Opinion ID: 1818508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable law. Iowa Code section 279.13 provides in relevant part:

Text: 1. Contracts with teachers, which for the purpose of this section means all licensed employees of a school district and nurses employed by the board, excluding superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, and assistant principals, shall be in writing and shall state the number of contract days, the annual compensation to be paid, and any other matters as may be mutually agreed upon. The contract may include employment for a term not exceeding the ensuing school year, except as otherwise authorized. The contract is invalid if the teacher is under contract with another board of directors to teach during the same time period until a release from the other contract is achieved. The contract shall be signed by the president of the board when tendered, and after it is signed by the teacher, the contract shall be filed with the secretary of the board before the teacher enters into performance under the contract. Iowa Code § 279.13 (emphasis added). B. Analysis. Meinders contends the italicized language imposes a duty on the defendants to refrain from tendering contracts to prospective employees, like him, unless such contracts are first signed by the president of the school board. The statute therefore sets a standard of conduct for the protection of such prospective employees and a breach of that standard is actionable as negligence per se. The purpose of this provision, Meinders points out, is to ensure that the prospective employee is in receipt of a binding offer when the contract is tendered to him. We have held that a violation of a statutory duty gives rise to a tort claim only when the statute, explicitly or implicitly, provides for such a cause of action. Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Sanford v. Manternach, 601 N.W.2d 360, 371 (Iowa 1999)). Without such a provision, the violation of a statutory duty does not give rise to a private cause of action. Id. There is no provision in Iowa Code chapter 279 expressly providing a cause of action for violation of section 279.13. We must therefore employ the following four-factor test to determine whether a private cause of action against the defendants may be implied from section 279.13: 1. Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted? 2. Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to either create or deny such a remedy? 3. Would allowing such a cause of action be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation? 4. Would the private cause of action intrude into an area over which the federal government or a state administrative agency holds exclusive jurisdiction? Id. at 726-27 (citations omitted). There is no implied cause of action if any one of these factors is not satisfied. Id. at 727. Because the fourth factor is not implicated here, it plays no part in our analysis. As for the first factor, we can certainly agree that one of the purposes of the statutory requirementthe contract be signed by the board president when tendered to the prospective employeeis for the protection of such employee. The requirement dictates that the board be the offeree. What happened here turns the requirement on its head. Instead of the board being the offeree, Meinders was the offeree. In such circumstances, prospective employees like Meinders would be in danger of precluding themselves from accepting other favorable employment until the board either accepts or rejects the offer. We conclude the first factor is satisfied: Meinders is a member of the class for whose benefit section 279.13 was passed. As for the second factor, there is no express indication in Iowa Code chapter 279 of legislative intent to create a private cause of action, i.e., recovery of money damages for a violation of section 279.13. We therefore turn to whether there is any indication of legislative intent to implicitly create such an action. The only remedies chapter 279 provides are those dealing with termination of a teacher's continuing contract. See Iowa Code §§ 279.13(2) (providing for automatic renewal of teacher's contract); 279.15 (providing procedure for recommending termination of teacher's continuing contract); 279.16 (providing for hearing regarding termination recommendation); 279.17 (providing for appeal of decision terminating teacher's continuing contract to adjudicator who  may affirm board action or remand to the board for further proceedings; adjudicator  shall reverse, modify, or grant any appropriate relief from the board action if substantial rights of the teacher have been prejudiced because board action is [i]n violation of a board rule or policy, or contract  or [u]nsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record before the board or [u]reasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion (emphasis added)); 279.18 (providing that either party may appeal arbitrator's decision to district court if such party has rejected arbitrator's decision; district court  shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the board decision or the adjudicator's decision equitable or legal and including declaratory relief if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because of several enumerated grounds, including, violation of a board rule, or policy or contract  (emphasis added)). There is no mention of a money damage remedy based on tort for a violation of the requirement in section 279.13 regarding a tender of a signed contract to a prospective employee. By not including such a remedy, we think the legislature has signaled its intention not to provide a private cause of action for a violation of section 279.13. In two of our cases we have similarly concluded that by providing specific remedies for violation of a statute without providing a private cause of action for its violation, the legislature intended to exclude such a remedy. See Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 371 (legislature's listing of relief in postconviction relief statute that did not include money damage remedy for violation of good-conduct time statute signaled legislature's intention not to allow a private cause of action for the violation); Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289-90 (Iowa 1995) (by providing a number of remedies for violation of Iowa Code chapter 22the open records lawthe legislature intended not to allow a private cause of action for the violation). In reaching this conclusion in these cases, we relied on the statutory construction rule of expressio unius est exclusio alteriousexpression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 371-72; Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 289. This rule recognizes that legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion, and the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not so mentioned. Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 289. Even were we to say that recognition of a private cause of action would be consistent with section 279.13the third factor of the testthe lack of any sign that the legislature intended to create such an action is fatal to Meinders' case. We therefore conclude the district court correctly granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, although on a ground urged but not decided by the court.