Opinion ID: 601273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's denial of the motion to suppress.

Text: 9 The starting point of the analysis requires a determination of whether the warrantless search of Hayes' automobile properly falls within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). If so, it must be supported by probable cause, see, e.g., Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, but it need not conform to the requirements of Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), which governs inventory searches of impounded vehicles when there is no probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime may be found. 10 It is well-settled that the ready mobility of an automobile and its pervasive regulation result in an objectively lower expectation of privacy in its contents. Carney, 471 U.S. at 391-92; United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1110 (1991). Individuals have always been on notice that an automobile may be stopped and searched when police have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 806 n. 8). 11 In this case, Hayes was driving his car when Agent Kuzia stopped him, ordered him to come out, and patted him down. At that time, Agent Kuzia had reason to believe that Hayes was driving on a suspended license and that the drug paraphernalia found in the motel room that had been registered in his name belonged to him. While patting Hayes down, Agent Kuzia found cocaine and marijuana on his person. On these facts, it would have been reasonable to search Hayes' automobile for contraband immediately. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 394-95 (search must be reasonable, so that a magistrate presented with the same facts could have authorized it). Moreover, the search could include a search of a package or other container found inside the car, as long as the container was capable of concealing the object of the search. See California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1986 (1991); Ross, 456 U.S. at 800, 825. 12 Removing the car from the scene of Hayes' arrest and impounding it in the Sheriff's substation does not take the subsequent search out of the automobile exception, provided removing the car to the substation was reasonable under the circumstances. 1 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52, 52 n. 10; see also United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 481, 484-85 (1985) (where officers had probable cause to search, they were permitted to take trucks to DEA headquarters before searching them). In this case, Agent Kuzia reasonably believed he had established probable cause to search Hayes' car for drugs, and determined that a thorough search should be conducted at the substation rather than in a residential area. 2 As in Chambers, a careful search at the scene of Hayes' arrest would have been impractical. 399 U.S. at 52 n. 10. 13 Hayes also briefly contests the district court's determination that the search was supported by probable cause, claiming that the court drew this conclusion after-the-fact. We review the district court's determination only for clear error. United States v. Fryer, 974 F.2d 813, 818 (7th Cir.1992), petition for cert. filed, No. 92-6832 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1992); United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 502 (1992). As discussed above, Agent Kuzia reasonably believed he had probable cause to search the car after he observed Hayes attempt to reclaim possession of drug paraphernalia that had been left in his motel room, and after he found drugs on Hayes' person. Under these circumstances, there was no error in the district court's conclusion that the search was supported by probable cause. 3 14