Opinion ID: 4123854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions for Variance

Text: Pielsticker filed two pre-sentence motions for variance.11 After hearing arguments from both parties at sentencing, the district court denied the motions. We associated with those invoices could testify about credits and recourses. After all, Moore and the billing clerks kept track of the overbilled amounts on a spreadsheet. 11 Pielsticker also filed a motion for downward departure, which the district court denied. He failed to challenge this on appeal. 21 review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a request for variance for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2008) (reviewing the district court’s denial of a variance motion for an abuse of discretion). A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. Id.
Pielsticker based his first motion for variance on his heart condition. He argues that the district court unreasonably denied the motion for variance by failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. In his motion and during sentencing, Pielsticker presented evidence that he relies on an implant to shock his heart when it fails or becomes arrhythmic; and that he needs to replace the implant. His treating cardiologist stressed that Pielsticker was at a “GREAT risk of death” and worried how prison might affect his medical condition. Appellant App. vol. 1 at 73-74. As a matter of procedural reasonableness, because Pielsticker’s sentence falls within the advisory Guidelines’ range, § 3553(c) requires that the district court state “the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court meets this threshold when it provides a “general discussion”12 of the § 3553(a) factors. Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1113. Despite Pielsticker’s contention that the district 12 Though we also noted that this “is not necessarily the best practice.” United States v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2007). 22 court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, the record shows that the district court provided more than a general discussion. Without explicitly listing the § 3553(a) factors, the district court considered the need “to provide the defendant with . . . medical care.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Based on a Bureau of Prisons’ (the “Bureau”) representation, the district court found that Pielsticker could have his implant replaced in a federal medical facility. It also found that Pielsticker’s “heart condition is not so extraordinary or unusual as to distinguish [his] case from typical cases covered by the guidelines.” Appellant App. vol. 3 at 585. Evidence from the record supported this finding, including (1) Pielsticker’s failure to have surgery within the eight months leading up to sentencing; (2) the Bureau’s representation that it had a federal medical facility capable of performing the replacement;13 and (3) Pielsticker’s ability to engage in normal life activities. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pielsticker’s first motion for variance. 13 Pielsticker argues that the Bureau’s representation is “a double hearsay ex parte communication about a mission-critical fact.” Appellant Opening Br. at 43. But at sentencing, the district court can credit “relevant information without regard to its admissibility . . . provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” USSG § 6A1.3(a); see United States v. Friedman, 499 F. App’x 807, 810-11 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (finding that the record suggested no prejudice from an assumed ex parte communication with the United States Marshals). 23
Pielsticker based his second motion for variance on a pending amendment to the 2015 sentencing guidelines. As mentioned above, the district court applied the 2014 sentencing guidelines, which imposed a 20-level enhancement for losses of more than $7 million and not more than $20 million. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K). Beginning November 1, 2015, an amendment to the fraud-loss table in USSG § 2B1.1 increased the threshold for a 20-level enhancement from $7 million to $9.5 million. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(K) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2015). Based on Pielsticker’s assuming that the district court erred by finding that he entered the bank-fraud conspiracy at its outset, he argues that the district court ignored the “parsimony principle” of § 3553(a) by not applying the 2015 guidelines. Appellant Opening Br. at 38. This argument fails because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Pielsticker joined the conspiracy at its outset, see supra Discussion Sections I(A)(2), and (3).