Opinion ID: 786696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title VII's Exception to the Feres Doctrine

Text: 39 Although Overton does not contest that the injuries for which he seeks redress arose from activities incident to military service, the application of the Feres doctrine to Title VII actions such as the one before us is not entirely straightforward. [ Feres ] is a judicial doctrine leaving matters incident to service to the military but only in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary. Stauber, 837 F.2d at 399; accord Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (noting that Congress is the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the military system of justice and can create causes of action that supersede the Feres doctrine); Roper, 832 F.2d at 248 (holding that the express indication of Congress supersedes the Feres doctrine); Gonzalez v. Dep't of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir.1983) (same). Title VII is, of course, congressional direction. The issue thus becomes whether and in what circumstances Title VII allows a Guard Technician to bring a claim relating to his or her civilian employment despite the Feres doctrine and whether Overton's suit is, therefore, justiciable.
40 The provision of Title VII under which Overton brings suit, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, reads in pertinent part: (a) Discriminatory practices prohibited.... 41 All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment ... in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, [which includes the Department of the Air Force,] ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 These protections apply only to civilian employees of the military. Roper, 832 F.2d at 248. Overton observes that even though at all relevant times he was a military employee of the Guard, he was performing the duties for which he was paid as a civilian at the times he allegedly was injured. He therefore insists that he is entitled to proceed under section 2000e-16 with respect to those injuries. 43 As far as we have been able to determine, each Circuit to address this issue has held on the facts before it that a section 2000e-16 action brought by a Guard Technician could not proceed in the face of the Feres doctrine. The Circuits have differed, though, in their analysis. 44 The Sixth Circuit has held that section 2000e-16 never supersedes the Feres doctrine in an action by a Guard Technician, even if the alleged harassment arises in the course of his or her civilian employment. Fisher, 249 F.3d at 443-44. The court based its decision on its previously articulated view that the positions of National Guard technicians are `irreducibly military in nature.' Id. at 439 (quoting Leistiko v. Stone, 134 F.3d 817, 820-21 (6th Cir.1998)) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Leistiko v. Sec'y of the Army, 922 F.Supp. 66, 73 (N.D.Ohio 1996))); 11 cf. Wright, 5 F.3d at 588 (stating that the role of a Guard Technician is irreducibly military in nature). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has stated that § 2000e-16 does not create an exception to the Feres doctrine for suits by Guard Technicians because the applicability of Title VII [to such suits] is clearly not provided in `unmistakable terms.' Mier, 57 F.3d at 749 (quoting Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928 (stating that if Congress had intended for [§ 2000e-16] to apply to the uniformed personnel of the various armed services it would have said so in unmistakable terms)). 12 45 The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, has read section 2000e-16 explicitly, but partially, to override the Feres doctrine. Brown, 227 F.3d at 299. As a consequence of the limited scope of the Title VII waiver, employment discrimination claims by [Guard Technicians] must be categorized as either arising from their position as a civilian employee of a military department, or their position as a uniformed service member. Id. In the Fifth Circuit's view, a Guard Technician's Title VII claim is therefore permissible if it involves only actions taken purely in the civilian capacities of the persons involved. The court noted that in some cases, categorizing a Guard Technician's claim may be difficult. Indeed, an apparently civilian claim might be military if the challenged conduct was integrally related to the military's unique structure. Id. at 299 n. 5 (citing Mier, 57 F.3d at 750). It was clear on the facts before the Brown court that the actions it was considering were military. The court therefore was not required to decide in what cases behavior towards a Guard Technician might be purely civilian, not integrally related to the military's unique structure, and thus, under its analysis, the basis for a justiciable Title VII claim. 46 We addressed the tension between the Feres doctrine and section 2000e-16 in Luckett v. Bure, 290 F.3d at 499. There, the plaintiff, an Army reservist and Guard Technician proceeding pro se, received a military transfer as a result of his physical condition. The transfer rendered him unqualified for his civilian Guard Technician post. In analyzing the effect of Feres on the justiciability of his subsequent Title VII claim, we, like the Fifth Circuit, abjured a categorical rule barring suit such as that adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Fisher. Instead, we applied two tests: Section 2000e-16 does not supersede the Feres doctrine and thus does not permit a Guard Technician to pursue a Title VII claim if the claim (1) challenges conduct integrally related to the military's unique structure, id. at 498 (quoting Mier, 57 F.3d at 749; internal quotation marks omitted), 13 or (2) is not purely civilian, id. at 499 n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under both of these tests, we concluded that the Feres doctrine barred the plaintiff's section 2000e-16 action. Id. at 499. 47 We again apply the two tests described in Luckett to determine whether Overton's claim falls within Title VII's exception to the Feres doctrine. 14
48 Overton asserts that his Title VII claim is different from those asserted by the plaintiffs in Luckett, Brown, Fisher, and Mier. In all of those cases, the plaintiffs challenged decisions regarding their military status in the National Guard. Because a military decision was at the core of each case, it was ultimately easy to conclude that whatever the test, section 2000e-16 did not override the operation of the Feres doctrine. But Overton's claim focuses on Fletcher's behavior toward Overton on weekdays during business hours, when both were performing what Overton asserts were purely civilian duties not integrally related to the military's unique structure. We disagree with Overton's characterization and therefore conclude that in the factual circumstances of this case, section 2000e-16 does not overcome the Feres bar. 49 To be sure, at the time the conduct of which Overton complains took place, his status was civilian. He was then being paid by the USAF to perform the nominally civilian portion of his Guard-Technician duties. At the same time, however, Overton's suit, if permitted to proceed, would likely affect his military relationship with Fletcher. The defendants' alleged misconduct occurred while Overton worked on a military base to assure the military's airlift capacity, while wearing a military uniform, under the direct supervision of Fletcher, who was also his immediate military superior. Overton's closely related dual roles engendered closely related military and civilian relationships with Fletcher. The nominally civilian, yet distinctly military, relationship between the two was thus central to Overton's military mission and the military's unique structure of command. Any attempt surgically to dissect and analyze the civilian relationship between Overton and Fletcher, with its military dimensions, moreover, would itself threaten to intrude into their military relationship. 15 Courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that... [such an] intrusion upon military authority might have. 16 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305, 103 S.Ct. 2362. 50 Because Overton's suit would likely intrude into and have an impact upon his military relationship with Fletcher, we conclude that Overton challenges conduct integrally related to the military's unique structure, and that the relationships and behavior that are the subject of his suit were not purely civilian. Overton therefore cannot pursue his Title VII claim in federal court. At the end of the day, we find nothing in the text or history of section 2000e-16(a) or its judicial interpretation to convince us that it constitutes a clear statutory command not to apply the Feres doctrine to Overton's claims. See Roper, 832 F.2d at 248 (noting that [i]n the absence of some express indication in the legislative history that Congress intended Title VII to apply, the Feres doctrine bars suits that affect military hierarchy and command). 51 We see no reason and the government does not seek to persuade us, 17 however, that there can be no situation in which a Guard Technician would have a justiciable Title VII claim with respect to his or her purely civilian employment by the federal government, even in circumstances where the Feres doctrine is otherwise applicable. We need not and do not speculate as to what circumstances, if any, might give rise to such a claim.