Opinion ID: 1124343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Accomplice Liability Jury Instructions

Text: Defendant was charged with one count of murder in the first degree and two counts of murder in the second degree. As to the second degree murder counts, the indictment charged that Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the deaths of the decedents by shooting them with a handgun. On May 4, 1995, the Prosecution requested a jury instruction on accomplice liability, [22] arguing that Defendant had himself raised the issue through the testimony adduced. Defendant argued that the Prosecution had indicated that it would be proceeding only on the theory that Defendant was liable as a principal and not as an accomplice. The trial court granted the proposed instruction over Defendant's objection, and the instruction was delivered on May 5, 1995. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in giving the accomplice liability instruction without prior notice. Defendant argues that, when the basis for accomplice liability is not apparent from the charge or the facts of the case, an allegation of accomplice liability is required at some point during the proceedings. Defendant distinguishes this case from prior Hawai`i case law, see State v. Albano, 67 Haw. 398, 688 P.2d 1152 (1984); State v. Apao, 59 Haw. 625, 586 P.2d 250 (1978); State v. Rullman, 78 Hawai`i 488, 896 P.2d 944 (App.1995), by arguing that, in those cases, possible accomplice liability was apparent from the grand jury transcripts or the facts of the case. Defendant argues that, in the present case, all the information provided by the Prosecution indicated that Defendant was being prosecuted as a principal. A review of the record and the relevant case law indicates that Defendant's arguments are meritless. In Apao, this court stated: The appellant also claims that because the indictment in this case did not notify him that he was being charged as a principal or accomplice he was unable to prepare a proper defense. The same argument was made in the case of State v. Cooper, 26 Wash.2d 405, 174 P.2d 545 (1946), where defendant appealed from a conviction of murder in the first degree. There, the court said that the defendant was sufficiently put on notice when he was charged as a principal in the indictment, and the court did not err in instructing the jury on the theory of aiding and abetting. The court said that the prosecuting attorney was not bound under the statute to elect between charging the defendant as a principal or an accessory. Apao, 59 Haw. at 645-46, 586 P.2d at 263 (emphasis added). Thus, one who is charged as a principal can be convicted as an accomplice without accomplice allegations being made in the indictment. Albano, 67 Haw. at 405, 688 P.2d at 1157. See also Rullman, 78 Hawai`i at 490, 896 P.2d at 946. Nothing in Apao, Albano, or Rullman indicates that any additional notice of accomplice liability is required beyond a charge as a principal. Furthermore, Defendant himself introduced evidence supporting possible accomplice liability. Pursuant to the defense theory that unknown persons connected to Japanese organized crime actually killed the Fujitas, the defense called two witnesses. Filemina Erickson testified that she saw a tall European man enter 1350 Ala Moana Boulevard with Kototome. Guido Giacometti testified that he saw a male Japanese national in the elevator of 1350 Ala Moana Boulevard. The description he gave did not match Defendant, but rather, allegedly matched an employee of Alii Divers. The logical response by the Prosecution to such evidence would be to argue that even if other people were involved in the murders, Defendant was at least liable as an accomplice. Thus, Defendant cannot complain that he lacked notice when it was his own defense strategy and the testimony of his own witnesses that raised the possibility of accomplice liability. Defendant's claim that accomplice liability was precluded by the Prosecution's assurances is unsupported by the record. On December 23, 1994, the following occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... [W]e need to know, especially in light of the Court's not granting or not allowing us to file a bill of particulars, whether [the Prosecutor] is proceeding on a principal or accomplice liability basis. We need to know that in order to avoid surprise at trial, and possibly to avoid double jeopardy. Because I don't know whether or not if Mr. Fukusaku is acquitted here on the basis of him being a principal, whether he could be retried in Japan as an accomplice. THE COURT: [Prosecutor], your response? [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, this is the first time I've heard this kind of argument to support this theory. There's no legal basis for his request. HeI don't know where he's putting out this speculation of being tried in Japan for accomplice. He's being tried in Hawaii and that's all that matters here, the trial in Hawaii. And the evidence as to the trial in Hawaii, we have turned over discovery material to defense counsel. All the material that we have we've turned over in discovery to them. THE COURT: Including all possible related investigation reports? [PROSECUTOR]: Well, Your Honor, we've turned over all the evidence of the investigation. The reason why I cannot say all possibleall possible evidence of who committed the crime all points to Mr. Fukusaku. THE COURT: So do you know of any other investigation or reports pertaining to any other suspects? [PROSECUTOR]: No. THE COURT: All right. That being the case then, item four is denied. Thus, the Prosecution's statements were primarily in relation to a theoretical double jeopardy problem if Defendant were to be prosecuted as an accomplice in Japan. Additionally, the Prosecution was simply stating that all the evidence at that point implicated Defendant. It was not until Defendant presented the testimony of Erickson and Giacometti at trial that the possibility of accomplice liability emerged. In any case, the statement cannot be regarded as a promise not to pursue a theory of accomplice liability should evidence supporting such a theory come to light in the future. The fact that accomplice liability was not precluded in the future is apparent from the exchange that occurred immediately after the Prosecution's statements: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, in light of the Court's ruling and [the Prosecutor's] representation, I would ask the Court at this point to make a determination that accomplice liability in this case be precluded, be precluded from arguing. We're asking specifically for this information. [The Prosecutor] says he doesn't have it, he doesn't relyall the evidence points to Mr. Fukusaku, so that when we prepare for this trial, it's going to be on the basis that he is being charged and tried as a principal. THE COURT: Well, it's not before me. I'm not going to make that ruling. And as I said, I disallowed the bill of particulars because it is untimely. It was submitted to this Court, what, this week, I think, and you had plenty of time to submit a bill of particulars if that is what you wished. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, you've got to remember, too, that we've just gotten these FBI report after the motions deadline. And it was based in part on that and in part on [the Prosecutor's] response at the motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause as to 1 and 2 that generated the bill. THE COURT: Well, II think that in looking athaving looked at the request motion for bill of particulars, that based on the discovery already provided to you that the bill of particularsmotion could have been filed sooner. But the Court will not make that declaration as requested. (Emphases added.) Thus, the trial court twice denied the defense request to foreclose the possibility of accomplice liability. Based on this exchange, Defendant had clear notice that accomplice liability was still a possibility.