Opinion ID: 150482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contrary to or Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

Text: Collins' first argument is that his petition should be granted because the Illinois courts' decisions were contrary to or unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that a decision is contrary to federal law when it contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases, or when the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law when it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case, id. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495, but not when the state court merely applies federal law erroneously or incorrectly, id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In other words, the state court's application of federal law must be well outside the boundaries of permissible differences`of opinion. Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2003), quoting Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir.2002) (quotation marks omitted). Here the state courts' decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Collins contends that the Illinois courts failed to hold the government to the heavy burden of proving that he validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). It is true that the Supreme Court used those words and the Illinois courts did not. But more than that is required to satisfy the standard of § 2254(d)(1). The state courts recited and applied the well-established requirement that a defendant's waiver must be both voluntary, meaning non-coerced, and intelligent, meaning with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); accord, Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-74, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471, 100 S.Ct. 652, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) (courts may not presume that waiver was voluntary and knowing; state must meet heavy burden of showing voluntary and knowing waiver). The state courts also applied the proper standard for intelligent waiver. The trial court wrote that the awareness component does not require knowing and understanding every possible consequence of a waiver . . . but rather simply being cognizant of the State's intention to use one's statement to secure a conviction and of the fact that one can stand mute and request a lawyer. The trial court properly cited Burbine and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the Supreme Court's central cases on this question. For its part, the Appellate Court cited only Illinois cases but used the same correct standard. Collins also argues that the state court's decision was contrary to federal law because it failed to require the government to show that police took special care in obtaining a voluntary waiver given his limited mental capacity. We disagree. The Supreme Court has said that when the police are aware of a suspect's mental defect but persist in questioning him, such dogged persistence can contribute to a finding that the waiver was involuntary. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-99, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (suspect's waiver was involuntary when police officer questioned him while he was confused and unable to think clearly, in critical condition in a hospital bed). The Court has also held that a suspect's mental capacity is a factor that a court must consider in deciding whether a waiver was voluntary. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). The Court has never held, however, that police can render a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary simply by failing to take special care that a suspect with a mental disability understands his rights. Even if the Supreme Court had clearly established a special care requirement in its precedents, the state courts' failure to apply such a requirement here would not have met the standard imposed by § 2254(d)(1) for habeas relief. Collins produced no evidence that the police officers who examined him were aware of his mental deficiency. Indeed, his trial counsel barely cross-examined Prosecutor Heil and Detective O'Shea on this point, and his appellate counsel conceded at oral argument that she was not claiming the police illegally coerced Collins into giving a statement.