Opinion ID: 2494205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Exacting Scrutiny to Maine's Laws

Text: As we have stated, we will consider a law constitutional under exacting scrutiny standards where there is a substantial relation between the law and a 'sufficiently important' governmental interest. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66, 96 S.Ct. 612). In Buckley, the Court recognized the goal of provid[ing] the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent to be such a sufficiently important governmental interest capable of supporting a disclosure law. 424 U.S. at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's more recent decisions have continued to recognize the importance of this informational interest. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914-15; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, 124 S.Ct. 619. Buckley tied the government's interest in the dissemination of information to the functioning of the electoral process, noting that [i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential. 424 U.S. at 14-15, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court observed that disclosure has several benefits in this regard: It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office. Id. at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, the informational interest is not limited to informing the choice between candidates for political office. As Citizens United recognized, there is an equally compelling interest in identifying the speakers behind politically oriented messages. In an age characterized by the rapid multiplication of media outlets and the rise of internet reporting, the marketplace of ideas has become flooded with a profusion of information and political messages. Citizens rely ever more on a message's source as a proxy for reliability and a barometer of political spin. Disclosing the identity and constituency of a speaker engaged in political speech thus enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages. [33] Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 916; see also Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th Cir.2003) (recognizing that, in the cacophony of political communications through which . . . voters must pick out meaningful and accurate messages[,]. . . being able to evaluate who is doing the talking is of great importance). Additionally, in the case of corporate or organizational speakers, disclosure allows shareholders and members to hold [them] accountable for their positions. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 916. In short, [t]he First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to [that] speech . . . in a proper way. Id. In line with these precedents, defendants offer Maine's interest in disseminating information about political funding to the electorate in support of the laws challenged here. [34] As the district court found, the interest is plainly a motivating factor behind Maine's laws, and Maine, through its Commission website and otherwise, makes [the financial disclosure] information easily available to the public. Nat'l Org. for Marriage, 723 F.Supp.2d at 263. We thus proceed under the exacting scrutiny framework to examine whether there is a substantial relation between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue.
As we have described, Maine considers an entity to be a non-major-purpose PAC when it receives contributions or makes expenditures of more than $5,000 annually for the purpose of promoting, defeating or influencing in any way a candidate's election. Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1052(5)(A)(5). Upon crossing that threshold, the newly-deemed non-major-purpose PAC must register with the Commission, maintain records of certain expenditures as well as donor contributions aggregating more than $50, and file reports both on a quarterly basis and shortly before and after each election. Id. §§ 1053, 1057, 1059-60. The reporting requirements are well tailored to Maine's informational interest, requiring disclosure only of the candidates or campaigns the non-major-purpose PAC supports or opposes, its expenditures made to support or oppose the same, and identifying information for any contributors who have given more than $50 to the PAC to support or oppose a candidate or campaign. Id. § 1060. NOM does not challenge the substantive obligations attendant to non-major-purpose PAC status, nor contest that the registration, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements bear a substantial relation to Maine's informational interest. Instead, NOM contends that Maine's definition of a non-major-purpose PAC, standing alone, is unconstitutionally overbroad. In rejecting NOM's argument for strict scrutiny, we have already addressed the claim that PAC status is somehow inherently burdensome apart from the specific requirements it entails. However, there is a second aspect to NOM's argument. NOM contends that Supreme Court precedent sharply limits regulation of PACs to those that are under the control of a candidate or have as their major purpose the election of a candidate. By its very definition, Maine's non-major-purpose PAC provision covers entities that fall outside of that allegedly limited zone of permissible regulation, and thus, NOM contends, the provision is fatally overbroad. We disagree. NOM extracts support for its argument from a dictum in Buckley, albeit a dictum that has had some reach. In Buckley, the Court concluded that the definition of expenditure used in connection with FECA's disclosure provisionand particularly the phrase for the purpose of influencing raised significant line-drawing problems because it had the potential for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result. 424 U.S. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612. In the course of its discussion, the Court noted that FECA's definition of political committees, which, like the disclosure provision, was defined in terms of contributions and expenditures, could raise similar vagueness problems. Id. The provision escaped these concerns, the Court explained, because it could be construed more narrowly: To fulfill the purposes of [FECA, political committees] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of political committees so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related. Id. Buckley's narrow reading of FECA's political committee definition, though dictum, appears to have been accepted by later opinions. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64, 124 S.Ct. 619; Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 252 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 616; cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 26-27, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (noting dispute over extent of narrowing construction). NOM draws from this the conclusion that the First Amendment permits an entity to be designated a PAC only where it (1) is under the control of a candidate or (2) has as its major purpose the nomination or election of a candidate. We find no reason to believe that this so-called major purpose test, like the other narrowing constructions adopted in Buckley, is anything more than an artifact of the Court's construction of a federal statute. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 191-92, 124 S.Ct. 619. The Court has never applied a major purpose test to a state's regulation of PACs, nor have we. And, as we have discussed, the line-drawing concerns that led the Court to read FECA's definition of political committee narrowly are not relevant to our First Amendment review of Maine's statutes. Moreover, as the district court aptly observed, application of NOM's major-purpose test would yield perverse results here: Under NOM's interpretation, a small group with the major purpose of re-electing a Maine state representative that spends $1,500 for ads could be required to register as a PAC. But a mega-group that spends $1,500,000 to defeat the same candidate would not have to register because the defeat of that candidate could not be considered the corporation's major purpose. Nat'l Org. for Marriage, 723 F.Supp.2d at 264. We, like the district court, see no basis to conclude that the First Amendment's protections should apply so unequally. Id. We therefore reject NOM's argument that the non-major-purpose PAC definition is unconstitutionally overbroad. Because we find a substantial relation between Maine's disclosure-oriented regulation of non-major-purpose PACs and its interest in the dissemination of information regarding the financing of political speech, we conclude that the law does not, on its face, offend the First Amendment.
