Opinion ID: 8312455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indirect Evidence of Discrimination and Retaliation

Text: In the absence of direct evidence, the court analyzes Title VII claims under the well-established burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Barnette v. Chertoff , 453 F.3d 513 , 515 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ; Lathram v. Snow , 336 F.3d 1085 , 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, which is not onerous. 4 Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 , 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). While the plaintiff maintains the burden of persuasion at all times, id. at 253 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [action in question],'  Wiley v. Glassman , 511 F.3d 151 , 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs , 450 U.S. at 253 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 ). Defendant has offered such reasons; therefore, the court need only decide on summary judgment whether Plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-discriminatory reasons were not the actual reasons and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis. Adeyemi v. District of Columbia , 525 F.3d 1222 , 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490 , 495 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ); see Durant v. D.C. Gov't , 875 F.3d 685 , 699 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Because the Department offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for Durant's termination, we 'proceed[ ] to the ultimate issue of retaliation vel non instead of evaluating whether [Durant] made out a prima facie case.' ) (quoting Jones , 557 F.3d at 678 ) (alterations in original) ); Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 812 F.3d 1109 , 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (In reviewing a summary judgment motion where the defendant has proffered some legitimate reason for its adverse employment action ..., [t]he only question that remains is whether the evidence creates a material dispute on the ultimate issue.). Pretext may be established by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or ... that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). However, Title VII ... does not authorize a federal court to become a super-personnel  department that reexamines an entity's business decisions, Barbour v. Browner , 181 F.3d 1342 , 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and a court may not 'second-guess an employer's personnel decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.'  Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corr. , 86 F.3d 1180 , 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Milton v. Weinberger , 696 F.2d 94 , 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ). The court considers whether a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination or retaliation from all the evidence, including (1) the plaintiff's prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer's proffered explanation for its action; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer). Carter v. George Wash. Univ. , 387 F.3d 872 , 878 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ).  'The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated [or retaliated] against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'  Wheeler , 812 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs , 450 U.S. at 253 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 ). Thomas claims that the purpose of the two positions for which Plaintiff applied was primarily to manage projects, as opposed to performing engineering tasks and functions. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 3). And the two persons who were ultimately selected for the two Project Manager positions ... demonstrated to me that they had the best combination of leadership ability, breadth of experience, and technical knowledge so as to be the best candidates for the respective positions. ( Id. ¶ 4). In contrast, Thomas testified that he saw in Plaintiff's resume an extensive list of technical experiences in the electrical engineering area of Metro, both designs as well as review of submittals for electrical engineering, which, in his opinion, was a very narrow focus of experience at Metro. (Thomas Dep. at 22:10-13). When pressed by Plaintiff about the candidates' levels of experience, Thomas insisted that it wasn't the length of the experience but the breadth of the experience that formed his opinion. ( Id. at 20: 19-20). Thomas testified that Plaintiff's resume read about somebody who was focused on electrical engineering design and review of submittals of electrical engineering. ( Id. at 22: 3-5). But Thomas wasn't looking for a highly technical person for any of these positions. ( Id. at 23:20-21-24:1). Thomas's deposition testimony is consistent with his observations in the January 31, 2014 Memorandum, which contemporaneously memorialized his decision not to interview Plaintiff. Then, as in his deposition, Thomas explained: Mr. Oviedo's experience at WMATA has been focused on the technical aspects of the electrical power systems for the operation of the rail system. The Project Manager position requires more than just technical knowledge of WMATA but, as noted above, knowledge of the business aspects of WMATA's policies, procedures and practices. Accordingly, I believed that Mr. Oviedo's experience was too narrowly focused to qualify for the position of Project Manager in MCAP. (Ex. 1 to Am. Compl.). The memorandum, as well as Thomas' testimony, reflects a reasoned business decision that courts have no authority to reexamine without evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus, which, as discussed next, is absent from this case. Plaintiff has produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Thomas acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory  motive, particularly where it seems that the two never met face-to-face. The record establishes that Thomas decided not to interview Plaintiff based on his review of Plaintiff's resume, which was among a package of six or seven applicants Thomas received from the Human Resources department. (Thomas Dep. at 17:17-18, 18:3; see also Thomas Aff. ¶ 4). Indeed, Plaintiff testified that Human Resources told me you were selected for interview to talk with the hiring manager and then Human Resources said the hiring manager decided not to interview me[.] (Oviedo Dep. at 25:9-14). Plaintiff has adduced no evidence, including his own testimony, from which a reasonable jury could find that Thomas knew or should have known about Plaintiff's national origin and then infer a discriminatory motive. 5 Plaintiff only surmises that Thomas is an individual who appears he does not like Plaintiff Spanish heritage (Opp'n at 17), but on summary judgment, a mere unsubstantiated allegation cannot not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact. Harding v. Gray , 9 F.3d 150 , 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ; see Aug. 28, 2017 Order at 3, ECF No. 28 (advising Plaintiff similarly). And when, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion [a party] fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the court may properly grant summary judgment against that party. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 . Similarly, Plaintiff has adduced no testimony or documentation from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor on the retaliation claim. Plaintiff must be able to prove that the [decision-maker] had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and ... the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity. Holcomb v. Powell , 433 F.3d 889 , 903 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis supplied). Temporal proximity can indeed support an inference of causation, but only where the two events are very close in time. Hamilton v. Geithner , 666 F.3d 1344 , 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Woodruff v. Peters , 482 F.3d 521 , 529 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ); see id. (noting that although not established as bright-line rule, the Supreme Court has suggested that in some instances a three-month period ... may ... be too lengthy to raise an inference of causation). Indeed, [t]his Circuit has held ... that when an inference of causation is premised on temporal proximity alone, even an eight to nine month gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is too great to establish an inference of causation. Ajisefinni , 17 F.Supp.3d at 46 (citing Mayers v. Laborers' Health & Safety Fund of N. Am. , 478 F.3d 364 , 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (other citations omitted) ). Plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the record to show that in November 2013 Thomas was aware, actually or constructively, of Plaintiff's prior EEO activity in 2009 that concluded in 2011 with the right-sue-notice. 6 Although the gap of two years is enough to negate the causation element  of the retaliation claim, see supra , summary judgment is warranted because where, as here, an employer has provided a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its employment action, 'positive evidence beyond mere proximity is required to defeat the presumption that the proffered explanation[ ] [is] genuine.'  Durant , 875 F.3d at 700 (quoting Talavera v. Shah , 638 F.3d 303 , 313 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (other citation omitted) ). Plaintiff has produced no such evidence. In sum, Plaintiff has produced no evidence to rebut WMATA's legitimate reasons for choosing not to interview him for the Project Manager positions announced in November 2013. As a result, WMATA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the preserved Title VII claims.