Opinion ID: 1684864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Circuit Court's Voir Dire

Text: For his first argument under this section, Anderson asserts that the circuit court erred in conducting voir dire by repeatedly interrupting and stifling defense counsel's questioning of potential jurors. He quotes, in his brief, several instances in which the circuit court limited his counsel's individual voir dire of potential jurors to those questions and topics previously approved by the court. The extent and scope of voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Ark. R.Crim. P. 32.2; Isom v. State, 356 Ark. 156, 148 S.W.3d 257 (2004); Bader v. State, 344 Ark. 241, 40 S.W.3d 738 (2001). Permitting a general voir dire and then a specific, individual voir dire falls readily within the circuit court's discretion with respect to the extent and scope of voir dire. The exchanges objected to in Anderson's brief deal with questions to the prospective jurors about the following subjects: (a) favoring one child over another; (b) personal knowledge of one who was mentally retarded; (c) the type of domestic violence incurred; and (d) a spouse's employment in the circuit clerk's office. While perhaps intriguing questions based upon the defense's theory of the case, we cannot say that these topics were so plainly appropriate as to sustain a finding that the circuit court abused its discretion in limiting counsel's ability to inquire. See Bader v. State, supra . The court did so on the basis that counsel's questions would have been more appropriate during the general voir dire, but counsel failed to inquire at that time. There was no abuse of the circuit court's discretion.