Opinion ID: 1820944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of civil code article 543

Text: The question is now whether C.C. 543 prohibits a partition by licitation. In Pasternack v. Samuels, supra, we held that C.C. 543 prohibits partition by licitation by co-owners of an undivided interest in property subject to a usufruct. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Pasternack from the present case. In his brief plaintiff contends: In Pasternack, unlike the case now before this Court, the usufructuary was both a usufructuary and an owner. This factual distinction was the basis of the court of appeal decision in which Pasternack was distinguished. In accepting the distinction urged by plaintiff, the court of appeal reasoned that: ... the parties' ownership interests in that case were different from those in the Cahn property. Joseph Pasternack, Jr.'s co-owner in indivision, Mrs. Samuels, from whom he sought partition, owned fractional interests in the property in full ownership in addition to interests in usufruct. Pasternack, 415 So.2d at 212 n. 1 and 213. Thus, Mrs. Samuels was precisely the person described in the second sentence of Article 543, `both a usufructuary and an owner.' In the present case, Dorothea Cahn is not both a usufructuary and an owner; her only interest in the property is a usufruct. There is no one who is both a usufructuary and a perfect owner of the Cahn property. Therefore, because of this critical factual distinction, we hold the rule in Pasternack inapplicable to the issue before us. Cahn v. Cahn, 459 So.2d 731, 733 (La.App.1984). This critical distinction is not of significance under C.C. 543. The second sentence of the article unmistakably provides: Partition by licitation is not allowed.... The language which follows this clear prohibition, ... even though there is a person who is both a usufructuary and an owner, does not lessen the effect of the prohibition or restrict its application to situations where the usufructuary is also an owner. The court of appeal failed to recognize the import of our holding in Pasternack. In that case we found that the prohibition against partition was clear and without ambiguity. Pasternack v. Samuels, supra at 213. Where the words of a law are clear and free of ambiguity, the plain meaning of the law may not be ignored. C.C. 13. Although the court of appeal found Pasternack distinguishable, it recognized, in its statement of the issue, that the sole issue in this case was identical with the issue raised in Pasternack. [7] According to the court of appeal: The sole issue we decide is whether one who holds an undivided fractional interest in property in full ownership has the right to seek partition by licitation even though there is a person who holds a usufruct over another undivided interest in the property. Cahn v. Cahn, supra at 732. Since identical legal issues are raised in both cases, the resolution of those issues must be the same. Civil Code article 543 prohibits plaintiff, the perfect owner of a one-quarter interest, from demanding a partition by licitation, since one-half of the property is burdened with a usufruct.