Opinion ID: 2223963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiff's second specification of negligence, failure to yield the right-of-way, is closely allied to lookout. Section 321.353, Code 1966, provides:

Text: Stop before crossing sidewalkright of way.    The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving on said highway and shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said highway. The statute contains two requirements which must be obeyed by a motorist backing from a private driveway onto a public highway or street. First, he must stop immediately prior to driving on the highway. The evidence is undisputed Andrews stopped when the back end of his vehicle was three or four feet from the highway. But more is required. He must yield to all approaching vehicles. In addition to the duties imposed by statute he has the common law duty to exercise the care required under similar circumstances. Division IV, supra. Beezley v. Kleinholtz, 251 Iowa 133, 136, 100 N.W.2d 105, 107; Christensen v. Kelley, supra, 257 Iowa, at 1325, 135 N.W.2d, at 512, and citations. As a reasonably prudent person with a realization of the extreme danger, exercising the care required under similar circumstances, one would not enter a public highway or street while backing from a private driveway unless he first determined that no vehicle was approaching close enough to constitute a hazard or approaching within a reasonably safe distance. Generally speaking, we say such distance is the distance a vehicle traveling within the speed limit would cover while one was attempting to make the maneuver required in backing out and proceeding forward onto the highway in this proper lane. Kuehn v. Jenkins, 251 Iowa 557, 564, 100 N.W.2d 604, 609. There was sufficient evidence to require submission of plaintiff's second specification to the jury. VII. Plaintiff's third specification, defendant's backing his automobile onto the roadway so at least a part extended into the wrong lane in front of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding, and his sixth specification, defendant's failure to drive his automobile on the right-hand side of the road when meeting the automobile in which plaintiff was riding will be considered together. As stated, immediately before the incident defendant's vehicle had been backed from the Rodgers driveway onto the highway. The occupants in the Bair vehicle testified when they first saw defendant's car a portion of it was in the east lane. Defendant in describing the angle of his vehicle as he was ready to go forward said, It is possible that angle would have been enough so a portion of the front of my car would have been in the east lane. Defendant's contention that Andrews by driving into the driveway not only gave the Bair car one half of the traveled way but the entire width of the highway, cannot be accepted. To reach the driveway defendant would, of necessity, have had to turn left in front of the Bair car. A jury would be justified in finding that the yielding maneuver was too late. Neither can his contention that his car and the Bair car were not meeting be sustained. As used in section 321.298, Code 1966, the phrase persons meeting each other does not mean merely persons passing each other while going in opposite directions but it implies a coming together in such manner that there would be an actual collision, or an apparent danger of one, if they should pursue their course without change of direction. Baker v. Zimmerman, 179 Iowa 272, 278, 161 N.W. 479, 481; Hubbard v. Bartholomew, 163 Iowa 58, 61, 144 N.W. 13, 15, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 443. The court erred by not submitting plaintiff's third and sixth specifications. VIII. Plaintiff's fourth specification, defendant's failure to have his car under control, was not argued by either side. The question of control largely depends upon the circumstances of each case and is ordinarily a question for the jury. Under the facts here the question of whether Andrews had his motor vehicle under proper control would be for the jury. Goman v. Benedik, 253 Iowa 719, 725-726, 113 N.W. 2d 738, 742. As to when a motor vehicle is under control see Schneider v. Swaney Motor Car Co., 257 Iowa 1177, 1184, 136 N.W.2d 338, 342. IX. Plaintiff argues in support of his fifth specification, defendant's failure to drive his automobile on the right side of the road when driving up over a hill, that Code sections 321.304 and 321.364 are applicable. Section 321.304 in part states: No vehicle shall,    be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions: 1. When approaching the crest of a grade or    where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed for a distance of approximately seven hundred feet. Section 321.364 states in part: The driver of a motor vehicle    approaching the crest of a hill or grade shall have such motor vehicle under control and on the right-hand side of the roadway.    While defendant might have originally intended to go south and thus approach the crest of the hill, the only evidence as to movement of his vehicle after being stationary in the middle of the road is a maneuver to the east. Defendant would not be going toward, nor continuing to advance near to a point aimed at, the crest of the hill. See Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Ed., 1964. It cannot be said defendant was approaching the crest of the hill. Under the circumstances the court did not err in failing to submit this specification. X. The final proposition plaintiff argues under this assignment is that Bair's acts did not constitute an independent intervening cause. Defendant contends Bair's negligence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In ruling on defendant's motion the trial court indicated he was of the opinion   the acts of plaintiff's driver were a separate and intervening cause   . An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed. Restatement, Second, Torts, § 441(1). It has also been defined as A new and independent force, which breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and the injury and is the proximate cause of the injury. 