Opinion ID: 727991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: summary judgment--copyright infringement

Text: 20 CMM contends that the district court improperly granted WPOR's motion for summary judgment on its copyright infringement claim with respect to all of WPOR's Payday Contest materials, except the brochure.
21 We review the district court's grant of motion for summary judgment de novo, according no deference to the district court's decision. Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 144 (1st Cir.1994); Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1262 (1st Cir.1991). Summary judgment is appropriate when  'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'  Grubb v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 88 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir.1991)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), the party opposing the motion must produce evidence on which a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate burden of proof, could base a verdict for the opposing party; if that party cannot produce such evidence, the motion must be granted. Grubb, 88 F.3d at 2.
22 To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove (i) ownership of a valid copyright, and (ii) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1295-96, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir.1995) (collecting cases), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 804, 133 L.Ed.2d 610 (1996); Concrete Machinery, 843 F.2d at 605; 3 Nimmer § 13.01, at 13-5 to 13-6. To show ownership of a valid copyright and thus satisfy the first prong under Feist, a plaintiff must prove that the work as a whole is original and that the plaintiff complied with applicable statutory formalities. Id. 23 Once the plaintiff produces a certificate of copyright, which constitutes prima facie evidence of copyrightability in judicial proceedings, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate why the claim of copyright is invalid. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813; Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir.1991). At this juncture, it is incumbent upon a putative infringer to establish that the work in which copyright is claimed is unprotectable (for lack of originality) or, more specifically, to prove that the portion of the copyrighted work actually taken is unworthy of copyright protection. Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir.1996). Upon defendant's proof of lack of originality by plaintiff through evidence that the plaintiff copied from prior works, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove originality. See, e.g., Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir.1990); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F.Supp. 125, 140 (D.N.J.1982); Nimmer, § 12.11[B] at 165-67. The burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption varies depending on the issue bearing on the validity of the copyright. Where, for example, the issue is whether the copyrighted article is 'original,' the presumption will not be overcome unless the defendant offers proof that the plaintiff's product was copied from other works or similarly probative evidence as to originality. Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 668-69; see Nimmer, § 12.11[B], at 165-67. 24 To show actionable copying and thereby satisfy Feist 's second prong, a plaintiff must first prove that the alleged infringer copied plaintiff's copyrighted work as a factual matter; to do this, he or she may either present direct evidence of factual copying or, if that is unavailable, evidence that the alleged infringer had access to the copyrighted work and that the offending and copyrighted works are so similar that the court may infer that there was factual copying (i.e., probative similarity). Lotus Development, 49 F.3d at 813. Next, a plaintiff must prove that the copying of copyrighted material was so extensive that it rendered the offending and copyrighted works substantially similar. Id. Even if both showings are made, however, the trier of fact may nonetheless find no copying if the defendant shows independent creation. Grubb, 88 F.3d at 3.
25 The crux of this appeal stems from WPOR's arguments below that CMM's brochure is unprotectable for lack of originality and/or that the heart of CMM's Payroll Payoff TM which WPOR allegedly infringed is unworthy of copyright protection. See, e.g., Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541. As we noted above, the district court agreed with most of WPOR's arguments when it dismissed all of CMM's claims except its claim that WPOR infringed its brochures. See CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197-98. On appeal, CMM advances five challenges in support of its argument that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of WPOR: (i) the originality of CMM's expression of the employment metaphor should have gone to the jury; (ii) WPOR's supporting materials should have gone to the jury; (iii) the error of the district court's rulings on originality and the supporting materials is made clear by the resulting inconsistent and incongruous jury verdict; (iv) WPOR's access to other CMM brochures remained a disputed material fact at the summary judgment stage; and (v) the district court improperly used a literal dissection analysis of protected and unprotected elements. 26 We address each in turn, beginning with the last, as we review de novo whether CMM escape[s] the swing of the summary judgment axe, Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989), keeping in mind that CMM has the burden of proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists that would preclude judgment as a matter of law. 27
