Opinion ID: 6331052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limited and Excluded Testimony

Text: Moving to the Timpsons’ second point of error, they claim the court improperly: (1) limited Johnny’s testimony; (2) limited and excluded the hybrid witnesses’ testimonies; and (3) prevented them from taking then-Ambassador Haley’s deposition. We review each in turn, cognizant that “evidentiary rulings are entitled to substantial deference and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion,” which occurs “only when the district court act[s] arbitrarily or irrationally.” United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A witness’s competency to testify is a threshold question of law lying exclusively in the trial court’s discretion. United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 1984). When a party questions a witness’s competency, the trial court must satisfy itself that the witness is competent to testify. Id. Though it did not need to conduct a formal hearing, the court did so here and found it “reasonable to question whether or not [Johnny] possesse[d] the legal competence to testify.” J.A. 4783. In response to the court’s questions at the hearing, Johnny correctly stated his name and age, recognized the importance of telling the truth, identified the current President of the United States, and confirmed that he lived with his sister. He could not, however, name 17 his state of residence, state the current year or his year of birth, identify his claims with any particularity beyond the fact that they related to the arm-burning incident, or define what it meant to swear an oath. The transcript indicates several times where Johnny’s responses were “inaudible” or the court otherwise struggled to understand him. See J.A. 4784–88, 4813. After hearing argument, the court found that Johnny met “the minimum qualifications of competence to the extent that he underst[ood] the importance of telling the truth, and that telling the truth is the right thing to do, that lying is wrong, and that . . . not telling the truth would carry with it negative consequences.” J.A. 4814. And that was enough “to get over the low bar” of competency. Id. But the court also determined that Johnny was “not a reliable historian based upon his response . . . about his date of birth, and his inability to tell [the court] what state he lives in and some of the other responses.” Id. As such, the court found that the probative value of Johnny’s testimony would be substantially outweighed by the prejudice involved: [There would be] confusion to the jury in that . . . it would likely result in both the direct and cross examinations being nothing more than testimony by the respective attorneys with Mr. Timpson having limited ability to communicate either his agreement or disagreement with what the attorney was propounding in their question. J.A. 4815. As a result, the court allowed the Timpsons to call Johnny, but limited his testimony to “very basic things” like “his name, where he lives, who [he] lives with, how long he’s lived there,” and “if his arms were injured.” Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See Odom, 736 F.2d at 111 (stating that the court may consider “the witness’ demeanor and testimony at the time, 18 his ability to recall, his knowledge of the facts, and his ability to narrate, then resolve the issue as one of credibility more than one of competency”). Indeed, Johnny’s testimony during trial supported the court’s decision to limit it. For example, during his direct examination, when asked how old he was, Johnny responded: A: I’m 50. Q: Sir? A: 50. I 51. I’m 50. I’m 58. Q. Are you 61? A: 58. Q: You think you’re 58. A: (Witness moves head up and down.) J.A. 5480. Johnny was 61 years old at the time. And like the preliminary hearing, the courtroom reporter repeatedly stated during Johnny’s trial testimony that he was “undiscernible” and that she could not understand him. See J.A. 5481–82, 5485–86, 5488, 5490. When asked if he could read and write, Johnny responded, “Yes. No. . . . I can read. I can read. I can read.” J.A. 5485. But when asked to do so, he responded “I didn’t learn that.” J.A. 5486. Given these inconsistent answers to simple questions coupled with the difficulty in understanding Johnny, we have no difficulty concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting his testimony. The Timpsons have also failed to show they were prejudiced by the court’s ruling. They have made no proffer of what facts Johnny would have testified about that were not already in evidence. Nor have they detailed how those facts would have supported their claims. See Nicholas v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 542–43 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding no abuse of discretion as to the denial of a discovery request where the complaining party 19 “ha[d] not been substantially prejudiced”). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s limitation of Johnny’s testimony during trial on this alternate ground as well.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding in part and limiting in part the testimonies of the Timpsons’ hybrid witnesses. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) requires any party who identifies a witness it may call at trial to include “a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case.” See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The requirement of a written report in paragraph (2)(B) . . . applies only to those experts who are retained or specially employed to provide [expert] testimony . . . or whose duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the giving of such testimony.”). Hybrid witnesses—fact witnesses with expertise that will inform their testimony— do not fall under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s purview. But most witnesses do not qualify as hybrid witnesses. See Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 849 F.3d 355, 371 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[H]ybrid fact/expert witnesses . . . must testify from the personal knowledge they gained on the job,” and “[t]he district court certainly may preclude these witnesses from testifying beyond the scope of facts they learned and opinions they formed during the course of their project duties.”); Downey v. Bob’s Disc. Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a hybrid witness whose opinion testimony arose “not from his enlistment as an expert but, rather, from his ground-level involvement in the events giving rise to the litigation” fell “outside the compass of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)”). 20 If a party wants to present opinion evidence through a hybrid witness, it still must disclose: “(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Failure to comply with either requirement typically will result in mandatory exclusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 595–96 (4th Cir. 2003). The Timpsons’ hybrid witness disclosures failed to satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). The disclosures included only “the subject matter on which” the Timpsons expected McPherson, Mullis, and Thomas to testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i); see J.A. 373–75, 378–79. At no point, however, did the disclosures set out “a summary of the facts and opinions to which” each was expected to testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). And the Timpsons cite no record evidence in their briefs before us to support their broad claim that they satisfied Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s requirements in full. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in preventing the claimed hybrid witnesses from providing expert testimony. But even if the Timpsons had properly disclosed McPherson, Mullis, and Thomas, the district court would not have erred in holding they failed to qualify as hybrid witnesses. None had any relevant factual evidence pertaining to the Timpsons’ claims. McPherson and Thomas had never met Johnny. And Mullis had only interacted with him briefly seventeen years before trial (well outside the statutes of limitations). Thus, their only involvement in the case occurred in the context of having been hired to provide their opinions, meaning the Timpsons should have produced expert reports for each under Rule 21 26(a)(2)(B). Because they failed to do so, the district court properly excluded these witnesses from offering their expert opinions during trial.
We next consider the Timpsons’ argument that the district court erred in denying their request to depose then-Ambassador Haley. “[F]ederal courts have consistently held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a government decision-maker will not be compelled to testify about [her] mental processes in reaching a decision, including the manner and extent of [her] study of the record and [her] consultations with subordinates.” Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Ryan, 922 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). That practice was especially appropriate here because Haley, in her role as Governor, was “not an official with responsibility for” decisions relating to “service levels of waiver participants,” determinations of services for specific patients, or “provid[ing] funding for [patients] to live outside of a congregate setting.” Kobe v. Haley, 666 F. App’x 281, 299 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Nor did she “have the authority to change them.” Id. What’s more, the Timpsons presented no theory (viable or otherwise) for proceeding against then-Ambassador Haley in her individual capacity. See J.A. 446 (the Timpsons suggesting they had a right to take then-Ambassador Haley’s deposition “to determine whether she may [have] be[en] liable, in her individual capacity, for any of the claims alleged in the amended complaint”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a direct, but limited approach to determine whether then-Ambassador Haley’s deposition had any potential to lead to relevant, admissible evidence in this case. The Timpsons failed to seize on this 22 opportunity and squandered their ten interrogatories on matters unrelated to her knowledge of Johnny or decisions involving his care. Nor have they shown on appeal why thenAmbassador Haley’s continued presence here is anything more than an attempt to uncover some unknown claim against her in her individual capacity. At bottom, we perceive no error in the district court’s denial of this request.