Opinion ID: 4558535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limited Exception: Osborn v. Haley

Text: 12 Case: 19-11187 Date Filed: 08/25/2020 Page: 13 of 19 Despite the force of the § 1447(d) bar, case law has staked out limited exceptions. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 566 F.3d 979, 983 (11th Cir. 2009). Because Dr. Tolliver and AAP Healthcare assert that we have appellate jurisdiction based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborn v. Haley, we will discuss that case in some detail. In Osborn v. Haley, the Supreme Court held that courts of appeals may review a district court’s order remanding a case removed by the Attorney General under § 2679(d)(2) of the Westfall Act, despite § 1447(d)’s bar. 549 U.S. 225, 243-45, 127 S. Ct. 881, 895-96 (2007). Under the Westfall Act, when federal employees are sued for common-law torts that occurred in the course of their official duties, the United States is substituted as the defendant after the Attorney General certifies that the employee had acted within the scope of his or her federal employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)-(2). That certification “conclusively establish[es] scope of office or employment for purposes of removal,” id. § 2679(d)(2), and by extension, exclusive federal jurisdiction, Osborn, 549 U.S. at 231, 127 S. Ct. at 889. In Osborn, the plaintiff sued a federal employee, Barry Haley, in state court alleging tortious interference with the plaintiff’s employment. Id. at 232-33, 127 S. Ct. at 889. The Attorney General removed the suit and certified under § 2679(d)(2) that Haley had acted within the scope of his federal employment, 13 Case: 19-11187 Date Filed: 08/25/2020 Page: 14 of 19 which automatically substituted the United States as the defendant. Id. at 233-34 & n.2, 127 S. Ct. at 889-90 & n.2. The district court, nevertheless, overruled the Attorney General’s certification and remanded the case to state court. Id. at 23435, 127 S. Ct. at 890. The remand was erroneous because § 2679(d)(2) says that “certification [by] the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2); see Osborn, 549 U.S. at 243, 127 S. Ct. at 895. Hence, once an Attorney General makes a scope-ofemployment certification under § 2679(d)(2), the suit must proceed in federal court, and the district court may not remand the suit even if the certification was erroneous. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 231, 241-42, 127 S. Ct. at 889, 894-95 (explaining that, by making a § 2679(d)(2) certification conclusive for purposes of jurisdiction, Congress wanted to “foreclose needless shuttling of a case from one court to another” (quotation marks omitted)). Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that “§ 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review of remand orders does not displace § 2679(d)(2), which shields from remand an action removed pursuant to the Attorney General’s certification.” Id. at 231-32, 127 S. Ct. at 889. The Supreme Court reasoned that § 2679(d)(2) must be treated as an exception to § 1447(d) to prevent district court judges from nullifying that provision of the Westfall Act. Id. at 244, 127 S. Ct. at 895-96. 14 Case: 19-11187 Date Filed: 08/25/2020 Page: 15 of 19 The Supreme Court discussed at some length “[t]he [Westfall] Act’s distinction between removed cases in which the Attorney General issues a scopeof-employment certification, and those in which he does not.” Id. at 240-41, 127 S. Ct. at 894. In the case where the Attorney General issues a certification, § 2679(d)(2) displaces § 1447(d) because the district court has no authority to remand. Id. at 243-44, 127 S. Ct. at 895-96 (reasoning that “of the two antishuttling commands, § 1447(d) and § 2679(d)(2), only one can prevail”). In contrast, where the Attorney General does not issue a certification, under § 2679(d)(3), the district court must remand the case if it decides that the person seeking certification is not entitled to it. Id. at 241-42, 127 S. Ct. at 894. The Supreme Court concluded: “Only in the extraordinary cases in which Congress has ordered the intercourt shuttle to travel just one way—from state to federal court— does today’s decisions hold sway.” Id. at 244, 127 S. Ct. at 896.