Opinion ID: 1990002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Award of Alimony for Life

Text: The husband next challenges the duration of the alimony award. He contends that the court erred in finding, on this record, that an award of alimony for life was warranted. Moreover, he argues that we must reverse because the court failed to state a basis for its decision to make alimony payments permanent. We agree. It has long been recognized that the primary purpose of alimony is rehabilitative. E.g., Tishkevich v. Tishkevich, 131 N.H. 404, 407, 553 A.2d 1324 (1989); see also RSA 458:19, I(c) (requiring that a trial court find, prior to awarding alimony, that the recipient is unable to be self-supporting through appropriate employment). This principle is based upon the realization that modern spouses are equally able to function in the job market and to provide for their own financial needs. Fowler, 145 N.H. at 520, 764 A.2d 916. Alimony should, therefore, generally be designed to encourage the recipient to establish an independent source of income. In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 431, 899 A.2d 258 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16, 918 A.2d 1 (2007). However, the express language of the alimony statute dictates that alimony awards need not be rehabilitative in all cases. See RSA 458:19, I (providing for alimony awards that are either temporary or permanent, for a definite or indefinite period of time); RSA 458:19, IV (mandating consideration of multiple factors when calculating the amount of an alimony award). Because of this, we have held that the rehabilitative principle is not controlling where, for instance: (1) the supported spouse suffers from ill health and is not capable of establishing her own source of income, see Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 162, 525 A.2d 267 (1987); (2) the supported spouse, in a fault-based divorce, has minimal job experience, no formal education, a learning disability and suffers from anxiety and panic attacks caused by the other spouse's emotional abuse, see In the Matter of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 39-40, 815 A.2d 938 (2002); and (3) the court determines that it is necessary for the supported spouse to maintain a part-time work schedule in order to care for the parties' child, see In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 284-85, 911 A.2d 14 (2006). In such cases, the court is permitted to provide for more than rehabilitative alimony because the supported party lacks the wherewithal to enter the job market and . . . provide for their own financial needs, Fowler, 145 N.H. at 520, 764 A.2d 916, as those needs have been shaped by the parties' lifestyle during the marriage. See RSA 458:19, I(a), (c); Harvey, 153 N.H. at 431, 899 A.2d 258. We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the record justifies an award of alimony for life in this case. Unlike prior cases where we have found non-rehabilitative alimony to be justified, in this case the wife is in good health, see Henry, 129 N.H. at 162, 525 A.2d 267, has no minor children to support, see Hampers, 154 N.H. at 284, 911 A.2d 14, and has marketable job skills, see Fowler, 145 N.H. at 520, 764 A.2d 916, including a bachelor's degree. Moreover, the standard of living to which she has become accustomed, and which she will attempt to reproduce through her own means, is indisputably modest. See id. (finding an alimony award insufficient where the recipient was unlikely to obtain a job which will allow her to maintain independently a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during her marriage). At the same time, the court found that the wife is [currently] only working 24 hours per week and clearly has an ability to work more hours . . . to become more self sufficient. We, therefore, reverse the court's award of permanent alimony as such an award is unwarranted by the record.