Opinion ID: 852192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Elevation and Additional Fixed Term

Text: Of course, [t]he primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind.2008). The statute itself is the best evidence of this intent. The Court presumes that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Id. Indiana's criminal confinement statute provides: (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) confines another person without the other person's consent, or (2) removes another person, by fraud, enticement, force, or threat of force, from one (1) place to another; commits criminal confinement. Except as provided in subsection (b), the offense of criminal confinement is a Class D felony. (b) The offense of criminal confinement defined in subsection (a) is: (1) a Class C felony if: (A) the person confined or removed is less than fourteen (14) years of age and is not the confining or removing person's child; (B) it is committed by using a vehicle; or (C) it results in bodily injury to a person other than the confining or removing person; and (2) a Class B felony if it: (A) is committed while armed with a deadly weapon; (B) results in serious bodily injury to a person other than the confining or removing person; or (C) is committed on an aircraft. Ind.Code § 35-42-3-3(a) (2008) (emphasis added). Nicoson's criminal confinement was elevated to a class B felony because it was committed while armed with a deadly weapon, as per subsection 3(b)(2)(A). A deadly weapon includes a loaded or unloaded firearm. Ind.Code § 35-41-1-8(a)(1). The criminal confinement statute straightforwardly provides six ways for upgrading the standard class D felony to a C and B offense, including the one used in Nicoson's case. The Court of Appeals has addressed this particular increase in class of felony by observing that [w]e can reasonably infer that our General Assembly considered the heightened risk to a confined victim if the perpetrator is armed with a deadly weapon when it determined that a Class B felony enhancement was warranted in such cases. Mallard v. State, 816 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). The extra five years about which Nicoson complains is not part of these provisions in the confinement statutes that authorize higher classes of felonies to be charged. Rather, it appears in the part of the Code on penalties. The section at issue authorizes an additional fixed sentence for the underlying offense where a firearm is used. Ind.Code §§ 35-50-2-11, 35-50-1-2(e) (2004). The General Assembly originally crafted this additional penalty for defendants who committed an offense knowingly or intentionally us[ing] an assault weapon. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11 (1994) (amended 1996, 2005). In 1996, it broadened the language so the applicable offenses would include those involving the use of firearm[s] rather than only assault weapon[s]. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(a) (1996) (amended 2005). In 2005, the legislature revised the language of subsection (d) [5] and set the additional imprisonment to the current fixed term of five years. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-11(e) (2005). The firearm statute today reads: Sec. 11. (a) As used in this section, firearm has the meaning set forth in IC XX-XX-X-X. (b)As used in this section, offense means: (1) a felony under IC 35-42 that resulted in death or serious bodily injury; (2) kidnapping; or (3) criminal confinement as a Class B felony. (c) The state may seek, on a page separate from the rest of a charging instrument, to have a person who allegedly committed an offense sentenced to an additional fixed term of imprisonment if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. (d) If the person was convicted of the offense in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene to hear evidence in the enhancement hearing. If the trial was to the court, or the judgment was entered on a guilty plea, the court alone shall hear evidence in the enhancement hearing. (e) If the jury (if the hearing is by jury) or the court (if the hearing is to the court alone) finds that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense, the court may sentence the person to an additional fixed term of imprisonment of five (5) years. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-11 (emphasis added). Subsections (b), (c) and (e) have particular relevance here. A plain reading of these subsections reveals at least two features worth noting. First, subsections (c) and (e) require the use[] of a firearm in the commission of the underlying offense. Mere possession of a firearm or being armed with a deadly weapon is not enough. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, it is reasonable to infer that the General Assembly was recognizing the additional escalation of danger associated with the actual use of a firearm versus the mere possession of one during the commission of an offense. Thus, it was Nicoson's use of the weapon as noted by the trial court that necessitated the additional enhancement of five years: Sir, I can't get beyond the fact in this case that you uh, held a loaded 9 millimeter weapon to somebody's head as they were lying in a prone position. (Tr. at 417.) Second, we note that in crafting the list of applicable offenses in which the additional fixed term may be imposed, the General Assembly specifically listed criminal confinement as a Class B felony as one of the offenses to which the five years may be added. Ind.Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(2). This is fairly powerful evidence of legislative intent, to say the least. Moreover, the General Assembly has amended the statute at least once since expanding its scope to include firearms and has had ample opportunity to do so again if a double enhancement was not desired. The difference between possessing a firearm and using it has been recognized before. In Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927 (Ind.2001), we touched on the distinction of being armed versus using a weapon as respects a double jeopardy claim involving convictions for murder and carrying a handgun without a license. To prove murder, the State had to prove Mickens caused the victims death by shooting the victim two times with a handgun. Id. at 931. In addition, the State proved that Mickens carried the gun as he approached the victim and thus the burden shifted to Mickens to prove that he possessed a valid license. Id. We concluded that Mickens did not provide proof he possessed a valid license. Id. Most telling is that, we said [c]arrying the gun along the street was one crime and using it was another. Id. Here, the State initially needed to prove only that Nicoson committed confinement while armed with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3. To apply the additional fixed five-year term the statute requires the State to prove Nicoson used a firearm in commission of his offense. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11. The record clearly reveals that Nicoson was not only armed with a deadly weapon, but that he used the firearmfiring it into the air, ordering the victims from the vehicle with it, and firing at the victims' vehicle as they drove away. In effect, Nicoson is contending that the State proved too much too soon. He has to mean that the legislative design seeks to impose a greater penalty on a perpetrator who brings a gun to the scene of his crime and eventually pulls it out of his pocket and aims it, but a lesser penalty for a perpetrator who discharges the weapon as a warning, aims it at other human beings, and brandishes it throughout the whole encounter. It cannot be so. The legislative direction in the language of the statutes is explicit. The enumeration of criminal confinement in the firearm use statute is authorization by the General Assembly for this type of enhancement.