Opinion ID: 220526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements About the Case

Text: In addition to the fact of Judge Hilliard's participation, the brief itself contains numerous troubling statements about the merits of Hurles's case. These statements display a familiarity with, and prejudgment of, the facts of his case long before any evidence had actually been presented. Judge Hilliard's brief describes the nature of Hurles's case, concluding that it was very simple and straightforward, with an over whelming amount of evidence assembled to demonstrate his guilt for the brutal murder. While any judge would need to make a determination as to whether additional counsel is needed by evaluating the relative complexity of a case, here it is the manner in which Judge Hilliard dismissed Hurles's case as simple that is problematic. Rather than discussing the simplicity of the case with reference to the number of expert or percipient witnesses that would need to be prepared, the number of trial days the case would likely call for, or other content-neutral factors, Judge Hilliard referred to the case as simple because the state had already purportedly amassed overwhelming evidence of guilt against the defendant. She writes: The State's evidence at this point includes, but is not limited to the following: eyewitness statements indicating that Petitioner was seen running from the Buckeye library after a witness saw a woman bleeding profusely inside the locked library building, Petitioner's statement to his brother that he had stabbed someone at the library, Petitioner's shirt and pants stained with blood of the same PGM type as the victim's, Petitioner's footprint in the victim's blood at the scene, and the fact that books returned by Petitioner in the return slot at the library place him at the scene a[t] the time of the murder. This description leads to only one conclusion. According to Judge Hilliard, the case was simple because he was obviously guilty. The dissent's contention that the proceeding involved an evaluation of the evidence only for purposes of determining whether a second counsel was necessary assumes the conclusion it wishes to draw. Dissent at 1329-30. Judge Hilliard's analysis is quite different from, for example, a detached determination that the case was simple because it would require very little witness preparation. In fact, on such neutral measures, the case was not simple at all. Judge Hilliard acknowledged that the State had already listed 22 witnesses to be called at trial and that the defense witness list was at that time unknown. While Judge Hilliard attempted to characterize the scientific evidence required as minimal, by her own admission there would be, at a minimum, blood, fingerprint, and footprint analysis. In addition, she focuses solely on guilt-phase evidence without mention of the sentencing process, one of Hurles's counsel's chief justifications for requesting additional counsel. As the subsequent competency evaluations and testimony at trial and sentencing showed, Hurles's personal and family background required extensive investigation into a multitude of alleged mitigating factors. Moreover, she gives short shrift to the need for extensive investigation on the part of Hurles's attorney to prepare a defense, including alleged bases for legal insanity. Indeed, the evidence amassed by the prosecution posed significant challenges for the defense. That the prosecution appeared to have a strong case for guilt does not render the defense's job easier or simpler. To the contrary, the more evidence the prosecution has, the more challenging it would be for the defense to put on a good case. Therefore, Judge Hilliard could not have been referring to the case as simple in any technical sense. There is no plausible reading of Judge Hilliard's statements other than that the case's resolution was a foregone conclusion. Judges are free to form opinions based on evidence presented in the same or earlier cases involving the litigant in question without offending notions of due process. See Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1130-32 (9th Cir.2007) (finding no due process violation where the judge's opinions as to the likelihood of a guilty verdict against defendant was based on evidence presented in an earlier, now complete, proceeding against his co-defendant for the same incident). In this case, however, the judge's opinions were formed long before trial and before any evidence had been presented. Indeed, the brief presumes that the State's amassed evidence is virtually unassailable, for if there were flaws in the scientific evidence, then the time required to prepare a vigorous defense would be much more significant than Judge Hilliard suggests. [11] Judge Hilliard's statements thus indicate a prejudgment of the case against Hurles months before she would preside over his trial and, later, unilaterally sentence him to death and adjudicate his post-conviction claims for relief.