Opinion ID: 58465
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Use of Videotaped Deposition Testimony

Text: Calderon and Rivas argue that the district court violated their Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by permitting the use of video deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony. According to Title 8 of the United States Code, Section 1324(d): Notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the videotaped (or otherwise audiovisually preserved) deposition of a witness to a violation of subsection (a) who has been deported or otherwise expelled from the United States, or is otherwise unable to testify, may be admitted into evidence in an action brought for that violation if the witness was available for cross examination and the deposition otherwise complies with the Federal Rules of Evidence. We have held that “this provision must be read in conjunction with other rules governing the admission of deposition testimony in a criminal proceeding.” United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2002). Rule 15(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that deposition testimony “so far as [it is] otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if the witness is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Rule 804(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines “unavailability” as being “absent from the hearing and the proponent of [his] statement has been unable to procure [his] presence by process or other reasonable means.” We have emphasized that “[u]navailability must ordinarily also be established to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, which generally does not allow admission of testimony where the defendant is unable to confront the witness at trial.” Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d at 565 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). However, this rule is not absolute and the lengths to which the Government must go to secure a witness to establish his or 14 No. 05-20706 her unavailability is a question of reasonableness. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. The Government need not make futile efforts to secure the presence of a witness at trial. Id. Instead, “[t]he ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness.” Id. The burden of proof rests with the Government. Id. at 74-75. We have previously found reasonable the following measures taken by the Government to secure the presence of a deported witness: (1) giving the witness the option of remaining in the United States with work permits; (2) providing witness fees and travel cost reimbursements; (3) giving the witness a subpoena and letter to facilitate his or her reentry into the United States; (4) calling the witness in his or her home country; (5) getting repeated assurance from the witness that he or she would return; (6) apprising border inspectors of the witness’s expected arrival into the United States; and (7) issuing checks to be given to the witness upon his or her reentry into the United States. United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1407 (5th Cir. 1992). We have further recognized that the Government need not take all of these steps to establish that it acted reasonably to secure a witness’s presence. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d at 566. Here, SA Hudson filed an affidavit indicating the efforts made to secure the presence of Contreras, Vaquedano, Monrroy, and Hernandez-Contreras for trial. Specifically, SA Hudson issued subpoenas and letters to each witness translated into Spanish indicating the trial date and that the witness might be required to testify at trial. The letters also provided explicit instructions for obtaining the necessary documents to enter the United States and provided each witness with the travel distance to the American Embassy from his respective place of residence, along with the addresses and telephone numbers for the American Embassies located in Mexico and Honduras. SA Hudson further informed each witness that the Government would pay for the trip and reimburse the witness for any other incidental travel needed for the purpose of 15 No. 05-20706 testifying. SA Hudson provided Contreras with a contact number, but Contreras failed to contact SA Hudson after his deportation. SA Hudson made several attempts to contact Vaquedano, but failed to locate him in Mexico. With respect to Monrroy and Hernandez-Contreras, SA Hudson remained in contact with them and requested Significant Public Benefit Paroles in order to facilitate their reentry into the United States. However, Monrroy refused to testify unless he could stay in the United States permanently and Hernandez-Contreras simply failed to show up. Based on these good-faith efforts, we agree that the Government made reasonable attempts to secure the presence of each witness at trial sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.6 Rivas argues that the use of the videotaped deposition testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because the defendants did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the deported witnesses on the issue of hostage taking. On the day that the first deposition was taken, the Government notified the defendants that “[it] will be superseding the indictment to include hostage taking. It won’t include all defendants, but it will probably include most of them. So you may want to take that into consideration in your questioning.” Although providing notice on the day of the first deposition that a superseding indictment will be filed to include a new count that might involve a particular defendant is not necessarily ideal, we agree with the district court that the defendants were nonetheless able to evaluate to what extent each deponent’s testimony would implicate them with regard to a potential hostage taking count and crossexamine each witness on that issue. Indeed, the defendants were able to elicit favorable evidence from the deponents regarding that very issue. Moreover, the 6 With respect to Calderon, even if we did find a Confrontation Clause violation, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, almost all of the evidence implicating Calderon came through the testimony of indicted co-defendant Hernandez, who provided live testimony before the jury and was subject to cross-examination. Thus, the videotaped deposition testimony was not even material to Calderon and, at best, provided cumulative evidence. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 16 No. 05-20706 deponents were deported more than a month after the first superseding indictment was filed on June 10, 2004. The defendants could have easily requested that the district court order that these witnesses be deposed a second time in light of the new charges and failed to do so.7 2. The Limitations on the Cross-Examination of SA Hudson Rivas argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation right by limiting his cross-examination of SA Hudson. “While the scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial judge, this discretionary authority to limit cross-examination comes into play only after there has been permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 908 (5th Cir. 1978).8 This right “is particularly important when the witness is critical to the prosecution’s case.” Jimenez, 464 F.3d at 559 (quoting United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1996)). However, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original); see also Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 573 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee defendants cross-examination to whatever extent they desire.”). The district court has “wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, 7 Rivas also argues that the videotapes were facially deficient because they did not always function properly and the audio and visual were not always synchronized. We see no reason to disturb the district court’s finding that any lack of synchronization was inconsequential and thus, did not somehow implicate the Confrontation Clause. 8 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend.