Opinion ID: 689891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant of New Trial to Rodriguez

Text: 11 The government contends that the district court erred in granting Rodriguez's motion for a new trial after the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both Count Two and Count Seven. We review the district court's decision to grant a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir.1992). 12
13 The district court granted Rodriguez a new trial because it feared that its jury instructions misstated an element of the substantive offense under Sec. 894(a)(1). Under that statute, [w]hoever knowingly participates in any way, or conspires to do so, in the use of any extortionate means (1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit is guilty of a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 894(a). Extortionate means is defined as any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 891(7). 14 The jury instruction that prompted Judge Nickerson to order a new trial was a conscious avoidance charge on the element of knowingly participates under Sec. 894(a)(1). It is the rule of this circuit that when knowledge is an element of an offense, trial courts may give a conscious avoidance charge if the evidence would permit a rational juror to conclude that a defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact. United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir.1993). The government requested the charge on the theory that Rodriguez deliberately shut his eyes to the fact that he was taking part in an extortion. Over Rodriguez's objection, the district court gave the following instruction: 15 If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert Rodriguez was aware that there was a high probability that the purpose of the mortgage he had been brokering was to facilitate the collection, through extortionate means, of an extension of credit, but that he deliberately and consciously avoided confirming this fact so that he could deny knowledge if apprehended, then you may treat this deliberate avoidance as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you find that the defendant actually believed that the mortgage proceeds would not be used to facilitate the collection, through extortionate means, of extensions of credit. 16 (Emphasis added). 17 In granting the motion for a new trial, the district court decided that its instruction was erroneous. Judge Nickerson concluded that mere facilitation of collection cannot amount to participation within the ambit of the extortionate collection statute. In his view, unless Rodriguez used 'extortionate means,' that is, explicit or implicit threats of violence, or participated in some way, not merely to supply funds to be used to pay the debt, but to reinforce the threats made by Scotti, Rodriguez may not be convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 894. United States v. Rodriguez, No. CR 92-1061, 1993 WL 534314, at  3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1993). The district court determined that the instruction, coupled with the prosecutor's comment in summation indicating that supplying funds to the victim was sufficient to constitute a violation of Sec. 894(a)(1), may have misled the jury. The instruction and summation could have led the jury to believe that it could find Rodriguez guilty for merely arranging Egnat's mortgage as long as he knew or consciously avoided knowing that the purpose of obtaining the mortgage proceeds was to pay off a debt that Scotti was attempting to collect through extortion. Id. 18 On appeal, the government argues that the instruction was proper and cannot serve as a basis for granting a new trial. Rodriguez counters that the order of a new trial should be affirmed because (1) conscious avoidance instructions are never proper on the element of knowing participation under Sec. 894(a)(1), and (2), as the district court held, the particular instruction issued in this case misstated that element of the offense. While we find no fault with giving an appropriate conscious avoidance charge on the issue of knowing participation under Sec. 894(a)(1), we do agree with Rodriguez and the district court that the conscious avoidance charge given here misstated that element of the offense. 1 19 Rodriguez's argument that a conscious avoidance charge is inappropriate on the issue of knowing participation is bottomed on United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.1984) and United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861, 107 S.Ct. 211, 93 L.Ed.2d 141 (1986). However, these cases are inapposite. They hold that such a charge is inappropriate on the fact issue of knowing participation in a conspiracy. See Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1022-23; Mankani, 738 F.2d at 547 n. 1. The reason that we do not permit conscious avoidance instructions on the issue of knowing participation in a conspiracy is that it is logically impossible for a defendant to intend and agree to join a conspiracy if he does not know that it exists. As we asked in Mankani, [i]f someone can consciously avoid learning of the activities and objects of a conspiracy, how can that person ever intend those events to take place? 738 F.2d at 547 n. 1; see also Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1023 (requiring accused have not actual knowledge of all the precise objects of the conspiracy but some knowledge of its unlawful aims). 20 Here, the knowledge at issue does not pertain to membership in a conspiracy, but participation in conduct proscribed by the substantive offense of Sec. 894(a)(1) (which is the object of the conspiracy offense of the same statute): namely, the use of any extortionate means to collect an extension of credit. In such a case, where guilty knowledge is at issue, a conscious avoidance instruction is proper. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 547 n. 1. 21 The substantive offense of Sec. 894(a)(1) requires that the accused participate in the extortion by some affirmative act; the accused may not escape liability by nurturing a calculated ignorance about whether his acts contributed to the extortion. Conscious avoidance instructions therefore facilitate the conviction of defendants whose conduct Congress clearly meant to outlaw under Sec. 894(a)(1). See United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966, 970-71 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1121, 111 S.Ct. 1077, 112 L.Ed.2d 1182 (1991); United States v. Touloumis, 771 F.2d 235, 243-44 (7th Cir.1985) (upholding conviction of creditor who maintained calculated ignorance of hired collector's tactics); United States v. Muscarella, 585 F.2d 242, 247, 252 (7th Cir.1978) (upholding conviction of collector who showed up at two extortion meetings and advised debtor to pay but who did not apparently make direct threats). We decline to state a general rule barring conscious avoidance charges on knowing participation under Sec. 894(a)(1). 22 We turn now to the question whether the district court correctly concluded that the conscious avoidance instruction it gave misstated an element of the offense. In granting a new trial, the district court held that, contrary to its instruction, brokering a mortgage knowing that its purpose was to facilitate an extortionate collection cannot constitute knowing participation under Sec. 894(a)(1). Rodriguez, 1993 WL 534314, at  3. The government argues that the instruction was entirely proper. In its view, the statute should be construed broadly to reach anyone who knowingly [becomes] the instrumentality through which the loanshark's collection tactics could bear fruit. 23 In construing a statute, we must rely on its plain language absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary. United States v. Granderson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 1278, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994). The text of Sec. 894(a)(1) militates against the construction the government advances. As the district court noted, the statute by its terms criminalizes participation in the use of extortionate means, not in the debt collection in which extortion is used. Rodriguez, 1993 WL 534314, at  2- 3. This language suggests that Congress intended to hold criminally liable those who play a role in the extortion itself, not those who merely facilitate the collection of funds knowing extortion is afoot. Cf. United States v. Pacione, 738 F.2d 567, 571-72 (2d Cir.1984) ([C]ongress was concerned primarily with the use of actual and threatened violence by members of organized crime engaged in loan sharking.). The construction the government urges would extend the reach of Sec. 894(a)(1) to cover even the benevolent arrangement of financing by a person to save the debtor, so long as it is known that the debtor will use the funds to pay off the extortionist. Accordingly, we hold that the defendant must play some role in the extortion itself to incur liability under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 894(a)(1); merely being the knowing instrumentality through which the loanshark's collection tactics could bear fruit, contrary to the government's contention in its brief, is not sufficient. 24 Because the issue will likely arise on retrial, we take note of the district court's observation that Rodriguez can only be convicted of a Sec. 894(a)(1) offense if there is proof that he used extortionate means himself, perhaps by reinforcing threats made by Scotti, see Rodriguez, 1993 WL 534314, at  3. This seems an unduly narrow reading of the statute. The statute makes it an offense if one knowingly participates in any way ... in the use of any extortionate means to collect an extension of credit. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 894(a)(1) (emphasis added). The breadth of the language reflects Congress's desire to craft a flexible set of tools for prosecutors to wield with vigor and imagination, H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2021, 2029, to shut down what it had found to be the second largest source of revenue for organized crime, see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1362, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (discussing legislative history), and to allay problems of proof that had stymied prior efforts to prosecute organized crime under the Hobbs Act, see United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1288 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S.Ct. 1226, 84 L.Ed.2d 364 (1985); Pacione, 738 F.2d at 570. Section 894(a)(1) is therefore not confined in its reach to those who directly threaten or commit acts of violence, but encompasses indirect participation in the use of extortionate means. Cf. Bigelow, 914 F.2d at 969-71 (upholding conviction of creditor who hired extortionist collectors). Contrary to the view of the district court, it seems to us that the provision of financing might be sufficient for liability in circumstances in which it is closely interwoven with and facilitates the use of extortionate means. 25 We also reject a narrowing of the statute on different grounds suggested by Rodriguez. He urges us to construe the statute to criminalize only those actions specifically intended by a defendant to further the extortion. At first blush, Rodriguez's argument seems to have merit. In dealing with a defendant who actually commits acts of violence or issues threats, we have held that [t]o be convicted [under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 894(a)(1) ], the defendant must have intended to make a 'threat of use[ ] of violence or other criminal means[ ] to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of [another] person.'  United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1168 (2d Cir.1975) (quoting 18 U.S.C. Sec. 891(7)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 193 (1976); see also United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Sears, 544 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir.1976). Moreover, a secondary participant in an extortion, as Rodriguez is accused of being, might be likened to an aider and abettor, and the well-settled rule is that the government must prove that an accused aider and abettor had the specific intent that his act or omission bring about the underlying crime. United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 262-63 (2d Cir.1988). 