Opinion ID: 3173167
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Such a deed containing those recitals is

Text: conclusive against the unit's former owner, his or her heirs and assigns, and all other persons. . . . NRS 116.31166(1)-(2) (2013). The Gogo Way trustee's deed contains recitals that NRS 116.31166 deems conclusive, to wit: Default occurred; and, All requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices and the posting and publication of the copies of the Notice of Sale have been complied with. Shadow Wood and Gogo Way maintain that, under NRS 116.31166, recitals such as these bar any post-sale challenge regardless of basis, whether it disputes the HOA's compliance with the statutory default, notice, and timing requirements or, as here, seeks to set aside the sale for equity-based reasons. If true, this interpretation would call into question this court's statement in Long v. Towne, that a common-interest community association's nonjudicial foreclosure sale may be set aside, just as a power-of-sale foreclosure sale may be set aside, upon a showing of SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 9 (0) 1947A 44t94 grossly inadequate price plus fraud, unfairness, or oppression. 98 Nev. at 13, 639 P.2d at 530 (citing Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 514, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (1963) (stating that, while a power-of-sale foreclosure may not be set aside for mere inadequacy of price, it may be if the price is grossly inadequate and there is in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of price (internal quotation omitted))). As a textual matter, the deed recitals to which NRS 116.31166 accords conclusive effect do not relate to the deficiencies NYCB alleges. The conclusive recitals concern default, notice, and publication of the NOS, all statutory prerequisites to a valid HOA lien foreclosure sale as stated in NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164, the sections that immediately precede and give context to NRS 116.31166. Cf. Bourne Valley Court Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1135 (D. Nev. 2015) (holding that under NRS 116.31166, when a foreclosure deed recited that there was a default, the proper notices were given, the appropriate amount of time elapsed between notice of default and sale, and the notice of sale was given, it was 'conclusive proof' that the required statutory notices were provided). But NYCB does not dispute that it defaulted, at least as to the superpriority piece of the original homeowner's lien, or that Shadow Wood complied with the notice and publication requirements of NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31164. NYCB's claim is that Shadow Wood acted unfairly, oppressively, perhaps even fraudulently by overstating its lien delinquency, rejecting a valid tender of the amount due, and selling the property at foreclosure for a grossly inadequate price. And, while it is possible to read a conclusive recital statute like NRS 116.31166 as conclusively establishing a default SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 (0) 047A 49em justifying foreclosure when, in fact, no default occurred, such a reading would be breathtakingly broad and is probably legislatively unintended. 1 Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitman, Ann M. Burkhart & R. Wilson Freyermuth, Real Estate Finance Law § 7:22 (6th ed. 2014). We decline to give the default recital such a broad and unprecedented reading, particularly since Shadow Wood and Gogo Way cite no germane authority in its support. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (this court will not consider arguments not cogently stated or supported with relevant authority). History and basic rules of statutory interpretation confirm our view that courts retain the power to grant equitable relief from a defective foreclosure sale when appropriate despite NRS 116.31166. At common law, courts possessed inherent equitable power to consider quiet title actions, a power that required no statutory authority. See MacDonald v. Krause, 77 Nev. 312, 317, 362 P.2d 724, 727 (1961) (It has always been recognized that equity has inherent original jurisdiction of bills to quiet title to property and to remove a cloud from the title.); Robinson v. Kind, 23 Nev. 330, 47 P. 977, 978 (1897) (recognizing the well-settled rules that an action to quiet title is a suit in equity) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, in Low v. Staples, 2 Nev. 209 (1866), this court determined that, notwithstanding the then-existing statutory requirement that a quiet title plaintiff must be in possession of the property, see Compiled Laws State of Nev., tit. VIII, ch. 3, § 256, at 372 (1873), a plaintiff not in possession still may seek to .quiet title by invoking the court's inherent equitable jurisdiction to settle title disputes. Low, 2 Nev. at 211-13. In so holding, the court explained: The plaintiff seeks a remedy which courts of equity have always granted independent of any SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 11 (0) 1947A at110 statute, where a proper case was made out. The relief sought is a decree to compel certain persons to execute deeds of conveyance to the plaintiff, and to remove a cloud from his title. That it requires no statutory provisions to enable a court of equity to award relief in such cases, there can be no doubt. Id. at 211. In 1912, the Legislature adopted statutes to govern quiet title actions that largely stand today. Compare Revised Laws of Nev., ch. 62, §§ 5514-5526 (1912), with NRS 40.010-.130. And in Clay v. Scheeline Banking & Trust Co., the court recognized that the statute authorizing a person to bring a quiet title claim against another who claims adversely, now numbered NRS 40.010, essentially codified the court's existing equity jurisprudence, stating that there is practically no difference in the nature of the action under our statute and as it exists independent of statute. 