Opinion ID: 2520615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Compliance

Text: We begin our analysis by examining the trial court's application of a strict compliance standard to section 24-10-109(3). After reviewing the various opinions of the court in Brock, we conclude that each supports a substantial compliance standard. The GIA establishes governmental tort immunity from actions filed against public entities or their employees and then provides exceptions and waivers under which individuals may maintain such actions. See §§ 24-10-105 to -106, 7B C.R.S. (2003). Under the GIA, an injured person seeking damages from a public entity or employee must provide written notice of the claim within 180 days of discovery of the injury. § 24-10-109(1), 7B C.R.S. (2003). The GIA then sets forth a series of criteria that the notice must satisfy. See § 24-10-109(2)-(6). This court has interpreted one of the GIA's notice provisions as a jurisdictional prerequisite for suits against public entities and other notice provisions as presenting statutory defenses to claims. See Brock v. Nyland, 955 P.2d 1037, 1042-43, 1045-46 (Colo.1998) (Scott, J.; Kourlis, J., concurring); Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Colo.1996). We characterized section 24-10-109(1), which requires injured parties to submit written notice within 180 days of the discovery of an injury, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit that therefore requires strict compliance with its terms. Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1192-95; East Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. Dist. Court, 842 P.2d 233, 235-36 (Colo.1992). In contrast, we characterized section 24-10-109(3) as providing a statutory defense to claims rather than creating a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Brock, 955 P.2d at 1042-43, 1045-46; Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1193. Subsection three of the statute requires litigants to file notice with either the governing body of the public entity or the entity's attorney. It states: If the claim is against the state or an employee thereof, the notice shall be filed with the attorney general. If the claim is against any other public entity or an employee thereof, the notice shall be filed with the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity. Such notice shall be effective upon mailing by registered mail or upon personal service. § 24-10-109(3). Though we have struggled to articulate the extent to which a plaintiff must comply with section 24-10-109(3) to fulfill its notice requirement, we have not completed this task. See Brock, 955 P.2d at 1037 (holding, in a plurality opinion, that section 24-10-109(3) mandates more than substantial compliance); Woodsmall v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63 (Colo.1990) (suggesting that a substantial compliance standard applies to section 24-10-109(3)). Most recently, in Brock, the court produced three separate opinions regarding the necessary level of compliance. Brock, 955 P.2d at 1037. Comparing the three separate opinions of the Brock court, we conclude the reasoning of all three opinions agree that determinations of compliance with section 24-10-109(3) must consider principles of agency and equity, as well as the intent and purposes of the statute. Therefore, we reject any reasoning in Brock that requires a strict compliance standard. In the lead opinion, Justice Scott, joined by one other justice, may have appeared to argue that section 24-10-109(3) requires strict compliance. Specifically, he stated that the plain language of section 24-10-109(3) mandates more than substantial compliance and rejected any interpretations of prior case law that endorsed a substantial compliance standard. Brock, 955 P.2d at 1043 (rejecting an interpretation of Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996)). He grounded his position in both the text of the statute and a concern that a more expansive standard would result in the ability to file notice with too many persons. Justice Scott first argued that substantial compliance cannot be applied in a manner consistent with the plain language of the statute. Id. at 1042. He then explained that if the court articulated a substantial compliance standard, so that the filing of notice with a claims adjuster in the [public entity's] claims department has the same effect as a filing with the governing body or attorney, the court could not control which parties may receive notice. Id. Although he advocated a more stringent standard than substantial compliance, Justice Scott also indicated that strict compliance with section 24-10-109(3) was not always required. He listed a series of considerations that, if present in Brock, might have yielded a different outcome. These considerations are inconsistent with a strict compliance standard, which requires absolute compliance and cannot be waived. See Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67. For example, he stated that the governing body of a public entity could delegate its authority to receive statutory notice to an agent, but noted that the plaintiff in Brock failed to advance such an argument. Brock, 955 P.2d at 1044. Similarly, he noted that the plaintiff did not argue waiver, estoppel, or that the public entity's governing body or its attorney had actual notice of the claims. Id. Furthermore, he noted that the plaintiff was not acting upon representations by [the public entity] that his filing with the claims department met the notice requirements of the GIA. Id. Finally, he observed that the plaintiff in Brock was not acting pro se and his attorney had ample opportunity during the interaction with the claims department to ascertain whether or not the claim had been forwarded to the [governing body] or its attorney. Id. Although the plaintiff did not advance these arguments, Justice Scott indicated that his standard of compliance allowed the court to consider them. Thus, because he advocated that the court take into account equitable arguments and other considerations, Justice Scott appeared to champion a standard less stringent than strict