Opinion ID: 1899355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding Ms. Dobbins' attorney's fees against Mr. Coleman.

Text: ¶ 21. On cross-appeal, Mr. Coleman argues that the chancellor's award of attorney's fees to Ms. Dobbins pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 93-9-45 was both unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unreasonable in light of the facts. The first claim is procedurally barred, while the second claim is without merit. ¶ 22. Section 93-9-45 of the Mississippi Uniform Law on Paternity controls the awarding of the petitioner's court costs and attorney's fees against a defendant after the entry of an Order of Filiation and states: If the court makes an order of filiation, declaring paternity and for the support and maintenance, and education of the child, court costs, including the cost of the legal services of the attorney representing the petitioner, expert witness fees, the court clerk, sheriff and other costs shall be taxed against the defendant. ¶ 23. Mr. Coleman's claim regarding this provision's unconstitutionality is procedurally barred for failure to raise the issue in the court below. At no point did Mr. Coleman ever argue that Section 93-9-45 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of sex. As such, we will not review this assignment of error. See Patterson, 798 So.2d at 351; Pickens, 748 So.2d at 692. ¶ 24. Mr. Coleman's second claim  that the attorney's fees awarded to Ms. Dobbins were unreasonable  is without merit. Section 93-9-45 provides that when an Order of Filiation is entered by the court, the defendant will be assessed the cost of the legal services of the attorney representing the petitioner . . . . Here, the chancellor entered an Order of Filiation on September 24, 2004, with respect to the petitioner, Ms. Dobbins, and the defendant, Mr. Coleman. The chancellor, in his November 15 Order, held that the attorney's fees incurred by Ms. Dobbins were reasonable and were to be paid by Mr. Coleman. ¶ 25. While the awarding of attorney's fees and costs appears automatic pursuant to the statute, we have held that those fees must be reasonable. R.E. v. C.E.W., 752 So.2d 1019, 1028 (Miss.1999). The record in this case includes a detailed Attorney's Report of Fees Incurred for Nita Elaine Snyder Dobbins with an itemization of all charges and expenses related to this paternity action, an employment contract, and affidavits from two attorneys practicing in DeSoto County as to the usual and customary fees charged by attorneys in domestic relations cases in the community. [2] In his opinion, the chancellor noted, [t]he attorney's fees are reasonable, and the statute also says that the future father shall pay attorney fees if they are reasonable and they are granted. He shall pay them. ¶ 26. This Court will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the Court can say with reasonable certainty that the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal standard. Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So.2d 97, 100 (Miss.1996). The chancellor's decision to award attorney's fees pursuant to Section 93-9-45 cannot be characterized as an abuse of discretion, manifestly wrong, or clearly erroneous. ¶ 27. Mr. Coleman's reliance on Clark v. Whiten, 508 So.2d 1105 (Miss.1987) and McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764 (Miss. 1982), is misplaced. Clark involved a jury's, rather than a judge's, awarding of attorney's fees without any evidence such as the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged by the petitioner's attorneys. Clark, 508 So.2d at 1108-09. In contrast, the fees charged by Ms. Dobbins' attorney fall within the customary charge in the community, as explained in two attorney affidavits. In McKee, we found that fees based on an estimated 850 hours worked on the case were too speculative to support an award of attorney's fees. McKee, 418 So.2d at 766-67. Here, the chancellor was provided with an itemized account of all of Ms. Dobbins' attorney's fees and charges. Given the substantial evidence supporting the chancellor's award of attorney's fees to Ms. Dobbins, we decline to disturb the chancellor's findings. Mr. Coleman's assignment of error fails on the merits.