Opinion ID: 2519635
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Heading: Common Law Duty of Care Based on Retained Control

Text: We first address whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined Space Needle did not retain the right to direct Kamla's work sufficient to bring it within Washington's retained control exception to the general rule of nonliability for the injuries of independent contractors. The common law has long distinguished between an employer's liability for work-related injuries suffered by independent contractors and an employer's liability for work-related injuries suffered by its employees. The scope of an employer's liability depends on whether the worker is an independent contractor or an employee. An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(3). On the other hand, employees are agent[s] employed by [an employer] to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the [employer]. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(2). The difference between an independent contractor and an employee is whether the employer can tell the worker how to do his or her job. Employers are not liable for injuries incurred by independent contractors because employers cannot control the manner in which the independent contractor works. Conversely, employers are liable for injuries incurred by employees precisely because the employer retains control over the manner in which the employee works. Kamla contends Space Needle retained control over the manner in which he worked and is liable for his injuries under the common law retained control exception. In the past, we have stated, [t]he test of control is not the actual interference with the work of the subcontractor, but the right to exercise such control. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wash.2d 323, 330-31, 582 P.2d 500 (1978). Kamla argues Space Needle's common law liability under the retained control exception is controlled by this statement. Space Needle argues that Washington courts have modified Kelley such that the bare right to control is no longer enough to strip away the common law liability insulation. We must determine whether we have abandoned, or should now abandon, Kelley's retained control analysis in favor of an actual control analysis. Space Needle cites Smith v. Myers, 90 Wash.App. 89, 95, 950 P.2d 1018 (1998), and argues Kelley's right to control rule no longer controls. In Smith, the court held, [t]he `retained control' exception applies ... only when one who engages an independent contractor retains actual control over the workplace and affirmatively assumes responsibility for project safety. Smith, 90 Wash. App. at 95, 950 P.2d 1018 (citing Hennig v. Crosby Group, Inc., 116 Wash.2d 131, 134, 802 P.2d 790 (1991); Straw v. Esteem Constr. Co., 45 Wash.App. 869, 874, 728 P.2d 1052 (1986); Bozung v. Condo. Builders, Inc., 42 Wash.App. 442, 445-46, 711 P.2d 1090 (1985)). Hennig, Straw, and Bozung, however, do not support Space Needle's argument or the holding in Smith. In Hennig, the plaintiff was injured when a three pound screw fell 60 feet onto his head. Hennig, 116 Wash.2d at 132, 802 P.2d 790. The plaintiff sued his employer (the independent contractor), the pin manufacturer, and the Port of Seattle. The contract under which the Port of Seattle hired the independent contractor authorized the Port of Seattle to inspect [the independent contractor's] work to ensure that it fully complied with the contract provisions. Hennig, 116 Wash.2d at 134, 802 P.2d 790. We held the authority to merely inspect the work and demand contract compliance was not retained control sufficient to strip away the common law liability insulation: It is one thing to retain a right to oversee compliance with contract provisions and a different matter to so involve oneself in the performance of the work as to undertake responsibility for the safety of the independent contractor's employees. The retention of the right to inspect and supervise to insure the proper completion of the contract does not vitiate the independent contractor relationship. Hennig, 116 Wash.2d at 134, 802 P.2d 790 (quoting Epperly v. City of Seattle, 65 Wash.2d 777, 785, 399 P.2d 591 (1965)). Neither Straw nor Bozung, two Court of Appeals opinions also cited by Smith, alter our common law liability exception. The Straw court merely held that controlling the timing of construction did not amount to controlling the performance of the work. Straw, 45 Wash.App. at 875, 728 P.2d 1052. The Bozung court simply held that such general contractual rights as the right to order the work stopped or to control the order of the work or the right to inspect the progress of the work do not mean that the general contractor controls the method of the contractor's work. Bozung, 42 Wash.App. at 447, 711 P.2d 1090. These decisions represent a straightforward application of the Restatement Second of Torts § 414 cmt. c (1965): [T]he employer must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the word is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way. We cannot accept Space Needle's implicit invitation to abandon the retained control inquiry. When we distill the principles evident in our case law, the proper inquiry becomes whether there is a retention of the right to direct the manner in which the work is performed, not simply whether there is an actual exercise of control over the manner in which the work is performed. Space Needle did not retain the right to interfere with the manner in which Pyro completed its work, nor did Space Needle affirmatively assume responsibility for workers' safety. Space Needle simply agreed to provide Pyro a suitable display site and fallout zone, access to the display site to set up the display, adequate crowd control, firefighters, and permit fees. Space Needle also agreed to provide Access to the site; Technical assistance and support; Security and fencing as determined by the Seattle Fire Department; Public broadcast, [and]; Public relations. Clerk's Papers at 330. Space Needle did not retain control over the manner in which Pyro installed the fireworks display or completed its work. As an independent contractor, Pyro was free to do the work in its own way. We hold Space Needle did not owe a common law duty of care based on retained control and is, therefore, not liable for Kamla's injuries.