Opinion ID: 2507343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lopez's Allegations Of Improper Prosecutorial Comment

Text: Lopez argues that the prosecution's comments during closing and rebuttal argument regarding his post-arrest silence went beyond legitimate comment on the evidence, such that he is entitled to a new trial. In evaluating whether improper prosecutorial comment warrants a new trial, we consider the following three factors: `(1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the promptness of a curative instruction; and (3) the strength or weakness of the evidence against the defendant.' State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai`i 38, 47, 79 P.3d 131, 140 (2003) (quoting State v. Pacheco, 96 Hawai`i 83, 93, 26 P.3d 572, 582 (2001)).
Lopez contends that the DPA's remarks during closing and rebuttal argument improperly commented on his post-arrest silence and, therefore, violated his right to remain silent. There is nothing more basic and more fundamental than that the accused has a constitutional right to remain silent, and the exercise of this privilege may not be used against him. [8] State v. Alo, 57 Haw. 418, 424, 558 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1976). Although the record does not reflect whether Lopez received Miranda warnings from Officer Hawkins or any other police officer at the time or after he was arrested, we hold that the right against self-incrimination attached at least as of the time of the arrest, [9] because the right to remain silent derives from the Constitution and not from the Miranda warnings themselves. United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634 (9th Cir.2000)). Any other holding would create an incentive for arresting officers to delay interrogation in order to create an intervening `silence' that would then be used against the defendant. United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 386 (D.C.Cir.1997). [10] Lopez takes issue with the DPA's comments pertaining to what an innocent person would have done in Lopez's situation when arrested by Officer Hawkins. The DPA's remarks related to the testimony of Officer Hawkins, who confirmed on cross-examination by defense counsel that, when he stopped Lopez for speeding, Lopez told him, [T]he car belongs to a friend and he doesn't know where the paperwork is. On redirect examination by the DPA, the officer testified that Lopez did not disclose his friend's name or address or how he might have acquired the car from his friend. The DPA asked, Did he say anything at all about this friend except [']well, I got it from a friend, I don't know where the paperwork is[']?, to which Officer Hawkins responded, That's all he said. On recross-examination, the officer admitted that he could not recall whether he asked Lopez for his friend's name and information like that. After summarizing Officer Hawkins's testimony during closing argument, the DPA asserted, A person is stopped in a stolen car and he really is innocent, what's the first thing he's going to do? Lopez objected on the ground that the DPA's comments offended his right to remain silent, but the DPA countered that Officer Hawkins's testimony was in evidence, and the circuit court overruled the objection. Continuing, the DPA asserted that an innocent person in Lopez's situation would have told Officer Hawkins, [']Wait a minute, wait a minute, I got it from my friend Greg Ramba, he lives in Makakilo, he fixes cars, he told me I could drive it, wait, wait, wait.['] During his closing argument, defense counsel raised Officer Hawkins's inability to remember whether he asked Lopez for information regarding his friend, apparently to imply that Lopez did not disclose that information because Officer Hawkins probably did not ask. On rebuttal, the DPA responded that the officer wouldn't need to ask[;] an innocent person would just start talking and try to convince the person arresting him that he didn't do it, because a reasonable person in Lopez's position would have said, [']I got [the car] from my friend, Greg Ramba, brah, go talk to him, he'll tell you.['] According to the DPA, Lopez said [n]othing like that. The prosecution asserts that defense counsel's questions during his cross-examination of Officer Hawkins regarding what Lopez did say about his friend opened the door to the DPA's inquiry on his redirect examination of the officer with respect to what Lopez did not say. Lopez responds that he takes issue not with the DPA's redirect of the officer but, rather, with the manner in which the DPA commented on that evidence during closing and rebuttal argument. The prosecution asserts that the DPA's comments on Officer Hawkins's testimony during closing and rebuttal argument were entirely proper, because the testimony was in evidence, and, as such, the DPA could properly discuss the import of [Lopez's] failure to provide [Officer] Hawkins with his friend's name, address, and other information. Although a prosecutor has wide latitude in commenting on the evidence during closing argument, it is not enough that a his comments are based on testimony in evidence; his comments must also be legitimate. See State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 304, 926 P.2d 194, 209 (1996) ([A] prosecutor, during closing argument, is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and wide latitude is