Opinion ID: 2637623
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Erroneous Inclusion of Instructions Regarding Three Unadjudicated Criminal Offenses

Text: According to defendant, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could consider three unadjudicated crimeschild endangerment (§ 273a), witness intimidation (§ 136.1) and weapon possession while in custody (§ 4574)as aggravating circumstances under section 190.3, factor (b). Citing People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 841, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865, defendant contends these three offenses do not constitute aggravating circumstances, because they do not inherently involve force or violence. (See § 190.3, factor (b) [evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity is admissible as an aggravating circumstance only if it involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence].) Defendant is wrong. In People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 777, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297, we held that Section 190.3, factor (b) ... does not require that any specific crime inherently involve force or violence, only that the actual criminal activity be violent. Although defendant concedes that Livaditis rejected his contention, he contends Livaditis conflicts with the following sentence in Cooper: Upon request by either party, the court should instruct on the elements of alleged other crimes [citation], but only those that in and of themselves involve violence within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Defendant, however, misreads the sentence. The sentence did not state that the unadjudicated crimes must inherently involve force or violence. Rather, the statement merely states that the actual acts must in and of themselves involve violence. ( Ibid. ) Cooper is therefore consistent with Livaditis. Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could consider defendant's alleged commission of child endangerment (§ 273a), witness intimidation (§ 136.1), and weapon possession (§ 4574) as aggravating circumstances. In committing child endangerment, defendant allegedly threw his daughter three to four feet. As such, the actual criminal act undoubtedly involved violence. Likewise, defendant's alleged threats to kill Figueroa if she reported the child-throwing incident clearly involved the threat of violence. Finally, `[i]t is settled that a defendant's knowing possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody is admissible under [section 190.3,] factor (b).' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1002, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err.