Opinion ID: 2737154
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clear and Convincing Proof of the Other Crime

Text: The second criterion under Rule 404(b) is whether the Defendant’s commission of the other crime was established by clear and convincing evidence. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). The Defendant contends that the evidence established only that: (1) the Defendant knew Perez; (2) the Defendant was in the vicinity of Perez at the time of his death; and (3) Perez checked into the Super 8 Motel accompanied by a skinny, African-American male. Thus, he claims that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he committed the Perez murder. We disagree. To meet the clear and convincing standard, the trial court must determine that the evidence offered to show the defendant’s involvement in the other crime is not “‘vague and uncertain.’” State v. Fisher, 670 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (quoting Wrather v. State, 169 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tenn. 1943)). The clear and convincing evidence standard is more exacting than preponderance of the evidence but less exacting than beyond a reasonable doubt, and it requires that “‘there [be] no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)); see also Little, 402 S.W.3d at 214 n.7 (observing that “Tennessee is different from most state and federal jurisdictions that evaluate the admissibility of prior crime evidence by a preponderance of the evidence standard”). The burden is on the State to establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) another crime was committed; and (2) the crime was committed by the defendant. White, 533 S.W.2d at 743 (quoting Wrather, 169 S.W.2d at 858). “Only thus can identification, or other proof of guilt, of the accused in the pending case be aided by evidence of the [other] crime.” Id. (quoting Wrather, 169 S.W.2d at 858). As indicated, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by circumstantial evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379. This principle also applies in the context of determining whether another crime has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we may not substitute our own inferences for those drawn by the trial court, which acted as the finder of fact in determining whether the proof of the Perez murder was clear and convincing. See id. (“On appeal, the court may not substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact in circumstantial evidence cases.”); see also State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (noting that “the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, . . . ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the [finder of fact]’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958))). -28- At the Rule 404(b) hearing, the State presented significant evidence placing the Defendant in both temporal and physical proximity of the Perez murder. Detective Reyes testified that on August 25, 2003, he initiated a traffic stop near Melbourne, Florida, of a Dodge Aries K-car driven by Young. During the stop, the Defendant pulled behind the detective’s vehicle in his Lincoln and acknowledged that he owned the Dodge. Because Young was subsequently arrested, the Dodge was left parked on the side of the interstate, approximately five miles from the Super 8 Motel, and the Defendant was instructed to later retrieve the vehicle. Perez was last seen alive the following day at approximately 1:00 p.m. when Patel, the manager of the Super 8 Motel, observed Perez exit a white, mid-sized sedan—a description matching both of the Defendant’s vehicles—and enter the motel office. Thereafter, Perez returned to the vehicle and an African-American male accompanied him into the motel. Perez’s body was discovered the next day. Notably, the Defendant admitted that he had worked with Perez, that they had associated with each other outside of work, and that Perez had been in both the Defendant’s Dodge and his recently purchased Lincoln. Most importantly, a Nike shoe print matching the size, shape, and tread design of a shoe recovered from the Defendant’s Lincoln was lifted from the motel room’s bathroom. FDLE crime analyst Emily Strickland, a footprint impression expert, testified that two unique individual characteristics on the shoe matched the latent prints from the Perez crime scene, indicating a high probability that the footprint impression from the motel room was made by the Defendant’s shoe. Based on this proof, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the evidence of the Perez murder was clear and convincing. The evidence, while circumstantial, was neither vague nor uncertain, see Fisher, 670 S.W.2d at 236, and it provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude, free from serious or substantial doubt, see Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d at 18, that the Defendant murdered Perez.6 6 The State urges this Court to consider the testimony of Catherine Theisen, the mitochondrial DNA specialist who determined that the DNA from pubic hairs found in the motel room was consistent with the Defendant’s DNA and is of a type found in only a small percentage of the population. As noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, this evidence was presented for the first time at trial after the trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling and was not available to the trial court