Opinion ID: 2003625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The first Malone test

Text: Relators argue that the petition fails to state a claim against Mr. Kaiser individually because the alleged acts and omissions were carried out in his capacity as a corporate officer, not as an individual. As noted in Malone, whether a petition states a claim against a defendant for venue purposes is a difficult issue. Id. at 825. The standard for determining if a petition states a claim against a defendant for venue purposes is whether, after reasonable legal inquiry under the circumstances, the plaintiffs state a claim under existing law or under a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, or under a non-frivolous argument for the establishment of new law. Id. at 825. Although this standard is less stringent than for granting a motion for summary judgment or sustaining a motion to dismiss on the merits, the petition still must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Id. While simply holding a corporate office does not expose an officer to individual liability for corporate misdeeds, it also does not necessarily shield the officer from individual liability. An individual is not protected from liability simply because the acts constituting the tort were done in the scope and course, and pertained to, the duties of his employment. Curlee v. Donaldson, 233 S.W.2d 746, 754 (Mo.App.1950). If the rule were otherwise, the agent of a corporation could shield himself from liability for almost every kind of wrong, provided he was acting in the capacity of agent.... Boyd v. Wimes, 664 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Mo.App. 1984), quoting, Rauch v. Brunswig, 155 Mo.App. 367, 137 S.W. 67, 68 (1911). Thus, a corporate officer may be held individually liable for tortious corporate conduct if he or she had actual or constructive knowledge of, and participated in, an actionable wrong. Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Mo.App.1995); Grothe v. Helterbrand, 946 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Mo.App.1997). When liberally construed, the plaintiffs' petition states a cause of action against Mr. Kaiser in his individual capacity that is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss based upon alleged pretensive joinder. The plaintiffs allege that Doe Run had a duty under state and federal environmental laws to control its emissions and that Doe Run was in violation of those laws, leading directly to the property damage within the defined area. The plaintiffs further allege that Kaiser, as the CFO, knew of and participated in Doe Run's tortious conduct by helping to set and then approve budgets that delayed or rejected the implementation of adequate measures for pollution control as well as remediation of properties within the defined area. Because of his actions, plaintiffs allege that Mr. Kaiser had actual or constructive knowledge of Doe Run's wrongful conduct and participated in it and, thus, is liable in his individual capacity. These allegations state a cause of action against Mr. Kaiser in his individual capacity under the standards announced in Lynch and Grothe . Relators have failed to carry their burden of showing that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action against Mr. Kaiser.