Opinion ID: 6329160
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We can affirm the award of summary judgment on

Text: alternative grounds. We have “discretion to affirm on any ground adequately supported by the record.” Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). In deciding how to exercise our discretion, we consider whether  “the ground was fully briefed and argued here and below,”  “the parties have had a fair opportunity to develop the factual record,” and  “our decision would only involve questions of law” “in light of factual findings to which we defer or uncontested facts.” Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations & internal quotation marks omitted). Each factor supports consideration of the Board’s argument for affirmance on the alternative ground that the Board previously lacked statutory authority to issue the licenses. First, the Defendants briefed the issue in district court and on appeal. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 7–8. The Plaintiffs could have (and should have) responded to this alternative argument for affirmance. But they didn’t. Second, both parties had a fair opportunity to develop the factual record on the Board’s authority to grant a specialty license. In district court, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on this issue, triggering an obligation for Dr. Seay and Dr. Jacobs to present their evidence on the Board’s authority to grant a specialty license. See Celotex 13 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 14 v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). So we have a full factual record to decide the issue. Finally, the Board’s authority involves a purely legal question: Even now, the parties present no factual disputes as to the Board’s authority prior to the recent statutory change. Because each factor supports consideration, we address the Defendants’ argument for affirmance on alternate grounds involving the Board’s prior inability to grant the specialty licenses. 2. The Plaintiffs waived their opportunity to address the statutory constraints on the Board. In their response brief, the Board members argued that the claims for damages were invalid because  Oklahoma law previously did not recognize dental anesthesiology as a specialty,  the Board was just carrying out the state law, and  the Board couldn’t have done anything differently. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 7–8. In their reply brief, the Plaintiffs did not respond to the merits of the Board members’ argument. The Plaintiffs instead argued that  the issue didn’t relate to the district court’s rationale,  the Board members’ brief did not refer to the record, and  the argument was not responsive to the opening brief. 14 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 15 Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4. Missing, however, was a response to the substance of the Board members’ argument. We don’t craft arguments for the parties. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13 (10th Cir. 1999). The Board members urged affirmance on alternative grounds, and the Plaintiffs had a full opportunity to address that argument in their reply brief. They declined to do so. In their opening and reply briefs, the Plaintiffs refer to the Board’s role in prosecuting them in the 1990s. The district court treated the conduct in the 1990s as time-barred, and the Plaintiffs don’t question that ruling. The Plaintiffs instead focus their appeal on the Board’s more recent denial of their applications for specialty licenses. In responding to that claim, the Board members urged us to affirm on the ground that they couldn’t issue specialty licenses for anesthesiology when those licenses were prohibited under state law. In their reply brief, the Plaintiffs did not respond to the Board members’ argument that Oklahoma law had prohibited approval of the specialty licenses. By forgoing any response in their reply brief, the Plaintiffs waived any non-obvious defect in the Board members’ alternative argument for affirmance. Hasan v. AIG Prop. Cas. Co., 935 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 15 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 16 2019); 4 see Eaton v. Pacheco, 931 F.3d 1009, 1031 (10th Cir. 2019) (stating that the failure to address an issue in the reply brief constitutes a waiver of “any non-obvious responses” that the appellant could have made); United States v. A.S., 939 F.3d 1063, 1076 (10th Cir. 2019) (stating that we’re free to conclude that the appellant waived any non-obvious responses to the appellee’s argument by failing to address it in the reply brief). Though Dr. Seay and Dr. Jacobs waived any objections to nonobvious defects, we asked about the issue after Dr. Seay and Dr. Jacobs had completed their presentations in oral argument. 5 They responded to our questions on the issue. But their responses to our questioning don’t cure the waiver from their failure to address the issue in their reply brief. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 800, 805 (10th Cir. 1998) 4 There we approvingly quoted a Seventh Circuit opinion: “When an appellee advances an alternative ground for upholding a ruling by the district judge, and the appellant does not respond in his reply brief . . ., he [does not] concede[] the correctness of the ruling . . . . But he waives, as a practical matter anyway, any objections not obvious to the court to specific points urged by the appellee.” Hasan, 935 F.3d at 1099 (alterations in original) (quoting Hardy v. City Optical Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 1994)). 