26 The Supreme Court, however, has cautioned courts against too readily imposing heightened mens rea requirements in construing federal criminal statutes. In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), the Court confronted the question whether an intent to avoid confinement should be read into the statute criminalizing escape from federal custody, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 751(a). Id. at 408, 100 S.Ct. at 633. Recognizing that the common-law distinction between the terms specific intent and general intent has been the source of a good deal of confusion in criminal law, id. at 403, 100 S.Ct. at 631, the Court observed that the more appropriate question is whether a criminal statute requires knowledge or purpose. Id. at 403-04, 100 S.Ct. at 631-32. The requirement of knowledge corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent. Id. at 405, 100 S.Ct. at 632. It is met if the government proves that a defendant was aware that a result proscribed by the statute was practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. Id. at 404, 100 S.Ct. at 631-32 (quotations omitted). On the other hand, the requirement of purpose, which corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, id. at 405, 100 S.Ct. at 632, demands that a defendant who causes a particular result have consciously desire[d] that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct, id. at 404, 100 S.Ct. at 631 (quotations omitted). The element of purpose has been required in certain narrow classes of crime ... [in which] heightened culpability has been thought to merit special attention. Id. at 405, 100 S.Ct. at 632. 27 Turning to the application of mens rea analysis to federal criminal statutes, the Court noted that, first, courts must follow Congress' intent as to the required level of mental culpability for any particular offense. Id. at 406, 100 S.Ct. at 632. Second, courts should avoid inferring hair-splitting distinctions, either traditional or novel, that Congress neither stated nor implied when it made the conduct criminal. Id. at 407, 100 S.Ct. at 633. With those precepts in mind, the Court refused to read a requirement of purpose into the escape statute when [n]othing in the language or legislative history of Sec. 751(a) indicate[d] that Congress intended to require ... such a heightened standard of culpability.... Id. at 408, 100 S.Ct. at 634. 28 Unlike the federal escape statute considered in Bailey, where both the statute and its legislative history were silent as to the mens rea required for conviction, id. at 406, 100 S.Ct. at 632-33, Sec. 894(a)(1) expressly specifies that the participation in the extortion need only be knowing[ ]. We see no reason to require a mental state of purpose or specific intent for all defendants accused of participation in an extortionate collection when Congress has declined to do so. 29 Our holding is not inconsistent with Natale. In that case, we required a showing that a defendant committing or threatening violence had the purpose to extort in order to clarify the element of extortionate means, not the element of knowingly participates. The question in Natale was whether the means could be considered extortionate, as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 891(7), only if the victim had been placed in actual fear. See 526 F.2d at 1168. We held that acts or statements need only be reasonably calculated to instill fear in the victim in order to qualify as extortionate. Id. Nothing in Natale requires that, if another person is committing or about to commit acts reasonably calculated to instill fear in the victim, a defendant who participates in that extortion must also have a specific purpose to extort. Once the extortion is otherwise initiated, it is enough that the defendant knows that his acts as a participant will further the extortion. Indeed, Judge Nickerson's jury instructions properly recognized this distinction. On the element of extortionate means, he charged the jury that it must find that the lender intended to take actions which reasonably would induce fear in an ordinary person. This instruction correctly pertained only to Scotti's intent as the lender, not to Rodriguez's. On the issue of Rodriguez's mens rea, the district court properly instructed the jury that he need only have knowledge to be guilty of the substantive offense of Sec. 894(a)(1). 30 We also do not find it problematic that, in a seeming paradox, it is easier to prove principal liability under Sec. 894(a)(1) than aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. Conviction as a principal under Sec. 894(a)(1) or as an aider and abettor requires participation in the extortion. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769-70, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949) (aiding and abetting liability attaches if the defendant  'participate[s] in [the crime] as in something that he wishes to bring about'  (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938) (L. Hand, J.))). However, as discussed above, aiding and abetting requires a finding of specific intent or purpose to bring about the crime, see Aiello, 864 F.2d at 262-63; Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402, whereas Sec. 894(a)(1) only requires knowledge. 31 Nothing in Peoni, a judicial construction of the federal aiding and abetting statute based on the common law of accomplice liability, see id., can be read to limit Congress's ability to define the participation crime of Sec. 894(a)(1) to require only the mens rea of knowledge. Cf. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 406, 100 S.Ct. at 632 (Principles derived from common law ... must bow to legislative mandates.). The plain language of Sec. 894(a)(1) indicates that Congress decided that extortion was a grave enough evil to warrant criminal liability on the basis of knowledge alone, cf. People v. Lauria, 251 Cal.App.2d 471, 480, 59 Cal.Rptr. 628, 634 (1967) (stating that under California law an operator of a telephone answering service used to facilitate the extortion of ransom might be chargeable on knowledge alone with participation in a scheme to extort money), and did not impose the additional mens rea requirement of specific intent or purpose to bring about the crime. 32 In summary, a defendant may only be convicted of a Sec. 894(a)(1) offense if he knowingly plays some role in the extortion itself, but not if he merely performs acts that he knows will facilitate a debtor's repayment of a debt being collected by extortionate means. Since the conscious avoidance instruction indicated that even the latter would suffice for liability, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on the erroneous instruction.
