Opinion ID: 794629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourth Amendment Status of Individuals with Diminished Liberty Interests

Text: 58
59 Courts have distinguished the liberty interests of individuals on probation and parole from ordinary citizens who have not been convicted of any crime. Warrantless searches that would not meet constitutional standards if other persons were the targets often meet constitutional muster when the target of the search is a parolee or probationer. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 259 (9th Cir. 1975). We have held that warrantless searches of parolees and probationers are acceptable provided that they are conducted pursuant to the terms of the probation, United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.1988), or they are conducted to advance the goals of the individual's probation, rather than merely for the purposes of investigation, United States v. Ooley, 116 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir.1997). Probationers and parolees' homes are often searched without a warrant or probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.2002) (allowing search of parolee's home based on reasonable suspicion); Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir.1982) (upholding probation condition stating that defendant convicted of drug possession must submit to search of his home at any time whenever requested by a probation officer); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.1975) (the parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties); People v. Reyes, 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445 (1998) (upholding search condition as it applied to parolee); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.10 (4th ed.2004). 60 Similarly, courts have determined that individuals who have been convicted of crimes but remain free on bond or OR pending sentencing have a diminished expectation of privacy as compared to ordinary citizens. Courts have determined that probable cause is not necessary to search the homes of convicts released presentencing. In State v. Fisher, 145 Wash.2d 209, 35 P.3d 366 (2001), the Washington Supreme Court held that although probable cause is normally required for issuance of a warrant, convicts released pending sentencing may be arrested on the basis of a reasonable grounds standard. The court distinguished the due process rights of an accused [from those of] a defendant who has already been adjudged `guilty[.]' Id. at 375. The court further pointed out that: 61 Both circumstances raise different expectations of privacy and levels of constitutional protections. An accused's liberty is subject to restraint through an arrest and the jurisdiction of the courts. A convicted and sentenced felon is subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. A convicted felon who awaits sentencing is still subject to the court's jurisdiction, but yet does not possess the same constitutional rights as one merely accused. . . . Accordingly, [the defendant's] rights must be analyzed not from the status of an accused person, but from her status as a convicted felon released on personal recognizance and awaiting sentencing. 62 Id. at 375-76 (emphasis in original). Other courts have similarly observed that individuals released after conviction, but not yet on probation or parole, have a reduced expectation of privacy[,] and thus, the police needed only a reasonable basis to conduct a warrantless search of their home. See State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 95 P.3d 635, 638 (2004). 63 We have drawn this same distinction. In Portillo v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 819, 823-24 (9th Cir.1994), we held that the supervisory nature of postconviction, presentence release is a special need justifying drug tests on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. In balancing the defendant's privacy interests against the state's supervisory interests, the court specifically considered the fact that the defendant [had] been convicted of theft and [was] awaiting sentencing. Id. 64 A few courts have considered the Fourth Amendment status of individuals, like Scott, who have been released pretrial on bail or on their own recognizance. We have commented only briefly on the status of pretrial releasees. In United States v. Kills Enemy, 3 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir.1993), we contrasted an individual on pretrial release with a convicted person awaiting sentence in that the latter is no longer entitled to a presumption of innocence or presumptively entitled to his freedom. Id. at 1203. And, in Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.2002), we observed that one who has been released on pretrial bail does not lose his or her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures. Id. at 1068. 65 In contrast, individuals confined in prison pending trial have no greater privacy rights than other prisoners. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (treating pretrial detainees the same as prisoners convicted of an offense); WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 17:9 (2005). Thus, a search of a pretrial detainee's cell, Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 65, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), as well as the random monitoring and recording of a pretrial detainee's telephone conversations on a prison telephone have not been held to violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.1988). 66 Although pretrial releasees may not lose their Fourth Amendment rights, until today's decision we have not squarely addressed whether pretrial releasees have diminished Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, does a search of a pretrial releasee require probable cause? But the question has been addressed by state courts. Each has determined that warrantless search conditions may be imposed on a pretrial releasee so long as those conditions are reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Ullring, 741 A.2d 1065, 1069 n. 3, 1073 (Me.1999); In re York, 9 Cal.4th 1133, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d 804 (1995). 67 The leading case is In re York, where the California Supreme Court determined that a state statute requiring compliance with reasonable conditions on pretrial release allowed for warrantless searches and random drug testing. Unable to post the bail prescribed for their offenses, the petitioners in York were given the choice of remaining in custody pending trial upon the charges or obtaining OR release. To obtain OR release, they had to agree to specified conditions, including a requirement that they [s]ubmit to drug [and, in some instances, alcohol] testing and [p]ermit search and seizure of his/her person, residence, and vehicle by any peace officer without a search warrant. Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 806. 68 Petitioners argued that the imposition of warrantless drug testing and search conditions upon OR releasees violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. The court rejected this claim for two reasons. The court first pointed out that defendants released on OR lack 69 the same reasonable expectation of privacy as that enjoyed by persons not charged with any crime, and by defendants who have posted reasonable bail. Unlike persons in these latter categories, however, a defendant who is unable to post reasonable bail has no constitutional right to be free from confinement prior to trial and therefore lacks the reasonable expectation of privacy possessed by a person unfettered by such confinement. Because an incarcerated individual generally is subject to random drug testing and warrantless search and seizure in the interest of prison security, the conditions challenged in the present case do not place greater restrictions upon an OR releasee's privacy rights than the releasee would have experienced had he or she not secured OR release. Viewed from this perspective, the challenged conditions do not require an OR releasee to waive Fourth Amendment rights that he or she would have retained had OR release been denied. Instead, the conditions simply define the degree of liberty that the court or magistrate, in his or her discretion, has determined to grant to the OR releasee. 70 Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 813. Second, the court stated that the conditions are not unconstitutional because a pretrial detainee is not required to agree to such restrictions, but rather is subject to them only if he or she consents to their imposition, in exchange for obtaining OR release. Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 814. The court reasoned that one who otherwise would be incarcerated prior to judgment[because he cannot post bail] is offered the opportunity to obtain OR release[;] he or she is not entitled to unconditional bail-free release, but may obtain OR release only in the discretion of the court or magistrate, and only upon those reasonable conditions attached to the release. Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 814. Recognizing that such restrictions are not unlimited, the court pointed out that the conditions must be reasonable under the circumstances, which in turn depends on the relationship of the condition to the crime or crimes with which the defendant is charged and to the defendant's background, including his or her prior criminal conduct. Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 815 n. 10. The court then held the search and drug testing conditions reasonable under the circumstances because they clearly relate to the prevention and detection of further crime and thus to the safety of the public. Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 810. Accordingly, the court concluded that warrantless searches and random drug testing did not violate petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. 71 In State v. Ullring, 741 A.2d 1065 (Me. 1999), the Supreme Court of Maine reached the same decision, concluding that probable cause is not required to search the home of a pretrial releasee. In Ullring, a defendant was arrested for possessing marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. Id. at 1066. He posted bail and signed a bail bond requiring him to submit to random searches of his person, residence, and vehicle. Id. After a warrantless search of his home uncovered marijuana, the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. The court began by considering the objectives of the bail system in Maine, observing that its purpose is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at trial and to do so without incarceration as long as conditions can be imposed which will fulfill that purpose and the purpose of ensuring the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 1072. The court reasoned that 72 [b]ail conditions, such as a prohibition against possession of illegal drugs and searches for illegal drugs, help to ensure that defendants whose backgrounds and charges indicate that substance abuse is a significant problem will show up at court. It is reasonable to expect that a defendant who maintains sobriety is more likely to appear in court on the appointed dates than a defendant who is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 73 Id. at 1072-73. The court concluded that the random search condition was constitutional because the condition was reasonable as applied to the history and personal situation of the defendant. Id. at 1073. 2 For support, the court appealed to the Supreme Court's seminal decisions in Griffin and Knights. 74 In Griffin, the Court upheld a Wisconsin law that permitted a probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant as long as his supervisor approved and as long as there were reasonable grounds to believe that contraband was present. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870-71, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Based on a tip, a probation officer searched Griffin's home and found a firearm. Griffin was then charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 872, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously announced a per se rule that a probation officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer's home without a warrant, and with only `reasonable grounds' (not probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. Id. at 872, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Court held that it was unnecessary to embrace a new principle of law . . . that any search of a probationer's home by a probation officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment as long as the information possessed by the officer satisfies a federal `reasonable grounds' standard, but it was enough to say that  this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that the search of Griffin's home satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it fulfilled a special need[, which] make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)). 75 The Court reexamined the issue in Knights, and held that a warrantless search of a probationer's apartment was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where it was authorized by a condition of his probation and supported by reasonable suspicion. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587. After obtaining probation for a misdemeanor drug offense, Knights signed a condition that he would [s]ubmit his . . . person, property place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer. Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. While Knights was on probation, a police officer conducted an investigatory search of his home and found materials indicating that he participated in a conspiracy to commit arson. Id. at 116, 122 S.Ct. 587. 76 Knights argued that a warrantless search of a probationer satisfies the Fourth Amendment only if it is . . . `a special needs' search conducted by a probation officer. Id. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 587. The Court rejected this rationale, again emphasizing that Griffin did not decide that all warrantless searches of probationers were reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 117-18, 122 S.Ct. 587. Instead, the Court relied on a general Fourth Amendment approach of `examining the totality of the circumstances,' Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996), with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. See also United States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d 964, 967-68 (9th Cir.2002). This approach consisted of assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)). The probation order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it. Id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587. The probation condition thus significantly diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The Court also recognized the state's concern in preventing a probationer from engaging in further criminal activities. Id. at 120-21, 122 S.Ct. 587. Because the state may justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen, reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause may justify a warrantless search. Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587.
77 Although the majority cites Griffin and Knights, it does not consider the various factors that are relevant in determining whether the search of Scott's home and person were reasonable. In my view, a balancing approach that incorporates those factors is appropriate here. Toward this end, I consider the state's interests, which include the purposes of the OR release and bail system in Nevada, state law standards relating to eligibility for pretrial release, and specific concerns applicable to Scott's pretrial release, taking into account the crime with which he was charged and the conditions to which he consented. 78 The imposition of pretrial search conditions must be adapted to the pretrial releasee; the conditions should be related to a public purpose such as rehabilitating the offender or protecting the public. See, e.g., Owens, 681 F.2d at 1366-67; Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 263. Even as I question the categorical no approach adopted by the majority, I would not endeavor to create a one-size-fits-all standard for approving all searches of pretrial releasees; this approach was rejected by the Court in Griffin with respect to probationers and it is equally ill-suited to pretrial releasees. 79 Finally, although the balancing test offered by the Court in Knights seems to invite a series of finely tailored standards, lower federal courts are not free to insert new standards into the gap between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540-41, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (rejecting an intermediate clear indication standard as incompatible with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness approach). Thus, recognizing reasonableness as the hallmark of the Fourth Amendment, I apply the standards announced in Knights, balancing Scott's privacy interests against the legitimate interests of the state in light of the totality of the circumstances. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587.