Opinion ID: 1213094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: billboards are entitled to the same first amendment protection as other forms of speech

Text: First Amendment protection extends to virtually all media utilized to disseminate ideas. ( Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville (1974) 422 U.S. 205 [45 L.Ed.2d 125, 95 S.Ct. 2268] (drive-in movies); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley (1972) 408 U.S. 92 [33 L.Ed.2d 212, 92 S.Ct. 2286] (picketing); Schneider v. State (1939) 308 U.S. 147 [84 L.Ed. 155, 60 S.Ct. 146] (leafletting); Welton v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 18 Cal.3d 497 (roadside sale of maps); Dulaney v. Municipal Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 77 [112 Cal. Rptr. 777, 520 P.2d 1] (posting signs on public utility poles); Dillon v. Municipal Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 860 [94 Cal. Rptr. 777, 484 P.2d 945] (demonstrations and parades); Wollam v. City of Palm Springs (1963) 59 Cal.2d 276 [29 Cal. Rptr. 1, 379 P.2d 481] (sound trucks); California Newspaper Publishers Assn., Inc. v. City of Burbank (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 50 [123 Cal. Rptr. 880] (newspaper racks).) The right of free speech necessarily embodies the means used for its dissemination because the right is worthless in the absence of a meaningful method of its expression. To take the position that the right of free speech consists merely of the right to be free from censorship of the content rather than any protection of the means used, would, if carried to its logical conclusion, eliminate the right entirely. ( Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, supra, 59 Cal.2d 276, 284.) In addressing their first basis in justification of the San Diego ordinance's blanket prohibition  outdoor signs are not entitled to the same protections as other forms of speech  the majority attempt to distinguish outdoor signs from other forms of communication which courts have held can be subjected only to narrowly drawn regulations serving a compelling governmental interest (e.g., leafletting, sound trucks, etc.) because an outdoor sign is a large, immobile and permanent structure as opposed to more transitory and less obtrusive media. ( Ante, p. 870.) Such distinction suffers the same overbreath as the ordinance itself. While the ordinance may seek to prohibit small, unobtrusive off-site signs, it permits obtrusive and perhaps even offensive on-site billboards. Being equally inconsistent, the majority selectively sustain the prohibition of offensive billboards but support the use of sound trucks, picketing, leafletting and demonstrations as constituting more transitory or less obtrusive media. Obtrusiveness does not justify total prohibition of protected expression. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, 422 U.S. 205, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance prohibiting exhibition of a motion picture displaying the bare female body by a drive-in theater whose screen was visible from a public street. Off-site advertising hardly commands the same attention as the unique type of eye-catching display of an animated drive-in movie ( id., at p. 222 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 138]; Burger, C.J., dis.), yet the court noted the screen of a drive-in theater is not `so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.' ( Id., at p. 212 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 132].) Obtrusiveness is thus measured by not only quality or degree of offensive intrusion, but also by the ability of the offended to avoid it. Is it not fair to assume that a display of animated nudes on a screen constitutes an intrusion of greater degree than a motionless sign or symbol advertising some product? Yet the Supreme Court did not find the nude display so offensive that its effect could not be kept within permissible limits. Off-site displays also are not so offensive that they cannot be kept within reasonable limits. While obtrusiveness may be a factor to be weighed in the balance in determining whether a restriction is reasonable as to time, place and manner, the majority fail to even attempt a balance. Rather, they use obtrusiveness as a sole reason, a la Ogden Nash, for the blanket ban on billboards. In instances when obtrusiveness has been deemed a factor justifying billboard regulation, the courts were persuaded by other considerations, such as the discredited view that the Constitution did not protect commercial speech, or that only those billboards next to interstate and state highways should be banned. ( General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Department of Public Wks. (1935) 289 Mass. 149 [193 N.E. 799, 803-804, 814]; Markham Advertising Co. v. State (1968) 73 Wn.2d 405, 428-429 [439 P.2d 248].) In this case, obtrusiveness must be balanced against constitutional protection given noncommercial as well as commercial uses of billboards, and the total ban of the San Diego ordinance. These factors compel the conclusion the ordinance is over-broad, constituting an impermissible infringement on First Amendment protections.