Opinion ID: 4126188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudice of Victim Impact Evidence

Text: To demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, Stone must prove that if counsel had not been deficient, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Williams, 363 S.C. at 343, 611 S.E.2d at 233. As to trial counsel's deficiency in failing to object to the testimony of Major Metts and Captain Hobbs and in failing to properly object to the testimony of Kubala-Hanvey, Stone would satisfy the second prong if he proved there is a reasonable probability that either (1) the trial court would have sustained an objection, which would in turn have changed the outcome of the resentencing proceeding, or (2) this Court would have reversed the death sentence on the basis of one of the preserved objections and remanded for a third sentencing proceeding. As to appellate counsel's deficiency in failing to brief the objection trial counsel made, Stone would satisfy the second prong if he proved there is a reasonable probability that this Court would have reversed the death sentence and remanded for a third sentencing proceeding. We find Stone did not prove prejudice under the second prong of Strickland as to any of these scenarios. As to the outcome of the resentencing proceeding, we find that none of the five components of the officers' testimony, nor Kubala-Hanvey's testimony about her suicide attempt, were so compelling that the exclusion of the evidence was likely to result in the jury not making a recommendation of death. The officers' testimony requires little explanation; we simply do not find it to be significant enough to change the jury's verdict if the jury had not heard it. Kubala-Hanvey's testimony regarding her suicide attempt does warrant explanation. We begin with the PCR court's finding that the testimony was not unduly prejudicial. While this finding is not dispositive as to whether it alone influenced the jury's decision, it is helpful to understanding whether the testimony was likely to improperly divert the jury away from its consideration of Stone's moral culpability and blameworthiness. See Hughey, 339 S.C. at 457, 529 S.E.2d at 730-31 (stating victim impact evidence . . . is only inadmissible where it is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair); State v. Byram, 326 S.C. 107, 118, 485 S.E.2d 360, 366 (1997) (contrasting victim impact evidence that is relevant for the jury to meaningfully assess appellant's moral culpability and blameworthiness from evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render [the] trial fundamentally unfair). As the following discussion of our own findings demonstrates, there is ample evidence to support the PCR court's finding. We find the exclusion of Kubala-Hanvey's testimony about the suicide attempt was not likely to have changed the result of the resentencing proceeding. First, KubalaHanvey explained several additional unrelated circumstances that caused her stress that day. Second, she testified her actions were stupid and that she later concluded, I saw I don't have [as] many problems as I thought I did, as other people do. You always find people that are in worse shape than you are. If her testimony about her suicide attempt improperly exaggerated the effect the murder or the reversal had on her, this testimony diminished it. Finally, the suicide attempt was mentioned only once and the State did not address it at all during its closing argument. As to whether this Court would likely have reversed the death sentence on the basis of a properly preserved and briefed objection, we begin our discussion with the same observation we made earlier: A trial judge has considerable [discretion] in ruling on the admissibility of [victim impact] evidence. Bixby, 388 S.C. at 555, 698 S.E.2d at 586. PCR counsel argues, A suicide attempt is on its face highly emotional. It was, in essence, a form of emotional blackmail for the jury, the subtext being that a decision for life may be unbearable for Kubala-Hanvey, causing her to attempt suicide again. The argument overstates the factual and contextual basis on which it is made. Even were we to find the admission of the testimony was an abuse of the discretion we give trial judges on victim impact evidence, Stone would still be required to demonstrate prejudice, see State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 444, 710 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2011) (To warrant reversal based on the wrongful admission of evidence, the complaining party must prove resulting prejudice.). As we noted in Hughey, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for demonstrating prejudice as to victim impact evidence—so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. 339 S.C. at 457, 529 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S. Ct. at 2608, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735). Applying this standard, we have affirmed trial courts' admission of victim impact evidence time and again. In Bixby, we affirmed the trial court's admission of a seven minute video showing footage of a slain officer's funeral as proper victim impact evidence. 388 S.C. at 555, 698 S.E.2d at 586. In Hughey, we affirmed the trial court's admission of narrative responses from family members describing their relationship with the victim as proper victim impact evidence. 339 S.C. at 457, 529 S.E.2d at 731. In State v. Powers, we affirmed the trial court's admission of testimony from the victim's wife and daughter regarding the victim's uniqueness and the impact of his death on the family. 331 S.C. 37, 45-46, 501 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1998). Applying the Hughey standard to the evidence in this case, we find we would not have reversed Stone's death sentence. As we previously discussed, there are several reasons the evidence did not have the impact Payne and Hughey require for a demonstration of prejudice, not the least of which is Kubala-Hanvey's own testimony. She immediately called her attempt stupid and explained to the jury, I don't have [as] many problems as I thought I did, as other people do. Considering the context in which the testimony was given—as we must—we find Kubala-Hanvey's testimony was not so unduly prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, we would not have reversed the death sentence on the ground the trial court admitted this testimony over a proper objection. Stone also argues Kubala-Hanvey's testimony improperly injected appellate review into the jury's deliberations, relying on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d. 231 (1985). In Caldwell, the Supreme Court held it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. 