Opinion ID: 2074116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: l. cofield.

Text: Cofield, a resident of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was an investigator of railroad accidents and was employed by various attorneys throughout the country to make investigations. Cofield's deposition was taken by petitioner in Kansas City, Missouri, on December 2, 1947, and was offered in evidence as petitioner's exhibit Z-47. At a conference held in chambers, with attorneys for both sides and a reporter present, respondent's attorney objected to the reading of the deposition. At that conference, Mr. Dell, for respondent, stated that since the taking of the deposition things had occurred which convinced him and other lawyers representing respondent that Cofield should give his testimony in court in the usual manner so that the court could have the benefit of the weight to be attached to his testimony. Mr. Dell informed the referee that Cofield was in Minneapolis and that he (Mr. Dell) had advised petitioner's attorneys on the first day of the hearing to that effect; that respondent had procured Cofield's attendance and had made him available for examination; and that in view of that fact there would be no necessity for the deposition to be read, since there was no longer any reason for its use. At that time respondent's attorney claimed that he showed petitioner's attorneys the affidavit (respondent's exhibit 1) which Cofield had signed, which affidavit had been prepared by one of the attorneys for respondent. The date of this affidavit was February 11, 1948. Mr. Dell further stated that he advised petitioner's attorneys of this matter prior to the hearing so that they could have immediate notice of the situation, and that Cofield was not going to make the claims which he did in his deposition. Mr. Dell claimed that he read the affidavit to them and felt that they had no right to claim surprise and ask for cross-examination. The referee admitted the affidavit as exhibit 1, solely for the purpose of respondent's motion with reference to the reading of the deposition. The affidavit of Cofield consists of about six typewritten pages and is shown in the record at page 826 and following. It is signed by L.L. Cofield before Mart M. Monaghan, notary public. While we cannot set it out completely here, it states in effect that affiant is the same Lou Cofield who gave the deposition in Kansas City on December 2, 1947, which was offered in evidence as petitioner's exhibit Z-47; that at the time the deposition was taken he testified to certain facts that had to do with transactions during 1942; that for six or eight months prior to the taking of the deposition he had been under a heavy mental strain occasioned by domestic troubles, when his former wife brought divorce proceedings against him, and that at that time he also had financial difficulties; that during the six to eight months prior to December 2, 1947, he was highly nervous and very foggy mentally about past occurrences; that since the giving of the Kansas City deposition his mental condition had cleared up; that he had gone over the testimony given in his deposition and that at the time of the giving of the affidavit of February 11, 1948, he had a clear recollection of events and details about which he was questioned on December 2, 1947; that he had gone over certain copies of the letters in his possession and was satisfied that the case referred to in the letter signed Gene dated November 22, 1943, about the Adkins case, was a case handled by Robert J. McDonald; that although this letter was signed Gene it was sent to him by Robert J. McDonald; that in regard to other letters and documents which were identified by him and marked as exhibits in the deposition he could not truthfully state where the letters came from, but that he knew at least one of them came from Robert J. McDonald and that others came from other individuals, one of whom was a certain Lee Price; that with reference to the Frank Lowery case he brought the Lowerys to Minneapolis and recommended Frank McAllister as attorney; that he called McAllister and went over the matter with him in regard to the Lowery case and introduced McAllister to Frank and Jennie Lowery; that McAllister was busy and stated that he would eventually associate respondent with him in this case; that McAllister telephoned respondent and after doing so Cofield took the Lowerys over to respondent's office, and respondent took a statement from them and had them sign a contract; that prior to taking the Lowerys to respondent's office he had not seen respondent for some time; that at the time he called at respondent's office with the Lowerys he notified respondent that he would be willing to handle railroad investigation work for him; that subsequent thereto respondent called Cofield five or six times, gave him the names of injured railroad people or their survivors, told affiant that these people had contacted him (respondent), and that respondent had requested him (Cofield) to investigate these cases; that in each of these cases the individuals whom he called upon expected affiant and knew that he was coming; that in these cases he followed respondent's instructions and made the investigations concerning the injuries and liability; that he did this type of work for respondent only for about six or eight months during 1942; and that respondent had asked him to send him his bill for expenses in connection with these investigations; that he did not comply, but requested respondent to send him money from time to time, with the understanding that they would eventually get together and straighten out all matters, which he claims was done sometime in January or February 1943. Cofield further said that at that time he told respondent that he understood he was working for the latter on the same basis as he worked for Robert J. McDonald, namely, one-third of attorney fees; that respondent jumped and hollered and yelled and told affiant to `get the hell out of the office,' and that under no circumstances did respondent understand that there was any such arrangement nor would he have had such an arrangement with affiant or with any other lay person; that Cofield and respondent got into a bitter argument about the matter and Cofield left the latter's office and since that time has been angry toward respondent; that during this argument affiant conceded to respondent that there was never any express agreement of any kind that he was to get one-third of the attorney fee. Affiant further stated in the affidavit that at no time did respondent ever request him to solicit a single case for respondent. Affiant further stated in this affidavit that in December 1946 Joe Brennan, Superintendent of Special Service for the Eastern Division of the Santa Fe, called on him at his home in Tulsa for the purpose of getting him to work for the Santa Fe railroad to investigate the activities of a number of personal injury lawyers; that Brennan called affiant to come from Phoenix, Arizona, to Topeka, Kansas, in September 1947 for the sole purpose of discussing respondent, and that Mr. Brennan stated that the Santa Fe was out to get Mr. Rerat and that there would be a lawyer from the Bar Association from the State of Minnesota there in Topeka to talk to affiant about Mr. Rerat; that on October 4, 1947, after affiant had been in Topeka for about two weeks he was called to the office of Robert Clark, general claims attorney for the Santa Fe, and that there was then present Joe Brennan, Robert Clark, and one of petitioner's attorneys; that Clark told them that he did not want any part of the matter, but that after much discussion the attorney stated that he wanted affiant to give a statement against respondent; that affiant protested that it was not necessary to give a statement at that time, as he could give it in a deposition, but that Mr. Clark suggested that he should go to the hotel with the attorneys. Affiant then said that he went over to the hotel, was asked a lot of details of what occurred in 1942, while he was in a nervous, foggy, and jumpy condition mentally. He further stated in his affidavit that for about a year prior to December 2, 1947, he was employed by the Santa Fe railroad and was associated with Joe Brennan, superintendent above referred to; that his work was to investigate and attempt to secure evidence against attorneys who were representing injured Santa Fe employes; and that during this period he was paid over $14,000 in cash by Brennan in connection with his activities. Affiant further stated that Brennan told him that the Santa Fe was out to disbar respondent because he had caused them worlds of trouble in obtaining large amounts for injured employees and widows whose husbands were killed; that Brennan complained about the Santa Fe having to carry the load in proceedings against respondent. He stated that his compensation was not specifically arranged for, but a promise was made that amounts would be determined as soon as his deposition was taken in the Rerat matter, and that he was promised $75,000 in the event Rerat was disbarred and $37,500 if disbarment proceedings were not successful. He further stated in his affidavit that the attorney told him he had influence with all the railroads and that if the Santa Fe did not treat him right he would not have any trouble in obtaining a good job for affiant with the Illinois Central Railroad. Brennan specifically denied the representations made by Cofield in the affidavit. Petitioner's attorney again offered in evidence the Cofield deposition (petitioner's exhibit Z-47). Respondent again objected to the deposition on the ground that, inasmuch as Cofield was present in Minneapolis and available as a witness, there was no longer any reason for the deposition. After considerable discussion, the referee permitted the reading of those parts of the deposition which he deemed admissible, and stated that at the conclusion of the reading of the deposition the court would call Cofield, who was present in court, have him sworn, and permit both sides to cross-examine him. Petitioner's attorney then commenced the reading of the deposition, and read the cross-examination of Cofield. On direct examination, Cofield testified that he had known respondent for 10 or 12 years and that his employment with him commenced the latter part of 1939 or the early part of 1940; that he first contacted respondent in Minneapolis; that there would be no argument about fees and that I would receive the one-third of the fees from the clients. He said that respondent called him to solicit and investigate; that he was to have a drawing account of $250 a week; and that he then proceeded to go to work for respondent. He testified that he would then go out and call on personal injury cases which he had heard about through reports and newspaper clippings which respondent had given him; that he was also supplied with photostatic copies of checks, letters from clients, and contract forms that could be signed. He named E.P. (Pete) Grandmougin, whose case was delivered to respondent under his arrangement. He also named several other cases. Respondent moved to strike the answer of the witness because most of the cases were not included in the bill of particulars, but his motion was denied. Among the other cases named was the Herschel Salters case. He said that he knew John Kalar, who was present at various business conferences in respondent's office, and was familiar with his signature. He identified certain exhibits signed G, John, and Eleanor, consisting of letters which he claimed he had received. He also stated that Eleanor Greene was working for respondent while the witness was there. It developed after the reading into the record of Cofield's deposition of December 2, 1947, which deposition was repudiated by his affidavit of February 11, 1948, also a part of the record, that when the time came to call Cofield as a witness, subject to cross-examination by both petitioner and respondent, he was no longer present in court, although he had been there for some time during the hearing. It appears from the referee's findings that sometime during the morning of March 18, 1948, Cofield left the state of Minnesota, notwithstanding the fact that he was under subpoena and that the subpoena had been kept good by the payment of his witness fees; that after leaving Minnesota he was in contact with Brennan, Superintendent of Special Service of the Santa Fe railroad. Mr. Brennan testified that the last time he had seen Cofield in person was January 21, 1948; that he had neither seen nor talked with Cofield between March 8, 1948, and March 20, 1948, when Cofield called Brennan on the latter date at his office in Topeka from Tulsa, and that was the first time he had learned that Cofield had left Minneapolis. It also appears, according to the referee's findings, that Brennan was in Minneapolis at the time Cofield left the state. The referee said with respect to this:    In view of this unusual situation and in order to meet and impeach the deposition of Cofield, which had been received in evidence under the specified arrangement, Respondent was permitted to introduce evidence of Mart Monaghan, Eleanor Greene and Don Chapman. This impeaching evidence as well as the testimony given by Cofield in the deposition and in the affidavit, and the manner in which Cofield's services were employed and the large sums of money which were paid to him by the Santa Fe in cash without any record kept other than as set forth herein, so discredit the entire transaction and relationship of Cofield to this entire matter as to make the deposition unworthy of consideration. [Italics supplied.] There are certain glaring inconsistencies in Cofield's testimony taken by deposition. Cofield was employed by other attorneys during the time he worked for Respondent. His testimony shows that he left Respondent's employ in February, 1943, after a dispute over money due Cofield. He did no work for Respondent in any capacity after that dispute. We may infer that Cofield was not friendly to Respondent after February, 1943. Cofield's deposition was taken December 2, 1947. Attached to the deposition are many exhibits purporting to be letters received by Cofield from Respondent's office. Only one of such exhibits is on Respondent's stationery (Ex. I.I. 1), and it refers to figures for income tax reports. The other exhibits are plain envelopes with Respondent's office address typed thereon, or on copy paper with various signatures including `G' or `Gene' signed to them. Is it to be assumed that Respondent used plain envelopes and copy paper to prevent such correspondence being traced to his office, and then signed his name or initials and typed his office address to insure detection? Cofield produced 20 empty envelopes received from Respondent's office but produced none of the letters received therein. What inference should be drawn from this circumstance is not clear unless it be that the enclosures were destroyed or withheld by Cofield because they were inconsistent with his testimony. Cofield testified Respondent furnished him `photostatic copies of checks, letters from clients and working material' but produced no such material. Did he save empty envelopes and scraps of paper and destroy his most cogent evidence? Cofield admitted the receipt of large sums of money from the Santa Fe. He was working for the Santa Fe when the deposition was taken in December, 1947. He did not know what pay he was to receive from the Santa Fe  whether his salary was $1.00 or $50.00 per day. Brennan of the Santa Fe, likewise, had no knowledge as to what part of the money paid Cofield by the Santa Fe was salary, or what part was expense. Cofield admitted to the use of at least six aliases, including his Santa Fe code name, `Cuddles'. It is noteworthy coincidence that after the taking of his deposition in December, 1947, Cofield left his lucrative and anomalous position with the Santa Fe on January 1, 1948. It is quite possible that the severing of his relationship with the Santa Fe had some motivating connection with his appearance in Minneapolis and recantation of the testimony given in his deposition. No trier of fact could give credence to the testimony of L.L. Cofield. It is the position of petitioner that it has been circumscribed to such an extent by the rules of procedure applied by the referee and by harassing and adversary tactics on the part of respondent that it has been impeded in its efforts to investigate and present evidence of misconduct as required by Rule XXI of the Rules of Practice of this court (222 Minn. xxxix). Petitioner contends that the findings of the referee are manifestly against the weight of the evidence and submits that the record, even when considered in the light most favorable to respondent, supports beyond a doubt the charges of professional misconduct. It argues that respondent, from the beginning, pursued a studied, planned, and determined policy of obstruction. It complains that except for incomplete copies of income tax returns and records of a few isolated cases no records were produced in response to the subpoena duces tecum which was issued by the referee, particularly with reference to Cofield, Benon, Kalar, and McDonald, referred to in the proceedings as investigators. While the record shows that respondent produced some copies of income tax returns and records of some cases, he testified that in 1946 he moved to his present office, which is a small one; that the office he was in had a large space that was used for a vault; that the owners of the building took back this space  originally intended for an elevator  from all the tenants in the building; that as a result of this change he had to move or do something with old accumulations in his office. So I cleaned out all these papers and briefs. There were just stacks of them; of the old stuff; and kept my records on all of my cases here. And the rest of that old junk was all destroyed. When questioned whether his ledgers and journals of his business up until the time he moved were destroyed, he replied affirmatively, but said that he had all his permanent records in respect to cases; that he had disposed of five or six boxes of records for which he had no further use. Petitioner argues that there was no explanation as to why records were not produced for at least the last six months of 1946 and refuses to believe that the records had been destroyed. Thus, we have a conflict between petitioner's contention that respondent wilfully withheld some of his records and the contention of respondent, who maintains that owing to his moving into smaller office space it was necessary for him to dispose of some of his older records on business finished prior to 1946. The period involved in the alleged solicitation under consideration ran from 1941 to 1946. Petitioner also calls our attention to the large increase in connection with investigation expense and payments made to associates as shown by respondent's income tax returns from 1939 to 1946. A great deal of controversy arose between the parties in connection with the admission of income tax returns for certain years. Respondent contended before the referee that petitioner should not have access to his income tax reports, to which the referee replied: Well, the Court is in no position to judge what they may or may not show with reference to the charges here. I'm satisfied no harm will be done by permitting Mr. Blethen to examine them. Exhibits Z-5 through Z-12 were marked for identification, purporting to be copies of respondent's individual income tax returns to the federal government for the years 1939 to 1946, inclusive. When questioned as to whether these were copies of his returns for those years, respondent answered that they were. Petitioner then offered the exhibits in evidence. Respondent objected on the ground that they were incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial and were not covered by the bill of particulars, would be of no assistance to the court, as they could neither prove nor tend to prove anything in the allegations of the petition, and were matters of a confidential nature. The referee then asked petitioner to point out what items contained in the reports were of interest to the court. Petitioner stated that he would like to show by the income tax returns of respondent for the years 1939 through 1947 the fact of the modest income reported by respondent in the earlier years of that period compared with the sudden large gross income and larger net income reported by respondent. The attorney for petitioner also said that he wanted them in evidence for the reason that they reflected large sums of money paid by respondent to other lawyers and for the purposes of investigation. Petitioner's attorney said: I mean where  for instance, in the year 1945, the sum of $70,835.00 is shown as general investigation expense; and the sum of $87,596.97 is shown as payments made to other attorneys. Case expense is listed 27,600 odd dollars; traveling expense, 27,700 odd dollars. For these items on that year, I purport to have Respondent have the opportunity of explaining who this money went to and what amount and on what basis and . Respondent's attorney interrupted to