Opinion ID: 2077250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Commissioner Abused his Discretion in Considering the 1987 Injury as a Cause When Ayers Pled 2002 as the Date of Injury

Text: D & N argues the commissioner erred in awarding Ayers benefits for his 1987 injury because the issue was not properly presented to the commissioner for consideration. Whether Ayers's application for workers' compensation benefits sufficiently informed his employer of the possibility of an award for the 1987 injury is a matter within the agency's discretion. Waters, 674 N.W.2d at 96. Thus, the proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion. Id. Ayers's application for benefits alleged an injury date of [o]n or about March 25, 2002. D & N argues Ayers should have been required to file a new application for benefits alleging 1987 as the date of the injury. In Waters, we reiterated [a]n application for arbitration is not a formal pleading and is not to be judged by the technical rules of pleading. Id. at 96-97 (quoting Coghlan v. Quinn Wire & Iron Works, 164 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1969)). Instead, [t]he key to pleading in an administrative process is nothing more than opportunity to prepare and defend. The employer is to be afforded a substantive right to be at least generally informed as to the basic material facts upon which the employee relies as a basis for compensation. Id. at 97 (quoting James R. Lawyer and Judith Ann Graves Higgs, Iowa Workers' CompensationLaw & Practice § 21-7, at 231 (3d ed.1999)). The commissioner did not abuse his discretion in considering the 1987 injury as the cause of Ayers's disability and knee replacement surgery because D & N was well aware of Ayers's long-standing history of knee problems. In fact, D & N made the 1987 injury and subsequent surgery in 1988 an integral part of the hearing. Its attorney stated what we're looking at here is not a new injury, but it's simply a continuation of the '87, '88 injury. And it's our position Your Honor, that all of this is really an ongoing part of the '87, '88 injury. D & N generated expert opinion testimony from Dr. Riggins to support this claim. Dr. Riggins was asked by defense counsel to review the Ayers file and opined the osteoarthritis present in [Ayers's] right knee was the expected result of the earlier [1988] surgical procedure. Defense counsel was so persuasive the commissioner adopted her argument. What D & N wished for came true. This is not a surprise development that prejudiced the employer. Eberhart Constr. v. Curtin, 674 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Iowa 2004). The commissioner correctly pointed out [n]othing would be gained by requiring another proceeding explicitly based on the 1987 injury. While D & N may have been surprised by the consequences of its argument, this is not Ayers's problem. Even if we were to order a new hearing, D & N would be barred from arguing the 1987 injury did not cause Ayers's disability and knee replacement surgery because it already proved this very matter. See generally Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 567, 573-75 (Iowa 2006) (discussing doctrine of judicial estoppel). In 1988, Ayers was paid for an eighteen percent permanent partial disability to his lower right leg. Since he proved the knee replacement surgery performed in 2002 was necessary to treat the 1987 injury, Ayers is entitled to be reimbursed for the reasonable cost of that treatment. Iowa Code § 85.26(2). He is not entitled to any additional temporary or permanent disability payments because more than three years have passed since he received his last disability payments for the 1987 injury. [1] Id. § 85.26(1).