Opinion ID: 2195069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Motion to Suppress Because Miranda Waiver Was Involuntary

Text: Williams argues that the court erred in not suppressing his statements because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. He argues that because he was tired, sleep deprived, and intoxicated, his statements were not voluntary. [5,6] But neither exhaustion nor intoxication will necessarily invalidate a Miranda waiver. U.S. v. Korn, 138 F.3d 1239 (8th Cir. 1998). Thus, we have held that intoxication is not conclusive on the issue of the voluntariness of a statement. State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 330 N.W.2d 462 (1983). [7,8] In determining whether a statement is voluntary, we apply a totality of the circumstances test. The determination reached by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong. See, State v. Thomas, 267 Neb. 339, 673 N.W.2d 897 (2004); State v. Lamb, supra . Concerning intoxication, we have recognized that `[t]he defendant must be so intoxicated that he is unable to understand the meaning of his statements. . . . If the trial judge is satisfied that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant was able to reason, comprehend, or resist, the statements are to be admitted.' State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. at 504, 330 N.W.2d at 467, quoting State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 610 P.2d 1045 (1980). Here, the trial court correctly admitted Williams' confession into evidence. Although the evidence showed that Williams was tired and had consumed alcohol, the record reflects that he was no longer intoxicated by the time of the interview and that he demonstrated his ability to understand and answer questions. In the videotaped interview, Williams appeared able to reason and comprehend the questions and he answered them coherently. Consequently, the trial court was not clearly wrong in determining that Williams knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed.