Opinion ID: 1043675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Habitat Connectivity Easements

Text: ¶ 32. The Towns’ final argument in Docket Number 2011-277 is that the Board erred by considering and granting GMP’s motion following issuance of the CPG to extend the deadline for GMP to obtain easements to mitigate fragmentation caused by the project. In its initial order, the Board found that absent the mitigation proposed and agreed to by ANR and GMP in the MOU, the proposed project would have an undue adverse effect on natural communities and the natural environment as a result of the habitat fragmenting effects of the project. It recounted that ANR had agreed to work in good faith with GMP on all of the requirements of the MOU and that paragraph 3.2 of the MOU required GMP to secure fragmentation-connectivity easements before commencing commercial operation of the proposed project. ¶ 33. The Board modified this deadline to require that such easements be secured prior to construction rather than the start of commercial operations. It found that during the technical hearings it had been established that under certain scenarios GMP might not be able to secure easements of adequate size and location. Thus, pursuant to the MOU, GMP might spend significant amounts of money to construct the proposed project, and in so doing, fragment the on-site habitat yet not be able to operate the project because adequate habitat had not been conserved. ¶ 34. The Board explained that only with secured adequate fragmentation-connectivity easements in place before the commencement of construction could it find that the project would not have undue adverse impacts on wildlife habitat due to fragmentation. It therefore required petitioners to secure prudent fragmentation-connectivity easements of adequate size and location, pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 3.2 of the MOU, and file them for Board approval before commencing construction. ¶ 35. In its motion for reconsideration, GMP asked the Board to modify its deadline for securing these easements to the start of commercial operations. It argued in part that its ability to obtain the easements prior to construction was largely beyond its control and that a preconstruction deadline would have the unintended consequence of delaying construction to the point where federal tax credits would be jeopardized. ¶ 36. The Towns opposed GMP’s request, raising both procedural and substantive concerns. The Towns first maintained that reconsideration was inappropriate because the Board was not rectifying its own error and GMP had failed to raise the easement-timing issue in its reply brief in response to the Towns’ position. The Towns also asserted that a preconstruction deadline was necessary to avoid undue impacts to wildlife habitat because fragmentation would occur when construction commenced, and there was no guarantee that adequate parcels could be obtained. In the Towns’ view, any timing issues were entirely of GMP’s own making because the utility had been aware of the need to be operational by a certain date to avoid losing the federal tax credits. Finally, the Towns argued that modification of the easement deadline would have an undue adverse impact on wildlife habitat for an undetermined period of time and that the loss of the tax credits was unrelated to the condition at issue and should therefore be disregarded by the Board. ¶ 37. In response to GMP’s motion for reconsideration, ANR proposed that the preconstruction deadline be modified to require GMP to obtain the easements on or before December 31, 2011 rather than prior to the commencement of commercial operations. ANR asserted that this would ensure that the easements were in place during the first phase of construction. ANR also recommended that the Board direct that if the easements were not obtained by December 31, 2011, all construction activities would cease until the easements were obtained and approved. GMP agreed to ANR’s proposal. ¶ 38. The Board amended its final order to incorporate, with a slight modification, the changes recommended by ANR. As an initial matter, the Board rejected the Towns’ assertion that it lacked authority to address this issue on reconsideration under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The Board stated that it had been unaware that the imposition of a preconstruction deadline would delay the commencement of construction and place the economic viability of the project at risk due to the potential loss of the federal tax credits. Given this, the Board concluded that the imposition of the condition had created an unintended consequence, making the issue appropriate for reconsideration. ¶ 39. Moreover, the Board was not persuaded by the Towns’ assertion that GMP’s failure to raise this issue in its reply brief prohibited it from reconsidering the issue. It found that GMP had raised the issue—and thus the Board was aware of GMP’s position—through inclusion of a preoperations deadline in the MOU. The Board reiterated that it had not known, and that GMP had previously been unable to call its attention to, the practical impossibility of complying with the condition while maintaining the economic viability of the project. Accordingly, the Board found the matter properly before it. ¶ 40. With respect to the deadline itself, the Board was persuaded by GMP’s arguments and ANR’s apparent support for the amended deadline. The Board explained that its primary concern in imposing the preconstruction deadline had been that GMP might delay meeting