Opinion ID: 1127477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: (5) It is well settled that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of a presumed group bias based on membership in a racial group violates both the state and federal Constitutions. ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 164 [32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 82-83, 106 S.Ct. 1712]; see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [128 L.Ed.2d 89, 96-97, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1421].) Under Wheeler and Batson, `[i]f a party believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the ground of group bias alone, he must raise the point in timely fashion and make a prima facie case of such discrimination to the satisfaction of the court. First, ... he should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association....' ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315], italics in original; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 164.) When a trial court denies a Wheeler motion because it finds no prima facie case of group bias was established, the reviewing court considers the entire record of voir dire. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 116 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) If the record `suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged' the jurors in question, we affirm. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1155, quoting People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1092 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) (3) The penalty retrial in this case preceded our decision in People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707 [286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75], in which we concluded that the trial court's statement that before trial, it would ` have the reasons set forth by the People, ' and the court's instructions following voir dire that the prosecutor obtain his records and justify his challenges, clearly indicate[d] that the court had implicitly found a prima facie case of improper exclusion on the basis of race, despite its contrary ruling on the following day. ( Id. at pp. 715, 716, italics in original.) We stated that under these circumstances the issue of whether a prima facie case was established was moot. ( Id. at p. 717.) We have since clarified that when a trial judge expressly rules that a prima facie case was not made, and then for purposes of completing the record in case the court on appeal disagrees with this conclusion, asks the prosecutor for his or her justifications, the issue of whether a prima facie case was made is not moot. ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 166-167.) That is the situation here. The trial judge did not ask the prosecutor to state his reasons, as the trial judge did in Fuentes. The prosecutor, however, did so. The trial judge then observed that he had not solicited these reasons, and that no finding of a prima facie case had been made. He then took the matter under submission, and independently reviewed the transcripts. The next day, after hearing oral argument from defense counsel regarding whether a prima facie case had been demonstrated, and testimony from defendant, the trial court expressly found that no prima facie case had been established requiring the prosecutor to justify his challenges. We conclude that under these circumstances the issue of whether a prima facie case has been established is not moot. (6) A trial judge who asks a prosecutor to respond to a Wheeler motion is not required to forcibly interrupt the prosecutor when the response concerns not whether a prima facie case was made, but the prosecutor's reasons for exercising his peremptory challenges, in order to retain his or her discretion to determine whether a prima facie case was established. Thus, when an appellate court is presented with such a record, and concludes that the trial court properly determined that no prima facie case was made, it need not review the adequacy of counsel's justifications for the peremptory challenges. ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 167.) (4b) Second, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining defendant had failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. In particular, defendant failed to establish from all the circumstances of the case a strong likelihood that Salcido, Venegas, and Flores were challenged because of their group association. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1154.) Rather, the only basis for establishing a prima facie case cited by defense counsel was that three of the six challenged prospective jurors had Hispanic surnames. This is insufficient. ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 167; People v. Rousseau (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 526, 536 [179 Cal. Rptr. 892] [defense counsel's statement that `there were only two blacks on the whole panel, and they were both challenged by the district attorney' failed to establish a prima facie case]; see People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1154-1155; People v. Dominick (1986) 182 Cal. App.3d 1174, 1193-1196 [227 Cal. Rptr. 849].) Indeed, as defense counsel noted, there were a number of Hispanics remaining in the venire. Of course, a trial court should not blind itself to everything except defense counsel's presentation. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1155.) Here, the trial judge, who had observed the voir dire, was in the best position to determine under all the relevant circumstances of the case whether there was a `strong likelihood' these prospective jurors were being challenged because of their group association. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1156; see People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047].) The record, reviewed independently by the trial court, clearly established specific nonrace-related reasons, i.e., the prospective jurors' aversion to the death penalty and their demeanor, why a prosecutor might want to excuse these prospective jurors. ( People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1092.) During Hovey voir dire prospective juror Loretta Salcido was asked by the court, Is there anything about the possibility of imposing either the death penalty or the penalty of life without possibility of parole which causes you to have such strong feelings you feel you would automatically vote for one or the other? Salcido responded, Yes, there is.... I haven't thought it out clearly, but I don't think I believe in death. The court inquired, All right. You don't believe that the law should allow for a death penalty; is that what you mean? Salcido answered, Probably. I haven't thought very much about it because I've never been on a  where I had to make a decision, but I would  I wouldn't like to pass the death sentence. After further discussion with Salcido, the court asked, Are you saying that in any case you would not vote for death? Salcido responded, I wouldn't  no, I probably wouldn't, even in any case. Salcido then indicated she would need to think more about it before she could make up my mind whether I definitely would never vote for the death penalty. The judge and Salcido agreed that she would go to the court cafeteria for 30 minutes to consider the issue. Salcido subsequently indicated she could pass the death sentence. Prospective juror Carlos Venegas, when asked on Hovey voir dire how he had voted on the 1978 death penalty initiative, said that he had voted to ban it. When asked why he voted to ban it, Venegas said, I felt I wanted a society that  that could deal with the problems without resorting to this brutal penalty. Do you feel that to execute somebody for something they have done is a brutal way to deal with it? It's kind of last resort, yes. Prospective juror Roman Flores, in response to the question on Hovey voir dire whether he had an opinion about the death penalty, responded, Well, I would have to say that there's a lot of things to be considered. It's the highest punishment one can receive.... I'd have to be very careful in making a decision  or coming to a decision. And if I'm not  oh, if I'm not with the other jurors on the decision that they're making, I  I'll stick to my guns, if I don't think something is right, and I'll have to go that way. They have got to convince me or I've got to be convinced that it's the right thing. It's the taking of a life. Flores conceded that the subject of the death penalty kind of overwhelm[ed] him. He agreed with the prosecutor that he was an actively religious person, and that his religious belief [was] anti-capital punishment or anti-death penalty. He stated that he might not believe everything that my religion teaches, he thought there should be a death penalty, and that he would be open to imposing either sentence. The prosecutor's challenge for cause, based not on any specific answer ... [b]ut rather his demeanor and the hesitation on certain things, was denied. Contrary to defendant's assertion, we have previously upheld the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges against death penalty skeptics  i.e., prospective jurors who, although not excusable for cause nevertheless expressed reservations about the death penalty. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 230 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) We see no reason to reconsider that conclusion here. In addition, peremptory challenges are properly made in response to `bare looks and gestures,' or the demeanor of a prospective juror. ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 171; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276.) Finally, a juror who indicates he or she may tenaciously cling to an opinion regardless of the evidence or the views of other jurors constitutes a legitimate concern for the prosecution, which seeks a jury that can reach a unanimous verdict. (See People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 170.) Defendant contends that the trial court's ruling is not entitled to deference because the court reviewed the Hovey voir dire transcripts before making its ruling. Not so. Here, Hovey voir dire occurred several weeks before the general voir dire. The trial court's diligence in reviewing the transcripts to refresh its recollection does not negate the fact that it had observed the entire voir dire process, and was therefore in the best position to determine whether a prima facie case had been established. Nor do we agree with defendant that no deference is due because the trial court acted under a misapprehension of the law. No such misapprehension is apparent. 3. Voir Dire Limitations (7a) Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in restricting questioning of the jury during Hovey voir dire. ( Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 80-81.) No abuse of discretion occurred.