in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of the Perez murder. Jones, 2013 WL 1697611, at . We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that because the trial court must base its Rule 404(b) findings upon other crime evidence heard outside of the presence of the jury, we must refrain from considering additional evidence presented to the jury after the trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling. See State v. Roshell, No. M2007-02358-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 890875, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2009) (limiting review of the evidence to “‘the evidence presented at the jury[-]out hearing’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dubose, 953 S.W.2d at 653)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). -29- 3. Probative Value Versus Danger of Unfair Prejudice The third and final criterion for the trial court to consider during a Rule 404(b) hearing is the probative value of the other crime evidence versus the danger of unfair prejudice that accompanies the admission of such evidence. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 405 (Tenn. 2012). This balancing test, under the plain language of the Rule, requires that evidence of another crime be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice “outweigh[s]” the probative value. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(4); cf. Tenn. R. Evid. 403 (allowing the admission of relevant evidence so long as the danger of unfair prejudice does not “substantially outweigh[]” the probative value of the evidence). “Th[is] restrictive approach of Rule 404(b) recognizes that evidence of other crimes, wrongs[,] or acts carries a significant danger of unfair prejudice.” DuBose, 953 S.W.2d at 654. The term “unfair prejudice” has been defined as “‘[a]n undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978)). When the other crime is similar to the charged offense in the pending case, the danger of unfair prejudice is especially prevalent, increasing the likelihood that “‘[the] jury would convict on the perception of a past pattern of conduct, instead of on the facts of the charged offense.’” State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 488 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). The trial court must weigh these concerns of unfair prejudice against any probative value of the proffered evidence, which will depend upon the actual need for the evidence in light of the issues at trial and the other evidence available to the State. State v. Burchfield, 664 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tenn. 1984) (quoting Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645, 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). Where, as here, the material issue at trial is the identity of the defendant, [t]he probative value of evidence of other crimes . . . depends upon the extent to which it raises an inference that the perpetrator of the prior offenses was the perpetrator of the offense in issue. Both the existence and the strength of an inference proceeds through an evaluation of the similarities between the prior offense and the charged crime. Thus, if the characteristics of both the prior offense and the charged offense are not in any way distinctive, but are similar to numerous other crimes committed by persons other than the defendant, no inference of identity can arise. An inference of identity from prior crimes can only arise when the elements of the prior offense and the charged offense, singly or together, are sufficiently distinctive to warrant an inference that the person who committed the prior offense[] also committed the offense on trial. . . . The probative value of evidence of other crimes on the issue of identity always depends upon the strength of the inference; when the inference of identity is weak, evidence of prior crimes should be excluded because under such circumstances the prejudicial effect of the evidence inevitably outweighs -30- the probative value of that evidence. Bunch, 605 S.W.2d at 230 (fourth alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1978)). Although the evidence of the other crime need not be identical to the evidence of the charged offense, for other crime evidence to have probative value it must bear a sufficient connection to the issue of identity so as to establish the defendant’s commission of “signature crimes.” To meet this threshold, the similarities of the crimes must do more than simply outweigh their differences—there must be a “‘highly distinctive common mark’” between the crimes. Id. at 231 (quoting People v. Cavanaugh, 444 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1968)); see also State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tenn. 1999) (“Before multiple offenses may be said to reveal a distinctive design, and therefore give rise to an inference of identity, the ‘modus operandi employed must be so unique and distinctive as to be like a signature.’” (quoting State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tenn. 1986))). The test, therefore, is not whether the evidence demonstrates that the defendant committed both crimes, but whether the defendant used a peculiar and distinctive method in committing the crimes. See Young v. State, 566 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). For example, in Harris v. State, this Court recognized that a particular strat[a]gem or method [may have] such unusual particularities that reasonable men can consider that it would not likely be employed by different persons. Many men commit murder, but Jack the Ripper used his knife in a manner so peculiar that when his crimes were viewed together there could be little doubt that they were committed by the same man. Merely the fact, however, that a series of such crimes may be committed with a knife will not render them unusual enough to identify the perpetrator of one as the perpetrator of the others. 