Opinion ID: 1794814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: overview of the first amendment

Text: The general issue presented in this case is whether, in the name of the First Amendment, religious institutions can be shielded from otherwise cognizable tort claims caused by their agents and employees. In the context of this case, the specific question is whether the First Amendment bars a secular court's consideration of the parishioners' claims of negligent hiring and supervision against the Church Defendants based upon the claim that Malicki fondled, molested, touched, abused, sexually assaulted and/or battered the minor and adult parishioners. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment, which is one of the hallmarks of our Bill of Rights, contains two clauses regarding religion the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. This constitutional guarantee is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995). The Free Exercise Clause guarantees first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). Moreover, [a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the Free Exercise Clause embraces two conceptsfreedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Thus, the First Amendment has never been interpreted to mean that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from government regulation. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Government regulation includes both statutory law and court action through civil lawsuits. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960). Importantly, before the constitutional right to free exercise of religion is implicated, the threshold inquiry is whether the conduct sought to be regulated was rooted in religious belief. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); see Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337-38 (5th Cir.1998); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283-84 (Colo.1988). Further, in order to launch a free exercise challenge, it is necessary to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against [the individual] in the practice of his religion. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). If it is demonstrated that the conduct at issue was rooted in religious beliefs, then the court must determine whether the law regulating that conduct is neutral both on its face and in its purpose. See Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217. [I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Id. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (citation omitted). The State may, however, regulate conduct through neutral laws of general applicability. See id. at 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Thus, a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Id. at 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The second aspect of the First Amendment religion clause, the Establishment Clause, states that government shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. This aspect of the First Amendment involves the separation of church and state and prevents the government from passing laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over the other. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216, 83 S.Ct. 1560. The United States Supreme Court has explained that there are three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: `sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)). In Lemon, the Court provided a three-part test to determine whether a neutral law violates the Establishment Clause: (1) the law must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the primary or principal effect of the law must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the law must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105. More recent cases examining the Establishment Clause have clarified that excessive government entanglement is merely a factor to consider in evaluating the second prong; that is, whether the principal effect of the statute is to advance or inhibit religion. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). [5] As particularly relevant to the analysis of the First Amendment challenge in this case, the Supreme Court has also held that the First Amendment prevents courts from resolving internal church disputes that would require adjudication of questions of religious doctrine. [6] See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). For example, the Supreme Court has stated that it is not within `the judicial function and judicial competence' of civil courts to determine which of two competing interpretations of scripture are correct. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). Instead, civil courts must defer to the interpretations of religious doctrine made by the highest ecclesiastical tribunal. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372. Thus, the First Amendment provides churches with the power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. 143; see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724-25, 96 S.Ct. 2372. In Kedroff, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York state statute passed specifically to address an intra-church property dispute. 344 U.S. at 121, 73 S.Ct. 143. Moreover, in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, the Supreme Court held that the Illinois Supreme Court had no authority, consistent with the First Amendment, to adjudicate a dispute concerning a priest's defrockment by the mother church. 426 U.S. at 724-25, 96 S.Ct. 2372. In reversing the judgment of the state court, the Supreme Court explained: The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that it rests upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes.... To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide ... religious law [governing church polity]... would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine. For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them. Id. at 708-09, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 369, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Intrachurch disputes, however, must be distinguished from disputes between churches and third parties. As then Justice Rehnquist observed, in rejecting the argument by the United Methodist Church that the Free Exercise Clause barred the Court's exercise of jurisdiction in a civil dispute involving a third party: In my view, applicant plainly is wrong when it asserts that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent a civil court from independently examining, and making the ultimate decision regarding, the structure and actual operation of a hierarchical church and its constituent units in an action such as this. There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese .... But this Court has never suggested that those constraints similarly apply outside the context of such intraorganization disputes.... [ Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese and other related cases] are premised on a perceived danger that in resolving intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. Such considerations are not applicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged. General Council on Fin. & Admin. v. California Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1355, 1372-73, 99 S.Ct. 35, 58 L.Ed.2d 63 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978) (emphasis added). A court thus must determine whether the dispute is an ecclesiastical one about `discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law,' or whether it is a case in which [it] should hold religious organizations liable in civil courts for `purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization.' Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir.1997) (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372; and General Council, 439 U.S. at 1373, 99 S.Ct. 35). See also Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. 601 ([T]here are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without `establishing' churches to which the property is awarded.) From this overview of the applicable United States Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that although the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses protect different interests, the analysis under the two clauses is intertwined. Thus, both clauses of the First Amendment must be analyzed in determining whether the reach of the constitutional protection extends to what amounts to an immunity from a tort claim where the religious institution is a defendant. Although an entanglement inquiry is associated with the adjudication of an Establishment Clause claim, the extent to which the courts will be called upon to determine matters of church practice also implicates the Free Exercise Clause. With this framework in mind, we turn to the split of authority among the jurisdictions that have considered the issue presented in this case.