Opinion ID: 269176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the alleged unfairness of appellant's trial.

Text: 13 The grain involved in Count I was allegedly stolen from the elevators of Federal at several towns in southeastern Missouri, and also a town in southwestern Illinois, just across the river. The grain in question had been gathered by Federal from farmers in the surrounding area. Federal eventually became insolvent and a number of farmers lost money as a consequence. In order to avoid the claimed prejudice of trial in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, in the farming area affected by the alleged thefts of grain, appellant and co-defendant Thompson moved before trial for a transfer of the case back to St. Louis, a different division of the same district. The indictment had been returned in the latter division, but the case had been transferred to Cape Girardeau on the Government's motion. The trial court denied appellant's motion to transfer on the ground that at this stage of the proceeding there was not sufficient showing that a fair trial could not be had in Cape Girardeau. 14 When appellant's case came on for trial he renewed his motion for transfer to St. Louis and also filed motions for a continuance and for disqualification of residents of the nearby counties as jurors. The trial court denied the motion for continuance and reserved ruling on the renewed transfer motion and the motion to restrict the panel pending the voir dire examination of jurors, after which time they were also denied. 15 The selection of the jury took two full days, most of the examination of the venire being concentrated on the question of prejudicial opinions. A number of jurors were excused for cause, some of whom had preconceived opinions and others for various other reasons. After nine veniremen were excused the court declared a recess and eight additional talesmen were procured by the marshal. Appellant moved to quash this part of the panel when it was learned that these eight talesmen were residents of the City of Cape Girardeau and that the marshal had not left the city limits in selecting them. 16 On the second day of the jury's selection, a prospective juror stated on voir dire, in the presence of the entire panel, I might mention we have did (sic) business with the people from Bell City and Vanduser and they have caused them a lot of trouble by this mishandling by the fact that the farmers didn't get their money. Appellant moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, immediately instructed the panel to disregard this remark, and excused the prospective juror who had made it. Appellant again moved for a mistrial, claiming that the instruction was unwarranted and emphasized the assertion that the farmers had lost money by reason of appellant's activities. The motion was denied. 17 Another prospective juror was excused because she revealed, under examination by the prosecution, that she could not view the evidence with an open mind. After a recess, the trial court reported to the panel that during the recess, while she was in the ladies' restroom she [the prospective juror just excused] made a remark concerning one of these defendants who is now on trial. The court then held a hearing in chambers to ascertain the facts as to the alleged remark. Five members of the panel were called in and informally questioned. They stated that they were in the restroom when the prospective lady juror just excused made a remark about her surprise that appellant was out of the penitentiary. These five ladies further stated that the remark did not prejudice them against appellant and that they could give appellant a fair and impartial trial. The court then called appellant into chambers and over the objection by the Government permitted him to be examined as to the circumstances of his prior convictions. The court concluded that in view of the remarks made by one of the prospective jurors in the presence of others that either of the attorneys for defendants would be permitted to make a brief statement of the circumstances of the convictions to the entire panel and inquire whether or not this would prejudice any of the prospective jurors against appellant. Appellant's counsel, again over objection by the prosecution, made a brief statement to the prospective jurors about the prior convictions and examined them on voir dire to determine if this would prejudice them against appellant. All replied that they would not be prejudiced. No objection was made by appellant to this procedure, nor did he request that any member of the panel be excused on account of this incident. 18 Because appellant's counsel was permitted to explain the prior conviction to the jury on voir dire, the trial court later allowed the Government to question appellant about the same conviction in some detail on cross-examination when appellant testified for the defense. The Government first asked whether appellant had ever been convicted of a felony, and appellant answered in the affirmative. The next question asked was the nature of the felony, and appellant's counsel objected. The trial court ruled: Mr. Joslyn, under normal circumstances the government could only go into the fact that he had been convicted of a felony. However, in this particular instance at your request and prior to the impaneling of the jury the court permitted Mr. Butler under oath to make a statement about the matter and nature of this charge. I then permitted you to examine the jury and make a statement about the circumstances of what that charge was. Accordingly, I will now permit the government to go into it. The Government then brought out that appellant's state court conviction had been for obtaining money under false pretenses by issuing warehouse receipts for over one thousand boxcars of grain when there were only four boxcars of grain in the warehouse. 19 At the conclusion of the voir dire examination, a jury of nine men and three women was selected to hear the case. Two male alternates also sat, but no occasion arose for them to take part in the deliberations. 20 Appellant's motions (1) to transfer, (2) for continuance, (3) to restrict the jury panel, (4) to quash the supplementary panel; and (5) and (6) the prospective juror's remark on voir dire and the court's instruction in that regard — these asserted errors collectively form the basis of defendant's claim that he was denied trial by an impartial jury. 21 (1) The Denial of Appellant's Protective Motions. 22 At the outset it may be observed that the resolution of questions as to prejudice are ordinarily within the discretion of the trial judge, The trial judge has a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice   . Generalizations beyond that statement are not profitable, as each case must turn on its special facts. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). 23 Clearly the trial court did not err in postponement of its final rulings on these questions (except the motion for continuance) until after the voir dire examination, The ultimate question is whether it is possible to select a fair and impartial jury, and the proper occasion for such determination is upon voir dire examination. Blumenfield v. United States, 284 F.2d 46, 51 (8th Cir. 1960). 24 The motion for continuance made on the day of trial was based on the alleged prejudicial effect of the publicity resulting from the receivership of Federal. Here also the trial judge is vested with wide discretion in ruling upon motions for continuance. Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 177 (8th Cir. 1955). But since the basis of the motion was possible prejudice, the voir dire examination of the jurors furnishes the most reliable evidence of whether any such prejudice existed. 25 This is also true of defendant's request that residents of five counties be excluded from the jury panel and his motion to quash the supplementary panel of eight veniremen from Cape Girardeau, which are ordinarily discretionary with the trial court. 26 The statement made by the prospective juror on voir dire in reference to the trouble caused by this mishandling was unsolicited and, of course, improper. Appellant argues that this was prejudicial and that the trial court's instruction to disregard the statement did not cure the impropriety, but, on the contrary, only magnified the prejudice resulting from this remark. 27 As the Government points out in its brief, while the statement of the veniremen is somewhat ambiguous the mishandling referred to was either a mishandling of grain or funds or both. 28 It was the Government's theory, and much testimony was introduced to show that when the grain was shipped from Federal to Best a theft occurred. In fact, the grain, its proceeds, and the money referred to in the indictment were alleged to have been stolen from Federal. The testimony showed that Federal became insolvent and of course it followed that some or all of those who were doing business with Federal would suffer financial loss. 29 Since the essential contents of the veniremen's statement were later presented in testimony before the jury, the court's instruction to the jury concerning the statement could not have been prejudicial. The court properly told the jury to disregard the statement, as it was not evidence. 30 Most of these objections are based upon publicity that had been given Federal's difficulties and appellant's connection with Federal and Best. But as this court stated in Blumenfield v. United States, supra 284 F.2d at p. 51, It is clear that the mere presence of adverse publicity does not per se establish proof of prejudice, or necessarily establish that a defendant would be unable to obtain a fair trial within the district. `The mere fact that a juror has read newspaper accounts relative to a criminal charge is not in itself sufficient grounds for excluding a juror.' Finnegan v. United States, 8th Cir., 204 F.2d [105], 110. 31 During the thorough voir dire examination, which lasted two days, none of the jurors finally accepted indicated the slightest prejudice whatsoever, and appellant has in no way at any time raised any question about any of the twelve jurors finally impaneled at his trial. At voir dire, one of the jurors finally accepted stated that he had read some newspaper accounts regarding the case but did not recall what he read; another said that she had probably heard of the case; another that he had read only headlines and had no impressions about the case; another that she had read about it but had forgotten all the information except the name; another that she had read headlines but had formed no opinion; another that he had heard it discussed but formed no opinion and had not paid much attention to the case; another that he recalled seeing something about it in the newspaper but did not pay attention to it and formed no opinion; another that he read about the case but not enough to get an idea of what it was about or form an opinion; another that he only remembered a newspaper report but formed no opinion; and finally two others who had only heard of the case through newspapers and one who had never heard or read of the case and had no knowledge of it one way or the other. 32 The ultimate and decisive test is whether the jurors who tried appellant were fair and impartial. Of course there could be no constitutional imfirmity in these rulings if petitioner actually received a trial by an impartial jury. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556, 82 S.Ct. 955, 963, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962). 33 It might be noted that the verdict of the jury indicated the opposite of bias or prejudice. It acquitted appellant on two of the four counts against him which were submitted to the jury. 34 The extensive voir dire examination of the jury panel and the answers of those selected and actually served certainly present no clear and convincing proof of prejudice existing in the minds of any juror finally accepted and empaneled. Beck v. United States, 298 F. 2d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1962). (2) The Cross-Examination of Appellant. 35 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the Government to cross-examine him as to his prior convictions. The inquiry into these convictions arose out of the restroom incident. The trial judge, over the objection of the Government, permitted appellant's counsel to explain to the panel on voir dire the nature of the charges which had resulted in the prior convictions. 36 It does appear, as the Government has suggested, that appellant made the most of this opportunity by making an explanatory statement about his convictions to the jury with the further benefit of his counsel later examining the prospective jurors as to any possible prejudice which they might entertain in light of appellant's convictions. Later, when appellant testified during the trial, the trial court recognized the settled rule that a prosecutor, on cross-examination of an accused, may not go beyond the fact of a conviction into its details. However, the trial judge recognized, and we agree, that appellant opened up the scope of the inquiry himself and it was not prejudicial error for the Government to pursue the matter judiciously on cross-examination. 37