Opinion ID: 47918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discussion of the District Court's Decision on the Merits

Text: 15 We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir.2002). Therefore we, like the district court, may only set aside the Corps's decision not to prepare an EIS where a plaintiff establishes that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-76, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976). 16 Courts may not, of course, use review of an agency's environmental analysis as a guise for second-guessing substantive decisions committed to the discretion of the agency. However, this restriction does not turn judicial review into a rubber stamp. In conducting our NEPA inquiry, we must `make a searching and careful inquiry into the facts and review whether the decision . . . was based on consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.' Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851. 17 The district court in this case based its decision on three grounds: (1) the Corps's failure to demonstrate the feasibility of the mitigation measures imposed; (2) the Corps's failure to consider the cumulative effects of the project, other permits, and area urbanization; and (3) the Corps's improper segmentation of Phase I of the project. We discuss each in turn. 18
19 The district court held that the administrative record contains no support for the Corps's conclusion that the mitigation measures would remove or reduce [to insignificance] the identified adverse impacts of the project. [T]he EA discusses the project's adverse impacts and describes the associated mitigation measures but nothing in the Document connects the two together. O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . 20 We have consistently accepted the proposition that reliance on mitigation measures may reduce a project's impacts below the level of significance. In Spiller, 352 F.3d at 241, we explicitly approved that principle, while noting that we have implicitly endorsed [such] use[.] Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 803 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that EAs satisfied NEPA where they considered appropriate alternatives, including mitigation measures) and Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that it was proper to consider restrictions placed on dredging permits in reviewing the agency's decision not to file an EIS)). Other circuits agree. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C.Cir.1982); C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 844 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1988); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir.1992); Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.1991); Audubon Soc'y of Cent. Ark. v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.1992). 21 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that proposed mitigation measures need not be laid out to the finest detail, even within the more labor-intensive context of an environmental impact statement. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (There is a fundamental distinction . . . between a requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated ... and a substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted.); Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 176-77 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352, 109 S.Ct. 1835). Mindful of that distinction, we have still required that an EIS involving mitigation must include a serious and thorough evaluation of environmental mitigation options for [a] Project to allow its analysis to fulfill NEPA's process-oriented requirements[.] Miss. River Basin Alliance, 230 F.3d at 178. We have, moreover, noted that mere perfunctory or conclusory language will not be deemed to constitute an adequate record and cannot serve to support the agency's decision not to prepare an EIS. Citizen Advocates For Responsible Expansion, Inc. (I-Care) v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. U.S. Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 & 1040 (D.C.Cir.1973)); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIG. § 8:57 (2006) (an environmental assessment does not require the full and `reasonably complete' discussion of mitigation measures that is required in an impact statement. Agencies must develop the record to a reasonable degree, however, in a manner that thoroughly and fairly evaluates environmental consequences.). With these principles in mind, we examine the Corps's EA and the reasons set forth there for its conclusion that each significant environmental impact it had identified would be reduced to insignificance by its prescribed mitigation measure. 4 22
23 The Corps's EA predicts that the project will have substantial, long-term, adverse effects on project site soils, including: 1) creation of anoxic and anaerobic conditions 5 due to clearing, grading, excavation, and filling; 2) possible impairment of subsurface drainage due to substrate compaction; 6 and 3) decreased aquifer recharge capability due to an increase in impervious surfaces. 7 All of the above work could contribute to a possible reduction in the site's flood control functions, including increased surface runoff volume and rate; reduced subsurface lateral flow, storage, and recharge; and reduced filtration. 24 In discussing the role of mitigation in reducing these problems, the EA states that the drainage plan incorporated into the development relies on a 100-foot vegetated buffer zone for flood water storage as well as creating detention areas. Additionally, the plan would raise the elevation of the major road. The EA also notes that the drainage plan meets St. Tammany Parish requirements. The EA asserts, without data or analysis, that the project as mitigated should have minimal [e]ffect on flooding within the scope of a 25-year storm, although storms in categories above a 25-year event could flood the development. 8 25
