Opinion ID: 327942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Vieux Carre Ordinance is a Proper Exercise of the Police Power.

Text: 39 The Supreme Court has erected wayposts to guide our consideration whether an enactment such as the Vieux Carre Ordinance violates due process. A legislative determination is generally accorded a presumption of constitutionality, 34 but it is nevertheless subjected to several tests before its validity is established. To be sound, the enactment must be within the perimeter of the police power, an authority residing in the law-making body to secure, preserve and promote the general health, welfare and safety. 35 A regulatory ordinance, to be sustained as a suitable exercise of the police power, must bear a real and substantial relation to a legitimate state purpose. 36 The means selected must be reasonable and of general application, 37 and the law must not trench impermissibly on other constitutionally protected interests. 38 40 Maher contends that, although the legislative purpose underlying the preservation of the Vieux Carre, may be unobjectionable, the general program of effectuation as well as the denial of Maher's demolition permit have inadequate standards and an arbitrary enforcement that violate due process. Furthermore, he asserts that the law is confiscatory in its operation and constitutes a taking that requires compensation. 41 A substantial body of precedent exists respecting the appropriate balancing of interests where an ordinance diminishes the freedom of an individual owner to dispose of his property in the name of what the lawmaker deems the greater public benefit. It is generally accepted that legislative bodies 39 are entrusted with the task of defining the public interest and purpose, and of enacting laws in furtherance of the general good. 40 The Supreme Court has made it clear that, while the police power is not unlimited, its boundaries are both ample and protean. 41 Drawing on the rich and flexible police power, a legislature has the authority to respond to economic and cultural developments cast in a different mold, and to essay new solutions to new problems. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the watershed case upholding the right of a municipality to enact a general zoning ordinance, the Supreme Court observed: 42 (P)roblems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. 42 43 Accordingly, no fixed constraints may be placed on the police power for the future. Rather, each case must be evaluated as it arises, on its own facts and in light of the prevailing circumstances. 43 44 A keystone of due process analysis is the determination that the state purpose to be served is legitimate. It would therefore appear beneficial to detail the substantial support that exists for a legislative determination to preserve historic landmarks and districts. 44 The Ordinance in question here declares as its objective: 45 The Vieux Carre shall have for its purpose the preservation of such buildings in the Vieux Carre section of the City as, in the opinion of the Commission, shall have architectural and historical value and which should be preserved for the benefit of the people of the City and State. 45 46 Proper state purposes may encompass not only the goal of abating undesirable conditions, but of fostering ends the community deems worthy. In Berman v. Parker the Supreme Court, giving well-nigh conclusive effect to the legislative determination of community needs and solutions, upheld the purposes of a slum clearance program designed to develop a more balanced, more attractive community. 46 47 Nor need the values advanced be solely economic or directed at health and safety in their narrowest senses. The police power inhering in the lawmaker is more generous, comprehending more subtle and ephemeral societal interests.  The values (that the police power) represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the domain of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 47 48 This circuit has held in Stone v. City of Maitland that zoning ordinances may be sustained under the police power where motivated by a desire to enhanc(e) the aesthetic appeal of a community. 48 The Court noted with approbation city action to maintain the value of scenic surroundings and the preservation of the quality of our environment. 49 49 One of the nation's distinctive historic districts is found in New Orleans. The federal, 50 state and local government have each ascertained that benefits would be conferred on society by preservation of the French Quarter. 50 Throughout the country, there appears to be a burgeoning awareness that our heritage and culture are treasured national assets. Many locales endowed with historic sites have enacted protective measures for them. The Vieux Carre Ordinance is among the earliest efforts in this regard, and has served as a prototype for similar enactments elsewhere. 51 51 The federal government also has acknowledged our debt to the past, in the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966:The Congress finds and declares 52 (a) that the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic past; 53 (b) that the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people . . .. 52 54 An Advisory Committee on Historic Preservation was established, and a National Register of Historic Places was developed that included the Vieux Carre. 