Opinion ID: 2521697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Secretary's Interpretation to Plaintiffs' Claims for August 23, 2004 to the Present

Text: The Secretary's controlling interpretation of the first responder regulation dictates the conclusion that plaintiffs' primary duty is not management. The undisputed record on summary judgment demonstrates that plaintiffs in this case clearly perform the type of work enumerated in the first responder regulation. The district court concluded that sergeants regularly conduct investigations and inspections for violations of law by verifying whether probable cause to arrest a suspect exists, determining whether a show-up identification procedure is justified, [and] making tactical decisions such as when to retreat from a crime scene. Mullins, 523 F.Supp.2d at 358 (footnotes omitted). Duties that are specific to sergeants and not handled by subordinate police officers similarly relate to their law enforcement tasks: Sergeants are dispatched and required to respond when situations involving emotionally disturbed individuals arise, as police officers are not permitted to take such people into custody. In handling suspects, sergeants are authorized to use certain restraining devices that are not available to police officers [including] tasers, water cannons, and restraining tape. Id. (footnote omitted). Since plaintiffs perform law enforcement duties alongside patrol officers in the field, id. at 357 (footnote omitted), and generally spend much of their time in the field with their subordinates, id. at 358 (footnote omitted), the first responder regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b), applies to the analysis of whether they may be deemed exempt executives under the FLSA. See DOL Amicus Br. at 3-4. In the Secretary's view, the district court misinterpreted the first responder regulation and its proper application to this case. We agree. The district court began its analysis by acknowledging that the DOL had promulgated the first responder regulation but observed that the new regulations do not depart from [] `established case law' ... in which application of the duties test determines whether a given employee is exempt. 523 F.Supp.2d at 354 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court thus determined that the new regulation simply reiterated that courts apply the primary duties test to determine whether an exemption from the overtime pay requirements is satisfied. Applying the general primary duties test to the test plaintiffs without further acknowledgment of the first responder regulation, the district court noted that [i]t is undisputed that plaintiffs perform law enforcement duties alongside patrol officers in the field, but ultimately held that plaintiffs are front-line supervisors of subordinate police officers and their primary duty is management. Id. at 357. [2] However, the district court's omission of the word this from its citation to the preamble's reference to the established case law alter[ed] [the] intended meaning of the preamble. DOL Amicus Br. at 4. As a result, the district court did not treat as non-exempt supervisory activities undertaken by plaintiffs in the course of performing their regular law enforcement duties. [T]he fact that the sergeants direct police officers while they perform field law enforcement activities does not transform the field law enforcement into management. DOL Amicus Br. at 10. Because the district court misconstrued the regulation's meaning, the district court erroneously concluded that plaintiffs' supervision of subordinate police officers while conducting law enforcement work is management. See DOL Amicus Br. at 7-8. Although the City argues that the district court correctly classified as exempt various supervisory activities undertaken by sergeants such as `apportioning work among [officers],' `determining the techniques' and personnel to be used, `reassigning and reallocating officers' and other activities described in 29 CFR 541.102, Def. Supp. Br. at 13 n. 13 (alteration in original), these activities are performed as part of plaintiffs' field law enforcement duties. Indeed, the Secretary reiterates that giving direction and exercising discretion while performing field law enforcement work do not transform [sergeants'] non-management primary duty in a management primary duty. DOL Amicus Br. at 11. In light of the Secretary's controlling interpretation of the first responder regulation, the fact that plaintiffs spend the majority of their time performing non-exempt work in the field, see Mullins, 523 F.Supp.2d at 345-46, 357-58, leads to the conclusion that the sergeants' primary duty is not management but field law enforcement. See DOL Amicus Br. at 11. Although the City argues that no deference should be given to the Secretary's interpretation as applied to the facts of this case, the City concedes that the Secretary's interpretation compels this outcome: Since it is undisputed that sergeants spend the majority of their time in the field, the conclusion would, under the Secretary's new interpretation, be inevitable. Def. Supp. Br. at 6 n. 5. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the district court's factual recitation confirms that sergeants perform few of the management tasks discussed in the preamble or listed in 29 C.F.R. § 541.102 outside the context of their field law enforcement duties. For example, sergeants are required to complete performance evaluations of subordinate officers on a monthly basis. See Mullins, 523 F.Supp.2d at 344; see also 69 Fed. Reg. at 22130 (listing evaluating personnel performance as among types of activities viewed by courts as management). Sergeants also have the authority to issue reports to commanding officers when a subordinate police officer is derelict in his duties. See Mullins, 523 F.Supp.2d at 344-45. Additionally, sergeants are responsible for their subordinates' appearance, punctuality, attendance, productivity, good order and discipline. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted). Thus, under the Secretary's interpretation of the first responder regulation and the definition of primary duty, we necessarily conclude that the principal benefit that sergeants confer to the NYPD is their performance of law enforcement duties in the field and concomitant supervision of lower-ranking officers while performing such duties. Since that work is considered non-exempt under the first responder regulation, the limited amount of exempt management duties undertaken by sergeants is insufficient to render their primary duty management. See also DOL Amicus Br. at 11-12. The other reasons cited by the district court for concluding that sergeants' primary duty is management are not persuasive. The district court concluded that differences in salary between plaintiffs and subordinate police officers suggested that their primary duty is not general law enforcement, see Mullins, 523 F.Supp.2d at 359; however, the Secretary explains that 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b) indicates that regardless of rank or pay level activities that form part of front-line law enforcement do not constitute management. See DOL Amicus Br. at 11. The additional duties performed by sergeants alone are not management, and, therefore, any difference in pay attributed to those duties cannot be used to satisfy the bona fide executive exemption. The district court's conclusion that plaintiffs are often the only supervisors in the field and thus exercise discretion in the performance of their duties  which is not one of the elements of the current version of the executive exemption, see 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a) [3]  overlooks the fact that such discretion forms part of their performance of law enforcement work in the field. See DOL Amicus Br. at 10. Plaintiffs do not, however, have discretion to determine when they perform any non-exempt duties, see 29 C.F.R. § 541.106(a) (Generally, exempt executives make the decision regarding when to perform nonexempt duties....), since sergeants generally receive their assignments from higher-ranking officers such as lieutenants. See Mullins, 523 F.Supp.2d at 344; see also DOL Amicus Br. at 12. Because under the Secretary's interpretation sergeants' primary duty is law enforcement, we need not reach the question of whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that the sergeants' suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(4). Since plaintiffs' primary duty is not management, the City has not met its burden of showing that plaintiffs satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirements for the executive exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirements for the period of August 23, 2004 to the present, and plaintiffs are therefore entitled to overtime pay for that time period.
