Opinion ID: 1864500
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Sufficiency of Plaintiffs' Negligence Claims.

Text: The order granting defendants' motion to dismiss under rule 104(b) can be upheld only if the petition on its face fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted under any circumstances. Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Iowa 1982); Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1981); Weber v. Madison, 251 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Iowa 1977). In determining this issue, we must view the allegations of the petition in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Citizens for Washington Square v. City of Davenport, 277 N.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Iowa 1979); Weber, 251 N.W.2d at 525. The district court's order indicated that the motion was sustainable on the basis that the State and its employees acted with due care as a matter of law. It also indicated that the motion was sustainable under the fireman's rule which this court recognized in Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1984). The State seeks to uphold the district court's order on both of the grounds specified in the ruling. It also urges that the motion was properly granted on the grounds raised in paragraph six of its motion to dismiss. That paragraph of the motion asserted that there was no cause of action for parole officer negligence on the facts which plaintiffs assert. If any ground asserted in a motion to dismiss is valid, a ruling sustaining the motion will be affirmed on appeal, even though other reasons were relied on by the district court. Rick v. Boegel, 205 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Iowa 1973); In re Lone Tree Community School Dist., 159 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa 1968); Emmert v. Neiman, 245 Iowa 931, 934, 65 N.W.2d 606, 608 (1954). Because the district court's reliance on the pleadings to establish due care as a matter of law was tenuous, and its application of the fireman's rule has raised some doubts, we prefer to test the ruling against the alternative ground advanced in paragraph six of the State's motion. In seeking reversal, plaintiffs note that, under subsection 5(b) of Iowa Code section 25A.2 (1981), tort claims are allowed against state employees for injuries caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission... while acting within the scope of the employee's office or employment. They further note that, under subsection 5(a) of that statute, tort claims may be brought against the state for the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee. Plaintiffs also stress that this court suggested in Anthony v. State, 374 N.W.2d 662 (Iowa 1985), in considering the analogous situation of a prisoner under work release supervision, that [t]he State could be liable in negligence for failing to exercise due care in implementing [the work release] plan but not for breach of any duty that inheres in the decisions involved in formulating the plan. Id. at 667. Plaintiffs tacitly concede that the approach to discretionary function advanced in Anthony and the more recent decision of Sheerin v. State, 434 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1989), would insulate the state and its agencies from any liability arising from both the decision to parole Lain and the decisions relating to the terms and conditions of his parole. They urge, however, that the Anthony rationale, as expressed in the quoted language, does not preclude and, indeed, supports their claims based on negligent implementation of Lain's parole. In response to these arguments, the State urges that the suggestion in our decisions that the discretionary function or duty exception is strictly limited to decisions made at the planning level should be modified. It urges that some decisions made at the operational level should also be included within the discretionary function exception. In addition, the State argues that, irrespective of the discretionary function exception, the same rationale which led to rejection of social worker malpractice for negligent placement of children in M.H. by and through Callahan v. State, 385 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1986), and Rittscher v. State, 352 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1984), should lead to rejection of liability claims for parole officer malpractice. In seeking to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties, we begin with a review of the Anthony decision. The portion of the opinion indicating that the state could be liable for negligence as a result of acts or omissions at the operational level was, we believe, intended to confirm the principle that liability for operational negligence was not precluded by the discretionary function exception. We do not find that this statement in the opinion was a general affirmation of the plaintiffs' theory of liability based on negligence. The discretionary function exception was raised in Anthony as a defense to only some of the negligence claims asserted. The negligence claims as to which it was urged and concerning which the quoted language was applicable were resolved against the plaintiffs based on the trial court's findings of an absence of negligence. With respect to the rest of the negligence claims in the Anthony case, we stated: The general rule at common law is that a person has no duty to prevent a third person from causing harm to another. Exceptions have been recognized in a number of situations. The one involved here is stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315 (1965): There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct,.... ... [W]e need not and do not decide in this case whether to recognize the exception or whether it would apply in the present facts. Such far-reaching and sensitive issues will be better decided in a case in which they are dispositive. Anthony, 374 N.W.2d at 668 (emphasis added). Based on the language last quoted, it is apparent the issue of whether the state, its agencies, or its employees owe a duty to third parties to prevent prisoners and parolees from causing them harm has not been finally determined prior to the present case. A persuasive argument that such duty does not exist is found in Cady v. State, 129 Ariz. 258, 630 P.2d 554 (Ariz.App.1981). In discussing the issue, the court stated: [T]he rationale, ... which we believe to be sound law, is that if the duty which is alleged to have been breached is one that the state (or its governmental agencies or agents) undertakes because of the obligation imposed upon it for