Opinion ID: 864445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in denying a

Text: continuance in order for the defense to investigate 3 Experts testified that after the shot, Rowland would have immediately lost all motor function due to the fact that the brain flew out of the open cranial cavity. This, plus the State's re-enactment of the shotgun's recoil, tend to prove that the shotgun would have landed in front of the body, just as the mostlyintact brain was found at Rowland's feet. 11 late-breaking information and incorporate it as an alternate defense theory. ¶32. Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-15-29 (Rev. 1994) provides that a court may grant or deny a continuance, in its discretion, and that a denial of a continuance shall not be grounds for reversal unless the Supreme Court shall be satisfied that injustice resulted therefrom. In order for us to reverse, Cox must show that a manifest injustice resulted from the denial of the continuance. Lambert v. State, 654 So. 2d 17, 22 (Miss. 1995). The decision whether to grant or deny a continuance is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. State, 631 So. 2d 185, 189 (Miss. 1994) (citing Wallace v. State, 607 So. 2d 1184, 1190 (Miss. 1992); Morris v. State, 595 So. 2d 840, 844 (Miss. 1991); Fisher v. State, 532 So. 2d 992, 998 (Miss. 1988)). ¶33. Prior to trial, Judy Fillyaw had contacted the State and informed it that Jerry Porter was a possible suspect in Rowland's murder. The State informed the defense and made an investigation. Upon interviewing Fillyaw and Teresa Porter, Jerry Porter's wife, the State had a clear belief that Fillyaw had mistaken Dave Rowland for Dave Nelson, who had allegedly been having an affair with Teresa Porter, and that Jerry Porter was not a possible suspect in Rowland's murder. Cox filed a motion for continuance, contending that he needed some time to develop the facts surrounding this incident. The circuit court denied the motion, stating that there had been no discovery violation because the State had notified the defense promptly. 12 ¶34. We find that no manifest injustice resulted from the denial of the motion for continuance. Cox has not presented any evidence that he was unable to call Fillyaw as a witness at this trial which lasted three weeks. Indeed, Teresa Porter did testify for the defense.4 V. Whether the circuit court erred in allowing the State to extract hearsay from a witness regarding her having heard Dave Rowland tell her about alleged threats supposedly made to him approximately ten months prior to his death. ¶35. The State made a proffer of Linda Meek's proposed testimony as follows: Ten months prior to Rowland's death, while she was speaking to Rowland on the telephone, Rowland told her that he saw Cox standing outside his apartment with a gun. Rowland sounded anxious and told Meek that he was scared. The circuit court allowed her to so testify. Cox challenges the admission of Meek's testimony on two grounds: that it was inadmissible hearsay and that it was not relevant because of the length of time between the event to which she testified and Rowland's death. ¶36. Relevancy and admissibility of evidence are left, in large part, to the discretion of the trial court. Mitchell v. State, 792 So. 2d 192, 217 (Miss. 2001) (citing Johnston v. State, 567 So. 2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990)). However, this discretion must be exercised within the confines of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Id. Reversal is proper only where such discretion has been abused and a substantial right of a party has been affected. M.R.E. 103(a); Mitchell, 792 So. 2d at 217; Green v. State, 614 So. 2d 926, 935 (Miss. 1992). A. Hearsay. 4 Porter testified that she had worked with Rowland and that he flirted with her a great deal. She did not testify as to Jerry Porter being a possible suspect. 13 ¶37. After the proffer of Meek's testimony, the circuit court ruled that Rowland's statement to Meek fell within two exceptions to the hearsay rule: Under M.R.E. 803(1), Rowland's statement described or explained an event or condition made while he was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter (a present sense impression). Also, under M.R.E. 803(2), Rowland's statement related to a startling event or condition made while Rowland was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition (an excited utterance). The circuit court cited the comments to Rule 803, stating that the present sense impression exception is based on the theory that the contemporaneous occurrence of the event and the statement render it unlikely that the declarant made a deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. Spontaneity is the essential factor. M.R.E. 803(1) cmt. Furthermore, in many respects the excited utterance exception is similar to the former res gestae rule. The underlying theory of the excited utterance exception is that circumstances may create such an excited condition that the capacity for reflection is temporarily impeded and that statements uttered in that condition are thus free of conscious fabrication. As in the present sense impression exception, the essential ingredient here is spontaneity. With respect to the time element, the issue is the duration of the excited state. This, depending on exact circumstances of a case, can vary greatly. The declarant need not be a participant but only an observer of the event which triggered the excitement. An excited utterance need only relate to the startling event, and, therefore, the scope of the subject matter of the statement may be fairly broad. Id. ¶38. We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the hearsay was admissible. Rowland contemporaneously related the event to Meek; therefore the statement was a present sense impression. He was anxious and admitted that he was scared; therefore the statement was an excited utterance. The circuit court did not err in admitting the testimony over a hearsay objection. 14