Opinion ID: 2202658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Ethical Standard

Text: The majority opinion rejects our Bar's effort to secure an uplifting ethical standard in the matter of the revolving door standard in Washington, D.C. The Bar urged the court to be mindful of this consideration: Avoiding the appearance of impropriety goes to the very heart of the legitimacy of the rule of law in our society: the people must have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 9-1 (1983). For this reason, the committee agrees with the emphasis of the panel majority[ [16] ] on the need for scrupulous care to avoid any appearance of impropriety. (Brief for Amicus Curiae at 10; citations omitted.) This seems to me to be a fair statement of the underlying purpose of the Canon we are considering. The Bar is aware, on the other hand, that if a reading too broad is given to that ethical standard, it might encourage counsel in other proceedings to harass, divert or delay decisions upon the merits . . . by unfounded motions to disqualify. Id. To reach a balance on this problem the Bar suggests that: [W]here transactions pertain to a single objective and involve the same property and the same party, public concerns about the fair administration of law usually will support a determination that the transactions are part of the same matter.[ [17] ] Id. at 10-11. The majority rejects this fair-minded approach to the problem, though I find it quite appealing. It is a sensible standard. It does not engage in syrupy rhetoric but, rather, gets down to earth on the issue. But the majority rejects the Bar's single objective criteria as too vague and wooden. I think that was quite unnecessary because it is practical and definitive. It avoids fine ratiocinations. The Bar, in its supplemental brief, later elaborated on the term single objective. It stated that in real estate development the term was not intended to be a goal as broad as the general economic development of an area. The term was meant, says the Bar, to be directed toward a more pointed objective. It is quite apparent in this case that the specific objective of the same party in these proceedings was at all times to increase the density of the marketable space in the building, a sufficiently narrow specific objective. To meet the Bar's test, the single objective need hardly be as narrow as, for example, to obtain larger elevators or different door knobs for the building in each of the three transactions in this case; nor, as the Bar put it (Brief for Amicus at 19), need it have related always to parking, though the BZA mistakenly thought so. [18] In contrast, the essence of the majority opinion in this case in relation to the ethical standard is: [O]nly if specific information (as distinct from general agency expertise or contacts) that a former government lawyer may have had access to in one matter is likely to be useful in a subsequent matter, will there be a reasonable possibility of the particular improprieties that DR 9-101 (B) is intended to forestall. (Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at 23. It is my view, however, that our Bar is eminently correct in the opposing view that the interest unique to Canon 9 is public confidence in the fair administration of the law. [19] Consequently, says our Bar, there is a need for `scrupulous care to avoid any appearance of impropriety.' (Brief for Amicus at 10) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir.1974)) (emphasis in original). I agree with the Bar's forthright statement of what the ethical standard should be in this jurisdiction. This standard does not stem from the issue of whether the attorney did or did not take away from the government useful information (whatever that may be) [20] later being applied in a case in private practice. The crucial consideration is that the useful information requirement successfully writes out of the equation the heart of the ethical rule, viz., the public's conception of impropriety. Instead, it substitutes a test which requires a substantial piece of collateral litigation to determine whether there was useful information employed. According to the court, it requires proof that there was an actual impropriety. ( See supra note 15, majority opinion). In reality, the court is requiring proof of a misfeasance. This is a rewrite of the Canon. The concern that lawyers consider the appearance their conduct will present to an independent observer (the public) is the primary reason that Canon 9 has special importance in the context of former government attorneys. [21] The public's perception is particularly important where government attorneys switch sides and represent adverse interests in a subsequent proceeding. It has been held that the preservation of public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice, and in the integrity of the bar, mandate disqualification even in those instances where a former government attorney's conduct may be only arguably improper. Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 570 (2d Cir.1975); New York Co. Lawyer's Association, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Opinion No. 202. The substantial relationship test has been construed most frequently in court decisions which focused upon an attorney's obligation to keep confidential information received from a former client. The majority opinion has seized upon this line of cases and narrowly confines its analysis to focus exclusively on the passage of information. Such a limited perspective is wrong, since the utilization of useful information obtained while in government is not the sole impropriety which the disqualification rule seeks to prevent. As the majority recognizes, resolving the ethical issues associated with side-switching requires balancing the need for capable government attorneys with the interest in public confidence in the administration of law. The majority fails to recognize, however, that in balancing these concerns, it is essential to recognize in accordance with the spirit of Canon 9 that public confidence can be undermined by the appearance of ethical improprieties. It is therefore essential that we be concerned with appearances from the public's reasonable perspective  a public that currently is not entirely trusting of lawyers. [22] Even in criminal law, the Supreme Court often returns to the theme: . . . to perform its high function in the best way, `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) (emphasis added)); see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 1670, 72 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (discussing the due process requirement of judicial impartiality); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) (discussing the reality that different juries reach different results); Proctor v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 435 U.S. 559, 98 S.Ct. 1596, 56 L.Ed.2d 547 (1978) (relief denied had nothing to do with habeas corpus relief requested). The principal concern is that when an attorney switches from government to private practice and gets involved in a matter in which he previously had substantial responsibility, it may reasonably appear to the public that he conducted his office with the hope of eventual personal gain in the private sector. See General Motors, supra, 501 F.2d at 650 n. 20; D.C.Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 26 (1977); Developments in the Law  Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.REV. 1246, 1430 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Developments ]. Involvement in private practice in a substantially related matter, for example, may create an appearance that the attorney failed to zealously represent the government's interest in anticipation of private employment. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir.1976); D.C. Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Inquiry No. 19, at 12 (Tent. Draft 1976); Allied Realty of St. Paul, Inc. v. Exchange National Bank of Chicago, 283 F.Supp. 464, 469 (D.Minn.1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823, 90 S.Ct. 64, 24 L.Ed.2d 73 (1969). Such an appearance, even if based solely upon representation in two substantially related matters, logically raises suspicions about an attorney's overall conduct as a government official. Woods, supra, 537 F.2d at 814. The ultimate fear is that the attorney may have neglected issues of public importance to concentrate primarily on developing matters that could prove profitable in private practice. Side-switching on related matters, therefore, creates appearances that from the public's perspective call into question the integrity of the attorney involved and the reliability of our legal system. It is a crucial consideration in this case that the majority fails to recognize that this appearance will exist regardless of whether the attorney carried useful information into private practice. While the concerns raised by the potential use of confidential information are significant, just as important is the concern that government power may be abused to secure subsequent private gain. See General Motors, supra, 501 F.2d at 650 n. 20. Such abuse can occur, for example, when an attorney uses the government position to initiate a suit that he will be able to later develop further in private practice or when he less than vigorously represents the government's interest in order to benefit the position of a potential private employer. The appearance that a public position was compromised through either of these methods can clearly arise without delving into whether the former government attorney had access to or possesses useful information. The majority does just what our Bar diplomatically warned against in this case with a certain incisiveness. Focusing on the taking away of information from the government position, it engages in just the type of fine ratiocination that, as the Bar cautioned, will only exacerbate public fears about the fair administration of justice. (Brief for Amicus at 19.) The simple reality ignored by the majority is that from the public's perspective, a substantial factual relationship between two matters may well be enough to reasonably give rise to the appearance that an attorney may have comprised the government's interests before entering private practice. For this reason, the gloss placed by the majority on substantially related matters is entirely at odds with the intended effect of DR 9-101(B). The fear of blanket disqualification is no longer of genuine concern to law firms which are considering employment of government attorneys. The only remaining disqualification concern is that individual attorneys may be barred from participating in particular matters over which they had substantial responsibility while in the government. It would be most unusual for this concern to be enough to dissuade a law firm from hiring a government attorney, as the number of matters from which an attorney must be screened is obviously limited and is unlikely to involve the bulk of a firm's practice in a particular area. [23] The practice of screening adequately addresses the concerns that underpin the majority's narrow definition of substantially related matters. The majority's preoccupation with these concerns is therefore unrealistic and detrimental to what is actually at stake  public confidence in the legal profession and the administration of justice. The court's unwillingness to invoke Canon 9 to correct improper appearances eviscerates this standard's effect on lawyer's conduct and, thus, runs counter to DR 9-101(B)'s intended purpose. This approach erroneously relegates Canon 9 and its focus on `appearance of impropriety' to a remote and uncertain role at best. