Opinion ID: 565038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Title VII and ADEA Claims

Text: 28 In dismissing plaintiffs' Title VII and ADEA claims, the district court erroneously concluded that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e), (f)(1) and 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d) were jurisdictional prerequisites. They are not. Since Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) and Stearns v. Consolidated Management, Inc., 747 F.2d 1105, 1111 (7th Cir.1984), we have consistently held that the administrative filing requirements imposed under Title VII and the ADEA are not jurisdictional prerequisites which pose an absolute bar to suit, but rather conditions precedent, similar to statutes of limitations, which are subject to equitable modification. Stark v. Dynascan Corp., 902 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir.1990) (ADEA); Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir.1989) (Title VII); Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1317 (7th Cir.1989) (ADEA); Anooya v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 733 F.2d 48, 49 (7th Cir.1984) (Title VII). 29 In Gaynor's case, the distinction is immaterial. He neither alleges compliance with Sec. 626(d), 5 nor demonstrates an equitable basis for modifying the requirements set out therein. In an affidavit in response to the motion to dismiss, Gaynor attempts to argue that his completion of an EEOC intake questionnaire satisfies the requirements of Sec. 626(d). The district court disagreed, as do we. In Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3191, 105 L.Ed.2d 699 (1989), we held that an intake questionnaire may, under certain circumstances, constitute a charge for purposes of the ADEA administrative filing requirements, i.e., where the information contained in the questionnaire was sufficient to constitute a charge, and both the claimant and EEOC indicated that they would treat the questionnaire as a charge. See also Philbin v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324-25 (7th Cir.1991). Those circumstances are not present in this case. Gaynor acknowledges in his affidavit that he was informed by the EEOC at the time he completed the intake questionnaire that there was insufficient information to support his claim of retaliation and that no further action would be taken on the basis of the questionnaire. 30 The distinction, however, is far more significant in Perkins' case. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) provide in relevant part as follows: 31 (e) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter.... 32 (f)(1).... If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section ... [or] has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge [ ] by the person claiming to be aggrieved.... 33 Perkins failed to allege compliance with either of these filing requirements in her original complaint. The omission was not inadvertent. Perkins did not have a right-to-sue letter when she filed her complaint, and had not named Dunne in the administrative charge which she filed with the EEOC. She attempted to cure both oversights in her response to the defendants' motion to dismiss. 6 She had, by that time, procured a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC which she attached to her response brief. With respect to defendant Dunne, she argued that Silverstein had been named in the EEOC charge and that notice to Silverstein constituted notice to Dunne since they were both administrators of the Forest Preserve District. 34 To the extent Perkins alleges any violation of Title VII by Dunne, the district court correctly concluded that her claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Perkins does not dispute the fact that George Dunne was not named in the charge which she filed with the EEOC. Her public denial of any connection between her relationship with Dunne and her job with the Department suggests a reasonable explanation for that omission. Neither has she alleged any facts which warrant an exception to the general rule that a party not named in the EEOC charge cannot be sued under Title VII. See Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 126-27; Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A., 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982); LeBeau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir.1973). 35 The disposition of Perkins' Title VII claims against Silverstein is not quite so simple. While they may have been subject to dismissal at any time prior to Perkins' receipt of a right-to-sue letter, the receipt of that letter after the complaint had been filed, but before it had been dismissed, effectively cured the deficiency in the original complaint. Williams v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 721 F.2d 1412, 1418 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1983); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir.1983); Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir.1982); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Division of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Board, 649 F.2d 1084, 1095 n. 13 (5th Cir.1981); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir.1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 912, 93 S.Ct. 976, 35 L.Ed.2d 275 (1973). Had the Title VII allegations been sufficient in all other respects, reversal would have been warranted and Perkins would have been afforded the opportunity to amend her complaint to show compliance with the statute. They were not. As our previous discussion clearly indicates, Perkins' Title VII claims were subject to dismissal for reasons totally unrelated to jurisdiction.