Opinion ID: 1166192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The superior court exceeded its discretion in awarding benefits to plaintiff's heirs and devisees.

Text: The superior court ordered the Controller to pay directly to plaintiff herein or her devisee or heirs one half of all benefits which may be payable under the Judge's Retirement Act by reason of the services of defendant Waite. (Italics added.) (8) Defendant objects to the italicized language favoring plaintiff's heirs or devisees; [6] he correctly contends that if plaintiff dies before him, her share of the monthly pension payments should then go directly to him, and not to plaintiff's estate. (9) As we stated in Phillipson, Pension programs for public employees serve two objectives: to induce persons to enter and continue in public service, and to provide subsistence for disabled or retired employees and their dependents. (3 Cal.3d at p. 49.) (10) As we likewise set forth in Bellus v. City of Eureka (1968) 69 Cal.2d 336, 351 [71 Cal. Rptr. 135, 444 P.2d 711], One purpose of providing pensions for municipal officers is to induce them to enter and continue in the service of the city. Another is to provide sufficient subsistence for retired or disabled officers (or their dependents) who have performed their obligations under the employment contract. (See also Malone v. City of Los Angeles (1954) 126 Cal. App.2d 447, 451 [272 P.2d 796]; Platt v. City of Los Angeles (1946) 72 Cal. App.2d 753, 770 [165 P.2d 714]; Klench v. Board of Pension Fd. Commrs. (1926) 79 Cal. App. 171, 189 [249 P. 46].) Accordingly, the state has established here a pension plan in which pension benefits terminate with the death of the employee or, under optional programs, with the death of his surviving spouse. (Gov. Code, §§ 75070, 75071.) The state contributes no benefits to the employee's estate, his heirs, or his legatees. [7] (11) The state's concern, then, lies in provision for the subsistence of the employee and his spouse, not in the extension of benefits to such persons or organizations the spouse may select as the objects of her bounty. Once the spouse dies, of course, her need for subsistence ends, and the state's interest in her sustenance reaches a coincident completion. When this termination occurs, the state's concern narrows to the sustenance of the retired employee; its pension payments must necessarily be directed to that sole objective. The wife complains that this reasoning deprives her of an equal portion of the pension; if the judge enjoys a right to payments for his lifetime but her right is limited to the period of the judge's life or her life (whichever is shorter), her interest would be unequal in length to his, and actuarially of lesser value. [8] The wife, however, can claim no right to precise equality in the division of community assets; in fact, in Phillipson we suggested that if feasible the court should award the entire pension to the employee, and compensate his spouse with property of equivalent value. (3 Cal.3d at p. 46.) (12) Thus a spouse suffers no injury when the court, in effectuating the purposes of the pension program, awards the employee more than half the actuarial value of the pension rights; the court, if it sees fit, may compensate the spouse by an award of more than half the value of some other community asset. We conclude that the statutory design for judges' pensions negates the spouse's contention that her legatees should inherit pension payments payable for the balance of the judge's life. Whatever community interest the wife may claim, it cannot transcend the legislation upon which the pension itself rests. (13) The legislation grants to the wife, not an inheritable legacy, but a continuing economic protection for her lifetime, a state-secured provision for subsistence.