Opinion ID: 1820206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the chancery court erred in failing to find a material change in circumstances or substantial evidence to support a modification of custody.

Text: ¶ 17. The June 8, 2004, Property Settlement Agreement between William and Chasity provided that the couple would have joint legal custody of the minor children, with [William] having primary physical custody and [Chasity] having reasonable periods of visitation.... The June 1, 2007, order of the chancery court regarding custody and visitation followed that agreement, providing that primary physical custody of the minor children shall remain in [William], with Chasity having visitation. Chasity argues on appeal, however, that William agreed to split weeks with the children and his breach of this agreement had an adverse effect on the minor children which necessitated a change in custody. (Emphasis added). As such, she asserts that the chancery court erred in not modifying custody. ¶ 18. This Court has stated that [i]t would be tantamount to defrauding the court for parties to present to the court a property settlement agreement, which is subsequently incorporated into the final decree, while actually intending to abide by a contradictory private contract. This is clearly against public policy. Sullivan v. Pouncey, 469 So.2d 1233, 1234 (Miss. 1985). See also Traub v. Johnson, 536 So.2d 25, 26 (Miss.1988) ([t]he Sullivan opinion clearly states that a prior agreement entered into by the parties is not enforceable if it is not approved by the court.). The Property Settlement Agreement expressly states that [i]t is... understood and agreed that this Agreement stands alone as a contract between the parties and shall remain in full force and effect unless and until modified by subsequent Agreement of the parties or superseded by a lawful Order of a [c]ourt of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis added). Though Chasity entered into the Property Settlement Agreement without counsel, this Court has stated that having elected to proceed without an attorney, a person is bound by the same rules of practice and procedure as an attorney. Bullard v. Morris, 547 So.2d 789, 790 (Miss. 1989). Therefore, Chasity is bound by the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement regarding custody unless and until modified by subsequent Agreement of the parties or superseded by a lawful Order of a[c]ourt of competent jurisdiction. In the case sub judice, neither modification nor supersession occurred as to custody. ¶ 19. Regarding the modification of child custody, the test is (1) whether there has been a material change in circumstances which adversely affects the welfare of the child and (2) whether the best interest of the child requires a change of custody. Floyd v. Floyd, 949 So.2d 26, 29 (Miss.2007) (citing Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So.2d 581, 585 (Miss.1999)). As the chancellor made no specific finding on this fact issue, we are required by our prior decisions and by sound institutional considerations to assume that the chancellor resolved all such fact issues in favor of appellee. Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1143-44 (Miss.1983) (citing Harris v. Bailey Ave. Park, 202 Miss. 776, 791, 32 So.2d 689, 694 (1947)). Chasity alleges that the purported separate agreement, and William's refusal to abide thereby, is a material change in circumstances which had an adverse effect on the minor children.... However, as the Property Settlement Agreement expressly provides that it was fair and equitable and freely entered by Chasity, this Court concludes that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in keeping custody consistent with the Property Settlement Agreement in his June 1, 2007, order. See Yates v. Yates, 284 So.2d 46, 47 (Miss.1973) (even though the record does not clearly and precisely show on what ground or specific finding of fact the decision of the lower court was made, we, as an appellate court, will affirm the decree if the record shows any ground upon which the decision may be justified.).