Opinion ID: 173127
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the 911 Call

Text: Mr. Minners appeals the admission of the 911 recording on both evidentiary and constitutional grounds. Even if the District Court did abuse its discretion by admitting the tape, and its admission violated Mr. Minners’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses testifying against him, any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus the convictions are affirmed. 1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by admitting the 911 recording We review the district court's admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). We cannot reverse a district court's ruling if “it falls within the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances and is not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Minners asserts the -6- District Court abused its discretion by admitting the recording: (1) because the ruling was made without previewing it and performing a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 prejudicial versus probative value balancing test; (2) because the recording was both inadmissible prior bad acts evidence and hearsay evidence offered for the truth and not to give context to the investigation; and (3) because the tape’s admission prejudiced Mr. Minners’s right to a fair trial. We find that even if the District Court abused its discretion by admitting the tape in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the error was harmless. First, Mr. Minners’s assertions that the District Court admitted the tape without previously viewing it or conducting a 403 balancing test regarding the prejudicial nature of the tape are without support. There is no evidence in the record that the court either did or did not preview the recording. However, even if the court permitted playing the tape to the jury without previewing it, the tape’s prejudicial value did not substantially outweigh its probative value, as prohibited by Rule 403. The recording was not likely to “provoke[] an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tend[] to affect adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.” Id. at 1218-19 (quoting United States v. PortilloQuezada, 469 F.3d 1345, 1353 (10th Cir. 2006)). Ms. Whaley related that she had been assaulted with a weapon and Mr. Minners was the man who had done so. The call’s prejudicial value did not substantially outweigh its probative value of Mr. Minners’s possession of the gun as prohibited by Rule 403. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion. -7- Second, Mr. Minners argues the call was inadmissible to provide context or explanation for the investigation because Officer Taylor had already testified he was responding to a domestic violence call. He asserts the 911 recording was inadmissible both because it was evidence of his prior bad acts but also because it was offered not for the purpose of providing context for the investigation but for the truth of the matter. The tape tended to prove Mr. Minners committed other bad acts such as breaking the windows of Ms. Whaley’s car the previous evening. Because the domestic violence call was what started the investigation, the general details of the event are “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense and “formed an ‘integral and natural part of [Ms. Whaley’s] accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offense[].’” United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 1982)). Thus, the evidence concerning Mr. Minners’s alleged prior bad acts discussed in the 911 call was admissible. The alleged prior bad acts listed in the tape were only mentioned once without any additional emphasis or explanation. The prejudicial effect of these allegations was minimal and did not outweigh their probative value. Additionally, the “familiar, standard rule [is] that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice” and is not bound by the defendant’s preferred method of presenting the evidence. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1996) (citing Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958)). The fact that the same evidence could have been presented in a different and less prejudicial manner does not presumptively make the way in which -8- it was presented an error. See id. The decision to admit the entirety of the tape was a “permissible choice” for the District Court and not an abuse of discretion in this respect. However, it was error for the District Court to admit the 911 call since it was hearsay evidence offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (possession of the gun by Mr. Minners). “Out-of-court statements can be admitted as background for an investigation only if they provide information that is necessary to explain the government’s subsequent actions, and it is not likely that the jury will ‘consider the statement[s] for the truth of what was stated with significant resultant prejudice.’” United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Cass, 127 F.3d 1218, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted)). Here, the government claimed it offered the 911 recording not for the truth of the matter asserted but instead to give context to the investigation. However, “[w]here the government introduces evidence that bears on the ultimate issue in the case but that is not necessary to explain the background of a police investigation, the only reasonable conclusion we can reach is that the evidence was offered, not as background, but as support for the government’s case against the defendant.” Id., at 1337. Since Officer Taylor had already explained the nature of the 911 call that triggered his particular investigation, it appears the call was actually offered for no other purpose than to prove the ultimate issue: that Mr. Minners was in possession of a firearm. Although the District Court committed error by admitting the evidence in this respect, given the overwhelming weight of the government’s case against Mr. Minners, any error -9- would have been harmless. As noted, several officers saw Mr. Minners in possession of the gun, it was observed that he threw the gun through the window and it was subsequently found on the ground, Mr. Minners expressed knowledge of the make of the gun, why he had it, and admitted to possession of the gun in his post-arrest interview. Third, Mr. Minners alleges the admission of the tape prejudiced his right to a fair trial because no cautionary instructions were read to the jury regarding the limited use of the 911 call. However, in view of the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Minners’s guilt, any error in failing to give the cautionary instructions here was harmless and did not prejudice his right to a fair trial. 2. Whether the 911 recording’s admission violated Mr. Minners’s right to confront Pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation right, according to the Framers, bars the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). In this case, the recording of Ms. Whaley’s 911 call was admitted against Mr. Minners and Ms. Whaley did not testify. Therefore, if the call was testimonial hearsay, then Mr. Minners had a constitutional right to cross-examine the speaker, Ms. Whaley. See id. Generally, this court reviews a District Court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Schene, 543 F.3d 627, 640 (10th Cir. 2008). However, when the evidence implicates the Confrontation Clause, the standard of - 10 - review is de novo. United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007). If this court finds the District Court violated Mr. Minners’s right to confront his accuser, which standard for reversal should be used turns on the question of issue preservation. If Mr. Minners preserved his constitutional objection, the government would bear the burden to prove the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that a hearsay error alleged on the basis of the Federal Rules of Evidence alone is reviewed for “harmless error” and a hearsay error alleged under the Confrontation Clause is reviewed under Chapman’s “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard)). If Mr. Minners failed to preserve his objection, then he has the burden to prove the District Court committed a plain error which “(1) was obvious, and (2) affected [his] substantial rights.” United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1582 (10th Cir. 1993 (en banc)). There is some debate as to whether Mr. Minners properly preserved his Confrontation Clause objection. Mr. Minners’s counsel did not explicitly state that his client’s Sixth Amendment right to confront was being violated by the admission of testimonial evidence. However, Mr. Minners’s counsel did object and make at least one reference to his inability to cross-examine the witness when the government sought to play the 911 recording to the jury. R., Vol. II, at 87. The government responded by saying the phone call was not considered testimonial under the definition explained in - 11 - Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (defining the parameters of the term “testimonial hearsay”). The evidence was admitted. R., Vol. II, at 88-89. It was clear from the context of the objection and the ensuing sidebar that both parties and the court understood there was a constitutional objection being asserted. Thus, the standard for reversal places the burden squarely on the government to prove any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 707. We accept the actions of Mr. Minners’s counsel as adequate to preserve his Confrontation Clause argument. Assuming arguendo that it was constitutional error for the 911 tape to have been played to the jury, the admission is reviewed for whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1303 (10th Cir. 2005). There was testimony by several officers that they saw Mr. Minners throw the gun. Mr. Minners’s own statements were in evidence confirming that he possessed the gun, including the videotape where Mr. Minners admitted that he possessed the gun. This strong evidence against Mr. Minners reduced the admission of the 911 call to limited importance and made any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.