Opinion ID: 4543548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption under R.C. 1901.20(A)(1)

Text: {¶ 12} Alternatively, Toledo argues that R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) does not preempt its administrative scheme. Rather, Toledo contends that R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) divests jurisdiction only from other courts, not from administrative bodies. In other words, despite the language in the amended statute, Toledo suggests that the jurisdiction of the municipal courts is not truly exclusive. According to Toledo, the language that the General Assembly added “can be read to mean ‘jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court’ ” but not to the exclusion of a municipal administrative body. {¶ 13} Toledo’s argument runs counter to the plain language of the statute, which vests the municipal courts with exclusive jurisdiction, without limitations. Toledo’s preferred construction of the statute requires us to add words to the text, which we are not permitted to do. In re Adoption of P.L.H., 151 Ohio St.3d 554, 2017-Ohio-5824, 91 N.E.3d 698, ¶ 27. {¶ 14} We reject Toledo’s argument that H.B. 62 preserved the jurisdiction of local administrative-hearing officers for noncriminal traffic-law violations. C. Constitutionality of certain provisions enacted in H.B. 62 {¶ 15} Finally, Toledo argues that R.C. 1901.20(A) is unenforceable because other provisions enacted in H.B. 62 are unconstitutional. Toledo points to R.C. 4511.096(C) and (D), which require a municipality to file specific documents 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO in municipal court in photo-enforcement cases. And Toledo contends that these— and other similar statutes that purport to set rules for a municipal court’s operation—violate the separation-of-powers doctrine and Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the Modern Courts Amendment of 1968. {¶ 16} But even assuming these provisions are unconstitutional (a question we emphatically do not decide), Toledo does not claim that the exclusivejurisdiction clause of R.C. 1901.20(A) itself violates the Constitution. To the contrary, the authority of the General Assembly to set the jurisdiction of the municipal courts is undisputed. {¶ 17} Toledo’s constitutional challenge to unrelated amendments that H.B. 62 made to other statutes fails to account for the authority of courts to sever unconstitutional portions of a statute without affecting other portions of the statute or related provisions. See State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 15; Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927); see also R.C. 1.50. {¶ 18} To determine whether severance is appropriate, we consider (1) whether the constitutional and unconstitutional parts are capable of standing alone, (2) whether the unconstitutional part is so connected with the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislature if we strike it, and (3) whether we must insert words in order to effectuate the remaining constitutional portion. Romage at ¶ 15; see also Geiger at 466. {¶ 19} The disputed provisions are easily severable (if necessary). The statutory provision making the municipal court’s jurisdiction exclusive may still be enforced even if (hypothetically) the specific requirements for conducting those hearings would eventually be declared to be unconstitutional. For this reason, Toledo’s constitutional challenge to portions of H.B. 62 is of no consequence to this case. 6 January Term, 2020