Opinion ID: 2748473
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: As a party opposing return based on Article 13's 'grave risk' exception, the mother here bears the burden of establishing that exception by clear and convincing evidence; she must prove subsidiary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Yaman, 730 F.3d at 11; see also 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2). On appeal, we review the district court's findings of fact with deference, overturning -22- a factual finding for clear error only if it 'hit[s] us as more than probably wrong -- it must prompt a strong, unyielding belief, based on the whole of the record, that the judge made a mistake.' Sánchez-Londoño, 752 F.3d at 539 (quoting Darín, 746 F.3d at 8–9). Here, the district court noted the mother's testimony that the father frequently acted toward her in a sexually abusive manner, and that he insisted on sexual activity at times and under circumstances when the children were or could have been exposed to it. However, the district court found that this testimony was general and vague, and that it was difficult to draw any reliable conclusions about how frequently such conduct occurred or how significant any impact on the children might have been. The court observed that the mother admits that [the father] has never harmed or attempted to harm [M.M.] or [R.M.]. Furthermore, the court found it telling that even after moving out in January 2011, [the mother] took no steps to prevent [the father] from having contact with their children. The court also referred to the mother's testimony that the father's son, B.M., was sexually aggressive toward his halfsister, M.M. One of these alleged incidents occurred in Haiti, and according to the mother's testimony, the father disciplined B.M. by beating him with a belt. The mother's aunt testified about a similar incident years later in Canada, but the district court found no evidence as to how B.M. was disciplined for that incident. -23- Meanwhile, the father's niece testified that all the children, including the older twins, played well together and enjoyed each other's company. Additionally, the district court reviewed the evidence concerning R.M.'s medical condition. In the fall of 2012, R.M. began experiencing frequent nosebleeds and weight loss. The parents agreed that R.M., as a U.S. citizen, could return to the United States for medical care in late August 2013. The court found that the medical records from the Boston Medical Center showed no major health issues. In the fall of 2013, R.M. was examined and treated for eczema, frequent nosebleeds, and mild anemia, for which she was prescribed an iron supplement. As to Dr. Newberger's expert testimony that R.M. or M.M. would suffer psychological harm if returned to Canada, the district court found such evidence unconvincing, because it was not based on an in-depth investigation, but rather on some office interviews and a review of hospital records that themselves did not disclose any grave medical or emotional issue. Accordingly, the court found that [t]he evidence fell well short of supporting a finding of a grave risk of psychological harm. Having reviewed the record evidence and the parties' arguments on appeal, we find no clear error among the foregoing findings of fact. First, we do not find any merit to the mother's argument that the district court improperly discounted -24- Dr. Newberger's testimony. Dr. Newberger was called as an expert witness, not as a fact witness. The mother's counsel submitted to the district court that no part of Dr. Newberger's opinion is based upon communication with the children. Dr. Newberger testified that his first involvement in this case began with a conversation with the mother's counsel. He only met with the mother and the children once, he did not review their Canadian medical records, and he never interviewed the father. He testified that with regard to the interviews of the children, there was nothing of probative importance. Dr. Newberger's expert testimony does not and cannot serve as factual testimony bolstering the mother's narrative regarding alleged past abuse in the household, as he had no independent knowledge of what transpired in the household. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district court's evaluation of Dr. Newberger's testimony. Second, we find no clear error in the district court's determination that R.M.'s medical records show no major health issues, or in its determination that her treated conditions include nothing more than eczema, frequent nosebleeds, and mild anemia. The mother has not demonstrated that these conditions cannot be adequately treated by health care providers in Canada, such that returning R.M. to Canada would subject her to a grave risk of physical harm. -25- Turning to her other arguments, the mother's allegations of abuse are not to be taken lightly. She has described incidents of brutality that, if true, paint a disturbing portrait of a physically, sexually, and emotionally abusive and controlling husband. We do not doubt that there can be significant, lasting psychological trauma inflicted on children who witness such abuse between their parents. