Opinion ID: 64503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The RLA

Text: We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. [4] Summary judgment is appropriate when the record indicates no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Yet, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case. [5]
This is a dispute over a grievance that involves the interpretation and application of the Continental-ALPA CBA and of the LCA entered into by McWhirter and Continental. As such, it is classified as a minor dispute under the RLA. [6] Minor disputes must be resolved through compulsory and binding arbitration before the SBA. [7] Judicial review of [SBA] decisions arising from the terms of a[CBA] is narrowly limited, and courts should afford great deference to arbitration awards. [8] The standard for this review is among the narrowest known to the law [9] and flows from the RLA's preference for the settlement of disputes in accordance with contractually agreed-upon arbitration procedures. [10] We will defer to an SBA decision based on any reasonable ground presented by the parties, even if not relied on by the SBA in its decision. [11] We may decline to defer to a decision of the SBA only if (1) the SBA failed to comply with the RLA, (2) there is evidence of fraud or corruption in the SBA, or (3) the order by the SBA did not confine itself to matters within the scope of [the SBA's] jurisdiction. [12] Absent one of those exclusive grounds, or a judicially created exception for public policy concerns, we must defer to the SBA's decision. [13] Continental does not contend that the SBA failed to comply with the RLA or that there is evidence of fraud or corruption in the SBA. Accordingly, only Continental's contention that the SBA failed to conform or confine itself to its jurisdiction is at issue. The jurisdiction of the SBA and the limits of that jurisdiction arise out the CBA. [14] The SBA therefore fails to conform or confine itself to its jurisdiction if it issues a decision that is contrary to an unambiguous provision of the CBA [15] or an LCA. [16] An LCA is a supplement to the CBA, and its terms are just as binding on an arbitrator as those of the CBA: Unambiguous provisions of an LCA may not be ignored. [17] This is a narrow exception, however, and `a court should not reject an award on the ground that the [SBA] misread the contract[s].' [18] The SBA's decision need only `draw its essence from the contracts[s] and [not] simply reflect the [SBA's] own notions of industrial justice,' [19] so that the decision is grounded in the [contracts]. [20] That is, `as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract[s] and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.' [21] The SBA may look beyond the written contract when interpreting a collective bargaining agreement if the instrument is ambiguous or silent upon a precise question. [22] If we determine that the SBA has exceeded its authority, we are empowered to vacate or modify the SBA's ruling, or to remand to the SBA for further proceedings. [23] Even in the very rare instances when [SBA] procedural aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court must not foreclose further proceedings by settling the merits according to its own judgment of the appropriate result.... [24] To do so would improperly substitute a judicial determination for the [SBA's] decision that the parties bargained for. [25] [T]he court should simply vacate the award, thus leaving open the possibility of further proceedings if they are permitted under the terms of the agreement... [or] remand when this step seems appropriate. [26]
It is clear from the foregoing that we must defer to the SBA's decision if it may be supported by any analysis of the LCA and CBA, whether or not relied on by the SBA, that arguably construes those agreements. Even if the chain of reasoning is not correct, and the SBA's decision appears to us to be a serious error, we must defer as long as no step in the reasoning process ignores an unambiguous provision of the LCA and CBA. Continental asserts that the SBA exceeded its jurisdiction in three ways: (1) The SBA should not have considered McWhirter's non-medical explanation for his refusal to take the no-notice test; (2) the SBA was without power to order McWhirter's reinstatement based on his non-medical explanation; and (3) the SBA was without power to order McWhirter's continued participation in Continental's EAP. We address each in turn.
