Opinion ID: 4200908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: birth mother’s invalid consent deprived the

Text: DISTRICT COURT OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION ¶ 19 Although neither party originally raised the issue, we have an independent obligation to address the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Nevares v. Adoptive Couple, 2016 UT 39, ¶ 23, 384 P.3d 213 (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is an issue that can and should be addressed sua sponte when jurisdiction is questionable.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); People ex rel. J.G.C., 318 P.3d 576, 578 (Colo. App. 2013) (after requesting supplemental briefing on “the district court’s jurisdiction to determine the nonpaternity of [the] presumptive father,” concluding that “the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a paternity determination”); see also In re Adoption of L.D.S., 155 P.3d 1, 8 (Okla. 2006), as supplemented on reh’g, No. 250 (Mar. 6, 2007). I would hold that invalid consent in adoption proceedings is a subject matter jurisdictional issue. 9 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part A. Valid Consent Is a Jurisdictional Prerequisite to an Adoption ¶ 20 Without valid parental consent to an adoption, there is no justiciable matter and therefore nothing for the district court to exercise jurisdiction over.6 This is because the subject of an adoption proceeding is a child and a court cannot proceed with the adoption unless the child has been validly placed within its purview. And absent consent, that placement has not happened, leaving a court without authorization to interfere with the fundamental right that is the parent-child relationship. In re Adoption of Strauser, 196 P.2d 862, 867 (Wyo. 1948) (“The first duty of the judge is to see that the necessary consents are given. If they are not, the proceeding is at an end. There is nothing for the judge to approve.”); cf. Atwood v. Cox, 55 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah 1936) (“Jurisdiction is the power to decide a justiciable controversy . . . .” (citation omitted)). ¶ 21 The principle that invalid consent deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction in adoption proceedings has been a part of Utah law for more than six decades. In Deveraux’ Adoption v. Brown, two children were placed in foster care but their mother’s parental rights were never permanently terminated. 268 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah 1954). When the children were placed for adoption, the mother objected that her consent was never validly given. Id. at 996. We held that it was unnecessary to even look at other issues in the adoption proceeding because “the court never obtained jurisdiction to exercise the power to grant the adoptions and therefore any questions pertaining to the welfare or custody of the children [were] not before it in such a proceeding.” Id. at 998. We therefore remanded, instructing the district 6 There are exceptions to the requirement of parental consent where, for example, abuse, neglect, or other “parental unfitness” is at issue. See Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 202–03 (Utah 1984), abrogated on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, 358 P.3d 1009 (“Constitutionally protected parental rights can be . . . [voluntarily] surrendered pursuant to statute. . . . Parental rights can also be terminated through parental unfitness or substantial neglect.”); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982) (“[A]ll unwed mothers are entitled to a showing of unfitness before being involuntarily deprived of their parental rights.”). Neither party argues that those exceptions apply in this case, so I focus only on the lack of consent. 10 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part court to set aside as void the orders granting the adoptions. Id. In doing so, we did not consider consent, as the majority on this point urges, to be “just one of many statutory prerequisites to the issuance of a valid adoption decree.” Infra ¶ 124. Rather, we meant what we said: because of the mother’s lack of consent, the district court “never obtained jurisdiction.” Deveraux’ Adoption, 268 P.2d at 998 (emphasis added); see also In re Adoption of Walton, 259 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1953) (“So jealously guarded is the parent-child relation[ship] that uniformly it is held that the abandonment or desertion firmly must be established [as a statutory exception to obtaining parental consent] . . . before any question as to the best interests or welfare of the child can be the subject of inquiry.”). ¶ 22 The majority argues that Deveraux’ Adoption has been implicitly overruled by our cases that adopt a jurisdictional clear statement rule, according to which we construe a statute as jurisdictional only if it is “clearly denominated as such.” See infra ¶ 143. This is wrong. It is true that Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center outlines a presumption “that our district courts retain their grant of constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of a clearly expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction.” 