Opinion ID: 846560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal

Text: MCL 750.316 states in pertinent part: (1) A person who commits any of the following is guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life:    (b) Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate ... home invasion in the first or second degree ....[ [4] ] [O]ur primary task in construing a statute, is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). The words of a statute provide `the most reliable evidence of its intent. . . .' Id., quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). The Court must consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as `its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.' Sun Valley, supra at 237, 596 N.W.2d 119, quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended. Sun Valley, supra at 237, 596 N.W.2d 119. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Id. at 236, 596 N.W.2d 119. To describe under what circumstances a second-degree murder can be elevated to first-degree murder, the Legislature used the words in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate an enumerated felony. MCL 750.316(1)(b). Home invasion in the first degree is one of these enumerated felonies. Id. Perpetrate is defined as to carry out; enact; commit. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), p. 972. To carry out is defined as to effect or accomplish; complete. Id., at 201. Defendant argues that a felony is complete when the definitional elements of the crime have been satisfied. Thus, in the context of a home invasion, defendant argues that he was no longer in the perpetration of first-degree home invasion once he left Albright's home. Indeed, defense counsel admitted under questioning at oral argument that under his interpretation of the statute, if defendant had shot and killed a police officer who was trying to arrest him on the street outside Albright's home, the murder still would not have been in the perpetration of the home invasion. [5] However, defendant's theory fails to account for the fact that commission of the felony itself does not render the defendant's criminal plan complete. When a defendant plans to commit a felonious act, it is a legitimate assumption that . . . [the defendant] also planned to escape from the scene of his crime. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 337 Pa. 171, 175, 10 A.2d 431 (1940). [6] The Colorado Supreme Court has understandably opined that escape is as important to the execution of the [felony] as the elements of the crime itself. Bizup v. People, 150 Colo. 214, 218, 371 P.2d 786 (1962) (holding that the felony-murder rule applies to a murder committed after the elements of armed robbery were met); see also People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 251, 290 P. 881 (1930) (holding that a murder committed during an escape from the scene of an armed robbery is felony murder because [t]he escape of the robbers with the loot, by means of arms, necessarily is as important to the execution of the plan as gaining possession of the property). In other words, a felon has not carried out or completed the felony for felony-murder purposes until the felon has escaped. A murder committed during the attempt to escape is committed in the perpetration of that felony, because the felonious transaction has not yet been completed. Accordingly, perpetration includes not only the definitional elements of the predicate felony, but also includes those acts that are required to complete the felony such as those that occur after the commission of the predicate felony while the felon is attempting to escape. To hold otherwise would make it `quite impracticable to ever convict for a murder committed in the perpetration of any of the [enumerated felonies].' Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind., 1986), quoting Bissot v. State, 53 Ind. 408, 412 (1876). In addition to its ordinary meaning, the phrase in the perpetration of has its roots in the common law. The crime of felony murder is derived from the English common law, which classified `all killing resulting from the commission of [a felony as] murder.' Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 248, 786 A.2d 706 (2001), quoting Moreland, The Law of Homicide (1952), p. 42. The felony-murder rule was adopted by the colonies and, following the American Revolution, became a part of the common law or statutory provisions of [nearly] every American state. Rodriguez v. State, 953 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex.App., 1997). In most states, including Michigan, felony-murder statutes are premised upon the 1794 felony-murder statute of Pennsylvania. [7] Pennsylvania defined felony murder as [a]ll murder . . . which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary. . . . [ Id., citing Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania statute creating degrees of murder, 97 U. Pa. L.R. 759 (1949).] Michigan's original first-degree murder statute, enacted in 1838, used the same in the perpetration of language to describe a killing committed during the course of an enumerated felony. Our Legislature has continued to use this language, with few changes, over the past 178 years. However, neither the original