Opinion ID: 2169216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Were the Board's Decisions Based Upon a Correct Interpretation of the Pertinent Statutes?

Text: The Board did not issue its Findings and Order until February 27, 1974, well after Ethyl had filed its appeals of the Board's decisions in the Superior Court. Although the court received the Findings and Order into evidence de bene, it disregarded them in reaching its judgment for the reason that they represent Board action subsequent to the filing of the appeals. . . and cannot be used to vary or enlarge the statements of Board action prior to the appeals. In declining to give probative value to the Board's Findings and Order, the Justice correctly applied this Court's reasoning in Gagne v. Inhabitants of City of Lewiston, Me., 281 A.2d 579, 583 (1971), where we said that [T]he filing of an appeal removes the cause from the administrative tribunal to the Superior Court. We hold that the appeal terminates the authority of the tribunal to modify its decisions unless the court remands the matter to the tribunal for its further action, thereby reviving its authority. Having properly decided to discount the Board's Findings and Order, the Justice below could not look to that document in order to ascertain how the Board interpreted the substantive law involved in this case. He likewise apparently did not rely on the two letters, n. 4 and n. 8 supra in which Ethyl received word that its applications had been denied by the Board, to illuminate the Board's legal reasoning. Those letters were written by a Board staff member, and the Justice may have quite reasonably judged that the opinions expressed in them as to why Ethyl's applications had been denied were merely an expression of the letter writer's personal views. Finally, we note that the brief excerpts of the minutes of the Board's meetings at which Ethyl's applications were denied, [14] which were introduced into evidence, shed but a dim light on the Board's legal reasoning. The court does not appear to have attached any significance to them. The Superior Court was thus, for all practical purposes, unapprised of the legal reasoning on which the Board's denials of Ethyl's applications was predicated. We, of course, are in this respect in the same position as was the court below. We do know, nonetheless, that the Board reached the ultimate conclusions of law that Ethyl's bark-oil boiler is not a water pollution control facility or an air pollution control facility, as defined by the applicable statutes. With those conclusions we agree. Upon close examination of those statutes, it is apparent that the Legislature in its wisdom has defined three distinct types of pollution control facilities. The definition of a water pollution control facility found in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(29) is in some respects different from the definition of a water pollution control facility found in 36 M.R.S.A. § 656(1)(E)(1). The definitions of an air pollution control facility which are given in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(30) and 36 M.R.S.A. § 656(1)(E)(2) are, by contrast, identical. We now set out these statutory definitions in full. A facility is a water pollution control facility qualifying for an exemption from sales and use taxes if it is installed, acquired or placed in operation primarily for the purpose of reducing, controlling or eliminating water pollution caused by industrial waste, § 1760(29)(B), AND IT IS EITHER (A) a `disposal system' ( i. e., a system used primarily for disposing of or isolating industrial waste, including thickeners, incinerators, pipelines or conduits, pumping stations, force mains and all other constructions, devices, appurtenances and facilities used for collecting or conducting water borne industrial waste to a point of disposal, treatment or isolation), § 1760(29)(A), which is not necessary to the manufacture of products, § 1760(29(A); OR (B) a `treatment works' ( i.e., a plant, pumping station, reservoir or other works used primarily for the purpose of treating, stabilizing, isolating or holding industrial waste), § 1760(29)(D); OR (C) an appliance, equipment, machinery, installation or structures, § 1760(29)(B). A facility is a water pollution control facility qualifying for an exemption from property taxes if it has a capacity to handle at least 4,000 gallons of waste per day, § 656(1)(E)(1) AND it is installed, acquired or placed in operation primarily for the purpose of reducing, controlling or eliminating water pollution caused by industrial, commercial or domestic waste, § 656(1)(E)(1)(a), AND IT IS EITHER (A) a `disposal system' ( i. e., a system used primarily for disposing of or isolating industrial, commercial or domestic waste, including thickeners, incinerators, pipelines or conduits, pumping stations, force mains and all other constructions, devices, appurtenances and facilities used for collecting or conducting water borne industrial, commercial or domestic waste to a point of disposal, treatment or isolation,), § 656(1)(E)(1)(b), which is not necessary to the manufacture of products, § 656(1)(E)(1)(b); OR (C) an appliance, equipment, machinery, installation or structures, § 656(1)(E)(1)(a). A facility is an air pollution control facility qualifying for an exemption from both sales and use taxes and property taxes if it is an appliance, equipment, machinery, installation or structures installed, acquired or placed in operation primarily for the purpose of reducing, controlling, eliminating or disposing of industrial air pollutants. §§ 1760(30)(A), 656(1)(E)(2) (a). Insofar as the Board denied Ethyl's applications, it necessarily determined, as a matter of law, first, that Ethyl's bark-oil boiler is not a water pollution control facility as defined by § 1760(29), and second, that it is not a water pollution control facility as defined by § 656(1)(E)(1), and third, that it is not an air pollution control facility as defined in § 1760(30) and § 656(1)(E)(2). The Superior Court concluded, as a matter of law, that the bark-oil boiler is a water pollution control facility as defined in § 1760(29), a water pollution control facility as defined in § 656(1)(E)(1), and an air pollution control facility as defined in § 1760(30) and § 656(1)(E)(2). As we have previously indicated, however, the court below arrived at these conclusions by its own interpretation of the statutory definitions as applied to the factual findings. In so doing, the court misconstrued the statutes. The Superior Court's conclusions of law are therefore erroneous in that they are based upon an incorrect interpretation of the statutes. In these peculiar circumstances, it falls to us to address the issue whether the Board was correct in concluding, as a matter of law, that Ethyl's bark-oil boiler is neither a water pollution control facility as defined in § 1760(29), nor a water pollution control facility as defined in § 656(1)(E)(1), nor an air pollution control facility as defined in § 1760(30) and § 656(1)(E)(2). We separate this issue into its three component questions and organize our discussion in the following manner: IV(a). Was the Board correct in concluding, as a matter of law, that Ethyl's bark-oil boiler is not a water pollution control facility as defined in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(29)? IV(b). Was the Board correct in concluding, as a matter of law, that Ethyl's bark-oil boiler is not a water pollution control facility as defined in 36 M.R.S.A. § 656(1)(E)(1)? IV(c). Was the Board correct in concluding, as a matter of law, that Ethyl's bark-oil boiler is not an air pollution control facility as defined in 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 1760(30), 656(1)(E)(2)?