Opinion ID: 201381
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal and State Court Actions

Text: On November 10, 2004, the Rosselló Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Acevedo Defendants in the District Court that asserted various federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of the November 2, 2004 election. On November 12, 2004, an amended complaint was filed alleging that the Commission's decision to (1) regard the three-mark ballots as valid and count the votes contained therein, (2) suspend the recount pending completion of the general canvass,14 and (3) disregard certain late-filed absentee ballots15 violated a variety of their federal constitutional rights.16 The Rosselló Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with the above 14 The Rosselló Plaintiffs, by their own concession, have achieved complete and substantial relief on this claim, and therefore, we need not give it any further consideration. 15 The Rosselló Plaintiffs have conceded, both in their opening brief and at oral argument, that they have achieved complete and substantial relief from the Commission with respect to this claim. To be sure, there is still a question as to whether the Commission will follow through with the relief it has promised. But, any claim concerning this open question is not yet ripe. 16 In addition, the Rosselló Plaintiffs have alleged that the Commission violated their constitutional rights when it made substantial changes to the rules governing the election after the votes had been cast. -9- challenges.17 The District Court scheduled a hearing for November 18, 2004.18 Meanwhile, on November 16, 2004, the Suárez Plaintiffs, who claim to have cast three-mark ballots, filed suit in the Court of First Instance seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the three-mark ballots and an injunction requiring the Commission to adjudicate the ballots.19 The Suárez Plaintiffs insisted that an invalidation of the ballots would deprive them of their right to vote and, thus, their right to due process of law and to equal protection under the law.20 17 The Rosselló Plaintiffs also sought injunctive and declaratory relief in connection with their claim that Puerto Rico Law No. 197, 1 P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 456 et seq., is unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to authorize or allow the transition process [for the next governor] to proceed before the next governor . . . has been determined. We need not address this issue. The District Court denied preliminary injunctive relief on this claim, and the Rosselló Plaintiffs did not bother to appeal that ruling. Moreover, whether Law No. 197 allows the transition process to go forward during a recount is a question of local law that will soon be mooted by the recount. 18 We note that the Rosselló Plaintiffs chose to challenge the decisions of the Commission in federal court rather than exercise their statutory right to appeal to the Court of First Instance. See 16 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3016a. 19 The Suárez Plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Commission to (1) complete the general canvass before conducting a recount and (2) certify the winning gubernatorial candidate by December 22, 2004. 20 The Suárez Plaintiffs filed this action even though the Commission had already decided that the three-mark ballots are valid. -10- The Court of First Instance dismissed the Suárez action without prejudice on November 18, 2004 on the ground that no actual controversy existed because the Commission had already upheld the validity of the ballots.21 That same day, the Suárez Plaintiffs, concerned that the validity of the ballots had not been adequately established, requested that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico review the Court of First Instance's dismissal. The Supreme Court agreed to do so. On the morning of November 20, 2004, the Commissioner of the NPP and the NPP itself, defendants in the Suárez action, removed the action to the District Court. Notice of removal was filed with the Supreme Court at 11:48 a.m. In response, the Suárez Plaintiffs and a defendant in the Suárez action, alleging various procedural defects in removal,22 as well as lack of federal jurisdiction, moved the District Court to remand. Soon thereafter, two mandamus petitions were filed in this court, each one seeking an order requiring that the District Court remand the action. Despite the removal, the Supreme Court purported to enter a judgment on the Suárez action on the evening of November 20, 2004. By a vote of four to three, it ordered that the three-mark ballots were to be adjudicated as containing valid votes for the 21 Significantly, the Commissioner of the NPP, a defendant in the Suárez action, had requested dismissal on several grounds, one of which was lack of jurisdiction because the Commission had already adjudicated the contested ballots as valid. 22 Because of the disposition of the removal issue on other grounds, we need not address the alleged procedural defects. -11- marked candidates for Governor and Resident Commissioner, as well as the identified party for purposes of maintaining its principal party status. See supra note 7. On November 20, 2004, the District Court issued an order in the Rosselló action that the Commission set aside and segregate the three-mark ballots and refrain from announcing the winner of the gubernatorial election. Then, on November 24, 2004, the District Court issued an order that: (1) stated that the Supreme Court's judgment was void because the removal rendered the Supreme Court without jurisdiction to enter the judgment;23 and (2) ordered that a recount be conducted by counting the number of [three-mark] split ballots, identifying and segregating the same, but not adjudicating the ballots. (Emphasis in original.) The Acevedo Defendants appealed from the order that the three-vote ballots not be adjudicated.