Opinion ID: 2156001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Weapons on Private Property

Text: The true issue in this case is whether a conviction of wearing and carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon in violation of Article 27, section 36, can be sustained where the weapon in question, otherwise legal to possess, is found in a place not in open view in the residence of the alleged offender but in close proximity to him. We hold that it cannot. State v. Brinkley, 102 Md.App. 774, 651 A.2d 465 (1995), relied on by the State, is distinguishable. In Brinkley, the Court of Special Appeals first addressed the issue, which is presented today, whether the crime of carrying a concealed weapon may be accomplished when the accused is on private property. Id. at 775, 651 A.2d at 465. Brinkley was a guest at a private residence in Montgomery County when the Maryland-National Capital Park Police executed a search warrant at the premises. He was clearly wearing a weapon. There was no evidence that the owner of the premises knew that Brinkley had a weapon on his person or anywhere on the property. During a pat-down search of Brinkley, the police officers discovered a knife inside his left boot and he was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Article 27, section 36. The trial court dismissed the charge ruling that Article 27, section 36 does not prohibit the carrying of a concealed weapon when the alleged offender is in a private residence. The Court of Special Appeals held: In our view, application of section 36 to private property is not inconsistent with [the purposes of Maryland's criminal concealed weapons statutes]. Applying section 36 to private property would protect those unsuspecting members of the public who find themselves on private property when a dangerous or deadly weapon, previously concealed, is wielded at them. There is no reason to believe that members of the public do not require protection from concealed weapons simply because they are situated on private property. We believe section 36 was enacted to protect members of the public generally, whether they be located on private property or on a public street. Id. at 778-79, 651 A.2d at 467 (footnote omitted). In that case, there was no indication that Brinkley was the owner of the private property, or that the owner of the property had, in any way, given permission for Brinkley to carry the weapon there at issue concealed on Brinkley's person or even upon the property. An owner of, or a resident in, or a guest invited by the owner or resident, when the owner or resident has knowledge of the weapon does not violate the provision of the statute at issue when he is on such private property and is in possession of a concealed weapon, otherwise legal to possess. The State argues in its brief that Article 27, section 36 applies equally to both public and private property. It bases its rationale on the premise that a private property exception exists concerning handguns in the relatively recent Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, section 36B. The State contends that if the Legislature had wanted a private property exception within section 36 it would have expressly put one in that statute. We disagree with the State's reasoning. Article 27, section 36 has remained substantially the same since 1886. See 1886 Md. Laws Ch. 375. In 1886, the corresponding statute provided: Every person not being a conservator of the peace entitled or required to carry such weapon as a part of his official equipment, who shall wear or carry any pistol, dirk-knife, bowie-knife, slung-shot, billy, sand-club, metal knuckles, razor or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind whatsoever, (penknives excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall carry or wear any such weapon openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned not more than six months in jail or the House of Correction. It is evident from the wording of the statute as originally enacted in 1886 that very little has been done to change the basic premise behind the statute in over 100 years. In 1972, however, the Legislature enacted Article 27, section 36B, concerning the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun. The statute's purpose is outlined as follows: (a) Declaration of policy. The General Assembly of Maryland hereby finds and declares that: (1) There has, in recent years, been an alarming increase in the number of violent crimes perpetrated in Maryland, and a high percentage of those crimes involve the use of handguns; (2) The result has been a substantial increase in the number of persons killed or injured which is traceable, in large part, to the carrying of handguns on the streets and public ways by persons inclined to use them in criminal activity; (3) The laws currently in force have not been effective in curbing the more frequent use of handguns in perpetrating crime; and (4) Further regulations on the wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns are necessary to preserve the peace and tranquility of the State and to protect the rights and liberties of its citizens. