Opinion ID: 1435796
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cross-Examination of Appellant Concerning Improper Influence of a Witness

Text: During the trial, Appellant took the stand and submitted to cross-examination by the Commonwealth. One of the prosecutor's lines of question was whether Appellant threatened, bribed, or forced witness Tameka Brown to testify for him. The portion of the cross-examination at issue follows: Q [Prosecutor]: Did you threaten or bribe or in anyway force Tameka Brown to come to court and testify in the manner that she did? A [Appellant]: No. [19] N.T., Sept. 26, 1991, at 954. Appellant contends that the prosecution had no basis for implying that he had obstructed justice by influencing a witness. He asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth's questions concerning other crimes and, although not clear from his brief, for not requesting a mistrial, which he claims prejudiced him in violation of his due process rights. Appellant frames the legal issue as a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, but he is also arguing that the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, which his counsel failed to prevent or correct. As we stated earlier, the PCRA affords no eligibility for relief from waived claims. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). During his direct appeal, Appellant did not claim that there was any error when the Commonwealth asked him about his alleged influence over Ms. Brown. [20] Having failed to raise this issue, it is waived. However, because he brings the related allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel in his first collateral appeal, it is eligible for review. Nonetheless, for the following reasons, he fails to establish error from ineffectiveness of counsel. Comments by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 720 A.2d 711, 729 (1998), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 78, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1999); Commonwealth v. LaCava, 542 Pa. 160, 666 A.2d 221, 231 (1995); Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 643 A.2d 61, 74 (1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995). When evaluating the prejudicial effect of leading questions asked by a district attorney on cross-examination, we must consider the substance of the questions, the circumstances in which they are asked, and the response they evoked. See Commonwealth v. O'Hannon, 557 Pa. 256, 732 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1999); Commonwealth v. Doswell, 533 Pa. 228, 621 A.2d 104, 106 (1993); Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 485 Pa. 542, 403 A.2d 521, 528 (1979); Commonwealth v. Perillo, 474 Pa. 63, 376 A.2d 635, 639 (1977); Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492, 493 (1971). In O'Hannon, the prosecution asked the defendant whether he had threatened his co-conspirators to perjure their testimony. The Superior Court found that the trial court allowed the admission of prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts and failed to give the jury a timely cautionary instruction, and it reversed the defendant's judgment of sentence and remanded for a new trial. We reversed the Superior Court. The prosecution's questions were not improper because the defendant answered the questions in the negative, the trial counsel entered a timely objection to the questions, and the trial court had given the jury both a cautionary and final instruction that jurors may not consider questions as evidence. O'Hannon, 732 A.2d at 1196. Because the defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of any improper evidence, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law. Id. The facts in the present case are similar to O'Hannon. The trial court instructed the jury prior to opening arguments and in its final instructions that comments by attorneys are not evidence. The court emphasized that [q]uestions are not evidence. An attorney can ask any questions he wants. It's the answer that is evidence. N.T., Sept. 16, 1991, at 6. When asked whether he had threatened Ms. Brown to testify in his favor, Appellant flatly denied any such action. Furthermore, Appellant presents an inaccurate representation by stating that his trial counsel sat moot during this part of the Commonwealth's cross-examination. Appellant's Brief, at 35. Although trial counsel did not object immediately after the prosecution asked the question at issue, his objection came close in time and preceded a similar inquiry concerning coercion. [E]very improper and inflammatory leading question by a district attorney does not necessarily require a new trial. Hoskins, 403 A.2d at 528 (citing Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873 (1975)). The central inquiry remains whether the effect of the question gave the jurors a fixed, mental bias or hostility against the defendant, so as to corrupt their truth-determining function. The effect of such questions depends upon the atmosphere of the trial. Id. at 528 (quoting Stoltzfus, supra ). In Commonwealth v. Perillo , we granted a new trial because improper questions by the prosecution prejudiced a defendant. In that case, both parties had routinely disregarded court rulings and entered into shouting matches, creating a circus atmosphere in the courtroom. Perillo, 376 A.2d at 639. After the trial had already descended into pandemonium, the prosecution posed questions to a defense witness that implied he was lying and the defendant had bribed the witness to commit perjury. We held that the cumulative effect of the circus atmosphere and the highly prejudicial nature of the remarks led us to the conclusion that the only appropriate relief was a new trial. Id. at 639-40. Here, there was no circus atmosphere. We have reviewed the record in this case and can find no semblance of courtroom chaos or other circumstances that might have created an environment ripe for bias or hostility in the minds of the jurors. It is worth noting that, on direct appeal, we previously held that there was no merit to Appellant's claim that he was prejudiced by the remark of the Commonwealth, in closing argument, that he had presented a lying alibi witness. Ragan, 645 A.2d at 829. It was our finding on direct appeal that the Commonwealth had presented evidence sufficient to permit the jury to infer a bias by Ms. Brown for impeachment purposes. [21] Id. The facts indicate that the Commonwealth had a good faith basis for attempting to prove a bias. In the present appeal, Appellant's claim that the prosecution's question had a prejudicial effect on him by generating bias or hostility among the jurors lacks arguable merit. [22] In addition, Appellant fails to develop each element of a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel to afford us an opportunity to conduct a meaningful review. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant has not proven that his counsel was ineffective for failing to make an immediate objection to the Commonwealth's question concerning coercion of a defense witness.