Opinion ID: 1798674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Manner of Zartner's Left Turn.

Text: Although Zartner was attempting to make a left turn into a private driveway, sec. 346.32, Stats., required him to make it in the same manner as he would at a regular highway intersection as provided in sec. 346.31 (3), there being no evidence that the turn could not be so made. Sec. 346.31 (3) (b) provides: The intersection shall be entered in the lane of approach and, whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection immediately to the left of the center of the intersection. Zartner admitted that in making his left turn his car was slightly to the south, or right, of the center of the intersection of the Eagles Club private driveway with Grandview. Because of this admitted statutory violation the trial court answered Yes to that question of the verdict which inquired whether Zartner was negligent in the manner of making a left turn. Appellants contend that this negligence of Zartner's should be held to be causal as a matter of law and that the jury's answer of No to the corresponding causation question should be set aside. We find no merit in this contention because the jury could well have concluded that the collision would have occurred even if Zartner had turned left just to the north of the center of the intersection. Appellants urge that Zartner's obvious disregard of approaching traffic and failure to exercise reasonable judgment are also proper aspects of negligence in respect to the manner of his left turn. However, the trial court's instructions to the jury make it clear that this aspect of making a left turn was not presented to the jury when they passed on this causation question. Sec. 346.34 (1), Stats., provides: No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in s. 346.31, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway unless the vehicle is in proper position on the roadway as required in s. 346.32, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. Whether Zartner in making a left turn violated the above provision requiring him not to do so unless the same could be made with reasonable safety involved an exercise of judgment on his part which could be made only after he had first sighted the approaching Scopp car. [6] Because Zartner never saw the Scopp car prior to the collision, Zartner was never presented with any opportunity to form a judgment as to whether he could safely pass in front of the approaching Scopp car. Thus Zartner's negligence in turning directly into the path of the Scopp car was that of failure of lookout and not in manner of making a left turn. Appellants rely on the case of DeBaker v. Austin [7] in support of their position that Zartner was causally negligent as to the manner in which he made his left turn. In the DeBaker Case a left-turning driver was found to be causally negligent as a matter of law in the manner in which he negotiated his turn. This negligent left turn resulted in a collision with an approaching vehicle. The turning driver in that case initially saw the approaching car before attempting his turn, but failed to look again prior to making the turn. The very fact that the driver in DeBaker saw the other vehicle and then proceeded to make the turn clearly distinguishes it from the facts before us. In DeBaker there were clearly issues as to lookout and failure to exercise proper judgment. In the instant case Zartner was never aware of any approaching traffic, so could hardly be said to have exercised rash judgment in making his turn. The following statement appearing in Reynolds v. Madison Bus Co. [8] is apposite: So also where the driver of the car is completely negligent as to lookout and because of this negligence wholly fails to see another car or to take any steps to avoid a collision the sole negligence is in respect of lookout. At first blush this holding, that the jury is not required to pass on the issue of whether Zartner violated the above-quoted provision of sec. 346.34 (1), Stats., with respect to manner of making a left turn because of his total failure of lookout, might appear inconsistent with our holding in Lewis v. Leiterman [9] where we held that violation of right-of-way must be submitted to the jury as well as lookout, even though in that case for all practical purposes there was a total failure of lookout by the driver who entered the arterial in the path of an oncoming car. The distinction between right-of-way and the instant turning case is that we construe the right-of-way statute (sec. 346.18) as imposing the duty of yielding right-of-way regardless of lookout. [10]