Opinion ID: 3006254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commonwealth Claims

Text: Pérez also pursues several Puerto Rico claims. Only his Law 80 claim merits extended discussion.4 4 We can easily resolve Pérez's claims under Law 100 and Law 17 -- Puerto Rico's Title VII analogues prohibiting employment discrimination and sexual harassment, respectively. See, e.g., Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 28 (1st Cir. 2013); PérezCordero v. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc., 656 F.3d 19, 26 n.10 (1st Cir. 2011). The parties here agree that the commonwealth claims differ from their federal counterparts only with respect to the burden shifting framework that applies. Cf. Dávila v. Corporacion de P.R. Para La Difusion Publica, 498 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that as applied to age discrimination, Law 100 differs from the ADEA only with respect to how the burden-shifting framework operates). That framework follows the Law 80 burden shifting framework, see Alvarez-Fonseca, 152 F.3d at 28, and as we explain below no reasonable jury could conclude that Horizon lacked cause to terminate Pérez. Thus, to succeed on his Law 100 claim Pérez must show that Horizon's proffered reason was pretext specifically designed to mask gender discrimination. For the same reason that Pérez's Title VII gender discrimination claim fails, it suffices to reiterate that Pérez has adduced no significantly probative evidence that his discharge was motivated by his gender. Dávila, 498 F.3d at 18. As to the Law 17 claim, Pérez has neither provided developed argumentation about the burden shifting - 16 - Law 80 modifies the concept of at-will employment and provides monetary compensation to employees who are employed without a fixed term and who are discharged without just cause. Otero-Burgos v. Inter Am. Univ., 558 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009); see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185a. The statute specifies several grounds that are considered good cause for termination including, as relevant here, when a worker indulges in a pattern of improper or disorderly conduct or when an employee has engaged in repeated violations of the reasonable rules and regulations established for the operation of the establishment, provided a written copy thereof has been opportunely furnished to the employee. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185b. The statute establishes that, by contrast, a discharge made by the mere whim of the employer or without cause relative to the proper and normal operation of the establishment shall not be considered . . . good cause. Id. Law 80 applies a burden shifting framework that differs from the Title VII framework. Under Law 80, a plaintiff must both prove that he was discharged and allege that his dismissal was not justified. Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1998). Law 80 then shifts the burden of proof to the employer to show that the discharge was justified framework that should apply nor identified any cases explaining how a Law 17 claim would be resolved differently than his federal claims. For that reason, his Law 17 claim fails as well. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 19. - 17 - by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185k). If the employer shoulders that burden, the employee must then rebut the showing of good cause. Id. We have not had occasion to precisely delineate the exact showing necessary for an employer to establish just cause under Law 80. Nevertheless, we think it sufficiently clear that to show just cause an employer need only demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis to believe that an employee has engaged in one of those actions that the law identifies as establishing such cause. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185b. The text of Law 80 supports this reading. By providing that an employer's decision to discharge an employee must not be made by the mere whim of the employer or without cause relative to the proper and normal operation of the establishment, Law 80 focuses on the employer's reasoned deliberation. Id. The statement that an employer must not act on a whim appears to indicate that a just discharge is one where an employer provides a considered, non-arbitrary reason for an employee's termination that bears some relationship to the business' operation. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court appears to have adopted this reading. When considering Law 80 claims, that court consistently asks whether an employer's termination decision was whimsical or abusive or whether the employer has acted abruptly or capriciously. Narvaez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 120 P.R. Dec. - 18 - 731, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 766, 773 (1988); Báez García v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 120 P.R. Dec. 145, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 153, 162 (1987). Indeed, that court has otherwise resisted reading Law 80 to impose statutory penalties just because an employer makes an error of judgment, since such a rigid reading (which would seem to require courts to regularly review the merits of companies' internal investigations) would go beyond the letter and spirit of the law. Narvaez, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 773. Following as we must the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, we have also focused on the employer's reasonable belief rather than the objective