Opinion ID: 795611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background: Federal Crack Cocaine Sentencing

Text: 9 As courts and commentators have explained on numerous occasions, the sentencing contrast for crack and powdered cocaine offenses debuted in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841) (Act). The Act created two tiers of mandatory sentencing ranges for drug offenses. Id. § 1002 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). The lower tier spans periods of imprisonment ranging generally from a mandatory minimum of five years to a maximum of forty years; the higher tier spans periods of imprisonment ranging generally from a mandatory minimum of ten years to a maximum of life. Id. These minimum prison terms are triggered exclusively by the quantity and type of drug involved in the offense. Though it is undisputed that crack and powder cocaine are pharmacologically indistinguishable, 3 Congress set dramatically different penalty structures for each, requiring one hundred times more powdered cocaine than crack cocaine to trigger inclusion in a particular range. Id. For example, a crack cocaine distribution conviction involving 5 grams yields a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence, while a distribution conviction involving 500 grams of cocaine powder is required to trigger the same 5-year sentence. Id. 4 10 The sentencing difference between crack and powder cocaine was based on Congress's determination that crimes involving crack pose a more serious societal danger than crimes involving powder cocaine. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 117-18 (1995), http://www.ussc.gov/crack/exec.htm (1995 Report). Specifically, legislators believed that crack is more addictive than powder cocaine, that it causes crime (psychopharmacological, economic-compulsive and systemic), that it has perilous physiological effects such as psychosis and death, that young people are particularly prone to becoming addicted to it (`students will be faced with the temptations of crack and other drugs during their school years') and that crack's low cost per dose and ease of manufacture would lead to even more widespread use of it. William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 Ariz. L.Rev. 1233, 1252 (Winter 1996) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir.2006) (citing 1995 Report at 118) (explaining that Congress found that crack cocaine was more likely to (i) induce addiction; (ii) correlate with the incidence of other serious crimes; (iii) implicate especially vulnerable members of society; (iv) cause deleterious physiological effects; and (v) attract youthful users). 11 Shortly after passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the United States Sentencing Commission incorporated the statutorily established difference in punishment between crack and powder cocaine offenses into the federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c); Spade, supra, at 1249. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained, 12 [t]he Commission built the base offense levels for crimes involving crack and powdered cocaine around the threshold quantities set by Congress. This architectural decision comported with Congress's discernible intent. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)(5) (requiring the Commission to specify a sentence to a substantial term of imprisonment for offenders convicted of trafficking in a substantial quantity of a controlled substance). Consistent with its congressionally imposed obligation to reduc[e] unwarranted sentence disparities, id. § 994(f), the Commission also fixed the guideline sentences for offenses involving non-threshold quantities of crack and powdered cocaine in accordance with the 100:1 ratio. See generally USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. (backg'd.) (concluding that a logical sentencing structure for drug offenses requires coordination with mandatory minimum sentences). Thus, while Congress designed the 100:1 ratio to operate at the minimum and maximum poles of the mandatory statutory sentencing ranges, it was the Commission that incorporated the ratio root and branch into its calculation of every cocaine offender's guideline sentencing range . . . . 13 Pho, 433 F.3d at 55 (emphasis added). 14 The Sentencing Commission revisited the 100:1 ratio for the first time on a directive from Congress to study federal sentencing policy as it relates to possession and distribution of all forms of cocaine, see Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097 (1994). In its 1995 Report, the Commission candidly conceded that a review of the relatively sparse empirical evidence available concerning those factors Congress considered in distinguishing crack from powder cocaine leads to mixed conclusions and few clear answers. See 1995 Report at 195. [E]ven while agreeing that crack may be more harmful than powder cocaine, the Commission [was] not prepared . . . to say definitely how that additional harm should be accounted for within the current penalty scheme. Id. Nevertheless, [it] firmly conclude[d] that it [could] not recommend a ratio differential as great as the current 100-to-1 quantity ratio. Id. at 196; see also id. at 198 (stating [t]he Commission strongly recommends against a 100-to-1 quantity ratio). 5 The Commission informed Congress that the crack/powder cocaine differential needed to be re-examined and revised, id. at 197, and that it intended to provide a more comprehensive review after further investigation. Id. at 198-200. 15 Shortly after issuance of the 1995 Report, the Commission recommended that Congress approve amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines abrogating any differential between the penalties mandated for crack and powder cocaine offenses. Notice of Submission to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 60 Fed.Reg. 25,074, 25,077 (May 10, 1995) (stating that the Commission has concluded that . . . the different offense levels based solely on the form of cocaine are not required); see id. at 25,075-25,076. The proposed amendments equalized sentences for offenses involving similar amounts of crack cocaine and powder cocaine at the level provided for powder cocaine. 16 Congress held hearings concerning the suggested amendments but ultimately rejected the Commission's recommendations. See Pub.L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334, 334 (1995). Its refusal to adopt the amendments was premised primarily on its determination that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates significant distinctions between crack and powder cocaine. H.R.Rep. No. 104-272, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N 335, 337. 17 Two years after the proposed changes were rejected and after deliberat[ing] carefully over federal cocaine sentencing policy, assess[ing] the concerns raised by Congress, conduct[ing] new research, consult[ing] with law enforcement and substance abuse experts, and review[ing] all of the Commission's prior research and analysis, the Commission issued another report concerning the crack/powder cocaine sentencing differential. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (1997) 1, http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/NEWCRACK.PDF (1997 Report). In that report, the Commission unanimously advocated that Congress replace the 100:1 ratio with a 5:1 ratio by changing the quantity levels that trigger mandatory minimum penalties for both powder and crack cocaine. Id. at 2 ([F]or powder cocaine, the Commission recommends that Congress reduce the current 500-gram trigger for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence to a level between 125 and 375 grams, and for crack cocaine, that Congress increase the current five-gram trigger to between 25 and 75 grams.). The Commission's recommendations received little support in Congress, which ultimately took no action. 18 Undaunted, the Commission issued a third report addressing the 100:1 differential in 2002. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf (2002 Report). It reiterated that reform was necessary and explicitly criticized the status quo: [T]he Commission firmly and unanimously believes that the current federal cocaine sentencing policy is unjustified and fails to meet the sentencing objectives set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act [of 1984] and the [Anti-Drug Abuse] Act. Id. at 91. It further explained that while there are reasons to punish crack cocaine offenses more seriously than powder cocaine offenses involving equivalent quantities, a 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio is excessive to account for the differences in harms between the two drugs. Id. at 92-93. According to the report, the underlying rationale that prompted the ratio (including the premise that crack cocaine was more addictive, would lead to a lost generation of crack babies, and was highly correlated with violent crimes) had been shown over time to be overstated. 6 Thus, the Commission endorsed a reduction of the crack/powder cocaine sentencing differential from a ratio of 100:1 to one of 20:1. Id. at 107. Congress again deliberated on the Commission's recommendations and again refused to modify or reform the 100:1 differential. 19 In sum, after three separate reports and proposed amendments to the 100:1 ratio, Congress has kept in force the initial sentencing difference between crack and powder cocaine. 20