Opinion ID: 2598851
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Extrinsic circumstances

Text: Henry last argues that extrinsic circumstances support his contention that he did not intend to be bound by the agreement. While the trial court pointed to the delay from the August mediation to Henry's first objection to the settlement's validity in February as evidence that Henry originally intended to be bound and was now only suffering from buyer's remorse, Henry argues that during the entire period he did not believe any agreement had occurred; therefore he had no reason to ask his lawyer to try and rescind the agreement. Henry claims his delay was simply the result of Brand's delay in reducing the agreement to a written document. Henry argues that his failure to abide by the agreement was further evidence of his not knowing that it was binding. Henry's argument does not account for what actually occurred during the recital and is not persuasive as to what occurred later. Henry was present after the mediation when Sanders, Brand, and Keene (Henry's lawyer) stated that the agreement was binding. Moreover, it is not entirely true that Henry failed to abide by the agreement. At one point Keene requested an extension of the date Henry was to leave the property, which suggests that Henry did in fact know there was an agreement. Also, at both sides' request, the trial was taken off the calendar, and no further settlement conferences or litigation ensued. Yet Henry took no step to resolve a matter that, according to his present position, was unresolved. Finally, we agree with Darlene's contention that to credit Henry's argument that his failure to abide by the agreement is evidence that he did not believe he was bound by it opens the door for any party to a contract to breach the contract and then use that breach as evidence of his or her belief that no contract had been entered. 2. Enforcing an agreement where the mediator failed to ask the parties whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily and whether they understood the agreement does not violate public policy. Henry contends that it would violate public policy to enforce an agreement where no one asked the parties whether they had entered into it voluntarily, understood its contents, and agreed to be bound. Henry argues that the presumption of enforcing settlements should not apply in these circumstances. Darlene responds that any such magic words requirement would itself be against public policy. We agree with Darlene. Henry argues that, because he was not asked whether he entered into the agreement voluntarily, no valid settlement was reached. He claims that the court erred in applying the presumption in favor of settlement, [16] as that presumption only applies to those settlements that are valid. Henry misconstrues both the law and Judge Thompson's statements. In his remarks, Judge Thompson stated that settlements are favored and should be enforced. But Judge Thompson was careful to note that the presumption applied only to a valid settlement: for their own sake we should enforce settlements when they're reached.  (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is clear that the court carefully determined the settlement to be valid before it applied the presumption of enforcement. In Crane v. Crane, [17] we held that a party need not expressly state on the record that it entered into a settlement agreement voluntarily for the agreement to be considered valid. [18] We made this finding based on the fact that Crane was represented by counsel and by looking to the record. [19] Henry distinguishes himself from Crane by arguing that, unlike Crane, he did not have the final settlement agreement before him, he was not present before a superior court judge, and he was not required to read or sign off on a written document. These distinctions do not call for a different result. Henry did not have an agreement before him because the parties had yet to put the oral agreement into written form. And the presence of a superior court judge is not required for the parties to enter into a binding agreement. Henry argues the lack of a judge is evidence that he did not intend the recital to be final. However, non-judicial settlement officers, mediators, and arbitrators are frequently used and Henry's rule would require a judge's presence to complete an agreement in any of these settings, an obviously unattractive rule. It is true that this case would be easier for usand would have been easier for the superior courtif the mediator had directly addressed the parties during the recorded session and confirmed that each understood the settlement and agreed with it. Simple affirmations by the parties of their understanding and intent to be bound may have obviated the need for an extensive evidentiary hearing and for later detailed reviews of the recitations made at the recorded session. Nonetheless, we reject Henry's contention that, without particular questions or recitations when a settlement is put on the record, either party may successfully attack the settlement. We encourage judges and mediators who conduct settlement proceedings, and who reach settlements, to confirm on the record directly with the parties their understanding of the settlement and their intentions to enter into it, but we reject the proposition that the failure to conduct such inquiries is necessarily fatal to the entry of a settlement. It was not clear error for Judge Thompson to find that Henry did intend to settle. It was not an abuse of discretion for Judge Thompson not to have required