Opinion ID: 725455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: leonard cooper

Text: 4 A district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Rubio-Topete, 999 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.1993), as are its rulings regarding the sufficiency of authentication and identification. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1462 (9th Cir.1994). 5 Defendant objected to the admission of testimony by Ana Casas, a United States Department of Agriculture Food & Nutrition program specialist, who testified concerning the food stamp redemption rates of A Cut Above, as compared to similarly-situated stores in the neighborhood. Defendant contends that Casas' testimony lacked foundation, and therefore reliability and trustworthiness. Casas' testimony was offered to show that defendant's percentage of food stamp redemptions were out of proportion with the norm, with the inference being that defendant's food stamp redemptions were unlawful. 4 Defendant argues that the sample of stores in the comparison was too small, and was not truly representative of the universe of specialty meat stores. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides: 6 The requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by sufficient evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 7 In laying a foundation, Appellants must establish evidence describing a process or system used to produce ... an accurate result. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(9). 8 Casas laid an appropriate foundation by testifying as to the method used by the Food and Nutrition Services Department to maintain records regarding food stamp redemptions; the statistical factors used; and the search of the records which generated a list of comparable stores. Casas' sample was limited to those six stores within A Cut Above's zip code which were comparable in size, number of employees, number of cash registers, store hours, and the type of merchandise sold. The district court found that the sample was neighborhood-intensive and comparable-intensive. Defendant's contention that some meat specialty stores did have gross business meat sales in excess of $500,000 over a 12-month period is not supported by the record. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
9 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had knowledge of the specific regulation that prohibited the acceptance of food stamp coupons in exchange for cash. 5 10 In Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1984), the Supreme Court stated: 11 We hold that in a prosecution for violation of § 2024(b)(1), the Government must prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations.... [but] the Government need not show that he had knowledge of specific regulations governing food stamp acquisition or possession. 12 Id. at 433-34. 13 Defendant argues that the legal requirement of actual knowledge is a natural extension of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 655, 657-58 (1994). We decline to expand Liparota's holding to impose such a burden of proof on the government. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by defendant.
14 The district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Blaize, 959 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2954 (1992). We review the district court's factual findings underlying a sentencing determination for clear error. United States v. Nazifpour, 944 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam).
15 Defendant argues that the probation officer's loss calculation of $466,144.00 under Guidelines section 2F1.1(b)(1), was erroneous and that the appropriate loss amount is $233,070, with the loss restricted to the actual profit received by defendant. 6 16 The $466,144.00 figure represents the full face value of the food stamps unlawfully received by the Defendant's business between June of 1993 and February of 1994. Defendant's argument that upon redemption, the government was only being defrauded of fifty percent of the face value of the food stamps is unpersuasive. 17 The guidelines provide: [I]n a case involving diversion of government program benefits, loss is the value of the benefits diverted from intended recipients or uses. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. n. 7(d). See United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (the amount of loss need not be precise ... the court need only make a reasonable estimate of the range of loss). Thus, the benefits diverted from the intended recipients is the full face value of the stamps. The district court's findings as to loss were not clearly erroneous.
18 Guideline section 3B1.1(a) provides that a defendant receive a four level upward adjustment if he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. 19 Defendant contends that in determining whether the offense was otherwise extensive, the district court engaged in impermissible double-counting by using the same factor--that defendant's scheme involved multiple offenses over a nine month period--in order to increase defendant's offense level under § 2F1.1(b)(2) for more than minimal planning, and under § 3B1.1(a) for role in the offense. 20 First, Defendant's scheme was otherwise extensive not because it involved multiple offenses over a nine-month period, as Defendant claims, but because it involved numerous individuals and used the unknowing services of many outsiders, resulting in a substantial amount of loss over that time period. Addendum to Presentence Report at 2. This basis for enhancement was recognized in United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1479 (9th Cir.1993) (upholding four-level increase for role in offense because defendant recruited accomplices for a scheme that had at least three participants and used the services of many outsiders); and United States v. Roberts, 5 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir.1993) (fraud involving only 3 participants but using the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive). 21 Second, we have held that when separate enhancements address sufficiently different concerns, applying both does not constitute double-counting. United States v. Kelly, 993 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir.1993). The four-level increase is appropriate. 7
22 Defendant argues that the district court erroneously increased his offense level by two points for abuse of trust. 23 A defendant's offense level is increased by two levels [i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense ... U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Defendant's attempt to equate his crime to ordinary theft involving no special position of trust is unavailing. The abuse of trust enhancement applies to fiduciary-like trust relationships of the sort described in the Sentencing Guidelines Commentary, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. n. 1. See United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.1990). 24 The primary focus in determining an abuse of trust is on the extent to which the position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong, and whether an abuse could be simply or readily noticed. Id. at 506. 25 As the owner and manager of an authorized food stamp retail store, Defendant had authority to accept and redeem food stamps in exchange for food provided to food stamp recipients. The government entrusted him to follow the rules and regulations of the federal food stamp program, and to submit food stamp redemption certificates to the government listing the amount of food stamps deposited. The program relied on Defendant's false representations that he had legitimately obtained the food stamps in exchange for food. Because his position gave him powers and privileges not available to the general public, Defendant was able to significantly facilitate the concealment of a difficult-to-detect crime. The district court's decision enhancing defendant's offense level for abuse of a position of trust was not clearly erroneous.