Opinion ID: 2588352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zeran

Text: Kenneth Zeran was bombarded with angry and derogatory telephone calls, including death threats, after an unidentified person posted a message on an America Online, Inc. (AOL) bulletin board. The message advertised t-shirts with offensive slogans referring to the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, and instructed prospective purchasers to call Zeran's home telephone number. Zeran notified AOL of the problem, and the posting was eventually removed. However, similar postings appeared, and an Oklahoma radio announcer aired the contents of the first message. Zeran was again inundated with threatening phone calls. He sued AOL for unreasonable delay in removing the defamatory messages, refusing to post retractions, and failing to screen for similar postings. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 328-329.) AOL successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings, relying on section 230. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 329-330.) The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plain language of section 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter contentare barred. ( Zeran, at p. 330.) Referring to the congressional finding that the Internet has flourished with a minimum of government regulation (§ 230(a)(4)), and the policy statement favoring a free market for interactive computer services unfettered by Federal or State regulation (§ 230(b)(2)), the Zeran court reasoned that Congress viewed [t]he imposition of tort liability on service providers for the communications of others as simply another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330.) While original posters of defamatory speech do not escape accountability, Congress made a policy choice ... not to deter harmful online speech [by] imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages. ( Id. at pp. 330-331.) This policy reflects a concern that if service providers faced tort liability for republished messages on the Internet, they might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted. ( Id. at p. 331.) The court noted that another important purpose of section 230 was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.) The legislative history indicates that section 230 was enacted in response to an unreported New York trial court case. ( Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995) 1995 WL 323710, 23 Media L.Rep. 1794 ( Stratton Oakmont ).) [7] There, a service provider was held liable for defamatory comments posted on one of its bulletin boards, based on a finding that the provider had adopted the role of publisher by actively screening and editing postings. Fearing that the specter of liability would ... deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230's broad immunity, which forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.) Zeran made the same argument adopted by the Court of Appeal here: that Congress intended to distinguish between publishers and distributors, immunizing publishers but leaving distributors exposed to liability. At common law, primary publishers, such as book, newspaper, or magazine publishers, are liable for defamation on the same basis as authors. Book sellers, news vendors, or other distributors, however, may only be held liable if they knew or had reason to know of a publication's defamatory content. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331; Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed.1984) § 113, pp. 810-811; Rest.2d Torts, § 581, subd. (1), & corns, c, d, & e, pp. 232-234; see also Osmond v. EWAP, Inc. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 842, 852-854, 200 Cal.Rptr. 674.) [8] Zeran contended that because Congress mentioned only the term publisher in section 230, it intended to leave distributors unprotected. He claimed that once he gave AOL notice that it was posting defamatory statements on its bulletin board, AOL became liable as a distributor. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 331-332.) The Zeran court held that the publisher/distributor distinction makes no difference for purposes of section 230 immunity. Publication is a necessary element of all defamation claims, and includes every repetition and distribution of a defamatory statement. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 332, citing Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, pp. 799, 802, 803, and Rest.2d Torts, §§ 558, subd. (b) & 577.) Although distributors become liable only upon notice, they are nevertheless included in the larger publisher category. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 332.) Zeran simply attaches too much importance to the presence of the distinct notice element in distributor liability.... [O]nce a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a traditional publisher. The computer service provider must decide whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran seeks to impose liability on AOL for assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes liabilitythe publisher role. ( Id. at pp. 332-333.) Subjecting service providers to notice liability would defeat the dual purposes of section 230, by encouraging providers to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333.) A provider would be at risk for liability each time it received notice of a potentially defamatory statement in any Internet message, requiring an investigation of the circumstances, a legal judgment about the defamatory character of the information, and an editorial decision on whether to continue the publication. Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet context. ( Ibid. ) Similarly, notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own services. Any efforts by a service provider to investigate and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further possible lawsuits, service providers would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation. More generally, notice-based liability for interactive computer service providers would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future lawsuits. Whenever one was displeased with the speech of another party conducted over an interactive computer service, the offended party could simply `notify' the relevant service provider, claiming the information to be legally defamatory.... Because the probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we will not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333.) In support of his argument for notice-based liability, Zeran invoked the rule against abrogation of common law principles unless Congress speaks directly to the question. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 333-334; United States v. Texas (1993) 507 U.S. 529, 534, 113 S.Ct. 1631, 123 L.Ed.2d 245.) However, the court reasoned that Congress had spoken directly by employing the term publisher, and that preserving distributor liability would defeat the primary purposes of section 230. The policy of strictly construing statutes in derogation of the common law does not require a literal interpretation conflicting with the obvious legislative purpose. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 334, citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson (1952) 343 U.S. 779, 783, 72 S.Ct. 1011, 96 L.Ed. 1294.) The Zeran court's views have been broadly accepted, in both federal and state courts. [9] Before the Court of Appeal issued its opinion below, two other California Courts of Appeal had followed Zeran. In Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, a taxpayer sued after her son obtained sexually explicit photographs through an Internet connection at a public library. She sought injunctive relief on various theories of liability. ( Id. at pp. 690-691, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d 772.) The Kathleen R. court held that the state law causes of action were barred by section 230. ( Kathleen R., at p. 692, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) It cited Zeran for the rule that section 230(c)(1) immunizes both publisher[s] and distributor[s]. ( Kathleen R, at p. 695, fn. 3, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) It also agreed with the Zeran court's analysis of congressional intent. ( Id. at p. 697, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) In Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal. App.4th 816, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 703, the plaintiffs used eBays on-line marketing services to purchase sports memorabilia. Claiming the items bore forged autographs, they sued eBay for negligence, unfair trade practices, and violation of Civil Code section 1739.7, which regulates the sale of such collectibles. ( Gentry, at p. 820, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 703.) The Gentry court ruled that section 230 immunized eBay from liability on all the plaintiffs' claims. It noted the broad scope given to section 230 immunity by the Zeran court and others, and reasoned that the plaintiffs were trying to hold eBay responsible for disseminating information provided by the individual sellers who used its service. ( Gentry, at pp. 828-831, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 703.) Regarding the allegation that eBay knew or should have known about the sellers' illegal conduct but failed to prevent it by withdrawing or altering the fraudulent content, the Gentry court stated: This is the classic kind of claim that Zeran found to be preempted by section 230, ... one that seeks to hold eBay liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions. ( Id. at p. 835, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 703.)