Opinion ID: 460188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Geyen's Challenge to His Activation and the Denial of His Hardship Applications

Text: 8 Geyen's first cause of action presents two issues: First, does the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(a) (1982) govern this action? If so, when did Geyen's action accrue for purposes of Sec. 2401(a)? 9
10 Amicus 4 argues that Sec. 2401(a) does not apply to this action because the statute governs only actions for damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2), and because Geyen's action is not against the United States. We reject both arguments. 5 11
12 Amicus offers considerable legislative history to support its contention that Sec. 2401(a) applies only to Tucker Act actions. This history demonstrates, according to amicus, that the predecessor of Sec. 2401(a) applied only to Tucker Act claims and that when Congress enacted Sec. 2401(a) in 1948 as part of the Judicial Code, it intended to retain this restriction. Several federal courts have rejected the argument that Sec. 2401(a) applies only to Tucker Act actions. See Christensen v. United States, 755 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir.1985); Walters, 725 F.2d at 111-14; Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 850 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 327, 83 L.Ed.2d 264 (1984); Werner v. United States, 188 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1951). 13 Moreover, amicus' analysis of Sec. 2401(a)'s legislative history, although extensive, is incomplete. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, accomplished the merger of law and equity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, 2. Congress undoubtedly took account of this merger when it replaced the word suit in the statutory predecessor of Sec. 2401(a) with the phrase every civil action in the current statute. See Saffron v. Department of the Navy, 561 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C.Cir.1977) (McGowan, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033, 98 S.Ct. 765, 54 L.Ed.2d 780 (1978); Werner, 188 F.2d at 268. This change in language indicates Congress' intent that Sec. 2401(a) apply to both legal and equitable actions. Thus, we reject amicus' contention that Sec. 2401(a) applies only to Tucker Act actions. 14
15 Amicus argues that an action such as Geyen's against a federal official alleging that the official has acted unlawfully and seeking injunctive relief is not an action ... against the United States within the meaning of Sec. 2401(a). Before 1976 this ultra vires theory might have been valid; to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity, courts indulged in the fiction that a federal official acting in violation of the Constitution or beyond his statutory powers was acting for himself only and not as an agent of government. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22, 83 S.Ct. 999, 1007, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1461-62, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). 16 In 1976, however, Congress waived sovereign immunity for suits seeking nonmonetary relief through nonstatutory judicial review of agency action. Act. of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-574, Sec. 1, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 (1982)). The principal purpose of this amendment was to do away with the ultra vires doctrine and other fictions surrounding sovereign immunity. As the House Report notes, Actions challenging official conduct are intrinsically against the United States and are now treated as such for all practical purposes. H.R.Rep. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6121, 6131. 17 Were we to hold, as amicus urges, that Geyen's action is not against the United States, we would revive the technical complexities that Congress sought to eliminate in 1976. We decline to do so. We hold that Geyen's action challenging his activation and the denial of his hardship applications is against the United States and subject to Sec. 2401(a)'s six-year limitation.
18 Geyen contends that his first cause of action accrued in 1982 when he exhausted his administrative remedies. He notes that this Court requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before military action may be reviewed in federal court, Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417, 419-20 (5th Cir.1974), and cites cases in which other courts requiring exhaustion have held that a serviceman's action challenging his discharge accrues when the ABCMR takes its final action. Lichtenfels v. Orr, 604 F.Supp. 271, 276 (S.D.Ohio 1984); Kaiser v. Secretary of the Navy, 525 F.Supp. 1226, 1229-30 (D.Colo.1981). 19 Appellees urge that Geyen's action accrued, at the latest, in 1972 when he was discharged. They acknowledge the exhaustion requirement, but contend that the proper approach is to toll the statute of limitations while agency proceedings are pending. They point to several cases that have adopted this approach. Nichols, 721 F.2d at 660; Mosley v. Secretary of the Navy, 522 F.Supp. 1165, 1167 n. 5 (E.D.Pa.1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 823 (3d Cir.1982). 20 Section 2401(a) must be read with due regard to those practical ends which are to be served by any limitation of the time within which an action must be brought. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517, 87 S.Ct. 1177, 1185, 18 L.Ed.2d 256 (1967) (quoting Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 62, 46 S.Ct. 405, 406, 70 L.Ed. 835 (1926)). The principal purpose of statutes of limitations is to protect defendants and courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). 21 Were we to find that Geyen's challenge to his activation and the denial of his hardship applications accrued in 1982 when the ABCMR decided not to upgrade his discharge, we would defeat the purpose of Sec. 2401(a)'s six-year limitation. The district court found that records concerning Geyen's case are missing and noted the difficulty in reconstructing events surrounding his activation and the denial of his hardship applications. Moreover, the ABCMR may in the interest of justice review and correct any military record, no matter how long ago the alleged error or injustice occurred. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552(b) (1982); see, e.g., Ballenger v. Marsh, 708 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.1983) (ABCMR considers petition in 1959 to remedy alleged injustice that occurred in 1923). Under Geyen's theory, a serviceman dishonorably discharged in 1985 could petition the ADRB for an upgrade within fifteen years, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1553(a) (1982), seek review from the ABCMR twenty years later in the interest of justice, and then, having exhausted his administrative remedies, seek review of the 1985 discharge in federal court within six years of the ABCMR's decision. Thus, in the year 2026 a federal court could find itself entertaining an action involving events that occurred in 1985. 22 We reject the rule that Geyen proposes. We hold that Geyen's first cause of action accrued, at the latest, upon his discharge in 1972. Although we agree with the Ninth Circuit that the statute of limitations should be tolled when a serviceman is exhausting his remedies before military review boards, Nichols, 721 F.2d at 660, the tolling does not help Geyen. Between his discharge in 1972 and his complaint in the district court in 1983, more than seven years elapsed during which he was not before any military review board and was not under any disability that would toll the running of the statute. We hold, therefore, that Geyen's first cause of action is barred by Sec. 2401(a)'s six-year limitation. 23