26 In its assessment of water quality impacts, the Corps's EA notes that the project could cause long-term, adverse impacts from increased non-point source pollution, 9 primarily in the roadside drainage swales incorporated in the project design. The EA asserts that the planned 100-foot vegetated buffer will minimize the amount of sediment entering the river and that the project will comply with St. Tammany Parish ordinances enacted to control sediment-laden run-off. The EA also states that Best Management Practices will be incorporated into project construction and inclusion of vegetated drainage swales and greenspaces will filter run-off and that [c]ompliance with the recommendations/ requirements of local ordinances and/or `Best Management Practices' should limit the volume of sediments entering local waterways. It neither describes what these practices may include nor how they will work. Similarly, the EA states that compliance with required state environmental permits should eliminate the potential for contamination of ground water resources, but does not describe what these permits require. 27
28 The EA predicts moderate to major adverse impacts on wildlife habitat, which, in turn, would create long-term adverse impacts to wildlife in a localized area. The document also notes that the project will result in a long-term increase in noise to levels loud and frequent enough to disturb wildlife in adjacent areas. In discussing mitigation of habitat loss and other adverse impacts on wildlife, however, the EA states, without explanation, that the buffer zone will mitigate some of the impact to aquatic organisms. When discussing habitat for non-aquatic wildlife the EA simply states that the buffer zone will be preserved and may provide habitat for some species, although others may be eliminated entirely. 29
30 The EA notes that the project will result in a total and complete loss of wetland functions for the developed portion of the site, which will, in turn, affect the remaining area directly affected by the development, as well as nearby wetlands and non-wetlands. Some of the mitigation discussion is built into the requirements pertinent to flood control, non-point source pollution, and wildlife habitat, discussed above. Beyond that, the EA says only that compensatory mitigation for wetland functionality losses will be required. The permittee must purchase credits for 47.5 acres of pine flatwood/savannah wetlands, which will be acquired from an approved site within the same USGS hydrologic watershed. 31
32 The EA states that the project will result in adverse and long-term impacts on traffic and transportation patterns, and as a result, could lead to increased safety concerns. The discussion of mitigation, however, is limited to statements that [a]ppropriate adjustments to the local highway system, such as warning signs, and traffic control signs or signals may be required to accommodate increases in traffic volume and that areas of congestion points may need to be altered. The EA also mentions that the applicant indicated in 2000 that it would conduct a traffic study, and that the developer would fund some identified improvements in order to mitigate adverse impacts. 33 After reviewing the EA's findings of significant adverse environmental impacts that will result from the project together with its reasoning as to the feasibility of the described mitigation measures imposed, we conclude that the district court correctly held that the EA fails to sufficiently demonstrate that the mitigation measures adequately address and remediate the adverse impacts so that they will not significantly affect the environment. The EA before us lists the potentially significant adverse impacts, and describes, in broad terms, the types of mitigation measures that will be employed. As is evident from our above review of the Corps's treatment of each individual potential impact, however, the EA provides only cursory detail as to what those measures are and how they serve to reduce those impacts to a less-than-significant level. Because the feasibility of the mitigation measures is not self-evident, we agree with the district court that the EA does not provide a rational basis for determining that the Corps has adequately complied with NEPA. 34 We recognize that an EA is meant to be a `rough-cut, low-budget', preliminary look at the environmental impact of a proposed project. Spiller, 352 F.3d at 240. The record before us, however, is simply not sufficient to determine whether the mitigated FONSI relies on `. . . mitigation measures which . . . compensate for any adverse environmental impacts stemming from the original proposal' that, unmitigated, would be significant. Id. at 241 (quoting Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682). In other words, the EA fails to tell us why the proposed agency action will not have a significant impact on the human environment. Coliseum Square, 465 F.3d at 224 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13). We therefore agree with the district court's determination that, the Corps acted arbitrarily in relying only on the information in the current EA to support the issuance of its mitigated FONSI. In so holding, we pause to note that [w]e have never said that deficiencies in an EA can only be cured by preparing an EIS, and that is not the law. Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1248 (5th Cir.1985) (overruled on unrelated grounds by Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 677 (5th Cir.1992)). Our review of the record today indicates only that we lack the information that would allow us to defer to the Corps's determination that mitigation will reduce the project's effects below the level of significance.
