Opinion ID: 857469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Further Background on the Tinker Standard

Text: Under Tinker, a public school may not restrict private student expression unless the school reasonably forecasts it “would materially and substantially interfere with the -18- requirements of appropriate discipline in operation of the school,” or “impinge upon the rights of other students.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06, 509.9 A disruption need not actually materialize. School officials may act to prevent problems as long as the situation “might reasonably [lead] authorities to forecast” substantial disruption or interference with the rights of others. Id. at 514. This forecast must be reasonable. Officials may not restrict speech based on “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” or a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Id. at 508-09. For a school’s forecast to be reasonable, courts generally require that it be based on a “concrete threat” of substantial disruption. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2002). Tinker rejected the idea that a “silent, passive” expression that merely provokes discussion in the hallway constitutes such a threat, particularly if that expression is political. 393 U.S. at 514. The Second and Third Circuits have reinforced this notion, overturning schools’ bans on t-shirts criticizing George W. Bush or featuring comedian Jeff Foxworthy. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006); Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 254.10 9 Subsequent Supreme Court cases have allowed schools to restrict student speech that is lewd or patently offensive or promotes illegal drug use. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 395 (2007). These cases offer useful insight for understanding Tinker’s substantial disruption test. 10 We note, however, that several circuits (including ours) have upheld restrictions on passive, silent expression—even political expression—where it is clearly associated Continued . . . -19- When the speech is neither passive nor silent, restrictions are more readily (but not always) upheld. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that student athletes were constitutionally protected in peacefully circulating a petition criticizing their coach, but upheld the school’s decision to suspend them for holding a protest before a sporting event and refusing to board the team bus. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006). The court found the protest was not protected because it created a substantial disruption with the operation of the school basketball program. Id. at 769. See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 397; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. When school officials reasonably forecast substantial disruption, they have discretion to restrict forms of student speech that might otherwise be protected in a nonschool setting. “‘[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.’” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in ______________________________________ Cont. with past school violence or substantial disruption. For example, in West v. Derby Unified School District, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000), we upheld a school policy prohibiting students from displaying the Confederate flag, finding the school reasonably forecasted substantial disruption due to past racial tension in the school context associated with that image. Id. at 1365. See also Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding school’s ban on Confederate flag); BWA v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 738-41 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008) (same). Cf. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting school’s ban on t-shirt featuring comedian Jeff Foxworthy based on a finding that the word “redneck” was not associated closely enough with a racial gang at the school known as the “Hicks”). -20- the result) (referring to Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the Supreme Court found an adult plaintiff had a First Amendment right to wear a jacket bearing profanity regarding the military draft in a courthouse)); see e.g., West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding school’s ban on displaying a Confederate flag).