28 CMM first states in a footnote that the district court erred when it applied a dissection analysis of protected and unprotected elements which, while logically used in compilation cases, was inappropriate here. See Lotus Development, 49 F.3d at 812 (requiring a showing of constituent elements of the work that are original). Then, in its reply brief, CMM adds that, because the brochures and, by extension, the supporting materials, combine both fact and fiction, under both Feist and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985), even if a direct mail brochure is deemed to have factual elements ... WPOR was obligated to disseminate those facts in a manner which did not impede the most expressive elements of CMM's work--its text, its layout and its 'heart'. CMM's Reply Brief, p. 16. Because the brochure design and copy constituted the heart of CMM's work, and because its inability to sell it in the Portland market diminished its copyright value, CMM concludes, copyright infringement occurred through WPOR's brochure and, by extension, its supporting materials. 29 As an initial matter, CMM seems to be making two distinct arguments. The first faults the dissection of the copyrighted and accused works in order to identify protectable elements such that the court might determine as a matter of law whether or not the alleged infringer copied protected elements. The second seems to urge us to find copyright infringement on the ground of unfair use within the meaning of copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. at 2223 n. 2. We address only the first, finding the second waived to the extent that it can be interpreted as advancing a fair use argument: CMM is not entitled to raise arguments on appeal that it failed to present to the district court. Equine Technologies, Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F.3d 542, 546 (1st Cir.1995) (citing cases). 15 30 As to CMM's first argument, we simply do not agree that the district court's dissection analysis vitiates the letter and intent of copyright law in this case. Rather, it comports with a key tenet of copyright law: [i]nfringement is shown by a substantial similarity of protectible expression, not just an overall similarity between the works. 3 Nimmer § 13.03[F], at 13-124 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, we note that the Copyright Act itself seems to mandate the dissection of works into copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1995) (providing that copyright in compilation or derivative work extends only to material contributed by author as distinguished from preexisting material). In other words, [e]ven when [as here] extended similarity exists between [the works] when taken as a whole, the analysis is not finished. To the extent that such similarity inheres in ideas, which are by definition unprotected, or in expression that is not proprietary to plaintiff, then an essential ingredient is lacking from plaintiff's prima facie case. 3 Nimmer § 13.03[B], at 13-67. 31 With this in mind, the district court's alleged application of the dissection analysis can be understood thus: 32 By dissecting the accused work and identifying those features which are protected in the copyrighted work, the court may be able to determine as a matter of law whether or not the former has copied protected aspects of the latter. The court can also determine, in at least a general way, those aspects of the work that are protected by the copyright and that should be considered in the subsequent comparative analysis under the ordinary observer test. Assuming copying of protected aspects is established, the trier of fact can then assess pursuant to the ordinary observer test whether there is substantial similarity between the protected expression and the accused work. 33 Concrete Machinery, 843 F.2d at 608-09 (concrete statues and ornamental articles); see Lotus Development, 49 F.3d at 813 (computer program). 34 The foregoing notwithstanding, we certainly recognize the potential danger ... that courts ... will so 'dissect' the work as to classify all its elements as unprotectable ... [thereby possibly] blind[ing it] to the expressiveness of their ensemble. Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 Colum.L.Rev. 2259, 2561 (1994) (noting that when courts distinguish public domain idea from protected expression this danger is not limited to computer software); cf. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that dissection analysis, extended to its logical conclusion when determining work's copyrightability, might result in conclusion of no originality). We do not think, however, that this danger is present in the instant case: at both the preliminary injunction and summary judgment stages, the district court ke[pt] sight of the [brochure] as a whole, Ginsburg, 94 Colum.L.Rev. at 2561, recognized it was undisputedly an original work of CMM, focused on the striking similarities between the parties' brochures, and permitted the infringement question to go to the jury, despite concluding that most--if not all of the text--consisted of uncopyrightable elements. See CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197. Furthermore, as we discuss below, we do not think that the lower court's approach resulted in the supporting materials being unfairly taken away from the jury or necessarily led to an inconsistent jury verdict. 35 Finally, as we view this case, because the parties do not dispute the validity of CMM's copyrights in its brochures or otherwise appeal from the jury's verdict so finding, resolution of this appeal essentially turns on the infringement issue of whether WPOR's alleged copying was of protected elements and, more specifically, of any original contributions by CMM. At its core, what drives CMM's appeal is the district court's conclusion that the employment metaphor and CMM's expression thereof--the fictional element of Payroll Payoff TM--was not original within the meaning of copyright law. This conclusion resulted in there being very few, if any, copyrightable elements beyond graphics, selection and/or arrangement, upon which the jury could base a verdict for copyright infringement. In turn, the dissection analysis undercut, as we discuss below, CMM's copyright infringement claim regarding WPOR's supporting materials. 36
