Opinion ID: 2624204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Because the Personal Injury Statute is Triggered by the Nature of the Damages Sought, the Statute Applies to Claims for Benefits Arising from Personal Injury, Irrespective of the Source of the Duty to Pay those Benefits

Text: Turning to the personal injury statute, an analysis of its text establishes that a claim against a UM/UIM insurer for benefits arising from the insured's personal injuries falls within its ambit. Although the USAA insurance policy issued to Parker is undoubtedly a contract, it is a contract to pay personal injury damages. [12] Thus, although Parker's right to recover benefits is contractual, the damages he seeks are damages for personal injury. The personal injury statute makes clear that its focus is upon the nature of the damages sought by the plaintiff, rather than the nature of the defendant's duty to pay those damages. In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person.... § 13-21-101(1), C.R.S. (2008) (emphasis added). The language of the statute does not restrict its application to cases sounding in tort. Rather, it includes  all actions, whether in tort or contract, brought to recover damages for personal injuries, where those injuries are occasioned by the tort of any other person, whether that person is the defendant or not. Had the legislature intended to restrict the application of the personal injury statute to claims involving a defendant's breach of a tortious duty owed to the plaintiff, it would have been easy for it to do so. The General Assembly could have drafted the statute so that it applied only to all tort actions, or all actions brought against the tortfeasor. Instead, the legislature made the nature of damages the touchstone of whether the personal injury statute applies, and made the source or nature of a defendant's obligation to recompense the plaintiff for those personal injuries irrelevant to this analysis. Thus, Colorado courts have held that a plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest under the personal injury statute in a suit against a tortfeasor's employer, even though the employer's obligation to pay arises from its relationship with the tortfeasor, rather than breach of a tortious duty owed directly to the plaintiff. [13] See, e.g., Ochoa v. Vered, 186 P.3d 107, 115-16 (Colo. App.2008) (upholding a doctor's vicarious liability for the negligence of his nurses based on the captain of the ship doctrine and calculating interest under the personal injury statute). Likewise, a plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest under the personal injury statute when he seeks damages for personal injuries, even though the defendant's obligation to pay such damages arises from contract and not tort. Therefore, the language of the personal injury statute also supports its application to claims by insureds against their UM/UIM carriers to recover benefits on the underlying tort because it is the nature of the damages sought by the plaintiff, rather than the source of the insurer's obligation to compensate the insured, which triggers the application of that statute.