53 55 The Court is not free to reverse the considered judgment of the legislature that it is in the public interest to preserve the status quo in the Vieux Carre and to scrutinize closely any proposed change in the ambiance by private owners. Where a legislative determination is fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. 54 We thus conclude that, considering the nationwide sentiment for preserving the country's heritage and with particular regard to the context of the unique and characteristic French Quarter, the objective of the Vieux Carre Ordinance falls within the permissible scope of the police power. 56 Since we deal here with legislation designed to effect a legitimate economic and social policy, so long as the means chosen a matter largely entrusted to the legislature are reasonable and not arbitrary, due process is satisfied. 55 It is not disputed that the Vieux Carre Ordinance furthers the object of preserving the character of the district in a meaningful fashion. 57 The Ordinance is of general application to a well-defined geographic area. In addition, it establishes a Commission whose professional qualifications and means of selection are delineated. Within the boundaries of the French Quarter, the Commission is directed to review plans for all proposed demolition or construction and its duties and procedures are specific. After due consideration the Commission reports its recommendations to the Director of the Department of Safety and Permits, whereupon a permit for the proposed work may issue. Provision is made for review by the City Council. 56 58 Though generally the procedures ordained are not faulted, 57 Maher attacks the schema as violative of due process because, in his view, it provides inadequate guidance to the Commission for the exercise of its administrative judgment. The City concedes that no official objective standards have been promulgated in this regard. Maher suggests that formal standards are mandatory to guide the Commission in its resolution of the buildings deserving of preservation. 59 To satisfy due process, guidelines to aid a commission charged with implementing a public zoning purpose need not be so rigidly drawn as to prejudge the outcome in each case, precluding reasonable administrative discretion. Because of the circumstances pertaining to the Vieux Carre, we conclude that the Ordinance provides adequate legislative direction to the Commission to enable it to perform its functions consonant with the due process clause. 60 While concerns of aesthetic or historical preservation do not admit to precise quantification, certain firm steps have been undertaken here to assure that the Commission would not be adrift to act without standards in an impermissible fashion. First, the Louisiana constitution, 58 the Vieux Carre Ordinance 59 and, by interpretation, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 60 have specified their expectations for the Vieux Carre, and the values to be implemented by the legislation. 61 Further, the legislature exercises substantial control over the Commission's decision making in several ways. Where possible, the ordinance is precise, as for example in delineating the district, 61 defining what alterations in which locations require approval, 62 and particularly regulating items of special interest, such as floodlights, overhanging balconies or signs. 63 62 Another method by which the lawmaking body curbed the possibility for abuse by the Commission was by specifying the composition of that body and its manner of selection. 64 Thus, the City is assured that the Commission includes architects, historians and business persons offering complementary skills, experience and interests. 63 The elaborate decision-making and appeal process set forth in the ordinance creates another structural check on any potential for arbitrariness that might exist. 65 Decisions of the Commission may be reviewed ultimately by the City Council itself. Indeed, that is the procedure that was followed in the present case. 66 64 It is true, as Maher observed, that no officially promulgated regulations pinpoint each decision by the Commission. Nonetheless, apart from the evident purpose of the legislation and the taut lines of review maintained by the legislature over the operation of the Commission, other fertile sources are readily available to promote a reasoned exercise of the professional and scholarly judgment of the Commission. It may be difficult to capture the atmosphere of a region through a set of regulations. However, it would seem that old city plans and historic documents, as well as photographs and contemporary writings may provide an abundant and accurate compilation of data to guide the Commission. And the district court observed, 65 In this case, the meaning of a mandate to preserve the character of the Vieux Carre takes clear meaning from the observable character of the district to which it applies. 67 66 Aside from such contemporary indicia of the nature and appearance of the French Quarter at earlier times, the Commission has the advantage at present of a recent impartial architectural and historical study of the structures in the area. The Vieux Carre Survey Advisory Committee conducted its analysis under a grant to Tulane University from the Edward G. Schleider Foundation. Building by building, the Committee assessed the merit of each structure with respect to several factors. For example, regarding the Maher cottage at issue here, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the Survey Committee was of the opinion that this cottage was worthy of preservation as part of the over-all scene. 