Opinion ID: 2534434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rejection of Anderson's proposed jury instructions

Text: ¶ 60 Anderson contends that the trial court erred by rejecting several of his requested jury instructions. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by evidence. State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 487, 733 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1987). A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309, 896 P.2d 830, 849 (1995).
¶ 61 Anderson requested a justification instruction because he claimed to have attacked Delahunt to stop a sexual assault on Lane. A person is justified in ... using ... deadly physical force against another if and to the extent the person reasonably believes that ... deadly physical force is immediately necessary to prevent the other's commission of ... sexual assault.... A.R.S. § 13-411(A) (1989). A defendant is entitled to a justification instruction if there is evidence of justification for the defensive act. State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 124, 817 P.2d 488, 491 (1991). ¶ 62 There was, however, no evidence at trial that the murder of Delahunt, as opposed to Anderson's initial confrontation with the victim, was committed to prevent a sexual assault on Lane. Anderson testified that he heard Lane scream for help, pulled Delahunt off of Lane, and then began to struggle with the boy, who bit Anderson's hand. At that point, Anderson cut Delahunt's throat and instructed Lane to go get help. Once Lane exited the trailer, any threat of sexual assault had ended. Delahunt did not die from the slicing of his throat, but from massive head trauma subsequently inflicted by Poyson and Anderson in an attack that continued long after the claimed sexual assault was terminated. The trial judge therefore did not abuse his discretion by refusing to give a justification instruction.
¶ 63 Anderson next argues that the denial of an aggravated assault instruction deprived him of due process under the rule of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). Beck held unconstitutional an Alabama statute that prohibited a trial court from instructing the jury on any lesser included offense in a capital murder prosecution. The Supreme Court found that such a restriction might lead a jury to convict a defendant of capital murder, despite jurors' reasonable doubts, merely because the jurors thought the defendant was guilty of some crime and should therefore be punished. Id. at 642-43, 100 S.Ct. 2382. ¶ 64 The Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), shows that Beck is of no avail to Anderson. In Schad, the defendant argued that the due process principles underlying Beck require that the jury in a capital case be instructed on every lesser included noncapital offense supported by the evidence. Id. at 646, 100 S.Ct. 2382. The Court disagreed, noting that its concern in Beck was the statute's all-or-nothing nature. Id. Because the jury in Schad was given the option to convict the defendant of a lesser offense, second-degree murder, and rejected that option, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to instruct on robbery did not implicate the Beck rule. Id. at 647-48, 100 S.Ct. 2382. ¶ 65 In this case, the superior court refused Anderson's request for an aggravated assault instruction, but did instruct the jury on second-degree murder and manslaughter. Because the jury had the option of these immediately-lesser included offenses, but nonetheless found the defendant guilty of the highest offense, it necessarily rejected all other lesser-included offenses. State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 542, 768 P.2d 1177, 1187 (1989) (quoting State v. White, 144 Ariz. 245, 247, 697 P.2d 328, 330 (1985)).
¶ 66 Anderson contends that the reasonable doubt instruction was erroneous. Because he requested the very instruction to which he now objects, he invited any error and waived this argument. Logan, 200 Ariz. at 565 ¶ 8, 30 P.3d at 632. In any event, the instruction followed the language recommended in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995), and approved repeatedly by this Court. See, e.g., State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 441 ¶ 49, 72 P.3d 831, 841 (2003); State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 156 ¶¶ 75-76, 42 P.3d 564, 587 (2002).
¶ 67 Anderson argues that the instruction defining premeditation lowered the State's burden of proof on an element of the offense of first-degree murder. The instruction provided that premeditation can be as instantaneous as successive thoughts in the mind. We disapproved this language in State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 479-80 ¶ 32, 65 P.3d 420, 428-29 (2003), and in State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 565 ¶ 16 & n. 2, 74 P.3d 231, 239 & n. 2 (2003). However, because Anderson requested the instruction to which he now objects, he invited any error. Logan, 200 Ariz. at 565 ¶ 8, 30 P.3d at 632.