Opinion ID: 2982646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disparate-treatment claim under Title VII4

Text: Wilson County is entitled to summary judgment on Tartt’s disparatetreatment claim under Title VII because he fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Title VII prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Courts have recognized two types of claims under Title VII: disparate-treatment claims and disparate-impact claims. Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 892 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Huguley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 52 F.3d 1364, 1370 (6th Cir. 1995)). Disparate-treatment claims involve intentionally discriminatory employment practices. Id. 4 Tartt also brought his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The elements of a prima facie case and the burden-shifting framework followed by courts in adjudicating such claims are the same as those in cases under Title VII. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993). We therefore proceed with the Title VII analysis for both sets of claims. -6- Case No. 13-6603 Tartt v. Wilson Cnty., Tenn. Accordingly, a plaintiff asserting a disparate-treatment claim must prove an employer’s discriminatory motive and connect that motive to a particular adverse employment decision. Id. (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)). A plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002); Foster v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 973504, 1998 WL 57481, at  (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 1998)). Where a plaintiff seeks to prove discriminatory intent based solely on circumstantial evidence, we apply the three-step, burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80204 (1973)). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If he is successful, then the employer must respond with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action in question. Id. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. The elements of a prima facie case will depend on the particular facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim, id. at 802 n.13, and “the key question is always whether . . . the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that he or she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances which give rise to an inference -7- Case No. 13-6603 Tartt v. Wilson Cnty., Tenn. of unlawful discrimination,” Thompson v. UHHS Richmond Heights Hosp., Inc., 372 F. App’x 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 703 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination here, Tartt must show “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which [Wilson County] was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and [Wilson County] continued to seek applicants from persons of [Tartt’s] qualifications.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Tartt meets the first prong of the test. As an AfricanAmerican, he is a member of a racial minority. However, Tartt does not show that he “applied and was qualified for a position for which [Wilson County] was seeking applicants,” and thus fails to establish the second prong of the test. Id. The uncontroverted evidence shows that Wilson County did not have an open position in Animal Control at the time Tartt applied in December 2008. The County had filled the most recent opening three months prior, and there were no further vacancies until nearly two years later, when Animal Control advertised for a new director in October 2010. Tartt presents no evidence that Animal Control had an open position or was seeking applicants when he applied “for the job of animal control officer” in 2008. (R.110-2, Page ID #1614.) -8- Case No. 13-6603 Tartt v. Wilson Cnty., Tenn. Tartt counters that he applied for any open position the County may have had, including those that became available in Solid Waste Disposal in the months following his application. (R.18, Page ID #164.) He supports this interpretation with the facts that he wrote “Animal Control/open position” at the top of his application and that he asked more than once if his application was still on file. Even taking both these facts into account, the record clearly demonstrates that Tartt applied for a position in Animal Control in December 2008. When he first arrived at the Department offices, he was asked which application he wanted to fill out, because there was more than one; he chose the application for Animal Control. On his follow-up calls, he reiterated his interest in a job for Animal Control. Though duly informed there were separate applications, Tartt neither mentioned nor requested an application for a position in Solid Waste Disposal, either in person in December 2008 or during any of his three phone calls in 2009. All references to keeping his resume on file took place in the context of a conversation about an Animal Control position. Tartt also specified that he applied for Animal Control in both his EEOC charge and his first two complaints in this litigation. (R.110-2, Page ID #1614; R.1, Page ID #11; and R.13, Page ID #76.) These documents contradict his current argument that he intended to be considered “for any open position.” (Appellant Br. 37 (emphasis in original).) The Supreme Court has stated that “a party cannot -9- Case No. 13-6603 Tartt v. Wilson Cnty., Tenn. create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement . . . without explaining the contradiction.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999). In his third complaint and now on appeal, Tartt states that the omission was because “there is not enough room on a[n EEOC] charge sheet to relay all facts of a case.” (Appellant Reply Br. 3.) While it is true he had to summarize his overall argument, in a failure-to-hire claim for discrimination, the position(s) for which plaintiff applies are a fundamental aspect of the claim. Failure to even mention them in not one, but three documents in the same case strongly suggests Tartt did not intend to apply outside the Animal Control department when he submitted his application. And, his subjective intent cannot overcome the absence of any notice to the County that he sought a position in the Solid Waste Disposal department. The Animal Control department only had one opening in the period between December 2008 and the filing of this case. The district court rightly observed that “Tartt’s observation that the Animal Control Department posted an opening for a Director in October 2010 . . . is a red herring. . . . Tartt applied for a position as an Animal Control Officer, not the Director of the Department. Among other problems with Tartt’s argument, Tartt has not shown that he was qualified for the Director position, which requires [among other things] an applicant to possess and maintain a valid euthanasia certification.” (R.118, Page ID #3809.) - 10 - Case No. 13-6603 Tartt v. Wilson Cnty., Tenn. Based on the record, Tartt cannot show that he “applied and was qualified for a job for which [Wilson County] was seeking applicants.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. He has not established a prima facie case of discrimination under a disparate-treatment theory under Title VII. Accordingly, Wilson County is entitled to summary judgment.