Opinion ID: 891580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Length of Delay: Presumptively Prejudicial Delay

Text: {15} Barker is ambiguous as to what role the length of delay plays on the balancing test as a whole. See id. The extent of Barker's discussion of this issue is as follows: The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Id. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted). The Court's use of the phrase presumptively prejudicial delay has been the source of confusion, because it suggests that this threshold determination creates a presumption that may be determinative, but such a presumption is at odds with Barker's ad hoc, flexible balancing test. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The issue in the present case is whether, and to what extent, a determination that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial carries forward into the balance of the factors and the determination of whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. {16} With Barker's limited guidance, our cases have attempted to decipher the function of presumptively prejudicial delay on the overall inquiry into whether a defendant's right has been violated. In Zurla v. State, this Court held that a presumptively prejudicial length of delay creates an overall presumption that the defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. 109 N.M. 640, 646, 789 P.2d 588, 594 (1990). Therefore, [o]nce the defendant has demonstrated presumptively prejudicial delay and thus triggered the Barker v. Wingo analysis, the presumption of prejudice does not disappear. Rather, the burden of persuasion rests with the State to demonstrate that, on balance, the defendant's speedy trial right was not violated. Id. {17} Work v. State, 111 N.M. 145, 803 P.2d 234 (1990), a plurality opinion, called the holding in Zurla into question. In Work, the plurality followed Zurla and explicitly rejected the function of the presumption of prejudice as merely a `triggering mechanism' that necessarily brings into play an inquiry of the other three Barker factors. Work, 111 N.M. at 147, 803 P.2d at 236. The plurality argued that the presumption of prejudice `carries forward' and serves to shift to the [S]tate the burden to demonstrate that, on balance, the defendant's speedy trial right has not been violated. Id. Justice Ransom, in a specially concurring opinion, agree[d] with the principles of the continuing presumption of prejudice, weight, balancing, and burdens as relied upon in the opinion announced by the Court today, but concluded that the presumption of prejudice was entitled to little weight under the facts of that case. Id. at 149, 803 P.2d at 238 (Ransom, J., specially concurring). {18} Justices Baca and Wilson dissented from the Work plurality. Writing for the dissent, Justice Wilson argued that Zurla erroneously carried forward the presumption of prejudice. Work, 111 N.M. at 152, 803 P.2d at 241 (Wilson, J., dissenting). The dissent further argued that Barker offered no support for the plurality's characterization of the presumption of prejudice, because Barker's balancing test evenhandedly weigh[s] each piece of evidence without a compelling presumption tipping the scales one way or another. Work, 111 N.M. at 153, 803 P.2d at 242. On this issue, Justice Wilson concluded: In my view, the better rule is to hold that the question of actual prejudice is a factor which must be determined on balance. If a defendant brings forth evidence of prejudice, the [S]tate will have the burden of rebutting such evidence. If no evidence of prejudice is offered, then the scales are balanced. In this latter situation the question of actual prejudice would be neither for nor against either party, but neutral. Id. {19} Salandre v. State, 111 N.M. 422, 806 P.2d 562 (1991), resolved the disagreement expressed in Work. Salandre cited the Work plurality with approval and reaffirmed the holding in Zurla. Salandre reiterated that [p]resumptively prejudicial delay refers to prejudice to the fundamental right to a speedy trial, not to specific prejudice covered by the fourth [ Barker ] element, much less simply to impairment of the defense at trial.... [O]nce the defendant demonstrates existence of presumptively prejudicial delay, the burden of persuasion rests with the [S]tate to demonstrate that, on balance, the defendant's speedy trial right was not violated. Id. at 427, 806 P.2d at 567 (quoting Zurla, 109 N.M. at 646, 789 P.2d at 594). By holding that presumptively prejudicial delay creates the presumption that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, Zurla, Work, and Salandre require that the State affirmatively sway the balance of factors in its favor, otherwise the reviewing court must conclude that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. Under this rule, where the State fails to meet its burden, the defendant is entitled to a dismissal of all charges based solely on the threshold determination that the length of delay was presumptively prejudicial. {20} While other courts and commentators have struggled with this issue, the overwhelming majority have rejected an interpretation of Barker that creates the kind of presumption that our cases have adopted. Uviller, supra, at 1384-85. (Whether or not such a shift in the vital burden is wise, it seems clear that it is unintended by the Court. Rather, it is likely that the choice of the term `presumptively prejudicial' in the duration discussion was simply inadvertent. Probably, the Court meant to say simply that a claim of denial of speedy trial may be heard after the passage of a period of time which is, prima