68 While the Schleider survey in no way binds the Commission, it does furnish an independent and objective judgment respecting the edifices in the area. The existence of the survey and other historical source material assist in mooring the Commission's discretion firmly to the legislative purpose. 69 67 We thus conclude that the present zoning ordinance, enacted to promote the social and economic goals of preserving an historical district judged of public value, does not delegate unfettered authority to the Vieux Carre Commission. Rather, the legislature has provided adequate structure and guidelines to that administrative body. 68 Although it primarily concerned a taking, Berman v. Parker 70 supplies an apt analogy to the present situation. The question arose whether it was necessary to have legislative guidance for each individual decision in a context of a district-wide project to eliminate slums and blighted areas. A redevelopment agency had decided to raze an entire district, and an individual owner objected to implementing the decision with respect to its property, insisting that its building should be allowed to stand because it was safe, sanitary and profitable. 69 The Supreme Court held that the agency, acting with the needs of the whole community in mind and the advantage of expert consultation, was free to implement its mandate with respect to the entire district without the need for a specific showing in each case that its action was necessary to the purpose of the legislation. Allowing each affected party to challenge the basis for an agency determination could thwart a comprehensive project, the Court held. It would appear that the Vieux Carre Commission, like the agency in Berman, acts in harmony with the public interest and directive, affords procedural fairness, and utilizes expert assistance. 70 By contrast, there is a case in which the Supreme Court did strike down a zoning regulation because of its improper delegation of arbitrary, unreviewable decision-making power by the enacting body. In Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 71 a local ordinance prohibited the erection of a philanthropic institution in a specified area, unless written consent was acquired from surrounding neighbors. Such provision, the Court held, violated due process, because no standards existed to govern consent, and consent could be withheld for any reason or for no reason. An owner was afforded no review or other recourse, and was thus entirely subject to the caprice of its neighbors. 71 In addition to his argument, that the ordinance is arbitrary for want of standards, Maher asserts that the ordinance as applied to him was arbitrary, because the decision of the City Council to prohibit him from leveling the Dumaine Street residence was unsupported by reasons. 72 The district court, faced with this contention stated, 72 Considerable testimony supported the (Council's) position that the Maher cottage had substantial architectural value as part of the Vieux Carre scene as well as some individual architectural merit. 73 (Although) a finding (in Maher's favor) would have certainly been possible (,) . . . (t)he fact that the city authorities did not ultimately agree . . . does not make their action arbitrary. 73 The district court was persuaded that 74 (T)his case has not been an example so much of a lack of standards as a disagreement as to whether the Maher cottage qualified for demolition under the applicable standards. In view of the whole record of this case, it is the opinion of the Court that since the City Council, rather than acting arbitrarily, merely resolved a fair, albeit heated, difference of opinion, the judgment of that zoning authority should be followed. 74 75 As a reviewing tribunal, we cannot detect reversible error in the district court's conclusion. 76 IV. There is no Taking of the Dumaine Cottage that Would Require the Payment of Compensation. 77 Maher presents a twofold basis for his contention that the application of the Vieux Carre Ordinance to the cottage constitutes a taking of his property. First, he claims that unless he can build the desired apartment complex, he may not pursue the most profitable use to which his property may be put. Second, he asserts that the city may not permissibly impose an affirmative maintenance duty upon a property owner without taking the property under the power of eminent domain. We deal with these two contentions in turn. 78 To survive attack as a taking, the zoning regulation must as a threshold matter satisfy the due process requirements that its purpose and means are reasonable. Even if it comports with due process, a regulatory ordinance may nonetheless be a taking if it is unduly onerous so as to be confiscatory. The Supreme Court has held that every regulation is in some sense a prohibition 75 and that whether a given regulation treads over the line of proper regulation and operates as a taking of property is a matter to be determined under all the circumstances in a specific case. Justice Holmes has remarked: 79 Constitutional rights like others are matters of degree. To illustrate: Under the police power, in its strict sense, a certain limit might be set to the height of buildings without compensation; but to make that limit five feet would require compensation and a taking by eminent domain. 76 80 The Supreme Court repeatedly made clear that an ordinance within the police power does not become an unconstitutional taking merely because, as a result of its operation, property does not achieve its maximum economic potential. 