Opinion ID: 2399306
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statements concerning Izod

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Ramsey to testify that Izod was his right-hand man in drug trafficking. The Commonwealth contends, correctly, however, that this testimony is not hearsay, since it does not involve an extrajudicial statement, but rather an observation based on Ramsey's personal knowledge of Johnson's drug-trade activities. Accord Commonwealth v. Hashem, 363 Pa.Super. 111, 153, 525 A.2d 744, 764 (1987) (quoting a trial court's observation that [i]t is hornbook law that what a person knows firsthand from his own knowledge is not hearsay (citations omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 526 Pa. 199, 584 A.2d 1378 (1991). Additionally, Appellant claims that Ramsey's testimony that she overheard conversations between Johnson and Izod about drug-sale locations, which she believed included places where Combs sold drugs, was not relevant to establish motive on account of a lack of specificity. This argument fails, since we have rejected the position that the Commonwealth was burdened with an obligation to develop a precise picture of the geographic overlap in drug sales to establish the competitive relationship between Johnson's and Combs' activities. See supra. Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from Ramsey indicating that, approximately two weeks before Combs' murder, she overheard Izod and Combs having an argument about turf, in which Combs told Izod that he was not going to let Izod take food out of our mouths. According to Johnson, the testimony was objectionable as hearsay which was not relevant to establish motive, since it was not probative of the Commonwealth's theory that Johnson killed Combs over a drug rivalry at 437 Schuylkill Avenue. Moreover, Johnson emphasizes that the statement did not involve him, but rather, reflects a conversation between Combs and Izod. Therefore, he claims, this statement cannot be attributed to or otherwise connected with him, absent some other relational evidence. In this regard, Appellant views Ramsey's testimony, and other indications in the record of Izod's affiliation with his group, as insufficient. The trial court's reasons for admitting this statement are unclear, since it did not address the matter either at trial or in its opinion. While we agree with the Commonwealth's position that the statement bears a relationship to its motive evidence, as it tends to show competition in drug sales, this merely establishes relevance, and its character as hearsay must be evaluated to determine its admissibility. The Commonwealth contends that the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; however, the statement may be read to embody the fact of competition in the drug trade, which the Commonwealth sought to prove to suggest Johnson's guilt. We conclude, however, that any error by the trial court in the admission of the statement is harmless, as it is cumulative of other evidence, in particular, Cook's descriptions from his personal observation concerning the impact of sales from the 437 Schuylkill Avenue location on his and Combs' drug trade, see, e.g., N.T., at 257, 263-64, as well as Cook's prior, unopposed testimony that Combs sought to address the issue, N.T., at 263-64. See generally Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34, 85, 748 A.2d 166, 193 (2000) (on reconsideration) (articulating the three, alternative bases on which a determination of harmless error may be predicated, including that the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted, substantially similar evidence); Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 411 & n. 20, 383 A.2d 155, 165 & n. 20 (1978) (collecting cases in which errors were found harmless on the basis that improperly admitted evidence was cumulative and its admission did not prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial).