Opinion ID: 2630886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mandatory vs. permissive inferences

Text: ¶ 11 Basic principles of due process require the State to prove every essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 698, 911 P.2d 996 (quoting State v. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d 704, 710, 871 P.2d 135 (1994)). Thus, the State bore the burden of proving every element of burglary, including criminal intent. Cantu contends that the trial judge employed an impermissible mandatory presumption, shifting the burden of persuasion to Cantu to show lack of criminal intent. The burden of persuasion is deemed to be shifted if the trier of fact is required to draw a certain inference upon the failure of the defendant to prove by some quantum of evidence that the inference should not be drawn. Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 701, 911 P.2d 996 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)). Cantu maintains that the Court of Appeals impermissibly applied a mandatory presumption in this case when it held: the defense offered no evidence to rebut the statutory inference of [criminal] intent.  Cantu, 123 Wash.App. at 410, 98 P.3d 106 (first emphasis added). ¶ 12 The State may use evidentiary devices, such as presumptions and inferences, to assist it in meeting its burden of proof, though they are not favored in criminal law. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d at 710, 871 P.2d 135; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-24, 99 S.Ct. 2450. We have previously approved the permissive inference of intent to commit a crime whenever the evidence shows a person enters or remains unlawfully in a building. State v. Grimes, 92 Wash.App. 973, 980 n. 2, 966 P.2d 394 (1998) (citing State v. Brunson, 128 Wash.2d 98, 107, 905 P.2d 346 (1995)); see also Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 699-700, 911 P.2d 996. The permissible inference of criminal intent is found in RCW 9A.52.040. ¶ 13 The statute provides that: In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent. RCW 9A.52.040 (emphasis added). Again, when permissive inferences are only part of the State's proof supporting an element and not the `sole and sufficient' proof of such element, due process is not offended if the prosecution shows that the inference more likely than not flows from the proven fact. Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 700, 911 P.2d 996 (citing Brunson, 128 Wash.2d at 107, 905 P.2d 346). ¶ 14 However, mandatory presumptions are more troubling. While RCW 9A.52.040 contains a constitutionally valid permissive inference, it may also be read to unconstitutionally shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant, as it did when the jury instructions included the specific statutory language, `unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the jury to have been made without such criminal intent.' Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 704, 911 P.2d 996; see RCW 9A.52.040. We held the inclusion of this language, essentially requir[ed] the Defendant to either introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the inference that he remained on the premises with intent to commit a crime, or concede that element of the crime. Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 701, 911 P.2d 996; see also RCW 9A.52.040. In other words, a reasonable juror could have concluded that once [the defendant's] presence on the premises was shown, a finding that he intended to commit a crime was compelled, absent a satisfactory explanation by [the defendant] as to why he was on the premises. Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 701, 911 P.2d 996. ¶ 15 In this case, while the record is not conclusive, it appears to us that the court applied a mandatory presumption to find Cantu's intent was criminal. We note in passing that the text of RCW 9A.52.040 is unfortunate and, as we explained in Deal, can be misleading. Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 702, 911 P.2d 996. In his own words, the trial judge seemed to have found Cantu's intent criminal on the belief that Cantu was unable to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. Statements made by the prosecutor and the judge near the close of the trial support our conclusion that the trial court improperly placed the burden on Cantu to prove his innocence-instead of the State having to prove his guilt. For instance, in discussing the statutory inference provided in RCW 9A.52.040, the prosecutor initially stated, [RCW] 9A.52.040, and burglary is unique ... a person [who] ... enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and [in this case], in the bedroom, may be inferred to have acted with [criminal] intent. And then the burden actually shifts [to Cantu] to show evidence satisfactory that the entry was made without such criminal intent. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 69. Subsequently, the prosecutor corrected herself, saying, [the] [i]nference of an intent to commit a crim[inal] act from [an] unlawful entry is not shifting the burden because the inference is permissible, not mandatory. RP at 71. However, the prosecutor continued stating, [s]o, um, it's [a] permissible inference that the court can find that an illegal entry should have some explanation to it. And [Cantu's] explanation at this point in time is lame, Your Honor. Id. In addition, in the trial court's oral decision, the judge stated, The assessment, first off [is that Cantu] broke into his mother's bedroom and he was not living there, [and] . . . did not have permission to be there and [that] he kicked ... in and ruined the door in . . . [gaining entry to the bedroom]. I pray that the inference is and it's not been rebutted, nor has there been any explaining, that [Cantu] didn't go in [the bedroom] without the intent to commit a crime. RP at 73 (emphasis added). Following this statement, the trial judge found Cantu guilty of residential burglary but dismissed the theft, drug, and alcohol charges. A fair interpretation of this statement, along with the prosecutor's discussion of the statutory inference provided in RCW 9A.52.040, leads this court to conclude that the trial judge impermissibly employed a mandatory presumption of criminal intent, making it incumbent upon Cantu to prove, with sufficient evidence, that his intent was innocent. [4] ¶ 16 In Deal, we found the error to be harmless because, even though the instruction shifted the burden to the defendant, Deal's own testimony was sufficient to prove he had the requisite criminal intent. Deal, 128 Wash.2d at 697, 703, 911 P.2d 996. However, unlike Deal, in this case there is no indication that the imposition of a mandatory presumption was harmless. It is the intent to commit a crime not the actual commission of a crime which is an element of residential burglary. State v. Bergeron, 105 Wash.2d 1, 15-17, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985); see also RCW 9A.52.025(1). Therefore the court's acquittal on the theft charge may be irrelevant. But, given that the court employed a mandatory presumption of criminal intent, we cannot conclude that the error was harmless. [5]