Opinion ID: 1449830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New Information

Text: Petitioners also assert that new information alerted them to the importance of intervening in the action after the regulatory deadline had passed. Specifically, petitioners cite three events that they contend create good cause for untimely intervention: (1) the National Marine Fisheries Service's issuance of a final rule in January 2006 failing to list Middle Piru Creek as a critical habitat for endangered steelhead trout, see 70 Fed.Reg. at 52,581; (2) a November 2006 report by Fisheries Service scientists working with the California Department of Fish and Game providing evidence that rainbow trout in the Middle Piru Creek are descended from steelhead trout rather than hatchery populations; [11] and (3) a February 2006 report by a consultant to DWR (that petitioners claim they were not able to access until April 2007) indicating that the arroyo toad increased in population in 2005, when there were large summer flows in Middle Piru Creek. [12] As the Commission pointed out, none of these events divulged a new issue with the license amendment. CalTrout was plainly aware of the potential impact of the license amendment on the wild trout in Piru Creek  in fact, it submitted several comments on that very topic to the Commission before the July 8, 2005, deadline for intervention. On April 6, 2005 (three months before the deadline for interventions) CalTrout commented that the [license amendment] may result in a violation of the Endangered Species Act ... because of its impact on the Southern California steelhead. On April 25, 2005 (still well within the deadline for intervention), it submitted another comment noting that the Fisheries Service has identified through genetic testing the trout in this reach of Piru Creek are native rainbow trout. Finally, CalTrout filed a comment a few days after the deadline for intervention (on July 14, 2005) asserting that the amendment request may have an adverse impact on the federally listed steelhead and that failure to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service about the steelhead might open the Commission to significant citizen suit liabilities. CalTrout also maintained in these comments that the current flow regime did not significantly damage the arroyo toad. CalTrout's April 6th comment claimed that past project operations and bypass instream flow releases to Piru Creek below Pyramid Dam have generally benefitted the resource, including the listed Arroyo Toad. This comment argued that alternative flow regimes warrant further consideration. Although FOR did not file similar comments, it was also aware of the issues it now presents. First, in November 2004, FOR was served with a copy of DWR's EIR, prepared in expectation of its license amendment. The EIR described in detail the reasons DWR believed the current flow regime was harming the arroyo toad, and the reasons DWR believed a natural flow regime would not harm the endangered steelhead. Later, in March 2005, FOR was served with a copy of DWR's request for a license amendment. This document described the proposed flow regime change and specifically noted that the Fisheries Service had proposed making portions of Middle Piru Creek a critical habitat for steelhead. Thus, beginning in March 2005, several months before the deadline for intervention, FOR had notice that at least one government agency considered Middle Piru Creek a potentially important habitat for steelhead trout; that DWR was applying to change its flow regime in a manner that might result in harm to whatever fish species inhabited the creek; and that DWR was doing so because it believed the new flow regime would benefit the arroyo toad. Although FOR did not have strong scientific support for its arguments that a natural flow regime would harm steelhead and not help the arroyo toad, it knew that these would be the environmental issues surrounding DWR's license amendment. In sum, although the 2006 reports now cited by the petitioners provided better support for petitioners' contentions, they did not fundamentally change the issues (or even the arguments) involved. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Commission to decide that this new information did not give petitioners good cause to intervene late. Indeed, it was consistent with the Commission's extant precedent. See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co., 100 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,327 (2002) (Choosing to focus on other matters rather than to timely respond to a filing before this Commission falls far short of the demonstration of good cause that would support a late intervention request.); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 100 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,247 (2002) ([Because, b]y their own admission, [petitioners] had some indication that [licensee's] filings in these proceedings may affect their interests, the fact that petitioners claimed that there appeared to be no disputes relevant to their interests was not enough to establish good cause for untimely intervention). In support of their argument that new information can constitute good cause under Rule 214, petitioners present only dicta in two cases involving the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Neither