Opinion ID: 2350310
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Considered by the Habeas Court

Text: ¶ 50 Archuleta appeals the habeas court's individual rejection of several of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For the reasons provided below, we affirm each of the habeas court's challenged holdings.
¶ 51 In closing arguments before the sentencing jury, the prosecution depicted Archuleta as a callous killer who lit up a cigarette after realizing that Mr. Church was dead, as a cold indifferent killer who thought of Mr. Church as nothing more than a dead rabbit and [who] was deliberate, calculating and methodical, and as a person who, after the killing, returned home to have sex with his girlfriend. Archuleta contends that these statements were inappropriate and prejudicial under this court's decision in State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), and that his counsel should have objected to them. He also argues that his appellate counsel should have sought reversal on this basis. ¶ 52 The habeas court granted summary judgment on this claim because Archuleta proffered nothing in support of his burden to establish Strickland prejudice. Archuleta has shown no error in that ruling. The sum of his prejudice argument is that [p]rosecutorial misconduct occurred, together with the accompanying reasonable likelihood of prejudicing and influencing the jury. Merely repeating the legal prejudice standard is insufficient. See Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877. Archuleta does nothing else. We affirm on that basis. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ([A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.).
¶ 53 During the guilt phase, the jury asked the following question concerning object rape: Can participation in previous sexual acts which could have incited Wood to commit object rape be legally considered encouragement? The court answered: This is for you to determine as fact finders. You have instructions that can assist you. Archuleta contends that the trial court committed constitutional error by failing to adequately address the jury's question asked during jury deliberation, and that Archuleta's attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present this claim on appeal. ¶ 54 The habeas court rejected this claim because Archuleta did not demonstrate[] that a genuine issue of material facts existed concerning prejudice. Archuleta put forth only a terse statement that it remains to be seen after an evidentiary hearing is held in this case whether the `different outcome' prong will be satisfied. The court found this statement to be insufficient to find that Archuleta had demonstrated that a genuine issue exists on whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome as a result of trial counsel's failure to object or that, had the issue of trial counsel's failure been raised by appellate counsel, it probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. ¶ 55 We agree with the habeas court's conclusion. A petitioner must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ¶ 31, 54 P.3d 1054. In his briefs on this appeal, Archuleta adds nothing further to this claim, arguing opaquely that the direct appeal did not resolve how [this] issue impacts the question of effective assistance of counsel or the question of how that issue interacts with the other issues raised by the petition to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict, penalty verdict, or both. With these issues in doubt and unaddressed, Archuleta continues, summary judgment was inappropriate. Such general assertions of prejudice are insufficient to survive summary judgment. We accordingly affirm the habeas court's dismissal of this issue.
¶ 56 Archuleta contends that the penalty phase jury instructions improperly created a presumption that death was the appropriate penalty, because they insufficiently emphasized the second Wood elementthat a death sentence must be justified and appropriate, State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)and that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise this claim at trial or on appeal. The habeas court refused to reach this claim because Archuleta first raised it in opposition to summary judgment. ¶ 57 Archuleta's claim is without merit. In Wood, this court established the appropriate standard to be followed by the sentencing authority . . . in a capital case: After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, [1] you must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and [2] you must further be persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the penalty phase instruction in this case substantially tracked this language from Wood, and because we have not since disavowed this aspect of Wood, it is still good law and trial counsel's failure to object was not ineffective. ¶ 58 In so holding, we reject Archuleta's assertion that our decision in State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), somehow superseded Wood. In that case, this court vacated a death sentence because the trial court failed entirely to apply the second Wood element. See id. at 1027 ( [T]he judge did not decide whether, based on all the circumstances, the death penalty was justified and appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt.). The Holland court described the purpose of the second Wood step as to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate under all the circumstances of the case and in light of the circumstances of the defendant's background and life as a whole. Id. The court then explained why that failure was important. [T]he Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not permit the death penalty to be imposed for every intentional homicide. To avoid having the first part of the Wood test produce an unduly broad application of the ultimate sanction, Wood also requires the sentencing authority to take a long, hard second look at the totality of the circumstances in light of societal values and the high value that this state and the Eighth Amendment place on the value of all human life and the humanity of every human being, no matter how depraved he or she may have become or how far he or she may have fallen from the norms of a civilized society. It is in applying the second part of the test that the sentencing authority may rely on leniency to refuse to impose the death penalty, even in the face of overwhelming aggravating evidence. After considering all aspects of the case, in addition to the particular aggravating and mitigating circumstances relied on by the State and the defendant, the sentencing authority must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances. Thus, the sentencing authority may refuse to impose the death penalty even though it concedes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1028 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Archuleta argues that this languageespecially the statement that the jury must examine the appropriateness of the death penalty in light of the circumstances of the defendant's background and life as a whole, id. at 1027should have been included in the jury instruction and that its omission violated Holland. We disagree. Holland did not displace Wood. It merely provided context for why including the second Wood step is so crucial. Because the trial court included both Wood steps in its jury instruction, we uphold the determination of the habeas court rejecting this claim.
