Opinion ID: 1320291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We stated in Batten:

Text: The jurisdiction of the OAH over the appeals of state employee grievances derives not from Chapter 150B, but from Chapter 126. The administrative hearing provisions of Article 3, Chapter 150B, do not establish the right of a person aggrieved by agency action to OAH review of that action, but only describe the procedures for such review. Batten, 326 N.C. at 342-43, 389 S.E .2d at 38 (emphasis added). Relying on this language, respondents contend that the NCAPA cannot confer upon petitioners the right to an administrative hearing in the OAH. Rather, they contend, the right to an administrative hearing must be expressly set forth in the organic statute, N.C.G.S. ch. 143, art. 21B (Air Pollution Control). Batten involved the grievance of an employee of the Department of Correction, an agency expressly exempted from application of the administrative hearing provisions of the NCAPA. See N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(e)(4) (1987, superseded). While the excerpted languageout of contextcan be interpreted as respondents propose, the language of the statute as this Court interpreted and applied it prior to Batten does not sustain respondents' proposed interpretation. We now clarify that the excerpted language applies only in the Batten context, i.e., of appeals of grievances of employees of agencies expressly exempted from the NCAPA. When we decided Batten, the NCAPA read, in pertinent part: § 150B-1. Policy and scope. (a) The policy of the State is that the three powers of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, are, and should remain, separate. The intent of this Chapter is to prevent the commingling of those powers in any administrative agency and to ensure that the functions of rule making, investigation, advocacy, and adjudication are not all performed by the same person in the administrative process. (b) The purpose of this Chapter is to establish as nearly as possible a uniform system of administrative rule making and adjudicatory procedures for State agencies. (c) This Chapter shall apply to every agency, as defined in G.S. 150B-2(1), except to the extent and in the particulars that any statute, including subsection (d) of this section, makes specific provisions to the contrary. (d)(1) The following are specifically exempted from the provisions of this Chapter: a. The Administrative Rules Review Commission; b. The Employment Security Commission; c. The Industrial Commission; d. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Board in all actions that do not involve agricultural employers; and e. The Utilities Commission. (2) The North Carolina National Guard is exempt from the provisions of this Chapter in exercising its court-martial jurisdiction. (3) The Department of Human Resources is exempt from this Chapter in exercising its authority over the Camp Butner reservation granted in Article 6 of Chapter 122C of the General Statutes. The Department of Human Resources is also exempt from Article 3 of this Chapter in complying with the procedural safeguards mandated by ... Section 680 of Part H of P.L. 99-457 as amended (Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986). (4) The Department of Correction is exempt from the provisions of this Chapter, except for Article 5 of this Chapter and G.S. 150B-13 which shall apply. (5) Articles 2 and 3 of this Chapter shall not apply to the Department of Revenue. (6) Except as provided in Chapter 136 of the General Statutes, Articles 2 and 3 of this Chapter do not apply to the Department of Transportation. (7) Article 4 of this Chapter, governing judicial review of final administrative decisions, shall apply to The University of North Carolina and its constituent or affiliated boards, agencies, and institutions, but The University of North Carolina and its constituent or affiliated boards, agencies, and institutions are specifically exempted from the remaining provisions of this Chapter. (8) Article 4 of this Chapter shall not apply to the State Banking Commission, the Commissioner of Banks, the Savings Institutions Division of the Department of Economic and Community Development, and the Credit Union Division of the Department of Economic and Community Development. (9) Article 3 of this Chapter shall not apply to agencies governed by the provisions of Article 3A of this Chapter, as set out in G.S. 150B-38(a). (10) Articles 3 and 3A of this Chapter shall not apply to the Governor's Waste Management Board in administering the provisions of G.S. 104E-6.2 and G.S. 130A-293. (11) Article 2 of this Chapter shall not apply to the North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Authority in administering the provisions of G.S. 104G-10 and G.S. 104G-11. Articles 3 and 3A of this Chapter shall not apply to the North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Authority in administering the provisions of G.S. 104G-9, 104G-10, and 104G-11. (12) Article 2 of this Chapter shall not apply to