Opinion ID: 2994102
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ethel Kroledge

Text: The district court enhanced Ethel Kroledge’s sentence for obstruction of justice, but, unlike her co-defendants, the court based its enhancement on Ethel Kroledge’s pretrial conduct rather than her testimony. On appeal, Ethel Kroledge argues that her pretrial conduct did not significantly impede the government’s investigation into the fire and, therefore, was not material for the purposes of enhancing her sentence for obstruction. In its finding that Ethel Kroledge obstructed justice, the court adopted the finding of fact contained in the pre-sentencing report that Ethel Kroledge had obstructed justice by attempting to influence the testimony of a witness. Ethel Kroledge admitted in her testimony that she told FBI investigators that Charles and Kathleen lived with Annette Mathews during the period when their house was being rebuilt. Annette Mathews testified that Ethel Kroledge asked her to lie to the FBI and State Farm investigators and claim that Charles and Martha lived in their basement apartment during that period. Ethel Kroledge admitted that she asked Annette Mathews whether she could use her name on receipts that the Kroledges presented to State Farm. The presented testimony dispels any argument that Ethel Kroledge did not obstruct justice in an attempt to protect her brother and sister-in- law. However, she claims that her misstatements were not material because she later corrected them by telling the truth to FBI investigators. To determine the materiality of her conduct, we must review whether the district court correctly found that Ethel Kroledge’s actions significantly impeded the investigation of the Kroledges’ conduct. See Barnett, 939 F.2d at 407. In Barnett, we refused to uphold an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on a defendant’s pretrial conduct when the defendant’s only pretrial misstatement was that he denied committing the offenses about which he was questioned. See id.; see also United States v. Wells, 154 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that obstruction of justice that has no consequence . . . is not a permissible basis for enhancement). In this case, however, Ethel Kroledge’s misstatements went well beyond a mere declaration of innocence. Instead, Ethel Kroledge concocted a false set of facts that led investigators toward a witness whom she had attempted to influence. As in Wells, Ethel Kroledge attempted to lead investigators on a wild goose chase in order to obscure evidence of her own criminal conduct. However, in this instance, unlike Wells, the evidence that Ethel Kroledge would obscure was not merely ancillary to questions of her (and her family’s) guilt; the activities she concealed were exactly those which led to Kathleen Kroledge’s and her own convictions for mail fraud. In circumstances such as these, we have found that such behavior was material, see United States v. Taylor, 135 F.3d 478, 483-84 (7th Cir. 1998), and we have no question that Ethel Kroledge’s behavior significantly impeded the instant investigation. As such, her behavior was material for the purpose of determining whether her sentence should be enhanced for obstruction, and we will uphold the district court’s enhancement of her sentence.