Opinion ID: 702303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Two Steps of the Lauritzen Choice of Law Inquiry

Text: 80 The solution to the lack of guidance lies in approaching the Lauritzen analysis in a way that is faithful to its nature as a specialized form of interest analysis designed to ensure that American maritime law of personal injuries applies only where significant American interests are implicated and only in conformity with international law. Specifically, we interpret the notion of substantial contacts to embody these twin concerns in a two-step inquiry derived from international law. We conclude below that, in a Jones Act or general maritime law case, a court deciding whether American contacts are substantial (so that American law applies) must at the threshold ask whether one of the following factors is involved in the incident, in which case there is a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction (which, we explain infra subsection 1, means that significant American interests are implicated): injury to an American seaman or a seaman with American dependents, injury in American territory, American defendants, an American flagged ship, or a contractual choice of law clause specifying American law. If so, the second step in the substantial contacts inquiry is for the court to ascertain whether application of American law is reasonable under the circumstances, in which case (as subsection 2 describes) international law is satisfied. 14 81 In this case, as we explain below, the plaintiff succeeds on both steps of the inquiry. Her American citizenship satisfies the threshold requirement of a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, and consideration of the Lauritzen factors reveals that the American interests at stake here are such that American law may be reasonably applied. Hence, the American contacts are substantial and the plaintiff was entitled to sue under American law. 82 In the following analysis, we rely on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law for the relevant principles of international law. Its standards appear fairly supported in the decisions of [the Supreme] Court construing international choice-of-law principles ( [e.g.,] Lauritzen, Romero, and McCulloch [v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963) ].... Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2920, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). A primary reason for relying on the Restatement of Foreign Relation Law is that one of the Court's chief motives for cabining the potentially unlimited scope of the Jones Act in Lauritzen was a concern that the legislation not violate norms of international law. While the dissent argues that the sections we rely on were not meant to apply in a tort case such as this, dissenting op. infra at 208 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW Pt. IV, Ch. 1, Introd. Note, at 237 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT], the passage it quotes reveals that the Restatement's rules are not unconditionally irrelevant to tort cases: they only do not necessarily apply. Id. (different emphasis supplied). However, [i]n some circumstances, issues of private international law may also implicate issues of public international law, and many matters of private international law have substantial international significance and therefore may be considered foreign relations law [.] RESTATEMENT Sec. 101, cmt. c, at 23 (emphasis supplied). The Jones Act and American maritime law more generally are examples of just such matters, as is reflected by the Supreme Court's concern in Lauritzen about the prospect of violating international law. 15 See also infra note 17 (discussing difference between maritime laws and conventional tort law). Furthermore, the views of Lea Brilmayer, one of the leading authorities in the area, support use of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law here. Professor Brilmayer has analyzed conflict of laws as the domestic counterpart of the international law issue of the extraterritorial application of American law. Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 L. & Contemp.Probs. 11, 11 (Summer 1987). Of particular relevance here, she has noted the unhelpfulness of the public/private distinction as regards international law: Whether or not that distinction is viable, it does not describe the different roles of the two Restatements. Some private law cases, such as Lauritzen v. Larsen, fall under the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. Id. at 12 (footnote observing that Lauritzen is mentioned in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law Sec. 403, reporters' note 2 omitted; emphasis supplied). 16 83
84 The first essential question in Lauritzen analysis is whether the suit implicates significant interests of the United States. In accordance with Lauritzen's direction to construe American maritime law so as not to violate international law, we identify this preliminary inquiry with the question whether there is a basis for the United States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over the incident at issue. 85 International law has long recognized limitations on the authority of states to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances affecting the interests of other states. RESTATEMENT, Introd. Note, at 230. The Restatement defines prescriptive jurisdiction--which is not to be confused with subject matter jurisdiction--as the authority of a state to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of person in things.... RESTATEMENT Sec. 401(a). It lists several alternative bases for prescriptive jurisdiction. As a general matter (subject to restrictions we discuss below), nations may prescribe law 86 with respect to 87
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