35 The intervenor argues that the district court incorrectly determined that the EA is supported by no real analysis or data with respect to cumulative effects of this project. O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . We begin by reviewing NEPA's specific requirements regarding cumulative impact analysis. 36 The CEQ's regulations define a project's cumulative impacts as the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (requiring that agencies take cumulative impacts into consideration during NEPA review). The regulation states that [c]umulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. In that vein, we have held that a consideration of cumulative impacts must also consider [c]losely related and proposed or reasonably foreseeable actions that are related by timing or geography. Vieux Carre Prop. Owners, Residents, & Assocs., Inc. v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir.1983). 37 In this case, the intervenor challenges the district court's holding with regard to the Corps's treatment of cumulative impacts. That court found that the EA merely recites the potential cumulative effects of the project in light of other wetlands destruction in the area but . . . is supported by no real analysis or data with respect to cumulative effects of this project. O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . 38 The Corps has already issued 72 other § 404 permits within a three mile radius of the proposed development, covering a total of 18,086.4 acres, of which 400.9 are wetlands. The EA identifies those permits, and notes that they cumulatively required [a] total of approximately 529.5 acres of compensatory mitigation. The Corps acknowledges that although [c]umulative impacts associated with this particular project would be considered minor[,] when considered in conjunction with, inter alia, historical development and land use practices, the cumulative effects may become major. The Corps carefully — and succinctly — describes how such individual projects can collectively cause fragmenting of state wetlands and result in increasing environmental pressures due to development. It notes that without local governments and the general public becoming pro-active in long-term land use planning and local watershed management and guiding development from the perspective of environmental stewardship, the potential for environmental impacts to approach a cumulatively significant level exists. Furthermore, it acknowledges that this permit covers only the first phase of a project that may have as many as three phases of development. Such language would seem to warrant a finding of significance, but instead the Corps states, without any exposition, that mitigation for impacts caused by the proposed project, possible future project phases, and all Corps permitted projects will remove or reduce e[x]pected impacts. 39 As above, we agree with the district court that this bare assertion is simply insufficient to explain why the mitigation requirements render the cumulative effects of this project less-than-significant, when considered with past, present, and foreseeable future development in the project area, including the project's other two potential phases. The intervenor argues that one may presume that through the mitigation requirement contained in NEPA all permits issued prior to the one under consideration had their respective impacts mitigated to levels of insignificance. We cannot accept that presumption as legally and empirically valid, however, because the Corps's EA provides no rational basis for concluding that when the individually mitigated-to-insignificant effects of this permit are added to the actual post-dredge and fill effects of 72 other permits issued to third parties by the Corps in the area, that the result will not be cumulatively significant. In so holding, we do not, as Mr. Bopp asserts, ask the agency to treat the EA as a local land-use planning guide. We simply agree with the district court's determination that the EA provides too little information as to the workability of the mitigation measures to conclude that the Corps took a hard look at the project, realistically assessed its individual and cumulative environmental effects, and reasonably found that the mitigation measures imposed will reduce those effects to a less-than-significant level.