veracity of the employer's action. In upholding the entry of summary judgment under Law 80, we have noted that a perceived violation suffices to establish that [the employer] did not terminate [the employee] on a whim, but rather for a sensible business-related reason. Hoyos v. Telecorp Commc'ns, Inc., 488 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). We have also found just cause, and affirmed the district court's grant of a Rule 50 motion in favor of an employer, where although [the employee] denie[d] it, his employer had overwhelming evidence that he instigated [a] fight with [his co-worker], and not the other way around. Alvarez-Fonseca, 152 F.3d at 28. As we have said in a similar context, courts do not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits -- or even the rationality -- of employers' nondiscriminatory business - 19 - decisions. Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991) (considering an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim). In modifying at-will employment, Law 80 undoubtedly circumscribes the reasons for which an employer may terminate an employee. But, in doing so, we do not read the statute to require a factfinder to regularly review the objective accuracy of an employer's conclusions.5 To establish just cause, therefore, Horizon merely had a burden to show that it had a reasonable basis to believe that Pérez had indulge[d] in a pattern of improper or disorderly conduct or engaged in repeated violations of the reasonable rules and regulations established for the operation of the establishment. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185b. Although Pérez has shown that he was discharged, a reasonable jury could only conclude that Horizon has met its burden of showing just cause. Cf. Alvarez-Fonseca, 152 F.3d at 28 (affirming district court's post-trial grant of Rule 50 motion because the evidence presented at trial would not permit a reasonable jury to find that discharge was unjustified); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (noting that the summary judgment standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under [Rule] 5 We have previously explained that an interpretation of Law 80 which would require that a jury always determine whether an employer had just cause to terminate an employee does not conform with our understanding of the statute. Hoyos, 488 F.3d at 6 n.4 (citing Velázquez-Fernández v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F,3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2007)). - 20 - 50(a)). Pérez admitted that he received a copy of and was aware of Horizon's Code of Business Conduct. Blakenship concluded that Pérez had violated that Code after reviewing the photos, determining in consultation with Rodriguez that those photos were taken on Horizon property, and considering the results of Acevedo's investigation. Acevedo's investigation not only suggested that the lower-torso photograph depicted Pérez, but also revealed that Pérez had exposed his genitals in the workplace on multiple occasions and that Pérez was generally involved in an atmosphere of inappropriate sexual horseplay and behavior. Because Horizon established cause for Pérez's termination, to withstand summary judgment Pérez bore the burden to rebut that showing. Pérez expends considerable energy arguing that Horizon came to several incorrect conclusions over the course of its investigation. But to rebut Horizon's showing that it had a reasonable basis to believe that he had engaged in workplace misconduct, he must do more than show that Horizon may have gotten some of the particulars wrong. Cf. Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding evidence casting doubt on the correctness of the employer's proffered reason for the discharge insufficient to show pretext). Instead, Pérez had the burden to adduce probative evidence that Horizon did not genuinely believe in or did not in fact terminate Pérez for the reason given. His numerous claims that the evidence fails to show just cause are unavailing. - 21 - First, he denies that the lower-torso photograph depicted him. But that question is immaterial. Horizon was aware that Pérez denied the photograph was of him and, in any event, Pérez's termination letter definitively refutes his contention that the lower-torso photograph was the sole reason for his termination. In the letter, Blankenship stated that the investigation had revealed that Pérez had exhibited behavior on numerous occasions that is in strict violation with Horizon Lines' Code of Business Conduct Policy. (Emphasis added). Blankenship was confronted with a plethora of evidence that Pérez had exposed his genitals in the workplace (although Pérez denies that he ever did) and, even now, Pérez concedes that he was involved in the sexually-charged horseplay among the San Juan dock employees. Horizon thus established that it had just cause to terminate Pérez for indulg[ing] in a pattern of improper or disorderly conduct or engaging in repeated violations of the reasonable rules and regulations established for the operation of the establishment.6 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185b. 6 Pérez also relies on Horizon's concession that no one ever submitted a formal complaint about his behavior. We do not find this fact relevant. While Horizon's Code of Conduct requires employees to report harassing or inappropriate behavior, in the absence of a formal complaint a company may still conclude that certain behavior is improper or disorderly. - 22 - Pérez also asserts that Acevedo singled him out, reinitiated