Opinion ID: 795530
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Use of Chapman's Statements against Him for the Purposes of Impeachment.

Text: 73 Chapman testified at trial that he attended the LET camps and did not hide his attendance because his motives were innocent. The government impeached this testimony by introducing un Mirandized statements that Chapman made to FBI agents that he did not attend the LET camps. Chapman contends that these statements, which he made to FBI agents after being held in near solitary confinement for weeks and which the district court found were obtained in violation of Miranda, were also involuntary. As such, Chapman argues, they were not useable against him for any purpose. This argument fails. 74 The parties agree that statements obtained in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach a witness, but statements that were made involuntarily cannot be used against a defendant at all. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (noting that involuntary statements are statements made that were not the product of rational or free will). The issue before us is whether the statements in question were involuntary. Though we must make an independent determination on the issue of voluntariness, the district court's findings of fact on the circumstances surrounding the confession are to be accepted unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir.2002). 75 In this case, the district court found that: 76 although Chapman's statements were procured in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda, they were not involuntary under Mincey. There was no evidence that government agents coerced Chapman's statements through physical pressure or imminent threats of physical harm. Moreover, the statements were false exculpatory statements rather than admissions, which suggests that Chapman's decision to make the statements was a calculated one, and thereby that his rational intellect and free will had not been overborne. For these reasons, the statements were not excluded for purposes of impeachment. 77 J.A. 3383. 78 Our review of the record in this case indicates that the district court did not clearly err in making its factual findings concerning the confession, so we accept them as true. See J.A. 244-80 (indicating that Chapman received medical attention from the FBI before the interrogation and providing no indication of physical force or threats of physical force against him). 79 For the statements to be off limits to cross-examination as involuntary, the facts would have to show that they were not the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (internal quotation omitted) (regarding the interrogation of a seriously wounded defendant suffering unbearable pain, almost in a coma, lying on his back in an intensive care unit encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus). To determine whether a defendant's will has been overborne or his capacity for self determination critically impaired, [we] must consider the `totality of the circumstances,' including the characteristics of the defendant, the setting of the interview, and the details of the interrogation. Cristobal, 293 F.3d at 140. In this case, the totality of the circumstances indicates that Chapman's statements were voluntary. Chapman freely answered some questions and declined to answer others. He joked with the agents, told them that he did not need his rights read to him, and seemed anxious to talk with them. On this record, the district court's refusal to find Chapman's statements to be involuntary was correct. Accordingly, use of those statements on cross-examination was appropriate. 13