Opinion ID: 1938741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the march 13 communication

Text: In support of its position that the trial justice misapplied the statute of frauds, UXB asserted that the March 13 cover letter signed by the Parkers' attorney, coupled with the accompanying unsigned purchase-and-sale agreements, signified the Parkers' agreement to all elements essential to a contract or agreement for the sale of land and thus satisfied the statute of frauds. It is well established that [t]he statute of frauds does not require contracts for the sale of land to be in writing[,] but if such a contract be an oral agreement, it will be enforced only if evidenced by a sufficient memorandum. Preble v. Higgins, 43 R.I. 10, 16, 109 A. 707, 710 (1920). See Durepo v. May, 73 R.I. 71, 76, 54 A.2d 15, 18 (1947). Furthermore, such a memorandum need not comprise a single writing: essential terms of a sale can be included in the writing itself or by a reference in that writing to another document which supplies the missing information. Cunha v. Callery, 29 R.I. 230, 231-32, 69 A. 1001, 1001 (1908). Moreover, the requisite signature need not be that of the party to be charged, provided an authorized agent intends by signing to vouch for the accuracy of the terms of the agreement. [1] MacKnight v. Pansey, 122 R.I. 774, 785, 412 A.2d 236, 242 (1980). Despite the flexibility of § 9-1-4, it remains axiomatic that in order to satisfy the statute of frauds, a memorandum must contain evidence that a contract has been made by [the parties] or offered by the signatory [of the memorandum] to the other [party]. 2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 6.7, at 136 (1990). Accord Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D.Cal. 1992); Thornton v. Kelly, 11 R.I. 498, 500 (1877); Restatement (Second) Contracts § 131 (1981). See FMC Finance Corp. v. Reed, 592 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir.1979). A contract exists when each party has manifested an objective intent to promise or be bound. Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I. 1989); 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 3.6, at 169 (1990). A writing devoid of such an intent fails to prove the existence of a contract, Read v. Henzel, 67 A.D.2d 186, 189, 415 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (1979), and therefore does not satisfy the statute of frauds, Centredale Investment Co. v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 540 F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir.1976). See Sholovitz v. Noorigian, 42 R.I. 282, 285, 107 A. 94, 95 (1919) (writing must manifest parties' respective intention to sell and to purchase to satisfy statute of frauds). A determination that the March 13 communication failed to objectively manifest an intent on the part of the Parkers to be bound therefore mandates a conclusion that the statute of frauds has not been satisfied. See Centredale Investment Co., 540 F.2d at 18-19. Examination of the March 13 letter and proposed purchase and sale agreements revealed that instead of attesting to the Parkers' intention to be bound to sell the property to UXB, the documents clearly disclosed that the Parkers did not possess an intent to be bound. The letter from Kinder indicated that instead of accepting the terms of the March 1 proposed agreements, UXB had suggested revisions, most of which the Parkers acknowledged in their March 13 proposed agreements. The letter also manifested disagreement over what cash deposit, if any, was required. In this regard, the letter merely reflected a problem that plagued the parties throughout their negotiations. UXB admitted that it never offered a cash deposit beyond the original $5,000 but contended that the deposit issue was resolved at the March 30 meeting. In any event, to the extent the March 13 letter indicated that negotiations were still ongoing, the letter conveyed that the Parkers possessed no intent to be bound. See Read, 67 A.D.2d at 189, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 523. Furthermore, the letter indicated that as of March 13, the Parkers looked forward to consummating the purchase and sale of the property at some future date and that although they viewed the proposed contract terms as reasonable, they contemplated execution of a formal written contract in the future. Thus, the March 13 correspondence further evidenced that the Parkers did not intend to be legally bound at that time. See Boyd, 553 A.2d at 134; O'Donnell v. Smith, 123 A. 291, 291-92 (1924); 1 Farnsworth, § 3.8 at 178-79. Obviously, had the Parkers intended to be bound to sell the property, they could have signed the proposed March 13 purchase-and-sale agreements. They chose not to sign. Instead of manifesting the existence of a contract between UXB and the Parkers, the March 13 correspondence indicated that the Parkers did not intend to be bound prior to the execution of a formal contract. Consequently, the March 13 communication did not satisfy the statute of frauds. Green v. Interstate United Management Services Corp., 748 F.2d 827, 830 (3d Cir.1984); Conaway v. 20th Century Corp., 491 Pa. 189, 201, 420 A.2d 405, 411 (1980). To hold otherwise would conflict sharply with this court's policy of affording parties to business transactions the freedom to negotiate without fear that they will be bound by mere discussion. Boyd, 553 A.2d at 134.