Opinion ID: 1134674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: PERB's Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Unfair Practices

Text: Section 3541.5 of the Government Code vests exclusive jurisdiction in PERB with respect to The initial determination as to whether the charges of unfair practices are justified, and, if so, what remedy is necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.... The majority interprets this language as authorizing PERB to decide initially, to the exclusion of the courts, whether a public employee strike should or should not be enjoined. To the contrary, nothing in EERA would support the view that the Legislature intended to divest courts of their traditional equitable jurisdiction over public strikes or any other unlawful activities which threaten irreparable injury. Such injunctive relief would not impair PERB's functions in any way, but would simply preserve the status quo while the parties mediate the merits of their dispute through PERB proceedings. As becomes readily apparent from an examination of its provisions, EERA was designed to provide a commendable forum whereby disputes between public school employees and employers might be discussed, mediated and resolved. The unfair and unlawful practices which fall within PERB's jurisdiction include such acts as discrimination or coercion of employees, refusal to negotiate or participate in impasse procedures, and interference with employee organizations. (See Gov. Code, §§ 3543.5, 3543.6.) However, EERA nowhere mentions a strike by public school employees as one of the practices which is subject to PERB's jurisdiction, and the Legislature's express refusal to validate such concerted activity ( id., § 3549) necessarily would preclude PERB from exercising jurisdiction over such strikes, or doing any act which might encourage or prolong such unlawful conduct. The principal thesis of the majority holding is that the EERA gives PERB discretion to withhold as well as pursue, the various remedies at its disposal.... PERB may conclude in a particular case that a restraining order or injunction would not hasten the end of a strike ... and, on the contrary, would impair the success of the statutorily mandated negotiations between union and employer. A court enjoining a strike on the basis of (1) a rule that public employee strikes are illegal, and (2) harm resulting from the withholding of teachers' services cannot with expertise tailor its remedy to implement the broader objectives entrusted to PERB. ( Ante, pp. 12-13.) By thus construing EERA, the majority permits PERB to validate a public strike by refusing to enjoin it. The majority thereby indirectly accomplishes precisely the result which the Legislature so carefully and specifically sought to prevent  the conferral of a right to strike on public school employees. Therefore, despite the majority's declaration that it leaves the question of public strikes open for future decision, the public as employer seeking to enjoin such strikes may henceforth find the courtroom doors firmly closed. The majority opinion is deeply troubling in one further respect. The majority concludes that it need not decide whether a school district may pursue its traditional judicial remedies if PERB should decline either to seek injunctive relief on its own or to issue an unfair practice complaint against the striking employees. ( Ante, p. 13.) The fair implications of such a principle are indeed startling. Consideration of this issue, in my view, should not be deferred but demands our immediate attention so that the lower courts will have guidance, for one can readily envision the following circumstances occurring with frequency: A strike is called hurriedly to coerce a settlement of the strikers' demands; irreparable harm ensues; the district rushes to PERB requesting immediate relief; PERB delays or withholds action pending its discretionary consideration of the broader objectives which the majority now places within its exclusive jurisdiction, or for other reasons satisfying to itself. Meantime, the entire public school system and its programs are held hostage to a combination of strikers' demands and PERB's inertia. It is inconceivable to me that the Legislature would seriously have intended such public impotence. In this instance, teachers' union officials studiously, with full knowledge of the consequences and with full ability to comply, chose to defy an express order of a court whose powers were properly invoked in the field of education, an area of continuing and consuming public interest. I cannot believe that the Legislature under such circumstances intended to strip from courts their traditional equitable powers, thereby leaving the public helpless and without a remedy to protect itself. In such a situation petitioners should be treated no differently than any other contemner. I would affirm the orders of contempt.