Opinion ID: 1236812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to instruct jury to assume death penalty will be carried out.

Text: (13) Finally, defendant contends the trial court had a sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury it must assume that, if imposed, the death penalty will be carried out. According to defendant, because of a commonly held misconception to the contrary, jurors will not appreciate the actual consequences of their sentencing choice, thereby undermining the reliability of the verdict. We find no error. First, the record discloses no factual substantiation of defendant's premise. (Cf. People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 681 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351] [nothing in the record supports the claim of a `commonplace misunderstanding' that life prisoners are arbitrarily and capriciously released from confinement].) In People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 696, we observed that in February 1986 few citizens of the state could have been unaware of the strenuous and well publicized campaign to unseat Chief Justice Bird and two associate justices, which coalesced around the high percentage of death penalty reversals and the claim that ... this court was intentionally evading the law in refusing to affirm more of those decisions and allow executions to recommence. These comments, which arose in the context of alleged juror misconduct, can hardly serve as empirical support for the proposition that there exists a widespread misperception among penalty phase jurors that death means anything other than eventual execution of the defendant. [23] Moreover, we impliedly concluded that discussion of such matters would not reasonably undermine the jury's sense of the gravity of its task. Second, and more importantly, defendant's contention is legally untenable. In People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37], the trial court refused to instruct the jury that if your decision in the penalty phase of this trial, is that the defendant should be put to death, the sentence will be carried out. ( Id., at p. 129.) We rejected the defendant's claim of error, concluding, It is as incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of death or life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out as it is to suggest they need not take their responsibility as seriously because the ultimate determination of penalty rests elsewhere. ( Id., at p. 130.) Such an instruction is simply not accurate. It ignores the power of the superior court to reduce a sentence of death on review under section 190.4, subdivision (e). It ignores the Governor's power of commutation. ( Ibid. ) Since a court may refuse an instruction that misstates the law, it obviously has no sua sponte duty to misguide the jury. Finally, we discern no evidence that defendant's jury actually experienced any confusion. The arguments of counsel highlighted the significance of the choice between life and death. Neither side suggested the jury's decision was merely an academic exercise with only theoretical consequences. Nor did the jury itself request clarification. (Cf. People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1277 [jury did not seek amplification of meaning of life imprisonment without possibility of parole].) On this basis as well, the trial court had no reason to infer any misunderstanding and spontaneously interpose a further admonition on the subject.