Opinion ID: 2539248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn

Text: The most troubling aspect of the principal opinion is its injection into Missouri standing analysis of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011). The Supreme Court's decision in Winn, however, is guided by federal court standing principlesprinciples that are quite different from those principles under which Missouri courts recognize taxpayer standing, a difference that reflects the vastly different roles of state and federal courts. The United States Supreme Court applies its doctrine under Article III of the United States Constitution, requiring plaintiffs challenging governmental action to show that they have suffered or will suffer (1) an `injury in fact;' (2) `a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;' and (3) that it is `likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.' Id. at 1442 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). See also, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). [12] In other words, to show standing under Article III, a taxpayer would have to show that the taxpayer has suffered an injury that is individual to him or her and not merely the generalized injury that may have been suffered by the public at large. The United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions for taxpayer plaintiff only in a narrow range of cases involving challenges based on the establishment clause of the First Amendment, as in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). Winn, 131 S.Ct. at 1445. Though discussing Flast, Winn leaves undisturbed the recent doubt that taxpayer standing will be recognized even in many religion cases. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007). This trend, of course, may leave the enforcement of the separation of church and state to the states under their state constitutions, where such matters resided until the last 70 years or so. See, e.g., Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609, 611-12 (1941). More to the point, however, is the fundamental difference between the role of state courts in enforcing specific provisions of a state constitution and the role of the federal courts enforcing federal constitutional constraints against states. In Winn, as noted, the challenge to the tax credits for tuition for religious schools first was presented to the state courts, and the taxpayer-plaintiffs lost on the merits. 131 S.Ct. at 1441 (citing Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P.2d 606 (1999)). There unquestionably was taxpayer standing in state court, and the Arizona courts met the challenge head-on without even mentioning standing. By adhering to its Article III standing requirements, on the other hand, the United States Supreme Court stays out of controversies that state courts have a duty to adjudicate under their constitutions, as the Arizona court did in Kotterman. The truly relevant cases, for our standing purposes, start with this Court's explicit holdings on standing in Tichenor, 742 S.W.2d at 172, and E. Mo. Laborers Dist., 781 S.W.2d at 47, and continue through Ste. Genevieve Sch. Dist. R-II, 66 S.W.3d at 11, all of which recognize the standing of taxpayers permitted to sue as taxpayers without showing the kind of particularized injury in fact that the United States Supreme Court requires under Article III. The significance of these modern Missouri cases is that they explain the taxpayer standing doctrine that has been assumed throughout much of our state's history. See Thomas C. Albus, Taxpayer Standing in Missouri, 54 J. Mo. Bar 199 (1998). The difference between the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri is importantMissouri recognizes a taxpayer's standing even though his injury may be no different from that of other taxpayers, and the United States Supreme Court does not. The differences in taxpayer standing cases reflect the profound differences between the constitutions under which these courts function. State constitutions do not reflect the same level of trust in state legislative decisionmaking as does the federal Constitution in congressional decisionmaking. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the Passive Virtues: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L.REV. 1833, 1891-92 (2001). Article I of the Constitution assumes that Congress is best situated to decide how to carry out the terms of its authority. . . . State constitutions, in contrast, impose not only substantive, but also procedural requirements on legislative activity. Id. at 1892. [S]uch provisions alter the dynamics of lawmaking, implicating the state courts in the resolution of certain governance questions that are largely outside the Article III experience. Id. at 1893. The principal opinion's analysis may allow the legislature to circumvent not just article III, section 38(a) but many other requirements of the Missouri Constitution, evading what this Court said in E. Mo. Laborers Dist. Council about the need for a system of checks and balances whereby taxpayers can hold public officials accountable for their acts. 781 S.W.2d at 47. While the choices of how to spend the public's money are choices that the elected political branches of our government get to make, the state courts have a duty to guard the state constitution and to intervene at the behest of an aggrieved taxpayer when the state's resources are being spent on matters that the constitution forbids or on projects that have no public purpose. [13] The principal opinion suggests that the remedy lies in the political process, but there is little doubt that the $500 million currently being spent on public projects to create jobs, make movies, [14] and do other useful thingsinstead of fully funding the needs of public education, for instance might well receive majority support. But constitutional constraints may serve occasionally to restrain the current generation from robbing the next generation, a function that is not fulfilled by democratic majorities unless, perhaps, the voting age can be lowered to age 8. The principal opinion in this case, I am sad to say, follows the irrelevant lead of the United States Supreme Court and, in doing so, may lead the Court in future cases to forsake its duty under the Missouri Constitution. The United States Supreme Court can assume that money is not public until it is deposited in the treasury and thereby find that a taxpayer suffers no direct injury in fact sufficient to support Article III standing. The Supreme Court's standing decisions reflect its reticence to redirect taxation and spending by applying the constitutional principles of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to interfere with state decisions is prudent and respectful of federalism, but in state supreme courts, there are no federalism concerns. When a state supreme court closes the courthouse doors to challenges based on specific provisions of a state constitution, the Court is not acting prudentlyits failure is a dereliction of duty, permitting state officials to spend the public's money indirectly through tax credits where they would be forbidden to spend the public's money directly. Thereby relieved of constitutional accountability by the principal opinion in this case, elected officials can feel free to use state government as an ATM for dispensing public money through tax credits for special projects and to special pleaders. Without judicial review, an important purpose of our state constitutionto safeguard the public's resources for the benefit of future generationswill be entirely dependent on elected officials who may depend on the beneficiaries of tax credits for the financial support their campaigns need. Are these elected officials cognizant of the needs of future generations? Yes, of course, as they often express devotion if not actual money to those needs. Are they dependent today on the well-being of future generations? Not so much. The Arizona Supreme Court decided the merits of the controversy over the funding of parochial school children's education with tax credit funds, without, as noted, even mentioning whether the taxpayers had standing to sue. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 606. [15] Regardless of whether an Arizonan agreed or disagreed with the court's resolution of the controversy, the Arizona taxpayers received what they had a right to receive from their courtsa resolution of a constitutional conflict over state spending, which is what Missouri taxpayers traditionally expect when they seek redress as taxpayers in our state courts. When the United States Supreme Court denies standing in a controversy involving the spending of state money, it can be seen as a prudent respect for state prerogatives in a federal system. But when state courts deny standing and refuse to reach the merits of a constitutional challenge to state spending, the constitutional controversy remains unresolved, with the consequence that a segment of our society may be marginalized because the merits of its side of a legal controversy never are addressed, and the unresolved controversy can continue to fester and build resentment. Hence the importance of getting to the merits and treating the taxpayers' grievances with the respect they are due.