Opinion ID: 1852505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether belmont homes owed a legal duty to stewart.

Text: ¶ 11. Whether a duty exists in a negligence case is a question of law to be determined by the court. Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 174 (Miss. 1999). See also Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir.1971) (applying Mississippi law). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Bodman, 674 So.2d 1245, 1247 (Miss.1996). ¶ 12. Belmont Homes argues that it owed no legal duty to Stewart regarding the condition of the highway shoulder in question. Stewart cites a number of cases in support of her proposition to the contrary that Belmont Homes had a duty to refrain from damaging the highway shoulder. ¶ 13. In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones, 236 Miss. 471, 499, 111 So.2d 240, 250 (1959), this Court stated: [A] traveler using a completed highway is expected to use only ordinary care, and one who without right or authority, creates or maintains in, upon, or near a highway a condition which endangers safety of travelers does so at his own peril and is liable for injuries proximately resulting therefrom. In Jones, United Gas had erected and maintained a concrete post on the shoulder of the highway as a pipeline marker. Id. at 242. A driver left the paved portion of the highway and struck the post. Id. United Gas argued that the pipeline marker was lawfully located and maintained. Id. at 248. This Court held that the company's authority [to erect and maintain the post] ... must be strictly construed and cannot lawfully be exercised in such a manner as to constitute a source of danger to the public, or prevent the ordinary use of the highway. Id. at 249. ¶ 14. More recently, in W.J. Runyon & Son, Inc. v. Davis, 605 So.2d 38, 42 (Miss. 1992), overruled on other grounds, Richardson v. APAC-Miss., Inc., 631 So.2d 143 (Miss.1994), this Court found Runyon, a subcontractor retained to perform paving work on an expansion of Highway 61, negligent in failing to sufficiently water a dust-prone area where the plaintiff had been involved in an accident attributable to dust clouds caused by Runyon's dump trucks. See also Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkin, 725 So.2d 721 (Miss.1998); United Gas Corp. v. Parker, 252 Miss. 486, 174 So.2d 370 (1965). ¶ 15. Like the defendants in the abovecited cases, Belmont Homes was granted special highway privileges. Specifically, Belmont Homes obtained the right to transport overweight, oversized manufactured homes over the state's highways. Permits were issued to Belmont Homes by MDOT pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 63-5-51 (Supp.2000). The permits, however, granted only the right to transport oversized, overweight homes down predetermined routes. They did not grant a license to Belmont Homes to damage the road, nor did the permits operate as a release from liability. As we stated in Jones, the right must be strictly construed and cannot lawfully be exercised in such a manner as to constitute a source of danger to the public or prevent the ordinary use of the highway. ¶ 16. Belmont Homes asserts that it lacked control over the shoulder of the highway and had no opportunity or right to repair damages, unlike the defendants in the cases cited by Stewart. By statute, MDOT has the duty to maintain and repair the highways and shoulders of the State of Mississippi. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 65-1-1 to -2 & -65 (1991 & Supp.2000). Neal Peach, District Superintendent for MDOT, testified that this responsibility is non-delegable and that private entities such as Belmont Homes have neither the duty nor the right to repair the highways and shoulders. We do not question this statement of authority. However, this argument is irrelevant. Whether one has a right to repair a damaged highway does not give one the right to damage the highway. An exaggerated fact scenario illustrates this point. If Belmont Homes used dynamite to blow up Highway 25, it would, indeed, have no right to repair the damage it caused. Yet, it would, nonetheless, be liable for any damages caused by its act. This argument not only lacks precedent; it is illogical and represents an excuse, not a defense. ¶ 17. We find that Belmont Homes, like all users of public ways, was under a legal duty to refrain from misuse of the highway. We find no merit to this assignment of error.