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, section 36B (emphasis added). [10] Article 27, section 36B was designed to accomplish what the then current laws had been unable to accomplishto crack down on the increased amount of violent crimes committed, primarily in public venues, with the use of handguns. Recognizing this growing problem, the statute included language similar to then already enacted Article 27, section 36. Section 36B also provides: (b) Any person who shall wear, carry, or transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, upon or about his person, and any person who shall wear, carry or knowingly transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, in any vehicle traveling upon the public roads, highways, waterways, or airways or upon roads or parking lots generally used by the public in this State shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person is knowingly transporting the handgun.... Article 27, section 36B prohibits the wearing, carrying or transporting of handguns, whether concealed or open. Although it was passed to address a more serious problem and although it demands a stricter standard than section 36, subsection (c)(4) of 36B nonetheless provides: Nothing in this section shall prevent a person from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun within the confines of real estate owned or leased by him or upon which he resides or within the confines of a business establishment owned or leased by him. Section 36B was an attempt by the Legislature to reduce the use of handguns primarily in the commission of street crimes of violence. See Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 584, 357 A.2d 360, 368 (1976); Wright v. State, 24 Md.App. 309, 317, 330 A.2d 482, 487, cert. denied, 274 Md. 733 (1975). However, apparently, the Legislature did not want its toughened stance on handguns on the street and in public areas to inadvertently be applied to affect an individual's right to possess a legal handgun in the home. We interpret the Legislature's addition of this private property exception not as support for the State's position that the absence of such an exception in section 36 should be interpreted to mean that the Legislature intended no distinction for shotguns between private and public property under section 36. Rather, we interpret the private property exception to mean that the Legislature recognized that, generally, a person has a right to possess a legal firearm in the home. [11] With the enacting of 36B(c)(4), the Legislature, it appears to us, simply wanted to safeguard this general right, to possess weapons in one's home, even as to handguns. The Legislature wanted what was implied in the more lenient section 36 to be specifically expressed in the stricter section 36B. Under the State's position, it would be legal for a person to have a handgun concealed on his person while standing in the kitchen of his home, but illegal for him to have the kitchen knives in a closed drawer nearby. We cannot accept that the Legislature intended such an incongruous interpretation of these related statutes. Our rationale is supported by our past recognition of the intertwined relationship between section 36 and section 36B. We noted in Eldridge, 329 Md. at 313, 619 A.2d at 534-35, that an evaluation of section 36B is instrumental in our understanding of section 36: Section 36B concerns handguns. Handguns were expressly excepted from the provisions of § 36 and § 36B was enacted to fill the void.... .... We think that § 36B, concerned with handguns, is, to all intents and purposes, the counterpart of § 36, concerned with deadly weapons generally, except handguns. The proscribed conduct in both § 36(a) and § 36B(b) is the samethe carrying of the designated weapon. In view of the similarity of the statutes and our holding in Webb [ v. State, 311 Md. 610, 536 A.2d 1161 (1988) ], we conclude that the unit of prosecution in § 36(a), as we have found it to be in § 36B(b), is one offensethe carrying of a deadly weapon, regardless of whether it is carried concealed or openly. Section 36B is a counterpart to section 36, and serves almost as an extension of the same legislative policy. Both attempt to crack down on the problem of the use of deadly weapons in the commission of violent crimes. Section 36B sets a stricter standard on the use of handguns, yet expressly provides for a limited private property exception. It would be contrary to the legislative scheme of both statutes for us to now apply a stricter standard concerning rifles and shotguns in private residences under the less evolved and less strict section 36. [12] We also look to our prior analysis of the purpose of Maryland's concealed weapon's statutes. As we said in Anderson: Criminal statutes dealing with concealed weapons serve two related purposes. First, they seek to protect the public by deterring persons from concealing on or about their persons weapons of which the public would be unaware, thereby preventing injury or death to unsuspecting members of the public. Second, these statutes protect the wearers or carriers of weapons from themselves, by attempting to deter persons from having at hand weapons that could be used in the heat of passion. Anderson, 328 Md. at 432, 614 A.2d at 965 (citations omitted). The act of placing a shotgun under a mattress within one's home is not the type of unrestrained exercise of rights that this