Opinion ID: 1316209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effective Representation Mitigation and Rebuttal

Text: Defendant contends trial counsel's strategy with respect to good inmate evidence in mitigation violated his federal constitutional rights to competent representation, due process, and a reliable penalty determination. For reasons we explain, the judgment should not be reversed on this ground.
As noted, the defense presented testimony by five deputy sheriffs concerning defendant's good attitude and behavior in custody, especially with respect to his ability to follow and enforce the rules as tank captain. On cross-examination, four of the deputies were asked whether they had heard about defendant's involvement in a food contamination incident in jail, and whether they were involved in any investigation thereof. Although each witness admitted hearing rumors concerning such misconduct, they denied any personal or official knowledge of the matter. While such cross-examination was underway, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the truth of any such rumors, and to use the information solely to evaluate the deputies' opinions of defendant. Immediately after the deputies testified, and before three chaplains described defendant's spiritual activities and progress in jail, lead counsel McKechnie moved in limine to prevent the prosecution from admitting evidence of the food contamination incident on rebuttal. The court and counsel discussed the proper scope of rebuttal outside the jury's presence when the motion was first made, and again on numerous occasions during the chaplains' testimony and up until completion of the defense case in mitigation. These discussions indicated that a criminal complaint had been filed in municipal court about one year earlier charging defendant and three cellmates with adulterating jailhouse food, with falsely reporting that a poisoning had occurred, and with conspiring to commit such acts. The trial court in the present case learned that McKechnie had represented defendant at a preliminary hearing in the food tampering case, and that the complaint had been dismissed because there was no evidence that a poison or harmful substance had been used or that knowingly false complaints were made within the meaning of the charged statute. (See § 347, subds. (a) & (b).) The preliminary hearing transcript, which was provided to the trial court and is included in the record on appeal, suggested at least two motives behind the alleged poisoning  manufacturing grounds for a lawsuit and obtaining early release from jail. McKechnie argued that fundamental fairness and res judicata principles prevented the penalty jury from being allowed to consider misconduct which had been the subject of a dismissed criminal complaint. Counsel also claimed that the food tampering incident was merely a harmless prank that had no tendency in reason to rebut evidence portraying defendant as a nonviolent person who posed no danger if spared the death penalty. Various other grounds were asserted in support of the motion in limine, including the prosecution's failure to include the food poisoning incident in its notice in aggravation (see § 190.3), and the risk that a mini trial on the topic would consume undue time and confuse the jury (see Evid.Code, § 352). In opposing the motion, the prosecutor confirmed his intent to present evidence that defendant masterminded the food tampering incident, and that he generally behaved in an aggressive and manipulative fashion as captain of the tank. The prosecutor relied on the well-settled notion that he could rebut particular character traits offered as a basis for mercy, and that he was not bound in this effort by the statutory factors in aggravation or by his pretrial notice of aggravating evidence. (See People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791-792 & fn. 24, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113, citing People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) According to the prosecutor, the proffered evidence would undermine testimony by the deputies and chaplains portraying defendant as a cooperative inmate and exemplary trusty who behaved well in jail and would conform in prison. Before the trial court ruled on the matter, cocounsel Barranco made certain statements giving rise to the issue now raised on appeal. Barranco  who claimed primary responsibility for handling defense evidence at the penalty phase  said that when she made the strategic decision to introduce evidence of defendant's good conduct in jail, she did not worry about the food poisoning [incident] because there's no basis for it. She expressed surprise over having just learned through McKechnie and the prosecutor that the municipal court complaint in the food tampering case had been dismissed for reasons other than a finding of factual[ ] innocen[ce]. Barranco blamed herself for not learning more about that case and for instead relying on rumor [and] hearsay. Barranco indicated that she would not have introduced good inmate evidence at all had she known the food tampering incident had happened and could come in ... as the last evidence the jury hears before they deliberate penalty. Barranco denied throwing herself on the sword of incompetence as a last resort, saying she simply wanted to create a record for any future habeas corpus proceeding. After taking the matter under submission, the trial court issued a lengthy ruling from the bench denying defendant's request to exclude evidence of the food tampering incident and authorizing rebuttal along the lines proposed by the prosecution. The court noted that while a capital defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to present relevant evidence bearing on his good qualities as an inmate, decisional law specifically allows the prosecution to respond with evidence suggesting that the contrary is true. (Citing People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 31, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1026-1027 & fn. 12, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1211, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301.) Based on this line of authority, defense counsel's suggestion that rebuttal should be limited to violent adjudicated acts, as opposed to a broader range of disruptive tendencies, was rejected. The trial court also rejected as unpersuasive any claim of great surprise by the defense that the prosecution would seek to present the food tampering incident and related evidence, or that the court would grant such a request. Finally, the court reserved the right to exclude cumulative and marginally relevant matters offered on rebuttal under Evidence Code section 352; granted a defense request for additional time to prepare surrebuttal; and granted a prosecution request to bar evidence of the municipal court's findings in the food poisoning case. As set forth earlier in the opinion, the prosecution's rebuttal evidence fell into two categories: (1) evidence that defendant tampered with dinner and disrupted the cellblock (though witnesses did not necessarily agree on whether toilet or tobacco water was used, and whether defendant was motivated by civil damages, early release, or escape); and (2) evidence that defendant feigned spirituality and engaged in duplicitous, threatening, and even physically assaultive behavior against other inmates in order to maintain control as captain and to serve his own selfish needs. In turn, surrebuttal evidence suggested that inmates testifying on rebuttal were biased against defendant, were lying or mistaken when they accused him of contaminating food and faking Christianity, and had exaggerated his aggressive acts. At the end of the penalty phase, the trial court gave various instructions limiting the manner in which the foregoing evidence could be used. On the one hand, the jury was told that mitigating factors are unlimited, and include the extent to which defendant adjusts in a prison or custodial institution, and the [strength and depth of [his] religious beliefs. On the other hand, the instructions made clear that reports of bad conduct in jail elicited on cross-examination of defendant's good character witnesses are not evidence that the reports are true, or that defendant behaved inconsistently with good jail behavior. Similarly, the jury was told that evidence offered solely to rebut mitigating evidence may not be considered as aggravating evidence, but may only be used to determine the truth, weight, or validity of the mitigating evidence. As noted, only one misdeed in custody was identified as an aggravating factor  evidence offered in the prosecution's case-in-chief concerning intimidation of inmate Heflin as a witness in the capital case.
