Opinion ID: 694348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of Wrongful Discharge Claim

Text: 23 Stanton argues that the district court erred in granting Fowler Trucking's motion for summary judgment on Stanton's wrongful discharge claim. Stanton's complaint, filed October 28, 1991, included a state law claim alleging he was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim in June 1990. This cause of action was first recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991), as a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Id. at 467. In response to this case and several others, the Arkansas legislature in 1993 passed Ark.Code Ann. Sec. 11-9-107, which expressly prohibits this cause of action. 7 The district court determined that Sec. 11-9-107(e) should be applied retroactively to bar Stanton's claim. 24 We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Landreth v. First Nat'l Bank of Cleburne County, 45 F.3d 267, 268 (8th Cir.1995). The district court based its decision on Arkansas law. We review the district court's interpretation of Arkansas law de novo, giving its decision no deference. Slaughter v. American Casualty Co., 37 F.3d 385, 387 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991)). We reverse. 25 In Arkansas, it is well established that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. Union Nat'l Bank v. Barnhart, 308 Ark. 190, 823 S.W.2d 878, 882 (1992). The legislation currently codified at Sec. 11-9-107 was originally enacted as Arkansas 1993 Session Law, Act 796, Sec. 6. This act was enacted with an emergency clause which states: Furthermore, the provisions of this act shall apply only to injuries which occur after July 1, 1993. Acts 1993, No. 796, Sec. 41. 8 Accordingly, it is clear the legislature did not intend Sec. 11-9-107(e) to be applied retroactively. Therefore, we reverse the district court's decision that the language of Sec. 11-9-107(e) necessarily implied a retroactive application. 9