Opinion ID: 2120247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Issue 2: Discipline for Failure to Supervise Court Personnel

Text: In Judge Rose's second issue, he contends that an elected judge can [not] be removed for the insufficiencies of his court staff, who are not his employees, rather than his own personal misconduct. ( See Rose Br. at ix.) Judge Rose briefs this issue in Section I of his argument. ( See id. at 10-12.) It is well-settled, however, that a judge may be disciplined for the conduct of those under his or her direction and control. We will overrule this issue. There is no doubt that the many duties of a court cannot be accomplished without court staff. Although frequently the words `judge' and `court' are used interchangeably, the judge is not the court[;] and the time when, the place where, and the persons by whom the judicial functions are to be exercised, are essential to a complete idea of court. 16 Tex. Jur.3d Courts § 1 (1997) (internal footnote omitted); see Ex parte Lowery, 518 S.W.2d 897, 901-902 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1975, orig. proceeding). In every court there must be some officer authorized to exercise each phase or element of the power conferred on the court, and there can be no valid creation of a court without provision for the necessary officers. 16 Tex. Jur.3d Courts § 3. But the judge, who necessarily delegates some of the court's responsibilities to staff, retains the obligation to see to it that his or her staff fulfills the responsibilities delegated. While, [a]s a practical matter, much of the day-to-day work involved in the recordkeeping and reporting duties officially allocated to a judge is performed by staff[, c]harges relating to failures in such areas, even if attributable in fact to staff inadequacies, relate to the ultimate responsibility of the judge.... Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Removal or Discipline of State Judge for Neglect of, or Failure to Perform, Judicial Duties, 87 A.L.R.4th 727, 768 n. 18 (1991). Thus, although the clerk performs the physical act of record keeping, the judge is ultimately responsible for the administration of his court. In re Quick, 553 So.2d 522, 525 (Miss.1989). Texas courts have recognized this principle. For example, former Texas Family Code Section 11.14(d) require[d] that a record be made in all suits affecting the parent-child relationship `as in civil cases generally unless waived by the parties with the consent of the court.' Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex.1985) (quoting Act of May 25, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, sec. 11.14(d), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1418 (repealed 1995) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 105.003(c) (Vernon 2002))). The Texas Supreme Court held that it was the responsibility of the trial judge to see that the court reporter performs this duty. Id.; accord Walker v. Stefanic, 898 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (The trial judge is ultimately responsible to see that a record is made of the proceedings....); see also In re Hatfield, 607 N.E.2d 384, 386 (Ind.1993) (trial judge responsible for one-year backlog of transcript requests because he is the employer and direct supervisor of the court reporters in his court). Likewise, the Dallas Court of Appeals issued a writ of mandamus to the presiding judge of a district court for actions taken by visiting judges. See Hoggard v. Snodgrass, 770 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding). The court noted that [b]ecause the visiting judge `sits for' the permanent judge, the rulings of the visiting judge are, in effect, the rulings of the permanent judge. Id. at 588. The visiting judges acted only at the request and pleasure of the permanent judge. Id. Therefore, the permanent judge ... is ultimately responsible for any order that issues from the ... District Court. Id. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the failure to supervise, or the under-supervision of, court staff can constitute judicial misconduct. See generally SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 6.10. Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C) expressly provides that in a judge's discharge of his or her administrative responsibilities, [a] judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge.... TEX.CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(2). In defining require in that context, the Code notes that a judge is to exercise reasonable direction and control over the conduct of those persons subject to the judge's direction and control. Id., Canon 8(B)(11). A corollary to the judge's duty to require a high standard of performance of the judge's staff is that the judge will be held accountable for the administrative shortcomings of the judge's staff. SHAMAN ET AL. § 6.10, at 196-97. In interpreting the Code of Judicial Conduct, the State Bar of Texas Committee on Judicial Ethics has long held that when a person is under the direction and control of a judge or judges, it is the duty of the judge(s) who employ that person to see that the employee complies with the provisions of the code. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 106 (1987), reprinted in 59 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SYS. ANN. REP. 79 (1987), available at htt p://www.courts.state.tx.us/Judethics/101-110.