Opinion ID: 2691982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robbery and Aggravated Robbery

Text: {¶ 15} Each count of robbery herein was charged under R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), which provides that no person, in attempting to commit or committing a theft offense, or fleeing immediately thereafter, shall “[i]nflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another.” Each count of aggravated robbery was charged under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), which provides that no person, in attempting to commit or committing a theft offense, or in fleeing immediately thereafter, shall “[h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it.” {¶ 16} In State v. Winn, 121 Ohio St.3d 413, 2009-Ohio-1059, 905 N.E.2d 154, we applied Cabrales to determine whether kidnapping defined in R.C. 2905.01(A)(2)and aggravated robbery defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) were allied offenses of similar import. In comparing these offenses, we explained, “In essence, the elements to be compared in the abstract are the restraint, by force, threat, or deception, of the liberty of another to ‘facilitate the commission of any felony’ (kidnapping, R.C. 2905.01(A)(2)) and having ‘a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control and either display[ing] the weapon, brandish[ing] it, indicat[ing] that the offender possesses it, or us[ing] it’ in attempting to commit or committing a theft offense (aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1)). It is difficult to see how the presence of a weapon that has been shown or used, or whose possession has been made known to the victim during the commission of a theft offense, does not also forcibly restrain the liberty of another.” Id. at ¶ 21. Thus, we held that even though the elements of these 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO offenses do not exactly align, they are “ ‘so similar that the commission of one offense will necessarily result in commission of the other.’ Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, paragraph one of the syllabus.” Id. {¶ 17} Similar reasoning applies when comparing robbery and aggravated robbery. The possession of a deadly weapon, used, shown, brandished, or made known to the victim during a theft or flight from a theft also constitutes a threat to inflict physical harm on that victim. Thus, robbery defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and aggravated robbery defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) are so similar that the commission of one offense will result in commission of the other. Accordingly, we hold that robbery defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and aggravated robbery defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) are allied offenses of similar import, and therefore a defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses when both are committed with the same animus against the same victim. C. Felonious Assault: R.C. 2903.11 (A)(1) and (A)(2) {¶ 18} In State v. Cotton (June 20, 2007), Hamilton App. No. C-060264, the defendant stabbed one victim, three times. He was convicted of felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). The trial court imposed sentences for both convictions. The court of appeals affirmed. {¶ 19} We reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in Cotton on the authority of State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149,1 holding that felonious assaults in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2) are allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25(A). State v. Cotton, 120 Ohio St.3d 321, 2008-Ohio-6249, 898 N.E.2d 959. 1. In State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 40, we held that “aggravated assault[s] in violation of R.C. 2903.12(A)(1) and (A)(2) are allied offenses of similar import.” 6 January Term, 2009 {¶ 20} On the authority of Cotton, we affirm that convictions for felonious assault defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and felonious assault defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) are allied offenses of similar import, and therefore a defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses when both are committed with the same animus against the same victim. D. Merger {¶ 21} Two allied offenses of similar import must be merged into a single conviction. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 42. In merging two allied offenses of similar import, we have held: “An accused may be tried for both but may be convicted and sentenced for only one. The choice is given to the prosecution to pursue one offense or the other, and it is plainly the intent of the General Assembly that the election may be of either offense.” (Emphasis added.) Maumee v. Geiger (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 238, 244, 74 O.O.2d 380, 344 N.E.2d 133. {¶ 22} A final judgment of conviction occurs when the judgment contains “(1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.” State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, syllabus. {¶ 23} In light of Baker, we hold that Geiger requires the prosecution to elect which offense it will pursue after a finding of guilt but prior to sentencing.