Opinion ID: 731310
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The police officers' initial stop of the van for traffic violations was lawful.

Text: 15 Defendants argue that this Court should adopt the Fourth Amendment views shared by the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which hold that because the police may be tempted to use commonly occurring traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other laws, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops is whether a reasonable officer would have stopped Tracy's van for the purpose of enforcing the traffic violations at issue. In this case, defendants argue, the police officers' stop of Tracy's van for violations of the traffic laws was unrelated to the drug search and, therefore, must be considered unlawful because the stop was used as pretext for discovering possible drug activity. 16 We have consistently rejected this argument, see United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc), and under the recent decision in Whren v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774-76, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (decided after defendants filed their first set of briefs), the Supreme Court unanimously agreed with this Court's treatment of the issue. As neither defendant contends that the police officers in this case had no probable cause to stop the van for traffic violations, defendants' pretext argument fails. 17 B. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not require police officers, who lawfully stop a motorist for traffic violations, to inform the motorist that the legal detention has concluded before the officers can obtain a valid consent to search the vehicle. 18 Tracy adopts Tim's argument that even if the initial stop for traffic violations was lawful, the officers were required to inform Tracy that the traffic violation stop had concluded before they could ask for consent to search the van. 3 In the alternative, Tracy maintains that even if the officers were not required to obtain informed consent, the consent was not voluntary. 4 19 In the recent decision of Ohio v. Robinette, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996), a case with facts similar to those presented by the Browns' appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth amendment does not require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is free to go before his consent search will be recognized as voluntary. In Robinette, a police officer pulled over the defendant's car for violation of the speed limit. After giving an oral warning, the officer asked the defendant whether he was carrying any illegal contraband in his car, such as weapons or drugs, to which the defendant answered no. The officer then asked for permission to search the car, and the defendant gave his consent. During the course of the car search, the officer found a small amount of marihuana in the car's console and a methylenedioxy methamphetamine pill in a clear plastic container. Id. at ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. at 418-20. 20 The defendant was charged with violating R.C. 2925.11(A). He filed a motion to suppress, and at the suppression hearing, testified that he felt he was free to leave after the officer gave him the oral warning about the speeding violation and returned his driver's license to him. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The defendant later entered a no contest plea and was found guilty of drug abuse. 21 The appellate court reversed the conviction, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. The four-justice majority held that the search of the defendant's car was invalid because it was the product of an unlawful seizure. The court explained that, while the decision to stop the defendant for speeding had been justified, once the officer returned to the defendant's car after checking his license, every aspect of the speeding violation had been investigated and resolved. Ohio v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (1995). And, the court held, [w]hen the motivation behind a police officer's continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure. Id. In so holding, the court emphasized that it was adopting a bright-line test, requiring police officers to inform motorists that their legal detention has concluded before the police officer may engage in any consensual interrogation. The court explained: 22 The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has occurred. The undetectability of that transition may be used by police officers to coerce citizens into answering questions that they need not answer, or to allow a search of a vehicle that they are not legally obligated to allow.... 23 Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them. The police officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.... 24 [C]itizens stopped for traffic offenses [must] be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase 'At this time you legally are free to go' or by words of similar import. Id. 653 N.E.2d at 698-99. 25 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Ohio Supreme Court's per se rule as directly undermining the U.S. Supreme Court's prior decisions which preclude any adoption of a per se rule to replace the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The Supreme Court explained: 26 We have previously rejected a per se rule very similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte it was argued that such consent could not be valid unless the defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request. We rejected this argument: 'while knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of effective consent.' And just as it 'would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning,' so too would it be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary. 27 The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and 'voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.' The Supreme Court of Ohio having held otherwise, its judgment is reversed.... Robinette, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 421 (internal citations omitted). 28 In sum, the per se rule advanced by the defendants has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court and, accordingly, is rejected by this Court. 29 C. Tracy Brown voluntarily consented to the police search of his van. 30 Tracy contends that, Robinette notwithstanding, under the totality-of-the-circumstances test it is clear that his consent was not voluntary. Specifically, Tracy claims--by adopting the relevant arguments in Tim's brief--that under the test set forth by this Court in United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1023-24 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982), Tracy's consent to search the van was not voluntarily given. 31 [T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In addition [w]here the judge bases a finding of consent on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong, since the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993). 32 In Phillips, this Court announced six factors to be considered in deciding whether consent to search is obtained voluntarily. These factors include (1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found. Id. at 1023-24; see also Kelley, 981 F.2d at 1470. All of these factors are relevant; however, no single factor is dispositive. Zucco, 71 F.3d at 191 n. 14. 33 Here, the district court did not clearly err in concluding based on the totality of the circumstances that Tracy's consent to search was voluntary. Tracy's custodial status was voluntary in that Officer Salmon did not request consent until after the traffic stop had concluded; there was no evidence of any coercion by either officer; Tracy was cooperative with the officers, as evidenced by, among other things, his decision to step out of the van and telling Officer Salmon to go ahead and search the van; and Tracy seemed to have the ability to understand and communicate competently with the officers. Although Tracy probably did not know he had the right to refuse consent and likely knew of the incriminating evidence hidden in the van, based on the totality-of-the-circumstances, Tracy's consent was voluntarily given. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) ([T]he absence of proof that [the defendant] knew he could withhold his consent, though it may be a factor in the overall judgment, is not to be given controlling significance.)