Opinion ID: 71475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was this a mixed-motive case?

Text: Xerox argues, nevertheless, that the mixed-motive jury instruction was erroneous because this was not tried as a mixed-motive case. It reasons that in a mixed-motive case the employee must concede that discrimination was not the sole reason for her termination, but that Smith never conceded Xerox had a legitimate reason for discharging her. We are unpersuaded by this argument and do not believe such a concession is necessary. Xerox's argument is based on our statement in Richardson that [t]he mixed-motive framework applies to cases in which the employee concedes that discrimination was not the sole reason for her discharge, but argues that discrimination was a motivating factor in her termination. [48] This statement articulated the mixed-motive framework generally and was not meant to enumerate the required elements of a mixed-motive case. [49] Requiring the plaintiff to concede at trial the legitimacy of the employer's stated reason for the discharge is contrary to the purpose of the mixed-motive framework. As we have stated, [a]lthough Price Waterhouse can be characterized as a method to prove discrimination, the mixed-motives theory is probably best viewed as a defense for an employer. [50] This defense allows the employeronce the employee presents evidence that an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor, even if not the sole factor, for the challenged employment actionto show that it would have made the same decision even without consideration of the prohibited factor. But an employee who is discharged for perceived discriminatory reasons will surely always believe the employer lacked a legitimate reason for the termination, and the mixed-motive framework does not require the plaintiff to concede that the employer's stated reason was legitimate. That is why we have juries. As recognized by the plurality in Price Waterhouse, a case need not be correctly labeled as either a `pretext' case or a `mixed-motives' case from the beginning in the District Court because the distinction often will not be known to the plaintiff prior to discovery. [51] Instead, [a]t some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide whether a particular case involves mixed motives. [52] As explained by the en banc Ninth Circuit decision in Desert Palace, [o]nce at the trial stage, the plaintiff is required to put forward evidence of discrimination `because of' a protected characteristic. After hearing both parties' evidence, the district court must decide what legal conclusions the evidence could reasonably support and instruct the jury accordingly . . . . [T]he choice of jury instructions depends simply on a determination of whether the evidence supports a finding that just oneor more than one-factor actually motivated the challenged decision. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. [53] Put another way, if the district court has before it substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that both a legitimate and an illegitimate (i.e., more than one) motive may have played a role in the challenged employment action, the court may give a mixed-motive instruction. That is our precedent, but the reality is that the defendant will always prefer a pretext submission that requires the plaintiff to prove that there was no legitimate motivation (but-for) while the plaintiff will always prefer a mixed-motive submission with the burden on the defendant. Illogical or not, that is the law we follow. Here, the district court determined that this was a mixed-motive case. Smith contended that she was terminated for discriminatory reasons, but Xerox insisted that Smith was a poor performing employee who failed to make plan. Smith agreed with Jankowski that she failed to make plan, but she contended that her sales goals were unreasonable and that her termination was based on her age, her gender, and retaliation for her EEOC complaint. We see no error by the district court in submitting this case to the jury as a mixed-motive case based on the evidence presented at trial. Xerox presented undisputed evidence showing that in 2005 Smith was behind in her plan numbers by a wide margin prior to her warning and probationary periods, and she failed to make up the shortfall by the end of the year. It also presented evidence that several agents that Smith supported complained about her product and technical knowledge and her ability to add value to their business. There was also testimony from Smith's fellow employees who said Smith was argumentative and negative on conference calls with Jankowski. These employees also testified that Jankowski was a tough but fair manager who was results and process oriented. Taken together, this evidence could support a finding by the jury that Xerox had a legitimate reason for terminating her. We emphasize could because there was also competing evidence that Jankowski could have also improperly considered Smith's EEOC charge when seeking her termination. In other words, in addition to evidence that Jankowski naturally would demand that Smith meet high standards, the failure of which could lead to adverse consequences, there was also evidence from which to infer that Smith's EEOC charge was a motivating factor in the termination decision. Smith's termination form was arguably faxed to the human resources department only days after Smith filed the EEOC charge. Jankowski then issued the letter of concern only a few weeks after the EEOC charge. Villa, the human resources manager, agreed that the letter of concern could be viewed as retaliation by Jankowski if Jankowski failed to speak with Smith before issuing it, which Smith contended he failed to do. There is also the fact that Xerox policies permit, and arguably encourage, lesser actions such as reassignment or demotion, rather than termination, for an employee with a tenure and track record as lengthy as Smith's. Xerox Human Resources personnel agreed at trial that demotion or reassignment ordinarily could be considered, yet Smith was terminated after a single poor performing year, only two years removed from being among the top performing employees in the country. We conclude from this evidence that the district court had before it substantial evidence of both legitimate and illegitimate motives for Smith's termination and properly concluded that this was a mixed-motive case. The court therefore properly instructed the jury on the mixed-motive framework. We therefore turn to Xerox's claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence.