Opinion ID: 8410697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City's Water Account Policy

Text: We now turn to the merits of Winston's appeal. We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Kass v. City of New York , 864 F.3d 200 , 205 (2d Cir. 2017). In doing so, [w]e apply the same standard as that applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations contained in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 206 . Here, we apply these standards to Winston's facial challenges to both the City's policy of denying tenants the opportunity to open water accounts and its policy of terminating water service to rental properties when landlords fail to pay their water bills. A facial challenge is an attack on a statute [or policy] itself as opposed to a particular application. City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2449, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015). The Supreme Court has recognized that a plaintiff may bring a facial challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Winston does here. See id . (citing Chicago v. Morales , 527 U.S. 41 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) ). It is well established that [a] facial challenge will only succeed if there is no set of circumstances under which the challenged practices would be constitutional. Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir , 156 F.3d 340 , 347 (2d Cir. 1998). We first address the City's policy of allowing only landlords to open water accounts. See Syracuse, N.Y., Code of Ordinances,  Part M, § 16-11. In her complaint Winston asserted that this policy violates the Equal Protection Clause because no rational basis exists to treat property owners and tenants differently in that respect. We reject this argument and affirm the district court's decision to dismiss Winston's equal protection claim with respect to the City's policy of not permitting tenants to open water accounts. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike, but may treat unlike cases accordingly. Vacco v. Quill , 521 U.S. 793 , 799, 117 S.Ct. 2293 , 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997). Whether a state law or policy satisfies this general principle, and what sort of review a court must apply, depends on the nature of the class of individuals the state or local government treats differently or the rights at issue. [I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 , 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) ; see also Heller v. Doe , 509 U.S. 312 , 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) ([A] classification [not involving a suspect class or fundamental right] cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.). Here, we apply rational basis review because the City has neither targeted a suspect class nor has Winston argued that opening a water account is a fundamental right. This form of review is highly deferential. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc. , 508 U.S. 307 , 314-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). Rational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. Heller , 509 U.S. at 319 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen , 793 F.3d 281 , 284 (2d Cir. 2015). Moreover, [a] State ... has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. Heller , 509 U.S. at 320 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 . Rather, [a] statute is presumed constitutional, id. , and [t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. , 410 U.S. 356 , 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001 , 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973). Rational basis review, however, does require some scrutiny of state and local government activity. [W]hile rational basis review is indulgent and respectful, it is not meant to be 'toothless.'  Windsor v. United States , 699 F.3d 169 , 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson , 450 U.S. 221 , 234, 101 S.Ct. 1074 , 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981) ), aff'd , 570 U.S. 744 , 133 S.Ct. 2675 , 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013). Instead, rational basis review imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out. Rinaldi v. Yeager , 384 U.S. 305 , 308-09, 86 S.Ct. 1497 , 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966). Winston cannot meet her heavy burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support the City's policy of allowing only landlords to open water accounts. Lehnhausen , 410 U.S. at 364 , 93 S.Ct. 1001 . Even if we draw all reasonable inferences in Winston's favor, she does not plausibly allege facts that would overcome the policy rationales that the City offers. See  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S 544 , 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). 4 The City's policy for opening water accounts treats two classes of individuals differently: landlords and tenants. Winston argues that landlords and tenants are similarly situated because they each seek water service from the City. The district court agreed with Winston in this respect. Winston , 205 F.Supp.3d at 247 . The City, however, offers at least two rationales that Winston fails to negative for this different treatment of the two classes. Lehnhausen , 410 U.S. at 364 , 93 S.Ct. 1001 . 5 First, the City argues that the transitory nature of tenants justifies the City's water account policy. Appellee's Br. at 27. Relatedly, the City contends that permitting only property owners to open water accounts allows the City to ensure it can collect on unpaid water bills by placing a lien on the property. In contrast, no such remedy would exist against tenants. Second, the City points out that separate water accounts are impossible in multi-unit dwellings, where water is supplied by a single pipe and measured by a single meter. Id. at 28. The City's proffered rationales satisfy the rational basis test, because there is a reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification of property owners and tenants. Beach Commc'ns , 508 U.S. at 313 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 . Winston's complaint does not plausibly allege otherwise. Winston disputes the City's bases for distinguishing between landlords and tenants, arguing that (1) the City could improve its collection of unpaid water bills by allowing more individuals to open water accounts, (2) the City could suspend water service to tenants if tenants had water accounts, and (3) it is feasible for the City to provide separate meters in multi-dwelling units. Winston's arguments merely quarrel with the wisdom of the City's policy, however, and do not demonstrate that the City lacks a rational basis to treat landlords and tenants differently. Winston may think that there is an imperfect fit between means and ends in achieving the City's goal of collecting money from water account holders, but we are compelled under rational-basis review to accept ... [those] generalizations. Heller , 509 U.S. at 321 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 . Here, the City rationally concluded that property ownership allows it to collect its unpaid bills more efficiently because the City can subject property owners, but not tenants, to liens. Moreover, the City may rationally conclude that water supply infrastructure in older, multi-dwelling buildings provides a valid reason to allow only property owners to open water accounts. Concluding otherwise could essentially require substantial reconstruction of apartment buildings throughout the City of Syracuse. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that Winston failed to allege facts that might demonstrate the City has  no rational basis to permit only property owners to open water accounts.