Opinion ID: 1744326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prompt reporting requirement

Text: Section 12.1-20-01, N.D.C.C., previously provided that prosecutions for various sex offenses involving minor victims could not be maintained unless the alleged offense was brought to the notice of public authority within three months after a parent, guardian, or other competent person specifically interested in the victim, learned of the offense. [5] In State v. Tibor, 373 N.W. 2d 877 (N.D.1985), we held that the section was a statute of limitation, and that the State must prove either compliance with the limitation or an exception to it. In State v. Ford, 377 N.W.2d 125, 126 (N.D.1985), we observed that [w]hen there are issues of fact concerning the applicability of a statute of limitations, it is appropriate for the trial court to refer the matter to the jury. Klem contends that the trial court denied his right to have the jury decide the issue of whether or not the prompt reporting requirement had been met. I disagree. It is important to note that in State v. Ford, supra , there was conflicting evidence as to when the mother of the minor victim of a sex offense learned of the offense, thus raising a factual issue for the jury to resolve. In my view there is no conflicting evidence justifying submission of the issue to the jury in this case. Klem argues that there is a dispute as to whether the offense was reported in October 1984 or October 1985, relying on Dr. Cook's reference to October 1984. Dr. Cook testified that his initial report said October 1984, but that he meant 1985 and that I would anticipate that I either misspoke as I dictated that or the secretary mistransposed `84 for `85. The other witnesses testifying about the reporting time testified to learning of the offense and reporting it in 1985. I am satisfied that there was no actual dispute as to the time involved.