Opinion ID: 453218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation of Coverage to the Manufacturing Sector

Text: 59 None of the petitioners still before us contend that the manufacturing sector should not be covered by a hazard communication standard. The Secretary's decision to provide coverage only for employees in the manufacturing sector is based on a finding that this sector, which includes 32% of total employment, accounts for more than 50% of the reported cases of illness due to chemical exposure. 48 Fed.Reg. 53285 (1983). From this datum the Secretary determined that employees in the manufacturing sector have the greatest risk of experiencing health effects due to chemical exposure. Id. Agricultural employees have a higher chemical source incidence rate than manufacturing employees. The Secretary discounted this datum, however, because 80% of the reported chemical source cases among agricultural workers involved skin illnesses from handling plants, which would not be regulated by the proposed Hazard Communication Standard. Id. Moreover the Secretary concluded that the Environmental Protection Administration has, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, exercised jurisdiction over regulation of field use of pesticides. Excluding agricultural employees, there is substantial evidence in the record that the manufacturing sector has the highest incidence rate of chemical exposures which the Agency has authority to regulate. 60 Several petitioners, while conceding that the finding about incidence rate of illnesses in the manufacturing sector is supported by substantial evidence, contend that the Secretary's exclusion of other sectors such as service, construction, and agriculture, is unsupported by reasons that are consistent with the purposes of the statute. They urge that while the incidence rate for employees in the manufacturing sector is high overall, some employees in specific non-manufacturing categories, such as hospital workers, are exposed to a greater number of toxic substances than are typical workers in the manufacturing sector. Moreover some workers in specific non-covered industries have higher reported rates of chemical source illness and injury than do workers in many covered industries. The Standard Industrial Classification breakdown, they contend, is not relevant to the statute, since that classification is made for a myriad of statistical purposes, mainly economic, having little to do with exposure to hazards. The result of the standard is that spray painters in the manufacturing sector, for example, must be provided with MSDS's and with information and training on hazardous chemicals in the products they use, while spray painters in the construction industry using the same products are not so protected. 61 In explaining the limited coverage, the Secretary reasoned: 62 It should be emphasized that the Agency does not believe that employees in other industries are not exposed to hazardous chemicals, or that they should not be informed of those hazards. OSHA has merely exercised its discretion to establish rulemaking priorities, and chosen to first regulate those industries with the greatest demonstrated need. 63 45 Fed.Reg. 53286. Rejecting arguments of participants in the rulemaking proceeding that other workers, such as painters in the construction industry, are exposed to the same hazards as are workers in the manufacturing sector, the Secretary reasoned: 64 As stated previously, OSHA acknowledges that exposures to hazardous chemicals are occurring in other industries as well. A limited coverage of them is included in the final standard since all containers leaving the workplace of chemical manufacturers, importers, or distributors will be labeled, regardless of their intended destination. This will alert downstream users to the presence of hazardous chemicals, and the availability of material safety data sheets. The Agency contends that the focus of this standard should remain on the manufacturing sector since that is where the greatest number of chemical source injuries and illnesses are occurring. This focus will also serve to ensure that hazard information is being generated for chemicals produced or imported into this country, and this increased availability will benefit all industry sectors. 65 Id. The Secretary's reasoning does not address the petitioners' contention that reliance on the Standard Industrial Classification is inappropriate because it ignores the high level of exposure in specific job settings outside the manufacturing sector. 66 The Secretary maintains that section 6(g) of the Act affords him unreviewable discretion to determine what industries shall be covered by a standard. That section provides in relevant part:In determining the priority for establishing standards under this section, the Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety and health standards for particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations, businesses, workplaces or work environments. 67 29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(g) (1982). We reject the Secretary's contention that his priority-setting authority under section 6(g) vitiates judicial review of his determination that only the manufacturing industry need be covered by the Hazard Communication Standard. Section 6(g) must be read in conjunction with section 6(f), which provides for judicial review of standards. Indeed the language due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety standards for particular industries suggests to us a statutory standard by which to measure the exercise of the Secretary's priority-setting discretion. 2 In United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1309-10 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3148, 69 L.Ed.2d 997 (1981) the court reviewed under section 6(f) the Secretary's decision to exempt the construction industry from a standard limiting exposure to lead. Although the court did not explicitly address section 6(g), it implicitly rejected the contention that the Secretary's priority-setting authority is unreviewable. We do so explicitly. 68 Our difficulty with the Secretary's reliance on section 6(g) arises from the Secretary's failure to explain why coverage of workers outside the manufacturing sector would have seriously impeded the rulemaking process. Section 6(g) clearly permits the Secretary to set priorities for the use of the agency's resources, and to promulgate standards sequentially. Once a standard has been promulgated, however, the Secretary may exclude a particular industry only if he informs the reviewing court, not merely that the sector selected for coverage presents greater hazards, but also why it is not feasible for the same standard to be applied in other sectors where workers are exposed to similar hazards. See United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1309-10. The explanation for the Secretary's action quoted above is deficient in the latter respect. Thus the Secretary has failed to carry the burden of persuading us that section 6(g) justifies limitation of coverage to the manufacturing sector. 69 We are also unpersuaded by the Secretary's contention that the communication rule will trickle down to uncovered workers because containers will be labeled. Section 6(b)(5) requires that: 70 The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or other harmful physical agents ... shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. 71 29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(b)(5) (1982). There is record evidence that workers in sectors other than manufacturing are exposed to the hazards associated with use of toxic materials or other harmful physical agents. The Secretary has given no statement of reasons why it would not be feasible to require that those workers be given the same MSDS's and training as must be given to workers in the manufacturing sector. Section 6(c)(7) provides that: 72 Any standard ... shall prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of warning as are necessary to insure that employees are apprised of all hazards to which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and appropriate emergency treatment, and proper conditions and precautions of safe use or exposure. 73 29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(c)(7) (1981). The Secretary has given reasons why the labeling, MSDS, and instruction requirements comply with section 6(c)(7) for employees in the manufacturing sector, but no explanation why the same information is not needed for workers in other sectors exposed to industrial hazards. Such a statement of reasons is required by section 6(f). Snythetic Organic, 503 F.2d at 1160. 74 We hold, therefore, that the petitions for review of those petitioners who object to the limitation of the Hazard Communication Standard must be granted. That standard may continue to operate in the manufacturing sector, but the Secretary's explanation for excluding other sectors does not withstand the scrutiny mandated by section 6(f). Thus the Secretary will be directed to reconsider the application of the standard to employees in other sectors and to order its application to other sectors unless he can state reasons why such application would not be feasible. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(b)(5). 75