Opinion ID: 770944
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Gingles three: analysis of white bloc voting

Text: 54 Considering all this evidence in the aggregate, we conclude that the white majority in the four districts challenged on appeal votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the [American Indians'] preferred candidate. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. This conclusion holds even if we assume, as did the district court, that at least 60% of the white majority must vote for a candidate to constitute a white bloc. In the contests between white and Indian candidates that are most probative of white bloc voting, the Indian (and Indianpreferred) candidate was usually defeated by white bloc voting in majority-white jurisdictions: in 86% of the contests in the four districts challenged on appeal and in 64% of the contests in the eight districts challenged at trial. Similarly, in contests between white candidates in majority-white districts in which white and Indian voters expressed a preference for different candidates, the Indian-preferred candidate was usually defeated by white bloc voting: in 52% (four districts) and 55% (eight districts) of the contests analyzed. In state legislative races between white candidates, which are the most probative white-white contests, see City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1015 n.16, the Indian-preferred candidate lost 100% of split-preference elections in majority-white districts as a result of white bloc voting in the four districts, and 83% of contests in the eight districts challenged at trial. In no case listed above does the rate at which Indian-preferred candidates are defeated by white bloc voting fall below 50%; in the contests that are most probative of white bloc voting, the percentages are far above that threshold. This evidence is more than sufficient to establish legally significant  white bloc voting within the meaning of the third Gingles factor. See 478 U.S. at 55. 55 In contrast, Indian and Indian-preferred candidates experienced strong electoral success in majority-Indian jurisdictions. Indian candidates (all of whom were also Indian-preferred) won 100% of the 3 contests in the four challenged districts, and 100% of the 6 contests in the eight districts. Indian-preferred white candidates won all 8 (100%) of the contests in the four districts, and 15 of the 19 (79%) contests in the eight districts. As we noted above, the presence of electoral success in majority-Indian jurisdictions does not lessen the significance of white bloc voting in neighboring majoritywhite jurisdictions. 56 The State does not accept our standard for determining legally significant white bloc voting. Pointing to Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997), the State urges that white bloc voting cannot satisfy the third Gingles factor when at least 22% to 38% of white voters cross over and vote for the minority-preferred candidate. See id. at 92-93. We reject such a bright-line test. As the Gingles Court observed, there is no simple doctrinal test for the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting. 478 U.S. at 58. The reason -the degree of racial bloc voting that is cognizable as an element of a 2 vote dilution claim will vary according to a variety of factual circumstances. Id. at 57-58; see also De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011. The Gingles Court itself invalidated multi-member districts in which white cross-over voting for black candidates ranged from 8% to 50% in primary elections, and from 28% to 49% in general elections. 478 U.S. at 59. 57 Nor do the factual circumstances of Abrams suggest that such a standard is applicable here. In Abrams the district court found that black and black-preferred candidates received significant occasionally overwhelming -support from both black and white voters. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 92. White crossover voting was so significant that two black incumbents won re-election to Congress in majority-white districts. Id. at 93. No such facts -or findings -are present here. We decline to apply the threshold urged by the State, even on a fact-specific basis. 58 Finally, the State offers an alternative rationale, which we reject, for the district court's finding on white bloc voting. Losses by Indian candidates, contends the State, can fairly be ascribed to partisan politics and not race, at least where Democratic Indian candidates lose in majority Republican districts. A plurality of the Supreme Court rejected this argument in Gingles. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63-65 (plurality opinion with respect to part III.C); see also Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1996); Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 1987). In any event, we need not address this question because the evidence on the record does not support the State's argument. Indian (Indian-preferred) candidates generally received a lower percentage of white votes than did white Indian-preferred candidates in the same district. We therefore decline to attribute white bloc voting in the four challenged districts to mere partisan politics.