Opinion ID: 1400019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: extreme emotional distress

Text: Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant was not acting under an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of his wife's death. In this regard we noted in Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 805 (Ky.2003)(quoting Coffey v. Messer, 945 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Ky.1997)), that once evidence was produced to prove the existence of EED, `its absence be[came] an element of the offense.' Moreover, KRS 500.070 establishes that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving every element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the essential elements are set out in KRS 507.020 (murder) and KRS 507.030 (manslaughter). In regard to how EED fits into this statutory pattern, our prior decisions have established that A person is guilty of murder under KRS 507.020(1)(a) if he/she intentionally causes the death of another, except that in any prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree under KRS 507.030(1)(b) if he/she intentionally causes the death of another under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in subsection (1)(a) of KRS 507.020. Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355, 356-57 (Ky.2001) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986)). Thus, the same act, or series of acts, may be murder or manslaughter in the first degree depending on a finding of EED. Admittedly, there have been some inconsistencies in our prior decisions concerning which party is properly encumbered with the burden of proof. However, our more recent opinions have categorized EED, or more properly, the absence of it, as an element of the substantive offense, rather than as a defense. See Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792 (Ky.2003); Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787 (Ky.2001); Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky.1999); Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669 (Ky.1994); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 878 S.W.2d 18 (Ky.1994); Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 811 (Ky.1991) overruled on other grounds by Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416 (Ky.1998); Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky.1980) overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867(Ky.1981). Justice Cooper, in his Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 3.21, (1999) includes the absence of EED as an element of the crime of murder. Yet, in his comment to Section 3.21, he notes that this inclusion is controlled by the evidence presented. Id. In Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Ky.2000), we explained that [a]lthough the Commonwealth must prove every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth need not affirmatively disprove EED unless the evidence of EED is so overwhelming that it necessitates acquittal on the charge of murder. (Emphasis added). Stated more simply, the Commonwealth is only required to affirmatively disprove EED when there is enough evidence presented to the fact finder that the defendant would otherwise be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because of the presence of EED. As was aptly stated in Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Ky. 1985), [t]he presence or absence of extreme emotional distress is a matter of evidence .... They are a matter of the circumstances of each homicide. An instruction on murder need not require the jury to find that the defendant was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance unless there is something in the evidence to suggest that he was, thereby affording room for a reasonable doubt ... Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 109 (Ky.1980)(emphasis added). Conversely, when there is evidence, the instruction should be included. Thus, where proof is presented that would support the finding of EED, and the absence of EED is then a statutory element, then the burden switches to the Commonwealth to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. But that does not mean that it has to affirmatively introduce proof of the non-existence of EED, if such proof is already present. The Commonwealth loses if no such proof is present, but where, as here, the proof, when taken in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, meets this burden, it is then a jury question. Although EED is essentially a restructuring of the old common law concept of heat of passion, the evidence needed to prove EED is different. There must be evidence that the defendant suffered a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986). [T]he event which triggers the explosion of violence on the part of the criminal defendant must be sudden and uninterrupted. It is not a mental disease or illness. . . . Thus, it is wholly insufficient for the accused defendant to claim the defense of extreme emotional disturbance based on a gradual victimization from his or her environment, unless the additional proof of a triggering event is sufficiently shown. Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted). And the extreme emotional disturbance . . . [must have a] reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Spears, 30 S.W.3d at 155. Thus, under Spears , given the evidence introduced, the burden of proof in this case was on the Commonwealth, and the absence of EED was a proper element of the charge. However, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). It must be remembered it is not the court but a jury that must make a factual determination of whether a particular defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at 467. The courts will test the sufficiency of the evidence, and we have to view it in a light most favorable to the prosecution; however, once found sufficient, it is for the jury to find the facts, and they are not bound to view it in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Although there certainly was evidence from which a jury could have found the presence of EED, in this instance  the same evidence also supported the contrary conclusion. Thus, we cannot say the jury was wrong when, after hearing all the evidence, it returned a verdict convicting Appellant of murder. Under the evidence presented, it was clearly not unreasonable for the jury to do so. Thus, hopefully these questions will now be laid to rest. In summary, (1) if EED is made an issue by the evidence, an instruction including it as an element of the crime should be given; (2) in the same instance (being a statutory element in the case), it then becomes an element of the crime, and the burden of proof lies with the Commonwealth; (3) the courts will then test the sufficiency of the proof, if properly presented and preserved, both at trial, upon a motion for directed verdict, and insufficiency of the evidence on appeal; but, (4) if the evidence passes the test, the question is one for the jury, as was the case here. Therefore, we find no error.