Opinion ID: 161306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Violation Pepper Spray

Text: 27 We next consider Mr. DeSpain's Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Tommy Bustos stemming from an occasion in which Officer Bustos sprayed capstun, or pepper spray, indiscriminately along the prison tier. The district court applied the Farmer conditions of confinement test to this claim and granted summary judgment to Officer Bustos, reasoning that Mr. DeSpain failed to state a claim upon which relief might be granted because pepper spray is generally of limited intrusiveness and does not present a substantial risk of serious harm. Rec., vol. III, doc. 134, at 7-8. Considering Farmer's subjective component, the district court further concluded that Mr. DeSpain failed to show . . . that Officer Bustos knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of harm. Id. at 8. After reviewing the record on the pepper spray claim and applying what we believe to be the correct legal standard, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. 28 The facts surrounding the pepper spray incident are largely undisputed. While walking along the tier in which Mr. DeSpain was housed, Officer Tommy Bustos held his can of pepper spray behind his back and discharged it for about seven seconds into the tier at large. After exposure to the spray, Mr. DeSpain suffered burning skin and lungs with congested breathing and tearing eyes. Id., doc. 112, 63. He washed his eyes and skin with water in his cell, id. 71, and he requested oxygen from a nurse brought in to administer medical treatment but was refused, id. 73. There is only one disputed material issue whether Officer Bustos sprayed the tier accidentally or deliberately. Mr. DeSpain relates that after the incident, Officer Bustos said he had discharged the pepper spray as an act of humor. Id. 78. He was allegedly seen laughing after the incident. Id. 65. For the purposes of summary judgment, we will accept the allegation that the act was done deliberately as a practical joke. 29 The legal analysis for this claim does not fall neatly into any one category of Eighth Amendment cases. The claim presents a mirror image of the flooding analysis: while it may be tempting to apply the Farmer test for conditions of confinement as the district court did, we are convinced it is more appropriate to apply the Whitley standard for excessive use of force. On one hand, Farmer could be applicable because, by spraying pepper spray into the air of the tier, Officer Bustos created a general condition that affected the environment surrounding the tier's occupants. The conditions analysis also seems appropriate because there was no need for Officer Bustos to weigh competing safety concerns or to restore order in the face of a disturbance. However, pepper spray is an instrument with which prison officers wield their authority, or force, and thus its use implicates the excessive use of force. Just as the Whitley standard for excessive use of force is inappropriate for analyzing conditions cases, 'application of the deliberate indifference standard is inappropriate' in one class of prison cases: when 'officials stand accused of using excessive physical force.' Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The fact that there was no disturbance under these circumstances determines not which standard should apply, but whether the use of force was justified. Accordingly, we apply the Whitley standard and ask whether Officer Bustos acted in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. 30 Assuming Officer Bustos discharged the spray as a practical joke, this test is easily met. [I]t is necessary for us to balance the need for application of force with the amount of force used. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1440 (10th Cir. 1996). Accepting Mr. DeSpain's allegations as true in this case, Officer Bustos' act of spraying the tier indiscriminately with pepper spray was not a good faith effort to maintain or restore order in the tier. It was not warranted at all. Where no legitimate penological purpose can be inferred from a prison employee's alleged conduct . . ., the conduct itself constitutes sufficient evidence that force was used 'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' Giron v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley, 475 US. at 320-21). We will not require inmates to be subjected to the malicious whims of prison guards. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.). 31 Mr. DeSpain does not allege any significant physical harm from exposure to the pepper spray. We note that, in general, [d]e minimis applications of force are necessarily excluded from the cruel and unusual punishment inquiry. Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1992). Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the ultimate constitutional inquiry is directed at whether an 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' has occurred, Northington, 973 F.2d at 1523. If so, there is no need for a plaintiff to allege significant and lasting injuries. Id.; see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Mr. DeSpain alleges that he suffered burning eyes and lung congestion as a result of the pepper spray and ongoing anxiety thereafter, enough to withstand the test for excessive use of force. Consequently, the district court erred in holding that Mr. DeSpain failed to state a constitutional claim against Officer Bustos.