Opinion ID: 552750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunized Testimony Before the Grand Jury

Text: 22 The IC renews its argument that presentation of immunized testimony to the grand jury is permissible and that no inquiry into whether the grand jury considered evidence based upon North's congressional testimony is therefore appropriate. The IC cites a long line of cases from both the Supreme Court and this court as having decided that a defendant who has been compelled to incriminate himself is entitled only to have that evidence suppressed at trial and not to have it excluded from consideration by the grand jury. Pet. for Reh'g at 10 & n. 9. But the IC fails to note that we have previously held that the grand jury may not consider immunized testimony or evidence derived from it. See Rinaldi, 808 F.2d at 1582-83. We therefore adhere to our original disposition; however, because neither our original opinion nor our opinion in Rinaldi discussed the line of authority now relied upon by the IC, we offer the following additional thoughts. 23 Under the IC's view, these cases stand for the proposition that a prosecutor could, consistent with Kastigar, read compelled testimony verbatim to the grand jury. All of the cases the IC cites, however, involve the presentation to the grand jury of evidence previously obtained in violation of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination; 8 none involves grand jury consideration of testimony obtained from the defendant through a grant of immunity. The IC thus continues to miss the fundamental distinction between the presentation to the grand jury of evidence that has previously been unconstitutionally obtained and that of constitutionally-obtained evidence whose exposure to the grand jury amounts to a constitutional violation in and of itself. 24 As we recently recognized, [g]rand jury inquiries grounded on information obtained in violation of a constitutional provision do not themselves work an additional wrong; they 'are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful [action].'  In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354, 94 S.Ct. 613, 623, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). And [w]hether such derivative use of illegally obtained evidence by a grand jury should be proscribed presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354, 94 S.Ct. at 623. By contrast, the grand jury and the grand jury process may never itself violate a valid privilege; such action presents a question not of remedies but of rights. Id. at 346, 94 S.Ct. at 619 (Although ... an indictment based on evidence obtained in violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege is nevertheless valid [citation omitted], the grand jury may not force a witness to answer questions in violation of that constitutional guarantee.). 25 We believe--as do five of our sister circuits, see Maj.Op. at 869-870--that grand jury consideration of evidence already unconstitutionally compelled and grand jury consideration of immunized testimony fall on different sides of this fence. In the former context, such as where Miranda warnings are not given, the constitutional violation occurs independent of the grand jury. Whether the resulting confession can be used derivatively by the grand jury or in subsequent proceedings is a matter of the reach of the exclusionary rule, which is a function not of any rights of the defendant but of a remedial balance factoring in the possible unreliability of the confession and the need to deter the government from future violations of Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-08, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290-93, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2630, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-47, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2364-65, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). The exclusionary rule is, of course, by no means talismanic--where the goals of trustworthiness and deterrence are not implicated, the confession may be used. For example, a confession obtained in violation of Miranda may (provided it is trustworthy) be used to impeach the defendant's contrary testimony at trial because sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). The cases cited by the IC thus reflect only the familiar proposition that, while evidence obtained previously in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege may not be used by the prosecution in its case in chief at trial, it may be used for other purposes, including grand jury proceedings. 26 In contrast, as the Supreme Court has recognized, use of immunized testimony is never justified by such balancing considerations. See Portash, 440 U.S. at 459, 99 S.Ct. at 1297. The prosecution obtains the immunized testimony legally, but only by promising that neither the testimony or information itself nor any information directly or indirectly derived from it will be used against [the defendant] in any criminal case. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002. And it is only this promise that compels the defendant to testify in spite of his constitutional privilege: immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.... [because i]t prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1661 (emphasis in original). When the prosecution reneges on this constitutionally-mandated bargain and presents the immunized testimony to the grand jury, the constitutional violation is part and parcel of the grand jury process. The presentation--use--of the testimony is precisely the proscribed act. The issue is thus not one of derivative use ... by the grand jury and of the exclusionary rule (indeed, any use of the testimony is per se excluded under the statute and Kastigar ). Rather, the situation is no different than if the grand jury had itself forced the defendant to give incriminating answers and any indictment based upon immunized evidence is no less tainted. 9