Opinion ID: 767290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intentional National Origin Discrimination

Text: 14 CBOE argues that the record fails to support the jury's finding of intentional discrimination. Noting that the trial court denied CBOE's motion for a judgment as a matter of law on these grounds, we interpret Appellant's issue presented for review as a challenge to the court's denial which we review de novo. See Williams v. Pharmacia, 137 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 1998). This Court is limited to deciding only whether the evidence presented at trial, with all the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]. See Collins v. Kilbort, 143 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 1998). We will overturn a jury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no rational jury could have found for the plaintiff. See Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1996). Indeed, this standard is applied stringently in discrimination cases where witness credibility is often crucial. Williams, 137 F.3d at 948. 15 Hasham's discrimination claim arises under 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a), which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . national origin. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a). CBOE denies that Hasham's national origin played a role in its decision to promote Smith over him and claims that it promoted Smith for performance and business reasons wholly unrelated to Hasham's national origin. The two accepted ways of establishing that an employer violated this prohibition are: first, by direct evidence (taking the form of, I did not promote you because of your national origin) or second, indirect evidence. See Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994). Because employers are usually careful not to offer smoking gun remarks indicating intentional discrimination, the Supreme Court established the burden shifting approach as a means of evaluating indirect evidence of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Even so, the elements of proof in an employment discrimination case need not be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Thus, this Circuit has also held that a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, none conclusive in itself but together composing a convincing mosaic of discrimination against the plaintiff, may allow a plaintiff to surpass the summary judgment hurdle. See Troupe, 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework provides a useful organizational structure under which the parties and the . . . court can assess the need for a full trial. See Sattar v. Motorola, 138 F.3d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1998). 16 Under the burden shifting method, the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination demonstrating that he or she is in a protected class, qualified for the promotion, did not receive the promotion despite his or her qualifications and that a person not in the protected class was promoted instead (or other such evidence from which one can infer that the employment action was taken for an impermissible purpose). See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Leffel v. Valley Fin. Serv., 1123 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendant CBOE does not claim that Hasham failed to establish this. Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, an inference of discrimination is created and the defendant has the burden to clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 507 (emphasis and quotations omitted). Should the defendant do so, the inference of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons proffered by the defendant were pretextual for intentional discrimination. See id. However, on post-trial review, whether Plaintiff's case is based on direct or indirect evidence, the McDonnell Douglas framework drops out of the analysis and we need only consider whether the record supports the resolution as to the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. See Collins, 143 F.3d at 335.
17 It was revealed at trial that sometime around the month of August 1993, Zigelman made a comment to one of the auditors in the Houston office about the foreign accent of an auditor from the New York office named D. Patel. Zigelman said that Patel was difficult to understand and then remarked about Hasham, If you want to hear something difficult, you should have heard that guy from Chicago. He was extremely difficult to understand. In fact, how did he expect to be a supervisor if he can't communicate with people. Another Houston auditor also testified that he heard Zigelman on another occasion state in a demeaning tone that he could not understand Hasham. However, Zigelman did testify at trial that there was absolutely no reason to believe that Hasham's accent would interfere with his ability to supervise. (Tr. at 150.) Also, in February 1992, Ruth Malloy and Pamela Hartman, two auditors in the Houston office, testified that they heard Zigelman say that he did not want to hire any more foreigners after he was told that an Asian applicant was waiting to be interviewed. (Tr. at 487, 496.) We are of the opinion that a reasonable jury could have concluded that, in conjunction with Zigelman's contradictory testimony, his comments about Hasham's accent and comment about the hiring of foreigners demonstrated a discriminatory animus that governed his promotional decision, which we are in no position, particularly . . . in employment discrimination cases[,] to . . . supplant[ ] our view of the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of . . . the jury. Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990).
