Opinion ID: 1685078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: consent to search the apartment

Text: [18, 19] ¶ 88. Having determined that Becker was not under arrest when she gave Officer Kosovac consent to search her apartment, we must next decide whether her consent was given voluntarily. Voluntariness of consent to search raises a mixed question of fact and law. This court reviews a circuit court's determination as to the voluntariness of consent to search in two steps, examining the circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, but applying constitutional standards to those facts de novo. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 194-95, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citing State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987)). [20, 21] ¶ 89. To determine whether consent was given voluntarily, a reviewing court must determine, under the totality of the circumstances, that the consent was not the result of duress or coercion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973); Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 197-98. A reviewing court considers the circumstances surrounding the consent and the characteristics of the defendant, and determines whether the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was voluntary. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 197-98. ¶ 90. Vorburger raised the issue of the voluntariness of Becker's consent before the circuit court. The circuit court summarized his argument: [he] argue[s] that her consent was tainted by the coercive nature of her detention; because the police indicated that if she didn't consent to a search, they'd obtain a search warrant and search anyway; because her blood sugar was fluctuating; and because she had recently undergone a surgical procedural and was on Tylenol with codeine. The circuit court rejected this argument, concluding: [T]he police tactic in questionexplaining their willingness to pursue a search warrant, while suggesting the less-intrusive alternative of a consent searchis not coercive, improper, or designed to overcome the defendant's resistance. . . . Finally, I do not find Becker's health issues to be of such quality as to render her unduly susceptible to police intimidation. Based on the testimony presented at the hearing, I conclude that the State has proven voluntariness by clear and convincing evidence. [22] ¶ 91. Vorburger now asserts that Becker's consent was involuntary because: (1) the police knew she was in a vulnerable physical and emotional condition because she was a diabetic who had recently had surgery; (2) she was upset and crying while she was handcuffed; (3) she was handcuffed for the first time and believed she was going to be taken to jail; (4) she was not advised of her right to refuse consent; and (5) officers did not present her with a written consent form. [22] ¶ 92. We find unavailing Vorburger's assertion that Becker's consent was involuntary because the officers knew of her vulnerable physical and emotional condition. First, the circuit court specifically stated: I do not find Becker's health issues to be of such quality as to render her unduly susceptible to police intimidation. Second, Vorburger's assertion that Officer Kosovac knew of Becker's alleged vulnerable physical and emotional condition is not supported in the record. ¶ 93. Becker gave consent to search the apartment to Officer Kosovac, who testified that when she interviewed Becker in the motel, Becker did not appear to be injured, drugged, intoxicated, or disoriented. Officer Kosovac testified that she did not see Becker cry, that Becker did not appear to be emotionally distraught and that she was not visibly upset. Becker provided responsive, clear, chronologically-ordered answers to Officer Kosovac's questions. Officer Kosovac also stated that while Becker told her in room 229 that she was a diabetic, [23] she did not talk about her recent operation. Officer Kosovac asserted that: She appeared to me to be in generally good health, and at no time did she tell me she was not feeling well or was not doing well. Becker did not look sick or weak and appeared to [be] in generally good health. ¶ 94. Becker's own testimony does not contradict Officer Kosovac's version of events in any significant fashion. Becker testified that she cried four or five times while she was detained, and that she felt thirsty and disoriented due to her high blood sugar level. However, Becker's testimony at the suppression hearing puts to rest any implication that Officer Kosovac knew or should have known of Becker's alleged vulnerable physical and emotional condition. Under cross-examination Becker acknowledged that she may not have cried while in room 229 with Officer Kosovac: DISTRICT ATTORNEY: And when you testified that you had cried four to five times during the course of the evening, when were you crying other than initially with Officer Linsmeier and when the cocaine was found in the bedroom [of her apartment]? BECKER: I guess I don't remember another time specifically. DISTRICT ATTORNEY: So you really could have just cried twice? BECKER: Yes. ¶ 95. Becker also acknowledged that she never told Officer Kosovac about any health problems that would affect her judgment: DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Did you tell her whether or notDid you tell her you needed medicine? BECKER: No. DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Did youDid you need any Tylenol III? BECKER: I think I had just recently taken it. DISTRICT ATTORNEY: So you didn't need any painkiller, did you, at this time? BECKER: I don't believe so. DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Did you ever tell Office Kosovac anything regarding any blood sugar problems that you may be having? BECKER: No. [23] ¶ 96. Similarly unavailing is Vorburger's argument regarding Becker being upset and crying while she was handcuffed and her belief that she was going to go to jail. In considering the totality of the circumstances, we first note that Becker gave consent while she was being interviewed in room 229, after she had used the bathroom and been given a drink of water, and after Officer Kosovac had removed her handcuffs. Vorburger does not explain how Becker's emotional state before her handcuffs were removed is relevant to the voluntariness of her consent after the handcuffs were removed. Nor does he explain why Becker would have been afraid she was going to jail when she disavowed all knowledge of the marijuana in room 230. [24] ¶ 97. Finally, Vorburger contends that Becker's consent was involuntary because Officer Kosovac did not provide her with a written consent form or advise her that she was free to refuse consent. Vorburger points to no authority providing that a law enforcement officer's failure to supply a consent form to a person who gives consent to a search renders the consent involuntary. The State does not dispute that Officer Kosovac neither informed Becker that she could refuse to consent to the search of her apartment nor supplied her with a written consent form. It instead asserts, there is no basis for finding a consent involuntary just because the police do not offer the suspect a consent form. ¶ 98. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether officers must inform a defendant that the defendant is free to go in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 (1996). The court held that The Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is `free to go' before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. Similarly, in Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 203, this court stated that the failure of law enforcement officers to inform a defendant that he could refuse to consent to a search weighs against, but is not fatal to, a determination of voluntary consent. ¶ 99. Officer Kosovac acknowledged in her testimony that she probably did not inform Becker that she could refuse to consent and did not supply her with a written consent form. Becker's testimony made clear, however, that she understood that she could refuse to consent. Becker stated that she thought she did not have an appealing choice. The implication of Becker's statement is that she understood that she had two choicesconsent to the search or refuse to give consent. [24] There is nothing in the record indicating that Becker would not have consented to the search if Officer Kosovac had told her that she could refuse to give consent or supplied her with a consent form. More importantly, there is nothing in the record indicating Becker did not actually understand that she could refuse to consent. We note that Becker cooperated with Officer Kosovac after receiving Miranda warnings. ¶ 100. While Officer Kosovac's failure to inform Becker that she could refuse to consent to a search weighs against . . . a determination of voluntary consent, see id., we cannot conclude under the circumstances of this case that it renders Becker's consent involuntary. ¶ 101. For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court's conclusion that the State has proven voluntariness by clear and convincing evidence.