Opinion ID: 342519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the subpoena

Text: 48 The subpoena directed the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission the next day to deliver to the Subcommittee, inter alia, all records in its possession relating to oil and gas lease extensions on federal lands which involve Ashland Oil Co. 49 The Subcommittee claims it complied with the Rules of the House in issuing such subpoena and that accordingly the subpoena is valid. In particular it relies on Rule XI, cl. 2. (m), which provides: 50 (1) For the purpose of carrying out any of its functions and duties under this rule and Rule X . . . any committee, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized (subject to subparagraph (2)(A) of this paragraph) . . . 51 (B) to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents 52 as it deems necessary. . . . 53 (2)(A) A subpena may be issued by a committee or subcommittee under subparagraph (1)(B) in the conduct of any investigation or activity or series of investigations or activities, only when authorized by a majority of the members of the committee . . . . 54 Rules of the House of Representatives, 94th Congress. (Emphasis added). 55 A resolution of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which the Subcommittee claims authorized it to issue the subpoena in question, was offered on April 17, 1975, by Mr. Staggers, Chairman of the Committee. The resolution provided: 56 RESOLVED, that in accordance with Rule XI, Clause 2. (m)(1) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, . . . (is) authorized to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as they deem necessary in the conduct of such Subcommittees of any investigation or activity or series of investigations or activities within their jurisdiction as set forth in Rule X, Clause 1(b) of said House Rules and the Rules and procedures of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. (Emphasis added). 57 (J.A. 407). In that Congress, at that time, 43 members constituted the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 2 A majority of the members of the Committee would thus be 22 members. Committee records, however, disclose that only 21 members of the Committee voted for the resolution. 3 This is one member short of the required majority of the members of the Committee. Thus the subpoena issued by the Subcommittee was not properly authorized unless the rule is to be construed other than according to its plain meaning, as contended by the Subcommittee chairman, Congressman Moss. His brief and memorandum assert that his Subcommittee has duly authorized, in conformance with the above quoted provision of Rule XI, cl. 2. (m), 94th Congress, to issue the subpoena because the authorizing resolution was passed by a majority of a quorum of the full committee. Supplemental Memorandum of Mr. Moss, filed May 14, 1976, p. 2 (emphasis added). 58 In the House of Representatives a quorum consists of a majority of the committee. 4 There is no question there that a majority of the committee means of the full committee. Thus 22 members would constitute a quorum and, according to the construction the Subcommittee here advances, 12 members of the 43-member committee would be a majority of a quorum and fully able to authorize a Subcommittee subpoena if only 22 members were present. The Subcommittee thus contends that a majority of the committee means 22 members in one rule and that a majority of the members of the Committee could mean 12 members in the other rule. The Supplemental Memorandum of the Subcommittee also argues at p. 2: 59 The House of Representatives has consistently interpreted a majority of the members of the Committee (House Rule XI, § 2(m)(2) (94th Congress)) to mean a majority of a quorum present and voting. (See attached correspondence between Congressman Moss and Speaker of the House, the Honorable Carl Albert; App. 142 (affidavit of Michael Lemov P 7)). 60 In support of the above position the Supplemental Memorandum attaches a copy of a letter of May 13, 1976 from the Honorable Carl Albert, M.C., Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, to the Chairman of the Subcommittee, the Honorable John E. Moss, M.C. The text of this letter in its entirety reads as follows: Dear Mr. Chairman: 61 I have received your letter of May 11, 1976, regarding the interpretation of House Rule XI, clause 2(m), which authorizes committees of the House of Representatives to issue subpenas. 62 There is no indication in the legislative history of the rule, which was adopted in the 93d Congress to become effective January 3, 1975, of any intent to require a different procedure for voting on subpenas than on other votes taken in House committees. Under the customary and correct practice of the House of Representatives, which derives its rule-making authority from the Constitution (Article I, Section 5, which provides that a majority of the House shall constitute a quorum for doing business), committee action is valid which is authorized by a majority of those Members voting, a quorum being present. It would create an anomalous situation to require a more stringent standard for authorizing the issuance of a subpena than for finding a witness in contempt of a committee for refusing to honor such a subpena, or for taking a final committee action in ordering a measure or matter reported to the House. 63 This letter correctly states that in the House of Representatives a majority of legal votes cast, a quorum being present, is generally sufficient to carry a proposition. This can be proved by a cursory examination of the proceedings in the House over any long or short period of time. And the Rules of the House are the rules of its committees and subcommittees so far as applicable . . . 