Opinion ID: 2558772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: pcra claims

Text: In Appellant's seventeenth and final issue, he asserts that his due process rights were violated because the PCRA court failed to allocate funds for investigation, discovery, and expert testimony necessary to prove his PCRA claims, and because the PCRA court denied his request for additional time to allow new counsel to conduct an investigation and hire experts. Appellant's assertions have no merit and are not supported by the record, as they ignore many highly relevant facts and circumstances of his case, as discussed infra. We consider first Appellant's claim that he was improperly denied funds for expert and investigative services. Appellant filed a pro se Petition for Investigative and Expert Funds to Aid in the Preparing of an Amended PCRA Petition (hereinafter Petition for Funds) on March 15, 2004. Citing his indigency, he claimed that he did not have the resources to obtain proper investigation and expert services. Petition for Funds at 1. His petition contained only vague assertions as to how the requested funds were to be used. The petition indicated that Appellant could not determine what claims are all available under the PCRA with respect to trial counsel's failure to properly investigate available defenses unless [Appellant] has sufficient funds and means to properly investigate and develop those claims. Id. at 2. He further claimed that preliminary investigation had revealed significant potential witnesses relevant to guilt phase and penalty phase issues, although no witnesses were identified. Id. at 3. In his Petition for Funds, Appellant provided not the slightest information concerning what investigations, what type of expertise or expert services, or what witnesses would be pursued with the requested funds. Nonetheless, he set forth his determination that the following funds were necessary: $5,000 for investigative funds to interview fact and mitigation witnesses. $10,000 to obtain experts. $1,000 for record collection. Id. at 1. On May 20, 2004, the PCRA court held a hearing concerning, inter alia, Appellant's Petition for Funds. Testimony presented at the hearing was only marginally more illuminating than the Petition. Appellant testified that he sought the services of an investigator to interview potential witnesses who were allegedly coerced by police to testify falsely against Appellant at his trial, and to interview witnesses who testified at Appellant's first, but not second trial. N.T., 5/20/04, at 47. Appellant did not give any testimony as to what expert or what type of expert he sought to retain. At the end of this hearing, the court directed Appellant to inform the court as to the name and the professional qualifications of the investigator that Appellant sought to hire, and to explain exactly what the investigator was to investigate. Id. at 63-64. On October 18, 2004, the PCRA court authorized an expenditure of public funds in the amount of $2,500 on behalf of Appellant for investigative services. The record does not indicate if or how these funds were used. In this appeal, Appellant claims that the allotted $2,500 was inadequate; however, he fails to provide any rationale for this claim, except to say that he was unable to hire any experts in support of his guilt phase claims, or any mental health or other experts in support of his penalty phase claims[, and] he was unable to complete a full investigation of his guilt and penalty claims. Appellant's Brief at 97. Although Appellant insists that his due process rights were violated by the PCRA court's refusal to allocate funds for experts needed to prove his innocence and needed to give him a fair opportunity to prove his claim of prejudice, he fails to provide any insight as to precisely what expert testimony might address such needs and how it might do so. Id. Appellant seems to suggest that the PCRA court was required to grant him the specific amount of public funds he demanded for expert and investigative services, but he cites no legal authority to support such a claim, and we are aware of none. Appellant does attempt to rely on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), which addressed the circumstances under which psychiatric assistance must be provided at trial. As this Court has held, Ake requires an indigent defendant to be given cost-free access to psychiatric experts only under limited circumstances: (1) in the guilt phase of trial, where the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant issue; and (2) in the penalty phase, only to rebut the prosecution's psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 596 Pa. 510, 946 A.2d 645, 659 (2008); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 746 A.2d 592, 600 (2000) (concluding that the appellant was not entitled to psychiatric assistance to prove the mental health mitigating circumstances because future dangerousness was not an issue at trial). We have expressly rejected the proposition that, under Ake, all capital defendants are entitled to psychiatric/psychological assistance to determine if there is any relevant mitigation evidence to present in the penalty phase of trial. Blakeney, supra at 658, 660. Ake is inapposite to the instant case for several reasons. Appellant sought funds to hire an expert to testify in a PCRA proceeding; as discussed supra, Ake applies only to the guilt and penalty phases of trial. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 707 (1998) (rejecting the application of Ake to a PCRA appellant's request for public funds to hire an expert to review the evidence presented at trial in light of recent scientific advances). Furthermore, neither Appellant's sanity nor his future dangerousness was or is at issue; accordingly, even if Ake were to be considered applicable in the context of the PCRA, Appellant would not be entitled to public funds to retain a psychiatric expert. The PCRA court, in the proper exercise of its discretion, granted Appellant $2,500 for investigative services. Appellant's claim that due process entitled him to more is supported neither by the facts of the case, nor by the law. Finally, we turn to Appellant's claim that the PCRA court erred by denying his counsel a continuance for further investigation and possible amendment of his PCRA petition. The decision to grant a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only if the court has abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 961 A.2d 119, 133 (2008); see Albrecht, supra at 708 (affirming a PCRA court's denial of an appellant's request for a continuance after concluding that the PCRA court had not abused its discretion). A number of factors, including Appellant's desire to proceed pro se and counsel's late entry into the case, militate against a determination that the PCRA court abused its discretion in the instant case, as discussed infra. Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 20, 2002. Counsel was appointed, but then allowed to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. New counsel was appointed on March 27, 2003. On May 8, 2003, the PCRA court questioned Appellant on his motion to represent himself, and held the motion under advisement; the court also permitted counsel to withdraw, but then on May 20, 2003, appointed another new counsel. On July 9, 2003, and October 1, 2003, Appellant sought and was granted continuances for further investigation. On October 22, 2003, counsel was permitted to withdraw because of a conflict of interest, and yet another new counsel was appointed on October 30, 2003. Following a video conference on November 14, 2003, the PCRA court granted Appellant's motion to represent himself and appointed back-up counsel. The court also granted a continuance until February 20, 2004, for preparation of an amended PCRA petition. On February 20, 2004, Appellant sought and was granted an additional ninety days; Appellant finally filed his amended pro se PCRA petition on May 20, 2004. In March 2004, Appellant filed his Petition for Investigative and Expert Funds to Aid in the Preparing of an Amended PCRA Petition, as well as a motion for a discovery hearing. A video hearing was held on these matters on May 20, 2004, at which time the court ordered the Commonwealth to determine if a number of documents existed and, if so, to supply them to Appellant. N.T., 5/20/04, at 61-63. Another video hearing was held on October 18, 2004, at which time the PCRA court rescinded its discovery order of May 20, 2004, and held that Appellant had received all the discovery to which he was entitled. The court also authorized the expenditure of $2,500 on behalf of Appellant for investigative services. Finally, the court gave Appellant a deadline for filing an amended PCRA petition of December 18, 2004, and directed the Commonwealth to respond by February 17, 2005. Appellant filed a 108-page second amended pro se PCRA petition on November 17, 2004. On February 9, 2005, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's PCRA petition. At a hearing on February 18, 2005, present defense counsel appeared in court and sought a continuance for further supplementation or amendment of Appellant's PCRA petition. The court denied Appellant's motion for a continuance and informed Appellant of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition without a hearing. On February 25, 2005, the court sent a formal notice of intent to dismiss Appellant's PCRA petition without a hearing, and granted Appellant and his new counsel sixty days to respond. [24] Appellant and his new counsel filed lengthy objections on April 26, 2005. On May 23, 2005, the court denied Appellant's PCRA petition. Given these undisputed facts, we cannot conclude that the PCRA court abused its discretion in denying Appellant yet another lengthy continuance to file yet another PCRA petition. Despite the court's strong advice to the contrary, Appellant insisted on representing himself. Over the course of more than two years, he filed three PCRA petitions. Appellant's present counsel did not appear until nearly three months after Appellant had filed his second amended pro se PCRA petition, and the court was preparing to announce its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Nonetheless, the PCRA court granted Appellant's new counsel sixty days to respond, which is three times longer than required by Rule 909. Appellant's counsel responded with voluminous objections. Having knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily decided to proceed pro se, Appellant was not entitled to reverse course after several years and delay the resolution of his case further by retaining counsel to file yet another amended PCRA petition. Accordingly, we hold that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a continuance. In sum, we affirm the PCRA court's order dismissing Appellant's claims, with the sole exception of one penalty phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and raise mitigation evidence of Appellant's background and life history. We remand to the PCRA court for an evidentiary hearing limited to that claim; for all other claims, we affirm the order of the PCRA court. Jurisdiction relinquished. Justice ORIE MELVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Justices BAER and TODD join the opinion.