Opinion ID: 1513273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Taking of Park Land.

Text: The building of the expressway requires the taking of a portion of park land in the City. 17 Del.C. § 175 provides in part: For the purposes of this subchapter the Department may acquire private or public property and property rights for controlled-access facilities and service roads, including rights of access, air, view, and light, by gift, device, purchase, or condemnation   . This section is an explicit grant of power to the Department to condemn property already devoted to a public purpose. Plaintiffs contend, however, that this power is limited within municipalities by § 134(a) above quoted. This subsection does not apply to cases otherwise provided in this section. Subsection (b), as we have already held, dispenses with municipal consent to the construction of a highway through the municipality unless the width of a street is changed. Plaintiffs rely also on 17 Del.C. § 173, which provides in part: The Department, acting alone or in cooperation with any other governmental agency or political subdivision of this State or with any Federal, State, or local agency of any other State having authority to participate in the construction and maintenance of highways, may plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide controlled-access facilities for public use wherever the Department is of opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special facilities, provided, that within cities and towns such authority shall be subject to such municipal consent as may be provided by law. They say that the last clause of this section requires the consent of both City Council and of the Park Board to the taking of park land. This is a misreading of the language. Municipal consent is required only when required by law. As we have seen, no such consent is required here unless the width of a street is changed, and then only from the governing body, i. e., the Council. The Vice Chancellor held that the Department had the power to condemn park land for the expressway, and we agree. The foregoing holding disposes of plaintiffs' final contention. The conclusion must be that plaintiffs have no legal grievance, and the Vice Chancellor's decision to grant the Department's motion for summary judgment was correct. We are not without sympathy for the plaintiffs and other property owners in like case. The sudden and drastic community changes that flow from the construction of these super-highways are understandably highly unpleasant to citizens whose homes are sacrificed to the modern demand for speed. But a reading of the record has convinced us that the Highway Department and the Wilmington City Council scrupulously observed the law. The judgment of the Court of Chancery is affirmed.