Opinion ID: 1122988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: SPJ is a person aggrieved and has standing.

Text: The City argues that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of SPJ because whether the HPD actually denied SPJ's requests is a genuine issue of material fact. The City asserts that, rather than deny the request, Chief Nakamura informed SPJ that he would in fact comply if SPJ would either pay a fee, estimated at $20,000, or provide him with the names of individual employees whose names SPJ was seeking. SPJ, however, failed to follow Police Nakamura's simple instructions for obtaining [the requested] information from the HPD. Therefore, the City argues, because reasonable persons could reach different conclusions on the critical issue of whether SPJ's request was denied, summary judgment was inappropriate. Whether the City actually denied SPJ's request, however, as opposed to merely failing to grant it, is not a critical or material factual issue for the purpose of summary judgment on the purely legal issue of whether disclosure is required by the UIPA. What the City appears to be arguing is that SPJ lacked standing to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction, an issue that this court recognized, but did not need to reach, in Kaapu v. Aloha Tower Development Corp., 74 Haw. 365, 385 n. 16, 846 P.2d 882, 890 n. 16 (1993) (noting that this court has not had occasion to delineate the standing requirements to seek judicial enforcement of access to government records under the UIPA). HRS § 92F-15 (1993) governs judicial enforcement of the UIPA and provides that: (a) A person aggrieved by a denial of access to a government record may bring an action against the agency at any time within two years after the agency denial to compel disclosure. (b) In an action to compel disclosure the circuit court shall hear the matter de novo. Opinions and rulings of the office of information practices shall be admissible. The circuit court may examine the government record at issue, in camera, to assist in determining whether it, or any part of it, may be withheld. (c) The agency has the burden of proof to establish justification for nondisclosure. (d) If the complainant prevails in an action brought under this section, the court shall assess against the agency reasonable attorney's fees and all other expenses reasonably incurred in the litigation. (e) The circuit court in the judicial circuit in which the request for the record is made, where the requested record is maintained, or where the agency's headquarters are located shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under this section. (f) Except as to cases the circuit court considers of greater importance, proceedings before the court, as authorized by this section, and appeals therefrom, take precedence on the docket over all cases and shall be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way. Id. (emphasis added). To the extent that the City is suggesting that SPJ is not a person aggrieved because it was not flatly denied access to the disciplinary records, we disagree. The City's over-literal interpretation of HRS § 92F-15(a) would lead to an absurd result that was clearly unintended by the legislature, that is, that an agency could ignore a UIPA request with impunity because failure to respond is not technically a denial of a request. Unlike the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), and the Uniform Information Practices Code (UIPC), both of which the legislature considered when drafting the UIPA, [8] the UIPA does not impose deadlines on an agency's response to a records request or specify the potential responses that are subject to judicial review. Both the FOIA and the UIPC mandate that, when an agency receives a written request that reasonably identifies the record sought, it must respond promptlywithin ten days and seven days, respectivelyby either: (1) making the record available; (2) informing the requester that the record is in use or that unusual circumstances have delayed the handling of the request and specifying in writing the earliest date when the record will be available; (3) informing the requester that the agency does not maintain the record and identifying, if known, the agency that does; or (4) denying the request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6); UIPC § 2-102. Generally, a requester may seek judicial review of any adverse response or failure to timely respond, although the FOIA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review is available. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (providing for administrative appeal of adverse determination and judicial review after agency determination has been upheld in administrative appeal); UIPC § 2-104 (providing that person aggrieved by violation of UIPC § 2-102 may bring judicial action). There is nothing in the UIPA or its legislative history to indicate that the legislature intended judicial review to be available only in the case of an agency's unequivocal and final denial of a UIPA request. The conference committee report explains that [t]he bill will provide for immediate access to the courts when an agency refuses to release records. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 112-88, in 1988 House Journal, at 818 (emphasis added). Moreover, HRS § 92F-15(f) requires the courts to expedite UIPA cases. Therefore, unlike the FOIA, the UIPA does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, although it provides, as an optional alternative, for appeal to the OIP. HRS § 92F-15.5 (Supp.1992). Further, HRS § 92F-15 provides for de novo review of the agency's determination, places the burden of proof squarely on the agency, contains liberal venue provisions, and requires the court to assess attorneys' fees and costs against the agency if the complainant prevails. It was obviously the intent of the legislature to remove barriers to judicial enforcement of the UIPA; to construe the term denial strictly would defeat that intent. We interpret denial of access as synonymous with withholding of access. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has defined withholding to include not only denials, but any agency response that has the net effect ... significantly to impair the requester's ability to obtain the records or significantly to increase the amount of time he [or she] must wait to obtain them. McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1110 (D.C.Cir.), on reh'g, vacated in part on other grounds, 711 F.2d 1076 (1983). Access is withheld, and a person aggrieved thereby, not only by an agency's outright denial of access, but also, for example, by the agency's non-response, claim that the request was not specific enough to identify the records sought, imposition of unauthorized or excessive fees as a condition of access, or claim that it does not have the records sought. Under this interpretation, SPJ is clearly a person aggrieved and, therefore, has standing under HRS § 92F-15 because: (1) SPJ requested access to government records; and (2) access to the requested records was withheld. [9] Moreover, whether the HPD's response to SPJ's request was a denial or some other adverse determination is not a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the determination that SPJ was entitled by law to an order compelling disclosure of the requested records.