Opinion ID: 620046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive Background

Text: “In the years prior to SORNA’s enactment, the Nation had been shocked by cases in which children had been raped and murdered by persons who, unbeknownst to their neighbors or the police, were convicted sex offenders.” Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2249 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). In response to these events, “Congress and state legislatures passed [several] laws requiring the registration of sex offenders.” Id. One such law was the federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (the “Wetterling Act”), Pub. L. 103-322, Tit. XVII, § 170101(c), 108 Stat. 2041.1 Despite federal and state efforts to monitor convicted sex offenders, approximately 100,000 sex offenders—nearly one-fifth of the United States’ total sex offender 1 “Under the Wetterling Act, states were given three years to establish a sex offender registration program in compliance with the Act or forfeit 10 percent of federal funding for a state and local law enforcement assistance program.” United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 2010). “The Wetterling Act required convicted sex offenders to register their addresses with states.” Id. The Wetterling Act was replaced by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 587, which contains more specific sex offender registration requirements. 2 population—remained unregistered in 2005. See H. R. Rep. No. 109-218, pt. 1, p. 26 (2005). In July 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (the “Walsh Act”), Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 1-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590-611 (2006). Title I of the Walsh Act established SORNA. See id. “SORNA was enacted to succeed and enhance the registration requirements of the Wetterling Act,” United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2010), and to eliminate “a dangerous gap in the then-existing sex-offender-registration laws.” Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2249 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that SORNA was enacted based on Congress’s “conclusion that existing sex offender registration and reporting requirements were too readily circumvented”). The declared purpose of SORNA is “to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children . . . [by] establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders.” 42 U.S.C. § 16901. To accomplish this objective, SORNA established a national database, see 42 U.S.C. § 16919(a), “[i]ntended as a means of preventing sex offenders from evading their registration requirements by crossing state lines.” United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2240 (noting that SORNA was “enacted to address the deficiencies in prior law that had enabled sex offenders to slip through the cracks”). SORNA includes civil and criminal components. Its civil component—42 U.S.C. § 16913—states: “A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the 3 offender is a student.” SORNA defines the term “sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” Id. at 16911(1). Section 16913 “requires all sex offenders to register [and to keep their registrations current], regardless of whether their convictions are based on federal or state law.” Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d at 1276; see also Begay, 622 F.3d at 1187 (noting that § 16913 imposes “two separate obligations—an obligation to register and an obligation to keep the registration current”). To ensure such compliance, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requires federal district courts to “order, as an explicit condition of supervised release for a person required to register under [SORNA], that the person comply with the requirements of that Act.” Thus, for all persons convicted of a federal sex offense after SORNA’s enactment, the registration requirements contained in § 16913 are a mandatory component of their supervised release. See id. SORNA’s criminal provision—18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)—imposes criminal penalties for failure to comply with § 16913’s registration requirements. Section 16913 “applies to all sex offenders regardless of whether their convictions arise under federal or state law.” Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d at 1278. By contrast, § 2250(a) “imposes criminal liability on two categories of persons who fail to adhere to SORNA’s registration requirements: (1) any person who is a sex offender by reason of a conviction under federal law, and (2) any other [sex offender] who travels in interstate or foreign commerce.” Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2238 (quotations and citations omitted). Persons convicted of state sex crimes “who never leave the state in which they were convicted” are not subject to criminal penalties under § 2250(a). Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d at 1278. 4
In the years since its passage, the Tenth Circuit has rejected numerous constitutional challenges to SORNA. The court has held that § 16913—SORNA’s registration provision—does not violate the Due Process Clause, the nondelegation doctrine, or the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e.g., Lawrance, 548 F.3d at 1333-34; United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 935-40 (10th Cir. 2008). We also have held that Congress acted within its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting § 2250(a)(2)(B)—SORNA’s criminal provision applicable to sex offenders who fail to register and travel in interstate or foreign commerce. See Lawrance, 548 F.3d at 1337; Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 940. Most recently, we held that Congress acted within its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause when it enacted § 2250(a)(2)(A)—SORNA’s criminal provision that applies to federal sex offenders, including those who do not travel interstate. See Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d at 1289.2 We reached this conclusion based on the assumption that § 16913—SORNA’s registration provision—was constitutional. See id. Specifically, we stated: “[O]perat[ing] on the assumption that § 16913 is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause . . . we conclude that Congress has the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact § 2250(a)(2)(A) in order to criminally enforce its validly enacted registration provision, § 16913.” Id. We assumed 2 On appeal, Mr. Carel asserts a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(A), but this challenge is foreclosed by our decision in Yelloweagle. 5 § 16913 was valid because the defendant-appellant “waived his challenge to § 16913.” Id. Despite all the constitutional challenges to SORNA that have been asserted in the Tenth Circuit, we have not expressly addressed whether Congress acted within the scope of its authority when it required federal sex offenders to comply with § 16913’s registration requirements. 3 3 Two other circuits—the Fifth and the Ninth—have directly addressed the constitutionality of applying § 16913 to federal sex offenders. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc opinion pending); United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010). Although they offered different reasons for doing so, both circuits upheld § 16913 as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s legislative authority. See Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d at 146 (“Congress had the authority under Article I of the Constitution to devise a narrow, non-punitive collateral regulatory consequence to this particular high-risk category of federal criminal convictions. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that [SORNA’s] application to intra-state violations . . . by sex offenders convicted under federal law is constitutional.”); George, 625 F.3d at 1130 (“SORNA’s registration requirements are valid based on the federal government’s direct supervisory interest over federal sex offenders.” (quotations omitted)). Additionally, although they have not addressed application of § 16913 to federal sex offenders who do not cross state lines, at least six other circuits have concluded that § 16913 is constitutional. See United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Section 16913 is a law made in pursuance of the constitution, because it is necessary and proper for carrying into Execution Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.” (quotations and citations omitted)); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To the extent that § 16913 regulates solely intrastate activity, its means are reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power, and therefore proper.” (quotations and citations omitted)); United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17, 25 n.8 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The defendant suggests that the registration requirement contained in § 16913 itself exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. This suggestion is incorrect. The Necessary and Proper Clause . . . provides Congress with ample authority to regulate local activity as part of a general scheme regulating interstate commerce.”); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[Section] 16913 is a logical way to help ensure that the government will more effectively be able to track sex offenders when they do cross state lines. To the extent that § 16913 regulates solely intrastate activity, the regulatory means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”); United States v. Howell, 6