compliance. Justice Kourlis, in a concurring opinion also joined by one other member of the court, called for determinations of compliance on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1046 (Kourlis, J., concurring). She argued that the determination of compliance should not focus on either substantial versus strict compliance or substantial versus impliedly strict compliance, id., nor the jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional import of the provision. Id. at 1045. Rather, she advocated that compliance should turn[] on the language and intent of the provision. Id. Specifically, she called the court to look to the language and intent of the statute and also take into account any relevant equitable considerations. Id. at 1046. She considered, for example, that the governing body of the public entity had not taken any action or made any representation which would constitute a waiver or create an estoppel argument. Id. at 1047. Ultimately, Justice Kourlis only agreed with Justice Scott that the plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions of the subsection. In a dissenting opinion joined by two other justices, I argued that a substantial compliance standard applies to section 24-10-109(3). The opinion reasoned that substantial compliance is attained when the plaintiff makes a good faith effort to satisfy the notice requirements and when any errors or omissions do not prejudice the public entity. Id. at 1050 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (quoting Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 68-69). The opinion explained that no prejudice occurs if the error does not prevent the public entity from investigating and remedying any dangerous conditions, making adequate fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability, or preparing a defense to the claim. Id. (citing Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 68). Since Brock, we have not further articulated what constitutes compliance with the GIA's notice provision. In Jefferson County Health Services Ass'n v. Feeney, 974 P.2d 1001 (Colo.1998), we only stated that section 24-10-109(3) requires litigants to file notice with one of two persons: the governing body of the public entity or the entity's attorney. Id. at 1003 (citing Brock, 955 P.2d at 1040). We did, however, explain that the purposes behind the GIA's notice provisions are not to set a trap for the unwary. Id. We explained that the notice provision instead functions to allow a public entity to promptly investigate and remedy dangerous conditions, to foster prompt settlement of meritorious claims, to make necessary fiscal arrangements to cover potential liability, and to prepare for defense of claims. Id. Although these cases explain the purposes and function of the notice provision, they do not further clarify the compliance necessary to satisfy section 24-10-109(3). In addition, our very recently announced decisions in University of Colorado v. Booth, 78 P.3d 1098 (Colo.2003), and Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, No. 02SC532, 83 P.3d 75, 2003 WL 22533402 (Colo. Nov. 10, 2003), do not further address this issue. Thus, the three opinions in Brock provide the only basis for determining the necessary standard of compliance. With our fractured vote in Brock, we not only were unclear about the degree of compliance necessary, but we failed to agree on common terminology. However, despite the inconsistencies among the opinions in Brock, all of the members of the court agreed on some basic underlying principles. The entire Brock court agreed that in some circumstances, service on the statutorily designated entity is not necessary and that principles of agency and equity apply. See Brock, 955 P.2d at 1044, 1047, 1050-51 (Scott, J.; Kourlis, J., concurring; Martinez, J., dissenting). Moreover, a majority of the court either specifically stated or implied that in determining whether a plaintiff complied with section 24-10-109(3), the intent and purposes of the statute are critical. Id. at 1047, 1050-51 (Kourlis, J., concurring; Martinez, J., dissenting). Thus, a determination of whether a plaintiff complied with section 24-10-109(3) should consider whether the purposes of the statute were satisfied. Generally, the purposes of the statute include avoiding prejudice to the governmental entity, encouraging settlement, and providing public entities the opportunity to investigate claims, remedy conditions, and prepare defense of claims. Feeney, 974 P.2d at 1003. Consistent with these purposes, the GIA's notice provision acts to help the governmental entity manage claims. Although governmental immunity protects the government from unlimited liability, it can act as an inequitable doctrine with harsh consequences for plaintiffs. See § 24-10-102, 7B C.R.S. (2003). Allowing public entities to mislead plaintiffs about how to meet the requirements of the notice provision, and then to assert the affirmative defense of noncompliance, is beyond the legitimate purposes of the GIA's notice provision. We reiterate that the GIA's notice provision should not act as a trap for the unwary. See Feeney, 974 P.2d at 1003. Therefore, interpretations of the GIA should not permit public entities to manipulate the notice provision to dodge otherwise proper suits. Today we attempt to clarify that the purposes behind the statute are critical when determining whether a plaintiff complied with section 24-10-109(3). Furthermore, we stress that governmental entities may not mislead potential claimants by incorrectly indicating that they have complied with section 24-10-109(3). We recognize that case-by-case determinations of compliance, which consider principles of agency and equity, the purposes of the statute, and concerns of protecting plaintiffs from misrepresentations by governmental entities, are required. Thus, without necessarily endorsing previous determinations of whether compliance with section 24-10-109(3) was substantial, we recognize that the standard we explain today is best described as substantial compliance, and to the extent that Brock suggests a different standard for section 24-10-109(3), we overrule.