Opinion ID: 1611086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Facts Relevant To Peart Issue

Text: Although the focus of the March 23, 2004 hearing was primarily the funding issue raised by defense counsel, part of the argument raised by separate counsel for Ware in support of the position that Ware should not be re-appointed to this case was that Ware's heavy caseload and administrative responsibilities would prevent him from rendering constitutionally-effective assistance of counsel. In support of this Peart argument, Ware's attorney, Walt Sanchez, proposed a stipulation as to Ware's personal pending caseload, the number of cases in which Ware would participate with other attorneys who had primary responsibility, and the administrative and supervisory duties for which Ware was responsible as Chief Public Defender. Sanchez also referred to the Rules of Professional Conduct and an ethics opinion. At the hearing, Sanchez acknowledged that, ... given the timing of this issue, [the Peart issue] isn't full blown in front of the Court at this point. [109] After Judge Canaday ruled and substituted counsel, Sanchez specifically asked the judge if he would formally rule on the Peart issue which had been raised. The judge stated that he did not believe any comment was required on the Peart issue, based on what had been presented, and later clarified that a reconsideration of that view would only be based on something much more substantial in black letter law. [110] At a subsequent hearing held September 15, 2004, Ware admitted that the March 23, 2004 hearing was not a Peart issue, it was a substitution of counsel issue, so there were some references made to the Peart case and things of that sort, but it wasn't fully developed. [111] Defense counsel raised the Peart issue in subsequent motions, hearings, and status conferences. On April 13, 2004, Ware filed a motion seeking the court's reconsideration of its March 23, 2004 order substituting counsel. [112] In addition to asking the court to reconsider its removal of Cuccia, da Ponte and Taylor as trial counsel, Ware also requested reconsideration of the portion of the court's ruling which re-appointed him as counsel, suggesting ... that current counsel will be unable to provide reasonably effective representation because of undersigned counsel's obligations to numerous other clients and his administrative duties as Executive Director of the Public Defenders' Office. [113] The district court denied the defendant's motion. [114] Subsequently, a status conference was held on May 21, 2004. [115] At that time, Ware informed the court of his upcoming schedule as part of his continuing objection to his appointment as lead counsel to the case. [116] The district court noted that Ware made these same arguments and objections at the time of his re-appointment. The court also noted that the defense had failed to take a writ on Ware's re-appointment, and stated its belief that the defense had evidently made the strategic decision to reserve that issue for appeal. Ware did not dispute this belief. [117] Another status conference was held on June 18, 2004. [118] Ware discussed with the court that the defense would be filing a motion to enroll an additional attorney from the public defender's office to assist with the defense of the case. [119] On June 23, 2004, a written motion to enroll Richard White, a staff attorney with the Calcasieu Parish Public Defenders' Office, was granted. [120] Also on June 23, 2004, the defense filed a written Peart motion, asserting that Ware has primary trial responsibility for 35 felony cases (including 1 capital rape, 5 second degree murder cases, and 10 aggravated rape cases). He is also playing a significant role in many other felony cases, that are being handled to some extent by other PDO attorneys. [121] The defense also sought to enroll separate counsel, Christine Lehmann, for the purpose of arguing the Peart motion. [122] The district court denied the motion to enroll Lehmann as separate counsel for the Peart hearing, and declined to hear the Peart motion itself: The Court would take notice at this time that nothing was stated in the body of this motion that was not argued or presented in court previously when new counsel was to be appointed. At that time the defendant was independently represented by Mr. Kerry Cuccia and Graham Deponte [sic]. In addition, Mr. Ron Ware and the Public Defenders' Office was independently represented by Mr. Walt Sanchez. The record speaks for itself as to the information that was presented to the Court prior to Mr. Ware and Mr. St. Dizier being appointed as counsel. It talked about caseload, it talked about a number of factors in which the Court made rulings and findings of which the Court would rely on the record at this time. Writs were not taken with regard to the Court's decision. The Court finds that this Motion to Enroll and the request for Peart information to be duplicative and moot based on the prior proceedings and determination of this Court and I will decline the appointment and I will also decline to fix a Peart proceeding in this