Opinion ID: 2069959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Alleged Failure to Raise a Diminished Capacity Defense

Text: Johnson next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a diminished capacity defense. Johnson avers that there was significant evidence that he suffered from mental health and cognitive impairments that prevented him from forming the requisite intent necessary for the commission of first-degree murder. At the PCRA hearing, Johnson presented the testimony of two mental health experts on this point. Dr. Carol Armstrong (Dr. Armstrong), a neuropsychologist, testified that Johnson suffered from right brain hemisphere dysfunction encompassing multiple neurocognitive domains, including memory, perception, and reasoning. Dr. Armstrong opined that these impairments surfaced during the childhood of Johnson and remained through his adolescence. N.T. PCRA, 5/11/01, pages 6-22. Dr. Armstrong testified that Johnson suffered from an impairment in judgment and reasoning that was present at the time of the murder; she further stated that the impairment probably would have been greater because [Johnson] was drinking and taking drugs at the time and was in a complex situation. N.T. PCRA, 5/11/01, page 25. When asked by PCRA counsel for Johnson if these mental problems impaired the ability of Johnson to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, Dr. Armstrong replied that they did because ... they caused him to act without thinking. He has poor control of his mental thoughts. If you put him under stress, inebriate him and give him drugs, he's going to act with even less forethought. Id. at 36. At the PCRA hearing, Johnson also presented the testimony of Dr. Julie B. Kessel (Dr. Kessel), a psychiatrist, who stated that Johnson suffered from depression, organic mental symptom with baseline brain impairments ([p]eople with baseline brain dysfunction tend to have a harder time judging reality, not saying over inadvertently out of touch with reality, but they tend to respond to interpret reality), substance abuse and alcohol dependency, and attention deficit disorder. Id. at 57-60. Dr. Kessel agreed with Dr. Armstrong that Johnson suffered from these impairments at the time of the shooting of Damon and Gregory and that these problems substantially impaired the ability of Johnson to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Id. at 62-64. At the PCRA hearing, when questioned by the Commonwealth, trial counsel [8] testified as follows: Q: Mr. Adams, with regard to the discussion that you had with diminished capacity, did you ever consider a diminished capacity defense? A: No. Q: I believe it was, in fact, your testimony that your client was merely interested in beating the charges; isn't that correct? A: Yes. And heafterwe discussed the plea agreement on a number of occasions, but he would not accept it. He wanted to take his chance and try to beat it. Q: And, in fact, with regard to a diminished capacity defense, isn't it true that you have to admit your culpability in your defense and merely show that he didn't have the specific intent to commit first degree murder; is that correct? A: I think that is a fair statement. Id. at 156-157. Attorney Miller testified consistently, stating that the case in chief during the guilt phase was that [Johnson] was a follower and that [Bridges] was acting in retaliation for what happened to [his girlfriend], that being the robbery by the Bankses .... After all, we said Bridges shot [Johnson]. Id. at 185. We have held that [a] defense of diminished capacity is only available to a defendant who admits criminal liability but contests the degree of guilt. Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 353 (1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Weaver, 500 Pa. 439, 457 A.2d 505 (1983)). In Weaver, counsel for Weaver had presented, without the consent of Weaver, a diminished capacity defense, even though Weaver insisted that someone else had committed the murder for which he was on trial. A jury convicted Weaver of first-degree murder and related crimes and the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County sentenced Weaver to life imprisonment. Weaver filed a direct appeal to this Court. [9] We determined that counsel for Weaver presented the only viable defense but, nonetheless, we vacated the Judgment of Sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County, finding that the authority to present a defense of diminished capacity, thereby conceding general criminal liability, is solely within the province of the accused. Weaver, 457 A.2d at 506. [C]ounsel's strategic decision to seek acquittal rather than pursue a diminished capacity defense does not constitute ineffective assistance if there is a reasonable basis for the strategy chosen. Commonwealth v. James Jones, 539 Pa. 222, 651 A.2d 1101, 1109 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 835, 116 S.Ct. 113, 133 L.Ed.2d 65 (1995). Johnson maintained throughout the trial that Bridges, not he, had shot Damon and Gregory; Johnson even contended that Bridges had shot Johnson. Absent an admission from Johnson that he had been the one to shoot Damon and Gregory, trial counsel could not have presented a diminished capacity defense. Thus, we cannot say that trial counsel did not have a reasonable strategic basis for rejecting such a tactic. Consequently, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present diminished capacity evidence. See Commonwealth v. Paolello, 542 Pa. 47, 665 A.2d 439, 454 (1995) (where the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed effective).