Opinion ID: 1347972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mincey argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the requisite intent and premeditation required to support convictions for aiding and abetting attempted first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Claiborne, 262 Kan. 416, Syl. ¶ 5, 940 P.2d 27 (1997); see State v. Mathenia, 262 Kan. 890, 901, 942 P.2d 624 (1997). First, Mincey attempts to draw a distinction between being charged with a crime and being charged as an aider and abettor to a crime. Mincey asserts that if she had been charged with the crime of first-degree murder, perhaps the charges against her would be permissible as a reasonably foreseeable result of aggravated robbery. However, she argues that because she was only charged with aiding and abetting, whether the state presented sufficient evidence of the requisite specific intent to prove aiding and abetting attempted first-degree murder must be analyzed in the specific context in which that charge was brought. Finally, Mincey argues that a showing of specific intent is required to establish guilt as an aider and abettor under K.S.A. 21-3205(1). The evidence indicates Mincey told her coconspirators to kill the victim of their robbery if necessary to avoid getting caught. In the face of this dispositive statement, Mincey now argues: The statement `kill them if you think you're going to get caught' is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Mincey had a specific intent to commit a premeditated murder. The statement is qualified; it does not establish the existence of a specific, premeditated intent to kill, but rather that a indication [sic] that a killing be resorted to if specific circumstances occurred. A specific intent to kill must be show [sic] to establish the offense of attempted first-degree murder. Further, Ms. Mincey's statement reveals that several potential victims of the robbery were discussed and that she did not know whether `Jo' was a man or a woman. Ms. Mincey could not have had a premeditated, specific intent to kill Ms. Ferguson when she was not even aware of whom the intended victim was to be. A review of the statute and Mincey's statement is sufficient to decide this issue. K.S.A. 21-3205 provides that a person is liable for the crimes of another if that person, aids, abets, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit the crime. Here, Mincey advised and counselled her coconspirators to kill the victim if necessary to avoid getting caught. Mincey's coconspirators followed her advice and counsel. That the decision to murder was conditional does not make the crime committed any less premeditated. Every premeditated murder is conditioned upon an alive victim at the time of the attempt. Mincey cited no cases to support her novel concept. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.