Opinion ID: 1809857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the ihl and usm may offer first and second year courses on the coast without the approval of the sbcjc?

Text: ¶ 20. IHL further argues that its actions do not violate any Mississippi law. Mississippi Code Ann. § 37-102-3 states: The Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning shall not permit its universities to offer courses for college credit at the lower undergraduate level at an off-campus site unless approved by the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges. The Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, in cooperation with the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges, shall study the need and advisability of offering (a) courses for college credit at the lower undergraduate level, and (b) advanced centers for technology partnerships for industrial training and professional development for credit and noncredit courses, at the following off-campus sites by four-year public state institutions of higher learning: the Mississippi-Gulf Coast counties; Greenville, Mississippi; Columbus, Mississippi; McComb, Mississippi; Hattiesburg, Mississippi; Meridian, Mississippi; Laurel, Mississippi; and any other proposed area of the state. Any such study shall take into account the ongoing programs of the community and junior colleges in the State of Mississippi when said board authorizes offcampus programs created under this chapter. It is the intent of the Legislature to meet the educational needs of students who do not have ready access to the educational opportunities that they desire. It is the further intent of this chapter that university off-campus programs established hereunder will in no way usurp the responsibilities of the public junior colleges of the State of Mississippi. The board shall establish such rules and regulations as it deems necessary and proper to carry out the purposes and intent of this chapter. ¶ 21. IHL notes the mandate of § 37-102-3, but also points out Article 8, § 213-A of the Mississippi Constitution, which empowers IHL with the management and control of Mississippi's eight universities. It argues that these two provisions must be read so the statute does not conflict with the constitutional provision, or in the alternative that the statute is unconstitutional. ¶ 22. As stated, Article 8, § 213-A of the Mississippi Constitution gives the management and control of this State's eight universities to the IHL. [3] Mississippi Code Annotated § 37-102-3 sets up the SBCJC as an authorizing body over the IHL whenever the IHL may decide to set up off-campus programs offering freshman and sophomore courses. The question we consider today is whether the actions of the IHL in planning to offer such courses at USM-GP are in violation of the law. This question turns on the reading of these two provisions. ¶ 23. The general principle followed when considering a possible conflict between the constitution and a statute is that the constitutional provision prevails. See Saxon v. Harvey, 223 So.2d 620, 624 (Miss.1969) (The wisdom of the drafters of our Constitution is not subject to question by this Court, and is to be modified or altered by amendment only.) It must be noted that the constitutional provision prevails if there is an irreconcilable conflict, otherwise a certain deference is afforded statutes. Attorney General v. Interest of B.C.M., 744 So.2d 299, 301 (Miss.1999). We can not assume that the Legislature intended to violate the Constitution by passing § 37-102-3. On the contrary, the presumption is that that body intended to comply with the organic law, and the statute should be given a reasonable interpretation which is consistent with that presumed intent and which would permit the upholding of the act. Berry v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n, 222 Miss. 260, 76 So.2d 212, 214 (1954) (quoting Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. Covington County, 221 Miss. 613, 71 So.2d 184, 189 (1954)). `When one construction of a statute would endanger its constitutionality, it will be construed in harmony with the Constitution if, under the language of the statute, this may reasonably be done.' Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1251 (Miss.1976)(verdict form discussed within superseded by statute) (quoting State v. County Sch. Bd., 181 Miss. 818, 181 So. 313 (1938)). As this Court recently summarized: Deference must be given to statutes and the presumption of constitutionality that must accompany them. See State v. Jones, 726 So.2d 572, 573 (Miss.1998). To be successfully challenged, the legislation must be shown to be in palpable conflict with some plain provision of the constitution. State v. Mississippi Ass'n of Supervisors, Inc., 699 So.2d at 1223 (citing In the Interest of T.L.C., 566 So.2d 691, 696 (Miss.1990)). Any legitimate interpretation that creates a reasonable doubt of unconstitutionality may prevent the court from striking the statute. See id. (quoting Wells v. Panola County Bd. of Educ., 645 So.2d 883, 888 (Miss.1994)). Interest of B.C.M., 744 So.2d at 301. It is under this deferential standard that we examine § 37-102-3. ¶ 24. The situation created by § 37-102-3 is to set up the SBCJC as the decision maker when it comes to determining what courses the IHL may select as part of a university off-campus location's curriculum. In Gully v. Lincoln County, 184 Miss. 784, 185 So. 795 (1939), this Court considered a trial court's dismissal of a state tax collector's action to collect commissions. While not particularly on point with this situation, the Court did review a point that is applicable to the case at bar. This discussion considered whether the state tax collector could collect such commission when the sheriff, the county tax collector, had collected the taxes. The Court initially stated that prior decisions had found an implied requirement in Section 135, Constitution 1890, that ad valorem state and county taxes shall be collected by the sheriff. Id. at 796, 185 So. 795. The Court reasoned that [s]ince this primary duty is one implied in the Constitution itself, no statute can make it a primary duty of some other officer. Id. The Court further stated: For if any such intervention were previously allowed, the duty of the sheriff as a primary constitutional duty would be subverted into one which is inferior or subordinate to that of the intervening statutory officer. It would be, indeed, to permit a statutory officer to exercise a superior authority of censorship over a constitutional officer in respect to the constitutional duties of the latter, and in a measure to displace him if, in the judgment of the statutory officer, the constitutional officer was not proceeding with the discharge of his duties as diligently as the statutory officer deemed proper or requisite. Id. ¶ 25. The same situation exists in the case at bar. Section 37-102-3, in effect, gives a statutorily created entity, the SBCJC, dominion over a constitutionally created body, the IHL. While we recognize that the legislature possesses the power to take away by statute what has been given by statute, the same can not be said for that created by the Constitution. To allow this would be an affront to our Constitution. ¶ 26. Section 37-102-3, as it reads, infringes on the constitutionally vested managerial powers of the Board of Trustees and is therefore unconstitutional. It effectively places the Board of Trustees in a subordinate position to the SBCJC in the management and control of the universities under its care. According to the statute, the SBCJC, and not the Board of Trustees, ultimately determines if a state college or university can offer lower level undergraduate courses at an off-campus site. Thus, statute removes a constitutionally authorized managerial power belonging to the Board of Trustees and gives it to the SBCJC. The resulting conflict between the powers of the Board of Trustees and the SBCJC is irreconcilable. As a result, the statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. ¶ 27. The SBCJC cannot be set up as a body with veto power over the IHL's constitutionally-mandated power to manage and control the State's universities. As this is the effect of § 37-102-3, we find it to be unconstitutional under Article 8, § 213-A of the Mississippi Constitution.