Opinion ID: 883677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: negligent infliction of emotional distress count iv

Text: Sacco asserts that the District Court erred by granting Dighans' motion for summary judgment as to Count IV, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Dighans contends that the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has been recognized by Montana in a very narrowly defined context. He further states that Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc. (1984), 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209, addressed the concept of emotional distress as an element of damages, not as a distinct tort. Therefore, according to Dighans, Sacco was wrong to rely upon Johnson for her contention that her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress was wrongly denied. Whether the tort of emotional distress may be pled and proved as an independent stand alone cause of action, as distinguished from being an element of damages in some other tort action, has been the subject of much discussion and controversy. The traditional rule has been that there is no recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress alone. Rodrigues v. State (Hawaii 1970), 472 P.2d 509, 518. Additionally, [t]he cases contain the broad statement that there is no duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of mental distress. Thus the paramount issue is characterized as one of duty: whether the plaintiff's interest in freedom from mental distress is entitled to legal protection from defendant's conduct. Duty, however, is a legal conclusion which depends upon the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Therefore, in determining the duty imposed on the defendant, if any, we must weigh the considerations of policy which favor the plaintiff's recovery against those which favor limiting the defendant's liability. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 518-19. (Citations omitted.) The major policy issues which have historically rendered courts reluctant to allow recovery for emotional distress are concern over fraudulent claims, a floodgate of litigation and unlimited liability for defendants. These policy concerns have served as impediments to recovery for the independent tort of emotional distress. Clinch and Johnson, Compensation of Emotional Distress in Montana: Distinctions Between Bystanders and Direct Victims, 47 Mont.L.R. 479 (1986). Courts have allowed recovery for emotional distress but only in limited cases where the genuineness of the mental distress could be adequately determined, such as recovery for emotional distress damages upon proof of another cause of action and by plaintiffs who have suffered physical impact or a physical manifestation of the emotional distress claimed. Clinch and Johnson at 480-481. These exceptions to the general rule, however, have not proved to be the panacea anticipated. Damages for emotional distress with a host cause of action, known as parasitic damages, have been recovered even in cases where the independent action giving rise to emotional distress damages is trivial. Even in cases where the courts have required a physical injury or threat of physical injury in order to recover for emotional distress, plaintiffs have been allowed to recover where they have suffered only the slightest impact. Furthermore, even in jurisdictions which require that the plaintiff physically manifest the emotional impact, slight physical manifestations will suffice in establishing emotional distress. In many instances, the exceptions have swallowed the rule and the dangers of fraudulent claims, opening the floodgates of litigation and unlimited defendant liability have not been prevented by requiring that emotional distress be in the form of parasitic damages, or accompany physical injury or present physical manifestations of emotional distress. Clinch and Johnson at 480-483. The types of cases mentioned above concern plaintiffs who were direct victims of a defendant's negligent conduct. However, there is another class of plaintiffs for whom courts have allowed recovery due to the negligence of defendants  bystander victims. Bystander victims are those who observe the injury or death of another person and suffer resultant emotional distress. Some courts allow recovery for emotional distress of bystanders only if the bystander was also in close enough proximity to an accident to have been placed in actual physical danger, and, that as a result of being within the `zone of danger' a plaintiff-bystander's emotional suffering was deemed genuine because of the fear of that physical danger. Clinch and Johnson at 483. The very narrow rule was eventually expanded based on the principle of foreseeability that the bystander would suffer emotional distress. However, even when the bystander exception allowed recovery without physical injury, compensation was still sometimes denied to a body of seemingly deserving plaintiffs. Clinch and Johnson at 483. We begin our resolution of Sacco's case with a review of Montana case law on emotional distress involving both bystanders and direct victims. We discuss Montana case law wherein we have allowed recovery for emotional distress based on traditional exceptions to the general rule that there is no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Our review includes those cases where we have allowed recovery for emotional distress based upon some accompanying physical injury or some physical manifestations of emotional distress, where recovery for emotional distress damages has been based upon an independent host cause of action and where recovery for emotional distress has been found for bystanders, persons who observe the death or serious injury of another. We then discuss cases in which we have addressed the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress as a distinct cause of action for persons who have been the direct victims of emotional distress. As can readily be seen from this review, the case law demonstrates that courts, including this Court, have struggled with the issue of how and whether to compensate for emotional distress, with the resultant development of a body of confusing, unclear and sometimes inconsistent precedent.