Opinion ID: 2361237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cppa

Text: The trial court held that Schiff's complaint was barred by this court's holding in Save Immaculata/Dunblane, Inc. v. Immaculata Preparatory School, Inc., 514 A.2d 1152 (D.C.1986), ruling that there was nothing in any of the cases cited by Schiff to support the proposition that the sale of certain goods and services to members of a membership organization like AARP was intended to subject such organizations to the CPPA even if a significant amount of dollars is generated by such sales. Schiff contends that the holding in Save Immaculata/Dunblane is limited to nonprofit educational institutions and does not apply to other nonprofit entities such as AARP. We see no basis for such a restrictive interpretation of that case. Our opinion in Save Immaculata/Dunblane stemmed from the decision of a private girls' school to cease its operation. A group of alumnae, students and parents bought an action seeking both an order barring the closing and damages on several theories, including a claim under the CPPA. The trial court granted summary judgment for the school and we affirmed, holding that the school, because it was a nonprofit educational institution, was not included within the coverage of the CPPA. There was nothing in our opinion, however, limiting the holding to educational institutions as such, or to activities involving the provision of educational services to students in return for a fee. Indeed, the only case relied upon by the Save Immaculata/Dunblane court suggests there should be no such limitations. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis.2d 657, 289 N.W.2d 801, 807 (1980). In Mussallem, a student, who had defaulted on a loan from the University of Wisconsin, defended against the school's effort to collect after a default on the loan by citing a provision of the state's consumer act, which is similar to the District's CPPA. The court began its analysis by recognizing that if the loan had been obtained from a private financial institution such as a bank, the credit act would have applied. Id. at 807. The act did not apply to loans given by the university, however, because the university was not a private commercial business and because its purpose is not one of earning a profit, but rather it is motivated by a public, non-profit purpose. . . . Indisputably, the university was an educational institution, but the court's analysis did not turn on that fact. The transaction in dispute  a loan  was the kind of transaction ordinarily regulated by the state's consumer act if conducted by a private commercial business. But the loan transaction in question was not subject to the consumer act because the university was maintained for a nonprofit purpose. The same is true with AARP's role as an agent between its members and Prudential. The sale of insurance would ordinarily be covered by the CPPA, but because AARP is maintained as a nonprofit organization, the act does not apply to it. See also Barry by Ross v. New Jersey State Highway Auth., 245 N.J.Super. 302, 585 A.2d 420, 424 (Super.Ch.1990) (public highway authority not included within state's consumer act). We find further support for this view in Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F.Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.1987), vacated on other grounds, 271 U.S.App. D.C. 182, 851 F.2d 437 (1988) (inapplicability of CPPA affirmed). Kozup relied on Save Immaculata's holding that a nonprofit educational institution, by virtue of its nonprofit status, is not a merchant within the meaning of section 28-3901. Kozup also rejected plaintiff's contention that Georgetown Hospital and its provider of blood products, the nonprofit American Red Cross (ARC), were merchants even though ARC sold blood products to Georgetown Hospital, the costs of which the hospital passed on to its patients. The Kozup court observed: That the ARC assesses charges for the provision of blood is not determinative of its identity as a merchant under the [CPPA] . . . . Many if not all non-profit entities are organized and run with traditional principles of sound business management. . . not to turn a profit, but to survive and continue to perform whatever functions they were founded to perform. Id. 663 F.Supp. at 1060-61. Similarly, the fact that nonprofit AARP accepted fees for arranging the sale of insurance to its members by Prudential did not make it subject to the CPPA. Finally, as AARP observes, the Save Immaculata/Dunblane decision exempting nonprofit organizations from CPPA coverage was decided over ten years ago, and during that time the Council of the District of Columbia (Council) has taken no steps to amend the provision of the CPPA to include activities of nonprofits within its coverage. We recognize that undue weight should not be given to the Council's silence on the subject. [8] However, since Save Immaculata/Dunblane was decided, the CPPA has been amended four times [9] without any changes being made in the act's coverage of nonprofits. Significantly, one of those amendments was adopted with the express purpose of reversing the holding in a case decided by this court. [10] See Winters v. Ridley, 596 A.2d 569, 576 (D.C.1991) (Schwelb, J., concurring) (because Council acted to reject one interpretation of a statute, its silence suggests absence of dissatisfaction with another interpretation of same statute). The Council is free, of course, to extend the coverage of the CPPA to certain activities of nonprofit organizations if it wishes to. However, because there is no indication that the Council intended that nonprofits be included, and in light of the holding of Save Immaculata/Dunblane and Kozup, and the absence of any disapproval of those cases by the Council, we are unwilling to extend such coverage ourselves. Accordingly, we hold, as a matter of law, that Schiff's claim against AARP fails because AARP is a nonprofit organization.