Opinion ID: 787818
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restoration to position

Text: 26
27 Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any eligible employee who takes leave under section 2612 of this title for the intended purpose of the leave shall be entitled, on return from such leave — 28 (A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or 29 (B) to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. 30 ... 31 (3) Limitations 32 Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle any restored employee to — 33 ... 34 (B) any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (emphasis added). 1 35 The Secretary of Labor has also promulgated a regulation describing employee rights on returning from FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214. It provides: 36 (a) On return from FMLA leave, an employee is entitled to be returned to the same position the employee held when leave commenced, or to an equivalent position with equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. An employee is entitled to such reinstatement even if the employee has been replaced or his or her position has been restructured to accommodate the employee's absence. See also § 825.106(e) for the obligations of joint employers. 37 (b) If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA. However, the employer's obligations may be governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See § 825.702. 38 Id. (emphases added). 39 There are a few limitations (sometimes referred to as exceptions) on an employee's right to restoration upon timely return from FMLA leave under § 2614(a). First, the substantive right is not absolute because the right established shall [not] be construed to entitle any restored employee to ... any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period.). An employee returning from FMLA leave is not entitled to restoration unless he would have continued to be employed if he had not taken FMLA leave. For instance, an employer need not restore an employee who would have lost his job or been laid off even if he had not taken FMLA leave. See Arban, 345 F.3d at 401; Pharakhone, 324 F.3d at 407; Chandler, 283 F.3d at 825. 40 In addition, the right to restoration does not arise unless the returning employee is able to perform the essential functions of the position or an equivalent. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA.); See also Green v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 198 F.3d 245, 1999 WL 1073686, at  2 (6th Cir. Nov.16, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (no FMLA violation when twelve weeks expired and plaintiff could not perform essential functions); Reynolds v. Phillips & Temro Indus., Inc., 195 F.3d 411, 414 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b)). 41 Next, the FMLA permits employers to apply a uniform policy or practice that conditions restoration under § 2614(a) on the receipt of medical certification from the employee's healthcare provider stating that the employee is able to resume work. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(4). Further, an employer may delay restoration until an employee submits the required fitness-for-duty certification. 29 C.F.R. § § 825.310(f), 825.311(c) & 825.312(c). However, the regulations permit an employer to seek such a fitness-for-duty certification only with regard to the particular health condition that caused the employee's need for FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(c). 42 None of these limitations to Hoge's right to restoration apply. Honda does not dispute Plaintiff's right to restoration or argue that any of the above limitations apply. Rather, Honda disputes the timing of its duty to restore Hoge to an equivalent position, arguing that the terms and structure of the FMLA required it to restore Hoge to an equivalent position only within a reasonable time after learning of her readiness to work under the circumstances in her case. Honda asks this Court to reverse the district court's ruling and enter summary judgment on its behalf because there is no genuine issue of fact that Honda complied with the FMLA's requirement to restore Plaintiff within a reasonable time after learning she was ready to return to work. It argues that the FMLA should be read in pari materia with the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and that employers must be afforded a reasonable amount of time to evaluate whether an employee is disabled, to identify reasonable accommodations, and to minimize potential liability under other federal and state laws. In short, Honda asks this court to read a reasonableness element into the timing of when a returning employee is entitled to restoration under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) where such an element does not exist in the text. 43 We decline Honda's invitation. The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for `[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.' Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) ( quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). If clear, the plain meaning of the statutory language controls; departure from the plain language of a statute is appropriate only in `rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafter ... or when the statutory language is ambiguous.' Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir.1994) (citation omitted). Moreover, we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997). In fact, courts have a duty to refrain from reading a phrase into a statute when Congress has left it out. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208, 113 S.Ct. 2035, 124 L.Ed.2d 118 (1993); United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.2000). As we have stated before: `It is not the Court's role to address perceived inadequacies in [a statute].' In re Aberl, 78 F.3d 241, 244 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Wolf Creek Collieries v. Robinson, 872 F.2d 1264, 1269 (6th Cir.1989) (alteration in original)). 44 The FMLA's text, set forth in more detail above, provides that an employee returning from FMLA leave shall be entitled, on return from such leave — ... to be restored by the employer to his prior position or an equivalent position with the same conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). The plain meaning of on return from such leave is not ambiguous and, contrary to Honda's argument, will not be construed to mean within a reasonable time after the employee is able to return from such leave. If an employee returning from FMLA leave can perform the essential functions of his previous or an equivalent position, the right to restoration is triggered on the employee's timely return from leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b). If Congress had intended to permit employers to restore employees within a reasonable time after their need for FMLA leave had ended, it would have so stated. