Opinion ID: 1866125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of essential duty.

Text: As to the first elementbreach of essential dutythe State correctly boils the question down to this. Would an appellate attorney of normal competence have filed a petition for certiorari after being denied relief on direct appeal? For reasons that follow, we think not. As we noted, several Supreme Court decisions before Coy v. Iowa focused on cross-examination as the essential element for confrontation purposes. As long as cross-examination was afforded, physical face-to-face confrontation was not essential. In reaching the same conclusion in several cases before Coy v. Iowa, we relied on these very decisions. That was the law when section 910A.14(1) was passed and that was the law when the court of appeals affirmed Morgan's conviction. We earlier said that Coy v. Iowa had articulated a new rule. Had the case not established a new rule, Coy v. Iowa would have applied automatically to Morgan's conviction. And Burns would not now be facing a claim of ineffective assistance. But Coy v. Iowa did establish a new rule. So that case would not apply automatically to Morgan's conviction. Burns incorrectly thought it would. As a result, he did not keep Morgan's case alive by seeking relief in the Supreme Court. Does such a mistaken belief amount to ineffective assistance of counsel? Before we can say so, we would have to say Burns should have predicted several thingsthings that were impossible for him to predict. First, he should have predicted the outcome of Coy v. Iowa. Second, he should have predicted whether Coy v. Iowa would announce a new rule. The unreasonableness of holding Burns to such an impossible duty is highlighted by comparing the majority's analysis in Coy v. Iowa with the majority's analysis in Craig. In Coy v. Iowa, the majority took the position that face-to-face confrontation had always been considered indispensable. In Craig, the majority took the opposite position. Last, Burns should have predicted when Coy v. Iowa would be decided so that he could keep Morgan's case alive. We have never held counsel to a duty of clairvoyance. And we do not do so now. See Cuevas, 415 N.W.2d at 633 (counsel not required to predict change in law); Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1981) (Counsel need not be a crystal gazer; it is not necessary to know what the laws will become in the future to provide effective assistance of counsel); Hinkle v. State, 290 N.W.2d 28, 34 (Iowa 1980) (ineffective assistance claim rejected even though counsel failed to object to instruction we rejected in later cases). To further underscore the unreasonableness of Morgan's claim, we look at Burns' duty in another light. We also guessed wrong on how the Supreme Court would view the face-to-face confrontation issue when we decided State v. Coy. Should we now hold Burns to a higher duty than we expect of ourselves? Taking Morgan's claim to its extreme, we would have to say that counsel should expect the Supreme Court to change its position on every constitutional issue raised on appeal to this court. And if we reject the issue, counsel should always seek relief in the Supreme Court to protect the defendant's right to retroactive application of any subsequent change in the law. Competent appellate counsel should not and do not operate this way. They raise legitimate issues and ignore frivolous ones. And they are not penalized for adopting this strategy. See Cuevas, 415 N.W.2d at 633 ([M]ost experienced appellate lawyers or judges will attest it is a tactical blunder, often devastating to an appellant, to assign every conceivable complaint. Highly competent lawyers generally assign only the strongest points and rely on them for reversal). In hindsight, Burns made a mistake. But that mistake falls short of qualifying as a breach of an essential duty.