Opinion ID: 146224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of the Claims

Text: As a threshold matter, the parties dispute the scope of the claims under review. Potter maintains that the claims are limited to the three incidents described in our prior opinion, while Morales asserts that, for various reasons, the claims submitted to the jury encompassed all of the plethora of unexhausted allegations which we excluded in the first appeal. One problem with Morales's argument is that the trial court's orders in limine, instructions to the jury, and discussion of Morales's claims in its post-trial order were all consistent with the limitation in our prior opinion. Though Morales contends that the district court ultimately agreed with his reading of the scope of the claims, he has identified nothing in the record to support that assertion. Another problem with Morales's contention is that our holding in Morales I limiting his claims to the three incidents we have described is the law of the case. See, e.g., United States v. Vigneau, 337 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir.2003)(law of the case doctrine is a prudential principle that `precludes relitigation of the legal issues presented in successive stages of a single case once those issues have been decided'); see also United States v. Rivera-Martínez, 931 F.2d 148, 150 (1st Cir.1991) (When a case is appealed and remanded, the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand. (emphasis in original)). We have recognized limited exceptions to the application of this doctrine, see Vigneau, 337 F.3d at 68, but Morales never argued to the trial court that any of these limited exceptions should apply, and he does not do so here. This failure to confront the implications of our prior holding essentially forecloses Morales's attempt, raised for the first time in his opposition to Potter's cross-appeal, to broaden the scope of the claims now under review. [9] Thus, while the trial court may have allowed Morales to introduce a broad range of evidence relating to his experience at the Caparra Heights station, including evidence relating to his excluded allegations, the jury was instructed that it could only compensate him for the three specific incidents that we remanded. [10] A basic premise of our jury system is that the jury follows the court's instructions, and therefore we assume, as we must, that the jury acted according to its charge. Refuse & Envtl. Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Servs. of Am., Inc., 932 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir.1991). Accordingly, we proceed to assess the legal sufficiency of only those claims actually submitted to the jury. [11]
Title VII provides that [a]ll personnel actions affecting federal employees shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). In order to present a legally viable claim of employment discrimination under the statute, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he suffered an adverse employment action on account of a protected ground. García v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 535 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir.2008); see also George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 411 (D.C.Cir.2005) (explaining that Title VII places the same restrictions on federal [employers] as it does on private employers, and so we may construe the latter provision in terms of the former (internal quotation marks omitted)). An adverse employment action is one that affect[s] employment or alter[s] the conditions of the workplace, Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 61-62, 126 S.Ct. 2405, and typically involves discrete changes in the terms of employment, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); accord Gu v. Boston Police Dep't, 312 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir.2002) (To be adverse, an action must materially change the conditions of plaintiffs' employ. (emphasis added)). A materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir.2002). Whether an employment action is materially adverseand therefore actionable under Title VIIis gauged by an objective standard. Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir.1996). Work places are rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is displeased by an employer's act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially adverse employment action. Marrero, 304 F.3d at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Unlike its private-sector counterpart, Title VII does not contain an express antiretaliation provision applicable to the federal government as employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Nonetheless, we have assumed that the antiretaliation provision applicable to private employers operates to prohibit retaliation in the federal sector. See DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir.2008); see also Gómez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 128 S.Ct. 1931, 1941 n. 4, 170 L.Ed.2d 887 (2008) (acknowledging, but declining to decide, the open question of whether Title VII bans retaliation in federal employment). As with a claim for discrimination, a plaintiff alleging workplace retaliation must prove, among other things, that he suffered an adverse employment action on account of a protected activity. See, e.g., DeCaire, 530 F.3d at 19; see also Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C.Cir.2006)(In the absence of a finding that the plaintiff has suffered adverse action, a retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.). However, the antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405; see also Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 54 (1st Cir.2008)([C]onduct need not relate to the terms or conditions of employment to give rise to a retaliation claim.). Rather, a plaintiff may satisfy this requirement by showing that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, `which in this context means it well might have `dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405. [12] This is an objective test and `should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all the circumstances.' Lockridge v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 597 F.3d 464, 472 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 71, 126 S.Ct. 2405). Examples of adverse employment actions in the retaliation context include `termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.' Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 986 (7th Cir.2008)(quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). Minor disruptions in the workplace, including petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners, fail to qualify. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405.

The first set of claims brought by Morales, alleging both discrimination and retaliation, arises from his allegation that the Caparra Heights coffee and lunch break policy was not enforced in an equal and nondiscriminatory matter, insofar as certain female employees were, at times, permitted to take longer breaks than the policy provided for. Under the policy, employees were allowed to take either a half hour or an hour lunch break, plus a ten minute coffee break during each half of their shift. When Morales complained about the discriminatory enforcement of the policy, his supervisor began to require all employees to clock in and out each time they took a break. However, even if two female employees were permitted to take longer breaks than Morales on account of their gender, such selective enforcement of the breaks policy had no material effect on Morales's employment and therefore cannot constitute discrimination within the meaning of the statute. He was not formally disciplined for violating the policy, [13] or denied the opportunity to take breaks himself. On these facts, we hold that the selective enforcement of the breaks policy fails to sustain a claim for gender discrimination. Likewise, we conclude that the selective enforcement of the breaks policy fails to rise to level of actionable retaliation. Morales's retaliation claim includes an allegation that, following the submission of an EEOC complaint, his supervisor, Enrique López, closely monitored the lunch and coffee breaks Morales took. He also testified that, by requiring that all employees clock in and out each time they went on break, López attempted to stir up other employees against him. [14] Morales, however, was not treated differently than other employees in the application of the policy as a result of his complaint; indeed, his complaint rests on the assertion that all employees were treated equally (though they may not have liked it). Thus, the adverse action anchoring Morales's complaint of retaliation is essentially the relief he requested in his discrimination complaint, and therefore would not dissuade a reasonable employee from filing or supporting a charge of discrimination. Cf. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (An employee's decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.). Accordingly, Morales's claims arising from the selective enforcement of the breaks policy fail as a matter of law because Morales suffered no material adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII's discrimination or retaliation provisions.
