Opinion ID: 348764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: implying civil remedies

Text: 29 In our opinion, neither party touches on the point which we feel is determinative of the legal effect of the breach of these regulations by Shell Oil Company. That is, even if we assume that the regulations were valid and applicable to our factual setting, what, if any, is the legal effect of their being breached by Shell? The trial court touches on the issue in its above quoted conclusions of law when it stated that civil remedies may be implied in certain situations, but the Court erred in concluding that a civil remedy may be extended to one injured by a breach of a statute or regulation which does not specifically provide for such relief as long as the person injured is clearly within the protective realm of the legislation or regulation. The inquiry which must be made before implying a civil cause of action for a person suffering injury as a result of another's conduct in violation of a regulatory statute which does not expressly provide for a civil remedy is not nearly so simple. 30 In 1916, the Supreme Court announced the doctrine of implying private actions in the absence of specific statutory authorization in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916). Rigsby, a railroad employee, sought damages for injuries resulting from his employer's violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The Court upheld his recovery while recognizing that the Act did not expressly confer a private right of action. In broad language, the Court stated: 31 A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied . . . . 32 Id. at 39, 36 S.Ct. at 484. 33 This rather unique question of whether a court can or should imply an action for an injured party who has no express statutory remedy has sparked a great deal of legal commentary, and a string of Supreme Court opinions whose main virtues are not consistency of results. The justification for implication most often proffered by courts and commentators is that it merely furthers the goals Congress was seeking to attain when it initially enacted the legislation. 4 Congress may accomplish these goals through regulation or prohibition of specified conduct. Generally speaking, however, these regulations or prohibitions are only as effective as the statutory sanctions behind them, and, unfortunately, Congress must often decide on these statutory sanctions without a prior opportunity to evaluate their practical effectiveness. In contrast, courts are charged with the duty of enforcing the statute on a case by case basis, and have the opportunity to observe the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms. Fully aware of this hindsight advantage, the Supreme Court has sanctioned, in limited situations, the implication of private civil remedies. 34 The criteria for courts to apply in deciding whether or not to imply a civil cause of action have gone through numerous changes since the implication doctrine was first recognized in 1916. 5 The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the matter, however, delineates the factors which we must consider in making that decision. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a private cause of action for damages against corporate directors should not be implied in favor of a corporate stockholder under 18 U.S.C. § 610 a criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors . . . are to be voted for. In making that decision, the court stated: 35 In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39, (36 S.Ct. 482, 484, 60 L.Ed. 874) (1916) (emphasis supplied) that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460, (94 S.Ct. 690, 693, 694, 38 L.Ed.2d 646) (1974) (Amtrak). Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423, (95 S.Ct. 1733, 1740, 44 L.Ed.2d 263) (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, (85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190) (1964). And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652, (83 S.Ct. 1441, 1445, 10 L.Ed.2d 605) (1963); cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434, (84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560, 12 L.Ed.2d 423) (1964); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-395, (91 S.Ct. 1999, 2003-2004, 29 L.Ed.2d 619) (1971); id., at 400, (91 S.Ct. (1999) at 206) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 36 Id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. 37 There is no question that the factors enunciated in Cort must control the decision-making process in the case before us, but fully understanding and properly applying these factors is no minor task. Our first step in this inquiry must be to examine briefly the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act since it would be fruitless to attempt to deal with the Cort criteria without this background. 38 In 1953 Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. This Act asserted United States' ownership of and jurisdiction over minerals in and under the Outer Continental Shelf. 6 It also extended the Constitution and laws of the United States to the shelf lands, and established an exclusive system of mineral leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf. Section 1332 of the Act asserts United States jurisdiction over the Shelf while section 1333 provides that federal law is applicable on the shelf, applying state law only as federal law, and only when not inconsistent with applicable federal law. Section 1334 deals with the administration of leases, and it grants the Secretary of the Interior the authority to promulgate regulations in order to comply with the provisions of the Act relating to leasing. Section 1334 also prescribes criminal penalties for any person knowingly and willfully violating the Act. The rest of the Act, §§ 1335-1343, deals almost exclusively with the leasing system to be applied on the Shelf. 39 Given this brief background, we can now delve deeper into the history and purpose of the Act as we analyze it within the framework of the Cort criteria. The first factor we must consider is whether the injured employees on the platform should be considered one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. The Cort opinion sheds little light on exactly how to handle this factor. On the one hand, there is language to the effect that the factor would be satisfied if the statute created any federal right in favor of the plaintiffs, or if there was any sort of pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiffs' class (workers on the platforms) and the defendant's class (a lessee of rights to resources on or under the Shelf). Given this interpretation of the criterion, it would most likely be satisfied in our case. Section 1333 of the Act deals with what law to apply in controversies arising on the shelf, and specifically provides that with respect to disability or death of an employee as the result of operations on the shelf, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act shall apply. From this provision alone, it appears that a federal right has been created in the plaintiffs' class. However, a reading of the entire Cort opinion leads one to question whether this is what the Supreme Court meant when it stated that the plaintiff must be in the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. The opinion seems to imply that a cause of action should not be created unless the primary purpose of the Act (or at least one of the primary purposes) is to benefit or protect the workers on offshore oil platforms. 