227 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn. 1950) (citation omitted). Thus, the focus of our inquiry is whether the trial court erred when it determined that the probative value of the evidence of the Perez murder outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice because the details of the crime were sufficiently distinctive to raise an inference that the Defendant committed the James murders. The State contends, and the trial court found, that strangulation, binding of the victims, removal of the bindings, multiple incisions to the throat, removal of clothes from some of the victims, placement of the bodies face down, and cleaning of the scene after the crime, in combination, constitute a signature crime. Because this finding would require us to ignore numerous differences between the murders as well as the expert forensic testimony offered by the State, it is our assessment based upon -31- our extensive review of prior decisions of this Court over a number of years, that the trial court’s ruling was “based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” See Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 660. We hold, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of the Perez murder. Although the trial court acknowledged that there were some differences between the Perez and James murders, it found that the similarities were distinct enough to establish that the same person committed both crimes. The trial court pointed to the testimony of Dr. O’Brian Cleary Smith as compelling such a conclusion: Dr. Smith, the former [M]edical [E]xaminer for Shelby County, testified that death as a result of knife wounds comprise[s] a minority of homicides and even fewer cases have both incised wounds to the neck and strangulation. Dr. Smith further stated that fewer still have incised wounds to the neck; strangulation; binding; and removal of binding prior to discovery of the body. He stated that taking these circumstances in connection with the fact that the victims were found lying face down; the crime scene appear[ed] to be “cleaned up”[;] and the victims were robbed by someone known to them, made the number of similar cases shrink even further. Unfortunately, however, the record demonstrates that the trial court misconstrued portions of the evidence and neglected to accord appropriate weight to the significant differences between the Perez murder and the James murders. As Judge McMullen observed in her dissenting opinion: The charged offense, the [James] murders, occurred in a suburban home and involved two elderly victims. It was perpetrated by two individuals[—]an accomplice, Young, and the Defendant. The uncharged offense, the [Perez] murder, occurred at a motel located in a high crime area and involved a young male victim and an[] unidentified female. The [Perez] murder also involved evidence of a sexual assault, while the [James] murders did not. Specifically, the [Shelby County] [M]edical [E]xaminer testified that both of the victims in the instant case died as a result of multiple injuries. Mr. James suffered incised wounds to the neck, a stab wound to his neck, a broken hyoid bone, blunt force injuries to his chest, fractured parts of the front neck bone, and rib fractures. There was also evidence suggesting that (1) his wounds were inflicted after he was killed, (2) possible strangulation, and (3) ligatures or bindings on his extremities. Mr. James’s body was found “in repose on his right side.” In regard to Ms. James, the medical examiner -32- testified that she suffered multiple incised wounds to the neck, incised wounds to forearms, and possible strangulation. Asked whether the linear marks on her neck were caused by manual or ligature strangulation, the medical examiner said, “it may [have been] some hard object that was used around the neck, an object could be held against the neck with enough force to compress the neck and leave the marks on the neck.” However, other than a “cut,” he found no evidence of bondage, and her hyoid bone was intact. Although Ms. James’s body was found face down, the medical examiner opined that her body had been moved “in a position other than that in which she was found at the time that the neck wounds were produced.” Jones, 2013 WL 1697611, at  (McMullen, J., dissenting). Moreover, the applicable standard focuses on the distinctiveness of the crimes, not a mere assessment of similarities or an existence of rarity. State v. Roberson, 846 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (“[M]ere similarity in the manner in which two crimes are committed does not produce the relevance necessary for admission—uniqueness does.” (emphasis added)). During the Rule 404(b) hearing, Dr. Smith unequivocally rejected all indications that the methodology of the murders was unique or distinctive. Specifically, on cross-examination, he testified as follows: Q: So, death by slashing the throat has become not