Opinion ID: 2815840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objections to Hull’s Testimony

Text: In his third claim, Smith contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to testimony from Hull concerning threats that Smith asked Hull to relay to Cellecz. “This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” Gregory v. State, 118 So. 3d 770, 780 (Fla. 2013). However, “[a] judge’s - 20 - discretion is limited by the rules of evidence and by the principles of stare decisis.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 949 (Fla. 2007) (citation omitted)). At trial, the trial court permitted the State to present Hull as a witness over defense objection. Hull testified that while he resided at the Manatee County Jail, he met Smith on the transportation bus when they were both returning to the county jail after a trip to the courthouse. Smith asked Hull where he was housed, and after learning that Hull was housed in the G2 West Unit, Smith then inquired whether Hull knew an inmate named James Cellecz. After Hull acknowledged that he knew Cellecz, Smith told Hull to relay a message to Cellecz that Smith had “something for his ass.” Smith then said that he knew where Cellecz’s wife and child were and that he had “something for them.” Hull explained that Smith wanted him to relay this message to Cellecz because Smith was upset at Cellecz after Smith had given Cellecz some “jewelry and stuff” to pawn and Cellecz was “snitching” on Smith. Smith acknowledges that he presented only two arguments to the trial court: (1) the evidence was inadmissible because it was evidence pertaining to a collateral, uncharged crime; and (2) the prejudicial impact outweighed any probative value. However, Smith now asserts that the statements were too vague to be considered threats and nothing linked his statements to Hull with the murder. - 21 - We conclude that Smith has failed to properly preserve his objection to the trial court’s admission of Hull’s testimony. As this Court has held, “in order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.” Carmichael v. State, 715 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982)). As Smith failed to present this ground to the trial court, we conclude that this claim is waived. Even if this Court were to consider this claim on the merits, however, Smith has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. This Court has long recognized that “a defendant’s attempt to intimidate a state witness is relevant and admissible.” England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660, 664 (Fla. 1994)). As this Court explained, “such evidence is based on consciousness of guilt inferred from such actions.” Id. In England, the defendant told a witness that if a codefendant “got me in trouble, I would kill him.” Id. That statement was held admissible. Id.; see also Anderson v. State, 574 So. 2d 87, 93 (Fla. 1991) (holding that a threat was relevant and admissible even though the defendant did not link his attempt to kill the witness to the possibility of the witness testifying in court against him). In this case, Hull’s testimony was relevant because it established that Smith was attempting to intimidate a State witness—evidence that could support - 22 - consciousness of guilt. Moreover, Hull testified that Smith was upset at Cellecz because Cellecz was “snitching” on him after Smith gave Cellecz certain jewelry to pawn—relevant evidence that was also in dispute. While Smith asserts that the evidence was vague and unreliable, this goes to the weight that a jury might assign to such evidence and not to its admissibility. We thus reject this claim.