Opinion ID: 1095462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: anderson, frazier and nunnally

Text: These defendants all serve in the Legislature. We have answered Anderson's claim that the Ethics Commission did not have authority to litigate. Anderson has only one other assignment of error, which is also argued by Frazier and by Nunnally, that the appropriation bills did not authorize their contracts. In addition to what we stated in Cassibry and above in this opinion in answer to this contention, it would denigrate the awesome importance, meaning and purpose of appropriation laws in the Legislature to accept the interpretation urged by the defendants. In the absence of some grave emergency, no state official, however supreme, has the power to obligate this state to pay one dollar without there having been an appropriation therefor. [19] See, e.g., Dickinson v. Edmondson, 120 Ark. 80, 178 S.W. 930, 931 (1915); Burr v. City of San Francisco, 186 Cal. 508, 199 P. 1034, 1036 (1921); McDougall v. Board of Comm'rs, 49 P.2d 663, 666 (Wyo. 1935). The governmental bodies contracting with these defendants could not have made payment under the contracts without these appropriations. These appropriation bills were laws. Cassibry, 404 So.2d 1360, 1366 (Miss. 1981). They were laws passed while these gentlemen served in the Legislature. Their contracts were made while they were in the Legislature. Thus, they squarely fit the prohibition of § 109. Frazier makes two other assignments of error. He asserts the suit against him was moot, which we find without merit. Frazier has taught part-time at Jackson State University since 1976. See: Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1982); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303, 1309 (1953); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642, 649 (1979). Also, there is a public interest exception in this case. See Sartin v. Barlow, 196 Miss. 159, 16 So.2d 372 (1944); M.T. Reed Construction Co. v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, 227 So.2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1969); Fordice v. Warren County Board of Education, 245 So.2d 201, 203 (Miss. 1971). We likewise find no substance to Frazier's contention there was a factual issue as to whether his salary came from the state appropriations. [20] Nunnally argues in addition that the appropriation bills authorizing his contract were general appropriation bills and not specific like the appropriation in Cassibry. While it is correct that in Cassibry we did not address whether a general appropriation bill should be treated differently from other appropriation bills of the Legislature, and there is some support for Nunnally's contention in State, ex. rel . Baca v. Otero, 33 N.M. 310, 267 P. 68 (1928), we cannot see such a distinction between House Bill No. 1172 (Chapter 165, Mississippi Laws 1984), which appropriated the funds necessary for a major portion of Nunnally's salary, and Senate Bill No. 2985 (Chapter 209, Mississippi Laws 1984), which appropriated the funds necessary for Anderson's and Frazier's salaries, as to require a different holding under § 109 in his case. Frazier and Anderson make no claim that their appropriation was general, as indeed it was not. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma faced a virtually identical case as here in State v. Board of Education of Dependent School District No. D-38, 389 P.2d 356 (Okla. 1964). Article 5, Section 23 of the Oklahoma Constitution stated in pertinent part: ... nor shall any member, during the term for which he shall have been elected, or within two years thereafter, be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with the State, or any county or other subdivision thereof, authorized by law passed during the term for which he shall have been elected. During State Representative Settles' term, the state legislature appropriated $52,500,000 for the support and maintenance of the public schools of Oklahoma. The local school district received approximately 85% of its funds from the state, and about 93% of the district's expenditures were for salaries of school teachers. The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the above-quoted clause of its constitution had never been directly construed by that court, if indeed construction is necessary. 389 P.2d at 359. That court held Settles was in violation of its state's constitution. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held, as we have held, that the appropriation bill was necessary to make Settles' school contract legal and binding, and therefore his school contract violated the state constitution. See generally Norbeck & Nicholson Co. v. State, 32 S.D. 189, 142 N.W. 847 (1913); Lillard v. Freestone County, 23 Tex.Civ.App. 363, 57 S.W. 338 (1900). Also, as we have noted above, Nunnally was a member of the Legislative session setting teachers' minimum salaries statewide, and a major portion of his compensation is paid by the state rather than the local school district. Nunnally makes the additional argument that his interest, being one of a class, is de minimis. This is a troublesome question, not however because his interest is de minimis. The term de minimis non curat lex means the law cares not for small things. If only a small portion of Nunnally's salary, as opposed to virtually all, came from the appropriation bill, he might have an argument. For here again, it would insult the common sense of the 1890 Constitutional Convention that they intended any interpretation of § 109 to trickle down to triviality. Yet, what about Nunnally's being but one of a large class of individuals who will benefit from this appropriation? Unfortunately for Nunnally, § 109 makes no exception for members of a large class. We must give weight to the words of § 109, and this is precisely how the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted that state's virtually identical constitutional provision involving a general appropriation bill. We must agree that it is relentlessly severe to conclude § 109 means no employed public school teacher can serve in the Legislature. Yet § 109 is just as plain in its restriction as the Oklahoma constitution. We cannot hold that applying § 109 to employed public school teachers goes beyond any rational purpose or intent of its authors. Even if we were inclined to view § 109 as Nunnally argues, this court cannot overlook the vote of the people of this State in 1984 and 1986 when amendments to § 109 which would clearly have authorized these defendants' conduct were soundly rejected by the people. Can we give an interpretation to § 109 which, when presented to the people for their approval, was soundly rejected? To do so would be an affront to Article 3, Sections 5 and 6 which declare all governmental power is vested in and derived from the people. The people were not asked to repeal § 109, but were asked to amend it so that it would read a certain way. They rejected that certain way. We cannot hold their rejection meaningless to any interpretation of § 109.