case is analogous. In Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.1988), we addressed whether a late-filed contention (issue) with the NRC was reasonabl[y] specific[ ] enough (under NRC regulations) to be considered. Id. at 226. We noted in dicta, in a footnote, that under the NRC's regulation governing late-filed contentions, [13] new information issued after the deadline for filing contentions could constitute good cause for late filing. Id. at 227 n. 6. The information in Sierra Club, however, revealed a safety issue theretofore not considered. See id. at 224. Likewise, in Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50 (D.C.Cir.1990), the D.C. Circuit noted in dicta that the NRC has ruled that good cause under its late-filing rule is by definition met where contentions are filed late only because the information on which they were based was not available until after the filing deadline. Id. at 52-53. Even if we thought that dicta in two NRC cases should inform our judgment about the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's proceedings, neither case gives us any reason to question the Commission's interpretation of its regulations governing late intervention. In both cases, the new information on which petitioners relied was actually new, and revealed an issue not previously considered by either the NRC or the petitioners. In this case, the new information does not reveal any new issues: it is simply stronger scientific support for arguments already made to the Commission. Moreover, even if we thought that the 2006 reports supplied good cause for late intervention, the petitioners were still untimely. These reports, and the new Fisheries Service rule, were issued in 2006, and yet petitioners failed to move to intervene until mid-2007  almost a year after the first of the information became available. Given these circumstances, we cannot find arbitrary and capricious the Commission's determinations that new information did not excuse petitioners' failure to intervene in a timely fashion.
Petitioners also claim that the Commission's determinations that CalTrout and FOR's late intervention would prejudice the other parties to the proceedings were arbitrary and capricious. They note that (1) no other party opposed their late intervention motions, (2) DWR was the only other party to the proceeding, (3) the Commission could not legally issue a license amendment until California issued a water quality certification for the project pursuant to the Clean Water Act  a process that is ongoing, and (4) DWR is currently operating Pyramid Dam under an interim flow regime substantially similar to that proposed in the license amendment, and thus cannot be prejudiced by prolonged proceedings. Petitioners assert that the Commission's decisions, by failing to account for these facts and by failing to explicitly discuss the factors constituting prejudice under Rule 214, are arbitrary and capricious. Rule 214 sets out five factors that the Commission may consider when acting on an untimely motion to intervene. The first factor gives the Commission the discretion to consider whether the movant had good cause for failing to file the motion within the time prescribed. 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(d)(1)(I). The next three factors constitute the inquiry into prejudice. The second factor asks whether [a]ny disruption of the proceeding might result from permitting intervention. Id. § 385.214(d)(1)(ii). The third factor looks to whether [t]he movant's interest is not adequately represented by other parties in the proceeding. Id. § 385.214(d)(1)(iii). The fourth factor inquires whether [a]ny prejudice to, or additional burdens upon, the existing parties might result from permitting the intervention. Id. § 385.214(d)(1)(iv). The fifth factor allows the Commission to determine whether the motion conforms to the requirements of paragraph (b), id. § 385.214(d)(1)(v), including the requirement that the movant show good cause why the time limitation should be waived, id. § 385.214(b)(3). The Commission's orders denying rehearing on CalTrout and FOR's motions for untimely intervention do not comprehensively address any of the three factors constituting prejudice. In its order denying rehearing of FOR's motion, the Commission mentions prejudice but does not explain either the basis for finding prejudice or the weight such a finding played in its determination. The Commission notes that its rules are designed to ensure an orderly administrative process and the certainty that there will be an end to interventions which prolong the proceeding. 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150 (internal quotation marks omitted). After analyzing whether the new information cited by FOR could give it good cause to intervene, the Commission then concludes that [a]llowing interventions, 21 months after the deadline, would delay, prejudice, and place additional burdens on the Commission and the licensees. Id. It reasons that [w]ere the Commission to allow new intervention every time a study was conducted or new information was otherwise placed in the record, we would never be able to establish a deadline for interventions, which is necessary for us to conduct orderly proceedings. Id. Similarly, when rejecting CalTrout's motion for rehearing, the Commission declares that [a]llowing intervention, 19 months after the deadline, would delay, prejudice, and place additional burdens on the Commission and the licensees. 