Opinion ID: 606718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Department of Labor Stipulation

Text: 9 The Commission asserts that the district court erred by refusing to admit a 1990 stipulation between the DOL and the Commission into evidence. Paragraph one of this stipulation states in part: 10 [i]t is further the Secretary's position that the employer has not violated the Act by treating the subject to call time status, in which employees are required to respond to a fire call in thirty minutes, as non-compensable. 11 Appellant's Appendix at 6. The Commission argues that this stipulation is an agency determination, and is relevant evidence that the Commission acted in good faith. The Commission therefore contends that the district court erred by refusing to admit the stipulation into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C). 4 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988). The district court found that the stipulation constitutes an agency enforcement policy, 5 but excluded it as overly prejudicial and irrelevant under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 402. See Pretrial Conference Transcript, at 19-20. 12 In reviewing this ruling, we must give substantial deference to the district court's decision on the admissibility of evidence, and we will not find error unless the district court clearly abused its discretion. Freidus v. First Nat'l Bank of Council Bluffs, 928 F.2d 793 (8th Cir.1991). Applying this deferential standard, we do not find that the district court's evidentiary ruling amounted to an abuse of its discretion. 13 The Commission advances two arguments in favor of admitting the stipulation. First, it contends that the stipulation serves to cut-off any claims for damages after January 16, 1990, the date the stipulation was signed. Second, the Commission argues that the stipulation serves as evidence of its good faith in continuing its nonrecompensed subject-to-call policy after January 16, 1990. If either of these points were at issue in this case, we might agree with the Commission that the stipulation would be relevant evidence. However, this lawsuit covers only the time period between the adoption of the policy, and the date of the stipulation. The employees make no claim that they are owed wages for time spent subject-to-call after January 26, 1990. Therefore the Commission does not need to prove the cut-off date for damages. Additionally, since state of mind is irrelevant to the FLSA violations alleged by the employees, good faith is not at issue in this case. See Pretrial Conference Transcript, at 16-17. 14 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Under Rule 402, evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. We agree with the district court's ruling that the stipulation is not relevant to this case, and therefore find that the district court properly excluded it under Rule 402. 6 See Donald v. Rast, 927 F.2d 379, 381 (8th Cir.1991) (public records that relate to a topic not at issue in a case are excludable).