Opinion ID: 2515297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: List v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 1996 OK 1, 910 P.2d 1011, its predecessors and its progeny.

Text: ¶ 7 In 1996, the Court decided List v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 1996 OK 1, 910 P.2d 1011, a case which tested the possible expansion of the tort-based exception to Oklahoma's employment-at-will doctrine recognized and adopted in Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 1989 OK 22, ¶ 17, 770 P.2d 24. Burk involved a federal certified question concerning an alleged implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in reference to termination of any employment-at-will contract. The Burk employee sued her employer in contract and in tort, alleging that she was prevented from performing her job duties and was, consequently, constructively discharged. She further asserted that her employer's agent told her he would not recommend her for a promotion because of her sex. ¶ 8 Although the Court rejected the implication of a duty of good faith and fair dealing in every employment-at-will contract, Burk was the landmark case wherein the Court adopted a public policy exception to the at-will termination rule in a narrow class of cases in which the discharge of an employee is contrary to the clear mandate of public policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory, or decisional law. We recognized, for the first time, that the action was a tort. We also noted that because the term public policy was vague, the exception had to be tightly circumscribed. ¶ 9 Three years after Burk, we promulgated Tate v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, 833 P.2d 1218. Tate involved the question of whether a Burk tort could be asserted for racial discrimination, to which we answered-yes. In discussing the remedies available for such a claim, the Court determined that the remedies provided by the Oklahoma Discrimination Act, 25 O.S.1991 § 1101-1901, for racial discrimination were not exclusive because the Act provided more available remedies for those who alleged discrimination on the basis of handicap than those who alleged racial discrimination. The court noted in ¶ 18 that: The Act here in contest does not provide a private right of action to a person aggrieved by racially discriminatory practices if the Commission does not resolve the claim to his satisfaction. In contrast, it does afford a private right of action for discrimination based on handicap. Were we today to construe the statute as having established the sole remedy for racially discriminatory practices, we would create a dichotomous division of discrimination remedies contrary to Art. 5 § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. There would be a more generous remedy for victims of handicap discrimination than for those who suffered from racial discrimination. For remedial purpose, discrimination victims comprise a single class. Our Constitution absolutely interdicts the passage of special law that would sanction disparate remedies for those who complain of employment discrimination. (Citations omitted.) ¶ 10 Accordingly, we held that the employee who brings a common-law tort action for damages occasioned by either a racially motivated discharge or by one in retaliation for bringing a racial discrimination complaint states a state-law claim for tortious employment termination under Burk.  [7] However, we left the matter for the trial court to preclude plaintiff's double recovery for cumulative theories of recovery. ¶ 11 After Tate, we decided List v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 1996 OK 1, 910 P.2d 1011, [8] which involved the question of whether the Burk tort would be extended to violations of public policy predicated on constructive discharge. The List plaintiff alleged that he was demoted based on his age and that it was a deliberate attempt to make his working conditions so intolerable that he would voluntarily resign. List's claim was predicated solely upon his status  his age. Diverging from the language we used in Tate in which we recognized that victims of discrimination form but one class and are constitutionally required to be treated the same, the Court instead focused on the remedies that would be available to List and whether they were adequate. Absent from the opinion was any discussion of art. 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. [9] ¶ 12 Ultimately, the Court determined that it need not extend the Burk exception to the at-will termination rule to age discrimination claims because the plaintiff had adequate statutory remedies for age discrimination. Rather than defining adequate, the Court postulated that because the plaintiff's rights were protected by the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, he had more comprehensive remedies than the Tate plaintiff did under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447. ¶ 13 Consequently, in List, we implicitly equated the fact that the plaintiff had more remedies available to him than the Tate plaintiff with term adequate remedies. The Court also noted that [m]ost courts have refused to allow common law retaliatory discharge actions based on age or illness, saying that only a discharge arising from the employee's acts, rather than his status, will support a common law retaliatory discharge action. [10] Examples of such conduct, rather than status were: employees being fired for reporting unlawful or unsafe activities to the authorities; refusing sexual advancement of supervisors; refusing to perform unsafe work activities; and filing workers' compensation claims. ¶ 14 The next year, the Court decided Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., 1997 OK 34, 939 P.2d 1116. [11] In Marshall, the employee sued a former employer alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and constructive discharge due to sexual harassment by a co-worker. The Court again declined to extend the Burk exception to a claim of constructive discharge based on sexual harassment. Relying on List, supra, the Court again decided that a Burk tort could not lie because the action was based upon the plaintiff's status rather than her conduct. ¶ 15 Again, looking to the adequacy of the remedies available to the plaintiff, Marshall determined that because the remedies provided by Federal law in Title VII [12] and Oklahoma's anti-discrimination statutes [13] provided adequate remedies, there was no reason to extend the Burk tort exception to Marshall's claim. ¶ 16 Two years after Marshall, we once again addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment in the workplace could state a Burk tort claim in Collier v. Insignia Financial Group, 1999 OK 49, 981 P.2d 321. This time, the victim alleged that quid pro quo [14] sexual harassment by a supervisor led to her constructive discharge. She, like the plaintiff in Marshall, sued under Title VII and Oklahoma's anti-discrimination statutes. ¶ 17 