2004 UT 15, ¶ 8, 89 P.3d 113. But this presumption does not require the statutory provision to explicitly state that it is jurisdictional. Instead, a statute clearly expresses the “intention to limit jurisdiction” when the statute imposes a prerequisite to an action that is “of the essence of the thing to be done,” and not “given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of . . . business, and by the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to those whose rights are protected by the statute.” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, ¶¶ 14, 19, 245 P.3d 184 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).7 In contrast, 7 We have also consistently regarded our appellate deadlines as jurisdictional, even though our rules of appellate procedure do not explicitly contain a jurisdictional statement. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2000 UT 40, ¶ 25, 999 P.2d 17 (“UPRR’s petitions for judicial review in both this court and the district court were filed late, thus depriving both courts of jurisdiction.”); Johnson v. Office of Prof’l Conduct, 2017 UT 7, ¶ 10, 391 P.3d 208 (holding that “we lack jurisdiction to hear the merits of [the] appeal” where appellant’s petition was outside of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure’s thirty- (cont.) 11 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part statutory provisions are “merely directory in nature rather than mandatory and jurisdictional” when disregarding them does not “compromise the purpose” of the statute but is simply a failure to adhere to “one of numerous procedural hurdles.” Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 19, 162 P.3d 1099 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 23 The statutory requirement of consent is mandatory and jurisdictional because it goes to the soul of the adoption. See Brown v. Baby Girl Harper, 766 S.E.2d 375, 378 (S.C. 2014) (“Consent lies at the foundation of the adoption process[.]” (citation omitted)); In re Adoption of Keith M.W., 79 P.3d 623, 629 (Alaska 2003) (“Parental consent lies at the foundation of the adoption process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Adoption of Walton, 259 P.2d at 883 (noting that although it is not the law in Utah that adoption statutes “are to be construed strictly in favor of the parent,” courts “have not hesitated to build a strong fortress around the parent-child relation[ship], . . . . [which] has been considered a bundle of human rights of such fundamental importance as to lead courts frequently to say that consent is at the foundation of adoption statutes”). In fact, although some states have based their jurisdictional holdings on statutory filing requirements that differ from Utah’s, see infra ¶ 136 & n.21, none of those statutes contains a clear statement that the required filings relate to subject matter jurisdiction—but the courts still widely recognize consent as a jurisdictional requirement. day deadline). And these deadlines are properly characterized as subject matter jurisdictional. See, e.g., Flannigan v. Jordan, 871 So. 2d 767, 770 (Ala. 2003) (untimely appeal deprives court of “subject-matter jurisdiction to review the case”); Ark. State Univ. v. Prof’l Credit Mgmt., Inc., 299 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Ark. 2009) (“The appeal from district court to circuit court was . . . untimely, and the circuit court was without jurisdiction to accept the appeal. We are likewise without jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and we therefore dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”); Holley v. Davey, No. CV115015458S, 2012 WL 1510966, at  (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2012); In re Marriage of Welp, 596 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 1999); Gore v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 132 S.W.3d 369, 378–79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Turbeville v. Dailey, No. 03-11-00679-CV, 2011 WL 6351850, at  (Tex. App. Dec. 14, 2011). 12 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part ¶ 24 In addition to the “clear statement” rule, Utah law also applies a “class of cases” rule, in which “the concept of subject matter jurisdiction [is limited] to those cases in which the court lacks authority to hear a class of cases, rather than when it simply lacks authority to grant relief in an individual case.” In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 31, 266 P.3d 702. The prospective adoptive parents argue that this limitation means that whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case cannot turn on any case-specific procedural facts. Instead, they argue that it is a limited inquiry into whether the case, considered in the abstract, is fairly characterized as a general type of case over which the court has jurisdiction. ¶ 25 But the “class of cases” paradigm begs the question, as defining the class of cases over which courts have subject matter jurisdiction is not as simple as looking at the general topic. By this logic, courts, by way of example, would have jurisdiction over anything with the rough shape and form of a “tort case” or “landlord-tenant case.” The prospective adoptive parents’ approach creates an unworkable standard—it is often impossible to determine whether a case falls within a “class of cases” without considering some concrete aspects about it. There are often prerequisites individual litigants must meet to show that they have satisfied the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction even when we unquestionably have subject matter jurisdiction over the topic. Consider the tort and landlord-tenant case categories noted above. District courts have jurisdiction over negligence cases, a species of tort, but parties must still comply with the Governmental Immunity Act’s notice requirements, because “[c]ompliance with the Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities.” Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ¶ 9, 40 P.3d 632; see also Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 35, 99 P.3d 842 (“Compliance with the notice requirements, where applicable, is a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction.”). Similarly, although district courts certainly have jurisdiction over landlord-tenant cases in general, we have held that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where one party failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Hous. Auth. of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ¶ 11, 44 P.3d 724. This logic applies with equal force to other statutory claims. Ramsay v. Kane Cty. Human Res. Special Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 5, ¶ 17, 322 P.3d 1163 (failure to 13 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part exhaust administrative remedies deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Retirement Act claims).8 ¶ 26 As the above cases demonstrate, an overly generalized take on the “category of cases” ignores the fact that courts cannot decide cases when they lack the authority necessary to do so, as is the case here. Furthermore, neither In re Adoption of Baby E.Z. nor its predecessor case, Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 234 P.3d 1100, purported to overrule Deveraux’ Adoption’s holding that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an adoption where valid consent has not been obtained. The standard put forth by the prospective adoptive parents, however, would essentially have us overrule Deveraux’ Adoption—but they have not briefed this argument and, in any case, I see no reason to do so. ¶ 27 The rationale behind the jurisdictional necessity of parental consent in adoption proceedings is based not, as the majority asserts, in “the availability of a particular form of judicial relief,” infra ¶ 130, but in justiciability, because, in the eyes of the law, no child has been made available for adoption. Put another way, the lack of parental consent to an adoption makes the case unripe. See Mendive v. Third Judicial Dist. Court in & for Lander Cty., 253 P.2d 884, 890 (Nev. 1953) (stating that before district court accepts guardian’s consent, “it would definitely appear that the further jurisdiction of the . . . district court over the . . . adoption proceeding would be futile and unavailing; that its present provisional jurisdiction could never ripen into a jurisdiction to make a final order permitting the adoption, dependent as such order would be upon the consent of the guardian”); In re St. Vincent’s Servs., Inc., 841 N.Y.S.2d 834, 844 (Fam. Ct. 2007) (holding that “the issue of adoption ripens into a justiciable issue” only after parents’ rights have been validly terminated); In re Adoption of G.V., No. 11AP-617, 2011 WL 4921672, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011) (stating that adoption 8 The majority is correct that Governmental Immunity Act cases and administrative exhaustion cases involve ripeness, which “fits comfortably within the traditional notion of justiciability.” Infra ¶ 145. I agree that ripeness is an appropriate jurisdictional issue, and it applies directly to this case because until parental consent is obtained, the adoption case is unripe. See infra ¶ 27. 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part petition had been dismissed as unripe where father’s consent was not obtained). ¶ 28 Furthermore, by stating that there is no child available for adoption, I do not mean, as the majority suggests, that the Child is not “a real child with a real interest in these proceedings.” Infra ¶ 152. The delicate and difficult nature of undoing error in an adoption proceeding is not lost on anyone. But the existence of a real child before the court does not mean the adoption case is ripe any more than the existence of a real tort before the court necessarily means that a case under the Governmental Immunity Act is ripe. Both require a prerequisite before the court is authorized to hear the case. In the adoption context, that prerequisite is parental consent, a traditional limit on justiciability. See infra ¶ 30 n.10. In short, district courts have no authority to place a child for adoption without the consent of the biological parents, and the prospective adoptive parents’ reliance on the district court’s error does not change the state of our law. ¶ 29 In the majority’s view, this application of justiciability principles will lead to a number of outcomes that will chip away at our longstanding law of jurisdiction. The majority’s concerns have no basis. Consent as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adoption is well established in this country, and none of the evils the majority predicts