40 Nev. 9, 16-17, 159 P. 1081, 1082 (1916). So, a person who brings a quiet title action may, consistent with NRS Chapter 40 and our long-standing equitable jurisprudence, invoke the court's inherent equitable powers to resolve the competing claims to such title. The Legislature borrowed NRS 116.31166's conclusive recital language from NRS 107.030(8), which it enacted in 1927 to govern powerof-sale foreclosures. A.B. 131, 33d Leg. (Nev. 1927); 1927 Nev. Stat., ch. 173, § 2, at 295; Hearing on A.B. 221 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 66th Leg. (Nev., May 23, 1991) & Exhibit C (conversion table matching up each component of the Nevada bill with its UCIOA counterpart providing that the section that became NRS 116.31166 had no UCIOA equivalent, but was explained as: Deed recitals in assessment lien foreclosure sale. See NRS 107.030(8).). The conclusive recital provisions in NRS 107.030(8) have never been argued to carry the preemptive effect• that SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 12 (0) 1947A ez, Shadow Wood and Gogo Way attribute to NRS 116.31166. While not directly addressing the preemption argument Shadow Wood and Gogo Way make as to NRS 116.31166, our post-NRS 107.030(8) cases reaffirm that courts retain the power, in an appropriate case, to set aside a defective foreclosure sale on equitable grounds. See Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. at 514, 387 P.2d at 995 (adopting the California rule that inadequacy of price, however gross, is not in itself a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee's sale legally made; there must be in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of price (quoting Oiler v. Sonoma Cty. Land Title Co., 290 P.2d 880, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955))); McLaughlin v. Mitt. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Nev. 181, 191, 60 P.2d 272, 276 (1936) (noting that, in the context of an action to recover possession of a property after a trustee sale, [h]ad the conduct of the trustee and respondent, in connection with the sale, been accompanied by any actual fraud, deceit, or trickery, a more serious question would be presented); see also Nev. Land & Mortg. Co. v. Hidden Wells Ranch, Inc., 83 Nev. 501, 504, 435 P.2d 198, 200 (1967) (In the proper case, the trial court may set aside a trustee's sale upon the grounds of fraud or unfairness.). And, cases elsewhere to have addressed comparable conclusive- or presumptive-effect recital statutes confirm that such recitals do not defeat equitable relief in a proper case; rather, such recitals are conclusive, in the absence of grounds for equitable relief Holland v. Pendleton Mortg. Co., 143 P.2d 493, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943) (emphasis added); see Bechtel v. Wilson, 63 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (distinguishing between a challenge to the sufficiency of pre-sale notice, which was precluded by the conclusive recitals in the deed, and an equity-based challenge based upon the alleged SUPREME COUFtT OF NEVADA 13 01 1947A e unfairness of the sale); compare 1 Grant S. Nelson, Real Estate Finance Law, supra, § 7:23, at 986-87 (After a defective power of sale foreclosure has been consummated, mortgagors and junior lienholders in virtually every state have an equitable action to set aside the sale.) (footnotes omitted), with id. § 7:22, at 980-82 (noting that [m] any states have attempted to enhance the stability of power of sale foreclosure titles by enacting a variety of presumptive statutes), and 6 Baxter Dunaway, Law of Distressed Real Estate, § 64:161 (2015) (noting that a trustee's deed recital can be overcome on a showing of actual fraud). The Legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn longestablished principles of law when enacting a statute. Hardy Cos., Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. 528, 537, 245 P.3d 1149, 1155-56 (2010) (internal quotation omitted). Also, this court strictly construes statutes in derogation of the common law, Holliday v. McMullen, 104 Nev. 294, 296, 756 P.2d 1179, 1180 (1988), and has been instructed to apply principles of law and equity, including. . . the law of real property, to MRS Chapter 116. NRS 116.1108. The long-standing and broad inherent power of a court to sit in equity and quiet title, including setting aside a foreclosure sale if the circumstances support such action, the fact that the recitals made conclusive by operation of MRS 116.31166 implicate compliance only with the statutory prerequisites to foreclosure, and the foreign precedent cited under which equitable relief may still be available in the face of conclusive recitals, at least in cases involving fraud, lead us to the conclusion that the Legislature, through NRS 116.31166's enactment, did not eliminate the equitable authority of the courts to consider quiet title actions when an HOA's foreclosure deed contains conclusive recitals. We therefore reject Shadow Wood's and Gogo Way's contention that MRS SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 14 (0) 1947A e 116.31166 defeats, as a matter of law, NYCB's action to set aside the trustee's deed and to quiet title in itself.