Opinion ID: 53858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment: Marketing Defect Claim

Text: Grants of summary judgment are reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Tango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Servs. LLC, 322 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir.2003). Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. American Intern. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir.2006). Further, in order to avoid summary judgment, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the non-movant `fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.' Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. EMCASCO, 438 F.3d at 523. [A] marketing defect occurs when a defendant knows or should know of a potential risk of harm presented by a product but markets it without adequately warning of the danger or providing instructions for safe use. Sims v. Washex Machinery Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). To sustain their marketing defect claim, the Wrights had to show the following: (1) a risk of harm inherent in the product or which may arise from the intended or reasonably anticipated use of the product; (2) the product supplier actually knew or should have reasonably foreseen the risk of harm at the time the product was marketed; (3) the product contains a marketing defect; (4) the absence of a warning renders the product unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user or consumer of the product; and (5) the failure to warn must constitute a causative nexus in the product user's injury. Id. In granting summary judgment in favor of Ford on the Wrights' marketing defect claim, the district judge determined there was no evidence of causation, noting that the Expedition's owner's manual presents information on the available reverse sensing system option and on the substantial blind spot behind the vehicle. In finding that no additional or different warning would have caused a different result as to this accident, the district judge mainly relied upon the testimony of the Expedition's purchaser, Darren McCutcheon. Darren McCutcheon testified that when he bought the vehicle, he knew of the vehicle's rear blind spot and knew of the reverse sensing system and its availability. He also testified that when he bought the Expedition, he knew what options he wanted on an Expedition before he set foot in the automobile dealershipit did not matter to him what anyone told him or what information was in the manual concerning the reverse sensing system. He was quite clear in saying he would have bought the vehicle without the reverse sensing system no matter what warning he had then received. Under Texas law, there is a presumption that an adequate warning would have been followed. [10] The presumption, however, is a Thayer-type presumption which disappears if evidence is presented that the warning would not have been followed. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiffs to show that the warning would have been followedotherwise the plaintiffs are subject to a directed verdict. General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex.1993). And, [t]here is no presumption that a plaintiff . . . or, presumably, other person . . . who ignored instructions that would have kept him from injury would have followed better instructions. Id. at 359. We agree with the district court's grant of summary judgment. Ford presented evidence through the testimony of the McCutcheons that they would not have heeded any warning if presented. To survive summary judgment, the Wrights had to present evidence that the purchasers would have bought the reverse sensing system option if they had been warneda burden the Wrights did not satisfy here. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Ford on this claim.