Opinion ID: 2995473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Francisco’s Claims

Text: Francisco also wanted to suppress the statements that he made when the agents questioned him, as well as the evidence obtained in the search of the Buffalo Grove house. He argued that the stop of his vehicle constituted an arrest for which probable cause was required, and that he was entitled to Miranda warnings before being questioned. The district court found that the stop was only a Terry stop and not an arrest, and that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Francisco had also requested an evidentiary hearing; he does not appeal the denial of that request.) The chase of the Jeep Wrangler was certainly not a seizure--a show of authority, without any application of physical force, to which the suspect does not yield, is not a seizure. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1991). But Francisco argues that he was effectively arrested when his Jeep was trapped in the dead end. The government, again, argues that the stop was an investigatory stop and not an arrest. Had Francisco simply chosen to stop his car and answer the government’s questions, it would have been easy toconclude that this was a Terry stop for which there was adequate justification. Francisco, like Guadalupe, had been seen in high drug crime areas. By the time the officers stopped Francisco, they had already discovered cocaine in a van that was garaged at a house in which Francisco had been seen. The agents saw Francisco drive into his subdivision and then speed past his residence. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (unprovoked flight upon noticing the police is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion). The question is whether the stop became an arrest when he was cornered in the dead end and had no choice but to stop and exit the car. We conclude that these circumstances were largely of Francisco’s own making and thus did not transform the nature of the police conduct. A Terry stop is, after all, a brief involuntary detention. One of the ways the police might ensure compliance with their request for a person to stop is to cut off other avenues of escape. That is all that happened here. Once police have the reasonable suspicion required to justify an investigatory stop, they may use reasonable means to effectuate that stop. United States v. Weaver, 8 F.3d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1993); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 1992). The stop in the dead-end street was necessitated by Francisco’s attempts to evade the agents. It is also worth noting that in considering whether an investigatory stop has transformed into an arrest, we consider whether the subject’s own actions in resisting the legitimate efforts of police to stop and question him played a role in bringing about the challenged police conduct. Weaver, 8 F.3d at 1243. Neither the chase nor the ultimate stop in the dead end had the effect of transforming this particular traffic stop and the resulting conversation into an arrest. Because the entire encounter was just a Terry stop, probable cause was not required. Nor were the police required at that stage to give Francisco his Miranda warnings. See United States v. Lennick, 917 F.2d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 1990). And, as already discussed, there was sufficient justification for the investigatory stop. It follows that the consent to search the home was also valid and Francisco’s claim of coercion must be rejected.
Minor Role Francisco also contends that he should have received a two-point adjustment to his offense level under sec. 3B1.2(b) of the sentencing guidelines. Section 3B1.2(b) allows a judge to decrease the offense level by two [i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity. A minor participant is a participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.2, comment (n. 3). The reduction is often used with a conspiracy charge to ensure that the defendant’s sentence, which may be based on the relevant conduct of co-conspirators, does not reflect conduct other than his own. See United States v. Mojica, 185 F.3d 780, 791 (7th Cir. 1999). At the sentencing hearing, Francisco bore the burden of demonstrating that the reduction was warranted. He chose to carry that burden by resting solely on his admission during his guilty plea and the government’s version of the offense; he did not offer any additional evidence that may have supported his request. The district court denied the reduction and sentenced him accordingly. Because the district court’s conclusion is heavily dependent on the facts, we review it only for clear error. See United States v. Lampkins, 47 F.3d 175, 180 (7th Cir. 1995). On appeal, Francisco argues that he was clearly less responsible than Guadalupe since it was Guadalupe who drove the van to the meeting site to deliver the narcotics. Vargas stated in his plea admission, however, that he met with both of the defendants to negotiate the deal. Additionally, Francisco did not dispute that he was responsible for the safekeeping of the cocaine at the residence. Last, and in this circuit most important, the district court held him accountable only for the 50 grams of cocaine that were found in a house where he was staying. In other words, he was sentenced only for drugs that he himself had his hands on at the house, which made the downward departure neither necessary, nor, under our interpretation of the existing guidelines, appropriate. See Lampkins, 47 F.3d at 180-81.