matter. [123] Upon Ware's request for clarification regarding the judge's refusal to fix the Peart motion for hearing, the judge stated: Correct, until something can be demonstrated to the court in writing that would be distinguishable from what was presented at the time of appointment, I believe that was in April [sic; March] of 2004, that was distinguishable and for good cause why it was not presented there's no reason for the Court to rehash the same matters that have been discussed. [124] Ware then explained that he was re-urging his Peart objection because, as he became more familiar with the case, he felt it was even more apparent that he could not be effective. [125] The judge stated he understood, but rejected, Ware's position, indicating anything that Ware was now saying had been said previously: I see no reason to go back unless some new information has been obtained and that new information can be specifically given to the Court to reviewreopening an issue that you're concerned about and that there's good cause for not having that information previously. Those are the standards in order to review something that the Court feels has already been reviewed. [126] In addition to the comments made by the court as to the merits of the Peart motion, the court noted the motion to enroll and the Peart motion were denied as having been submitted under Ms. Lehmann's signature, who was not counsel of record, but were to be made part of the proceedings as a proffer. [127] On June 29, 2004, the defense filed a notice of its intent to seek a writ from the district court's refusal to hear the Peart motion and a writ application was subsequently filed in the court of appeal. [128] The court of appeal, in a 2-1 ruling, denied the defense's writ, stating: There is no error in the trial court's ruling which denied the motion to enroll additional counsel for the limited purpose of litigating a Peart motion. Based thereon, we additionally find that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the Peart motion to be filed because it was not signed by enrolled counsel. [129] On September 3, 2004, the defense tried again, and filed another Peart motion. [130] The allegations in this motion added the information that ... despite his diligent efforts, [Ware] continues to be unable, due to his other caseload and his administrative duties, to provide fully competent and adequate representation to Mr. Reeves. The motion alleged generally that [Ware's] personal caseload continues to be of a volume that is out of compliance with LIDAB and ABA standards for competent capital representation. Included as an exhibit was a Declaration of Jason Reeves, requesting that Cuccia and da Ponte be placed back on the case. [131] The state opposed the defense's Peart motion as being repetitive, pointing out that the new Peart motion was nearly identical to several previous motions filed by the defendant and ruled upon by both the district court and the court of appeal. The sole new issue presented in the latest motion urged the court to reinstate Reeves' former counsel for the retrial, a little over a month before Reeves' second trial was to begin, and over seven months since Ware was assigned to the case. The state urged that this latest filing was clearly a dilatory tactic, as all issues had thoroughly been fleshed out and discussed in previous motions. Further, the state noted that the defense had never sought further review from the Louisiana Supreme Court. [132] At a hearing on the defense's second written Peart motion, held September 15, 2004, the district judge stated his appreciation of the history of the defense's Peart allegations, beginning with the March 23, 2004 hearing: In that March of 2004 proceeding the Court I believe accepted Mr. Walt Sanchez, who appeared and made an appearance as counsel for Mr. Ron Ware. It's also noticed that Mr. Cuccia and Ms. DaPonte were present and were independent counsel for Mr. Reeves during those proceedings. In addition, the defendant was present; and, in addition, the State was present. And the Court received substantial information and argument with regard to Mr. Ware's caseload, his administrative duties, his supervisory duties, everything that is contained within the concerns espoused in the Peart motion. [133] Judge Canaday noted that a formal, written Peart motion was submitted by the defense in June of 2004, but that he denied the motion itself based on the fact that the motion was not submitted by an attorney of record in the case. The judge noted that writs were taken from this ruling, and denied by the court of appeal. [134] Judge Canaday continued, as follows: ... on September of 2004 now the defendant has as lead counsel resubmits [sic] under his signature the same proceedings disposed of in the June 2004 and March 2004 proceedings. As stated before, the Court has taken the concerns of counsel into consideration, specifically initially at the March of 2004 reassignment proceedings and determined that the unique position of Mr. Ware would only be self-limiting. It was noted at that time Mr. Ware did not have any