Opinion ID: 785392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: FIRs Lacking Probable Cause

Text: 48 With respect to FIRs 52, 87, and 220, Barapind submitted evidence of fabrication, coercion of witnesses, and witness torture respectively. The charges in FIR 52 rest entirely on the affidavits of Rajinder Kaur, who, in 1997, testified under oath during the trial of one of Barapind's alleged co-conspirators that she never identified Barapind. The crimes alleged in FIR 87 were similarly supported; and the 2001 declaration of Rattan Singh alleges that he was forced under threat of death to provide his thumbprint for the Barapind identification, but that he in fact never identified Barapind as the perpetrator of those crimes. The sole basis to implicate Barapind in the charges in FIR 220 is the confession of his alleged accomplice Tarlochan Singh, who has since been killed by cross-fire during what the police describe as a rescue attempt. Barapind, however, submitted three eyewitness affidavits which allege that Tarlochan was tortured by Indian police. The extradition court found that the evidence offered by Barapind with respect to these three FIRs was sufficient, not just to controvert, but to destroy probable cause as to the charges contained therein. Id. 49 Barapind argues that the acknowledgment of torture, forced confession, and unreliable evidence as to some of the FIRs should negate probable cause as to the entire body of India's evidence. We disagree. 50 We faced similar situations in Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.1999) and Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.2000). In Mainero, both the magistrate judge and the district court acknowledged that evidence of torture was present in the record. Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1206. However, both judges reviewed all of the statements and determined, as found by the magistrate judge, that none of the evidence on which it is necessary to rely was obtained by torture. Id. The judge in Cornejo-Barreto also chose to isolate the taint that the alleged torture would have on the evidence by considering the sufficiency of the evidence without the challenged confessions. 218 F.3d at 1008. Similarly in this case, the magistrate reviewed each FIR individually, as was his exclusive province, and where there was compelling and material evidence of fabrication, coercion, and torture, he appropriately found the totality of the evidence to be too unreliable to support probable cause. This discriminating approach is all the law requires. Not all evidence becomes fatally infected by discrete unrelated incidents. V THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION A. Standard of Review 51 The court's purely factual findings underlying the application of the political offense exception are reviewed for clear error. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 791. However, the crucial determination — whether the crime was incidental to a political uprising — is a mixed question of law and fact that must be reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509, 16 S.Ct. 689, 40 L.Ed. 787 (1896)). A conclusion that a crime is a political offense is a determination that the crime does not fall within the terms of the treaty. B. Analysis 52 The language of the applicable treaty is the essential component in analyzing the reach of the political offense exception to extradition. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir.1986). Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty provides as follows: 53 A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the crime or offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for a crime or offense of a political character. 54 Extradition Treaty, art. 6, T.S. No. 849. 55 Barapind argues that the political offense exception protects him from extradition because his crimes — with the exception of the crime charged in FIR 100 — were of a political character. 56 The purpose of the political offense exception, however, is more narrow than its abstract label might suggest. Its core intention is to protect acts that are directed at the State itself, and not to protect every criminal act that in some sense contributes to the political goal of those committing it. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 597 (citing Quinn, 783 F.2d at 798; Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520-23 (7th Cir.1981)). Political motivation does not convert every crime into a political offense. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir.1990); see also McMullen, 788 F.2d at 597 (quoting Eain, 641 F.2d at 520) (Motivation is not itself determinative of the political character of any given act.). 57 The Supreme Court has addressed the political offense exception in only one case, Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 16 S.Ct. 689, 40 L.Ed. 787 (1896), which established a two-prong test used to answer these questions. Commonly referred to as the incidence test, Ornelas's two-prong test dictates that in order to be considered a political offense, there must be 1) the occurrence of an uprising or other violent political disturbance at the time of the charged offense, and 2) a charged offense that is `incidental to' `in the course of,' or `in furtherance of' the uprising. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 797 (9th Cir.1986); see also McMullen, 788 F.2d at 595; Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir.1980); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.1980). 58 [T]he focus of inquiry is on the circumstances and status of those harmed and not merely on whether the acts were committed during the disorder. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544, 570 (D.Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1985). The Supreme Court has suggested that the character of the foray, the mode of attack, the persons killed or captured, and the kind of property taken or destroyed are appropriate factors to be considered when making this determination. Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 511, 16 S.Ct. 689. Moreover, the political offense exception should be applied with great care lest our country become a social jungle and an encouragement to terrorists everywhere. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir.1981). 59 The determination as to what type of acts are incidental to the uprising is properly within the discretion of the magistrate. 2 A purely objective approach could lead to a situation where isolated acts of social violence undertaken for personal reasons would be protected simply because they occurred during a time of political upheaval. Id. at 521. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that the law is not so utterly absurd, and that this is not the result the political offense exception was designed to produce. Id. at 520-21 (Terrorists who have committed barbarous acts elsewhere would be able to flee to the United States and live in our neighborhoods and walk our streets forever free from any accountability for their acts.). Indeed, the magistrate must be given some freedom to deal with the intricacies of each case, and to determine whether the conduct is directly connected with, or in furtherance of, the insurgent activity. This cannot be accomplished unless the magistrate is able to subjectively evaluate the nature of the tactics employed. As we held in McMullen, the direct causal link between the crime committed and its alleged political purpose and object, when balanced with proportionality and atrocity, must warrant the protection afforded a `political' crime. 788 F.2d at 597. 60 The extradition judge in this case realized that a standard that looks solely to the revolutionary's generalized political intent is an unworkable, uncivilized standard, and undertook instead this balancing process for each and every FIR. 61 C. Application of the Political Offense Exception: FIRs 89, 34 and 100 62 As discussed in the extradition order, the crimes with which Barapind is charged took place in the midst of the extended political clash between Sikh militants and the Indian government, and thus the uprising contextual prong has been satisfactorily established. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F.Supp.2d at 1030-32. The only live issue, therefore, is whether the crimes for which Barapind is set to be extradited are incidental to the uprising. In other words, whether there is a close and direct causal link between the crime committed and its alleged political purpose and object. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 597.
