Opinion ID: 156679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Access and the CJA Statutory Scheme

Text: 72 The Albuquerque Journal argues that even if we do not find a First Amendment right of access, all of the CJA materials should still be unsealed pursuant to the common law and/or the CJA statutory scheme. We reject the Journal's common law argument for two reasons. First, the statute and regulations discussed below occupy this field and would supercede the common law right even if one existed. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534, 113 S.Ct. 1631, 123 L.Ed.2d 245 (1993); see also In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 504 (D.C.Cir.1998) (common law right of access to grand jury-related information is supplanted by Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(5), 6(e)(6)); Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1511 (10th Cir.1994) (common law right of access to criminal justice records is supplanted by Colorado statute). Second, as we have discussed above, the CJA materials are not judicial documents as that term is used by courts that have applied the common law right of access. Rather, these are administrative documents, see United States v. Davis, 953 F.2d 1482, 1498 n. 21 (10th Cir.1992), to which there is no right of access under the common law. We therefore analyze to what extent the materials should be released under the CJA. 73 The CJA was enacted in 1964 to insure effective representation for those charged with a crime or confronted with the risk of being deprived of constitutional rights in ancillary proceedings. United States v. Smith, 633 F.2d 739, 741 (7th Cir.1980) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 91-1546 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3982, 3983); see also United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1161-62 (5th Cir.1974). To achieve its purpose, the CJA provides for both representation by counsel and other services necessary for adequate representation. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). 74 The version of the statute in effect for this case provides that the Judicial Conference of the United States may, from time to time, issue rules and regulations governing the operation of plans formulated under this section. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(h). Accordingly, the Administrative Office, under the direction of the Judicial Conference, has promulgated rules relating to the release of all types of CJA information. See AO Guide, chap. III, part A, § 3.03; chap. V, § 5.01. The AO Guide includes the forms to be used in conjunction with the CJA process, including forms 20, 21, 30, and 31 discussed above. We apply the version of the AO Guide applicable to this case in our discussion below. 75 Under the statute and regulations, the information related to counsel's fees is presumptively accessible to the public. It may be sealed at the discretion of the district court upon motion of the defendant or on the court's own motion. Similarly, this information that is placed under seal may be released later at the court's discretion, after consideration of the interests discussed below. To the contrary, information pertaining to the application for services other than counsel is sealed from the outset. After trial, the court has the discretion, after finding on the record that the same interests are protected, to release this information as well. 76 Although the CJA has been amended twice since the present case was commenced and both amendments have altered the provisions for access to CJA vouchers, 21 the amendments essentially codify the regulations. However, one amendment specifically provides that amounts expended under the CJA shall be made available to the public, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(4), which apparently takes the discretion away from the district court as to the release of the totals. In death penalty cases, the amounts are to be made available to the public after the disposition of the petition. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10)(C). In addition, one of the amendments, applicable only to death penalty cases, changes the presumption from an ex parte hearing for services other than counsel to a process which is not to be held ex parte unless a proper showing is made concerning the need for confidentiality. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9). Our interpretation of the statute in effect for this case is consistent with the amendments, except as those amendments alter access to CJA information in death penalty cases. 77 1. Motions, Orders, and Hearing Transcripts Related to the Retention and Compensation of Services Other Than Counsel 78 Services other than counsel that are necessary for adequate representation may be obtained by a defendant who is financially unable to obtain them, upon an ex parte application, heard by the court in camera. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e); AO Guide, chap. III, part A, § 3.03. The application, which is not a voucher but is usually an ex parte motion followed by an ex parte hearing, shall not be revealed without the consent of the defendant. The application shall be placed under seal until the final disposition of the case in the trial court, subject to further order of the court. Maintaining the secrecy of the application prevents the possibility that an open hearing may cause a defendant to reveal his or her defense. Id. § 3.03. Similar procedures are provided in death penalty cases under the version of the statute applicable to this case. