Opinion ID: 1170873
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions on the Special Circumstance

Text: (18a) Another difficulty appears in the relationship of the doctrine of People v. Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, to the special circumstance instructions. The only special circumstance alleged in this case was that the murder took place during the commission of a burglary. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii).) As the court pointed out in its instructions on the felony-murder rule, defendant might have entered the apartment the second time either to engage in further theft or to murder Reed. On the guilt issue, the court correctly instructed the jury on the Ireland exception  i.e., that the felony-murder rule could apply only if the jury found the second entry was for the independent purpose of theft and not for the purpose of murder. On the special circumstance issue, however, the court did not specifically instruct on that exception. But it did instruct the jury, pursuant to People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pages 61 to 62 (decided under the relevantly similar 1977 death penalty law), that it could not find the special circumstance true unless it first found that the burglary was committed in order to advance an independent felonious purpose  i.e., that the special circumstance would not be established if the burglary was merely incidental to the murder. We shall assume for argument's sake that the doctrine of Ireland is applicable to the felony-murder special circumstance. From that assumption it follows that the court was obligated to instruct the jury that it was required to find that the second entry was not for the purpose of murder but for the independent purpose of theft. But as noted above, the court effectively told the jury to make such a finding by instructing it on independent felonious purpose pursuant to Green. Accordingly, the court cannot be deemed to have erred under Ireland.