7 If this is the proper interpretation of the Court's language, then this criterion would not be satisfied. A review of the legislative history of the Act outlines specifically the purposes behind the legislation. The House of Representatives Report on the bill stated: 40 The purpose of H.R.5134 is to amend the Submerged Lands Act in order that the area in the outer Continental Shelf beyond boundaries of the States may be leased and developed by the Federal Government. At the present time the Submerged Lands Act merely established that the seabed and subsoil in the outer Continental Shelf beyond State boundaries appertained in the United States and was subject to its jurisdiction and control. 41 There are no provisions for the leasing and development of the area by the Federal Government nor are provisions made for the exchange of State leases for Federal leases in the same area. 42 This bill contains provisions to accomplish those very objectives. 43 H.R.Rep.No.413, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953). The report then proceeded to explain the need behind the legislation: 44 Representatives of the Federal departments, the States, and the offshore operators all urged the importance and necessity for the enactment of legislation enabling the Federal Government to lease for oil and gas operations the vast areas of the Continental Shelf outside the State boundaries. They are unanimously of the opinion, in which this committee agrees, that no law now exists whereby the Federal Government can lease those submerged lands, the development and operation of which are vital to our national economy and security. It is, therefore, the duty of the Congress to enact promptly a leasing policy for the purpose of encouraging the discovery and development of the oil potential of the Continental Shelf. 45 The committee is also of the opinion that legislative action is necessary in order to confirm and give validity to Presidential Proclamation 2667 of September 8, 1945, wherein the President, by Executive declaration asserted, in behalf of the United States, jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf. Many other nations have made assertions to a similar effect with respect to their continental shelves, and the committee believes it proper and necessary that the Congress make such an assertion in behalf of the United States. 46 Id. at 2, 3. Similar language was used in the Senate Report. In explaining the reasons why jurisdiction needed to be asserted over the Shelf, the Report stated: 47 (T)he discovery of extremely valuable deposits of oil and gas and probably sulfur in the seabed of the Continental Shelf off the shores of the United States, as well as its vast potential as a source for other raw materials, gave rise to the necessity for protection and control of the area and administration of the development of its economic wealth, so essential to our economy in peace or war. 48 S.Rep.No.411 of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1953). 49 There can be no question that the primary purpose for this legislation was to assert United States jurisdiction over the shelf, and to set up a system for the full development of its natural resources. Protection of the workers on the platform, while no doubt a legitimate concern of Congress, was not a motivating force behind the legislation, and, in fact, only became relevant if jurisdiction was asserted. Therefore, it would not be unfair to say that protection of these workers, like protection of the ordinary stockholder in Cort, was at best a secondary concern of the Act. 50 There is no language in Cort to the effect that all four criteria must be met in order to imply a cause of action. Rather, the Court simply said that several factors were relevant and worthy of consideration. Consequently, it is not necessary for us to decide which of the above interpretations of the especial benefit language is correct. We do consider it relevant that protection of these workers was not the motivating force behind the legislation, but we also think that it is important that Congress did feel it necessary to provide certain rights in the Act to these workers. 51 The fact that Congress did specify certain remedies in the Act might, however, indicate an intent by Congress to deny any other type of civil remedy. This result would follow if we were to employ the doctrine of statutory construction known as expressio unius exclusio alterius, and this leads us into the consideration of the second Cort factor: 52 (I)s there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create a remedy or to deny one? 53 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). 54 Prior to the Cort opinion, the law appeared to be that if legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies absent clear contrary evidence of legislative intent. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 693, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) (Amtrak). The Cort opinion seems to modify this position somewhat. The statute under scrutiny in Cort provided for criminal sanctions, yet the Court stated that provision of a criminal penalty does not necessarily preclude implication of a private cause of action for damages. 422 U.S. 66, 79, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). The Cort opinion also differed from Amtrak in that it stated that absence of any intention to create a cause of action in the legislative history would not necessarily preclude implication, although an implicit or explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling. 55 The controversy before us is significantly different than the facts before the Supreme Court in Cort. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act not only provides criminal penalties for violation of the Act (§ 1334(a)(2)), but also provides extensive civil remedies. As previously noted, § 1333(c) provides that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act should apply in cases of disability or death of an employee working on the platform, and § 1333(a)(2) provides the workers on the shelf any remedy which might be available under state law as long as that remedy is not inconsistent with federal law. We feel, therefore, that fewer reasons exist to imply a cause of action in this case than were present in Cort. The workers on the platform potentially have extensive civil remedies, 8 and, keeping in mind that the underlying purpose of implication is merely to effectuate the goals of Congress, we fail to see how implying this additional remedy will significantly further the goals Congress was seeking to accomplish in passing the act. Therefore, a much stronger argument can be made for applying the expressio unius exclusio alterius doctrine here than could be made in Cort, and this argument is strengthened by language in the legislative history of the Act which indicates that the plight of the workers was considered, and that the remedies provided for by the statute were intended to be the sole solution for this plight. Senator Cordon, while presenting the reasons to the Senate for adopting state law in certain situations, explained that the full development of the estimated values in the shelf area will require the efforts and the physical presence of thousands of workers on fixed structures in the shelf area. Industrial accidents, accidental death, peace and order present problems requiring a body of law for their solution. Since as every member of the Senate knows, the Federal Code was never designed to be a complete body of law in and of itself, the Senate Committee decided that state law would have to be referred to in some instances. 99 Cong.Rec. 6962-6963 (1952), quoted in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U.S. 352, 358, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 1838, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969). 56 The language of Senator Cordon, and the extensive civil remedies available to the workers, indicates to us a legislative intent to deny a civil remedy for breach of the Secretary of Interior's regulations. If in fact Congress considered the situation of these workers and set forth specifically the remedies which it felt would adequately deal with the situation (and there is every indication that this is what occurred), then we would indeed be exceeding our authority to ignore their will, and, in effect, legislate our own remedies. 57 This conclusion does not change as we examine the third and fourth Cort criteria. The third factor we are to consider is whether it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply a remedy for the plaintiffs. In applying this factor, the Cort opinion explained that although it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose . . . in this instance the remedy sought would not aid the primary congressional goal. 422 U.S. 66, 84, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2090, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). It is not surprising that the Cort opinion stressed the fact that implying a civil remedy was not necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. In most cases where cause of actions have been implied, it has been done to remedy the inadequacy of the express statutory means of enforcement. See, e. g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969). As in Cort, we fail to see how it could be argued that the remedies available to the workers in our case are inadequate. Nor do we feel that it is necessarily consistent with the legislative goal of the Act (to fully develop the natural resources of the Shelf) to impose liability upon a lessee based upon violation of a departmental regulation when that lessee is admittedly free from fault. 58 The final factor which Cort commands us to consider is whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. From what we have previously stated, it is apparent that Congress, at least, felt that state law should govern this sort of controversy. Congress reached this conclusion not solely because there are gaps in the Federal Code, but also because it recognized that the individual states had a very real interest in the workers on these platforms. As Senator Long pointed out in his minority report to the Senate: 59 A typical individual employed in operations in the shelf area will maintain his family in one of our coastal parishes; he will own or be buying his house and an automobile there. His children will attend Louisiana schools. If either he or a member of his family becomes ill, he will be cared for by a Louisiana doctor in a Louisiana hospital. After his employment in the shelf ends, he will continue to live in Louisiana and will spend his old age there. 60 The children of these employees will attend a free public school, and be provided with free schoolbooks, supplies, lunches, and transportation. Our highways and streets will be traveled by both employer and employee. The State provides charity hospitals for the indigent sick. Care for those stricken with tuberculosis or mental diseases is provided by State-operated hospitals. A State-financed medical school now provides many of the doctors who will minister unto these people. The worker's person and property will be protected by our police. He will be protected from disease and sickness by our public health and sanitation offices. His elderly parents are likely to be receiving a pension during their period of nonproductivity. 61 Louisiana provides a system of courts in which the employee will litigate many of his claims. 62 Many of these same services will be provided for the oil company whose base of operations will be necessarily on Louisiana soil. The company will use our highways, will benefit from police protection, and make use of our courts. 63 None can deny that the furnishing of such services to the thousands of shelf workers, their families, and the companies for which they work will be a heavy financial burden on the State and its subdivisions. 64 S.Rep.No.411 of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 66, 67 (1953). We think that it is apparent, therefore, that this controversy should be controlled by state law. The concern of the state for these workers is real, and this concern was recognized and provided for by Congress in the actual provisions of the Act. 65 We are aware of the fact that brevity is not the chief attribute of this decision. We have gone to some lengths to explain our holding because of the many lives and fortunes involved. Development of the Outer Continental Shelf will continue for generations, and, indeed, seems to be gaining added importance. All involved in these vital activities, employers and employees, have a right to know the rules. Having reached this point, there is much left to be resolved including the applicable state law.