Opinion ID: 2670267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abandonment Claim

Text: We first consider whether Santiago’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a motion for resentencing once the case had been remanded pursuant to United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005). After careful review of the record, we do not see, nor does Santiago proffer, any actual prejudice. In response to Santiago’s April 7, 2011 letter inquiring about the status of the Crosby remand, Judge Marrero stated unequivocally: “Upon examination of the record of Santiago’s conviction and sentence in the light of the relevant considerations stated in Booker and Crosby, the Court finds no grounds supporting a resentencing of Santiago.” App. 19. Accordingly, 1 In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides: (a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 2 Judge Marrero was in an especially good position to conclude, in later ruling on Santiago’s habeas petition, that there was not a reasonable probability of a different outcome had Santiago’s counsel sought resentencing. See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 227 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that “the original sentencing judge’s familiarity with a case would allow him or her to make this comparative assessment [required by Crosby] most easily and reliably”). We similarly reject the contention that this case fits within that narrow set deemed “presumptively” prejudicial due to counsel’s “‘total[ ] absen[ce] . . . during a critical stage of the proceeding.’” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25). Under our case law, “we have been disinclined to expand further the conduct denominated per se ineffective,” United States v. Kaid, 502 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2007), and have focused instead on whether, due to counsel’s absence, “‘the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.’” Id. at 46–47 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 496). Accordingly, even where “[t]he alleged absence . . . was certainly unprofessional and likely objectively unreasonable,” in order “to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, [a petitioner] must still demonstrate some prejudice from his attorney’s absence, whether specific, or . . . general.” Id. at 47. In the circumstances presented here, counsel’s failure to file a motion for resentencing did not cause a breakdown in the adversarial process so as to warrant a finding of prejudice. The scope of the Crosby remand is limited; it is not a remand for resentencing, but a remand “for determination of whether to resentence.” Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117. The primary inquiry on a Crosby remand— whether a sentence imposed under the post-Booker regime “would have been essentially the same as originally imposed,” id. at 118—was one best addressed by the District Court, not counsel, in this case. Moreover, Santiago has not proffered any arguments on appeal in favor of resentencing to rebut the District Court’s unequivocal statement that resentencing was unwarranted. Accordingly, Santiago has not demonstrated sufficient prejudice to warrant habeas relief on this claim.