Opinion ID: 75691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence to prove the interstate commerce element of money laundering

Text: 9 Oliveros contends that the government did not prove that the money laundering transactions for which he was convicted had an interstate commerce nexus. Under §1956(c)(4)(B), which sets out one of the alternative jurisdictional elements of the money laundering statute, the government must prove both that a financial institution was engaged in or affected interstate commerce, and that the transaction involved the use of the financial institution. Oliveros does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to prove that SunTrust Bank, from which the dirty cash was withdrawn and into which the clean checks were deposited, is a financial institution engaged in interstate commerce. 3 Instead, he contends that the transactions (his receipt of the cash and delivery of the checks) were not financial transactions as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(4), because they did not involve the financial institution (SunTrust). 10 Oliveros bases his argument that the bank was not involved in the transactions on United States v. Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir. 1996). In that case, we held that under the money-laundering statute, each transaction or transfer of money constitutes a separate offense. According to Oliveros, the money-laundering scheme which formed the basis of his conviction consisted of several distinct offenses (some of which were not charged): (i) his accepting the cash from Casanova; (ii) his depositing the cash in a bank account; (iii) his delivering the check to Casanova; and (iv) the FBI's depositing the check into its account. Because Oliveros was only charged with receiving the cash from and delivering the checks to Casanova, those particular transactions must have their own interstate commerce nexus and cannot share a nexus with other distinct offenses within the same money-laundering scheme. Or so Oliveros argues. 11 We disagree. The statute defines a financial transaction as a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree. 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(4)(B) (emphasis added). In interpreting a statute, we adhere to its plain meaning. See CBS, Inc., v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998)(en banc). The plain meaning of this statute does not require that use of the financial institution be an integral or essential part of the particular transaction which forms the basis of the conviction, but only that the transaction involve the use of the institution in some way. Because the money-laundering statute reaches the full extent of Congress' Commerce Clause power, see United States v. Peay, 972 F.2d 71, 74 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S. Ct. 270, 272 (1960) (interpreting the Hobbs Act from which the money-laundering statute derived its language), the government satisfies the interstate commerce requirement under §1956(c)(4)(B) when it proves that a financial institution with an interstate nexus was, at least, incidentally involved in the transaction charged in the indictment. Incidental involvement or use is enough. 12 Case law in other circuits supports our interpretation of §1956(c)(4)(B). See United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1410-12 (7th Cir. 1992) (The statute does not, however, literally require that the use of the financial institution with the interstate commerce nexus be a part of, contribute to, or facilitate the design to conceal, and since the purpose of the interstate commerce nexus is to provide a predicate for federal legislative jurisdiction, we think that the use of the financial institution involved in the transaction may be incidental, as it was here, and need not be shown to have been a part of, contributed to, or facilitated the design to conceal.); see also United States v. Laurenzana, 113 F.3d 689, 692 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (reiterating that the connection to interstate commerce required for a money-laundering offense need only be 'incidental' to the transaction and holding that a subsequent deposit of the check representing the clean money is sufficient for the interstate commerce nexus); United States v. Richard, 234 F.3d 763, 767-68 (1st Cir. 2000) (in the context of construing the term monetary transaction under 18 U.S.C.§ 1957(f)(1), which includes any financial transaction under §1956(c)(4)(B), holding that the delivery of a criminally derived check to a third person so that the third person can deposit the check is a transaction involving the use of a financial institution). 13 In this case the government's proof satisfied §1956(c)(4)(B) as to each of the transactions for which Oliveros was charged and convicted. With respect to Counts I, III, and V, which charged Oliveros with receiving the cash from Casanova, the government proved that the bank was involved because the evidence established that before each of the exchanges the FBI withdrew the cash used from the bank. Even though the withdrawal from the bank occurred before the transaction that formed the basis of Oliveros' conviction on Counts I, III, and V (the receiving of the cash), the financial institution was involved at least incidentally in Oliveros' receiving the cash, and that degree of involvement is a sufficient predicate for federal jurisdiction. See Koller, 956 F.2d at 1412-13 (holding that the interstate commerce requirement was satisfied by evidence that the defendant used a bank in interstate commerce before committing the transaction which formed the basis of his conviction, even though the use of the bank did not itself violate the money laundering statute). 14 In a similar fashion, the FBI's depositing the checks Oliveros delivered to Casanova supplies the interstate commerce nexus for Counts II, IV, and VI of the information, which charged Oliveros with delivering the checks to Casanova. While deposit of the checks occurred after the transactions themselves, the deposit was at least incidental to delivery of the checks and the success of the transactions. See Laurenzana, 113 F.3d at 692 (Although [the defendant] would like our analysis to stop with his delivery of [money] to the [law enforcement] officers, we cannot do so, because neither commerce nor the flow of cash is a static process.); see also Richard, 234 F.3d at 767-68 (finding that the subsequent deposit of a check by a third person is sufficiently connected to the delivery and acceptance of the check to satisfy §1956(c)(4)(B)). 15 Accordingly, we hold that the government's evidence did prove the jurisdictional element of the money-laundering statute for each of the transactions which formed the basis of Oliveros' conviction. 16