Opinion ID: 613156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quasi-contractual Remedies

Text: We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, construing all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Musch v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 587 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir.2009). Stryker argues that under Wisconsin law Carroll cannot invoke the equitable remedies of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment in light of the parties' express contract regarding compensation. Carroll responds that the 2008 compensation plan laying out Stryker's commission structure did not amount to an express contract because he did not sign it, Stryker reserved the right to modify it, and the receipt for the employee handbook disclaimed the existence of a contract. In Wisconsin the quasi-contractual theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are legal causes of action grounded in equitable principles and can be invoked only in the absence of an enforceable contract. See Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 557 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir.2009); Meyer v. The Laser Vision Inst., 290 Wis.2d 764, 714 N.W.2d 223, 230 (Wis.Ct.App.2006) (equitable claims barred by express contract); Greenlee v. Rainbow Auction/Realty Co., 202 Wis.2d 653, 553 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Wis. Ct.App.1996) (doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply where parties have entered into a valid contract). Where there is an enforceable contract, the proper claim is for breach of contract; quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are unavailable. See Lindquist Ford, 557 F.3d at 476; Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis.2d 493, 577 N.W.2d 617, 624 n. 13 (1998); Schultz v. Andrus' Estate, 178 Wis. 358, 190 N.W. 83, 84 (1922) (Where a valid, express contract is proven, no recovery can be had on an implied contract.). Carroll insists that there was no express contract between the parties. We have little trouble rejecting this argument. It is undisputed that Carroll was an at-will employee; he had no employment contract. Under employment at will, the employer may discharge an employee for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong. Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis.2d 99, 579 N.W.2d 217, 222-23 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Though he could be discharged at will, his compensation was the subject of an express contract. The 2008 compensation plan spelled out in detail the pay structure for Stryker's commission-based sales representatives. See Piaskoski & Assocs. v. Ricciardi, 275 Wis.2d 650, 686 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Wis.Ct.App.2004) (listing the three basic requirements for a contract: offer, acceptance, and consideration); Petersen v. Pilgrim Vill., 256 Wis. 621, 42 N.W.2d 273, 274 (1950) (An offer must be so definite in its terms, or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain. (quotation marks omitted)). The parties manifested their consent to be bound by the compensation plan when Carroll continued to work for the company after receiving it, and Stryker paid him in accordance with its terms until he was terminated. Ricciardi, 686 N.W.2d at 679 (holding that [o]ffer and acceptance exist when the parties mutually express assent). This exchange of services for pay also supplied the consideration. See Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. River City Refuse Removal, Inc., 299 Wis.2d 561, 729 N.W.2d 396, 408 (2007) (defining consideration as either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee). That Carroll did not sign the plan doesn't mean it's not a contract. Carroll accepted the 2008 compensation plan by performing under its terms, and the lack of his signature does not defeat this acceptance by performance. See Chudnow Constr. Corp. v. Commercial Disc. Corp., 48 Wis.2d 653, 180 N.W.2d 697, 698 (1970) (explaining that a contract may be effective even though it is not signed by parties). Nor is the contract illusory because Stryker reserved the right to change the terms of payment in the future. A promise is illusory and thus unenforceable only where one party assumes no detriment or obligation and therefore has given no consideration. Devine v. Notter, 312 Wis.2d 521, 753 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Wis.Ct.App. 2008). Here, Stryker undertook an obligation to pay Carroll in accordance with the terms of the compensation plan as long as the plan was in force. A contract can be modified by future agreement, see Lakeshore Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Drobac, 107 Wis.2d 445, 319 N.W.2d 839, 845 (1982), and Stryker's reservation of the right to modify the pay plan does not make this an illusory contract. The company agreed to pay for services performed in accordance with the compensation plan's terms while the plan was in effect. If Stryker had exercised its right to modify the commission structure, Carroll would have had an opportunity to accept the new terms by continuing to work for the company. Finally, we reject Carroll's argument that the receipt he signed when he accepted a copy of the employee handbook disclaimed the existence of any contract between the parties. Carroll is misreading both the receipt and the employee handbook. The receipt simply acknowledged that the handbook was meant to inform me of the Company's policies and rules, and cautioned that nothing contained in the Handbook constitutes an employment contract and any previous contracts, policies, or representations ... are no longer in effect and have been replaced by the Handbook. The receipt was thus a straightforward acknowledgment of the handbook's purpose: It was not an employment contract but rather a statement of the company's workplace policies and practices. By all accounts nothing in the receipt or the handbook sheds any light on whether the compensation plan is an enforceable contract; neither the receipt nor the handbook itself specifies payment schedules for Stryker's commission-based employees. [3] Accordingly, we agree with the magistrate judge that Stryker's 2008 compensation plan constitutes an express contract and Carroll may not recover under the quasi-contractual doctrines of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.