Opinion ID: 835146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: brady-aiello matter

Text: The Bar's first three causes of complaint arose out of the accused's handling of an estate matter. The Bar alleged that the accused violated four rules in his handling of the Brady-Aiello matter: DR 1-102(A)(4) and RPC 8.4(a)(4) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice); [4] DR 2-106(A) (charging clearly excessive fee); and RPC 8.1(a)(2) (failure to respond to lawful requests of disciplinary authority). The trial panel's opinion sets out an extensive and detailed recitation of factual findings relevant to this matter, complete with citations to the record. We have reviewed both the trial panel's findings and the record in full. Based on that review, we provide the following summary of what occurred. The accused represented a disabled man (Brown) and prepared both a living trust and a pour-over will for him. Under Brown's will, the accused was made the personal representative of the estate, all of which was devised to Brown's caregivers, Trudy Brady-Aiello and Michael Aiello. Under the trust, the accused succeeded Brown as trustee upon Brown's death. Brown died in 2001. Because both Brown and his wife, who predeceased him, had received state health assistance during the last years of their lives, the state had two priority claims against Brown's estate. The estate consisted of only a few assets, and there were only a few claims against those assets ( e.g., the state's claims, hospital claims, and a few other routine creditor claims). Settling the estate and distributing the assets should have been a straightforward process for all concerned. But, due to the accused's conduct, it was not. Although often representing that he stood ready to distribute the assets, the accused delayed and failed to do so. Eventually, the beneficiaries were forced to retain independent counsel. Some 17 months after Brown's death, the accused finally filed a small estate matter in probate court. The state then made two formal claims against the estate to recover the medical assistance paid on behalf of Brown and his wife. The accused, however, disallowed the claims, forcing the state to petition the court. In that and other respects, the accused, who was frequently suspicious and distrustful of the beneficiaries and their lawyers, often treated the process of settling the estate and distributing the estate as an adversarial one. Eventually, by court order, the accused was removed and replaced as trustee of the trust and personal representative of the estate. That occurred more than two and a half years after Brown's death. The new personal representative settled the estate and distributed the assets within a year after taking over. The only significant complications that the new personal representative encountered were the accused's failure to turn over various items in the estate (including access to a safe deposit box) and the accused's filing of an attorney fee lien against the estate for fees that the court, in removing the accused as personal representative, had told the accused that he could not collect. Once the lien was dismissed and the new personal representative had access to the materials and information that he needed from the accused, the estate matter was completed within a few months. We do not relate, detail by detail and date by date, the series of failed meetings, frustrated negotiations, and protracted court proceedings that are described in the trial panel's extensive findings of fact. We do, however, quote in full the trial panel's summary of and assessment of those facts: The Brady-Aiello matter became a nightmare for virtually everyone involved solely because of the actions taken by the Accused. As noted above, this matter arose out of the death of Alan Brown. He had two beneficiaries, Trudy Brady-Aiello and Michael Aiello. There were no other beneficiaries to the estate, and only a single claim made against the estate assets. The bulk of the estate was in a trust and should have passed without fanfare or issue to the Aiellos. Unfortunately, each action taken by the Accused seemed designed to lengthen the process. When he was removed as trustee of the estate in May 2004, nearly three years after the decedent's death, the title to a single asset had not yet passed to the beneficiaries. In a case where most beneficiaries would not need independent counsel, three separate lawyers represented the beneficiaries over the 31 months the Accused was involved. Hundreds and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of dollars in attorney fees were incurred on behalf of the beneficiaries and paid for by the estate. Despite an order to provide one, the Accused never provided the beneficiaries with a complete accounting. He filed an interpleader action, which all lawyers who testified or wrote on the issue indicated was unnecessary. He disallowed legitimate claims of the State of Oregon in the small estate matter, refused to seriously consider settlement of those claims, and then told a circuit court judge in open court that he had not denied any claim against the estate. He directed his legal assistant to draft a special power of attorney for Michael Aiello to sign so his wife, Trudy Brady-Aiello, could handle all estate matters, reviewed the special power of attorney, billed for his time, and then refused to honor the special power of attorney. He was rude, obstreperous