Opinion ID: 2081107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions Concerning Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Text: In his instructions to the jury, the presiding Justice stated: [T]he State's burden is to prove-to satisfy the minds of the Jury of the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.. . . [R]easonable doubt really defines itself. It is its own best definition, that's the standard. Now, it's not necessary for the State to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt or to a mathematical certainty. Such proof is rarely, if ever available in the realm of human affairs. The test, as I've already said, is one of reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is just what the words imply; a doubt based on reason and common sense, the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond reasonable doubt must therefore be of such a convincing character, that you would be willing to rely and to act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. We still come back to the fact that it really is its own best definition. The State has to prove each and every element beyond a doubt. What kind of a doubt? All doubt? No. A whimsical doubt? No. Beyond a reasonable doubt, and that's the standard. All right, and that's what you're going to apply here. (Emphasis added). The defendant argues that this instruction was erroneous because it contained the term common sense and because the instruction included the so-called affirmative action analogy. These references, the defendant claims, impermissibly reduced the State's burden of proof. Because the defendant failed to object to the instructions given, review of these claims is governed by the obvious error standard of M.R. Crim.P. 52(b). See, e. g., State v. Carey, Me., 303 A.2d 446, 449 (1973). In attempting to define reasonable doubt, the presiding Justice added a doubt based on reason and common sense. The defendant claims that the inclusion of this term impermissibly suggested to the jury that a doubt based on reason alone was not sufficient to acquit; a juror must additionally find that his doubt was also based on common sense. The court's reference to common sense imposed no additional requirement but served only to emphasize that the jury should bring good judgment to bear on its deliberations. Cf. United States v. MacDonald, 455 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (1st Cir.) (reasonable doubt is doubt for which an intelligent reason can be stated; reference was solely to emphasize to the jury that its verdict should be the product of a rational thought process), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962, 92 S.Ct. 2070, 32 L.Ed.2d 350 (1972). Therefore, the instruction given was unlike one defining reasonable doubt as `doubt as for the existence of which a reasonable person can give or suggest a good and sufficient reason,' Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1978), or as `a doubt in your mind that you can stand up in the jury room and argue with principle and integrity to your fellow jurors,' Bumpus v. Gunter, 452 F.Supp. 1060, 1061 (D.Mass.1978). Moreover, this Court has noted with approval an instruction containing identical language. See State v. Carey, supra, 303 A.2d at 451. In a further attempt to explain the State's burden of proof, the presiding Justice gave what the defendant claims was the affirmative action analogy-proof beyond a reasonable doubt defined as that quantum of proof upon which laymen would act in making important decisions in their daily lives. The use of the affirmative action analogy in criminal cases to explain the State's burden of proof has generally been condemned. E. g., Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C.Cir.1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 883, 88 S.Ct. 139, 19 L.Ed.2d 179 (1967); Bumpus v. Gunter, supra, 452 F.Supp. at 1062-63; Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, ___, 364 N.E.2d 1264, 1272-73 (1977). On the other hand, courts commonly approve an instruction explaining reasonable doubt as such a doubt as in the graver transactions of life would cause reasonable, fair-minded, honest, and impartial people to hesitate and pause. State v. Poulin, Me., 277 A.2d 493, 496 (1971); e. g., Dunn v. Perrin, supra, 570 F.2d at 24-25; see Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). Noting that in important affairs people might frequently take affirmative action in the face of serious doubts, this Court pointed out in State v. Carey, supra , that the safer and, therefore, preferred, practice is for the presiding Justice to avoid entirely resort to the `affirmative action' analogy. 303 A.2d at 450. Where, however, as here, the analogy is accompanied by a description of reasonable doubt as that quantum of proof sufficient to cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act-or to act without hesitation-the use of the affirmative action analogy is permissible. See id. Indeed, defining reasonable doubt in terms of hesitation to act is a concept having a long tradition in the state of Maine. See, e. g., State v. Merry, 136 Me. 243, 262, 8 A.2d 143, 153 (1939). Despite this long tradition, as we noted in State v. Carey, supra , the preferable practice is to avoid any resort to this analogy. The defendant also contends that those portions of the charge that define reasonable doubt in its own terms do not help the jury to understand the State's burden. The State argues that it is proper to define reasonable doubt simply as a doubt which is reasonable. See, e. g., State v. Maxwell, Me., 328 A.2d 801, 806 (1974); Dunn v. Perrin, supra, 570 F.2d at 23 n.2. Viewing this instruction in its entirety, see, e. g., State v. Foster, Me., 405 A.2d 726, 730 (1979), we find no error since we conclude the charge sufficiently apprised the jury of the degree of belief to which it had to be convinced in order to return a verdict of guilty. On the other hand, we reject the suggestion that merely to define reasonable doubt in its own terms adequately advises the jury of the State's burden of persuasion. We recognize that many appellate courts have suggested that no better definition of the term reasonable doubt can be devised than the words themselves. See generally 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1268 (1961) (collecting cases). Yet, the repeated efforts of trial judges, who deal daily with trial juries, to expand upon the definition convince us that they accurately discern a necessity further to explain those words to the jury in some meaningful way. In the famous case of Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295 (1850), Chief Justice Shaw defined reasonable doubt: It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. Id. at 320. Almost 100 years later, Professor McBaine defined reasonable doubt as follows: A reasonable doubt exists where after a comparison and consideration of all the evidence the mind of the judge or the minds of the jurors are not convinced that it is almost certain that the accused committed the crime with which he is charged . . . . McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif.L.Rev. 242, 265 (1944). As this Court noted over a century ago, [o]ther definitions almost without number might be cited but all, though different in words, are to the same effect, and all describe an absence of reasonable doubt, as a state of mind existing in the jurors amounting to a reasonable and moral certainty, in distinction from an absolute certainty. State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129, 144 (1874). Although we hesitate to adopt a formula instruction which must be given in all cases, we believe the trial court must convey to the jurors the knowledge that before they may convict a defendant of a criminal offense the evidence must be sufficient to convince them of the defendant's guilt and that the degree of conviction which they must have is a conscientious belief that the charge is almost certainly true.