Opinion ID: 186155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Vindictiveness of the Court

Text: 45 Stanfield's final argument is that the revocation of his probation was a vindictive response to his challenge to the special condition that (prior to revision) barred him from all use of the internet. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2081 (1969), permits a presumption of vindictiveness when longer sentences are imposed on retrial, but only when there is a reasonable likelihood that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204-05, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the absence of such a reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness. Id. at 799-800, 109 S.Ct. at 2205 (citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3223, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984)). 46 Aside from Pearce itself, in which a longer sentence was imposed after a defendant successfully appealed his conviction, the Supreme Court has found a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness — and thus has applied a presumption of vindictiveness — in only one other circumstance: when a prosecutor added a new felony charge against a defendant seeking de novo review of a misdemeanor conviction. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2102, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). Stanfield urges us to extend the presumption of vindictiveness to situations in which a court revokes probation after a defendant brings a constitutional challenge — in the form of a motion to clarify — against a condition of the probation. Even if the Supreme Court had not indicated that it is chary about extending the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness when the likelihood of vindictiveness is not as pronounced as in Pearce and Blackledge,  Wasman, 468 U.S. at 566, 104 S.Ct. at 3221-22, we would be disinclined to extend the presumption to a case like the one before us. A motion to clarify is categorically different from a retrial or resentencing that occurs after a defendant has successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy, Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724, 89 S.Ct. at 2080. As the Court noted in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 1983, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973), the judge who has been reversed may have a personal stake in the prior conviction and [a] motivation to engage in self-vindication; any such concerns are certainly attenuated, and perhaps even absent, when a judge is himself merely asked to clarify an earlier ruling. 47 Even if a presumption of vindictiveness did apply in this case, it would be more than adequately rebutted. 4 See Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 141, 106 S.Ct. 976, 980, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) (Nothing in Pearce is to be read as precluding a rebuttal of intimations of vindictiveness.). The trial court articulated the reasons for its decision to revoke Stanfield's probation, including two violations that the court found to be willful and the severity of the underlying offense, as reflected in the initial prison term to which Stanfield could have been sentenced, HOV Tr. at 122-24; see Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572, 104 S.Ct. at 3225 (court may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings). Moreover, the court's statement at the initial sentencing — putting Stanfield on notice that any problems at all and I will hold you accountable.... I will revoke your probation and impose a period of incarceration — roundly defeats any suggestion that it was a vindictive response to the motion to clarify that led to the revocation. 48 A showing of actual vindictiveness is exceedingly difficult to make, Maddox v. Elzie, 238 F.3d 437, 446 (D.C.Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and Stanfield has not presented the required objective evidence that the court's action was motivated by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do, United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n. 12, 384, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2492 n. 12, 2494, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). The fact that the court converted the scheduled status hearing to a hearing on violation on April 25 (after Stanfield filed the motion to clarify the internet ban) does not show vindictiveness, since the court had already noted Stanfield's violation and informed the probation office before Stanfield filed the motion to clarify. 49 The court's knowledge of Stanfield's internet use during his probation also helps explain why the court stated the following at the hearing on violation: 50 All of this business, Mr. Stanfield, is not a game. It is not a game. When I told you not to use the Internet, you went through this whole group of machinations. Do not use the Internet. [Do] not have anybody else use the Internet for you in any way, shape or form. All of this is done in lieu of putting you in prison. You should welcome that kind of condition, given what it is a substitute for. 51 HOV Tr. at 126. Stanfield argues that the only machination the court could have had in mind was Stanfield's motion to clarify. Appellant Br. at 39. Not at all. In context, it is clear that the court was referring to the continued posting of Stanfield's poetry and e-mail addresses on the internet. 5 As explained in Stanfield's brief, his counsel had advised him that he could give copies of his writing to a friend for eventual posting on the internet; the district court contacted counsel on April 10, 2003 and stated that it considered such action to be an end-run around the internet ban. See id. at 4. In sum, Stanfield has fallen far short of the requirements for showing actual vindictiveness. 52