Opinion ID: 1541540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress Melusky's Identification

Text: On review, we will not overturn a trial justice's decision to deny a motion to suppress an identification unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Texter, 923 A.2d 568, 573 (R.I.2007). In determining whether or not the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress an identification was clearly erroneous, we assess the available evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Id. We use a two-step procedure to determine whether the identification procedures the police employed violated a defendant's right to due process of law and the identification must be excluded. State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 293 (R.I.1990). First, the [C]ourt must consider the question of whether the procedures used in the identification were unnecessarily suggestive. Id. If the procedure is found to have been unnecessarily suggestive, the second step requires a determination of whether the identification still has independent reliability despite the suggestive nature of the identification procedure. Id. (citing State v. Nicoletti, 471 A.2d 613, 615 (R.I.1984)). A witness's out-of-court identification is not admissible at trial if the identification procedure employed by the police was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to a substantial likelihood of misidentification that the accused was denied due process of law. State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1269 (R.I.1981) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)). The United States Supreme Court has said that, [i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process   . Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198, 93 S.Ct. 375. This Court never has adopted a per se rule of exclusion when police officers have employed a procedure in which they show a single photograph or a single individual to a witness for the purpose of identifying a suspect. See State v. Hall, 940 A.2d 645, 653 (R.I.2008) (citing Texter, 923 A.2d at 574). In fact, we have said that admission of evidence of a show up without more does not violate due process, id. (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)), and we never have required the state to show evidence of exigency when such a procedure is used. Texter, 923 A.2d at 574 (citing State v. Ramos, 574 A.2d 1213, 1215 (R.I.1990)). It is our opinion that the hearing justice prematurely concluded that the identification procedure, in which the police showed Melusky two copies of the same photograph, one being a blowup of the other, was unnecessarily suggestive. The hearing justice concluded that this violated the first part of the test simply on the basis that a single individual's photograph was shown, but he did not consider whether the procedure resulted in a substantial likelihood of misidentification. We believe this was error. Although we agree that the better procedure is the use of a photograph array, we cannot, from this record, conclude that the procedure used here unnecessarily exacerbated the risk of misidentification. We are troubled by the fact that Melusky was shown a single photograph of an individual, who technically did not fit the original description of Hispanic, as provided by Melusky. However, this, without more, is not enough to suggest that the risk of misidentification was substantial and this should have ended the inquiry. At this point, both the out-of-court and in-court identifications were admissible without further analysis. See State v. Lynch, 770 A.2d 840, 844 (R.I.2001). In any event, the hearing justice then engaged in the second part of the test and permitted Melusky's in-court identification of defendant, concluding that it was independently reliable. Assessing whether Melusky's identification of defendant was independently reliable requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, and, in particular, the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. State v. Parker, 472 A.2d 1206, 1209 (R.I. 1984) (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375). The hearing justice concluded that Melusky, whom he characterized as keen and alert, had ample time and opportunity to view the suspects as they gave their order and later while they ate in the car. The hearing justice was impressed with the level of detail Melusky recited, from the type of pizza ordered to details of the suspects' conversation. He also concluded that Melusky paid a high degree of attention to the men because of the fancy car they were driving. The hearing justice noted that Melusky testified that he knew right away that the person depicted in the photograph was the same man he saw on that day. Finally, the length of time between his observation of defendant on January 1 and the identification on January 28 was not so long as to render the identification unreliable. The defendant argues that the hearing justice failed to consider the accuracy of Melusky's prior description, in particular because he believed that the suspect was Hispanic; however, T.J. is Indian. It is clear that Biggers requires that the presiding justice conduct a holistic analysis of the circumstances, which includes weighing the various above-mentioned factors. Here, we believe the hearing justice did consider Melusky's prior description of defendant as Hispanic, and he weighed it in light of Melusky's surprising attention to detail. T.J. certainly is not Hispanic. However, Melusky testified at trial that he [was] not sure what nationality [he was], but not white. Melusky also stated during a pretrial hearing that he thought the suspect was sort of Hispanic, [but he did not] really know what nationality. It is persuasive to us that this description, even if lacking in its precision, was the best description this nineteen-year-old Portsmouth pizza delivery person could convey with regard to the ethnicity of the suspect. We cannot expect him to pinpoint the suspect's exact country of origin. Rather, any discrepancies about his identification, including what he meant when he used the word Hispanic, was an appropriate topic that could have been explored on cross-examination. It is apparent that the Biggers factors weighed heavily in the state's favor. Even though, in this case, we conclude that the record does not support a finding that the showup procedure was unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, it is our inescapable conclusion that the hearing justice was not clearly wrong when he admitted Melusky's in-court identification. Therefore, we affirm that Melusky's identification was independently reliable and properly admitted into evidence at defendant's trial.