Opinion ID: 3011219
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under Christensen v. Harris County, informal

Text: agency interpretations are not binding, but are entitled to respect to the extent they ar e persuasive. We have made clear that agency interpr etive guidelines do not rise to the level of a regulation and do not have the effect of law. Brooks v. V illage of Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court recently clarified the distinction between the level of deference to be accorded formal agency regulations and informal agency interpretations. In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655 (2000), the Court explained that informal agency interpretations in opinion letters and similar documents are not entitled to Chevron deference.12 _________________________________________________________________ 12. As noted, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), held courts must defer to an agency's regulation interpreting an ambiguous statute, if the statute is one the agency is charged to administer. 16 Instead, they are entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), but only to the extent they have the power to persuade.13 Christensen, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. at 1663. To grant Chevron deference to informal agency interpretations would unduly validate the results of an informal process. The Supreme Court's clarification in Christensen requires us to revisit our previously applied parameters of deference. See, e.g., United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1999) (following Cleary; court must defer to agency's statutory interpretation that find support in informal agency practice); Br ooks v. Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d at 135 (agency's interpr etive bulletins do not have the effect of law; level of defer ence due is governed by bulletin's persuasiveness); Cleary, 167 F .3d at 808 (agency's informal interpretation is accorded deference if agency is charged to interpret the statute, if the interpretation is consistent with agency's other pronouncements, and if the interpretation furthers the statute's purposes). Christensen now confirms that informal agency interpretations are entitled to r espect based only on their persuasiveness. So that the District Court may apply this standard, we will remand this case for a determination of the power to persuade of S 778.215(a)(5) and the extent to which it is entitled to respect in interpreting FLSA S 207(e)(4). As to the persuasiveness of agency interpretive guidelines, we note our continued reliance on the framework laid out in Skidmore v. Swift , 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See, e.g., Cleary, 167 F .3d at 809. The Skidmore Court explained: [R]ulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not contr olling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly r esort for _________________________________________________________________ 13. As the Supreme Court noted, defer ence to agency interpretation is appropriate for an agency's interpretation of its own regulation where the regulation itself is ambiguous. Christensen , 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. at 1663. That is not the case here. 17 guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 774 reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to contr ol. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. In applying the Skidmore test, the Supreme Court has noted that agency interpr etations issued contemporaneous with a statute are entitled to greater deference. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463 n.12 (1989) (one r eason deference was not due an agency interpr etation was the passage of time between enactment of the statute and promulgation of the regulation in question); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (EEOC guideline did not fare well under Swift standards in part because it was not a contemporaneous interpretation). An agency interpretation's persuasiveness also is derived in part from the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. To be persuasive, an agency interpretation cannot run contrary to Congress's intent as reflected in a statute's plain language and purpose. See Cleary, 167 F.3d at 808.