Opinion ID: 2009182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recorded statements

Text: At trial the State introduced in evidence a recording of a conversation between co-defendants Gary Colson and Perley Moulton. The Superior Court, in a pretrial suppression hearing, had found that the manner in which the police made this recording did not violate Moulton's sixth amendment right to counsel. We reverse. On November 4, 1982, Gary Colson called Police Chief Keating and said that he had been receiving threats regarding the criminal charges pending against Colson and Moulton. On November 6, 1982, Colson met with Moulton, at which meeting Moulton allegedly revealed his plans to kill Gary Elwell, a State's witness. Twice within the next four days, Colson met with Chief Keating and Officer Rexford Kelley. Colson discussed the threats he had received from someone other than Moulton, as well as Moulton's plans to kill Elwell and to threaten other witnesses. Chief Keating had previously been informed that other witnesses in the Moulton case had reported receiving threatening phone calls. With Colson's consent, Chief Keating placed a recording device on Colson's phone. Colson recorded three telephone conversations he had with Perley Moulton. [3] Gary Colson also arranged to meet Moulton in late December, 1982. In preparation for this meeting, Chief Keating provided Colson with a body wire transmitter. By Colson's use of the body wire, the police were able to record Colson's conversation with Moulton. That lengthy conversation focused on the upcoming trial on the charges against Moulton and Colson. During the conversation Moulton made several incriminating statements that were later used against him at trial. The sixth amendment requires suppression of an accused's statement if, after the initiation of adversary proceedings, the State, or its agent, has deliberately elicited an incriminating statement, see Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1203, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), or the State has intentionally created a situation likely to induce a defendant to make incriminating statements, see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 2189, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); State v. White, 460 A.2d 1017, 1021 (Me. 1983). The Superior Court found that the State did not deliberately elicit or create a situation likely to induce Moulton to make incriminating statements. On appeal, the justice's ruling on this issue will be upheld if `the evidence in the record provides rational support for the conclusions he reached'. Id. (quoting State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1358 (Me.1981)). In its ruling the Superior Court focused upon the motives of the Belfast police officers who dealt with Colson in setting up the body wire recording system. The Superior Court found that the recordings were made for legitimate purposes not related to the gathering of evidence concerning the crime for which the defendant had been indicted. On our review, we find ample evidence that supports this conclusion. Chief Keating was concerned about Colson's safety and about gathering information relating to possible threats made against other witnesses in the case against Moulton. Although, as the police knew, Moulton was represented by counsel and had exercised his right to remain silent, the police were free to gather information via the body wire regarding possible crimes, such as the threats against witnesses, not already the subject of judicial proceedings. See United States v. DeWolf, 696 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1982). However, the State's valid purpose in investigating other criminal activity cannot remove from constitutional scrutiny evidence thereby uncovered that relates to alleged criminal acts for which the right to counsel has already attached. As explained in Massiah: We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial. 377 U.S. at 207, 84 S.Ct. at 1203 (emphasis in original). Reference to the State's legitimate motive may be relevant to, but cannot wholly refute, the alleged infringement of Moulton's right to counsel. The State cannot use at trial against Moulton the fruits of such recording devices where the State should have known that the situation it intentionally created would likely induce Moulton to make incriminating statements. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271, 100 S.Ct. at 2187. The record plainly reveals that the police knew, or should have known, that Moulton likely would make incriminating statements at the meeting that Colson recorded. As the Superior Court found, Chief Keating admitted that by this time [just prior to the Colson-Moulton conversation] he was aware that Colson and Moulton [co-defendants in a multi-count criminal prosecution] would probably discuss their upcoming case at the meeting. The fact that Moulton and Colson were friends and co-defendants was of central importance in this case. That close relationship significantly increased the chance, as Chief Keating should have known, that Moulton would confide incriminating information to Colson. A defendant's normally cautious approach to dealing with government agents is replaced by an off-guard openness when dealing with an undisclosed police informant. Moulton was more seriously imposed upon because he did not know that his codefendant was working with the police. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273, 100 S.Ct. at 2188; see Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206, 84 S.Ct. at 1203; Malone v. State, 390 So.2d 338 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1034, 101 S.Ct. 1749, 68 L.Ed.2d 231 (1981). The Superior Court found that Colson was told to try to act like himself, converse normally, and avoid trying to draw information out of Moulton. Even granting that this is an accurate characterization of Colson's mission, this finding in no way suggests that Chief Keating should not have expected Moulton to incriminate himself. Whether or not Colson intended to question him, or merely engage in conversation, the fact that the conversation would concern the pending charges made it likely that Moulton would incriminate himself. In Henry, an informant contacted the police, who advised him to be alert to any statements made by the federal prisoners, but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery. 447 U.S. at 266. Notwithstanding this finding, the Supreme Court concluded that Henry's statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. A review of the transcript of the Colson-Moulton meeting makes clear that Colson was not merely a passive listener. See United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir.1983). Instead, Colson frequently pressed Moulton for details of various thefts and in so doing elicited much incriminating information that the State later used at trial. This is precisely what Chief Keating should have anticipated. His advice to Colson to avoid actively questioning Moulton is an insufficient protection where Colson and Moulton were planning to discuss the upcoming criminal trial. By the time the body wire was placed on him, Colson was fully cooperating with the police and no longer stood in the same adversarial position as did Moulton. When the police recommended the use of the body wire to Colson they intentionally created a situation that they knew, or should have known, was likely to result in Moulton's making incriminating statements during his meeting with Colson. The police's valid purpose in investigating threats against witnesses does not immunize the recordings of Moulton's incriminating statements from constitutional attack. Those statements may be admissible in the investigation or prosecution of charges for which, at the time the recordings were made, adversary proceedings had not yet commenced. But as to the charges for which Moulton's right to counsel had already attached, his incriminating statements should have been ruled inadmissible at trial, given the circumstances in which they were acquired.