Opinion ID: 2268472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Roles of the Attorney General and the Commission

Text: At the outset we are confronted with two interrelated issues raised in our order of February 26, 1976, Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Harsch, R.I., 352 A.2d 400 (1976), wherein we denied without prejudice the company's motion that the Attorney General be barred from filing a brief in the present case. In that order, we directed the parties to brief and argue the questions whether the Attorney General represented the public or the Public Utilities Commission and whether or not the commission is a proper party to this petition. Inasmuch as the entire field of utilities regulation is governed by statute, the resolution of these questions lies in our reading of the pertinent provisions of the general laws. See generally G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) title 39, as amended by P.L.1969, ch. 240, § 1. Prior to 1969, all authority to regulate utilities and to set and approve rates was vested in the Division of Public Utilities within the Department of Business Regulation. All matters involving proposed changes in rates were submitted to the administrator of said division for hearing, investigation and the issuance of appropriate orders. Persons aggrieved by such orders were entitled to judicial review thereof in the Superior Court within the strictures of the Administrative Procedures Act. [1] In essence, therefore, the administrator and the Division of Public Utilities exercised a broad range of administrative powers and whatever judicial powers were incidental to the general duties to conduct hearings and to make investigations as to the propriety of proposed changes in utility rates. [2] With the enactment of P.L.1969, ch. 240, § 1, the General Assembly effected a major revision of the processes by which proposed rate changes were to be scrutinized and by which utilities were generally to be regulated. Most significantly, the newly enacted § 39-1-3 created within the Department of Business Regulation a Public Utilities Commission (the commission) and a Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (the division) which were both ordained as independent bodies free from the jurisdiction of the department director. In the following language, the jurisdictions and powers of the two new units were set forth by the Legislature:    The [Public Utilities] commission shall serve as a quasi-judicial tribunal with jurisdiction, powers, and duties to hold investigations and hearings involving the rates, tariffs, tolls and charges and the sufficiency and reasonableness of facilities and accommodations of [various] public utilities   . The administrator [of the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers] shall exercise the jurisdiction, supervision, powers and duties not specifically assigned to the commission. By virtue of his office, the chairman of the public utilities commission shall be the public utilities administrator who shall supervise and direct the execution of all laws relating to public utilities and carriers and all regulations and orders of the commission governing the conduct and charges of public utilities, and who shall perform such other duties and have such powers as are hereinafter set forth. General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 39-1-3. Inasmuch as the statute is not entirely clear in its delineation of the powers of the commission and division respectively, we must attempt herein to ascertain the legislative intention from a consideration of the legislation in its entirety, viewing the language used therein in the light, nature, and purpose of the enactment thereof. Mason v. Bowerman Bros., 95 R.I. 425, 431, 187 A.2d 772, 776 (1963). In so doing, it is our belief that the only meaningful way in which to read the present statute and specifically, the above-quoted provision, is that the General Assembly intended by its enactment to segregate the judicial and administrative attributes of ratemaking and utilities regulation and to vest them separately and respectively in the commission and the administrator (or division). [3] Other provisions in title 39 support this interpretation. For instance, the commission is clothed with the powers of a court of record in determining and adjudicating matters within its jurisdiction (§ 39-1-7). It is further empowered to make orders and render judgments and to enforce the same by suitable process (§ 39-1-7). The commission is defined at one point in the statute as an impartial, independent body which renders decisions affecting both the public interest and private rights [4] based upon the law and the evidence (§ 39-1-11). The commission is permitted, in much the same manner as a trial justice in the courts, to conduct prehearing conferences and issue prehearing orders which control the conduct of the rate case (§ 39-1-12). Cf. Super.R.Civ.P. 16. The several commissioners are empowered to administer oaths, to summon and examine witnesses, to compel production and examination of papers, books and other evidence, and to apply to a Superior Court justice to have persons held in contempt of the commission's process (§ 39-1-13). Furthermore, the commission has been granted broad powers to issue appropriate orders preventing irreparable injury to the public interest (§ 39-1-32), and to order additions, alterations or extensions to a utility's plant or equipment when such are deemed necessary (§ 39-4-2). In contrast to the aforementioned judicial powers enjoyed by the commission are the general and administrative powers conveyed to the administrator and the division as set forth in ch. 3 of title 39. Of particular relevance to this case, though, is the interrelationship which the statute has established between the commission and the administrator (or division) in matters dealing with rates, tariffs, tolls and charges. Section 39-1-11 requires that the commission's adjudications be based upon the law and upon the evidence as presented before it by the division and by the parties in interest. It would appear, therefore, that the Legislature perceived that, in matters brought for hearing before the commission, the division would assume a role not unlike that of a party in interest. This version of the legislative intent is further borne out by a later passage in the same title which requires that, upon the issuance of a writ of certiorari by this court, citations shall issue from the clerk to all parties in interest, including the public utility administrator. Section 39-5-2. Thus, it would appear that the party-like posture of the administrative arm of the bifurcated regulatory machinery has been purposely carried through to the appellate level. One final passage of the General Laws lending support to the position that the division appears as an adversary participant before the commission in rate hearings also resolves the question raised by our order of February 26, 1976, regarding the Attorney General's participation in these and similar proceedings. That is, by the authority of § 39-1-19, the Attorney General or a designee shall honor the request of the administrator to appear and represent the division in any hearing, investigation, action or proceeding under this title   . Such hearings, actions and proceedings include, of course, hearings before the commission (§ 39-1-11), and certiorari proceedings before this court (§ 39-5-1). Thus, it seems manifest that, in pursuit of the public interest set forth in § 39-1-1, the Legislature has conceived a system whereby the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, in addition to its broad regulatory powers, appears on behalf of the public to present evidence and to make arguments before the commission. [5] The Attorney General or his designee is required, in most instances, [6] to represent the division in this role, § 39-1-19, and the commission is required to determine and to adjudicate matters before it as an impartial and independent quasi-judicial tribunal: [7] Sections 39-1-3 and 39-1-11. Thus, in answer to the first question presented by our order regarding whether the Attorney General represents the public or the commission, we hold that, strictly speaking, he represents neither. The language of § 39-1-19 is abundantly clear in specifying that the Attorney General shall serve as counsel, upon request of the administrator, to the division in all hearings, investigations, actions and proceedings arising under title 39. The arguments presented to us on this issue would indicate that all parties have been laboring under the misapprehension that the Attorney General's services were available to the commission rather than to the division. [8] In the present case, the fact that the Attorney General's brief was submitted on behalf of the Public Utilities Commission rather than on behalf of the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers is only a formal error which is not a ground for reversal. With regard to the second question posed by our order, that is, whether the commission is a proper party to this petition, we hold that it is not. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the relevant statutory provisions that the Legislature intended that the commission shall sit as a quasi-judicial tribunal and that its administrative affiliate, the division, would appear before it, through counsel, as an adversary participant in the commission's hearings. It is clear also that the Legislature envisioned that the division would similarly be a participant in and be represented by the Attorney General in certiorari proceedings before this court. Turning to the present case, the fact that the named respondents are the Public Utilities Commissioners individually and in their official capacities is not a fatal flaw. Specifying the commissioners rather than the administrator or the division as respondent constitutes only a formal error which has absolutely no effect upon the rights of the parties.