Opinion ID: 615433
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Officers Used Excessive Force Against Mattos

Text: Determining whether the force used against Jayzel Mattos was constitutionally excessive, we begin again by considering the nature and quality of the force used. Here, the taser was employed in dart-mode, which we have held constitute[s] an intermediate, significant level of force. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826. The taser's aluminum darts penetrated Jayzel's skin and delivered the intended dart-mode response: [t]he electrical impulse instantly overrides the victim's central nervous system, paralyzing the muscles throughout the body, rendering the target limp and helpless. Id. at 824. Jayzel felt an incredible burning and painful feeling locking all of [her] joints [and] muscles and [she] f[e]ll hard on the floor. It is against this backdrop that we consider the governmental interests at stake and the ultimate reasonableness of the officers' action. Considering the first governmental interest factor, the severity of the crime at issue, we are mindful that we must construe the facts in the light most favorable to Jayzel at this stage. See KRL, 512 F.3d at 1188-89. When Jayzel appeared in the hallway, Agarano asked to speak to Jayzel outside; she agreed, but before she could comply, Aikala entered the residence. When Aikala announced that Troy was under arrest, Jayzel was already standing in front of Troy. She did not immediately move out of the way. As Aikala moved in to arrest Troy, he pushed up against Jayzel's chest, at which point she extended [her] arm to stop [her] breasts from being smashed against Aikala's body. Aikala then asked Jayzel, Are you touching an officer? At the same time, Jayzel was speaking to Agarano, asking why Troy was being arrested, attempting to defuse the situation by saying that everyone should calm down and go outside, and expressing concern that the commotion might disturb her sleeping children who were in the residence. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Jayzel, and resolving all conflicts in her favor, the most that can be said about her actions is that, while standing between Troy and Aikala, she attempted to prevent Aikala from pressing up against her breasts. While this may have momentarily deterred Aikala's immediate access to Troy, it did not rise to the level of obstruction. Thus, under Graham, the severity of the crime, if any, was minimal. The next, and most important, Graham factor is whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Jayzel was the suspect against whom force was used, so we consider whether she posed an immediate threat to the officers' safety. The officers came to the residence in response to a 911 call made at Jayzel's request during a domestic dispute with Troy. Once the officers arrived and saw Jayzel, there were no objective reasons to believe that she was armed, she did not verbally threaten the officers, and her only physical contact with Aikala resulted from her defensively raising her hands to prevent him from pressing his body against hers after he came into contact with her. Jayzel's main contribution to the scene consisted of repeatedly entreating the officers and her husband to calm down and go outside so that her sleeping children would not be awakened. Jayzel posed no threat to the officers. The third enumerated governmental interest factor is whether Jayzel was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280. According to Jayzel's rendition of the facts, the most that can be said is that she minimally resisted Troy's arrest. She was standing between Aikala and Troy before Aikala moved in to arrest Troy, and her physical contact with Aikala was defensive, intended to protect her own body from contact with Aikala. That being said, when Aikala stated that Troy was under arrest, Jayzel did not immediately move out of the way to facilitate the arrest. For the purposes of this Graham factor, however, we draw a distinction between a failure to facilitate an arrest and active resistance to arrest. Moreover, the crux of this Graham factor is compliance with the officers' requests, or refusal to comply. Here, Jayzel was attempting to comply with Agarano's request to speak with her outside when she got physically caught in the middle between Aikala and Troy. Accordingly, this factor weighs in Jayzel's favor. Finally, it is important in this case that we consider the additional  `specific factors'  relevant to the totality of these circumstances. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (quoting Franklin, 31 F.3d at 876). While Jayzel herself did not pose any threat to the officers' safety, we must also consider the danger that the overall situation posed to the officers' safety and what effect that has on the reasonableness of the officers' actions. As we have recounted, the officers came to the Mattoses' residence in response to a 911 domestic dispute call. When they arrived they encountered Troy, who was sitting by himself outside the residence, hostile, seemingly intoxicated, six feet three inches tall and approximately 200 pounds. We have observed that [t]he volatility of situations involving domestic violence makes them particularly dangerous. United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.2005). When officers respond to a domestic abuse call, they understand that violence may be lurking and explode with little warning. Indeed, more officers are killed or injured on domestic violence calls than on any other type of call. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have also recognized that the exigencies of domestic abuse cases present dangers that, in an appropriate case, may override considerations of privacy. United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We take very seriously the danger that domestic disputes pose to law enforcement officers, and we have no trouble concluding that a reasonable officer arriving at the Mattoses' residence reasonably could be concerned about his or her safety. In light of such concerns, we have recognized that the exigencies of domestic abuse cases present dangers that ... may override considerations of privacy where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation was a warrantless entry into a residence for the purpose of intervening in a domestic dispute, protecting the potential victim, and gaining control over a volatile situation that could endanger the officers. Id.; see Martinez, 406 F.3d at 1165; United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (9th Cir.2004). Here, though, the alleged Fourth Amendment violation is the excessive use of force against the potential nonthreatening victim of the domestic dispute whom the officers ostensibly came to protect. Our previous reasoning for providing some Fourth Amendment leeway to officers who must enter a residence without a warrant in response to domestic disputes does not logically extend to officers who use an intermediate level of force on the non-threatening victim of a domestic dispute whom they have come to protect especially when the domestic dispute is seemingly over by the time the officers begin their investigation. In drawing this distinction, we are guided by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Scott. There, the Court observed that in weighing the Graham governmental interests in a situation where someone is likely to get hurteither a fleeing suspect or innocent bystandersit is appropriate in this process to take into account ... relative culpability. Scott, 550 U.S. at 384, 127 S.Ct. 1769. Given the procedural posture at this stage of the proceedings, we cannot say that Jayzel was culpable in this situation. We understand that Jayzel was unintentionally in the way when Aikala attempted to gain control over a potentially dangerous situation by arresting Troy, and we appreciate that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments... about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. At the same time, we are unable to identify any reasonableness in the conclusionwhether made in a split-second or after careful deliberationthat tasing the innocent wife of a large, drunk, angry man when there is no threat that either spouse has a weapon, is a prudent way to defuse a potentially, but not yet, dangerous situation. See Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281 (A desire to resolve quickly a potentially dangerous situation is not the type of governmental interest that, standing alone, justifies the use of force that may cause serious injury.). We stress that this unreasonableness is compounded by the officers' knowledge that there were children present in the home at the time. Finally, the fact that Aikala gave no warning to Jayzel before tasing her pushes this use of force far beyond the pale. We have previously concluded that an officer's failure to warn, when it is plausible to do so, weighs in favor of finding a constitutional violation. See Bryan, 630 F.3d at 831; Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004); Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1284; see also Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007) (denying qualified immunity for the use of a taser where the absence of any warningor of facts making clear that no warning was necessarymakes the circumstances of this case especially troubling). To summarize, Aikala used the intermediate force of a taser in dart-mode on Jayzel after he and the other officers arrived to ensure her safety. Her offense was minimal at most. She posed no threat to the officers. She minimally resisted Troy's arrest while attempting to protect her own body and to comply with Agarano's request that she speak to him outside, and she begged everyone not to wake her sleeping children. She bears minimal culpability for the escalation of the situation. The officers were faced with a potentially dangerous domestic dispute situation in which they reasonably felt that Troy could physically harm them if he chose to, but there was no indication that Troy intended to harm the officers or that he was armed. When Aikala encountered slight difficulty in arresting Troy because Jayzel was between the two men, Aikala tased her without warning. Considering the totality of these circumstances, we fail to see any reasonableness in the use of a taser in dart-mode against Jayzel. When all the material factual disputes are resolved in Jayzel's favor and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to her, we conclude that she has alleged a Fourth Amendment violation. That is, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the officers' use of force against Jayzel, as alleged, was constitutionally excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Brown, 574 F.3d 491 (denying qualified immunity to officers who tased the passenger-wife of a driver who evaded their initial attempts to pull him over when the wife refused to hang up the 911 call she made after the officers pulled her husband out of the car, threw him against the car, and handcuffed him); Bryan, 630 F.3d at 832 (holding that the plaintiff alleged a constitutional violation where he was tased in dart mode even though he was neither a flight risk, a dangerous felon, nor an immediate threat). [9]