the North Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Commission in administering the provisions of G.S. 130B-13 and G.S. 130B-14. Articles 3 and 3A of this Chapter shall not apply to the North Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Commission in administering the provisions of G.S. 130B-11, 130B-13 and 130B-14. (13) Article 3 and G.S. 150B-51(a) of this Chapter shall not apply to hearings required pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (Public Law 93-122), as amended and federal regulations promulgated thereunder. N.C.G.S. § 150B-1 (1987 & Supp.1989, superseded). One year prior to Batten, we had interpreted this statute in Vass v. Bd. of Trustees of State Employees' Medical Plan, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989). The plaintiff there was a State employee whose health was insured through the Teachers' and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (Medical Plan). He filed a claim under the Medical Plan to recover his costs for surgery, but his claim was denied by the agency and, upon appeal, by the supervisory Board of Trustees of the Medical Plan (Board). Vass, 324 N.C. at 403-04, 379 S.E.2d at 27. He then instituted an action for breach of contract against the Board. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board; the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Board is an administrative agency covered by the NCAPA and that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided by the NCAPA i.e., plaintiff had failed to file a petition for a contested case hearing in the OAH and therefore was not entitled to judicial review of the administrative decision. Id. at 404-05, 379 S.E.2d at 27-28. On discretionary review, we concluded that because the Board is an agency as that term is defined under the NCAPA, the NCAPA applies to the Board except to the extent and in the particulars that any statute makes specific provisions to the contrary. The Board had contended that the organic statute creating the Medical Plan made such specific exemptions: If, after exhaustion of internal appeal handling as outlined in the contract with the Claims Processor any person is aggrieved, the Claims Processor shall bring the matter to the attention of the Executive Administrator and Board of Trustees, which may make a binding decision on the matter in accordance with procedures established by the Executive Administrator and Board of Trustees. N.C.G.S. § 135-39.7 (1988) (Administrative Review). The Board, like respondents here, argued that the language of the organic statute exempted it from application of the NCAPA because the language revealed the General Assembly's intent that any review of the Board's decisions be limited to judicial review. Id. at 406-07, 379 S.E.2d at 28-29. We held that plaintiff was entitled under the NCAPA to an administrative hearing to have his rights under the Medical Plan determined, stating: It is clear that the General Assembly intended only those agencies it expressly and unequivocally exempted from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act be excused in any way from the Act's requirements and, even in those instances, that the exemption apply only to the extent specified by the General Assembly. Therefore, we conclude that N.C.G.S. § 135-39.7 is not a statute which makes specific provisions to the contrary as that phrase is used in ... N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(c). The language in N.C.G.S. § 135-39.7... is not an express and unequivocal exemption of the Board from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.... ... [T]he General Assembly has shown itself to be quite capable of specifically and expressly naming the particular agencies to be exempt from the provisions of the Act and has clearly specified the extent of each such exemption. E.g., N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(d) (1987) (totally exempting certain named agencies by stating that the Act shall not apply to them, and partially exempting certain other named agencies by specifying the extent to which the Act shall apply or the agency shall be exempt).... Applying the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, we conclude that the Board's decisions are subject to administrative review under the Act, since the Board has never been specifically exempted by any statute from the Act's requirements. Had the General Assembly intended that the defendant-appellant Board be excluded from the requirements of the Act, we must assume that it would have inserted a specific provision in some statute expressly stating this intent. As the General Assembly has not done so, we will not infer any such intent on its part. Id. at 407-08, 379 S.E.2d at 29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Respondents contend that we made it clear in Batten that the administrative hearing provisions of the NCAPA do not establish the right of a person `aggrieved' by agency action to administrative review of that action by the OAH, but only describe procedures for