33 Even if the instruction on principal liability given in this case was erroneous, the government contends that the guilty verdict against Rodriguez on Count Seven should nevertheless be sustained on an aiding and abetting theory. We disagree. Count Seven allowed the jury to convict Rodriguez as either a principal or aider and abettor, and, since the verdict was a general one, it is unclear on what theory the jury decided Rodriguez's guilt. Because the jury may have reached its verdict on the basis of the legally inadequate instructions on principal liability under Sec. 894(a)(1), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rodriguez a new trial on Count Seven. Cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 58, 112 S.Ct. 466, 474, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (acknowledging permissibility of invalidating general verdict when one of the possible bases of conviction was legally inadequate); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957) ([T]he proper rule to be applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.), overruled on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 12, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147-48, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). 34 Count Seven of the Superseding Indictment charged in its entirety: 35 On or about and between July 31, 1991 and July 14, 1992, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants JOHN SCOTTI and ROBERT RODRIGUEZ did knowingly and wilfully participate in the use of extortionate means, as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 891(7), to collect and attempt to collect from John Egnat an extension of credit. 36 (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 894(a)(1), 2 and 3551 et seq.). 37 The reference to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, the federal aiding and abetting statute, gave the jury the choice of finding the defendants guilty either as a principal or an aider and abettor. The court charged the jury accordingly, stating, The indictment charges defendant Robert Rodriguez with using extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect extensions of credit in Count Seven and with aiding and abetting the extortionate collection of extensions of credit. 38 Had Count Seven charged Rodriguez only with aiding and abetting, reinstatement of the jury verdict might be warranted. Judge Nickerson's jury instructions flawlessly recounted the elements of aiding and abetting. Cf. Aiello, 864 F.2d at 262-63 (To convict a defendant under a theory of aiding and abetting the commission of a crime ..., the government must prove: (1) commission of the underlying crime, (2) by a person other than the defendant, (3) a voluntary act or omission by the person charged as an aider and abettor, with (4) the specific intent that his act or omission bring about the underlying crime. (citations omitted)). The erroneous conscious avoidance charge pertained only to Rodriguez's liability as a principal. Because the jury was properly instructed as to Scotti's liability as a principal, and found him guilty, any error in the conscious avoidance charge would have had no effect on the jury's determination of whether Rodriguez aided and abetted Scotti's crime. Thus, if a separate aiding and abetting count were charged and we were to find the evidence sufficient to convict Rodriguez on that theory (an issue we do not decide on this appeal), a reversal of the district court's grant of a new trial on Count Seven would be in order. 39 The problem in this case is that, given the form of the indictment, we do not know whether the jury found Rodriguez guilty as a principal or an aider and abettor. The jury merely returned a general verdict of guilty on Count Seven, and thus did not indicate on what theory its verdict rested. 40 Although Rodriguez may be punished as a principal if convicted as an aider and abettor, see United States v. Schwartz, 548 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1977), the distinction between the two theories of liability is crucial in this case. As explained above, because aiding and abetting requires proof of Rodriguez's purpose to bring about the crime, it is more difficult to prove than principal liability under Sec. 894(a)(1). 41 Rodriguez's purpose is a closely contested issue in this case. He may have sought to aid Scotti's commission of the crime, or he may have sought only to secure his broker's fee and provide Egnat with the needed financing. As the record stands, we are unable to determine whether the jury based its verdict on Count Seven on the correctly charged aiding and abetting theory or the less exacting but erroneously charged theory of principal liability. 42 If the basis for the jury's verdict on Count Seven was unclear to the district judge who, after sitting through the trial, decided to set it aside, we are in no better position to determine the matter based on the cold record on appeal. Because of this uncertainty, we are unable to say that the district court abused its discretion in setting aside the conviction on Count Seven and granting a new trial. Therefore, we affirm the order of a new trial for Rodriguez on Count Seven.
43 The jury also found Rodriguez guilty of Count Two of the Superseding Indictment, which charged him with conspiracy to use extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit. The government argues that the conspiracy verdict should stand even if the jury's verdict on Count Seven must be set aside. The erroneous conscious avoidance charge applied only to Rodriguez's liability as a principal; the jury was properly instructed on the elements of conspiracy; and the jury found Rodriguez guilty as charged. Since it is immaterial to a conspiracy charge whether Rodriguez could properly be convicted of the substantive offense or not, the government argues, the conspiracy verdict is untainted. 44 Even though the district court set aside the conspiracy verdict on Count Two without giving separate reasons for its decision, we cannot say that it abused its discretion in so doing. In this context, there is a substantial risk of prejudicial spillover of the kind we discussed in United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 855-56 (2d Cir.1994). Common sense and experience tell us that it is more likely that the jury will find a defendant guilty of conspiracy if it also finds him guilty of the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy. We are also reluctant to say that the court abused its discretion in vacating the conspiracy conviction when the jury received an erroneous instruction on the only object of the conspiracy charged in Count Two. 45 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of a new trial to Rodriguez on Count Two.