Opinion ID: 1193933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retaliation in the Form of Constructive Discharge

Text: Fischer also appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on her claim that Defendant, in violation of Title VII, constructively discharged her in retaliation for her complaints of sex discrimination. See Sitar v. Ind. DOT, 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); see also Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., Inc., 361 F.3d 1021, 1032 (7th Cir.2004) (discussing how constructive discharge can serve as the adverse employment action in a retaliation claim). This too can be proved through either a direct method or indirect method. See Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 787-88 (7th Cir.2006). Unlike Fischer's failure to promote claim, here she proceeds under the direct method. Under this approach, summary judgment must be denied if Fischer presents direct evidence . . . that [s]he engaged in protected activity . . . and as a result suffered the adverse employment action of which [s]he complains. Id. at 787 (quoting Stone v. City of Indianapolis Public Utilities Division, 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002)). Summary judgment may still be granted however, if Defendant then presents unrebutted evidence that he would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff even if he had no retaliatory motive. Id. at 787-88 (quoting Stone, 281 F.3d at 644). In order to show a retaliatory motive on Defendant's part under the direct method, Plaintiff can present[ ] sufficient circumstantial evidence such that a jury could infer retaliation. Id. at 788 (citing Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 546 (2005)). Here, Fischer claims that she engaged in protected activity that led to her being constructively discharged from Avanade. [7] Constructive discharge does constitute an adverse employment action and is deemed to have occurred when the plaintiff . . . show[s] that she was forced to resign because her working conditions, from the standpoint of the reasonable employee, had become unbearable. EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 331 (7th Cir.2002). Constructive discharge can take on two different forms. The district court analyzed Fischer's claim under the first form, where an employee resigns due to alleged discriminatory harassment. Id. Under this approach, we require the plaintiff to demonstrate a discriminatory work environment `even more egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment.' Id. at 331-32 (quoting Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1078, 121 S.Ct. 777, 148 L.Ed.2d 675 (2001)). Fischer contends that the second form is more fitting to her claim  that, [w]hen an employer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable employee that she will be terminated, and the plaintiff employee resigns, the employer's conduct may amount to constructive discharge. Id. at 332. In other words, constructive discharge also occurs where, based on an employers actions, `the handwriting [was] on the wall' and the axe was about to fall. Id. (quoting Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir.1998)). The first matter to address is whether Fischer engaged in statutorily protected activity. An employer cannot discriminate against an employee for voicing opposition to employment practices deemed unlawful under Title VII, Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 265 (7th Cir.2001), but at the same time, the [employee's] complaint must indicate the discrimination occurred because of sex, race, national origin, or some other protected class. Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir.2006); Sitar, 344 F.3d at 727 (Although an employee need not use the magic words `sex' or `gender discrimination' to bring her speech within Title VII's retaliation protections, `she has to at least say something to indicate her [gender] is an issue.') (quoting Miller v. Am. Family Mutual Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1008 (7th Cir.2000)). Here, Defendant concedes that Fischer's participation in the April 11, 2005 conference call with Avanade's CEO and her filing of an EEOC charge on July 21, 2005 constituted protected activity. Fischer contends however, that her complaints in 2003 and 2004 to Mendel regarding morale building dinners at a gentleman's club, as well as her questioning Human Resources Specialist Spielmann as to whether Lewis' and Sieverding's promotions were all set up, also constitute statutorily protected activity. We need not decide this issue, because regardless of whether Fischer's first statutorily protected act occurred in 2003 or April 11, 2005, Fischer has not shown that Defendant's alleged response to these actions indicated that the axe was about to fall when Fischer submitted her resignation on September 30, 2005. Fischer points to a series of events that she claims reflect that the handwriting was on the wall regarding Avanade's intent to terminate her: 1) the audit of her cellular and broadband expenses following the filing of her EEOC charge; 2) Director of Human Resources Friendman asking Fischer, after she filed her EEOC charge, What is it that you are looking for . . . a new role within Avanade, a transfer to another region, money?; 3) General Manager