Opinion ID: 2633516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Contribution Is Available.

Text: The superior court held that the McLaughlins' action as the assignees of claims held by Robson against Hughes Thorsness was effectively one for contribution and because contribution actions were repealed by the 1989 voter initiative establishing proportionate fault . . . the action could not be maintained. We agree that the action can fairly be described as seeking contribution. Robson's assignees seek to allocate a share of Robson's fault to Hughes Thorsness which is alleged to have acted concurrently with Robson in causing harm to the McLaughlins. The assignees claim that Robson has been held one hundred percent at fault for their loss, whereas another tortfeasor, Hughes Thorsness, was also responsible and should reimburse Robson. Although this remedy could be given any number of names, [33] it is effectively contribution. We do not agree, however, that the 1989 initiative was intended to bar common law contribution. As already noted, the initiative repealed Alaska's version of the Uniform Contribution Act. This repeal was necessary because the act called for contribution on a per capita rather than a fault-proportional basis. The Uniform Contribution Act was therefore inconsistent with the comparative fault-several liability system of the 1989 initiative. The injustice of retaining the per capita contribution system is readily illustrated by reference to the facts of Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, Ltd. [34] In Ehredt the jury found that the plaintiff was ten percent at fault, defendant Ehredt fifteen percent at fault, and defendant DeHavilland seventy-five percent at fault. [35] DeHavilland paid the plaintiff roughly $2 million for the release of the whole amount of the defendants' joint and several liability and then sought half of that sum from Ehredt in a claim for contribution. [36] We held, based on the per capita measure mandated in the Uniform Contribution Act, that DeHavilland was entitled to a full fifty percent of the sum it paid even though Ehredt was only fifteen percent responsible. [37] Under a proportional fault contribution system Ehredt would have been liable for only about $333,333 (the product of 15/90 x 2,000,000) rather than the $1,000,000 it had to pay using the Uniform Contribution Act's pro-rata measure. This example, from a case that was decided not long before the initiative was proposed, illustrates how the pro-rata measure of contribution liability contained in the Uniform Contribution Act would have undermined the comparative fault-several liability system enacted by the 1989 initiative. But the repeal of the Uniform Contribution Act meant only that Alaska's pro-rata statutory contribution system was no longer in effect. The repeal does not imply rejection of the principle of contribution based on proportional fault. We recognized this in Alaska General Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell. [38] We held there that a tort defendant's third-party claim for equitable apportionment under Civil Rule 14(c), filed after the statute of limitations governing the original action had expired, was not time-barred. [39] We recognized that such claims were similar to contribution actions: At its root each claim is a mechanism for spreading damage. [40] To illustrate this similarity we observed that the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts preserved contribution as a remedy under systems like Alaska's in cases where fewer than all those responsible had been joined: Indeed, the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes that even under apportioned liability a defendant sued in an action in which fewer than all the relevant persons have been joined might be liable for more than its percentage of fault and thus might be entitled to contribution. See Proposed Final Draft, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 33 cmt. f (1999).[ [41] ] We concluded that a defendant's equitable apportionment claim, like contribution, did not accrue when the underlying tort was committed, but upon settlement or judgment concerning the underlying claim. [42] This was true even though the equitable apportionment claim could be joined for litigation with the underlying claim before it technically accrued. [43] One complication was that with the repeal of the Uniform Contribution Act the separate contribution statute of limitations was also repealed. But we held that this repeal did not imply a rejection of third-party procedures well established in this state and the common law. [44] The scant legislative history demonstrates that the initiative's supporters were concerned almost exclusively with ensuring that defendants would be liable only for their share of fault. [45] Most other states have contribution systems. In many states contribution is statutory. But in a substantial number of states contribution has been developed as a matter of common law. [46] One of the leading cases is American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County. [47] American Motorcycle was decided three years after California by judicial decision abolished the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence in favor of a comparative negligence system. [48] In American Motorcycle the court adopted a rule of comparative contribution, termed partial equitable indemnity, under which liability among multiple tortfeasors may be apportioned on a comparative negligence basis. [49] This rule was found necessary in order to further the objective of the newly adopted comparative negligence system under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault. [50] The court further observed that its holding represented an evolutionary development of the common law equitable indemnity doctrine that furthered an equitable distribution of loss among multiple tortfeasors. [51] American Motorcycle adopted a contribution remedy even though California had an existing contribution statute. The statute was applicable only to joint judgment debtors and, like Alaska's repealed statute, called for contribution per capita rather than proportional to fault. [52] The American Motorcycle court observed that the contribution statute merely represented an effort to lessen the harshness of the early common law rule that prohibited contribution. [53] The statute was not intended to preempt the field or to foreclose future judicial developments which further the act's principal purpose of ameliorating the harshness and inequity of the old no contribution rule. [54] The courts of New York and Missouri have also adopted common law contribution under similar circumstances as in California, even though those states also had contribution statutes which provided for a limited contribution remedy. [55] Contribution in these states, as in most other states, may be asserted in the original tort action or in a separate action. [56] Common law contribution is also permitted by the Restatement of Torts. [57] The current Restatement makes it clear that contribution has a viable role in several liability jurisdictions where the contribution defendant's responsibility was not considered in the original action. [58] Comment f to section 23 of the current Restatement [59] states: If a person is otherwise entitled to recover contribution, contribution is limited to the amount that person pays to the plaintiff above that person's percentage of responsibility. In a jurisdiction where a defendant is only severally liable . . ., a defendant normally would pay no more than its own percentage share and would not be entitled to contribution. Even in a jurisdiction that does not use joint and several liability, however, a severally liable defendant might be sued with less than all of the relevant persons and be liable for more than its own percentages of responsibility, and therefore be entitled to contribution. See Comment c and Illustration 4. Comment c states in part: Normally, liability for the same indivisible injury will result from joint and several liability . . . but a severally liable person might sometimes be liable for the same indivisible injury caused by another severally liable person. Such a person may be entitled to contribution. Illustration 4 following this comment gives the following example pertaining to contribution in a severally liable jurisdiction: A is injured jointly by B, C, and D and sues B and C. In a jurisdiction that has rejected joint and several liability, B and C are each held severally liable for A's damages without any consideration of D's responsibility. B and C have been held liable for the same indivisible harm caused by D and may be entitled to contribution from D. In our view contribution should be available as a common law remedy because it furthers the goal of apportioning of tort losses in accordance with each responsible person's percentage of fault. Adopting this remedy for Alaska is a logical concomitant of two aspects of our law. The first is the holding of Benner v. Wichman. [60] Since the fault of non-parties is not assessed in the original trial, some defendants may be made to bear more than what their share of fault would be if the responsibility of all those at fault were considered. The second is the rule of Universal Motors, Inc. v. Neary . [61] Our rejection of a one-action rule leaves little reason to insist that defendants seeking to spread their damages must bring their claims under Civil Rule 14(c) rather than independently. [62]