Opinion ID: 65395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stop and Arrest

Text: Harris next contends that his motion to suppress was improperly denied because the stop of his vehicle and his subsequent arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Under the framework established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), investigative vehicle stops are proper only if the officer's action was: (1) `justified at its inception'; and (2) `reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir.2005) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The first Terry prong is met when an officer has an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. Id. Harris's contention that the officers had improperly intended to search his truck prior to the stop is without merit. It is well established that [s]o long as a traffic law infraction that would have objectively justified the stop had taken place, the fact that the police officer may have made the stop for a reason other than the occurrence of the traffic infraction is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 173 (5th Cir.1997) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). Harris further claims that, in this case, the traffic violations occurred after the officers attempted to stop him, and were induced by the officers' conduct in chasing his truck. However, Rhyne testified that he and Gayle observed Harris driving well over the speed limit and running several stop signs before attempting to stop his truck. The magistrate judge's factual findings are consistent with Rhyne's version of the events, and we see no reason to disturb those findings. The stop of Harris's truck, even if pretextual, was justified by Harris's numerous traffic violations. Further, we reject Harris's claim that his arrest was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the stop, in violation of the second Terry prong. The Supreme Court has held that warrantless arrests for traffic offenses, such as driving with a suspended license, are permitted when the officers have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed in their presence. See Virginia v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that warrantless arrests for minor non-violent crimes are constitutional). In light of the serious traffic violations observed by the officers, we conclude that the detention and arrest of Harris were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We accordingly affirm the denial of Harris's motion to suppress.