Opinion ID: 743016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantially Similar Accidents

Text: 10 Cessna claims that the district court erred in allowing evidence of certain other accidents involving Cessna 210 airplanes to be admitted because: (1) the plaintiff did not prove that the accidents were substantially similar to the Ridge accident, (2) the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and (3) the evidence was inadmissible on the issue of causation as a matter of Virginia public policy. We review such evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1383, 1385 (4th Cir.1995). 11 The district court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of this evidence. The court heard deposition testimony of three Cessna employees and live testimony from plaintiff's expert witness. The district court ruled that the evidence was admissible because the other accidents were substantially similar to the current accident and the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. This finding is supported by the record. 12 The record does not support a finding that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that evidence of the other accidents was admissible. Any dissimilarities do not go to the question of admissibility but rather to its weight. Benedi, 66 F.3d at 1386. The district court did not err in refusing to exclude the evidence as unfairly prejudicial because the evidence was probative on the issue of notice, and Cessna was free to offer evidence to rebut plaintiff's evidence or to discredit plaintiff's evidence during cross-examination. See Benedi, 66 F.3d at 1386. 13 Cessna also claims that plaintiff's witness Donham's reference to accidents other than the substantially similar accidents was unfairly prejudicial. Cessna moved for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion and offered to give a limiting instruction, but Cessna declined. Upon reviewing the exhibit in question, 1 the court determined that it was relevant and not prejudicial. We are of opinion this ruling was correct. 14 We do not reach the question of whether the evidence of other accidents was inadmissible as a matter of Virginia public policy because the objection to the evidence was not made on that ground. When Cessna objected to this evidence, it did so on two grounds: (1) relevance because the other accidents were not substantially similar and (2) prejudice because Cessna had not seen the specific list in the exhibit. The district court asked if there was any other objection and when advised there was not, the court overruled the objection. 2 15