Opinion ID: 2318844
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Text: Respondent next excepts to Judge Holland's conclusion that he violated MRPC 1.4(a) and (b) in the Sims case by failing to communicate with the plaintiffs, other than Michael Sims. Respondent asserts there was an agreement among the Sims plaintiffs that Michael Sims would represent the group regarding communication with Respondent. Finding no evidence that such an agreement existed, either by witness testimony from the Sims plaintiffs or a written agreement or documentation of an oral agreement, Judge Holland concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 1.4(a) by failing to communicate with the Sims plaintiffs, other than Michael Sims, about the status of their case. For the same reason, Judge Holland concluded Respondent violated MRPC 1.4(b) by failing to explain to the Sims plaintiffs, other than Michael Sims, the consequences of allowing the lawsuit to be dismissed. Respondent argues that this reasoning is erroneous because his testimony at the evidentiary hearing provided evidence of the existence of the agreement. Moreover, he argues, Petitioner bore the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the nonexistence of the agreement, whether through witnesses or documents. Respondent's argument is misguided. Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence through Respondent's own testimony that Respondent had communicated with Michael Sims to the exclusion of the other co-plaintiffs. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992) (holding Bar Counsel must prove by clear and convincing evidence the factual determinations essential to establishing its case against the [defending] attorney.); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606, 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991). Q. [Bar Counsel]: You were dealing with the other individuals through Mr. Sims, is that correct? A. [Respondent]: Mr. Sims was the spokesman for the family. Now, even though he was running around with a sixteen year girl or seventeen year old girl, he Q. [Bar Counsel]: Your Honor, again, I ask this be stricken. A. [Respondent]: All right. Yes, he was. Yes. He was the spokesman for the family. He was the pater familius, as we say in Latin.     Q. [Bar Counsel]: Did you ever contact any of your other clients with respect to the dismissal of the case? A. [Respondent]: No, just Michael Sims.     Respondent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had an agreement with the Sims plaintiffs that Michael Sims would be their spokesperson. See Sheridan, 357 Md. at 17-18, 741 A.2d at 1152 (quoting Powell, 328 Md. at 288, 614 A.2d at 108 (holding that an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding need only establish factual matters in defense of the attorney's position by the preponderance of evidence)). He failed to convince Judge Holland of that fact: Q. [Bar Counsel]: Do you have any evidence or anything in writing in your files which would indicate that you were to speak only with Michael [Sims] with respect to these cases? A. [Respondent]: No. It was understood. The only other proof offered by Respondent as to the existence of an agreement was the absence of oral or written documentation to the contrary: Q. [Respondent's Counsel]: Okay. Now, you stated that Mr. Sims, Michael Sims was to be the spokesman for the group. Is that correct, sir? A. [Respondent]: That's right. Q. [Respondent's Counsel]: Did any other of the four people involved or three people involved ever tell you that was not the situation? A. [Respondent]: No. Q. [Respondent's Counsel]: Any of them ever tell you in writing that it was not the situation? A. [Respondent]: No. Q. [Respondent's Counsel]: Any of them ever tell you other than in writing that was not the situation? A. [Respondent]: No. Q. [Respondent's Counsel]: Any of them ever object to you about the fact that Mr. Sims was the spokesman? A. [Respondent]: No. This was the way it was done. Instead of making four phone calls, I made one phone call. This was not convincing, particularly in light of the fact that Respondent's reluctance to proceed to trial arose, to a large extent, from the assumed effect Michael Sims's prior drug conviction would have on the civil case, a concern that was not shared by his co-plaintiffs. Respondent failed to sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an agreement among the Sims plaintiffs that Michael Sims would be their spokesperson. Accordingly, this exception is overruled. In regard to the Braswell matter, Respondent excepts to Judge Holland's conclusion that he violated MRPC 1.4(a) by not keeping Mrs. Braswell reasonably informed of the status of her minor child's pending case, including a $1,000 settlement offer made by defendant's insurance company. Respondent notes that the only witnesses in the Braswell matter were Mrs. Braswell and the Respondent. Respondent suggests that Mrs. Braswell's testimony did not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence in view of her limited recall of several events. [13] As we have previously stated, the factfinder determines the weight of the evidence, including whether to believe any witness. Harris, 310 Md. at 210, 528 A.2d at 901. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Winters, 309 Md. 658, 666-67, 526 A.2d 55, 59 (1987). It is the essence of the fact-finding function that a trial judge clearly `may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.' Kemp, 303 Md. at 675, 496 A.2d at 677 (quoting Nothstein, 300 Md. at 684, 480 A.2d at 816). Applying the clearly erroneous standard, we will not substitute our judgement for that of Judge Holland where it was dependent on her assessment of witness credibility. See Sheridan, 357 Md. at 17, 741 A.2d at 1152; Harris, 310 Md. at 210, 528 A.2d at 901. This exception is overruled.