the protection of the public at large, that duty is actionable by an individual only when it can be established that by reason of previous conduct a relationship was established between the state and the [injured] individual such that failure to perform that duty or its negligent performance would actively work to the special injury of that individual.... ... We admit that a general statutory scheme for the protection of a particular class of the public can give rise to a reliance by the public on existence of that protection in conducting their affairs, and that the breach of that reliance and protection may impose liability.... However, when the duty is created by statute, no matter how specific, the first inquiry must always be whether the statutory functions undertaken pursuant thereto were in the furtherance of an obligation arising out of the protection of the public at large. If the answer to that inquiry is in the affirmative, then the second inquiry is undertaken to determine whether by prior conduct between the state and the injured plaintiff, a relationship was established whereby either the failure to perform the public duty or its negligent performance would actively work a special injury to that plaintiff. Applying this analysis to the facts in the case, we hold that the duty to keep felons in custody ... imposes upon the superintendent [of corrections] and hence the state, obligations that flow to the public at large. We further hold that the plaintiff here has failed to plead or establish a course of conduct between herself and the state which would create a relationship that would form the basis of a duty to her individually. Id. at 263, 630 P.2d at 559-60 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). A similar view is expressed as follows in Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955): [I]f the State negligently permitted Kennedy's premature return to society, it breached only that public duty to punish, a duty owed to the members of the community collectively but importing no crushing burden of liability to individuals for the breach thereof. Id. at 556, 127 N.E.2d at 549. Plaintiffs' claims based on the alleged acts or omissions of community corrections officer Molamphy and his superior Gillman are premised on the theory that these parole officials should have acted with more dispatch to restrict Lain's liberty by arresting him or requesting law officers in the State of Washington to arrest him. Assuming that the conduct of Molamphy or Gillman in this regard failed to satisfy the standard of due care under the circumstances, we do not believe that such failure should render them or the state liable for plaintiffs' injuries. The basis of plaintiffs' claims is not dissimilar in legal principle from a claim based on the negligent failure of a police officer to arrest a person when possessed of probable cause to do so. We have previously rejected the contention that such failure to act will give rise to a legal liability. See Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 1985). In Hildenbrand, we reaffirmed our prior holding in Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1982), that we do not recognize an independent tort for negligent investigation of crime by law enforcement officers. We then applied this principle to the failure-to-arrest situation and made the following observation: We choose not to depart from the rule of Smith and its rationale. Instead we apply here a sound corollary of that rule of non-liability of peace officers investigating criminal activity. The rule not only applies when the person allegedly harmed by a negligent investigation has been charged and arrested, but also when the allegedly negligent investigation results in no arrest.... Our refusal to recognize a tort of negligent failure to detect a person's intoxicated condition and protect the person from harm is consistent with common law principles recognized by sections 314, 314A, 315, 319 and 320 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). While adopting the general rule that a person owes no duty to act for the protection of others unless the actor has a special relationship to the other person, those Restatement provisions identify the special relationships and circumstances under which liability can be imposed on the actor. Id. 369 N.W.2d at 415. This rationale has been similarly applied by courts in other jurisdictions. See Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987); Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E. 2d 468 (1988). We are satisfied that the absence of a special relationship between the public officials and the injured parties which precluded recovery in Hildenbrand also serves to defeat recovery on the present claims. In reaching this conclusion, we find considerable merit in the State's contention that we would be acting inconsistently if we were to permit recovery on the present claims in the face of our rejection of social worker liability in the Callahan and Rittscher cases. For purposes of applying the Restatement standard of special relationships, a much closer nexus existed between the injured parties and agents of the state in those cases than has been shown to exist between the present plaintiffs and the affected state agencies. Plaintiffs contend that a motion to dismiss under rule 104(b) is an inappropriate procedural device for the adjudication of their claims on the merits. We have cautioned the bar and trial court judges that, since the advent of notice pleading, it is a rare case which will not survive a rule 104(b) motion. See American Nat'l Bank v. Sivers, 387 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Iowa 1986). In spite of this admonition, we find that the defendants' motion to dismiss was properly granted in the present case. As indicated in our prior discussion, we are not deciding this case based on whether or not the State, its agencies, or its employees were negligent. We are assuming that the allegations of negligence against them could be sustained upon trial. Notwithstanding that assumption, we have determined the absence of liability as a matter of law given the relationship of the parties. The granting of motions to dismiss upon a finding of absence of legal duty has been upheld in several other tort actions. See, e.g., Roberts v. Bruns, 387 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Iowa 1986); Callahan, 385 N.W.2d at 537-38; Rittscher, 352 N.W.2d at 251-52; Smith, 324 N.W.2d at 301-02. The district court did not err in ruling that plaintiffs' allegations of negligence failed to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted.