Opinion ID: 2317022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Brady Analysis

Text: Grandison's primary contention is that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the State's alleged repeated violations of its constitutional obligations under Brady. Therefore, we shall begin our analysis of the elements that Grandison is required to establish to prevail on his Brady claim. As we recently stated in Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 597-98, 790 A.2d 15, 30-31 (2002): The Supreme Court made clear in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith of the prosecution. [ Brady, 373 U.S.] at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. In order to establish a Brady violation, Petitioner must establish (1) that the prosecutor suppressed or withheld evidence that is (2) favorable to the defense  either because it is exculpatory, provides a basis for mitigation of sentence, or because it provides grounds for impeaching a witness  and (3) that the suppressed evidence is material. Evidence that is obviously favorable must be disclosed even absent a specific request by the defendant. Impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence, is evidence favorable to an accused. [ C]f Napue v. People of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (holding that the prohibition against the use of false testimony applies even when the evidence goes only to the credibility of the witness because the jury's assessment of credibility can be determinative of guilt or innocence).    The standard for measuring materiality of the undisclosed evidence is strictest if it demonstrates that the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury. In [ United States v. ] Agurs, [427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)] the Supreme Court explained that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. In cases where there is no false testimony but the prosecution nonetheless fails to disclose favorable evidence, the standard for materiality, in the language of the Supreme Court, is whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. [ S ] ee ... Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [4] Materiality is assessed by considering all of the suppressed evidence collectively. The question, therefore, is not whether the State would have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that the jury's verdict would have been the same, which is determined in reference to the sum of the evidence and its significance for the prosecution. (Footnote omitted and alterations in original). We observe that Brady jurisprudence predominantly addresses the materiality prong. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-454, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565-75, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, 505-18 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-84, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381-85, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 491-95 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-91, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-98, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218-21. Various courts have recognized that the materiality prong is the gravamen of analysis under Brady. See, e.g., United States v. Kubiak, 704 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852, 104 S.Ct. 163, 78 L.Ed.2d 149 (1983) (in determining whether nondisclosure of exculpatory information constituted a denial of due process, the focus is not upon the fact of nondisclosure, but upon the impact of the nondisclosure on the jury's verdict); Floyd v. State, 902 So.2d 775, 778 (Fla. 2005) (stating that the focus in postconviction Brady-Bagley analysis is ultimately the nature and weight of undisclosed information); State v. Louviere, 833 So.2d 885, 897 (La.2002) ([W]e observe that in the main, the Brady jurisprudence focuses on the materiality inquiry); Atkinson v. State, 778 A.2d 1058, 1063 (Del.2001) (In this case, as in most cases where the issue of a ` Brady violation' is raised, the focus is on the third component  materiality); State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 690 A.2d 1, 33 (1997) (The focus of the Brady analysis often is whether evidence is sufficiently `material' to the defendant's case to come within the State's Brady obligation). Therefore, because our determination of Grandison's Brady claim will ultimately turn on whether the evidence is material, we shall assume only for the sake of argument that the evidence in issue was withheld and that it was favorable to Grandison with respect to his guilt or sentencing and focus our attention on the issue of whether the suppressed evidence was material. [5] We base our conclusion on the factors that this Court previously has found to be useful in determining materiality for Brady purposes. Conyers, 367 Md. at 612, 790 A.2d at 40. These factors applicable to the facts of this case include the specificity of the defendant's request for disclosure materials, the closeness of the case against the defendant and the cumulative weight of the other independent evidence of guilt, the centrality of the particular witness to the State's case, and whether and to what extent the witness's credibility is already in question. Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 352, 768 A.2d 675, 685 (2001). Grandison's proffered evidence can be divided into three categories. The first category consists of descriptions of the African-American male observed in the Warren House lobby or the vicinity of the motel shortly before the murders, which allegedly contradict Etta Horne's and Helen Kondilidis's identifications of Evans, including the testimony from Janet Bannister, Roberta Weinstein, and Derese Pinkney, and the 302 statements by Janet Bannister. The second category, which is comprised of the majority of the evidence, was offered to show that between 2:45 p.m. and 3:15 p.m. on April 28, 1983, the witnesses did not see, and the surveillance tape did not record, Etta Horne or Helen Kondilidis in the lobby at the time they had testified to being present there, and that the witnesses did not observe anyone in the lobby except Scott Piechowicz and Susan Kennedy. The third category consists of Darryl Primeaux's grand jury testimony and Calvin Harper's handwritten signed statement to the police on May 12, 1983, which Grandison asserts impeaches Calvin Harper's testimony concerning