Opinion ID: 1190676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: question of injury to plaintiffs.

Text: To some extent we shall consider the interests of the two plaintiffs separately. The plaintiff Thomas is an abutting owner on the alley in question. Such owner has two distinct rights, one which he enjoys in common with the public generally, and certain private rights which arise out of his ownership of property contiguous to a highway. Blumenthal et al. vs. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 114, 186 P.2d 556. His rights in the highway insofar as respects the rights of passage and travel thereover, is simply equal to and in no sense greater than that of the general public. 25 Am. Juris. 433. His private rights include the right of access  the right of ingress and egress to and from his property  which is a property right  a special interest  of which he cannot be deprived without just compensation. 39 C.J.S. 1079, 1081. 25 Am. Juris. 448. In 4 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations supra, Section 1429 the author states: The most important right of the abutter incident to his ownership of property abutting on a street or alley is his right of access, i.e., his right of ingress and egress. The easement (as it is usually called) of access is not the mere right of going out from one's home or place of business upon the street and returning therefrom to his own land, but includes a certain convenience in the use of his property with respect to the rest of the world, such as the opportunity for a man's customers to come to his place of business without unreasonable hindrance or interruption. It includes not merely the right of the abutting owner to go into and come out of his premises but also the right to have the premises accessible to patrons, clients, and customers. Courts are not agreed as to the extent of private rights of property holders in the highways, some courts holding that even non-abutters have a right to complain of obstructions or vacation thereof, if a special injury has been sustained. Annotation 49 A.L.R. 330-375, 68 A.L.R. 1285 and subsequent pages. Most of the cases deal with abutting property holders. In some of the states it is held that if access of property is not cut off in front thereof, the fact that it is cut off in one direction only, gives no right of action and that no special injury is sustained thereby if the opposite direction is left open. 4 McQuillin supra, Section 1526. That is the situation in the case at bar insofar as the plaintiff Thomas is concerned. Thus it was said in Kachele vs. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 109 Conn. 151, 145 Atl. 756 quoting from another case: `The right which every man exercises who travels the highway for highway purposes, is a public right. It is common to all; and although the business of one man may be far more urgent than that of another    still the character of the injury would seem to be the same in both cases, differing only in degree   .' Although the plaintiff may have more occasion than others to make use of the highway, and consequently suffer more inconvenience or other injury, yet his injury does not differ in nature, but in degree only. On the other hand, many authorities hold that when a property owner is cut off from access to the highway in either direction, he sustains a special injury giving him cause to complain. 4 McQuillin supra, Section 1526. And the author considers that rule to be the more just. A late case on the subject is Bacich vs. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 which contains a majority, a concurring, and a dissenting opinion, and all of which review the subject at length, and all of which throw much light thereon. The majority held that when an access to either street next to his property (although not further) is cut off, thus creating a cul-de-sac of a street, the property owner in the block sustains a special injury of which he may complain. See Annotation, 49 A.L.R. 359. See also the late case of Wolfe vs. City of Providence (R.I.) 74 Atl.2d 843. The same rule was applied as to an alley in Beals vs. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal.2d 381, 144 P.2d 839, holding that a property owner in a block is entitled to have the alley in the block open to the streets on either side. In other words, a municipality cannot, by vacating a part of an alley, create a cul-de-sac against a lot owner without compensating him. The case of Bacich vs. Board of Control supra, is so illuminating that we shall quote to some extent from the majority opinion. It was stated in part as follows: It has long been recognized in this state and elsewhere that an owner of property abutting upon a public street has a property right in the nature of an easement in the street which is appurtenant to his abutting property and which is his private right, as distinguished from his right as a member of the public. That right has been described as an easement of ingress and egress to and from his property or, generally, the right of access over the street to and from his property, and compensation must be given for an impairment thereof.    The precise origin of that property right is somewhat obscure but it may be said generally to have arisen by court decisions declaring that such right existed and recognizing it.    If the question is one of first impression its answer depends chiefly upon matters of policy, a factor the nature of which, although at times discussed by the courts, is usually left undisclosed.    