Opinion ID: 682711
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MSHA's Interpretation of 30 C.F.R. Sec. 50.2(e).

Text: 17 Secondary to the argument that the regulation misinterprets the statute, petitioner contends that MSHA's interpretation of the regulation, as making reportable lost-time accidents which occur at the mine but are not otherwise work-related, is unreasonable. Specifically, petitioner argues that the Secretary's interpretation impermissibly conflicts with related Part 50 regulations. First, Sec. 50.20(a) requires reporting of each occupational injury ... at the mine. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 50.20(a). Energy West asserts that, in order to give effect to each word in that regulation, occupational must mean something other than at the mine. Instead, it must mean work-related. As applied in this case, because Hammond's automobile accident injury was not work-related, petitioner's interpretation would mean that MSHA's citation was improper. 18 On the question of regulatory interpretation, we accord great deference to interpretations such as this one advanced by the Secretary and accepted by the Commission. Secretary of Labor v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 1432, 1435 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Secretary's interpretation of Mine Act regulations is emphatically due deference even when it conflicts with Commission interpretation). Our task is not to determine whether the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation charged to his administration is the one we would reach if deciding the question as a matter of first impression. Rather, we will defer to the Secretary's interpretation of his regulations unless it is clearly erroneous. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-02, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). Here the Secretary's interpretation by no means fails that standard. 19 We reject the contention that the Secretary's interpretation renders the language of Sec. 50.20(a) superfluous. Rather, the term occupational, as construed by the Secretary, focuses on the protection of miners, as opposed to those at the mine site for other reasons. See 30 C.F.R. Sec. 50.2(e) ([o]ccupational injury involves only an injury to a miner). Injuries to trespassers or visitors are not occupational, and thus not the concern of the Secretary under his interpretation. 20 Energy West also asserts that the Secretary should interpret occupational injury and occupational illness consistently. The Secretary's definition of occupational illness has a work-relatedness requirement. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 50.2(f) (occupational illness is any illness or disease of a miner which may have resulted from work at a mine....). Consequently, the Secretary should import the causal nexus requirement into his interpretation of occupational injury. This does not necessarily follow. There are legitimate reasons why the Secretary might interpret the two provisions differently. The situs of an injury is much easier to determine than the situs of an illness. It is unnecessary to determine whether an injury is work-related in order to conclude that it falls within the Secretary's authority to regulate health and safety conditions at the mine. The onset of an illness as opposed to an injury is a transitory, often gradual event with little geographic definition or significance. The fact that an illness occurs in or out of the mine or both says little about the Secretary's authority to regulate related health and safety concerns. This difference between illnesses and injuries justifies, if indeed it does not suggest, a different construction of the adjective occupational when used to limit each of those nouns in the context of defining the Secretary's authority to regulate related health and safety concerns. 21 The Secretary's geographic interpretation of occupational injury finds further support in the Mine Act's definition of mine. The Mine Act defines coal or other mine as (A) an area of land from which minerals are extracted, ... [and], (B) private ways and roads appurtenant to such area.... 30 U.S.C. Sec. 802(h)(1) (1988). The Secretary's application of the occupational injury definition--an injury to a miner which occurs at the mine--to a miner's injury which occurs on a road leading to the mine parking lot is consistent with this statutory definition. 22 Petitioner also argues that MSHA's interpretation frustrates the purpose of Part 50, which it defines as computation of injury rate data. In order to develop and maintain health and safety standards in the industry, the Secretary employs information concerning occupational injuries in determining a statistical incidence rate. See 30 C.F.R. Sec. 50.1. That incidence rate is defined as the number of injury cases per hour of employee exposure. Id. Energy West contends that dividing all injuries that occur at the mine, including those that occur before a miner reports to work, by hours of employee exposure, which includes only hours on the job, produces an inherently flawed injury incidence rate. Thus, the Secretary's interpretation here is unreasonable. While we note that the Secretary's interpretation may lead to some distortion in the incidence rate, our task is not to determine whether the interpretation results in a perfect fit. Requiring the reporting of on-site, off-the-clock injuries to miners is not unreasonable, even assuming distortion of the incidence rates, because calculating incidence rates is not the sole purpose for the reporting requirements. In addition to determining statistical rates based upon injury reports, the Secretary uses the information to determine whether measures might be taken to prevent additional injuries of the same kind. In this case, the Secretary might have concluded that a different type of guardrail would prevent future injuries of the kind suffered by Hammond. It is within his authority to require this information to carry out his statutory duty to promulgate and enforce health and safety standards. 23 MSHA's interpretation and the FMSHRC decision applying it are consistent with longstanding Commission precedent. In Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1577 (1984), MSHA cited a mine operator for failing to report a miner's back injury which occurred on mine property an hour before the beginning of the miner's shift as he was putting on his work boots. Id. at 1578. The Commission upheld the citation, reasoning that the regulations do not require a showing of a causal nexus. Id. at 1579. In considering whether an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is permissible, the consistency with which that interpretation has been applied in the past weighs heavily in the agency's favor. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1989). In issuing the citation here, MSHA simply concludes that causal nexus is not required under 30 C.F.R. Sec. 50.2(e). MSHA has maintained this position since at least 1984. Its position is entitled to deference as a reasonable, consistently maintained interpretation of MSHA regulations. 24