Opinion ID: 2508462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The definition of in a reckless manner as used in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes is well settled in our case law.

Text: The term in a reckless manner is not defined in either the vehicular homicide statute, RCW 46.61.520, or the vehicular assault statute, RCW 46.61.522. Nor is the term defined elsewhere in the Motor Vehicle Code. However, through a series of decisions by this court, a definition of the term in a reckless manner for purposes of the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes has evolved and is now well settled. This evolution culminated in our decision in State v. Bowman, 57 Wash.2d 266, 270, 271, 356 P.2d 999 (1960), in which we indicated that driving in a reckless manner means driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences. (Emphasis omitted.) Roggenkamp and Clark each assert that the Court of Appeals has wavered in its application of the definition of in a reckless manner. In support of this assertion, they call to our attention three cases in which divisions of that court have applied the willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property language of the reckless driving statute to vehicular assault or vehicular homicide cases. See State v. Hursh, 77 Wash.App. 242, 248, 890 P.2d 1066 (1995) (Division One) (vehicular assault); State v. Miller, 60 Wash.App. 767, 773, 807 P.2d 893 (1991) (Division Three) (vehicular homicide); and State v. McAllister, 60 Wash.App. 654, 658-59, 806 P.2d 772 (1991) (Division Three) (vehicular homicide). We view the McAllister, Miller, and Hursh decisions as aberrations in the long string of cases, stretching back to 1938, that have rejected defining the term in a reckless manner in vehicular homicide and vehicular assault cases as willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. This position finds support in the fact that Division Three of the Court of Appeals implicitly declined to follow its holdings in Miller and McAllister in a later case in which it explicitly rejected a defendant's contention that the `reckless manner' element of vehicular assault is the same as the `willful or wanton disregard' element of reckless driving. State v. Thompson, 90 Wash.App. 41, 47-48, 950 P.2d 977 (1998). In that case, the court held that driving in a `reckless manner' ... means to drive in a rash or heedless manner, with indifference to the consequences. Id. at 48, 950 P.2d 977.