Opinion ID: 4175415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence against Stanley

Text: Stanley argues that he should have been acquitted--of everything, and of the gun charge at a bare minimum--because the government did not present enough evidence for the jury to convict him. First, we explain the few facts necessary to understand his - 28 - arguments in the light most favorable to the verdict, RodríguezSoler, 773 F.3d at 289-290, followed by the arguments and our take. a) Background As we mentioned earlier, the charges against Stanley included possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drugtrafficking conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)-- specifically, a rifle. At trial, two witnesses testified that Stanley possessed that rifle:  Alexa Doran--one of Stanley's exes and the mother of one of his children--testified that Stanley bought a big gun, like a rifle or something in a large case from a friend and stored it behind the couch for a few weeks. During that time, she was working for Stanley and counting money and distributing pills in the apartment where the gun was kept.  Matthew Hernon--Doran's brother, who started working for Stanley when he was fifteen or sixteen and chauffeured Stanley to drug deals while still on his learner's permit--testified that in 2011, he saw an AR-15, the public model of the M16 assault rifle, in Stanley's house. Stanley pulled a case out from behind the couch, took the gun out of the case, cocked the gun, and pointed it at Hernon from one or two feet away. Afterwards Stanely wiped his fingerprints off the gun and put it back in the case. Stanley told Hernon he was afraid someone was going to rob him, so he had the gun for protection. In his opening and closing arguments, and throughout his cross-examination of the government's witnesses, Stanley attacked the witnesses' credibility. Hernon, for instance, wanted an opportunity to get back at Stanley for leaving Doran for another woman while Doran was pregnant with Stanley's child. On top of - 29 - being a jilted ex, Doran also had a drug problem while she was working for Stanley and was testifying against him to avoid prosecution for her own part in the conspiracy. (Thirteen of the thirty-six witnesses were alleged co-conspirators subject to this brand of attack.) At the close of the evidence, Stanley moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion. Stanley now reprises his two-part insufficient-evidence challenge, contending as he did below that (1) the government presented insufficient evidence on all of the charges because [a]ll of the witnesses were proven incredible--all were impeached by their animosity for the brothers, criminal past, or the deals they got for testifying; and (2) the government did not present evidence that he possessed a gun in furtherance of a drugtrafficking offense, as it must for the jury to convict him under § 924(c), because [b]eyond the rifle's existence, there is no evidence it was ever used . . . as part of any transaction. The government disagrees. b) Sufficiency Analysis We review a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, considering whether, after assaying all the evidence in the light most amiable to the government, and taking all reasonable inferences in its favor, a rational factfinder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that - 30 - the prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of the crime. United States v. George, 841 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 281 (1st Cir. 2012)). i) Witness Credibility Stanley's witness-credibility-based sufficiency argument is hopeless. As a general matter, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence this court must defer all credibility judgments to the jury. United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 706 (1st Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1174 n.4 (1st Cir. 1993). We are not at liberty to question the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Rodríguez-Milían, 820 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 138 (2016). As the government points out, Stanley made his credibility arguments to the jury, but the jury found him guilty nonetheless. On appeal, he simply reiterates that the witnesses were incredible, but does not explain how or why his case escapes our credibility rule, so this argument gets him nowhere. ii) Gun Charge Stanley's § 924(c) transactional argument fares no better--a rational factfinder could find Stanley guilty of the § 924(c) charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to his position on appeal, the government did not have to show that Stanley used the gun in a drug transaction in order to convict. - 31 - Instead, it had to show three things, that Stanley (1) possessed a firearm (2) in furtherance of (3) a drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (2). As to the first element, the government presented evidence that Stanley possessed a gun: Doran and Hernon testified that they saw Stanley handle a rifle he pulled out from behind his couch, and Hernon said Stanley pointed it at him. See United States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 509 (1st Cir. 2003) (testimony that defendant was carrying a gun established element of possession). As to the second element, the government also presented evidence that Stanley possessed the gun in furtherance of his oxycodone-trafficking conspiracy. A gun is possessed in furtherance of a crime where it is possessed to advance or promote the commission of the underlying offense. United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 399 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Grace, 367 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2004)). For instance, a gun kept near a drug distribution point for protection from robbery of drug-sale proceeds . . . may reasonably be considered to be possessed 'in furtherance of' an ongoing drug-trafficking crime. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d at 509 (quoting United States v. Garner, 338 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2003)). That's what the government showed here: Doran said Stanley kept the gun behind the couch where he distributed oxycodone pills and counted drug money, and Hernon - 32 - said he had the rifle for protection in case someone tried to rob him. As for element three, Stanley was convicted of a drugtrafficking crime--conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute oxycodone under 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Aside from his witness-credibility argument, which we have already rejected, Stanley does not otherwise challenge that conviction on appeal. The government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Stanley of possessing the rifle in furtherance of his drug-trafficking conspiracy.7