Opinion ID: 680033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the ex parte young doctrine

Text: 53 The final issue we consider in these appeals is the tribes' request for an order under IGRA directing the Governors of Oklahoma and New Mexico, respectively, to negotiate tribal-state compacts. The district courts in Ponca, Pueblo of Sandia, and Mescalero Apache dismissed this claim as barred by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). 54 Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit in federal court against state officers to enjoin federal law violations. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60, 28 S.Ct. at 453-54. A state officer who violates federal law is stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. Id. at 160, 28 S.Ct. at 454. 55 A critical limitation on this doctrine, however, is that a federal court may only order a state officer to perform a ministerial act. Id. at 158, 28 S.Ct. at 453 (explaining that the injunction can only direct affirmative action where the officer having some duty to perform not involving discretion, but merely ministerial in its nature, refuses or neglects to take such action). 56 In light of our Tenth Amendment analysis, IGRA does not require the states to regulate Class III gaming by entering into tribal-state compacts. Instead, the only obligation on the state is to negotiate in good faith. The act of negotiating, however, is the epitome of a discretionary act. How the state negotiates; what it perceives to be its interests that must be preserved; where, if anywhere, that it can compromise its interests--these all involve acts of discretion. Thus, injunctive relief against the governors is barred under Ex parte Young. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 11 F.3d at 1028-29 (rejecting Ex parte Young claim against the governors of Florida and Alabama because the decision to negotiate is discretionary, not ministerial); Accord Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F.Supp. 1549, 1551-52 (S.D.Ala.1992), aff'd, Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1028-29. 57 Additionally, the tribes' suits against the Governors are in reality suits against the respective states and thus not authorized under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when 'the state is the real, substantial party in interest.'  Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945)). The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'  Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 83 S.Ct. 999, 1006, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963) (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1012, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1468, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949)) (emphasis added). Because IGRA names only the state as the party to negotiate with Indian tribes, an injunction ordering a Governor to negotiate a compact would operate against the state itself because the state is the only party that may enter into a compact with an Indian tribe. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102, 104 S.Ct. at 909 ([A] suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.). 58 Accordingly, we affirm the judgments in Ponca, Pueblo of Sandia, and Mescalero Apache dismissing the tribes' suit against the Governors of Oklahoma and New Mexico.