Opinion ID: 2678967
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Promise

Text: Brown asserts that he raised a triable issue of fact regarding promised compensation through evidence that (1) Laub promised to ‚search the budget‛ for money to pay him, J.A. 620; and (2) Jerome informed him and others that Banana Kelly was applying for a grant that could be used, among other things, to fund a stipend for interns. Like the district court, we conclude that these facts cannot admit a genuine dispute as to promised compensation. Because the regulations do not define the term ‚promise‛ as used in § 553.101(a), we assume that the word bears its ordinary meaning: ‚a declaration that one will do or refrain from doing something specified.‛ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1815 (1986); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1332 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ‚promise‛ as ‚[t]he manifestation of an intention to act or 22 refrain from acting in a specified manner, conveyed in such a way that another is justified in understanding that a commitment has been made; a person’s assurance that the person will or will not do something‛). To the extent the statements cited by Brown made declarations or commitments sufficient to be deemed a ‚promise,‛ that promise was not to pay Brown, but only to search the budget or to apply for a grant that might make payment possible. In short, before the outcome of the search was known or the grant received, no person would be justified in understanding that defendants had made a commitment to pay Brown.