Opinion ID: 1184955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fourth Did the trial court properly admit evidence of other crimes committed by defendant?

Text: Yes. In an unsolicited statement which defendant made to St. Louis police officers on November 5, 1965, he admitted robbing and killing the Bowens in San Diego and thereafter robbing and killing a man in Dallas, whose name he did not recall, and robbing and attempting to kill a Mr. Thomas in St. Louis. A Dallas County medical examiner testified that on April 26, 1965, he performed an autopsy on the body of William Ward in Dallas; that Mr. Ward's death had been caused by a stab wound into his heart; and that there were innumerable other cuts and bruises on his body. Two detectives from the Dallas Police Department testified with respect to their investigation of the crime, indicating that the victim had been brutally cut, beaten, and robbed and that defendant's fingerprints had been found in the victim's room. Mr. Bascom Minus, of Dallas, testified that he owned a labor pool; that Mr. Ward and defendant had been members of the pool; that on April 26, 1965, defendant, who had not reported for work that day, appeared and asked if the checks were ready; and that when asked why he had not shown up for work, defendant said that he and Mr. Ward had drunk some bad whiskey and that Mr. Ward was at home in bed ill. Thereafter, apparently no one saw Mr. Ward alive. A St. Louis police officer testified as to the details of the attempted killing of Mr. Thomas in St. Louis on November 5, 1965, the victim having been slashed across the abdomen from one side completely to the other and severely beaten. The officer testified that defendant admitted to him that he and Mr. Thomas were roommates and that he had robbed Mr. Thomas and tried to suffocate him but then changed his mind and merely tied him to the bed. The People also presented evidence that about 5 a.m. on April 1, 1965, shortly after robbing and attacking the Bowens, defendant, through a ruse, gained entrance to the home of Diana Dawson, the stepdaughter of his brother, and raped her, threatening to kill her two-year-old son if she did not do as he told her, and that when defendant and his victim heard a radio broadcast indicating that an elderly couple at the yacht club where he was employed had been brutally attacked, defendant, protesting his innocence, fled in a stolen automobile. Another woman testified that in August 1959 she had met defendant in a bar and thereafter accepted his offer to drive her home; that he drove her into an area where there were no houses and sought to rape her; that she was able to hide in some bushes, but he threatened to kill her if she did not come out; that he subsequently found her and raped her; that while they were returning to the city, she opened the door and put her leg out; that a police car happened to come by at that time and pursued them; that defendant rammed the police car several times, and he and the police officer exchanged shots; and that she thereafter told the police what had taken place. Albert Ackert, a member of the San Diego Police Department, testified that in August 1959 his attention was attracted to a vehicle from which a woman's leg was protruding; that he gave chase; that the driver accelerated his speed to between 70 and 80 miles an hour; that the driver rammed into the right side of the police car two or three times, pushing it onto the center island of the highway; that thereafter he (Officer Ackert) fired four shots at the right rear tire of the other automobile; that at this time the driver slowed down and pulled over; that defendant was the person who was driving the other car; and that the car defendant was driving was a stolen automobile. [8] Defendant was charged in the present indictment with the rape of Diana Dawson and with car theft, and he pleaded guilty to such charges. The record does not show that he was charged with, or convicted of, the other crimes hereinabove enumerated. However, under our holding in People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal.2d 503, 542 [30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394], this fact is immaterial as long as the evidence was relevant on the issue of punishment. The fact that a defendant who is charged with first degree murder thereafter killed or attempted to kill another person is relevant to show that his state of mind was such that he was not revulsed by the prior killing but was willing to kill again. ( People v. Bentley, 58 Cal.2d 458, 461 [24 Cal. Rptr. 685, 374 P.2d 645].) Accordingly, the evidence on the killing in Dallas, the attempted killing in St. Louis, and the threat made to Diana Dawson to kill her son was clearly admissible. Since the evidence shows that defendant's raping Mrs. Dawson and fleeing in a stolen automobile occurred almost immediately after he robbed and viciously attacked the Bowens, his behavior on the day in question may be said to constitute a criminal spree. [9] Under the circumstances, evidence that on another occasion defendant indulged in massive violations of the law, such as he did in August 1959, when he stole an automobile, raped a woman, and then attempted to ram a police car with the car he was driving (such action constituting an assault with a deadly weapon) and shot at the police officer driving the car, is relevant on the issue of punishment as showing a recurrent behavior, since the jury might conclude that the behavior would probably or possibly recur again if defendant should be given a life sentence and eventually be paroled. (See People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d 137, 143-145; People v. Ketchel, supra, 59 Cal.2d 503, 542 [48].) [10] It will be noted that the killing in Dallas and the attempted killing in St. Louis were admitted by defendant in his extrajudicial statement. However, the People introduced ample corroborating evidence with respect to the commission of those crimes. As a result, the rule that a defendant's extrajudicial admissions are inadmissible without other proof that the crimes had been committed ( People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal.2d 105, 129 [18] [32 Cal. Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412]) is inapplicable.