have befallen the courts that have recognized as much. See infra ¶ 130 & n.14 (listing cases in which courts around the country have been successful in “rebuff[ing] attempts by litigants to recast merits arguments as issues of subject-matter jurisdiction”). To the contrary, courts have easily made distinctions between the jurisdictional implications of consent and general statutory requirements. See, e.g., In re Bullock, 146 S.W.3d 783, 788 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that despite the fact that a valid termination order is a jurisdictional prerequisite, “not all statutory prerequisites to filing suit are jurisdictional”); In re Harshey, 318 N.E.2d 544, 548–49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (holding that despite statutory language requiring both parental and agency consent for child’s adoption, lack of parental consent deprives a court of jurisdiction but lack of agency consent does not). Despite its language about “opening the door” and “sow[ing] the seeds,” infra ¶ 122, the majority points to no situation in which a party would be able to use my opinion to ask a court to improperly expand subject matter jurisdiction to any statutory requirement. The majority may fear that litigants will attempt to stretch precedent to win cases—as often happens, in any matter—but it has offered no explanation for why it thinks Utah courts, unlike all the 15 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part other courts that have not been persuaded by those efforts, will be lured into inappropriately extending our subject matter jurisdiction law. The majority raises several hyperbolic “slippery slope” arguments—e.g., warning of “chaos and unpredictability for years to come,” infra ¶ 100, and that “[a]ny and all ‘case-specific procedural facts’ would be eligible for classification as subject-matter jurisdictional,” making the possibilities “endless” for courts to misinterpret our holding, infra ¶ 150. In doing so, rather than taking on the actual parameters of our opinion, the majority “tilts at a windmill of its own invention.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 385 n.15 (2002). In the majority’s view, the principles of ripeness and the case law of our court and the majority of other jurisdictions “rest[] on no settled legal principle,” dooming our lower courts to hopeless confusion. Infra ¶ 150 n.28. But I have faith in our lower courts’ ability to apply justiciability principles and our precedent, thereby preventing a situation in which “whenever . . . a defect [in a statutory prerequisite] was found, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the adoption court would be in jeopardy.” Infra ¶ 149. Because I unambiguously limit my opinion to the jurisdictional implications of parental consent in adoption proceedings, I am confident that we can avoid a Pandora’s box of subject matter jurisdictional evils.9 9 The majority also laments that recognizing the subject matter jurisdictional nature of consent in an adoption proceeding will mean that district courts will be forced to carefully review adoption proceedings to ensure that they are error-free. Infra ¶ 149. I cannot conceive of how this is a problem. We have encouraged, and continue to encourage, district courts to tread carefully “in this highly sensitive area of child adoption.” In re Adoption of W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Utah 1991). This is particularly important in the ICWA context, where state courts’ being too quick to remove Indian children from their families “is precisely one of the evils at which the ICWA was aimed.” In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)–(5) (“Congress finds . . . that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in nonIndian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and . . . that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child (cont.) 16 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part ¶ 30 And as noted above, our holding in Deveraux’ Adoption that invalid consent deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the great majority of states’ views on the issue; the majority’s assertion that consent is “a mere legal prerequisite to the issuance of an [adoption] order,” infra ¶ 121, flies in the face of holding after holding.10 custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”). 10 See, e.g., L.T. v. W.L., 159 So. 3d 1289, 1291 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (“When a required valid consent is not obtained, the probate court lacks jurisdiction to enter an adoption judgment.”); Westerlund v. Croaff, 198 P.2d 842, 845 (Ariz. 1948) (“[C]onsent in writing of the living natural parents, or its statutory equivalent, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid adoption.”); Arnold v. Howell, 219 P.2d 854, 858 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (“Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption . . . . With certain statutory exceptions, consent to an adoption is considered a jurisdictional prerequisite.” (citation omitted)); In re I.H.H-L., 251 P.3d 651, 657 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (“[Where] there is no consent from any statutorily authorized person . . . . the district court did not have jurisdiction over the petition for adoption and should have