Opinion ID: 2673881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion Justified the Pat Down

Text: Each factor Officer Devos identified is relevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis, even if not sufficient by itself to decide the outcome. Those factors and Officer Devos’s concern for his safety establish reasonable suspicion sufficient to pass constitutional muster. We first analyze each of the factors: (1) Officer Devos’s previous encounter with Mr. Garcia, (2) Mr. Garcia’s criminal history, (3) Officer Devos’s working conditions, _________________________________ than as co-dependent. We agree the “armed and dangerous” test is conjunctive, but the dissent’s view forecloses consideration of how an officer’s suspicion that an individual is dangerous can affect that officer’s suspicion that an individual is armed, and vice versa. This omission undervalues officers’ concern “that [their] safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also United States v. Morrison, 58 F. App’x 381, 384 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”) (unpublished) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)). Although not precedential, unpublished decisions may be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). The dissent further notes that requiring an officer to have reasonable suspicion of an individual being armed and dangerous makes sense as a practical matter: “If an officer does not reasonably believe the suspect is armed, there would be no reason for the officer to engage in a Terry pat down because the officer would have no legitimate fear of a concealed weapon that could be used to harm.” Dissent at 3. But this reasoning forecloses the possibility of an officer’s concern about an individual’s dangerousness contributing to the officer’s reasonable suspicion the individual is armed. The dissent concedes there are instances when an individual’s past criminal history or current involvement in a crime support a finding of reasonable suspicion—even without specific signs the individual is presently carrying a weapon. See United States v. Garcia, 459 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that “a connection with drug transactions can support a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous”); Rice, 483 F.3d at 1084-85 (holding that Mr. Rice’s extensive criminal history of crimes with weapons combined with the encounter occurring in a high-crime area at a late-night hour support a conclusion of reasonable suspicion). -9- and (4) other, less significant factors. We then present a totality of the circumstances analysis. 1. Mr. Garcia’s Previous Encounter with Officer Devos Two weeks before the traffic stop and pat down of Mr. Garcia’s person, Mr. Garcia ran from Officer Devos and then aggressively confronted him when he could no longer run. Officer Devos used a Taser on Mr. Garcia to subdue him. The district court found this encounter to be a significant reasonable suspicion factor. Mr. Garcia and the dissent contend this incident should carry little weight because Mr. Garcia was not armed. Because the reasonable suspicion test is broad enough to include consideration of aggressive actions—including actions without weapons—we agree with the district court that this encounter supports reasonable suspicion. This circuit and other circuits have determined that an officer’s knowledge of an individual’s recent aggressive conduct is relevant to reasonable suspicion. In United States v. Sanchez, 519 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008), we held that officers had reasonable suspicion to perform a pat-down search of Mr. Sanchez after (1) receiving information from an informant that an individual had slapped a woman and (2) finding a concealed weapon on an occupant of a vehicle associated with the assault but not the vehicle in which Mr. Sanchez was a passenger. See also Brown, 232 F.3d at 594 (individual “acting erratically and somewhat aggressively throughout the late afternoon to early evening period” by running over a fence with his vehicle roused officer’s concern for his own safety and thus justified the officer’s pat-down search, despite no specific -10- suspicion of a weapon); United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 13-8596, 2014 WL 515959 (U.S. Mar. 10, 2014) (officer’s observation of “vehicle aggressively chasing the vehicle in front of it, following by less than one car length” and turning right through a red traffic light fast enough “to cause the vehicles' tires to screech” contributed, among other factors, to the officer’s reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct a pat-down search for weapons). Although Mr. Garcia did not possess a weapon during the previous encounter, the reasonable suspicion test does not require Officer Devos to be “absolutely certain that the individual is armed; [rather] the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Officer Devos knew Mr. Garcia was able and willing to act combatively toward police officers in confrontational situations. Requiring Mr. Garcia to exit a vehicle following the arrest of the driver to allow Officer Devos to inventory and impound that vehicle had as much or more potential to be a confrontational situation as the previous encounter. Officer Devos previously tasered Mr. Garcia and facilitated his arrest, which could reasonably raise Officer Devos’s suspicion that Mr. Garcia had a motive for revenge. In sum, Officer Devos’s previous encounter with Mr. Garcia provided ample ground for officer safety concern even though Mr. Garcia did not have a gun on that occasion. -11- 2. Mr. Garcia’s Criminal History Officer Devos knew Mr. Garcia had a criminal record that included a 2003 armed robbery. Mr. Garcia and the dissent contend the conviction’s nine-years-old status marginalizes its relevance for reasonable suspicion. We disagree. Not only did Mr. Garcia previously possess a weapon, he used it in a crime of violence. We do not think the passage of time significantly diminishes the relevance of this criminal history in the context of an officer in the field assessing a safety risk. See United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n conjunction with other factors, criminal history contributes powerfully to the reasonable suspicion calculus.”). An officer’s knowledge of past criminal conduct is probative of whether the defendant is armed and dangerous, especially if a weapon was involved. See, e.g., Rice, 483 F.3d at 1081-82 (the report from police dispatch mentioned that Mr. Rice was “known to be armed and dangerous” (quotations omitted));8 United States v. Garcia, 459 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that a defendant’s history of drug trafficking— which itself is often connected with firearms—contributes to an officer’s reasonable 8 The dissent’s view of Rice seems confined to the statement that the officer in that case “could not perform a pat-down search for weapons unless he reasonably suspected that [Mr.] Rice might be carrying one.” Rice, 483 F.3d at 1084. But the court in Rice did not confine its reasonable suspicion analysis to specific observations suggesting Mr. Rice was presently armed. Rather, the court concluded the officer possessed reasonable suspicion based upon (1) Mr. Rice’s history of weapons crimes and (2) the circumstances surrounding the pat down, including Mr. Rice being stopped in a high-crime area late at night. Id. -12- suspicion that the defendant is armed and dangerous); McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536 (drug trafficking).9 Our decision in McRae is instructive because there was no direct evidence that Mr. McRae had ever actually possessed a gun. Mr. McRae had been convicted of drug trafficking. Although the dates of Mr. McRae’s convictions were unreported, we said the officer could reasonably infer previous gun possession. In this case, Mr. Garcia was found guilty of armed robbery—and, therefore, found to have actually possessed a weapon—beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180, 187-88 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding an officer’s knowledge of a past armed robbery conviction of undetermined age relevant to reasonable suspicion, but insufficient on its own). Officer Devos could infer from Mr. Garcia’s criminal record that he had the ability to secure a weapon and the propensity to use it in criminal activity. We conclude Officer Devos’s knowledge of the armed robbery conviction supported reasonable suspicion that Mr. Garcia was armed and dangerous. 3. Officer Safety: Time, Place, and the Inventory Search Officer Devos stopped the vehicle on a sparsely travelled street. He needed to turn his back to Mr. Garcia to conduct the inventory search. The district court properly relied 9 None of these cases report dates of past convictions or suggest older convictions are irrelevant to reasonable suspicion. -13- on these factors in determining that Officer Devos was reasonably concerned for his safety. Mr. Garcia distinguishes this case from those involving an arrest or pat down in high-crime areas late at night. He is correct to a degree. But the circumstances here—a nighttime stop in a sparsely travelled area—would still have heightened a reasonable officer’s concerns for safety, especially in the context of a single-officer inventory search. This court has twice ruled that similar circumstances were relevant to officer safety. See McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536; Manjarrez, 348 F.3d at 887. In McRae, an officer frisked Mr. McRae after obtaining consent to search Mr. McRae’s vehicle. McRae, 81 F.3d at 1531-32. The court concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion to frisk Mr. McRae because (1) “a search of the