Opinion ID: 2808990
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doyle Errors

Text: Ceballos argues that, on three occasions, Government witnesses improperly testified that she invoked her rights to counsel and to remain silent. In particular, she challenges the comments below as violations of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). As Ceballos failed to object in all instances, our review is again for plain error. See United States v. Andaverde–Tinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 518 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1912 (2014).
During Agent McCarthy’s direct testimony, Government counsel asked whether Ceballos told the agent anything during or after her arrest. Agent McCarthy explained that once Ceballos was out of her vehicle, he recited her 19 Case: 13-50786 Document: 00513080900 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/16/2015 No. 13-50786 Miranda rights in Spanish and asked whether she understood her rights and whether she was willing to speak with or without an attorney present. According to Agent McCarthy, after he repeated the question, another agent approached and asked Ceballos whether or not she wanted an attorney. Agent McCarthy testified that Ceballos “answered that, yes, she did want an attorney, then all incriminating questions were stopped.”
Defense counsel also questioned Agent McCarthy regarding his initial approach and questioning of Ceballos. Specifically, counsel asked Agent McCarthy whether he asked “[Ceballos] if she wanted to make any statements.” Agent McCarthy responded: I asked her what she was doing there. She said she was there to collect child support. . . . That’s when I went ahead and Mirandized her. And the Defendant at first was very evasive in answering the question whether she understood her rights. . . . [A]s I testified earlier, she finally said she understood her rights and she was . . . not willing to make any statements without her attorney present. At this point, Agent McCarthy placed Ceballos in the CBP vehicle.
Defense counsel questioned Agent Contreras regarding the procedure for determining what information is included in a CBP report, prompting the following exchange: Q. And when you’re putting your report together and you’re talking about an initial arrest, do you get to ask your agents, tell me what statements were made by the Defendant at the arrest site? A. When I spoke to the agents, I asked them what happened. They gave me everything that occurred, but I don’t recall getting that information until later when we spoke with the AUSA. Everything that I was told by the agents when I spoke to them, the last I remember is that she invoked her right to counsel, of what they said and from what I saw in the report. 20 Case: 13-50786 Document: 00513080900 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/16/2015 No. 13-50786
A defendant’s rights are violated when the prosecutor comments on the fact that a defendant has chosen to remain silent following her arrest and receipt of the Miranda warnings. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617–18. “A prosecutor’s or witness’s remarks constitute comment on a defendant’s silence if the manifest intent was to comment on the defendant’s silence, or if the character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally and necessarily so construe the remark.” United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1464 (5th Cir. 1992). “Both the intent of the prosecutor and the character of the remarks are determined by reviewing the context in which they occur, and the burden of proving such intent is on the defendant.” United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1303 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted)). Ceballos has not shown any Doyle error that was “clear or obvious,” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. In his opening remarks, Ceballos’s counsel mentioned multiple times that Ceballos invoked her rights to silence and to counsel. Counsel also commented on Ceballos’s defense, including her belief—expressed at the time of her arrest—that she had been set up by her ex-husband in a ploy to avoid his child-support obligations. Accordingly, the Government had reason to question Agent McCarthy regarding Ceballos’s statements at the time of her arrest: to test whether Ceballos advised the agents of the misunderstanding and of the plot against her. As a result, we cannot say that Ceballos has discharged her burden, on plain error, to establish that the direct-examination testimony was “manifest[ly] inten[ded]” to comment on her silence or was of such a character as to lead the jury “naturally and necessarily” to so construe it, Carter, 953 F.2d at 1464. See also United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding no Doyle violation where prosecutor intended for the witness to comment on actual statements made by the defendant yet 21 Case: 13-50786 Document: 00513080900 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/16/2015 No. 13-50786 inadvertently caused the witness to comment on the defendant’s silence). Further, given the substance of his opening statement, defense counsel at least arguably opened the door to the challenged testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez–Larraga, 517 F.3d 258, 268 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing an exception to Doyle that permits a prosecutor to reference a defendant’s post-Miranda silence in order to respond to some contention of the defendant concerning her post-arrest behavior). As for the testimony on cross-examination, not only were the objectionable statements elicited by defense counsel rather than by the Government, but they were directly responsive to the questions posed. The question to Agent McCarthy was whether he asked “[Ceballos] if she wanted to make any statements,” and the question to Agent Contreras pertained to the process of completing a CBP report—including, critically, how and why the report came to omit Ceballos’s statement to Agent McCarthy that she had been at the location to collect child support. In neither case can we say, through the prism of plain error, that the manifest intent of the witness’s remarks, or their natural and necessary construction, was to comment on Ceballos’s silence in a way that improperly implied her guilt. See Carter, 953 F.2d at 1464.