Opinion ID: 2321233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Unlawful Incarceration

Text: Brown's next argument on appeal is grounded in his contention that he has been unlawfully incarcerated since 2000 in violation of what Brown maintains is a mandatory parole requirement under § 13-8-10(a). [19] This provision of the parole statute states: (a) If a prisoner is confined upon more than one sentence, a parole permit may be issued whenever he or she has served a term equal to one-third (1/3) of the aggregate time which he or she shall be liable to serve under his or her several sentences, unless he or she has been sentenced to serve two (2) or more terms concurrently, in which case the permit shall be issued when he or she has served a term equal to one-third (1/3) of the maximum term he or she is required to serve. Brown contends that the Legislature's use of the word shall in the second clause, addressing concurrent sentencing situations, required the parole board to issue to him a parole permit upon serving one-third of his longest sentence. Brown's completion of one-third of his maximum sentence occurred in 2000 after ten years of incarceration, at which time the board denied him parole. After considering the language of the provision, the statutory parole scheme as a whole, his perception of legislative intent, and applicable precedent, the hearing justice rejected Brown's proposed interpretation of § 13-8-10(a) and determined his unlawful custody claim to be without merit. The parole board is authorized by § 13-8-9 to issue parole permits to prisoners whose sentence is subject to its control in a discretionary fashion whenever that prisoner has served not less than one-third (1/3) of the term for which he or she was sentenced, with the exception of prisoners sentenced to life or classified as habitual offenders under G.L.1956 § 12-19-21. When a prisoner is serving multiple sentences, the provisions of § 13-8-10, titled Prisoners subject to more than one sentence, generally come into play. [20] Brown's contentionthat the second clause of § 13-8-10(a) creates a separate, nondiscretionary parole mechanism for prisoners serving concurrent sentencesis wholly without merit. This Court explicitly held otherwise in DeCiantis v. State, 666 A.2d 410 (R.I.1995), when faced with a similar challenge invoking § 13-8-10(a) by the postconviction-relief applicant in that matter. In DeCiantis, the applicant, then serving two concurrent life sentences and a consecutive life sentence, asked this Court to require his parole on the two concurrent life sentences after only ten years, even though a prisoner serving just one life sentence consecutively to another life sentence must wait twenty years before seeking parole. DeCiantis, 666 A.2d at 411. DeCiantis premised his argument on the second clause of § 13-8-10(a) and asserted that the clause created a distinct mandatory parole procedure for prisoners serving concurrent sentences. DeCiantis, 666 A.2d at 412. Although we ultimately determined that § 13-8-13 governed DeCiantis's case as opposed to § 13-8-10, we nonetheless concluded that DeCiantis's reading of § 13-8-10(a) misconstrue[d] the clear intent of the General Assembly and further noted that [t]he applicant would have this Court read the clause relating to concurrent sentences in isolation from the preceding clause. DeCiantis, 666 A.2d at 413. While the factual circumstances of DeCiantis's sentencing are distinguishable from the sentences imposed in this case, both DeCiantis and Brown advocated an interpretation of § 13-8-10(a) that would result in the mandatory parole of any prisoner serving concurrent sentences upon the completion of one-third of his or her maximum sentence. As we stated in DeCiantis, and as we emphasize now, such a reading of this provision ignores the discretion imparted upon the parole board throughout the parole statute as a whole and flouts the clear intent of the Legislature in enacting this statutory scheme. See DeCiantis, 666 A.2d at 413. The hearing justice likewise recognized the reasoning and holding announced in DeCiantis and acknowledged the discretionary nature of the parole board's procedure set forth under § 13-8-10 and throughout the remainder of the parole statute. Accordingly, we find no error in the hearing justice's dismissal of Brown's claim of unlawful incarceration. [21]