69 In concluding that Congress intended to preempt only regulation of radiological hazards, we join the only other circuit court to have considered the issue thus far. In Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035, 92 S.Ct. 1307, 31 L.Ed.2d 576 (1972), the Eighth Circuit was faced with a Minnesota statute regulating the level of radioactive discharges from nuclear plants. The standards imposed by Minnesota paralleled federal standards, but were considerably more stringent. Id. at 1145. The court concluded that section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 demonstrates Congressional recognition that the AEC at that time possessed the sole authority to regulate radiation hazards associated with by-product, source, and special nuclear materials and with production and utilization facilities. Id. at 1149. The court then went on to explain the effect of section 274(k): 70 The only logically acceptable reason for inclusion of subsection (k) within (section 274) was to make it clear that Congress was not, by subsection (c) of the 1959 amendment, in any way further limiting the power of the states to regulate activities, other than radiation hazards, associated with those areas over which the AEC was forbidden by that subsection to relinquish its control. 71 Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original). 31 Other courts which have considered the states' power to regulate nuclear plants have made a similar distinction, and have concluded that the Atomic Energy Act preempts only regulations directed at radiation hazards. 32 72 2. The moratorium provision and the three-site requirement 73 Since Congress intended to permit states to regulate for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards, § 274(k), we must next inquire whether the California statutes at issue here are aimed at radiation hazards. We conclude that they are not. 74 The moratorium provision, Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 25524.2, was part of a legislative package 33 enacted as an alternative to a proposed voter initiative, Proposition 15. Proposition 15 would have ultimately barred any nuclear plants in California, unless (1) the federal limit on liability for nuclear accidents, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 2073, 2210 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (the Price-Anderson Act), was removed; (2) the California legislature determined reactor safety systems to be adequate; and (3) the California legislature determined that nuclear wastes could be stored without danger to the public. See Reassessment, supra note 33, at 159-63 (reprinting text of Proposition 15). 75 The California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, which proposed the package of bills that became the Nuclear Laws, published a lengthy report explaining Proposition 15 and contrasting it with the committee alternatives. Reassessment, supra note 33. Proposition 15 was intended to deal with a number of perceived problems with nuclear power, some safety-related and some economic. One major problem identified in the committee report was the lack of a federally approved method of disposing of nuclear wastes. The committee classified this as a stipulated problem, since representatives of industry and government, as well as critics of nuclear power, recognized the problem's existence. Id. at 2, 12. In addition, the committee classified the problem as largely economic or the result of poor planning, not safety-related. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original). As the committee saw it, the lack of a federally approved method of waste disposal created a clog in the nuclear fuel cycle; more wastes were continually being produced, storage space was limited, and no permanent means of disposal was available. The committee noted that the costs of nuclear power were escalating sharply, and that increasing disappointments in portions of the fuel cycle were a contributing factor. Id. at 27-28. Several government witnesses testified that the continued development of nuclear power in the absence of a method of waste disposal was inadvisable. Id. at 18-21. 76 The safety considerations associated with nuclear waste disposal were viewed by the committee as quite a different problem, one on which industry representatives and nuclear critics largely disagreed. Id. at 3, 12-13. Critics of nuclear power believed that the methods of waste disposal being considered by the federal government would be inadequate to safeguard the wastes during the hundreds of years that they remained dangerous. The nuclear industry, on the other hand, believed that the methods of waste disposal being considered would prove adequate once the federal government had invested sufficient time and money in research and testing. See id. at 67-71. 77 Proposition 15 was designed to deal with both types of problems associated with nuclear waste disposal. The proposition would have banned nuclear plants unless the California legislature determined that nuclear wastes could be stored or disposed of, with no reasonable chance ... of intentional or unintentional escape of such wastes or radioactivity into the natural environment which will eventually adversely affect the land or the people of the State of California. Proposition 15, § 1 (proposed Cal.Gov.Code § 67503(b)(2)), reprinted in Reassessment, supra note 33, at 160. Thus, the California legislature would have had to make an independent judgment about whether a proposed method of waste disposal was safe. 34 78 Section 25524.2, in contrast, was intended to deal only with the stipulated problem caused by the lack of any approved method of waste disposal. The committee explained that its bills were designed to provide a pause in the deployment of nuclear power plants until (certain) problems which may 'clog' the nuclear fuel cycle are resolved. Reassessment, supra note 33, at 154-55. One of the major distinguishing features differentiating Proposition 15 and the committee bills was that (w)aste disposal safety is not directly addressed by the bills, which ask only that a method be chosen and accepted by the federal government. Id. at 156 (emphasis in original). 79 As the committee report makes clear, section 25524.2 is directed towards purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. While Proposition 15 would have required California to judge the safety of a proposed method of waste disposal, section 25524.2 leaves that judgment to the federal government. California is concerned not with the adequacy of the method, but rather with its existence. 35 80 Until a method of waste disposal is approved by the federal government, California has reason to believe that uncertainties in the nuclear fuel cycle make nuclear power an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy. The legislature has chosen to mandate reliance upon other energy sources until these uncertainties associated with nuclear power are resolved. We find that such a choice is expressly authorized under sections 271 and 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 81 The requirement that utilities submit three alternate sites for their proposed plants, Cal.Pub.Res.Code §§ 25503, 25504, 25516, is also unrelated to protection against radiation hazards. The requirement applies to all power plants, nuclear and non-nuclear. It provides California with an efficient means of deciding where a proposed power plant should be located. Such decisions have been regarded as within the states' authority, for nuclear as well as other power plants. During hearings on section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, it was agreed that state and municipal zoning regulations (establishing, for example, residential, commercial, or industrial zones) would apply to nuclear plants. Federal-State Relationships, supra note 27, at 494 (remarks of Rep. Price & Sen. Hickenlooper). The AEC's general manager pointed out that section 274(k) would permit the courts latitude in sustaining certain types of zoning requirements which have purposes other than control of radiation hazards, even though such requirements might have an incidental effect upon the use of ... nuclear materials licenses (sic) by the Commission. Letter from A. R. Luedecke to Sen. Clinton P. Anderson, reprinted in Federal-State Relationships, supra note 27, at 500. More recently, Congress passed legislation explicitly recognizing the states' authority to impose requirement(s) relating to land use or respecting the siting of nuclear plants. NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980, Pub.L.No.96-295, § 108(f), 94 Stat. 780 (1980). 82 California has chosen to determine site suitability on a case-by-case basis rather than through zoning laws. The NRC has itself recognized that states retain the right, even in the face of the issuance of an NRC construction permit, to preclude construction on such bases as ... the environmental unacceptability of the proposed facility or site. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-453, 7 N.R.C. 31, 34 (1978). California's requirement that utilities submit three alternate sites simply makes the state's suitability determination more efficient. We hold that the Atomic Energy Act does not prevent California from imposing such a requirement. 83