Opinion ID: 2521294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Colorado Code Of Judicial Conduct Mandates Recusal Whenever A Judge's Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned

Text: Canon 3(C)(1) mandates recusal whenever a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, providing: A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: . . . (b) a judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it. . . . C.J.C. 3(C)(1)(b) (emphasis added). The commentary to Canon 3(C)(1)(b) explains that: A lawyer in a governmental agency does not necessarily have an association with other lawyers employed by that agency within the meaning of this subsection; a judge formerly employed by a governmental agency, however, should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding if the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of such association. (Emphasis added.) Courts approach the question of appearance of bias from an objective perspective: The question of disqualification focuses on whether an objective assessment of the judge's conduct produces a reasonable question about impartiality, not on the judge's subjective perception of the ability to act fairly. Abramson, supra, at 15. The dispositive question is not whether a judge is impartial in fact but whether a reasonable person  not knowing whether the judge is actually impartial  would be apt to question her impartiality. Flamm, supra, § 5.5, at 153-54 (footnotes omitted). This is because a judge who is convinced of his own impartiality, as well as the purity of his motives, may nonetheless act in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is biased. Id., § 5.6.2, at 157 (footnotes omitted). Hence, whenever a reasonable person, apprised of all the relevant facts, might question the impartiality of the judge, the judge must be disqualified. Shaman, supra, § 5.25, at 143. All reasonable doubt as to whether there is an appearance of impropriety must be resolved in favor of recusal. Johnson, 674 P.2d at 956 (concluding that the judge should have disqualified himself on the basis of an appearance of bias because it is the court's duty to eliminate every semblance of reasonable doubt or suspicion that a trial by a fair and impartial tribunal may be denied); see also Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327, 1329 (5th Cir.1986), opinion on reh'g 796 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.1986) (The separation between the roles of the prosecutor and judge must be certain and inflexible.); Abramson, supra, at 16. Whenever possible, a judge must consider whether her impartiality might reasonably be questioned before trial begins. If so, then the judge must take action sua sponte. See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Studies of the Justice System: Judicial Disqualification Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 10 (2d ed. 1992) (A judge can disqualify himself from hearing a case on his own motion. . . . Canon 3(C) is intended to be used by a judge at the start of each case as a checklist to assist in deciding whether at that point he should disqualify himself from any participation in the proceedings.); see also United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir.1988) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the federal equivalent of Canon 3(C)(1), imposes a sua sponte duty upon the judge to recuse himself if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality). Consistent with the fundamental fairness concerns that propel our judicial system, a judge who recognizes that her impartiality might reasonably be questioned must, at a very minimum, disclose to the parties all facts that suggest an appearance of bias. See, e.g., Shaman, supra, § 5.26, at 146 ([I]t is the obligation of a judge to disclose all facts which might be grounds for disqualification. It is not the duty of the parties to search out disqualifying facts about the judge.) (footnotes omitted). In my view, such disclosure is required if the judge wishes to preside over the case. Early disclosure by the trial judge provides the judge with an opportunity to reassure the parties and the public that he can be fair and impartial, that he has sworn to and intends to uphold the law, and that he harbors no loyalties towards the prosecutor's office. It also assists the judge to make the transition from being an advocate for one party to being a neutral arbiter who favors neither party. The colloquy engendered by disclosure, between the court and the parties, will ease this transition. Once a judge has disclosed his ties to the prosecution as a former employee of the district attorney's office, the judge may still be obligated to disqualify herself, absent waiver. [3] I believe that this approach, requiring both disclosure and recusal in some cases, is consistent with both Canon 3 and with the need to preserve the appearance of impartiality in our courts.