Opinion ID: 2321234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Preclusion of Witness Testimony

Text: The defendant next asserts that the trial justice erred in precluding testimony from his wife and daughter, both of whom were eyewitnesses to two previous incidents involving Ms. Beltram. In explaining why their testimony was necessary, defendant argued at sidebar that his daughter would have testified that she witnessed Ms. Beltram throw rocks at defendant in 2003. With respect to his wife, defendant argued that she would have testified that in 2005, she heard Ms. Beltram remark that she planned to file an assault charge against defendant. However, the trial justice excluded the testimony under Rule 608(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Their testimony, defendant asserts, would have undermined Ms. Beltram's allegations and bolstered his self-defense claim. Rule 608(b) forbids attacking a witness's credibility by proving specific instances of that witness's conduct through extrinsic evidence. See also State v. Tutt, 622 A.2d 459, 462 (R.I.1993) (concluding that a witness other than a witness-defendant cannot be impeached by extrinsic evidence). Therefore, should a party elect to inquire into specific instances of the conduct of a witness on cross-examination, then `the cross-examiner is restricted to the answers of the witness' and cannot introduce extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes. State v. Briggs, 886 A.2d 735, 753 (R.I.2005) (quoting Tutt, 622 A.2d at 462). In attempting to admit the above-mentioned testimony, defendant sought to do precisely what our rules of evidence and the corresponding case law prohibit. Ms. Beltram, although the complaining witness in this matter, was not a party to the case. The testimony proffered by defendant, through his wife and daughter, is extrinsic evidence; testimony that Ms. Beltram threw rocks at defendant as well as testimony that Ms. Beltram stated that she planned to file an assault charge against defendant would demonstrate specific instances of Ms. Beltram's conduct. Accordingly, we agree with the trial justice in concluding that the testimony of defendant's wife and daughter should have been precluded because it would have amounted to improper impeachment evidence under our rules of evidence. We pause to note that although defendant argues on appeal that the proffered testimony of his wife should have been admitted under the prior similar false accusations exception to Rule 608(b), this issue was not properly preserved. Because defendant did not raise this argument in the Superior Court, he has waived it on appeal. See East Bay Community Development Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review of Barrington, 901 A.2d 1136, 1152 (R.I.2006) (It is well settled that we `will not consider on appeal an issue that was not raised before the trial court.') (quoting Harvey Realty v. Killingly Manor Condominium Association, 787 A.2d 465, 466-67 (R.I.2001)).