Opinion ID: 2054068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Does the New Jersey Constitution prohibit the State from using project-labor agreements designating particular unions?

Text: Certain appellants and certain amici contend that the New Jersey Constitution prohibits project-labor agreements that require the use of specific unions on public projects. They believe that even if authorized by the Legislature, such project-labor agreements do not accord with constitutional principle. Other appellants and amici disagree. Because we decide this case on statutory grounds alone, we need not resolve the constitutional questions. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 132 N.J. 234, 240, 624 A. 2d 578 (1993) (holding that courts should not reach constitutional questions unless necessary to the disposition of the litigation). However, we set forth the arguments of the parties and some of the concerns a court would have to address in deciding the constitutional issues. The New Jersey Constitution declares in paragraph 19 of article I that [p]ersons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively. Although we regard the `experience and adjudications' under the N.L.R.A. as appropriate and helpful guides for the implementation of Article I, paragraph 19, Comite Organizador de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Molinelli, 114 N.J. 87, 98, 552 A. 2d 1003 (1989), NLRA precedents do not define the State constitutional right in the absence of preemption. (Paragraph 19 was intended to protect workers who are not covered by the NLRA. See Richard A. Goldberg and Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers' Organizational and Collective Bargaining Rights in New Jersey: Implementing Self-Executing State Constitutional Rights, 18 Rutgers L.J. 729, 742 (1987).) Thus, State law defines the scope of the constitutional right guaranteed by paragraph 19. In that respect, our courts have held that the right to organize and bargain collectively is not only constitutional in its dimension but should be accorded the `same stature as other fundamental rights.' Communication Workers v. Atlantic County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 250 N.J. Super. 403, 408, 594 A. 2d 1348 (Ch.Div. 1991) (quoting Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 197, 175 A. 2d 639 (1961)). Under federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis, [w]hen    legislation regulates `fundamental rights'   , it will be subject to `strict scrutiny' and the state will be required to demonstrate (1) that a compelling need justifies the legislation and (2) that no less restrictive alternative will accomplish that state objective. United States Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 157-58, 445 A. 2d 353 (1982). However, we have held that [t]he analysis of fundamental rights under the New Jersey Constitution differs from analysis of those rights under the United States Constitution. Starting with our decision in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491-92 [303 A. 2d 273], cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed. 2d 219 (1973), we began to develop an independent analysis of rights under article 1, paragraph 1. Thereafter, we rejected two-tiered equal protection analysis and employed a balancing test in analyzing claims under the state constitution. In striking the balance, we have considered the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. [ Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 567, 494 A. 2d 294 (1985) (citations omitted).] In applying that three-part balancing test, the more personal the right, the greater the public need must be to justify governmental interference with the exercise of that right. See Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 43, 364 A. 2d 1016 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 1672, 52 L.Ed. 2d 373 (1977). Whether characterized as the denial of equal protection or the infringement of a fundamental right, the analysis would largely be the same. Freedom of choice in selecting one's bargaining agent is the very essence of collective bargaining. The courts of this State have recognized, at least inferentially, that N.J. Const. 1947, Art. I, sec. 19, guarantees this freedom of choice   . Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local No. 680, 23 N.J. 85, 96, 127 A. 2d 869 (1956) (citations omitted). That freedom of choice demands that when a group of persons in private employment [has] freely exercised [its] right to choose a bargaining representative, the will of the majority may not be undermined by picketing where the sole object is economic duress upon the employer and the employees. Id. at 97-98, 127 A. 2d 869. Thus, no third party, including another union, may exert economic coercion on a group of employees to influence its choice of bargaining representatives. The question presented by some of the plaintiffs here is whether the State or one of its agencies has improperly coerced New Jersey construction workers in their choice of bargaining representatives by favoring one group of unions over others in the award of public contracts. The TPA's Resolution 19-93 required all contractors performing Widening Project contracts to sign project-labor agreements with a designated labor organization. Then-Governor Florio's Executive Order No. 99 broadened that requirement to include all State construction contracts. Efforts by a labor organization to interfere with the statutory rights of workers under the NLRA to elect a bargaining representative of their own choosing are questionable under Independent Dairy Workers, supra, 23 N.J. 85, 127 A. 2d 869. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D) (making it unfair labor practice for labor organization to strike or engage in other coercive activity for the purpose of forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization). [2] Accession to demands that infringe constitutional rights has been held elsewhere to comprise a civil-rights violation. See, e.g., Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 502 N.E. 2d 1375 (1987) (holding that under Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, defendant may be liable for interference with rights of another even if defendant had no personal desire to abridge those rights, but merely acquiesced to pressure from third parties who did wish to abrogate such rights). Of course, this begs the question of whether any rights have been infringed. The parties disagree about that point. Employees of Harms argue as appellants that the TPA has diminished the State constitutional rights of New Jersey construction workers to choose a union free from external pressure. The TPA counters that it has not denied any Harms employees the right to be represented by labor organizations of their own choosing and that Harms is free as well to obtain workers through its preferred labor organization. The TPA essentially argues that it has denied neither Harms nor its employees any rights; rather, it has merely denied Harms and its employees the privilege of obtaining Turnpike contracts. That reasoning recalls Justice Holmes's famous aphorism: A policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892). More subtle and indeed more complex principles are now employed to analyze the dispensation of government benefits. The question today is whether the government has unreasonably burdened the exercise of a constitutional right by conditioning the dispensation of a government benefit ( i.e., a public contract) on how one has exercised that right ( i.e., which union a bargaining unit has chosen). See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965 (1963) (striking down denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh-day Adventist whose employer had discharged her because she refused to work on Saturday in accordance with her religious beliefs). Through restrictive conditions on the award of public contracts, the State could theoretically limit the freedom of choice that New Jersey construction workers currently exercise in designating unions to bargain for them. And if the State could favor one union over another, it could favor, by the same logic, nonunion contractors over union contractors. Although [t]he right to employment on a local public works project, like the right to a city job, is not fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis, United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council, 88 N.J. 317, 343, 443 A. 2d 148 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 208, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 79 L.Ed. 2d 249 (1984), the right not to be denied a public contract for invidious reasons, such as race, or religion, is a fundamental right. [3] Does the denial of public work because of union affiliation violate a similar fundamental right? Were we to resolve that question, we would have to determine (1) the nature of the right to choose one's bargaining representative, (2) whether a public-contract specification that does not by its terms prohibit the free choice of a bargaining representative may still impinge on that right, and (3) if the specification does impinge on that right, whether the public need for the restriction justifies its imposition. Among the factors to be considered in assessing that public need would be the availability of other mechanisms to achieve the same substantive goal, such as a no-strike clause requiring all workers to work without interruption during the term of the project or an agreement to resolve jurisdictional disputes by reference to independent arbitrators. For example, the State might consider a bid specification that would require jurisdictional disputes to be mediated by an impartial jurisdictional disputes board. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers & Pointers of Greater New York, Local 1974 v. Local 530 of Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Internat'l Assoc., 954 F. 2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.1992) (discussing both national Plan of Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry and New York Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes). Finally, we would consider the extent to which we must defer to legislative action in defining the contours of a constitutional right. Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A. 2d 621 (1986). We are certain that the Legislature is as fully aware as we of the nature of the affected rights, the extent of any intrusion thereon, and the public need for such intrusion.