¶ 59 Archuleta contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object and argue to the trial court that the Utah Death Penalty Scheme as contained in [Utah Code section] 76-5-202(1) does not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and to channel the sentencer's discretion. He also contends that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise this issue on appeal. According to Archuleta, Utah's death penalty scheme fails to narrow the class of death-eligible murders or properly channel the sentencing authority's discretion because (1) by stating so many broad categories of capital murder[,] . . . virtually all intentional murders qualify as aggravated, and (2) the standard set forth in Wood, and adopted by the legislature, fails to give . . . jurors adequate guidance in the imposition of the death penalty[] and permits so much juror subjectivity to enter into the decision as to virtually guarantee arbitrary results. ¶ 60 The claim that Utah's death penalty scheme fails to narrow the class of murders eligible for the death penalty is not a new one. This court has entertained and rejected that claim on multiple occasions. In State v. Arguelles, we rejected a similar claim, stating that [w]e have addressed challenges to Utah's . . . death penalty scheme and found [it] to be constitutional. 2003 UT 1, ¶ 127 63 P.2d 731. [6] ¶ 61 Noting the numerous cases from this court rejecting claims identical to Archuleta's, the habeas court held that trial counsel's decision not to raise them at trial was not unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. We agree and see no need to proceed to the second component of Strickland. Given our repeated rejection of this claim, Archuleta's trial and appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel for electing not to bring a claim that had little or no chance of gaining any traction.
¶ 62 Archuleta next contends that one of the four aggravating circumstances found by the sentencing jury is vague and overbroad on its face and does not adequately channel the jury's discretion and protect against the arbitrary application of the death penalty. Specifically, Archuleta asserts that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance set forth in Utah Code section 76-5-202(1)(q) requires the victim to endure pain and suffering beyond that which is necessary to simply cause the victim's death. This aggravating circumstance is therefore unconstitutional, Archuleta argues, when applied to acts committed after a victim has lost consciousness. Because there was no showing at trial that Church was conscious during the entirety of the brutal assault, especially the violent object rape, Archuleta maintains that there was no showing that the the heinous assault on Church caused him to endure additional pain and suffering, and it would therefore be unconstitutional for the especially heinous aggravating circumstance to apply to Archuleta's case. ¶ 63 In granting summary judgment to Respondent on this issue, the habeas court observed that the question [w]hether the `especially heinous' aggravating circumstance requires that the victim have a conscious awareness of pain during the lethal attack has not been expressly answered by the Utah Supreme Court. It also noted that various state jurisdictions are split on the questionsome requiring the victim to consciously experience additional pain above and beyond that generally required to produce death, [7] and others holding that consciousness during a lethal attack is not required. [8] Reasoning from the language of the statute in question and the judicial glosses placed on the statute by this court, the habeas court sided with those courts that do not require conscious suffering to trigger the especially heinous aggravating circumstance. The court accordingly held that trial and appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to raise this claim. We affirm. ¶ 64 At the time of Archuleta's trial, an intentional homicide was classified as a capital offense if it was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (1989). The United States Supreme Court has held this language to be unconstitutionally vague, however, because [t]here is nothing in these few words. . . that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). In order to remedy this vagueness problem, the legislature amended the statute to clarify its meaning and to limit the types of cases to which the especially heinous aggravating circumstance could apply, adding that an especially heinous murder is one that is demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (1989). ¶ 65 This court placed an additional gloss on the new version of subpart (q) in State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989). The court stated in Tuttle that if subpart (q) is interpreted too literally, it would include all murders not resulting in instantaneous death because all murders involve serious bodily injury. Id. at 1216. To avert this problem, the court further limited the range of murders that could qualify as especially heinous. An intentional homicide is committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner only if the facts demonstrate (1) that the defendant inflicted physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury [upon] the victim before death which is qualitatively and quantitatively different and more culpable than that necessary to accomplish the murder, and (2) that any of these forms of abuse were inflicted upon the victim while the defendant was in a mental state materially more depraved or culpable than that of most other murderers. Id. at 1216-17. Unless there is a convergence of serious physical abuse and a depraved mental state (both of which must exceed that which is normally required to