Opinion ID: 483876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: JURISDICTION: WALLACE v. CHRISTENSEN

Text: 4 Even though neither of the parties has raised the issue, we must determine at the outset whether we have jurisdiction. In re Ryther, 799 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir.1986). Our review of decisions by the Parole Commission is limited, and we have recently charted those limits in Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc). We held there that Congress committed all substantive decisions to grant or deny parole to the discretion of the Parole Commission and that such decisions are therefore not reviewable. Id. at 1545. Wallace thus explicitly rejects our earlier cases that have reviewed Parole Commission decisions for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1542. By definition, a bare allegation that the Commission has abused its discretion acknowledges that the Commission has exercised a judgment, if improperly, within its discretion. Congress has specifically withdrawn such cases from our jurisdiction. Id. at 1551 (emphasis in original). 5 Wallace also determined the extent to which removal of our jurisdiction to review the Commission's decisions to grant or deny parole also precludes our review of the Commission's decision-making processes. Id. at 1546 (emphasis in original). Wallace declined to take an all or nothing position, holding instead that Congress intended judicial review of some aspects of Parole Commission decision-making but not others. Analysis of the Parole Act and its legislative history led us to conclude in Wallace that Congress intended to carve out an area of decision-making which, like the decision to grant or deny parole, is committed to agency discretion and hence unreviewable even for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1551. Within this unreviewable area are those judgments integral to individual parole decisions, judgments as to: the 'institutional behavior of each prospective parolee,' the 'nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner,' the 'concepts of general and special deterrence, retribution and punishment,' [and] the 'relevance of material before the Commission'.... Id. at 1549-50 (quoting Joint House-Senate Conference Report No. 94-838, 94th Cong.2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 351). 6 Some aspects of Parole Commission decision-making are reviewable, however. Because Congress has delineated boundaries beyond which the Commission may not act, courts may consider whether the Commission has acted outside these statutory limits. Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1551. To determine jurisdiction, then, a court must inquire whether the Commission has in fact made a 'judgment' within its discretion. Specifically, the court's inquiry is addressed to whether the Commission's decision involves the exercise of judgment among a range of possible choices or options, or involves a plain violation of a matter which does not admit of discretion and choice. Id. at 1552. For example, [a]lthough the relevance of the information considered by the Commission is a matter committed to discretion, a court may review whether the Commission completely failed to consider these factors which by statute it is required to consider in rendering its parole decision. Id. at 1551 (citation omitted). Wallace also holds that a court has jurisdiction to consider whether the Commission violated the Constitution. Id. at 1552. To determine whether we have jurisdiction, we must determine whether Roberts' challenge of the Parole Commission's decision-making process involves these limited areas.