unusual. Correct? A: That’s correct. Q: What about asphyxiation by possible strangulation. Is that unusual? A: No, sir. That’s probably a little bit more common than throat cutting. Q: What about the two of those combined. Is that unusual? A: No. Q: Bondage. . . . Is bondage unusual? A: No. .... Q: What about the three of those combined. Is that unusual? -33- A: No. .... Q: So [the bindings on Mr. James] had been removed? A: Yes, sir. Q: Is that unusual? A: No. Defense counsel then questioned Dr. Smith about the multiple lacerations to the neck: Q: . . . Is there anything unusual at first glance to these—in the autopsy as far as the incised wounds, anything out of the ordinary that you would see in this sort of homicide? A: No. Q: Was there an efficiency to the incised wounds in any way that would indicate any sort of training or technique? A: No. .... Q: So four strokes across the same part of [Mr. James’] neck in layman’s terms? A: Yes, sir. Q: But that’s not unusual? A: No. Q: Okay. Can you explain? A: Well, in the absence of a surgical instrument, cutting or incising the skin with a knife is very inefficient. . . . And when the cutting edge is applied to the -34- skin surface and then dragged across, the skin is going to move and you lose the power of the knife so that it’s more common than not to see a—an incised wound may first open up the skin and then as the knife is reapplied in a slightly different area, it goes into the—cuts its way into the already open area from the first or prior incision, and then once it gains access to the deeper tissues, it cuts with more efficiency. . . . To find a single application of a knife in a throat cutting incident would be unusual. Although Dr. Smith conceded that the number of murders involving incisions, bondage, strangulation, bindings removed, and cleaning of the crime scene constituted a minority of all of the murders in Shelby County, he explained that there was nothing unusual about the methods employed—even in combination. Moreover, as Judge McMullen pointed out in her dissent, not all of the victims were found lying face down, as the trial court mistakenly observed. Our prior case law includes numerous decisions which, as in this instance, involved offenses with similarities that did not rise to the level of a signature crime. For example, in Harris, 227 S.W.2d at 9, the defendant was charged with rape, and the trial court admitted evidence that he had committed another rape one week earlier. This Court noted multiple similarities in the two offenses, including their temporal proximity, the fact that both crimes were rapes committed by forcible coercion, and the use of a knife in both instances. Id. at 11. Nevertheless, because there were also significant differences—including the nature of the sexual acts committed and the location of the crimes—the Court held that the “methods pursued were not so peculiar as to” justify admission of the other crime evidence on the issue of identity. Id. Similarly, in State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 227 (Tenn. 2003), the Court analyzed whether separate incidents of aggravated child abuse shared a similar modus operandi such that they qualified as signature crimes.7 Again, the Court observed numerous similarities between the two crimes: both involved the same victim (the defendant’s stepson), both involved the defendant striking the victim on the buttocks with a braided extension cord, and both arose from the victim receiving poor grades. Id. at 229. Despite these similarities, the Court highlighted the differences in the methods employed to commit the crimes, which included the fact that in one instance the extension cord had been braided with wire and wrapped with duct tape, whereas in the other instance the victim had been required to lean over a barrel and the defendant had wrapped the extension cord around the victim’s neck, jerking him around the room. Id. at 229-30. Because the method employed did not “have ‘such unusual particularities that reasonable men can conclude that it would not likely 7 Although Toliver involved the question of whether the two cases should have been severed rather than jointly tried, it employed the same standard in its signature crime analysis. Id. at 230 (citing Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)). -35- be employed by different persons,’” the Court concluded that “the method employed in committing the offenses [did] not constitute a modus operandi so unique and distinctive as to be comparable to a signature.” Id. at 229 (quoting State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 248 (Tenn. 1999)); see also State v. Bobo, 724 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (excluding evidence of a prior armed robbery because, although sharing many characteristics with the armed robbery charged, there was “nothing unique about any of” the similarities, which included the robber using a pistol, being unmasked, wearing a coat and a hat, and targeting a Winn-Dixie grocery store); Young v. State, 566 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (“The test is not whether there was evidence that a defendant committed both crimes, but whether there was a unique method used in committing the crimes. It is not enough that the appellant was wearing the same clothing during the commission of the two crimes, unless in some way, his clothing was a part of the modus operandi.”). In contrast, our cases allowing other crime evidence