Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying several defense challenges for cause.

Text: ś 129. Evans next argues that the trial court erred in denying eight defense challenges for cause. Each challenge is reviewed below with accompanying discussion. However, prior to addressing each challenge, it is necessary to revisit Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995), wherein this Court stated: [T]his Court has held on more than one occasion that when a trial court fails to sustain a challenge for cause by the defense, it must be shown that the defense had exhausted all of its peremptory challenges before the trial court's refusal to allow the challenge for cause. Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss.1988); Johnson v. State, 512 So.2d 1246, 1255 (Miss.1987). The rationale behind this rule was set out in Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d at 129-130: [T]he appellant has the power to cure substantially any error so long as he has remaining unused peremptory challenges. We would put the integrity of the trial process at risk were we to allow a litigant to refrain from using his peremptory challenges and, suffering an adverse verdict at trial, secure reversal on appeal on grounds that the Circuit Court did not do what appellant wholly had the power to do. Chase, 645 So.2d at 845-46. ś 130. In Berry v. State, 575 So.2d 1, 9 (Miss.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S.Ct. 2042, 114 L.Ed.2d 126 (1991), this Court held: Denial of a challenge for cause is not error where it is not shown that the defense has exhausted peremptory challenges and is thus forced to accept the juror. Rush v. State, 278 So.2d 456, 458 (Miss.1973). This threshold test is applicable in a capital murder case. ś 131. Evans did not exhaust his peremptory challenges until the State tendered the twelfth juror. Therefore, any assignment of error prior to the exhaustion of peremptory challenges is barred. Alternatively, however, we address the merits of each challenge.
ś 132. Evans argues that the trial court should have granted the defense challenge for cause on the basis that Meridith had extensive knowledge about the case and indicated that she believed Evans was guilty. Juror Meridith did sit on the jury. ś 133. Juror Meridith had extensive knowledge about the case, including Evans' escape from jail and the fact that Beatrice's body was maintained in storage for two years. Moreover, Meridith indicated that she believed Evans was guilty. Meridith stated that this opinion was confirmed after the defense attorneys stated that they expected that Evans would be proven guilty. However, Meridith indicated that she had reached no opinion as to Evans' punishment. Upon further questioning by the trial judge, Meridith stated that she could set her knowledge of the case aside. ś 134. Evans' challenge for cause was overruled by the trial court. Evans later renewed the challenge for cause and his motion for additional peremptory challenges summarizing as follows: The problem is that there are others down the list that we know we're going to get to that we feel are more worthy of our peremptory challenges than perhaps Ms. Merideth. I mean, we basically are caught in a catch 22 in this matter. That in order to preserve our objection to Ms. Merideth we've got to strike her peremptorily. The problem is if we do there are some down the list that we know we absolutely do not want. The trial court overruled Evans' motion and urged counsel to file the motion again at such time as any are exhausted, all 12 are exhausted and there's a compelling reason otherwise.... Defense counsel then accepted Merideth. ś 135. At the time Evans challenged Merideth for cause, he had six remaining peremptory challenges. Evans, however, made a strategic decision to retain Merideth and not exercise a peremptory challenge which may have been better utilized on another juror. Any prejudice which may have occurred from Merideth's presence on the jury is obviated by the fact that defense counsel, during voir dire, repeatedly conceded that the State of Mississippi could prove Evans' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Merideth had firm opinions about Evans' guilt which were confirmed by statements by defense counsel, she repeatedly indicated that she had no opinions about Evans' punishment. ś 136. The trial court cannot now be put in error for Evans' strategic decisions. This issue is without merit.
ś 137. Like Juror Merideth, Evans had not exhausted his peremptory challenges at the time his challenge for cause was denied. As such, this assignment of error was not properly preserved and is therefore barred from consideration on appeal. See Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Berry v. State, 575 So.2d 1, 9 (Miss. 1990). However, without waiving the bar, we alternatively address the merits of this argument. ś 138. Juror Harris did in fact serve on the petit jury and indicated during individual sequestered voir dire that she knew about the facts on the case from due to television coverage. Harris also indicated that she knew about Evans' escape from jail. ś 139. In Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 457 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed.2d 369 (1985), reh'g denied, 470 U.S. 1089, 105 S.Ct. 1858, 85 L.Ed.2d 154 (1985), this Court held a juror who may be removed on a challenge for cause is one against whom a cause for challenge exists that would likely effect his competency or his impartiality at trial. In Billiot, this Court relied on Armstrong v. State, 214 So.2d 589, 593 (Miss.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965, 89 S.Ct. 2109, 23 L.Ed.2d 750 (1969), wherein this Court held that [t]hose [jurors] who say that they could follow the evidence and the instructions of the court should be retained, and those who cannot follow the instructions of the court should be released. ś 140. Harris repeatedly indicated that she could be impartial and follow the instructions of the court. Harris stated that she would consider mitigating circumstances and would make the State prove aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, Harris stated that she had not formed an opinion about Evans' guilt or innocence or what punishment he should receive. Evans chose not to utilize a peremptory challenge to strike Harris. As such, the record does not reveal that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to strike Juror Harris for cause.
ś 141. Norman Thornburg did not sit on the petit jury. During individual sequestered voir dire Thornburg indicated that he could set aside what he had heard about the case. Thornburg admitted that he believed if Evans was found guilty that the death penalty would be appropriate. Thornburg, stated that this belief was not based on the media coverage, but rather based on the nature of the crime itself. Later, however, Thornburg stated that he could set his opinion aside and decide the case based on the evidence and the law. ś 142. Evans challenged Thornburg for cause due to his knowledge of Evans' escape. The trial court overruled the challenge and Evans peremptorily struck Thornburg. Based on Thornburg's ability to listen to the evidence and follow the law, it was not error for the trial court to refuse Evans' challenge for cause. Moreover, Evans use of a peremptory challenge to remove Juror Thornburg cured any error which may have been present. See Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995). ś 143. Like Thornburg, the remaining jurors challenged by Evans indicated that despite their knowledge of the case, they could disregard what they had seen or heard and listen to the evidence presented at trial. Based on these responses, the trial judge did not err in refusing to excuse these jurors for cause. Moreover, each of the remaining jurors were peremptorily struck by Evans and did not serve on the petit jury. Any error which may have occurred was cured by Evans' peremptory strikes. Chase, 645 So.2d at 845.