dismissed the case.” (citation omitted)); G.M.D. v. M.D., 610 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (“[I]n the absence of consent the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed.”); In re Jackson, 28 P.2d 125, 129 (Nev. 1934) (Because “consent lies at the foundation of adoption statutes . . . . [t]he order of adoption in this case was void because [it was] made without the consent of [the father].”); In re Ralph, 710 N.Y.S.2d 500, 503 (App. Div. 2000) (“The court lacks jurisdiction to act upon incomplete adoption applications[.]”); In re Holder, 10 S.E.2d 620, 622 (N.C. 1940) (“[N]either parent . . . gave consent to the adoption in the manner contemplated by the statute . . . . This . . . is held to be essential to jurisdiction of the subject matter.” (citation omitted)); McGinty v. Jewish Children’s Bureau, 545 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (Ohio 1989) (per curiam) (“[P]arental consent to an adoption order is the jurisdictional prerequisite which, if absent, allows the order to be attacked as void . . . .”); Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850, 856 (Okla. 1977) (“It is fundamental that notice and parental consent are jurisdictional (cont.) 17 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part ¶ 31 For example, in a case with similar facts to this one, a mother lied to an adoption agency about the identity of the father of the two children she wanted to place for adoption and the county court thus never obtained consent from the biological father. In re Adoption of Kassandra B., 540 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Neb. 1995). The Nebraska Supreme Court, noting that “[c]hildren are not legally free for adoption unless both biological parents consent or one of the statutory exceptions to the need for their consent has been met,” held that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the father’s consent was never obtained. Id. at 560. The order terminating parental rights was therefore void. Id. ¶ 32 And where a technical defect arose involving the witnesses to the birth mother’s signing of a consent form for adoption, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the notion that substantial compliance with the statutory requirements was sufficient. Brown, 766 S.E.2d at 379. The court noted that “statutory formalities [regarding consent or relinquishment forms] have heightened relevance and importance” because they “are the only clear line separating a biological parent’s rights with respect to the child prior to the adoption, from the finality and irrevocability resulting from the execution of the formalities.” Id. at 380. And because “[c]onsent lies at the foundation of the adoption process,” the lack of valid consent from the birth mother meant any adoption decree would be invalid. Id. at 378 (citation omitted).11 prerequisites to the adoption of a legitimate child. . . . [and] [a]n adoption granted without parental consent is void . . . .” (citations omitted)); Hughes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 383 P.2d 55, 60 (Or. 1963) (“Consent to an adoption by parents or guardian or other person in loco parentis is jurisdictional, except where the statute does not require it.”); In re Adoption of List, 211 A.2d 870, 873 (Pa. 1965) (“[N]otice to a natural parent of the adoption proceedings and the consent of a natural parent, where necessary, are jurisdictional prerequisites in an adoption proceeding . . . .”); In re JWT, 104 P.3d 93, 94 (Wyo. 2005) (“But here, the appropriate documentation never having been filed, the district court did not obtain jurisdiction to hear the adoption.”). 11 A handful of cases have suggested that the rule is different. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court held in a conclusory footnote that lack of consent made adoption proceedings merely voidable under 25 (cont.) 18 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part ¶ 33 The majority attacks these cases on several grounds, none of which is persuasive. First, the majority argues that because these cases involve challenges to the validity of consent made by the birth parent, “they tell us nothing useful about . . . whether a failure of consent is a U.S.C. section 1914, based entirely on the fear that “a challenge made years after the adoption was finalized and untimely under state law might result in a holding that was detrimental to the best interests of the Native American child that the ICWA was designed to protect.” In re Petition of Phillip A.C., 149 P.3d 51, 60 n.44 (Nev. 2006). Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court held that federal law did not force the conclusion that “invalid consents under § 1913 are void as a matter of law,” reasoning that otherwise decrees stemming from invalid consents would not be subject to state statutes of limitations. