Opinion ID: 77055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Toyota Study of Other Incidents

Text: 25 Finally, Tran argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence a study of Cressida accidents performed by Dr. Donald Huelke in the 1980s (the Toyota study or the study). [T]his court will afford great deference to the decisions of the district court with regard to evidentiary matters. We will only reverse a district court's ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence where the appellant can show that the judge abused his broad discretion and that the decision affected the substantial rights of the complaining party. Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1395 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Wood v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir.1995)). 26 The Toyota study was an examination of other accidents involving the Cressida's restraint system. Toyota introduced the study to demonstrate the system's overall effectiveness in a wide array of accidents. Tran asserts that the Toyota study should not have been admitted because Toyota did not prove that the accidents in the study were substantially similar to hers. 27 The doctrine of substantial similarity applies when one party seeks to admit prior accidents or occurrences involving the opposing party, in order to show, for example notice, magnitude of the danger involved, the [party's] ability to correct a known defect, the lack of safety for intended uses, strength of a product, the standard of care, and causation. In order to limit the substantial prejudice that might inure to a party should these past occurrences or accidents be admitted into evidence, courts have developed limitations governing the admissibility of such evidence, including the substantial similarity doctrine. This doctrine applies to protect parties against the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence, evidence which, because it is not substantially similar to the accident or incident at issue, is apt to confuse or mislead the jury. 28 Heath, 126 F.3d at 1396 (quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 661 (11th Cir.1988)) (internal citation and footnotes omitted; alteration in original). 29 The substantial similarity doctrine does not apply to situations, like this one, where the evidence is pointedly dissimilar and not offered to reenact the accident. Heath, 126 F.3d at 1396-97. The evidence may have had some prejudicial effect on Tran's case by showing that the Cressida's restraint system generally performed well in a variety of accidents (a point that Tran's expert conceded). But the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that this prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the study as part of Toyota's case that its restraint system was not defectively designed. Id. Therefore, we affirm the district court's ruling on Tran's objection to the admission of the Toyota study.