Opinion ID: 2982903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Trial Recess

Text: Johnson next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a recess or adjournment of the trial following the conclusion of the government’s case. Johnson submits that a recess would have afforded him time to consider whether he would take the witness stand in his own defense. This Court has granted district courts wide discretion when determining whether a district court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s request for a trial continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion. United States v. Lewis, 605 F.3d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2010). A district court’s denial of a continuance is typically considered an abuse of discretion only when it has made its ruling based on “an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Vasquez, 560 F.3d at 466 (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)). Further, in order for the district court’s ruling to warrant reversal, a defendant must show that the denial of the continuance caused him actual prejudice in the defense of his 12 case. To show actual prejudice, the defendant must establish that the continuance “would have made relevant witnesses available or added something to the defense.” United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 1997). Perhaps the primary reason that appellate courts accord trial courts such broad discretion with these decisions is the recognition that the trial court judge has the best perspective to make judgments about how a trial should proceed, based on his or her personal involvement in the broader context of the proceedings themselves. So it is in this case. The district judge had already been involved with the parties regarding the nature of the disputes between defense counsel and Johnson, including disputes as to whether it was advisable for Johnson to take the witness stand in his own defense. While the district court did not explicitly state his reasons for denying the continuance, the record is clear that he gave the defendant an opportunity to state his position and decided to deny the continuance based on the posture of the trial. See Doc. 41 at 120 (having a dialogue with the defendant regarding his right to testify and concluding that defendant should be ready to make a determination after several days of trial and numerous meetings with his attorney). Accordingly, we find an appropriate deference to the trial court’s judgment in this regard requires us to reach a conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s request for an over-the-weekend trial continuance.3 C. Failure to Comply with Sentence Enhancement Procedure Johnson next asserts that the district court failed to comply with the procedure required by 21 U.S.C. § 851(b), yet imposed an enhanced sentence upon him. In his brief, Johnson recognizes that this Circuit has held that violations of “the statute have been held harmless error 3 Even if we were to question whether the district court was entitled to deference in these circumstances, Johnson has failed to show how his testimony would have “added something to [his] defense,” meaning that any error by the district court in this regard would be harmless. However, based on the record before the Court, the Court would only be able to make such a determination based on speculation, which it is unwilling to do. 13 in instances where the prior convictions occurred more than five years prior to the filing of the information, and were thus prohibited from collateral attack per 21 U.S.C. § 851(e).” (App. Doc. 15 at 40). The United States attorney must file a notice identifying prior drug-related convictions of the defendant before trial or entry of a guilty plea in order to seek an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). United States v. Roberts, 529 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2013). Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(b), such an enhanced sentence may be imposed only if, prior to the imposition of sentence, the sentencing judge inquires of the defendant whether he or she affirms or denies the prior convictions and warns the defendant that failure to challenge the conviction prior to imposition of sentence forecloses a later challenge. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 1526, 1529 (6th Cir. 1990). In the case of a defendant whose prior convictions occurred five years before the information was filed, 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) prohibits collateral attack of those convictions. United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Cir. 1998). A district court’s failure to conduct this inquiry is examined under a harmless error standard. Id. In this case, it is undisputed that the district judge did not engage with Johnson in the colloquy mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 851 and that Johnson received a sentence of 262 months rather than the maximum statutory penalty of 30 years pursuant to this enhancement scheme. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c). It is also undisputed that the convictions noticed by the government and ultimately used by the court to enhance Johnson’s sentence occurred more than five years before the government filed its notice of its intent to enhance Johnson’s sentence in the instant case. Based on these undisputed facts, Johnson’s collateral attack of the use of his prior 14 convictions is barred under 21 U.S.C. § 851(e). Thus, Johnson’s challenge to the enhancement of his sentence must fail.4 D. Unreasonableness of the Sentence Imposed Finally, Johnson asserts that the sentence imposed upon him was substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of criminal sentencing, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In support of his position, Johnson cites the “national trend towards shorter sentence for federal drug offenses” as well as the district court’s intent to sentence Johnson at the bottom of his guidelines range. (App. Doc. 15 at 47). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court is required to consider certain factors in imposing a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “Sentences must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable.” United States v. Pirosko, No. 14-3402, 2015 WL 2402121, at  (6th Cir. May 21, 2015) (quoting United States v. Kamper, 748 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir. 2014)). We review a district court’s sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56 (2007). A sentence may be considered “substantively unreasonable if the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Darji, No. 133240/3525, 2015 WL 3372729, at  (6th Cir. May 26, 2015) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 528 (6th Cir. 2007)). A sentence imposed within a properly-calculated 4 Although Johnson asks the Court to review and expand our precedent subjecting 21 U.S.C § 851(b) errors to harmless error review, this panel “may not overrule decisions issued by other panels.” United States v. Young, 496 F. App’x 570, 579 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, we cannot reach this issue. 15 advisory guidelines range carries with it a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). At Johnson’s sentencing, the district court appropriately considered and referenced the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including Johnson’s history and the need for the sentence imposed, in explaining the basis for its sentence. See Doc. 37 at 33 (“Important to the sentence at this juncture is the fact that the continued and repeat criminal behavior involvement in a significant amount of the offenses, obviously, dictate a significant sentence in the case.”). Although Johnson submits that the district court should have imposed a lower sentence on account of Johnson’s background and his work with the Drug Enforcement Agency, it remains undisputed that the district court was aware of these facts, but, given Johnson’s classification as a “career offender” pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1, sentenced him to the bottom of his properly-calculated guideline range at 262 months. See United States v. Easting, No. 14-5557, 2015 WL 2056962, at  (6th Cir. May 5, 2015) (per curiam) (concluding that the defendant’s “wish that the district court had balanced these factors differently and imposed a belowguidelines sentence, without more, [was] insufficient to justify [] disturbing the reasoned judgment of the district court”). While Johnson may disagree with the district court’s analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, his disagreement does not establish an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. As Johnson is unable to establish that his position amounts to anything more than disagreement with the district court’s sentence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment.