Opinion ID: 1987708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Circumstantial Equal Evidence

Text: As noted above, Justice Calvert believed the exclusive standard applied only when a no-evidence challenge asserted the evidence was no more than a scintilla. [39] But he went on to note a variation that required contrary inferences to be considered when the equal-inference rule applied. [40] In claims or defenses supported only by meager circumstantial evidence, the evidence does not rise above a scintilla (and thus is legally insufficient) if jurors would have to guess whether a vital fact exists. [41] When the circumstances are equally consistent with either of two facts, neither fact may be inferred. [42] In such cases, we must view each piece of circumstantial evidence, not in isolation, but in light of all the known circumstances. [43] Justice Calvert argued there was no necessity for the variation because drawing an inference based on meager evidence was unreasonable whether or not the reviewing court considered the opposing inferences. [44] Nevertheless, he recognized that [t]he opposing inference is present and it does no harm to note its presence. [45] In subsequent cases this Court has continued to note rather than disregard the presence of equal but opposite inferences, often because lower courts have overlooked them. Thus, for example, one might infer from cart tracks in spilled macaroni salad that it had been on the floor a long time, but one might also infer the oppositethat a sloppy shopper recently did both. [46] Similarly, when injury or death occurs without eyewitnesses and only meager circumstantial evidence suggests what happened, we cannot disregard other meager evidence of equally likely causes. [47] Thus, when the circumstantial evidence of a vital fact is meager, a reviewing court must consider not just favorable but all the circumstantial evidence, and competing inferences as well.