Opinion ID: 2091215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: constancy of accusation testimony

Text: Lastly, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted the constancy of accusation testimony of S.C., A.D. and K.J. [23] because such testimony serves no legitimate purpose in the case of a consensual sexual relationship between consenting adults, where the conduct is illegal solely due to the parties' relationship. Alternatively, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted the constancy of accusation testimony of S.C. and K.J. because P.L. confided in both witnesses only after she had formed a plan to inform school authorities about the defendant's misconduct and, therefore, their testimony was akin to postcomplaint testimony. Finally, the defendant claims that the prejudicial effect of the constancy of accusation testimony adduced from all three witnesses outweighed its probative value. The state responds that, because constancy of accusation testimony is admissible to establish the fact and timing of a sexual assault, and because sexual intercourse between a teacher and a student in these circumstances constitutes a sexual assault in violation of § 53a-71 (a)(8), the trial court properly permitted S.C., A.D. and K.J. to testify as constancy of accusation witnesses. The state further maintains that, because P.L. had confided in S.C. and K.J. before she filed an official complaint with the police, the trial court properly admitted their testimony. Lastly, the state claims that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the constancy of accusation testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We agree with the state. The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the state from introducing any constancy of accusation testimony because, inter alia, [t]he testimony of more than one constancy witness [would] be cumulative and unnecessarily prejudicial, and [t]he historical rationale and policy reasons for permitting so-called `constancy' testimony . . . to rebut an implication of `recent fabrication'  are inapplicable to the present case because P.L. had informed most individuals about her alleged sexual encounters with the defendant on or about the same day that she made those allegations public at school. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. [24] At trial, P.L. testified that she had had sexual intercourse with the defendant on numerous occasions between June 9 and October 24, 2001. She further testified that, during this time period, she had informed three individuals  S.C., A.D. and K.J.  about her sexual relationship with the defendant. Although P.L. had confided in A.D. throughout the summer and fall of 2001, she did not confide in K.J. or S.C. until sometime in mid-October after she and N.R. had resolved to confront the defendant and to inform officials at Career School about the defendant's sexual misconduct. On October 24, 2001, a few days after P.L. had confided in K.J. and S.C., N.R. and P.L. confronted the defendant and reported his sexual misconduct to school officials. At the conclusion of P.L.'s testimony, the state moved, outside the presence of the jury, to introduce constancy of accusation testimony from S.C., A.D. and K.J. The defendant requested a preliminary hearing to determine whether the anticipated testimony of each witness satisfied the requirements of State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d 917 (1996), and State v. Samuels, 75 Conn.App. 671, 817 A.2d 719 (2003), rev'd on other grounds, 273 Conn. 541, 871 A.2d 1005 (2005). The trial court granted the defendant's request. At the preliminary hearing, S.C. testified that P.L. had informed him of her sexual relationship with the defendant [t]hree or four days before she told the [school] administration. S.C. testified that P.L. told him that she had had sexual intercourse with the defendant more than once, that the defendant had taken her to some library, the Fairfield library, and that the two had gone jogging together throughout the summer. The defendant objected to the admission of S.C.'s testimony, claiming that it lacked specificity. [25] The trial court overruled the defendant's objection, and permitted S.C. to testify before the jury as a constancy of accusation witness. At the conclusion of S.C.'s testimony, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction, cautioning them that the evidence was admissible only to corroborate the alleged victim's testimony concerning the fact and timing of the alleged victim's complaint. [26] Thereafter, the jury was excused, and the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing concerning the admissibility of A.D.'s constancy of accusation testimony. A.D. testified that, commencing in May or June of 2001, P.L. began to confide in her that she was having a sexual relationship with the defendant. Specifically, P.L. told A.D. that she had engaged in oral and vaginal sexual intercourse with the defendant at various locations, including the Fairfield University Library and near Whalley or Southern where P.L. and the defendant often went jogging in the mornings. The defendant objected to the admission of A.D.'s testimony, claiming that it was cumulative in light of S.C.'s testimony. The trial court overruled the objection, and permitted A.D. to testify before the jury as a constancy of accusation witness. At the conclusion of A.D.'s testimony, the trial court reiterated its limiting instruction to the jury. [27] Thereafter, the jury was excused, and the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing concerning the admissibility of K.J.'s constancy of accusation testimony. K.J. testified that P.L. had told her a few days before she reported [the defendant's sexual misconduct] that she had had sexual intercourse with the defendant on numerous occasions. Moreover, P.L. had told K.J. that she and the defendant often met in libraries, and at the park whenever she would go jogging near her house. The defendant objected to the admission of K.J.'s testimony, claiming that it lacked specificity. See footnote 25 of this opinion. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection, and permitted K.J. to testify before the jury as a constancy of accusation witness. At the conclusion of K.J.'s testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that the same limitations that I told you about with respect to those other two witnesses apply to [K.J.'s] testimony as well. Moreover, in its final charge to the jury, the trial court reiterated its limiting instructions concerning the constancy of accusation testimony of S.C., A.D. and K.J. [28] As a preliminary matter, we set forth the appropriate standard of review. [T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility . . . of evidence. . . . [E]videntiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541, 547, 871 A.2d 1005 (2005). Before addressing the merits of the defendant's claims, we review the history and purpose of the constancy of accusation doctrine. The constancy of accusation doctrine traces its roots to the `fresh complaint' rule; State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. at 294, 677 A.2d 917; [t]he narrow purpose of [which] was to negate any inference that because the victim had failed to tell anyone that she had been [sexually assaulted], her later assertion of [sexual assault] could not be believed. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 296, 677 A.2d 917. Because juries were allowed  sometimes even instructed  to draw negative inferences from the woman's failure to complain after an assault . . . the doctrine of fresh complaint evolved as a means of counterbalancing these negative inferences. Used in this way, the fresh complaint doctrine allowed the prosecutor to introduce, during the case-in-chief, evidence that the victim had complained soon after the [sexual assault]. Its use thereby forestalled the inference that the victim's silence was inconsistent with her present formal complaint of [assault]. . . . In other words, evidence admitted under this doctrine effectively served as anticipatory rebuttal, in that the doctrine often permitted the prosecutor to bolster the credibility of the victim before her credibility had first been attacked. . . . The fresh complaint doctrine thus constituted a rare exception to the common-law rule that prohibited rehabilitative evidence in the absence of an attack on the witness's credibility. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. at 303, 677 A.2d 917, we observed that the state and the victim both have a legitimate interest in protect[ing] against the unwarranted, but nonetheless persistent, view that a sexual assault victim who does not report the crime cannot be trusted to testify truthfully about the incident. On the other hand, we observed that a defendant has an interest in not being unreasonably burdened by such accrediting or supporting evidence, which . . . generally is not admissible in the trial of crimes other than sexual assault. Id., at 302, 677 A.2d 917. In light of these competing interests, we rejected the then existing rule that a person to whom a sexual assault victim had complained could provide substantive testimony with respect to the incident. See id., at 303-304, 677 A.2d 917. Instead, we concluded that a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator. In all other respects, our current rules remain in effect. Thus, such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes. Before the evidence may be admitted, therefore, the victim must first have testified concerning the facts of the sexual assault and the identity of the person or persons to whom the incident was reported. In determining whether to permit such testimony, the trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence against any prejudice to the defendant. In addition, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that any delay by the victim in reporting the incident is a matter for the jury to consider in evaluating the weight of the victim's testimony. Id., at 304-305, 677 A.2d 917; accord Connecticut Code of Evidence § 6-11(c). [29] In light of the history and purpose of the constancy of accusation doctrine we further concluded, in State v. Samuels, supra, 273 Conn. at 551-52, 871 A.2d 1005, that statements made by a victim after he or she had filed an official complaint with the police were inadmissible as constancy of accusation evidence. In arriving at this conclusion, we reasoned that [o]nce a sexual assault victim has reported the crime to the police . . . corroborative testimony by constancy witnesses that is based on post-complaint conversations with the victim, even if relevant, no longer serves the purpose of countering a negative inference as to the victim's credibility because it is the inconsistency between the victim's silence following the assault and her subsequent complaint to the police that gives rise to such an inference. Id. With this background in mind, we now turn to the merits of the defendant's claims. The defendant first claims that the constancy of accusation doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because P.L. was over the age of consent and did, in fact, consent to sexual intercourse with the defendant. We reject this claim because, pursuant to § 53a-71 (a)(8), P.L. legally was incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse with the defendant. Just as a minor under the age of sixteen legally is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse generally; see General Statutes § 53a-71 (a)(1); an elementary or secondary school student legally is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse with a school employee who works in the school system in which the student is enrolled. See General Statutes § 53a-71 (a)(8); see also State v. Russell, 25 Conn.App. 243, 252, 594 A.2d 1000 ([t]he statute proscribing sexual assault in the second degree has its origins in the desire of the state to prohibit persons from engaging in sexual intercourse with individuals who are deemed legally incapable of consent), cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911, 597 A.2d 338 (1991). To the extent that the defendant invites this court to draw a distinction between consent-in-fact and consent-in-law for purposes of the admission of constancy of accusation testimony, we decline to do so. Cf. State v. Samuels, supra, 273 Conn. at 550, 871 A.2d 1005 (the fact that statutory rape differs from traditional rape because the underage victim may have consented to the act does not alter the requirement that the victim must report to the constancy witness that the act was of a sexual nature). The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly permitted S.C. and K.J. to testify as constancy of accusation witnesses because P.L. had not confided in K.J. or S.C. until after she and N.R. decided to report the defendant's sexual misconduct to school authorities. In support of this claim, the defendant relies on Samuels, wherein we concluded that statements made by a victim after he or she had filed an official complaint with the police were inadmissible as constancy of accusation evidence. We determined that such statements do not counter the negative inference concerning the victim's credibility that may arise due to the victim's silence following the assault, but prior to her subsequent complaint to the police. Id., at 552, 871 A.2d 1005. In the present case, P.L.'s statements to S.C. and K.J. were made four or five days before P.L. reported the defendant's sexual misconduct to school authorities and filed an official complaint with the police. These statements therefore countered the negative inference that the jurors might have drawn about P.L.'s credibility based on the inconsistency between P.L.'s silence following the sexual assaults and her subsequent filing of an official complaint with the police. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's reliance on Samuels is misplaced. Lastly, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the constancy of accusation testimony out-weighed its prejudicial effect. We are not persuaded. Our review of the record reveals that S.C., A.D. and K.J. testified only as to the fact and timing of P.L.'s complaint and the details necessary to associate P.L.'s complaint with the charges against the defendant. Each of the three witnesses testified that P.L. said that she had had sexual intercourse with the defendant more than once at the Fairfield University Library and in the area in which P.L. and the defendant often went jogging. [30] Moreover, because each witness testified as to separate complaints made by P.L. on separate occasions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the constancy of accusation evidence was not prejudicially cumulative. See State v. Parris, 219 Conn. 283, 294, 592 A.2d 943 (1991) (constancy of accusation testimony of four witnesses not prejudicially cumulative because each witness testified with respect to a different statement that the victim had made to a different person at a different point in time [and] therefore, the evidence covered new matter by demonstrating, as was its relevant purpose, that the victim previously had reported the incident she described on direct examination in a constant and consistent fashion); State v. Zoravali, 34 Conn.App. 428, 441, 641 A.2d 796 (constancy of accusation testimony of seven witnesses not prejudicially cumulative because all of the testimony pertained to different statements made by the victim to different people at different times), cert. denied, 230 Conn. 906, 644 A.2d 921(1994). Finally, the trial court instructed the jury repeatedly as to the limited purpose for which the constancy of accusation evidence could be considered, thereby minimizing any risk of prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Parris, supra, at 294, 592 A.2d 943 (The [trial] court minimized any appreciable danger that the jury might treat [the constancy of accusation] testimony as substantive evidence by giving an appropriate instruction as to its limited corroborative use. The jury is presumed, in the absence of a fair indication to the contrary, to have followed the court's instructions.); see also footnotes 26, 27 and 28 of this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the constancy of accusation testimony of S.C., A.D. and K.J. outweighed its prejudicial effect. The judgment is affirmed.