We similarly find that Maine's independent expenditure reporting provision poses no First Amendment concerns. The law primarily obligates anyone spending more than an aggregate of $100 for communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate to report the expenditure to the Commission. Me.Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1019-B(1)(A), (3). Reviewing a prior, substantially similar version of this provision in Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 466 (1st Cir.2000), we held that the modest amount of information requested is not unduly burdensome and ties directly and closely to the relevant government interests. We see no reason to depart from that conclusion here. The independent expenditure law also presumptively requires a report of any expenditure over $100 for communications naming or depicting a clearly identified candidate within a set period prior to any election. Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1019-B(1)(B), (3). Though we did not review this aspect of the law in Daggett, the Supreme Court upheld in Citizens United a similar provision of federal election law that required disclosure in connection with expenditures for electioneering communications (communications made shortly before an election that refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office). 130 S.Ct. at 913-16. In so doing, the Court noted that the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election. 130 S.Ct. at 915-16. The law here is perhaps more tailored than that at issue in Citizens United, as it offers an opportunity to rebut the presumption that a communication made shortly before an election and identifying a candidate had the intent to influence the nomination, election or defeat of a candidate. Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1019-B(2). Regardless, the information that must be reported under this subsection is, as Daggett found, modest, 205 F.3d at 466, and it bears a substantial relation to the public's interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915-16. NOM argues that Maine lacks a sufficiently important interest in the $100 threshold at which the reporting requirement adheres, and, alternatively, that the threshold lacks a substantial relation to a sufficiently important governmental interest. NOM's argument operates from a mistaken premise; we do not review reporting thresholds under the exacting scrutiny framework. In Buckley, facing a similar challenge to a $10 threshold for a recordkeeping provision and a $100 reporting threshold, the Supreme Court noted that the choice of where to set such monetary thresholds is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left in the context of this complex legislation to congressional discretion. 424 U.S. at 83, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court concluded that, although there was no evidence in the record that Congress had focused carefully on the appropriate level at which to require recording and disclosure, and despite the fact that the low thresholds might discourage participation by some citizens in the political process, it could not say that the limits designated are wholly without rationality. Id. ; see also id. n. III ([W]hen it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. (quoting Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41, 48 S.Ct. 423, 72 L.Ed. 770 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). The Court thus upheld FECA's recordkeeping and reporting thresholds. Following Buckley, we have granted judicial deference to plausible legislative judgments as to the appropriate location of a reporting threshold, and have upheld such legislative determinations unless they are `wholly without rationality.' Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 32-33 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83, 96 S.Ct. 612). In Daggett, for example, we applied these standards in rejecting a challenge to the $50 reporting threshold in the prior iteration of Maine's independent expenditure law. 205 F.3d at 466 (We remain unconvinced . . . that, if $100 was an appropriate threshold for requiring the reporting of independent expenditures in federal elections in Buckley, $50 is an illegitimate threshold for Maine elections.). Despite the fact that the threshold has been doubled since Daggett, NOM argues that we should find the line unconstitutional because it is not indexed to inflation. In so arguing, it relies on an observation in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 261, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006), that [a] failure to index limits means that limits which are already suspiciously low. . . will almost inevitably become too low over time. The limits at issue in Sorrell, however, were substantive contribution limits, the setting of which presents different considerations than the determination of the threshold for a reporting requirement, [35] and which is subject to different standards of review. Neither we nor the Supreme Court has ever second-guessed a legislative decision not to index a reporting requirement to inflation. Indeed, in Buckley, the Court acknowledged that Congress, in setting FECA's $100 reporting threshold, appeared to have simply adopted the threshold used in similar disclosure laws since 1910i.e., over the course of more than sixty years, without any adjustment for inflation. 424 U.S. at 83, 96 S.Ct. 612. We thus reject NOM's argument that the $100 threshold is unconstitutional simply because it is static. Moreover, we cannot conclude that Maine's choice of a $100 threshold, double the amount we upheld just a decade ago in Daggett, is wholly without rationality.
Finally, we agree with the district court that  Citizens United has effectively disposed of any attack on Maine's attribution and disclaimer requirements. Nat'l Org. for Marriage, 723 F.Supp.2d at 267. NOM argues that Maine's attribution and disclaimer requirements are so great that the government's interest does not reflect the burden on speech, as the required disclosures will distract readers and listeners from NOM's message. We disagree. The requirements are minimal, calling only for a statement of whether the message was authorized by a candidate and disclosure of the name and address of the person who made or financed the communication. Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1014(1)-(2). These are precisely the requirements approved in Citizens United, [36] see 130 S.Ct. at 913-14 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441d), and they bear a close relation to Maine's interest in dissemination of information regarding the financing of political messages. The disclaimer and attribution requirements are, on their face, unquestionably constitutional. [37]