Opinion ID: 762043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Free Speech Clause

Text: 53 Finding the landscape of Establishment Clause jurisprudence inhospitable, SFISD alternatively seeks sanctuary for its graduation prayer policy in the Free Speech Clause, a contention to which we now turn. SFISD asserts that its July Policy survives constitutional scrutiny because through this policy it has created a limited public forum. This being the case, continues SFISD, it is not simply permissible for the school district to allow sectarian and proselytizing student prayers, but SFISD would be guilty of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination were it to do otherwise. We disagree with these assertions for the simple reason that as a matter of law SFISD has not created a limited public forum. See American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477-78 (3d Cir.1996) (holding that school board's graduation prayer policy permitting students to vote to include prayer in graduation ceremony did not create limited public forum); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 456-57 (9th Cir.1994) (same), vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154, 115 S.Ct. 2604, 132 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995). 54 We begin with the basics. There are three classifications of fora. Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 481 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)). The first category is the traditional public forum. These are places, such as public parks and streets,  'which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.'  Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439). Second, there is  'the public forum created by government designation.'  Id. This type of forum  'may be created by government designation of a place or channel of communication [not traditionally open to assembly and debate] for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.'  Id. Finally, there is the  'nonpublic' forum. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803, 105 S.Ct. 3439). This is the residual class of government-owned property, to which the First Amendment does not guarantee access. Id. 55 A graduation ceremony is quite obviously not a traditional public forum. The question, therefore, under the July Policy is whether SFISD's commencement program constitutes a government designated public forum, or, more accurately, whether the portions of the commencement program allocated to the invocation and benediction constitute designated public fora. Two factors are key to determining whether the State has transformed its property into a designated public forum. The first is governmental intent. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439 ([T]he Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum). The nature of the State property and its compatibility with expressive activity are important indicia of intent. Id. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439; see also Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, ----, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 1639, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998) (holding public television broadcasting not generally a public forum and stating in broadcasting broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion that stations ... must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Com'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (5th Cir.1982) (A facility is a public forum only if it is designed to provide a general public right of access to its use, or if such public access has historically existed and is not incompatible with the facility's primary activity.). 56 The second factor relevant to determining whether the government has established a public forum is the extent of the use granted. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47, 103 S.Ct. 948. A designated public forum may, of course, be limited to a specified class of speakers or to discussion of specified subjects--thus the term limited public forum. Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Assoc., 863 F.2d 371, 378 (5th Cir.1989). Nevertheless, the State does not create a designated public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (emphasis added). To create such a forum, the government must allow general access to, Id. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, or indiscriminate use of, Perry, 460 U.S. at 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, the forum in question by the general public, or by particular speakers, or for the discussion of designated topics. 57 Regarding the first factor--governmental intent--it is clear that the government's proffered intent does not govern this inquiry, else it would be a limited inquiry indeed. In the typical case, to justify a limitation it has placed on the speech of private individuals, the State asserts that it has not created a designated public forum. In the instant case, the reverse is true: SFISD attempts to evade the requirements of the Establishment Clause by running for the protective cover of a designated public forum. We must, therefore, view skeptically SFISD's own self-serving assertion of its intent and examine closely the relationship between the objective nature of the venue and its compatibility with expressive activity. 58 In Estiverne, we framed the relevant inquiry as: Does the character of the place, the pattern of usual activity, the nature of its essential purpose and the population who take advantage of the general invitation extended make it an appropriate place for communication of views on issues of political and social significance? Estiverne, 863 F.2d at 378-79. SFISD's July Policy flunks this test hands down. 59 Neither its character nor its history makes the subject graduation ceremony in general or the invocation and benediction portions in particular appropriate fora for such public discourse. See Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 (3d Cir.1992) (Graduation ceremonies have never served as forums for public debate or discussions, or as a forum through which to allow varying groups to voice their views.) (quotation and citation omitted); cf. Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 116-18 (5th Cir.1992) (concluding that university campus was limited public forum because it served as central site of student body and because university's written policies established a general policy of open access). For obvious reasons, graduation ceremonies--in particular, the invocation and benediction portions of graduation ceremonies--are not the place for exchanges of dueling presentations on topics of public concern. See Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 406 (The [basketball] games are school-sponsored and controlled events that do not provide any sort of open forum for student expression....). Such presentations would undoubtedly clash with a ceremony's primary activity. See Muir, 688 F.2d at 1042. Indeed, a graduation ceremony comprises but a single activity which is singular in purpose, the diametric opposite of a debate or other venue for the exchange of competing viewpoints. 