Opinion ID: 27331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wrongful Disclosure

Text: With regard to the wrongful disclosure claim under 26 U.S.C. § 7431, applicable to violations of the confidentiality requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 6103, we agree with the district court’s analysis of this issue. The comments of IRS spokesman Holmes made to the Conroe Courier reporter were of a general nature, were not based on personal knowledge of the Harrises’ “return information” under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2), and do not constitute the disclosure of such. Holmes was instead discussing general IRS policies. The record indicates that IRS officer Luckey was the source of the statement in the article that “IRS agents on hand . . . confirmed that the taxes owed by the Harrises for a five-year period beginning in 1978 totaled in the ‘hundreds of thousands of dollars.’” To the extent that the public record federal court judgment, on file with the county real estate records as well, was the “immediate source” of this disclosed information, a violation of § 6103 did not occur. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1321 n.1, 1323 (5th Cir. 1997). In her affidavit Luckey stated: I explained [to the reporter] that there was a judgment on record in the Montgomery County Court House which was a matter of public record and that he could obtain a copy from the clerk. I explained that the recorded judgment listed the plaintiffs’ liability which, beginning in 1978, totaled in the amount of hundreds of thousands of dollars. 5 To the extent that there was a material issue of fact as to whether the immediate source of the disclosure of the Harrises’ tax liability was the judgment itself, we agree with the district court that the disclosure was nevertheless subject to the good faith defense of § 7431(b). We have little to add to the district court’s analysis, but make the following observations to respond to certain arguments raised on appeal. The Harrises argue that Johnson and its rejection of a general “public records” exception to § 6103 was already clearly established at the time of the conduct in issue, because the district court in Johnson had already ruled. In Huckaby v. United States, 794 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir. 1986), we held that the good faith defense under § 7431(b) is analogous to the civil rights qualified immunity defense, which looks to whether the official violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Under analogous civil rights law, we have stated that in determining whether a right is clearly established, we are confined to precedent from our circuit or the Supreme Court. Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the district court’s decision in Johnson did not in our view “clearly establish” the absence of a public records exception for purposes of the § 7431(b) good faith exception. To the extent that uncertainty might exist on this question, we should find the good faith exception applicable, since the good faith exception limits the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, and such waivers must be strictly construed in favor of the government. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). 6 The Harrises also argue that the government waived the good faith defense by failing to assert it in its answer. The government did assert the defense in its motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, filed before the district granted plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. Regardless, we again note that the good faith defense is a limitation on the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity the district court had no jurisdiction. Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994). Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and sua sponte by the court. Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 218 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996). The court of appeals has a duty to consider, sua sponte if necessary, the basis of the district court’s jurisdiction. Solsona v. Warden, F.C.I., 821 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987). AFFIRMED. 7