472 U.S. at 328–29, 105 S. Ct. at 2639, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 239. The district attorney in Caldwell was permitted—over opposing counsel's objection—to explain to the jury that their decision was automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. 472 U.S. at 325–26, 105 S. Ct. at 2638, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 237. In ruling on the objection, the trial court stated—in front of the jury—I think it proper that the jury realizes that [the sentence] is reviewable automatically as the death penalty commands. 472 U.S. at 325, 105 S. Ct. at 2630, 86 L. Ed. at 237. The Supreme Court explained that such state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court would result in unreliability and bias in the favor of death sentences. 472 U.S. at 330, 105 S. Ct. at 2640, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 240. The admission of Kubala-Hanvey's description of her suicide attempt bears little resemblance to what happened in Caldwell. First, no one told this jury its sentence was automatically reviewable. To the extent Kubala-Hanvey's testimony made any suggestion to the jury concerning appellate review, it was only by implication. Second, and more importantly, any suggestion the testimony made was not a state-induced suggestion, and unlike Caldwell, the trial court did not comment on and validate such a suggestion. Kubala-Hanvey's testimony did not inject appellate review into the jury's deliberations on any level close to what the prosecutor and the judge did in Caldwell, and thus we would not have reversed Stone's death sentence on this ground.5 Despite proving instances of deficient performance by trial and appellate counsel regarding victim impact evidence, we find Stone has not proven a reasonable probability the outcome of the resentencing proceeding or the appeal from his death sentence would have been different. Thus, we find Stone did not satisfy the second prong of Strickland. IV. Evidence of Brain Damage and Intellectual Impairment Stone argues trial counsel was deficient in not thoroughly investigating Stone's brain damage and in not presenting evidence of Stone's low intellectual functioning during the resentencing proceeding. At the PCR trial, Stone's counsel proved through expert testimony Stone suffers from brain damage and significant intellectual impairment. Appellate counsel in this appeal began her Statement of the Case in the Brief of Petitioner, There is no dispute that Bobby Wayne Stone suffers from organic brain damage and intellectual impairment. The State did not contest this statement in its brief or at oral argument. We begin our analysis of this claim, therefore, with the recognition—in hindsight—that Stone does in fact suffer from organic brain damage and significant intellectual impairment. Stone correctly argues evidence of mental impairments such as brain damage or low intellectual functioning has powerful mitigating effect. See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 945–46, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1025, 1028 (2010) (stating significant frontal lobe brain damage that caused perform[ance] at or below the bottom first percentile in several measures of cognitive functioning and reasoning is significant mitigation evidence); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2572, 159 L. Ed. 2d 384, 397-98 (2004) (Evidence of 5 We also reject Stone's argument that Kubala-Hanvey's testimony was an improper opinion of what the appropriate sentence should be under Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508–09, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2535–36, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 451-52 (1987) (holding a witness' opinion as to what the appropriate sentence should be was inadmissible), overruled in part by Payne, 501 U.S. at 828-30, 111 S. Ct. at 261011, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 737-39, and his argument that her testimony was an inadmissible opinion as to the ultimate issue in the case under Wise, 359 S.C. at 27, 596 S.E.2d at 481 (A capital defendant is prohibited from directly eliciting the opinion of family members or other penalty-phase witnesses about the appropriate penalty.). significantly impaired intellectual functioning is obviously evidence that 'might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.' (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1671, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7 (1986))); Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1205 (10th Cir. 2012) (Evidence of organic brain damage is something that we and other courts, including the Supreme Court, have found to have a powerful mitigating effect. (citations omitted)). The expert evidence presented at the PCR hearing places Stone's brain damage squarely in this category of powerful mitigating evidence. For example, Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D.—a neuropsychologist and professor at the University of Pennsylvania—performed an assessment of Stone's brain structure and function. Dr. Gur described numerous abnormalities in Stone's brain, including abnormalities . . . in regions [of the brain] that are very important for regulating behavior, and stated the kind of structural abnormalities observed in the frontal regions of Mr. Stone's brain interfere with executive functions such as abstraction and mental flexibility, planning, moral judgment, and emotion regulation . . . and impulse control. He further described a reduced metabolism in the amygdala, which he called his most striking finding. He stated, A damaged amygdala will misinterpret danger signals and when excited it will issue false alarms . . . . When Mr. Stone's amygdala becomes activated, his frontal lobe is unlikely to be capable of exercising control as a normal one would, because his frontal lobe is not only damaged but his cortex is already operating at full capacity in its hyper-vigilant state. The frontal lobe is unable to do its job and act as the brakes on . . . primitive emotional impulses . . . . Fred L. Bookstein, Ph.D.