Opinion ID: 1589788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Counsel, Competency to Proceed Pro Se, and Failure to Order a Mental Competency Examination and to Conduct a Competency Hearing

Text: ¶ 56. Goff argues that the trial court erred when it allowed him to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and proceed pro se. Goff also claims that the trial court should have ordered a mental-competency evaluation and conducted a competency hearing.
¶ 57. While Goff presents the issue as whether the trial court erred when it allowed him to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and proceed pro se, we find that the actual issue is whether the hybrid representation Goff received during trial provided him with effective assistance of counsel. See Metcalf v. State, 629 So.2d 558, 564 (Miss.1993); see also United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 671 (7th Cir.2001). ¶ 58. A trial court may permit hybrid representation which consists of the participation by an attorney in the conduct of the trial when the defendant is proceeding pro se. Metcalf, 629 So.2d at 562-63 (citations omitted); see also Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26 (1890) (In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both....). This Court has set forth various factors to consider in determining whether the trial court granted pro se or hybrid representation: [T]he defendant's accessibility to counsel; whether and how often he consults with counsel up to the point of the request; the stage of trial at which he requests a participatory role in his defense; the magnitude of the role he desires to assume; whether the trial court encourages immediate and constant accessibility of counsel; and the nature and extent of assistance of counsel which has been provided up to the point of the request, including both substantive and procedural aid. Metcalf, 629 So.2d at 565. ¶ 59. Considering these factors individually, we find that this case is analogous to other cases in which this Court has held that the defendant was not deprived of counsel due to hybrid representation. Deen and McNally, Goff's privately retained attorneys, were present at Goff's counsel table during the entire trial, and Goff consulted with them on several occasions. See Dunn v. State, 693 So.2d 1333, 1342 (Miss.1997); Metcalf, 629 So.2d at 565. Both Deen and McNally provided substantial assistance before trial. See Dunn, 693 So.2d at 1342. They filed numerous pretrial motions and represented Goff at two pretrial hearings. After Goff filed a motion to proceed pro se, which the trial court granted, the trial judge stated: [U]nder these circumstances and given the nature of the charges here, I am appointing Mr. Deen and Mr. McNally and directing that they remain to provide you with any support, assistance, and advice that you deem sufficient to seek from them. And also, I will authorize them to act as co-counsel, if that is acceptable to you. ¶ 60. It is clear from the record that Deen and McNally were not casual observers. Deen conducted voir dire; handled jury challenges; made numerous objections throughout the trial; conducted the cross-examination of Margaret Clark, Trooper Ginn, James Yates, Jr., Dr. Hayne, Investigator Smith, Investigator Bowlus, and Detective Lambert; conducted the direct examination of Dee Dee Wall, Detective Lambert, and Rachel Manders; [21] made the motion for directed verdict; presented the closing argument in the guilt phase; represented Goff at sentencing; made the opening statement on behalf of Goff at sentencing; conducted the direct examination of Lessie Goff and Dr. Van Rosen at sentencing; and filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, judgment notwithstanding the verdict. ¶ 61. McNally participated in the approval of jury instructions and otherwise assisted both Deen and Goff throughout the trial. As already noted, Deen and McNally filed numerous pretrial motions as well. ¶ 62. In contrast to the involvement of Deen and McNally, Goff had a limited role throughout the course of the trial. Goff made miscellaneous objections, but his only direct involvement was conducting the cross-examinations of Pearl Boulware and Sheriff Welford, and making a closing argument, along with Deen, at the guilt phase. ¶ 63. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that Goff never was actually without counsel. Deen and McNally were available throughout the entire trial and substantially participated. The role of each was not merely that of a skilled bystander, but of a substantive litigator. Metcalf, 629 So.2d at 565. Goff, having never been fully without the assistance of counsel, cannot now complain. He received the best of both worlds  the assistance of counsel while conducting his own defense. Id.; Dunn, 693 So.2d at 1342-43, Metcalf, 629 So.2d at 565.
