Opinion ID: 3135205
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The End of Cross-Comparison Analysis

Text: The above review of our case law in this area has convinced us that judging penalties by a comparison with penalties for offenses with different elements should never have been part of our proportionate penalties jurisprudence. This court has stated that the proportionate penalties clause was clearly intended by the framers to be synonymous with the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. See People v. McDonald , 168 Ill. 2d 420, 455 (1995). Accordingly, for over 100 years this court gave the clause a restrictive construction, holding that we would invalidate a penalty only if it was cruel, degrading or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense that it shocked the moral sense of the community. We previously acknowledged that the nature of penalties was a matter “almost wholly legislative” ( Landers , 329 Ill. at 457), and that this court was reluctant to invalidate penalties determined by the legislature (see, e.g. , Bryant , 128 Ill. 2d at 456; Steppan , 105 Ill. 2d at 319). We are reluctant no more. In the last three years we have invalidated nine penalties. See Walden , 199 Ill. 2d 392 (armed robbery with a firearm); Morgan , 203 Ill. 2d 470 (attempted first degree murder with a firearm; attempted first degree murder in which a firearm is discharged; attempted first degree murder in which a firearm is discharged and causes great bodily harm, permanent disfigurement, permanent disability, or death); Moss , 206 Ill. 2d 503 (armed robbery in which a firearm is discharged, aggravated kidnapping with a firearm, aggravated kidnapping in which a firearm is discharged, aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm, and aggravated vehicular hijacking in which a firearm is discharged). The whole cross-comparison branch of our proportionate penalties jurisprudence began with a questionable “ Cf .” cite rather a deliberate choice supported by reasoned analysis. See Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d at 196. Once this court started down that path, it could never find a way to make the analysis work. For several years after Wisslead , this court stated that the proportionate penalties clause was violated when conduct that created a less serious threat to the public health, safety, and welfare was punished more harshly than conduct that constituted a greater threat. Nevertheless, the standard this was judged under was the “cruel or degrading” standard. This analysis was problematic for two reasons: one, the test is largely subjective, and two, it is simply not a good test for judging which of two offenses is more serious. In Davis , this court tried to fix the analysis to make it less subjective and more workable. This court made it clear that it would compare only statutes that had similar purposes, and that if a less serious offense was punished more harshly than a more serious offense, then the greater penalty would be invalidated. This court would simply compare the two offenses rather than trying to judge them under the “cruel or degrading” standard, which became the test solely for judging a penalty in relation to its specific offense. Davis , 177 Ill. 2d at 503-04. All that Davis accomplished, however, was to create a whole new set of problems. The analysis became even more subjective, as courts now had to find a way to define “statutory purpose.” The cases show that this was not done consistently, and the courts never did settle on a way to define it. The outcome of a cross-comparison case could always be determined by how narrowly or broadly a court chose to define statutory purpose, and there is simply no principled, objective way to define it. When the legislature gave us its own statement of statutory purpose for the 15/20/25-to-life offenses, a whole new set of problems was created and this court began invalidating penalties on a regular basis. Also, in trying to determine which of two offenses is more serious, this court has long noted the problem that we do not know what factors the legislature took into account in setting the penalty. All that we can base the assessment on is the degree of harm or the value of property involved, but we have consistently noted that the legislature might have taken other factors into account, such as the need to halt an increase in the occurrence of a particular crime. Nevertheless, when we have invalidated penalties, we have never considered these other factors. Finally, in all the years after the questionable Wisslead cite, this court has never defended the use of cross-comparison analysis, except to say that we used it in several cases. See Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 420-21. It is clear what needs to be done. After much reflection, we have concluded that cross-comparison analysis has proved to be nothing but problematic and unworkable, and that it needs to be abandoned. Those cases that used such an analysis to invalidate a penalty are overruled, and this court will no longer use the proportionate penalties clause to judge a penalty in relation to the penalty for an offense with different elements. Overruling a decision of this court, let alone an entire body of case law, necessarily implicates stare decisis principles. With regard to stare decisis , this court recently observed the following: “The doctrine of stare decisis ‘expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.’ Neff v. George , 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936), overruled on other grounds by Tuthill v. Rendelman , 387 Ill. 321 (1944). This doctrine ‘is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.’ Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Elections , 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). Stare decisis enables both the people and the bar of this state ‘to rely upon [this court’s] decisions with assurance that they will not be lightly overruled.’ Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp. , 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1982). To be sure, stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Chicago Bar Ass’n , 161 Ill. 2d at 510; Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 842, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 746, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). However, we have consistently held that any departure from stare decisis must be specially justified ( Chicago Bar Ass’n , 161 Ill. 2d at 510) and that prior decisions should not be overruled absent ‘good cause’ ( Moehle , 93 Ill. 2d at 304; Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co. , 6 Ill. 2d 152, 166-67 (1955)) or ‘compelling reasons’ ( Moehle , 93 Ill. 2d at 304; People v. Robinson , 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999)). This court also has recognized that ‘it will not depart from precedent “merely because the court is of the opinion that it might decide otherwise were the question a new one.”’ Robinson , 187 Ill. 2d at 463-64, quoting Maki v. Frelk , 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97 (1968). In sum, ‘when a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute or constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to public interests.’ Maki , 40 Ill. 2d at 196; see also Heidenreich v. Bremner , 260 Ill. 439, 450-51 (1913).” Vitro v. Mihelcic , 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81-82 (2004). We have further noted that good cause to depart from stare decisis exists when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned. See People v. Jones , 207 Ill. 2d 122, 134 (2003), citing Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). For several reasons, we believe departing from stare decisis and abandoning cross-comparison proportionate penalties analysis is justified. First, it is clearly an area of the law in which the governing decisions are badly reasoned. As noted above, cross-comparison analysis started with a questionable citation and was never supported by any reasoning other than stating that the court has used it in several cases. Second, the governing decisions have proved unworkable. This court has experimented with different analyses in this area, and all that we have accomplished is to make the analysis more subjective and to put ourselves in a position in which we are improperly substituting our judgment for that of the legislature. The law in this area has never been settled for any appreciable length of time. Third, this analysis set this court on a collision course with separation of powers principles. Were this court to keep using the cross-comparison analysis as it had been, this court would no longer be constrained to serve as a mere check on the legislature, ensuring compliance with the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Instead, we would be free to act as a superior legislative branch, substituting our judgment for the legislature whenever we disagreed with the penalties it set. Thus, “serious detriment  prejudicial to public interests” is likely to arise from this case law. See Maki v. Frelk , 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196 (1968). Good cause exists to abandon the cross-comparison analysis. 10. The Future of Proportionate Penalties Clause Jurisprudence A defendant may no longer challenge a penalty under the proportionate penalties clause by comparing it with the penalty for an offense with different elements. We retain the other two types of proportionate penalties challenges. A defendant may still argue that the penalty for a particular offense is too severe, and such a challenge will be judged under the familiar “cruel or degrading” standard. Further, a defendant may still challenge a penalty on the basis that it is harsher than the penalty for a different offense that contains identical elements. Some previous justices of this court have criticized the identical-elements analysis on the same basis as the cross-comparison analysis: that the proportionate penalties clause only allows a defendant to challenge a penalty as being too harsh for its particular offense. See Christy , 139 Ill. 2d at 181-88 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.); Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.). These justices have noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that providing different penalties for different offenses with identical elements does run afoul of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. See Christy , 139 Ill. 2d at 185 (discussing Batchelder , 442 U.S. 114, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 99 S. Ct. 2198). Batchelder , however, merely addressed the question under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. That case does not answer whether different penalties for different offenses with identical elements offends the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. This clause requires the legislature to set penalties “according to the seriousness of the offense.” If the legislature determines that the exact same elements merit two different penalties, then one of these penalties has not been set in accordance with the seriousness of the offense. The legislature has made two different judgments about the seriousness of one offense. Also, as we noted in Lewis , the identical-elements analysis is not fraught with the same difficulties as cross-comparison analysis: it requires no subjective determinations by this court, it does not require that we act as a “superlegislature,” and it does not threaten separation of powers principles. See Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 421-22. Additionally, we do not by this decision prevent defendants from raising challenges to penalties under the due process clause. A defendant can still challenge a penalty on the basis that the penalty is not reasonably designed to remedy the particular evil that the legislature was targeting. See, e.g. , Steppan , 105 Ill. 2d at 319; Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d at 417. That said, we caution that the cross-comparison challenge will not simply resurface as a due process challenge along the lines of Wagner . We agree with the dissenters in Wagner that the majority in that case misapplied Bradley in striking down the penalty for delivery of a noncontrolled substance represented to be a controlled substance. The majority in Wagner made a subjective determination about the seriousness of delivery of a controlled substance versus delivery of a look-alike substance without knowing what factors the legislature took into account in setting the penalties. This was different from the situation in Bradley , where the penalty for possession was more severe than the penalty for delivery of the same substance, in direct contradiction to the legislature’s stated intent to punish delivery more harshly. Thus, in Bradley it was clear that the harsher penalty for possession was not reasonably designed to remedy the particular evil the legislature was targeting. No such problem was apparent in Wagner . See Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d at 314-17 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.). Wagner was merely the erroneous cross-comparison analysis under a different constitutional provision.