Opinion ID: 2759760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Chapter 934 and the Recordings

Text: Whether the provisions of chapter 934, Florida Statutes, apply to the recordings at issue in this case—where the facts relevant to the recordings are undisputed—is a question of statutory interpretation. “Judicial interpretations of statutes are pure questions of law subject to de novo review.” Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305, 1310 (Fla. 2012) (citing State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 841 (Fla. 2007)). “In construing this statute, this Court must give the ‘statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,’ and is not ‘at liberty to add words . . . that were not placed there by the Legislature.’ ” Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 528 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001); Hayes v. State, -8- 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999)). “Where the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction to determine and effectuate legislative intent.” Johnson, 78 So. 3d at 1310 (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009)). Section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (2010), contains a general prohibition on the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communications. Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2010), defines the term “oral communication” for purposes of chapter 934 as “any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” Section 934.03(2), Florida Statutes (2010), contains a list of specific exceptions to the general prohibition in section 934.03(1). One of these exceptions is for situations in which all parties to the conversation have consented. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). None of the exceptions allow for the interception of conversations based on one’s status as the victim of a crime. The State does not argue that any of the exceptions listed in section 934.03(2) are applicable in this case. Section 934.06 provides that the contents of any improperly intercepted communication may not be used as evidence: -9- Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision thereof, if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter. The prohibition of use as evidence provided in this section does not apply in cases of prosecution for criminal interception in violation of the provisions of this chapter. This Court analyzed these statutory provisions in State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978). In Walls, “the alleged victim of extortionary threats, electronically recorded a conversation” between himself and the defendants. Id. at 295. The Court concluded that the recording was inadmissible under section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975). The Court explained: We agree with the trial court that an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in the victim’s home is an “oral communication” within the definition of Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1975); that pursuant to Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the electronic recording of such “oral communication” without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited; and that Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), expressly prohibits the use of such electronic recording as evidence. The subject electronic recording did not fall within any of the situations permitting interception delineated in Section 934.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), contains no exception to the prohibition against use of the illegally intercepted wire or oral communication as evidence. Id. at 296. Similarly, under the definition of oral communication provided by section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2010), McDade’s conversations with his stepdaughter - 10 - in his bedroom are oral communications. The facts related to the recorded conversations support the conclusion that McDade’s statements were “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that [his] communication [was] not subject to interception” and that McDade made those statements “under circumstances justifying” his expectation that his statements would not be recorded. § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). The recordings were made surreptitiously. McDade did not consent to the conversations being recorded, and none of the other exceptions listed in section 934.03(2) apply. The recordings, therefore, were prohibited. Because the recordings impermissibly intercepted oral communications, the recordings are inadmissible under section 934.06, Florida Statutes (2010). The facts of Inciarrano are in important ways different from those in both Walls and the instant case. In Inciarrano, the trial court had determined that the “statements were not made under circumstances justifying an expectation to privacy,” based on factual circumstances including “the quasi-public nature of the premises within which the conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to bystanders, and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone used to record the conversations.” 473 So. 2d at 1274. Thus, the recording was made in the victim’s place of business—a “quasipublic” place—and the recording device was visible. In addition, the recording contained sounds of the crime that were not “oral communications.” Arguably, the - 11 - recording was admitted at trial not for the “contents” of any “oral communications.” The recording simply revealed the presence of the defendant— from the sound of his voice—and the sounds that accompanied the commission of the crime—that is, “five shots being fired . . . several groans by the victim, the gushing of blood, and the victim falling from his chair.” Id. Conversely, the recordings at issue in this case were made in McDade’s bedroom, the recording device was hidden under the stepdaughter’s shirt, and the recordings contain conversations between McDade and his stepdaughter. Because of the differences in the location, visibility of the recording device, and content of the recordings at issue in Inciarrano, it presented a set of circumstances that are starkly different from those present here. The reasoning of Inciarrano turns, however, on the Court’s conclusion that any subjective expectation of privacy that Inciarrano had was unjustified because it was not an expectation “that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. at 1275. In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the fact that Inciarrano went to the victim’s office “to do him harm” and on Inciarrano’s resulting status as a “trespasser.” Id. The holding of Inciarrano thus is a narrow holding based on the view that a trespasser cannot have a justified expectation that his utterances in the premises where he trespasses are not subject to interception. Cf. United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that defendant who had - 12 - previously been evicted from residence had “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence”); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that defendant who squatted in a vacant house “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of having stayed a week in the vacant premises that he did not own or rent”); United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding trespassing defendant “lacked the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in the premises required to challenge the search”); United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant who occupied motel room that was not registered to defendant or someone he was sharing it with lacked a “legitimate expectation of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment in the motel room). Inciarrano therefore is not based on a general rule that utterances associated with criminal activity are by virtue of that association necessarily uttered in circumstances that make unjustified any expectation that the utterances will not be intercepted. Nor can the holding in Inciarrano be used as a basis for the decision reached by the Second District, which turns on McDade’s status as a person engaged in crimes involving the sexual abuse of a child. We thus do not understand the references in Inciarrano to “whether society is prepared to recognize [an expectation of privacy] as reasonable” to provide a basis for either - 13 - such a general rule or the view adopted by the Second District. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1275. The whether-society-is-prepared-to-recognize formulation has its genesis in