Opinion ID: 867592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pecuniary gain factors

Text: ¶ 36 This case presents two related aggravating factorsprocuring the commission of the offense by promise of payment(F)(4); and committing the offense in the expectation of pecuniary gain(F)(5). [6] ¶ 37 To prove (F)(4), the state must prove that Defendant got the actual killers to commit the murder by promising to pay them. This aggravator thus applies to a hired killer. See, e.g., State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 537, 703 P.2d 464, 481 (1985). The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant hired Dan and Scott to murder Lynne. To prove (F)(5), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that pecuniary gain was a motive, cause or impetus for the murder and not merely the result of the murder. State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 433 ¶ 32, 984 P.2d 31, 41 ¶ 32 (1999) (quoting State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 292, 908 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1996)). The finding may be based on tangible evidence or strong circumstantial inference. State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 280, 921 P.2d 655, 683 (1996) (citing State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 512, 662 P.2d 1007, 1019 (1983)). Defendant wanted Lynne killed precisely so she could benefit from Lynne's trust fund and annuities. The evidence in this case thus establishes both the (F)(4) and (F)(5) factors. ¶ 38 Rarely have both (F)(4) and (F)(5) been found in the same case, but we did find both factors in State v. (Michael) Apelt, 176 Ariz. 349, 861 P.2d 634 (1993). It could be argued that there is only one plan or transaction that has given rise to both (F)(4) and (F)(5). The one transaction is very simple: Defendant wanted her mother-in-law murdered so she would get the proceeds of the trust fund and annuities; she would then share a small portion of this money with Dan and Scott, the people she hired to commit the murder. Because the two factors are so closely related, there is arguably an issue of whether the judge improperly double counted this one transaction. We have dealt with double counting before, but not with regard to the two types of pecuniary gain. In Apelt, the husband killed his wife to obtain life insurance proceeds and got his brother to help with her murder by promising him a share of those proceeds. However, we did not consider the single transaction problem in that case. ¶ 39 Even if there is but one transaction leading to the murder, a judge can properly use a single fact to support the application of more than one aggravating factor. State v. Bly, 127 Ariz. 370, 373, 621 P.2d 279, 282 (1980). It is not the separate counting per se that is a problem but the weight allocated. In State v. Scott, we stated: The use of one fact to establish two aggravating circumstances is proper, provided the court, in balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors does not weigh the [fact] twice. Because it is but one fact, it cannot be weighed twice, even though it satisfied two separate aggravating factors. 177 Ariz. 131, 144, 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993). In this case, use of the related factors to establish two aggravating circumstances is proper, provided the judge, in balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, does not give full weight to both factors. In the present case, both pecuniary aggravators were properly found. They are separate and independent and thus can be counted twice. However, because they are so closely related, each factor should not be independently assigned full weight.