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Domestic Violence, Developing Brains, and the Lifespan: New Knowledge from Neuroscience, 53 Judges' J., no. 3, Summer 2014, at 32, 35 (The toxic stress that harms developing brains comes from living in a chronic state of tension and fear.). However, the district court did not fully credit the mother's testimony, which it found to be general and vague. The father denies the mother's allegations, and the mother has offered scant evidence to corroborate her testimony. There is no indication in the record that the mother previously sought legal protection in either Haiti or Canada against the father, no indication that she sought sole custody previously, and no indication that she made any such allegations prior to her removing the children from Canada and taking them to Boston. To the contrary, prior to removal, the mother had consistently allowed the father to play an active role in the children's lives. The mother admits that the father has never harmed or attempted to harm M.M. or R.M. As previously described, the district court also found it -26- difficult to draw any reliable conclusions about the frequency of the conduct alleged by the mother and how significant its impact was on the children. Moreover, the mother does not dispute that the father has since remarried. Although she asserts that the father is a serial spousal abuser and that the children would experience psychological trauma if returned to Canada -- a place they associate with their [f]ather's abuse of [their] [m]other -- there is no evidence or allegation in the record that the father has ever committed abuse of any sort against his current wife. Thus, there is no indication of a grave risk that upon their return to Canada the children will be exposed to the type of domestic abuse alleged by the mother. As to potential sexual abuse of M.M. or R.M. by their half-brother, B.M., who is himself still a young child, there is testimony describing isolated instances of sexually aggressive or inappropriate behavior by B.M. toward M.M. In her requests for findings of fact before the district court, the mother alleged three such instances. However, several years have passed since the last alleged instance of sexually inappropriate behavior by B.M. toward M.M., and both the mother and the father agree that B.M. was disciplined in some way for the prior incident. The father's niece further testified that all the children get along well together. The record does not establish that B.M. continues to exhibit -27- sexually aggressive or inappropriate behavior, or that the father and his new wife are unwilling or unable to prevent any such incidents in the future. Thus, on the supported factual findings made by the district court, we cannot say that there is a grave risk that B.M. will behave in sexually aggressive or inappropriate ways toward either M.M. or R.M. if they are returned to Canada. In her submissions, the mother relies heavily on Walsh, 221 F.3d at 204, asserting that the district court, like the district court in Walsh, erred by failing to give proper weight to: the mother's allegations; the connection between exposure to spousal abuse and physical and psychological harm; the danger of the sexualized environment in the home; and the degree of the father's propensity for violence. However, the district court here explicitly considered our decision in Walsh and applied it to the instant case, finding that [t]he facts of this case are neither as dire nor as clear. Reiterating her most serious allegations of abuse, the mother focuses on attacking the former determination (whether these facts are as dire), but, critically, fails to establish that the district court erred in finding that the instant facts are not as clear as those in Walsh. Indeed, the mother's argument regarding Walsh hinges on accepting all of her allegations as true. The district court did no such thing. Rather, the district court merely recited aspects of her testimony. -28- Nothing in the district court's opinion suggests that it accepted the mother's testimony wholesale or resolved all credibility determinations in her favor. To the contrary, the district court found the mother's testimony to be general and vague, and found that it could not draw any reliable conclusions about the frequency of the alleged conduct or its effect on the children. Furthermore, the district court expressed skepticism regarding the degree to which the mother feared for her children's safety, stating that it was telling that she took no steps to prevent [the father] from having contact with their children, unlike the respondent in Walsh, who had sought numerous protective orders out of fear of harm to her or her children. We find no clear error in these determinations, which do not leave us with the 'strong, unyielding belief . . . that the judge made a mistake.' Sánchez-Londoño, 752 F.3d at 539 (quoting Darín, 746 F.3d at 8–9). The instant case thus involves competing he said, she said testimony from both parties, with little independent evidence corroborating the mother's testimony, and no clear acceptance by the district court of the mother's narrative over the father's. The district court thus effectively found that the mother did not bear her burden of proof in establishing that returning the children to Canada would subject them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. We see no error in that -29- determination. By contrast, the Walsh case involved ample evidence that the father in that case, John Walsh, has been and can be extremely violent and that he cannot control his temper. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219. In Walsh, there was a clear and long history of spousal abuse, and of fights with and threats against persons other than his wife. These include John's threat to kill his neighbor in Malden, for which he was criminally charged, and his fight with his son Michael. Id. at 220.5 Moreover, John Walsh had severely beaten his wife, Jacqueline Walsh, multiple times over the years, including when she was seven months pregnant. Id. at 209-12.6 Many of these beatings, as well as a beating of John's older son by another marriage, took place in front of Jacqueline's two small children. Id. John fled the United States for Ireland as a fugitive after 5 The district court in Walsh explicitly found that the mother in that case was the victim of random beatings -- beatings which were known to, among others, the following persons: three of John's older children from previous relationships; the mother's physician in Ireland, who advised her to seek legal protection and a court order, and to get photographs taken to document the abuse; and a licensed social worker who worked with her case. Id. at 20912. 