Opinion ID: 1837873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proposition One

Text: This Court has never, in a proper holding, narrowly interpreted the scope of § 11 as guaranteeing only (1) impartiality, (2) duodecimality, and (3) unanimity, to the exclusion of the jury's factfinding function as that function existed at common law. The language that gives rise to this proposition springs from dictum in Baader v. State, 201 Ala. 76, 77 So. 370 (1917). In that case, the defendant in a misdemeanor prosecution attempted to waive his right to a jury trial under a statute that required defendants, in order to preserve that right, to demand a trial by jury within five days of arrest or of the giving of bond. Nevertheless, at the request of the prosecution, which was made several months after the prosecution had begun, the trial court conducted a jury trial. The defendant contended that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by this noncompliance with the statute. This Court, holding that the prosecution's request for a jury trial was not timely, reversed the judgment of the trial court. Although no issue was raised regarding the power of the legislature to provide for a waiver of the right to a trial by jury, the Court preliminarily discussed the subject in general terms. The Court's discussion, which was entirely unnecessary to the disposition of the issue presented, contained the statement that forms the basis of Proposition One. The one case cited in Baader in support of this dictum was Spivey v. State, 172 Ala. 391, 397, 56 So. 232 (1911). Spivey, however, contains no formula regarding the fundamental requisites of a jury such as that which appears in Baader; nor is such a restriction on the scope of constitutional protection fairly inferable from Spivey. The Baader dictum was once more cited by this Court in Kirk v. State, 247 Ala. 43, 22 So.2d 431 (1945). Immediately following its reference to the language in Baader, however, this Court added the following qualification: It should be clearly understood, however, that we are not dealing in the case at bar with an infringement of constitutional rights, but with the right of the accused at his election to forgo rights granted by the Constitution and especially the right to waive such rights when the public policy of the State is expressed in the statute set forth above. Kirk, 247 Ala. at 45, 22 So.2d at 432 (emphasis added). It is thus clear that an application of the tripartite formula expressed in the Baader dictum was equally unnecessary to the resolution of the issue in Kirk. [6] In fact, the principal opinion cites no case in which the Baader dictum formed the basis of this Court's holding, nor has my research revealed any. Moreover, the opinion ultimately concedes that the Baader dictum was underwritten, that is, that it clearly did not describe the totality of protection afforded the role of juries by § 11. Consequently, I must conclude that this Court has never subscribed to the view that § 11 preserved only (1) impartiality, (2) duodecimality, and (3) unanimity, to the exclusion of the jury's traditional factfinding function. In this connection, the opinion seems to imply that statutes regulating the qualifying, selecting, drawing, summoning, and empaneling [of] juries do not offend § 11. At 191. If that is so, it is because those statutes do not impair the jury's truly essential function, which is to resolve disputed issues of fact.