Opinion ID: 1719788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Vested Rights Argument.

Text: Another exception to the general rule of the validity of curative acts arises when legislation deprives a party of vested rights. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Streepy, 211 Iowa at 1338, 236 N.W. at 26; McSurely, 140 Iowa at 169, 118 N.W. at 418; Windsor, 110 Iowa at 179, 81 N.W. at 477; Iowa Savings and Loan Association v. Heidt, 107 Iowa 297, 303, 77 N.W. 1050, 1052 (1899); 2 Sutherland, supra, § 41.06, at 268. While the plaintiffs did not couch this argument in constitutional terms, the rule that a curative act cannot deprive one of vested rights is premised on traditional due process principles. See 2 Sutherland, supra, § 41.16, at 298-99. A party has no vested right, however, in a particular result of litigation, and a curative act may affect litigation already in progress. Id.; Windsor, 110 Iowa at 179-80, 81 N.W. at 477. [A] right is not vested unless it is something more than a mere expectation, based on an anticipated continuance of present laws. It must be some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is not open to doubt or controversy. (Citation omitted). Leach v. Commercial Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 1154, 1165, 213 N.W. 517, 521 (1927). In this case, the plaintiffs have no more than an expectation of a favorable final ruling. As this court said in Windsor, however, [t]his is a suit in equity, and is triable de novo in this court. Until final decree is passed, there is no vested right to be disturbed, and the case must be determined on the law as it now stands. These are elementary propositions.... The interest that these plaintiffs had in the subject matter of this lawsuit was not a vested right which protects them from the effect of a curative act. The district court erred in concluding the curative act in question was unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. REVERSED AND REMANDED.