Opinion ID: 3062208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Immunity of GAL

Text: Ms. Dahl challenges the district court’s decision that GAL Peterson was entitled to immunity from her claims against him under federal wiretap law. We reject the challenge. Absolute immunity has long been available to protect judges from liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). Over time the defense has been extended to “certain others who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Id. at 200. There is widespread recognition that guardians ad litem are entitled to the defense, which is often called quasi-judicial 11 immunity when it is applied to someone other than a judge. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (guardian ad litem has “absolute quasi-judicial immunity for those activities integrally related to the judicial process”); Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We would agree that a guardian [ad litem] should be absolutely immune when acting as an integral part of the judicial process.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994) (guardians ad litem in custody cases are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 liability); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (“A failure to grant immunity would hamper the duties of a guardian ad litem in his role as advocate for the child in judicial proceedings.”); Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Guardians ad litem . . . are absolutely immune from liability for damages when they act at the court’s direction.”); McCuen v. Polk Cnty., Iowa, 893 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1990) (guardian ad litem is entitled to absolute immunity); Wideman v. Colorado, 409 F. App’x 184, 186 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming grant of absolute quasi-judicial immunity to a guardian ad litem). There are limits to the scope of the immunity for a GAL. Not every act performed by a person with that title is immunized. For example, there is no immunity for acts taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). We need not resolve the precise boundaries of the privilege, however, because Mr. Peterson’s challenged acts were within the core duties of a GAL in assisting the court—that is, in performing a “function[] closely 12 associated with the judicial process.” Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200. As a fellow circuit has said, “[A] guardian ad litem would be absolutely immune in exercising functions such as testifying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions, and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality.” Gardner, 874 F.2d at 146. The claim against Mr. Peterson rests on his use of the recording of a conversation between Ms. Dahl and C.D. on October 12, 2009. He used the recording twice: first, when he played part of it during an interview with C.D.; and second, when he discussed it during his verbal report to the court on November 3. Because the court on October 7 had directed Mr. Peterson to meet with the children and report on how they were responding to the change in Ms. Dahl’s visitation privileges, both uses were within the report-andrecommendation function that generally warrants immunity for guardians ad litem. See id. Ms. Dahl argues that Mr. Peterson acted in in the absence of all jurisdiction because he violated federal and state wiretapping laws. But an act is not outside of a GAL’s jurisdiction just because it is wrongful, even unlawful. As the Supreme Court said in Stump, “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 435 U.S. at 356– 57 (internal quotation marks omitted). Immunity does not protect only the innocent. 13 Why grant immunity to those who have no need of it? See Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Absolute immunity has its costs because those with valid claims against dishonest or malicious government officials are denied relief.”). Immunity is conferred so that judicial officers can exercise their judgment (which on occasion may not be very good) without fear of being sued in tort. Alternatively, Ms. Dahl argues that Mr. Peterson was not acting within his jurisdiction because he “abandoned his role as the GAL to advocate for [Dr. Dahl].” Aplt. Br. at 44. But her complaint amounts to no more than challenging Mr. Peterson’s motives and criticizing what he decided to do or say on various occasions; she does not dispute his authority to make the decisions. Certainly a GAL has authority to assist one of the parties when the parties are at odds about who should have custody. Ms. Dahl’s grievance is only that the GAL decided to assist Dr. Dahl instead of her. Moreover, even if Mr. Peterson had acted outside his jurisdiction in some respects, he would not thereby forfeit immunity for the conduct challenged here regarding the October 12 recording. Because Mr. Peterson used the recording in furtherance of his GAL duties and in response to the court’s order to report on the well-being of the children, he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity on the federal wiretapping claim.