Opinion ID: 1726449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in failing to grant specific performance?

Text: No. Because of the inadequate development of the facts regarding the parties' intention of method of payment and Griffin's preference for form of payment, the trial court was not in error in failing to grant specific performance. Specific performance could have been granted in this case only if the chancellor had concluded that the language in the option referring to a future agreement was a mere formality and that there was an express acknowledgment in paragraph 4 of a cash payment upon delivery of the deed. The rule regarding presumption of a cash payment in such action only negates such presumption where the option specifies a credit sale or that terms are to be fixed by a later agreement. Had the chancellor determined from the pleadings that the plain intent of the parties was for there to be a cash payment in full upon delivery of the deed, then and only then could the chancellor have rendered a judgment for specific performance. Obviously, then and only then would this Court summarily reverse the chancellor in his failure to do this and granting of the 12(b)(6) motion instead. As we are reversing on the grounds set out under assignment number I, that this case must be remanded for additional proof as to the intention of the parties regarding method of payment, we cannot find merit in this assignment of error. The chancellor's action in granting the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) was error due to the ambiguous language contained in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the option, and the cause is remanded for additional proof upon the intent of the parties and the ability of Busching to meet whatever payment terms Griffin may lawfully require. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.