Opinion ID: 202354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Express Warranty Instruction

Text: 22 The Levins challenge the express warranty instruction as it pertains to the clock. They argue that the district court erred by instructing the jury under a New York statute that governs express warranty claims for fine art. See N.Y. Cult. Arts Law, § 13.01 (McKinley 2004) (the fine art statute). 23 The fine art statute provides that whenever an art merchant sells a work of fine art to someone who is not an art merchant and provides a document certifying the period or author of the piece, the merchant's representation is an express warranty. Id. § 13.01(1)(b). The statute further provides that a warranty should be interpreted in light of the custom and usage of the trade. Id. § 13.01(2). In at least one case, a gloss has been placed on the statute, requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that the merchant's warranty was made without a reasonable basis in fact at the time that it was offered. Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F.Supp. 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y.1978). 2 24 The breach-of-warranty instruction offered in this case recited the requirements of the fine art statute with the Dawson gloss. 3 The Levins contend that this instruction was erroneous because the grandfather clock is not a piece of fine art within the meaning of the statute. 4 On appeal, the parties treat this issue as a question of law subject to de novo review. We follow their approach. 5 25 Fine art is defined under the statute to mean a painting, sculpture, drawing, or work of graphic art, and print. N.Y. Cultural Arts Law § 11.01(9). The Levins make the straightforward claim that this case concerns a clock and a clock is not fine art. 26 This argument appeals in its simplicity, but identifying fine art may not be so easy. See generally Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 Tul. L.Rev. 805 (2005) (discussing judicial reluctance to determine what constitutes art). As one trial expert testified, [t]here is sort of a murky distinction between decorative and fine arts. 27 The clock (a picture of which is included as an addendum to this opinion) has multiple painted panels showing mythological scenes all of which pertain to the relationship between peace and justice. The tear sheet focused on the painted panels as major features of the clock, and one of Dalva's principals testified that it viewed the painting as the most significant attribute of the clock. There also was expert testimony that a purchaser of the clock would view it as a piece of fine art because the painting is so extraordinary and it is so unusual. Indeed, the Levins' own expert admitted that the decoration . . . was, in fact, the most important thing with [this] clock. This testimony supports the district court's ruling that the clock was fine art. 28 Applying the fine art statute to the clock accords with Dawson, the only reported case considering the scope of the statute's fine art definition. See 463 F.Supp. at 466 n. 4. There, the court held that a decorated bowl and several vases were fine art. Like the clock, the items at issue in Dawson were not traditional canvass paintings or sculpted figures. Although they were items that had functional uses, the court concluded that their artistic decoration elevated them to works of fine art. Id. So too here. Of course, ruling that this clock is fine art does not mean that all clocks so qualify; indeed, most probably do not. But in light of the expert testimony, the description provided in the tear sheet, and the photograph of the clock, we conclude that the district court was correct to instruct under the fine art statute. 29 The Levins offer a second objection to the express warranty instruction, applicable to the warranty claims for all of the items. They contend that the court erroneously instructed that the breach-of-warranty claims should fail if the jury concluded that Dalva merely offered an opinion by attributing the antiques to a specific period. 6 We review this claim de novo. See Forgie-Buccioni v. Hannaford Bros., Inc., 413 F.3d 175, 178 (1st Cir. 2005). 30 The fine art statute was a specific legislative enactment designed to regulate express warranty claims brought by lay people after purchasing fine art from art merchants. As such, it supplants the otherwise applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Dawson, 463 F.Supp. at 465 n. 3; see also Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F.Supp. 1556, 1562 (D.Haw.1990) (stating that, in the absence of specific state statute, the UCC applies to an express warranty claim concerning fine art). 31 If the UCC were to apply, then the district court may have been correct to instruct concerning the distinction between opinion and fact. See Yuzwak v. Dygert, 144 A.D.2d 938, 534 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App.Div.1988) (stating that, in a breach of warranty action under the UCC, [w]hether representations made by a seller are warranties, and therefore, a part of the bargain, or merely expressions of the seller's opinion is almost always a question of fact for a jury's resolution). But the instruction is inconsistent with the fine art statute. 32 The statute provides that where an art merchant states to a lay person that a piece is by a specific author or can be attributed to a specific period, the statement shall create an express warranty. N.Y. Cult. Arts Law, § 13.01 The purpose of this provision was to eliminate questions as to whether an art dealer's representations with respect to the authorship of a particular work were to be considered an affirmation of a fact, in which event the description would create an express warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code or merely the expression of the dealer's opinion which would not give rise to such a warranty. Dawson, 463 F.Supp. at 465 n. 3. 33 Attributing fine art to a particular period or author is an educated guess or opinion and the more remote the creator is from the present the more remote is the possibility that anyone can make attribution of authorship as a fact. 7 Mem. of the Att'y Gen. of N.Y. Concerning Warranties in the Sale of Fine Art, N.Y.1968 Legis. Ann. 79, reprinted in 2 F. Feldman, S. Weil, & S. Biederman, Art Law at 100 (1986). Under the UCC, this inherent difficulty in attributing fine art allowed art merchants to offer an affirmative attribution for a piece of art in order to raise the price and, if the attribution was later determined to be incorrect, to fall back on the defense that the attribution was only an opinion. Id. at 100-01. To correct this perceived inequity, New York enacted a law hold[ing] a merchant-seller responsible to a non-merchant buyer for any statement relevant to the authorship of a work of fine art notwithstanding that such statement is or purports to be or is capable of being merely [an] opinion. Id.; see Comment, Regulation of the New York Art Market: Has the Legislature Painted Dealers into a Corner, 46 Fordham L.Rev. 939, 954-56 (1978). 34 Here, the representations attributed the art to specific historical periods. These representations were express warranties as a matter of law under the fine art statute. Therefore, the instruction allowing the jury to find that these attributions were opinions should not have been given. Moreover, we are unable to say that the instruction was harmless. See Goodman v. Bowdoin College, 380 F.3d 33, 47 (1st Cir.2004) (an erroneous jury instruction warrants a new trial only if the error can fairly be said to have prejudiced the objecting party). Much of the evidence concerned the difficulties in dating a particular antique to a certain historical period and several witnesses noted that any attribution is ultimately a matter of judgment. In closing, Dalva's counsel argued that the representations were to some extent a matter of opinion. On this record, we cannot say with adequate assurance that the jury's verdict was untainted by the instruction. Accordingly, the express warranty claims must be retried.