Opinion ID: 221079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability Of The Discretionary Function Exception

Text: We review de novo the dismissal of a FTCA suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the discretionary function exception. See Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir.2008). We review determinations of underlying facts for clear error. Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir.2005).
The FTCA waives the government's sovereign immunity for tort claims arising out of the negligent conduct of government employees acting within the scope of their employment. Among the exceptions to that waiver is the discretionary function exception, which provides immunity from suit for any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The discretionary function exception insulates certain governmental decisionmaking from `judicial second guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.' Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129 (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)). The government bears the burden of proving that the discretionary function exception applies. GATX/Airlog Co. v. United States, 286 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.2002); see also Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir.2005) (same). The two-prong test to determine the applicability of the exception requires the court to determine (1) whether challenged actions involve an element of judgment or choice; and (2) if a specific course of action is not specified, whether the discretion left to the government is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield, namely, actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129 (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988)). The first-prong inquiry looks at the `nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor' and the discretionary element is not met where `a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.' Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954). If there is such a statute or policy directing mandatory and specific action, the inquiry comes to an end because there can be no element of discretion when an employee `has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.' Id. On the other hand, if there is no statute or policy directing mandatory and specific action, the court must continue to the second prong of the analysis. Id. The second prong requires the court to determine whether the discretion left to the government is the kind of discretion protected by public policy, which is understood to include decisions grounded in social, economic, or political policy. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the decision is an abuse of the discretion granted, the exception will apply. Id.

Myers argues that there are two sources of mandatory and specific action in this case: The Manual provision requiring the Navy to review HASPs and the FFA provision requiring the project QAO to ensure that all work is performed in accordance with approved work plans, sampling plans, and QAPPS. The Navy argues that neither source imposed sufficiently specific requirements to divest the Navy of its discretion. i. Manual provisions. On appeal, Myers asserts that the Manual required that the HASP be reviewed by the Navy's CIH or similar competent person, not just by an employee of the contractor. The Navy argues that the provision of the Manual on which Myers relies does not specify how any review of the HASP was to be conducted and was not specific enough to remove discretion. The Navy also contends that the HASP was reviewed by the contractor's CIH. The district court made no findings on this issue. The relevant provision in the Manual, ¶ 0407.c, uses the unambiguously mandatory shall in stating the requirement for review of HASPs by a competent person. A competent person is defined as a CIH or equivalent by training and/or experience. The preceding provision in the Manual specifies that [e]ach NAVFACENGCOM activity shall ensure that plans are reviewed and accepted prior to issuing the Notice to Proceed. Manual, ¶ 0407.b. Because the NAVFACENGCOM is the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and this provision is also cast in the unambiguously mandatory terms shall ensure, this provision imposed upon the Navy itself a mandatory and specific duty to ensure that plans were reviewed and accepted. See Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129. In short, read in conjunction, paragraphs 0407.b and 0407.c of the Manual required review of HASPs by the Navy's competent person. No meaningful review  and certainly no meaningful review by the Navy  would be accomplished by having a contractor's CIH review the contractor's own HASP, particularly if the contractor's CIH is also the author of the contractor's HASP, as is the case here. This federal ... policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow, review by the Navy of a contractor's HASP by a competent person, such that the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. Thus, the Manual specifically prescribes a course of conduct, leaving nothing to the Navy's discretion. See Kelly v. United States, 241 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir.2001). The provision is