Opinion ID: 3052800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Duties

Text: In addition to finding the required consent, we must determine whether closing argument “bear[s] some relation to the specified duties” that magistrate judges are already authorized to perform. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 930 (internal quotation marks omitted). We hold that it does. [10] In Peretz, the Court found that the Act’s “additional duties clause permits a magistrate to supervise jury selection in a felony trial provided the parties consent.” Id. at 933 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that the responsibility and importance of presiding over voir dire at a felony trial are comparable to the duties and responsibility that magistrate judges have in supervising entire civil and misdemeanor trials. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (with the parties’ consent, a district court judge may delegate the supervision of entire civil and misdemeanor trials to a magistrate judge). The Peretz Court, as noted above, also encour- aged the district courts to experiment in the use of magistrates to carry out functions not previously considered so long as the parties consent or the defendant fails to object. See 501 U.S. at 932-33. [11] The reasoning the Court applied in Peretz equally extends to closing argument. If a magistrate judge can con- duct jury selection, then, logically, he can preside over closing argument as well. A magistrate judge who conducts a civil or misdemeanor trial necessarily must preside over closing argument. Closing argument clearly bears a relation to specified duties magistrate judges are statutorily authorized to perform. UNITED STATES v. GAMBA 11909 Accordingly, where defense counsel consents to proceed before a magistrate judge for tactical or strategic reasons, there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory impediment to delegating closing argument in criminal cases to magistrate judges. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121.