Opinion ID: 1922439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Defendant's Statements

Text: (a) Choice of Law The defendant asserts that the trial justice erroneously applied Rhode Island law in determining the admissibility of the statements that he made both at his residence (the non-police-station statements), as well as at the New Hampshire State Police headquarters (the police station statements). The defendant, apparently believing that the state would not be able to meet New Hampshire's higher standard of proof in determining the admissibility of his statements, contends that the law of that jurisdiction should have been applied. [5] He contends that his constitutional rights were violated when he made his statements in New Hampshire, and that New Hampshire had a greater interest in the outcome of the hearing because the statements were taken in that state, where he, the decedent's children, and many of the witnesses in the case resided. Consequently, he asserts that the trial justice should have applied New Hampshire law in determining the admissibility of his statements. We disagree. We have stated previously that the procedural law of the forum state applies even if a foreign state's substantive law is applicable. Israel v. National Board of Young Men's Christian Association, 117 R.I. 614, 620, 369 A.2d 646, 650 (1977). In the present case, the trial justice determined that Rhode Island law controlled the admissibility of the defendant's statements. [6] In State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 863 (R.I.1991), we said that the reliability and concomitant admissibility of a confession is an evidentiary matter that is governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum. Likewise, in this case, the admissibility of the defendant's statements was an evidentiary matter and concern; consequently, the law of the forum applied and the trial justice did not err when he applied Rhode Island law. See Pailon, 590 A.2d at 863; State v. Bello, 417 A.2d 902, 905 n.3 (R.I.1980) (proving the admissibility of the evidence, as opposed to elements of the substantive crime, the standard of proof in this jurisdiction is `clear and convincing evidence' and not `beyond a reasonable doubt,' quoting State v. Gianoulos, 122 R.I. 67, 73 n.2, 404 A.2d 81, 84 n.2 (1979)). See also John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 Geo.L.J. 1217, 1217 (1985); Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 Criminal Procedure, § 10 (2d ed.1999). (b) Suppression of the Statements In this case, the defendant filed motions to suppress all the statements he gave while at his home and while in custody at the police station. The trial justice denied his motion to suppress the statements he made to the police at his home, but granted his motion to suppress all the statements he made at the police station. We have stated that: In reviewing a trial justice's decision on a motion to suppress a confession that is claimed to be involuntary, we perform a two-step analysis. First, we review the trial justice's findings regarding the historical facts relevant to the voluntariness of the challenged confession. Next, we apply those historical facts and review the trial justice's determination as to the voluntariness of the challenged confession de novo. State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1273 (R.I.1998) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564, 569 (R.I.1997)). [7] In doing so, we accord deference to the trial court's factual findings concerning the historical events pertaining to the confession by using a `clearly erroneous' standard of review. State v. Brouillard, 745 A.2d 759, 762 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Carter, 744 A.2d 839, 845 (R.I.2000)). We will reverse a trial justice's findings on a motion to suppress only if (1) his or her findings concerning the challenged statements reveal clear error, and (2) our independent review of the conclusions drawn from the historical facts establishes that the defendant's federal constitutional rights were denied. State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1044 (R.I.2000) (citing Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273 (quoting State v. Baton, 488 A.2d 696, 701 (R.I. 1985)). At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial justice ruled that the statements the defendant made while in his driveway and later in his home were admissible because they were given voluntarily and at a time when he was not in custody. However, he suppressed all of the statements the defendant gave at the police station, finding that those statements were given involuntarily while he was in custody.