Opinion ID: 77872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Trial and Direct Appeal

Text: After the murder charge was transferred in 1978 to Alabama Circuit Court, Judge Kenneth Ingram presided over Davis's case. Frank Teel continued as one of the State's attorneys, along with District Attorney William Hill and Assistant District Attorney Robert Williams, Jr. However, Judge Teel no longer was involved in the case. Davis's jury trial before Judge Ingram began on April 14, 1980. The jury found Davis guilty of capital murder and fixed his punishment at death by electrocution. Davis then filed a motion for a new trial based on, inter alia, Judge Teel's having presided in juvenile court when Judge Teel's brother was one of the State's attorneys. This was the first time Davis objected to Judge Teel's presiding. The state trial court denied Davis's motion for a new trial. After holding a separate sentencing hearing, the state trial court sentenced Davis to death by electrocution. Davis appealed, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed Davis's conviction and sentence. [3] See Davis v. State, 554 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Crim. App.1984). In that direct appeal, Davis argued, inter alia, that Judge Teel's sua sponte failure to recuse himself from the juvenile court proceedings when his brother Frank Teel appeared as one of the State's attorneys violated Davis's constitutional rights to due process. [4] In denying this claim, the state appellate court determined that Judge Teel was not required to disqualify himself under Alabama Code § 12-1-12 [5] because his brother was not a party in the proceeding. Id. at 1098-99. The state appellate court also examined Canon 3C(1)(d) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, which provides that a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to, instances where: (d) He or his spouse, or a person within the fourth degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is named a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. . . . Ala. Canons Jud. Ethics 3C(1)(d)(i)-(ii). The state appellate court concluded under Canon 3C(1)(d)(ii) that Judge Teel was not required to recuse himself because his brother, acting in his official capacity as an Assistant District Attorney, did not have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding[s]. Davis, 554 So.2d at 1098-99 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). The state appellate court reasoned that because Frank Teel's fee or salary was not dependent upon the result of the litigation . . . he had no interest other than his pride in the successful outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 1099 (quotation marks omitted). The state appellate court also found that Davis had presented no evidence of actual bias by Judge Teel to rebut the presumption in Alabama law that a judge is qualified and unbiased. Id. The state appellate court noted that Davis did not challenge Judge Teel's presiding over the juvenile court until Davis filed a motion for a new trial nearly two years after the juvenile court proceedings. Id. Furthermore, after independently reviewing the juvenile court proceedings before Judge Teel, the state appellate court found no evidence of bias against Davis and noted that Judge Teel's ruling at the first detention hearing was favorable to Davis. Id. Finally, in evaluating Davis's appearance claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Judge Teel's decision to certify Davis to be tried as an adult was well reasoned and showed no signs of an abuse of discretion. Id. The Supreme Court of Alabama summarily affirmed as to the judicial recusal issue. Ex parte Davis, 554 So.2d 1111 (Ala.1989). The Supreme Court of Alabama thereafter overruled Davis's application for rehearing. Davis v. State, 569 So.2d 738 (Ala.1990). The United States Supreme Court denied Davis's petition for a writ of certiorari. Davis v. Alabama, 498 U.S. 1127, 111 S.Ct. 1091, 112 L.Ed.2d 1196 (1991).