Opinion ID: 172243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Flawed Endorsement Analysis

Text: In addition to ignoring Van Orden, the court's endorsement analysis is wanting. Under the Lemon test as modified by Justice O'Connor, the government violates the Establishment Clause by impermissibly endorsing religion if its conduct has either (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. [7] Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Significantly, the endorsement inquiry is conducted from the point of view of a reasonable observer similar to the `reasonable person' in tort law, who is not to be identified with any ordinary individual. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 779, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we do not ask if there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whether some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable person might think [the State] endorses religion. Id. at 780, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original). Rather, we ask whether a reasonable observer undertaking an objective inquiry would conclude that the government's action had the effect of endorsing religion. See id. at 779, 115 S.Ct. 2440 ([T]he endorsement test creates a more collective standard to gauge the `objective' meaning of the [government's] statement in the community. (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original)). The panel opinion departs from this objective analysis and engages in a subjective inquiry that takes all the facts in the light of an ultra-sensitive observer rather than a reasonable observer.
The court erroneously imputes the motives of a private citizen to the commissioners for the purpose of finding a government endorsement of religion, placing considerable importance on the fact that the reasonable observer would be aware of [the private donor's] religious motivation for seeking the erection of the Monument. Green, 568 F.3d at 800. However, a truly objective inquiry would not impute a private citizen's motivations to the commissioners simply because they accepted his proposal. While the reasonable observer might have been aware that Mr. Bush had religious motivations in proposing the monument, the reasonable observer would not make the logical leap that the commissioners must therefore have shared his religious motives. Such a leap needlessly imputes a religious motive to the government, as it ignores the fact that the commissioners discussed the historic importance of the display and stated that the monument should be permitted based on the county's policy of neutrality in accepting displays. See Green, 450 F.Supp.2d at 1275-76, 1292-94. Moreover, the court comes perilously close to engaging in a subjective inquiry that penalizes private citizens for their religious beliefs, improperly using the Establishment Clause as a sword to justify repression of religion [and] its adherents from any aspect of public life. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). We should not be using the fact that the private donor had an unalloyed religious motivation, Green, 568 F.3d at 801 n. 10, as proof certain that the Establishment Clause has been violated. Sadly, we seem to have reached the day where we construe the Establishment Clause, meant to protect religion, so as to discourage people of faith from participating in the civic arena. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 2105, 2206 (2003) ([O]ne of the principal arguments against establishment was that it was harmful to religion.... Disestablishment `advanced' religion.). The court suggests that, while the motivation of a private citizen is irrelevant under the purpose prong of the endorsement test, it is significant for the effect it has on the reasonable observer's view of the monument. Green, 568 F.3d at 801 n. 10. This is a distinction without a difference. Under the purpose prong, we must scrutinize the government's intent; thus, where the challenged conduct is the selection or display of artwork, the artist's inspiration or intent is irrelevant. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir.2008). Similarly, under the effect prong, what counts is whether the reasonable observer would conclude that the government's objective act has the effect of advancing religion. Accordingly, whether a private citizen subjectively intends that the monument have the effect of advancing religion is irrelevant to an objective effect inquiry.
