Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assertedly Inadequate Appellate Record

Text: Bryant contends various asserted omissions from the appellate record violated his constitutional and statutory rights. These include descriptions of witnesses‘ physical gestures, unreported discussions, charts and visual aids used by counsel, and some sealed records. We assume Smith and Wheeler have joined this claim. As defendants acknowledge, we have consistently held that ―state law entitles a defendant only to an appellate record ‗adequate to permit [him or her] to argue‘ the points raised in the appeal. [Citation.] Federal constitutional requirements are similar. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require the state to furnish an indigent defendant with a record sufficient to permit adequate and effective appellate review. [Citations.] Similarly, the Eighth Amendment requires reversal only where the record is 75 We have assumed that Bryant‘s absence when Smith made his motion to reopen the jury‘s deliberations on the guilt phase verdicts does not preclude him from joining the appellate claim of error (see ante, pt. III.L.). 157 so deficient as to create a substantial risk the death penalty is being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. [Citation.] The defendant has the burden of showing the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 857-858.) Defendants present no compelling reason to revisit the requirement that they establish a material omission from the record, nor do they attempt to demonstrate that any of the claimed omissions actually prevent meaningful review. ―Human affairs being what they are, . . . perfect records are not always achieved. Appellants must do more than merely complain about omissions; they must demonstrate that the record is insufficient for meaningful appellate review.‖ (Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1283.) C. General Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law Defendants raise a number of challenges to California‘s death penalty statute that we have consistently rejected. 76 They present no compelling arguments against those settled precedents. The death penalty statute does not unconstitutionally fail to adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 769.) None of the following renders the death penalty statute unconstitutional: (1) permitting jury consideration of the circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a) (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 769); (2) permitting jury consideration of a defendant‘s unadjudicated violent criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b) (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 848); (3) the absence of intercase proportionality review (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 769); 76 Defendants have raised a number of related challenges to the penalty phase jury instructions that we addressed ante, in parts IV.A and C. 158 (4) the absence of various ―safeguards‖ in the penalty determination, such as written findings, jury unanimity, and a burden of proof regarding the sentence (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 769); (5) the existence of prosecutorial discretion in charging and pursuing the death penalty (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 495); or (6) the provision of different procedural rights to capital defendants (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 770). The imposition of the death penalty in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory law does not violate international law or the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 770.) D. Cumulative Prejudice and Reversal of Any Count Defendants contend the combined guilt and penalty phase errors require reversal of their convictions and death sentences even if the errors are not prejudicial when considered individually. As discussed ante, we have concluded that those errors we have found or assumed for the sake of argument are harmless. Even when considered cumulatively, such errors did not deny defendants a fair trial. Because we have not concluded that any count or special circumstance must be reversed, defendants‘ claim that any such reversal warrants the reversal of the entire judgments against them fails. 159