37 A threshold issue is whether, as WPOR maintains, CMM has waived this argument. WPOR asserts that to the extent that CMM argues that it is appealing the district court's ruling that the employment theme was not protected by copyright law due to a lack of originality, CMM has waived its right to appeal this issue by its failure to object to the court's jury instructions on this point: there is no copyrightable interest in ... the work or employment metaphor. WPOR argues that an appeal of a prior determination of the trial court that is repeated in the court's instructions to the jury is, in essence, a revisiting of the point and requires an objection to the instruction. See Wells Real Estate v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 809 (1st Cir.1988) (noting that a long line of precedents in this circuit instructs that failure to raise an objection subsequent to the actual charge constitutes waiver under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51); McGrath v. Spirito, 733 F.2d 967, 968 (1st Cir.1984) (We have held that the rule requires that the objection to jury instructions be made after the charge, not before.). Thus, WPOR concludes, CMM's objection is too late and results in a waiver of the objection and the issue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. In all events, we need not resolve this contretemps. Assuming, arguendo, that the issue is properly preserved, we nonetheless reject CMM's position on the merits. 38 Originality: The Law and The District Court's Decision 39 Before addressing CMM's arguments, we review the applicable law and the district court's opinion. As the district court noted, the Supreme Court has made clear that 40 [t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. 41 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. at 1287. As CMM correctly points out, the threshold of creativity within the meaning of the copyright statute is very slight: 42 To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might be.... Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. 43 Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author..... [I]f the selection and arrangement are original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection. Id. at 348-49, 111 S.Ct. at 1289 (internal citations omitted). What is protectible then is the author's original contributions, id. at 350, 111 S.Ct. at 1290. No matter how original the [contribution], however, the [unprotectable elements] themselves do not become original through association. Id. at 349, 111 S.Ct. at 1289. 44 Despite this low threshold, the district court concluded that neither the employment metaphor itself nor CMM's expression of it were original within the meaning of copyright law and, thus, that neither were copyrightable. As to the employment metaphor itself, the district court concluded that it was not an original contribution of CMM, because Izor, the creator of CMM's payroll games, testified during the hearing on the preliminary injunction that the employment concept originated from WWW. As to CMM's expression of the employment metaphor, the district court rejected CMM's argument that Izor added a sufficient modicum of originality by expanding the promotion to include both sexes, to run all week (as opposed to only Wednesdays) and to add a grand prize. According to the district court, these 'original' contributions do not extend or vary the employment metaphor; they simply expand the operating scope of the promotion. CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 198. In addition, the district court concluded that these contributions lacked the minimal quantum of creativity required for copyright, reasoning that expanding the promotion to include men and to run for five days is of the same magnitude as the geographic selection and alphabetic arrangement of telephone numbers in Feist. Id. at 198 (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. at 1296-97). In reaching its conclusion it also noted that CMM admitted that radio promotions generally run five days a week and are open to men and women. 45 With this in mind, we turn now to CMM's arguments. 46 Originality: A Jury Question? 47 CMM first argues that the district court erred by ruling as a matter of law on the originality of CMM's expression, contending that originality is a fact question determinable by the jury, not by the court on summary judgment. In support of this proposition, CMM cites to three cases: North Coast Industries v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that whether copyright holder's expression of idea inspired by French designer was copyrightable was for jury where it was not clear that expression was substantially similar and differences merely trivial); Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 99 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.1938) (holding that common-law copyright suit could not be summarily disposed of on motion to dismiss where suit involved question of originality which was one of fact and not of law); Knickerbocker Toy Co., Inc. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F.Supp. 1309, 1318 (D.N.H.1982) (holding that summary judgment on the question of originality must be denied if there is a material question of fact as to the issue of independent creation, such as where evidence exists from which a jury could find the existence of an original aesthetic appeal). 48 While we do not dispute that the question of originality can be a question of fact for the jury, it is not necessarily so. Feist itself makes this clear. There, the Supreme Court decided the question of originality as a matter of law when it held that the white page listings in a telephone directory were not entitled to copyright protection because they lacked the requisite originality. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364, 111 S.Ct. at 1297; see, e.g., American Dental Assoc. v. Delta Dental Plans Assoc., No. 92 C 5909, 1996 WL 224494, at  17 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.1996) (noting that [w]hether a work is original is treated by some courts as a question of fact and others as a question of law). We reject CMM's first claim of error, because courts clearly may determine the question of originality and, in turn, copyrightability so long as they do so in accord with the familiar rules governing summary judgment: where there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the originality of the work, such that no reasonable trier-of-fact could find originality, then the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 495 (4th Cir.) (finding no reversible error in court's instruction that jury need not concern themselves with [question of copyrightability] given court's ruling as a matter of law that works were original and, thus, subject to copyright protection), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 53, 136 L.Ed.2d 16 (1996); Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk, 867 F.Supp. 673, 681 (N.D.Ill.1994), aff'd, 59 F.3d 719 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 520, 133 L.Ed.2d 428 (1995); Magic Marketing, Inc. v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F.Supp. 769, 771-72 (W.D.Pa.1986) (noting that issue of copyrightability is typically resolved by a motion for summary judgment). Indeed, we note that in North Coast, relied upon by CMM, the Ninth Circuit noted that it has not hesitated in granting summary judgment where no reasonable trier-of-fact could find substantial similarity. 