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057. Neither decision addresses whether any disruption of the proceeding might result, whether CalTrout's or FOR's interests would be adequately represented, or how exactly petitioners untimely intervention would prejudice or place additional burdens upon DWR, the only party to the proceedings. Cf. 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(d)(1). The Supreme Court has advised that the scope of review under the `arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). Although the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including `a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,' id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)), and the reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for [any] deficiencies [in the agency's reasoning], id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)), we should uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission's explanations are not a paragon of clarity. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir.2007). Both orders denying rehearing mention delay and prejudice almost as throw-away pointsthe Commission refers to these factors in a single line, in the middle of a paragraph otherwise discussing whether new information might present good cause for late intervention. See 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150, 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057. Additionally, both decisions discuss the factors in the abstract and do not enumerate the specific reasons why CalTrout or FOR's intervention would prejudice or delay the proceedings. Indeed, the Commissions' decisions appear to simply employ boilerplate language from prior decisions in this regard. Cf., e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co., 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,014 (2005) (noting the absence of any undue delay, prejudice or burden to the parties); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 111 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,118 (2005) (same). Nevertheless, we think that due to the peculiar nature of the regulation at issue, the Commission's path may reasonably be discerned. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 497, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d 967 (2004). Under Rule 214, the Commission has the discretion to consider good cause, prejudice, and other factors before granting or denying a movant's request for untimely intervention. Good cause is plainly the most important consideration because it is mentioned twice in the Commission's regulation. A motion for intervention  must ... show good cause why the time limitation shall be waived. 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(3) (emphasis added). The Commission may consider whether the motion conforms to the [procedural] requirements of paragraph (b), id. § 385.214(d)(1)(v), and whether the movant had good cause for failing to file the motion within the time prescribed, id. § 385.214(d)(1)(i). A finding that a movant has failed to show good cause is a sufficient basis for denying late intervention. If the Commission determines that the movant failed to show good cause, it may, but is not required to, consider any other factor, including prejudice. In other words, a late petitioner must ordinarily show good cause and, once that is shown, additionally prove that the late intervention will not prejudice the Commission or other parties. If the Commission determines that an untimely movant lacks good cause, the Commission is not required to consider the remaining factors. See Power Co. of Am., 245 F.3d at 843. Under the Commission's regulation, lack of prejudice is not the same as good cause. Here, the Commission clearly found that neither FOR nor CalTrout had presented good cause for its untimely intervention. See 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150, 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057. The Commission discussed at length FOR's and CalTrout's failure to provide any convincing reasons why it could not have intervened earlier in the proceeding, concluded that the allegedly new information could not provide good cause for FOR to intervene, and held that late intervention was [not] warranted by the longstanding principles [of NEPA]. 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150. See also 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057. We thus do not need to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action, Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196-97, 67 S.Ct. 1575, or infer an agency's reasoning from mere silence, Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission made clear that petitioners lacked any viable reason for their failure to intervene earlier in the proceedings, and was justified in denying their motions for late intervention solely on that basis, even if, as petitioners claim, no prejudice would result from their untimely intervention. We cannot conclude that by mentioning factors not necessary to its holding, the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously or otherwise abused its discretion.
