Opinion ID: 1924014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Point 4, Speedy Trial

Text: The law is clear that appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, Maine Constitution Article I, § 6, (upon the charge of breaking arrest), and reflected in Rule 48(b) [2] M.R.Crim.Proc. has not been violated unless the previous dismissal at District Court level is significant. His right to a speedy trial does not exist until he is charged with an offense. State v. Couture, 156 Me. 231, 244, 163 A.2d 646; State v. Boynton, 143 Me. 313, 323, 62 A.2d 182; Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318, [2, 3] 320 (5 CCA 1965) cert. den. 384 U.S. 921, 86 S.Ct. 1370, 16 L.Ed.2d 441, reh. den. 384 U.S. 958, 86 S.Ct. 1575, 16 L.Ed.2d 553 (under Federal Constitution 6th Amendment and Rule 48(b) Federal Rules Criminal Procedure, from which latter our Rule 48(b) is derived, in substantially the same terms). The right may be waived by the accused's failure to assert it. Boynton, supra, 143 Me. at page 323, 62 A.2d 182; Bruce, supra, 351 F.2d [2, 3] at page 320 (delay of seven years). For an offense allegedly committed on October 31, 1967 appellant was charged on November 1, 1967 and faced with trial on November 3, 1967 at which time the charge was dismissed as covered by another complaint. Such dismissal is authorized, is without prejudice and does not prevent the reinstitution of the criminal proceeding against the defendant. Rule 48(a) [3] District Court Criminal Rules, Rule 48(a) M.R.Crim.Proc. and § 48.1 Maine Practice, State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386, 138 A. 625. Appellant was indicted January 4, 1968 for the same offense, was tried and convicted between that date and January 9, 1968 when notice of appeal was filed. No criticism of the promptness with which trial was given, is justified. With the dismissal on November 3, 1967 appellant stood uncharged and so remained until January 4, 1968. During that interim there was nothing upon which he could have been tried. He was in a position, not unlike Boynton in Boynton, supra, wherein it was held that a delay from October 2, 1947 to January 9, 1948 in filing a complaint was not unreasonable and the Court said (143 Me. page 322, 62 A.2d page 188): The only bar because of lapse of time, to the institution of proceedings    is the statute of limitations. (Six years, 15 M.R.S.A. § 452). See also Sanchez v. United States, 341 F.2d 225 [3] II, 227 (9 CCA 1965), where a February violation was charged in September. Appellant takes nothing by this point of appeal. As to claim of double jeopardy on the charge of assault, appeal sustained. As to sufficiency of indictment and claim of denial of speedy trial on breaking arrest, appeal denied. POMEROY, J., did not sit.