Opinion ID: 393871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: waiver and its scope

Text: 5 The waiver of constitutional guarantees is a matter of federal constitutional law. The Supreme Court announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), a standard that has been repeated and affirmed; the burden is upon the state to demonstrate an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Id. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023. The Supreme Court has consistently required adherence to a totality of the circumstances test in assessing the effect of constitutional waivers. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). 6 As we recently noted, (i)n considering the voluntariness of a confession, this court must take into account a defendant's mental limitations, to determine whether through susceptibility to surrounding pressures or inability to comprehend the circumstances, the confession was not a product of his own free will. Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 937 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1709, 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981). A fundamental concern is a mentally deficient accused's vulnerability to suggestion. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). 5 7 Even assuming that Henry could meaningfully grasp his constitutional rights so as to admit of a valid waiver, 6 we are not convinced he knew or could understand the range and scope of proper polygraph examination questioning. Although the Agreement and Stipulation recites that the wording of the test questions shall be at the polygraphist's sole discretion, the inquiries propounded must still be relevant test questions. See note 4, supra. When Sergeant Ruiz prematurely told Henry that he had failed, an inference that the machine had detected him, Ruiz breached the allowable bounds of test questioning. The Sergeant moved from administration of a polygraph examination to police interrogation without pausing to remind Henry of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to have his counsel present during questioning. 8 During the examination Henry was alone with Sergeant Ruiz; he was not allowed to communicate with counsel. This isolation was designed to permit completion of the test without interruption or extraneous influence; it is part of the effort to secure accurate polygraph results. The examination, however, was not conducted as planned, and it was not routinely concluded. Instead, the examination quickly devolved into an exercise which the fifth amendment restrains. We find pertinent the following which, cumulatively, compel our decision. Misrepresentation 9 Sergeant Ruiz's statement to Henry that he had failed the examination lacked verity. The examination was aborted; purportedly definitive results were never secured. We cannot glean from this record the veracity of Henry's responses to the questions that were asked. Oregon v. Mathison, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), suggests that false police statements do not necessarily render an interrogation environment coercive, but the Supreme Court considered the factor relevant. 7 Henry was in no position to dispute the polygraph examiner or the ominous lie detector machine. Considering his age and his limited mental acumen, this turn of events had to weigh heavily upon him. This must be considered in the overall evaluation of what later transpired. Interrogation 10 A crucial issue in this appeal is whether Sergeant Ruiz's dialogue with Henry constituted interrogation. The Supreme Court has defined interrogation as queries reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted). Ruiz's statement that Henry had failed the test, and his challenge to Henry to tell the truth about this thing constitutes such interrogation. Accordingly, the commands of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), apply. The issues now raised are whether Henry was adequately warned and whether he consented to the interrogation. 11 It is nigh onto superfluous to remind that Miranda forbids interrogation unless prefaced by a list of cautions. 8 In addition, Miranda also included in its survey of interrogation practices the use of psychological ploys, such as to 'posit( )' 'the guilt of the subject,' to 'minimize the moral seriousness of the offense,' and 'to cast blame on the victim or on society.'  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. 12 At the suppression hearing, Henry's counsel testified that, when he advised Henry to sign the various instruments and submit to the polygraph examination, there was no suggestion the examination would range beyond the typical scope and become an interrogation session. Neither Henry nor his counsel contemplated that the instruments they signed exposed Henry to questioning which was not an integral part of a polygraph examination. Nonetheless, Henry was subjected to interrogation by a police officer, out of the presence of his counsel, and without the benefit of meaningfully timed Miranda warnings. We conclude that Henry did not consent to this mode of questioning, nor did he waive his rights in that regard prior to entering the examination room. The final inquiry is whether he waived his rights after entering the room.Henry's Subnormal Intelligence 13 As noted, Henry's intelligence quotient places him in the educable mental retardate category. His mental capacity brings into serious question his understanding of the documents he signed. The record contains uncontradicted testimony of a psychologist that it was unlikely Henry could have understood the complex waivers and their consequences. Given this evidence, we are persuaded Henry did not separately and independently waive his constitutional rights when he was alone with Sergeant Ruiz in the examination room. 14 When persons of markedly limited mental ability, such as Henry, are questioned without the aid of counsel, issues of suggestibility and possible overreaching are raised ... and must be factored into a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d at 938. Extra precautions must be taken. It must be painstakingly determined that they comprehend what events are transpiring. In addition, the presence of counsel should be assured absent an unmistakable, knowing waiver of that assistance.