Opinion ID: 202978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presumption of Credibility

Text: Kho supplements his disfavored group approach with an argument that because the IJ did not make an explicit finding concerning Kho's credibility, his testimony must be accepted as true by this court. Kho bases this proposed rule as well on a series of Ninth Circuit cases. [4] See, e.g., Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 342 (9th Cir.1994) (Absent an explicit finding that a specific statement by the petitioner is not credible we are required to accept her testimony as true.); Artiga Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir.1987); Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir.1985). We have already rejected the proposition that aliens are entitled to a presumption of credibility on review in this court if there is no express credibility determination made by an IJ. See, e.g., Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2007). There may be a variety of reasons why such a finding is not relevant to the ultimate disposition of the case and may be pretermitted. Further, such a presumption would confuse the roles of the court and the agency. The court reviews agency proceedings but does not act as a finder of fact itself. Hence, it makes no sense to talk about presumptions of credibility which the courts of appeals must apply. Our standard of review of administrative factfinding is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). If, in the absence of a credibility finding by the IJ, a reviewing court determines that such a finding is necessary for effective review of the case, it may remand to the agency for further factfinding. See, e.g., Castañeda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 24-25 (1st Cir.2007) (en banc); El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 204-05 (1st Cir.2003). A reviewing court is not bound, however, to accept a petitioner's statements as fact whenever an IJ simply has not made an express adverse credibility determination. The REAL ID Act also provides no support for Kho's argument. In the REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress stated that for purposes of determining asylum and withholding claims, [t]here is no presumption of credibility [in proceedings before an IJ;] however, if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-13, Div. B §§ 101(a)(3), (c), 119 Stat. 231, 303-04 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) & 1231(b)(3)(C)). [5] It is apparent that this rebuttable presumption applies to appeals from immigration courts to the BIA. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (referring to rebuttable presumption . . . on appeal), and id. § 1158(d)(5)(iii)-(iv) (referring to administrative appeal), and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38 (describing procedure for appeals to BIA from IJ decision), with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (referring to jurisdictional limitation on judicial review in courts of appeals), and id. § 1252 (controlling [j]udicial review of orders of removal in courts of appeals). There is no language in the statute directing the reviewing courts of appeals to apply any such presumption. The REAL ID Act in fact displays Congress's awareness of the distinction between the differing standards to be applied during administrative appeals and in petitions for review in the courts of appeals. A separate provision of the Act modifies 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) such that courts reviewing a final order of removal cannot reverse an agency determination concerning the availability of corroborating evidence unless a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable. REAL ID Act § 101(e). Congress chose to modify, through explicit language and specific placement within the statutory scheme, one standard for judicial review of agency decisions. Congress did not similarly modify the scope and standard of judicial review concerning petitioners' credibility.