Opinion ID: 1834781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Civil Rights Claim.

Text: Finally, we consider plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in determining that his employment discrimination claim based on marital status depended on an extraterritorial application of a local ordinance. Plaintiff asserts that, where an employer has employees at various locations within its organization, it is subject to local regulations affecting employment at all locations which bear a relationship to a discrimination claim. He contends that in the present case Mason City has a legitimate interest in assuring that local employers hiring or transferring employees from other locations for work in Mason City comply with the local regulations on employment discrimination. He urges that to allow CNW to claim extraterritoriality will unnecessarily permit employers whose principal place of business is outside of Mason City to escape these regulations in hiring or transferring from other locations. We need not resolve this issue in the present case. CNW and the other defendants contend that the district court's ruling limiting the application of the local ordinance was correct. They also contend that plaintiff's marital status discrimination claim is preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. In regard to the claim of preemption, plaintiff notes that the Supreme Court has recognized that certain civil rights claims are not preempted by the labor relations regimen set forth in the Railway Labor Act. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714, 724, 83 S.Ct. 1022, 1027, 10 L.Ed.2d 84, 91 (1963). Assuming that plaintiff is correct with respect to the availability of civil rights actions against an employer outside the ambit of the Railway Labor Act, it nevertheless appears that, if Railway Labor Act procedures are pursued to a conclusion, a collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may arise which will defeat a subsequent effort to pursue a civil rights claim outside the confines of the Act. We have recognized that collateral estoppel and issue preclusion may arise within the context of administrative proceedings. Walker v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 351 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Iowa 1984); Toomer v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 340 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Iowa 1983). It has been demonstrated in the present case that plaintiff's grievance, which was processed to a conclusion under Railway Labor Act procedures, was based on the same theory of marital status discrimination which he later urged in this civil action. Having lost on that issue at the administrative level, he should not now be permitted to reassert the claim in another forum. Our view concerning the collateral estoppel or issue preclusive effect of the administrative proceedings is buttressed by the fact that there also appears to have been an issue preclusion on plaintiff's civil rights claim based on the result reached in his defamation action. The district court expressly found on the latter claim that CNW's contentions that plaintiff lacked maturity and was not qualified for the Mason City position were substantially correct. It further found that plaintiff's claim that his transfer request was refused because of marital status discrimination was not established. We recognize that, in order for an issue preclusion to arise from a court's findings of fact, the findings must be necessary to the decision in the case. McGee v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety, 443 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Iowa 1989); Noel v. Noel, 334 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Iowa 1983); Bertran v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 232 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Iowa 1975); Schneberger v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 213 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Iowa 1973). We believe that requirement has been met in the present case. In order to determine CNW's qualified privilege defense in the defamation action, it was necessary for the district court to make findings with respect to the presence or absence of malice in connection with the statements made about plaintiff's job performance. See Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 117. The employer's motive was an essential fact to be determined in connection with that inquiry. Because we conclude that the basis for plaintiff's employment discrimination claim has been rejected in both a prior administrative determination and a separate legal action, any error by the district court in the application of the Mason City ordinance was without prejudice. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.