Opinion ID: 1309468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attorney General's Ability to Appeal

Text: Respondents argue that the Attorney General's appeal from the circuit court's award of their attorneys' fees should be dismissed. For several reasons, we agree. In support of their contention, Respondents cite Bailey v. North Carolina, 353 N.C. 142, 540 S.E.2d 313 (2000). In Bailey, plaintiffs (a consolidated class of state and federal retirees) sued North Carolina over the constitutionality of a tax exemption cap on retirement benefits. Id. After extensive litigation, in which the State was represented by the Attorney General, the State reached a settlement with the plaintiffs, and the circuit court awarded attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel. Id. Subsequently, the Attorney General appealed from the award of fees, alleging that the fees awarded were excessive and against the public interest. [5] Id. Ultimately, the North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as improper and also held that the Attorney General was precluded from seeking review of attorneys' fees by way of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed whether the Attorney General had standing at all to assert this appeal, the court chose to base its decision on the Attorney General's failure to intervene as required by Rule 24 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (NCRCP). Rule 24, NCRCP, provides the procedure for intervention of right and permissive intervention. To intervene under either subsection of Rule 24, NCRCP, the person wishing to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon all parties affected thereby. The Attorney General did not move to intervene. As such, the court reasoned, [a]s a review of the record reveals neither an intervention motion on the part of the Attorney General nor an order granting such a motion from the trial judge, we are constrained by law to conclude that the Attorney General, at least in regard to his asserted role as defender of the public interest, is not a party to this action. Id. at 155-56, 540 S.E.2d 313. The court then dismissed the appeal as improper because only parties are entitled by law to appeal under Rule 3 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. A careful reading of Rule 3 reveals that its various subsections afford no avenue of appeal to either entities or persons who are nonparties to a civil action. Therefore, as we have already determined the Attorney General is not a party to the case sub judice, we can find no grounds on which to allow his appeal. Id. at 156, 540 S.E.2d 313. Likewise, Rule 24 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, (SCRCP), provides for both intervention of right and permissive intervention, and requires that a a person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties. In addition, Rule 201(b), SCACR, provides that only a party aggrieved by an order, judgment, or sentence may appeal. (emphasis added). In the case at hand, it is undisputed that the Attorney General was not a party to the action originally, and never intervened to become a party. In his reply brief, the Attorney General avoids discussing the impact of his failure to move for intervention pursuant to Rule 24, SCRCP. In fact, the Attorney General appears to admit that he is a nonparty, but argues that his duty to protect the public interest enables him to bring this appeal, even as a nonparty. Like the North Carolina Attorney General in the Bailey case, our Attorney General claims statutory and common law authority give him the ability to appeal in this case, apparently regardless of the Rules of Civil Procedure. [6] In support of his right to appeal, the Attorney General cites South Carolina Code Ann. § 1-7-40, which provides that the Attorney General shall appear for the State in the Supreme Court and the court of appeals in the trial and argument of all causes, criminal and civil, in which the State is a party or is interested, and in these causes in any other court or tribunal when required by the Governor or either branch of the General Assembly. S.C.Code Ann. § 1-7-40 (Supp.2002). Because the State and the DOR are parties to this action, the Attorney General reasons that he can automatically appear for the State. In addition to the Code, the Attorney General cites several South Carolina cases in which the Attorney General's authority, as the State's chief law officer, to represent the State and to protect the public's interests has been recognized by this Court. See State ex rel. Condon v. Hodges; State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537 (1929); State ex rel. Wolfe v. Sanders, 118 S.C. 498, 110 S.E. 808 (1920). [7] This Court has recognized that the Attorney General has broad statutory and common law authority in his capacity as the chief legal officer of the State to institute actions involving the welfare of the State and its citizens, including vindication of wrongs committed collectively against the citizens of the State. See Condon v. Hodges, 349 S.C. 232, 562 S.E.2d 623 (2002); State v. Beach, 271 S.C. 425, 248 S.E.2d 115 (1978). However, this Court has never held that the Attorney General's authority to do so is unlimited or somehow uniquely exempts him from acting in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beach. The Attorney General cites Watson v. Wall, in which the Attorney General intervened in a will dispute in order to protect the public's interest in the charitable trust at issue, in support of his authority to assert the appeal in the present case. 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 918 (1956). In Watson, however, the Attorney General moved to intervene, and, consequently, was named a party to the action. Id. Further, in Watson, the Attorney General had specific statutory support for his intervention under his duty `to enforce the application of funds given or appropriated to public charities.' Id. at 515, 93 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting S.C.Code §§ 1-240 (1952)). In our opinion, Watson actually supports the Respondents' contention that the Attorney General is required, like everyone else, to formally intervene and become a named party before he can file an appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal based on the Attorney General's failure to move for intervention as required by Rule 24, SCRCP. Such a ruling avoids the necessity of addressing the Attorney General's standing to become involved in this action, and makes clear that the Attorney General is required to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure when he wishes to become involved in a case. In addition, we note that this holding serves the public interest in the finality of settlement agreements, particularly in settlements with the State. The settlement agreement in this case contains a no appeal provision. The agreement provides, [i]t is expressly acknowledged and agreed that the parties and their counsel will not institute, participate in, or encourage, any appeal from an order implementing this Agreement, provided, however, any party has the right to appeal an order which is substantially different from the terms of this Agreement, or which alters the consideration to be given by or to any party. The stated purpose of the settlement agreement is to settle this conflict by the terms set forth herein such that the Agreement forever ends all litigation. The agreement mandates that [a]ny interpretation of language in this Agreement must be made so as to effectuate the [stated] purpose. The Attorney General uses the statement within the Attorneys' Fees section of the settlement agreement to support his right to appeal. As discussed, the settlement agreement does not prevent public officials from discussing the amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the Court or taking a position before the Court about such fees. However, it is clear from the settlement agreement's repeated reference to the Court that it is referring to the circuit court. As such, this provision must be construed to give the Attorney General, as a public official, the right to take a position on fees before the circuit court only, which the Attorney General did at the December 27, 2001, circuit court hearing. This is the interpretation most consistent with the no appeal provision in the agreement, and with the agreement's mandate to interpret language to further the parties' stated purpose of reaching a final settlement.