Opinion ID: 2163145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether terrorism is a forcible felony. The term forcible felony is defined in section 702.11:

Text: A  forcible felony  is any felonious assault, murder, sexual abuse, kidnapping, robbery, arson in the first degree, or burglary in the first degree. (emphasis in original). Because terrorism is not specifically named in the definition, we must determine whether it is a form of felonious assault. We defined felonious assault as used in section 702.11 in State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979), saying that the phrase `any felonious assault' means any assault the commission of which constitutes a felony. Thus terrorism is a felonious assault if it is a felony and necessarily includes an assault. No dispute exists that terrorism is a class D felony. The only dispute is whether it requires the commission of an assault. If it does, terrorism satisfies the Powers definition and is a forcible felony for purposes of section 902.7. An offense is necessarily included in another if the minor offense is necessarily an elementary part of the greater. State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 106, 106 (1928). If the minor offense is so included, the major offense cannot be committed without also committing the minor offense. State v. Johnson, 291 N.W.2d 6, 11 (Iowa 1980) (McCormick, J., concurring). Terrorism can be committed in a number of alternative ways. We need decide only whether assault is necessarily included in the offense charged here. The present charge falls under the part of section 708.6(1) which provides terrorism is committed when a person with the intent to injure or provoke fear or anger in another . . . discharges a dangerous weapon . . . into any building . . . occupied by another person, and thereby places the occupants thereof in reasonable apprehension of a serious injury. The crime of assault is defined in section 708.1 which provides in part that a person commits an assault when without justification, the person does . . . [a]ny act which is intended to cause pain or injury to . . . another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act or [a]ny act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. Because terrorism under the portion of section 708.6(1) relied on here requires the doing of an act intended to cause injury or place another in fear, a person could not commit that offense without first having the intention required for assault coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act which is threatened in an assault. Terrorism is one means of carrying out such an act. Therefore the crime charged here could not have been committed without also committing an assault. It was thus a felonious assault and, as such, a forcible felony. Consequently the guilty plea established defendant's guilt of a forcible felony in which a firearm was used, and the trial court did not err in holding the offense came within section 902.7. Defendant argues that the statute is nonetheless inapplicable because the use of the firearm was an element of the offense rather than merely incidental to it. Section 902.7 makes the use of a firearm in committing a forcible felony equally culpable without regard to whether proof of its use is necessary under the definition of the offense or merely accompanies its commission. The distinction makes no difference. II. Whether equal protection was denied. Defendant contends that application of section 902.7 denied him equal protection because two other defendants in Black Hawk County who were convicted of terrorism were not given mandatory minimum sentences. One problem with this contention is that defendant offered no evidence to support it. We have no way to determine the truth of the claim or to compare the circumstances of the cases. We have no occasion to decide whether defendant's claim would be meritorious if he had established a factual predicate for it. The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to a mandatory minimum five-year prison sentence under section 902.7. AFFIRMED.