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 979 (Alaska 1989). But we need not reach the issue of how this court would decide a case where the adoption had already been finalized. Utah law provides a limitation on the time period in which to contest an adoption. UTAH CODE § 78B-6-133(7)(b) (“No person may contest an adoption after one year from the day on which the final decree of adoption is entered.”). Because the court has not entered a final adoption decree, we do not need to decide whether this statute would bar a parent from contesting an adoption more than one year after the final adoption decree where the underlying proceeding was void for want of jurisdiction. Cf. In re Estate of Willey, 2016 UT 53, ¶ 16, 391 P.3d 171 (declining to reach issue of “whether all claims that judgments are void under rule 60(b)(4) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] are subject to the reasonable time limit imposed by rule 60(c)” because “the parties do not adequately brief this issue, because other jurisdictions are split on this issue, and because resolution of this issue is not necessary to the disposition of this case”). However, I note that other courts have, under certain circumstances, applied similar statutes in such a manner. See Hogue v. Olympic Bank, 708 P.2d 605, 608, 611 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (en banc) (holding that one-year statute of limitations barred challenge to void adoption judgment where mother knew of adoption within statutory time period but did not act). But see Hughes, 383 P.2d at 66 (holding that statute did not bar challenge to void adoption judgment where applying statute of limitations would interfere with vested property rights). 19 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part subject-matter jurisdictional defect that can be raised by the court sua sponte.” Infra ¶ 134. Of course, there are cases in which the court has raised the issue sua sponte. See, e.g., In re I.H.H-L., 251 P.3d 651, 653 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (“Neither party questioned the district court’s jurisdiction to conduct the [termination of parental rights] proceedings that led to this appeal. On its own motion, however, this court questioned that jurisdiction and sought additional briefing from the parties addressing the jurisdictional questions. An appellate court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative.”); In re Adoption of L.D.S., 155 P.3d at 8 (“The jurisdictional issue [of whether the child was eligible for adoption without the valid consent of the biological parents] was raised sua sponte by this Court.”). And in any case, no court has relied on the dissent’s distinction, as parties are also free to raise subject matter jurisdiction concerns. See Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 10 (stating that “parties can raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time during a proceeding”). We are obligated to raise subject matter jurisdictional issues when they appear in a case before us, and there is no authority for the assertion that we may not do so if the facts of other cases did not require other courts to do the same. ¶ 34 The majority also points out that some adoption cases have personal jurisdiction defects due to lack of notice to the biological father. See infra ¶ 135 & n.18. But the fact that lack of notice often is intertwined with lack of consent does not mean that the issue is one solely of personal jurisdiction. A court may lack both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, and the dissent’s attempt to distinguish cases in which a lack of consent stemmed from failure to give notice is unavailing. ¶ 35 Additionally, the majority harbors “suspicion” of the cases we cite for the proposition that consent is a jurisdictional prerequisite because it thinks that many of them are from a “bygone era”—a time before courts focused on the best interests of the child. Infra ¶¶ 138–39. But courts across the country have continually and recently restated this proposition. Requiring parents to validly consent to termination of their parental rights before the court may assert jurisdiction over their children is not at all inconsistent with the current recognition in Utah and many other states that “the best interests of the child are paramount.” Infra ¶ 139. Indeed, numerous courts with statutory 20 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part schemes that, like ours,12 recognize the importance of the best interests of the child hold that consent is a jurisdictional requirement for adoption. See C.T. v. J.S., 951 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Alaska 1998) (“The only question is whether the trial court permissibly circumvented the consent requirement . . . . If not, then the adoption decree is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction[.]”);13 Brown, 766 S.E.2d at 378 (“Consent lies at the foundation of the adoption process[.]” (citation omitted));14 In re Adoption of L.D.S., 155 P.3d at 8 (“[T]he best interests of the child can be served in no legitimate manner except in obedience to the policies and procedures mandated by law.”).15 In any case, the best interests of a child are not furthered by placing the child for adoption without parental consent. See In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275, 1285 (D.C. 2015) (“Although ‘the paramount consideration’ in determining whether to terminate parental rights is the best interest of the child, our case law recognizes that the [termination of parental rights] factors must be applied in accordance with ‘the presumption that the child’s best interest will be served by placing the child with his natural parent, provided the parent has not been proven unfit.’” (citation omitted)); In re Adoption of N.L.B., 212 S.W.3d 123, 128 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (stating that statutorily required consideration of “the welfare of the person sought to be adopted . . . is informed by the fundamental proposition and presumption that maintaining the natural parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the child”); In re Adoption of L.D.S., 155 P.3d at 9 (“The lesson of this matter is that the interests of the child and ultimately all concerned in matters regarding parental rights can be 12 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(1) (“It is the intent and desire of the Legislature that in every adoption the best interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the court’s determination.”). 13ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.005 (The adoption “chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that the best interests of adopted children are promoted.”). 14 S.C. CODE § 63-9-20 (“[W]hen the interests of a child and an adult are in conflict, the conflict must be resolved in favor of the child.”). 15 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7501-1.2(A)(1) (stating that one purpose of the Oklahoma Adoption Code is to “[e]nsure and promote the best interests of the child in adoptions”). 21 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part adequately served only through scrupulous adherence to the statutory scheme found in the Adoption Code.”). ¶ 36 Having explained why valid consent is a subject matter jurisdictional prerequisite for an adoption proceeding, I now turn to whether Birth Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights. I would hold that her consent was not timely under ICWA and therefore invalid. B. Birth Mother’s Consent Was Invalid ¶ 37 ICWA lays out a series of requirements for the termination of parental rights, including that “[a]ny consent given prior to, or within ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall not be valid.” 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). Because the Child is an Indian child and therefore ICWA applies to these proceedings, the question is whether Birth Mother’s consent was timely given under this section. ¶ 38 That Birth Mother’s consent did not comply with ICWA’s timing requirements is undeniable, as both times she attempted to consent were “within ten days after[] birth of the Indian child.” Id. The Child was born at 12:14 p.m. on August 29, 2014, and Birth Mother attempted to consent for the first time on August 30, 2014. Both parties agree that this consent was invalid. Birth Mother again attempted to consent at 1:29 p.m. on September 8, 2014, and the prospective adoptive parents argue that this attempt was valid—even though it did not occur more than ten days after the Child’s birth—because it occurred more than ten twenty-four-hour periods after the Child’s birth. This argument is flat wrong. ¶ 39 When interpreting a statute, “our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose” of the legislative body. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (citation omitted). The best evidence of legislative intent is “the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s terms.” Rent-A-Center W., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2016 UT 1, ¶ 13, 367 P.3d 989. We often look to dictionary definitions as a “starting point” to determine the plain and ordinary meaning. Nichols v. Jacobsen Constr. Co., 2016 UT 19, ¶ 17, 374 P.3d 3 (citation omitted); State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 13, 308 P.3d 517 (“In determining the ordinary meaning of nontechnical terms of a statute, our ‘starting point’ is the dictionary.” (citation omitted)). ¶ 40 The prospective adoptive parents purport to apply a plain language analysis by looking to Black’s Law Dictionary, which, around 22 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part the time ICWA was passed, defined “day” as “[a] period of time consisting of twenty-four hours and including the solar day and the night.” Day, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). Under the prospective adoptive parents’ approach, ICWA’s timing requirement would be satisfied if consent was given any time after 240 hours of the child’s birth. ¶ 41 But the prospective adoptive parents may not cherry-pick a dictionary definition and call it a plain language analysis. I note that most definitions refer to a twenty-four-hour period with respect to the time from midnight to midnight. E.g., Day, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973) (“the mean solar day of 24 hours beginning at mean midnight”); Day, RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (revised ed. 1984) (“Also called civil day. a division of time equal to 24 hours but reckoned from one midnight to the next”); Day, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2011) (“The 24-hour period during which the earth completes one rotation on its axis, traditionally measured from midnight to midnight.”). This definition is compatible with the notion that we do not begin counting the days since the Child’s birth based on the hour and minute he was born, but rather by the midnight-tomidnight metric generally used. See, e.g., Reisbeck v. HCA Health Servs. of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, ¶ 