Opinion ID: 6341049
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

Text: excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A court’s power to vacate judgments under Rule 60(b) in order “to accomplish justice” is balanced against “the strong public interest in the timeliness and finality of judgments.” Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 16 MARTINEZ V. SHINN Some Rule 60(b) motions are available to federal habeas petitioners despite the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). In relevant part, AEDPA establishes three requirements for second or successive habeas petitions: First, any claim that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed. [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(b)(1). Second, any claim that has not already been adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a new or retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability of actual innocence. § 2244(b)(2). Third, before the district court may accept a successive petition for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual- innocence provisions. § 2244(b)(3). Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529–30. However, “[w]hen no ‘claim’ is presented, there is no basis for contending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a habeas corpus application,” and therefore the motion may be considered by a district court. Id. at 533. Rule 60(b) motions alleging a “previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar,” or alleging “some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,” such as “[f]raud on the federal habeas court,” do not advance a “claim” and are permitted despite AEDPA. Id. at 532, 532 nn.4–5. On the other hand, motions asking MARTINEZ V. SHINN 17 “for a second chance to have the merits determined favorably” are not. Id. at 532 n.5. Rule 60(b)(6), upon which Martinez relies, is a catchall provision that depends on the “exercise of a court’s ample equitable power . . . to reconsider its judgment.” Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1135. A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is required “to show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). “Extraordinary circumstances occur where there are ‘other compelling reasons’ for opening the judgment” that prevented the movant from raising the basis of the motion during the pendency of the case. Bynoe v. Baca, 966 F.3d 972, 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1949)). Although “[s]uch circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context,” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535, “Rule 60(b)(6) can and should be ‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice,’” Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). We held in Phelps that an intervening change in law can constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for habeas petitioners, but that courts must analyze motions under Rule 60(b)(6) using a “case-bycase inquiry” that balances numerous factors. 569 F.3d at 1133. “A relevant alteration to constitutional rights, for example, may be sufficient, but a narrow change in peripheral law is ‘rarely’ enough.” Bynoe, 966 F.3d at 983 (citations omitted). In Phelps, we outlined six non-exhaustive factors that are to be flexibly considered to determine whether a post18 MARTINEZ V. SHINN judgment change in the law meets the “extraordinarycircumstances” requirement: (1) [T]he nature of the legal change, including whether the change in law resolved an unsettled legal question; (2) whether the movant exercised diligence in pursuing reconsideration of his or her claim; (3) the parties’ reliance interests in the finality of the judgment; (4) the delay between the finality of the judgment and the Rule 60(b)(6) motion; (5) the relationship between the change in law and the challenged judgment; and (6) whether there are concerns of comity that would be disturbed by reopening a case. Id. at 983 (summarizing Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1134–40). Relevant here, “only [legal rulings] that may have affected the outcome of the judgment the petitioner seeks to review should weigh toward a finding of extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 986. “[W]e consider . . . whether the change in law affects an issue dispositive to the outcome of the case.” Id. In the case before us, as we explain below, Mitchell does not substantially affect either Martinez’s underlying case or his request for discovery. The only effect of Mitchell is to make clear that the district court had jurisdiction to consider his Rule 60(b)(6) request.