Opinion ID: 2995706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevant Conduct/Reasonable

Text: Foreseeability Mr. Gutierrez argues that a four- kilogram quantity was not reasonably foreseeable to him because the conspiracy he entered into with Marin and Jose was for the sale of two kilograms. Mr. Gutierrez argues that, because he pleaded guilty to conspiracy, the relevant conduct for which he can be held responsible under U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3 is co-extensive with the responsibility under the conspiratorial agreement. This argument is incorrect. Under U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3, a defendant’s base offense level is computed on the basis of both his count(s) of conviction and all relevant conduct. When a drug offense is involved, relevant conduct encompasses all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction, U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(2), including all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or wilfully caused by the defendant. See U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Thus, whether or not Mr. Gutierrez’s effort to reacquire the lost kilograms was part of the conspiracy to distribute them initially, his personal involvement in the September transaction renders it relevant conduct. When a conspiracy defendant personally engages in illegal conduct, his actions are deemed relevant conduct for sentencing purposes without resort to the reasonable foreseeability test of U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). For example, in United States v. Crockett, 82 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 1996), a defendant cocaine supplier argued that his sale to a co-conspirator, who by then was cooperating with authorities, did not constitute relevant conduct in part because the transaction was made after the conspiracy had ended and thus the drugs involved were not reasonably foreseeable to him. We held the defendant’s argument mistaken because the transaction involved his own conduct and therefore the requirement of reasonable foreseeability did not apply. Id. at 729 n.3; see also United States v. Dorsey, 209 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2000) (gun possession that defendant personally aided by supplying purchase money was relevant conduct without resort to the reasonable foreseeability analysis of U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)); United States v. Corral-Ibarra, 25 F.3d 430, 438 (7th Cir. 1994) (defendant who played direct, personal role in drug transaction liable for entire quantity of drugs involved without resort to reasonable foreseeability analysis)./1 The same is true here; Mr. Gutierrez went to the Popeye’s for the specific purpose of meeting Marin and accepting delivery of the two kilograms of cocaine. Mr. Gutierrez personally committed the wrongful act, and the district court did not clearly err by attributing the two kilograms of cocaine to him as relevant conduct under sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) without resorting to the reasonable foreseeable analysis of sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).