Opinion ID: 1869912
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MPCA's Interpretation of the Regulation

Text: When the language of a regulation is unclear or susceptible to different interpretations, we consider several factors to determine the level of judicial deference afforded to the agency's interpretation. Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 513-16. First, we consider the nature of the regulation at issue. See id. at 513. Clearly, the MPCA is responsible for administering and enforcing the regulation and, therefore, it is the agency's own regulation. See id. (concluding that a federal CWA regulation administered and enforced by the MPCA is the MPCA's own regulation). Second, we consider the agency's expertise and judgment; specifically, we examine whether the subject matter of the regulation is within the agency's technical training, education, and experience. Id. at 514; see also Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Minn.2002). It is undisputed that establishing effluent limits under Option A to protect and restore the waters of this state involves a subject matter uniquely within the agency's expertise and special knowledge. Third, we will defer to the agency's expertise and special knowledge when the agency's interpretation of an unclear regulation is reasonable. Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 515. Thus, we consider whether the MPCA's interpretation of the regulation is reasonable under the circumstances of this case.  Id. at 522 (emphasis in original). The MPCA argues that Option A does not categorically ban reissuing an NPDES permit until the lake is restored, but rather gives the agency flexibility to restore the lake to water quality standards and its designated uses within a reasonable period of time. Specifically, the agency argues that the regulation gives it flexibility to establish interim effluent limits that will apply until the TMDL process is completed. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; Surface Water Toxics Control Program, 54 Fed.Reg. 23868, 23876 (June 2, 1989) ([O]ption A gives the states maximum flexibility in developing water quality-based effluent limits for pollutants for which the state has not adopted a water quality criterion.). We conclude that the agency properly applied its technical judgment and expertise in concluding that Option A does not categorically ban reissuing an NPDES permit under these circumstances. In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992), the United States Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation involving a waterbody that was already impaired. The Court held that the CWA authorized the EPA to issue an NPDES permit that allows a new Arkansas sewage treatment plant to discharge effluent into the Illinois River, even though the river was already in violation of existing water quality standards. Id. at 107-08, 112 S.Ct. 1046. In doing so, the Court concluded that the CWA vests the EPA and the States with broad authority to develop long-range, area-wide programs to alleviate and eliminate existing pollution. Id. at 108, 112 S.Ct. 1046. The Court reasoned: [I]t might be wise to prohibit any discharge into the Illinois River, even if that discharge would have no adverse impact on water quality. But it was surely not arbitrary for the EPA to concludegiven the benefits to the river from the increased flow of relatively clean water and the benefits achieved in Arkansas by allowing the new plant to operate as designedthat allowing the discharge would be even wiser. It is not our role, or that of the Court of Appeals, to decide which policy choice is the better one, for it is clear that Congress has entrusted such decisions to the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at 114, 112 S.Ct. 1046. According to the MPCA, Option A gives the agency considerable discretion in deriving numeric effluent limits that meet narrative standards, particularly when the federal regulation expressly allows the state agency to derive the effluent limits using state policies and regulations that interpret the narrative water quality standard. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(vi)(A). In this case, the applicable narrative water quality standard provides for no material increase in undesirable slime growths or aquatic plants, including algae in Lake Winona. Minn. R. 7050.0150, subp. 3. To derive the effluent limits in the permit, the agency applied an explicit state policy and regulationthe MPCA's phosphorus rule, which requires that [w]here the discharge of effluent is directly to or affects a lake or reservoir, phosphorus removal to one milligram per liter shall be required. Minn. R. 7050.0211, subp. 1a. More important, the rule also requires that removal of nutrients from all wastes shall be provided to the fullest practicable extent wherever sources of nutrients are considered to be actually or potentially detrimental to preservation or enhancement of the designated water uses. Id. In applying the phosphorus rule, the MPCA determined that phosphorus removal to the fullest practicable extent requires a permit limit of 0.30 mg/L after the facility is fully operational and before the TMDL study is completed. Once the TMDL study is completed in 2009, the agency will have the numeric limits necessary to develop a TMDL implementation plan that will restore the Lake Winona watershed. The MPCA points out that the permit limit of 0.30 mg/L maximum phosphorus concentration discharge is three times more stringent than the existing ALASD permit and is the most stringent limit the agency has ever imposed on a wastewater treatment facility. Further, the permit reduces the daily mass load limit for phosphorus from the 11.3 kilograms allowed in the previous permit to 5.4 kilograms. The modeling study confirms that the effluent limits comply with the applicable narrative water quality standard and protect the lake against any further degradation until the TMDL study is completed. Finally, the final permit requires the ALASD facility to comply with new phosphorus limits established in the TMDL study and implementation plan. We conclude that the agency reasonably interpreted and applied Option A when it reissued the permit to the ALASD facility. The phosphorus limit in the permit was based on several scientific and policy judgments, including the MPCA's determination of the fullest practicable extent of phosphorus removal for the ALASD facility under the phosphorus rule and whether the effluent limits will achieve water quality standards using scientific lake modeling. Given the central importance of TMDLs in restoring impaired waters under the CWA, the MPCA reasonably interpreted the regulation as giving the agency flexibility to establish more stringent phosphorus limits under the MPCA's phosphorus rule during the interim period while the TMDL study is underway and then to establish new limits in the TMDL implementation plan. The interim phosphorus limits in the permit will adequately control phosphorus in the lake until the TMDL study and implementation plan is completed. The MCEA's suggestion that the effluent limits in the reissued permit must fully restore Lake Winona within the span of the five-year NPDES permit is neither realistic nor supported by the regulatory scheme. [11] Although the MCEA contends that the phosphorus limits in the permit are not stringent enough, we defer to the MPCA's technical knowledge and expertise in calculating the specific numeric water quality criteria under 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(vi)(A). In accordance with this regulation, the effluent limits were derived from explicit state policies and regulations, and the MPCA's modeling study confirms that the phosphorus entering Lake Winona will have no measurable impact on algal conditions. [12] Therefore, we uphold the MPCA's interpretation and application of the regulation. We recognize that any additional phosphorus discharge by the ALASD facility into the lake will, ipso facto, delay restoring the lake to water quality standards. But the MPCA needs the results of the TMDL study to determine the proper long-term effluent limits for phosphorus that will ultimately restore the lake. Once the TMDL study is completed in 2009, the MPCA must develop a TMDL implementation plan that will potentially reduce the phosphorus limit in the permit as part of its overall strategy to restore the waterbody. The results of the TMDL study and the reasonableness of the TMDL implementation plan are not the subject of this appeal and, therefore, we decline to address them. Although the dissent concludes there is no ambiguity in the words will attain and maintain applicable narrative water criteria and will fully protect the designated use in the regulation, the dissent does not explain these words in contextspecifically, it does not explain how quickly water quality standards for a severely impaired lake such as Lake Winona must be attained when the TMDL process is already underway. Notably, the dissent does not adopt the MCEA's position that no permit can be issued unless the phosphorus concentration in the lake will be reduced to a level that will restore the lake to its designated uses. Instead, acknowledging that restoring Lake Winona will be a long and difficult task, the dissent simply concludes that the MPCA has not done enough. In doing so, the dissent implicitly substitutes its judgment for that of the MPCA in terms of what is enough and how quickly the lake must be restored to satisfy the regulation. The dissent asserts that the MPCA is delaying setting stringent effluent limits until after the TMDL process is completed, but the 0.30 mg/L phosphorus concentration limit in the reissued permit is three times more stringent than the 1.0 mg/L limit in the previous permit, and the reissued permit limits the mass load of total phosphorus to 5.4 kg/d, which is half the 11.3 kg/d allowed under the previous permit. The dissent does not specify what further reductions in phosphorus concentration limits or mass load would have been enough. The .30 mg/L concentration limit is the most restrictive limit ever imposed by the MPCA and represents the fullest practicable extent of phosphorus removal the facility is capable of achieving. Further, the dissent's water quality analysis focuses exclusively on a potential increase in phosphorus levels in Lake Winona. The dissent assumes that there will be an increase in phosphorus levels; however, this assumption is based on the worst-case scenario projected by the MPCAthe ALASD facility operating at full wet weather flow all year long and always at the maximum concentration limit of .30 mg/La situation that an MPCA technical analyst described as not likely. Under more realistic operating conditions, the MPCA asserts that there likely will be a net reduction of phosphorus in Lake Winona. Although the dissent takes little solace in the MPCA's determination that there will not be any dramatic increase in algal levels or decrease in secchi depth, the narrative water quality standard at issue requires that the MPCA consider not only changes in phosphorus levels, but also changes in chlorophyll-a levels and light transparency. See Minn. R. 7050.0150, subp. 3 (specifying no material increase in algae). The MPCA found that even with the expanded facility operating at the maximum proposed expanded effluent flow, there will be no change in chlorophyll-a levels or water clarity. Thus, in concluding that the MPCA has not complied with the narrative standard, the dissent essentially has rewritten the narrative standard to consider only phosphorus levels, disregarding the scientific and technical judgment of the agency. We do share the dissent's concerns about the consequences of delaying the restoration of impaired waters in Minnesota. Nonetheless, after careful consideration of the multiple factors relevant to our deference analysis, see Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 516, 525, we conclude that deference to the expertise of the MPCA is warranted under these circumstances.