¶ 64. With regard to Goff's claim that the trial court should have ordered a mental-competency evaluation and conducted a competency hearing, we find that the facts of this case did not warrant either. ¶ 65. Rule 9.06 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice provides in pertinent part: If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by some competent psychiatrist selected by the court in accordance with § 99-13-11 of the Mississippi Code Annotated of 1972. After the examination the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the defendant is competent to stand trial. After hearing all the evidence, the court shall weigh the evidence and make a determination of whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. If the court finds that the defendant is competent to stand trial, then the court shall make the finding a matter of record and the case will then proceed to trial. Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 9.06. ¶ 66. What constitutes reasonable ground to believe that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge. See Cox v. State, 793 So.2d 591, 597 (Miss.2001) citing Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1248 (Miss.1993), ( overruled on other grounds ). [22] The pertinent question is whether the trial judge receive[d] information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about defendant's competence and alerted him to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense? Conner v. State, 632 So.2d at 1248 (citing Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir.1980)). ¶ 67. On January 21, 2005, Goff's attorneys filed a motion for a court-ordered mental examination of defendant. The motion stated: The attorney for the defendant in this case moves this Court to order a mental examination of defendant to be conducted at such time or times as the Court may direct, by qualified mental health professionals to determine: (1) The defendant's present mental condition and competency to stand trial; and; (2) The mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense, and that the prosecution of this case be stayed depending the outcome of such examination. As attorney for defendant, I question the defendant's competency to stand trial and believe that it is essential for a mental examination to be conducted in advance of the trial because: (1) During the course of the investigation for this offense, undersigned counsel has come to believe that defendant has a history of mental illness and that he has been treated by mental health professionals while incarcerated in the State of Alabama. (2) The defendant has engaged in bazaar [sic] behavior during the past several years; (3) No mental health clinician has seen the defendant in over six months, during which time the defendant has been confined in the George County, Mississippi Jail. ¶ 68. On April 7, 2005, the court heard various motions brought by Goff. Goff testified at this hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for Goff, in the presence of the State, requested that an ex parte conference be held regarding a previously-filed motion for a court-ordered mental evaluation. During this ex parte conference, [23] counsel for Goff stated that the horrific nature of the crime prompted him to request the mental examination: BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): And when I came over here at first to represent him, I told him, due to the horrendousness of the allegation, that we ought to look into some type of maybe not guilty by reason of insanity or some type of looking into his competency at the time the event was done. ¶ 69. During the conference, counsel informed the trial court that Goff was a difficult client, that Goff was a child of incest, and that Goff had suffered psychotic episodes. Conversely, counsel also said that he had no trouble communicating with Goff. At the conclusion of this conference, defense counsel amended the previous request for a mental evaluation for the purposes of determining whether Goff was competent to stand trial, so that the requested evaluation was for mitigation purposes only. ¶ 70. At a second pretrial hearing on April 25, 2005, counsel further explained that he was no longer requesting a mental evaluation for the defendant. Counsel stated that between the filing of the motion on January 21, 2005, and the hearing on April 7, 2005, he could find no independent background of Mr. Goff where he would have had any psychiatric care or psychologist care or any indication that he would not be competent to stand trial or that he was legally insane at the time of the offense. According to counsel, Goff had been able to assist counsel in his preparation of the defense, Goff had an appreciation of the situation he was in, and the trouble that counsel had communicating with Goff was no different than that with any other client who is under substantial stress. ¶ 71. During the April 25, 2005, hearing, the trial court granted Goff's previous request for funds for the purpose of securing a mental-health expert to testify during the penalty phase. At the conclusion of this hearing, in commenting on the issue of Goff's competency, the trial judge stated: It was my observation at the hearings conducted April 7th ..., I did not observe or perceive any untoward conduct on the part of the defendant. He certainly appeared to me to appreciate the nature of the proceedings. He was able to proceed and testify at that hearing, and his responses to the questions that were asked were appropriate and responsive. I didn't see any basis for the Court on its own, sua sponte, bringing up, you know, having a hearing conducted or an examination conducted. [24] ¶ 72. The trial court did not err in failing to order a mental-competency evaluation or failing to conduct a competency hearing, and Goff's argument is without merit.