Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicability of post-conviction procedure to capital convictions

Text: In regard to the third issue, section 46-21-101, MCA, recites in applicable part:  Circumstances in which validity of sentence may be challenged. A person adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record who has no adequate remedy of appeal ... may petition the court which imposed the sentence, the supreme court, or any justice of the supreme court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. This Court has not specifically addressed the question of whether capitally-sentenced defendants are entitled to the protections of the post-conviction relief statute, or whether the automatic sentence review statute, section 46-18-307 et seq., MCA, stands in the place of post-conviction relief. We are aware of the language of Mr. Justice Sheehy in State v. Coleman (1979), Mont., 605 P.2d 1000, 1006, 36 St.Rep. 1134, 1135, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 2952, 64 L.Ed.2d 831, wherein he writes: Because the review conducted by this Court [pursuant to the automatic review provisions of section 46-18-307 through section 46-18-310, MCA] statutorily stands in place of any recourse to the Sentence Review Division, the completion of this review will mark the end of state action upon this cause, excepting any action upon a petition for rehearing. (Emphasis added.) But cf., State v. McKenzie (1978), 177 Mont. 280, 322, 581 P.2d 1205, 1229. That language, as noted, only specifically pertains to the sentence review procedure and only generally could it be interpreted to represent a bar to the utilization of post-conviction procedure. The post-conviction statute does not limit its provisions to non-capitally-sentenced persons, nor does the automatic review statute herald itself as an exclusive remedy. Such an interpretation would have to be inferred from the nature of the statutes and policies involved. We do not believe that such an interpretation can be given to these statutes. In arriving at this conclusion, the plain meaning of the post-conviction statute is particularly persuasive. The statute provided that a person adjudged guilty of an offense is entitled to access to the post-conviction procedure. If the legislature intended this statute to be applied only in noncapital sentences, we must conclude that it would have expressly done so. The terms of a person or any person and a crime or any crime are generic terms encompassing a very broad spectrum of acts and actors. Any limitation on the grant of review in post-conviction procedures must be made by the legislature. It is clearly not the power of this Court to interpret the law in a manner contrary to legislative intent. See American Linen Supply Co. v. DOR (1980), Mont., 617 P.2d 131, 37 St.Rep. 1707; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co. (1968), 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. Although the State argues persuasively regarding the legislature's intent regarding finality of sentences, we do not believe that the plain meaning of the statute demonstrates its inapplicability to capitally-sentenced offenders. Though aware of these competing legislative interests, this Court does not have the power to go beyond the clear and unequivocal provisions of the law.