Opinion ID: 2232278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conviction on the lesser included offense

Text: On appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief, the appellate court noted that unlawful possession of cannabis is a lesser included offense of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 2-9(a); People v. Jones (1992), 149 Ill.2d 288, 293, 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 595 N.E.2d 1071.) The court held that defendant's conviction for the lesser offense of possession was void and, therefore, vacated the conviction. The State concedes that the conviction on the lesser included offense is improper. (See People v. Lewis (1980), 83 Ill.2d 296, 47 Ill.Dec. 314, 415 N.E.2d 319; People v. King (1977), 66 Ill.2d 551, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838.) Nonetheless, the State contends that the appellate court erred by vacating defendant's conviction. Defendant urges that the appellate court's vacatur of the improper conviction was proper. It is his contention that the conviction offends the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. The whole of the State's argument, with respect to the improper conviction, is intended to preclude our consideration of the issue. We consider first the State's argument that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to address the issue of the improper conviction. It is the State's position that because no sentence was entered on the conviction for the lesser included offense, there is no final, appealable judgment. (See People v. Rose (1969), 43 Ill.2d 273, 278, 253 N.E.2d 456; People ex rel. Filkin v. Flessner (1971), 48 Ill.2d 54, 268 N.E.2d 376.) In support of its position that no sentence was entered, the State points out that the Probation Order form notes only the conviction for the greater offense, unlawful possession with intent to deliver. We disagree with the State's reasoning. The Probation Order form is not dispositive. Further, it appears to us that the abbreviated statement of the conviction on the form results for no other reason than lack of space. The Judgment and Sentence was entered in the record on May 26, 1989, and signed by the sentencing judge. On one line of the Judgment and Sentence form, it states that defendant is guilty of the crime of Unlawful Possession with Intent to Deliver Cannabis. On the very next line, the form states Unlawful Possession of Cannabis. The parties do not contend that defendant was not convicted of both offenses. The sentence imposed, which is also entered on the Judgment and Sentence form, is general; the entry does not designate that the sentence is for a particular offense or count. We are, therefore, unable to conclude that the general sentence is solely for the greater offense. However, because the Judgment and Sentence recites defendant's conviction for both offenses, we believe it to be a reasonable conclusion that the sentence pertains to both offenses. We conclude that the judgment was final, and that the appellate court's jurisdiction was, therefore, proper. The State next argues that the improper conviction does not rise to the level of constitutional error. It is the State's contention that because defendant was not sentenced on both convictions, there was no multiple punishment as prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. (See Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187.) Therefore, the State contends, defendant's improper-sentencing argument is a sham, and not cognizable under the Act. Defendant takes the position that because the improper conviction implicates double jeopardy concerns, this court may properly notice and vacate it in the context of this post-conviction proceeding. In light of our conclusion that the sentence imposed pertained to both convictions, we reject the State's argument. Further, defendant maintains, the improper conviction issue does not depend, for its viability, on the Post-Conviction Hearing Act because the conviction constitutes a void judgment. Defendant finds support for the conclusion that the judgment is void in various opinions rendered by our appellate court. (See People v. Johnson (1990), 200 Ill.App.3d 1018, 146 Ill.Dec. 644, 558 N.E.2d 607; People v. Rodriguez (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 131, 139, 119 Ill.Dec. 717, 523 N.E.2d 185; see also People v. Perruquet (1989), 181 Ill.App.3d 660, 130 Ill.Dec. 284, 537 N.E.2d 351 (sentence in excess of what statute permits is void).) The State argues that the improper conviction constitutes a voidable judgment which is not subject to collateral attack. See People v. Holder (1991), 213 Ill.App.3d 109, 156 Ill.Dec. 744, 571 N.E.2d 528 (claim that multiple convictions were improper can be waived by failure to raise the issue in the trial court); accord People v. Schaefer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 317, 135 Ill.Dec. 326, 543 N.E.2d 894; People v. Gray (1988), 171 Ill.App.3d 860, 121 Ill.Dec. 726, 525 N.E.2d 1033. The term void is so frequently employed interchangeably with the term voidable as to have lost its primary significance. Therefore, when the term void is used in a judicial opinion it is necessary to resort to the context in which the term is used to determine precisely the term's meaning. Whether a judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdiction. ( Herb v. Pitcairn (1943), 384 Ill. 237, 241, 51 N.E.2d 