Opinion ID: 4562033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The X-Ray Was Favorable

Text: Phillips’s argument is that the X-ray shows that there was far less shot in Glodo’s skull than one would expect had the fatal blast been fired straight-on from behind, as the prosecution alleged at trial. The blast, in other words, must have been at an angle, so that only some of the shot emitted from the shotgun entered his skull. This in turn, Phillips argues, shows—or would have allowed him to argue at trial—that the prosecution’s theory of the case was incorrect, and that physical evidence corroborated Phillips’s tale of self-defense. The evidence could have been used 15 Case No. 18-6184, Phillips v. Valentine for impeachment of prosecution witnesses (Dr. Schott and forensic examiner Deskins) as well as to serve as the basis for expert testimony in the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. The X-ray evidence and the argument built from it, finally, would have played a role in mitigation, as well as exculpation. Without it, jurors convicted Phillips of the second-most-serious crime charged; with it, even if he were not acquitted, perhaps they would have found him guilty only of a lesser included offense. We evaluate the argument just outlined through two discrete parts of the Brady test. The first, which asks whether the X-ray was “favorable” “asks only which party the evidence favors.” Clark v. Warden, 934 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2019). Evidence providing an alternative explanation of how the decedent died or undermining the prosecution’s theory of the case is favorable. See, e.g., Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, because the favorability inquiry “asks only which party the evidence favors,” Clark, 934 F.3d at 492 (emphasis added), credibility inquiries are not appropriate at this stage. Ibid. Normally, the question of credibility arises in the context of witness testimony. See, e.g., ibid. In our case, however, we have an X-ray that does not ‘speak for itself,’ particularly to those not trained to read one. For this exact reason, the district court had originally ordered an evidentiary hearing, observing that “the Court lacks a medical degree and cannot on its own determine what [the X‑ray] shows.” As we have seen, at that evidentiary hearing, the Commonwealth produced Dr. Schott as its sole witness, while Phillips produced forensic scientist Dehus. In making its determinations, the district court appears to have equated the value of the X-ray with the credibility of the expert witnesses. The court then used the question of which direction the X-ray was taken from (about which the court questioned both witnesses) as a touchstone for which witness was more credible. Dehus’s mistake as to the direction of the X-ray is damaging, as is his insistent doublingdown in the face of medical testimony to the contrary. However, when stripped of matters we 16 Case No. 18-6184, Phillips v. Valentine cannot now take into account (such as the wadding issue, or the lack of marring of Glodo’s face) and of matters on which Dr. Schott rebutted him (his over-confident statements regarding the direction of the shot, given her points about inability to trace this in a 2-D image), the heart of his testimony is: 1) There were 170 to 220 pieces of shot in the shell that was fired. 2) Had the shell been fired straight-on at the distance indicated, these should all have wound up in Glodo’s skull. 3) The X-ray does not show anywhere near that number in Glodo’s skull. 4) Therefore, the shot must have been fired at an angle. It is upon the third of these points—whether or not the X-ray shows what one would expect to see—that the question of favorability turns.12 Here, it seems noteworthy that Dr. Schott did not rebut this point directly. She testified that she could not tell “from the x-ray how many pellets are . . . in the head[.]” But elsewhere, she stated that X-rays of this type “give me a general idea of the distribution of the pellets or of the bullet.” Given how X-rays work, there would be a significant and visible difference between an X- ray of a skull with a full load of 170-220 metal pellets in it (or nearly that many) and one with far fewer than that. That observation was the heart of Dehus’s argument: “It’s not possible from the x-ray to individually count each pellet. But it doesn't seem -- it doesn't appear to be anywhere near that number.” As Dr. Schott herself admitted (indeed, argued), the X-ray is a two-dimensional photograph. Therefore, Dehus’s error as to whether it had been taken from the front or the back does not seem to affect the basic ability to argue such points as the density of shot shown. Even with Dehus’s skill somewhat in question, we conclude that we cannot dismiss his basic conclusion that there was not nearly enough shot in the skull to support the Commonwealth’s theory. Or to put it another way, the X-ray provides some support for Phillips’s theory. We particularly cannot 12 Dr. Schott admitted that she was not qualified to address the first point, but at trial, the state’s firearms witness gave testimony suggesting this general type of shell might have “2 or 300 shot” shot in it. Thus, we can take Dehus’s testimony on this point as relatively uncontested. The state produced no evidence—nor argued—to suggest the second point is wrong, at least as to the vast majority of the shot. 17 Case No. 18-6184, Phillips v. Valentine discount this conclusion in view of the Commonwealth’s and Dr. Schott’s inability to rebut it directly. Phillips also developed—better on appeal than at the evidentiary hearing—a second, somewhat weaker argument: It is possible to use the X-ray to tell if the shot was fired at an angle or straight-on based solely on the distribution of the shot in the X-ray in terms of being on or offcenter. This is subject to similar analysis as that above about the sheer quantity of shot. Dr. Schott demonstrated at the evidentiary hearing why the 2-D image could not be used to trace the directionality of any given pellet. But if the mass of the pellets is to one side, that would suggest that they were fired at an angle. As Phillips points out, the mistake over whether the X-ray was taken back-to-front or front-to-back would not matter for this inquiry, because either way, offcenteredness would remain. But Dehus’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was less well developed on whether this was so than in the case of the sheer-quantity argument above. As to the district court’s equating Dehus’s credibility with the value of the X-ray, had Dehus’s testimony itself been the Brady material, this kind of credibility judgement would have been inappropriate. Cf. Clark, 934 F.3d at 492. Here, however, we are in a somewhat anomalous situation: The Brady material is the X-ray itself, and as an inanimate object, it does not present a “credibility” question in the usual sense—but on the other hand, most judges cannot evaluate it without an expert intermediary. Thus, as compared to Clark, this situation poses a slightly different question: what is the role of the court in evaluating the credibility of the experts who will help it evaluate the meaning (rather than the credibility) of the Brady material? On the one hand, courts perform a screening role constantly as to expert credibility, both before testimony is given at trial and in evidentiary hearings. Such a role, to some extent, seems necessary here: obviously, it would be a recipe for chaos (and injustice) if courts were obligated 18 Case No. 18-6184, Phillips v. Valentine to accept as true any testimony, no matter how blatantly incorrect and self-serving, regarding the value of a supposed piece of Brady evidence. On the other hand, however, we have recognized “the Supreme Court’s directive that ‘the criminal trial . . . [be preserved] as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations.’” Clark, 934 F.3d at 492 (quoting Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 F.3d 345, 364 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440) (brackets in original))). If the evidence suffices to create a battle of the experts, such a battle should be waged at trial, not simply before a judge in a post-hoc setting. There are good reasons to think that the threshold for the favorability inquiry should be fairly low. Most of the key cases treat it only glancingly13 or even omit to discuss it.14 (We note, however, that this is likely due to the fact that the Brady material in question is usually either testimony or police notes that, if believed, are obviously favorable.) The physical evidence here obviously does not have an innate credibility problem, and nor was the testimony surrounding it blatantly self-serving or dishonest. To the contrary, despite an unfortunate misstep or two, it made out the “favorability,” in the Brady sense, of the X-ray evidence to Phillips. In short, we hold that the evidence was favorable, and thus we move on to materiality.