Opinion ID: 2211646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Evidence Presented In This Case

Text: I feel compelled to point out that the majority seems to assume that Mrs. Chambers knew of defendant's sexual harassment policy and the procedures outlined thereunder. Op., pp. 912-913. However, at trial, the evidence presented to the jury suggests that the policy was never communicated to her. Mrs. Chambers was hired on June 27, 1995. Mr. Wolshon was her supervisor and sexually harassed her between July 5 and 8. At trial, defendant's regional manager explained in detail the company's sexual harassment policy. He also testified that new hires are supposed to sign an acknowledgment form contained in an employee handbook distributed to them. The handbook contains defendant's sexual harassment policy. According to Mr. McLaughlin, [a]n employee will not be paid unless that acknowledgment sheet is received in our office. But, defendant offered no tangible evidence showing that Mrs. Chambers actually received and signed the handbook. She testified that she did not receive the handbook and that she was not aware of defendant's sexual harassment policy. According to Mr. McLaughlin, defendant should have had in its records a form signed by Mrs. Chambers. A signed form indicating that Mrs. Chambers received and read defendant's sexual harassment policy was never produced at trial. The majority attempts to cast responsibility on plaintiff for the fact that she was not actually aware of defendant's sexual harassment policy. According to the majority, it matters little to the issue of vicarious liability if, for reasons not attributable to defendant, plaintiff was not actually aware of the policy. Op., p. 922. In taking this position, the majority usurps the role of the jury by deciding that defendant did communicate the policy to plaintiff. The evidence presented permitted the jury to infer that defendant never communicated the policy to plaintiff. If the jury did so infer, the fact that defendant had a sexual harassment policy becomes irrelevant. Of what value is a sexual harassment policy if the employer fails to ensure its employees are actually aware of it? The majority seems to suggest that employees have a duty to discover employers' policies when they begin working. The majority also impermissibly credits defendant's version of why Mrs. Chambers was fired, as opposed to her version. Op., p. 913 (Plaintiff was eventually discharged in September 1995 when she failed to show up for work for several consecutive days). Mrs. Chambers testified that she was told to go home and wait for a telephone call informing her where her next assignment would be. It is the function of the jury to decide whose testimony to believe, not the function of the Court. Throughout this case, the majority decides facts and makes inferences favoring the defendant. The jury, however, found in favor of the plaintiff. In determining whether the trial court should have granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, this Court is supposed to view all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Kubczak v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 456 Mich. 653, 663, 575 N.W.2d 745 (1998). The majority fails to do so. This case illustrates why we should proceed with great reluctance when asked to disturb a jury's findings of fact. In concluding that defendant failed to take prompt remedial action once it knew that Mrs. Chambers had been sexually harassed, the jury may have credited Mrs. Chambers' testimony over defendant's. We cannot know what factors the jury took into account when returning a verdict in plaintiff's favor.