Opinion ID: 517722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bill Luke Statements

Text: 23 Monroe contends that the trial court erred in admitting the Steven Jernigan and Mary DeMoss's testimony regarding certain statements Bill Luke made to them. The government counters that the trial court did not err in admitting this testimony, because the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 2 24 Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) states:(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not a hearsay if-- 25 .... 26 (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is 27 .... 28 (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 29 Monroe contends that the record does not support a finding that these statements were made in furtherance of any conspiracy between Luke and Monroe; thus, they do not come within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Monroe argues that Jernigan's testimony did not indicate that Luke attempted to get Jernigan to join the conspiracy or to act in any way to further it. Although Jernigan did subsequently assist Luke in ordering chemicals, Monroe contends that no evidence exists to indicate that Luke attempted to enlist Jernigan's aid at the time he initially told him about the plan to make methamphetamine. 30 Monroe contends that no factual basis exists for finding that what DeMoss overheard Luke say about him was a statement in furtherance of a conspiracy. Monroe notes that DeMoss was not asked to join a conspiracy or act in any way to further a conspiracy. Further, Monroe argues that the testimony of Jernigan and DeMoss did not indicate that Luke's statements about Monroe were meant to allay any suspicions or fears that they may have had so as to further the objectives of the conspiracy. Monroe contends that the statements at issue were only casual admissions of culpability to people Luke had individually decided to trust. 31 The government concedes that neither Jernigan nor DeMoss were members of the conspiracy at the time Bill Luke made the statements. The government contends, however, that statements made by a coconspirator to a non-member of the conspiracy are admissible by meeting the in furtherance of a conspiracy standard when found to advance the objectives of the conspiracy. The government argues that Jernigan's conversation with Bill Luke did lead to his becoming an active participant in the conspiracy between Luke and Monroe. 32 Whether a statement is in furtherance of the conspiracy is determined on the particular facts of each case. That determination is a finding of fact which may be overturned only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Posner, 764 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir.1985). The in furtherance of the conspiracy standard must not be applied too strictly, lest we defeat the purpose of the exception. United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Vasquez v. United States, 423 U.S. 855, 96 S.Ct. 105, 46 L.Ed.2d 81 (1975); see also United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1050 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 465, 98 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987). On review, we apply a liberal standard in determining whether a statement is made in furtherance of a conspiracy. United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir.1988). Statements made by one conspirator to a fellow conspirator identifying yet another conspirator for the purpose of affecting future dealings between the parties are held to be in furtherance of a conspiracy. United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir.1979). Also, when a conspirator provides information to his coconspirators necessary to keep them abreast of the conspiracy's current status, such statements are properly admitted as coconspirator declarations. United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). Conversations made by conspirators to prospective coconspirators for membership purposes are also considered acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Strange v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 356, 98 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987). Statements can be made in furtherance of a conspiracy if meant to allay suspicions or fears of others. Posner at 1538. 33 Based on this authority and a close examination of the contested testimony, we find that the district court did not err in admitting the testimony of Steven Jernigan and Mary DeMoss regarding the Bill Luke statements. These statements are admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule because the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy.