Opinion ID: 2828566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elder-Abuse Contract

Text: The district court allowed the government to use evidence of a contract between Dr. Gutierrez and the Attorney General’s office to create media materials raising awareness of elder abuse, dubbing the 9 Mr. Kupfer relies on United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 671 (10th Cir. 1989). Cardall does not support Mr. Kupfer’s argument. There we explained that the government must give a precise reason for introduction of evidence requiring a prior bad act, and the reason must involve the defendant’s participation in the bad act. 885 F.2d at 671. Here, the government provided the precise reason for introduction of the evidence; that reason involved Mr. Kupfer’s own “bad act,” a scheme to obtain kickbacks for inflating Dr. Gutierrez’s payments from the State. -16- contract the “Elder-Abuse Contract.” The government alleged no wrongdoing with respect to that contract, offering it only as an example of a legitimate baseline to compare the cost of the antismoking campaign. Mr. Kupfer argues the district court erred in allowing use of the elder-abuse contract because there was no link between him and the evidence. We need not reach this argument for two reasons: 1. The elder-abuse contract could have been admissible as probative evidence unrelated to character. 2. Any error in admitting the evidence would have been harmless.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise stated by federal law or rule. Rule 404(b) provides an example of a rule stating otherwise, for this rule precludes evidence of other acts. United States v. Commanche, 577 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 2009). But this rule precludes the use of evidence only when it is offered to attack a witness’s character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 n.5 (10th Cir. 1985) (“To fall within the scope of 404(b), an act need not be criminal, so long as it tends to impugn a defendant’s character.”). -17- The evidence of an elder-abuse contract is not subject to Rule 404(b) because it does not concern character. The government offered the evidence only to illustrate a legitimate contract between Dr. Gutierrez and the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office. Under the contract, Dr. Gutierrez received $63,418.92 (for which there was no allegation of wrongdoing). R., vol. VIII, at 1861–62. By comparison, Dr. Gutierrez received over $1.1 million for similar work under the suspect anti-smoking contract. Id. at 1867. Once the anti-smoking contract was admitted, the elder-abuse contract became relevant to show Dr. Gutierrez’s normal billing rate for a legitimate media contract. Because there was no suggestion of wrongdoing in connection with the elder-abuse contract, there was no danger involving use of the contract as character evidence. Minimal danger arose from this benign evidence and it had probative value; thus, the evidence was relevant and was not subject to exclusion under Rule 403 or Rule 404(b).
Even if the district court had erred in admitting the elder-abuse contract evidence, it would have been harmless. We will not reverse a defendant’s conviction on the basis of a district court’s erroneous admission of evidence if the error was -18- harmless to the defendant. United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1067 (10th Cir. 2011). Under this standard, we ask if the error had a “substantial influence” on the trial’s outcome or generates “‘grave doubt’ as to whether it had such effect.” United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 756 (1946)). To make this assessment, we review the entire record de novo, “examining the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted evidence at trial and how it compares to properly admitted evidence.” United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1999). The government showed that any error would have been harmless, for the elder-abuse contract had played only a minor role in the trial. On that contract, the government asked one witness five general questions. R., vol. VIII, at 1861–62. These questions pertained only to the amount of the fees ($63,418.92) and identification of Ms. Kupfer as the person overseeing the contract. Id. In these questions and answers, there was no suggestion of wrongdoing with respect to that contract. Id. And in closing argument, the prosecutor never even mentioned the elder-abuse contract. In these circumstances, we conclude that the evidence regarding the elder-abuse contract did not substantially influence the -19- trial or generate grave doubt about the outcome. Accordingly, any error would have been harmless. II. Issues Involving Procedural Reasonableness of the Sentence After entering a judgment of conviction, the district court sentenced Mr. Kupfer for all offenses. In deciding on the sentence, the court calculated the guideline range. According to Mr. Kupfer, the calculations were incorrect because the court had (1) selected the wrong guideline for the offense, and (2) improperly enhanced the sentence based on obstruction of justice. We agree with both of Mr. Kupfer’s arguments. A. Applicable Offense Guideline When calculating the appropriate guideline, the district court started by evaluating the trial evidence. R., vol. VIII, at 3253–61. Mr. Kupfer argues this approach constituted error because the court should have considered only the offense of conviction as charged and presented to the jury. We agree. In reviewing the district court’s selection of the applicable offense guideline, we engage in de novo review. See United States v. Neilson, 721 F.3d 1185, 1187 (10th Cir. 2013). 10 Applying de novo 10 The government argues that the clear-error standard applies because the selection of the offense guideline turns on factual findings. As discussed below, we disagree. The district court -20- review, we conclude that the district court incorrectly chose the offense guideline. To determine the offense guideline in this case, the court had to engage in a three-step process 11: 1. identifying the charge from the indictment and jury instructions, 2. finding the substantive offense in the guidelines’ statutory index, and