statute nor the current murder statute defines this common-law term. Where a statute employs the general terms of the common law to describe an offense, courts will construe the statutory crime by looking to common-law definitions. People v. Riddle, 467 Mich. 116, 125, 649 N.W.2d 30 (2002). Thus, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to change the common law, we apply the common law as it was understood when the crime of murder was codified.. . . Id. at 126, 649 N.W.2d 30. One of the first states to address the scope of perpetration for purposes of a felony-murder statute was Indiana in Bissot. In Bissot, the defendant shot and killed a town marshal who accosted him in the midst of a burglary. The defendant argued that, because the elements of burglary were complete before the shooting, the killing was not in the perpetration of that burglary. The Indiana Supreme Court opined: In this case, take away the elements of burglary which surround it, and the prisoner might plausibly contend that he had committed nothing more than excusable homicide; for it appears that the deceased shot at him first, and thus put his life in immediate jeopardy. It could not be higher than manslaughter, at most; and in such cases it might be accidental, and then, if held not to be in the perpetration of the burglary, would be excusable. If the charge was murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery, as soon as the accused had forcibly and feloniously, or by violence or putting in fear, taken from the person of another any article of value, the robbery would be consummated; yet, if immediately afterwards, in the struggle to release himself and escape, he had killed his victim, the degree of the homicide, unconnected with the robbery, would be no higher than manslaughter. . . . Although we must construe criminal statutes strictly, adhere closely to the definition of crimes, and interpret technical words according to their fixed meaning, yet we cannot give to the section under consideration the construction contended for by the appellant. In our opinion, where the homicide is committed within the res gestae of the felony charged, it is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, the felony, within the meaning of the statute; and, being convinced in this case that the burglary charged was committed, and that the homicide was committed within the res gestae of the burglary, we must hold that it was committed in the perpetration of the burglary, within the true intent and fair meaning of the statute. It seems to us that such a construction is safe to the State and the citizen, and the only one by which the intention of the legislature can be practically carried into effect. And we think, according to this view, that the evidence in this case fairly warrants the conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the homicide alleged was committed in the perpetration of the burglary, as charged in the indictment. [ Bissot, supra at 412-414.] See, also, State v. Brown, 7 Or. 186, 208-209 (1879) (noting that in the context of a killing committed during the defendants' escape from the scene of a robbery, [w]hen a person takes with force or violence the goods of another from his person or presence and against his will, he has committed robbery. . . . [B]ut it does not necessarily complete the crime. It constitutes robbery so far as to render the perpetrator liable to conviction for it; but the act of robbery itself may be prolonged beyond the time when that liability is fixed.). In commenting on felony-murder statutes, Professor Francis Wharton opined that, in order for a murder to have been committed in the perpetration of a felony, it must have been done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it. The killing must have had an intimate relation and close connection with the felony, and not be separate, distinct, and independent from it; and when the act constituting the felony is in itself dangerous to life, the killing must be naturally consequent to the felony. . . . It is not enough that it occurred soon or presently after the felony was attempted or committed; there must have been such a legal relationship between the two that it could be said that the killing occurred by reason of, or as a part of, the felony, or that it occurred before the felony was at an end, and was concurrent with it, or at least part of it in an actual and material sense. . . . Where a homicide is committed within the res gestae of a felony, however, it is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony within the meaning of such statutes. That the attempt to commit the felony was not far advanced does not lessen the offense. And a burglar who breaks into a building, or who shoots a person who discovers him in an effort to escape, cannot avoid punishment for murder in the first degree, upon the theory that the burglary consisted in breaking in, and was consummated before the killing. A burglar may be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime of burglary while making away with the plunder, and while engaged in securing it. So, a robbery within the meaning of a rule that a homicide committed in the perpetration of a robbery is murder in the first degree is not necessarily concluded by the removal of the goods from the presence of the owner; and it is not necessary that the homicide should be committed at the precise time and place of the robbery. As in the case of burglary, the robber may be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime while he is endeavoring to escape and make away with the goods taken. And a homicide committed immediately after a robbery, apparently for the purpose of preventing detection, is within the rule. [Wharton, Law of Homicide (3d ed.), § 126, pp. 184-186.] Thus, both the common law, as it was understood when the crime of murder was codified, and the clear language of MCL 750.316(1)(b) lead to the same conclusiona murder that occurs during the uninterrupted chain of events surrounding the commission of the predicate felony is committed in the perpetration of that felony for felony-murder purposes. Accordingly, we conclude that the term perpetration encompasses acts beyond the definitional elements of the predicate felony, to include those acts committed within the res gestae of that felony. Bissot, supra ; Brown, supra ; Wharton, supra. Michigan courts have also routinely held that perpetration extends beyond those elements required to prove the predicate felony and includes a murder committed after the predicate felony has been committed or attempted. The res gestae principle, which holds that a murder committed during the unbroken chain of events surrounding the predicate felony is committed in the perpetration of that felony, was adopted by this Court in People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952). In Podolski, supra at 514, 52 N.W.2d 201, the defendant and two accomplices committed armed robbery at a bank and were attempting to escape, when they were intercepted by the police in the immediate vicinity of the bank. During the ensuing gun battle, an officer was killed by a bullet from a fellow officer's gun. This Court expressly adopted the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 190-191, 53 A.2d 736 (1947), which stated: It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon's attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act. . . . Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain of events he inaugurates will be the use of deadly force against him on the part of the selected victim. For whatever results follow from that natural and legal use of retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible. The Court, quoting Wharton, then concluded that because the homicide [8] occurred during the res gestae of the robbery, i.e., during the defendant's attempt to escape, he was properly convicted of first-degree felony murder. Podolski, supra at 517-518, 52 N.W.2d 201. [9] The Court of Appeals, including both the majority and dissenting opinions in the instant case, has consistently applied the res gestae principle in felony-murder cases for at least four decades. The most common of these cases define perpetration in the context of a murder committed during an escape from the scene of an armed robbery. For example, in People v. Oliver, 63 Mich.App. 509, 234 N.W.2d 679 (1975), the defendant's vehicle was stopped by a Michigan State Police trooper half an hour after and a few miles away from the scene where the defendant had robbed a bank and kidnapped a teller. During the traffic stop, the defendant shot and killed the trooper. The defendant argued that he was no longer in the perpetration of the armed robbery, because he was not being pursued by the police at the time of the traffic stop and because of the time and distance between the robbery and the murder. Thus, according to the defendant, he had reached a place of temporary safety before the stop and, therefore, the robbery was completed before the murder. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding: [The trooper] was shot only a few miles away from the scene of the robbery within a half an hour after its commission. [The trooper] had his gun drawn and was approaching defendant's car when Oliver discharged his revolver and then quickly sped away. It is incredible that the defendant even suggests that he had reached a point of temporary safety at this point. [ Id. at 523, 234 N.W.2d 679.] See, also, People v. Bowen, 12 Mich. App. 438, 440-441, 162 N.W.2d 911 (1968) (relying on the dictionary definition of perpetrate as `[t]o carry through' to conclude that a homicide committed while attempting to leave the bank was felony murder because it cannot be said that the entire contemplated robbery, which would include escape, was as yet carried through) (citation omitted); People v. Goree, 30 Mich.App. 490, 495, 186 N.W.2d 872 (1971) (holding that a defendant who murdered a police officer who was attempting to arrest him for armed robbery is guilty of felony murder because escape is part of the original felony [and] getting away with the contraband is as essential to the execution of an armed robbery as the theft itself. The escape ceases to be a continuous part of the original felony when the escaping felon reaches a point of at least temporary safety or [has been successfully taken into police custody].) (citations omitted); People v. Smith, 55 Mich. App. 184, 189, 222 N.W.2d 172 (1974) (stating that if a murder is committed while attempting to escape