Opinion ID: 2181897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legislative privilege

Text: On numerous occasions during trial, plaintiffs attempted to introduce evidence from Dr. Anthony Coelho, the legislative aide to the General Assembly's Reapportionment Commission; Speaker of the House Matthew J. Smith; Representatives Joseph DeAngelis and Zygmunt J. Friedemann; and Senator Lila M. Sapinsley, concerning the formation of the state reapportionment plan. The evidence was principally offered to show that the Reapportionment Commission used a ± 2.5 percent target deviation in drawing district lines, that the commission members were politically motivated when they decided on district boundaries, and that the members were ignorant of applicable laws by which they were required to abide. The trial justice excluded this testimony on two grounds: (1) that under R.I. Const., art. IV, sec. 5, [3] the legislators and their aides enjoyed a constitutional privilege from testifying concerning their words and conduct in the execution of their legislative duties and (2) that the evidence was irrelevant. At first he allowed Senator Sapinsley to testify because she allegedly waived her privilege, but he later sustained defendants' objections to her testimony on relevancy grounds. There has never been an interpretation or application of Rhode Island's speech in debate clause by this court. [4] In order to interpret this provision adequately, we must look at the history of this section as well as the interpretation of a similar provision in the United States Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 6). [5] We do not accept plaintiff's contention that there is a relevant difference between the federal provision (speech or debate) and the state provision (speech in debate). English history provides the origin of freedom of speech for legislators. The language in both the federal and state speech in debate clause appears to be taken directly from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. [6] As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202-03, 26 L.Ed. 377, 391 (1881): Many of the colonies, which afterwards became States in our Union, had similar provisions in their charters or in bills of rights, which were part of their fundamental laws; and the general idea in all of them, however expressed, must have been the same, and must have been in the minds of the members of the constitutional convention. The speech in debate clause was first recorded in 1542 in the Speaker's Petition that defined the relationship between Parliament and the Crown. [7] It had been asserted by members of Parliament, however, long before its inclusion in that document. [8] A struggle between the English Crown and Parliament for legislative independence ensued and culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 1689. [9] The English Bill of Rights was established to ensure that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. [10] The extent of the privilege was broad. Thus the privilege of having their debates unquestioned, though denied when the members began to speak their minds freely in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and punished in its exercise both by that princess and her two successors, was soon clearly perceived to be indispensable and universally acknowledged. By consequence, whatever is done within the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place. For speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous to the public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity. Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng.Rep. 1112, 1156 (1839). The speech in debate privilege first appeared in this country in state constitutions. [11] This privilege was deemed so essential for representatives of the people that it was written into the Articles of Confederation and later into the Constitution. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372, 71 S.Ct. 783, 786, 95 L.Ed. 1019, 1025 (1951). Only four days after the Constitutional Convention opened, article V of the first draft of the United States Constitution submitted by Charles Pinckney stated that Freedom of Speech or Debate in the legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in any place out of it. [12] The provision was adopted by the convention with virtually no debate and subsequently became Art. I, Sec. 6, of the United States Constitution. The purpose of the speech in debate clause is to ensure the Legislature freedom in carrying out its duties. James Wilson, a member of the Committee of Detail of the Constitutional Convention, stated: In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 373, 71 S.Ct. at 786, 95 L.Ed. at 1025. (quoting II Works of James Wilson 38 (Andrews ed. 1896)). The Constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire explicitly declare that free speech and debate in the Legislature are essential to the rights of the people. Mass. Const., pt. I, art. XXI, and N.H. Const., pt. I, art. XXX. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in the first interpretation by a court in this country of the privilege, further highlighted its importance: These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office, without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808). This freedom ensures the separation of powers among the coordinate branches of government. Further, the fact that the legislators can carry out their duties without being questioned in any other place allows the free flow of debate among legislators and the maximization of an effective and open exchange of ideas. These principles are protected by a liberal construction and strict enforcement of the speech in debate clause. As James Madison noted in Federalist No. 47: It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that neither of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers.    [T]he next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. The Federalist 343 (Dawson ed. 1864). The legislative privilege    is one manifestation of the `practical security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179, 86 S.Ct. 749, 754, 15 L.Ed.2d 681, 687 (1966). We now turn to the specifics of the case before us to determine the scope of the privilege and whether it was properly applied by the trial justice. The first issue is whether the trial justice correctly upheld the claim of privilege by Speaker Smith, Representatives DeAngelis and Friedemann, and consultant Dr. Coelho. The second issue is whether an individual legislator can waive this privilege as Senator Sapinsley purported to do and as plaintiffs claim Speaker Smith, Representatives DeAngelis and Friedemann, and Dr. Coelho did during a deposition in another case.
