Opinion ID: 2347721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Staff Participation

Text: On February 12, 1976, the Companies filed a Petition for Reconsideration seeking a rehearing and reopening of the Consolidated Decree contending that they suffered a denial of their procedural due process rights when the Commission's staff attorney of record wrote the Consolidated Decree for the Commission. In its Order of Denial refusing to reopen the Consolidated Decree, the Commission stated: [T]his Commission decided the issues in this case before the Staff submitted any part of the decree. All drafts were reworked extensively by the Commission, and the final decree is the work of the Commission. On appeal, the Companies reassert their due process claim and allege that the Commission abused its discretion in denying the Petition for Reconsideration. In replying, the Commission asserts that the Companies were on notice that such a practice might occur and waived their objection by not challenging such conduct prior to the issuance of the decree. Rule 9.3 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Public Utilities Commission of Maine states: Neither § 9.1 nor § 9.2 shall prohibit the Commission from consulting persons in its employ without affording an opportunity to other parties to the proceeding to be present; nor shall said sections prohibit persons in the Commission's employ from preparing proposed findings for any proceeding before the Commission pursuant to the Commission's direction without forwarding a copy of such proposed findings to all other parties to the proceeding. (emphasis supplied). Because the Companies were on notice, it was incumbent upon them to bring any objection to the Commission's practice to its attention if they wished to preserve their rights on appeal. Hennesey v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 285 F.2d 511, 514-15 (3rd Cir. 1961). The reason for the rule is that the agency and not the appellate court should have the first opportunity to rule on the objectionable practice. Wilson & Co. v. United States, 335 F.2d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 1964). remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 454, 86 S.Ct. 643, 15 L.Ed.2d 523 (1966). Although it may have been more judicious for the Companies to have raised their due process argument prior to the Consolidated Decree, a timely filing of the Petition for Reconsideration contending that the staff attorney had in fact written the decree sufficiently informed the agency of their objection thereby preserving the issue on appeal. Wilson & Co. v. United States, id . We reject the Companies' position that it was error for the Commission to deny their Petition for Reconsideration. As explained earlier, see A(I) and n.8, supra, the Commission may reopen any prior order. Reopening is not a matter of right but rests within the sound discretion of the Commission. In re General Marine Construction Corp., Me., 272 A.2d 353, 354 (1971). In its Order of Denial, the Commission essentially admitted all of the Companies' requests for findings of fact thereby leaving no factual question unresolved. [45] Its decision to deny the Companies' petition does not reflect an abuse of discretion. The issue on appeal is very narrow. The question is whether a due process violation occurs if the Commission orders a staff attorney of record to prepare its decree after the Commission had already reached its decision. An abundance of case law suggests that there is no due process violation in such circumstances. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955); American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 449 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1971); Wilson & Co. v. United States, supra . On the facts in this case, we agree. [46]