Opinion ID: 2360914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Expert

Text: Whether a witness qualifies as an expert is a matter which is addressed to the discretion of the judge presiding at the trial and such discretion will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. [2] Cooper v. Housing Authority, 105 R.I. 126, 249 A.2d 904 (1969); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public Works, 102 R.I. 696, 233 A.2d 423 (1967); Redding v. Picard Motor Sales, Inc., 102 R.I. 239, 229 A.2d 762 (1967). The automobile dealer testified that the Super Sport was worth $1,300 at the time of the shutting of the doors and the grasping of the keys. The witness was the owner of a Ford dealership. He had been in the business for 22 years during which time he was personally involved in the buying and selling and appraisal of both new and used cars. During this interval, he also served as chairman of the state Motor Vehicle Dealers' Licensing Commission for about a decade. In giving his opinion as to the car's worth, the dealer emphasized that his appraisal was based upon his experience in the business and an analysis of several trade publications. The subject matter of the dealer's opinion was unquestionably beyond the ken of the average juror. Expert testimony would be an indispensable aid to the jury in its quest to discover the truth. In Morgan v. Washington Trust Co., 105 R.I. 13, 249 A.2d 48 (1969), we observed that a witness may acquire the necessary expertise which will permit him to show his skill with the jury in a number of ways, be it by way of study, observation, practice or experience. The dealer's years of experience could and did prove to be of immeasurable assistance to the jury as it came to grips with that portion of Anderson's claim relating to damages. The defendants challenged the trial justice's ruling on the dealer's expertise on the basis that he had never bought or sold an automobile identical to Anderson's customized convertible. This contention is misdirected. A similar argument was presented in St. Jean v. Lippitt Woolen Co., 69 A. 604 (R.I. 1908). There, the trial court had allowed a man who had worked with machinery for 40 years to testify as an expert. Subsequently, it developed that the witness had not used a machine that was similar to the one in dispute. Such a failing, it was held, was a factor affecting the weight to be accorded to the expert's testimony but not his competency. The defendants also fault the expert because of his failure to check such matters as the car's engine, its undercoating, its interior, and whether it came equipped with a spare tire and a jack. These answers are matters that go to weight rather than competency. On the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in permitting the dealer to testify as to the reasonable value of Anderson's Super Sport.