Opinion ID: 727337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discrimination Claims--Failure to Promote, Demotion, and Failure to Accommodate

Text: 27 We first note that Kocsis' failure to accommodate claim is, to some extent, interwoven with her failure to promote and demotion claims. Where appropriate, we will address the failure to accommodate claim in the discussion of the other issues. As a separate matter, however, Kocsis' failure to accommodate claim must fail. The district court correctly noted that Kocsis firmly stated in her deposition that she never requested any accommodation from the defendant. She testified several times that she was physically capable of performing the duties of the nursing supervisor and the unit RN. Moreover, Kocsis' doctors reported that she was not limited in her activity and that she, consequently, did not need any accommodations. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment for the defendant on the failure to accommodate claim essentially for the reasons stated by the district court. 28 Next, Kocsis claims that the defendant illegally failed to promote her, i.e., failed to hire her for the corporate nursing position, because of her disability. Again, we find that the district court was correct in its analysis on this issue. Kocsis was aware that having a Train the Trainer certificate was a written requirement for anyone seeking the position. She has introduced no evidence to show that having such a certificate is not a genuine prerequisite of the position she sought. The oral representations of Suzanne White, even if true, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on this question. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment for the defendant on Kocsis' failure to promote claim. 11 29 Kocsis' demotion claim, in our view, also fails for several reasons. As is explained above, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on this claim because, although Kocsis stated a prima facie case of discriminatory demotion, the defendant successfully articulated a non-discriminatory reason for the demotion. Because Kocsis did not produce sufficient evidence to show that the articulated reason may have been a pretext for discrimination, the court found in favor of the defendant. 30 We agree with the district court that the defendant cannot discriminate because of a disability if it has no knowledge of the disability. See Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 932-34; Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.1993) (under Rehabilitation Act of 1973, employer cannot discriminate on the basis of a mental disability when employer had no knowledge of such disability); accord, Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 448 (11th Cir.1996) (no recovery under ADA when prospective employer had no actual knowledge of applicant's disability); Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir.1995) (no relief under the ADA when employer did not know that employee had a manic depressive condition). We disagree, however, with the district court's finding that Kocsis established, in the first instance, a prima facie case of disability discrimination. 12 31 In order to recover on any of her ADA claims, Kocsis must first establish as part of her prima facie case that she was a qualified individual with a disability at the time of the discriminatory act. 13 To show that she had a disability, Kocsis must establish that she had an impairment that substantially limited her major life activities, that she had a record of such an impairment, or that she was perceived as having such an impairment. 32 First, Kocsis testified in her deposition that none of her impairments--arthritis, MS, or any combination of health problems--limited her activity in any way. 14 By her own admission, therefore, she does not have an impairment that limits her major life activities. Although both arthritis and MS can be disabling in some instances, they were not so substantially limiting in this case. 15 Also, there is no evidence that a record of such an impairment existed at the time ofKocsis' reassignment in March of 1993. Therefore, Kocsis does not have a disability under either of the first two prongs of the definition. 33 As is noted above, an individual with a disability also includes persons who have impairments that are not substantially limiting, but who are regarded by their employer as being substantially limited. The applicable regulations provide that there are three ways in which a plaintiff can show that she is regarded as having a disability: 34 (1) The individual may have an impairment which is not substantially limiting but is perceived by the employer ... as constituting a substantially limiting impairment; 35 (2) the individual may have an impairment which is only substantially limiting because of the attitudes ofothers toward the impairment; or 36 (3) the individual may have no impairment at all but is regarded by the employer ... as having a substantially limiting impairment. 37 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. B, § 1630.2(l). That definition of disability is designed to protect against erroneous stereotypes some employers hold regarding certain physical or mental impairments that are not substantially limiting in fact. Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 1437, 1448-49 (W.D.Wis.1996). Under that provision, a plaintiff must show that the perceived impairment is a substantial limitation on a major life activity. Id. at 1449; accord Byrne v. Board of Education, 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir.1992) (an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job, quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir.1986)). 38 Kocsis argues that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant regarded or perceived her as having a substantially limiting disability. She points to the fact that her superiors knew that she was having health problems and that Kocsis suspected that she had MS. From this knowledge, Kocsis argues, the defendant viewed her activities as being substantially limited. In our view, however, there is virtually no evidence to support that position. Kocsis' performance evaluations reveal that the defendant was aware of her health problems, lack of energy, and mood swings. While the defendant may have perceived that Kocsis' health problems were adversely affecting her job performance, there is no evidence that defendant regarded Kocsis as being unable to care for herself or to perform all of the duties of her job. Therefore, Kocsis cannot establish that she had a disability under the regarded as prong of the definition. 