its obligation until just before commercial operations began, when it could find itself with little or no options if parcels that it had previously identified turned out to be unavailable. It found, however, that GMP had been working steadily since signing the MOU to obtain the required easements and that it appeared to be making progress. ¶ 41. The Board concluded that the December 31, 2011 deadline, coupled with the requirement that GMP cease construction if the easements were not approved by that date, gave GMP adequate time to either obtain the identified potential easements or work with ANR under the MOU to identify and obtain alternate parcels. The Board further concluded that the risk of financial exposure would be limited by establishing the deadline at a time relatively early in the construction process. ¶ 42. The Board agreed with the Towns that the fragmentation effects would begin at the time that GMP entered the area and began clearing activities in preparation for road and crane-path construction. It found, however, that the parcels being pursued to mitigate the fragmenting impacts of the project were close to, but not actually on, the project site. The parcels were undeveloped and the Board found that the commencement of construction prior to their conveyance would not have an impact on their undeveloped nature. Accordingly, the Board found that allowing construction to commence while imposing a short deadline for obtaining the requisite easement rights would neither exacerbate the fragmentation effects of the project nor compromise the mitigation value of the undeveloped parcels. ¶ 43. The Board also noted that ANR, the state agency charged with protecting the state’s natural resources, had entered into the MOU with GMP to address the habitat fragmentation impacts of the project by requiring GMP to obtain habitat fragmentation-connectivity easements. Additionally, ANR (through the MOU) had been agreeable to allowing construction to commence before GMP obtained the necessary mitigation parcels, which suggested to the Board that ANR believed sufficient mitigation could be obtained by GMP in this proceeding. The Board further noted that parcels meeting the MOU objectives had already been identified and that discussions with the landowners were underway. ¶ 44. The Board recognized the risk that GMP would be unable to obtain adequate mitigation by December 31, 2011. Nonetheless, it believed that the risk was sufficiently minimized by the steps it was taking in its decision. The Board also indicated that it had found that the wind energy project, subject to certain conditions, would promote the general good of the state. That finding was based, in part, on the state’s legislated policy goal of promoting the construction of renewable resource generating facilities. The Board reasoned that its decision minimized potential risks and avoided an unintended consequence that would run counter to those legislated policy goals. In short, the Board concluded that the impacts of the project would not be unduly adverse as long as adequate mitigation was obtained, even if the deadline for obtaining mitigation was extended as requested by GMP and approved by ANR. ¶ 45. The Board revisited this issue in denying the Towns’ motion for a stay pending appeal. In their stay request, the Towns again argued that the Board lacked the authority to consider GMP’s request for reconsideration. They also pointed to GMP’s admission that it knew as early as February 2011 that obtaining the easements preconstruction might be problematic. ¶ 46. The Board denied the Towns’ motion while acknowledging that, given GMP’s February 2011 admission, GMP should have raised the issue of the potential loss of federal tax credits earlier. Nonetheless, the Board found that GMP’s failure to do so did not preclude it from reconsidering the easement deadline. ¶ 47. Noting that Rule 59(e) represented a codification of a trial court’s inherent discretionary power to open and correct, modify, or vacate its judgments, the Board asserted that it could examine the correctness of any issue in the record, even issues not raised by the parties in their Rule 59(e) motions. Moreover, according to the Board, the nature of a § 248 decision reinforced its discretion to reconsider the easement deadline. As the Board stated, the ultimate question in such proceedings is whether a proposed project will promote the general good of the state. Interpreting Rule 59(e) to preclude reconsideration of a decision that would otherwise result in unintended consequences and possibly lead to the demise of a project that had been determined to be consistent with the public good would be counter to the purpose of § 248 proceedings. ¶ 48. The Board also rejected the Towns’ assertion that it had improperly considered GMP’s economic interests in deciding whether to amend the easement deadline. According to the Towns, the plain language of § 248 did not allow the Board to balance GMP’s economic interests against the potential for undue adverse impacts to the natural environment. The Board found that the Towns misunderstood the basis of its decision to extend the easement deadline. It explained that the decision was unrelated to GMP’s profitability but rather directly related to promoting the general good of the state. The Board reiterated why it had found the project to serve the public good. The Board noted that project construction needed to begin by August 2011 to ensure access to federal tax credits and that delaying commencement of construction would create