Opinion ID: 2770336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal and Inconsistency

Text: The parties vigorously contest whether D.J.‟s trial testimony was inconsistent with her statements in the video. The government contends that D.J. refused to testify and that her refusal was inconsistent with the statements in her CAC interview. Appellant contends that because D.J. did not give any trial testimony related to the first time she was abused, there was no testimony for her prior statement to be inconsistent with. If anything, he argues, D.J.‟s testimony was consistent with her CAC interview. Before the video was played to the jury, 8 D.J. affirmed the truth of her statements at the CAC and testified, without giving specific details, that appellant had touched her body. It is, of course, well-settled that “[p]rior consistent statements are generally inadmissible to support one‟s own unimpeached witness, because mere repetition does not imply veracity.” Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 215-16 (D.C. 1993). Is a refusal to testify about a certain subject inconsistent with a previous statement discussing that topic? There is case law on both sides of the issue. In this jurisdiction, and in many others, a witness‟s prior statement is considered inconsistent with her testimony if she evades questions at trial by claiming a loss of memory. See Diggs, 28 A.3d at 594 (holding that witness‟s prior grand jury testimony was inconsistent with his claimed loss of memory at trial). Several courts have extended this principle, holding that refusal to testify about an event has the same evasive effect as a claim of memory loss and thus is inconsistent with a witness‟s prior statements describing that event. E.g., United States v. Truman, 688 F.3d 129, 142 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that where “a witness who testifies under oath and is subject to cross-examination in a prior state court proceeding explicitly refuses to answer the same questions at trial, the refusal to answer is inconsistent with his prior testimony”); United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that “when a witness who testifies frankly under oath 9 subject to cross-examination only two days later states that he now „can‟t answer the question‟ and is otherwise evasive and vague, a district court may find that these statements are inconsistent”); People v. Homick, 289 P.3d 791, 828 (Cal. 2012) (comparing refusal to testify to claimed memory loss and holding that “a witness‟s refusal to answer may be materially inconsistent with prior statements, exposing the witness to impeachment”). In contrast, some courts have reasoned that a witness‟s refusal to testify is unlike a claim of memory loss because there is no current testimony to compare with the prior statement. See Tyler v. State, 679 A.2d 1127, 1132 (Md. 1996) (holding that the effect of witness‟s refusal to testify was “virtually the same as if [he] had not physically taken the witness stand,” and if he “had not taken the stand, his prior testimony could not be deemed „inconsistent‟”); Barksdale v. State, 453 S.E.2d 2, 4 (Ga. 1995) (holding that government could not impeach witness with prior statement because he “refused to answer any questions and thus gave no testimony in court with which the prior statement could be judged to be inconsistent”); State v. Williams, 442 A.2d 620, 623 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (holding that witness could not be impeached with prior statement because his silence did “not constitute „testimony‟”). These courts therefore do not permit the use of a prior statement to impeach a witness who refuses to testify on the same 10 topic. See Tyler, 679 A.2d at 1132-33; Barksdale, 453 S.E.2d at 4; Williams, 442 A.2d at 623. “The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing . . . .” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004). Thus, a strong preference for live testimony undergirds the rules of evidence. See Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873, 884 (D.C. 2012). Generally, hearsay statements are not admissible at trial because they lack “indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant‟s word is not subject to crossexamination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury.” Jones v. United States, 17 A.3d 628, 632 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 194 (D.C. 1979) (en banc)). Even when many of those concerns are ameliorated because the declarant testifies at trial, prior consistent statements of a witness are inadmissible for their truth unless they meet the requirements of D.C. Code § 14-102 (b)(1) because of “an unwillingness to countenance the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive evidence . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(1) advisory committee‟s note 11 (1972). 2 Unless an out-of-court statement falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule against hearsay, it may not be used to supply the testimony of a witness.