Opinion ID: 2512667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdictional Preemption: Title 8 United States Code Section 1329

Text: (8) Federal criminal laws relating to immigration are collected in title 8, chapter 12, subchapter II of the United States Code. Congress has granted federal courts jurisdiction over such matters: The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, brought by the United States that arise under the provisions of this subchapter. (8 U.S.C. § 1329.) We think it clear Congress has not thereby preempted state court jurisdiction. (9) Title 8 United States Code section 1329 vests federal courts with jurisdiction but makes no mention of state courts. The absence of an express exclusion of state court jurisdiction is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent. ( Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly (1990) 494 U.S. 820, 823 [108 L.Ed.2d 834, 110 S.Ct. 1566].) While in some cases preemption may be found in the absence of an explicit textual directive based on legislative history or demonstrated incompatibility with federal interests, we discern no such history or incompatibility here, and Jose C. identifies none. The consequence of state jurisdiction in the context of a wardship proceeding touching on immigration law is that state and federal courts may engage in parallel interpretation of the same statutes, but this concern has never alone been understood as sufficient to defeat jurisdiction. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at page 464, state interpretation of federal law, even federal criminal law, creates no significant danger of inconsistent application because federal courts are not bound by state interpretations, state courts are to be guided by existing federal interpretations, and any erroneous state court interpretations are subject to direct review in the United States Supreme Court. Jose C. relies on Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee (E.D.Wash. 1987) 662 F.Supp. 821, 824, for the proposition that state courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether a federal immigration law has been broken. While Gutierrez so holds, we are not persuaded. In Gutierrez, an alleged illegal alien facing state incarceration following a probation revocation hearing sought an injunction in federal court. The terms of his probation forbade violation of any laws; at the probation revocation hearing, the state court purported to determine Gutierrez had violated federal immigration law. The federal district court issued a declaratory judgment, holding Gutierrez's immigration status could be decided only in the context of a federal prosecution or federal administrative proceeding. ( Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee, supra, 662 F.Supp. at pp. 822, 825.) (10) Gutierrez rests, first, on the understanding that immigration may be regulated only by the federal governmenta proposition we agree with in part, as discussed below, but which is not determinativeand second, on the understanding that under section 3231, state court adjudications of whether federal criminal laws have been violated impinge on federal sovereignty, even when the adjudication arises in the course of an independent state law proceeding (there, a probation revocation hearing). (See Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee, supra, 662 F.Supp. at p. 824.) That latter understanding is incorrect, as the United States Supreme Court made clear a few years later in Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. 455; contrary to Gutierrez 's holding, section 3231 does not strip state courts of jurisdictional authority to make[] a factual determination and reach[] a legal conclusion that a federal law has been broken ( Gutierrez, at p. 824). Accordingly, Gutierrez does not persuade us that state court jurisdiction is lacking here. [9]