Opinion ID: 2602282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: violations based on dealings with clients

Text: ¶ 14 On 20 December 1994 the District Court, Pontotoc County, appointed respondent to serve as co-conservator of Mary L. Cothran (Ms. Cothran), an elderly woman confined to a nursing home. In July of 1993, Ms. Cothran's nephew, Tom Cothran (Mr. Cothran), had discovered that the person then serving as his aunt's conservator had been embezzling money and/or property from her estate. In appointing respondent as Ms. Cothran's new conservator, the court directed him to seek restitution of the assets embezzled by the former conservator as well as pursue legal action against anyone who might be liable for the loss. [29] ¶ 15 Prior to respondent's appointment, Mr. Cothran had engaged a Tulsa accounting firm to investigate and report on the amount embezzled. The report was not provided to respondent until April or early May 1995. Respondent, theorizing that the former conservator's law partners might be liable along with the former conservator, then met with lawyers for all three in an effort to negotiate a settlement. On 22 May 1995, while these negotiations were proceeding, Ms. Cothran died. ¶ 16 When the negotiations failed to produce a settlement, respondent filed an action in June 1995 against the former conservator and his law partners to recover the embezzled funds. Having as yet not filed a probate proceeding nor sought the appointment of a special administrator, [30] respondent filed the action in his capacity as conservator. [31] The action was filed within the limitations period, which was set to expire in July. In November 1995, several months after the limitations period expired, the court dismissed the action without prejudice on the grounds that it had not been brought in the name of the real party in interest. Respondent made no request of the district court prior to the suit's dismissal for a reasonable time to effectuate a substitution of the proper party [32] nor did he attempt to re-file the action under the state's reviver statute within a year after the dismissal. [33] Neither did he appeal the decision. Respondent's inaction deprived the estate of the opportunity to recover approximately $375,000. [34] ¶ 17 Respondent did not file a probate proceeding for Ms. Cothran's estate until 20 February 1997, almost two years after she died. Respondent testified that Mr. Cothran began pressing him to file a probate proceeding in the fall of 1995. Respondent also stipulated that Mr. Cothran prepared a final accounting of the conservatorship, which he, respondent, never filed. Although he stipulated that he received the final accounting from Mr. Cothran in May 1995, he testified at the PRT hearing that the stipulation was in error and that he did not in fact obtain it until March 1997. [35] Respondent's explanation for not filing it after that date  that he thought he was no longer the estate's attorney  is not supported by the record, which contains a letter dated mid-July 1997 indicating that Minter would be meeting that day with Mr. Cothran and his sister to discuss issues remaining in the case. It was not until 26 September 1997 that Mr. Cothran sent respondent a letter asking him to withdraw from the probate and informing him that new counsel had been retained. Respondent never filed a motion to withdraw. ¶ 18 Respondent stipulated that Mr. Cothran felt that Respondent failed to properly communicate with him about the status of the conservatorship and probate. Despite this acknowledgment of Mr. Cothran's feelings about the level of communication between them, respondent testified that he believed he properly communicated with Mr. Cothran. Mr. Cothran did not testify. [36] ¶ 19 The trial panel concluded that respondent violated the following sections of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC): Rule 1.1(failing to provide competent representation), [37] Rule 1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), [38] Rule 1.4 (failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), [39] Rule 1.16(d) (failing to take reasonable steps upon termination of representation to protect a client's interests), [40] Rule 3.2 (failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), [41] and Rule 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). [42] The panel also concluded that respondent's misconduct violated the terms of Rule 1.3 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP) (engaging in acts contrary to prescribed standards of conduct and bringing discredit upon the legal profession). [43] ¶ 20 We agree that the record provides clear and convincing evidence respondent failed to provide competent and diligent representation to the Cothran estate in violation of ORPC Rules 1.1 and 1.3, and that he failed to expedite litigation in violation of ORPC Rule 3.2. [44] We also agree with the trial panel's conclusion that respondent violated the provisions of RGDP Rule 1.4. Despite respondent's contention that he frequently communicated with Mr. Cothran, it is clear from the evidence that respondent did not inform Mr. Cothran that he was so disquieted by the prospect of handling a probate proceeding that he might not, or would not, be able to render that legal service. This was critical information regarding the status of the legal matters entrusted to respondent and Mr. Cothran was entitled to be informed of it. No matter how many conversations and meetings were held or what else respondent told Mr. Cothran, his failure to be honest with him about his competence to handle the probate establishes a violation of ORPC Rule 1.4. ¶ 21 We disagree with the trial panel's conclusion that respondent violated ORPC Rule 1.16(d). The complaint does not allege facts and the record fails to establish that respondent failed to take steps after discharge to protect his client's interests. Nevertheless, the complaint does allege and the evidence does establish a violation of ORPC Rule 1.16(a)(5), which requires a lawyer to withdraw upon being discharged. [45] The fact that the Bar did not specifically charge a violation of this rule is of no consequence. [46] The provisions of RGDP Rule 6.2, which govern the contents of disciplinary complaints, demand only that the complaint set forth the specific facts constituting the misconduct, and does not require the lawyer to be notified of the specific disciplinary rule that the misconduct violates. [47] The Bar discharged its duty to provide adequate notice by alleging that Respondent failed to timely remove himself from representation in the Mary L. Cothran Estate as requested by the personal representative, Tom Cothran. Respondent stipulated that he did not withdraw from the Cothran representation as requested. The evidence establishes a violation of ORPC Rule 1.16(a)(5). ¶ 22 The Bar also charged respondent with violating ORPC Rule 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and RGDP Rule 1.3 by engaging in behavior contrary to prescribed standards of conduct and bringing discredit upon the legal profession. In its brief the Bar indicates that it brought these charges based upon the totality of the circumstances constituting Counts One and Two of the complaint. Respondent asserts that nothing in the complaint, including the bare citation of the rules in its boilerplate paragraphs, informs him that the charges are based on the totality of the circumstances. This, he urges, constitutes a violation of his right to due process. ¶ 23 Due process must be afforded an accused attorney in a bar disciplinary proceeding. [48] Compliance with due process requires the Bar to allege facts sufficient to put the accused lawyer on notice of the conduct upon which the charges of professional misconduct are based. [49] It is the duty of this court, not that of the parties by stipulation or otherwise, to examine the facts de novo and determine which ethical rules are applicable. [50] As long as the respondent has notice of the facts underlying the misconduct charges, it is within the court's discretion whether to look at those facts as discrete instances of misconduct or consider them as part of a larger set of circumstances. The Bar's invitation to review respondent's conduct in the context of the totality of the circumstances is entirely appropriate and does not violate respondent's due process claim to notice and to an opportunity to be heard. ¶ 24 While we disagree with respondent that the application of Rule 8.4(d) to his misconduct would violate his right to due process, we do agree with respondent's contention that his conduct in the Cothran matter was not prejudicial to the administration of justice. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Bourne, [51] the court reviewed Oklahoma case law applying ORPC Rule 8.4(d). In every case, the respondent's conduct included some element of deceit, dishonesty, misrepresentation, criminality, sexual misbehavior or other morally reprehensible conduct. [52] The Bar has cited no case where the court has held that lack of competence and diligence alone, the gravamen of respondent's misconduct in the Cothran matter, is a sufficient basis for a charge that the lawyer's conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Spadafora, [53] we said, Rule 8.4(d) may not be used to establish professional misconduct unless the complained acts were the sort that were `previously disapproved by case law, statute, court rules or the lore of the profession.' [54] The Bar has not cited any case law, statute, or court rules, other than the substantive violations of the ORPC and RGDP, the breach of which would serve to establish that respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of judicial process. [55] We hence hold that the Bar has not met its burden with respect to a violation of ORPC Rule 8.4(d). Of that violation respondent stands exonerated. ¶ 25 As for RGDP Rule 1.3, we find that there is clear and convincing evidence that respondent's conduct violates that provision.
¶ 26 On 27 March 1998, Ron Hanna filed a lawsuit against Larry Paul Goff (Goff) to recover money for medical services rendered. Goff retained respondent to represent him. Respondent failed to timely file an Entry of Appearance or an Answer, and a default judgment was entered against Goff on 11 May 1998. On 12 May 1998, respondent filed an Answer and a First Set of Interrogatories. The plaintiff's attorney never received a copy of those pleadings through the mail, and first learned of them while reading The Journal Record. Plaintiff's attorney wrote a letter to respondent informing him that he had never received the pleadings. Respondent did not reply to that letter. ¶ 27 Upon obtaining the default judgment, the plaintiff's attorney, who was unaware that Goff had retained counsel, sent Goff a copy of the journal entry of default judgment. Goff's wife immediately called respondent and spoke to his secretary, who assured her that respondent would file a Motion for Rehearing. Respondent did not then nor at any other time file a motion to vacate the default judgment. Goff and his wife repeatedly called respondent's office between the date they learned of the default judgment and the date they finally retained new counsel. Respondent did not return any of their telephone calls. ¶ 28 The trial panel found respondent guilty of violating ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. [56] It also found respondent guilty of violating RGDP Rule 5.2. [57] The record provides clear and convincing evidence that respondent is guilty of violating ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. The amended complaint contains no factual allegations in Count Four that would serve to establish a violation of RGDP Rule 5.2. Of that charge respondent stands exonerated.
