Opinion ID: 1978964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Confrontation Clause claim

Text: Appellant makes several allegations of trial court error relating to both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. In one of these claims, Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion by denying her motion to sever, and erred by allowing the jury to hear a redacted audiotape of Housman's confession implicating her in the murder. She maintains that this violated her Sixth Amendment confrontation rights as it was evident to the jury that the tape was redacted because the phrase the other person, in a distinct voice, was dubbed over the name Beth or Markman. Appellant states that this error was compounded when the court affirmatively told the jury that the tape had been altered in this manner. We agree with Appellant that it was error to allow the jury to hear this tape. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court considered whether Bruton's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated by the introduction, at a joint trial, of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession that facially incriminated Bruton, and if so, whether this violation could be cured by a contemporaneous jury instruction to consider the confession as against the co-defendant only, and not against Bruton. The Court explained that, notwithstanding the benefit of joint trials and the ordinary rule that the jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the court, there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect. . . . The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed. Id. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. at 1627-28. See generally Commonwealth v. McCrae, 574 Pa. 594, 612-13, 832 A.2d 1026, 1037-38 (2003); Commonwealth v. Travers, 564 Pa. 362, 366-67, 768 A.2d 845, 847 (2001). Thus, as there was no opportunity for Bruton to cross-examine his co-defendant concerning the assertions in the statement, the Supreme Court found that its introduction violated Bruton's confrontation rights, and reversed his conviction. See also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2064, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (recognizing that a codefendant's confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant's conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product of the codefendant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another). Subsequently, in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1709, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), the Court concluded that no Bruton violation occurs where a confession is altered to remove the defendant's name and any reference to his existence, and a proper limiting instruction is given. Nevertheless  and critical to this appeal  under Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), a scenario in which the defendant's name is replaced with the word, deleted, or the statement is otherwise redacted in such a manner that it clearly refers to the defendant, does not satisfy the strictures of Bruton. See id. at 197, 118 S.Ct. at 1157. As an initial matter, it is evident that Housman's confession in its unredacted form comes within the Bruton rule, as it comprises an attempt by Housman, a non-testifying codefendant, to shift the bulk of the blame to Appellant; as noted, it alleges in substantial detail that Appellant conceived of the plot to kill the victim, directed its execution, and forced Housman to cooperate. Additionally, the manner in which the confession was redacted and presented to the jury falls squarely within the proscriptions enunciated in Gray. In that case, the Supreme Court indicated that redactions that replace a proper name with an obvious blank, the word `deleted,' a symbol, or similarly notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar enough to Bruton's unredacted confessions as to warrant the same legal results. Gray, 523 U.S. at 195, 118 S.Ct. at 1156 (emphasis added). Here, the audio-taped redaction was accomplished via the dubbing of a different voice over Housman's; the prosecutor told the jury that the tapes were redacted pursuant to [the trial court's] instructions, N.T. 433; and, before the tapes were played, the judge instructed the jury as follows: You will note that the tape has been altered at some point to insert the words, quote, the other person, unquote. It will be obvious to you that these words are not part of the original tape-recorded statement. I am instructing you that these words, quote the other person, unquote, were inserted at my direction based upon the law in Pennsylvania. You are to draw no inference regarding the insertion of these words, and you should listen to the tapes just as if they had not been altered. N.T. 437. The judge also told the jury, more specifically, that you may consider the statement of Housman as evidence against Housman. You must not, however, consider the statement as evidence against Markman. N.T. 568. The Gray Court explained the difficulties inherent in such an approach: For one thing, a jury will often react similarly to an unredacted confession and a confession redacted in this way, for the jury will often realize that the confession refers specifically to the defendant. . . . Consider a simplified but typical example, a confession that reads I, Bob Smith, along with Sam Jones, robbed the bank. To replace the words Sam Jones with an obvious blank will not likely fool anyone. A juror somewhat familiar with criminal law would know immediately that the blank . . . refers to defendant Jones. A juror who does not know the law and who therefore wonders to whom the blank might refer need only lift his eyes to Jones, sitting at counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer, at least if the juror hears the judge's instruction not to consider the confession as evidence against Jones, for that instruction will provide an obvious reason for the blank. . . . For another thing, the obvious deletion may well call the jurors' attention specially to the removed name. By encouraging the jury to speculate about the reference, the redaction may overemphasize the importance of the confession's accusation. . . . Id. at 193, 118 S.Ct. at 1155-56. The events here mirror the scenario proscribed by Gray: Appellant's name was replaced with a phrase that was an obvious (and indeed explicit) substitution, and the jury was admonished not to consider the statement as evidence against Appellant. [9] The redactions by their nature alerted the jury to the fact of alteration, and they did not likely fool anyone as to whose name had been removed  particularly as Housman and Appellant were the only two defendants in the courtroom, and, as discussed previously, the tape itself contained two instances in which Housman's express references to Beth were left intact. See supra note 5. See generally Gray, 523 U.S. at 196, 118 S.Ct. at 1157 (observing that accusations made by a statement redacted in an obvious manner are more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1707)). Moreover, the trial court explicitly revealed the fact of the redactions to the jurors. Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that introduction of this statement in its redacted form violated her Bruton confrontation rights for the reasons expressed in Gray. [10] Although it is thus evident that error occurred, Appellant is not entitled to a new trial if the error was harmless. See Commonwealth v. Uderra, 550 Pa. 389, 399, 706 A.2d 334, 339 (1998) (citing Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)). An error will be deemed harmless if: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimus; [or] (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34, 85, 748 A.2d 166, 193 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 554 Pa. 293, 305, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (1998)). The Commonwealth bears the burden to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. The Commonwealth does not presently make any attempt to carry its burden in this regard, and we are unconvinced from the record that the error was harmless. There was never any dispute that Housman and Appellant were the only individuals involved in the kidnapping and killing of Leslie White, or that Housman's actions were the direct cause of her death. Rather, for purposes of ascertaining Appellant's guilt, the central issue as to both the murder and the kidnapping was whether, and to what extent, Appellant acted with an intention to bring about the kidnapping and killing of White. The degree to which the jurors would believe Appellant's account of the underlying events, as recited both in her confession and in her trial testimony, would therefore determine whether they would find her guilty of these crimes, including whether they would conclude that she acted with a specific intent to kill. On this topic, Housman's confession represented the only proof directly refuting Appellant's claim that Housman forced her against her will to harm White. Indeed, Appellant's and Housman's accounts of the central facts were irreconcilable. In contrast to Appellant's account, Housman's confession painted Appellant as the individual who directed all of the crucial events to accomplish the binding and killing of White. Under such circumstances, the prejudicial effect of Housman's statement was not de minimis. See generally Young, 561 Pa. at 85, 748 A.2d at 193 (It is difficult to imagine any evidence more prejudicial to a defendant than that which identifies the defendant as a perpetrator of a capital crime.). We also cannot conclude that the remaining uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming, and the error's prejudicial effect was so insignificant by comparison, that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. In this regard, because Appellant's testimony contradicted Housman's confession as to the central issues of Appellant's intentions and role in the underlying events, any other, uncontradicted evidence of guilt would have to have come from someone else. Accord Young, 561 Pa. at 87 & n. 16, 748 A.2d at 194 & n. 16 (concluding, where the defendant testified and contradicted much of the Commonwealth's evidence, that none of the proofs thus disputed could be used to establish harmless error, as it is not within the province of this Court to determine the comparative credibility of conflicting evidence). This consisted primarily of testimony regarding Appellant's demeanor and statements before and after the murder, as well as her having fled the jurisdiction and assisted Housman in hiding evidence. While these proofs comprised circumstantial evidence of Appellant's state of mind during the actual kidnapping and homicide, they are of limited value to the present analysis because Appellant specifically denied that she acted voluntarily, see N.T. 1012-18, 1057, 1166, and additionally stated that she did not have any intention of harming White, but rather, was coerced into taking actions against her will, see N.T. 941-42, 967. Particularly in view of the defense claim of coercion, this evidence did not so overwhelmingly prove Appellant's guilt that Housman's statement could not have been a factor in the jury's decision to convict her. [11] A central premise of the dissenting opinion is that Appellant admitted [she] murdered White, that is, she identified herself as the perpetrator of a capital crime. Dissenting Opinion at 614. As we have detailed above, however, this simply is not the case. Although the dissent discounts Appellant's testimony as self-serving, see id. at 6, whether this Court believes such testimony to be truthful is of no relevance to the present inquiry, as witness credibility assessments are within the jury's exclusive realm. See Young, 561 Pa. at 87 n. 16, 748 A.2d at 194 n. 16. The critical fact here is that the crucial aspects of the Commonwealth's case for first-degree murder were plainly contradicted by Appellant's testimony, and thus, under the Young line of cases (dating from Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978)), cannot be considered when ascertaining whether the other evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Moreover, the central question for purposes of harmless error is whether the jury might have relied upon Housman's confession in finding that Appellant acted with a specific intent to kill, not whether any specific actions on her part were, in some sense, voluntary. [12] Finally, the dissent also views Housman's confession as only minimally prejudicial, but it does not reconcile its approach with the fundamental principles arising out of Bruton, namely, that this type of shifting of blame onto the defendant results in a high level of prejudice, particularly where the codefendant's account is substantially in dispute. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCrae, 574 Pa. 594, 614, 832 A.2d 1026, 1038 (2003) (stating that [i]t is the particularly devastating prejudicial effect and inherent unreliability of a directly incriminating statement made by a non-testifying co-defendant that powered Bruton [] (internal quotation marks omitted)). [13] Finally, Housman's confession was not cumulative of other, properly admitted, evidence. Although Appellant apparently harbored ill will toward White prior to the events in question, Housman's statement, as noted, constituted the only proof directly contradicting Appellant's rendition of what occurred in the trailer on the night of the murder. For these reasons, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Accordingly, Appellant's convictions relative to the charges of murder, kidnapping, and unlawful restraint must be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial. [14]