Opinion ID: 1189282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Exclusion of Hoffecker's out-of-court statements

Text: Hoffecker next contends that the District Court erred when it did not permit co-defendant Myers to play the entirety of a tape recording, portions of which the Government had played during its case-in-chief, as admissions by a party-opponent. In the recording made on February 24, 1997, Hoffecker was making a presentation to CIC, a Government undercover operation in East Brunswick, New Jersey, seeking to recruit CIC as an Amitex boiler-room. Hoffecker asserts that he made statements on the tape that support his claim at trial that Amitex was a legitimate operation. The Government contends that Hoffecker has waived this claim because although Myers raised the issue before the District Court, Hoffecker never sought to play the CIC tape himself and did not join in or adopt Myers's motion. The Government suggests that Hoffecker made a strategic decision not to join in Myers's motion because he feared that by offering his own purportedly exculpatory out-of-court statements, he would trigger the Government's use of his own inculpatory statements he made to the Government during two proffer sessions in May 1999. Hoffecker entered into a proffer agreement with the Government which permitted the Government to use his proffer statements against him to rebut any evidence or arguments offered on his behalf. Supp. app. at 102-04. The Government contends that by offering his own exculpatory statements on the CIC tape to argue that Amitex was a legitimate business, Hoffecker would have contradicted the statements he made during his proffer sessions and thus open the door to the Government using his proffer statements to attack his credibility as a hearsay declarant on the CIC tape. Accordingly, the Government contends that Hoffecker had something to lose by raising this claim in the District Court and thus by making the strategic choice not to join in Myer's motion, he has waived the claim. Hoffecker responds that the Government's argument ignores the strength of the operative trial agreement that bound both defendants to all objections and evidence unless expressly opting out, a protocol initiated by the district court at the first trial and continued throughout the retrial. Appellant's Rep. Br. at 54. Hoffecker does not, however, provide us with a citation to the record to demonstrate this operative trial agreement. Hoffecker contends that, under this agreement, Myers's motion to admit the CIC tape fully preserved this evidentiary issue for appellate review. Id. at 55. We question whether Hoffecker has preserved this issue for the appeal. But even assuming that he has not waived the claim, we conclude that the claim is without merit because the evidence is inadmissible hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) (`Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.); Fed.R.Evid. 802 (Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules....). Hoffecker claims that the CIC tape is not hearsay because he did not offer it for the truth of the matter stated but as evidence of his then existing state of mind. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) (Hearsay rule does not apply to [a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed....). He argues that the tape is evidence of his state of mind because it presents a more complete picture of Hoffecker's attitude toward his customers, and his repeated emphasis that sales must be based on correct information, that Amitex was a delivery program in which deliveries would always be made upon the investor's direction, and that Amitex hedged all investor positions through hedging expert Hug. Appellant's Br. at 54-55. Hoffecker is incorrect. Of course, the mere fact that he claimed he offered the tape for a different purpose does not change the reality that he offered it for its truth, i.e., to show that Amitex was a legitimate operation. The District Court characterized the statements as his description of how to sell in a way that is wholly legal, a characterization with which Myers agreed. App. vol. 34 at 16. The District Court found that the statements were plain and simple exculpatory. This statement is a sell about the legitimacy of the Amitex program. This statement is being made to people that Mr. Hoffecker believed would be agents of his program and he had every reason to want them to sign on and sell aggressively for his own personal gain. Id. at 22. As the Government pointed out during oral argument before the District Court, admitting his out-of-court statements about the legitimacy of the Amitex operation would have been tantamount to allowing Hoffecker to testify without being subject to cross-examination. Indeed, in his Reply Brief Hoffecker states that the CIC tape was corroborative of the defense claims of actual innocence and markedly inconsistent with government portrayals of an ongoing fraud scheme.... [It] contained the very fabric of the Amitex program as explained to brokers.... Appellant's Rep. Br. at 54, 56. It is apparent that he offered these out-of-court statements solely for their truth. In these circumstances, we agree with the District Court and find that the court properly excluded the tapes as inadmissible hearsay. Hoffecker also takes issue with the District Court's decision to allow the Government to introduce and play portions of the CIC tape for the jury. This decision, however, was not erroneous because the Government could offer the statements as admissions by a party-opponent. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). Hoffecker also contends that Myers should have been allowed to play the entire CIC tape for the jury pursuant to the doctrine of completeness. Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides that [w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. As we have explained, additional portions of a recording may be played if it is necessary to (1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial understanding. United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir.1982)). The Rule does not require introduction of portions of a statement that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the passages that have been admitted. Id. Hoffecker argues that it was necessary to admit his statements on the entirety of the CIC tape to rebut his statements on another recording, the Westin tape, which the Government played in its entirety, and to rebut his unrecorded statements that two former Global employees testified that they recalled. The Westin tape was a recording of Hoffecker's sales tutorial to his telemarketers at Westin, one of his telemarketing businesses. The two former Global employees testified that they heard Hoffecker give similar presentations to the Global sales force. The context of the CIC tape, however, was very different from the context of the Westin and Global presentations. At CIC, Hoffecker sought to woo prospective boiler-room sales people to join his Amitex sales force. Hoffecker did not own or control CIC and was visiting CIC for the first time when he made these statements. Hoffecker's sales pitches to his employees at Westin and Global, two companies that he owned and controlled, were much more frank and blatant, explaining to them how to talk to and treat customers in order to defraud them. Appellee's Br. at 117. As the Government points out, his instructions to his telemarketers whom he had co-opted into his fraud ... were probative of [his] intent to defraud[, while] the CIC tape was probative of how Hoffecker would attempt to recruit prospective telemarketers (whom he had never met before, had no control over, and had not yet co-opted into his scheme). Id. at 117-18. Significantly, Hoffecker does not point to any specific statement on the CIC tape to support his arguments. In these circumstances, we find that Hoffecker has not shown that the CIC tape was necessary to explain or place in context the Westin tape or the testimony about the Global presentation, avoid misleading the jury, or insure a fair and impartial understanding. Soures, 736 F.2d at 91. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it did not permit Myers to play the CIC tape in its entirety at trial.