Opinion ID: 2626176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: It Was Error for the Superior Court To Grant Summary Judgment on Okpik's Claim for Wrongful Termination.

Text: To prevail on a wrongful termination claim an employee must prove: (1) that the employee was discharged by [his or her] employer and (2) that the employer breached a contract or committed a tort in connection with the employee's termination. [20] Constructive discharge satisfies the first element; [21] a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing satisfies the second. [22] The superior court concluded that Okpik had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the issue of constructive discharge because she could have felt compelled to resign after she was demoted. Barrow did not challenge this ruling in its motion for reconsideration, but it did challenge the denial of summary judgment on the issue of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court granted Barrow's motion for reconsideration and entered summary judgment in favor of Barrow on the issue of breach of the implied covenant. Okpik challenges this ruling on appeal. [23] At-will employees may be terminated for any reason that does not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [24] An employer may breach the covenant objectively or subjectively. [25] The objective prong of the covenant is breached when an employer fails to act in a manner that a reasonable person would consider fair, which includes treating similarly situated employees disparately, terminating employees on unconstitutional grounds, and terminating employees in violation of public policy. [26] In support of her theory that Barrow objectively breached the covenant when Olemaun demoted her, Okpik argues that she presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Olemaun improperly received city funds and demoted her to cover up actions he took to increase his own pay, thereby violating public policy. [27] Barrow disputes this argument and claims Okpik was replaced and reassigned based on legitimate business considerations. It argues that she did not produce sufficient admissible evidence to show a connection between the improper payments Olemaun received and his decision to demote her, or that Barrow treated her objectively unfairly. To defeat the summary judgment motion, Okpik needed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a nexus between the improper payments and her demotion, thereby showing a violation of public policy and a breach of the covenant. Demonstrating Olemaun's improper receipt of city funds  without a nexus to the employment action  is insufficient by itself. To support her theory that the demotion and Olemaun's improper payments were connected, Okpik argued that: (1) the April 14 meeting, in which Olemaun told Okpik he intended to replace and reassign her, occurred within days of April 6, when Lyn gave him the first corrected personnel form; (2) Olemaun did not sign the corrective personnel action notice until after Okpik's resignation and upon the presentation of a second notice; (3) Okpik had no authority over personnel matters; (4) Olemaun had exclusive control over personnel action notices because he was the personnel director; (5) Olemaun knew about the overpayment for [six] months and took no corrective actions on his own volition; (6) Olemaun and Lyn drafted a confidential memo to the [c]ouncil blaming Okpik for the error; and (7) Okpik competently performed her job as [f]inance [d]irector for many years prior to Mayor Olemaun's election and the alleged reason for Okpik'[s] demotion in April[] 2005  lack of qualifications  was pretextual. The mere fact that Olemaun signed the second corrected personnel form after Okpik resigned does not establish a causal link between the improper payments and her demotion. [28] It is also unclear what Okpik means to show by stating Olemaun knew he was overpaid since October 2004 and did not correct it. [29] Similarly, the temporal proximity between Olemaun receiving a corrected personnel form from Lyn and Olemaun informing Okpik that he intended to replace her does not by itself create an inference of a connection between the two events. But we conclude the remaining pieces of evidence, taken together and construed in Okpik's favor, support her argument that she has met her evidentiary burden for purposes of surviving summary judgment. Okpik was required to present admissible evidence to rebut Barrow's justifications for its employment action if her claim for breach of the implied covenant was to survive summary judgment. [30] It is well established that the evidentiary threshold necessary to preclude an entry of summary judgment is low, including in employment cases. [31] And generally whether the covenant has been breached is a question for the trier of fact. [32] Barrow argued that Okpik's inadequate performance of her duties as finance director, which included overseeing payroll, constituted a legitimate reason for replacing her. Specifically, Olemaun stated he decided to replace and reassign Okpik because of budget problems created under her watch, and that he concluded that the [c]ity would benefit from having a [f]inance [d]irector with more training, better qualifications and more experience. Barrow also appears to blame Okpik for Olemaun's six months of overpayment. On the first issue  that Okpik was unqualified or incapable of performing her job  Okpik presented admissible evidence to rebut Barrow's justification for replacing and reassigning her: positive job evaluations in 1996, 1999, and 2000. Her relevant job evaluations, which rank her work as very good or outstanding on all rating criteria, create a disputed question of fact about whether Okpik had the necessary competency for the position. On the second issue  that Okpik was to blame for the six months of overpayment  Okpik argues that she had no authority to correct Olemaun's pay because he had sole authority over personnel matters. To support this assertion, she points to Olemaun's testimony that under the Barrow Code, the mayor is the personnel director, and the personnel director is the one with final responsibility to sign personnel action forms. [33] Although Olemaun testified that only the finance director would know what the salary should be for a particular employee, this evidence creates a disputed question of fact about whether Olemaun improperly blamed Okpik for the change in his salary. A fact finder could decide that this evidence shows that the alleged reasons for Okpik's demotion were pretextual and that she was actually demoted for an improper reason. Barrow's reliance on French v. Jadon, Inc. [34] and Witt v. State, Department of Corrections [35] is misplaced. Unlike the employees in French and Witt, Okpik has presented at least some admissible evidence in support of her claim separate from her own allegations: Olemaun's deposition testimony, Lyn's memorandum, and three positive job evaluations. Taken together, this evidence creates an issue of material fact about whether Barrow objectively breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because Okpik presented sufficient admissible evidence tending to show a genuine issue of material fact about whether Barrow demoted her for an improper reason, and because she presented admissible evidence to rebut some of Barrow's reasons for demoting her, she satisfied her evidentiary burden to survive summary judgment on the issue of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.