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 452 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) ( vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981)). It is difficult to accept that a profession which prides itself on maintain[ing] the highest standard of ethical conduct, should be willing to retreat from the general principle that the actions of its members should merit the approval of all good men. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Preamble (1979); see also United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964). Moreover, since access to useful information  whatever that is  may be difficult to demonstrate, the guidepost of appearance is particularly appropriate in these matters. The term substantial relationship signifies something more than a mere facial similarity between the nature of the past and present representations. It is not necessary to treat each distinct form of a proceeding as a separate matter without regard to any underlying factual nexus between such proceedings. After all, [t]here may be for various technical reasons, all sorts of separate proceedings conducted under different docket numbers, in some or different form, which all arise from a single set of underlying facts, circumstances, or transactions. In our view, it is the [underlying] factual relation between various pleadings or claims which determines whether they constitute the same matter. D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion No. 92 (emphasis added). This the BZA did not understand. The Bar in its brief puts it to the court this way: A former government attorney should not . . . represent, consult or advise a person concerning a property or project if while in government the attorney opposed or advised that same person regarding his or her same practical objectives regarding that same property or project. . . . (Brief for Amicus at 13.) I agree, and it seems evident that it fits this case squarely. It is not open to question that one or the other of the two attorneys at varying times advised or opposed Carr on this building project from its infancy. And it also seems undeniable that there were present at all pertinent times Carr's practical objectives regarding construction of a building on the same property. The Bar in its brief stated the proposition well: The substantial relationship test used to construe matter in DR 9-101(B) should recognize reasonable public perceptions of impropriety and thereby encourage public confidence in the neutral administration of law. Ordinarily, transactions involving the same party, property and objective will justify these apprehensions. In such situations, the potential for disqualification is sufficiently serious that attorneys should take available precautions to avoid the appearance of impropriety. (Brief for Amicus at 22.) Saying it is the key to this case, the court in this case holds that: [O]nly if specific information (as distinct from general agency expertise or contracts) that a former government lawyer may have had access to in one matter is likely to be useful in a subsequent matter, will there be a reasonable possibility of the particular improprieties that DR 9-101 (B) is intended to forestall. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) This test, which this court now says is the key to this case, requires a law firm to determine whether its attorney  previously a government attorney  had access to information as a government attorney which was  likely to be useful in a subsequent matter.  (Emphasis added.) Apparently, the decider must (1) examine all the information to which the former government attorney gained access; and (2) determine whether there was any information likely to be useful in a [ the ] subsequent matter.  (Emphasis added.) This is a hazy test for this ethical question and will likely require extensive litigation to determine whether one is able to prove useful information was available to the former government attorney. And this is what the court says is the key to this case. Translated into this case, it should not have been necessary for the law firm initially to discover what information the two attorneys came upon in the government and then determine whether any such information would be useful in the parking proceeding. It was readily apparent that the parking proceeding was still another attempt to increase the density of marketable space in the same building by the same property owner. There was thus a substantial relationship between the proceedings going far back. The firm should have assigned a different attorney to the case, not a particularly horrendous decision. If one were disenchanted with the revolving door canon of ethics there would scarcely be a more effective way of smothering it than to now require the court's useful