Opinion ID: 185677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 13 Although we hold that Wahl's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is properly before us as to the section 924(c)(1) charge, upon review of the record we conclude that the challenge fails on the merits. In considering a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence of record de novo, considering that evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and affirm a guilty verdict where  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). The evidence in this case survives that review. 14 Prior to 1998, a defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) only if he use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994). In applying this statute, courts have employed various tests to evaluate whether a defendant used a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. We previously applied an accessibility and proximity test, and held that a defendant violated section 924(c)(1) if he puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or one's agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime. See United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc). The Supreme Court reversed our decision, requiring instead evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143, 116 S.Ct. 501, 505, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (emphasis in original). The Court clarified that a defendant does not violate section 924(c)(1) merely for storing a weapon near drugs or drug proceeds. Id. at 149, 116 S.Ct. at 508. 15 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, Congress amended section 924 to broaden its reach. Section 924(c)(1)(A) now imposes a mandatory five-year consecutive penalty for any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). Wahl argues correctly that even under the amended statute, the mere presence of a firearm at the scene of drug trafficking is insufficient to support a conviction under section 924(c)(1). Wahl continues that because the government failed to produce any evidence suggesting that the presence of the gun in the apartment furthered his drug trafficking crime, his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. 16 In order to uphold a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), we must first determine whether the government has offered sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition. Cf. United States v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628, 639 (D.C.Cir.1999). The prosecution offered ample evidence to support a finding that Wahl possessed the firearm recovered from his apartment. While there was no evidence placing the firearm in Wahl's actual possession, possession may be either actual or constructive. Constructive possession is established with evidence supporting a finding that the defendant had the ability to exercise knowing `dominion and control' over the items in question. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 619 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 780 F.2d 113, 116 (D.C.Cir. 1986)). The evidence before us supports such a finding. First, the firearm was found on top of the entertainment center immediately in front of Wahl when the police first entered his apartment, apparently within his reach. Second, [a] jury is entitled to infer that a person exercises constructive possession over items found in his home. Id. at 620 (citation omitted). While that inference may not alone compel a conclusion that Wahl had constructive possession, given that the firearm was recovered from Wahl's apartment in close proximity to him, the jury had sufficient evidence to support a finding of possession. What remains is to determine if there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Wahl's possession was in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 17 Although this is our first occasion to construe the language of the statutory amendment in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, other circuits have addressed the issue, and we find their reasoning useful in our analysis. In United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir.2000), the Fifth Circuit identified several factors as helpful in determin[ing] whether a particular defendant's possession furthers, advances, or helps forward a drug trafficking offense.... Id. at 414. These include: the type of drug activity conducted; accessibility of the firearm; type of firearm; whether the firearm is stolen; whether the possession of the firearm is legal or illegal; whether the firearm is loaded; the proximity of the firearm to the drugs or drug profits; and the time and circumstances under which the firearm is found. Id. at 414-15. In Ceballos-Torres, the court held that evidence that the police recovered an illegally possessed, loaded, and easily accessible firearm from the defendant's apartment along with a substantial amount of drugs and money, reasonably support[ed] a finding that [the defendant's] gun protected his drugs and money against robbery and therefore upheld a jury verdict that the defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. Id. at 415. 18 In United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457 (6th Cir.2001), the Sixth Circuit held that furtherance requires that the weapon must promote or facilitate the crime. Id. at 460-61. The court then offered a nonexclusive list of factors helpful to a court distinguishing between possession in furtherance of a crime and innocent possession. Id. at 462. The court held it essential that the firearm be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use, id., and included as relevant factors 19 whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm was found. 20 Id. (citing Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 414-15). We agree with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that the enumerated factors are useful, and we have applied them in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence before us. 21 The firearm was on the top shelf of the entertainment center, in front of which Wahl was standing when the police entered. The gun was loaded with nine rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber. The gun was also found in close proximity to 5.6 grams of cocaine base and a small amount of cash. The fact that Wahl was found in possession of 47 bags of cocaine and another person was found in the bathroom with one bag of cocaine leads to the reasonable inference that the gun was recovered shortly after a drug transaction had taken place. Finally, Wahl possessed the gun illegally. Taken together, this evidence could lead a reasonable jury to infer that the firearm recovered from Wahl's apartment provided a defense or deterrent in furtherance of the drug trafficking for which Wahl was arrested. See Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 415; see also Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462-63. We therefore conclude that the government introduced sufficient evidence to support Wahl's conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. 22 Wahl also sets forth two additional arguments concerning evidence produced at trial and the scope of his closing argument. After careful consideration, we find these additional arguments are not well taken and do not merit further discussion.