Whether or not such impairment (of access) is compensable must depend upon the character and extent of his easement of access. Does it extend to a right to pass to the next intersecting street.    Practically all authorities hold, and we believe correctly, that no recovery may be had where the obstruction is beyond the next intersecting street.    The extent of the easement of access may be said to be that which is reasonably required giving consideration to all the purposes to which the property is adapted. It is obvious that in the instant case the damage suffered is greater and different than if the obstruction had been beyond the next intersecting street.    It would seem clear that the reasonable modes of egress and ingress would embrace access to the next intersecting street in both directions. It should be noted that the right is more extensive than the mere opportunity to go on to the street immediately in front of the property.    Many authorities and writers have either declared or intimated that the creation of a cul-de-sac, that is, the blocking of access to the next intersecting street in one direction is compensable, although the access still exists in the opposite direction to an intersecting street.    We do not fear that permitting recovery in cases of cul-de-sacs created in a municipality will seriously impede the construction of improvements, assuming the fear of such an event is real rather than fancied. The damage to the property owner is immediate and direct. The value of the use of the property is directly affected. To be able to get onto the street immediately in front of the property is of little value if that is as far as he can go. If he has access to the next intersecting street in both directions and one way is cut off, his easement, if it has any value to him at all, has certainly been impaired. We conclude, therefore, that the right of access extends in both directions to the next intersecting street. We may, in passing, specially note the statement in the foregoing case that: Practically all authorities hold, and we believe correctly, that no recovery may be had where the obstruction is beyond the next intersecting street. The statement is sustained by 4 McQuillin supra, Section 1527. Under this rule and the general rule stated in the foregoing case, Thomas would have the right of access to a street or alley if such ran along the west boundary of block 404 in question here. If the property of the plaintiff manufacturing company abutted such alley or street on the west, Thomas would, of course, by means thereof, have direct access thereto. If, however, such property were located in a block or part of a block further west with an alley through it like the alley through Block 404, and this alley were vacated thus cutting off the direct access to Thomas by reason thereof, he would have no right of complaint. That may seem arbitrary. But, of course, a line must be drawn somewhere. Arbitrariness, to a more or less extent, seems to be inherent in the solution of the rights of abutting property holders. Hence, if our solution in this case appears to be arbitrary to some extent, the surprise in that connection will not, perhaps, be too great. Assuming that, as claimed by plaintiffs, the general rule announced in the California case is correct and better subserves justice, it cannot be applied in the case at bar. There is no street or alley or other passageway to the west of the alley here in question. It was always a cul-de-sac from the beginning. And in order to hold that the plaintiffs herein, or at least plaintiff Thomas, have cause to complain of the vacation of part of the alley here in question, we are compelled to go beyond the liberal rule adopted by California and other states. So we must strike out on a path of reasoning of our own, hoping that our logic will not go too far astray. It may, in the first place, be observed that the authorities cited to us, or which we have examined, speak of access of the owner of a lot to and from his own property, and to and from streets and alleys. They do not refer to access to the private property of others, although such access must necessarily, in the ordinary case, be reached through a public highway. It is suggested that the reason, perhaps, is that lack or facility of access to the property of others on the part of anyone, is of the same kind as that on the part of all others, although the degree may be different and that, hence, that factor cannot be considered in determining whether or not an owner has been injured by a vacation of or an obstruction in a street or alley. While on the surface Thomas complains of the fact that he has no access to the western part of the alley here in question, the real reason of the complaint is that he has no direct access to the property of the manufacturing company by that means. The special injury which plaintiffs claim is by reason of the interlocking, economic interests between the plaintiffs  they want the property of Thomas to be used for warehouse and parking purposes. Let us examine the right of Thomas a little more in detail. If a man owns property in a city block on which a street or alley abuts, he has in the ordinary case the unqualified and public right to travel along the street or alley, cross the boundary of the block and enter the public passageway on either side of the block (disregarding a situation in which one