Defendant first argues that, in light of Barranco's assessment of her own performance, the decision to present good inmate evidence was flawed because it was based on inadequate investigation of the facts giving rise to food poisoning charges, and the reasons underlying dismissal of those charges in municipal court. The argument seems to be that trial counsel would not have opened the door to admission of this disruptive incident or to other unfavorable rebuttal evidence if the omission identified by Barranco had not occurred. However, evidence concerning the food tampering incident, standing alone, could not have fundamentally altered defense strategy or otherwise deterred a reasonably competent attorney in Barranco's position from presenting substantial mitigating evidence of defendant's life in custody. Nothing in the record indicates that Barranco was unaware of all the other evidence admitted on rebuttal, including various threatening and assaultive acts similar to conduct described by inmate Heflin at the guilt phase. (See ante, fn. 9.) Indeed, by negative inference from Barranco's remarks, the defense went forward with its case in mitigation, and decided to inform jurors of defendant's good qualities as an inmate, despite its awareness that the prosecution could rebut with a sizeable body of previously unpresented evidence placing his jailhouse behavior in an unfavorable light. For this reason, Barranco's claim that admission of the food tampering evidence was a surprise material to her entire strategy carries little weight on appeal. We decline to find ineffective assistance of counsel on this narrow ground. Defendant argues more broadly that trial counsel's decision to present good inmate evidence invited a bad inmate rebuttal of greater weight, and was thus incompetent. Defendant claims that no effective attorney, aware as trial counsel was, or should have been, of all potentially damaging rebuttal would have introduced any evidence bearing on defendant's positive qualities as an inmate. However, the decision to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, and thus risk unfavorable revelations on rebuttal, calls for a tactical judgment not normally second-guessed on appeal. We generally defer to such decisions, and assume trial counsel properly weighed the relative risks and benefits. ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 101, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 468, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; see People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, 513, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1251, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) Nothing in the record demonstrates that competent counsel, armed with the information defendant's trial attorneys knew or should have known, would necessarily have reached a different conclusion on the matter. In any event, none of the acts or omissions characterized as incompetent by defendant could have prejudiced him at sentencing. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) We reach this conclusion first by comparing the penalty trial that actually occurred, including evidence introduced about defendant's life in jail, with the penalty trial defendant would have received if no such evidence had been presented in mitigation, rebuttal, and surrebuttal. As we have seen, the jury heard new information on rebuttal  offered primarily by inmates who were portrayed as biased and untruthful on surrebuttal  about defendant's shrewd and predatory behavior as captain and his possible involvement in a bizarre food tampering incident. This new bad inmate evidence tempered the strong praise defendant received from several law enforcement officers and chaplains who testified on his behalf, and could have raised concerns in jurors' minds as to whether defendant would be dangerous or prone to escape if sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. However, had trial counsel proceeded in the manner defendant now suggests and withheld all good inmate evidence, the life history presented in mitigation would have ended with defendant's descent into cocaine addiction and his commission of the gruesome crime against Muck. In other words, the penalty jury would have received no information from which it could infer that defendant was willing or able to conform in prison, and could have placed undue weight on the jailhouse assault on Heflin admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief (see ante, fn. 9). It is not reasonably probable that a more lenient sentence would have been imposed under such circumstances. We reach no different conclusion based on the overall effect of rebuttal at the penalty phase. In addition to the assault on Heflin (see ante, fn. 9), the prosecution sought a death sentence based on the capital crime and the violent acts later committed on Bates Street while defendant was addicted to cocaine. The defense responded with comprehensive evidence suggesting that, until shortly before the capital crime, defendant had worked to overcome his troubled childhood, and had performed fairly well as a college athlete, minister, police officer, soldier, husband, and father. Defense evidence further suggested that defendant's respect for authority and interest in religion had reemerged after his arrest in this case, and that he could conform in a structured custodial setting. To the extent the prosecution established that defendant may have abused his position as captain and behaved in an aggressive or disruptive fashion in jail, such rebuttal evidence could not have materially affected the foregoing balance of factors in aggravation and mitigation. The jury was already aware that defendant had threatened and assaulted at least one cellmate. More importantly, the jury knew from the court's instructions and the prosecutor's argument that evidence admitted on rebuttal was not aggravating and, at most, merely offset defendant's good inmate evidence  a discrete segment of the case in mitigation. We find no reasonable probability that any ineffective assistance of counsel permitting the introduction of such rebuttal evidence affected the penalty determination.