Opinion ID: 311492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: -The Special Land Use Permits (Part I of the Majority

Text: Opinion) 232 In this part of its opinion the majority holds that it would be illegal for the Secretary of the Interior to issue the requested special land use permits (also referred to as revocable permits). The majority maintains that this alleged illegality rests upon two grounds: (1) The first is the contention that the legislative history of section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act requires that statute to be interpreted as prohibiting the issuance of the requested revocable permits because Congress in section 28 intended all construction work to take place within the [54 foot] width limitation of the statute. 1 (2) The second ground is the argument that it would be illegal to issue the requested revocable permits because they would not be revocable in fact. 2 A. Legislative History 233 Regardless of the validity of the second ground it is important to point out the fatal flaws in the majority's first contention with regard to the legislative history, because the claimed illegality of revocable permits for pipeline purposes, which the majority asserts, rests upon an incorrect interpretation of the statute by the majority that would affect all prior and future applications of the Act. This infirmity in the opinion of the majority should be pointed out for the benefit of other courts who may be called upon to interpret section 28. It is thus essential to examine those instances of congressional action upon which the majority opinion relies for support of its interpretation of the legislative history because the validity of any decision based on legislative history is no better than its ability to stand analysis that it correctly translates specific legislative action into demonstrable legislative intent. It is in this area that the opinion of the majority fails. 234 Basically the opinion of the majority contends that the legislative debates with respect to section 28 indicate that Congress intended thereby to prohibit the issuance of any special land use permits for temporary construction purposes. 3 However, when Congress enacted section 28 and thereby fixed the amount of land to be granted as permanent right of way for the operation of a pipeline as a transportation facility they were not considering and they did not decide how much space and material they would permit to be used temporarily in its construction. To assume, as the majority opinion does, that the one decision included the other is completely illogical. The one decision, fixing the amount of land that would be permanently granted for construction, maintenance and operation, which Congress did make, simply did not include any expression of intent as to the extent of allowable temporary permits for the use of additional public lands in such projects. Temporary revocable permits were not involved in any of the provisions of the congressional bills which preceded the enactment of section 28, nor in any of the amendments proposed to these bills while they were being acted upon by Congress. 235 1. The Rejection by Congress of the Amendment Authorizing 236 the Taking of Necessary Materials, Earth and Stone 237 The majority opinion rests its contrary interpretation of the legislative history partially upon the fact that Congress at one time defeated a proposed amendment to an earlier Mineral Leasing Bill which contained a provision that would have authorized all pipelines being constructed over United States lands to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said pipe line material, earth and stone necessary for the construction of said pipe line. 4 From the defeat of the proposed amendment containing this provision the opinion of the majority concludes: Congress voted down the amendment, however, clearly indicating its desire to restrict construction to the statutory right-of-way. 5 However, the action by the House on the amendment does not support such conclusion because the amendment that was offered included substantial additional propositions. Thus, the action by the House cannot be construed as expressing the claimed intention with respect to the single proposition that related to the use of materials outside the right of way. 238 To make the first point clear it is only necessary to compare the provision in the bill that was sought to be amended with the proposed amendment because these two provisions composed the entirety of the propositions on this issue considered by the House. The provision of the bill that was sought to be amended provided: 239 Sec. 17. That rights of way through the public lands of the United States are hereby granted for pipe line purposes to any applicant possessing the qualifications provided in section 1 of this act to the extent of the ground occupied by the said pipe line and 10 feet on each side of the same, under such regulations as to survey, location, application, and use as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and upon the express condition that such pipe lines shall be constructed, operated, and maintained as common carriers: Provided, That no right of way shall hereafter be granted over the public lands for the transportation of oil or natural gas except under and subject to the provisions, limitations, and conditions of this section. 240 51 Cong.Rec. 15418 (emphasis added). 241 The proposed amendment would have inserted in lieu of the foregoing the following: 242 That the right of way through the public lands of the United States is hereby granted to any applicant qualified under this act, any pipe-line company or corporation formed for the purpose of transporting oils, crude or refined, which shall have filed or may hereafter file with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation and due proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of the ground occupied by said pipe line and 25 feet on each side of the center of line of the same: also the right to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said pipe line, material, earth, and stone necessary for the construction of said pipe line. 243 That any company or corporation desiring to secure the benefits of this act shall within 12 months after the location of 10 miles of the pipe line if the same be upon surveyed lands, and if the same be upon unsurveyed lands, within 12 months after the survey thereof by the United States, file with the register of the land office for the district where such land is located a map of its line, and upon the approval thereof by the Secretary of the Interior the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office, and thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way. 244 That if any section of said pipe line shall not be completed within five years after the location of said section the right hereto granted shall be forfeited, as to any incomplete section of said pipe line, to the extent that the same is not completed at the date of the forfeiture. 