Opinion ID: 1991894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prima Facie Showing For the Odd-Lot Doctrine.

Text: Nelson claims that the industrial commissioner erred in failing to find that he is an odd-lot employee. An odd-lot employee is one who is incapable of finding work in any established branch of the labor market. Guyton, 373 N.W.2d at 105. [I]f the only services the worker can perform are `so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist,' then the employee falls in the odd-lot category and is totally disabled. Id. (quoting Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433, 436 (1950)). This conclusion follows from the fact that [a] person who has no reasonable prospect of steady employment has no material earning capacity. Id. The difficulty in Nelson's case comes not from the principle that an odd-lot employee is totally disabled, but from the process by which the worker proves he is an odd-lot employee. We held in Guyton that when a worker makes a prima facie case of total disability by producing substantial evidence that the worker is not employable in the competitive labor market, the burden to produce evidence of suitable employment shifts to the employer. If the employer fails to produce such evidence and the trier of fact finds the worker does fall in the odd-lot category, the worker is entitled to a finding of total disability. Id. at 106 (emphasis added). We also said, however, that it is normally incumbent on the claimant `to demonstrate a reasonable effort to secure employment' in the worker's area of residence before the burden of producing evidence shifts to the employer. Id. at 105 (quoting Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 Ariz.App. 117, 119, 541 P.2d 580, 582 (1975)). The practical effect of this burden-shifting rule is that when a claimant is an odd-lot employee, we presume that no jobs are available unless the employer introduces evidence of such work. Nevertheless, the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of industrial disability always remains on the employee. Id. The fighting issue here is whether the requirement of reasonable efforts to obtain employment is necessary if the employee otherwise produces substantial evidence that the worker is not employable in the competitive labor market. Nelson claims he introduced such evidence here when both vocational rehabilitation experts testified that Nelson could not return to his past employment and was unable to be competitively employed. In addition, Dr. McCoy testified that Nelson's bad knees and shoulder would prevent him from working. The industrial commissioner and district court ruled that Nelson had not met the threshold requirement for application of the odd-lot doctrine because he had not looked for work. However, we agree with Nelson that such proof is not an absolute prerequisite if the employee introduces other substantial evidence that he has no reasonable prospect of steady employment. Pomerinke v. Excel Trucking Transport, 124 Idaho 301, 306, 859 P.2d 337, 342 (1993) (claimant does not have to search for work as a prerequisite to odd-lot status if he shows his efforts would have been futile); cf. Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 342 S.E.2d 798, 809 (1986) (in affirming decision that employee was totally and permanently disabled, court held that the employee need not show that he had unsuccessfully sought work if he demonstrates that any effort to obtain employment would be futile because of age, inexperience, lack of education or other preexisting factors); Phillips v. Liberty Mut., 67 Or.App. 692, 679 P.2d 884, 887 (1984) (A claimant, however, need not make efforts to work if those efforts would be futile.). Any other rule would require clearly unemployable claimants to go through the futile exercise of searching for nonexistent employment. Moreover, mere proof that the claimant cannot find a job would not necessarily mean he is totally and permanently disabled. A particular employee may be a likely candidate for vocational retraining that would enable him to obtain employment in the future even though he is currently unemployable. In summary, we think it is too mechanistic to equate a current inability to obtain employment with the odd-lot doctrine. Clearly, in the typical case the employee will want to demonstrate a good faith, unsuccessful effort to find steady employment since such evidence, although not determinative, is certainly persuasive evidence that he cannot be employed. On the other hand, we conclude there are other factors that are also important in determining whether someone falls in the odd-lot category such as the claimant's physical impairment, intelligence, education, training, ability to be retrained and age. See Guyton, 373 N.W.2d at 105. Substantial evidence that these factors show the worker is capable only of odd-lot work can suffice to prove a prima facie case and shift the burden of producing evidence of suitable work to the employer. We point out that it is not necessary that the employee's evidence be so strong as to compel a finding that he is an odd-lot employee as a matter of law; it is merely necessary that he generate a fact question on this issue, through the introduction of substantial evidence, to establish a prima facie case. We think Nelson has established a prima facie case that he is an odd-lot employee through the consistent testimony of the medical and vocational experts that he cannot work in the competitive job market together with evidence of his age, his multiple physical impairments (knees, shoulder and deafness) and his lack of education and training for any employment other than manual labor. Therefore, the burden of producing evidence shifts to Basic Materials to show that jobs were available that Nelson could perform. Basic Materials offered evidence of two possible employment opportunities. It offered Nelson a position driving a truck at the quarry. However, the uncontroverted medical testimony was that Nelson would not be able to operate the clutch because of his knee problems. The second job possibility was less definite. Basic Materials' general manager testified that had Nelson returned to the quarry in June of 1989, the company would have made every effort to find something, a productive job for him. This testimony is too vague to support a finding that a steady job that Nelson was capable of performing actually existed. See Spitzack v. Berg Corp., 532 N.W.2d 72, 76 (S.D.1995) (the employer must establish that there are positions actually open and available); see Thilges, 528 N.W.2d at 617 (finding industrial commissioner properly considered claimant's ability to find employment in competitive market without regard to the accommodation furnished by the claimant's present employer); Cone Mills Corp., 342 S.E.2d at 805 (an injured employee's earning capacity must be measured not by the largesse of a particular employer, but rather by the employee's own ability to compete in the labor market). Thus, the industrial commissioner was required to presume that there was no suitable work regularly and continuously available that Nelson could perform. Although Nelson successfully established that he fell within the odd-lot category, a conclusion that Basic Materials is liable for Nelson's total and permanent disability is not compelled as a matter of law. It is still essential that Nelson's disability be caused by conditions and injuries for which Basic Materials must compensate him, as discussed above. Guyton, 373 N.W.2d at 106 (even though employee established a prima facie case that he was totally disabled, such a finding was not compelled as a matter of law because there was evidence his inability to find a job was attributable to an unsatisfactory work record unrelated to his injury).