Opinion ID: 78179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first consider our jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir.1994) ([A] court must first determine whether it has proper subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the substantive issues.); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Parklane/Atlanta Venture (In re Parklane/Atlanta Joint Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 534 (11th Cir.1991) (Before reaching the principal issue raised in this appeal, this Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction.). Fitel submits this Court has jurisdiction over its appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and pursuant to United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958). EBG contends we lack jurisdiction, citing Druhan v. American Mutual Life, 166 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir.1999) and Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir.1999). After review, we conclude appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the Constitution. The parties are correct that Procter & Gamble, Druhan, and Woodard are relevant to our inquiry. Consequently, we discuss and then apply these precedents.

In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co ., the government filed a civil antitrust lawsuit following a grand jury investigation in which no indictment was returned. 356 U.S. at 678, 78 S.Ct. at 984. Because the government was using the grand jury transcript to prepare for the civil trial, the defendants sought access to the transcript as well. Id. The government refused, but the district court ordered production. Id. at 679, 78 S.Ct. at 985. The government, adamant in its refusal to obey, moved the district court to either (1) stay its order pending the filing of an appeal and an application for an extraordinary writ, or (2) amend its order to state that if the government failed to produce the transcript, the district court would dismiss the complaint. Id. The district court granted the government its latter option and amended its order to provide for dismissal if the grand jury transcript was not produced. Id. The government refused to produce the transcript, and the district court dismissed the case. Id. at 679-80, 78 S.Ct. at 985. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court confronted the question of jurisdiction. Id. at 680, 78 S.Ct. at 985. The Supreme Court first noted that the dismissal order was a final order that ended the case. Id. The Supreme Court then acknowledged the familiar rule invoked by the defendants in arguing that jurisdiction was lackingthat a plaintiff who has voluntarily dismissed his complaint may not appeal. Id. However, the Supreme Court concluded that [t]he rule has no application here, because the government had at all times opposed the production orders and invited the dismissal sanction as a way of getting review of the adverse ruling. Id. In that regard, the Supreme Court held that when the government proposed dismissal for failure to obey, it had lost on the merits and was only seeking an expeditious review. Id. at 680-81, 78 S.Ct. at 985. In other words, `[t]he plaintiffs did not consent to a judgment against them, but only that, if there was to be such a judgment, it should be final in form instead of interlocutory, so that they might come to this court without further delay.' Id. at 681, 78 S.Ct. at 986 (quoting Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 83, 37 S.Ct. 353, 358, 61 L.Ed. 597 (1917)). Thus, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal.
After Procter & Gamble, this Court heard two cases where (1) the district court denied a plaintiff's motion to remand its case to state court; (2) the plaintiff then filed a written motion to dismiss; and (3) the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. In both remand cases, this Court concluded the plaintiff was not adverse to the final judgment, and thus jurisdiction did not exist. Specifically, in Druhan v. American Mutual Life , this Court addressed the question of whether an appeal from a final judgment, which resulted from a voluntary dismissal with prejudice after the plaintiff lost a motion to remand to state court, is within this Court's jurisdiction. 166 F.3d at 1325. The plaintiff Druhan sued the defendant insurance company in state court, alleging the defendant fraudulently induced her to purchase one of its policies. Id. at 1324. Because Druhan purchased the policy in connection with her employer's benefit package, the defendant believed Druhan's claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and removed the case to federal court. Id. at 1324-25. Druhan moved the district court to remand the case to state court, arguing that ERISA did not preempt her claims. Id. at 1325. The district court agreed with the defendant and denied Druhan's remand motion. Id. Druhan then filed a written Request and Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment (the Judgment Request). Id. at 1325 & n. 3. Because it was not signed by the defendant, this Court characterized the Judgment Request as a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1325 n. 3. In her Judgment Request, Druhan stated that she had no claims under ERISA and thus the [district] court's order denying her motion to remand effectively left her without a remedy. Id. at 1325. Although the district court granted Druhan's request by dismissing the action with prejudice, [4] the Druhan majority opinion does not state that the district court ever approved or agreed with Druhan's assertion that she had no claim under ERISA. Indeed, Judge Barkett's concurrence points out the district court's remand order was not