Opinion ID: 3048259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Rohan Gunaratna’s testimony

Text: 19 The government also presented historical background information about conflict zones and key figures in the violent Islamic movement through the testimony of Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, the head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Asia. Dr. Gunaratna testified about the characteristics of the support cells upon which the violent Islamic movement relies. [Doc. 1393, p. 114–184; Doc. 1137; Doc. 1138; Doc. 1139; Doc. 1136, Doc. 1394; Doc. 1157; Doc. 1158.] Dr. Gunaratna had studied the fields of terrorism and political religious violence for about twenty-five years and had been a teaching fellow at the U.S. Military Academy and at the Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy at the Egyptian Center for Counter Terrorism Studies. He testified that the International Center manages one of the largest terrorism databases in the world, and it creates counter-terrorism research centers in conflict zones such as Kabul, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He explained that the International Center works with a number of governments and countries around the world to create environments that hinder terrorist support. Dr. Gunaratna testified that he had a special focus on Islamic organizations from 1993 to 1996, particularly organizations advocating jihad. He authored ten books, one entitled “Inside Al-Qaeda,” and he had been an expert witness in terrorism cases for both the prosecution and the defense. While conducting his 20 research into al-Qaeda, he interviewed members of Islamist radical groups, spoke to academicians, and traveled to countries where radical Islamist violence occurred, such as Pakistan and Iraq. The district court admitted him as an expert in the area of al-Qaeda and its associated groups and in the area of international terrorism. [Doc. 1393, p. 134.] Dr. Gunaratna provided background information on al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, a Saudi who moved to Pakistan and founded al-Qaeda, an organization committed to establishing Islamic states based on Islamic law. Islamic law is historically opposed to the political process and to democratic regimes. [Doc. 1393, p. 135–39.] Abdullah Azzam helped found the predecessor of al-Qaeda, and he was a key ideologue of the jihadist movement. [Id.] Abdullah Azzam consistently campaigned for the creation of Sharia-based Islamic states (states governed by strict imposition of Islamic laws), and had no problem with using force to achieve his political objectives. When he used the word “jihad,” he meant the use of violence. [Id.] Abdullah Azzam and bin Laden created MAK, an organization to recruit and assist fighters coming to Afghanistan. In November 1989, Abdullah Azzam was killed, and bin Laden took control of MAK and created al-Qaeda to work with MAK to support different jihadist groups which 21 were fighting globally. Al-Qaeda had a military training camp on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. [Id. at p. 144–155.] Dr. Gunaratna testified that al-Qaeda established and managed the Advice and Reformation Committee to distribute propaganda. This committee had an office in the United Kingdom, and Khalid al-Fawwaz served as the leader. Dr. Gunaratna acknowledged that Jayyousi received a fax from this committee, informing Jayyousi that al-Fawwaz had been appointed as bin Laden’s representative to operate in that region. He acknowledged that this publication, which Jayyousi received via fax, was sent to a specific group of people. [Id. at 158– 63.] He stated that al-Qaeda had relationships with other radical Islamist groups outside of Afghanistan, and it provided support for these like-minded groups. [Id. at 169–70.] Dr. Gunaratna also provided information regarding the support cells that provide assistance to terrorist and militant organizations. He stated that the support cells provide funds, transportation, safe houses, communications, training, and recruitment. He explained that these cells operate through “front” organizations, such as community, religious, humanitarian, and educational charities. [Id. at 173–80.] He also testified that in his research, he learned that members of these support cells and groups use code words and double talk in their 22 communications by substituting key words likely to draw suspicion with more common verbiage. [Id. at 181.] In reviewing the telephone intercepts in this case, Dr. Gunaratna opined that the defendants used code words in some of their communications. When they used the word “tourism,” that meant armed jihad; the word “football and/or soccer” meant fighting or combat; the phrase “to be married” referred to going to paradise or martyrdom; the phrase “first area” meant Pakistan or Afghanistan; the word “screws” meant bullets; the word “eggplant” meant a rocket propelled grenade launcher; and other words denoting fruits and vegetables were used as codes for arms. [Doc. 1137, p. 11–15.] He noted that many of these words were in other transcripts that he reviewed between radical Islamist groups and their supporters. [Id. at 12.] His interpretation of the code words’ meanings was similar to Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony, except that Dr. Gunaratna opined that when the defendants used the word jihad, they meant the violent or armed jihad, whereas the agent did not specify if the word jihad meant violent or peaceful jihad. Dr. Gunaratna testified that during a phone call, Hassoun referenced bin Laden by his nickname, “Abu Abdallah,” which was known only by his supporters. [Id. at 27.] In a later call, Jayyousi mentioned bin Laden’s mentor, Sheikh Salman, and mentioned a CNN interview with bin Laden that showed the 23 radical Islamic violence in Somalia during that time period. Both Hassoun and Jayyousi discussed a statement or “fatwa” (a religious opinion usually issued by established religious leaders but also issued by radical leaders) that