Next, Morales asserts claims for both discrimination and retaliation arising from the incident in which plaintiff's duties and responsibilities were awarded to a female employee and he was given window clerk duties to perform. Morales I, 339 F.3d at 18. We hold that this temporary rotation of Morales's preferred distribution duties to a female clerk fails to qualify as an adverse employment action for purposes of either claim. Morales was required to perform window duties rather than distribution duties for only a limited period of time, those duties fell within his job description (indeed, which he bid for), and there was evidence that on other, albeit rare, occasions he had performed window duties in the normal course of his employment. Cf. Butler v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir.2008) (Requiring an employee to perform her job is not a change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.). Morales himself testified that, I was trained for [window duties]. I could do [them]. I was prepared to do [them]. Such a minor disruption in the tasks Morales preferred to perform cannot, as a matter of law, sustain his claim for damages under Title VII's antidiscrimination provision. See Marrero, 304 F.3d at 23 (secretary's permanent, lateral reassignment to work in same capacity for different boss did not rise to level of an adverse employment action where her general job description and salary remained the same, notwithstanding the fact that she was required to do more work, subjected to `extreme supervision,' and forced to undergo a period of probation); see also Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.2005) (explaining that a lateral transfer that does not affect pay (or significantly affect working conditions) cannot be called discriminatory). [15] Nor can this temporary rotation of responsibilities qualify as an adverse employment action for purposes of his retaliation claim. In appropriate circumstances, disadvantageous work assignments may qualify as materially adverse, but Morales's temporary reassignment is a far cry from those situations where we have found actionable retaliation. See generally Valentín-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 95 (1st Cir.2006) (finding a totality of assignments, which included a police officer's transfer for an unusually long duration to a remote and solitary duty site that was regarded as punishment by officers, to constitute adverse employment action). While Morales testified that the window duties presented certain physical difficulties in light of his arm condition, he made it crystal clear that he was able to perform those duties as long as it was not for a long time and he did not state that he experienced any unique hardship as a result of performing window tasks. There is no evidence that window duties were more difficult, less prestigious, or objectively inferior to Morales's distribution duties; rather, the gravamen of Morales's complaint is that he preferred his regular assignment. Compare Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 71, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (holding that permanent reassignment of a female forklift operator to track laborer was a materially adverse action where there was considerable evidence that the track laborer duties were `by all accounts more arduous and dirtier'; that the `forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige'; and that `the forklift operator position was objectively considered a better job and the male employees resented [the plaintiff] for occupying it'). Under the circumstances, we hold that the temporary rotation of Morales preferred window duties does not qualify as materially adverse and cannot support his claims under Title VII.
Morales's final claim, alleging retaliation only, focuses on the altered job posting. He maintains that, because he filed a complaint with the EEOC, the USPS changed the days off that were expected to come with a certain Distribution and Window Clerk position when it was posted for bidding. There is no dispute that the only difference between Morales's position at the time of this incident and the position in which he expressed an interest was that the new posting was expected to come with Saturdays and Sundays off, but was ultimately posted with Thursdays and Sundays off instead. We conclude that this alteration of rest days was insufficient to dissuade a reasonable employee from filing or supporting a charge of discrimination. In appropriate circumstances, not present here, a schedule change may operate to dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting workplace discrimination. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405. In this case, however, there is no indication in the record that changing the days off associated with the new posting affected Morales any more than it did other eligible bidders. See Lockridge, 597 F.3d at 473 (no adverse employment action where denial of office space left [the employee] in no worse a position than that held by similarly situated faculty members). Moreover, there is no evidence that Morales suffered any undue hardship as a result of continuing to have Sundays and Mondays, rather than Sundays and Saturdays, off. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (explaining that [a] schedule change in an employee's work schedule may make little difference to many workers, [but] may matter enormously to a young mother with school-age children); see also Washington, 420 F.3d at 662 (finding flex-time schedule critical to employee with disabled child, and recognizing that actions that would be harmless to most people [may] do real damage to select targets). Rather, Morales testified that, as a result of the rotation, he continued to have Sundays and Mondays off rather than a normal weekend schedule, which he would have preferred. This is plainly insufficient to support a claim for retaliation under the statute. Cf. Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 454 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 2006) (no actionable retaliation where there was no evidence to suggest [employee] suffered a materially significant disadvantage by having to work more Sundays and Wednesdays, rather than his preferred schedule). [16] We note that Morales's own medical expert failed to identify the altered job posting as a stressor contributing to his adjustment disorder. Thus, after careful consideration, we conclude that Morales has failed to prove that he suffered any adverse employment action capable of supporting his claims for discrimination or retaliation. [17] Accordingly, we vacate the verdict and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment as a matter of law in Potter's favor. No costs are awarded. Vacated and Remanded.