Opinion ID: 704021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable Partition.

Text: 71 The statute required the district court to partition lands in which the two tribes had a joint interest in 1934: 72 Any lands in which the Navajo and Hopi Tribes or Navajo or Hopi individuals are determined to have a joint or undivided interest shall be partitioned by the District Court on the basis of fairness and equity and the area so partitioned shall be retained in the Navajo Reservation or added to the Hopi Reservation respectively. 73 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-7(b). The district court partitioned about three quarters of the jointly held land to the Navajos, about one quarter to the Hopis. The Hopis argue that the partition should have been equal. The interpretation of 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-7(b) is a question of law reviewed de novo. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1222. The district court's partition decision, based on fairness and equity, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239, 244 (9th Cir.1978). 74 We reject the argument that the partition had to be equal. The Hopis argue that at common law, when property held by tenants in common is partitioned, the shares are equal. The partition at issue was on the basis of a statute, not common law. We also reject the argument that because jointly held land in the Hopi reservation was partitioned equally, so must land in the Navajo reservation. Congress had rejected the fair and equitable language for the Hopi Reservation partition which it adopted for the Navajo Reservation partition. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F.Supp. 125, 190-91 (D.Ariz.1962). The subsequent statutory provision for dividing jointly held land in the Hopi reservation was different from the one for the Navajo Reservation. See 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-5. 75 The Hopis argue that the district court gave the Navajos the benefit, in deciding upon a fair and equitable division, of areas the Navajos had settled in violation of the Bennett Freeze. (See Part II-E, infra). In principle, the Hopis are correct that it would not be fair and equitable to give the Navajos more land based on their own wrongdoing. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Henry L. McClintock, McClintock on Equity 59 (1948). We are unable to conclude, however, that the district court awarded any more of the jointly held lands to the Navajos than it would have awarded absent the freeze violations that occurred, or that any of the award to the Navajos results from freeze violations. The district court concluded that most of the Navajo sites [violating the Bennett Freeze] fall within the areas where Navajo families have been since before 1966 [the implementation date of the pre-statutory Bennett Freeze].... Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1416. The district court would have given those areas to the Navajos even if the homesites had not been built. Only three new homesites, as opposed to improvements at preexisting homesites, violated the freeze, so the effect on the partition was de minimis in any event. 76 We agree with the district court that the statutory term fairness and equity does not mean that jointly held lands must be equally divided between the two tribes. The statute says the partition must be based on fairness and equity, not equal division between the two tribes. Equality between tribes would be capable of arithmetic precision, but fairness and equity is necessarily discretionary. Fairness and equity require that each tribe have its due, not that each have an equal share, and equal shares awarded to parties unequal in relevant respects would be unjust. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Chapter 6. The district court considered five factors to determine a fair partition, four of which are principles justifying modification of an equal division: 77 The partition line takes a number of factors into account, including (1) avoiding the relocation of individuals, (2) avoiding the disruption of grazing areas as much as possible, (3) providing 50% of the joint use area acreage to the Hopi Tribe, to the extent possible, (4) fairly and equitably distributing water sources, and (5) ensuring the feasibility of future administration of the partitioned areas, including fencing. 78 Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1418. Considering the broad discretion in the district court implied by the statutory phrase, shall be partitioned by the District Court on the basis of fairness and equity, we cannot conclude that the use of any of these factors amounted to an abuse of discretion. 79 The district court said the most important factor is avoiding the relocation of individuals. Id. It adjusted the partition so that every Navajo homesite is located on land partitioned to the Navajo Nation and every Hopi home and ranch site is located on land partitioned to the Hopi Tribe. Id. While the statute does not compel this result, the district court had discretion so to adjust the division, so long as the adjustments did not otherwise cause the division to be inequitable. 80 The Hopis argue that the district court gave too much weight, in deciding where Navajos were located and should not be displaced, to seasonal locations. 81 Many Navajos ... live part-time in Tuba City (or other towns on the Reservation) and part-time (generally weekends and summers) at their homesites. This part-time use of the homesites is important to these people; often many generations have lived at these homesites (or sites close by within a customary use area), and their periodic return is necessary for conducting livestock operations. Thus, the Court will attempt, as much as is possible, to place full-time and part-time residences of Navajos on land partitioned to the Navajo Nation. 82 Id. at 1414 (emphasis in original). Consideration of this extent of use was not an abuse of discretion. 83 We are unable to conclude that the district court's partition of the joint use land was so unfair or inequitable as to amount to an abuse of discretion. We affirm. 84