Opinion ID: 6330219
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualified for Her Position

Text: King was a qualified employee if given the reasonable accommodation of medical leave. “‘Qualified disabled person’ means . . . a disabled person who can safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job in question, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Ohio Admin. Code 4112-5-02(K). Broken down, this element raises two distinct questions. First, could King perform “essential” functions of a nurse, with or without an accommodation. A job function is “essential” if removing the function would “fundamentally alter[]” the job. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Second, if King needed an accommodation to perform essential functions, was her required accommodation reasonable. Reasonable accommodations include any “reasonable adjustment made to a job and/or the work environment,” Ohio Admin. Code 4112-5-02(A), and may include “job restructuring” and “modified and part-time work schedules,” id. 4112-5-08(E)(2). King argues that she was “well-qualified by education and experience for her job as a Nurse and could perform the essential functions of that position if given the reasonable accommodation of time off of work.” (Pl. Br. at 8.) With her requested accommodation— medical leave—she could have returned to work and satisfactorily performed her job, as she had done for fifteen years. The Hospital argues that King’s asthma flare-ups made her unqualified for her job because “an essential element of her job as a nurse . . . required regular, in-person No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 11 attendance.” (Def. Br. at 11.) According to the Hospital, between April 28 and June 2, King repeatedly missed work and could not perform basic nursing duties. It concludes that King sought an exemption from an essential job function; thus, her preferred accommodation was per se unreasonable. King recognizes that she had to be at the Hospital to do her job. Even so, she argues that medical leave is a reasonable accommodation and, therefore, approved extended absences do not automatically make her unqualified. It is true that attendance is an essential function of many jobs. Our Court has found that “with few exceptions, ‘an employee who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise.’” Ford Motor, 782 F.3d at 761 (quoting EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 948 (6th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, “[r]egular, in-person attendance is an essential function—and a prerequisite to essential functions—of most jobs, especially the interactive ones.” Id. at 762–63. The Hospital believes that Ford Motor decides this case and urges the Court to adopt the following logic: attendance was an essential function of King’s job as a nurse; King’s preferred accommodation—medical leave—required extended absences. Relying solely on Ford Motor, the Hospital would have the Court stop there—as the district court did. See King, 2021 WL 1578076, at –. Taken to its logical end, however, this argument would bar any in-person employee from obtaining temporary medical leave as an accommodation. But that cannot be the case in light of the plain language of the ADA. The plain language of the ADA defines a qualified individual as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions [of the job].” 42 U.S.C. § 121118(8). And the purpose of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement is to require employers “to change the way things are customarily done to enable employees with disabilities to work.” EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act (May 9, 2016). Leave as a reasonable accommodation is therefore consistent with that statutory purpose because it enables the employee to return to work following the period of leave requested as an accommodation—i.e., it enables the employee to perform the essential function of attendance. No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 12 In any event, even after Ford Motor, this Court has found that “medical leave can constitute a reasonable accommodation” under certain circumstances. Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Cehrs, 155 F.3d at 783), as have Ohio courts, see Matasy v. Youngstown Ohio Hosp. Co., 95 N.E.3d 744, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (citing Foster v. Jackson Cnty. Broad. Inc., 2008 WL 109649 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)). We recently reached that same conclusion in Blanchet v. Charter Communs., LLC, --- F.4th ---, 2022 WL 682540, at  (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2022), where we explained that an employee requesting leave was still otherwise qualified under the ADA because “[e]mployees requesting medical leave often cannot perform their jobs when they request leave, and medical leave allows them time to recover from illnesses or medical procedures.” These outcomes make sense given that Ford Motor was not a medical leave case—the plaintiff there requested a permanent modified schedule allowing her to telework up to four days per week. See 782 F.3d at 759. Therefore, the “general rule” espoused in Ford Motor—that “regularly attending work on-site is essential to most jobs,” id. at 761—cannot automatically apply where medical leave would enable the employee to return to work and perform the essential job duties. Indeed, “[a]pproved medical leave may be a reasonable accommodation and an inability to work while on such leave does not mean that an individual is automatically unqualified.” Terre v. Hopson, 708 F. App’x 221, 228–29 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Cehrs, 155 F.3d at 782). Thus, in medical leave cases, we focus on the reasonableness of the leave request. See Williams, 847 F.3d at 393; Maat v. Cnty. of Ottowa, 657 F. App’x 404, 412 (6th Cir. 2016). When assessing reasonableness, this Court considers: (1) the amount of leave sought; (2) whether the requested leave generally complies with the employer’s leave policies; and (3) the nature of the employee’s prognosis, treatment, and likelihood of recovery. See Williams, 847 F.3d at 394; Maat, 657 F. App’x at 412–13; Cleveland, 83 F. App’x at 78; Terre, 708 F. App’x at 229. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to King, non-FMLA leave would have been a reasonable accommodation for her asthma flare-up. First, we have generally “declined to adopt a bright-line rule defining a maximum duration of leave that can constitute a reasonable accommodation.” Cleveland, 83 F. App’x at No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 13 78. But we have noted that requests for indefinite leave are likely unreasonable. Williams, 847 F.3d at 394. Applying this rule, the district court found that King’s request was unreasonable because she sought “indefinite leave.” King, 2021 WL 1578076, at  13. But the record contains many disputes about how much leave she actually sought. When she called FMLASource on May 19, King did not initially say how much time she needed off. The hospital argues that this means King sought indefinite leave. But, according to King, FMLASource did not give her the chance to specify how much time she needed during the May 19 call. King testified that FMLASource would not let her apply for any kind of leave because FMLASource erroneously believed that King had only worked 300 hours in the past year. But when FMLASource eventually permitted King to apply for leave on June 5—after King spent weeks fixing FMLASource’s mistakes—she asked for a set amount of leave to cover her absences between April 28 and June 1.3 Hospital policy allowed her to seek up to twelve weeks of FMLA leave and up to one year of non-FMLA leave. King ultimately only requested five weeks of leave. Thus, she did not seek an unreasonable amount of leave according to the Hospital’s own leave policies. Second, the record supports King’s position that retroactively granting emergency leave can be a reasonable accommodation. Requests for retroactive leave are not per se unreasonable, and we have recognized employers’ practices of granting retroactive leave in unforeseeable situations like this. See Williams, 847 F.3d at 394–95. Indeed, the Hospital had policies in place to handle these types of requests, including relaxed notice requirements for emergency leave requests and a five-day look back period for retroactive requests. King’s situation fell within these policies. King did not immediately request medical leave after her April 28 asthma attack because she “thought that she was going to improve” and that her flare-up would not be a longterm issue. (King Dep., R. 45, Page ID #712, #715.) Under Hospital policy, King had to request 3 The dissent ignores this point and agrees with the Hospital’s assertion that King sought indefinite leave. The dissent writes off the medical documentation that King submitted on June 5 because the Hospital had already terminated King’s employment by the time King was allowed to submit her leave application. But, at the summary judgment stage, the Court must accept King’s version of the facts. According to King, her efforts between May 19 and June 5—including multiple calls to FMLASource, her supervisor, and a Hospital human resources manager— were part of the same attempt to apply for medical leave. King completed that request on June 5 with a medical certification form stating that she needed a finite period of medical leave between April 28 and June 1. Therefore, she did not request indefinite leave. No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 14 FMLA leave “as soon as possible,” (Hospital Leave of Absence Policy, R. 44, Page ID #423), and she had to request non-FMLA leave “as soon as circumstances allow[ed],” (CBA, R. 44, Page ID #382–83.) King contacted FMLASource to request leave on May 19, shortly after her emergency room visit. Moreover, FMLASource’s own errors caused some of King’s failure to give advance notice. FMLASource miscalculated her hours, and it violated its own policy by refusing to consider King’s eligibility for both FMLA and non-FMLA leave when she first sought leave on May 19. King cannot be faulted for the lengthy application process when the Hospital—through the agent it hired to process leave requests—caused the delays. Under these circumstances, emergency retroactive leave would be a reasonable accommodation. Further bolstering this conclusion is the fact that the Hospital ultimately found that King qualified for non-FMLA leave between May 14 to June 1. By granting King’s leave request— even if only partially—the Hospital admitted that retroactive non-FMLA leave was a reasonable accommodation in this case.4 If given this accommodation, King would have been a qualified employee. None of the cases that the Hospital points to require a different conclusion. Most found that medical leave was not a reasonable accommodation—or the employee was unqualified— when the leave lasted over a year or extended beyond company policies. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2000); Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1046–47 (6th Cir. 1998); Melange v. City of Ctr. Line, 482 F. App’x 81, 84–86 (6th Cir. 2012). In several others, this Court was not considering whether the leave itself was a reasonable accommodation, but whether an employee would be able to perform essential functions of her job after returning from an approved leave. See Williams, 847 F.3d at 395; Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp., 610 F. App’x 519, 528 (6th Cir. 2015); Gamble v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 689 F. App’x 397, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2017). 