Opinion ID: 2271216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Victim-Impact Testimony was Properly Admitted.

Text: St. Clair contends that the trial court improperly allowed victim-impact testimony in the re-sentencing trial. Admitting that our precedent allows for the presentation of victim-impact testimony during the penalty phase in a capital case, [50] St. Clair argues victim-impact testimony is not specifically allowed by our capital sentencing statute (KRS 532.025), as opposed to our non-capital felony sentencing statute (KRS 532.055), and that the United States Supreme Court case of Payne v. Tennessee [51] only permits the admission of such victim-impact evidence in capital cases if allowed by state sentencing statutes. [52] Contrary to St. Clair's arguments, Kentucky's sentencing statutes allow the presentation of victim-impact evidence during sentencing proceedings in capital cases. Although KRS 532.025, governing sentencing proceedings in capital cases, does not specifically list victim-impact evidence as a potential aggravating factor in capital sentencing, it does provide that the jury may consider any other aggravating factors as otherwise authorized by law. . . . [53] Because KRS 532.055(2)(a)(7), which is part of the felony sentencing statute, allows the consideration of victim impact evidence, [54] this consideration is otherwise authorized by law. So victim impact evidence is allowable in capital sentencing proceedings, despite the specific lack of mention of such evidence in KRS 532.025. This we have recently held in an unpublished case. [55] Accordingly, we reject St. Clair's argument that victim-impact evidence is not admissible in capital sentencing proceedings in Kentucky. The victim-impact evidence presented at the re-sentencing proceeding in the form of testimony of victim Frank Brady's daughter about his personality characteristics, hobbies, and family connections covered less than ten transcribed pages. Brady's daughter's testimony was neither inappropriate nor excessive. It provided some description of the victim as a unique human being, rather than a mere statistic, without glorifying or enlarging the victim. So the victim-impact evidence presented was not unduly prejudicial to St. Clair and would not warrant a reversal of his sentence. [56]