Opinion ID: 2779924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Circumstances Beyond a Party’s Control

Text: In addressing one of these criteria, the MSPB in its brief asserts “Ms. Herring did not present any evidence to the Board that there were circumstances beyond her control.” Resp’t’s Br. 18. Ms. Herring had, however, executed a power of attorney authorizing agents of the federal government to “fully communicate with” her designated attorneys with respect to “any and all information . . . deemed necessary” to her appeal. Resp’t’s App. 67. In addition, although OPM determined Ms. Herring had not proven a disability, the agency acknowledged “the evidence [Ms. Herring] submitted shows that [she has] medical conditions.” Id. at 69. Among Ms. Herring’s claimed conditions were “[d]epression/[a]nxiety” and “[f]atigue.” Id. at 68. These circumstances are relevant when considering the reasonableness of Ms. Herring’s actions or inactions. See, e.g., Malloy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 578 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is established that mental impairment, when present, warrants consideration and weight in assessing the reasonableness of the action taken.”). The MSPB acknowledges Ms. Herring’s assertions that she contacted counsel substantially in advance of the deadline, submitted the required payment for legal services on August 7, 2012, and followed up by telephone on August 7 to ensure that payment and documentation had been received. Resp’t’s Br. 11; Pet’r’s Br. 7, 13–14. The unusual facts of this case show Ms. Herring had done everything that could reasonably be expected of her and the failure to timely file was due to circumstances beyond her control. “The appellant need not show an utter impossibility, but only that the delay was excusable in light of the particular facts and attending circumstances where 6 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD diligence or ordinary prudence has been exercised.” Anderson v. Dep’t of Justice, 999 F.2d 532, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Alonzo, 4 M.S.P.R. at 184); see also Lamb v. U.S. Postal Serv., 68 M.S.P.R. 500, 502 (1995) (“To establish good cause for an untimely filing, a party must show that she exercised diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case.”). In arguing there were no circumstances beyond Ms. Herring’s control, the MSPB states Ms. Herring could have “contacted her attorney between August 8, 2012, and August 13, 2012,” or “personally filed her appeal.” Resp’t’s Br. 19. It is true it is a party’s “duty to monitor the progress of the appeal at all times.” Soleto v. Dep’t of Agric., 58 M.S.P.R. 253, 256 n.2 (1993). However, under the circumstances of this case, where the petitioner had relevant physical and psychological conditions, executed a power of attorney in favor of her legal representatives, completed all of the steps requested by counsel, and followed up by telephone a few days prior to the filing deadline, the duty to monitor did not require the petitioner to make additional telephone calls to counsel, within the short period prior to the deadline, in the absence of any indication whatsoever that additional steps were necessary. The MSPB acknowledges Ms. Herring’s claim that she was reassured, just a few days before the filing deadline, that the appeal would be timely filed. See Resp’t’s Br. 11. These circumstances, taken together, indicate the actions and inactions of Ms. Herring’s law firm “were misleading and deceptive in effect” and “‘misled and lulled’” Ms. Herring “‘into believing th[e] case was proceeding smoothly.’” Crawford v. Dep’t of State, 60 M.S.P.R. 441, 446 (1994) (quoting Dabbs v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 56 M.S.P.R. 57, 60 (1992)). For similar reasons, although a party could personally file an appeal, it is not reasonable to expect a party to do so under the circumstances of this case. In Crawford, the MSPB found the appellant had established good cause for HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 7 a filing made twenty-three days late notwithstanding that repeated phone calls made by the appellant to her attorney had not been returned. 60 M.S.P.R. at 445. In Soleto, the MSPB found important “the fact that the petition was returned to [the appellant]” which “should have put him on notice that some additional action was necessary.” 58 M.S.P.R. at 256. In Dabbs, the MSPB found good cause, 56 M.S.P.R. at 60, even though “counsel’s apparent nonchalance regarding [the filing deadline]” could have indicated to the appellant the need to “file[] the petition himself,” id. at 61 (Levinson, dissenting). Unlike these cases where the returned petition, failure to return phone calls, or an attorney’s nonchalance might have alerted the claimant to the attorney’s negligence and suggested a need for personal filing, Ms. Herring’s interactions with her attorney provided no indication that additional action on her part was needed. See Pet’r’s App. 38.