Opinion ID: 450588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: district court's refusal to quash count six

Text: 26 Adi filed a pretrial motion to suppress his grand jury testimony or in the alternative to quash Counts Five and Six of the indictment, which the district court denied. On appeal, Adi asserts that the district court should have dismissed Count Six of the indictment against him pursuant to Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This argument is meritless. Rule 7 provides no support for Adi's contention. The rule sets forth the requisites of an indictment or information, but sets no standards for the granting of a motion to quash. 27 Adi next maintains that his grand jury testimony was literally true and thus did not constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a). On April 25, 1983, Adi was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury regarding the grand jury's investigation of whether Adi had caused Lloyd to make false statements in the acquisition of firearms in order to conceal the fact that Adi was the actual purchaser of the firearms. The indictment charged that in sworn testimony, Adi knowingly made a material false declaration when the following exchange occurred during the Government's examination of Adi before the grand jury: 28 Q. But were you with this June fellow when he was buying the guns? 29
30 Q. So you didn't participate in any of the conversation anyway? 31 A. What I am saying is I don't even know he was buying anything... 32 Record Vol. I at 219. Adi characterizes his answer as being merely unresponsive, rather than untruthful. In reliance upon Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 361, 93 S.Ct. 595, 601, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973), Adi asserts that it was the responsibility of the United States Attorney to press for a specific answer and that perjury statutes should not be invoked in a situation such as the instant case. Adi also contends that the United States Attorney's question was devoid of any facts concerning the precise time, date and place to which the inquiry was directed. This argument is specious. Our examination of the record indicates that the time frame surrounding the Government's inquiry involved the incident during which ATF agents confiscated a box of firearms from Adi and Lloyd as they exited Mason's Pawnshop. It is also readily apparent from the record that Adi knew the time frame surrounding the Government's inquiry. As this Court has stated: 33 The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object of the questioner's inquiry [citing Bronston ]. This does not mean, however, that question and answer must be aligned in categorical and digital order. If the answer to an arguably ambiguous question is sufficiently explicit to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly made a false statement, then the statement may serve as the predicate for the offense of making a false declaration. 34 United States v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir.1981). 35 In sum, Adi has made no showing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to quash Count Six of the indictment.