Opinion ID: 1747473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Closing Argument in the Penalty Phase

Text: In arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor entered the realm of fantasy, and according to the majority, that is not reversible error. It is hard to imagine a more sickening image than the one painted by the State's attorney in closing argument when he invited the jury to visualize a helpless mother, bound, and compelled to watch as her infant son is hanged by an extension cord before her very eyes. If this were true, it would be helpful to the jury in deciding punishment, but unfortunately, it is the product of the fantasy of the State's attorney. The majority holds that this was plausible, or, in other words, it was not impossible that it might have occurred. Plausibility is not the standard. It is every plausible inference that may be argued, not every possible course of events. While there is no question Trevor was strangled, there are no facts which would support any inference that he was hanged, or that he was hanged before his mother's eyes. The closing argument was based upon pure fiction. There is no basis in the record. A prosecutor acts in a quasi -judicial capacity, and it is the prosecutor's duty to seek a fair and impartial trial. Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5 S.W.3d 448 (1999). As the United State Supreme Court noted in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), the prosecutor is not the representative of an ordinary party, but of a sovereignty whose obligation is to govern impartially. This court's holding in Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473, 25 S.W. 279 (1894), has been cited often, last in Leaks, supra ., wherein this court stated: Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury which, whether true or not, have not been proved. The desire for success should never induce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the case and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same. To convict and punish a person through the influence of prejudice and caprice is as pernicious in its consequences as the escape of a guilty man. The forms of law should never be prostituted to such a purpose. Leaks, supra, 339 Ark. at 358, 5 S.W.3d 448. The majority holds that the argument Shannon Day saw her child hanging from an extension cord before she died is a fair inference from the evidence. I must ask from what evidence this inference arises? The child was not even found in the same room as Shannon's body. There was no evidence to show what occurred in that home. There was only evidence that the child was strangled, not that he was hanged. And there was no evidence to show whether Shannon was assaulted first, or whether the child was assaulted first, or, for that matter, where within the home the assaults occurred. The State's attorney was not going beyond the record to argue evidence that he thought should have been admitted. Instead, he testified to fictional facts. This is a serious problem that calls the very legitimacy of the trial into question. The State's attorney did not argue facts or inferences from facts in the case. He introduced facts by way of argument. By so doing, the State's attorney deprived Howard of his right of cross-examination of the witness, the State's attorney. La-Fave, Criminal Procedure § 24.7(e), at 555 (1999). This was not evidence. It was pure speculation and conjecture. The jury heard it and considered it in deciding on the death penalty. The sentence is subject to attack on the basis that death was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. In State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 5 S.W.3d 51 (1999), we stated that we recognized that there must be adequate power in the judiciary to check the arbitrary and capricious imposition of a death sentence, noting that in Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977), we held that those safeguards existed in Arkansas and stated: The Arkansas judiciary is vested with broad powers to check the arbitrary, capricious, wanton or freakish imposition of the death sentence by a jury. Those powers exist at both trial and appellate levels. Robbins, 339 Ark. at 384, 5 S.W.3d 51. This court can not say that the death penalty was imposed based upon the evidence in this case. We have a duty to guard against precisely what occurred in this case. No objection was made. That is of no moment. We anticipated this very situation in Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), when we stated: A third exception is a mere possibility, for it has not yet occurred in any case. That relates to the trial court's duty to intervene, without an objection, and correct a serious error either by an admonition to the jury or by ordering a mistrial. We implied in Wilson v. State, 126 Ark. 354, 190 S.W. 441 (1916), that no objection is necessary if the trial court fails to control a prosecutor's closing argument and allows him to go too far: Appellant can not predicate error upon the failure of the court to make a ruling that he did not at the time ask the court to make, unless the remarks were so flagrant and so highly prejudicial in character as to make it the duty of the court on its own motion to have instructed the jury not to consider the same. See Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256 [85 S.W. 428 (1905) ]; Harding v. State, 94 Ark. 65 [126 S.W. 90 (1910) ]. This case presents precisely this situation. The argument was beyond flagrant. Howard's right to a fair and impartial trial was fatally compromised. This case should be reversed and remanded on this basis for resentencing. I also think it worthy of note that by our per curiam dated July 9, 2001, Ark. R.App. P.Crim. is being amended for cases where the death penalty is imposed on or after August 1, 2001. Thereby, the issues to be reviewed by this court are expanded to include: iv) whether the trial court failed in its obligation to intervene without objection to correct a serious error by admonition or declaring a mistrial;    vii) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.