Opinion ID: 2033261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Legality of Assessment for Recycling Programs.

Text: Both the Cedar Rapids and Marion recycling programs are funded through an assessment charged to each residential unit, regardless of whether the particular residential unit uses the city's curbside collection service. In Marion, this assessment is part of the monthly fee for solid waste disposal. In Cedar Rapids, a separately designated recycling fee is included in residents' monthly bills for solid waste disposal. These fees are established by ordinance in each city. HMR asserts that the cities' fees violate residents' due process rights and that the fees constitute an unauthorized tax. A. Due process. HMR claims that the recycling fee is arbitrary and capricious because all residents must pay the fee regardless of whether they use the service. It contends the imposition of an unreasonable fee violates the individual plaintiffs' due process rights. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. Due process requires that there be a rational nexus between a city ordinancehere the ordinances establishing the recycling feesand the governmental purpose the ordinance is intended to advance. See State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 519-20 (Iowa 2000). Chapter 455B, which requires cities to use recycling as part of their comprehensive solid waste reduction programs, contains an enlightening statement of the purpose underlying such programs. See Iowa Code §§ 455B.301A (stating that recycling is part of the solid waste management policy of the state), .302 (requiring cities to implement solid waste reduction programs consistent with the state's solid waste management hierarchy, which includes recycling). Chapter 455B contains the following declaration of policy: The protection of the health, safety, and welfare of Iowans and the protection of the environment require the safe and sanitary disposal of solid wastes. An effective and efficient solid waste disposal program protects the environment and the public, and provides the most practical and beneficial use of the material and energy values of solid waste. While recognizing the continuing necessity for the existence of landfills, alternative methods of managing solid waste and a reduction in the reliance upon land disposal of solid waste are encouraged. In the promotion of these goals, the following waste management hierarchy in descending order of preference, is established as the solid waste management policy of the state: a. Volume reduction at the source. b. Recycling and reuse. Id. § 455B.301A(1). We conclude from this statement of policy that recycling programs are intended to protect the environment and the public by reducing the need for land disposal of solid waste. Because all citizens benefit from a reduction in the amount of solid waste being deposited in landfills, it is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious for a city operating a recycling program to assess a fee to all residents for this program. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals under similar circumstances reached the same conclusion. See City of Princeton v. Stamper, 195 W.Va. 685, 466 S.E.2d 536 (1995). In Stamper, city residents objected to paying refuse disposal charges when they did not actually use the refuse collection service provided by the city. Id. at 537. The West Virginia court held that the ordinance imposing the fee was reasonable, stating the following rationale: The appellants fail to recognize that the municipal charge is not just for collecting and disposing of refuse from their places of residence. The sum of all charges are marshalled and designed to defray the expense of a systemic refuse disposal scheme within the City of Princeton. In other words, the purpose of the Ordinance is to protect the health, safety and welfare of the entire community. ... The appellants attempt to emphasize that a service fee cannot be imposed against a non-user. The fallacy in this reasoning is that the appellants are users of the municipal service, in a real sense, regardless of how they choose to dispose of refuse because they receive the benefit from the general disposal system. All residents, regardless of how they personally choose to dispose of their refuse, receive a benefit in the collection and disposal of refuse from other premises in the community. Id. at 539. The same rationale supports our rejection of HMR's due process claim here. B. Unauthorized tax. HMR also claims that the recycling charges are illegal because they constitute an unauthorized tax in violation of the Iowa Constitution and the Iowa Code. As previously noted, the Iowa Constitution grants home rule power to municipalities except that they shall not have power to levy any tax unless expressly authorized by the general assembly. Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A; accord Iowa Code § 364.3(4) (A city may not levy a tax unless specifically authorized by a state law.). In support of its assertion that the recycling charges are a tax, HMR relies on this court's statement in Newman v. City of Indianola, 232 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1975), that [a] tax is a charge to pay the cost of government without regard to special benefits conferred. 232 N.W.2d at 573. Accepting HMR's characterization of the recycling charges as a tax, we think the determinative issue is whether these charges are authorized by the legislature. We conclude they are. Iowa Code section 384.84 provides: The governing body of a ... city enterprise... may establish, impose, adjust, and provide for the collection of rates and charges to produce gross revenues at least sufficient to pay the expenses of operation and maintenance of the ... city enterprise. Iowa Code § 384.84(1). As we have already determined, the cities' solid waste management systems, which include curbside recycling services, are city enterprises. Therefore, the cities, through the action of their respective city councils, may establish rates or charges that would at least cover the costs of the programs. Witnesses for the cities testified that all of the funds generated by the recycling fees were utilized to support the cities' waste management programs. HMR has presented no evidence to the contrary. Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude that the charges challenged by HMR are authorized by section 384.84(1). Therefore, these charges do not violate the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against the levy of a tax by a city. The district court correctly rejected HMR's claim that the assessments made for the recycling programs were illegal.