Opinion ID: 1155589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vagueness Challenge under the Oregon Constitution

Text: Defendant contends that ORS 166.165(1)(a)(A) violates Article I, sections 20 and 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because its terms are vague. We analyze his contention under the Oregon Constitution first. See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983) (courts should decide questions of state law before reaching federal constitutional issues). The terms of a criminal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it of what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. State v. Graves, 299 Or. 189, 195, 700 P.2d 244 (1985). A reasonable degree of certainty about what conduct falls within the statute's prohibition is required; absolute certainty is not. State v. Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or. 27, 29-30, 741 P.2d 501 (1987). In addition to giving fair notice of prohibited conduct, a criminal statute must not be so vague as to allow a judge or jury unbridled discretion to decide what conduct to punish. Id. at 29, 741 P.2d 501. A law that gives such unbridled discretion to judges and juries offends the principle against ex post facto laws embodied in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, [3] and the principle against standardless and unequal application of criminal laws embodied in Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. [4] State v. Graves, supra, 299 Or. at 195, 700 P.2d 244. Defendant's challenge is directed to the phrase because of their perception of [the victims'] race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation. ORS 166.165(1)(a)(A). He argues that that phrase is inherently nebulous and imprecise. Consequently, he asserts, it invites standardless prosecution. He claims that prosecutors will be able to charge, and juries will be able to convict, under the statute whenever the race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation of the assailants differs from that of the victim. We disagree. The crime is defined in sufficiently clear and explicit terms to apprise defendant and others of what conduct is prohibited. ORS 166.165(1)(a)(A) prohibits two or more assailants, acting together, from causing physical injury to another because the assailants perceive the victim to belong to one of the specified groups. The challenged phrase means simply that the assailants' perception need not be accurate for them to have committed the crime of intimidation in the first degree. For example, if the assailants, acting together, intentionally cause physical injury to a victim because they perceive the victim to be Catholic, the assailants have committed the crime of intimidation in the first degree even if the victim is not in fact Catholic, but is instead Episcopalian. Defendant's assertion that the statute invites prosecution whenever the race of the assailants and the victim happen to differ misses the point in at least two respects. First, even where race is the alleged motivating factor, the perpetrators and the victim do not have to be of different races. Second, the statute requires that the assailants inflict the physical injury because of their perception that the victim belongs to a specified group. The statute expressly and unambiguously requires the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailants' perception of the group to which the victim belongs. See State v. Brown, 310 Or. 347, 353-54, 800 P.2d 259 (1990) (under ORS 163.095(2)(a), defining a form of aggravated murder, the state must prove a causal connection between the murder and the victim's status as a witness, juror, police officer, or other person with duties to the criminal justice system); State v. Maney, 297 Or. 620, 626, 688 P.2d 63 (1984) (same). The trier of fact must find all the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 313 Or. 19, 24, 828 P.2d 1006 (1992). ORS 166.165(1)(a)(A) is not unconstitutionally vague under Article I, sections 20 and 21, of the Oregon Constitution.