Opinion ID: 665853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hopson/Sinkler Doctrine

Text: 27 Plaintiff contends that the negligence of Airfast should be imputed to Brinkerhoff and Crowley under the Hopson/ Sinkler  doctrine. In Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262, 263, 86 S.Ct. 765, 766, 15 L.Ed.2d 740 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the Jones Act incorporates the standards of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which renders an employer liable for the injuries negligently inflicted on its employees by its 'officers, agents, or employees.'  Quoting an earlier ruling in a FELA case, Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 78 S.Ct. 758, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958), the Court held that when [an] ... employee's injury is caused in whole or in part by the fault of others performing, under contract, operational activities of his employer, such others are 'agents' of the employer within the meaning of ... FELA. Hopson, 383 U.S. at 264, 86 S.Ct. at 766. 28 The district court ruled that since there was no contractual relationship between Brinkerhoff or Crowley and Airfast, plaintiff could only establish that Airfast was Brinkerhoff or Crowley's agent by presenting evidence that either Brinkerhoff or Crowley exercised a sufficient amount of control over Airfast. The court found that while Brinkerhoff and Crowley could request changes in Airfast's flight plans, the ability to 'request' a change without any authority to enforce that request does not constitute control. 29 In Tim v. American President Lines, Ltd., 409 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.1969) we applied the Sinkler/ Hopson doctrine. The plaintiff in Tim was injured while acting in the course of his employment as an electrician aboard the S.S. President Tyler. The injury occurred as a result of the negligence of a crane operating company, Matson Terminals, that was in the process of unloading cargo from the vessel. The facts of the case (which were not contested) established that the defendant employer had not selected Matson to unload the terminals, it had no oral or written contract with Matson, and it had no ownership or other financial interest in Matson. Tim, 409 F.2d at 388. On these facts, we held that Matson could not be considered the agent of the employer. Id. 30 Neither Brinkerhoff nor Crowley had a contractual relationship with Airfast, they did not select Airfast to transport their employees, and they had no ownership or other financial interest in Airfast. The district court considered one additional factor--whether Brinkerhoff or Crowley had actual control over Airfast. It properly concluded that neither Brinkerhoff nor Crowley had actual control over Airfast's flight plans. 6 Airfast was not the agent of Brinkerhoff or Crowley.