car might compel Officer Colyar to turn his back on Mr. McRae, and the two men were on an isolated stretch of highway”; (2) the officer received information that Mr. McRae has a criminal history and should be approached with “extreme caution”; and (3) Mr. McRae put on his jacket before exiting his vehicle, and “a jacket is a likely place in which to store a weapon.” Id. at 1536. In Manjarrez, an officer frisked Mr. Manjarrez after obtaining consent to search Mr. Manjarrez’s vehicle. Manjarrez, 348 F.3d at 884. Unlike the officer in McRae, however, the officer in Manjarrez had no knowledge of any previous criminal history, and Mr. Manjarrez was not acting suspiciously. Id. The court concluded that the officer “could not reasonably be expected to leave Defendant in his patrol car, turn his back on -14- Defendant, insert his head into Defendant’s car, and search the car without first checking Defendant for weapons.” Id. at 887. Although neither McRae nor Manjarrez are factually identical to the present case,10 both suggest Officer Devos’s circumstances—including working alone on a sparsely travelled street and having to turn his back to Mr. Garcia—support reasonable suspicion. 4. Other Factors: Nervousness and Drug Use Officer Devos also cited Mr. Garcia’s nervous behavior and his knowledge of Mr. Garcia’s drug use history as contributing to his decision to pat Mr. Garcia down. Nervous behavior11 and drug use history12 may be relevant to reasonable suspicion, but we consider both as having minimal impact on the analysis here. 10 Unlike either McRae or Manjarrez, this case does not involve the consensual search of a vehicle. The reasonable suspicion analyses in both McRae and Manjarrez, however, did not turn on whether the search was consensual, but instead on the officers’ concern for their own safety, including having to turn their backs to defendants to conduct the search. 11 The cases analyzing an individual’s nervous behavior to determine reasonable suspicion highlight a tension between deferring to an officer’s ability to detect suspicious behavior and discounting nervous behavior because “everyone gets nervous when stopped by a police officer.” United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1220 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[U]nless an individual’s display of nervousness is unusually severe or persistent, or accompanied by other, more probative grounds for reasonable suspicion, it is of limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.” (quotations omitted)). -15- 5. Totality of the Circumstances The totality of the circumstances includes Officer Devos’s knowledge, the conditions under which he was working, and his concern for his own safety. See McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536. By arresting the vehicle’s driver and following Police Department protocol to perform the mandatory vehicle inventory, Officer Devos needed to deal with the vehicle’s passenger, Mr. Garcia. Officer Devos knew Mr. Garcia (1) previously sought to evade arrest, took a combative stance when escape was not feasible, and had to be tased; and he knew Mr. Garcia (2) had a violent criminal past, which included an armed robbery. In addition to this knowledge, Officer Devos needed to conduct an inventory search of the Hyundai after sundown without other officer support on an isolated road with his back turned to Mr. Garcia. In the two Tenth Circuit cases that have considered _________________________________ 12 As the district court concluded, Officer Devos’s knowledge of Mr. Garcia’s drug use was a minor factor. In cases where this court has found a defendant’s drug involvement sufficient to justify a pat down, the defendant had a history of trafficking drugs. The nexus between drug trafficking and carrying a weapon gave the officer reasonable suspicion that the defendant might be armed and dangerous. See Garcia, 459 F.3d at 1064 (stating that “[n]umerous other cases lend support to the proposition that an individual's involvement with drug transactions or distribution can support reasonable suspicion to frisk that individual for weapons” and citing to several cases). Officer Devos had knowledge only of Mr. Garcia’s drug use. Although it may have been reasonable for Officer Devos to fear Mr. Garcia’s using a syringe as a weapon, the district court did not decide on this ground, and we conclude the other circumstances surrounding the pat down suffice to support a conclusion of reasonable suspicion. -16- an officer’s having to turn his or her back to a defendant, we required little beyond this concern to support the officer’s reasonable suspicion. See McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536; Manjarrez, 348 F.3d at 887. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Officer Devos had reasonable suspicion sufficient under the Fourth Amendment to pat down Mr. Garcia.