Opinion ID: 2585470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Ordinance a Valid Time, Place, and Manner Restriction?

Text: ¶ 62 Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court indicate municipalities may regulate the placement and ownership of sexually oriented businesses through time, place, and manner restrictions. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440-41, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 1737, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002). Such restrictions are termed content-neutral since they lack any form of censorship. Some difficulty in this area has arisen, however, because the analytical framework between content-neutral and content-based regulations is not altogether clear. As Justice Brennan noted in FW/PBS, Inc., where a regulation is aimed at a specific type of business, the distinction between censorship and licensing may be illusory. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 241, 110 S.Ct. 596, 613, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). Finally, even if a licensing scheme is determined to be a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, when such an ordinance fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards, it is nonetheless unconstitutional. ¶ 63 FW/PBS, Inc. declined to elaborate on this issue, and as a result, courts are left with little to guide them in this area. See id. at 223, 110 S.Ct. at 603. However, other jurisdictions have held that an otherwise constitutional ordinance that seeks to regulate the placement and ownership of SOBs may properly be termed a content-neutral scheme. While the motives underlying a licensing scheme should be examined in regard to the stated goals of controlling secondary effects of SOBs, a municipality surely has a justifiable interest in obtaining information on the business owner and restricting licensing in this respect. ¶ 64 Content-neutral means the regulation is not aimed at the content of the speech but rather at the secondary effects of [the SOB] on the surrounding community. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 929, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (emphasis omitted). A regulation meets content-neutral time, place, and manner requirements if it (1) is content neutral; (2) is designed to serve a substantial government interest; and (3) does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression. See id. at 46-55, 106 S.Ct. at 928-33. ¶ 65 The clear weight of jurisprudence in this area indicates that most courts consider the subject matter in this case as commercial speech and the regulation as a time, place, and manner restriction, resulting in a significantly lower level of scrutiny. See id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 930; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-69, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2451-52, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-71, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Nevertheless, while licensing schemes pose less substantial risks to protected speech than censorship schemes, the fact that a licensing process differentiates between certain types of businesses militates in favor of a slightly higher level of scrutiny than would be afforded commercial speech. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 226-28, 110 S.Ct. at 605-06. ¶ 66 There is significant disagreement in this area, which is perhaps best exemplified by the fractured nature of the Supreme Court's opinion in FW/PBS, Inc., where Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, noted that it was unwise to apply prior restraint doctrine to licensing schemes aimed at preventing secondary effects. This tension is apparent in prior restraint cases that have followed FW/PBS, Inc., and likely reflects the fact that it is impossible to neatly separate a licensing scheme's good intentions from its practical effects. Even a perfectly constitutional licensing scheme with carefully drafted procedural safeguards may have an altogether unforeseeable, unconstitutional effect in certain instances, and it is folly to expect municipalities to surmount this intractable problem. ¶ 67 If any central premise can be gleaned from FW/PBS, Inc. and its progeny, it is that licensing schemes should be analyzed with an eye toward prior restraint doctrine simply because First Amendment jurisprudence is one tough nut. Furthermore, [i]f courts were compelled to wait until the government discriminated on the basis of content, they would lack the power to review licensing schemes in advance of their application and to require procedural safeguards. Graff v. City of Chicago, 986 F.2d 1055, 1067 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc). ¶ 68 Under the most restrictive interpretation, the Midvale ordinance regulates not conduct, but rather ownership, and is therefore clearly a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction unrelated to expression. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49, 106 S.Ct. at 929. Because the city does not exercise discretion over any particular expressive speech, the regulation is a ministerial action that is not presumptively invalid. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. at 607. Under the Renton test, the ordinance is constitutional if it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for alternative avenues of communication. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 930. As it now stands, an SOB may locate anywhere as long as the owner completes the proper application. ¶ 69 Clearly [a]ny effect on the overall expression is de minimus [sic]. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 294, 120 S.Ct. at 1393. If States are to be able to regulate secondary effects, then such de minimus [sic] intrusions on expression cannot be sufficient to render the ordinance content based. Id. at 294, 120 S.Ct. at 1394. At best, Dr. John's sexually explicit products rise to the level of expression found in the nude dancing in Pap's A.M. and should be afforded no more than marginal protection, rather than the cherubim and a flaming sword Dr. John's proposes. ¶ 70 Having determined that the licensing scheme is a valid time, place, and manner restriction would generally not end the inquiry. If the city sought to regulate the time, place, and manner of expression, the court would need to measure the city's proposed interests in regulating conduct and the availability of other channels of communication. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954-55, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). However, although the ordinance classifies certain businesses differently, it does not treat them differently and thus need not be tested by the strict scrutiny applied when government action impinges upon expression. The policy, therefore, need only rationally further a legitimate state purpose, and classification of SOBs is surely such a purpose.