Opinion ID: 2606242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the State avoid liability because its action was in response to an emergency?

Text: The State argues that no liability should be imposed on it because the breach destroyed the canal to avert an overwhelming destruction of property. Colman argues, however, that that principle only applies when the plaintiff's property would have been destroyed by the emergency condition irrespective of the governmental action. Colman correctly states that many of the cases involve situations where the plaintiff's property would have been destroyed by the emergency even if there had been no governmental action. See United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149, 44 S.Ct. 264, 265, 68 L.Ed. 608 (1924). Colman argues that the emergency created by the higher lake waters did not affect the operation of the canal. However, the trial court must determine whether Colman's canal would have been in danger without the breach. Other cases dealing with emergencies and eminent domain can be distinguished because they involve questions of proper regulation and the use of the police power as discussed above. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928); Teresi v. State, 180 Cal. App.3d 239, 225 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1986). These cases do not involve a direct physical taking, as is alleged in this case. However, all of the cases dealing with this emergency doctrine cannot be distinguished on these bases. The State argues correctly that in some cases there is no liability where property is destroyed by a governmental entity to prevent imminent public catastrophe. The privilege to take or damage private property without compensation arises from the necessity of sacrificing some property to prevent overwhelming damage or loss of life. This privilege is based on the privilege of any individual to take immediate action that harms property so as to prevent loss of life or great destruction of property. City of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 65 (S.D. 1978). This exception to the general requirement of just compensation for property taken is explained in 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 1.43[1] and 1.43[2]: More closely allied to the power of eminent domain is the power of destruction from necessity. In the case of fire, flood, pestilence or other great public calamity, when immediate action is necessary to save human life or to avert an overwhelming destruction of property, any individual may lawfully enter another's land and destroy his property, real or personal, providing he acts with reasonable judgment. ... . If the individual who enters and destroys private property happens to be a public officer whose duty it is to avert an impending calamity, the rights of the owner of the property to compensation are no greater than in the case of a private individual. The most familiar example of the exercise of this right is seen in case of fire. The neighbors and fireman freely trespass on the adjoining land, and houses are even blown up to prevent the spread of the conflagration. The danger of flood or the existence of a pestilence may call for equally drastic action. However, the permanent appropriation of private property without the payment of compensation therefor cannot be justified under the power. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 1.43[1], 1.43[2], at 1-841 to 843 (3d ed. 1989) (footnotes omitted). This exception only applies where there is an extreme, imperative, or overwhelming necessity. Mere expediency is insufficient. Boland, 271 N.W.2d at 66. There must be circumstances of imminent necessity. Srb v. Board of County Comm'rs, 43 Colo. App. 14, 18, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979), cert. denied as improvidently granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980). This exception must be narrowly construed. Almost every act of taking property under the eminent domain powers involves some degree of public necessity. This exception could overcome the rule of just compensation if it is not limited to only the most extreme emergencies. In McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 P.2d 1097 (1957), this Court outlined how a governmental entity or any riparian owner could protect itself against extraordinary floods without liability: However, it is generally recognized that riparian owners may embank and protect their lands against the overflow of extraordinary floods, even though damage to the lands of others is caused thereby. An extraordinary flood is one which is not foreshadowed by the usual course of nature, and is of such a magnitude and destructiveness as could not have been anticipated or provided against by the exercise of ordinary foresight. McKell, 6 Utah 2d at 95-96, 305 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis in original). McKell involved an extraordinary flood. Here, it is a question of fact whether the rising water level constituted an extraordinary flood and whether there were otherwise circumstances of overwhelming necessity. These questions cannot be decided on the basis of the pleadings and will have to be decided at trial. Also involved in this case is the State's role in creating the emergency. Colman alleged that Southern Pacific is the owner of a right-of-way granted by the State over the bed of the lake for the construction of the causeway. It appears that the State played some role in the construction of the causeway, and the causeway seems to be the major factor in causing the emergency the State is now claiming. It is more difficult to find an emergency of overwhelming necessity when the State played a part in creating the circumstances causing the emergency. See McKell, 6 Utah 2d at 96-97, 305 P.2d at 1099-1100. Nichols on Eminent Domain makes clear that the permanent appropriation of property without compensation does not fit into this exception. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.43[2], at 1-843 (3d ed. 1989); see Short v. Pierce County, 194 Wash. 421, 435-36, 78 P.2d 610, 616 (1938). In this case, Colman alleges a permanent taking of his property. This is another question of fact for the trial court to determine. On remand, the trial court must determine whether the emergency exception applies in this instance. To fall within this exception, the trial court must find that the flooding created a situation of extreme, imperative, or overwhelming necessity. In addition, the exception is not applicable if the State played a foreseeable role in causing the emergency.