Opinion ID: 2186087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of evidence. At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal of the charges of first-degree murder, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill. He contends the trial court erred in overruling the motion.

Text: We recently set out the principles we follow in reviewing a motion for a directed verdict based upon insufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases: [W]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. All of the evidence must be considered, State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1980), and all legitimate inferences that may be deducted therefrom will be accepted. State v. Schrier, 300 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Iowa 1981). A trial court's refusal to direct a verdict for a defendant will withstand challenge if there is any substantial evidence in the record tending to support the charge. State v. York, 256 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Iowa 1977). Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d at 339. State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 39 (Iowa 1981). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(16). However, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture. State v. Schrier, 300 N.W.2d at 308. Defendant concedes that the essential elements of an offense may be established by inference from circumstantial evidence that malice may be inferred from the use of a weapon in a deadly and dangerous manner, as may intent to kill. But he argues that under the evidence of this case premeditation or deliberation must be inferred from malice or intent to kill, which must be inferred from the use of a weapon in a deadly manner. Defendant thus contends that the jury had to make one inference the basis for another, which he claims is clearly improper under State v. Leib, 198 Iowa 1315, 201 N.W. 29 (1924). Defendant's reliance on Leib is unfounded. This court has stated that the deliberate, violent use of a deadly weapon. . . with opportunity to deliberate is evidence of malice, deliberation, premeditation, and intent to kill. This is not making one inference the basis of another. . . . It is instead recognition of the fact that deliberation, premeditation and specific intent to kill, as is true of mental processes generally, are not ordinarily susceptible of direct proof but must be deduced from conduct and the circumstances accompanying it. State v. Christie, 243 Iowa 1199, 1207-08, 53 N.W.2d 887, 891, opinion modified, 54 N.W.2d 927 (1952) (quoting State v. Heinz, 223 Iowa 1241, 1258-59, 275 N.W. 10, 20 (1937)). Premeditation and deliberation are essential elements of the first-degree murder charges involved in this case. See § 707.2(1), The Code. The State was therefore required to prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d at 39, and cases cited therein. In State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 1975), this court stated: To deliberate is to weigh in one's mind or to consider. To premeditate is to think or ponder upon a matter before action. Premeditation and deliberation may not be presumed. It may not be inferred from intent. However premeditation and deliberation need not exist for any particular length of time. In finding premeditation and deliberation the trier of facts may consider the fact a defendant has selected a deadly weapon, such as the gun involved here, with an opportunity to deliberate where he thereafter uses it in a deadly manner. Id. at 41 (citations omitted). Thus, the general rule is that one who arms himself with the express purpose of shooting another cannot ordinarily claim the elements of first degree murder are lacking. State v. Smith, 240 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1976). We find substantial evidence of premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill. The evidence would permit the jury to find the following facts. On the date of the murders, James Wilkins, a friend of defendant, observed a handgun at defendant's residence. He also overheard defendant state during a telephone conversation: I'll be over in a little bit, Nick. Within two hours, Nick Pappas asked Douglas Millin to leave the premises after Cathy Larson told Pappas someone was there. As Millin left he observed defendant come from the front of the residence to move a car. Within a half hour Pappas and Larson were found dead in separate rooms in Pappas's house. Pappas had two bullet wounds in the back of his head. The wounds were surrounded by particles of gunpowder, indicating that he had been shot at close range. Larson had three bullet wounds, but no powder burns, which suggests that the shots were not fired from close range. There was evidence that all of the wounds were caused by Smith and Wesson bullets fired from the same .38 caliber gun. Two .38 caliber Smith and Wesson bullets were found in the car defendant used on the date of the murder, and a spent .38 caliber shell casing, believed to be a Smith and Wesson, was found among the clothes defendant wore that day. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, there was substantial evidence that the defendant selected a deadly weapon and had an opportunity to deliberate before using it. Defendant had ample opportunity to deliberate from the time he left his residence with the gun until he entered the Pappas's residence prior to the fatal shootings. Nick Pappas was shot at close range, and there was no evidence of a struggle. It could be concluded that defendant then deliberately shot Larson to prevent her from testifying. There was substantial circumstantial evidence to support the first-degree murder charges. The trial court did not err in submitting the charges to the jury. IV. Other issues. Because we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial, we need not resolve the other issues raised by defendant. Defendant claims the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial. The motion was based on surprise testimony of Dr. R. C. Wooters, the Polk County Medical Examiner, concerning an alleged confession by defendant. Now apprised, defendant may make the appropriate motion to suppress before retrial. Defendant also raises issues concerning misconduct by a special investigator of the county attorney's office and by the jury. These matters should not reoccur. REVERSED AND REMANDED.