Opinion ID: 1181110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Clarify Which Guilt Phase Instructions Applied to Penalty Phase.

Text: (38a) Defendant claims that the trial court's failure sua sponte to instruct the jury as to which of the guilt and sanity phase instructions applied in the penalty phase denied him a fair penalty phase trial. He asserts that if the jurors ignored all the guilt and sanity phase instructions in their penalty deliberations, then it left the jury without guidance as to how to assess witness credibility [22] and created the possibility of an adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify. If, on the other hand, the jury believed that the guilt and sanity phase instructions applied at the penalty phase, defendant was denied a fair penalty determination because the jury was instructed at the guilt phase not to be influenced by sympathy for defendant and to disregard the consequences of its decision. (39) We first observe that in the penalty phase, as in the guilt phase, the trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the defendant's failure to testify. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 758-759 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) (38b) Further, we question defendant's premise that at the penalty phase the jury either applied or rejected in toto all of the guilt phase instructions. The language of the no-sympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) refers specifically to deciding a defendant's guilt or innocence. [23] The instructions on witness credibility (CALJIC No. 2.20) [24] and the defendant's failure to testify (CALJIC Nos. 2.60, 2.61), [25] by contrast, make no reference to the issue of guilt or innocence. The jury therefore could reasonably have understood that the former did not apply to the penalty phase, whereas the latter did apply. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1209 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) The question, in any event, is whether the jury may have been misled into applying the antisympathy guilt phase instruction at the penalty phase. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 785; see People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 624 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854]; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 761; cf. California v. Brown, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 544-546 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837](conc. opn. by O'Connor, J.).) As discussed earlier, both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued the weight of defendant's mitigating evidence, specifically including evidence relating to his background, character and history. The jury was not told that it could not consider sympathy. Nor is there any indication that it may have been misled into applying the antisympathy guilt phase instruction at the penalty phase. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 786.) We conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to give additional clarifying instructions on the subject of sympathy at the penalty phase. ( People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 624; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 102-103.) (40) We similarly reject defendant's argument that there was a prejudicial carryover effect from the final portion of CALJIC No. 1.00, which read you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. As with the guilt phase antisympathy instruction (se People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 785), the potential for confusion from the guilt phase instruction to disregard the consequences is attenuated at the penalty phase. Consequently, the question is whether on review of the record as a whole it appears that an abstract possibility of prejudice may have been realized. (See People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 759-760; cf. People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 785.) Here both the prosecutor and defense counsel emphasized to the jury the gravity of its decision. Thus, the prosecutor stated, [Y]ou have an awesome and a grave decision to make, ... [one] that will cause you all some emotional turmoil. Defense counsel stated: You are going to have to consider the fate of Mr. Babbitt.... [Y]our decision, should it be death, is a premeditate[d], deliberate, cruel, calculated killing. All twelve of you can decide to kill someone.... [ถ] You are going to have to face your decision.... We conclude that the jury could not have been misled as to its responsibility to consider the consequences of its decision. [26]