Opinion ID: 2301355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Unlawful Sentencing

Text: Spratt also argues on appeal that the hearing justice incorrectly rejected his claim of unlawful sentencing. He asserts that the trial justice improperly invoked the habitual-criminal statute by finding Spratt a habitual criminal and sentencing him to an additional twenty years. Spratt contends that he should not have been sentenced as a habitual criminal because, prior to this conviction, he had served only two six-month sentences for prior felonies. Spratt's reasoning ignores the clear language of the habitual-criminal statute, G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21, which reads in pertinent part: (a) If any person who has been previously convicted in this or any other state of two (2) or more felony offenses arising from separate and distinct incidents and sentenced on two (2) or more occasions to serve a term in prison is, after the convictions and sentences, convicted in this state of any offense punished by imprisonment for more than one year, that person shall be deemed a `habitual criminal.' Upon conviction, the person deemed a habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for a term not exceeding twenty-five (25) years, in addition to any sentence imposed for the offense of which he or she was last convicted. (b)    If it appears by a preponderance of the evidence presented that the defendant is a habitual criminal under this section, he or she shall be sentenced by the court to an additional consecutive term of imprisonment not exceeding twenty-five (25) years   . It appears from Spratt's submitted briefs that he contends that the statute was intended to only apply to someone with a more extensive criminal record. However, we apply the statute's language as it is plainly written. See Iselin v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I.2008). Had the Legislature intended for different standards to apply, it would have so stated. Accordingly, we find Spratt's unlawful sentencing contention to be unavailing.