Opinion ID: 2212884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Simultaneous recovery.

Text: Without citation of authority to support its argument, the city asserts that sec. 66.191, Stats. 1971, prohibits recovery where recovery has also been had under sec. 41.14 (Wisconsin Retirement Fund). There is undisputed evidence that the applicant has received a payment of $21,851 from the Wisconsin Retirement Fund pursuant to sec. 41.14. Sec. 66.191 (2) (c) and (5), Stats. 1971, as previously quoted, prohibit the simultaneous recovery of benefits under that section and ch. 102 or sec. 41.13. There is no similar prohibition as to recovery under sec. 41.14. We are of the opinion that the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention and implied exclusion) applies, and that the failure to provide that sec. 41.14 is an exclusive remedy, as was done with ch. 102 and sec. 41.13, indicates a clear intention to permit double recovery. See: 82 C. J. S., Statutes, pp. 666-668, sec. 333; cf. Teamsters Union Local 695 v. Waukesha County (1973), 57 Wis. 2d 62, 203 N. W. 2d 707; Wood County v. Board of Vocational Technical Adult Education (1973), 60 Wis. 2d 606, 211 N. W. 2d 617. Because we have determined that the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and the cause remanded to the ILHR for further proceedings, we feel it unnecessary to undertake a discussion of the other issues raised by the city. By the Court. Judgment reversed with directions to remand to the Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. HEFFERNAN, J. (dissenting). Three facts must be established to trigger the statutory presumption under sec. 891.45, Stats. The fireman must have been found to be free of any respiratory disease at the time of hiring, he must have served a total of five years as a fireman, and his disability or death must have been caused by a respiratory disease. If all three factors are present, there is presumptive evidence that such defect or disease was caused by such employment. In this case, Schroeder was disease-free at the time of his employment, and he served more than five years as a fireman. These two factors are undisputed. There is also positive, undisputed documentary evidence that Schroeder died of a respiratory disease. The death certificate gives the cause of death as Bronchopneumonia . . . associated with bronchogenic carcinoma. . . . In accordance with sec. 227.12, Stats., the decision of the department included a statement of facts and ultimate conclusions relied upon in rejecting the recommendations of the hearing officer. The department found, and the circuit judge agreed, that the cause of death was pneumonia. The writer of this dissent finds no contrary finding in the recommended findings of the examiner. He acknowledged that death was caused by pneumonia. The fact that the examiner relied upon the testimony of Dr. Russo, who concluded that cancer, induced by cigarette smoking, was the probable cause of the pneumonia, is irrelevant. It is irrelevant, because that is not the finding the department made. Had the department found that the deceased contracted the disease from cigarette smoking and not from his occupation, there would have been substantial evidence to support that finding. Dr. Russo's testimony was not incredible. The question is not whether there was substantial credible evidence to support a finding that was not made, but whether there was substantial credible evidence to support the finding that was made. Unruh v. Industrial Comm. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 394, 398, 99 N. W. 2d 182. Hence, it is clear that, in order to sustain a finding based on credible evidence, there need not be a finding or conclusion that the evidence not relied on was incredible. Accordingly, the evidence before the departmentthe evidence of Dr. Russo, which the majority contends should have been further analyzed in company with the examiner to determine its credibilitywas before the department unchallenged as to credibility. On the other side of the coin was the statutory presumption under sec. 66.191, Stats. 1971. The credible evidence of Dr. Russo tended to rebut that presumption. However, we stated in Sperbeck v. ILHR Department (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 282, 174 N. W. 2d 546, even were there a credible contradiction of the presumption, an inference remains that is sufficient to support a finding of an employment-related injury. Hence, under Sperbeck, there was probative and credible evidence to sustain the finding the department made. It had the choice either to accept the finding postulated by Dr. Russo's credible testimony or to accept the finding that followed from the inference that remained. We said in Robertson Transportation Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 653, 658, 159 N. W. 2d 636: Substantial evidence is not equated with preponderance of the evidence. There may be cases where two conflicting views may each be sustained by substantial evidence. In such a case, it is for the agency to determine which view of the evidence it wishes to accept. Likewise, there are cases where only one view can be supported by substantial evidence and the determination depends upon the credibility of witnesses. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear that, in this case, we deal with the first type of situation discussed in Robertson the situation in which there are alternative findings, each supported by substantial credible evidence. Under these circumstances, the rationale of Braun v. Industrial Comm. (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 48, 153 N. W. 2d 81, and Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. ILHR Department (1969), 43 Wis. 2d 398, 168 N. W. 2d 817, is irrelevant. The credibility of Dr. Russo is not challenged. No due process question arises. Under the law, the department was obliged either to award compensation or not make an award. Either conclusion would have found support in the evidence determined by the examiner. The legislature has seen fit to create a presumption which, under Sperbeck, supra, will result in a surviving inference that will always support an award if the three criteria of sec. 66.191, Stats., are met. Whether this is wise legislative policy is not for this court to decide, but it is policy we must follow. It is not a proper function of this court to thwart the legislative will under the guise of a dubious claim of due process. The award should be affirmed.