Opinion ID: 780168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficient Factual Basis for Sentence

Text: 7 Eyman also claims that the District Court failed to make adequate factual findings to support two specific sentencing enhancements that it imposed under the Guidelines. 8 First, Eyman argues that the Court did not make adequate findings to sustain a 13-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(N) (1997) 1 (current version at U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2001)) that the Court imposed for defendant's causing financial loss between $2.5 million and $5 million. The Court held three different sentencing hearings in an attempt to determine the proper method of calculating loss. At those hearings, the government urged that losses resulting from Eyman's criminal activity be calculated under a market loss theory that measured the decline in the market value of the relevant stock as a result of defendant's illegal bribes. The defense argued that the value of the stock should be based on its intrinsic value, as reflected in the assets and liabilities of the company, rather than the market price. 9 At Eyman's final sentencing hearing on March 15, 1999, Judge Baer stated, I have a March 8th letter from the government, putting to rest the last [of my concerns], the intrinsic value argument. Tr. of 3/15/99 at 2. He later stated, [T]he government has made it abundantly clear that [its recommended sentencing enhancement] is a fair and reasonable fraud enhancement, and thus the 13 additional levels are in fact agreed to by the Court. Id. at 25. When asked whether the Court's loss calculation was based on the decline in value in the stock prices set forth in the various submissions by the government, Judge Baer responded affirmatively. Id. at 33. 10 By expressly adopting the position set forth by the government over three sentencing hearings, the Court satisfied its obligation to make factual findings. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Hernandez, 94 F.3d 582, 584-85 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that findings were sufficient where the district court's comments established that it had adopted the government's position with respect to a guidelines issue); United States v. Thomas, 969 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Peters, 962 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir.1992) (same). Furthermore, the Court noted at sentencing that, although it had tried mightily, it could not come up with a number, even under the defendant's intrinsic-value theory, that was less than the $2.5 million threshold. Tr. of 3/15/99 at 33. Thus, regardless of what valuation method the court used, a 13-point sentencing enhancement would have been required. 11 Eyman also claims that the Court did not make adequate factual findings to support the imposition of a four-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which provides for an enhancement where a defendant is the organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). In order to apply that enhancement, a sentencing court must make two specific factual findings: (i) that the defendant was `an organizer or leader,' and (ii) that the criminal activity either `involved five or more participants' or `was otherwise extensive.' United States v. Patasnik, 89 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted). In this case, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared by the United States Probation Office included a finding that Eyman was the leader of a fraudulent scheme and that more than five participants were involved. In its written judgment, the Court explicitly adopt[ed] the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report, with the exception of the separate abuse-of-trust enhancement. A district court satisfies its obligation to make the requisite factual findings when it indicates in its written judgment that it is adopting the findings set forth in the PSR. See United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 107 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Escotto, 121 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 228-29 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Prince, 110 F.3d 921, 924 (2d Cir.1997). 12 Because the District Court made the necessary factual findings with respect to both the 13-point sentencing enhancement for causing economic loss of between $2.5 and $5 million and the four-point enhancement for having exercised a leadership role in criminal activity, it did not err in the imposition of Eyman's sentence. 13