Opinion ID: 2980812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Translation Problems

Text: Popovych has failed to show that any errors in translation took place. Although he points out several instances in the record where the answers given do not respond to the questions asked, he offers no proof that the translation was the issue rather than his own answers. In the past, we have declined to find translation errors where the petitioner “fails to explain ‘how these passages should have been interpreted.’” Makhalou v. Gonzales, 173 F. App’x 378, 380 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Filipi v. Gonzales, 127 F. App’x 848, 851 (6th Cir. 2005)). This court should not be asked to assume that mistranslations have occurred without some proof in the record beyond discrepancies and ambiguities. In Koods v. Gonzales, 129 F. App’x 263, 265 (6th Cir. 2005), we rejected a similar request. Popovych has also failed to prove that the interpreter was incompetent. He was certified to translate in Popovych’s native language, and there is no evidence to suggest that there were different dialects at play. In Fall v. Gonzales, 218 F. App’x 385, 389 (6th Cir. 2007), we found no violation of due process in part because “[a]t no point does the record indicate that the interpreter was incapable of interpreting the language petitioner spoke or that he spoke a different dialect.” Popovych’s case can be distinguished from Amadou v. I.N.S., where the translator spoke a different dialect and commented several times during the hearing that he did not understand what Amadou was saying. Amadou v. I.N.S., 226 F.3d 724, 725 (6th Cir. 2000). The IJ acted reasonably when confronted with the translation difficulties to ensure Popovych’s due process concerns were addressed. When Popovych’s lawyer expressed concerns 10 about the quality of the translation, the IJ asked him specifically what was being lost.2 When she determined that nothing of significant import had been lost, she had the interpreter instruct Popovych “to speak in shorter sentences and to watch you and you tell him to stop so you can make sure you’re interpreting the exact sentences.” The record suggests that the interpreter tried to do so, but that Popovych did not listen to the instruction, requiring the IJ to stop him again. The IJ concluded that the translator was not at fault for the length of Popovych’s answers and so saw no need to stop the proceeding or find a replacement. These actions are similar to those taken by the IJ in Malaj v. Gonzales, 199 F. App’x 453, 460 (6th Cir. 2006), where the IJ had the interpreter repeat questions that elicited unclear answers and warned the interpreter to translate word for word. In Iancu v. I.N.S, 69 F. App’x 661, 662 (6th Cir. 2003), counsel objected only once that “something was lost in translation” but did not make further objections after that. The court determined that because “counsel had ample opportunity to clarify any matters that he thought were unclear, during direct and redirect examination,” there had been no denial of due process. Id. Although Popovych points to several cases where the IJ treated the objection differently, including sending a recording of the hearing to a translation-evaluation service, none of these cases suggests that such actions are required to ensure due process. See Peci v. Holder, 379 F. App’x 499 (6th Cir. 2010); Ba v. Holder, 374 F. App’x 594 (6th Cir. 2010). Immigration judges have broad discretion in conducting their hearings. See Ahmed v. Gonzales, 398 F.3d 722, 725 (2005). The IJ took action to ensure that Popovych was 2 At oral argument, counsel for Popovych stated that the Ukrainian speaker was actually Latvian, which explained why he was unable to specify translation errors. This fact would not have prevented Popovych from reviewing the transcript after the hearing and submitting a showing of specific errors. 11 afforded a full and fair hearing. Under the standard articulated in Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 533, 553 (6th Cir. 2003), no due process violation occurred. Even had Popovych shown errors in translation, he has failed to show that he was prejudiced by any alleged translation errors. Proof of prejudice is necessary to establish a due process violation in an immigration hearing. See Warner v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 524, 539 (6th Cir. 2004). The IJ found Popovych to be credible, and denied his application for an independent reason, namely, his failure to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground. There is little potential that a translation error affected her finding. This case is similar to Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 2010), in which we stated that inadequate translation was irrelevant because the BIA rejected an application for failure to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. Because the case did not hinge on an adverse-credibility determination, any inadequate translation was not prejudicial. See also Kalaj v. Gonzales, 185 F. App’x 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2006); Cela v. Gonzales, 205 F. App’x 376, 387 (6th Cir. 2006). This case is again distinguishable from Amadou, 226 F.3d at 725-26, where the IJ denied Amadou’s application on adverse-credibility grounds because of inconsistencies in Amadou’s testimony and his limited knowledge on crucial points. We held that “the interpreter’s faulty translation directly prejudiced Amadou because the judge and Board denied his application based on the testimony at the hearing. . . . [T]he interpreter’s faulty translation likely played a significant part in the judge’s credibility determination” and the Board’s decision to deny Amadou’s applications, and therefore constituted a violation of due process rights. Id. at 727. In situations like Amadou, the potential for translation to prejudice the applicant is great, because inconsistencies and vagueness will work against the applicant. We recently stayed an appeal to provide a petitioner with 12 the opportunity to present evidence to the BIA that her medical records were mistranslated, because an inconsistency in the records “contributed substantially and directly to the Immigration Judge’s adverse-credibility determination.” See Sea v. Holder, 444 F. App’x 843, 844 (6th Cir. 2011). In Popovych’s case, with no adverse-credibility finding, he has failed to show such prejudice.