—a University of Washington professor of morphometrics, which predicts patterns of behavior based on measurements of body parts—reviewed measurements of the parts of Stone's brain, particularly the corpus callosum. Dr. Bookstein concluded that abnormalities he found in these measurements would lead to poor judgment and difficulties in impulse control. Finally, Stone presented the testimony of James R. Merikangas, M.D.—a board certified neurologist and psychiatrist. Dr. Merikangas testified Stone suffers from organic brain damage. He explained, [Stone's] brain is anatomically abnormal. His frontal lobes are smaller than normal. His ventricles, which are the fluid-filled spaces inside the brain, are abnormally large . . . . The ventricles enlarge in a condition called hydrocephalus, which is dripping water on the brain. But it's a sign that the brain has lost brain tissue or never had brain tissue to the extent that the space is filled with fluid in excess . . . . And the corpus callosum, which is the white matter track that connects the left hemisphere to the right hemisphere, in the case of Mr. Stone, has at least three different abnormalities . . . . Dr. Merikangas further explained that as a consequence of this brain damage Stone has cognitive problems and difficulty with impulse control. He continued, And the pattern of function in Mr. Stone's brain is distinctly abnormal. He has decreased functioning in the limbic system, the system that has to do with emotional control, and the amygdala, the system that has to do with reactions to fear, recognition, and startle. Under cases like Sears, Tennard, and Hooks, Stone's trial counsel would have been obligated to present to the jury this evidence of brain damage and the effects it would have on his behavior. However, Stone's trial counsel could not have presented this evidence to the jury because they did not know about his brain damage. The question, therefore, is whether counsel should have known about it, or more specifically, whether trial counsel's investigation was reasonable under the Sixth Amendment even though trial counsel did not discover Stone's brain damage. We first address the suggestion that trial counsel must always undertake a medical investigation for organic brain damage in any capital case. In other words, must trial counsel—as a part of every death penalty defense—obtain neuropsychological testing and neuroimaging such as MRI and PET scans, which are the objective tests from which Doctors Gur, Bookstein, and Merikangas were able to reach a definitive diagnosis in Stone of organic brain damage. The answer is clearly no. We are unaware of any court that has adopted such a standard, and not even Stone's own presentation of evidence supports such a suggestion. The American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, on which Stone consistently relies in this appeal, do not require neuropsychological testing and neuroimaging in every case. Guideline 10.7—which governs counsel's investigation of the case—simply requires counsel to investigate all reasonable mitigation evidence. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.7 (rev. 2003).6 Moreover, appointed counsel—as trial counsel was here—is not permitted to obtain any testing that requires funding until counsel demonstrates to the trial court that such testing is reasonably necessary under the specific facts of the case. Subsection 17-3-50(B) of the South Carolina Code (2014) provides counsel may obtain up to five hundred dollars to pursue investigative, expert, or other services . . . reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant. Under subsection 17-3-50(C), however, counsel may obtain more than five hundred dollars only if the court certifies, in a written order with specific findings of fact, that . . . payment in excess of the limit is appropriate because the services provided were reasonably and necessarily incurred. Therefore, counsel's performance cannot be found deficient simply because they did not seek neuropsychological testing or neuroimaging. Rather, we measure counsel's performance by an objective standard of reasonableness. Weik, 409 S.C. at 233, 761 S.E.2d 767 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 2535, 156 L. E. 2d at 484). In Wiggins—a case involving the sufficiency of trial counsel's investigation of the defendant's background—the Supreme Court held there are no specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct, but the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 2535, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 484. In Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 130 S. Ct. 447, 175 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2009), the Supreme Court held that under . . . prevailing professional norms . . . , counsel had an 'obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background.' 558 U.S. at 39, 130 S. Ct. at 452, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 405 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389, 420 (2000)); see also Ard, 372 S.C. at 331, 642 S.E.2d at 597 (Without a doubt, 'a criminal defense attorney has a duty to investigate . . . .'). As the Supreme Court did in Wiggins, 6 The Supreme Court of the United States and this Court have relied on the ABA Guidelines to determine whether counsel's performance was reasonable under the first prong of Strickland. See e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S. Ct. at 2536-37, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 486-87 (citing the ABA Guidelines, to which we long have referred as 'guides to determining what is reasonable'); Ard, 372 S.C. at 332, 642 S.E.2d at 597 (stating the ABA has specifically provided guidelines for defense counsel's performance regarding investigation of a capital case, and then citing the ABA Guidelines in holding counsel's performance was unreasonable). [W]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [Stone's] background was itself reasonable. In assessing counsel's investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their performance, . . . which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel's perspective at the time. 