Opinion ID: 2571564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct: Arguing Absence of Remorse

Text: At various points during closing argument, the prosecutor made reference to Bonilla's apparent lack of remorse. Bonilla argues these remarks constituted misconduct and deprived him of his right to a fair trial and a reliable capital sentencing determination. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) These claims are partially forfeited. The first time the prosecutor referenced the absence of remorse, Bonilla objected, and the court offered Bonilla additional instruction to the jury on what it could and could not consider. On a later occasion the prosecutor referenced the absence of remorse in connection with mitigation, Bonilla objected, and the court reminded the jury that it would instruct them on the correct law as it related to consideration of mitigation. Otherwise, Bonilla failed to object. As there is no indication objection would have been futile, Bonilla's remaining claims of misconduct are forfeited. ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 835-836, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 462, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) Moreover, we conclude there was no misconduct. We have long recognized that `[r]emorse is universally deemed a factor relevant to penalty. The jury, applying its common sense and life experience, is likely to consider that issue in the exercise of its broad constitutional sentencing discretion no matter what it is told.' ( People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 866, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Prosecutors are allowed to focus on a defendant's lack of remorse in two ways. First, [c]onduct or statements at the scene of the crime demonstrating lack of remorse may be considered] in aggravation as a circumstance of the capital crime under section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1184, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353; accord, People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 361, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 448-449, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Second, [a] prosecutor may properly comment on a defendant's lack of remorse, as relevant to the question of whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance, so long as the prosecutor does not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 187, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; accord, People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 141, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400.) In contrast, when a prosecutor does argue absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, it is misconduct. ( People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 465, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 510, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) The prosecutor's comments on Bonilla's lack of remorse fell within these guidelines. He did not argue absence of remorse as an aggravating factor; instead, he contended the jury should consider the absence of remorse when it evaluated the mitigating circumstances: One of the principles that I think is very significant in terms of this concept of mitigating evidence is this issue of remorse. In their case, there has been a total lack of remorse shown by the evidence by either of these two defendants, and before you consider any mitigating evidence, the fact that there has been no remorse shown whatsoever should weigh very heavily against even considering any of that in mitigation. Later: Again, it is this effort to get you off the real issues, whether there is any mitigation that is sufficient to allow you to give [them] less than what the evidence shows they deserve. [ถ] And again, before you can get to that point where the mitigation is something you should even consider, they ought to be able to, they ought to express some remorse before they are entitled to any mitigation. Finally: And then the horror of the discovery and knowing what had become of [Harris], chewed up by the animals. That is what we talk about when we talk about the circumstances of the crime, those things you ought to consider and that remorse, that lack of remorse before you are, you ever, ever, consider any mitigation. Because what we're talking about is responsibility Neither of these two men are taking any responsibility, and it doesn't appear they ever will. How could sympathy or mercy be applicable to them? The gist of the prosecutor's argument throughout, as most clearly reflected in these final remarks, was that because Bonilla had shown no remorse, the jury should take his mitigating evidence, which amounted to a plea for mercy from his family, with a grain of salt, and should be less inclined to grant him mercy. We have consistently approved similar arguments. (See People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 141, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400 [argument permissible where reasonable jury would have understood prosecutor to be arguing lack of remorse showed the defendant was not entitled to the jury's sympathy]; People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1184, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353 [allowing argument that You can consider his lack of remorse later on as just tending to show there isn't any mitigation or the mitigation is not worthy of your consideration]; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 146, 148-149, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887 [allowing argument that jury should ask to see at least some evidence of remorse by the defendant before extending him sympathy and considering life without the possibility of parole].) There was no misconduct.