intentionally kill the victim), the especially heinous aggravating circumstance is not applicable to the case. See id. at 1218. ¶ 66 Archuleta does not deny that he was in a depraved mental state at the time he inflicted the tire iron assault and other injuries upon Church. He only asserts that physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim must occur before he loses consciousness, a showing that was not made at trial. ¶ 67 We now hold that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance does not require that the victim have a conscious awareness of pain during the depraved attack. The only requirement that appears in the language of the statute is that the torture, physical abuse, or bodily injury occur prior to death. The statute says nothing of the victim's consciousness during the attack. We recognize that common definitions of physical torture involve the infliction of intense pain . . . to punish or coerce someone. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2414 (1986). And, as Archuleta points out, if Church was rendered unconscious by blows to his head, he would not have felt the pain of the multiple unnecessary and depraved assaults he endured between the time of his being rendered unconscious and his death. ¶ 68 We need not resolve whether the depraved infliction of physical injury on an unconscious person qualifies as torture under subpart (q), however. In addition to torture, that provision defines an especially heinous murder as one involving serious physical abuse and serious bodily injury. Those terms do not suggest that conscious awareness of pain is a necessary prerequisite to a finding that physical abuse or bodily injury occurred. Bodily injury, for example, is defined by statute as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601(3) (2008) (emphasis added); and serious bodily injury is defined as bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death, id. § 76-1-601(10). When he rammed the tire iron into Church's rectum so far that it pierced his liver, Archuleta at a minimum impaired the function of one of Church's organs unnecessarily and with a depraved mental state. Under this analysis, Church could have been rendered completely unconscious by the blows to his head while still suffering physical abuse that is quantitatively greater and qualitatively more severe than the physical abuse necessary to accomplish an act of murder. See Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (Va. 1985) (For purposes of the `vileness' determination, it is immaterial whether the decedent remained conscious during the course of several assaults. The number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim is the essence of the test whether the defendant's conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved. . . an aggravated battery. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 69 Accordingly, the habeas court did not err in granting summary judgment to Respondent on this claim. The prosecution was not required to demonstrate that Church was conscious at the time he was assaulted with the tire iron, and Archuleta's counsel thus did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by not raising this claim at trial or on direct appeal.
¶ 70 Archuleta next challenges trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the autopsy report and appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on appeal. To support these claims, Archuleta cites State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 643 (Utah 1995) (superseded by statute), for the proposition that a party who is allowed to admit evidence on a disputed issue in written form will be unfairly advantaged over the party who admits evidence on the issue in oral form only. Because the prosecution was permitted to admit the 21-page autopsy report, which detailed numerous of Church's horrific injuries, while the jurors were left to their collective recollection of the oral cross-examination of the medical examiner, Archuleta argues that the prosecution was given an unfair advantage that should have been prevented by a timely objection from trial counsel. ¶ 71 The habeas court rejected this claim and granted Respondent's summary judgment motion on this issue on both Strickland prongs. First, the habeas court noted that in State v. Kell , this court held that a medical examiner's report is not inadmissible on grounds of hearsay and lack of confrontation if the medical examiner relied on the report in her testimony at trial . . . [and] [d]efendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine her regarding the report itself. 2002 UT 106, ¶ 37. Because the medical examiner in Archuleta's case testified at trial and defense counsel cross-examined her, the habeas court held that it would have been futile to challenge the admissibility of the autopsy report in light of our holding in Kell. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for counsel to choose to not challenge the admission of the autopsy report. ¶ 72 Moreover, as to the second Strickland component, the court noted that nowhere in his pleadings has [Archuleta] presented evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue with respect to the prejudice prongi.e., that counsel's failure would have had an effect on the outcome of the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, or that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether such a claim probably would have resulted in a reversal on appeal. Based on its conclusions regarding both Strickland prongs, the habeas court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment on this issue. ¶ 73 We agree with both lines of analysis set forth by the habeas court, and we accordingly affirm the court's grant of summary judgment on this issue.
¶ 74 At both the guilt and penalty phases, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court defined reasonable doubt as follows: [A] reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense growing out of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty but requires that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. ¶ 75 Archuleta claims that his counsel should have challenged this definition both at trial and on appeal, and that failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Archuleta contends that the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally deficient insofar as it failed to affirmatively define the appropriate standard of proof. That is, the definition provided by the court failed to distinguish between what is required for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, and a finding based upon lesser standards of proof, like the clear and convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence standards. According to Archuleta, this makes the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction constitutionally deficient because, presumably, it allow[ed] a finding of guilt based upon a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990). ¶ 76 The habeas court dismissed this claim on summary judgment because Archuleta failed to demonstrate that there is any genuine issue of material fact related to whether the decision by either trial or appellate counsel to not raise this issue was reasonable under prevailing professional norms. Specifically, Archuleta, in opposing summary judgment, identified no authority indicating that a trial court must contrast the definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with lesser standards of proof. ¶ 77 We affirm the habeas court's decision. It is well settled that the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. . . . [S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citations omitted). Constitutional problems arise only when courts incorrectly define reasonable doubt so that they effectively make the state's burden something less than beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 5-6. Thus, to establish ineffective assistance, Archuleta must prove that defense counsel overlooked an error in the instruction that made the state's burden lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. He has not done so. ¶ 78 Finally, Archuleta complains about the trial court's reference to `that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.' Again, Archuleta cites no authority available to counsel demonstrating that this language was constitutionally infirm. In fact, at the time of Archuleta's trial, both this court and the United States Supreme Court had rejected challenges to instructions incorporating this language. Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, 440 (1887); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 572-73 (Utah 1987). ¶ 79 In sum, Archuleta points to no case that would have alerted defense counsel to any flaw in the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction. He has not shown that any challenge to the instruction had a reasonable chance of succeeding. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the habeas court on this issue.
¶ 80 Archuleta next contends that trial counsel provided ineffective representation when he failed to ask for a jury instruction requiring the jury to find each penalty phase aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously. He also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal when the issue was not raised in that forum. ¶ 81 We have entertained this claim before. The petitioner in Carter, for example, asked this court to adopt[] a death sentencing scheme which would require the jury to unanimously and specially find, beyond a reasonable doubt, each aggravating factor upon which it relies in imposing its sentence. 888 P.2d at 655. Only then, the petitioner argued, could he be given a fair hearing. Id. ¶ 82 The Carter court declined to adopt such a sentencing scheme. We held, [g]iven the procedures required at trial and the careful appellate review given by this Court to death penalty cases over the years, a specification of reasons by the sentencing authority on the record for imposing the death penalty, even if it were practicable, is not necessary to prevent arbitrary and capricious sentences. Indeed, such a procedure would be extraordinarily cumbersome, especially when a jury would have to agree unanimously on a statement of reasons under the process outlined in Wood. Id. at 656 (alteration in original) (quoting Holland, 777 P.2d at, 1025. The court accordingly dismissed the petitioner's arguments. ¶ 83 Archuleta acknowledges our holding in Carter, but he nevertheless argues that juror unanimity at the sentencing phase was required on each aggravating factor. In support of this contention, Archuleta points to a United States Supreme Court decision from 2002 that held that [i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002). According to Archuleta, this holding supersedes Carter and requires capital sentencing juries to unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of an aggravating factor before that factor may be relied upon to reach a sentence of death at the penalty phase. ¶ 84 The habeas court rejected this claim. It held that Ring does not alter or call into question Utah's case law on this issue. In Archuleta's case, the jury convicted him of first degree murder by unanimously finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he intentionally or knowingly caused Church's death under four statutory aggravating circumstances. As a result of his unanimous conviction, Archuleta became eligible for the death penalty, subject to a comparative weighing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances by the penalty phase jury. Thus, the habeas court held that it was not ineffective assistance for Archuleta's counsel to fail to raise this claim at trial or on appeal. ¶ 85 We affirm this holding. First, Ring was decided in 2002 and was thus not available to Archuleta's counsel at trial or on appeal. The law available at the time of Archuleta's trial did not require unanimity on individual aggravating circumstances, and counsel accordingly did not perform unreasonably in not raising this claim. At that time, the law required unanimity only on whether the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighed the totality of the mitigating circumstances. Wood, 648 P.2d at 83-84. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on that burden. In fact, six years after Archuleta's trial, this court made clear that the sentencing jury is not obligated to reach unanimity on individual sentencing phase aggravating circumstances. See Carter, 888 P.2d at 655-57. ¶ 86 Second, Ring does not require a unanimous jury determination on whether to impose a death sentence, but holds only that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt on any fact that makes death a possible sentence. Ring, 536 U.S. at 596-609. Under Arizona law, the facts that the defendant's jury found during the guilt phase exposed him to a maximum possible sentence of life. Id. at 596. The maximum possible sentence did not increase to include death until the sentencing judge found at least one statutory aggravator at the penalty phase. Id. at 597. Ring held that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt only on that issue. Id. at 609. ¶ 87 In Utah, the fact finder in the guilt phase must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubtthe statutory aggravator that makes death a possible sentence. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(3) (1989). The maximum possible sentence does not increase at the subsequent penalty phase. Rather, the sentencing jury decides only whether to impose the maximum possible sentence. Ring does not require a unanimous jury determination on that issue. Therefore, it does not call into question controlling Utah precedent that Archuleta has no constitutional right to require the jury to find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt each aggravating circumstance it considers in selecting the sentence.
¶ 88 During proceedings at the penalty phase of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that the instructions previously given to you in the guilt phase of the trial are to apply in the penalty phase where applicable. Archuleta contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge this instruction, and that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he didn't raise this issue on appeal. Archuleta claims that this instruction created a conflict among the guilt phase and penalty phase instructions, which ultimately prevented the sentencing jury from giving mitigating effect to evidence that Archuleta was intoxicated at the time of the crime. ¶ 89 The evidence at trial indicated that Archuleta had consumed alcohol before the homicide and that he felt it. There was a conflict in the evidence, however, as to the extent of Archuleta's alcohol impairment. The jury was instructed during the guilt phase that [i]t is not a defense to a crime that a person has merely been drinking or is intoxicated and that [b]eing under the influence of alcohol is not an excuse for the commission of a crime where it merely makes a person more excited or reckless, so that one does things which he might not otherwise do. During the penalty phase, however, the jury was instructed that it is a mitigating circumstances that [a]t the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of . . . intoxication. Archuleta contends that because the trial court told the jury that the guilt or innocence phase instructions applied during the penalty phase where applicable, without any further elaboration, the jury gave inadequate weight to the penalty phase instruction. ¶ 90 The habeas court rejected this ineffectiveness claim. For starters, the trial court instructed the jury that it could rely on the guilt or innocence phase instructions only if they were applicable. Given that the penalty phase instructions regarding intoxication contradicted the guilt or innocence phase instruction, the where applicable proviso kicked in and instructed the jury to disregard the guilt or innocence phase instruction. Moreover, the habeas court noted that during the penalty phase the court instructed the jury that mitigating circumstances may include circumstances which do not constitute justification or excuse for the crime but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the moral culpability or blame. Because the jury was expressly informed that circumstances which do not excuse the crime may still constitute mitigating evidence, the habeas court continued, no conflict was created by the trial court's instructions and, therefore, neither trial nor appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in choosing not to raise this issue. We agree with the habeas court's astute analysis and affirm its rejection of this claim.