Opinion ID: 784129
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intention

Text: 108 The district court identified five statements in Agent Plunkett's affidavit that it deemed misleading. First, the court believed the affidavit misled by stating that Awadallah had substantial family ties in Jordan and elsewhere overseas, but omitting that Awadallah had three brothers in San Diego, one of them a citizen. Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 97. Second, the court believed the affidavit misled by stating that Awadallah's phone number had been found in the car at Dulles Airport, but omitting that the phone number belonged to Awadallah at a prior residence eighteen months earlier. Id. at 98. Third, the court believed the affidavit misled by omitting that Awadallah had been cooperative with FBI agents on September 20 and 21. 19 Id. at 97-98. Fourth, the court believed the affidavit misled by stating that a box-cutter had been found in Awadallah's apartment, but omitting that it was really a carpet knife; that it had actually been found in his inoperative second car; and that witnesses had seen him install a carpet recently. Id. at 98 n. 27. Finally, the court believed the affidavit misled by referring to prior conduct for which Awadallah might have feared being investigated, when no such conduct was known. Id. at 97. 109 We do not see how the final statement can be regarded as misleading when read in context. The affidavit stated that Awadallah may also be concerned that his prior conduct, as set out above, may provide a basis for law enforcement authorities to investigate and possibly prosecute him. The district court failed to appreciate the limitation in the phrase as set out above, which makes clear that the statement references the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit itself and does not describe or suggest any additional conduct for which Awadallah could have been prosecuted. It does not matter that the conduct described in the affidavit was not prosecutable: the affidavit stated only that Awadallah may ... be concerned about prosecution and that he therefore had considerable incentive to flee. 110 It is a stretch to say that any of the four other statements identified by the district court were in fact misleading, but assuming that they are misleading for purposes of our Franks analysis, we find no basis to conclude that these misrepresentations and omissions were intentional. Awadallah must establish that the misleading statements were the result of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Canfield, 212 F.3d at 717-18. The district court did not find that the statements were intentionally or recklessly misleading; it said they were not a result of mistake or accident. Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 98-99. Although we review factual findings on intent only for clear error, see Trzaska, 111 F.3d at 1028, this finding is insufficient as a matter of law under the Franks doctrine. 111 Our review of the record reveals no basis for a finding that Agent Plunkett intentionally misled the court or recklessly disregarded the truth. The evidentiary hearing held by the district court was limited in scope. See generally Awadallah II, 202 F.Supp.2d at 21 (discussing issues that required hearing). Agent Plunkett testified only with regard to (1) whether any information had been presented orally to Chief Judge Mukasey to supplement the warrant application; and (2) Awadallah's October 4 proffer to the government. The AUSA who helped Agent Plunkett prepare the affidavit did not testify. There was no examination of Agent Plunkett's intent or of additional knowledge that might have been imputed to him. 112 The affidavit itself disclaims any pretense of completeness: Because the limited purpose of this affidavit is to support the issuance of the requested warrant, I have not set forth all the facts known to me, or to other agents or law enforcement personnel concerning this nationwide investigation. The finding that omissions were not made by mistake or accident is compatible with this express disclaimer. But the mere intent to exclude information is insufficient, as the Fourth Circuit has observed: 113 An affiant cannot be expected to include in an affidavit every piece of information gathered in the course of an investigation. However, every decision not to include certain information in the affidavit is `intentional' insofar as it is made knowingly. If ... this type of `intentional' omission is all that Franks requires, the Franks intent prerequisite would be satisfied in almost every case.... [Rather,] Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead, the magistrate. 114 United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300-01 (4th Cir.1990) (emphasis in original). The district court, which was cognizant of this standard, made no finding of recklessness or bad intent. And the nature of the omissions does not itself suggest concealment. 20 Therefore, even assuming that four of the statements identified by the district court were misleading, there is no basis to conclude that they were intentionally or recklessly so.