Opinion ID: 728100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reduction of traffic deaths, injuries, and property damage from traffic accidents ....

Text: 23 c. Integration of installation safety, engineering, legal, medical, and law enforcement resources into the installation traffic planning process. 24 d. Removal of intoxicated drivers from installation roadways followed by the expeditious application of appropriate sanctions. 25 Army Regulation 190-5, § 1-5 (1988). Equally clear is the government's intent that the procedure and the sanction be civil and administrative. As Imngren and Johnson concede: 26 Not only is AR 190-5 [labeled civil], but the procedures set out in AR 190-5 are civil or administrative. For instance, the Notification Letter to defendants states that this suspension is administrative in nature. In addition, AR 190-5 provides that the hearing officer determines by a preponderance of the evidence whether the motorist was engaged in intoxicated driving. By creating such distinctly civil procedures, the government has indicated clearly its intent to create a civil or administrative sanction. 27 (Appellee's Br. at 21-22.) 28 Turning to the second factor the Court enunciated in Ursery, we find that the suspension of a motorist's driving privileges is not so punitive in form and effect as to negate the remedial intent of the sanction. Imngren and Johnson's contentions to the contrary are without merit. For example, they contend that, at least in part, the one-year suspension of their driving privileges is punitive because it promotes one of the traditional aims of punishment, deterrence. See Imngren, 914 F.Supp. at 1330. However, the Supreme Court has held that deterrence can serve legitimate nonpunitive goals. See, e.g., Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2149 (stating that the Court has long held that deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals); Bennis v. Michigan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 994, 1000, 134 L.Ed.2d 68 (1996) (holding that forfeiture serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose). Consequently, the argument that suspending a motorist's driving privileges is punitive because some element of deterrence is involved is without merit. 29 Imngren and Johnson also argue that the one-year suspension is punitive because it is much longer than suspension schemes upheld by other courts. Imngren, 914 F.Supp. at 1329-30. However, if a civil sanction serves a remedial purpose, the duration of the sanction does not necessarily make it punishment. See, e.g., Glymph, 96 F.3d at 725 (four-year debarment from government contracting was remedial); United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710 (1st Cir.1996) (indefinite debarment order imposed by the FDIC was remedial); United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.1992) (total prohibition on commodities market trading was remedial); United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 265-66 (10th Cir.1990) (twenty-four month suspension from participation in a federal housing program was remedial). 30 In any event, it is misleading to compare a one-year suspension of driving privileges on all federal lands under the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States to a 90-day suspension on all state highways. Such a comparison ignores the fact that the territorial scope of a state suspension is much broader than the territorial scope of Army Regulation 190-5 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3118(b). In fact, despite their suspensions, Imngren and Johnson may still drive on most of the roads in the United States. This would not be the case had the state suspended their licenses. 31 In addition, the district court erred in comparing the one-year suspension to state suspensions for first-time offenders. See Imngren, 914 F.Supp. at 1329. Johnson is a repeat offender with a prior DUI conviction. Imngren refused to submit to a BAC test. Because these types of offenders potentially pose a greater threat to highway safety, states often impose longer driving suspensions in both of these situations. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1001(f)(1)(D) (Supp.1994) (one-year suspension for refusing to take a BAC test); State v. Boehler, 542 N.W.2d 745 (N.D.1996) (one-year suspension for repeat offenders). Consequently, the argument that suspending a motorist's driving privileges is punitive because of the duration of the suspension is without merit. 32 Finally, Imngren and Johnson contend that suspending a motorist's driving privileges is punitive because the behavior to which the suspension applies is already a crime. As the Court noted in Ursery, simply because a sanction is linked to an activity that is also criminal is insufficient to render the [sanction] punitive. See --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2149. It is well settled that Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938). 33 The suspension of driving privileges is not primarily an act of punishment; rather, suspension promotes public safety by removing from the highways motorists who have shown a tendency to drive under the influence of alcohol. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2620, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979) (upholding statute mandating suspension of a driver's license when the licensee refuses to take a BAC because of the paramount interest the Commonwealth has in preserving the safety of its public highways). Further, sanctions promoting public safety are usually considered remedial. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (pretrial detention held not to be punitive because preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal). This is true even in double jeopardy cases where the punitive/remedial distinction is dispositive. See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364, 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (promoting public safety by regulating the widespread traffic in firearms is more remedial than punitive); Cullen, 979 F.2d at 994 (forfeiture of an instrument of the offense is not primarily an act of punishment; rather, forfeiture protects the community from the threat of continued drug dealing). Because sanctions promoting public safety are typically considered remedial, we hold that suspending a motorist's driving privileges is not punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes. 4 See also Allen v. Attorney General of State of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 577 (1st Cir.1996) (finding that a 90-day suspension of driving privileges was remedial because it represent[ed] a reasonable effort to protect the public from motorists who have demonstrated a dangerous propensity to drink before they drive).