under a signature crime theory demonstrate the type of unique modus operandi that is lacking in this instance. In Warren, 156 S.W.2d at 419, a robbery case, this Court affirmed the trial court’s admission of evidence of another robbery with several striking similarities. In particular, the two robberies occurred within a few nights of one another at the same place and time of night, and in each instance the victims “were robbed by a man dressed in a black cap and overalls, with his face smeared with dark grease or paint, carrying a pistol in one hand and a flash light in the other, who had an impediment in his speech.” Id. at 417. In State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d 553, 557-58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tenn. 1995), our Court of Criminal Appeals found the signature crime standard satisfied as to two sex offenses with the following similarities: each victim was a young, white female living alone in an apartment; the attacker covered the head of each victim or forced her to turn around so that she could not see him; the attacker forced each victim to submit to cunnilingus and then vaginal intercourse; and the attacker demanded that each victim rub his nipples as he performed vaginal intercourse.8 8 Like Tennessee, other jurisdictions set a high bar for the admission of other crime evidence on a signature crime theory. Compare, e.g., Knox v. State, 621 So. 2d 403, 405 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (finding no signature modus operandi in two robberies despite the fact that the victims of both robberies were cab drivers, both crimes occurred after the cab driver picked up the robber, and the robber in both instances brandished a gun), and Diffee v. State, 894 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Ark. 1995) (finding no signature modus operandi in a first degree murder and a prior uncharged incident despite the fact that both incidents involved the use of an ice pick, both occurred in or near the defendant’s residence, and both victims were members of the defendant’s family), with State v. Porambo, 544 A.2d 870, 874 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (finding a signature modus operandi in two armed robberies because in both instances the robber gained entry into a private residence by posing as public safety official and disguised himself using false facial hair, including a “fake mustache[]” that “was distinctive in appearance”). -36- As these authorities demonstrate, while there are similarities between the Perez murder and the James murders, those similarities fail to establish a modus operandi that is comparable to a signature. The trial court erred, therefore, by determining that the evidence of the Perez murder was so distinctive that it raised an inference that the Defendant committed the James murders. In light of our conclusion that the State failed to establish the Perez murder as a signature crime that could be used to prove the Defendant’s identity in the James murders, the admission of the evidence regarding the Perez murder was profoundly prejudicial. By allowing the evidence of the Perez murder, a crime for which the Defendant had not been charged, the trial court created an opportunity for the jury to infer that the Defendant committed the uncharged murder and, therefore, must have committed the murders for which he was on trial. See Dotson, 254 S.W.3d at 387 (“When the defendant’s prior bad acts are similar to the crime for which the defendant is on trial, the risk of unfair prejudice is even higher. As this Court has consistently cautioned, the jury should not ‘be tempted to convict based upon a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes rather than . . . evidence relating to the charged offense.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Spicer, 12 S.W.3d at 448)). Although the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury, a substantial amount of evidence was presented regarding the Perez murder. The presentation of the evidence lasted two days and included inherently prejudicial testimony about a sexual encounter at the Perez crime scene, which was absent from the James murders. In the absence of sufficiently distinctive characteristics amounting to a signature crime, the danger of unfair prejudice created by the detailed evidence of the Perez murder clearly outweighed any probative value. C. Harmless Error Because the evidentiary error here is neither structural nor constitutional, our harmless error analysis is governed by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b), which provides that “[a] final judgment from which relief is available and otherwise appropriate shall not be set aside unless, considering the whole record, error involving a substantial right more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” This standard “‘recognizes that . . . a person convicted of a crime as a result of an essentially fair trial is not entitled to have his or her conviction reversed based on errors that, more probably than not, did not affect the verdict or judgment.’” Sexton, 368 S.W.3d at 429 (quoting State v. Ferrell, 277 S.W.3d 372, 380 (Tenn. 2009)). Our harmless error analysis “does not turn upon the existence of sufficient evidence to affirm a conviction or even a belief that the jury’s verdict is correct. To the contrary, the crucial consideration is what impact the error may reasonably be taken to have had on the jury’s