facie, unreasonable in the circumstances.). Though Barker's limited treatment of this issue leaves room for various interpretations, no federal circuit courts have adopted a rationale similar to ours, in which the determination of presumptive prejudice creates a presumption that the defendant's right has been violated. See 5 LaFave et al., supra, § 18.2(b) (The reference to `delay which is presumptively prejudicial' contributes to this confusion, but viewing the case in its entirety it seems fair to say that this phrase does not mean a period of time so long that it may actually be presumed the defense at trial would be impaired. Nor does it mean that once a sufficient time has been shown the prosecution has the burden of establishing that in fact there was no prejudice. (footnote omitted)). The Circuit Courts of Appeals uniformly treat the threshold inquiry of whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial as merely a triggering mechanism and do not carry forward any presumption based on this determination. See United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 432 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that rather than carrying prejudice forward from presumptively prejudicial delay, prejudice to the defendant may only be presumed `when the delay is great and attributable to the government' (quoting United States v. Shell, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir.1992))); United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 597-600 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336-37 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that the threshold determination of presumptively prejudicial delay merely entitle[s the defendant] to a presumption of prejudice sufficient to proceed with the other considerations in the Barker analysis); United States v. Batie, 433 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir.2006) (The first factor, length of delay, functions as a gatekeeper.); United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 87 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148-49 (2nd Cir.1977) ([L]ength alone is not dispositive, the length of the delay ... does unquestionably `trigger' our review of the three other factors enumerated in Barker and our consideration of such other circumstances as may be relevant. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 849 (D.C.Cir.1975); Ricon v. Garrison, 517 F.2d 628, 632-33 (4th Cir.1975) (replacing presumptively prejudicial delay with sufficiently unusual delay). {21} In Zurla, Work, and Salandre, we considered only Barker's ambiguous language and failed to consider the manner in which the rule announced in Barker consistently has been applied by the Circuit Courts of Appeals and interpreted by scholarly commentators. In light of the overwhelming consensus among the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and our policy of providing a functional analysis based on the facts and circumstances of each case, we abolish the presumption that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated based solely on the threshold determination that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial. We hold instead that a presumptively prejudicial length of delay is simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry into the Barker factors. {22} We, therefore, modify the standards set forth in Zurla, Work, and Salandre to the extent they are inconsistent with this holding. However, where the defendant proves actual prejudice, see infra Part II.E, the State retains its burden of persuasion on the ultimate question of whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. {23} If a court determines that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial, then it should consider the length of delay as one of four factors in the analysis, none of which alone are sufficient to find a violation of the right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. As discussed in Part III of this Opinion, we are enacting new guidelines to aid district courts in determining when the length of delay may become presumptively prejudicial. However, for purposes of this case, because the district court relied on our prior guidelines, we review the court's holding according to those guidelines. The district court found that the present case is a simple case in which nine months was considered presumptively prejudicial. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 9, 145 N.M. 242, 195 P.3d 1254. Therefore, the delay of ten months and six days was sufficient to trigger inquiry into the Barker factors. {24} Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the State. The delay in this case scarcely crosses the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Therefore, the delay was not extraordinary and does not weigh heavily in Defendant's favor. See id. at 657-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (holding that six years of delay attributable to the Government's negligence far exceeds the threshold needed to state a speedy trial claim; indeed, we have called shorter delays `extraordinary'); United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that a three-year and nine-month delay was too short to weigh heavily in the defendant's favor); United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 489-91 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that delay over five years weighed heavily in the defendant's favor); Shell, 974 F.2d at 1036 (Five years delay attributable to the government's mishandling of Shell's file, like the eight year delay in Doggett, creates a strong presumption of prejudice.).