Opinion ID: 168799
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary R uling

Text: W e next consider whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of Alford’s history of domestic violence against M s. Fuston-Lounds. Appellants contend the admission of this evidence violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), which provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” They argue that the evidence ought to have been excluded because A lford’s conviction and arrest for domestic abuse is irrelevant and prejudicial. W e review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. M acsenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th Cir. 2001). W hile it is true that evidence of other crimes or wrongs unrelated to the conduct at issue is inadmissible to prove a propensity to behave in a given manner, if offered for another purpose, such evidence may be admissible under Rule 404(b). Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005). To be admissible, the evidence -6- must be offered for a proper purpose; it must be relevant; the trial court must determine under Fed. R. Evid. 403 that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and the trial court must give the jury a proper limiting instruction when requested. United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, all four requirements were satisfied. First, evidence of Alford’s 2002 conviction and 2003 arrest for domestic abuse of M s. Fuston-Lounds was offered not to show his character, but for the proper purpose of rebutting M s. Fuston-Lounds’ claim for damages. See Tanberg, 401 F.3d at 1166 (“W hen a party opens the door to a topic, the admission of rebuttal evidence on that topic becomes permissible.”). Second, the evidence was relevant because M s. Fuston-Lounds put the nature and quality of her relationship with Alford at issue by claiming damages for grief and loss of companionship. See, e.g., Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1048 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence of pornographic images found throughout decedent’s home and accessible to his minor child was relevant to the question of child’s damages for loss of companionship). In this regard, the fact that the abuse occurred before or during their common-law marriage is of no consequence because her claim was premised not on the loss of her marriage, but on the loss of her relationship. Third, the district court balanced the evidence as required by Rule 403, and concluded that its probative value clearly outweighed its prejudicial impact. Aplt. A pp. at 1422. To the extent appellants dispute this conclusion, we note that Rule 403 requires -7- that even if prejudice is found, “it must substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence in order to be excluded.” United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2001). Here, the district court did not find, and appellants do not contend, that there was substantial prejudice. Finally, the district court specifically instructed the jury that the evidence was to be used “for damages based on grief and the loss of companionship resulting from the death of A lford Lounds.” Aplee. Suppl. App. at 263. W e presume the jury followed this instruction. Darks v. M ullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1015 (10th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we find the district court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence.