Opinion ID: 1667377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of a statutory aggravating circumstance ex post facto

Text: One of the statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstances unanimously found by the jury was, The capital murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. Mr. Bowen contends it should not have been applied to his case because the law describing that aggravating circumstance had not been enacted at the time the crime was committed. In Wilson v. State, 295 Ark. 682, 751 S.W.2d 734 (1988), we held that a statutory aggravating circumstance using the terms heinous, atrocious, or cruel was unconstitutionally vague. In 1991, the General Assembly amended the law to state the current terminology. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(8) (Repl.1993). Between 1988 and 1991, Arkansas law did not prescribe as an aggravating circumstance either heinous, atrocious, or cruel, or cruel and depraved murder. As the crime in this case occurred in 1990, Mr. Bowen argues that the application of the aggravating circumstance codified in 1991 violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Ark. Const. art. 2, § 17. The State argues that Mr. Bowen is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal because there was no objection on that basis in the Trial Court. Although the State is correct in its assertion that no such objection was made, this assignment of error comes within a very narrow exception to the rule that this Court will not entertain claims of plain error not brought to the attention of the Trial Court. As reported in Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), we recognized in Smith v. State, 205 Ark. 1075, 172 S.W.2d 248 (1943), and in Wells v. State, 193 Ark. 1092, 104 S.W.2d 451 (1937), that we have not required an objection to a trial court's failure to bring to a jury's attention a matter essential to its consideration of the death penalty. We apply that holding here and consider the issue on its merits. Whether or not retroactive application of the statutory cruel and depraved manner aggravating circumstance violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation depends upon the nature of the law. If the amendment creating the statutory aggravating circumstance after the commission of the crime is considered substantive, then application of it is a constitutional violation. If it is considered procedural, there was no error in applying it retroactively to Mr. Bowen's case. That is the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), and in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). In Miller v. Florida, supra , the Florida legislature, through an amendment in a points system, effectively increased the number of years in the sentence range for certain offenses from a range of three-and-a-half years to four-and-a-half years to a range of five-and-a-half to seven years. The increase occurred after the offense in question was committed but before Miller was tried. In its opinion determining that the new law could not be applied, the Supreme Court said: Article I of the United States Constitution provides that neither Congress nor any State shall pass any ex post facto Law. . . . Our understanding of what is meant by ex post facto largely derives from the case of Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 [1 L.Ed. 648] (1798), in which this Court first considered the scope of the ex post facto prohibition. In Calder , Justice Chase, noting that the expression ex post facto had been in use long before the revolution, . . . summarized his understanding of what fell within the words and the intent of the prohibition: 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. Id. at 390 (emphasis omitted).       As was stated in Weaver [v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)], to fall within the ex post facto prohibition, two critical elements must be present: first, the law must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and second, it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. . . . We have also held in Dobbert v. Florida, supra , that no ex post facto violation occurs if a change does not alter substantial personal rights, but merely changes modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance. By way of contrast to Miller v. Florida, supra , the Dobbert case had to do only with whether the judge or the jury made an ultimate decision about imposition of the death penalty. At the time the crime was committed, the Florida law permitted imposition of the death sentence unless a majority of the jurors recommended mercy. At the time of the trial, the law permitted the judge to impose the death penalty if he or she stated in writing reasons based on statutorily prescribed findings. That change was held to be procedural only, and thus it was not prohibited as an ex post facto law. The Supreme Court concluded the change in the law actually worked to the benefit of the accused. Previously, the death penalty was presumed unless the jury called for mercy, but under the new law the judge was to implement statutory safeguards enacted in the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). In Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430 (1980), an issue was whether there was sufficient evidence in support of aggravating circumstances found by the jury. In upholding the jury's findings, we said: One of the reasons these statutes were enacted was to give this court an insight in the thought process of the jury so that we can compare the circumstances of cases involving the death sentence in our effort to avoid any arbitrary and unconstitutional application of the sentence. We do not consider the jury's findings as separate little verdicts, and we do not require the same degree of proof to sustain a jury finding that an aggravating circumstance exists as we would require to sustain a conviction if that circumstance was a separate crime. That expression about our statutory aggravating circumstances is similar to one made a few years later by the Supreme Court in Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), in which it was said that the finding of an aggravating circumstance is not a separate verdict but is a standard to guide the jury in its selection of punishment. In Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144, 772 S.W.2d 297 (1989), we explained the circumstances under which a sentencing law will be considered substantive: Appellants have cited a number of our cases stating that sentencing provisions are substantive rather than procedural and that the sentencing provisions in effect at the time an offense occurs govern sentencing. Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373 (1982); Easley v. State, 274 Ark. 215, 623 S.W.2d 189 (1981); Culpepper v. State, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W.2d 220 (1980). However, those cases, and others like them, deal with attempts to apply a harsher sentence than was provided by law at the time an offense was committed, rather than with changes in sentencing procedures. While the addition of an aggravating circumstance to be considered in determining whether the sentence will be death or life without parole does not guarantee the harsher sentence, it may have a direct effect on the decision and thus result in a harsher sentence than might have been imposed were that aggravating circumstance not available. We can hardly say that a standard for application of the death penalty is merely procedural. We regard it as a substantive provision that cannot be applied retroactively. It was error to do so, thus we must remand the case for resentencing.