Opinion ID: 3165956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pretrial and Trial Error

Text: Jamal argues that the district court should have granted his motion in limine to exclude any evidence of his alleged gang affiliation, arguing that any mention of gangs was unduly prejudicial. See United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 649-50 (6th Cir.) (holding that gang affiliation evidence is inadmissible if there is no connection between the gang evidence and the charged offense), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 771 (2014). The government counters that despite the district court's failure to exclude gang membership in limine, there was no mention of gangs at trial. Further, the district court's reasoning not to categorically exclude the evidence prior to trial–because it may have been necessary for context–was sound. See United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1497 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of gang association may be necessary to show the nature and extent of the association between defendants). We review the district court's admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sewell, 457 F.3d 841, 843 (8th Cir. 2006). Having carefully reviewed the trial transcript, we agree with the government's assertion that there was no evidence of gang affiliation at trial. There was extensive evidence of gang affiliation at Jamal's sentencing hearing. However, -12- as we understand Jamal's argument, he is not challenging the specific content of the sentencing hearing testimony but instead the hearsay nature of it, a subject we will address below. Accordingly, this point is denied. Jamal next makes several arguments regarding allegedly erroneous jury instructions. First, in relation to the previously discussed Hobbs Act argument, Jamal asserts that the district court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction that interfering with commerce is an element of the crime. However, Jamal requested this instruction for Count 1, which was the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies. The instruction as given read, at some time during the period of the conspiracy–that is, from a date unknown until about April 29, 2013–in the Northern District of Iowa, two or more persons reached an agreement or understanding to commit robberies of drug traffickers. The government points out that the instruction adequately informed the jurors to find Jamal guilty if he agreed with another to commit robberies of drug traffickers. Indeed, longstanding Eighth Circuit precedent supports the government's interpretation. See Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th Cir. 1941) (holding that government did not need to prove that defendants knew the effect of their conspiracy would be to affect interstate commerce; but rather that they agreed to do something, the natural effect of which was to affect interstate commerce). Further, the government points out that interstate commerce was defined in the jury instruction directly preceding the challenged instruction, and was specifically included as an element of the offense regarding Counts 2 and 3, the actual Hobbs Act counts. We review the district court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the instruction did not fairly and adequately represent the evidence and law. United States v. Manes, 603 F.3d 451, 458 (8th Cir. 2010). Because the instruction fairly and adequately represented the evidence and the law, we deny this point. Jamal also argues the district court erred in instructing the jury on possession, relating to his conviction on Count 8 for prohibited possession of a firearm and -13- ammunition. Possession was defined in the instructions as follows: A person possessed something if all three of the following are true: the person knew about it, and the person had physical control over it or a vehicle in which it was concealed or transported, or the power, or ability, to control it, and the person had the intention to control it . . . . Jamal claims the words or transported after the word concealed was inconsistent with constructive possession. The gist of Jamal's argument is that there may have been a firearm in the car that he did not know about and thereby would not have had constructive possession of it. This argument is without merit. The district court's instruction required the jury to find that Jamal had knowledge of any firearm, and indeed, the evidence supports the jury's finding. Jamal carried a firearm at all pertinent times in the underlying crime spree. Jamal used the firearm during a traffic stop on one occasion, and used it as a weapon to hit both J.R. and C.B. on the head at other times. Because the instruction fairly and adequately represented the evidence and the law, we reject this point. Jamal's final complaint about the jury instructions is the district court's failure to give a multiple-conspiracy jury instruction. As recounted above, Jamal argues that the government proved two conspiracies, but only alleged one in the indictment. A single conspiracy is comprised of people sharing common objectives under one general agreement. United States v. Benford, 360 F.3d 913, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). As earlier noted, we found that there was sufficient evidence for the government to establish one single conspiracy. Accordingly, Jamal's lack of success on the merits of the multiple- versus single-conspiracy claim precludes him from prevailing on his claim that the district court erred in refusing to give his multiple conspiracies jury instruction.