Opinion ID: 575310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Interpretation Of Section 621(a)(2) Creates Substantial Constitutional Difficulties

Text: 15 This court will avoid any interpretation of a federal statute which raises serious constitutional problems or results in an unconstitutional construction. This canon of statutory interpretation is well-established in the case law. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2501, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988); United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir.1984); Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida For Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir.1982). The district court's construction of Section 621(a)(2) creates serious questions regarding the potential unconstitutional taking of McNeil's private property. Therefore, this court is wary of such an interpretation. 16
17 If Section 621(a)(2) authorized Smyrna Cable to construct its cable system on McNeil's private property regardless of the presence of any compatible easements, we would have little difficulty in finding the provision in violation of the Fifth Amendment. After all, under such facts Section 621(a)(2) would be indistinguishable from the New York statute analyzed in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982). In Loretto, the New York law at issue provided that an owner of a multi-unit apartment building must permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities upon his property. Id. at 421, 102 S.Ct. at 3168. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall concluded that such a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve. Id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for a determination of the amount of compensation due the property owner. 18 Loretto, then, stands for the proposition that the government may not require (without providing for just compensation) a property owner to grant access to a third party so that the third party can permanently occupy the owner's premises. The rationale of Loretto is simple. The most fundamental private property right is the owner's ability to exclude others. See, e.g., id. at 433, 102 S.Ct. at 3175; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3145, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80, 100 S.Ct. 383, 393, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). When the government appropriates an owner's right to exclude another's physical presence without paying the owner just compensation, the government violates the Takings Clause. 19 2. The district court interpreted Section 621(a)(2) in a manner which may usurp an owner's right to exclude. 20 Of course, the district court did not construe Section 621(a)(2) to permit a franchised cable company to access and occupy another's property under all circumstances. Rather, the court ruled that Section 621(a)(2) only permits such a physical occupation when the property owner has privately agreed to allow other occupations which would be compatible with a government-sanctioned occupation by a cable company. Given that the government may not appropriate a property owner's right to exclude, the takings issue created by the district court's interpretation is whether the government may appropriate the right to exclude whenever the owner selectively relinquishes that right by permitting a compatible occupation. 21 We decline to reach this takings issue today. We note only that if Section 621(a)(2) authorized such an occupation by a franchised cable company, this court would have substantial reservations regarding the constitutionality of the Cable Act. Crucial to our trepidation is the fact that the district court's construction of Section 621(a)(2) effectively permits exactly the same occupation found impermissible in Loretto--the permanent physical presence of a franchised cable company inside private apartment buildings against the express wishes of the property owner. Because every modern apartment building is linked to electric, telephone, and/or video programming services, the district court's interpretation effectively grants franchised cable companies the same unencumbered right of access to private property which the Supreme Court held to be a compensable taking in Loretto. Indeed, in this case, McNeil could only prevent Smyrna Cable's physical occupation if McNeil also denied its residents the benefits of service from Georgia Power, Southern Bell, and ODC. We doubt whether the government may so condition a property owner's right to exclude. Cf. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439 & n.17, 102 S.Ct. at 3178 & n.17. 22 The government could not force a beachfront property owner to provide an easement in favor of the general public so that all could access the owner's beach. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831, 107 S.Ct. at 3145. Could the government instead legislate that if the beachfront owner allowed his neighbors to cross his beach, he must also allow the public at large to cross? Similarly, the state could not force landlords to allow third parties to build swimming pools on the rooftops of the landlords' apartment buildings. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436, 102 S.Ct. at 3176. Could the state instead pass a law providing that if a landlord set aside space for one swimming pool company, he must also allow access to that same space for a competing swimming pool company? Admittedly, these analogies are less than perfect. However, the illustrations adequately demonstrate the constitutional difficulties engendered by the district court's interpretation of Section 621(a)(2). 23 A property owner's right to exclude another's physical presence must be tenaciously guarded by the courts. The district court's resolution of this case failed to recognize this fundamental principle of private property. Because the district court's interpretation of Section 621(a)(2) creates significant constitutional problems regarding the government's ability to condition a property owner's right to exclude, we must search for a construction of the Cable Act more consistent with the demands of the Takings Clause. 24