Opinion ID: 220703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Gang References

Text: Santiago's primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred in admitting evidence concerning the Spanish Cobras and his membership in that gang. According to Santiago, admission of the gang evidence was improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In light of the trial judge's first-hand exposure to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and because of the judge's familiarity with the case and ability to gauge the impact of the evidence in the context of the entire proceeding, we review the district court's decision to admit the evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). We recognize that a jury is likely to associate gangs with criminal activity and deviant behavior, such that the admission of gang evidence raises the specter of guilt by association or a verdict influenced by emotion. United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir.1996). In recognition of the prejudicial nature of gang affiliation evidence, we examine the care and thoroughness with which a district judge considered the admission or exclusion of gang-involvement evidence. United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996, 1007 (7th Cir.1997). But the risk of prejudice associated with gang evidence does not render it automatically inadmissible. In numerous cases, we have upheld the admission of gang evidence as more probative than prejudicial. See United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2004) (admission of gang evidence proper to help establish motive); United States v. King, 627 F.3d 641, 649 (7th Cir.2010) (admission of gang-related evidence is appropriate to demonstrate the existence of a joint venture or conspiracy and a relationship among its members) (citation omitted); Clark v. O'Leary, 852 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.1988) (witness' membership in rival gang admissible for purposes of impeachment to show bias); United States ex rel. Garcia v. Lane, 698 F.2d 900 (7th Cir.1983) (evidence of defendant's gang affiliation admissible to explain earlier inconsistent statement of witness due to fear of retaliation). Evidence of Santiago, Padilla, and Suave's membership in the Spanish Cobras was necessary to help the jury make sense of Padilla's reference to Cobra folk. Without an explanation of what Cobra meant, the jury would not have been able to understand the exchange between Padilla and Agent Gomez after the green van's first arrival in the parking lot. And omitting the recording of that conversation from the trial would have left the jurors to speculate why the individual in the green van showed up to a drug deal without the drugs. Moreover, the Cobra folk statement was probative of the conspiracy charged in Count One. To prove the conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government was required to demonstrate more than a buyer-seller relationship between Santiago and Padilla. United States v. Rivera, 273 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir.2001). It needed to show an agreement between the two to possess and distribute the cocaine base. United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 518 (7th Cir.2004). To determine whether a conspiracy exists, we look to a number of factors, including the level of mutual trust between the individuals. Id. The Cobra folk statement revealed Padilla's confidence that Sabu would not rip him off, and thus was directly probative of the trust between Santiago and Padilla. [1] Reference to Agent Gomez's involvement in the larger Spanish Cobras investigation was relevant to his ability to recognize the name Sabu and identify the driver of the green van as Santiago. We recognize that some of the gang references at Santiago's trial may have been unneeded. In our view, Investigator Rosario and Sergeant Parks could have avoided referring to the Spanish Cobras investigation. And the government's characterization of Padilla and Santiago as gang members in the rebuttal portion of its closing argument appears unnecessary. But we do not believe these references gave rise to the danger of unfair prejudice that must be balanced against probity to determine the admissibility of evidence under Rule 403. United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir.1996) (emphasis in original). The evidence of Santiago and Padilla's gang membership did not substitute for direct evidence that [they] actually joined the drug distribution conspiracy, and thus any unfair prejudice that might have resulted was limited. Id. For these reasons, we believe the district court was within its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the gang evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Even assuming that a few of the gang references were more prejudicial than probative, their admission was harmless. As noted above, evidence that Santiago was a Spanish Cobra was properly admitted. Therefore, the jury was going to hear about his gang affiliation. Any impact of the additional statements regarding the gang had on the jury would have been very slight. See United States v. Jung, 473 F.3d 837, 842-43 (7th Cir. 2007) (erroneous admission of evidence is harmless if we are convinced that the error did not influence the jury or only had very slight effect). Furthermore, the evidence of Santiago's guilt was overwhelming. Agent Gomez testified that he was able to identify Santiago as the driver of the green van each time it arrived at the K-Mart parking lot. Vehicle records show that Santiago owns a van similar to the one described by Agent Gomez. And phone records indicate that Padilla and Santiago (or his girlfriend) communicated prior to and during the transaction. Consequently, we conclude that any error was harmless. See Jung, 473 F.3d at 843 (erroneous admission of evidence harmless where evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming).