Opinion ID: 2272225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initial Stop and Continued Detention Were Illegal

Text: Mr. Grayson argues that the initial investigatory stop of his vehicle was invalid because it was based on an anonymous tip that failed to provide reasonable suspicion. Further, he argues, his continued detention after Officer Lambert determined that he was not Terry Reed was illegal because it was made without reasonable suspicion or articulable facts on which to base a belief of criminal activity. This Court agrees. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. [2] U.S. Const. amend. IV. A person is seized when the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident indicates that `a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007), quoting, State v. Werner, 9 S.W.3d 590, 600 (Mo. banc 2000). Here, Officer Lambert detained Mr. Grayson by compelling him to pull his vehicle over to the side of the road for questioning. The officer said that Mr. Grayson was not free to leave, and a reasonable person would not feel free to leave once he was pulled over by the police and his license taken. This constitutes a seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (stopping a car and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); State v. Hyland, 840 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 1992) (a vehicle stop . . . constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). The issue, therefore, becomes whether the seizure was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. The State argues that it was a reasonable Terry stop under the principles set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under Terry, `where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot . . .,' the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make `reasonable inquiries' aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), quoting, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. A Terry stop remains valid only so long as it is based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999). In evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must determine if the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability is sufficient to create a `reasonable suspicion' of criminal activity. State v. Berry, 54 S.W.3d 668, 673 (Mo.App.2001). A suspicion is reasonable when, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ([T]he detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity). Where, as here, the initial stop is based upon an anonymous tip, special concerns arise. [A] detention and search and seizure is unlawful if conducted solely on the basis of an anonymous tip. Deck, 994 S.W.2d at 536, citing, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). The police may, however, properly consider such evidence if it is in conjunction with . . . other, independent corroborative evidence suggestive of criminal activity. Id. In the absence of independent corroboration of the anonymous tip, the seizure will be found invalid. Id. For instance, in State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Mo. banc 1995), Mr. Miller was stopped based on information an officer obtained from an unknown source that a red car would be in a particular area transporting controlled substances. The police saw a red car in the area and stopped it. Id. Mr. Miller, a passenger, was asked for identification. He refused to produce it and put his hand in his pocket, where police saw and seized a small yellow bowl containing cocaine residue. Mr. Miller was arrested. Id. at 651. In suppressing the drug evidence, this Court stated that the mere fact that information came through a police dispatch does not provide a basis for finding reasonable suspicion, for if it did, the requirements of reasonable suspicion and probable cause would be rendered meaningless because police could simply filter a `hunch' through a radio dispatch or cellular phone and have it come out reliable on the other end. Miller, 894 S.W.2d at 653. Rather, the court must consider the source of the information provided by a dispatch; if the dispatch is based on information `obtained from an anonymous informant, the question is whether the police corroborated the details of the tip before making the stop.' Id. at 653, quoting, Franklin, 841 S.W.2d at 644 n. 6. In Miller, independent corroboration was not made of the details of the tip other than the presence of a red car at the noted location. This was insufficient, and this Court held the stop illegal. Id. at 653-54. Miller relied on Franklin, in which a driver was stopped based on a tip about a black car with an armed person in it in a particular area. 841 S.W.2d at 640. The officer searched the driver and driver's seat area and found no weapon. The officer then arrested the driver and performed a search incident to the arrest. The search incident to arrest produced evidence of illegal drugs. Id. at 640-41. On appeal, this Court held that this evidence should have been suppressed, stating: the record contains no evidence of a dispatch issued on the basis of reasonable suspicion, and the detaining officer did not personally observe, independent of the dispatch, any behavior that would justify the stop. The dispatcher was not called to testify at the suppression hearing. The record is silent as to the source of the information that [led] to the police dispatch. Without that information the court cannot determine whether the dispatch was based on reasonable suspicion. Id. at 644. In contrast to these cases, Deck shows what constitutes sufficient corroboration. In that case, police received an anonymous tip from an informant that Mr. Deck and his sister were involved in a robbery or homicide in Jefferson County and that they would be armed and driving a gold two-door car. [3] 994 S.W.2d at 534-35. Police went to Mr. Deck's last known