Opinion ID: 2058374
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aggravated Manslaughter State-of-Mind Testimony.

Text: Although not raised by counsel at trial or before us, the testimony of defendant's expert concerning defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims warrants our consideration of the appropriateness of an aggravated manslaughter charge based solely on the expert's state-of-mind testimony. We address this issue independently of defendant's contentions concerning imperfect self-defense and diminished capacity. [W]here the death penalty is involved, it is the duty of this Court to examine the record for any errors affecting the substantial rights of the accused, even though not made a ground of appeal. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 69 (1988) (quoting State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 330, 49 S.E. 2d 289, 289 (1948)). We focus particularly on Dr. Cooke's statement that defendant experienced a loss of control under the influence of extreme emotions    a rage reaction,    which I would define as an anger that goes out of control and    which interferes with the cognitive ability a person has, planning, judgment, recognizing consequences, deliberating   . Unquestionably, this testimony by Dr. Cooke provided support for the court's instruction to the jury, specifically requested by defense counsel, on passion/provocation manslaughter. As we noted in State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515 (1971): Voluntary manslaughter    is an intentional homicide done in sudden passion or heat of blood, without malice aforethought. [ Id. at 523.] In State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191 (1963), we described passion/provocation manslaughter as follows: Voluntary manslaughter is a slaying committed in a transport of passion or heat of blood induced by an adequate provocation, provided the killing occurs before the passage of time sufficient for an ordinary person in like circumstances to cool off. The common law deemed such circumstances to negate the malice required for murder. Involved is a concession to the frailty of man, a recognition that the average person can understandably react violently to a sufficient wrong and hence some lesser punishment is appropriate. [ Id. at 209-10 (citations omitted).] Thus, our cases recognize that evidence sufficient to support a finding that a homicide was committed by one in a state of rage, induced by reasonable provocation, ordinarily would warrant a charge of passion/provocation manslaughter. See State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319-24 (1980); State v. Bishop, 225 N.J. Super. 596, 605 (App.Div. 1988); State v. Washington, 223 N.J. Super. 367, 377 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 612 (1988). Although Dr. Cooke testified that defendant's anger interfered with his cognitive ability, the expert did not conclude that defendant lacked the state of mind required for purposeful or knowing murder. Under the Code, conduct is purposeful, with respect to a result, if it is the person's conscious object to cause such a result, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1); conduct is knowing if the person is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). The testimony that defendant's anger interfered with [his] cognitive ability [for] planning, judgment, recognizing consequences was consistent with the concept that the passion sufficient to sustain a passion/provocation manslaughter verdict must disturb a defendant's reason: [T]o reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter it must appear that the killing occurred during the heat of a passion resulting from a reasonable provocation, a passion which effectively deprived the killer of the mastery of his understanding, a passion which was acted upon before a time sufficient to permit reason to resume its sway had passed. [ State v. King, 37 N.J. 285, 300 (1962).] [3] Thus the expert's testimony supported a passion/provocation manslaughter theory, but did not describe defendant's state of mind in a manner inconsistent with responsibility for knowing murder. Defense counsel conceded as much in his colloquy with the trial court concerning his request for a charge on imperfect self-defense: THE COURT: In terms of the manner in which the case has been tried to this jury we don't have self-defense, we have at best manslaughter, heat of passion, reasonable provocation; if I perceive your defense, that is the way the case has been tried to the jury. MR. GOLDSTEIN: That is absolutely correct. THE COURT: And the knowing aspect of the killing you admit in your opening statement and the defendant testified to it and that is not in issue really: MR. GOLDSTEIN: That is not in issue that he killed  that when he was doing what he was doing he was doing it knowingly. That is not in issue. But he was doing it knowingly because he may have in the words of Dr. Cooke temporarily misperceived the situation as one in which he had to defend himself and act impulsively and emotionally at the time. That is what Dr. Cooke said. I don't think that means he didn't do it knowingly. In fact, if he has the honest belief that in the need to use deadly force to defend himself, that would be consistent with knowingly because he makes that decision at that time that he must use deadly force to defend himself. What I am saying is that decision is unreasonable under all the facts and circumstances, but it should constitute what was known under 2A as the imperfect self-defense   . Moreover, Dr. Cooke offered no testimony suggesting that defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims was reckless rather than purposeful or knowing. See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3) (A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.). Thus, we do not find in Dr. Cooke's expert testimony a rational basis on which the jury could have convicted defendant of any other lesser-included offense of murder, except for passion/provocation manslaughter. See State v. Crisantos ( Arriagas ), 102 N.J. 265, 276 (1986). Hence, we conclude, based on our review of Dr. Cooke's opinion testimony concerning defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicides, that the trial court properly charged the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter and did not err in omitting to instruct the jury on any other lesser-included offense of murder. To recapitulate, we hold that it was not plain error for the trial court to have omitted to charge the jury on aggravated manslaughter  whether in connection with the proofs offered by defendant bearing on imperfect self-defense, diminished capacity, or state of mind. Examined in the context of the entire trial, defendant's proofs attempted to persuade the jury that the homicides, although committed deliberately, were the product of impassioned impulse, provoked by circumstances that caused defendant to lose control of his emotions. The thrust of defendant's proofs was that his actions were uncontrollable, not that his conduct was reckless in the sense of consciously disregarding a known risk. We are satisfied that the jury, charged on passion/provocation manslaughter, was thereby afforded the opportunity to consider that alternate verdict to murder to which defendant's proofs were essentially directed. Thus, although we hold that defendant was not entitled to a charge on aggravated manslaughter, we are also satisfied that its submission to the jury would have had no effect on the verdict.