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2004) (interpreting TEX.CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(2), 50 TEX. B.J. 391, 392 (1987, amended 1994) (A judge should require his or her staff and court officials subject to the judge's direction and control to observe the standards of this Code.)). The Committee has further noted that the Code makes no provisions for the sanctions against the employee for non-compliance with the code, but it does provide sanctions against the judge(s) in the event of non-compliance by the judge(s) in not requiring personnel under the direction and control of the judge(s) to adhere to the provisions of the code. Id. Thus, in Texas, judges have frequently been disciplined for their failure to supervise their courts' personnel. Examples of such misconduct are:  A judge allowed her staff complete responsibility for the recording and reporting of fines collected and the judge's inattention to her responsibility resulted in thousands of dollars being unaccounted for. STATE COMM'N JUD. CONDUCT ANN. REP. (1991), 55 TEX. B.J. at 1064.  A judge failed to inform his staff and court officials subject to his direction and control that they are required to observe the same standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to him. STATE COMM'N JUD. CONDUCT ANN. REP. (1987), 51 TEX. B.J. at 465.  A judge failed to establish appropriate internal controls within his office so as to properly safeguard and account for public funds coming into the office. Id. This principle is recognized in other jurisdictions as well. The Supreme Court of Kansas publicly censured a district judge for the failure to issue summons and set hearings timely in juvenile cases. In re Long, 244 Kan. 719, 772 P.2d 814, 816 (1989) (per curiam). Under Kansas law, when a petition is filed under the Kansas Code for Care of Children, unless the parties are personally served at a temporary custody hearing, the court shall ... [i]ssue summons stating the place and time at which the parties are required to appear and answer the allegations of the petition, which shall be within 30 days of the date the petition is filed, and deliver the summons with copies of the petition attached to the sheriff or a person specially appointed to serve it. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1532 (2000). Likewise, when a complaint is filed under the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code, unless the respondent child is personally served at a detention hearing, the court shall ... issue summons to the respondent to appear within thirty days and answer the complaint. Id. § 38-1625 (2000). In Long , the Kansas Supreme Court found that in 13.9% of Code of Care for Children cases and 38.39% of Juvenile Justice Code cases, the mandatory statutory requirements for issuance of summons were not met. Long at 816. The Court noted the district judge's attempts to shift blame to the administrative judge, and her claim that she was never given sufficient or loyal staff to carry out her responsibilities. Id. However, the Court held that it is not the duty of the judge to actually prepare and mail the summons, but it was the responsibility of the judge to see that the mandatory provisions of the statute for setting the hearings were followed. Id. The Court held: We recognize that the trial judges of this state are dependent upon a number of individuals to perform many of the services essential to the orderly operation of the courts. However, whatever the proficiency of the various members of the court staff, the judge is solely responsible for the operation of the court. Id. at 818. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin suspended a judge for two years, in part for his persistent failure to organize his court and supervise its personnel for the prompt and convenient disposition of judicial business. In re Van Susteren, 118 Wis.2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579, 581 (1984) (per curiam) (interpreting former WIS. SUP.CT. R. § 60.01(4) (A judge should organize his or her court and supervise the personnel under his or her charge so that the business of the court is dispatched with promptness and convenience.) (quoted in Van Susteren at 580 n. 2)). Wisconsin law requires: If under formal administration final judgment is not entered in an estate within 18 months after filing of the petition for administration and the estate is not open pursuant to an order extending time, the judge shall order the attorney and the personal representative for the estate to show cause why final judgment has not been entered.... Wis. Stat. § 863.35(1) (LEXIS through all 2003 legislation). Over one hundred such dormant estates were pending in the suspended judge's court, with twenty-five of them having been pending for thirteen years or more. Van Susteren at 580. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the suspended judge did not give any instructions to court personnel under his supervision concerning how to ensure that probate matters did not become delinquent, nor did he take any steps himself to deal with dormant estates. Id. Accordingly, a judge may be disciplined, including removal, for the conduct of his or her staff. [30] Judge Rose's second issue is overruled.