Opinion ID: 740289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dishonesty on Voir Dire

Text: 33 More troubling is the problem presented by Weinper's answers (or, more accurately, non-answers) to the district court's voir dire questions. Because of the nature of this case, the district court asked the potential jurors various questions intended to solicit information about their past contact with the judicial system and their own experiences with physical and/or sexual assault. As Hilton demonstrated at the post-trial evidentiary hearing, Weinper failed to disclose a number of previous misdemeanor convictions, involvement in at least one civil proceeding, and instances of domestic violence. Although we are troubled by Weinper's failure to disclose these items to the district court, we conclude that Hilton suffered no actual bias in those instances where the record shows Weinper was dishonest rather than simply mistaken as to the district court's questions. As a result, we conclude that no new trial is necessary. 34
35 After soliciting proposed questions from counsel for all parties, the district judge asked a variety of questions to prospective jurors during voir dire. Among these questions was the following: 36 Now, have you, or to your knowledge, any members of your family, ever been involved in a civil or criminal case as either a party to that case or a witness to that case? Any of you ever been a plaintiff or a defendant in a lawsuit, or called to testify as a witness at a trial of any kind, or a court hearing of any kind? If so, please raise your hand. 37 Weinper apparently raised his hand, because the district judge called on him after questioning two other prospective jurors. Weinper then disclosed that he had been the plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit arising out of a car accident. He told the court that the case was filed in California in 1988 and was resolved after a trial. 38 Next, the district judge asked the following: 39 Now, if not an actual lawsuit, have any members of the prospective jury, the 14 of you, or to your knowledge, members of your immediate family, ever made a claim for personal injury, maybe one which did not end up going to a lawsuit, but otherwise a claim for injuries you might have sustained? If so, would you raise your hand. 40 Weinper did not respond to this question. Later, because the case involved an alleged assault, the district judge asked the following series of questions: 41 Have any of you, or to your knowledge, any members of your family, ever been physically or sexually assaulted or molested? 42 Have any of you, or anyone you know, ever been accused of physical or sexual assault, or of sexual harassment, or have any of you, or anyone you know, ever made a claim regarding physical or sexual assault or sexual harassment against some other individual?Have any of you ever personally witnessed an incident involving a physical or sexual assault on another individual? 43 Again, Weinper did not respond. 44 At the evidentiary hearing on their motion for a new trial, Hilton established the following: 45 (1) In 1993, Weinper's mother obtained a temporary protective order against him due to domestic violence. 46 (2) In 1993, Weinper was convicted of cocaine possession and sentenced to six months probation. 47 (3) In 1992, Weinper filed a lawsuit against a taxicab driver and a taxicab company for injuries suffered when the driver allegedly stabbed him in an altercation. 48 (4) In 1992, Weinper pled guilty to a misdemeanor drug possession charge. He received a suspended sentence and probation. 49 (5) In 1991, Weinper pled guilty to a misdemeanor drug possession charge and was fined $250.00. 50 (6) In 1989, Weinper filed a civil lawsuit in Nevada alleging that another driver had rear-ended his automobile. 51 (7) In 1974, Weinper pled guilty to a drug possession charge in California. He received probation. 52 Relying on this evidence, Hilton contends Weinper was dishonest in responding to the district court's questions asking whether the prospective jurors had been a party or a witness in a civil or criminal case, whether any prospective juror had ever filed any claim for personal injury, and whether any prospective juror had ever been physically or sexually assaulted or been accused of physical or sexual assault. In addition to these failures, Hilton also contends the record shows that Weinper lied about other things during voir dire and during his testimony at the new trial evidentiary hearing. Without going into detail, these lies include the following: (1) misrepresentations about possession of a pilot's license and flight experience; (2) misrepresentations about home ownership; and (3) misrepresentations about ownership of a business. 53 During his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Weinper offered explanations for his failure to disclose completely his criminal and civil litigation history during voir dire. First, Weinper explained that he had not revealed to the court his criminal history because the question about lawsuits was twofold and it never crossed [his] mind to reveal his criminal history. In his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Weinper explained that I wasn't consciously thinking about criminal cases. Similarly, Weinper explained that he did not reveal his involvement in various domestic abuse cases or the taxicab altercation because he thought the question was directed at sexual assaults because of the nature of the case. Weinper also explained his failure to disclose his other automobile accident case by claiming that he thought the question only related to proceedings in which he had been a witness. [W]hat I was thinking about was testifying as a witness in a formal trial.... [M]entally it didn't register. Finally, Weinper explained that he failed to disclose the civil case arising out of the taxicab altercation because it never crossed [his] mind. 54 Although dubious of Weinper's explanations, the district judge ultimately concluded that these explanations were plausible and consistent. 55 Given Juror Weinper's explanation that he perceived the Court's questions as calling for responses to criminal and civil litigation in which he had testified at a formal hearing, his disclosure of the 1988 civil lawsuit is plausible and his omission of other cases consistent. Similarly, Weinper's testimony that he was focused during jury selection on the issue of sexual assault versus physical assault when answering the Court's voir dire questions is equally plausible given the nature of the case brought by Plaintiff Coughlin as it was outlined by the Court minutes earlier in the jury selection process. 56 This analysis led to the district court's ultimate conclusion: On balance, the Court finds that Juror Weinper misunderstood some of the Court's voir dire questions. The Court does not, however, find that Juror Weinper failed to honestly answer material questions on voir dire.
