Opinion ID: 1903716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the wrongful actions of the board and the edd violated bond's constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process.

Text: ¶ 20. Bond argues that the actions of the Board violate procedural and substantive due process guarantees. Bond asserts that the Board's conduct was deliberately intended to circumvent the election results. Again, Bond argues that because the Bond issue was defeated, the Board was prohibited from financing the Hood project in any manner that would require the county's taxpayers to fund the project. The actions complained of include the Board's failure to receive bids prior to financing the project, the Board's refusal to follow the opinion of the Attorney General, and the Board's determination to seek financing pursuant to S.B. 3269. ¶ 21. Bond complains that the Board failed to solicit competitive bids prior to financing the project at issue. Bond asserts that Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-99(3)(b) (Supp.2000) requires that the construction of the Hood facility should have been publicly bid and advertised. Section 19-5-99(3) provides, in pertinent part: (a) Any economic development district established under this section shall have the authority to acquire by gift, purchase or otherwise, and to own, hold, maintain, control and develop real estate situated within the county or counties comprising such district for the development, use and operation of industrial parks or other development purposes. (b) Contracts for the construction, improvement, equipping or furnishing of an industrial site and improvements thereon as authorized in this section shall be entered into upon the basis of public bidding under Section 31-7-1 et seq. The circuit court found that this statute does not require public bidding for the project at issue because the EDD acquired the facility after its construction and leased it back to the industry. Accordingly, the Board argues that § 19-5-99 requires public bidding only where the county actually constructs the facility and then turns it back over to the private operator. ¶ 22. This is a question of first impression for this Court, though the Attorney General has issued numerous opinions regarding this precise question. The Attorney General has opined that § 19-5-99(3)(b), by its express language, does not require public bidding for the acquisition of an existing building or structure. Rather, the Attorney General has stated that an economic development district has the authority to acquire a facility after its construction and in turn lease it back to the particular industry without soliciting competitive bids. 93-0851 Op. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 24, 1993); Op. Att'y Gen. (Sept. 25, 1990); Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 11, 1986). ¶ 23. It is evident from the record that the Board conferred with Wallace prior to the construction of the facility and that the county did not construct the facility itself because the limited time period required by Hood did not allow time for location of a suitable site, development of specifications, and solicitation of bids. However, the record also demonstrates that the lease and option to purchase agreement entered into with Wallace was executed after the building had been completed, and the funds sought by both the proposed bond issue and pursuant to S.B. 3269 were clearly in contemplation of the acquisition of the facility, not its construction. Miss. Code Ann. § 31-7-1(g) (2000) defines construction as the process of building, altering, improving, renovating or demolishing a public structure, public building, or other public real property. (emphasis added). The facility constructed by Wallace was a privately owned building constructed on private property. In accordance with the clear and express language of § 19-5-99(3)(b) and § 31-7-1(g), the Board was not required to solicit competitive bids prior to entering into the lease and option to purchase agreement with Wallace. ¶ 24. Bond also complains that the Board acted arbitrarily by ignoring the opinion of the Attorney General. He contends that § 19-5-99 did not authorize the EDD to directly borrow funds. This argument is without merit. The request submitted to the Attorney General by the Board's attorney specifically inquired whether, under § 19-5-99, the EDD had the authority to borrow money, and the Attorney General's opinion limited itself to that inquiry. The opinion was requested on April 5, 1995, prior to the to passage of S.B. 3269 on April 6, 1995. The opinion, issued May 17, 1995, did not address S.B. 3269. In acting pursuant to S.B. 3269, the Board did not act contrary to the opinion of the Attorney General. ¶ 25. Finally, Bond argues that the Board's determination to seek financing pursuant to S.B. 3269 violated his due process rights by denying him the results of the bond election. Again, Bond received the results of the bond election that is, no bond issue occurred. Furthermore, this Court has stated, Where no election is required by statute, none is required. Gautier Utility Dist., 465 So.2d at 1020. S.B. 3269 requires no election. The Board cites numerous methods of financing available to public bodies which do not require elections as a condition precedent to implementation: Miss. Code Ann. § 21-45-1 (1990), et seq. (authority to issue Tax Increment Financing Bonds); Miss.Code Ann. § 43-35-1 (2000), et seq. (authority to issue Urban Renewal Bonds); Miss.Code Ann. § 17-21-51 (1995), et seq. (authority to issue short-term notes); and Miss.Code Ann. § 57-10-201 (1996), et seq. (authority of Mississippi Business Finance Corporation to issue tax-exempt Industrial Development Revenue Bonds). The election results do not prohibit the Board from seeking alternative financing through legislative means so long as the legislative authority granted is constitutional. ¶ 26. Taxpayers have no due process right to be heard on the question of desirability or feasibility of public improvement projects and the provisions for financing of such projects by a political subdivision, which has been granted full legislative powers in the premises, unless the political subdivision acts ultra vires. Gautier Utility Dist. at 1020. The actions of the Board were not beyond its powers. Where a political subdivision covered by the local and private act has alternatives in that they may proceed under either that act or the general law, the election so made is not subject to judicial review. Id. at 1008, 1017. See also Brandon v. City of Hattiesburg, 493 So.2d 324, 326 (Miss. 1986) (entity may elect to proceed under either general law or local and private act). The generically legislative determination of the Board, having been vested with full legislative authority in Marion County, that the proposed project was necessary and in the public interest and the determination to proceed under S.B. 3269 is not subject to due process challenge. See Gautier Utility Dist. at 1020 (citing In re Savannah Special Consol. School Dist., 208 Miss. 460, 469-70, 44 So.2d 545, 547 (Miss.1950)). ¶ 27. But where the method of taking is ad valorem taxation levied generally and equally on all property in an entire taxing district, a property owner's due process rights are thought satisfied when he is afforded a reasonable procedure for challenging the accuracy and equity of the valuation of his property and the computation of his tax. Gautier Utility Dist. at 1018. See also State Tax Comm'n v. Fondren, 387 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss.1980); Fondren v. State Tax Comm'n, 350 So.2d 1329, 1333-34 (Miss. 1977); Hutchins v. Bd. of Supervisors of Alcorn County, 227 Miss. 766, 780, 87 So.2d 54, 58 (1956). So long as the Board acted within the authorities conferred upon it by the Legislature and so long as Bond is afforded his day in court on the question of validation, rights conferred upon him by the due process clause have been afforded him. See Gautier Utility Dist. at 1018. ¶ 28. Again, no tax has been specially levied pursuant to S.B. 3269 to fund the project at issue. In the event the Board seeks to levy such a tax, S.B. 3269 provides for notice to taxpayers, acceptance of written protests, and an election. Due process also affords Bond a day in court to dispute the accuracy, validity and proportionality of the assessment. To date, Bond has not been denied due process.