Opinion ID: 795431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evolution of Liability Under CERCLA and SARA

Text: 21
22 Prior to the enactment of the SARA amendments in 1986, several courts held that CERCLA exposed PRPs to joint and several liability, and that this implied a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. See, e.g., United States v. S.C. Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C.1986), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 807-08, 810 (S.D.Ohio 1983). Innocent parties were allowed to recover their full response costs from any PRP under § 107(a)(4)(B), see Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 889, 891-92 (9th Cir.1986); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1985), and PRPs were allowed contribution pursuant to either an implied cause of action under § 107, see City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D.Pa.1982), or the common law, see United States v. New Castle County, 642 F.Supp. 1258, 1267-69 (D.Del.1986) (hereafter NCC ); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F.Supp. 1484, 1489-90, 1491 (D.Colo. 1985). As the Supreme Court has explained, these cases allowed private parties, including PRPs, to seek contribution for costs incurred in forced or voluntary cleanups. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 161-62, 125 S.Ct. 577 (citing cases); Reading, 115 F.3d at 1118-19 (same, and noting that, [u]ntil the passage of SARA in 1986, the judicially[ ] created expansion of § 107(a)(4)(B) served as the sole means by which parties could obtain contribution). 23
24 Following the passage of SARA and the inclusion of § 113 in CERCLA (which specifically provides contribution rights), courts retreated from implied causes of action for PRPs to seek contribution under § 107(a). Instead, they interpreted §§ 107 and 113 as establishing two clearly distinct remedies: cost recovery under § 107(a), and contribution under § 113(f). See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 163 & n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 577; Morton Int'l, 343 F.3d at 675 (Accordingly, CERCLA and SARA together create two legal actions by which parties that have incurred costs associated with cleanups can recover some or all of those costs: (1) Section 107 cost recovery actions; and (2) Section 113 contribution actions.). 25 In New Castle County, we determined that a cost recovery action under § 107 is not available to a PRP. 4 Rather, a section 107 action brought for recovery of costs may be brought only by innocent parties that have undertaken clean-ups. An action brought by a potentially responsible person is by necessity a section 113 action for contribution. New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1120 (second emphasis added). We based our conclusion on the understanding that, although § 107 is not limited by its terms to innocent parties, the section was designed to enable innocent persons who incur expenses cleaning up a site to recover their costs from potentially responsible persons, and thus a potentially responsible person does not experience section 107 injury and cannot obtain section 107 relief. Id. at 1122. 5 Indeed, because § 107 imposes strict, joint, and several liability on all PRPs for the costs of cleanup, a PRP allowed to bring a cost recovery action under § 107 against another PRP could recoup all of its expenditures regardless of fault — which, we noted, strains logic. Id. at 1120-21 (emphasis in original). Moreover, we concluded that it made little sense to allow a PRP the choice of proceeding under either § 107 or § 113, because parties would always choose § 107 (which allows recovery based on joint and several liability with a six-year statute of limitations) over § 113 (which allows recovery based on equitable apportionment of costs with a three-year statute of limitations), thus render[ing] section 113 a nullity. Id. at 1123. 6 26 In Reading, decided a few weeks after New Castle County, we held that a PRP also may not invoke the pre-SARA implied cause of action for contribution under § 107. 7 Examining the legislative history of § 113, we noted that the section was intended to `clarif[y] and confirm[ ] the right of a person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances.' Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119 (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985)) (alterations in original); see also New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122 (same, quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1985), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1986 pp. 2835, 2861). Based on the statute's language, the legislative history, relevant case law, and the fact that § 113(f)(1) specifically permits an action for contribution to be brought `in the absence of a civil action under ... section [107],' Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120 (alterations in original), 8 we held that, [i]n passing § 113(f), Congress acted to codify existing federal common law and to replace the judicially crafted measure with an express statutory remedy. Id. at 1119. 27 Thus we concluded that Congress intended § 113 to be the sole means for seeking contribution. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added). It replaced the judicially created right to contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B) with an express (and exclusive) statutory remedy, id. at 1119, and also superseded common law remedies: 28 [W]hen Congress expressly created a statutory right of contribution in CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), it made that remedy a part of an elaborate settlement scheme aimed at the efficient resolution of environmental disputes. Permitting independent common law remedies would create a path around the statutory settlement scheme, raising an obstacle to the intent of Congress. We conclude therefore that [the plaintiff's] common law claims are preempted by CERCLA § 113(f). 29 Id. at 1117. 