Opinion ID: 382652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: federal court review of state npdes decisions

Text: 16
17 The District charges that the EPA's failure to veto Maryland's grant of an NPDES permit did not comport with the provisions of the Clean Water Act. The District views Maryland's failure to notify it, a downstream jurisdiction, as a fatal defect that compels revocation of the permit and closure of the plant until new studies are completed. Furthermore, the District argues that the Clean Water Act required the EPA and Maryland officials to consult with the Department of the Interior and the National Capital Planning Commission regarding a treatment plant that would degrade Rock Creek's waters. Finally, the District believes the EPA and Maryland impermissibly failed to incorporate limitations on infectious viruses in the permit itself and unlawfully included a treatment bypass provision that will allow the discharge of untreated sewage into Rock Creek. These errors, according to the District, justify granting injunctive relief barring the discharge of effluent into Rock Creek. 18 At the outset, however, the EPA raises a threshold jurisdictional issue. It contends that its decision not to object to a state-issued permit is one committed to agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976), and therefore not reviewable in federal court. The District responds that the EPA's participation in the joint review and approval of the permit application constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, id. § 702 (1976). 19 Federal courts clearly may review Agency vetoes of state NPDES decisions. Under section 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F), the United States courts of appeals are empowered to (r)eview . . . the Administrator's action in issuing or denying any permit under (33 U.S.C.) section 1342 . . . . Id. When the EPA objects to a state permit, the precise effect is to 'deny( )' a permit within the meaning of section 509(b)(1)(F). Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 196, 100 S.Ct. 1093, 1095, 63 L.Ed.2d 312 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (per curiam); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1230 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 1219, 59 L.Ed.2d 457 (1979). Direct review by the courts of appeals ensure(s) prompt resolution of challenges to EPA's actions and . . . recognize(s) that EPA's veto of a state-issued permit is functionally similar to its denial of a permit in States which do not administer an approval permit-issuing program. Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. at 1094, 100 S.Ct. at 1094. 20 Review of the Agency's decision not to veto a state permit is a more difficult question. 10 When the Agency vetoes a permit, a clear record exists of its actions and reasons; when the Agency decides not to act, there may be no record to review. Having examined the legislative scheme, the policies of the Clean Water Act, and the case law, we conclude that the Agency's decision not to veto a state NPDES permit is not reviewable in federal district court. 21 In considering the Clean Water Act, Congress carefully constructed a legislative scheme that imposed major responsibility for control of water pollution on the states. Once the EPA approves a state program for issuing NPDES permits, Congress envisioned the EPA's role as largely a supervisory one. The Agency retains a veto over the issuance of state permits, but it may also waive responsibility for objecting to noncomplying state permits and even waive notice of the NPDES applications. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3), (e). 22 The course of the Clean Water Act through Congress demonstrates the emphasis Congress placed on giving responsibility to the states and letting the Agency exercise discretion in supervising the NPDES program. The Senate version of the Act, S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 2 Legislative History 1534, originally required Agency approval for all major state-issued permits. 11 See S.Rep.No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1972), reprinted in 2 Legislative History 1489-90. The House version, H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1 Legislative History at 893, however, entrusted more responsibility to the states; states with Agency-approved programs would themselves issue permits, subject only to a discretionary veto by the Agency. See H.R.Rep.No. 911, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 814. This provision placed the major burden for regulating water pollution on the states. The House committee considering the bill stated: 23 representatives of the States, almost unanimously, stressed the need to put the maximum responsibility for the permit process in the States. They deplored the duplication and second guessing that could go on if the Administrator could veto the State decisions. The Committee believes that the States ought to have the opportunity to assume the responsibilities that they have requested. 24 Id. 25 The bill that emerged from the conference committee and became the Clean Water Act featured provisions of H.R. 11896 that gave the states the primary responsibility for issuing NPDES permits. The bill also made the EPA approval of state programs meeting the statutory requirements mandatory rather than discretionary, as in S. 2770. In addition, the final version incorporated the waiver provisions of the House and Senate bills, thereby permitting the EPA to waive the notification requirement under section 1342(e) and to waive its right to veto an application for failure to follow the guidelines under section 1342(d)(3). 