Opinion ID: 3012785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction Under the MDLEA

Text: On appeal, Ledesma contends that the District Court erred in finding jurisdiction over Count Three, charging a violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 App.U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.2 Specifically, Ledesma argues that the Bahamian ship on which he was apprehended was not a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the context of the statute. The MDLEA states in pertinent part: (a) It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or who is a citizen of the United States or a resident alien of the United States on board any vessel, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance. . . . (j) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 46 App.U.S.C. § 1903(a), (j). The definition of “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” includes “a vessel located within the customs waters of the United States.” 46 App.U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(D). The parties do not dispute that Ledesma was apprehended by the Trojan Star crew in international waters, but was not arrested until he was in the Philadelphia harbor, well within U.S. customs waters.3 2. Ledesma also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions on Counts Two, Three and Four. As we note in Part III.B, this claim has no merit. 3. According to Captain Dobson, the “customs waters” of the United States are three miles of water from any point of land out to sea, and the “territorial waters” extend to a 12-mile limit. 7 Ledesma observes that the Trojan Star was registered in the Bahamas and the Government presented no evidence at trial with regard to any consent or waiver by the flag nation to the enforcement of United States law by the United States. Ledesma also notes that he was apprehended and dispossessed of the cocaine before he reached United States customs waters. Therefore, Ledesma concludes, the Trojan Star did not meet any of the requirements for being “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” under the MDLEA. 46 App.U.S.C. § 1903(c). We disagree. Even though Ledesma’s cocaine was taken from him and he was detained before he entered U.S. customs waters, he was clearly attempting to enter the United States with four kilos of cocaine for distribution in the United States when the crew of the Trojan Star discovered him on board their ship. As quoted above, attempted possession with intent to manufacture or distribute is equivalent to actual possession for purposes of the MDLEA. 46 App.U.S.C. § 1903(j). Indeed, as we have noted, Count Three of the indictment explicitly charged Ledesma with attempted possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Under federal law, attempt requires intent and “conduct amounting to a ‘substantial step’ towards the commission of the crime.” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 134 (2d Cir. 2003). In this case, the question is whether Ledesma’s conduct up to the point of his discovery by the crew amounted to a substantial step toward possessing cocaine with an intent to enter the United States to distribute the cocaine. We conclude that it did. The evidence in this case clearly established that Ledesma, possessing a large amount of cocaine, knowingly boarded a vessel headed for Philadelphia. Specifically, the jury could have inferred from Ledesma’s past experience as a stevedore that he knew of the Trojan Star’s well-established route to Philadelphia, and it could certainly have relied upon his attempt to bribe the Trojan Star captain to let him disembark in Philadelphia. In light of his evidenced attempt to reach U.S. territorial waters covertly to distribute cocaine, the fact that he was discovered before he actually reached U.S. customs waters 8 in possession of the cocaine is irrelevant. Under Ledesma’s argument to the contrary, a drug courier could never be prosecuted for an attempt to bring drugs into the United States aboard a ship under 46 App.U.S.C. § 1903(j), if he were fortunate enough to be discovered before entering U.S. customs waters. Such a result would directly contradict Congress’ stated purpose in drafting the MDLEA. The MDLEA was enacted “to facilitate enforcement by the Coast Guard of laws relating to the importation of illegal drugs” because “the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970 . . . inadvertently contained a section repealing the criminal provision under which drug smugglers apprehended on the high seas were prosecuted without creating a new provision to replace it.” S. Rep. No. 96-855, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2785, 2785. According to the Senate Report, “most of the [Coast Guard’s] difficulties in drug enforcement stem[med] from this statutory void which [did] not proscribe possession of controlled substances on the high seas, while such conduct [was] a crime in U.S. territory.” Id. In essence, Congress enacted the MDLEA to strengthen the United States’ drug laws in areas not adequately addressed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, specifically by removing geographical barriers which had impeded efforts to combat the drug trade. In subsequent amendments to the MDLEA, Congress attempted to bolster the law by: (1) broadening its jurisdiction to deal with “defendants . . . [who had] been relying heavily on international jurisdictional questions as legal technicalities to escape conviction;” and (2) adding the offenses of attempt and conspiracy to bring the law into conformity with the treatment of those offenses in other statutes. S. Rep. No. 99-530, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6000; H.R. Rep. No. 101-681, pt. 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6606. These attempts are explicitly reflected in 46 App.U.S.C. § 1903(h), which states: “This section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” In United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 9 1993), we noted that Congress had authority to enact 46 App.U.S.C. § 1901, et seq., pursuant to its constitutional power to: “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.” Inasmuch as the trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is “fundamentally unfair” for Congress to provide for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas. Id. (quoting from U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10). The case before us, then, is the exact type of case the MDLEA was designed to address: one in which the defendant is caught on the high seas, with drugs intended for illegal distribution once he reaches U.S. territory. Our conclusion is bolstered by the Second Circuit’s decision in Yousef. In that case, the defendants were charged with attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. § 32(a), which prohibits damaging aircraft in the “jurisdiction of the United States.” Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86. The prosecution’s evidence on the attempt charges consisted of proof of several acts, including bombings, perpetrated by defendants in the Philippines. The defendants pointed out that none of their alleged actions took place in the United States or on a U.S. aircraft. Id. at 134. The Second Circuit found this fact irrelevant to their attempt convictions, reasoning that because the acts amounted to substantial steps toward an eventual attack on an aircraft within U.S. jurisdiction, their locale was irrelevant. Id. Similarly, in this case, by the time Ledesma was apprehended, he had already taken substantial steps toward possessing with intent to illegally distribute the cocaine in U.S. customs waters, making his actual location at the time of apprehension immaterial. The crew of the Trojan Star could not have acted more properly. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to have expected the crew to stand by and allow Ledesma to retain the drugs until the ship entered U.S. waters. Ledesma knew when he boarded the Trojan Star that it was bound for Philadelphia, and he cannot avoid the impact of United States laws merely on 10 the fortuity that he was caught before the ship entered U.S. waters rather than afterward. A decision to the contrary would not only undermine law enforcement efforts to arrest drug smugglers, but would discourage crews aboard ships in international waters from apprehending drug traffickers found aboard their vessels who are intent on distributing drugs in the United States. Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s denial of Ledesma’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Three. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Expert Testimony Ledesma raises two other issues on appeal. First, he claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict on Counts Two, Three and Four. Next, he contends that the District Court erred in allowing expert testimony that possession of approximately four kilograms of cocaine was consistent with distribution and not personal use. After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, we discern no basis for disturbing the District Court’s rulings on these issues.