245 That nothing in this act shall authorize the use of such right of way except for the pipe line, and then only so far as may be necessary for its construction, maintenance, and care. 246 That all pipe lines built under the provisions of said act shall be common carriers. 247 51 Cong.Rec. 15421 (emphasis added). A mere reading of this amendment makes it obvious that the House was not expressing any view on the italicized portion of the amendment separate and apart from the rest of the amendment. To summarize, the amendment proposed the following changes over the provisions of the pending bill: 248 1. The right of way to be permanently granted would be increased from 10 feet to 25 feet on each side of the pipeline. 249 2. The express requirement of the bill that applicants for pipeline right of way must possess the citizenship and nationality qualifications provided in section 1 of this Act in the proposed amendment would be replaced by a provision authorizing a grant to any applicant qualified under the Act. (Emphasis added.) This would have effectively removed the requirement that applicants for pipeline rights of way possess United States citizenship or be state corporations. 250 3. The proposed amendment would have excluded the provision That no right of way shall hereafter be granted . . . except under and subject to the provisions, limitations and conditions of this section. This was a material provision of the bill and its intent was obviously far from duplicated by the provision in the proposed amendment: 251 That nothing in this Act shall authorize the use of such right of way except for the pipeline, and then only so far as may be necessary for its construction, maintenance and care. 252 4. The proposed amendment would also have authorized the pipeline companies to take from [adjacent] public lands . . . material, earth, and stone necessary for the construction of [the] pipelines. 6 253 Since there was no division of the four questions when the amendment was rejected by the House, 7 the expressed intent of the House obviously did not indicate any separate position on any of the single provisions contained in the amendment. Thus no separate intent was expressed by Congress on the proposal to authorize the taking of materials outside the right of way. To hold to the contrary, as the majority opinion does, is unreasonable, illogical and unwarranted. The same logic which the opinion of the majority applies in asserting its position would conclude that if a Congressman refused to order soup, fish, steak and pie ala mode from a menu on September 1, 1914, 8 and he went into another restaurant 9 six years later on February 25, 1920 10 and ordered only steak, 11 that it could be concluded positively from such actions that he would never order ice cream. 12 Ordinary people do not believe that such acts on their part will be so interpreted; nor should they. 254 From the foregoing comparison of the bill and the proposed amendment it is self-evident that Congress did not by its rejection of the particular amendment, with the numerous changes it suggested, indicate that it intended absolutely to restrict the space and materials that might be available for construction to that solely within the confines of the permanent statutory right of way by prohibiting the issuance of temporary revocable permits for construction purposes. 255 Questions of this sort come up most frequently in congressional debates when an amendment containing two propositions is rejected and then later one of the propositions is offered singly. That the offering of the single proposition presents a substantially different question to the House, than when it was offered in combination, is recognized by parliamentary law based on congressional precedents. 13 And since Congress (and all parliamentary law) recognizes that the rejection of the amendment containing several propositions does not indicate any position on the individual propositions in isolation, the action by Congress here cannot be interpreted as taking any position on that portion of the amendment dealing solely with the use of adjacent lands. 256 Moreover, even if the amendment to allow pipeline companies to take material, earth and stone necessary for construction from public lands adjacent to the permanent right of way had been offered singly and rejected by a separate vote it would not indicate that Congress thereby indicated an intention to prevent the Secretary from issuing temporary revocable permits for construction purposes. This conclusion is deducible because each of the two provisions embody substantially different considerations. The former would amount to a permanent statutory grant, over which the Secretary would only have limited authority to see that the statute was not violated by the pipeline company, while the latter would be merely a temporary permit, which the Secretary could issue or not within his discretion, which he could condition as he deemed best, and which was required to be revocable. It is thus obvious that the denial of the first in no way indicates an intention to deny the latter. The requirement of revocability alone, which is present in one and not in the other, is a sufficient basis for concluding that the House did not intend to prohibit the issuance of revocable permits when it rejected the amendment to give pipelines a permanent statutory right to obtain construction materials from adjacent public lands. 14 257 2. The Reliance of the Majority Opinion on the Act 258 Specifically Authorizing the Secretary to Issue Revocable Permits for Pipeline Purposes Over Indian Lands 259 The majority opinion, in respect to this same issue (its interpretation of the legislative history of section 28, supra n. 45), also relies upon another false prop when it cites the action of Congress in passing the statute authorizing grants over Indian lands for pipeline purposes as another indication of legislative history which supports its claimed interpretation. 260 By the Act of March 2, 1917, c. 146, 39 Stat. 969, Congress amended the Act authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to grant right of way for pipe lines through Indian lands, March 11, 1904, c. 505, 33 Stat. 65, so as to provide that the Secretary of the Interior may, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, grant temporary permits revocable in his discretion for the construction of such [pipe]lines. (39 Stat. 974, emphasis added.) 261 The opinion of the majority interprets passage of this 1917 legislation authorizing the Secretary to grant temporary revocable permits for pipeline purposes over Indian lands as indicating that Congress intentionally withheld such authorization from the Secretary with respect to pipelines running over United States lands. Such interpretation is unwarranted and will not withstand analysis. 