Opinion ID: 22204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Williams's Cage-Victor Claim

Text: 29 We note in passing that even if Cage and Victor apply retroactively to Williams's petition, it is indeed doubtful that claim would succeed because the instruction at his trial does not appear to have exhibited the same constellation of factors that rendered the instruction in Cage constitutionally defective. The instruction given to the jury at Williams's trial contained three traditionally suspect terms, grave uncertainty, actual or substantial doubt, and moral certainty, as well as the additional qualifier, known as an articulation requirement, which equates a reasonable doubt with a serious doubt for which you could give a good reason. 30 At the outset, we note that we would not consider whether the articulation requirement might have corrupted the reasonable doubt instruction because the Supreme Court has never expressed disfavor with such language. See Muhleisen, 168 F.3d at 844 n.2. As explained above, AEDPA only allows us to apply Supreme Court rulings, not our own rulings, such as Humphrey I and II, which perceived Due Process problems with that phrase. Id. 31 Regarding the other three phrases, the state trial court's use of grave uncertainty and actual or substantial doubt is materially indistinguishable from the instruction in Cage. 8 By contrast, the moral certainty phrase and its surrounding context bear a stronger resemblance to the constitutionally permissible instructions in Victor. In Cage, the moral certainty phrase stated that [w]hat is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty. Cage, 111 S.Ct. at 329 (emphasis in original). In this case, the moral certainty phrase providesthat a reasonable doubt is one that would make you feel that you had not an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt. Victor considered two similar phrases 9 and found that the context of both phrases-language which instructed the jurors that their conclusion had to be based on the evidence-did not suggest, as the instruction in Cage had done, that moral certainty, instead of or as distinguished from evidentiary sufficiency, might be enough to convict. See Victor, 114 S.Ct. at 1248, 1250-51. Similarly, the moral certainty phrase here was immediately preceded and followed by instructions that a reasonable doubt would spring from the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or if you find the evidence unsatisfactory upon any single point indisputably necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt. Moreover, only shortly before the jury was told that [e]ven where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, yet if it does not establish it beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit. 32 Without a defective moral certainty phrase, the other two phrases in and of themselves do not render the instruction constitutionally defective. See Muhleisen, 168 F.3d at 844 n.2 (noting that under Cage, these first two phrases only suggest a higher degree of guilt and need the third moral certainty to amount to a constitutional violation); see also Dupuy v. Cain, 201 F.3d 582, 586-87 (5th Cir. 2000) (denying successive petition and upholding instruction with only good reason articulation requirement and moral certainty phrase); Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 811-12 (5th Cir. 1998) (under AEDPA upholding instruction with grave uncertainty phrase and surrounding text that properly explained reasonable doubt standard); Brown v. Cain, 104 F.3d 744, 753-55 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); Schneider v. Day, 73 F.3d 610, 611-12 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (pre-AEDPA, upholding instruction with only moral certainty and actual and substantial doubt phrases). Based on our reading of Cage and Victor, as well as the fact that this case, in contrast to Humphrey I (see id. at 533) and II, was not even remotely close regarding Williams's guilt or innocence, we do not believe that Williams has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction unconstitutionally. Cf. Depuy, 201 F.3d at 587 (finding that where there is no serious question of guilt or innocence, as there was in Humphrey, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice from the instruction in order to avoid dismissal of his successive petition). In sum, even if we were to find that Cage and Victor apply retroactively to Williams's petition, it is indeed doubtful that Williams would prevail.