Opinion ID: 168467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judgment as a Matter of Law on the Failure to Warn Claim

Text: 13 Plaintiff next argues that the district court erred when it sustained defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the failure to warn claim. It contends there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that all the elements of a prima facie case for strict liability were met. In order to establish a prima facie case for negligence or strict liability in a Kansas products liability case, plaintiff must produce evidence that shows: (1) the injury resulted from a condition of the product; (2) the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one; and (3) the condition existed at the time it left defendant's control. Messer v. Amway Corp., 210 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1227 (D.Kan.2002) (citing Jenkins v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 256 Kan. 602, 886 P.2d 869, 886 (Kan.1994)). Plaintiff asserted at trial that defendant had failed to include a warning label on the busway regarding the risks of water infiltration into the busway. Defendant offered testimony that it did place such a warning label on the busway when it was manufactured. 14 In ruling in favor of the defendant on its motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court concluded that there was a complete absence of proof on the issue of whether the warnings were missing from the bus duct system at the time it left the control of the Square D Company. Aplt.App. at 18. The court noted that it would reach the same conclusion even if the testimony of Mr. Goens was considered by the jury. 15 Plaintiff did not own the building when the busway was installed and it failed to elicit testimony from anyone who was present when the busway left the control of defendant and was installed in the building. Although Mr. Goens testified that he had not seen a warning on the busway, he did not start working at the building until five years after the busway was installed. Moreover, the fire did not occur until twenty-three years after the busway was installed, prompting the district court to observe that I don't think that any jury could reasonably conclude that the bus duct was still in the same condition as it was when it left the manufacturer's premises except by engaging in speculation. Id. at 19. 16 We agree. The plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence on a necessary element for its prima facie case, that the unreasonably dangerous condition—lack of a warning label—existed at the time the busway left defendant's control. The district court did not err in granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.