Opinion ID: 2387713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was fitchburg entitled to a directed verdict on the contract claim?

Text: We have already concluded that Corrente did not satisfy two conditions of her policy, namely, the filing of a proof of loss in terms that would satisfy the policy requirements and, her failure to appear for a deposition as required by the policy. She argues, however, that she should properly be absolved from these two requirements by reason of having submitted to lengthy interrogations (though unsworn) by two investigators designated by Fitchburg. One interview was conducted by Arthur Currier, an insurance adjustor, and one interview was conducted by Currier and Ernest Reed, a special investigator. Although plaintiff's answers were vague in response to the questions propounded at these interviews, a trier of fact might deem that she gave to the investigators all the information that she had. Her lack of knowledge as to the source of the jewelry, save that they were gifts from her parents and grandparents, would not have been cured if she had given these answers under oath. Corrente also points out in respect to the proof-of-loss condition that she had provided a notice to Fitchburg that itemized all the items that had been lost and contained an estimated value based on appraisals from Ross-Simons. These were the same appraisals that had been given to Fitchburg in February 1980 when she added the theft endorsement to her policy. We have stated in Siravo v. Great American Insurance Co., 122 R.I. 538, 410 A.2d 116 (1980), that the failure to submit a timely proof of loss will not defeat recovery unless the insurer can demonstrate that it has been prejudiced. We were dealing with the question of timeliness in that case. However, in the case at bar, we cannot say that a question of fact was not presented in respect to whether Fitchburg was prejudiced by the untimely and inadequate proof of loss and by Corrente's declining to submit to a sworn deposition. It was undisputed that the value of the items would of necessity be established by appraisals of which the company had notice. The source of purchase of the items, while no doubt of interest, could scarcely be said to be critical since these items ranged in age from four to ten years. In reviewing the trial justice's decision on a motion for directed verdict, we apply the oft-stated doctrine that we are bound by the same rules that govern the trial justice. We must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without considering the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. We must draw from that evidence only those reasonable inferences that support the position of the nonmoving party. If such analysis reveals issues upon which reasonable minds could differ, the motion for directed verdict should be denied and the jury should be allowed to resolve the issues of fact presented. See, e.g., Souza v. Narragansett Council, Boy Scouts of America, 488 A.2d 713 (R.I. 1985); Bitgood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 481 A.2d 1001 (R.I. 1984); AAA Pool Service & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 479 A.2d 112 (R.I. 1984); Welsh Manufacturing, Division of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton's Inc., 474 A.2d 436 (R.I. 1984); Katz v. Prete, 459 A.2d 81 (R.I. 1983). Although it may be a close question concerning whether the conduct of the investigators was sufficiently egregious to excuse Corrente from failing to submit to the deposition, we must concede that certain of their questions created such an atmosphere of hostility and accusation as to cause reasonable minds to differ concerning whether this conduct barred Fitchburg from insisting upon the sworn deposition. Therefore, the trial justice did not err in declining to grant Fitchburg's motion for a directed verdict on the contract claim.