Opinion ID: 1891715
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prohibition of Court Fees in Delinquency Cases

Text: Finally, the majority claims that the Legislature . . . expressly provid[ed] that court fees and costs should not ordinarily be imposed in juvenile proceedings. Majority op. at 1278. It endorses Judge Sharp's argument that section 985.221, Florida Statutes (2004), which prohibits imposition of court fees in juvenile delinquency cases, applies to the surcharges as well. Majority op. at 1278, 1282 (citing V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 347 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). The statute provides in relevant part: Court and witness fees.In any proceeding under this chapter, court fees shall not be charged against, nor witness fees allowed to, any party to a delinquency petition or any parent or legal guardian or custodian or child named in a summons. (Emphasis added.) The State, however, argues that section 985.221 specifically prohibits only fees, not surcharges. See also S.L.G., 912 So.2d at 614 (concluding that section 985.221 ... prohibits only the imposition of court fees in juvenile proceedings). The question, then, is whether a surcharge is a court fee or something else. Neither section 985.221 in particular nor chapter 985 in general defines the term court fees. Justice Pariente believes that, because the Legislature failed to define these terms, we cannot be sure that their usual meanings and distinctions should be applied to sections 938.08, 938.085, and 985.221. Specially concurring op. at 1285. However, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have established that, when the Legislature has not defined a word or term in a statute, we should construe it according to its ordinary and common meaning. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979)); see also Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.2005) ([O]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.) (quoting Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001)). The plain and ordinary meaning of words can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary. Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So.2d 201, 205 (Fla.2003). A dictionary defines the term fee as a charge fixed by law or by an institution... for certain privileges or services and a charge fixed by law for the services of a public officer. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 833 (3d ed. 1993). The Fifth District has held that, in legal terms, `[f]ees' ... are charges fixed by law for the services of public officers or for the use of some privilege under control of the government. S.L.G., 912 So.2d at 614 (citing Crawford v. Bradford, 23 Fla. 404, 2 So. 782 (1887); 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs § 1 (2004)). It distinguishes fees from costs, which are statutory allowances recoverable by the prevailing party to reimburse the prevailing party for expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending the proceeding. Id. (citing Golub v. Golub, 336 So.2d 693, 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). No other court in Florida has defined the term court fees. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that, in the context of lawsuits, `[f]ees' are generally those amounts paid to a public official, such as the clerk of the court, by a party for particular charges typically delineated by statute. United States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 508 U.S. 1, 8, 113 S.Ct. 1893, 123 L.Ed.2d 563 (1993) (citing 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666 (2d. ed. 1983)). Most commonly these include such items as docket fees, clerk's and marshal's charges, and witness' fees. Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra. Section 985.03(14) defines court as the circuit court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter. When used with the word court, the phrase court fee connotes a sum fixed by law that is paid or charged for a court's services, particularly those of the marshal or clerk of court. On the other hand, the term surcharge is defined as a charge in excess of the usual or normal amount; an additional tax, cost, or impost and an additional and usu[ally] excessive charge. Webster's at 2299. In addition, a fee is distinguishable from a cost, which is defined as the amount or equivalent paid or given or charged or engaged to be paid or given for anything bought or taken in barter or for service rendered. Id. at 515. The plural form costs refers to expenses incurred in litigation . . . those payable to the attorney or counsel by his client esp. when fixed by law ... [and] ... those given by the law or the court to the prevailing against the losing party in equity and frequently by statute. Id. Based on these definitions, the term court fees does not include surcharges. While the term cost, which generally connotes an amount paid for something bought or for services rendered, may include fees, which connotes a similar amount paid for a service rendered, particularly that of a public officer, a surcharge refers to an additional or excessive charge, which may be punitive in nature. Based on the ordinary meanings of the terms fee and surcharge, I conclude that section 985.221's prohibition against charging court fees does not prohibit the surcharges set forth in sections 938.05 and 938.085. To the contrary, section 985.228(4), Florida Statutes (2001), which, as I noted earlier, allows a court to impose as a penalty component restitution in money or in kind, community service, a curfew ... or other nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense, at least implicitly authorizes imposition of surcharges. Even assuming that section 985.221 conflicts with sections 938.08 and 938.085, the latter statutes govern because they were enacted after section 985.221. [I]f statutes are inconsistent or conflict, the last expression of legislative intent, in point of time or order, prevails. S.S.M., 898 So.2d at 85 (citing Askew v. Schuster, 331 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla.1976), and Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So.2d 813, 816-17 (Fla. 1962)) (other citation omitted). The last expression of the Legislature prevails due to the general presumption that later statutes are passed by the Legislature with the knowledge of prior existing laws. Id. (citing Oldham v. Rooks, 361 So.2d 140, 143 (Fla.1978), and J.A. v. State, 633 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Here, sections 938.08 and 938.085 were enacted in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Ch.2001-50, § 5, at 320, Laws of Fla.; ch.2003-114, § 3, at 729, Laws of Fla. Section 985.221 (formerly section 39.073) has been in effect since 1990, ch. 90-208, § 5, at 1150, Laws of Fla., and was last updated in 1997. S.S.M., 898 So.2d at 85. The Legislature presumably was aware of section 985.221 when passing sections 938.08 and 938.085. See id. Therefore, sections 938.08 and 938.085 represent the last expression of legislative intent and should prevail.