information test. It is important to realize what the court is here doing in the process of the fine ratiocinations [24] of its opinion. The court says: In the present case, for example, we are satisfied that the three land use transactions directed at the same property in the unique, relatively small CR zone, involving Oliver T. Carr and the District of Columbia government in each instance, provide a sufficient factual overlap for a reasonable person to infer that Iverson Mitchell and C. Francis Murphy, while attorneys for the District, may have had access to information from the height litigation and the air rights condominium discussions that could be legally relevant to, or otherwise useful in, the special exception case at issue here. (Emphasis added.) That conclusion by the court should have been enough to resolve the ethical issue. What that statement necessarily means is that there is a reasonable public perception of impropriety. If as the court says, and I agree, there is enough here for a reasonable person to infer that Iverson Mitchell and C. Francis Murphy, while attorneys for the District, may have had access to information from the height litigation and the air rights condominium discussions that could be legally relevant to, or otherwise useful in, the special exception case at issue here, then there inevitably is enough here without more for a reasonable public perception of impropriety. This is after all not a criminal proceeding. We are here dealing with an ethical standard relating to the public perception of the administration of justice. And we are dealing with a problem that is readily avoided by the use of the moderate screening device in the law firm. But that is not the court's view of the question. The court's view is that the inference to which I have referred is simply enough to cause a review of the findings of the BZA to determine whether there was actually anything improper. So, in order to determine this the court then turns to the fatally defective findings of the BZA, swallows them whole, no matter how indiscriminate, and proceeds to conclude that the ethical issue vanishes. The court's view of the ethical standard, and more specifically the grafting of the useful information (confidential information) test onto Canon 9 is more properly a test for a case when there is a vicarious disqualification involved; by that I mean, a case where the law firm is disqualified if one of its attorneys is disqualified. But the useful information test is too protective in this jurisdiction where we have a screening provision which avoids the heavy sanction against the law firm. The presence of the screening provision should require a construction of the Canon as it is written  to avoid the appearance of impropriety, i.e., to avoid a reasonable public perception of impropriety. The court should realize it must pay more attention to a reasonable public perception when ethical issues stemming from revolving door are before it. Those issues have the additional factor of problems directed toward governmental integrity. According to the new rule in this jurisdiction being announced today by the court, even though there is an appearance of impropriety, the law firm may properly ignore this if the firm believes the attorney in question did not actually take useful information (whatever that may be) away from the government position. The court does not satisfactorily define useful information except to say it does not include agency expertise and contacts. How this is in reality distinguished from useful information is not apparent. This illustrates the folly of the court's useful information test now being grafted onto the Canon. Before this was done, the Canon specifically related entirely to the appearance of impropriety. This is in fundamental conflict with the test proposed by the Bar. The Bar proposes this worldly test: [W]here transactions pertain to a single objective and involve the same property and the same party, public concerns about the fair administration of law usually will support a determination that the transactions are part of the same matter. (Brief for Amicus at 10-11.) It is readily apparent that the Bar and the court have a philosophical difference in viewpoints on this issue of legal ethics. The court adopts something akin to a punitive test approach (misfeasance) and the Bar views it as a purely ethical question. The Bar's outlook is aspirational. The court approaches it as though a punitive sanction were involved. Yet, the screening provision was intended to allay just those economically punitive fears and remove a financially harsh sanction. The court approaches the question as though the economic consequences to the law firm were grave in the manner of vicarious disqualification of the entire law firm from the case, and perhaps additional cases. But that consequence no longer exists due to the screening provision. The court, however, essentially views the issue as if the consequences were still as severe as they were in the past. This underlying conflict in views is at the root of the fundamental difference between the court and the Bar. The Bar's concern is with a reasonable public perception. The court largely ignores this consideration and is excessively solicitous of the law firms. We in dissent favor the viewpoint of the Bar. What this all boils down to is that in rejecting the enlightened ethical standard proposed by our Bar, we are presenting an unnecessary rebuff, instead of support, to the legal profession of this city.