Opinion ID: 1188122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of robtoy's confession

Text: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination required that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the accused that he has the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney. If the accused indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. (Footnote omitted.) Miranda, at 473-74. If he requests counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Miranda, at 474. The Miranda decision recognizes that, under certain circumstances, the person being interrogated may validly waive the right to counsel. Miranda, at 475. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney, the state has the heavy burden of establishing the defendant's waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n. 14, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964). The state can satisfy this burden if it can prove the voluntariness of the statement by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, 92 S.Ct. 619 (1972); State v. Braun, 82 Wn.2d 157, 162, 509 P.2d 742 (1973). The waiver must be: (1) knowing; (2) voluntary; and (3) an intelligent relinquishment of a known right. Whether a waiver by the defendant is shown depends in each case `upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981), quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938). In a footnote to the Miranda decision, the Supreme Court noted its agreement that the interviewing agent must exercise his judgment in determining whether the individual waives his right to counsel, but stated the standard for waiver is necessarily high and the ultimate responsibility for resolving the constitutional question lies with the courts. Miranda, at 486 n. 55. Recently, we decided the case of State v. Pierce, 94 Wn.2d 345, 618 P.2d 62 (1980), which involved the question of whether a defendant could validly waive his previously asserted right to counsel when questioning was later reinitiated by the police. We determined that such a waiver was possible under the following circumstances: To summarize, the rule that we draw from Miranda, Mosley [ Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975)], and Innis [ Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980)] is that the police may question a suspect who has once cut off questioning by requesting an attorney as long as (1) the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored, (2) the police engaged in no further words or actions amounting to interrogation before obtaining a valid waiver or assuring the presence of an attorney, (3) the police engaged in no tactics which tended to coerce the suspect to change his mind, and (4) the subsequent waiver was knowing and voluntary. Pierce, at 352. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court decided Edwards v. Arizona, supra , a case factually similar to Pierce. The Edwards opinion seems to settle the question of whether the right to counsel can be waived after it has been once asserted: [W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. (Footnote omitted. Italics ours.) Edwards, at 484-85. Clearly, insofar as Pierce indicates that the police may again engage in questioning after the accused requests the presence of an attorney, it is now overruled by Edwards. [1] Once a suspect requests the presence of an attorney, Edwards makes it clear there can be no further questioning until an attorney is provided unless the suspect himself reestablishes a line of communication with the police. Edwards, at 484-85. As stated by the Court in Edwards, it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel. Edwards, at 485. [1] In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n. 10, 46 L. Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975), the Court noted that Miranda distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney and required that interrogation cease until an attorney was present only if the individual stated that he wanted counsel. Thus, the question now before us is whether Robtoy in fact invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he said, Maybe I should call my attorney. 2 Report of Proceedings, at 201. Certainly, if Robtoy had made an unequivocal request for an attorney, the rule of Edwards would be applicable to prevent any further questioning. In the Edwards case itself, the Supreme Court hinted that a different rule may well apply if the request is equivocal in nature: The rule in the Fifth Circuit is that a knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be found once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been clearly invoked unless the accused initiates the renewed contact. See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (1977); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (1969). Waiver is possible, however, when the request for counsel is equivocal. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (CA5 1979) (en banc). See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (CA5 1979). (Italics ours.) Edwards, at 486 n. 9. In Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 62 L.Ed.2d 409, 100 S.Ct. 485 (1979), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals established the rule that if a suspect makes an equivocal request for an attorney, interrogation about any offense must cease and questioning must be confined to clarifying the suspect's wishes regarding an attorney. Nash, at 517-18. The Nash court expressed its adherence to the rule set forth in United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir.1969) that when a suspect makes an unequivocal request for an attorney's presence, there can be no inquiry as to the subsequent waiver of that right. Nash, at 517. When a suspect who has been informed of his rights expresses both a desire for counsel and a desire to continue the interview without the presence of counsel, however, it is permissible for the questioning official to make further inquiry to clarify the suspect's wishes. Nash, at 517-18. Accord, United States v. Weston, 519 F. Supp. 565, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 939 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981); Vaughn v. State, 248 Ga. 127, 131, 281 S.E.2d 594 (1981); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 670 (W. Va. 1980). Any questioning after the equivocal assertion of the right to counsel must be strictly confined to clarifying the suspect's request. [W]henever even an equivocal request for an attorney is made by a suspect during custodial interrogation, the scope of that interrogation is immediately narrowed to one subject and one only. Further questioning thereafter must be limited to clarifying that request until it is clarified. Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir.1979). The court in Nash went on to warn that an interrogating officer may not utilize the guise of clarification as a subterfuge for eliciting a waiver of the previously asserted request for counsel. Nash, at 517-18. See also State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440, 446 (S.D. 1980). The Fifth Circuit rule, cited with seeming approval by the United States Supreme Court in Edwards, at 486 n. 9, appears to us to be the most reasonable approach to dealing with an equivocal request for counsel. Otherwise, the mere mention by the suspect of the word attorney takes on talismanic significance. We believe the Fifth Circuit's distinction between equivocal and unequivocal requests for an attorney gives a suspect the proper amount of protection to his rights without unduly burdening the police from taking voluntary statements. See Michigan v. Mosley, supra . We note that the reasoning of Nash v. Estelle, supra , was recently adopted by Division Two of the Court of Appeals in State v. Lewis, 32 Wn. App. 13, 20-22, 645 P.2d 722 (1982). We now join in the adoption of that Fifth Circuit rule. At the same time, we express the same admonition as the Fifth Circuit that we will not permit interrogating officers to use the guise of clarification as a subterfuge for eliciting a waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel. In examining an alleged waiver of the right to counsel, we will continue to indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 97 S.Ct. 1232 (1977). The trial court in the present case found Robtoy's statement was not an unequivocal request for an attorney. This finding is supported by Detective Dean's testimony that when Robtoy said, Maybe I should call my attorney, he appeared to be thinking out loud instead of making a request for an attorney. Detective Dean's testimony about his exchanges with Robtoy regarding an attorney is as follows: A: ... He was  like he appeared to be thinking like this (demonstrating), and he said that  He said, Maybe I should call my attorney. I recall that he waited for a while, and he paused there, and I told him, you know,  Mike, if you say you want your attorney, this conversation ends right here, and he said that he knew that. Q: Who did he direct that comment at or towards? A: Well, he  Me and Rusty [Simpson] were in the room, but he directed that comment  It was kind of like a thought to himself. It was kind of like I know I could do that. Maybe I should, but I'm still  You know, like he was still considering I'm going to  like he knew he had this problem, and it wasn't going to go away, and I want to tell somebody about it. Q: Did he ask Trooper Simpson for an attorney? A: He did not. Q: Did he ask you for an attorney? A: No. Q: How long after he said this did the pause last? A: He  It seemed to me like he paused for about 20 seconds. He didn't say anything, and I told him  First I told him that Do you understand that once you say you want an attorney, you know, we have to stop talking. It's going to be difficult to change and go back and forth. Q: What did he say to that? A: Said that he knew that. Q: Okay. A: Then he paused, and he  he seemed to have difficulty starting to talk, so I told him that what I was going to do, I'd go ahead and start typing the questions, and I would try to make them as easy as possible getting into this thing and that if we arrived at a point where he didn't want to answer any questions, he didn't want to say anything more or he wanted his attorney, to say so, and so he said,  Okay,  ... (Italics ours.) 2 Report of Proceedings, at 201-02. The above quoted testimony indicates that Detective Dean's questioning was properly within the scope of the Nash rule. After Robtoy made his equivocal statement regarding an attorney, Detective Dean sought clarification of Robtoy's words. There was no further interrogation about any offense until Dean was satisfied Robtoy had no present desire to have the presence of an attorney. Further, Robtoy was reminded by Detective Dean that he would cease questioning immediately if Robtoy wanted to remain silent or speak with an attorney. At that point, we believe the totality of the circumstances indicates that Robtoy made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). In light of the fact that Robtoy acknowledged his awareness that he could terminate questioning at any point, had several experiences of being informed of and actually exercising his Miranda rights, and apparently did not again request an attorney after a pause in questioning, we find that Robtoy's subsequent confessions to the murders of David King and Ruth Pitts were voluntarily given. The evidence was therefore properly ruled admissible.