Opinion ID: 782174
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of AEDPA Statute of Limitations

Text: 11 AEDPA's provisions apply to this case because Jenkins' petition was filed after the Act's April 24, 1996 effective date. Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1116 n. 5 (9th Cir.2000). AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitation on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). State prisoners like Jenkins, whose convictions became final prior to April 24, 1996, have a one-year grace period in which to file their petitions. Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). The grace period, however, is tolled statutorily during any time in which a properly filed application for post-conviction relief is pending before the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). 12 Jenkins contends that he is entitled to statutory tolling sufficient to render his § 2254 petition timely. In the alternative, he maintains that any period during which the limitation period was not statutorily tolled should nonetheless be equitably tolled. The state counters that Jenkins' fourth amended state petition was neither properly filed nor pending within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and that Jenkins is not entitled to tolling. 13
14 In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a petition for state post-conviction relief containing claims that were procedurally barred under state law could ever be considered properly filed within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Court concluded that such a claim could be considered properly filed under certain circumstances. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that an application is not properly filed unless it complies with all mandatory procedural requirements that would bar review of the merits of the petition. Bennett, 531 U.S. at 8, 121 S.Ct. 361. 15 Bennett noted that a petition is technically filed when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record. Id. The court determined that such a petition is properly filed for § 2244(d)(2) purposes: 16 when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee. 17 Id. The Court expressly distinguished between statutes that place a condition on filing, as opposed to statutes that impose a condition to obtaining relief. Id. at 11, 121 S.Ct. 361. As the Court noted, the question whether an application has been `properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious and free of procedural bar. Id. at 9, 121 S.Ct. 361 (emphasis in original). 18 Although the Bennett Court clarified that the § 2244(d)(2) inquiry should center on whether any state procedural bar aims specifically at preventing a petition's filing, the Court explicitly expressed no view on the question of whether the existence of certain exceptions to a timely filing requirement can prevent a late application from being considered improperly filed. Id. at 9 n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 361. 19 Following the Court's decision in Bennett, this court withdrew Dictado I and replaced it with Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724 (9th Cir.2001) ( Dictado II ). In Dictado II, a case not unlike this one, we considered the timely filing question that the Court declined to reach in Bennett: whether a petition could be considered properly filed when it had been dismissed by the state supreme court as both untimely and repetitive. We looked to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Smith v. Ward, 209 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.2000), which held that a time limitation is not a filing requirement as long as it contains exceptions. According to Smith, if a statute requires the state court to look at the petition to consider whether certain exceptions might apply, then it is not an absolute bar to filing, but merely a limitation on a court's ability to grant relief. Id. at 385. 20 Dictado II followed Smith. We held that if a state's rule governing timely commencement of post-conviction relief proceedings contains exceptions that require the state courts to examine the merits of the petition before dismissing, the petition, even if it is ultimately found to be untimely, should be regarded as properly filed since the state statute does not impose an absolute bar to filing. Dictado II, 244 F.3d at 727-28. 21 Applying the rule in Dictado II, we determined that Washington state statutes governing successive petitions imposed a condition to obtaining relief under Bennett, rather than a condition to filing. Id. at 727. We based our conclusion on the fact that the statute disfavors successive petitions, but allows a state court to consider a successive petition under certain circumstances. Id. Because Washington's statute included an escape clause permitting successive petitions upon a showing of good cause, we concluded that the successive petition bar simply prescribes a rule of decision. Id. 3 22 In its motion to dismiss Jenkins' fourth amended petition for post-conviction relief, the state argued that the petition was barred under Oregon's statutes governing both timeliness and successive petitions. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without identifying the basis for its ruling. Consistent with Bennett and Dictado II, we must determine whether Oregon's statute governing the timeliness of post-conviction petition filings imposes a condition to filing. The relevant portions of ORS § 138.510 in effect at the time Jenkins filed his petition read: 23 (2) A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 [Oregon's Post-Conviction Hearing Act] must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition: 24 (a) If no appeal is taken, the date the judgment or order on the conviction was entered in the register. 25 (b) If an appeal is taken, the date the appeal is final in the Oregon appellate courts. 26 (3) A one-year filing period shall apply retroactively to petitions filed by persons whose convictions and appeals became final before August 5, 1989, and any such petitions must be filed within one year after November 4, 1993. A person whose post-conviction petition was dismissed prior to November 4, 1993, cannot file another post-conviction petition involving the same case. 27 Jenkins' conviction became final in 1981. 