Opinion ID: 196676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: General Law Chapter 93, Section 70

Text: E. General Law Chapter 93, Section 70 -21- One National's final argument is that Antonellis is liable under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93, 70. Under that section, an attorney rendering a certificate of title for a mortgagee may be subject to liability to the mortgagor as well: The liability of any attorney rendering such certification shall be limited to the amount of the consideration shown on the deed with respect to the mortgagor, and shall be limited to the original principal amount secured by the mortgage with respect to the mortgagee. Said certification shall be effective for the benefit of the mortgagor so long as said mortgagor has title to the mortgaged premises, and shall be effective for the benefit of the mortgagee so long as the original debt secured by the mortgage remains unpaid. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93, 70. The loan or credit secured by the purchase money first mortgage must be on real estate with between one and four dwellings, to be occupied by the mortgagor. Id. ONB argues that because it holds the mortgage it falls within the scope of mortgagee as used in section 70, and that Antonellis is thus liable to it. Noting that section 70 operates in a manner analogous to a statute of limitations in that it provides that the title certification will remain in effect so long as the original debt is unpaid, ONB argues it would be unreasonable to argue that the attorney's liability disappears when a mortgage is sold, no matter whether or not the original debt is unpaid. Further, ONB notes that the sale of a mortgage neither enlarges the attorney's liability, as it is limited by the statute, nor changes the nature of the liability. As ONB states, one bank is simply substituted for another: all else -22- remains constant. Thus the attorney remains liable on the certificate until the mortgage debt is paid. Upon de novo review, we agree with the district court that, while One National's argument makes intuitive sense, it eventually fails. First, like the court below, we find that the plain language of the statute does not support ONB's position. It is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that where the plain language of a statute is clear, it governs. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979) (If a legislative purpose is expressed in 'plain and unambiguous language, . . . the . . . duty of the courts is to give it effect according to its terms' (quoting United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914)). ONB correctly points out that here, the statute's text does not state that the attorney's liability to the mortgagee terminates when the mortgage is transferred. However, we refuse to read the opposite inference - - that the liability is not extinguished upon transferral -- into the statute when it is not warranted by the plain language of the text. The language of section 70 focuses on mortgagees, not, as One National would have us believe, on their assignees. See Falmouth Ob/Gyn Assoc. Inc. v. Abisla, 629 N.E.2d 291, 293 (Mass. 1994), (A term employed in a statute should be afforded its customary meaning, taking into account the legislation's purpose and history.); Page, 445 N.E.2d at 152 (refusing to extend 70's application to mortgagors purchasing unimproved land in the absence of suggestions or implications in the clear language -23- of the statute). Exceptions to clearly delineated statutes will be implied only where essential to prevent 'absurd results' or consequences obviously at variance with the policy of the enactment as a whole. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 552. Clearly, no such exception arises here. Constraining the application of section 70 to mortgagees' assignees does not create absurd results. As the court below noted, Chapter 93 as a whole addresses the regulation of trade and enterprises in order to prevent unfair practices against consumers. (District Court Memorandum and Decision, p. 8). Our reading of the statute is not obviously at variance with that policy, even if this reading does not extend the policy to assignees of mortgagees. Second, like the court in Page, we note that the legislature, in its amendments to section 70, has not expanded the class of mortgagors it protects to encompass assignees. See Page, 445 N.E.2d at 152. As the district court stated, had the legislature desired to extend the provisions of section 70, it could have done so. Instead, only purchase money first mortgages, of dwellings of up to four families, occupied by the mortgagor, fall within the section. Clearly, the legislature did not intend for section 70 to provide that a commercial bank, which neither paid for the attorney's services nor had any contact with the attorney, be entitled to the protection of the section merely because it was assigned the mortgage. In the face of the plain language of the statute, and in the absence of -24- legislative action to the contrary, we reject One National's argument that Antonellis is liable to it under section 70.