state that he came into court charged with meeting certain specific things, and asked what materiality they could have as bearing on any of the things set out in the bill of particulars. After much further discussion on the part of counsel, the referee stated that it was his opinion that the only material matters in the reports would be those items pertaining to fees paid to attorneys, investigations, and miscellaneous cases, and stated that he thought those were admissible. He then said: And if counsel for the petitioner desires, he may read these figures into the record and interrogate Respondent concerning those. But except as to those items, I think the exhibits are not properly admissible, and it is so ruled. Petitioner then offered to prove, for example, by exhibit Z-5, that respondent reported a net income of $5,570.10 in 1939; by exhibit Z-6, the net income for 1940, and that respondent listed that year the sum of $745 for special office work, $2,450 as fees paid to other attorneys, and $3,238.50 for investigations and process serving; by exhibit Z-7, that for the year 1941 respondent reported a net business income of $5,545.13, and for that year reported $8,836.61 for process serving and special investigation and $11,433.81 fees to other attorneys. Exhibit Z-8 purported to be the 1942 return when respondent was self-employed. Respondent objected on the ground that this information was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial and, among other things, that they did not prove or disprove any of the allegations in the bill of particulars. He stressed that our decision in In re Application for Discipline of Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 28 N.W. (2d) 168, limited petitioner to the bill of particulars, closing his objection on this point along the general line that information in the income tax returns was confidential, and that if placed in the record petitioner's attorney could give a copy of this information to any of his clients or to anyone who asked for it. Respondent objected to the reading into the record of any figures as reflected by the income tax returns from 1939 to 1946. The referee reiterated what he had previously said as to which items he thought were admissible, stating, for example, that on petitioner's exhibit Z-8 he considered the following items admissible: Case expense, $6,000; salaries and payment for services, $34,000; miscellaneous expense, $8,000; and said that petitioner's attorneys should be given the opportunity of examining respondent as to whether he had any record concerning these disbursements, on account of the charge in the petition that some of the so-called solicitors shared in the fees. He further said: But as far as the total amount he took in on all of his cases for himself and his clients or what his earnings were, whether one year he made good money and other years not so good, I don't believe that it has any bearing on the case at all. And that's why I made the ruling that except for those matters that I have referred to, the exhibits would not be received. Petitioner then offered to prove by petitioner's exhibit Z-9 that in 1943 respondent was self-employed; that for that year he reported a net profit of $10,335.24; that he listed the sum of $125,215.23 for general case expense; $31,302.09 for general investigation; and $18,379.99 for traveling expense. With reference to petitioner's exhibit Z-10 for the year 1944, petitioner contended in its offer of proof that it reflected a total business for respondent of $17,876.93 for that year, with case expense listed at $23,903.37, general investigation expense, $31,106.01, and other attorneys, $37,068.33. By petitioner's exhibit Z-11 it offered to prove that for 1945 respondent was self-employed; and that the report reflected a net business income of $35,648.73, with gross legal fees of $272,018.68; with deductions for general investigation of $70,835.32; deduction of amounts paid other attorneys of $87,596.97; general case expense of $27,599.10; and traveling expense of $20,717.52. By its exhibit Z-12 (1946), petitioner offered to prove on the return the net gross income from his business of $25,783.50; with a total receipts for that year of $258,487.91; with total ordinary and necessary business expense deducted of $226,340.86, being included among those deductions an item of case expense of $28,452.81; general investigation in the sum of $87,250.22; and other attorneys  payments made to other attorneys, $88,124.31. Petitioner then referred to the fact that respondent's attorney had informed him that the income tax returns for 1947 had not yet been filed. After listening to all of these offers of proof, the referee denied the offer except as to the items specified above and notified petitioner that it would be entitled to examine respondent relative to those items. Petitioner then proceeded to examine respondent and asked him if he had his account books available as to who received the amount reported for general investigation expense in 1946 and was informed that they were not available. Respondent again explained that when he moved his office I had thrown all the files and all the stuff away, except my permanent records there. He also said that he had no record as to the amount paid to other attorneys as shown in the 1946 report, and