Opinion ID: 540898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Political Neutrality as Political Opinion.

Text: 51 We also differ from other circuits on the crucial question of what constitutes persecution ... on account of ... political opinion. The Ninth Circuit has held that political neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1153(h). See, e.g., Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.1989). This holding eviscerates the political opinion requirement of the statute. It means that a politically inactive alien, and perhaps most illegal aliens are, may now gain the protection of asylum. Other circuits have not been blind to this distortion of the historical purposes of asylum. In a footnote, the Perlera-Escobar court made clear that it perceived a difference in legal standard between these two circuits: 52 Although [the] Maldonado-Cruz [district court opinion] has been reversed by the Ninth Circuit in Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.1989), we still regard it as persuasive and as a statement of the BIA's position. In reversing the BIA's decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on its own decisions which hold that political neutrality is a political opinion within the meaning of the Act. This circuit has not adopted the Ninth Circuit's belief that political neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of the Act. 53 894 F.2d at 1297 n. 4. 54 As a concept of international law, political asylum developed in response to the need to protect persons from persecution by their government because they had performed political acts or held political opinions in defiance of the state. Authorities interpreting the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 (Refugee Convention), 189 U.N.T.S. 137, for example, hold two different views regarding the nature of political opinion necessary to qualify for refugee status. Neither encompasses political neutrality. According to S. Prakash Sinha, an international authority on asylum: 55 Where the nature of the offense is mixed, one point of view maintains that the Convention applies only to those cases where the political opinion of the individual involved is decisive of the nature and severity of his punishment, while another viewpoint holds that it is sufficient that he has committed the offense because of his political opinion. 56 S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law 103 (1971). 57 This core idea of political activism underlies the concept of refugee status. As Sinha notes, the key element of political opinion involves the ruptur[ing] of the refugee's normal relationship between him and his state. In turn, this rupture results from a political controversy, which may arise from his non-submission to a new government for various political reasons, or from acts of political persecution by the government of his state, or from his own political offenses. Id. at 97. We distort the meaning of an important requirement for refugee status when we permit political aloofness to serve as an active political opinion, that endangers its holder. It also demeans the true martyr for whom asylum was intended. 58 It is not likely this concurring opinion will alter either the statutory or case law with which it is concerned. Nonetheless, from time-to-time sightings should be taken to establish one's position. Our ship appears to be at some distance from the main fleet but no reefs or shoals appear dead ahead. As a passenger, I shall go below and hope for the best.