Opinion ID: 492626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Actual Vindictiveness

Text: 6 Marrapese points to the following evidence of vindictiveness: (1) the prosecutor made jocular, derogatory comments about Marrapese in a chambers conference; (2) Marrapese and the prosecutor had an altercation when the prosecutor asked him to cooperate in the case against his lawyer; (3) the prosecutor questioned the wisdom of Marrapese's attack on the grand jury process, commenting that he could always issue a superseding indictment, with additional counts if necessary; and (4) the aggressive defense throughout the companion conspiracy cases aggravated the prosecutor. 7 The first two events were well removed in time from the superseding indictment and not strong evidence in any case. The third event, the prosecutor's comments to defense counsel, appears at first glance to be more troubling. But a careful analysis of the allegations and the context in which they arose provides adequate support for the district court's conclusion that defense counsel overreacted, reading a sinister motive into innocuous remarks. Finally, although the defendants in these cases pursued their defense very aggressively, Marrapese can point to no evidence, other than that just recited, that the prosecutor behaved in anything other than a professional manner, or that he was any more aggravated by the defense tactics than prosecutors are generally. A criminal trial is not a tea party. 8 Additionally, the district court found the prosecutor's explanation of the reason for the addition of the obstruction of justice count credible. In October 1982, seven months before Marrapese was originally indicted in this case, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512, which prohibits, inter alia, the use of violence or coercion to influence the testimony of a witness. The Act also amended 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503 by eliminating its reference to influencing, intimidating, or impeding witnesses. The prosecutor understood the Act and the amendment to mean that Sec. 1503 no longer prohibited noncoercive efforts to influence witnesses. The reasonableness of this understanding was demonstrated in March, 1984, when the Second Circuit stated, in dictum, that Congress intended to remove witnesses entirely from the scope of Sec. 1503. United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.1984). 9 Subsequent court decisions, however, questioned this reading of Sec. 1503. These later decisions focused on the omnibus clause of Sec. 1503, which was not changed by the October, 1982 amendments, and which prohibits all endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede[ ] the due administration of justice. Non-coercive tampering with witnesses, these courts concluded, is covered by this omnibus clause. See United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Beatty, 587 F.Supp. 1325 (E.D.N.Y.1984); see also United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 329, 93 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986); United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1951, 90 L.Ed.2d 360 (1986); United States v. Wesley, 748 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1130, 105 S.Ct. 2664, 86 L.Ed.2d 281 (1985). The prosecutor in this case learned of the Lester decision in December, 1984, and immediately recommended to his supervisor that Marrapese be charged with obstruction of justice for his noncoercive witness tampering. Based on this evidence, and on the prosecutor's testimony that it was easier to issue a new indictment than to defend the old one against Marrapese's challenge, the district court found that there was no credible evidence linking the superseding indictment with any vindictiveness by the prosecutor. That finding was not clearly erroneous. 10