Opinion ID: 2298009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Question One: Right to Counsel

Text: Grandison argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel, in a capital case, after he filed various motions seeking a new trial, a reopened post conviction, [and] a new sentencing. Grandison draws our attention to State v. Walker, 417 Md. 589, 11 A.3d 811 (2011), in which we quoted a case that summarized aptly the right of a defendant in a criminal case to the assistance of counsel, id. at 596-97, 11 A.3d at 816. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the same right to the assistance of counsel, including the right to the appointment of counsel in the case of the indigent defendant, in state criminal prosecutions[.] Central to the cases dealing with the right to counsel is the recognition that the assistance of a lawyer is essential to assure a fair trial[.] Consequently, because essential fairness is lacking if an accused cannot put his case effectively in court ... and because it is unlikely that an accused will be able to present his case effectively without the assistance of counsel, a conviction cannot be allowed to stand where the accused is not represented at trial by counsel unless it be determined that there was an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused[.] To assure protection of so fundamental a right, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver ... and do not permit waiver to be presumed from a silent record[.] It must appear affirmatively on the record that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id. In Walker, however, the defendant represented herself at trial, and we were faced with a direct appeal of her conviction. Id. at 595-96, 11 A.3d at 815. As the State observes, Grandison has not lodged this appeal from his conviction at trial. These proceedings are collateral matters, all filed years after Grandison's initial trial and sentencing, and indeed, after other collateral proceedings. Different standards apply to these proceedings, and Walker and the principles utilized therein are not applicable here. Grandison makes several arguments in support of his claim. He directs our attention to Sites v. State, in which this Court held that although a person apprehended for driving while intoxicated has no statutory or Sixth Amendment right to consult counsel before deciding whether to submit to a chemical sobriety test, that right is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 707, 717, 481 A.2d 192, 194, 199 (1984). As we explained: The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been recognized as a source of a right to counsel independent of the Sixth Amendment where critically important to the fairness of the proceedings. We recognized in Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 358, 464 A.2d 228 (1983) that the constitutional right to counsel is broader than the specific guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in that, under certain circumstances, the requirements of due process include a right to counsel, with appointed counsel for indigents, in civil cases or other proceedings not constituting critical stages of criminal trials. The concept of a due process right was described as far back as Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937) as a guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. While the exact contours of the due process right are not definable with precision, the right, as restated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S.Ct. 205, 210, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), is one that assures that convictions cannot be brought about in criminal cases by methods which offend a sense of justice. (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 716, 481 A.2d at 199. Grandison argues that it would indeed offend a sense of justice for courts to find that he may not have counsel appointed for a motions hearing in a death penalty case, but that he may have counsel appointed before this Court, immediately thereafter, for an appeal from rulings made at that hearing. He also argues that it would also offend a sense of justice if the right to appointed counsel were more freely extended to one facing probation for drunk driving[] than to one facing execution for murder. Keeping in mind the unique nature of capital cases, we still are not persuaded by Grandison's argument on this issue. First, the decision by the Public Defender to provide Grandison with representation for this appeal does not mean that he has a constitutional or statutory right to such representation. Second, in Sites, our primary concern was that convictions cannot be brought about in criminal cases by methods which offend a sense of justice. Id (emphasis added). Here, Grandison's conviction and direct appeal thereof have long since passed, and he has been represented by counsel for several postconviction proceedings. Any argument that Grandison must have counsel for these collateral motions is further muted by the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Finley : We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions that we establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals.    Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well. (Citations omitted.) Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993-94, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). This Court's previous interpretations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights paint a similar picture: The Maryland Constitution has not hitherto been interpreted to provide a right to counsel in collateral proceedings challenging a criminal conviction. Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be allowed counsel ... This Court has held that Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not afford any right to counsel which is more expansive than that afforded by the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 626 n. 3, 870 A.2d 217, 223 n. 3 (2005) (stating that the right to counsel provisions in Article 21 are in [ pari materia ] with Sixth Amendment); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440, 509 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1986) (holding that [t]here is no distinction between the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights). Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 235, 909 A.2d 1020, 1033 (2006). Grandison asks us to recognize rights that simply do not exist. Grandison's analogy to the drunken driving cases is also unpersuasive, as he was represented by counsel throughout his criminal trial, direct appeal, resentencing, and first set of postconviction proceedings. Grandison also attempts to use selective citation of rules and statutes to bolster his claim. He first cites Maryland Rule 4-214(b), which provides that [w]hen counsel is appointed by the Public Defender or by the court, representation extends to all stages in the proceedings, including but not limited to the post-trial motions and other legal proceedings enumerated in Rule 4-214(b). The final sentence of Rule 4-214(b), however, conspicuously absent from his brief, provides: The representation of appointed counsel does not extend to the filing of subsequent discretionary proceedings including petition for writ of certiorari, petition to expunge records, and petition for post conviction relief. The statutory framework offers no help to Grandison either. First, the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act exempts such motions from the right to counsel. It provides: (a) In general. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is entitled to assistance of counsel [in a postconviction proceeding.] (b) Exceptions. If a person seeks to reopen a postconviction proceeding under § 7-104 of this subtitle, the court shall determine whether assistance from counsel ... should be granted. Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 7-108(a)-(b)(1) of the Criminal Law Article. Thus, the Act grants the right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, except that in a request to reopen, the court shall determine whether assistance from counsel should be given. This is exactly what the Circuit Court did in this case. The passages from the Circuit Court proceedings that we quoted earlier demonstrate that the Circuit Court considered whether the law required the appointment of counsel, and decided there was no such requirement. We affirm that decision. As the State argues, the statute that empowers and defines the rights and obligations of the Office of the Public Defender does not contemplate the extension of counsel to collateral attacks so far removed from a defendant's conviction, direct appeal, or state post conviction proceeding such as the challenges Grandison brings here. Grandison merely asserts that because this is a capital case, the Circuit Court abused its discretion, under section 7-108, by having him proceed pro se. If anything, the Circuit Court went to considerable length to attempt to secure counsel for Grandison, even though it was under no obligation to do so. As the State correctly points out, the Circuit Court's failure to secure counsel for Grandison on these motions does not render the lower court's efforts erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Circuit Court's effort to help Grandison find counsel for these collateral proceedings did not spawn an affirmative right for Grandison to have counsel. Grandison's previous treatment and dismissal of various counsel appointed for him likely plagued his and the Circuit Court's efforts to secure counsel for him at the hearing in this case. That is Grandison's own doing, and he must suffer the consequences. Grandison also seeks support from our decision in OPD. We summarized the question presented in that case and answered it: In the present case, we must determine whether a Maryland trial court possesses the authority, statutory or otherwise, to appoint an attorney from a local Office of the State Public Defender (OPD) to represent a criminal defendant who qualifies for public representation based on indigency, as defined by the Maryland Code, upon the court's finding that the local OPD denied previously and erroneously representation to the defendant. For reasons we shall explain, we answer that question in the affirmative. OPD, 413 Md. at 415, 993 A.2d at 57. We explained: OPD contends that the Circuit Court's actions in this regard exceeded its authority, and that, although a circuit court may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant who has been denied representation by the local OPD, the circuit court may not appoint an attorney from the local OPD once the local OPD declines representation of the defendant. For reasons we shall explain, we disagree and hold that, upon finding that the local OPD denied erroneously representation to an indigent defendant, a circuit court may appoint any attorney, including an attorney from the local OPD, to represent a defendant. OPD, 413 Md. at 428-29, 993 A.2d at 66. In OPD, defendant Jason Flynn Stinnett was erroneously denied representation on the grounds that he did not meet the indigency standards utilized by the Public Defender, and as a consequence, entered a guilty plea and received a three-year suspended sentence and two years' probation. Id. at 421-22, 426-27, 993 A.2d at 61, 64-65. We held that: where the local OPD declines representation to a defendant erroneously, because of the local OPD's failure to consider properly the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining indigency, and where a court finds, upon its subsequent mandatory independent review, that the individual qualifies for representation, the trial court, in carrying out its role as ultimate protector of the Constitutional right to counsel, may appoint an attorney from the local OPD to represent the indigent individual unless an actual and unwaived or unwaivable conflict of interest would result thereby. Id. at 434, 993 A.2d at 69. It is manifestly clear that OPD does not apply to Grandison in this proceeding. Grandison is well past the trial phase, and there was no previous or erroneous denial of representation by the Office of the Public Defender. There was no finding by that office that Grandison did not qualify for representation because he failed the indigency test. Grandison was also not compelled to proceed through a trial pro se because of such an erroneous denial. [7] Even though the Circuit Court has inherent authority as the ultimate protector of a defendant's rights, that kind of authority, as the State argues, does not transform into an affirmative duty by the lower court to obtain counsel for Grandison when he otherwise has no legal right to counsel at this stage of the proceedings, especially when Grandison fired the counsel who were appointed to him. We therefore hold that the Circuit Court did not err or abuse its discretion in allowing Grandison to discharge Lawlor and Proctor, of his own volition. We also affirm the Circuit Court's decisions in response to Grandison's discharge of counsel.