Opinion ID: 1589681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did Administrative Order 49 bar the submission of supplemental evidence after the March 2001 cutoff date?

Text: Having found that the circuit court did not err in its judgment that the evidence submitted by MSEJ prior to March 2001 was insufficient, this Court next considers whether the referee should have considered evidence submitted after the March deadline. The issue before this Court is whether Administrative Order 49 sets an absolute bar to the filing of additional evidence or proof after March 2001. Because this Court finds that Administrative Order 49 does create such a deadline, this Court need not reach the issue of whether MSEJ is estopped from bringing its claims. MSEJ contends that the governing instrument concerning supplemental evidence should be section 375.1214.2, which, in MSEJ's view, allows parties to bring additional evidence before the appellate body reviewing the claim denial. Section 375.1214.2 states that following a denial of a claim, an appeal may be heard by the court or by a court-appointed referee, as it was in the present case. Following the hearing, the referee shall submit written findings of fact and conclusions of law along with his recommendation for disposition. Id. If the appellant disagrees with the referee's findings, the appellant may file a motion for reconsideration that shall allege either the existence of new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and presented before the referee, or such erroneous conclusions of law, that would justify reconsideration of the claim by the court. Id. (emphasis added). MSEJ maintains that this statutory provision should trump Administrative Order 49's time limit. Administrative Order 49 was enacted pursuant to section 375.670, which empowers the court to limit and ... extend the time for the presentation of claims against the receivership and mandates that any creditor neglecting to present his claim within the time so limited shall be debarred of all right to share in the assets of the insurer. The real question here is not whether Administrative Order 49 should be trumped by section 375.1214 but rather whether section 375.670 trumps section 375.1214. It does. § 375.670 is intended to empower courts to set reasonable time standards for the resolution of a receivership. The language of Administrative Order 49 reflects that legislative intent in its statement that the filing deadline for the existing evidence of ... current unresolved claims is intended to expedite the closure of the Receivership. The appellate procedure spelled out in section 375.1214 must be interpreted within the broader goal of an ultimate resolution of the receivership. It is also worth noting that Manville filed its original notice of claims in 1987. Manville did not buy any new policies from Transit after 1987. MSEJ purchased its claims from Manville in 1998. The claims MSEJ filed in March of 2001 pertained to policies that had to have been purchased nearly 14 years earlier. MSEJ itself had more than three years, since 1998, to gather evidence and research the outstanding liability on the policies assigned to it by Manville prior to the March 2001 cutoff date. MSEJ does not present any compelling reasons that it was possible to supply that proof in the interim between 2001 and 2005 but not between 1998 and 2001.