Opinion ID: 449732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propriety of the Verdict Director.

Text: 14 Robinson attacks the propriety of the verdict director given in connection with his claim of retaliatory discharge. That verdict director read as follows: 15 Your verdict must be for Plaintiff, Aussie Robinson, and against Defendant, Monsanto Company, if Plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence, 16 first, that he was a black employee of Defendant, Monsanto Company; 17 second, that he filed a complaint of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; 18 third, that he was thereafter terminated from his employment by Defendant, and 19 fourth, that Defendant's action in terminating Plaintiff from his employment was intentional and would not have occurred had Plaintiff not filed his complaint of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and 20 fifth, Plaintiff was thereby damaged. 21 Robinson asserts that this verdict director placed too heavy a burden of proof on him. In addition, he contends that the jury was not properly instructed on the burden shifts in discrimination claims. We disagree. 22 We note preliminarily that, in order to determine whether an error in an instruction constitutes reversible error, the [i]nstructions must be 'read as a whole and considered in light of the entire charge.'  Crimm v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 750 F.2d 703, 710-11 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting Tribble v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1197 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080, 103 S.Ct. 1767, 76 L.Ed.2d 342 (1983) ). Instructions should correctly state the law and not be unfair or prejudicial to either the plaintiff or defendant. Id. at 711. However,  'the fact that the instructions are technically imperfect or are not a model of clarity does not render the charge erroneous.'  Id. (quoting Tribble, 669 F.2d at 1197). 23 We reject Robinson's contention that the verdict director placed too heavy a burden of proof on him. When read in conjunction with the other instructions, the director is consistent with the basic legal principles applicable in retaliatory discharge claims set forth by this court in Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). These principles dictate that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of retaliatory termination, 3 the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the dismissal. 4 Id. at 1296. Under this analysis, Monsanto did not have to prove the absence of retaliatory motive, but only had to produce evidence to dispel the inference of retaliation by establishing a legitimate reason for the discharge. Id. If the employer produces evidence of a reason other than retaliation for the discharge, the plaintiff may still prevail by proving that the employer's reason is merely a pretext. Id. The overall burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 729 F.2d 541, 545 (8th Cir.1984). 24 The verdict director properly set forth the elements of plaintiff's prima facie case and clearly required the jury to reach a verdict in Robinson's favor if it found that Monsanto had unlawfully retaliated against him. In addition, the instruction immediately preceding this verdict director informed the jury that it is not unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee so long as the fact that the employee filed a claim with the [EEOC]    was not a determining factor in the employer's decision to terminate the employee. Taken together, these instructions clearly informed the jury of the proper legal standard in a retaliatory discharge case. Moreover, the record indicates that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to conclude that the discharge would have taken place even if Robinson had not filed his EEOC complaint. 25 Robinson also contends that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant after proof of a prima facie case by the plaintiff. We conclude that it was unnecessary to do so. It is clear that, after Robinson made his prima facie case, Monsanto came forward with persuasive evidence of reasons other than retaliation for the discharge. It was not necessary to instruct the jury that it was Monsanto's burden to come forward with that evidence. 5 26