Opinion ID: 2464715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: District Court Referring to AI as the victim

Text: [¶ 24] Sanchez contends that reversible error occurred when the district court referred to AI as the victim in the case. Sanchez claims the district court's actions violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and effectively nullified his claim of self-defense. [¶ 25] At issue is the following statement made during the State's voir dire, which we have highlighted and placed in context: [4] THE COURT: First of all, this case happened February 13, 2008. It happened... in Rawlins, Wyoming. That's in Carbon County. It's in the ... Apartments. Now, I don't know if there has been much media coverage, but you already know who the defendant is in this case. It is Mr. Henry R. Sanchez. The victim is [AI]. Does anybody know about this case? Has anybody heard about this case prior to coming in here today? [Emphasis added.] Sanchez acknowledges that he did not object to the alleged error at trial and, consequently, he bears the burden of demonstrating plain error. Under the plain error doctrine, Sanchez must prove, by reference to the record, the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way and resulting material prejudice to a substantial right. Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 797-98 (Wyo.2006); Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 91, 99 P.3d 928, 954 (Wyo. 2004). To establish material prejudice, Sanchez must show a reasonable possibility exists that he would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the error. Miller, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d at 798. We find that Sanchez has not satisfied his burden. [¶ 26] Primarily, we are not convinced that any error occurred in this instance. Sanchez's entire argument is premised on a contention that the district court improperly instructed the jury panel, and thus members of the seated jury, that AI was, in fact, the victim in the case. [5] However, viewing the challenged statement in proper context, it is clear the district court was simply describing the alleged roles of the major identified players in the case in an effort to ascertain if any of the potential jurors had knowledge of the case, or had any ties to it or the parties which might prevent them from being impartial or fair. The district court did not tell the panel that, as a matter of law, it had to consider AI to be a victim, much less Sanchez's victim. [¶ 27] Moreover, we are not persuaded the district court's statement materially prejudiced Sanchez. The district court's description of AI as the victim was a single, isolated incident that occurred at the beginning of a four-day trial. The jury was instructed that it was the sole judge of the facts of the case and that it was to disregard any comment the court made regarding the facts in assessing Sanchez's guilt or innocence on the charged offenses. Additionally, it was uncontested at trial that AI was the victim of a vicious beating. [6] The only real dispute concerned whether Sanchez was her assailant and, if so, whether he was the first aggressor or acted in self-defense. Lastly, as already noted, the evidence of Sanchez's guilt was substantial. After careful consideration of the record, we do not believe a reasonable possibility exists that the jury's verdict would have been more favorable to Sanchez in the absence of that isolated statement. Accordingly, we cannot find the existence of plain error.