Opinion ID: 77698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Supreme Court's Balancing Test

Text: 39 The Supreme Court long has recognized candidates' constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to associate for political ends and to participate equally in the electoral process. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Ballot access restrictions also implicate the constitutional rights of voters, especially those with preferences outside the existing parties, to associate and cast their votes effectively. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). However, the Supreme Court also long has recognized that states have important and compelling interests in regulating the election process and in having ballot access requirements. Green v. Mortham, 155 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). In particular, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a state has an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot—the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election. 9 Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442, 91 S.Ct. at 1976. 40 In order to balance these interests, a court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the [candidate] seeks to vindicate. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. Id. In making this evaluation, a court must determine the legitimacy and strength of [the State's] interests [and] consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the [candidate's] rights. Id. A court then must weigh all these factors to determine if the statute is constitutional. Id. 41 Furthermore, if the state election scheme imposes severe burdens on the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, it may survive only if it is narrowly tailored and advance[s] a compelling state interest. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997). But when a state ballot access law provision imposes only `reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, a State's `important regulatory interests' will usually be enough to `justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.' Id. (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063). Lesser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review. . . . Id. 42 Under this framework, we first review the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to plaintiffs' constitutional rights, considering the burden posed by the signature requirement and the June filing deadline independently and in combination.