Opinion ID: 2382311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: testimony of dr. artie bates

Text: Appellant next challenges the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Artie Bates. Appellant's argument is twofold. First, he contends that the Commonwealth violated a discovery order by failing to provide all medical articles and research upon which Dr. Bates relied. Second, Appellant claims the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Bates's expert testimony. Dr. Bates conducted the medical exam on L.T. and documented in her report that L.T. still had a hymen. The report extensively delineated the physical findings and described in detail the characteristics of L.T.'s hymen. Dr. Bates concluded that her findings were indicative of sexual abuse. In accordance with the discovery order, the Commonwealth provided Appellant a copy of the report. Dr. Bates testified as both L.T.'s treating physician and an expert in the physical aspects of child sexual abuse cases, particularly involving young females. Dr. Bates stated that in addition to her general medical training, she had performed over two thousand pelvic exams on young women. She stated that although there is no recognized specialty in child sexual abuse in Kentucky, she had completed all available training and remained current on all publications and information available in the area. In addition, Dr. Bates testified that she participated in monthly review sessions with other physicians specializing in child sexual abuse cases. As such, the court qualified her as an expert. Dr. Bates testified as to the contents of her report and her conclusion that L.T. had been sexually abused despite the fact the hymen was still present. Over defense objection, she further stated that it was not uncommon for women who have had numerous sexual encounters to still have a hymen. In fact, Dr. Bates commented that approximately fifty percent of the sexually active women she examined retained a hymen. She stated that her opinion was based upon her experience with pelvic examinations, as well as extensive medical research she had studied. On cross-examination, Dr. Bates again referred to numerous studies which debunked the theory that the hymen is destroyed after the first sexual encounter. At no point during her testimony did the defense elicit the names of these studies or question their veracity and general acceptability. Appellant first contends that Dr. Bates's testimony should have been prohibited because the Commonwealth violated the discovery order when it failed to provide all of the research and literature she relied upon in stating her expert opinion. Appellant argues that this omission by the Commonwealth left him ill-prepared to counter Dr. Bates's testimony that sexual intercourse does not destroy the hymen. The Commonwealth points out that Appellant did not allege a discovery violation until his motion for new trial, and argues that this issue should be deemed unpreserved for review. Nonetheless, we do not find any merit in Appellant's claim. RCr 7.24(1)(b) requires, upon defense request, the disclosure of any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, that are known by the attorney for the Commonwealth to be in possession, custody or control of the Commonwealth. In conformity with this rule, the Commonwealth provided Appellant a copy of Dr. Bates's report. The studies referred to by Dr. Bates were not made in connection with the present case. Further, there is no requirement that an expert tender each and every article or study upon which an opinion is based. In fact, Kentucky Rule of Evidence 705 states, in part, that an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons thereof without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The Commonwealth was not required under either the discovery order or the criminal rules to provide Appellant with all of Dr. Bates's reading material. Moreover, we cannot accept Appellant's contention that he was unduly surprised by Dr. Bates's testimony. Her report clearly stated that L.T. had a hymen. Further, Dr. Bates concluded that the physical examination, in conjunction with the history L.T. provided, was indicative of sexual abuse. Reading the report in its entirety, Appellant could only have concluded that Dr. Bates was of the opinion that a female could engage in sexual intercourse and still have a visible hymen. It is further evident that Appellant was cognizant of Dr. Bates's testimony in that he presented an expert to rebut her opinion. Appellant also challenges the substance of Dr. Bates's testimony on the grounds that it did not satisfy the test set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Daubert provides that when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, the trial court must determine at a preliminary hearing whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The Daubert decision was based upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and overruled the prior standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). Kentucky Rule of Evidence 702 contains the same language as its federal counterpart, and provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. This Court adopted the Daubert analysis in Mitchell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 908 S.W.2d 100 (1995). The Mitchell opinion discusses the factors a lower court should consider in determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony, including whether the theory or technique can be tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review; whether it has been generally accepted; and the known or potential rate of error. Id. at 102. Having articulated that Kentucky follows the Daubert analysis for the admissibility of scientific evidence, we conclude that such analysis is not, in fact, triggered in this case. Daubert and Mitchell use the catch phrases expert scientific testimony, theory, technology, and methodology. Dr. Bates's testimony, on the other hand, concerned basic female anatomical findings. Her examinations did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories. Likewise, the research that Dr. Bates referred to involved the study of a female physical characteristic. Dr. Bates testified that the studies she relied upon were compilations of statistics derived from pelvic examinations of young females in various age groups. We discern nothing of a scientific nature to trigger the necessity of applying the Daubert analysis. In accordance with KRE 702, Dr. Bates was qualified as an expert based upon her knowledge, experience and training. Her testimony clearly assisted the trier of fact to understand a fact in issue, i.e., the presence of a hymen in a female who has been sexually active. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Bates's expert testimony.