Opinion ID: 1728383
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State antitrust principles

Text: ¶ 92 Wisconsin's antitrust law is set out in ch. 133 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The operative provision at issue in the case before us is Wis. Stat. § 133.03. It provides in relevant part: Unlawful contracts; conspiracies. (1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce is illegal. . . . (2) Every person who monopolizes, or attempts to monopolize, or combines or conspires with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce is guilty. ¶ 93 Wisconsin antitrust law follows federal antitrust law in most respects. State v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., 81 Wis.2d 555, 568-69, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978). For example, both federal and state laws prohibit conspiracies to restrain trade and monopolies of the market. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4, 15; Wis. Stat. § 133.03. However, Wisconsin antitrust law differs from federal antitrust law in that Wisconsin law may permit the recovery of damages by indirect purchasers [12] alleging unlawful anticompetitive conduct, Olstad, 284 Wis.2d 224, ¶ 63, 700 N.W.2d 139, but federal law does not. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (U.S.Ill.1977). ¶ 94 The most recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision interpreting Wis. Stat. § 133.03 is Olstad. There we addressed the certified question: Does Wisconsin's antitrust act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03, apply to interstate commerce affecting Wisconsin commerce? Olstad, 284 Wis.2d 224, ¶ 10, 700 N.W.2d 139. Olstad claimed that Microsoft's share of the market for personal computer operating systems was so large that it prevented others from entering the market. Id., ¶¶ 2-3. Olstad alleged that Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct caused Wisconsin consumers to pay higher prices. Id., ¶ 7. The circuit court dismissed the action after concluding that § 133.03 did not apply to interstate conduct. Id., ¶ 9. ¶ 95 We concluded that at least in some circumstances Wis. Stat. § 133.03 does apply to interstate conduct. Id., ¶ 74. Our limited conclusion was based in large part on our prior holding in Allied Chemical & Dye, where we addressed whether Wisconsin could apply its antitrust law to the sales of calcium chloride made in Wisconsin through interstate commerce when those sales were subject to the federal antitrust law. Allied Chem. & Dye, 9 Wis.2d at 292, 101 N.W.2d 133. We concluded that Wisconsin law could be applied in some circumstances, in part because there was no conflict between federal and state antitrust laws. Id. at 295, 101 N.W.2d 133. ¶ 96 In Olstad, we also set out a test to assist courts and the public ascertain when Wis. Stat. § 133.03 may reach interstate actions. As a very general framework, we explained that either: (1) actionable conduct, such as the formation of a combination or conspiracy, must have occurred within Wisconsin, or (2) if the actionable conduct occurred predominantly or exclusively outside of Wisconsin, the illegal activity must substantially affect the people of Wisconsin and have impacts in Wisconsin. Olstad, 284 Wis.2d 224, ¶ 85, 700 N.W.2d 139. We advised that the test was to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion so that Wisconsin's antitrust law would be available on only a limited basis with regard to interstate conduct: Operating with lesser standards would jeopardize the action, undermine the validity of our antitrust statute, and create the spectacle of Lilliputian harassment in Wisconsin courts. Questions of provincialism, favoritism, and undue burden on interstate commerce should be determined by resort to contemporary federal commerce clause jurisprudence. Id. ¶ 97 It is important to note that Olstad does not address any issue that may arise in the application of state antitrust law in the context of a federal patentee's actions, where federal law may effect whether state law will be applied. Furthermore, in Olstad, we also did not address whether an indirect purchaser's claim based on conduct that occurred solely outside of Wisconsin should be subject to Wisconsin's antitrust law because that question was not brought to us for decision. ¶ 98 However, we have in past decisions shown that Wisconsin antitrust law will not be applied to each and every occasion where the claim of a state law violation is made. In State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis.2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966), we carefully considered the lack of federal prosecution of interstate conduct and what impact that should have on our decision about the prosecution of an antitrust claim under Wisconsin law. ¶ 99 Milwaukee Braves involved a state antitrust action brought against the Braves and others by the State, due to major league baseball's decision to move the club to Atlanta, while refusing to permit another major league baseball team to locate in Milwaukee. Id. at 703-04, 144 N.W.2d 1. We acknowledged that a substantial injury to business activity within Wisconsin was caused by the exercise of major league baseball's monopoly power. Id. at 719, 144 N.W.2d 1. We explained that organized baseball is interstate commerce and Congress may therefore regulate it. Id. at 720, 144 N.W.2d 1. However, we noted that major league baseball had not been subjected to prosecution under federal antitrust law. Id. at 721, 144 N.W.2d 1. ¶ 100 When considering how to determine whether that de facto exemption from federal antitrust law could cause a conflict with the application of state antitrust law in regard to the decision to move the Braves, we framed the question as: whether there is a conflict between state and federal policy, so that the state policy must yield. Id. We concluded that federal choice must control and Wisconsin could not enforce its antitrust law based on the concerted action of moving the Braves from Milwaukee and refusing Milwaukee another major league baseball franchise. Id. at 732, 144 N.W.2d 1. ¶ 101 In Prentice, we once again addressed whether prosecution of alleged conduct, which if proved true, appeared to violate Wisconsin antitrust law, should proceed. Prentice was brought as a class action against twelve title insurance companies and several of their employees. Prentice, 176 Wis.2d at 720, 500 N.W.2d 658. It was claimed that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade, causing the consumer plaintiffs to pay substantially higher prices for title insurance and related services than they would have had to pay in the absence of the alleged conspiracy. Id. At issue was whether the filed rate doctrine shield[ed] the defendants from liability under Wisconsin's antitrust law. Id. at 721, 500 N.W.2d 658. ¶ 102 In Prentice, we explained how a regulatory agency's approval of a rate established the lawfulness of a rate; and therefore, the legal rights of the parties were measured solely by the filed rate. Id. at 722, 500 N.W.2d 658. We concluded that because the insurance companies filed the rates they would charge pursuant to the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 625.15(2) (1977-78) and the agency had approved those rates under the filed rate doctrine, the rates charged were lawful rates. Id. at 725, 500 N.W.2d 658. Therefore, the title insurance companies and their employees were not subject to prosecution under Wisconsin antitrust law. Id. This discussion demonstrates that while Wisconsin's antitrust law may initially appear to be applicable, there are occasions when it will not be applied because to do so would interfere with other federal or state laws or doctrines.