Opinion ID: 157623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Face of the Indictment Approach

Text: 71 The operation of Mr. Nichols' proposed approach was demonstrated in Terry. There, the defendants were charged and convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a), for firing a shotgun at an occupied vehicle while in a national forest. The driver of the vehicle escaped unhurt, but the vehicle sustained $2,869 in damage. No guideline expressly covered the offense of conviction so section 2X5.1 instructed the district court to apply the most analogous guideline. The district court applied the guideline for aggravated assault. See 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(a). 72 On appeal, the defendants argued the district court should have applied the guideline for property damage or destruction. See 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.3(a). The court of appeals disagreed. It began by stating that in determining which guideline is most analogous, the sentencing court must ... look to 'the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted.'  Terry, 86 F.3d at 357 (quoting 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a)). The court then examined the indictment and noted it charged that the defendants did unlawfully and maliciously shoot at an occupied vehicle, putting in peril the life of the occupant therein. Id. at 358. The court concluded: 73 [W]e believe the indictment in this case describes conduct much more serious than simple property damage.... Here the indictment charges that the defendants acted with malice and that they actually imperiled the life of another person. We recognize that the conduct described in the indictment does not match the Guidelines' definition of aggravated assault perfectly, but a perfect match is not required. The defendants' argument fails because the conduct charged in the indictment is more like aggravated assault than like property damage or destruction. 74 Id.; see also Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314 (utilizing the same approach to compare guidelines). The Terry method informs our judgment here. 75 The pertinent count of conviction in Mr. Nichols' case is Count One of the indictment. Count One charges him with conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. As part of the offense conduct charged in that count, the government alleges Mr. Nichols intended with premeditation to kill the persons in the Murrah building. Paragraph two alleges [i]t was the object of the conspiracy to kill and injure innocent persons and to damage property of the United States. And paragraph thirty-eight of the same count further alleges Mr. Nichols intended the truck bomb explosion to result in death and personal injury. Given the indictment's allegations of premeditation and malice, we think it clear the conduct described in Count One is more like first-degree murder under section 2A1.1 than property damage under section 2K1.4. See United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137, 1140 n. 2 (10th Cir.1993) (describing requirements for first-degree murder). The district court did not err in selecting as it did. 76 We further hold that even if the indictment had omitted the allegations of intent to kill and premeditation, the first-degree murder guideline would remain the most analogous because the doctrine of felony murder would serve to imply the malice as a matter of law and obviate the need for premeditation. The felony-murder rule provides that an unintended death resulting from the commission or attempted commission of certain felonies is murder in the first degree. The doctrine circumvents the normal mens rea requirements of first-degree murder and requires only an intent to commit the underlying felony. See United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 1086, 143 L.Ed.2d 87 (1999). As we recently noted, 77 [t]here is an intended felony and an unintended homicide. The malice which plays a part in the commission of the felony is transferred by the law to the homicide. As a result of the fictional transfer, the homicide is deemed committed with malice; and a homicide with malice is, by definition, common-law murder. 78 United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 485 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 147, at 296-97 (15th ed.1994)). The felony-murder rule also eliminates the need for a finding of premeditation. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); Nguyen, 155 F.3d at 1229; United States v. El-Zoubi, 993 F.2d 442, 449 (5th Cir.1993). 79 At present, the felony-murder rule is incorporated into 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). That statute provides in pertinent part that [e]very murder ... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnaping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery ... is murder in the first degree. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994). Typically, prosecutors utilize the doctrine at the guilt phase of a trial to garner a first-degree murder conviction. But use of the rule is not so strictly limited. The Sentencing Guidelines also incorporate the felony-murder rule and provide that guideline 2A1.1 also applies when death results from the commission of certain felonies. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1. Indeed, our sister circuits have made use of the felony-murder rule at sentencing even where the case was not tried on a felony murder theory. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 130-31 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Tham, 118 F.3d 1501, 1505-11 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 672 (8th Cir.1993), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 41 F.3d 361 (8th Cir.1994). Thus, a felony murder conviction is not a procedural prerequisite to use of the doctrine at sentencing. 80 Mr. Nichols argues that his most serious offense of conviction, conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a, cannot serve as the predicate felony because that offense is not listed among the triggering felonies in 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). We disagree. 81 Initially, we note that courts are not bound by the constraints of section 1111(a) at sentencing. As the district court correctly observed, the situation now is different because we're not looking at the liability; we're looking at the punishment that is appropriate. The Sentencing Guidelines' restatement of the felony-murder rule is not as limited as the articulation of the rule in section 1111(a). The Guidelines provide that guideline 2A1.1 also applies when death results from the commission of certain felonies, 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1 (emphasis added), but the Guidelines do not delineate what felonies suffice. That decision is left for judicial determination. See, e.g., Tocco, 135 F.3d at 130-31 (suggesting section 1111(a) as indicative of which felonies are included as certain felonies). 82 Recognizing that we are not bound by section 1111(a), we nevertheless think it appropriate to work within the scope of that statute. The doctrine of felony murder expresses a highly artificial concept that generally deserves no extension beyond its required application. See People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (1966), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 18 Cal.4th 470, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 (1998). In keeping with our desire not to unduly expand the doctrine, we hold our decision in the context of sentencing must be made with 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) as a guide. Ultimately, our task is to determine whether Mr. Nichols' offense of conviction, as charged and described in Count One of the indictment, could serve as a predicate felony under section 1111(a). We believe it can. 83 The substantive offense of using an explosive weapon of mass destruction is functionally equivalent to the arson listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). 5 See United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 948-49 (4th Cir.1996) (reaching the same conclusion with respect to cases involving explosive devices under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)); United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 779-82 (7th Cir.1994) (same). The court in Prevatte persuasively noted that when death results, crimes involving explosive devices should be treated no differently under the felony-murder rule than those involving arson. 84 [T]o hold that a death caused by fire could be punished under the first degree murder guideline but that a death caused by a bomb was to be punished more leniently ... would attribute to Congress a result that would be anything but realistic or rational. We decline to attribute such a result to the legislative branch. 85 Id. at 782. We agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion and extend its reasoning to an offense involving explosives under 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. 86 The fact Mr. Nichols was convicted of conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction, and was in fact acquitted of the substantive charge, does not alter our conclusion. Section 2332a makes no distinction between a person who uses a weapon of mass destruction or conspires to use one. The statute provides in pertinent part: 87 A person who uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction ... shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 88 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (1994). Congress did not create different punishments for the conspiracy or underlying substantive offense, leading to the inference it viewed the two as equivalent in consequence and severity. This is especially so because Congress normally treats conspiracy as a crime punished by no more than five years of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). The legislature's special treatment strongly suggests we should not distinguish between using an explosive weapon of mass destruction or conspiring to do so in determining the proper punishment in this case. 89 Furthermore, the felony-murder statute does not require actual commission of the predicate offense. Rather, the statute provides that inchoate offenses, such as an attempt to commit the crime, are also sufficient. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994). This lends further support for concluding that conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction, also a form of inchoate offense, may suffice as a predicate offense to felony murder. 90 We understand there are degrees of inchoate offenses, and conspiracy requires much less than attempt. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.4(c), at 530 (2d ed. 1986) ([U]nder attempt law it must be shown that the defendant has taken ... a 'substantial step' toward commission of the crime.... Conspiracy law, however, attacks inchoate crime at a far more incipient stage--the crime of conspiracy is complete at the time of the agreement....). However, given the allegations of overt acts stated in the indictment, we are persuaded Mr. Nichols' actions were more akin to attempt and should not be treated any differently at sentencing. 91 We are satisfied our interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) in the context of sentencing promotes the rationale normally associated with the felony-murder rule. Although often skeptical of the wisdom of the felony murder rule, courts and commentators generally agree that the rule was conceived to deter the commission of certain dangerous felonies. The felony-murder rule not only deters felons from killing during crime, but also deters potential felons from committing the predicate offense in the first place. Tham, 118 F.3d at 1509-10 (citations omitted). The underlying offense of which Mr. Nichols was convicted, conspiring to use an explosive weapon of mass destruction, as charged and described in Count One of the indictment, presents a great danger to the public. That Mr. Nichols was not convicted of the substantive offense does not mitigate the dangerousness of his actions. As has been stated by a respected commentator: 92 [T]he act of reaching agreement with one or more other persons on an unlawful purpose is a clear[ ] manifestation of intent.... It is less likely that the defendant will turn back, for a conspirator who has committed himself to support his associates may be less likely to violate this commitment than he would be to revise a purely private decision.... The agreement also increases the danger to society, for by a division of labor the group is more likely to be able to bring about the criminal result. This is particularly true when the objects of the conspiracy are ambitious and elaborate. 93 LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law § 6.4(c), at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961). Given the dangerousness of such an offense, we think it appropriate to attach the severe consequences of guideline 2A1.1 at sentencing. 94 Mr. Nichols refers us to United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782 (10th Cir.1990), for the proposition that the any arson language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) is limited to the arson described in 18 U.S.C. § 81. Any extension of section 1111(a), he argues, would be over-expansive and impermissible in light of Bedonie. We have reviewed that decision and find it inapposite. 95 In Bedonie, the defendants were convicted of first-degree murder on a felony murder theory. The defendants had set fire to two police vehicles while in Indian country, killing the persons inside. The district court instructed the jury that it had to return a verdict of first-degree murder if it found the deaths resulted from the commission or attempted commission of arson. The court defined arson by reference to a Utah statute. 96 On appeal, the defendants argued the trial court erred in relying on the Utah statute because that statute could not serve as the predicate to felony murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). They contended the only proper predicate was 18 U.S.C. § 81, the federal arson statute, which by its own terms did not apply to setting fire to motor vehicles. Because section 81 was inapposite on the facts, they argued, there could be no felony murder. The government countered that the any arson language of section 1111(a) did not limit itself to the arson contemplated in section 81 and that the definitions of predicate crimes could be supplied by state statute. 97 We rejected both parties' arguments and affirmed the first-degree murder conviction. Taking the government's argument first, we held that in prosecuting a defendant for first degree murder under the 'felony-murder' provision of § 1111(a), the predicate crime shall be defined by reference to the appropriate federal statute. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). We then went further and limited the arson listed in section 1111(a) to the federal crime defined in 18 U.S.C. § 81. To hold otherwise, we stated, would permit the government to select the statute with the definition most favorable to prosecution. Id. at 788. Our decision next disposed of the defendants' argument that section 81 did not apply to motor vehicles. We held that the plain and ordinary meaning of § 81 criminalizes the burning of a motor vehicle ... [and that the] statute's terms provide[d] sufficient notice of the criminality of such conduct. Id. at 790. Because the defendants violated section 81 and death resulted from the commission of that offense, we concluded the first-degree murder conviction was proper. 98 Thus exposing the particulars of the case, it becomes evident Bedonie does not bind us here. First, the proposition upon which Mr. Nichols relies--that the any arson language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) is limited to 18 U.S.C. § 81--is dictum. Bedonie 's resolution of the defendants' argument disposed of the case in toto. Thus, any discussion of proper predicate felonies was superfluous. Moreover, in Bedonie we were asked to decide only whether a state statute, the Utah statute, could define the predicate arson felony, and not whether federal statutes other than section 81 would suffice. Second, Bedoniedoes not purport to pertain to application of the felony-murder rule at sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Nichols' reliance on Bedonie is misplaced.