Opinion ID: 2831691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Conduct at Trial

Text: Lanza and Galán next assert two, interrelated challenges to the judge's conduct during trial: (1) the judge purportedly 4 Galán also points us to two state court cases to support his position. See Commonwealth v. Stewart,13 N.E.3d 981 (Mass. 2014); Harris v. State, 184 S.W.3d 801, 813 (Tex. App. 2005). But, neither of those cases presented a factual background establishing that the officer's inferences were both obvious and reasonable. 5 The government also offers the good faith exception as a fall-back position. The clear absence of any error in the affidavit makes going down this potentially dubious path, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.24 (1984), unnecessary. -14- intervened exclusively on behalf of, and associated herself with, the prosecution; and (2) the judge allegedly made improper comments about Galán's attorney. The parties dispute whether these claims were preserved or whether plain error review applies. Given that the defendants cannot succeed under either standard, we need not dither. Under the usual framework for judicial bias claims, a party must still show (1) that the [judge's] comments were improper and (2) that there was serious prejudice. United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Laureano-Pérez, -- F.3d --, 2015 WL 4577763 at  (1st Cir. July 30, 2015). The defendants' first contention is that the judge excessively interfered on behalf of, and associated herself with, the prosecution. They begin this argument by focusing on the instances when the court allegedly assisted the government. The defendants cite nearly twenty examples where defense counsel objected to the prosecution's question, and the court, rather than merely ruling on the objection, responded by asking the witness a question in a non-objectionable way or by instructing the government on how to properly phrase the question. E.g., (So counsel, what you want to ask is . . . how [the list] comports to what he used to prepare.); ([Y]ou stated that at the police headquarters you actually saw what was seized, is that correct?); ([A]sk him if he was the arresting agent he will say no and then -15- you will ask him if he knows who arrested them. [A]nd then he testified he alerted the other agents.); (He wants to know how did you get the latent print to look at from the object.) In doing so, the defendants say, the trial judge essentially doffed her judicial robe and joined the prosecution. Of course, the mere fact that the judge intervened is not enough for us to find error. It is well-established that a judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). He or she thus has a perfect right -- albeit a right that should be exercised with care -- to participate actively in the trial proper. Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997). We do not examine a single comment by a judge on its own but, instead, must view it in the context of the entire transcript. United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 607 (1st Cir. 2012). As a comprehensive review of this transcript establishes, the judge skirted near the line on discrete occasions but, on the whole, never crossed it. Broadly, the trial lasted 18 days and was a massive, multi-defendant conspiracy case which the court had the authority to move through expeditiously. Cf. Deary v. City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1993) (The trial judge has discretion to maintain the pace of trial.) Indeed, the judge was quite explicit that this was the court's goal. See, e.g., (I ask -16- that the government use the time [a 15 minute break] to identify the specific spots where they need to go because we need to move faster.). More concretely, a pattern emerges with respect to the judge's participation. The court generally intervened after a party made a consistent (sometimes repetitive) string of objections, or when an objection was lodged immediately after the parties completed a lengthy bench conference discussing that very same evidentiary issue. In other words, the judge interrupted when the case was unnecessarily slowing down. While it is true that this was generally done to the benefit of the prosecution -- though, contrary to what the defendants insinuate, not exclusively so -- the interactions were largely driven by defense counsels' own conduct. Defense counsel asserted a plethora of objections (often repeatedly so or after the judge had made her rulings clear), while the prosecution exhibited more restraint. Diligent defense of a client is certainly encouraged, but technical and repetitive interruptions may properly prompt the trial judge to intervene to proceed the trial. Indeed, the judge indicated this on several occasions by saying, for example, Stop basically, you should stop objecting on the same grounds it is clear . . . You can further inquire on cross. The judge was not, despite the defendants insistence, gratuitously interfering. -17- With respect to this initial claim, Lanza and Galán also invoke instances where they allege that the judge affirmatively identified herself with the government and thus, in their view, turned the jury against the defendants. Three statements, at first blush, could appear fairly damaging. For example, at one point the