Opinion ID: 434746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Necessity of Proof of Discriminatory Impact

Text: 26 The special master concluded that the veterans age credit here violated Title VII ... because the veterans age credit prevented [Appellees'] admission to the construction program in 1977. This conclusion was adopted by the district court. 27 Appellants contend that the veterans' age credit did not have a disparate impact on women. This issue presents a question of law which we must review de novo. See Vesey v. United States, 626 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir.1980) (review of damage judgment under Federal Tort Claims Act). 28 Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for any ... joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training ... to discriminate against any individual because of his ... sex ... in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(d). 29 Title VII does not prohibit laws that expressly discriminate against non-veterans. In 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-11, Congress provided as follows: Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, Territorial, or local law creating special rights or preferences for veterans. Appellants argue that [a]gainst the back drop of pro-veteran legislation and explicit protection of such policies in Title VII, it beggars belief that Congress intended to prohibit private voluntary efforts to equalize employment opportunity for veterans as constituting illegal sex discrimination. 30 Appellants' reliance on section 2000e-11 is misplaced. As pointed out by Appellees, no law creates the JAC's veterans age credit. The exception to Title VII contained in section 2000e-11 is expressly limited to any Federal, State, Territorial, or local law which may have a discriminatory effect on non-veterans. The JATC's age credit was adopted by a non-governmental private organization. The fact that it was encouraged to do so by an agency that is a part of the executive branch of the federal government cannot convert the veterans' age credit into an act of Congress. Furthermore, as we shall discuss below, the veterans' age credit does not have a discriminatory impact on non-veterans. Thus, section 2000e-11 would be inapplicable even if Congress had required veterans' age credits in apprenticeships, because no preference is afforded. 31 The district court concluded that the JATC veterans' age credit had a clear-cut disparate impact on women. In reaching this conclusion the court found that 21.5 percent of all males and only 0.4 percent of all females in the area covered by the apprenticeship program are veterans, and 8.0 percent of all males and 0.2 percent of all females are Viet Nam or post-Viet Nam era veterans. Since veterans could apply to the program until a later age than non-veterans, the court determined that men were given preferential treatment in applying for apprenticeship training. This analysis ignores the fact that veterans could not receive apprenticeship training during the years they served in the military, whereas non-veterans could apply for training between their 18th and 26th birthdays. 32 Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the veterans' age credit did not prevent the admission of women to the apprenticeship program. Under the challenged program women had a maximum of eight years to apply for apprenticeship training. The existence of the age credit did not give veterans more than eight years to apply for the apprenticeship program. Thus, the existence of the age credit had no adverse effect whatsoever on women. Had the age credit not been created, however, veterans would have had less time to apply for apprenticeship training than non-veterans of the same age. The program did not give a less-qualified veteran preference over a better qualified non-veteran. The sole effect of the age credit was to give some veterans the same amount of time to apply for apprenticeship training as was available to non-veterans. As can be seen from the examples set forth above, the age credit program failed to give the veteran with more than four years service in the armed forces the same opportunity available to the non-veteran. 33 Contrary to Appellees' contention, the disparate impact analysis developed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), is inapplicable here. In Griggs, an employer required a high school education or a passing score on a standardized intelligence test as a condition of employment or transfer at its plant in Draper, North Carolina. Both requirements operated to disqualify Blacks at a higher rate than Whites. The court noted that [b]asic intelligence must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools. Id. at 430, 91 S.Ct. at 853. The education and testing requirements thereby operate[d] as a 'built-in headwind'  to employment opportunity for Blacks. Id. at 432, 91 S.Ct. at 854. The requirements had not been shown to predict successful performance of the jobs for which they were required. Because Title VII requires the removal of unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification, id. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853, the education and testing score requirements were found to violate Title VII in Griggs. 34 The JATC's veterans' age credit, by contrast, cannot be characterized as a headwind or barrier to employment opportunity since it had no effect on the number of years that non-veterans could apply for apprenticeship training. 35 Appellees correctly observe that three federal trial courts have applied a disparate impact analysis to veterans preference claims (emphasis added). These cases do not support the judgment of the district court. Rather, they involve attempts to prefer veterans over equally qualified non-veterans. 36 In Bailey v. Southeastern Area Joint Apprenticeship Committee, 561 F.Supp. 895, 912 (N.D.W.Va.1983), the court found that the practice of giving veterans extra points on their interview scores had a disparate impact on women. In Krenzer v. Ford, 429 F.Supp. 499, 502 (D.D.C.1977), the facts showed that the Administrator of the Veterans Administration would submit only veterans' names for appointment to the Board of Veterans Appeals. The court held that the 'veterans only' requirement ... ha[d] a disproportionate impact upon the class of women [female attorneys] before the court. In Woody v. City of West Miami, 477 F.Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.Fla.1979), the court was called upon to decide whether a city's policy of giving preference to veterans who had served in the armed forces for 20 years in the hiring of police officers had a disparate impact on women. In each of these cases veterans were given a preference not granted equally qualified women who were non-veterans. 37 In the instant case, at the time Appellees applied, they were no longer qualified for the training program because they exceeded the age limit. The extension of that limit for veterans, who were unable to apply while in military service, had no effect on these Appellees. Appellees had the opportunity to apply for apprenticeship training for eight years. The age credit gave veterans no more than eight years to apply. The age credit's sole effect was to afford veterans the same opportunity to apply for the apprenticeship training available to non-veterans. 1 We therefore hold that the district court erroneously applied a disparate impact analysis to these facts. Judgment for the appellees is reversed. They suffered no disadvantage. 38 Because we conclude the veterans' age credit did not affect Appellees' opportunity to be hired, we need not decide whether the JATC operated as Local's and NECA's agent. The judgment for Appellees, including back pay, costs, and attorney's fees, is REVERSED.