and evasive in his deposition. His answers rose to the level of misrepresentation. He frequently responded to questions by saying he could not answer without looking at his file, but had taken steps to make the file unavailable at the time of his deposition. At the deposition of his legal assistant and office manager, he directed her not to review the file despite a subpoena duces tecum which required that file be present. He opposed a motion to consolidate on the ground there were no common issues of law and fact, but argued the interpleader action should go forward for that very reason. He continually offered to either settle the matter or mediate the dispute in a fashion that indicated the offer to do so was specious. In fact, there was nothing to mediate. The beneficiaries wanted to resolve the claim of the state in the manner negotiated by Grant [the Aiellos' attorney], and the Accused refused. He unnecessarily antagonized at least one circuit court judge for no reason the panel can find, to the potential detriment of his client. He collected fees in the small estate matter without court approval. By charging the same work to multiple files, he was found by the court to have double billed. He commingled entries on matters that needed to be segregated. A circuit court judge ordered his attorney fee lien dissolved and ordered repayment of $14,000 in fees he collected from the estate improperly. He was ordered to provide access to a safe deposit box the next day, but took nearly two months to comply with the order. Ultimately, he was removed as trustee, but even then balked when it came to transferring all of the necessary file materials. With that factual backdrop, we turn to the particular violations that the accused was alleged to have committed based on his conduct in the Brady-Aiello matter.
DR 1-102(A)(4) and RPC 8.4(a)(4) prohibit a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. To establish a violation of those rules, the Bar must show that: (1) the accused lawyer's action or inaction was improper; (2) the accused lawyer's conduct occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding or a proceeding with the trappings of a judicial proceeding; and (3) the accused lawyer's conduct had or could have had a prejudicial effect upon the administration of justice. The administration of justice includes both the procedural functioning of the proceeding and the substantive interests of parties to the proceeding. Prejudice may arise from several acts that cause some harm or a single act that causes substantial harm to the administration of justice. In re Kluge, 335 Or. 326, 345, 66 P.3d 492 (2003) (synthesizing test from In re Haws, 310 Or. 741, 746-48, 801 P.2d 818 (1990)) (citations omitted). [5] Regarding the second element (occurring in the course of a judicial proceeding), the trial panel determined that the accused's conduct, which occurred over almost a three-year period, encompassed three court actions filed in connection with Brown's small estate and trust matters, discovery depositions, the denial of legitimate state priority claims against the estate, and refusals to comply with court orders. Regarding the third element (prejudicial effect), the trial panel's pertinent findings and conclusion included that the accused's conduct (1) forced the Aiellos to hire multiple lawyers and to suffer needless upset, anxiety, and delay in the distribution of Brown's simple estate; (2) the accused's conduct forced the state to initiate costly legal action to obtain payment of a legitimate lien, one that the estate eventually settled; (3) despite a court order, the accused refused to turn over the records of the estate, which then required additional legal action to obtain the accused's compliance; (4) the accused purposely obstructed a discovery deposition of his legal assistant; and (5) the accused refused to distribute the estate because Michael Aiello was unable to be personally present for the distribution, even though the accused had prepared and his office had notarized a special power of attorney for Trudy Brady-Aiello to exercise if Michael Aiello could not be present. [6] As the trial panel concluded, the evidence amply satisfies both the second and third elements. See In re Gresham, 318 Or. 162, 166, 864 P.2d 360 (1993) (probate lawyer engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when the lawyer took an extended period of time to close an estate and repeatedly failed to do anything to administer the estate, requiring the trial court to make repeated requests for information). The accused does not argue otherwise. As to the first elementimproper or illegal conduct on the accused's partthe trial panel's opinion identifies numerous improper actions and inactions by the accused. Many are set out in the material quoted from the trial panel's opinion above. The accused does not directly take issue with any of those particular facts or conclusions. He does, however, appear to take indirect issue with them. Specifically, in his summary of facts (but not in his questions presented or his substantive arguments), the accused states that Tab 5 of his Exhibit 203 is the solitary document that exculpates [the accused] completely; that it demonstrates his painstaking efforts to distribute the estate; and that it contains [13] specific, documented overtures by [the accused] to resolve the estate long before Judge McElligott intervened to [remove the accused