Opinion ID: 4561258
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Edna Robinson

Text: Turning then to Plaintiff’s claim against Robinson, Plaintiff alleges that Robinson had received complaints that, in October 2012, Duvall threw a drink carton at a student, yanked another out of her chair, squeezed and shook a student by the head and neck, and allowed another to defecate in his clothing rather than permit him go to the bathroom, as well as complaints that he threw a student into a bookcase in February 2014 and that he had done this several times before. Beyond this, Plaintiff alleges that an aide asked to be removed from Duvall’s classroom because of abuse between 2010 and 2011 and that the school was asked not to place a student in Duvall’s classroom based on reported abuse in October 2012. These represent several independent reports of abuse over a consolidated period of time leading up to the incident with C.G., a sufficiently widespread pattern to make Robinson aware of Duvall’s likely future abuse. Plaintiff further contends that, although Duvall was investigated and suspended for three days after grabbing a student by the neck and shaking her, Robinson failed to notify law enforcement, Protective Services, or victim guardians about this abuse. And Plaintiff alleges that Robinson failed to take any action in response to the other reports.9 This plausibly suggests that Robinson failed to take adequate precautions in the face of a widespread pattern of violations. Roseville, 296 F.3d at 439. 9We note that some of these allegations may be undermined by evidence entered into the record after Robinson’s dismissal, which was secured in discovery on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Alwardt, Caamal Canul, and Nickson. However, in reviewing the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, this Court considers the sufficiency of the facts pleaded by the plaintiff, not the facts later discovered. Had Plaintiff been allowed to continue her claim against Robinson, she might also have uncovered additional evidence that would have bolstered her case against Robinson at summary judgment. No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 20 Again, unlike the defendants in Claiborne County, Robinson allegedly let incidents go altogether uninvestigated or unaddressed, and, again unlike the defendants there, apparently never thought the allegations against Duvall unfounded or already dismissed. See 103 F.3d at 501–02, 513. And unlike the defendants in Roseville, Robinson allegedly never reported any abuse to child welfare, despite knowing of multiple instances of abuse, and never undertook investigations of multiple other incidents. See 296 F.3d at 434–35. As before, Plaintiff’s allegations are also sufficient to show causation at this stage. Had Robinson notified the requisite authorities about the choking incident or acted in response to other allegations against Duvall, those allegations may have been more thoroughly investigated and responded to, resulting in disciplinary action against or termination of Duvall. This is a sufficiently direct chain of causation. And again, Defendants present no reason for us to conclude, at this stage, that Defendant Robinson could not have foreseen C.G.’s injury. Thus, we also reverse the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Robinson. B. Summary Judgment to Defendants Alwardt, Caamal Canul, and Nickson We next confront Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Alwardt, Caamal Canul, and Nickson. Plaintiff claims that these Defendants are liable for Duvall’s violation of C.G.’s rights because they were responsible for reporting and responding to Duvall’s misconduct, yet failed to take adequate precautions to prevent the continuation of that misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding that “[their] conduct was, at best, negligent and C.G. cannot sustain a section 1983 action against them.” (Op. & Order Den. Summ. J., R. 132 at PageID #3469.) It did not reach the question of whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants and that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Credibility determinations, the No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 21 weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . . The evidence of the non- movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 1. Defendant Martin Alwardt Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Alwardt, the District’s Director of Special Education, demonstrated deliberate indifference to Duvall’s abuse by not ensuring that reports of abuse were investigated, failing to follow up on the investigations that were conducted, actually chastising Duvall for failing to physically restrain students, not maintaining documentation of Duvall’s abuse, and transferring Duvall to a new school despite knowing about his history of abuse. The evidence suffices to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alwardt bore supervisory liability for Duvall’s abuse of C.G. Considering first the information that Alwardt possessed about Duvall’s history of abuse, Alwardt stated in his deposition that the district files did not include any information on Duvall’s alleged abuse prior to October 2012, when Dove reported that Duvall had engaged in series of abusive acts culminating in choking a student. Plaintiff argues that information about this preOctober 2012 abuse must have been available to Alwardt because it was ultimately produced in response to their FOIA requests. But regardless of whether Alwardt had information about Duvall’s abuse prior to October 2012, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Defendant Alwardt received enough information about Duvall’s misconduct between October 2012 and October 2014 to demonstrate his strong likelihood of abusing other students. See Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 513. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record suggests that Alwardt received at least the following complaints during that time: Ellenwood’s April 2012 report that Duvall pushed a student into the wall, pressed on a student’s jaw to get her to stop making noises, and generally used physical force with students; Ellenwood’s October 2012 follow-up letter expressing her dissatisfaction that her reports of abuse were not adequately investigated; the timeline of abuse allegations Ellenwood provided to Alwardt in an August 2014 meeting; Defendant Robinson’s “inconclusive” report on her informal investigation of a parent’s complaint that Duvall had bruised a student; Dove’s October 2012 complaints of four instances No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 22 of abuse, which culminated in Duvall choking a student; CMH’s “firestorm” of complaints that Duvall had physically abused students from October 2012; Mid-Michigan Guardianship Services’ request that a student not be placed in Duvall’s classroom; reports of the February 2014 incident involving Duvall throwing another student into a bookcase; and independent requests from parents and guardians asking to move their students out of Duvall’s classroom. Altogether, these complaints represented allegations of approximately fifteen different instances of abuse by Duvall over a period of three years. Taken together, this is far more than “isolated” or “sporadic” incidents of abuse. Howard, 695 F. App’x at 113–114. Instead, Alwardt was confronted with a widespread pattern of alleged abuse, putting him on notice that Duvall had a strong likelihood of future abuse. Moreover, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alwardt knew that Duvall told Robinson that he would continue to use force even after the October 4, 2012 incident. This conversation would provide Alwardt with additional notice that Duvall was likely to abuse students in the future. The record further presents genuine issues of material fact as to whether, armed with this knowledge, Alwardt still failed to take adequate precautions to ward off Duvall’s future abuse. See Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 513. Alwardt was jointly responsible for training special education teachers and responding to concerns about their performance. Likewise, according to Parks, Alwardt was responsible for following up on his investigative reports and authorizing future investigations. Despite this, Alwardt admitted that he did not even review investigative reports on Duvall’s abuse, raising a genuine issue as to whether Alwardt fulfilled his duty with regard to allegations against Duvall. See, e.g., Peatross, 818 F.3d at 243 (denying qualified immunity in part based on allegations that the defendant failed to supervise officers alleged to have used excessive force and failed to investigate allegations of excessive force properly). Likewise, the record presents a genuine issue as to whether Alwardt himself was responsible for the District’s failure to investigate other complaints made against Duvall, including Ellenwood’s allegations that Duvall physically abused students and the additional reports of abuse that Parks uncovered in his investigation of Dove’s 2012 allegations. While it is evident, as Defendants argue, that Alwardt took some action in response to instances of Duvall’s alleged abuse, these minimal responses do not eliminate any genuine issue No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 23 of material fact as to whether he demonstrated deliberate indifference to the possibility of Duvall abusing students in the future. Defendants note that Alwardt reported instances of Duvall’s misconduct to HR. But even if true, Duvall continued to engage in abuse even after these reports, and many allegations against Duvall were not addressed even after being reported to HR. Moreover, if Alwardt himself was responsible for following up on HR reports, the fact that he simply reported Duvall’s misconduct to HR does not show that he took adequate precautions. Defendants also argue that Alwardt recommended that Duvall be suspended following the October 2012 incident. But again, upon Duvall’s return to teaching after his short suspension, allegations continued to come in against him, providing Alwardt with notice that this “remedial action [was] inadequate and ineffective.” Vance, 231 F.3d at 261. Despite this, Alwardt continued to simply refer claims against Duvall to HR, raising a genuine dispute as to whether, by “continu[ing] to use those same methods to no avail,” he failed to act reasonably. Id. Moreover, the record demonstrates genuine issues as to whether Alwardt actually responded to Duvall’s conduct in other ways Defendants suggest. For instance, although Defendants say that Alwardt chastised Duvall following the October 2012 incident and told him to undergo additional crisis intervention training, Duvall testified that Alwardt never discussed any complaints about Duvall’s use of force with him prior to the incident with C.G. and had actually chastised him when he failed to use physical restraints. This raises another genuine issue as to whether, even when confronted with Duvall’s history, Alwardt encouraged Duvall to use force more frequently. Finally, Defendants say that Alwardt had Duvall transferred to Gardner in response to a “firestorm” of allegations against him. But in Doe v. Warren Consolidated Schools, we concluded that a defendant’s action to transfer an abusive teacher to a different school, despite his knowledge that the teacher posed a danger to students, “constituted ‘knowing acquiescence’ to abuse.” 93 F. App’x at 821; accord Howard, 695 F. App’x at 109, 115–16 (finding defendants had “heightened the risk of harm to the plaintiff” where they had transferred him to the plaintiff’s class despite knowledge of his history of abuse). Again, viewing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, Alwardt’s decision to place Duvall in a new school, where his colleagues had less notice of his history, raises a genuine issue as to whether Alwardt was deliberately No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 24 indifferent to the possibility of future abuse. Moreover, the record suggests that upon transferring Duvall to Gardner, despite having received multiple reports against Duvall and knowing that he had been suspended based on one, Alwardt assured Gardner’s principal, Defendant Nickson, that Duvall was known to be a good teacher and that none of the allegations against him had been substantiated. This, too, arguably further increased Duvall’s risk of additional abuse. Defendants again contend that Roseville and Claiborne County require this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment as to Alwardt. We disagree. The record suggests that Alwardt was presented with many more specific reports of abuse than were any of the administrators in Roseville or Claiborne County. See Warren Consolidated Sch., 93 F. App’x at 821 (concluding that Roseville was “easily distinguishable” from the case at hand where the relevant teacher’s misconduct “was repeated and recent, as opposed to sporadic”); Howard, 695 F. App’x at 114 (denying qualified immunity where “Plaintiffs point[ed] to numerous examples where parents and students complained to [the defendant] about specific incidents of abuse witness or otherwise discovered, not just a generalized fear of potential abuse”). Some of these instances were admitted and others substantiated, providing reason to conclude that Alwardt knowingly acquiesced in Duvall’s abuse. See Warren Consolidated Sch., 93 F. App’x at 821. In Claiborne County, on the other hand, the defendant school administrators understood that prior charges of sexual abuse against a teacher who went on to abuse the plaintiff were “unfounded,” had resulted in an “exoneration,” or had been dismissed. 103 F.3d at 503. Likewise, in Roseville, the defendant school administrators did not believe reports of abuse by the teacher who went on to abuse the plaintiff or, after investigation, found there were “plausible explanations” for the teacher’s conduct. 296 F.3d at 435. In Warren Consolidated Schools, we contrasted the defendant’s knowledge with that in Roseville, explaining that the defendant “knew that [the teacher] posed a danger to young girls,” but nevertheless continued to expose students to that danger by choosing to transfer the teacher to a school that young girls attended. 93 F. App’x at 821. Similarly, in this case, Alwardt was presented with approximately fifteen reports of abuse over a period of three years, and he acknowledged that Duvall presented a danger to students. (Alwardt Dep., R. 112-24 at PageID #2892 (noting that Alwardt No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 25 recommended to HR that Duvall be closely monitored because of the number of allegations against him).) Altogether, we are faced with evidence that raises questions as to whether Alwardt failed to fulfill his obligation to review investigatory reports, failed to investigate other allegations, exposed students to additional risk by transferring Duvall to a new school, and actually verbally encouraged the use of force. This evidence demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Alwardt knowingly acquiesced in or was deliberately indifferent to the possibility that Duvall would continue his abuse. Plaintiff’s claim against Alwardt thus withstands summary judgment, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. 2. Defendant Yvonne Caamal Canul Plaintiff next argues that Defendant Caamal Canul, the District’s Superintendent, demonstrated deliberate indifference to Duvall’s abuse by not ensuring that allegations against Duvall were investigated and addressed and by not following up on complaints she received about him. Plaintiff has also presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on her claim that Caamal Canul bore supervisory liability for Duvall’s abuse of C.G. Like Alwardt, Caamal Canul possessed information showing that Duvall had a strong likelihood of abusing other students before October 7, 2014. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record suggests that Caamal Canul had been informed of at least the following allegations against Duvall: Ellenwood’s April 2012 complaint, including allegations that Duvall had pressed on a student’s face to quiet him or her and pushed another into a wall, in addition to general allegations of Duvall being physically rough with students; Ellenwood’s subsequent complaints about the District’s failure to investigate of her abuse reports; Mid-Michigan Guardianship Services’ letter requesting that a student not be placed in Duvall’s classroom; and CMH’s October 2012 complaints, which themselves referenced the October 4 incident in which Duvall choked a student and other instances in which Duvall dunked a student’s head under water and students returned home bruised. In her deposition, Caamal Canul agreed that she received multiple complaints against Duvall within the first few months of being superintendent and that the behavior Duvall allegedly engaged in could prompt termination. Thus, Caamal No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 26 Canul was presented with several specific reports of abuse over a short period of time close to the C.G. incident. Caamal Canul did not express that she disbelieved any of these reports, found them unsubstantiated, or altogether dismissed them. Especially given the short period of time that Caamal Canul had been in the district at that point, these allegations are not “isolated” and “sporadic,” but appear consistent and widespread. See Howard, 695 F. App’x at 113–14. Moreover, the record suggests that two of the complaints of which Caamal Canul was made aware—those from Ellenwood and CMH—alleged that the District had insufficiently investigated, addressed, and reported prior instances of misconduct, further putting Caamal Canul on notice that the instances reported were not the only possible instances of abuse by Duvall. Thus, to the extent that Caamal Canul was not informed of more incidents of Duvall’s abuse, this was because of her own failure to inquire into whether allegations against him were indeed adequately investigated and reported. Supervisors may not “turn a blind eye [to misconduct] for fear of what they might see” and then claim they were not liable because they did not see. Roseville, 296 F.3d at 440 (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). The fact that Caamal Canul had received reports that complaints against Duvall had not been sufficiently investigated also provided her reason to conclude that additional incidents may have taken place. Plaintiff has further raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether, confronted with this knowledge, Caamal Canul fulfilled her obligations to address it. Caamal Canul acknowledged in her deposition that she had responsibility for ensuring student safety, for ensuring teachers were trained on mandatory reporting requirements and how to prevent child abuse, for establishing and administering a system for reporting employee misconduct, and for generally ensuring the District’s compliance with Michigan law. CMH specifically reported that the District had failed to notify CMH, a student guardian, or protective services about alleged instances of abuse, and that parents’ requests for information about alleged instances of abuse had gone unanswered. Despite this, the record suggests that Caamal Canul did not confirm that the District was indeed notifying the legally required parties of allegations, but simply passed the report to her subordinates to follow up without instruction. She also heard that Ellenwood was dissatisfied with the District’s investigation of her reports. Similarly, the record suggests Caamal Canul did No. 19-1645 Garza v. Lansing Sch. District, et al. Page 27 nothing to confirm that prior investigations were indeed thorough, let alone to confirm that other alleged incidents had been sufficiently investigated. Thus, when Caamal Canul was put on notice, by both Ellenwood and CMH, that the systems she was responsible for were failing, she simply continued to channel reports into those systems by referring the complaints to HR employees and subordinates without follow-up. This raises a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Caamal Canul acquiesced in Duvall’s continued abuse of children. If a defendant knows that her previous action to address alleged violations was inadequate and ineffective, simply repeating those same actions may constitute deliberate indifference. Vance, 231 F.3d at 261. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant Caamal Canul.