Opinion ID: 1163316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The cumulative effect of the alleged errors

Text: We recognize that there are situations in which although no single prosecutorial act deprive[s] Defendant of a fair trial, the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's improper conduct [can be] so prejudicial as to deny him [or her] a fair trial. Pemberton, 71 Haw. at 476, 796 P.2d at 85. In the instant case, however, as discussed above, we have concluded that most of the acts challenged by Pulse did not involve any improper prosecutorial conduct. Furthermore, [a]fter carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that [because] the individual errors raised by Appellant are by themselves insubstantial[,] ... it is unnecessary to address the cumulative effect of these alleged errors. State v. Samuel, 74 Haw. 141, 160, 838 P.2d 1374, 1383 (1992).
Pulse additionally contends that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his convictions. We have long held that evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or a jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.... Substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Jackson, 81 Hawai`i at 46, 912 P.2d at 78 (quoting State v. Pone, 78 Hawai`i 262, 265, 892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995)) (brackets omitted). Pulse's argument on this issue is not very clear. He appears to argue that there was insufficient evidence that he carried a firearm outside of his place of business, residence, or sojourn, HRS § 134-6(b), because Appellant, Office patrol officer Gaeta, and Appellant's girlfriend `Sandy' testified that some minor shouting occurred on the date of the incident but that no weapon was observed or displayed. Unfortunately for Pulse, Cartagena testified that Pulse had carried a loaded firearm from Pulse's boat to Cartagena's boat. The testimony of one percipient witness can provide sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 141, 913 P.2d 57, 67 (1996) (citing State v. Ibuos, 75 Haw. 118, 123, 857 P.2d 576, 578-79 (1993)). Moreover, it is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses[.] Domingo v. State, 76 Hawai`i 237, 242, 873 P.2d 775, 780 (1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to convict Pulse for the violation of HRS § 134-6(b).
Pulse argues that the circuit court's exclusion of Aku's testimony at his suppression hearing violated his due process right to a fair hearing. The resolution of this issue requires us to first examine the propriety of the warrantless seizure of the gun from Pulse's boat, before we address Pulse's specific argument on appeal.
It is uncontroverted that Pulse resided on the boat where the gun was seized, and, therefore, that Pulse had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his boat protected by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7, of the Hawai`i Constitution, against unreasonable searches and seizures. Cf. State v. Paahana, 66 Haw. 499, 504, 666 P.2d 592, 596 (1983) (holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in laundry room near defendant's home); Alward v. State, 112 Nev. 141, 912 P.2d 243, 248-49 (1996) (holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in a tent located on a public campground). A warrantless search of a premises in which a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy is presumptively unreasonable. State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai`i, 433, 442, 896 P.2d 889, 898 (1995); see also State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 393, 910 P.2d 695, 706 (1996). The [prosecution] has the burden of overcoming [the] initial presumption of unreasonableness by proving that the search falls within one of the well-recognized and narrowly-defined exceptions to the general warrant requirements[.] Lopez, 78 Hawai`i at 443, 896 P.2d at 899 (quoting Paahana, 66 Haw. at 504, 666 P.2d at 596); see also Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 393, 910 P.2d at 706. One such well-recognized and narrowly-defined exception to the warrant requirement occurs when the government has probable cause to search and exigent circumstances exist necessitating immediate police action. State v. Clark, 65 Haw. 488, 494, 654 P.2d 355, 360 (1982) (citations omitted). Probable cause [to search] exists when the facts and circumstances within one's knowledge and of which one has reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. State v. Navas, 81 Hawai`i 113, 116, 913 P.2d 39, 42 (1996) (citation omitted). We hold that Cartagena's identification of Pulse as the person who terrorized him with a gun gave the officers sufficient