Opinion ID: 785776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenge to Forfeiture

Text: 85 Count Eight of the indictment sought forfeiture of any property that Gaskin had used and intended to ... use[ ], to facilitate the drug crimes charged in Count One and Count Six, specifically the $3,895 seized from his person and the $16,000 seized from his car at the time of his arrest. Indictment 00 CR 6148, at Count 8. Having heard the trial evidence, the district court found that Gaskin had so used the seized monies and ordered forfeiture. 9 Gaskin challenges this ruling on two grounds: (1) the prosecution failed to carry its burden pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(d)(2) to demonstrate no likely source for the seized monies other than drug trafficking; and (2) the district court's decision was informed by unreliable evidence, a canine alert to drugs on the $16,000. 86 Because criminal forfeiture is viewed as part of the sentencing process, see Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38-41, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995), the government need prove facts supporting forfeiture only by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 595 (2d Cir.1999). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See In re Seizure of All Funds in Accounts in the Names Registry Publ'g, Inc., 68 F.3d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1995). 87 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), the government may seek a defendant's forfeiture of the following: 88 (1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of [the violation of conviction]; 89 (2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and 90 (3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise ..., in addition ... any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contractual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise. 91 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). Subsection (d) of the statute affords the government a rebuttable presumption of forfeiture as to any property acquired by a defendant during the period of his criminal offense or soon thereafter. Id. § 853(d). For the presumption to apply, however, the government must demonstrate no likely source for such property other than the violation of this subchapter. Id. § 853(d)(2). 92 Section 853(d)(2) is not applicable to Gaskin's case. By its terms, it applies only when forfeiture is sought pursuant to § 853(d)'s statutory presumption as to the property's criminal origins. In this case, the government did not invoke that presumption; it sought forfeiture pursuant to § 853(a)(2). Because a preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that Gaskin had used or intended to use the seized money to facilitate his drug trafficking, forfeiture was appropriate under § 853(a)(2) without regard to the likely source of the property. See generally United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 518 (9th Cir.1998) (discussing various sections of § 853). 93 Gaskin, after all, had brought almost $20,000 in cash with him to a site where he expected to take delivery of a large quantity of marijuana. Gaskin's intent to use the money to facilitate this drug transfer was established, in part, by direct evidence: his own statement to Shaw that he had with him the money necessary to pay the remainder of Shaw's fee, $1,000, and to reimburse him for certain travel expenses. Moreover, the trial evidence showed that Gaskin, in his role as organizer and leader of the charged conspiracy, see infra at Part II.F.4, routinely carried and spent large sums of cash to meet myriad expenses associated with his drug operation. Thus, a fair inference could be drawn that Gaskin intended to use the cash at issue to pay Shaw and to cover such other expenses as would arise in connection with the distribution of the delivered drug load. Indeed, such an inference of guilty intent with respect to use of the seized money was strengthened by Gaskin's post-arrest false exculpatory statement denying ownership or knowledge of the $16,000. See United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that false exculpatory statements do not alone prove guilt but may constitute circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt and may strengthen inferences supplied by other pieces of evidence). 94 Further, such an inference was supported by the canine alert, which suggested that the $16,000 had already been used in some way connected to Gaskin's drug operation. Gaskin challenges the reliability of canine alerts. This court, however, has ruled that a reliability challenge to such evidence does not preclude its consideration so long as other evidence supports the factfinder's conclusion. See United States v. Marji, 158 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.1998) (rejecting trial challenge to canine alert evidence). 95 Because ample direct and circumstantial evidence supported a finding that Gaskin had used and intended to use the seized money to facilitate his charged drug trafficking, we conclude that it was properly ordered forfeited.