Opinion ID: 2640889
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Contempt Power

Text: (4) It is well settled that the court has inherent power to enforce compliance with its lawful orders through contempt. ( Shillitani v. United States (1966) 384 U.S. 364, 370 [16 L.Ed.2d 622, 86 S.Ct. 1531]; In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 288-289 [243 Cal.Rptr. 224, 747 P.2d 1152].) The Legislature has recognized this power of the juvenile court in section 213, which states: Any willful disobedience or interference with any lawful order of the juvenile court or of a judge or referee thereof constitutes a contempt of court. (See In re Michael G., at p. 289; In re Ricardo A. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 586] [concluding, based on Michael G., that juvenile court's inherent contempt power is statutorily implemented by § 213].) However, not every violation of a court order is subject to punishment as a contempt of court. The court's traditional contempt power rests on `the premise that the right of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies at the foundation of our system of government and that courts necessarily must possess the means of punishing for contempt when conduct tends directly to prevent the discharge of their functions.' ( Wood v. Georgia (1962) 370 U.S. 375, 383 [8 L.Ed.2d 569, 82 S.Ct. 1364].) ( In re Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 288.) Based on this premise, we long ago explained that contempt is an act, committed in or out of the court's presence, which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court in the discharge of its duties. ( In re Shortridge (1893) 99 Cal. 526, 532 [34 P. 227].) The contempt power represents the inherent power of a trial court to exercise a reasonable control over all proceedings connected with the litigation before it, a power which . . . `should be exercised by the courts in order to insure the orderly administration of justice.' [Citations.] ( Cooper v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 291, 301 [10 Cal.Rptr. 842, 359 P.2d 274].) Contempt is generally a summary procedure designed to protect the dignity of the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. ( In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247-248 [110 Cal.Rptr. 121, 514 P.2d 1201].) The court's power to compel compliance with its orders to ensure the orderly administration of justice does not extend to punishing violations of substantive law when such violations do not impair the dignity or functioning of the court. When the Legislature has established a specific penalty for a transgression, courts may not impose a contempt punishment that is inconsistent with the legislative scheme. (Cf. In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 [105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921] [in our tripartite system of government it is the function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishments, and . . . such questions are in the first instance for the judgment of the Legislature alone].) Violations of substantive law, whether criminal or otherwise, must be adjudicated and punished in accordance with the Legislature's directives. As explained below ( post, at pp. 1233-1236), the legislative scheme involved here contemplates that the ultimate penalty for a parent's failure to satisfy reunification plan requirements is the loss of parental rights.