case-dispositive. See Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1327 (Barkett, J., concurring) (The district court's denial of Druhan's motion to remand... did not have the effect of dismissing her action. Druhan still had the ability to make her claim under ERISA.); see also id. at 1326 (majority opinion) (stating that plaintiff believes [the remand order] effectively disposed of her case, but not stating that the district court ever agreed). Druhan appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying the remand motion because ERISA did not preempt Druhan's state law claims. Because Druhan affirmatively invited the final judgment entered against her, this Court confronted a jurisdictional issuespecifically, whether an appeal from a final judgment that resulted from a voluntary dismissal with prejudice is within this court's jurisdiction. Id. at 1325. Although the judgment was with prejudice and indisputably final, the Druhan Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because there was no case or controversy. Id. at 1326. [5] The Druhan Court pointed out that Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to Cases and Controversies, and [a]t the heart of the case or controversy requirement is the presence of adverse parties. Id. The Court concluded that because the final judgment was entered in response to the plaintiff's motion for a dismissal with prejudice, and because neither party was contending the district court entered that judgment in error, [t]here is therefore no adverseness as to the final judgment, and thus no case or controversy. Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Druhan Court looked beyond the form of the appeal to the substance and concluded that it was not an appeal from a final judgment, but an appeal from an interlocutory order denying the plaintiff's motion to remand. Id. The Druhan Court determined that such an appeal from an interlocutory order is not statutorily authorized because the district court's order denying remand is not among the orders from which an appeal lies as a matter of right, and the plaintiff did not seek an appeal by certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. Although recognizing that there may be good policy reasons to allow the appeal to proceed, the Court concluded, [t]hat, however, is a decision that rests in the hands of Congress, which, along with the Constitution, sets the boundaries of this court's jurisdiction. Id.
Shortly after Druhan, this Court confronted a similar issue in Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d at 1043. Like Druhan, Woodard involved an appeal from an invited final judgment after the denial of the plaintiff's motion to remand a case to state court. Also like Druhan, Woodard did not involve an order that was case-dispositive. Specifically, the Woodard plaintiff brought a class action in state court. Id. at 1044. After a grant of conditional class certification, the defendants removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court. Id. The district court denied the motion and vacated the state court's conditional class certification. Id. The plaintiff then filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, which the defendants opposed. Id. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. The plaintiff appealed, challenging, among other things, the district court's denial of remand. Id. This Court noted that the plaintiff did not obtain § 1292(b) certification and thus could not appeal directly from the order denying remand. Id. Although the plaintiff obtained a final judgment when the court granted with prejudice his motion for voluntary dismissal, the Woodard Court concluded the judgment was not appealable because it was obtained at the request of the plaintiff and there is therefore no `case or controversy' in regard to it. Id. (citing Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1326). This Court dismissed the appeal of the remand denial for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1044-45.
In light of these precedents, it is clear that for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal, our jurisdiction must be both (1) authorized by statute and (2) within constitutional limits. Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1326. As to the first prong, Congress authorized by statute appeals from final judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.). Fitel's appeal satisfies the requirement of being authorized by statute because it is an appeal of a final judgment of dismissal with prejudice. See District Court Order of Jan. 5, 2007 (the Dismissal Order), at 4 (this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice). If Fitel loses this appeal, the case is over. Fitel cannot re-file because the district court's dismissal was with prejudice. [6] See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir.2007) (stating that an order is final and appealable when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment). [7] Because Fitel appeals a final judgment, jurisdiction exists under § 1291 regardless of whether the substance of Fitel's appeal concerns an interlocutory order. See Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 673 (11th Cir.1990) (Under general legal principles, earlier interlocutory orders merge into the final judgment, and a party may appeal the latter to assert error in the earlier interlocutory order.); Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 931 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that review of the final judgment opens for consideration the prior interlocutory orders). Thus, Fitel's appeal of the district court's final dismissal with prejudice is expressly authorized by § 1291. The only