statute is attempting to prevent. Section 36 is attempting to prevent incidents on public streets and in publicly accessible areas. As the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated, in a factually similar case involving a person convicted of carrying a concealed weapon (switchblade knife) in his home: [T]he [S]tate's interpretation would restrict the manner in which one could carry a legal weapon from room to room within one's home and would inhibit an act that is so intrinsic to ownership and self-defense that it would unreasonably interfere with the exercise of one's constitutional right to possess the [deadly weapon]. State v. Stevens, 113 Or.App. 429, 432, 833 P.2d 318, 319 (1992). We recognize that Article 27, section 36 was intended by the Legislature to apply, generally, to persons traveling or congregating on public streets or areas generally accessible to the public. It was not designed to apply to people on their private property or people who reside in, or are an invited guest on that property when the owner has knowledge of the weapon. To apply this statute to people concealing weapons on such private property who have a legitimate reason for being on that property could lead to absurd results. In statutory construction, absurd results are to be avoided. In D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990), we stated that construction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided. See also, e.g., Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 418, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) ([W]e should construe the statute in a manner that results in an interpretation `reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense.' (quoting Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998))); Edgewater Liquors, 349 Md. at 808, 709 A.2d at 1303 ([W]e approach statutory construction from a common sense perspective.); Lewis, 348 Md. at 662, 705 A.2d at 1135 (We shall not interpret a statute to produce unusual or extraordinary results, absent the clear legislative intent to enact such a provision.); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) ([R]ules of statutory construction require us to avoid construing a statute in a way which would lead to absurd results.); Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284, 493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985) (A statute should not be construed by forced or subtle interpretations....). Under the State's theory, a resident or owner of premises would have to keep his knives, his handguns, his rifles, his shotguns, and every other type of weapon, or potential weapon, in the open; i.e., standing in the corner, on the coffee table, on the counter, on top of the bed, in the center of the floor. To conceal a weapon by hiding it in order to reduce the likelihood that a child will discover it, and use it, would be a crime. That is absurd. Moreover, the State's position that a weapon may not be concealed on private property, if it resulted in weapons being left unconcealed, as it might, would lead to violations of other statutes. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, section 36K, titled Access to firearms by minors provides in relevant part in subsection (b): an individual may not store or leave a loaded firearm in any location where the individual knew or should have known that an unsupervised minor would gain access to the firearm. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more that $1000. If we were to adopt the State's position that shotguns may not be concealed, i.e., that they must be in open view, every hunter in Maryland with small children would be forced to violate one statute or the other: Keep the shotgun on the counter in violation of section 36K, or hide it from the child, i.e., conceal it in violation of section 36. We hold that, generally, a person in legal possession of a dangerous and deadly weapon may conceal or store it as long as they are on property, which they own, or are a legal resident of, or are an invited guest who has informed the owner or resident of the presence of the weapon. To hold otherwise would turn this statute on its ear. How could a person place knives into a kitchen drawer without concealing them and violating this statute upon closing the drawer? How could a responsible hunter place shotguns in a gun cabinet without concealing them and violating this statute? How could an owner, and invited guests, transport encased shotguns across the back 40 to the duck hunting blinds along the edge of the marsh or the deer-stand along the edge of the woods? How could a homeowner keep weapons for his protection without having them readily and illegally accessible to children? Clearly it was not the intent of the Legislature to make it a misdemeanor to put away silverware or to store a legal firearm. Petitioner was concealing a weapon within his home. We hold that section 36 does not prohibit the concealing of otherwise legal weapons in one's residence, or on one's property, or on the private property of others, if the owner of that property is made aware of the presence of the otherwise legal weapon. This holding applies to owners, residents, renters, and, as we have indicated, under certain circumstances and conditions, even invited guests.