Opinion ID: 4565544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: background: the engle case

Text: This is an “Engle progeny” case, the name insiders give to the originating class action lawsuit with a lead plaintiff named Engle. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). In that case, a group of Florida smokers and smokers’ survivors filed a class action against the major tobacco companies, including R.J. Reynolds, for injuries they suffered because of the tobacco companies’ manufacture and sale of cigarettes containing nicotine. See id. at 1256 & n.3. The Engle class asserted numerous claims, including: (1) strict liability; (2) fraud; (3) conspiracy to commit fraud; (4) breach of implied warranty; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) negligence; and (7) breach of express warranty; they also requested equitable relief. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). After lengthy discovery and a year-long trial in the class action, the jury found, among other things, that the tobacco companies had breached their duty of care and sold defective cigarettes, and that their conduct satisfied the conduct 3 Case: 18-11901 Date Filed: 09/15/2020 Page: 4 of 53 elements of the torts of fraudulent concealment, conspiracy to fraudulently conceal, breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1255, 1276–77; see also Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2018) (“According to [the Florida Supreme Court], the Engle jury did not decide the defendants’ liability, but instead ‘decided issues related to [the defendants’] conduct.’”) (first brackets added) (quoting Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1263). The Florida Supreme Court upheld the jury’s findings and “decertified the class to allow individual actions about the remaining issues of specific causation, damages, and comparative fault.” Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citing Engle, 945 So. 2d 1246). The Florida Supreme Court also clarified that some of the jury’s findings “had preclusive effect in the later individual actions.” Id.; see also Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1277. Specifically, the Engle jury findings establish: (1) “that smoking cigarettes causes’ various diseases, including ‘lung cancer”; (2) “that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive”; (3) “that the defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous”; (4) “that the defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both”; (5) “that the defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment”; (6) “that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective”; (7) “that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to 4 Case: 18-11901 Date Filed: 09/15/2020 Page: 5 of 53 representations of fact made by said defendants”; and (8) “that all of the defendants were negligent.” Searcy, 902 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1276–77). All members of the Engle class in their individual follow up trials are entitled to the benefit of those specific findings without having to prove them. As a result, in his individual lawsuit an “Engle progeny” plaintiff who proves he is a member of the Engle class can use the findings of the Engle jury to establish the conduct elements for the torts of “strict liability, negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal claims.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419, 436 (Fla. 2013). What is left for each Engle progeny plaintiff to prove to prevail on an individual claim for negligence and strict liability (the two claims on which Mrs. Sowers succeeded) is: (1) membership in the Engle class, (2) individual causation, which is established by showing “that addiction to smoking the Engle defendants’ cigarettes containing nicotine was a legal cause of the injuries alleged,” and (3) damages. Searcy, 902 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Douglas, 110 So. 3d at 430). To prevail on individual claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal (the two claims on which Mrs. Sowers did not succeed), Engle progeny plaintiffs must prove: (1) membership in the Engle class; (2) detrimental reliance on the material information that the Engle defendants had 5 Case: 18-11901 Date Filed: 09/15/2020 Page: 6 of 53 concealed and conspired to conceal about the health effects and/or addictive nature of smoking; (3) that the plaintiff’s reliance was a legal cause of his injuries; and (4) damages. See Cote v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 909 F.3d 1094, 1106 (11th Cir. 2018). If an Engle progeny plaintiff who is a member of the class asserts in his individual lawsuit a negligence claim, he is entitled to the benefit of the Engle jury’s finding that the tobacco company was negligent. But under Florida law, in a negligence or strict liability action, the company is entitled to assert the affirmative defense of comparative fault and to use it to seek a reduction in an award of compensatory damages on the ground that the injured person 1 contributed to his own injuries. See Fla. Stat. § 768.81(2) (stating that in a civil action for damages based on certain claims, including negligence and strict liability, “contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as economic and noneconomic damages for an injury attributable 1 We say “injured person” instead of “plaintiff” because the plaintiff in a Florida wrongful death action is the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, seeking damages for the benefit of the estate itself and for the decedent’s survivors. See Fla. Stat. § 768.20. Mrs. Sowers is both the estate’s personal representative and a survivor. As a result, she is both an “injured person” and the “plaintiff.” But that will not necessarily be true in every wrongful death case. If the personal representative is not one of the decedent’s survivors, she will not have suffered any injuries that are compensable under the Florida Wrongful Death Act. See id. § 768.21. And, of course, to the extent the representative seeks to recover damages on behalf of the decedent’s estate, the injured person (the decedent) cannot be the plaintiff. The dead can’t act as litigants any more than they can act as judges. See Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 710 (2019)