39 Assuming, however, that Kocsis could establish that she had a disability under the ADA, she would still be required to show, as part of her prima facie case, that the employer's actions about which she complains were materially adverse. See Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir.1987); Cherry v. Thermo Electron Corp., 800 F.Supp. 508, 511 (E.D.Mich.1992); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Specifically, Kocsis must show that her reassignment to unit RN was a materially adverse change in the terms of her employment. With respect to this issue, we refer to analogous cases decided in the context of age and sex discrimination, because cases involving the ADEA and Title VII are instructive in cases involving the ADA. 40 This court has held that reassignments without salary or work hour changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir.1987). In Yates, the plaintiff sued her employer, alleging that it retaliated against her for engaging in protected activities. The allegedly adverse action involved requiring the plaintiff to sign an agreement with her employer as a condition to being promoted. The court found that the employer's requirement was not an adverse action, noting particularly that the plaintiff received no pay or benefits reduction. Id. (citing Ferguson v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 560 F.Supp. 1172 (D.Del.1983)). 41 In Spring v. Sheboygan Area School District, 865 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.1989), the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA requires the plaintiff to prove that she suffered a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of her employment because of her employer's conduct. Spring, 865 F.2d at 885 (emphasis in original). In Spring, the plaintiff was a school principal who, as part of a district-wide reorganization plan, had been transferred to a dual-principalship position that she claimed was generally perceived by the public as a nudge towards retirement. In the new position, however, she received a new employment contract and a merit pay increase. Id. at 886. The court found that the plaintiff's order of proof showed that the new position actually seemed more advantageous if not easier to perform, and the staff size remained the same. Id. The court summarily dismissed the public perception argument by noting that the public's perception of the job or transfer was not a term or condition of employment. Id. The court concluded that the reassignment was not a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of her employment. 16 Id. 42 In a later case, the Seventh Circuit fleshed out the standard advanced in Spring, stating that a materially adverse employment action might be indicated if an employee received significantly diminished material responsibilities, and would therefore potentially raise a genuine issue of material fact. Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). 17 The plaintiff in Crady, a bank officer, had been transferred from one division of the bank to another, but simply failed to offer any proof that his responsibilities were any less significant even though they were different. Id. The court listed certain factors to consider in determining whether an employment action was materially adverse: termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Id. The court also stated that a change in employment conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Id. Although the plaintiff's new title did not carry the Assistant Vice-President designation of his former position, the court found that the change was not materially adverse. Id.; accord, Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir.1994) (a semantic change in title and a bruised ego were not enough where pay and benefits remained the same); see also Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994) (changes in ... working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage ... are insufficient to establish the adverse condition required. (Emphasis added)). 43 In the constructive discharge context, this court has affirmed a Kentucky district court which stated the general rule that, [b]arring unusual circumstances, ... a transfer at no loss of title, pay, or benefits does not amount to ... [an] adverse employment action. Darnell v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 731 F.Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D.Ky.1990), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.1991). In Darnell, the plaintiff, a county employee, received a transfer to a job with the same duties, pay, and grade level, but the new position was in another County office that was a 20-minute drive further than the original job. The plaintiff argued that the required additional driving time converted the transfer to a constructive discharge. In deciding that the transfer was not a materially adverse employment action, the court reasoned that the two jobs were the same in terms of salary, duties, etc. and ... the [20-minute additional drive did] not impose an onerous burden. Id. at 1313; accord, Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079, 1086 (5th Cir.1985) (a plaintiff's subjective impressions as to the desirability of one position over another is not controlling). The district court considered whether plaintiff had tried the new position so as to experience and compare any claimed unfavorable or harmful effect in comparison to the old position. The court held that plaintiff ha[s] the obligation to give it a try and could not speculate that the defendant was acting in bad faith. Darnell, 731 F.Supp. at 1312. 44 We conclude that Kocsis has not suffered a materially adverse employment action. In her new job as unit RN, she enjoyed the same (or a greater) rate of pay and benefits, and her duties were not materially modified. She submitted no evidence that she lost any prestige in her position because of her working conditions or her title change. Also, Kocsis failed to make a real attempt to compare the two positions before she filed her discrimination claim. Her immediate challenge of the transfer as a reflection of disability discrimination was premature. We agree with those courts who have required such a plaintiff to demonstrate as part of a prima facie case a showing of materially adverse conditions imposed by the employer. In our opinion, plaintiff has failed to make out such a case in her demotion claim, and summary judgment was appropriate for defendant on that basis.