Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Marlow's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment

Text: Both defendants challenge the propriety of the process by which Marlow, on cross-examination after his direct testimony in rebuttal to Coffman's testimony, as described below, invoked his privilege against self-incrimination some 44 times when questioned about the Orange County crimes. Respondent acknowledges error occurred, but argues neither defendant suffered any prejudice thereby. Marlow also contends that comment by the prosecutor and Coffman's counsel in their respective closing arguments concerning his failure to testify about the Orange County offenses violated his privilege against self-incrimination and the rule in Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229.
We first place these contentions in context. Before trial, the prosecutor informed the court and defendants that he would not seek to introduce evidence of the Orange County offenses against Lynell Murray. Accordingly, neither in his opening statement nor in his case-in-chief did he refer to or present evidence of those crimes. In Coffman's counsel's opening statement and Coffman's testimony, however, she informed the jury about the Orange County killing. The trial court instructed the jury that Coffman's testimony about the Orange County offenses was being admitted only to show Coffman's state of mind and was not to be considered as evidence against Marlow, either as reflecting on his character or as demonstrating a probability that he committed the San Bernardino County offenses. After Coffman rested, Marlow testified in rebuttal. Just before Marlow took the stand, his counsel sought a ruling precluding cross-examination on the Orange County crimes. The trial court declined to make a ruling at that time. During the course of Marlow's direct examination, his counsel asked him if he had intended to kill Novis. Marlow denied so intending. When his counsel asked him if Novis was still alive at the point when, after choking her, he laid her on the ground in the vineyard, Marlow replied: I know she was alive. I didn't want to kill her or anybody else.  (Italics added.) Just before the start of cross-examination, the court held an in limine hearing on the scope of the proposed cross-examination. The prosecutor argued that Marlow's response as quoted above opened the door to cross-examination on the Orange County homicide. Marlow's counsel contended his client's answer was nonresponsive and ambiguous as to what incident he was referring to and that he retained a privilege to refuse to answer questions relating to the Orange County homicide. The trial court noted that although defendants were currently on trial only for the charged offenses against Novis, Coffman's defense had raised the issue of her relationship with Marlow in an effort to show she acted only under duress and coercion; and Marlow, for his part, had testified to the contrary, namely, that he had not manipulated her, she had manipulated him. The Orange County crimes, the court believed, were highly relevant to the nature of defendants' relationship in connection with the murder of Novis. And, said the court, because Marlow had denied having the intent to kill anybody at any time, the People had the right to show the relationship in connection with this other murder in Orange County. Thereafter, Coffman's counsel cross-examined Marlow, asking him various questions about his actions in Orange County. Rather than answer, Marlow stated he was taking the Fifth on those questions. Finally, Coffman's counsel asked the court to direct Marlow to answer, stating, [W]e've had a ruling on that and this is an area I am seemingly entitled to probe. The court disagreed: The ruling is you could ask questions. I didn't rule on whether or not he could take the 5th Amendment. That issue was not raised. In further discussion outside the presence of the jury, Marlow's counsel clarified that [Marlow] is not testifying on my advice because he has not come to trial and will not come to trial in Orange County until these proceedings are concluded. The court stated: [I]n any event, the court has to honor his reliance upon his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify concerning the Orange County thing. [ļ] That was not gone into at all on his direct. [ļ] It is true that there are a lot of overlapping things, such as intent to kill, which flow from one case to the next that give the District Attorney a great interest in inquiring into the details of that case. [ļ] But there is no way you can force him to answer as against his reliance on the Fifth Amendment. The prosecutor responded: I know we can't force him to answer. You could instruct him to. I know it wouldn't do any good. We have no control over him, but you legally, as you know, can instruct him that he is required to answer. The court answered: Yes. I think in view of the fact that he does have a trial pending in Orange County and he has avoided that testimony on the stand here, justice requires that we honor his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court continued: [A]s a practical matter we all know that taking the Fifth Amendment in view of all the evidence that's come out in this case is a tacit admission to the jury that the worst is true. [ļ] And since nobody is trying to convict him of the Orange County case, why, we