Opinion ID: 751794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court Properly Interpreted the PMPA's Preemption Provision

Text: Section 2806(a) of the PMPA states: 47 To the extent that any provision of this subchapter applies to the termination (or furnishing of notice with respect thereto) of any franchise, or to the nonrenewal (or the furnishing of notice with respect thereto) of any franchise relationship, no State or any political subdivision thereof may adopt, enforce or continue in effect any provision of law or regulation (including any remedy or penalty applicable to any violation thereof) with respect to termination (or the furnishing of notice thereto) of any such franchise relationship unless such provision of such law or regulation is the same as the applicable regulation of this subchapter. 48 This express preemption provision has been interpreted as clearly intended to provide uniform minimum standards for the termination and nonrenewal of franchises and to bar state regulation of this area. Continental Enters., Inc. v. American Oil Co., 808 F.2d 24, 27 (8th Cir.1986). 49 Consistent with this understanding of the express preemption provision of the PMPA, the district court held that some of Clark's claims were preempted. Specifically, Clark's claims that the defendants improperly terminated or refused to renew his franchise for purposes of the PMPA because they violated implied contractual duties, such as the duty of good faith, and fiduciary duties created by Tennessee law were held to be preempted. This conclusion was correct. These claims amount to an attempt to impose standards concerning termination and nonrenewal, and notice thereof, that are more stringent than those imposed by the PMPA. As such, they are clearly covered by the preemption provision of the PMPA. See Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 804 F.2d 907, 914-16 (6th Cir.1986) (holding similar claims premised on state law preempted by the PMPA); see also Simmons v. Mobil Oil Corp., 29 F.3d 505, 512 (9th Cir.1994) (holding PMPA claim premised on implied state law duty of good faith preempted). III 50 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's partial grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and its remand of Clark's remaining claims to state court. 51