Opinion ID: 1822581
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty of Care for Mentally Disabled Persons

Text: [9-11] ¶ 38. We affirm the principle that mentally disabled persons are generally held to the same reasonable person standard of care as other individuals. Jankee, 235 Wis. 2d 700, ¶ 54. This duty of care obligates all persons to exercise ordinary care for their own safety. See Peters, 224 Wis. 2d at 192 (quoting Wis JICivil 1007). Because a mentally disabled plaintiff normally operates under an objective standard of care, she is normally subject to the same principles of contributory negligence as a plaintiff who is not mentally disabled. Jankee, 235 Wis. 2d 700, ¶¶ 75-76. ¶ 39. The Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, appearing as amicus curiae, argues that Jankee's establishment of an objective duty of care for mentally disabled persons represents a complete reversal of prior Wisconsin law. The Academy points to the case of Karow v. Continental Insurance Co., 57 Wis. 56,15 N.W. 27 (1883), in which this court said: Of course, negligence involves a want of care in one who ought to bestow care. It is an omission of duty. But the law imposes no dutyno obligation of careupon one who has no control over his mental faculties, and hence no control over his physical action. Being under no obligation of care, and under no restraint of duty, and incapable of exercising either, it would be inapt, if not inaccurate, to say that, by his omission, an insane person was guilty of negligence. Id. at 63. [12] ¶ 40. This passage is no longer consistent with modern negligence theory. Today, a mentally disabled person may be held liable for the damages caused by the person's negligence because all persons have a duty of ordinary care. Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 537, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). The result in a typical negligence case today is the same as it would have been in 1883. Only the analysis is different. ¶ 41. Our court has never been in doubt that, as a general rule, an insane person is civilly liable for torts. In Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 237, 238 (1863), this court quoted with approval from Reeve's Dom. Rel. 258 that a lunatic is as liable to compensate in damages as a man in his right mind. In Karow, this court cited cases from four other states, including Vermont, where a court said that no reason can be assigned why a lunatic should not be held liable. Karow, 57 Wis. at 61 (citing Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 (1845)). ¶ 42. Contemporary analysis may be traced to German Mutual Fire Insurance Society v. Meyer, 218 Wis. 381, 261 N.W.211 (1935), where we held that insanity is not a defense for tort liability unless evil intent or express malice is required by the claim. Id. at 385. The court's opinion quoted extensively from Karow. Id. at 386-87. Then in Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970), the court indicated that some forms of insanity are a defense and preclude liability for negligence, but not all types of insanity. Id. at 541. The court stated: The effect of the mental illness . . . or disorder must be such as to affect the person's ability to understand and appreciate the duty which rests upon him . . . [for] ordinary care, or . . . it must affect his ability to control [his conduct] in an ordinarily prudent manner. And in addition, there must be an absence of notice or forewarning to the person that he may be suddenly subject to such a type of insanity or mental illness. Id. The court continued: We think the statement that insanity is no defense is too broad when it is applied to a negligence case where the driver is suddenly overcome without forewarning by a mental disability or disorder which incapacitates him from conforming his conduct to the standards of a reasonable man under like circumstances. These are rare cases indeed. Id. at 543 (emphasis added). ¶ 43. The implication of the Breunig analysis is that the reasonable person standard of care is normally applied even to the mentally disturbed. Burch v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 465, 470, 543 N.W.2d 277 (1996). This was made explicit in Gould v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 198 Wis. 2d 450, 543 N.W.2d 282 (1996), where the court said: It is a widely accepted rule in most American jurisdictions that mentally disabled adults are held responsible for the torts they commit regardless of their capacity to comprehend their actions; they are held to an objective reasonable person standard. See generally, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B (1965); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 135 (1984). . . . When fault-based liability replaced strict liability, American courts in common law jurisdictions identified the matter as a question of public policy and maintained the rule imposing liability on the mentally disabled. Although early case law suggested that Wisconsin followed this trend, this court specifically adopted the common law rule and the public policy justifications behind it in German Mut. Fire Ins. Soc'y v. Meyer, 218 Wis. 381, 385, 261 N.W. 211 (1935). Id. at 456-57. The court continued: The court of appeals erroneously perceived the underlying premise of Breunig to be that a person should not be held negligent where a mental disability prevents that person from controlling his or her conduct. By limiting its holding to cases of sudden mental disability, the Breunig court chose not to adopt that broad premise. We also decline to do so. Id. at 459 (citations omitted). ¶ 44. Consequently, the assertion that a mentally disabled person can never be negligent is simply wrong. As the Academy concedes, since 1971 Wisconsin has followed a pattern jury instruction, entitled Negligence of Mentally Disturbed, that expressly states: A person who is mentally disabled is held to the same standard of care as one who has normal mentality, and in your determination of the question of negligence, you will give no consideration to the defendant's mental condition. Wis JICivil 1021 (emphasis added). This is good law.