Opinion ID: 195550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Principles of Statutory Construction--What does the Guideline Say and Mean?

Text: 23 The sentencing guideline at issue, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(c)(2) (1990), provides: 24 If the defendant used or possessed the firearm in connection with commission or attempted commission of another offense, apply Sec. 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) in respect to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above. 25 U.S.S.G. Sec. 2X1.1(a) (1990) in turn requires that the base offense level is to be determined from the guideline for the object offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established within reasonable certainty. 26 The question in this appeal is whether Thompson's constructive possession of the firearm was in connection with one or more of the drug offenses. 2 This Circuit has not specifically identified what evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding under Sec. 2K2.1(c)(2) that a firearm was possessed in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense. Thompson argues that the phrase in connection with should be interpreted narrowly, in a way that requires a tight facilitative nexus between a defendant's possession of a firearm and the commission of any drug offense. Thompson contends that such a nexus is lacking in this case. The government argues that the phrase is to be interpreted broadly and that Thompson's conduct easily falls within the purview of the guideline. 27 When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that a court must first look to the plain words and structure of the statute. United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 295 (1st Cir.1993); see also United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir.1994) (stating that principles of statutory interpretation apply to sentencing guidelines). With respect to the sentencing guidelines, courts should strive to apply the guidelines as written, according words in common usage their ordinary meaning. Brewster, 1 F.3d at 54. Because the phrase in connection with is not defined under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2, we assume that the Sentencing Commission did not intend the terms to have an exceptional or guideline-specific meaning. This reinforces our belief that the words should be accorded their customary meaning. See Smith v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2054, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993); Brewster, 1 F.3d at 54. 3 28 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 245 (10th Ed.1993) defines connection as a causal or logical relation or sequence. This definition suggests that there must be some reasoned link between a defendant's possession of a firearm and the commission or attempted commission of another offense. While it is difficult to sketch the outer boundaries of this link, there is no question that where a defendant's possession of a firearm somehow aids or facilitates, or has the potential to aid or facilitate, the commission of another offense, the defendant's possession of the firearm is causally and logically related to the other offense. A defendant's possession of a firearm cannot therefore simply be coincidental. 29 Courts which have interpreted the phrase in connection with in the context of Sec. 2K2 of the guidelines have adopted and applied this plain meaning. In Brewster, the First Circuit reviewed the district court's application of the phrase in connection with in the context of U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) (1992), a similar cross-reference provision. 4 Id. at 54-55. In Brewster, over the course of a month, an undercover federal agent met with Brewster several times to discuss the possibility of buying drugs and guns. Their discussions came to fruition when Brewster sold the agent a small amount of crack cocaine, and within an hour of that transaction, also sold him an automatic weapon. Brewster eventually pled guilty to charges of distribution of cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the sentencing hearing, the agent testified that he had told Brewster from the outset that he aspired to be a drug dealer, and that he needed a weapon to facilitate his plan. Brewster denied that he knew of any link between the weapon and the agent's planned drug trafficking. The court then found that Brewster sold the firearm with knowledge of the buyer's intended narcotics-related use of the weapon, and enhanced his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5). Brewster then appealed the court's application of this cross-reference. We determined that the phrase in connection with should be accorded its ordinary meaning. The court then noted that the case turned on credibility, and found that the district court's decision to credit the agent's recitation of events, which indicated that Brewster sold the gun with reason to believe that his customer planned to use the gun in connection with drug trafficking, was supported by the record, and that this constituted a sufficient nexus between the weapon and the drug trafficking, for purposes of the sentence enhancement. Id. at 54-55. See also United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1200 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Sanders, 990 F.2d 582, 585 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 216, 126 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). 30 Our construction of the phrase in connection with comports with the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of an analogous phrase, in relation to in the context of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). See Smith v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2059, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993); United States v. Routon, 25 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.1994). In Smith, the Supreme Court looked to the ordinary meaning of the phrase in relation to and found that it meant with reference to or as regards. Smith, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2058-59 (citing Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, at 2102). The Court emphasized that the phrase had an expansive meaning. