Opinion ID: 2342308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Effect of the Applicable Statutes

Text: However, whether the Affidavit of Birth Out of Wedlock suffices as a similar acknowledgment under the statutes, does not resolve whether the statutes, enacted five years after Nichols signed this form, apply retroactively to such acknowledgment. Bean argues that the statutes do have a retroactive effect because it is a civil act that affects eligibility for welfare and is remedial in nature. Furthermore, Bean argues that because this act affected the State's eligibility for federal aid, the act can be applied retroactively. Bean also cites Littles v. Flemings, 333 Ark. 476, 970 S.W.2d 259 (1998) ( Littles II ), for the proposition that this court has already applied Act 1091 of 1995 retroactively. To the contrary, CSEU argues that all legislation is intended to act prospectively unless the purpose and intent of the legislature is to give the statutes retroactive effect which is expressly declared or necessarily implied from the language used. In that Act 1091 contained no express retroactivity, the language of that Act could only intend a prospective application. CSEU is correct. Our rule on this point could not be more clear. Retroactivity is a matter of legislative intent. Unless it expressly states otherwise, we presume the legislature intends for its laws to apply only prospectively. Estate of Wood v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 319 Ark. 697, 894 S.W.2d 573 (1995) (citing Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark. 936, 311 S.W.2d 297 (1958)). Any interpretation of an act must be aimed at determining whether retroactive effect is stated or implied so clearly and unequivocally as to eliminate any doubt. In determining legislative intent, we have observed a strict rule of construction against retroactive operation and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it, to operate prospectively only and not retroactively. See Arkansas Rural Med. Practice Student Loan & Scholarship Bd. v. Luter, 292 Ark. 259, 729 S.W.2d 402 (1987); Chism, supra ; Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Hightower, 238 Ark. 569, 383 S.W.2d 279 (1964). However, this rule does not ordinarily apply to procedural or remedial legislation. Gannett River States Publ'g Co. v. Arkansas Industrial Dev. Comm'n, 303 Ark. 684, 799 S.W.2d 543 (1990); Forrest City Mach. Works v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981). The strict rule of construction does not apply to remedial statutes which do not disturb vested rights, or create new obligations, but only supply a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right or obligation. Harrison v. Matthews, 235 Ark. 915, 362 S.W.2d 704 (1962). Procedural legislation is more often given retroactive application. Barnett v. Arkansas Transp. Co., 303 Ark. 491, 798 S.W.2d 79 (1990). The cardinal principle for construing remedial legislation is for the courts to give appropriate regard to the spirit which promoted its enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished, and the remedy proposed. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 866 S.W.2d 823 (1993); Skelton v. B.C. Land Co., 260 Ark. 122, 539 S.W.2d 411 (1976) (citing United States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 225 U.S. 219, 32 S.Ct. 617, 56 L.Ed. 1063 (1912)). In addition, we have approved retroactive application of civil statutes, especially those concerning the fiscal affairs of government. For example, we held that the State can retroactively impose taxes. DuLaney v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 185 Ark. 517, 47 S.W.2d 1082 (1932). The United States Supreme Court has also said taxes can be retroactively applied. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 53 S.Ct. 570, 77 L.Ed. 1109 (1933). As noted above, Bean argues that not only does Act 1091 of 1995 affect the fiscal affairs of the State but that it is remedial in nature. Bean notes that Act 1091 was enacted to conform with federal requirements set forth in title IV-D of the Social Security Act relative to voluntary paternity acknowledgments. The relevant portion of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 651676, includes § 668 entitled Encouragement of States to adopt simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity and a civil procedure for establishing paternity in contested cases. This section states: In the administration of the child support enforcement program under this part, each State is encouraged to establish and implement a simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity and a civil procedure for establishing paternity in contested cases. This section was enacted in 1988 and amended in 1996. As the language indicates, there is nothing in this particular section which required immediate adoption of a specific procedure, but instead encouraged the establishment of a procedure of voluntary acknowledgment. In fact, the 1996 amendment of § 668 struck a simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity as part of that statutory section. Compliance with the federal statutes is required in order for the states to continue to receive certain federal benefits [3] ; however, § 668 does not appear to be mandatory as far as voluntary acknowledgments are concerned, but instead actually focuses on the establishment of a civil procedure for establishing paternity. Using that history, determining whether the legislature intended Act 1091 of 1995 to be retroactive becomes clearer. As noted, in the absence of an express declaration, in order for a statute to be applied retroactively, it either must affect the fiscal viability of the State or qualify as remedial. To be remedial, the courts must give appropriate regard to the spirit which promoted its enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished, and the remedy proposed, but cannot disturb vested rights, or create new obligations, but only supply a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right or obligation. Harrison, supra . Whether the State would be fiscally harmed by failure to include the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity language was a prospective concern, as there is no indication that funds had been cut off or were likely to be. The federal statute did not require, but only encouraged, compliance with the provision and, in fact, such language was removed from § 668 a year after the passage of Act 1091. Bean notes that the Emergency Clause of Act 1091 stated that there was a problem with the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and failure to remedy that provision could affect the State's right to federal benefits. Bean fails to note, however, that the Emergency Clause also states that an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.  (Emphasis added.) This is not a definite statement that the Act will apply retroactively. Finally, retroactive application of Act 1091 for remedial purposes would only be appropriate if it did not disturb vested rights, or create new obligations, but only supply a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right or obligation. If Act 1091 were applied to any type of acknowledgment signed before the Act's effective date a new obligation would be created. The man signing the form, by operation of law (see Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-120), would become the father conclusively when, before Act 1091 was passed, such evidence could only be used as persuasive, presumptive evidence of paternity. Bean also argues that we have already applied Act 1091 retroactively in Littles v. Flemings, 333 Ark. 476, 970 S.W.2d 259 (1998)( Littles II ). We disagree with Bean's analysis of Littles. It simply is inapposite to the instant facts. In that case, the issue was whether one who has been adjudicated to be the father of a child is entitled to relief from future child-support obligations if scientific testing proves that he is not the child's biological father. There, Littles was adjudicated to be the father of a child in 1982 when he failed to pay for the DNA testing to establish paternity. He did not appeal from the judgment. In 1994, Littles moved the chancellor to order a paternity test, and that motion was granted. The test proved that he was not the biological father, and Littles moved the chancery court in July 1995 to set aside the 1982 paternity judgment, which the court did. We reversed the chancellor's decision in Flemings v. Littles, 325 Ark. 367, 926 S.W.2d 445 (1996) ( Littles I ). In the reversal decision, we held that the chancellor had no authority under Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-115(c)(1) to modify the original judicial finding of paternity because Littles had not met all statutory conditions for the granting of relief. However, in Littles II , after Littles returned to the chancery court to have the child-support order modified pursuant to changed circumstances, we allowed a modification of future support pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-115(d) after a showing of scientific evidence that the adjudicated father was not the natural father. The Littles cases involved substantially different facts and none of the same issues as the present case. Moreover, the Littles cases contain no holding respecting retroactive application of Act 1091 for any purpose. Because we hold that Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-115 should not be applied retroactively, Bean's second argument therefore also fails. The five-year statute of limitations found in the then existing version of § 9-10-115(c)(2) cannot apply to the Nichols affidavit. If the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is not conclusive by operation of law under the law as it existed in 1990, which it is not, then paternity has not been established in Nichols to trigger the running of the statute of limitations.