Opinion ID: 2265095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: alice scott's contentions

Text: Alice Scott argues that her conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred in permitting Lisa Holmes to identify her in court. [21] Scott contends that because Ms. Holmes was told by an agent of the government that she had chosen the wrong person in the lineup, the reliability of her in-court identification was tainted. The trial court ruled that the statement to Holmes that she picked the wrong person was somewhat suggestive, but because she had previously made a reliable identification of Alice Scott from a photograph, it found nothing that is overly suggestive or possibly unreliable about a possible in-trial identification. This ruling was entirely correct. We have held that when there has been an unequivocal, unsuggested, and otherwise constitutionally acceptable identification, subsequent identifications... are not conducive to irreparable misidentification, in violation of due process. Patterson v. United States, 384 A.2d 663, 667 (D.C. 1978); accord, United States v. Brannon, 404 A.2d 926, 928 (D.C.1979) (an in-court identification could not abridge [the defendant's] right to due process because the potential witness had initially identified the [defendant] at a constitutionally acceptable confrontation, despite the prosecution having later refreshed the witness' memory with a single photo prior to a hearing to suppress the showup and in-court identification). Because the trial court found that Lisa Holmes had already identified Alice Scott in a non-suggestive photo array, the later conversation between Lisa Holmes and the detective or prosecutor, which the court found to be somewhat suggestive, did not require suppression of Holmes' identification.
Alice Scott claims that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for severance on the second day of trial. She argues that severance was required because the evidence against her son and co-defendant was far more damaging than that against her. We find little to distinguish the amount of evidence against the two co-defendants; hence we reject Alice Scott's argument that a severance should have been granted. The disposition of a motion for severance is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling either way will be reversed only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. E.g., Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979). When ... the defendants are charged with jointly committing crimes, a strong presumption exists that they will be tried together. Russell v. United States, 586 A.2d 695, 698 (D.C. 1991) (citation omitted). [A] defendant is not entitled to severance merely because the evidence against a codefendant is more damaging than the evidence against him. Manifest prejudice occurs only where the evidence of a defendant's complicity in the overall criminal venture is de minimis when compared to the evidence against his codefendants. Bush v. United States, 516 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C.1986) (citation omitted). That test is not met here. Two of the three victims identified Alice Scott from a photographic array, and two picked her out of a lineup. All three victims identified her in court as the female robber, and all three described how she assisted the male robber in carrying out the robbery. On this record it cannot be said that the evidence against Alice Scott was de minimis in comparison with the evidence against Phillip Scott. Alice Scott also argues that the general principle requiring severance is heightened by the family relationship between the two defendants, and that the jury's knowledge of this relationship made the potential for spillover ... tremendous. In particular, she contends that the admission of the other crimes evidence about her son's possession of a gun and his involvement in the pawn transaction tainted her trial. There is no merit in this claim because the evidence of which Alice Scott complains was not other crimes evidence. Jones v. United States, supra, 477 A.2d at 237-238. Nor was Phillip Scott's involvement in the pawn transaction independent of the crime charged. Ali v. United States, 581 A.2d 368, 375 (D.C.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 259, 116 L.Ed.2d 213 (1991). Moreover, there is no general principle requiring severance, as Alice Scott asserts; on the contrary, there is a strong presumption that persons jointly charged with committing the same crime will be tried together. Russell v. United States, supra, 586 A.2d at 698.