probable cause to believe that Pulse had committed a crime. We next consider whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and seizure of the gun. The exigent circumstances exception exists when the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response. More specifically, it includes situations presenting an immediate danger to life or serious injury or an immediate threatened removal or destruction of evidence. However, the burden, of course, is upon the government to prove the justification. . ., and whether the requisite conditions exist is to be measured from the totality of the circumstances. And in seeking to meet this burden, the police must be able to point to specific and articulable facts from which it may be determined that the action they took was necessitated by the exigencies of the situation. Clark, 65 Haw. at 494, 654 P.2d at 360 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). In this case, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing (assuming that the evidence was properly adduced, see section II.F.2. of this opinion) clearly demonstrated that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Mariani reasonably believed that Pulse posed an imminent danger to everyone in the vicinity. The record reveals that, upon arrival at the scene of the incident, Officer Mariani was informed that Pulse had just terrorized Cartagena with a gun and that Pulse appeared inebriated. Cognizant of these facts, Officer Mariani and the other officers walked to the finger pier outside Pulse's boat. From this vantage point, Officer Mariani peered into the cabin of the boat and saw Pulse sleeping with what appeared to be the butt of a handgun beside him. Mariani alerted the other officers, and when Pulse began to stir in his sleep, Mariani boarded the boat to secure the gun for the safety of Pulse, the officers, and the public. Based on these facts, particularly Officer Mariani's observation of Pulse stirring in his sleep with a gun within his immediate reach and control, the circuit court could have properly concluded that there were sufficient exigent circumstances present to justify the warrantless entry and seizure of the gun.
The error in this case, however, emanates from the circuit court's decision to exclude Aku's proffered testimony at the suppression hearing. The due process guarantee of a fair trial under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 14, of the Hawai`i Constitution confers upon the accused in criminal proceedings a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. State v. Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 185, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (1990) (citations omitted). Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The right to a fair hearing also extends to pretrial suppression hearings. State v. Mitake, 64 Haw. 217, 221-24, 638 P.2d 324, 327-329 (1981) (citations omitted). Once it is determined that a pre-trial suppression hearing is warranted under the circumstances of a particular case, . . . the due process clause requires that a defendant be afforded a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of admissibility[.] Id., at 221-22, 638 P.2d at 327-28 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not without limitation and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. State v. Nizam, 7 Haw. App 402, 410, 771 P.2d 899, 904-05 (1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecution contends that Aku's testimony and photographs were not relevant under Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) 401 [15] and, therefore, were either inadmissible under HRE 402 [16] or excludable as cumulative evidence under HRE 403. [17] [D]ifferent standards of review must be applied to trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence, depending on the requirements of the particular rule of evidence at issue. When application of a particular evidentiary rule can yield only one correct result, the proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong standard. However, the traditional abuse of discretion standard should be applied in the case of those rules of evidence that require a judgment call on the part of the trial court. Craft v. Peebles, 78 Hawai`i 287, 293-94, 893 P.2d 138, 144-45 (1995) (quoting Kealoha v. County of Hawaii, 74 Haw. 308, 319-20, 844 P.2d 670, 676 (1993), reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 847 P.2d 263 (1993)) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, evidentiary decisions based on HRE 401 are reviewed under the right/wrong standard of review. See, e.g., State v. Kupihea, 80 Hawai`i 307, 314, 909 P.2d 1122, 1129 (1996) (citation omitted). Evidentiary decisions based on HRE 403, which require a judgment call by the trial court, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Kaiama, 81 Hawai`i 15, 22, 911 P.2d 735, 742 (1996) (citation omitted). Although the precise reason for the circuit court's decision to exclude Aku's testimony is unclear, it would appear that the court relied in part upon HRE 401 and 402 as the bases of its decision to exclude Aku's testimony. As discussed in section II.F.1. of this opinion, the exigency in this case stemmed largely from Officer Mariani's observing Pulse stir in his sleep with a gun in his immediate reach and control. Aku's testimony was directly relevant to contradict Officer Mariani's bare assertion that he saw Pulse with the gun inside the cabin. Accordingly, the circuit court erred to the extent that it may have concluded that Aku's testimony was irrelevant under HRE 401 and, therefore, inadmissible under HRE 402. The prosecution claims that the court's exclusion of Aku's testimony was justified by HRE 403 because Aku's testimony is cumulative of the testimony of the officers who were present at the time of the search. In order for evidence to be considered cumulative for HRE 403 purposes, it must be substantially the same as other evidence that has already been received. See Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai`i 230, 241, 891 P.2d 1022, 1032 (1995) (holding that one expert's testimony could be considered cumulative where it did not offer a different opinion than another expert's prior testimony); State v. Klafta, 73 Haw. 109, 115, 831 P.2d 512, 516 (1992) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting witnesses' testimonies over the defendant's objection that the testimonies were cumulative where the witnesses each observed many of the same things, but they also observed some things which were different); see also Monlux v. General Motors Corp., 68 Haw. 358, 363, 714 P.2d 930, 933 (1986); In re Application of Hawaii Elec. Light Co., 67 Haw. 425, 430-31, 690 P.2d 274, 278 (1984). According to Pulse's offer of proof, Aku would have contradicted the officers' testimony. Therefore, we hold that the exclusion of Aku's testimony as cumulative under HRE 403 was an abuse of discretion. The circuit court also stated in its ruling that Aku's testimony would not have affected the court's assessment of Officer Mariani's credibility because with respect to the testimony that Mr. Aku would have been able to provide, which is that virtually no one can see within this cabin area unless they are standing on the water, it would just raise an issue of credibility. And, again, this has to do with the person's ability  one particular person's ability to see, Officer Mariani, in the night in question. And Mr. Aku apparently has not been at the scene during the evening hours so that he would be able to make that statement with respect to the conditions at night as opposed to during the day. As we have noted, in a suppression hearing, due process requires that a criminal defendant be afforded a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of the admissibility of the evidence. Mitake, 64 Haw. at 221-22, 638 P.2d at 327-28. Therefore, at minimum, the court must remain impartial and refrain from assessing a witness's credibility until after that witness has testified. In the instant case, the court appears to have found that Officer Mariani's testimony was credible prior to hearing Aku's proffered impeachment testimony. Based on this finding, the court erroneously declined to hear Aku's proffered testimony. Accordingly, we hold the circuit court's refusal to allow Aku to offer relevant testimony in support of Pulse's motion to suppress violated Pulse's due process right to a fair hearing. We take this opportunity to also clarify the proper use of an offer of proof. As indicated above, the court erroneously opted to exclude Aku's testimony following Pulse's offer of proof on the basis that the proffered testimony would just raise an issue of credibility. This ruling reflects a serious misunderstanding of the purpose of an offer of proof, which is to provide an adequate record for appellate review and to assist the trial court in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 20(a) (Tillers rev.1983); see Kelekolio, 74 Haw. at 522-23, 849 P.2d at 78. Therefore, the court's determination on an offer of proof is limited to the issue of whether the proffered evidence is relevant and admissible, not whether a witness may or may not be credible. There being no other cogent grounds for its exclusion, we hold that the circuit court erred in excluding Aku's proffered testimony.
