Opinion ID: 2481410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's Reference to Other Crime Committed by Defendant

Text: During the State's case in aggravation, the prosecutor presented evidence that defendant and an accomplice committed a burglary in 1993. Amy Briggs identified defendant as one of the two persons she discovered stealing a VCR when she returned to her boyfriend's house to retrieve an item she had forgotten. She also testified that it was possible her boyfriend, the victim, owned a gun. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning regarding the gun and the objection was sustained. The court also instructed the jury that it was to disregard the question and any answer that may have followed it. The court added, You should not consider it in any way. Later, Tom Crew, a police witness for the State, testified that defendant's accomplice in that burglary blamed the burglary on defendant because the crime was defendant's idea. Crew added that according to the accomplice, one of the main focuses was to obtain a weapon or a firearm of some kind. Defense counsel did not object to this testimony. Lastly, the prosecutor questioned defendant's juvenile court officer and made a final reference to the gun by asking the following: Prosecutor: The defendant committed the burglary with a man by the name of Dustin Wade? Wood: Okay. Prosecutor: Wade told police the defendant wanted to get a gun to shoot a police officer. Defense Counsel: Objection. Leading. COURT: Sustained.    Prosecutor: The defendant was caught in someone's home, right? He was caught in someone's home, right? Wood: I remember Dustin Wade. I remember there being a burglary, but I do not remember the circumstances. Prosecutor: And the defendant was trying to steal a gun, right? Defense Counsel: Objection. Leading. COURT: Sustained. Defendant argues that these three references to the burglary of the victim's gun unfairly prejudiced defendant by suggesting that defendant was a violent person. He argues that the remark that suggested defendant wanted to shoot a police officer was particularly inflammatory and denied defendant a fair trial. We disagree. We first note that the State does not specifically argue that the prosecutor's questions at sentencing were proper. Rather, it assumes arguendo that the references to defendant's purported motive for the burglary were improper. We also make this assumption, which favors defendant, and conclude that even if the prosecutor's questions were improper, they did not deny defendant a fair trial. Every defendant has the right to a trial free of improper prejudicial comments or arguments by the prosecutor. People v. Simms, 192 Ill.2d 348, 396, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092 (2000). This right is of constitutional magnitude. Therefore, we review de novo the question of whether a prosecutor's statements denied the defendant a fair trial. People v. Burns, 209 Ill.2d 551, 560, 283 Ill.Dec. 914, 809 N.E.2d 107 (2004). Although a defendant is entitled to a trial free of improper comments, not every improper question or comment requires reversal. Instead, `the act of promptly sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to disregard such argument has usually been viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice.' People v. Childress, 158 Ill.2d 275, 298, 198 Ill. Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635 (1994), quoting People v. Baptist, 76 Ill.2d 19, 30, 27 Ill. Dec. 792, 389 N.E.2d 1200 (1979). In this case, most of the State's allegedly improper questions were met with immediate objections from defense counsel. During the State's questioning of the burglary victim's girlfriend, defense counsel objected to the question whether the victim owned a gun. The objection was immediately sustained and the trial court went so far as to offer a verbal instruction that the jury was not to consider the question or answer in any way. Later, during the State's questioning of defendant's juvenile court officer, defense counsel again objected to both references to a gun. Both objections again were immediately sustained. The only mention of a gun that went uncured by the trial court was made during the State's questioning of police officer Tom Crew, who indicated that part of the motivation for the burglary was to obtain a gun. This, too, however, weighs against defendant, as the failure to object denied the court the opportunity to cure the error. Counsel cannot gain the advantage of obtaining a reversal through his own failure to act. People v. Carlson, 79 Ill.2d 564, 577, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980). Even had counsel objected to Crew's statement, we conclude that defense counsel's objections, and the trial court's response to those objections, adequately cured any prejudice to defendant. Any prejudice to defendant was minor, when the references are viewed in the context of the sentencing hearing as a whole. These references to stealing a gun, including the question that went unchallenged by defense counsel, constituted a small part of the State's case in aggravation. During the sentencing phase, the State focused primarily on the circumstances of the crime itself. Specifically, the State focused on the number of victims and the cold and calculated manner in which defendant committed the crime. It emphasized the deceit defendant used to get the adults out of the Sloop house. The State also focused on refuting the mitigating factors defendant presented. After the objections on the issue were sustained, the State did not mention in argument that the defendant wanted to steal a gun. Overall, the evidence and circumstances of the crime and the arguments based on this evidence overshadowed the isolated references to defendant's desire to steal a gun. As a result, we cannot say that such references were so prejudicial that they could not be cured by a sustained objection and instructions from the court. Therefore, we hold that defendant was not denied a fair trial on the basis of the State's improper questions.