Opinion ID: 2540917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nash's Conviction Was Proper Under Section 565.001, RSMo 1978

Text: Nash first argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash the information against him and to dismiss the charges against him. He contends that he improperly was charged, tried, and convicted under section 565.001, RSMo 1978, the statute that criminalized premeditated murder when Judy was killed in March 1982. [6] He maintains that this statute was repealed in 1983 and that no other statute has existed or now exists that allows him to be prosecuted for Judy's murder. He asserts that his conviction under the repealed statute violates section 556.026, RSMo 2000, [7] which provides: No conduct constitutes an offense unless made so by this code or by other applicable statute. This Court reviews these statutory arguments de novo. See Sch. Dist. of Kansas City v. State, 317 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Mo. banc 2010) (noting that statutory construction challenges and constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo). Section 565.001, RSMo 1978, was repealed in 1983 along with a number of other criminal statutes. [8] In the place of these repealed statutes, the legislature enacted a new chapter 565, which defines offenses against persons. The new provisions included section 565.020, which defines the crime of first-degree murder. The new chapter 565 specified its applicability to crimes committed after July 1, 1984, and its effective date later was changed to October 1, 1984: 1. The provisions of [chapter 565] shall govern the construction and procedures for charging, trial, punishment and appellate review of any offense defined in this chapter and committed after July 1, 1984 [effective date later October 1, 1984]. 2. The provisions of this chapter shall not govern the construction or procedures for charging, trial, punishment or appellate review of any offense committed before the effective date of this chapter. Such an offense must be construed, punished, charged, tried and reviewed on appeal according to the applicable provisions of law existing prior to the effective date ... in the same manner as if this chapter had not been enacted, the provisions of section 1.160, RSMo, notwithstanding. 3. All provisions of The Criminal Code or other law consistent with the provisions of this chapter shall apply to this chapter. In the event of a conflict, the provisions of this chapter shall govern the interpretation of the provisions of this chapter. ... Section 565.001. Nash maintains that the reference in section 565.001.2 to the provisions of section 1.160, RSMo, notwithstanding, makes the provisions of section 1.160, RSMo Supp.2010, inapplicable to all murders committed before October 1, 1984. Section 1.160, RSMo Supp.2010, referred to as the saving statute, provides: No offense committed and no fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred, or prosecution commenced or pending previous to or at the time when any statutory provision is repealed or amended, shall be affected by the repeal or amendment, but the trial and punishment of all such offenses, and the recovery of the fines, penalties or forfeitures shall be had, in all respects, as if the provisions had not been repealed or amended, except that all such proceedings shall be conducted according to existing procedural laws. He argues that, because the notwithstanding phrase in section 565.001.2 expresses that section 1.160, RSMo Supp. 2010, does not apply to the new chapter 565 provisions, no statute is in place that allows him to be prosecuted for Judy's murder, which occurred prior to the October 1, 1984, effective date for the new chapter 565, but was not prosecuted before the new provisions took effect. This Court, however, is not persuaded by Nash's insistence that Judy's murder cannot be charged and punished pursuant to the provisions of section 565.001, RSMo 1978. The notwithstanding phrase of the new section 565.001.2 cannot be read in a way that would decriminalize a subset of murders simply because the perpetrators avoided prosecution before October 1, 1984. Statutes cannot be interpreted in ways that yield unreasonable or absurd results, and it is assumed that the legislature's enactment of a statute is meant to serve the best interests and welfare of the general public. See Tribune Pub. Co. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 661 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Mo.App.1983). These canons of statutory construction undermine Nash's arguments that section 1.160, RSMo Supp.2010, is inapplicable and fails to permit his prosecution under section 565.001, RSMo 1978. Nash's view of the meaning of the notwithstanding phrase in section 565.001 advances that certain murders escape prosecution based on legislative semantics. This is an absurd result that is against the public's interest. The apparent purpose of the 1983 enactment of the new section 565.001 was to make clear that an offense committed in 1982 should be charged and prosecuted according to the laws existing in 1982, not the law as it existed after the new chapter 565 changes were enacted. The effect of the language of section 565.001.2 is the same as the language in section 1.160, RSMo Supp.2010. The trial court did not err in allowing Nash's prosecution under section 565.001, RSMo 1978, to proceed, as Nash was not entitled to have the information filed against him dismissed.