Opinion ID: 1791952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: traditional or indirect trespass?

Text: The Lamberts assert that the district court erred in finding that an indirect trespass occurred. They argue that the action is instead based upon a direct or traditional trespass theory as defined by our case law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 157 et seq. (1965). To bring an action in trespass, the complaining party must have had title to or legal possession of the land when the acts complained of were committed. Dugan v. Jensen, 244 Neb. 937, 510 N.W.2d 313 (1994). It is undisputed that the Lamberts have legal possession of the private sewerline. However, the district court concluded that the possession requirement was not established by the Lamberts in the instant case because the geographic point at which the Holmbergs connected to the sewer was not on the Lamberts' property and was instead beneath a public street. See Neb. Rev.Stat. § 39-1404 (Reissue 2004) (no private party may acquire interest in any part of city street). The geographic point of connection is not outcome determinative because liability for trespass exists if an actor intentionally enters land in the possession of [another], or causes a thing or a third person to do so. (Emphasis supplied.) Restatement, supra, § 158(a) at 277. The Holmbergs' connection to the sewerline beneath 48th Avenue clearly and necessarily causes sewage to enter and pass through the privately owned sewerline beneath the undeveloped Lambert property. Although the entry was not direct and immediate, it nevertheless amounted to a trespass because an actor, without himself entering the land, may invade another's interest in its exclusive possession by throwing, propelling, or placing a thing either on or beneath the surface of the land. Restatement, supra, § 158, Comment on Clause (a) i. at 278. Further, it is not necessary that the foreign matter should be thrown directly and immediately upon the other's land. It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter. Id. at 278-79. Without expressly stating these principles, we have applied them in analogous situations. In Lackaff v. Bogue, 158 Neb. 174, 62 N.W.2d 889 (1954), the plaintiffs constructed ditches in order to divert water from two lakes. Although the ditches were constructed entirely on the plaintiffs' land, they caused the lake water to drain over the defendants' land. The trial court found a trespass had occurred and entered an injunction requiring the plaintiffs to fill the ditches, and we affirmed. Similarly, in Faught v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irri. District, 147 Neb. 1032, 25 N.W.2d 889 (1947), we affirmed a decision ordering an irrigation district to increase the carrying capacity of a canal located on the district's property after the negligent design of the canal caused floodwaters to trespass onto a farmer's land. In a case involving facts similar to those of this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama applied a traditional trespass analysis and found that the repeated dumping of sewage into a private line by way of a separate private line was a continuous trespass. Underwood v. West Point Manufacturing Company, 270 Ala. 114, 116 So.2d 575 (1959). Other jurisdictions have similarly applied a traditional trespass theory, even when the act alleged to constitute a trespass occurred away from the complaining landowner's premises. See, Miller v. Carnation Company, 33 Colo. App. 62, 68, 516 P.2d 661, 664 (1973) (interpreting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) and finding that landowner who sets in motion a force which, in the usual course of events, will damage property of another is guilty of a trespass on such property); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1085, 1090, 89 S.W.2d 723, 725 (1935) ([i]t is sufficient if the wrongdoer actually set in motion some dangerous agency which in itself, though far distant from the wrongdoer, inflicts a wrong, such is a `breaking of the close,' and for such trespass relief is granted). The Holmbergs rely on Cornwall v. Garrison, 59 Idaho 287, 81 P.2d 1094 (1938), in support of their argument that the instant case involves only an indirect trespass. In that case, the court held that one who constructs a sewer beneath a city street is not the owner of the sewer and thus cannot enjoin its use by another. This holding is factually inapplicable to the instant case because it is undisputed that the Lamberts do have a private ownership interest in at least one portion of the sewer system through which the Holmbergs are emitting waste material. Moreover, the Lamberts' private sewerline is not located beneath a public street. The rationale of Cornwall thus does not aid us in resolving the instant dispute. This court has never considered whether to recognize the doctrine of indirect trespass. We need not do so here because we conclude that the record establishes that the Holmbergs' act of connecting to the sewer system beneath 48th Avenue constituted a trespass on the Lamberts' property under traditional trespass principles. Sewage released by the Holmbergs at the connection point necessarily passes through the Lamberts' private sewerline before reaching the city sewer system, and thus it is more than a substantial certainty that the connection will ultimately result in a trespass on the Lamberts' private line. See Restatement, supra. When the sewage emitted from the Holmberg residence ultimately enters the Lamberts' private sewerline, it constitutes a continuous and repeated trespass on that segment of sewerline located beneath the Lamberts' undeveloped property, inasmuch as a trespass can be committed on, above, or beneath the surface of the land. See Restatement, supra, § 159.