Opinion ID: 2070347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board's Determination of the Trust Property's Just Value

Text: [¶ 16] We next address the Town's claim that the Board erred in its determination of the property's just value. See Quoddy Realty Corp., 1998 ME 14, ¶¶ 7-9, 704 A.2d at 409-10. Contrary to the Town's assertions, the record plainly shows how the Board calculated Harwood's property's just value. See ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8. In April 1997, the Town assessed Newman's property at $883,200, which represented a $153,200 increase from his September 1996 arms length purchase price of $730,000. The amount $153,200 represented approximately a 21% increase from $730,000 or approximately a 17% decrease from $883,200. There were no sales of properties on Greenings Island in that interim six months, nor was there any other evidence of market fluctuations. Finding that there was no credible evidence to indicate a 21 percent increase in the Newman property in the 6 months after it sold, the Board concluded that the Town's assessment method was in error. [6] [¶ 17] The Board then determined that because a uniform system had been used to increase the assessment of all Greenings Island properties, the trust property's assessment value was similarly overvalued. Thus, reducing the trust property's erroneous value by the percentage of overvaluation, the Board subtracted 17% of its value from $1,389,700 to achieve the property's just value at $1,149,700. [7] In so determining, the Board relied only on the facts in the record, many of which were presented by the trustee. Although the Board did not make a separate determination of the trust property's value in its corresponding land and house components, as a whole, the Board's method was neither irrational nor affected by error of law. [¶ 18] Southwest Harbor contends, nonetheless, that the Board abused its discretion by refusing to give weight to two post-April 1, 1997, Greenings Island salesthe 1997 Dinsmore sale and the 1999 Newman resalewhich the Town alleges support the assessor's April 1, 1997, assessment values. Contrary to the Town's assertions, the Board, in its discretion, could have deemed unpersuasive those sales that took place after the April 1 effective date. See 36 M.R.S.A. § 502 (Supp.2000) (the status of all taxpayers and of such taxable property must be fixed as of [April 1]). [8] [¶ 19] Similarly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Southwest Harbor's argument that the 1996 Newman purchase price, although indisputably arising out of an arms length sale, did not represent fair market value. The Town argues that the Board should have given greater weight to the fact that Newman listed his property for $2 million shortly after his purchase in 1996. The Town concedes that the property did not sell for another three years and did not sell at that price. Contrary to Southwest Harbor's argument, the Board acted within the bounds of its discretion in giving no weight to Newman's hoped for, but never realized, price. Newman's asking price, unlike his purchase price, was not reliable evidence of just value. See Wesson v. Town of Bremen, 667 A.2d 596, 599 n.5 (Me.1995) (affirming the Board's conclusion that the Trustees' data was flawed because it was based on asking prices, not sale prices of property). The arms length sale price of property provides the best evidence of market value. Id.; see also McCullough v. Town of Sanford, 687 A.2d 629, 631 (Me. 1996) (holding that `just value' means market value). [¶ 20] Finally, we address the Town's contention that because the Board declined to adopt the ultimate opinion of value presented by the trust's appraiser, it must necessarily have rejected all of the evidence presented by the trustee, thereby leaving no affirmative evidence from which it could have determined just value different than the one set by the assessor. The Town misreads our opinion in Waterville Homes. There, the Board concluded the evidence of value provided by each party lacks validity. Waterville Homes, Inc., 655 A.2d at 366. Here, the Board accepted some of the evidence presented by the taxpayer, but rejected the expert's ultimate opinion of value. [¶ 21] When a Board is presented with evidence, it may accept parts of the evidence and reject other parts. See Gulick v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202, 1208 (Me.1982). It is not required to engage in an all or nothing fact-finding. See, e.g., Kittery Elec. Light Co. v. Assessors of the Town of Kittery, 219 A.2d 728, 738 (Me.1966) (concluding that it was not error for the fact-finder to agree only in part with the plaintiff's experts). The Board was free to accept facts presented by the trustee and reject the trustee's expert's opinion, just as it was free to accept facts presented by the Town and reject the Town's expert's opinion. [¶ 22] Given the unique nature of the property at issue, the Board acted within the bounds of its discretion when it used Newman's arms length sale as its baseline for values of similar property on the island. No fewer than four opinions of just value, each with multiple subopinions and different methodologies, were offered regarding the different ways of calculating the fair market value of the trust property. Faced with conflicting opinions, the Board was entitled to make credibility determinations and undertake its own independent assessment of just value. See McTeague v. Dep't of Transp., 2000 ME 183, ¶¶ 7, 9, 760 A.2d 619, 621; Quoddy Realty Corp., 1998 ME 14, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d at 409. Although it was limited to using the evidence before it, the Board was not limited to the methodologies suggested by the various witnesses. [¶ 23] Because the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record, we must vacate the Superior Court's judgment, which vacated the decision of the Board. The entry is: Judgment of the Superior Court vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to affirm the decision of the Board of Assessment Review.