Opinion ID: 159704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the motion to suppress evidence obtained

Text: AS A RESULT OF THE ARREST Fortune contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. When reviewing such a denial, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Dickerson , 195 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999); accord United States v. McKissick , 204 F.3d 1282, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hill , 199 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 1999). “Keeping in mind that the burden is on the defendant” in most cases to prove that “the challenged seizure was illegal under the Fourth Amendment,” the ultimate determination of reasonableness is a question of law subject to de novo review. McKissick , 204 F.3d at 1296 (quoting United States v. Long , 176 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 283 (1999)); accord Hill , 199 F.3d at 1147. We consider “the totality of the circumstances” when assessing the reasonableness of a particular seizure. Dickerson , 195 F.3d at 1186; accord McKissick , 204 F.3d at 1296. 6 Fortune’s main argument on appeal is that officers unjustifiably arrested him without a warrant. It is settled that “[l]aw enforcement personnel may arrest a person without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that person committed a crime.” United States v. Gordon , 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 205 (1999); see also United States v. Dozal , 173 F.3d 787, 792 (10th Cir. 1999) (echoing that “a warrantless search must be supported by probable cause”) . The probable cause inquiry requires us to determine whether “an officer has learned of facts and circumstances through reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person arrested.” United States v. Anchondo , 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1998); accord McKissick , 204 F.3d at 1296 n.5; Dozal , 173 F.3d at 792. Probable cause requires “more than mere suspicion,” but it “need not be based on facts sufficient for a finding of guilt.” Dozal , 173 F.3d at 792 (quoting United States v. Vazquez-Pulido , 155 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 437 (1998)). The evidence clearly supports the denial of Fortune’s motion to suppress. In the early morning hours of September 15, 1998, officer Edwards personally observed a white automobile traveling on an access road from the direction of the Oasis. The automobile was the only vehicle seen by Edwards while he was diverting traffic. The automobile approached at a high rate of speed, with “tires 7 squealing” as it neared the intersection. Aided by the overhead lights from the interstate highway, Edwards saw two black males wearing white T-shirts in the automobile. Edwards observed the two men from a distance of approximately 25 feet. Moments after the automobile passed through the intersection, Edwards received a radio report detailing a robbery that had occurred only three miles from his location. Using the victims’ descriptions of the robbers, the report identified the suspects as two black males wearing white T-shirts in a white vehicle. These facts and circumstances plainly establish that Edwards and other officers had probable cause to pursue and arrest Fortune. Searches incident to that lawful arrest were proper. See United States v. Green , 178 F.3d 1099, 1107 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding a search of a defendant’s vehicle incident to lawful arrest); Anchondo , 156 F.3d at 1045 (“[O]fficers may conduct a warrantless search of a person when it is incident to a lawful arrest of that person.”). Fortune’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. For example, Fortune asserts that several other facts cut against the district court’s finding of probable cause. Fortune points out that (1) the access road was not the only route the robbers could have taken from the Oasis; (2) by itself, the white automobile’s “high rate of speed” did not prompt Edwards to take action; (3) the automobile was a Buick, not a Cadillac as described in the radio report; and (4) the automobile had tinted windows. None of these facts demonstrates that Edwards’ 8 decision to pursue and arrest Fortune was based on “mere suspicion” and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, the information available to Edwards easily could have led a reasonable person to believe that the occupants of the automobile were responsible for the Oasis robbery. Fortune also maintains that United States v. De la Cruz-Tapia , 162 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1998) requires us to reverse the district court. We disagree. In that case, we held that a border patrol officer in an unmarked police car lacked probable cause to stop a vehicle simply because (1) the vehicle was an “older model;” (2) the driver of the vehicle did not make eye contact with the officer; (3) the vehicle made an abrupt exit from the highway; (4) the driver stopped at a gas station and opened the hood and trunk; and (5) the vehicle had crossed the border several times in the last few days. 162 F.3d at 1278-80. To state the obvious, no officer in De la Cruz-Tapia observed individuals who matched a description of fleeing felons in a police dispatch, let alone individuals traveling at a high rate of speed from the direction of a robbery on an otherwise deserted roadway. III. