Opinion ID: 1250281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Insurrection.

Text: Wagner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on the insurrection count. He also asserts the insurrection statute is unconstitutionally vague. In relevant part Iowa's insurrection statute provides: An insurrection is three or more persons acting in concert and using physical violence against persons or property, with the purpose of interfering with ... the government of the state ... or to prevent any executive ... officer or body from performing its lawful function. Iowa Code § 718.1 (1981). In view of the large number of individuals identified as involved in the uprising, Wagner's role as a ringleader, the violence done to the hostages and the penitentiary, and the unquestionable disruption of State activities caused by the uprising, Wagner's claim of insufficient evidence is meritless. We turn to Wagner's contention that Iowa Code section 718.1 is unconstitutionally vague, despite our reservations whether this issue was timely raised. Wagner attacks the phrase in section 718.1 providing that individuals charged with insurrection must have been acting in concert with two or more other persons. See Iowa Code § 718.1 (1981). [5] The rules for determining whether this phrase is unconstitutionally vague are well settled. While due process requires that persons be informed as to what the State commands or forbids, a person challenging a criminal statute as unconstitutionally vague must demonstrate it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Iowa 1986). To carry that burden, a defendant must prove either the challenged provision fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited or the challenged provision provides no explicit standards for those who apply it and thus allows such individuals to determine arbitrarily the scope of the prohibition. Id. at 321-22. A statute is not vague if the meaning of the words used and the standards they establish can be fairly ascertained by reference to similar statutes, other judicial determinations, reference to common law, to the dictionary, or if the words themselves have a common and generally accepted meaning. State v. Donner, 243 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1976). The term concert is defined in the dictionary as to plan together; to make a plan for; to act in harmony or conjunction. Webster's New Third International Dictionary 470 (1976). The term concert also is explained as follows in Black's Law Dictionary: A person is deemed to act in concert when he [or she] acts with another to bring about some preconceived result. Black's Law Dictionary 262 (5th ed. 1979). These definitions of concert mirror the ordinary usage and everyday meaning of the word. Examining Iowa Code section 718.1 in light of the above principles demonstrates the phrase acting in concert has a sufficiently defined meaning to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning of what is prohibited. Further, the same common, well-understood meaning provides standards sufficiently explicit to prevent the State from arbitrarily determining the scope of this statute. Accordingly, we conclude trial court rightly rejected Wagner's constitutional challenge to Iowa Code section 718.1.