Opinion ID: 461052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ill Ann.Stat. ch. 34, p 3151 (Smith-Hurd 1985 pocket part).

Text: 6 Although the parties have not briefed the issue (except for a footnote reference in the State of Illinois' Amicus brief), we think that the claim regarding the zoning decision may be barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, another exemption that the Supreme Court has read into the Sherman Act. This doctrine bars Sherman Act suits against persons who associate for the purpose of restraining trade and competition if they pursue this purpose through legitimate political means. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) (limiting Noerr-Pennington to legitimate, non-abusive political conduct); Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 601 F.Supp. at 908-910 (setting forth the doctrine in greater detail). As we understand the complaint (as amended by the brief) it charges that the Villages violated the Sherman Act by associating together in an attempt to persuade the county Board to deny the special permit and that they did so for anticompetitive purposes. The complaint contains no intimation that the Villages abused the political process in seeking to convince the County to deny the special zoning permit. This sort of association for purposes of influencing governmental action would appear to be exempt from antitrust challenge under Noerr-Pennington