Opinion ID: 2171066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Respondent's Acts of Misconduct

Text: Our responsibility, upon independent review of the record and the findings submitted by the Board, is to determine the appropriate judicial discipline by measuring respondent's conduct against these ethical standards. It is a record of misconduct revealing an extensive course of soliciting and engaging in prostitution with 15 to 20 young male prostitutes during a period of 7 or 8 years, all in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.324 (1982). The sexual misconduct in most, not all, instances was sodomous and violative of Minn.Stat. § 609.293 (1982); however, since we are told by counsel for respondent that sodomy is a regular course of activity between a customer and a prostitute whether it be homosexual or heterosexual, we direct our attention solely to the offenses of prostitution. The facts regarding prostitution as developed in the record and the panel's findings are for the most part undisputed, except for details as to frequency of some of the sexual contacts and a substituted finding made by the Board. All of the occurrences originated in the Loring Park area of Minneapolis, within a few blocks of respondent's home, in an area known by respondent to be frequented by male prostitutes looking for customers and to which respondent went, in his words, looking to pick a boy up. (Respondent testified that in each case he asked the prostitute whether he was under 18 years of age because respondent didn't want to do it with anyone other than a consenting adult.) Respondent admitted that he paid money in exchange for sexual services. He also admitted that several of the prostitutes were aware that he was a judge. The first prostitute engaged by respondent was Mark Haley. Respondent picked Haley up 7 to 8 years ago in the Loring Park area and brought Haley to his home. Haley was 18 or 19 years old. Respondent and Haley had no further sexual contact, although respondent testified that he saw Haley again five, six or seven times after that  two or three of those times at respondent's judicial chambers. Respondent testified that at one time Haley told respondent that he was in trouble with the Minneapolis police because he missed a court date. Respondent told Haley he could not advise him and told Haley to report to his probation officer. John James Scharver, a 17-year-old prostitute, who was the subject of one of the two misdemeanor convictions, engaged in sexual contact with respondent in the late summer of 1980. Scharver testified by deposition [6] that he told respondent he was 17 years of age, but the panel and the Board credited respondent's testimony that he did not know that Scharver was under 18 years of age at the time. Scharver testified that respondent gave him a piece of paper marked From the desk of Crane Winton, bearing respondent's telephone number. They did not have sexual contact again. Timothy Flaherty, another prostitute, age 23 or 24, accompanied Scharver to respondent's home in April 1981, Scharver's purpose being to prove to his companion that he knew a judge. Although there was no sexual contact during the first visit, respondent later met Flaherty at Loring Park and brought him to his home for sexual relations. Richard Pat Penland, the subject of the second misdemeanor conviction, had sexual relations with respondent in the fall of 1979 or 1980, when Penland was 21 or 22 years old. Penland testified by deposition that after their first encounter respondent told Penland that he would like to see him again and gave Penland his telephone number. The number of times that respondent had sexual relations with Penland is in dispute. It is clear from respondent's testimony that they met at least three more times and had sexual relations on at least one of those occasions. At their final meeting, respondent gave Penland his personal check for $65; Penland cashed the check at a Hennepin Avenue bar. Rickie Lee Howard, a 22 year old, was picked up by respondent in Loring Park on May 27, 1980, and was taken to respondent's home, where they engaged in sexual relations. Respondent issued Howard his personal check for $20. The panel heard evidence with respect to respondent's alleged sexual contacts with five other persons identified as prostitutes  Thomas Conyers, Scott Finch, Jeffrey Michael Pugh, Lloyd Charles Howard, and Daryl Lee Hanson  but rejected the evidence as not clear and convincing. [7] The Board adopted the panel's findings, except as to Lloyd Charles Howard and Daryl Lee Hanson. The Board found that respondent engaged in sexual contact with Lloyd Charles Howard, age 16, and Daryl Lee Hanson, who was over 18 years of age. We take note of this controverted fact issue but state that our judgment of discipline is not affected by whether this finding of fact is sustainable. Respondent testified that he did not recall either name. Hanson did not testify, but Howard testified that he, together with Hanson, had sexual relations with respondent in the spring or summer of 1981. Respondent denies that he ever had sexual relations with more than one person at the same time. The panel presumably rejected Howard's testimony because of Howard's admission that he had periods of blackout, due to emotional problems and heavy drinking, that made it difficult for him to remember many things. He had told investigators that his memory about the evening in question was blank for periods before arriving at and after leaving respondent's home and part of the period while he was at the home. However, there is evidence corroborative of Howard's testimony. He recalled having been served drinks by respondent and was possibly fairly drunk, so drunk that he became nauseous and went to respondent's bathroom. When shown pictures of the interior of respondent's home, Howard stated that to the best of my ability, but it is a little fuzzy, that is the liquor cabinet of the judge. He was shown a picture of respondent's automobile and a picture of respondent himself. He identified the automobile as that in which he was picked up in Loring Park. He identified respondent, whom he had known previously only by first name, as the man who picked him up. Howard stated that there was no doubt in my mind that [respondent] was the man I was with that night. Were these criminal proceedings, this evidence might well fail to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Were these civil proceedings, the evidence could well preponderate in favor of the Board's