Opinion ID: 2523830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Meaning of Proceeds in Section 29B-1

Text: ¶ 36 Between the plurality's and the dissent's positions in Santos, we find the dissent's more persuasive. Applying that reasoning and traditional canons of statutory construction leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the legislature intended proceeds to mean gross receipts in section 29B-1. ¶ 37 We begin by noting, as we did above, that the primary dictionary definition for proceeds refers to the total amount brought in from a transaction. Webster's provides a profits definition as a secondary definition (Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1807 (1993)), and Black's uses the term net proceeds rather than proceeds to mean profits (Black's Law Dictionary 1325 (9th ed.2009)). We believe that established canons of statutory construction show that the legislature intended the primary definition. ¶ 38 The Santos plurality stated that the term proceeds had not acquired a common meaning in the federal criminal code. Santos, 553 U.S. at 511, 128 S.Ct. 2020. Indeed, in some portions of the federal criminal code, the word is defined as receipts, and in some others as profits. Id. at 511-12, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(e)(3) (Supp. V 2006), § 981(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B) (2000)). We agree with the State, however, that the Illinois legislature has a clear pattern of using the term proceeds as distinct from profits in statutes that serve a similar purpose. The State points out that fines and forfeitures provisions serve the same ends as the money laundering statute in that they seek to prevent criminals from enjoying the fruits of their crimes. The money laundering statute went into effect on January 1, 1988, and, at that time, there were several forfeiture provisions in effect that used the term profits or proceeds. For example, section 11-20.1(f)(1)(A) of the Criminal Code of 1961 required that someone convicted of child pornography forfeit to the State of Illinois any profits or proceeds generated by that offense. Ill. Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, ¶ 11-20.1(f)(1)(A); see also Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 23, ¶ 8A-7(d) (requiring forfeiture of monies, profits or proceeds acquired from public aid fraud); Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 56½, ¶ 1655(a)(3) (requiring forfeiture of any profits or proceeds acquired or maintained as a result of narcotics racketeering). Similarly, when the legislature enacted the money laundering statute, statutes relating to fines in drug cases used the phrase profits or other proceeds when setting forth how a fine should be determined. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 56½, ¶ 710.1(b)(2) (Cannabis Control Act); Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 56½, ¶ 1411.1(b)(2) (Illinois Controlled Substances Act); Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 56½, ¶ 1655.1(b)(2) (Narcotics Profit Forfeiture Act). Thus, it is clear that, when the legislature enacted the money laundering statute, it had established a distinct pattern in criminal statutes of using the term proceeds to mean something distinct from profits. If, in the above statutes, the legislature meant the term proceeds to mean profits, then it would be using the redundant phrase profits or profits or profits or other profits. See Bucci, 582 F.3d at 123 (To interpret the term `proceeds' in the phrase `profits or other proceeds' to mean profits would render the word `profits' redundant.). We construe statutes so as not to render any term superfluous. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d at 280, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139. ¶ 39 We explained earlier that a cardinal rule of statutory construction is that a court must consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Garcia, 241 Ill.2d at 421, 349 Ill.Dec. 929, 948 N.E.2d 32. In this vein, we share the concerns of the Santos dissent that the objectives of money laundering lawsproviding deterrence in preventing criminals from using funds to support a luxurious lifestyle and inhibiting the growth of criminal enterpriseswould be frustrated with a profits definition because dirty money may be used for these purposes even during times when the underlying activity is unprofitable. We find it highly unlikely that the Illinois legislature was perfectly fine with criminals laundering money in those instances in which a net gain was not realized in the underlying transaction. ¶ 40 We likewise share the concern of the Santos dissent that a profits definition would present difficult problems of proof that the legislature could not have intended. As the Santos dissent noted, there are no generally accepted accounting rules for criminal enterprises, tracing funds back to particular transactions and proving that they were profitable would often be difficult if not impossible, and prosecutions of professional money launderers would be difficult because the professional money launderer will often not know or care if the funds represented a net profit. ¶ 41 The Santos plurality brushed these concerns aside with the observation that ambiguous criminal provisions are interpreted in favor of defendants, not