Opinion ID: 1494894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Question of Costs.

Text: The action of the court below in taxing one-half of the costs against the defendant was based upon the fact that the defendant county and the members of its finance board resisted the application for plaintiff to intervene in the case of Park v. Greenwood County when that case was pending before the Supreme Court of South Carolina. In this we think there was error. The Supreme Court of South Carolina held, and we must assume properly, that the plaintiff had no right to intervene in that case. We have decided here, not only that the statute complained of was constitutional and that the action of the Administrator of Public Works was authorized thereunder, but also that no right of plaintiff was invaded by the proposed action of the Administrator which would give it any standing in court to contest his action. Under such circumstances we can perceive no reason why plaintiff should not be taxed with the full cost of the litigation or why the defendants should be penalized with taxation of any part of the costs for defending it. Certainly, the opposition of defendants to the intervention of plaintiff in a suit in which it had no right to intervene is no sufficient reason for such taxation, and particularly is this true of the defendant Ickes who was not a party to the action in the state court and is not shown to have had anything to do with the resistance offered to plaintiff's motion. Ordinarily, it is true, the taxation of costs in an equity suit is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court and its action with respect thereto will not be reviewed on appeal; but this discretion is to be exercised not arbitrarily, but with reference to the general principles of equity and special circumstances of each case. Kell v. Trenchard (C.C.A.4th) 146 F. 245, 247. And where, as here, the entire decree and the proceedings of the lower court are before us, it is proper for us to consider whether the discretion was properly exercised. Citizens Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 319, 323, 17 S.Ct. 89, 41 L.Ed. 451; The Scotland, 118 U.S. 507, 519, 6 S.Ct. 1174, 30 L.Ed. 153; Trustees of Internal Improv. Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157. Under the circumstances here, we think there was no ground for taxing any part of the costs against defendants and that, as to that feature, the decree appealed from should be reversed. The decree appealed from will accordingly be affirmed except as to the taxation of costs against the defendants, as to which it will be reversed.