5 At that time, we asked the Plaintiffs why they haven’t waived the Board members’ alternative argument for affirmance by failing to address it in the reply brief. Oral Arg. at 29:28–31:51. The Plaintiffs did not respond to this part of the question or otherwise suggest a reason for us to overlook the waiver. See id. 16 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 17 (appellate arguments are waived when presented for the first time in oral argument). After oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefing on mootness. The Plaintiffs responded, presenting their argument on mootness. But the Plaintiffs slipped into their supplemental brief a new response to the Board’s alternative argument for affirmance. Appellants’ Am. Supp. Br. on Mootness at 5. That was too late. We ordered briefing on mootness, not issues that could and should have been presented in the Plaintiffs’ reply brief. We thus confine our review to any obvious defect in the Board members’ alternative argument for affirmance. We haven’t squarely addressed how to consider obviousness in this setting. But the Supreme Court and our court have addressed obviousness when considering qualified immunity and plain error. In these settings, an error is ordinarily obvious only when it is apparent from precedent or the great weight of authority. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (qualified immunity); United States v. Miller, 978 F.3d 746, 763 (10th Cir. 2020) (plain error). This approach makes sense here, for we would ordinarily consider a defect obvious if the defect had been apparent from a precedent or weighty authority elsewhere. We thus conclude that a defect in the Board members’ argument would ordinarily be obvious only in the presence of contrary precedent or the great weight of authority. 17 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 18 3. We see no obvious defect in the Board members’ alternative argument for affirmance. The Board members argued in their response brief that until the recent statutory amendment, they couldn’t issue specialty licenses in dental anesthesiology. We see no obvious defect in that argument. The Board is a creature of Oklahoma law, so the Board members drew their authority from the Oklahoma legislature. State ex rel. Okla. State Dep’t of Health v. Robertson, 152 P.3d 875, 880 (Okla. 2006). When the Board denied the Plaintiffs’ applications, Oklahoma law prohibited specialty licenses in dental anesthesiology. Because of this prohibition, the Board members could reasonably have considered themselves powerless to do anything different. See Sholer v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 945 P.2d 469, 474 (Okla. 1995), as corrected (June 26, 1997), as supplemented on reh’g (July 1, 1997), as corrected (Aug. 14, 1997) (noting that while Oklahoma courts afford deference to a state agency’s interpretations of Oklahoma statutes, state agencies cannot “misapply” unambiguous statutes). When the Board denied the Plaintiffs’ applications for specialty licenses, the Oklahoma Dental Act listed the specialties that could be recognized. That list omitted dental anesthesiology. Despite that omission, the Plaintiffs insisted at oral argument and in their supplemental brief on 18 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 19 mootness that the Board members had the power to grant licenses for unlisted specialties. Even if the Board had enjoyed this power, it wouldn’t be obvious to us. To determine the extent of the Board’s authority, we ordinarily start with the wording of the statute (the Oklahoma Dental Act). See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016). When the Plaintiffs sued in 2017, the Oklahoma statute provided that “[t]he Board shall use the American Dental Association guidelines for the purpose of defining a specialty practice area.” Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 328.22(D) (2015 supp.) (emphasis added). 6 The use of the mandatory shall suggested that the Board could grant licenses only for the listed specialties. See Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1320 (2020). Shall means “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to.” Shall, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). “Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.” Kingdomware, 579 U.S. at 171. Oklahoma amended the statute in 2018, changing shall to may and allowing the Board to use either “the American Dental Association guidelines or the guidelines of another nationally recognized dental 6 The statute elsewhere identified dental specialties that the Board had to recognize. Okla. Stat. tit. 59 § 328.22(A)(3) (2015 supp.). These specialties did not include dental anesthesiology. See id. 19 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 20 association or board for the purpose of defining a specialty practice area not otherwise defined [in the statute].” Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 328.22(D) (2018 supp.). 7 The 2018 amendment broadened the Board’s authority to allow recognition of specialties upon approval by the Commission on Dental Accreditation of the American Dental Association. Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 328.22 (2018 supp.); see Okla. Admin. Code § 195:10-9-2 (2006 supp.) (specialties recognized by the Board and qualifying requirements). But at that time, the American Dental Association had not yet recognized dental anesthesiology as a specialty; 8 and the Plaintiffs have 7 In their opening brief, the Plaintiffs state that after the American Dental Association voted to approve dental anesthesiology as a specialty, the Oklahoma legislature amended the law in 2019 by changing shall to may. The Plaintiffs are mistaken. The statute was amended in 2018 (before the American Dental Association had recognized dental anesthesiology as a specialty). See Okla. H.B. 2759 (2017). The 2019 amendment dealt with another provision of the statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 328.22(A)(2) (2019 supp.). See Okla. S.B. 603 (2019). In their supplemental brief on mootness, the Plaintiffs assert that the legislature amended the statute in 2019 “so that the Board could avoid granting licenses to anesthesiologists.” Appellants’ Am. Supp. Br. on Mootness at 5. But the Plaintiffs cite no support for this assertion. 8 Anesthesia and Sedation, Amer. Dental Assoc., https://www.ada.org/resources/research/science-and-research-institute/oralhealth-topics/anesthesia-and-sedation (last updated Nov. 9, 2021) (noting that the American Dental Association had recognized dental anesthesiology in March 2019); see Am. Acad. of Implant Dentistry v. Parker, 152 F. Supp. 3d 641, 647 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (stating in 2016 that the American Dental Association did not recognize dental anesthesiology as a specialty), aff’d, 860 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2017). 20 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 21 not identified another national organization that had recognized dental anesthesiology as a specialty. So even with the statutory change in 2018, Oklahoma law continued to prohibit specialty licenses for dental anesthesiology. Given the statutory constraints on the Board’s authority, we see no obvious defect in the Board members’ alternative argument for affirmance. 4. The Plaintiffs haven’t shown an obvious constitutional infirmity in the Oklahoma Dental Act when the Board initially denied the applications. In oral argument, the Plaintiffs suggested that despite the Oklahoma Dental Act’s exclusion of dental anesthesiology as a recognized specialty, the Board members should nonetheless incur liability for enforcing the statute because they knew the statute was unconstitutional. Oral Argument at 29:35–31:54. A board member’s reliance on a state statute may prevent liability. Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2005). But “some statutes are so obviously unconstitutional” that board members may incur liability for damages unless they “second-guess the legislature and refuse to enforce an unconstitutional statute.” Id. at 1233. A constitutional violation would ordinarily have been obvious only if a precedent or the weight of authority had already deemed the state law unconstitutional. See Part III(B)(2), above. But even now, the Plaintiffs have pointed to no such case law. 21 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 22 The Plaintiffs say that the prior statutory restrictions constituted denials of due process, equal protection, and free speech. But the Plaintiffs haven’t pointed to any meaningful support in the case law. In the context of discussing the statute of limitations, the Plaintiffs asserted that Dr. Seay had a property interest in a specialty license and was entitled to due process. This assertion consisted in its entirety of this paragraph: The [district] court trivialized Plaintiff Seay’s right to due process of law. In April 2017, Seay filed an Application for a Specialty License. His application has never been considered by the Board. He has never been given an opportunity to be heard. The Board has defended the due process violation by pleading that Seay does not have a protected property interest in his license and is not entitled to due process. (JA III:444, Doc. 57; JA I: 26–27, Doc. 1.) This defense is contrary to law. Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, 1996 OK 41. Appellants’ Opening Br. at 17. But the only cited case, Johnson, wouldn’t have rendered a property interest obvious to the Board. There the court had addressed revocation of an existing license—not an applicant’s request for a new license. Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists of State of Okla., 913 P.2d 1339, 1345, corrected (Okla. 1996). The Plaintiffs also refer in their opening brief to a denial of equal protection. These references consist of these three cursory assertions. 1. Plaintiff filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that under color of state law, they had been continuously deprived of their property and liberty interest 22 Appellate Case: 21-6054 Document: 010110665826 Date Filed: 04/01/2022 Page: 23 without due process of law, denied equal protection, freedom of speech and restrained from competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 and the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act, 79 O.S. § 201, et seq.