Opinion ID: 1379313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: requested instruction on honest belief in imminent peril as negating malice

Text: Defendant relied on the defense that he participated in the homicides because he feared that if he did not do so, Rutherford would kill him or have him killed. Section 26 lists among those not capable of committing crimes [p]ersons ( unless the crime be punishable with death ) who committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused. (§ 26, subd. Six, italics added.) The jury was instructed that a person is not guilty of a crime if he acts under threats or menaces that cause him reasonably to fear that his life would be in immediate danger if he did not do the otherwise criminal act. (See CALJIC No. 4.40; all references to CALJIC are to the fourth edition 1979, unless otherwise indicated.) But in accordance with the statutory exception, the jury was also instructed that such threats are not a defense [w]here a person commits first degree murder with a special circumstance. (See CALJIC No. 4.41.) In addition to the foregoing instructions on threats as an absolute defense, the court gave two other instructions that broadly authorized the jury to consider the effect of threats on the mental states requisite to murder. One of these instructions authorized the jury to consider evidence show[ing] the existence of threats, menaces or compulsion that played a part in inducing the unlawful killing of a human being ... for such bearing as it may have on the question of whether the murder was of the first or second degree. The other instruction stated as follows: If you find from the evidence that at the time the alleged crime was committed the defendant honestly held a belief that his own life was in danger, you must consider what effect, if any, this belief had on the defendant and whether he formed any of the specific mental states that are essential elements of murder. [¶] Thus if you find he had an honestly held belief that his life was in peril and as a result did not maturely and meaningfully premeditate, deliberate and reflect on the gravity of his contemplated act or form an intent to kill, you cannot find him guilty of a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of the first degree. [¶] Also, if you find the defendant did not form the mental state constituting express malice, you cannot find him guilty of either the first or second degree. [¶] In the event that you find the defendant is guilty of one or more murders in the first degree, you may still consider the operation of threats, menaces or compulsion, if any, with regard to your finding on the special circumstances. (Italics added.) (1) Notwithstanding these instructions, defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing his request for an instruction that threats causing him to believe honestly that his own life was in imminent peril would negate malice aforethought and reduce his crime to voluntary manslaughter. The court declined not only this request but also all other requests for instructions on manslaughter. Defendant now contends that the court's action deprived him of the defense that even if he intended to kill, his honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity of self-defense negated the element of malice. He relies on People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 674 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1], in which we held that [a]n honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter. (Italics omitted.) We need not decide what relevance, if any, Flannel has to this case, for any error in refusing to give the requested instruction was harmless. As noted, the court instructed the jury to consider what effect an honest belief that defendant's life was in danger may have had on the formation of any of the specific intent requirements for first degree murder and the special circumstance allegations. The instructions did not entirely remove the question of the defendant's mental state from the jury's consideration ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 13 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392]), or the question of his honest belief that his life was in danger. So instructed, the jury rejected a second degree murder verdict in favor of first degree. In Croy, the trial court instructed the jury that an aider and abettor must have knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose, but erroneously did not instruct that he must also share the guilty intent of the perpetrator. Although intent is different from knowledge, we held that it may be possible to find that the error could not possibly have affected the verdict  i.e., that no reasonable trier of fact, having actually found the requisite knowledge, could at the same time have concluded that the defendant did not act for the purpose of facilitating or encouraging the crime. In those cases the judgment could be affirmed. (41 Cal.3d at p. 14.) This rationale applies here. No reasonable trier of fact, having rejected a second degree murder verdict in favor of first degree after being instructed to consider any honest belief that defendant's life was in danger, would have returned a manslaughter verdict because of the same factor under the instructions the court did not give. Any error was thus harmless.