Opinion ID: 2824665
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: De Facto Officer Doctrine

Text: The only other argument in the Board’s supplemental brief is the de facto officer doctrine. This oft-forgotten doctrine has “feudal origins,” dating back to the 15th century. Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 909 n.1 (1963) (“The first reported case to discuss the concept of de facto authority was The Abbe of Fountaine, 9 Hen. VI, at 32(3) (1431).”). The doctrine “confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.” Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995). In its most recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has limited the doctrine, declining to apply it when reviewing Appointments Clause challenges, see id. at 182–83, and important statutory defects to an adjudicator’s authority, see Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 78 (2003). In its traditional form, the de facto officer doctrine distinguishes between “direct” and “collateral” attacks on an officer’s authority. Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1496. A collateral attack challenges “government action on the ground that the officials who took the action were improperly in office.” Id. (emphasis added). The de facto officer doctrine bars such attacks. Id. A direct attack, by contrast, challenges “the qualifications of the officer, rather than the actions taken by the officer.” Id. (emphasis added). The de facto officer doctrine allows such attacks but they can be brought via writ of quo warranto only. Id. at 1496–97. To obtain quo warranto against a federal official, an interested party must petition the 26 Attorney General of the United States to institute a proceeding in federal district court. D.C. CODE §§ 16-3501–02. If the Attorney General declines, the interested party can petition the court to issue the writ instead. D.C. CODE § 16-3503. Both the Attorney General and the court, however, have “broad discretion” to decline to make use of quo warranto. Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1498. This Court has rejected the traditional version of the de facto officer doctrine. See id. at 1498–99. Direct action via quo warranto is too “cumbersome,” we explained in Andrade, and “could easily operate to deprive a plaintiff with an otherwise legitimate claim of the opportunity to have his case heard.” Id. at 1498. We disapprove of any “interpretation of the de facto officer doctrine that . . . would render legal norms concerning appointment and eligibility to hold office unenforceable.” Id. Instead, we have held that collateral attacks on an official’s authority are permissible when two requirements are satisfied: First, the plaintiff must bring his action at or around the time that the challenged government action is taken. Second, the plaintiff must show that the agency or department involved has had reasonable notice under all the circumstances of the claimed defect in the official’s title to office. Id. at 1499. Both requirements are met here. The first requirement, as stated in Andrade, appears on its face not to fit this case. The plaintiffs in Andrade filed a separate suit for injunctive and declaratory relief, id. at 1479, which explains the Court’s instruction to “bring [an] action at or around the time the challenged government action is taken,” id. at 1499 (emphases added). Here, by contrast, Southwest is subject to an enforcement action brought by the NLRB. In 27 these circumstances, we have held, a party satisfies the first Andrade requirement if it challenges an officer’s authority as a defense to the enforcement action. See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Of course, the ordinary rules of exhaustion and forfeiture still apply. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952); FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In the administrative proceedings below, Southwest raised its FVRA challenge as an exception to the ALJ decision. It therefore complied with the NLRA’s jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (“No objection that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court,” absent “extraordinary circumstances”); id. at § 160(f) (incorporating § 160(e)); see also Trump Plaza Associates v. NLRB, 679 F.3d 822, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Cases interpreting section 10(e) look to whether a party’s exceptions are sufficiently specific to apprise the Board that an issue might be pursued on appeal.”). And the Board does not assert that Southwest’s challenge was otherwise untimely or forfeited. Thus, we assume it was properly preserved. Nor does the Board contest that the second Andrade requirement—notice—is also satisfied here. To meet this requirement, “the agency . . . [must] actually know[] of the claimed defect.” Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1499. Notice ensures that the agency has a chance to “remedy any defects (especially narrowly technical defects) either before it permits invalidly appointed officials to act or shortly thereafter.” Id.; see also Wilkinson v. Legal Services Corp., 80 F.3d 535, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Here, Southwest notified the NLRB of the defect in Solomon’s authority by excepting to the ALJ decision. See Andrade v. Regnery, 824 F.2d 1253, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The filing of the underlying suit . . . in and of itself notified the government of appellants’ . . . challenge.”). The Board 28 does not challenge the adequacy of this notice. Moreover, the notice requirement is satisfied if the agency learns of the defect from any source, not only the petitioner. See Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1499 (“[We] do[] not require . . . that the agency’s knowledge of the alleged defect must come from the plaintiff.”). The Board has not informed us when it first became aware of Solomon’s problematic service. We therefore cannot say that its notice of the FVRA defect was inadequate. Accordingly, we conclude that the de facto officer doctrine does not bar Southwest from challenging Solomon’s authority. Finally, we emphasize the narrowness of our decision. We hold that the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, Lafe Solomon, served in violation of the FVRA from January 5, 2011 to November 4, 2013. But this case is not Son of Noel Canning 8 and we do not expect it to retroactively undermine a host of NLRB decisions. We address the FVRA objection in this case because the petitioner raised the issue in its exceptions to the ALJ decision as a defense to an ongoing enforcement proceeding. We doubt that an employer that failed to timely raise an FVRA objection—regardless whether enforcement proceedings are ongoing or concluded—will enjoy the same success. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1499. For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review, deny the cross-application for enforcement and vacate the NLRB order. So ordered. 8 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).