Opinion ID: 1300601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutionality of the JMSC and Separation of Powers

Text: Article I, § 8 of the South Carolina Constitution provides: In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other. The constitution vests in the Legislature the sole authority for the election and re-election of judges, specifically supreme court justices, court of appeals judges and circuit court judges. S.C. Const. Art. V, §§ 3, 8 and 13. By statute, the Legislature is similarly charged with the election and reelection of family court judges. S.C.Code Ann. § 63-3-30(B) (2008). [2] The constitution was amended by the people of South Carolina in 1997 to establish the JMSC. The JMSC was constitutionally established to mandate that all judgeships which are filled by election of the General Assembly be considered by the JMSC. Article V, § 27 provides in part: In addition to the qualifications for circuit court and court of appeals judges and Supreme Court justices contained in this article, the General Assembly by law shall establish a Judicial Merit Selection Commission to consider the qualifications and fitness of candidates for all judicial positions on these courts and on other courts of this State which are filled by election of the General Assembly. The General Assembly must elect the judges and justices from among the nominees of the commission to fill a vacancy on these courts. No person may be elected to these judicial positions unless he or she has been found qualified by the commission. The Legislature established the JMSC, providing for its membership, powers, duties, functions and procedures. S.C.Code Ann. § 2-19-10 (2008). The provision regarding membership provides: (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Judicial Merit Selection Commission shall consist of the following individuals: (1) five members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and of these appointments: (a) three members must be serving members of the General Assembly; and (b) two members must be selected from the general public; (2) three members appointed by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and two members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and of these appointments: (a) three members must be serving members of the General Assembly; and (b) two members must be selected from the general public. Petitioner states [c]oncern has long been expressed that having the entire power and process of selecting judges vested in the legislature may tend to make the process too political. Accordingly, Petitioner asserts the evident purpose of the people in adopting S.C. Const. Art. V, § 27 was to create a requirement beyond the power of the General Assembly, in the form of an independent body whose concurrence was a condition precedent to the General Assembly's selection of a judge. She argues the composition of the JMSC, established by the Legislature in Section 2-19-10(B), frustrates the very reason for its creation. More specifically, Petitioner contends that the constitutional amendment precludes the presence of legislators on the JMSC. The use of the term establish in the constitutional amendment, she asserts, means the JMSC was to be something new, not simply a remade version of the [earlier] Joint Legislative Committee for Judicial Screening. Citing opinions of this Court defining the term establish, Petitioner maintains the intent of the amendment was to bring into being something that did not previously exist. The structure of the South Carolina Constitution provides the analytical framework for resolving Petitioner's challenge. The provisions of the state constitution are not a grant but a limitation of legislative power, so that the Legislature may enact any law not expressly, or by clear implication, prohibited by the state or federal constitution. Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 39 S.E.2d 133 (1946). State constitutional provisions will not be construed to impose limitations beyond their clear meaning. State v. Broad River Power Co., 177 S.C. 240, 181 S.E. 41 (1935). Moreover, when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, every presumption will be made in favor of its validity. A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no doubt that it violates some provision of the constitution. Gold v. S.C. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 271 S.C. 74, 245 S.E.2d 117 (1978). A legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt. Joytime Distribs. and Amusement Co. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 640, 528 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1999). The question, then, is whether the language in article V, § 27 expressly or by clear implication precludes (as violative of separation of powers) legislative membership on the JMSC. Because the constitutional amendment contains no express reference to legislative service on the JMSC, we are left with only the clear implication criteria. Here, Petitioner seeks to bolster her argument by blending judicial independence concerns with the constitutional prohibition against dual-office holding. As Petitioner's excellent counsel urged at oral argument, we should broadly construe our constitution because it does not expressly provide for the laudable goal of judicial independence. This argument is not without appeal, but it is irreconcilably at odds with the settled principle that the provisions of the state constitution are not a grant but a limitation of legislative power. Article V, § 27 simply contains no prohibition against legislative membership on the JMSC. In making this determination, we are not persuaded by Respondents' argument that Act No. 391, 1996 S.C. Acts 2393, which added Chapter 19 to Title 2, including Section 2-19-10(B), was ratified on the same date as the joint resolution proposing the article V, § 27 amendment to the constitution. Respondents invite us to glean the meaning of the constitutional amendment from enabling legislation prepared prior to the vote on the constitutional amendment. We decline the invitation. While Respondents' argument may be technically correct, it is simply not realistic to give legal weight to the fiction that the electorate is sufficiently aware of enabling legislation at the time it votes on a constitutional amendment. The Constitution belongs to the people of South Carolina, not the Legislature. Our decision rests solely on the unambiguous language in article V, § 27, which contains no indication that the people intended to foreclose legislative membership on the JMSC. The separation of powers argument that the Legislature is both creating and executing law must be rejected. In enacting Section 2-19-10 pursuant to the constitutional mandate of article V, § 27, the Legislature was acting within its constitutional role. In exercising a political judgment in assessing the fitness of a judicial candidate, the JMSC is not constitutionally foreclosed from addressing in a political context a matter concomitantly determined by the judicial branch. To be sure, judicial independence considerations are implicated. Yet this Court may not, under the allure of separation of powers, intervene in what is a political question. As the JMSC correctly observes in its brief, the Court is being asked to delve into the subjective decision making process of the JMSC which is political in nature. As noted, the complainant against Petitioner appealed the recusal issue to the court of appeals and filed a grievance with Commission on Judicial Conduct. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's decision not to recuse. The judicial grievance was dismissed. [3] Petitioner argues that in revisiting the recusal issue, the JMSC usurped the power of the judicial branch by super-reviewing final legal determinations of the judicial branch. We find Petitioner's argument without merit. Simply stated, the Legislature has plenary authority over the political aspects of its constitutional authority in the election of judges. Beyond the legal/political distinction discussed above, we add the following observations. Petitioner's notion of super-reviewing an action of the judicial branch would have merit but for the express constitutional delegation of authority to the legislative branch for the election and re-election of judges. It seems to us that this point is most easily understood by applying the converse of Petitioner's argument. Assume the court of appeals reversed Petitioner's decision not to recuse or that the Commission on Judicial Conduct had made a finding adverse to Petitioner: would the JMSC be bound by that determination and be required to find Petitioner unqualified? Absolutely not. What if Mr. Simpson had decided not to appeal Petitioner's recusal decision, due to lack of resources or otherwise? In that case, in the absence of an appellate court determination, would the JMSC be free to consider the matter? Or would Petitioner's super-reviewing position only apply in the presence of an appellate court determination? The implications are obvious, for we cannot place limitations on the ability of the JMSC to fully vet a judicial candidate based on the presence or absence of an appellate court determination. The same reasoning would apply with respect to a judicial grievance complaint. An individual wishing to file a complaint against a judge is not required to choose between the Commission on Judicial Conduct (a legal forum) and the JMSC (a political forum). Consider also the case of Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 640 S.E.2d 457 (2007). This Court was presented with a legal challenge to appointments approved by the Legislature. Because the case presented a justiciable controversy, we reached the merits and declared as unlawful legislative appointments beyond the term prescribed by law. Hardee illustrates the fundamental distinction between a legal question and a political question. In the separation of powers context, the JMSC has acted in its political capacity. As a result, there has been no showing of an article I, § 8 separation of powers violation concerning the JMSC. This returns us to Respondents' claim that Petitioner's complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question. The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers. S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 369 S.C. 139, 142, 632 S.E.2d 277, 278 (2006) ( SCPIF ) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). The fundamental characteristic of a nonjusticiable `political question' is that its adjudication would place a court in conflict with a coequal branch of government. SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 142-43, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393-94, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990)). Therefore, the courts will not rule on questions that are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial. SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)). This Court, specifically, has declined to opine on issues where the constitution delegates authority to the Legislature. See SCPIF (holding the question of whether the JMSC properly determined residence of judicial candidate or gave proper weight to concerns regarding residency presented a nonjusticiable political question the Court should decline to answer because the power to determine if a person is qualified to hold judicial office is vested with the Legislature by the state constitution); cf. Stone v. Leatherman, 343 S.C. 484, 541 S.E.2d 241 (2001) (holding state constitution provides Senate with authority to judge election returns and qualifications of its members). In the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198, 82 S.Ct. 691. In determining whether a question is political and nonjusticiable, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939). Much confusion results from the capacity of the `political question' label to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11, 82 S.Ct. 691. The political question doctrine is one of `political questions,' not one of `political cases.' The courts cannot reject as `no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated `political' exceeds constitutional authority. Id. Indeed, this Court is duty bound to review the actions of the Legislature when it is alleged in a properly filed suit that such actions are unconstitutional, as the above reference to Sloan v. Hardee illustrates. While [a]ll considerations involving the wisdom, policy, or expediency of an act are addressed exclusively to the General Assembly[,] ... when the unconstitutionality of an act is clear to this court, beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is its plain duty to say so. Elliott v. Sligh, 233 S.C. 161, 103 S.E.2d 923 (1958); see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (stating the political question doctrine, which derives from the separation of powers doctrine, excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of state legislatures or to the confines of the executive branch). It is the duty of this Court to interpret and declare the meaning of the constitution. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999). Accordingly, because of Petitioner's separation of powers argument, this Court must analyze the claim, which it has done. At the end of the day, Petitioner's separation of powers challenge presents not a legal question, but a nonjusticiable political question.