Opinion ID: 2335942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Weighing instruction

Text: Nevada law provides that in cases in which the State seeks the death penalty, the jury must weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. NRS 175.554(2), (3). Nunnery argues that he has a constitutional right to a jury finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and he thus takes issue with the district court's refusal to so instruct the jury. This is not the first time that we have spoken to whether the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but our prior decisions have created an apparent conflict. This court had long rejected claims that the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in a death penalty case was subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. See, e.g., DePasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 852, 803 P.2d 218, 223 (1990). But the issue found some new life after the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), that any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), that capital defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of aggravating circumstances that make the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Based on Ring, this court decided in Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 59 P.3d 450 (2002), that the use of a three-judge panel to find aggravating circumstances in capital cases was unconstitutional because those findings must be made by a jury based on the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In doing so, we commented on the elements of death eligibility under Nevada's death penalty scheme and, although the issue had not been raised in that case, we indicated that the weighing determination was subject to the same requirement: Nevada statutory law requires two distinct findings to render a defendant death-eligible: The jury or the panel of judges may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found. This second finding regarding mitigating circumstances is necessary to authorize the death penalty in Nevada, and we conclude that it is in part a factual determination, not merely discretionary weighing. So even though Ring expressly abstained from ruling on any Sixth Amendment claim with respect to mitigating circumstances, we conclude that Ring requires a jury to make this finding as well: If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson, 118 Nev. at 802-03, 59 P.3d at 460 (internal quotations omitted). When directly presented with the question more recently in McConnell v. State (McConnell III), 125 Nev. 243, 254, 212 P.3d 307, 314-15 (2009), we reached a contrary conclusion, stating that [n]othing in the plain language of [the relevant statutory] provisions requires a jury to find, or the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that no mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances in order to impose the death penalty. And we further observed that this court has imposed no such requirement. Id. The holding in McConnell III thus conflicts with the dicta in Johnson. We take this opportunity to resolve this conflict and hold that even if the result of the weighing determination increases the maximum sentence for first-degree murder beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, it is not a factual finding that is susceptible to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Therefore, we reaffirm McConnell III and overrule Johnson to the extent that it suggests that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.