Opinion ID: 887262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 32 Whether other procedural irregularities prejudiced Allum's trial. ¶ 33 Allum makes additional claims that his conviction violated due process. First, citing Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, Allum argues that he was denied access to crucial evidence and witnesses for his defense. See State v. Ellenburg, 2000 MT 232, ¶ 52, 301 Mont. 289, ¶ 52, 8 P.3d 801, ¶ 52 (discussing Brady violations). Under Brady, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the State possessed evidence, including impeachment evidence, favorable to the defense; (2) the petitioner did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it with reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Ellenburg, ¶ 52 (quoting Gollehon v. State, 1999 MT 210, ¶ 15, 296 Mont. 6, ¶ 15, 986 P.2d 395, ¶ 15). ¶ 34 On February 6, 2002, eight days after his arrest, Allum filed a discovery request asking the Municipal Court to order the State to obtain the security camera video from the day of his arrest. On February 7, 2002, the court issued an order which, among other things, ordered the State to obtain the video. Allum filed the request after discussing the matter at length with the city prosecutor, who advised Allum that the State did not possess a copy of the video, and that the quickest way for Allum to obtain a copy would be to request an Investigative Subpoena from the District Court. A few days after the State received the order, around February 13, 2002, the city prosecutor had a conversation with the manager of the bank and learned for the first time that the video in the bank is recorded digitally and that the data is destroyed five to fourteen days after it is recorded. The manager made inquiries and discovered that the data, indeed, had been destroyed. In addition, the city prosecutor learned that even if the State had inquired the day it received the discovery order (no earlier than February 8, 2002), the data would already have been lost. ¶ 35 These facts demonstrate that the State did not commit a Brady violation because the State did not suppress the evidence. Neither the State nor Allum knew that the data would be destroyed five to fourteen days after the incident. ¶ 36 Allum also claims that the State committed a Brady violation when it successfully moved to quash some of Allum's subpoenas. These subpoenas were for various witnesses to attend pretrial depositions and trial itself. The Municipal Court granted the State's motion and quashed Allum's subpoenas. It quashed the deposition subpoenas because Allum had not demonstrated that the witnesses would be unavailable for trial as required by § 46-15-201(1), MCA. Regarding the subpoenas for trial, the court quashed them because the anticipated testimony of the witnesses was either irrelevant or duplicative. Allum sought to call various City of Bozeman officials to testify to police policies. The court concluded that this information was irrelevant under Rules 401-403, M.R.Evid., and that any information they might provide that was germane to Allum's case was available through other witnesses. We conclude that the State did not commit a Brady violation in moving to quash these witness subpoenas because, again, the State did not seek to suppress favorable evidence, but was merely raising valid statutory and evidentiary concerns. ¶ 37 Allum correctly points out that the State did not file a sworn complaint when it commenced its prosecution. An officer signed the complaint, but it was not sworn to. Allum argues that § 46-11-102, MCA, and § 46-11-110, MCA, require the State to file a sworn complaint at the commencement of a prosecution. This is incorrect. Section 46-11-110, MCA, states, When a complaint is presented to a court charging a person with the commission of an offense, the court shall examine the sworn complaint or any affidavits, if filed, to determine whether probable cause exists to allow the filing of a charge. This language does not require a sworn complaint to be filed. Instead, it requires the court to examine a sworn complaint if one is filed. Furthermore, § 46-11-102, MCA, does not require a sworn complaint. It states that the prosecution of offenses not charged in district court must be by complaint. A sworn complaint is not mentioned. ¶ 38 In arguing that our statutes require a sworn complaint in a prosecution such as in the instant case, the Dissent appeals to § 46-11-110, MCA, along with the language of § 46-11-401(3), MCA (2001). The Dissent concedes that the 2001 legislature amended § 46-11-401(3), MCA. However, it points out that the legislature replaced signed on oath by a peace officer, § 46-11-401(3), MCA (1999), with signed by a sworn peace officer. Section 46-11-401(3), MCA (2001). Although with this amendment the legislature eliminated the statute's requirement that a complaint filed by a peace officer be sworn, it did not alter the above-quoted § 46-11-110, MCA. Therefore, reasons the Dissent, In amending statutes in piece-meal fashion, the 2001 legislature confused the statutory scheme and we should conclude that because the legislature did not alter § 46-11-110, MCA, a complaint filed by a peace officer still must be sworn. However, here we must disagree with the Dissent on two counts. First, the legislature obviously did mean to change the requirement that a peace officer swear to a complaint. State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court, 2000 MT 266, ¶ 18, 302 Mont. 39, ¶ 18, 22 P.3d 166, ¶ 18 (It has long been the law that, when the Legislature amends a statute, we will presume that it meant to make some change in the existing law.). Second, we must restate our above conclusion that § 46-11-110, MCA, itself does not require a complaint to be sworn. Therefore, we conclude that a peace officer may file a complaint without swearing to it. ¶ 39 The Dissent also argues that the complaint should be dismissed because it was not sufficient to allow the court to determine the existence of probable cause. However, Allum does not raise this argument on appeal, and we therefore decline to address the issue. ¶ 40 Finally, Allum points to the fact that the Municipal Court did not hold an omnibus hearing, as required by § 46-13-110, MCA. This Court will not reverse a conviction for failure to hold an omnibus hearing without a showing of prejudice. State v. Hildreth (1994), 267 Mont. 423, 427, 884 P.2d 771, 774. Allum has not demonstrated any prejudice regarding the lack of an omnibus hearing.