Opinion ID: 2773017
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government's rebuttal argument

Text: Finally, González claims that the government made some improper remarks in its rebuttal argument which rendered the trial unfair. Where a timely objection was made, [w]e review de novo whether the challenged portion of the government's closing argument was improper and, if so, whether it was harmful. Appolon, 695 F.3d at 66. The prosecutor's improper statements during closing argument are considered harmful if they so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected, thus warranting a new trial. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 62 (quoting United States v. Azubike, 504 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2007)); United States v. Garza, 435 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2006) (A non-constitutional evidentiary error is harmless . . . so long as it is highly probable that the -28- error did not influence the verdict. (quoting United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In making this determination, we focus on (1) the severity of the misconduct, including whether it was isolated and/or deliberate; (2) whether curative instructions were given; and (3) the strength of the evidence against the defendant. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 62. In contrast, we review for plain error any part of the government's rebuttal argument which the defendant failed to object to. Id. at 64. To meet this exacting standard, id., the defendant must show that an error occurred, which was clear or obvious and which not only affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.; United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011). [P]lain error review tends to afford relief . . . only for 'blockbuster' errors. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64 (citations omitted). During the rebuttal argument, the government responded to González's reference that the government ha[d] a problem by stating: Do you know how many times the government doesn't have evidence like you saw in this case? The government also stated that defense counsel wanted to confuse the jury, since defense counsel was unable to make González disappear from the videos played at trial. González timely objected to both statements, and -29- the district court overruled both objections. González now claims that the government improperly compared the evidence in this case to that in other cases and, thus, engaged in bolstering,10 and that it misstated and disparaged the defense strategy by taking aim at defense counsel. The challenged government statements were not improper. Regarding the first statement, defense counsel invited the prosecutor's comparison to other cases by stating that the government ha[d] a problem in this case . . . . They are very concerned that they had to rely so much on Cotto and Eusebio Hernández to prove their charges. It was reasonable for the prosecutor to respond that it did not have a problem because in this case, unlike many others, there was video evidence linking González to the crimes charged. See United States v. Ayala-García, 574 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2009) (Our cases establish that some leeway is appropriate when the government's challenged comments may fairly be seen as a response to comparable remarks by defense counsel.). And contrary to González's contentions, the government's comments cannot fairly be read to suggest that evidence not presented at trial supported the defendant's guilt. 10 We note that bolstering generally occurs when a prosecutor implies that a witness's testimony is corroborated by evidence known to the government but not known to the jury. United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). -30- Instead, the prosecutor was pointing out how much inculpatory evidence the government had introduced at trial. The prosecutor's further suggestions that defense counsel was trying to confuse the jury because he could not make González disappear from the videos, while perhaps impolitic, did not render the trial unfair. These comments, too, referred to the strength of the government's case (specifically, the fact that there was video evidence). Moreover, United States v. Manning, which González cites for his argument that the comments were improper, involved statements much more egregious than those in this case: there, the prosecutor stated that the role of the defense counsel in a criminal trial is to cloud the issues or make smoke screens, and he liken[ed] them to Shakespeare's players, full of sound and fury signifying nothing. 23 F.3d 570, 573 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994). Nothing like that was said in this case. Finally, González alleges that the government misstated the law as to reasonable doubt and criminal intent. Since González did not contemporaneously object to these allegedly improper statements, we review them only for plain error. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64. González fails to meet that standard. The statement regarding reasonable doubt was made in the context of the firearm charges and González was acquitted of all such charges, which makes clear that such alleged error does not meet the standard for plain error. As to the other statement, -31- the government said that all criminal intent means is that [González] knew he was breaking the law. González has failed to show that, when read in context, the statement was clearly and obviously erroneous. Moreover, after closing arguments, the district court gave specific instructions as to what both criminal intent and reasonable doubt meant. González does not point to anything indicating that the jury disregarded these instructions and we ordinarily presume that juries follow instructions. See id. at 63. He has simply failed to show that the alleged misstatements of the law affected his substantial rights and seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Pires, 642 F.3d at 14; see also Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 65 (noting that the fact that defendant had objected to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument, but had failed to do so during rebuttal suggested that even the defendant failed to regard the comments as having a damaging effect (citations omitted)). Thus, the alleged errors do not constitute the blockbuster errors required to satisfy the plain error standard. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64.