Opinion ID: 3164793
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Satisfied the Troxel Presumption

Text: Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The applicability of Troxel to parental termination proceedings is an issue of first impression for this court. However, it is not necessary to determine whether Troxel applies to parental termination proceedings generally because in this case, the trial court afforded M.C. Troxelâs heightened due process requirements. The trial court sufficiently protected M.C.âs fundamental liberty interest in his children because it applied a presumption in favor of preserving parental rights and made findings, required under section 19-5-105, to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We begin our analysis by recognizing that the right to parent oneâs children is a fundamental liberty interest. The right to raise oneâs own children is âessential,â Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), and âfar more precious than any property right,â Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758â59 (1982). Thus, M.C. unquestionably has due process rights stemming from his fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his children. In Santosky, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated that â[t]heÂ fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their childâ requires âfundamentally fair procedures.â Id. at 753â54. Although its facts are quite different from the instant case, Santosky is helpful here because it elucidates parentsâ due process rights regarding the care and custody of their children. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Santosky considered New Yorkâs permanent neglect statute, which permitted the court to terminate the natural parentsâ rights to their child if the state proved by a âfair preponderance of the evidenceâ that the child was permanently neglected according to the statutory criteria. Id. at 748â49. In addressing whether the preponderance of the evidence standard was constitutionally sufficient, the Court noted that natural parents retain a fundamental liberty interest in their children even if they are not currently parenting those children: âIf anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.â Id. at 753. The Court in Santosky ultimately concluded that states must apply at least a âclear and convincing evidenceâ standard to guarantee due process in parental termination proceedings and protect parentsâ fundamental interests in the care, custody, and control of their children. Id. at 769â70. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Subsequently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed these fundamental parental rights in Troxel. It stated that such parental rights are âperhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interestsâ that the Court has recognized. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. Troxel concerned the limits of a stateâs ability to override the parenting decisions of fit parents in the specific context of third-party visitation rights. Id. at 62â63. In Troxel, the CourtÂ struck down Washingtonâs âbreathtakingly broadâ nonparental visitation statute. Id. at 67. The Washington statute allowed any person to file a petition for visitation with someone elseâs children and permitted a court to grant the petition based solely on the courtâs own estimation of the childrenâs âbest interests.â Id. Moreover, it did not require the court to give the parentâs visitation decision âany presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever.â Id. Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After stating that the lower court in Troxel did not base its decision on âany special factors that might justify the Stateâs interferenceâ with the parentâs decisions regarding her children, the Court went on to state that there is a presumption that âfit parents act in the best interests of their children.â Id. at 68. According to Troxel, then, the trial courtâs failure to apply a presumption in favor of the natural parent improperly denied that parent due process with respect to her parental rights. In striking down the statute, the Court emphasized that âthe Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a âbetterâ decision could be made.â Id. at 72â73. In sum, Troxel stands for the proposition that states may not overrule parental decisions without giving those decisions âspecial weight,â id. at 70, and considering âspecial factors that might justify the Stateâs interference,â id. at 68. Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Troxel and Santosky give form to the long-standing tenet that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, which courts must presume to be valid. Troxel creates a presumption in favor of natural parents and adds that there must be special factors that justify the state interfering withÂ parental rights, while Santosky holds that the state must overcome this presumption and find those special factors by clear and convincing evidence. There is no clarification of what âspecial factorsâ in particular the court must consider when terminating parental rights, and no requirement that courts state that they are applying Troxel. Neither case held that courts must track the language in the case exactly; rather, they were meant to emphasize the importance of parental rights. Thus, taken together, Santosky and Troxel give direction to courts when entering orders that affect parental rights. The cases state that courts may interfere with parentsâ liberty interests in their children only if there is clear and convincing evidence of special factors that justify doing so. Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The trial court in this case applied a presumption in favor of M.C. and made findings under section 19-5-105 that overcame and rebutted the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. In doing so, it followed Troxelâs and Santoskyâs guidelines. The trial court emphasized that âColorado Courts recognize a presumption that the biological parent has a first and prior right to custodyâ which can be rebutted only if the evidence shows that the best interests of the children would be served by granting custody to a third party. See In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 256 (Colo. 1995). This language shows that the trial court presumed that M.C. should retain his parental rights and that M.C. was acting in the best interests of his children in his attempt to gain custody. It is analogous to Troxelâs language stating that âthere is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.â 530 U.S. at 68. Thus, although theÂ trial court did not track Troxelâs language exactly, it applied the necessary presumption in favor of M.C. Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Having determined that the trial court applied the requisite presumption in favor of M.C., we must now consider whether section 19-5-105 adequately protects M.C.âs due process rights. Thus, we turn to the statute to answer that question.