Opinion ID: 4518071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: In this case, Valentino generally contends that he was selectively prosecuted for soliciting prostitution. In particular, he asserts that the decision by law enforcement to target and prosecute male buyers of sex was selective prosecution because it was an unlawful, deliberate discrimination based on a suspect class, namely the arrestee’s gender. Valentino also - 103 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALENTINO Cite as 305 Neb. 96 asserts that a policy of denying pretrial diversion to buyers was impermissible gender-based discrimination. With respect to pretrial diversion, Valentino contends that the county attorney improperly failed to give reasons for denying him participation in the pretrial diversion program. We find no impropriety. We refer to Clayton v. Lacey, 256 Neb. 282, 589 N.W.2d 529 (1999), which primarily involved a question of appealability. Although in Clayton we disapproved of the county attorney’s failure to give a reason for denying participation in pretrial diversion, we ultimately dismissed the challenge, because the defendant had pursued an unacceptable form of action. The crime for which the defend­ ant in Clayton was prosecuted was specifically identified on the list of crimes eligible for pretrial diversion. In contrast, the crime of soliciting with which Valentino was charged was not listed as an eligible offense, and thus our disapproval of providing no reasons for denial in Clayton is not warranted in this case. [7] The State’s decision to deny an arrestee admission into a pretrial diversion program is a decision to prosecute and may be attacked by a claim of selective prosecution. We need not separately analyze Valentino’s pretrial diversion selective prosecution contention, because it is encompassed by Valentino’s claim that he was selectively brought to trial. See Clayton v. Lacey, supra. Thus, Valentino’s claims of selective prosecution with regard to pretrial diversion and trial are but a single claim that he was selectively prosecuted based on his gender. As explained below, we conclude that Valentino did not proffer sufficient evidence of selective prosecution to entitle him to relief. [8] It is important to underscore that the general rule regarding prosecutorial discretion in law enforcement is that unless there is proof that a particular prosecution was motivated by an unjustifiable standard based, for example, on race, religion, nationality, sex, or political affiliation, the use of such discretion does not violate constitutional protections. See, State v. - 104 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALENTINO Cite as 305 Neb. 96 Katzman, supra; Salaiscooper v. Dist. Ct., 117 Nev. 892, 34 P.3d 509 (2001). [9-11] To establish a selective prosecution claim, it has been generally held that a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution “had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1985). As in the present case, this requires the defendant to establish (1) that similarly situated individuals of a different gender were not prosecuted and (2) that the decision to prosecute was “invidious or in bad faith,” based upon impermissible considerations or the desire to prevent the defendant’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights. State v. Katzman, 228 Neb. 851, 855, 424 N.W.2d 852, 856 (1988). See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996). It has been observed that the trial court has the remedy of dismissing the charge against the defendant if such intentional and purposeful discriminatory enforcement is shown. City of Minneapolis v. Buschette, 307 Minn. 60, 240 N.W.2d 500 (1976). With respect to obtaining discovery in support of a selective prosecution claim, a defendant must produce “some evidence” making a “credible showing” of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470. Just as the standard for ultimately proving a selective prosecution claim is a rigorous one, so, too, is the evidentiary threshold for obtaining discovery from the State or government to support such a claim. United States v. Armstrong, supra. The U.S. Supreme Court has observed: Our cases delineating the necessary elements to prove a claim of selective prosecution have taken great pains to explain that the standard is a demanding one. These cases afford a “background presumption” . . . that the showing necessary to obtain discovery should itself be a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial claims. Id., 517 U.S. at 463-64 (citation omitted). - 105 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALENTINO Cite as 305 Neb. 96 Turning to Valentino’s arguments on appeal, his claims are predicated on the view that only men were prosecuted as buyers of sex and that such prosecution was driven by bad faith. However, the record does not support Valentino’s view. Sergeant Miller testified that he had not arrested a woman for solicitation of prostitution, but that he had also never encountered a woman as a buyer. The deputy county attorney testified that the Lancaster County Attorney will “prosecute who shows up on our doorstep” and would prosecute women charged with soliciting a prostitute. It has been observed and we agree that “[t]he police do not intentionally discriminate against one gender by the absence of attempts to detect and apprehend offenders of the other gender, when no evidence is presented that offenders of the other gender are engaging in similar criminal behavior.” Branche v. Com., 25 Va. App. 480, 489, 489 S.E.2d 692, 696-97 (1997). Thus, Valentino did not show that similarly situated women were not prosecuted for solicitation as buyers or that the prosecutorial decision had a discriminatory effect. See, United States v. Armstrong, supra; State v. Katzman, supra. To the extent that Valentino asserts that solicitation is gender specific and impermissible, a plain reading of the statute is to the contrary. State v. Stanko, 304 Neb. 675, 936 N.W.2d 353 (2019) (noting that in absence of anything indicating otherwise, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning). Section 28-801.01 regarding solicitation provides as follows: “(1) Any person who solicits another person not his or her spouse to perform any act of sexual contact or sexual penetration, as those terms are defined in section 28-318, in exchange for money or other thing of value, commits solicitation of prostitution.” (Emphasis supplied.) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-801 (Reissue 2016) regarding prostitution provides in relevant part as follows: (1) Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section, any person who performs, offers, or agrees to perform any act of sexual contact or sexual penetration, as those - 106 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALENTINO Cite as 305 Neb. 96 terms are defined in section 28-318, with any person not his or her spouse, in exchange for money or other thing of value, commits prostitution. (Emphasis supplied.) In Nebraska, solicitation and prostitution are separate ­gender-neutral offenses, meaning they can be committed by either men or women. In particular, as can be seen in the foregoing gender-neutral statutory language regarding solicitation and prostitution, the defendant is referred to as “any person” and “his or her.” Compare City of Minneapolis v. Buschette, 307 Minn. 60, 240 N.W.2d 500 (1976) (referring in footnote to historical prostitution statutes which applied only to women). With respect to bad faith, Valentino has not shown that the State acted with a discriminatory purpose with respect to the decision to prosecute. A court will not presume a discriminatory purpose. See State v. Katzman, 228 Neb. 851, 424 N.W.2d 852 (1988). The record shows that Valentino’s application for pretrial diversion was denied because the county attorney’s office follows written eligibility Diversion Guidelines under which neither solicitation nor, incidentally, prostitution is identified as an eligible offense. Other courts have found, and we agree, that where a government distinguishes between buyers and sellers of sex and offers pretrial diversion to one group but not the other, the deterrence of crime is a valid, gender-neutral motivation for the differential policy. See, e.g., Salaiscooper v. Dist. Ct., 117 Nev. 892, 34 P.3d 509 (2001). The record shows that the NJSI operation was designed to reduce prostitution— a valid motivation—and targeted buyers of prostitution and that it could have resulted in arrests of either men or women as buyers. Valentino has not made an adequate showing that the denial of his request for participation in a pretrial diversion program or that the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute him was based on an impermissibly discriminatory reason. Furthermore, the rulings on motions about which Valentino - 107 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. VALENTINO Cite as 305 Neb. 96 complains are encompassed by the foregoing analysis and were not erroneous. Neither the county court nor the district court erred when it found that Valentino had not been selectively prosecuted based upon his gender.