Opinion ID: 1253171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Make-My-Day Defense

Text: The People contend that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that the jury instructions did not properly allocate the burden of proof as to the make-my-day defense. We disagree. Section 18-1-704.5 provides, in relevant part, as follows: Use of deadly physical force against an intruder. (1) The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-704 [the self-defense statute], any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant. § 18-1-704.5(1), (2). Pursuant to this statute, a district court is authorized to dismiss a pending criminal charge prior to trial when the defendant establishes the statutory conditions for immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. See People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 980 (Colo.1987). One such condition requires a defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim knowingly made an unlawful entry. People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 312 (Colo.1995) (interpreting unlawful entry in context of defendant's motion for pretrial statutory immunity). If the pretrial motion to dismiss on grounds of statutory immunity is denied, the defendant may raise the make-my-day statute at trial as an affirmative defense to criminal charges arising out of the defendant's use of physical force against an intruder into his home. The burden of proof generally applicable to affirmative defenses applies to such a defense. See People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 981. Under that standard, if a defendant presents some credible evidence supporting the applicability of an affirmative defense, the prosecution then bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant as to the issue raised by the affirmative defense as well as all other elements of the offense charged. See § 18-1-407, 6 C.R.S. (1998). Here, Janes asserted and the jury was instructed as to the affirmative defenses of self-defense and make-my-day. Despite the fact that these two affirmative defenses were asserted in this case, the original package of jury instructions approved by the court did not include an instruction explaining the prosecution's burden of proof with respect to an affirmative defense. When the court recognized this oversight, it gave the jury another instruction, numbered 11A, to address this issue. Instruction No. 11A referred to affirmative defenses and both instruction No. 10 on self-defense and Instruction No. 11 on make-my-day were identified as affirmative defenses. [4] However, Instruction No. 11A did not cross-reference Instruction No. 12, which is now before us. Instruction No. 12 provided as follows: To find the defendant not guilty based upon the lawful use of deadly physical force against an intruder, you must find that the victim made a knowingly unlawful entry into the defendant's apartment. An entry that is uninvited is not necessarily unlawful. This defense is not available if the victim entered the apartment in the good faith belief he was making a lawful entry. The People contend that this instruction was properly based on language from People v. McNeese and was appropriate to explain to the jury the unlawful entry requirement of the make-my-day statute, whether asserted for pretrial immunity or raised as an affirmative defense at trial. Janes argues that Instruction No. 12 eviscerated the make-my-day defense in the absence of proof that Tillman did not enter the condominium in the good faith belief he was making a lawful entry. Although Instruction No. 12 accurately tracks the language of People v. McNeese in an attempt to define the term unlawful entry, the jury instructions must be considered as a whole in determining whether this particular instruction was so misleading as to constitute reversible error. See People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734, 740 (Colo.1985). Because the make-my-day statute creates an immunity defense when raised before trial as well as an affirmative defense when raised at trial, it poses special problems when instructing a jury. Although the elements of the make-my-day defense remain the same, the burden of proof is very different. When the make-my-day statute is asserted as an affirmative defense at trial, the defendant no longer has the burden to prove all elements of the statute by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the burden of proof is, as it always is, on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. See § 18-1-407, 6 C.R.S. (1998). Effectively, this requires the People to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the language of Instruction No. 12 eliminated that burden by telling the jury that the make-my-day statute does not apply unless the defendant proves that the intruder's entry was knowingly unlawful. Instruction No. 12 was drawn from McNeese, which dealt with the make-my-day statute in the context of pretrial immunity, and thus did not refer to the burden of proof applicable to this case. Unlike Instruction No. 10 and Instruction No. 11, Instruction No. 12 was not identified as an affirmative defense. Thus, the jury had no reason to know that the prosecution's burden of proof with respect to affirmative defenses, as stated in Instruction No. 11A, applied to Instruction No. 12. Logically, the jury could have concluded that the burden was on the defendant to prove the conditions set forth in Instruction No. 12. As Janes points out, this is especially problematical with respect to the language in Instruction No. 12 that the defense does not apply if the victim entered the condominium with the good faith belief that he acted lawfully. Clearly it is not the defendant's burden at trial to prove that the victim did not enter in good faith. Because the instructions given by the court in this case did not put the McNeese concepts into context, we conclude that the jury instructions, when read as a whole, confused or misled the jury as to the burden of proof applicable to the affirmative defense of make-my-day. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals as to this issue.