Opinion ID: 1365946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeal of Wright

Text: By his first assignment of error, defendant Wright contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and admitting into evidence inculpatory statements given by him to police officers on 6 and 7 November 1981. Upon defendant's motion to suppress, the trial judge conducted an extensive voir dire. At the close of this evidentiary hearing, Judge Sitton found facts and concluded that none of [defendant's] constitutional rights, either Federal or State, ... were violated by [his] arrest, detention, interrogation or confessions. Defendant's motion to suppress was therefore denied and the 6 and 7 November statements were admitted into evidence. The voir dire testimony revealed the following regarding the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest and interrogation: On 5 November 1981, Terry Wright was arrested for a probation violation unrelated to this case and was booked into the Mecklenburg County jail. At about 6:00 p.m. the following day, Officer R.D. Sanders brought Wright to the Law Enforcement Center for the purpose of questioning him regarding his involvement in the Wallace murder. Officer Sanders testified that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant was afforded an opportunity to read the waiver of rights form. According to Officer Sanders, Wright took about five minutes to read the form, going over it with his finger. Defendant stated that he understood the warnings and signed the waiver of rights form. Officer Sanders then questioned defendant about the Halloween incident. Wright inquired as to whether Michael Fincher had given a statement to police officers. After Sanders responded that he had, Wright said he would rather not say anything regarding that until he had a chance to read Michael Fincher's statement. Officer Sanders then retrieved Fincher's statement and read it aloud to defendant. Defendant asked to read it and he was permitted to do so. Sanders testified that defendant took his finger and read from left to right under each line through all the pages. After he went over the statement, Wright said he did not see his name and inquired as to what Fincher said he had done. Officer Sanders told defendant that he only knew that Fincher said he was involved. Following this exchange, defendant agreed to make an oral statement and, with Wright's permission, Officer Sanders wrote it down. Officer Sanders told defendant that he didn't believe the statement. Defendant admitted he had not told the truth and stated that Fincher's statement was also untrue. Sanders asked for another written statement and defendant said he would give a written statement when Michael Fincher tells him, face-to-face, about what happened. At that point, Officer Sanders ceased questioning and took Terry Wright back to jail. At about 11:00 the next morning, 7 November, Officers Mullis and Sanders brought defendant to the police station for further interrogation. Defendant was again advised of his constitutional rights. Officer Mullis asked defendant to read aloud blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the waiver form. Mullis testified that defendant read the requested paragraphs, stated that he understood the warnings and signed the waiver form. Officer Sanders then asked Wright if he would give a written statement. Wright reiterated that he would only give a written statement when he heard the truth from Michael Fincher. Officer Sanders asked defendant if he could ask him one more question and Wright said yes. Sanders asked, How many people were involved Halloween night? Wright said, Two. Sanders then went to where Fincher was being interrogated and informed Officer S.C. Cook that Wright had said that only two were involved. Officer Cook then informed defendant Fincher that Wright would tell the truth if he did. He also told Fincher that Wright said they were both involved. Fincher then said that he might as well tell the truth and offered a confession. After the police obtained Fincher's statement, they took him to the room where Wright was being interrogated. In the presence of Wright, Fincher related the events as they occurred on Halloween night. After Fincher was taken out of the room, Sanders asked Wright if Fincher had told the truth. Wright stated that he had and agreed to give a truthful written statement outlining his involvement in the Wallace murder. Defendant first contends the 7 November confession was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of his fifth amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. He takes the position that he invoked his right to remain silent when he told the police officers that he did not wish to give any further written statements until he heard the truth from Michael Fincher. He argues that Officer Sanders did not scrupulously honor his right to cut off questioning because he asked the one more question which triggered the ensuing confessions of Fincher and Wright. We reject this contention for we are of the opinion that defendant did not invoke his fifth amendment right to remain silent. Defendant twice stated that he did not want to give another written statement until after Fincher