prosecutors. Santos, 553 U.S. at 519, 128 S.Ct. 2020. Defendant echoes this argument in her brief. Such an argument misses the mark. We are not construing the statute in favor of prosecutors. Rather, we are doing what we always do in interpreting statutes, which is considering the reasons for the law and the consequences of construing it one way or the other. As the Santos dissent explained, the point in citing the accounting and proof problems that would be produced by a net income interpretation is not that the `receipts' interpretation is preferable because `it is easier to prosecute,' [citation] but that creating these obstacles would serve no discernable purpose. Santos, 553 U.S. at 542, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). It is difficult to believe that the legislature would enact a criminal statute designed to address a serious problem while at the same time making violations of the statute exceedingly difficult to prove and effectively exempting from prosecution a class of transactions that further the very evils that the legislature intended to combat. Congress confirmed with its amendment to the federal money laundering statute that it had no such intent, and we do not believe that the Illinois legislature did either. ¶ 42 We also do not believe that the potential for a merger problem in a given situation is any reason to adopt a profits reading. In Illinois, any such problems could be resolved under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. See People v. Miller, 238 Ill.2d 161, 165-76, 345 Ill.Dec. 59, 938 N.E.2d 498 (2010) (setting forth in detail how the one-act, one-crime doctrine is to be applied). ¶ 43 Finally, we address defendant's argument that we must employ the rule of lenity and construe the ambiguity in defendant's favor. Defendant essentially argues that, once the court identifies an ambiguity in a criminal statute, it must be construed in the defendant's favor. [3] We have said repeatedly, however, that the rule of lenity must not be stretched so far or applied so rigidly as to defeat the legislature's intent. See People v. Jackson, 2011 IL 110615, ¶ 21, 353 Ill.Dec. 353, 955 N.E.2d 1164; Garcia, 241 Ill.2d at 427, 349 Ill.Dec. 929, 948 N.E.2d 32; Jones, 223 Ill.2d at 581, 308 Ill.Dec. 402, 861 N.E.2d 967; In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill.2d 123, 142, 298 Ill.Dec. 361, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (2005); People v. Brooks, 158 Ill.2d 260, 264, 198 Ill.Dec. 851, 633 N.E.2d 692 (1994); People v. Bratcher, 63 Ill.2d 534, 542, 349 N.E.2d 31 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has explained how the rule of lenity is to be applied: Finally, petitioners and the dissent invoke the `rule of lenity.' The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree. Cf. Smith, 508 U.S., at 239 [113 S.Ct. 2050] (`The mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction ... does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable'). `The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,' ... we can make `no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.'' United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 [117 S.Ct. 921, 137 L.Ed.2d 107] (1997) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 [115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46] (1995), in turn quoting Smith, supra, at 239 [113 S.Ct. 2050], and Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 [79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199] (1958)). To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there is a ``grievous ambiguity or uncertainty' in the statute.' Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, n. 17 [114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608] (1994) (quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 [111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524] (1991)). Certainly, our decision today is based on much more than a `guess as to what Congress intended,' and there is no `grievous ambiguity' here. The problem of statutory interpretation in these cases is indeed no different from that in many of the criminal cases that confront us. Yet, this Court has never held that the rule of lenity automatically permits a defendant to win. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 [118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111] (1998); see also Santos, 553 U.S. at 548, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.) (the rule of lenity does not require us to put aside the usual tools of statutory interpretation or to adopt the narrowest possible dictionary definition of the terms in a criminal statute). ¶ 44 While the meaning of the word proceeds in section 29B-1 is ambiguous, we not believe that it is a grievous ambiguity, and we are not left with a mere guess as to what the legislature intended. The Santos plurality argued that, pursuant to the rule of lenity, the tie must go to the defendant. Santos, 553 U.S. at 514, 128 S.Ct. 2020. We do not believe that this is a tie. Rather, we agree with the Santos dissent that the meaning of `proceeds' in the money laundering statute emerges with reasonable clarity when the term is viewed in context, making the rule of lenity inapplicable. Id. at 548-49, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.).