Opinion ID: 1407787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction and Failure to Object

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving jury instruction 27. The instruction stated as elements of aggravated sexual assault that defendant performed or attempted to perform sexual acts with or upon the victim without her consent and that in the course of the act defendant either 3.... a. caused bodily injury to [the victim]; or c. [sic] compelled or attempted to compel [the victim] to submit to submit [sic] to rape, forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse by threat of kidnapping, death, or serious bodily injury to be inflicted imminently on any person; and 4. That the defendant did so knowingly or intentionally or recklessly. Defendant failed to object to the instruction at the trial, even when specifically queried by the court. Now, however, he objects to the inclusion of recklessly as a culpable mental state. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c) provides: No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. Under the guidance of this rule, we have been very reluctant to review jury instructions and other matters not preserved for appeal by means of an objection at trial. In State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987), we declined to review a challenged jury instruction under the manifest error exception to rule 19(c) even though, in retrospect, the instruction seemed ill-advised. We noted that the defendant's counsel consciously chose not to object and affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong with the instruction. Id. at 1023. In Medina, as in the instant case, defense counsel read the instruction and then affirmatively stated that she had no objection. We found no occasion to reach that issue because it was not properly preserved below. Id.; see also State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989). Finally, in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), we emphasized, We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error. Id. at 1220 (footnote omitted). There we explained that this rule, known as the invited error doctrine, serves two purposes. First, it fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. Id. (citations omitted). In the instant case, the trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to object to jury instruction 27, and he failed to do so. Consequently, we hold, consistent with our previous cases, that this defendant `cannot lead the court into error by failing to object and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions.' Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah.Ct.App.1989)). Defendant further argues, It would be manifestly unjust and deny appellant due process of law to incarcerate him for a crime that should not be recognized in Utah, i.e., reckless aggravated sexual assault, apparently attempting to invoke the exception to rule 19(c). Defendant's brief sets forth the culpable mental states specified or implied for sex crimes and argues that recklessness does not appear among them. He then seeks to establish manifest injustice by relying on State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), and State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993), for the proposition that an accused cannot be prosecuted for a crime the state does not recognize. The jury instruction in Haston permitted the jury to consider attempted depraved indifference homicide, a crime which our holding in Vigil declared to be unrecognized in Utah and which is, prima facie, logically inconsistent since attempt is always an intent crime. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 845-46 ([W]e ... construe the intent language in paragraph (2) to limit the attempt statute to offenses with a mental state of `intent.'). As we explained in State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989): [W]hen faced with a claim that a particular assertion of instructional error not raised at trial should be considered on appeal because failure to do so would result in manifest injustice under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c), we will determine whether to review such a claim of error under the same standard we use when determining the presence of plain error under Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). That standard is two-pronged. First, the error must be obvious. Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party. Assuming that the first prong is met in the instant case, it is clear to us that the second prong cannot be met. The undisputed facts are that the victim's injuries were the result of an intentional beating and sexual assault, which defendant himself insists must statutorily and logically always be knowing or intentional. He has not been convicted of a crime not recognized in this state. Consequently, we conclude that no manifest injustice will result from our holding.