Opinion ID: 4545965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: I would adopt the narrow approach

Text: As discussed in detail above, we have already rejected the broad approach, and I would reject the middle ground approach, too. This leaves the narrow approach. To some extent, our court has already adopted what amounts to the narrow approach. In McUne v. Fuqua, McUne sued over injuries he suffered in an automobile accident. 42 Wn.2d 65, 68, 253 P.2d 632 (1953). The parties disputed whether McUne had impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege. Id. at 74. We explained, first, that “[w]hen a patient permits his physician to testify without objection, he of course waives the privilege as to that physician.” Id. (citing Williams v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry. Co., 42 Wash. 597, 84 P. 1129 (1906)). In that situation, the patient “also waives the privilege as to other physicians who attended the patient at the same time and in consultation with the first physician.” Id. 16 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) We also held that at least in some circumstances, a patient may voluntarily open the door and waive “the privilege as to any medical testimony which tends to contradict or impeach medical testimony which he has himself offered.” Id. at 76. We held that McUne voluntarily opened the door by having three doctors testify on his behalf and by personally testifying “that he was able to do heavy work before the accident but not afterwards, that his health was good prior to the accident, and that he had not consulted a doctor ‘for years.’” Id. at 75-76. We subsequently limited this holding to some extent, clarifying that “we did not there adopt the minority rule that waiver, by permitting one treating physician to testify without objection, is a waiver as to all.” Phipps, 74 Wn.2d at 448 n.9. We have also explained that a patient does not waive the privilege by testifying as an adverse witness, as that testimony does “not constitute a ‘voluntary opening of the door.’” Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 421, 312 P.2d 640 (1957) (quoting Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345, 265 P. 1082 (1928)). So the holding of McUne can be summarized as follows. A patient waives the physician-patient privilege as to those physicians who testify on the patient’s behalf, as well as to those physicians who attended the patient at the same time and in consultation with the testifying physician. And when a patient testifies about his or her condition as it existed in the past, prior to the incident at issue, the patient 17 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) waives the privilege as to those physicians who had treated the patient at that time. This holding, limiting waiver to the topics on which the party affirmatively offers evidence, contains the seeds of the narrow approach. In accord with our case law, I would explicitly adopt the narrow approach now. I would hold that the Magneys have not impliedly waived privilege simply by seeking damages for mental anguish. As this case proceeds, it’s possible that they may waive privilege at some point by, for example, affirmatively claiming no preexisting mental health issues or placing the substance of their communications with their marital counselor directly at issue, see, e.g., Koch, 489 F.3d at 389-90. But they have not done so here. If the Magneys call their counselor as a witness, or if they testify to the substance of their counseling sessions, or if they otherwise rely on their prior treatment in making their case, then they will have waived privilege. McUne, 42 Wn.2d at 74. The Magneys might also waive privilege if they choose to rely on the status of their mental health prior to the events that led to this lawsuit. McUne, 42 Wn.2d at 75-76 (finding implied waiver in part because plaintiff voluntarily took the witness stand and claimed that “his health was good prior to the accident”). But all the Magneys have done at this stage is file a lawsuit in which they seek damages for mental anguish. Because I would adopt the narrow approach to 18 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) waiver, I would hold that this is insufficient to waive privilege. Thus, the Magneys’ marital counseling records are protected by privilege and not subject to discovery, regardless of their relevancy. CR 26(b)(1). The majority suggests that the Magneys may have impliedly waived privilege through some action other than filing this lawsuit. Majority at 3 (reasoning that the trial court should determine “whether the Magneys have impliedly waived privilege through any of their actions thus far”). According to the majority, the Magneys may have “impliedly waived privilege by providing the defendants with evidence of mental anguish akin to that which was discussed during the marital counseling.” Id. at 19-20. But that is a hypothetical situation not before us. The respondents are arguing that the Magneys impliedly waived privilege by filing this lawsuit. See Br. of Resp’ts at 2-3. For purposes of this appeal, the only relevant action that the Magneys have taken is to file the lawsuit. And the majority itself concludes that filing a lawsuit is not enough to waive privilege. Majority at 18 (“we hold that the Magneys did not automatically waive privilege by filing the lawsuit”). I agree, and the potential relevancy of the marital 19 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) counseling records does not change this. There is no reason to remand this case for in camera review of those records. 7