4 The plain language of subsection (3), which contains no escape clause or list of exceptions, seems to suggest that Jenkins' fourth amended petition, filed in 1996, was untimely; under Dictado II, then, it would not have been properly filed for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Jenkins, however, points to subsection (2) of ORS § 138.510, which contains an escape clause for cases in which a court finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. Because this escape clause would require a court to assess the merits of a petitioner's claim before dismissing a petition for untimeliness, under Dictado II, ORS § 138.510(2) does not impose a condition to filing. Accordingly, a petition subsequently dismissed pursuant to that section is nonetheless to be considered properly filed within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 28 The state counters that the statute's terms make clear that Jenkins falls under ORS § 138.510(3), rather than subsection (2). Jenkins, however, argues that, prior to the Oregon Court of Appeals' decision in Wallis v. Baldwin, 152 Or.App. 295, 954 P.2d 192 (1998), (Or. App.), review denied, 327 Or. 174, 966 P.2d 218 (1998), it was not clear (Or. 1998), that the escape clause contained in subsection (2) did not also apply to subsection (3). In Wallis, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered a state constitutional challenge to ORS § 138.510(3). The plaintiff in that case argued that the limitation period imposed under subsection (3) was unreasonably short under a previous decision, Bartz v. State, 314 Or. 353, 839 P.2d 217 (Or. 1992). Bartz considered an earlier version of the statute, which imposed a 120-day limit on post-conviction relief filings but also included the exception present in the current statute where a court finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. Id. at 219. The Bartz court concluded: 29 [t]he 120-day limit, when combined with the exception, provides a reasonable opportunity to seek post-conviction relief. We do not hold that any time limit, no matter how short, would be permissible in this context, but we do hold that the 120-day period of limitation in ORS 138.510(2), which incorporates an exception in certain circumstances, does not prevent the available procedure from being reasonable for persons who seek redress. 30 Id. at 225 (emphasis in original). 31 The plaintiff in Wallis read Bartz to say that a statutory limitation period was unconstitutional unless it provided an escape clause allowing later petitions on a showing of good cause. Wallis, 954 P.2d at 193-94. Seeking to avoid a finding that the lack of such an escape clause in ORS § 138.510(3) rendered the subsection unconstitutional, 5 the state itself argued in Wallis that the escape clause contained in subsection (2) was implicitly incorporated into subsection (3), making the subsection reasonable under Bartz. Id. at 195 n. 1. 32 Although the Wallis court rejected the state's claim that the escape clause contained in subsection (2) applied to petitions governed by subsection (3) and concluded that the absence of the escape clause to the one-year limitation period in subsection (3) was not fatal, id. at 195, the fact that the court did not make this clear until 1998 — two years after the state post-conviction court dismissed Jenkins' petition — coupled with the fact that the state itself believed that the subsection (2) escape clause applied to petitions filed pursuant to subsection (3) supports Jenkins' claim that there was no absolute bar on filings like his in 1996. 33 After Wallis it is now clear that subsection (3) would apply to Jenkins without the benefit of the subsection (2) escape clause, and under Bennett and Dictado II, subsection (3), as understood post- Wallis, therefore imposes a bar to filing whose violation would render a petition improperly filed for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) purposes. In light of the state's own apparent confusion in Wallis, however, we hold that the inapplicability of the escape clause was not Oregon law at the time of Jenkins' filing. Cf. Martinez v. Klauser, 266 F.3d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir.2001) (Idaho state court's dismissal of habeas petition as untimely not adequate basis to bar federal review where prior state authority does not support the decision and later authority indicates that the decision may have been contrary to state law). 34 We now turn to Oregon's successive petition statute, ORS § 138.550(3). As explained above, the state post-conviction court did not indicate the grounds upon which it based its dismissal of Jenkins' claim. Because the state argued that the petition was barred as both untimely and successive, the successive petition bar could apply even though the untimeliness bar fails. 35 ORS § 138.550(3) provides, in relevant part: 36 All grounds for relief claimed by petitioner in a petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be asserted in the original or amended petition, and any grounds not so asserted are deemed waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. 37 (Emphasis added.) The statute includes an exception requiring a court to consider whether a petition asserts permissible grounds for relief before the court dismisses on procedural grounds. Thus, under Bennett and Dictado II, ORS § 138.550(3) does not impose an absolute bar to filing, and a petition subsequently dismissed as successive under that statute is nonetheless properly filed for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) purposes. 38 Therefore, because ORS § 138.510(3) was not an adequate state ground of decision for procedural bar purposes prior to Wallis, and because ORS § 138.550(3) does not impose an absolute bar to filing but instead only a condition to obtaining relief, Jenkins' fourth amended petition was properly filed. The next step of the analysis is to determine whether that petition was pending for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) purposes for a sufficient period to render Jenkins' federal petition timely. 39
40 The state contends that Jenkins' state post-conviction petition was not pending within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for a sufficient period to render his federal petition timely under AEDPA. This issue was raised but not reached in the district court. 41 In Nino, the court concluded that AEDPA's statute of limitations must be tolled during all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application. 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court determined that a sensible construction of AEDPA demanded that a broad construction [be] given the word `pending.' Id. at 1005. Nino made clear that a petition could be considered to have been pending even if the courts ultimately declined to consider its merits. Id.; see also Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir.2001) (as amended) (holding that AEDPA's period of limitation is tolled during the pendency of a state application challenging the pertinent judgment, even if the particular application does not include a claim later asserted in the federal habeas petition.). Nino's broad interpretation of pending allows the state courts to have the unfettered first opportunity to review the prisoner's claim and to provide any necessary relief.... Tolling AEDPA's statute of limitations until the state has fully completed its review reinforces comity and respect between our respective judicial systems. 