Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claims Relating to Accomplice Liability

Text: Defendant claims the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct the jury on accomplice liability and testimony regarding prosecution witness, Pridgon. (§ 1111; [5] CALJIC Nos. 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.14, 3.16.) Because the testimony implicating defendant in the crimes was from an accomplice, the trial court should have instructed the jury that the testimony must be independently corroborated by evidence connecting defendant to the crimes. Based on the trial court's failure to do so, defendant maintains his conviction rests on uncorroborated accomplice testimony proscribed by section 1111. Under section 1111, an accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. To be chargeable with an identical offense, a witness must be considered a principal under section 31. [6] ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1113-1114, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; but see id. at p. 1114, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478 [a mere accessory is not an accomplice].) An accomplice must have `guilty knowledge and intent with regard to the commission of the crime.' ( People v. Hoover (1974) 12 Cal.3d 875, 879, 117 Cal.Rptr. 672, 528 P.2d 760.) If there is evidence from which the jury could find that a witness is an accomplice to the crime charged, the court must instruct the jury on accomplice testimony. [Citation.] But if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that a witness is an accomplice, the trial court may make that determination and, in that situation, need not instruct the jury on accomplice testimony. [Citation.] ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1114, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; accord, People v. Hoover, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 880, 117 Cal.Rptr. 672, 528 P.2d 760 [`Whether the facts with respect to the participation of a witness in the crime for which the accused is on trial are clear and not disputed, it is for the court to determine whether he is an accomplice'].) Defendant proffered evidence that Pridgon was at the crime scene, he had intimate knowledge of the crimes beyond that of a mere bystander, he had a habit of carrying sticks or boards, and he had a reputation for dishonesty. Defendant also points to testimony from a shoe store owner that the bloody shoes fit Pridgon better than they fit defendant, evidence of Pridgon's history of mental illness and auditory hallucinations, which may have caused him to kill Simms, and Pridgon's inconsistent and evasive testimony. He also postulates that based on the fact that Simms was struck on the left side of her face, Simms must have been struck by a left-handed person like Pridgon, and not defendant, who is right-handed. Defendant argues the foregoing evidence constituted disputed facts on the issue of accomplice liability, a question of fact which the trial court should have submitted to the jury. We find no error. Defendant's evidence supporting the request for accomplice instructions was not substantial but speculative. Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to `deserve consideration by the jury,' not `whenever any evidence is presented, no matter how weak.' [ People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 361, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961.) Although Pridgon was at the scene of the crime and had intimate knowledge of the robbery and murder, this fact without more merely means that he was an eyewitness and not necessarily an accomplice to the crimes. (See People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23.) There was no admissible evidenceapart from evidence that Pridgon may have kicked and bit a police officer who called him derogatory names of his violent, assaultive behavior. Defendant also presented no evidence that Pridgon used the sticks or boards he carried as weapons to assault people. In short, the evidence relating to Pridgon's motive to commit the crimes was speculative. Although defendant is correct that motive is not an element of the crimes and thus is not indispensably necessary for conviction, [m]otive is an intermediate fact which may be probative of such ultimate issues as intent [citation], identity [citation], or commission of the criminal act itself [citation]. ( People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal. App.4th 1009, 1017-1018, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676.) Moreover, the evidence relating to the bloody tennis shoes did not support giving accomplice instructions. Although at trial defendant asserted that Pridgon, who was in defendant's room the night of the murder, may have planted the shoes or that defendant was confused when he pointed to the shoes, defendant failed to show any evidence supporting these assertions. Moreover, even the shoe store owner's testimony was ambiguous. Although the owner said that the tennis shoes fit Pridgon better than they fit defendant, he did not state the shoes actually fit either defendant or Pridgon, and defendant was still able to wear the shoes. In addition, defendant's argument that Pridgon was left-handed and, as such, was more likely the one to have hit Simms on the left side of her head, was speculative and not dictated by the evidence. In short, there was no evidence other than speculation that Pridgon planned, encouraged or instigated the murder and robbery to give rise to accomplice liability. ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1115, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; see also § 31.) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, evidence tending to negate his own guilt, including his denial that he owned the tennis shoes and his alleged lack of motive to commit the crimes, would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Pridgon was an accomplice. Even assuming the trial court erred by failing to give accomplice instructions, we find the error to be harmless. A trial court's failure to instruct on accomplice liability under section 1111 is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1271, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Corroborating evidence may be slight, may be entirely circumstantial, and need not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense. [Citations.] (Ibid.) The evidence is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 834, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) Pridgon's testimony was sufficiently corroborated. As discussed, Detective Sanchez testified that defendant pointed to the bloody tennis shoes as his, and tests later confirmed that a bloodstain on one shoe was consistent with Simms's PGM type. Based on her refreshed recollection, Boggs testified that the shoes the police took when they arrested defendant were defendant's, and that he had no other shoes besides those. Also, Pridgon's description of how Simms's murder took place was corroborated by the pathologist. To the extent defendant argues the jury should have been instructed to view Pridgon's testimony with distrust (CALJIC No. 3.18), we find the other instructions givenincluding [a] witness, who is willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony, is to be distrusted in others (CALJIC No. 2.21.2), along with instructions on a witness's credibility (CALJIC No. 2.20) and the character of a witness for honesty or truthfulness or their opposites (CALJIC No. 2.24)were sufficient to inform the jury to view Pridgon's testimony with care and caution, in line with CALJIC No. 3.18. Indeed, the prosecution informed the jury during closing argument of Pridgon's prior convictions and told the jury to consider whether his testimony was truthful in view of the physical evidence and other witnesses' testimony. Emphasizing Pridgon's possible involvement in the murder, the defense argued that Pridgon was at the scene of the crime and either did it himself or watched someone else do it or may have somehow assisted in the particular murder. The problem is that with Paul's record of falsity and Paul's record of mental problems we can't know exactly what his contribution was. Thus, we conclude there was no reasonable probability that defendant would have received a more favorable result if the trial court instructed the jury to view Pridgon's testimony with distrust. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837, 299 P.2d 243.) Indeed, defendant did not contend that Pridgon helped him commit the crimes, nor was there evidence they were working together. Thus, the instructions requested would have informed the jury to view Pridgon's testimony with distrust if the jury determined that Pridgonand not defendant committed the crimes. Any reasonable juror would reach this conclusion without instruction. Notwithstanding defendant's citation of federal and state Court of Appeal cases, we have observed that [n]o cases have held failure to instruct on the law of accomplices to be reversible error per se. ( People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 470, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) Because we find no error and otherwise find any error to be harmless, we accordingly reject defendant's federal constitutional claims that the court's failure to instruct on accomplice liability violated his right to a trial by jury, to due process, and to present a defense protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his right to a reliable conviction for a capital offense under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and deprived him of a reliable, individualized capital sentencing determination guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.