Opinion ID: 2353346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Complaint of Gerald McCants

Text: This complaint also involves a matter concerning the termination of the employment of an associate professor at Morgan State University. In March, 1978, Dr. McCants engaged the Respondent, who initially contacted the University and subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. This action was dismissed in January, 1979, on the defendant's motion. While there was some communication between Dr. McCants and the Respondent over progress of his complaint, a new action for breach of contract was not filed until March, 1981. In July, 1981, Respondent advised Dr. McCants that a defense of sovereign immunity had been made. Thereafter, Dr. McCants was unable to locate Respondent. In December, 1981, this later action was dismissed on the defendant's motion following a hearing attended by Dr. McCants but not by Respondent. The hearing judge, based on the above, found Respondent to have violated DR 1-102 (A) (1) and DR 6-101 (A) (3) (neglect). Again, no exceptions were taken by either party. It seems to us that the record amply supports the conclusion reached by the trial judge. Just why the March, 1981, breach of contract action was dismissed we are unable to discern from the record. In any event, it is clear that Respondent was not present in court when the dismissal took place and this alone would constitute neglect. Proceeding to the matter of sanction, we disagree with the Commission's recommendation of a public reprimand. It appears to us that while all of the complaints seem to have a common thread running through them (lack of communication), there are more serious problems in the cases. In times past, we have stated that the purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is to protect the public rather than to punish an erring attorney. See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 682, 431 A.2d 1336, 1351 (1981); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 596-97, 403 A.2d 1241, 1247 (1979); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Stewart, 285 Md. 251, 258, 401 A.2d 1026, 1029 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845, 100 S.Ct. 89, 62 L.Ed.2d 58 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 975, 100 S.Ct. 472, 62 L.Ed.2d 391 (1979). Thus we recognize that we have a responsibility to the public. In fulfilling this responsibility, we believe we would be remiss in adopting the recommendation of reprimand. In our view, lack of communication with one's client, for whatever reason, is a matter of continuing concern to the public. Moreover, this Court has consistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client's interests to be a violation of the Canons of Ethics warranting the imposition of some disciplinary sanction. See, e.g., Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 547, 391 A.2d 434, 436-37 (1978); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225, 237, 369 A.2d 61, 68 (1977); Bar Ass'n of Balto. City v. Dearing, 274 Md. 66, 332 A.2d 649 (1975). Respondent's failure to communicate with his clients, coupled with the obvious failure to withdraw in the Boone and Rodriguez cases and the neglect involved in the McCants, Behrendt, and Rodriguez cases, persuades us that a suspension is more appropriate than a reprimand. It is well settled that [t]he severity of the sanction to be imposed is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case [,] and that facts of mitigation may be taken into consideration. Pollack, supra, 279 Md. at 238, 369 A.2d at 68. There was no indication of deceit, fraud or dishonesty on the part of Respondent. Nor did he profit or unjustly enrich himself by his conduct. During the course of the proceedings, Respondent addressed the court wherein he acknowledged that a lawyer must maintain communication with his client and that a lawyer should also maintain himself in a position where clients can reach him. Respondent also stated that he had taken steps to improve in both these areas. As an explanation for his problems, he explained: These difficulties, that is the resource difficulties, the economic kind of difficulties that come from maybe an extended kind of pro bono activity, are real difficulties. I find unfortunate that it was necessary to move and have my office moved, but the economic circumstances dictated that. The economic circumstances dictated a number of circumstances that made it very difficult for me, as an individual and in terms of my, in terms of all relationships. Although from Respondent's explanation it is obvious that his troubles to a large extent emanated from poor economic conditions, we conclude that a 60 day suspension, nevertheless, is an appropriate sanction. Accordingly, James Henry Montgomery, Jr., shall stand suspended from the practice of law in this State for the period of sixty days, beginning thirty days after the filing of this opinion. He shall stand suspended beyond that date unless and until all costs incurred in connection with this proceeding are paid in full. It is so ordered; respondent shall pay all costs, including all costs of transcripts, pursuant to Maryland Rule BV 15c, for which sum judgment is entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission against James Henry Montgomery, Jr. Murphy, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part: I concur with the Court's conclusion that the Respondent has violated the designated provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. I think, however, that the appropriate sanction for what I view as extremely serious gross neglect of client affairs should be six months' suspension from the practice of law. In my judgment, the sixty-day suspension sanction imposed by the Court in this case will be viewed both by the public and the profession as far too light in view of the Respondent's egregious misconduct. Compare Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 347 A.2d 556 (1975).