Opinion ID: 1992508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: quinn family's common-law privacy rights

Text: Defendant and the intervenor further argue that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the decedent's family. Again, to assist in our FOIA analysis we look to the common law and examine the scope of the family's common-law privacy rights in the autopsy results. The common-law privacy claim that most closely resembles the assertions by defendant and the intervenor that disclosure would violate the family's privacy right is public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. [10] In Fry, the Court of Appeals stated that public disclosure of embarrassing private facts requires that the disclosed information be highly offensive to a reasonable person and of no legitimate concern to the public. 101 Mich App 728. See also Beaumont v Brown, 401 Mich 80; 257 NW2d 522 (1977). Comment (a) to  652I of the Restatement of Torts states: The right protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded. The cause of action is not assignable, and it cannot be maintained by other persons such as members of the individual's family, unless their own privacy is invaded along with his. [ Id. at 403.] Prosser offers a similar comment on the subject: As to any of the four, it is agreed that the plaintiff's right is a personal one, which does not extend to members of his family, unless, as is obviously possible, their own privacy is invaded along with his. [Prosser, supra,  117, pp 814-815.] Keeping in mind that the right of privacy is a personal right, which can only be asserted by persons whose rights have been invaded, we evaluate whether the family's common-law rights of privacy are implicated in the autopsy information. In Fry, the defendant published an article stating that the decedent, the plaintiff's husband, and another woman were believed to have perished in a house fire. The article went on to state the names and relations of the plaintiff and her children to the decedent. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeals referred to the Restatement of Torts in discussing that a successful claim of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts requires that the matter not be of legitimate public concern: Authorized publicity includes publications concerning homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, fires, catastrophes of nature, a death from the use of narcotics, a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve-year-old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, a report to the police concerning the escape of a wild animal and many other similar matters of genuine, even if more or less deplorable, popular appeal. 3 Restatement Torts, 2d,  652D, comment g, pp 390-391. [101 Mich App 730.] The Court went on to say that an action for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained by a relative of the person concerned, unless that relative is brought into unjustifiable publicity. [ Id. ] The Court held that the plaintiff could not maintain a privacy action because the article did not discuss private facts about the plaintiff, the matters concerning her and her children were taken from public record, the material relating to the plaintiff was not highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the article dealt with a subject matter of legitimate public interest. In Andren v Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 10 Med L Rptr 2109 (ED Mich, 1984), the plaintiff sued the defendant for invasion of privacy after the defendant published an article recounting the facts surrounding the murder of the plaintiff's daughter. The author of the story supplied excerpts from the deceased's diary. Applying Michigan law, the court determined that the plaintiff had no standing to maintain an action for invasion of privacy. The court found that the plaintiff's private life had not been made public, even though the article mentioned her name, identified her as the victim's mother, and gave some background information on the family. The court found that the statements with regard to the family would not be offensive to the reasonable person. The court also noted that the article was newsworthy because [e]ven though the murder occurred 1500 miles from the Free Press's readership, it certainly could be of concern to a reading public who would consider leaving the so-called high crime of Michigan for the glamour of South Florida. [ Id. at 2111.] The court concluded that the mother had no standing to sue. In Cordell v Detective Publications, Inc, 419 F2d 989 (CA 6, 1969), the court, applying Tennessee law, disallowed the plaintiff's action for invasion of privacy. The defendant wrote an article sensationalizing the murder of the plaintiff's daughter. In finding that the plaintiff could not bring an action for public disclosure of private matters, the court highlighted the rule that the cause of action is personal and only to be asserted by those who are subjects of the publication. The court stated: Consequently, the right lapses with the death of the person who enjoyed it, and one cannot recover for this kind of invasion of the privacy of a relative, no matter how close the relationship. [419 F2d 990-991.] The court went on to discuss the policy behind the rule: The policy underlying these limitations is not hard to discern. The law is not unwisely wary of actions for injury which is purely emotional; the danger of spurious claims is too great. See Rest 2d Torts,  436A (1966).... As one court put it, if the right asserted here were sustained, it would be difficult to fix its boundaries. Kelley v Post Pub Co, 327 Mass 275, 277; 98 NE2d 286, 287 (1951). How distant a relative could sue? At what relational distance does the danger of feigned claims overcome the likelihood of real emotional distress? [ Id. at 991-992.] Finally, the court wrote that the prevailing authority, which we believe would be followed in Tennessee, does not regard an injury inflicted on the daughter as giving rise to a cause of action by the mother in her own right. [ Id. at 992.] In Smith v City of Artesia, 108 NM 339; 772 P2d 373 (1989), the plaintiffs sued the defendant, claiming that their constitutional rights of privacy were violated after learning that the police, in investigating the murder of the plaintiffs' daughter, circulated nude photographs of her which were taken after she died. Before deciding the constitutional question, the court discussed the common-law right of privacy. The court stated: Isolated commentary supports a cause of action for the relatives of a decedent whose private life is publicized. E.g., Green, Relational Interests, 29 Ill L Rev 460, 485-490 (1934). Yet judicial concerns about framing the scope of the tort and its possible misuse, as well as traditional reluctance to permit damages that are solely emotional, have outweighed natural revulsion to abuse of the dead. See Justice v Belo Broadcasting Corp, 472 F Supp 145, 147-148 (ND Tex, 1979). The great weight of judicial authority is against granting relatives of a decedent a cause of action for invasion of privacy arising from disclosures about the decedent. See Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Publication Dealing With One Other Than Plaintiff, 18 ALR3d 873 (1968).... Reporter's Note to Restatement, supra,  652I. [ Id. at 341.] We follow the general rule that the right of privacy is personal, and the relatives of deceased persons who are objects of publicity may not maintain actions for invasion of privacy unless their own privacy is violated. There is no relational right to privacy in Michigan. We agree with Fry that for an invasion to occur, the relative must be brought into unjustifiable publicity.