5 This is also the clear rule of the common law. 6 Moreover: 64 Where a majority or other proportion of votes is required without specifying whether the vote refers to the entire membership or to the members present, or to the members present and voting, the general rule is that the proportion refers to the number present and voting. 65 Mason's Legislative Manual, Sec. 510, Para. 2 (1970), and cases cited therein. However: 66 Where a . . . controlling provision of law requires a majority vote of the entire membership or of all members present or any other number or proportion to take action; that vote must be obtained, and a vote less than that number, although a majority of those present and voting, a quorum being present, is not sufficient. 67 Mason's Legislative Manual, Sec. 511, Para. 1 (1970) (emphasis added). 7 68 There are many instances in which controlling provisions of law and the rules require something more than a majority vote of a quorum. Several instances appear in the Rules of the House of Representatives. Rule XXVII, cl. 1, for suspension of rules requires a vote of two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present . . . .; Rule XXIV, cl. 7, provides that the normal business of the House shall not be altered unless the House by a two-thirds vote on motion to dispense therewith shall otherwise determine; Rule XXIV, cl. 6, for a similar purpose requires a two-thirds vote on motion to dispense therewith . . .; and Rule XI, cl. 4. (b) to call up for consideration a report of the Rules Committee on the same day it is presented to the House requires a vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members voting . . . . 69 The Constitution in several instances also requires more than a majority vote of a quorum. For the Senate to convict on impeachment requires the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. To expel a member from Congress requires the Concurrence of two thirds. . . . Id., § 5. A roll call in either House shall be entered on the journal at the Desire of one fifth of those Present. . . . Id., § 5. Passing a bill over a President's veto requires for both the House and the Senate two thirds of that House. . . . Id., § 7. Similarly, Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary if the President disapproves of same shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives . . . . Id., § 7. The President may make treaties provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . . U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary . . . . Id., art. V. A constitutional convention to propose amendments may be called upon Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States . . . . Id., art. V. Constitutional amendments shall be valid when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . . Id., art. V. The Twelfth Amendment for the election of President requires a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed . . . ., and in electing a President in the House of Representatives a quorum consists of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all of the states shall be necessary to a choice. The same amendment provides that the Vice President shall be the person having the greatest number of votes . . . if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed . . . ., and, if no person has a majority, the Senate chooses the Vice President at a meeting at which a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. The fourteenth amendment, § 3, provides that the disability thereby imposed for having engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States could be removed by Congress by a vote of two-thirds of each House . . . . 70 So it is customary and usual in many instances for Congress to be required to act by some required vote which exceeds a majority of a quorum. 71 We must thus decide whether Congress in adopting Rule XI, cl. 2. (m)(2)(a), supra, requiring a majority of the members of the committee intended to require a majority of the membership of the committee or a majority of a quorum of the committee. As indicated above this can mean a maximum difference between requiring 22 members or 12 members to authorize subpoenas. This is a difference between a majority and a minority of the committee. The Speaker's letter, supra, asserts that 72 There is no indication in the legislative history of the rule . . . of any intent to require a different procedure for voting on subpoenas than on other votes taken in House committees. 73 This statement is in error. When the House of Representatives in the 2d Session of the 93d Congress adopted H.Res. 988 it sought to reform the subpoena-issuing practices of its committees. The resolution changed the prior rule, which had allowed a majority of a quorum, into a requirement of a majority of the members to issue subpoenas. See, e. g., Rules of the House of Representatives, 93d Cong. XI, cl. 2. (b) and id., 94th Cong. XI, cl. 2. (m) (2)(a), supra. The resolution making this change in the long-standing rule was entitled the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974. Requiring a majority of the members of the committee, rather than a majority of a quorum, to authorize the issuance of subpoenas was a part of that reform. Accompanying the Resolution to the floor of the House was the Report of the sponsoring Select Committee on Committees, which, with respect to the SUBPENA POWER, stated: 74 The select committee proposes certain standardized procedures and safeguards covering subpenas that would apply uniformly to all committees. The Committees on Appropriations, Government Operations, and Standards of Official Conduct would continue to have standing subpena authority, while others would be required to receive House authorization for each activity or series of activities. However, in the case of all committees, a majority of the membership of each committee would be necessary to authorize the issuance of a subpena or group of subpenas. Compliance could be enforced only as authorized or directed by the House. 