Opinion ID: 1058388
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acquisition of Riparian Rights by Court Order

Text: The Association first challenges the trial court's determination that the Braceys acquired riparian rights by virtue of the 1925 court order granting a right and privilege of erecting a wharf to Poole. The legal effect of a court order is a question of law, and we review such issues de novo on appeal. Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006). As a general rule, riparian rights are appurtenant to land, and are included when the land is conveyed. Waverly Water-Front & Improv. Co. v. White, 97 Va. 176, 33 S.E. 534 (1899). The law in Virginia is clear, as both parties agree, that riparian rights are severable from the property to which the rights were originally appurtenant. Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 912, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965). Further, such severance need not be explicit, and may be accomplished by clear implication when one party conveys to another the right to build a wharf or pier by easement, Irby v. Roberts, 256 Va. 324, 330, 504 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1998), or by lease, see Grinels v. Daniel, 110 Va. 874, 876, 67 S.E. 534, 535 (1910). In Irby, we reviewed our decision in Grinels holding that a lease for the purposes of building a steamboat wharf carried with it riparian rights: [I]n making such a grant ... the landowner did not `part with his riparian rights to any greater extent than was necessary to enable the lessees to erect the wharf.' Implicitly, however, the landowner must part with those rights necessary to fulfill the intent of the grant. Irby, 256 Va. at 330, 504 S.E.2d at 844 (citation omitted) (quoting Grinels, 110 Va. at 876, 67 S.E. at 535). However, we have not had occasion to decide the extent and duration of riparian rights obtained by virtue of a court order pursuant to Code § 62.1-165 or its predecessor statutes. Upon initial consideration, the treatment of riparian rights in the easement and lease contexts suggests that a court order granting the right to build a wharf would accomplish the same severance and conveyance of riparian rights. When Poole obtained from the county the right to construct a wharf pursuant to statute via the 1925 court order, he necessarily obtained from the county the rights necessary to fulfill the intent of the grant. Irby, 256 Va. at 330, 504 S.E.2d at 844. The trial court explicitly acknowledged this, holding that a wharf, by its very nature, carries with it riparian rights. However, the nature of the riparian rights necessary to fulfill the intent of the grant by definition depends upon the nature and extent of the grant itself. Grinels concerned two women who obtained a lease, for them and their successors, on a quarter-acre of riverfront property `for the purposes of constructing a steamboat wharf, and to give the public an uninterrupted travel thereto and from.' 110 Va. at 875, 67 S.E. at 535. Some years later, the lessor's successor brought suit, asserting his continuing riparian rights and seeking to restrain unrelated uses of the wharf. Id. at 876, 67 S.E. at 535. We held that although the lessor had conveyed to the lessees the riparian rights necessary to accomplish the stated purposes, that was all he conveyed, and that he retained sufficient rights to prevent uses inconsistent with the purposes of the lease. Id. at 876-78, 67 S.E. at 535-36. We have reiterated this concept with regard to riparian rights obtained by easement. In Irby, a very similar case, we dealt with a deed granting `a 30[-foot] easement ... for the purpose of constructing a pier.' 256 Va. at 329, 504 S.E.2d at 843. Relying on Grinels, we held that implicit in the deed was a conveyance of only those rights necessary to fulfill the intent of the grant. Id. at 330, 504 S.E.2d at 844. The nature of the grant here is similarly dispositive. By its express terms, the court order relied upon by the trial court merely granted to Poole the right and privilege of erecting a wharf. The statute under which Poole petitioned the circuit court allowed courts to evaluate petitions for the privilege of erecting a wharf at or on any county landing, and to determine the same and... grant such privilege and fix such rates and charges upon such conditions and limitations as to it may seem fit. Code § 1998 (1925) (now Code § 62.1-165). Whereas the lease in Grinels was to the original lessees and their successors, and the easement in Irby, like all easements appurtenant, passed to the successors of the holder of the easement unless extinguished by some legal means, privileges such as the one granted to Poole by court order do not pass to successors. Indeed, the court order specified only Poole as the grantee. When Poole died, the personal privilege he received by court order also expired. Because the riparian rights implicitly conveyed by a grant are limited to those rights necessary to fulfill the intent of the grant, Irby, 256 Va. at 330, 504 S.E.2d at 844, it follows that when a grant has ceased to be effective, the accompanying riparian rights are no longer effective. The Association argued at trial that the personal nature of the grant defeated the Braceys' claim to have received riparian rights by way of the court order. It has assigned error to the trial court's holding that the riparian rights were not personal to Poole. We agree with the Association. As a matter of law, the Braceys could not have obtained riparian rights under the 1925 court order granting the privilege to Poole. [2]