Opinion ID: 1786760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child so as to render the subject adoption void.

Text: ¶ 9. Had the doctrine of res judicata been inapplicable in this case, the Carrolls' substantive argument nevertheless fails to prove reversible error. ¶ 10. The Carrolls argue that the chancellor's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interest of the child in the subject adoptionwhich necessarily resulted in a termination of their parental rightsrenders the adoption void. They support this assertion by citing Miss.Code Ann. § 93-15-107(1) (Supp.2000), which requires a guardian ad litem to be appointed in an action to terminate parental rights. That statute states: (1) In action to terminate parental rights, the mother of the child, the legal father of the child, and the putative father of the child, when known, shall be parties defendant. A guardian ad litem shall be appointed to protect the interest of the child in the termination of parental rights. A child may be made party plaintiff, and any agency holding custody of a minor shall act as party plaintiff. Id. ¶ 11. The Youngs assert that this case is one primarily involving an uncontested adoption proceeding and since Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-8 (Supp.2000) does not require a guardian ad litem to be appointed to protect the interest of the child in such cases, the subject adoption is valid. That statute states, in pertinent part: (1) Whenever an adoption becomes a contested matter, whether after a hearing on a petition for determination of rights under Section 93-17-6 or otherwise, the court:    (b) Shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child. Such guardian ad litem shall be an attorney, however his duties are as guardian ad litem and not as attorney for the child. The reasonable costs of the guardian ad litem shall be taxed as costs of court. Neither the child nor anyone purporting to act on his behalf may waive the appointment of a guardian ad litem.    (5) Appointment of a guardian ad litem is not required in any proceeding under this chapter except as provided in subsection (1)(b) above and except for the guardian ad litem to be appointed where the chancery judge presiding in the adoption proceedings deems it unnecessary and no adoption agency is involved in the proceeding. No final decree of adoption heretofore granted shall be set aside or modified because a guardian ad litem was not appointed unless as the result of a direct appeal not now barred. Id. § 93-17-8(1)(b) & (5). ¶ 12. In their brief to this Court, the Carrolls disagree that the adoption was uncontested. [4] However, the chancellor, in the Judgment of Adoption and Other Relief, specifically stated that the Carrolls had joined in the petition for adoption for the purpose of giving their assent. No appeal from that ruling was prosecuted. And some sixteen months later when the Carrolls filed a Motion for Contempt and Counterclaim to Set Aside Judgment of Adoption for lack of sufficient consent to the adoption, the chancellor denied the motion. In so doing, he cited to the following authorities: Miss.Code Ann. § § 93-17-5, 93-17-7, 93-17-15, Rule 60(b) Miss. R. Civ. Pro., and Grafe v. Olds, 556 So.2d 690 (Miss.1990). No appeal from that ruling was prosecuted. As such, this Court is bound by the chancellor's apparent finding that the adoption was indeed consensual. Therefore, the adoption proceedings below must be viewed as having been uncontested. [5] ¶ 13. Perhaps most significant is this Court's holding in Grafe, where the majority held that the written, voluntary consent by a natural parent terminates their parental rights and thereafter, no objection to the adoption from the parent may be sustained. Grafe, 556 So.2d at 690-96; see also Miss.Code Ann. §§ 93-17-7 & 93-15-103(2) (1994). This authority apparently bars the Carrolls' claim. Notwithstanding the preclusive effect the consent has on their claim, the issue of the necessity for appointment of a guardian ad litem in such proceedings as occurred below is of great importance and is addressed by the Court. ¶ 14. Thus the question presented is whether our statutory scheme requires the chancellor to appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interest of the child in an uncontested adoption proceeding which necessarily involves the termination of parental rights. Because there is no easily derived answer to this issue, a review of this Court's jurisprudence on the necessity of the appointment of a guardian ad litem in adoption and termination of parental rights cases is in order. ¶ 15. In Luttrell v. Kneisly, 427 So.2d 1384 (Miss.1983), the Kneislys petitioned the trial court for the termination of the parental rights of the Luttrells as to Marie Luttrell, the Kneislys' foster child. The Kneislys also sought to adopt the child upon their termination of the natural parents' rights. The Luttrells contested the proceedings. The chancellor found that the Luttrells