as the personal representative of the estate] in 2004   . At the hearing before the trial panel, the accused similarly testified that Tab 5 was the lynchpin to demonstrate that he acted properly. We have reviewed Tab 5 in full. It consists of 18 documents or parts of documents. A few are undated draft pleadings or stipulations. The remainder are dated and signed letters that the accused sent in 2002, 2003, and 2004, to various individuals in connection with the estate matterindividuals such as the Aiellos, their attorneys, and the attorneys who represented the state on its claim. The accused's only argument as to how those documents exculpate[] the accused completely is that the letters often stated that the accused was willing and able to distribute the estate, and often invited the recipients to contact him or set up meetings for that purpose. The evidence is overwhelming, however, that his words in those letters did not match his conduct. [7] Despite his professed willingness to distribute the estate, the accused took few or no significant steps to facilitate matters. At best, he was frequently passive and waited for others to take the initiative. More often, the accused delayed, frustrated, and even actively interfered with efforts to settle and resolve claims against the estate and distribute the remaining assets to the beneficiaries. The accused's actions and inactions in those regards were improper. Moreover, as the trial panel found, the accused's improper conduct was sufficiently persistent over time as to reflect a disturbing pattern on the accused's part, especially when considered in the context of highly similar past conduct on the accused's part that had resulted in formal discipline. [8] The Bar has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and RPC 8.4(a)(4).
DR 2-106(A) prohibits a lawyer from charging an illegal or clearly excessive fee. The Bar alleged and the trial panel found that the accused, by comingling his billings as personal representative with those for his work as trustee in connection with the Brady-Aiello estate matter, double-charged for certain services and collected $14,000 without the statutorily required permission of the court. See ORS 116.173(1) (setting out fees to which a personal representative, [u]pon application to the court[,] may seek for services). On review, the accused does not address the trial panel's findings or conclusions with regard to the violations of DR 2-106(A). Having reviewed the record as it pertains to that cause of complaint, together with the findings and conclusions of the trial panel, we conclude that the Bar has proved that the accused violated DR 2-106(A) in this matter. See In re Knappenberger, 344 Or. 559, 564, 186 P.3d 272 (2008) (accused violated rule when he charged a fee that, by law, required authorization by Social Security Administration without obtaining that authorization).
In part, and as relevant here, RPC 8.1(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall not, in connection with a disciplinary matter, knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority. As a final cause of complaint in connection with the Brady-Aiello matter, the Bar alleged that the accused had violated RPC 8.1(a)(2). On review, the accused does not challenge the trial panel's findings of facts and conclusions in that regard. In concluding that the accused violated RPC 8.1(a)(2) when the Bar attempted to investigate the Brady-Aiello matter, the trial panel specifically found: The Accused failed to fully and truthfully respond to the Bar's repeated requests for information. Many responses were intentionally non-responsive to the specific inquiries made by the Bar, others offered nothing of substance. Indeed, on a number of occasions relating to the various cases at issue in the proceeding, the Accused didn't respond at all. We conclude therefore that the Accused acted knowingly in his failure to respond to the Bar's inquiries. It is clear he intended to give the Bar as little information as possible while attempting to preserve his ability to argue that he was attempting to be cooperative and responsive. We also recognize the Accused feels he is being persecuted by the Bar. He feels this stems from his activity relating to a disciplinary task force and his work on the Board of Bar Governors. We recognize the Accused's feelings are sincere and strongly held. However, he has not proven that his suspicions are true. His decision to express these feelings by being evasive only strengthens our conclusion that he chose not to cooperate with the Bar's investigation [except] in the most de minimus of manners. Our ethical rules require more than what the Accused provided. The trial panel's findings and conclusions in that regard are significantly demeanor based, and we defer to them. See In re Fitzhenry, 343 Or. 86, 103, 162 P.3d 260 (2007) (this court defers to credibility determinations of trial panel in disciplinary proceedings). We conclude, as did the trial panel, that the accused, on some occasions, failed to respond at all to the Bar's investigatory requests; on other occasions, the accused responded incompletely and insubstantially to the Bar's requests. We further conclude that the accused did so with at least the knowing mental state that the rule requires. [9] The Bar has proved that the accused violated RPC 8.1(a)(2) (failure to respond to lawful requests of disciplinary authority) in this matter.