Opinion ID: 853614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Comparative Fault Act

Text: The Comparative Fault Act, Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1, [3] applies generally to damages actions based in fault that accrued on or after January 1, 1985. The primary objective of the Act was to modify the common law rule of contributory negligence under which a plaintiff was barred from recovery where he was only slightly negligent. Indianapolis Power v. Brad Snodgrass, Inc., 578 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. 1991). The Act seeks to achieve this result through proportional allocation of fault, ensuring that each person whose fault contributed to cause injury bears his or her proportionate share of the total fault contributing to the injury. See Bowles v. Tatom, 546 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind.1989). Under Indiana's comparative fault scheme, a named defendant may assert a nonparty defense, seeking to attribute fault to a nonparty rather than to the defendant. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-51-2-14 (West Supp.1999). [4] When a defendant asserts this defense, the court instructs the jury to determine the percentage of fault of each party and any person who is a nonparty. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-51-2-7(b)(1) (West Supp.1999). [5] A nonparty is: a person who caused or contributed to cause the alleged injury, death, or damage to property but who has not been joined in the action as a defendant. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-6-2-88 (West Supp.1999). [6] A defendant must affirmatively plead the nonparty defense, and the defendant carries the burden of proof on the defense. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-51-2-15 (West Supp.1999). Skinner first notes that the Act makes adding a nonparty permissive and not mandatory. Indeed, Ind.Code § 34-51-2-14 says: In an action based on fault, a defendant may assert as a defense that the damages of the claimant were caused in full or in part by a nonparty. Relying on the statute's permissive nature, Skinner argues that it was not required to assert a nonparty defense under the Act as the sole method of seeking to reduce liability. When examining a statutory provision, we look at the statute as a whole and give common and ordinary meaning to the words employed. Robinson v. Wroblewski, 704 N.E.2d 467 (Ind.1998). The term may in a statute generally indicates a permissive condition. Haltom v. Bruner & Meis, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 6 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997). Skinner is obviously correct that the statute leaves to defendants the discretion to add nonparties. On the other hand, while the Act provides defendants with this choice, it says nothing by way of creating or precluding credits.