Petitioners also object that the Commission's actions are inconsistent with its precedent. Petitioners claim that the Commission inexplicably departed from several prior decisions in which similarly positioned movants were permitted to intervene after the regulatory deadline, and thus that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Atchinson, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 37 L.Ed.2d 350 (1973) (plurality opinion). We generally expect agencies to deal consistently with the parties or persons coming before them. Not only must an agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998). If an agency fails to adhere to the rules developed in its precedent, those subject to the agency's authority cannot use its precedent as a guide for their conduct; nor will that precedent check arbitrary agency action. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 41 (1st Cir.1989) (Breyer, J.). Accordingly, [a] settled course of behavior embodies the agency's informed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to it by Congress. Atchinson, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 412 U.S. at 807, 93 S.Ct. 2367. Consistency is not the only value at issue. Within certain bounds, [f]ederal agencies have the power to adjust policies and rulings in light of experience. Cal. Trucking Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 900 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting Mont. Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 608 F.2d 334, 347 (9th Cir.1979)) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). An agency's learned expertise with certain types of decisions gives it the ability to make the sort of informed policy choices that we cannot. The intersection of these principles gives rise to our standard of review for agency decisions interpreting its prior holdings. Thus, while an agency may announce new principles in an adjudicatory proceeding, it `may not depart, sub silentio, from its usual rules of decision to reach a different, unexplained result in a single case.' Id. (quoting NLRB v. Silver Bay Local Union No. 962, 498 F.2d 26, 29 (9th Cir.1974)). See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). In other words, [t]hough the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and followsby rule or by settled course of adjudicationa general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as `arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion' within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32, 117 S.Ct. 350, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996). Our task accordingly is to assess whether the cases petitioners cite indicate that the Commission departed irrationally from its prior decisions. If we so conclude, then we must analyze the Commission's reasons from departing from its past precedent to determine whether the Commission has clearly set forth the ground for its departure from prior norms. W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 284 (9th Cir.1996). Petitioners assert that the Commission departed from its prior precedent by denying them intervention despite the fact that they raised NEPA claims and other environmental issues in their motions to intervene. Petitioners cite three cases in which the Commission granted late intervention to a movant who filed its motion for late intervention raising issues about a draft EA. [14] See Cameron LNG, LLC, 118 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,019 (2007); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 113 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,118, 61,438 (2005); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County, 63 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,337, 63,202 (1993). None of these cited cases, however, indicate that the Commission here irrationally departed from its prior precedent. Two of the cited cases deal with intervention in a natural gas proceeding, and the Commission has concluded they merit special consideration. In Cameron LNG, the Commission held that [a]lthough ... an environmental assessment and not an environmental impact statement [was prepared], and although [the movant] moved to intervene and filed comments on the environmental assessment one day late, we will grant [the movant's] motion to intervene. 118 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,019. But it did so reasoning that [i]n the interest of giving full consideration to requests for authorization of natural gas projects, including those for LNG facilities, the Commission has a liberal intervention policy in natural gas cases at this particular stage of the proceeding, that is before an order on the merits has been issued. Id. (emphasis added); see also Columbia Gas Transmission, 113 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,118 (allowing intervention in a natural gas case). Thus, both Cameron LNG and Columbia Gas Transmission are easily distinguishable from this caseboth involve natural gas projects that the Commission has concluded involve special circumstances not present here. Far from establishing a broad principle that the Commission will allow untimely intervention whenever a movant raises concerns with a draft EA, these cases establish the oppositethat allowing such intervention is the exception rather than the norm. Moreover, the petition to intervene in Cameron LNG was filed only four months after the deadline for motions to intervene and only one day after the deadline for comments on the draft EA. Id. This is in contrast to the petitioners in this case, who filed more than twenty months late. See Transok, L.L.C., 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,055, 61,186 (1999) (Late intervention at the early stages of a proceeding generally does not disrupt the proceeding or prejudice the interests of any party ... [so] the Commission is more liberal in granting late intervention at the early stages of a proceeding, but is more restrictive as the proceeding nears its end. (footnote omitted)) (denying a motion for intervention filed nine months after the deadline). Although Public Utility District is not a natural gas case, it too does not support petitioners' claim that the Commission departed from prior precedent. In Public Utility District, the