Opinion ID: 1668303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: christiansen's appeal

Text: On cross-appeal, Christiansen contends that the trial court should have directed a verdict on the breach of contract claim brought by Lindsay. By the end of trial, Lindsay's remaining allegations were that Christiansen breached its contract (1) in failing to fulfill and comply with the plans, specifications, and contract documents of the facility; (2) in not performing the contract monitoring wells' installation pursuant to the best known workmanship; and (3) in not performing its work and services in a skillful, careful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. With respect to the alleged breach of contract, both parties rely on the following rule: Where a contractor makes an absolute and unqualified contract to construct a building or perform a given undertaking, it is the general, and perhaps universal, rule that he assumes the risks attending the performance of the contract, and must repair and make good any injury or defect which occurs or develops before the completed work has been delivered to the other party. But where he makes a contract to perform a given undertaking in accordance with prescribed plans and specifications, this rule does not apply. Under such a contract he is not permitted to vary from the prescribed plans and specifications even if he deems them improper and insufficient; and therefore cannot be held to guarantee that work performed as required by them will be free from defects, or withstand the action of the elements, or accomplish the purpose intended. Where the contract specifies what he is to do and the manner and method of doing it, and he does the work specified in the manner specified, his engagement is fulfilled, and he remains liable only for defects resulting from improper workmanship or other fault on his part. State v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 43, 50-51, 248 N.W. 807, 810-11 (1933). See, also, Langel Chevrolet-Cadillac v. Midwest Bridge, 213 Neb. 283, 329 N.W.2d 97 (1983); Fuchs v. Parsons Constr. Co., 166 Neb. 188, 88 N.W.2d 648 (1958); Fuchs v. Parsons Constr. Co., 172 Neb. 719, 111 N.W.2d 727 (1961). Christiansen asserts that the performance rendered was, in all material respects, in accordance with plans and specifications provided and that Lindsay, therefore, cannot hold Christiansen liable for the defectiveness or insufficiency of the plans, but only for those defects resulting from improper workmanship. Lindsay, however, asserts that because Christiansen failed to comply with the plans and specifications, Christiansen assumed the risk attending the performance of the contract. Furthermore, Lindsay submits that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in that respect. The issue before us, therefore, is whether the plans and specifications in the contract were followed. The plans reveal that the monitoring wells were originally intended to be dug to a depth of 110 feet and that only the first 3 feet below ground level of the annular spaces were to be filled with bentonite clay. As built, the wells were dug to a depth of approximately 58 feet, and the first 26 feet of the annular spaces were filled with bentonite clay. Gilmore preapproved the change in depth, but not the change in the fill of the annular spaces. Notwithstanding this evidence, we note that the contract between Lindsay and Gilmore contained the following provisions: 27.1 The Engineer [Gilmore] shall act as the Owner's [Lindsay's] representative during the construction period. He shall decide questions which may arise as to quality and acceptability of materials furnished and work performed. He shall interpret the intent of the Contract Documents in a fair and unbiased manner. (Emphasis supplied.) Further, we note that Gilmore certified that construction of the acid waste treatment facility, including work incidental thereto, has been completed and contract, therefore, has been fully performed in accordance with the plans and specifications.... We also note that uncontroverted evidence establishes that Lindsay paid Christiansen pursuant to the certificate of payment issued by Gilmore covering the installation of the monitoring wells. In City of Gering v. Smith Co., 215 Neb. 174, 337 N.W.2d 747 (1983), we held that an express or implied acceptance of work as in compliance with a building contract operates as a waiver of defective performance. However, this rule is inapplicable where the acceptance was under protest or induced by fraud, or where the defects were latent and unknown to the owner. Id. In that case, the City of Gering hired Smith Company to construct a sewer. Upon completion of the construction, the city's engineer issued a certificate to the city stating that the sewer had been completed in accordance with the terms of the contract. The engineer also recommended that the city accept the work. Pursuant to the engineer's recommendation, the city council accepted the work. Notwithstanding the certification and acceptance, one of the engineers working on the job knew that the sewer had a sag in it. Although the city officials testified that they were unaware of the sag at the time they accepted the work, we held that this did not affect the validity of the waiver. We held that knowledge of the engineer-agent was knowledge of the principal. If the City intended to object to the work because of the sag, a fact known to the City's engineer, it had to do so before accepting the work in reliance upon its engineer's certificate. 215 Neb. at 180, 337 N.W.2d at 751. Likewise, if Lindsay was going to object to the construction of the wells, it had to do so before accepting the work in reliance upon Gilmore's certificate. As in City of Gering, Lindsay's acceptance of the work operated as a waiver of defective performance. Lindsay has neither pled nor attempted to prove that its acceptance was induced by fraud or was made under protest. In light of Lindsay's express waiver, the trial court should have directed a verdict for Christiansen.