that he had no record, such as check stubs, ledger sheets, or journal entries which would show to whom the investigation expenses and amounts to other attorneys were paid as shown in the 1945 return. Objections were made to this questioning by respondent, but overruled in each case by the referee. When asked about his income tax returns for the years 1939 through 1944, respondent again said that he had no records as to who received the investigation expense, payments to other attorneys, and case expense. He admitted that he had no cancelled check record for the years 1944 or 1945. When asked if he had cancelled checks for 1946, respondent indicated that he had, but said that he would have to check that up. He admitted that he had cancelled checks for 1947, and when asked to produce them his attorney objected on the ground that they were incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial and were checks written after the proceedings were begun. The referee sustained the objection in regard to the 1947 checks. The referee assured petitioner that the offer to prove the matters referred to, petitioner's exhibits Z-5 to Z-12, inclusive, with reference to investigation expense, attorneys' fees, miscellaneous case expense, etc., would be shown in the final record, but that these figures should not be made public. Petitioner assured the referee that there was no desire to have the figures made available to the public. Petitioner contends that for many years respondent availed himself of a newspaper clipping service as an aid in his solicitation of personal injury cases. Respondent denied that he availed himself of any such service between 1939 and 1945. When asked if he knew whether the newspaper clipping service mailed clippings concerning railroad accidents to his office, he replied, Not that I know of; I don't know. Petitioner called as a witness the manager of Chapin Publishing Company and Press Clipping Service, who produced exhibits Z-92, Z-92A, Z-93, and Z-94 under subpoena duces tecum. These exhibits reflected that the clipping service regarding railroad accidents was sent to George Rerat, brother of respondent, at 322 West Broadway, Minneapolis. On March 3, 1942, the address was changed to 2155 Rand Tower, and on May 25, 1944, to 800 Foshay Tower, the office address of respondent on those dates. When the witness was questioned as to what service was furnished, respondent objected on the ground of immateriality, claiming that there was no showing of any connection between the clipping service and respondent. The referee sustained the objection on the ground of hearsay as to what service was asked for, but permitted the record to show that the service was furnished to George Rerat at the above addresses. In denying petitioner's request to have these records introduced in evidence, the referee said that he admitted what he thought was relevant. It appears to us that there was sufficient testimony admitted into the record to show that George Rerat apparently received clippings regarding railroad accidents from the newspaper clipping service. While there is reasonable ground for suspicion that some of the clippings may have been sent to some of the persons employed by respondent as investigators, respondent denies that he availed himself of any clipping service and denied that he knew of any such service being mailed to his office. On the other hand, petitioner contends that these clippings were furnished respondent's investigators. There is nothing in the record which definitely links the services as being mailed personally to respondent or as being charged to him on the records of the companies furnishing this service. While it is true that the record seems clear that railroad accident clippings were sent to respondent's brother, we do not feel that, standing alone, they have been so connected with respondent as to justify his disbarment on the record as shown in connection with the clipping services. There is also a controversy as to the validity of various documents shown in the record. These are of two kinds. The first group consists of letters purportedly signed by respondent or Kalar and addressed to various persons, especially Cofield, Butherus, Salters, and Lowery. In varying degrees, some of these letters would appear to strengthen petitioner's claim of organized solicitation. The second group consists of checks and releases purportedly endorsed or witnessed by respondent. It is apparently conceded by petitioner that respondent did not sign the letters contained in the first group. However, petitioner's handwriting expert, George W. Schwartz, testified that John Kalar had written them. He also testified that in many instances documents of the second group were in fact signed by Kalar and not by respondent. Mr. Schwartz admitted on cross-examination that his findings did not contradict respondent's earlier testimony as to which of the exhibits he had signed and which he had not. Apparently, it is petitioner's position that although the checks and releases shown in the second group were not incriminating they at least showed the extent of Kalar's activities in respondent's behalf. Respondent admitted that Kalar spent a good deal of time in respondent's office, but denied that he was authorized to sign respondent's name except in specific cases. Respondent's