Opinion ID: 1387896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: final appellate jurisdiction

Text: Marathon asserts that the superior court's order directing an acquittal is a final order. Hence, Marathon argues that the limitations in AS 22.05.010 preclude the state from appealing the order to this court. It is, however, conceptually incorrect to view the case in its present posture as an appeal by the state from a final order of the superior court. Rather, the appellate process began at the time the appeal was taken by Marathon from the judgment of the district court. In this matter the superior court must be recognized as an intermediate appellate court since final appellate jurisdiction by reason of Article IV, Section 2, of the Alaska state constitution rests in this court: The supreme court shall be the highest court of the State, with final appellate jurisdiction. Once the appellate process is properly invoked, final appellate jurisdiction is in the Supreme Court; for to hold otherwise would contravene the explicit constitutional provision. This court expressed similar views in State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1971). It was held there that the limitation in AS 22.05.010 could not preclude a petition for review [4] to this court filed by the state where the matter sought to be reviewed involved a non-final order or decision of the superior court: If AS 22.05.010 is construed to prohibit this court's review of any actions challenged by the state, then a conflict would arise between article IV, section 2 of the constitution and AS 22.05.010. Acceptance of this construction in the context of the case at bar would mean that the superior court, rather than this court, is the highest court of the state possessed of final appellate jurisdiction. This court would then be limited to reviewing only those cases where a conviction had been obtained and a defendant had appealed. We believe that a construction of AS 22.05.010 which carries over the limitation on the state's right to appeal in criminal matters to other forms of review would be contrary to the intent of the framers of our constitution when they determined that the supreme court was to be the highest court of the state, and was to be vested with final appellate jurisdiction. Unless the supreme court can fully implement its final appellate jurisdiction through use of its review jurisdiction, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for this court to exercise proper control over the administration of criminal justice, and the development of rules of law in criminal trials. [5] [footnote omitted] Our decision in the case at bar is consistent with the underlying purposes of AS 22.05.010. That statute furnishes the essential implementation for constitutional protection against double jeopardy. [6] Therefore, the limitation proscribing state appeals in criminal cases applies to appeals from judgments of acquittal in the trial court. Since Marathon was found guilty and convicted in the trial court, a double jeopardy question is not now presented. [7] We conclude on the basis of our analysis of the pertinent constitutional provision and the statute that the state is not precluded from appealing a final order of the superior court when that court is acting as an intermediate appellate court. Our appellate rules in their present form fail to provide detailed procedures to implement the exercise of final appellate jurisdiction in matters of this kind. However, we find the procedures for review prescribed in Alaska Appellate Rule 23 to be appropriate under the circumstances. [8]