Opinion ID: 870353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Coupe's Challenge to the Valuation of the Property in Condemnation 2

Text: As to Coupe's third argument, Coupe posits that the valuation of the property taken in Condemnation 2 did not account for the increase in appreciation during the time between Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2. According to Coupe, the court erred in concluding that the County's appraiser determined that the value of the land did not appreciate between Condemnation 1 and Condemnation 2 when in fact the appraiser testified that the land appreciated by 239% in that time. Thus, Coupe maintains that the property should be valued at $387,669.54 rather than $162,204.83. In response, the County asserts, first, that Coupe's contention is untimely because it reargued the issue of just compensation after the trial on this issue was completed and it was not one of the issues remanded back to the [court.] Second, the County argues that the just compensation amount for the property was appropriate because [t]here is nothing improper of [sic] this [c]ourt finally deciding on a value of $140,500 (which is between the ranges testified to by [experts] Medusky and Bloom [at trial]). In reply to the County, Coupe argues that valuation of the property was sufficiently preserved ... by raising as error the pretextual nature of the taking in Condemnation 2 because Coupe prevailed on the pretext issue in Coupe I, and jurisdiction was once again vested in the trial court for further consideration; even if the valuation issue was not raised in the prior appeal, this court vacated the trial court's entire previous judgment in Condemnation 2 and [a]s a result, ... the parties were returned to their respective prejudgment positions; all that was required of [Coupe] was that [it] preserve the issue by objecting below, which [it] did; and this court may  sua sponte notice and consider points of plain error where substantial rights may be affected, even if not properly raised on appeal or preserved below.
The record is clear that the court determined just compensation for the property in Condemnation 2 prior to the first appeal to this court in Coupe I. The court's First Amended FOFCOL and Order included the following relevant findings: 121. The [c]ourt finds that the fair market value of the Property in [Condemnation 1] is $140,500. 122. For [Condemnation 1], based on the fair market value of the land sought to be taken, the blight damage percentage is set at 10% per annum, and damages computed from October 9, 2000 to January 28, 2005. The [c]ourt finds that four years, three months, and nineteen days have elapsed between the two dates. With the percentage set at 10% per annum, and with the fair market value of the Property in [Condemnation 1] at $140,500, blight damages are $60,443.87. 123. The [c]ourt finds that the fair market value of the Property in [Condemnation 2] is $162,204.83. 124. For [Condemnation 2], based on the fair market value of the land sought to be taken, the blight damage percentage is set at 10% per annum, and computed from January 28, 2005 until date paid. .... 126. Just compensation for [Condemnation 2] shall be as follows: $162,204.83 (fair market value) plus 10% (blight damages) per annum until paid. (Emphases added.) On September 27, 2007, the court entered its First Amended Final Judgment, stating in part, Just compensation for the condemnation of the [p]roperty in [Condemnation 2] is $162,204.83. Additionally, [b]light of [s]ummons damage from January 28, 2005 to the time of payment shall be 10% per annum. On February 8, 2008, Coupe filed its first notice of appeal, and on July 9, 2008, this court accepted transfer from the ICA in Coupe I. Coupe had the opportunity to challenge the evidentiary valuation of the property in its first appeal to this court, but did not do so. Therefore, Coupe's just compensation challenge is untimely.
Coupe argues that it preserved the valuation issue when it raised the pretext defense in Coupe I. However, a pretext defense is distinct from a just compensation challenge. A challenge to just compensation assumes a valid taking but challenges the valuation amount for the property. [21] On the other hand, the pretext defense asserts that a private person's constitutional right was violated because his or her property was not taken for a public purpose, but as pretext for a primarily private benefit. Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 384, 198 P.3d at 647 (recognizing that a [c]ity would no doubt be forbidden... to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-78, 125 S.Ct. 2655)) (citations omitted). A taking for a private benefit violates the public use requirement under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 20 of the Hawai'i Constitution, irrespective of whether just compensation was paid for the property. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477, 125 S.Ct. 2655 ([I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.). Hence, a determination that an alleged public purpose was a pretext will constitute an unlawful taking, even though the landowner is justly compensated for the property. Inasmuch as the issue of just compensation is not relevant to the determination of a pretext defense, Coupe's pretext defense did not preserve[] Coupe's just compensation challenge of the property in Condemnation 2.
Additionally, Coupe argues that it could challenge the just compensation amount because Coupe I returned the parties to their respective prejudgment positions. This argument is also unavailing. In Coupe I, this court remanded both condemnation proceedings for the court to make two determinations: (1) a decision on [Coupe's] motion for statutory damages, Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 389, 198 P.3d at 652, and (2) a decision on whether the asserted public purpose was pretextual[,] id. at 390, 198 P.3d at 653. As discussed above, a pretextual defense does not implicate a just condemnation challenge. Similarly, the motion for statutory damages under HRS § 101-27 in this case does not implicate the valuation of the property. Thus, this court did not remand on any issue concerning just compensation. The just compensation value of the property taken in Condemnation 2, then, was not open to litigation on remand. See Standard Mgmt. Inc. v. Kekona, 99 Hawai'i 125, 137, 53 P.3d 264, 276 (App.2001) ([R]emand for a specific act does not reopen the entire case; the lower tribunal only has the authority to carry out the appellate court's mandate.) (Citation omitted.)
Finally, Coupe contends that this court should sua sponte address the just compensation issue based on plain error. The three factors necessary for this court to take plain error review in a civil case are [(1)] whether the consideration of the issue requires additional facts, [(2)] whether the resolution of the question will affect the integrity of the findings of fact of the trial court[,] and [(3)] whether the question is of great public import. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9, 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973) (citations omitted). [22] In the instant case, Coupe's challenge to just compensation does not meet the third factor. Whether the court correctly valued the property in Condemnation 2 is not of general public importance. The just compensation value of the property applies exclusively to the specific parcel of Coupe's property being taken in Condemnation 2 and, thus, is solely a matter of private interest. Inasmuch as the third factor is not present here, plain error cannot be noticed.