Opinion ID: 1744326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges of jurors for cause

Text: Klem contends that the trial court erred in not excusing two potential jurors for cause, thus requiring that he exhaust his peremptory challenges, resulting in the seating of a juror that Klem wanted to excuse with a peremptory challenge. Klem argues that the two challenged jurors were equivocal about their ability to return a not guilty verdict if Klem did not testify, about whether they thought Klem had to prove anything, about whether they could set their opinions aside, and about whether they could rely only on the evidence presented in court. [T]he formation of an opinion or impression regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence. Commentary to Standard 15-2.5, Challenges for Cause, III A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice p. 15.59 (2d ed. 1986) [quoting ALI Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) ]. A prospective juror need not be excused merely because he knows something of the case to be tried or has formed some opinions regarding it. 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 21.3(c), p. 729 (1984). The relevant question is not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891, 81 L.Ed.2d 847, 856 (1984). As the court said in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-1643, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, 756 (1961): To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. See also State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428 (N.D.1984), and State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D.1980), applying Irvin v. Dowd, supra . A juror's partiality is a question of fact. Patton v. Yount, supra . The determination of a juror's partiality is essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor. Id., 467 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 2892, 81 L.Ed.2d at 858. Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. Id., 467 U.S. at 1038 n. 14, 104 S.Ct. at 2892 n. 14, 81 L.Ed.2d at 858 n. 14 (1984). [T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156, 25 L.Ed. 244, 247 (1879) (quoted in Patton v. Yount, supra, 467 U.S. at 1037 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. at 2892 n. 12, 81 L.Ed.2d at 858 n. 12). The trial court's resolution of questions about a juror's partiality is entitled to special deference. Patton v. Yount, supra . [T]he question is whether there is fair support in the record for the [trial court's] conclusion that the jurors here would be impartial. Id., 467 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 2892-2893, 81 L.Ed.2d at 858. Klem argues that one of the two challenged potential jurors said he might be able to return a not guilty verdict if Klem did not testify, said that he thought Klem probably would have to establish his innocence, and never equivocally [sic] stated that he could lay aside his opinions. Klem argues that the other challenged potential juror, when asked if she could put aside completely and ignore what she had heard from other sources and rely only on what she had heard at the trial, replied that she was not sure, that she would try to rely only on the evidence presented in court, and that she felt that Klem had to prove something. While the potential jurors' responses relied upon by Klem were somewhat equivocal responses to questions put to them by defense counsel, their responses to questions put to them by the trial court were more definite. The following colloquy took place between the court and one of the challenged jurors: THE COURT: ... Will you be able to apply the law that Mr. Klem is in fact innocent and he doesn't have to prove anything? A That's right. THE COURT: He doesn't have to offer any evidence at all. A But, still in the back of my mind, you know, I will have that, but, THE COURT: But can you set that aside? A I would hope so. THE COURT: And if you take the oath, will you be able to uphold the oath and follow the law as I tell you it is? A Yes. THE COURT: And part of that law would be that the State has to prove him guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt in this trial. A That's right. THE COURT: Not based upon anything you have heard before or not based upon any or probable cause determination, but, only on the evidence in this trial. A Right. THE COURT: And if the State does not come up with the quality or quantum of proof, would be you be able to return a verdict of not guilty even if the Defendant offers no evidence whatsoever? A I think so. The following colloquy took place between the court and the other challenged juror: THE COURT: ... In a criminal case, the Defendant doesn't have to prove anything. The Defendant doesn't even have to offer any evidence unless he chooses to do so. Rather the sole burden of proof is on the State or the prosecution.... So, if I instruct you as to what the law is and if you take an oath to serve as a fair and impartial juror and render a true and fair verdict based only on the evidence in Court and the law, would you be able to obey that oath even though it would be difficult for you to do so as you acknowledged? Would you be able to set aside anything that you have heard, any hearsay or even if you don't think it's hearsay, set that aside and make your decision based only on what you hear in the Courtroom? A I would try to do my best, yes. THE COURT: And you would try to obey that oath? A Yes, I would. THE COURT: You're satisfied that that is what the law is and you would take the oath and you would do your duty? A Yes, I would do my duty. THE COURT: You would have some concern about how difficult it would be but you are satisfied that you would be able to perform your duty as a citizen to be a juror and a fair and impartial one in this case? A I think I could.       THE COURT: Well, Counsel, excuse me for interrupting again, but, if I tell you that the law is that you must regard Mr. Klem as innocent unless and until the State proves him guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be able to apply that law and regard and presume Mr. Klem to be innocent unless and until the State proves him guilty? A Yes, I could. What the prospective jurors meant by their responses in voir dire was a question of fact for the trial court, who was in a position to judge their credibility and discern their conscientiousness. The trial judge properly may choose to believe those statements that were the most fully articulated or that appeared to have been least influenced by leading. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. at 2893, 81 L.Ed.2d at 859. [O]nly the trial judge could tell which of [the] answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty. Id. As in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. at 2893, 81 L.Ed.2d at 859: We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of publicity do not reveal the kind of `wave of public passion' that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. As a juror's partiality is a question of fact, the trial court's resolution, which is presumptively correct, is entitled to special deference, and ought not be reversed except in a clear case. Patton v. Yount, supra . A trial court's determination on whether a prospective juror should be dismissed for cause will not be disturbed unless the court abused its discretion. State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428. From my review of the record, I conclude that the trial court could properly have determined that each of the challenged jurors could lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. at 1642-1643, 6 L.Ed.2d at 756. I am, therefore, not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the challenged jurors for cause.