277.) Jurisdiction is a fundamental prerequisite to a valid prosecution and conviction. Where jurisdiction is lacking, any resulting judgment rendered is void and may be attacked either directly or indirectly at any time. (5 Callaghan's Illinois Criminal Procedure § 39.09 (1971).) By contrast, a voidable judgment is one entered erroneously by a court having jurisdiction and is not subject to collateral attack. See 5 Callaghan's Illinois Criminal Procedure § 39.09 (1971). In Illinois, jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution. ( People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456.) Pursuant to article VI, section 9, of our constitution, the circuit courts have jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 9.) As applied in the context of criminal proceedings, the term subject matter jurisdiction means the power to hear and determine a given case. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 149 (1989). Some authorities, including this court, have held that the power to render the particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as is personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Without such power the judgment or sentence is void. (See People ex rel. Rice v. Appellate Court (1971), 48 Ill.2d 195, 197, 268 N.E.2d 420; Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove (1938), 369 Ill. 334, 339, 16 N.E.2d 717; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 150 (1989); H. Black, The Law of Judgments § 258 (1891).) However, jurisdiction or power to render a particular judgment does not mean that the judgment rendered must be the one that should have been rendered, for the power to decide carries with it the power to decide wrong as well as to decide right. People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 409, 75 N.E.2d 851; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 19, at 50 n. 40 (1947), citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (E.D.Okla.1938), 24 F.Supp. 961. Generally, once a court has acquired jurisdiction, no subsequent error or irregularity will oust the jurisdiction thus acquired. Accordingly, a court may not lose jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in determining either the facts, the law or both. (22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 176 (1989).) However, a judgment or decree may be void where a court has exceeded its jurisdiction. Armstrong v. Obucino (1921), 300 Ill. 140, 142-43, 133 N.E. 58; see, e.g., People v. McCarty (1983), 94 Ill.2d 28, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 445 N.E.2d 298; People v. Edge (1950), 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359. Defendant's reasoning, although not expressly articulated, is that because the constitution prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense, the improper conviction on the lesser offense, coupled with the conviction on the greater offense, exceeds constitutional authority. Clearly, the infringement of certain fundamental rights, like due process and equal protection, is constitutionally impermissible. However, although violation of such rights may present a proper subject for an exercise of the court's jurisdiction, the rights do not, themselves, vest a court with subject matter jurisdiction. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 9 (1940) (jurisdiction is subject which relates to power of court and not to rights of parties). Our constitution confers upon the circuit courts a general grant of authority to hear and decide all matters of controversy. Such jurisdiction is not defined by the propriety of the court's judgments. There are many rights belonging to litigants rights which a court may not properly deny, and yet which if denied do not oust the jurisdiction or render the proceedings absolutely null and void. ( Humphries v. District of Columbia (1899), 174 U.S. 190, 194, 19 S.Ct. 637, 639, 43 L.Ed. 944, 945.) Significantly, this court has held that the constitutional right to not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is a personal privilege which may be waived. People v. Scales (1960), 18 Ill.2d 283, 285, 164 N.E.2d 76. In this case, jurisdiction over the defendant, as well as over the subject matter, was proper. The court had authority to enter conviction and sentence on either of the charged offenses (see People v. Donaldson (1982), 91 Ill.2d 164, 170, 61 Ill.Dec. 780, 435 N.E.2d 477; People v. King (1977), 66 Ill.2d 551, 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838), and judgment on both was, merely, error. Nevertheless, the court's erroneous judgment was insufficient to effect divestiture of the court's jurisdiction. The judgment was, therefore, voidable and is not subject to collateral attack. See People v. Stueve (1977), 66 Ill.2d 174, 179, 5 Ill.Dec. 256, 361 N.E.2d 579 (where subject matter and personal jurisdiction proper, judgment on multiple convictions, though improper, not void). In further response to the State's argument that the improper conviction is not properly before this court, defendant contends that trial counsel's failure to challenge the propriety of the conviction on the lesser offense supports his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Barring that claim, defendant urges post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to argue trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The State responds that because defendant failed to raise the improper-conviction issue either at trial, on appeal or in his post-conviction petition, the issue is waived. Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. (Ill. Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 122-3; see also People v. Flores (1992), 153 Ill.2d 264, 274, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078.) Where fundamental fairness so requires, however, strict adherence to the rule of waiver may be avoided. People v. Flores (1992), 153 Ill.2d 264, 274, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078; People v. Hamby (1965), 32 Ill.2d 291, 294, 205 N.E.2d 456, citing People v. Davies (1933), 354 Ill. 168, 188 N.E. 337. In this case, defendant took no appeal from his conviction and sentence. That fact, however, does not bar defendant's ineffective-assistance claims. While a petitioner waives, by failure to appeal, those rights based on mere error in the trial, he is still entitled to assert those constitutional rights which the Act is designed to protect and preserve. People v. Rose (1969), 43 Ill.2d 273, 279, 253 N.E.2d 456. However, an issue is not preserved, for purposes of post-conviction relief, merely by framing it in the context of a constitutional claim. Here, it is the improper conviction which underlies defendant's ineffectiveness claims. The improper conviction was not presented in defendant's post-conviction petition and defendant makes no claim of any impediment to post-conviction counsel's ability to do so. Because the improper conviction, which now forms the basis of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, was not raised below it is waived. Further, in Flores, this court held that post-conviction assistance of counsel is a creation of statute; such assistance is not the assistance of counsel contemplated by the sixth amendment. ( Flores, 153 Ill.2d at 276, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078.) Consequently, defendant may not properly assert a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Finally, defendant asserts that this court has, in the past, noticed improper concurrent sentences as plain error (see People v. Cox (1972), 53 Ill.2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1), and may do so in this case. This court has more recently held that, in post-conviction proceedings, the plain error rule may not be invoked to save procedurally defaulted claims. (See People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill.2d 303, 316-17, 135 Ill.Dec. 780, 544 N.E.2d 276; People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill.2d 367, 377-78, 119 Ill. Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184.) Thus, we may not, as defendant urges, consider the improper conviction on this basis. Further, to the extent that Cox, 53 Ill.2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1, conflicts with Owens and Free, it is overruled. In sum, the defendant's improper conviction on the lesser included offense, which was challenged for the first time on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, constituted a voidable judgment which is not subject to collateral attack. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which was not raised in his post-conviction petition, is waived. Further, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Finally, in the context of post-conviction proceedings, plain error is not available to attack an improper sentence. Thus defendant's improper conviction has not been properly preserved for review. Despite our conclusion that defendant has waived the improper-conviction issue, in the exercise of our supervisory authority, we vacate defendant's conviction on the lesser offense of possession. We do so out of an awareness that the effects of the improper conviction are not confined to this trial and sentence. Defendant may be subject to future prejudice as a result of the improper convictions. In the unfortunate event of a future encounter with the criminal justice system, the improper conviction could likely affect decisions with respect to the setting of bond and sentencing, as well as parole opportunities. This is so regardless of whether an improper sentence has also been imposed. Significantly, the improper conviction appears on defendant's presentence investigation report as well as on the court's record sheet. Because of the prejudicial effect on defendant, we vacate the erroneous conviction and sentence of unlawful possession of cannabis. Further, as we are unable to discern what portion of defendant's sentence impermissibly pertains to the lesser offense, we remand this cause to the trial court for resentencing. Notably, in cases where improper sentences have been imposed on both the lesser and greater offenses, this court has vacated those sentences in the interests of maintaining an orderly administration of justice (see People v. Scott (1969), 43 Ill.2d 135, 251 N.E.2d 190 (post-conviction proceeding)), or to prevent any resulting prejudice in connection with the defendant's application for parole (see People v. Duszkewycz (1963), 27 Ill.2d 257, 189 N.E.2d 299 (direct appeal); People v. Schlenger (1958), 13 Ill.2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 316 (direct appeal)). We are aware that in these cases, the improper-sentence issues appear to have been properly preserved for review. The courts' supporting rationales in vacating the sentences are, nonetheless, applicable here.