¶ 29 In early 1994, Sharon Pittman, Tonya Pittman, and Cindy Pittman (the Pittmans) agreed to sell a parcel of land to Leon Sloan. The land had belonged to Charles Pittman, deceased. It had never been probated. Respondent testified that when the Pittmans retained him in March 1994 to represent them in connection with the sale of the land to Sloan, it was understood that he was to furnish Sloan with marketable title. ¶ 30 Respondent did nothing for almost two-and-one-half years. During that time, Sloan called respondent's office a couple of times, but respondent testified that he did not believe it was necessary to return his calls and never spoke to him. He did not recall ever speaking to the Pittmans during that period either. On 29 August 1996, respondent had each of the Pittmans execute a quit-claim deed to Sloan. Respondent testified in explanation of the delay that it was one of those things that got stuck on the back burner. Tonya and Cindy were both married women, but neither husband signed the deed. [58] Respondent neither delivered the deeds to Sloan nor filed them for almost two years after their execution. [59] Almost four-and-one-half years had by this time elapsed since respondent was retained to implement the land sale. ¶ 31 The execution of the deeds by the Pittmans did nothing to clear the cloud on Sloan's title to the property. He appeared in respondent's office on several occasions demanding that respondent do something to clear his title, but never directly spoke with respondent. In November 1997, Sloan wrote a letter of complaint to the Bar. The Bar then wrote to respondent asking him to communicate with Sloan within two weeks. Four weeks later, Sloan again wrote the Bar to say that he had heard nothing from respondent. Sloan was in the process of selling the Pittman land along with other property he owned and the lack of marketable title to the Pittman parcel was interfering with the sale. ¶ 32 On 11 June 1998, the day before he filed the deeds, respondent filed a quiet-title action in the District Court, Marshall County, styled Leon Sloan v. The Unknown Heirs of Charles Junior Pittman, in which he represented that he was Sloan's attorney. Respondent did not confer with Sloan prior to taking this action on his behalf, did not inform Sloan after the fact that he had filed a petition in his name, nor did he otherwise communicate with Sloan during the pendency of the action. Respondent argues in his brief that a letter Sloan wrote to the Bar after the quiet title action had been filed shows that Sloan was aware of the action brought on his behalf. On 21 August 1998, the district court entered an order quieting title in Sloan. ¶ 33 The trial panel concluded that respondent had violated ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 3.2, as well as RGDP Rule 5.2. [60] Except as to RGDP Rule 5.2, the record provides clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated each of these provisions with respect to the Pittmans. Respondent objects that the Pittmans never filed a grievance against him. The absence of a grievance from a client does not prohibit the Bar from charging, and the court from finding, that ethical violations were committed. [61] ¶ 34 The complaint may also be understood to charge respondent with the same ethical violations toward Sloan. This presents a threshold question as to whether Sloan can be regarded as respondent's client for disciplinary purposes. Oklahoma recognizes that a duty may be created by a contract which is made expressly for the benefit of a third-party non-client beneficiary when harm to the beneficiary is foreseeable. [62] Sloan was a third-party non-client beneficiary of the contract between the Pittmans and respondent. Under the circumstances here, where the Pittmans no longer had an interest in the property and marketable title had to be pursued in Sloan's name, respondent's professional obligations became obligations owed to Sloan as well. Additionally, once respondent held himself out as Sloan's attorney by filing an action in that capacity, he became Sloan's attorney for disciplinary purposes. The record hence provides clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated the provisions of ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2 with respect to Sloan. ¶ 35 The amended complaint contains no factual allegations in this count that would serve to establish a violation of RGDP Rule 5.2. Of that charge respondent stands exonerated.