Opinion ID: 29291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: lindsey’s fmla claim

Text: Lindsey also claims that Chevron violated the terms of the FMLA. Under the FMLA, an “eligible” employee is entitled to up 3 In his deposition testimony, Lindsey stated that after his pacemaker surgery, he had no trouble walking, seeing, hearing, caring for himself, driving, and lifting objects. In fact, his doctor cleared him for work a month after surgery. 4 While an in-depth discussion of the other elements of his prima facie case would only be superfluous, it is also worth observing that Lindsey failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was none-the-less qualified to perform his job at Chevron and he was replaced by or treated less favorably than non-disabled employees 12 to twelve weeks leave when a serious health condition renders the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her position. E.g., Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1999).5 A “serious health condition” is defined as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves—(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.” E.g., Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1997). Specifically, Lindsey asserts that an FMLA violation occurred when Chevron gave him an incorrect form. He also contends that his thirty-four days of sick leave were allowed under the FMLA, which expressly provides a full sixty days of leave. Because he did not take leave time beyond that which was statutorily-allotted, Lindsey claims his termination upon his request for FMLA leave was unlawful. Chevron reasons that the FMLA is available only to employees who require leave due to serious health conditions and Lindsey offers no proof of a such a condition. Similarly, the district court found that because there was no documentation whatsoever relating to his medical condition or care at the time of his termination, Lindsey could 5 The FMLA also provides leave when an employee needs to care for a newborn child, place a child for adoption or care for an adopted child, or care for family member with serious medical condition. None of these circumstances arises in the instant case, so consideration of them is unnecessary. 13 not show that he endured a serious medical condition for which leave was not granted. We agree with the district court’s assessment of Lindsey’s FMLA claim. To survive summary judgment, Lindsey must first raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was eligible for FMLA-protected leave. Lindsey’s claim boils down to the contention that Chevron retaliated against him when it terminated him upon his request for leave in March 2000.6 The timing and justification for the requested leave, not the number of days of leave not taken, are critical here. Although the summary judgment record suggests that, in the past, Lindsey’s medical treatments may have constituted serious medical conditions warranting FMLA-protected leave, there is no evidence in the record indicating that the leave requested in March 2000 was justified by a serious medical condition. Because Lindsey does not assert such a justification, he is not be eligible for protection under the FMLA for the leave request at issue. Hence, Lindsey cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Chevron violated his rights under the FMLA. Summary judgment was appropriate. 6 Contrary to Lindsey’s assertion, there is no legal authority to support the claim that distribution of an incorrect form violates the FMLA. 14