Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Court's Failure to Conduct Further Voir Dire

Text: At voir dire the court asked Elva Cazares, a member of the venire, whether she would refuse to vote to return a verdict of first degree murder so that you wouldn't even have to get to the death penalty? She replied, Yes, I think I would. It then asked her if she would vote to find the special circumstance allegation false in order to stop a capital penalty phase. She replied, Well, it's kind of confusing in that term. But just to sum it all up, I don't believe in the death penalty. The court asked Julietta Lopez, also a member of the venire, If the prosecution proves that the defendant's guilty of first degree murder, ... would you refuse to vote for that because you know by voting for something other than first degree murder there wouldn't be a death penalty? She replied, I would. (1a) Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to inquire more fully about the basis for the two potential jurors' opposition to the death penalty. The result, in his view, was a violation of a right he asserts to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (2) Potential jurors must be excused if their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with the instructions and their oath. ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 169 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331].) The court's determination resolves what is essentially a question of fact or, perhaps more accurately, a mixed question that is essentially factual. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1262 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) Accordingly, our review is deferential: we determine whether substantial evidence supported the rulings. ( Ibid. ) (1b) The court implicitly ruled that the ability of the two potential jurors in question to follow their oaths was substantially impaired. These determinations were supported by substantial evidence. First, we note that the court excluded the potential jurors on its own motion after eliciting their views on the death penalty, and that counsel failed to object. It continues to be the rule that the failure to object does not waive the right to raise the issue on appeal [citation].... ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 648, fn. 4 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) But the failure to object to the rulings does suggest defense counsel's concurrence in the court's assessment of each venireperson's firm and sincere expression of his or her inability to impose the death penalty. ( Ibid. ) Substantial evidence supported the court's implicit determination that the ability of the potential jurors to follow the law at the guilt phase was, at a minimum, substantially impaired. Defendant does not persuade us that any constitutional right was violated.