finding. This proceeding is neither, but is sui generis and, by Rule 9(c)(2), Rules of Board on Judicial Standards, requires evidence that is clear and convincing. No mechanistic corroboration requirement is necessary, In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648, 692 (Minn.1979), for uncorroborated evidence may be clear and convincing if the trier of fact can impose discipline with clarity and conviction of its factual justification. Id. This evidence may be viewed in a total context of numerous unquestioned acts of like kind and is not an isolated act. This evidence, as in several other cases, was received in the form of depositions so that the opportunity for assessing credibility was as open to the Board and this court as it was to the panel. Howard's testimony, notwithstanding obvious impairment of memory, was reinforced by memory-refreshing associational facts: critical photo identification; closeness to the time that he and his friend, Daryl Hanson, ceased working together; his being served drinks to the point of illness at the home of the man he positively identified as respondent. Howard's testimony is not countervailed by respondent's own impaired credibility. [8] Notwithstanding his subsequent admissions as to all other acts of prostitution found by the panel and the Board, respondent, in a deposition before the Board, falsely denied under oath having engaged in prostitution. On June 21, 1982, respondent pled guilty to two counts of misdemeanor prostitution. At his deposition 6 months later, respondent repeatedly denied giving anyone money in exchange for sexual acts. He stated that he loaned the young men money and that he had sexual contact with them, but he denied that one was in exchange for the other. At the hearing before the panel, 5 months after the deposition, respondent admitted that he paid money for sexual services. He testified that he would never again engage in prostitution. Our system of justice depends upon people telling the truth under oath. If witnesses do not testify truthfully under oath, the justice system will be unable to function. If a judge, who has a professional duty to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, gives false testimony under oath with impunity, we can hardly expect the public to take seriously the oath to tell the truth. An entirely different charge against respondent was an alleged violation of Minn. Stat. § 546.27, subd. 1 (1982), a statute that provides that a judge shall not be paid his salary unless he submits a voucher therefor accompanied by a certificate of full compliance with another statute requiring disposition of pending cases within 90 days. The required certification was printed on the back of respondent's payroll checks, with an endorsement stating: Endorsement shall constitute the payee's certificate of eligibility under the applicable statutes. In negotiating his checks, respondent signed his name but struck the printed certification. Notwithstanding evidence of some mitigating circumstances, the panel and the Board found that respondent violated the statute. We conclude that the evidence of respondent's prostitution activities, wholly apart from violations of other statutes, [9] is sufficient to justify the Board's recommendation of discipline. Respondent, contending that there should be no discipline or no more than a censure, argues that his conduct was purely private and, but for a public disclosure by the television media, would not have brought the judiciary into disrepute, prejudicing the administration of justice. Contrary to his assertion, respondent's conduct was not purely private. He openly solicited prostitutes in a public place, a place notoriously frequented by young prostitutes. By disclosing his identity and his judicial position to the prostitutes, moreover, he made even greater the risk of discredit both to himself and the judiciary. He told them his name, gave them his telephone number on slips of paper bearing his name, and wrote them personal checks that were cashed in public places. One prostitute was so impressed that he brought another to respondent's home to prove that he knew a judge. Respondent welcomed one of the prostitutes to his judicial chambers for social visits. Respondent strongly argues that removal would be impermissibly severe in view of the censure imposed 4 years ago in the case of Judge Walter Mann. See In re Mann, No. 50982 (May 4, 1980). Respondent's assertion that he should be subject to a sanction similar to that imposed on Judge Mann assumes that the situations are the same. The cases are similar to the extent that both involved acts of prostitution made public by investigative reports in the public media. The similarity ends there. Upon inquiry by the Board, Judge Mann immediately acknowledged the truth of the investigative report and entered into a stipulation for the imposition of censure as discipline. By this stipulation, Mann admitted that he had engaged in prostitution with one person, a 26-year-old woman, 10 times or better during a 1-year period. [10] While Judge Mann's prostitution activities occurred in a private place, respondent's conduct involved solicitation of prostitutes in Loring Park, a public place. Respondent participated in prostitution with several more prostitutes over a long period of time and, more importantly, did so with at least one person under the age of 18, constituting contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 260.015, subds. 2, 5(a), 260.315 (1982). Unlike the offense of prostitution, where mistake of age is a defense to a felony prosecution, see Minn.Stat. § 609.325, subd. 2 (1982), there is no defense based on lack of knowledge as to actual age for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. What is critical is not what the statutes provide with respect to criminal responsibility but what the standards of ethical responsibility require of a judge. The most crucial aspect of this sordid affair is that respondent sought out and exploited vulnerable young persons. His expressed caution about their age was apparently only to protect himself from engaging in conduct constituting a felony instead of a misdemeanor, not concern for the welfare of the young persons. As respondent stated at the time he pled guilty to the criminal charges, the painful fact is that I have violated a law that I took an oath to uphold. I truly am sorry that I did so. And I give the assurance that it never shall happen again. Now, I must live with the consequences, whatever they may be.