Opinion ID: 1512718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the factor of excuse

Text: Nanci Holley contends, however, that Section 15.02(1)(E) is rendered inapplicable where a parent's duty of support has been excused, and that her duty of support was excused in the instant case. An analogous contention was before this court in the context of determining whether the consent of a parent was a necessary prerequisite to the adoption of his child under Article 46a(6)(a), Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, [2] Heard v. Bauman, 443 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.1969). That statute provided that the consent of a parent to adoption of his child was not necessary where such parent or parents shall not have contributed substantially to the support of such child during such period of two (2) years commensurate with his financial ability. However the statutory scheme which was before this court in Heard v. Bauman, supra , is significantly different from Section 15.02 of the Texas Family Code and thus the case is not necessarily controlling. As noted in Wiley v. Spratlan, supra , the focus of the current termination proceeding is twofold; first, on the acts or omissions of the parent and, second, upon the best interest of the child. The emphasis of Article 46a(6)(a) was on whether the conduct of the parent justifies the waiver of the requirement that the parent consent to an adoption. This change demonstrates the intent of the Legislature to move from the concept that the parent cannot block the severance of the parent-child relationship through adoption when the parent has engaged in unexcused blameworthy conduct, to the idea that the parent cannot prevent termination (1) when there exist acts or omissions by the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (2) when termination is indeed in the best interest of the child. The interpretation of Section 15.02 which will best fulfill the intent of the Legislature is that any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent can be considered by the trial court only as one of the factors in determining the best interest of the child.