Opinion ID: 1834681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Section 614.1(11) Violates Equal Protection Guarantees.

Text: Mapco believes that section 614.1(11) violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and Iowa Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend XIV ([n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws); Iowa Const. art. I, § 6 (prohibits laws grant[ing] to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens). Mapco asserts that the statute as written is discriminatory, denying Mapco the opportunity to seek indemnity from those who are allegedly protected by the statute. The discrimination Mapco is talking about allegedly results from the legislature's exclusion of owners, occupants, and operators of an improvement to real property from section 614.1(11) coverage. Such a result, Mapco insists, grants immunity to the manufacturers whobut for the statuteshould and would be primarily liable for injuries to third parties caused by the manufacturers' negligence. Yet, owners and others in the excluded class are burdened with the liability for these damages because of their common law duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees. So, Mapco concludes, section 614.1(11) creates an unreasonable and arbitrary classification. A. Standing. Honeywell denies Mapco's standing to raise this constitutional challenge because Mapco does not claim the statute violates its own right to equal protection. Stated another way, Mapco neither belongs to the group granted immunity nor to the group that is without immunity. Honeywell is right in asserting that Mapco lacks standing in its own right to argue that the statute deprives owners and others in the excluded class of equal protection. Generally, a party may not assert the rights of others not before the court. Elview Constr. Co. v. North Scott Community School Dist., 373 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Iowa 1985); State v. Henderson, 269 N.W.2d 404, 405 (Iowa 1978). As one court put it, [t]his rule is based in part on the notion that a third party cannot effectively vindicate the rights of others. Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 714, 437 N.E.2d 514, 523 (1982). But this rationale does not apply here. Section 614.1(11) bars Mapco from suing those defendants protected by the statute. So Mapco's interest in the equal protection challenge is as great as that of the owners and others excluded from the protection of section 614.1(11). We think therefore that Mapco has standing in a representative capacity to raise the potential rights of the potential defendants excluded from the statute's protection. Cf. Klein, 386 Mass. at 714, 437 N.E.2d at 523 (applying same reasoning to lack of standing challenge to statute of repose barring injured plaintiff from suing architect protected by statute that excluded owners of property and others from its protection). B. The merits. We presume statutes are constitutional. A challenger must show beyond a reasonable doubt a constitutional violation. That means the challenger must negate every reasonable basis that might support the statute. Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Iowa 1989) (citations omitted). In equal protection challenges based on the federal and Iowa Constitutions, we usually interpret both federal and state equal protection provisions the same. Id. Because Mapco raises no issue regarding suspect classifications or fundamental rights, our standard of review is the rational basis test. Id. A state can treat classes of persons unequally if a rational basis for the unequal treatment exists. State v. Wehde, 258 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Iowa 1977). Not surprisingly, the cases go both ways on the constitutional issue Mapco raises. Compare Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9-13, 514 P.2d 568, 570-72 (1973) (statute of repose protected licensed building professionals but not owners; held that (1) classification was not based on reasonable consideration of differences between the two classes and (2) such classification had no fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation) with Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 203-05, 551 N.E.2d 938, 948-49 (1990) (holding that such classification was based on valid distinction). Sedar collects the jurisdictions that have upheld such statutes against equal protection challenges and those jurisdictions are many. See Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 203 n. 8, 551 N.E.2d at 948 n. 8. In addition, on this issue the United States Supreme Court has dismissed appeals from state courts for lack of a substantial federal question. See, e.g., Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Civ.App.1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 24, 74 L.Ed.2d 39, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 1059, 103 S.Ct. 478, 74 L.Ed.2d 625 (1982). A local federal district court upheld section 614.1(11) against a federal and Iowa equal protection challenge. See Patel v. Fleur De Lis Motor Inns, Inc., 771 F.Supp. 961 (S.D.Iowa 1991) (mem.). In Patel, the court found a rational basis for the legislature's decision to exclude owners, occupants, and operators from the protection afforded others who improve real property. Id. at 968. The rationale, which we adopt, is this: Owners have continuing control of the premises and are responsible for their repair and maintenance. In contrast, architects and builders have no control over the premises once they are turned over to the owner. Id. (citation omitted). See also McKiness, 507 N.W.2d at 410 (applying same rationale to section 614.1(11) in context of due process challenge). We should also point out that property owners have a defense if they did not know nor had any reason to anticipate the unsafe or defective condition of the premises. Capener v. Duin, 173 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1969). If they do know about the condition, the liability potential should remain to prompt them to correct it. We find additional rationale in McKiness. There we said that for due process purposes the legislature could reasonably have decided that [t]he lapse of time between completion of an improvement and initiation of suit often results in the unavailability of witnesses, memory loss and a lack of adequate records. Another problem particularly critical is the potential application of current improved state-of-the-art standards to cases where the installation and design of an improvement took place many years ago. McKiness, 507 N.W.2d at 410 (citation omitted). For all these reasons, we conclude section 614.1(11) does not violate the equal protection provisions of either constitution.