not so uncertain in its definition of the requisite training of the person conducting the review that it is discretionary. Rather, the provision expressly requires review by a certified industrial hygienist [(CIH)] or equivalent by training and/or experience. Manual, ¶ 0407.c. (emphasis added). This specification of equivalence to a CIH by training and/or experience is sufficiently specific to define the requisite training of the person conducting the review. Although some professional judgment might be involved in deciding whether or not a particular person actually is the equivalent of a CIH by training and/or experience, that professional judgment is not the same as discretion. Moreover, in Bolt v. United States, 509 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2007), this court found that a comparable policy provision was sufficiently mandatory and specific to make the discretionary function exception inapplicable. In Bolt, this court held that the Army's Snow Removal Policy was sufficiently specific and mandatory to avoid application of the discretionary function exception, where it required that snow be removed from family housing parking areas once per year in late February or March. Bolt, 509 F.3d at 1032-33. This court found that this provision expressly impose[d] a specific and mandatory duty to clear Family Housing Parking Areas of snow and ice once a year, before the end of March, so that the Army had failed its burden under the first prong of the discretionary function analysis. Id. at 1033. This was so, even though the policy did not specify how the snow was to be removed or the training or qualifications of the person to perform the snow removal. See also Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944 (9th Cir.2000). Even supposing that the Navy had some discretion in the fulfillment of its duty to review HASPs, it had no discretion under the policy expressed in the Manual about whether or not to review the HASP at all and no discretion for such a review to be performed by anyone other than a Navy CIH or other competent person. Therefore, upon de novo review, we hold that the district court erred in determining that the Navy had met its burden on the first prong of the discretionary function analysis, because the Manual did impose mandatory and specific, requirements for review by the Navy of the contractor's HASP. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129. [4] Because the Manual directed mandatory and specific action, the inquiry comes to an end because there can be no element of discretion when an employee `has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive,' and the discretionary function exception is inapplicable. Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954). [5] ii. FFA provisions. Myers also argues that the FFA included mandatory and specific provisions regarding the Navy's obligation to ensure that safety procedures were followed. Specifically, she relies on the provision of the FFA requiring the Navy to designate a QAO to oversee field work and to ensure compliance with work plans and sampling plans. FFA, ¶ 20.1. The Navy contends that this provision did not specifically describe how the QAO was to ensure compliance with work or safety plans, nor did it remove discretion to delegate certain functions to the contractor. The district court did address this dispute, at least in its 2004 ruling on the Navy's motion to dismiss: The district court held that the FFA did not create any mandatory duty, because it did not specify how the Navy would carry out its duty to supervise. In its ruling on the first phase of the bench trial, the district court did not specifically address the FFA provisions at issue. The district court did conclude, however, that the evidence showed that Defendant made policy-based decisions regarding discretionary questions of whether to do the remediation work at all, and whether to do the work itself  or select a contractor. The FFA provision at issue, like the Manual provision discussed above, uses mandatory language: The QAO  will ensure that all work is performed in accordance with approved work plans, sampling plans and QAPPS and  shall maintain for inspection a log of quality assurance field activities and provide a copy to the Parties upon request. FFA, ¶ 20.1 (emphasis added). Again, these provisions specifically prescribe[] a course of action for an employee [the QAO] to follow, such that the employee [the QAO] has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. Unlike the provisions of the Manual discussed above, however, the first provision, at least, does not indicate what the [Navy] must do to comply with the QAO's duty to ensure that all work is performed in accordance with work and sampling plans. Thus, it does leave that aspect to the government's discretion. The second provision, which undisputably requires that the QAO maintain a log, also is not sufficiently specific as to what must be logged as a quality assurance field activity. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the cited provisions of the FFA are discretionary. Thus, at least as to the FFA provisions upon which Myers relies, the court must proceed to the second prong of the discretionary function inquiry. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129.
