Opinion ID: 2995272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ethnicity Discrimination

Text: Lalvani’s claim here is straightforward: he contends that Coleman fired him (by eliminating his Social Worker IV position) because of his Asian-Indian ethnicity. He has no direct evidence to back up this assertion, and thus, like many others, he must use the burden- shifting method first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A prima facie case of race or ethnicity discrimination under sec. 1981 is predicated on the same elements as an ethnicity discrimination claim under Title VII, and we thus analyze these two aspects of his case together. As plaintiff, Lalvani had to produce evidence that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the job in question or was meeting his employer’s legitimate performance expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. Taylor v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court found that Lalvani satisfied the first three elements of the prima facie case but failed to provide any evidence under the fourth part that similarly situated persons not in his protected class were treated more favorably. We agree. Lalvani did not identify a single CCH employee (Social Worker IV or otherwise) who was in a similar position and was not terminated during the RIF. Because he has not even attempted to make such a showing, we need not decide who actually was similarly situated for this purpose. The only obvious candidate in the record is Saliga, a Caucasian woman, and she was terminated, too. The district court properly determined that all of Lalvani’s arguments regarding Coleman’s stated desire to get rid of him go to the question of pretext, an issue we do not reach until Lalvani has made out his prima facie case. On appeal, Lalvani argues that he satisfied the fourth element of the prima facie case by pointing to open positions in the Social Work Department for which he was qualified but to which he was not transferred after the elimination of his position. But here he is mixing apples and oranges. The open position cases to which Lalvani cites involve allegations of a failure to hire, promote, or properly bump. See, e.g., Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999). In such cases, a plaintiff can often raise an inference of discrimination by pointing to positions left unfilled. Lalvani’s complaint only alleges that [i]n terminating Plaintiff Prem Lalvani each Defendant . . . intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff Prem Lalvani on the basis of his race, color, and national origin. Nowhere in his complaint does Lalvani allege that Cook County or Coleman discriminated against him in failing to hire him for one of the open Social Worker II positions, and he cannot amend his complaint on appeal. We acknowledge that in cases involving economically motivated RIFs we have held that plaintiffs can point to empty positions as evidence of pretext, see, e.g., Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1996), but in these cases the plaintiff is still required to identify similarly situated individuals who were treated more favorably. Id. at 831. Lalvani did not. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on these claims.