Opinion ID: 3184573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Potential Sources of Breached Information

Text: ¶14. Doe argues there are many reasons for the deduction that the disclosure of the rape could not have come from anyone other than McBeth. Doe first focuses on the group of teenage boys who committed the sexual assault. According to Doe, the boys did not attend the same school as she did, and they were not part of the same social groups as Doe or her friend. Doe claims it is thus unlikely and highly speculative that the disclosure of the rape would have come from this group, since it would implicate them in a crime. ¶15. Doe also argues that neither she nor her friend could have disclosed the information. Because rape victims tend to feel confused, ashamed, and helpless, it is common for many victims to remain silent and not report the assault to authorities.2 Doe also claims that during that short time frame, her family never had a chance to disclose this information. It is obvious, Doe argues, that McBeth disclosed her confidential medical information and breached the standard of care. 2 Doe cites a study from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention that found only ten percent of victims report to the police and only two and a half percent report to medical personnel. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Child and Youth Victimization Known to Police, School and Medical Authorities 1 (2012), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/235394.pdf, (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 7 ¶16. Doe relies chiefly on two cases concerning circumstantial-evidence and negligence claims. One case is Anderson v. Walmart, No. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48239, at  (S.D. Miss. Apr. 3, 2013), in which the plaintiff claimed that she slipped and fell over a piece of metal on Walmart’s floor. The plaintiff alleged that the employees placed the piece of metal on the floor while they were working on the store’s shelves. Id. at . The plaintiff offered no direct evidence of how the metal piece got on the floor, and Walmart denied any role. Id. Walmart filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. at . Plaintiff opposed the motion and stated that although she could not prove with certainty how the metal piece got on the floor, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that it was likely part of the shelving that the Walmart employees were handling on the day of the accident. Id. at . The trial court found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record to create a jury issue and denied Walmart’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at . ¶17. Doe also relies on Elston v. Circus Circus Mississippi, Inc., 908 So. 2d 771 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). The plaintiff in Elston slipped in a puddle of water in the lobby of a casino. Id. at 772. The casino filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff could not show sufficient evidence regarding how the water got on the floor. Id. Plaintiff opposed the summary-judgment motion by showing that the water was near the potted plants and that the plaintiff fell on a day the plants were usually watered. Id. The plaintiff did not offer any direct proof that the plants were watered on that exact day. Id. Based on the circumstantial evidence, the trial court’s order granting the casino’s motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for trial. Id. at 776. 8 ¶18. We note that there are distinctions between Elston, Anderson, and this case. First, the Elston and Anderson plaintiffs were injured by a tangible and identifiable danger (the puddle or piece of metal shelving), which were capable of a definite description (substance, appearance, location, etc.). Here, Doe claims injury from a “nebulous and evolving danger”–the rumors allegedly repeated by unidentified students. Second, in Elston and Anderson, the casino and Walmart were unable to identify any source for the puddle or metal piece. In this case, McBeth and Rankin Medical argue that several other individuals are equally as likely as McBeth to have participated–intentionally or unintentionally–in the spread of the rumors. Such individuals include Doe, her parents, her siblings, her friend, the alleged assailants, law enforcement officials, or unknown witnesses at the movie theater. ¶19. As to the alleged assailants, they knew Doe’s identity and even called her cell phone during the relevant time frame. While the assailants did not attend Doe’s school, Doe did not cite any evidence indicating that the boys did not know Doe’s other classmates. McBeth and Rankin Medical argue that it is equally likely that these boys (directly or indirectly) spread the rumors as it is that they did not. Doe never deposed them, so one can only speculate whether this was true. ¶20. McBeth and Rankin Medical also note that Doe’s friend, who was treated by McBeth at Rankin Medical, cannot be excluded as a possible source of the rumors. Doe’s friend was an eyewitness to the sexual assault and to Doe’s treatment at Rankin Medical. Doe never deposed her friend, nor did she obtain an affidavit. Doe testified she did not remember talking to her friend about the rumors, and she stated that she didn’t remember whether the 9 two still went to school together at the time of these events. Doe failed to cite any evidence or testimony which excludes her friend as a source for the rumors at the school. Additionally, as McBeth and Rankin Medical argue, the Does spent the entire day waiting and giving statements at the police station. Doe did not present any testimony or affidavits from police officers or other individuals who may have–directly or indirectly–been the source of the information. ¶21. This Court finds that Doe’s failure to obtain testimony or affidavits from any of these possible sources to counter McBeth’s and Rankin Medical’s motion for summary judgment means that Doe has not taken “the case out of the realm of conjecture and place[d] it within the field of a legitimate inference of liability.” Patterson v. T.L. Wallace Constr., Inc., 133 So. 3d 325, 332 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Huynh v. Phillips, 95 So. 3d 1259, 1263 (Miss. 2012)). 