Opinion ID: 2571433
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under a purely recidivist statute, a conviction must continue to be valid at the time of adjudication and sentencing.

Text: Purely recidivist statutes address repeat offender behavior by increasing the punishment for every subsequent violation. See Shimabukuro, 100 Hawai`i at 330, 60 P.3d at 280 (Levinson, J., concurring) (noting that HRS § 291-4(b) (Supp.1998) [9] created an escalating sentencing scheme keyed to the defendant's degree of recidivism); id. at 333, 60 P.3d at 283 (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (noting that HRS § 291E-61 (Supp. 2001) [10] resembled a recidivist statute in that the amended version includes, in its plain language, a `multiplier' effect or enhanced sentencing for the repeat offender). In contrast to a status offense, under a purely recidivist statute, if a conviction was valid at the time of the commission of a subsequent offense but was later invalidated prior to adjudication of the subsequent offense, the defendant's conviction for that subsequent offense may not be based on the vacated conviction. See Shimabukuro, 100 Hawai`i at 330-32, 60 P.3d at 280-82 (Levinson, J., concurring) (reasoning that, inasmuch as at the time of adjudication of the habitual DUI offense at issue, one of the defendant's prior DUI convictions had been vacated, he could therefore not be convicted of habitual drunk driving  as to which three prior convictions was a requisite attendant circumstance  because, in light of the vacated conviction, at the time of adjudication he had been lawfully convicted of DUI only twice). [11] In Veikoso, this court characterized the Shimabukuro analysis as follows: [c]entral to the judgment in Shimabukuro . . . was the fact that the defendant . . . had succeeded in having one of his prior convictions vacated by the rendering court prior to entering his . . . guilty plea . . . . A majority of this court agreed . . . that the vacated conviction could not be used to establish culpability. . . . 102 Hawai`i at 222, 74 P.3d at 578. We further reasoned in Veikoso that, [w]here a defendant succeeds in having a prior conviction expunged, reversed, or set aside, its use in connection with proceedings relating to subsequent offenses will be limited. Similarly, a defendant who succeeds in having prior convictions expunged, reversed, or set aside after they have been used to support guilt or enhance punishment in subsequent proceedings may have a basis for attacking that subsequent conviction or enhanced punishment. Id. at 226-27, 74 P.3d at 582-83 (emphasis in original). [12] If a defendant who succeeds after sentencing in having a prior conviction expunged or vacated may have a basis for attacking that subsequent conviction or enhanced punishment, id., it follows, a fortiori, that a defendant who, at sentencing, has, through direct appeal, succeeded in having a prior conviction vacated as constitutionally defective, has grounds for opposing an enhanced sentence based upon that invalid conviction. 3. HRS § 291E-61 (Supp.2001), a recidivist statute, required that any necessary prior convictions be valid at the time of adjudication and sentencing, but the 2003 amendments transformed HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (3) into status offenses. HRS § 291E-61 (Supp.2001), see supra note 10, created an escalating sentencing scheme keyed to the defendant's degree of recidivism, Shimabukuro, 100 Hawai`i at 330, 60 P.3d at 280 (Levinson, J., concurring), and was devoid of language indicating, for purposes of sentencing, that any prior conviction upon which the sentence was premised need only be valid at the time of the commission of the subsequent offense. Therefore, consistent with Shimabukuro and Veikoso, pursuant to HRS § 291E-61(b) (Supp.2001), any prior convictions to which a defendant's punishment was pegged would necessarily have had to be viable at the time of adjudication and sentencing. In 2003, however, the legislature manifested a clear intent to transform HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (3) into three separate status offenses by adding the following language to HRS § 291E-61(c): Any judgment on a verdict or a finding of guilty . . . that at the time of the offense has not been expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside shall be deemed a prior conviction under this section. (Emphasis added.) The conclusion that the legislature intended that HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (3) be treated as status offenses is reinforced by the legislative history surrounding the creation, through the same legislation, of the separate offense of habitual intoxicated driving: As part of the 2003 amendments, the legislature excised the class C felony for four convictions within ten years set forth in HRS § 291E-61(b)(4), see supra note 10, and renumbered it as a wholly separate offense, entitled Habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, codified at HRS § 291E-61.5. [13] The Senate expressly indicated that it was creating a status offense in HRS § 291E-61.5: the Senate Committee on Transportation, Military Affairs, and Government Operations explained that it amended the provisions of the habitual drunk driver offense so that it is clearly a status offense. Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1185, in 2003 Senate Journal, at 1523. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary and Hawaiian Affairs further noted that it found that being punished as a status offender rather than receiving an enhanced sentence has distinct implications. Status offenders receive a specific punishment as long as the offender meets the criteria at the time the offender reoffends. The offender cannot defeat the charge by having a previous conviction reversed on a subsequent appeal. By contrast, enhanced sentences can be avoided if any prior convictions that are the basis for an enhanced sentence are overturned. Your Committee believes it is important that the habitually impaired driver understand that he or she will be charged with a felony for any further impaired driving arrests, even if one of [the driver's] prior convictions is reversed after their arrest. Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1268, in 2003 Senate Journal, at 1564. In order to effectuate its intent, the legislature included the following language in HRS § 291E-61.5(b): For the purposes of this section:  Convicted three or more times . . . means that, at the time of the behavior for which the person is charged under this section, the person had three or more times within ten years of the instant offense . . . [a] judgment . . . that, at the time of the instant offense, had not been expunged by pardon, reversed or set aside. (Emphases added.) This language strongly resembles the amended language of HRS § 291E-61(c), see supra note 10 (Any judgment on a verdict or a finding of guilty . . . that at the time of the offense has not been expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside shall be deemed a prior conviction under this section.). Both the plain language of and the legislative history surrounding the 2003 amendments, accordingly, reflect a clear legislative intent that HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (3) be treated as separate status offenses. We therefore hold that the 2003 amendments to HRS § 291E-61 transformed HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (3) into status offenses. 4. The amendments to HRS § 291E-61 do not alter this court's conclusion in State v. Domingues that HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (4) describe intrinsic elements that the prosecution is required to plead and prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Effective January 1, 2002, the legislature repealed an earlier DUI law, HRS § 291-4.4 (Supp.2000), [14] and enacted HRS § 291E-61 (Supp.2001), see supra note 10. See 2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, §§ 21, 23, 32, and 41 at 405-06, 425-27, 432-33. [15] In State v. Domingues, 106 Hawai`i 480, 107 P.3d 409, (2005), this court confronted the question whether HRS § 291E-61 (Supp. 2001) was a substantial reenactment of HRS § 291-4.4. In Domingues, the defendant had been arrested in August 2001 for violating HRS § 291-4.4, in effect at the time, but was subsequently indicted in March 2002 under the same law, three months after its repeal. 106 Hawai`i at 482-83, 107 P.3d at 411-12. This court analyzed the structure and purpose of the two statutes and held that the legislature had substantially reenacted HRS § 291-4.4 as HRS § 291E-61. Id. at 482, 107 P.3d at 411. In reaching that holding, this court concluded that the language of HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (4), see supra note 10, describes attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and `enmeshed' in the hierarchy of offenses that HRS § 291E-61 as a whole describes. Id. at 487, 107 P.3d at 416 (citing HRS § 702-205 (1993) (defining elements of an offense)). This court thereby concluded that, as attendant circumstances and, therefore, essential elements of the offense intrinsic to the commission of the crime charged, such aggravating circumstances `must be alleged in the [charging instrument] in order to give the defendant notice that they will be relied on to prove the defendant's guilt and support the sentence to be imposed, and they must be determined by the trier of fact.' Id. at 487-88, 107 P.3d at 416-17 (quoting Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i at 528, 880 P.2d at 203). That was required, we concluded, because [i]t is an impermissible dilution of the jury's role as factfinder to remove the responsibility for determining the existence of facts leading to the imposition of a particular punishment. . . . We hold that when a fact susceptible to jury determination is a predicate to the imposition of an enhanced sentence, the Hawai`i Constitution requires that such factual determinations be made by the trier of fact. The legislature may not dilute the historical province of the jury by relegating facts necessary to the imposition of a certain penalty for criminal behavior to the sentencing court. The jury is the body responsible for determination of intrinsic facts necessary for the imposition of punishment for an offense criminalized by the legislature. The analysis in Schroeder protects the jury's role by mandating that the determination of facts intrinsic to the offense be made by the trier of fact.[] Id. at 488, 107 P.3d at 417 (quoting State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai`i 261, 270, 273, 982 P.2d 890, 899, 902 (1999)) (emphases omitted). The language of HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (3) remains unchanged by the 2003 amendments and, while the legislature, as noted supra in section III.C.3, excised the class C felony from HRS § 291E-61(b)(4), it inserted a new aggravating factor into § 291E-61(b)(4), imposing additional punishments beyond those provided for in HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) to (3), for any adult convicted of operating a vehicle while under the influence and with a passenger under the age of fifteen years in or on the vehicle, see supra note 10. The Domingues analysis, therefore, retains its vitality, inasmuch as considerations of due process continue to require that the aggravating factors set forth in HRS § 291E-61(b) [16]  all of which remain attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and `enmeshed' in the hierarchy of offenses that HRS § 291E-61 as a whole describes, Domingues, 106 Hawai`i at 487, 107 P.3d at 416  be alleged in the charging instrument and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 5. The district court plainly erred in convicting Ruggiero as a second time DUI offender pursuant to HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b)(2). This court's holding in Tafoya requires that the essential elements of any offense be alleged in the complaint and found beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact. 91 Hawai`i at 270, 273, 982 P.2d at 899, 902; see also Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i at 528, 880 P.2d at 203. Inasmuch as we conclude, supra, that a prior conviction, as described in HRS § 291E-61(b)(2) (Supp.2003), is an elemental attendant circumstance, intrinsic to the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, it was necessary that Ruggiero's prior conviction be alleged in the charging instrument and proven at trial as preconditions to his present conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant for the second time within five years, in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b)(2). The complaint charging Ruggiero with a violation of HRS § 291E-61 was silent with respect to the attendant circumstance of any prior conviction, see supra note 3, and, therefore, was insufficient as a matter of law in charging a violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b)(2), because [i]t is well settled that an accusation must sufficiently allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged, a requirement that obtains whether an accusation is in the nature of an oral charge, information, indictment, or complaint[.] State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977)[; accord . . . Israel, 78 Hawai`i at] 69-70, 890 P.2d [at] 306-07 . . .; ... Elliott, 77 Hawai`i [at] 311, 884 P.2d [at] 374. . . . Put differently, the sufficiency of the charging instrument is measured, inter alia, by whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he [or she] must be prepared to meet[.] State v. Wells, 78 Hawai`i 373, 379-80, 894 P.2d 70, 76-77 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original). A charge defective in this regard amounts to a failure to state an offense, and a conviction based upon it cannot be sustained, for that would constitute a denial of due process. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. at 281, 567 P.2d at 1244 (citations omitted). Cummings, 101 Hawai`i at 142, 63 P.3d at 1112 (some bracketed material added and some in original) (quoting State v. Merino, 81 Hawai`i 198, 212, 915 P.2d 672, 686 (1996)). For [j]ust as the [S]tate must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense charged, the State is also required to sufficiently allege them and that requirement is not satisfied by the fact that the accused actually knew them and was not misled by the failure to sufficiently allege all of them. Israel, 78 Hawai`i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310 (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw.App. 287, 293, 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982)). In State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 657 P.2d 1019 (1983), we adopted a standard for post-conviction challenges to indictments [that] means we will not reverse a conviction based upon a defective indictment unless the defendant can show prejudice or that the indictment cannot within reason be construed to charge a crime. Id. at 92, 657 P.2d at 1020. But Ruggiero does not challenge the sufficiency of the complaint against him on appeal; rather he challenges only his sentence as a second-time offender. Therefore, any review of the sufficiency of the complaint under the Motta standard has to be undertaken on the basis of plain error. We may recognize plain error when the error committed affects substantial rights of the defendant. State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997) (citations and internal quotation signals omitted)[; s]ee also Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 52(b) . . . (Plain error or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.). State v. Staley, 91 Hawai`i 275, 282, 982 P.2d 904, 911 (1999) (quoting [State v.] Maumalanga, 90 Hawai`i [58,] 63, 976 P.2d [372,] 377 [ (1998) ], (quoting [State v.] Davia, 87 Hawai`i [249,] 253, 953 P.2d [1347,] 1351[ (1998) ])). Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i at 101, 997 P.2d at 27. Ruggiero does not claim that the complaint prejudiced him; rather, he filed his appeal solely to reduce his sentence to that of a first-time offender. While the complaint  by omitting any mention of a prior DUI conviction  substantially prejudiced him with regard to defending against a DUI charge as a second-time offender, cf. State v. Kekuewa, 112 Hawai`i 269, 145 P.3d 812 (App.2006), [17] Ruggiero concedes that he is subject to sentencing under HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) as a first-time offender. Moreover, on its face, the complaint can reasonably be construed to charge the crime of DUI as a first offense, in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b)(1). It plainly states the elements set forth in HRS § 291E-61(a) (operates or assumes actual physical control of a vehicle) and -61(a)(1) ([w]hile under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair the person's normal mental faculties or ability to care for the person and guard against casualty). See supra note 3. While the complaint is silent as to the lack of prior DUI convictions, given the unique nature of the element  the presence of an empty set, that is, the absence of any prior convictions [18]  silence with respect to prior violations can only betoken that their absence, i.e., the import of HRS § 291E-61(b)(1), is implicit in the charge. [19] Ruggiero himself impliedly acknowledges that the complaint was sufficient to charge DUI as a first-time offense when he concedes that he is subject to sentencing as a first time offender under HRS § 291E-61(b)(1). And while, in light of Ruggiero's January 29, 2003 DUI conviction, it was within the discretion of the prosecution to pursue a sufficiently articulated charge of DUI as a second-time status offender, it would also have fallen within the prosecution's discretion to charge the lesser included offense of DUI as a first-time offender. See State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 44, 904 P.2d 912, 929 (1995) (Within constitutional limits, it is always the prosecution's prerogative to undercharge any offense for whatever reason it deems appropriate. . . . (Emphasis in original.)); State v. Mendonca, 68 Haw. 280, 283, 711 P.2d 731, 734 (1985) (holding that the prosecution has the discretion to decide which statutory subsection to charge the accused with); Territory v. Ouye, 37 Haw. 176, 181 (1945) (noting that the prosecution had the discretion to select which charge upon which it wished to proceed). Inasmuch as Ruggiero suffered no substantial prejudice from the complaint in defending against a DUI charge as a first-time offender, and the circuit court made the appropriate findings and conclusions to convict Ruggiero of DUI as a first-time offender, we remand the case to the district court for the entry of judgment of conviction of that offense. See Elliott, 77 Hawai`i at 313, 884 P.2d at 376.