30 In so holding, we acknowledged dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic that § 107 unquestionably provides a cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs, 511 U.S. at 818, 114 S.Ct. 1960, and that CERCLA expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107, id. at 816, 114 S.Ct. 1960. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120. We determined, however, that the overlap consisted of the fact that (as New Castle County held) an innocent private party (most likely a landowner who purchased land that had been contaminated by others) may bring a cost recovery action under § 107 holding a PRP jointly and severally liable for the full cost of the cleanup. Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120. The fact, however, that a direct action might be brought under § 107(a) [by an innocent landowner against a PRP] does not open the door for [the] PRP to bring an action for contribution [against other PRPs] under that same section. Id. 31 In sum, after SARA introduced the § 113 contribution provision, our Court and other courts concluded that §§ 107 and 113 were complementary (but not really overlapping, as the Supreme Court had suggested in Key Tronic ) remedies. Section 107 allowed the Government or an innocent landowner to recover the full cost of cleanup from a PRP on the basis of strict, joint, and several liability. The PRP could then seek contribution from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1). Moreover, according to the understanding at that time (as intimated in Reading ), § 113(f)(1) allowed a PRP to seek contribution even in the absence of an action under § 106 or § 107; in other words, a PRP that voluntarily cleaned up a contaminated site sua sponte could seek contribution from other PRPs without waiting for an enforcement action, a Government or innocent-landowner cost recovery suit, or a settlement of liability.
32 In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court significantly altered this understanding. The Court held that the plain language of § 113(f)(1) ( i.e., Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section [107] of this title, during or following any civil action under section [106] of this title or under section [107] of this title.) required a pre-existing civil action (either pending or completed) against the PRP under § 106 or § 107 before the PRP could seek contribution from other PRPs. The Court concluded that, if § 113(f)(1) were read to authorize contribution actions at any time, regardless of the existence of a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action, then Congress need not have included the explicit `during or following' condition in § 113(f)(1). Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166, 125 S.Ct. 577. Thus, a PRP may only seek contribution under § 113(f)(1) if it is the subject of a § 106 or § 107 civil action or has been adjudged liable as a result of such an action. Id. 9 33 The Court also considered the so-called saving clause of § 113(f)(1) (Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section [106] of this title or section [107] of this title.). We relied on this sentence in Reading when we said that § 113(f)(1) specifically permits a PRP to seek contribution from other PRPs without a pre-existing action under § 106 or § 107. 115 F.3d at 1120. Insofar as this statement implied that § 113(f)(1) permitted such an action, the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that [t]he sole function of the [saving clause] is to clarify that § 113(f)(1) does nothing to `diminish' any cause(s) of action for contribution that may exist independently of § 113(f)(1). Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166, 125 S.Ct. 577 (emphasis added). As the Court explained, 34 the sentence [ i.e., the saving clause] rebuts any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling clause [in § 113(f)(1)] is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP. The sentence, however, does not itself establish a cause of action; nor does it expand § 113(f)(1) to authorize contribution actions not brought during or following a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action; nor does it specify what causes of action for contribution, if any, exist outside § 113(f)(1). Reading the saving clause to authorize § 113(f)(1) contribution actions not just during or following a civil action, but also before such an action, would again violate the settled rule that we must, if possible, construe a statute to give every word some operative effect. 35 Id. at 166-67, 125 S.Ct. 577. 36 The Court left open the questions of whether a PRP may seek cost recovery under § 107, and whether that section includes an implied cause of action for contribution on which a PRP may rely independently of § 113. With respect to the former question, the Court noted that numerous decisions from the Courts of Appeals, including this Court's decision in New Castle County, had held that a § 107(a) cost recovery action is only available to an innocent party, and concluded that the question had not been briefed to the Supreme Court and thus it was more prudent to withhold judgment on these matters. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 169-70, 125 S.Ct. 577. While the Court did not reach the latter issue as well, it drew the litigants' attention to those cases in which this Court has visited the subject of implied rights of contribution before, id. at 170-71, 125 S.Ct. 577 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638-47, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981), and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 90-99, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981)). It noted further that, in enacting § 113(f)(1), Congress explicitly recognized a particular set (claims `during or following' the specified civil actions) of the contribution rights previously implied by courts from provisions of CERCLA and the common law. Id. at 171, 125 S.Ct. 577. 10