Opinion ID: 2069831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearing on the first 23-110 motion

Text: After the remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the first 23-110 motion, receiving testimony on June 16, November 12, and December 16, 1999. The only issue before the court was whether Dobson's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for promising an alibi defense in the opening statement and then deciding not to present the alibi testimony at trial. Both Dobson and his trial counsel, Andrew Lipps, testified.
Lipps testified [3] that a few weeks before trial, Dobson advised Lipps how to contact three potential alibi witnesses. Lipps also testified that he had discussed with Dobson the possibility of putting on an alibi defense before he received the letter. [4] Lipps told the trial court that he was prepared as of the morning of the trial to present an alibi defense, an assertion supported by the existence of subpoenas issued for all three alibi witnesses. The alibi witnesses in question were Jean Harris, the mother of Dobson's child; Dr. Eric B. Dobson, a physician who is Dobson's brother; and Steve Cole, Jean Harris's cousin. According to Lipps, these witnesses were credible because he wouldn't proffer even in an opening statement an alibi defense if [he] thought the witnesses weren't worthy of being put on. The witnesses were expected to testify that they and Dobson were in Baltimore, Maryland, at a party on the night of the robbery. Lipps acknowledged that during opening statement he told the jury he would be presenting an alibi defense and during jury selection he introduced the three witnesses expected to support the alibi. In addition, an October 31, 1980, post-trial memorandum prepared by Lipps for the Public Defender Service appellate section, outlined possible issues on appeal, including a reference to the alibi mentioned in his opening statement. [5] Lipps explained why he informed the jury in the opening statement about the alibi and the alibi witnesses: It is a tactical decision in every case whether to announce a defense in opening statement at the outset or to reserve the opening statement until the beginning of the defense case. I have handled the practice in  depending on the case, in different ways. In this case, it seemed to me it was useful to introduce the alibi defense and important to introduce the alibi defense at the outset for the following reasons. First, as I mentioned earlier, a jury will often form opinions of a case early on. And to simply have them listen to the entire case without any knowledge of what sort of defense was to come puts you behind the 8-ball. In this case, it seems to me I would have known, from talking to the three witnesses, that they were three presentable witnesses, certainly, particularly Mr. Dobson's brother who was then, I gather from my written notes, in medical school. And third, unlike some cases where it is hard to have a precise knowledge of what the government's case is going to look like, in this case we had an extensive pretrial identification hearing. And so I thought at the time, at least according to my reconstruction, that I knew well what the government's chief identification witness was going to testify. And, therefore, felt reasonably certain that it would be necessary and appropriate to put on an alibi defense .... So I think the question of whether to put on a  testify about a defense in opening statement or not depends upon the facts of each case. And I do believe that there was an appropriate basis to identify an alibi defense at the time of the initial opening. If I had an uncertainty as to what sort of defense Mr. Dobson would assert, then it would be more reasonable to wait until the defense case before giving an opening statement. But here there was no question that Mr. Dobson had told me, as reflected in his September 14th letter, that he was not at the place of the offense at the time it occurred and, indeed, had an alibi. And I checked that out with each of the three witnesses who confirmed that. Now, I hasten to add, this is all by way of reconstruction, and not by way of actual independent memory. However, after the government presented its case, Lipps decided not to present any of the alibi witnesses or to advance the alibi defense because, in his opinion, the government's case was not nearly as strong as he had anticipated. Lipps did present the videotape of the first lineup where Sawyer selected two people other than Dobson as the robbers. Lipps explained that Sawyer's identification testimony at trial was much weaker than he had expected. According to Lipps, [t]hings apparently changed midway through the actual trial when the witnesses' [sic] testimony reflected a far greater degree of uncertainty than I had any reason to expect, based upon the pretrial hearing, [6] in which case we  I say we. I mean Mr. Dobson and myself made a decision not to put on an alibi defense. Further, in Lipps's October 31, 1980, post-trial memorandum, he wrote, [b]ecause we believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the government's case was weak, we chose not to introduce this alibi defense. Because the strength of Sawyer's testimony is central to this appeal we will review Lipps's testimony regarding the four separate identifications that took place. The first occurred three weeks after the robbery, on June 26, 1978, in the form of a photo identification. Sawyer selected Dobson from an array of photographs, and Lipps testified that Sawyer said at the suppression hearing that he was 75 to 80 percent certain of that identification. The second identification proceeding was a lineup held on July 11, 1978. At that lineup, Sawyer selected two people other than Dobson as the robbers. According to Lipps's October 16, 1980, post-trial memorandum to the Public Defender Service, the police told Sawyer that he had picked out the wrong person. [7] Lipps stated, however, that Sawyer had explained at the pretrial suppression hearing that he had told the police that the people he had identified weren't really the people at the robbery but looked like the people. The third opportunity came during a second lineup almost six months after the robbery, in which Sawyer identified Dobson as one of the robbers. Finally, at trial, more than two years after the robbery, Sawyer made an in-court identification of Dobson. Lipps described Sawyer's testimony at the suppression hearing as strong and clear, providing an adequate explanation of the reason he selected two different people rather than Dobson at the first lineup. As a result of that assessment Lipps decided that the alibi defense should be presented at trial. On cross-examination at trial, however, Sawyer indicated a far less degree of certainty concerning his initial photo identification. With respect to Sawyer's trial testimony, Lipps stated: The question of his reliability that I referred to becomes crystal clear when you look at my notes of his trial testimony where I take, as you see, virtually verbatim notes of his direct testimony. And then after my cross-examination I come back to the stand, I'm not taking notes as I'm writing, and I write in a box, and I don't have it in front of me, but it says basically 45 to 60 percent certain of identification. I put a box around these notes. I star it out in the margin. An examination of Lipps's trial notes reveals a starred entry, 40 to 60% certain at photo. [8] Lipps stated that Sawyer's trial testimony, reducing the degree of certainty regarding his initial photo identification from 75 to 80 percent to 40/45 to 60 percent, was a critical change and great for the defense in his testimony where he had indicated under oath a degree of uncertainty that he hadn't indicated either in the prior investigator's statement [9] nor in a sworn pretrial testimony under oath. In large part, because Sawyer stated a lesser degree of certainty at trial, which caused an apparent weakness of the government's case, Lipps decided not to present the alibi witnesses. Instead, Lipps rested the defense case after presenting a videotape of the lineup in which Sawyer selected two individuals, neither of whom were Dobson. Finally, during closing argument, Lipps alluded to [the government's weakness] briefly in front of the jury and told them that we chose not to dignify the government's case with the defense. Lipps also testified that another reason for not presenting the testimony of the alibi witnesses was the danger that the jury would learn about Dobson's prior criminal conduct. More specifically, the witnesses would have testified that they were with Dobson in Baltimore on the night of the robbery celebrating his one-month release from jail on an unrelated charge, and Lipps feared that the reason for having the party would be revealed during cross-examination. According to Lipps's notes, the witnesses referred to the day as D-Day, or Dobson Day, June 6, 1978. Lipps testified that he was concerned that a reference to Dobson's prior criminal record would have been highly prejudicial to his defense. Lipps also testified that the decision not to put on the alibi testimony was made in consultation with Dobson. Finally, Lipps's decision not to present the witnesses was made after he had the opportunity to think about and discuss the pros and cons with his colleagues at the Public Defender Service.
Dobson's testimony largely was consistent with Lipps's testimony except for disagreement on whether Dobson agreed with the decision not to present the alibi witnesses. Dobson testified that Lipps did not want to present the alibi witnesses after the government rested its case. Dobson told Lipps that he thought abandoning the alibi was a bad idea ... because they had been introduced to the jury and they would be expecting to hear from [the] alibi witnesses. When asked to explain why it was important to put on the witnesses after introducing them, Dobson stated: Because we had introduced them to the jury and basically it has always been  maybe perhaps it's the way I have been raised with things that come along when. But when you promise somebody something, you need to deliver. And if you don't, generally people feel that you can't. In our neighborhood, we say, put up or shut up, or put your money where your mouth is. It was that type of situation that we introduced them, and the jury would be expecting them. Anything less would just be probably looked upon as we were bluffing or that we couldn't deliver. In addition, Dobson testified that the final decision on whether to abandon the alibi was Lipp's to make, but have Lipps knew Dobson wanted to advance the alibi defense. Dobson remembered Lipps stating in his closing argument that, because the government had not proved its case with Sawyer's testimony, he was not going to dignify the government's case by presenting the alibi witnesses. [10]
The trial court issued an oral ruling after the close of testimony on December 16, 1999. The court found there was no indication that the alibi witnesses would have testified differently than what Lipps stated in his opening argument. The trial court also credited Dobson's testimony that Lipps and he did not agree on the decision not to put on the alibi defense. The trial court, however, found that Lipps's decision of whether or not to put on the witnesses was a tactical one. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Lipps's decision not to put on the alibi witnesses was not deficient performance within the meaning of the first prong of Strickland. [11]