Opinion ID: 1923309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Conflict in the District Courts

Text: The conflict issue is whether a claim of denial of counsel at sentencing is a sentencing error for purposes of rules 3.800(b) and 9.140(e). In Gonzalez, the First District recognized that unpreserved sentencing errors cannot be considered on appeal, but concluded that [t]he lack of representation is not a sentencing error, but rather a due process error, that could be considered. 838 So.2d at 1243. In the decision we review, the Second District held that a claim of deprivation of counsel at sentencing is a sentencing error. Jackson, 952 So.2d at 615. The district court explained that it had classified a claim of constitutional error affecting a sentencing proceeding as a claim of sentencing error which must be preserved in order to be raised on appeal. Id. at 614-15 (citing Harley v. State, 924 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)). The district court concluded that any error that affects the sentencing proceeding is subject to rules 3.800(b) and 9.140(e) and, therefore, Jackson's failure to file a rule 3.800(b) motion precluded appellate review. The court certified conflict with Gonzalez. See Jackson, 952 So.2d at 615. In his specially concurring opinion, Judge Stringer disagreed that Jackson's claim could have been preserved under rule 3.800(b). He concluded that a `sentencing error' that can be preserved under rule 3.800(b)(2) is an error in the sentence itself  not any error that might conceivably occur during a sentencing hearing. Jackson, 952 So.2d at 616 (Stringer, J., specially concurring). Judge Stringer explained: Jackson's lack of representation at the sentencing hearing is not a harmful error in an order entered as a result of the sentencing process. It is also not an error within the sentence itself. Instead, Jackson's lack of representation constitutes a due process violation that occurred at the sentencing hearing and which was subject to the contemporaneous objection rule. . . . I do not believe that by adopting rule 3.800(b)(2) the supreme court intended to give a criminal defendant the right to stand mute in the face of obvious procedural irregularities at a sentencing hearing secure in the knowledge that if he or she is dissatisfied with the resulting sentence, he or she could resurrect objections to those procedural deficiencies in a subsequent 3.800(b)(2) motion. Id. He therefore agreed with the First District's decision in Gonzalez. Id. To resolve the conflict, we must decide whether a claim of a denial of counsel at sentencing is a sentencing error as contemplated by rule 3.800(b).