Opinion ID: 2334050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amendments to the Information

Text: The information in this case initially charged that defendant failed to stop and give his name, residence, license number, and the name of the owner of the motor vehicle to the party whose property was injured, John Nichols, and to a law enforcement official. This represented only a portion of the offense of LSA as defined in 23 V.S.A. § 1128, which states in part: (a) The operator of a motor vehicle who has caused or is involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person or property, other than the vehicle then under his control or its occupants, shall immediately stop and render any assistance reasonably necessary. He shall give his name, residence, license number and the name of the owner of the motor vehicle to any party whose person or property is injured and to any enforcement officer. During the course of the trial, the information was amended with permission of the court in the following respects: (1) The alleged owner of the cab, John Nichols, was first changed to Yellow Cab and later dropped entirely; (2) the words immediately and render any assistance reasonably necessary were placed after stop. [2] Ownership of the cab had no relevance to the case; it was not an element of the offense, and the amendments concerning it were not prejudicial. As to the amendment pertaining to rendering assistance, we conclude, for several reasons, that this too was not prejudicial. Defendant argues that the amendment to the information constituted an additional offense in violation of V.R.Cr.P. 7(b) and (d). Rule 7(b) provides that the information shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Rule 7(d) permits amendment of the information during trial [i]f no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. The initial version of the information charged defendant with failing to stop and failing to disclose certain information. The amendment added that defendant failed to render assistance. By joining these separate violations with an and, the amendment added a third element to the charge. The purpose of the information is to reasonably indicate the exact offense the accused is charged with in order to allow him to prepare intelligently for his defense. State v. Phillips, 142 Vt. 283, 288, 455 A.2d 325, 328 (1982) (quoting State v. Christman, 135 Vt. 59, 60, 370 A.2d 624, 625 (1977)). The affidavit of probable cause which accompanied the information informed the defendant that the affiant believed that defendant did not immediately stop and render any assistance reasonably necessary [and] ... did not provide [the taxi driver] with any applicable information in regard to himself or his vehicle. Read in conjunction with the affidavit, the information thus clearly met the test of Phillips. See State v. Burclaff, 138 Vt. 461, 465, 418 A.2d 38, 40 (1980). Second, the amendment required the State to prove more than had been required prior to the amendment. The court instructed the jury that failure to provide both assistance and information were elements that the State was required to prove. [3] The jury was instructed to acquit defendant if a reasonable doubt existed about either element. Under the statute, however, failure either to stop and render assistance or to give the required information at a time and in a manner reasonable under the circumstances is sufficient to convict. State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 273, 138 A.2d 425, 428 (1958). Third, defendant prepared a defense pertaining to all of the elements appearing in the amended information. On the one hand, he argued that he had stopped, looked back and saw no one there (presumably to show that no assistance was possible); on the other, he offered the fact that he called the police some time after the accident (to show that he disclosed the required information). This was not a case where a defendant is surprised by an additional charge and is unprepared to present evidence in defense. Had defendant been charged by the statutory language, as he well might have been, his defense would not have been any different. Consequently, we fail to understand how the defendant was disadvantaged by the amendments.