Opinion ID: 615269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Twigg's FMLA Retaliation Claim

Text: Twigg's second claim is that HBC retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the FMLA. Twigg contends that her termination on April 7, 2008; Kathy Sade's refusal to retract her termination on April 17, 2008; and Nita Long's refusal to rehire her on October 20, 2008, all occurred because she exercised her right to take FMLA leave. Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), it is unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by [the FMLA]. We have construed this provision of the FMLA as creating a retaliation theory of recovery. Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir.2006) (citing Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960 (10th Cir.2002)). Ordinarily, we evaluate the evidence in FMLA retaliation cases under the McDonnell Douglas /indirect framework described above in connection with Twigg's § 1981 retaliation claim. See id. Here again, however, Twigg claims that she is asserting a mixed-motive theory of recovery in regard to her retaliation claim under the FMLA. [10] (Aplt. Br. at 33.) Thus, Twigg's position is that she can prevail on her claim by showing directly that retaliation played a motivating part HBC's decisions to fire and not to rehire her. This Court has not issued a published decision addressing whether the direct/mixed motives theory applies in FMLA retaliation cases. In light of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,  U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2349-51, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009), there is a substantial question whether a mixed motive analysis would apply in a retaliation claim under the FMLA. However, we need not decide that issue in this case. Even assuming, without deciding, that a mixed motive analysis would be used in a FMLA retaliation case, Twigg's FMLA retaliation claim would fail. As we explained above in connection with Twigg's § 1981 retaliation claim, a plaintiff proceeding under the direct/mixed motives approach must present direct or circumstantial evidence that directly shows that retaliation played a motivating part in the employment decision at issue. Fye, 516 F.3d at 1226. In the FMLA context, the retaliatory animus must relate to the employee's FMLA-protected activities, including, inter alia, the taking of FMLA leave. Twigg's direct/mixed motives FMLA retaliation claim is, in most respects, identical to her § 1981 claim. She relies on the same four types of circumstantial evidence, but with additional factual nuances that allegedly show HBC's intent to retaliate against her for her taking FMLA leave. (Aplt. Br. at 34.) Accordingly, the majority of our analysis from Part III.A applies with equal force here, and we will not rehash that analysis. Instead, we will consider Twigg's additional factual nuances to determine whether they overcome the previously identified deficiencies in Twigg's evidence. First, regarding HBC's allegedly false reasons for terminating Twigg, Twigg claims that one of Sade's statements to Twigg during their phone conversation on April 17, 2008, was inaccurate. During that conversation, Sade told Twigg that Amber Cotton in HR had called Twigg at some point and informed her that her FMLA leave had only been approved through April 1, 2008. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Twigg, a reasonable jury could conclude that Sade's statement regarding Amber Cotton's phone call was false. See supra note 2. But Twigg makes no argument regarding how the alleged falsity of Sade's statement directly shows that Sade made the decision to terminate Twigg because Twigg took FMLA leave. Nor would such an argument have merit, because, as we explained above, evidence of the falsity of an employer's explanation can prove retaliation only indirectly. Thus, this additional falsity evidence suffers from the same fundamental flaw as Twigg's other falsity evidence when examined under the direct/mixed motives framework. See supra Part III.A. 1.a. Second, Twigg relies on the portion of Nita Long's deposition where Long, the HBC benefits director, testified that she refused to rehire Twigg in October 2008 [b]ased on the fact that [Long] wasn't going to change [her] decision on the FMLA. According to Twigg, because HBC has a practice of approving FMLA leave for as long as MetLife approves short-term disability benefits, and because Long was aware of MetLife's decision to extend Twigg's short-term disability when Long refused to reinstate Twigg in October 2008, [a] reasonable jury could find Ms. Long's explanations to be inconsistent or contradictory. (Aplt. Br. at 35.) Although Twigg frames this as an inconsistent-explanations argument, she offers no other explanation with which Long's deposition testimony supposedly conflicts. Instead, Twigg's real argument is that Long's explanation cannot be squared with HBC's general practice of basing FMLA leave approval on MetLife's short-term disability determinations, which is more properly viewed as a deviation-from-normal-company-procedure argument. But, as we have already explained, evidence of deviations from normal company procedure can help a plaintiff prove retaliation only indirectly, as such evidence does no more than allow an inference that the employer may be manufacturing rationales to hide the real reason for its actions. Therefore, Long's alleged deviation from HBC's normal practice does not directly reflect retaliatory animus, and this factual nuance does not support Twigg's direct/mixed motives theory. See supra Part III.A. 1.d. Twigg's final factual nuance relates to her temporal-proximity argument. Twigg attributes great significance to the fact that Long refused to rehire her during the course of the DOL's investigation of her administrative complaint. According to Twigg, a reasonable jury could infer retaliatory motive from the close temporal proximity between Twigg's pursuit of her administrative complaint and Long's decision not to reinstate her. The problem with Twigg's argument is that even very close temporal proximity cannot directly show an employer's retaliatory motive. Rather, evidence of temporal proximity may assist a plaintiff in proving retaliation only indirectly, as the function of such evidence is to cast doubt on the sincerity of the employer's legitimate explanation for its actions. See supra Part III.A.1.b. In short, the additional factual nuances associated with Twigg's FMLA retaliation claim do not distinguish this claim from Twigg's § 1981 retaliation claim for purposes of a direct/mixed motives analysis. The FMLA claim, like the § 1981 claim, rests entirely on pretext evidence. Such evidence does not suffice to demonstrate retaliatory animus directly. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of HBC on Twigg's FMLA retaliation claim.