77 In Goldblatt v. Hempstead an ordinance was amended to forbid excavation below the water table. Goldblatt owned property theretofore dedicated to quarrying which had through the years created a rather deep lake of several acres. The ordinance as applied to Goldblatt substantially reduced the value of his property and its potential utility. The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the validity of the measure as a reasonable regulation, stating, 81 Concededly the ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has previously been devoted. However, such a characterization does not tell us whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional. It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If this ordinance otherwise is a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional. 78 82 Relying on Mugler v. Kansas, 79 the Supreme Court in Goldblatt observed that a properly enacted prohibition against a use of property for purposes adverse to the public weal is not controlled by the doctrine of eminent domain. Such regulation is not, and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be, burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain . . . . 80 83 The Court's attention has been directed to ordinances of other municipalities where the authority to prohibit destruction of designated buildings is more limited. Refusals to allow razing may be accompanied by tax credit arrangements, by permission to transfer building rights to other owners or by other economic incentives or palliatives; ordinances may prohibit demolition conditionally or temporarily. 81 Such measures may be considered wiser or fairer by a legislature which contemplates an historic preservation enactment. All we must decide today is whether an enactment that does not furnish alleviating devices may be constitutional. 84 An ordinance forbidding the demolition of certain structures, if it serves a permissible goal in an otherwise reasonable fashion, does not seem on its face constitutionally distinguishable from ordinances regulating other aspects of land ownership, such as building height, set back or limitations on use. We conclude that the provision requiring a permit before demolition and the fact that in some cases permits may not be obtained does not alone make out a case of taking. 85 As the ordinance was applied to Maher, the denial of the permit to demolish and rebuild does not operate as a classic example of eminent domain, namely, a taking of Maher's property for government use. 82 Nor did Maher demonstrate to the satisfaction of the district court that a taking occurred because the ordinance so diminished the property value as to leave Maher, in effect, nothing. 83 In particular, Maher did not show that the sale of the property was impracticable, that commercial rental could not provide a reasonable rate of return, or that other potential use of the property was foreclosed. 84 To the extent that such is the theory underlying Maher's claim, it fails for lack of proof. 86 We finally consider Maher's objection to that portion of the ordinance requiring reasonable maintenance and repair of buildings in the French Quarter. 85 By imposing an affirmative duty on property owners to prevent and correct defects, Maher claims that the City Council has overstepped permissible bounds of police power and by requiring him to make expenditures has effectively taken his property. To do this, Maher invokes the eminent domain provisions and demands just compensation. 87 Tests set forth by the Supreme Court again inform our analysis. 86 Once it has been determined that the purpose of the Vieux Carre legislation is a proper one, upkeep of buildings appears reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the goals of the ordinance. 87 As noted above, the responsibility for determining the wisdom of a legislative determination is not lodged with the judiciary. 88 The fact that an owner may incidentally be required to make out-of-pocket expenditures in order to remain in compliance with an ordinance does not per se render that ordinance a taking. In the interest of safety, it would seem that an ordinance might reasonably require buildings to have fire sprinklers or to provide emergency facilities for exits and light. In pursuit of health, provisions for plumbing or sewage disposal might be demanded. Compliance could well require owners to spend money. Yet, if the purpose be legitimate and the means reasonably consistent with the objective, the ordinance can withstand a frontal attack of invalidity. 89 Our decision is narrow regarding the requirement reasonably to maintain property in the French Quarter. In holding that the ordinance provision necessitating reasonable maintenance is constitutional, we do not conclude that every application of such an ordinance would be beyond constitutional assault. For, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Goldblatt, even a generally constitutional regulation may become a taking in an isolated application if unduly oppressive to a property owner. 88 It may be that, in some set of circumstances, the expense of maintenance under the Ordinance were the city to exact compliance would be so unreasonable as to constitute a taking. 89 90 The burden of proof as to this point falls on the party alleging the taking. 90 On the evidence presented here, the district court found that Maher had not sustained his burden of demonstrating that the upkeep provisions were inordinately burdensome. 91 We go no further than to state that we cannot find the district court determination in this regard to be erroneous. 91