Opinion ID: 1441366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Appellant's Theories of Liability

Text: In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff can file an action for injuries caused by the failure of a manufacturer to give adequate warnings under either a theory of strict liability or negligence. See McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 578 (D.C. 1996); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prod., 486 A.2d 712, 721 (D.C.1985). Under either theory, the plaintiff must show: (1) the appropriate standard of care; (2) a violation of that standard; and (3) that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. McNeil, supra, 686 A.2d at 578. The advantage of the strict liability is, however, that the defendant cannot use contributory negligence as a defense. Id. (citing Payne, supra, 486 A.2d at 721 n. 9). [3] Here, the defense of contributory negligence was not invoked, and the jury did not receive such an instruction. Thus, Johnson received the same benefit as if she had been allowed to proceed on a strict liability theory. Under District of Columbia law, a mother cannot recover for the emotional distress caused by witnessing harm that was negligently inflicted on her child alone. Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1063 (D.C. 1990). Rather, the District follows the zone of danger approach. Id. at 1067. In order to recover, the plaintiff must show that she was physically endangered by the defendant's negligent activity. Id. The record shows that Johnson failed to present any evidence that she was herself in danger from the hot water. Therefore, this claim could not lie. Lastly, the jury concluded that appellant had not proven a negligent failure to warn against any of the corporate appellees; nor any claim against the District. Accordingly, upon consideration of all of the contentions raised, we find no errors which warrant reversal and we therefore affirm the judgment. So ordered.