Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count One A: Failure to Disqualify

Text: At the August 2 hearing on Henderson's case, defense counsel stated that Henderson had said petitioner was a friend of Henderson's uncle and that diversion was a done deal. According to petitioner, on hearing this information, he concluded that Henderson did not deserve diversion because he was using his parents and uncle to manipulate the court. At that point, petitioner determined that his ex parte contacts and his feelings about Henderson had created a conflict and he decided to disqualify himself from making the diversion decision. Petitioner informed counsel of his decision, referred the matter to the probation department for preparation of a diversion report, and scheduled a diversion hearing for September 6. The probation department's report recommended against diversion, finding Henderson statutorily ineligible because of a prior conviction. At the September 6 hearing, the district attorney expressed willingness to consider diversion despite the recommendation. After Henderson's counsel asked the court to consider diversion, petitioner replied: Well, I don't want to consider it. Number one is because ... I know his uncle. I've talked to his uncle about getting him diversion and getting him treatment. And because of that, I don't think I should make the decision. Defense counsel then asked: Should we send it down to Madera Justice Court? Petitioner replied: No. Iif you two can work it out, that's fine with me. I'll go along with anything, [¶] I just want to put it on the record that I've talked to his uncle about helping him on a diversion, if he gets diversion, [¶] And I think if I got involved in overruling the Probation Department at this point, I think it would be a conflict. Contrary to his stated intent, petitioner then discussed with counsel Henderson's prior conviction, the reported level of his drug use, and his family situation, remarking on comments Henderson's uncle had made to petitioner about this subject. When defense counsel suggested getting a second probation report, petitioner replied: I don't think they're going to change their mind. Counsel then asked: You don't want to have another report? Petitioner responded: No. That would just tick them off. Defense counsel then expressed doubt about the probation department's conclusion regarding statutory eligibility. Petitioner then interjected: Yeah, well, the problem is, too, it says here, a `daily use of cocaine.' [¶] And diversion ... was originated for people who are in danger or might become endangered. When you have a regular user, C.R.C. is the place for them. Petitioner also expressed doubt about the relevance of the fact that Henderson had not been caught using drugs for some time. Finally, petitioner asked: What do the People want to do? The district attorney then suggested getting a rap sheet and noted numerous instances where the court, on the prosecution's recommendation, had overridden the probation department's recommendation. Petitioner replied: Absolutely. No problem with that, [¶] But I told you I have a conflict with that. At counsel's suggestion, petitioner then continued the diversion hearing to September 20 and set it before himself. At the hearing on September 20, the district attorney recommended diversion. Petitioner responded: All right. [¶] I told you that I wasn't going to make the decision in this. It's up to you. Henderson's counsel ask[ed] for the court's order for diversion even though the [probation] report [did] not seem to be too favorable. Petitioner replied: All right. [¶] Then ... under the People's recommendation, I'll grant you diversion. He also directed Henderson to appear on March 21, 1995, for review of his compliance with the terms of diversion. Petitioner later explained to the Commission: I should have denied the [diversion] request and set the case for another hearing with another Judge, but knowing that the Court usually goes along with the D.A. recommendation in these type [sic] of cases, and the problem of getting a visiting Judge on a Tuesday for one case, I went along with the D.A. and granted diversion. On this record, the Commission unanimously adopted the special masters' conclusion that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct by fail[ing] to disqualify himself after the ex parte communications and improperly delegat[ing] his [judicial] power [to order diversion] away to the District Attorney to avoid a conflict. Petitioner challenges these conclusions, noting that he fully disclosed his [ex parte] contact, he indicated he did not want to decide the diversion question because of a conflict, the parties did not seek his recusal, and he had no independent duty to disqualify himself. He also challenges the conclusion that he improperly delegated his judicial authority, arguing that diversion was a foregone conclusion in this case. We find clear and convincing evidence to support the Commission's conclusions. By statute, a judge shall be disqualified if [f]or any reason (A) the judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of justice, (B) the judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial, or (C) a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6).) Petitioner was disqualified under this provision; he himself testified before the special masters that he had personal feelings about the propriety of granting diversion and that he should therefore not participate in the decision, based on his ex parte communications and Henderson's comment to his attorney that diversion was a done deal. As petitioner later explained to the Commission: I wasn't going to make the [diversion] decision, because I felt if I denied diversion it would look like I was mad at them, which I was. [¶] I was very angry at Mr. Henderson for playing games with his family.... And I felt that I needed to get out of the case. Disqualification based on the judge's personal bias or prejudice concerning a party may not be waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (b)(2)(A).) Moreover, even as to waivable disqualifications, a waiver must be written, signed by all parties and their attorneys and filed in the record. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (b)(1); see Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995) 10 Cal.4th 866, 906, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 606, 897 P.2d 544 ( Adams ).) Thus, petitioner's suggestion that the parties waived the disqualification is unconvincing. We also agree that petitioner improperly delegated his judicial authority regarding diversion to the district attorney. Petitioner incorrectly contends that, because diversion was a foregone conclusion in this case, delegating this decision did not constitute prejudicial misconduct. Regardless of the likelihood that Henderson would receive diversion, as petitioner conceded during the Commission proceedings, legally it was [petitioner's] decision, and he should have ... set the case for another hearing with another Judge rather than address his conflict by ceding his power to the district attorney. Petitioner's decision to follow the latter course constituted prejudicial misconduct. (See McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 532, 116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268 ( McCartney ) [judge improperly delegated judicial power and committed misconduct by imposing sentences bailiff suggested]; cf. Fewel v. Fewel (1943) 23 Cal.2d 431, 436, 144 P.2d 592 [judicial decisionmaking `may not be delegated to investigators or other subordinate officials or attachés of the court, or anyone else'].)