40 Finally, the intervenor challenges the district court's determination that this project, the first phase of a possible three-phase development plan, constitutes improper segmentation, or piecemealing: an attempt by an agency to divide artificially a `major Federal action' into smaller components to escape the application of NEPA to some of its segments. Save Barton Creek Ass'n v. Fed. Highway Admin., 950 F.2d 1129, 1139 (5th Cir.1992). In so holding, the district court identified nothing that rendered the other two phases impracticable, financially unattractive, or generally not feasible. O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . It held that [t]he record blaringly suggests that the sole reason that Phases II and III were eliminated... was to facilitate the issuance of the permit so that the project could get underway. Id. Ultimately, the district court found that the current project represents a piecemealing approach for implementing the totality of the [entire three-phase] project. Id. 41 `As a general rule under NEPA, segmentation of highway projects is improper for purposes of preparing environmental impact statements.' Save Barton Creek, 950 F.2d at 1140 (quoting Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). Although the question of piecemealing may arise when dealing with a multi-phase project, it presents a different problem than that reviewed in the preceding section on cumulative impacts. As we have discussed, an assessment of cumulative effects asks whether a project with individually mitigated-to-insignificant effects may yet result in significant environmental impacts when those effects are aggregated with the foreseeable effects of other environmentally impacting human activities and natural occurrences. An analysis of improper segmentation, however, requires that where proceeding with one project will, because of functional or economic dependence, foreclose options or irretrievably commit resources to future projects, the environmental consequences of the projects should be evaluated together. Fritiofson, 772 F.2d at 1241, n.10. 10 42 To determine whether a single project is improperly segmented into multiple parts, this Circuit applies a four-part test that asks whether the proposed segment (1) has logical termini; (2) has substantial independent utility; (3) does not foreclose the opportunity to consider alternatives; and (4) does not irretrievably commit federal funds for closely related projects. Save Barton Creek, 950 F.2d at 1140 (citing Piedmont Heights, 637 F.2d at 439). It is important to note that projects, for the purposes of NEPA, are described as proposed actions, or proposals in which action is imminent. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23. `[T]he mere contemplation of certain action is not sufficient to require an impact statement.' Fritiofson, 772 F.2d at 1240 (citing Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 404, 96 S.Ct. 2718). While a cumulative impact analysis requires the Corps to include reasonably foreseeable future actions in its review, improper segmentation is usually concerned with projects that have reached the proposal stage. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 999 (5th Cir.1981). We have stated that in rare cases a court [may] prohibit segmentation or require a comprehensive EIS for two projects, even when one is not yet proposed, if an agency has egregiously or arbitrarily violated the underlying purpose of NEPA. Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.3d at n.19. 43 In this case, the current § 404 permit allows only the filling and dredging required to construct Phase I of the planned development. Although the project as originally submitted was a three-phase undertaking, the application as eventually approved included only the first stage. The Corps cites this decrease in scale as one of the project requirements that reduce the project's effects below the level of significance. 44 The district court did not apply the independent utility test laid out above, but simply stated that considering Phase I by itself constituted improper piecemealing because nothing in the record suggested that Phases II and III were impracticable, financially unattractive, or generally not feasible and that the two phases were almost certainly going to be financially viable in light of the expanding urbanization in St. Tammany Parish. O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . Plaintiffs, too, argue that the current project is wrongly piecemealed because Phases II and III are reasonably foreseeable. While this argument is relevant to whether the Corps rationally addressed and mitigated the cumulative impacts, it does not appropriately address the improper segmentation question. 45 In this respect, we agree with Mr. Bopp that Vieux Carre Prop. Owners, Residents, & Assocs., Inc. v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir.1983), provides the relevant analogy. In that case, a multi-phase project was submitted, withdrawn, and resubmitted in a form that included one phase of the original project. Id. at 1276-78. The court held that the project had not been improperly segmented because the future phases remained in the speculative, planning stages. Id. at 1278 (citing Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 999 (we are here dealing with two projects that are historically distinct, one of which is proposed and the other still in the process of study and design. In that situation, NEPA does not yet require the [agency] to evaluate the environmental impact of the [second project].)). 46 In the case before us, the record indicates that the three phases have independent utility — Phase I can stand alone without requiring construction of the other two phases either in terms of the facilities required or of profitability. Neither plaintiffs nor the district court identify any evidence that construction of Phase I irretrievably commits federal funds to construction of Phases II and/or III or that the future phases have progressed to the proposal stage. 11 Nor do they identify any evidence suggesting that construction of Phase I will foreclose the Corps's ability to consider various alternatives to construction of either future phase. Indeed, Phases II and III would encompass a far larger quantity of wetlands (80% of their total acreage) than Phase I (which was 40-50% wetlands). The Corps's analysis of practicable alternatives to construction of future phases may, as a result, prove far different than its analysis for Phase I. 47 On this point, therefore, we reverse the district court's judgment. The record before us does not reflect that the Corps must have considered the possible future second and third phases as part of the present project in conducting its EA and preparing its FONSI, nor that in failing to do so the Corps has arbitrarily violated the underlying purpose of NEPA. Phases II and III are relevant to the EA insofar as they relate to the Corps's analysis of cumulative impacts. Conducting an EA for Phase I alone, however, does not offend the prohibition against piecemealing projects in order to avoid NEPA requirements. We cannot say that the Corps has acted arbitrarily in this respect. 48