Opinion ID: 1830115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: peaceable possession

Text: To maintain an action to quiet title to real property, the plaintiffs must prove that, at the time of the filing of the complaint, they were in actual or constructive possession of the property, and that their possession was peaceable as distinguished from scrambling or disputed. Denson v. Gibson, 392 So.2d 523, 524 (Ala.1980); Adams v. Bethany Church, 380 So.2d 788 (Ala.1980); Hinds v. Slack, 293 Ala. 25, 299 So.2d 717 (1974). The distinction between peaceable possession and scrambling possession is that in the former, an adverse party may be denying the complainant's right to possession, but in the latter there is a denial of the fact of his actual possession. Adams, 380 So.2d at 791; Denson, supra; Adams, supra; and Hinds, supra. In this case, the trial court concluded that the Simmonses and their predecessor in title had been in peaceable possession of the property, based on the testimony of David George, A.R. Simmons, and John Kilgore, regarding various acts of possession by Ark, including the drilling of core holes, marking the boundary with paint, the building and traversing of roads, checking for forest infestation, posting of mining permit signs, and monthly inspections to prevent trespassing. The trial court also heard testimony that no one with defendant Cullman had visited the property prior to the filing of this suit, that Almon had visited the property only once prior to the filing of this suit, and that prior to the filing of this suit no one had denied the fact of Ark's possession of the property and no one had challenged Ark's right to use the property. Cullman argues that the Simmonses were not in peaceable possession because, it argues, it alone was assessed the taxes and it alone paid the taxes on the subject property from 1980 to 1982, and that its predecessor in title, Almon, had objected in writing to the plaintiffs' predecessor's mining of coal on the property without his permission. Cullman also relies on Almon's testimony that he went to the property in 1976, that at that time it was abandoned, and that the plaintiffs never posted any signs to indicate their ownership of the property. This Court has held that isolated acts by a defendant that do not interfere with the plaintiff's peaceable possession do not defeat the plaintiff's right to bring an action to quiet title. Denson, supra, Adams, supra, and Ford v. Washington, 288 Ala. 194, 259 So.2d 226 (1972). The plaintiff must show that he was in actual possession of the property. Ford, supra. Further, a defendant's going to property and claiming title to it when it is in the possession of the plaintiff does not constitute possession that would defeat an action to quiet title. Adams, supra. Finally, payment of taxes is not sufficient to defeat the possessor's right to bring an action to quiet title. Ford, supra. The evidence argued by Cullman does not overcome the trial court's holding that the Simmonses were in peaceable possession. Cullman further argues that the trial court's ruling on this issue was clearly erroneous because, it says, the Simmonses failed to show evidence of color of title, citing Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-560. Cullman asserts that the showing of color of title could be made only from the copies of the deeds entered into evidence. Cullman states that none of the deeds was authenticated, as it says was required by Rule 44(a)(1), A.R.Civ.P., and that, therefore, the deeds could not be considered evidence of color of title. According to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-560, a person can file a complaint to establish a right or title to land when he claims ... to own [the land] or any interest therein, and is in the actual, peaceable possession of the land, or if neither he nor any other person is in the actual possession of the lands and he holds, and has held, color of title to the lands, subject to certain further conditions. In this case, the Simmonses presented sufficient evidence to enable the trial court to determine that they were in peaceable possession of the property. Further, Rule 44(e), A.R.Civ.P., states that [e]very instrument permitted or required by law to be recorded in the office of the judge of probate, and which has been proved or acknowledged in the manner provided by law in force at the time of its execution, may be read in evidence without further proof and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Therefore, the trial court's determination that it had jurisdiction under Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-6-560 and 6-6-561, was correct. Cullman's argument as to color of title is without merit.