Opinion ID: 78332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Seizure & Arrest

Text: Lopez-Garcia says that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was stopped by Officer Maldonado. We disagree. The Fourth Amendment provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of this provision. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). It is by now well established that a law enforcement officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of a vehicle, analogous to a Terry -stop, if the seizure is justified by specific articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). An inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity is not sufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, [w]hen making a determination of reasonable suspicion, we must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Id. (internal quotation marks removed). Adopting this perspective is important, as the Supreme Court has observed, because it allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, Officer Maldonado's suspicion that the defendant was engaged in a hand-to-hand drug transaction was supported by several specific, objective, and articulable facts. First, Lopez-Garcia's vehicle was stopped in the roadway; second, the activity took place in a high-crime area known specifically for street-level, hand-to-hand drug transactions; third, an unknown person was seen leaning into the window and having a conversation with the defendant; and fourth, once they saw Officer Maldonado, the individual abruptly withdrew from the car window, and Lopez-Garcia began to drive away. Taking all of these facts in concert, we are satisfied that Officer Maldonado had reasonable suspicion to stop Lopez-Garcia's vehicle. See also United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 707, 709 (11th Cir.1991) (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop driver sitting in parked car with headlights on in the early morning hours in a lot near several businesses that had recently been robbed). The district court was surely correct in observing that a defendant's presence in a high-crime area, standing alone, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. But Maldonado's suspicion was not just based on the area in which the conduct was observed; it was also based on specific features of the individuals' conduct. Nor does the fact that Officer Maldonado never witnessed any actual exchange between Lopez-Garcia and his brother-in-law preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion. Indeed, no single factor is dispositive in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in any particular context. Rather, the determination whether reasonable suspicion exists must be made on a case-by-case basis, and each Fourth Amendment determination must finally turn on its own facts. United States v. De Gutierrez, 667 F.2d 16, 19 (5th Cir.1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Maldonado's arrest of Lopez-Garcia for possession of methamphetamine also comported with the Fourth Amendment. The reasonableness of a seizure or arrest under the Fourth Amendment turns on the presence or absence of probable cause. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials have facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime. Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the substance and the paraphernalia recovered from the consensual search of Lopez-Garcia's vehicle, Maldonado reasonably believed that the defendant was in possession of methamphetamine. [2]