Opinion ID: 168427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Murder Evidence

Text: 33 Prior to trial, Portillo-Quezada filed a motion in limine to prevent the presentation of testimony and evidence regarding the murder of Bruce Andrews. The motion contended that the evidence of uncharged conduct was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The district court denied this motion before trial, holding that the evidence was intrinsic to the conspiracy and, therefore, not subject to Rule 404(b). The court, however, limited the government from introducing evidence about the murder beyond the general nature of Andrews's killing, and from naming Portillo-Quezada as the gunman. 3 On appeal, Portillo-Quezada argues that the prosecution violated the court's order by introducing evidence beyond its scope, and the graphic nature of the evidence prejudiced the jury. We disagree. 34 Captain John Cosgrove, the Kansas City police officer who interviewed Espino, testified about Espino's confession to his role in Andrews's murder. Cosgrove's testimony established the following motives for the murder: (1) to punish Andrews for failing to pay money owing to the conspiracy, and (2) revenge for disclosing Raul Portillo's drug activity to police. Cosgrove testified that Espino described the killing and the subsequent disposal of the car in which the crime occurred. Some of the account was graphic—Cosgrove stated that Espino claimed he cleaned blood and brains from the windshield of the victim's car after the murder. Supp. Vol. V at 53. 35 Portillo-Quezada did not object to Cosgrove's testimony until after the government had concluded its direct examination. Although counsel objected that the testimony exceeded the court's order in limine, he did not ask for a mistrial at the time, nor did he move to strike the testimony or suggest a curative instruction. Portillo-Quezada eventually moved for a mistrial at the close of the government's case. The district court denied the motion finding that the evidence was in context probably not that shocking [for] this jury to have heard .... I do not believe it in any way undermines the fairness of this trial or unfairly prejudices those individuals who are alleged to have had some role in murdering Mr. Andrews. Id. at 69-70. 36 We review the district court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir.1997). We will not reverse a district court's decision to admit evidence if it falls within the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances and is not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. Id. We review a district court's denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion. Gabaldon, 91 F.3d at 93-94. 37 The murder evidence was not barred by Rule 404(b). While Rule 404(b) precludes evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, it does not apply to testimony offered as direct evidence of charged crimes. In a conspiracy prosecution, uncharged acts committed in furtherance of the charged conspiracy are themselves part of the act charged. United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir.1999). Such evidence is therefore intrinsic [to the crime] and simply does not implicate the requirements of 404(b). Id. In sum, conduct which occurs during the life of a conspiracy and is a part of the same is direct evidence of the conspiracy and therefore not subject to Rule 404(b). United States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir.1992). 38 The facts in United States v. Green, supra, help illustrate this point. In Green, a co-defendant argued against the admission of evidence he threatened a co-conspirator with a firearm in order to collect missing drug profits. The district court allowed testimony about the defendant's use of threats at gunpoint, a strip search for hidden money, and conversations about a possible murder. We found no error, concluding the evidence of [the defendant's] attempt to collect missing profits from [co-conspirators] is intrinsic to the conspiracy charged. Green, 175 F.3d at 831. 39 The murder evidence in this case is admissible for the same reason. The prosecution presented testimony that Andrews (1) owed Portillo-Quezada money for drugs stolen from a vehicle belonging to Portillo-Quezada, and (2) revealed to police the role of Portillo-Quezada's brother in the conspiracy. The testimony further showed that Espino served the conspiracy in an enforcer role, and that Portillo-Quezada used monies from the conspiracy to compensate Espino for his aid in killing Andrews. As in Green, Andrews's murder was evidence of Portillo-Quezada's attempt to collect missing profits owing to the conspiracy. Moreover, the display of force also could serve to intimidate others who might have considered cheating the conspiracy, again furthering its aims. 40 Given this testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the murder evidence as direct proof of the conspiracy and Portillo-Quezada's willingness to employ violence to ensure the conspiracy's success. See also United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir.1997) (upholding admission of evidence of several murders in RICO prosecution of organized cocaine distribution ring on theory of conspiracy); United States v. Baptiste, 264 F.3d 578 (5th Cir.2001), amended by 309 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.2002) (upholding admission of murder evidence where defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine). 41 Portillo-Quezada also argues the evidence was unduly prejudicial. We test for unfair prejudice using a balancing test under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2001). To be excluded, evidence must do more than damage the [d]efendant's position at trial. Id. It must make[] a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or [innocence] of the crime charged. Id. at 1212. [E]xclusion of evidence under Rule 403 ... is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly. Id. at 1211. To be a basis for mistrial, the evidence must have an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted). 42 The murder evidence here, while graphic, was not unduly prejudicial. The district court, in considering this objection, concluded the testimony did not shock the jury given the evidence Andrews had been shot with an assault rifle at close range in a car. The court found the reference to the crime scene's grisly nature was therefore not surprising to the jury in context, and the murder evidence was otherwise probative to show the scope of the conspiracy and demonstrated the lengths to which Portillo-Quezada was willing to go to protect the conspiracy's interests. 43 In the circumstances here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.