Opinion ID: 1103876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Other Jurisdictions' Boot and Tow Cases

Text: The city's brief cites Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir.1982); Breath v. Cronvich, 729 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir.1984); and Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F.Supp. 542 (E.D.La.1976) in support of its position. Each of these cases dealt with the validity of towing cars that were illegally parked at the time that they were towed, a case that is not before us today. In Bricker v. Craven, 391 F.Supp. 601 (D.Mass.1975), the court was likewise faced with a question not presented to this court today: the difficulty of giving notice to the owners of vehicles registered out of state. Also, that court expressly found that the person initiating the seizure was a government official, that the state kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force, which is not true in the case before us. Other cases cited by the city include Grant v. City of Chicago, 594 F.Supp. 1441 (N.D.Ill.1984); Bane v. Boston, 8 Mass. App. 552, 396 N.E.2d 155 (1979); and Gillam v. Landrieu, 455 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D. La.1978). The courts in those cases concluded, either expressly or implicitly, that affording a pre-immobilization hearing would impose a costly administrative burden. But as we discuss above, due process does not require an all-or-nothing choice between no hearing at all and a full-blown, trial-type hearing. The sort of informal procedure required by the due process clause as interpreted by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge and Goss v. Lopez will not impose prohibitive cost on the city, and might even increase its revenues. Also, none of the cases relied upon by the city mentions the involvement of a private, financially interested actor exercising governmental discretion, such as the record in this case shows that Datacom exercises in New Orleans.