Opinion ID: 6496835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Step Two: Unusual or Extraordinary Activity

Text: ¶38 Having identified the totality of the circumstances surrounding the employment activity that precipitated Hickey‘s injuries, we turn to the court of appeals‘ determination that this activity was not unusual under step two of the Allen test. We disagree with the court of appeals and conclude that Hickey‘s long-haul drive in a commercial diesel truck is distinct from typical nonemployment activities in everyday life. ¶39 Under step two of the Allen test, we must ―compare the activity that precipitated the employee‘s injury with ‗the usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life.‘‖ Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 48 (quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 26). We apply an objective standard, based on activities ―the average person typically undertakes in nonemployment life,‖ Allen, 729 P.2d at 28, rather than looking to ―the nonemployment life of the particular worker,‖ id. at 26. An activity is unusual under the test if the exertion it requires or its impact on the body is different from the ―typical nonemployment activities . . . generally expected of people in today‘s society.‖ Id. Examples of employment activities that Utah courts have considered unusual and extraordinary include those that involve ―jumping, lifting great weight, or repetition.‖ Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 51. In contrast, the Allen court named examples of typical exertions performed in ordinary life, including taking a trash can out to the curb and ―climbing the stairs in buildings.‖ 729 P.2d at 26. 11 JBS CARRIERS v. HICKEY Opinion of the Court ¶40 Applying this objective standard, the court of appeals concluded that Hickey‘s drive was neither unusual nor extraordinary because the court ―perceive[d] no meaningful distinction between sitting for a long time in a truck cab and sitting for a long time in a passenger car, or sitting for a long time in an airplane seat, or even sitting for a long time on a couch in front of a television screen.‖ JBS Carriers, 2021 UT App 44, ¶ 24. We must disagree for two reasons. ¶41 First, the Allen analysis requires a comparison of the workplace activity with nonwork activity that is typical of everyday life. The question is not whether some corollary can be identified in nonwork life that some people may do occasionally, but whether the employment activity is like the usual and ordinary activities that people do in everyday life. Unlike taking out the trash or climbing stairs, driving a commercial truck for nine hours in one day with only one break—and with a stationary left leg—is not typical of everyday nonwork life. And while some people may watch television for nine hours straight without moving, take nine-hour international flights and leave their seat only once, or go on long road trips, we cannot describe these as typical of the usual, ordinary activities people do day to day. ¶42 Fundamentally, if we define usual nonemployment activities so broadly as to include international flights and bingewatching television, we may distort the Allen test so that virtually any work activity has some equivalent in nonemployment life. For example, we have concluded that ―jumping, lifting great weight, [and] repetition,‖ Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 51, are unusual workplace activities. But some people may sometimes do those things in nonwork life. After all, some people jump out of airplanes with parachutes, lift 200 pounds at the gym, or run marathons. But the fact that some people sometimes do these things does not make them typical of everyday life. In analyzing whether a particular workplace activity is ―unusual‖ or ―extraordinary,‖ the benchmark for usualness or ordinariness is activity that is typical of everyday nonwork life—like taking out a trash can, walking up stairs, Allen, 729 P.2d at 26, or regaining one‘s balance during a bumpy bus ride, Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 53. ¶43 Second, the nonemployment activities referenced by the court of appeals differ from professional long-haul truck driving in some key respects. Hickey was not just sitting passively for nine hours. He was responsible for operating a commercial 18wheel diesel truck on the highway from Utah to California. So he 12 Cite as: 2022 UT 31 Opinion of the Court had to remain focused on the road, seated in the driver‘s seat, and in a relatively stationary position with his head forward and arms on the steering wheel. His left leg was motionless, and in general he had ―very little‖ room to move his feet. He had ―limited opportunity . . . to stretch, change position, or otherwise move about.‖ And the Board emphasized that ―driving a truck is more complex and demanding than operating or traveling in a personal automobile.‖ If Hickey‘s job was more taxing than driving a personal car, it was certainly more demanding than sitting on a sofa watching television or sitting on an airplane as a passenger. ¶44 But while we ultimately disagree with the court of appeals‘ determination that Hickey‘s drive to California was not an unusual activity under Allen, we recognize the challenge the Labor Commission and courts face when asked to assess whether an employment activity is typical, usual, or ordinary. The varying conclusions of the ALJ, the Board, the court of appeals, and now our court on this question demonstrate this difficulty. Perceptions of what is ―usual‖ or ―unusual‖ can vary. And we do not dispute the dissent‘s observation that there is no precise metric for determining what is typical or usual. Infra ¶¶ 52–53. ¶45 It is possible that, as the dissent posits, there is a better way to determine whether a claimant‘s injury arose ―out of and in the course of the employee‘s employment,‖ UTAH CODE § 34A-2-401(1), when the claimant has a preexisting condition. But neither party has asked us to overturn Allen or briefed the Eldridge factors for overturning precedent. See Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 (identifying ―(1) the persuasiveness of the authority and reasoning on which the precedent was originally based, and (2) how firmly the precedent has become established in the law since it was handed down‖ as two factors to consider before overturning precedent). And we have no briefing before us on the merits of an alternative to the Allen test. So while the dissent makes some valid points, ―[w]e do not overrule our precedents ‗lightly.‘‖ Taylorsville City v. Mitchell, 2020 UT 26, ¶ 30, 466 P.3d 148 (quoting Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 21). And we generally do not return to the drawing board ―unless and until a party meets its burden of establishing that our prior case law is unworthy of stare decisis respect.‖ Waite v. Utah Lab. Comm’n, 2017 UT 86, ¶ 88, 416 P.3d 635 (Pearce, J., concurring). ¶46 To provide additional guidance in this area within the confines of our precedent, we emphasize that the question is not whether some corollary to the employment activity can be located 13 JBS CARRIERS v. HICKEY Opinion of the Court that some people may do outside of work. The question is whether the employment activity is comparable to the usual and ordinary activities that are typical of everyday nonwork life. ¶47 Because we have determined that driving a commercial diesel truck for approximately nine hours with only one break and a stationary left leg is not like the ordinary activities people do in everyday life, we reverse the court of appeals‘ decision. Hickey has successfully shown his employment activities were the legal cause of his injuries under Allen. Accordingly, he has prevailed on his workers‘ compensation claim, regardless of whether his super obesity was a preexisting condition. ¶48 For this reason, we need not determine whether Hickey‘s super obesity functioned as a preexisting condition here. And we do not address whether the court of appeals erred in opining on this question, which was addressed by the ALJ but not the Board. Accordingly, we vacate this portion of the court of appeals‘ opinion.