allowed in discussing the evidence. It is also within the bounds of legitimate argument for prosecutors to state, discuss, and comment on the evidence. . . . (Citations omitted.)). A prosecutor's comments are legitimate when they draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Iuli, 101 Hawai`i at 208, 65 P.3d at 155 (The prosecution is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. . . . ). In this case, the DPA's comments were not legitimate because, in contravention of Lopez's fundamental right to remain silent, see Alo, 57 Haw. at 424, 558 P.2d at 1016, the DPA argued the unreasonable inference that Lopez was guilty in light of his post-arrest silence, that is, his failure to act like an innocent person and disclose to Officer Hawkins Ramba's name, address, and occupation. See Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 638-39 (holding that the district court erred in permitting the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence during closing argument by remarking that, after the defendant was arrested, he failed to ask What is going on here?, Why I am being treated like this?, and Why am I being arrested? and by commenting that the defendant didn't say a word because he knew); United States v. Branson, 756 F.2d 752, 753-54 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that the prosecutor improperly referred to the defendant's post-arrest silence during closing argument by asserting that an honest person in the defendant's position would have told the law enforcement officer, I don't know this was counterfeit, I just got it somehow, and that the defendant refused to tell law enforcement where he received the counterfeit bills); Scarborough v. Arizona, 531 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir.1976) (finding fundamental error where the prosecutor commented during closing argument that the defendant remained silent after he was arrested and that, if he were arrested for armed robbery, he would have said something ÔÇö if he were not guilty); cf. State v. McCrory, 104 Hawai`i 203, 208, 87 P.3d 275, 280 (2004) (observing that a defendant has no affirmative duty to proclaim his innocence). The prosecution cites two cases in support of its argument that the DPA's comments were entirely proper, to wit, Hauge and State v. Briggman, 21 Ill.App.3d 747, 316 N.E.2d 121 (1974). In Hauge, this court concluded that, because the defendant undertook to `explain away' much of the prosecution's evidence, he virtually invited the prosecutor to cross-examine him and later comment, during rebuttal argument, on his failure to explain away the DNA evidence showing that his blood was found at the scene of the crime. 103 Hawai`i at 57, 79 P.3d at 150. In Briggman, the Illinois Appellate Court held that, because the defendant volunteered on cross-examination that he had been smoking reefers on the night in question, he assumed the risk that his testimony would be subject to elaboration by cross-examination or comment in closing argument and, therefore, the prosecutor's comment during closing argument that he had smoked some reefers was proper. 316 N.E.2d at 127. While these cases permit prosecutorial comment on issues raised by the defendant, we conclude that they are distinguishable. They do not suggest, much less hold, that a prosecutor may argue to the jury that a defendant's failure to disclose facts to the police during and following his arrest may be equated with guilt, which is precisely what the DPA did in the present matter by suggesting that the import of [Lopez's] failure to provide [Officer] Hawkins with his friend's name, address, or other information, was that Lopez didn't do what an innocent person would do. In light of the language employed by the DPA, we think that the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret his remarks during closing and rebuttal argument as comments on Lopez's post-arrest silence and that the comments are consequently improper. See State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawai`i 504, 515-16, 78 P.3d 317, 328-29 (2003) (holding that, given the language used, the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret the prosecution's rebuttal argument as a comment on [the defendant's] failure to testify, where the prosecutor commented during closing argument that the defendant would know certain facts and that, [i]f he doesn't tell us, we can only look to [the evidence] and see what [the evidence] tells us); State v. Vild, 155 Ariz. 374, 746 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Ct.App.1987) (holding that the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's post-arrest silence because, [w]hile the prosecutor did not flatly state that the [defendant] remained silent after his arrest, his description of what an innocent person would have said when first informed of his arrest for cocaine-related offenses implied that this is what the [defendant] would have said at the time of his arrest or shortly thereafter if his testimony had been true (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, the ICA erred in concluding that the DPA was legitimately commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. ICA's Lopez mem. op at 10. The nature of the DPA's conduct ÔÇö the first factor ÔÇö weighs in favor of granting Lopez a new trial. See Wakisaka, 102 Hawai`i at 515-16, 78 P.3d at 328-29.
