Opinion ID: 1834428
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Heading: QualifiedAnalytical Framework.

Text: A. Chapter 601A. In the past, we have placed the burden of proving qualification on the plaintiff as part of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. E.g., Henkel, 471 N.W.2d at 810-11; see Annear v. State, 454 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Iowa 1990). However, some of our cases suggest that the employer must show that a plaintiff's disability disqualifies the plaintiff for a particular position as part of the employer's nature of the occupation defense. E.g., Smith, 456 N.W.2d at 385; Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 318 N.W.2d 162, 168-69 (Iowa 1982). Most recently, in Miller v. Sioux Gateway Fire Department, 497 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Iowa 1993), we left open the question whether the burden of proving qualification in a chapter 601A disability discrimination claim rests on the person claiming discrimination or on the defendant. We answer that question now. We believe the difficulty in analyzing a disability discrimination claim stems from the fact that the traditional framework used in chapter 601A cases does not fit well. That is because the issue in disability cases is generally not whether the plaintiff was discharged because of his disability but whether the plaintiff's disability and its consequences make the plaintiff unqualified for his position. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir.1981). Consequently, we take this opportunity to state what we believe is a more workable analysis to use in disability discrimination cases where the discriminatory motive of the employer is not at issue. We have previously looked to federal cases interpreting Title VII for guidance in applying chapter 601A. E.g., King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1983) (applying by analogy the same burdens and order of presentation of proof in chapter 601A religious discrimination case as used in title VII cases). The comparable federal statute for disability discrimination claims is section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We believe section 504 is sufficiently similar to our chapter 601A that federal cases interpreting section 504 are helpful in determining the appropriate analytical framework for state disability discrimination claims. Both statutes prohibit discrimination based on a person's disability. Section 504's requirement that the person be qualified for the position from which the person is discharged fulfills the same purpose as chapter 601A's nature of the occupation defense in disability cases. See Brand v. Florida Power Corp., 633 So.2d 504, 509 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1994) (holding that section 504's qualified language implies a bona fide occupational qualification defense). Chapter 601A requires reasonable accommodation, as does section 504. Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir.1991); Foods, Inc., 318 N.W.2d at 169; 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1993) (employer must accommodate an employee's disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship); 161 Iowa Admin.Code §§ 8.27(6), 8.28 (1993) (an employer of a disabled individual has the obligation to make reasonable accommodations to allow the employee to retain his job where such accommodations do not impose an undue hardship). Because of the similarity in section 504 and chapter 601A as it applies to disability discrimination claims, we look to the analytical framework used in section 504 claims in considering Boelman's chapter 601A claim. Courts interpreting section 504 and similar state statutes have concluded that the analytical framework used to prove a discriminatory motive is unnecessary where the employer relies on the employee's disability in its employment decision. E.g., Teahan, 951 F.2d at 516; Doe, 666 F.2d at 776; Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1385-86 (10th Cir.1981); Brand, 633 So.2d at 509. Therefore, instead of applying the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case requirements, courts have replaced or modified the McDonnell Douglas analysis with one designed specifically for disability discrimination claims. In cases where the employer relies on disability-related reasons for the discharge, courts require a plaintiff to prove that he or she (1) has a disability; (2) was qualified for the position; and (3) was discharged because of his or her disability. Jackson, 22 F.3d at 278; Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1390; Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir.1991). [7] We adopt the same analytical framework for chapter 601A disability discrimination claims where the employer admits reliance on disability-related reasons for the discharge. Therefore, Boelman had the burden to prove that he was qualified for the position from which he was terminated. We turn now to a discussion of how qualification is proved under section 504. B. Rehabilitation Act. As we have stated, Boelman had to prove he was qualified for the job of vice president in order to establish his claim under section 504. [8] Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1390; Arenson v. Southern Univ. Law Ctr., 911 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 949, 111 S.Ct. 1417, 113 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991). Boelman is qualified if he, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of [himself] or others.... 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1993); accord School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1131 n. 17, 94 L.Ed.2d 307, 321 n. 17 (1987). Thus, to determine whether a person is qualified for a given job, two questions must be answered. First, the fact finder must decide whether the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job. Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1393. The essential functions of the job are those that bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue. Id. If the plaintiff proves he can perform the essential functions of the job, then he is qualified. If the plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of the job, then the fact finder goes on to the second inquiry whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable [the plaintiff] to perform those functions. Id. at 1394. At this stage of the analysis, the plaintiff must produce enough evidence to make a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible. Id. at 1395; Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 439 (8th Cir.1993). Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it is not able to accommodate the plaintiff's disability or that the proposed accommodation is unreasonable. Wood, 985 F.2d at 439. An accommodation is unreasonable if it requires the employer to change the essential nature of the job or if it places undue burdens on the employer. Id. Here the trial court concluded that Boelman had not proved that he was qualified for his job. Boelman claims there was insufficient evidence to support the court's factual finding that he was not qualified to perform the essential functions of a bank vice president. We now turn to that issue.