Opinion ID: 2631141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Directory or Mandatory Provision

Text: Generally speaking, the `directory-mandatory' distinction is concerned only with whether a particular remedy invalidation of the ultimate governmental actionis appropriate when a procedural requirement is violated; even when invalidation is not appropriate, other remediessuch as injunctive relief, mandamus, or monetary damagesmay be available to enforce compliance with the statutory provision. Indeed, the availability or unavailability of alternative remedies may have an important bearing on whether a procedure is to be accorded `directory' or `mandatory' effect. ( Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 908, fn. 4, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606, italics omitted (Morris ).) The directory-mandatory distinction does not refer to whether a particular statutory requirement is `permissive' or `obligatory.' (Id. at p. 908, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606; see also Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410, 158 Cal.Rptr. 662, 599 P.2d 1365 (Edwards ).) [5] Although somewhat tautological, the principle is ostensibly or perhaps deceptively simple: If the action is invalidated, the requirement will be termed 'mandatory.' If not, it is `directory' only. ( California Correctional, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1145, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79; see also Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 909, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606 [citing cases].) Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty is a question of interpretation for the courts. ( Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 624, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846 (Nunn ).) We recognized long ago that there is no simple, mechanical test for determining whether a provision should be given `directory' or `mandatory' effect. ( Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 909-910, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606, citing Pulcifer v. County of Alameda (1946) 29 Cal.2d 258, 262, 175 P.2d 1 (Pulcifer ).) Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits are typically deemed directory. ( California Correctional, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1145, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79; see also Ganison v. Rourke (1948) 32 Cal.2d 430, 435, 196 P.2d 884 (Garrison) [time limit's mandatory effect must be expressly provided or otherwise clearly intended].) [6] However, as in any case involving statutory interpretation, we must ascertain the legislative intent to determine what effect to give a statute's time requirement. ( Pulcifer, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 262, 175 P.2d 1.) The legislative intent can usually be determined from the statutory language. ( Nunn, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 624, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846.) In the absence of express language, the intent must be gathered from the terms of the statute construed as a whole, from the nature and character of the act to be done, and from the consequences which would follow the doing or failure to do the particular act at the required time. ( Pulcifer, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 262, 175 P.2d 1; see also People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 958, 140 Cal.Rptr. 657, 568 P.2d 382 [courts look to the purpose of the procedural requirement to determine whether invalidation is necessary to promote the statutory design].) We begin with the language of section 2972(e) itself. (See Nunn, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 624, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846.) As noted above, the section provides: Prior to the termination of a commitment under this section, a petition for recommitment may be filed to determine whether the MDO's severe mental disorder is not in remission. (Italics added.) The Attorney General contends that the term may demonstrates that section 2972(e) is directory. (See Common Cause of California v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610 [the word `may' ordinarily is construed as permissive, whereas `shall' is ordinarily construed as mandatory].) Therefore, the trial court's extension of Allen's commitment notwithstanding the district attorney's untimely recommitment petitionis not void. We are not persuaded by the Attorney General's contention. Neither the word may, nor the word shall, is dispositive. ( Atkinson v. Elk Corp. of Texas (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 212, 227-228, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 [`It is true that in statutes the word may is sometimes construed as shall. But that is where the context, or the subject-matter, compels such construction'].) Also, several Courts of Appeal have determined that certain deadlines under the MDO Act are directory despite the Legislature's use of the word shall. (See, e.g., Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 129, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 469 [§ 2970's 180-day deadline]; Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 451, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 [§ 2972, subd. (a)'s 30-day deadline].) More importantly, in the context of the statutory scheme, the term may does not signal whether section 2972(e)'s time requirement is directory or mandatory. Rather, it reflects the district attorney's discretion to file a recommitment petition or notonce the MDO's current commitment is set to end. The petition under section 2972(e) seeks to determine whether to extend the existing commitment if the MDO's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission with treatment, and if the MDO represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (§ 2972(e).) Thus, a district attorney, after receiving a written evaluation on the MDO's severe mental disorder, may then file a petition with the superior court for continued involuntary treatment for one year. (§ 2970; §§ 2972(a) [The court shall conduct a hearing on the petition under Section 2970 for continued