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9). 79 The legislative history of the act indicates that the need for secrecy in obtaining services other than counsel is to prevent the possibility that an open hearing may cause a defendant to reveal his defense. H.R.Rep. No. 88-864 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990, 2990; see also Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir.1970). Because the Defendants are act[ing] jointly, sharing responsibility for motions and investigation and attending joint strategy sessions ... to avoid duplicative efforts and to minimize expenses, United States v. Gonzales, No. CR-95-538-MV, 1997 WL 155403, at  12 (D.N.M. Feb.11, 1997), the release of any CJA documents prior to the last Defendant's sentencing would prejudice that Defendant by causing him to reveal his defense. H.R.Rep. No. 88-864 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990, 2990. Thus, we reject the Albuquerque Journal's argument that materials related to services other than counsel should be released prior to the end of all Defendants' sentencing hearings. 80 The district court, however, because it found a First Amendment right of access, ordered that all CJA-related documents, motions, orders, and hearing transcripts be released after the last remaining Defendant is sentenced. Pursuant to the CJA statutory and regulatory scheme, we conclude that this information is presumptively closed. The scheme favors continuing confidentiality of the information, and given the interests identified in the discussion of the logic prong of the constitutional analysis above, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ordering that the motions, orders, and hearing transcripts related to services other than counsel be released. 81 2. Materials Related to the Appointment and Compensation of Counsel and the Backup Documentation to Vouchers for Services Other Than Counsel 82 The CJA provides that appointment of counsel is to be achieved after determining that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel pursuant to a plan implemented by each district court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b). Similar procedures apply to death penalty cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005; 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)-(8), (10). Neither the statute nor the Administrative Office's rules specify whether this procedure is to be done ex parte. 83 Section 5.01 of the AO Guide changes the presumption from one of secrecy in non-attorney retention and compensation to one of openness for information not otherwise routinely available to the public, while still giving the court the discretion to place CJA-related materials under seal until after all judicial proceedings 22 in the case are completed and for such time thereafter as the court deems appropriate. This section of the AO Guide also applies to the backup documentation to the vouchers for services other than counsel. 23 Information should be released unless its release might ... unduly intrude upon the privacy of attorneys or defendants or compromise defense strategies, investigative procedures, attorney work product, the attorney-client relationship or privileged information provided by the defendant or other sources. Id. 84 In our discussion of the logic prong of the Press-Enterprise II analysis above, we considered several of these factors, concluding that access to CJA materials, including backup documentation to CJA forms 20, 21, 30, and 31, and motions, orders, and hearing transcripts related to the appointment of counsel, would not play a significant positive role on the functioning of the CJA process. In addition to those factors discussed above, we conclude that the other factors also favor continued sealing of these CJA materials, even after sentencing is completed. 85 The district court considered several of these other factors, but did so in the context of its Press-Enterprise II analysis of higher values. First, the district court found, and we agree, that allowing disclosure of the backup documentation to the attorneys' requests for compensation may subject innocent people who have been interviewed or investigated by Defendants to public speculation about their involvement in the crime. Gonzales, 1997 WL 155403, at  8. This interest is similar to one justification for keeping grand jury proceedings secret even after trial is over. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979); see also United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 231 & nn. 8-9 (7th Cir.1989); Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1989). 86 In addition, several witnesses are in the Witness Protection Program, and information, such as the places to which defense counsel have traveled, which could reveal their location should not be disclosed. See United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir.1985); cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982). Non-witnesses also have a privacy interest in retaining anonymity for similar safety reasons. We disagree, therefore, with the district court's apparent conclusion that a non-defendant's privacy interest is only valid until the conclusion of litigation. Gonzales, 1997 WL 155403, at  8. 