had abandoned Marie and were unfit to have her back. The Luttrells' parental rights were terminated, and an adoption decree entered in favor of the Kneislys. In reversing the trial court, this Court found that the chancellor erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem, as is required in a termination of parental rights case. In interpreting § 93-15-107(1), the Court stated, The statute, as written, is clear and unambiguous. It unequivocally mandates that a guardian ad litem be appointed to protect the interest of a child in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The statute is clearly mandatory and not permissive. Luttrell, 427 So.2d at 1387. ¶ 16. In In re R.D., 658 So.2d 1378 (Miss.1995), the Department of Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minors were neglected by their mother. The chancellor adjudicated the children as neglected and removed them from the mother's custody. The mother then filed numerous petitions attempting to have custody of the minors restored to her. Her final petition to restore custody was granted. The DHS appealed. On appeal, this Court, noting Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-121(1)(e) (1993), which requires a guardian ad litem to be appointed in every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding, reversed and remanded in part the lower court's decision due to the chancellor's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem. The Court stated: This entire process appears to be a mere oversight by the chancellors [two were chancellors involved]. Nonetheless, the children's due process rights to representation cannot and will not be ignored by this Court. Whether requested or not, judges have the obligation to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent every minor alleged to be abused or neglected as the statute requires. In re R.D., 658 So.2d at 1384. ¶ 17. In E.M.C. v. S.V.M., 695 So.2d 576 (Miss.1997), the mother and her new husband filed a complaint for adoption of the child by the husband. The father challenged the jurisdiction of the court and requested dismissal. The court found that it had jurisdiction, the father had abandoned the child, abandonment justified termination of his parental rights, and it was in the child's best interest to be adopted by the stepfather. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On grant of certiorari, this Court, citing § 93-15-107, held that the appointment of a guardian ad litem was mandatory as the adoption required the termination of the natural father's parental rights, and that failure to make such appointment was reversible error. In re R.D., 658 So.2d at 1384. ¶ 18. Unlike the cases above, the instant case is one where the adoption proceeding below must be viewed as being uncontested. The Carrolls' consent to the adoption necessarily entailed a consent to the termination of their parental rights. And although a termination of parental rights necessarily evolved from the action, the nucleus of the case involved an uncontested adoption. As such, the more specific statute controlling this case is § 93-17-8(5). That statute limits the occasions where the appointment of a guardian ad litem is required in an adoption proceeding to contested allegations and where an adoption agency is involved. Neither of those scenarios is present here. Although this Court may think it better to appoint a guardian ad litem in uncontested adoption proceedings, the Legislature has exercised its prerogative and spoken otherwise. ¶ 19. The Carrolls argue that § 93-17-8(5) violates Katherine's right to due process by limiting the child's right to representation in adoption proceedings to those aforementioned situations. Although not explicitly stated in this Court's prior cases concerning a guardian ad litem's representation of a child in an adoption or termination matter, the due process which must be afforded that child appears to be one of procedural due process, as opposed to substantive due process. Indeed, in In re R.D., the Court found there to be a violation of the children's due process rights not to have been represented by a guardian ad litem solely because the statute required every minor alleged to be abused or neglected to be represented by a guardian ad litem. In re R.D., 658 So.2d at 1385. This Court has never found a child to have a fundamental liberty interest in having a guardian ad litem represent the child in an adoption or termination proceeding, as to render it a substantive due process right. As stated before, in Mississippi, adoption proceedings are purely statutory. In re Adoption of a Minor, 558 So.2d 854, 855 (Miss.1990). ¶ 20. While it may have been most preferable for the chancellor to have appointed a guardian ad litem in this caseespecially in hindsight of the accusations of misrepresentation this Court cannot find error in the chancellor's failure to do so where the statute specifically exempts such appointment in an uncontested adoption proceeding.