Opinion ID: 174856
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Challenged Provisions Regulate Commercial Speech .(1) Identifying Commercial Speech

Text: The propriety of distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech in evaluating a First Amendment claim derives from Supreme Court precedents affording the former only a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); accord Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S.Ct. at 1339; United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426, 113 S.Ct. 2696, 125 L.Ed.2d 345 (1993). The Supreme Court has explained that [t]wo features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. at 564 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 594 F.3d 94, 104 n. 11 (2d Cir.2010) (explaining that commercial speech is more durable and less central to the interests of the First Amendment than other forms of speech (internal quotation marks omitted)). [15] While the core notion of commercial speech is speech which does `no more than propose a commercial transaction,' Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 762, 96 S.Ct. 1817), the Supreme Court has also defined commercial speech as expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. at 561, 100 S.Ct. 2343. Moreover, it has held that speech does not cease to be commercial merely because it alludes to a matter of public debate. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. at 67-68, 103 S.Ct. 2875 (reviewing advertisements for contraceptives as commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain[ed] discussions of important public issues); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. at 562 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (rejecting suggestion that any link between product offered for sale and current public debate transformed commercial speech into noncommercial speech). In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (holding charitable fundraising not commercial speech because financial motivation was inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech), the Supreme Court explained that a court's lodestars in distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon, id. at 796, 108 S.Ct. 2667.