Opinion ID: 762172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing (Claim 16)

Text: 85 Poland filed his first PCR petition in the state trial court in 1987. One of the claims raised was (28) Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel throughout the sentencing phase of the proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition: 86 It appears to the Court that the State's waiver/preclusion analysis is sound. The position of the State regarding waiver and preclusion as set forth in the Reply (Motion to Dismiss) at pages 2-5, in State of Arizona v. Patrick Gene Poland, filed September 28, 1988, ... is adopted by the Court. The Court concludes and orders as follows: 87
88 There are no issues raised in the petition or subsequently filed pleadings and memoranda or at the hearing which either were not 1) finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal (Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.2(a)(2)) or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently not raised at trial, on appeal.... (Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.2(a)(3)). 89 The claims raised have been waived. (Rule 32.2 and 32.10). The relief requested is precluded. (Rule 32.2) 90 The State's Motion to Dismiss on waiver and preclusion grounds is granted. 91 The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief of Patrick G. Poland is dismissed. 92 Poland filed a second PCR petition in 1993. The trial court summarily rejected the bulk of the claims as precluded. As to present Claim 16, it said: 93 Claim 16: The petitioner once again raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel-trial counsel, appellate counsel and counsel on the first petition for post-conviction relief. With respect to the attorneys that handled this case at trial and sentencing and on appeal, these issues have already been presented to the court and are thereby precluded. Rule 32.2(a), (c) and Rule 32.10 ARCrim.P. Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities is replete with allegations that every lawyer that ever touched this case is ineffective for failing to raise each and every issue that could ever come to the mind of a lawyer during the course of fifteen years of litigation without respect to the professional judgment of the attorneys involved, effective advocacy or the viability of any of the issues. This claim is frivolous in the extreme, is unsupported by the record and flies in the face of any concept of judicial economy or the finality of judgments. The claim is without merit. 94 The State argues, and the district court found, that Poland's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally barred by the trial court's rulings. We agree. 95 When a state prisoner has defaulted a claim by violating a state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review in the U.S. Supreme Court, he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1818, 140 L.Ed.2d 955 (1998). See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was firmly established and regularly followed at the time it was applied by the state court, Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), and is considered independent if it is not interwoven with federal law or dependent upon a federal constitutional ruling. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). The mere fact that a federal claimant failed to abide by a state procedural rule does not, however, in and of itself, prevent review of the federal habeas claim: The state court must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989). 96 In the present case, the trial court found Poland's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be barred under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. 7 As discussed above in Section III, Arizona's procedural rules are consistently and regularly followed and are adequate to bar federal review. The only question, then, is whether the trial court actually ... relied on the procedural [rule] as an independent basis for its disposition of the case. Id. To answer this question, we must closely examine the rule relied on by the state trial court, Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2. 97 The version of Rule 32.2 in effect in 1988, which applied to both Poland's first and second PCR petitions, provided in relevant part: 98 (a) Preclusion. A petitioner will not be given relief under this rule based upon a ground: 99 .... 100 (2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding. 101 (3) Knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently not raised at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. 102 .... 103 (c) Inference of Waiver. The court may infer from the petitioner's failure ... to raise any ground then available to him in a previous Rule 32 proceeding ... that he knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally relinquished the right to do so. 104 Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2 (1988). 105 Thus, under Rule 32.2, a claim is barred in two different situations. First, under subsection (a)(2), a claim is barred if it was previously presented to the Arizona Supreme Court, or to the trial court in a prior PCR proceeding. We will refer to subsection (a)(2)'s bar to consideration as preclusion. 106 Second, under subsection (a)(3), a claim is barred if it was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently not raised at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. We will refer to subsection (a)(3)'s bar to consideration as waiver. 107 The distinction between a claim that is precluded under subsection (a)(2) and one that has been waived under subsection (a)(3) becomes important in federal habeas. A claim that has been found to be precluded under subsection (a)(2) appears to be a classic exhausted claim and may therefore be subject to consideration in federal habeas. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1252-53 (9th Cir.1996) (recognizing the distinction between waiver and preclusion, and holding that [p]reclusion does not provide a basis for federal courts to apply a procedural bar). 108 In contrast, a claim that has been waived under subsection (a)(3) is procedurally defaulted and therefore barred from federal court consideration, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice. 109 With the distinction between waiver and preclusion in mind, we turn to an analysis of the effect of the two PCR orders in the present case. 110 The trial court's 1994 ruling on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in Poland's second PCR petition can be separated into two parts. In the first part, the court mentions ineffective assistance of counsel issues relating to trial, appeal and the first PCR proceeding, then proceeds to hold that the claims relating to trial, sentencing and appeal are precluded as having been previously presented to the trial court. In the second part of its ruling, the trial court addresses generally the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which included ineffective assistance of counsel during the first PCR proceeding. 8 111 The plain import of the 1994 ruling is that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing had been previously presented and could not again be considered. 9 Thus, the trial court found the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be precluded, see Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), rather than waived, see Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), and federal review is not necessarily barred. To determine whether federal review is available on this claim, we must look to the prior proceeding-the first PCR proceeding-and determine whether the state trial court's rejection of the ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim in that proceeding was based on a procedural default which bars federal review. 112 In his first PCR petition, Poland presented a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, contending that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel throughout the sentencing phase of his trial. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which only generalized claims relating to lack of mitigation evidence were presented. The trial court's order rejecting the first PCR petition adopted the State's analysis of waiver as stated on pages 2-5 of the State's Reply to Poland's post-hearing memorandum. 113 The State's Reply specifically took the position that the PCR petition process was not intended to stand in for a second appeal; that all of the issues presented in the first PCR petition were based upon facts that were available at the time of the prior direct appeal; and that the defendant's contention that many of his arguments could not have been raised on appeal must be rejected because the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that a particular claim was not available on appeal. In fact, except for one paragraph, where the State argued, In any event, defendant has not shown that [his trial counsel] was ineffective, the State's entire argument on pages 2-5, which was adopted by the trial court, was devoted to arguing waiver. The State concluded: 114 [T]he basis for raising each and every claim in the petition was present at the time of appeal. If defendant felt that an additional record needed to be made to support the claims, he could have stayed the appeal and filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He did not do so. It is too late to do it now. 115 The trial court's specific language, and its adoption of the State's analysis, make it clear that in its ruling on the first PCR petition, the court found the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be waived under Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). See Arizona Superior Court's 1988 order denying Poland's first PCR petition (adopting the State's analysis on waiver and holding that [t]he claims presented have been waived (Rule 32.2 and 32.10).); State's Reply (Motion to Dismiss) First PCR Petition at 2-5. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing was not raised on direct appeal and thus could not have been the subject of a finding of preclusion on the basis of prior presentation under Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 10 116 The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, having been declared barred by waiver under Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), is procedurally defaulted and cannot be considered in federal habeas absent a showing of cause and prejudice, to which we now turn.