Opinion ID: 75672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Facial Challenge Based on Overbreadth

Text: 60 In addition, the Supreme Court itself in Salerno acknowledged an exception to the unconstitutional-in-every-conceivable-application rule in cases involving the overbreadth doctrine in the limited context of the First Amendment. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984)); see also Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 (describing overbreadth and vagueness as two different doctrines under which imprecise laws can be challenged). In such cases, facial challenges may be successful though its application in the case under consideration may be constitutionally unobjectionable. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992). The reason for this exception lies in the fact that the very existence of some broadly written laws has the potential to chill the expressive activity of others not before the court. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has permitted facial challenges based on overbreadth where every application creates an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas, such as an ordinance that delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker, and in cases where the ordinance sweeps too broadly, penalizing a substantial amount of speech that is constitutionally protected. Id. at 129-30, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (citations omitted). This exception, however, has generally been applied only to prior restraints on speech such as before-the-fact permitting and licensing regimes. See Frandsen, 212 F.3d at 1236 (recognizing exception to general rule of Salerno for facial challenges to prior restraints on speech and listing Eleventh Circuit cases applying the exception in permitting and licensing regimes). 61 Horton's challenge does not qualify under the specialized exception for prior restraints on speech because it does not involve a permitting or licensing scheme or other prior review but instead an after-the-fact enforcement. Id. at 1236-37 (defining prior restraint as when the government can deny access to a forum for expression before the expression occurs) (emphasis added) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)). 13 62 Even if it did fall within a Salerno exception, Section 22-9, as originally enacted and as amended, is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. A legislative enactment may be constitutionally overbroad when lawmakers define the scope of a statute to reach both unprotected expression as well as, at least potentially, protected speech. Ward v. County of Orange, 217 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation and citation omitted). But a law is considered facially invalid on this basis only when it is substantially overbroad, that is, its application would be unconstitutional in a substantial proportion of cases. Id. It is not, however, a common judicial remedy. In considering the overbreadth doctrine, we remain mindful its application is strong medicine, and has been employed by the [Supreme] Court sparingly and only as a last resort. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)). [W]here conduct and not merely speech is involved . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615) (emphasis added). 14 63 Here, Section 22-9's language, under both the original and amended version, is not substantially overbroad. The law specifies a limited area in which distinct types of expression and physical conduct not all speech may not take place, such as acting and singing as well as the sale of visual art and wares. This is a step the City may legitimately take in pursuit of its aforementioned interests, and one that does not impinge to a great degree on one's freedom of speech which remains largely untrammeled on St. George Street. Thus, when judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep, protected expression condemned by the application of Section 22-9 is insubstantial. 15 Any protected expression harmed by Section 22-9 can be remedied independent of a facial challenge. See United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 569 (11th Cir. 1995) (If a conduct-regulating statute reflects legitimate governmental interests and is not substantially overbroad, whatever overbreadth does exist should be cured on a case-by-case basis.) (citation omitted). 16 64