Opinion ID: 785472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Can the Phase I Award Be Confirmed Against the Russian Federation?

Text: 23
24 Because Noga is seeking to enforce an arbitration award rendered in a foreign state, the confirmation of the Phase I Award is governed by the framework set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 53 (Convention), as implemented by, and reprinted in, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08. Under the Convention, [a] district court's role in reviewing a foreign arbitral award is strictly limited and the showing required to avoid summary confirmance is high. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 19, 23 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the FAA provides that, upon the application of a party to an arbitration award made pursuant to the Convention, a district court shall enter an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration, unless the court finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the... Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 207. As the party opposing confirmation, the Russian Federation bore the burden of establishing that the Phase I Award should not have been honored. See Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 770 (9th Cir.1992) (citing La Societe Nationale Pour La Recherche v. Shaheen Natural Res. Co., 585 F.Supp. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y.1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.1984) (per curiam)). This burden is imposed because the public policy in favor of international arbitration is strong. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir.1975). 25 The District Court declined to confirm the Phase I Award on the grounds that (i) the Russian Federation was not a party to the Swedish arbitration proceedings and (ii) this case did not fall under one of the limited exceptions in which we have held that an arbitration award can be enforced against a nonparty. See Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 495 (2d Cir.2002) (listing five theories for binding nonsignatories to arbitration agreements: incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, and estoppel); see also Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 355-56 (5th Cir.2003). Consequently, the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to confirm the award against the Russian Federation. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the District Court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to confirm the Phase I Award against the Russian Federation.
26 On appeal, Noga principally challenges the District Court's legal conclusion that the Russian Federation and the Government are not the same entities for the purpose of confirming the Phase I Award, and urges that we apply principles of federal common law or public international law to reach this conclusion. The Russian Federation counters that: (i) this case should be decided under principles of private international law, which dictate that Russian law be applied in determining whether the Russian Federation and the Government are the same entities; and (ii) under Russian law, the Russian Federation and the Government are separate entities. 9 27 In making their respective choice-of-law arguments, both parties rely on the Supreme Court's decision in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) ( Bancec ). There, the Republic of Cuba established a state-owned trade bank with full juridical capacity ... of its own. Id. at 613, 103 S.Ct. 2591 (internal quotation marks omitted). This trade bank sued to collect on a letter of credit issued by an American bank. The American bank counterclaimed, asserting a right to set off the value of its assets in Cuba that had been nationalized by the Cuban government. Id. at 614-15, 103 S.Ct. 2591. The Cuban trade bank claimed immunity from this counterclaim under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. 28 The Supreme Court concluded that the FSIA did not control the determination of whether the seized Cuban assets could be set off against the claim of the Cuban trade bank. Instead, the Court held that principles of public international law and federal common law — rather than Cuban domestic law — should be applied to determine the effect to be given to [the Cuban trade bank's] separate juridical status. Id. at 621, 103 S.Ct. 2591. According to the Court, [t]o give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining whether the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be respected would permit the state to violate with impunity the rights of third parties under international law while effectively insulating itself from liability in foreign courts. Id. at 621-22, 103 S.Ct. 2591. On the other hand, the Court cautioned that [f]reely ignoring the separate status of government instrumentalities would result in substantial uncertainty over whether an instrumentality's assets would be diverted to satisfy a claim against the sovereign, and might thereby cause third parties to hesitate before extending credit to a government instrumentality without the government's guarantee. Id. at 626, 103 S.Ct. 2591. Consequently, the efforts of sovereign nations to structure their governmental activities in a manner deemed necessary to promote economic development and efficient administration would surely be frustrated. Id. Thus, [d]ue respect for the actions taken by foreign sovereigns and for principles of comity between nations led the Court to conclude... that government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such. Id. at 626-27, 103 S.Ct. 2591. 29 As the principal issue in this appeal is whether the Government is an instrumentality established as a juridical entity distinct and independent from the Russian Federation, the Bancec decision is of little help to us here. In any event, because we conclude that the answer to this question is the same regardless which of the bodies of law advocated by the parties is applied here, we need not cut the Gordian choice-of-law knot presented to us by the parties. Cf., e.g., Blake v. Comm'r, 697 F.2d 473, 477 n. 4 (2d Cir.1982) (declining to decide whether to apply federal common law or state law where the result would be the same under either analysis).
30 We turn first to the Constitution of the Russian Federation in determining whether the Government and the Russian Federation should be treated as separate parties for the purposes of this confirmation proceeding. That charter provides a detailed discussion of the relationship between these two entities. The Russian Constitution provides for a bicameral federal executive consisting of the President of the Russian Federation, who is described as being the head of [S]tate, Konst. RF art. 80(1), and the Government, which shall exercise [e]xecutive power in the Russian Federation, id. art. 110(1). The Government consists of the Chairman of the Government (who is appointed by the president, subject to consent of the State Duma, the federal legislature), and the Deputy Chairman of the Government and the federal ministers (who are appointed by the president in consultation with the Chairman of the Government). Id. arts. 83(a), (e), 110(2), 111(1). 31 The Russian Constitution also enumerates the responsibilities of the Government, which include, among other things: (i) submitting a federal budget to the State Duma; (ii) ensur[ing] the implementation... of a uniform financial, credit, and monetary policy; and (iii) exercis[ing] any other powers vested in [the Government] by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, [Russian] federal laws, and decrees of the President of the Russian Federation. Id. art. 114(a), (b), (g). To carry out these responsibilities, the Government is empowered to issue decrees and orders, which shall be binding throughout the Russian Federation. Id. art. 115(1), (2). Finally, the members of the Government serve at the pleasure of the President: they must resign upon the election of a new President, id. art. 116; they may resign only with the consent of the President, id. art 117(1); and the President also can require them to resign at any time, id. art. 117(2). 32 Plainly, in light of the description of the Government in the Russian charter, that entity is not a sovereign, corporation, or instrumentality separate from the Russian Federation. Rather, the Government is a political organ of the Russian Federation, analogous to the cabinet of the American president. Most significantly, in the words of one scholar, the Government is not a juridical person and enjoys no autonomous legal capacity. William E. Butler, Russian Law 343 (2d ed.2003). Indeed, given the Supreme Court's Bancec decision, had either the Government or the Russian Federation wanted to shield the latter entity from being the subject of these confirmation proceedings, either could have designated a publicly-owned state corporation or instrumentality as the entity to contract with Noga. At bottom, the Government was performing a quintessential governmental function: financing the purchase of massive quantities of basic necessities and infrastructure improvements to provide for the Russian people and paying for those necessities and improvements with the country's natural resources. 33 Finally, the Russian Federation has not satisfied its burden of proving that the Government is a separate juridical entity that can sue and be sued in Russian courts for obligations that are analogous to the ones set forth in the Loan Agreements or, indeed, for any legal obligations. For example, the Russian Federation could have presented docket entries or court filings from Russian courts indicating that the Government had sued or been sued in this capacity. No such evidence was presented to the District Court, however. Accordingly, we find that, under Russian law, the Government and the Russian Federation should be treated as the same party for the purpose of this confirmation proceeding.
