Opinion ID: 3063359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Procedural Soundness of the Sentence

Text: Vélez-Soto argues that the district court's decision not to impose a fully concurrent 108- to 120-month sentence, and its failure to consider the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), rendered its sentence procedurally unsound. A sentencing court has discretion to impose either a consecutive or a concurrent sentence when a defendant is subject to an undischarged state-court term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Nonetheless, in exercising this discretion, a sentencing court must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including any applicable sentencing Guidelines or policy statements. Id. § 3584(b); United States v. Carrasco-de-Jesús, 589 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2009). Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, 'district courts must still give respectful consideration to the now-advisory Guidelines (and their accompanying policy statements).' United States v. Millán-Isaac, 749 F.3d 57, 67 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 501 (2011)). The applicable version of Guidelines § 5G1.3(b) provides for a concurrent or partially concurrent sentence when the defendant is subject to a previously imposed but undischarged term -6- of imprisonment that has resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction, if the relevant conduct offense was the basis for an increase in the offense level. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (2012). To gain the benefit of § 5G1.3(b), a defendant must prove that [he] satisfies each and every element of the guideline, including that the charge underpinning the undischarged term of imprisonment was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the offense of conviction. Carrasco-de-Jesús, 589 F.3d at 27. Under § 5G1.3(c), a district court may impose a sentence concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively and [t]he end result need only be 'reasonable.' United States v. Vázquez-Alomar, 342 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Caraballo, 200 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1999)). Vélez-Soto did not claim that his undischarged state convictions were relevant conduct during his sentencing hearing, nor does he so claim on appeal. Moreover, because the district court accurately held that Vélez-Soto's state sentence for second degree murder did not involve relevant conduct, and therefore that § 5G1.3(b) did not apply, the court was under no obligation to impose a concurrent sentence. See Carrasco-de-Jesús, 589 F.3d at 27. In declining to impose a 108- to 120-month concurrent sentence, the district court stated: I am not going to sentence concurrently [for 108 to 120 months] because I think it's -- -7- well it's totally unrelated conduct. This is a drug case, that's a murder case. If I sentence concurrently [for that number of months], basically he's getting a freebie for the murder or for the drugs. The commentary to § 5G1.3(c) states that in determining whether to impose a concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the court should consider the following factors to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense and avoid unwarranted disparity: (i) the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); (ii) the type (e.g., determinate, indeterminate/parolable) and length of the prior undischarged sentence; (iii) the time served on the undischarged sentence and the time likely to be served before release; (iv) the fact that the prior undischarged sentence may have been imposed in state court rather than federal court, or at a different time before the same or different federal court; and (v) any other circumstance relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence for the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. n.3(A) (2012). The sentencing transcript reveals that the district court evaluated the factors enumerated in the commentary to § 5G1.3(c). The district court noted the type and length of Vélez-Soto's state sentence,3 the time served on the undischarged state sentence and 3 The court noted that the state sentence was 17 years plus the three years probationary period. -8- the time likely to be served before release,4 and it properly took into account that Vélez-Soto was convicted at the state level of second degree murder and firearms violations. Furthermore, the court explicitly addressed the § 3553(a) factors, including Vélez-Soto's prior criminal record, the need to provide just punishment for the offense,5 afford adequate deterrence,6 protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,7 and provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.8 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). A sentencing court need not specifically address all of the § 3553(a) factors in its explanation, nor . . . give each of the factors equal prominence in its determination. United States v. Zapata, 589 F.3d 475, 487 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district 4 The court stated that [i]f both sentences are served consecutively, you know, he starts serving his State sentence once he's served [the proposed federal sentence of] 108 months, which he served already two years approximately. 5 The court emphasized the need for Vélez-Soto to serve his entire state sentence in addition to a federal sentence, so as not to get a free bite at the apple by serving two sentences for the price of one. 6 The court understands that the federal system . . . will . . . adequately deter him. 7 The court stressed the need to protect the public from further crimes of this gentleman. 8 The court stated that the sentence will promote the best rehabilitation possible. -9- court's treatment of the § 3553(a) factors was adequate. Its decision to impose a 280-month concurrent sentence was thus procedurally sound and within its discretion. See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012) (stating that [j]udges have long been understood to have discretion to select whether the sentences they impose will run concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences that they impose, or that have been imposed in other proceedings, including state proceedings). In sum, the record shows no procedural errors in Vélez-Soto's sentencing.