Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Challenge to Prospective Juror C.C.

Text: At the time of trial, C.C. was 47 years old, married with three children, and worked as a motor sweeper operator for the City of Los Angeles. He had served in the Marine Corps and held a bachelor's degree in sociology. According to his questionnaire answers, he had no opinions about the American jury system and did not know what should be done about violent crime. His general feelings about the death penalty were only in support of the law and that he support[ed] whatever the law states. Asked whether he believed in an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth he checked both yes and no and added, whatever the law stipulates. He believed the death penalty may be appropriate when the law makes it appropriate and not appropriate when the law so stipulates. Although he thought all the circumstances surrounding a case should be considered in deciding penalty, he indicated he believed all aspects of the defendant's background should not be considered, explaining, in answer to question No. 76 of the questionnaire, that the only thing that's important is the letter of the law. Regarding any potential conflict between religious views and the law, he said he would follow the law because this is a nation of laws and we should be bound by laws. On question No. 84, he indicated he did not think the death penalty should be automatic for an intentional murder because I would need to know what the law stipulates. [17] Questioned by the court about his answer to question No. 76, C.C. agreed that he could follow instructions to consider the defendant's background in weighing factors in aggravation and mitigation in a penalty phase trial. When the prosecutor asked him to explain questionnaire answers the prosecutor characterized as noncommittal and whatever's the law, C.C. responded: Whatever the instructions are, whatever the law is. I'm not thoroughly familiar with the whole concept. Responding to the court's request, in the Wheeler/Batson hearing, for his reasons for excusing C.C., the prosecutor said: Mr. [C.], it was my feeling was very noncommittal in his, not only his questionnaire, but some of the questions that were asked. When I was talking to other jurors, I noticed Mr. [C.] was looking away like he did not want to be here in this courtroom. And the questionnaire under the death penalty was, again, noncommittal. Whatever is the law. Did not say he could go for the death penalty or for life, and that's the reason I excused Mr. [C.]. Later, when the court asked him to clarify what he meant by noncommittal, a term he had used about T.J. as well, the prosecutor added: Noncommittal. Unequivocal [ sic ] in their answers. They're neither for the death penalty nor against it. They were very vague in their answers in the questionnaire. They, they wouldn't give an indication either way whether they would automatically or even strongly favor either life or death. At another point in the hearing, the prosecutor itemized several questionnaire answers in which C.C. stated simply that he would follow the law and added: And that was his attitude at one point, almost turning his head and closing his eyes during jury selection, and that is the reason, not race, that I felt he should be excused. The court stated C.C. was a close one, but if I understand [the prosecutor's] reasons, he felt that he was noncommittal. The court agreed with defendant that such lack of commitment was not grounds for disqualification, but found the prosecutor was looking for somebody who had a stronger view regarding the death penalty or regarding their ability to impose the death penalty. Defendant argues that as a middle-aged, family man, a former combat Marine, with an obviously very conservative, law-and-order philosophy, C.C. was a desirable juror from the prosecution's point of view and the choice to excuse him could only have been based upon race. But while C.C. repeatedly stated he would follow the law, his responses do not necessarily indicate a proprosecution inclination. He did not have an opinion about solving the problem of violent crime and did not believe in retribution (an eye for an eye) except to the extent the law stipulated it. He had no strong feelings for or against the death penalty generally, and he neither favored nor opposed the death penalty for a person convicted of first degree murder in the course of a residential burglary and robbery. The prosecutor's description of C.C. as noncommittal, rather than as a clear prosecution juror, accords with the record. Defendant points out that two jurors accepted by the prosecutor to sit in this case, both White, also indicated on the questionnaire or in voir dire that they would follow the law. But neither of these retained jurors clung so persistently to this answer as C.C. did. In answer to question No. 63 (strength of feelings about the death penalty), Juror No. 3 said it should be used only where circumstances indicate as determined by [the] judicial system, but he gave detailed, well-thought-out answers on questions Nos. 60 and 61 (feelings about the death penalty and reasons for so feeling) and question No. 64 (regarding an eye for an eye), all of which C.C. responded to with terse statements that he supported the law and believed whatever it provided. In answer to questions Nos. 73 and 74, Juror No. 7 stated the death penalty was appropriate only as prescribed by the law, but on question No. 60 he said he favored the death penalty as a deterrent to crime (where C.C. responded only that his feelings were in support of the law), and on question No. 84 he said the death penalty should be automatic for certain specified kinds of murder (where C.C. responded only that he would need to know what the law stipulates). [18] (14) Finally, defendant observes that some jurors the prosecutor accepted gave answers suggesting reservations about imposing the death penalty. But the prosecutor's stated reason for challenging C.C. was not that he insufficiently favored the death penalty; rather, it was that he resisted expressing a view on either possible penalty: he [d]id not say he could go for the death penalty or for life, was  neither for the death penalty nor against it, was very vague in [his] answers, and wouldn't give an indication either way whether they would automatically or even strongly favor either life or death. (Italics added.) Certainly, impartiality requires that a juror not commit to one penalty or the other before hearing the evidence. But a prosecutor might plausibly fear that a prospective juror who articulates no personal views and insists his role will be merely to follow the law will be unprepared and perhaps unable to make the difficult normative decision required of a California penalty juror. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the prosecutor peremptorily challenged C.C. not because of his race, but because the prosecutor was looking for somebody who had a stronger view regarding the death penalty or regarding their ability to impose the death penalty.