Opinion ID: 786221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary and trial management rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion

Text: 7
8 Hoffman challenges the district court's rulings which excluded portions of proposed testimony from Hoffman's expert, Steven Lavender. Specifically, on March 28, 2002, after considering the factors enumerated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the district court ruled that although neither Hoffman's expert nor Caterpillar's expert would be allowed to offer opinions as to Hoffman's ability to operate the high-speed scanner at mandated production levels, both would be allowed to testify generally about whether a one-handed person could operate the machine at established standards. The court reasoned that because neither expert had personally observed Hoffman operating the scanner, such testimony could not be based upon sufficient facts or data as required under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 Following the March 28 order, Hoffman received training on how to operate the scanner and on August 22, 2002, was videotaped operating it for an eight-hour period. On February 3, 2003, the first day of trial, Hoffman asked the district court to revisit its March 28 order prohibiting testimony by Lavender about Hoffman's ability to operate the scanner. The testimony should be allowed, the plaintiff reasoned, because Lavender viewed the videotape, and therefore had a sufficient basis to conclude that Hoffman could operate the machine at established standards. The district court denied Hoffman's request. We review this decision for abuse of discretion. Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir.1997); Doe v. Johnson, 52 F.3d 1448, 1458 (7th Cir.1995). 10 Although Lavender had a sufficient basis (i.e., the videotape) to offer an opinion regarding whether Hoffman could run the machine at set production levels, the district court implied that such testimony could not assist the trier of fact, as required under Rule 702. The court previously determined that the videotape could be played for the jury and entered into evidence, and consequently,jurors could make a determination for themselves with respect to Hoffman's ability to run the high-speed scanner. Based upon this independent assessment of Hoffman's performance on the scanner, the jury could then draw inferences regarding her ability to meet production levels, and expert testimony would be of no help. The court therefore disallowed the contested portions of Lavender's testimony. We find this reasoning persuasive; the district court did not abuse its discretion. 11 Moreover, there was an alternative justification for the district court to exclude Lavender's testimony about the plaintiff's ability to operate the machine at set production levels. Hoffman was required to disclose to Caterpillar the basis for all of Lavender's expert opinions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B) (FRCP) ([t]he report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor). The court concluded that Hoffman's failure to amend its prior expert disclosures to include the videotape as a basis for Lavender's opinion violated Rule 26, and the violation was not harmless to Caterpillar. Therefore, the court properly excluded the contested portion of Lavender's testimony under Rule 37(c)(1). 12 In the instant appeal, Hoffman does not expressly challenge whether there was a violation of Rule 26's disclosure requirements. Instead, Hoffman asserts — without authority — that it would have been a ludicrous formality to disclose in writing Lavender's reliance upon the videotape since Caterpillar was aware both of the videotape itself and that Lavender would review it. We recently rejected such arguments, stating that the formal requirements of Rule 26 are not pointless, see Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir.2004), and we again do so here. 13 Moreover, Hoffman presents nothing more than a bald assertion (There was no surprise to Caterpillar ....), in support of her argument that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that the Rule 26 violation was not harmless. We disagree. Following the August 22, 2002 videotaping, Hoffman gave no indication of an intention to have the district court revisit its March 28 ruling until the first day of trial, on February 3, 2003. Had the district court reversed its March 28 ruling and allowed Hoffman to present expert testimony as to her ability to operate the scanner at required production levels, Caterpillar would have been harmed in three related ways. 14 First, because the renewed motion was made on the first day of trial, there was not enough time remaining for Caterpillar to depose Lavender on this new basis for his opinion. Relatedly and second, Caterpillar would have been hard-pressed to develop alternate cross-examination strategies (because the obvious approach — attacking Lavender's credibility because he never personally observed the plaintiff operating the machine in question — would be ineffective). And third, Caterpillar would have a distressingly small amount of time to develop expert testimony to counter Lavender's. In fact, Caterpillar indicated that it decided to entirely forego expert testimony in reliance upon the March 28 order, presumably because it felt that the jury would have no problem assessing Hoffman's performance after observing the videotape. We therefore find that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the Rule 26 violation was not harmless. 3 15
16 Hoffman also argues that Caterpillar should have been prohibited from presenting evidence and argument about Hoffman's inability to operate the high-speed scanner at the production levels required by Caterpillar because it would be extremely confusing and prejudicial to the jury. As a preliminary point, we note that neither the text nor the required appendix of Hoffman's brief to this court cited or otherwise referenced any specific order of the district court or any motion in limine addressing this issue — and our review of the record revealed none. 17 More importantly, Hoffman conveniently ignored the fact that her ability to run the machine at the required production levels was the primary issue at trial. 4 See Hoffman I, 256 F.3d at 573, 576. It is nonsensical to suggest that counsel for either party should be prevented from making an argument or presenting evidence as to the ultimate issue in a case. Therefore, assuming there is in fact some order of the district court denying Hoffman's phantom motion to preclude Caterpillar from making any reference to Hoffman's inability to operate the high-speed scanner at set production levels, we now expressly find there was no error in such a denial. 5 18
19 Hoffman next argues that because Caterpillar decided not to call its expert Jodi Glunz, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to give a missing witness instruction and refused to allow Hoffman to encourage the jury to draw an adverse inference based upon Glunz's absence. The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to give a missing witness instruction, see Doe v. Johnson, 52 F.3d 1448, 1458 (7th Cir.1995), and in supervising closing arguments to ensure that counsel does not make reference to matters not in evidence, United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 524 (7th Cir.1999); Trytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 727 (7th Cir.1994). 20 Hoffman's first challenge to the district court's refusal to tender the missing witness instruction is based entirely upon Shvartsman v. Septran, Inc., 304 Ill.App.3d 900, 238 Ill.Dec. 299, 711 N.E.2d 402 (1999), a case not binding upon this court. Regardless, and contrary to Hoffman's understanding of the case, Shvartsman supports the district court's determination. The district court correctly refused to give the instruction because Caterpillar offered entirely reasonable explanations about why Glunz was not called as a witness: (1) the district court's March 28, 2002 order restricted the testimony of all experts to the abilities of one-handed persons generally and hence, Glunz's testimony could not have been very probative of the ultimate issue; and (2) the jury could observe the videotape of Hoffman operating the scanner and draw inferences for itself, and thus, the testimony of Glunz would have been unhelpful and unnecessarily duplicative. See supra Part II.A.1. Consequently, there was no error. 21 Second, Hoffman asserts that because three witnesses mentioned Glunz's name and that she was an expert for Caterpillar, the district court's decision to prohibit Hoffman from urging the jury at closing to draw an adverse inference based upon Caterpillar's decision not to call Glunz was an abuse of discretion. But as we noted above, Caterpillar gave at least two cogent reasons for its decision not to call Glunz. Moreover, at trial Caterpillar never sought to introduce Glunz's report or discuss it in any way. Despite Hoffman's protestations to the contrary, there was absolutely no evidence indicating that Glunz had formed an opinion detrimental to Caterpillar. Allowing Hoffman to make an argument that Glunz's testimony would have been unfavorable to Caterpillar, would allow the jury to speculate about the meaning of a great deal of non-evidence. United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 703 (7th Cir.1985). We see no constructive purpose to be served by such a procedure and conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in preventing commentary on [Glunz's] absence in closing argument. Id.