Opinion ID: 1756872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Point Three: Trial Court Errors

Text: In the third point, Appellant argues: A) the trial court erred in overruling the motion for judgment of acquittal; B) the trial court erred in submitting the first-degree murder jury instruction because section 565.002(3)'s definition of deliberation, `cool reflection for any amount of time no matter how brief,' reduces the distinction between first and second degree murder to imperceptibility; and C) the trial court committed plain error in: 1) allowing the State to [r]epeatedly argu[e] that [Appellant's] conscious decision to shoot was deliberation, Prosecutor McCulloch misled the jury, contravened the law, and created manifest injustice: a conscious decision to kill is second degree murder (emphasis in original); 2) allowing argument that the jury had to acquit [Appellant] of first-degree murder to consider second-degree murder; and 3) submitting [i]nstruction 5, the first-degree murder verdict-director, [which] failed to require unanimity as to each element of first-degree murder.
Appellant alleges the trial court erred in overruling the motion for judgment of acquittal. A sufficiency of the evidence argument is reviewed to determine if a reasonable juror had enough evidence to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salter, 250 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Mo. banc 2008). Evidence and inferences favorable to the state are accepted, and contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. Id. The record shows Appellant retrieved his gun from his vehicle after his brother was taken to the hospital and expressed his belief that the police did not help his brother because they were focused on finding him. Two hours later, Appellant approached Sgt. McEntee's patrol car, squatted down to see into the window, and said you killed my brother before firing his handgun approximately five times at Sgt. McEntee's head and upper body. Appellant took Sgt. McEntee's silver gun and walked down the street with both guns. He then saw his mother and told her that m___ f___ let my brother die, he needs to see what it feel[s] like to die. After leaving his mother, Appellant walked around the neighborhood and came to Sgt. McEntee, whose patrol car had rolled down the street and hit a tree. Appellant approached Sgt. McEntee and shot him two more times in the head. Appellant drove to his father's house and later went to a family member's apartment for several days until he surrendered to police. The trial court did not err in overruling the judgment of acquittal as a reasonable juror had sufficient evidence to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that the definition of deliberation in the first-degree murder jury instruction reduces the distinction between first-degree and second-degree murder and is unconstitutionally vague. Appellant objected during the instruction conference and raised the point in the motion for new trial. An instructional error is reviewed for an error in submitting the instruction and prejudice. State v. Zink, 181 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Mo. banc 2005). MAI instructions are presumed valid. Id. The Court has previously found first-degree murder is distinguished from second-degree murder by deliberation. [5] Strong, 142 S.W.3d at 717. Deliberation is defined as a cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief. Section 565.002(3). The first-degree murder instruction [6] provided was based on MAI-CR3d 314.02, which included the statutory definition of deliberation. The instruction adequately sets out the additional element of deliberation to distinguish first-degree murder. There is also no evidence Appellant was prejudiced. The statutory definition of deliberation is not unconstitutionally vague. This Court has rejected the claim that first-degree murder is unconstitutionally vague for failing to distinguish first-degree and second-degree murder. See State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 231 (Mo. banc 2006). The trial court did not err in submitting the instruction.
Three of Appellant's arguments were not preserved as Appellant did not object at trial or raise the points in the motion for new trial. These points are reviewed for plain error. Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 43. Plain error requires a finding of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Id. at 34.
Appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State, during its closing argument, to: blatantly misle[a]d the jury to believe that if [Appellant] consciously or knowingly decided to kill a police officer, he had coolly reflected and deliberated. These arguments eliminated deliberation, cool reflection, from the elements the jury had to find to convict [Appellant] of first degree murder. Appellant also argues a conscious decision to kill someone, without more, is second degree murder. The State in its closing argument first defined deliberation as cool reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief [7] and went on to say you make a conscious decision to go after somebody and kill them, that is cool reflection. The State proceeded to use the terms deliberation, cool reflection, and conscious decision to illustrate Appellant's actions. Plain error review of a closing argument not objected to will be considered only if there is a sound, substantial manifestation, a strong, clear showing, that injustice or miscarriage of justice will result if relief is not given. Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 49. A conviction is reversed due to an improper closing argument when the argument had a decisive effect on the jury's determination. Id. The burden is on the criminal defendant to show a decisive effect. Id. Rarely is plain error relief granted for a closing argument claim, absent an objection, because it may be a strategic decision by counsel. Id. The trial court is vested with discretion regarding closing arguments. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 537. The entire record is considered when interpreting a closing argument, not an isolated segment. Id. The term conscious decision is neither an element nor description of first-degree or second-degree murder. See sections 565.020, 565.021. Conscious is defined as perceiving, apprehending, or noticing with a degree of controlled thought or observation: recognizing as existent, factual, or true. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 482 (1993). Decision is defined as a determination arrived at after consideration. Id. at 585. In the context of the State's entire closing argument, the State argued both deliberation and conscious decision. The State initially defined deliberation and in the process of arguing the deliberation element used the terms deliberation, cool reflection, and conscious decision. Although the term conscious decision is not used in the instruction, the use of this phrase in closing argument, especially after reciting the actual language of the instruction, was not plain error. [8] Furthermore, it is presumed the jury followed the instruction, see Tisius v. State, 183 S.W.3d 207, 217 (Mo. banc 2006), which properly defined deliberation.
Appellant argues that allowing the State to argue the jury had to acquit [Appellant] of first-degree murder to consider second-degree murder was plain error contrary to law. The jury instruction for second degree murder provides, If you do not find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you must consider whether he is guilty of murder in the second degree. MAI-CR3d 314.04 (emphasis added). In closing arguments, the State read the instruction and explained you're considering Murder in the First Degree, which is only if you decide that he didn't commit Murder in the First Degree that you even get to Murder in the Second Degree.  (Emphasis added). An acquittal first instruction requires the defendant to be acquitted of the greater offense before the lesser offense is considered. An acquittal first instruction is: [i]f you determine that the defendant is not guilty of the crime of ____ you may consider the lesser included crime of ____. State v. Allen, 301 Or. 35, 717 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1986) (citing comments to UCrJI No. 1009, Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction for Lesser Included Offense Order of Deliberation). Thus, if an acquittal is first required, a deadlocked jury could not consider a lesser offense. State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 517 (Mo. banc 1994) ( overruled on other grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. banc 2008)). However, an acquittal first argument will be upheld if the strength of the evidence of deliberation precludes a finding of prejudice. Tisius, 183 S.W.3d at 217. The second-degree murder jury instruction in Missouri, MAI-CR3d 314.04, is not an acquittal first instruction. Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 517. The instruction does not require the defendant to be found not guilty on the greater offense, first-degree murder, before the lesser-included offense, second-degree murder, is considered. Id. Instead, a lesser-included offense may be considered if the jury does not find the defendant guilty of the greater offense. Id. Thus, a lesser-included offense may be considered when the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense. Id. The difference between the State's closing argument and MAI-CR3d 314.04 is minimal. Regardless, this Court assumes that the jury followed the instruction of the court, see State v. Bowman, 741 S.W.2d 10, 15 (Mo. banc 1987), which was a proper instruction mirroring MAI-CR3d 314.14. Additionally ... the strength of the evidence of deliberation precludes a finding of prejudice. Tisius, 183 S.W.3d at 217. [9]
Appellant argues the first-degree murder jury instruction did not require unanimity for each element of first-degree murder. The first-degree murder instruction provided, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree. MAI-CR3d 314.02. The jury was also instructed: You will then discuss the case with your fellow jurors. Each of you must decide the case for yourself but you should do so only after you have considered all the evidence, discussed it fully with the other jurors, and listened to the views of your fellow jurors. Your verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, must be agreed to by each juror. Although the verdict must be unanimous, the verdict should be signed by your foreperson alone. When you have concluded your deliberations, you will complete the applicable form to which you unanimously agree and return it with all the unused forms and the written instructions of the Court. MAI-CR3d 302.05 (emphasis added). The instructions require unanimity as to each element. See State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 752 (Mo. banc 1997) (finding no constitutional error when the trial court refused to further explain the jury instructions when the jury asked if each element had to be unanimously agreed to). The instruction is not erroneous.
For the third point, the trial court did not err. The point is denied.