Opinion ID: 1902007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellee's Subrogation Agreement.

Text: Taylor next asserts that the trial Court erred in allowing Mason to testify, over objection, as to his subrogation agreement with his property damage insurer, under which the insurer would be compensated for its payments out of any award granted. We agree. Any fact, incapable of affording a presumption or reasonable inference of a material fact or inquiry, involved in triable issues between the parties, is inadmissible in evidence. Fincher v. State, 58 Ala. 215 (1877). See, also, ARCP 43(a). As a general rule, a defendant is precluded from introducing evidence that the plaintiff had insurance coverage or has been indemnified for the accident in question. Lengle v. North Lebanon Township, 274 Pa. 51, 117 A. 403 (1922). See Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 189.04(2), 3rd Ed. (1977). Cognizant of the general rule, we note that under our facts it was the Plaintiff's evidence of his subrogation agreement with his insurer which was admitted by the trial Court. Our interpretation, whether it be applied to a plaintiff or defendant, is that, again, all evidence must have some tendency to shed light on the inquiry in issue. Ward v. State, 52 Ala.App. 392, 293 So.2d 307 (1974). Any such effect by Plaintiff's evidence of his subrogation agreement on the issues of liability or damages totally escapes us. Consequently, we hold that it was improperly admitted. [1] Thus, for the prejudicial errors noted and discussed above, this cause is due to be, and hereby is, reversed and remanded. REVERSED AND REMANDED. TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.