Opinion ID: 2625753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Admission of Evidence Regarding Defendant's Mother

Text: Dixon properly objected to admission of testimony about his mother's offer to replace Shaw's property in exchange for Shaw's silence about her suspicions regarding Dixon. He contends the testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Dixon asks this court to review the admission of this evidence de novo, because the district judge failed to state his rationale for the admission. The State maintains that the admission decision should be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. This court has stated many times in the past that it reviews the admission or exclusion of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 272 Kan. 1366, 1378, 39 P.3d 47 (2002); State v. Wagner, 248 Kan. 240, 243, 807 P.2d 139 (1991). But we have recently clarified this standard of review, reaffirming relevance as the first consideration of a district judge. See K.S.A. 60-407(f); State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 126, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005); State v. Carter, 278 Kan. 74, 77, 91 P.3d 1162 (2004); State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291, 303, 44 P.3d 305 (2002). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. K.S.A. 60-401(b). To establish relevance, there must be some material or logical connection between the asserted facts and the inference or result they are intended to establish. Carter, 278 Kan. at 77, 91 P.3d 1162. State v. Lumley, 266 Kan. 939, 950-51, 976 P.2d 486 (1999). The concept of relevance under Kansas law includes both whether evidence is probative and whether it is material. On appeal, the question of whether evidence is probative is judged under an abuse of discretion standard; materiality is judged under a de novo standard. State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, Syl. ¶ 3, 194 P.3d 563 (2008). See State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 503-09, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). Furthermore, `[o]nce relevance is established, evidentiary rules governing admission and exclusion may be applied either as a matter of law or in the exercise of the district judge's discretion, depending on the contours of the rule in question.' State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 47, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) (quoting Carter, 278 Kan. at 77, 91 P.3d 1162). If the adequacy of the legal basis of a district judge's decision on admission or exclusion of evidence is questioned, this court reviews the decision de novo. Gunby, 282 Kan. at 47-48, 144 P.3d 647. If the record in this case showed only that Dixon's mother spontaneously called Shaw and offered to replace the items in Shaw's apartment that were damaged or destroyed and that the call had nothing to do with Dixon, then we would agree that testimony about the call tested the limits of both the abuse of discretion probative value standard and the de novo materiality standard encompassed by the concept of relevance under Kansas law. But that is not what the record shows. Dixon's mother's call was not spontaneous; it was prompted by Dixon's telephone conversation with Shaw and her accusation of him, followed by Dixon's telephone conversation with his mother. The record also shows the call may have had everything else to do with Dixon as well; he not only hoped his mother could speak more calmly with Shaw but, Shaw testified, the mother's offer was expressly conditioned on Shaw keeping her suspicions of Dixon to herself. The conversation and its timing and content were, as a matter of law, material to Dixon's possible consciousness of guilt and attempt at a coverup. Further, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district judge to decide that the web of telephone conversations was probative on these material considerations. We also do not regard the admission of this evidence as unduly prejudicial. See State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 477, 931 P.2d 664 (1997). It certainly tended to inculpate Dixon rather than exculpate him, but, given the largely consistent stories of his three accomplices about Dixon's leadership role in the burglaries and other crimes and from others about his motives, it is simply impossible that any juror's vote on guilt turned on Dixon's mother's evidently misguided or malign effort to help her son.