Opinion ID: 1847218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Confusion and Verdict Unanimity

Text: Lance argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial because, it says, the jury was confused as to whether it or the trial court was responsible for deducting from the verdict the amount of the pro tanto settlements. That confusion, it says, violated its right to a fair trial. Lance also contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial because, it says, the trial court did not adequately ensure the unanimity of the verdict, and that its failure to do so violated its right to due process and its right to a unanimous verdict in a trial by jury. During the trial, the jury was informed of the pro tanto settlements, pursuant to which the motel paid the parents $7 million and Montgomery Coca-Cola paid them $3 million. At the close of the evidence, both sides requested that the trial judge give instruction 11.30, Alabama Pattern Jury Instruction: Civil (APJI 11.30), which instructs the jury that it must reduce its award by the amount of any settlements by other parties. During the charge conference, however, the parents obtained permission from the trial court to argue during their closing statement that the court, not the jury, should be responsible for reducing the verdict by the amount of the pro tanto settlements. Although this argument was directly contrary to APJI 11.30, Lance did not object. The parents' closing argument included the following statement: If indeed you intend to award a dollar to Michael and Tela Ramanauskas in this case, you'd have to add $10 million to it in order for them to be awarded a dollar. The parents never argued to the jury that it was the trial judge's responsibility to deduct the amount of the pro tanto settlements from the amount of the verdict. Again, Lance did not object. At the conclusion of the closing arguments and just before the trial court's charge, Lance again asked the judge to give APJI 11.30, asking, In the charge on pro tanto, can you give one right out of the [ Alabama ] Pattern Jury Charges?  The trial court replied, You both submitted the same charge. The trial court then gave its oral charge; that charge included APJI 11.30. At the end of the charge, Lance, for the first time, complained of an inconsistency between the parents' closing argument and the charge. After Lance expressed concern about a possible inconsistency, the parents requested that the trial court reread APJI 11.30 to the jury before allowing the jury to begin its deliberations. Lance agreed that recharging the jury was the proper way to remedy any possible confusion. The trial court then addressed the jury on the subject of the effect of the $10 million previously paid, and instructed the jury to determine from the evidence the total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff and then give credit for the amount of $10 million which Plaintiffs have already been paid ... and render a verdict for the balance remaining. After the additional instruction, both sides stated that they had no exceptions to the charge. When the jury returned a $13 million verdict against it, Lance asked that the jury be polled as to whether they meant to return a verdict of $3 million or $13 million. A juror, hearing Lance's request, blurted out, Three. Lance did not then ask that the jury resume deliberations. The trial court polled the jury, restricting that polling solely to whether the verdict was the verdict of each and every juror. All the jurors responded affirmatively. During the polling of the jurors, a colloquy between the court and the juror who had blurted out Three led to her statement that she had had a misunderstanding of what was awarded. The trial court said that it was not trying to badger the juror or to elicit anything but an honest response from her and told her, If it is your verdict, ma'am, it is. If it isn't, it isn't. She answered, Yes. The trial court then asked her one more time, This is your verdict? She replied, Yes. No other juror expressed any concerns. After polling the entire jury, the trial court returned to the juror who blurted out Three and said, And again, ... please understand, all I'm trying to find out is, is this your verdict? Out of an abundance of caution, let me please ask you again.... [I]s this your verdict? To which the juror responded, Yes, it is. After the jury was discharged, Lance attempted to impeach the jury's verdict by offering four affidavits from jurors who stated that they intended to award $3 million, not $13 million. The parents countered with affidavits from three jurors denying any confusion and supporting the verdict; those affidavits stated that those jurors supported an award higher than $13 million but that they could not get unanimous support for a verdict in excess of $13 million. Lance contends that the differences between what was agreed to at the charge conference, what was argued during closing argument, and APJI 11.30 left the jury so confused that Lance's right to a fair and impartial trial was violated. Lance says this confusion is evidenced by the colloquy with the juror who blurted out, Three, and by the four juror affidavits it submitted to the trial court, in which the jurors stated that they intended to award the parents $3 million, not $13 million. However, we conclude that Lance is precluded from arguing that the giving of APJI 11.30 confused the jury. As previously noted, Lance did not object to the parents' request for permission to make the allegedly confusing argument to the jury, nor did it object to the argument itself. In fact, Lance expressed its approval of the trial court's additional charge. This Court held in Bush v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 175, 181 (Ala. 1991), that the plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the trial court's supplemental charge after the plaintiffs requested that the trial court clean up the confusion created by its original charge, but did not object to the trial court's subsequent charge. Therefore, Lance waived any objection to the trial court's supplemental instruction by expressing its satisfaction with the rereading of APJI 11.30. Lance also contends that the fact that one of the jurors blurted out Three, proves that the verdict was not unanimous. We disagree. When that juror expressed confusion about the verdict, the trial court was authorized to determine whether the verdict represented her convictions. See Winslow v. State, 76 Ala. 42 (1884), and Martin v. State, 23 Ala.App. 281, 124 So. 392, cert. denied, 220 Ala. 149, 124 So. 393 (1929), both of which were followed in Corner v. Rush, 403 So.2d 205 (Ala.1981). The trial court did so by properly restricting the polling of the jury to the issue whether the verdict was the verdict of each and every juror. See Ala.Code 1975, § 12-16-15. As noted above, all the jurors responded in the affirmative to the polling. Moreover, the juror who blurted out Three affirmed her verdict twice during the polling. The verdict was unanimous, contrary to Lance's assertion. We reject Lance's argument that the four affidavits attacking the verdict also prove that the verdict was not unanimous. These affidavits provoke the swearing match to which Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid., is directed. That rule provides: Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict..., a juror may not testify in impeachment of the verdict ... as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. Nothing herein precludes a juror from testifying in support of a verdict.... This rule makes jurors incompetent to testify, either orally or by affidavit, as to the deliberations of the jury when offered to attack the validity of a verdict or indictment. Gamble's Alabama Rules of Evidence § 606, p. 171 (1995). See, also, Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 606. In addition, we have previously held inadmissible juror affidavits attacking a verdict on the basis of alleged confusion over who would deduct the amounts paid in a pro tanto settlement, because those affidavits deal with the substance, not the form, of the verdict. Kumar v. Lewis, 561 So.2d 1082 (Ala.1990); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979). Lance, however, attempts to stretch the exception in Rule 606(b) to those cases in which juror testimony is necessary to show juror attentiveness to extraneous prejudicial information. Lance argues that the unobjected-to statements of the parents fall into the category of extraneous prejudicial information, which would be admissible under Rule 606(b). We think that the trial judge correctly disposed of this argument in his posttrial order: This argument strains credulity. The courts of this state have generally limited the scope of this exception to the visitation of a crime scene by a juror, the introduction of the definition of legal terms in the jury room, and [the reading of] concepts from general reference books. See Dawson v. State, [710 So.2d 467](Ala.Crim.App.1996); Jordan v. Brantley, 589 So.2d 680 (Ala.1991); Nichols v. Seaboard Coastline, 341 So.2d 671 (Ala.1976). These scenarios do not remotely approach the facts of this case. In addition, we recognize that the courts of this State have interpreted the exception in the same manner. See McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 94.06(4)(a), p. 458-59 (5th ed.1996), and cases cited therein. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on the basis of lack of a unanimous verdict.