Opinion ID: 2646575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Proportionality of the Fee Award

Text: This brings us, finally, to Jiten's argument that the district court committed reversible error by failing to calibrate the amount of the fee award to the amount of the damages obtained. -15- Jiten urges upon us the proposal that an award needs to be proportional to the relief obtained, because there is little social benefit to encouraging attorneys to spend resources . . . that are disproportionate to the results of the litigation. Because the district court awarded over $100,000 in fees and costs after the jury awarded only $7,650 in damages, the disparity between the fees requested and the result obtained for Diaz is self evident, and the award must, Jiten says, be vacated. Aware that a district court must undertake a number of judgment calls in order to determine the extent of a fee award, we review such awards only for mistake of law or abuse of the district court's extremely broad discretion. Martinez-Vélez v. ReyHernández, 506 F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2007). In this area, we normally prefer to defer to any thoughtful rationale and decision developed by a trial court and to avoid extensive second guessing. United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted). Given the standard of review and the relevant statutory framework, Jiten's challenge fails. The Massachusetts statute under which Diaz prevailed, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B,8 provides that [i]f the court finds for the petitioner it shall, in addition to any other relief and irrespective of the amount in controversy, award the petitioner 8 Because Diaz prevailed only under Massachusetts law, Massachusetts law governs our analysis. See Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 24, 37 (1st Cir. 1999). -16- reasonable attorney's fees and costs unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Id. § 9. And as we noted in an earlier opinion in this very case, the rules surrounding feeshifting in civil rights cases are designed to encourage attorneys to take these types of cases and are based on full compensation for the work performed. Diaz, 704 F.3d at 154. Recently, in interpreting the very statute at issue here, we quoted the Supreme Judicial Court's comment that fee-shifting provisions are designed to encourage suits that are not likely to pay for themselves, but are nevertheless desirable because they vindicate important rights. Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 720 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Stratos v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 323 (1982)). As the principle of full compensation suggests, Jiten's emphasis on proportionality as determinative of reasonableness runs directly counter to fundamental precepts of Massachusetts law. See, e.g., Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 429-30 (2005). Under state law, a judge must examine a number of factors to determine whether an award of attorney's fees and costs is reasonable. Id. No one factor is determinative. Berman, 434 Mass. at 303. Relying on that principle, we recently held that a district court had in fact abused its discretion when it appeared to treat the damages award as the only significant result obtained -17- under chapter 151B. Joyce, 720 F.3d at 31. We noted that even if [a lawsuit] achieve[s] nothing other than compensatory relief for the plaintiff, it is an error of law for the district court to link the amount of recoverable attorney's fees solely to the amount of . . . damages. Id. We further noted that [f]ee-shifting provisions in general reflect a legislative judgment that 'the public as a whole has an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by the statutes.' Id. (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, while the results obtained in litigation are a preeminent consideration in the fee-adjustment process, such results can consist of a plaintiff's success claim by claim, or [of] the relief actually achieved, or [of] the societal importance of the right which has been vindicated, or [of] all of these measures in combination. Joyce, 720 F.3d at 27. Jiten's narrow focus on the jury award evinces a misinterpretation of Massachusetts law. This case produced a substantial order clarifying the stray remarks doctrine, see 762 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass. 2011), as well as a published First Circuit opinion holding that mixed-motive analysis applies to Massachusetts age discrimination claims, see 671 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012). The fee request has already been adjusted downward so that it appropriates only time spent in pursuit of the claim on which Diaz prevailed. See generally Gay -18- Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting, in the context of a different fee-shifting statute, that proportionality is no longer an issue once the prevailing party has separated the wheat from the chaff (i.e., isolated the time spent on her successful claim or claims)). Jiten does not suggest that the hours expended were excessive or that the rate charged was too much; it simply maintains that the amount awarded is too large in proportion to the jury verdict. Because we see no basis in Massachusetts law for concluding that disproportionality alone supports vacatur of the district court's conscientious exercise of its discretion, we decline to disturb the district court's award of fees and costs.