Opinion ID: 173302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Warden Wiley

Text: The Bivens claim against Warden Wiley was properly dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Arocho’s allegation that Wiley erroneously denied a grievance he had filed regarding his Hepatitis C treatment does not state an actionable claim. This court has repeatedly held, albeit in unpublished decisions, “that ‘the denial of . . . grievances alone is insufficient to establish personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations.’” Whitington v. Ortiz, 307 F. App’x 179, 193 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Larson v. Meek, 240 F. App’x 777, 780 (10th Cir. 2007)); accord George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.”). We do not mean to rule out the possibility of liability where the officer denying a grievance has an independent responsibility for the wrong in question and the grievance provides the necessary notice of the wrong or the effective means to correct it. But, as explained below, the complaint fails to -26- allege grounds on which Warden Wiley could be held responsible for the medical decisions involved here. Mr. Arocho’s allegation that Wiley failed to properly supervise the medical facility at Florence is also facially inadequate. The traditional standard for supervisory liability in this circuit “requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence” in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008). As alluded to earlier, the Supreme Court’s recent discussion of supervisory liability casts doubt on the continuing vitality of even this limited formulation of such liability: Respondent . . . argues that, under a theory of “supervisory liability,” petitioners can be liable for knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among detainees. That is to say, respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action–where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants–the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities. -27- Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation and quotations omitted; emphasis added). In any event, Mr. Arocho’s allegations do not satisfy our extant standard. His claim here is that “warden [Wiley] was in the position to correct plaintiff[’s] rights violation and fail[ed] to do so.” R. vol. 1 at 270. To the extent the rights violation was a function of BOP Director Lappin’s decision, Lappin is obviously not Wiley’s subordinate and any allegation that Wiley was in a position to “correct” Lappin’s decision would be facially implausible. With respect to Nafziger, there are no facts alleged to suggest that Wiley knew of and acquiesced in any act of deliberate indifference by Nafziger, who had tested Mr. Arocho, recommended treatment, and was simply waiting for approval. The complaint bespeaks nothing more than a warden’s reasonable reliance on the judgment of prison medical staff, which negates rather than supports liability. See McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 981 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoted in Weatherford ex rel. Thompson v. Taylor, No. 09-7018, 2009 WL 3164727, at  (10th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009) (unpub.)); Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). Finally, Mr. Arocho’s claim that Wiley violated his right to equal protection is patently deficient. The sole allegation in this respect is: “Other inmate’s [sic] have received the treatment [presumably Interferon/Ribavirin] with my same situation in [a] timely manner.” R. vol. 1 at 270. In addition to its utterly conclusory nature, this allegation does not remotely suggest a plausible -28- factual basis for attributing such differential treatment to the warden of the prison, who is not responsible for the recommendation of medical treatment or the approval of such treatment. Dismissal of Claims for Injunctive Relief The district court held injunctive relief unavailable because its “finding that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants necessarily means that his claim for injunctive relief, although not prohibited on jurisdictional grounds [i.e., sovereign immunity], cannot stand.” R. vol. 4 at 150 n.4. The premise for this holding has been significantly altered by our analysis of the Bivens claims against Lappin and Nafziger. Injunctive relief from Lappin is obviously no longer legally foreclosed, and the dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief against Nafziger should be without prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. Specifically, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice of the claims against defendant Wiley, reverse the dismissal of the claims against defendant Lappin, and direct that on remand Mr. Arocho be provided on opportunity to amend his pleadings, if possible, to state a legally sufficient claim against defendant Nafziger. In addition, appellant’s motion for appointment of appellate counsel is DENIED, his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, i.e., without prepayment of the filing fee, is GRANTED, and we -29- remind appellant that he is obligated to continue making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid. Finally, appellant’s request to file new documents as evidence before this court is DENIED, without prejudice to renewal of the request in the proceedings on remand. ENTERED FOR THE COURT