Opinion ID: 867274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Narrowing Instructions

Text: ¶30 Arizona's (F)(6) especially heinous, cruel or depraved aggravator is unconstitutionally vague. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). However, this vagueness is remedied when jury instructions provide adequate specificity in accordance with appellate courts' narrowing constructions. Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 114, 111 P.3d at 395. ¶31 Villalobos did not object to the aggravation phase (F)(6) instruction and concedes on appeal that it accurately stated Arizona law. [4] But, he argues, the instruction does not cure the vagueness of the (F)(6) aggravator because the term especially was not properly defined. We have repeatedly rejected similar arguments, holding that jury instructions materially identical to those here sufficiently narrowed the especially cruel aggravator. See State v. McCray, 218 Ariz. 252, 258-59 ¶¶ 25-26 & n. 3, 183 P.3d 503, 509-10 & n. 3 (2008); Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 308 ¶¶ 28-29, 166 P.3d at 99; State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 189-90 ¶¶ 42-45, 119 P.3d 448, 456-57 (2005); Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 114 & n. 19, 111 P.3d at 395 & n. 19.