Opinion ID: 686809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: shields

Text: 7 Shields pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine. Shields's criminal history category of IV was based on 7 criminal history points, including 2 points for a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle in Los Angeles in October 1988; 2 points for committing the instant offense while on probation from that conviction; and 1 point for committing the instant offense less than 2 years after release from custody on that conviction. Shields filed objections to the pre-sentence report, arguing that his 1988 conviction was related to the instant offense and should not be included in his criminal history category, and objecting to the 3 additional points stemming from that conviction. 8 Shields renewed these objections at sentencing. He argued the 1988 conviction was similar to conduct charged in the indictment, was committed during the first year of the conspiracy in the city where the conspiracy began, and was related to the conspiracy. The district court nonetheless imposed both a firearm possession enhancement for the instant offense and a 2-level increase in Shields's criminal history score for the 1988 firearm conviction. The district court also rejected Shields's contention that the additional 3 points should not be added. The district court sentenced him to 262 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. 9 On appeal, appointed counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). The brief reiterates the issues Shields raised below--namely, that the 1988 conviction should not be counted in his criminal history score because it was conduct associated with the instant offense, rather than a prior sentence as defined by the Guidelines. 10 The term 'prior sentence' means any sentence previously imposed upon the adjudication of guilt ... for conduct not part of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(a)(1). Although conduct that is part of the current offense should be counted as relevant conduct rather than as a prior sentence, conduct is not part of the instant offense when it is a severable distinct offense. United States v. Blumberg, 961 F.2d 787, 792 (8th Cir.1992). In making this determination, the district court should consider several factors, including temporal and geographical proximity, common victims, and a common criminal plan intent, and we review for clear error. Id. Here, the district court noted that the firearm possessed in the 1988 weapon conviction was a .25 caliber Raven handgun, while the firearm the indictment charged Shields with possessing was a .38 caliber Rossi revolver. The district court also noted that the offenses were similar and the 1988 conviction occurred during the time of the conspiracy, but determined they were separate situations. We find no clear error, given that the firearm possession involved a different firearm, that this incident was not charged in the indictment as an act in furtherance of the drug conspiracy, and that it was not part of the conduct of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine to which Shields pleaded guilty. See United States v. Butler, 966 F.2d 559, 563-64 (10th Cir.1992). 11 When an Anders brief is filed, this court must then itself conduct 'a full examination of all the proceeding[s] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous'  and only after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits without the assistance of counsel. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 350, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (internal citation omitted). Having carefully reviewed the record, we find no other nonfrivolous issues suitable for appeal.