from or prevent detection of the felony, it is felony murder, but only if it is committed as a part of a continuous transaction with, or is otherwise `immediately connected' with, the underlying felony); People v. Goddard, 135 Mich.App. 128, 135, 352 N.W.2d 367 (1984), rev'd on other grounds 429 Mich. 505, 418 N.W.2d 881 (1988) (noting that Michigan's inclusion of murders committed while attempting to escape within the felony-murder rule has been adopted in other jurisdictions). The Court of Appeals has also applied the res gestae principle to murders committed in the perpetration of felonies other than armed robbery. In People v. Gimotty, 216 Mich.App. 254, 549 N.W.2d 39 (1996), the codefendant stole six dresses from a clothing store and he and the defendant sped away in the defendant's vehicle. The vehicle was identified by another driver, who called the police and then followed the vehicle until the police arrived. Once the police joined the pursuit, they identified the defendant's vehicle and gave chase. During the pursuit, the defendant failed to stop at a red light and struck another vehicle. A three-year-old passenger in the other vehicle died as a result of the collision. The defendant argued that the codefendant's commission of retail fraud was complete when he left the store and, therefore, that he had reached a point of temporary safety when he got into the car. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that defendant sped out of the store's parking area and onto Coolidge Road, where he was observed by another driver, who called the police on his car phone and then followed defendant until the police began their pursuit. Defendant was in the midst of a high-speed police chase when the victim was killed; he had not reached a place of temporary safety. [ Id. at 258-259, 549 N.W.2d 39.] See, also, Thew, supra at 88, 506 N.W.2d 547 (holding that a murder committed 20 minutes after the commission of first-degree criminal sexual conduct was part of a continuous transaction and that inculpatory inferences can be drawn that he killed the victim to prevent detection of the act of sexual intercourse with [the victim], and that the killing was `immediately connected' with the act of sexual intercourse). To summarize, perpetration as used in the felony-murder statute contemplates something beyond the definitional elements of the predicate felony. Michigan courts have recognized this broader common-law meaning through the adoption of the res gestae principle, which holds that a murder committed during the unbroken chain of events surrounding the predicate felony is committed in the perpetration of that felony. [10] Having concluded that perpetration encompasses acts beyond the definitional elements of the predicate felony, we must next assess what factors a jury should consider to determine whether a murder has, in fact, taken place during the unbroken chain of events arising out of the predicate felony. [11] As observed by the Ohio Supreme Court, those acts committed in the perpetration of the predicate felony change with every case, and may be numerous. Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 70, 78 N.E. 957 (1906). In Goddard, supra at 135-136, 352 N.W.2d 367, the Court of Appeals explained that, in order to determine whether a particular murder occurred within the res gestae of the predicate felony, [c]ourts have usually required that the killing and the underlying felony be closely connected in point of time, place and causal relation. State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632 (1936). The required relationship between the homicide and the underlying felony has been summarized as being whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the felony and the homicide depends on whether the defendant's felony dictated his conduct which led to the homicide. LaFave & Scott, [Criminal Law, § 71, p. 557.] We hold that, to qualify as felony murder, the homicide must be incident to the felony and associated with it as one of its hazards. It is not necessary that the murder be contemporaneous with the felony. A lapse of time and distance are factors to be considered, but are not determinative. Professor Wayne LaFave has also observed that a jury should look at four factors in construing the scope of the expression `in the perpetration of': (1) time; (2) place; (3) causation; and (4) continuity of action. 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed.), § 14.5(f), p. 463. [12] While not exclusive, we agree that these factors should be considered in determining whether there exists sufficient evidence to support a felony-murder conviction. [13] The first factor to be considered by the jury pertains to the time between the commission of the predicate felony and the murder. In discussing the time factor, Professor LaFave states that, even if it is clear beyond question that the crime was completed before the killing, the felony-murder rule might still apply. The most common case is that in which the killing occurs during the defendant's flight. A great many of the modern statutes contain languagetypically the phrase or in immediate flight therefrommaking this absolutely clear. But even statutes without such language have rather consistently been construed to extend to immediate