the interaction between Rodney Kelly, whom Harper claims provided Evans with the murder weapon, and Evans on April 18, 1983. Grandison argues that this testimonial and statement evidence, when viewed in conjunction with the surveillance videotape that corroborates the statements and testimony of the witnesses impeaching Kondilidis and Horne, creates sufficient doubt so as to undermine our confidence in the verdict against him. Our view of the evidence, however, differs and we determine that the evidence, when examined as a whole, does not undermine our confidence in the verdicts against Grandison. The testimony and statements upon which Grandison relies concerning the appearance of the man in the lobby as well as the statements indicating that Kondilidis and Horne were not in the lobby between 2:45 p.m. and 3:15 p.m. are examples of the well-documented phenomena that different witnesses' descriptions of a person or estimates of time will often vary to a considerable extent. Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 265, 855 A.2d 291, 301 (2004); see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967) (The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known), and the authorities cited therein. When examined with that precept in mind, it is clear that the testimony and statements do not create a significant possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been any different, and Grandison would have been convicted of hiring Evans to kill two federal witnesses. Even assuming arguendo, as the Circuit Court did, that the evidence impeached Horne's and Kondilidis's accounts of the events leading up to the murders, which is the purpose of the majority of Grandison's proffered evidence, it does not serve to meaningfully deplete the cumulative weight of the remaining independent evidence against Evans and, by extension, Grandison during Grandison's 1983 guilt/innocence trial and his 1994 re-sentencing. During the 1983 trial, the State's key witness was Charlene Sparrow, Evans's girlfriend and accomplice. Sparrow's testimony that she accompanied Evans and Janet Moore to the Baltimore City Jail, and to Theresa Purdie's apartment to meet with Kelly, as well as her statements that Evans told her that he was going to kill someone remain unimpeached by Grandison's proffered evidence. Moreover, Sparrow testified that Evans was at the Warren House at the time of the shootings, independent of Horne's and Kondilidis's identifications. She further recounted that Evans told her that he shot Scott Piechowicz and Susan Kennedy. Sparrow's testimony also was corroborated by a number of independent witnesses. Those portions of Sparrow's testimony implicating Rodney Kelly in the planning of the murders are supported by Calvin Harper's testimony as well. Harper described the bag in which Kelly carried the gun used in the murders as a brown sports bag, a description that is consistent with Sparrow's statement that the bag was a brown and white canvas bag. Moreover, Primeaux's grand jury testimony does little to discredit Harper. Although Primeaux denied participation in the events that Harper alleged to have occurred, he stated that his knowledge is not complete because Kelly would not have shared information concerning the gun and murder plot with him. The prosecution's case in the 1983 trial was further supported by the testimony of Special Agent Daniel Ryan and handwriting expert Luther Senter. Special Agent Ryan testified concerning the authenticity of a letter addressed to Janet Moore, dated March 14, 1983, and written by Grandison, The judge sure make his decision by at least Wednesday, I'm banking on him throwing it out, but in the mean time I am preparing for trial. Like I said no one can put me in there, the white bitch testimony ain't shit, because she's talking about Nov. 9, 82, at 11 p.m. at night, the hotel was rented on Nov. 10, 82 and the black dude stated that I was not the one who rented the hotel.    I might have you take a friend of mine, name short [Evans's nickname], over there to see one of the kids, probably Rodney [Kelly] or Mike [Queen], because I want him to take care of something to be on the safe side. Senter confirmed that the letter was in Grandison's handwriting. The evidence presented by the prosecution at Grandison's 1983 trial, including that of Evans's guilt and Grandison's role as mastermind is overwhelming and supports our confidence in the result of Grandison's 1983 trial. Therefore, we are not convinced that there is a reasonable probability that the jury in the 1983 trial would have reached a different result in light of evidence Grandison now provides. We reach an identical conclusion with respect to the case presented during Grandison's 1994 re-sentencing proceedings. The prosecution's case was even more powerful due to the addition of Janet Moore's testimony. Moore testified to the fact that Grandison called her on April 26, 1983 and told her to pick up Evans and bring him to the Baltimore City Jail to visit him. She further corroborated Sparrow's account, from both 1983 and 1994, that Moore and Evans went into the jail while Sparrow waited in the car, and later that the three went to Theresa Purdie's apartment to see Rodney Kelly. She also stated, consistent with Sparrow's 1983 and 1994 testimony, that at Purdie's apartment, Evans, Kelly, Purdie, and Moore spoke to Grandison on the phone. Moore testified that Grandison asked her to take Evans to Warren House, once more corroborating Sparrow's testimony that she and Evans went to Warren House in the company of Moore. Moreover, Moore stated that while on a three-way call, she heard Grandison tell Kelly to take Evans in the car up to the motel and show Evans who the white couple was. The remainder of the prosecution's 1994 re-sentencing case was nearly identical to that presented in Grandison's 1983 trial. Thus, we conclude that the prosecution's evidence against Grandison at his 1994 re-sentencing proceeding was even more persuasive than that introduced at his 1983 guilt/innocence trial. Therefore, we hold that the evidence at issue in the case at bar fails to satisfy the materiality component of the Brady analysis because it does not create a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense (assuming it had not), Grandison would not have been convicted and sentenced to death. Because Grandison has failed to satisfy the materiality prong of the Brady analysis, we hold that his Brady claim is without merit.