Opinion ID: 2257538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: A Comment on the Dissent

Text: We respectfully disagree with the dissent's summary of the record. We acknowledge that the State's timing of its revelation that it did not intend to call Brown and the fact that its late tender of a discovery response caused the defense to ask for a continuance complicated the issues for the trial judge. Nevertheless, this is not a case where the trial judge's exercise of his 403 discretion properly protected Linda from the efforts of her misguided defense counsel. This is a case where the trial judge denied Linda's constitutional right to present her defense theory with the effective assistance of counsel. The dissent states that the trial judge allowed the credibility of the witnesses to be determined based upon fair cross-examination and evidence that would not be unfairly prejudicial to Linda Charbonneau. [65] Our reading of the record, however, reflects that defense counsel questioned Mellisa for a few minutes (representing about two pages of the record) about some of her disagreements with Brown's statements, but the jury had no opportunity to see Brown's statements in context. The record also reflects that the State continued to object to the use of Brown's proffer. The record reflects no circumstances, given the trial judge's rulings and the State's continuing objection, that would suggest that the trial judge's initial ruling barring the proffer was tentative and subject to reconsideration. The dissent's suggestion that the admission of Brown's proffer would result in a reversal, or subject defense counsel to denigration in a putatively successful post conviction relief petition, seems farfetched at best. [66] The proffer would have been introduced without objection, would have survived plain error scrutiny and, would have been admitted entirely consistent with sound defense strategy, and not subject to successful challenge by hindsight. [67] The dissent avoids discussing Potts in support of its argument, but cites Johnson v. State. [68] Linda's attorneys properly distinguished Johnson in their memorandum to the trial judge. The standard for the defense using a guilty plea to establish the defendant's innocence was the issue in Johnson, but it is not the issue here. [69] The dissent suggests that the jury was fully aware that Brown's and Mellisa's statements were replete with inconsistencies. The jury, however, never had the benefit of Brown's proffer. Whether the trial judge agreed with defense counsel's strategy or not, the defense wanted to show that the State accepted guilty pleas from two codefendants based on different operative facts. Defense counsels' chosen method for doing that would have shown the jury that Brown inculpated Linda directly, an admitted risk, but the defense's point would be that the State wanted Linda, and both Brown and Mellisa would say anything to avoid the death penalty. The dissent creates the impression that the State took the ethical high road by not calling Brown (despite an apparent fog hindering earlier disclosure for more than six months) and that this maneuver did not harm Linda, because her defense counsel could have made whatever points they wished about Brown by the structurally limited crossexamination of Mellisa the trial judge did allow. [70] While we agree that neither side could have presented perjured testimony for its truth, the dissent fails to note that the defense could have used Brown's proffer for other purposes; i.e., impeachment  a fact the trial judge recognized. Ironically, the dissent finds no difficulty with the State introducing Mellisa's confessed perjured testimony. We appreciate the dissent's thoughtful position, but believe the trial judge's rulings unfairly thwarted the defendant's constitutional right to present her case in the way she and her counsel believed to be most effective.