Opinion ID: 1364770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Work Product Privilege

Text: Attorney J.P. separately resists the government's discovery of his work product related to representation of G.S. and F.S. In light of our holding regarding the possible misconduct of J.P.'s clients in close connection with J.P.'s legal advice, we conclude that the government has shown a substantial need for J.P.'s non-opinion work product. That evidence may contain information critical to the government's case should this matter proceed to a criminal trial, for the government would likely need to prove both the exact nature of the transactions and the clients' intent at the time that they were undertaken. Because the appellants do not contend that the government can obtain the materials through any other means, we also conclude that the district court did not err in compelling production of non-opinion work product. See Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d at 980 (explaining the standard for obtaining non-opinion work product). The district court determined that J.P.'s opinion work product was discoverable because there was probable cause to believe J.P. was complicit in his clients' unlawful activity. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding. J.P.'s prior experience in the area of bankruptcy law should have made obvious to him the distinction between legitimate exemption planning and bankruptcy fraud. As noted previously, in documents that we have reviewed in camera, J.P. expressed concern to his clients about the legality of transferring assets to close relatives and retrieving the transferred assets post-bankruptcy. [4] Although J.P. warned his clients that G.S.'s father should not be involved in the stock transfer in which some of G.S.'s non-exempt stock was pledged as collateral for a loan, J.P. later apparently ignored his own advice and helped facilitate the questionable transaction. There is also a reasonable likelihood that J.P. either knew or was willfully blind to the fact that his clients were entering sham transactions with relatives so that they could later retrieve their original assets after discharging their debts. The appellants contend that J.P. had no knowledge of his clients' plans once the bankruptcy proceedings were complete. The documents that we have reviewed, however, suggest that J.P. was aware that G.S. and F.S. were contemplating strategies for reacquiring at least some of their assets at a later time. In spite of his apparent knowledge that this scheme could be illegal, J.P. continued to assist G.S. and F.S. in parking their assets with close family. Giving the district court's determination the deference to which it is entitled, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was probable cause to believe that J.P. was complicit in his clients' crime or fraud. Accordingly, the district court properly held that J.P. could not assert the work product privilege with regard to his representation of G.S. and F.S. in matters related to their bankruptcy.