87 Second, release of the backup documentation, motions, orders, and hearing transcripts related to the appointment and compensation of counsel and of the backup documentation to vouchers for services other than counsel will intrude on the privacy interests of the Defendants and will reveal privileged information provided by the Defendants. As discussed above, disclosure of this CJA information may implicate the Defendants' Fifth Amendment rights as to the instant crime. It may also put the government in a position to investigate and bring new charges against [defendants who inculpate themselves in uncharged criminal conduct in order to obtain an adequate defense]. Supplemental R. Vol. I, Tab 2073 at 5 n. 1 (district court order granting in part defendants' motion to stay pending appeal). These privacy interests also do not cease at the conclusion of the litigation. 88 Third, unsealing the backup documentation, motions, orders and hearing transcripts related to the appointment and compensation of counsel and the backup documentation to vouchers for services other than counsel would reveal information protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the attorney work-product doctrine. In addition to the attorney being reluctant to provide the court with information necessary to obtain services for the defense as discussed above, 24 the specter of the release of detailed backup documentation to the attorney's vouchers and non-attorney's vouchers, which, the district court found, often contain information directly or indirectly implicating the attorney-client privilege, would make a defendant reluctant to reveal information that could help the attorney in the defense of the case, or in analyzing the strength of the case for trial. 25 Gonzales, 1997 WL 155403, at  8; see Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir.1980). The importance of this privilege and doctrine is well-established, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-92, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), a point which the Supreme Court just recently reemphasized in holding that the attorney-client privilege extends beyond the death of the client. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 2084-88, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998). Certainly, then, the privilege does not terminate when the Defendants' trials are over. 89 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ordering that the backup documentation, motions, orders and hearing transcripts related to the appointment and compensation of counsel and the backup documentation to vouchers for services other than counsel should be unsealed after the conclusion of all Defendants' sentencing hearings. 3. Vouchers and Total Expenditures 90 Finally, we address the district court's order that the total attorney fees and overall total paid through CJA funds be released for each Defendant after that Defendant is sentenced and that all of the vouchers themselves (without the backup documentation) be released at the end of all Defendants' sentencing hearings. The district court found that because the vouchers (forms 20, 21, 30, and 31) themselves contain trial strategy, Gonzales, 1997 WL 155403, at  7, release of the entire vouchers prior to the conclusion of all Defendants' trials would harm Defendants not yet tried. The court considered the interests involved and properly applied its discretion to release the total amount spent on counsel and the total amount spent overall on each Defendant at the end of that Defendant's sentencing hearing and to save the release of the vouchers themselves until all Defendants' sentencing hearings are completed. We find no abuse in the court's conclusion that forms 21 and 31, relating to the compensation of experts, investigators, and others, contain trial strategy. Although we question how much trial strategy is revealed on forms 20 and 30 regarding compensation to counsel, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in waiting to release them until the end of all sentencing hearings since the forms themselves require the attorneys to specify certain information, which could reveal strategy. 26 91 The district court's order that the vouchers should ultimately be released is also consistent with the two recent amendments to the CJA, which require that the amounts expended for counsel and other services under the CJA be disclosed. See supra note 21. The most recent amendment provides that the amount paid to counsel is to be divided into twelve categories, which roughly match the categories presently on CJA forms 20 and 30, to be released pursuant to the court's order. Therefore, all of the vouchers may properly be disclosed, without the backup documentation, at the end of the last Defendant's sentencing hearing, in accordance with the district court's order. And as the district court has made clear, its order has not foreclosed the Defendants from seeking a protective order with regards to sensitive information that may be contained on the vouchers themselves. See Supplemental R. Vol. I, Tab 2073 at 6 n. 2 (district court order granting in part defendants' motion to stay pending appeal). 92 Finally, even if we were to assume that a qualified First Amendment right applied to the vouchers as the Second Circuit held in Suarez, 880 F.2d at 631, the interests we have already identified, and that the district court balanced, lead us to agree with the district court's narrowly tailored conclusion that the vouchers should remain sealed until all Defendants are sentenced, except for the total amount paid to the attorney and the total amount spent overall, which will be released at the conclusion of each Defendant's sentencing hearing.