Opinion ID: 768212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Propriety of Summary Judgment on the Present Record

Text: 48 Finally, we have procedural difficulties with the district court's ruling, on summary judgment, that St.Pierre possessed an ironclad prescription defense. That ruling was based on factual findings (a) that St.Pierre had not sufficiently acknowledged his debt to Kenworth prior to the expiration of the prescription period to interrupt that period, and (b) that St.Pierre had taken no action sufficient to revive the debt after the expiration of the prescription period. The resolution of these factual issues as to the nature and timing of actions taken by St.Pierre with respect to his debt to American Iron was not consistent with the principles that govern decisions of motions for summary judgment. 49 A motion for summary judgment may not properly be granted unless the the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the district court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Balderman v. United States Veterans Administration, 870 F.2d at 60. In ruling on the motion, the court is not entitled to weigh the evidence. See, e.g., id.; Heyman v. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 131920 (2d Cir. 1975). Rather, if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper. See, e.g., Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1988). 50 A summary judgment motion may be made with or without supporting affidavits, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); however, Rule 56 provides that if affidavits are submitted they shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Rule also provides that [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 51 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). However, if the motion for summary judgment is not made and supported as provided in Rule 56, the Rule does not impose on the party opposing summary judgment an obligation to come forward with affidavits or other admissible evidence of his own. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 52 In the present case, although the district court discussed these principles, it did not appropriately apply them. First, to the extent that defendants sought summary judgment on the basis that St.Pierre had not previously acknowledged his debt to Kenworth or its parent, their motions were not properly supported as provided by Rule 56(e). Although defendants and Connecticut Indemnity asserted that St.Pierre had not acknowledged his debt to Kenworth prior to the expiration of the prescription period, we have seen in the record no such assertion based on evidence or personal knowledge of the facts. For example, the affidavit of Connecticut Indemnity's Canadian consultant stated his opinion that [a]s of February 20, 1993 [i.e., five years and a day from the date of the theft], Kenworth had no legal right to claim any money from St.Pierre under the Leasing Contract. (First Borenstein Aff. 28.) Although this opinion apparently assumes that St.Pierre had not, prior to February 19, 1993, acknowledged his debt to Kenworth, counsel did not make any such assertion on the basis of his personal knowledge of any facts. He stated only, I can see absolutely no indication in St.Pierre's letter of September 6, 1994 ... that even implies the abandonment of St.Pierre's right to assert prescription (First Borenstein Aff. 30 (emphasis added)); he proffered no factual observations as to any prior acknowledgement that might have occurred. If defendants sought summary judgment on the basis that in fact St.Pierre had not, prior to the expiration of the prescription period, acknowledged his debt to Kenworth or its parent, it was incumbent on defendants to adduce admissible evidence to that effect, perhaps by obtaining discovery from St.Pierre in which he so admitted, or by obtaining deposition testimony or affidavits from Kenworth or American Iron. Defendants adduced no such evidence. Thus, although the court described St.Pierre's affidavit, which stated that St.Pierre had made such acknowledgements throughout the period, as conclusory, we cannot see that Rule 56 imposed on St.Pierre an obligation to come forward with evidence that was more specific, given defendant's failure to support their motions with evidence or factual assertions based on personal knowledge. 53 Second, the district court failed to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of St.Pierre as the party against whom summary judgment was sought, for there is evidence in the record that suggests that St.Pierre may in fact have given pertinent acknowledgements to Kenworth prior to the running of the prescription period. For example, in his affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment, St.Pierre stated that [t]hroughout this unfortunate affair, I have consistently acknowledged my obligations to Kenworth. (St.Pierre Aff. 34.) By letter dated September 6, 1994 (September 1994 Letter), St.Pierre wrote Kenworth stating that he acknowledge[d] owing $102,409.23 to Kenworth, and apologiz[ed] for not having honoured [his] undertakings. Although this letter is dated after the expiration of the prescription period, its reference to prior undertakings is compatible with St.Pierre's affidavit assertion that he had consistently acknowledged his obligations to Kenworth [t]hroughout. In addition, American Iron in its complaint in the Quebec action alleged that St.Pierre had on numerous occasions[] acknowledged his liability for the loss of the Kenworth truck and for the amount of ... $102,409.23[], a copy of such acknowledgement being herein produced as Exhibit P3. (American Iron Declaration dated June 7, 1996, 6.) While the exhibit referred to was St.Pierre's post-prescription-period September 1994 Letter, that letter plainly constituted only one of the allegedly numerous acknowledgements. 54 We note that although the district court termed St.Pierre's submissions self-serving, the self-serving nature of a witness's statements goes not to their admissibility but to their weight, see, e.g., United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1984). The weighing of St.Pierre's evidence is a matter for the finder of fact at trial; it was not the prerogative of the court on a motion for summary judgment. Further, we have seen no citation, by defendants or by the district court, of Canadian law requiring that, in order to interrupt the prescription period, the debtor's acknowledgement must be in writing. Plainly it would be open to St.Pierre at trial to give chapter and verse of the acknowledgements he has sworn he consistently made [t]hroughout. 55 In sum, we conclude that the district court, in granting summary judgment, inappropriately weighed the evidence, failed to draw all permissible inferences in favor of St.Pierre as the party opposing summary judgment, and imposed on him a burden to adduce evidence that was not warranted by the speculative affidavits supporting defendants' motions. 56 Finally, we add a note of caution with respect to the doctrinal basis for the court's ruling that the prescription period was not revived. That ruling was based on the finding that St.Pierre, although defaulting in the American Iron action, had not made a post-prescription-period promise to pay his debt to Kenworth. So far as we can see, however, neither the parties nor the court have pointed to any provision of Canadian law that forecloses the possibility that a party who defaults in responding to a lawsuit will thereby be considered to have satisfied the renunciation requirement by having made the functional equivalent of an unconditional promise to pay the debt. Indeed, we note that one of the authorities cited by the district court states that [r]enunciation requires 'a new obligation or an unequivocal promise to pay the prescribed debt.' Catellier v. Belanger, 4D.L.R. 267, 271 (Sup. Ct. of Can. 1924). St.PierreIII, 21 F.Supp.2d at 145 (emphasis ours). Plainly the judgment entered against St.Pierre represents an obligation. If, as defendants contend, the prescription period had expired and extinguished St.Pierre's obligation to pay American Iron, the American Iron judgment would seem to constitute a new obligation ... to pay the prescribed debt. Catellier v. Belanger, 4 D.L.R. at 271. Thus, even if defendants had come forward with actual evidence that St.Pierre made no explicit promise to pay, it is not at all clear that they were entitled to judgment against him as a matter of law.