262 Rather, the fact that one Congress (1917) that was considering the Mineral Leasing Act (but did not enact it) found it necessary to enact a specific law authorizing the Secretary to issue revocable permits for pipelines being constructed over Indian lands, in addition to the authority previously conferred by statute, with respect to Indian lands, to issue permanent rights of way for such purposes, clearly demonstrates that Congress was aware that revocable permits were necessary for the construction, operation and maintenance, 33 Stat. 65, of pipelines in addition to even the liberal right of way authorized by the Indian Lands Pipeline Act, 33 Stat. 65. And the fact that Congress did not expressly authorize the Secretary to issue revocable permits for similar purposes with respect to pipelines being constructed over lands owned by the United States, indicates that Congress considered the Secretary already possessed such authority, as he did (see authorities cited, note 15, infra). This interpretation is obvious because the construction, maintenance and operation of a pipeline over United States lands requires exactly the same space and materials as over Indian lands, and it is certain that Congress never intended to discriminate against the pipelines which run over both United States lands and Indian lands by depriving those running over United States lands of the same temporary construction assistance it considered to be necessary for pipelines constructed over Indian lands. 263 On the basis of the foregoing it is concluded that the analysis of the legislative history in the opinion of the majority is unsupported, and therefore any statutory interpretation based upon that analysis must fall. 264 B. The Revocability of a Portion of the Special Land Use Permits 265 The majority opinion contends that it would violate departmental regulations, applicable decisional law, Attorney General opinions and administrative rulings to issue the requested special land use permits. Among the alleged deficiencies, the opinion of the majority finds that the so-called revocable permits would not in fact be temporary or revocable. I disagree with all the grounds asserted in the majority opinion as a basis for this conclusion except that based on the finding that a portion of the uses would not be temporary and revocable in fact. In sum, it is my opinion that the requested permits could be validly issued for construction purposes, but not for operational and maintenance purposes. Under no circumstances could I concur in any opinion holding that a permit for construction purposes was not temporary or revocable in fact. Given the long history of the issuance of revocable permits and the temporary nature of construction, it strains credulity to even suggest the contrary. It is, however, important to determine the exact basis of illegality because of the precedential nature of our decision and the weight it may have with Congress and other courts in other matters. 266 1. Alyeska's Request for a Special Land Use Permit 267 When we analyze the request made by Alyeska Pipeline Service Company on February 4, 1972 to the Department of the Interior for a Special Land Use Permit Necessary for Trans Alaska Pipeline Construction, we note that it is a request to use land in the requested amounts adjacent to and in addition to the 54-foot pipeline right of way authorized by 30 U.S.C. Sec. 185. The application was made under 43 C.F.R. Part 2920, 15 and stated that the requested permits were for 268 Temporary use, during construction, of land adjacent to the proposed pipeline right-of-way . . . [which would be] temporary, revocable at the will of the government and that any special land use permit or permits issued will not give rise to any easement or other form of interest affecting title to land involved. . . . The applicants agree that they will accept the special land use permit(s) subject to all terms and conditions of applicable regulations and to such stipulations as may generally be applicable to the construction and operation of the trans-Alaska pipeline system (Emphasis added.) 269 The last sentence above makes the conditions upon which the application might be granted rather open ended and indicates that the requested permit will be used for operation of the trans-Alaska pipeline (a permanent use) as well as for construction, a temporary use. Basically, the application is for the use of Government lands for a construction zone of such width [to be] requested at each point along the pipeline right-of-way as Alyeska would demonstrate to the authorized officer [to be a] . . . reasonably necessity. This amount of land, in addition to the land included in the right of way, which would be needed for construction purposes will vary depending on the mode of construction, topography, soil types and conditions, amount of cut spoil, and utilization of construction techniques designed to minimize environmental disturbance. 16 Estimates of the amount of land needed accompanies the application in the form of alignment maps. The application also stated: 270 [A]pproximately 85 per cent of the right-of-way (approximately 662 miles) will require the temporary use of widths ranging from 46 to 146 feet. 17 Approximately two-thirds of this distance (about 456 miles) will require temporary widths of 96 feet or less. . . . [G]reater widths will be necessary . . . at river crossings, road crossings, and in mountainous terrain. Temporary widths exceeding 246 feet [would] . . . comprise only about 28 miles of the 789-mile pipeline route, occurring primarily at river crossings and in particularly difficult terrain. 271 [T]he total amount of land required for temporary use during construction is estimated to be approximately 9,600 acres. Of this amount, however, only about 3,600 acres will be necessary for working area, the remainder being utilized for cut spoil and for the graded slopes which are necessitated by slope stability considerations. . . . The 3,600-acre temporary working area will ordinarily be approximately 46 feet in width, although the topography, the construction mode, and other special situations, such as road crossings, and river crossings, will require variations in the width of this space. The remaining temporarily affected area, approximately 6,000 acres, will, after proper grading, be revegetated and otherwise dealt with in order to assure slope stability, to control erosion, and to mitigate any adverse slope stability, to control erosion, and to mitigate any adverse aesthetic affects. 272 . . . With respect to the gravel working surface, Alyeska will adhere to the instructions of the Authorized Officer concerning its removal and/or maintenance. Alyeska recognizes that any authorization to use the space requested by this application will remain at all times revocable at will by the government, without cause or justification, and without giving rise to any claim against the government arising out of such revocation. 273