Opinion ID: 520594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Person/Enterprise Identity

Text: 127 As the district court noted, the plaintiffs alleged that the party is both an enterprise according to section 1961(4), and a defendant (i.e., person) according to section 1961(3). But since this court has held that a person charged with violating section 1962(c) cannot be the same entity as the enterprise, see Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir.1988); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d at 1359; B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir.1984), the district court dismissed the claim against the party. Rose, 692 F.Supp. at 533 (Rose Amended Complaint paragraphs 56, 61); Hill v. Bartle, slip op. at 28 (Hill Amended Complaint paragraphs 54, 59); Reed v. Bartle, slip op. at 28 (Reed Amended Complaint p 59, 64). The plaintiffs maintain that the party should be considered an enterprise insofar as it serves as a vehicle for some individuals' [i.e., Asher's and Bartle's] predicate acts of racketeering, but as a person insofar as it conducted the affairs of the county as an enterprise. Rose brief at 48. 128 Our rationale in Hirsch for the requirement of separate person and enterprise identity for purposes of section 1962(c) was based on what we conceived of as the Congressional scheme to orient section 1962(c) toward punishing the infiltrating criminals rather than the legitimate corporation which might be an innocent victim of the racketeering activity in some circumstances. 751 F.2d at 634. We further explained this rationale in Petro-Tech: We ... held [in Hirsch ] that section 1962(c) was intended to govern only those instances in which an 'innocent' or 'passive' corporation is victimized by the RICO 'persons,' and either drained of its own money or used as a passive tool to extract money from third parties. 824 F.2d at 1359. 129 We see nothing in our decisions that would necessarily preclude an entity from functioning both as an innocent victim of certain racketeering activity, and thus be the enterprise under section 1962(c), and as a perpetrator of other such activity, and thus be a person under that subsection. The complaints describe Asher and Bartle as acting for or as agents of the party in the commission of alleged racketeering acts. See Rose Amended Complaint paragraphs 12, 15, 27; Hill Amended Complaint paragraphs 11, 14, 26; Reed Amended Complaint paragraphs 18, 21. These acts would have victimized the county enterprise (and its residents) as well as the plaintiffs. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs are not barred from alleging that the party is liable under section 1962(c).