Opinion ID: 776169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deficient Performance in the Sentencing Phase

Text: 85 Mr. Freeman's performance exhibited several deficiencies, most importantly his failure to (1) prepare mitigation evidence relating to Mr. Bryan's history of mental illness for, or present this mitigation evidence at, the sentencing phase; (2) comprehend the nature of the compelling and substantial mitigation evidence in the record; and correspondingly, (3) articulate and explain to his client the purpose that presentation of Mr. Bryan's mental history would serve at the sentencing stage. The cumulative effect of these factors amounted to deficient performance on the part of Mr. Freeman. 86
87 During the sentencing stage, Mr. Freeman presented brief testimony from Mr. Bryan, his sister and his mother. First, Mr. Bryan testified to offer an explanation for an alleged assault that took place while he was incarcerated. Next, Mr. Bryan's mother and sister testified that Mr. Bryan had high moral standards, was nonviolent, and was a caring family member. This is the extent of evidence that Mr. Freeman believed he could present to counter the government's evidence of aggravators. See Vol. VII, at 1695-1734 (trial transcript). 88 Mitigating evidence plays an overwhelmingly important role in the 'just imposition of the death penalty.' Romano, 239 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1288). 'As a practical matter, the defendant probably has little or no chance of avoiding the death sentence unless the defense counsel gives the jury something to counter both the horror of the crime and the limited information the prosecution has introduced about the defendant.' Id. (quoting Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 Am. J. Crim. L. 359, 364 (1997)). Similarly, our case law is consistent with that of our sister circuits in rejecting the notion that a strategic decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them. 1 89 Here, Mr. Freeman admits that he did no other investigation or preparation for the second stage apart from talking to Mr. Bryan, Mr. Bryan's family and a doctor who had treated Mr. Bryan for diabetes. Mr. Freeman incorrectly believed that's all [he] had and he sought out nothing further. Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 108. 90 Mr. Bryan's unrefuted testimony likewise confirms that there just wasn't any preparation made for the penalty phase. Mr. Bryan was told minutes before he was called to the witness chair that he would be testifying. Mr. Bryan never discussed with Mr. Freeman the possibility of using mental health evidence in the second stage of the trial. Id. at 36-37. 91
92 It is remotely conceivable that the decision not to extensively investigate a defendant's background may be, in exceptional cases, tactical. However, before an attorney can insulate his strategic behavior from review by claiming that a decision to forego mitigation evidence was tactical, an attorney must have chosen not to present mitigating evidence after having investigated the defendant's background, and that choice must have been reasonable under the circumstances. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1369 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1558 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)). Mr. Freeman could not have weighed the risks and benefits of presenting the testimony regarding Mr. Bryan's mental capacity where he did not even realize that he could present that testimony. He was apparently unable to articulate to Mr. Bryan any purpose mitigation evidence might serve and never considered any impact the mitigating evidence would have upon Mr. Bryan's moral culpability. Cf. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229 (holding counsel's performance ineffective and noting there was no strategic decision at all because [counsel] was ignorant of various other mitigation strategies he could have employed). 93 Mr. Freeman's own testimony makes this clear. Mr. Freeman admitted that he characterized Mr. Bryan's stories and events regarding the farm and business ventures as fantastic and delusional. He does not dispute the conclusions of the various medical reports that state Mr. Bryan was confused, depressed, delirious, paranoid, psychotic and delusional and that he had suffered brain atrophy and organic brain damage. He admits that multiple medical records indicated there was substantial evidence from competent professionals regarding his client's organic and mental problems. See Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 90-93, 100-03, 112. He acknowledges that Dr. Murphy concluded Mr. Bryan suffers from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question his competence to stand trial, as well as his legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged. Id. at 95. It is almost unbelievable that Mr. Freeman did not seek to introduce this evaluation, which is appended to this dissent. See id. at 90-99. 94 Most important is not what Mr. Freeman admitted he knew, but what he admitted he did not know about mitigation. Mr. Freeman clearly testified that he saw no use for the experts' mental testimony, except to prove either insanity or incompetence. Id. at 105. Mr. Freeman ethically and honestly believed that he could not present evidence of mental defects at the sentencing stage simply because the experts were not going to say [Mr. Bryan] was insane. Id. at 86-87. Because he believed the experts could not testify as to Mr. Bryan's insane or incompetent state, Mr. Freeman did not consider any other use he could have made from the testimony. Rather he simply assumed that the testimony would not have been relevant at all. Id. at 106, 108. 95
96 Mr. Freeman also admits that if Mr. Bryan was organically brain damaged and mentally ill at the time of trial, he might not have received the death penalty. See id. at 110. Given Mr. Freeman's unsound investigation which, in turn, hampered his ability to make strategic choices regarding the second-stage proceedings and competently advise his client regarding those proceedings, Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1234, I believe there was no informed decision by counsel or client in this case. The OCCA held that defense counsel conducted a reasonable investigation but concluded that the failure to present the psychiatric mitigating evidence was tactical. If so, it was tactical surrender. I believe this was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1522. 97 The OCCA relied upon Mr. Freeman's purported residual doubt strategy: to present the evidence might focus the jury on future dangerousness rather than moral culpability. There is no question that [t]he guilt phase may . . . provide the opportunity to sow the seeds of 'residual' doubt concerning the defendant's guilt, enhancing the chances of a life sentence. James M. Doyle, The Lawyer's Act: Representation in Capital Cases, 8 Yale J.L. & Human. 417, 449 (1996). Counsel may further attempt to stir up any lingering doubt concerning the guilt of the defendant during the sentencing phase hoping to cause the jury to decide against the imposition of the death penalty. However, to read such a strategy into Mr. Freeman's actions is not reasonable. There was no testimony regarding Mr. Bryan's potential innocence. Mr. Freeman's closing argument, rather than suggesting that the circumstantial evidence may not point to his client, stated Leroy should not have killed, Vol. VII, at 1753 (trial tr.), and asked the jury not to impose the death penalty here because the underlying crime did not warrant the penalty. See id. at 1748-1754. 98 In contrast to the majority, I would hold that Mr. Freeman's failure first to understand the purpose of such mitigating evidence and second to persuade his client to let him present the only evidence that could help him at the sentencing phase was deficient under Strickland. 2 I believe that presentation of the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Bryan's mental defects would have rebutted evidence that Mr. Bryan might commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, 701.12.