18 Defendant argues that Smith was promoted for the following reasons: Zigelman believed that Smith was the most qualified candidate; to continue promoting in-house employees; and to accommodate Carol Cross's voluntary demotion. Obviously, it is the prerogative of the jury to weigh and balance the credibility of each and every witness and disbelieve or believe any or all reasonable testimony and evidence offered to support an employment decision. See Emmel, 95 F.3d at 633-34. A jury may also reasonably find the proffered nondiscriminatory reason pretextual and that the real reason was in fact unlawful discrimination. Id. at 634 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). In other words, pretext is a lie, specifically a phony reason for some [employment] action by the employer. Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144-45 (quoting Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995)). Pretext does not require that plausible facts presented by the defendant not be true, only that they not be the reason for the employment decision. See Emmel, 95 F.3d at 634. Indeed, circumstantial evidence can be offered to prove that Defendant's purported reasons for the promotion decision are not worthy of belief and thus pretextual. See Huff v. Uarco, 122 F.3d 374, 380 (7th Cir. 1997). As we have previously stated, 19 [Plaintiff's] circumstantial evidence was not presented in vain, however, for it can be used at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas test to demonstrate the ultimate fact of discrimination. Bearing this in mind, our task is to determine whether [Plaintiff] has come forward with sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer that [her employer] denied her training or promotion on the basis of her race or national origin . . . 20 Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 666 (7th Cir. 1998). Similar to the criminal law context, because it is [often] so unlikely that direct evidence will be available, United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1996); accord Emmel, 95 F.3d at 629 ([E]mployers are usually careful not to generate such [direct discrimination] evidence . . . .); Castleman v. Acme Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that direct evidence of intent to discriminate is rarely found), we are of the opinion that there should be nothing novel about establishing [intentional discrimination] through the use of circumstantial evidence, for . . . circumstantial evidence is not less probative than direct evidence, and, in some cases is even more reliable. United States v. Griffin, 150 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted). 21 From a review of the record, it seems evident that the testimony at trial raised substantial credibility issues relating to Zigelman's often contradictory proffered reasons for promoting Smith instead of Hasham. At deposition, Zigelman testified that he believed that Smith, as a supervisor, would relate well to the staff. On the other hand, a number of other Houston employees contradicted Zigelman's testimony and stated that Smith stayed to himself and thus, rarely interacted with people. (Tr. at 424-25, 497.) Smith even admitted that after two years on the job, he had yet to learn all the names of the Houston auditors. (Tr. at 441.) Further, Zigelman testified at trial that Hasham would make a very good supervisor and do a comparable job to Smith, had an excellent interview for the position and had a favorable reference from his supervisor (Tr. at 148.) In spite of this testimony, on cross examination, Zigelman testified that one of the reasons he disfavored Hasham was because he was an unknown quantity. (Tr. at 249-50.) 22 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Zigelman asserted in his affidavit that even though there was not a significant difference in experience between the candidates, he still believed that Smith was the most qualified candidate. On the other hand, Hasham had a higher exam score than Smith, double the years of experience working for the out-of-state district, more than double the years of experience as a Staff Tax Auditor and even passed the Supervisor II exam. (Tr. at 147-55.) Further, at the time of his decision, Zigelman was aware that Hasham was a CPA and Smith was not. (Tr. at 155.) Zigelman also was aware that Hasham had substantially more experience working on complex mega audits. (Tr. at 200-04.) At deposition, Zigelman even admitted that Hasham was more qualified than Smith when considering individual job-related factors, such as education, exam score and years of experience. Although this Court has consistently held that courts should not sit as a super personnel department and second-guess an employer's personnel decision, see Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997), these facts certainly put into question Zigelman's credibility as a witness and his proffered denial of any major difference in experience between the candidates, as well as his belief that Smith was the most qualified candidate. 