Opinion ID: 2622975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Standing Requirements

Text: ¶ 45 As we have stated, Prior to deciding the substantive questions presented by the parties, this Court must ascertain whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions and the appeal before it. [50] In this case, three sections of the Utah Code are relevant in determining whether any individuals have appellate standing that would grant this court subject matter jurisdiction to hear their appeal: (1) section 54-7-15, (2) section 63-46b-14, and (3) section 63-46b-16. Read together, these three sections provide the basis for our standing analysis. ¶ 46 First, section 54-7-15 of the Public Utilities Act (PUA) identifies the individuals who are allowed to seek judicial review of a Commission decision. Section 54-7-15(1) states as follows: Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other person pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall meet the requirements of this section. [51] ¶ 47 Second, section 63-46b-14 of the UAPA, which governs state administrative agency proceedings, requires individuals to exhaust all administrative remedies before they will be allowed to seek judicial review of an agency decision. [52] This includes applying for a rehearing with the Commission. [53] The UAPA also reflects the traditional notion that a party may appeal only an adverse judgment. [54] ¶ 48 Third, section 63-46b-16(4) echoes the aggrievement requirement of section 63-46b-14 by using a synonymous term, stating as follows: The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced . . . . [55] Thus, if an agency decision has not substantially prejudiced the appealing party, the party has no appellate standing. ¶ 49 In sum, an individual may have appellate standing to seek judicial review of an agency decision if he or she has exhausted all administrative remedies and qualifies as an aggrieved or substantially prejudiced party, stockholder, bondholder, or other person pecuniarily interested in the public utility. ¶ 50 The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not at issue here, since the Petitioners sought rehearing before the Commission on both the Intervention Order and the Approval Order. Further, while none of the Petitioners were parties to the proceedings below, [56] (indeed only Ball and Geddes petitioned the Commission to intervene and their request was denied) some of the Petitioners are ratepayers or stockholders of Questar. We therefore are left to consider whether those petitioners who qualify as nonparty (1) ratepayers or (2) stockholders have appellate standing. We conclude that the ratepayers do not have standing because they are not pecuniarily interested in the public utility. And while the stockholders are among an authorized class of persons who have standing, they are not aggrieved or substantially prejudiced by the Commission's decision and therefore have no appellate standing.