Opinion ID: 1060090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: venue where the carmack amendment controls

Text: The venue provisions of the Carmack Amendment pertinent to this appeal are found at former 49 U.S.C.A. § 11707: .... (d)(1) A civil action under this section may be brought against a delivering carrier (other than a rail carrier) in a district court of the United States or in a State Court. Trial, if the action is brought ... in a State court, is in a State, through which the defendant carrier operates a ... route. (2)(A) A civil action under this section may only be brought  .... (iii) against the carrier alleged to have caused the loss or damage, in the judicial district in which such loss or damage is alleged to have occurred. Clearly, under this statute venue in claims brought in a state court against a delivering carrier must be laid in a state through which the carrier operates a ... route, and a civil action against a carrier causing loss or damage to the cargo must be brought in the judicial district where loss or damage is alleged to have occurred. Flynn and Newsome assert that Hairston's claim is predicated upon the structural harm to, and resulting diminution in value of, the vehicles caused by Newsome's accident, and that this is the loss or damage referenced by subsection (d)(2)(A)(iii) of the statute. They further assert that the loss or damage occurred in Pennsylvania rather than in Virginia and, thus, they argue that the statute mandates that the action be tried in Pennsylvania. We disagree. First, these defendants disregard the fact that the damaged vehicles were not delivered to Hairston. Hairston's motion for judgment asserts a claim, alternately against each carrier, that they are liable because of failure to deliver in Danville all the vehicles consigned to them. This breach of the carriers' duty, and its associated loss to Hairston, occurred in Danville rather than in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, venue in Danville is consistent with the mandate of subsection (d)(2)(A)(iii) of the federal statute. Second, we reject the defendants' assertion that venue is improper in Danville for lack of a showing that defendants operate a ... route through Virginia as required by subsection (d)(1), since their liability is predicated on one or the other of them being the delivering carrier. We are not persuaded that the Carmack Amendment's provisions for venue are to be so narrowly construed as to mean that a carrier may only be subject to suit in a state through which it maintains regularly scheduled or published routes. Rather, we construe them to require simply that an interstate carrier, other than a rail carrier, is subject to suit only in a state through which it actually transports property. Here, the motion for judgment expressly avers that both Flynn and Newsome contracted to transport vehicles within Virginia, that Flynn had delivered vehicles into Virginia in the past, and that both Flynn and Newsome actually delivered vehicles in Virginia in the current instance. Defendants have not controverted these facts. We hold that on the facts as pled, these carriers operated a route through Virginia as contemplated by subsection (d)(1) of the federal Act. For these reasons, we further hold that Danville is a permissible venue with respect to the claims against Flynn and Newsome, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the action against them on venue grounds. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.