Opinion ID: 2773017
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Instruction on Entrapment Defense

Text: González claims that he was entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment. He argues that there was enough evidence in the record to find both that the government induced him to commit the crimes by forceful solicitation and dogged insistence, and that he otherwise lacked the predisposition to do so. Because González preserved his objection below, we review the district court's refusal to give an entrapment instruction de novo. United States v. Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012). In so doing, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to González. Id. at 10. -8- The defense of entrapment has two elements: (1) government inducement of the criminal conduct; and (2) an absence of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct. Díaz-Castro, 752 F.3d at 109; United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1992). Inducement requires not only giving the defendant the opportunity to commit the crime but also a plus factor of government overreaching. United States v. Guevara, 706 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of government conduct that may satisfy this plus factor include excessive pressure, such as the use of intimidation, threats, or 'dogged insistence,' [and] 'taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of motive.' Id. (citations omitted). Operations which merely give a defendant an opportunity to commit a crime, including sting operations, ordinarily do not constitute entrapment. Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d at 9. In order to be entitled to an instruction on entrapment, the record must show some hard evidence of both government inducement and the defendant's lack of predisposition. Id. This evidence must be more than uncorroborated self-serving assertions. United States v. Shinderman, M.D., 515 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 2008). In assessing the sufficiency of this evidence, the district court may not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations or resolve conflicts in the evidence. Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d at 10. -9- Rather, it must determine whether the evidence is enough, if believed by a rational juror, to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of his own accord. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d at 259.6 González claims that the government improperly induced him to commit the charged crimes because Cotto was a friend of his, knew of González's difficult financial situation, and called González several times, first asking to buy drugs from him, and then to offer him the armed security job. None of these circumstances amount to improper government inducement. First, González cites no evidence indicating that Cotto solicited his participation by appealing directly to their friendship. United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting the proposition that friendship, without a plea predicated upon friendship, suffices legally as inducement (quoting United States v. Young, 78 F.3d 758, 761 (1st Cir. 1996))). Second, González cites no evidence indicating that his financial situation was such that he was at a particularly 6 We recently stated in Díaz-Maldonado that the entrapment defense is a difficult defense to raise and prevail on. 727 F.3d at 139. There, we affirmed the district court's refusal to charge the jury on entrapment and we noted that [i]n twenty-two prior appeals to this circuit challenging a trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction on entrapment, we have overruled the refusal only three times. Id. at 139-140. Subsequently, in Díaz-Castro, we once again affirmed the district court's refusal to give an instruction on entrapment. 752 F.3d 101. -10- vulnerable point in his life. All the record shows is that González had various part-time jobs, the last one ending the week preceding his first transaction, that he was receiving unemployment benefits, and that he thought that the high payment offered by Cotto would help him solve his financial situation. This is not enough to constitute inducement. See United States v. Díaz-Díaz, 433 F.3d 128, 136 (1st Cir. 2005) (The promise of financial gain, however, even if significant, is insufficient to demonstrate government inducement.); Baltas, 236 F.3d at 37 (holding that merely presenting defendant with a plan to alleviate a strangling financial situation does not constitute inducement). Third, González's bare assertion that Cotto called him several times and González declined previous invitations to commit offenses does not amount to inducement. In analyzing whether there was improper inducement, the method of purportedly inducing a defendant is more important than the number of solicitations. Accordingly, we have held that having an enthusiastic and persistent buyer does not amount to improper government inducement. United States v. Teleguz, 492 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2007) ([M]erely giving a defendant an opportunity to commit a crime when the government puts forth an enthusiastic and persistent buyer of illicit goods cannot be improper inducement.); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 989 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's contention that he was entitled to a jury instruction regarding -11- entrapment given evidence of multiple phone calls from the government agent, even coupled with defendant's failure to return phone calls and appear at scheduled meetings). Here, there was no arm-twisting or undue coercive method employed. Although González claims that there was some resistance on his part before the first drug transaction and that it took several calls before all details were ironed out, the record shows that González's resistance had nothing to do with the idea of providing protection for the transaction,7 but rather with the requirement of taking a firearm with him and of recruiting someone else to also provide armed security. The several telephone calls were made to straighten out the details, not to convince him to do the job. See United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641, 646 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant's claim that he was targeted because he proved ready enough to enter into talks and [h]is only resistance was not to the idea of the crime, but rather to the risks and the terms). In fact, González seemed so eager to avail himself of the opportunities to commit the crimes that he repeatedly told Eddie that he was very grateful and at his service, and exclaimed Oh wow! That's awesome, dude, upon learning of an additional opportunity to provide armed security. 7 The first time that Cotto offered him a job providing armed security, González said that he would be happy to participate if Cotto would not take [him] for a fool and would actually pay him. -12- Moreover, additional evidence on the record undercuts González's claim of improper government inducement. The evidence showed that he associated with people connected to the drug world,8 he never reported any alleged threat, he participated in fifteen separate transactions, and the videos of these transactions show that he d[id]n't look anything like a person who's being entrapped. See United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 243 (1st Cir. 2003) (emphasizing these same circumstances as indicators that there was no government inducement). In fact, he seemed so comfortable around Eddie, the drug dealer, that he drank beer with him, hugged him, and even invited his family and close friends, including his brother, sister-in-law, and his neighbor, to participate in the drug transactions. He also was comfortable enough to make demands from Cotto and even reproached Cotto for not answering his telephone call when González had been calling him all day to ask him whether there was more work. Although González would have us consider only the evidence proffered by him, to the exclusion of other evidence in the case, when we assess the sufficiency of the evidence for an instruction on entrapment, we must consider all the evidence on record. Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to González, no reasonable juror could conclude that he was improperly 8 According to the evidence on record, while working as a police officer, González let a drug trafficker, who would potentially face drug and firearm charges, walk away in exchange for money. -13- induced by the government. Because we conclude that González did not carry his entry-level burden as to improper government inducement, the district court's refusal to charge the jury on entrapment was justified and we need not dwell on the evidence of predisposition. United States v. Ramos-Paulino, 488 F.3d 459, 462 n.1 (1st Cir. 2007) (Given the disjunctive nature of the [entrapment] test, we can fulfill our appellate function . . . on either inducement or predisposition. (alteration in original) (quoting Capelton, 350 F.3d at 242-43)).