Opinion ID: 179425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remand in Light of Kimbrough and Spears

Text: Curb also requests remand in light of Kimbrough and Spears because the career offender provisions incorporate, in his case, the infamous 100:1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio. Kimbrough, 552 U.S at 91, 128 S.Ct. 558, held that a district court may consider the disparity between the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses, and conclude that for a crack-cocaine offense, a within-Guidelines sentence is greater than necessary to serve the objectives of sentencing. Subsequently, Spears, 129 S.Ct. at 843-44, held that district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines, even in a run-of-the-mill case. The government objects to remand because Curb has failed to show that the district court made any procedural or substantive error in imposing the sentence. Curb's contention that the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio is entangled in the career offender guideline, such that categorical disagreement with the ratio may also support a district court's rejection of the career offender enhancement, has found support in this Court. See United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 326-28 (6th Cir.2009) (holding that a district court may disagree with the 100:1 ratio as implicitly incorporated in the career offender guideline). On what grounds this Court may remand for resentencing in light of Kimbrough and Spears, however, is a less-settled question. In United States v. Johnson, 553 F.3d 990 (6th Cir.2009), the district court sentenced the defendant-appellant based on an amended version of the Guidelines that adjusted downward the prior 100:1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6) (2006) (applying base offense level of twenty-eight to twenty grams of cocaine base and two kilograms of cocaine) with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6) (2007) (applying base offense level of twenty-eight to thirty-five grams of cocaine base and two kilograms of cocaine). Even so, this Court in Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996, remanded for resentencing, holding that  Spears applies with equal force ... under the new crack-cocaine Guidelines. Johnson reasoned that remand was appropriate because this Court had no way of ascertaining [from the record below] whether the district judge would have imposed the same sentence if he had known of his discretion to vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement. Id. Subsequently, United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2009), held that an express statement from the district court about the policy behind the ratio is required to justify remand. [W]hen a district court observes that the Guidelines are advisory and provides no indication that policy disagreements are not a proper basis to vary, then a sentence within the Guidelines range remains presumptively reasonable on appeal. Id. at 364. While this rule overlaps with the rule in Johnson, it promulgates a test that elides the Johnson court's focus on its inability to ascertain[ ], Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 n. 1, what the district judge would have done in light of the authority articulated in Kimbrough and Spears. Conflicts between published decisions must be resolved in favor of the earlier-decided case. See Sowards v. Loudon Cnty., Tenn., 203 F.3d 426, 431 n. 1 (6th Cir.2000). Johnson, then, controls the standard for remand under Kimbrough and Spears; Simmons must be harmonized with this Court's prior ruling. As in Johnson, we cannot know from the sentencing transcript whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence on Curb had it been aware of its authority to vary categorically from the career offender Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio. The district court sentencing transcript does not speak at all to that question. It shows only that the district court understood that the Guidelines were advisory. Therefore, Johnson compels resentencing. Moreover, a close look at the facts in Simmons reveals a key difference in this case. The defendant in Simmons directly raised the issue of the 100:1 ratio at sentencing. Curb did not. The sentencings in both cases occurred before Kimbrough and Spears brought the 100:1 ratio clearly to the forefront of the minds of sentencing courts. However, in Simmons, the issue of the ratio was undeniably brought before the sentencing court's attention, and yet it chose to impose a within-Guidelines sentence without making an express statement. The express statement rule from Simmons is predicated upon the disparity issue being brought before the sentencing court in some fashion so that it had the opportunity to consider it. Because it is not clear in this case that the sentencing court ever had such an opportunity, Simmons does not apply. Therefore, Johnson is the controlling authority, and resentencing is warranted.