Opinion ID: 1859780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Tennessee

Text: Because our decision is based, in large part, upon the development of the law of mental distress and the erosion of traditional barriers to recovery, we will briefly address the evolution of the law of intentional infliction of emotional distress. At early common law, the right to recover for mental injuries sustained through intentional conduct was afforded little respect. In an influential decision, Lord Wensleydale declared: Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861). However, despite the law's early reluctance to provide a remedy for mental distress, courts were permitting recovery for emotional injuries alone, frequently by stretching the meaning of traditional tort categories. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum. L.Rev. 42, 44 (1982). In Tennessee, for example, as early as 1888, courts applied broad interpretations of traditional legal principles to reach a similar resultremedying purely emotional injuries. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Western Union Tele. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S.W. 574 (1888) (permitting plaintiff to proceed with suit for injury to the feelings, anguish, and pain of mind, based on defendant's failure to comply with statutory obligations). In Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899), Maggie Lane sued Knoxville Traction Company for injuries to [her] feelings and sensibilities caused by the conduct of an employee of Knoxville Traction. The employee, a motorman, loudly announced that Lane was a damn good-looking old girl who he would like to meet ... when she gets off. Id. at 558. When Lane rebuffed his advances, the employee made further abusive comments and accused Lane of being nothing but a whore. Id. at 559. Finally, after Lane began crying, the employee asserted that Lane would go out to the lake and throw herself out to the men there. Id. Lane sued for $5,000, and a jury returned a verdict of $500 in her favor. See id. at 558-59. Knoxville Traction asserted that the suit could not be maintained because it was based solely upon injury to the feelings of the plaintiff. Id. at 560. The Court rejected this argument holding that Lane could recover damages for injuries to her feelings and sensibilities. Id. The Court's decision relied, in part, on the contract of carriage between a common carrier and passenger which includes a duty that the former will protect the latter from insult or injury by its employees or third persons. See id. Thus, the Court characterized the gravamen of the action as breach of contract of carriage. See id. The Court's conclusion, however, that Knoxville Traction was liable for the injury and insult willfully inflicted upon Mrs. Lane, id. at 560, illustrates the attempts of the judiciary to remedy intentional conduct within the narrow confines of then-existing law. See also Hill v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 154 Tenn. 295, 294 S.W. 1097 (1927) (concluding plaintiff stated a cause of action for damages from grief, worry, and mental anguish caused by interference with plaintiff's right of possession of deceased spouse's body). Despite the result in Knoxville Traction and other similar cases, recovery for emotional distress was still limited in that a plaintiff had to fit a claim within a pre-existing legal category or prove an accompanying physical injury. Restrictions on such claims were justified, in part, on grounds that mental injuries were slight and unimportant but even when mental injuries were considerable, they [gave] no right of action, since the law is designed to meet general conditions, and not exceptional cases. Colsher v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 19 Tenn.App. 166, 84 S.W.2d 117, 125 (1935) (citing 3 L.R.A. 49). More significantly, the consequences of mental injuries were characterized as so elusive in character and the means of testing the truth of the allegations so inadequate that public policy militated against permitting recovery of damages. Id. at 126. As early as 1888, this Court conceded that the bases upon which it permitted claims for emotional distress were often no more than legal fictions. See Wadsworth, 8 S.W. at 576. [2] Nevertheless, Tennessee's common law retained devices including legal fictions and requirements of physical injury to distinguish actions based on emotional distress. Consequently, claims for purely emotional injuries that did not fit within traditional causes of action failed. See, e.g., Bowers v. Colonial Stages Interstate Transit, Inc., 163 Tenn. 502, 43 S.W.2d 497 (1931), modified by Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1996); Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917), modified by Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1996); Knoxville, Cumberland Gap & Louisville R.R. Co. v. Wyrick, 99 Tenn. 500, 42 S.W. 434 (1897); All v. John Gerber Co., 36 Tenn.App. 134, 252 S.W.2d 138 (1952), modified by Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1996); Colsher, 19 Tenn.App. 166, 84 S.W.2d 117. This Court recognized the hardship this approach caused, and in Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966), it examined whether the law recognizes and protects a right to emotional tranquility where recovery is sought for mental or emotional disturbance alone. Id. at 273. In the context of intentional conduct, the Court concluded that a plaintiff does have a right to emotional tranquility that, if violated, gives rise to an independent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 273-74. The Court reached this conclusion by discarding the traditional arguments used to preclude claims for emotional distress. First, the Court rejected the assertion that emotional injuries were unprovable. It recognized the inherent unfairness in a rule that allowed a plaintiff with a slight physical injury to recover damages for accompanying mental anguish, see id. at 273, while a plaintiff with only a mental injury was left without a remedy. The Medlin Court observed that recovery by a plaintiff falling within the former designation implies that a mental injury may be sufficiently proved to permit an award of damages. See id. Indeed, this Court rejected distinctions between mental and physical injury and concluded that [m]ental suffering ... is no more difficult to prove and no harder to calculate in terms of money than the physical pain of a broken leg which has never been denied compensation. Id. Second, the Court in Medlin dismissed the argument that mental injuries could not be adequately remedied by damages, because they were so intangible and peculiar to a particular individual that they could not be anticipated. See id. We acknowledged the view of medical science that emotional distress may well have physical consequences and agreed that such knowledge was possessed by the average person who understands to some extent that [the consequences of emotional distress] are normal, rather than the unusual result of many types of conduct. Id. Thus, this Court discarded foreseeability as the sole criterion of legal cause. Id. Finally, the Court in Medlin addressed concerns that recognizing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress would lead to a host of trivial claims. The solution to these concerns was found in the requirements of section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm results from it, for such bodily harm. Id. at 274 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)). By grounding the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress within the Restatement framework, we limited recovery to those plaintiffs who could satisfy its requirements. In Bain, we had the occasion to clarify the requirements to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) the conduct complained of must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the conduct must result in serious mental injury to the plaintiff. See Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. It is this third requirement that is the subject of this appeal and to which we now turn our attention.