Opinion ID: 1511681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Injury Arose in the Course of Employment

Text: In order to obtain compensation, Wentzell must show not only that his injury arose out of his employment but also that it was in the course of his employment. Westman's Case, 118 Me. 133, 139-140, 106 A. 532, 537 (1919); Johnson v. Highway Commission, 125 Me. 443, 444, 134 A. 564 (1926). The commissioner advanced two reasons in support of his conclusion that Wentzell's injury did not arise in the course of his employment. The commissioner found that at the time of the assault, Wentzell (1) was engaged in conversation with his brother and father which had no relationship to his work and (2) had not entered upon his work having reported earlier than he was obligated to. The first rationale is insufficient to support the commissioner's conclusion. Non-work-related conversations are a normal incident of the work place. The subject matter of a discussion between employees does not, in and of itself, remove the employees from the protections afforded by the Workers' Compensation Act. Nor is the second rationale adequate, in and of itself, to support the commissioner's conclusion that Wentzell's injury did not arise in the course of employment. Certainly, an employer is not an insurer of his employee's safety whenever the employee chooses to enter the work place. But [w]e have long recognized that an employee going to or departing from his regular work-shift is within the course of his employment while on the employer's premises or a way maintained by the employer to provide ingress or egress. Rioux v. Franklin County Memorial Hospital, Me., 390 A.2d 1059, 1060 (1978) (emphasis in original). As we stated in Roberts' Case, 124 Me. 129, 131, 126 A. 573, 574 (1924), `the course of employment' does not begin and end with the actual work he was employed to do, but covers the period between his entering his employer's premises a reasonable time before beginning his actual work . . .. Thus, having found that Wentzell had reported earlier than he was obligated to, the commissioner should have proceeded to determine if the employee's time of arrival was nonetheless reasonable in light of the time Wentzell was actually to begin work. This entails finding the employee's time of arrival and the time that the employee actually was to begin work and then drawing a legal conclusion as to whether the time of arrival was reasonable. Ordinarily, it might be necessary to remand to the commissioner to make these determinations. However, where the essential facts are undisputed and the legal inference to be drawn from those facts is beyond doubt, considerations of judicial economy and the interest of the parties in obtaining a speedy resolution of their dispute dictates that the Law Court make the final determination without remanding to the commissioner. Beaulieu v. Francis Bernard, Inc., Me., 393 A.2d 163 (1978). The instant case is amenable to final disposition on this appeal. The commissioner expressly found that Wentzell arrived for work between 10:15 and 10:30 p. m. The commissioner did not expressly find the time Wentzell was to begin work. However, the employee testified that although his shift was formally scheduled to begin at 11:00 p. m., he would start at ten-thirty. Wentzell explained that the previous shift would usually knock off, stop work at ten-thirty so they can wash up and get ready to go. The employer did not rebut this testimony. The conclusion that Wentzell ordinarily began his shift a half-hour early is bolstered by the commissioner's express finding that Wentzell punched in for his job on the day of the incident between 10:15 p. m. and 10:30 p. m., in accordance with his usual practice as to time of reporting. If Wentzell did not actually begin work until 11:00 p. m., it is highly unlikely that he would have made a usual practice of reporting 30-45 minutes early. In short, the record provides firm support for a finding that Wentzell was actually to begin work at 10:30 p. m., a half hour before his shift was formally scheduled to begin. Given this fact, it is clear that Wentzell's arrival at the plant between 10:15 and 10:30 p. m. was not unreasonable. Accordingly, we hold that Wentzell's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. We remand to the commissioner to determine the amount of compensation to which the employee is entitled. The entry will be Appeal sustained. Pro forma decree of the Superior Court vacated. Remanded to the Workers' Compensation Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; and It is further ordered that the employer pay to the employee $550 for his counsel fees, plus his reasonable out-of-pocket expenses for this appeal. WERNICK and NICHOLS, JJ., did not sit.