Opinion ID: 2602155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: disbarment sanction

Text: ¶ 5 Attorney discipline sanctions are governed by the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, chapter 15 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. These standards state that the purpose of sanctioning an attorney is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to discharge properly their professional responsibilities. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions rule 1.1. Rule 3 of those standards provides that after misconduct has been found, the factors to be considered in imposing a sanction include (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. ¶ 6 These rules additionally provide that an order disbarring an attorney is generally appropriate absent mitigating or aggravating circumstances when he or she (a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or (b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation ... or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or (c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions rule 4.2. [1] ¶ 7 Subsection (a) above directs us to rule 8.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for definitions of professional misconduct sufficient to trigger the sanction of disbarment. The first subsection of rule 8.4 provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to [v]iolate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another. Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 8.4(a). ¶ 8 The trial court held that Mr. Johnson violated rule 1.15(a), (b), and (c) . . . of the Rules of Professional Conduct when he intentionally misappropriated [his client's] funds for his personal or business use. After determining that Johnson had violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, the trial court correctly weighed mitigating and aggravating factors and determined that, although Johnson's conduct was not as egregious as that of other attorneys who have been disbarred by this court in recent years, disbarment was the appropriate remedy under our case law because there were no substantial mitigating circumstances. We agree. ¶ 9 We held in Babilis that intentional misappropriation of a client's funds will result in disbarment absent truly compelling mitigating circumstances. 951 P.2d 207, 217 (Utah 1997). We see no reason to deviate from this rule. The rule takes into consideration the factors listed in rule 3, including the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. As we stated in Babilis, [i]ntentional misappropriation of a client's funds is always indefensible; it strikes at the very foundation of the trust and honesty that are indispensable to the functioning of the attorney-client relationship and, indeed, to the functioning of the legal profession itself. Id. We will not abide such conduct. ¶ 10 Johnson does not dispute the fact that he did not return the $28,800 to his client upon demand. The trial court found that he made no satisfactory explanation for this failure. The court weighed the mitigating factors presented by Johnson and determined that they were not sufficient to warrant a lesser sanction. He contends that he has maintained a practice for many years, which includes significant pro bono work, involvement in community organizations, and a good reputation among his fellows and that he is not the type of individual committing the type of acts requiring disbarment. Although a good reputation and community service are commendable, they do not constitute truly compelling mitigating circumstances when there has been a misappropriation of client's funds. Id. at 217. ¶ 11 In addition, Johnson contends that the entire circumstances surrounding the misappropriation is a mitigating circumstance. Although he does not dispute that he used the $28,800 for personal or business purposes, he asserts that there is a question of fact about whether the client was even entitled to that money. He argues that when the client, after rejecting his tender of the money, terminated the attorney-client relationship and told him to do with the money what he would, his own obligation to keep the money in trust ended. He argues further that his client owed him money from other transactions including fees for protecting his interest in this case, and thus he was entitled to a portion of the $28,800 he initially tendered. We disagree. ¶ 12 The Rules of Professional Conduct require that in the case of a dispute over funds, the attorney is to maintain those funds in a separate trust account until the dispute is resolved. Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 1.15(c). Johnson tendered $28,800 as the client's portion of the settlement funds. Pending resolution of the dispute with his client over ownership of those funds, he was required to maintain them in a separate trust account. [2] Neither of the factors he presents as mitigating the presumptive sanction of disbarment is truly compelling, and we therefore affirm the trial court's order. [3] ¶ 13 Johnson also contends that [a]bsent a finding by the trial court of `serious criminal conduct' his case does not meet the requirements for presumptive disbarment in rule 4.2. We reject that argument here as we did in Babilis. First, disbarment is appropriate when an attorney's conduct falls within any one of the three subsections of rule 4.2. The trial court's finding that Johnson knowingly violated rule 1.15 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for his own benefit was sufficient to support his disbarment. As we earlier stated, this conduct seriously injures, at the very least, the public and the legal system. Second, the intentional misappropriation of client funds falls within the description of other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation referred to in subsection (c) of rule 4.2. [4] ¶ 14 We do not administer the sanction of disbarment lightly; we understand its devastating effects on an attorney. However, we are charged with protecting the public and the legal system of our state from those attorneys who do not abide by their professional responsibilities, and we cannot tolerate the intentional misappropriation of a client's funds. Thus we affirm the disbarment.