Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of motion to modify judgment

Text: During consideration of the automatic motion to modify the judgment pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e), the trial court reviewed the evidence pertinent to section 190.3, factor (a) (the circumstances of the offenses). The court noted the advanced age of the victims, that William was partially handicapped, that the victims were rendered defenseless, the brutality of the victims' chest wounds, the multiple wounds (some clearly nonfatal) inflicted upon the victims' heads and faces, the nature of the nonfatal wounds inflicted on William's jaw and mouth, the needless infliction of pain upon Katherine through wounds to the lip and stomach, the indignity caused by the removal of Katherine's underclothing if that occurred prior to her death (or the depravity of that act if occurring after her death), the planning engaged in by defendant in transporting to the scene and using a slaughtering knife to inflict injury, the stabbing torture of William, the sophistication of the offenses (evidenced by defendant's having brought from his own home a pillowcase used to bind the victims, as well as his care in not leaving evidence of his presence), the circumstance that defendant was motivated by financial gain, the callousness of the offenses, defendant's repeated attempts at escape, and the kidnapping of Kronen. In the course of this recitation of factors, the trial court stated: Eleven. Lack of remorse. The defendant wrote on both bathrooms the epitaph for William and Katherine Chiapella that the horror visited on the Chiapella household was `just the beginning.' This statement was not used to show any future dangerous tendencies nor is it considered as such here. Also, although lack of remorse is not an aggravating factor in the scheme of aggravating and mitigating factors, it is a circumstance of the crime which may be properly considered bearing on the issue of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. [¶] Additionally, the defendant conducted himself as his happy, normal self within minutes of the killings. He went with his girlfriend for a walk, then to dinner, talked happily about the future, and went to the movies. His conduct was such that a total lack of conscience on the defendant's part is demonstrated. That he held the victims in contempt is exhibited by the use of Mrs. Chiapella as an object of lurid and obscene fabrications. (34a) Defendant contends the trial court's use of defendant's post-offense conduct, defendant's total lack of conscience, and defendant's lurid and obscene fabrications involving Katherine was impermissible under the rule expressed in People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776, that evidence in aggravation bearing upon a nonstatutory matter may not be considered, and also was impermissible under the holding set forth in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290, that the absence of a mitigating factor may not be considered a factor in aggravation. (35) Pursuant to section 190.4, in ruling upon an application for modification of a verdict imposing the death penalty, the trial court must reweigh independently the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then determine whether, in its independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdict. (§ 190.4, subd. (e); People v. Diaz (1993) 3 Cal.4th 495, 571 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 846 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1045 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].) The trial court must consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in section 190.3. (34b) As indicated in the discussion above, lack of remorse, because it suggests the absence of a mitigating factor, is deemed a relevant factor in the jury's determination as to whether the factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation, and is thus an appropriate subject of comment by the prosecutor, so long as he or she does not argue that lack of remorse constitutes a factor in aggravation. Because a trial court, in ruling upon a motion for modification of a death verdict, is charged with reviewing that determination in light of the same aggravating and mitigating factors that guided the jury, no error was committed by the trial court in giving proper consideration to defendant's lack of remorse. (See People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 943-944 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].) [17] In the present case, it is clear from the trial court's comments that it understood lack of remorse could not be considered as a factor in aggravation. Contrary to defendant's argument, the circumstance that the court, in evaluating the circumstances of the offenses, discussed the post-offense behavior of defendant that was indicative of a lack of remorse, does not suggest the trial court actually employed defendant's lack of remorse as a circumstance in aggravation. The behavior noted by the court occurred either immediately following the offenses or within a few days of their commission, and the court's consideration of that behavior logically followed its consideration of the nature of the offenses. The trial court did not err, in the course of its review of the circumstances of the offenses, in reflecting briefly upon evidence relevant to the absence of a mitigating factor.
(36) Defendant contends the trial court improperly considered the probation report in ruling upon the application for modification of the verdict of death. We previously have held that, in ruling upon an automatic motion for modification of the penalty, the trial court may consider only the evidence before the jury, and that therefore it is error to consider the probation report, a matter not before the jury. ( People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1038; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 665 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80]; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 866 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].) Nonetheless, in the event the trial court has considered the report, we assume the court was not improperly influenced thereby, absent evidence in the record to the contrary. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1106 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40]; People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1038-1039; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th 792, 866; see People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 337 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710]; cf. People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892].) The record in the present case reveals that the trial court reviewed the factors in aggravation and mitigation and then denied the automatic motion for modification. The court thereafter proceeded to sentence defendant. Immediately prior to sentencing, the court noted that it had considered the probation reports for both the murder and the kidnapping offenses. Because there was no recess between the proceedings at which the trial court considered the motion to modify and the proceedings at which it imposed sentence, it appears that at the time it reviewed and ruled upon the application for modification of the penalty the court already had read and considered the probation report. That circumstance did not result in any prejudice to defendant, however. The court did not allude to the probation report during its review and determination of the motion to modify the death verdict. The court reviewed each of the potentially aggravating and mitigating factors, and in determining the nature of, and weight attributable to, each factor, articulated detailed reasons based upon the evidence presented during the trial. Our review discloses that the court made its determination in reliance upon the evidence submitted at trial, placing great weight upon the circumstances of the crime. ( People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1038.) There is no reasonable possibility that the court's apparent error in considering the probation report affected its decision. ( People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th 610, 666-667; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th 792, 866-867; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1238.) Nor do we detect any federal constitutional error that would justify remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the motion.