Opinion ID: 525561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard for Deciding a Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Text: 21 In general, the district court may grant a preliminary injunction if the moving party establishes (1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party. See, e.g., Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir.1982); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam). We have held, however, that where the moving party seeks to stay governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the district court should not apply the less rigorous fair-ground-for-litigation standard and should not grant the injunction unless the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of his claim. See, e.g., Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 1014, 1018 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1698, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981); Medical Society of the State of New York v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir.1977). In the latter case, brought by physicians, patients, and a medical society challenging certain Medicaid regulations, we reversed the order of the district court which had granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the regulations using the fair-ground-for-litigation branch of the test. We stated that where the grant of interim relief may adversely affect the public interest in a manner which cannot be compensated for by an injunction bond, the moving party must satisfy the more stringent part of the test by establish[ing] a probability of success on the merits. Id. 22 In the present case, it is plain that DSS acts in pursuit of the public interest and in accordance with the regulatory scheme by suspending a provider from Medicaid participation when there is probable cause to believe that the provider has dumped hazardous medical wastes from its laboratories into public waters. We conclude that the district court properly rejected Plaza's request that it use the less rigorous fair-ground-for-litigation test. 23