flight situations. [ Id. at 464.] For example, in Oliver, the Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant was still in immediate flight from an armed robbery when he murdered a State Police trooper 30 minutes after the commission of an armed robbery. See, also, Thew (affirming a felony-murder conviction for a murder committed 20 minutes after the predicate felony). At the same time, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a killing that took place almost a month after the commission of the predicate felony was too remote in time to support a conviction of felony murder. State v. Pierce, 23 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn., 2000). In Pierce, the defendant's girlfriend stole her parents' vehicle in Florida. The vehicle was reported stolen and a nationwide bulletin was issued for the vehicle. Twenty days later, while driving the vehicle, the defendant was identified by a Virginia police officer, who gave chase. When the defendant crossed into Tennessee, the Virginia police officer notified Tennessee law enforcement officers, who took over the pursuit. During the pursuit, the defendant struck a police car, killing a deputy sheriff. The Tennessee court rejected the prosecutor's argument that the killing occurred within the res gestae of the automobile theft, concluding that the killing in this case was not closely connected in time or place to the taking of the vehicle. Id. The second factor to be considered by a jury pertains to the physical distance between the scene of the predicate felony and the scene of the murder. For example, in State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 512, 234 S.E.2d 563 (1977), the defendants' vehicle was stopped for a traffic violation by a North Carolina State Police trooper 13 minutes after and ten miles away from the scene where the defendants had robbed a bank. A codefendant, under the apparent mistaken belief that the trooper was investigating the robbery, shot and killed the trooper. The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the defendant's felony-murder conviction, holding that, [o]bviously, the defendants had not reached what they regarded as a place of temporary safety from pursuing officers when the shooting of [the trooper] occurred. Thus, the robbery was still in progress and the shooting occurred in the perpetration of it and was first degree murder. [ Id. at 512-513, 234 S.E.2d 563.] At the same time, the Virginia Supreme Court held that a killing that took place 280 miles from the scene of the predicate felony was too remote to support a conviction of felony murder. Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500, 502-503, 237 S.E.2d 797 (1977). In Doane, the defendant stole a vehicle from a car dealership. The next day, the defendant disobeyed a stop sign, striking another vehicle and killing the driver. The accident occurred 280 miles away from the scene of the predicate felony. The prosecutor argued that, because the defendant was still in possession of the stolen vehicle at the time of the killing, there was a sufficient nexus between the killing and the predicate felony to support a felony-murder conviction. The Virginia court rejected this argument, holding that there is neither a showing of causal relationship nor a showing of nexus between the larceny . . . and the accidental killing of [the victim 280 miles from the scene of the larceny.] Id. at 502, 237 S.E.2d 797. However, more than a mere coincidence of time and place is necessary for a murder to qualify as a felony murder. LaFave, supra at 465. The third factor to be considered by the jury pertains to whether there is some causal connection between the murder and the predicate felony. Id. For example, in Gimotty, the defendant collided with the victim's vehicle while attempting to avoid capture by the police after fleeing from the scene of a larceny. Likewise, in Podolski, the defendant engaged in a gun battle with the police in order to avoid capture after robbing a bank. However, in Allen v. State, 690 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 1997), the Florida District Court of Appeals held that a vehicle accident that occurred outside the context of a pursuit was not causally connected to the predicate felony. In Allen, the defendant stole a vehicle and, while driving the vehicle that evening, struck another car, killing the driver. At the time of the accident, the defendant was not being pursued by the police. The Florida court noted that, while the killing was close in time and place to the commission of the predicate felony, the prosecutor failed to show that the death was causally related to the grand theft. Id. Thus, the Florida court held that because the killing did not occur while the defendant was trying to escape, the death did not occur as a result of the perpetration of the grand theft. Id. at 1335. The fourth factor that the jury should consider pertains to whether there was continuity of action between the predicate felony and the murder. Professor LaFave notes that perpetration [has] consistently been construed to extend to immediate flight situations. In assessing what flight is sufficiently immediate, courts require that there have been no break in the chain of events, as to which a most important consideration is whether the fleeing felon has reached a place of temporary safety. [LaFave, supra at 464-465.] In Oliver, supra at 523, 234 N.W.2d 679, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claim that he had reached a point of temporary safety by driving unpursued at normal highway speeds, holding that there was no interruption in the chain of events between the robbery and the murder of a State Police trooper who had stopped the defendant's vehicle for a traffic infraction. