Opinion ID: 491574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effectiveness of Representation at the Sentencing Hearing7

Text: 18 The district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Elledge's counsel rendered unreasonable assistance at the sentencing phase because he failed to investigate and to present a psychiatric mitigating defense based on his client's mental deficiencies, abject childhood and history of drug and alcohol abuse. That court nevertheless determined that counsel was not ineffective because the failure did not prejudice Elledge: he would have received the same sentence even had such evidence been adduced. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. Because these conclusions are subject to plenary review by this court, 8 id. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070, 80 L.Ed.2d at 700, we shall discuss each separately.
19 As discussed earlier, the first prong in an ineffective assistance claim is whether counsel's performance was professionally unreasonable. A reviewing court, however, must be highly deferential in scrutinizing counsel's performance; the tendency and temptation to second-guess is high and must be avoided. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. Thus, we look to the particular facts of the case and determine whether the acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance to the extent that the errors caused the adversarial testing process not to work. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. 20 In this case, the claim is that counsel failed to investigate Elledge's past. 9 Specifically, the district court found that counsel made no effort either to locate an expert psychiatric witness or to put on background character testimony from family members in mitigation. 10 This factual determination is not clearly erroneous. 11 See id. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070, 80 L.Ed.2d at 700. As the court noted, counsel presented a psychiatric defense without a psychiatrist, relying instead solely on Elledge's free-form testimony about his background and mental impairments. 21 We accept the district court's view that counsel's failure at least to interrogate Elledge's relatives and to seek an expert witness was outside the range of competent assistance. See Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 744-45 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied sub nom. James v. Tyler, 474 U.S. 1026, 106 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed.2d 564 (1985), overruled in part (on other grounds), Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 n. 15 (11th Cir.1986); King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1463-64 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 2020, 85 L.Ed.2d 301 (1985). An attorney has a duty to undertake reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Elledge made his counsel aware of his unhappy and abused past; yet counsel did not even interrogate Elledge's family members to ascertain the veracity of the account or their willingness to testify. He also did not seek out potentially helpful expert witnesses. 22 Briefly stated, counsel's total failure to investigate possible witnesses, both expert and lay, when he was aware of Elledge's past and knew that mitigation was his client's sole defense, was unprofessional performance.
23
24 The district court stated that counsel for the respondent conceded that a psychiatrist such as Dr. Dorothy Lewis, who testified in Mr. Elledge's defense during the evidentiary hearing before this Court, could have been located in 1977 to testify during the sentencing proceeding.... 12 This led the court to conclude that counsel's performance fell below the standard set out in Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 744-45 (11th Cir.1985). 13 The court went on to conclude, however, that even had counsel produced such a witness the death sentence nevertheless would have been imposed. Consequently, Elledge was not prejudiced; counsel was not ineffective under Strickland; and the sixth amendment was not violated. 25 Although the district court's conclusion that the sixth amendment had not been violated is correct, the analytic framework the court used to determine that a favorable witness could have been located was inaccurate. The record reveals that the State's counsel merely acknowledged that Dr. Lewis was extant in 1977 and had formulated her clinical theories at that time. The State never conceded that a reasonably diligent investigation would have uncovered either Dr. Lewis or a similar expert who would have testified favorably at Elledge's sentencing. 26 Specifically, the district court concluded that, in 1977, counsel could have located Dr. Lewis. The test, however, is not simply whether counsel could have located a witness similar to the one eventually produced. Instead, the court must determine whether it is reasonably likely that a reasonable attorney, operating under the circumstances of the case and acting in a reasonably professional manner, would have located such a witness. 14 27 In other words, Strickland requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 1066. To prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced. If such a result was not reasonably probable, the petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate. Merely proving that someone--years later--located an expert who will testify favorably is irrelevant unless the petitioner, the eventual expert, counsel or some other person can establish a reasonable likelihood that a similar expert could have been found at the pertinent time by an ordinarily competent attorney using reasonably diligent effort. 15 28 In deciding whether a petitioner has met this burden a court must look to all the circumstances of the case and consider all the evidence presented. 16 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. In Elledge's case, he has made no showing that it was reasonably probable that an ordinary, reasonable lawyer, operating under the time and monetary constraints Elledge's counsel faced and using reasonable diligence, would have discovered a psychiatrist who would have testified as did Dr. Lewis. 17 Accordingly, Elledge cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate his mental condition and produce a favorable expert witness. 29
30 Even if Elledge's counsel had produced Dr. Lewis and Elledge's family members at the sentencing phase, we agree with the district court that Elledge was not prejudiced thereby: he nevertheless would have received the death penalty. 31 The value of Dr. Lewis's testimony was undercut in part by the revelation that her analysis largely relied on Elledge's recitations and had not been fully corroborated by independent follow-up investigation. In addition, the two court-appointed psychiatrists who examined Elledge each gave damaging evaluations that would have diluted Dr. Lewis's impact. 18 Moreover, much of the testimony elicited from Elledge's brother and sister could be used against him; e.g., their descriptions of his early violent temper, his sister's explanation of his alleged incestuous assault on her, his brother's description of Elledge as a mean guy, and their emergence as normal citizens even though they had been subjected to similar abuse and neglect. The family testimony also was cumulative to a degree since Elledge had testified to many of the particulars in question. 32 As a final point, the aggravating circumstances of the case were substantial. It cannot be gainsaid that the cruelty of the rape and the murder made it more difficult for Elledge to alter the final sentence by adducing mitigating circumstances. It is proper for a reviewing court, in deciding whether the additional evidence would have altered the eventual sentence, to consider the strength of the case presented against the defendant. 19 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699 (a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.) 33 Elledge nevertheless maintains that if the psychiatric mitigating circumstances had been presented and if those circumstances had been credited by the judge and jury, the entire evidentiary picture would have been altered. See id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699. Psychiatric mitigating evidence has this potential because it may impact the causal relationship that can exist between mental illness and homicidal behavior. Thus, psychiatric mitigating evidence not only can act in mitigation, it also could significantly weaken the aggravating factors. See Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 33-34 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920, 98 S.Ct. 393, 54 L.Ed.2d 276 (1977). 34 This argument fails, however, because a careful reading of the district court's order shows that the court--acting within its discretion as factfinder--gave little weight to the testimony of Dr. Lewis as well as that of Elledge's family members. The district court simply found that no significant mitigating evidence was adduced. Further, when the court weighed the value of Dr. Lewis's testimony, it found that the aggravating factors outweighed those presented in mitigation. See, e.g., Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 785 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 940, 83 L.Ed.2d 953 (1985); Adams v. State, 412 So.2d 850, 854, 857 (Fla.1982) (three mitigating factors, including that the capital offense was committed while defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, outweighed by three aggravating circumstances), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1506, 89 L.Ed.2d 906 (1986). There is no indication that the district court applied anything other than the reasonable probability standard or failed to weigh the overall impact of the evidence on the total evidentiary picture. 35 The foregoing discussion illustrates that Elledge has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, if adduced at trial, the psychiatric and background evidence presented in his habeas proceeding would have caused the sentencer to conclude that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. 36