Opinion ID: 1103323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting the county's motion for summary judgment as to punzo's claim for money damages.

Text: ¶ 13. The trial court's basis for dismissing the money claims by partial summary judgment was that the claim was time barred by the statute of limitations provision that applies to government entities: All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as required by subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five (95) days from the date the chief executive officer of the state agency receives the notice of claim, or for one hundred twenty (120) days from the date the chief executive officer or other statutorily designated official of a municipality, county or other political subdivision receives the notice of claim, during which time no action may be maintained by the claimant unless the claimant has received a notice of denial of claim. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3). The County claims that the discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute. Punzo claims the discovery rule does apply. ¶ 14. Punzo argues that if the one-year statute of limitations in § 11-46-11(3) applies, then his claim was promptly filed since he filed his complaint within one year of his discovery of the County's negligent rebuilding of the bridge. Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 733 So.2d 199, 204 (Miss.1999). Punzo asserts that he had no way of knowing that the County was liable until September 12, 1998, when his neighbor, Mark Holland, and former Jackson County supervisor Tommy Brodnax advised him of the modification to the bridge. As a result, he maintains that his notice to the County, filed on September 9, 1999, was timely filed within one year of his discovery of the County's negligent conduct. His complaint filed on December 8, 1999, was also timely filed. ¶ 15. The County argues that the statutory language used, the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct, requires the statute to run from the date the bridge construction was completed, which would have been late 1991 or early 1992. The County also argues that for the discovery rule to apply, there must be a latent injury. Looking at the flood as the injury, the County states there is nothing latent, or concealed, about floodwaters in a house. Punzo contends that this Court should look to the discovery of the cause of the injury in this instance, not the date, because the cause was not readily apparent or obvious. The trial court held that Punzo's injury was immediate rather than latent, explaining, [t]he cause of the injury may have been unknown at the time, but [Punzo] certainly knew that he had been injured in May of 1995. ¶ 16. The trial court's findings are not consistent with this Court's prior holdings as in Barnes, 733 So.2d 199, and Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So.2d 332 (Miss.1994). In Barnes, this Court repeated Sweeney's summary of the rationale supporting the application of the discovery rule to latent injury cases: Thus, where an injury or disease is latent, a determination of when the statute of limitation begins to run focuses not on the time of the negligent act or omission, but on when the plaintiff discovers the injury or disease. Moreover, knowledge that there exists a casual relationship between the negligent act and the injury or disease complained of is essential because it is well-established that prescription does not run against one who has neither actual nor constructive notice of facts that would entitle him to bring an action. 733 So.2d at 204 (quoting Sweeney, 642 So.2d at 334 (quoting Williams v. Kilgore, 618 So.2d 51, 55 (Miss.1992))). Also, Sweeney references Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So.2d 1117 (Miss.1992), in which this Court held that wrongful death and medical negligence were two separate causes of action, following the logic that [p]rescription does not begin to run against one who is ignorant of facts that would entitle him to bring an action. Sweeney, 642 So.2d at 335 (quoting Ayo v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 771 F.2d 902 (5th Cir.1985)). ¶ 17. The County concedes that in Barnes, this Court held that the absence of specific discovery language in § 11-46-11(3) did not preclude the application of the discovery rule; however, the County argues that the injury to Punzo's property was not latent. 733 So.2d at 204. Further discussion in Sweeney examined the history of discovery rule application in medical malpractice actions involving latent injuries. Prior to the enactment of § 15-1-36 and the three-year statute of limitations with a discovery rule provision for latent injuries, the six-year general statute of limitations applied to medical malpractice claims without a discovery rule provision. Barnes, 733 So.2d at 204 (citing Sweeney, 642 So.2d at 333). By adopting § 15-1-36, the Legislature shortened the time period for bringing a medical malpractice suit, but adopted a discovery standard for triggering the running of the statute.... Similarly, when the Legislature amended § 15-1-49 (the general statute of limitations), shortening the limitations period from six years to three years, it included a discovery provision for latent injuries as a trade-off. 733 So.2d at 204. Barnes clearly decided that where the one-year statute of limitations applied, the claim was filed properly when it was filed within one year of the discovery of the defendant's negligent conduct. Id. In Barnes, 733 So.2d at 205, this Court thoroughly described the history of the discovery rule at common law and its application to a variety of case types, reviewing cases such as Schiro v. Am.Tobacco Co., 611 So.2d 962, 965 (Miss.1992) (discovery rule as a