address and observed Mr. Deck drive by alone in a two-door gold car and pull into a parking space. There was independent, corroborative evidence suggestive of criminal activity in that Mr. Deck was driving his car with its lights off although it was late at night, as if to avoid detection, and Mr. Deck immediately leaned down toward the passenger side of the vehicle when the officer shined his light on him. Id. at 535. This Court held that these circumstances corroborated the anonymous tip and provided grounds for reasonable suspicion to search the car, in which they found a weapon hidden under the front seat. Id. at 536. This case is like Miller and Franklin, not Deck. The evidence showed that the police had received an anonymous tip that a person named Terry Reed was possibly drunk and had just left a specific address driving a red Ford pickup on West Fifth Street. A few minutes later, Officer Lambert saw a red Mazda truck on Main Street, being driven by a person who he thought resembled Terry Reed, a person known to the officer. Officer Lambert followed the red Mazda truck. It did not weave or otherwise show indications that it was being driven by an intoxicated driver, as the anonymous tip had stated was the case. Neither did the red Mazda violate any traffic law, nor did the driver otherwise act in a criminal manner. At this point, the anonymous tip relayed by dispatch was not corroborated by other evidence suggestive of criminal activity. Deck, 994 S.W.2d at 536. The driver did not appear inebriated, the truck was a different make than the one in the tip, it was on a different street and no traffic infraction was observed. While Mr. Grayson's truck also was red, there are countless red trucks of all makes and models operating on the roads and highways of this state. The mere fact that Mr. Grayson was driving a red truck, without more, did not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. Nothing about the circumstances of Mr. Grayson's driving were otherwise suggestive of criminal activity so as to give rise to an articulable basis to pull him over. Officer Lambert had no reasonable basis to detain Mr. Grayson. The stop was unjustified. Nonetheless, Officer Lambert pulled over Mr. Grayson's vehicle because he thought the driver resembled Mr. Reed. Even were Officer Lambert's belief that the driver might resemble Mr. Reed sufficient for an initial investigatory stop at this point, despite the lack of corroboration of any facts in the anonymous tip and despite the failure to conduct any other investigation, the stop should have ended as soon as Officer Lambert walked up to the driver's side window and saw that the driver of the red Mazda was Matthew Grayson, whom he knew by sight, not Terry Reed. An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). `If the detention extends beyond the time reasonably necessary to effect its initial purpose, the seizure may lose its lawful character unless a new factual predicate for reasonable suspicion is found during the period of lawful seizure.' State v. Slavin, 944 S.W.2d 314, 317-18 (Mo.App.1997), quoting, State v. Stevens, 845 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Mo.App. 1993). Officer Lambert did not claim that after the stop a new factual predicate for reasonable suspicion developed that justified continued detention. At the point Officer Lambert saw the truck's driver was Mr. Grayson and not Terry Reed, all plausible suspicion on which to premise continuing the traffic stop was dispelled completely. In fact, Officer Lambert told Mr. Grayson that he was not the person for whom the officer was looking. Yet the officer chose to continue to detain Mr. Grayson and took his driver's license to check for warrants. He did so not because he had any information that there was a warrant but because he knew Mr. Grayson had been arrested in the past and decided to check to see if he might have a warrant again. The State suggests, citing State v. Hawkins, 137 S.W.3d 549 (Mo.App. 2004), that Officer Lambert's knowledge of Mr. Grayson's criminal history could have provided reasonable suspicion for the prolonged stop. The State dramatically misreads Hawkins. While past criminal activity can be one factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, Hawkins makes clear that `knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement (to say nothing of a mere arrest) is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion.' Id. at 558, quoting, United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994). Criminal history cannot form the sole basis to determine reasonable suspicion to support detention. State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669, 679 (2003). See also Reed v. Roylston, 22 Ariz.App. 118, 524 P.2d 513, 516 (1974) (We do not believe that the information furnished to the officers concerning petitioner's prior convictions of carrying concealed weapons provided such reasonable grounds [for a Terry stop]); State v. Collins, 479 A.2d 344, 346 (Me.1984) (an investigative stop cannot be made merely because the person has a criminal record). Here, all Officer Lambert had was a hunch that because Mr. Grayson had been arrested in the past, there might be a warrant for him. A mere hunch does not provide a basis for commencing or prolonging an unlawful detention. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (an officer's reliance on a mere `hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop); See also State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 813 (Mo.App. 2004) (court properly suppressed evidence where trooper was, at most, acting upon a hunch when he stopped Respondent's truck and did not have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that a criminal activity was taking place when he stopped Respondent's truck). Officer Lambert's detention of Mr. Grayson was an unreasonable seizure. [4]