Opinion ID: 220374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lamontagne’s Claim

Text: Here, Lamontagne has not shown that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Lamontagne’s theory of his ineffective assistance claim rests on the assumption that he had a viable motion to exclude the child pornography found on his computer from being admissible in his child molestation case. Because this assumption is faulty, the state court correctly concluded that Lamontagne could not show either deficient performance or resulting prejudice. Under Florida law, similar fact evidence of other crimes, referred to as Williams Rule evidence, “is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in 8 issue” such as motive, intent, preparation or plan. Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(a). If the State intends to rely on Williams Rule evidence, it must give written notice to the defendant’s counsel “no fewer than 10 days before trial,” unless the evidence is to be “used for impeachment or on rebuttal.” Id. § 404(2)(c)(1). However, the failure to provide such notice is subject to harmless error analysis and is not reversible error unless the defendant establishes actual prejudice or unfair surprise. Barbee v. State, 630 So. 2d 655, 655-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting defendant’s argument that State must strictly comply with ten-day notice requirement and concluding trial court correctly held hearing to determine whether violation resulted in prejudice or harm to the defendant); State v. Paille, 601 So. 2d 1321, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding lack of notice harmless error where defendant knew of other crime evidence and possibility that State would introduce it at trial). Evidence of other crimes that are “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense is admissible as “a relevant and inseparable part of the act” that is necessary “to adequately describe the deed.” Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994). This evidence is not considered Williams Rule evidence and is not subject to the statutory ten-day notice requirement. Id. The undisputed facts in the record show that: (1) the evidence of child 9 pornography was found on Lamontagne’s computer; (2) Lamontagne confessed to downloading some of the child pornography the day before he committed the charged child molestation offenses; and (3) in fact, during the charged child molestation offenses, Lamontagne took photographs of the child victim’s genitalia. At a minimum, the evidence of child pornography with young children on his computer at exactly the same time of his child molestation conduct involving a six-year-old victim was admissible similar fact evidence of other crimes under § 90.404(2)(a) as relevant to show Lamontagne’s motive, intent and preparation. Therefore, a motion to exclude the evidence as inadmissible character evidence would almost certainly have failed. Further, the record indisputably shows that: (1) the State gave Lamontagne’s trial counsel actual notice of its intent to introduce the evidence at trial when trial counsel took the victim’s deposition in March 2004; and (2) his trial counsel was given an opportunity to inspect the photographs before Lamontagne’s May 2004 plea hearing. As such, Lamontagne could not have shown unfair surprise or prejudice to his trial preparation. Given the close timeframe and Lamontagne’s own use of a camera during the charged offenses, it is arguable that possession of the images Lamontagne downloaded the night before he committed the charged offenses constituted inseparable other crimes not subject 10 to the ten-day notice requirement. Either way, the trial court would not have excluded the child pornography evidence for failure to comply with § 90.404(2)(c)’s ten-day notice requirement. In sum, it is very unlikely a motion to exclude the child pornography evidence would have been successful. Therefore, under the Strickland standard, trial counsel’s advice to Lamontagne during plea negotiations was reasonable and did not prejudice Lamontagne with respect to his decision to plead nolo contendere rather than proceed to trial. Given that the undisputed facts show that the state court did not act contrary to, or unreasonably apply, Strickland in rejecting Lamontagne’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lamontagne’s § 2254 petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 812 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is not required unless [the petitioner] can demonstrate that his factual allegations, if proven, would indicate that the state courts acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established law when they rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”).6 AFFIRMED. 6 Lamontagne claims we should not give the state court’s summary decision AEDPA deference. However, even reviewing Lamontagne’s ineffective assistance claim de novo, we would reach the same result. 11