Opinion ID: 1452469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether sufficient evidence existed to sustain the aggravating circumstance of creating great risk of death to more than one person

Text: Pursuant to NRS 200.033(3), the State alleged and the jury found the aggravating circumstance that in committing the murders, appellants knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. Appellants contend that there was insufficient evidence to find this circumstance. Appellants cite Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 694 (1989), where this court determined there was no factual basis for finding creation of a great risk of death to more than one person. However, the murder weapons in Jimenez were knives, and the court concluded: Stabbing two persons with two different knives, even if Jimenez did both stabbings, does not make either knife a weapon or device that is normally dangerous to a multiplicity of persons. Id. at 342, 775 P.2d at 697. Appellants also cite Moran v. State, 103 Nev. 138, 734 P.2d 712 (1987). However, in Moran no other persons were present in the apartment when Moran shot the victim, and there was no evidence that any neighbor was at an immediate risk of death or that Moran knew of any other person in close proximity. Id. at 142, 734 P.2d at 714. In the case at bar, Flanagan shot his grandmother knowing that his grandfather was upstairs, and Moore shot the grandfather as he came downstairs. They planned to kill both grandparents. This court held in Hogan v. State, 103 Nev. 21, 24-25, 732 P.2d 422, 424 (1987) ( Hogan I ), that NRS 200.033(3) includes a `course of action' consisting of two intentional shootings closely related in time and place.... See also Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 959, 860 P.2d 710, 715 (1993) ( Hogan II ) (Obviously, one who intends to commit multiple murders within a closely related time and place engages in a course of conduct inherently hazardous to the life of more than one person.). Appellants point out that in 1993 the Legislature added the aggravating circumstance of conviction, in the immediate proceeding, of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. NRS 200.033(12); 1993 Nev.Stat., ch. 44, § 1 at 77. This amendment does not apply to murders committed before October 1, 1993. 1993 Nev.Stat., ch. 44, § 2 at 77. Appellants contend that this shows that the Legislature did not intend to include cases such as theirs, where only intended victims were murdered, within the ambit of NRS 200.033(3), undermining the holding in Hogan I and Hogan II. However, we conclude that under Hogan I the aggravator in question was valid in appellants' case. The legislative amendment apparently requires that for murders committed after October 1, 1993, the aggravator set forth in NRS 200.033(12), rather than the one in NRS 200.033(3), be applied to cases such as this one. But this does not mean that NRS 200.033(3) was improperly applied to appellants' case, where the murders occurred in 1984. We conclude that substantial evidence existed to support the finding that appellants knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon and course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.