Opinion ID: 698642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: full first amendment protection of broadcast

Text: 125 Because no reasonable basis can be found to distinguish broadcast from cable in terms of the First Amendment protection the two media should receive, I would review section 16(a) and the Enforcement Order under the stricter level of scrutiny courts apply to content-based regulations of cable. This means the most exacting scrutiny should be applied to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. TBS, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2459. 26 In Sable, the Court indicated that the exacting scrutiny test has two prongs: the Government's interests must be compelling, and the method of regulation chosen must be the least restrictive means to achieve those compelling interests. 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836. That is the essence of the test, I think. 126 In this case, the majority views the broadcast media as disfavored in the application of First Amendment rights, relying principally on Pacifica; however, my colleagues nonetheless agree that section 16(a) reflects a content-based regulation that is subject to exacting scrutiny. Indeed, even the FCC viewed the case in this way. In my view, there is no way that section 16(a) can survive exacting scrutiny.
127 In explaining the reasons for applying heightened or exacting scrutiny, the Supreme Court recently stated: 128 At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. 129 TBS, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2458. This fundamental principle means that the First Amendment ... does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals. Id. 27 Because section 16(a) and the Enforcement Order ban indecent expression, 28 they constitute content-based regulations, which have traditionally raised the red flag of exacting scrutiny. As the Court stated in Sable, [t]he Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836. At issue in this case is whether the Government's interests are indeed compelling and whether it has chosen the least restrictive means to further its asserted compelling interests. 130 To withstand constitutional scrutiny, the Government's regulations must serve its interests  'without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.'  Id. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836 (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637, 100 S.Ct. 826, 836, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980)). The First Amendment rights at stake here are those of broadcasters and the adult broadcasting audience. The Supreme Court finds laws insufficiently tailored when they deny adults their free speech rights by allowing them to read, watch, or hear only what was acceptable for children. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383, 77 S.Ct. 524, 525-26, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957); Sable, 492 U.S. at 127, 109 S.Ct. at 2837 (finding that this case, like Butler, presents [the Court] with 'legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal' ) (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383, 77 S.Ct. at 526). 131 When First Amendment rights are at stake, appellate courts cannot defer to a legislative finding, but must make an independent inquiry to assess whether the record supports the Government's interests. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129, 109 S.Ct. at 2838; Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1543-44, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (assessing legislative finding or declaration that clear and present danger existed). The Court has found this particularly true where the Legislature has concluded that its product does not violate the First Amendment. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129, 109 S.Ct. at 2838.
132 The FCC claims that section 16(a) serves three compelling governmental interests. The ban is meant, first, to support parental supervision of children; second, to promote the well-being of minors; and third, to preserve the privacy of the home. Enforcement Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 705-06. Only the first two interests are at issue. 133 With respect to the interest in facilitating parental supervision, the Supreme Court has stated that the law has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968). It is entirely reasonable for [t]he legislature [to] properly conclude that parents and others ... who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. Id. Similarly, with respect to the Commission's second interest, protecting the well-being of its youth, the Court on numerous occasions has found a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836; see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 98 S.Ct. at 3040; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640, 88 S.Ct. at 1281. But to note that these interests are compelling in the abstract is not to scrutinize the Government's assertions as applied to this case. 134 As I discussed in the panel decision, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 183-86 (D.C.Cir.1993) (Edwards, J., concurring), one of the most significant problems with the Government's defense of its regulations is that its first two asserted interests, at least as the FCC appears to define their scope here, are irreconcilably in conflict. The Commission cannot simultaneously seek to facilitate parental supervision over their children's exposure to indecent programming and at the same time protect all children from indecent speech by imposing a flat ban on indecent programming from the hours of 6 a.m. to midnight. Simply put, among the myriad of American parents, not every parent will decide, as the Commission has, that the best way to raise its child is to have the Government shield children under eighteen from indecent broadcasts. Furthermore, not every parent will agree with the Commission's definition of indecency, nor whether it is appropriate in some contexts, nor at what age their own children may be exposed to such programming. In asserting both interests--facilitating parental supervision and protecting children from indecent broadcast--the Government must assume not only that parents agree with the Commission, but that parents supervise their children in some uniform manner. Surely, this is not the case. When acting consciously, some parents may prohibit their children from any exposure to indecent material; some may impose a modified prohibition depending upon the content of the programming and the child's maturity; still others may view or listen to indecent material with their children, either to criticize, endorse, or remain neutral about what they see or hear. A complete ban on indecent broadcasts does not facilitate the variety of American parents in supervising their children's exposure to broadcasting. 