63 The applicability of the political offense exception to the charges in FIR 89, the murder of the wife of a perceived police collaborator, hinges on whether or not the killing of an innocent civilian in the midst of an otherwise politically motivated attack falls within the exception. The extradition court recognized that the killing of the three brothers was incidental to the uprising; however, it found that Barapind failed to establish that the killing of Kulwant Kaur was causally or ideologically related to the uprising. Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 511, 16 S.Ct. 689. As the extradition court observed, the record is silent as to the circumstances under which Kulwant Kaur was murdered. It is unknown whether she was murdered in cold-blood for being the spouse of a political opponent, or simply because she was present, or to eliminate an eyewitness. 64 Barapind rests his argument entirely on the dicta in Quinn. Quinn, he argues, stands for the proposition that one's status as a political revolutionary creates a license to kill innocent civilians with impunity. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810 ([T]here is no justification for distinguishing between attacks on military and civilian targets.... [i]t is for the revolutionaries, not the courts, to determine what tactics may help further their chances of bringing down or challenging the government.). We decline to adopt this uncivilized standard. We agree with the magistrate that the political offense exception is inapplicable to shield the knowing effort to kill or injure unarmed, uninvolved, innocent civilians who are non-combatants in the struggle. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F.Supp.2d at 1036 (citing Ahmad, 726 F.Supp. at 405-08 (condemning the slaughter of innocent civilians as not worthy of protection as a political offense); Eain, 641 F.2d at 520-21 ([T]he indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized as a protected political act even when the larger political objective of the person who sets off the bomb may be to eliminate the civilian population of a country.); In re Extradition of Marzook, 924 F.Supp. 565, 577 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (stating that attacks targeted at civilians do not advance any political motive other than as terrorist acts); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. at 570 (The civilian status of the victims is also significant because the United States does not regard the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians as a political offense.)). Barapind presents no evidence to satisfy his burden of showing that Kulwant Kaur was anything other than a civilian target, and therefore we uphold the magistrate's decision to certify extradition for FIR 89. 65 2. FIR 34: The Murders of Bulwant Singh Sarhal, Amar Nath Kanugo, Suda Ram, and Jasbir Singh 66 The extradition judge stated that [t]he evidence establishes that a former government official, active government official, and their police affiliated body guards were driving in a village, presenting a target of opportunity. The extradition magistrate determined that the fact that the victims were agents of the State was not sufficient to demonstrate that the killings were politically motivated, and that these facts equally support the finding that the crimes were acts of domestic terrorism. The fact that the ambush resulted in the assassination of government officials might suggest that the crime was of a political nature; however, Barapind must establish the offenses committed were incidental to the political uprising by a preponderance of the evidence. Given that no evidence of political activity or motive, other than the identity of the victims as agents of the State, was presented to the magistrate, we conclude that Barapind failed to meet his burden of proof. 67 3. FIR 100: The Murder of Sahib Singh and the Attempted Murder of Makhan Ram 68 Barapind does not contest the magistrate's determination that F.I.R. 100 does not fall within the political offense exception. D. Extradition Request as a Subterfuge 69 Barapind argues that the second clause of Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty — that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for a crime or offense of a political character — must be interpreted to encompass the entire extradition request. Extradition Treaty, art. 6, T.S. No. 849. He reasons that because some of the crimes with which he was charged fall within the political offense exception, that fact alone proves that the Indian government is trying to punish him for his political activities, and thus the certification of extradition on three counts was improper. In essence, he argues that the political offense exception is an all or nothing proposition. 70 Assuming that the various branches of government are adequately performing their duties, the case law suggests otherwise. The doctrine of specialty prohibits the requesting nation from prosecuting the extradited individual for any offense other than that for which the surrendering state agreed to extradite. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 783. In addition, as the court in In re Lincoln, stated it is not a part of the court proceedings nor of the hearing upon the charge of crime to exercise discretion as to whether the criminal charge is a cloak for political action, nor whether the request is made in good faith. Such matters should be left to the Department of State. The government of the United States, through the Secretary of State, should determine whether the foreign government is in fact able to exercise its civil powers, and whether diplomatic and treaty relations are being carried out and respected in such a way that it is safe to surrender an alleged criminal under a treaty. 71 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y.1915). Therefore, it is the independent duty of the Secretary of State to determine whether India is likely to comply with the directives of the treaty, and whether Barapind will receive a fair trial upon return. The magistrate is constrained by his duty to apply the law, and thus India's motivations for requesting the extradition are properly left to the Executive Branch, which has the responsibility to enforce the rule of specialty. VI