Opinion ID: 2395051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant's Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: The defendant contends he was denied the right to a speedy trial guaranteed under both Maine Constitution article I, section 6 and United States Constitution amendments VI and XIV, by the trial court's continuance of his trial, at the State's request, pending this court's disposition of the appeals of Robert, Rita and Stacie Willoughby from their judgments of contempt. We reject the defendant's contention. We recently recognized that whether an accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial can be determined only through the use of a delicate balancing test that takes into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand. State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.1985); see State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me.1984). In Murphy we listed the four factors to be considered in the balancing test under both our state and federal constitutions, as identified by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-93, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant arising out of the delay.
The Barker analysis is necessary, however, only when the length of the delay is `so presumptively prejudicial as to warrant consideration' of the three remaining factors in the balancing process. State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d at 627 (quoting State v. Dudley, 433 A.2d 711, 713 (Me.1981)). The length of the pretrial delay here, measured from the day of indictment or actual restraint imposed by arrest to the opening day of trial, was just over fourteen months. Such a delay is sufficient to trigger the plenary Barker analysis. See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1151. As a factor to be weighed, however, it is not chargeable against the State, particularly in a complex murder case involving co-defendants. Cf. State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d at 627 (25-month, 3 week delay not unusually egregious); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1152 (1-year delay in a gross sexual misconduct case not excessive or helpful to defendant in balancing process).
The defendant challenges only the trial court's granting of the State's motion to continue, alleging that the delay was unnecessary because the family-privilege issue being appealed by Robert, Rita, and Stacie Willoughby was not fairly litigable. At the hearing on the Willoughbys' motions to quash their subpoenas, the court ruled that a family privilege precluding family members from testifying against Philip did not exist. He therefore denied their motions, and found each of them in contempt for failing to answer questions when the court directed them to do so. When they immediately filed notices of appeal to the Law Court, the State moved to continue the trial pending disposition of the appeals. Over the defendant's objection, the court granted the continuance on the ground that the Willoughbys' testimony could be significant at trial. The defendant's reliance upon State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194 (Me.1974) in arguing that the issues the Willoughbys sought to have resolved were not fairly litigable is misplaced. In Fernald, we held that the time consumed by the prosecution's interlocutory appeal of the denial of a search warrant was not chargeable against the State, and noted that the issue was fairly litigable, even though the outcome was unfavorable to the State in that the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in the Law Court. Id. at 196; see State v. Fernald, 381 A.2d 282 (Me.1978). We dismissed the Willoughbys' appeal for similar reasons, holding that there was no practice that allowed a witness to obtain a ruling on confidentiality through an interlocutory appeal prior to trial. In re Willoughby, 487 A.2d at 638. As in Fernald, there is nothing in the case before us to suggest that either the appeal or the motion for continuance was a bad-faith tactic of the prosecution to impair the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Moreover, we are unable to say that the law in Maine prior to In re Willoughby was so clear as to preclude an attempt to resolve the family-privilege issue prior to trial through an appeal of the denial of the motions to quash and of the judgments of contempt. See I Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 17.7, at 17-12 n. 29 (1985). The defendant further contends that the Willoughbys would have continued to be unavailable as witnesses regardless of the decision on appeal. A party seeking a continuance for the purpose of securing the attendance of witnesses must show that the witness can probably be obtained if the continuance is granted. State v. Curtis, 295 A.2d 252, 255 (Me.1972); see also State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1295 (Me.1984); State v. Carey, 303 A.2d 446, 449 (Me.1973). Here, the fact that the Willoughbys' attorney stated that he had a feeling there was a real possibility they might continue to refuse to testify regardless of the decision on appeal does not establish their continuing unavailability. The State clearly believed that the Willoughbys would indeed be available to present what it considered essential evidence if their appeals were denied, based particularly on Robert Willoughby's prior willingness to testify before the Grand Jury after the court there ruled on the privilege question. We therefore find the defendant's argument that the delay was unnecessary to be without merit.
The State concedes, as it must, that this factor weighs in the defendant's favor since he timely and consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial when the trial court granted the State's motion for continuance.
We have evaluated any prejudice to an accused in light of the following three interests that the speedy trial right is designed to protect: 1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial; 2) to minimize anxiety and concern to the accused accompanying public accusation; and 3) to limit the possibility the defense will be impaired. State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d at 196 ( quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966)). The additional period of incarceration occasioned by the appeal here, as in Fernald, was not rendered undue or oppressive in the sense that it was unnecessarily caused by the State and does not in itself warrant dismissal absent actual prejudice to the defendant. The defendant concedes that the defense was not impaired in any obvious way since no witnesses became unavailable. His general claim of additional memory lapse is purely speculative and therefore will not be favorably considered. See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1151. His claim that some of the inmates at the jail had it in their mind to `get him similarly does not constitute actual prejudice. It is further not within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial to protect against the creation of new evidence against the defendant, such as that supplied by the jail inmates. State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d at 197. On balance, the length of the pretrial delay was not unjustifiably long, particularly in view of the time and effort that both the defense and prosecution ordinarily require to prepare for the trial of a complicated murder case. State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268, 280-81 (Me.1979). Even assuming that the delay caused by the State's motion to continue is chargeable against the State, the defendant suffered no actual prejudice from it. We accordingly conclude that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.