Opinion ID: 2598459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: appellant's w.r.e. 801(d)(1)(b) arguments

Text: [¶ 14] We recognize that the State did not have an adequate opportunity to respond to the additional issues appellant raised at oral argument, but we choose briefly to comment on appellant's general arguments. First, in our recent precedent, we have specifically decided not to follow the reasoning of the authority cited by appellant regarding the application of a temporal requirement in admitting prior consistent statements pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). [5] In Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58 (Wyo.2000), we stated the following: We expressly stated in Makinen [ v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo.1987)] that the rule was not limited to statements made before the advent of an allegedly improper motive, as Cook suggests here. Id. We recently affirmed that position in Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 (Wyo.1999). Cook contends that our holding in Makinen has been superseded by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995). In Tome, the Supreme Court held that F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), after which our rule is patterned, allows only those prior consistent statements made prior to the alleged fabrication or improper influence or motive. Tome, 513 U.S. at 159-60, 115 S.Ct. at 702, 130 L.Ed.2d at 583-84. We acknowledge that federal court interpretations of federal rules are highly persuasive in our interpretations of analogous Wyoming rules. Kimbley v. City of Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 445 n. 3 (Wyo.1982). However, the decision in Tome was not based on a constitutional issue and is, therefore, not binding upon this court, which is the final authority on this state's court rules. This court determined in Dike that post-motive consistent statements are admissible for the purpose of evaluating the credibility of the declarant who testifies at trial. We further held that the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction to that effect, if he or she so requests. Id. at 1024. See also Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 13-18, 43 P.3d 80, 87-89 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 15] Second, we note that prior consistent statements, when admitted under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been impeached in the particular manner described in the rule, may be prejudicial. See Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 27, 43 P.3d at 92-93. Prior consistent statements are governed by the general principles of relevancy found in W.R.E. 401, 402, and 403, and are not admissible without limitation. Further, repetitious testimony of prior consistent statements offered for rehabilitative purposes is not always admissible: If the corrupting influence did in fact precede the statements, probative value is greatly diminished.    Evidence which merely shows that the witness said the same thing on other occasions when his motive was the same does not have much probative force `for the reason that repetition does not imply veracity.' Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 72 (Wyo.1989) ( quoting 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01] at 803-150 to -151 (1987)). [¶ 16] We continue to observe that prior consistent statements are relevant for consideration when their admission will provide a whole picture for the jury to determine whether there was any real inconsistency. Generally, post-motive statements are not significantly probative, and admitting a statement that merely repeats in-court testimony can, depending on the circumstances, have minimal impact on a trial. However, where there is a proper objection, the trial court should consider whether having numerous authority figures trained to recognize sexual abuse appear at trial is actually a trial strategy of preparing a multitude of self-serving, biased, inflammatory, video, audio, and written statements for trial; having the witness testify; and then introducing into evidence these consistent statements made prior to testifying. See Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo.1987) (Cardine, J. and Urbigkit, J., specially concurring). Such a trial strategy could render the statements irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, particularly if the consequence of repeating the same testimony several times unduly emphasizes that testimony over all other testimony in the case. [6] [¶ 17] Given that the purpose of a forensic interview is, according to Huylar, an assessment process regarding whether, based upon the information the victim provides during such an interview, the victim's disclosure is indeed credible, and that it is evident from this case, and other recent cases, that expert forensic interviews are being conducted for introduction at trial pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), the district court should, in deciding to admit such evidence in the face of a proper objection, carefully consider how these factors affect the legitimacy of the interviews as prior consistent statements, as well as their probative value. We do not mean to question the legitimacy of statements introduced during expert testimony for some other proper purpose or according to another aspect of the hearsay rule.