Opinion ID: 3029823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The California Court of Appeal’s decision was a

Text: consistent application of clearly established Supreme Court law The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is Supreme Court precedent existing at the time of the state court’s decision.8 Supreme Court precedent includes not only the bright-line rules it establishes but also the legal principles and standards flowing from them.9 [1] Supreme Court precedent regarding the permissible timing of a Faretta request is scarce. No Supreme Court case has directly addressed the timing of a request for selfrepresentation. However, the holding in Faretta indirectly incorporated a timing element.10 In Faretta, the Court mentioned that Faretta’s request was “[w]ell before the date of trial,”11 and “weeks before trial.”12 It then held that “[i]n forcing Faretta, under these circumstances, to accept against his will a state-appointed public defender, the California courts deprived him of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense.”13 Thus, the Supreme Court incorporated the facts of 7 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 8 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 See Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002). 10 The Court also mentioned the timing of the self-representation request in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 172 (1984) (detailing that the defendant’s request was renewed the day before trial); however, the timing of the request was not raised as an issue in that case. See Wiggins v. Estelle, 681 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled by McKaskle, 465 U.S. 168. 11 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. 12 Id. at 835. 13 Id. at 836 (emphasis added). MARSHALL v. TAYLOR 581 Faretta into its holding. Accordingly, the holding may be read to require a court to grant a Faretta request when the request occurs “weeks before trial.” However, the holding does not define when such a request would become untimely. Moore v. Calderon14 acknowledged this reading of Faretta. In Moore, we determined that a timeliness element in a Faretta request is “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”15 The Ninth Circuit did not define the timing element prescribed by Supreme Court precedent, however. It merely acknowledged it. Thus, after Moore, we know that Faretta clearly established some timing element, but we still do not know the precise contours of that element. At most, we know that Faretta requests made “weeks before trial” are timely. [2] Because the Supreme Court has not clearly established when a Faretta request is untimely, other courts are free to do so as long as their standards comport with the Supreme Court’s holding that a request “weeks before trial” is timely.16 In Windham, the California Supreme Court held that a Faretta request must be made a reasonable amount of time before trial.17 14 108 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Williams, 529 U.S. 362, as recognized by Baker v. City of Blaine, 221 F.3d 1108, 1110 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 15 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As a general rule, “one threejudge panel of this court cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.” United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when a prior three-judge panel has held that a principle is clearly established Supreme Court law, we are bound by the earlier panel’s decision. 16 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 17 Windham, 560 P.2d at 1191. The Ninth Circuit has held that a Faretta request made before the jury is impaneled is timely unless it was a tactic to secure delay. Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1985). However, “[o]ur own independent consideration of the [timing] issue is neither relevant, nor necessary to dispose of the question presented.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069. 582 MARSHALL v. TAYLOR The California Court of Appeal applied the Windham rule in this case to find Marshall’s request, made on the morning of his trial, untimely. Because the timing of Marshall’s request fell well inside the “weeks before trial” standard for timeliness established by Faretta, the court of appeal’s finding of untimeliness clearly comports with Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal could, and did, properly conclude that Marshall’s request was untimely. Accordingly, we conclude that Marshall is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis that the California Court of Appeal’s decision based on untimeliness was contrary to clear Supreme Court precedent.