Opinion ID: 164917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: August 31, 1986 distribution

Text: Cunningham’s argument concerning the August 31, 1986 distribution boils down to this: he claims Adams withdrew his contributions and the employer matching contributions from the Plan, under the guise of being terminated, when in fact Adams remained the President and Chairman of the Board for Adams Investment Company and its affiliates. The district court found that even if this were true, Adams had only received a distribution of those funds that were in his own discrete Plan account, under the defined contribution structure of the Plan. Therefore, the court concluded, the distribution “is really not the concern of Mr. Cunningham because the transaction had no adverse impact on any other participant [besides Adams].” Aplt. App. at 26 (emphasis omitted). In order to have standing to proceed with this action, Cunningham must show that he was personally injured or harmed by the challenged withdrawal. See generally Piazza v. Ebesco Indus., Inc. , 273 F.3d 1341, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 2001); Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav. Plan Admin. Comm. , 168 F.3d 671, 678-79 (3d -5- Cir. 1999). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, it is Cunningham’s burden to demonstrate an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing. See Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 371 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004). For the reasons stated by the district court, he failed to make this showing concerning the August 31, 1986 distribution. 1 We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the anti-inurement claim concerning the August 31, 1986 distribution. 1 Cunningham does not contest the district court’s determination that the Plan is a defined contribution Plan with segregated accounts for participants. Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. He asserts that this determination is “misleading,” but he fails to provide any facts to establish any injury in fact to himself, reiterating only his contention that Adams’s “intended withdrawal of PLAN funds was inappropriate.” Id. In his reply brief, Cunningham incorporates by reference a mathematically-based argument he made in a district court brief, purporting to show that the funds distributed to Adams exceeded the maximum contributions Adams could have made to the Plan between January 1, 1983 and August 31, 1986, unless Adams was earning in excess of $1.5 million per year. Aplt. Reply Br. at 1; see Aplt. App., Vol. I at 87-89. If Adams was distributed more than he was entitled to as a Plan participant, this could have an adverse effect on other participants. As defendants pointed out in their district court briefing, however, Cunningham’s argument is fatally flawed because it assumes that the Plan had only been in existence since 1983. In fact, the Plan was merely a restatement of a Plan already in effect since 1978. See Aplt. App., Vol. II at 275. Therefore, the mathematical argument does not establish that Adams was distributed more than his share of Plan assets. -6-