Opinion ID: 878517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Unpaid Bills

Text: In another attack on final argument, counsel for Dr. Alvord referred to the fact that the funeral bill for Annabelle Kuhnke had not been paid. He stated: The only thing you want to keep in mind in this case then I'm going to pass on from damages, is that here we've got somebody who comes into our community and wants us, ladies and gentlemen of this jury, to assess a large verdict against these defendants here and he's been in this community before and he was here in May of 1978 and his wife was hospitalized and unfortunately, certainly she died, but what is the status of the funeral balance? MR. LUVERA: I object as highly prejudicial, irrelevant, a comment by counsel on it. I really would like to be heard on that. I think that it's so  THE COURT: I'm not going to interfere I have great confidence in that jury. MR. LUVERA: Very well. THE COURT: Listen to this argument. MR. WELLCOME: All right. My recollection and you trust your own, is that Mr. Kuhnke on the witness stand was asked `Was the funeral bill paid?' And he said, `No, Sir.' That's my only point. It was completely irrelevant to the cause of action being tried that the funeral bill was not paid at the time of trial, for here the implication is strong that the plaintiff was a deadbeat. We need cite no authority that when a person is injured or has suffered death through the wrongful death of another, the incurrence of the medical bills and the funeral costs, without more, is sufficient to establish a basis for the recovery of damages. In an action for the wrongful death of an adult, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just, section 27-1-323, MCA. The only limitation is that damages must in all cases be reasonable, for no more than reasonable damages can be recovered, section 27-1-302, MCA. No statute, and no case law, requires the payment of medical bills before payment can be recovered in a wrongful death cause. In answering the issue of improper argument, defendants' counsel have presented argument that the trial court is in the best position to judge the prejudice to the jury from the statements; that the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict must be upheld unless its discretion was abused; that there is substantial evidence to support the defendants' verdict; that great latitude is allowed in oral argument; that the court's instruction that the statements of counsel to the jurors was not to be considered as evidence and could be disregarded should be accorded value; and one of counsel suggests that if a new trial be granted it should be as to Dr. Alvord only. In Brothers v. Town of Virginia City (1976), 171 Mont. 352, 558 P.2d 464, we held that where there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, the District Court's refusal to grant a new trial would not be disturbed. That decision, however, is applicable when the ruling of the District Court is based on whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict, and no other element affects the jury verdict. If the jury had returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case, we should be constrained on review of the record to hold that there was substantial evidence in favor of the plaintiff. What controls is that in this case, where there was conflicting but substantial evidence on both sides of the issue, and where it appears that one of the parties was prevented from receiving a fair trial by improper argument in summation, the question of whether substantial evidence supports the jury verdict in spite of the oral argument does not arise. The acid of the improper argument may have eaten away the substantial evidence presented by the plaintiff and left only prejudice against him. When a party's right to a fair trial has been materially impaired by improper jury argument, the fact of the imperfect trial transcends the substantial but conflicting evidence that supports the jury verdict. The District Court's rulings as to the conduct of counsel in this cause, including the denial of new trial, are to weighed against his obvious concern about what was happening in his courtroom: THE COURT: I have been terribly disturbed about Mr. Wellcome's conduct in this case from the very start. Mr. Wellcome does not heed the court's rulings, he's had me shouting at him during the period of time of court. His  I don't know what I would characterize his final argument as counsel for the plaintiff but he went as far as he could and I understand his concern and I understand his client's concern but that there was a threat in that where he stated to the jury that Dr. Alvord has been here all the time and his wife has been here all the time and his  they will be here when the verdict is given, concerned me and the  you will destroy the integrity and the feeling and the practice of medical professions, all disturbs me but I don't think that anything will be added to the justice of this situation by my instructing the jury and I'm not going to do it. The court made that statement in deciding not to further instruct the jury about the improper argument. Counsel for Dr. Fisher point out that Rule 59(a), M.R.Civ.P., gives the court the option to grant a new trial to all or any of the parties, and suggest that under Irwin v. Marvel Petroleum Corporation (1961), 139 Mont. 413, 424, 365 P.2d 221, 226, we grant a new trial to one of the defendants, and affirm the judgment in favor of the other defendants. It is impossible in this case to separate the defendants in considering the effect of the prejudice created by the argument of one of counsel for one of the defendants. We have not set forth in detail the facts in this case upon which plaintiff claims the death of Annabelle was the result of the wrongful acts of the professionals here. It is enough to say that the evidence presented by the plaintiff included professional testimony which cast blame upon one or all of the defendants. In like manner, the defendants presented professional testimony and in some instances, their witnesses blamed one or other of the remaining defendants. It may have been possible in this case, if the cause had been fairly tried, that one or more of the defendants would have received a defendant's verdict, and depending upon the weight and credibility given to the testimony by the jury, such jury action would be sustained. There is no way now to measure how the prejudicial argument may have affected not only Dr. Alvord, but each of the remaining defendants. The only way to be sure which, if any, of the defendants should be exonerated or whether plaintiff should recover at all is to grant a new trial.