Opinion ID: 727068
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Robinson's Motion to Suppress

Text: 13 Robinson begins his brief with one of his least plausible claims: that the warrant used to search his home and business was not supported by probable cause. Robinson's contention here is actually twofold: first, there was no evidence specifically linking his residence to any alleged drug activities and therefore no grounds to search the residence for drug evidence; second, there was no basis for searching his current business premises because all of the asserted illegal activities occurred before he moved into these premises. In general, the role of this court in such cases is simply to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant. United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 958 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984)), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 716 (1996). Stated somewhat differently, we affirm if we believe that the magistrate had 'a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.'  Id. at 958-59 (quoting United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1363 (6th Cir.1993)). We believe such a substantial basis exists here. 14 First, the magistrate judge issued the warrant based on a 20-page affidavit, which detailed numerous instances of drug dealing and money laundering by Robinson and his associates. Although none of the instances was specifically tied to Robinson's home, the affiant--an FBI special agent--relied upon his 17 years of law enforcement training and experience, including the execution of over 100 search warrants in narcotics cases, to conclude that it was reasonably likely that evidence of cocaine trafficking would be found in Robinson's home. According to the affidavit, those who sold drugs would often keep records of these sales in their residences, garages, where they work, and motor vehicles. Reinecke Aff. at 18-19, J.A. at 168-69. The law is well established that search warrant affidavits may contain conclusions based on an affiant's training and experience, especially where those conclusions relate to the possibility of finding drug evidence at a drug dealer's home. See, e.g., United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1193 (6th Cir.1996) (reasonable to defer to officer's assessment of probability of finding drug paraphernalia in defendant's home, where officer had spent 15 years in law enforcement and at least seven of those years in narcotics investigations); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393, 399 (6th Cir.1990) (appropriate to rely on FBI agent's experience that cocaine distributors frequently keep certain items at home). In light of the ample evidence of illegal drug activity by Robinson, the magistrate's decision to permit a search of his home was clearly supported by substantial evidence. 15 Second, Robinson suggests that all of the illegal activities cited in the affidavit preceded his move to new business quarters, but this is simply untrue. The April 30, 1993 affidavit alleges a continuing pattern of illegal acts from 1987 to April 1993. Thus, even if some of the evidence relating to activities in the old office was stale, as Robinson contends, that does not necessarily negate the existence of probable cause. See United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1381-82 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting Emery v. Holmes, 824 F.2d 143, 149 (1st Cir.1987): Where recent information corroborates otherwise stale information, probable cause may be found.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989). Furthermore, there is no reason to think that the information relating to conduct before the time of Robinson's move was stale. The affidavit pointed to the probability of finding documents, tapes, disks, and other records of ongoing drug trafficking and money laundering at his office. The mere fact that Robinson changed his office location does not mean that these records were likely to have suddenly vanished. It would have been equally (or more) reasonable to suppose that Robinson retained his files, especially since many of these files presumably contained financial documentation for automobiles still used by Robinson's customers. In addition, the ongoing nature of Robinson's activities greatly diminished any danger of staleness, as the evidence from the late 1980s constituted an integral part of the pattern of conduct extending to the time of the affidavit. As this court has already recognized, [I]nformation which demonstrates a chain of related events covering a broad span of time continuing to the current period may furnish a most reliable indicia of present activity, thereby clearly demonstrating that probable cause exists for the order to intrude. Id. at 1382 (quoting United States v. Haimowitz, 706 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984)). In short, there was a substantial basis for allowing the search of Robinson's current office.