Commission held in a very brief one-page order that because it [was] still in the process of considering [comments filed in response to a draft EA], granting[certain organizations'] motions to intervene out of time[would] not unduly delay or disrupt the proceeding or prejudice any party to it. 63 F.E.R.C. ¶¶ 61,337, 63,202. The Commission's decision (on a motion for rehearing) never mentioned whether the movants had good cause to intervene-indeed, it did not even consider whether there was good cause to intervene. Here, unlike in Public Utility District, the Commission explicitly determined that the petitioners did not have good cause to intervene: thus, it was not required, under Rule 214, to give any weight to the fact that late intervention would not delay the proceeding or otherwise prejudice the existing parties. The Commission's decision to treat petitioners differently based on their lack of good cause is not unreasonable, or plainly inconsistent with the rationale of Public Utility District. Cal. Trucking, 900 F.2d at 213. [15] In its decisions denying intervention here, the Commission cited numerous cases in which it found that similarly situated persons lacked good cause to intervene late. See 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150 nn. 5 & 7 (citing cases); 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057 nn. 4 & 5 (citing cases). These cases set out the Commission's clear policy of denying intervention to movants who knew (either directly or constructively) that the Commission's proceedings could infringe on their interests, but sat on their rights and waited for an adverse result before intervening. See, e.g. Crown Landing LLC, 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,209 (2006) ([Movant's] argument that it discerned no need for a specific intervention prior to issuance of the June 20 Order does not demonstrate good cause for its late motion to intervene.); Erie Boulevard Hydropower, L.P., 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,189 (2006) (The fact that [a movant] only determined at an extremely late date that it would like to compete for the project site is not sufficient grounds to justify later intervention.); Fla. Gas Transmission Co., 100 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,241 (2002) (denying motion to intervene filed six months after the deadline because [the movant] had or should have had knowledge of [the subject matter of the proceeding]). All in all, the Commission has steadfastly and consistently held that a person who has actual or constructive notice that his interests might be adversely affected by a proceeding, but who fails to intervene in a timely manner, lacks good cause under Rule 214. See, e.g., Bradwood Landing LLC, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,035 (2009) (denying late intervention to movant who claimed that scientific studies made it more aware of its interests in the proceeding); Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,192 (2008) (The Commission expects parties to intervene in a timely manner based on the reasonably foreseeable issues arising from the applicant's filings and the Commission's notice of proceedings. (emphasis added)); Broadwater Energy LLC, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,225 (2008) (Those entities with interests they intend to protect are not entitled to wait until the outcome of a proceeding and then file a motion to intervene once they discover the outcome conflicts with their interests.). This is precisely the position in which petitioners find themselveseach had actual or constructive notice that the DWR license amendment might affect its interests, but neither intervened until after the Commission issued its draft EA. Because good cause is the principal factor the Commission must point to when rejecting an untimely motion to intervene, see supra Part II.B.2, this line of precedent applies directly to petitioners' motions. We cannot say that the Commission deviated irrationally from its prior precedent in failing to make an exception to its general rule for petitioners' untimely motions for intervention. The dissent argues that the Commission deviated from its past precedent because in hydroelectric cases, the Commission in practice does not impose a good cause requirement on late intervention when there is no risk of prejudice. Dissenting Op. at 9200 (citing Alaska Power & Tel. Co., 98 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,092 (2002)). The case cited by the dissent, however, establishes nothing more than the entirely unremarkable proposition that, in hydroelectric cases, the Commission often has made no finding of whether the movant has demonstrated good cause for the late [intervention] request. Alaska Power, 98 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,092 (emphasis added). [16] As we have noted, the Commission is perfectly justified in deciding that it will not consider good cause or the other discretionary factors permitted by Rule 214. It is also perfectly justified, however, in considering such factors and denying intervention when it determines that a prospective intervener lacks good cause. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(3) & (d)(1)(v). Where, as here, the agency's rule gives it the discretion either to consider or to ignore certain factors, we would be remiss to eliminate this discretion by requiring the agency to always ignore certain factors just because it has often ignored these factors in the past. The parity insisted on by the dissent would force the Commission either to always consider or always ignore good cause when considering motions for late intervention. We cannot see that either of these outcomes is required by rule or good administrative practice. Finally, we observe that the Commission's procedural rules are no less importantand, therefore, no less deserving of respectthan our own code of procedure. Such rules provide for orderly decisionmaking and constitute advance notice of the process by which our institutions will conduct themselves. The petitioners knew the rules of the game and assumed the risks of their decision not to intervene. The Commission had no obligation, by statute or by rule, to provide relief for petitioners' failure to intervene in a timely fashion.