Opinion ID: 789142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Focus of Executive Order 3-2003

Text: 131 The pertinent Clause of the First Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940), provides that Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.... U.S. Const. amend. I. [S]peech may include expressive conduct, see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-06, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), and certain principles governing the application of this First Amendment prohibition are well established. 132 The government's authority to regulate speech or expressive conduct on property that has traditionally been open to the public for such activity, such as public streets and parks, is sharply circumscribed. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (plurality opinion); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). A prior restraint[] on speech, i.e., any regulation that g[i]ve[s] public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-53, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975), such as a requirement that a permit be obtained in advance of the proposed speech or conduct, see, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, is not unconstitutional per se,  but it bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 558, 95 S.Ct. 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). 133 Restraints on speech on the basis of its content, except in a few limited categories such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting words, are generally disallowed. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 115, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-11, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). [T]he fundamental principle that underlies our concern about `content-based' speech regulations, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), is that the government is not permitted to `grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views,' id. at 48-49, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286). The concern is that if the government were able to impose content-based burdens on speech, it could effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. at 116, 112 S.Ct. 501; see, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991). Further, [t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). In short, regulations of speech based on its content are presumptively invalid. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538. 134 However, this presumption of invalidity can be overcome if the restriction passes a strict test. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (majority opinion) (content-based restrictions on political speech must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny). Under the strict-scrutiny test, a content-based restriction may be upheld if the restriction serves a compelling governmental interest, is necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 395, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (emphasis and brackets in R.A.V. ) (internal quotation marks omitted), is precisely tailored to serve that interest, and is the least restrictive means readily available for that purpose, see, e.g., Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2791, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321, 329, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (majority opinion). 135 In contrast, a less stringent test — applying intermediate scrutiny — is applicable to regulations of expressive activity that are not based on content. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (plurality opinion); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Content-neutral regulations may limit the time, place, or manner of expression — whether oral, written, or symbolized by conduct — even in a public forum, so long as the restrictions are reasonable, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065; see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925. Although a restriction that is content-neutral must be narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest, it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see, e.g., id. n. 6 (While time, place, or manner regulations must ... be `narrowly tailored' in order to survive First Amendment challenge, we have never applied strict scrutiny in this context. As a result, the same degree of tailoring is not required of these regulations, and least-restrictive-alternative analysis is wholly out of place.). The narrow tailoring requirement is satisfied so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Id. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (internal quotation marks omitted). 136 In the analysis of whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, the principal inquiry ..., in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Id. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. at 116; Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. at 448, 111 S.Ct. 1438; FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984). Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is `justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065); see, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925. 137 A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 925. Thus, a regulation that targets only potentially harmful secondary effects of speech, rather than the contents of the speech itself or the listener's agreement or disagreement with those contents, is deemed content-neutral. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., TDBA Kandyland, 529 U.S. 277, 291, 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 291, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (ordinance prohibiting public nudity and thus nude dancing was not [an] attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of watching nude erotic dancing, but rather [targeted] the secondary effects, such as the impacts on public health, safety, and welfare.  is content-neutral (emphasis added)); id. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (Erie's asserted interest in combating the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments like Kandyland is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic message conveyed by nude dancing.). A restriction designed to serve a governmental need to protect the security of the audience targets the speech's secondary, rather than its primary, effect. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (plurality opinion). 138 Finally, a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must also provide narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority in acting on the permit application. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); see, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130-31, 112 S.Ct. 2395; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72, 71 S.Ct. 328, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951). 139 Application of these principles in the present case leads us to the conclusion that Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003 survives constitutional scrutiny because the County has the requisite interest in the welfare of children, the permit requirement is content-neutral, and this content-neutral requirement serves the governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. And, as discussed in Part II.C. below, the Executive Order provides County officials with sufficient guidance to prevent arbitrary denials of permit applications. 140 First, it is indisputable and undisputed that a significant and substantial governmental interest is at stake. The government has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors, Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989) (emphasis added), indeed, an interest of surpassing importance, in preventing the sexual exploitation of children, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). ( See Hobbs brief on appeal at 15 (there is no dispute that ensuring the well-being of children is a compelling governmental interest; id. at 25 (same).)) 141 Second, the Executive Order, whose pertinent provisions are set out in Part I.F. above, is content-neutral. Although it deals with speech or expressive conduct to the extent that the activity constitutes solicit[ation], perform[ance], demonstrat[ion] or other similar conduct, e.g., Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003, §§ I, II, VI-activity that we will refer to collectively as presentations — the Executive Order does not impose the permit requirement on any person or group of persons on the basis of any particular viewpoint or any particular topic. Without discriminating on the basis of content, the Executive Order focuses first — and potentially only — on the means by which the speaker's message is to be delivered. The  Application  section states that [t]his policy shall apply to all individuals seeking to obtain a permit to solicit, perform, demonstrate, or engage in similar conduct utilizing props and/or equipment on public property owned by the County that is considered to be a public forum. Id. § II (emphasis added); see also id. § I (similarly referring to the use of props and/or equipment in connection with the description of the  Purpose  of the permit requirement). There is no indication in the Executive Order that a permit is required of any person who does not use props and/or equipment. Accordingly, in the district court, the County repeatedly noted the props and/or equipment limitation on the applicability of its permit requirement. For example, in an April 2003 memorandum, the County stated that [t]he language of the [Executive] Order is limited and specific; it applies ... only to a `solicitation, performance or demonstration ... utilizing props and/or equipment' (and not, for example to hand billing or hand billing and advocating verbally) .... (Defendants' Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law dated April 17, 2003, at 8 (emphases added).) In a June 2003 memorandum, the County stated that Executive Order 3-2003 applies only to individuals who seek to engage in a very limited class of expressive activities (to wit, persons who seek to `solicit, perform, demonstrate, or engage in similar conduct ...') and even then, only when those activities involve the use of `props and/or equipment'.  (Defendants' Memorandum of Law Regarding Issues Raised at the June 2, 2003 Hearing, dated June 16, 2003, at 2 (emphasis added).) And at a later hearing on Hobbs's challenges to the Executive Order, when the court asked for confirmation that, if the speaker just dressed as a clown and did a funny act[,]... made funny faces, [and] mimed, attracting people to congregate, but used no props, that is not prohibited, the County responded, That is correct. (Hearing Transcript, June 20, 2003, at 18.) 142 Although the phrase props and/or equipment does not appear in § VI of the Executive Order, and the district court analyzed the Prohibition as if it were applicable irrespective of whether a speaker sought to use props or other equipment, see Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at  n. 8, we think it more appropriate to view the Executive Order as setting forth an integrated permit scheme. Both § II, i.e., the  Application  section that describes the broad class of individuals to whom [t]his policy shall apply, and § VI, i.e., the  Prohibition section that describes how the policy is to be applied to one category of applicants, appear in the Part headed WESTCHESTER COUNTY PERMIT POLICY, and we regard § II as an integral part of the Prohibition stated in § VI. The Executive Order does not by its terms extend to a person who wishes to convey his or her message, whatever that message may be, without the use of physical articles or equipment as theatrical aids. As we read the Executive Order, therefore, and as it is expressly interpreted by the County itself, a person not seeking to use props and/or equipment need not apply for a permit. 143 Hobbs, according to his complaint, seeks to deliver to the public various messages [that] often have political value, and or social value. (Complaint at 6.) His political messages comment[] on government inefficiency. He is criticizing the Government. He is criticizing the daffiness of some civil servant controlled governmental processes. His message is political and critical of the government. ( Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).) He apparently illustrates his point by, inter alia, referring to government inefficiency in responding to requests by General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. ( See id. at 13-14.) Hobbs also seeks to remind the public of the plight of the homeless, including homeless veterans of the military. ( See id. ) And he promotes good will and honesty and obedience to parents, promotes diversity and universal acceptance of others, and discourages prejudice and pride. ( Id. at 23.) 