Opinion ID: 222737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sworn Statements in Loan Applications

Text: Green also contends that certain testimony offered by witnesses for the government prejudiced him by misleading the jury about the charges against him. The jury heard three government witnesses read slight variations of the following passage from loan application materials submitted in connection with Green's loans: Borrower understands that it is a federal crime punishable by fine or imprisonment or both to knowingly make any false statement concerning any of the above facts, as applicable under the provisions of Title 18 USC, Section 1014. I declare that the foregoing agreement is true and correct. . . . At its first mention, defense counsel requested a limiting instruction directing the jury that Green had not been charged with violating Section 1014. After the government responded that it was offering the evidence to show Green's knowledge, the court asked both counsel to review the issue overnight and raised the possibility of striking the reference or giving a limiting instruction the following day. The next morning, prosecutors and defense counsel agreed on an instruction that the court gave the jury. The court told the jury that it had heard some evidence regarding statements in loan documents about that it's unlawful to violate particular statutes. That evidence, the particular statute actually isn't at issue here other than it'sthe government is offering it with respect to knowledge and intent. Similar passages referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1014 were read and referenced again by two witnesses and by the government during closing argument. On appeal, Green argues that the government's repeated references to section 1014 confused the jury. He contends that, as a result of this testimony, the jury convicted Green based on statutory violations not charged. But Green forfeited this argument by not objecting to the admissibility of the statements when they were offered. Rather, upon their introduction, Green's counsel requested, and the court gave, a limiting instruction to avoid the very confusion Green claims still permeated his trial. In light of Green's forfeiture, we review the introduction of the testimony for plain error only. United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir.2005). We find none. Although the references to another provision of law perhaps posed some risk of confusing the jury, the court's limiting instruction alleviated that risk. The references were not so prejudicial so as to render the instruction ineffectual. See United States v. Curry, 538 F.3d 718, 728 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that we assume a jury follows an instruction unless the evidence is so powerfully incriminating that they cannot reasonably be expected to put it out of their minds). Even if Green had not forfeited his objection, we would have little trouble agreeing with the district court that the passages were admissible to help prove that Green knew he was required to provide true information and knew it was wrong to provide false information, and finding that the limiting instruction was sufficient to protect against any potential prejudice.