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (discrimination under the ADA includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability). The text of the FMLA makes restoration required once an employee's entitlement arises (i.e., once he is capable of performing the job's essential functions). It also provides an employer the ability to condition restoration upon medical certification that the employee is able to return to work. The clear import of this language requires restoration upon return, unless one of the specific limitations or exceptions apply. See Chandler, 283 F.3d at 825 (With exceptions not at issue here, an employer is obliged to restore the employee to her prior position or an equivalent position upon return from leave.). 45 Moreover, because [a]n employee may not be required to take more leave than necessary to address the circumstances for which leave was taken, an employer would violate the FMLA's prohibition against interfering with FMLA rights if it decided to extend an employee's leave anytime such an extension would be reasonable under the circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(e); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 46 Although the FMLA does not define the time when an employee's return from FMLA leave becomes effective, thus triggering an employer's duty to restore a returning employee, the FMLA's regulatory scheme specifically contemplates circumstances where the date of an employee's return from FMLA leave may change. Ordinarily, the employer and employee will communicate and establish the return date for an employee taking FMLA leave. In such cases, the timing of the employee's return will not be at issue and the restoration entitlement will arise when the employee returns in a timely manner and in a physical condition to perform the essential functions of the position he left, and after providing the medical certification if required by an employer under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(4). In fact, 29 C.F.R. § 825.309 facilitates communications regarding the return date for an employee on FMLA leave by permitting an employer to require an employee on FMLA leave to report periodically on the employee's status and intent to return to work. Moreover, the FMLA regulations specifically address circumstances in which an employee needs to use more or less FMLA leave time than originally anticipated. In such cases, employers are entitled to reasonable notice of an employee's return. 47 It may be necessary for an employee to take more leave than originally anticipated. Conversely, an employee may discover after beginning leave that the circumstances have changed and the amount of leave originally anticipated is no longer necessary. An employee may not be required to take more FMLA leave than necessary to resolve the circumstance that precipitated the need for leave. In both of these situations, the employer may require that the employee provide the employer reasonable notice (i.e., within two business days) of the changed circumstance where foreseeable. The employer may also obtain information on such changed circumstances through requested status reports. 48 29 C.F.R. § 825.309(c) (emphasis added). Section 825.312(e) of the Department of Labor's FMLA regulations further provides: If the employee is able to return to work earlier than anticipated, the employee shall provide the employer two business days notice where feasible; the employer is required to restore the employee once such notice is given. 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(e). 49 In this case, Hoge was originally expected to return from her abdominal surgery leave on June 12, 2000. As of that date, Honda would have been aware that it would be required to restore her to work. It is undisputed, however, that Hoge requested an extension of her FMLA leave beyond June 12. The record does not establish her new expected return date and the parties dispute whether Honda had reason to expect her return on the morning of June 27. If her early return from approved leave was not anticipated, then the regulations governing an employee's early return from FMLA leave apply. Under 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.309(c) and 825.312(e), Plaintiff was required to provide Honda reasonable notice (i.e., two business days) that she would be returning sooner than expected. Thus, by showing up for work at the beginning of the work day, Hoge put Honda on reasonable notice that she was ready and capable of returning to the position that she left (with the accommodation of her physical limitations associated with her back injury) or its equivalent. 50 If Honda did not have reasonable notice of Hoge's return date, it was not required to permit Plaintiff to return to work until June 29, 2000, two business days after receiving notice of her willingness and ability to return to work. Conversely, if Honda did have reasonable notice that Hoge's extension of FMLA leave was to end on June 26, 2000, it was required to restore her to a door line position or an equivalent on June 27, 2000 because it does not dispute that Hoge was capable of performing the essential functions of such a position. 51 Honda argues that the FMLA has no time limit on when restoration must occur and that restoration of an employee need only be reasonable under the circumstances. Honda claims that an immediate restoration rule is not required by the text of § 2614(a) because it is silent as to the timing of when an employer must restore an employee returning from FMLA leave. It argues that the flexible process contemplated by the statutory structure mandates that the court impart a reasonableness element to an employer's duty to restore an employee under § 2614(a). Honda also argues that the FMLA should be read in pari materia with the ADA and that failing to read a reasonableness requirement into an employer's duty to restore an employee under § 2614(a) would expose employers to potential ADA and state law liability. We are not persuaded. 52 As discussed above, the language found in § 2614(a) is not ambiguous. Additionally, the structure of the FMLA does not require the court to read a reasonableness element into the restoration provision. The provision permitting an employer the opportunity to restore an employee to the same position or an equivalent does not express clear Congressional intent to permit employers a reasonable time to delay restoration. The equivalent position provision under § 2614(a)(1)(B) recognizes the dynamic needs of employers and permits them to restore employees to positions other than the exact one they left, but it does not permit the employer to delay an employee's restoration for a reasonable time after returning from FMLA leave. Likewise, the requirement under 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) that a returning employee be capable of performing the essential functions of the job does not impart a reasonable delay period for the employer to find a suitable position. 