Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Level of Participation

Text: 123 At both trials, the district court instructed the jury, in part, in the following language: 124 The third element, which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the defendant conducted or participated in the affairs of the enterprise. 125 The terms conduct and participate in the conduct of an enterprise, include the performance of the acts, functions or duties that are necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise. 126 A person may participate in the conduct of an enterprise even though he had no part in the management or control of the enterprise and no share in any profits. But the participation must be wilful and knowing. 127 (Transcript of Coleman Trial (Coleman Trial Tr.) at 751-52; see Miller Trial Tr. at 6053-54.) Coleman and Raymond Robinson objected to this instruction at their trial, contending that it did not properly reflect the standard set by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (Reves ). It does not appear that there was such an objection at the Miller Trial. 128 In Reves, in assessing the RICO liability of an outside accounting firm for racketeering activity carried on by its client, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself to be subject to liability under this provision. Id. at 172, 113 S.Ct. at 1166. The Court answered the question in the affirmative, though noting that one may be liable for participating in the enterprise's operation without being a member of its upper management. Id. at 184, 113 S.Ct. at 1172. As we observed in United States v. Thai, 129 the Reves Court concluded that [i]n order to 'participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' one must have some part in directing those affairs..... Nonetheless, while thus adopting what it called an  'operation or management' test, ... and stating that one is liable under RICO only if he participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself, ... the Court also said that the word 'participate' makes clear that RICO liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility ... and that liability under § 1962(c) is not limited to upper management,.... The Court observed that, in addition, within the meaning of § 1962(c), [a]n enterprise is 'operated' ... also by lower-rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management..... The Court declined to decide in [Reves ] how far § 1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation. 130 United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 816 (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 179, 183, 184 & n. 9, 113 S.Ct. at 1170, 1172, 1173 & n. 9). In light of Reves, we have held that an instruction virtually identical to the one given in the present case was erroneous. See United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1198, 115 S.Ct. 1270, 131 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995). 131 The failure of the district court to give an instruction that comports with the Reves standard, however, is not a basis for automatic reversal. If the defendants timely objected to the erroneous instruction, the error will not warrant reversal if, in light of the evidence introduced as to their roles, the error was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 54, 136 L.Ed.2d 18 (1996); Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir.) (convictions of defendants, who were high up on the 'ladder of operation,'  were unaffected by Reves error), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1084, 115 S.Ct. 1796, 131 L.Ed.2d 724 (1995); see also Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 369 (2d Cir.1992) (error in RICO pattern instruction subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 824-25 (2d Cir.1990) (same). If there was no objection to the erroneous instruction, the instruction is reviewable on appeal only for plain error, that is, error that affected the defendant's substantial rights. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 816. 132 In United States v. Viola, in which the trial court instructed the jury, without objection, that [a] person may participate in the conduct of an enterprise even though he had no part in the management or control of the enterprise and no share in any profits, 35 F.3d at 41 (emphasis in original), we found the error plain as to defendant Michael Formisano. Viola and several others, including Formisano, had been charged with participating in a drug and stolen property importation and distribution ring. Formisano was a janitor who performed menial tasks for Viola, a coffee company proprietor, and the only evidence against Formisano was that on two occasions, at the direction of Viola, he had sold stolen beer and lamps and brought the proceeds to Viola. Although the government asserted that Formisano knew of the broader enterprise, we noted that he was hardly even mentioned in the trial evidence concerning the enterprise. Id. at 44. For example, the government's year-long electronic surveillance did not reveal a single conversation between Formisano and other members of the conspiracy; and in their trial testimony, witnesses who had been participants in the conspiracy ... never mentioned Formisano, much less indicated their familiarity with him. Id. We noted that while Reves holds that liability may attach to lower rung participants in the enterprise, Reves, 507 U.S. at 184, 113 S.Ct. at 1172, Formisano was not on the ladder at all, but rather, as Viola's janitor and handyman, was sweeping up the floor underneath it. United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d at 43. Given the dearth of evidence against Formisano, we reversed his RICO conviction outright, rather than remanding for a new trial before a properly instructed jury. 133 In the present case, there was no such dearth of evidence; indeed, the evidence with respect to the defendants' management or operating roles shows that the error here was entirely harmless. For example, the Supreme Team had scores of workers who were lower on its organizational ladder than Coleman and Raymond Robinson. Coleman had responsibility for groups of workers and sales operations at three Supreme Team drug locations; he was described by former Supreme Team member Trent Morris as one of the organization's lieutenant[s]. Raymond Robinson, whose tenure with the organization was limited and whose rank was somewhat lower than that of Coleman, nonetheless also participated in the Supreme Team's operations at an important level: on wiretaps he was overheard arranging the gang's purchase of cocaine; he acted as security during drug transactions and served as Miller's personal bodyguard; he supervised the processing of cocaine into crack and delivered it to sales locations; and he participated in the gang's move into rival territory. In light of this evidence, Coleman and Raymond Robinson plainly met the standard of participation required by Reves, and we conclude that the jury was not affected by the error in the court's instructions. The erroneous instruction was harmless. 134 We reach the same result with respect to the defendants tried in the Miller Trial, whether or not they objected to the instruction, for the evidence was that each of the six defendants eventually convicted on the RICO count after that trial (Jimenez prevailed on his motion for acquittal on this count) had substantial responsibility for the management of, or discretion in the operation of, the Supreme Team's operations. Miller was the leader; Arroyo was second-in-command. David Robinson helped supervise the drug operations; Tucker managed a retail spot and supervised a crew of workers. Hunt was Miller's bodyguard, and Hale was a security guard; by the nature of their duties as providers of security, Hunt and Hale had discretion to take action without direction from those higher on the chain of command; and both had considerable responsibility for dealing with the Supreme Team's perceived enemies. For example, when Rivera was targeted to be killed, Hunt shot him; when Rivera survived and was tracked down, Hale was one of the men who killed Rivera. It is plain that all six of these defendants had roles that met the standard of participation required by Reves. We conclude that the erroneous instruction was harmless and, a fortiori, was not plain error.