Opinion ID: 2618299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Damage to the plaintiff resulting from such reliance.

Text: Id. at 599, 540 P.2d at 117. Summary judgment as to the fraud claim is proper. First, Bulbman fails to raise a genuine issue concerning whether Nevada Bell either knowingly made false representations or lacked sufficient basis for making the representations. Nevada Bell's representations to Bulbman about the cost of Centrex and the installation time are estimates and opinions based on past experience with the system. As such, these representations are not actionable in fraud. See Clark Sanitation v. Sun Valley Disposal, 87 Nev. 338, 487 P.2d 337 (1971). Nevada Bell's representations as to the reliability and performance of the system constitute mere commendatory sales talk about the product (puffing), also not actionable in fraud. See e.g., Coy v. Starling, 53 Or. App. 76, 630 P.2d 1323 (1981). Furthermore, in his deposition, Gerald Roth, Jr., testified that he did not believe Nevada Bell had intentionally lied to him about its Centrex system. Rather, Roth stated that Nevada Bell might have been more careful in making certain representations, particularly with respect to how long it would take to install a Centrex system. Roth's testimony establishes the absence of fraudulent intent on the part of Nevada Bell. Bulbman also fails to demonstrate a triable issue concerning whether Bulbman was induced to purchase Centrex by the alleged misrepresentations of Nevada Bell. The deposition testimony indicates that Bulbman based its decision to purchase Centrex solely on the advice of the independent telephone consultant retained by Bulbman. Where an essential element of a claim for relief is absent, the facts, disputed or otherwise, as to other elements are rendered immaterial and summary judgment is proper. See Sims v. General Telephone & Electric, 107 Nev. 516, 815 P.2d 151 (1991). Bulbman fails to demonstrate triable issues of material fact as to the essential elements of a fraud claim. At most, Bulbman's evidence presents a question of fact concerning the discrepancy between what Nevada Bell promised and what Nevada Bell actually performed. The mere failure to fulfill a promise or perform in the future, however, will not give rise to a fraud claim absent evidence that the promisor had no intention to perform at the time the promise was made. Webb v. Clark, 274 Or. 387, 546 P.2d 1078 (1976). This case involves a routine commercial transaction, a purchase and sale of services. The intentional wrongful conduct required to convert a contract case into a fraud case cannot be found here. Or, as the trial court commented, the evidence in this case is simply not the stuff of an intentional tort sounding in fraud.