53 The right to restoration arises when the employee is able to perform the essential functions of the position he left or an equivalent. If an employee can do so and has provided medical certification (if required by a uniform policy), the employer cannot simply delay restoration while it takes a reasonable amount of time to find a suitable position. Again, a reasonable delay in restoration after reasonable notice is given would force the employee to take more FMLA leave than is required and would interfere with an employee's exercise of FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(e). 54 Next, we are not persuaded by Defendant's argument to read the FMLA in pari materia with the ADA because the statutes deal with the same subject. See Jones v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 257, 262 (6th Cir.1984). Although the FMLA and the ADA both regulate the employer-employee relationship, they protect an employee in different ways. We have recently highlighted this distinction. 55 The FMLA protects an employee from adverse action as a result of his taking leave for a serious medical condition. It does not protect an employee from adverse action motivated by the underlying medical condition itself. Although the factual scenarios that give rise to an FMLA or ADA cause of action may often coincide, the legal entitlements that flow from these facts will differ. 56 Chandler, 283 F.3d at 825. The ADA and the FMLA have divergent aims, operate in different ways, and offer disparate relief. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 101 (1st Cir.2001); Watkins v. J & S Oil Co., 164 F.3d 55, 62 (1st Cir.1998) (FMLA and ADA causes of action may interrelate, [but] they involve separate and distinct statutory claims). Unlike the FMLA, the finding of a disability is the key that unlocks the storehouse of statutory protections under the ADA. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 101. The ADA prohibits discrimination against employees who have a disability as defined by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer must make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Id. at § 12112(b)(5)(A). 57 Honda argues that Plaintiff's return raised potential application of the ADA and that the FMLA should be read to include a reasonableness element like the ADA. Honda contends that it should be given reasonable time to find a position as a reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff's physical restrictions. This argument is unavailing. [T]he leave provisions of the [FMLA] are wholly distinct from the reasonable accommodation obligations of employers covered under the [ADA]. 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a). 58 The ADA implications surrounding Hoge's physical limitations existed prior to her FMLA leave associated with her abdominal surgery and the uncontested evidence shows that she was capable of performing the essential functions of the position which she left. As such, Honda was not confronted with new potential ADA liability. Honda points out that courts have recognized that an employer's inquiry under the ADA to identify alternative positions is a time consuming process and that an employer is permitted a reasonable time to make a reasonable accommodation inquiry under the ADA. See Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir.2001) (When job reassignment is appropriate [under the ADA], an employer `should reassign the individual to an equivalent position ... if the individual is qualified, and if the position is vacant within a reasonable amount of time.') (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( o )); see also Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 457 (6th Cir.2004); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., 222 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir.2000). Because the ADA may permit a reasonable time to make accommodations for statutorily disabled employees, does not however, impact the FMLA's right to restoration. 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (An employer must [ ] provide leave under whichever statutory provision provides the greater rights to employees. When an employer violates the FMLA and a discrimination law, an employee may be able to recover under either or both statutes.) Under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a), an employee is entitled to be restored if he can perform the essential functions of his job. If he can, he is entitled to restoration and no potential ADA liability exists because he is capable of doing the work done previously. If he cannot, no FMLA liability follows for failing to restore that employee. However, the employer must then also look to the separate and distinct potential for liability under the ADA or other statutes. 59 The position Hoge left accommodated her physical limitations associated with her back injury and Honda was required to restore her to that position or an equivalent upon her return. Honda does not argue that it did not have an equivalent position or that Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of such an equivalent position. 60 Next, Honda's assertion that construing § 2614(a) to include an immediate right to restoration on return from FMLA leave would render certain regulations passed by the Secretary of Labor invalid is without merit. The FMLA requires restoration on return from leave and the regulations that permit delay in restoration merely identify when an employee's return is effective, triggering the right to restoration. These regulations are therefore not inconsistent with the statute. Although we recognize Honda's potential needs to juggle the realities of a dynamic business environment with its obligations under the FMLA, its policy arguments (offered to support reading an implicit reasonableness requirement into the statutory language) necessarily fall on deaf ears. Such policy arguments are more appropriately addressed to the United States House of Representatives and Senate. See In re Aberl, 78 F.3d at 244. The text is not ambiguous and the structure of the FMLA does not impart a reasonableness element into 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). 61 We affirm the district court inasmuch as Honda was required to restore Plaintiff to her previous position or its equivalent starting at least on June 29, 2000 (two business days after receiving unambiguous notice of her return). However, an issue of fact exists as to whether Honda anticipated Hoge's return on June 27, 2000. If Honda, in fact, had reasonable notice that Plaintiff's FMLA leave was to end on June 27, 2000, she was entitled to restoration on that date.