Opinion ID: 2333215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: intent of the statutes.

Text: L. 1926, c. 67, now R.S. 40:176-3, 4, supra, contained no reference to the procedural requirements to be followed by the municipality in effecting leases of municipal property. L. 1925, c. 248, now R.S. 40:176-15 et seq., supra, has comparable status. Both of these compiled statutes must be read in pari materia with the Home Rule Act of 1917 and with L. 1933, c. 355, now R.S. 40:61-1, supra, which are hereinbefore detailed. L. 1900, c. 99, as amended, now R.S. 40:179-113 et seq., supra, likewise is in pari materia. R.S. 40:179-116, supra, seems to be confined to letting of buildings within public parks and places of public resort and it may be doubted that it applies at all to store properties bordering a boardwalk although a boardwalk (or the beaches in the vicinity thereof) are places of public resort. The legislative intent seems to encompass concessions within park property, such as the premises which existed in Hill v. Borough of Collingswood, 9 N.J. 369 (1952). That is, purposes directly connected with recreational activities and not primarily commercial or trade purposes. This premise is borne out by comparison of R.S. 40:179-116, supra, with R.S. 40:176-17, supra, and R.S. 40:176-3, supra. The latter, R.S. 40:176-3, supra, which is confined to convention and entertainment buildings, authorizes incidental letting for any purposes deemed advisable including the sale of merchandise. The specific inclusion of merchandising purposes in this statute is evidence that its omission in the other statutes was deliberate. Assuming that the proposed letting in the present matter is within the scope of R.S. 40:176-3, R.S. 40:176-17, or R.S. 40:179-116, supra, as to purpose it is apparent that only R.S. 40:179-116, supra, contains language from which it might be argued that general statutes relating to advertising for bids might be inapplicable. The specific expression of the phrase and for such rental or return as they may deem for the best interest of said city, is not contained in R.S. 40:176-3 and 17, supra, and the omission must be deemed intentional. The resolution and lease in question herein being within R.S. 40:179-116, supra, it devolves upon the court to declare whether advertising for bids is a prerequisite to a letting of municipal property thereunder. The defendants contend that L. 1937, c. 172, secs. 1 to 6 inclusive, incorporated in R.S. 40:61-36 to 41, inclusive, supra, which is comparable to R.S. 40:179-116, supra, in respect to the public property adverted to therein, but expressly requires bidding and advertising for bids, did not impliedly repeal the discretionary rental clause of R.S. 40:179-116, supra. The defendants' argument is premised upon the clause in L. 1937, c. 172, sec. 6, now contained in R.S. 40:61-41, reading The power conferred in this article is in addition to those given by any other law or laws. This clause may not have such a restrictive application as is advanced by the defendants. In approaching this question a further rule of construction will be germane, namely: In reaching the meaning of amendatory language the court must look to the prior law, the matters deemed to require correction thereunder, and the remedy enacted. Grogan v. DeSapio, 11 N.J. 308, 323 (1953). The courts will not construe a clause in a statute in such fashion as to charge the Legislature with deliberately rendering impotent the clear and unambiguously expressed intention of the whole act. Grogan v. DeSapio, supra, 11 N.J., at page 324. Pertinent here is the reasoning expressed by me in the dissenting opinion in the Whirl-O-Ball case, supra (136 N.J.L., at pages 322-325): Conceding all that is contended as to the state of the law at the time the Legislature proceeded to enact P.L. 1937, Chapter 172 `there is no safer or better settled canon of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expressed.' Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3 d ed., Volume 2, page 334. If the plain language of the Act is to be overcome by resort to the inconsistent provision of P.L. 1900, Chapter 99 not requiring advertising, then the lucid meaning of distinct English words is rendered inert. Inconsistent provisions cannot stand. There should also be applied the additional canon of construction that the Legislature is presumed not to do a vain thing and enact useless legislation. It is to be assumed that the Legislature was doing more than merely restating an existing power without in any way amplifying or modifying it. `The principle upon which subsequent legislation will operate to repeal prior legislation without any express repealing clause has been frequently considered by the courts of this state, and is well defined. Where there are two acts on the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both, if possible. If the two acts are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act operates to repeal the earlier to the extent of the repugnancy. ' (Italics supplied.) State Board of Health v. Borough of Vineland, N.J. Ch. 1906, 72 N.J. Eq. 289, at page 290; affirmed Err. & App. 1907, 72 N.J. Eq. 862. Stress is laid by the appellants on the necessity of giving effect to the following clause contained in the act of 1937 ( P.L. 1937, Chapter 172, R.S. 40:61-41, N.J.S.A. ): `The power conferred in this article is in addition to those given by any other law or laws.' This section has reference to the basic powers theretofore granted as distinguished from the mode or manner of the exercise of such power. The power to lease is preserved but its exercise is conditioned by the mandatory verb `shall' in sections 39 and 40 of R.S. 40:61, supra. Every such municipality may make such a lease, but if it chooses to do so, the letting shall be made to the highest responsible bidder, and the letting shall be advertised as therein provided.    