Opinion ID: 199698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Cross-Examination Using Grand Jury Testimony

Text: 21 Meserve claims that the district court erred by not allowing the defense to cross-examine Grant concerning a discrepancy between her trial testimony and her grand jury testimony. At trial, Grant testified that Craig came into the Chez Paris on the night of the robbery and that Craig's entrance prompted Meserve to mention that Craig was working at the store when he robbed it. In contrast, although Grant testified before the grand jury that after the robbery she went to two bars with Meserve, the Chez Paris and the Bob-In, she never stated that she saw Craig at the Chez Paris. Nor did she mention seeing Craig that night at the Chez Paris even though, in response to a question as to whether Meserve had recognized any of the Ferris Market's employees, Grant testified that Meserve told her that he recognized a girl named Amy because she was dating a friend of theirs. 22 When the defense sought to question Grant about why she had not mentioned Craig's presence at the Chez Paris in her grand jury testimony, the district court barred this line of questioning because Grant was not specifically asked about the incident before the grand jury. Meserve argues that this restriction on Grant's cross-examination violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. E.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-80 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974). The government responds that Grant's grand jury testimony was not inconsistent with her testimony at trial and that even if error occurred, it was harmless. 23 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness's credibility may be impeached by asking him about prior inconsistent statements. Fed. R. Evid. 613(a); United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 953-54 (1st Cir. 1992). The rule applies when two statements, one made at trial and one made previously, are irreconcilably at odds. United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 558 (1st Cir. 1999). Prior statements, such as the grand jury testimony at issue here, that omit details included in a witness's trial testimony are inconsistent if it would have been natural for the witness to include the details in the earlier statement. United States v. Stock, 948 F.2d 1299, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980)). This test is an elastic one, because the naturalness of a witness's decision not to include certain information in an earlier statement may depend on the nuances of the prior statement's context, as well as [the witness's] own loquacity. Id. 24 District courts have broad discretion concerning whether two statements are in fact inconsistent, and thus whether the witness may be impeached by the prior statement. Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Agajanian, 852 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 568 (7th Cir. 1986)). Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, a district court's refusal to permit a witness to be questioned about a prior inconsistent statement may constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Stock, 948 F.2d at 1301 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 891-92 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Ayotte, 741 F.2d 865, 870-71 (6th Cir. 1984)). 25 Here, however, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion by refusing to allow Meserve to cross-examine Grant regarding the omission from her grand jury testimony of certain details about which she testified at trial. Before the grand jury, Grant was not asked whether she remembered anyone coming into the Chez Paris on the night of the crime nor whether she saw any of the victims of the crime at any point. Although Meserve argues that questions about whether Meserve recognized any of the workers at the Ferris Market and about Grant and Meserve's activities after they went to the Chez Paris should have prompted Grant to mention that she saw Craig at the Chez Paris that night, such nuances are peripheral and not directly inconsistent. 26 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Grant to be questioned about her prior omission. The right to confrontation through cross-examination is not unlimited. A district court has wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about . . . interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. The district court appropriately exercised its authority under the circumstances of this case.