Opinion ID: 706907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NRC's STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND ANTITRUST CONDITIONS

Text: 30 Cleveland asks us to reverse the Commission's ruling that it has authority to modify antitrust license conditions imposed pursuant to Sec. 105(c). Because we decide that Cleveland did not satisfy the statutory requirements for appealing the final order of an administrative agency, we do not pass on the question. 31 The Hobbs Act permits [a]ny party aggrieved by [a] final order 10 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to file a petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2344. In determining when a party is aggrieved, this circuit has recognized only a few exceptions to the general rule that a party may not appeal from a disposition in its favor. Showtime Networks, Inc. v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C.Cir.1991) (citing cases). Cleveland claims that it falls within the exception set forth in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330 (D.C.Cir.1988) (IBEW). In IBEW, the court permitted petitioner union IBEW to challenge the ICC's jurisdiction to review arbitration awards, even though it had prevailed on the merits of the specific arbitration award before the ICC. Id. at 334. The court found IBEW's plight extraordinary because arbitration proceedings were a central component of the union's operation, IBEW would be forced to litigate numerous future arbitration awards before the ICC, without any opportunity for resolution of its jurisdictional claim until it lost an arbitration proceeding on the merits and could appeal. This threat of repeatedly having to pursue disputes with employers was sufficient to render IBEW aggrieved, despite its victory on the merits of the individual case. Cf. Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1186, 1202 (D.C.Cir.1995) (IBEW exception inapplicable where petitioner would not incur virtually inevitable and repeating costs in future litigation before reviewing agency). 32 The risk of future litigation by Licensees over the antitrust conditions at issue in this case seems neither so inevitable nor of such a magnitude as to bring Cleveland within the IBEW exception. Cleveland does claim that repeat litigation over the conditions is virtually guaranteed because of the past adversarial relationship between the parties. But while it is of course possible that Licensees will renew their efforts to suspend the antitrust conditions through a claim of changed circumstances and in such an event, Cleveland may find it necessary to return to court to defend the restrictions, see Respondents' Br. at 19 (discussing Cleveland's remedies if Licensees should seek a future modification of antitrust conditions), IBEW requires more. It demands a showing of an inevitable and repeating course of litigation, between the same parties, all based on a single jurisdictional issue. We find the inchoate threat of another round of litigation about these conditions based on a new theory not to rise to the level of potential harm incurred by the labor union petitioners in IBEW. Accordingly, Cleveland is not a party aggrieved, and we dismiss its petition for review. 33 So ordered.