Opinion ID: 1908093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether a sentence of thirty years, eighteen years to serve, twelve years suspended, with five years of post-release supervision amounts to a life sentence.

Text: As a general rule, when sentences are within the limits of the statute, the imposition of such sentences is within the sound discretion of the trial court and this Court will not reverse them. . . . Likewise, we have held that providing punishment for crime is a function of the legislature, and, unless the punishment specified by statute constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, it will not be disturbed by the judiciary. Presley v. State, 474 So.2d 612, 620 (Miss.1985). We review sentences in light of the factors articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), only when a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. Nichols v. State, 826 So.2d 1288, 1290 (Miss.2002). Generally, sentences that do not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute will not be considered grossly disproportionate and will not be disturbed on appeal. Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 302-03 (Miss.1992). Mingo, 944 So.2d at 34. ¶ 23. Johnson asserts his rights under Article 3, sections 14, 26 and 28 of the Mississippi Constitution and under the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution have been violated by his sentence. Johnson argues that the eighteen years to serve provision of his sentence is tantamount to a life sentence, considering he is only twenty years of age. Johnson further argues the sentence subjects him to overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and makes him a victim of physical crimes, and therefore, is cruel and inhuman[e]. ¶ 24. Johnson was convicted for the sale of cocaine under Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139 and received the maximum sentence of thirty years, albeit twelve years were suspended, and the trial judge did not follow the State's recommendation to enhance the sentence an additional thirty years. We have never found a maximum penalty in a drug case  even if the sentences were to run consecutively-to be cruel and unusual punishment. Braxton v. State, 797 So.2d 826, 829 (Miss.2000) (quoting Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 958 (Miss.1997)). Furthermore, [i]t is the prerogative of the Legislature to determine the appropriate sentence for crimes and Johnson's sentence comes within the purview of the statute. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 950-51 (Miss.1997). ¶ 25. The sentence imposed by the trial court was within the statutory limitation and was within the sound discretion of the learned trial judge. Further, this Court has previously determined it is the Legislature's function to determine punishment and, [w]e have said that thirty years is not cruel and unusual punishment for drug charges, i.e., not violative of the United States or Mississippi Constitution. Bell v. State, 797 So.2d 945, 950-51 (Miss.2001); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Accordingly, this issue brought by Johnson has no merit.