it goes without saying that it is reasonably to be presumed that the Legislature intended to make some change in the law. The saving clause in the Act of 1937 must, on well settled principles, be given a construction consistent with the manifest policy of the enacting clause  a construction that proceeds upon the premise that the Legislature intended to do what the enacting clause provides in clear and unambiguous terms, and that language is to be given its ordinary meaning. Saving clauses and provisos and exceptions are to be strictly construed and `all doubt should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the proviso or exception.' New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. S.S. Kresge Co., N.J. Sup., 1934, 113 N.J.L. 287; affirmed Err. & App. 1935, 115 N.J.L. 495; Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3 d ed., Secs. 4933, 4937. All pre-existing basic powers are preserved intact but the prior inconsistent procedural provisions must give way to those provided in the Act of 1937 as now contained in R.S. 40:61-36 to 41. This construction does not do violence to said section. The Act applies to municipalities bordering on the Atlantic Ocean, whether they be boroughs, townships or cities. It is presumed that the Act was aimed at good government and to prevent evils which might flow from such lettings without advertisement and public notice and to one not the highest bidder. The contention that this cloak of protection was to be thrown about all municipalities bordering on the Atlantic Ocean excepting fourth class cities is untenable. The problems of municipalities along the Atlantic Ocean are comparable, whether they be boroughs, townships or cities. Most all of them have their boardwalks, beach fronts, buildings erected with taxpayers' money, and other privileges which they let out for revenue and thus lessen the taxpayers' burden. It is illogical to conclude that fourth class cities were to be excluded from the benefits conferred by such an act upon all other seashore municipalities. The 1937 Act, Chapter 172, is found in R.S. 40:61-36 to 41 and as a revised Statute under the general classification of Municipalities, Chapter 61, subtitle Public Parks and Playgrounds, under Article 3 thereof entitled `Lease by Municipalities bordering on the Atlantic Ocean, whereas the Act of 1900, Chapter 99, as amended in 1919, Chapter 252, is found in R.S. 40:179-116, but not as a revision but only as a part of a compilation under the Classification: Subtitle 13 Cities (Compilation). The provisions of the 1937 Act, Chapter 172 should therefore gain force and effect by virtue of such treatment in the revision, as the revision is a wholly independent enactment and supersedes all pre-existing general laws. State v. Czarnicki, N.J. Sup. 1940, 124 N.J.L. 43; Duke Power Co. v. Somerset County Board of Taxation, Err. & App. 1940, 125 N.J.L. 431, at page 433. The Act of 1925, Chapter 248, R.S. 40:176-17, the second Act upon which the City also relies for its failure to advertise is found in the category of a compilation. It is generally comparable to the 1900 Act, as amended in 1919 and further in view of the history of its enactment, statements herein relating to the 1900 Act are applicable thereto. If, however, it might be contended in the face of these determinations that there was no implied repealer of the discretionary rent provisions of R.S. 40:179-116, supra, by L. 1937, c. 172, supra, it is still evident that R.S. 40:179-116, supra, was impliedly amended by L. 1933, c. 355, modifying L. 1917, c. 152, Art. XXXVI, sec. 13, p. 455, see paragraphs ( g ) and ( h ) of R.S. 40:61-1, supra, and requiring such leases to be advertised in some newspaper circulating in the municipality at least ten days prior to the receipt of bids. The defendants place reliance in this respect on Reade v. City of Asbury Park, supra. But the Reade case was decided prior to the enactment of L. 1933, c. 355, supra, and was succeeded by West v. Borough of Monmouth Beach, 107 N.J.L. 445, 448-449 ( E. & A. 1931). The West case held that the Home Rule Act ( L. 1917, c. 152, ante ) controlled and required a borough to advertise leases for bids although the empowering statute, in that case L. 1909, p. 128, as amended by L. 1910, p. 232, did not. The Reade case, supra, held that L. 1919, c. 252, incorporated in R.S. 40:179-116, supra, was subsequent to the Home Rule Act, ante, and controlling whereas the West case, supra, held that the Home Rule Act was controlling where it was subsequent. The Legislature is deemed to have cognizance of these decisions, and it deliberately enacted L. 1933, c. 355, supra. The enactment of the later act, of 1933, removed the effectiveness of the Reade case, supra, not only upon the reasoning of the West case, supra, but upon the strength of the same reasoning applied in the Reade case, supra. Compare the dissenting opinion in the Whirl-O-Ball case, supra, 136 N.J.L., at page 327. Compare Jersey City v. Department of Civil Service, 7 N.J. 509, 522-523 (1951). Clearly, advertising of the lease for bids was required by R.S. 40:61-1, supra. The defendants' argument is that the classification and arrangement of L. 1933, c. 355, supra, in R.S. 40:61-1, supra, defeats its applicability herein. There is no merit in this argument. R.S. 1:1-5 expressly provides: The classification and arrangement of the several sections of the Revised Statutes have been made for the purpose of convenience, reference and orderly arrangement, and therefore no implication or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn therefrom. In summary, we find that advertising for bids was required under R.S. 40:61-1, 40:61-36 et seq., and R.S. 40:179-116, supra.