Opinion ID: 1183105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attitude

Text: The central question in an attorney reinstatement matter is whether the attorney has been rehabilitated. While evidence of rehabilitation consists primarily of acts and conduct, rehabilitation is also demonstrated by the attorney's remorse for and appreciation of the misconduct for which he was suspended or disbarred. In re Krogh, 93 Wn.2d 504, 507, 610 P.2d 1319 (1980); In re Simmons, 71 Wn.2d 316, 319-20, 428 P.2d 582 (1967). Accord, In re Wright, 102 Wn.2d 855, 859, 690 P.2d 1134 (1984). Before the Board of Governors, Walgren testified: Q [by James K. Sells, Walgren's attorney] Now, despite all that and with all that in mind, you are aware, are you not, that this Board must accept the jury's finding of guilty? A [Walgren] Absolutely. Q Do you accept the jury's finding of guilty? A Yes, I do. Q Do you agree with the jury's finding of guilty? A I certainly do not. Q How do you explain ... the difference between accepting the finding of guilty and agreeing with the finding of guilty? A Well, I understand under our system of law, a system which I truly endorse and, as I told the judge during my sentencing, I totally endorse, it is the best system we have in the world in my opinion. When that jury comes back with its findings, that is what it is, and I have been on both sides  all sides, I guess now, except sitting in front making the determination.... ... I have said many, many times before when that jury gives the word, that is what it is under the law and that is the way it is under the law as far as I am concerned. I have been found guilty by a jury and I stand guilty, convicted by that jury and having judgment pronounced against me. That does not, however, change what I know to be the fact and what I feel in my heart and what I know was the situation. I can accept the verdict as a lawyer but I certainly emphasize that I do not agree with it. (Italics ours.) The question of innocence and guilt is not at issue in a reinstatement proceeding. In re Lonergan, 23 Wn.2d 767, 771, 162 P.2d 289 (1945). The purpose of securing the attorney's repentance, moreover, is not to coerce the attorney into admitting intentional misconduct. In re Eddleman, supra at 45 n. 1. Rather, it is to assure the court that the attorney recognizes past wrongdoing so as to ensure it will not be repeated in the future. In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975). As one court noted: [R]epentance and rehabilitation are not the same. Rehabilitation, the most important consideration in reinstatement proceedings, is a matter of one's return to a beneficial, constructive and trustworthy role. Repentance is a matter of contrition and regret. In re Wigoda, 77 Ill.2d 154, 159, 395 N.E.2d 571 (1979). In assessing Walgren's testimony before the Board of Governors, we turn to other cases in which an attorney has denied having committed the offense for which he was found guilty. In re Hiss, supra , involved the effort of Alger Hiss to be reinstated into the Massachusetts Bar 23 years after he was disbarred for committing perjury before a grand jury. The court rejected the Bar Association's position that because Hiss continued to assert he was innocent he could not be reinstated. The court reasoned: The continued assertion of innocence in the face of a prior conviction does not, as might be argued, constitute conclusive proof of lack of the necessary moral character to merit reinstatement.... Simple fairness and fundamental justice demand that the person who believes he is innocent though convicted should not be required to confess guilt to a criminal act he honestly believes he did not commit. For him, a rule requiring admission of guilt and repentance creates a cruel quandary: he may stand mute and lose his opportunity; or he may cast aside his hard-retained scruples and, paradoxically, commit what he regards as perjury to prove his worthiness to practice law.... Honest men would suffer permanent disbarment under such a rule. Others, less sure of their moral positions, would be tempted to commit perjury by admitting to a nonexistent offense (or to an offense they believe is nonexistent) to secure reinstatement. In re Hiss, at 457-59. See also In re Wigoda, supra (city alderman convicted of accepting bribe may be reinstated despite his continuing assertion of innocence). [2] The continued assertion by Walgren of his innocence does not reflect negatively on our assessment of his rehabilitation. While asserting he was innocent, Walgren accepts the verdict as the law and has served his sentence faithfully. This contrasts markedly with In re Wright, supra at 859, in which the applicant asserted his act of murder did not represent a breach of any fiduciary duties nor did it involve any acts of dishonesty but was a product of bad judgment. The distinction between accepting and respecting the system which found one guilty and conceding guilt is not without precedent in this state. In In re Simmons, 71 Wn.2d 316, 428 P.2d 582 (1967), a judge was disbarred for having made disparaging remarks about the judicial system while he was on the bench. Despite evidence the judge was otherwise well qualified to practice law, this court denied his application for reinstatement on the grounds: There is, in the statement of the petitioner before the [B]oard [of Governors], a tenor which leaves the impression that his new attitude is based upon a conclusion that it is wise to accept such duties, because the consequences of failing to accept them may be painful, rather than a belief in the wisdom and justice of the rules imposing those duties. (Italics ours.) Simmons, at 320. Walgren's attitude regarding his convictions is not inconsistent with that necessary for reinstatement; he accepts and respects the system which found him guilty of his acts and has suffered the punishment and stigma brought on by his convictions.