972 F.2d at 1034. 49 Originality: Is CMM's Expression Original? 50 On appeal, CMM does not dispute that it borrowed the employment metaphor, but instead insists that the district court erred in concluding that the employment metaphor itself and its expression thereof was not original within the meaning of copyright law. It essentially advances two arguments: (i) the district court misapplied the copyright concept of originality, imposing instead the higher patent-derived standard of novelty; and (ii) it failed to focus on the true differences between WWW and Payroll Payoff TM, maintaining that the features contributed by CMM went far beyond the full week, both sexes, and grand prize features. According to CMM, it meets the low originality threshold because Izor['s] expan[sion of] the employment phraseology she heard ..., translat[ion of] the idea graphically and independent[ ] creat[ion of] employment images such as the time clock and newspaper classified ads cannot be considered trivial additions, especially when coupled with other standard radio direct mail features never previously used together in one campaign. CMM's Brief, pp. 22-23. Finally, it also claims that whether payroll campaigns were commonplace or in the public domain prior to Payroll Payoff TM was a hotly-contested issue and, thus, the question of originality should have been decided by the jury. 51 At the outset, we dismiss CMM's claim that the district court imposed the patent-derived standard of novelty. As we noted above, the district court set forth the correct applicable law, see CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197-98, and, as we discuss, it did not err in its analysis. 52 That said, we turn first to the originality of the employment metaphor itself. Upon de novo review, we conclude that, by CMM's own admission, the similarity between the two promotions' employment concept--the use of the metaphor of earning an hourly wage--was, to borrow from Feist, not fortuitous but, rather, the result of copying. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. at 1287. Indeed, not only does CMM concede that it borrowed the employment metaphor from WWW, it also concedes in its Statement of Disputed Facts that the WWW campaign used the employment phraseology to get on the clock which it also uses and claims WPOR infringed. Because copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author, Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. at 1289, we agree with the district court that the employment metaphor itself does not enjoy copyright protection as it was not an original contribution of CMM within the meaning of copyright law. 53 In so concluding, we do not dispute that, as CMM points out, the mere borrowing of elements from previous works will not defeat copyrightability as long as the author has devised a new version of the work or has otherwise rearranged or transformed it so as to have made an original contribution. Towle Mfg. Co. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 986, 992 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (citing 1 Nimmer § 3.01, at 3-10 (1985 ed.)); cf. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27, 35 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that variations, although minor, to preexisting copyrighted sketch of Paddington Bear were original). We also do not dispute that CMM, as it insists, devised its own embellished version of a payroll contest using an employment metaphor. However, as we discuss below, CMM's contributions building upon the borrowed employment metaphor are either insufficient to satisfy the minimal requirements of originality or are unprotectable elements. 54 Before explaining why we reach this conclusion, we add this: Because we affirm the district court's conclusion that the employment metaphor itself was not original to CMM and, thus, not copyrightable, we accept WPOR's invitation not to address its cross-appeal from the district court's conclusion that the employment metaphor is protectable expression ... [and] that the use of the employment related terms and images in the various tangible works associated with CMM's promotions is protectable expression. CMM Cable Rep, 888 F.Supp. at 197. We prefer to do what the district court did at the preliminary injunction stage: decline to answer the more difficult question--determining whether copyright protection extends to the employment metaphor for the idea of an accumulating jackpot radio promotional sweepstakes on the basis that the metaphorical terminology of employment is protected expression--because we conclude that, even if protectible expression, it is not copyrightable here due to CMM's failure to meet the originality prong required for copyright protection. See CMM Cable Rep., 879 F.Supp. at 135. By not addressing WPOR's cross-appeal, we neither address its merits nor comment on the correctness of the district court's conclusion nor, for that matter, the similar determination made by an earlier court. See CMM Cable Rep., Inc., 888 F.Supp. at 197; CMM Cable Rep., Inc., 870 F.Supp. at 633-34 (same). 55 We turn next to the originality of CMM's contributions expanding the scope of the WWW promotion. Upon de novo review, we affirm the district court's conclusion that CMM's expansion of the promotion's scope does not constitute the modicum of originality necessary for copyright protection, finding no error in its reasoning. We note that, even assuming, as we read the record most favorably to CMM, that there were few, if any, prior payroll campaigns and even assuming that CMM's expansive contributions were original, they simply cannot enjoy copyright protection: to do so would be to erroneously extend copyright protection to a method of conducting a radio promotional contest. 