Opinion ID: 1667377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motions to suppress inculpatory statements

Text: Mr. Bowen contends that the custodial statements he made to the Phillips County Sheriff, the Chief of the Elaine Police, and the FBI should have been suppressed by the Trial Court. In making this argument, Mr. Bowen argues (a) the statements were obtained without a valid waiver of his Miranda rights, (b) the statements and waiver of rights (if made) were not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and (c) the statements were the fruit of an illegal arrest. In his order denying the motion to suppress the statements, the Trial Court did not address the statements made to Chief Lawman just after the arrest. It was Mr. Bowen's obligation to obtain a ruling with respect to those statements in order to preserve a point of appeal with respect to them. State v. Torres, 309 Ark. 422, 831 S.W.2d 903 (1992); Hobbs v. State, 43 Ark.App. 149, 862 S.W.2d 285 (1993). The statement to Sheriff Winfrey was made after Mr. Bowen said he wanted to think about whether to waive his rights and make a statement. As he escorted Mr. Bowman to a holding cell, the Sheriff told Mr. Bowen he did not think he had committed the crime alone, mentioned that he had 25 to 30 officers ready to investigate, and asked Mr. Bowen to do him and himself a favor by saying what happened. At that point Mr. Bowen said there were others involved but that one of them had nothing to do with it. Mr. Bowen then asked the Sheriff to promise that nothing would happen to her, and Sheriff Winfrey responded that if she had nothing to do with it, then nothing would happen to her. Mr. Bowen told the Sheriff that the others were Crickett Tindall, who is Mr. Bowen's mother, and her friend, Cheryl Lobdill. Mr. Bowen described their vehicle and told the Sheriff that they were on their way to Fort Smith. Shortly after giving these statements, Mr. Bowen was taken to a hospital in Helena for treatment of his ankle which he apparently had injured while attempting to flee after the robbery. We are not convinced by Mr. Bowen's arguments about the voluntariness of his remarks to Sheriff Winfrey. He made a passing reference to having been abused by sheriff's deputies and to the pain he suffered from his injured ankle, but all of the police witnesses testified Mr. Bowen seemed alert and not to have been seriously affected by his injury. They also testified there was no abuse or coercion. Custodial statements are presumed to be involuntary with the burden of proof placed on the State to show that they are not. Noble v. State, 319 Ark. 407, 892 S.W.2d 477 (1995); Everett v. State, 316 Ark. 213, 871 S.W.2d 568 (1994). If, however, after an independent review of the totality of the circumstances we conclude there was no coercion and the statements were made knowingly and intelligently we do not reverse on the basis of their admission into evidence. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 504, 868 S.W.2d 483 (1994). In this instance, the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to overcome the presumption. We should note here that statements made to the FBI agents later were made after a clear waiver by Mr. Bowen of his rights. He told those agents in detail about the planning and commission of the crime. The issue that draws our attention has to do with whether Sheriff Winfrey acted properly in questioning Mr. Bowen after Mr. Bowen had acknowledged an understanding of his right not to answer but had declined to sign a waiver of rights form, saying he needed to think about waiver. Does that statement amount to an invocation of his right to remain silent? Perhaps so, but the question is whether a subsequent statement may imply waiver. Mr. Bowen cites United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 301 (11th Cir.1993), for the proposition that if there has been an equivocal invocation of rights it is the duty of a police officer not to inquire further other than to ask questions in an attempt to clarify the waiver. Mr. Ramsey had, after being warned of his rights and asked to make a statement, looked away from his interrogator and remained silent. Other investigators took him to another room out of the presence of the first questioner on the assumption that he just did not want to talk to her but would talk to them. They urged him to talk, suggesting that it would benefit him to do so, and he made an inculpatory statement. It was held that the investigators had an obligation to clarify his equivocal invocation of his rights before asking questions which could lead to an inculpatory statement. Our view of this matter is that, by saying he wanted to think about waiver, Mr. Bowen indicated an understanding of what was at stake. We do not regard the statement as an invocation of his rights, however. In a recent case, the Supreme Court has held that the invocation of the right to counsel must be made with specificity. Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). We see no distinction between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent with respect to the manner in which it must be effected. Mr. Bowen had acknowledged that he understood his right to remain silent and to the presence of counsel and yet he spoke without further mention of those rights. We have held that by merely answering questions one may waive one's right to remain silent by implication. Bryant v. State, 314 Ark. 130, 862 S.W.2d 215 (1993); Ward v. State, 308 Ark. 415, 827 S.W.2d 110 (1992); Duncan v. State, 291 Ark. 521, 726 S.W.2d 653 (1987). Before leaving the subject of the inculpatory statements, we must mention briefly several other contentions of Mr. Bowen. He argues the Sheriff made a promise that nothing would happen to his mother if Mr. Bowen cooperated. The Sheriff's testimony was that he said nothing would happen to her if, as Mr. Bowen had said, she had no part in the robbery and murder. Obviously, if that is all that was said it amounted to such a conditional promise that it could not be considered to be coercive. Mr. Bowen also asserts his mental illness prevented his statements from being intelligently and voluntarily made. Again, the evidence to the contrary in the testimony of the police officials who took the statements posed a question of credibility only. The detail in which he described to the FBI agents the crime and its planning also lent credibility to the State's position that Mr. Bowen was not incapacitated by his alleged mental illness. Finally, Mr. Bowen contends all his statements were the results of an illegal arrest and should have been suppressed for that reason. We do not consider that point as the trial court made no ruling on it. Gidron v. State, 316 Ark. 352, 872 S.W.2d 64 (1994).