Opinion ID: 2010460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In Capital Cases Involving Overwhelming Evidence of Guilt, Counsel Satisfies the Sixth Amendment by Subjecting the State's Case to an Adversarial Process

Text: To establish a Sixth Amendment violation under Cronic's standard, the accused bears the burden of proving that counsel entirely failed to subject the State's case to a meaningful adversarial process. [155] In Cronic, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the following factors are relevant to analyzing counsel's effectiveness: the time afforded for investigation and preparation; experience of counsel; the gravity of the charge; the complexity of possible defenses; and the accessibility of witnesses. [156] The five factors ... are relevant to an evaluation of a lawyer's effectiveness in a particular case, but neither separately nor in combination do they provide a basis for concluding that competent counsel was not able to provide [the defendant] with the guiding hand that the Constitution guarantees. [157] To satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement of effective assistance, counsel must function as an advocate for the defendant, as opposed to a friend of the court. [158] Cronic, however, limited counsel's duty as an advocate in cases where there is no bona fide defense to the charge. [159] The Court specifically recognized that counsel cannot create [a defense] and may disserve the interest of his client by attempting a useless charade. [160] In Nixon, a heinous capital murder case involving overwhelming evidence against the defendant, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that defense counsel must consider both the guilt and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed. [161] The Court reasoned that, where the evidence is overwhelming and the crime atrocious, avoiding execution may be the best and only realistic result possible. [162] Given overwhelming evidence of guilt, the best defense may be to present a case that is the functional equivalent of a plea for a life sentence, while at the same time testing the prosecution's case yet not running the risk by professing innocence of increasing the chances of the death penalty. [163] Supportive of that reality are the ABA's Guidelines for Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which suggest that [i]deally, the theory of the trial must complement, support, and lay a groundwork for the theory of mitigation. [164] In certain cases, to preserve credibility in the penalty phase, defense counsel must avoid making fruitless and potentially harmful arguments during the guilt phase. [165] It is well settled that in capital cases defense counsel can concede guilt as a trial tactic in the guilt phase, to preserve credibility in the penalty phase, where the defendant knows of the tactic and does not expressly object to it. [166] Counsel, however, must consult with the defendant concerning the overall defense strategy. [167] That said, the defendant's consent to every tactical decision is not required. [168] Conceding guilt alone does not violate a fundamental right. Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, defendants' only fundamental rights are the right to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify or not, or to take an appeal. [169] Red Dog v. State, [170] for instance, focused on a defendant's fundamental right to appeal. In Red Dog, counsel attempted to act in the best interest of the defendant by filing an appeal on his behalfcontrary to the defendant's objective. [171] In Red Dog's Motion for Stay of Execution, we held that his counsel acted in derogation of [the defendant's] express directions to the contrary [172] because the decision to pursue or dismiss any application for post-conviction relief ... is [the defendant's] to make. [173] Red Dog differs from this case even though in both cases defense counsel diverged from the defendant's objective. Red Dog's defense counsel, however, violated Red Dog's fundamental right to take or refuse to take an appeal. Not so with Cooke, who asserted all of his fundamental rights: he pleaded not guilty, had a trial by jury, testified, and took a direct appeal. [174] Nothing in Red Dog supports the Majority's citation to that case for the proposition that beyond entering a not guilty plea, [t]he decision to pursue a verdict of not guilty and assert his factual innocence belongs to the defendant. There is at least one capital case where the defendant openly objected to defense counsel conceding his guilt. In Haynes v. Cain , Louisiana indicted a defendant for first degree murder and sought the death penalty. [175] Defense counsel concluded that the best trial strategy would be to concede the allegations except for the element of intent to cause death, in order to preserve the defendant's life. [176] That strategy was intended to result in a conviction of second degree murder, thereby avoiding the death penalty. [177] Following the opening statement, the defendant informed the trial judge that he did not agree with defense counsel's strategy. [178] Concluding that excellent attorneys represented the defendant, the judge denied his request for a change of counsel. [179] Cooke and his counsel's differing views on strategy cannot and do not lead inexorably to the conclusion that he received a complete denial of counsel, as the majority suggests. Cooke's counsel actively engaged in the pretrial and trial proceedings. They were never absent at any stage of the trial. Cooke not only had access to counsel but also had the discretion to make key decisions at critical stages of the trial. To reiterate: Cooke pleaded not guilty, testified, his counsel cross examined witnesses against him where advantageous, and Cooke filed an appeal. [180] Given what any reasonable person would conclude to be overwhelming evidence of guilt, Cooke's defense counsel recognized that, given the strength of the evidence, that... [Cooke's] guilt was not subject to any reasonable dispute. [181] Given the overwhelming evidence against their client, Cooke's counsel similarly concluded that the only way to save [Cooke's] life would be to present extensive mitigation evidence centering on ... mental instability. [182] Although their strategy entailed implicitly conceding guilt, counsel did not prevent Cooke from pleading not guilty, did not waive Cooke's trial rights and did not hinder his right to appeal. Counsel's strategy focused on preserving Cooke's lifethe best and only realistic possible result similar to the strategy counsel employed in Nixon. Although defense counsel's decision to present a GBMI defense constrained them from arguing his innocence, counsel still zealously advocated for Cooke and contested the State's case. Defense counsel filed several pretrial motions to suppress evidence and motions to exclude certain unfairly prejudicial evidence. Defense counsel also filed motions to change venue and to declare the Delaware death penalty statute unconstitutional. During trial, counsel also cross examined witnesses where there may have been merit in doing so, and moved to suppress evidence of an alleged crime that occurred after the murder. The only instance where defense counsel arguably affirmatively conceded guilt beyond asserting GBMI was through the testimony of Dr. Turner, a psychologist who had evaluated Cooke before trial. Dr. Turner testified that during an interview Cooke had admitted culpability, at least in part. Despite that equivocal testimony, the Majority writes as if the confession stood uncontradicted even by Cooke himself during sessions with Dr. Turner. That portrayal is incomplete. Dr. Turner also testified that Cooke told him (Turner) that: he could not believe what he was doing, that he did not remember anything, that he could not believe the victim was dead, and on occasion, Cooke even denied having committed the crimes. Dr. Turner's testimony supported a finding that Cooke was mentally ill, consistent with counsel's GBMI mitigation defense. [183] We cannot conclude that defense counsel entirely failed under any of the factors suggested in Cronic's five prongs, because counsel: (1) investigated and prepared the case; (2) were highly experienced capital defense lawyers; (3) lacked any other plausible defenses; (4) and were accessible to Cooke. [184] We, therefore, believe that Strickland, not Cronic, provides the template for evaluating counsel's performance in order to determine whether Cooke received a fair trial. For those reasons, we cannot agree that defense counsel's strategic actions violated Cooke's Sixth Amendment rights. In capital cases that involve overwhelming evidence of guilt and where defense counsel utilizes a strategy that may not frontally support the original not guilty plea, counsel's most effective course might be to force the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt while at the same time tactically striving to avoid the death penalty. [185] No U.S. Supreme Court opinion holds that that strategy is constitutionally prescribed.