Opinion ID: 1335906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to petition and freedom of speech

Text: Mr. Berrill, appellant and defendant below, challenges his conviction on the grounds that it violates his right to petition for a redress of grievances and his right to freedom of speech as provided under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article III, §§ 7 and 16 of the West Virginia Constitution. Although the right to petition and the right to free speech are separate guarantees, they are related and generally subject to the same constitutional analysis. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1532 n. 11, 84 L.Ed.2d 547, 558 (1985). Therefore, we will analyze Mr. Berrill's constitutional claims together. In advancing his arguments on the issue of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, Mr. Berrill argues that his activity was peaceful conduct directed at communicating a grievance to government. He asserts that petitions to government, particularly in the case of perceived grievances, will involve controversy and passion, and thus his disruption of the meeting was part of the process of government. He also contends that, in case of controversy, it is to be expected that speakers and spectators on both sides of an issue will appear and participate. He states that applause for favored speakers and hoots for the opponents, perhaps even a few angry words, are all considered de rigueur. Finally, he asserts that the line drawn by the Federal and State Constitutions is at violence and the real threat of violence, not comfort or subjective alarm. Mr. Berrill concludes that because he was not violent and did not threaten violence, his conduct should be protected. [5] In further support of the argument that his right to petition was violated, appellant relies on Webb v. Fury, 167 W.Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981), overruled by Harris v. Adkins, 189 W.Va. 465, 432 S.E.2d 549 (1993) (holding that right to petition does not provide an absolute privilege for intentional and reckless falsehoods), and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which was established in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). Webb and the cases discussed in it relating to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine involved claims of immunity from civil actions arising out of concerted efforts to persuade government to act in a public policy arena. After reviewing these authorities, we find them inapplicable to the case at hand. The Webb Court specifically observed that the petitioners in that case attempted to conduct their petitioning activity in the manner prescribed by statute and agency regulations. Webb v. Fury, 167 W.Va. at 453, 282 S.E.2d at 39. Mr. Berrill, in contrast, disregarded the established procedures for offering public comment during a Board of Education meeting, interrupted the orderly conduct of the meeting, and thus utterly failed to conduct his petitioning activity in the manner prescribed by statute and agency regulations. Appellant further asserts, without discussion, that the anti-disruption statute must be found void under the tests established in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 680 (1968): [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id., at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. We find that the anti-disruption statute meets these requirements. Clearly, the anti-disruption statute under discussion here does no more than provide for the protection of the public interest in the orderly and open conduct of public meetings. Many courts, including the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, have recognized that governments have a substantial interest in maintaining order in public meetings. [6] The Fourth Circuit has stated: Because of government's substantial interest in having such meetings conducted with relative orderliness and fairness to all, officials presiding over such meetings must have discretion, under the `reasonable time, place and manner' constitutional principle, to set subject matter agendas, and to cut off speech which they reasonably perceive to be, or imminently to threaten, a disruption of the orderly and fair progress of the discussion, whether by virtue of its irrelevance, its duration, or its very tone and manner. Collinson v. Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 1000 (1990) (Phillips, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Secondly, we note that Mr. Berrill was not prevented from communicating his message to the Board of Education. The Board president testified at the trial that he always permitted the public an opportunity to speak at the appropriate time and a time was fixed on the agenda for such public input. Mr. Berrill initially undertook to follow those procedures by arranging to be placed on the meeting agenda as a speaker, albeit under the alias, Mr. DeVille. He failed, however, to wait until he was properly called to address the gathering. Instead, Mr. Berrill entered the meeting room in the middle of the meeting and immediately began his exhortation. Mr. Berrill admits that the meeting came to a halt during his presentation. The anti-disruption statute imposes no explicit restrictions on free expression or other First Amendment freedoms; at most it sanctions only implicit limitations on the time, place, and manner of free expression which a public body, whose meetings are protected by the provisions of the statute, may adopt or enforce to structure and conduct its meetings. Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221, 227 (1984). [7] Such restrictions are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Id. Thus, we conclude that the anti-disruption statute was not applied to Mr. Berrill in a way that violated his rights of freedom of speech and petition. The statute proscribes, in relevant part, wilfully interrupting or molesting the orderly and peaceful process of political subdivisions. Because W.Va.Code § 61-6-19 creates an offense without reference to speech, or the content thereof, we hold that it is a simple time, place, or manner restriction on the right to petition and freedom of speech, a restriction which is wholly neutral with respect to the content of the restricted speech. Finally, we note the State's argument that First Amendment rights may not be exercised in a manner destructive of other's rights. In this case, Mr. Berrill failed to follow the specific procedures established by the Board to allow citizens to address their concerns. If concerned citizens were permitted to assert their First Amendment rights by addressing public meetings at will, without following established procedures, the governmental body would cease to function and no meaningful communication could occur. First Amendment rights `are not a license to trample upon the rights of others. They must be exercised responsibly and without depriving others of their rights, the enjoyment of which is equally precious.' Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228, 238-39 (S.D.W.Va.1968) ( quoting Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 586 (4th Cir.1964)), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905, 89 S.Ct. 1009, 22 L.Ed.2d 217 (1969). We turn now to the anti-mask statute, utilizing again the O'Brien analysis. [8] The government interest implicated in our anti-mask statute can be ascertained from its plain language. One canon of statutory construction is to follow the statute's plain, unambiguous language. `When the statute is unambiguous on its face, there is no real need to consider its legislative history.' Cooper v. Tazewell Square Apartments, Ltd., 577 F.Supp. 1483, 1487 (W.D.Va.1984), rev'd on other grounds, Kennedy v. Block, 606 F.Supp. 1397 (W.D.Va.1985); Brown v. Porcher, 502 F.Supp. 946, 955-56 n. 17 (D.S.C.1980), aff'd as modified, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.1981) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150, 103 S.Ct. 796, 74 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1983). State v. Boatright, 184 W.Va. 27, 399 S.E.2d 57 (1990) (per curiam). The language of W.Va.Code § 61-6-22 clearly and unambiguously prohibits appearing in specified places when any portion of the face is so covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer. Appellant questions whether the government has a legitimate interest in individuals concealing their identity. The obvious governmental interest here is the protection of citizens from violence and from the fear and intimidation of being confronted by someone whom they cannot identify. [9] As the Georgia Supreme Court observed in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1990): We know that [p]ublic disguise is a particularly effective means of committing crimes of violence and intimidation. From the beginning of time the mask or hood has been the criminal's dress. It conceals evidence, hinders apprehension and calms the criminal's inward cowardly fear. M. Abram & A. Miller, How to Stop Violence! Intimidation! In Your Community (August 15, 1949). A nameless, faceless figure strikes terror in the human heart. But, remove the mask, and the nightmarish form is reduced to its true dimensions. The face betrays not only identity, but also human frailty. Moreover, under the plain language of the statute, it does not matter what message, if any, is to be conveyed by wearing a mask. The focus, as appellant has conceded, is on the concealment of identity, and any limitation on speech is merely a secondary effect. Thus, the anti-mask statute plainly `seeks to proscribe conduct, not free speech, and ... that conducteven if expressivefalls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Id. 398 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2917, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973)). We find further that any restriction on Mr. Berrill's constitutionally protected freedoms was minimal. The anti-mask statute did not prevent Mr. Berrill from delivering his message. As we previously mentioned, he had already addressed the Board on the same issue the previous fall. Moreover, the statute did not prevent Mr. Berrill from demonstrating his perception of the evil appearance of the devil, as long as he did not conceal his identity while doing so. [10] Obviously, Mr. Berrill had alternate methods of demonstrating and articulating his concerns that would not have concealed his identity and thus violated the statute under consideration. An amicus curiae brief filed in this appeal raises, among other matters, a series of cases which protected anonymous writings and anonymous membership in organizations. [11] We find that none of these cases implicate the government's interest in public order and safety in the manner and scope of the two statutes herein involved. [12] Additionally, we note that there is a clear nexus between the government's interest and Mr. Berrill's activity. Our review of the record reveals that the people who attended the meeting were frightened by Mr. Berrill's behavior. They were worried that Mr. Berrill would become violent, and they were concerned for their own safety, as well as the safety of the children present. Certainly, these people would not have suffered such fear and intimidation if they had known the identity of the person portraying the devil before them. Therefore, we find W.Va.Code § 61-6-22 was constitutional as applied to Mr. Berrill. We reject Mr. Berrill's arguments for an additional, persuasive reason. [I]t is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069 n. 5, 82 L.Ed.2d 221, 227 (1984). We have considered whether Mr. Berrill has met his burden of demonstrating that his conduct at the Board meeting constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2538, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 352 (1989). To answer this question, we have considered whether Mr. Berrill has demonstrated that [a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d 842, 847 (1974) (per curiam). Having reviewed the record in this case, we find that Mr. Berrill may have demonstrated an intent to convey a particularized message, but he has failed to show a likelihood that his message would be understood. Indeed, the record clearly demonstrates that his intended message was completely misunderstood. Mr. Berrill sought to convey his concern about the use by a high school of a devil image as the school mascot and to persuade the Board to employ another mascot image. Having failed to adequately bring the matter to the attention of the Board, in his view, despite an oral address to the Board in the fall of 1993 and a series of letters to persons he deemed appropriate (including an unpublished letter to the editor of the local paper), Mr. Berrill resorted to the conduct outlined in this opinion. Mr. Berrill asserts that he employed the devil costume in an effort to draw attention to his cause. He contends that the mask was not intended to conceal his identity, but was a critical part of his message, the purpose of which was to graphically portray the image he felt the mascot represented. He asserts that the mask was intended to conjure the horrific image of the master of hell, as distinguished from the almost cherubic aspect of the actual mascot. In the surrounding circumstances, it appears that Mr. Berrill's conduct resulted more in chaos than understanding. The surrounding circumstances to which we refer include Mr. Berrill's entrance into a public meeting while dressed as a devil with his identity concealed; his address to the assembly at a time when the public had not yet been invited to speak; his having moved or pranced around the room; and, with his speech and his refusal to cease and desist, having disrupted the orderly process of the meeting. We further refer to the circumstance that the room had but one exit, to an interior area of the building, likely inhibiting exit from the room by the assembly had violence occurred. Finally, we note that there were children present, which created additional uneasiness and concern on the part of the adults. Our view that Mr. Berrill's conduct was more likely to create confusion than convey an understandable message under the circumstances is further supported by testimony presented at trial, which tended to indicate that the audience was preoccupied with evaluating the potential danger of the situation. Of the four State witnesses who testified about the meeting, two indicated their concern that the man dressed as a devil might have been carrying a gun, and three stated that they were concerned about the safety of the children who were present. All four of the witnesses expressed that they did not know what to expect and that they were concerned that the situation may become violent. Additionally, one witness specifically stated that she was so scared that she did not listen to much of what Mr. Berrill said. We conclude that Mr. Berrill has failed to demonstrate that his conduct was likely to be understood by those present as expressive of the message he wished to convey. Rather, it appears to have generated, at the very least, uncertainty as to Mr. Berrill's identity, concern for the safety of children, some fear of violence, and concern for the safety of those who might wish to exit the room in case violence occurred. Accordingly, we hold that neither the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States nor Article III, §§ 7 and 16 of the West Virginia Constitution preclude the prosecution of the defendant under the W.Va.Code § 61-6-22.