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE Fortune also contends the court erred by denying his motion to suppress the identification evidence that resulted from his out-of-court identification at the 9 scene of the arrest. Whether an identification procedure violates the Due Process Clause is “a question of law, which we review de novo.” United States v. Smith , 156 F.3d 1046, 1050 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1090 (1999); accord United States v. Brown , 200 F.3d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 1213 (2000). We review the district court’s findings of fact on this issue “under the clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Sanchez , 24 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Wiseman , 172 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 211 (1999). When examining the constitutionality of a pre-trial identification procedure, “we must engage in a twotier analysis. First, we must determine whether the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. If the procedure is found to have been unnecessarily suggestive, we must then weigh the corrupting influence of the suggestive procedure against the reliability of the identification itself.” Grubbs v. Hannigan , 982 F.2d 1483, 148990 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing, among other cases, Manson v. Brathwaite , 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)) . “Only when a pre-trial identification procedure is so unnecessarily suggestive that it is ‘conducive to irreparable mistaken identification’ does the procedure violate due process.” Id. at 1490 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois , 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972)); accord United States v. Thurston , 771 F.2d 449, 452 (10th Cir. 1985). Turning to the case at hand, we assume without deciding that the 10 identification technique used by law enforcement officials was unnecessarily suggestive. This leads us to the second prong of the analysis, in which we must balance the “corrupting influence” of the suggestive procedure against the reliability of the identification. At least five factors are relevant to any assessment of reliability. As the Supreme Court explained in Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. at 199-200; accord Brown , 200 F.3d at 707; Smith , 156 F.3d at 1051 . The evidence in this case demonstrates that the likelihood of misidentification was minuscule, notwithstanding the suggestive identification procedure used at the location of the arrest. First and foremost, Blake had a reasonable opportunity to view Fortune at the time of the crime. Fortune did not wear a disguise when he entered the Oasis, and the interior of the store was “lit very well.” Tr. at 33; cf. Wiseman , 172 F.3d at 1210 (approving an identification in part because a store was “well lighted” and the perpetrator’s face “was not covered”); Grubbs , 982 F.2d at 1491 (finding that a witness had an opportunity to view a defendant in part because the crime “occurred in a lighted lobby”); Thurston , 771 F.2d at 453 (reaching the same conclusion in part because “the 11 lighting conditions were adequate”). Blake not only viewed Fortune for several seconds at the time of the robbery, cf. Archuleta v. Kerby , 864 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing cases upholding identifications based on several seconds of observation), but also saw Fortune prior to the robbery when Fortune and Wineberry entered the store to purchase a Coke. Blake testified that he remembered Fortune and Wineberry when they returned to the store, believing that “they just forgot something.” Tr. at 66; cf. Wiseman , 172 F.3d at 1210 (approving an identification in part because a witness “noticed defendant before he had shown his weapon and demanded money”). The remainder of the Biggers factors similarly demonstrate that there was little likelihood of misidentification. Blake remembered Fortune when he reentered the store, and Fortune and Wineberry were the only patrons inside the Oasis at the time of the robbery. The description of the robbers’ attire given by Blake and Benard matched the attire worn by Fortune and Wineberry at the time of their arrest. Cf. Wiseman , 172 F.3d at 1210 (finding an identification reliable in part because “the witnesses’ descriptions were fairly accurate, if not especially detailed”); Thurston , 771 F.2d at 453 (reaching a similar conclusion based in part on a prior description that was “reasonably accurate”). Both before and during trial, Blake identified Fortune as one of the perpetrators with “100 percent” certainty. Cf. Smith , 156 F.3d at 1052 (approving an identification in part 12 because a witness testified that he was “real sure” of the identity of a suspect); Archuleta , 864 F.2d at 712 (making a finding of reliability based in part on a victim’s identification that was “unequivocal at all times”). Finally, Blake’s identification of Fortune took place only 30 minutes after the robbery, a “short interval of time” that “adds to the reliability of the identification.” Archuleta , 864 F.2d at 712; cf. Grubbs , 982 F.2d at 1490 (upholding an identification in part because it “occurred within a week of the crime”); Thurston , 771 F.2d at 453 (reaching a similar conclusion in part because the identification took place within four hours of the incident). In view of this evidence, we conclude that the identification technique used by police officers did not deprive Fortune of his right to due process.