Slattery's August 2005 negative assessment of Fischer's participation on a leadership team; 4) what Fischer expected to be a forthcoming, negative annual review from Practice Director Lewis; 5) Defendant requiring Fischer to either move to Chicago to maintain her current position, or else transfer to another region; and 6) only offering Fischer one transfer option  to government opportunities, a historically difficult line of work. Fischer then places these incidents against the backdrop of an alleged environment at Avanade where women are discriminated against. Although Fischer has set forth a long list of incidents which she claims support a finding of constructive discharge, we cannot say that these incidents, when viewed in the aggregate, would cause a reasonable person to believe that the writing was on the wall regarding Fischer's future at Avanade. We reach this conclusion despite the fact that, as Fischer correctly points out, the Supreme Court in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415-16, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006), did not limit what constitutes a materially adverse employment action to a specified list of actions, as the district court did below. Instead, under Burlington Northern, the question is whether, when considering the particular circumstances and context of this case, a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have found the action materially adverse. Id. The fact however, that under such a standard this Court may consider an employer's exploitation of a particular employee's vulnerabilities, see Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.2005), does not mean that exploitation of that kind has occurred here. Fischer fails to point to any details, aside from perhaps her prior negative experience working in government opportunities, that make any of the incidents she references particularly unique or egregious to her circumstances. Even with respect to her transfer however, this cannot be said to be materially adverse when the government opportunities position was offered as an alternative to participation in a department-wide restructuring, and the new position allowed Fischer to maintain her current title, salary, benefits, and primary responsibilities. We are mindful of the fact that the incidents described by Fischer  an audit, negative performance reviews, and a requirement to either relocate or transfer departments  are not circumstances an employee would wish upon herself. A look at cases where evidence of constructive discharge has been found to exist however, reveals that the incidents Fischer references are insufficient to establish that her working conditions . . . had become unbearable. In University of Chicago Hospitals for example, this Court found that the writing was on the wall when, after the employee had been warned of her employer's intention to terminate her and having been told that a mistake on her part was the last straw, the employee arrived at work after vacation only to find her desk packed up, boxes piled up, and her office being used for storage. 276 F.3d at 332. Similarly, in Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., this Court affirmed a jury's finding of constructive discharge when the plaintiff suffered a drastic reduction in duties following her whistle-blowing action, was made to feel like a traitor by her supervisor for this action, and could not be assured that she would be kept safe at work from the person she had ratted out. 191 F.3d 827, 830-31 (7th Cir.1999). Here, despite the audit and the negative assessment by Slattery, unlike University of Chicago Hospitals, Fischer has not pointed to any evidence indicating that there had even been so much as a whisper on Avanade's part of a desire to terminate her. To the contrary, when Fischer decided to opt out of the relocation requirement for the restructured U.S. Delivery Center, Slattery and Lewis assisted Fischer in locating an alternative PM position. Moreover, unlike Neal, no reduction in duties occurred. Rather, Fischer, after declining to relocate, was given a parallel position in a different department where she maintained the same title, salary, benefits, and primary responsibilities. That being said, Fischer could perhaps defeat summary judgment on this claim if she were able to show that, despite seemingly maintaining her compensation, position, and responsibilities on paper, her transfer did in fact set her on a dead-end path towards termination. This indeed is what Fischer argues, contending that working in government opportunities would prevent her from meeting her performance goals and thus lead to her discharge. There is insufficient evidence however, to support Fischer's contention. All Fischer points to is Avanade's struggle in government engagements in 2002, without any evidence concerning Avanade's status in this area in 2005. Furthermore, Fischer did not provide ample time to test her hypothesis regarding the dead-end nature of her new position, since she tendered her resignation on September 30, 2005, merely a few weeks after accepting the transfer. Because Fischer is unable to show that she was constructively discharged, there is no need for this Court to address the issue of retaliatory motive, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment for Defendant on this claim.