Opinion ID: 2635920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Legislative Directive to File Suit

Text: Regarding the essential nature of the power of the attorney general and of the legislature with respect to the attorney general, the Kansas Constitution designates the attorney general as an executive officer in Article 1, § 1. The Kansas Constitution does not define the attorney general's duties, however. In the absence of constitutional definition of powers, the legislature has the power to define the attorney general's duties. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 578, 836 P.2d 1169 (1992) (`[T]he executive power is more limited than legislative powers, extending merely to the details of carrying into effect laws enacted by the legislature . . ., the legislature having the power, except where limited by the constitution itself, to stipulate what actions executive officers shall or shall not perform.'). In defining the attorney general's duties, the legislature obligated the attorney general to give his or her opinion in writing, without fee, upon all questions of law submitted to him or her by the legislature, or either branch thereof. K.S.A. 75-704. This power is consistent with the long-held view that the giving of advisory opinions is an executive, not a judicial, power. Tex. Ass'n of Business v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 n. 6 (Tex.1993) (citing Correspondence of the Justices, Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices to President George Washington, August 8, 1793, in Tribe, American Constitutional Law, p. 73 n. 3 [2d ed.1988]); see Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. at 70, 687 P.2d 622 (Herd, J., dissenting) (positing that court had issued advisory opinion that intruded upon attorney general's duty to advise). The legislative record regarding the Kansas Funeral Privacy Act reveals the attorney general advised the legislature regarding the constitutionality of the Act and, consistent with his argument before this court, opined the funeral protest provisions are laudable, important, and constitutional. Minutes, House Comm. on Fed. & State Affairs, March 8, 2007 (testimony of Attorney General Paul J. Morrison, attachment 4). The legislature apparently wanted a second opinion and directed the attorney general to seek that opinion by filing the judicial trigger lawsuit. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 856 A.2d 320, 323 (R.I.2004) (in exercising constitutional power granted by Rhode Island Constitution to issue advisory opinion, court cautions the justices are speaking in our individual capacities as legal experts rather than Supreme Court justices and that this opinion is not an exercise of judicial power, it is not binding and it carries no mandate). Additionally, the legislature imposed a duty upon the attorney general to file and defend lawsuits involving the State when directed to do so by the legislature or the governor. The duty is imposed by K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 75-702, which states: The attorney general shall appear for the state, and prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in the supreme court, in which the state shall be interested or a party, and shall also, when required by the governor or either branch of the legislature, appear for the state and prosecute or defend, in any other court or before any officer, in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which this state may be a party or interested or when the constitutionality of any law of this state is at issue and when so directed shall seek final resolution of such issue in the supreme court of the state of Kansas. This provision is not under attack in this suit. Nor does the attorney general argue the judicial review provision in the Kansas Funeral Privacy Act, which draws authority from K.S.A.2007 Supp. 75-702, is unconstitutional by itself. Rather, he argues the unconstitutionality arises when the judicial review provision of the Kansas Funeral Privacy Act is combined with the judicial trigger provision, because the result is a directive from the legislature requiring the attorney general to take action contrary to the Kansas Constitution and, therefore, lacking merit. The first premise of this argumentthat the legislature cannot constitutionally direct the attorney general to take an action the attorney general believes is without meritis supported by State ex rel. Foster v. City of Kansas City, 186 Kan. 190, 350 P.2d 37 (1960). State ex rel. Foster was an original quo warranto proceeding filed by the State, on relation of the county attorney, to test the validity of ordinances annexing an industrial district to the City of Kansas City. The attorney general intervened and filed a motion to dismiss the action. The following month, the governor directed the attorney general not to seek the dismissal of the proceeding but to prosecute it and assure all parties an opportunity to present the issues. The principal issues on appeal were whether the attorney general had authority to intervene in a suit brought by the county attorney and, having done so, whether the attorney general had the right to file a motion to have the action dismissed when dismissal was contrary to the instructions of the governor. The court ruled the governor did not have the power to prevent the attorney general from pursuing the motion to dismiss if the attorney general, acting as an attorney and, therefore, as an officer of the court, felt the action lacked merit. Even though the directive came from one member of the executive branch to another, the court found a violation of the separation of powers because the attorney general, in that capacity, acted as an officer of the court: [W]e conclude the attorney general by his motion to intervene and supersede the county attorney exercised his powers and duties under the constitution and appropriate statutes; this was as far as he could go as an executive officer and as an attorney and officer of this court. Since he is an officer of the judicial branch, under the separation of powers of the three branches of government, he was limited and restricted in his conduct before this court by the code of professional ethics [citation omitted] to the same extent any other lawyer would be. If, therefore, the attorney general considered the action unmeritorious, he not only had the authority, but he also had a duty to move for dismissal. We cannot think that the framers of our state constitution or the members of the legislature ever intended that the governor should have control over the judicial branch, or its officers, as is advocated [by the defendant]. Each of the three branches of our government should be zealous of its jurisdiction and each should also be vigilant to see that it does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other two. 186 Kan. at 197, 350 P.2d 37. These conclusions control the first issue in this case; the legislature, like the governor, lacks constitutional authority to intrude into the attorney general's duties as an officer of the court. The legislature cannot override an attorney's ethical duties to not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 3.1 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 500) (meritorious claims and contentions); see K.S.A. 60-211(b)(2), (c) (signing petition certifies good faith belief that claims are meritorious; sanctions provided for violations). Moreover, the attorney general is duty bound to uphold the constitution. K.S.A. 54-106 (oath of office shall be taken by all officers elected or appointed under any law of the State of Kansas to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Kansas and to faithfully discharge all duties of office). Consequently, the legislature cannot direct the attorney general to file an action if the attorney general has a good faith belief that the action seeks an unconstitutional remedy. The attorney general does not suggest this conclusion ends our analysis. Nor does he argue his conclusion regarding the merits of a judicial trigger action should not be tested. Indeed, the point of this action is to seek an adjudication that an action attacking the inoperative Kansas Funeral Privacy Act's funeral protest provisions would necessarily seek a remedy that is constitutionally prohibited i.e., an advisory opinion.