Although the Secretary interpreted this Court's questions in the order inviting amicus briefing to refer solely to the period postdating August 23, 2004, and therefore did not directly address the period beginning April 19, 2001, see DOL Amicus Br. at 2 n. 2, the Secretary's views nevertheless inform our analysis of the plaintiffs' primary duty under the previous regulation. We therefore also hold that, for this time period, the City has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that plaintiffs satisfy the bona fide executive exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirements. The DOL indicated in the preamble that the new Part 541 regulations were intended to clarify the existing regulations in effect. 69 Fed.Reg. at 22125. The preamble indicates that the revisions were necessary to restore the overtime protections intended by the FLSA which have eroded over the decades, id. at 22122, and were designed to clarify and better organize the regulations defining and delimiting the exemptions for administrative, executive and professional employees. Rather than broadening the exemptions, the final rule will enhance understanding of the boundaries and demarcations of the exemptions Congress created. The final rule will protect more employees from being misclassified.... Id. at 22125. In this regard, we agree with plaintiffs that the DOL intended simply to clarify the manner in which the exemptions were always meant to be applied to such first responders. Pls. Supp. Br. at 8. In the preamble, the DOL cited cases in which police officers and other first responders had been held to be non-exempt and indicated that it ha[d] no intention of departing from this established case law. 69 Fed.Reg. at 22129. The DOL's agreement with the holdings of those prior cases suggests that the interpretation advanced by the Secretary under the current regulation applies with equal force to the previous version of the executive exemption. [4] Plaintiffs point out that 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b)'s clarification that a police officer is not exempt merely because [he] directs the work of other employees is also consistent with prior case law in which plaintiffs had supervisory duties in addition to their primary duties of field law enforcement. Pls. Supp. Br. at 10. As the Secretary notes, the sergeants' direction of police officers is done in conjunction with their performance of field law enforcement work.... [T]he fact that the sergeants direct police officers while they perform field law enforcement activities does not transform the field law enforcement into management. DOL Amicus Br. at 9-10. We therefore see no reason to depart from the preceding analysis as applied to plaintiffs' performance of their duties under the previous version of the regulation. The City nevertheless argues that, under the new regulation, one of the factors listed as pertinent to the primary duty analysis is relative freedom from supervision, which is virtually synonymous with discretion, and discretion therefore remains a relevant factor. Def. Br. at 46 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a)). Although the previous regulation explicitly included discretion among the factors relevant to the primary duty inquiry, see 29 C.F.R. 541.1(d) (2003) (whether employee customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers), we indicated, supra at 119 & n. 3, that this factor formed part of the long test, not the short test applicable to plaintiffs, and furthermore, plaintiffs do not have discretion to determine when they perform non-exempt duties; instead, the majority of plaintiffs' discretion is exercised in the performance of their field law enforcement duties. See Mullins, 523 F.Supp.2d at 358 (noting that plaintiffs ... exercise discretion and make significant decisions based on their judgment while in the field); 29 C.F.R. § 541.106(a). It is also relevant to note that, in reaching the conclusion that sergeants' direction of subordinate police officers was not management, the Secretary's analysis did not rely on plaintiffs' relative freedom from supervision. Assuming, arguendo, that we were to equate discretion with relative freedom from supervision, our analysis would not be different. Given that the new regulations were designed to be consistent with the previous ones, it follows that any discretion exercised by plaintiffs in their supervision of police officers' field law enforcement duties does not render such supervision management for the purposes of the FLSA executive exemption. In light of the controlling deference we have given to the Secretary's interpretation of the first responder regulation, we do not interpret the previous regulations to indicate that any discretion inherent in sergeants' supervision of police officers while performing law enforcement duties transforms that supervision into management. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to the overtime pay protections of the FLSA for their claims covering this time period.