Opinion ID: 349945
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standards for making an award to the state as prevailing defendant

Text: 8 Section 706(k) vests the court with discretion to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party. With respect to private prevailing parties, the standard for awarding such fees to successful defendants is quite different from those for awarding to successful plaintiffs. (P)rivate parties who commence such litigation are 'private attorneys general' vindicating a policy to which Congress gave the highest priority . . .  Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976), quoting Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113, 1117-1118 (2d Cir. 1976). Given the role of private suits in accomplish(ing) the desired public objective of eradicating discrimination, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 1975), the encouragement to pursue one's rights provided by a liberally administered attorney's fee provision is crucial to Title VII's effective operation. Accordingly, it is the general rather than the exceptional practice to award attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Denial of fees to prevailing plaintiffs can be justified only by special circumstances. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, supra, 519 F.2d at 363; Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 86, 503 F.2d 177 (1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). 9 The situation with respect to a prevailing private defendant is markedly different. A prevailing defendant seeking an attorney's fee (under Title VII) does not appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, supra, 519 F.2d at 364. A general practice of awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants would work to defeat the goal of effective enforcement of Title VII. As this Court has noted (a) routine allowance of attorney fees to successful defendants in discrimination suits might effectively discourage suits in all but the clearest cases, and inhibit earnest advocacy on undecided issues. Id. at 364-365. An award of attorney's fees to a prevailing private defendant is appropriate, therefore, only when certain extraordinary indicia vexatiousness, bad faith, abusive conduct, or an attempt to harass or embarrass characterize the plaintiff's suit. Id. at 364; see also E. E. O. C. v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 432 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2948, 53 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1977); Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D.Pa.1973); Carrion v. Yeshiva University,535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976). 10 One question posed by the Attorney General's motion is whether there is any reason to be any less exacting in considering a request for attorney's fees by a state defendant which prevails in a Title VII suit. We see no reason for the application of any different standard. Routine allowance of attorney's fees to prevailing state defendants would have the same potential for discouraging plaintiffs as in cases of private employers. Today state government employees comprise a very substantial percentage of the total work force, and it would be arbitrary, to say the least, to construe § 706(k) as applicable to those employees in a manner different from the rest of the work force. Indeed there are two reasons why, in the exercise of discretion in awarding fees to states in Title VII cases, the courts should be particularly demanding. First, the resources of a state defendant, since the state has taxing powers, are far in excess of those of the typical private defendant. States generally employ salaried attorneys paid out of tax revenues. Thus it will generally be less burdensome for a state to bear its own attorney's fees than for a private defendant. We have heretofore observed that ability to pay may enter into a court's decision whether to award counsel fees. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, supra, 519 F.2d at 364 n. 24. By a parity of reasoning it seems appropriate to take into account the prevailing state defendant's ability to bear the expense. Second, discrimination by government, especially damaging because of the pervasive role that government plays in society, requires particular attention from the courts. As the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare noted in its report on the bill that became the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972: 11 The exclusion of minorities from effective participation in the bureaucracy not only promotes ignorance of minority problems in that particular community, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all too often hostility toward the entire process of government. 12 S.Rep. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1971). Considering the significantly more destructive effects of discrimination by government, the courts must be especially concerned that awards to successful state defendants do not have the undesirable effects of discourag(ing) suits in all but the clearest cases, and . . . inhibit(ing) earnest advocacy on undecided issues. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, supra, 519 F.2d at 364-65. We conclude, therefore, that as with private prevailing defendants, an award of attorney's fees to the state can be made only after a finding that the pursuit of the Title VII remedy, or an appeal from the denial of such a remedy, involved vexatiousness, bad faith, abusive conduct, or an attempt to harass or embarrass.