the investigation on her own accord, and concealed relevant information from Blankenship. He seems to assume that if Acevedo's investigation was a sham then the decision Blankenship made in reliance on that investigation could not constitute adequate cause. Perhaps if the record contained some evidence tending to show that Blankenship was aware of false information contained in Acevedo's investigation notes or that Acevedo's information would give a reasonable supervisor reason to doubt the investigation's conclusions, such an argument could suffice to defeat summary judgment. But none of the contentions Pérez relies upon to buoy this argument are supported by the record.7 We acknowledge the several minor discrepancies in Acevedo's 7 investigation notes that Pérez claims demonstrate that the investigation was a sham. For example, Pérez points out that during the deposition another Horizon employee, Juan Carrero, Carrero denied meeting with Acevedo until after Pérez was discharged -- although Carrero's interview did take place after Pérez had been placed on administrative leave, and the record does not make clear what period Carrero meant when referring to Pérez's discharge. Carrero also claimed that, contrary to Acevedo's interview notes, he had not discussed prior incidents when Pérez had exposed his genitalia. But Carrero did confirm that he had heard that the lower-torso photograph depicted Pérez, thus supporting Acevedo's overall conclusion. Pérez also repeatedly emphasizes the fact that Acevedo's son, a recently terminated Horizon employee, first sent the lower-torso photograph to her. Yet, when stripped of the conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, acrimonious invective, [and] rank speculation, Ahern, 629 F.3d at 54, we fail to see how any of these facts provide probative evidence that something nefarious was going on or would allow a jury to infer that Blankenship's lacked cause to terminate Pérez, in light of repeated testimony from other employees corroborating the general thrust of Acevedo's findings. - 23 - First, the record does not support Pérez's speculation that Acevedo initiated her investigation entirely on her own accord after Rodriguez's own inquiry concluded and without direction from Blankenship. Although Rodriguez did testify that Blankenship had told him the initial inquiry into the lower-torso photograph's source would not move forward, Rodriguez, Blankenship, and Acevedo all testified that Rodriguez's inquiry was not a formal investigation but was, at most, an informal inquiry undertaken on Rodriguez's own initiative. Moreover, even Rodriguez testified that after his meeting with Blankenship, Acevedo indicated that she had received a second photograph, and Rodriguez surmised that the second photo was the reason the investigation was going to continue. Indeed, Ortega's own deposition supports this same interpretation of events: he stated that he provided Acevedo with the upper-torso photograph depicting Pérez roughly two weeks after she received the lower-torso photograph (around the time that she started her investigation). And an e-mail from Acevedo to Blankenship sending two photographs on November 2, 2010 -- after Rodriguez met with Blankenship and around the time that Acevedo began to investigate the photographs in earnest -- substantiates that understanding of the record. Thus, beyond Pérez's own speculation, the record simply does not support his claim that Acevedo began an unauthorized investigation out of the blue. - 24 - Nor does the record support Pérez's two specific claims that Acevedo concealed evidence. First, the statement of another co-worker, Robert Batista, which Pérez says proves that Ortega had previously admitted that the lower-torso photo depicted Ortega (and not Pérez) was included in Acevedo's interview notes, which Blankenship reviewed before deciding to terminate Pérez. Moreover, Batista's statement is not necessarily the smoking gun that Pérez describes, and he fails to explain how it might have changed Blankenship's assessment.8 Second, although Pérez asserts that Acevedo concealed that the lower-torso photograph was likely several years old, Rodriguez had already informed Blankenship via e-mail that the photograph was very old. And, again, Pérez fails to explain how the age of the photograph would have had any impact on Blankenship's assessment that exposing oneself on Horizon's property, at any time, violated Horizon's Code of Business Conduct.9 8 According to Acevedo's notes, Batista stated that Ortega had a photograph of a big penis that he shows the girls he goes out with so they can see how big he has it. This statement may suggest only that Ortega showed women a photo that Ortega boasted depicted his own genitals, not that the photo was, in fact, of him. In fact, during his deposition, Batista further clarified that, to be clear, he didn't know if that photo was the same as the lower-torso one that Acevedo received. Furthermore, another employee, Manuel Barreto, similarly stated during his deposition that he didn't think that [Ortega] said it was a photograph of him, but that Ortega had only claimed that [t]his is what there is for the gals. 9 Pérez also vigorously asserts that others involved in the - 25 - Ultimately, [n]othing in the record supports an inference that Blankenship's reason for terminating Pérez's employment was anything other than [Pérez's] own conduct. Hoyos, 488 F.3d at 10. Accordingly, because Pérez has failed to rebut Horizon's showing of just cause, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Law 80 claim.