Opinion ID: 1835190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Informed Consent

Text: Even assuming the court had an adequate factual basis for accepting Bailey's pleas and for revoking his probation, Bailey argues that he did not make the pleas knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. As a matter of federal constitutional law, [a] plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some way indicates a free and intelligent waiver by the defendant of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, his constitutional right to trial by jury, and his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Stacey v. State, 349 N.W.2d 439, 441 (S.D.1984) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)). In addition to waivers of these three Boykin rights, the record must disclose, as a matter of South Dakota law, that the defendant understood the nature and consequences of his plea. Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 178 N.W.2d 198 (1970). While there is no set formula for establishing on the record the voluntariness of a guilty plea, [t]he trial court must normally inform the defendant of these rights personally to insure that the record indicates a free and intelligent waiver of these rights. Logan v. Solem, 406 N.W.2d 714, 716-717 (S.D.1987) (emphasis original). The court's obligation to satisfy itself as to each of these four prerequisites before accepting a guilty or a guilty but mentally ill plea by address[ing] the defendant personally in open court and making a record of it are codified at SDCL 23A-7-4, 23A-7-5, 23A-7-15, and 23A-7-16. Bailey suggests that his pleas could not possibly have been knowing, voluntary and intelligent because he was mentally ill when the pleas were entered. However, competence to plead is an issue of fact to be decided by the trial court, taking into consideration the totality of relevant circumstances. Clark v. State, 294 N.W.2d 916, 920 (S.D.1980). In order to overturn an otherwise effective plea, a defendant claiming involuntariness based upon mental condition must show that the mental condition was so debilitating that she was unable to consult with counsel or unable to understand the proceedings. State v. Lashwood, 384 N.W.2d 319, 321 (S.D.1986). This Bailey cannot show. Three psychiatrists who examined him over a five-month period, including his own defense expert, all agreed that he was competent to stand trial and to assist in his own defense. Bailey's attorney stated during the course of the October 30, 1989 sentencing that as long as he's on his medications, he's fine and ... so I have no question that Dr. Lee might well have found that he was competent. Bailey's testimony of September 22 and his extended closing remarks of October 30 suggest no incapacity to understand the proceedings. Furthermore, the trial court recites in its Order Suspending Imposition of Sentence, and Bailey does not challenge, that constitutional and statutory rights as well as the defendant's understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea were covered at the January 18 arraignment. Therefore, we conclude Bailey has not shown that his mental condition precluded a voluntary plea and we affirm. MILLER, C.J., and, WUEST and MORGAN, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., dissents.