Opinion ID: 1316238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Relevant Supreme Court decisions.

Text: This court's decision in Desimone I primarily adhered to the analytical approach delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). Kurth Ranch addressed whether a Montana tax assessed on marijuana was invalid as successive punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause where the taxpayers had already been criminally convicted of owning the marijuana that was taxed. The Court held that the Montana tax proceeding was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the [taxpayers] in jeopardy a second time `for the same offense.' Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 784, 114 S.Ct. 1937. After this court decided Desimone I, the Supreme Court issued two decisions significantly clarifying the proper analysis for determining whether a civil forfeiture or penalty constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (addressing civil in rem forfeiture proceedings); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (addressing administrative proceedings involving imposition of monetary penalties and occupational debarment). In Hudson, the Court largely disavowed the double jeopardy analysis previously announced in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). [2] Instead, Hudson articulated a two-part test, previously outlined in Ursery, for determining whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil. This court has since adopted and applied the Ursery and Hudson analysis in examining double jeopardy concerns in cases involving civil forfeitures and administrative penalties. See Levingston v. Washoe County, 114 Nev. 306, 956 P.2d 84 (1998) (applying Ursery analysis in forfeiture context); State v. Lomas, 114 Nev. 313, 955 P.2d 678 (1998) (applying Hudson analysis in civil driver's license revocation proceedings). As Hudson instructs, in assessing the double jeopardy implications of a civil sanction, we look first to whether the legislature intended the provision in question to be civil or criminal in nature. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (first question is whether the legislature `indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other') (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). Second, even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil mechanism, this court must inquire further into whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect, as to `transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S.Ct. 219, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956)); see also Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (court must first look to whether Congress intended the provision to be civil or criminal and then to whether the proceedings are so punitive in fact as to persuade the court that they may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature despite Congress' intent) (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984)). Hudson explains: In making this latter determination, the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter ; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488. Hudson emphasizes that these Kennedy factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face, and only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Neither Ursery nor Hudson specifically call into question the holding or double jeopardy analysis applied in Kurth Ranch in the tax context. See, e.g., Commissioner of Revenue v. Mullins, 428 Mass. 406, 702 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1998) (nothing in the Court's Hudson decision indicates that the mode of examination employed in Kurth Ranch is no longer appropriate in the tax context). In fact, both opinions appear to acknowledge that the Kurth Ranch analysis encompasses at least to some extent the two-part test of Hudson and Ursery. Id. Nonetheless, Ursery and Hudson both highlight the key, determinative factors that persuaded the Court in Kurth Ranch to conclude that the Montana tax at issue implicated double jeopardy concerns. For example, in summarizing the Kurth Ranch analysis, the Ursery Court explained: We first established that the fact that Montana had labeled the civil sanction a tax did not end our analysis. We then turned to consider whether the tax was so punitive as to constitute a punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Several differences between the marijuana tax imposed by Montana and the typical revenue-raising tax were readily apparent. The Montana tax was unique in that it was conditioned on the commission of a crime and was imposed only after the taxpayer had been arrested: Thus, only a person charged with a criminal offense was subject to the tax. We also noted that the taxpayer did not own or possess the taxed marijuana at the time that the tax was imposed. From these differences, we determined that the tax was motivated by a penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue. Concluding that the Montana tax proceeding was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution, we affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment barring the tax. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 282, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (quoting Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781, 784, 114 S.Ct. 1937) (internal citations omitted). Ursery further explained: [ Kurth Ranch ] expressly disclaimed reliance upon Halper, finding that its case-specific approach was impossible to apply outside the context of a fixed civil-penalty provision. Reviewing the Montana marijuana tax, we held that because tax statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties, ... Halper 's method of determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive simply does not work in the case of a tax statute. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 285-86, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (quoting Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 784, 114 S.Ct. 1937). [3] The Court's subsequent decision in Hudson also distinguished Kurth Ranch from Halper, emphasizing with approval Kurth Ranch 's recognition that all civil penalties have some deterrent effect, and that the presence of a deterrent purpose or effect is not dispositive of the double jeopardy question. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102 n. 6, 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781, 114 S.Ct. 1937). [4] The Court also noted that unlike the Halper decision, Kurth Ranch applied a Kennedy -like test, before concluding that Montana's dangerous drug tax was `the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution.' Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102 n. 6, 118 S.Ct. 488 (internal citations omitted). Finally, Justice Breyer's concurrence in Hudson further identified and defined factors considered in Kurth Ranch in assessing the double jeopardy implications of the Montana tax. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 115, 118 S.Ct. 488 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer explained, Kurth Ranch properly tracked the following non-exclusive list of factors set forth in Kennedy.  [The Montana] tax was remarkably high; it had an obvious deterrent purpose; it was conditioned on the commission of a crime; it was exacted only after the taxpayer ha[d] been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation; its alternative function of raising revenue could be equally well served by increasing the fine imposed on the activity; and it departed radically from normal revenue laws by taxing contraband goods perhaps destroyed before the tax was imposed. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 115, 118 S.Ct. 488 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781-84, 114 S.Ct. 1937). With the above-stated principles in mind, we now reconsider whether Desimone's criminal conviction constituted impermissible successive punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In so doing, we first assess whether the legislature intended the CSA, either expressly or impliedly, to be civil or criminal in nature. Second, even assuming that the legislature intended the provision to be civil in nature, we next consider whether the $166,000 tax judgment imposed in this case pursuant to the CSA is so punitive in purpose or effect as to constitute punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. In making this latter determination, we have paid due regard to the  Kennedy -like factors identified above in Kurth Ranch, Ursery, and Hudson.