Opinion ID: 1059722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: future dangerousness based on unadjudicated criminal acts

Text: Next, the defendant challenges the imposition of the death penalty based on the finding that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.4(C). The defendant's attack with regard to this issue is threefold. He first asserts that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish future dangerousness because he had no prior history of significant violent offenses. He next contends that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining future dangerousness. Finally, he argues that the introduction into evidence of unadjudicated criminal acts violates the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Virginia because there is no requirement that such acts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [11] We do not agree with any of the defendant's arguments. As to the first prong of the defendant's attack, we find sufficient evidence of future dangerousness to support the imposition of the death penalty. During the month of January 1998, the defendant committed numerous criminal acts in three separate episodes, in addition to the robbery and murder of Burnett. On January 21, he entered Jones' home while no one was present and then shot Jones in the leg when she attempted to stop the defendant's abduction of Scougal. That same day, the defendant used a firearm to rob Powell. Then on January 30, the day before the defendant was apprehended, he abducted and robbed three women, again using a firearm, and left them in a small closet after nailing the door shut. This evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. Code § 19.2-264.2; see also § 19.2-264.4(C). Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the Commonwealth's evidence with regard to the defendant's future dangerousness. The defendant's next argument is that the trial court adopted the wrong legal standard when it used the phrase sufficient probable cause in the following statement, which the court made while overruling the defendant's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence at sentencing: The matter of future dangerousness, again, the evidence there is evidence before the Court and before this jury and the jury will make the determination as to whether there is sufficient probable causeprobability that the Defendant is guilty of any future dangerousness. We do not agree with the defendant's contention for two reasons. First, we believe that the court's use of that phrase was a misstatement because the court immediately corrected itself by using the term probability. The term probability is part of the criteria set forth in Code § 19.2-264.4(C) for determining future dangerousness: The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant ... that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. (Emphasis added.) See also Code § 19.2-264.2. Furthermore, the court properly instructed the jury in accordance with this statutory provision. Thus, we conclude that the trial court decided the motion to strike on the issue of future dangerousness under the appropriate standard. We also find no merit in the third aspect of the defendant's argument regarding future dangerousness. The defendant asserts that the Commonwealth used unadjudicated criminal acts that had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish future dangerousness. However, most of the criminal acts about which the jury heard evidence had been adjudicated. The record shows that, before the sentencing hearing in this case, the defendant had been found guilty, based on his guilty pleas, of the offenses that he committed on January 21 in the City of Richmond and those that he committed on January 30 in New Kent County. As to those criminal acts that were unadjudicated on the date of the sentencing hearing in the present case, we have previously construed Code § 19.2-264.4(C) to permit the admission into evidence of unadjudicated misconduct. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 317, 384 S.E.2d 785, 799 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990). Moreover, we specifically held in Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 66, 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (1999), that evidence of each unadjudicated criminal act admitted to show a defendant's future dangerousness is not subject to the reasonable doubt standard. Rather, the finding of future dangerousness must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The defendant has offered no reason why we should depart from these precedents. Accordingly, we will not disturb the circuit court's judgment on this issue.