Opinion ID: 1443424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: constitutional takings

Text: [4, 5] Having completed the due process formula, we return to our threshold issue and consider the taking analysis used by the United States Supreme Court and by this court in Orion II. If we consider threshold inquiries and determine that the challenged regulation goes beyond preventing a public harm to actually enhance a publicly owned right in property, or if we determine that the regulation denies the owner a fundamental attribute of ownership, [21] it then becomes necessary to determine whether the regulation effects a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Const. art. 1, § 16. The taking analysis requires that the court first ask whether the regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests. If it does not, then it constitutes a taking. [22] If it does substantially advance a legitimate state interest, then it becomes necessary to look further and see if the challenge to the regulation is a facial challenge or one involving application of the regulation to specific property. It would not be necessary for the challengers to exhaust administrative remedies in a facial challenge because the allegation would be that application of the regulation to any property would constitute a taking. [23] If the case is a facial challenge, then the landowner must show that the regulation denies all economically viable use of any parcel of regulated property in order to constitute a taking. [24] In pursuing this inquiry, however, it first becomes necessary to determine just what property it is that the court is to consider. [6] With the exception of this court's recent decision in Allingham v. Seattle, 109 Wn.2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988), neither state nor federal law has divided property into smaller segments of an undivided parcel of regulated property to inquire whether a piece of it has been taken or whether a due process violation has occurred with regard to a piece of regulated property. Rather, we have consistently viewed a parcel of regulated property in its entirety. Federal case law has also specifically refused to focus its inquiry upon a given portion of a regulated property. [25] As the United States Supreme Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978) explained: `Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole  here the city tax block designated as the `landmark site.' Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. [26] Similarly, our own state case law demonstrates that a regulatory scheme's economic impact is to be determined by viewing the full bundle of property rights in its entirety. [27] [7] The landowner in the case before us relies heavily on Allingham's views of a taking which looked only to one portion of the regulated parcel of property. To the extent that Allingham is inconsistent with the foregoing analysis, it is hereby overruled. Additionally, to the extent that Allingham equates a physical taking of an owner's land with a regulation upon its use, it is also expressly overruled. [28] Returning to our taking analysis, if the challenge to the regulation is a facial one, and if the landowner succeeds in showing that a regulation denies all economically viable use of any parcel of regulated property, then a constitutional taking has occurred. Practically, however, this should prove to be a relatively rare occurrence. [8] If the challenge involves an application of the regulation to specific property, then the court should consider: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the property; (2) the extent of the regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations; [29] and (3) the character of the government action. [30] [9] If the court determines a taking has, in fact, occurred, then just compensation is mandated by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and by Const. art. 1, § 16. [31] If the taking was due to an overly severe land use regulation, and was temporary and reversible, the governmental unit involved has the option of curing the taking or maintaining the status quo by exercising its eminent domain power. Whichever it chooses, just compensation must be paid for the period during which the taking is effective. [32]