26 These provisions reflect the desire of Congress to put the regulatory burden on the states and to give the Agency broad discretion in administering the program. As Representative James Wright stated in describing the NPDES permit process, 27 If the Administrator determines that a State has the authority to issue permits consistent with the act, he shall approve the submitted program. In that event, the States, under State law, could issue State discharge permits. These would be State, not Federal actions . . .. 28 . . . The managers expect the Administrator to use this authority (over state programs) judiciously; it is their intent that the act be administered in such a manner that the abilities of the States to control their own permit programs will be developed and strengthened. They look for and expect State and local interest, initiative, and personnel to provide a much more effective program than that which would result from control in the regional offices of the Environmental Protection Agency. 29 118 Cong.Rec. 33761 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 262 (remarks of Rep. Wright). 30 This legislative history compels the conclusion that the Agency's decision not to review or to veto a state's action on an NPDES permit application is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). Although section 701(a)(2) has a narrow scope, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), it applies here, where  'the statutes are drawn in such broad terms that . . . there is no law to apply.'  Id. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 821 (quoting S.Rep.No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). The Clean Water Act allows the EPA to choose whether to participate in the application for a state NPDES permit. The Act also gives the EPA freedom to waive notice of the application and to waive any violations in the permit. Certain guidelines apply to the application process, but these guidelines do not bind the Agency in its supervisory role of monitoring state permits. In reaching substantially the same conclusion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that 31 the legislative history makes very clear that Congress intended EPA to retain discretion to decline to veto a permit even after the agency found some violation of applicable guidelines. That legislative history, more explicit and unequivocal than generally found, leans in almost every expression toward minimal federal intervention when a state plan has been approved. 32 . . . In light of the pervasiveness of this theme, . . . and the conferral of broad discretion to waive review of individual permits, we conclude that Congress intended to allow the Administrator to consider the significance of any guideline violations in terms of the overall goal of the (Act) . . . . 33 Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1294 (5th Cir. 1977). 12 34 That the Agency participated in a joint review of the application with Maryland officials does not alter this conclusion. Though the Agency fulfilled its responsibility of reviewing the limitations and other conditions imposed as part of a draft permit, Memorandum of Agreement at 10, reprinted in J.A. at 45, by advising state officials concerning the effluent limitations and regional sewage treatment planning, see Letter from Charles W. Sapp to Arnold Schiffman (June 14, 1976), reprinted in J.A. at 127, such participation does not make the Agency's actions reviewable in federal district court. EPA involvement is still discretionary, and its involvement in the issuance of the plant's permit did not undercut the primary responsibility of the state of Maryland to consider and approve the NPDES application. Granting federal court review of the Agency's actions in cases such as this one would upset the federal-state balance struck by Congress: it would allow parties to create a basis for federal jurisdiction when federal involvement is merely secondary. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978),a holding that statutorily sanctioned advice by the EPA to a state constitutes final federal agency action reviewable in the federal courts would permit an applicant, dissatisfied with a decision of a state board, to circumvent the appellate process envisioned by the statute and bestow jurisdiction upon a federal court simply by alleging coercion or undue influence. 35 Id. at 414. See generally Note, Jurisdiction to Review Informal EPA Influence Upon State Decisionmaking Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 1814 (1979). Such a result would be unacceptable. Therefore, we hold that the Agency's actions regarding Maryland's approval of the NPDES permit for the plant are not reviewable in federal court. 36
37 The District further contends that the Agency had a duty to prepare an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). The District cites as support for its contention 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c), 13 which states in part that the issuance of a (NPDES) permit . . . for the discharge of any pollutant by a new source can be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Id. Such major Federal action requires an environmental impact statement. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 38 We disagree with the District's fundamental premise that the EPA issued the permit for the Rock Creek plant. After the study under the joint review program was completed, the EPA elected not to veto the project under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2). It was the state of Maryland that approved and issued the permit. As a district court considering the same question stated, the determination of the federal government not to object . . . 'cannot realistically be classified as Federal action much less major Federal action' . . . . Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Board, 453 F.Supp. 122, 125 (E.D.Va.1978) (quoting Molokai Homesteaders Cooperative Association v. Morton, 506 F.2d 572, 580 (9th Cir. 1974)). See generally McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 Tex.L.Rev. 801, 837-38 & n.139, 851 (1977). These being no major Federal action, the Agency was not required to prepare an environmental impact statement. 14
