Opinion ID: 1175246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immunity for Participants in Adversarial Judicial Proceedings

Text: The caseworkers' role in this matter was established by the Legislature in setting up procedures to govern the disposition of dependent children. RCW 13.34.110 mandates a fact-finding hearing on the dependency petition to be followed by a separate hearing on the dependent child's disposition. The initial dependency hearing in this case took place in Louisiana. The disposition hearing was held, after two continuances, on August 26 and 27, 1982. The DSHS's role in the disposition hearing is specified in RCW 13.34.120: (1) To aid the court in its decision on disposition, a social study, consisting of a written evaluation of matters relevant to the disposition of the case, shall be made by the person or agency filing the petition. The study shall include all social records and may also include facts relating to the child's cultural heritage, and shall be made available to the court. The court shall consider the social file and social study at the disposition hearing in addition to evidence produced at the fact-finding hearing. At least ten working days before the disposition hearing, the department shall mail to the parent and his or her attorney a copy of the agency's social study and proposed service plan, which shall be in writing or in a form understandable to the parents or custodians. In addition, the department shall provide an opportunity for parents to review and comment on the plan at the community service office. If the parents disagree with the agency's plan or any part thereof, the parents shall submit to the court at least twenty-four hours before the hearing, in writing, or signed oral statement, an alternative plan to correct the problems which led to the finding of dependency. This section shall not interfere with the right of the parents or custodians to submit oral arguments regarding the disposition plan at the hearing. (2) In addition to the requirements set forth in subsection (1) of this section, a predisposition study to the court in cases of dependency alleged pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(2) (b) or (c) shall contain the following information: (a) A statement of the specific harm or harms to the child that intervention is designed to alleviate; (b) A description of the specific programs, for both the parents and child, that are needed in order to prevent serious harm to the child; the reasons why such programs are likely to be useful; the availability of any proposed services; and the agency's overall plan for ensuring that the services will be delivered; (c) If removal is recommended, a full description of the reasons why the child cannot be protected adequately in the home, including a description of any previous efforts to work with the parents and the child in the home; the in-home treatment programs which have been considered and rejected; and the parents' attitude toward placement of the child; (d) A statement of the likely harms the child will suffer as a result of removal. This section should include an exploration of the nature of the parent-child attachment and the meaning of separation and loss to both the parents and the child; (e) A description of the steps that will be taken to minimize harm to the child that may result if separation occurs; and (f) Behavior that will be expected before determination that supervision of the family or placement is no longer necessary. At the August hearing Mark Bronson testified for DSHS, based on the report prepared by Wanda Tyler. [1] The fact that the caseworkers acted as participants in an adversary hearing renders their actions immune under the common law doctrine of absolute immunity for participants in judicial proceedings. This immunity is well described by the United States Supreme Court in the cases Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976), Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978) and Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 75 L.Ed.2d 96, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (1983). [2] The defendants contend that these cases establish two separate grounds of immunity. First, social services caseworkers are said to be entitled to quasi-prosecutorial immunity because a caseworker's role in dependency proceedings under RCW 13.34 is analogous to that of a prosecutor in criminal proceedings. Second, the defendants argue that the caseworkers are entitled to immunity as witnesses. The defendants are almost correct. The leading cases actually set forth a single theory of immunity: that participants in adversarial judicial proceedings are immune from suit as a safeguard on the integrity of the adversarial process itself. In Imbler, the plaintiff alleged that a state prosecuting attorney had knowingly used false evidence and had suppressed exonerating evidence at his trial for felony murder. The Court held the prosecutor immune from suit under section 1983 on the ground that prosecutorial immunity at common law was incorporated into the Civil Rights Act by Congress. [3] That common law immunity has several grounds. There is the effect on the prosecutor himself: civil suits would distract him from the business of his office. There is also a question of efficiency, in that the civil suit would require a virtual retrial of the criminal case. Above all, however, prosecutorial immunity is required to preserve the truth-finding function of the criminal trial. The threat of liability to suit would have a chilling effect on the initiation of criminal prosecutions and on the prosecutor's conduct at trial. The jury's function might be impaired by a prosecutor's decision to withhold evidence that is relevant but not ironclad. Finally, the judgment of those responsible for evaluating the fairness of the trial on appeal and collateral review might be biased by the knowledge that a favorable decision for the prisoner could subject the prosecutor to liability. The important thing to notice about the Imbler case is that it bases prosecutorial immunity on the nature of the criminal proceeding; not on the nature of the prosecutor's duties. The Court reinforced this point in its opinion recognizing quasi-prosecutorial immunity in Butz. The plaintiff in Butz sued officials of the Department of Agriculture for their initiation and conduct of an adversarial administrative hearing related to his status as a commodities broker. The Court held that the hearing examiner and administrative law judge were entitled to absolute immunity. [4] Butz 's grant of immunity to the two officials was based on the resemblance between the adversarial administrative hearing and a criminal trial. Butz, at 512-13. The hearing officer and administrative law judge in Butz were not held immune because of their resemblance to a prosecutor and trial judge. The critical fact was that they were participants in an adversarial proceeding in need of the same safeguards as a criminal trial. Justice White's opinion stresses that the prosecutorial immunity recognized in Imbler is based on the prosecutor's status as one of the various participants in judge-supervised trials, a group which includes judges, grand jurors, petit jurors and witnesses. Butz, at 509-12. He discusses the features of a criminal trial stressed in Imbler and also several others which justify immunity for the various participants in any adversarial proceeding. First, immunity serves the system's interest in finality. The cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process ... [C]ontroversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree. The loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus. Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation. (Citations omitted.) Butz, at 512. Second, a variety of features of adversary proceedings make civil suits based on their conduct unnecessary or redundant. [T]he safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious action by judges. Advocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in open court. Jurors are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses are, of course, subject to the rigors of cross-examination ... and the impartiality of the decisionmaking process, there is a less pressing need for individual suits to correct constitutional error. (Footnote omitted.) Butz, at 512. Since these considerations are equally present in criminal trials and administrative hearings, the Court recognized immunity for the hearing officer and administrative law judge. In Briscoe, the Court considered whether witnesses are entitled to immunity in section 1983 suits. Given the logic of Imbler and Butz, the Court had no difficulty in determining that they are. As the Court noted in discussing Imbler and Butz : The central focus of our analysis has been the nature of the judicial proceeding itself. Briscoe, at 334. Witnesses, the Court held, are entitled to immunity for the sake of the adversary process. In the words of one 19th-century court, in damages suits against witnesses, the claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of public policy, which requires that the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as possible. Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860). A witness' apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce two forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be distorted by the fear of subsequent liability. (Citations omitted.) Briscoe, at 332-33. Based on Imbler and progeny, a number of courts have recognized immunity for social services workers in cases similar to this one, based on their role in judicial proceedings. See Meyers v. Contra Costa Cy. Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir 1987); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir.1984); Hennessey v. State, 627 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).