144 Nothing in the Executive Order prevents Hobbs from communicating his criticisms of the government and his other social commentary — or from providing entertainment — in words or expressive action. As just discussed, the Executive Order affects only the manner of presentation through the use of props and/or equipment. Although Hobbs alleges that [t]he balloon is a tool through which he conveys his message (Complaint at 13), plainly such a prop is not integral to political or social-conscience messages, and nothing prevents Hobbs from delivering his messages or entertaining without that prop. 145 Further, the goal of the Executive Order's Prohibition plainly is to protect the safety and welfare of children using public property. At the outset, the Executive Order notes the use of such areas by children, see, e.g., Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003, WHEREAS clauses 1 & 3; the  Application  section states generally that the restrictions are being imposed for the safety of the public, id. § II; and the  Prohibition  section states expressly that its ban on the issuance of permits to persons known to have been convicted of sex offenses against minors, where the presentation would entice children to congregate around such known sex offenders, is meant to prevent unreasonable risk[s] to the safety and welfare of children, id. § VI. 146 In providing that no permit will be granted where the applicant is  known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor ... if the [presentation] would entice a child to congregate around that person,  id. (emphases added), the Prohibition is not concerned with the content of the message, or the audience's agreement or disagreement with the message, or the audience's enjoyment of the presentation. By focusing on prop-assisted presentations that would entice a child to congregate around a person known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, the Prohibition looks beyond primary effects such as mere enjoyment of the presentation. Rather, it focuses on the safety of children and aims to limit the opportunity for such a convicted sexual offender to attract children with whom he might later engage in child molestation. The Prohibition thus targets effects that are secondary. 147 To be sure, the content of the applicant's proposed presentation can be examined — along with the proposed props and/or other equipment — to determine whether the presentation is likely to attract a crowd of children. But the specific content of the speech — whether the speaker is talking about animals, fairy tales, government inefficiency, or the plight of homeless veterans — is irrelevant to the governmental goal that a person with a criminal record of sexual offenses against minors not be permitted to use artifices to entice children to gather around him, developing rapport with the children and gaining new opportunities for child molestation. We conclude that the Executive Order constitutes a restriction only on the manner of speech and is designed to prevent harmful secondary effects unrelated to its content. 148 We are unpersuaded by Hobbs's contentions that the Prohibition is neither necessary nor narrowly tailored for the achievement of its purpose. As to necessity, it cannot reasonably be disputed that there exists a need for concern for the welfare of children in the presence of persons who have committed sexual offenses against minors. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), for example, which was decided a few days before the issuance of Executive Order 3-2003, discussed the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class, 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140, and quoted a 1997 United States Department of Justice report which noted that [w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault, id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, before issuing the Executive Order, the County had sought the advice of Dr. Pogge, whose report discussed the relatively high recidivism rate of sexual offenders in general and the even higher rate for persons whose offenses were either homosexual or pedophilic (Pogge Report at 4). It is permissible for a municipality to conclude that secondary-effects-oriented regulations are necessary based on evidence such as this, which is reasonably believed to be relevant to the secondary effects that they seek to address. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 442, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., TDBA Kandyland, 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (in terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a threat, the city need not `conduct new studies' ... `so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses') (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925). 149 Finally, the Prohibition is narrowly tailored to further its purpose. It applies only to certain persons known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, and the Executive Order expressly requires County officials to work closely with law enforcement agencies in order to determine whether a given applicant is such a person, see Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003, § VIII. Given the high rate of recidivism by convicted child molesters and the facts, inter alia, that (a) the permit requirement does not apply to persons whose presentations would not use props and/or equipment, and (b) the Prohibition (i) does not apply to a person who is merely suspected or who has been accused but not convicted of being a sexual offender against a minor, and (ii) does not apply, even as to a person known to have been convicted of a sex offense against a minor, if the planned presentation, even with props and/or equipment, would not entice a child to congregate around that person, we conclude that the Prohibition is a manner-of-presentation restriction that is narrowly tailored to further the County's compelling interest in the safety and welfare of children.