Opinion ID: 2349960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attack on Findings of the Court in the Ejectment Case

Text: Judge Pugh says Judge Carter cited six alleged defalcations by the tenant in failing to make repairs to the premises between November 1, 1962 and December 18, 1962. He went on to say these defalcations did not occur during this period.    [they] occurred years before   . (Emphasis supplied.) Judge Pugh also disputes Judge Carter's findings regarding the violation of health and fire regulations. What Judge Carter held can best be related by using his own language: The evidence here presented on the first issue establishes that during the period from November 1, to December 18, 1962 the buildings and improvements on the property were in a state of disrepair to an extent that their condition constituted a default at that time of the obligation of the Lessee under paragraph 2(e) of the lease requiring the Lessee `to keep and maintain the demised premises in good repair including painting, as the same shall be at the commencement of the term.  ' These defalcations as they have been thus established consist of:  (a) failure to keep the exterior of the buildings properly painted; (b) failure to properly maintain the interior of the main buildings; (c) failure to maintain the roadway leading to the main building in proper repair; (d) failure to maintain several hundred feet of fencing on the property in proper repair; (e) failure to maintain the apron of the swimming pool in proper repair; and (f) failure to maintain the lake at the rear of the property and the border thereof in proper condition. All of these failures caused the property to be in substantially less valuable and usable condition than when possession thereof was acquired by the Lessee on April 1, 1956. These failures existed on December 18, 1962 when Mr. Hickey, as attorney for the President of the Lessee corporation, attempted to exercise the option on behalf of the corporation. The evidence presented on the second issue as to whether the Lessee was in default in respect to its obligations under paragraph 2(g) requiring compliance with County health and fire regulations at the time the option to purchase was attempted to be exercised on December 18, 1962, establishes the following non-compliances: (a) failure to connect the sewerage disposal facilities on the property with the public sewerage system as directed by the health authorities; (b) failure to correct a nuisance and health menace created by an overflow of the sewerage disposal facilities; (c) failure to clean the exhaust fan above the stove and the stove itself, used in the preparation of food; (d) failure to correct fire hazards as requested by the county authorities namely, to repair the boiler room door and cover the inside thereof with fire resistant material; and (e) failure to correct a fire hazard caused by use of extension cords, and unapproved fire extinguishers. The Lessee's failure to comply with the regulations of lawful authority in respect to these matters, related to the operation of the Club, constituted a direct violation of its obligation under the aforesaid paragraph of the lease and therefore amounted to a default on its part which existed. We have examined those parts of the record which Judge Pugh cited in support of his contradiction of Judge Carter's findings but, in our judgment, they fall far short of demonstrating that Judge Carter's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In any event, even if it could be shown that he was wrong, the judgment implementing his decision is final and unreversed and it is not subject to attack or impeachment by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. See cases collected in 13 M.L.E., Judgments, §§ 131-35.