34 The question of whether a federal court will confirm a foreign arbitration award against a sovereign nation, where one of the sovereign's political organs was a party to the arbitration, appears to be one of first impression. Federal courts have been asked to confirm such awards against a corporation owned or operated by a foreign sovereign under such theories as alter ego, piercing the corporate veil, or agency. See, e.g., Monde Re, 311 F.3d 488; see generally Carolyn B. Lamm & Jocelyn A. Aqua, Defining the Party — Who Is a Proper Party in an International Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association and Other International Institutions, 34 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 711 (2003) (discussing when U.S. courts will deem a foreign state to have consented to arbitration based on the acts of an instrumentality or state-owned entity). The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, is illustrative. 35 There, an Argentinian corporation (Bridas) entered into a joint venture agreement with a production association formed and owned by the Government of Turkmenistan, which was not itself a party to the agreement. Bridas subsequently initiated an arbitration proceeding against both the production association and the Government of Turkmenistan, alleging breach of the agreement. Id. at 351-52. The arbitrators expressly rejected the argument of the Government of Turkmenistan that it was not a proper party to the arbitration because it had not signed the agreement. Id. at 352. The arbitrators subsequently issued an award in favor of Bridas, which successfully brought an action in the Southern District of Texas to confirm the award. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit declined to confirm the arbitration award against the Government of Turkmenistan under theories of agency, estoppel, and third party beneficiary. Id. at 356-58, 360-63. Nevertheless, the court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings with respect to whether the production association was the alter ego of the Government of Turkmenistan, instructing the district court to consider, inter alia, the factors used by the Fifth Circuit in determining whether a state agency is the alter ego of a state for Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity purposes. Id. at 358-60. 36 Likewise, this Court has been asked to confirm domestic arbitration awards under similar theories against nonparties to an arbitration proceeding or agreement. 10 It is this latter line of cases that both the District Court and the Russian Federation cite in support of their conclusions that the Phase I Award should not be enforceable against the Russian Federation. But, as we noted above, analogizing the relationship between the Russian Federation and the Government to the relationship between a corporate parent and a subsidiary belies the reality of the political relationship between the Russian Federation and the Government and is thus inapposite. Analogies, as Cardozo warned of metaphors, in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58 (1926). 37 While the issue of the nature of the relationship between a foreign sovereign and one of its political organs has not been presented in the context of the enforcement and confirmation of an arbitration award, this issue has come up in other contexts, and in each of those contexts the fact of an internal separation of some sort between the sovereign and one or more of its organs has been found to be of no legal significance. The most developed area of federal common law concerning this issue relates to whether, in the context of the FSIA, a ministry or other political subdivision of a foreign sovereign should be treated either as the foreign state itself or a political subdivision of it (in which case it would be immune from suit), or as an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state (in which case it would be subject to suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)). For example, in O'Connell Machinery Co. v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir.1984), we found that the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, a public financial entity which coordinate[d] the management of the commercial enterprises of the Italian Government, was a political subdivision of Italy because it was a governmental unit beneath the central Italian government. 38 Ten years later, in Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 153 (D.C.Cir.1994), the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Bolivian Air Force was a foreign state rather than an agency or instrumentality of Bolivia because the air force's core functions were predominantly governmental. According to the court, the armed forces are as a rule so closely bound up with the structure of the state that they must in all cases be considered as the `foreign state' itself, rather than a separate `agency or instrumentality' of the state. Id. at 153. Indeed, [a]ny government of reasonable complexity must act through men organized into offices and departments. Id. 11 Consequently, [n]umerous other courts have assumed without discussion that governmental departments or ministries [— including ministries of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union —] qualify as political subdivisions of a foreign state under the FSIA. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F.Supp.2d 16, 37 (E.D.N.Y.2002), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 72 Fed. Appx. 850 (2d Cir. 2003). 12 Moreover, a similar conclusion was apparently reached by the Supreme Court in Bancec, when in the course of reinstating the district court's opinion, the Court quoted that opinion's statement that [t]he [Cuban] Ministry of Foreign Trade is no different than the Government [of Cuba] of which its minister is a member. 462 U.S. at 618 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 2591 (quoting Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F.Supp. 412, 425 (S.D.N.Y.1980)). 39 Notably, as the district court in Garb recognized, the United States adopted an analogous position in an amicus brief submitted in Transaero. There, the United States took the view that if a judgment would essentially be one against the state and an entity's assets are not separate from those of the state, then the entity is not a legal person separate from the state even if, in a formalistic sense, that entity can enter into contracts in its own name, and sue or be sued in its own name. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 17, Transaero (No. 92-7222), quoted in Garb, 207 F.Supp.2d at 37. The legal standard articulated in the Transaero amicus brief is the same standard that has been adopted by the Supreme Court in determining whether an agency or instrumentality of a state is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50-51, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994). Indeed, it is black letter Eleventh Amendment law that the political agencies and departments of states are entitled to the same sovereign immunity as the state. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Jones v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir.1998). Significantly, in the case at bar, it is clear from both the record and statements made by counsel for the Russian Federation during oral argument before this Court that the Government owns no assets that could be attached to satisfy a judgment confirming the Phase I Award and, moreover, that all such assets are owned by the Russian Federation. 40 Finally, we note that an issue similar to the one before us has arisen in the federal common law of bankruptcy and set off. Specifically, when monies are owed to an individual by one federal agency and that individual owes a debt to another federal agency, the two federal agencies may set off the debts owned by one of them against the claims of the other. In other words, the agencies are treated as constituent parts of a unitary entity. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a); Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995); Turner v. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Turner), 84 F.3d 1294, 1296-97 (10th Cir.1996) (en banc). 41 In sum, under the federal common-law principles articulated above, no meaningful legal distinction can be drawn between a sovereign and one of its political organs. Accordingly, the Russian Federation has failed to overcome the presumption in favor of confirming the Phase I Award, and it has failed to demonstrate that the Government should be treated as a separate party from the Russian Federation in this context under federal common law.
