Opinion ID: 290539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cousins' appeal.

Text: 6 Cousins asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he had possession of the stolen liquor. 7 The district court correctly instructed the jury that possession of goods known to have been stolen from interstate commerce includes constructive as well as actual possession. While term constructive possession is not free from ambiguity, it has been generally defined as knowingly having both the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the property. Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311-312 (9th Cir. 1960). 8 A review of the cases dealing with possession offenses indicates, however, a tendency to avoid generalities. The circumstances of each case must be examined to determine if there is such a nexus or relationship between the defendant and the goods that it is reasonable to treat the extent of the defendant's dominion and control as if it were actual possession. United States v. Casalinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 209-211 (2d Cir. 1965) and cases cited. 9 The evidence showed that Cousins initiated the sale, knowing the liquor was stolen. He arranged for delivery and participated in the unloading. He was no mere intermediary or innocent person at the scene of illicit activity but rather an active participant, if not the principal, in the sale and delivery. With this evidence, a jury could find that Cousins, along with Gano, exercised dominion and control over disposal of the stolen liquor. See Cellino v. United States, 276 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1960). 10 Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1962), upon which Cousins relies, involved another point. We there held that possession could not be imputed to a defendant through doctrines of conspiracy or aider and abettor. Once constructive possession is shown, as in this case, the statutory element is satisfied without resort to any theory of vicarious liability. See Figueroa v. United States, 352 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1965). 11 Cousins next assigns error to a jury instruction that possession of recently stolen property, without a reasonable explanation, may be considered as evidence of guilty knowledge of its stolen character. No objection was taken to the instruction. In light of the direct evidence indicating Cousins' knowledge of the stolen character of the merchandise, we decline to consider it as plain error affecting substantial rights. Rule 52(b) F.R.Crim.P. 12