Opinion ID: 2525107
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Possession of a Handcuff Key

Text: Deputy Sheriff David Mertens searched defendant one evening and found a piece of metal concealed in defendant's wristband. The instrument, which the deputy considered a makeshift handcuff key, easily opened the handcuffs just like the ones restraining defendant when he traveled to court. Deputy Sheriff Hall searched defendant's property and discovered a shank. Defendant now contends the trial court erroneously admitted this evidence. Section 190.3, factor (b) permits the trier of fact to consider the defendant's criminal activity that involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. In People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950 and People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169, we upheld the admission under section 190.3, factor (b) of evidence showing the defendant possessed weapons in jail and attempted to escape. (Mason, at pp. 954-957, 277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950; Gallego, at pp. 155, 196, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.) In People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 428, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279, we found that even possession of a handcuff key by itself could evince an express or implied threat to use force or violence. We did not conclusively decide the question in Howard, however, because we found the abundant additional evidence presented of violent activity rendered any error in admitting the handcuff key evidence harmless. (Ibid.) The People in the instant case also presented abundant additional evidence of violent activity. We find Mason, Gallego and Howard persuasive, and find the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in admitting the evidence in question. Defendant cites People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, where we found the defendant's removing a metal grating from an air vent was not admissible under section 190.3. In that case, the Attorney General argue[d] that the presumably violent removal of the grate [was] sufficient to justify admission of the evidence. (Boyd, at p. 776, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) We rejected the contention that the violent injury to the property satisfied section 190.3. We had no occasion to consider the proposition, described in Howard, that the possession of the handcuff key and its implied intended use to permit defendant to free himself from handcuffs, normally worn during defendant's transportation in the custody and presence of law enforcement personnel, constituted criminal activity which posed an `implied threat' to use force or violence. ( People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 428, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279.) The Boyd decision therefore does not lead us to find the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the key evidence. Defendant also asserts the admission of the key violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 1, 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. He acknowledges, however, that the same analysis governs both the constitutional claim and the allegation of error under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), because the statutory claims underlying defendant's motion to exclude evidence about the purported handcuff key are the same arguments that support the constitutional issues. The trial court's resolution of one effectively resolved the other. In light of our finding that there was no error under Penal Code section 190.3, we find no constitutional violation.