Opinion ID: 614652
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intermediate scrutiny requires remand

Text: As for the novel registration requirements, to pass muster under intermediate scrutiny the District must show they are substantially related to an important governmental objective. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910; see also United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692-94 (7th Cir.2010) (prohibition of firearm possession by felons survives intermediate scrutiny). That is, the District must establish a tight fit between the registration requirements and an important or substantial governmental interest, a fit that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028; see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 782-83, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (The requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve that interest). We think the District has advanced, albeit incompletelyalmost cursorilyarticulated, two important governmental interests it may have in the registration requirements, viz., to protect police officers and to aid in crime control. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (the Government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling). The Council Committee on Public Safety explained: Registration is critical because it ... allows officers to determine in advance whether individuals involved in a call may have firearms ... [and] assists law enforcement in determining whether registered owners are eligible to possess firearms or have fallen into a prohibited class. [] Report on Bill 17-843, at 3-4 (Nov. 25, 2008). We cannot conclude, however, that the novel registration requirementsor any registration requirement as applied to long gunssurvive intermediate scrutiny based upon the record as it stands because the District has not demonstrated a close fit between those requirements and its governmental interests. In support of the registration requirements, the District relies upon the Committee Report on the FRA, along with testimony and written statements submitted to the Committee at public hearings. Even so, the record is inadequate for us confidently to hold the registration requirements are narrowly tailored. For example, the Committee Report asserts studies show that laws restricting multiple purchases or sales of firearms are designed to reduce the number of guns entering the illegal market and to stem the flow of firearms between states, and that handguns sold in multiple sales to the same individual purchaser are frequently used in crime. Id. at 10. The Report neither identifies the studies relied upon nor claims those studies showed the laws achieved their purpose, nor in any other way attempts to justify requiring a person who registered a pistol to wait 30 days to register another one. The record does include testimony that offers cursory rationales for some other requirements, such as safety training and demonstrating knowledge of gun laws, see, e.g., Testimony of Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Police, at 2 (Oct. 1, 2008), but the District fails to present any data or other evidence to substantiate its claim that these requirements can reasonably be expected to promote either of the important governmental interests it has invoked (perhaps because it was relying upon the asserted interests we have discounted as circular). Although we do accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of the legislature, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 195, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445) (internal quotation marks omitted), the District is not thereby insulated from meaningful judicial review, Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (controlling opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citing Turner I and acknowledg[ing] that the Los Angeles City Council is in a better position than the Judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems). Rather, we must assure that, in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195, 117 S.Ct. 1174 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the District needs to present some meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its predictive judgments. On the present record, we conclude the District has not supplied evidence adequate to show a substantial relationship between any of the novel registration requirements and an important governmental interest. Nor, however, do the plaintiffs present more meaningful contrary evidence concerning handguns, and neither the District nor the plaintiffs present any evidence at all concerning application of the registration requirements to long guns. The parties' mutual failure in their briefs to distinguish between handguns and long guns points up a significant deficiency in the present record. [] The Committee Report implicitly acknowledged the distinction between handguns and long guns only back-handedly, quoting Heller to emphasize specifically the problem of handgun violence in this country before discussing the proposed FRA. Report on Bill 17-843, at 3 (Nov. 25, 2008). Handguns indeed appear to have been the exclusive subject of the Committee's concern. Nowhere in the Report is there even a single reference to the need for registration of rifles or shotguns. For all the legislative record and the record in this case reveal, the provisions of the FRA that deal specifically with registration of long guns might have been written in invisible ink. In the light of these evidentiary deficiencies and the importance of the issues at stake in this case, taking our cue from the Supreme Court in Turner I, we believe the parties should have an opportunity to develop a more thorough factual record. 512 U.S. at 664-68, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (controlling opinion of Kennedy, J.). In Turner I, the Court had determined intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for the First Amendment challenge at issue. On the state of the record developed [that] far, however, the Government was unable to show the law was narrowly tailored. Id. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Rather than invalidate a legislative judgment based upon that shortcoming, the Court remanded the case for development of a more thorough factual record. Id. at 668, 114 S.Ct. 2445. We follow suit by remanding the novel registration requirements, and all registration requirements as applied to long guns, to the district court for further evidentiary proceedings.