135 The Commission maintains that these two interests bolster and reinforce each other. Tr. of Oral Argument at 56. It contends that it simply is not practical for these parents to control effectively what their children might see and hear on the broadcast medium. Brief for Respondents at 16. But here, the Commission assumes that parents are unavailable or inept at the task of parenting, and essentially establishes itself as the final arbiter of what broadcast American children may see and hear. In so doing, the Government tramples heedlessly on parents' rights to rear their children as they see fit and to inculcate them with their own moral values. 29 Courts generally do not take these moves lightly. We have long recognized the rights of parents to raise their children in the manner they see fit. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (striking state law requiring children to attend public schools as interfer[ing] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 627, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (striking state law that prohibited teaching foreign languages to children as interfering with the power of parents to control the education of their own). As the Supreme Court said in Ginsberg, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. 390 U.S. at 639, 88 S.Ct. at 1280; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-36, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532-44, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (exempting children of Amish faith from compulsory school attendance law on grounds that it impinges on other fundamental rights such as traditional interest of parents with respect to religious upbringing of their children). When the Government does intervene in the rearing of children contrary to parents' preferences, it is usually in response to some significant breakdown within the family unit or in the complete absence of parental caretaking. Society protects children who are abused, neglected, or abandoned, because the harm is clear and such actions are contrary to civilized notions of parenting. The Government does not generally tell parents what speech their children should and should not hear absent some showing of harm to their children. 136 In other contexts, these two interests--facilitating parental supervision and protecting children from indecency--may have worked in tandem. For example, in Pacifica, a father's complaint that his son heard an indecent monologue prompted the FCC to enforce sanctions. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-33, 98 S.Ct. at 3030-32. In that case, facilitating parental control and protecting the well-being of minors might have simultaneously converged; the parent agreed with the Commission (or vice versa). In Ginsberg, the statute only prohibited selling obscene magazines to minors; it did not prohibit the selling of obscene magazines to everyone. 390 U.S. at 634-35, 88 S.Ct. at 1277-1278. Again, this statute may be viewed as facilitating parental control while simultaneously protecting children from indecency. Indeed, the Court explicitly recognized that the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children. Id. at 639, 88 S.Ct. at 1280 (citing Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COL.L.REV. 391, 413 n. 68 (1963) (noting that one can well distinguish laws which do not impose a morality on children, but which support the right of parents to deal with the morals of their children as they see fit)). The instant case, however, differs from those two; this ban removes indecent speech from the broadcast airwaves beyond the reach of adults and parents, essentially mandating the Commission's desired result. Once it becomes clear that, in this context, these two interests conflict, it is then important to determine which compelling interest takes precedence. 137 The FCC asserts that its primary interest is in facilitating parental supervision. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 55 (counsel for FCC stating [w]e consistently stated that the primary interest is in aiding parents in supervising children). The Commission is wise to assert its interest in facilitating parents as its primary interest, for this surely offers a firmer base for permissible regulation. As the Supreme Court stated in Ginsberg. 138 [i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. 139 390 U.S. at 639, 88 S.Ct. at 1280 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)). 140 However, if facilitating parental supervision means allowing parents to run the household in the manner they choose, then the FCC has preempted, not facilitated, parental control in enforcing section 16(a). While the Government's interest in protecting the well-being of children is undoubtedly compelling, when it conflicts with parental preferences and arguably treads on First Amendment rights, case law requires the Government to show some evidence of harm. It is easy to assume that there must be ill effects from exposing children, and especially young ones, to indecent material, but Supreme Court doctrine suggests that we must check our assumptions. And with respect to exposure to broadcast indecency and the impact on children, we have yet to unearth any ill effects. 