Opinion ID: 1713846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interpretation of Statutory Definition of Meeting.

Text: A gathering of a governmental body must be open to the public only where there is deliberation or action upon any matter within the scope of the governmental body's policy-making duties. Iowa Code § 21.2(2) (emphasis added); accord Tel. Herald, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 297 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Iowa 1980). The fighting issue in the present case is whether the negotiating committee's deliberations and actions were in furtherance of any policy-making duty placed on the committee. The phrase policy-making duties is not defined in chapter 21. Therefore, we look to the common meaning of that term in interpreting the statutory definition of meeting. See In re Estate of Thomann, 649 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2002); see also State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1999) (stating the dictionary supplies a ready source for the common meaning of a word). The dictionary defines policymaking as the act or process of setting and directing the course of action to be pursued by a government, business, etc. Webster's New World College Dictionary 1114 (4th ed.2001) (emphasis added). To set and direct a course of action is to establish and order a course of action. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 640, 2077 (unabr. ed.2002) (defining direct as to point out, prescribe, or determine a course or procedure and stating synonyms for set are FIX, SETTLE, ESTABLISH); see also Roget's International Thesaurus 893.8, at 615 (5th ed.1992) (including direct with govern . . ., rule, control . . ., order, regulate, . . . guide). In contrast, to recommend a course of action is merely to suggest favorably a particular plan of action. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1897 (defining recommend as offer or suggest as favored by oneself). Thus, policy-making is more than recommending or advising what should be done. Policy-making is deciding with authority a course of action. Although the plaintiffs contend there is nothing in the statutory definition that restricts the open-meetings requirement . . . to bodies that have decision-making authority, the authority to make a decision is inherent in the duty to make policy. See 1980 Op. Iowa Atty. Gen. 148, 152-53 & n. 3 (stating requirement in statutory definition of meeting that body exercise policy-making duties excludes advisory groups from open-meetings requirement). The notion that policy-making commonly denotes something more than advice is illustrated by our prior cases applying the open meetings law. In Donahue, we held that an advisory board exercises no policy-making power. 474 N.W.2d at 539. In an earlier case in which we held an entity was subject to the open-meetings requirement, this court noted that the entity at issue was a powerful decision-making and policymaking body and was not a mere study or advisory group. Greene v. Athletic Council, 251 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Iowa 1977), superseded by statute as stated in Donahue, 474 N.W.2d at 539. In determining that a policy-making duty entails some degree of decision-making authority, we have not overlooked the fact that in 1989 and in 1993 the legislature added certain purely advisory groups to the statutory definition of governmental body, specifically e. An advisory board, advisory commission, or task force created by the governor or the general assembly to develop and make recommendations on public policy issues. . . . . h. An advisory board, advisory commission, advisory committee, task force, or other body created by statute or executive order of this state or created by an executive order of a political subdivision of this state to develop and make recommendations on public policy issues. Iowa Code § 21.2(1)( e ) (enacted 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 73, § 1), ( h ) (enacted 1993 Iowa Acts ch. 25, § 1). These groups by definition make recommendations on public policy issues as opposed to making policy. Iowa Code § 21.1(1)( e ), ( h ) (emphasis added). As we have already determined, only gatherings in which a governmental body establishes and directs policy are encompassed in the statutory definition of meeting. Clearly, then, there is a conflict between the legislature's definition of meeting and its subsequent inclusion of advisory groups in the definition of governmental body. We do not think the amendments to the statutory definition of governmental body can be interpreted as amendments of the statutory definition of meeting, in effect eliminating the policy-making duties qualification from the latter definition. If such a modification was desired by the legislature, it was for the legislature to specify the change; it is not for the court to incorporate the change by interpretation. See Consol. Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 122, 137 N.W.2d 900, 905 (1965). Notwithstanding the tension in the statute, we think it is clear the legislature intended to make the delineated advisory groups subject to the open meetings requirement. Otherwise, the legislature's act of including these entities in the definition of governmental body would be a nullity because none of the restrictions and requirements imposed on meetings of a governmental body would apply. See Jenney v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 456 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1990) (stating court assumes amendment is adopted to accomplish a purpose and was not simply futile exercise of legislative power); Iowa Code § 4.4(2) (stating presumption that in enacting a statute, legislature intends the entire statute to be effective). Thus, the specified advisory groups would be subject to the open-meetings requirement when they deliberate or act within the scope of their duty to develop and make recommendations on public policy issues. But as to all other governmental bodies, the legislature left unchanged the definition of meeting, including the requirement that the body act in its policy-making role. The fact that the legislature made specified advisory groups subject to the open meetings law is of no assistance to the plaintiffs here because the negotiating committee was not created by the governor, by the general assembly, by statute, or by executive order of the state or a political subdivision of the state so as to fall within paragraphs ( e ) or ( h ) of section 21.2(1). Although the plaintiffs contend the negotiating committee was in reality a Vision Iowa review committee created by section 15F.304(2), the record does not support this contention. The undisputed facts establish that the negotiating committee did not consist of the board members designated in the statute creating review committees; the negotiating committee did not review the application and make a recommendation to approve, defer, or deny the application as review committees are required by section 15F.304(3), (4) to do; and a CAT review committee had already performed these functions prior to the formation of the negotiating committee. Thus, the negotiating committee is not one of the statutorily-specified advisory groups subject to the open-meetings requirement. Consequently, we must determine whether the undisputed facts establish that the negotiating committee did not deliberate or act within the scope of any policy-making duty so that its gathering did not qualify as a meeting within the statutory definition of that term.