Opinion ID: 2073745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Directed Verdicts on CMI's Counterclaim

Text: As with respect to a judgment n.o.v., in considering a motion for a directed verdict the trial court assumes the truth of all credible evidence on the issue and of all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, and considers them in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Dix v. Spampinato, 278 Md. 34, 37, 358 A.2d 237 (1976); D.C. Transit System v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 580, 287 A.2d 251 (1972); Stoskin v. Prensky, 256 Md. 707, 709, 262 A.2d 48 (1970); P. Flanigan & Sons v. Childs, 251 Md. 646, 653, 248 A.2d 473 (1968); Hogan v. Q.T. Corporation, 230 Md. 69, 74, 185 A.2d 491 (1962); Campbell, Etc. v. Patton, 227 Md. 125, 134, 175 A.2d 761 (1961). If there is any legally relevant and competent evidence, however slight, from which a rational mind could infer a fact in issue, then a trial court would be invading the province of the jury by declaring a directed verdict. In such circumstances, the case should be submitted to the jury and a motion for a directed verdict denied. Snoots v. Demorest, 254 Md. 572, 575, 255 A.2d 12 (1969); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ely, 253 Md. 254, 263, 252 A.2d 786 (1969); Jacobson v. Julian, 246 Md. 549, 555-556, 229 A.2d 108 (1967); Plitt v. Greenberg, 242 Md. 359, 367-368, 219 A.2d 237 (1966); Smack v. Jackson, 238 Md. 35, 37, 207 A.2d 511 (1965); Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230, 233, 179 A.2d 371 (1962). Impala presents seven questions, numbered 2 through 8 in its brief, going to the issues determined by the jury pertaining to CMI's counterclaim. In denying the motions for directed verdicts the court said: Now, with regard to the Motions for Directed Verdicts as to Counts 1 and 5 of the counterclaim, of [CMI], the court is of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence in the case to be submitted to the Jury on the questions raised or the claims made under these two counts, and that the matters were fairly submitted to the Jury on the issues which were propounded to them. And, the court therefore believes that there was sufficient evidence upon which the Jury could act in these matters to sustain the verdict and judgments which they rendered. We agree. In considering the propriety of the trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict, this Court, as well as the lower court, is obliged to assume the truth of all evidence tending to sustain the party against whom the motion is directed, as well as all inferences of fact reasonably and fairly deducible therefrom. Fleming v. Prince George's County, 277 Md. 655, 658, 358 A.2d 892 (1976); Taylor v. Armiger, 277 Md. 638, 640, 358 A.2d 883 (1976); Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 46, 288 A.2d 114 (1972); Wood v. Johnson, 242 Md. 446, 452, 219 A.2d 231 (1966); Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 405, 174 A.2d 53 (1961). Following this dictate, we find that the issues and the matters covered by them, inherently including the questions Impala propounds, were all properly submitted to the jury under the trial court's explanations and instructions. It is manifest that, with respect to the points raised by Impala, the evidence, and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to CMI, led to conclusions from which reasonable minds could differ, and, thus, the issues were not ones of law for the court, but were ones of fact for the jury with the weight and value of such evidence left to it. We hold that the court did not err in denying the motions for directed verdict.