handwriting expert, Ralph E. Kirpach, in almost all cases flatly contradicted the assertions that Kalar signed these letters. However, he was not shown petitioner's exhibits Z-39 and Z-40. The former consists of a writing with lead pencil on yellow copy paper and reads as follows: Lou: Tell Lucille there are no more socks here  have sent you books by express  How about a good deal against the Q real soon  J Petitioner's exhibit Z-40 was another longhand writing, with ink, on yellow copy paper, and contained the following: Dear Lou: There have sure been a lot of good ones this month  How many will we get  May be you should get to Ill. & Kentucky on some of those good ones  Bring in one soon  John Attached to this exhibit was an envelope (petitioner's exhibit 40-b) addressed to Mr. Lou Cofield, 1213 S. Marion Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma, bearing a posting at Minneapolis dated November 17, 1942. In the upper right-hand corner of the envelope was type-written 2155 Rand Tower Minneapolis, Minn. Also attached to the letter was petitioner's exhibit Z-40-a, purporting to be a newspaper clipping on which was stamped Western Press Clipping Exchange, Minneapolis, Minn. The clipping, apparently taken from the St. Paul Pioneer Press, dated November 16, 1942, referred to a Neillsville, Wisconsin, railroad workman who was killed by a work train on a certain railroad. Petitioner's handwriting expert testified that petitioner's exhibits Z-39 and Z-40 were in the same handwriting as the signature John E. Kalar shown by petitioner's exhibit Z-33, the joint account signature card referred to above. Kalar did not testify. An examination of petitioner's exhibits Z-39 and Z-40 does not disclose a great deal, unless by insinuation. The exhibits are neither dated, nor are they signed by last names, nor do they appear to convey any very lucid messages. While we are somewhat impressed with petitioner's argument that Kalar carried on a solicitation with at least the sufferance of respondent, we do not believe that this evidence alone warrants discipline or disbarment. The expert handwriting testimony was contradictory. The referee apparently chose to believe respondent's expert, and we do not feel warranted in overruling the referee in connection with this kind of testimony in view of the fact that he was present and had an opportunity to make his observations in the entire matter. While petitioner's exhibits Z-39 and Z-40 were not shown respondent's expert, the vagueness of these exhibits would make it difficult for us to say that they could be considered as convincing testimony that either the party who signed J on exhibit Z-39 or John on exhibit Z-40 were actually soliciting on behalf of respondent. Kalar did not testify, but it is apparent that he had acted as an independent investigator and had dealt with other lawyers from time to time, as well as with respondent. If that was the general nature of his work, it could be inferred that if some of these disputed exhibits were actually written by Kalar he could possibly have been attempting to solicit on behalf of other lawyers he was representing as well as respondent. While all busy lawyers may from time to time require additional help or investigators, we would admonish respondent, as well as others, to refrain in the future from association with such investigators as might cast suspicion upon their profession or their legal practice. We realize that while we have attempted to go over this vast record as comprehensively as possible there are still many details which cannot be properly discussed. All parties conceded on the oral argument before this court that a tremendous record had been turned over to us for our consideration. We have conscientiously attempted to examine what we considered the most important parts of this record, including the exhibits. We have also carefully reviewed the findings of the referee. Our examination of this record convinces us that upon the complaints received petitioner was justified in making its investigation. It is our opinion that the investigation was intensive and that petitioner attempted to properly submit to this court all the facts available under the circumstances. There are some discrepancies and inefficiencies on respondent's part in connection with the case, particularly his inability to furnish specific records as to certain items paid out for investigation expense and amounts paid other attorneys during the period involved here. We realize that in any law office where a vast amount of business is done records may be disposed of from time to time in order to cope with the problems of space. However, we think that respondent, even though he moved his office in 1946, should have had available more specific data, particularly with reference to certain items paid out during the latter part of that year. We are not entirely satisfied under the facts and circumstances here that respondent has fully explained all transactions during the period involved as completely as they should have been explained. We are faced, however, with the serious problem of determining whether the record before us is sufficient under the circumstances and under the referee's findings to discipline or disbar respondent. In determining this, we must necessarily consider that in disbarring