Opinion ID: 2634389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of evidence of prior settlement

Text: In 1995, before the lawsuit in this case was brought, Genentech and City of Hope settled a dispute concerning Genentech's settlement of its lawsuit against Eli Lilly for patent infringement. At the trial in this case, the court allowed City of Hope to present evidence of its settlement with Genentech under which Genentech agreed to pay City of Hope royalties on Eli Lilly's sales of products that did not use City of Hope's synthesized DNA. Genentech contends this evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 1152, subdivision (a), as evidence of a prior settlement. Genentech, however, stipulated to admission of this evidence. Therefore it is now barred from raising this claim. Controlling here is the general rule that stipulations pertaining to the admission of evidence, absent an express limitation, apply to a later trial of the same action, unless the trial court allows the stipulation to be withdrawn. ( Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1950) 34 Cal.2d 749, 755, 214 P.2d 809; Harris v. Spinali Auto Sales, Inc. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 447, 453-454, 49 Cal.Rptr. 610.) Before commencement of the first trial in this case, Genentech stipulated to the admission into evidence of its 1995 settlement with City of Hope on the Eli Lilly matter and documents relating to that settlement. Then, after the first trial but before commencement of the second trial in this case, Genentech moved to exclude the evidence at issue. The trial court ruled that all stipulations made at the first trial were binding at the second trial. Because the trial court did not allow Genentech's stipulation to be withdrawn, it is binding here. Misplaced is Genentech's reliance on two Court of Appeal decisions, Brunt v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 179, 183, 35 Cal.Rptr. 492, and Duncan v. Garrett (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 291, 294, 1 Cal.Rptr. 459. Those decisions concern this principle: When a particular legal conclusion follows from a given state of facts, no stipulation of counsel can prevent the court from so declaring it. ( San Francisco Lumber Co. v. Bibb (1903) 139 Cal. 325, 326, 73 P. 864.) The stipulation here pertained not to a legal conclusion but to the admission of evidence.