1 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, Third Ed., § 53.5. Where there is an intervening efficient cause the original act of negligence is the remote cause and not the proximate cause. Blashfield, supra. The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. Restatement, Second, Torts, § 431, Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 298-299, 100 N.W.2d 624, 629, and citations therein support this statement. There may be more than one proximate cause of an accident or injury. Lockwood v. Wiltgen, 251 Iowa 484, 490, 101 N.W.2d 724, 728, and citations. Nor will the fact that some other cause operates with the defendant's negligence to produce the injury relieve the defendant if the injurious result is traceable in some material degree to his want of due care [citations]. (Emphasis added.) Swaim v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 187 Iowa 466, 471, 174 N.W. 384, 386, quoted in Frederick v. Goff, supra. While of course plaintiff had the burden to prove direct causal connection between defendant's negligence, in one or more of the respects alleged, and the happening of the accident, the burden of proving this pleaded defense that Bair's negligence was the sole proximate cause thereof rested on defendant. Frideres v. Lowden, 235 Iowa 640, 642, 17 N.W.2d 396, 397; McMaster v. Hutchins, 255 Iowa 39, 47-48, 120 N.W.2d 509, 514, and citations. The trial court's ruling, in effect, held defendant had established this affirmative defense as a matter of law. It is seldom that one having the burden of proving an issue can be said to have established it as a matter of law. Frideres v. Lowden, supra; Maland v. Tesdall, 232 Iowa 959, 963, 5 N.W.2d 327, 329; Kellogg v. Rhodes, 231 Iowa 1340, 1342, 4 N.W.2d 412, 413; Low v. Ford Hopkins Co., 231 Iowa 251, 254, 1 N.W.2d 95, 97. The question of Bair's negligence as an intervening cause or as the sole proximate cause should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions, bearing in mind that the negligence of an operator of an automobile is not imputable to a passenger who has no right of control over the car. Frideres v. Lowden, supra, 235 Iowa, at 647-648, 17 N.W.2d, at 400. XI. In view of a reversal we should consider plaintiff's second assignment of error, the admission of testimony that Jack Bair entered a plea of guilty before a justice of the peace to a charge of not having his vehicle under control. This problem arose during cross-examination of Bair when asked: Q.    you lost control of the car, didn't you? A. No, not completely. The car swerved, but I had the car under control.    Q. And you mean to say you haven't told anyone you lost control of the car? A. No, sir. Q. Did you appear in the justice of peace court A. Yes. Q. in Atlantic, Iowa A. Yes, sir. Q. and enter a plea of guilty to At this point plaintiff's objection was made. After some colloquy between counsel and the court the witness was permitted to answer and said, Yes. The objection was overruled. Later, in the jury's absence, plaintiff moved the court to admonish the jury to disregard the question to Bair and the answer thereto as not cross-examination, immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, no bearing on any issue and plaintiff was not bound by any admissions of Bair. The court at that time stated: This is an admission against interest. Defendant's counsel added, I know, but you are talking about an admission against interest. This is the only reason that this is admissible, as an admission against interest. It appears the sole purpose of defendant's counsel in offering this testimony was as an admission against Bair. Limited to this purpose, it was clearly inadmissible. The use of the phrase, admissions against interest is an invitation to confuse two separate exceptions to the hearsay rule. McCormick on Evidence, § 240; 4 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., § 1049. In argument both counsel suggest for the first time the testimony was impeachment of Bair. Defendant's statement as to the purpose for which the testimony was offered is binding on him here. However, if we consider the offer as for impeachment, no proper foundation was laid therefor. Law v. Hemmingsen, 249 Iowa 820, 834-835, 89 N.W.2d 386, 396. It is not enough to ask him the general question whether he has ever said so and so. McCormick on Evidence, § 37, footnote 6. Defendant's contention the plea of guilty is certainly a declaration against the plaintiff is untenable. 5 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., §§ 1456, 1461 and 1476. The rule announced in Book v. Datema, 256 Iowa 1330, 131 N.W.2d 470, as to the admissibility of such evidence as an admission against a party to the action, appears to express the view of the majority of this court as now constituted. We need not determine what our holding would be in interpreting section 321.490 if such testimony is offered for impeachment and the question is properly raised in the trial court. Because of the trial court's failure to submit the specifications of negligence here approved, the cause is Reversed. GARFIELD, C. J., and MOORE, STUART, RAWLINGS and BECKER, JJ., concur. LARSON and SNELL, JJ., concur in the result but dissent from Division VIII. LARSON, J., also dissents from Division IV. THORNTON, J., not sitting.