Because of the circuit court's error in excluding Aku's testimony at the suppression hearing, we must determine whether the error affected Pulse's substantial right to a fair trial. We have held that [t]he exclusion of competent testimony designed to impeach the credibility of a material witness for the [prosecution] was error that infringed upon a constitutional right of the accused, and as such was presumptively prejudicial. State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 26, 29, 548 P.2d 1402, 1405 (1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 963, 97 S.Ct. 392, 50 L.Ed.2d 332 (1976) (citations omitted). The burden is on the prosecution to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Caraballo, 62 Haw. 309, 323, 615 P.2d 91, 100 (1980). In State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 904 P.2d 912 (1995), we explained that error is not be viewed in isolation and considered purely in the abstract. It must be examined in light of the entire proceedings and given the effect which the whole record shows it to be entitled. In that context, the real question becomes whether there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to conviction. State v. Heard, 64 Haw. 193, 194, 638 P.2d 307, 308 (1981) (citations omitted). If there is such a reasonable possibility in a criminal case, then the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judgment of conviction on which it may have been based must be set aside. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402-03 [111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432] (1991); see also State v. Suka, 79 Hawai`i 293, 300, 901 P.2d 1272, 1279 (App.1995) (In applying the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard the court is required to examine the record and determine `whether there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.') (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 32-33, 904 P.2d at 917-18 (footnote omitted). After reviewing the record in its entirety, we are not convinced that the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We can only speculate as to whether the circuit court would have granted or denied the motion to suppress after hearing Aku's relevant testimony. Moreover, assuming that the court would have granted the motion and suppressed the use of the gun at trial, [18] the prominent use of the gun by the prosecution during the trial was clearly harmful. For example, during the prosecution's case in chief, the prosecution asked Cartagena, the only eyewitness who observed Pulse carrying the gun, if he recognized the gun. In response, Cartagena stated Yeah, that looks like the weapon there, yes. Also, during closing argument, the prosecution argued: So, if [Pulse] pulled a gun and threatened [Cartagena], like [Cartagena] testified, that's terroristic threatening. The fact it was a gun in that threat makes it that other charge, [134-6(a) ] for which he is charged. So, you have to consider both things. Did he threaten [Cartagena] and did he use a gun to threaten him. Did he use a gun in the course of commencing the terroristic threatening. If the answer is yes then he is guilty of [134-6(a) ]. [The 134-6(b) count] is commonly called a possessory offense or status offense which is called place to keep a firearm. As Mr. Pulse said, you can keep your firearm in your house or residence. You can take it to the firing range for practice. You can carry it with you, but it's got to be in a special container and it will be  the language will tell you that it's got to be in a closed container. So you can't have it you know, on your person. . . . . So, as I said, if in fact he did have a gun with [him] that night when he made the threats, then he's also violated [134-6(b) ]. The Judge is not going to give you the guns and the bullets the same time I don't think. It's unfortunate  well, we just don't want anybody fooling around with the gun back there in deliberation. A gun with the bullets, right? But, it's a revolver so it's not that dangerous. But, if you look at the bullets and look at the cylinder where the bullets go in[,] you could check [Cartagena's] story. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court's error in excluding Aku's testimony at the suppression hearing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pulse finally contends that the circuit court erred when it excluded Aku's photographs during the suppression hearing. We disagree. Subsequent to the circuit court's declining to allow Aku to testify, the defense introduced into evidence eleven photographs of Pulse's boat and the pier and finger pier where it was moored. Pulse testified that the photographs fairly and accurately depict[ed] how his boat and the pier and finger pier looked on the date of the incident. Although Pulse did not testify that these photographs were the ones that Aku had taken, at the hearing on Pulse's motion for reconsideration, the circuit court stated that there [had] already been testimony concerning the photographs from the defendant when he took the stand and later reiterated that, with respect to the photographs that Mr. Aku would have been able to testify to, there [had] already been sufficient testimony from the defendant himself concerning these photographs as to various locations. At the hearing, Pulse did not contend that the circuit court was mistaken that Pulse's testimony concerned the photographs that Aku had taken. If, as the court's uncontested statements suggest, the photographs that Aku had taken were the ones that were subsequently admitted, Pulse has no legitimate complaint. Moreover, even if the photographs that were admitted were not the photographs that Aku had taken, in light of Pulse's testimony that the photographs that were admitted fairly and accurately depict[ed] the scene, the court's failure to consider Aku's photographs could not have been error. In this context, we agree with the following argument made by the prosecution: [I]f the investigator's pictures looked the same [as the photographs that were admitted], they were cumulative of [those] pictures. If the investigator's pictures looked different, they were inadmissible because they did not depict the scene as it looked at the time of the offense.