16 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197 (noting that CMM cannot copyright the ideas, concepts, or methodologies that constitute the promotional contest itself); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 300 n. 1 (9th Cir.1979) (noting that game concepts are specifically not protected by the copyright laws). Cf. Lotus Develop., 49 F.3d at 815 (holding that Lotus' menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable method of operation). As another court noted in a previous copyright infringement case brought by CMM, a copyright infringement claim is not established merely by virtue of the fact that the CMM Payroll Payoff TM and the alleged infringer's campaigns share the same features involved in a radio promotional cash giveaway. Keymarket, 870 F.Supp. at 637. Cf. Barris/Fraser Enterp. v. Goodson-Todman Enter., 5 USPQ.2d 1887, 1988 WL 3013 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (For an infringement to be found, the copied material must be more than a stock element of television game shows.). Thus, we affirm the district court's ruling that, [t]o the extent that CMM's complaint can be interpreted as claiming infringement on the promotion itself (i.e., a method of conducting a radio promotional contest), ... summary judgment [is granted] in favor of WPOR. CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197. 17 56 Finally, we turn to the originality of CMM's alleged expansion of the employment phraseology, which, as CMM explains, is part of the heart of its expression which WPOR allegedly infringed. In response to WPOR's observation that CMM fails to point to any record evidence regarding what specific employment phraseology was original to Izor as opposed to having been lifted from the WWW promotion, CMM insists it had nothing tangible to copy when it created Payroll Payoff TM. 18 Even assuming this is true, and that CMM's employment phraseology was original to it, 19 we nonetheless conclude that it is not subject to copyright protection. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818. 57 It is axiomatic that copyright law denies protection to fragmentary words and phrases and to forms of expression dictated solely at functional considerations on the grounds that these materials do not exhibit the minimal level of creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection. 1 Nimmer, 2.01[B], at 2-13-18; see, e.g., Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that single words and short phrases in copyrighted text are not copyrightable); Magic Marketing, 634 F.Supp. at 771 (noting that phrases describing envelope contents and instructing recipients are unprotectable); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir.1972) (holding that most personal sort of deodorant is short phrase or expression, not an appreciable amount of text, and thus not protectible); Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 598 F.Supp. 445, 448 (E.D.Mo.1984) (Cliched language, phrases and expressions conveying an idea that is typically expressed in a limited number of stereotypic fashions, [sic] are not subject to copyright protection.). 20 The Copyright Office's own interpretive regulations explicitly embrace this rule of non-copyrightability. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1994) (excluding from copyright protection [w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans and familiar symbols and designs). 21 58 Here, the phraseology about which CMM claims infringement involves cliched language that is typically used to convey the idea of employment: if you're still 'on the clock' at quitting time and clock in and make $50 an hour. In addition, CMM's call in, clock in, and win is nothing less than a slogan as it is clearly a phrase expressing the aims or nature of an enterprise ... [and/or] a catch phrase used in advertising or promotion. Webster's II New Riverside Univ. Dictionary (1988). Even viewing the text as a whole, as CMM urges, it simply does not involve an appreciable amount of text or the minimal level of creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection; indeed, this is particularly true given CMM's concession that the phraseology to get on the clock was used in the WWW promotion. Furthermore, we cannot disregard the fact that, while perhaps not dictated solely at functional considerations, the phraseology is nonetheless inescapably functional in that it tells potential participants how to participate and how the contest works; as such, it essentially communicates the promotion's rules of the game. In addition, we are also cognizant that the limited space on, and costs of producing, the brochures favor (presumably) simple, catchy or hackneyed phrases. Accordingly, we conclude that the phraseology used by CMM in its expression of the employment metaphor, which itself was unoriginal to CMM in the first instance, is not protectible expression. See, e.g., Magic Marketing, 634 F.Supp. at 771 (noting that even colorful descriptions, such as advertising slogans, are not accorded copyright protection). 59 In reaching this conclusion, we simply disagree with CMM that the foregoing cases do not support this result. While certainly distinguishable on their facts, these cases nonetheless stand for, or otherwise support, the proposition that copyright protection simply does not extend to words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1994). That said, we understand--and do not dispute--CMM's point that it has not claimed copyright protection in the phraseology alone but rather in its brochure as a whole. This, however, does not alter our conclusion. Alberto-Culver is particularly instructive. Just as CMM alleges that WPOR copied the entire essence or heart of CMM's brochures, in Alberto-Culver the plaintiff similarly alleged that the defendant copied the same general image and thought. Alberto-Culver, 466 F.2d at 708. More important is the court's response to what it considered to be plaintiff's strongest case[:] ... that [its] label copyright as a whole was infringed. Alberto-Culver, 466 F.2d at 710. While the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the label as a whole--as a pictorial composition--is copyrightable, id. it nonetheless reversed on the ground that the phrase most personal sort of deodorant is uncopyrightable as, inter alia, it is a 'short phrase or expression' ... hardly qualify[ing] as an 'appreciable amount of original text.'  