common law exception), Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So.2d 704 (Miss.1990) (discovery rule exists in case of negligence or products liability cause of action involving latent disease), Evans v. Boyle Flying Serv., Inc., 680 So.2d 821 (Miss.1996) (holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury), Smith v. Sneed, 638 So.2d 1252 (Miss.1994) (discovery rule applied in legal malpractice actions), Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, 233 So.2d 811, 814 (Miss. 1970) (discovery rule in statutes of limitations applied to workers' compensation case), and Staheli v. Smith, 548 So.2d 1299 (Miss.1989) (statute of limitations in suit for defamatory material does not begin to run until reasonable discovery of the material). Remaining consistent with the above cases, this Court incorporated a discovery rule in actions brought under the MTCA involving latent injuries. Barnes, 733 So.2d at 205. ¶ 18. In Smith v. Braden, 765 So.2d 546, this Court reiterated its earlier holding in Barnes incorporating the discovery rule into actions brought under the MTCA. Given the relatively short one-year statute of limitations, it is particularly important. Id. When a question of fact exists as to when the statute of limitations begins run, the issue should be considered by the trial court. Id. (citing Barnes, 733 So.2d at 203-06.) ¶ 19. In Evans, 680 So.2d at 827, this Court held it was not reasonable to bar a person's cause of action when that person initially had no knowledge that time was running on the statute. The Evans court found it to be an injustice to prevent a person's recovery on a claim, i.e. an injury for which redress is guaranteed by our Constitution and statutory law, by being barred by a limitation period, in actuality a statute of repose if it were so construed, when they should not have reasonably known that damage had occurred. The Evans holding is similar to and consistent with this Court's earlier statement in Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Miss.1986): There may be rare cases where the patient is aware of his injury prior to the [expiration of the limitations period], but does not discover and could not have discovered with reasonable diligence the act or omission which caused the injury. In such cases, the action does not accrue until the latter discovery is made. ¶ 20. The County also contends that if the injury was latent, Punzo did not use the required reasonable diligence to determine the cause of the flood because three years passed between the first flood and the time Punzo learned from a neighbor of the bridge's alterations. This Court maintains that one flood does not create enough notice of an actionable claim's existence or of someone's fault. The second flood was just six months before Punzo's third flood and his learning of the bridge alterations. The record indicates that Punzo had completed the clean up and repair of his house from the damage of the second flood in March of 1998 just a month or so prior to the third flood in September of 1998. Within six months of that flood he learned of the alleged cause. We find that six months is a reasonable time period to discover the alleged cause of the harm. ¶ 21. Within one year of his discovery of the potential cause of the floods, he instigated proceedings against the County in compliance with § 11-46-11. Additionally, Punzo testified that he had written letters to the County's attorney as early as February 1999, asking for help with the flooding conditions. In Sarris v. Smith, 782 So.2d 721, 724 (Miss.2001), this Court examined the application of the discovery rule to a wrongful death suit, stating: Sweeney stands squarely for the proposition that the statute of limitations can be tolled until a plaintiff gains actual knowledge of the defendant's negligent conduct even if that knowledge is not gained until years after the death that is the basis for the suit.... The discovery rule should have been applied to toll the statute of limitations, because while Sarris knew that her husband was dead, under the facts of this case, she could not reasonably have known that the death was the result of negligence. We have recognized that some instances of discovery require knowledge beyond that of a layman. Water flow and flood currents are subjects requiring expert knowledge to fully comprehend. In Donald v. Amoco Production Co., 735 So.2d 161, 168 (Miss.1999), we examined the proposition that a layperson may have limited knowledge, stating, the discovery exception may be applied when it is unrealistic to expect a layman to perceive the injury at the time of the wrongful act. (citing Smith, 638 So.2d at 1257). ¶ 22. In granting summary judgment dismissing the money damages claims, the trial court stated that the injury to Punzo was immediate rather than latent, so the discovery rule would not apply; however, the court did not hold a hearing before making that finding of fact. According to Schiro, genuine disputes as to the ability to discover a latent injury are questions of fact to be decided by the fact finder, not on summary judgment. 611 So.2d at 962. ¶ 23. In another property damage case, this Court found that when a plaintiff missed the three-year limitation period by less than two years, then the claim could not be considered stale, especially since all witnesses were most likely still alive and still had fresh memories. Barnes, 733 So.2d at 207. The situation is similar in Punzo's case because the witnesses testified at trial in the injunction phase of the case and appeared to have impaired memory due to the passage of time. ¶ 24. We find the trial court erred in dismissing the money damages portion of Punzo's complaint as time barred. We reverse and remand the matter for a full trial on the merits.