Opinion ID: 1360544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: bailiff and juror misconduct

Text: Finally, Surgidev argues that two separate acts of misconduct by the bailiff warrant a new trial. First, on the day before closing argument, three jurors and an alternate juror saw the bailiff drive away with Gonzales at the lunch break, and later saw the two having coffee together at Arby's. Second, Surgidev alleges that the bailiff refused to bring exhibits requested by a juror during deliberations and failed to notify the court of the juror's request. Surgidev also alleges that the foreman refused to write a note to the judge on behalf of a juror. Based on this information, Surgidev moved for a new trial. The judge conducted a hearing in which he heard testimony from several jurors and the bailiff, and reviewed juror affidavits. After reviewing the evidence, the judge denied the motion for a new trial. It is within a trial court's discretion whether to grant a motion for a new trial based on bailiff misconduct, and we will review that decision only to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Prudencio v. Gonzales, 104 N.M. 788, 789, 727 P.2d 553, 554 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 761, 726 P.2d 1391 (1986). We note that in a claim of bailiff and jury misconduct the general rule is that affidavits and testimony of jurors, presented after jury discharge, cannot be used to impeach the jury verdict. Hurst v. Citadel, Ltd., 111 N.M. 566, 568, 807 P.2d 750, 752 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 529, 807 P.2d 227 (1991). However, juror testimony and affidavits may be admissible to determine whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. SCRA 1986, 11-606(B) (Repl. Pamp.1994); see also Prudencio, 104 N.M. at 789-90, 727 P.2d at 554-55. Our Court of Appeals has long held that in cases involving improper communications or extraneous prejudicial information reaching the jury, prejudice is presumed. Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 100 N.M. 167, 171, 667 P.2d 972, 976 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983). If there is a reasonable possibility that the claimed error may have affected the jury, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises. Id.; see also State v. Beal, 48 N.M. 84, 92, 146 P.2d 175, 180 (1944). In the present case we need not determine whether the actions of the bailiff in having coffee with Gonzales fall within the category of extraneous prejudicial information because we find that Plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated that no prejudice occurred. Only three jurors and one alternate juror witnessed the lunch in question, and they did not discuss it with the other jurors. The alternate juror was excused before jury deliberations. At the restaurant, neither the bailiff nor Gonzales made any attempt to communicate with the jurors and the jurors did not hear any conversations between the two. The bailiff did not seek out the jurors, did not attempt to promote Gonzales's claim, and did not indicate to the jury that he had any relationship with Gonzales. Compare Prudencio, 104 N.M. at 789, 727 P.2d at 554 (noting jurors were aware that bailiff was defendant's brother-in-law and that bailiff was trying to influence the jury). Furthermore, the jury never discussed the encounter during its deliberations. Although we note that having lunch with a plaintiff is inappropriate behavior for an officer of the court, in this case Plaintiffs presented evidence that the meeting was an isolated and innocuous occurrence. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Plaintiffs rebutted any presumption of prejudice against Surgidev. Surgidev's second claim is that the bailiff refused to bring an exhibit requested by one of the jurors into the jury room. The juror, Virginia Starquist, testified that she wanted to see the package insert that was included with the Style 10 lens sent to ophthalmologists but that the bailiff refused to bring it to her. However, the bailiff and several other jurors testified that the bailiff brought a stack of papers several inches high into the jury room. They testified that this stack included all the exhibits in the trial except for the binders containing FDA panel hearing transcripts and premarket approval documents as well as several poster-sized blow-ups of charts and documents, which were never requested by the jurors. Thus the package insert for which Starquist was searching was already in the jury room according to the other jurors. Furthermore, the bailiff and the other jurors also testified that the bailiff always brought any exhibits the jury requested and that he never refused any of Starquist's requests. We find that Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to rebut Surgidev's claim of bailiff misconduct. Finally, Surgidev alleges that the foreperson refused to write a note to the judge on behalf of Starquist. However, this refusal does not rise to the level of extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury's attention nor improper influence brought to bear upon a juror. A jury foreperson is not obligated to communicate with the judge on behalf of another juror. The trial court made it clear that any juror could write a note to the judge if there was a question. There is no indication in the record that the foreperson or the other jurors gave Starquist any instructions to the contrary or lead her to believe she could not contact the judge herself. Therefore, no presumption of prejudice would arise from the alleged refusal, and Surgidev has not demonstrated that it was in fact prejudiced. In addition, Plaintiffs presented testimony by the foreperson contradicting Starquist's testimony. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Surgidev's motion for a new trial based on juror or bailiff misconduct.