Opinion ID: 1791789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: To rebut evidence of motive.

Text: Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that the evidence was admissible to rebut Appellant's denial that his motive in photographing A.B. in the nude was to satisfy his interest in [A.B.'s] sex. Assuming that the rebuttal evidence was offered to prove that Appellant's motive in taking the photograph was to satisfy his own homosexual voyeurism, evidence of other bad acts was admissible under KRE 404(b)(1) only if it satisfied the three-part test of Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 882 (1994), viz: (1) Is the evidence relevant? (2) Does it have probative value? (3) Is its probative value substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect? Id. at 889-91.
A factor bearing on the relevancy of evidence to prove motive depends on whether the issue of motive is in actual dispute. Lawson, supra note 15, § 2.25[3][b], at 127. Appellant admitted taking the photograph and admitted that he took it to satisfy a prurient interest  but not his own prurient interest. Whose prurient interest was to be satisfied was largely irrelevant to whether the photograph was lewd or obscene. Thus, the relevancy of the evidence was weak, at best. In fact, it more strongly tended to prove only a propensity, a purpose which we condemned in Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (1985) (Contrary to the language in Russell v. Com., 482 S.W.2d 584 (Ky.1972), ... no evidence is admissible to show `lustful inclination.').
This aspect of the Bell test relates to whether there is sufficient evidence that the other crime, wrong, or act actually occurred. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890; Lawson, supra note 15, § 2.25[3][c], at 130-31. The testimonies of J.W., R.S., K.F. and M.M. satisfied this aspect of the test.
Even if evidence is relevant and probative, it should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and confusion of issues. KRE 403. If protection against propensity evidence is to be meaningful, courts must limit the use of the motive exception to situations where motive is pertinent to the issues of the case and where the other crimes evidence shows a motive to commit the charged offense and not just some offense ... [B]ecause proving motive by other acts may inject serious risks of prejudice ... considerable caution is needed. In the end, other acts that bring such risk should not be admitted to prove motive where the connection with such elements in the case ... is too attenuated, where such elements are abundantly established by other evidence ..., or where they are not seriously contested. Need is greatest and relevance is clearest when the defense is denial of the criminal act.... Lawson, supra note 15, § 2.25[5], at 146 (quoting Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 110). As noted, evidence of Appellant's other bad acts of homosexual voyeurism was not crucial to the Commonwealth's case because Appellant admitted that he had a prurient motive in taking the photograph of A.B. Further, the acts testified to by J.W., M.M., K.F., and R.S. occurred approximately twenty years prior to the charged offense, thus further reducing their probative weight. Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 944 (1999). On the other hand, the prejudicial effect of this evidence was devastating. It identified Appellant as a long-practicing serial homosexual predator. The only purpose of this evidence was to encourage the jury to convict Appellant because of what he was, rather than what he did on the occasion of the charged offense. A trial court's decision with respect to the KRE 403 balancing test is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 105 S.W.3d 430, 438 (2003); English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. Here, however, the trial judge did not purport to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect but only ruled that the evidence was admissible because Appellant had opened the door. We are not required to defer to discretion that was never exercised. Cf. Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 144-45 (8th Cir.1973) (deference not required where trial court did not exercise discretion in imposing sentence). We conclude that the probative value of the rebuttal evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect and should have been excluded. Accordingly, we reverse Appellant's conviction and the sentence imposed therefor and remand this case to the Fleming Circuit Court for a new trial in accordance with this opinion. LAMBERT, C.J.; JOHNSTONE, KELLER, and STUMBO, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion, with GRAVES, J., joining that opinion.