Opinion ID: 2455908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: When was this action commenced?

Text: We hold that the action of the bondholder class was not commenced until November 24, 1976, the date of the filing by the bondholders of their third-party complaint against the defendant bond attorneys. Until they were brought in by service of process under the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant attorneys were not parties to the action; therefore, the argument of the bondholders that the running of the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing on January 9, 1976, by bondholder Podrog of his individual answer to the second amended complaint filed by the original plaintiffs in which he made generalized claims for relief against the original plaintiffs, cannot be sustained; Podrog's individual answer cannot be construed as asserting any claim whatever against bond counsel because they were not parties, plaintiff or defendant, at that time. Bond counsel did not become real parties in interest merely by acting as counsel for the Security Bank & Trust Company in the filing and prosecution of the second amended complaint which sought a declaratory judgment against the bondholder class exonerating the Bank, its original counsel, Phipps, Johnson & Holmes, and the Bank's other employees of any liability arising out of the administration of the trust fund consisting of the proceeds derived from the sale of the bonds. Bond counsel did not represent the Bank in the administration of the trust fund and had no interest, as parties, in the outcome of that case. Bond counsel's only interest was that of attorneys representing their client. Cf. Tennessee Eastman Company v. Adams, 214 Tenn. 451, 381 S.W.2d 269 (1964). In the Tennessee Eastman Company case this Court recognized that one who is not a party to litigation may, by reason of its control of the proceedings and its financial interest in the outcome thereof, become a real party in interest and, therefore, bound by the judgment rendered therein. Here, however, bond counsel did not have such interest and control in the second amended complaint. The result is that since bond counsel were neither named parties nor real parties in interest at the time Mr. Podrog filed his answer to the second amended complaint on January 9, 1976, the filing of that answer did not toll the running of the statute of limitations in their favor.