Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judicial Decorum

Text: Defendant complains that the court's comments, quips, and banter during voir dire and the penalty phase injected prejudicial levity into a very serious proceeding. He contends the jury was overly entertained, thereby diminishing the jurors' responsibility to reach a death verdict in a reliable fashion in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Although the liberal use of humor in a capital case is a delicate matter that has the potential to raise concerns about proper judicial decorum, the comments here do not cast doubt on the validity of defendant's conviction. As defendant concedes, he failed to object to any of the over 40 quips and humorous comments he now challenges on appeal. He has thereby forfeited his objections. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1177, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 511, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249.) We also reject his claims on the merits. Although a jury trial, especially for a capital offense, is obviously a serious matter, `Well-conceived judicial humor can be a welcome relief during a long, tense trial. Obviously, however, the court should refrain from joking remarks which the jury might interpret as denigrating a particular party or his attorney.' ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 511, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; see also People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Defendant does not claim here that the court denigrated defendant or his attorney or otherwise called into question the court's impartiality. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 753, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741 ( Melton ); cf. Ng v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1024, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 49.) Indeed, defendant concedes that judicial comment exhibiting bias against the defense is not the issue here. He argues instead that the court's reliance on humor improperly diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for its death verdict. The record does not support his claim. The trial judge explained during voir dire that he had known the attorneys for a long, long time, believed that both counsel were competent, intelligent and decent human beings, and therefore in all probability ... will have friendly exchanges with both and may be flippant occasionally. Defendant relies in particular on two occasions when the court quipped that recalcitrant prospective jurors should be shot and one occasion when the court similarly joked that jurors who were caught talking about the case in violation of the admonition would be shot. We have reviewed the entire record, including each example defendant cites in support of his claim. These comments, even when considered in conjunction with the trial judge's numerous other efforts at humor throughout the trial, did not so trivialize the proceedings as to raise a question whether the jurors were fully conscious of the gravity of their decision. ( People v. Hess (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081, 90 Cal.Rptr. 268; accord, State v. Simmons (Mo.1997) 955 S.W.2d 752, 774 [court's humorous but disparaging comments about sequestration `were nothing more than reasonable attempts by the Court to use humor to alleviate the tedium of voir dire and did not, as a matter of fact, have the direct or indirect effect of forcing the sitting juries to hasten deliberations or otherwise act unfairly'].) [4] CALJIC No. 17.30, which instructed the jury not to take its cue from the judge, further bolsters our analysis. ( People v. Chong (1999) 76 Cal. App.4th 232, 244-245, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 198.) Defendant cites no authority to justify a contrary conclusion. Although we have concluded that defendant's rights were not infringed by the trial judge's comments, we reiterate that even well-conceived judicial humor is best invoked in measured doses.