Opinion ID: 2977760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FMLA Interference Theory

Text: 1. Preservation of Claim under the FMLA Interference Theory First, Family Dollar argues that Morris did not preserve a claim based on the interference theory because he failed to clarify which theory he was advancing before the district court. Morris’s complaint and response to Family Dollar’s motion for summary judgment did not distinguish between the two theories.7 The district court analyzed Morris’s FMLA claim under the retaliation theory only. In general, “[i]ssues that are not squarely presented to the trial court are considered waived and may not be raised on appeal.” Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1172 (6th Cir. 1996). In the context of FMLA claims, however, this court recently concluded that a plaintiff had not waived a claim based on the interference theory where the complaint alleged general violations of 29 U.S.C. § 2615 that could apply both to interference and retaliation claims. Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2007). In reversing the district court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s interference claim as “an overly rigid approach which stands in conflict with our 7 Morris’s response to Family Dollar’s motion for summary judgment included four sections addressing his FMLA claim. Section One is entitled “Plaintiff was qualified for FMLA leave” and argues that Morris is an eligible employee, an element required for both types of claims. This section cites an interference theory case, Pharakhone v. Nissan North America, Inc., 324 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2003). Section Two is entitled “The Plaintiff Gave Proper Notice,” again a required element for both types of claims. Section Three is entitled “Plaintiff’s Mother Suffered From a ‘Serious Health Condition,’” another requirement of both claims. Section Four is entitled “There is a Causal Connection Between Plaintiff’s Leave and His Termination.” This is the fourth element of a retaliation claim. At the end of this fourth section, Morris discusses the framework for a retaliation case, citing two retaliation cases, Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Service Co., 272 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2001), and Canitia v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.1990). The district court assumed that Morris raised only a retaliation claim. Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., No. 1:05 CV 2211, 2007 WL 893051, at  (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007). 8 notice-pleading system,” id., we explained in Wysong that “[a] defendant looking at [the plaintiff’s] complaint would be on sufficient notice that she was broadly alleging violations under 29 U.S.C. § 2615, and that her FMLA claim could encompass either the interference theory, the retaliation theory, or both theories.” Id. This court emphasized that ambiguity on a plaintiff’s complaint does not waive an interference claim and “does not box plaintiffs into one theory or the other.” Id. Although Wysong involved the issue of whether a plaintiff had waived an argument before the district court instead of the appellate court, we find that our reasoning in Wysong applies equally to the situation at hand.8 Although Morris should have clarified the theory on which he premised his claim, Family Dollar was clearly on notice that he might be advancing an interference claim—an issue it briefed below and on appeal. Given the overlapping nature of the two claims and the ambiguous nature of Morris’s complaint, we will address both claims. 2. Merits of FMLA Interference Theory Claim To establish a claim under the interference theory, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was an eligible employee; (2) his employer was a covered employer; (3) he was entitled to leave under the 8 Family Dollar argues that this case is controlled by the unpublished opinion in Conner v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc., 65 F. App’x 19 (6th Cir. 2003). In Conner, the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged the breach of an implied contract without specifying whether the plaintiffs were advancing an implied-in-fact or implied-in-law theory of recovery. Id. at 24. After the defendant briefed both theories in its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs’ response failed to clarify which theory they were advancing or explicitly state that they were proceeding upon a contract implied-in-law theory (although some language in their brief and one case cited suggested this theory). Id. The Conner court concluded that the claim was waived because the plaintiffs had “failed to brief the issue before the district court, and because the district court did not rule on the issue in its opinion.” Id. at 24-25. Unlike the fairly different contract implied-in-law and contract implied-in-fact theories at issue in Conner, the FMLA interference and retaliation theories at issue here are closely related and largely overlap. Because of the similar nature of the two theories and Wysong’s on-point reasoning, we find Conner inapplicable. 9 FMLA; (4) he gave his employer notice of his intent to take leave; and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA rights to which he was entitled. Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2003). The intent behind the employer’s conduct is not relevant to an interference claim. Arban, 345 F.3d at 401. Family Dollar does not dispute that Morris is an eligible employee and that Family Dollar is a covered employer. Family Dollar contends, however, that Morris was not entitled to leave under the FMLA; that if he was entitled, he did not provide sufficient notice; and that even if he did provide notice, Family Dollar did not interfere with his FMLA rights. The FMLA “entitle[s] employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). The statutory language of the FMLA limits “serious health condition” to “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves . . . inpatient care . . . or . . . continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). The regulations, in effect at the time the underlying conduct occurred, further defined “continuing treatment” as a “period of incapacity . . . of more than three consecutive calendar days . . . that also involves . . . [t]reatment two or more times by a health care provider . . . or . . . [t]reatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(1)-(2) (2003).9 9 The Department of Labor has recently promulgated new regulations interpreting the phrase “serious health condition.” See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67934, 68079 (Nov. 17, 2008). Those regulations took effect on January 16, 2009, id. at 67934, and neither party argues that they should be applied retroactively here. 10 The legislative history clarifies that the FMLA “is not intended to cover short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery are very brief.” S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 28 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30 (emphasis added). “Conditions or medical procedures that would not normally be covered by the legislation include minor illnesses which last only a few days and surgical procedures which typically do not involve hospitalization and require only a brief recovery period.” Id.; see Beaver v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, Inc., 144 F. App’x 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases where plaintiffs’ claims were denied because their “routine, short-term illnesses [were] not covered by the FMLA”). Morris contends that Betty Morris had a “serious health condition involving continuing treatment” based upon 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (2003). Morris has offered some evidence of Betty Morris’s health condition including: his own testimony that she needed help getting in and out of the shower and with household chores, and that she had trouble walking for approximately four days; and Betty Morris’s affidavit, providing that following the biopsy, she was “bedridden for at least four days and her son had to take care of her every day needs.” (Betty Morris Aff. at 1.) However, Morris conceded that his mother was not “incapacitated.” (Morris Depo. at 107.) Morris also does not dispute that after the biopsy, Betty Morris received a pathology report that the lump was benign, and she did not see her doctor again until a follow-up visit ten days after the biopsy. An outpatient procedure with a follow-up appointment is not a “regimen of continuing treatment.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(B) (2003). Neither does it constitute “[t]reatment two or more times by a health care provider.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(2)(i)(A) (2003); see Doughtie v. Ashland, Inc., No. 03-2073, 2005 WL 1239286, at  (W.D. Tenn. May 24, 2005) (follow-up visit 11 with doctor eleven days after plaintiff had returned to work did not count as a second treatment by a health care provider); see also Jones v. Denver Pub. Schs., 427 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o qualify for FMLA protection, the health condition must be sufficiently serious that it entails an absence of more than three consecutive calendar days during which the employee obtained treatment by a health care provider at least two times (or one time followed by a regimen of continuing treatment).”); Perry v. Jaguar of Troy, 353 F.3d 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2003) (periodic examinations every six months did not render the condition a “serious health condition”); Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999) (pre-arranged drug counseling session did not qualify as continuing treatment). As the district court commented, “the Court has serious doubts as to whether an outpatient needle biopsy with one follow-up visit two weeks later would constitute a ‘serious medical condition’ for purposes of the FMLA.” Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., No. 1:05 CV 2211, 2007 WL 893051, at  n.4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007). We agree. The outpatient needle biopsy involved neither inpatient treatment nor continuing treatment by a healthcare provider and simply does not satisfy the plain meaning of a “serious health condition” in the relevant statutory and regulatory language. Because Morris failed to establish that Betty Morris had a “serious health condition” under the FMLA, we find that he did not make out a prima facie case under the interference theory. Thus, we do not need to address the other prongs of his interference claim. 12