39 Congress did not explicitly provide a federal cause of action to persons seeking review of state decisions on NPDES applications. The District nonetheless claims that it has a federal cause of action implicit in the statutory scheme. The Maryland defendants, on the other hand, contend that federal law does not create such a cause of action and that the District is relegated to whatever rights and remedies may be available under Maryland law. 40 A cause of action may exist where the federal statute does not explicitly provide one. See, e. g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964). A court must look to Congress's intent when enacting the federal statute to determine whether a corresponding federal right of action is created. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). In determining whether a private right of action exists, a court must consider four questions: (1) Is the plaintiff a member of the special class for whom the statute was created? (2) Is there evidence of legislative intent to confer or deny a right? (3) Is it consistent with the purpose of the legislative scheme to imply the right? (4) Is the subject matter an area traditionally relegated to state law, so that a cause of action based solely on federal law would be inappropriate? Id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. 41 Having considered these factors, we believe a federal right of action is not implicit in the Clean Water Act. The District is a member of the general class designed to be protected by the Act. The Act's structure and legislative history, however, argue strongly against implying a federal cause of action. 15 In authorizing the creation of state NPDES permit programs, Congress made clear that state permits would be issued under State law (and) would be State, not Federal, actions .... 118 Cong.Rec. 33761 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History at 262 (remarks of Rep. Wright). Before granting a state authority to issue these permits, Congress requires the state to create adequate enforcement mechanisms for administering its program. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). A state can qualify to establish and administer under State law its own NPDES program only if the state attorney general submits a statement that the laws of such State . . . provide adequate authority to carry out the program. Id. 16 Among other requirements, 17 the state must have sufficient authority (t)o abate violations of the permit or the permit program, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement. Id. § 1342(b)(7). By requiring states to maintain or create sufficient legal and equitable rights and remedies to deal with violations of state permits in order to exercise permit-granting powers under the Act, Congress must have intended that states apply their own law in deciding controversies involving state permits. 42 Given the existence of adequate state remedies and the strong current of federalism in the Clean Water Act, we believe we should not infer a federal right of action in this case. The state courts are the proper forums for resolving questions about state NPDES permits, which are, after all, questions of state law. We therefore remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint insofar as it deals with Maryland's issuance of an NPDES permit for the Rock Creek plant.III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE 43 The District also contends that the Maryland defendants are violating the federal common law of nuisance by discharging effluent into Rock Creek. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized such a cause of action for states 18 injured by pollution of interstate or navigable waters. The Court concluded that such pollution presented a general federal question, with the action cognizable under federal common law in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). 19 To be entitled to equitable relief, the complainant must demonstrate that the defendant is carrying on an activity that is causing an injury or significant threat of injury to some cognizable interest of the complainant. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979). The District has failed to make such a showing and therefore is not entitled to equitable relief. 44 The district court in its opinion held that the District had failed to demonstrate any harm from the operation of the plant. We believe this finding is clearly supported in the record. The District did not have reliable data documenting the impact of the discharge of effluent by the plant on the quality of water in Rock Creek; in fact, the District's data on water quality came entirely from tests taken before the plant began operations. J.A. at 332-33. Furthermore, the available data were inconclusive. The parties disagreed on the proper level of dissolved oxygen to use in the Streeter-Phelps formula, which measures biochemical oxygen demand of a waterway, and the District presented no evidence on the recovery of the creek's oxygen levels in the twelve miles from point of discharge to the District's border. 45 Many variables affect a stream's water quality, for example, the natural aeration of the stream, its confluence with tributaries, the seasons, and the urban or rural setting of the stream. The District did not account for many of these variables in presenting its evidence to the district court. If the District had shown that the plant is injuring Rock Creek, it would have been entitled to some form of relief. On the present record, however, the district court properly concluded that the District had not demonstrated harm to Rock Creek. 20