23 Zigelman also stated that although Hasham had superior auditing skills and experience, Staff Tax Auditing skills and experience were not controlling qualifications for a supervisory position. (Tr. at 148-53.) However, Zigelman admitted that a Supervisor I oversees the mega audits performed by Staff Tax Auditors and explains complex tax law issues to corporate taxpayers. (Tr. at 152-53.) Indeed, the qualifications for Staff Tax Auditor and Supervisor I, in particular the communication, supervisory and leadership skills, were identical, admitted Zigelman. (Tr. at 153-54.) 24 Even though CBOE argues that Zigelman's decision was based, in part, on his desire to promote in- house from the Houston office to boost moral, CBOE has failed to point to any evidence in the record of such policy. In fact, the record reflects that CBOE has rarely promoted from within the Houston office, as evidenced by the fact that most of the senior staff members of the Houston office received their promotions as a result of transfers from other offices. (Tr. at 181-84.) Even as an unspoken policy, CBOE contradicts itself on this assertion on several occasions because the record evidences that it has promoted outside candidates over in-house candidates. (Tr. at 404.) Indeed, it appears that only after Hasham filed his complaint did Zigelman come up with the idea that he preferred to promote in-house. (Tr. at 305-06.) 25 CBOE further maintained that Smith was promoted so that it could retain Carol Cross. In contrast, evidence was presented at trial that established that Henline had full authority to create a position for Cross with or without promoting Smith. (Tr. at 341-42.) Also, Zigelman offered testimony in his affidavit stating, in essence, that he thought so highly of Smith's qualifications that he would have promoted him regardless of his desire to keep Carol Cross on staff. Again, when considering Zigelman's testimony in its totality, the jury might very well have considered his proffered reasons for his promotion decision suspect and thus, unreliable. 26
27 Indeed, the trial record is replete with Zigelman's contradictory statements to the jury. At deposition, he testified that according to the California merit system, he was obligated to recommend the most qualified candidate. Conversely, at trial, Zigelman stated that although the merit system mandates that the most qualified candidate be promoted, he was not required to. (Tr. at 144-45.) He made the assertion without any explanation, or much less citing any specifics or examples, but only that his altered testimony was based on literature that he had read since his deposition, which he believed suggested that there is no firm requirement that the most qualified person be promoted. (Tr. at 145.) Indeed, despite his deposition testimony, Zigelman was steadfast in his statements at trial that when he promoted Smith over Hasham, he was not required to promote the most qualified candidate. (Tr. at 145-46.) Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably found that Zigelman did not follow CBOE promotion policy, or, at the very least, again found Zigelman's explanation incredulous. 11 28 At trial, Zigelman also testified that during the phone interview with Hasham, he asked him questions to determine whether his qualifications were superior to that of Smith. (Tr. at 156-57.) At the deposition, however, Zigelman testified that during Hasham's telephone interview, he asked [n]ot a single question to determine his qualifications. (Tr. at 159.) 12 Indeed, Zigelman's failure to express consistent explanations at trial or deposition could compel a jury to find that his proffered reasons for promoting Smith were pretextual for something much more invidious. See also Perfetti v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1991) (If at the time of the adverse employment decision the decision maker gave one reason, but at the time of the trial gave another reason which was unsupported by the documentary evidence the jury could reasonably conclude that the new reason was a pretextual after-the-fact justification.) We also are aware that Zigelman was the decision maker relating to the promotion and thus, his credibility, which was thoroughly impeached, was crucial to this case. 29 As we have previously stated, 30 [W]e will not second-guess a jury on credibility issues. While this court's review is confined to the cold pages of an appellate transcript, the jury had an opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the witnesses, including the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements. . . . [I]t is not the task of this appellate court to reconsider the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. 31 United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1006 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). Being particularly careful in employment discrimination cases to avoid supplanting our view of the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of both the jury (in its verdict) and the judge (in not interfering with the verdict), Hybert, 900 F.2d at 1054, we hold that CBOE was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as we must, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that CBOE intentionally discriminated against Hasham on the basis of his national origin. See Williams, 137 F.3d at 948-49. 13 32