Opinion ID: 1546590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Claimed Merger of UUV and RSP

Text: Finally, Sutton contends that his UUV and RSP convictions, based on his taking the Taurus on November 20, should merge. In applying the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against multiple punishments for a single offense, we merge two offenses unless each requires proof of a fact that the other does not. E.g., Scott v. United States, 953 A.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C.2008). To convict Sutton of UUV but not RSP, the government had to prove that he had take[n], used[d], operate[d], or remove[d] or cause[d] to be taken, used, operated, or removed, a motor vehicle. D.C.Code § 22-3215(b) (2001); see also § 22-3232 (2001). To obtain conviction for RSP but not for UUV, the government had to prove that Sutton knowingly b[ought], receive[d], possesse[d], or obtain[ed] control of stolen property with intent to deprive another of the right to use the property or a benefit of the property. D.C.Code § 22-3232(a); see also § 22-3215(b). Because each offense contains an element that the other does not, merger is not constitutionally required. Sutton, however, attempts to rely on Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386, 391, 393 (D.C.1991), in which we held that, because D.C.Code § 22-3203(2) (2001) [28] bars consecutive sentences for theft and UUV, and because RSP is at least the functional equivalent of theft, consecutive UUV and RSP sentences may not be imposed for the same conduct. Although Byrd analyzes constitutional merger requirements, it ultimately turns on interpretation of § 22-3203; thus in any event, under Byrd, only consecutive sentences for UUV and RSP are barred. See Byrd, 598 A.2d at 394. Because Sutton received concurrent sentences for these two convictions, his Byrd argument has no merit.