side, perchance, might be legally closed). The situation is entirely different in the case of a cul-de-sac. No one has the unqualified and public right to cross the boundary of a cul-de-sac at the end thereof, and enter the private property of another physically abutting thereon. Hence, the right of Thomas to travel the whole length of the cul-de-sac in question here to the western boundary thereof, is in itself of no value. It can, from a practical standpoint, make no difference to him considering that right alone that it is vacated beyond the front of his own lots. It could be of no possible injury to him. The cul-de-sac would be merely shortened. Hence, the right considered, as stated, by itself may well be regarded as substantially non-existing. What might make the right to keep the whole cul-de-sac open of some value would be an extraneous factor, namely in conjunction with the right to cross the boundary into the property of the manufacturing company. That right to cross does not exist except by the consent of the company. There can scarcely be any doubt that the manufacturing company may, if it wishes, erect a fence or wall to prevent anyone from crossing the boundary at the end of the cul-de-sac. In fact, it might at times be very desirable, even almost necessary, for a manufacturing company situated similarly to construct such wall or fence. For the public to cross the boundary without consent would be trespass which the company is not, we think, compelled to tolerate. We have no doubt that if Thomas did not happen to have an interest in the manufacturing company, he  just as everybody else  would be treated as a trespasser by that company and rightfully so, if he should attempt to cross the boundary by way of the cul-de-sac. It was stated in Kachele vs. Bridgeport Hydraulic Company, cited above, that the right which every man exercises who travels a highway for highway purposes is a public right, and it is common to all. And as stated in 25 Am. Juris. 433 the right in a highway as a highway insofar as respects the right of passage and travel thereover is simply equal to and in no sense greater than that of the general public. So we find it stated in 40 C.J.S. 246 that there is no such thing as a rightful, private, permanent use of a public highway. The public would be interested in traveling along and into the cul-de-sac at most only far enough to reach, if necessary, the owner of the property at the end thereof, and not any farther. Hence, according to the rule above mentioned, the interest of Thomas is limited to that as well. To say that the manufacturing company has the right to give consent to Thomas to cross the boundary, and that hence, he has the right to travel along the whole of the cul-de-sac, would, it seems, mean that, from a practical standpoint, the cul-de-sac would be converted from a public passageway into a private one. The truth is, as already indicated, so far as Thomas is concerned, that the right to travel along the whole cul-de-sac is purely an incident to the consent given him to cross the boundary, or an incident to the interest which Thomas happens to own in the manufacturing company. It is difficult to see how the nature of such incident, in itself valueless, can be entirely changed by an extraneous factor and foreign to it. Stated differently, it is difficult to see how a public right of no value or practically nonexisting when considered by itself, can in a case like that before us, be changed into a substantial right in a constitutional sense by the consent above mentioned given by a private party. We pass then to the rights of the manufacturing company. The case before us becomes clearer when we do so. The public would have no legal right to cross the boundary into the cul-de-sac from the side of the manufacturing company. That clearly would be trespassing unless consent were given, since private property would first have to be crossed, as may be noted by examining the map. A public right, such as here considered, cannot ordinarily be created by consent of a private party. Long usage giving rise to prescription, or filing a plat by which streets and alleys are dedicated seem to be exceptions. These factors are not involved herein. If then the manufacturing company, and the latter alone had the right to cross the boundary from its side, then it again may well and rightly be argued that the cul-de-sac is converted from a public into a private right-of-way, which would not, we think, be permissible under the facts disclosed herein. Counsel for defendants have cited us to cases which hold that a property owner at the end of a cul-de-sac is not an abutting owner in the legal sense, and, hence, has no right to complain of the vacation thereof. Kings-highway Supply Co. vs. Iron Works, 266 Mo. 138, 181 S.W. 30, Campbell vs. City of Glendale, (Mo. App.) 211 S.W.2d 519, Friscoville Realty Co. vs. Police Jury, 127 La. 318, 53 So. 578. Other cases relating to the vacation of a street do not seem to agree with that reasoning. Johnson vs. Watertown, 131 Conn. 84, 38 Atl.2d 1, Messinger vs. City of Cincinnati, 36 Ohio App. 337, 173 N.E. 260. And as already mentioned, non-abutting property holders have, in a number of cases, been held to have a cause of action when a street has been vacated. It is not, we think, necessary in this case to enter into any discussion of the rules involved in the forgoing decisions. One factor enters into this case which does not enter into the cases on the subject generally, and that is the fact that the property of the manufacturing company is outside of the limits of the city. It is true that highways in municipalities are for the use of the public at large, and not only for the use of the people living within the municipality. 