Opinion ID: 2600567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mauro's Assertedly Protected Conduct Was Criminal Extortion as a Matter of Law and Was Undeserving of the Protection of the Anti-SLAPP Statute.

Text: Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 is de novo. ( Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056, 18 Cal. Rptr.3d 882.) We consider `the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits upon which the liability or defense is based.' (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) However, we neither `weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, ... [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant's evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.' ( HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal. App.4th 204, 212, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 786.) ( Soukup v. Hafif, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___, fn. 3, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 645, 139 P.3d at p. 36, fn. 3.)
Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... induced by a wrongful use of force or fear.... (Pen.Code, § 518.) Fear, for purposes of extortion may be induced by a threat, either: [¶] ... [¶] 2. To accuse the individual threatened ... of any crime; or, [¶] 3. To expose, or impute to him . . . any deformity, disgrace or crime[.] (Pen.Code, § 519.) Every person who, with intent to extort any money or other property from another, sends or delivers to any person any letter or other writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat such as is specified in Section 519, is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were actually obtained by means of such threat. (Pen.Code, § 523.) Extortion has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of themselves, may not be illegal. [I]n many blackmail cases the threat is to do something in itself perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a demand for money. ( Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1079, 267 Cal.Rptr. 457.) [13] The extortion statutes all adopted at the same time and relating to the same subject matter, clearly indicate that the legislature in denouncing the wrongful use of fear as a means of obtaining property from another had in mind threats to do the acts specified in section 519, the making of which for the purpose stated is declared to be a wrongful use of fear induced thereby. ( People v. Beggs (1918) 178 Cal. 79, 83, 172 P. 152.) It is the means employed [to obtain the property of another] which the law denounces, and though the purpose may be to collect a just indebtedness arising from and created by the criminal act for which the threat is to prosecute the wrongdoer, it is nevertheless within the statutory inhibition. The law does not contemplate the use of criminal process as a means of collecting a debt. ( Id. at p. 84, 172 P. 152; People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 955, 987 P.2d 168 [In Beggs we explained that because of the strong public policy militating against self-help by force or fear, courts will not recognize a good faith defense to the satisfaction of a debt when accomplished by the use of force or fear]; Lindenbaum v. State Bar (1945) 26 Cal.2d 565, 573, 160 P.2d 9 [For purposes of extortion [i]t is immaterial that the money which petitioner sought to obtain through threats may have been justly due him]; Gomez v. Garcia (9th Cir.1996) 81 F.3d 95, 97 [The law of California was established in 1918 that belief that the victim owes a debt is not a defense to the crime of extortion].) Moreover, threats to do the acts that constitute extortion under Penal Code section 519 are extortionate whether or not the victim committed the crime or indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or arrested the victim. ( People v. Sanders (1922) 188 Cal. 744, 756, 207 P. 380; People v. Goldstein (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 581, 587, 191 P.2d 102; People v. Hesslink (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 787, 213 Cal.Rptr. 465.) Furthermore, the crime with which the extortionist threatens his or her victim need not be a specific crime. [T]he accusations need only be such as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime. The more vague and general the terms of the accusation the better it would subserve the purpose of the accuser in magnifying the fears of his victim, and the better also it would serve to protect him in the event of the failure to accomplish his extortion and of a prosecution for his attempted crime. ( People v. Sanders, supra, at pp. 749-750, 207 P. 380; People v. Massengale (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 758, 764-765, 68 Cal.Rptr. 415.) Attorneys are not exempt from these principles in their professional conduct. Indeed, the rules of professional conduct specifically prohibit attorneys from threaten[ing] to present