Opinion ID: 1902761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was appellant denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial abuse of voir dire?

Text: ¶ 5. Although Palm now objects to certain statements made during voir dire, no such objection was made during trial. The failure to make a contemporaneous objection waives the right of raising the issue on appeal. Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1259 (Miss.1995). [A] voir dire examination of jurors must be discretionary with the circuit judge, and in the absence of objection we have no way of knowing the degree of influence it had, if any, on the ultimate verdict. West v. State, 485 So.2d 681, 685 (Miss.1985). A trial court is not put in error unless it had an opportunity to pass on the question. Boutwell v. State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479, 482 (1932). Although we find that Palm is procedurally barred from asserting this objection for the first time on appeal, we will, nevertheless, discuss the merits of his argument. ¶ 6. URCCC 3.05 discusses the process of voir dire and states as follows: RULE 3.05 VOIR DIRE In the voir dire examination of jurors, the attorney will question the entire venire only on matters not inquired into by the court. Individual jurors may be examined only when proper to inquire as to answers given or for other good cause allowed by the court. No hypothetical questions requiring any juror to pledge a particular verdict will be asked. Attorneys will not offer an opinion on the law. The court may set a reasonable time limit for voir dire. ¶ 7. Palm asserts that he was denied a fair trial due to the prosecutorial abuse of voir dire. He claims that the prosecution violated URCCC 3.05 with three separate statements. The first alleged violation came in the form of a statement made by the prosecution which was as follows: It happens from time to time that there may be a conflict in the evidence. State's witnesses may testify to a certain set of circumstances, and if the Defendant chooses to call witnesses, they may testify to something different. But, do you understand that a mere conflict in the evidence does not necessarily create a reasonable doubt? That's why we have twelve jurors, to sit up here and listen to the case, to resolve that conflict and decide what the truth is. ¶ 8. Palm asserts that this statement required the jury to resolve all conflicts, thereby causing them to do away with the consideration of reasonable doubt. He further asserts that this statement violates URCCC 3.05 because it offers an opinion and misstates the law. Other than his cite to URCCC 3.05 he cites no relevant authority for his argument. ¶ 9. As this Court explained in Puckett v. State, 737 So.2d 322, 332 (Miss.1999) [t]he purpose of voir dire is to select a fair and impartial jury. Because the human element is always present, the process can by no means ever be perfect. Therefore, it is the trial court's duty to ensure that although not perfect, the jury panel that is finally empaneled can render an impartial verdict ... The preceding statement was clearly made to determine whether the potential jurors understood their function and how they were to evaluate the evidence. This is the very purpose of voir dire. There was no error in ascertaining if the potential jurors knew what was expected of them in order to determine their suitability to serve as jurors. Additionally, the statement does not erode the consideration of reasonable doubt. It simply clarifies that conflicts in the evidence do not equate to reasonable doubt. Furthermore, there is nothing in the transcript that would require the venire persons to pledge a particular verdict in violation of URCCC 3.05. ¶ 10. The second statement to which Palm objects was as follows: So, my final question to you is simply this: After you have heard all of the evidence and you are satisfied the State has proven the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, can you tell me that you will act upon your oath as jurors at that point and return a verdict of guilty? Other than the people who have already indicated they have a situation, they are either related to or friends with the Defendant and might not want to sit on this particular jury, can the rest of you return a verdict of guilty as charged? ¶ 11. Palm objects to this statement, asserting that is was a direct requirement that the jurors pledge a verdict and was therefore in violation of URCCC 3.05. Again, Palm cites no authority for his argument. In addition to the foregoing, he asserts that the following question was an implied request that the jury pledge a verdict: The Defendant as he sits here right this minute, is clothed with a presumption of innocence. The law says at this point we have to presume he is innocent, but do you understand once we go forward with the evidence and produce testimony to prove to your satisfaction his guilt, then at that point, he no longer enjoys that presumption of innocence? Does everyone understand that? ¶ 12. URCCC 3.05 specifically prohibits hypothetical questions requiring any juror to pledge a particular verdict. This Court, in West v. State, 553 So.2d 8, 21 (Miss.1989), examined the problem of when an attorney presents hypothetical facts to the prospective jurors during voir dire and questions them on their ability to return a verdict in his favor should he prove those facts. The Court noted that in West I prosecuting attorneys were directed to avoid questions seeking a promise or commitment from the jury to convict if the State proved certain facts. West, 553 So.2d at 21, (citing West I, 485 So.2d at 686). In the instant case the jury was not given a hypothetical set of facts. They were asked if they would be able to return a guilty verdict if the prosecution proved their case to the satisfaction of the jury. ¶ 13. Additionally, Palm objects to the prosecution's mention that the State prove its case to the satisfaction of the jury. He asserts that this statement destroys the consideration of reasonable doubt and misstates the law because proof of guilt to the satisfaction of the jury does away with the presumption of innocence. Again Palm cites no authority. An instruction was included which detailed the fact that the burden of proof never shifts from the prosecution to the defendant. In light of the prosecution's statement alluding to the fact that the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that seven jury instructions required the jurors to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court finds that any error in the statement was harmless. Since there was not one single instance of prosecutorial abuse of voir dire, this entire issue is without merit.