Opinion ID: 2048265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employer Review of Majority Interest Evidence

Text: The Board next argues that, contrary to the appellate court opinion, an employer is not entitled to review a union's evidence of majority support. We review this legal issue, which devolves into an issue of statutory construction, de novo. Harrisonville Telephone Co., 212 Ill.2d at 247, 288 Ill.Dec. 121, 817 N.E.2d 479. The Board's rules state that [t]he Board shall maintain the confidentiality of the showing of interest, and that such evidence shall not be furnished to any of the parties. 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(e)(1) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). The Board argues that if the confidentiality of the evidence of majority support is not preserved, the basic purposes of the Act will be undermined. Relying upon federal case law analyzing the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. ), the Board contends that employees have a strong privacy interest in their personal sentiments regarding union representation, and that this right to privacy is a right necessary to full and free exercise of the[ir] organizational rights under the Act. Pacific Molasses Co. v. National Labor Relations Board Regional Office #15, 577 F.2d 1172, 1182 (5th Cir.1978). According to the Board, disclosure of authorization cards, which identify the signers, would chill the right of employees to express their union sentiments. Pacific Molasses, 577 F.2d at 1182; Committee on Masonic Homes of R.W. Grand Lodge v. National Labor Relations Board, 556 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir.1977). The Board notes that even the attempted discovery of union authorization cards by an employer has been deemed an illegal objective by the federal court of appeals. Wright Electric, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 200 F.3d 1162, 1167 (8th Cir.2000). The Employer responds that majority interest evidence need not always be deemed confidential. In support, the Employer cites three decisions from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) involving unfair labor practice charges against the employers. See Raley's, 337 N.L.R.B. 719, 2002 WL 1454112 (2002); American Beef Packers, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 996, 1971 WL 32626 (1971); Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1959 WL 15170 (1959). We have reviewed these decisions and find them inapposite. In Raley's, the NLRB affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the employer unlawfully refused to recognize and bargain with the union as the majority representative at two of the employer's stores. After the General Counsel unsuccessfully sought to have the matter of majority status submitted to a neutral third party, the union refused to produce the authorization cards necessary to establish majority status, and the complaint was dismissed. Raley's, 337 N.L.R.B. 719. In American Beef Packers, the NLRB dismissed a complaint alleging that the employer improperly engaged in collective bargaining at a time when the union did not represent a majority of the employees. The dismissal was based on the failure of the NLRB's General Counsel to come forward with evidence establishing the number of authorization cards and the number of employees in the unit at the time in question. American Beef Packers, 187 N.L.R.B. at 997, 1971 WL 32626. Finally, in Stoner Rubber the NLRB dismissed a complaint alleging the employer unlawfully refused to bargain with the union because the General Counsel failed to produce evidence of majority interest, other than the union's certification order entered 14 months earlier. The NLRB noted that [p]roof of majority is peculiarly within the special competence of the union and may be proved by signed authorization cards, dues checkoff cards, membership lists, or any other evidentiary means. Stoner Rubber, 123 N.L.R.B. at 1445, 1959 WL 15170. At most, the foregoing decisions suggest that where an employer is subject to a charge of an unfair labor practice, the need to establish whether the union did or did not enjoy majority status may result in the authorization cards or other evidence of majority support being made part of the evidentiary record before the finder of fact. These decisions do not, however, indicate that an employer must be allowed access to the union's evidence of majority interest where, as here, the evidence has been submitted to, and reviewed by, the body charged with administration of the labor act. Rather, we agree with the Board that preserving the confidentiality of the authorization cards and other evidence of majority support is consistent with the public employees' statutory right to full freedom of association, self-organization and union representation (5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2004)), and that disclosure of such evidence to the employer would chill the exercise of these statutory rights. As the Employer notes, however, the appellate court attempted to address the Board's confidentiality concerns. The appellate court stated: We note that respondents [the Board and the Union] raise concerns over breaching the anonymity protections of the employees who might be seeking to organize union representation, and the chilling effect on unionization that review of the majority interest petition might entail. We note further, however, that petitioners [the Employer] appear to be sensitive to such concerns and have requested only that they be allowed to review such redacted evidence that demonstrates majority interest on the part of the eligible deputies while maintaining the anonymity of the deputies. We certainly see no problems in providing for some sort of review of the redacted evidence in support of a majority interest petition. Further, because the majority interest petition stands in lieu of an election, and to allow the meaningful review of the Board's decision, the Board must adopt some sort of regulation that provides for the submission of the evidence it relied upon to the reviewing court and follows the mandates of section 9(a-5). We imagine that the submission of redacted dues authorization cards and other evidence will both preserve the employees' anonymity and allow the employer to have the same rights of review as provided in section 9(a) regarding the secret ballot election of a representative. 375 Ill. App.3d at 779, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The Board questions the value of submitting redacted authorization cards. The Board notes that if all of the identifying information is redacted (name, signature, address, social security number, work unit), only the original preprinted card remains. Whatever the benefits, or burdens, in submitting redacted copies of the evidence of majority support, the submission of redacted evidence at least appears to address the confidentiality concerns raised by the Board. The Board's disagreement with the appellate court opinion, however, goes beyond issues of confidentiality. The Board also disagrees with the appellate court's rationale for allowing an employer access to the evidence of majority support. The appellate court reasoned as follows. The Board's certification order is a final administrative decision and therefore subject to review by the appellate court under section 9(i) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2004)). Review must be meaningful, i.e., the court must be able to ascertain that the union's evidence was the type and amount sufficient to demonstrate majority support. Therefore, the evidence of support must be submitted to the reviewing court and to the employer. 