Opinion ID: 2721616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: APO Statute

Text: On appeal, appellant first argues that the charge of misdemeanor APO violated the Home Rule Act because, since this case involved United States Park Police officers, rather than the Metropolitan Police Department, the Council had no legal authority to criminalize appellant‟s conduct directed towards federal law enforcement. In appellant‟s view, the charge is invalid as applied to him because it would infringe on a restricted “federal function.” See D.C. Code § 1-206.02. We disagree. 8 “We apply a de novo standard of review to issues of statutory interpretation.” Porter v. United States, 769 A.2d 143, 148 (D.C. 2001) (citation omitted). The issue of whether the Council had the authority to criminalize appellant‟s conduct directed towards federal police officers is a question of law. See Farina v. United States, 622 A.2d 50, 61 (D.C. 1993). Under the Home Rule Act, Congress delegated broad power to the Council to enact local laws, subject to certain limitations. D.C. Code §§ 1-206.01 to - 206.04 (2012 Repl.). Specifically, “[t]he Council shall have no authority to pass any act contrary to the provisions of this chapter except as specifically provided in this chapter, or to . . . [e]nact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress, which concerns the functions or property of the United States,” D.C. Code § 1-206.02 (a)(3) (emphasis added), i.e., the Council cannot pass laws which affect a “federal function.” Our APO statute originates from a 1953 congressional act,7 which preceded passage of the Home Rule Act in 1973. The Omnibus Public Safety Amendment Act of 2006, enacted by the Council, replaced the original APO statute, which had 7 The District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 85, § 205, 67 Stat. 90, 95 (1953). 9 only included a felony offense, with the current language that provides for both a felony and a misdemeanor charge. D.C. Council, Report on Bill 16-247 at 2, 18 (Apr. 28, 2006). The 2006 amendment of the APO statute does not in and of itself exceed the Council‟s authority because the Home Rule Act “explicitly permits the Council to amend Titles 22-24, and thereby to enact new offenses and repeal old ones.” In re Crawley, 978 A.2d 608, 618 (D.C. 2009); see also D.C. Code § 1- 206.02 (a)(9); McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 754 (D.C. 1978). Nor are we persuaded by appellant‟s broad interpretation that United States Park Police necessarily carry out a “federal function” under the Home Rule Act.8 The term “federal function” is narrowly construed and only pertains to those activities that explicitly impact the federal government‟s ability to operate. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Cent. Labor Council, AFL-CIO, 442 A.2d 110, 116 (D.C. 1982) (“We are not persuaded that Congress intended that 8 To the extent that appellant also argues that the location of the arrest, the 1000 block of Madison Drive, is “federal park land,” or that the officers were “administrat[ing] . . . federal park areas[,]” the record shows, instead, that the officers were enforcing District of Columbia traffic laws on a District of Columbia street. We agree with the government that the facts of this case evidence a “purely local matter.” The Council‟s police power is, at its core, the enforcement of District of Columbia substantive criminal law, regardless of the location of the arrest in question. See Farina, supra, 622 A.2d at 61 (affirming the convictions of demonstrators under the D.C. Code for blocking streets on the Capitol grounds,
10 performance of a local function by federal officials . . . would transform the function into a „function of the United States‟ for the purpose of [§ 1-206.02].” (emphasis added)). The enforcement of traffic laws on a local street is not a “federal function.” See In re Crawley, supra, 978 A.2d at 610 (“The core and primary purpose of the [Home Rule Act] was to relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local matters to the greatest extent possible, consistent with constitutional mandates.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)); see also 18 DCMR § 2406 (authorizing the Director of Public Works to place “signs prohibiting parking” on local streets). Applying our narrow construction of “federal function” here, the United States Park Police officers‟ were effectuating a local function, and enforcement of the APO statute in relation to their performance of this local function did not interfere with “the integrity of the federal domain as it relates to administration of federal legislation having national implications.” Greater Wash. Cent. Labor Council, AFL-CIO, supra, 442 A.2d at 116. Specifically, Officers Blake and Hiott were enforcing District of Columbia traffic laws on a local street when they encountered appellant, namely, directing traffic flow on Madison Drive. The officers‟ instructions directing appellant to remove himself from the scene and to refrain from parking in restricted areas also concerned the enforcement of District 11 of Columbia traffic laws. See 18 DCMR § 2000.2 (“No person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer, police cadet, or civilian crossing guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.”). Because the officers were effectuating purely local laws at the time of the incident, the APO charge did not violate the Home Rule Act. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on this basis.