Opinion ID: 2054822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: coaches freidel and meyer

Text: There are three questions that must be answered with respect to Freidel and Meyer's actions: (1) Were they acting within the scope of their employment? (2) Were they grossly negligent in causing the injury to Gasper? (3) Were they performing a discretionary function? Bego, supra . Gasper argues that summary judgment was inappropriate on scope of employment because whether one is acting as an agent for another is a fact to be determined by a jury. Zee v. Assam, 336 N.W.2d 162 (S.D.1983). This general proposition is true only if the facts are disputed. If they are not, the matter is a question of law for this court. Bego, supra . Here, Freidel and Meyer were conducting a program as part of their twelve-month contractual duties that called for pre-school term duties. The program was approved by Carda and met all rules of the SDHSAA for an out-of-season conditioning program. There is no disputed question of fact whether Freidel and Meyer were acting as agents of the school district. Though Gasper's pleadings allege that Freidel and Meyer failed to provide adequate or proper instruction, supervision, safety devices and facilities and permitted Gasper to attempt to lift without the aid of spotters or other safety devices, these allegations do not amount to intentional torts that would carry Freidel and Meyer outside their scope of employment. Bego, supra . Gasper's own testimony established that there were no material issues of fact on every point except adequate supervision. He admitted that he had been properly instructed in using a weight belt when lifting and had done so on 25 previous occasions prior to the accident. He also admitted being instructed by Freidel on the need to always use spotters. Despite this, he lifted without spotters though Freidel and Meyer were close enough they could have been asked to perform this function. Gasper is bounded by his own statements of the facts and cannot make a stronger case than that which is established by his testimony. Ford v. Robinson, 76 S.D. 457, 80 N.W.2d 471 (1957). Additionally, expert witness Max Hawk provided uncontroverted evidence that the Andes Central weight lifting facilities, squat racks, and safety equipment were proper and appropriate. Thus, the only factual allegation that remains contested is that Freidel and Meyer failed to provide adequate and proper supervision. Even assuming this to be true, this is an act of omission, not an intentional tort. Freidel had given Gasper a thorough class on the proper use of the weights and safety equipment. Taking Gasper's fact under the best light, they allege nothing more than omissions on Freidel's and Meyer's part. The key to understanding this concept is the difference between misfeasance and non-feasancethat is to say, between active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction or failure to take steps. South Dakota has traditionally recognized this distinction in acts of commission and omission. Erickson v. Lavielle, 368 N.W.2d 624 (S.D.1985); Blumhardt v. Hartung, 283 N.W.2d 229 (S.D.1979). Here, there was no active misconduct that produced the injuries. As such, there was no gross negligence to take Freidel and Meyer outside their scope of employment. Finally, we must determine whether Freidel's and Meyer's actions were ministerial or discretionary. Since the facts are not in dispute as to their actions, we must determine as a question of law whether their function was discretionary and thus shielded them from liability under sovereign immunity. National Bank, 325 N.W.2d at 850. Once again we look to the discretionary action test in National Bank, supra . Freidel and Meyer were carrying out the important function of conditioning student/athletes for all sports. For this court to second guess Freidel's and Meyer's judgment on how to supervise and train athletes would infringe on the executive branch of government. Most importantly, imposition of liability would impair the free exercise of discretion. No person will want to be a coach if his or her judgment in supervising athletic training is continually open to lawsuits. In all sporting events, there is the potential for injury, especially in the contact sports. No matter how well a coach trains an athlete, there are always unexpected events which may produce an injury. This court does not want to position itself to continually decide whether the string of athletic injuries that occur every year are the result of coaching negligence. And, while we realize that there is some harm done to the public, student athletes who go out for sports know there are attendant dangers. Injury is one of those risks and athletes accept that as part of the price of participating in sporting events. Further, we would point out that Freidel's and Meyer's actions are distinguishable from what we have defined as ministerial acts in National Bank, supra ; Kruger v. Wilson, 325 N.W.2d 851 (S.D.1982); and Sioux Falls Construction Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 297 N.W.2d 454 (S.D.1980). In National Bank, two social workers were held personally liable for their negligent placement and supervision of children in foster care. The criteria for placement and standards for follow-up of foster children were already established. The social workers were merely required to carry out the standards. That differs radically from our facts here. Freidel designed the summer conditioning program and he and Meyer personally implemented and supervised the program. It was their decision on how to implement their standards. Kruger, supra, also differs from our facts here. In that case, a state employee on state business in a state car struck another car. This court deemed the following factors as determinative of ministerial actions: (1) unimportance of the function, driving a car; (2) imposing liability would not effect job discretion; (3) likelihood of harm depended on defendant, not on department authorizing trip; and (4) imposing liability would make defendant more careful and not impact employer. We have previously discussed the importance of Freidel's and