Opinion ID: 4535219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, as binding precedent. 5 Case: 20-11101 Date Filed: 05/19/2020 Page: 6 of 8 Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “Religion” is defined as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Id. § 2000e(j). Generally, an employer is required to accommodate an employee’s religious practices. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2. However, if “an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business,” the employer need not provide an accommodation. § 2000e(j) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(1) (stating that it is an unlawful practice “for an employer to fail to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of an employee . . . unless the employer demonstrates that accommodation would result in undue hardship on the conduct of its business”). “In religious accommodation cases, we apply a burden-shifting framework akin to that articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.” Walden, 669 F.3d at 1293 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); see also Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581, 585–89 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 685 (2020). The employee has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination and must show that “(1) he had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his employer of his belief; and (3) he was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting 6 Case: 20-11101 Date Filed: 05/19/2020 Page: 7 of 8 employment requirement.” Beadle v. Hillsborough Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994) (referencing Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1982)). The employee need not show that “employer has ‘actual knowledge’ of” his “need for an accommodation”; the employee “need only show that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). After the employee establishes his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that it provided the employee with a reasonable accommodation or that an accommodation would cause an undue hardship. Beadle, 29 F.3d at 591–93; see § 2000e(j). The Supreme Court in Hardison “described ‘undue hardship’ as any act requiring an employer to bear more than a ‘de minimis cost’ in accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs.” Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84). A “de minimis cost” includes “not only monetary concerns, but also the employer’s burden in conducting its business.” Id. In his unopposed motion for summary affirmance, Dalberiste acknowledges that Hardison is binding precedent and further stipulates for purposes of this appeal that the accommodation he requested would impose more than a de minimis burden on GLE. Dalberiste argues for the first time, however, that Hardison was wrongly decided and that the Supreme Court should overturn its decision. It is, of course, 7 Case: 20-11101 Date Filed: 05/19/2020 Page: 8 of 8 one of the fundamental principles of our judicial system that we do not have the authority to overrule Supreme Court precedent. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983). As such, summary affirmance is appropriate here because “there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. Dalberiste’s motion for summary affirmance is granted, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of GLE is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 8