Opinion ID: 2782334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Civilian Analogue

Text: The existence of a comparable civilian analogue for Matthews’s speech also supports our conclusion that he spoke as a citizen. Speech has a “relevant civilian analogue” if it is made through “channels available to citizens generally.” Jackler, 658 F.3d at 238. “[A]n indicium that speech by a public employee has a civilian analogue is that the employee’s speech was to an ‘independent state agency’ responsible for entertaining complaints by ‘any citizen in a democratic society regardless of his status as a public employee.’” Id. at 241 (quoting Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 204). In Jackler, we held that a police officer’s refusal to retract a truthful report to the police had a civilian analogue because a non‐ employee citizen may also refuse to retract a truthful police report. 658 F.3d at 241. In Weintraub, on the other hand, we found the teacher’s speech unprotected in part because “lodging of a union grievance is not a form or channel of discourse available to non‐ employee citizens, as would be a letter to the editor or a complaint to an elected representative or inspector general.” 593 F.3d at 204. 22 Unlike the teacher in Weintraub, Matthews did not follow internal grievance procedures, but rather went directly to the Precinct commanders, with whom he did not have regular interactions and who had an open door to community comments and complaints. Matthews chose a path that was available to ordinary citizens who are regularly provided the opportunity to raise issues with the Precinct commanders. Captain Bloch stated that he attended nearly every monthly Community Council meeting. And Captain Bugge testified that one to three times per month he met with members of the community to discuss issues in the Precinct. Matthews reported his concerns about the arrest quota system to the same officers who regularly heard civilian complaints about Precinct policing issues. The district court found an absence of a civilian analogue because Matthews had better access to his commanding officers than would ordinary citizens. The district court noted that Matthews could speak to the officers “more readily, more frequently, and more privately than could an average citizen.” Matthews v. City of New York, 957 F. Supp. 2d. 442, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). We do not consider 23 the relative degree of access to be material; rather what matters is whether the same or a similar channel exists for the ordinary citizen. If courts were to confine their focus to the degree of access, then internal public employee speech on matters of public concern not made as part of regular job duties would be unlikely to receive First Amendment protection because, presumably, employees always have better access to senior supervisors within their place of employment. Here, Matthews pursued the same avenue to complain about a precinct‐wide policy as would a concerned civilian. The channel Matthews chose to address his concerns about the quota system thus reinforces our conclusion that Matthews spoke as a citizen, not as a public employee.