don't have the problems of the burden of proof. [ļ] So far as the information which the jury willâ whether we like it or not, consider his refusal to answer is one of the things which is in their heads. [ļ] They will be instructed very carefully not to consider that, but it'sâ . The prosecutor responded: I'm not sure taking the Fifth this way isn't something they shouldn't be able to consider. That's part of what I'm trying to make my point. [ļ] Procedurally, will the court at least permit me to force him to take the Fifth on these issues? The court acknowledged the prosecutor was entitled to get his answer. Before the jury, the prosecutor asked a succession of questions to which Marlow responded with an assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. After the 27th such assertion, the court interjected: I'd better clarify the record on that, counsel. Mr. Marlow, when you say I have to take the Fifth on that, are you intending to say that you refuse to answer the question on the ground that the answer may tend to incriminate you? Marlow responded in the affirmative. The court then told the jury: The record may show that when the defendant refers to taking the Fifth, he is in effect stating that he refuses to answer the question on the ground that the answer may tend to incriminate him. [ļ] On that basis, he does not have to answer the question. The court also informed the jury that the questions as to which Marlow asserted a privilege were not themselves evidence and were not to be considered as such. The court later instructed jurors with CALJIC No. 2.25, directing them to draw no adverse inference from Marlow's invocation of the privilege.
Marlow contends the trial court erred in permitting any cross-examination concerning the Orange County offenses because no evidence had been admitted against him, and he had not testified, concerning that incident. Marlow further contends that once the trial court ruled his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination regarding the Orange County crimes was proper, it erred in requiring him to assert the privilege in front of the jury and informing the jury that he did so each time because the answer would tend to incriminate him. (See People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440-442, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Finally, the instruction advising the jury to draw no adverse inference from Marlow's invocation of the privilege did not, he contends, eliminate the prejudice stemming from these circumstances. Respondent contends Marlow waived his Fifth Amendment privilege as to the Orange County crimes by testifying, on direct examination, that he did not want to kill anybody, inferentially including Lynell Murray, and that he therefore actually no longer had a privilege to assert before the jury. Consequently, respondent urges, Marlow received the benefit of an instruction (CALJIC No. 2.25, telling the jury to draw no adverse inference from the assertion of the privilege) to which he was not entitled. Moreover, respondent points out, the jury was instructed regarding the limited purpose of evidence of the Orange County murder, an offense for which he was not on trial in the present proceeding. We conclude that Marlow's direct examination response denying he ever wanted to kill Novis or anybody else did open the door to questioning regarding the Orange County murder, and the trial court abused its discretion in implicitly ruling to the contrary. A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of the scope of relevant cross-examination. [Citations.] `It matters not that the defendant's answer on cross-examination might tend to establish his guilt of a collateral offense for which he could still be prosecuted.' ( People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 760-761, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, and abrogated on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 234, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512; Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231, 236, fn. 3, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86.) None of [the] fundamental principles [underlying the rule precluding the prosecution from cross-examining a testifying defendant beyond the scope of direct examination, upon the case generally] . . . imply that when a defendant voluntarily testifies in his own defense the People may not fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence through cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may necessarily be drawn from them. ( People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 770, 80 Cal.Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841; see also United States v. Hearst (9th Cir.1977) 563 F.2d 1331, 1340-1341.) In the context of the trial, following Coffman's testimony that Marlow killed Murray, Marlow's testimony denying he wanted to kill anybody reasonably would have been understood as referring to Murray, and it would have been unfair not to permit Coffman and the prosecutor to amplify it. Cross-examination of Marlow concerning the events in Orange County, we conclude, thus was relevant and proper, and his purported assertion of the privilege was ineffective. [19] From this conclusion it follows that the trial court did not commit Griffin error (see Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229) in explaining to the jury the meaning of Marlow's purported assertions of the privilege. The trial court should not then have instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.25, or perhaps, on request, should have stricken Marlow's direct testimony regarding his lack of desire to kill anybody. Nevertheless, we see no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of these irregularities, for Marlow was not charged in this proceeding with the Orange County offenses, and we presume the jury followed the instruction to draw no adverse inferences from his assertion of the privilege. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) [20] Marlow further contends that both the prosecutor and Coffman's counsel violated his right against self-incrimination by commenting, in their respective summations, on his failure to testify about the Orange County homicide. ( Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 157, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781 [ Griffin rule applies to comment by codefendant as well as prosecutor].) Specifically, the prosecutor commented: Now the abduction out of that cleanersâ and we have only heard Miss Coffman's version of itâ is that they are starting to be a good team. Coffman's counsel stated: When you compare what Miss Coffman did, and starting at the beginning and recounting and answering questions, to what Mr. Marlow did, including picking and choosing what he wanted to talk about, I think that the differences are very extreme. [ļ] And I offer that as a suggestion to you. [ļ] I do not want to suggest that by exercising his right under the Fifth Amendment, that for that reason, you should disregard Mr. Marlow's testimony, because instruction 2.25 indicates that a person has a right to rely on that. Finally, in his penalty phase closing argument, Coffman's counsel stated: Greg Marlow never told the police anything about Lynell Murray. And he took the Fifth Amendment, as I remember, here in court when he was asked about what occurred in Orange County. Marlow forfeited any appellate challenge to the foregoing comments by failing to make a contemporaneous objection at trial or to ask that the jury be appropriately admonished. ( People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 873-874, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) As he contends counsel's failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance, we turn to the merits of the claim. Because Marlow's direct testimony that he did not want to kill anybody opened the door to cross-examination concerning the Orange County offenses, as discussed above, the Fifth Amendment no longer shielded him from cross-examination thereon, and both the prosecutor and his codefendant's counsel were free to comment on his silence or failure to explain the evidence. (See Jenkins v. Anderson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 236, 100 S.Ct. 2124; People v. Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 770-771, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841; Pen.Code, § 1127; Evid.Code, § 413.) Moreover, the remarks by Coffman's counsel seem aimed not at implying that Marlow's failure to testify concerning Orange County signaled his guilt, but rather at suggesting Coffman's credibility was comparatively strong because she took the stand and submitted to cross-examination. In any event, brief and mild references to a defendant's failure to testify, unaccompanied by any suggestion that the jury should draw an inference of guilt from it, are, like the comments Marlow cites, generally held to be harmless. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) We see no reason to reach a different conclusion here.
Coffman contends the prosecutor's cross-examination causing Marlow to invoke, in front of the jury, his privilege against self-incrimination regarding the Orange County crimes, and the prosecutor's closing argument urging the jury to find both defendants guilty on the basis of Marlow's testimony, improperly invited the jury to infer her guilt and thus deprived her of state and federal constitutional rights, including those to confrontation, due process and a fair trial. Coffman's argument is curious, for absent her testimony about the events in Orange County, the Murray homicide would not have been mentioned in the guilt phase of this trial; Marlow then never would have had occasion to assert his privilege in this connection, as he did, moreover, 11 times in response to cross-examination by Coffman's counsel, in addition to numerous instances during cross-examination by the prosecutor. In any event, we conclude any error in Marlow's cross-examination was harmless as to Coffman; the jury was instructed, whether or not appropriately, with CALJIC No. 2.25, and instructed that questions themselves are not evidence. Presumably, therefore, the jury did not infer that Marlow was effectively admitting every incriminatory fact about which her counsel and the prosecutor asked him. We further conclude the portion of the prosecutor's closing argument that Coffman contends was Griffin error [21] (see Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 154, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781) is reasonably understood not as a request to infer that Coffman was guilty because Marlow had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, but as fair comment on the evidence as it related to Coffman.