Opinion ID: 1188928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In Furtherance Of Instruction

Text: During the instructions conference, Morris's counsel offered the following instruction pertaining to Count Two of the indictment, which charged Morris with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A): The phrase in furtherance of as used in these instructions means to advance or promote the commission of the underlying drug trafficking offense. The government must prove a specific nexus between the firearm and the crime charged. After some discussion, and over defense counsel's objection, the court declined to give the instruction. We review the district court's refusal to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 655 (7th Cir.2007). The problem with Morris's argument is that it rests on the faulty premise that in furtherance of requires definition. In Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, we noted that an instructive line of cases holds that it is not errorplain or otherwiseto fail to give a definition of a statutory term or phrase that carries its natural meaning and that meaning is accessible to lay jurors. Id. at 821. Other cases have alluded to this same principle. Cf. United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 252 (3d Cir.1991) (finding no plain error when the district court declined to define preponderance of the evidence because, in part, the phrase's legal meaning was consistent with its common meaning); United States v. Sherwood, 770 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.1985) (finding no plain error when the district court declined to define willfully because the ordinary meaning of the term likely did not confuse the jury). In Castillo, we discussed in furtherance of at length, commenting on the phrase's natural meaning, 406 F.3d at 814 (furthering, advancing or helping forward (quotations omitted)), and stating that it means what it says, id. at 815; see also id. at 821 (`[I]n furtherance of' naturally and necessarily connotes more than mere presence or innocent possession. (first emphasis added)). Thus, although the court was free to give an instruction defining in furtherance of, we determined that it was not error to decline to do so. Id. at 821-22. In an attempt to minimize Castillo 's weight, Morris notes, correctly, that the discussion regarding the plain meaning of in furtherance of was not the core holding of the case. Indeed, by our count, the phrase's plain meaning was one of three reasons we provided to support our conclusion that the district court did not plainly err in refusing to define in furtherance of. Id. at 820-21. But that fact does nothing to detract from the import of our comments, which was that the phrase carries a readily understood meaning that jurors comprehend without additional definition. Further, the facts of Castillo are closer to those now before us than Morris would have us believe. A second factor we found important in our in furtherance of discussion was the comments made by the attorneys during closing arguments. Id. There, the prosecutor said the following: So how did that shotgun further a drug crime? That's the question. Did it furthersimply did it help the drug crime? Did it aid a drug crime in some way? How did that shotgun help this defendant possess with intent to distribute narcotics? Id. at 820. Here, the prosecutor did not use words like help or aid. But taken in context, his comments left little doubt about the meaning of in furtherance of: [W]hat furthers the crime of drug trafficking. Protection of your product, protection of your proceeds, protection of your person.... It's important for drug dealers to protect themselves, first and foremost, and almost as importantly their product and their cash, and that's exactly what happened here. The defendant had the gun in the driver's side door just below the drugs that he was selling, protecting that product, protecting his person, and he was using guns to protect the money that he was generating from the heroin sales. We conclude that the district court did not err by refusing to include a jury instruction defining the phrase in furtherance of, as used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The words have a plain meaning that is easily understood by jurors, rendering any definitional instruction perhaps helpful but not necessary. This conclusion is bolstered by the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments, which, to the extent further illumination might have been desired, provided additional light.