Opinion ID: 287267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Filing of the Charge

Text: 2 Between October 7 and October 21, 1966, petitioner (then called the J. W. Carter Company) discharged seven Negro employees. On November 8, 1966, the EEOC received from the Tennessee Commission on Human Relations a letter containing seven charges set forth on EEOC forms and signed by the seven employees who had been discharged. Each charge related a detailed (and identical) account of the employees' experiences at the company, and each complainant alleged that she had been discharged for reasons of race or color. However, the forms on which the charges were filed did not provide a place for an oath or affidavit, and the charges were unsworn. 3 Almost six months later, on March 30, 1967, the EEOC served petitioner with seven charges. These charges were dated March 29, 1967, and contained allegations by the seven former employees that they had been discharged because of race or color. 2 The charges were signed and verified by the discharged employees. However, the detailed recital of events which had appeared in the November 8, 1966 charges was not included. The charges merely declared: 4 The J. W. Carter Shoe Company discriminates against Negroes by: 5 Restricting Employment opportunities for Minorities 6 Maintaining a discriminatory promotion program. 7 Restricting Training Opportunities for minorities. 8 Petitioner contends that because the November 8 documents did not contain sworn statements by the former employees, they were not charges within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, petitioner contends, no charges were filed within 90 days of the alleged discriminatory practices as required by section 706(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). 9 Sections 706(a) and 706(d) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a) and 2000e-5(d), provide in part: 10 (a) Whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be aggrieved    that an employer    has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall furnish such employer    with a copy of such charge and shall make an investigation of such charge.    If the Commission shall determine, after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.    11 (d) A charge under subsection (a) of this section shall be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.    12 Although a literal reading of section 706(a) would seem to require that a charge be verified at the time of filing with the Commission, a reading of the entire statute makes it clear that the Congressional intent in requiring an oath is to prevent the harassment of respondents by reckless charges. However, this purpose can be served by requiring verification before action is taken by the Commission, and this was done in the instant proceeding. Such a construction recognizes the remedial nature of the statute and does not prejudice an unwary victim of discrimination by insistence upon a formal requirement which can be supplied before the respondent is brought into the picture. Accordingly, courts have consistently held that a charge filed within ninety days of an alleged unfair practice need not be accompanied by the oath of the complainant. Sworn verification may occur later. Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7 Cir. 1968), rev'g 274 F.Supp. 776 (S.D.Ill.1967); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F.Supp. 950 (N.D.Ga.1968); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F.Supp. 117 (S.D.Ga.1967); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 67-573, (E.D.La.1967); Roig v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 67-574, (E.D.La. 1967); Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum Co., 58 Lab.Cas. ¶ 9137, 68 L.R.R.M. 2762 (W.D.Mich. June 12, 1968); Kendrick v. American Bakery Co., 58 Lab.Cas. ¶ 9146, 69 L.R.R.M. 2012 (N.D.Ga.1968); Russell v. Alpha Portland Cement Co., F.Supp., 58 Lab.Cas. ¶ 9151, 69 L.R.R.M. 2256 (N.D.Ala.1968). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b). 13 Petitioner also attempts to invoke the ninety day requirement of section 706(d) by suggesting that the variances between the November 8 charges and the March 29 charges converted the latter into a new, and different, set of charges, which would be untimely. Again, we find petitioner's reasoning unpersuasive. The March 29 charges reflect the essence of the earlier charges and merely represent an exercise of the Commission's authority to reframe charges and to use available materials and information to articulate lay complainants' charges. Union Bank v. EEOC, 408 F.2d 867, n. 6, (9 Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum Co., 58 Lab.Cas. ¶ 9137, at 6535 (W.D.Mich.1968). 14 Finally, petitioner contends that the Commission did not provide it with copies of the charges as required by section 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). Since the only charges under oath were those prepared on March 29, 1967, it is clear the Commission did comply with this requirement when it served those charges on petitioner on March 30, 1967. 3 The Commission was not required to serve the unsworn charges of November 8, 1966 on petitioner.