Opinion ID: 3030685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Remedy Required by Law Is to Allow Riggs to

Text: Remain Free Because He Has Served More Time Than He Would Have Under the Plea Offer The issue we decide today is whether the district court’s remedy places Riggs in the position in which he would have been, had he received effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. The clear answer is “No.” A defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379 (1986); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). We have articulated the remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining stage as follows: Since the remedy for counsel’s ineffective assistance should put the defendant back in the position he would have been in if the Sixth Amendment viola- tion had not occurred, in certain circumstances granting a new trial may not be the appropriate remedy. . . . Thus, where, as here, the defendant was deprived of the opportunity to accept a plea offer, putting him in the position he was in prior to the Sixth Amend- ment violation normally will involve reinstating the original offer. 2806 RIGGS v. FAIRMAN United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Blaylock was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence; his motion was denied. He appealed both his conviction and the denial of his Section 2255 motion, and the appeals were consolidated. He argued, in relevant part, that he had ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage. Blaylock claimed his attorney did not tell him about a plea offer until after it expired and that had he known about the offer in time, he would have accepted it. Id. at 1467. We held it was an abuse of discretion to deny Blaylock an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; that if Blaylock proved on remand he would have accepted the plea offer, the correct remedy would be to reinstate the plea offer, not to give him a new trial. Id. at 1465, 1468-69. There is only one recognized exception to Blaylock’s general rule that a plea offer should be reinstated where there is ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage: “The government may of course, in proper cases, seek to demonstrate that intervening circumstances have so changed the factual premises of its original offer that, with just cause, it would have modified or withdrawn its offer prior to its expiration date.” Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1468-69 (emphasis added). The burden to prove such changed factual premises rests on the prosecution. Id. Blaylock does not say a change in the state’s understanding of the law permits the state to withdraw its plea offer retroactively. There were no changes in the facts in our case. The prosecution presented absolutely no evidence of changed factual circumstances after the plea offer—such as a defendant refusing to cooperate after agreeing to testify against a codefendant, the defendant attacking a prison guard, or the disRIGGS v. FAIRMAN 2807 covery of new evidence in the case. Even assuming changes in the facts, the state has not presented any evidence it would have withdrawn the offer prior to the original expiration date had it known Riggs could have been charged under the three strikes law. As noted, the district court found Riggs would have taken the five-year plea offer if he had received effective assistance of counsel, Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1149, and that finding has not been appealed. Thus, as the district court itself acknowledged, its remedy of remanding for a new trial “does not restore the lost plea opportunity of which petitioner was deprived.” Id. at 1152. Rather, the district court’s remedy returns the parties to the point in time before the offer had been made, not the status quo when the ineffective assistance of counsel to Riggs occurred—when the offer was open.3 As the district court stated, “The Court also believes the forced restoration of the plea offer would be inappropriate. The onestrike charging decision, and the plea offer, resulted from a prosecutor’s temporary misunderstanding of California law.”4 Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. In short, by returning the case to a point before the prosecutor had committed a “mistake”, the district court incorrectly sought to protect the state from its own ineffective counsel, rather than focus solely on the text and purpose of the Sixth Amendment—protecting the right to effective counsel of the person accused of a crime. 3 Although the district court’s decision states that it is returning the parties to the pre-error stage of the proceedings and the parties will be free to negotiate a plea bargain or not, the parties have been unable to negotiate a settlement in the district court or this court, and are unlikely to do so upon remand. The prosecution knows it can obtain a conviction, the prosecution’s office has a policy of not negotiating Third Strike cases after the preliminary hearing, and Riggs has nothing with which to bargain. Therefore, in reality, the parties will find themselves back in the position they were in after the offer had expired and the Information had been amended, rather than at the time the offer was made. 4 See pages 2806-2808, infra, for a discussion of why there is no evidence the prosecutor was operating under a “misunderstanding”, but there is much evidence of no misunderstanding at all. 2808 RIGGS v. FAIRMAN Our case is also similar to Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). In Nunes, the prosecutor offered a plea bargain of 11 years, with credit for time actually served, if Nunes would plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Id. Defense counsel incorrectly told Nunes the offer was for 22 years, not 11. Id. Nunes testified he asked his attorney to clarify the offer, but defense counsel simply rejected the offer. Id. Nunes was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life, with a two-year enhancement. The California Court of Appeal rejected Nunes’ claim that he had ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining stage, holding he had not made out a prima facie claim he would have accepted the plea bargain but for counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 1050. Nunes then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded Nunes did have ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining stage and he would have pleaded guilty to accept the 11-year offer. The court vacated Nunes’ conviction and ordered the state to reinstate its 11-year plea offer. Id. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s grant of the habeas writ, and remanded with instructions for the district court to “modify the writ to order Nunes’ release (that is, after all, the classic relief afforded by the writ) within a reasonable time unless the state provides the identical offer it made to Nunes earlier.” Id. at 1056. The remedy we ordered on remand would obviously have been meaningless if the state could revoke its offer after remand. Necessarily implied in our remand order was the condition that had the state chosen to offer Nunes the identical offer, it would have had to leave that offer open long enough for Nunes to accept it by pleading guilty. Otherwise, the remedy would not have put Nunes “back in the position he would RIGGS v. FAIRMAN 2809 have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation had never occurred,” which we stressed we must do. Id. at 1057. Puzzlingly, the state relies on In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747 (1992), for the proposition that it should not be forced to reinstate its plea offer. But in Alvernaz, the district court disagreed with such a ruling by the state court, granted a habeas writ, and specifically held that a new trial would be an empty remedy and would deprive the defendant of the opportunity to accept the plea which he would have taken absent the improper advice of counsel. See Alvernaz v. Ratelle, 831 F. Supp. 790, 791, 797-98 (S.D. Cal. 1993). Therefore, Alvernaz was entitled to be released unless the plea offer was reinstated. Id. Blaylock was a federal case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, whereas Riggs is a state prisoner, bringing an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Nevertheless, Blaylock was simply applying clear federal constitutional law as articulated by the Supreme Court. We are called to do the same here. Although Kimmelman did not involve a plea bargain, it did involve ineffective assistance of counsel at the pre-trial stage. Counsel had failed to file a motion to suppress within the time allowed under state law. As a result, evidence the defendant objected to on grounds of illegal search and seizure was introduced at trial. The Supreme Court held that, although under New Jersey law the lack of a timely motion to suppress allowed the evidence to be admitted, Kimmelman’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated by his counsel’s failure to move to suppress; the right to effective counsel prevailed over any New Jersey law that interfered with that right. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 379. After all, the application of federal constitutional law (which is exactly what 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is all about) cannot be subordinated to state law concepts. This principle applies even if, as here, those concepts happen to be precisely the same; a criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under 2810 RIGGS v. FAIRMAN California law as well. People v. Bautista, 115 Cal. App. 4th 229, 237-42 (2004). The Court in Kimmelman went on to explain that where the right to effective assistance of counsel conflicts with a principle of state law, “the Constitution constrains our ability to allocate as we see fit the costs of ineffective assistance. The Sixth Amendment mandates that the State bear the risk of constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel”, not the criminal defendant. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 379. The only remedy which could cure the constitutional error was to return the accused to the point in the criminal proceeding when the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the prejudicial error in violation of constitutional rights. Blaylock and Nunes were simply applying these principles of federal constitutional law enunciated in Kimmelman to develop the correct remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage.5 As the Supreme Court has explained, “rules of law may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes even when they are expressed in terms of a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000); see also Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “Ninth Circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, and may also help us determine what law is clearly established.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “generalized standards” in Kimmelman were (1) where a state law conflicts with the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, the defendant’s rights prevail and (2) where ineffective assistance of counsel is so grave as to effect a deprivation of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the state should bear the 5 If more were thought needed, Nunes was a California state case, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after the enactment of AEDPA. RIGGS v. FAIRMAN 2811 burden of the ineffectiveness of counsel rather than the defendant. Further, this is not the typical section 2254 case. We are not here called upon to review a state court’s decision. The only decision being appealed is the federal district court’s remedy. The district court’s decision that Riggs is entitled to a grant of habeas corpus for ineffective assistance of counsel, which did differ from the state court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, has not been cross-appealed by the state. Thus, the traditional limitations of review of a state court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) do not apply to this case because we are not reviewing a state court decision at all, much less the “last reasoned decision”6 of the state courts.7 In light of this precedent, the majority’s citation to United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 1998), is unpersuasive. It is a decision from the Second Circuit and, therefore, is not binding on us. Additionally, the Second Circuit makes a crucial distinction between cases where a relatively short time has lapsed, since the defendant’s trial, and cases where a great deal of time has lapsed and the defendant has already served more time than he would have served under the plea offer. We have not as yet recognized this as a factor in fashioning the correct remedy, but it is one worth thinking about. In cases where, as here, the defendant has served more time than he would have under the original plea bargain, the Second Circuit itself has found that the correct remedy is to release the prisoner. Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, clarified on reh’g, 90 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1996). Riggs has been out of prison on bail since the district court’s decision in 2001—after serving seven years in prison. 6 See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991). 7 The state court ruling on Riggs’ petition for writ of habeas corpus raising ineffective assistance of counsel consisted of one sentence: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.” 2812 RIGGS v. FAIRMAN Having already served two years longer than the original fiveyear plea bargain, Riggs should be allowed to remain a free man. We have granted a writ of habeas corpus and ordered a defendant’s immediate release in a similar case where the defendant had already served more time than she would have under the terms of her plea agreement. See Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003).8