Opinion ID: 688156
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bostick's abandonment of his luggage.

Text: 22 Bostick also argues that the district court erred when it held that he had abandoned his luggage in the airport, and therefore could not establish an expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. A search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only occurs when state action infringes upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. But if Bostick abandoned his luggage, its subsequent seizure and search would not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. See Rem, 984 F.2d at 810. The test for abandonment is whether an individual has retained any reasonable expectation of privacy in an object. Id. 23 The district court did not err when it held that Bostick had abandoned his luggage and therefore could not establish an expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Bostick told agents Fulkerson and Johnson that he had not checked any luggage and thereby disavowed its ownership. Bostick's denial of ownership of the suitcase is, in our view, sufficient to preclude his assertion of any legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag. United States v. Rush, 890 F.2d 45, 48 (7th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1096 (7th Cir.1993) (defendant had no expectation of privacy in bag where he denied ownership). Thus, Bostick cannot show that he had an actual subjective expectation of privacy, when his disavowal of his luggage is considered in terms of the objective test used to evaluate Fourth Amendment claims. See Rem, 984 F.2d at 810 (because subjective intent could be any hindsight excuse that fits the situation ... [w]e must instead examine the objective facts ...); Rush, 890 F.2d at 48; Smith, 3 F.3d at 1096. Bostick's departure from the terminal simply confirmed his disavowal of ownership. See Rem, 984 F.2d at 811-812 (defendant abandoned luggage where he did not check his luggage, placed it in public rack remote from his private sleeper car, and abruptly left train at a nonpassenger stop). Bostick's expectation of privacy is also patently unreasonable. As this court has stated: [a]ppellants cannot have it both ways; they cannot eschew ownership of the bag and then assert that a search of it violates their Fourth Amendment rights. Smith, 3 F.2d at 1096. Otherwise, a suspect would be able to thwart legitimate law enforcement initiatives by abandoning luggage yet preserving an option to suppress evidence obtained as a result of that abandonment. That is exactly what Bostick would like to do in this case. But Bostick cannot have it both ways; the district court did not err when it held that Bostick abandoned his luggage. Thus the resulting seizure and search of that luggage did not violate a legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.