criminal, administration, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute. (Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 5-100(A).) [14] In Libarian v. State Bar (1952) 38 Cal.2d 328, 239 P.2d 865, we upheld disciplinary action against Librarian who, after losing at trial, sent a letter to opposing counsel, accusing his opponent's client of perjury and threatening to use the perjury charge as the basis of a new trial motion and a criminal complaint unless opposing counsel's client paid Librarian's client. Although no action was taken either by Librarian or Siegel to prosecute Nadel, the record clearly shows conduct which is in violation of Librarian's oath and duties as an attorney. The threats contained in the letter indicate an attempt to commit extortion. The sending of a threatening letter with intent to extort money is `punishable in the same manner as if such money ... were actually obtained' (Pen.Code, § 523) and the crime of extortion involves moral turpitude. ( Id. at pp. 329-330, 239 P.2d 865; Barton v. State Bar (1935) 2 Cal.2d 294, 297, 40 P.2d 502 [The conduct of an attorney who threatened an oil company with reporting adulteration of its gasoline to the prosecutor unless it paid his clients was not only grounds for disbarment but constituted an attempt to extort money as said crime is defined in sections 518, 519 and 524 of the Penal Code]; State v. Harrington (1969) 128 Vt. 242, 260 A.2d 692, 699 [attorney's suggestion in letter demanding $175,000 settlement in divorce case that he might advise his client to report husband to Internal Revenue Service and United States Custom Service constituted veiled threats [that] exceeded the limits of respondent's representation of his client in the divorce action and supported attorney's extortion conviction].) As these cases illustrate, a threat that constitutes criminal extortion is not cleansed of its illegality merely because it is laundered by transmission through the offices of an attorney. Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to the instant case.
Extortion is not a constitutionally protected form of speech. ( R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 420, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.) [Although the First Amendment broadly protects `speech,' it does not protect the right to . . . `extort']; United States v. Quinn (5th Cir.1975) 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 [It may categorically be stated that extortionate speech has no more constitutional protection than that uttered by a robber while ordering his victim to hand over the money, which is no protection at all].) The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, of course, is to protect the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) Flatley argues that the letter Mauro sent on behalf of Robertson, and his subsequent telephone calls to Flatley's attorneys, constituted extortion as a matter of law and, therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed Mauro's motion to strike Flatley's action as a SLAPP. ( Paul, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1366-1367, 102 Cal. Rptr.2d 864.) Mauro maintains that his activity on behalf of Robertson amounted to no more than the kind of permissible settlement negotiations that are attendant upon any legal dispute or, at minimum, that a question of fact exists regarding the legality of his conduct precluding a finding that it was illegal as a matter of law. We review the question de novo. ( Soukup v. Hafif, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___, fn. 3, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 645, 139 P.3d at p. 36, fn. 3.) Preliminarily, we note that, in the proceedings below, Mauro did not deny that he sent the letter nor did he contest the version of the telephone calls set forth in Brandon's and Field's declarations in opposition to the motion to strike. We may therefore view this evidence as uncontroverted. (See State v. Harrington, supra, 260 A.2d at p. 699 [The acts which he performed and the words that he wrote are established by direct and documentary evidence that is not contradicted.].) At the core of Mauro's letter are threats to publicly accuse Flatley of rape and to report and publicly accuse him of other unspecified violations of various laws unless he settled by paying a sum of money to Robertson of which Mauro would receive 40 percent. In his follow-up phone calls, Mauro named the price of his and Robertson's silence as seven figures or, at minimum, $1 million. The key passage in Mauro's letter is at page 3 where Flatley is warned that, unless he settles, an in-depth investigation will be conducted into his personal assets to determine punitive damages and this information will then BECOME A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD, AS IT MUST BE FILED WITH THE COURT.... [¶] Any and all information, including Immigration, Social Security Issuances and Use, and IRS and various