the potential for loss of the tax credits, thereby creating a risk to the economic viability of the project. As the Board stated, the potential threat to the viability of a project found to promote the general good of the state “provided the context” in which the Board considered moving the deadline for obtaining the easements. ¶ 49. On appeal, the Towns assert that the basis for the Board’s decision to accept and rule on GMP’s motion was clearly erroneous because the Board relied upon GMP’s misrepresentations regarding its lack of awareness at the time it submitted its reply brief that a preconstruction deadline for obtaining mitigation could delay the project. According to the Towns, the Board did not have inherent power to rule on GMP’s reconsideration motion because the Board’s inherent power is limited to correcting mistakes in the record. ¶ 50. The Towns also reassert their argument that the Board erroneously altered the easement deadline based on economic concerns. According to the Towns, the Board extended the deadline for mitigation based on GMP’s need to commence construction by August 1 to qualify for federal tax credits, not based on natural-resource impacts. Thus, the Towns maintain that the Board’s decision improperly balanced GMP’s economic concerns with the need to ensure that no undue adverse impact to the natural environment would result from the project. The Towns also assert that the Board’s reasoning is inconsistent with its finding that the project cannot obtain the tax credits if construction is not commenced by August 1 and with its earlier ruling that the tax credits do not implicate § 248 criteria because they are not related to the economic benefits of the project. ¶ 51. We reject these arguments. We first address the Board’s authority to consider GMP’s request on reconsideration. We conclude that the Board acted within its discretion in considering GMP’s motion. We recently reiterated that Rule 59(e) “gives the court broad power to alter or amend a judgment,” and that the rule may be invoked “to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.” In re SP Land Co. , 2011 VT 104, ¶ 16, 190 Vt. 418, 35 A.3d 1007 (quotations omitted). As we stated in SP Land Co. : Under this rule, the court may reconsider issues previously before it, and generally may examine the correctness of the judgment itself. That is, Rule 59(e) codified the trial court’s inherent power to open and correct, modify, or vacate its judgments. The trial court enjoys considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant such a motion to amend or alter. Indeed, we have held that the court’s power on a Rule 59(e) motion even extends to issues not raised in the motion. Id . ¶¶ 16-17 (quotations and citations omitted). ¶ 52. Here, regardless of the timing of GMP’s awareness of the potential for a preconstruction deadline to delay the project, the Board had the authority, within the confines of GMP’s Rule 59(e) motion, to address the correctness of its judgment. Id . ¶ 19 (reiterating “our longstanding view that Rule 59(e) affords trial courts the broad power to generally examine the correctness of a judgment itself”). In response to a Rule 59(e) motion, the trial court has the power to make an appropriate modification or amendment, including with respect to issues considered at trial but not raised in the Rule 59 motion. This approach strikes “an appropriate balance between reconsideration and finality.” Id . ¶ 17 (quotation omitted). Hence, it was proper for the Board to reconsider an issue that had been previously before it during the proceedings on the merits of the proposed project. See In re Robinson/Keir P’ship , 154 Vt 50, 54, 573 A.2d 1188, 1190 (1990) (stating that Rule 59(e) allows trial court to examine correctness of judgment and reconsider issues previously before it). ¶ 53. The Towns’ remaining arguments concerning the Board’s extension of the deadline for GMP to obtain easements are unavailing. As the Board pointed out, it did not find that GMP would be unable to obtain federal tax credits if it did not commence construction by August 1; rather, it found that the potential for obtaining the credits would be threatened if construction were not commenced by that date. Thus, the record does not demonstrate that the tax credits were no longer available, and there is no conflict with the Board’s extension of the deadline for obtaining mitigation easements. ¶ 54. The Towns concede that the Board may weigh aesthetic and economic considerations of a project, and the Board unequivocally stated that in extending the deadline for obtaining easements it was balancing the potential risk of harm caused by the extension against the risk that not extending the deadline would imperil the financial viability of a project found to benefit the public. Noting that tax credits to GMP would ultimately flow through to taxpayers, the Board weighed what it perceived as a relatively small potential risk to the natural environment posed by the delay against the potential loss of a project deemed to be beneficial to the public—not against the risk of GMP losing profits on the project. ¶ 55. We conclude that the Board acted well within its discretion in reevaluating whether it made sense to modify the easement deadline under the circumstances. When the Board became aware that holding up the project based on GMP’s inability to meet the deadline for obtaining easements could potentially threaten the viability of the project itself, it had the discretion to extend the deadline to ensure the project’s viability.