Opinion ID: 2032055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: malicious prosecution action

Text: Defendants contend that the bare offering of the nolle prosequi order, without any additional testimony as to why the order was entered, did not establish that the criminal proceedings were terminated in Swick's favor. Defendants note that Swick alleged in his complaint that the criminal charges were nol-prossed because of the absence of any showing of evidence indicating Swick's guilt. Defendants argue that since Swick did not offer evidence of the State's Attorney's reasons for the nolle prosequi, Swick failed to establish an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim. In order to establish a malicious prosecution action, the plaintiff must allege facts showing: `(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.' ( Joiner v. Benton Community Bank (1980), 82 Ill.2d 40, 45, 44 Ill.Dec. 260, 411 N.E.2d 229, quoting Ritchey v. Maksin (1978), 71 Ill.2d 470, 475, 17 Ill.Dec. 662, 376 N.E.2d 991.) The absence of any one of these elements bars a plaintiff from pursuing the claim. ( Joiner, 82 Ill.2d at 45, 44 Ill.Dec. 260, 411 N.E.2d 229; see Misselhorn v. Doyle (1994), 257 Ill.App.3d 983, 986, 195 Ill.Dec. 881, 629 N.E.2d 189.) In regard to the second element, a malicious prosecution action cannot be predicated on underlying criminal proceedings which were terminated in a manner not indicative of the innocence of the accused. Joiner, 82 Ill.2d at 45, 44 Ill. Dec. 260, 411 N.E.2d 229. Whether the nol-pros of a criminal charge constitutes a favorable termination in a malicious prosecution action is a question of first impression before this court. In a criminal context, a nolle prosequi is not a final disposition of a case but    is a procedure which reverts the matter to the same condition which existed before the commencement of the prosecution. ( People v. Woolsey (1990), 139 Ill.2d 157, 163, 151 Ill.Dec. 309, 564 N.E.2d 764.) In the civil malicious prosecution context, the majority rule is that a criminal proceeding has been terminated in favor of the accused when a prosecutor formally abandons the proceeding via a nolle prosequi, unless the abandonment is for reasons not indicative of the innocence of the accused. (Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 659, 660, 661 (1977); McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co. (1991), 304 S.C. 21, 22, 402 S.E.2d 887, 888; Wynne v. Rosen (1984), 391 Mass. 797, 464 N.E.2d 1348.) The abandonment of the proceedings is not indicative of the innocence of the accused when the nolle prosequi is the result of an agreement or compromise with the accused, misconduct on the part of the accused for the purpose of preventing trial, mercy requested or accepted by the accused, the institution of new criminal proceedings, or the impossibility or impracticability of bringing the accused to trial. (Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 660, 661 (1977).) We find that the majority rule best reflects the need to balance an individual's right to be free from unreasonable criminal prosecutions with the public policy which favors the exposure of crime. (See Joiner, 82 Ill.2d at 44, 44 Ill.Dec. 260, 411 N.E.2d 229 ([p]ersons acting in good faith who have probable cause to believe crimes have been committed should not be deterred from reporting them by the fear of unfounded suits by those accused).) Accordingly, we adopt this rule. The burden of proof of a favorable termination, however, remains with the plaintiff. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 672 (1977).) Only when a plaintiff establishes that the nolle prosequi was entered for reasons consistent with his innocence does the plaintiff meet his burden of proof. The circumstances surrounding the abandonment of the criminal proceedings must compel an inference that there existed a lack of reasonable grounds to pursue the criminal prosecution. ( Wynne, 391 Mass. at 800-01, 464 N.E.2d at 1350-51.) Otherwise, every time criminal charges are nol-prossed a civil malicious prosecution action could result. In the instant cause, Swick alleged in his complaint that the nolle prosequi was entered because of a lack of evidence showing his guilt. In their answer to the complaint, the defendants denied this allegation. The nolle prosequi order did not reflect the reasons for its entry. The order simply stated, m/s nolle pros per Gary Johnson instructions recall warrants and was signed by the trial judge. Although Lieutenant Olsen testified regarding the nolle prosequi, he did not state the reasons behind its entry. Because of the lack of evidence at trial regarding the reasons for the entry of the nolle prosequi, we find that Swick has failed to meet his burden of proof of a favorable termination. Swick has not provided any evidence of the reason for the entry of the nolle prosequi. The bare use of the nolle prosequi order, which did not state its reasons for its entry, did not establish that the criminal proceedings were terminated in a manner consistent with Swick's innocence. Swick did not prove that the State lacked reasonable grounds to pursue the criminal charges. Outside the presence of the jury, Swick's counsel even admitted that he did not provide evidence of the State's Attorney's reasons for the entry of the nolle prosequi. Further, the trial judge stated that he had not heard anything to explain why the charges were nol-prossed. Therefore, the jury was improperly instructed that [a] nolle prosequi dismissal of a criminal proceeding is a termination in favor of the plaintiff. Although it may appear that defendants have the right to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as Swick did not establish an element of the cause of action, fairness requires that Swick be given the opportunity to provide evidence of the reasons for the entry of the nolle prosequi. This court has clarified a plaintiff's burden of proof in a malicious prosecution action and decided an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Fairness requires that Swick be given the opportunity to prove that the nolle prosequi order was entered in a manner indicative of his innocence. Thus, we remand this cause to the trial court for a new trial on the malicious prosecution count. Since we remand for a new trial, we decline to consider the defendants' allegations concerning the award of punitive damages and whether Swick proved compensable damages.