Opinion ID: 365815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: barry mills

Text: 43 One week before the date set for trial, Mills requested the substitution of appointed counsel. The appointed counsel had first appeared on behalf of Mills nearly two months earlier. In support of his motion for substitution, Mills asserted that he was unable to agree with counsel concerning a question of trial strategy and that his counsel had failed to prepare the case adequately. The trial court denied the request, finding that the attorney was competent and adequately prepared and that substitution of counsel at that date would cause an unwarranted delay in the trial. On appeal, Mills contends that he was entitled to a substitution of counsel because he was embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney. 44 The denial of a motion to dismiss counsel is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Good v. United States, 378 F.2d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 1967). However, the court's discretion is not without limit. In Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), we held that refusal to allow the substitution of attorneys may result in a denial of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel if the defendant and his attorney are embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict. Id. at 1170. In applying the rule developed in Craven, we consider a number of factors, including the timeliness of the motion to dismiss counsel, the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint, and whether the conflict between the defendant and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. See Id. at 1169-70; United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1977) (motion filed late); United States v. Jones, 512 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1975) (adequate hearing); United States v. Main, 443 F.2d 900, 901 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 328, 30 L.Ed.2d 276 (1971), (no showing of total lack of communication). 45 In this case, the court held an adequate and fair hearing on Mills's motion. The record shows that Mills and his attorney were not embroiled in a conflict resulting in a total lack of communication. Although Mills asserted at the hearing that he refused to discuss his alibi defense with his counsel, it was apparent that his counsel was able to prepare all other facets of the case. Indeed, at the hearing Mills complained more about the infrequency of his meetings with his attorney than about his reluctance to communicate with counsel. Mills's attorney ultimately presented an adequate defense which included the presentation of the alibi witness. Finally, we note that Mills did not present his motion until one week before trial, and substitution of counsel almost certainly would have delayed the trial. Under these circumstances, we hold that Mills was not deprived of effective counsel. 46 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mills's motion to dismiss counsel. 47
48 The court instructed the jury that any one of the defendants charged with armed bank robbery could be found guilty of that offense if he either directly committed the offense or aided and abetted the commission of the offense. 2 Mills contends that the court committed reversible error by failing to instruct further that Mills could not be found guilty of aiding and abetting an armed bank robber unless he Knew that the robber carried a deadly weapon. 49 Mills did not object to the instructions; therefore, he is entitled to no relief on appeal unless the omission from the jury instructions amounts to plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104, 107-108 (9th Cir. 1976). We will not reverse for plain error unless it appears necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Id.; United States v. Eskridge, 456 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.) Cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883, 93 S.Ct. 171, 34 L.Ed.2d 138 (1972). 50 The jury was instructed generally that Mills could not be convicted unless he willfully aided another person committing armed bank robbery. The evidence shows that Mills passed within a few feet of Vargas while Vargas had his gun drawn inside the bank; it is difficult to conceive that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had it been specifically instructed that knowledge of the gun was an essential element. This differs from United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1974), relied upon by Mills, because in that case the trial judge had erroneously instructed the jury that knowledge of the weapon was not an element of the crime. There was no plain error.