Opinion ID: 1427400
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pruitt is the Controlling Law on this Issue in the Sixth Circuit

Text: In United States v. Wickizer, 633 F.2d 900, 901 (6th Cir.1980), a case decided shortly after Payton (but before Steagald ), we relied on Payton 's holding that an officer possessing a valid arrest warrant may enter the suspect's premises to execute the arrest warrant when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602-03, 100 S.Ct. 1371. The specific question in Wickizer was whether the police  upon arriving at a cabin to execute an arrest warrant for one Ernest Smith  had reason to believe that Smith was inside based solely on a tip that Smith was staying at [the] cabin with another man and woman and that ... [t]he cabin was owned by Smith's stepbrother. Wickizer, 633 F.2d at 901. We resolved this question succinctly, concluding that [w]e believe the police were properly authorized to enter the cabin. Id. (citing Payton ). Thus, in Wickizer, the tip and the suspect's relation to the owner were sufficient to establish reason to believe. In United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 297-98 (6th Cir.1983), a case decided shortly after Steagald, we considered whether an arrest warrant and/or search warrant was required to arrest [Buckner] at his mother's home. Ultimately, we decided the appeal on Fourth Amendment standing  finding that Buckner could not show a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother's apartment  but opined further that even if Buckner had standing to challenge the search, the district court correctly denied the suppression motion because the police had a warrant for [Buckner's] arrest and reason to believe that he was in his mother's apartment. Id. at 300. Although this portion of the Buckner opinion is clearly dicta  in the traditional sense  this portion of Buckner underlies the theory and reasoning of Pruitt and is therefore worth reciting. Dennis Buckner was a suspect in a bank robbery that went something like this: at approximately 2:30 p.m., a man walked into the bank with a large manila envelope, ordered the teller to put money in it, and, after she did, fled the bank and deposited the envelope in a public mail box across the street. Id. at 298. Unfortunately for the robber, a witness directed the police to the mailbox and, upon retrieving the envelope, the police recovered the cash and found that the envelope was addressed to Buckner at 3289 DuVall Drive. Id. The FBI arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m. and, by 5:00 p.m., the police and FBI had arrived at 3289 DuVall Drive with an arrest warrant. Id. Buckner was not there. Id. Instead, the police spoke with one Claudette Thompson (Buckner's girlfriend), who informed them that Buckner's mother lived nearby. Id. But: The officers did not get a precise address for the mother's residence from Thompson; rather, they got only a description of where the residence was located, and they had some trouble locating it. After the officers knocked on at least one door in error, Detective Brubrink approached 3214 DuVall and, according to his testimony, knocked on the door which was answered by Buckner's brother. When the door was opened, Brubrink was able to see appellant Buckner sitting in a chair in the apartment. Brubrink and the other officers then entered, informing Buckner that the FBI had a bench warrant for him for carrying a concealed deadly weapon.... In the living room where they arrested Buckner, [the police] seized in plain view manila envelopes resembling the one in which the stolen money had been placed, a pen, and a field jacket which they patted down for weapons. The jacket contained a notebook, with the following note: Larry Hughes, use bank at 4th Street, 2:30. Id. Buckner moved to suppress the evidence and the district court denied the motion. Id. On appeal, we began our analysis by stating that [t]wo recent Supreme Court cases, Steagald [] and Payton [], form the framework for our discussion, id. at 299, and explained that [t]he fact that [Buckner] was the person named on the arrest warrant mandates application of Payton rather than Steagald.  Id. at 300. Relying on Payton  i.e., Under Payton, the police could have entered the defendant's own home if they had a warrant for his arrest and reason to believe that he was inside. id.  we concluded that, assuming that [Buckner] did have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother's apartment, the [police] entry was proper because the police had a warrant for his arrest plus reason to believe that he was inside. Id. at 301. Thus, a suggestion (at most) that the suspect might be at his mother's residence and an imprecise description of where the residence was located (from which the officers knocked on at least one door in error) was sufficient to afford the officers reason to believe that Buckner was there, and thereby satisfy Payton. In United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 481-82 (6th Cir.2006), we specifically considered whether officers may rely on an arrest warrant, coupled with the reasonable belief that the subject of the warrant is within a third-party's residence, to enter that residence to execute the warrant; and whether a lesser reasonable belief standard, and not probable cause, is sufficient to allow officers to enter [the] residence to enforce [the] arrest warrant. We answered both in the affirmative. When Demetrius Pruitt failed to report to his parole officer, the court issued an arrest warrant. Id. at 478. Based on an anonymous tip, some surveillance, and another informant's