Opinion ID: 71300
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Paralegal Hours

Text: 27 Defendants have challenged a portion of the hours spent by the paralegals to procure medical research for the unsuccessful damage claims. As the court discussed above, those hours should therefore be excluded. Defendants have not raised issue with the remaining 22.1 hours of paralegal work claimed by Plaintiff. Because there is no evidence regarding the paralegals' expertise in a civil rights case, the court finds that compensation at the lowest rate for paralegals outlined by Mr. Weathersby, $45 per hour, is an appropriate fee. 28 In sum, the court finds that Mr. Howe is entitled to attorney's fees for 398.3 hours worth of work at the rate of $200 per hour. His co-counsel, Mr. Weathersby, is entitled to 543.7 hours worth of compensation at the rate of $150 per hour for his time and to 22.1 hours worth of compensation at the rate of $45 per hour for the paralegals. A rough sketch of the court's calculations is included below.4. Adjustments to the Lodestar 29 After determining the lodestar amount as above, the court is entitled to adjust the amount of final fees awarded in light of the results obtained through the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939-40, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Defendants urge the court to exercise its discretion by either denying fees altogether or by reducing fees awarded to a minimum. In support of this request, Defendants point to the fact that the ultimate net recovery of Plaintiff is far below the mark of the damages sought. Defendants remind the court that Plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief from Defendants and even suggest that this court was responsible for providing the legal theory of liability upon which Plaintiff prevailed. The most arresting argument advanced by Defendant is the assertion that the benefits of any supervisory policies instituted as a result of this litigation are marginal when compared to the net worth of the fees Plaintiff has requested. This court, however, will not endorse Defendants' efforts to undermine the significance of this litigation. 30 Not all nominal damage awards produce purely pyrrhic victories. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 120-22, 113 S.Ct. 566, 578, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). As this writer has recognized, [w]hen a constitutional right is vindicated, ... the fact that the monetary result was small may not always control. This is particularly the case where the outcome promotes some public purpose. Cullens v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 827 F.Supp. 756, 762 (M.D.Ga.1993) (citations omitted). The case at bar illustrates that principle. 31 The record bears witness to a de facto policy of the DeKalb County Sheriff's Department imposing minimal disciplinary sanctions for officers who used excessive force, who filed false reports concerning excessive force, or who perjured themselves regarding excessive force. As the court noted, the initial complaints of Plaintiff's family and prior attorney to the Department were not sufficient to trigger an internal investigation of Officer Patrick's use of excessive force. The pursuit of this litigation, however, has revealed both the unconstitutional act of Officer Patrick and the tacit condonation of such excessive force by DeKalb County. The acknowledgement of this practice and pattern can only inure to the benefit of those involved when redressing an officer's abuse of discretion which violates a person's constitutional rights. This court therefore declines to exercise its discretion to reduce the lodestar amount.