Opinion ID: 776323
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reimposition of the Original Sentence After Remand

Text: 20 Any increase in a resentence above the original sentence imposed is presumptively vindictive, and requires an affirmative explanation by the resentencing judge, based on specific conduct or events that have taken place since the original sentence. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Rodgers views this case as constructively identical to the situation typically governed by Pearce, where the resentencing judge imposes a sentence that is more severe than the original sentence. Rodgers takes this position even though the sentence imposed after remand in this case was the same as the original sentence. His argument hinges on the fact that the Sentencing Guidelines, which did not exist at the time Pearce was written, require an actual decrease in the sentence when a judge finds acceptance of responsibility. Rodgers contends that there should have been a decrease in his sentence after remand because the district court found that the original denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility based on his state arrest was improper under Jeter. He asserts that if the denial was improper, then the reduction should have been granted. Because there was no actual decrease, his argument goes, there must have been some actual increase. See United States v. Bond, 171 F.3d 1047, 1051 n. 2 (6th Cir.1999) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (asserting that an increase in either component of the current sentencing scheme (i.e. offense level or criminal history category), even without a higher total sentence, raises the fairness issues addressed in Pearce and should be fully explained on the record). Therefore, Rodgers claims that the sentence imposed on remand gives rise to the Pearce presumption of vindictive sentencing. 21 Rodgers' attempt to classify a reimposition of the original sentence after remand as an increased sentence after remand conflicts with this Court's prior rulings. It is clearly established that a court violates due process when it acts vindictively and imposes a heavier sentence upon a reconvicted defendant for the purpose of punishing him for his having exercised his right to an appeal and succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-24, 89 S.Ct. 2072; see Duso, 42 F.3d at 367-69 (applying the Pearce rule when the defendant succeeded in getting his sentence, but not conviction, set aside). If the sentencing judge fails to provide a clear explanation on the record for the change upon resentencing as required by Pearce, the fact of the increase gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness that violates due process. Nonetheless, resentencing courts retain wide discretion in determining appropriate sentences, and may consider all the information that reasonably bears on the proper sentence for the defendant. United States v. Jackson, 181 F.3d 740, 745-46 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984)). 22 In cases where the defendant ultimately receives a lower sentence at resentencing, the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness never arises. Jackson, 181 F.3d at 745 n. 4; see United States v. Smith, No. 00-5370, 2001 WL 1216972, slip op. at  (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 2001) (Because the resentence term was shorter than the original sentence, we hold that the presumption of vindictive sentencing does not apply.). Likewise, the Pearce presumption does not arise where the resentence term is equal to the original sentence. See United States v. Blanton, No. 90-5533, 1990 WL 197832, at  (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 1990) (finding that the Pearce presumption did not apply where the same total sentence was imposed after remand when the resentencing judge reduced the defendant's offense level, but then sentenced him at the high end of the sentencing range). In determining whether the resentence term is shorter than, longer than, or equal to the original sentencing term, the Court is to compare the total resentence term with the total original sentence. Smith, 2001 WL 1216972, slip op. at  (stating that this Court's past decisions have consistently compared the total resentence term with the total original sentence in determining whether the presumption of vindictiveness applied) (citations omitted); see Bond, 171 F.3d at 1049-50 (finding no vindictiveness when the total resentence term was shorter than the total original sentence, even though the district court increased the defendant's criminal history category during resentencing). 23 A comparison between the total resentence term and the total original sentence in the matter sub judice reveals that the two terms are identical. Therefore, the Court finds that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not arise in this case.