Opinion ID: 2087597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecution of Butler's Drunk Driving

Text: In 1987, during his third D.U.I., Butler crashed his vehicle into another car. As a result of Butler's acts, Juanita McClendon was killed, her eleven-year-old son was left paralyzed, her twelve-year-old daughter's leg was broken in three places, her sister's face was seriously scarred and her arm broken, and her five-year-old nephew broke both legs, both knees and received a head injury resulting in mental retardation. The State charged Butler with a host of crimes: operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, a class C felony; [1] reckless homicide, a class C felony; [2] four counts of criminal recklessness causing serious bodily injury, class D felonies; [3] four counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury, class D felonies; [4] driving while suspended, a class A misdemeanor; [5] and one count alleging Butler was a habitual substance offender, a class C felony enhancement. [6] Butler's lawyer negotiated a plea bargain under which Butler pled guilty to operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting in death or serious bodily injury, and to being a habitual substance offender. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining six charges. The court sentenced Butler to concurrent sentences of eight years for the driving while intoxicated charges and added eight years for the habitual substance count. Three years later Butler filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he was not a habitual substance offender. The Indiana Code requires two prior substance convictions as class A misdemeanors or as felonies; Butler contended one of his priors was a class C misdemeanor. [7] Butler said he did not know this when he pled guilty to being a habitual substance offender. He also alleged that he had entered this fallacious plea because his counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction judge undertook to determine the nature of the challenged prior conviction. During the hearing on Butler's petition, the post-conviction court examined the text of the chronological case summary and the citation for Butler's second offense. [8] The CCS stated Butler was charged with `DR UNDER INFLUENCE (REFUSAL)' and `NO PLATES.' The citation indicated that Butler was `driving while intox., contrary to the form of State Statute, I.C. 9-11-2-1,' (R. 150.) This citation referred to a statute defining a class C misdemeanor, but the post-conviction court found as a fact that the text of the ticket referred to the offense of Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, a class A misdemeanor. Ind Code Ann. § 9-11-2-2 (West Supp.1987). In effect, the court inferred that the statutory citation was a scrivener's error. The court buttressed this conclusion by noting Butler's own testimony revealed he was not misled about the nature of the charge, for he admitted to the sentencing court that he had two prior D.U.I.s. (R. 61.) Finally, the court concluded the offense was likely a class A misdemeanor because there was no evidence Butler submitted to a blood-alcohol content test. The court noted that without this test Butler could not have been convicted of driving with the .10 percent blood-alcohol content required for conviction of a class C misdemeanor under § 9-11-2-1. [9] The post-conviction court also denied Butler's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It found that even if counsel failed to suggest that Butler might collaterally challenge the status of the second offense, there was no evidence to suggest that this would have made a difference to [Butler's] decision to plead guilty. (R. 153.) Butler appealed, alleging the post-conviction court erred by finding he had committed the required predicate offenses. He further claimed he had been denied effective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court had erred by considering the testimony of a deputy prosecutor on an issue of law. The Court of Appeals reframed Butler's first issue, asking instead whether his guilty plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis. The court held there was no factual basis to accept the plea because Butler's testimony was the only evidence about the class of his convictions. It held that this evidence alone could not constitute a sufficient factual basis. Butler v. State (1994), Ind.App., 638 N.E.2d 826. Reversing on this ground, it did not address Butler's second and third claims of error. We grant the State's petition to transfer to consider the following issues: 1. Whether the post-conviction court erred when it found Butler had committed two prior class A misdemeanors; 2. Whether Butler received effective assistance of counsel; and, 3. Whether the post-conviction court erred by admitting and relying on opinion testimony about a legal issue. At the outset, we note that a petitioner who loses in a post-conviction proceeding stands in the shoes of one appealing from a negative judgment. On appeal, he must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Lowe v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 1126. On appeal, we examine only the probative evidence which supports the post-conviction court's judgment, along with any reasonable inferences from that evidence. Wickliffe v. State (1988), Ind., 523 N.E.2d 1385. With this standard in mind, we turn first to the nature of Butler's prior conviction.