Opinion ID: 1452969
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pager Seized from Garcia's Person

Text: The officers seized Garcia's pager during a patdown of his person following the stop of the Suburban. The district court determined that the pager was legally seized pursuant to a Terry frisk for weapons. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (authorizing a strictly circumscribed search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest). Garcia argues that Terry does not justify the seizure of his pager because Terry permits only the seizure of items that reasonably appear to be weapons, not other evidence of crime. We agree with Garcia that the district court erred in concluding that Terry and its progeny authorize the seizure of his pager, but because we conclude that the pager would inevitably have been lawfully discovered, we affirm the district court's refusal to suppress the pager. If a police officer reasonably believes or suspects that the defendant is armed, he may conduct a patdown for weapons in the interest of his own safety. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). The Terry doctrine permits only a search for weapons, not for evidence in general. See id. at 93-94, 100 S.Ct. 338 (Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow . . . any search whatever for anything but weapons.); United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1993) ( Terry allows only an examination for concealed objects and forbids searching for anything other than weapons.). Upon stopping the Suburban, the officers reasonably suspected the occupants of drug trafficking because they had overheard them discussing kilos, guns, and large quantities of money. The officers also knew that the recently arrived occupants  Garcia and Rodriguez  claimed to work for Ovalle, a suspected drug dealer. Based on this and other information, the officers reasonably suspected that Garcia was armed, and they acted properly in conducting a patdown for weapons. Seizure of items during a patdown is warranted if the officer reasonably believe[s] that the [concealed item] could be a weapon. Id. Moreover, under the plain feel doctrine, an officer may seize an object whose contour or mass makes its identity as contraband immediately apparent. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); see also United States v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774, 778 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search . . . so long as the officers' search stays within the bounds marked by Terry ). The government did not elicit testimony from the seizing officer claiming that he mistook the pager for a weapon, and even assuming that the officer knew that the concealed object was a pager, it is clear that a pager is not contraband. We conclude that the district court erred in finding the seizure of the pager justified under Terry. We nonetheless affirm the admissibility of the pager because it would inevitably have been lawfully discovered and, in any event, the district court's denial of the motion to suppress the pager was harmless error. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (noting that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is closely related in purpose to the harmless-error rule). The Fourth Amendment does not contain a provision that prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). But the judicially crafted exclusionary rule mandates suppression of evidence obtained from a constitutional violation. Id. at 10-11, 115 S.Ct. 1185. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (declaring that the exclusionary rule is essential in applying constitutional principles). The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule which allows unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted at trial if the government can [show] . . . that the evidence inevitably would have been acquired through lawful means. United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir.1995); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501. The doctrine applies whenever there are compelling facts establishing that the disputed evidence inevitably would have been discovered. Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 499. More specifically, the doctrine applies where the facts indicate that the officers inevitably would have discovered and seized the tainted evidence by following routine procedures. United States v. Vite-Espinoza, 342 F.3d 462, 466 (6th Cir.2003). Had the police not seized Garcia's pager during the protective patdown, they inevitably would have seized it from his person during his subsequent arrest. After the search of the Suburban disclosed two bundles of cash in Garcia's luggage, the officers had probable cause to arrest him. As a part of this lawful arrest, the officers would have followed the routine procedure of searching Garcia prior to taking him into custody. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973) (holding that an officer who arrests a suspect and takes him into custody is entitled to make a full search of [his] person incident to that lawful arrest). The officers would have seized his pager during this search as evidence of his involvement in drug trafficking. The pager thus inevitably would have been seized from Garcia, and its introduction into evidence did not violate the exclusionary rule. Alternatively, even if we assume that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply and the district court erred in admitting the pager, we find that its admission was harmless. Some errors, when viewed in light of the particular facts, are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(a) (Any error . . . that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.). [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. The harmless error doctrine has been applied to a variety of constitutional errors, including the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-77, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). The government did not introduce phone records from the pager at trial, and in fact used the pager merely to argue that Garcia was probably involved in drug trafficking because drug dealers are notorious for using pagers. In light of the other evidence supporting Garcia's conviction, we find that the government's use of the pager at trial did not contribute to the verdict and that its admission  assuming it was erroneous  was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.