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2058. The Court stated: 31 The phrase in relation to thus, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. As one court has observed, the in relation to language allays explicitly the concern that a person could be punished under Sec. 924(c)(1) for committing a drug trafficking offense while in possession of a firearm even though the firearm's presence is coincidental or entirely unrelated to the crime. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir.1985) (Kennedy, J.). Instead, the gun at least must facilitate, or have the potential of facilitating, the drug trafficking offense. 32 Smith, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2059 (other citations omitted); United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 998 (1st Cir.1990) (stating that under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c), the critical concern is the presence or absence of a facilitative nexus between the firearm and drug activity, and finding that even if a firearm is not instantly available or exclusively dedicated to the narcotics trade, a sufficient nexus may exist to find a firearm was used during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936, 111 S.Ct. 2062, 114 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991). We therefore believe that the phrase in connection with should be interpreted broadly and that where a defendant's possession of a firearm aids or facilitates the commission of another offense, the requisite link is present. 5 33 We do not believe that the district court's factual finding that Thompson's constructive possession of the handgun facilitated the commission of the cocaine and cocaine base offenses, and therefore fell within the ambit of the Sec. 2K2.1(c)(2) cross-reference provision, was clearly erroneous. The record supports the conclusion that a drug distribution operation was run out of the Theodore Street apartment, and that Jackson was the Boss, who was supported in his business by his boys, one of whom was Thompson. As the district court found, it was imminently reasonable to believe that Thompson knew about this drug dealing operation--he was present on numerous occasions when the CI went to Theodore Street to purchase cocaine and cocaine base, and while there, saw drug related activities openly occurring in the apartment. 34 While purchasing drugs, the CI repeatedly sought to purchase firearms as well. Specifically, the CI was looking to purchase a handgun on October 11, 1991, when he bought a quarter-kilogram of cocaine base at Theodore Street. The handgun was not available and the CI was told to come back the next day. On October 12, the CI returned to Theodore Street to purchase the gun, and Thompson, along with Henry, personally delivered the 9 millimeter pistol and ammunition to the CI. Essentially, this completed the sale from the previous day. It does not in any way strain credulity to believe that the Theodore Street group's sale of the firearm to the CI facilitated the cocaine and cocaine base sales. The evidence reasonably suggested that the cast of characters at Theodore Street was in the business of supplying both drugs and firearms, and that they were willing to obtain whatever contraband the CI requested, in order to accommodate a good customer and to maintain his confidence and business. 35 Thompson argues that the requisite nexus should only be found to exist when there is some type of physical proximity between the firearm and the drugs. The guideline does not require that the defendant actually use the firearm himself, or use the firearm in any particular way. Rather, as we have already determined, the language of the guideline is broad. The combination of firearms and drugs is common, and the guideline encompasses the many logical links which exist between the use of firearms and drugs. 36 Thompson also points out that the usual case in which the Sec. 2K2.1 cross-reference is used to apply drug guidelines to a firearms offender is where the defendant used a firearm for protection during a drug transaction or had the firearm available to protect his supply of drugs. While this may be the most common scenario, it is certainly not the only type of situation. Rather, the cross-reference has been applied in a variety of factual scenarios where a firearm has somehow aided or facilitated the cross-referenced offense. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 947 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir.1991) (finding that the district court properly applied Sec. 2K2.1(c)(2) enhancement when evidence showed that defendant had a gun under the front seat of his car while he was driving to purchase drugs, even though no drugs were physically present in the car.) Here, the requisite nexus existed by virtue of the fact that the enterprise, which Thompson was associated with, sold the guns and drugs together, in an attempt to accommodate a customer and maintain his business. The application of the Sec. 2K2.1(c)(2) cross-reference to Thompson reflects the seriousness of firearm possession in connection with other felonies, and the reality that when firearms are possessed or used in connection with drug offenses, there is a greater threat to public safety. See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 464 (1st Cir.1994) (noting that Congress viewed the connection between firearm possession in relation to drug trafficking provided by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) very seriously by requiring a mandatory five year sentence, thus denying parole to an offender at a time when parole was ordinarily available as a matter of course); U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) comment (n. 3) (1990) (enhancement of drug trafficking offense for weapons possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons). 37 For the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(c)(2), and the sentence is affirmed.