Opinion ID: 1778740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the complaint tribunal improperly failed to impose discipline against logan for his misconduct.

Text: ¶ 47. Previously, this Court has enumerated the purposes of imposing discipline on an attorney who has been found in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Asher v. Mississippi Bar, 661 So.2d 722 (Miss.1995). The purpose is not to punish the guilty attorney, but to protect the public, the administration of justice, to maintain appropriate professional standards, and to deter similar conduct. Mississippi State Bar Assn. v. A Mississippi Attorney, 489 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Miss.1986). ¶ 48. Factors considered by this Court when imposing punishment on a violating attorney are: 1. Nature of the misconduct involved; 2. The need to deter similar misconduct; 3. The preservation of the dignity and reputation of the profession; 4. The protection of the public; and, 5. Sanctions imposed in similar cases. Mississippi State Bar v. Blackmon, 600 So.2d 166, 173 (Miss.1992). ¶ 49. Logan's misconduct can be characterized as deceit. The need to deter such conduct is clear and pressing. Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So.2d 1213, 1222 (Miss.1993). Proliferation of similar actions would undoubtedly produce serious adverse consequences for the reputation and dignity of the profession as well as a general erosion of the principle that our society accomplishes justice through adherence to the `rule of law'. Id. Logan's misconduct does not present a danger to the public. ¶ 50. With regard to sanctions imposed in similar cases, the parties cite no authority to guide this Court. The Bar asks for a substantial suspension if Logan is found to have violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(a and f). If Logan is found to have violated Rules 3.5(a and b) and 8.4(a, d, and f), the Bar asks for a relatively short suspension. ¶ 51. In mitigation, Logan points to the fact that his actions were undertaken in good faith in an attempt to resolve a procedural dilemma. Magistrate Weldy's testimony supports the finding that such communication was not improper ex parte communication. Justice Lee stated that the original mandate issued was an erroneous mandate. However, such support does not diminish the fact that Logan continued to withhold his actions from his opponent, even when it became apparent that Owen and the bank, caught in the middle, had a need to know of Logan's efforts to get the issue of interest back before the Court. ¶ 52. Logan argues that he did not intend to gain any advantage through his actions, he merely wanted this Court to correct an erroneous mandate. He asserts that he has a distinguished record of service the past 33 years and no prior history of disciplinary action. Additionally, he notes that he has already received a reprimand delivered in open court by the trial judge in his oral findings and conclusions in this matter. ¶ 53. We find that an appropriate punishment in this case is as follows: 1) public reprimand; 2) costs associated with the petition for extraordinary relief filed by Owen and those incurred in taking Logan's deposition should be assessed to Logan; and, 3) award of attorney's fees in the amount of $5,000 to Owen for having to file a petition for extraordinary relief.