Opinion ID: 200820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of request to proceed pro se

Text: We see no error in the denial of North's mid-trial request to proceed pro se. On the eleventh day of the trial, North requested that his trial counsel's representation be permitted to continue only until the close of the prosecution's case so that, thereafter, North could present his case in defense pro se. He explained that he wished to call and recall witnesses in order to pose questions and present theories with which his counsel disagreed. The court held a hearing on the request and engaged North in a lengthy colloquy anent the evidence and theories that he wished to present. The court also heard from North's counsel, counsel for co-defendant Monaghan, and the government. The court then rejected North's request. The controlling legal principles are clear: A district court has considerable discretion to grant or deny a request for self-representation that is not presented until trial is underway. . . But that discretion is not unbridled. It is improper for the court to deny the defendant the right to serve as his own attorney solely because of a perceived lack of legal dexterity. . . Rather, in the last analysis the court must balance the legitimate interests of the defendant in self-representation against the potential disruption of the proceedings already in progress. -19- United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 498 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-36 (1975) (observing that a defendant has an absolute right to self-representation when the right is asserted in a timely manner prior to trial). The trial judge's decision rejecting North's request expressly balanced a myriad of relevant factors including the complexity of the trial, the numerous delays and conferences that had already occurred, the likely further disruption that might be caused by granting the request, and the likely prejudice to the other parties. The court supportably found that the evidence that North wished to present on his own was remote, collateral and probably prejudicial to his own cause,4 whereas his defense lawyers are highly experienced and skilled, [and] have obviously devoted a great deal of time and effort to the case. In these circumstances, the court concluded that permitting North to change course in order to represent himself mid-trial would cause an intolerable disruption of the orderly process of the trial -- a disruption that outweighed any legitimate interest he might have in self-representation. For the same reason, the court also properly refused a narrower request to permit North to make his own closing argument. 4 Because this determination was unexceptionable, we also reject North's argument that he was deprived of his constitutional right to call witnesses in his own defense. -20- These rulings pass muster. As we said in similar circumstances: The reasonableness of this conclusion is scarcely open to question. District Courts have an institutional interest in avoiding the disruption of trial proceedings. To permit a defendant to switch roles near the halfway point of a complicated criminal trial runs an obvious risk of dislocating both the court's docket and the orderly progression on the trial. . . [and] . . . would have tended to prejudice the prosecution. Noah, 130 F.3d at 498.