Opinion ID: 1706950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: failure to instruct jury on effect of tennessee sentence on a life sentence in this case

Text: ¶ 106. The jury was given the options of sentencing Bell to death or to life imprisonment. [5] Bell now argues that the trial court should have informed the jury that if Bell was sentenced to life imprisonment, he would only begin to serve that sentence after completion of his Tennessee sentence, and that this instruction is particularly important in view of what Bell perceives to be the State's argument of future dangerousness. Of course, as we have pointed out above, the State did not in fact argue, as an additional aggravating circumstance, that propensity, but rather argued his violent nature, in a most limited way, as a response to evidence offered on behalf of Bell through his mother. ¶ 107. We note that Bell does not argue that he was prohibited from placing evidence on this matter before the jury, that he was limited in his summation, or that he was denied an instruction in this area. Nor does he suggest that the trial judge erroneously overruled any objection to the sentencing instructions made on this ground. His argument is that the court committed plain error in failing to so instruct the jury, sua sponte. Of course, under these circumstances and the cases cited above, unless there is error and it is of such nature and degree as to constitute plain error, this argument is procedurally barred. ¶ 108. Because Bell sought no such instruction, and the State did not attempt to argue on the point, we are left to wonder what Bell's argument would have been if in fact the jury had been instructed that in deciding between life and death it was to consider the length of not only a Mississippi life sentence but also the length of the Tennessee sentence and the time that Bell would actually serve under each, and if the State had then argued the effect of the possibility of parole. ¶ 109. Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss.1984), is instructive. There, the defendant, having been convicted of capital murder while engaged in an armed robbery, was sentenced to death. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony on cross-examination of the defendant's expert, which tended to show that one sentenced to life imprisonment could expect to serve a term of not more than thirty years. Reversing, we said that [a] jury should have no concern with the quantum of punishment because it subverts a proper determination of the sentencing issue, and expressly condemned placing the issue of parole before the jury. Id. at 813. ¶ 110. Bell relies on Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657 (Miss.1990), for this proposition. However, Turner was indicted and tried as an habitual offender, and, if convicted as such, would have had no possibility of parole. There, the status hearing on the habitual offender status was not conducted prior to the sentencing hearing, and Turner, unlike Bell, presented an instruction advising the jury that if sentenced to life imprisonment, he would never be eligible for parole. Our holding in Turner was that in such cases, the status hearing should be conducted prior to sentencing. We then said: At the sentencing phase, the jury shall be entitled to know by instruction whether the defendant is eligible for parole.... Providing juries with such non -speculative information would be compliant with the dictates of logic and constitutional principles of due process and fundamental fairness. In other words, the procedure would meet the essential requirement that juries have before them  all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. Id. at 675 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). ¶ 111. In Blue v. State, supra , the defendant was tried for capital murder, but not as an habitual offender. There, the jury sent out a note asking for a definition of life imprisonment. The State said that the jury should be told that it meant ten years, and Blue objected to any response beyond the original instructions. The judge responded saying that `the law will not allow me to define `life imprisonment' for you.' Blue, 674 So.2d at 1194. Thereafter, on appeal, Blue argued that the jury did not know the meaning of the term, and that he should have been allowed to tell the jury that it meant that he would serve thirty years in prison and that his trial lawyer's failure to request such an instruction was ineffective assistance. Finding that Blue was not entitled to such an instruction, we said: We hold that the case sub judice is controlled by [ Walter] Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss.1984), in which the defendant convicted of capital murder was not a habitual offender. In Williams, this Court reasoned that as parole is not automatic, [a]llowing argument or testimony regarding the possibility of the defendant some day being paroled is in effect inviting the jury to speculate how ten years in the future [or thirty years as the case may be in the present case] the parole board may exercise its legislatively granted discretionary authority. 445 So.2d at 813. See also [ Jessie Derrell] Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 798 (Miss.1987). Because such discussion of parole is merely speculative, it would introduce into the sentencing proceedings an `arbitrary factor' proscribed by § 99-19-105(3)(a). Williams, 445 So.2d at 813. See also Williams, 544 So.2d at 799. In fact, in Mackbee, 575 So.2d at 40, this Court clearly held that the one exception to the rule forbidding jury consideration of parole issues is when a defendant is sentenced as a habitual offender under § 99-19-83. This Court reasoned that this is so because such defendants are not eligible for parole, and thus, their fate under a life imprisonment sentence is non-speculative. Blue at 1196. ¶ 112. In Simmons v. South Carolina, supra , decided after Bell's trial, the United States Supreme Court held that in a case in which propensity for future dangerous conduct is argued as a factor, and a sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an option for the jury, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that the life sentence will in fact preclude that possibility. There, the defendant requested an instruction, but it was refused and the Court instead instructed the jury that it was not to consider parole in sentencing. Recently, in U.S. v. Chandler, 950 F.Supp. 1545 (N.D.Ala.1996), the district court had the opportunity to consider the application of Simmons in a federal setting. Chandler argued that under Simmons, he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the fact that if not sentenced to death, he would serve his life sentence without the possibility of parole. The district court found Simmons inapplicable, distinguishing that case, in which the defendant's future dangerousness was said to have been argued as a sentencing criterion, from Chandler's in which, like Bell's, the only references to his dangerous propensities were made in argument responding to the defendant's evidence and argument, saying: Because the government did not place Chandler's future dangerousness into issue at the sentencing hearing, Simmons does not apply here. Id. at 1578. ¶ 113. We find this point procedurally barred and substantively without merit.