57 In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), the United States Supreme Court addressed a claim for a new trial due to a juror's failure to answer honestly the court's voir dire questions. In that products liability case, the juror failed to reveal that his son had been injured as the result of an exploding tire even though the trial court asked whether any prospective juror or juror's family member had suffered a severe injury as the result of an accident at home. Rejecting the argument for a new trial, the Court recognized that it was nearly impossible to give each litigant a trial free from any error. Id. at 553, 104 S.Ct. at 848-49. Thus, the Court reversed the lower court's ruling that the juror's failure to disclose his son's accident required a new trial. In so doing the Court adopted the following test: We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a jury failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Id. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850. 58 We recently clarified McDonough 's holding in United States v. Edmond, 43 F.3d 472 (9th Cir.1994). In that armed robbery case, an empaneled juror failed to reveal that he had been an armed robbery victim some years earlier. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered a new trial, even though it concluded that the juror had simply forgotten about the experience. We reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that [the juror]'s simple forgetfulness fell within the scope of dishonesty as defined by McDonough. Id. at 474.
59 Relying on Edmond and McDonough, the district court concluded that Weinper's responses to the voir dire questions were mistaken but honest. Therefore, it concluded that Hilton had failed to meet the first part of the McDonough test. Additionally, the district court also stated that it was not persuaded that correct responses to its questions would have served as the basis for a challenge for cause. Relying on Weinper's statement that he knew of no reason why he could not render a verdict based solely on the evidence and the court's instructions, the court concluded there was no evidence that Weinper was actually biased. Although our reasoning differs slightly, we agree with the district court's conclusion. 60 Even under a deferential clearly erroneous standard, we are not prepared to endorse the district judge's conclusion that Weinper's responses to the court's voir dire questions were entirely honest. However, we are convinced that any dishonesty by Weinper was related to non-material, collateral matters. Weinper's failure to disclose his misdemeanor drug convictions, for instance, did not result in any bias or prejudice to Hilton. Similarly, Weinper's failure to disclose the 1989 lawsuit arising out of an auto accident is not the source of any bias or prejudice to Hilton. Finally, any dishonesty in Weinper's statements regarding his flight experience or his ownership of a home is clearly related to matters that are not material to the instant case. Thus, to the extent Weinper was dishonest in his answers during voir dire and in his testimony during the evidentiary hearing, any such dishonesty was not related to a material question. 61 Weinper's failure to disclose his involvement in physical altercations is more troubling. Here, however, Weinper's explanation that he was mistaken as to the scope of the district judge's question is convincing. The district judge's phrasing of the question-physically or sexually assaulted or molested ... physical or sexual assault or sexual harassment-could be understood as placing an emphasis on sexually-related violence. Weinper explained that he did not disclose the taxicab altercation or his domestic abuse problems because he thought the question was directed at sexual assaults. Given the question's emphasis, we cannot conclude that the district court's acceptance of Weinper's explanation was clearly erroneous. 62 Weinper's failure to disclose his 1992 lawsuit against the taxicab company is also troubling. Clearly, Weinper should have disclosed this lawsuit in response to the district court's question about involvement in civil or criminal cases. He did not. He explained that he thought the question was limited to cases that went to trial, or cases where he had actually testified. As a result, the taxicab lawsuit never crossed [his] mind. The district court accepted this explanation, finding that it was plausible and ... consistent. Although it is a close question, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred. 63 Thus, the district judge did not clearly err when he concluded that Weinper did not fail to answer honestly material questions on voir dire. We conclude that Weinper's dishonesty, if any, was limited to collateral matters that had no impact on his ability to serve as a juror in this proceeding. Accordingly, Hilton's argument for a new trial under McDonough fails.