8 (Emphasis added). 75 This clearly indicates that the intent of the authors of the Rule was to require the votes of a majority of the membership  and since the membership of the Committee is just one figure 43 the Rule would clearly require 22 votes to issue a subpoena. We find no distinction between a majority of the membership of each committee, as used in the Report, and a majority of the members of the committee, as used in the Rule which the Report discussed. The membership of the committee is 43 and there are 43 members of the committee. 76 The interpretation of the words of the members to refer to all persons named to the body is the unequivocal rule of common law. This was the holding in the Supreme Court of Judicature of Indiana in Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 315 (1863), in which the court, regarding a city council's vote to authorize certain city improvements, construed a city charter providing that improvements could be ordered by the council, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members thereof . . . The court wrote: 77 The order appears to have been voted for and passed, by two-thirds of the members then present, but the transcript very clearly shows that the city council of Logansport is composed of 10 members, and the charter, as has been seen, affirmatively requires the concurrence, to such order, of two-thirds of the members. As the order in question was concurred in by only 6 members, and that number not being two-thirds of the city council, it must be deemed a nullity. 78 20 Ind. at 317 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama held, in Anniston v. Davis, 98 Ala. 629, 13 So. 331 (1893), regarding the contested election of one Davis to succeed to the seat of a resigned council member: 79 It will be noticed that the common council is composed of eight members. At the meeting at which Davis was elected only five members were present. To fill the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Riddle by the terms of the charter a majority vote of the remaining members  was necessary. The minutes of the council as corrected show that only three members, one less than a majority of the remaining members, voted for Mr. Davis. If this be true, he was never legally elected. The council have no authority to disregard the charter provision. No subsequent approval or ratification could legalize or make valid a disregard of this mandate of the charter. The rule that a majority of a quorum controls has no application under such a provision. 80 13 So. at 332 (emphasis added). A similar interpretation was given to a majority of the members of the board (emphasis added) in Houser v. School District of South Sioux City, 189 Neb. 323, 202 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (1972) against arguments similar to those advanced here that the language meant a majority of a quorum. In reaching its decision on a Nebraska statute the court stated: 81 We see no distinction between the phrasing a majority of all members, and a majority of members. . . . The language used indicates to us the intention to require a majority of all members of the board, and not a majority of the quorum. 82 202 N.W.2d at 624. I find no cases to the contrary. 83 In looking at the House Rule, and its history, it is also supportive of the above interpretation to note that if the House had intended the normal rules in the House to apply there would not have been any necessity to adopt the provision that it did adopt. It could have just said nothing about the vote required to issue subpenas and the general majority of a quorum rule would have stated the required vote. Thus, what the Subcommittee are arguing for is an interpretation that would make matters as though the reform change was never adopted. But, as the Committee Report and the Rule both indicate, the obvious intent was to reform the subpoena issuing practices, inter alia, by requiring a majority vote of the members (membership). 84 To permit a minority of the members of a committee to control its actions in matters as important as issuing subpoenas is contrary to democratic principles and breeds congressional absenteeism. It allows a small number of committee members to exercise vital governmental powers over the rights of citizens that a majority should exercise. When Congress was reforming committee practices by providing safeguards against abuses in the issuance of subpoenas by committees, they were well advised to require a vote by a majority of the members of a committee for the issuance of subpoenas. Subpoenas are very powerful weapons and capable of much abuse. The instant subpoenas are a good example of the tremendous power that may be exercised by Congress through these investigatory instruments. They seek to compel the surrender to Congress of trade secrets worth millions of dollars, the value of which can be utterly destroyed by mere disclosure to the public. If the House does not wish to require a vote of a majority of the members of a committee before issuing such an intrusive document, the House can easily change the rule. There is nothing to the argument that an anomalous situation would be created by such interpretation of the rule because a majority of a quorum of the full House (435 members at maximum) can pass a contempt resolution. That is the rule in the full House, and Rule XI states the rule in committee. This likewise is no technical point, because given the dire consequences of disclosure of the subject data, the committee might be unable to get the additional vote to authorize the subpoena or the committee might impose some needed safeguards against disclosure of the data. 85 Since the necessary vote was not obtained for the issuance of the subpoenas in question it follows that the subpoena was invalid. 9