Opinion ID: 2427684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the probate proceedings:

Text: In 1948 Roy W. Bell, Sr. executed with all the formalities required by law a valid will in which Mrs. Myrle O. Burton, his sister, was named executrix. At the time of his death this will had not been revoked, unless it was by the writing discovered after Mr. Bell's death, and wholly in his handwriting, and which we will discuss. The district court held this holographic instrument did not contain testamentary intent, but that it was sufficient to revoke the 1948 will and that Roy W. Bell, Sr., died intestate. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the holographic instrument was not a will, neither did it revoke the 1948 will, and ordered the 1948 will admitted to probate. The holographic instrument above referred to was, according to all parties, wholly in the handwriting of Mr. Bell. After his death it was found in a box of stationery on a desk used by Mr. Bell at El Lago. Mrs. Bell testified that some three or four weeks prior to Mr. Bell's death they were having some company visit with them, and in straightening up Mr. Bell's desk, she gathered up some loose papers and stuffed them in this stationery box. She did not then notice this writing, but found it after Mr. Bell's death. It contained certain interlineations and corrections, and is as follows: Last Will & Testament of Roy Wheeler Bell State of Tex. | Know all men by } Co of Harris | these presents That I, Roy Wheeler Bell, of Harris Co. Tex being of sound disposing mind memory, do make this my last will & testament, hereby revoking any & all other wills heretofore made by me. 1st That my wife Helen W. Bell has pat invested cash for development in approximate of value of at time we were married (Jan 1st-1955) of the following property. Lt 24 & E 50' of lot 23 of Jackson place 3rd section a subdivision of Pasadena Tx as per map recorded of deeds & Records of Harris Co. I therefore declare the above property to be community property. This property has been and is now in my name. I wish to hereby declare this to be community property owned equally by she her & myself. It will be noticed that it is not dated, nor is it complete, nor signed at the end. However, the first part of the sentence, That I, Roy W. Bell, etc. being in Mr. Bell's handwriting, is a sufficient signature for a holographic will. Lawson v. Dawson's Estate (Tex.Civ.App., 1899, writ denied), 21 Tex.Civ.App. 361, 53 S.W. 64. This instrument is not effective as a will because it does not make any disposition of Mr. Bell's property. It cannot be admitted to probate as Mr. Bell's last will and testament. Brackenridge v. Roberts (1924), 114 Tex. 418, 267 S.W. 244, rehearing overruled 114 Tex. 418, 270 S.W. 1001; Hinson v. Hinson (1955), 154 Tex. 561, 280 S.W.2d 731; Adams v. Maris (Comm. of App., 1919), 213 S.W. 622; Page v. Barnes (Tex.Civ.App., 1924, writ dismissed), 258 S.W. 264; Maxey v. Queen (Tex.Civ.App., 1947, writ refused, n. r. e.), 206 S.W.2d 114; Poole v. Starke (Tex.Civ.App., 1959), 324 S.W.2d 234, writ refused n. r. e. We hold this holographic instrument did not revoke Mr. Bell's 1948 will, and that the 1948 will should be admitted to probate upon proper proof. Section 63 of the Probate Code, V.A.T.S., provides that No will in writing, and no clause thereof or devise therein, shall be revoked, except by a subsequent will, codicil, or declaration in writing, executed with like formalities   . (All emphasis herein is that of the writer). It is clear under the above statute and it has been so held, that if there is a separate writing, showing an intention to revoke the will, which does comply with the necessary formalities, the will is revoked. 3 A.L.R. 836. In discussing the formalities required of a written instrument to revoke a will it is said in 3 A.L.R. 836: The court in Re Backus (N.Y.) supra, (1900, [49 App.Div. 410] 63 N. Y.Supp. 544), dealing with a revocation in a deed of trust, says that `the statute permitting a revocation of a will by some other writing, and requiring that it should be executed with the same formality as a will, is not to be construed as meaning that the other writing, which is not a will, should erroneously be characterized as such by the person executing it. In other words, it would be an unreasonable construction to give the statute, to hold that every literal and verbal expression required in the publication of a will should be applied to other paper writings, when it is evident that such language, when so used, would be an untrue statement, and not applicable or germane as indicative of the character of such other writings    What is evidently meant by the statute is that the formality required in the making of a will shall be applied to a paper of revocation, so far as the latter, from its nature and character, is susceptible of having the same formality observed.' In Griffin v. Griffin (1790) 4 Ves.Jr. 197, note, 31 Eng. Reports Reprint 101, a paper begun by the testator several days before his deathand when the testator was capable of transacting businesswas held not to be a revocation. The contents of the written instrument were not shown in that case, but the court states that the presumption of law is that he never meant to finish the paper, or that it was intended only as a draft for consideration. Page on Wills, Lifetime Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 459, p. 824 says: Even where a will may be revoked by a subsequent writing other than a will or codicil, a will or codicil which contains a revocation clause together with dispositive provisions, and which is executed so as to be a sufficient `writing' but not so as to be a valid will, does not operate as a revocation, unless the instrument shows affirmatively that testator intended that such revocation clause should take effect without regard to the validity of the remaining provisions of the will. This rule is an application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, and rests in reality, in most cases, upon the reason that testator intended to revoke the first will only to dispose of his property by the second will; and that if the second will is inoperative, such mistake of law prevents the revocation clause from taking effect. See also 57 Am.Jur. p. 328 § 470; 95 C.J.S. Wills §§ 269, 272, pp. 40, 44. On Sunday before Mr. Bell died the following Thursday, he told his sister, Mrs. Burton, that he had not made another will; that he probably should make one, because his children had grown up, and because he was married again, but he had not made another will yet. This statement was made when it is undisputed that the holographic instrument was in existence. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, we find there is no evidence to sustain a finding that this instrument was intended by Mr. Bell to be a revocation of his 1948 will. The paper on its face, at best, shows that it was not intended to be a revocation of this 1948 will, but was only a memorandum of a proposed will to take the place of the 1948 will. The memorandum is incomplete and does not show that Mr. Bell intended to die intestate. His statement to his sister that he should make another will, but had not done so, shows no intent to revoke the 1948 will. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the cause to the district court is hereby reversed. The probate proceedings are severed from the consolidated cause, and are remanded to the district court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, and for compliance with Rule 338, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment of the trial court that plaintiffs Roy W. Bell, Jr. and Mary Bell Boettcher have and recover a portion of the escrow fund arising from the sale of the Bell Apartments is hereby modified so as to award recovery of the entire escrow fund to the plaintiffs Roy W. Bell, Jr. and Mary Bell Boettcher, subject to the provisions of the 1948 will of Roy W. Bell, Sr., as probated. That portion of the trial court's judgment awarding plaintiffs Roy W. Bell, Jr. and Mary Bell Boettcher the sum of $21,124.50 is hereby reversed. That part of the trial court's judgment awarding $2,000.00 to Myrle O. Burton out of the $9,000.00 distributable estate, and awarding 50% of the remainder of $7,000.00 to Roy W. Bell, Jr. and Mary Bell Boettcher, and awarding 50% of $7,000.00 to Helen W. Bell is affirmed. The trial court's judgment as modified herein is affirmed. Costs are taxed one-half against Mrs. Bell and one-half against the plaintiffs herein.