Opinion ID: 205413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the Affidavits

Text: Next, Easterwood contends the admission of his financial affidavits to establish he was the author of the handwritten list of pornography files violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. He did not make these constitutional objections at trial, instead arguing the jury would view him and his counsel in a bad light if they knew counsel was court appointed. Because Easterwood’s counsel failed to raise a constitutional challenge at trial, we again review for plain error. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 817. -7- Easterwood argues generally that the use of such financial affidavits at trial to prove guilt offends the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. C ONST . amend. VI. If a criminal defendant cannot afford private counsel, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent him. The defendant has the burden of establishing financial eligibility for appointed counsel. United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 662 (10th Cir. 1980). To establish eligibility, the defendant ordinarily provides an affidavit to the court attesting to personal indigency. Easterwood contends this financial affidavit cannot be used against him at trial, because requiring him to risk self incrimination in order to assert the right to counsel would unconstitutionally burden his Sixth Amendment rights. The only support Easterwood musters for this claim is a case where we held the government violated the Fifth Amendment by introducing a defendant’s statements in a financial affidavit at trial. United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996). In that case, the government used the affidavit to show the defendant had no legitimate source of income, to support the inference that the $10,000 in cash found on his person was the fruit of a drug transaction. We reasoned to find otherwise would force the defendant “to choose between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.” Id. This holding echoes the conclusions of other circuits -8- regarding the admissibility of financial affidavits. See, e.g., United States v. Aguirre, 605 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 840–41 (8th Cir. 1977). But the government contends the use of the financial affidavits created no tension between Easterwood’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, the government distinguishes Hardwell by asserting the evidence in Easterwood’s affidavits was not protected by the Fifth Amendment. In other words, since the district court could have ordered Easterwood to produce the same evidence in another form, he suffered no disadvantage in pursuing his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by submitting the financial affidavits. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination applies only to testimonial evidence and does not protect a defendant from being compelled to produce “real or physical evidence.” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (quotations omitted) (noting a defendant may be compelled to appear in a lineup, speak aloud for purposes of identification, and give blood for analysis). Where financial affidavits such as these are used for their substantive content, the evidence is unquestionably testimonial. See Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1484 (finding a Fifth Amendment violation where the government introduced the defendant’s financial affidavit to prove he had no licit income, in support of the money laundering charge); Anderson, 567 F.2d at 840–41 (holding the financial data disclosed in the defendant’s affidavit should be sealed and not used in a -9- related tax prosecution); Aguirre, 605 F.3d at 358 (finding the government compromised the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights when it used a similar financial affidavit to show he was unemployed, creating the inference that the money found in his apartment came from illegal sources). But in this case, the government offered the financial affidavits as evidence of Easterwood’s handwriting and spelling. As Easterwood concedes, it is long settled that handwriting in and of itself is not testimonial. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967) (“A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside [of the Fifth Amendment] protection.”). Though Easterwood does not raise this point, it is much less settled whether spelling (or misspellings) can be considered testimonial evidence. We have never addressed the question, and other circuits have reached conflicting views. Compare United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding a defendant may be compelled to provide a writing sample by dictation, which would disclose information about his spelling, because spelling “may tend to identify a defendant as the author of a writing without involving the content or message of what is written.”); with United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir. 1984) (“When he writes a dictated word, the writer is saying, ‘This is how I spell it,’—a testimonial message in addition to a physical display.”). -10- We need not resolve this thorny question today. Because Easterwood did not raise either of his constitutional objections before the district court, he must show the alleged error was plain. That is, the error must be “clear or obvious under current law,” either because the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit has ruled on the subject, or because the district court’s interpretation of the law was “clearly erroneous.” United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009). First, neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has addressed the question of whether evidence of spelling is protected by the Fifth Amendment. And because the circuits have divided on the issue, we cannot find the district court’s actions are clearly erroneous. United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1319 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e cannot find plain error if the authority in other circuits is split.”); United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Certainly, an error cannot be deemed ‘plain,’ in the absence of binding precedent, where there is a genuine dispute among the other circuits.”). Moreover, no court has squarely held that the admission of financial affidavits is a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Thus, we conclude the district court did not commit plain error. Easterwood’s claim also fails on the third prong of plain error review, because he cannot show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 733. Easterwood’s statement to the ICAC agent at the time of his arrest is -11- substantial evidence that he, and not another member of his household, downloaded the illegal files. The evidence also showed that Easterwood’s computer contained hundreds of images that could be shared across the internet through a software program commonly used to transmit child pornography, negating any inference of accident or mistake. Given this and other evidence, we cannot see how the outcome of the trial would have been different even if the financial affidavits had been excluded. Having said this, the government had other avenues available to obtain a sample of the defendant’s handwriting and spelling. There was no reason for the government to inject into this trial documents of indigency for appointed counsel, the use of which risked compromising the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to access to counsel. The government had the means to obtain other handwriting exemplars, or it could have sought a warrant to search for additional handwriting samples at Easterwood’s home or business. It should have done so.