State Tax Levies and information will be exposed. We are positive the media worldwide will enjoy what they find. This warning is repeated in the fifth paragraph: [A]ll pertinent information and documentation, if in violation of any U.S. Federal, Immigration, I.R.S., S.S. Admin., U.S. State, Local, Commonwealth U.K., or International Laws, shall immediately [be] turned over to any and all appropriate authorities. Finally, Flatley is warned that once the lawsuit is filed additional causes of action shall arise including Defamatory comments, Civil Conspiracy, Reckless Supervision which are just the beginning and that ample evidence exists to prove each and every element for all these additional causes of action. Again, these actions allow for Punitive Damages. At the top of the final page of the letter is the caption: FIRST & FINAL TIME-LIMIT SETTLEMENT DEMAND. Beneath it a paragraph warns that there shall be no continuances nor any delays. At the bottom of the page, beneath Mauro's signature, a final paragraph warns Flatley that, along with the filing of suit, press releases will be disseminated to numerous media sources and placed on the Internet. In his first telephone conversation with Brandon, Mauro gave Flatley a deadline of the end of the month to offer sufficient payment, apparently without any further discussion of the particulars of Robertson's claim. In his call to Brandon, one week after he sent the letter, Mauro complained that he had not yet heard from Flatley and told Brandon he would not extend the deadline and I know the tour dates; I am not kidding about this it will be publicized every place he [Mr. Flatley] goes for the rest of his life, and that dissemination of the story would be immediate to any place where he and the troupes are performing everywhere in the world. The very next day, January 10, Mauro called Brandon again and, after leaving a message threatening to go[ ] public if Brandon did not return his call within a half-hour, Mauro complained that people were investigating the matter before contacting him and were doing so in an intimidating manner. He said that, if he did not receive a call by 8:00 p.m. Central Standard Time that night from a representative of Mr. Flatley with authority, he would `go public and the January 30 deadline is gone.' He said, `I already have the news media lined up' and would `hit him [Mr. Flatley] at every single place he tours.' Later that day, when Fields spoke to Mauro, Mauro told him he knew how to play `hardball' and that, if Mr. Flatley did not pay an acceptable amount, they would `go public,' would see that their story would follow him wherever he or his groups performed and would `ruin' him. In response to Fields' query about how much money Mauro wanted to avoid this, Mauro said it would take `seven figures.' He repeated that the deadline to respond was January 30. Evaluating Mauro's conduct, we conclude that the letter and subsequent phone calls constitute criminal extortion as a matter of law. These communications threatened to accuse Flatley of, or impute to him, crime[s] and disgrace (Pen.Code, § 519, subds.2, 3) unless Flatley paid Mauro a minimum of $1 million of which Mauro was to receive 40 percent. That the threats were half-couched in legalese does not disguise their essential character as extortion. ( Libarian v. State Bar, supra 38 Cal.2d at pp. 329-330, 239 P.2d 865; State v. Harrington, supra, 260 A.2d at p. 699.) Mauro's letter accuses Flatley of rape and also imputes to him other, unspecified violations of various criminal offenses involving immigration and tax law as well as violations of the Social Security Act. With respect to these latter threats, Mauro's letter goes on to threaten that [w]e are positive the media worldwide will enjoy what they find. Thus, contrary to Mauro's claim that he did nothing more than suggest that, if evidence of other criminal conduct became public knowledge it would receive media attention, the letter implies that Mauro is already in possession of information regarding such criminal activity and is prepared to disclose this information to the worldwide media. Whether Flatley in fact committed any violations of these various laws is irrelevant. ( People v. Goldstein, supra, 84 Cal.App.2d at p. 587, 191 P.2d 102 [For purposes of extortion, [a] false accusation of crime is often as harmful as one that is true].) Moreover, the threat to disclose criminal activity entirely unrelated to any alleged injury suffered by Mauro's client exceeded the limits of respondent's representation of his client and is itself evidence of extortion. ( State v. Harrington, supra, 260 A.2d at p. 699 [attorney's veiled threat to have his client in a divorce action inform on her husband to the Internal Revenue Service and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization supports attorney's conviction of extortion].) That Mauro did not specify these other criminal offenses is of no importthe accusations