Opinion ID: 2804713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Delay Between Death Sentence and Execution

Text: Defendant contends the delay between his sentence and its execution attributable to the process of postconviction review violates the Eighth Amendment‘s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment as well as 37 international law. We have consistently rejected this claim and see no reason to reconsider our earlier precedents. ― ‗One under judgment of death does not suffer cruel and unusual punishment by the inherent delays in resolving his appeal. If the appeal results in reversal of the death judgment, he has suffered no conceivable prejudice, while, if the judgment is affirmed, the delay has prolonged his life.‘ ‖ (People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1037.) F. Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute Defendant raises a number of challenges to the death penalty statute we have consistently rejected. He fails to persuade us to reconsider our previous precedents. Thus we again conclude: ―The death penalty statute does not unconstitutionally fail to adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.‖ (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 468.) The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because it allows the jury to consider the circumstances of a defendant‘s crime under section 190.3, factor (a). (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 469.) The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional ―for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate penalty. [Citations.] ‗The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the presence of aggravating factors . . . . [Citation.]‘ [Citation.] The high court‘s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 do not change this result.‖ (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 723–724.) Moreover, defendant‘s constitutional rights were not violated by the absence of written findings by the jury regarding aggravating factors. (Id. at pp. 724–725.) 38 ―The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review.‖ (People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.) ― ‗At the penalty phase, the jury properly may consider a defendant‘s unadjudicated criminal activity and need not agree unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts.‘ ‖ (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207.) ― ‗The use of restrictive adjectives, such as ―extreme‖ and ―substantial,‖ in the statute‘s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it unconstitutional.‘ ‖ (People v. Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1207.) ―The court need not instruct the jury that mitigating factors can be considered only in mitigation, or to omit mitigating factors that do not apply to defendant‘s case.‖ (People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724.) ―Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California‘s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.‖ (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 295.) Consequently, the law is not unconstitutional for failing to require jurors to agree on what facts are true or important, or what aggravating circumstances apply, or to articulate reasons for selecting a death sentence. (People v. McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 1110–1111.) ―The death penalty as applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional through operation of international law and treaties.‖ (People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 295.) G. Cumulative Error Defendant contends the cumulative weight of errors occurring at his trial— particularly the admission of the jailhouse letter, the instruction concerning motive 39 at the guilt phase, the granting of the fourth penalty trial, and imposition of limitations on family member testimony at the penalty phase, combined with the constitutional infirmities of the death penalty statute—require reversal of his convictions and sentence. We have rejected all these claims of error with the sole exception of his argument regarding limitations on family member testimony at the penalty phase where, assuming error, we found no prejudice. Accordingly, there is neither individual nor cumulative prejudice that requires reversal.