Opinion ID: 531018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Imposition of a Prison Term Without Parole

Text: 35 Robles also complains that the district court erred when it imposed a sentence without the possibility of parole on count two, the substantive distribution count. We conclude that Robles has incorrectly construed the statutory law applicable to his sentence. 36 The offenses of which Robles was convicted occurred in February 1987. At that time, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4205(a) 5 provided that any prisoner serving a definite imprisonment term of more than one year would be eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence. See Parole Commission & Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 94-233, Sec. 2, 90 Stat. 219, 222-23 (1976). Section 4205(h), however, provided that [n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to provide that any prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole if such prisoner is ineligible for such release under any other provision of law. Id. 37 Robles was convicted of distribution of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a). The punishment for that crime is established in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b). On October 27, 1986, prior to the time that Robles committed this offense, section 841(b) was largely rewritten by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, Sec. 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to -4. One of the changes was the addition to section 841(b)(1)(B) of the proviso that [n]o person sentenced under this subparagraph shall be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed therein. Id., 100 Stat. at 3207-4. Similar provision was made in section 841(b)(1)(A) and (C). Id., 100 Stat. at 3207-3, -4. In other words, the amended section 841(b) created an explicit exception to the general 4205(a) rule allowing parole. The issue on appeal, therefore, is whether the no parole provision added to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b) by the 1986 amendments became effective before or after February 1987, when the instant offense was committed. 38 Ordinarily, a statute becomes effective as soon as it is signed into law in the absence of some provision to the contrary. E.g., United States v. Stillwell, 854 F.2d 1045, 1047 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010, 109 S.Ct. 508, 102 L.Ed.2d 544 (1988); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1047, 98 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1988). If this general rule applies, then the no parole provision became effective on October 27, 1986, when President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into law. In that case, Robles' claim would fail. 39 Robles, however, contends that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 expressly delayed the effective date of section 1002, including the no parole provision. He relies on our decision in United States v. Byrd, 837 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1988), in which we were asked to determine the effective date of the 1986 amendment to section 841(b) requiring courts to impose a term of supervised release for drug offenses under that section. The supervised release requirement was substituted for the prior special parole term requirement as a part of the sweeping changes to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b) made by section 1002 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the same section of the Act that added the no parole provision at issue in Robles' appeal. A different section of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, section 1004(a), replaced the phrase special parole term with term of supervised release throughout the federal narcotics laws. 40 Section 1002 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 does not expressly provide for its effective date. Section 1004(b) thereof, however, does expressly delay the effective date of the amendments made by section 1004(a) until November 1, 1987. 6 In United States v. Byrd, supra, this Court recognized that section 1002 had no specific effective date, but nonetheless held that the section 1004(a) change from special parole terms to supervised release included the change from special parole terms to supervised release in section 841(b) made by section 1002. Thus, the Court held that the delayed effective date provided for in section 1004(b) applied to the change from special parole to supervised release in section 841(b). The Court reasoned that Congress intended a single effective date for the changeover from special parole terms to terms of supervised release, and that this construction made for a more logical administrative arrangement. See Byrd, 837 F.2d at 181 n. 8. 41 The Byrd Court did not, however, hold that the section 1004(b) effective date applied to all of the changes made by section 1002. Section 1004(b) clearly does not have such a broad effect. The Byrd Court applied the section 1004(b) delayed effective date to the new supervised release provision in section 841(b) because it determined that Congress intended a single changeover date from special parole to supervised release. That reasoning does not apply to the remaining changes made by section 1002, which are independent of the changeover from special parole terms to terms of supervised release. Nothing in the statute indicates that the delayed effective date in section 1004(b) applies beyond the limited context of the changeover from special parole to supervised release, and we conclude that it does not. 42 Thus, there is no express provision for the effective date of the 1986 no parole amendment to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b). Under the general rule, that amendment became effective when signed into law on October 27, 1986. It was in effect in February 1987, when the cocaine distribution in the present case occurred. Therefore, a specific exception to the general parole requirement of section 4205(a) applied, and the district court correctly refused to allow parole on count two.