2. Whether Doe’s testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact. ¶22. Not only did Doe fail to provide any affidavits or other testimony to counter the motions for summary judgment, Doe’s testimony of the statements made by her unidentified classmates is hearsay and not admissible evidence to prove a breach of confidentiality. McBeth denied disclosing Doe’s medical treatment at Rankin Medical to her daughter. The only testimony to the contrary is Doe’s. Doe testified that “more than ten” unidentified classmates approached her, stating they knew she had been raped and that McBeth’s daughter had told them. Doe did not remember the names of the students who approached her at 10 school.3 Nor did Doe confront McBeth’s daughter. Doe had no personal knowledge or any other admissible evidence that McBeth had disclosed her confidential medical information to anyone. ¶23. Doe’s statements of what other students allegedly told her is hearsay under Rule 801(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which is inadmissable at trial and not appropriate evidence in opposition to McBeth’s and Rankin Medical’s motions for summary judgment. Doe cannot repeat the purported statements of unidentified students/declarants in order to prove that McBeth’s daughter communicated the rumors to them. See Karpinsky v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 109 So. 3d 84, 91 (Miss. 2013) (affidavit testimony about what an incident report documented about notice provided to a defendant before a slip-and-fall incident was hearsay, which is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment). While Doe may believe that McBeth’s breach of confidentiality led to rumors at school about her sexual assault, these are unverified alleged hearsay statements by unknown classmates, and they do not create a genuine issue of material fact. See Meador, 81 So. 3d at 1117 (excluding portions of affidavits given in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, which were not based on personal knowledge). ¶24. We find that Doe cannot overcome her lack of direct evidence of McBeth’s supposed role in the rumors through speculation and conjecture, which she attempts to pass off as circumstantial evidence. The testimony offered by Doe is inadmissible hearsay. Thus, this issue is without merit. 3 Doe testified to the identity of another classmate named Candace Tillman, who told her about the rumors. But Doe did not depose her or provide a supporting affidavit from her. 11 C. Whether McBeth’s credibility as a witness creates a genuine issue of material fact. 1. McBeth’s Prior Drug Use ¶25. The exact date is not clear from the record, but McBeth died sometime before March 7, 2011, when the suggestion of death was filed with the circuit court. Her cause of death is not given. When McBeth was alive, she testified by deposition that she did not tell her daughter about Doe’s treatment for rape at Rankin Medical. Doe argues that McBeth’s testimony must be completely disregarded, because McBeth was not a credible witness. Doe argues that, since McBeth had a history of drug abuse, of falsifying records to get drugs from hospital patients, and of stealing drugs from the hospitals that employed her, this seriously calls into question the veracity of any statement she made under oath in her deposition. ¶26. McBeth admitted she was fired from her nursing position at St. Dominic’s Hospital, a previous employer, for suspicion of drug abuse and theft. Rankin Medical also fired McBeth for drug abuse, drug theft, and falsifying medical records. McBeth admitted abusing Demerol and other opiates during the time frame in question. Doe notes that the side effects of those drugs seriously affect the mind and functionality of the abuser, and that McBeth admitted that the drug abuse affected her memory. Because of this, Doe argues the trial court should have disregarded McBeth’s and Rankin Medical’s attempts to rely on her statement that she did not disclose the information. ¶27. The circumstances of McBeth’s termination and drug use would be inadmissible at trial under Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So. 2d 1314 (Miss. 1981). Sheffield involved a medical negligence/wrongful death action. Id. Plaintiffs introduced at trial, over objection, testimony 12 about the defendant physician’s drug use. Id. at 1315. No proof was introduced that the defendant was using drugs at any time or was impaired at the time of the treatment at issue. Id. at 1316. In ordering reversal, the Court noted that the “testimony that would show that the [the defendant] was under the influence of drugs at any time during which he did anything relating to the baby’s care or at the time he was testifying” would be relevant. Id. at 1317. ¶28. As in Sheffield, Doe has not shown that McBeth was in any way impaired at the time of her deposition testimony or on March 3, 2003, when Doe’s friend was in McBeth’s care. Not only is evidence regarding McBeth’s employment termination and prior drug use inadmissible as evidence at trial, it also is insufficient to rebut the motion for summary judgment. See Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So. 2d 184, 186-87 (Miss. 1988). No attacks on McBeth’s credibility can substitute for Doe’s failure to meet the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with admissible evidence to support claims of an improper disclosure of confidential information. We find this issue is without merit.