42 The distinction made by the District Court between the acts of a sovereign and the acts of one of its governmental organs also finds no basis in international law. An axiomatic principle of international law is that [t]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State. Draft Articles on Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles), art. 4(1), reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (ILC Report), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/convents.htm. 13 As the commentary to this provision of the Draft Articles explains, [t]he replies by Governments to the Preparatory Committee for the 1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law were unanimously of the view that the actions or omissions of organs of the State must be attributed to it. Id. art. 4(1) cmt. 4 (footnote omitted), reprinted in ILC Report at 85. The Third Committee of the Conference adopted unanimously on first reading an article 1, which provided that international responsibility shall be incurred by a State as a consequence of any failure on the part of its organs to carry out the international obligations of the State. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 43 The maxim that the acts of an organ of a sovereign's government are attributable to the sovereign have also been regularly applied in international courts and arbitrations. See Lamm & Aqua, supra, at 730-34. For example, in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 393 (1975), the arbitrator rejected the Libyan Government's objections to the tribunal's jurisdiction to arbitrate claims arising out of Libya's nationalization of its oil industry. One of those objections was that the contracts in question had been entered into by the Libyan Minister of Petroleum and thus Libya, a sovereign State, was not a party to these contracts. Id. at 415. Citing to the 1970 draft of the (as yet unfinished) Draft Articles, the arbitrator overruled this objection, concluding that it [was] incontestable and uncontested that, if the `Ministry of Petroleum' or any other qualified organ of the Libyan Government ... ha[d] entered into Deeds of Concession, such organ acted as the organ duly qualified and authorized to do so by the Libyan Government. Id. at 416. Thus, it was the Libyan Arab Republic ... and that State alone — which ha[d] become bound by the acts performed by its own organs. Id. 14 44 In sum, we hold that regardless of whether principles of Russian law, federal common law, or international law are applied, the Russian Federation and the Government are not separate parties for the purposes of confirming and enforcing an arbitral award under the Convention. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court denying Noga's motion to confirm is vacated. 45 II. What Effect Does Noga's Assignments of Its Arbitration Claims to Its Creditors Have on These Proceedings? 46 As noted above, the Russian Federation also sought dismissal of Noga's complaint on the grounds that Noga was not the real party in interest by virtue of Noga's prior assignments to the Assignee Banks and its subsequent failure to join them as parties in either the New York or Kentucky Actions. Because the District Court dismissed Noga's complaint on the ground that the Phase I Award could not be enforced against the Russian Federation, the court did not reach these alternative bases for dismissal. However, Judge Pauley opined in a footnote that the Condordat, together with the claim assignments themselves[,] suggests that the Assignee Banks are real parties in interest to this action and that the Russian Federation could be subject to multiple litigations and judgments. Judge Pauley further opined in this same footnote that the Assignee Banks' absence from this action [appeared to] compromise their ability to protect their interests in the Award. 47 On appeal, Noga invites us to exercise our power to consider these issues sua sponte to preempt possible error on remand. Given the complexities of the legal issues presented and the lack of a sufficiently developed factual record to decide them, we decline to accept this invitation and remand the case to the able District Court for further development of the record and specific resolution of these remaining issues, as well as the other defenses raised by the Russian Federation in its Answer.