Even if neither the Manual provisions or the FFA provisions on which Myers relies mandates a specific course of action, that is not the end of the discretionary function analysis. Instead, the court must then consider, in the second prong of the discretionary function inquiry, whether the judgment left to the agency is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield, that is, governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129. The district court held that the evidence showed that Defendant made policy-based decisions regarding discretionary questions of whether to do the remediation work at all, and whether to do the work itself  or select a contractor. The district court apparently also concluded that the Navy made policy-based decisions about requirements for experience and training of key employees of the contractor, the frequency and degree of oversight by Navy employees, and the involvement of other federal agencies. Myers argues that, once the Navy undertook responsibility for the safety of the project, the execution of that responsibility was not subject to the discretionary function exception, because execution of safety standards is not susceptible to a policy analysis. The Navy argues that the government's discretionary oversight of a contractor, even of the contractor's compliance with safety standards, is immune from tort suit by virtue of the discretionary function exception and that the Navy never took on the responsibility of approving every step of every action of its remediation contractor, but instead relied on its contractor's expertise. This court must determine whether the work of remediation of contaminated soil would involve protected policy judgments. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1133. Specifically, [t]he focus of our inquiry is `on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.' Id. (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991)). [I]t is therefore `insufficient for the government to show merely that some choice was involved in the decision-making process. The balancing of policy considerations is a necessary prerequisite.' Bolt, 509 F.3d at 1033 (quoting ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 194 (9th Cir.1987), with alterations and internal quotation marks omitted by the Bolt court). As explained in Terbush, [t]he decision to adopt safety precautions may be based in policy considerations, but the implementation of those precautions is not.... Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is a recognized exception: The implementation of a government policy is shielded where the implementation itself implicates policy concerns, such as where government officials must consider competing firefighter safety and public safety considerations in deciding how to fight a forest fire. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This case falls within the general rule, not the exception. The district court's conclusion that the Navy's decision about whether or not to pursue the remediation project at all was a discretionary one informed by public policy considerations misses the point, even if it were correct, where Camp Pendleton was on the EPA's National Priorities List of sites requiring environmental cleanup. Because [t]he focus of our inquiry is on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis, id. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted), we look at the nature of the actions in conducting the remediation project, not the decision to undertake the remediation project. With the focus properly on the conduct of the remediation project, it is well to remember that matters of scientific and professional judgment  particularly judgments concerning safety  are rarely considered to be susceptible to social, economic, or political policy. Whisnant, 400 F.3d at 1181; Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1214. More specifically, this court has held that implementation of a course of action is not a discretionary function. Id. Thus, while the Navy contends that its determinations about how much safety oversight was required were susceptible to policy considerations, those determinations properly fell within the scope of professional judgments about implementation of the safety plan that were not susceptible to public policy considerations. This case is similar in all important respects to Bear Medicine. What is at issue here, as in Bear Medicine, is not just a general statutory obligation to promote safety, but a failure to effectuate policy choices already made that are not protected under the discretionary function exception. See Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1215 (quoting Camozzi v. Roland/Miller and Hope Consulting Group, 866 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir.1989)). Even if the Navy did have discretion in its monitoring of IT/OHM's actions, the Navy's actions in carrying out its responsibilities were not protected policy judgments. Id. In other words, once the[Navy] ha[d] undertaken responsibility for the safety of [the OU-3] project, the execution of that responsibility [wa]s not subject to the discretionary function exception, and [t]he decision to adopt safety precautions may be based in policy considerations, but the implementation of those precautions is not. Id. Like the government's argument in Bear Medicine, the Navy's argument here `would essentially allow the Government to administratively immunize itself from tort liability under applicable state law as a matter of `policy.'' Id. (quoting McGarry v. United States, 549 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1976)). The Navy's attempts to distinguish Bear Medicine are unavailing. First, the Navy asserts that Bear Medicine is distinguishable, because the agency in that case retained for itself the responsibility to regularly inspect the work (the logging) to ensure adherence to basic safety practices, but the Navy did not do so here. This assertion is simply wrong, and any such finding is clearly erroneous, because it is without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Manual retained the Navy's responsibility to review HASPs, and the FFA required the Navy's QAO to ensure that all work was performed in accordance with approved work and sampling plans and to maintain for inspection a log of quality assurance field activities. Thus, in this case, as in Bear Medicine, the Navy was required to ensure that the contractor complied with the safety provisions of the contract. Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1217. Like the BIA's failure in Bear Medicine, the Navy's failure to have IT/OHM's HASP reviewed by the Navy's own CIH or other competent person and the failure of the Navy's QAO to inspect any air monitoring were not policy judgments that Congress intended to protect from FTCA liability. Id. The Navy also contends that Bear Medicine is distinguishable, because here, unlike the BIA in that case, the Navy presented evidence that policy factors influenced its conduct, including the efficient allocation of agency resources and the need to rely on the contractor's expertise, because the Navy was not the organization with the required expertise. That argument is also unavailing, however. This court in Bear Medicine in fact rejected a contention that limited resources was a policy-based excuse for failure to adhere to accepted professional standards, id. at 1216-17, and it is no better as a policy-based excuse for failure to adhere to policy manual and contractual requirements. Thus, the Navy has also failed to carry its burden on the second prong of the discretionary function analysis.
Upon de novo review, we find that the Navy failed to establish either prong of the discretionary function exception. Therefore, we reverse the district court's determinations that Myers's FTCA claim against the Navy is barred by the discretionary function exception and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that claim.