statements of voluntariness from the parties for the agreement to be valid. B. The Trial Court Properly Entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Minor Factual Errors in the Findings and Conclusions Do Not Require Reversal. Henry claims the trial court committed legal error by not reading the findings of fact and conclusions of law before signing them. He points to two mistaken dates [20] and a misstatement that Henry appeared personally rather than telephonically at the hearing. Henry also notes a substantive error in the divorce decree: The property table states that the Ford Marina is valued at $1,400,000 and apportions $700,000 to both Darlene and Henry, whereas paragraph 2 of the decree states that fifty-five percent of the value of the marina should be distributed to Darlene and forty-five percent to Henry. Darlene argues in response that Henry never properly objected to these factual errors at the trial court level to allow for their correction. She further contends that the errors are merely clerical and do not affect the substance of the divorce decree or findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree with Darlene. Henry failed to bring these errors to the superior court's attention after initially requesting additional time to bring objections under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), raising the possibility that he waived the alleged errors. But we need not decide whether Henry's failure to file objections under Rule 78(b) constituted a waiver of these arguments, because Henry's arguments for reversal lack merit. Although Henry is correct that the decree of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law do contain factual errors, the errors are not substantial. [21] They hardly constitute evidence that Judge Thompson did not read the documents. Further, the one substantive error does not warrant undoing the settlement. This is because the mistake in the distribution in the property table is evident from the text of that table. The property table states entire property (upper and lower) to be sold and proceeds distributed as set forth in Paragraph 2 below. Paragraph 2 thus controls and the division should be governed by the fifty-five percent/forty-five percent division in Darlene's favor found in that paragraph. Moreover, even if the document were ambiguous, the transcript of the recital of the agreement makes clear that the parties intended a fifty-five percent/forty-five percent split. There is, therefore, no basis to reverse the superior court's findings and conclusions. It is sufficient that the superior court correct the clerical errors concerning dates, note that Henry participated telephonically rather than in person at the hearing, and insert the correct distributional figures (fifty-five and forty-five percent of $1,400,000 for Darlene's and Henry's shares, respectively, of the marina). C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Issuing the Order To Enforce the Settlement Agreement. Henry argues that the order to enforce the settlement agreement grossly exceeded the terms of the actual agreement, a modification the court did not have the power to enforce. We disagree. Under the decree Darlene was charged with marketing the marina, and Henry agreed to undertake certain tasks to aid in that endeavor. The decree provided Darlene with payment for her services and advanced her the sum of $3,500. Darlene was to notify Henry of proposed expenditures in excess of this amount and obtain his consent. Darlene and Henry would then split these costs. When Henry failed to meet his obligations, Judge Thompson ordered Henry to pay Darlene $10,000 as an advance for her expenses in hiring people to help her clean up the Ford Marina. Henry claims this was a unilateral modification of the property settlement and thus impermissible. Henry relies on Davis v. Dykman, [22] where we found a settlement agreement invalid because it was uncertain. [23] The agreement failed to state a dollar amount of the settlement or any method for calculating the dollar amount. [24] Although the parties asked the superior court to fill in this gap for them, we held that `[t]he courts should not impose on a party any performance to which he [or she] did not and probably would not have agreed.' [25] Henry argues that the trial court should not have been allowed under Davis to order the additional payment. But Davis is inapposite. Here the trial court was faced with remedying a breach, not filling in the gaps of an agreement. Henry did not fulfill any of his responsibilities under the agreement with regard to the Ford Marina. He did not clean the property, sell the equipment on the property, or ensure the property was vacated by its tenants. Indeed, the condition of the property allegedly worsened after the August 31 mediation. In order to remedy the situation, Darlene requested in her motion to enforce that she be entitled to take all necessary actions and be compensated for her actions to ready the marina for sale. She also requested that she be advanced $10,000 for this purpose. Judge Thompson thus ordered Henry to pay Darlene an advance of $10,000 to accomplish this. Henry did not object to this request at the superior court level and only now voices his opposition. The order falls within the superior court's powers to enforce its own orders [26] and was not an abuse of the court's discretion. Henry also asks that the award of attorney's fees be vacated as an improper exercise of the court's authority. We decline to consider the argument because it is inadequately briefed. [27]