Opinion ID: 1060237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Dover Elevator

Text: After receiving the contract as modified by Galloway, Dover submitted an amendment which modified Article 12 to require final payment within 30 days of certain conditions being fulfilled by Dover. Dover was to receive payment if Rowe accepted the installation of the elevator cabs provided by Dover or if Rowe accepted the completion of the project in whole including acceptance of the elevator installation. Paul A. Galloway, Galloway's president, testified that neither of these conditions had occurred prior to Rowe's default. He further testified that he understood this to be a modification of the pay when paid clauses to eliminate the defense only in the event of one of the two conditions occurring. Although Dover presented evidence from its local manager, the manager conceded that he had no knowledge of the negotiations between Dover and Galloway. Because Dover was in the position of having made the final offer, and thus technically having control over the drafting of the contract, we are required to construe the contract in favor of Galloway. See Baird v. Dodson Bros. Exterminating, 217 Va. 745, 749, 232 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1977); Graham v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 431, 434-35, 143 S.E.2d 831, 834 (1965). Moreover, Dover's modification of Article 12 would indicate an understanding of the effect of Galloway's prior modification of paragraph 12.1, and, by extension, the identical modification of paragraph 11.3. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence adequately supports Galloway's contention that the parties had the intent of providing a pay when paid defense in circumstances other than those covered by the amendment to Article 12. The trial court's award to Dover for breach of contract was thus in error and will be reversed.