Opinion ID: 2518991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Names and Salaries of Peace Officers.

Text: The Oakland Police Officers Association (Police Officers Association), which intervened in this action, does not object to disclosure of the actual salary paid to each peace officer, so long as the officers are identified only by job title. It does, however, object to disclosures that link the actual salary paid to the officer's name. It asserts that the latter disclosure would violate Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), which provides in relevant part that [p]eace officer ... personnel records ... or information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed except as otherwise provided by statute. According to the Police Officers Association, individually identifiable salary information constitutes either a confidential personnel record[ ] or information obtained from personnel records within the meaning of Penal Code section.832.7, subdivision (a), by virtue of Penal Code section 832.8. The latter defines the term personnel records in Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), as any file maintained under [a peace officer's] name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating to any of the following: [¶] (a) Personal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information, [¶] (b) Medical history. [¶] (c) Election of employee benefits. [¶] (d) Employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline, [¶] (e) Complaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties, [¶] (f) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. [7] (Pen.Code, § 832.8.) In making its argument, the Police Officers Association first emphasizes that an officer's actual pay is based on the following information that is expressly included within the term personnel records in Penal Code section 832.7: educational and employment history ( id., § 832.8, subd. (a)), and [e]mployee advancement and appraisal ( id., § 832, subd. (d)). Because of this fact, the Police Officers Association asserts, an officer's actual pay constitutes information obtained from personnel records within the meaning of Penal Code section 832.7. It also qualifies independently as a confidential personnel record under Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), because it is, in the words of Penal Code section 832.8, relat[ed] to the information specified elsewhere in the section. I agree with the majority's analysis and rejection of these arguments. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 710-711, 711-712, 165 P.3d at pp. 502-503, 504-505.) The Police Officers Association also argues that individualized salary information qualifies for protection because it constitutes `[p]ersonal data' or `other similar information' under Penal Code section 832.8[, subdivision] (a). It asserts that anything unique to the person ... qualif[ies] as [p]ersonal. data under Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a), and that a particular officer's salary is unique because it depends on the officer's years of service, performance, education and specialties. Like the majority, I reject this argument. As the majority explains, because all of the information specified in subdivisions (b) through (e) of Penal Code section 832.8 also is unique to the individual officer, those subdivisions would be unnecessary were we to construe the term [p]ersonal data in subdivision (a) to include everything that is unique to the person. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 709, 165 P.3d at p. 502.) Well-established canons of statutory construction preclude us from interpreting statutory language so as to render other parts of the statute unnecessary. ( Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 895 P.2d 56.) As the majority also explains, that the Legislature expressly specified another form of compensationelection of employee benefitsin a separate subdivision of the statute (Pen.Code, § 832.8, subd. (c)) counsels against adopting an interpretation of the term [p]ersonal data in subdivision (a) that includes an officer's salary. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 709-710, 165 P.3d at pp. 502-503.) For these reasons, I agree that salary information does not constitute [p]ersonal data within the meaning of section 832.8, subdivision (a). [8] Amicus curiae Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 argues that individualized salary information regarding peace officers qualifies for protection under subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 832.8, because disclosure of this information would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. I reject this argument because, as explained above in connection with Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), I do not believe that any invasion of privacy from disclosure of the requested salary information would be unwarranted. Regarding the names of peace officers, as explained in my dissenting opinion in Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court (Aug. 27, 2007, S134072) ___ Cal.4th ___, 64 Cal. Rptr.3d at p. 682, 165 P.3d at p. 480, 2007 WL 2410091 (dis. opn. of Chin, J.), I believe that peace officers' names are [p]ersonal data within the meaning of Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a). Thus, I would hold that where, as here, a request is made for disclosure of names linked to salary, officers' names may not be disclosed to the extent the source of that information is a file maintained under [the peace officer's] name by his or her employing agency. (Pen.Code, § 832.8.) Where, however, the request identifies officers by name and asks for disclosure of their salaries, Penal Code section 832.7 does not preclude disclosure.