Opinion ID: 2191086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1969-72 tax abatements

Text: The appeals regarding the 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 taxes are governed by RSA 76:16-a V (Supp. 1973) which became effective September 1, 1973. Under this section the findings of fact of the board are final and the appeal is limited to questions of law. Dartmouth Corp. of Alpha Delta v. Hanover, 115 N.H. 26, 332 A.2d 390 (1975). State law requires that cities and towns appraise all taxable property at its full and true value in money (RSA 75:1) or bring such valuations to the true and market value. RSA 71-B:5 II (Supp. 1973). Since the statutes are silent about the method or combinations of methods to be used in making value estimations, this court, as well as others, has permitted considerable leeway. 2A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 21.17, at 170 (1974). Reproduction or replacement cost methods are acceptable. Fusegni v. Portsmouth Housing Auth., 114 N.H. 207, 317 A.2d 580 (1974); New England Power Co. v. Littleton, 114 N.H. 594, 326 A.2d 698 (1974). Income-producing power of property can be another standard in fixing value. Public Service Co. v. New Hampton, 101 N.H. 142, 148, 136 A.2d 591, 596-97 (1957). The comparable sales method may also be used. Bartage, Inc. v. Manchester Housing Auth., 114 N.H. 203, 318 A.2d 152 (1974). But all relevant factors to property value should be considered when making an appraisal in order to arrive at a just result. Concord Natural Gas v. Concord, 114 N.H. 54, 314 A.2d 679 (1974); Trustees &c. Academy v. Exeter, 98 N.H. 473, 33 A.2d 665 (1943); Grafton &c. Co. v. State, 78 N.H. 330, 100 A. 668 (1917). As a quasi-judicial body, the board of taxation must assess conflicting evidence, its credibility, and the weight to be given the various portions thereof. RSA 76:16-a (Supp. 1973); Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179 A. 357 (1935); Manchester v. Boston & Maine R.R., 98 N.H. 52, 94 A.2d 552 (1953); Peter Salvucci & Sons, Inc. v. State, 110 N.H. 136, 155-56, 268 A.2d 899, 911-12 (1970), aff'd, 111 N.H. 259, 281 A.2d 164 (1971). In this case the board of taxation freely admitted in its opinion that it had placed considerable weight on the re-evaluation company's (United Appraisal Company) appraisal and the review appraiser's report which varied by less than 3% from each other. This ultimately resulted in a valuation using the replacement cost method of $195,000. By relying on this mode of appraisal, the board necessarily gave less weight to the comparable sales and the income capitalization methods offered as evidence by the plaintiff. Expert evidence submitted by the plaintiff indicated that under an income valuation method property like the plaintiff's, with an annual income of $17,000, should be valued at $142,000. But within the discretion granted the board, the current earning power of the property is not necessarily the controlling factor in fixing market value. Donovan v. Haverhill, 247 Mass. 69, 141 N.E. 564 (1923); In re Pine Raleigh Corp., 258 N.C. 398, 403-04, 128 S.E.2d 855, 859-60 (1963); People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Comm'n, 17 App. Div. 2d 225, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1962). In a similar manner, the board could have found that the sales figures of other property, which ranged widely, were not an adequate showing of value, because of remoteness in time or lack of comparability. Cohn v. Hartford, 130 Conn. 699, 704-06, 37 A.2d 237, 240 (1944). Since the board had before it all the city's records and appraisal reports as well as the plaintiff's memoranda of law and other expert appraisals, we cannot find that it erred as a matter of law in reaching its decision by placing considerable weight on certain evidence. This was a matter of reasoned discretion in the fact-finding process. And as a matter of logic, decision-making always necessitates relying more on some information than on other. Plaintiff also contends that he was denied due process because of extended delays and because he was denied information with regard to the evidence upon which the board relied. We agree that there was undue delay in granting a hearing in this case; however, we see no suitable remedy under the particular facts of this case, nor are we convinced that there was any substantial prejudice to the plaintiff. RSA 76:16-a IV (Supp. 1973) and RSA 71-B:7 (Supp. 1973) provide that the board shall not be bound by technical or strict rules of evidence. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 113 N.H. 92, 302 A.2d 814, 821 (1973). RSA 76:16-a I (Supp. 1973) authorizes the board to conduct an inquiry and investigation prior to hearing and RSA 71-B:7 (Supp. 1973) provides that the board may introduce into evidence or take into consideration ... any information obtained through its own investigation. See RSA 76:16-a III (Supp. 1973). Justice requires that it reveal to the taxpayer evidence obtained by its own investigation which it intends to consider so that the taxpayer may have a reasonable opportunity to meet that evidence. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 552 (1951); 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 444 (1962); 1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law, ch. VII, § 2 (1968); see State v. Duranleau, 99 N.H. 30, 104 A.2d 519 (1954). Here, plaintiff was denied access to the staff report until after a determination had been made. RSA 76:16-a III (Supp. 1973). Thereafter, the board furnished the information so that it was available at the time of rehearing. Although the plaintiff then had the burden of overcoming a finding already made, we cannot say that on the facts of this case plaintiff was denied due process. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text §§ 2.09, 7.01 (1972). Appeals dismissed.