Opinion ID: 3178608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: L.J.’s Tender-Years Testimony

Text: ¶10. The tender-years exception to the hearsay rule is contained in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(25), which provides: A statement made by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another is admissible in evidence if: (a) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide substantial indicia of reliability; and (b) the child either (1) testifies at the proceedings; or (2) is unavailable as a witness: provided, that when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. ¶11. As T.J. testified at trial after the trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury, “the sole issue is whether the ‘time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide substantial indicia of reliability.’” Smith v. State, 925 So. 2d 825, 837 (Miss. 2006). The comment to Rule 803 provides the following list of nonexhaustive factors trial courts should use to determine whether a statement possesses sufficient indicia of reliability: (1) whether there is an apparent motive on declarant’s part to lie; (2) the general character of the declarant; (3) whether more than one person heard the statements; (4) whether the statements were made spontaneously; (5) the timing of the declarations; (6) the relationship between the declarant and the witness; (7) the possibility of the declarant’s faulty recollection is remote; (8) certainty that the statements were made; (9) the credibility of the person testifying about the statements; (10) the age or maturity of the declarant; (11) whether suggestive techniques were used in eliciting the statement; and (12) 5 whether the declarant’s age, knowledge, and experience make it unlikely that the declarant fabricated. M.R.E. 803(25) cmt. ¶12. While L.J., the grandmother, did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, her proposed testimony was proffered to the judge. The trial court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined the statement (to the mother) was made within a short time after the child was in “a place where the child felt safe or felt unencumbered by any threats by anyone . . . and that the child was able to give an unsolicited response.” The child repeated that statement to her grandmother (L.J.). The court discussed how there was a good relationship at the time between the mother, grandmother, and Tubbs. “There was no ulterior motive[,]” no argument between L.J. and Tubbs, and no animosity between them. The court found the child had a close relationship with her grandmother and that there was no reason for her to fabricate testimony. Finally, the court found it was up to the jury to determine whether the event happened as T.J. said it happened.6 The defendant argues the failure of the court to use the specific words “substantial indicia of reliability” was error. ¶13. We find the trial court’s evidentiary hearing contains more than sufficient findings on the record. While the trial court did not use the specific words, it did not abuse its discretion 6 Tubbs argues that T.J.’s statement to D.J. that Tubbs licked her and her statement to L.J. that Tubbs touched her are inconsistent, which “undercuts ‘whether more than one person heard the statements[.]’” However, Tubbs overlooks the legal argument that “licking” is “touching” under the statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-23 (Rev. 2014) (defining fondling as “touch[ing] or rub[bing] with hands or any part of his or her body or any member thereof . . . .”). 6 in allowing L.J. to testify as to T.J.’s statement to her pursuant to the tender-years hearsay exception of Rule 803(25).