Opinion ID: 2196446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amateur Sports Exclusion

Text: Having found that claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of 21 V.S.A. § 618, we must now consider the second certified question, whether the amateur sports exclusion operates to bar this claim. See 21 V.S.A. § 601(14)(B). Section 601(14)(B) excludes from coverage a person engaged in amateur sports even if an employer contributes to the support of such sports. In holding that the amateur sports exclusion did not apply in this case, the Commissioner relied on an earlier Department of Labor and Industry decision, Nutbrown v. Roadway Express, Op. No. 2-93 WC (June 7, 1993), which examined the legislative history of the exclusion. Nutbrown concluded that the exclusion represented the Legislature's response to a New York case in which a little league baseball player obtained workers' compensation coverage for a game injury because he was playing for a team sponsored by the employer. It held that the exception applies only to members of an amateur sports team sponsored by the employer, such as company softball, bowling, or basketball teams. The Commissioner in this case held that [b]ecause the claimant was not involved in any employer sponsored team activity at the time of the accident, the statutory exception does not apply here. Employer argues that limiting the exclusion to team sports is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the language, which can not be overcome by the scant legislative history uncovered in Nutbrown. We reiterate that we must defer to the Commissioner's interpretation of the workers' compensation law absent a clear indication of error. Wood, 169 Vt. at ___, 739 A.2d at 1204. We also reiterate that we construe the statute liberally in favor of eligibility. See Close, 166 Vt. at 324, 693 A.2d at 732; see also Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 168 Vt. 48, 53, 716 A.2d 17, 21 (1998) (where remedial legislation has an express limitation, we have generally declined to expand the exception beyond its plain terms). There are three distinctions between the situation described in Nutbrown, which induced the Legislature to enact the exclusion, and the facts before us: (1) claimant here was otherwise an employee of employer; (2) claimant was not a member of a team sponsored by employer; and (3) claimant was not part of a competition at the time of the injury. Employer argues that the Commissioner relied only upon the second distinction, the absence of an employer-sponsored team, and that this distinction is not found in the statute. We might agree with this characterization of the Commissioner's ruling if claimant had been involved in a ski race as an individual, and the decision turned on the absence of a team. Instead, we believe that the Commissioner relied upon both of the latter distinctions. Claimant was injured while he participated in a recreational activity, that broadly could be called a sports activity, but lacked the competitive aspect normally associated with a sport. See Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary 960 (Lexicon Publications, Deluxe Ed.1989) (sport means the playing of games or participation in competitive pastimes involving physical exertion and skill). That the Legislature intended a narrow definition of sportsthose involving an athletic competitionis shown by its use of the modifier amateur. See Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 744 A.2d 422, 426 (1999) (in construing statute we must look to whole statute and every part of it). The distinction between amateur and professional sports is relevant to an athletic competition in which the athlete might be paid money for a performance. The Commissioner's decision is consistent with this definition of sports as involving athletic competition. We defer to his construction of the statute, a liberal construction in favor of eligibility. Reversed and remanded for an award of compensation consistent with this opinion. AMESTOY, C.J., dissenting. By ignoring the relevant factual findings of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry in this case, the majority's opinion exposes employers and insurers to workers' compensation claims for recreational injuries incurred by employees. The rational response to such exposure will be to eliminate from an employee's compensation any benefit (e.g., health club membership; golf, ski, or swim passes, etc.) that could conceivably be characterized as an inducement to attract employees under the majority's open-ended test. Because I believe that the unpredictability prompted by the majority's reasoning is neither consistent with the remedial purpose of the workers' compensation statute nor necessary when applicable law is applied to the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent. I do agree with the majority that [t]he relevant facts in this case are ... largely undisputed .... ___ Vt. at ___, 751 A.2d at 767. Indeed, it is the majority's inexplicable inattention to the most salient facts that lies at the root of my disagreement with its rationale. The Commissioner specifically found that despite its job title the ability to ski was not a job requirement [of the ski bum position] and non-skiers had held the job in the past. Whatever the claimant's subjective hope that he could get a job that would enable him to ski, the objective fact is that it was not necessary for the Gables to offer a ski pass to induce applicants to accept employment. Employer testified that, in the past, the Gables had employed persons who had accepted the ski bum position without taking the offered ski pass and without being offered alternative compensation. Nor do the facts as found by the Commissioner support the inference that an offer of a ski pass was necessary to induce the claimant to apply for employment. Indeed, the Commissioner found that the claimant was unaware that the Gables had advertised a job opening when he applied for a position. Without a sufficient factual basis to support a finding that the ski pass was an inducement, it cannot be concluded that employer gained a benefit from the claimant's off-the-job recreational activity. The majority's reliance on Dorsch v. Industrial Commission, 185 Colo. 219, 523 P.2d 458, 460 (1974), is similarly flawed. First, the employee in Dorsch, unlike claimant here, was injured on the premises of his employer's ski resort. Second, unlike the Gables' ski bum position, which the Commissioner found had been filled by nonskiers as well as skiers, the hearing officer in Dorsch specifically found that the ski pass was an incentive to attract employees to the employer's ski area. Third, the court in Dorsch determined that offering a ski pass benefitted the employer because it attracted prospective employees to odd hour and remote area employment. Even assuming that claimant would not have accepted employment without inclusion of the ski pass, there must be a showing that the inducement benefitted employer. See Byrd v. Stackhouse Sheet Metal Works, 317 S.C. 35, 451 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Ct.App.1994) (gas money as inducement to employment not a basis of compensation without benefit to employer); Berry v. Colonial Furniture Co., 232 N.C. 303, 60 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1950) (death resulting from fishing trip offered as inducement to employment in place of health insurance not compensable because trip not directly or indirectly in furtherance of employer's business); Brooks v. New York State Dep't of Correction Matteawan State Hosp., 26 A.D.2d 850, 273 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1002 (1966) (existence of low cost residency on employer premises not sufficient inducement to employment to award compensation because residency benefitted only employee). At the hearing claimant apparently recognized the weakness of a claim that predicated eligibility for workers' compensation benefits on the attenuated link between the perk of a ski pass and a recreational skiing injury. Much of claimant's evidence went to the issue of whether employer required claimant to perform job-related duties while skiing (e.g., mingle with Gables guests or report ski conditions). The Commissioner found that claimant had no responsibilities whatsoever to the Gables while he was on the mountain. The record discloses ample evidence for this as well as each of the Commissioner's other factual findings. The majority correctly notes that we can overrule such factual findings only where those findings have no evidentiary support in the record. Coburn v. Frank Dodge & Sons, 165 Vt. 529, 533, 687 A.2d 465, 467-68 (1996). We are left, therefore, with the benefit of inducement theory ably advanced by claimant at oral argument. If I thought that the only effect of the majority's opinion would be to make the seriously injured claimant eligible for workers' compensation benefits, I would be far less troubled by the result. However, the ramifications of the majority's decision will extend beyond this case. The likely increase in cost to employers for workers' compensation coverage would be justified if today's decision advanced the remedial purpose of the workers' compensation lawto liberally provide coverage for employees injured in the course of their employment. But even a liberal reading of the act's purpose cannot transform a recreational ski injury into an injury arising in the course of employment. In its good faith effort to extend the reach of workers' compensation coverage, I believe an unintended consequence of the majority's decision will be the diminishment of recreational benefits provided by employers to employees. In any event, employers who offer ski passes to employees will be as rare as the rope tow. I am authorized to state that Justice SKOGLUND joins me in this dissent.