need only be such as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 188 Cal. at p. 749, 207 P. 380.) Indeed, the very vagueness of the accusation serves the dual purpose of magnifying the fear of his victim and protect[ing] the extortionist in the event of the failure to accomplish his extortion and ... prosecution. ( People v. Massengale, supra, 261 Cal.App.2d at p. 765, 68 Cal.Rptr. 415.) Mauro also threatened to accuse Flatley of raping Robertson unless he paid for her silence. Mauro argues that this threat cannot be the basis of a finding of extortion because Robertson had already reported the rape to the Las Vegas police department by the time the letter was sent. In the circumstances of this case, we reject his argument for the following reasons. We begin by examining the pleadings. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) Flatley's complaint alleged that the purpose of Robertson's telephone call to the Las Vegas Police Department was not to file an actual crime report but simply to create a `sham' record of a police report that would make her threats more ominous.... [S]he wanted to prevent the police from taking any action that might make the matter public, since any public report of police action would necessarily spoil Robertson's scheme to extort a payment from [Flatley] to avoid such publicity. [15] These allegations are supported by the declarations of Mauro and Trautmann that they were never contacted by the police in connection with the alleged rape before Mauro sent his letter to Flatley's lawyers, and the absence of any evidence that the police ever took any action on the complaint. Moreover, Robertson's letter to the Las Vegas Police Department and Mauro's statements to the media after he filed Robertson's lawsuitthat she did not return to Las Vegas to pursue her complaint because she was too traumatized support the conclusion that whatever complaint Robertson made to the Las Vegas police was insufficient to trigger a police investigation. Mauro's declaration did not deny that he was aware that the Las Vegas police had not launched an investigation into Robertson's allegations when he sent the letter to Flatley. Yet, the letter was careful to include the number of a police report made to the Las Vegas Police Department as if to hold a police investigation over Flatley's head. Thus, as Flatley alleges, the incomplete police report appears to have existed only to make the threat of disclosure more ominous and the need to settle with Robertson and Mauro all the more urgent. Under these circumstances, the fact that Robertson may have made some report to the police did not render her threat to publicly accuse Flatley of rape unless he paid her and Mauro any less extortionate. ( People v. Umana (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 640, 41 Cal. Rptr.3d 573 [Although section 519, subdivision 2, speaks in terms of accusing the victim of a crime, there is no reasonable basis for drawing a distinction between the initial accusation of a crime and continued pursuit of a criminal charge].) Moreover, in addition to the threats to accuse Flatley publicly of rape and violations of other laws, Mauro also alleged that he had in his possession ample evidence to support claims against Flatley for defamation and civil conspiracy and that these were just the beginning. At minimum, these were threats that Flatley would be exposed to various kinds of opprobrium and he would be disgraced thereby unless he met Mauro's demands. (Pen.Code, § 519, subd. 3 [threat to impute disgrace sufficient to establish extortion].) Lastly, any doubt as to extortionate character of the letter is dispelled by the accounts from Brandon and Fields of Mauro's telephone calls to them within a week of having sent the letter. In his very first conversation with Brandon, Mauro did not discuss the particulars of the claim or express an interest in negotiations but simply stated a deadline for Flatley to offer sufficient payment. In a follow-up phone call, he objected to Flatley's investigation of Robertson's allegation and threatened to withdraw the January 30 deadline, thus further demonstrating that it was never his intention to engage in settlement negotiations. Instead, the insistent theme of his conversations with Flatley's lawyers is the immediate and extensive threat of exposure if Flatley failed to make a sufficient offer of money. This culminates in Mauro's threat to go public and ruin Flatley if the January 30 deadline was not met. We conclude that Mauro's conduct constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law in violation of Penal Code sections 518, 519 and 523. [16] Accordingly, because the activity forming the basis of Mauro's motion to strike Flatley's action was extortion as a matter of law and, therefore, not constitutionally protected activity for purposes of section 426.15, we further conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Mauro's motion to strike.