Opinion ID: 2034518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overview of the Implied Consent Law

Text: The question presented by this appeal is whether Minn.Stat. § 169.123 (1982), which mandates suspension of a driver's license because of a refusal to take a chemical test for alcohol concentration or failure of a chemical test by registering an alcohol concentration of .10 or more, is violative of due process or the privilege against self-incrimination. The elements of an implied consent violation are clearly defined by the statute: Subd. 2. Implied consent; conditions; election as to type of test. (a) Any person who drives, operates or is in physical control of a motor vehicle within this state consents, subject to the provisions of this section and section 169.121, to a chemical test of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance. The test shall be administered at the direction of a peace officer. The test may be required of a person when an officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169.121 and one of the following conditions exist: (1) the person has been lawfully placed under arrest for violation of section 169.121, or an ordinance in conformity therewith; or (2) the person has been involved in a motor vehicle accident or collision resulting in property damage, personal injury, or death; or (3) the person has refused to take the screening test provided for by section 169.121, subdivision 6; or (4) the screening test was administered and recorded an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. No action may be taken against the person for declining to take a direct blood test, if offered, unless an alternative test was offered. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(a) (1982) (emphasis added). The statute goes on to require that when requesting a test, the peace officer must notify the driver of the consequences of a decision to test or not test. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b) (1982). A final element in implied consent procedure is that a peace officer must afford the driver a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel before opting to test or not test. This requirement was established by this court in Prideaux v. State, Commissioner of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976). Administrative revocations under the implied consent law are 90 days for test failures and 6 months for test refusals. Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1982). The law is designed to encourage the taking of tests and to remove suspected and certifiable drunken drivers from the road. Under the system in effect prior to July 1, 1982, a driver was given a 30-day temporary license with the notice of revocation. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5a (1980). The driver then had the right to appeal the license revocation by requesting a judicial hearing. If the driver did appeal, he was issued a temporary license until a final determination on the revocation was made. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5a (1980). If no appeal was requested, the revocation became effective at the end of the 30-day period. This system resulted in approximately one request for judicial review out of every three implied consent violations reported. During 1981, of the approximately 33,000 implied consent violations reported, there were approximately 10,500 requests for judicial review. Out of these 10,500 requests for review, 326 drivers were able to avoid license revocation. During the 1982 legislative session Minn. Stat. § 169.123 was amended in order to reduce the time lapse between an implied consent violation and the imposition of license revocation. The old law delayed all revocations for 30 days from the notice of revocation. The new law provides just 7 days. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subds. 5 and 5a (1982). The old law enabled additional delay by a request for judicial review. The new amendments provide that [t]he filing of the petition shall not stay the revocation or denial. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5c (1982). While removing the opportunity for lengthy delay, the 1982 amendments simultaneously created a more efficient system for obtaining review of the revocation order. The amendments provided for two distinct avenues of review: administrative review by the Department of Public Safety, and judicial review in a county or municipal court. The administrative review mechanism is entirely new. The statute provides as follows: Administrative review. At any time during a period of revocation imposed under this section a person may request in writing a review of the order of revocation by the commissioner of public safety. Upon receiving a request the commissioner or his designee shall review the order, the evidence upon which the order was based, and any other material information brought to the attention of the commissioner, and determine whether sufficient cause exists to sustain the order. Within 15 days of receiving the request the commissioner shall report in writing the results of his review. The review provided in this subdivision is not subject to the contested case provisions of the administrative procedure act in sections 14.01 to 14.70. The availability of administrative review for an order of revocation shall have no effect upon the availability of judicial review under this section. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5b (1982). This provision contemplates an informal review procedure which is designed to remedy obvious errors. The procedure is speedy, promising a result within 15 days, and it accords a certain measure of due process to subjects of revocation orders. Drivers requesting administrative review are asked to fill out an administrative review form setting forth facts pertaining to why the revocation is not valid. Drivers are then asked to sign the form, have it notarized, and submit it to the commissioner. Each numbered paragraph of the form sets forth an element of the implied consent violation and solicits the driver's version of the facts pertaining to that element. Administrative reviews are conducted by civil service employees known as driver safety analysts. All employees in this classification have past experience with the laws and rules governing license revocation. They have also undergone training in administrative review and in the legal principles in this area. In addition to the written request for review, drivers may appear in person for administrative review on any business day in St. Paul or at regularly scheduled times in locations throughout the state. Counsel may appear with the driver, although there are no provisions for subpoenaing or cross-examining witnesses. In conducting an administrative review, the review officer considers information provided by the driver and all relevant reports provided by law enforcement agencies. The review officer reports his findings to the driver within 15 days of request for review. The report includes findings on each element of the offense. Within 30 days following receipt of the notice and order of revocation a person may petition the court for judicial review. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5c (1982). This may be done while pursuing administrative review. The judicial review provision, as amended in 1982, requires that a hearing be conducted at the earliest practicable date, and in no event later than 60 days after the filing of a petition for judicial review. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 6 (1982). Judicial district administrators are directed to implement this requirement through efficient scheduling and the transfer of cases within their districts to expedite hearings. Court administrators in the 10 Minnesota judicial districts have established a scheduling system for implied consent cases whereby judicial review will normally be had from within 10 to 40 days following the filing of a petition. Appellants raise the following issues on this appeal: (1) Whether the prehearing license revocation provisions of Minn.Stat. § 169.123 (1982) violate due process of law as guaranteed by the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. (2) Whether Minn.Stat. § 169.123 (1982) compels persons to incriminate themselves in violation of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 1. Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution. A license to drive is an important property interest. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). The state does not dispute that appellants' licenses are property interests subject to due process protection; rather, it concludes that the existing procedures, as previously discussed, provide all the process that is constitutionally due before a driver can be deprived of his license. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The resolution of the issue of whether the procedures provided under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1982) are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that identification of the specific dictates of procedural due process requires the consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. The United States Supreme Court faced the due process question presented by a prehearing implied consent license revocation in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979). Montrym involved a class action challenge to the Massachusetts implied consent system. The Massachusetts system is similar to the new Minnesota system in most respects, but distinguishable in some. The license revocation in Massachusetts, unlike Minnesota, is only for test refusals. The revocation is based upon a report from a peace officer to the state licensing agency, and takes immediate effect upon issuance. The post-revocation review system in Massachusetts, like Minnesota, provides multiple levels of review. The first is an appearance before the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. Massachusetts Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 24(1)(g) (West 1975). This appearance is available immediately and a decision is apparently available within 2 to 10 days. 443 U.S. at 7-8, n. 5, 99 S.Ct. at 2615-2616, n. 5. An appeal is provided to a more formal administrative body known as the Board of Appeal. The Massachusetts statute does not specify how soon this hearing must be held or when a decision must be rendered. Massachusetts Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 90, § 28 (West 1975). The United States Supreme Court examined the Massachusetts implied consent system under the due process analysis used in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra . The Montrym court concluded that the compelling interest in highway safety justifies the Commonwealth in making a summary suspension effective pending the outcome of the prompt postsuspension hearing available. 443 U.S. at 19, 99 S.Ct. at 2621. A comparison of the Minnesota and Massachusetts prehearing revocation systems employing the Eldridge factors shows that the Minnesota system is not significantly distinguishable from that of Massachusetts. The three factors employed by the Montrym court were: (1) the nature and weight of the private interest affected by the official action challenged; (2) the likelihood of erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the procedures used; and (3) the state interests served by the summary procedures used, as well as the administrative and fiscal burden that would result from substitute procedures sought. We will examine the Minnesota and Massachusetts implied consent systems using each of these factors.