Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Improper Aggravating Factors

Text: Defendant argues that, through evidence and argument, the jury was permitted to consider improper nonstatutory aggravating factors in violation of the rule of People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 774, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, limiting aggravating evidence to matters coming within one of the aggravating factors listed in section 190.3. As discussed below, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on how it could consider the evidence. Defendant failed either to object to any of the evidence or argument on this basis or to request an additional or different limiting instruction. Accordingly, he has not preserved this issue for appeal. ( People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 156, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) In response to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we see good reason for defense counsel not to have objected or requested additional instruction. The Boyd rule does not apply to evidence presented at the guilt phase or by the defense. Rather, `It stands for the proposition that the 1978 law prevents the prosecution from introducing, in its case-in-chief, aggravating evidence not contained in the various factors listed in section 190.3.' ( People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 963 [248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917].) ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 156, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) But no such event occurred here.... ( People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 963, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917.) The prosecution presented no evidence whatever in its penalty phase case-in-chief. Defendant argues that this language from People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 156, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561, and People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 963, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917, is inconsistent with other cases suggesting that when evidence presented at another phase of trial would not have been admissible at the penalty phase, the court should, on request, give a limiting instruction telling the jury to disregard the evidence during the penalty phase. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1168, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 630, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) We see no inconsistency. Clark and Guzman correctly recognize that the Boyd rule limits evidence the prosecution can present in its penalty phase case-in-chief and does not involve evidence admitted at another phase or by the defense. Those cases do not, however, enlarge the range of evidence the jury may consider in aggravation at the penalty phase. As the other cases have recognized, the jury may still consider in aggravation only evidence coming within one of the factors listed in section 190.3. The evidence of which defendant complains was all properly admitted either at the guilt phase or by the defense as part of its penalty phase evidence. We have already considered, and rejected, defendant's arguments regarding the admissibility of the guilt phase evidence. At the penalty phase, defendant called as a witness in mitigation the former director of a special education school that defendant had attended as a teenager to testify about his good qualities. She mentioned on direct examination that he got in trouble one time at school. He stole 50 cents from a tuna fish can, apparently because he felt embarrassed that his mother had not given him money for bus fare. When another child reacted strongly to the theft, defendant broke the child's watch crystal. On cross-examination, the witness said the watch crystal cost $4.85. We see no incompetence in defense counsel's presenting this evidence (or, in response to defendant's claim that it was not responsive to any question, failing to move to strike it) or not objecting to the cross-examination. Defendant may not present evidence about his good behavior during a time period while hiding from the jury evidence of misbehavior during that same time. Moreover, defense counsel could reasonably believe that allowing the witness to describe this relatively trivial incident as defendant's only misconduct would enhance her credibility regarding defendant's general good behavior. In addition, because the witness discussed the incident in her direct testimony, the prosecution properly cross-examined her on the subject. Accordingly, no evidence was improperly admitted. Defendant's main complaint seems to be that the jury was erroneously permitted to consider this evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase. It was not. The court and parties were well aware of the limited nature of the evidence the jury could consider in aggravation. Defense counsel wanted the court not to specify the evidence of other crimes, although they wanted to guard against the jury considering in aggravation incidents such as the taking of the two quarters out of the tuna fish can. After discussion, the parties agreed the court would instruct, and the court did instruct, as follows. It told the jury to consider, take into account, and be guided by the standard statutory factors, which it listed, and told it to disregard any guilt phase instructions which conflict[ ] with this principle. Regarding evidence of other crimes, it instructed, Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant ... has been convicted of two crimes of second degree burglary prior to the offense of murder in the first degree of which he has been found guilty in this case.... You may not consider any evidence of other crime as an aggravating circumstance. (Italics added.) Telling the jury not to consider in aggravation evidence of crimes other than the two convictions was adequate. Competent counsel could reasonably believe that this instruction fully protected defendant, and that it was not in his best interest for the court additionally to list every possible crime the evidence suggested, then tell the jury not to consider those crimes. Defendant argues the jury might have considered the instruction to limit only its consideration of criminal convictions rather than criminal acts, but we see no reason to so find. The words seem reasonably clear. If defendant had wanted a clearer instruction, he could have requested one. Moreover, no one suggested in argument that the jury could consider any of this evidence in aggravation. Indeed, defense counsel expressly argued there were mitigating circumstances but no aggravating circumstances other than the two burglary convictions. Defendant correctly notes that the prosecutor discussed the theft of 50 cents and the tape-recorded conversation among defendant and his mother and sister in county jail. But the prosecutor was responding to defense argument, not suggesting that this evidence was itself aggravating.