Opinion ID: 2508259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: A. Failure to object Preliminarily, Jafek's failure to object or raise the issue of whether the State was bound by the plea agreement at sentencing would normally preclude this Court from addressing the issue because issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). However, [i]n the case of fundamental error in a criminal case the Supreme Court may consider the same even though no objection ha[s] been made at . . . trial. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). Because a claim that the State breached a plea agreement affects whether the agreement was knowingly or voluntarily entered, it goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights. . . . State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918, 854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993). Therefore, it is fundamental error and can be raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 915, 693 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Ct.App.1985). B. Plea agreement The next issue is whether the State was bound by the plea agreement after Jafek failed to appear at her sentencing hearing. A defendant is constitutionally entitled to relief when the State breaches a promise made to him in return for a plea of guilty. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 519, 960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998) (citations omitted). When the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise and hence, his conviction cannot stand. Id. (citations omitted). It is important to note that Jafek is not seeking to withdraw her plea; rather, she merely seeks specific performance of the plea agreement. A defendant is also bound by a plea agreement. If the condition upon which the prosecution's promised sentencing recommendation was based fails, the prosecution is not obligated to perform the agreement. Berg, 131 Idaho at 519, 960 P.2d at 740 (citations omitted). In Berg, the defendant pled guilty in exchange for several things, including the State's agreement to recommend the defendant be released on his own recognizance pending sentencing and to recommend retained jurisdiction at sentencing. The defendant failed to appear at the sentencing hearing and the court ordered a bench warrant issued for his arrest. Berg was eventually found in California and extradited back to Idaho. This Court stated: [I]t was implicit in the agreement that [the defendant] must appear at the sentencing hearing. To carry out the purpose of the agreement  a lighter sentence in exchange for a guilty plea  it was essential that [the defendant] appear at the sentencing hearing to accept his sentence. Berg, 131 Idaho at 519-520, 960 P.2d at 740-741. In essence, part of pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, is receiving the benefits of the agreement at sentencing for the crime to which the defendant has admitted guilt. Generally a defendant cannot receive a sentence unless he attends the sentencing hearing and consequently, failing to attend sentencing constitutes a breach of the plea agreement by the defendant. In this case, Jafek promised to accept her sentence when she entered the plea agreement. Like the defendant in Berg, Jafek did not perform her part of the plea agreement to plead guilty to the charge because she did not attend the sentencing hearing. The prosecution is not obligated to perform a plea agreement [i]f the condition upon which the prosecution's promised sentencing recommendation was based fails.... Berg, 131 Idaho at 519, 960 P.2d at 740. Therefore, at the time the State appeared and argued for an appropriate sentence, it was no longer obligated under the plea agreement to recommend a sentence of two to four years with a rider. Thus, no error was committed when the State recommended a harsher sentence for Jafek. C. Retained jurisdiction Because Jafek's sentence is within the statutory limits, Jafek carries the burden of establishing that her sentence represents a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Shiloff, 125 Idaho 104, 106, 867 P.2d 978, 980 (1994). When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). In this case, the district judge correctly exercised his discretion in acknowledging the option of retained jurisdiction, but then articulating the reasons why he felt it was not a good option under the circumstances. The judge explained that the retained jurisdiction program was based on trust and that Jafek had demonstrated she was not a candidate for the program based on her conduct in failing to appear at both the preliminary hearing and for sentencing. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to retain jurisdiction. D. Motion for reduction of sentence Jafek argues the district court abused its discretion by denying Jafek's Motion for Reduction of Sentence. A motion to reduce a sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea of leniency, and a decision on such a motion is vested within the sound discretion of the sentencing court. State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 504, 873 P.2d 144, 149 (1994) (citations omitted). Jafek admits that no new or additional information was presented in support of the motion. Because we conclude Jafek's sentence was reasonable when imposed, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion.