Opinion ID: 390265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motion to Strike Saka's Testimony.

Text: 26 Third, the appellants argue that the court should have struck Saka's testimony after he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court denied appellants' motion to strike, finding that the question Saka refused to answer was collateral and that it was not sufficiently material to the defense to merit the extreme sanction of striking Saka's testimony. 27 Where a witness asserts a valid privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination, all or part of that witness's testimony must be stricken if invocation of the privilege blocks inquiry into matters which are direct and are not merely collateral. See, e. g., United States v. Williams, 9 Cir., 1980, 626 F.2d 697, 702. 28 The distinction between matters which are collateral and those which are direct is not precise or easy. It can be drawn only by reference to the particular facts of the particular case, and we recognize that (a) trial court has wide discretion to determine whether a witness's testimony must be stricken because cross-examination was restricted. United States v. Star, 9 Cir., 1972, 470 F.2d 1214, 1217-18. The ultimate questions on appeal are whether the defendant has been deprived of his right to test the truth of the direct testimony, Fountain v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 384 F.2d 624, 628, citing United States v. Cardillo, 2 Cir., 1963, 316 F.2d 606, 611, and whether answers to the particular questions would have undermined the government's case. United States v. Williams, supra, 626 F.2d at 702, quoting United States v. Norman, 9 Cir., 1968, 402 F.2d 73, 77. 29 Appellants argue that the question put to Saka as to the identity of his lender was not collateral but went to the heart of the defense theory in this case. The defense theory was that Saka and Peres-not Seifert and Ehrlich-established Videoflex as a fraud. They contend that Saka supplied $75,000 to Peres to begin the business and that once Peres was caught they both attempted to shift blame to Seifert and Ehrlich, who were but employees. The defense pointed to several facts which they argued supported their theory: Saka and Peres were old friends; Saka had operated a business in New York similar to Videoflex called Studioflex and it had gone out of business, apparently in debt to its creditors, near the time Videoflex opened; according to a Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. form Videoflex had a starting capital of $75,000; Saka had moved to the west coast near the time Videoflex opened. In their offer of proof the defense argued that Saka had not obtained the $75,000 from a lender but from his own sources, i. e. Studioflex and that this money had been given to Peres directly to start Videoflex. On appeal appellants further argue that Saka never purchased merchandise from Ehrlich and Seifert but rather received it as a return on his initial investment in Videoflex. 30 But Seifert and Ehrlich were not hindered in the presentation of that defense theory by Saka's invocation of the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, counsel made an able presentation of the theory in their closing statements to the jury and repeatedly attempted to strengthen it in the course of trial. Nor was the source of the money important to the development of the theory. Even if Saka had revealed that the money had not in fact been borrowed, this would not have shown, except by the most extended and poorly supported set of inferences, that Saka had invested $75,000 in Videoflex in partnership with Peres and thus, by inference, had not made the purchases from Seifert and Ehrlich which he described on his direct examination. See Fountain v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 384 F.2d 624, 629. No such extended set of inferences was involved in United States v. Cardillo, supra, upon which appellants rely for support. At best Saka's answer would have permitted Seifert and Ehrlich to have tested Saka's credibility as to a matter on which he gave direct testimony. But counsel had ample opportunity to challenge the credibility of Saka's direct testimony. Over the course of a lengthy cross-examination this was the only question that Saka refused to answer. 31 The trial court did not err in refusing to strike Saka's testimony. 32