Opinion ID: 4556341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 1987 Leola Douglas Murder

Text: {¶ 92} Kirkland also contends that during the cross-examination of a defense mitigation witness, the prosecutor introduced evidence that Kirkland had been convicted of a 1987 homicide, a homicide that was not part of the course of conduct. {¶ 93} The 1987 homicide first came up on cross-examination during the video deposition of defense medical expert Joseph Wu. On direct examination, Dr. Wu had testified that damage to the brain’s frontal lobe can impair the brain’s ability to regulate aggression and cause significant changes in personality. Dr. Wu further testified that Kirkland had a history of multiple traumatic brain injuries, including one in 2004, after which, according to Dr. Wu, a friend of Kirkland’s “reported that he became a completely different person,” and another in 2006. {¶ 94} On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Dr. Wu whether Kirkland “was exhibiting extremely violent behavior    well before 2004.” And Dr. Wu admitted that he was. The prosecution then called his attention to a presentence investigation report “for a homicide [Kirkland] committed in    May 1987 when he killed his uncle’s girlfriend and set the house on fire to cover that up.” {¶ 95} The defense objected, arguing that the 1987 homicide was irrelevant and that its probative value was significantly outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. During the resentencing hearing, the trial judge overruled this objection; Dr. Wu’s video deposition was then played for the jury. Kirkland makes no claim that the trial court erred by overruling that objection. 24 January Term, 2020 {¶ 96} After the jury heard Dr. Wu’s deposition, the defense presented another expert, psychologist Patti van Eys. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. van Eys whether she had received a presentence report indicating that “the defendant basically did the same thing to another woman when he was 18 years old.” Dr. van Eys acknowledged that she had received the report. The prosecutor then asked: And    the defendant and the victim    engaged in a verbal altercation. According to the defendant, she    threatened to tell his uncle, who was her boyfriend, that they had been having sexual intercourse. And at that point the defendant became angry, choked her to death and then poured lighter fluid on her and set her on fire; is that correct? {¶ 97} Later, the prosecutor asked Dr. van Eys two other questions about the 1987 murder. Explaining her belief that Kirkland did not display antisocial personality disorder, Dr. van Eys testified that Kirkland did not “externalize all the blame” for his actions. The prosecutor asked: “Leola Douglas, the first victim, back in 1987, he killed her because she threatened to rat him out.    Isn’t that externalizing the blame?” Finally, the prosecutor asked Dr. van Eys whether she knew that Kirkland had been suspected of the murders of Newton and Casonya in 2006 “because the police saw he had done something very similar years ago.” {¶ 98} The defense did not object to any of these references to the 1987 murder. Kirkland’s failure to object forfeits this issue, absent plain error. We find no plain error here because the jury already knew about the 1987 murder. That murder was properly introduced during Dr. Wu’s cross-examination, as the trial court ruled and as Kirkland does not dispute. Thus, Kirkland cannot show a reasonable probability that mentioning it during the cross-examination of Dr. van 25 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Eys resulted in prejudice. See Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, at ¶ 22. {¶ 99} We overrule Kirkland’s fourth proposition of law.