The court also construes the endorsement test so as to disadvantage small communities. The panel opinion relies on the fact that Haskell County is a place where everyone knows each other. Green, 568 F.3d at 801 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). According to the court, Haskell County's small size means that the reasonable observer would conclude that the commissioners' statements of support for the monument reflect a government endorsement of religion. Id. at 802. By reaching this conclusion, the court all but creates a presumption that small-town commissioners' statements are official statements, and having done so, treats them as indicative of an endorsement of religion. Such reasoning leads to a completely untenable result: that the Establishment Clause means one thing in small-town America and something different in a metropolitan area. This cannot be correct not only from a First Amendment perspective, but also from the standpoint of announcing law that is uniform and predictable. It is telling that the court cited no legal authority or evidence for the proposition that members of a small community are more likely to view an elected representative's statement to be official speech. It is just as likely that a commissioner's neighbors in a small town would realize that the commissioner was simply speaking for himself. Certainly, context is important to an Establishment Clause inquiry, see McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722, but there is no reason in the law to create a presumption that all statements by small-town commissioners arise in their official capacity, any more than we should attribute a sectarian purpose to the commissioners' actions without proof more compelling than this case offers. Even if the small size of Haskell County should create a presumption that all statements by county officials reflect government policy, that presumption is rebutted by the facts of this case. The court relies upon religious statements by a commissioner as well as the presence of the commissioners at a dedication ceremony and a rally for the Ten Commandments monument to demonstrate a sectarian purpose on the part of the government. Green, 568 F.3d at 801-02. However, neither the statements nor the commissioners' presence at the ceremonies should be controlling considerations. First, while the court places great emphasis on the religious statements of the commissioners, only one commissioner actually made religious statements. Green, 568 F.3d at 802. Further, these statements were phrased in the first person, suggesting that the statements merely reflected that commissioner's personal beliefswhich, of course, are irrelevant to our inquiry. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 863, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (Establishment Clause analysis does not look to the veiled psyche of government officers.); Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir.1989) (We simply do not believe elected government officials are required to check at the door whatever religious background (or lack of it) they carry with them before they act on rules that are otherwise unobjectionable.). It does not follow, then, that the personal statements of one commissioner shed any light whatsoever on the government's policy. Even assuming that one commissioner voted for the monument for religious reasons (which is by no means clear), that commissioner's statements are not probative of whether the other two commissioners voted to accept the placement of the monument in order to endorse religion. Quite simply, the purpose of the government cannot be divined from one commissioner's personal statements when there are three commissioners. [8] A truly reasonable observer would not assume otherwise. Second, the commissioners' presence at the dedication ceremony and rally does nothing to demonstrate a sectarian effect. Commissioners can be expected to attend most any public function, especially in a small town. Attendance does not necessarily indicate endorsement; rather, it reflects what elected officials doincluding attending functions and representing the constituency. The reasonable observer would not conclude that the mere presence of the commissioners at the ceremonies suggests an endorsement of religion. That is why other courts confronting a similar situation have not found the mere presence of public officials at commissioning ceremonies to be particularly relevant to the endorsement inquiry. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (plurality opinion) (two state legislators presided over dedication ceremony of Ten Commandments monument); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (mayor accepted Ten Commandments monument at ceremony); cf. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 851, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (judge-executive not only attended the dedication ceremony for the Ten Commandments monument but also delivered a religious address). While the court relies on this tenuous evidence of endorsement, it conspicuously neglects other contrary considerations. The commissioners never said that they were approving the monument for religious reasons. To the contrary, the record reflects that the commissioners discussed the historical aspect of the monument at the meeting where the monument was accepted. The county also had an informal policy regarding the erection of monuments that was perfectly neutral. Green, 450 F.Supp.2d at 1275-76. This neutral policy warrants further mention as it, combined with the wide variety of monuments displayed at the courthouse, does much to negate any possible message of endorsement. The fact that there were monuments for the Classes of 1954 and 1955 does not mean that the County preferred those classes over those graduating in 1957 or any other year. Nor does the presence of a monument for the Choctaw mean that the County approved of that tribe more than any other. If some other group feels lonely or neglected, they can donate a monument too under County policy. So it is with the Ten Commandments monument. These considerations dispel any notion that the display of this Ten Commandments monument violated the Establishment Clause by endorsing religion. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 781, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that a reasonable observer would know that many displays had been permitted at the park). I note that this conclusion, unlike that of the court, is consistent with the decisions reached by the other circuits that have considered Ten Commandments displays since Van Orden. This case is an outlier. See Card, 520 F.3d at 1020-21 (monument on government property); City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d at 776-77 (same); see also ACLU v. Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624, 636-40 (6th Cir.2005) (display in a courthouse).