Opinion ID: 1899017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mens rea analysis

Text: The bribery statute does not have an explicit mens rea requirement on its face, but it is subject to the culpability requirements of Section 302 of the Crimes Code; § 302. General requirements of culpability (a) Except as provided in section 305 of this title (relating to limitations on scope of culpability requirements), a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. . . . . (c) Culpability required unless otherwise provided.  When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto. 18 Pa.C.S. § 302. Thus, bribery is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently with respect to each material element of the offense. The Superior Court concluded that SAIA and SEA, unlike bribery, satisfy an exception to the culpability requirements of Section 302(a) of the Crimes Code. The culpability requirements of Section 302 apply to all crimes in the Crimes Code, like bribery, and those outside of the Crimes Code, like SAIA and SEA. However, the General Assembly provides limitations to the culpability requirements of Section 302(a) in Section 305(a) as follows: § 305. Limitations on scope of culpability requirements (a) When culpability requirements are inapplicable to summary offenses and to offenses defined by other statutes.  The requirements of culpability prescribed by section 301 of this title (relating to requirement of voluntary act) and section 302 of this title (relating to general requirements of culpability) do not apply to: (1) summary offenses, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense or the court determines that its application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense; or (2) offenses defined by statutes other than this title, in so far as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears. 18 Pa.C.S. § 305 (emphasis added). When the General Assembly plainly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability, pursuant to Section 305(a)(2), the Commonwealth does not have to establish a mens rea element to establish the defendant is guilty of a crime. The Commonwealth argues that SEA and SAIA plainly impose absolute criminal liability and pursuant to Section 305(a)(2) are not, therefore, subject to the culpability requirements of 302(a). We disagree. No intent plainly appears to impose absolute liability in either SEA or SAIA. The omission of an explicit mens rea element in a criminal statute is not alone sufficient evidence of the legislature's plain intent to dispense with a traditional mens rea requirement and impose absolute criminal liability. Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). [9] In the absence of plain legislative intent, we must consider the purpose for the two statutes, the severity of punishment and its effect on the defendant's reputation and, finally, the common law origin of the crimes to determine whether the legislature intended to impose absolute criminal liability. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994); Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983) (Zappala, J., concurring) (quoting Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir.1960)). Absolute criminal liability statutes are an exception to the centuries old philosophy of criminal law that imposed criminal responsibility only for an act coupled with moral culpability. Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 499 Pa. 106, 116, 451 A.2d 1344, 1348 (1982). A criminal statute that imposes absolute liability typically involves regulation of traffic or liquor laws. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983) (upholding the imposition of absolute criminal liability where the Commonwealth failed to charge or prove culpability pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4), driving with a blood alcohol of.10%, and the defendant was sentenced to less than ninety days imprisonment); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959) (upholding absolute vicarious criminal liability for the sale of liquor to minors); Commonwealth v. Rudinski, 382 Pa.Super. 462, 555 A.2d 931 (1989) (absolute liability for parking violations); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 497 Pa. 49, 438 A.2d 964 (1981) (statutory rape is a strict criminal liability crime); compare Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Com., 504 Pa. 191, 470 A.2d 945 (1983) (Section 404(d) of SEA unconstitutionally imposes criminal liability for noncompliance with reporting requirements with which a public official is not able to have the ability to comply and thereby violates the essence of our criminal law that imposes criminal liability for voluntary culpable acts). As we explained in Koczwara, [s]uch so-called statutory crimes are in reality an attempt to utilize the machinery of criminal administration as an enforcing arm for social regulation of a purely civil nature, with the punishment totally unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt. Koczwara, 397 Pa. at 580, 155 A.2d at 827-28. Neither SEA nor SAIA, however, regulates or governs behavior that is the subject of the typical public welfare offense for which the legislature imposes absolute criminal liability. Both SEA and SAIA have the same legislative purpose, which is to increase public confidence in state government by providing criminal penalties involving a public office that is for financial gain or personal benefit. The earlier statute, SAIA, focuses on adverse interests in state contracts, whereas the later statute, SEA, applies to a wider variety of financial conflicts. These are very different concerns from those addressed by other absolute liability offenses such as violating traffic laws or statutes governing the distribution of liquor. Also, both statutes impose serious penalties, which indicates that the General Assembly did not intend to eliminate the mens rea requirement. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). A violation of SAIA is a misdemeanor punishable by automatic forfeiture of state employment, up to a $1,000.00 fine and a year in prison. 71 P.S. § 776.8. A person who violates Sections 403(a), (b) or (c) of SEA is guilty of a felony and subject to a sentence of up to five years in prison and a $10,000.00 fine. 65 P.S. § 409. The severity of these punishments is a further factor tending to suggest that the legislature did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement. Staples, 511 U.S. at 618, 114 S.Ct. at 1803. Additionally, common law crimes like bribery traditionally have a mens rea requirement. Morissette. Bribery occurs when a judge, or other person concerned in the administration of justice, takes any undue reward to influence his behaviour in his office. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries . A related common law crime, extortion, consists of any officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due. Id. at . By proscribing the use of public office for personal financial gain or other benefit, SEA and SAIA are direct descendants of these common law crimes that impose a culpability requirement and the legislature, therefore, is less likely to have silently eliminated culpability. Id. Finally, we have held that criminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of the offense when the proscribed conduct necessarily involves deceitful acts and acts of fraud. Commonwealth v. Lurie, 524 Pa. 56, 569 A.2d 329 (1990). Both SEA and SAIA involve deceiving the State for the personal benefit of the employee. Therefore, they necessarily involve a mens rea requirement pursuant to Lurie.