Opinion ID: 2207829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Explicit Standards.

Text: Although a statute may not be vague in the ordinary sense of the word, it may yet violate due process requirements if it fails to provide explicit standards for those who enforce it. As stated in State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 1976): A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. (Quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972).) In short, the question is whether the challenged statute invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by its very breadth or scope. The statute clearly limits forfeiture of property used to facilitate a crime. The statute does not give county attorneys and the attorney general the power to determine arbitrarily the scope of the forfeiture provision. Virtually all criminal statutes, even those which are precise, allow discretionary application. We view the forfeiture law no differently. As stated in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. ____, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 528, 547 (1989): The Constitution does not forbid the imposition of an otherwise permissible sanction, such as forfeiture, merely because in some cases prosecutors may abuse the processes available to them. We conclude the language of the statute, viewed in light of the procedural safeguards attending it, provides sufficient standards governing its application.