Opinion ID: 6318081
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Taser Applications

Text: Officers may use non-lethal force—such as tasers or pepper spray—if they have an “objective justification” for doing so. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 774 (6th Cir. 2004). Specifically, officers may use a taser if a person is “particularly violent or physically resistant, so as to endanger responders.” Estate of Erwin v. Greene Cnty., 861 F. App’x 1, 6 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Kent, 810 F.3d at 391). Johns argues that tasing Palma was reasonable because Palma “was actively resisting at every turn” by failing to comply with Johns’ orders to stop and show his hands. (Defs.’ Br. at 20.) Indeed, officers may tase a person who actively resists arrest, Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012)), or who “resist[s] . . . an officer’s commands even if the officers were not attempting to arrest him,” Kelly v. Sines, 647 F. App’x 572, 575 (6th Cir. 2016). Resistance includes “physically struggling with, threatening, or disobeying officers.” Id. (quoting Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2012)). But not all disobedience justifies the use of force. “[A]n officer may not tase a citizen not under arrest merely for failure to follow the officer’s orders when the officer has no reasonable fear for his or her safety.” Wright, 962 F.3d at 868–69. Thus, Johns could not have tased Palma merely for refusing to stop and (quoting Novosteel SA v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, Plaintiffs were under no obligation to support their claim that use of the taser was excessive when Defendants did not identify this claim or raise any arguments against this claim in their motion for summary judgment. Even so, recognizing that the complaint clearly stated an excessive force claim based on the tasings, the district court addressed this claim and concluded that all three taser applications were reasonable. Palma, 2021 WL 798405, at  (citing Sheffey v. City of Covington, 564 F. App’x 783, 796 (6th Cir. 2014)). Thus, while Defendants failed to raise the issue in their summary judgment motion, we will consider whether Johns used excessive force when he tased Palma because this claim was pled in the complaint, the district court decided the issue, and both parties briefed it on appeal. No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 12 show his hands unless he had some other reason to fear for his safety. See Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 642 (reasonable to tase man who was “verbally defiant,” “swung his arms in the officer’s direction,” and “refused to give [the officer] his hands”). Palma never physically resisted. However, the parties agree that Palma ignored Johns’ orders to stop moving and take his hands out of his pockets. Even so, this defiance, alone, cannot justify Johns’ decision to tase Palma. See Wright, 962 F.3d at 868–69. If the jury accepts Johns’ version of events—that Palma “aggressively” approached him with a “crazed look on his face,” (Johns Aff., R. 46-2, Page ID #576, #582)—then the taser applications may have been reasonable. At the summary judgment stage, however, we do not blindly “accept the officers’ subjective view of the facts.” Jacobs, 915 F.3d at 1041. As discussed below in relation to the shootings, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Palma’s mere failure to follow orders would not lead a reasonable officer to believe that Palma posed a danger. See Wright, 962 F.3d at 868–69. Moreover, Plaintiffs dispute key facts about the tasing. Salvatore said that Johns and Palma were separated by Johns’ patrol car and that Johns “tased [Palma] across the hood of the car to the other side.” (S. Palma Dep., R. 50-5, Page ID #1034.) This conflicts with Johns’ narrative that Palma was walking straight towards him in a way that was immediately threatening. In this situation, tasing Palma while he and Johns were separated by a physical barrier would be unreasonable. Other evidence contradicts Johns’ reports that the taser was ineffective on Palma, thus undermining the reasonableness of Johns’ decision to tase Palma multiple times. Palma fell to the ground after the second taser application. Salvatore saw Palma convulsing on the ground “for minutes” after Johns tased Palma the second time. (Id. at Page ID #1046.) Melissa similarly saw Palma on the ground for two to three minutes after Johns tased him. If Palma fell to the ground for several minutes after the second tasing, then Johns could not justify the third taser application, as he had ample time to reassess the situation and react with less force. See Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., — F.4th —, No. 20-6027, 2022 WL 369348, at  (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2022) (continued use of force unreasonable if the person is on the ground for an extended period No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 13 of time during which officers “could have handcuffed him at any time while he remained on the ground”). The parties also dispute where Palma was in relation to Johns and what Palma was doing when Johns applied the taser for the third time. In her deposition, Melissa testified that Palma stood up after the second taser application and “started going back to the house.” (M. Palma Dep., R. 50-6, Page ID #1157.) She said that Palma was not walking towards Johns. Admittedly, Melissa gave a different statement to officers on the scene immediately after the shooting, where she said that Palma stood up after the second taser and again began approaching Johns. Relying solely on Melissa’s on-the-scene written statement (and ignoring her deposition testimony), the dissent concludes that the third taser application was reasonable because Palma was walking towards Johns even after the first and second taser applications. The dissent goes as far as questioning Melissa’s credibility, highlighting that her deposition testimony was given only “after retaining counsel and filing a civil damages suit against Officer Johns.” (Infra Dissent at 37.) But whether one statement is more reliable than another is a credibility question that is not for this Court to decide. See Godawa, 798 F.3d at 463 (quoting Schrieber, 596 F.3d at 333). Indeed, this Court recently refused to wade into a similar credibility issue at the summary judgement stage. See Gambrel, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 369348, at . In Gambrel, the plaintiff’s star witness gave two statements that recounted starkly different versions of events—one that he gave in an initial police interview and one that he gave during his deposition. See id. at –. However, “[w]hen witnesses tell differing stories . . . we cannot credit the story of the witness that we find more believable.” Id. at  (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). “[S]imply because [the plaintiff] might find it difficult to convince a jury to believe [a witness] does not allow us to ignore [that witness’s] testimony now.” Id. (citing 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725.2, at 440 (4th ed. 2016)). In her deposition, Melissa explained that her on-the-scene statement was wrong. The police took Melissa and Salvatore’s written statements shortly after the shooting while the bulletridden Palma was still laying in the yard. As Melissa explained, she was just “trying to leave” when she gave her on-the-scene statement. (M. Palma Dep., R. 50-6, Page ID #1157.) After unjustifiably opining on the reliability of Melissa’s different statements, the dissent chooses to No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 14 ignore portions of her deposition testimony. It finds that, based solely on Melissa’s written onthe-scene statement, this material fact—whether Palma was approaching Johns when Johns applied the taser for the third time—is undisputed. This approach is antithetical to our summary judgment standard; courts cannot choose which statements are credible and then build an “undisputed” record based on those credibility determinations. See Gambrel, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 369348, at  (explicitly rejecting the approach taken by the dissent here). Accepting the facts most favorable to Plaintiffs, the tasings amounted to excessive force, and Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.