Opinion ID: 31536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Grant Willard Leave to Amend Complaint for Third Time

Text: 48 Willard argues that the district court erred by dismissing his Second Amended Complaint in part based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) without granting him another opportunity to amend. The district court stated that Willard has not requested leave to amend his complaint to remedy this failure. 49 Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, and should be granted absent some justification for refusal. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The liberal amendment policy underlying Rule 15(a) affords the court broad discretion in granting leave to amend and, consequently, a motion for leave to amend should not be denied unless there is undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed [or] undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,... Foman, 83 S.Ct. at 230. 50 Except as authorized by the first sentence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) for one amendment before service of a responsive pleading, a complaint may be amended only by leave of the district court, and, while such leave is to be freely given when justice so requires, the decision is left to the sound discretion of the district court and will only be reversed on appeal when that discretion has been abused. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Dunn v. Koehring Co., 546 F.2d 1193, 1198 (5th Cir.1977). 51 A party who neglects to ask the district court for leave to amend cannot expect to receive such a dispensation from the court of appeals. Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 183-84 (1st Cir.1997). Rule 15(a) applies where plaintiffs expressly requested to amend even though their request was not contained in a properly captioned motion paper. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir.1988). A formal motion is not always required, so long as the requesting party has set forth with particularity the grounds for the amendment and the relief sought. Fed. R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1), 15(a); Edwards v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1445-46 (9th Cir.1990). [A] bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss — without any indication of the particular grounds on which the amendment is sought, cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b) — does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a). Confederate Mem'l Ass'n, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C.Cir.1993). 52 For several reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Willard to amend his complaint for a third time. First, Willard did not expressly request with particularity the opportunity to amend his complaint for the third time. Willard points to the following sentences on page 20 of his Response to Humana's Second Motion to Dismiss: 53 In any event, the only relief possibly available to it at this stage of the case is that relator replead. A court should not dismiss a plaintiff's complaint under Rule 9(b) unless the plaintiff has already been given the opportunity to amend. Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247, n. 6 (5th Cir.2000); Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476 (2nd Cir.1995). 54 While Willard need not necessarily have filed a separate Rule 15 motion to amend, this brief statement does not expressly request that Willard be given leave to amend and does not provide any indication of the grounds on which such an amendment should be permitted. Following the district court's order dismissing the case, Willard did not file a motion to reconsider as part of which he could have moved to amend his complaint. 55 Additionally, leave to amend properly may be denied when the party seeking leave has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed and when amendment would be futile. Foman, 83 S.Ct. at 230. Here, Willard has already had two opportunities to amend the complaint. The record indicates that the second instance in which the district court granted Willard leave to amend was to cure the complaint's lack of specificity, which is the same basis on which Willard now argues he should be allowed to amend for a third time. 56 Finally, it appears that a third chance to amend would prove to be futile. First, there is no indication in Willard's briefs to this court that he will be able to allege the necessary who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud. Furthermore, because Willard has failed to make a cognizable claim that Humana violated its contract or an applicable regulation, Willard's fraud in the inducement claim cannot be sustained independent of Rule 9(b).