If the LCA unambiguously excludes any non-medical explanation of McWhirter's refusal to be tested, then Continental's first contention would be correct; the SBA would have acted out of conformity with the jurisdiction conferred on it by the parties. But the LCA not only fails unambiguously to reject inclusion of the non-medical mitigation provision of the CBA, its structure and brevity essentially compel incorporation of the CBA's mitigation provisions. The relevant portions of the LCA are: Pursuant to Section [15] of the collective bargaining agreement between [Continental] and [ALPA], we have agreed that your employment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 1. As a condition of continuing employment, you agree to undergo evaluation by the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Director (or designee) and to complete any rehabilitation recommended by EAP.... .... 3. Your continuing employment shall be conditional upon your compliance with all of the following conditions: .... c. You shall agree in writing to be subject to no notice alcohol testing at the direction of the Company as frequently as the Company may decide for a period of five (5) years from the completion of the formal rehabilitation program. Following the five (5) year period during which you shall be subject to no notice testing, you shall be obligated only to submit to such further testing as may be required by applicable federal regulations or the collective bargaining agreement.... The LCA's preamble to all of the conditions on McWhirter's continued employment makes clear by its terms that Continental and McWhirter agreed to those conditions [p]ursuant to Section [15] of the CBA. Accordingly, Continental cannot plausibly maintain that, using the terms of Section 15 of the CBA, the SBA's analysis of McWhirter's refusal to be tested was not just seriously wrong, but a failure even arguably to construe the language of the contracts. The district court recognized that the CBA's mitigation provisions must have been included in the LCA. It concluded that the LCA does not say [McWhirter] will be fired for not taking a test. This is likely because circumstances could arise that would prevent him from doing it. [27] Common sense compels this conclusion. It is quite unlikely that at the time that it entered into the LCA, Continental believed that it could fire McWhirter for refusing to take an alcohol test if, say, his doctor concluded that his blood volume was so low that it was medically dangerous for him to give a blood sample. The parties must have contemplated that there would be some acceptable excuses for refusing to take a no-notice test when they entered into the LCA. That observation makes the point that the LCA must have incorporated some parts of the CBA. Continental offers no reason why the SBA's implicit conclusion  that because Sub-part 8(A) must have been incorporated, Sub-part 8(B) must also have been incorporated  was not at least an arguable construction of the CBA and LCA. We deal with Continental's arguments about the propriety of applying Sub-part 8(B) to McWhirter's case below; here we only make the point that if Sub-part 8(A) must have been incorporated into the LCA, it was a perfectly reasonable construction for the SBA to conclude that Sub-part 8(B) must have been similarly incorporated. Incorporation is a question logically prior to application. The [p]ursuant to Section [15] language in the preamble to the section containing the no-notice testing requirement makes the provisions of Section 15 an obvious choice to provide content to this issue on which the LCA is silent. Continental itself seemed to recognize as much when it wrote to McWhirter that he had failed to offer a `sufficient explanation' for refusing the no-notice test. The district court relied on that letter to conclude that Continental thought itself obliged to consider explanations and to excuse McWhirter's refusal for at least some subset of those explanations. The SBA has the ability to look beyond the LCA when faced with an ambiguous term or silence; it could have considered Continental's letter evidence of the parties' intention that some reasons proffered for refusing to test must be acceptable under the LCA. The brevity of the LCA and its failure to define no-notice testing also belie Continental's argument that the LCA did not incorporate the mitigation provisions of the CBA. The LCA is obviously intended to supplement the CBA, not replace it. For example, what is no-notice testing? The practices of the parties appear to have conformed to the no-notice testing procedures set out in Section 15 of the CBA, something