Opinion ID: 2604731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: comment on dissenting opinions

Text: In an effort to give succor to a criminal, both dissenting opinions accept the statement of the convicted person as to the facts of the criminal incident. They refuse to recognize that a jury did not believe his story and found that he lied when he contended that he was entrapped, and that he lied when he said that he did not institute the conversation and transaction for sale of the drugs by him. Rather, the jury believed the contrary evidence and convicted him of the crime. The dissenting opinions quote from the criminal's testimony and disregard the jury's conclusion that such testimony was false. We have repeatedly said that: On appeal, when presented with a challenge to the trier of fact's findings, we are required to accept the evidence of the prevailing party  in this instance the prosecution  as true, and leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the appellant in conflict therewith.    Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889, 891 (1982).    and giving to the State those inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.    Tillett v. State, Wyo., 637 P.2d 261, 263 (1981). See McCarty v. State, Wyo., 616 P.2d 782, 786 (1980); Leppek v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1981); Mainville v. State, Wyo., 607 P.2d 339, 341 (1980); Padilla v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 189, 191 (1979); Reinholt v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1311, 1312 (1979) and many others. In this instance, the dissenting opinions do the opposite and accept the testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, as related by the criminal, as true and disregard the testimony to the contrary. Witness Young testified about a conversation with David Jones, a friend of appellant. He was then asked: Q. During the course of this conversation did Mr. Wright, the defendant, enter into the conversation at all? A. He did. Q. What was the subject that Mr. Wright brought up? A. Mr. Wright brought up the subject of offering to sell me some marijuana. Q. Had you at any time asked Mr. Wright for some marijuana? A. I did not. Witness Miller testified: Q. As between Agent Young and Mr. Wright, who was the individual that first brought up purchasing marijuana? A. Mr. Wright. Q. Did Agent Young at that time ask to purchase marijuana from Mr. Wright? A. No, he didn't. Appellant does not deny the sale of marijuana to Young. The jury found appellant guilty of the crime as charged. It is true that the sentencing considerations can be much broader than those concerning guilt. But if we question the discretion of the trial court for refusing to accept the jury findings, we are straying far from the definition of abuse of discretion (see supra); and if we are encroaching on the proposition whereby we disregard the evidence of the appellant and consider only that of the appellee when a challenge is made on appeal to actions predicated upon findings by the trier of facts, we are throwing appellate fundamentals into disarray. The dissenting opinion of Justice Cardine recognizes that the evidence was such that the jury could find appellant guilty, but then it concludes that he was not a dealer in drugs nor engaged in the business. The crime committed by appellant had nothing to do with dealing in drugs or engaged in the business of drugs  although appellant obviously was found to have done both. He acknowledged that he made a sale. He was charged with, and the jury found him guilty of violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, in that he did unlawfully deliver a controlled substance. Deliver is defined in § 35-7-1002(a)(vi), W.S. 1977, as the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. Of course these are questions of fact, and the jury found them to be against appellant. The dissenting opinion of Justice Rose ranges far and wide in contending that the criminal should not receive a penitentiary sentence  all founded on (1) the false premises that he was entrapped, [6] (2) that he did not initiate the sales transaction, and (3) that the criminal was not in the drug business and had not in any way been associated with drugs. The jury verdict dictates just the opposite. Contrary to that said in Justice Rose's dissenting opinion, he did possess the drugs long before he made the sale. He acknowledged that he kept them in his automobile, i.e. in his possession. The extensive dicta in Justice Rose's opinion need not be of concern at this time. I will note, however, that I consider the words necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction in Art. 5, § 3 of the Wyoming Constitution to pertain to that which they modify, i.e. to other writs, and not to pertain to the writs specified in the section (including certiorari). Affirmed.