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) Section 1122. But that does not necessarily mean that the owner of property outside of the city limits has identically the same rights as property owners within the limits. For instance, it is held that every purchaser of a lot in the city, according to the dedicated plat, has the rights to have the designated scheme of public ways and places maintained in its integrity. Chichester vs. Kroman, 221 Ala. 203, 128 So. 166 and cases cited, 26 C.J.S. 145-146 under the subject of Dedication. That arises by reason of the purchase of lots according to the plat. But it is hardly logical to hold that the identical rights must be extended to one who has not bought any lots and whose property is outside of the limits of the city. And the question arises why an owner of property outside the limits of the city should have the right to control the lawful exercise of the powers of municipal authorities. In any event, the public right which anyone has in and over highways should be construed in conjunction and in pari materia with the power of the municipalities to vacate streets and alleys, and if that power is exercised reasonably it should control. See 39 C.J.S. 1082. In the case of House vs. City of Greensburg, 93 Ind. 533 it appears that there was in the city a street running north and south by the name of East street. South of the city and adjacent to it, plaintiff House owned a farm. His buildings were constructed some distance from the northern boundary of the land which also was the southern boundary of the city, but he constructed a roadway running north to connect with East street of the city, also running north. The city proposed to vacate a portion of East Street for some distance north from the boundary line between the city and plaintiff's land thus shutting off plaintiff's access. The question arose as to whether or not the plaintiff had any interest in the vacation of the street in the city. The court said in part: Can a non-resident land-owner, whose land is outside of, but abuts upon, the corporation line of an incorporated city, be heard to complain of the action of the common council of such city in the vacation of a street or part of a street, within the city limits, upon the terminus of which such land also abuts? We are of opinion that this question must be answered in the negative.    The appellant shows in his complaint, and it is shown, also, by the report of the city commissioners, that he is not such a property owner, as, under the statute, is authorized to object to the proposed vacation of East street. It is clear, therefore, as it seems to us, that the appellant has no standing in court to complain of the action of the appellee in the vacation of East street, however much it may affect his private interests, and however much inconvenience may result to him therefrom. He is a stranger to the municipality, and, for this reason, has no direct or substantial interest in any of its public streets, within the meaning of the city charter. In the case of Messinger vs. City of Cincinnati cited supra, the plaintiffs proposed to establish a subdivision to the City of Cincinnati on the east. The planning commission of the city had authority within three miles of the outside limits of the city to require the co-ordination of the streets in the subdivisions with the streets in the city, and that was done in the case at bar. But the city authorities proposed to vacate part of a street which connected with the subdivision. The court discusses the subject in part as follows: The next proposition is the question of the capacity of the plaintiffs to maintain this action, since their property lies wholly outside the corporate limits of the city of Cincinnati. This question is not without difficulty. At first blush, it would seem that a nonresident of the city would have no capacity to interfere in the control of council over the streets, which control is given it by the statutes. However, we are confronted with section 3586-1, General Code, giving the planning commission, an administrative body of the city, jurisdiction over subdivisions outside the city limits.    We, therefore, have the situation of the planning commission requiring the plaintiffs to plat their subdivision and requiring the coordination of the streets of the subdivision with existing streets, which in this case would be the extension of Teakwood avenue, co-ordinating with the existing Teakwood avenue. The city, through one of its administrative bodies, required plaintiffs to conform to Teakwood avenue, and provide for its extension, while another body of the city seeks to prevent and to take away all rights thereunder by cutting the street at the corporation line. This action appears to this court to be inequitable and unfair to plaintiffs. They acquired equitable rights by reason of the action of the planning commission, in so far as it affects their subdivision and the ingress and egress thereto. It would seem, accordingly, that apparently the Ohio court would have agreed with the Indiana court in the case above mentioned, had it not been for the fact that by reason of the action of the planning commission, plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest. The rule of the Indiana case above mentioned seems, perhaps, somewhat harsh. But it would not be harsh as applied to the alley here in question, in view of the limited use to which alleys are ordinarily devoted. We think that the power to vacate the alley in this case was exercised reasonably. We do not, however, think, speaking incidentally, that the rule of the Indiana case should be extended to a highway which, as it is commonly called a through highway, connecting a municipality with the outside world. Thus it is said in Brown vs. