Opinion ID: 2291663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: in personam jurisdiction over robey is conferred under krs 454.210

Text: In the recent case Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Beach, 336 S.W.3d 51 (Ky.2011), we reevaluated the requirements for long-arm jurisdiction against a nonresident defendant. Specifically, we overruled Wilson v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589 (Ky.2002) and other cases that had created the impression that the language of KRS 454.210 had been subsumed by federal due process standards for exercising in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents. We clarified that the proper analysis of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consists of a two-step process under which review first proceeds under KRS 454.210 and, if jurisdiction is permissible under the long-arm statute, only then is jurisdiction under federal due process examined. Caesars, 336 S.W.3d at 57. Accordingly, we must first examine jurisdiction over Robey under KRS 454.210 independent of federal due process concerns. KRS 454.210(2)(a) enumerates nine distinct instances in which Kentucky courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. Before the circuit court, Hinners argued that three of the nine provisions of KRS 454.210 authorized the extension of long-arm jurisdiction over Robey. They are specifically: [7] (2) (a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's: 1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; 2. Contracting to supply services or goods in this Commonwealth; . . . 4. Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth, provided that the tortious injury occurring in this Commonwealth arises out of the doing or soliciting of business or a persistent course of conduct or derivation of substantial revenue within the Commonwealth.... Long-arm jurisdiction analysis is especially dependent upon the underlying facts of the individual case, so our first undertaking is to identify the relevant factual predicate for our review. Those facts are: (1) Robey, situated in Missouri, advertised the vehicle for sale on eBay; (2) Hinners, in Kentucky, submitted the winning bid; (3) Hinners traveled out-of-state to take possession of the vehicle; (4) Robey executed vehicle transfer documents to enable Hinners to obtain a Kentucky registration and title for the vehicle; (5) Robey, in his eBay listing and in oral statements to Hinners, misrepresented the condition of the vehicle; and (6) the vehicle came to Kentucky covered by Robey's warranty, the one month/1000 mile service agreement. We agree with Hinners that Robey's conduct constitutes Contracting to supply services or goods in this Commonwealth and therefore KRS 454.210(2)(a)(2) is applicable. A plain reading of the statutory language produces the interpretation that the contract need not be made or executed in this Commonwealth, but, rather, only that the contract provide for the supplying of services or goods to be transported into, consumed or used in Kentucky. Here, although the final deal was executed beyond Kentucky's border, it was anticipated by the parties from the outset that the vehicle would be transported to and used in Kentucky. Clearly, Robey contracted] to supply services (the warranty) or goods (the vehicle) in this Commonwealth. Subjecting Robey to adjudication in Kentucky is therefore authorized by the statute, if the claim asserted against him is one arising from his contract to supply services or goods in this state. Caesars, 336 S.W.3d at 58. In Caesars, we rejected the use of a but for test in determining if a plaintiffs claim has aris[en] from the specific statutory predicate authorizing in personam jurisdiction. Instead, we said that there must exist a reasonable and direct nexus between the wrongful acts alleged in the complaint and the statutory predicate for long-arm-jurisdiction. Id. at 58. We held that a slip-and-fall accident in an Indiana casino could not reasonably be construed as arising from the casino's transacting business in Kentucky by way of advertising and promotional campaigns, and sponsoring civic events in Kentucky. The connection between the tort claim based upon a theory of premises liability and the casino's business activity in Kentucky was far too attenuated. In stark contrast, Hinners's claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of warranty are based upon the very same contract to supply[ ] goods (i.e., the Cadillac Escalade) upon which long-arm jurisdiction under the statute is predicated. It is self-evident from the complaint itself that the claims of misrepresentation arise from from Robey's contract to supply goods in Kentucky. Therefore, we conclude that this transaction meets the requirements for long-arm jurisdiction under KRS 454.210(2)(a)(2). [8] Thus, under the two-step long-arm jurisdictional analysis identified in Caesars, we proceed to a determination of whether this application of our statute offends the standards of federal due process.