Opinion ID: 203945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Protective Principle

Text: I will address the latter rationale first. Justifying the reach of the MDLEA under the protective principle is not convincing on facts where there is no nexus between the drug trafficking vessel and the United States. Cf. Robinson, 843 F.2d at 3-4 (Breyer, J.) (observing problems with that principle and so relying only on the territoriality principle). Since the drugs at issue in this case were heading for the Dominican Republic, not the United States, there is not the kind of direct threat to the United States required to trigger the protective principle. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1162 (9th Cir.2006) (Our circuit has recognized the `protective principle' as part of its consideration of whether nexus exists, not as a substitute for it.). The only response to this argument is that drug trafficking, generally, is such a global threat that the United States is justified in protecting itself by prosecuting traffickers anywhere, regardless of the destination of the drug shipment. See 46 U.S.C. § 70501 (generally finding trafficking to be a threat to the United States). But this broad proposition is not consistent with international law. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 cmt. f (1987) (defining the scope of the protective principle as allowing prosecution of offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized as crimes by developed legal systems, such as counterfeiting currency). Relying on the protective principle without any nexus would be to conclude that Congress could allow for arrests and prosecutions of drug traffickers on the other side of the world, even without flag-nation consent. This cannot be and is not the correct result; the protective principle requires a showing that the particular conduct endangered the United States. Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress's Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 Minn. L.Rev. 1191, 1229-31 (2009) (rejecting, in the context of analyzing Congress's Article I powers, the argument that the MDLEA could be justified under the protective principle because drugs not destined for United States markets do not fall into the limited class of offenses ... directed at the security of the State, since that principle refers to the safety and integrity of the state apparatus itself (its `government functions' or `state interests'), not its overall physical and moral well-being); see also Robinson, 843 F.2d at 3 (identifying, but not resolving, this argument). Such interpretation would result in a protective principle which swallows the principle of universal jurisdiction. Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon, supra, at 1231.