Opinion ID: 2607964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applicability of the statute of frauds

Text: At the close of the evidence appellant submitted to the court the following instructions: Instruction No. 2: You are instructed that there can be no enforceable agreement concerning real property made by an agent of either the plaintiff or defendant, unless the authority of the agent is in writing. AS 09.25.010. Instruction No. 3A: I instruct you, as a matter of law, that in order for the defendants or their agents to have a right on the land of the plaintiff, there must have been a written memorandum or both the plaintiff and defendant have admitted that the defendant had the right to enter onto and use the land of the plaintiff. AS 09.25.010(6), AS 09.25.020(4). Appellant argues that these instructions should have been given because the alleged agreement whereby appellee was to deposit earth upon appellant's land was an agreement concerning real property under AS 09.25.010(a) (6) and (7) [4] and could not be proved by parol evidence. If this were so, then appellee additionally would not have been able to prove consent by parol because Ledford's authority, as agent, was not in writing and there was no memorandum of the agreement signed by appellee. Since the agreement would not have been enforceable against appellee, it, in turn, should not be enforceable against appellant, under a rule of negative mutuality. We believe that this argument overlooks the nature of a license for the use of real property. A license, it has been said, `passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful which without it, had been unlawful;   .' 3 Tiffany, Real Property, § 829 at 401 (3d ed. 1939). It is an almost universal rule of law today that a license is not an interest in real property within the terms of the statute of frauds relating to the transfer of interests in real property. [5] The creation of a license requires only express words, or conduct indicating the landowner's consent to the doing of certain acts upon the land. [6] There was ample evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably infer that an agreement creating a license had been reached between Ledford and appellant. The record contains no facts which would indicate that a conveyance of the standing timber on the land was intended or that the parties were attempting to create an easement or a lease to last more than one year. The denial of appellant's requested instructions was not error. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 423 P.2d 680 (Alaska 1967).