treatment], 2972(e) [recommitment proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section].) The related provisions under the MDO Act supply additional support for the conclusion that the maximum term for each commitment is one year, and as such, a district attorney must petition for an MDO's recommitment within that one year. Section 2972, subdivision (c), provides that if a court or jury finds a prisoner's severe mental disorder is not in remission and as such, the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the court-ordered commitment shall be for a period of one year from the date of termination of parole or a previous commitment or the scheduled date of release from prison as specified in Section 2970. Time spent on outpatient status ... shall not count as actual custody and shall not be credited toward the person's maximum term of commitment or toward the person's term of extended commitment. (Italics added; see also § 2970 [The district attorney may then file a petition with the superior court for continued involuntary treatment for one year, italics added].) These provisions clearly reflect the Legislature intended the MDO's maximum term of commitment to be one year, which may be extended annually for additional one-year terms under the conditions of the Act. Indeed, the drafters of the MDO Act recognized that a prisoner could conceivably be `treated' for the rest of his life as there is no limit on the number of times he may be recommitted to an inpatient facility. (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1054 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 30, 1985, p. 4.) Thus, it is paramount that [p]eriodic reviews are required because if the basis for a commitment ceases to exist, continued confinement violates the substantive liberty interest in freedom from unnecessary restraint. ( Clark v. Cohen (3d Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 79, 86; see Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 364, 117 S.Ct. 2072 [Kansas civil commitment scheme provides similar yearly reviews].) Among other things, the Attorney General argues that it would be inconsistent to allow for good cause or waiver exceptions from time requirements in sections 2970 and 2972, subdivision (a) (see ante, 64 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 129-130, 164 P.3d at p. 562), while concluding the time for filing the extension in section 2972(e) is mandatory. We disagree. In Williams, the Court of Appeal concluded section 2972, subdivision (a)'s 30-day deadline to commence trial on a recommitment petition was directory; the practical purpose of the deadline is to ensure a reasonable amount of time in which to conduct a trial before the defendant is to be released. ( Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 450-451, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 1; see People v. Kirkland (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 891, 913, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 863.) In so holding, the Court of Appeal noted that section 2972, subdivision (a) did not expressly set any deadline for the completion of the trial; however, section 2972(e) provided a set deadline based on the MDO's release date. ( Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 452, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 1.) The plain language of section 2972, subdivision (e), together with other provisions, reflects a legislative intent to prohibit the filing of a petition, and the initiation of commitment proceedings, after a parole period or previous commitment has expired. (Id. at p. 455, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 1.) Thus, the court's holding that the authorities need not strictly comply with the 30-day deadline (§ 2972, subd. (a)) was based in part on its understanding of the absolute deadline to begin the recommitment processthe termination of the current one-year commitment. ( Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 452-455, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Legislature intended the deadline set forth in section 2972(e) to be mandatory, i.e., requiring the district attorney to file a recommitment petition before the MDO's current commitment term ends. The consequence for not complying with a mandatory requirement, as discussed above, is generally the invalidation of the ultimate governmental action. ( Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 908, fn. 4, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606; see ante, 64 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 130-131, 164 P.3d at pp. 562-563.) Here, that would mean invalidating the trial court's purported extension of Allen's recommitment and ostensibly releasing Allen into the community. The Attorney General, however, asserts that even if section 2972(e) is mandatory, the superior court retains fundamental jurisdiction to determine whether the missed time deadline limit violates Allen's due process rights to compel dismissal of the proceeding. We disagree that the Attorney General's approach would provide Allen an adequate remedy. In this situation, determining whether an MDO's due process rights were violated by a delayed petition would often be futile. [R]egardless of whether defendant's claim is based on a due process analysis or a right to a speedy trial not defined by statute, the test is the same, i.e., any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay must be weighed against justification for the delay. ( Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 505, 149 Cal. Rptr. 597, 585 P.2d 219, fn. omitted.) As this case demonstrates, more often than not, an MDO would be unable to show prejudice if his or her mental disorder is not in remission. For instance, the Attorney General asserts thatnotwithstanding the district attorney's untimely petition Allen has suffered no actual prejudice because he would have been recommitted anyway as he continues to suffer from his severe mental disorder. Nonetheless, Allen was denied his annual review under the MDO Act, which may be deemed prejudicial. However prejudice may be characterized here, Allen is entitled to some type of remedy, or more precisely, a resolution of his commitment status.