Opinion ID: 782173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actionable Statements

Text: I must part company with the majority opinion, however, on the question of which statements are actionable. There are dozens of allegedly actionable statements in this case. Both the majority and the dissent analyze these statements as a whole, using an all-or-nothing approach. I believe that each statement must be considered separately against the standard outlined above. Under this analysis, 2 only two of the statements withstand CU's motion for summary judgment. 1 The first of these appeared in an August 20, 1996, CU Background Paper: In 1988, we developed the short course because we discovered that the Suzuki Samurai, then undergoing testing, showed a propensity to roll over during our long course AM maneuver. (Emphasis added.) The evidence detailed in the majority opinion is sufficient to allow a rational jury to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that CU developed the short course before discovering a rollover propensity and in order to create a rollover propensity, not because of it. 2 The second potentially actionable statement appeared in CU's January 1996 anniversary issue: 1986 CU buys its own auto test track in rural Connecticut. Two years later, based on tests conducted there, CONSUMER REPORTS discovers that the Suzuki Samurai easily rolls over in turns and rates it Not Acceptable. (Emphasis added.) The evidence in the summary judgment record would allow a reasonable jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that what CU discovered was that the Suzuki Samurai did not roll over easily in turns, but had to be coaxed. For the reasons explained here and in the majority's opinion, Suzuki has presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that CU made those two statements with actual malice. Summary judgment with respect to those statements was inappropriate. Notes: 1 In this case, the credibility of a number of CU's employees is of paramount importance to the actual malice inquiry. Further, were the jury at trial to disbelieve those employees' explanations of statements made during the testing process, this court could not question the jury's finding See Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that the independent examination rule does not mean we give jury findings no weight; on questions of credibility, which the jury is uniquely qualified to answer, we defer.); see also Bose, 466 U.S. at 498, 499-500, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (noting that the independent examination rule is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)'s mandate that `due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses'). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party at summary judgment is particularly important in cases such as this one, where the jury could choose to disbelieve the testimony of the moving party's witnesses. 2 Suzuki's claims are untimely with respect to many statements. Others fail to meet the exacting summary judgment standard used in a First Amendment case