Opinion ID: 889775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err in failing to grant Kalin's motion to dismiss the petition for an order of protection for lack of jurisdiction?

Text: ¶ 21 Kalin argues that Jordan's petition for a temporary order of protection was jurisdictionally flawed because it did not allege more than one act of stalking in Montana, as he contends is required under § 45-5-220, MCA. He points out that the only act mentioned in the petition that was alleged to have occurred in Montana was the sending of the collage to Jordan's Montana place of employ. ¶ 22 Any person may file a petition for an order of protection if that person is a victim of stalking as defined in § 45-5-220, MCA. See § 40-15-102(2)(a), MCA. The offense of stalking is defined, in relevant part, as follows: (1) A person commits the offense of stalking if the person purposely or knowingly causes another person substantial emotional distress or reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or death by repeatedly: (a) following the stalked person; or (b) harassing, threatening, or intimidating the stalked person, in person or by mail, electronic communication, as defined in 45-8-213, or any other action, device, or method. Section 45-5-220(1), MCA. ¶ 23 District courts have jurisdiction in all civil matters and cases at law and in equity. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4(1); § 3-5-302(1)(b), and (c), MCA. Jordan was a resident of Montana when she filed her petition for a temporary order of protection. It alleged Kalin had committed acts in Columbiana County, Ohio, and in Daniels County, Montana, that justified issuance of a protective order. The petition described the events that had occurred in Ohio and, in addition, the bizarre collage sent to Jordan's work address in Montana. Section 46-2-101(1)(a), MCA, provides that [a] person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense that the person commits while either within or outside the state ... [if] the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state. Pursuant to the broad assertion of jurisdiction granted by this section, Montana has jurisdiction if the offense is committed `partly within' the state. State v. Kills on Top, 243 Mont. 56, 72, 793 P.2d 1273, 1284 (1990) (citations omitted). Here, the petition alleges acts committed partly within Montana. There is no requirement, under either § 45-5-220 or § 40-15-102, MCA, that repeated acts occur within Montana. We conclude the allegations of the petition were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the District Court. The court did not err in failing to grant Kalin's motion to dismiss.