Opinion ID: 185189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims based upon the APA

Text: 14 The Union first contends that MarAd's order is invalid under the APA because it is arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). The MarAd responds that decisions regarding transfers of registry are committed to agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), and therefore outside the range of judicial review authorized in the APA. If the MarAd is correct, then this court lacks jurisdiction over the Union's claims based upon the APA. See, e.g., ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 282, 287 (1987). 15 The MarAd concedes that its regulations provide specific criteria to govern its decisions regarding transfers of registry, but contends that, as in National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (NFFE), the subject matter of the agency's decision does not admit of judicially manageable standards. We agree. In NFFE, we were asked to review an APA challenge to the closure of certain military bases. The Secretary of Defense had created a Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and directed it to identify which bases should be closed or realigned. Id. at 402. The Secretary listed nine criteria upon the basis of which the Commission was to make its recommendations, see id., but the Commission itself decided that, of the nine, the military value of a base should be the preeminent factor. Id. at 405-06. After the Commission had submitted its recommendations to the Secretary, the Congress passed the Base Closure Act directing the Secretary to implement them. See id. at 403. 16 The court held that the Secretary's decisions regarding base closures and realignments were committed to agency discretion by law and hence not subject to review under the APA. See id. at 405. Although the Base Closure Act incorporated the nine specific criteria that had informed the Secretary's closure and realignment decisions, the court held that his decisions were not reviewable because the subject matter of those criteria is not 'judicially manageable.'  Id. at 405; see Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). Review of the Secretary's decisions would require second guessing the Secretary's assessment of the nation's military force structure and the military value of the bases within that structure, and courts are ill-equipped to conduct reviews of the nation's military policy. Id. at 405-06. 17 Even a cursory examination of the order under review in this case reveals that the primary factors driving the MarAd's decision are national defense, the adequacy of the merchant marine, foreign policy, and the national interest. Indeed, the MarAd specifically consulted the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy to aid in its decision, and the overwhelming majority of the analysis in the agency's decision relates to these factors. Were we to decide whether the MarAd's order is reasonable, we would necessarily be second guessing not only the Executive's determinations regarding the military value of the eight vessels but also its judgments on questions of foreign policy and national interest. These are not subjects fit for judicial involvement. See, e.g., People's Mojahedin Org. v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 18 The Union attempts to distinguish NFFE on the ground that the concededly preeminent factor in the decision under review in that case was the military value of the bases, whereas in this case consideration of the national defense was but one factor [the MarAd] was required to consider per its own regulations. As we have noted, however, considerations of national security, foreign policy, and national interest were clearly at the center of the MarAd's decision; the Union does not even suggest that the other criteria listed in the regulations were given similar weight in this case. 19 The Union also argues that the MarAd's decision must be subject to review for conformity with the APA because the Hobbs Act specifically provides that the courts of appeal have: 20 jurisdiction ... to determine the validity of-- 21 (3) all rules, regulations, or final orders of-- 22 (A) the Secretary of Transportation issued pursuant to section 2, 9, 37, or 41 of the Shipping Act, 1916 ... 23 28 U.S.C. 2342(3)(A). That the courts have statutory jurisdiction over an act of the Executive in some contexts does not automatically imply, however, that the courts always have jurisdiction to review that act for conformity with the APA. In ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Supreme Court held, despite the grant of jurisdiction in the Hobbs Act over final orders issued by the ICC, that the agency's order denying reconsideration of a prior order was not subject to review under the APA because the latter decision was committed to agency discretion by law. See 482 U.S. at 282.Having held that the MarAd's decision is likewise committed to agency discretion by law, it follows that the grant of jurisdiction in the Hobbs Act to review final orders issued under 9 is similarly qualified. 24 In sum, the MarAd's decision regarding the transfer of registry in this case is committed to its discretion by law.We therefore lack jurisdiction over the Union's claims based upon the APA. See Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 282, 287. We also note, but we do not decide, that in a case where considerations of national defense, foreign policy, and the national interest do not play a significant role, if such there be, we may well have jurisdiction to review the MarAd's decision regarding a transfer of registry.