Opinion ID: 1918907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Final Order

Text: The trial court conducted a hearing at which all parties were present on all three challenged acts  Act No. 288, Act No. 357, and the validating Act No. 531 enacted by the legislature in 2004. On June 28, 2004, the trial court entered its order. The court noted that the issue before it was narrowly defined: whether, as the City and the County argued, a bill must receive the affirmative vote of a majority of a quorum, or whether, as the Authority and the Legislature argued, a bill must receive only the affirmative vote of a majority of the yea and nay votes cast in the presence of a quorum. Recognizing that [t]here is every presumption in favor of the validity of legislation, the trial court also acknowledged the power vested in courts at least since Marbury v. Madison [, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),] ... to decide all questions regarding the constitutionality of statutes. Looking to the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, the trial court determined that the evidence from that convention indicated that a majority of each house, as that phrase is used in § 63, means a majority of a quorum. The trial court cited cases in which this Court has addressed the meaning of the phrase majority of each house, such as State ex rel. Woodward v. Skeggs, 154 Ala. 249, 46 So. 268 (1908), Farmers' Union Warehouse Co. v. McIntosh, 1 Ala.App. 407, 56 So. 102 (1911), and Opinion of the Justices No. 30, 228 Ala. 140, 152 So. 901 (1934), and concluded that those cases supported the position advanced by the City and the County. The trial court considered rules employed by the legislature and concluded that the rules cited in support of the position advanced by the Authority and the Legislature actually deal not with the issue before it but with the limited question of what constitutes a quorum. The trial court then considered a common-law voting rule that supports the Authority's position and concluded that the common-law rule applies to decisions made in elections and in business proceedings rather than in legislatures. Finally, the trial court considered the fact that the legislature has employed its voting practice for many years, as a matter of local legislative courtesy. [5] The trial court stated that the framers of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 intended to remove power from the counties and to vest it in Montgomery. Therefore, the trial court concluded, the practice of local legislative courtesy was not constitutionally sanctioned, and, thus, could not support the interpretation of § 63 advanced by the Authority and the Legislature. The trial court then addressed Act No. 531, the attempted validation legislation. The trial court noted that House Bill 814, the bill that became Act No. 531, received 39 affirmative votes and 8 abstentions in the House, but that there were 102 members present in the House. Thus, the trial court concluded, House Bill 814 would have had to have received a majority of that number, or 52 votes, in order to pass the House, and it did not. Therefore, the trial court concluded, Act No. 531 is also void. Confronting the implication that its order could potentially affect hundreds or thousands of local legislative acts, and despite its previous references to Act No. 531, the trial court stated that it was ruling only on the validity of Act No. 288 and Act No. 357, not on the validity of Act No. 531 or any other act: If there are consequences to other bills not before this Court, the appellate courts have the power to fashion an appropriate and practical remedy to lessen the impact upon existing law. The trial court held that the requirement of § 63 that a bill pass by a favorable vote of a majority of each house means that a bill must receive a favorable vote of a majority of a quorum. Because there are 105 members of the House, a quorum is 53 members. Because a majority of 53 is 27, the trial court held that a bill must receive at least 27 votes in the House in order to pass. Because the bills that became Act No. 288 and Act No. 357 each received fewer than 27 votes, the trial court declared them unconstitutional. The trial court ordered the Authority to continue to collect fees and charges in lieu of taxes and to place them in escrow pending a final disposition of the case. The trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P. The Authority, along with the Legislature and the State, petitioned this Court for permission to appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P. This Court granted the petition and held oral argument on this case on March 1, 2005.