Opinion ID: 746262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Eighth Amendment Claim: Excessive Sentence

Text: 21 Dr. Koo was convicted of the rape of his patient and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The state appellate court noted that sentencing determinations rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and found no abuse of that discretion in this case. Because Dr. Koo was sentenced within the statutory limits, his sentence must be manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and character of the offender for it to be overturned. Koo, 640 N.E.2d at 105 (citing Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind.1991)). After reviewing the facts of the case, as well as the aggravating and mitigating factors presented to the sentencing court, the appellate court concluded that it could not say the sentence was manifestly unreasonable. 22 The federal district court considered specifically whether the state trial judge's consideration of the prior bad acts evidence in sentencing Dr. Koo was violative of the Eighth Amendment. It noted that the number of aggravating factors, even without considering the evidence of prior misconduct, exceeded the number of mitigating factors; furthermore, stated the district court, it was within the discretion of a trial court to weigh those factors in determining a sentence. The sentence was within the statutory limits established under Indiana law; thus, the judge could have imposed that sentence whether or not he had considered the prior bad acts in the weighing process. The district court concluded that the state trial record did not reflect an Eighth Amendment violation. 23 Dr. Koo's claim that his sentence is excessive and violative of the Eighth Amendment cannot succeed on habeas appeal. [A] federal court will not normally review a state sentencing determination which, as here, falls within the statutory limit. Gleason v. Welborn, 42 F.3d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109, 115 S.Ct. 1961, 131 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). However, we shall review a petitioner's showing that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose this term or committed a constitutional error making the sentence fundamentally unfair. Id. (citation omitted). A sentence violates the Constitution if it is extreme and  'grossly disproportionate' to the crime. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3008-09, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)). In Solem the Supreme Court enunciated three factors relevant to the proportionality determination: (1) the inherent gravity of the offense, (2) the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 986-87, 111 S.Ct. at 2697 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91, 103 S.Ct. at 3009-10). 24 Dr. Koo does not attempt to prove gross disproportionality with respect to any of these factors. His claim is that the testimony of the two witnesses impermissibly added to the aggravating factors and increased his sentence. According to Dr. Koo, the sentencing court should not have considered the prejudicial testimony of the two prior misconduct witnesses as an aggravating factor at sentencing. That evidence, the petitioner submits, when weighed against the mitigating circumstances, resulted in an untrue balancing process which denied him a fair trial. Pet'r Br. at 43. 25 As the state appellate court noted, the trial court, in determining the petitioner's sentence, took into account the fact that Dr. Koo was a physician who used his position of trust with susceptible female patients, who used his medical expertise to subdue his patient before engaging in the criminal conduct, and who took advantage of a vulnerable victim who, he knew, was sexually abused as a child. Koo, 640 N.E.2d at 105. The state court of appeals stated that, under Indiana law, a trial court may rely on a single aggravating factor to enhance a presumptive sentence, id. at 105-06, and that these numerous aggravating factors led to a sentence that was not manifestly unreasonable. See Duvall v. State, 540 N.E.2d 34, 36 (Ind.1989) (establishing state standard for weighing and articulating aggravating factors in sentencing determinations). We have no authority to question the Indiana Supreme Court's interpretation of state law. See Neumann v. Jordan, 84 F.3d 985, 987 (7th Cir.1996); Mason v. Duckworth, 74 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir.1996). We note that the state sentencing court sufficiently articulated the aggravating circumstances it considered in enhancing Dr. Koo's sentence, and those circumstances were supported by the evidence. We conclude that the state court violated no federal right in sentencing Dr. Koo. The sentence imposed was valid under the statute and within the limits imposed by the statute. There has been absolutely no showing that it is disproportionate to the crime.