4 As discussed below in Part II.B.1.d, the Hospital granted her request in name only. King never received the benefits of non-FMLA leave. No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 15 b. Defendant Knew or Should Have Known of Plaintiff’s Disability King raised a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the Hospital knew or should have known about her disability. “An employer has notice of the employee’s disability when the employee tells the employer that [s]he is disabled.” Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1046). “Of course, the employee need not use the word ‘disabled,’ but the employer must know enough information about the employee’s condition to conclude that [s]he is disabled.” Cady v. Remington Arms Co., 665 F. App’x 413, 418 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Leeds v. Potter, 249 F. App’x 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2007)). “Relevant information could include, among other things, a diagnosis, a treatment plan, apparent severe symptoms, and physician-imposed work restrictions.” Id. (citing Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc., 625 F. App’x 729, 737–38 (6th Cir. 2015)). The Hospital argues that it could not have known about King’s disability merely because it “kn[ew] that King had asthma and that she called in sick on many occasions.” (Def. Br. at 15.) According to the Hospital, “knowing that King had a health issue is not the same as knowing she had a disability.” (Id. (citing Brown v. BKW Drywall Supply, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 814, 829–30 (S.D. Ohio 2004)).) But, as King notes, an employee does not have to use “magic words” or explicitly use the word “disability” to put her employer on notice of her condition. Leeds, 249 F. App’x at 449 (citing Smith v. Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Hospital admits that it knew King had asthma, thus the question is whether the Hospital knew that her condition substantially impaired her ability to perform her essential job functions. King raised sufficient factual disputes on this point to defeat summary judgment. Whenever she called in sick, King told her supervisors that it was because of her asthma. She told Bungard that she “literally could not breathe,” and that she could not get off the couch “without being out of breath and wheezing.” (King Dep., R. 44, Page ID #210–11.) She even told Bungard that her asthma was debilitating. When King called FMLASource on May 19, she said that she needed medical leave because of her asthma. While an employer may not have knowledge of an employee’s disability merely because they took leave in the past and the employer is aware that they have some medical issues, see Messenheimer v. Coastal Pet Prods., Inc., 764 F. App’x 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2019), King alleges that she repeatedly notified the No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 16 Hospital of her severe asthma when her symptoms prevented her from working. Thus, a jury could find that the Hospital knew that, during flare-ups, King’s asthma was so severe that it rose to the level of a disability. c. Plaintiff Requested an Accommodation Viewing the facts in King’s favor, a jury could conclude that King requested an accommodation on several occasions. The employee bears the “initial burden of requesting an accommodation.” Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1046. “We have generally given plaintiffs some flexibility in how they request an accommodation.” Mobley v. Miami Valley Hosp., 603 F. App’x 405, 413 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Talley v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1108 (6th Cir. 2008)). Just as an employee does not need to use “magic words” to inform her employer that she is disabled, the employee does not need to explicitly use the word “accommodation.” Leeds, 249 F. App’x at 449 (citing Smith, 376 F.3d at 535). Medical documentation is not required. See Mobley, 603 F. App’x at 413 (citing Talley, 542 F.3d at 1108). A plaintiff’s own requests, whether written or oral, can satisfy this element. See id. (citing Talley, 542 F.3d at 1108). Additionally, “an employee’s initial request does not need to identify the perfect accommodation from the start.” Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 779 (Moore, J., dissenting). “Once an employee requests an accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an interactive process” to try to determine whether the employer can accommodate the employee’s disability. Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 421 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2018)); Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1031 n.1, 1045 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923, 929 (6th Cir. 2013)). The employer must participate in “good faith” and conduct an “individualized inquiry” into possible accommodations. Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Keith, 703 F.3d at 923). Construed in King’s favor, the record includes four instances that could qualify as a request for an accommodation. First, King called in sick for every shift between April 28 and June 2, and she told different supervisors that she could not work because of her asthma. Repeatedly calling in sick, even if it put the Hospital on notice about the severity of her asthma flare-up, does not amount to a request for medical leave if the Hospital had to speculate as to No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 17 King’s need for extended medical leave. See Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1046–47. Initially, when King called in, she did not say that she needed medical leave. The district court rightfully concluded that these daily call-ins were not requests for an accommodation. However, beginning on May 19, King started calling in and telling the on-call supervisor (Bungard and others) that she “was trying to get a leave but [she] hadn’t gotten it yet so [she] was reporting off again for the next day.” (King Dep., R. 44, Page ID #270.) A jury could find that the calls beginning on May 19 were requests for an accommodation because King explicitly told Hospital supervisors that she wanted medical leave to handle her asthma flare-up. Second, King called FMLASource and asked for medical leave on May 19. The district court found that this was not a request for an accommodation and pointed to an unpublished lower court opinion finding that merely asking if medical leave was “a possibility” was not a request for an accommodation. King, 2021 WL 1578076, at  (citing Hudson v. First Scholar, Inc., No 12-cv-2292, 2014 WL 12600136, at  (N.