60 It is not surprising then that SFISD has not, in fact, opened the ceremony to such exchanges, which brings us to the second relevant factor-- extent of use. In no way can SFISD be said to have granted general access to a class speakers at its graduation ceremony. Rather, it has simply concocted a thinly-veiled surrogate process by which a very limited number of speakers--one or two--will be chosen to deliver prayers denominated as invocations and benedictions. These speakers, moreover, will not be given free reign to address issues, or even a particular issue, of political and social significance. Rather, they will be chosen to deliver very circumscribed statements that under any definition are prayers. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1190 (defining invocation as the action or an act of petitioning for help or support) & 203 (defining benediction, similarly, as an expression or utterance of blessing or good wishes) (1993). SFISD has thus granted no one, not even the students elected to give the invocations and benedictions, indiscriminate use of its government controlled channel of communication. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47, 103 S.Ct. 948; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (holding that school-run student newspaper was not designated forum because school officials did not evince either by policy or practice any intent to open the pages of [newspaper] to indiscriminate use by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally) (quotations and citations omitted). 61 In short, even though the government may designate a forum only for particular speakers or for the discussion of particular topics, Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, SFISD's restrictions so shrink the pool of potential speakers and topics that the graduation ceremony cannot possibly be characterized as a public forum--limited or otherwise--at least not without fingers crossed or tongue in cheek. Cf. Forbes, 523 U.S. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 1640 (holding candidate debates constitute narrow exception to general rule that public broadcasting does not constitute public form because (1) debate was by design a forum for political speech by candidates, and (2) candidate debates are, by tradition, of exceptional significance in electoral process); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms.) (emphasis added). 62 Clear Creek II does not hold to the contrary. Although our opinion in that case does advert to Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990), which rests, in part, on public forum analysis, Clear Creek II does not rely on Mergens for the conclusion that the Clear Creek ISD had created a public forum. Rather, Clear Creek II adverts to Mergens only within the limited context of its Endorsement Test analysis, concluding that the graduation prayer policy at issue paralleled the practices held constitutional in Mergens. 11 Clear Creek II, 977 F.2d at 968-69. Indeed, nowhere in the Clear Creek II opinion does the term public forum even appear. 63 This should surprise no one. For, if a graduation program, open, as it is, to such a limited number of student-elected or selected speakers, constitutes a limited public forum, the graduation prayer policy blessed in Clear Creek II would, in fact, be un constitutional--not, however, as a violation of the Establishment Clause, but as impermissible viewpoint discrimination: Once the State has established a limited public forum, it cannot discriminate against speech because of the message, even if that message is religious in nature. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828-31, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (holding unconstitutional university's decision to deny generally-available school funds to student organization publishing newspaper because of newspaper's Christian editorial viewpoint); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-96, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (holding unconstitutional school's policy of denying school facilities to group desiring to show film series addressing child-rearing questions from a Christian perspective as impermissible viewpoint discrimination). Thus, if public forum analysis were applicable, then Clear Creek's proscription of prayer that is sectarian and proselytizing would violate the First Amendment after all, but would do so on grounds we never considered in Clear Creek II. 12 64 In sum, our Clear Creek II opinion explicitly--and (we are bound by stare decisis to acknowledge) correctly--relies on Clear Creek ISD's nonsectarian, nonproselytizing restrictions to dodge the outcome otherwise dictated by Lee. Without these twin restrictions, a Clear Creek Prayer Policy cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, SFISD cannot escape this result by piously wrapping itself in the false banner of limited public forum. The July Policy created no forum at all and therefore could not, and did not, trigger the First Amendment's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination. The limited number of speakers, the monolithically non-controversial nature of graduation ceremonies, and the tightly restricted and highly controlled form of speech involved, all militate against labeling such ceremonies as public fora of any type. Absent feathers, webbed feet, a bill, and a quack, this bird just ain't a duck! 65 The district court, therefore, did not err in rejecting SFISD's stretch to reach limited public forum status for its graduation and through it find viability for the July Policy in the Free Speech Clause. Neither did the court err in holding that provisions of the initial paragraph of SFISD's July Policy violates the Establishment Clause or in ordering SFISD to institute the fall-back alternative--a pure Clear Creek Prayer Policy--in its stead. 66 We need only note briefly that the district court did, however, clearly err in overbroadly defining nonsectarian to include reference to specific deities, see, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1538 (defining nonsectarian as not restricted to or dominated by a particular religious group), a mistake the district court can easily correct on remand. A nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer that, for example, invokes the name of Buddha or Mohammed or Jesus or Jehovah is an obvious oxymoron.