Opinion ID: 1628715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Erroneous Admission of Evidence

Text: In his second claim, Jackson alleges three separate errors regarding allegedly impermissible evidence: (1) the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial after a witness impermissibly testified that Jackson carried a little pistol; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Jackson sold drugs; and (3) the trial court erred in permitting testimony regarding Hunt's motivation for reporting the crime to the police. For the following reasons, we find the trial court did not err in its rulings. As to Jackson's claim involving the gun, the record reflects that while the State was questioning Hunt as to an argument that Hunt had with Jackson concerning some borrowed money, the State asked Hunt whether he left Jackson's apartment at that point. Hunt responded, No. He got up in my face. And he always carries a little pistol with him right here in his little waistband. The defense immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The court determined that, based on its ruling as to a motion in limine, Hunt should not have mentioned the gun because it did not relate to the date of the crimes, but concluded that the incidental comment did not rise to the level of a mistrial. The court offered to give a curative instruction, but the defense declined. The trial court should grant a motion for mistrial only when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 372 (Fla. 2008) (quoting England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 401-02 (Fla.2006)). [T]his Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 371. The State first asserts that this evidence would have been relevant and thus there was no error when the testimony accidently came in. We disagree. In order for this evidence to be relevant, the State must show a sufficient link between the weapon and the crime. For example, in Amoros v. State, 531 So.2d 1256, 1260 (Fla. 1988), the Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting facts that the defendant was seen in possession of a gun on a prior occasion and that the bullet fired from that gun showed that the same weapon was used to kill the victim in the case under review. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that [s]imply allowing testimony that [the defendant] had possession of a gun does not serve to identify it as the same murder weapon. Id. The evidence became relevant because the State linked the murder weapon to the defendant by showing possession of the weapon, the firing of the weapon, the retrieval of the bullet fired from the weapon from the victim's body, and the comparison of the two bullets. See Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 251 (Fla.1995) (holding that evidence that the defendant possessed the gun shortly after the murder and pointed it at a colleague was relevant and admissible). In this case, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the testimony should not have been admitted. The record contains minimal testimony as to the gun that was used when Jackson kidnapped Paulk. While Morris testified that Jackson possessed a gun at the time, he did not describe the gun. Later in the proceedings, Hunt testified that Jackson usually carried a little pistol in his waistband. Nothing in the record linked the little pistol that Hunt described to the gun that Jackson possessed when kidnapping Paulk. Moreover, there was a significant time difference between Paulk's kidnapping and Hunt's disagreement with Jackson. This does not mean, however, that the trial court was required to grant the motion for mistrial. As addressed above, a mistrial should be granted only when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. Salazar, 991 So.2d at 372. Here, the mention as to the gun was brief; Hunt simply mentioned that Jackson carried it on him. The trial court recognized that this was error and asked defense counsel whether the court should give curative instructions to the jury, which counsel declined. We conclude that the brief mention of possessing a gun was not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. See, e.g., Marek v. State, 492 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Fla. 1986) (holding that the trial court properly denied a motion for mistrial even though a policeman improperly testified that he found a gun in the defendant's truck). In his second subclaim concerning allegedly impermissible evidence, Jackson alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Jackson sold drugs. This Court faced a similar question in Jorgenson v. State, 714 So.2d 423, 426 (Fla.1998), where the defendant claimed on appeal that the State should not have been permitted to present evidence regarding his activities as a drug dealer. This Court disagreed and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the defendant's drug dealing was relevant to support the State's theory of motive. Id. at 428. The Court noted that the record established that the defendant was in the business of selling methamphetamine, the victim regularly delivered drugs for the defendant, the victim had stolen from the defendant, and the victim had threatened to turn in the defendant if he cut off her drug supply. Id. In this case, a similar motive can be shown. The State's theory of the case was that the defendant was a drug dealer and the victim stole Jackson's drugs and money. After Jackson discovered the theft, he apprehended the victim, brought her to a location where he felt safe, bound her and kept her for several hours, and showed her to others as a warning of what would happen if they acted against Jackson's interests. Moreover, this evidence was relevant to Jackson's relationship with Hunt. After Hunt helped Jackson with the kidnapping, Jackson invited Hunt to live with him and help him in his other activities, including selling drugs for Jackson. Based on this close relationship, Jackson later made incriminating statements to Hunt, including requesting that he find a flyer about Paulk's disappearance and his statement no body, . . . no case. In light of the above, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Jackson's drug-selling activities. In his third subclaim on this issue, Jackson alleges that the trial court erred in permitting Hunt to testify on redirect regarding his actual motivation in talking to the police. The State asserts that this evidence was proper because on cross-examination, the defendant challenged Hunt's motive for waiting to come forward and alleged that Hunt had other personal motives to testify. The State further argues that this testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The record shows that on direct examination, Hunt testified that shortly before he went to the police, he and Jackson had a disagreement regarding some money that Jackson owed Hunt. During the cross-examination of Hunt, Jackson's counsel asked numerous questions regarding Hunt's motive in reporting the crime and testifying against Jackson. On redirect, the State asked why Hunt decided to go to the police. Hunt responded that he had heard Jackson had threatened to kill him. Defense counsel objected, asserting that this testimony was hearsay, immaterial, and unduly prejudicial. Because defense counsel questioned Hunt regarding his motives, the trial court held that the door had been opened during the cross-examination. The State then asked Hunt again why he went to the police, and Hunt responded that it was because Jackson's wife informed him that Jackson had threatened to kill Hunt. Hunt told his brother about this potential threat, and he was afraid that his brother might try to handle the matter himself if Hunt did not go to the police. As this Court has recognized, hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Penalver v. State, 926 So.2d 1118, 1131 (Fla.2006) (quoting § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005)) (emphasis omitted). Thus, if the statement is offered for the truth of the facts asserted, then the statement is hearsay and must fall within one of the recognized hearsay exceptions in order to be admitted into evidence. Id. at 1132. However, if the statement is offered for some purpose other than its truth, the statement is not hearsay and is generally admissible if relevant to a material issue in the case. Id. For a statement to be admissible, the purpose for which the statement is being offered (i.e., the motive) must be a material issue in the action. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 801.2 (2009 ed.). In State v. Baird, 572 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1990), a police officer testified on direct examination, over a defense objection, that the officer had received information that the defendant was a major gambler and was operating a major gambling operation in Pensacola. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of three counts of racketeering based on activities involving football betting. Id. at 905. Even if this testimony was not hearsay, the Court held that the testimony was inadmissible because it was offered only to prove the officer's motive for investigating the defendanta subject that is not generally a material issue in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 907-08. We did acknowledge, however, that the testimony would have been admissible on redirect after the defense attempted, during cross-examination, to establish that Mr. Baird had been targeted for prosecution. Id. at 908. In this case, Hunt's testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., whether Jackson had threatened him. Accordingly, it was not hearsay. Moreover, the testimony was elicited only during redirectafter defense counsel questioned Hunt on cross-examination as to his motives and why Hunt waited so long before he contacted the police. By questioning Hunt's motives during its cross-examination, defense counsel opened the door to this rebuttal. Because defense counsel put Hunt's motive at issue, counsel cannot claim it was not material or unduly prejudicial. We find that the trial court did not err in permitting this testimony after defense counsel opened the door to this line of inquiry.