Opinion ID: 2611079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: bryant's individual liability

Text: Throughout this case, Bryant has maintained that he acted only as the agent of Anderson, Bryant, and that consequently, no individual liability can attach. The trial court overruled his motion to dismiss and submitted the issue of his individual liability to the jury. Bryant here urges error based solely on an agency argument. The general rule is that a contract made with a known agent for a disclosed principal is a contract with the principal alone. Moran v. Loeffler-Greene Supply Co., 316 P.2d 132, 134 (Okla. 1957). However, equally true is the exception to the general rule: If the agent, acting within the scope of his authority, in the pursuit of a lawful purpose, steps aside to engage in a tortious act to the injury of property or personal rights of another, the agent becomes liable for the injury done. Rogers v. Brummett, 92 Okl. 216, 220 P. 362, 365 (1923). The exception applies to actions for fraud, negligence, and conversion by the agent. Fidelity Funding Co. v. Vaughn, 90 P. 34 (Okla. 1907); Sutherland v. St. Francis Hospital, 595 P.2d 780, 783 (Okla. 1979); J.C. Penney Co. v. Barrientez, 411 P.2d 841 (Okla. 1965); Ping v. Kershaw, 89 Okl. 43, 213 P. 840 (1923). Further, the Oklahoma tort statutes specifically provide that one who willfully deceives another, with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers. 76 O.S. 1981 § 2. An additional basis for individual liability appears in the Oklahoma securities statutes which form the gravamen of the first two of Bane's claims for relief. Title seventy-one provides that: Every person who materially participates or aids in a sale or purchase made by any person liable under subsection (a) of § 408, or who directly or indirectly controls any person so liable, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the person so liable ... 71 O.S. 1981 § 408(b). The plaintiff's petition alleges seven different claims for relief: violation of 71 O.S. 1981 § 408, violation of 71 O.S. 1981 § 101, common law fraud, breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, common law negligence, and conversion. Clearly, the trial court correctly maintained Bryant as a defendant. However, because Bryant alleges error both in the trial court's refusal to grant his motion to dismiss and alternately in the jury's finding of individual liability, we now inquire whether the jury heard sufficient evidence to return a verdict against him individually. The record reflects that in 1982 Bane established a personal Keogh account, and that in 1984 she invested its contents with Anderson, Bryant & Co. in a limited partnership securities project called Water World. She testified she did so after being advised that this security was approved for Keogh status, and that Anderson, Bryant & Co. was authorized to make Keogh investments. Bryant supervised the Water World project, and was directly in charge of the project for the firm. Tr. pp. 174-176. The documents resulting in transfer of Bane's $4,381.87 indicated that these funds were to be transferred into an Anderson, Bryant & Co. Keogh account within the 60 day period allowed for such transfers without penalty. Tr. pp. 186-206, 218. Bryant decided how to divide the commission for this sale between the defendants Phillips and Oden. Tr. pp. 206-210. Later, defendant Oden told Bryant that Bane's cashier's check was ready, but that the plaintiff's bank could not transfer the account to an outside security such as Water World. Oden further attempted to locate another bank to handle this transaction, and informed Bryant of his unsuccessful efforts. Oden also informed Bryant that the transaction needed to be completed within 60 days, or Bane's money must be returned to her in order to preserve the Keogh tax benefits, and further advised Bryant to return Bane's money. Tr. pp. 418-428, 433, 440-41. Only after the 60 day grace period elapsed was Bane apprised that Anderson, Bryant & Co. was not qualified to maintain Keogh accounts. We find the evidence sufficient to submit the issue of Bryant's individual liability to the jury. After receiving all of the evidence, the jury rendered a general verdict against Anderson, Bryant & Co., Bryant, and Phillips. A general verdict is that by which they pronounce generally upon all or any of the issues, either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant. 12 O.S. 1981 § 587. Additionally, a general verdict of a jury constitutes a finding of every material fact necessary to support it, and is conclusive as to all disputed facts and conflicting statements. Garrison v. Bonham, 207 Okl. 599, 251 P.2d 790, 793 (1952); Walker v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 646 P.2d 593, 597 (Okla. 1982). None of the defendants requested specific findings of fact, and consequently none were made. See, 12 O.S. 1981 § 588. The trial court properly submitted the issue of individual liability to the jury. No special findings of fact exist to controvert the general verdict against Bryant, and we therefore affirm the verdict against that defendant individually.