16 n.4, 2 P.3d 447 (noting that rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure’s deadline of days was meant to be calculated according to calendar days); see also State v. Sheets, 338 N.W.2d 886, 886–87 (Iowa 1983) (“The general rule is that when the word ‘day’ is used it means calendar day which includes the entire day from midnight to midnight . . . . We find no language in the [45-day statutory requirement] that indicates an intention to measure the time twenty-four hours from a given event.” (citations omitted)); In re Janklow, 589 N.W.2d 624, 626 (S.D. 1999) (“A ‘day,’ in this sense, begins at 12 o’clock midnight, and extends through 24 hours to the next 12 o’clock midnight.” (citation omitted)); Troxell v. Rainier Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 307, 111 P.3d 1173, 1176–77 (Wash. 2005) (citing Webster’s Dictionary in holding that the plain language of a statute required defining day as a twenty-four-hour period beginning at midnight). The prospective adoptive parents’ formalism has no place in this area of the law, as their method of tracking time would require district courts to track unique filing deadlines for each individual litigant—3:24 p.m. for litigant A, 5 p.m. for litigant B, and so on. See Troxell, 111 P.3d at 1177 n.4 (noting “absurd consequences” of “computation based on the precise timing of an act” including that “parties would have to attend to the precise 23 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part hour, minute, and second of the filing” at issue (citation omitted)). I cannot see how Congress could have intended this result for counting time periods for purposes of ICWA. ¶ 42 This plain language interpretation of “day” as the time from midnight to midnight also meshes with the method for computing time outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its Utah counterpart, which also count in terms of days, not hours. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) (count in days “[w]hen the period is stated in days” and count in hours only “[w]hen the period is stated in hours”); UTAH R. CIV. P. 6(a) (same). This method of counting days applies in a variety of settings. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) (This rule applies “in computing any time period . . . in any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.”); UTAH R. CIV. P. 6(a) (same); see Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah 1981) (stating that the “method of computing time periods relating to acts provided for by law is set out in Rule 6(a) [of the] Utah Rules of Civil Procedure” and requires counting by calendar days); see also LeGras v. AETNA Life Ins. Co., 786 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have consistently applied Rule 6 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] when interpreting time periods in various statutory contexts.”); Edwards v. Bay State Milling Co., 519 F. App’x 746, 748 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “applies to any statute that does not specify a method of computing time” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, we have applied rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to extend the waiting period for a putative father to file a paternity petition if the birth of the child falls on a holiday or weekend. Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶ 4, 163 P.3d 623, abrogated on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, 358 P.3d 1009. ¶ 43 The prospective adoptive parents’ interpretation contorts the plain language of ICWA—had Congress intended to count by hours, it would have done so, as many state legislatures have done. See UTAH CODE § 78B-6-125(1) (“A birth mother may not consent to the adoption of her child or relinquish control or custody of her child until at least 24 hours after the birth of her child.”); see also IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(g), (4) (requiring a release of custody to be signed “not less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the child” and revocation of consent “within ninety-six hours of the time such parent signed a release of custody”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.070(1) (“All releases for and consents to adoption executed in this state by the mother before the birth of a child or within 72 hours after the birth of a child are 24 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part invalid.”). But ICWA’s language is unambiguous in requiring a waiting period in terms of days, and the argument that the waiting period is really 240 hours is demonstrably wrong. ¶ 44 Because Birth Mother gave consent before midnight on the tenth day after the Child’s birth, she gave consent “within ten days after” the Child’s birth and her consent is therefore invalid.16 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a); see In re Adoption of C.D.K., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1261, 1263 (D. Utah 2009) (invalidating a mother’s consent to termination of her parental rights because the relinquishment hearing happened within ten days of the child’s birth). This, in my view, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, and I now turn to whether Birth Father had the right to raise the issue of the underlying subject matter jurisdictional defect.