375 Ill.App.3d at 777-79, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The Board argues that the appellate court's reasoning overlooks that the Act limits an employer's role in the determination of majority interest, and that except in narrow circumstances not present here, the Board's majority interest determination is not litigable. See 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(e)(3) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004) (providing that the showing of interest shall be determined administratively by the Board and is not subject to litigation, except for cases of fraud or coercion). We understand the Board's argument to be this. If, under the Act, an employer may not challenge the Board's determination of majority status, then this is not an issue that could be raised before the Board and not an issue that could be raised on administrative review. Therefore, no need exists to submit copies of the evidence of majority support (redacted or otherwise) to the employer. In evaluating this argument, we return to the language of the Act. Section 9(a-5) mandates that [t]he Board shall designate an exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining when the representative demonstrates a showing of majority interest by employees in the unit. 5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004). Significantly, the legislature provided for minimal involvement by the employer in this procedure. Section 9(a-5) states: If either party provides to the Board, before the designation of a representative, clear and convincing evidence that the dues deduction authorizations, and other evidence    are fraudulent or were obtained through coercion, the Board shall promptly thereafter conduct an election. 5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004). The legislature made no other provision for the employer to involve itself in the process by which the union seeks certification under section 9(a-5), or the process by which the Board determines whether a union has established majority support under section 9(a-5). We will not assume that the legislature intended a larger role for the employer than the language of section 9(a-5) allows. See In re Ryan B., 212 Ill.2d 226, 234, 288 Ill.Dec. 137, 817 N.E.2d 495 (2004) (courts may not restrict or enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute). We thus agree with the Board that its determination of whether a union enjoys majority support may not be litigated. This conclusion finds support in the fact that, at the time the legislature adopted section 9(a-5), the Board's rules provided that the showing of interest under section 9(a) would be determined administratively by the Board and would not be subject to litigation. 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(d)(3) (as amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 7393, eff. May 1, 2003). See also County of Kane v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill.App.3d 614, 620, 116 Ill.Dec. 359, 518 N.E.2d 1339 (1988) (holding that section 9(a) showing of interest is not litigable). If the legislature desired a different result when it adopted section 9(a-5), it could have included appropriate language in the statute. It did not do so. To the extent section 9(a-5) could be considered ambiguous and the legislature's intent in doubt, we would defer to the Board's reasonable construction of the statute. See Lauer, 199 Ill.2d at 388, 264 Ill.Dec. 87, 769 N.E.2d 924; Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 194 Ill.2d at 106, 251 Ill.Dec. 654, 741 N.E.2d 248. The Board's construction, which limits the employer's ability to challenge a finding of majority support, is consistent with the legislative history, set forth in section I supra, demonstrating that the General Assembly intended section 9(a-5) to limit an employer's ability to delay or interfere in the process of union recognition. See 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 21, 2003, at 12 (statements of Senator Sandoval). The legislature would not have provided a streamlined card check procedure for union recognition on the one hand, but on the other hand provide an employer the ability to delay a certification order by allowing a fishing expedition in the union's evidence of support. We are not persuaded by the Employer's argument that, under section 9(i) of the Act, all aspects of a certification order, including the sufficiency of the evidence of majority support, are litigable. Section 9(i) states in pertinent part: An order of the Board    determining and certifying that a labor organization has been fairly and freely chosen by a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit,    is a final order. Any person aggrieved by any such order    may apply for and obtain judicial review in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Review Law,    except that such review shall be afforded directly in the Appellate Court for the district in which the aggrieved party resides or transacts business. 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2004). Section 9(i) addresses who may appeal a certification order. It does not address the separate issue of reviewability, i.e., the scope of review. See Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill.2d 462, 496, 120 Ill.Dec. 531, 524 N.E.2d 561 (1988), quoting 2 C. Koch, Administrative Law & Practice § 9.1, at 84 (1985) (reviewability sets out the area of review). The Employer's reliance on Champaign-Urbana Public Health District v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 354 Ill.App.3d 482, 486, 290 Ill.Dec. 379, 821 N.E.2d 691 (2004), and County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 358 Ill.App.3d 174, 179, 294 Ill.Dec. 297, 830 N.E.2d 709 (2005), is misplaced. Champaign-Urbana Public Health held that, under section 9(i), the employer had standing to appeal the Board's final order because the employer was a party to the representation proceeding and the certification order binds the employer to a collective-bargaining relationship with the union. Champaign-Urbana Public Health, 354 Ill.App.3d at 486, 290 Ill.Dec. 379, 821 N.E.2d 691. County of Du Page followed suit, holding that because an aggrieved party may seek review of a certification of representative, and because the employer's interests were implicated in the case, they had standing to maintain the appeal. County of Du Page, 358 Ill.App.3d at 179, 294 Ill.Dec. 297, 830 N.E.2d 709. Neither opinion addressed the issue before us now. In sum, we hold that section 9(a-5) precludes an employer from litigating the Board's determination that a union enjoys majority status and, consequently, that an employer is not entitled to review the evidence of majority support. The appellate court erred in requiring the Board to make this evidence available to the employer. Our holding does not mean that the Board's certification order is immune from challenge and review. [T]he interest in making administrative agencies conform to the law compels some judicial intervention. Greer, 122 Ill.2d at 495, 120 Ill.Dec. 531, 524 N.E.2d 561. Thus, other aspects of the Board's order may be challenged. Although we will not attempt to set out an exhaustive list of the issues an employer may raise before the Board and on review, we note that, in addition to claims of fraud or coercion, an employer may challenge, as it did here, the Board's interpretation of the Act and the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. The employer may also raise other issues pertinent to the facts of the case. See 5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004); 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.100(b)(3) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004).