Opinion ID: 2567623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exceptions: first report

Text: Before the hearing, respondent moved for access to trial counsel's file; the referee denied the motion. Respondent takes exception to the referee's denial order. We review the referee's discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. ( In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 814, 129 Cal. Rptr.2d 605, 61 P.3d 402.) The referee found respondent's motion overbroad, in that it extended to irrelevant documents. He ruled instead that respondent could issue a subpoena duces tecum or a request for production from the files of petitioner's trial counsel for documents relevant to the limited question of whether any of petitioner's trial counsel were in receipt of the Montez letter prior to the entry of judgment in the respective criminal cases, for example: (1) the Montez letter itself or a copy thereof; (2) each writing that contains any reference to the Montez letter; and (3) each writing that indicates that [p]etitioner's trial counsel were in receipt or aware of the Montez letter. The referee directed petitioner to respond to any such request within 20 days of service with [a]ll requested writings that are not privileged and [a] privilege log for requested writings for which a protective privilege is claimed. Respondent issued the subpoena; petitioner replied that the file contained no such information. Respondent argues that petitioner put in issue the entire contents of his trial counsel's files by alleging counsel never received the Montez letter. Respondent relies in particular on the allegations that [t]he Montez letter is not in Joe Ingber's or Alan [ sic: Albert] Garber's trial files. Respondent also asserts that by alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel (for failing to investigate whether Saucedo killed Hosey) in an earlier habeas corpus petition we summarily denied in 1993, petitioner forever waived any attorney-client privilege regarding counsel's competence. (See Evid.Code, § 958 [no privilege as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship].) Accordingly, respondent argues, the referee's ruling denying him access to trial counsel's files precluded his testing counsel's testimony about the files' contents against the best evidence in the case, i.e., the files themselves. The referee did not abuse his discretion in denying respondent's motion for access to trial counsel's files. As the referee noted, the motion was overbroad in seeking access to materials having nothing to do with the issues presented in this case. The referee properly permitted respondent to tailor a subpoena duces tecum or request for production of documents seeking only the items potentially relevant to the question presented by our reference order. Moreover, as we have explained, in filing his previous habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner did not waive the privilege, he merely triggered an exception to it that is not applicable in future proceedings. (See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 695, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657 [under Evid.Code, § 958, the attorney-client privilege continues to apply for purposes of retrial after otherwise privileged matters have been disclosed in connection with habeas corpus proceedings].) In sum, having been permitted to request production of all conceivably relevant materials in trial counsel's files, respondent has shown no abuse of discretion in the referee's ruling. ( In re Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 814, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 605, 61 P.3d 402.)