Opinion ID: 776928
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The THA Action

Text: 10 Because the district court considered evidence outside the pleadings in its dismissal, we review the THA claim under the summary judgment standard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 277 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2002). We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Id. The district court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 11 The THA, codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-50-103, states: 12 There shall be no discrimination in the hiring, firing and other terms and conditions of employment of the state of Tennessee or any department, agency, institution or political subdivision of the state, or of any private employer, against any applicant for employment based solely upon any physical, mental or visual handicap of the applicant, unless such handicap to some degree prevents the applicant from performing the duties required by the employment sought or impairs the performance of the work involved. 13 Id. § 8-50-103(a). 14 Specialty argued that Chandler's case should be dismissed because the statute only applies to applicants and it is undisputed that Chandler was not an applicant at the time of her discharge. The district court agreed, stating in its memorandum opinion: 15 The plain language of the statute indicates that it was designed to protect job applicants from discrimination by both public and private employers based upon any physical, mental or visual handicap. It also clearly prohibits handicap discrimination in hiring, firing and other terms of employment by state agencies. It does not appear to protect employees in private employment from handicap discrimination once they have been hired. No Tennessee courts have addressed this question although one unpublished opinion from the Tennessee Court of Appeals assumes (without discussion) that the Act applies to a discharge situation involving a private employer. 16 After careful consideration of this interesting question, the Court has decided not to follow the lead of this isolated opinion but to adhere to the actual wording of the statute. 17 J.A. at 146 (footnote omitted). 18 On appeal, Specialty restates and refines its argument. Even if the THA prohibits discrimination in the hiring, firing, and other terms and conditions of employees, it argues, the statute only covers discrimination against public employees because the disjunctive or of any private employer, against any applicant demonstrates legislative intent to cover only applicants in the private sector. Def.'s Brief at 18-19. 19 Chandler argues that the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698 (Tenn.2000), decided after the district court disposed of her case, demonstrates conclusively that the THA applies to termination of a private employee. In Barnes, Larry Barnes, an employee of Goodyear, alleged he was laid off from his job due to a neurological disorder. Goodyear did not challenge the applicability of the statute to Barns's claim; instead it challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. at 704. The Tennessee Supreme Court assumed the statute was applicable and went on to clarify the appropriate framework for analyzing handicap discrimination under the THA. However, it did state in its decision that the THA prohibits an employer from terminating an employee for a perceived disability or handicap. See generally Sutton [ v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 486-89, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999).] and that [t]he record supports a finding that the basis for the layoff was an impairment. Barnes, 48 S.W.3d at 707. 20 A federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity jurisdiction. Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir.1999). Moreover, we must give an intervening state decision its full force and effect, despite the fact that the decision was unavailable to the district court at the time it rendered its decision. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.2001). 21 Specialty cannot point to any state authority that supports its interpretation of the statute. Instead, it argues that Barnes did not directly address the applicability of the statute to termination by private employers, and hence we are not bound to apply what is essentially dicta. 22 We disagree. Barnes sends an unmistakable signal that the Tennessee Supreme Court understands the THA to apply to discriminatory termination in private employment. Even if this Court were convinced the language in Barnes was dicta, we are called upon to predict how the state supreme court would decide a case based upon all relevant data, including such dicta. Garden City Osteopathic Hosp. v. HBE Corp., 55 F.3d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir.1995). Combined with the fact that a lower appellate court in Tennessee has assumed the THA to apply to private employers, see Hallums v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 874 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993), we have little difficulty concluding that the THA applies to discriminatory discharge by private employers. 23 Furthermore, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Beck fired Chandler because he regarded her as disabled. See Barnes, 48 S.W.3d at 706. The undisputed evidence in the record is that Beck lost confidence in Chandler only after he discovered that she had taken an overdose of pills in a suicide attempt. His stated reason was that he thought her act of intentionally overdosing was irresponsible. Specialty has offered no evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the termination other than to emphasize that Beck considered only her act of overdosing and not her mental condition. This unsupported explanation is not sufficient to overcome Chandler's evidence. Therefore, the case shall be remanded to the district court for trial on the THA claim.