Opinion ID: 544790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Joinder of Parties Defendant

Text: 15 Over their objection the trial court joined the appellant banks as parties defendant, rather than certifying a defendant class. It is undisputed that but for the four named defendants, Comfed Savings Bank, First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Seminole County, Southeast Mortgage Corporation, and Republic Savings and Loan Association, none of the defendants holds any paper signed by any of the named class plaintiffs. Therefore, all of the remaining appellants complain that they should not have been joined as defendants, and without their joinder, there was no case or controversy between the named plaintiffs and the seven defendants. 16 There is a strange paucity of appellate court decisions dealing with the precise question with which we are faced here. Appellant relies heavily on the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.1973). In that case, the Court stated: 17 [W]e assert that a plaintiff who has no cause of action against the defendant can not fairly and adequately protect the interests of those who do have such causes of action. This is true even though the plaintiff may have suffered an identical injury at the hands of a party other than the defendant and even though his attorney is excellent in every material respect. Obviously this position does not embrace situations in which all injuries are the result of a conspiracy or concerted schemes between the defendants at whose hands the class suffered injury. Nor is it intended to apply in instances in which all defendants are juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious. 18 489 F.2d at 466 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The appellees, of course, rely heavily upon the underscored part of the La Mar opinion, particularly the last sentence, Nor is it intended to apply in instances in which all defendants are juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious. They point to further language in La Mar in which the Court stated: It is our view that the class actions in question here are inferior to other 'available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.' F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3). Id. at 467. They point to several statements by the trial court indicating its view that representation of the plaintiffs' class by the named plaintiffs was not inferior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, thus contrasting the case with La Mar. The court below stated: 19 Other named plaintiffs could be supplied to match with each named defendant but it would be unwieldy to do so. Each plaintiff and the defendants have connection to each other through Land Bank equity. The case is simpler and more economical with the class of plaintiffs and the named defendants. 20 The court also stated: No court would want to have 644 separate lawsuits. 21 Appellees cite several cases, all decided at the district court level, which they state support their concept of the juridical link referred to in La Mar. These cases all involved bilateral class action suits but they may well be considered as illustrating the propriety of considering the juridical link in cases such as the one now before us. These cases are United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C.1977), Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D.Ga.1981), In re Alexander Grant & Co., 110 F.R.D. 528 (S.D.Fla.1986), and In re Computer Memories Securities Litigation, 111 F.R.D. 675 (N.D.Cal.1986). 22 While all of these cases support plaintiffs' view that in the event there is a juridical link, it is appropriate to join as a defendant a party with whom the named class representative did not have a direct contact, each of them presents a situation in which there was either a contractual obligation among all defendants or a state or local statute requiring common action by the defendants. 23 In addition to the provisions of the class action rule, Rule 23(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., we also consider the rules relating to the joinder of parties either by motion or sua sponte by the court. 24 Rule 19 provides in relevant part as follows: 25 Rule 19 Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication. 26 (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if 27 (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party.... 28 (Emphasis added). 29 The trial court based its ruling to join the appellants-defendants as parties on this rule, expressly stating that complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties. 30 Appellees contend in their brief that the joinder was justified under Rule 20 relating to permissive joinder of parties. This rule provides in relevant part as follows: Rule 20 Permissive Joinder of Parties 31 (a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities. 32 (Emphasis added). 33 Referring first to Rule 19, it seems clear that under the rules of stare decisis if these defendants were not joined, a decision in favor of the then present defendants and against the plaintiff class would at least to some extent impair or impede a plaintiff's ability to protect his or her legal interest against a defendant. See Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212 (11th Cir.1989). 1 34 However, we need not decide whether joinder was required under Rule 19 because we are satisfied that under Rule 20 dealing with permissive joinder of parties, the trial court had ample basis for joining these defendants. The rule states: 35 All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.... 36 Rule 20(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. (emphasis added). 37 Here, it is plain from the record that all of these transactions arose out of a series of transactions or occurrences initiated by Land Bank and that all of the claims involved the same question of law and fact. 38 Appellants contend that rather than arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences each contract was separate and distinct. 39 We are of the view that a proper construction of this rule would permit the joinder of all these defendants which acquired their loans from Land Bank, and which for several years continued to pay Land Bank a part of the payments received from the plaintiffs. 40 We, therefore, conclude that the joinder in this case was proper.