such review. That interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute as interpreted and applied in Vass. Under that interpretation, the plaintiff there would not have been entitled to an administrative hearing under the NCAPA to determine his rights under the Medical Plan because the organic statute did not set forth his right thereto. In Batten we neither mentioned nor overruled the interpretation of the administrative hearing provisions applied in Vass. Batten involved the appeal of a grievance of an employee of an agency expressly exempted from the administrative hearing provisions of the NCAPA; thus, under the plain meaning of the NCAPA, that employee can be entitled to an administrative hearing to appeal his grievance to the OAH only by virtue of another statute. For these reasons, we reject respondents' interpretation of the language excerpted from Batten. Subsequent amendments to the NCAPA bolster our interpretation of the statute. See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 216, 388 S.E.2d 134, 141 (1990) (Courts may use subsequent enactments or amendments as an aid in arriving at the correct meaning of the prior statute by utilizing the natural inferences arising out of the legislative history as it continues to evolve.). Effective 1 October 1991, the NCAPA was amended, 1991 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 418, § 2, and now reads, in pertinent part: § 150B-1. Policy and scope. (a) Purpose.This Chapter establishes a uniform system of administrative rule making and adjudicatory procedures for agencies. The procedures ensure that the functions of rule making, investigation, advocacy, and adjudication are not all performed by the same person in the administrative process. (b) Rights.This Chapter confers procedural rights. (c) Full Exemptions.This Chapter applies to every agency except: (1) The North Carolina National Guard in exercising its court-martial jurisdiction. (2) The Department of Human Resources in exercising its authority over the Camp Butner reservation granted in Article 6 of Chapter 122C of the General Statutes. (3) The Utilities Commission. (4) The Industrial Commission. (5) The Employment Security Commission. (d) Exemptions from Rule Making.Article 2A of this Chapter does not apply to the following: (1) The Commission. (2) The North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Authority in administering the provisions of G.S. 104G-10 and G.S. 104G-11. (3) The North Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Commission in administering the provisions of G.S. 130B-13 and G.S. 130B-14. (4) The Department of Revenue, except that Parts 3 and 4 of Article 2A apply to the Department. (5) The North Carolina Air Cargo Airport Authority with respect to the acquisition, construction, operation, or use, including fees or charges, of any portion of a cargo airport complex. (e) Exemptions From Contested Case Provisions.The contested case provisions of this Chapter apply to all agencies and all proceedings not expressly exempted from the Chapter. The contested case provisions of this Chapter do not apply to the following: (1) The Department of Human Resources and the Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources in complying with the procedural safeguards mandated by Section 680 of Part H of Public Law 99-457 as amended (Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986). (2) The Governor's Waste Management Board in administering the provisions of G.S. 104E-6.2 and G.S. 130A-293. (3) The North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Authority in administering the provisions of G.S. 104G-9, 104G-10, and 104G-11. (4) The North Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Commission in administering the provisions of G.S. 130B-11, 130B-13, and 130B-14. (5) Hearings required pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (Public Law 93-122), as amended and federal regulations promulgated thereunder. G.S. 150B-51(a) is considered a contested case hearing provision that does not apply to these hearings. (6) The Department of Revenue. (7) The Department of Correction. (8) The Department of Transportation, except as provided in G.S. 136-29. (9) The Occupational Safety and Health Review Board in all actions that do not involve agricultural employers. (10) The North Carolina Air Cargo Airport Authority with respect to the acquisition, construction, operation, or use, including fees or charges, of any portion of a cargo airport complex. (f) Exemption from All But Judicial Review.No Article in this Chapter except Article 4 applies to The University of North Carolina. N.C.G.S. § 150B-1 (1991). The equivocal language of purpose and applicability construed in Vass was deleted: The purpose of this Chapter is to establish as nearly as possible a uniform system of administrative rule making and adjudicatory procedures for State agencies. N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(b) (1987, superseded) (emphasis added). This Chapter shall apply to every agency, as defined in