Opinion ID: 168346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: E ntry into L iving R oom

Text: -9- M r. Cruz-M endez apparently contends that M s. Armenta did not consent to the officers’ presence in her living room during their second visit to the apartment. The district court held that she voluntarily consented. Consent can justify an entry into a home, regardless of whether there is probable cause. See United States v. Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890, 894 (10th Cir. 2006). But consent is valid only if it is “freely and voluntarily given.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). W hether consent satisfies this requirement is “a factual determination based upon the totality of the circumstances.” Id. W e uphold a district court’s factual findings regarding consent “unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous w hen although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. De la Cruz-Tapia, 162 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The clearly-erroneous standard is “significantly deferential.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). Our deference to the district court’s factual findings is even greater w hen the credibility of witnesses is at issue. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (interpreting Fed. R. -10- Civ. P. 52(a)); United States v. Little, 60 F.3d 708, 713 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Anderson to appellate review of findings at suppression hearing). The district court found that M s. Armenta’s consent to the officers’ entering her apartment “was unequivocal and freely given with no duress.” R. Doc. 48 at 11 (District Court Decision). The court observed that although M s. Armenta was apparently not pleased that the officers had been looking around her living room while she and Agent Derewonko inspected the bathroom, she did not ask them to leave. M r. Cruz-M endez claims that any consent was necessarily coerced by the presence of multiple officers and the officers’ request for identification and, later, proof of legal status. The presence of several officers is, however, not dispositive. See United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006) (providing list of factors, none of w hich is dispositive). Nor does a mere request for identification render a consent involuntary. Cf. United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537–38 (10th Cir. 1991) (request to see identification can be a noncoercive, consensual encounter not implicating the Fourth Amendment). The officers testified that they acted courteously and did not draw their weapons. She gave consent to enter soon after they came to her door the second time. See United States v. Benally, 146 F.3d 1232, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 1998) (length of interviews with defendant relevant in determining whether consent w as coerced). -11- And she invited them in again after she retrieved her license. In addition, the court could properly view her state of mind in hindsight; one can now infer that her concern was that the officers not enter the bedroom, and that she was not reluctant for them to enter the rest of the apartment. The district court’s finding of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous.