Opinion ID: 2684154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Inappropriate Statements in Rebuttal

Text: There is no question that the prosecutor in this case improperly used his own personal credibility, and therefore that of -6- the government, to vouch for the prosecution's investigation and witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1999). This case marks at least the third time in the past three years that we have noted in a published opinion improper vouching by a prosecutor. See United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Gomes, 642 F.3d 43, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2011). In this instance, the prosecutor in effect testified that he ran the investigation, and that any flaws in it were therefore not probative on the question of the witnesses' credibility. In other words, he employed his own standing and credibility to buttress the one part of his case upon which the defense focused its attack. Quite simply, the experienced prosecutor likely knew better, as his apology and partially-corrective retraction implied.2 Nevertheless, the prosecutor's error caused no harm justifying setting aside the verdict. As the transcript reflects, the district judge sustained an objection to the statements, and Rojas requested no additional relief. Even on appeal, Rojas fails to describe specifically what the judge should have done differently. Rojas does not argue, for example, that the judge should have declared a mistrial based on the statements. Perhaps the judge should have instructed the jury to disregard the 2 He did not retract the actual thrust of the improper remarks, i.e., the suggestion that he, not the witnesses, was responsible for any flaws in the investigation. -7- statements, although Rojas asked for no such instruction. The judge did offer the following general instructions prior to deliberations, the first of which was also given at the beginning of trial: • The evidence that is properly before you does not . . . include comments or statements or arguments by attorneys. • [T]he mere fact that this case is brought in the name of the United States of America does not entitle the prosecution to any greater consideration than that which is accorded to Mr. Rojas. We have held that instructions of this kind can help eliminate any prejudice arising from improper vouching. See United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 (1st Cir. 1987). Rojas does say vaguely that the judge should have, as a result of both of the prosecutorial errors at issue on this appeal, given a stern rebuke and applied repressive measures, quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935). But Berger can be easily distinguished based on the more frequent and severe prosecutorial misconduct there, including misstating the facts in his cross-examination of witnesses, pretending to understand that a witness had said something which he had not said and persistently cross-examining the witness upon that basis, assuming prejudicial facts not in evidence, bullying and arguing with witnesses, and generally conducting himself in a thoroughly indecorous and improper manner. Id. at 84. The less egregious misconduct here, -8- while warranting a rebuke, did not mandate that one be given sua sponte. In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that the judge erred by failing to give a stronger rebuke or instruction, Rojas's challenge would fail under the plain error standard, which applies here because Rojas did not request at trial the relief he now says he should have received. See United States v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Kasenge, 660 F.3d 537, 541-42 (1st Cir. 2011). To prevail under this standard, Rojas would have to show, among other things, that the error affected his substantial rights. Mitchell, 596 F.3d at 25. Although Rojas made an attack on Chau's credibility the cornerstone of his defense, and the prosecutor's statements sought to buttress Chau's credibility, the jury had no actual reason to doubt Chau. More importantly, the audio and video tapes and physical evidence rendered attacks on Chau's credibility largely tangential and speculative. The fact that Chau did not record all of his interactions with Rojas would not create doubt about Chau's testimony unless there was some independent reason to question him. And the fact that Chau's car was not searched for drugs before he met with Rojas would only be of significance if it was plausible to believe that Chau repeatedly obtained and turned over to the government the consequential amounts of cocaine involved, while Rojas supplied only fake product. We cannot imagine that the jury -9- would have accepted the defense's attacks on Chau's credibility if only the judge had given a stronger instruction about the prosecutor's statements.