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 88 P. 713, 714: Every owner of land abutting upon a highway has a right of access from his land to the highway and from the highway to his land. This right of access is an easement, and an obstruction to the highway which at the same time obstructs this easement is a peculiar injury to the abutting landowner and gives him a cause of action. The Lincoln Highway is a through highway and we do not doubt that the manufacturing company plaintiff has the right of continued access to it. But there is no special reason why such right should extend to the alley here in question which was laid out primarily for the benefit of the parties in the block when it was dedicated as a part of the City of Cheyenne. If our foregoing reasoning is faulty, still we think that we should arrive at the same result when considering the case before us from a somewhat different standpoint. We have not heretofore greatly differentiated between a street and an alley and have, to a large extent, treated an alley as though it were a highway, the same as a street. But, of course, everyone knows that that is true only in a limited sense. In Flynn vs. City of Worthington, 177 Minn. 28, 224 N.W. 254 the court stated: Alleys differ from streets. They are not intended to convenience the public in the way that streets do. They are more of local convenience to the parts of the block which they abut.    They are not thought of as a street connecting with other streets and supplying the municipality with a system of connecting highways. An alley is not intended for such purpose. While the public travels it, its use is local to abutting property. (Italics supplied.) In Bagley vs. People, 43 Mich. 355, 5 N.W. 415, 38 Am. Rep. 192 the court stated: An alley can, in no proper or legal sense, be considered as a public highway, or governed by rules relating thereto. While the city may, and undoubtedly has, certain limited rights therein for municipal purposes, yet the public have no general right of way over or through the same. It is designed more especially for the use and accommodation of the owners of property abutting thereon, and to give the public the same unqualified rights therein that they have in and to the use of the public streets would defeat the very end and object intended. Similar in effect see Talbert vs. Mason, 136 Iowa 373, 113 N.W. 918, 14 L.R.A.N.S. 878, Athey vs. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 191 Ala. 646, 68 So. 154, Phipps vs. City and County of Denver, 57 Colo. 205, 140 P. 797, Paul vs. City of Detroit, 32 Mich. 108, 111, Beecher vs. People, 38 Mich. 289, 291. What has been said is, of course, much more true in the case of an alley which is a cul-de-sac, and particularly one the end of which is at the city's limits, and which could not be said to have been created for the benefit of property outside of these limits. The cul-de-sac is not designed or intended for travel or traffic beyond the end thereof. The party, at its beginning or opening, is not in the ordinary case interested in its being open beyond him, except perhaps insofar as the public in general is interested in reaching the property of the party further on inside of the cul-de-sac. We hardly think we should be asked to hold that this case should be considered as an exception merely because the end of a cul-de-sac happens not to be fenced or closed by a wall or building at its end, and because plaintiff Thomas happens accidentally to be interested in the plaintiff manufacturing company. The ordinary mode of travel and traffic in the case of the existence of a cul-de-sac as in the case at bar is by the existing streets. Any other mode of travel and traffic would be extraordinary and we hardly think that we are warranted in saying that plaintiffs are entitled to that extraordinary mode. It is stated in Con Realty Co. vs. Ellenstein, 125 N.J.L. 196, 14 Atl.2d 544, 546: The vacation of a street is not ordinarily deemed violative of private rights. It is in substance but the surrender or extinction of the public easement; and the consequential loss, if any, to the abutting landowners is not chargeable to the municipality. Except where there is statutory provision therefor, the law does not render compensation for losses resulting from a valid surrender of public rights. That must be much more true in the case of an alley and particularly one where that alley is a cul-de-sac. Looking at the map it will be noted that the Lincoln Highway is only one-third of a block away from the alley at Stinsen Avenue  say about 75 feet  hardly a distance that could be called a burden on plaintiffs. If that highway is as dangerous as plaintiffs seem to think, it is a danger shared in common with the public generally. We think that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and it is so ordered. Affirmed. KIMBALL, C.J., and RINER, J., concur.