Opinion ID: 794524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interstate Commerce: the Hobbs Act Robbery

Text: 23 We are bound by Eighth Circuit precedent to hold that the present robbery interfered with interstate commerce as required to elevate the crime from a state offense to a federal offense under the Hobbs Act. In United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843-44 (8th Cir.1996), we held that an attempted armed robbery of a store belonging to a large interstate chain of stores comprised a Hobbs Act violation. There we stated, We have no doubt of the power of Congress to protect from violence businesses that are part of an interstate chain. Id. at 843. In that case, we distinguished United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), in which the Supreme Court relied on the Commerce Clause to invalidate a statute that prohibited the possession of a firearm near a school. We stated, We think [ Lopez ] has no application to cases of commercial establishments, such as the [interstate chain] store involved here. Farmer, 73 F.3d at 843. 24 Later in United States v. Vong, 171 F.3d 648, 654 (8th Cir.1999), we held that the robberies of several Twin Cities area jewelry stores interfered with interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act because the stores, bought and resold jewelry that was manufactured, in part, outside the State of Minnesota and shipped to the stores using interstate transportation channels. Id. In Vong, we emphasized the statement from Farmer that  Lopez does not apply to cases involving commercial establishments. Id. We further distinguished Lopez by noting the fact that the firearms statute in Lopez had no express jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce, id., whereas the Hobbs Act has an express nexus that requires the robbery to affect commerce. Id. 25 Finally, in United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 838-40 (8th Cir.2002), we upheld a Hobbs Act conviction for the armed robbery of a Cedar Rapids, Iowa, taxicab driver. In Williams, the evidence showed that the cab was locally owned by an individual and driven by another man. The individual cab owner paid for the use of a logo and dispatch service and bought insurance from an out-of-state company. The driver was responsible for the expenses of operation and had an interest in the fares. As noted therein, the cab frequently transported Federal Express employees, railroad crew members, and packages that were moving in interstate commerce. [The cab driver] also regularly transported passengers to and from the Eastern Iowa Airport. The robbery forced the cab to be shut down during the time when lucrative trips to the airport were likely to occur. Id. at 836. The actual issue we decided in Williams was whether it was harmless error to instruct the jury that the effect on interstate commerce may be merely probable or potential, not an actual effect. Id. at 837. We stated that the instruction was erroneous, because an actual rather than probable effect is required. We held, however, that the error was harmless because the substantial weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that there was an effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 838. 26 These three cases show that a commercial victim in a robbery need not be a large, interstate chain, as in Farmer, to trigger application of the Hobbs Act. Rather, as in Vong and Williams, robberies from small commercial establishments qualify as Hobbs Act violations so long as the commercial establishments deal in goods that move through interstate commerce. The defendants nevertheless argue that the present robbery of the stand-alone, mom and pop convenience store had only a de minimis connection to interstate commerce such that it should not be a federal crime. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (stating that one factor to consider in determining whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce is whether the connection between the activity and an effect on interstate commerce is too attenuated to permit federal regulation). We have recognized, however, that a statute with an express jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce may be applied in circumstances where the actual connection to interstate commerce is small. See United States v. Foster, 443 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir.2006) (`where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence') (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624); United States v. Mugan, 441 F.3d 622 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting a commerce clause challenge to federal child pornography convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(5)(B), both of which contain an express jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce). We must conclude that the present robbery involved a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to qualify as a Hobbs Act violation. 27 F. Dobbs's Possession or Use of the Firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924. 28 Dobbs was indicted and convicted of aiding and abetting on the gun counts. 5 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) defines principal to include persons who aid or abet others in the commission of an offense. Also, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) states, Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. By directing Wilson's actions during the robbery and therefore during the use of the gun, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) makes Dobbs punishable as a principal based on Wilson's possession and use of the gun. 29 G. Sentencing Issues: Wilson's Life Sentence under § 3559. 30 Turning to sentencing issues, the district court found that Wilson had two prior convictions for serious violent felon[ies] under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). One of the prior convictions was a 1998 Illinois burglary conviction under a statute that did not require proof that Wilson used violence, threats of violence, or possessed a weapon. The other was a 1992 Illinois armed robbery conviction. Wilson argues that the burglary conviction does not qualify as a serious violent felony under § 3559. We agree. 31 The government relies exclusively on precedent under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (violent felony) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (crime of violence) to argue that burglary is a serious violent felony under § 3559. These other provisions do not contain the specific term serious violent felony. They do expressly list burglary as a violent felony or crime of violence, respectively, but we can find no support for the proposition that Congress intended the separate term serious violent felony to be synonymous with crime of violence or violent felony. Further, we do not presume that Congress intended the modifier serious to be meaningless, as would be the case if we were to read § 924(e) as being coextensive with § 3559. 32 Most convincing on this point is the text of § 3559 itself. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A) expressly exempts from the definition of serious violent felony robberies that do not involve the use of a firearm or dangerous weapon. No similar exception exists under § 924(e)(2)(B) or U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), both of which clearly encompass robbery as a qualifying offense. Accordingly, § 3559 and these other provisions, on their faces, bear distinctions that militate against treating the three terms interchangeably. 33 This same exception demonstrates that Congress did not intend a burglary to be included within the definition of serious violent felony. The historical, common law definitions of robbery and burglary make robbery a more serious offense than burglary as robbery necessarily involves confrontation and the associated threats of violence or actual violence whereas burglary may occur without confrontation. Accordingly, it would run counter to the plain text of § 3559 to hold that Wilson's prior conviction under Illinois law for burglary without a firearm or dangerous weapon could satisfy the definition of serious violent felony when robbery without a dangerous weapon could not. Because the prior burglary conviction under Illinois law does not qualify as a serious violent felony, § 3559 and the mandatory life sentence under that section are inapplicable to Wilson.