Id. (quoting Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.1959)). Similarly, here, although CMM may have obtained a copyright in the brochures as a whole, the fact remains that copyright protection does not extend to its ordinary employment phraseology which lacks the minimal level of originality. 60 We also reach this conclusion despite CMM's implicit assertion, which we in no way doubt, that CMM and Izor invested a substantial amount of effort into customizing and developing Payroll Payoff TM. However frustrating or disheartening as it may be, substantial effort is largely immaterial to the question of copyrightability. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 354-61, 111 S.Ct. at 1292-96 (rejecting the notion that copyright protection can be obtained merely through the sweat of the brow). That we so conclude with respect to the employment metaphor and its expression, however, does not necessarily leave CMM without any copyright protection in its brochures. 22 While the employment metaphor and its expression are not copyrightable given that copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author, Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. at 1289 (emphasis added), the jury reasonably found, 23 particularly after hearing Izor's testimony regarding her design of the brochure and her creation documents, that CMM's KIX brochure was nonetheless copyrightable as it was undisputed that [its] selection and arrangement are original and independent work products of CMM's Izor, id. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1004 (noting that Feist makes clear [that] a work may be copyrightable even though it is entirely a compilation of unprotectible [sic] elements). 61
62 CMM argues that a side-by-side comparison of WPOR's supporting media--which consists of a newspaper ad, faxes, television advertisements, and on-air script--with CMM's brochures reveals that direct plagiarism of the heart of CMM's work occurred. CMM's Reply Brief, at 9. It further contends that, because the supporting media parroted the WPOR brochure which the district court found likely to be a direct copy, the entry of summary judgment with respect to this media was incongruous error. Id. Upon de novo review, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on WPOR's supporting materials. 63 As an initial matter, we note that, contrary to CMM's characterization, the district court did not find that WPOR's brochure was likely to be a direct copy; rather, it described their striking similarities and subsequently made a sua sponte observation that summary judgment could also--but not quite--go in CMM's favor. CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197. Not only is this observation not controlling, 24 but it does not necessarily follow that it was incongruous error to treat the supporting materials differently from the brochures just because the brochures' striking similarities (which, as CMM points out, include the expression of the employment metaphor) also appear in the supporting materials. While CMM's KIX brochure and WPOR's supporting materials contain similar--even substantially similar--language, the controlling fact is that this similar language is simply uncopyrightable. As the district court properly concluded, and as we discussed above, the phrases payday, punch in, go on the clock, and begin earning $25 an hour, are uncopyrightable for one or both of two reasons: (i) the employment metaphor is unoriginal to CMM and/or (ii) these elements are made up of uncopyrightable words and short phrases. See CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 198. 64 There is an additional reason, stemming from the fact that the parties are essentially running the same promotion--a direct mail radio promotion using the unoriginal employment metaphor--for which the procedures for participating are the same. CMM points to the following in support of its claim of direct plagiarism of the heart of [its] work, CMM's Reply Brief, pp. 8-9: (i) the newspaper ad contains the same entry form found on the back of Payday Contest brochure and generously borrows from CMM's brochures when it directs the listener to send it in; (ii) the faxes tell the listener that they can win big bucks just for listening; (iii) the television advertisements encourage listeners to punch in on our time clock and earn 25 dollars an hour in the WPOR Payday Contest and to [l]isten, punch in and win; and (iv) the on-air script describes how to participate in the Payday Contest, introducing the idea with the statement that smart people know about the other pay day [sic] with more than [$16,000] up for grabs.... WPOR's Payday Contest. Id. 65 Exposed, the heart consists essentially of how to elements, conveyed through the use of the unoriginal employment metaphor, that inform potential listeners about both the promotion and how to participate. In a somewhat similar scenario, we have previously held that where the rules of a promotional contest of the sweepstakes type were so straight-forward and simple, copyright protection did not extend to those rules. See Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678 (questioned in Nimmer, § 13.03[B], at 13-81); see also American Dental, 1996 WL 224494 at  12 ([W]hile there are no hard and fast rules about when merger occurs, the consensus is that the 'shorter a phrase is, the less likely it is to have accep[table] substitutes, thus barring protection under the [m]erger [d]octrine.' ) (quoting Paul Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 2.7.3, at 2:100 (2d ed.1996)). Without going so far as to hold that the rules here are uncopyrightable per se under the merger doctrine, see id. (discussing merger doctrine); Concrete Machinery, 843 F.2d at 606-07 (same); Nimmer, § 13.03[B], at 13-81, we nonetheless conclude that CMM cannot succeed on its infringement claim with respect to the text of the supporting materials. We do so under the scenes a faire doctrine as the complained-of similarities consist of unoriginal elements flowing from the undisputed standard and inherent characteristics of direct mail radio promotions and, as such, flow from the logic and necessities of [these radio] game[s]. Barris/Fraser, 5 USPQ.2d at 1891 (stating that to prevail in infringement claim of television show copied material must be more than stock element). 