else the SBA could have considered when deciding whether reference to Section 15 of the CBA was appropriate in interpreting the LCA. Finally, according to the SBA's decision, Continental relied primarily on part of Section 15, albeit a different part than did McWhirter, during the SBA proceedings. [28] That is evidence that Continental considered Section 15 to be incorporated by reference into the LCA, or, at the least, that such a reading was arguable. Some of the above arguments may not be the most natural reading; some may be incorrect; some may even be serious errors of interpretation. None of that matters under the RLA, however, because the existence of such arguments in favor of reading the LCA and Section 15 of the CBA in pari materia compels the conclusion that the SBA's interpretation  that the LCA incorporates or does not displace the CBA's mitigation provisions  draws its essence from the agreements between Continental and McWhirter. [29] Turning to those provisions, Section 15, Part 5, Sub-part 8(B) of the version of the CBA that the parties agree governs this dispute states: A pilot who refuses or fails to cooperate in any drug or alcohol test as mandated... by this Agreement, or who misses a no-notice test without a valid reason shall upon request have his circumstances reviewed by the Company. The Company shall consider such mitigating circumstances as the pilot may offer, and give those circumstances fair consideration. This provision, combined with the SBA's jurisdiction over all disputes arising out of the CBA, [30] entitled the SBA to consider whether Continental gave fair consideration to the non-medical mitigating circumstances that McWhirter offered. First, Sub-part 8(B) refers to no-notice testing, but Sub-part 8(A), [31] the provision that Continental insists is applicable, does not. Sub-part 8(B) therefore appears to be the most obvious provision to consult concerning McWhirter's refusal to be tested. Second, Sub-part 8(B) applies when a pilot misses a no-notice test without a valid reason. Continental's reasoning that Sub-part 8(B) countenances only medical excuses because it only allows consideration of valid reason[s] is flatly contradicted by the plain text of Sub-part 8(B). Third, Continental's assertion that misses may not embrace a refusal to test is arguable. Continental contrasts misses in the second clause with refuses or fails to cooperate in the first clause. Rather than treating misses ... without a valid reason as a reformulation of refuses or fails to cooperate, Continental reasons that, because McWhirter refused his test but did not miss it (without a valid reason), he was required to have a medical excuse. Even if it were possible to miss a test without a valid reason without having refused or failed to cooperate with the test (at least a plausible construction, as was conceded at oral argument) McWhirter's no-notice test was mandated ... by this Agreement as well, because it was ordered pursuant to an LCA entered into under the scheme of the CBA. [32] And, refusals or failures to cooperate in tests mandated by the CBA (and an LCA entered into pursuant to it) are not subject to a requirement that any excuse be valid. Finally, even if the CBA requires that the reasons for failing to cooperate, refusing, or missing a no-notice test be valid, it would not contradict the plain language of the parties' agreements to construe valid reason to embrace non-medical excuses. Again, this construction could be seriously wrong. For example, (1) Sub-part 8(A) might limit Sub-part 8(B) in some way, (2) the treatment of refusals to be tested as required by this Agreement and a no-notice test missed without a valid reason the same might be incorrect, (3) Sub-part 8(A)'s rehabilitation-related testing provisions may be the correct section on which to rely, or (4) such mitigating circumstances might refer to something other than being upset at the company. These possibilities are irrelevant. The SBA's construction is not so contrary to an unambiguous term that it fails to construe arguably the CBA's two sections that could address McWhirter's refusal to take a no-notice alcohol test. Sub-parts 8(A) and 8(B), and the relationship between them, admit ambiguity and multiple interpretations. As such, the SBA was free to choose among arguable constructions of them. Accordingly, the part of the SBA's decision that considered McWhirter's non-medical excuse for refusing to be tested draws its essence from the parties' agreements and was an action within its jurisdiction. Therefore, we now turn our attention to the jurisdiction of the SBA to order McWhirter's reinstatement.
