Opinion ID: 1345677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Language of the shield law

Text: (4) We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers' intent. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724 [257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406].) In the case of a constitutional provision adopted by the voters, their intent governs. ( Kaiser v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538 [58 P.2d 1278]; Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 597, 618 [194 Cal. Rptr. 294].) To determine intent, `The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d 711, 724, quoting Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters). ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) (2b) The language of article I, section 2(b) is clear and unambiguous as to the question presented in this case. The section states plainly that a newsperson shall not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose any unpublished information. (Italics added.) The parties seeking discovery in this case (Delaney and the prosecutor) contend article I, section 2(b) applies only to unpublished information obtained in confidence by a newsperson. Such a construction might be possible if the voters had used the phrase unpublished information without the modifier any. They did not do so. The use of the word any makes clear that article I, section 2(b) applies to all information, regardless of whether it was obtained in confidence. (5) Words used in a constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) (2c) In the context of article I, section 2(b), the word any means without limit and no matter what kind. (Webster's New World Dict. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 62.) To restrict the scope of article I, section 2(b) to confidential information would be to read the word any out of the section. We decline to do so. (6) Significance should be given, if possible, to every word of an act. ( Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112 [65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315].) Conversely, a construction that renders a word surplusage should be avoided. ( City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54 [184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935]; California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844 [157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) [9] (2d) We need not rely solely on the voters' use of the word any. Article I, section 2(b) further states: As used in this subdivision, `unpublished information' includes information not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based upon or related to such material has been disseminated. Nowhere in this broad definition is there an explicit or implied restriction of article I, section 2(b) to confidential information. (7) To so limit the section, we would have to insert into it the word confidential and thus violate the cardinal rule that The constitution is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is therein declared in definite language than they are to disregard any of its express provisions. ( People v. Campbell (1902) 138 Cal. 11, 15 [70 P. 918]; Ross v. City of Long Beach (1944) 24 Cal.2d 258, 260 [148 P.2d 649].) Delaney contends a reporter's percipient observations of a nonconfidential occurrence are not information within the meaning of shield law. This attempted distinction between observations and information is unpersuasive. Under Delaney's strained interpretation, a reporter or any other eyewitness to an automobile accident would have no information as to the accident. This flies in the face of reason and plain English. (8) Information includes reception of knowledge and knowledge obtained from reading, observation, or instruction. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1958) p. 1276, italics added.) When a reporter or other person is called on to testify as to his observations of an event, he is being asked to disclose information. Moreover, if the distinction between observations and information were logical, the result would be that even a newsperson's confidential observations would not be protected. That result would be contrary to the manifest purpose and language of article I, section 2(b). (2e) In short, the plain language of article I, section 2(b) leads to only one tenable conclusion. We hold that the shield law's definition of unpublished information is not restricted to information obtained in confidence by a newsperson.