Opinion ID: 170720
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States v. Bramblett, 349 U.S. 503 (1955)

Text: Section 1001 as it stood in 1934 encompassed the concealing or covering up of a material fact, which led courts to question whether it could constitutionally apply when a defendant pleaded not guilty or when counsel moved to exclude hearsay testimony known to be true. [3] See O'Sullivan, 96 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY at 709. In Bramblett, a former Member of Congress was charged under § 1001 for falsely representing to the House Disbursing Office that a named person was entitled to compensation as his official clerk. The district court had granted [Mr.] Bramblett's motion for arrest of judgment following his conviction on the ground that he had not falsified a material fact within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States because the Disbursing Office was not a department or agency within the meaning of § 1001. United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 151 (D.C.Cir.1997) (explaining Bramblett ); see also Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C.Cir.1962) (also explaining Bramblett ). The Supreme Court rejected the argument that § 1001 only penalizes false statements made within the jurisdiction of executive agencies. The Court, held that department, as used in § 1001, was meant to describe the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 509, 75 S.Ct. 504 (emphasis added). In the wake of Bramblett, federal courts carved out the `judicial function' exception to § 1001, under which § 1001 was found `not [to] apply to statements made to a court acting in its judicial capacity.' United States v. Tracy, 108 F.3d 473, 476 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 766 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Deffenbaugh Indus., 957 F.2d at 752; United States v. Holmes, 840 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Mayer, 775 F.2d 1387, 1388-92 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam); United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1979); Morgan, 309 F.2d at 237. This judicially-crafted exception provided that if a false statement or concealment concerned a court's `judicial function' it was not actionable under § 1001; if, however, the conduct was addressed only to the administrative functions of the court, it was actionable. O'Sullivan, 96 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY at 709.