Generally, this court considers a curative instruction sufficient to cure prosecutorial misconduct because [it] presume[s] that the jury heeds the court's instruction to disregard improper prosecution comments. Id. at 516, 78 P.3d at 329. In this case, however, the circuit court declined to give a curative instruction when Lopez objected to the DPA's comments and, instead, overruled the objection. Thus, the circuit court's failure to give any form of curative instruction militates in Lopez's favor. See id. (holding that the circuit court's failure to give a curative instruction in response to the prosecution's comment on the defendant's decision not to testify at trial weighed heavily in the defendant's favor); State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai`i 405, 415, 984 P.2d 1231, 1241 (1999) (concluding that the second factor weighed heavily in favor of the defendant, because the circuit court did not give a curative instruction in the wake of the defendant's objection to the prosecutor's inflammatory argument). Nevertheless, the prosecution argues that the evidence against Lopez was strong because, pursuant to HRS  708-836, see supra note 3, it only had to prove that he intentionally or knowingly operated the car without first obtaining Gregory's or Mona's consent and because Lopez admitted those facts. The prosecution's argument rests on the false premise that it was not subject to the burden of proving that Lopez was not mistaken as to the identity of the registered owner. As we explained supra in section III.A, we believe that the intentional or knowing state of mind prescribed in HRS  708-836(1) applies to the authorization element of the offense, such that the prosecution bore the burden of proving that Lopez did not mistakenly believe that the person who authorized his use of the vehicle was the registered owner of the vehicle. Proof of this element turned principally on whether the jury believed Lopez's account of how he acquired the car. Accordingly, under the third factor, we think that the evidence in this case is not so overwhelming that we are convinced that the DPA's intrusion into Lopez's right to remain silent may not have contributed to his conviction. See Rogan, 91 Hawai`i at 415, 984 P.2d at 1241 (holding that the evidence against the defendant, which essentially turned on the credibility of the complainant and the defendant, was not so overwhelming as to outweigh the inflammatory effect of the deputy prosecutor's [racial] comments). In summary, we hold that all three factors counsel that the DPA's improper comments were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and, consequently, that Lopez is entitled to a new trial on remand. [11] See Wakisaka, 102 Hawai`i at 516, 78 P.3d at 329 (holding that, because all three factors demonstrated that the prosecution's improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was entitled to a new trial). The ICA erred insofar as it reached a contrary conclusion.
Lopez argues that the DPA's comments during closing and rebuttal argument with respect to Lopez's failure to call Greg Ramba were improper, because they unreasonably implied that Lopez bore the burden of proof. `When it would be natural under the circumstances for a party to call a particular witness, and he fails to do so, tradition has allowed his adversary to use this failure as the basis for invoking an adverse inference.' State v. Padilla, 57 Haw. 150, 160, 552 P.2d 357, 364 (1976) (quoting McCormick, Evidence 656-67 (2d ed.1954)). It is natural for a party to call a witness when `a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce [a] witness[] whose testimony would elucidate the transaction.' 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence 221 (6th ed.2006) (quoting Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893)). Under those circumstances, the permissible inference is that, if the witness had been called by the party, the witness's testimony would have been unfavorable to the party. See id. In Padilla, this court held that, because the defendant invoked an adverse inference with respect to the prosecution's failure to call a witness, the prosecution was entitled to explain why it had not done so. 57 Haw. at 161, 552 P.2d at 364. This court has not, however, addressed the question whether the prosecution may invoke an adverse inference against the defendant by virtue of his failure to call a witness. [12] Lopez cites Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 803 P.2d 1104 (1990), in which the Nevada Supreme Court held that [i]t is generally outside the boundaries of proper argument to comment on a defendant's failure to call a witness, because such comment improperly `suggests to the jury that it was the defendant's burden to produce proof by explaining the absence of witnesses or evidence.' Id. at 1105 (quoting Barron v. State, 105 Nev. 767, 783 P.2d 444, 451 (1989)). In response, the prosecution quotes several paragraphs from Napulou, which include a citation to United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726 (2d Cir.1994), a decision upon which Lopez also relies, apparently for a fall-back position in the event that this court declines to follow Ross. In Bautista, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that the government may comment on a defendant's failure to call witnesses to support his factual theories, but may not . . . go further and suggest that the defendant has the burden of producing evidence. Id. at 733. Unlike the Ross court's relatively hard and fast rule against commenting on the defendant's failure to call witness, the Bautista court's approach permits such comment to the extent that it does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See id. We believe that the more flexible rule in Bautista is consistent with the wide latitude that this court affords prosecutors when they comment on evidence. See Clark, 83 Hawai`i at 304, 926 P.2d at 209. At the same time, the rule also safeguards the defendant's right to require the prosecution to shoulder the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Murray, 116 Hawai`i 3, 10, 169 P.3d 955, 962 (2007) (The defendant's right to have each element of an offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutionally and statutorily protected right.); Hauge, 103 Hawai`i at 55-56, 79 P.3d at 148-49 ([E]fforts by the prosecution to shift the burden of proof onto a defendant