Opinion ID: 2023260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction: Motion to DismissTimeliness of Appeal.

Text: The judicial branch's motion to dismiss raises a jurisdictional question. The jurisdictional question arises from the failure of Explore to appeal within thirty days of the district court's ruling on Explore's application to adjudicate law points. The district court's ruling was filed on September 10, 1998. Eight days later, on September 18, Explore filed its motion to reconsider pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b). The district court denied that motion on November 30, 1998. Explore filed its notice of appeal on December 21, 1998, within thirty days of the order denying its motion to reconsider but 102 days after the ruling on its application to adjudicate law points. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) prescribes the time for appeal. The rule provides in relevant part that appeals to the supreme court must be taken within, and not after, thirty days from the entry of the order, judgment, or decree, unless a motion ... as provided in R.C.P. 179(b) is filed, and then within thirty days after the entry of the ruling on such motion.... Iowa R.App. P. 5(a). We have held this rule is mandatory and jurisdictional, requiring us to dismiss a case not meeting these deadlines even if the parties do not raise the issue. Beck v. Fleener, 376 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1985); Kunau v. Miller, 328 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1983). Because Explore did not appeal within thirty days of the order overruling its application to adjudicate law points, we have jurisdiction of the appeal only if the motion to reconsider was appropriate to challenge the ruling on the application for adjudication of law points. If the motion was not appropriate, then Explore's notice of appeal, filed more than thirty days after the ruling on the application to adjudicate law points, was late and this court is without jurisdiction. Osborne v. Iowa Natural Resources Council, 336 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Iowa 1983). If the motion was appropriate, then the thirty-day period provided for filing appeal was tolled. Id. The critical question then is whether a rule 179(b) motion is appropriate to challenge an adjudication of law points ruling. Rule 179(b) provides in relevant part: On motion joined with or filed within the time allowed for a motion for new trial, the findings and conclusions may be enlarged or amended and the judgment or decree modified accordingly or a different judgment or decree substituted.... In Osborne and Kunau, this court discussed situations where a rule 179(b) motion is authorized and effective. Osborne, 336 N.W.2d at 747; Kunau, 328 N.W.2d at 530. Except as provided by separate rule, not applicable here, such a motion is restricted to a nonjury ruling on an issue of fact. Id. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 116 (formerly Rule 105, amended and redesignated, effective January 24, 1998), regarding applications for adjudication of law points, provides: The court may in its discretion, and must on application of a party, made after issues are joined and before trial, separately hear and determine any point of law raised in any pleading which goes to the whole or any material part of the case. It shall enter an appropriate final order beforetrial of the remaining issues, adjudicating the point so determined, which shall not be questioned on the trial of any part of the case of which it does not dispose. If such ruling does not dispose of the whole case, it shall be deemed interlocutory for purposes of appeal. Iowa R. Civ. P. 116. In State ex rel. Miller v. Hydro Mag, Ltd., we described the purpose and use of an application for adjudication of law points: Generally, an application for separate adjudication of law points is only considered when the questions of law arise from uncontroverted pleadings. If the pleadings reveal fact issues with respect to the law points, disposition under rule 105 is generally inappropriate unless the parties stipulate the facts. No facts, other than stipulated facts, which are established outside the pleadings may be examined and no evidence may be taken to either support or resist the application. We will not assume or speculate on controverted facts, this being contrary to a rule 105 ruling. We have, however, adjudicated purely legal issues under a rule 105 application when the facts were controverted or disputed.... But we still decline to adjudicate a rule 105 application that requires a court answer speculative and abstract legal questions which may become moot by the time the facts are finally determined. Therefore, we will adjudicate a rule 105 application, despite the existence of controverted pleadings or unstipulated facts, only when the trial court is presented a legal issue that is independent of a disputed factual issue and a ruling favorable to the applying party will necessarily be dispositive of the case in whole or in part. 379 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1986) (citations omitted) (second emphasis added). In Easter Lake Estates, Inc. v. Polk County, we addressed the issue of a rule 179(b) motion following an adjudication of law points. 444 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 1989). In that case, the district court entered judgment for Polk County on its application for adjudication of law points pursuant to rule 105. Id. at 73. The plaintiff moved to enlarge and amend the district court's findings pursuant to rule 179(b). Id. at 73-74. Eight months later, the district court ruled on the motion. In its ruling, the court rescinded the prior order and entered judgment against Polk County, even though the plaintiff had not asked for such relief. Id. at 74. We held that the plaintiff's use of a rule 179(b) motion was ineffective to challenge the district court's ruling on the county's application for adjudication of law points or to delay appeal from the ruling. Id. The district court, we said, was therefore without authority to reverse itself eight months later after the ruling and reinstate Polk County as a party. Id. We then reversed the district court's 179(b) ruling and reinstated its previous ruling. Id. We explained our holding this way: Neither by its terms nor by its purpose... is a rule 105 adjudication amenable to [a rule 179(b)] challenge. Ordinarily, an adjudication under rule 105 is appropriate only when a question of law