Opinion ID: 721317
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reed I

Text: 9 On appeal, as reflected in Reed I, this Court discussed principles governing obstruction-of-justice enhancements under § 3C1.1 and concluded that the district court's findings were not sufficiently clear to permit meaningful appellate review. Section 3C1.1 provides for an upward adjustment in offense level if the defendant, inter alia, willfully obstructed or attempted to obstruct the administration of justice during sentencing for the underlying offense. Since the term willfully implies a mens rea requirement, see, e.g., United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir.1990), such an adjustment is appropriate only if the defendant had the specific intent to obstruct justice, i.e., ... the defendant consciously acted with the purpose of obstructing justice, United States v. Defeo, 36 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Reed I, 49 F.3d at 900. We also pointed out that certain conduct, such as intentionally failing to appear as required at judicial proceedings, is so inherently obstructive of the administration of justice that it is sufficient that the defendant willfully engaged in the underlying conduct, regardless of any additional purpose. See id.; United States v. Aponte, 31 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir.1994) (It is sufficient for these purposes that the defendant intended to fail to appear at a judicial proceeding, regardless of his reason for desiring to flee.). 10 If the defendant raises an issue as to the state of mind with which he engaged in the conduct that is alleged to have obstructed or impeded the administration of justice, the sentencing court must make a 'specific finding of intent.'  Reed I, 49 F.3d at 901 (quoting United States v. Thomas-Hamilton, 907 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir.1990)); see also United States v. Defeo, 36 F.3d at 276. Further, if the government has proffered more than one basis for an enhancement and the court decides that the enhancement is warranted, the court should specify the basis or bases on which it has relied, and make the pertinent findings, in order to permit appellate review. See generally Reed I, 49 F.3d at 901. 11 With respect to the initial sentencing of Reed, we stated that 12 [t]he district court did not make findings sufficient to reveal which of the bases on which the government presented evidence or argument formed the basis of the court's decision to enhance for obstruction of justice, and it made no findings that the conduct it believed was obstructive was willfully so. The court's statement that it was considering the conduct of the defendant since the time of his plea and his failure to appear for ... sentencing is unclear as to whether the court was relying on Reed's failure to appear on November 19 or on his conduct since the time of his failure to appear. 13 Id. We noted that the court did not make a finding that Reed knew before November 19, 1993, that that date had been set for his sentencing, and we questioned whether a finding of such knowledge would have been sustainable in light of the evidence at the sentencing hearing. We noted, however, that the sentencing court might properly consider whether the concept of conscious avoidance could be applied in assessing whether a defendant's failure to appear for a scheduled hearing was willful. See Reed I, 49 F.3d at 902-03. 14 Further, we noted that the district court did not make findings that Reed's conduct after November 19 was intended to obstruct sentencing. For example, the court made no finding that Reed had quit his Troy residence in an effort to thwart the disposition of the criminal charges against him, id. at 902; made no finding that Reed's seeking to deal with the DEA instead of the FBI or his probation officer was an attempt to avoid being sentenced at all, rather than an attempt, as Reed testified, to earn a more lenient sentence, id.; and did not find that [Reed] knew that the men from whom he attempted to escape were law enforcement officers, id. 15 In sum, we concluded that as to none of the [government's] proffered bases did the court find that Reed's intent was to obstruct justice or to do an act that was inherently such an obstruction. Id. Accordingly, we vacated and remanded for findings.