Opinion ID: 766486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying Krutikov's Conviction

Text: 36 Krutikov argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction of conspiracy. Specifically, he claims that there was no evidence of an agreement between him and any other conspirator. 37 Krutikov bears a very heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that led to his conviction. See United States v. Keats, 937 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1991). In considering any such challenge, we view all proof in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor. Id. We must uphold a conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)(emphasis in original). 38 An essential element of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). We have taken a bilateral approach to the crime of conspiracy. See United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1122 n.3 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1984). In other words, [u]nless at least two people [agree], no one does. When one of two persons merely pretends to agree, the other party, whatever he may believe, is in fact not conspiring with anyone. United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). 39 There is substantial evidence in the instant case that Krutikov intended to be involved in the murder-for-hire plot. He knew the plot existed, he told Vayzer that he would carry out the murder in exchange for money, he knew of the existence and intermediary role of Sadoulaev, and he drove Vayzer to Paterson to meet with Sadoulaev and collect the advance payment. Krutikov correctly argues, however, that he could not reasonably have been found to have conspired with Vayzer. While it is clear that Krutikov's agreement with Vayzer to travel to Paterson was a step toward committing the murder for hire, that agreement was not an agreement with a co-conspirator, because the government does not claim that Vayzer was a conspirator at any time. Indeed, the government's arguments on appeal all assume that Vayzer was not a conspirator. Moreover, in a statement underscoring the government's theory of its case, the District Court explicitly instructed the jury that the government has not charged that David Vayzer is a conspirator. However, one conspirator can conspire with other conspirators, even though their identities are unknown to him and he can do so through an intermediary who is not himself a conspirator. 40 Because the government effectively conceded that Vayzer was not a conspirator at any time, and the District Court instructed the jury accordingly, we agree that Krutikov could not properly have been found guilty of conspiracy for agreeing with Vayzer alone. See Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d at 38. Nevertheless, Krutikov reasonably could have been found guilty of conspiracy on the theory that he agreed with the actual conspirators through Vayzer. A person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names are unknown. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951); United States v. Cepeda, 768 F.2d 1515, 1516 (2d Cir. 1985) (conspirators can agree without being aware of one another's identity). Moreover, parties can conspire through a non-conspiring intermediary, even a government informant. United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994). However, while it is true that parties may agree-i.e., may conspire with each other-without being aware of one another's identity, the evidence must support an inference that, at a minimum, the accused conspirators knew there were other participants in the conspiracy. See id. at 45 (A defendant can conspire with individuals he has never met, so long as he participates and is aware of their assistance in the criminal venture. (emphasis added)); Cepeda, 768 F.2d at 1517 ([T]he evidence must support the existence of such unknown persons and their complicity.). 41 In United States v. Sanchez-Solis, 882 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1989), for example, a federal agent arranged with an individual, Luis Gonzalez, to buy a kilogram of cocaine. Gonzalez stated that the cocaine would be delivered in a blue car. A short time later, appellant Sanchez arrived in a blue car and delivered a package of cocaine to Gonzalez. Sanchez appealed his conviction, claiming that there was no evidence that he knew Gonzalez or knew that the package contained cocaine. We held that the government was not required to prove that Gonzalez and Sanchez conspired directly with each other. Id. at 696. Rather, it was enough that Sanchez knew someone would be waiting at a specified location to receive the package, even if he did not know the identity of the person. By delivering the cocaine, Sanchez implicitly acknowledged that he was aware of the participation of others in the scheme, even if he knew nothing of their identity. 42 Krutikov argues that there is no evidence in this case that the original conspirators-Bicaksiz, Kapaev and Sadoulaev-knew that someone other than Vayzer was willing to join the conspiracy. Vayzer communicated only with Sadoulaev, and he (Vayzer) never told Sadoulaev that he had recruited another person to kill Esen. Nor did Vayzer ever hint to Sadoulaev, his intermediary, that there might be another person involved. On the contrary, Vayzer made clear to Sadoulaev that he did not wish to involve anyone else. In addition, Sadoulaev never indicated, implicitly or explicitly, any willingness to have others participate in the conspiracy. Because there is no evidence in this record to suggest that Sadoulaev knew or acknowledged the existence of anyone other than Vayzer as the potential hitman, Krutikov argues, the requisite agreement between Krutikov and other conspirators is absent. 43 We disagree. We need not decide whether a Krutikov-Sadoulaev conspiracy is precluded by the latter's affirmative belief that Vayzer, and none other, would act as the hitman. Even if that were the case, it would be possible for Krutikov to have conspired with Bicaksiz 10 -who knew that someone was to be hired as a hitman but who knew nothing of the hitman's identity, and therefore, unlike Sadoulaev, had no reason to believe that the hitman would be Vayzer (or any other particular person). Thus, as in Sanchez-Solis, there is evidence in this case to support the inference that each of two individuals-here, Krutikov and Bicaksiz-was aware of the other's existence and participation in the scheme, even if they were not aware of each other's identity. At one end of the conspiracy was Bicaksiz, who knew that, at his behest, Sadoulaev would arrange for someone to kill Esen. 11 At the other end was Krutikov, who learned through Vayzer that an unnamed person or persons had offered to pay for the murder of Esen. In short, although Bicaksiz and Krutikov were unaware of each other's identity, there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to have reasonably found that each was aware of an unknown participant playing an assigned and understood role in furtherance of the criminal venture. Sadoulaev may have believed that Vayzer would carry out the killing himself, but his understanding does not alter the fact that both Bicaksiz and Krutikov were willing to participate-and did participate-in a scheme that each knew included other, unidentified persons who would take predictable steps in furtherance of the same illicit goal. 44 Because we find that the evidence supports the conclusion that both Bicaksiz and Krutikov knew of the existence of [ ] unknown persons and their complicity in the conspiracy, Cepeda, 768 F.2d at 1517, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence of the agreement to establish the crime of conspiracy.