Opinion ID: 1844436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Restatement of Torts

Text: The majority relies for its conclusion on several sections of the Restatement of Torts. However, it incorrectly interprets these sections. I will discuss each in turn.
The majority misinterprets section 324A(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Majority op. at 1187-88. Section 324A states: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm.... The question under subsection (a) is whether Clay Electric's failure to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the streetlights increased the risk of harm beyond the risk that existed before Clay Electric's alleged agreement to maintain the streetlights. The answer is obviously no, because the failure to maintain an installed streetlight does not create a greater risk than that created by the absence of a streetlight. It simply reverts the circumstances to the status quo ante darkness. Other courts have interpreted section 324A(a) consistent with this analysis. They hold that, for liability to attach, the defendant's conduct must have increased the risk beyond that existing before the defendant undertook the conduct. See, e.g., Turbe, 938 F.2d at 432 (concluding that sections 323(a) and 324A(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts only apply when the defendant's actions increase the risk of harm beyond the risk that would have existed had the defendant never provided services initially); Vaughan, 719 N.E.2d at 525 (same). The majority stands alone in its new interpretation of section 324A(a). It implicitly concludes that liability attaches if the defendant's conduct left the plaintiff in a worse position than the plaintiff was in when the services were begun. Majority op. at 1187. Under the majority's analysis, the relative risk to the plaintiff is measured when the streetlights were already installed, and were simply being maintained. Therefore, under the majority's view, because walking across a dark street at night is riskier than walking across a lighted one, once Clay Electric began maintaining the streetlights it incurred a duty to maintain them forever. The majority cites no case interpreting section 324A(a) in such a fashion, and I can find none. To the contrary, many of the cases refusing to find a duty did so where the allegation was negligent maintenance. See Vaughan, 719 N.E.2d at 523 (holding that ordinarily an electric company under contract to make repairs and maintain street lights has no common law duty to third persons who are injured); White, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 437 (noting that the failure to maintain an installed streetlight does not create a risk greater than the risk created by the total absence of a streetlight); Fishbaugh, 969 P.2d at 406 (holding that [b]ecause a municipality has no common law duty to light its streets, it has no duty to maintain such lights that it has nevertheless elected to install). In fact, virtually every case involves streetlights that allegedly were inadequately maintained, because allegations of negligent installation are extremely rare. The majority's opinion is the first and only case creating a distinction between the installation of streetlights (for which no duty exists) and their maintenance (for which a duty does exist). Florida stands alone among the fifty states in such a jurisprudence. The majority's holding has far-reaching consequences that not even the majority has contemplated. It essentially imposes a duty on those who provide a benefit to the public or to an individual to continue doing so forever. [22] Nothing in our lawor any states' lawsuggests imposing such a heavy burden.
The majority also misinterprets section 324A(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under that section, one who renders services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things is subject to liability if the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A(c). Thus, if a third party relies on Clay Electric's maintenance of streetlights, then Clay Electric owed a duty to maintain them. Using this principle, the majority assumes that Clay Electric, in undertaking to maintain the streetlights in Dante's neighborhood, arguably caused Delores Johnson to rely on the fact that the lights would be operating properly and that Dante's pathway to the school bus stop would be lighted. Majority op. at 1187. Nowhere in the record, however, does Ms. Johnson allege that she relied on the streetlights. The complaint merely alleges that the nonfunctionality of the streetlights was known to Clay Electric or existed for a sufficient length of time so that Clay Electric should have known of it. Moreover, a neighbor of Ms. Johnson testified that the two streetlights closest to the accident site never worked and had been out for years. Another neighbor testified that the light to the west of the accident site had been out the entire time he lived in the area (over seven years) and the light to the east of the accident site only worked intermittently. [23] This testimony was undisputed. Because the plaintiff did not even allege reliance, let alone submit evidence of it, no inference can reasonably be drawn from the record that anyone relied on a functioning streetlight. In sum, the Restatement simply does not support the majority's holding. Although a minority of courts across the country have imposed a duty to maintain streetlights, none have relied on the Restatement.