Opinion ID: 1290968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability as a Manufacturer of Component Parts

Text: Pust contends that even if Union Supply is not found to be a designer, it may still be held strictly liable as the manufacturer of component parts of a defectively designed conveyor system. The court of appeals agreed with this argument and specifically held:    that a fabricator, who manufactures a product according to plans submitted by the ultimate user cannot avoid liability even if the design submitted is unsafe, provided it is feasible for him to install safety devices. Although we do not embrace the expansive view of the court of appeals, we agree that the manufacturer of component parts may be held strictly liable in certain situations. We follow the majority view that a manufacturer of component parts may be held strictly liable for injuries to a consumer caused by design defects in the component parts when they are expected to and do reach the consumer without substantial change in condition. Accord, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182; Burbage v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., Inc., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563. In Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., supra , it was suggested that the manufacturer of a component part that undergoes no change when incorporated into something larger can be liable in strict tort for defects in that part. [4] The present case reaches further because it involves alleged design defects in parts that may have undergone some change before reaching the consumer. Our view of the scope of a strict liability case against a manufacturer of component parts is more circumscribed than that of the court of appeals. Thus, we review what we believe to be the proper elements of a strict liability cause of action based on design defects against a manufacturer of component parts. The first element is that component parts must be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. [5] It will undoubtedly be difficult to decide whether a defect is in the design of certain component parts or in the design of the conveyor system as a whole. Unlike defects in manufacturesuch as a defective tire assembly in an automobile or a defective fuse in a hand grenadedefects in design are not easily attributed to one component part or group of parts. Cf. Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 39 Ill.App.3d 155, 349 N.E.2d 578; Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.). Nonetheless, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff here, a jury could find that there was a design defect, in not including safety guards at the nip point or in not attaching a cleaning device, in the conveyor sections manufactured by Union Supply. The second element is that the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A(1)(b). When applied to this case, the question is whether the sections manufactured by Union Supply were expected to reach the user (Pust) and did so without undergoing a substantial change in design. The element of without substantial change has been strictly adhered to in most decisions that have held component part manufacturers strictly liable. [6] For example, in the landmark case of Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, the Illinois Supreme Court held the manufacturer of a defective automobile brake system strictly liable, noting that the automobile assembler had made no substantial change in the system. Likewise, in Burbage v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563, a valve manufacturer was held strictly liable for injuries caused by the explosion of a boiler since the defective boiler valve did not undergo substantial change. On the other hand, a few courts have occasionally excused a plaintiff from showing that a product was not expected to and did not undergo a substantial change in condition. E. g., Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281. The authors of the Second Restatement expressed no opinion on this issue. Caveat (3) and comment q, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. In our view, however, this element is important and a showing should be made that the defectively designed component parts were not expected to and did not undergo a substantial change after they left the manufacturer's hands. We emphasize, though, that the expected change in the parts must be substantial; small changes and minor processing will not relieve the component part manufacturer of liability. Of course, even substantial changes which do not affect a pre-existing design defect in parts do not absolve the manufacturer of liability. The third element is that the design defect must be the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Union Supply does not dispute that Pust received his injuries at the nip point of this conveyor. If it is shown that design defects in sections manufactured by Union Supply made the conveyor unreasonably dangerous at the nip point to Pust, then the element of causation has been shown. Union Supply has argued that many conditionssuch as Pust's knowledge of the risk, the patent nature of the danger at the nip point, and a substantial change in the partswere intervening causes of Pust's injury. Each of these conditions is more properly considered as a defense based on assumption of the risk. Union Supply argues that it should be permitted to introduce evidence that it reasonably expected Holly Sugar to add safety guards, and that Holly's failure to do so constitutes an intervening cause. This evidence injects into the case the irrelevant negligence issue of who had the duty to install safety guards. In strict liability cases, we are not concerned with who had the duty to provide guards, but rather with whether the conveyor was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous because of the failure to provide safety guards before it reached the ultimate user or consumer. See Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., supra . The fourth element of the component part design strict liability case is that the defendant sold this product and is engaged in the business of selling such products. Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A(1)(a). The final element, of course, is that the plaintiff has sustained damages as a result.