25 66 Thus, while the parties are essentially operating the same promotion, and while WPOR may well have decided to copy the ideas underlying CMM's promotion, WPOR's supporting materials do not constitute actionable copying to the extent that the similarities arise from uncopyrightable elements, such as the unoriginal employment metaphor or de minimis phraseology, or involve standard how to features of a direct mail radio promotion. Because the basis of CMM's infringement claim regarding the supporting materials boils down to alleged copying of uncopyrightable similarities, the district court properly granted summary judgment. This conclusion is not altered by CMM's claim that WPOR's access to other CMM brochures remained a genuine disputed fact. In its Reply Brief, CMM compares its KTK brochure with WPOR's newspaper advertisement, pointing out that its KTK brochure contains a time clock similar to that in WPOR's advertisement, suggesting copying by WPOR of, among other elements, that image. Even assuming, without deciding, that access remained a disputed fact or that WPOR had access to the KTK brochure, we would nonetheless affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the supporting materials. Not only is the image of the time clock an uncopyrightable familiar symbol used to express the unoriginal employment phraseology to get on the clock, the time clocks themselves are not substantially similar. To the ordinary observer, see Concrete Machinery, 843 F.2d at 608-09, CMM's clock is a small stand-alone clock which has two minute hands suggesting movement. Under the face of the clock, it has a slot in which there is a time card sticking out containing a dollar sign. In contrast, WPOR's clock is a larger clock's face with only one stationary minute hand. Also, instead of being a stand-alone image, WPOR's clock is a large background image over which the brochure's and advertisement's text is printed. 67 Furthermore, CMM has failed to show how it was prejudiced by the district court's failure to consider the KTK brochure when it ruled on the supporting materials. CMM states that, while the advertisements closely track the KTK piece in layout and graphics, [ ... it] track[s] the text of KIX most closely, CMM's Reply Brief, pp. 6-7 n. 1, and the court did consider the latter. Moreover, the KTK brochure was actually given to the jury for consideration and, thus, the jury was able to take into consideration the layout and graphics of the KTK brochure when rendering its verdict. Finally, although CMM sought to have its claims with respect to the supporting materials get to the jury, we are hard pressed to think that--in light of its verdict of non-infringement of the brochures--the jury would have found any differently were it to consider the supporting materials. 68
69 CMM also claims error alleging that WPOR's access to CMM's other copyrighted Payroll Payoff TM promotions remained in question at the summary judgment phase. CMM points to WPOR's admission that it had access to both the KIX and KHEY brochures. First, WPOR's access to the KIX brochure was never in dispute, as WPOR admitted access. Second, we dispose of CMM's claim that access to other promotional brochures was a disputed material fact in the same way the district court did when it denied CMM's motion for reconsideration: CMM's record citations provide no support for any inference whatsoever that, at the summary judgment phase, WPOR had such access. CMM provides three fruitless record citations in its discussion of access in its principal brief: The first we disregard as irrelevant as it supports the undisputed fact of access to the KIX brochure; the second is a citation to the Jury Trial Transcript as evidence of WPOR's admission that it had access to the WHEY brochure, which we dismiss as utterly irrelevant and inappropriate in an appeal from summary judgment; and the third is an inexplicable citation to footnote 11, supra, which we ignore as a typographical error given that footnote 11 addresses CMM's trademark infringement claim and no other footnote is relevant. CMM's Brief, at 27. Nor do any of the additional record citations CMM provides in its reply brief persuade us differently. CMM's Reply Brief, at 6-7 n. 1. 70 Finally, even drawing all reasonable inferences in CMM's favor and assuming as true that, as CMM argues elsewhere in its brief, WPOR had access to CMM's promotions both by virtue of its prior use of CMM's services in 1991 and through McVay Media which received CMM promotional materials used by its customers, these inferences do not change the outcome of this appeal. Given our position that access to other brochures does not alter the outcome vis-a-vis the supporting materials, we consider--with some bewilderment--these inferences in connection with CMM's final argument that the question of access to (and therefore copying of) these other protected brochures was another matter that should have been left to the jury. CMM's Brief, at 27. Even taking them as true, we reject CMM's claim of error thus: Given that the Jury Verdict Form shows that the question of copying of all four of CMM's brochures was in fact submitted to the jury, we fail to understand CMM's claim that the question of access (and therefore copying of) [the] other protected brochures should have been left for the jury. While the jury did not address the question of access, it did address the ultimate question of whether WPOR copied any copyrightable elements of four of CMM's brochures--including those about which it claims access was in dispute.v. Verdict Inconsistency 71 CMM also argues that the district court's disparate treatment of the brochure and the supporting materials resulted in an inconsistent verdict. CMM may well have waived its right to raise this issue here, because it failed to raise this Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b) argument in a timely manner before the district court. Previously we have held that a defendant may not argue verdict inconsistency if he or she failed to object 'after the verdict was read and before the jury was discharged.'  Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 201 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 134 (1st Cir.1987)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 294, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1996). We note that CMM did not even explicitly raise the inconsistency issue in its post-judgment motion as a matter of law. The possibility of waiver notwithstanding, we nonetheless address CMM's contention to the extent that it is inextricably intertwined with the issues raised by its appeal of the district court's ruling on the supporting materials. 72 CMM essentially argues that the jury's verdict that CMM had a valid copyright in its brochures is inconsistent with the court's ruling as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage that the supporting materials were not copyrightable. There is an inconsistency, CMM explains, because the brochure and the supporting materials contain the same language. In addition, CMM complains that when the district court determined and the jury was informed by defendant's counsel that WPOR's supporting media had been deemed non-infringing as a matter of law, the jury had to find that the accused brochure was non-infringing as well, since the accused brochure and the supporting media contain the same text and similar graphics. CMM's Reply Brief at 4. 73 We disagree. As an initial matter, when we consider the jury's instructions, we find no inconsistency between the jury's verdict that CMM had a valid copyright in its brochures and the court's prior ruling regarding the supporting materials. Without objection by CMM, the jury was instructed thus on the issue of copyrightability: 74 To have a valid copyright in a brochure, CMM must persuade you by a preponderance of the evidence that it through an employee created an original work in composing the brochure. A work is original if it was independently created as opposed to copied from other works, and if it involves at least some modest creativity. Copyright can extend to text, layout, and/or design to the extent that they are original. CMM must have contributed some more than trivial element to the copyrighted work, but the result does not have to be new or novel. Indeed, a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works, so long as the similarity is fortuitous or coincidental, not the result of copying. 75 However, there is no copyrightable interest in the numerals, 1, 2, and 3; the accumulating jackpot idea; the work or employment metaphor; short ordinary phrases like the radio contest rules or registering by filling out a form, or requiring someone to tune in and listen, or to participate by calling in on the telephone or by facsimile; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variation of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring. 76 Moreover, if you conclude that a direct mail brochure for an employment related accumulating jackpot radio contest can be composed and/or designed in only one or a very few ways, then the law does not recognize a valid copyright of the material because to do so would foreclose altogether the use of such brochures by others. 77 Trial Transcript, Vol. IV at 738-39. First, we note that these instructions are consistent with the law of the case regarding the supporting materials. See CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 198. Second, the fact that the jurors found CMM to have a valid copyright in its brochures despite the court's ruling on the supporting materials suggests that--in following the instructions--they made a permissible and reasonable distinction between, on the one hand, the brochure's language or text and, on the other, its graphics or arrangement. While the law of the case held that the former did not constitute copyrightable elements, it did not preclude the jury from finding that CMM met its burden of proving that the brochures' graphics or arrangement were independently created by CMM's Izor and, thus, were original and copyrightable. 78 In addition, we are unconvinced that the district court's grant of summary judgment on the supporting materials necessarily affected--let alone adversely to CMM--the jury's deliberations: One could just as reasonably think that if the district court's prior ruling had any effect at all, it would be more likely to have prejudiced the jury's determination of the existence of a valid copyright; but, instead, the fact that the supporting materials and the brochure contain the same language did not preclude the jury from finding that CMM had a valid copyright in its four brochures. In any event, CMM's contention ignores the fact that the district court's prior ruling said nothing about the brochures' layout and/or design, aspects which the jury also considered in determining both the existence of a valid copyright and infringement. 79 Finally, it is well established that even if both access and substantial similarity are demonstrated, the trier of fact may nonetheless find no copying if the defendant shows independent creation. Grubb, 88 F.3d at 3. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 599 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 156, 136 L.Ed.2d 101 (1996), the verdict that WPOR did not infringe CMM's copyrights could also be understood as a reasonable determination that, uncopyrightable elements aside, there was no substantial similarity between the two brochures; indeed, based upon our own comparison of the brochures (as set forth above), we do not find them to be substantially similar. In the alternative, the jury could also have reasonably found that access and substantial similarity aside, WPOR's Payday Contest brochure was, in fact, an independent creation, crediting Spizuoco's corroborated testimony that he put away CMM's KIX brochure because he did not want to copy it as per the instructions he had received. Based upon our own review of the evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, see id., we affirm the jury's verdict as we find no inconsistency.