an attorney we are depriving him of his right to earn a livelihood in the profession in which he has spent many years of preparation. On the other hand, we must consider that one who wilfully violates the Canons of Ethics in connection with the legal profession not only harms himself, but harms the profession in general. It is evident here that respondent apparently had been quite successful in obtaining settlements in connection with accidental death and injury claims against railroad companies. It is also evident that his business extended over a considerable area. None of the six specific cases urged most emphatically by petitioner in its brief arose in Minnesota. It is self-evident that in doing as extensive and successful a business as apparently was done by respondent he would acquire quite a large circle of friends, some well-wishers, and quite a reputation as a successful lawyer, particularly among railroad people. If, as a result of this wide acquaintanceship, he made contacts based on his reputation as a successful lawyer which later resulted in business coming to his office, he could not be criticized. It is common knowledge that in all law offices, large or small, some of the business obtained results from favorable handling of similar matters in the locality where the attorney practices most extensively and where he has been most successful. It is also reasonable to believe that under such circumstances the railroad companies against which verdicts or settlements were obtained would not be too pleased in all cases. This would not justify, however, an open solicitation on the part of respondent or any other attorney by means of newspaper clippings, cancelled checks, photostatic copies of checks, etc., to induce claimants to seek out respondent as their attorney. Here, we have some instances where the record clearly shows that a satisfied client in a former case recommended respondent to others as an attorney. There are other instances where on direct examination certain persons claimed that they were solicited and later changed their statements. All of these matters have been somewhat reviewed herein. We have a situation here which was recognized, particularly by the referee, and which cannot be ignored by us, and that is the type of testimony produced by petitioner to show solicitation on the part of respondent. With reference to the Burlington railroad particularly, it appears to have received a great deal of cooperation from the special assistant attorney general of the state of Nebraska in connection with the effort made to disbar respondent. Clearly, there are reasons why the claim departments of the railroads would be pleased to see respondent disqualified from the practice of law. The phase of this part of the proceedings that does not appeal to us particularly is that one John Samson, while acting as a special assistant attorney general for the state of Nebraska, also appears to have gone with the railroad claim agent in several instances and obtained statements from claimants on the same day that the claim settlement was made. A review of these statements would clearly indicate in most instances that they are not necessarily in the language of the claimant, but were perhaps dictated and written in the language of the party taking the statement. For example, if it is true, as claimed in the testimony of Mrs. Rose C. Kline, that Samson took her in the sheriff's car from a funeral and had her sign a statement against her wishes, little credence could be given to such a statement. We also have the case of Harry Benon, an admitted solicitor in his own right, a man not admitted to the practice of law, and a man who apparently was acceptable to the railroad companies in connection with the settlement of claims he solicited. His testimony involving respondent related to a time back in 1943, when he claims he worked for him for a few months. If the testimony of Don Chapman is to be considered, that after giving an affidavit to the railroad claim agent charging respondent with solicitation endeavors he (Benon) later came back and repudiated this statement on the claim that he had to give it or else, his testimony could receive little recognition. So far as the deposition and the later repudiation affidavit of L.L. Cofield is concerned, we agree with the referee that no consideration can be given to them. Here is a man who claimed to have worked for respondent in 1942 and so testified in his deposition taken December 2, 1947. He then almost completely repudiated his deposition in the affidavit previously referred to. His affiliation with Brennan, Superintendent of Special Service for the Santa Fe, and the methods used by the railroad company in paying him are not too convincing  a situation where apparently large sums were paid to Cofield with no special accounting record of these payments being kept by the railroad company. No credence can be given to Cofield's testimony based on his own record, and we would not consider it sufficient in itself to justify disbarment of respondent. 6. It is our conclusion that under the record here, with its many conflicts in testimony, the conflicting stories by witnesses, and the circumstances in general, that the referee's findings that respondent was not guilty of organized solicitation should be sustained. Affirmed.