unverified statement, the police determined that Pruitt was at his girlfriend's home. Id. at 478-79. [3] Upon arriving at the girlfriend's home, the police found Pruitt hiding in a kitchen closet and performed a protective sweep of the premises, whereupon they found several bags of crack cocaine, marijuana, a wallet, and a loaded .25 caliber pistol[,] all within plain view. Id. at 479. The police arrested Pruitt, the government charged him for the drugs and the firearm, and Pruitt moved to suppress the evidence as the result of an illegal search. Id. The trial court originally granted the motion, but upon the government's request to reconsider, reversed itself and denied the motion. Id. On appeal, we distinguished Steagald and stated the issue as whether officers may rely on an arrest warrant, coupled with the reasonable belief that the subject of the warrant is within a third-party's residence, to enter that residence to execute the warrant. Id. at 481. We explained that [w]e ha[d] already considered this issue, albeit in dicta, in Buckner,  and then adopted Buckner 's reasoning, explaining that the rationale underlying Buckner is applicable here, to wit: Under Payton, the police could have entered the defendant's own home if they had a warrant for his arrest and reason to believe that he was inside. It would be illogical to afford the defendant any greater protection in the home of a third party than he was entitled to in his own home. That illogical result, however, is precisely what would happen if we accepted the defendant's contention that Steagald required a search warrant in this case. Id. at 481-82 (quoting Buckner, 717 F.2d at 300). Pruitt argued that, even without a search warrant, the police must still establish probable cause to believe a suspect is in the home, on the theory that reasonable belief in Payton actually means probable cause. Id. at 482. And, Pruitt insisted, the police did not have reason to believe that he was in the home at the time of his arrest, Id. We rejected Pruitt's argument and held that reasonable belief is a lesser standard than probable cause, and that [police need only have a] reasonable belief that a suspect is within the residence, based on common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances, [in order] to enter a residence to enforce an arrest warrant. Id. at 485. We offered two reasons for this holding: First, we do not agree ... that a reasonable ground for belief of guilt is the grammatical analogue to a reasonable belief that an individual is located within a premises subject to search. These are two entirely different inquiries. Second, ... it is more than likely that the Supreme Court in Payton used a phrase other than probable cause because it meant something other than probable cause. ... The Payton Court's use of probable cause in describing the foundation for an arrest warrant and its use of reason to believe in describing the basis for the authority to enter a dwelling shows that the Court intended different standards for the two. Had the Court intended probable cause to be the standard for entering a residence, it would have either expressly stated so or used the same term for both situations. Instead, its use of different terms indicates that it intended different standards [to] apply. Id. at 484 (citations, quotation marks, and editorial marks omitted; paragraph break added). Furthermore, we explained, it is evident that the Supreme Court does not use the terms probable cause and reasonable belief interchangeably, but rather that it considers reasonable belief to be a less stringent standard than probable cause. Id. (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990)). Thus, we have found consistently that when police enter a third-party's residence to execute an arrest warrant, any evidence that they observe in plain view while executing that warrant may be admitted in a subsequent case against the subject of that arrest warrant, so long as the police had a reason to believe that the subject of the warrant was within a third-party's residence. Furthermore, that reasonable belief, based on common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances, is a lesser standard than probable cause. This is the basis for the Pruitt decision, and it is the controlling precedent and the law of this Circuit. Moreover, Wickizer, 633 F.2d at 901, indicates that a mere tip may be sufficient to establish reason to believe and Buckner, 717 F.2d at 301, similarly suggests that a vague description of where the residence [i]s located may be sufficient. [4] In the present case, the police received a tip from a confidential informant, advising that Malik Hardin was staying with his girlfriend at a particular apartment complex. Although the informant did not provide the apartment number, he described the apartment and its location within the complex, and he described the car that Hardin had been driving. When the police arrived at the apartment complex, they were able to locate the apartment based on the informant's description, and they verified the location when they identified the car parked nearby. Consulting the apartment manager, the police confirmed that a single tenant, a woman, leased the apartment in question, though the manager had not seen Hardin on the complex premises. From this, I believe that, under the guidance of our established precedent  Wickizer, Buckner, and Pruitt  the trial court was justified in finding that the police had a reasonable belief, based on common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances, that Hardin was present within Ms. Reynolds's apartment.