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2014)). Even if this proposition were correct, it is only relevant if the Court accepts the Hospital’s version of the facts. But at summary judgment, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to King. Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 660 (citing Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587). While the Hospital believes that King called on May 19 only “to ask if she was eligible” for FMLA leave, (Fischer Decl., R. 49-2, Page ID #1378), King disputes this fact. According to King, she told FMLASource that she “was calling in to request the leave” because of her asthma. (King Dep., R. 44, Page ID #266.) Taking King’s version as true, this would satisfy her burden to request an accommodation even if King only asked for FMLA leave (for which she was ineligible) rather than non-FMLA, and even if she did not say how much time off she needed. See Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 779 (Moore, J., dissenting) (employees “do not need to identify the perfect accommodation from the start”). Thus, a jury could find that King requested an accommodation in her May 19 call with FMLASource. Third, after calling FMLASource on May 19, King told a human resources employee (Burns) and her supervisor (Bungard) that she was seeking medical leave. King called Burns on May 19 and said that she was trying to apply for leave but that FMLASource was not letting her because of her low hours. Roughly a week later, King called Bungard and said that she “was No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 18 trying to apply for the hospital’s medical leave and FMLA.” (King Dep., R. 44, Page ID #271.) At this point, multiple people within Hospital leadership knew that King was seeking medical leave to deal with her asthma flare-up: Burns, Bungard, the FMLASource representative that King called on May 19, and the other on-call supervisors that King contacted to call in sick between May 19 and June 2. Finally, King called FMLASource two more times on May 30 and June 5. In response, FMLASource sent King a letter on June 5 stating that it had “received [her] request for leave,” but that it needed more medical documentation to support her request. (FMLASource Letter, R. 44, Page ID #650 (emphasis added).) King completed her leave application, including supporting medical documentation, on June 6.5 A jury could find that King first requested leave on May 19 and that her application for leave was outstanding for two weeks before it was finalized on June 6, when Dr. Alam submitted a medical certification form indicating that King needed leave between April 28 and June 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to King, the record shows that she made several requests for medical leave between May 19 and June 6. These requests triggered the Hospital’s duty to engage in an interactive process to determine whether it could reasonably accommodate King’s asthma flare-up. See Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 857. The record indicates that the Hospital did not participate in that process in good faith in three ways. First, the record indicates that FMLASource violated the Hospital’s own policies on May 19 when it did not consider King’s eligibility for non-FMLA leave. Even if King only asked for FMLA leave, FMLASource was obligated to consider her eligibility for both FMLA and non-FMLA leave. But FMLASource simply told King that she was ineligible for FMLA leave and refused to allow her to actually make a request. As King puts it, she “was immediately rebuffed by FMLASource.” (Pl. Br. at 6.) This shows the Hospital’s bad faith refusal to consider her May 19 request for leave. See Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 5 There is some disagreement over whether an employee can properly request an accommodation after her employer terminates her. Compare Johnson v. Otter Tail Cnty., No. 00-3098, 2001 WL 664217, at  (8th Cir. May 14, 2001) (“[P]ost-termination requests for accommodation are not properly viewed as requests for accommodation at all, but, rather, as requests for reinstatement.” (citing Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999))), with Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1996) (employers must consider accommodation requests made shortly after the employee’s termination). We do not need to wade into this debate because the record shows that King was trying to apply for medical leave well before her termination on June 2. See Lafata v. Church of Christ Home for the Aged, 325 F. App’x 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2009). No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 19 485 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2007) (employers may not “rebuff[]” an employee’s request for an accommodation); Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1046 (noting that an employer’s failure to discuss the employee’s request is evidence of bad