Opinion ID: 223249
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States

Text: In another landmark Commerce Clause case, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964), the Supreme Court held that Congress acted within its commerce authority in enacting Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination in public accommodations. The plaintiff owned and operated a 216-room motel whose guests were primarily out-of-state visitors. Id. at 243, 85 S.Ct. at 350-51. The motel refused to rent rooms to black patrons. Id. at 243, 85 S.Ct. at 351. The Supreme Court detailed the overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel. Id. at 253, 85 S.Ct. at 355. The Court noted that it had long been settled that transportation of persons in interstate commerce is within Congress's regulatory power, regardless of whether the transportation is commercial in character. Id. at 256, 85 S.Ct. at 357. Additionally, Supreme Court precedents confirmed that the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof . . . which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. Id. at 258, 85 S.Ct. at 358. Thus, Congress mayas it hasprohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however `local' their operations may appear. Id. The Heart of Atlanta Motel Court acknowledged that Congress could have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions it found in interstate commerce caused by racial discrimination, but the means employed in removing such obstructions are within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress and are subject only to one caveatthat the means chosen by it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. Id. at 261-62, 85 S.Ct. at 360. The means chosen by Congress in Title II clearly met this standard. [71]