If the SBA's authority to hear disputes is to mean anything, the CBA must bestow the power to order reinstatement of a grievant. Nothing in the CBA, LCA, or practices of the parties of which we are aware precludes the SBA from asserting that power. [33] Continental nevertheless insists that once the SBA found that Continental did consider the putatively mitigating circumstances that McWhirter offered, the matter was at an end; the requirements of the CBA were satisfied. Continental contends that the SBA was therefore without authority to order reinstatement under the unambiguous language of the CBA. That is not, however, the only arguable construction of Sub-part 8(B). The SBA could have read Sub-part 8(B) to require fair consideration. By concluding that Continental should have given more weight to the circumstances McWhirter presented, the SBA also could have concluded that Continental did not fairly consider that which McWhirter presented. By ordering reinstatement, it could have concluded that fair consideration of McWhirter's excuse would reveal no just cause for his termination. [34] If the SBA's interpretation of the CBA to permit non-medical mitigation evidence was within its jurisdiction, it would read the give fair consideration requirement out of the CBA to conclude that an order of reinstatement based on the SBA's consideration of the merits of such evidence was outside of its jurisdiction. The fact that no express provision of the CBA or LCA forbids an order of reinstatement by the SBA  indeed, several sections contemplate it [35]  means that we must defer to the SBA's interpretation of the justiciability of the fair-consideration requirement and the proper remedy. Continental also argues that the plain terms of the LCA require that McWhirter be fired for refusing a no-notice test, and that those terms override any CBA requirement to consider mitigating evidence. This argument is without merit. The no-notice testing provisions of the LCA do not say that McWhirter will be terminated for refusing, missing, or failing to comply with a order to be tested. Instead, they condition McWhirter's employment on his agreement in writing to be subject to `no notice' alcohol testing at the direction of the Company as frequently as the Company may decide for a period of five (5) years. One construction of this language would require McWhirter's termination for refusing a no-notice test. Another interpretation would, as demonstrated above, require Continental to take account of certain mitigating factors. Even Continental, if only as a back-up argument, seems to acknowledge  as did the district court  that at the very least a valid medical excuse for refusing, missing, or failing to comply with a no-notice test would not be grounds for immediate termination without further consideration. In contrast, and as an example of what qualifies as an unambiguous provision, the LCA says: Upon release by EAP to return to work, you will be required to complete a return-to-work drug and alcohol test. A positive result for any drug or alcohol test shall be cause for your immediate termination.  (emphasis added). Had McWhirter tested positive on his return to work, the SBA would not have been free to order his reinstatement. The difference in the clarity of the two provisions' phrasings  the testing requirement and the consequences of a positive test  are obvious. The CBA has better language to support Continental's position. Section 15, Part 5, Sub-part 5(D)(2)(f) provides: If the pilot fails to comply with the provisions of the conditional reinstatement, termination will result. If the Company terminates the pilot, the only matter that may be grieved is whether or not the pilot has violated the provisions of the conditional reinstatement. On one reading, this provision would preclude the SBA from considering anything other than whether McWhirter refused the no-notice test. On another reading, particularly in pari materia with the reference to no-notice testing in Sub-part 8(B), whether McWhirter violated the provisions of the conditional reinstatement depends in part on the existence of mitigation (whether medical or non-medical). The conflict between Sub-part 5(D)(2)(f) and Sub-part 8(B) allows the SBA to pick any arguable construction of the two, which it did. We repeat for emphasis: Our cases make clear that when a CBA or LCA is not unambiguous, any arguable construction by the SBA is owed deference. With this in mind, we next turn our attention to the power of the SBA to order McWhirter's continued participation in Continental's EAP.