faith (citing EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 622 (5th Cir. 2009))). Second, the record indicates that the Hospital unreasonably stalled King’s request because of FMLASource’s errors. On May 19, FMLASource did not have accurate timesheets because of a recent change in the Hospital’s management. Yet FMLASource made no effort to independently confirm or correct King’s hours. Rather than reaching out to the proper human resources representative (Burns) to fix King’s hours, FMLASource told King she had to reach out to Burns herself. Although the Hospital and FMLASource caused the error, they did nothing to fix it. Even after King called Burns, Burns did little to help. It took several weeks for FMLASource to update King’s hours, and, when it finally did, no one told King. King had to call FMLASource two more times—on May 30 and June 5—before FMLASource updated her hours and let her file a formal application for leave. Ultimately, the Hospital put the onus on King to fix its own mistake. A jury could find that the Hospital obstructed King’s attempts to apply for leave and thereby failed to participate in the interactive process in good faith. See Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1040–41 (“[F]ailing to assist an employee in seeking an accommodation may suggest bad faith.” (citing Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 2006))); Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 872 (refusing to provide information to the employee is evidence of bad faith). Finally, the Hospital prematurely halted the interactive process by terminating King while her leave request was still outstanding. See Cash v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 548 F. App’x 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2013) (employer fails to engage in good faith when “the interactive process . . . was still ongoing when the employer terminated the worker’s employment” (citing Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1284–87)). “An employer may not stymie the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability by preemptively terminating the employee before an accommodation can be considered or recommended.” Cutrera v. La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005). And if the employer terminated the employee before fully considering the request for an accommodation, then the employer may need to “reconsider No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 20 the decision to terminate” the employee. See Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1286. Bungard knew that King was trying to apply for leave and that she needed FMLASource to fix her hours. Despite this knowledge, Bungard terminated her for failing to timely seek leave, even though he knew that King was trying to do just that. Thus, King sufficiently requested an accommodation, but the Hospital failed to engage in the interactive process in the wake of her requests. d. Defendant Failed to Provide the Accommodation As discussed above, construing the facts in her favor, King requested a reasonable accommodation—medical leave—to help manage her temporary asthma flare-up. Ultimately, the Hospital retroactively approved King’s request for non-FMLA leave between May 14 and June 1, but only after the Hospital terminated her. But this retroactive approval did not give King the full benefits of non-FMLA leave. Therefore, FMLASource denied King the accommodation that she sought. As defined by the Hospital’s own policies, non-FMLA leave provides that, “[u]pon returning from leave of absence, the employee shall be reinstated to the job assignment which [s]he formerly occupied.” (CBA, R. 44, Page ID #384 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, one of the benefits of medical leave is that the employee will still have a job when she comes back from an approved leave. After King requested leave on May 19—and while King was trying to fix FMLASource’s erroneous hours records—the Hospital terminated her for “failure to apply timely for a leave of absence.”6 (Bungard Dep., R. 50, Page ID #1419.) But on June 22, the Hospital retroactively granted King’s request for non-FMLA leave. Even though the Hospital ultimately approved King’s request for leave, it never gave her the benefits of an approved leave, which would have included reinstatement. Cf. Terre, 708 F. App’x at 227 (recognizing that plaintiffs can bring a claim based on the theory that an employee “was granted an accommodation which was then made ineffective due to [the employee’s] position being [terminated],” because the termination effectively “nullif[ied the] accommodation”). Employers 6 King initially brought a wrongful termination claim. See King, 2021 WL 1578076, at . However, the district court found that she abandoned this claim, id., and she does not challenge that finding on appeal. The record offers little insight into why King decided not to pursue this claim. But since King does not present this claim on appeal, we agree that she abandoned this cause of action. See United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 308 n.1 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Rose v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 766 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2014)). No. 21-3445 King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp. Page 21 cannot skirt liability by rubber stamping a period of medical leave after terminating the employee. By granting King “leave” when she was no longer employed, King had no job to return to. Thus, the post hoc approval of her request did not provide all of the protections that medical leave is designed give. Accepting King’s version of events, the Hospital did not give her all of the benefits of non-FMLA leave and, therefore, failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.