Opinion ID: 895007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expenses Under Section 21.019(b)

Text: In the alternative, FKM contends that although the University labeled its pleadings as amended petitions instead of motions to dismiss, the pleadings were in substance and effect the same as motions to dismiss, at least to ninety-seven percent of the tract, which in any event entitles FKM to fees and expenses. FKM bases its claim on a combination of two factors. The first is the drastic difference in size between the original tract of land and the smaller tract sought to be condemned by the amended petition  the original tract contained 47,008 square feet whereas the smaller tract contained 1,260 square feet. The second is that the University alleged it intended to use the smaller tract to expand the University campus, but specifically pleaded that (1) the only improvements to the tract would be landscaping, and (2) an appurtenant access easement across the tract and along FKM's frontage would be reserved to FKM for driveway access to Calhoun Road. The easement would run with FKM's land. The University relies on the plain language of the statute to refute an award of fees and expenses in two ways. It asserts that section 21.019(b) is facially inapplicable because the University never moved to dismiss the condemnation action and the trial court did not have a hearing on or grant a motion to dismiss. And although the University agrees that the pleading's effect and not its title determines its nature, the effect of the pleading, it argues, must be to dismiss the entire proceeding, as opposed to only part of the original tract. Section 21.019(b) is applicable to dismissals requested by the condemning authority. It provides: A court that hears and grants a motion to dismiss a condemnation proceeding made by a condemnor under Subsection (a) shall make an allowance to the property owner for reasonable and necessary fees for attorneys, appraisers, and photographers and for the other expenses incurred by the property owner to the date of the hearing. Section 21.019(a) provides that [a] party that files a condemnation petition may move to dismiss the proceedings, and the court shall conduct a hearing on the motion. (emphasis added). We first address the question of whether a landowner must file a formal motion that the trial court grants before the right to fees and expenses arises under this subsection. If a party to a condemnation proceeding files a timely and proper objection to the special commissioners' award, the case shall be tried in the same manner as other civil causes. TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.018(b). In civil causes generally, filing an amended petition that does not include a cause of action effectively nonsuits or voluntarily dismisses the omitted claims as of the time the pleading is filed. No hearing is necessary to effect the nonsuit. Even if the nonsuit applies to the entire case, the nonsuit or voluntary dismissal is effective when notice is filed or announced in open court. Entry of an order granting the nonsuit is ministerial. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Estate of Blackmon ex rel. Shultz, 195 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex.2006) ([A] nonsuit extinguishes a case or controversy from `the moment the motion is filed' or an oral motion is made in open court.). Our rules provide that amended pleadings and their contents take the place of prior pleadings. TEX.R. CIV. P. 65. So, causes of action not contained in amended pleadings are effectively dismissed at the time the amended pleading is filed, except for possible circumstances not present here. See Ortiz v. Collins, 203 S.W.3d 414, 421 n. 4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (amended pleading specifically reserved right to re-assert or appeal trial court order dismissing causes of action and which causes of action were, therefore, not pleaded in the amended pleading). To decide the issue we must reconcile statutory language that facially allows a motion and hearing to dismiss, see section 21.019 ([A] party that files a condemnation petition may move to dismiss. (emphasis added)), with language that results in a condemnor being allowed to dismiss its claim by amending pleadings as occurs in other civil cases, see TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.018(b) ([T]he court shall cite the adverse party and try the case in the same manner as other civil cases. (emphasis added)). In construing statutes, we ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed by the language of the statute. See State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex.2006). We use definitions prescribed by the Legislature and any technical or particular meaning the words have acquired, but otherwise, we construe the statute's words according to their plain and common meaning unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.011; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2004). We presume the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result by enacting the statute. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.021(3). We find no guidance in legislative history as to how the Legislature intended sections 21.018(b) and 21.019 to interact in regard to this question. Early eminent domain statutes specified that condemnation trials were to be conducted as were other civil causes. See Act approved Feb. 8, 1860, 8th Leg., R.S., ch. 51, § 2, 1860 Tex. Gen. Laws 60, 61-62, reprinted in 4 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 1422, 1423-24 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (if either party be dissatisfied with the decision of said Commissioners, he or they shall have the right to file a petition in the District Court, as in ordinary cases, reciting the cause of action, and the failure to agree, and such suit shall proceed to judgment as in ordinary cases.). Section 21.018(b) includes the substance of that language. Thus, we seek legislative intent in the plain words of the statutory provisions, mindful that we presume the Legislature to have intended