Opinion ID: 1843999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: procedure in the workers' compensation court

Text: Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-163 (Reissue 1988) provides in part: The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may adopt and promulgate all reasonable rules and regulations necessary for carrying out the intent and purpose of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and shall administer and enforce all of the provisions of such act, except such as are committed to the Supreme Court. Also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-168 (Reissue 1988) states: The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall not be bound... by any technical or formal rules of procedure.... Stewart's Request for a Continuance. Rule XXIII of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court's Rules of Procedure (1991) includes the following provision for a continuance: No continuance will be granted in any event unless good cause is shown and none within two weeks of the date of hearing unless an emergency arises. As we expressed in Wachtel v. Beer, 229 Neb. at 402, 427 N.W.2d at 63: [A] motion for continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. See, also, State v. Fleming, 223 Neb. 169, 388 N.W.2d 497 (1986). Although we realize that Nebraska statutes prescribing procedure for a civil action are inapplicable to an action in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, see § 48-168, Rule XXIII clearly requires a showing of good cause for a continuance. As an analog for Stewart's case, we refer to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1148 (Supp.1991) concerning the procedure for a continuance in Nebraska courts other than the Workers' Compensation Court. Construing § 25-1148 and its requirement of a showing to justify a continuance, we have stated: An application for continuance must be in writing and supported by an affidavit which contains factual allegations demonstrating good cause or sufficient reason necessitating postponement of proceedings. Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 884, 443 N.W.2d 577, 591 (1989). The affidavit offered by Stewart for a continuance does not identify the questions that engendered, and answers that reflected, Dr. Reckmeyer's purported confusion. Rather than expressing a specific statement about particular questions and answers, the affidavit contains a somewhat indefinite characterization of the situation: [Dr. Reckmeyer] had been confused by several questions and ... his testimony would have been significantly different had said confusion not occurred. Which questions were confusing, and, correspondingly, which of Dr. Reckmeyer's answers show the physician's confusion? Perhaps definite information, imparted directly by Dr. Reckmeyer's affidavit rather than through the conduit of counsel's affidavit, might have more graphically presented Dr. Reckmeyer's problematic confusion. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent that the area of Dr. Reckmeyer's claimed confusion relates to the questions and answers concerning the physician's opinion on causation, that is, whether Stewart's fall on December 5, 1989, caused an injury which resulted in disability and medical expenses compensable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. From a review of Dr. Reckmeyer's deposition, our conclusion is substantially the same as that reached by the compensation court: Counsel's questions on causation were unequivocal. Dr. Reckmeyer answered the questions asked, and even articulated cogent reasons for his answers. If there was any confusion surrounding the doctor's answers, counsel had the opportunity to eliminate any confusion and elicit clarification by additional questions, either immediately in the course of direct examination of the physician or after a recess during which the doctor might have collected his thoughts or thoughts from someone else. Under the circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the compensation court abused its discretion in denying additional time for Stewart's obtaining a second deposition from Dr. Reckmeyer. Defendant's Use of Deposition Obtained by Plaintiff. Rule XXI of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court's Rules of Procedure (1991) states in part: Without limiting the Compensation Court in any manner as to the taking and furnishing of evidence, the Compensation Court will recognize and accept depositions, interrogatories, requests for admissions and discovery proceedings which are in conformance with the Nebraska Discovery Rules For All Civil Cases provided they do not delay the holding of hearings or rehearings. Neb.Ct.R. of Discovery 32(a) (rev. 1989), regarding use of depositions in court proceedings, provides in pertinent part: Any part or all of a deposition ... may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition.... The language of Rule 32(a) itself, with its express and unambiguous provisions, is sufficient authority that, pursuant to Rule 32(a), use of a deposition is not restricted to the party taking the deposition; rather, any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition may use the deposition. The Nebraska Discovery Rules, generally, have counterparts in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In considering the question of prompt filing required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(f) for use of a deposition, the court stated in McVay v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Company, 416 F.2d 853, 856 (6th Cir.1969): Any party may use a deposition, not merely the party taking it. While appellant relies on the absence of prompt certification and filing under Rule 30(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of such prompt certification and filing should be of no controlling importance when the counsel for the party taking the deposition is fully aware of its contents. The failure promptly to file is harmless where the adverse party saw the deposition prior to trial. The knowledge of the contents of the deposition ... nullifies the requirement of prompt filing under Rule 30(f).... See, also, Green v. Williams, 90 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.Tenn.1981) (any party may use a deposition). Stewart sought Dr. Reckmeyer's deposition to supply the compensation court with the physician's testimony concerning Stewart's injury and subsequent condition; hence, the Reckmeyer deposition was the means of presenting evidence to the compensation court on issues involved in the litigation between Stewart and Amigo's Restaurant. Under the circumstances, we find nothing which indicates that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court abused its discretion in allowing Amigo's Restaurant to use the Reckmeyer deposition.