183 F.3d at 1007. 42 The Supreme Court recently underscored the importance of permitting states the fullest opportunity to consider a petition for post-conviction relief before requiring that a petitioner take his case to federal court. In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002), the Supreme Court held that a petition is pending during the period between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal in a higher state court. Id. at 217, 122 S.Ct. 2134. The Saffold Court reiterated earlier holdings that a habeas petitioner must  `invok[e] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process' in the interest of promoting  `comity, finality, and federalism.' Id. at 220, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d (1999) and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 436 (2000)). AEDPA intends that state courts receive the first opportunity to review [the] claim, and to correct any constitutional violation in the first instance. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, a petitioner may not file for relief in federal court until he has exhausted his state remedies; according to the Supreme Court, exhaustion has not occurred as long as the petitioner retains the right under the law of the State to raise ... by any available procedure, the question presented. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 43 Saffold therefore requires that we answer a threshold question: Was a procedure available to Jenkins? Here, the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court considered Jenkins' motion to file a delayed appeal pursuant to ORS § 138.071(4). 6 As recounted above, Jenkins did not receive notice of the state post-conviction court's September 9, 1996, dismissal of his petition until January 28, 1997, some four and a half months after it was filed. ORS § 138.071(1) requires that a notice of appeal be served within thirty days after judgment is entered. Therefore, Jenkins' notice of appeal would have been due on October 9, 1996. However, ORS § 138.071(4) provides, in relevant part: 44 (4)(a) Upon motion of a defendant, the Court of Appeals shall grant the defendant leave to file a notice of appeal after the time limits described in subsections (1) to (3) of this section if: 45 (A) The defendant, by clear and convincing evidence, shows that the failure to file a timely notice of appeal is not attributable to the defendant personally; and 46 (B) The defendant shows a colorable claim of error in the proceeding from which the appeal is taken. 47 . . . 48 (c) The request for leave to file a notice of appeal after the time limits prescribed in subsections (1) to (3) of this section shall be filed no later than 90 days after entry of the order or judgment being appealed and shall be accompanied by the notice of appeal sought to be filed[.] 49 . . . 50 (e) The denial of a motion under paragraph (a) shall be a bar to post-conviction relief under ORS 138.510 to 138.680 on the same ground, unless the court provides otherwise. 51 Because Jenkins did not receive notice of the state post-conviction court's entry of judgment until more than ninety days after it had occurred, he could not possibly have complied with ORS § 138.071(4)(c), the section upon which the Oregon Court of Appeals based its dismissal. His argument to the Court of Appeals was essentially one for equitable tolling: He argued that equity requires that the statute of limitations not be mechanically applied where the state courts themselves forced a late filing by their own failure to follow mandatory procedures — in this case, sending Jenkins notice that the state court had dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. 52 The question, then, is whether or not Jenkins' equitable request for permission to file a late notice of appeal invoked a procedure available to him in light of the requirement that we broadly interpret when a petition might be pending for purposes of statutory tolling. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1005-06 (favoring a permissive reading of pending where [a] contrary construction would be antithetical to the entire theory of state remedy exhaustion and would inevitably lead to the filing of protective federal petitions because construing the tolling statute broadly reinforces the orderly presentation of claims to the appropriate state tribunals and obviates the need for federal action prompted by AEDPA's statute of limitations.). Nino implicitly held that we should defer, when possible, to a state court's own determination of whether a petition is pending. Saffold reinforces this approach. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (If the California Supreme Court had clearly ruled that Saffold's 4-month delay was `unreasonable,' that would be the end of the matter ...). 53 The record shows that Jenkins — placed in a very difficult position due to the state post-conviction court's failure to timely notify him of the decision in his case — made a reasoned argument to the Oregon Court of Appeals that the statute of limitations imposed in subsection (c) was not mandatory but permissive, and that the court should exercise its discretion to permit his late notice because his delay was entirely out of his control. The fact that the Oregon Court of Appeals ultimately disagreed with Jenkins' argument — whether because it determined that the requirement was, in fact, mandatory or because it rejected his equitable claim on the merits is unclear — does not in and of itself demonstrate that Jenkins was not using available state court procedures properly when he filed his petition. 54 However, the district court never made any findings of fact on the issue of whether the state courts deemed Jenkins' petition untimely. It simply never reached the issue. Although we conclude that Jenkins' petition was properly filed, we remand, as requested by the petitioner, for the district court to determine whether it was pending and whether tolling applies. On remand, Jenkins may advance his claims and develop the record as to whether equitable tolling applies even if statutory tolling may not. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a habeas petition is available if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). From the record before us, it appears that Jenkins pursued his state remedies as expeditiously as practically possible, filing a motion on the very day he learned of the judgment. The failure to notify Jenkins of the judgment in a timely manner was certainly out of his control. Moreover, had he not persisted with his state court appeal, and simply proceeded to file a federal habeas petition, he ran the distinct risk that the federal petition would be dismissed for failure to exhaust his claims in the state courts. 55 Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 56 VACATED AND REMANDED.