Opinion ID: 1130504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: do principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel bar the lower court from considering the question of contract validity?

Text: Jane argues that the Hinds County Chancery Court, in Moreland I [ Estate of Moreland, 537 So.2d 1337] determined, inter alia, that the contract at issue was void, and that no appeal was taken from this determination. Therefore, she argues that this determination is conclusive, and that the question of contract validity was improperly re-litigated by the Lee County Chancery Court. Mittie argues that the Hinds County Chancery Court in Moreland I did not rule the contract void and even so, the elements of res judicata or collateral estoppel are not present. Collateral estoppel is a subsidiary doctrine of res judicata, and it precludes the parties from re-litigating a specific issue actually litigated, determined by, and essential to the judgment in a former action, even though the latter suit proceeds on the basis of a different cause of action. Dunaway v. W.H. Hopper & Associates, Inc., 422 So.2d 749, 751 (Miss. 1982). The doctrine applies only to questions actually litigated. Id. In the former action, the question of contract validity was not actually litigated, and certainly was not determined by or essential to the judgment. The only question actually litigated in the former action was whether Mittie Moreland should be removed as administratrix, and Jane Riley substituted in her place. Judgment vacating Mittie's prior appointment was entered accordingly. The Hinds County Chancellor did render findings of fact and conclusions of law on Mittie's motion for new trial. However, the chancellor refused to state as a matter of law whether the actions taken by Mittie before her removal were void or voidable. The chancellor stated that he could not cover individually each one of the items, because they are not before the court. In short, there was never a specific question, finding, or conclusion regarding the validity of the contract at issue. Thus, the present action is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. As pertains to the broader doctrine of res judicata, the parties will be prevented from re-litigating all issues tried in the prior lawsuit, as well as all matters which should have been litigated and decided in the prior suit, provided of course that the four identities of res judicata are present. Id. They are: (1) identity of the subject matter of the action; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action; and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made. Id. In our view, there are not sufficient identities to invoke the doctrine. Drawing from the previous discussion of jurisdiction, the two causes of action involved are distinct. This distinction is based on the rule in this State that a cause of action by the administrator of an estate for the assets of an estate, and a suit in the name of an administrator for the use and benefit of the ... persons named in the wrongful death statute are distinct causes of action and are unrelated although they grow out of the results of the wrongful death of the decedent. Byars v. Austin, 218 So.2d 11, 16 (Miss. 1969). Therefore, the underlying facts and circumstances upon which the [present] claim is asserted and relief sought is the wrongful death suit, out of which this contract issue has arisen. Conversely, the underlying facts and circumstances upon which the [former] claim is asserted and relief sought is the administration of the decedent's estate. See Walton v. Bourgeois, 512 So.2d 698, 701 (Miss. 1987) (identity of cause of action is identity of underlying facts and circumstances upon which a claim is asserted and relief sought from the two actions.) Stated otherwise, the claim of Mittie Moreland in the present case arises out of and is connected with the wrongful death action, and is separate and distinct from the claim in the former action which arose out of and was connected with the administration of the decedent's estate. Therefore, we hold that the Lee County Chancery Court did not err in overruling Jane Riley's Motion to Dismiss on account of res judicata or collateral estoppel.