Opinion ID: 885402
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Trial Incarceration

Text: ¶ 24 The first basis for assessing prejudice is present here. Johnson was incarcerated for the entire 230-day period between the filing of the charges and the commencement of trial. Johnson argues that he suffered an impairment to his liberty by virtue of the lengthy pre-trial incarceration, which substantially limited his ability to assist with his defense. That Johnson suffered an impairment to his liberty is undoubtedly true. However, he provides this Court with no evidence or indication of what, if anything, he could or would have done to assist in his defense had he not been incarcerated pending his trial. And, while we agree with Johnson that pre-trial incarceration suggests a greater degree of prejudice to the defendant, and can be sufficient under particularized circumstances to constitute prejudice standing alone, we disagree with Johnson that his pre-trial incarceration proves prejudice in this case. ¶ 25 Johnson remained incarcerated pending his trial, principally, because he was unable to post the $25,000 bail required by the District Court. Although the court refused his request to reduce his bail to $2,000 or to release him on his own recognizance, the record does not support Johnson's intimation on appeal that the District Court was unwilling to admit him to any lesser bail. ¶ 26 Importantly, a defendant's right to a speedy trial is not designed to prevent any pre-trial incarceration whatsoever. Rather, Barker instructs that the speedy trial right is designed only to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118 (emphasis added). Thus, as we have suggested since the Bruce decision, the proper inquiry is whether a defendant was  unduly prejudiced by pretrial incarceration. See Kipp, ¶ 20 (emphasis added). ¶ 27 As the State indicates, the only possible basis in the record for prejudice due to pre-trial incarceration was Johnson's complaints about inadequate medical treatment while incarcerated. However, the record does not support a conclusion that Johnson was unduly prejudiced by the medical conditions in jail. Rather, both Johnson's testimony at the hearing on his speedy trial motion as well as the medical records militate in favor of finding little prejudice here. ¶ 28 In addressing Johnson's allegation of prejudice due to medical treatment while incarcerated, the District Court found that Johnson did receive treatment for his medical complaints. In fact, [Johnson]'s requests for medical attention ended in August, 1998, just over one month after his arrest. [Johnson]'s final medical request, dated August 16, 1998, states: (Ex-meds) seem to be working nicely now if I can get my blood pressure checked and my weight. . . . I'm not in the best of shape and was in poorer shape when I got here. Just would like to keep a eye on things. Thank you. Clearly, [Johnson]'s complaints and anxiety [about his medical condition] had been greatly relieved within a short amount of time. ¶ 29 We agree with the State that Johnson's medical complaints bore no relationship to his pre-trial incarceration, nor to the delay in bringing him to trial. In fact, Johnson's medical problems existed prior to his arrest in this matter. And, by his own admissions, Johnson received prompt medical treatment while incarcerated, and his medical condition improved during his incarceration. We conclude that Johnson was not unduly prejudiced by pre-trial incarceration in and of itself. Neither the length nor the conditions of incarceration indicate that Johnson's pre-trial incarceration was oppressive in nature. However, we keep in mind the fact of pre-trial incarceration as we move on and evaluate the other bases for prejudice.