The SBA's requirement that McWhirter participate in the EAP program for two years cannot be the result of an arguable construction of the LCA and CBA. The best argument in favor of the SBA's authority to order the EAP condition, which nevertheless fails even on this deferential standard of review, is that CBA Section 15, Part 5, Sub-Part 6(A)(2) recognizes that the SBA may order no-notice alcohol testing. No-notice testing, unlike the EAP, is not committed to the discretion of the EAP director and protected by federal regulations; further, the SBA's power to order it is clear from the text. In contrast, both agreements appear to commit the length of time spent in the EAP to the discretion of its director. [36] With even clearer language, 49 C.F.R. § 40.297(a) vests sole discretion in a Department of Transportation (DOT) accredited Substance Abuse Professional (SAP) to make treatment evaluations of, or recommendations for assistance about, an employee who has violated DOT drug and alcohol regulations. [37] It states in relevant part: [N]o one (e.g., an employer, employee, a managed-care provider, any service agent) may change in any way the SAP's evaluation or recommendations for assistance. For example, a third party is not permitted to make more or less stringent a SAP's recommendation by changing the SAP's evaluation or seeking another SAP's evaluation. There can be no dispute that the SBA qualifies as a third party and is swept into the regulation's scope by the no one language. There are, however, a few ambiguities around the applicability of this regulation to the subject case. For example, the title of the regulation refers only to initial evaluations by a SAP, and an initial evaluation is not at issue here. Next, even though the plain language of § 40.297(a) is not limited to an initial evaluation, it is limited to the SAP's evaluation or recommendations for assistance. There may be an argument that the SBA order does not alter a recommendation or evaluation. For example, McWhirter argues that the EAP condition simply requires that, in addition to whatever else McWhirter's compliance with the LCA (and so the EAP) might require of him, he must stay in the EAP for at least two years. If, however, the SAP were to recommend that McWhirter be released before two years, that would be an evaluation or recommendation, and the SBA's order would interfere with that decision by the SAP. Further, the plain language of the regulation says that a third party is not permitted to make more or less stringent a SAP's recommendation. Only if Continental's SAP should decide independently that McWhirter must remain in the program for two additional years would the SBA's order not change in any way the SAP's evaluation. We cannot see how interfering with a SAP's recommendation to discharge McWhirter from the EAP before two years would not serve the purposes of the DOT regulations governing the return to work of safety-sensitive employees. After all, that would be forcing more treatment and longer observation than the DOT regulations require. Further, McWhirter does not challenge this provision of the SBA's order or ask to be relieved of additional EAP participation, and he is the party that the regulation is likely intended to protect by its prohibition against more stringent recommendations for assistance. Continental nevertheless urges that we reverse this condition, and the plain terms of § 40.297(a) do not countenance any interference with a SAP's evaluations or recommendations, even if that interference results in more ... stringent conditions. Having established that an applicable federal regulation does not permit the SBA to interfere with a SAP's treatment recommendation, Continental urges that the SBA cannot issue a decision in contravention of that regulation and claim that the decision draws its essence from the CBA; the CBA by its terms purports to be in compliance with federal regulations. [38] In reply, McWhirter points out that interference with a SAP's discretion does nothing more than take McWhirter's rehabilitation out of compliance with the DOT's return-to-work provisions. Under the regulations cited by Continental, there does not appear to be a reason why the company could not do as it wished with McWhirter's EAP participation. If McWhirter is to be returned to safety-sensitive work, e.g., flying, the DOT regulations must be observed. [39] The inverse is not obviously untrue, and Continental has not invited our attention to anything in the CBA, LCA, or DOT regulations that requires it to assign McWhirter to safety-sensitive tasks. Nevertheless, to permit the SBA to order McWhirter to participate in the EAP for two more years  forcing Continental to enroll McWhirter in the EAP for that duration regardless of the SAP's professional opinion  comes so close to directly contravening a controlling federal air-safety regulation that, if such a decision were not outside of the SBA's jurisdiction, it would be a violation of public policy. We hold that by vesting the EAP director with the discretion to prescribe McWhirter's course of treatment, the CBA and LCA cannot be construed to vest that power in the SBA. United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., [40] teaches that the proper remedy in this case is a vacatur of the EAP condition and remand for further proceedings, and this is what we order. We have been presented with no reason  and are aware of none  why on remand the SBA is prevented from ordering McWhirter to comply with whatever period of additional EAP participation Continental's SAP might recommend. Section 40.297(a) speaks only to the impermissibility of chang[ing] in any way the SAP's evaluation or recommendations for assistance. Accordingly, the SBA is free on remand to order McWhirter to comply with the SAP's recommendations for assistance.