141 The Supreme Court has not established what is required in terms of a showing of harm from exposure to indecency. Although harm was not at issue in Pacifica, one can read the plurality opinion there as assuming that the indecent monologue harmed children. Recent Supreme Court case law, however, suggests that more is required. In TBS, a plurality of the Court found that, while the Government's asserted interests are important in the abstract, this did not mean that the regulations at issue in that case in fact advance those interests. --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2470. It continued, [w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to ... prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.'  Id. (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C.Cir.1985)). The Court was clear about the burdens on the Government: It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1798-99, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993)); see also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2034, 2038, 90 L.Ed.2d 480 (1986) ([T]his Court 'may not simply assume that the ordinance will always advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive activity.'  (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2127 n. 22, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984))); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C.Cir.1977) ([A] regulation perfectly reasonable and appropriate in the face of a given problem may be highly capricious if that problem does not exist. (internal quotations omitted)). While the Court in TBS noted that Congress's predictive judgments are entitled to substantial deference, and that Congress is not required to make a record of the type an agency must make, it stressed that Congress's judgments are not insulated from meaningful judicial review. --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2471 (plurality). On the contrary, the Court stated we have stressed in First Amendment cases that the deference afforded to legislative findings does 'not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.'  Id. (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 129, 109 S.Ct. at 2838). 142 In Edenfield, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting certified public accountants (CPAs) from engaging in direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation. --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1798-1804. The Court held that, under the intermediate scrutiny prescribed for commercial speech under its decision in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), a party seeking to uphold a restriction on speech carries the burden of justifying it which is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. Edenfield, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1800; see also League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 391, 104 S.Ct. at 3123 (finding that interest asserted by Government is not substantially advanced by statutory scheme, in part because risk that Government would seek to influence or pressure local stations was speculative at best). In Edenfield, the Court found that the state Board of Accountancy failed to present any studies that suggested that personal solicitation of prospective business clients by CPAs creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence, the prevention of which the Board claimed as its interest. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1800. The Court noted that the only suggestion that the prevention of these evils was served by the ban was found in an affidavit containing conclusory statements. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1801. The evidence offered by the Commission in this case is no better. 30 143 In contending that the Government must protect children's well being, the Commission makes two arguments: first, it asserts that it may assume that indecent broadcast material harms children as a matter of law, citing Pacifica and Ginsberg; and, second, it suggests that the congressional sponsors considered evidence of the negative effects of television on young viewers. Enforcement Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 706-07. The Commission's reliance on Pacifica does not help its case; the question of harm was not before that Court, and, as discussed earlier, the interest in the protection of children was not necessarily at odds with the interest in facilitating parental supervision in that case. Contrary to the Commission's assertion, the Court in Ginsberg did not presume harm as a matter of law. Rather, the Court struggled with the question of whether the legislature had shown evidence of a causal link between obscenity and impairing the ethical and moral development of youth. 390 U.S. at 641-42, 88 S.Ct. at 1282. Under rationality review, the Court found that it could not state that the statute's regulation of obscenity had no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm. 31 Id. at 643, 88 S.Ct. at 1282. In this case, the court is not reviewing regulations that deal with obscenity, nor is the court operating under rationality review. 144 The congressional sponsors do not offer any evidence of a link between exposure to indecency and harm to children. Five out of the eight articles cited address materials involving violence, not indecency, 32 and the remaining three discuss sexual materials but do not account for any harm. 33 There simply is no evidence that indecent broadcasts harm children, the absence of which stands in striking contrast, to the wealth of research conducted on the harmful effects of televised violence. 34 In oral argument, counsel for the Commission was unable to cite to any study that found a causal connection between exposure to indecent broadcast and psychological or other harm to children. Tr. of Oral Argument at 47-51. The Government has failed to be mindful of recent Supreme Court decisions, such as TBS and Edenfield, requiring the showing of evidence before asserting that its restrictions on speech will alleviate real harms. Where the interest of protecting children conflicts with parental preferences, and where this interest is asserted with no evidence of harm, it cannot withstand exacting scrutiny. Accordingly, the only interest the Commission asserts which is indeed compelling in this context is facilitating parental supervision.
