Opinion ID: 771658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Requirement

Text: 29 Brooks claimed that Howmedica failed to warn her of the dangers of exposure to methyl methacrylate vapors while mixing Simplex. Brooks argues that a common law failure-to-warn claim is generic, and therefore cannot constitute a specific state requirement subject to federal preemption. 30 We agree with Brooks that Minnesota failure-to-warn claims are generic in the sense that such claims apply to a wide range of products. Cf., e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 99-100 (Minn. 1987) (motor vehicle); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Machine Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924-25 (Minn. 1986) (hydraulic press); Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 782, 787-88 (Minn. 1977) (space heater); Marcon v. Kmart Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728, 730-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (plastic snow sled). But this conclusion doesn't resolve the more difficult question framed in Lohr: may an otherwise generic common law claim act as a device-specific requirement by virtue of the claim's application to a particular product? 31 Five Justices in Lohr indicated that generic common law claims could be preempted, though such claims aren't device-specific in the abstract. Those Justices (through the opinions of Breyer and O'Connor, JJ.) concluded that, in application, a common law judgment adverse to a medical device manufacturer would force compliance in much the same fashion as a state's enactment of regulations or other positive law specific to the medical device at issue. Justice Breyer stated that insofar as the MDA pre-empts a state requirement embodied in a state statute, rule, regulation, or other administrative action, it would also pre-empt a similar requirement that takes the form of a standard of care or behavior imposed by a state-law tort action. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 504-505 (Breyer, J.). Justice O'Connor's partial concurrence echoed Justice Breyer's sentiment that common law tort actions frequently act as state requirements, as described in 360k. See id. at 510-11 (O'Connor, J.); see also id. at 500 (Stevens, J.) (allowing for the remote possibility that general state requirements could sometimes be preempted). 32 A judgment favoring Brooks would provide precisely the sort of specific state-law mandate, or requirement, envisioned by Justices Breyer and O'Connor. If a jury found Howmedica liable for failing to warn Brooks and others of Simplex's asthma-inducing propensity, then the resulting judgment against Howmedica would effectively require Simplex to bear more expansive labeling detailing the risk of contracting asthma from exposure to chemical byproducts in the mixing process. Thus we find that Brooks's state law failure-to-warn claim would have the effect of a specific state law requirement, the first step in the preemption triad.