Opinion ID: 201687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorney-Client Privilege Claim

Text: 9 There is no common law accountant-client privilege, 1 so Bisanti's claim depends on his showing that Mancinone was acting as his attorney as to the statements admitted. See Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 246 (1st Cir.2002). The burden is on Bisanti, as the party claiming attorney-client privilege, to establish that the privilege exists and covers the statements at issue here. In re Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir.2003). 10 Although the parties cite an early case in which this court said that the existence of the attorney-client privilege is a factual determination, see United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir.1986), that is not quite correct, as our later case law makes clear. We have since said that issues of privilege are subject to a three-part standard of review, depending on which question is presented to us. On an appeal respecting a privilege claim, the standard of review depends on the issue. Cavallaro, 284 F.3d at 245 (citing United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 683 (1st Cir.1987)). Factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, legal determinations are reviewed de novo, and evidentiary determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 11 The essential elements of the claim of attorney-client privilege are as follows: 12 (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 13 Id. (citations omitted). 14 The district court addressed the issue of privilege on two different occasions. The first was in a pre-trial hearing on Bisanti's motion in limine to preclude the government from calling Mancinone as a witness. The district court noted that it did not need to decide broadly whether Mancinone was acting as an accountant or an attorney, but rather would address privilege issues on a statement-specific basis. The court ruled that any statements made by Mancinone to the IRS were clearly outside any privilege, and that any statements made by Bisanti to Mancinone with the understanding that the information would be divulged to the IRS were also clearly outside any privilege. The court also ruled that Mancinone could testify as to any information given to him by the IRS that he then passed on to Bisanti. The court did say, however, that any inculpatory statements attributed to Bisanti would be covered by the privilege and inadmissible. 15 The court revisited the issue of privilege again during Mancinone's testimony. Bisanti objected to two proffered questions the government intended to ask Mancinone, arguing that the answers would require disclosure of privileged information. No appeal is taken from the first question, which was whether Mancinone ever discussed with Bisanti his obligation to pay the taxes assessed as a result of the audit, and the consequences of not doing so. The court ruled that this was routine accountant-client communications, and not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 16 The sole testimony on which the claim of privilege is made on appeal concerns the government's questions to Mancinone as to whether Bisanti had ever asked Mancinone to enter into an offer in compromise with the IRS concerning payment of his tax obligations as calculated by the IRS. The court at conference asked the government to rephrase the question. As a result, the precise question asked was did you discuss the possibility of an offer [in] compromise on behalf of John Bisanti with the revenue agent with whom you were dealing for the '94 and '95 tax years? Mancinone responded that he had. The government then asked, Did you pursue an offer [in] compromise on behalf of John Bisanti for his tax liability for the 1994, 1995 tax years with any IRS representative? Mancinone responded that he had not. The government then asked why he had not done so, and Mancinone replied that he had not been authorized to do so by Bisanti. 17 Whether or not Mancinone acted on occasion as counsel (not as accountant), not all communications with counsel are privileged. Cavallaro, 284 F.3d at 245. The rationale for the privilege is that safeguarding communications between attorney and client encourages disclosures by the client to the lawyer that facilitate the client's compliance with the law and better enable the client to present legitimate arguments should litigation arise. Id. 18 Neither of the first two questions relating to the offer in compromise asked about communications between Mancinone and Bisanti. Rather, they asked about Mancinone's communications with the IRS, and thus were clearly outside any privilege. 19 As to the third why question, which had the potential to elicit information about Bisanti's communications with Mancinone concerning authority to negotiate a tax matter, the district court found that this situation was characteristic of an accountant-client relationship, that the context did not show an attorney-client relationship, and so the answer was not privileged. This determination was clearly correct. Because we find there was no error in the admission of the statement, we do not reach Bisanti's argument that the answer was somehow prejudicial to him. 20