Opinion ID: 2516937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the statute and the case law

Text: [¶5] Appellants bring to their argument the complex history of Wyoming's statutory and judicial treatment of the very difficult issue of co-employee liability and the delicate constitutional quid pro quo that underlies worker's compensation benefits. See Torres v. State ex rel. Division, 2005 WY 7, ¶ 22, 105 P.3d 101, 112 (Wyo. 2005). Indeed, it might be said that they attack it with a sledgehammer. That the history and evolution of co-employee liability is fraught with complexities and idiosyncrasies that are not readily parsed is a matter well-known to this Court. We do not intend to reiterate that history in this opinion. We are satisfied that we have set a workable standard for resolving such cases in our decision in Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, 67 P.3d 627 (Wyo. 2003). We decline the Appellants' ardent request to reverse our decision in that case. We also decline to engage in the debate as to whether or not Wyoming is an intentional injury state, as that phrase is used in the general discussion of cases of this genre. These are complex questions, and not easily pigeonholed by a word or short phrase. The Bertagnolli case now serves as a complete restatement of Wyoming's jurisprudence in this regard. Also see Eric Hollowell, Annotation, Willful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct of Coemployee as Ground of Liability Despite Bar of Workers' Compensation Law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888, § 3 (1987 and Supp. 2007) (which confirms that Wyoming is far from being the Lone Ranger, as characterized by Appellants). [¶6] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (LexisNexis 2007) provides: (a) The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint employee, and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint employer making contributions required by this act, or their employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured employee, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any other person. [Emphasis added.] [¶7] In Bertagnolli, ¶¶ 15-19, 67 P.3d at 632-34 (emphasis added), we explained: ...We continue to believe the concept of willful and wanton misconduct has essentially the same legal effect as the statutory language intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury. Well before the 1993 amendment to § 27-14-104(a), this court expressly defined willful and wanton misconduct in terms of intentional actions: Willful and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Wyo.1986) (emphasis added); see also Mayflower Restaurant Company v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo.1987). In addition, one of the bases of the Mills decision was the conclusion that allowing immunity for intentional acts and willful and wanton behavior violated the constitution, and the legislature's response to that decision was the adoption of the statute granting immunity except for intentional acts. Mills, 837 P.2d at 55. Our conclusion that the statutory grant of immunity covers all but intentional acts and willful and wanton misconduct is consistent with the parameters of statutory construction: All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the courts. Fosler v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo.1976)); see also Andersen, 2002 WY 105, ¶ 22, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶ 22. Mr. Bertagnolli argues the key factors in finding co-employee liability under § 27-14-104(a) are a co-employee with (1) knowledge of the hazard or serious nature of the risk involved, (2) responsibility for the injured employee's safety and work conditions, and (3) willful disregard of the need to act despite the awareness of the high probability that serious injury or death may result. Our jurisprudence in this area is consistent with these factors. In Calkins v. Boydston, 796 P.2d 452 (Wyo.1990), we held the injured employee must demonstrate his co-employees had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition which caused his injury. Mr. Calkins worked for an oil well service company and was injured when his leg got caught in the unguarded drive shaft of a pump truck. He sued the company secretary-treasurer, Marinell Boydston, and her son Gerald Boydston, the president of the company. The evidence demonstrated Mr. Calkins had used the pump truck in the past and had informed the Boydstons that the pump needed to be replaced. However, he provided no evidence the Boydstons knew the drive shaft was unguarded or the pump was dangerous; therefore, summary judgment was proper. In Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712 (Wyo.1995), this court emphasized that the co-employee's actions must be willful and not merely inadvertent in nature. In that case, Mr. Throckmartin was Mr. Smith's supervisor, and, on the day of the accident, they were working together loading sand into a truck. Mr. Throckmartin operated a backhoe while Mr. Smith tamped and broke up clumps of sand in the truck bed with a metal bar. By Mr. Smith's own admission, Mr. Throckmartin hit the metal bar with the backhoe bucket by mistake causing Mr. Smith to fall from the truck bed and incur serious head and spinal injuries. This court again required the plaintiff to provide evidence the co-employee acted with a state of mind approaching intent to do harm or committed an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of known or obvious risks so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. 893 P.2d at 714. Inferences from evidence of violations of safety regulations were found insufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding the co-employee's knowledge of the nature of the risks, particularly when uncontroverted evidence that the co-employee lacked such knowledge was presented. See also McKennan v. Newman, 902 P.2d 1285, 1287-88 (Wyo.1995); Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo.1988). In Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo.1989), we reversed summary judgment in favor of certain co-employees, and the underlying facts are similar to those alleged by Mr. Bertagnolli. The plaintiff provided evidence that responsible supervisors were apprised of the dangerous condition, failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the dangerous condition, and overtly threatened to fire the reporting employee who was ultimately injured. While working at a coal mine, Mr. Case slipped on a hidden grease spot and fell onto the metal surface of the boom point sheave area of a dragline. We found evidence was provided that four co-employees had varying degrees of direct supervisory responsibility for Mr. Case's safety and working conditions, had been made aware of the dangerous condition, had refused to clean or allow Mr. Case to clean or lock out the area to lessen the danger posed, and had threatened to terminate his employment if he did not do the work as instructed. In each of these cases, we consistently held the requirements of the statute and the standards of willful and wanton misconduct were met when the evidence demonstrated the co-employee had knowledge of the dangerous condition and demonstrated a disregard of the risks through intentional acts. With this standard in mind, we now must review the evidence submitted by Mr. Bertagnolli to determine whether it was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the supervisors' knowledge of the dangerous condition and whether they acted intentionally in disregard of known risks.