Opinion ID: 2332726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DIVISION OF THE 401(k) ACCOUNT

Text: [¶ 4] While courts do not have authority to alter or amend divorce judgments, there is no question that the court has the inherent and continuing authority to construe and clarify its judgment when that judgment is ambiguous. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 582 A.2d 976, 977 (Me. 1990); accord Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2000 ME 37, ¶¶ 9-10, 746 A.2d 358. When faced with ambiguous prior orders, it is incumbent on a later court to reasonably interpret those previous orders. See Raymond v. Raymond, 480 A.2d 718, 721-22 (Me.1984). We employ a two-part, objective test when reviewing a trial court's order that attempts to clarify a divorce decree: (1) [W]hether the court's prior judgment was sufficiently ambiguous as a matter of law; and (2) whether the court's construction of its prior judgment is consistent with its language read as a whole and is objectively supported by the record. MacDonald, 582 A.2d at 977 (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. Gamester, 1999 ME 92, ¶ 10, 732 A.2d 273, 276 (applying this two-part objective test); Murphy v. Murphy, 1997 ME 103, ¶ 8, 694 A.2d 932, 934 (same). When a divorce judgment does not expressly determine a particular issue, the judgment will be construed by considering the intent of the divorce court. See In re Reider, 177 B.R. 412, 418-19 (Bankr.Me.1994) (applying Maine law); Elliot v. Elliot, 431 A.2d 55, 57 (Me.1981). [¶ 5] The MacDonald test initially asks whether the divorce judgment was sufficiently ambiguous as a matter of law to require subsequent clarification. See MacDonald, 582 A.2d at 977. In this case, the divorce judgment was not ambiguous. The relevant portion of the divorce decree read: The plaintiff's 401K pension account is agreed to have a balance of $341,642. One-half of that account is awarded to the defendant. Defendant is to prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order for that purpose. Reading the preceding statement in context of the entire divorce judgment, it remains clear the divorce court sought to award Valerie one-half of the account, not one-half of the value of the account as of any particular date. [¶ 6] The Superior Court agreed and found the following: Although the divorce court recited the balance in the account as of the date of the hearing, the award was not one-half of that balance but one-half of the account. The Court then substituted a new order for the unambiguous order of the divorce court: Given the vagaries of the stock market, this court concludes that the value of the account to be distributed should have been determined as of the date of the divorce and the defendant should have received one-half of this amount. [¶ 7] It is clear that the original decree sought to award to Valerie one-half of the 401(k) account. The court, however, erred in fixing the date of valuation as the date of the decree, rather than the date of the actual division of the asset. Gains or losses in the account's value subsequent to the divorce belong to the parties in proportion to their share in the fund. Although Stephen had investment authority pursuant to the provisions of the trust establishing the account, he was not entitled to any more than his share of the fund's growth. As of the date of the decree, Valerie was entitled to one-half of the account. The court's order deprives her of her share of the fund's growth subsequent to the date of the decree. We therefore remand to the Superior Court in order that it may (1) establish the value of the account as of the date of distribution; and (2) award to Valerie her share of that fund and the income on any undistributed portion of the fund to the date of its final distribution to her.