145 It would be hard to object to some sort of regulation of indecency in broadcast as well as other media were it narrowly tailored to facilitate parental supervision of children's exposure to indecent material. But that is not what the Government has offered. As the Supreme Court has stated, [i]t is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2837. The Government's chosen means, a ban on indecent speech from the hours of 6 a.m. to midnight (or until 10 p.m., the court-enforced zone), is not the least restrictive means to facilitate parental supervision. 146 Although unlikely, it is conceivable that such a ban on indecent programming could be the least restrictive means of facilitating parental control. For example, the Government might show that significant numbers of unsupervised children were watching or listening to programs containing indecency during the hours of the ban, that parents wished to limit what their children saw or heard, and that other means of controlling such exposure was considered and found to be ineffective. In this case, the Government offers no data on actual parental supervision, parental preferences, or on the effectiveness of parental supervision at different hours of the day and night. The Commission presents no program-specific data of what children watch, despite the existence of this data. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 46 (in response to the court's question, concerning whether more reliable data was available--Could the Commission collect specific data about the number of children in the audience of particular programs or particular stations by age?--Counsel for the FCC replied, [i]t is available and advertisers rely on it). Without this kind of data, the Commission's decision to ban indecent broadcasting during the extensive period here in question is not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted interest of facilitating parental supervision. 147 More telling perhaps than the lack of data on parental supervision and the programming children watch, is the lack of any consideration of other less speech-restrictive means in the Enforcement Order. The Commission simply asserted: 148 the broadcast indecency channeling program ... most effectively serves the compelling interest of protecting children from exposure to indecent broadcast material without intruding excessively on the rights of those entitled to present or receive such material. We therefore believe that the means chosen is the least restrictive available for the broadcast medium and that other alternatives cannot effectively further this interest. 149 8 F.C.C.R. 711. To what other alternatives is the Commission referring? Absent from the Commission's decision is any discussion of an alternative method. And yet, at oral argument, counsel for the FCC assured the court that blocking technology, in which a chip placed in television sets prevents certain shows from being transmitted, is available. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 62. This device actually facilitates parental supervision in allowing parents to choose what programs or stations to block; and it is undoubtedly less speech-restrictive since parents assume control. 35 In the Alliance case heard on the same day as this one, the Commission presented another alternative, a segregate-and-scramble scheme of indecent programming on cable's leased access channels. Again, while this may not be the best means, surely exacting scrutiny requires some consideration of alternatives before finding that the means chosen is the least restrictive available. The Commission's Enforcement Order shows no consideration of alternatives when they clearly exist. Therefore, the Commission's ban on indecent broadcast cannot be seen as the least restrictive means to facilitate parental control. 150 In summary, the Government's ban on indecent speech is not the least restrictive means available to further the Commission's primary compelling interest of facilitating parental supervision of their children's exposure to indecent programming. 36 The Commission has failed to show that its secondary interest, protecting children from exposure to indecent broadcast, is compelling when it conflicts with the rights of parents to rear their children in the way they see fit and when it is advanced with no evidence of harm. In applying the same level of scrutiny to regulations of broadcast as we do to regulations of cable and other media, it seems clear that section 16(a) and the Enforcement Order violate the First Amendment.