are improper and implicate the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Hawai[`]i Constitution.). Because we believe that the Bautista rule strikes a fair balance between the interests of both the prosecution and the defense, we adopt it and conclude that the prosecution may invoke the adverse inference against the defendant for his failure to call a witness [w]hen it would be natural under the circumstances for [the defendant] to call [the] witness, Padilla, 57 Haw. at 160, 552 P.2d at 364 (quoting McCormick, Evidence 656-67), and when the comments do not suggest[ ] to the jury that it was the defendant's burden to produce proof by explaining the absence of witnesses or evidence, Bautista, 23 F.3d at 733. In the present matter, Lopez does not dispute that it would have been natural for him to call Ramba but, instead, maintains that the DPA's comments on his testimony impermissibly implied that he bore the burden of proof. At trial, Lopez testified that Ramba was a friend, law abiding, and honest. Consequently, during rebuttal argument, the DPA argued as follows: Wouldn't you have liked to have heard from Greg Ramba? [Lopez] says he's a local boy, lives [in] Makakilo with his family. You know, would it have been so hard to get him in here into court to tell you guys[, Y]eah, I lent him the car, I told him it was okay, and I neva know it was stolen either[]? [Lopez] himself said Greg is law abiding, honest, his friend. You know, don't you think his friend would come in? And all he would have to say is[, Y]eah, I lent him the car.[] I would probably vote not guilty maybe at that point.[ [13] ] Why didn't he do that? I suggest to you one of two possibilities: There is no Greg Ramba or Greg Ramba would have come in here if he called him and said something very different from what [Lopez] would have wanted Greg to say. Lopez argues that the DPA shifted the burden of proof by repeatedly referring to his failure to call Ramba and by asserting that, had he called Ramba, Ramba's testimony would have been unfavorable. The DPA's comments on Lopez's failure to call Ramba and Ramba's potentially unfavorable testimony did not, however, shift the burden of proof. See United States v. Caccia, 122 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that a jury instruction that permits the jury to draw an adverse inference against [the defendant] for his failure to call an available material witness does not deprive him of his right to have the prosecution bear the burden of proof as to all elements of the crime). Lopez further argues that the DPA suggested to the jury that Lopez deliberately withheld Ramba from the jury because Ramba would have said `said something very different from what [Lopez] would have wanted Greg [Ramba] to say.' (Emphasis added.) (Brackets in original.) The record does not, however, reflect that the DPA asserted, or even implied, that Lopez was deliberately withholding Ramba from the jury. To be sure, the DPA's comments suggest that Lopez made a strategic decision not to call Ramba, but they do not, in our view, insinuate foul-play on Lopez's part. Lopez next asserts that the DPA shifted the burden of proof by arguing that, if Lopez had called Ramba and Ramba had provided favorable testimony, the DPA would perhaps vote not guilty. According to Lopez, the DPA implied that, because Ramba did not testify, Lopez must be found guilty. (Emphasis added.) It is true that the prosecution may not expressly or impliedly assert that the defendant's failure to call a witness obligates the jury to find the defendant guilty. Cf. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that a prosecutor's comments to the jury did not shift the burden of proof, because the prosecutor simply stated that, if the defense failed to mention or adequately explain unfavorable facts, ask yourselves why and because [t]he prosecutor did not argue that a failure to explain [the uncomfortable facts] adequately required a guilty verdict); Bautista, 23 F.3d at 733 (observing that prosecutors should avoid statements suggesting that the defense is `obligated' at any time `to come forward with evidence'). Nevertheless, we do not think that the prosecution made that argument here. The DPA's precise language was that, if Lopez had called Ramba to testify and Ramba provided favorable testimony, the DPA would probably vote not guilty maybe at that point. In our view, this statement implies that, because Lopez did not call Ramba, the DPA would likely vote guilty. Although the DPA should have refrained from interjecting his personal opinion on Lopez's guilt by suggesting how he would vote if he were a juror, see supra note 4, an issue that was not raised on appeal or in the proceedings below, we do not believe that he implied, as Lopez suggests, that Lopez's failure to call Ramba required the jury to return a guilty verdict, see Mares, 940 F.2d at 461. Accordingly, we do not perceive that the DPA's comments regarding how he would vote shifted the burden of proof to Lopez. Finally, Lopez contends that the DPA inappropriately implied that Ramba did not exist by virtue of Lopez's failure to call him as a witness. The inference that Ramba did not exist falls within the realm of reasonable inferences that the DPA was permitted to draw from the evidence adduced at trial, especially given Lopez's inability to recall Ramba's home address, despite the fact that he had allegedly been to Ramba's house and had known him for two years. See Iuli, 101 Hawai`i at 208, 65 P.3d at 155; Alston v. United States, 552 A.2d 526, 528 (D.C.App. 1992) (holding that the prosecutor properly commented during closing argument that the person who allegedly gave the defendant permission to use a stolen automobile did not exist, because that theory could reasonably be inferred from the evidence adduced at trial, such as defendant's testimony that he did not know the person's last name). Accordingly, we do not believe that the DPA's comments regarding Lopez's failure to call Ramba were improper and, consequently, we do not address whether they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Valdivia, 95 Hawai`i at 483, 24 P.3d at 679 ([W]e hold that the [prosecutor's] statement did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in the first instance and need not reach the question whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.). The ICA was correct on this issue. See ICA's Lopez mem. op. at 10.