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reached a similar conclusion in addressing a situation bearing a strong resemblance to the instant case in Lampkin v. State, 808 P.2d 694 (Okla. Crim.App., 1991). In Lampkin, the defendant had left the scene of an armed robbery when a police officer observed him disobey a stop sign. The defendant was spotted in the vicinity of the scene of the robbery, just minutes after he had committed the crime. When the officer attempted a traffic stop, the defendant accelerated and a high-speed chase ensued. It was only after the chase began that the officer learned that the defendant was a suspect in a robbery. The chase ended when the defendant struck another vehicle, killing the passengers. The Oklahoma court rejected the defendant's assertion that the robbery was complete at the time of the accident, noting that he had not yet completed the robbery when the chase started; he was not yet in a safe haven, but rather was still in the process of leaving with the stolen money. Id. at 696. Therefore, because the accident was part of one continuing transaction stemming from the robbery, the defendant was properly convicted of felony murder. Id. [14] In contrast, there can be no conviction for felony murder where an intervening act has broken the chain of events between the killing and the crime committed or attempted. . . . State v. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68, 72, 277 P. 394 (1929). In Diebold, the defendant and his friend stole a vehicle and drove it to a café five miles away. The defendant testified that, during the meal, he decided to return the vehicle. On the way back to the scene of the larceny, the defendant lost control of the vehicle, striking and killing a pedestrian. The Washington Supreme Court determined that, because the killing took place after the defendant had stopped at the café, [i]t cannot be held that, at the time appellant drove his car against the unfortunate victims of his carelessness, he was committing, or attempting to commit, or withdrawing from the scene of, a felony. Id. at 73-74, 277 P. 394. See, also, Lester v. State, 737 So.2d 1149, 1151-1152 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App., 1999) (The defendant, driving in a vehicle he had stolen the night before, saw a police car and drove away unpursued, eventually disobeying three stop signs before hitting another vehicle and killing the passengers. The Florida District Court of Appeals held that the theft of the vehicle had been completed the night before the accident and, therefore, that defendant's reckless driving was too attenuated from the grand theft of the car the previous evening to support a felony murder conviction.); People v. Ford, 65 Cal.2d 41, 52 Cal.Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132 (1966) (The defendant kidnapped his estranged wife and burglarized the home she was living in. After [driving] about the countryside without aim or purpose, id. at 48, 52 Cal.Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132, for approximately four hours, he shot and killed a police officer who attempted to disarm him. The California Supreme Court held that the defendant had won his way to places of temporary safety during the four-hour drive, because there was here no direct evidence that defendant was endeavoring to escape the robbery when he shot the [officer]. . . . Id. at 56-57, 52 Cal.Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132.). In light of this analysis, we conclude that the trial court here did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The relevant question in the instant case is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was still in the midst of his escape from the home invasion when he struck and killed the Ackermans. After its review of the case law, and in particular Gimotty, the trial court correctly instructed the jury as follows: Actions immediately connected with the felony of home invasion in the first degree, including attempts to escape or prevent detection[,] are a continuous part of the commission or perpetration of the felony of home invasion in the first degree. . . . [E]scape ceases to be a continuous part of the felony of home invasion in the first degree if and when the Defendant reaches a point of at least temporary safety. The facts elicited at trial support the jury's determination that the murder of the Ackermans was a continuous part of the commission or perpetration of the felony of home invasion in the first degree. Here, the homeowner, Albright, confronted defendant in the doorway between the garage and the sunroom. Defendant closed the door and abruptly fled. Albright observed both defendant and his vehicle flee from the scene of the home invasion. A reasonable juror could infer from defendant's flight his intent to avoid apprehension by the police. Additionally, he was still in flight from the Albright home when Trooper Kramer spotted him approximately ten minutes after his abrupt flight. Under these facts, a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant had neither escaped nor reached a point of temporary safety when Trooper Kramer attempted the traffic stop. [15] Further, a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant had sped away from Trooper Kramer specifically in order to prevent detection of the home invasion. Therefore, such a juror could also conclude that when defendant collided with the Ackermans' vehicle during his flight from the police, that act was part of the res gestae of the home invasion. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Application of the LaFave factors lends further support to the jury's verdict. First, addressing the time and place factors, a reasonable juror could conclude that the murders and the predicate felony in the instant case were sufficiently connected in time and place to support the convictions of felony murder. Approximately ten minutes after the home invasion, defendant's vehicle was spotted by Trooper Kramer. Defendant struck and killed the Ackermans approximately 18 minutes after leaving the scene of the home invasion. The time frame in this case is completely unlike that in Pierce, in which there was a 20-day gap between the predicate felony and the killing. Indeed, the 18-minute gap in the instant case is significantly less time than the 30-minute interval between the bank robbery and the traffic stop in Oliver. Likewise, the distance between the home invasion and the murder of the Ackermans does not resemble the 280-mile gap between the theft of a vehicle and the killing in Doane. Rather, in the instant case, defendant was spotted by Trooper Kramer just over ten miles from Albright's home. The Ackermans were killed within a few miles of the place were defendant was first observed by Albright. Accordingly, we conclude that the scene of the murders was sufficiently close in both time and distance from the scene of the home invasion to support convictions of felony murder. Likewise, the causal connection and continuity of action factors also support the jury's conclusion that defendant was in the perpetration of the home invasion when he murdered the Ackermans. The common thread running through the cases finding a lack of causal connection is that the defendant was not being pursued by the police when the defendant committed the murder. Doane, supra ; Allen, supra; Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361, 365 (Okla.Crim.App., 1981); Diebold, supra ; Lester, supra . However, in the instant case, the record establishes that defendant was interrupted by Albright in the midst of the home invasion. Defendant's reaction was to abruptly flee. Albright testified that he relayed both a description of defendant and a description of the unique characteristics of defendant's vehicle to the police immediately after defendant fled the scene. Approximately ten minutes after the home invasion, defendant's vehicle was spotted by Trooper Kramer. The Court of Appeals concluded that because defendant was driving in a normal manner at the time he was spotted by Trooper Kramer, he had reached a point of temporary safety. However, defendant had not stopped at any point between Albright's home and the point where he was observed by Trooper Kramer. Cf. Diebold (the defendant had stopped at a café between the theft and the killing of a pedestrian). Further, defendant's actions were not inconsistent with those of a person attempting to escape detection by the police, cf. Ford (the defendant's aimless driving for four hours after commission of the predicate felony demonstrated that he was not attempting to escape at the time he shot a police officer), and, in fact, defendant's act of speeding away from Trooper Kramer during the attempted traffic stop suggests both a causal connection and a continuity of action between the home invasion and the murders. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that defendant recognized that he had been identified as the perpetrator of a home invasion just minutes before. It is reasonable to infer from the testimony at trial that defendant failed to comply with Kramer's direction to stop and instead sped away precisely because of this knowledge. Had defendant assumed, for example, that he was being stopped for a broken headlight or for an improper left turn, it seems highly unlikely that he would have failed to stop and instead engage in the extremely reckless driving that followed. The evidence is consistent with the prosecutor's theory that when defendant led Kramer on a chase while driving the wrong way on I-94 and I-69, he did so in order to escape apprehension for the home invasion. As in Gimotty, defendant's act of colliding with the Ackermans' vehicle and killing the couple was part of an unbroken chain of events surrounding the home invasion. Because a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Ackermans' murders occurred as part of the res gestae of the home invasion, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to direct a verdict of acquittal. [16]