arises from uncontroverted pleadings. Given the underlying purpose of the ruleto dispose of a case on a point of law where the facts are undisputeda motion to enlarge or amend findings would have no application. Moreover, the rule itself provides that such an adjudication is a final order ... which shall not be questioned on the trial of any part of the case of which it does not dispose. Thus we have said that [w]here a ruling on an application to adjudicate law points under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 105 disposes of the entire case, it is an appealable final order. Id. (citations omitted). In its application for adjudication of law points, Explore alleged: The following point of law goes to the whole or material part of this case, and has been raised in the pleadings filed in this case: Whether Iowa Code section 321.491, unnumbered paragraph 2, Code Supp.1997, authorizes or directs the judicial branch to collect a fee of [fifty cents] for each copy of any record of conviction or forfeiture of bail, when such records are provided through the Iowa Court Information System, in electronic format, on a monthly basis, in bulk. Explore further alleged that this point of law involves the interpretation of a statute, which is a legal issue that may be raised by a Rule 116 application. Finally, Explore alleged that this point of law arises from uncontroverted facts contained on the record or in the pleadings of this case or, in the alternative, if there is a disputed fact, the legal issue is independent of such disputed facts. In support of its application, Explore submitted a statement of uncontroverted facts. Those facts included the language of section 321.491 before the 1997 amendment, after the 1997 amendment, and after the 1998 amendment. The statement further stated that (1) Explore purchased records in electronic format from ICIS monthly at a fee based on the reasonable cost of reproduction and (2) after the 1997 amendment the charge was fifty cents per record, at a fee of more than $20,000 per month. The judicial branch resisted the application, arguing that (1) ICIS is not a lawful custodian of clerk of court records and (2) the 1998 amendment materially changed the law. In its reply to this resistance, Explore argued in part: [T]he court is required to rule on the application for adjudication of law points, and is precluded from considering additional evidence for this question of pure statutory interpretation. As Explore urged, the district court treated the issue as one of statutory interpretation. The court concluded the 1997 amendment authorized the judicial branch to collect the fifty-cent fee for driving records. Clearly, as Explore argued to the district court and as the district court correctly recognized, the only issue raised by the application for adjudication of law points was one of statutory interpretation: whether the 1997 amendment authorized the judicial branch to collect the fifty-cent fee for driving records. The district court could decide this issue based on uncontroverted pleadings as restated in Explore's statement of uncontroverted facts. The ruling, favorable to the judicial branch, disposed of the whole case. Therefore, under our Easter Lake holding, Explore's 179(b) motion was ineffective to challenge the district court's rule 116 ruling. While a rule 179(b) motion may concern factual disputes or legal conclusions, it is necessary to preserve error only when the district court fails to resolve an issue, claim, or legal theory properly submitted for adjudication. Arnold v. Lang, 259 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Iowa 1977). Here, the district court resolved the issue submitted to it for adjudication. As the judicial branch points out, Explore admits in its brief that the basis for its challenge to the district court's ruling on the rule 179(b) motion is `substantively identical' to its challenge to the district court's final ruling on the merits. Explore's rule 179(b) motion therefore amounted to no more than a rehash of legal issues raised and decided adversely to itby way of the district court's ruling on Explore's application for adjudication of law points. See Bellach v. IMT Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Iowa 1998). Because it was ruling on an application to adjudicate law points, the district court was limited to the uncontroverted facts found in the pleadings. See Reynolds v. Nowotny, 213 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 1973). The court could not consider the facts Explore presented in its rule 179(b) motion, because it could not have considered them in conjunction with its initial ruling on Explore's rule 116 application. A rule 179(b) motion was not the proper vehicle to challenge the adjudication of law points ruling. That ruling was a final order which could only be challenged by an appeal filed within the time limits of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a). We must accordingly sustain the motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as untimely. We agree with the judicial branch that the three cases Explore relies on to distinguish its rule 179(b) motion from the motion we found inappropriate in Easter Lake fail in that respect. The rule 179(b) motions in Woody v. Machin, 380 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1986), and Beck addressed fact issues that arose during posttrial hearings before the district court following jury trials. Woody, 380 N.W.2d at 729 (party challenged the court's fact findings concerning costs and the scope of an abatement order); Beck, 376 N.W.2d at 596 (factual dispute arose over a party's opportunity to object to jury instructions). We held in both cases that the rule 179(b) motion extended the deadline for appeal because the motion raised factual issues tried to the court. Woody, 380 N.W.2d at 729; Beck, 376 N.W.2d at 596. In the third case, Bellach, the rule 179(b) motion challenged the court's denial of numerous posttrial motions. 573 N.W.2d 903, 904 (Iowa 1998). We concluded that the rule 179(b) motion amounted to no more than a rehash of legal issues previously raised by the proponent of the motion. Id. at 905. For that reason, we concluded the motion did not toll the time for appeal and dismissed the appeal as untimely. Id. Contrary to Explore's assertions, Bellach actually is consistent with Easter Lake. Additionally, the three cases Explore cites do not address the procedure a party must follow to challenge a ruling on an adjudication of law points.