Opinion ID: 2267814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the instructions on assault and battery, high and aggravated

Text: After the jury had deliberated for approximately two hours, it asked the Court for clarifying instructions on the meaning of simple assault and battery as opposed to high and aggravated assault and battery. In response to this request, the presiding Justice made the following statement: [Y]ou are employing a subjective standard; you are making an evaluation of the community's reaction, if you will, to this act, whatever act you found was committed and in the circumstances of its commissionin terms of its threat to public order, in terms of its threat to the peace and security of the citizens, in terms of its threat to the peace and security of the individuals concerned and/or victims. These are the things that disturb public order, disquiet, fear, threats. All of these things have a bearing, and this statute is calculated to take into account the basic nature of man to meet force with force . . . . The defendant made a timely objection to this portion of the Court's supplementary instructions and now asserts that the instruction implied the jury must consider, in its deliberations, what the community's reaction would be to its verdict. We disagree. Immediately before giving the above quoted instruction, the Justice below told the jury: So again, what I'm trying to say to you is that it [i.e., whether an assault is aggravated] is addressed to your sound good common sense. Under all of the circumstances that you find existed in the case at bar, what was the character of this act in your good sound judgment? You are members of the community; you come from different walks of life, from varied experiences, and how does it impress you, because granted, aggravation is a matter of a subjective standard. The objective indicia of aggravation are so numerous and so varied, and the circumstances under which they can be enployed are so varied that we cannot lay down any fixed hard and fast formulation in the law. This is why it is left to the common sense and good judgment of the people of the community, of which you are a cross-section. It thus becomes clear that the language objected to, when read in the context of the entire charge, does not support the defendant's argument. The defendant also suggests that the presiding Justice's supplementary instruction contained an impermissible comment on the evidence in violation of 14 M.R.S.A. § 1105. The defendant's argument is premised on the fact that he was indicted for striking a police officer during a period of public disorder in the Town of Boothbay Harbor. The jury was instructed that it could consider, for the purpose of determining whether an assault and battery was high and aggravated in nature, whether the defendant's conduct was a major affront to public order or an affront to the exercise of public authority. The defendant therefore maintains that the presiding Justice's references to public order and public authority unfairly emphasized the State's theory of the case. [2] 14 M.R.S.A. § 1105 provides: During a jury trial the presiding justice shall rule and charge the jury, orally or in writing, upon all matters of law arising in the case but shall not, during the trial, including the charge, express an opinion upon issues of fact arising in the case, and such an expression of opinion is sufficient cause for a new trial if either party aggrieved thereby and interested desires it, and the same shall be ordered accordingly by the law court on appeal in a civil or criminal case. We do not agree with the defendant's contention that the language employed by the presiding Justice constituted an expression of opinion, on a factual issue. On the contrary, the supplementary instructions given by the Justice below correctly stated the law to the jury. In State v. Davenport, 326 A.2d 1, 6 (Me.1974), we recognized that [t]he Legislature foresaw that a great variety of circumstances surrounding the offense could raise the simple assault and battery to one of grave and serious effect upon the victim as well as have a major impact upon the peace, health, safety, good morals and general welfare of the public. We have also indicated that a defendant's resistance to lawful authority may be considered by the jury in determining whether an assault and battery is high and aggravated. See State v. Bey, 161 Me. 23, 27, 206 A.2d 413, 416 (1965). See also State v. Davenport, 326 A.2d at 7; State v. Smith, 306 A.2d 5, 6 (Me.1973). That the defendant was involved in a confrontation with the police during a period of public unrest was a factor which the jury was entitled to consider in deciding whether the defendant was guilty of the more serious offense of high and aggravated assault and battery. The jury had been clearly instructed that it was the sole trier of fact, and that the presiding Justice did not, and could not, have any opinion with respect to the factual contentions of the parties. After a thorough review of the entire charge, we are satisfied that no error was committed.