Opinion ID: 2610235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of want of probable cause and malice.

Text: On the issue of probable cause, plaintiff offered testimony that although defendant knew that $182 of the $496 claim was for damage to the kitchen counter and to a desk in the rented house it nevertheless prepared and filed the affidavit of attachment for the entire $496 as due upon an express contract for the payment of money, to-wit; as set forth in the complaint and that the complaint alleged that $496 was payable for rental services rendered. Defendant's president admitted that he knew that an attachment was not proper on a tort claim for damages, but stated that he considered a claim for failure to deliver rented premises in good condition to be a claim in contract, rather than tort, and thus properly subject to attachment. ORS 29.110(1) (a) authorizes attachments for An action upon a contract, expressed or implied, for the direct payment of money,   . Defendant contends that there is an implied covenant in every lease that the tenant will return the premises unharmed and that ORS 29.110(1) (a), by its terms, permits attachments for breach of implied contract. The question remains, however, whether such a claim is for the direct payment of money, within the meaning of ORS 29.110. In Ruby v. Whitten, 117 Or. 271, 243 P. 559 (1926), we held that attachment will not lie under the provisions of this statute for damages claimed for breach of a lease covenant requiring defendant to return the premises in good condition, based upon the law as settled by Neilson v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 101 Or. 262, 199 P. 948 (1921). In Neilson, although not involving a lease covenant, it was held (at p. 274, 199 P. at p. 952) that attachment is only proper to recover upon an actual and bona fide debt and that a debt must be liquidated in amount. In State ex rel. Bethke v. Bain, 193 Or. 688, 240 P.2d 958 (1952), the most recent of the cases cited by defendant in support of its contention that attachments will lie on implied contracts, the claim involved was not for failure of a tenant to return premises in good condition and this court specifically noted (at p. 701, 240 P.2d at p. 964) that In the instant case no uncertainty exists as to the amount of money plaintiff paid on the purchase price and which he is entitled to recover upon rescission. [7] It follows, under the undisputed evidence and as a matter of law, [8] that since a substantial portion of defendant's claim was for damages to the premises, an unliquidated claim, defendant did not have probable cause for the issuance of the attachment in the total sum of $496. Defendant also contends that since the amount actually attached (the sum of $105.43) was less than the amount of that portion of the claim which was properly subject to attachment (the sum of $314), the attachment is not invalid because it joined an additional claim for damages that was not subject to attachment. In support of that contention defendant cites cases holding that the joinder in a complaint of a cause of action upon which an attachment will lie with a cause of action upon which an attachment will not lie will not invalidate an attachment issued for the amount claimed under the first cause of action. See Stotland v. Mobile Homes Engineering Corp., 197 Cal. App.2d 815, 17 Cal. Rptr. 591, 594 (D.C.App. 1962). See also Samuels v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 276 Cal. App.2d 264, 81 Cal. Rptr. 216 (C.A. 1969), and Bradford v. Eden, 47 Misc.2d 482, 262 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup.Ct.App.Div. 1965). But where, as in this case, the affidavit of attachment stated a single claim for an amount which, in fact, consisted in part of a claim for damages not subject to attachment, such an attachment is completely invalid. Allen v. Merchants Electric Company, 54 Cal.2d 67, 4 Cal. Rptr. 527, 351 P.2d 799, 802 (Cal.Sup.Ct. 1960); National Reefer Service v. Felman, 164 Neb. 783, 83 N.W.2d 547, 549 (1957); Cecrle v. W.H. Jeffries, 12 Ohio Misc. 25, 229 N.E.2d 477, 479-480 (1967); Vollmer v. Spencer, 5 Idaho 557, 51 P. 609, 610 (1897). See also Haroco Co., Inc. v. Sahim, 105 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup.Ct. 1951), and Republic of Italy v. DeAngelis, 111 F. Supp. 216, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Although this court has not previously decided this question, we adopt the rule as stated in these cases as consistent with the established policy of this court that strict compliance with attachment statutes must be pleaded and proved. Banker's Discount Corp. v. Noe, 116 Or. 570, 577, 242 P. 610 (1926). Accordingly, we hold that not only did defendant have no probable cause for issuance of the attachment, but that the attachment was invalid. It does not follow, however, that the lack of probable cause was of itself sufficient evidence from which the jury could properly infer that defendant acted with malice in the attachment of plaintiff's wages. Alvarez v. Retail Credit Association, supra , (at 264, 381 P.2d at 503). Nevertheless, as stated in Alvarez (at p. 264, 381 P.2d at p. 503):    What the courts have said, however, is that the law will permit the jury to draw an inference of malice in most cases where a want of probable cause is found. See also Prosser, Torts (3d ed.) 868, § 113, and 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts 321-322, § 4.6, and cases cited therein. In Alvarez we also said (at p. 266, 381 P.2d at p. 504) that in an action for malicious prosecution in the bringing of a civil action, plaintiff must prove not only that he was wrongfully sued, but that the defendant in bringing the action had a motive other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim on which the action was based, although recognizing (at p. 265, 381 P.2d at p. 504) that: Had there been in the case before us some evidence of wanton or reckless failure to exercise any care in learning the facts, or evidence of some oppressive and flagrant disregard for the rights of Alvarez, there might have been some justification for submitting the issue of malice to the jury.   . In this case, there was evidence on the issue of malice in addition to the fact that defendant knew that a substantial part of the claim was for damages to the rented premises and had not probable cause for issuance of the attachment for $496. Thus, there was evidence that the complaint and affidavit for attachment in this case were prepared by a secretary in defendant's office and were then signed by defendant's attorney in a perfunctory manner, without any reliable knowledge of the facts, and that if he had known the facts he would not have approved these documents. These documents included an affidavit that the entire $496 was owed under an express contract for the payment of money, which was not true, and a complaint alleging that the $496 was for rental services rendered, which was a statement of dubious veracity, to say the least. In fairness to present counsel, it should be noted that the attorneys who represented defendant in the attachment proceedings were not the same as those who represent defendant in this case. We hold that from the evidence in this case the jury could have properly found that defendant was guilty of wanton or reckless failure to exercise any care in learning the facts, as well as an oppressive and flagrant disregard for the rights of Mr. Crouter. We also hold that from the evidence in this case the jury could have properly found, on the issue of defendant's motives, that in issuing the attachment in this case, particularly for the sum of $496, defendant was more interested in coercing plaintiff into paying that full amount than in securing a proper adjudication of the claim on which the attachment was based. Accordingly, we hold that there was sufficient evidence of malice to take that issue to the jury in this case.