The Court set forth the requisites for asserting a retaliatory constructive discharge claim and noted that the Burk tort was available to redress employer violations of any state-declared public policy for which there was no civil remedy. We said that if the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act [15] provided an adequate remedy for the offending sexual harassment, there can be no Burk tort. The Court then recognized that the Oklahoma Act gave discharged victims of handicap discrimination a private cause of action against the offending employer, but it provided only an administrative remedy for victims of quid pro quo sexual harassment. ¶ 18 Finally, the Court determined that if we were to hold that the Oklahoma Act provided the exclusive remedy, in effect, we would be sanctioning unequal remedies for members of the same class in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. Accordingly, we held that a common law Burk tort was an available remedy for the plaintiff. Absent from the discussion in Collier was an analysis of the remedies available to the plaintiff under Federal law and their alleged adequacy. ¶ 19 However, the adequacy of a federal remedy was tested in Clinton v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Logan County Election Board, 2001 OK 52, 29 P.3d 543, [16] the final case leading to Saint. Clinton involved an employee who alleged she was discharged because she was pregnant. The Court held that because the employee had an adequate federal statutory remedy for wrongful discharge, she could not also assert a Burk tort. We did not discuss the adequacy of the federal remedy, instead, we noted that: When a statutory remedy adequately accomplishes the goal of protecting Oklahoma public policy, a common law remedy is not needed. While a federal statute cannot by itself serve as a statement of Oklahoma policy, a federal statutory remedy may be as effective as an Oklahoma statutory remedy in dissuading employers from discharging employees for reasons that violate Oklahoma public policy. Accordingly, we hold the existence of a federal statutory remedy that is sufficient to protect Oklahoma public policy precludes the creation of an independent common law claim based on a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. ¶ 20 The Court also clarified the parameters of the Burk tort remedy: 1) the plaintiff must identify an Oklahoma public policy goal that is clear and compelling and is articulated in existing Oklahoma constitutional, statutory or jurisprudential law; 2) the existence of a federal statutory remedy or state statutory remedy which is sufficient to protect the identified Oklahoma public policy goal precludes a Burk tort; 3) the plaintiff must establish he or she is an at-will employee and the reason for discharge violates the identified Oklahoma public policy goal; and 4) a discharge for purposes of the Burk tort may be either actual or constructive. ¶ 21 Finally, in Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc., 2006 OK 59, 145 P.3d 1037, [17] the Court again addressed whether a Burk tort remedy was available to an age-discrimination plaintiff. The Saint plaintiff brought an age discrimination suit in Federal Court, asserting claims under the federal age discrimination statute [18] and Oklahoma's public policy against age discrimination as embodied by the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, 25 O.S.2001 §§ 1101-1901. The plaintiff's argument was that the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act created a unified class of persons who are the victims of handicap, race, gender, or age discrimination, therefore, equal remedies are required for all those persons under art. 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. [19] ¶ 22 The federal court in Saint certified the following question: Is there either an implied statutory remedy or a common-law Burk tort remedy for state age discrimination claims arising under the operation of the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 46 and the provisions of the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, 25 O.S. §§ 1101, et seq. and § 1901? We noted the prior holdings which had expanded the common-law Burk tort remedy to the areas of race and sexual harassment. We recognized that: 1) refusal of such remedies would create a dichotomous division of members of the same class, which would offend the § 46 mandated norms of uniformity, symmetry and evenhanded treatment; [20] 2) age-discrimination victims are part of the employment discrimination class, and as such must be afforded the same rights as the other members of the class; and 3) there is a Burk tort remedy for those who allege age employment age discrimination. [21] ¶ 23 Although Saint also involved age discrimination, it did not address List at all. Saint was decided under a constitutional question, whereas List was not. Nevertheless, the holding in Saint is clearly contrary to List's holding and as such, List was implicitly overruled. Today, we expressly overrule List and reaffirm that age discrimination victims are part of the employment discrimination class to which Burk applies. ¶ 24 After Saint, [22] we again addressed the elements of a Burk tort in Vasek v. Board of County Commissioners, 2008 OK 35, ¶¶ 27-28, 186 P.3d 928. It involved a plaintiff who alleged wrongful termination for making a complaint to the Department of Labor (DOL) concerning mold at the courthouse. The plaintiff's action was not based on discrimination such as those addressed in Saint (handicap, race, sex and age), rather it was based on the fact that she alleged she was fired for reporting her employer's violation of the law. We reiterated the elements of a Burk tort in such circumstances, stating: The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee articulated in Burk and its progeny can be summarized. A viable Burk claim must allege (1) an actual or constructive discharge (2) of an at-will employee (3) in significant part for a reason that violates an Oklahoma public policy goal (4) that is found in Oklahoma's constitutional, statutory, or decisional law or in a federal constitutional provision that prescribes a norm of conduct for Oklahoma and (5) no statutory remedy exists that is adequate to protect the Oklahoma policy goal. ¶ 25 In Vasek, we equated adequacy of remedies with sufficiency, in other words: Were the remedies available to the plaintiff sufficient to protect Oklahoma's public policy goals? Our decision today does not disturb Vasek or cases in which a plaintiff's conduct is alleged to have triggered a discharge or constructive discharge in violation of Oklahoma public policy. However, to the extent that the rationale of Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., 1997 OK 34, 939 P.2d 1116 and Clinton v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Logan County Election Board, 2001 OK 52, 29 P.3d 543, conflicts with our decision in Saint and our decision today, they are expressly overruled.