The plaintiffs attempted to question Speaker of the House of Representatives Matthew J. Smith, Representatives Joseph DeAngelis and Zygmunt J. Friedemann, and Reapportionment Commission consultant Dr. Anthony Coelho concerning the process of reapportionment. The extent of plaintiffs' attempted questioning can be found in their depositions taken in a related case ( Licht v. Quattrocchi, No. 82-1494 R.I. Superior Court, aff'd, R.I., 449 A.2d 887 (1982)), which plaintiffs presented in total as their offer of proof. The testimony that plaintiffs wished to present concerned the following matters: who hired Dr. Coelho as consultant to the Reapportionment Commission, whether a targeting specialist addressed the political reasons for particular district lines, whether any consideration was given to aligning Jamestown with a city or town on the west shore of Narragansett Bay instead of with the city of Newport, whether there was an agreement that the House and the Senate would each apportion themselves, whether the Newport Democrats bickered at redistricting meetings, whether the legislators had agreed to Newport's maintaining control of four seats, whether a ± 2.5 percent deviation target was used, and whether the Reapportionment Commission participated in the formation of the House plan. The plaintiffs concede that an inquiry into the thoughts or motivations of legislators with respect to their vote or into legitimate legislative activity would be protected by the speech in debate clause. They argue, however, that the evidence offered as proof was  not within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. We must disagree. The speech in debate clause contained in Rhode Island's Constitution confers a privilege on legislators from inquiry into their legislative acts or into the motivation for actual performance of legislative acts that are clearly part of the legislative process. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515-16, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 33 L.Ed.2d 507, 520 (1972). Legislators should not be questioned by any other branch of government for their acts in carrying out their legislative duties relating to the legislative process. We go no further at this time than to hold that the speech in debate clause limits judicial inquiry into words or actions that are clearly a part of the legislative process. The scope of the privilege does not extend to actions by legislators outside the legislative process. It does not protect the political activities of the legislators, United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512, 92 S.Ct. at 2537, 33 L.Ed.2d at 518, nor does it protect legislators engaged in criminal activity, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 n. 12, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2625 n. 12, 33 L.Ed.2d 583, 600 n. 12, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 98, 34 L.Ed.2d 165 (1972), even if committed in furtherance of legislative activity. Id. 408 U.S. at 622, 92 S.Ct. at 2625, 33 L.Ed.2d at 600. Although a legislator cannot be officially questioned outside the legislative chambers about his legislative activities, he may be asked about these acts if they are relevant to the investigation of the criminal activity of another party as long as the propriety of the legislative act itself is not questioned. Id. at 628, 92 S.Ct. at 2628, 33 L.Ed.2d at 604. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 127, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2684, 61 L.Ed.2d 411, 426 (1979): Claims under the Clause going beyond what is needed to protect legislative independence are to be closely scrutinized. We need not reach very far into an interpretation of the speech in debate clause in order to find the excluded testimony in this case privileged. The excluded testimony of the legislators concerned the actions and motivations of the legislators and the General Assembly in proposing and passing the reapportionment plan. Inquiry by the court into the actions or motivations of the legislators in proposing, passing, or voting upon a particular piece of legislation (as plaintiffs attempted to require) falls clearly within the most basic elements of legislative privilege. The privilege applies equally to legislative aides and commission staff members who are engaged in legislative activity. For the purpose of construing the privilege, legislators and legislative aides are to be `treated as one.' Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 616, 92 S.Ct. at 2622, 33 L.Ed.2d at 597. In order fully to effectuate the purpose and design of the speech in debate clause, it must be construed as an immunity from suit as well as a testimonial privilege. See United States v. Peoples Temple of the Disciples of Christ, 515 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1981). This conclusion is further supported by the plain meaning of the constitutional provision that reads: no member shall be questioned in any other place. R.I. Const., art. IV, sec. 5. In Sweeney v. Notte, 95 R.I. 68, 82-83, 183 A.2d 296, 304 (1962), this court stated that the General Assembly is required to reapportion after a census is taken, and the prevailing apportionment constitutes a denial of equal protection. Article XIII of the Rhode Island Constitution vests the General Assembly with exclusive jurisdiction to apportion the House. Id. at 82, 183 A.2d at 303-04. The General Assembly undertook that obligation when it passed Public Law 1980, ch. 146, art. VIII, establishing the Reapportionment Commission and subsequently amended chapters 1 and 2 of title 22. Although it is impossible to analyze here each of the legislators' statements from their depositions, which plaintiffs offered as proof, it is apparent that the thrust of plaintiffs' questioning would have involved matters that directly relate to the legislators' motivations and actions in proposing and carrying out the House plan. The business conducted at meetings of the Reapportionment Commission, the discussions that took place among groups of individual legislators, and the actions of individuals in carrying out the reapportionment process are areas of legitimate legislative undertakings. The fact that some of the meetings took place outside the State House and were not formal committee meetings does not preclude application of the privilege. At times the Legislature's business is conducted outside the four walls at the State House. The physical setting and the informality of the meeting do not impair the privilege or dilute its objective. Restrictive application of the privilege to words spoken within the walls of the State House in a formal setting would inhibit legitimate legislative activities. The plaintiffs claim that evidence of the use of a ± 2.5 percent deviation target would show a highly impermissible purpose on the part of the legislators and therefore falls outside the privilege. The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788, 95 L.Ed. at 1027. Legislators' testimony is privileged in order to ensure the free flow of debate within the Legislature and the separation of powers among co-equal branches of government. An inquiry into the purpose behind legislative discussions or actions would dilute the rationale for the very existence of the privilege.
The plaintiffs contend that the depositions of Smith, DeAngelis, Friedemann, and Coelho which were taken in the case involving the Senate redistricting and the assertion by Senator Sapinsley constitute a waiver of the privilege. The United States Supreme Court has on three occasions declined to decide whether, on the federal level, a member of Congress or Congress as a whole can waive the privilege of the speech in debate clause. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2440, 61 L.Ed.2d 12, 24 (1979); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 529 n. 18, 92 S.Ct. at 2546 n. 18, 33 L.Ed.2d at 527 n. 18; United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185, 86 S.Ct. at 758, 15 L.Ed.2d at 690-91. We must therefore turn to the purpose of the privilege in order to analyze the waiver issue properly. The speech in debate clause has two definite purposes: first, to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, co-equal, and independent branches of government, United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 491, 99 S.Ct. at 2441, 61 L.Ed.2d at 24; and second, to protect individual legislators from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 618, 92 S.Ct. at 2623, 33 L.Ed.2d at 598. The privilege protects the institution of the Legislature itself from attack by either of the other co-equal branches of government. At the same time it protects the individual legislator personally from attack either by another branch of government or from a majority within the Legislature itself. To allow the privilege to be waived would be inconsistent with these purposes. The privilege is institutional in its protection of the Legislature, ensuring the separation of powers among the co-equal branches of government. To allow an individual legislator to waive the institution's privilege would be to allow one to act on behalf of the whole in waiving the protection of a significant bulwark of our constitutionally mandated system of government. We need not address the issue of whether an individual legislator can waive the privilege when he or she is being sued or prosecuted individually. That question is not before us. Senator Sapinsley was allowed to testify concerning the process of formation of the reapportionment plan. No actions or statements on her part were being called into question. The privilege she purported to waive protects the Legislature as an institution from judicial interference. This waiver by Senator Sapinsley was incorrectly allowed, and the objection of defendants should have been sustained. The same ruling holds true for the testimony of Representatives Smith, DeAngelis, and Friedemann, and Dr. Coelho. These individuals were not allowed to testify after objection by defendants. Their testimony was contained in depositions given in a related case which were received by the trial justice in an offer of proof by plaintiffs. Because of the privilege, none of the testimony as it related to legitimate legislative activities should have been introduced, and the depositions could not therefore have constituted a waiver.