told the truth. From the cold record, we would not interpret this statement as indicating a desire that all questioning cease. It seems clear to us that defendant merely refused to give another formal statement indicating his involvement in the crime. This is far different from a request for the complete cessation of questioning regarding any aspect of the case. We will concede, however, that defendant's statement might have been uttered with such intonation that it could reasonably have been interpreted as an expression of a desire to remain silent. The statement is, however, ambiguous in any context for it seems to merely condition the giving of a formal written statement. In Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 485, 62 L.Ed.2d 409 (1979), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where a suspect's desires are expressed in an equivocal fashion, it is permissible for the questioning official to make further inquiry to clarify the suspect's wishes. The court explained the rationale for this holding as follows: While the suspect has an absolute right to terminate station-house interrogation, he also has the prerogative to then and there answer questions, if that be his choice. Some persons are moved by the desire to unburden themselves to confessing their crimes to police, while others want to make their own assessment of what to say to their custodians. [A] blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). When, as in the case at bar, a desire for immediate talk clearly appears from the suspect's words and conduct, but he also states he wants a lawyer (i.e., I would like to have a lawyer, but I would rather talk to you), it is sound and fully constitutional police practice to clarify the course the suspect elects to choose. .... The critical factor is whether a review of the whole event discloses that the interviewing agent has impinged on the exercise of the suspect's option to cut off the interview. 597 F.2d at 517-18. See also United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir.1976). Here, it is abundantly clear that Officer Sanders indicated at all times a willingness to respect defendant's constitutional privileges should he have chosen to exercise them. The record discloses that Officer Sanders attempted to ascertain whether defendant was intending to invoke his fifth amendment right by inquiring as to whether he could ask another question. Defendant immediately and unhesitatingly answered affirmatively, thereby clarifying that his earlier statement was not an expression of an intent to preclude all further questioning. We hold that defendant did not invoke his fifth amendment right to remain silent when he stated that he would not give another written statement until Fincher confronted him with the truth. Defendant's assertion that his right to cut off questioning was not scrupulously honored is without merit. Defendant next asserts that his fifth amendment rights were violated because his 7 November confession was precipitated by an illegal confession by Fincher. Wright contends that Fincher's statement was involuntary because it was made only in response to a lie by Officer Cook as to what defendant had said earlier to police officers. [2] Defendant appears to argue that since his inculpatory statement was occasioned by Fincher's, this primary illegality tainted his statement and rendered it inadmissible at trial. As stated earlier, the record reveals that a few minutes before Officer Cook spoke to defendant Fincher, Wright told police officers that he would tell the truth if Fincher would truthfully relate what happened. Wright also informed the officers that two people were involved in the perpetration of the crime. Initially, we note that the record is contradictory on the point of exactly what Officer Cook related to Michael Fincher. Officer Jones testified that Officer Cook related to Fincher precisely what Terry Wright actually stated. Officer Cook testified that he told Fincher that Wright said they were both involved and that Wright was going to tell the truth. The trial judge did not resolve this conflict in the evidence by making a specific finding of fact on this point. We are of the opinion that his failure to do so was entirely reasonable. This is so because we are convinced that even if Officer Cook did not repeat Wright's words verbatim, he communicated the essence of these statements to Fincher. Saying that Terry ... was going to tell the truth about it is not a deceitful perversion of Wright's statement that he would tell the truth if Fincher did. Furthermore, when Wright stated that two were involved, it is obvious from the context that Wright was speaking of Fincher and himself. He had just stated that he would tell the truth if Fincher did; the clear import of this statement being that the two of them were the individuals involved. Also, at that point, each of them had already given statements admitting participation in the crime. Construed contextually, we are of the opinion that Officer Cook's statement to Fincher was not deceptive or untruthful. Officer Cook in fact related to Fincher essentially what Wright had earlier stated. Fincher's 7 November confession was therefore not involuntarily