Opinion ID: 2977492
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Michel Abboud’s Offense Level Calculation

Text: Michel Abboud first argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights because his sentence was based on facts not admitted by him or found by a jury. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred by increasing his offense level based on the amount of funds laundered when it was the district court that calculated the amount. In support of his argument, Defendant refers to Cunningham v. California, 547 U.S. 270 (2007). However, this Court has previously held that Cunningham did not alter our post-Booker decisions concerning the Sixth Amendment’s limitations on a district judge’s factfinding authority during sentencing. United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2008). Post-Booker, “district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, the district court did not mistakenly apply the Guidelines as mandatory. “Where, as here, the district court recognized the advisory nature of the guidelines, the increase in a defendant’s sentence based on facts not admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Conatser, 514 F.3d at 527. Defendant next argues that the district court erred in its calculation of the amount of funds laundered. The district court calculated the amount of funds laundered to be over $10 million. This is the amount of funds that were “bled” from the kite over the course of the check kiting scheme. Defendants used these funds to operate their business, in effect giving themselves a no-interest loan. This amount is independent from the amount of the bank fraud loss, which was calculated to be $2.3 million at the time the fraud was discovered. In determining the amount of funds laundered, the district court relied on the amounts contained in the money laundering counts of the indictment. The district court’s factual determination is supported by the trial testimony of Special Agent David Morgan, who identified the financial transactions in the money laundering counts, and established that the funds involved were derived from the check kiting scheme. Therefore, the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining the amount of funds laundered. Defendant further argues that the district court erred in denying Defendant’s request for an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Defendant had the burden of proving acceptance of responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Gilbert, 173 F.3d 974, 979 (6th Cir. 1999). The district court’s determination that Defendant failed to meet that burden should be reversed “only for clear error, and great deference is afforded the court’s determination in light of the credibility issues involved.” Id. The district court found that Defendant continued to assert his innocence, which did not entitle him to a departure for acceptance of responsibility. Because an expression of innocence is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, the district court’s determination was not clearly erroneous. Finally, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying him a departure under USSG § 5K2.0, for the case being outside of the heartland of the money laundering Guidelines. As part of the Guidelines calculation, the district court must determine whether a departure under Chapter 5 of the Guidelines is appropriate. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2006). This Court has previously held that a district court’s decision to deny a Guidelines-based departure is not subject to review in the narrow context of the advisory Guidelines calculation, so long as the district court was aware of its authority to do so. Id. In this case it is clear that the district judge was aware of this authority. Although the district court's denial of the downward departure is not reviewable in the above narrow context, Defendant’s sentence remains reviewable for reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 510 F.3d 593, 600 (6th Cir. 2007). We are not prevented from reviewing the district court’s failure to grant a non-Guidelines variance or the overall reasonableness of his sentence based on the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 370 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the district court’s decision to impose a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, see United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469-70 (2007), and because Defendant provides no valid reason to rebut the presumption, his argument is rejected. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Michel Abboud had an offense level of 30.