a just and reasonable result, and not an absurd one. In construing sections 21.018(b) and 21.019 together, it seems to us that the Legislature intended section 21.019, with language allowing a condemnor to file a dismissal motion, to assure notice and a hearing before entry of an order dismissing a condemnation proceeding. That is a just and reasonable result. For example, if a condemnor desires to dismiss the entire condemnation proceeding, the landowner has the right to a hearing to seek statutorily allowed fees and expenses. On the other hand, a condemnor that decides to dismiss the entire proceeding has the right to a hearing on the amount of fees and expenses that might be assessed against it. But it also seems to us that having provided for notice and a hearing under these circumstances, the Legislature did not intend to override the directive of section 21.018(b), that condemnation cases should be tried as other civil cases  including, we believe, the procedural aspect of voluntarily nonsuiting claims so long as the nonsuit does not prejudice other parties. The two sections are compatible when so viewed. Moreover, construing the statutory framework to deprive condemnors the right to nonsuit a claim by filing a notice of nonsuit or an amended pleading could lead to an absurd result. For example, could a trial court deny a motion by a condemning authority to dismiss the proceeding, and thereby require the authority to take property it did not want to take? Clearly it could not. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d at 954 ([A]n agency clothed with the power of eminent domain may not be forced to take land against its will.). We see no purpose in putting form over substance by requiring a motion and order granting the motion, so long as the court's judgment does not prejudice or deprive notice and hearing to either the condemnor or the landowner. Construing sections 21.018(b) and 21.019 in this manner, we believe, reflects the Legislature's intent that although condemnors may file motions to dismiss entire proceedings should they desire, they also have the same procedural rights as plaintiffs in other civil actions to dismiss claims by filing amended pleadings or by notice of dismissal. Of course, neither party may use a dismissal to deprive the other party of any hearing necessary to protect its interests. Thus, the University could have dismissed all or part of its claim by amending its petition, subject to FKM's right to claim fees and expenses pursuant to statute. TEX.R. CIV. P. 162; see Cole, 313 S.W.2d at 530. Further, it is clear the University intended to omit the larger tract from its amended pleadings and condemn only the smaller tract. Accordingly, the amended pleadings effected a voluntary dismissal of the University's claim as to that part of the larger tract not included in the amended pleading. See Webb v. Jorns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex.1972). Whether section 21.019(b) allows recovery of fees and expenses should turn on a common-sense view of events rather than an excessively formalistic, mechanical approach of looking only for particular words in the label on the condemnor's pleading or in the pleading itself. This is the approach embodied in procedures for trying civil cases generally. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 71 provides that [w]hen a party has mistakenly designated any plea or pleading, the court, if justice so requires, shall treat the plea or pleading as if it had been properly designated. We believe that incorporating such flexible and just procedures is what the Legislature intended by requiring condemnation cases to be tried as other civil cases, see section 21.018(b), and by providing protection for landowners against the burden of fees and expenses when an entity lodges a condemnation proceeding against it and then abandons the action. In this case, the availability of fees and expenses should not turn on whether the University accomplished its abandonment by omission from an amended petition or a document labeled motion to dismiss. We cannot agree with the University that the plain wording of section 21.019(b) always requires complete and strict dismissal of the entire action before the landowner's right to fees and expenses arises. As the University points out, the statute does not make reference to a partial dismissal, but it likewise does not specifically provide that the condemnor must move to dismiss the condemnation proceeding in its entirety or use similar all-inclusive language. It simply makes reference to dismissal of a condemnation proceeding. We think the Legislature's language is sufficiently flexible to encompass the uncommon factual circumstances presented in this case. [11] Section 21.019(b) provides for waiver of sovereign immunity, a point the University does not dispute. We have stated generally that waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocal, although they need not be models of perfect clarity. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex.2003). We have also recognized that the protections given in the statutory scheme regulating condemnation proceedings must be liberally construed for the benefit of the landowner. John v. State, 826 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex.1992). We should not construe the fee-shifting statute so woodenly as to reach an absurd result, see Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 356, or a result that could essentially render it inoperable, see Ex Parte Pruitt, 551 S.W.2d 706, 709 (1977) (Statutes should be read as a whole and construed to give meaning and purpose to every part.). One court of appeals has held, under a predecessor statute to section 21.019, that an amended petition seeking a smaller tract did not constitute an implied abandonment of the proceeding entitling the landowner to recover expenses. Zucht v. City of San Antonio, 698 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (interpreting Act of May 28, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 772, § 1, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2293, repealed by Act of May 24, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475, 3729, providing that the landowner shall recover expenses [w]here a plaintiff . . . desires to dismiss, abandon the proceedings, or refuse the jury verdict). On the other hand, in State v. Tamminga, 928 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.App.-Waco 1996, no writ), the court of appeals considered a situation where the State originally brought three separate actions to condemn three separate tracts of property. The trial court consolidated the actions, and the State later amended its petition in the consolidated action to exclude one of the tracts. The court of appeals held that the amendment constituted a motion to dismiss within the meaning of Section 21.019 as to the tract excluded. Id. at 740. Other states have statutes similar to the Texas statute that provide for recovery of expenses but do not specifically address instances in which abandonment by the condemning authority is less than absolute and complete abandonment. In many states, courts have not construed the statutes. Decisions in those states that have interpreted their statutes have construed them in different ways. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has held that landowner expenses can only be awarded when the condemnor dismisses the proceedings entirely. Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305, 314-15 (Utah 1991). However, courts in at least six other states and the former Hawai'i Territory have held that landowner expenses are sometimes recoverable if the condemnor amends its complaint to reduce or alter the property interests it seeks. [12] We agree with the view that statutes such as the Texas statute sometimes allow recovery of expenses when the condemning authority amends its pleadings to seek less than one hundred percent of the originally-sought property. We hold that an amended condemnation petition dismisses the proceedings within the meaning of section 21.019(b) even if the condemnor does not completely dismiss or abandon the proceedings, but continues them in such manner that the amendment functionally abandons the original condemnation claim and asserts a different claim. To hold otherwise would mean that a condemning authority could artfully amend its petition to condemn only an extremely small fraction of the original area sought and avoid liability for fees and expenses under section 21.019(b). FKM claims the amended petition here is designed to do just that  to allow the University to avoid the statutory requirement that it reimburse costs and fees to FKM if it dismisses the proceeding  and section 21.019(b) reflects legislative intent that landowners recover fees and expenses when a condemning authority abandons its condemnation. We do not ascribe to the Legislature an intent to allow a condemnor to circumvent the statutory provision allowing fees and expenses to landowners by abandoning all but such a comparatively insignificant part of the original condemnation claim that the condemnation proceeding is effectively a different claim. There is no bright line that can be drawn here, and we add that section 21.019(b) does not waive a condemning authority's immunity from liability for fees and expenses when just any downward adjustment in the size of the condemned property occurs. Other factors, such as whether the planned use of the smaller tract sought by amendment differs significantly from the tract originally sought and whether the potential future uses of the different tracts are similar, may be probative on the issue, in addition to the size of the reduced claim. In this case, the reduction in property rights to be taken constitutes an overwhelming part of the originally-sought property. When the reduction is considered together with the potential and expressed planned uses for the different tracts, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the University effectively abandoned its original claim and FKM is entitled to recover fees and expenses pursuant to section 21.019(b). We have no quarrel with the dissent's reading of the statutory language. We simply disagree that the Legislature could have intended to allow a landowner such as FKM to recover fees and expenses only if a condemning authority files a formal motion to dismiss as to every small part of the originally-sought land. As we note above, the Legislature has long prescribed that condemnation cases be tried as other civil cases, thus incorporating the mechanism of dismissal by amending pleadings and notice of dismissal so long as another party is not prejudiced. That fulfills the purpose of the statutory language precluding a condemnor from discontinuing a proceeding in some manner without a court and the landowner being able to examine the circumstances of the former claim to determine if fees and expenses are recoverable by the landowner. The Legislature has directed courts to presume it intended a just and reasonable result by its enactments. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.021(3). If it is just and reasonable for landowners to obtain relief from fees and expenses they incur in condemnation proceedings that are fully dismissed, surely it is so if the functional effect of an amended pleading by a condemnor is dismissal of the original proceeding while effectively pursuing a different claim. However, we agree with the dissent that the Legislature plainly has not provided for partial or full recovery of fees and expenses merely because a partial dismissal occurs. Even though the University effectively abandoned its original proceeding, FKM was not entitled to all its fees and expenses. Section 21.019(b) provides that a property owner is allowed to recover fees and expenses incurred by the property owner to the date of the hearing. By the plain language of the statute, a landowner is not entitled to recover fees and expenses, such as appellate fees incurred after the dismissal hearing. Furthermore, the recoverable fees and expenses are only those fees and expenses the landowner would not have incurred had the smaller tract been sought originally instead of the larger tract.