6 Jacqueline described many instances of attacks by John, including kicks and punches on specific dates that resulted in the following injuries: a broken tooth; repeated bruises (including on her face, chest, and knees); scratch marks; and an injured coccyx bone (or tailbone) in her lower spine. Id. at 210. She sought the Irish equivalent of a temporary restraining order, which John then violated by coming to her home and threatening her again. Id. at 211. Jacqueline testified at trial, and her allegations were corroborated by additional witnesses, including a social worker and her sister. Id. at 212. -30- being charged with threatening to kill his neighbor,7 and he violated court orders in Ireland that he stay away from Jacqueline's home. Id. at 210-11. The district court in Walsh accepted these underlying facts. See id. at 218-22.8 On appeal in Walsh, we found that the facts of the case -- including the father's flight after indictment for threatening to kill another person in a separate case and a documented history of violence and disregard for court orders -- were clearly established. Id. at 222. In contrast, the instant case has none of these strong, independent pieces of evidence corroborating the mother's testimony as to the father's alleged abuse. Additionally, the district court here did not fully accept the allegations against the father. Furthermore, on appeal in Walsh, we placed particular emphasis on John's repeated history of ignoring court orders. See 7 In 1993, in Malden, Massachusetts, after becoming drunk following a wake, John Walsh ran to his next door neighbor's house, banged on the door, breaking the door's glass, and yelled that he was going to kill the man. Id. at 209. He did this repeatedly until the police arrived, and he was later charged in a Massachusetts criminal complaint with attempting to break and enter, and threatening to kill another person. Id. He then absconded to Ireland, id., and he remained a fugitive from justice in the United States at the time of the appeal in Walsh. Id. at 215 (John is plainly a fugitive.). 8 See also In re Walsh, 31 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Mass. 1998), rev'd, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000); id. at 201 (finding that John physically abuses Jackie); id. at 202-04 (making detailed findings of fact that John committed various specific acts of physical abuse against his wife); id. at 208 (concluding that the court had identified deplorable conditions of domestic abuse in the case). -31- id. at 220-21 (We do not believe th[at] undertakings . . . or even a potential [protective] order, are sufficient to protect the children from the exposure to grave risk in this case. We have no doubt that the Irish courts would issue appropriate protective orders. That is not the issue. The issue is John's history of violating orders issued by any court, Irish or American.).9 The father here has no such history of violating court orders. Quite simply, this case is not Walsh. Importantly to our decision here, an order returning the children to Canada is not equivalent to an order mandating that the children live with their father rather than with their mother, another family member, or guardian. Again, an order of return to Canada under the Convention is not a final determination of custody rights. Neergaard-Colón, 752 F.3d at 530. Instead, implementation of the return remedy here means that the courts of Canada -- the children's country of habitual residence -- will make the appropriate custodial and family law determinations. See id. (citing Abbott, 560 U.S. at 9); see also Charalambous v. 9 In Walsh, we further explained that: John's past acts clearly show that he thinks little of court orders. He has violated the orders of the courts of Massachusetts, and he has violated the orders of the courts of Ireland. There is every reason to believe that he will violate the undertakings he made to the district court in this case and any [protective] orders from the Irish courts. Id. at 221. -32- Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462, 469-70 (1st Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (We point out that [the mother] is free, in the courts of [the children's country of habitual residence], to seek custody of the children and such other orders as may become necessary as to the children.). For all the foregoing reasons, we find no clear error in the district court's underlying findings of fact on the narrow grave risk exception. See Sánchez-Londoño, 752 F.3d at 539; Neergaard-Colón, 752 F.3d at 530. Nor do we disagree with the district court's conclusion that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing that exception by clear and convincing evidence. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 11; see also 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2) (providing that a respondent who opposes the return of the child has the burden of establishing . . . by clear and convincing evidence that the exception set forth in Article 13(b) of the Convention applies). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the mother has not shown a grave risk that returning the children to Canada would expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place [them] in an intolerable situation. See Hague Convention, art. 13(b).