Opinion ID: 1676759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to confessions in instruction # 30?

Text: Without deciding that it was reversible error in and of itself, we next consider Dokken's assignment of error pursuant to jury instruction # 30. Defense counsel objected to the inclusion of this instruction on the grounds that Dokken's statements made after arrest did not amount to a confession. The trial court over-ruled the objection. Instruction # 30 is essentially South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) 1-16-2. It contains a definition of confession, however, instruction # 30 omits the distinction between confessions and admissions. Following his arrest, Dokken waived his Miranda rights and made certain statements to the police. At trial, the arresting officer testified, in essence, that subsequent to arrest, Dokken stated that he shot one of the Deadmen, that he didn't know who the individual was, but that he could identify him. On appeal, Dokken argues that these statements constituted an admission to the act of shooting and not a confession to the crime of murder. We agree. In State v. Callaghan, 81 N.J.Super. 518, 196 A.2d 245, 248 (1963), the defendant appealed his conviction for assault and battery. Callaghan sought to exclude a statement he made to a police officer to the effect that he slapped the complainant. The Superior Court of New Jersey took this opportunity to discuss the difference between a confession and an admission relative to a separate legal issue in dispute. To that end, the following comments are relevant to the instant action: [T]he statement herein made by the defendant to the detective was not a confession but rather an admission of one of the facts in issue. A confession is an admission of guilt by a party charged with a crime. It is a special kind of admission. Every confession is an admission but not every admission is a confession. Thus, there may be an admission of some fact in issue without its being an admission of guilt of the crime charged. (emphasis added) Id. 196 A.2d at 246. In Callaghan, the court went on to say that the defendant's admission to slapping the complainant was not per se an admission of guilt to the crime of assault and battery. The court continued: [t]he slapping may have been accidental and unintended; he may very well have had a legal defense to the charge even though he admitted the physical act. Here, Dokken's admission to shooting one of the Deadmen was not an automatic confession to killing Paul Brandsgaard, Jr. with premeditated design. Rather, Dokken's admission to shooting one of the Deadmen embraced an inculpative fact, e.g., that he pulled the trigger, however, it did not concede the central fact of his guilt for murder or first degree manslaughter. See: Callaghan, 196 A.2d at 249. This is especially true in light of Dokken's claim of justification. We find, therefore, that instruction # 30 as it was used below was incomplete, given its failure to distinguish between confessions and admissions, and coupled with the arresting officer's testimony, prejudicially misleading. As such, we hold that the trial court erred in over-ruling defense counsel's objection. We have considered the remaining issues and find them to be without merit, especially in view of the new trial mandated by this reversal. We accordingly reverse the trial court, and remand this case for a new trial consistent with the guidelines set forth above. MORGAN and WUEST, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs specially. FOSHEIM, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. SABERS, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.