Opinion ID: 1176393
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Flight After Commission of Crime.

Text: (23a) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to warrant an instruction that flight after commission of a crime, or after accusation, supports an inference of guilt. [9] He maintains it was shown by uncontradicted evidence that he left the P. house after the homicides for reasons other than fear of immediate apprehension and with the intention to return to dispose of the bodies. Accordingly, he argues that his leaving was not flight. (24) An instruction on flight is properly given if the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's flight reflected consciousness of guilt, and flight requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. ( People v. Cannady (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 391 [105 Cal. Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585].) Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested. (23b) Although defendant left the P. house without reporting the deaths of Ernest and Edward and with the purpose of concealing their deaths, and although this conduct supported an inference of consciousness of guilt, his leaving was not flight in the absence of any evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that he left to avoid being observed or arrested. Defendant did not leave to avoid being observed (his presence at the house on the morning following the murders was already known to Juan Salasar, among others) and he did not expect the crimes to become known before his intended return. He left to accomplish specific tasks and with the intent of returning to dispose of the bodies. There is no evidence he ever wavered in this intent; indeed, he was arrested while returning and less than a block from the P. house. Accordingly, the instruction on flight should not have been given. However, the error was manifestly harmless. The instruction did not figure in the prosecutor's closing argument and defendant's conduct, though not constituting flight, did manifest consciousness of guilt. Finally, the instruction did not posit the existence of flight; both the existence and significance of flight were left to the jury. (See People v. Clem (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 337, 344 [163 Cal. Rptr. 553].) It is not reasonably probable a verdict more favorable to defendant would have resulted had the instruction not been given.