Opinion ID: 2995203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Category Two: Things in Interstate

Text: Commerce The plain language of sec. 2251(a) regulates the movement of visual depictions of child pornography in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court’s formulation of its three analytical categories in Lopez explicitly included within the second category the regulation of things in interstate commerce, 514 U.S. at 558./3 Although some recent decisions have articulated a reluctance to include within this category the power to regulate, as opposed to protect, things in interstate commerce,/4 in Black, 125 F.3d at 460, we nevertheless held that the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 228, is permissible under category two because it regulates the nonpayment of interstate child support obligations, thus regulating a thing in interstate commerce./5 Our court has upheld, as consistent with Lopez, the prohibition of the possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1), see Bell, 70 F.3d at 497- 98,/6 and the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119, see United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 2000). Although Bell, stressing the statute’s explicit jurisdictional element, did not peg its analysis to one of the Lopez constructs, and Taylor, relying on category three, saw no necessity to discuss category two, see Taylor, 226 F.3d at 599, we later acknowledged in Petersen that both of these statutes are properly characterized as permissible exercises of Congress’ Commerce Clause power under category two. See Petersen, 236 F.3d at 856. Notably, our colleagues in the Tenth Circuit also have determined that category two encompasses congressional regulation of things in interstate commerce. See United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1635 (2001) (holding that sec. 922(g) is viewed best under categories one and two because it orders that the channels of interstate commerce be kept clear of firearms (category one) and addresses items sent in interstate commerce (category two)). We believe that the symbiotic relationship of categories one and two, which the Tenth Circuit aptly perceived in its analysis of the firearms provision, also is present with respect to the provision before us today prohibiting the transportation of child pornography. Through the invocation of an explicit jurisdictional nexus, Congress has limited the scope of its regulation to the transportation of the item in interstate commerce. Thus, it has sought to prevent the spread of pornographic material depicting children by forbidding its presence in interstate commerce.