Opinion ID: 623905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: in any case—

Text: ... (B) the court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Textually, this statutory language operates as a “clear” and mandatory restriction on a court’s authority. Gonzalez, at 649. In Rule 35(a), which the statute incorporates by reference, the time limitation and grant of authority are contained within a single sentence: “Within 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from . . . clear error.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Thus, both Rule 35(a) and the statute suggest an intent to constrain a court’s authority to act outside the prescribed time limits. Contextually, the time limit here is an integral part of the statutory grant of authority. Section 3582(c)(1)(B), the provision that incorporates Rule 35(a)’s -17- time limitation, itself serves as the grant of authority: “the court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” § 3582(c)(1)(B). Thus, much like the timeliness requirement in In re Latture, Rule 35(a)’s deadline is given jurisdictional force by the very provision authorizing courts to correct errors. This provision contrasts with the restriction at issue in Gonzalez, which was “set off” from jurisdictional provisions in a different statutory subsection. Gonzalez, at 651. Historically, Rule 35(a) does not have the pedigree of limitations on the time to appeal—on the contrary, many courts historically “recognize[d] the inherent power in a court to correct an acknowledged and obvious mistake.” United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he district court has the inherent power to correct the sentence within the time fixed for filing a notice of appeal.”). But the clear intent of Rule 35(a) was to restrict courts’ authority. The Rule acknowledged courts’ inherent power to correct sentences, but only within seven days (extended to 14 in 2009). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 Advisory Comm. Notes (“The Committee believed that the time for correcting such errors should be narrowed within the time for appealing the sentence to reduce the likelihood of jurisdictional questions in the event of an appeal. . . .” (emphasis added)). Thus, -18- when Congress enacted § 3582, it recognized courts’ inherent power to correct clearly erroneous sentences, but only within the specified time. A jurisdictional conception of Rule 35(a)’s time limit also comports with the Rule’s purposes. A court’s authority under Rule 35(a) is “intended to be very narrow and to extend only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the sentence.” Id. A strict time limit “reduce[s] the likelihood of abuse of the rule by limiting its application to acknowledged and obvious errors in sentencing.” Id. Finally, to the extent obvious sentencing errors are not addressed within the time limit, the Notes contemplate that “a defendant detained pursuant to such a sentence could seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. In sum, we find that recent jurisprudential developments do not justify overturning Green. We join the other circuits in holding that Rule 35(a)’s 14-day time limit is jurisdictional. Thus, we find the district court had no jurisdiction to rule on McGaughy’s Rule 35(a) claim past the 14-day limit. 5 5 In his Reply, McGaughy argues that a strict construction of Rule 35’s time limit “is no longer viable in the post-Booker era, where district courts have much wider authority in sentencing.” This reliance on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is misplaced; Booker did not give us discretion to ignore statutory restrictions on our own authority. See United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 840 (10th Cir. 2008). Even if we had jurisdiction, we see no error. “The authority to correct a sentence under [Rule 35(a)] is intended to be very narrow and to extend only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred.” Green, 405 F.3d at 1185. As the district court explained, McGaughy “has requested an evidentiary hearing and endeavors to prove that the Government misrepresented facts or made (continued...) -19-