Opinion ID: 2083453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Effectiveness of Counsel During Sentencing Phase

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of trial. We observe that defendant's claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his capital sentencing hearing are also governed by the Strickland standard. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill.2d 248, 274, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 533 N.E.2d 1089 (1989). This standard requires the defendant to show (1) that his attorney's performance at the sentencing hearing did not constitute reasonably effective assistance, judged by prevailing professional norms ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694), and (2) there is reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant death ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069). 80 L.Ed.2d at 698). Defendant makes several assertions in support of his ineffectiveness claim and essentially argues that his trial counsel (1) failed to argue defendant lacked the capacity to waive his right to a jury for sentencing; (2) was per se ineffective because he represented defendant alone and developed no mitigation strategy; (3) failed to investigate and present available mitigating evidence of defendant's mental impairments; (4) failed to discover specific evidence that defendant suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance; and (5) failed to discover other key mitigating evidence.