Opinion ID: 2631820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Results Contrary to the Voters' Intent

Text: ¶ 19 In addition, though we most commonly examine legislative history due to statutory ambiguity or absurdity, it is also well established that even where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will not employ a plain meaning interpretation [that] would lead to ... a result at odds with the legislature's intent. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Techs., Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201, 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994) (McGregor, J.); see also, e.g., Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 501, 990 P.2d 1055, 1061 ¶ 20 (1999) (Courts should avoid hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent. (internal quotations omitted)); Mail Boxes, Etc., U.S.A. v. Industrial Comm'n, 181 Ariz. 119, 121, 888 P.2d 777, 779 (1995) (Where language is unambiguous, it is normally conclusive, absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.); Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 592, 667 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) ([I]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that where the statutory language is unambiguous, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive, absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.). ¶ 20 Proposition 200's intent provisions, which explicitly call for treatment rather than incarceration of first time drug offenders in order to reduce drug use and preserve prison space for more dangerous criminals, make it clear that the electorate, acting in the role of the legislature, did not intend to incarcerate for the lesser offense and yet mandate probation for the more serious. Text of Proposed Amendment § 3(C),(E),(F), Proposition 200, 1996 Ballot Propositions. ¶ 21 Under the State's interpretation, the overwhelming majority of first time drug users would be subject to imprisonment despite Proposition 200's mandate that, [n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary, qualifying defendants convicted of personal possession or use of a controlled substance shall receive probationary treatment. A.R.S. § 13-901.01(A) (2000). The court of appeals, Division One, found this construction directly at odds with the stated purposes of Proposition 200: The voters who insisted on probationary treatment for drug users could not have meant to mandate probation for possessing methamphetamine but permit prison for possessing a tube to smoke it in. The voters who sought to reserve prison space for violent offenders could not have intended, when a defendant is caught with a joint of marijuana, to require probation for the drug, yet permit prison for the rolling paper wrapped around it. Estrada, 197 Ariz. at 388, 4 P.3d at 443 ¶ 21. ¶ 22 Most importantly, the State's approach compels an irrational result. The term drug paraphernalia, broadly construed, includes virtually all devices or objects used or intended for use in connection with the possession, use, production, or sale of illegal drugs. A.R.S. § 13-3415(F)(2) (2000). The possession of otherwise innocuous items, such as [b]lenders, bowls, containers, [or] spoons, would thus become criminal, simply by their regular association with drugs. A.R.S. § 13-3415(F)(2)(h) (2000). Yet, as a practical matter, a person will rarely, if ever, possess or use a controlled substance without also possessing these associated paraphernalia. Accordingly, there exists a conspicuous gap in the statute because it is silent as to paraphernalia. This is not the first time such a phenomenon has occurred. In City of Scottsdale v. McDowell Mountain Irrigation & Drainage Dist., this court declined to read the statutory phrase resident owners of real property as meaning owners who physically reside on the real property, where doing so would require a practical impossibility and thereby defeat the statutory objective. 107 Ariz. 117, 122-23, 483 P.2d 532, 537-38 (1971). In the instant case, the practical impossibility drug use occurring absent paraphernalia arises because, in actual practice, drug possession routinely requires a container of some sort, such as a plastic bag or an envelope. And similarly, drug use is regularly facilitated by a delivery device of some kind, such as a syringe, a wrapper, or a smoking pipe. ¶ 23 To interpret Proposition 200 as mandating probation for the crime of smoking marijuana but permitting incarceration if the State charges the user for possessing paraphernalia because the shredded marijuana was wrapped in paper, produces a transparently absurd result. ¶ 24 We hold, therefore, that the probation eligibility provisions of Proposition 200 apply to convictions for the possession of items of drug paraphernalia associated solely with personal use by individuals also charged or who could have been charged with simple use or possession of a controlled substance under the statute. [2] To find otherwise would permit the State to circumvent the manifest purpose of the statute and render Proposition 200 a practical nullity. ¶ 25 We emphasize that Proposition 200 does not make all drug paraphernalia convictions probation eligible. The protections of the statute apply only to clearly defined individuals engaged in personal possession or use of a controlled substance. The protections do not apply to individuals engaged in the sale, production, manufacturing or transportation for sale of any controlled substance or to paraphernalia associated with those activities. A.R.S. § 13-901.01(C) (2000). See Foster, 196 Ariz. at 233, 995 P.2d at 275 ¶ 7 (Proposition 200 differentiates non-commercial possession or use from the commercial or potentially commercial trafficking in controlled substances.). This important distinction can be made by an appropriate instruction to the jury and the essential factual determination can be resolved by a simple interrogatory.