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S. Ct. at 2536, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 485-86 (citations omitted). In doing so, every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S. Ct. at 2536, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 486 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L.E.2d at 694), and we must recognize a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance, Ard, 372 S.C. at 331, 642 S.E.2d at 596 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. E. 2d at 695). Stone argues trial counsel was aware of numerous red flag indicators of Stone's brain damage during the investigation leading up to the resentencing proceeding. From these indicators, Stone argues, trial counsel should have seen the need for further investigation and to seek basic neurological testing, obtain neuroimaging, or consult with experts. Stone contends these indicators were located in four sources: Stone's medical records, Stone's school records, Stone's siblings' school records, and expert testimony in the case. First, Stone's medical records are not included in the Appendix before us because they were not admitted into evidence at the PCR trial. It is, therefore, impossible for this Court to find indicators in Stone's medical records that trial counsel should have further investigated Stone's brain damage. From testimony that describes the contents of Stone's medical records, we find little evidence the medical records contain any indication Stone suffered from brain damage. There is evidence the records contained one emergency report involving a head injury, but there was no indication the incident created a potential for brain damage or had any impact on Stone's neuropsychological health. Stone's brief to this Court demonstrates the weakness of his argument. The brief states, [T]rial counsel possessed medical records for Bobby Stone, which showed that he was treated at the emergency room on numerous occasions. For example, when he was thirteen years old, Stone was treated at the hospital because he fell and injured his ribcage. At age fourteen, he experienced another fall during which he cut his right foot. The following year, he appeared in the ER complaining of pains in his left chest and broken ribs. Stone fell again at age sixteen, resulting in a fractured foot. Later that same year, Stone fell about eight feet and ha[d] pain in his chest and back. At age twentyseven, Stone was in a motor vehicle accident resulting in back pain. The following year, he was working on a car when the motor fell about a foot onto his head. Stone reported that a bolt went into his right ear. Emergency room staff noted abrasions, blood coming from the ear canal, cranial swelling and tenderness. The brief contains no other argument as to how the medical records indicate potential brain damage. The one reference to a head injury—with little evidence as to its severity—is not a sufficient indicator of potential brain damage on the facts of this case to require a finding that trial counsel was deficient in not pursuing further testing. Moreover, Stone's experts at the PCR trial unanimously agreed his brain damage was congenital, meaning it was present from birth. Thus, there is no chance Stone's brain damage was caused by this incident that occurred when he was twenty-eight years old. From what the Appendix indicates about his medical history, Stone had remarkably little experience with head injuries. Therefore, we find no evidence that the medical records should have alerted trial counsel that Stone might have organic brain damage. As to the second and third sources, PCR counsel argues Stone's school records and those of his siblings contained numerous references to academic failure, impaired intellectual functioning and potential brain damage. These references include (1) Stone failed the first, fourth, and sixth grades; (2) he dropped out of school at age 17 after completing only the ninth grade; (3) his IQ scores declined from 86 in 1975 when Stone was ten years old to a range of 69 to 75 in 1979 when he was fourteen; (4) his reading, spelling, and math scores in the seventh grade placed him in the first to fourth percentile among his peers; and (5) his original classification of learning disabled was downgraded to educable mentally handicapped.7 Stone's siblings' school records likewise indicated academic and intellectual deficits. During the course of representing Stone, trial counsel employed several experts and other consultants, including a licensed clinical social worker, a psychologist, and a forensic psychiatrist. None of these professionals advised trial counsel to investigate brain damage. Stone has shown no specific basis for his argument that trial counsel should have realized further testing was warranted. Trial counsel is not required to be omniscient. Rather, we evaluate counsel's performance in the realistic context of representing a capital defendant. As the Supreme Court stated in Wiggins, we must conduct an objective review of their performance, . . . which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen 'from counsel's perspective at the time.' 