Opinion ID: 183016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession of the Hi-Point Rifle

Text: Mr. King first challenges his conviction by claiming that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that he possessed the weapon of conviction. Possession of a firearm can be either actual or constructive. United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1125 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 395, 175 L.Ed.2d 268 (2009); see also United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1177 (10th Cir. 2002) (Generally speaking, possession of contraband, whether it be drugs or a firearm, may be either `actual or constructive.' (quoting United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir.1992), abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995))). Mr. King asserts and the government rightfully concedes that he did not have actual possession of the Hi-Point rifle. See Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209 (noting that actual possession of a firearm requires a showing that the party had direct physical control over [it]). The government maintains, however, that it presented ample evidence showing that [Mr.] King constructively possessed the rifle found in the trunk of [Ms. Washington's] car. Aplee. Br. at 13. We agree. Constructive possession of a firearm exists when an individual knowingly hold[s] the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over it. United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir.2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir.1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Constructive possession is often found where an individual has ownership, dominion, or control over the premises wherein the firearm was found. United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 713 (10th Cir.2005). This inference of knowing dominion over or control of a firearm is appropriate where the defendant has exclusive possession over the premises. See United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir.2000) (In most cases, the defendant's dominion, control, and knowledge may be inferred if he has exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found.). In contrast, in situations of joint occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive possession by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 713 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir.1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires the government to point to evidence plausibly supporting the inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the firearm. Poe, 556 F.3d at 1125 (citing Ledford, 443 F.3d at 714). Mr. King argues that the government failed to present any evidence establishing that [he] constructively possessed the [charged weapon] other than a picture of a rifle found on his cell phone, which he claims is insufficient to demonstrate either dominion or control over the firearm. Aplt. Opening Br. at 10. More specifically, he claims that the government failed to present evidence suggesting access to the vehicle, noting that keys to the car were not found on Mr. King's person, nor were any of his personal effects found in the car. He contends that this is a case where we need not even reach the nexus inquiry as there [i]s no evidence . . . that [he] was ever `present' or `occupied' the car where the rifle was found in the trunk, and thus there was no showing of joint occupancy, which he reads as a requirement on these facts for constructive possession. Aplt. Reply Br. at 3; see also Aplt. Opening Br. at 9. Mr. King is mistaken. Although we recognize that control over the premises where the firearm is found can be a strong indicator of constructive possession, see, e.g., Hishaw, 235 F.3d at 571, we have categorically rejected Mr. King's assertion that it is a prerequisite to our determination of constructive possession. See Lopez, 372 F.3d at 1213 (Control or dominion over the premises where the item is found is . . . a factor, but not a requirement, for finding constructive possession of the item itself. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)). [5] Instead, we have held that constructive possession exists where the defendant has the power to exercise control or dominion over the item.  Id. at 1212 (emphasis added). Put another way, what matters is whether the defendant has an appreciable ability (i.e., the power) to exercise dominion or control over the contraband. United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 294 (10th Cir.1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also have recognized that a defendant may exercise this ability or power personally or through others who have an adequate tie to the defendant. See id. at 1120 (The bedrock of constructive possessionwhether individual or joint, whether direct or through another person is the ability to control the object.) (first emphasis added); United States v. Lindsey, 389 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir.2004) (The evidence . . . showed Defendant maintained constructive possession of the firearms while Watson transported them [separately] in the U-Haul because he exercised dominion and control over Watson and the U-Haul. Defendant, although not in actual possession of the firearms at the time of his arrest, had both the power and the intention at the relevant time to exercise dominion and control over the firearms, either directly or through Watson.  (emphasis added)); United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1441 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that the defendant had constructive possession of drugs that were being transported by a third party based on a delivery agreement he made with the driver that made it reasonable to infer [that the defendant] had the ability to guide the destination of the cocaine); cf. Massey, 687 F.2d at 1354 (stating that a defendant may have constructive possession over narcotics when he or she has some appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drug (quoting United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C.Cir.1978))). Guided by these principles, [6] we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient in this case to allow a reasonable jury to infer that Mr. King had the ability (i.e., the power) to exercise dominion or control over the Hi-Point rifle. By Mr. King's own admission, he had been in an intimate relationship with Ms. Washington (i.e., his baby's mama), and there was no evidence to suggest that this relationship was not ongoing at the time of the offense. Although Mr. King did not have a key to the vehicle on his person, Ms. Washington most certainly did, and a reasonable jury could infer from their relationship that Mr. King could have accessed the rifle in the trunk at any time simply by asking Ms. Washington for the key. See United States v. Payne, 377 F.3d 811, 815 (8th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds by 543 U.S. 1112, 125 S.Ct. 1065, 160 L.Ed.2d 1050 (2005) (At a minimum, the close personal relationship between Payne and Eason and their joint undertakings provided sufficient evidence of constructive joint possession of the guns in the console.); United States v. Ramos-Rascon, 8 F.3d 704, 712 (9th Cir.1993) ([C]onstructive possession may be demonstrated circumstantially by the defendant's special relationship to those who directly control the [goods].); United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.1991) (observing that constructive possession of narcotics may be proven by showing exclusive dominion or . . . some special relationship to. . . persons who directly control it (emphasis added)). To be sure, the jury was not obliged to draw that conclusion from Mr. King's intimate relationship with Ms. Washington. We only hold that it reasonably could do so. Furthermore, we do not intend to suggest that access to contraband through another will necessarily equate with the ability to exercise dominion or control over the contraband. However, on these facts, we are confident that a reasonable jury could have determined that Mr. King's access to the vehicle's trunk through Ms. Washington gave him the ability to exercise dominion or control over the Hi-Point rifle stored therein. In particular, we note that Mr. King acknowledged owning the rifle. Possession and ownership are distinct concepts and the statute at issue punishes possession, not ownership. See United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1350 n. 9 (10th Cir.) (noting that mere knowledge and access to the ammunitionnot ownershipwas all that was required to convict [the defendant] of possession), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2446, 174 L.Ed.2d 237 (2009); see also United States v. Rogers, 41 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.1994) (noting that ownership alone does not establish possession). But a defendant's ownership of a firearm may be highly relevant where the authority to exercise control is disputed. Rogers, 41 F.3d at 30. A reasonable jury could have easily inferred that if Mr. King owned the firearm and had access to it through Ms. Washington that he had the ability (i.e., the power) to exercise dominion or control over it. In further resisting this conclusion, Mr. King also argues that, even assuming that his ability to control the firearm could be inferred from his relationship with Ms. Washington, the government failed to offer sufficient evidence that he knowingly held that ability, thereby precluding a finding of constructive possession. [7] See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 714 (To sustain a conviction for constructive possession, the government must present `evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon.' (emphasis added) (quoting Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 922)). Put differently, Mr. King suggests that a reasonable jury could not find, based on the evidence presented, that he constructively possessed the rifle because there was no evidence establishing that he even knew about the gun prior to his arrest. To this end, Mr. King notes that his fingerprints were not found on the rifle, no keys to the vehicle were found on his person, and no testimony by a percipient witness was offered linking him to the car. Aplt. Opening Br. at 10. In staking out this position, however, Mr. King ignores some of the strongest evidence presented against him, including his own admission to police that the rifle belonged to him and the photograph of the firearm found on his cell phone. Indeed, Mr. King claimed ownership of the rifle twice in front of law enforcement officers, and he did so the second time only after he was specifically warned not to claim anything that is not [his]. R., Vol. II, at 59, 61. And, while we recognize that a defendant generally may not be convicted solely on the basis of his uncorroborated extrajudicial statements, see Poe, 556 F.3d at 1125-26 (citing Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954)), that is not the situation here. The photograph of the rifle found on his cell phone provides strong circumstantial evidence that corroborates Mr. King's admission and cogent proof that Mr. King had knowledge of the rifle's existence prior to his arrest. [8] Moreover, the fact that the firearm was found stored next to quantities of marijuana that were consistent with drug traffickinga crime that Mr. King does not currently deny committingfurther suggests that Mr. King was speaking honestly when he stated that the rifle was his. Thus, when considering both Mr. King's admission and the corroborating evidence, we have no difficulty concluding that sufficient evidence existed to allow a reasonable jury to find that Mr. King constructively possessed the Hi-Point rifle. See id. at 1126 (Far from requiring the government to corroborate each detail of [a defendant's] statement, . . . the `corroboration rule' requires only that the government present evidence establishing the trustworthiness of the extrajudicial confession.); cf. United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, [t]he evidence necessary to support a verdict `need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt' (quoting United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir.1991))).