Opinion ID: 1288202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior West Virginia Law Governing Forum Selection Clauses

Text: We are equally perplexed with the majority's position that this Court has generally approved forum selection clauses. While this Court in General Electric Company v. Keyser, 166 W.Va. 456, 275 S.E.2d 289 (1981), acknowledged in a footnote [3] that such clauses are not per se invalid, it was further recognized in that footnote that even though our law on this point is skeletal, it does indicate that [forum selection] contract clauses which affect such matters as jurisdiction and the like should be carefully analyzed. Id. at 461-62 n. 2, 275 S.E.2d at 292-93 n. 2. While omitting this portion of the footnote from its quotation [4] the majority did include the paragraph noting: As the Federal court observed, West Virginia appears not to subscribe to the rule that choice of forum clauses are void per se. `Rather the rule of most jurisdictions and the rule that this Court believes that West Virginia should and would adopt is that such clauses will be enforced only when found to be reasonable and just'. Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford Inc., 423 F.Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D.W.Va.1976). See also, Kolendo v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F.Supp. 983 (S.D.W.Va.1980). See Op. at 235. By selectively quoting from Keyser, the majority reaches the sweeping conclusion that the law of this state favors enforcing forum selection clauses. An objective reading of the entire footnote hardly supports such a conclusion. Moreover, there are no subsequent cases in our jurisprudence suggesting a move in that direction in this area of our law. The extensions of forum selection clause law in this case to cover and govern the tort claims brought in the West Virginia suit before us ignores the very spirit of a reasonable and just outcome contemplated by the Court in Keyser. The majority likewise ignores the express caution in Keyser that forum selection clauses affecting jurisdiction and the likee.g., venueshould be carefully analyzed. 166 W.Va. at 461 n. 2, 275 S.E.2d at 292 n. 2. As a result of the majority's reliance on selective portions of a footnote, Mr. Caperton's individual right to due process and a fair and just determination of his claims has been foreclosed. [5] Mr. Caperton as an individual was not a party to the coal supply agreement (hereinafter also referred to as CSA) and did not have standing in his individual capacity to enforce the CSA. The majority has left him without remedy or a place where one could be sought. The long and the short of it is that the majority simply pushed right past the cautious and judicious language of Keyser to construct and apply sweeping new law clearly fashioned to unequivocally deprive Plaintiffs, both corporate and individual, of the relief to which they are entitled.