Opinion ID: 4368551
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Active Efforts Under ICWA

Text: Pursuant to ICWA, “[b]efore terminating parental rights to an Indian child, a court must find that ‘active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.’ ”11 We conduct active efforts inquiries “on a case-by-case basis because ‘no pat formula’ exists for distinguishing between active and passive efforts.”12 Generally, “active efforts will be found when OCS ‘takes the client through the steps of the plan rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its own,’ 9 Caitlyn E. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 399 P.3d 646, 654 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Pravat P. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 249 P.3d 264, 270 (Alaska 2011)). 10 Id. (quoting Philip J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 314 P.3d 518, 526 (Alaska 2013)). 11 Id. (quoting Jon S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 760-61 (Alaska 2009)); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); 25 C.F.R. § 23.120(a) (2018); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(B). 12 Philip J., 314 P.3d at 527 (quoting A.A. v. State, Dep’t of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999)). -9- 7335 but not when ‘the client must develop his or her own resources towards bringing [the plan] to fruition.’ ”13 In 2016 the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) implemented new regulations (the Regulations) related to the active efforts requirement, setting a “nationwide definition for this critical statutory term.”14 The Regulations took effect December 12, 2016; as such, they were in force at the time OCS filed its August 2017 petition to terminate Bill’s and Clara’s parental rights.15 The Regulations define active efforts as “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with his or her family.”16 The Regulations reaffirm that what constitutes active efforts is fact-dependent and that “efforts are to be tailored to the . . . circumstances of the case.”17 Finally, and of critical importance to this appeal, the Regulations state that “[a]ctive efforts must be documented in detail in the record.”18 13 Id. (alteration in original) (first quoting N.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597, 602-03 (Alaska 2001); and then quoting Lucy J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 244 P.3d 1099, 1114 (Alaska 2010)). 14 Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,790 (June 14, 2016) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23). 15 Id. at 38,778; 25 C.F.R. § 23.143 (“None of the provisions of this subpart affects a proceeding under State law for . . . termination of parental rights . . . that was initiated prior to December 12, 2016 . . . .”). 16 25 C.F.R. § 23.2. 17 Id. (including a list of 11 examples of what active efforts may include). 18 25 C.F.R. § 23.120(b). -10- 7335 Bill and Clara argue OCS’s evidence was too “vague” and “over generalized” to demonstrate active efforts by clear and convincing evidence.19 We agree. B. It Was Error To Find By Clear And Convincing Evidence That OCS Made Active Efforts. The superior court found by “clear and convincing evidence that . . . [OCS] made active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs,” based in large part on Bill’s and Clara’s “demonstration of an unwillingness to change.” Bill and Clara argue OCS’s evidence was vague and overgeneralized and therefore not sufficient to demonstrate active efforts. “Whether substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that the state complied with ICWA’s ‘active efforts’ requirement . . .[is a] mixed question[] of law and fact.”20 Bill’s and Clara’s argument is not based on “specific factual errors [made by the superior court,] but on whether [OCS’s] efforts satisfy the 19 Bill and Clara also argue the superior court inappropriately discounted the lapse in mental health services to Noah and Olwen during their placement in Juneau as irrelevant to the issue of active efforts. We have previously upheld OCS’s discretion to prioritize which services should be provided to a family based on the specific needs of the case. See Denny M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 365 P.3d 345, 351 n.22 (Alaska 2016). OCS reasonably focused its efforts (such as they were) on addressing the issues that made Noah and Olwen children in need of aid, i.e., Bill’s and Clara’s domestic violence and substance abuse issues. We do not express an opinion whether the efforts toward the children were active, as we need not decide that issue at this time. 20 Jon S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 761 (Alaska 2009). -11- 7335 ICWA standard. This presents a question of law.”21 We review conclusions of law de novo, including whether the court’s findings satisfy the requirements of ICWA.22 1. OCS’s testimony was insufficient to demonstrate active efforts. Bill’s and Clara’s argument that OCS did not demonstrate active efforts by clear and convincing evidence is based primarily on the “vague testimony” of the OCS caseworker. To support its showing of active efforts, OCS admitted into evidence the family case plan and contact plan; otherwise, OCS’s demonstration of active efforts relied primarily on the caseworker’s testimony. The caseworker testified that OCS involvement “was ongoing through the [T]ribe or through OCS for quite some time prior to removal,” but she could not testify as to the approximate date of the first report of harm. The caseworker also could not speak to the last time Clara participated in treatment, as the caseworker had not received a recent report from the Tribe’s treatment center. The caseworker admitted she herself had not spoken to Clara about case planning in “quite some time.” Similarly, when asked if OCS ever talked to Bill about getting a substance abuse assessment, the caseworker replied, “I did not. I know that the [T]ribe has worked with him. . . . They provide services on the island, so we work very closely with them, and I know that those conversations were had”; but she could not provide further detail about what those efforts entailed. The caseworker’s testimony throughout the termination trial is riddled with similarly generic statements that defer to the Tribe’s actions without documentation by OCS or the Tribe and without testimony from the Tribe to support when and in what 21 Jude M. v. State, Dep’t of Health &Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 394 P.3d 543, 556 (Alaska 2017). 22 Bob S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 400 P.3d 99, 105 (Alaska 2017). -12- 7335 context those efforts occurred. As we have repeatedly said, “[a]ctive efforts occur ‘where the state caseworker takes the client through the steps of the plan rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its own.’ ”23 Here, OCS recommended inpatient treatment for both parents — did it help them identify appropriate programs and complete the necessary paperwork to apply? OCS recommended parenting classes — did it provide Bill and Clara a schedule for those classes, give reminders, or check in afterward to confirm their attendance? OCS recommended domestic violence classes — after Bill and Clara completed what was available on-island, did OCS connect them to other resources to continue this education?24 The answers to these questions are unclear on the record before us.25 Like the superior court, we are underwhelmed by the quality of OCS’s testimony. We agree with the court’s observation that OCS “made a rather lackadaisical effort” and “put on a skeletal case about [its] required active efforts.” The superior court was rightly concerned to doubt OCS’s demonstration of active efforts. We acknowledge that the superior court concluded that OCS met its burden due in large part to “the consideration the Court is to give to the parents’ demonstration of an unwillingness to 23 N.A. v. State, 19 P.3d 597, 602-03 (Alaska 2001) (quoting A.A. v. State, Dep’t of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999)). 24 The OCS caseworker testified Bill and Clara completed the domestic violence education available on St. Paul. She mentioned the idea of trying an online program, but it does not appear she followed through with connecting either parent to such a service. 25 We do not intend to convey OCS must have taken all these actions for its efforts to be considered active. These questions are relevant queries a court might consider and are posed solely to demonstrate the inadequacy of OCS’s evidentiary support. -13- 7335 change or participate in rehabilitative efforts.”26 While this principle remains valid, the parents’ lack of effort does not excuse OCS’s failure to make and demonstrate its efforts. Even considering the parents’ lack of participation, there is simply insufficient evidence in the record to show that OCS made active efforts. It was legal error for the superior court to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family. 2. Active efforts are not documented in detail in the record. A related but distinct problem is OCS’s failure to document its active efforts in detail in the record.27 While documentation is related to OCS’s duty to make active efforts, documenting those efforts is a separate responsibility. The act of documentation is not itself an “active effort”;28 rather, it is a mechanism for OCS and the 26 On this point, the superior court relied in particular on the following language: “[A] parent’s demonstrated lack of willingness to participate in treatment may be considered in determining whether the state has taken active efforts.” Failed attempts to contact the parent or obtain information from her may qualify as active efforts if the parent’s evasive or combative conduct “rendered provision of services practically impossible.” And “[i]f a parent has a long history of refusing treatment and continues to refuse treatment, OCS is not required to keep up its active efforts once it is clear that these efforts would be futile.” Sylvia L. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 343 P.3d 425, 432-33 (Alaska 2015) (alterations in original) (first quoting E.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 46 P.3d 986, 990-91 (Alaska 2002); and then quoting Wilson W. v. State, Office of Children’s Servs., 185 P.3d 94, 101 (Alaska 2008)). 27 25 C.F.R. § 23.120(b) (2018). 