Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threats As Evidence in Aggravation

Text: Defendant next argues the court improperly instructed the jury regarding threats contained in a letter defendant wrote to Theresa Roch, and threatening words spoken over the telephone to Donna Hatch. He argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that these acts violated any penal statute and therefore was inadmissible as a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). He also argues the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. The error, he argues, violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a reliable penalty verdict. 1. Letter to Theresa Roch On July 6, 1979, defendant wrote a letter to Theresa Roch from the San Diego County Jail in which he stated the following: By the way, today I got news from Quack. He says he knows I am innocent but also knows how I will get railroaded. So if I loose [ sic ] this case, they will take out O'Connor, Sexton, McCarno [ sic ] and Armstrong, or at least one member of their family [ sic ]. I don't like the idea of violence, since I have never been a violent person and the proposal seeks my agreement. I haven't sent an answer as of yet because I have to consider a lot of things before I do. I don't like the idea ... but I also don't like sitting on someone else's murder charge! So that gives me a lot to think about. Over defendant's objections, the prosecution introduced the letter as a factor in aggravation, characterizing it as a threat to kill Deputy District Attorneys Frank Sexton and Thomas McArdle, Defense Attorney Patrick O'Connor, San Diego County Sheriff's Department laboratory criminalist, Brandon Armstrong, and members of their families, in violation of sections 69 (deterring an executive officer) [19] and 71 (threat to injure a public officer), [20] and title 18 United States Code section 876 (use of mail to communicate threat). [21] Defendant argues the court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of these three crimes and admitting the letter into evidence as a factor in aggravation. We agree that the prosecution lacked sufficient evidence to prove that defendant violated either section 71 or title 18 United States Code section 876, but conclude the evidence was sufficient to find that he violated Penal Code section 69. The letter, therefore, was properly admitted. Any error in instructing the jury regarding section 71 or title 18 United States Code section 876 was harmless. (29) Section 69 requires that the defendant attempted, by threat, to deter executive officers from performing their legal duties. The fact that defendant wrote the letter at the start of the capital proceedings against him and in it threatened to kill the prosecutors, Sexton and McArdle, Criminalist Armstrong, his own defense counsel, and their families should he lose at trial is sufficient evidence to find the letter contained threats to executive officers. Further, in spite of the fact that the letter was addressed to Theresa Roch, there is sufficient evidence to find defendant knew the threats would be delivered to the district attorney's office. Defendant was incarcerated at the San Diego County Jail and therefore was unable to deliver the letter directly to the United States Postal Service. He used the only means available to him under those circumstances, and placed the letter into the San Diego County Jail's normal mail circulation routine by giving the letter to a deputy sheriff assigned to process outgoing mail. The deputy sheriff, however, intercepted the letter upon learning that there had been a security hold placed on defendant's mail and delivered it instead to the district attorney's office. The record reveals that at the time defendant placed the letter to Theresa Roch with the deputy sheriff, he was aware of the existence of the hold on his mail and knew that the district attorney would read his letters. [22] It can be argued, therefore, that even though defendant placed the letter to Theresa Roch into the jail's outgoing mail by giving it to the deputy sheriff, he knew it would eventually be delivered to the prosecutor's office. Contrary to defendant's argument, section 69 does not require a showing that McArdle, Armstrong, Sexton or O'Connor took the threats seriously or felt threatened by the letter ( People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572]), or that defendant had the present ability to carry out the threats ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1060 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388]). Evidence that the letter contained the threats was sufficient to support a finding that defendant violated section 69. (30) Whether the letter sufficed to prove a violation of title 18 United States Code section 876 is a closer question. That statute requires proof of only two elements for conviction: first, the defendant must have written and mailed a letter or other communication containing a threat to injure another person, and second, he or she must have knowingly caused the letter to be deposited in the mails. ( United States v. Sirhan (9th Cir. 1974) 504 F.2d 818, 819.) Contrary to defendant's argument, the threat need not be directed to the recipient of the letter. ( Ibid. [letter addressed to U.S. Secretary of State Rogers contained a threat to kill Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir].) Nor is it necessary that the victim receive the threat. ( U.S. v. Geisler (7th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 1070, 1072.) Defendant correctly argues the evidence failed to prove he violated title 18 United States Code section 876 because it did not establish that he caused the letter to be deposited in the mail. As set forth