Opinion ID: 223249
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Gonzales v. Raich

Text: Next came Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), where the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 vote, concluded that Congress acted within its commerce power in prohibiting the plaintiffs' wholly intrastate production and possession of marijuana, even though California state law approved the drug's use for medical purposes. The legislation at issue was the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., in which Congress sought to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances and prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12-13, 125 S.Ct. at 2203. Congress consequently devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA. Id. at 13, 125 S.Ct. at 2203. Under the CSA, marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug, meaning that the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana constitutes a criminal offense. Id. at 14, 125 S.Ct. at 2204. In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, which exempted from criminal prosecution physicians who recommend marijuana to a patient for medical purposes, as well as patients and primary caregivers who possess and cultivate marijuana for doctor-approved medical purposes. [79] Id. at 5-6, 125 S.Ct. at 2199. The two California plaintiffs, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, suffered from serious medical conditions and used marijuana as medication for several years, as recommended by their physicians. Id. at 6-7, 125 S.Ct. at 2199-2200. Monson cultivated her own marijuana, while Raich relied upon two caregivers to provide her with locally grown marijuana at no cost. Id. at 7, 125 S.Ct. at 2200. After federal agents seized and destroyed Monson's cannabis plants, the Raich plaintiffs sued. Id. They acknowledged that the CSA was within Congress's commerce authority and did not contend that any section of the CSA was unconstitutional. Id. at 15, 125 S.Ct. at 2204. Instead, they argued solely that the CSA was unconstitutional as applied to their manufacture, possession, and consumption of cannabis for personal medical use. Id. at 7-8, 125 S.Ct. at 2200. In rejecting the plaintiffs' quite limited as-applied challenge, the Raich Court stated that its case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic `class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 15, 17, 125 S.Ct. at 2204-05. The Supreme Court emphasized that, in assessing Congress's commerce power, its review was a modest one: We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a `rational basis' exists for so concluding. Id. at 22, 125 S.Ct. at 2208. The Raich Court commented that [w]hen Congress decides that the `total incidence' of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class, and it need not legislate with scientific exactitude. Id. at 17, 125 S.Ct. at 2206 (quotation marks omitted). [W]e have reiterated, the Supreme Court continued, that when `a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.' Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. at 1629). The Supreme Court found similar regulatory concerns underlying both the CSA in Raich and the AAA wheat provisions in Wickard. Just as rising market prices could draw wheat grown for home consumption into the interstate market and depress prices, a parallel concern making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana into that market. Id. at 19, 125 S.Ct. at 2207. In both cases, there was a threat of unwanted commodity diversion that could disrupt Congress's regulatory control over interstate commerce. Id. According to the Raich Court, Wickard established that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself `commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. Id. at 18, 125 S.Ct. at 2206. Characterizing the similarities between the plaintiffs' case and Wickard as striking, the Raich Court explained that [i]n both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. Id. at 18-19, 125 S.Ct. at 2206-07. The Raich Court opined that the failure to regulate intrastate production and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA's regulatory scheme: CSA enforcement would be frustrated by the difficulty in distinguishing between locally cultivated marijuana and out-of-state marijuana, and the marijuana authorized by state law could be diverted into illicit channels. Id. at 22, 125 S.Ct. at 2209. The Raich Court rejected the notion that California had surgically excised a discrete activity that is hermetically sealed off from the larger interstate marijuana market. Id. at 30, 125 S.Ct. at 2213. Accordingly, even though the CSA ensnares some purely intrastate activity, the Raich Court refuse[d] to excise individual components of that larger scheme. Id. Instead, congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Id. at 28, 125 S.Ct. at 2212. The Raich Court concluded that the statutory challenges in Lopez and Morrison were markedly different from the plaintiffs' statutory challenge to the CSA. Id. at 23, 125 S.Ct. at 2209. Whereas the Raich plaintiffs sought to excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme, the Supreme Court noted that in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress' commerce power in its entirety. Id. The Raich Court considered this distinction between facial and as-applied challenges pivotal because [w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 154, 91 S.Ct. at 1361). Additionally, since the CSA was a lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework, its statutory scheme was at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum from the statutes in Lopez and Morrison. Id. at 24, 125 S.Ct. at 2210. Once again central to the Court's analysis was whether the regulated activities were economic or noneconomic. The Raich Court defined [e]conomics as referring to the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities. Id. at 25-26, 125 S.Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). In contrast to the activities regulated in Lopez and Morrison, the Raich Court concluded that the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. Id. at 25, 125 S.Ct. at 2211. Indeed, the activities engaged in by the plaintiffs themselves fit the Court's definition of economic, since they involved the production, distribution, and consumption of marijuana. Concurring in only the Raich judgment, Justice Scalia commented that under his understanding of the commerce power, the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 34-35, 125 S.Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cited two general circumstances in which the regulation of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 35, 125 S.Ct. at 2216. First, the commerce power permits Congress not only to devise rules for the governance of commerce between States but also to facilitate interstate commerce by eliminating potential obstructions, and to restrict it by eliminating potential stimulants. Id. at 35, 125 S.Ct. at 2216. Yet, [t]his principle is not without limitation, as the cases of Lopez and Morrison made clear. Id. at 35-36, 125 S.Ct. at 2216-17. Second, Justice Scalia submitted that Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 37, 125 S.Ct. at 2217. The relevant question then becomes whether the means chosen are `reasonably adapted' to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power. Id. In addition to relying on these Commerce Clause cases, both parties and the district court conducted a separate analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause's implications for the Act. We review some foundational principles relating to that Clause, focusing our attention on United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010).