G.S. 150B-2(1), except to the extent and in the particulars that any statute, including subsection (d) of this section, makes specific provisions to the contrary. N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(c) (1987, superseded) (emphasis added). Language was added which clearly, unambiguously, and in accordance with our interpretation in Vass, declares the purpose and applicability of the statute: This Chapter establishes a uniform system of administrative rule making and adjudicatory procedures for agencies. N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(a) (1991). This Chapter confers procedural rights. N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(b) (1991). The contested case provisions of this Chapter apply to all agencies and all proceedings not expressly exempted from the Chapter. N.C.G.S. § 150B-1(e) (1991). Thus, the General Assembly clarified that which previously was doubtful. See Town of Hazelwood v. Town of Waynesville, 320 N.C. 89, 95, 357 S.E.2d 686, 689, reh'g denied, 320 N.C. 639, 360 S.E.2d 106 (1987) (When the legislature amends an ambiguous statute, the presumption is not that its intent was to change the original act, but `merely to' ... clarify that which was previously doubtful. (quoting Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. 230, 240, 328 S.E.2d 274, 280 (1985) (quoting Childers v. Parker's, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260, 162 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1968))). The language now is clear and provides that the NCAPA confers procedural rights to, inter alia, administrative hearings. See N.C.G.S. ch. 150B, art. 3. Therefore, we cannot hold, as respondents urge, that, apart from the context of agencies or proceedings expressly excepted therefrom, the NCAPA does not confer such a right. See Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, 322 N.C. 271, 276-77, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658, reh'g denied, 322 N.C. 610, 370 S.E.2d 247 (1988) (When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.). The NCAPA provides, further: It is the policy of this State that any dispute between an agency and another person that involves the person's rights, duties or privileges, ... should be settled though informal procedures.... If the agency and the other person do not agree to a resolution of the dispute through informal procedures, either the agency or the person may commence an administrative proceeding to determine the person's rights, duties, or privileges, at which time the dispute becomes a contested case. N.C.G.S. § 150B-22 (1991). A contested case shall be commenced by filing a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings and ... shall be conducted by that Office.... The parties in a contested case shall be given an opportunity for a hearing without undue delay. Any person aggrieved may commence a contested case hereunder. N.C.G.S. § 150B-23(a) (1991). Interpretation of these provisions, a matter for this Court, will clarify the range of situations in which the NCAPA entitles a person to commence an administrative hearing. In contrast, [u]nder the vast majority of state APA's [sic] and the Federal APA, the right to invoke the adjudication procedures is not provided by the APA's [sic] themselves. Instead, the right under most APA's [sic] arises only when rights, duties or privileges are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or like formulation. Unlike this majority, the NC APA does not limit the procedural protections governing adjudications to instances when the constitution or statutes require a right to an evidentiary hearing. Charles E. Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L.Rev. 833, 869 (1975) [hereinafter Daye, Administrative Procedure ]. Respondents misconstrue the relation of the organic statute to the NCAPA. The NCAPA confers procedural rights and imposes procedural duties, including the right to commence an administrative hearing to resolve disputes between an agency and a person involving the person's rights, duties, or privileges. The organic statute may confer procedural rights and impose procedural duties in addition to those conferred and imposed by the NCAPA, but more importantly, it defines those rights, duties, or privileges, abrogation of which provides the grounds for an administrative hearing pursuant to the NCAPA. [1] For these reasons also, we decline to adopt respondents' interpretation of the NCAPA, and instead reaffirm that the NCAPA confers upon any person aggrieved the right to commence an administrative hearing to resolve a dispute with an agency involving the person's rights, duties, or privileges. To the extent that the language in Batten, reiterated in Harding v. Dept. of Correction, 334 N.C. 414, 417-18, 432 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1993), suggests otherwise, it is disapproved. To the extent that Citizens for Clean Industry v. Lofton, 109 N.C.App. 229, 427 S.E.2d 120 (1993) may be viewed as inconsistent herewith, it is also disapproved.