64 Even where a juror's answers are entirely honest, however, a new trial may be warranted under an implied bias theory. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 104 S.Ct. at 850 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ([R]egardless of whether a juror's answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias, or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.); id. at 558-59, 104 S.Ct. at 851 (Brennan, J., concurring) (I therefore cannot agree with the Court when it asserts that a new trial is not warranted whenever a prospective juror provides an honest answer to the question posed.). Implied bias can serve as the basis for a new trial in extraordinary or extreme circumstances. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948-49, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 65 In Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.1990), we discussed four general fact situations where bias might be presumed or implied: (1) where the juror is apprised of such prejudicial information about the defendant that the court deems it highly unlikely that he can exercise independent judgment even if the juror states he will, id. at 528; (2) [t]he existence of certain relationships between the juror and the defendant, id.; (3) where a juror or his close relatives have been personally involved in a situation involving a similar fact pattern, id.; and (4) where it is revealed 'that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial ... or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the [underlying] transaction,'  id. (quoting Phillips, 455 U.S. at 222, 102 S.Ct. at 948 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Although bias may be presumed or implied in other factual contexts as well, these general categories are instructive. Id. 66 Hilton's allegation that Weinper is somehow biased falls into none of these four general categories. Hilton does not contend that Weinper had some pre-trial knowledge about the facts underlying this lawsuit, and Hilton does not contend that Weinper was somehow related to Coughlin, Hilton, or a witness in this case. Although Weinper's taxicab altercation in 1992 led to a lawsuit based on a somewhat analogous legal theory (respondeat superior ), the facts of that case are significantly different from the facts underlying this dispute between Coughlin and Hilton. Little of the trial testimony in this case focused on the actual attack on Paula Coughlin; most of the witnesses were Hilton employees who did not witness the attack. 67 As a result, we conclude that there are no extraordinary or extreme circumstances in this case that require a new trial because of Weinper's implied bias. Although the record shows that Weinper was a drug user with an extensive background of civil and criminal litigation, nothing in the record indicates that Weinper was presumptively biased against Hilton or in favor of Coughlin. Although Weinper's participation in the jury verdict in this case can safely be called unfortunate, it does not warrant a new trial. We therefore affirm the verdict and judgment in Coughlin's favor.VI. NEVADA'S CAP ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 68 Because we reject Hilton's efforts to have the jury verdict overturned, we must turn to the issue presented by Coughlin's cross-appeal. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005 places a limitation on the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded to a plaintiff. The statute provides as follows: 69 Except as otherwise provided in this section or by specific statute, an award of exemplary or punitive damages made pursuant to this section may not exceed: 70 (a) Three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff if the amount of compensatory damages is $100,000 or more; or 71 (b) Three hundred thousand dollars if the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff is less than $100,000. 72 Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005(1). 73 The district court concluded that the $400,000 Association settlement should be subtracted from Coughlin's $1,695,000 compensatory damages award before the application of Nevada's punitive damages cap. Thus, the district court concluded that the appellants' punitive damages liability was capped by section 42.005(1) at three times that amount, or $3,885,000. The district court reduced Coughlin's award accordingly. In her cross-appeal, Coughlin argues that the district court erroneously interpreted section 42.005(1). 74 We conclude that a question of Nevada law is determinative of Hilton's punitive damages liability. We further conclude that it appears there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court on this issue. In such a circumstance, we may in our discretion exercise our authority to certify the question to the Nevada Supreme Court. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 902 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we certify the following question to the Nevada Supreme Court: Should the limitation of Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005(1) be computed on the amount of compensatory damages awarded by the jury or that amount less any amount received from a settling defendant? 75 We respectfully request the Nevada Supreme Court to exercise its discretionary authority under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 to accept and decide this question. Our phrasing of the question should not restrict the court's consideration of the problems and issues involved. If the Nevada Supreme Court declines certification, we will resolve the issues according to our perception of Nevada law. 76 The Clerk will file a certified copy of our opinion and order with the Nevada Supreme Court pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. This panel retains jurisdiction over further proceedings in this Court. Because we affirm the verdict and judgment in Coughlin's favor, she may execute her damages award to the extent of the district court's judgment. If the Nevada Supreme Court responds that the punitive damages cap should be computed based on the amount of compensatory damages awarded by the jury, we will remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter a supplemental damages award. 77 The parties shall notify the Clerk within one week after the Nevada Supreme Court accepts or rejects certification, and again within one week if and when that court renders an opinion.