Opinion ID: 3053996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Aggravated Identity Theft Count

Text: Blixt contends that the district court “erred as a matter of law when it ruled that a signature is a name for purposes of [the] Aggravated Identity Theft” statute and thus erred in denying both her motion to dismiss Count 2 and her motion for acquittal on Count 2. Blixt asserts that she did not use another’s name, she merely forged a signature, and because a forged signature is not separately identified as a “means of identification” under § 1028A, her actions did not violate the statute. [1] Whether the use of another’s signature constitutes a “means of identification” for purposes of the Aggravated Identity Theft statute has not yet been resolved by this or any other circuit. Finding no prior authority on the issue, we hold as a matter of first impression that forging another’s signature 15816 UNITED STATES v. BLIXT constitutes the use of that person’s name and thus qualifies as a “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The Aggravated Identity Theft statute provides in part: (1) In general.—Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The felony violations enumerated in subsection (c) include mail, bank, and wire fraud; acquisition of customer information by false pretenses; theft of public money or property; and alien registration, immigration and citizenship violations. Id. § 1028A(c). Blixt was charged with using “a means of identification of another person” to commit mail fraud. In determining whether a signature qualifies as a “means of identification” in this case, we begin by considering the language of the statute. See United States v. Fuller, 531 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). [2] The Aggravated Identity Theft statute defines the term “means of identification” in a way that makes reasonably clear that forging another’s signature on a check constitutes the use of a means of identification. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d) (providing that “[i]n this section and section 1028A . . . (7) the term ‘means of identification’ means any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any — (A) name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, UNITED STATES v. BLIXT 15817 employer or taxpayer identification number . . .”) (emphasis added). [3] This definition includes the use of a name, alone or in conjunction with any other information, as constituting the use of a means of identification so long as the information taken as a whole identifies a specific individual. There is nothing in the language of the statute that suggests the use of another’s name in the form of a signature is somehow excluded from the definition of “means of identification.” [4] Were we to find that signatures are categorically not names and thus not included within this definition, we would be disregarding the “settled principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute.” Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., 460 U.S. 824, 833 (1983) (citation omitted). By using the word “any” to qualify the term “name,” the statute reflects Congress’s intention to construct an expansive definition. See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 835-36 (2008) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ”) (citation and alteration omitted). Categorically carving out a signature from this definition, although a signature is commonly understood to be the written form of a person’s name1, would impermissibly narrow the definition of “name” in the statute. Thus, we agree with the district court that a signature is a name for the purpose of applying the Aggravated Identity Theft statute. [5] Blixt urges us to acknowledge that a signature is no more than “a series of lines, curves, and squiggles,” and that no one would be able to decipher Fitzpatrick’s name from his signature. However, she does not dispute that Fitzpatrick’s signature was meant to be a particularized rendering of his 1 Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “signature” to mean “[a] person’s name or mark written by that person or at that person’s direction.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).” 15818 UNITED STATES v. BLIXT name. Fitzpatrick’s signature, however illegible, was thus nothing more than his name written in a particular way and meant to identify him, specifically. Thus, in forging his signature, Blixt indisputably used another person’s means of identification for an unauthorized purpose in violation of the Aggravated Identity Theft statute. Concluding that a forged signature constitutes a means of identification does not lead to an unreasonable result. Rather, recognizing a signature as a subset of “name” is consistent with the statute’s purpose. See House Report No. 108-528, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780 (June 8, 2004) (“The terms ‘identity theft’ and ‘identity fraud’ refer to all types of crimes in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person’s personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically for economic or other gain . . .”). Here, Blixt’s forgery of Fitzgerald’s signature without authorization and for her personal economic gain falls precisely within this description of “identity theft” or “identity fraud.” Each of the two arguments Blixt offers to support her position is countered by the plain language of the statute or by its legislative history. First, Blixt argues that because “signature” is not specifically included in the list of “means of identification” in § 1028(d)(7), but “name” is included, Congress must have purposely excluded the term “signature.” Blixt cites to our decision in United States v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), to support this argument. See id. at 1153 (describing the inclusion of “language in one section of a statute” and the omission of that language in another section of the same Act) (citation omitted). This general principle of statutory construction is inapplicable to the Aggravated Identity Theft statute because the statute does not include the word “signature” in one section of the Act and then exclude it in another section. The word “signature” is simply not included in the statute. Blixt’s reliance on Fiorillo is thus misplaced. Blixt next argues that the presence of a signature on a check is the event that causes a check to be paid, not the UNITED STATES v. BLIXT 15819 name; and that this use of a signature is “not the theft of ‘personal data’ contemplated by Congress when enacting this statute.” As a preliminary matter, we note that the process used by banks to direct payment on a check in no way affects the legal question of whether forging another’s signature constitutes the use of that person’s name. More importantly, as discussed above, the legislative history cited by Blixt more strongly supports a conclusion that Blixt’s forgery of Fitzgerald’s signature constitutes the use of a “means of identification” because it conforms precisely to the conduct Congress sought to proscribe — wrongfully obtaining and using Fitzpatrick’s signature for her own economic gain. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s conclusion, as a matter of law, that forging another’s signature constitutes the use of that person’s name for the purpose of applying the Aggravated Identity Theft statute.