Opinion ID: 2192828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Step One Cases

Text: Unfortunately, the Act does not define total dependency or wholly dependent. Until June 1, 1947, when Chapter 895 of the Acts of 1947 took effect, the law presumed that a wife was wholly dependent on her husband. Meyler v. Mayor and City Council, 179 Md. 211, 215, 17 A.2d 762, 764 (1941). The 1947 amendments removed the presumptions of dependency and placed all matters of dependency within the discretion of the Commission. § 9-679. We have often stated, in accordance with § 9-679, that the question of dependency is one primarily of fact to be decided in every case upon the facts of that case. Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 420, 45 A.2d at 81. In 1941, this Court stated that the test of dependency is not whether a claimant was capable of supporting himself without the earnings of the workman, but whether he did in fact rely upon such earnings for his livelihood, in whole or in part, under circumstances indicating an intent on the part of the workman to furnish such support. Meyler, 179 Md. at 217, 17 A.2d at 765. In 1958, we defined a dependent within the meaning of the Act as one who relies wholly or in part upon a workman for the reasonable necessities of life at the time of his accidental injury. A legal or moral obligation to support some one does not create dependency in the absence of actual support. Mario Anello v. Dunn, 217 Md. 177, 180, 141 A.2d 731, 733 (1958)(emphasis added). Meyler, supra, was one of our early cases in which we examined the issue of dependency in the workers' compensation death benefits context. In Meyler, the claimant, who was the stepdaughter of the deceased, and her stepfather agreed that she would stay home and take care of her invalid mother and the home. 179 Md. at 213, 17 A.2d at 763. Even though the claimant had previously held a factory job and was capable of supporting herself, we held that there is no provision in the statute requiring that a person must be incapable of supporting himself before he can be dependent, and there is no reason to hold that dependency should be so restricted in its meaning. Meyler, 179 Md. at 217, 17 A.2d at 765. We further stated that the mere ability to earn a livelihood does not necessarily preclude a person from being a dependent. Id. See also Superior Builders, Inc. v. Brown, 208 Md. 539, 543, 119 A.2d 376, 378 (1956)([I]n construing the Act, the courts do not demand that a claimant must show destitution to obtain an award as a total dependent.). We held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the claimant was either totally or partially dependent on the deceased and ordered a new trial. Meyler, 179 Md. at 219, 17 A.2d at 766. In the 1944 case of Larkin v. Smith , we examined the words wholly dependent as delineated in the Act. 183 Md. 274, 37 A.2d 340 (1944). In this case, the claimant alleged that she was dependent on her son for financial support, even though she sometimes sold eggs from her hens, ate occasional free meals at the restaurant where she previously worked, and intermittently received clothing from her former employer. Larkin, 183 Md. at 276-77, 37 A.2d at 341. The employer/insurer (appellants) maintained that the jury should be instructed that if they should believe from the evidence `that the claimant received any support from any source other than from [her son] at the time of his injury ' then the claimant could not be found wholly dependent on her deceased son. Larkin, 183 Md. at 278, 37 A.2d at 342 (emphasis added). In finding the claimant to be wholly dependent on her deceased son, we noted that while these words were not precisely defined under the Act, other jurisdictions had adopted what appeared to be the following universal rule as to their meaning: `Total dependency exists where the dependent subsists entirely on the earnings of the workman; but in applying this rule courts have not deprived claimants of the rights of total dependents, when otherwise entitled thereto, on account of temporary gratuitous services rendered them by others, or on account of occasional financial assistance received from other sources, or on account of other minor considerations or benefits which do not substantially modify or change the general rule as above stated.' (Emphasis added). Larkin, 183 Md. at 280, 37 A.2d at 343 (quoting Bloomington-Bedford Stone Company v. Phillips, 65 Ind.App. 189, 116 N.E. 850, 852 (1917)). See also Johnson v. Cole, 245 Md. 515, 520-21, 226 A.2d 268, 271 (1967)(stating that aid or benefits from other sources will not negate a finding of total dependency so long as they do not substantially affect or modify [the dependent's] status toward the deceased employee). In adopting the above rule, we stated that we did not think that the legislature intended such an illiberal construction of the word `wholly' as contended ... by the appellants and concluded that the Act must be interpreted to effectuate its general purpose, and not by strict rules of construction. Larkin, 183 Md. at 282, 37 A.2d at 344. Similarly, in Rosenthal, supra, we also found that the claimant was totally dependent on her deceased husband, even though she was employed at the time of her husband's death. In examining the particular facts of the case, as we are required to do pursuant to § 9-679, we found that the claimant was working outside the home because her boy was in the Navy and she was worried and wanted to occupy her mind ... until her son came home.... Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 423, 45 A.2d at 82. Therefore, we held that the claimant's work was only temporary or occasional, and that her intention was to depend solely on her husband's income in the future as she had in the past. So finding, the jury could decide that there was total dependency within the meaning of the Act. Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 426, 45 A.2d at 84 (emphasis added). See also Harvey v. Roche & Son, 148 Md. 363, 129 A. 359 (1925) (recognizing that claimant, who though separated from her spouse at the time of his death but received monthly support money from him, could be found a total dependent even though she collected weekly rent from a boarder). Thus, as the above cases illustrate, a claimant can be found totally dependent even though he or she has received occasional financial aid or benefits from sources other than the deceased employee. Later cases somewhat restricted the above holdings, however, with the development of the consequential contribution test, under which total dependency status may be denied to dependents who make a consequential contribution to their own support. Specifically, this test states that while a wholly dependent claimant may receive temporary gratuitous services, occasional financial assistance or other minor benefits from sources other than the deceased workman ... he must not have had a consequential source or means of maintenance in addition to what is received out of the earnings of the deceased. Mullan Construction Co. v. Day, 218 Md. 581, 586, 147 A.2d 756, 759 (1959)(emphasis added). [7] Mario Anello, supra, was the first case to apply the consequential contribution test. In Mario Anello, Mrs. Dunn, the claimant, had pooled her significant earnings with that of her husband's for several years and used them to support the family. 217 Md. at 180, 141 A.2d at 733. In finding Mrs. Dunn to be partially dependent, we held that we were unable to say that a jury could properly find, or infer, that her earnings were not a consequential part of her maintenance; therefore she was not wholly dependent upon her husband. 217 Md. at 183, 141 A.2d at 734. Mullan Construction, supra, following on the heels of Mario Anello, supra, also involved a wife pooling her earnings with her deceased husband. As in Mario Anello, we found that Mrs. Day was partially, not totally, dependent on her deceased husband, as she made almost fifty percent of her husband's salary. Mullan Construction, 218 Md. at 588, 590, 147 A.2d at 760, 761. We held that: [W]here the earnings of [Mrs. Day] were substantial, where she did not subsist solely out of the earnings of her husband, and where she either could not or would not account for more than half of her net earnings, she cannot establish the status of a total dependent by merely claiming she did not pool her earnings with those of her husband. Mullan Construction, 218 Md. at 589, 147 A.2d at 760. In yet another pooled income case, Toadvine v. Luffman examined whether the deceased employee's two minor children were totally dependent on him at the time of his death. 14 Md.App. 333, 286 A.2d 790 (1972). The court applied the consequential contribution test and found that because the mother's contributions were a substantial source, about 40%, of the total funds, the children were not totally dependent on their deceased father. Toadvine, 14 Md.App. at 346-47, 286 A.2d at 797. The court stated that [t]he mother's contributions were regular as distinguished from occasional, permanent as distinguished from temporary, substantial as distinguished from minor. Toadvine, 14 Md.App. at 346, 286 A.2d at 797 (emphasis added). See also Simmons v. B & E Landscaping Co., 256 Md. 13, 15, 259 A.2d 314, 316 (1969)(upholding the trial judge's conclusion that `the mother's contribution to this family [cannot] be deemed either occasional or inconsequential. She ... was and is the bulk of the support of her children.'). Thus, as these step one cases demonstrate, a claimant can be found a total dependent even though he or she has received occasional financial aid or benefits from sources other than the deceased worker. However, if these additional benefits constitute a consequential contribution to the claimant's own support, then a finding of total dependency will be defeated.