Opinion ID: 797100
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or

Text: 153 (ii) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it [.] 154 Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.08.020 (1994) (emphasis added). The court then quoted Instruction 46, which closely tracked the statutory language. The only difference between the statute and the instruction was that the word it, which appears twice in the statute, was each time replaced by the words the crime in the instruction. 155 The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute, as well as the jury instructions, were based on the in for a dime, in for a dollar theory of accomplice liability. The court agreed with the prosecution's statement of the law to the jury during her closing argument. It held that the statute and the instructions did not require that an accomplice have knowledge of the particular crime the principal intended to commit. The Court of Appeals wrote: 156 Sarausad misstates the law in Washington when he asserts that to be convicted as an accomplice, the State must prove that the accomplice had the mental state required for commission of the charged offense. His argument that an accomplice is only liable for that substantive offense which he willfully sought to bring about has specifically been rejected in Washington. 157 In order to convict an accomplice of intentional murder, the State need not show that the accomplice had the intent that the victim would be killed. RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a) has no such requirement. 158 Accomplice liability in Washington is premised on the following principles: (1) To convict of accomplice liability, the State need not prove that principal and accomplice shared the same mental state, (2) accomplice liability predicates criminal liability on general knowledge of a crime, rather than specific knowledge of the elements of the principal's crime, and (3) an accomplice, having agreed to participate in a criminal activity, runs the risk that the primary actor will exceed the scope of the preplanned illegality. 159 Ronquillo, 89 Wash.App. 1037, 1998 WL 87641, at  (citations omitted). The Washington Supreme Court denied review without comment. State v. Ronquillo, 136 Wash.2d 1018, 966 P.2d 1277 (1998). 160 In two other cases, decided shortly thereafter, the Washington Supreme Court repudiated the in for a dime, in for a dollar theory that had been the basis for the Court of Appeals' affirmation of Sarausad's conviction. In State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471, 14 P.3d 713 (2001) (as amended), Jury Instruction 7 had defined accomplice liability as follows: You are instructed that a person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of a crime. 161 A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime . . . if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate its commission, he either: 162
163
164 Id. at 735 (italics in original; underlining added). In rejecting the in for a dime, in for a dollar theory of accomplice liability and disapproving the jury instruction, the Washington Supreme Court wrote, The Legislature . . . intended the culpability of an accomplice not extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has `knowledge,' . . . . In contrast, jury instruction 7 here essentially allowed the jury to impose strict liability on Roberts. The instruction, therefore, improperly departed from the language of the statute. Id. at 735-36. 165 In State v. Cronin, 142 Wash.2d 568, 14 P.3d 752 (2000), the Washington Supreme Court adhere[d] to its decision in Roberts: 166 [T]he fact that a purported accomplice knows that the principal intends to commit `a crime' does not necessarily mean that accomplice liability attaches for any and all offenses ultimately committed by the principal. See Roberts, 14 P.3d at 736. In our judgment, in order for one to be deemed an accomplice, that individual must have acted with knowledge that he or she was promoting or facilitating the crime for which that individual was eventually charged. 167 Id. at 758 (emphasis in original). 168 Sarausad brought his PRP in the Washington Court of Appeals after the Washington Supreme Court decided Roberts and Cronin. Now sitting with three different judges from those who heard Sarausad's direct appeal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the previous Court of Appeals panel had misinterpreted the Washington statute when it denied relief in Sarausad's direct appeal based on the in for a dime, in for a dollar theory. Sarausad v. State, 109 Wash.App. 824, 39 P.3d 308, 313-14 (2001). Recognizing that Roberts and Cronin had repudiated that reading of the statute, the Court of Appeals now held that Sarausad's jury instructions mirrored the state statute on accomplice liability and thus did not suffer from the fatal flaw in State v. Roberts. Id. at 313. The Court of Appeals did not mention the fact that the prior panel on direct appeal in Sarausad's case had held essentially the opposite. That is, it did not mention that the prior panel of the Court of Appeals had held that the Washington statute and Sarausad's jury instructions meant the opposite of what the Washington Supreme Court later held the statute to mean in Roberts and Cronin, and that the prior panel had held that the statute and jury instructions were based on the now-repudiated in for a dime, in for a dollar theory of accomplice liability. 169 Sarausad specifically argued to the second Court of Appeals panel that the prosecutor's in for a dime, in for a dollar argument misstated the law of accomplice liability and misled the jury, thereby relieving the State of its burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. He argued that the prosecutor erroneously assumed, and argued, that the jury could find Sarausad guilty as an accomplice to murder if he had the purpose to facilitate an offense of any kind whatsoever, even a shoving match or fist fight. Id. at 316-17. The Court of Appeals responded, But this is not an accurate description of the prosecutor's actual argument. Id. at 317. It continued, [T]he prosecutor did not in fact argue that even if Sarausad drove to Ballard High School the second time having the purpose to facilitate only another shoving match or a fist fight, he nevertheless was guilty of murder. Id. at 318 (emphasis in original). Not once did the prosecutor suggest to the jury that it could or should convict Sarausad even if it believed that he returned to Ballard High School for the purpose of facilitating nothing more than another shoving match or a fistfight. . . . Id. at 319. 170 These statements by the Court of Appeals are flatly contradicted by the record. As is obvious from the trial transcript (quoted at length above), the prosecutor argued clearly, emphatically, and repeatedly that Sarausad could be convicted of accomplice liability for murder even if he believed that Ronquillo intended merely to commit assault. We quote again only a small portion of the prosecutor's argument: 171 Let me give you a good example of accomplice liability. A friend comes up to you and says, Hold this person's arms while I hit him. You say, Okay, I don't like that person anyway. You hold the arms. The person not only gets assaulted, he gets killed. You are an accomplice and you can't come back and say, Well, I only intended this much damage to happen. . . . The law in the State of Washington says, if you're in for a dime, you're in for a dollar. 172 Based in part on its incorrect description of the prosecutor's argument, the Court of Appeals denied Sarausad's PRP. 173 In an unpublished written order signed by the Court Commissioner, the Washington Supreme Court denied review. The Court Commissioner, like the Court of Appeals, did not acknowledge that the Court of Appeals had held on direct appeal that the jury in Sarausad's case had been permitted to convict based on the in for a dime, in for a dollar reading of the Washington statute. Instead, the Commissioner wrote, [H]ere the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it could convict Mr. Sarausad of murder or attempted murder as an accomplice only if it found he knowingly aided in the commission `the' [sic] crime charged. In denying the PRP, the Commissioner, like the Court of Appeals, flatly misstated the record in describing the prosecutor's argument to the jury. The Commissioner wrote, The prosecutor never suggested Mr. Sarausad could be found guilty if he had no knowledge that a shooting was to occur.