Opinion ID: 1796517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a statement taken in violation of tina's constitutional rights?

Text: Tina voluntarily went to the sheriff to give a false missing person report on her husband. She gave details to Sheriff McMullen and agreed to go with him to identify a body. Sheriff McMullen then asked her to talk to Lieutenant Dickerson to give the statement of her missing husband for him to record. She was not the target of any investigation at this time, nor a suspect in Thomas' murder. When Lieutenant Dickerson noted a conflict between the statement Tina gave him and his understanding of what she had told the sheriff earlier, he advised Tina of her Miranda rights at 5:00 p.m. She signed a waiver of rights form at 5:10 p.m. During this interview, Tina made self-incriminating statements of the murder of her husband. Tina contends that she made two requests for counsel. First, she asked if she needed an attorney before she made a statement. She did not request an attorney be appointed for her. Officer Dickerson told her not yet, Tina also alleges that later, after she received her Miranda warnings, she asked for an attorney. She asserts that Dickerson then told her she could not have an attorney. Tina contends that her Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated in this case. The standard of reviewing the admission of a confession is well-settled. Determining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is not disturbed unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or the decision was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Lee v. State, 631 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 742 (Miss. 1992)); Ricks v. State, 611 So.2d 212, 214 (Miss. 1992). The trial judge ruled that the statement was freely and voluntarily given after the Miranda rights had been administered. Whether Tina's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated depends on whether she was (a) in custody and (b) being interrogated. A person's Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not triggered by general on-the-scene questioning and/or any voluntary statement. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629-30, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907 (Miss. 1993). Clearly, when a person who is in custody and is being interrogated requests an attorney, the police's questioning must cease until one is provided. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612-13; Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 147, 111 S.Ct. 486, 487-88, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1992). On the other hand, if Tina's first alleged request for an attorney took place in a non-custodial setting, her Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2208-09, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir.1990). Clearly, Tina had been asked to give a statement and she was being questioned; therefore, she was being interrogated. Thus, whether Tina was denied her Fifth Amendment right to counsel depends on whether she was in custody. [2] The test for whether a person is in custody is whether a reasonable person would feel that she was in custody. That is, whether a reasonable person would feel that she was going to jail  and not just being temporarily detained. Compton v. State, 460 So.2d 847, 849 (Miss. 1984). See also, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). The officer's subjective intent is irrelevant. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). Whether a reasonable person would feel that she was in custody depends on the totality of the circumstances. Factors to consider include: (a) the place of interrogation; (b) the time of interrogation; (c) the people present; (d) the amount of force or physical restraint used by the officers; (e) the length and form of the questions; (f) whether the defendant comes to the authorities voluntarily; and (g) what the defendant is told about the situation. See People v. Goyer, 265 Ill. App.3d 160, 202 Ill.Dec. 744, 747-48, 638 N.E.2d 390, 393-94 (1994). Considering the totality of the circumstances, the record reflects that Tina and Dickerson's conversation about an attorney occurred prior to her being in custody. It is undisputed that she voluntarily went to the sheriff's office to report Thomas as missing. She was questioned during the late afternoon for a relatively short period of time, during which, she was alone with Officer Dickerson. She was not physically restrained, but she contends that she was told she could not leave until she gave a statement to Officer Dickerson. Thus, Tina was detained temporarily in order to obtain a missing-person report. More importantly, she went voluntarily to the sheriff's office for the express purpose of making such a report. [3] Therefore, the trial judge did not commit manifest error by admitting her self-incriminating statement. Once the trial judge has determined at a preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal. Sills v. State, 634 So.2d 124, 126 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345, 1350 (Miss. 1986)). Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1281 (Miss. 1994) (citations omitted). The trial judge's decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. Where the evidence is contradictory, this Court generally must affirm. Lesley v. State, 606 So.2d 1084, 1091 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). Based on the foregoing analysis, the trial judge's admission of Tina's statement is affirmed.