given because it was offered in response to Officer Cook's information regarding Wright's statements. Consequently, defendant's argument that his confession was tainted by Fincher's induced confession must fail. Defendant's final argument with respect to the admissibility of his confessions is that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial judge's finding that defendant knowingly and understandingly waived his Miranda rights. Defendant relies primarily upon his youth and subnormal intellectual capacity to support his position that he was incapable of adequately understanding his constitutional rights. Dr. John Wheeler was qualified as an expert in psychological evaluation and testing and testified on voir dire as to defendant's mental capabilities. At the request of defendant's attorney, Dr. Wheeler observed, tested and evaluated Wright on three separate occasions, spending a total of four and one-half hours with him. Dr. Wheeler was permitted to give his opinions concerning defendant's capacity to read, write, understand, reason and function, based on his observations, testing and school records. Dr. Wheeler testified that defendant scored very poorly on all tests, placing in the first or second percentile on each of them. He estimated defendant's I.Q. to be 73. Dr. Wheeler was asked to evaluate the level of reading required to read and understand the waiver of rights form which the officers used to advise Terry Wright. It was his opinion that one would at least need to be able to read and comprehend at the sixth grade, minimum, sixth grade level; to be absolutely confident, more like seventh or eighth grade level, to understand this document.' It was further Dr. Wheeler's opinion that defendant could not have read the waiver form and understood it in less than five minutes. Although the officers could easily have read it to him in less than 30 seconds, it was Dr. Wheeler's opinion that defendant could not have understood the consequences and implications of the concepts in the form. Dr. Wheeler testified that during one of his sessions with defendant, he read the Surgeon General's warning as to the hazards of cigarette smoking to him. It was Dr. Wheeler's opinion that Wright understood the implications of this warning. Finally, in his analysis of defendant's personality test, Dr. Wheeler stated that the test did not suggest that he has a significant serious psychological disorder. However, it was Dr. Wheeler's opinion that defendant was a follower; that he would be conscious of avoiding the possibility that others would not like him and might therefore say that he understood something even though he did not. As stated earlier in our discussion of defendant Fincher's appeal, the fact that a defendant is youthful and mentally retarded does not compel a determination that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 3215, 49 L.Ed.2d 1213 (1976). In such cases, however, the record must be carefully scrutinized, with particular attention to both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. State v. Spence, 36 N.C.App. 627, 629, 244 S.E.2d 442, 443, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 556, 248 S.E.2d 734 (1978). The admissibility of the confession must be decided by viewing the totality of the circumstances. State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983). Guided by these principles, we are of the opinion that the totality of the circumstances support the trial judge's conclusion that defendant Wright was capable of making an understanding waiver of his constitutional rights. The trial judge's findings of fact reflect the following: Defendant was carefully advised of his Miranda rights on more than one occasion and each time unhesitatingly responded that he understood them. At the request of Officer Mullis, defendant read aloud numbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the waiver of rights form. At one point during the officers' explanation of the warnings, defendant indicated by a facial expression that he did not understand the meaning of the word leniency. Officer R.E. Sanders then explained the meaning of the word to defendant. After he gave the first statement to police officers on 6 November, defendant declined to give another written statement until Michael Fincher confronted him with the truth. Defendant twice repeated this condition and steadfastly refused to give a written statement until his conditions were satisfied. This is, of course, some indication that defendant was aware of his right to control the timing and subject matter of police questioning and that he was not unduly intimidated by the officers. The trial judge also found that defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system, having been arrested and advised of his rights by Officer R.L. Quick on 26 March 1981. This is an important consideration in determining whether an inculpatory statement was made voluntarily and understandingly. See State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983); State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 362, 180 S.E.2d 140, 147 (1971). Finally, the trial judge specifically found: 1. That on November 6th and 7th, 1981, both defendants appeared to be alert, coherent, were not under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs; that neither defendant was threatened, nor were they promised or offered any reward or inducements by the law enforcement officers to make a statement or to sign the waivers herein. 