Opinion ID: 1763820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relationship between Franks and Leon

Text: Finally, we realize that there is some confusion as to the difference between the Franks analysis and the Leon good-faith exception. In particular, upon the State's requests the trial court considered the Leon good-faith exception instead of the Franks analysis. Accordingly, we take this opportunity to attempt to dispel some of the confusion. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the District Court suppressed evidence because it disagreed with the magistrate's determination that there was sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence should not be suppressed when it was obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. Id. The Court then explained that: Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. [590], at 610-611, [95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)] (Powell, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 263-264, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (White, j., concurring in judgment). Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Id. (emphasis added). Hence, a Franks analysis applies only when the affidavit is allegedly defective due to error on the part of the police. There, the reviewing court must determine if the officer's conduct was so egregious and the error so material that the evidence should be suppressed. In contrast, the Leon analysis applies when the search warrant is allegedly defective due to an error on the part of the magistrate. Pursuant to Leon , the reviewing court must determine if the magistrate's error was so obvious that the officers could not in good faith have thought that the warrant was valid. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, §§ 1.3 & 4.4 (3rd ed.1996). Because the case before us today involved the first situation, and not the latter, we conclude that the trial court should have applied Franks instead of Leon . Reversed and remanded. BROWN, J., dissents.