Opinion ID: 1768560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Judicial Override

Text: In Ex parte Waldrop, [Ms. 1001194, November 22, 2002] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2002), we addressed the same arguments Hodges makes here concerning the constitutionality of the judicial-override provision in Alabama's capital sentencing scheme in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). [1] We upheld the judicial-override in Waldrop. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In Ring, the defendant was convicted of a murder committed during the course of a robbery. However, under Arizona's statutory scheme, unlike Alabama's, only the trial court heard the evidence submitted at the sentencing hearing. The trial court determined which aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances existed, weighed those circumstances, and sentenced Ring to death. The Supreme Court concluded that because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' those factors must be found by a jury. 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348). Because the trial judge and not the jury made the factual findings required to sentence Ring to death, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Id. In Waldrop, we first addressed Waldrop's argument that a defendant cannot be sentenced to death in Alabama unless a jury finds both that a defendant is guilty of a capital offense and that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists. We concluded: Because the jury convicted Waldrop of two counts of murder during a robbery in the first degree, a violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(2), the statutory aggravating circumstance of committing a capital offense while engaged in the commission of a robbery, Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-49(4), was `proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-45(e); Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-50. Only one aggravating circumstance must exist in order to impose a sentence of death. Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-45(f). Thus, in Waldrop's case, the jury, and not the trial judge, determined the existence of the `aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.' Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. Therefore, the findings reflected in the jury's verdict alone exposed Waldrop to a range of punishment that had as its maximum the death penalty. This is all Ring and Apprendi require. ___ So.2d at ___. Likewise, in Hodges's case, because the jury convicted him of murder made capital because it was committed during a first-degree robbery, the jury, not the trial court, determined the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance that exposed Hodges to a range of punishment that had as its maximum the death penalty. ___ So.2d at ___. We next addressed in Waldrop his argument that the process of deciding whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is a factual finding that must be made by the jury and not the trial court. We concluded: [T]he determination whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is not a finding of fact or an element of the offense. Consequently, Ring and Apprendi do not require that a jury weigh the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances. ___ So.2d at ___. That conclusion applies to Hodges as well. Finally, we addressed Waldrop's argument that the existence of the aggravating circumstance that a murder is especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other capital offenses, § 13A-5-49(8), Ala.Code 1975, is a factual finding that must be made by the jury, not the trial court. We concluded: ... Ring and Apprendi do not require that the jury make every factual determination; instead, those cases require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt only those facts that result in `an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment ...' or `expose[] [a defendant] to a greater punishment....' Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. at 2439, 2440 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348). Alabama law requires the existence of only one aggravating circumstance in order for a defendant to be sentenced to death. Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-45(f). The jury in this case found the existence of that one aggravating circumstance: that the murders were committed while Waldrop was engaged in the commission of a robbery. At that point, Waldrop became `exposed' to, or eligible for, the death penalty. The trial court's subsequent determination that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel is a factor that has application only in weighing the mitigating circumstances and the aggravating circumstances, a process that we held earlier is not an `element' of the offense. ___ So.2d at ___. Likewise, Hodges became eligible for the death penalty when the jury found that he committed the murder while he was engaged in a robbery in the first degree, and the trial court's subsequent finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel is implicated only in the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), released the same day as Ring, stated: Basing a 2-year increase in the defendant's minimum sentence on a judicial finding of brandishing does not evade the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 536 U.S. at 568, 122 S.Ct. at 2420.