Opinion ID: 64707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mauskar's motion to dismiss count 1 of the indictment on grounds of duplicity was timely.

Text: Before reaching the substance of Mauskar's motion to dismiss count 1 of the indictment on grounds of duplicity, we address a procedural issue. Mauskar filed his motion approximately two weeks before his second trial. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely and that a unanimity instruction would be given to protect Mauskar's rights. The government, reasoning that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 required Mauskar to file the motion before his first trial, argues that the district court was correct in holding the motion untimely. Rule 12 requires that a motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground of duplicity be filed before trial. See United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir.2003). It does not, however, address the question raised by the government here, which is whether a defendant who fails to challenge a duplicitous indictment before a trial ending in a mistrial is barred from raising the challenge before a subsequent trial on the same indictment. No controlling authority exists, but the long-established principle that [t]he declaration of a mistrial renders nugatory all trial proceedings with the same result as if there had been no trial at all militates strongly against the government's position. See United States v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir.1971) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Groth, 682 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 1982) (We agree with the trial judge ... that the prosecution is not bound by its first waiver. The waiver referred to the earlier trial.... Once a mistrial was declared each party was free to assert or waive his rights.). We apply this principle and hold that Mauskar's motion to dismiss the indictment was timely filed.