Opinion ID: 2328760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of May 16th Order

Text: KMA argues that the molding of the verdict was erroneous in light of the May 16th Order. In April 2005, KMA filed a motion to bifurcate, seeking separate trials on common issues from issues that it identified as individual, i.e., defect manifestation, notice and opportunity to cure, causation, and damages. According to KMA, its request was for a court order confirming that issues of fact and law identified by KMA [t]herein [would] be adjudicated in future, class-member-specific proceedings, in the event that [Bassett] prevail[ed] in the . . . common issue trial. See KMA's Motion to Bifurcate, 4/25/05, at 14, 19. The trial court denied the motion and stated that class members' entitlement to recover[,] if plaintiff class prevails, shall be determined at class proceedings. Tr. Ct. Order, 5/16/05. Thereafter, the parties proceeded to trial and Bassett introduced evidence to prove the claims of all the members of the class. On May 25 and 26, 2005, the trial court conferred in chambers with both parties regarding their requested jury instructions and the jury verdict sheet, and sought to provide prompt resolution to the parties' objections. The court described its jury instructions and jury questions in terms of amount sustained by each class member, inter alia, for repair expenses as a result of defendant's breach of warranty. The trial court asked if there were any objections to the questions on the jury verdict form as explained and KMA's counsel responded No, Your Honor. N.T., 5/25/05, Vol. 7, at 70-73. Both the jury instructions and the verdict form reflected the discussion in chambers. Indeed, after providing a description of the damages requested by the class in its charge to the jury, the court explained: [b]ecause you're rendering a verdict for each class member, I will take care of making sure that the Class members recover. At sidebar, immediately after the damages instruction, the court again asked attorneys for both parties if there were any objections to the charge and the attorneys responded in the negative. N.T., 5/26/05, Vol. 3, at 50-53. The court then released the jury for deliberations. The questions on the verdict sheet, in relevant part and with the jury's answers, read: Question No. 1: Did [KMA] breach its express warranty on the cars purchased by the class? X Yes___________ No    Question No. 5: State the amount of damages if any, sustained by each Class member: b) For repair expenses, reasonably incurred, as a result of [KMA]'s breach of warranty. $ 600.00 Jury Verdict Special Interrogatories, 5/27/05; accord N.T., 5/27/05, Verdict, at 3-8. After the trial court recorded the jury's answers to the questions on the verdict slip, the court multiplied the $600 damages award by the agreed-upon number of class members9,402and recorded a verdict of $5,641,200 on behalf of the class. After dismissing the jury, the court asked the parties if there was anything further they wished to address at that time. Counsel for KMA answered No, Your Honor. Thanks to the Court. The court concluded proceedings. N.T., 5/27/05, Verdict, at 4-8. On appeal, KMA concedes that it raised an objection to the molding of the verdict premised on the May 16th Order for the first time in its post-trial motion, re-asserted it in its Rule 1925(b) statement, and argues that such an objection afforded the trial court sufficient opportunity to correct its error. In the Rule 1925(b) statement, KMA asserted that Bassett had consented to undertake post-verdict claims proceedings to determine each class member's entitlement to recover, yet the trial court  sua sponte and in derogation of its own order on bifurcation, transformed this bifurcated class action trial into a unitary verdict in favor of the class. The manufacturer also raised an alternate, facially contradictory, argument that [t]he time for determining whether class members have claims against KMA is at trial, not `at claims proceedings' following trial and verdict. KMA's Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, ¶ 3. KMA had initially asserted the latter, but not the former, argument in its post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. KMA's Motion for Post-Trial Relief, ¶ 9. On appeal, KMA insists that absent reversal and decertification of the class, KMA's due process rights will have been violated. KMA's Brief at 30-32; KMA's Reply Brief at 12 n. 12. [30] We disagree with KMA that its objection, which it concedes was offered for the first time in a post-trial motion, was timely under the circumstances. Under prevailing Pennsylvania law, a timely objection is required to preserve an issue for appeal. Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1(b)(1) & n.; Pa.R.A.P. 302; Straub v. Cherne Indus., 583 Pa. 608, 880 A.2d 561, 567 (2005); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116-17 (1974). Here, KMA failed to object to the verdict sheets when composed and offered to the jury, to the related jury charge, or, at the latest, contemporaneous with the actual molding of the verdict. As a result, the issue of whether the May 16th Order precluded the trial court from molding the verdict was waived. The substance of the trial court's May 16th Order does not affect this conclusion. This Court's Straub decision is particularly instructive. In Straub, after the parties rested, the trial court discussed the verdict sheets with the parties and stated that it aimed to explain to the jury that the plaintiffs were forwarding two independent claims, and that the plaintiffs could win on one claim but lose on the other or vice versa. The parties agreed and the trial court issued its instruction. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on one claim but not on the second. The defendant did not object to the jury questionnaire, the trial court's instructions, or the jury's verdict. Then, in post-trial motions, the defendant sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that once the jury found that the product was not defective respecting the first claim, it should have found in its favor on all counts. The trial court did not rule on the post-verdict motions and entered judgment on the verdict; the Superior Court reversed and remanded. This Court, however, held that the Superior Court erred in rejecting the plaintiffs' waiver argument and reversed. We concluded that the defendant premised its claim of error on the argument that the jury's verdict was incompatible with a principle of law. But, this alleged error should have been evident when the verdict sheets and the trial instructions were agreed upon and formulated. Yet, the defendant did not object to the verdict sheets, to the trial court's related instructions, or to the verdict itself when it was rendered. By failing to object, the defendant had waived its claim. 880 A.2d at 567. Here, we have a similar scenario. KMA argues that the molded verdict was incompatible with the May 16th Order, which it poses as the law of the case, and upon which it claims it relied to allegedly forego pursuit of undisclosed defenses to the class claims. [31] Pursuant to Straub, however, this so-called reliance was not sufficient to excuse KMA's obligation to raise a timely objection when, in its view (as alleged now), the court acted contrary to the prior order. KMA should have objected contemporaneously to the jury questionnaire or, at the latest, contemporaneously to the actual molding of the verdict in order to give the trial court a contemporaneous opportunity to address the alleged error and to preserve the present issue for appeal. Indeed, the object of contemporaneous objection requirements respecting trial-related issues is to allow the court to take corrective measures and thereby to avert the time and expense of appeals or new trials. See Criswell v. King, 575 Pa. 34, 834 A.2d 505, 509-10 (2003) (listing policy considerations behind contemporaneous objection requirement). KMA simply did not do that here. As a result, the manufacturer's claim of error in the molding of the verdict, premised upon a supposed inconsistency with the May 16th order, is waived for failure to record a contemporaneous objection.