Opinion ID: 1102298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Summary of Our Holdings

Text: Based on the above, we hold that GMAC was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to Bell's personal claim for damages for mental distress and with respect to the dealership's fraud and wantonness claims arising out of GMAC's purchase of the dealership's retail paper. We also hold that GMAC was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to the dealership's wantonness claim arising out of the repossession chargeback plan under which the dealership operated for most of its existence. However, we hold that the dealership's evidence was sufficient with respect to its misrepresentation and suppression claims against GMAC arising out of the repossession chargeback plan and, therefore, that the dealership may present these claims to another jury in another trial. Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So.2d 134 (Ala.1981). Likewise, we hold that GM was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to Bell's personal claim for damages for mental distress, and with respect to the dealership's fraud and wantonness claims arising out of GM's handling of its auctions. Because of our resolution of the dealership's claims against GMAC and GM, we pretermit any discussion of the new trial issues raised by GMAC and GM (most importantly, their contention that they were entitled to a new trial because of the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that it was not to consider the dealership's claims under the Dealer Act). Because the dealership has apparently chosen not to pursue any claims that it might have under the Dealer Act, this issue is not likely to arise again on retrial. 1950506REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1950508DISMISSED. MADDOX, J., concurs. ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur in the result. HOOPER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. BUTTS, J., dissents.