Opinion ID: 674597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Quang's Challenges to His Conviction on the RICO Counts

Text: 175 Quang makes two challenges to his convictions on the RICO counts. He contends that the evidence as to one of the two predicate acts attributed to him was insufficient, leaving an insufficient basis to support a RICO conviction, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5) (1988). He also contends that the court's instructions to the jury were erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (Reves ). We reject both contentions.
176 Quang's sufficiency argument is that the Asian Market robbery in Tennessee was an independent venture of some of the gang members and was not sufficiently related to the affairs of BTK to constitute a predicate act by that enterprise. This contention need not detain us long. 177 To support a conviction under RICO, the government must establish a relationship between the predicate acts and the criminal enterprise. See United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d at 951. That relationship is satisfied if the offense was related to the enterprise's activities, whether or not it was in furtherance of those activities, or if the defendant was enabled to commit the offense solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1646, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994); United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 947-48 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed.2d 662 (1988); United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d at 951; United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). 178 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we must in connection with any sufficiency challenge, see Part II.F. below, we conclude that an ample showing of relatedness was made here. Kenny Vu, who provided the bulk of the testimony of Quang's involvement in this robbery, testified that Quang proposed robbing a jewelry store that he said was run by people who were Vietnamese. He came to the Gainesville house to make his proposal where BTK members were staying, and he took BTK members with him to execute the robbery. Both the selection of an Asian target and the manner of perpetration of the robbery (see Part I.B.5. above) were indistinguishable from the manner of BTK's operations. And though Thai had not ordered this particular robbery, when the robbers returned with their $66,000 in loot, they turned it over to Thai. The evidence thus was more than sufficient to support the conclusion that the Asian Market robbery was related to the affairs of the BTK enterprise.
179 In its charge to the jury, the district court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: 180 The third element which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the enterprise. The terms conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise include the performance of acts, functions, or duties that are necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise. A person may participate in the conduct of an enterprise even though he had no part in the management or control of the enterprise and no share in any profits. 181 (Tr. 7743.) In Reves, the Supreme Court, in the context of the RICO liability of an outside accounting firm, addressed the question of whether one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself to be subject to liability under this provision. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1166. 182 After parsing the language of Sec. 1962(c), the Reves Court concluded that [i]n order to 'participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' one must have some part in directing those affairs. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1170. Nonetheless, while thus adopting what it called an  'operation or management' test, id., and stating that one is liable under RICO only if he participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1172, the Court also said that the word 'participate' makes clear that RICO liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1170, and that liability under Sec. 1962(c) is not limited to upper management, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1173. The Court observed that, in addition, within the meaning of Sec. 1962(c), [a]n enterprise is 'operated' ... also by lower-rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1173. The Court declined to decide in [Reves ] how far Sec. 1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation. --- U.S. at ---- n. 9, 113 S.Ct. at 1173 n. 9. 183 Here, Quang was proven to have participated in the conduct of BTK's affairs, for the record revealed plainly that he was not at the bottom of the management chain. Though normally Thai ordered and organized the robberies, he did not instruct Quang to rob the Asian Market in Tennessee. Rather, that robbery was solely Quang's idea, and there is no evidence that he obtained Thai's approval. Quang simply arrived at the Gainesville house and said he wanted to commit the robbery; he then took Jimmy and another BTK member with him; and the three of them carried out Quang's plan. Without deciding how far down the ladder of operation Sec. 1962(c) extends, we have no doubt that it extends at least to Quang. 184 In any event, we note that no defendant objected to the trial court's RICO instruction in this regard, and thus we would not reverse on account of any error in light of the later-decided Reves unless it were plain error. See United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir.1993) (reviewing Sec. 1962(c) charge only for plain error because Reves resolved a split between circuits ... so the objection could easily have been made at trial); see generally United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 825 (2d Cir.1990) (applying plain-error standard even when error in the instructions was established only by a decision rendered after the date of the trial); United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1019-20 (2d Cir.1990) (same). Plain error is error so egregious as to result in a miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d at 825. If there was error in these instructions, it surely was not plain error.