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S. Ct. at 2536, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 486. The PCR court found Stone fail[ed] in meeting [his] burden with regard to showing counsel's investigation was not reasonable. We find ample evidence to support the PCR court's ruling. See Ard, 372 S.C. at 331, 642 S.E.2d at 596 (This Court will uphold factual findings of the PCR court if there is any evidence of probative value to support them.). Stone has not persuaded us trial counsel's performance was unreasonable. Stone's fourth argument—that trial counsel should have known from the testimony of their expert to investigate brain damage—is also not persuasive. Trial counsel retained a licensed clinical social worker—TeAnne Oehler—to investigate Stone's background and make a psychological or psycho-social evaluation. Oehler reviewed Stone's medical and school records; conducted numerous interviews with Stone, his family members, and others; and thoroughly investigated Stone's social, family, and personal history. The fact that Oehler never recommended neuropsychological testing or neuroimaging supports—not undermines—the reasonableness of counsel's decision not to pursue the testing. 7 Educable mentally handicapped is a classification of mentally handicapped individuals for special education purposes. The educable mentally handicapped are pupils of legal school age whose intellectual limitations require special classes or specialized education instruction to make them economically useful and socially adjusted. S.C. Code Ann. § 59-21-510 (2004). Stone also argues trial counsel failed to present even the mitigating evidence that they did have in their possession. We rely on Stone's brief to this Court to identify which items of mitigating evidence Stone now contends should have been presented, but were not. Stone makes two primary arguments. First, he argues Stone consistently struggled with academic failure, very low psychological functioning, problems with visual-motor coordination, and deficits in adaptive functioning skills, among other things. He then states, Oehler incorrectly testified at trial that Stone 'didn't have too much difficulty in school until about the sixth grade,' and that his academic record included no suggestion of possible mental retardation. Second, Stone argues trial counsel failed to adequately prepare Oehler's testimony, preventing the jury from hearing an accurate account of Stone's academic difficulties and intellectual impairments. We have examined in detail the mitigating evidence trial counsel did present during the resentencing proceeding, and we have compared it with mitigating evidence Stone's PCR counsel presented in the PCR trial. We find the evidence does not support Stone's arguments. Oehler presented the jury a bleak picture of Stone's life—including many of the same difficulties, struggles, and academic failures that Stone argues trial counsel failed to present. Oehler's extensive testimony on these subjects includes the following, There was a significant history of depression among family members. One aunt had a history of schizophrenia. . . . And there is a history of depression among other family members. His sisters, one sister in particular, has a history of depression and has been outpatient, as well as inpatient psychiatric care off and on through the years. . . . [His psychiatric history] describes a family life where it was one crisis after another, and a home life that was not emotionally secure . . . because of a history of depression that was severe. Family members weren't able to carry out their roles in the family because they were frequently disrupted by . . . the psychiatric hospitalizations. Oehler described how this difficult family structure led to problems with school and employment, There's not just one family member who had difficulty in terms of judicial involvement or in terms of a history of depression or exposure to violence or problems in school, but it showed that for several generations on either side of the family, there's a significant history of alcoholism, of drug use, of problems with school, problems with employment. In this family, there's frequent changing of jobs, if people are employed. There's just not, very few family members have significant stable employment . . . . Oehler further described inadequate supervision during the day and nights where the children [did not have] a good sleep such that Stone, as a young child, frequently fell asleep in school and was unable to concentrate. She described very poor life skills and poor structure for Stone as a result of there not being values in this family that you need to get an education, you need to get a job, you need to obey the law. Particularly as to school, Oehler described a history of learning disability, and stated he didn't have the ability, according to these school records, to pay attention, to concentrate, to focus on information and to be able to internalize that to move forward with a plan. She testified all of this absolutely affected his judgment and his decision-making. Oehler's presentation of Stone's social, family, and personal history was not perfect. PCR counsel argues in their brief she made two statements that might not have been accurate. First, Oehler stated Stone didn't have too much difficulty in school until about the sixth grade, when in fact he did have difficulties. However, we read Oehler's statement of not too much difficulty as an effort to contrast those early years from the more significant difficulties he had in school after the sixth grade, and we find the contrast was effective. PCR counsel's second claim— that Oehler incorrectly testified . . . that his academic record included no suggestion of mental retardation—is itself a misstatement. Oehler's actual testimony—on cross examination by the solicitor over the objection of trial counsel—was there's no documentation of mental retardation. In any event, PCR counsel does not argue Stone is mentally retarded. Stone also argues Oehler failed to give the jury Stone's numerical IQ scores. However, her overall presentation of Stone's learning disability, her frequent references to his problems with school, and her detailed descriptions of his poor school performance gave the jury a reasonably clear picture of the effects of Stone's low IQ, even if the jury didn't know the scores themselves. As to Stone's claim that trial counsel failed to properly investigate and present evidence of his brain damage and present evidence of his low intellectual functioning, we find the PCR court's ruling that trial counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness is supported by the evidence.