Opinion ID: 2973671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Eighth Circuit’s Decisions

Text: That leaves only the Eighth Circuit. Although I believe that the Eighth Circuit’s decisions, upon which the panel relies, have been undermined — and also that the decisions are likewise not supported by Leon — I shall discuss the cases and then explain why they do not support the panel’s ultimate conclusion. These decisions include United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413 (8th Cir. 1989), United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d 48 (8th Cir. 1996). The decision that undermines these cases is United States v. O’Neal, which I discuss infra. White, Kiser, Fletcher, (and O’Neal) involved Terry-like stops at airports or bus terminals. In each of the cases, the police believed that they had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and conducted Terry stops. In each case, it was subsequently determined by a reviewing court that the facts relied upon by the officers were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit held that the evidence obtained as a result of the Terry stop, which was used to obtain a warrant to search the defendants’ luggage, was admissible pursuant to the goodfaith exception. In Fletcher, for example, the officers had some facts that they believed amount to reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant’s luggage in order to execute a canine sniff of the luggage. Fletcher, 91 F.3d at 49. The dog then alerted and the officers used this information to obtain a warrant to search inside the bag. Id. The district court and Eighth Circuit held that the particular facts did not amount to reasonable suspicion — that is, there was not reasonable suspicion to conduct the canine sniff. Nevertheless, the court determined that the facts were “close enough” to reasonable suspicion that the evidence should not be suppressed. Id. at 52. No. 04-5887 United States v. McClain, et al. Page 14 According to the Fletcher court, the “relevant inquiry is whether the facts surrounding reasonable suspicion are ‘close enough to the line of validity’ that the police officers were entitled to a belief in the validity of the warrant and the existence of reasonable suspicion. . . . If the case presents such a ‘close’ question, the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be considered.” Id. at 51 (citing White, 890 F.2d 1413). Without reviewing the purpose of the exclusionary rule or recognizing the distinction between police errors and a magistrate’s error, per Leon’s instructions, the court stated that “[t]his case is indeed within the gray area of Leon.” Id. (also noting that both White and Kiser were “so close to the line of validity as to warrant application of Leon”); see also id. at 52 (“While neither case supported a finding of reasonable suspicion, both were close to the line of validity.”). These cases, addressing only erroneous Terry stops, fail to accord the purpose of the exclusionary rule its due respect.