Opinion ID: 2576140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The same elements test protects a defendant's double jeopardy rights and interests in a multiple punishments case.

Text: Again, we have not previously adopted a test for determining whether an offense is the same offense under the double jeopardy clause of the Hawai`i Constitution in multiple punishments cases. [17] Feliciano argues that the same conduct test this court has adopted for successive prosecution cases should apply to his multiple punishments case because: (1) it comports with the common sense notions of double jeopardy protections; and (2) it prohibits legislative end-runs around his constitutional double jeopardy protections. We do not believe, however, that it is necessary to extend the protection of the Lessary same conduct test to multiple punishments cases. First, the rights and interests protected by the double jeopardy clause, as it applies in multiple punishments cases, are adequately preserved by the same elements test: [T]he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense.... Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). [18] In other words, the double jeopardy clause (as applied in multiple punishments cases) ensures that the courts cannot punish a defendant beyond what is authorized by the legislature. As such, the same elements test adequately preserves the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause because it focuses on whether the legislature intended to allow the imposition of multiple punishments for the commission of a particular act, and ensures that the courts cannot punish a defendant beyond what was intended. Second, in multiple punishments cases, we do not have the same concerns that caused us to apply the Lessary same conduct test in successive prosecution cases. As we expressed in Lessary, the dangers in successive prosecution cases are as follows: Successive prosecutions, however, whether following acquittals or convictions, raise concerns that extend beyond merely the possibility of an enhanced sentence[.] The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity[.] Multiple prosecutions also give the State an opportunity to rehearse its presentation of proof, thus increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction for one or more of the offenses charged. Even when a State can bring multiple charges against an individual under Blockburger, a tremendous additional burden is placed on that defendant if he must face each of the charges in a separate proceeding. Lessary, 75 Haw. at 455-56, 865 P.2d at 154-55 (quoting Grady, 495 U.S. at 518-19, 110 S.Ct. 2084)(alterations in original). Third, a legislative end-run around constitutional double jeopardy protections is not possible so long as the legislature acts within its power to define criminal offenses and to set the punishment for those convicted of these offenses. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) ([T]he legislative power to define offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them resides wholly with the Congress.); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai`i 146, 158, 102 P.3d 1044, 1056 (2004) ([T]he power to determine appropriate punishment for criminal acts lies in the legislative branch.) (Quoting State v. Bernades, 71 Haw. 485, 490, 795 P.2d 842, 845 (1990).); Bernades, 71 Haw. at 490, 795 P.2d at 845 (stating further that the courts cannot interfere unless the punishment prescribed appears clearly and manifestly to be cruel and unusual). In multiple punishments cases, the double jeopardy clause serves as a constraint on the courts, ensuring that the court cannot impose punishment upon a defendant that is greater than what the legislature has authorized. As such, it is not possible to have a legislative end-run as long as the legislature is acting within its power. The dissent disagrees with our analysis, contending that the same conduct test should be applied as Lessary is not limited to successive prosecution cases, and that Lessary extended double jeopardy protections against the legislature. We respectfully disagree. The facts of Lessary, discussed infra, show successive prosecution for abuse, terroristic threatening, and unlawful imprisonment, and not a multiple punishments scenario. As clearly stated by Justice Ramil in Jumila, a multiple punishments case decided after Lessary: [T]here is a crucial distinction between Lessary and the present case  Lessary involved successive prosecutions while the present case involves multiple punishments. Successive prosecutions raise significant dangers that are not present in multiple punishment situations. These concerns justify a more rigorous standard for successive prosecution cases. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 12, 950 P.2d at 1212 (Ramil, J., dissenting)(emphasis added). In addition, the dissent in Brantley acknowledged that Lessary did not decide the issue of whether the same conduct or same elements test applies to multiple punishments situations: The question of whether State v. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 865 P.2d 150 (1994), or Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), applies to multiple punishments in a single prosecution has not been answered by this court. See Tomomitsu v. State, 93 Hawai`i 22, 31, 995 P.2d 323, 332 (App.2000)(Acoba, J. concurring) (The supreme court has not expressly indicated which test applies under the Hawai`i Constitution in the multiple punishments situation.) Brantley, 99 Hawai`i at 485, 56 P.3d at 1274 (Acoba, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted). The dissent's contention that Lessary extended our double jeopardy protections against the legislature is belied by our subsequent decisions in Jumila and Brantley. In Jumila, discussed infra, we stated that the legislature could, if it desired, create an exception to the statutory prohibition set forth in HRS § 701-109 against convictions for both an offense and an offense included therein. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 4-5, 950 P.2d at 1204-05. In Brantley, we found that the legislature indeed did intend to permit convictions of both HRS § 134-6(a) and the separate felony (the included offense), and held that a defendant can be convicted of both offenses. Brantley, 99 Hawai`i at 469, 56 P.3d at 1258. Our jurisprudence on this issue, grounded in the belief that the double jeopardy clause is primarily a restriction on the courts and the prosecution, which allows the legislature (within the boundaries of the eighth and fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Hawai`i Constitution) to define crimes and fix punishments, is consistent with the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. In addition, with the exception of Indiana cited in the dissent, we have been unable to locate any other jurisdiction, state or federal, whose majority has agreed with the dissent's argument; the dissent's premise (with the exception of Indiana) has been espoused solely in dissents. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 370, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the legislature cannot authorize multiple punishments). We reject the dissent's argument as it is contrary to the double jeopardy jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and this court. [19] We consequently hold that the double jeopardy clause does not constrain the legislature from intentionally imposing multiple punishments upon a defendant for separate offenses arising out of the same conduct. In conclusion, we believe that the protections afforded by the United States Constitution, as set forth in the Blockburger same elements test, adequately protect against double jeopardy in multiple punishments cases.