above, even though defendant placed the letter to Theresa Roch into the jail's outgoing mail by giving it to the deputy sheriff, he knew it would be intercepted by the deputy sheriffs and delivered to the district attorney's office. He knew it would not be, and arguably did not intend for it to be, actually deposited into the United States Postal Service, and therefore he did not violate title 18 United States Code section 876. That the evidence was insufficient to show a violation of section 71 is clear. Section 71 requires a showing that the defendant with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any ... public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat could be carried out.... The prosecution presented no evidence that the threats were directly communicated to the four intended victims and no evidence that any of the victims harbored a reasonable belief that the threat could be carried out. In the absence of such evidence, the prosecution failed to establish defendant violated section 71 by writing the letter to Theresa Roch. Because the letter included threats to use force and violence and violated section 69, the court did not err in admitting it as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). We see no reasonable likelihood that in giving the additional instructions regarding section 71 and title 18 United States Code section 876 the court misled or confused the jury. Although it is error to give an instruction that, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case, such an error does not appear to be of federal constitutional dimension. ( People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129-1130 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45].) Further, the court instructed the jurors not to consider a factor in aggravation unless they first were convinced of its truth beyond a reasonable doubt, and we presume they followed those instructions. (See People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 920 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494].) Even assuming error in the giving of the instructions, in light of the great weight of evidence presented in aggravation we see no reasonable possibility defendant would have obtained a different verdict in the penalty retrial had the instructions regarding section 71 and title 18 United States Code section 876 not been given. 2. Words to Donna Hatch Donna Hatch testified that on June 8, 1979, defendant called her house in Terrell, Texas. Her grandmother initially answered the telephone and when Hatch took the line, defendant was still babbling on. I guess he thought she was still on the phone. When he found out it was me he said, `I'll kill you, too.' Defendant asserts the court erred when it instructed the jury that they could consider whether defendant's words to Donna Hatch constituted a threat to Hatch in violation of California Penal Code section 653m (making annoying phone calls), and Texas Penal Code section 42.07 (harassment by telephone). We agree, but conclude the error was harmless. In 1979, when the telephone call was made, Texas Penal Code section 42.07 defined harassment by telephone as a communication that intentionally threatens, by telephone or in writing, to take unlawful action against any person and by this action intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly annoys or alarms the recipient or intends to annoy or alarm the recipient. (Tex. Penal Code Ann., former § 42.07(a)(2).) In 1983 the Texas Legislature amended Texas Penal Code section 42.07 to clearly delineate what types of actions would alarm or annoy people, and to specify that such actions, to be unlawful, must be performed in a manner reasonably likely to annoy or alarm the recipient of the telephone call. In 1989, the Texas courts decided that Texas Penal Code former section 42.07, as it existed before the 1983 amendment, was unconstitutionally vague ( May v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) 765 S.W.2d 438, 440), and that the 1983 amendment was constitutional ( Bader v. State (Tex.App. 1989) 773 S.W.2d 769, 770) but not retroactive ( May v. State, supra, 765 S.W.2d at p. 440). Therefore, in 1979, when the telephone call was made, there was no constitutionally valid statute in effect in Texas prohibiting defendant's actions, and when the court instructed the jury pursuant to the 1983 amendment of Texas Penal Code section 42.07, it erred. The 1983 amendment did not apply retroactively and the statute in effect before the amendment was unconstitutional. In addition, because defendant called Terrell, Texas, from Greenwood, Louisiana, and not from within California, he did not violate the laws of California. (Cf. §§ 27 [persons are liable for punishment for crimes committed, in whole or in part, within the state], 653m [an offense is deemed committed either in the place where the telephone call was made or where it was received].) The court erred, therefore, in instructing the jury to consider the facts in light of section 653m. Further, the prosecution did not argue that the telephone call was admissible as a violation of any other penal statute. Because the telephone call originated in Louisiana, it may have violated Louisiana law, but the prosecution did not so argue. The court therefore erred in admitting the evidence as a factor in aggravation. Any error, however, in admitting the evidence of the phone call or instructing the jury as to California and Texas penal statutes was harmless in light of the great weight of evidence presented in aggravation. We see no reasonable possibility defendant would have obtained a different verdict in the penalty retrial had the evidence of the phone call not been admitted and the erroneous instructions not been given.