28 Compare 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (providing a list of 11 examples of what active (continued...) -14- 7335 court to ensure that active efforts have been made.29 Documentation is required by ICWA and is critical to compliance with ICWA’s purpose and key protections.30 The CINA statute also requires OCS to document its provision of family reunification support services.31 But such documentation is woefully missing here.32 28 (...continued) efforts may include, such as “[c]onducting a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the Indian child’s family,” “[i]dentifying appropriate services and helping the parents to overcome barriers,” and “[c]onsidering alternative ways to address the needs of the Indian child’s parents”), with 25 C.F.R. § 23.120 (setting forth in a separate section of the Regulations the requirement that the state agency and the court document active efforts as a means to ensure that these efforts have been made). 29 See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN C H I L D W E L F A R E A C T 4 4 ( D e c . 2 0 1 6 ) , https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc2-056831.pdf (“The rule . . . requires the court to document active efforts in detail in the record. . . . State agencies also need to help ensure that there is sufficient documentation available for the court to use in reaching its conclusions regarding the provision of active efforts.”). While the BIA Guidelines are non-binding, we have looked to these guidelines in the past for assistance in interpreting ICWA. See, e.g., David S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 270 P.3d 767, 781-82 (Alaska 2012). 30 See Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,816 (June 14, 2016) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23); 25 C.F.R. § 23.120(b). 31 AS 47.10.086(a)(3). 32 On appeal, OCS cites pervasively in its brief to evidence that was not admitted at the termination trial and therefore cannot be relied upon by this court. See Chloe O. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 309 P.3d 850, 856 (Alaska 2013) (“On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision in light of the evidence presented to that court.”); Paula E. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 276 P.3d 422, 430 (Alaska 2012) (“[W]e will consider only the evidence that was admitted at the hearing.”). For example, OCS cites to its emergency petition for adjudication of a child (continued...) -15- 7335 We also reiterate that the superior court warned OCS at the February 2016 adjudication hearing “that this is as little over the line of active efforts as you can get while crossing the line.” It escapes comprehension why, in the face of such an explicit warning, OCS failed to rectify its deficiencies and failed to create the documentation and provide the witness testimony necessary to support what efforts it and the Tribe did make.33 For example, OCS contracted with the Tribe to provide on-island services to Bill and Clara; it likely would have been helpful for the superior court to hear testimony from tribal representatives describing the efforts made to provide family support services, but 32 (...continued) in need of aid, hearing log notes, Clara’s substance abuse assessment, testimony from the adjudication hearing, and the OCS report for the permanency hearing. OCS did not seek to admit any of these items into evidence at the termination trial, nor did it ask the superior court to take notice of earlier testimony. This attempt by OCS to bolster its documentation of active efforts only serves to further illustrate the paucity of evidence presented at the termination trial. Additionally, even if evidence and testimony from the February 2016 adjudication hearing had been admitted at the October 2017 termination trial, it would not substantiate OCS’s efforts during the intervening twenty months. 33 It is theoretically possible that adequate testimony regarding OCS’s active efforts might suffice even if the documentation of those efforts is sparse. We have held that in certain circumstances the superior court may “credit OCS caseworkers’ sworn testimony about the extent of services provided . . . without requiring additional documentation.” Caitlyn E. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 399 P.3d 646, 656 (Alaska 2017) (dismissing argument that the record should have included “more detailed reports” from the mother’s stay in a long-term inpatient treatment facility). But without supporting documentation, the quality of a caseworker’s testimony must be sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard; in this case, it was not sufficient. -16- 7335 none was proffered. OCS also could have provided the court with its ORCA documentation34 regarding actions taken to reunify the family, but it did not. On the record before us, there is insufficient evidence to sustain an active efforts finding under a clear and convincing evidence standard. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’s active efforts finding, vacate the court’s termination order, and remand for further proceedings. As this case is governed by the 2016 BIA Regulations, on remand the superior court should expressly analyze OCS’s efforts under those standards. Finally, we are mindful of the fact that Noah and Olwen have been in OCS custody since 2015 and of the importance of achieving permanency for these young children. Therefore, the superior court and OCS should expedite further proceedings.