Opinion ID: 4566408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Qazi’s challenge

Text: Qazi’s pre-trial indictment challenge was timely. The only question is whether it was specific enough to trigger Du Bo. We conclude it was. Qazi challenged his indictment for “fail[ing] to allege all the elements of a Federal Crime.” While his supporting memorandum was not a model of clarity, as most pro se pleadings aren’t, Qazi specifically argued his indictment was deficient because it “failed to include a necessary element of the offense at issue.” Du Bo, 186 F.3d at 1181. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) details five reasons why an indictment may be defective. “[F]ailure to state an offense,” the reason cited by Qazi in his motion, is but one of them. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). Thus, Qazi did not challenge his indictment at the highest level of generality, he identified a specific reason for deficiency that is provided in the Federal Rules themselves. But that is not all—his motion and memorandum further assert the indictment failed to state an offense because it omitted an essential element—one of at least two reasons why an indictment may fail to state an offense. See 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Crim. Proc. § 19.3(a)–(b) (4th ed.). Considering our liberal-construction mandate, Qazi’s motion and his attached memorandum satisfy Du Bo, even if he did not “specifically identify” the element he believed was missing. See Zichko, 247 F.3d at 1020. Had Qazi moved to dismiss without relying on a reason from 12(b)(3)(B), perhaps that would not trigger Du Bo. Had Qazi only claimed that his indictment failed to state an offense, without further arguing an essential element was missing, maybe that UNITED STATES V. QAZI 9 too would not trigger Du Bo. But where he identified the specific legal theory for why his indictment was deficient— it was missing a required element—he did enough, as a prose defendant, to trigger Du Bo. Indeed, the purpose of requiring litigants to raise specific errors to the district court in the first instance is to give the opposing party an opportunity to respond and the district court an opportunity to correct the error. See Santiago, 466 F.3d at 803. That purpose was served here. Although the government did not know which element Qazi believed was missing, it knew it was one of only a few elements required under Section 922(g)(1), (9). And in response to Qazi’s motion, the government affirmatively asserted that all elements were present, indicating it had sufficient opportunity to address Qazi’s objection. Moreover, the district court apparently viewed Qazi’s motion as an objection that the indictment omitted an essential element. Thus, it had the opportunity to—and did—consider whether all required elements were present when it concluded: “the indictment tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. 922(g), sets forth the elements of the offense. This is sufficient.” After Rehaif, we know this conclusion was wrong. 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Qazi’s indictment neither “track[ed] the language of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)” nor “set[] forth the elements of the offense,” because it did not allege that he had knowledge of his felon status. That the district court had little reason before Rehaif (aside from the plain text of Sections 922 and 924) to recognize that omitting Qazi’s knowledge of his felon status from the indictment was a material error is irrelevant. 3 The fact remains that Qazi did 3 When the Supreme Court interprets a criminal statute in a way that narrows the scope of criminal conduct, we view the statute as always 10 UNITED STATES V. QAZI enough to give the government a chance to respond to his deficiency theory and to give the district court the opportunity to correct the error in the first instance. At first glance, our conclusion that Qazi’s pro se challenge triggers Du Bo may seem to place Qazi in a better position than he would have been in had he been represented by counsel. But how could we ever know? We cannot say what arguments an attorney would have raised or how specific they would have been. And, in any event, this is beside the point. Qazi was not represented by an attorney and, therefore, we have a duty to construe his motion liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). And, of course, our duty is not confined to circumstances where a liberal construction makes no difference to the outcome. See, e.g., Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763–64, 767 (9th Cir. 2014). Having concluded that Qazi’s pre-trial indictment challenge triggers Du Bo, applying that rule here is straightforward. On de novo review, Qazi’s indictment “fails to recite an essential element of the charged offense.” Omer, 395 F.3d at 1088. This “is a fatal flaw requiring dismissal of the indictment.” Id. at 1089.