question is whether there is sufficient adverseness as to that final dismissal to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution. Where a party appeals through § 1291 (the final-judgment appeal statute), she must be adverse as to the final judgment. See Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1326. EBG argues that the adverseness question is controlled by this Court's precedent in Druhan and Woodard and that Fitel is thus not adverse to the district court's final judgment. We disagree. This Court addressed the adverseness question in Druhan and Woodard only in the context of the appeal of a denial of a motion to remand, not an interlocutory ruling that was effectively case-dispositive. In both Druhan and Woodard, this Court found that sufficient adverseness is not present when a plaintiff loses a contested interlocutory ruling on a motion to remand and then voluntarily files a written request that a final judgment be entered with prejudice. In such cases, the contested remand denial affects only the forum in which the plaintiff must litigate, and the dismissal on the merits derives only from the plaintiff's own written request. Thus, when a plaintiff after denial of a motion to remand requests a dismissal with prejudice, there is no contested court ruling, either interlocutory or final, as to the merits of the plaintiff's claims. Consequently, in the factual circumstances of Druhan and Woodard, the plaintiff is adverse to the remand order but not adverse as to the final judgment on the merits, and thus no case or controversy exists. See Woodard, 170 F.3d at 1044 (stating that there was no case or controversy as to the final judgment because the plaintiff requested it after remand was denied, and implying that both the district court and the defendants anticipated that the plaintiff and/or his counsel intended to re-file the claims elsewhere); Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1326 (stating that the required adverseness is lacking as to the final judgment that the plaintiff specifically requested); see also Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1327 (Barkett, J., concurring) (Druhan still had the ability to make her claim under ERISA.). But Druhan and Woodard are not directly on point here because the present case contains distinct factual ingredients that are critical to the adverseness issue. First, the contested interlocutory orders at issue are materially different. Unlike the remand orders at issue in Druhan and Woodard that concerned only the forum where the cases would be heard, the sanctions order here excluding plaintiff's legal expert was case-dispositive because it foreclosed Fitel from presenting the expert testimony required to prove professional negligence, which was a core element in all of its claims. See Howard v. Walker, 242 Ga. 406, 249 S.E.2d 45, 46 (1978) (holding that in legal malpractice actions, for the plaintiff to recover he must produce opinion testimony of an expert witness); Schluter v. Perrie, Buker, Stagg & Jones, P.C., 230 Ga.App. 776, 498 S.E.2d 543, 545 (1998) (The law presumes that lawyers perform legal services in an ordinarily skillful manner. This presumption remains with the attorney until the presumption is rebutted by expert legal testimony; otherwise the grant of a summary judgment in favor of the attorney is proper. (quotation marks and footnotes omitted)). [8] Second, this case involves an attorney who candidly informed the district court of the impact of its sanctions ruling on the plaintiff's case. Fitel's counsel advised the district court that its interlocutory sanctions ruling was case-dispositive and that the court should terminate the case at that point for efficiency purposes rather than proceed with the other pending motions. The dissent treats Fitel's counsel's suggestion as only a voluntary consent to a judgment against Fitel. However, the more accurate and fairer reading of Fitel's counsel's statements, both literally and in context of the record as a whole, is not that Fitel was consenting to an adverse judgment against it but only stating that, since the court had excluded its required expert, the court should expedite the case and put the ruling in final form because that ruling was undisputedly case-dispositive. Third, and importantly, the district court here agreed with Fitel's counsel's suggestion that the sanctions ruling was case-dispositive. The district court stated that the nature of the sanctions ruling made the case dead at this point. In regard to Fitel's counsel's statement that the case should terminate for efficiency, the district court responded, I appreciate your suggestion. I think it's appropriate. [9] And because Fitel was willing to stipulate to the fact that the court's expert sanctions ruling was case-dispositive, this allowed the court to act immediately rather than proceeding with other motions. The court itself then stated, And, based upon the stipulation by the plaintiff that the exclusion of its expert is a case dispositive event, this action is dismissed. The basis of the district court's dismissal was thus the undisputed case-dispositive nature of its contested interlocutory sanctions order. And by basing its dismissal on that case-dispositive event, the district court effectively made that contested interlocutory expert exclusion order a final order. Because of these important factual distinctions, this Court's precedent in Druhan and Woodard is not directly on point here as to the adverseness question. Instead, this case is factually closer to, and thus controlled by, the Supreme Court's decision in Procter & Gamble. As in Procter & Gamble, Fitel had lost on the merits of the contested exclusion of its expert and the district court's final order merely allowed Fitel to seek an expeditious review of that ruling. See Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 680-81, 78 S.Ct. at 985 (acknowledging rule that a plaintiff who seeks voluntary dismissal may not appeal but concluding that rule is inapplicable when the plaintiff opposed an interlocutory production order and invited dismissal after it had lost on the merits and only as a way of seeking an expeditious review). Because the interlocutory sanctions order was case-dispositive and Fitel opposed that interlocutory order on the merits, Fitel stands adverse to the resulting final judgment that was expressly based on the undisputed case-dispositive nature of the contested interlocutory ruling. Accordingly, because Fitel's appeal satisfies both the statutory requirement of a final judgment and the Constitutional requirement of parties that are adverse to the final judgment, we have jurisdiction to hear Fitel's appeal. Lastly, we pause to address the dissent's concerns. Our dissenting colleague suggests Fitel should have simply asked the district court to certify the appealability of the expert exclusion order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Such reasoning has fatal flaws. First, the district court entered a final judgment, making the § 1291 route directly applicable. There is no requirement that a party travel the § 1292 route before filing a § 1291 appeal from a final judgment. Rather, the only question here is whether the requisite adverseness as to that final judgment exists to satisfy the Constitution, and it does. Second, § 1292(b) certification is wholly discretionary with both the district court and this Court. [10] Furthermore, § 1292(b) sets a high threshold for certification to prevent piecemeal appeals. Indeed, to obtain § 1292(b) certification, the litigant must show not only that an immediate appeal will advance the termination of the litigation but also that the appeal involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Most interlocutory orders do not meet this test. [11] Although the district court's order excluding Fitel's expert was case-dispositive, it was nonetheless a discovery sanctions order where the chances of § 1292(b) review are slim. [12] Third, the dissent advocates looking beyond the form of the final dismissal with prejudice to the substance of the underlying issue raised on appeal. However, as discussed above, our precedent establishes that when the appeal is from a final judgment, the fact that the appeal substantively concerns an interlocutory ruling is no bar to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Myers, 916 F.2d at 673 (stating that earlier interlocutory orders merge into the final judgment, and a party may appeal the latter to assert error in the earlier interlocutory order). Fourth, and more troubling, the dissent's approach foists upon litigants and counsel an untenable position that is not required by § 1291 nor § 1292 nor the Constitution. Under the dissent's approach, an attorney dare not candidly tell the court that its ruling is case-dispositive and that it, for efficiency reasons, should consider terminating a case with prejudice due to the case-dispositive nature of the interlocutory order because any subsequent attempt to appeal would be insufficiently adverse and there would be no jurisdiction. The dissent suggests the attorney instead should move for a § 1292(b) certification and, if that fails, proceed to a Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment determination. Thus, under the dissent's approach, an attorney in Fitel's counsel's position faces an ethical dilemma. He can either (1) fulfill his duty of candor and ethical responsibility to the court by forthrightly informing the court that its ruling was case-dispositive and a final dismissal with prejudice is thus appropriate for efficiency purposes, thereby surrendering Fitel's right to appeal the court's order, or (2) continue to litigate to finality a case he knows has no legitimate basis for proceeding without an expert witness, just so Fitel ultimately can challenge the court's case-dispositive interlocutory order excluding the expert. On the other hand, if we recognize that adverseness as to the final judgment (i.e., the dismissal with prejudice here) is preserved when the contested interlocutory order is case-dispositive and the district court bases its dismissal with prejudice on the fact that its interlocutory decision disposed of the entire case, and the plaintiff consistently has opposed the order underlying the final dismissal, we prevent such a dilemma and also harmonize Druhan and Woodard with Procter & Gamble. [13] Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the fundamental appellate jurisdiction principles of judicial efficiency and avoiding piecemeal appeals highlighted by the dissent. It avoids the waste of a party going through a dismissal or summary judgment procedure that it already knows it will lose simply to get a final judgment. And because this approach rests on the facts that the district court's interlocutory ruling was case-dispositive and the final judgment was with prejudice, an appeal of such an interlocutory order is no more piecemeal than an appeal of a dismissal or summary judgment order as the case either will end on appeal if the district court is affirmed or be remanded for further proceedings if the district court is reversed. If anything, this approach is less piecemeal than the dissent's approach, which encourages increased reliance on the interlocutory appeal statute. For all these reasons, we conclude jurisdiction over this appeal exists under § 1291 and the Constitution. Now we turn to the merits of Fitel's appeal.