Opinion ID: 2216328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's statements to grand jury regarding Hardaway

Text: During the testimony of Sergeant Morrill before the grand jury, a grand juror asked, [w]asn't there a third suspect also? The prosecutor responded, [w]e can't really discuss anything with respect to Mr. Hardaway and [h]e's not a suspect. I can tell you he's not a suspect in this case. Appellant's challenge raises a question of prosecutorial misconduct. As a general rule, a prosecutor should honor grand jury requests for additional evidence, State v. Wollan, 303 N.W.2d 253, 255 (Minn.1981). A prosecutor should not knowingly withhold evidence from the grand jury which would tend to substantially negate a suspect's guilt. See State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 105-06 (Minn.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132, 101 S.Ct. 954, 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981). Whether or not additional information concerning Hardaway was exculpatory, the failure to produce exculpatory evidence `will not require reversal unless it would have materially affected the [grand jury] proceeding.' State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 104-05 (Minn.1989) (quoting Olkon, 299 N.W.2d at 106). It is very unlikely that permitting the grand jury to investigate Hardaway would have materially altered the grand jury's decision to indict Roan because the grand jury also had Roan's confession before it. We hold that any error committed by the prosecutor in deflecting questions about Hardaway was harmless. See Minn.R.Crim.P. 31.01. Next, appellant asserts that the State, because of its working relationship with the BATF, was required to disclose an allegedly exculpatory tape recording of Betty Cole within the possession of the BATF. In November 1993, appellant served a subpoena duces tecum on the BATF for all documents pertaining to its federal investigation of Hardaway and Cole, specifically requesting the tape recording. The BATF refused to disclose the tape, asserting that any disclosure would jeopardize an ongoing federal investigation. On the morning of trial, the trial court granted the U.S. Attorney's motion to quash the document portion of the subpoena. At trial, the BATF agents testified they were instructed not to answer questions about the on-going federal investigation. Agent Keaton acknowledged the existence of the on-going federal investigation into gun running and money laundering involving Hardaway and Cole, and he acknowledged that federal agents postponed Hardaway's indictment. He testified that Hardaway was not an informant and that neither Hardaway nor Cole had made a deal with federal agents. Moreover, on cross-examination of Betty Cole, appellant emphasized Cole's potential bias, highlighting her relationship with Hardaway and her pregnancy at the time of his arrest. Appellant repeatedly emphasized that Hardaway's indictment was delayed. Appellant argues the BATF information should have been disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and the trial court's quashing of the subpoena duces tecum violated appellant's right to a fair trial. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Minn.R.Crim.P. 9.01, subd. 2(1), provides for discovery of matters in the possession or control of other governmental agencies. Upon motion of the defendant, the court for good cause shown shall require the prosecuting attorney,    to assist the defendant in seeking access to specified matters relating to the case which are within the possession or control of an official or employee of any governmental agency, but which are not within the control of the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney shall use diligent good faith efforts to cause the official or employee to allow the defendant access at any reasonable time and in any reasonable manner to inspect, photograph, copy, or have reasonable tests made. Minn.R.Crim.P. 9.01, subd. 2(1). Moreover, The prosecuting attorney's obligations under [rule 9.01] extend to material and information in the possession or control of members of the prosecution staff and of any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with reference to the particular case have reported to the prosecuting attorney's office. Minn.R.Crim.P. 9.01, subd. 1(7). Minn.R.Crim.P. 9.01, subd. 1(7), is dispositive on this issue. The BATF, as a federal agency, does not report to the Hennepin County prosecutor's office within the meaning of Minn.R.Crim.P. 9.01, subd. 1(7). Moreover, appellant does not allege that the prosecutor withheld information in this matter, and we conclude that the prosecutor fulfilled the diligent good faith requirement of Minn.R.Crim.P. 9.01, subd. 2(1). Even if the trial court erred in quashing the subpoena, a new trial is required only if the BATF's nondisclosure was material to the outcome of the verdict. See State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 359, 370-71 (Minn.1980).    [I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). The jury was aware of a potentially relevant ongoing federal investigation. Given appellant's confessions and the ballistic evidence linking appellant with the murders, BATF's refusal to disclose additional information does not warrant a new trial. Appellant asserts that police failure to record his confessions violated his right to due process and that his confession was involuntary. In State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.1994), this court held that all custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention. We clearly stated that the rule established in Scales applies prospectively from June 30, 1994, the date the opinion was filed. Id. at 593. Thus, the police officer's failure to record appellant's confessions did not violate Scales. Having carefully reviewed the circumstances surrounding appellant's confession we conclude that appellant's confession was voluntary. See State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502 (Minn.1984). This court considers several factors in making this determination including the appellant's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience, and the ability to comprehend. State v. Orscanin, 283 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Minn.