2. That no threats or suggested violence or show of violence of law enforcement officers to persuade or induce the defendants to waive their rights and make statements existed. . . . . . 5. That the answers of the defendants were responsive and were reasonable to the questions asked of each. These findings are amply supported by the voir dire testimony and are therefore binding upon this Court. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 102 S.Ct. 1741, 72 L.Ed.2d 155 (1982); State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 229 S.E.2d 152 (1976). These facts, in turn, support the conclusion that defendant Wright's confessions were made freely, voluntarily and understandingly. After a careful review of the entire record, we hold that the trial judge correctly admitted the inculpatory statements made by defendant on 6 and 7 November 1981. By his final assignment of error, defendant contends the trial judge committed prejudicial error during his burglary charge to the jury by making a confusing and erroneous comparison to the burglary charge previously given as to defendant Fincher. When the trial judge instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree burglary as to Michael Fincher, he itemized the seven elements the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant directs our attention to that portion of the charge wherein Judge Sitton instructed on the sixth element. Sixth, that at the time of the breaking and entering, the defendant intended to commit the felony of rape or larceny. The Court instructs you that rape is the having [of] vaginal intercourse by force and against the will of the victim, when the perpetrator inflicts serious, personal, bodily injury. STRIKE THE PORTION ABOUT WHAT I SAID `OR LARCENY.' At this point, the trial judge had informed the jury that in order to convict Fincher of first-degree burglary, they were required to find that at the time of the breaking and entering he intended to commit the felony of rape. When the trial judge began to give the elements of burglary as to defendant Wright, he stated: I have previously stated to you the seven things, inas to the defendant Michael Fincher, as to the crime, that the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt. I will not repeat those seven things, at this time. But, they apply here the same as previously given in my instructions. Obviously, this incorporation by reference of the elements necessary to convict Wright of first-degree burglary was erroneous, since the only evidence presented by the State related to defendant Wright's intent to commit the felony of larceny. However, immediately following this erroneous instruction, Judge Sitton gave an accurate charge in his final mandate to the jury as follows: So, I charge that if you find, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on or about October 31, 1981, the defendant, Terry Wright, acting either by himself or acting together with Michael Fincher; and, in a common scheme or purposeplan or purpose to commit the burglary; and, Terry Wright went through a doorway, pushed open by another, and ran or walked into Henrietta Wallace's apartment dwelling, without her consent, in the night-time, intending at that time to commit the felony of larceny; and, that he took therefrom, the pocketbook, knowing at the time that he was not entitled to take it, intending at the time to deprive her of its use permanently; and, that Henrietta Wallace was in the house when he broke and entered, it would be your duty to return a verdict of Guilty of burglary in the first degree as to the defendant, Terry Wright. (emphasis ours.) We are of the opinion that the trial court's earlier misstatement was rectified by this correct instruction and that any misunderstanding or confusion that might have been caused by the error was removed. Where ... the inadvertence complained of occurs early in the charge but is not called to the attention of the court at the time, and is later corrected, the occurrence will not be held for prejudicial error when it is apparent from the record that the jury could not have been misled. State v. Wells, 290 N.C. 485, 498, 226 S.E.2d 325, 334 (1976). As further evidence that the jury could not have been misled by this error, we note that the written verdict form also clarified the jury instructions. The relevant portion reads: 1. Guilty of first degree burglary (felonious larceny). ANSWER: Guilty This verdict form would clearly have indicated to the jurors that they could find defendant Wright guilty of first-degree burglary on the theory that at the time of the breaking and entering he intended to commit the felony of larceny. For these reasons, we find the trial judge's misstatement wholly lacking in prejudicial effect. This assignment of error is overruled. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that defendants Michael Edward Fincher and Terry Jerome Wright received a fair trial free of prejudicial error. NO ERROR.