Opinion ID: 172867
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Heading: Wanton conduct under Kansas law

Text: In Kansas, wanton conduct is distinct from negligence and differs in kind. Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112, 118 (1984) (citing Kniffen v. Hercules Powder Co., 164 Kan. 196, 188 P.2d 980 (1948)). Unlike negligence, [w]anton conduct is established by the mental attitude of the wrongdoer rather than by ... particular negligent acts. Robison v. State, 30 Kan.App.2d 476, 43 P.3d 821, 824 (2002) (citing Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 215 Kan. 316, 524 P.2d 1141 (1974)). That is, [w]anton conduct is distinguished from a mere lack of due care by the fact that the actor realized the imminence of injury to others from his acts and refrained from taking steps to prevent the injury. Bowman, 686 P.2d at 118. This reckless disregard or complete indifference rises substantially beyond mere negligence. Id. Because wantonness derives from the mental attitude of the wrongdoer[,] ... acts of omission as well as acts of commission can be wanton. Gould v. Taco Bell, 239 Kan. 564, 722 P.2d 511, 518 (1986). To establish wanton conduct, a plaintiff must make a two-pronged showing: (1) that the act was performed with a realization of the imminence of danger; and (2) that the act was performed with a reckless disregard [of] or complete indifference to the probable consequences of the act. Reeves v. Carlson, 266 Kan. 310, 969 P.2d 252, 256 (1998); see also Gould, 722 P.2d at 518. Thus, [t]he keys to a finding of wantonness are the knowledge of a dangerous condition and indifference to the consequences. Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256. The plaintiff need not prove any intent or willingness to injure. Lanning ex rel Lanning v. Anderson, 22 Kan. App.2d 474, 921 P.2d 813, 818 (1996) (citing Boaldin v. Univ. of Kan., 242 Kan. 288, 747 P.2d 811, 814 (1987)); see also Reeves, 969 P.2d at 256. The first prong of the tortthat the act was performed with a realization of the imminence of dangermay be established in two ways. First, the plaintiff may put on direct evidence of the defendant's actual knowledge of a dangerous condition. Lanning, 921 P.2d at 819. Second, the plaintiff may establish, through circumstantial evidence, the defendant's reason to believe that his act [might] injure another, because that act was taken in disregard of a high and excessive degree of danger, either known to [the defendant] or apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position. Id. (quotations and emphasis omitted). As to the tort's second prong, reckless disregard of or indifference to probable consequences, the Kansas Supreme Court has explained that a token effort to prevent [harmful consequences] would not avoid liability under this [prong], while definite acts which materially lessen the chances of [those consequences] would avoid liability. Friesen, 524 P.2d at 1148. Critical to our analysis of such precautions is whether they materially lessen the chances of the consequences of the particular dangerous condition that we analyze under the tort's first prong. In Reeves v. Carlson , for instance, the defendant injured the plaintiff when, while driving intoxicated, he ran a stop sign at an intersection and crashed through a wall of her house. 969 P.2d at 256. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not established that he was fully aware of and clearly understood that he was about to collide with [the plaintiff's] home and that he was indifferent to the impending collision.  Id. (emphasis in original). The court explained that the defendant fail[ed] to recognize that the wanton conduct at issue was not the collision, but his choice to drive under circumstances that would likely or probably result in a collision. Id. In that case, [t]he precautions and care that the defendant claimed to have taken did little, if anything, to reduce that risk.  Id. (emphasis added). In assessing whether a plaintiff has established wanton conduct, then, we must take care to apply both prongs of the tort to the same alleged risk, whether that risk be described narrowly (e.g., the risk of the specific accident that occurred) or broadly (e.g., the risk of any serious accident occurring because of the conduct at issuee.g., the risk of any accident when the driver is intoxicated. See Reeves, supra. ) In other words, if the first part of Kansas's two-part inquiry asks whether the defendant had knowledge of a broadly described dangerous condition, the second part of that inquiry must ask whether the defendant recklessly disregarded or was indifferent to the same broadly described risk; conversely, if the first part of the test targets the narrow, specific risk that caused the particular accident at issue and asks if the defendant was aware or should have been aware of that particular specific risk, then the second part of the analysis to be consistent must ask if the defendant was indifferent to that specific risk. In short, a plaintiff may not establish wanton conduct by satisfying the notice or knowledge element of the tort as to one risk e.g., a broad generalized riskand the second element of indifference of that risk to a differently defined riske.g., the specific risk that caused the accident at issue. We need not decide in this case whether both the knowledge of the risk and the indifference to that risk should define risk in a generalized and broad manner or in a narrow, specific manner, and indeed courts seem to have used both approaches. Compare Robison v. State, 30 Kan.App.2d 476, 43 P.3d 821 (2002), and Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 215 Kan. 316, 524 P.2d 1141 (1974), with Reeves v. Carlson, 266 Kan. 310, 969 P.2d 252 (1998). But what we can and do conclude from our review of Kansas law is that risk must be defined consistently for both elements of the tort of wantonness. As will be seen here, whether the risk is to be defined broadly (e.g., the risk of any accident in motorcycle races generally) or narrowly (e.g., the specific risk that a motorcycle might leave the track at corner #10 in this race) a JMOL should have been granted to SFX in this case so long as the risk is defined consistently for both elements of this test. Finally, [w]hether a defendant's conduct constitutes wantonness necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Wolfgang, 111 F.3d at 1522 (applying Kansas law and citing Friesen, 524 P.2d at 1147).