Opinion ID: 2639452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: due processpersonal jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 57 The UCCJEA's rational scheme assigning default jurisdiction to a child's home state does not require that state to have personal jurisdiction over both parents of the child in order to make a parental rights termination decision. If we forego the provisions of the UCCJEA when making pre-adoption parental rights determinations, however, due process requires that, in such a proceeding as this, a Utah court at least have personal jurisdiction over the parent whose rights it is terminating. [5] ¶ 58 Contrary to the Adoption Center's argument, I do not believe that this court's decisions in D.A. v. State (In re W.A.), 2002 UT 127, 63 P.3d 607, and State v. E.A. (In re W.A.), 2002 UT 126, 63 P.3d 100, lead to the conclusion that Utah can assert jurisdiction over Osborne under the status exception to the minimum contacts requirement. The rationale underlying these cases in fact leads to the opposite conclusion. As the analysis in that opinion makes clear, the status exception may apply when a plaintiff is seeking determination of his or her status with respect to an out-of-state defendant. D.A., 2002 UT 127 at ¶¶ 20-21, 63 P.3d 607. The court quotes Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), as observing that cases involving the status of a plaintiff are unique and can be pursued in the plaintiff's home state even if that judicial forum does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. D.A., 2002 UT 127 at ¶ 20, 63 P.3d 607 (emphasis added); see id. at ¶ 21 (quoting similar language in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). The point of the status exception is to allow individuals residing in one state to resolve their own legal relationship with others who are not within the state. Otherwise, such individuals would be left in limbo or would be forced, at substantial inconvenience and expense, to travel to the defendant's home state to file their action. ¶ 59 D.A. provides a suitable example of this rationale. In that case, a minor, one of whose parents had abused him and both of whom had been forced to relinquish custody of him six years earlier when they were facing felony charges, had been brought to Utah by his aunt and had lived here with her for a significant time. Id. at ¶ 4. The minor's guardian ad litem, together with the State, filed a motion to terminate the parents' parental rights. Id. at ¶¶ 2-5. The guardian ad litem and the State, both charged with protecting the minor's best interests, thus acted on his behalf to determine his status with respect to his parents. ¶ 60 In the original trial court proceeding at issue here, in contrast, the Adoption Center, a for-profit adoption agency, sought to terminate a biological father's parental rights in order to proceed with its business of facilitating the adoption of a child whose home state had never been Utah. The Adoption Center is a private entity under no public obligation to protect a child's best interests. These interests are not served by unfairly preventing a biological parent who has developed a relationship with his child from asserting his parental rights. It is the role of the courts to protect the interests of both parent and child by considering further whether traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice have been satisfied. See id. at ¶ 16. ¶ 61 Having decided that the status exception applied in D.A., the court nevertheless found it necessary to determine if exercising jurisdiction in this case otherwise meets the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at ¶ 28. The court listed two reasons for its decision that due process was otherwise satisfied: First the court found it clear that Utah was the most suitable jurisdiction for resolving the minor's status with respect to his parents because all relevant information concerning the minor was in Utah, Utah had supported the minor for a number of years, and, [p]erhaps most importantly, there was good reason to believe that if the Court refused to exercise jurisdiction, no other state would be able to assert jurisdiction to resolve W.A.'s status. Id. at ¶ 29. Second, the court noted that the parents' procedural due process rights were satisfied because they had received actual notice of the termination proceeding and had an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing. Id. at ¶ 30. ¶ 62 I have explained above my belief that, under the UCCJEA, Utah is not the most appropriate jurisdiction for the resolution of Osborne's parental status in regard to his child. (In light of the proceedings that have already taken place in North Carolina, we surely cannot claim that Utah is the only state that can determine this issue.) I also believe that the lower court rulings allowing Osborne's parental rights to be terminated without notice unfairly deprived him of due process.