Opinion ID: 2521108
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Bar AVCP's Claim of Passive Negligence.

Text: Judge Hunt ruled that AVCP's five indemnity claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Judge Curda had already decided the same claims. We have held that [u]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment in a prior action operates as a bar to a subsequent action if (1) the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment, and (3) the same cause of action and same parties or their privies were involved in both suits. [9] Judge Steinkruger held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar AVCP's express and implied contractual indemnity claims but did bar AVCP's passive negligence claim. Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion bars the relitigation of an issue where: (1) the party against whom the preclusion is employed was a party to or in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue precluded from relitigation is identical to the issue decided in the first action; (3) the issue was resolved in the first action by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment. [10] Both doctrines are founded upon the principle that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and that when a right or fact has been judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties. [11] The earlier judgment in question here is Judge Curda's decision in the Bethel trial court denying AVCP's motion to amend its complaint to assert an equitable indemnity claim against Vranckaert. The parties do not dispute that the Bethel trial court is a court of competent jurisdiction, nor do they question whether Judge Curda's involuntary dismissal of AVCP is a final judgment. The crux of the dispute before us is whether the causes of action or issues before Judges Steinkruger and Hunt had already been litigated before Judge Curda. Vranckaert argues that all five indemnity claims asserted by AVCP are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they arise out of the same transaction as the equitable indemnity claim. [12] Vranckaert maintains that AVCP's pleadings in Nilsson indicate that AVCP did not limit itself to claims of legal indemnity. Rather, Vranckaert argues, AVCP's motion to amend to include an equitable indemnity claim also contemplated claims of express and implied contractual indemnity, and Judge Curda ruled on those claims. Therefore, Vranckaert concludes, AVCP's contract-based indemnity claims are barred by res judicata. We conclude that Judge Curda issued a final decision only on the merits of AVCP's equitable indemnity claim. In ruling that equitable indemnity is not a viable cause of action, Judge Curda distinguished the cases cited by AVCP in support of the viability of its equitable indemnity claim as relying on contract theory and equitable apportionment. Judge Curda quoted Benner v. Wichman , in which this court held that despite our rejection of equitable indemnity in Vertecs, we certainly did not reject contractual indemnity. [13] Judge Curda's citation of contractual indemnity cases to distinguish the equitable indemnity claim does not amount to a decision on the merits of the contract-based indemnity claims. We interpret Judge Curda's decision as merely noting that while contractual indemnity may constitute a viable cause of action in Alaska, equitable indemnity cannot. AVCP's use of the more general term indemnity in its pleadings does not alter our conclusion that Judge Curda ruled only on the merits of the equitable indemnity cause of action. Judge Steinkruger was correct in concluding that AVCP's passive negligence claim was adjudicated by Judge Curda. She reasoned: Since the claim for indemnity for passive negligence is the same claim as the equitable indemnity claim brought in the Nilsson case, albeit [under] a different name, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should bar this claim, because the claim was disposed of on its merits in a court of competent jurisdiction. And counsel for AVCP conceded at oral argument before this court that AVCP's passive negligence claim was the same as the equitable indemnity claim that Judge Curda dismissed. We also agree with Judge Steinkruger that AVCP's express and implied contractual indemnity claims are not collaterally estopped because they do not require relitigation of an issue identical to those issues resolved by Judge Curda. Express and implied contractual indemnity claims require proof of a contract to indemnify, whereas equitable indemnity is based on concepts of equity. [14] Having concluded that only AVCP's equitable indemnity and passive negligence claims were adjudicated by Judge Curda, we now turn to an examination of whether summary judgment is proper on the other four claims on any basis other than collateral estoppel or res judicata. [15]