Opinion ID: 4468301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard of Review Applicable to the

Text: R&R Is Plain Error The next question is what standard of review we should apply in considering the merits of the R&R adopted by the District Court. In general, “where a party fails to file timely objections to a magistrate judge’s R & R in a habeas proceeding, and the district court then adopts the R & R, we will only review the R & R for plain error.” Nara, 488 F.3d at 194. There are, however, indications in our case law that we may review an R&R de novo where “the district court elects to exercise its power to review a magistrate’s report de novo[.]” EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 657 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Once the District Court independently reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s R & R, the Commonwealth’s ‘previous failure to object [became] irrelevant.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Given that Janine failed to object to the R&R and that Rule 60(b)(1) relief was properly denied, plain error would seem to be the appropriate standard. Nevertheless, citing our 10 The strength of a party’s position may also be relevant in deciding upon Rule 60(b)(1) relief. Cf. Mullin, 875 F.3d at 154 & n.48 (noting that, in some circumstances, a party may be relieved of the consequences flowing from counsel’s mistakes, based on a balancing of factors, including whether the underlying claim has merit). As explained below, even if we take that into account, it does not help Janine because she does not have a meritorious position. 10 decision in Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1987), Janine argues that we should review the R&R de novo because the District Court reviewed it de novo before adopting it. She’s mistaken both as to what the District Court did and as to the import of Henderson. To begin with, the District Court’s succinct order does not show that it conducted a de novo review. It is better read as simply noting the lack of objections and then adopting the R&R. Given the absence of any independent reasoning by the District Court, it seems clear that, while the Court no doubt gave thoughtful consideration to the R&R and record, it did not engage in de novo review and decision making. When it said that it rendered its decision “upon independent review of the petition and the record and upon consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” (App. at 23), it was, we think, employing boilerplate language to assure the parties that it had looked at the petition and record before deciding to adopt the R&R nothing more.11 Cf. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d at 100 (observing that, even in the absence of an objection, district courts must give “reasoned consideration” to R&Rs (citation omitted)). Janine’s reliance on Henderson is also misplaced. We held there that “the failure of a party to object to a magistrate’s 11 In Evans v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, we used the phrase “independently reviewed” instead of “reviewed de novo.” Evans, 645 F.3d at 657; Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878 n.4. In context, we meant “reviewed de novo,” but we do not think that every use of the phrase “independently reviewed” necessarily means “reviewed de novo.” 11 legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo review in the district court—but not in the loss of the statutory right to appellate review.” Id. at 878-79. We also said, in dicta in a footnote, that, “when the district court elects to exercise its power to review a magistrate’s report de novo, a party’s previous failure to object becomes irrelevant” and that, “since the district court conducted a de novo review even though no objection was made, appellate review would arguably be proper even if we were to adopt a waiver rule.” Id. at 878 n.4. We concluded that the district court had performed a de novo review because, “according to the district court’s order, the magistrate’s report was adopted only after ‘independent review of the entire record and applicable law.’” Id. (citation omitted). But the Henderson footnote does not bind us with respect to what is necessary to demonstrate that a district court has engaged in de novo review, nor does it tell us what standard of review we must employ on appeal even if there has been de novo review in the district court. Henderson has an entirely different focus. It held, based on extensive reasoning, that appellate review is appropriate despite a party’s failure to object to an R&R. Id. at 877-79. That is binding, and rightfully so. The Henderson footnote simply added that, even if we had not reached the holding we did in the text of the opinion, “appellate review would arguably be proper” on the facts then at hand, given the district court’s order. Id. at 878 n.4 (emphasis added).12 We have never Thus, the footnote was “not necessary to our ultimate 12 holding[,]” and “properly is classified as dictum.” In re Friedman’s Inc., 738 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 12 adopted the Henderson footnote’s conclusion on what is required to show that de novo review has occurred, although we have cited the footnote in subsequent decisions. For example, in Nara, we acknowledged the footnote in describing and responding to an argument that we should review an R&R de novo because the district court did so. 488 F.3d at 197. We concluded, however, that there was “no indication the District Court conducted an independent review of the entire record and applicable law de novo.” Id. We did not have to decide what would be enough if there were some indication. Likewise, in Evans, we cited the Henderson footnote in concluding that, “[o]nce the District Court independently reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s R & R, the Commonwealth’s ‘previous failure to object [became] irrelevant.’” 645 F.3d at 657 (second alteration in original) (quoting Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878 n.4). But, the district court in that case had “squarely addressed” the point at issue. Id. It was clear that there had been de novo review, so we had no occasion to assess whether perfunctory language in an order, like that discussed in the Henderson footnote, would necessarily be sufficient to show there had been such review. Finally, in City of Long Branch, we cited the Henderson footnote for the basic proposition that a party’s failure to object to an R&R becomes irrelevant if the district court has reviewed the R&R de novo. 866 F.3d at 100. How a party establishes that de novo review has occurred was not, however, at issue in the case. Id. at 100-02. In short, a party seeking to avoid the consequences of failing to object to an R&R by proving that the district court has reviewed de novo the matter at hand must point to 13 something more than boilerplate language in an order with no independent reasoning. Nothing of that sort appears in the record here.13 Consequently, we will review the R&R for plain error.