decision-making.” State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 372 (Tenn. 2008) (citations omitted). The evidence connecting the Defendant to the James murders consisted primarily of -37- the testimony of Young, an accomplice to the murders. No other witness testified as to the Defendant’s presence at the crime scene. No forensic evidence tied him to the James murders. Therefore, the evidence of the James murders, although sufficient to support the convictions, is not so overwhelming as to preclude the grant of a new trial. Moreover, as stated previously, the improperly admitted evidence of the Perez murder was extensive. Hardly any evidence in a murder trial could be more prejudicial than evidence that the Defendant committed another murder. In consequence, we are constrained to hold that the erroneous admission of the evidence surrounding the Perez murder more probably than not affected the outcome of the trial. We must, therefore, reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. D. Evidence of Perez Murder as Contextual Background In addition to allowing the evidence of the Perez murder as proof of the Defendant’s identity, the trial court observed the “nearly inextricable investigative connection” between the Perez murder and the James murders, indicating that “it may be necessary to admit at least portions of proof, relating to the Perez murder, in order to create a complete picture for the jury of the investigation conducted by the Bartlett authorities.” Because this issue is likely to recur on remand, we will briefly address the use of contextual background evidence that involves other crimes, wrongs, or acts. As discussed, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the use of other crime evidence “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait,” although such evidence “may . . . be admissible for other purposes.” This Court has held that one of the “other purposes” for which evidence of another crime may be admitted is to provide “contextual background.” State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 272 (Tenn. 2000). Not all background evidence, however, will be admissible, and trial courts must strike a careful balance between evidence that will provide context for the jury and evidence that will only tend to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes. Id. Thus, within the framework of Rule 404(b), the proper analysis is as follows: [W]hen the [S]tate seeks to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that is relevant only to provide a contextual background for the case, the [S]tate must establish, and the trial court must find, that (1) the absence of the evidence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the [S]tate’s presentation of its case; (2) the void created by the absence of the evidence would likely result in significant jury confusion as to the material issues or evidence in the case; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. -38- We acknowledge that there exists significant overlap between the investigations into the Perez and James murders, including crucial breakthroughs in the James murders during the investigation into the Perez murder. The various law enforcement agencies in Florida and Tennessee worked closely to establish the time lines and certain details of both cases. For that reason, as the trial court observed, it may become necessary to admit at least some portions of the evidence relating to the investigation of the Perez murder in order to alleviate potential confusion caused by a chronological or conceptual void in the explanation of the James murders. We caution the trial court, however, that if such evidence is offered by the State to provide contextual background, the evidence must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the admissibility requirements of Rule 404(b) and Gilliland are met. The use of limiting instructions to the jury would also be appropriate in this situation. See id. at 273 (“[M]ultiple limiting instructions to the jury from the trial court worked to alleviate the prejudicial effect of the [contextual background] evidence, and we also presume that juries follow the instructions given to them by the trial court.”). It is the responsibility of the Defendant, however, to request the appropriate limiting instructions. See Little, 402 S.W.3d at 210. E. Mandatory Death Sentence Review By statute, appellate review of a sentence of death has “priority over all other cases” and requires determinations as to whether: (A) The sentence of death was imposed in any arbitrary fashion; (B) The evidence supports the jury’s finding of statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances; (C) The evidence supports the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances; and (D) The sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1). As indicated, the erroneous admission of the evidence relating to the Perez murder requires a new trial in this case. Accordingly, we will not evaluate the arbitrariness of the Defendant’s death sentence, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, or whether the Defendant’s sentence of death was disproportionate to the -39- same penalty imposed in other cases. Cf. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d at 428-29.9 Our ruling does not preclude the State from seeking the death penalty on remand. See Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 328 (Tenn. 2011).