Opinion ID: 852379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Indiana Constitutional Claim

Text: Edwards urges us to find broader self-representation rights under the Indiana Constitution than those afforded by the federal constitution. Edwards contends that there is a firmer foundation for the right of self-representation under article I, section 13 which guarantees an accused the right to be heard by himself and by counsel. [4] Section 13 does provide broader rights than the Sixth Amendment. But each of these expanded rights dealt with the right to counsel, and none addressed the right of self-representation. Compare Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (Ind.2003) (section 13 guarantees the right to be notified that hired counsel is present at police station and wishes to consult with the accused) with Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-32, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (Sixth Amendment guarantees no such right); compare Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 928 n. 4 (Ind.1998) (under some circumstances, section 13 right to counsel attaches prior to the filing of formal charges) and Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975) (person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent) with United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings). We think that the right to self-representation of mentally impaired persons under section 13 is no broader than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Edwards. Our precedents respecting self-representation have tracked federal standards. See, e.g., Stroud v. State, 809 N.E.2d 274, 279 (Ind.2004) (drawing no distinction between state and federal constitutional requirements for waiving counsel); Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind.2003) (same). Moreover, we have found that the Indiana Constitution assumes and demands fundamental fairness in all judicial proceedings. Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. 2001). Denial of self-representation is admittedly an intrusion into the defendant's right to direct his own affairs and to make his own decisions in conducting his defense. But if a defendant is so impaired that a coherent presentation of a defense is unlikely, fairness demands that the court insist upon representation. We are persuaded that a defendant's mental illness may preclude competent self-representation in the interest of a fair trial, and therefore conclude that the Indiana Constitution gives no broader rights than the Sixth Amendment as explained in Edwards. We acknowledge the textual distinction between the Sixth Amendment and section 13. Section 13 guarantees the accused the right to be heard by himself. We have also observed that the Indiana Constitution places a unique value upon the desire of an individual accused of a crime to speak out personally in the courtroom and state what in his mind constitutes a predicate for his innocence of the charges. Biddinger v. State, 868 N.E.2d 407, 412 (Ind.2007) (quoting Vicory v. State, 802 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ind.2004)). But these expressions have addressed the right of the defendant to present evidence, Sanchez, 749 N.E.2d at 520-21, to testify at trial, Phillips v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1200, 1201-02 (Ind.1996), or to make statements in allocution at sentencing. Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 429. None specifically dealt with whether the defendant or counsel was to take these steps. The constitution, in guaranteeing the right to be heard by himself and by counsel, does not express a preference for either. We have frequently held that where the defendant is represented by counsel, some actions must be taken by counsel. See Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind.2000) ([O]nce counsel [i]s appointed, [a d]efendant sp[eaks] to the court through counsel.); Vance v. State, 620 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind. 1993) (when a defendant is represented by counsel, it is within the trial court's discretion to entertain or strike pro se motions). We do not consider the accused's right to be heard by himself as an unlimited right to conduct all trial proceedings on his own. Finally, the State encourages us to adopt a section 13 standard allowing courts to deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or jury. The State argues that [r]ather than focusing on whether a defendant has any particular mental diagnosis or any particular level of mental cognition, the State's proposed rule relates directly to the basic functional demands that having a trial necessarily places on the defendant. The federal constitution establishes rights that the states may choose to expand, but the Supremacy Clause precludes any state doctrine that restricts a federal constitutional right. Edwards describes a limitation on the general federal constitutional right to self-representation, and the Supreme Court expressed uncertainty as to how the State's proposal would work in practice and declined to adopt it as a federal standard. 128 S.Ct. at 2388. It remains to be seen whether the State's proposal, or any attempt to refine the Edwards language, will be found to violate the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. We therefore decline in the absence of experience under the current Edwards language to attempt to tinker with it.