Opinion ID: 205890
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure To Adequately Cross Examine Christofferson

Text: In his next alleged instance of ineffectiveness, Orr claims that trial counsel failed to sufficiently cross examine Christofferson to satisfy his constitutional right to confront witnesses testifying against him. Specifically, Orr maintains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he (1) failed to impeach Christofferson with her cooperation agreement with the government and (2) failed to impeach her with her prior inconsistent statements regarding the number of drug transactions between Orr and others that she arranged. Concerning Orr's first contention, Orr points out that, prior to testifying, Christofferson faced two charges that each carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years absent Christofferson's agreement to cooperate with the government. Orr maintains that Christofferson's expected benefits from her performance under the cooperation agreement motivated her to embellish or fabricate her inculpatory testimony. Orr argues that Cohn should have highlighted Christofferson's potential ulterior motive. Additionally, Orr notes that in a proffer interview Christofferson gave on February 11, 2008, to federal and local law enforcement, she stated that she had purchased crack cocaine at the Washington Street house from Orr three or four times for [sic] one-half ounce quantities. Christofferson did not expound on this testimony and made no mention of arranging drug transactions between Orr and others. Nevertheless, less than a month later, on March 8, 2008, Christofferson testified at Orr's grand jury hearing that she obtained crack cocaine from Orr for herself and others, probably 75 to 100 times. Christofferson substantially reiterated her grand jury testimony at Orr's trial. Again, Orr maintains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach Christofferson on this prior inconsistency. The Supreme Court has recognized that strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after a less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Accordingly, we generally entrust cross-examination techniques, like other matters of trial strategy, to the professional discretion of counsel. Villalpando, 259 F.3d at 939. Still, we heed the Supreme Court's guidance that, `[a]bsent competent counsel, ready and able to subject the prosecution's case to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing, there can be no guarantee that the adversarial system will function properly to produce just and reliable results.' Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 377, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). In that vein, [t]he Eighth Circuit has found constitutionally deficient performance of trial counsel based on ineffective cross-examination where counsel allowed inadmissible devastating evidence before the jury or when counsel failed to cross-examine a witness who made grossly inconsistent prior statements. Whitfield v. Bowersox, 324 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir.2003), vacated in part on other grounds by, 343 F.3d 950, 950 (8th Cir.2003) (citing Hadley v. Groose, 97 F.3d 1131, 1135-36 (8th Cir.1996); Driscoll, 71 F.3d at 709-11). Specifically, [a] failure to impeach constitutes ineffective assistance when there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's failure, the jury would have had reasonable doubt of the petitioner's guilt. Id. at 1018 (citing Driscoll, 71 F.3d at 711). When probed at the evidentiary hearing about his alleged failure to impeach Christofferson with her cooperation agreement and prior inconsistent statements, Cohn could not even recall his cross-examination of Christofferson, let alone any strategic reasons for his actions during it. Still, Cohn admitted that, if faced with the same scenario in the futurei.e., an adversarial witness testifying under a cooperation agreement and having previously made statements grossly inconsistent with those offered at trialhe undoubtedly would have impeached the witness on both aspects of her testimony. Regarding the cooperation agreement, the government correctly noted that it questioned Christofferson at trial about her cooperation agreement and introduced the agreement into evidence. Moreover, although Orr contends in his brief that Cohn failed to ask ... Christofferson even one question about the agreement, the trial transcript reflects otherwise. Indeed, the record reveals that Cohn elicited Christofferson's admission on cross examination that she was testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement and in hopes of receiving a reduced sentence. Accordingly, the record clearly belies Orr's argument that Cohn erred by failing to impeach Christofferson with evidence of her cooperation agreement with the government. Additionally, concerning Cohn's failure to impeach Christofferson with the inconsistent statements that she made in her proffer interview, the government also notes that Cohn vigorously cross examined Christofferson on her history of mental health problems. Still, given Cohn's failure to impeach Christofferson's veracity on this critical aspect of her testimony, coupled with his inability to articulate a strategic reason for such failure, Cohn's representation likely fell below the threshold of reasonable professional competence required by Strickland. See Steinkuehler, 176 F.3d at 445 (finding ineffective assistance for defense counsel's failure to impeach especially critical testimony, and rejecting the state's argument that such failure was attributable to strategy, citing that trial counsel could not recall why he did not pursue this area, and only speculated as to what he may have been thinking). Cohn may have eroded Christofferson's credibility in the jury's eyes by impeaching Christofferson with her grossly-inconsistent prior statements. Nonetheless, Orr again fails to show the requisite prejudice: namely, that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's failure to impeach, the jury would have had reasonable doubt of Orr's guilt. Whitfield, 324 F.3d at 1018 (citing Driscoll, 71 F.3d at 711). Indeed, `it is very difficult to show the trial outcome would have been different had specific questions been asked on cross examination,' particularly where other trial testimony repeatedly corroborated the [challenged] testimony. United States v. Watkins, 486 F.3d 458, 466 (8th Cir.2007), vacated on other grounds, 552 U.S. 1091, 128 S.Ct. 906, 169 L.Ed.2d 719 (2008). Here, the evidence corroborating Pfaltzgraff's testimony concerning Orr's extensive narcotics distribution was overwhelming. In addition to Christofferson's unimpeached testimony, the jury heard testimony from law enforcement regarding its many controlled buys from Orr, as well as the testimony of Bailey and Dickerson, the two confidential informants who participated in these controlled buys and also purchased crack from Orr prior to aiding law enforcement. This testimony, coupled with the drugs and drug paraphernalia seized at the Washington Street house and linked to Orr, rendered Christofferson's testimony merely cumulative. Orr attempts to square his case with Driscoll, where we found a defense counsel's failure to adequately cross examine or impeach a witness to be constitutionally ineffective. Nevertheless, Driscoll is inapposite to Orr's case. In Driscoll a case involving the murder of a prison guard during a jailhouse riotwe found ineffective assistance where defense counsel failed to impeach the state's key eyewitness, the defendant's cellmate, with his prior inconsistent statements. 71 F.3d at 710. The cellmate initially told investigators that the defendant, upon returning to the cell after the riot, merely commented that the guard had been stuck, but the cellmate later testified at trial that the defendant had exclaimed, Did I take him out, JoJo, or did I take him out. 71 F.3d at 710. Faced with these facts, as well as little other evidence directly implicating the defendant, we found no objectively reasonable basis on which competent defense counsel could justify a decision not to impeach a state's eyewitness whose testimony, as the district court points out, took on such remarkable detail and clarity over time. Id. Driscoll is easily distinguishable from Orr's case because of the extensive corroborating evidence from other sources establishing Orr's drug distribution. Thus, there is not a reasonable probability that Cohn's impeachment of Christofferson would have manufactured reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find ineffective assistance.