Opinion ID: 2365445
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute and Instructions

Text: Defendant raises several challenges to California's death penalty statute and penalty phase jury instructions based on various provisions of the federal Constitution. We reaffirm the decisions that have rejected those claims, and decline to reconsider them, as follows: The absence of intercase proportionality review does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 227; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 48 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591]; see Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871].) The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating circumstances, or that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate punishment. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 753 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145].) The high court's recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee ( Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [160 L.Ed.2d 621, 125 S.Ct. 738]; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [59 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428]; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348]) do not alter these conclusions. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 227; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 44.) Brown v. Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212 [163 L.Ed.2d 723, 126 S.Ct. 884], has no bearing on this issue. In that case, the high court held a reviewing court's invalidation of one or more special circumstances did not render a California death sentence unconstitutional where other special circumstances existed that made the defendant death eligible. The case says nothing about any burden of proof at the penalty phase of a capital case. The lack of any burden of proof or persuasion as to penalty does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, and the trial court does not have to instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof or persuasion. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 227; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 44; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753.) Jury unanimity as to aggravating circumstances is not required. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 227; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 43.) The trial court does not have to instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof or requirement of jury unanimity as to mitigating circumstances or that there is a presumption that life without possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44; see People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 852-853 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].) CALJIC No. 8.88, the instruction that defines the jury's sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process, is not unconstitutional for (1) failing to inform the jury that, if it finds the circumstances in mitigation outweigh those in aggravation, it is required to return a verdict of life in prison without the possibility of parole; (2) failing to inform the jury it must find the death penalty to be the appropriate penalty, not just the warranted penalty; or (3) using the phrase so substantial. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 42-43; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 124 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 465 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].) Further, although the terms aggravating and mitigating are commonly understood and do not require further elaboration ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 54-55 [252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249]), CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately defines mitigation ( People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 304 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459, 226 P.3d 949]; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 817 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1]). Defendant's argument that jurors would not understand the instruction's definition of aggravation is based entirely on studies not presented to the trial court. We presume that the jurors understood and followed the instruction notwithstanding empirical assertions to the contrary based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to cross examination. ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in determining the appropriate penalty, is neither vague nor overbroad, and it does not impermissibly permit arbitrary and capricious sentencing. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976, 979 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b) ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228), jury unanimity regarding such conduct is not required ( People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 800 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548]), and factor (b) is not unconstitutionally vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 976.) The trial court was not constitutionally required to instruct the jury that certain sentencing factors can be considered only in mitigation, and CALJIC No. 8.85's instruction to the jury to consider whether or not certain mitigating factors were present did not unconstitutionally suggest that the absence of such factors was aggravating. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 42.) Written jury findings regarding aggravating factors are not constitutionally required. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 43.) The use of the adjective extreme in section 190.3, factor (d), is not unconstitutional. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228; People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 801.) Nothing in Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman (2007) 550 U.S. 233 [167 L.Ed.2d 585, 127 S.Ct. 1654], or Brewer v. Quarterman (2007) 550 U.S. 286 [167 L.Ed.2d 622, 127 S.Ct. 1706], which applied the holding of Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 [106 L.Ed.2d 256, 109 S.Ct. 2934], in the context of the Texas sentencing scheme, alters this result. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1005-1006 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171] [§ 190.3, factors (d), (h) & (k) satisfy Penry 's requirement that the instructions permit the jury to give mitigating effect to evidence of a defendant's mental condition].) The death penalty law does not violate equal protection by denying capital defendants certain procedural safeguards that are afforded to noncapital defendants because the two categories of defendants are not similarly situated. ( People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 758 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 192, 229 P.3d 101]; People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 968 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 224 P.3d 877].) Section 190.2, which sets out the special circumstances that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, adequately narrows the class of eligible offenders in conformity with the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 926 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528].) Prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to seek the death penalty in a given case does not render the law unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary. ( People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 366.) Justice Blackmun's dissent from the high court's denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins (1994) 510 U.S. 1141 [127 L.Ed.2d 435, 114 S.Ct. 1127], does not convince us that the death penalty is so arbitrary or unreliable as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. ( People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1255 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321].) Similarly, the increasing barriers to postconviction relief in state and federal courts, as outlined by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Sawyer v. Whitley (1992) 505 U.S. 333, 357-360 [120 L.Ed.2d 269, 112 S.Ct. 2514], do not provide a basis for relief on direct appeal. ( People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 758; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 44 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229].) The slow pace of executions in California, which defendant contends is similar to the conditions condemned by Judge Noonan in his dissenting opinion in Jeffers v. Lewis (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 411, 425-427, does not render our system unconstitutionally arbitrary. ( People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 758-759; People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 44-45.) The alleged inconsistency between regular imposition of the death penalty and international norms of human decency does not render that penalty cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 47-48); nor does regular imposition of the death penalty violate the Eighth Amendment on the ground that `[i]nternational law is a part of our law' ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 755). To the extent defendant contends the errors and due process violations that occurred at his trial also violate international law, his claim fails because we have found no such errors or due process violations. International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. ( People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228; People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 366.)