Opinion ID: 214080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wolff and Hill

Text: In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), state inmates filed suit under § 1983 alleging several prison rules and regulations did not comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... Id. at 542-43, 94 S.Ct. at 2968. In Nebraska, a state statute created good time credits and state prisoners could lose those good time credits if they were guilty of serious misconduct. Id. at 547, 94 S.Ct. at 2970. The Supreme Court held that a prisoner had a protected liberty interest in statutory good time credits, and thus had a constitutional right to procedural due process in a disciplinary hearing. Id. at 555-57, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-75. The Supreme Court in Wolff outlined the specific hearing procedures that prison disciplinary panels must comply with to satisfy the standards of procedural due process in the prison setting. Id. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975 (Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.). Wolff instructed that prisoners must receive: (1) advance written notice of the charges against them; (2) an opportunity for the inmate to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, so long as doing so is consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder outlining the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Id. at 563-67, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-80. Similarly, in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed the requirements of procedural due process in the prison setting. Inmate Hill had his good-time credits revoked after a disciplinary board found him guilty of violating prison regulations for his involvement in an assault on another prisoner. Id. at 448, 105 S.Ct. at 2770. [11] His conviction, in turn, was based on testimony by a prison guard at his disciplinary hearing. Id. at 447, 105 S.Ct. at 2770. Hill instructed that the revocation of good time credits only satisfies minimal standards of procedural due process if the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record. Id. at 454, 105 S.Ct. at 2773 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also advised that [a]scertaining whether this [due process] standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Id. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774. According to the Supreme Court, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774 (emphasis added). Applying these rules, the Supreme Court determined that the complaining guard's oral testimony and written report were sufficient to meet the requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 456, 105 S.Ct. at 2774. [12] Taking into account the unique concerns surrounding prison disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court in Hill emphasized that those hearings take place in a highly charged atmosphere in which prison administrators must often act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that due process merely requires that there be some evidence in the record that supports the decision of the disciplinary board. Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774. The Supreme Court instructed that:  [t]he fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact.  Id. at 456, 105 S.Ct. at 2774 (emphasis added). This is because [r]evocation of good time credits is not comparable to a criminal conviction, and neither the amount of evidence necessary to support such a conviction, nor any other standard greater than some evidence applies in this context. Id. (citations omitted). [13] The clear implication of Hill is that courts are not to conduct exhaustive reviews of the findings of prison disciplinary panels. Id. at 457, 105 S.Ct. at 2775 (Although the evidence in this case might be characterized as meager, ... the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.); see Young v. Jones, 37 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir.1994) (stating the Wolff Court indicated a reluctance to review the judgments of prison administrators and acknowledged that prison disciplinary proceedings do not require the `full panoply of rights' due a defendant in a criminal proceeding). [14]