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 464, 62 L.Ed.2d 385 (1979). Appellant received six separate Miranda warnings including the warning administered immediately before he commenced his formal statement to police. He received a Miranda warning upon his arrest, when questioned by Agent Keaton, when questioned by Sergeant DeConcini at 2:40 p.m. and again near midnight, by Sergeant Walsh in roll-call room, and prior to his formal statement. He indicated he understood those rights. There was no evidence appellant was emotional prior to his confession, nor was there evidence of coercion. Appellant was permitted to use the bathroom, and ate pizza with the officers during his detention in Chicago. Based upon the totality of the relevant circumstances we conclude that appellant's statement was voluntary. Appellant asserts the photographic line-up employed by police was so unnecessarily suggestive as to create a `very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.' State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 106-07 (Minn.1985) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)). Admission of identification evidence derived from suggestive identification procedures violates due process. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). However, a lineup need not use exact clones of the accused. State v. Farr, 357 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Minn.App. 1984). Nor must a photographic display exactly follow the description of the suspect. State v. Myers, 413 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Minn. App.), aff'd as modified, 416 N.W.2d 736 (Minn.1987). The photographic line-up observed by witnesses consisted of seven polaroid photographs of African-American men taken by a Chicago police officer. Photograph number one was a picture of Hardaway, number three was of Logan, and number six was of Roan. Appellant asserts the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive because both appellant and Logan have short, cropped hair. Of the remaining four filler photographs, only one other participant also had very short hair. The other three had medium-short to medium length hair. Appellant repeatedly called the jury's attention to perceived deficiencies in the line-up on cross-examination. [2] In State v. Vance, 392 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn.App.), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn., Oct. 29, 1986), the court held that a photographic display shown to the victim was not impermissibly suggestive although defendant's was the only photograph among seven that portrayed a man with a mustache extending past the corners of his mouth. The display included four photographs of men with mustaches, one with a beard, and two without facial hair. Id.; see also Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d at 106 (lineup not impermissibly suggestive although the accused was the only participant with a beard and the ages of participants varied within 12-year range); State v. King, 296 Minn. 306, 310, 208 N.W.2d 287, 290 (1973) (holding that lineup in which defendant was conspicuously taller than other participants was not unduly suggestive); State v. McConoughey, 282 Minn. 161, 167-68, 163 N.W.2d 568, 573 (1968) (holding that nine-man lineup was not impermissibly suggestive where defendant was the only participant with freckles). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the photographic lineup was not so impermissibly suggestive as to violate appellant's due process rights. Appellant challenges as inadmissible hearsay Betty Cole's testimony describing appellant's gesture [l]ike a gun to the head when appellant was implicitly asked to confirm Logan's report that each of them had shot a man. Minn.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(B) provides that the statement of a third person offered against a party is not hearsay and is therefore admissible where the party has manifested an adoption [of the statement] or belief in its truth. In a criminal proceeding, any waiver of the constitutional right to confront an accuser must be clear and unequivocal. Village of New Hope v. Duplessie, 304 Minn. 417, 421, 231 N.W.2d 548, 551 (1975). Therefore, the trial court must first determine that the asserted adoptive admission be manifested by conduct or statements which are unequivocal, positive, and definite in nature, clearly showing that in fact defendant intended to adopt the hearsay statements as his own. 304 Minn. at 425, 231 N.W.2d at 553 (emphasis in original). In State v. Shoop, 441 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Minn.1989), a nod of the head was sufficient to constitute an adoptive admission under the guidelines established in Duplessie. In Shoop, a witness testified that the co-defendant stated, I didn't do it, [defendant] did. 441 N.W.2d at 482. The trial court permitted the witness to testify that he saw the defendant nod his head affirmatively immediately after the comment. Id. The trial court properly admitted the head nod as an adoptive admission of defendant because [t]he record demonstrates [the witness'] positive and unequivocal testimony that he saw defendant affirm [co-defendant's] statement by nodding his head. Id. Betty Cole's testimony describing appellant's gesture is certainly as definitive as the nod of the head in Shoop, 441 N.W.2d at 482, and therefore we conclude that it is sufficiently unequivocal, positive and definite to qualify as an adoptive admission. Finally, appellant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive life sentences. When sentencing a person convicted of multiple counts of first-degree murder, the trial court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive life sentences. Minn.Stat. § 609.15, subd. 1 (1994); State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Minn.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). When reviewing the imposition of consecutive life sentences, this court considers whether the sentences are commensurate with culpability or whether they exaggerate the defendant's criminality. Id.; Bangert v. State, 282 N.W.2d 540, 547 (Minn.1979). The court is guided by sentences received by past offenders. State v. Miller, 488 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Minn.1992). Appellant contends consecutive sentences exaggerate his culpability. A review of cases properly imposing consecutive sentences demonstrates that the consecutive sentences here in no way exaggerate appellant's criminality. See, e.g., Miller, 488 N.W.2d at 241 (upholding three consecutive sentences permissible where defendant shot and killed three victims as they slept); Bangert, 282 N.W.2d at 547 (upholding consecutive sentences where defendant shot and killed two sleeping victims). Appellant executed the brutal, premeditated killing of two store employees in order to obtain guns for sale on the street. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences in this case. The judgment of conviction and sentencing is affirmed. Affirmed.