Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Alleged Penalty-Phase Errors

Text: With regard to the penalty phase, defendant raises two evidentiary points. The first concerns photographs of defendant, depicting him as a youth with his mother, at his prom, and at his wedding. Defendant's trial counsel, however, withdrew the photographs when the prosecutor objected to their admission. Consequently, the court never ruled on the admissibility of the photographs, and the issue is not preserved for this appeal. Defendant also objects to the trial court's refusal to allow him to admit the verified complaint filed in a divorce proceeding by Michael Eck's ex-wife, Maria Kuo-Eck. In those papers, Kuo-Eck, an Asian-American, alleged that Eck had engaged in a pattern of racist, verbal abuse against her, praised Adolf Hitler, and castigated people of Jewish, Asian, and African ancestry. Kuo-Eck's matrimonial attorney, William Buckman, represented co-defendant Bryant in Bryant's trial for the Eck murder. On learning that Buckman planned to use her complaint in defense of Bryant and defendant, Kuo-Eck filed a certification expressing her objection to such use. The trial court excluded the complaint, ruling that it was irrelevant because it did not tend to prove that at the time of the attack Eck had made any racist statements. The court also reasoned that, just as the prosecution is not permitted to submit evidence designed to build sympathy for the victim, defendant can't slander the victim in order to alienate the Jury. A defendant is permitted to offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(b). As relaxed as this standard may be, it does not provide for the automatic admission of all evidence a defendant offers. State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 623-24, 477 A. 2d 308 (1984). In its discretion, the court may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unfounded or speculative character or by the risk that it would cause confusion. Ibid. Generally, evidence of a victim's character is admissible only to a limited extent at the penalty phase. State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 47-48, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996) (allowing courts to limit victim-impact statements). The probative value of the complaint was so slight that it could not have had a substantial effect on the jury's penalty-phase deliberations. Thus, any error resulting from the exclusion of the papers was harmless. See Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 355-56, 680 A. 2d 677.
On appeal, defendant argues for the first time that the penalty-phase jury charge was fatally deficient in two respects. First, he notes that the court failed to define purpose when instructing the jury on the escaping apprehension aggravating factor. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f). Second, he contends that the charge failed to instruct the jury that it could not double-count evidence in support of multiple aggravating factors. Although the court did not define purpose in its instruction on the avoid apprehension factor, this omission was not plain error. See R. 2:10-2. Three days earlier, the court defined purpose six times in the guilt-phase charge. Cf. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 385, 700 A. 2d 306 (noting, in upholding penalty-phase charge that omitted definition of purpose, that purpose had been defined repeatedly during the guilt phase). In addition, the prosecutor discussed purpose in both his penalty-phase opening statement and summation. Cf. ibid. (noting defense counsel's discussion of purpose during penalty-phase summation). Given the repeated reference to and definitions of the terms, the jury almost certainly knew what `purpose' meant and presumably applied it faithfully during its penalty-phase deliberations. Id. at 385-86, 700 A. 2d 306. We find no error in the court's failure to instruct the jury not to double-count evidence in support of more than one aggravating factor. The court correctly informed the jury that its process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors was a qualitative one. The weighing process, the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors is not mechanical or numerical in nature. You do not count factors, you consider them qualitatively. The answers depend upon your exercise of careful and considered judgment. One aggravating factor may be found to outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt numerous mitigating factors. Similarly, many aggravating factors may be found not to outweigh a single mitigating factor. Essentially, it's a matter addressed to your human judgment as mature people. You make a decision based upon qualitative judgment as to what the appropriate penalty should be. When it's here, the prosecution uses the same evidence or some of the same evidence in seeking to prove multiple aggravating factors, and you found multiple aggravating factors have been proved by the same evidence. It's particularly important to remember that you may not simply compare the number of aggravating factors against the number of mitigating factors. Rather  remember that in such an instance you're considering the same facts more than once, because the same facts are being used to prove more than one aggravating factor. So, I think that is fairly sensible. You have to consider the factors, you don't in any way count the number of factors and compare three aggravating factors against three mitigating. It's a qualitative analysis. But if more than one aggravating factor is based upon the same facts, then you want to be aware that under these you only really need one set of facts, and it may mean that the aggravating factors have less weight than may otherwise be the case. The charge comports with our prior holding that the trial court should advise the jury that it should not simply compare the number of aggravating factors against the number of mitigating factors, that it is considering the same facts more than once, and that it should be cognizant that the same facts are being used to prove more than one aggravating factor. This result permits the jury to consider the evidence relevant to each aggravating factor, and should prevent it from giving undue weight to the number of factors when one aspect of the defendant's conduct supports multiple aggravating factors. [ Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 176, 548 A. 2d 887]. Properly instructed, the jury was not precluded from using the same evidence to find multiple aggravating factors. Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 287, 619 A. 2d 1208; Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 176, 548 A. 2d 887.
Defendant challenges the submission of the torture or depravity aggravating factor to the jury, arguing that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. See N.J.S.A. 3C:11-3c(4)(c) (The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim.). We disagree. Although the fact that Eck was stabbed twenty-four times by itself may not justify submission of this aggravating factor, see Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 138, 594 A. 2d 232, other evidence supported the conclusion that defendant inflict[ed] pain incremental to that attributable to the act of killing. Ibid. Specifically, the medical examiner testified that Eck had been stabbed in the genitals. Other testimony suggested that defendant inflicted these wounds for good measure. Cf. State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 389, 558 A. 2d 1259 (1989) ([M]ultiple stab wounds, when combined with other evidence of defendant's intent, could support the contention that defendant knew or intended that the victim would suffer....). We hold that defendant's intent to inflict pain additional to that of the murder itself can be inferred from the circumstances of this case. See Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 137, 594 A. 2d 232 (noting evidence of torture can be inferred from circumstances of the case); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 211 n. 38, 524 A. 2d 188 (noting that, in most cases, proof of torture or depravity factor will be totally circumstantial). Thus, it was not error for the court to submit this factor to the jury for consideration.