threatened America. Dr. Gunaratna opined that this fatwa the defendants discussed was “very likely” the same fatwa issued by bin Laden in August 1996. [Id. at 52–53.] In that same call, Jayyousi mentioned Armed Islamic Group, which was one of the most violent groups and wanted to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. [Id. at 58.] In commenting on a statement by Hassoun that MAK can deal with “these people” by “the sword,” Dr. Gunaratna testified that “these people” meant the people in the White House, and by “the sword” was a term commonly used by the MAK leader and radical Islamists. [Id. at 72.] The government presented other calls in which the defendants discussed the Chechen conflict. Dr. Gunaratna explained that the Chechens were Muslims who lived in Russia and were attempting to separate from Russia. [Id. at 94–132.] At some point, the Arab mujahideen assisted the Chechen separatists, and Ibham Omar al Khattab—together with bin Laden and Fat’hi Shishani, leader of the International Islamic Brigade—fought with the Afghans against the Soviets. Shishani’s group was violent and wanted to create Islamic states wherever Muslims lived; this group was an extension of al-Qaeda. [Id. at 104–06.] Dr. 24 Gunaratna testified that the foreign mujahideen fighters in Chechnya engaged in a lot of violence; killings, suicide attacks, and martyrdom were common. [Id. at 108.] He stated that al-Qaeda provided financial support directly to the fighters in the Chechen conflict. [Id. at 117.] Dr. Gunaratna also commented on calls between some of the defendants in which they discussed the success of the Chechen conflict, evidenced by the fact that the Russian flag was no longer flying over the Chechen capital of Grozny. They also discussed the provision of funds to the Chechen separatists. [Id. at 111–22.] Dr. Gunaratna described the conflict in the Muslim area of Kosovo, Yugoslavia that occurred in the 1990s. [Id. at 143.] Foreign mujahideen assisted in this conflict, later establishing a presence in bordering Albania. Al-Qaeda provided financial and other support to these fighters in Kosovo. The Kosovar people opposed these fighters because the people perceived them as too violent. Dr. Gunaratna commented on a call in which Youssef informed Hassoun that he was in Albania, which was the launching pad for the Arab mujahideen to enter Kosovo. [Id. at 149.] Dr. Gunaratna testified that al-Qaeda’s most significant number of training camps was in Afghanistan, and their purpose was to train people to participate in violence. [Doc. 1139, p. 7.] “Al-Qaeda’s premier facility for providing training in 25 the 1990's was the al-Frooq camp” near Kandahar. [Id. at 10.] He commented on the secrecy of the training camps and the necessity of having an individual recommend you for training, especially for American Muslims. He stated that alQaeda kept records on the people who attended the training camps, and the attendees had to complete a mujahideen application form. He noted that a number of these forms were discovered from various Arab safe houses and training camps. [Id. at 19–30.] He testified that a new recruit could not provide his real name on the identification form. [Id. at 31.] The government questioned Dr. Gunaratna regarding other intercepted calls he reviewed. In one call, Hassoun identified himself with the Abu Muhjin group, and he discussed al-Ittihad al-Islami. Dr. Gunaratna stated that both of these groups are radical Islamic groups. [Doc. 1158, p. 145.] He also commented on several calls involving Jayyousi. In one call, Jayyousi referred to funds for preparations and referred to the “first area”—code for Afghanistan. [Id. at 146–47.] In another call, Jayyousi spoke to the Blind Sheikh and referred to Chechnya, saying that the government was an Islamic government, “but it is full of heresy.” Dr. Gunaratna noted that this statement was consistent with the view of establishing an Islamic state in Chechnya. [Id. at 168.] Jayyousi also referred to bin Laden in another call and discussed a fundraiser to collect money to send to 26 Afghanistan. Jayyousi clarified that the brother of whom he spoke was Arab, not Afghani, which Dr. Gunaratna testified was an important distinction because the terrorist groups wanted to support primarily the Arab mujahideen. [Id. at 177–79.] On cross-examination, defendants attacked Dr. Gunaratna’s credibility and his qualifications as an expert. [Doc. 1139, p. 71; Doc. 1136; Doc. 1394; Doc. 1157.] They did elicit from Dr. Gunaratna that he had not listed AWR and Save Bosnia Now as cover organizations for jihad terrorist groups; however, he did list the Islamic Group of Egypt as one. [Doc. 1157, p. 96.] He acknowledged that in the intercepted calls he reviewed involving Jayyousi, he discerned no code talk. [Id. at 113.] The government presented several other witnesses in its case-in-chief. A Department of Defense employee testified that he performed a personnel search on Padilla and discovered that Padilla did not serve in the military. [Doc. 1159, p. 21.] FBI Agent Russell Fincher testified that he interviewed Padilla at the Chicago O’Hare airport in 2002. [Id. at 90–101.] Fincher stated that Padilla acknowledged some of his travels, but was evasive regarding his overseas travel. Joyce Kandalaft, a contract linguist with the FBI, identified several documents: two checks from Hassoun to the Canadian Islamic Association, one in the amount of $8,000 for “tourism” and another in the amount of $3,000 for “tourism” and 27 “tourists”; a check from Hassoun to AWR in the amount of $5,000 “for the brothers”; a check from Hassoun to Jayyousi for $600; several checks from Hassoun to Global Relief, one in the amount of $5,000 for “Kosovo,” one in the amount of $600 for “Kosovo support,” one with “Chechen tourism and media” and a Koranic verse on it, and one in the amount of $2,000 for “Afghan Relief.” [Doc. 1160, p. 7, Gov’t Ex. 600H–R.] The government also presented a portion of a CNN videotape of an interview with Osama bin Laden. [Doc. 1137, p. 32.]