Opinion ID: 765611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1988 Heroin Purchase

Text: 48 At trial, cooperating co-defendant Rosa Rodrguez-Campos (Rodrguez) testified pursuant to a plea agreement that she was a long-time drug trafficker and that in 1990 she agreed to loan Escobar money to finance his importation of cocaine from Colombia to Puerto Rico. As part of its direct examination of Rodrguez concerning her role in the alleged conspiracy, the government sought to introduce her testimony that Escobar purchased $90,000 worth of heroin from her in 1988. 18 The district court allowed Rodrguez to testify that Escobar had purchased heroin from her, reasoning that the heroin purchase, although uncharged in the indictment, was relevant and admissible because it helped to explain the history between Rodrguez and Escobar and her willingness to finance Escobar's cocaine trafficking venture. 19 Escobar claims that the district court erred by admitting this testimony concerning the heroin transaction, arguing that it was outside the scope of the charged conspiracy (which pertained only to cocaine, not heroin) and that it was elicited solely for the purpose of showing his propensity to commit drug crimes in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 49 Evidence that a defendant on trial for one crime has been involved in another crime or bad act is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) if it is offered solely to prove the criminal character of the defendant or his propensity to commit crimes of the sort for which he is on trial. See United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Johnston, 784 F.2d 416, 423 n.10 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Zeuli, 725 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir. 1984)); United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 1978). Rule 404(b), however, is not exclusionary. See Fosher, 568 F.2d at 212; 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence, § 404.20[3] (2d ed. 1997). Rather, the rule permits the introduction of uncharged bad act evidence if the evidence is relevant for purposes other than proof of a defendant's bad character or criminal propensity, subject only to the limitations of Rule 403. See United States v. Spinosa, 982 F.2d 620, 628 (1st Cir. 1992); Johnston, 784 F.2d at 423 n.10 (citing Fosher, 568 F.2d at 212). 50 In a conspiracy case, evidence of other bad acts, subject always to the requirements of Rule 403, can be admitted to explain the background, formation, and development of the illegal relationship, see United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jones, 982 F.2d 380, 382-83 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Passarella, 788 F.2d 377, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 1976); and, more specifically, to help the jury understand the basis for the co-conspirators' relationship of mutual trust, see United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 603 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 565-56 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Daz, 994 F.2d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 1993). As the district court observed, see supra note 19, the heroin purchase was important to show how a relationship of trust had developed between Escobar and Rodrguez through other similar drug transactions, which in turn explained why Rodrguez would have agreed to finance Escobar's cocaine trafficking venture as she claimed. Such evidence was specially probative of the conspiratorial agreement that existed between them, a fact which was directly in issue and material to the case. See United States v. Spaeni, 60 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1995). 51 Moreover, the potential of prejudice from the heroin purchase evidence, although undeniably present in some quantum, did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Rodrguez's testimony regarding the heroin purchase, although brief, was critical to set the stage for the rest of her testimony concerning the formation, nature, and extent of her conspiratorial relationship with Escobar, and it represented only a tiny fraction of the incriminating evidence presented to the jury during the course of the trial. 20 In these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to admit the challenged testimony. 21