Opinion ID: 1235436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Elements of a Cause of Action for Invasion of the State Constitutional Right of Privacy

Text: (9a) Our cases do not contain a clear statement of the elements of a cause of action for invasion of the state constitutional right to privacy. Plaintiffs and Stanford succeeded in convincing the lower courts that the NCAA was required to justify any conceivable impact on plaintiffs' privacy interests by a compelling interest and to establish that its drug testing program was the least restrictive alternative furthering the NCAA's interests. The NCAA assails the compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test; plaintiffs and Stanford naturally come to its defense. We consider the positions of the parties in light of the history of the Privacy Initiative. Our Privacy Initiative jurisprudence emanates from White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757. In White, we upheld against a general demurrer a taxpayer's complaint seeking to enjoin expenditures of public funds for a police department's covert surveillance of university classes at the University of California at Los Angeles. ( Id. at p. 773.) The complaint alleged a level of extensive, routine, covert police surveillance of university classes and organization meetings that was unprecedented in our nation's history. ( Id. at p. 776.) According to plaintiff's allegations, police informants and undercover agents disguised themselves as students, attended university functions, and compiled dossiers of statements made by others in attendance, despite the absence of any illegal activity. Because White arose on the pleadings, we necessarily assumed the truth of plaintiff's allegations and intimated no view regarding the ultimate question, i.e., whether plaintiff's state and federal constitutional rights had been violated by the challenged conduct of law enforcement authorities. ( White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 776.) Focusing on plaintiffs' rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression, we held the facts as alleged revealed government conduct likely to pose a substantial restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights and observed that the challenged surveillance activities can only be sustained if defendant can demonstrate a `compelling' state interest which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment rights and which cannot be served by alternative means less intrusive on fundamental rights. ( Id. at p. 772.) Commenting on the state constitutional right to privacy, we characterized the law enforcement conduct alleged in the complaint as inherently intrusive, noting defendant would have the opportunity to contest any of the allegations of the complaint as well as to designate the compelling governmental interests upon which they rely.... ( White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 776.) Properly analyzed, our decision in White did not establish a blanket compelling interest test for all state constitutional right-to-privacy cases. According to the White plaintiffs' allegations, the government was spending taxpayer dollars to gather information and construct dossiers containing the surreptitious observations of academic speech by government agents. There was no legitimate government interest in this activity; its continuation threatened to harass and embarrass citizens in the exercise of their rights to free expression and association. Plaintiff's charge in White thus pertains to government invasion of one distinct set of privacy interests  those which overlap the First Amendment and relate to our expressions, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we choose. (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.) This view of White is supported by an examination of the authority cited by the court. The White court refers without discussion to three cases in support of its compelling governmental interests language. None of the cases involves our state constitutional right of privacy. Two of the three cases cited in White deal with freedom of expression and the concomitant right to hold public office. In City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, supra, 2 Cal.3d 259, plaintiffs attacked a sweeping conflict-of-interest law requiring every public officer and each candidate for state or local public office to file a statement disclosing all investments in excess of $10,000 owned by the officer, a spouse, or a minor child. ( Id. at p. 262.) Drawing on state and federal cases recognizing a First Amendment right to participate in political activity, we emphasized that laws restraining political expression must be justified by a government showing of compelling state purpose as well as an absence of any alternatives that are `less offensive' or `less subversive of constitutional rights.' ( Id. at pp. 264-265.) Finding the conflict-of-interest statute overbroad and not subject to a reasonable limiting construction, we held it unconstitutional. ( Id. at p. 272.) In County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662, 670-672 [114 Cal. Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345], we upheld a revision of the conflict-of-interest law designed to satisfy the demands of City of Carmel-by-the-Sea. Both of the conflict of interest cases make reference to a right to privacy, but in the context of the federal penumbral right. ( City of Carmel-by-the -Sea v. Young, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 266-268; County of Nevada v. MacMillen, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 672.) The third case cited in White  the Supreme Court's Griswold decision  involves the federal penumbral right to privacy as applied to a married couple's right to use contraceptives. White refers to Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, which discusses a compelling state interest standard for a significant encroachment on personal liberty. ( White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 776, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 497 [14 L.Ed.2d at pp. 522-523] (conc. opn. of Goldberg, J.).) The standard is borrowed from Bates v. City of Little Rock (1959) 361 U.S. 516 [4 L.Ed.2d 480, 80 S.Ct. 412], a National Association for the Advancement of Colored People membership-list disclosure case involving privacy as an aspect of freedom of association protected by the First Amendment. Justice Goldberg's concurrence represented the views of three justices. The majority opinion, written by Justice Douglas, does not adopt a compelling interest standard. ( Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at pp. 480-486 [14 L.Ed.2d at pp. 512-516].) As we have observed in part 2(a)(2), ante, there is no clear or uniform compelling interest standard emanating from the federal penumbral privacy decisions. Based on its language and the authority it cites, our decision in White signifies only that some aspects of the state constitutional right to privacy  those implicating obvious government action impacting freedom of expression and association  are accompanied by a compelling state interest standard. Some of our decisions following White use compelling interest language; others appear to rely on balancing tests giving less intense scrutiny to nonprivacy interests. The particular context, i.e., the specific kind of privacy interest involved and the nature and seriousness of the invasion and any countervailing interests, remains the critical factor in the analysis. Where the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a compelling interest must be present to overcome the vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the privacy interest is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed. [11] For the reasons stated above, we decline to hold that every assertion of a privacy interest under article I, section 1 must be overcome by a compelling interest. Neither the language nor history of the Privacy Initiative unambiguously supports such a standard. In view of the far-reaching and multifaceted character of the right to privacy, such a standard imports an impermissible inflexibility into the process of constitutional adjudication. There remains, however, the question of the correct legal standard to be applied in assessing plaintiffs' claims for invasion of privacy. Based on our review of the history of the Privacy Initiative, we will describe in the remainder of this part the elements of the cause of action for violation of the state constitutional right to privacy and the defenses that might be asserted against such a cause of action.