Opinion ID: 2321145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Trial Court's Ex Parte Communication With the Jury

Text: For his second contention, Mr. Van Dyke argues that the trial court impermissibly engaged in an ex parte communication with the jury. Based on Rogers, supra , and our Rule 43(a), we have held consistently that: A defendant and his counsel have a right to be informed of all communications from the jury and to offer their reactions before the trial judge undertakes to respond. ( Michael ) Smith v. United States, 389 A.2d 1356, 1361 (D.C. 1978) (per curiam) (citing Rogers, 422 U.S. at 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091) (other citations omitted); see also Cox v. United States, 999 A.2d 63, 70 (D.C.2010); Hallmon v. United States, 722 A.2d 26, 27 (D.C.1998). [12] Here, we can readily understand the trial judge's obvious frustration about the second delayed arrival of the defendant, and government and defense counsel's slow arrival after his admonition that they should [s]tay close by because he expect[ed] another note of some kind. In addressing the earlier delayed arrival of the parties, the judge complained: It took about a half an hour to get everybody back here today. Please make sure to check with [the courtroom clerk] as to when the jury is taking their lunch break so we can respond quickly. The judge's frustration undoubtedly increased because people were not picking up [the telephone] at [the] office of one of the counsel. Notwithstanding our understanding of the judge's frustration, we are left with the fact, as the government states it, that: In the absence of appellant and counsel, the trial court erred in responding to the jury's note that it `remain[ed] firmly deadlocked' by writing a note asking whether the jury had reached a unanimous verdict on second degree murder and/or voluntary manslaughter. Because we agree with the government that there is error on this record, the only remaining question is whether the error was harmless. The government recognizes that in this type of case we variously have applied the standard of harmlessness as articulated both in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) and in Chapman, supra . On the record in this case, we believe that the Kotteakos standard of harmlessness is appropriate; [13] we cannot say that at the time the trial court received the second deadlock note from the jury and Juror 737's note, that the presence of [Mr. Van Dyke was] a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would [have] be[en] thwarted by his absence. Gagnon, supra, 470 U.S. at 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 1482. As the government argues, at the time the court asked the jury if it had reached a decision on either second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, the judge had already heard and rejected Mr. Van Dyke's objection that the inquiry would communicate to the jury that the court expected a verdict. Upon his delayed arrival, the court gave Mr. Van Dyke the opportunity to assert any new objections. He declined, instead resting on the record that he previously made. Moreover, Mr. Van Dyke had requested, and the trial court had given during its final instructions before the jury began deliberating, an acquittal first instruction. We have held that the acquittal first instruction bears within its own terms the possibility of a reasonable efforts reinstruction in the event of deadlock. Taylor, supra, 866 A.2d at 825. Therefore, it should have come as no surprise to defense counsel that the next step would be a reasonable efforts determination. Counsel and defendant not only were present when the jury communicated that it was deadlocked as to the charge of second degree murder but they also had the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the next response to the jury, that is, the response following the judge's ex parte communication. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's ex parte communication, by itself, in no way created a substantial risk of juror coercion, Hankins, supra, 3 A.3d at 361, and thus, the error was harmless because we can say with fair assurance, . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, and it [is] highly probable that the error had [no] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Kotteakos, supra, 328 U.S. at 764-65, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239. [14]