Opinion ID: 1418188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Commission's Jurisdiction Under NRS 645.630(9).

Text: Appellant suggests that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under NRS 645.630(9), ( supra, n. 1), because the compliant on file herein alleged that [appellant] committed acts which would constitute the crime of theft or abetting such crime. She contends that the Commission is only empowered to discipline licensees for the commission of criminal acts under NRS 645.630(12), which provides for such discipline when a licensee has been found guilty of: Forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false pretenses, larceny, extortion, theft, fraud, conspiracy, a crime involving moral turpitude or other like offense, whether arising from a real estate transaction or not, and has been convicted thereof in a court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) Appellant's contention, however, ignores the posture of the case before the Commission. The complaint alleged, and the Commission so found, that she was guilty, not of theft, but of violating the code of ethics of her profession by failing to do her utmost to protect the public against unethical practices or to eliminate practices damaging to the public or to the dignity or integrity of the real estate profession. Under NRS 645.630(9), and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder, the Commission is empowered to impose discipline upon a licensee for violation of the code of ethics, without reference to any potential criminal liability. Appellant argues, nevertheless, that NRS 645.630(12) must be read to deprive the Commission of such jurisdiction so long as there is any possibility that the conduct found to be a violation of the code of ethics might also provide the basis for a charge that the licensee had committed a crime. We do not agree. There is no basis in the statutory language, or in logic, for concluding that the legislature intended to immunize from disciplinary action a licensee accused of unethical conduct on grounds serious enough to warrant criminal charges as well. See State Board of Technical Registration v. McDaniel, 84 Ariz. 223, 326 P.2d 348, 353 (1958). Appellant suggests that this result would in some way compromise the fifth amendment rights of licensees. The record in this case refutes such a suggestion. Appellant's right to invoke the fifth amendment at hearing was fully protected by the Commission, and there is no basis in the record for concluding that the Commission drew any adverse inference from her refusal to testify. Cf. Rudin v. Nevada R.E. Advisory Comm'n., 86 Nev. 562, 471 P.2d 658 (1970). The fifth amendment does not require more. See De Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.1970) (denial of application for stay of disbarment proceedings until completion of pending criminal proceedings does not violate privilege against self-in-crimination). We conclude that the Commission was acting within its jurisdiction in subjecting appellant to discipline for conduct found violative of NRS 645.630(9).