Opinion ID: 2557294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Claims

Text: Smyjunas first argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss J & M's claims for improper dissolution and unjust enrichment because, he argues, both claims are time-barred. Under RSA 508:4, I (2010): [A]ll personal actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of, except that when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of. Smyjunas contends that J & M's improper dissolution claim is untimely because when J & M deposed him in January 2002, it knew or should have known that he had improperly dissolved Gorham Supermarket. He argues that J & M's unjust enrichment claim similarly is untimely because, as of his January 2002 deposition, J & M knew or should have known that he had allegedly received Gorham Supermarket's assets unjustly. Thus, he reasons, J & M should have filed its suit within three years of January 2002 to be timely. These arguments presume that J & M would have had standing to assert its improper dissolution and unjust enrichment claims in January 2002, three years before the trial court had even calculated the amount of attorney's fees and costs that Gorham Supermarket owed J & M. For a party to have standing, the party must have suffered a legal injury. Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Sec'y of State, 158 N.H. 194, 195, 965 A.2d 1078 (2008). J & M did not suffer an injury from the allegedly improper dissolution of Gorham Supermarket or Smyjunas's alleged unjust enrichment in 2002. Smyjunas's reliance upon the discovery rule to support his arguments is to no avail. The discovery rule allows a plaintiff to commence an action within three years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of. RSA 508:4, I. The rule has two prongs that must be satisfied: First, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that it has been injured; and second, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that its injury was proximately caused by conduct of the defendant. Beane v. Dana S. Beane & Co., 160 N.H. 708, 713, 7 A.3d 1284 (2010) (quotation omitted). Here, there was no injury for J & M to discover in 2002. Smyjunas next asserts that J & M's unjust enrichment claim is barred by laches because J & M sat on its rights for more than six years after his 2002 deposition before filing suit on this claim. He has failed to provide a record, however, demonstrating that he preserved this claim for our review by arguing laches in the trial court. Accordingly, we decline to address it. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250, 855 A.2d 564 (2004).