division assignments. He is the only capital certified public defender within Calcasieu Parish Public Defenders' office as lead counsel. He has handled other capital matters, and the other capital matters that were pending within Calcasieu Parish have been staggered to allow preparation within time constraints to Mr. Ware. Further, he has been able to pick and choose the cases he wishes to become personally involved in. It is noted that there are other felony public defenders who are assigned to specific divisions that have primary responsibility for those cases, and Mr. Ware makes those decisions on his own as to whether he wants to be involved, should appear, and supervise. The Court also notes the years of experience he has had in administrating and oversight of the Calcasieu Parish Public Defenders' Office. Further and even additionally important is the previous representation of other felony charges to this specific defendant, Mr. Jason Reeves, and the rapport and relationship that is noted by the Court in the February of 2004 trial. Now, in totality and in looking at the standards as indicated of the facts specific, the Court would have to make this comment, that in the past six months since the reappointment the Defense team, which are three capable attorneys at this point, have effectively represented the defendant through all new areas. Motions have been filed, there's been aggressive cross-examinations, and there's been significant trial preparation both open and adversarially as well as ex parte with relations to the Court of which the record will speak for itself. The Court is clearly satisfied that there has been effective representation up to this point exceeding all Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [104 S.Ct. 2052] standards. I would like to note just for your concern that in this day and age it seems to be that there must be many motions and actions that are taken in order to defend all of those charged with crimes, but it is also necessary that individuals file certain motions to protect those that are even appointed to represent those defendants, and the Court acknowledges that and understands the need for those motions to be filed, Mr. Ware. The Court will at this time as to the application of the Peart proceeding is going to deny thewill allow you to file the motion, but will deny the fixing of the motion. It is being denied as repetitious. It is also noted as res judicata and the law of the case doctrine. Nothing has changed; and, in fact, the actions of Defense counsel in the interim while these arguments and positions have been presented have demonstrated just the opposite [sic; ,] of thoroughly effective preparation. Any specifics, statistical data, that you feel the Court has not had or received will be allowed to be proffered into the record. That may be submitted since the motion is part of the record and is being denied at this time for the reasons stated.... [135] On September 24, 2004, the defense made a proffer into the record of its evidence in support of its Peart motion. [136] Three staff attorneys with the public defenders' office testified as to Ware's inability to provide training, assistance and supervision due to his heavy caseload. Ware described the administrative demands of his position, including staffing concerns that arose in his office during the time period of his re-appointment to Reeves' case. Ware testified that his caseload prevented him from providing competent representation to Reeves and the rest of his clients. Ware concluded by stating he did not think he was competent under the standards for constitutionally effective representation announced in Strickland. In addition to this testimony, the defense proffered several exhibits into the record, including a list of Ware's cases; a listing of the mandatory life cases pending in the public defenders' office; the curriculum vitae of Dane Ciolino, the defense's expert; the ABA 10 Principles of a Public Delivery System; an ethics opinion of the American Council of Chief Defenders; and a case from a federal appellate court. The defense took a writ to the court of appeal from the court's September 15, 2004 ruling. The court of appeal subsequently denied the writ, and a requested stay of the trial, finding the following: There is no error in the trial court's ruling denying Defendant's September 2 [sic; September 3], 2004 Peart motion. This issue was previously raised by the Defendant, and was denied on March 23, 2004. The Defendant did not seek review of the trial court's ruling. Further, the Defendant failed to demonstrate a significant change in circumstances, between March 23, 2004 and September 2, 2004, warranting either a hearing on his repetitive motion or the grant of relief, which was previously denied. Additionally, the Defendant failed to submit proof regarding all of the factors enumerated in State v. Peart, 92-907 (La.7/2/93), 621 So.2d 780, which are necessary before application of a rebuttable presumption of ineffectiveness to the Public Defender's Office. For these reasons, the Defendant's writ application is denied. [137]