Opinion ID: 2551177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weighty Consideration to Parents' Choice

Text: `Where the parents have unequivocally exercised their right to designate a custodian, [] the court can terminate the parents' right to choose only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the placement selected by the parents is clearly not in the child's best interest[.]' [2] T.W.M., supra, 964 A.2d at 604 (quoting T.J., supra, 666 A.2d at 16) (alterations in original); see also C.A.B., supra, 4 A.3d at 900; In re A.T.A., 910 A.2d 293, 295 (D.C. 2006); D.C.Code § 16-304(a), (b)(2)(A), (e) (2001). [A] determination as to whether the natural parents are withholding consent contrary to the best interests of the child pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-304(e) requires weighing the factors considered in termination of parental rights proceedings pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-2353(b) (2001). [3] In re P.S., 797 A.2d 1219, 1223 (D.C.2001); see also In re F.W., 870 A.2d 82, 85 (D.C.2005) (In making its determination, the trial court must weigh the same factors as those weighed in a termination of parental rights proceeding.); A.T.A., supra, 910 A.2d at 295; In re D.H., 917 A.2d 112, 117 (D.C.2007). [W]e recognize that the best interests standard `is flexible and not susceptible to ready definition; it must of necessity contain certain imprecision and elasticity.' In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826, 832 (D.C.1998) (quoting In re D.R.M., 570 A.2d 796, 803 (D.C.1990)). The trial judge has wide latitude in applying the statutory criteria set forth in Section 16-2353(b). In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. 1996). We also note that judges are not required to inventory all the evidence and explain how they weighed each evidentiary item in reaching their decisions. Sufficiency of findings is assessed in a less formalistic fashion. We examine whether the findings are detailed enough to allow a reviewing court to conclude that the decision followed rationally from the findings of fact, and is consistent with the requirements of the law. In re I.B., 631 A.2d 1225, 1232 (D.C.1993) (internal citations omitted). T.B., and S.E., T.E.'s biological parents, and A.E. claim the trial court erred when it found by clear and convincing evidence that T.E.'s adoption by A.E. would be contrary to T.E.'s best interests. The parties claim that the trial court's finding that removing T.E. from T.W.M. would be devastating to T.E. is not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Primarily, the parties fault the court's reliance on the testimony of Dr. Missar, who testified that removing T.E. from T.W.M. would cause significant short- and long-term damage because T.E. was securely attached to T.W.M. [4] We find that the trial court's decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence. It is clear from the trial court's order that its decision was animated by the fact that T.W.M. has cared for T.E. for all but two years of her life and that the two share a close parent-child attachment. This court has previously noted the importance of stability and continuity when assessing a child's best interests. We have stated that `a stable and desired environment of long standing should not be lightly set aside.' In re W.E.T., 793 A.2d 471, 478 (D.C.2002) (quoting Rutledge v. Harris, 263 A.2d 256, 257-58 (D.C.1970)); see also S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 883 n. 35 (D.C.1991) ([T]he interests of the natural parent cannot overcome the interests of the child in physical and mental health and continuity of care.). [I]t would be `ruthless beyond description' to take a child out of a loving home, when she had lived at that home for a substantial period of time as a result of her biological parents' inability or unwillingness to care for her. In re L.L., 653 A.2d 873, 883 (D.C.1995); see also Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1380 (D.C.1978) (noting that where a nearly five-year-old child had lived with the same caregiver for the previous two-and-a-half years, [b]ouncing this child back and forth between [caregivers] has not and will not be healthy for her. Each time she is moved, she gets a scar and who knows whether if ever it will be healed.). In finding that removing T.E. from such a long-standing stable environment would be devastating, the trial court relied extensively on the expert testimony of Dr. Missar. Dr. Missar testified that a secure attachment provides the child with a solid and secure base from which . . . they can explore the world, and that T.E. had such a secure attachment with T.W.M. He testified that disrupting a secure attachment carries both short- and long-term consequences for children. In the short term, a child goes through a period of time of emotional and behavioral regression, and that the child will grieve the loss of such a relationship. This will cause a child to experience problems with anxiety, heightened fears, significant problems with sometimes an elevated startle response because they've essentially lost that secure base and that secure object that they came to count on. In the long-term, a child will develop [p]roblems with trust[, p]roblems with redeveloping and making connections with others, as well as problems with self-esteem and self-confidence. He also stated that, from his experience, he has never known a child of T.E.'s age to experience the disruption of a secure attachment without negative consequences. In his opinion, removing T.E. from T.W.M.'s care would have tremendous negative consequences for her both in the short and long-term because T.E. has been living with [T.W.M.] approximately six of the eight years of her life [and] the development of a secure attachment would have grown and deepened. The trial court also found support for this conclusion from the testimony of A.E.'s expert, Dr. Zitner. Dr. Zitner testified that, in her opinion, T.E.'s ability to form secondary attachments was due to the strong primary attachment T.E. had with her foster mother. She noted that T.E. expressed a lot of stress when she's been separated from her foster mother, as evidenced by the year that she lived in another foster home without the foster mother and she was sad and had tremendous difficulty during that year. . . . She stated that [r]emoving a child from a home in which they have thrived [] for a significant period of time is something that has to be undertaken only under very, very particular, compelling circumstances and should never be considered lightly and that . . . there would be serious repercussions, emotional repercussions for a child to be removed from any caretaker with whom they had been living and thriving and that one would have to do it in a very particular and appropriate way. Thus, the trial court determined that Dr. Zitner's testimony corroborated the testimony of Dr. Missar that removing T.E. from T.W.M. could potentially have devastating consequences for T.E. The appellants criticize the trial court for its reliance on Dr. Missar's testimony and point to the testimony of Drs. Zitner [5] and King which they believe demonstrate that T.E. would not suffer significant harm if she were to be adopted by A.E. This argument is unavailing. The trial court, when acting as fact-finder as it was in this case, is entitled to credit the testimony of one expert witness over that of another. See In re G.H., 797 A.2d 679, 683-84 (D.C.2002). `[A]s a general proposition, when faced with conflicting expert testimony, the trial court may credit one expert over the other, or disregard both in rendering its judgment.' In re L.L., supra, 653 A.2d at 882-83 (quoting Rock Creek Plaza-Woodner Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 466 A.2d 857, 859 (D.C.1983)). Thus, the trial court was entitled to credit and rely on the testimony of Dr. Missar. Based on the undisputed evidence that T.E. was securely attached to T.W.M. and the testimony of the experts, there was clear and convincing evidence that removing T.E. from T.W.M. and granting A.E.'s adoption petition would be contrary to T.E.'s best interests.