Meyer's jobs and the effect on their discretion. What we find critical is the impact liability will have on the school districts. If, by way of just one example, a coach can be held personally liable because a player is told to leap high for passes and is hit in mid-air and injured, we believe school districts will find it nearly impossible to hire people to coach athletic programs. Finally, Sioux Falls Construction is distinguishable from our facts as well. In that case, the water department superintendent failed to warn a contractor of impending flood run off or take actions to divert run off that damaged the contractor's equipment. This court put importance on the fact that the superintendent was not required to weigh policies for or against his action. Here, coaches Freidel and Meyer weighed the policy of how to best supervise and train people for the conditioning program. Freidel chose the option of one intensive class that taught techniques and safety. The program he developed allowed other students to act as spotters and required minimal on-hands supervision by the coaches. This court will not be one to second guess this discretionary policy decision. Realizing the inherent dangers in athletics and other school activities that require discretionary decisions on supervision, two of our sister states have held teachers failing to act in similar situations were performing discretionary acts protected by sovereign immunity. Truelove v. Wilson, 159 Ga.App. 906, 285 S.E.2d 556 (1981) (unsupervised student killed when soccer goal fell on her); Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1978) (unsupervised student injured when calf kicked beam and knocked down building on him). We agree with the reasoning in these opinions and hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Freidel and Meyer. District, as an alternative theory of sovereign immunity protection, argues that SDCL 21-32-17 protects Board, Carda, Freidel and Meyer as long as they were acting within the scope of their employment, regardless of whether their actions were ministerial or discretionary. Gasper argues this statute is unconstitutional. Since we have ruled on other grounds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment, we need not reach this question. Sheehan v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 439 N.W.2d 117, 119 (S.D.1989) (court differs deciding constitutional question when the cause can be determined without reaching constitutional issue); Baldwin v. First Nat. Bank of Black Hills, 362 N.W.2d 85 (S.D.1985). As an alternative position, Gasper contends that even if all defendants were acting in their official capacity as officers and employees of the Lake Andes School District, the subsequent passage in 1986 of SDCL 21-32A-1, 21-32A-2 and 21-32A-3 waived immunity, since the school district has purchased liability insurance. SDCL 21-32A-1 through SDCL 21-32A-3 was the legislature's response to our distinctions of when agencies were state agencies for the purpose of waiving sovereign immunity. These statutes used the term public entities to avoid this problem. They establish a scheme where public entities, which includes school districts and their employees, waive sovereign immunity to the extent of purchasing liability insurance. All the defendants contend that it would be improper to retroactively apply these statutes. In Arndt v. Hannum Trucking, 324 N.W.2d 680 (S.D.1982), we made clear that statutes are presumed to have prospective application and may be construed as retroactive only when such intention plainly appears. Arndt cited State ex rel. Van Emmerik v. Janklow, 304 N.W.2d 700 (S.D.1981) appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1131, 102 S.Ct. 986, 71 L.Ed.2d 285 (1982), as an example of the type of stated intention required for retroactive application. In Van Emmerik, a case involving utility sales tax, the legislation specially stated: An act to provide for a retroactive and prospective sales tax increase on utility services, amusement and athletic events; to allow credit for taxes already paid, to validate and ratify the collection of prior taxes, and to declare an emergency. Id. at 702. The statute went on to give specific dates the legislation should be applied to. Absent similar language in SDCL 21-32A-1 through SDCL 21-32A-3, we find no legislative intent for retroactive application of the statute waiving sovereign immunity when liability insurance has been purchased. Finally, Gasper makes a sweeping argument that sovereign immunity is unconstitutional and that in particular, the doctrine violates the open courts provision of our state constitution, article VI, § 20. In High-Grade Oil Co. Inc. v. Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736 (S.D.1980), we answered Gasper's general constitutional objection to sovereign immunity: To say that sovereign immunity is a constitutional violation is on its face an incongruity. In our republican form of government the people are the sovereign. The rights granted under the constitution are such rights as the sovereign grants. Id. at 739. Gasper provides no argument, let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt, why article III, § 27 violates the open courts provision, article VI, § 20 of our state constitution. Under the common law, sovereign immunity only extended to the state and its agencies and subdivisions. Oien v. City of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 286, 290 (S.D.1986). As we noted earlier, school districts have always been considered state agencies. Bego, supra ; Holland, supra . The open courts provision of our constitution is only violated if the cause of action against the school district, officers and employees would have existed at common law. Oien, supra . Since suits for discretionary actions did not exist at common law, Gasper has not met his burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the concept of sovereign immunity embodied in article III, § 27 of our state constitution is unconstitutional. Affirmed. HENDERSON and MILLER, JJ., concur. SABERS, J., concurs specially. WUEST, C.J., deeming himself disqualified, did not participate in this opinion.