Opinion ID: 311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: L. Ry. Co., 107 S. C. 179, 92 S. E. 335.

Text: 113 S.E. at 639. In the McConnell decision, relied on in Bushardt, the Supreme Court of South Carolina had explained: It seems to us that the gist of the action for false imprisonment is that one has been restrained of his liberty without lawful authority; and, where it appears that the restraint or imprisonment complained of is under lawful process, the action must necessarily fail. It is quite true that one arrested 8 and restrained of his liberty, even under lawful process, may have a cause of action, if it is alleged and shown that the prosecution was malicious, and was without probable cause, and has terminated; but that is a different cause of action, and depends upon different allegations and proofs, and the action for malicious prosecution must not be confounded with an action for false imprisonment. McConnell, 7 S.E. at 78. More than fifty years after Bushardt, the Court of Appeals held that a claim of false arrest did not lie where the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Watkins v. Mobil Oil Corp., 313 S.E.2d 641 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984). The Court stated: The dispositive rule of law of this case is well stated in Bushardt v. United Inv. Co., 121 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637 (1922). In essence this case holds that where one is lawfully arrested by lawful authority, an action for false imprisonment cannot be maintained against the party causing the arrest. 313 S.E.2d at 642. Accord Manley v. Manley, 353 S.E.2d 312, 314-15 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (“Even if the arrest is improvidently procured, the wronged party's remedy lies in an action for malicious prosecution.”). In 1985, the Supreme Court of South Carolina abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applied to the state and all local subdivisions, subject to certain qualifications. McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). 9 In James v. Fast Fare, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 565, 566-67 (D.S.C. 1988), the District Court held that where a person is arrested by law enforcement personnel pursuant to a facially valid warrant, “there can be no cause of action for false imprisonment asserted against the party causing the arrest, because the arrest has been made pursuant to lawful authority,” citing Watkins, supra. Ms. Dorn relies upon Gist v. Berkeley County Sheriff’s Dept., 521 S.E.2d 163 (1999). This is a per curiam opinion from the South Carolina Court of Appeals, in which the court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s Department. The decision focused on the standard for finding liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, § 15-7860(3),  rather than the elements of a valid claim for false arrest. In its decision, the Court of Appeals relied upon two cases, both of which cases involved warrantless arrests; Jones v. City of Columbia, 389 S.E.2d 662 (1990), and Wortman v. Spartanburg, 425 S.E.2d 18 (1992). The decision did not