Opinion ID: 1835988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: questions of law to be answered

Text: Whether the provisions of Chapter 73-120 Laws of Florida 1973, `AN ACT relating to distribution of obscene materials; providing for the offense of distributing obscene material; providing definition of obscene material; providing penalties; providing for the offense of wholesale promotion of obscene material; providing penalty; providing for offense of requiring purchasers to accept obscene materials as a condition to sale or delivery for resale of other materials; providing penalty; providing for prior adversary hearing where appropriate; abrogating county and municipal ordinances relating to obscene materials and in effect July 1, 1973; prohibiting county and municipal ordinances relating to obscene materials, providing a severability clause; providing an effective date.' A. is guided by insufficient and arbitrary standards which are vague, indefinite and uncertain so as to violate the First Amendment standard of the United States Constitution set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Miller v. California, 41 LW 4925, [413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419], and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 41 LW 4935, [413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446], in specifically defining sexual conduct? B. still requires the State of Florida to prove that the material must be `utterly without redeeming social value' or in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. California, 41 LW 4925, [413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419], and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 41 LW 4935, [413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446], rejecting same as a constitutional standard only the United States Supreme Court's rephrasing requiring that the work, taken as a whole, must be proved to lack `serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value,' or both standards? C. is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause and equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida because a trial judge cannot determine what specifically defined sexual conduct is embodied with the definition of obscene material as written in Chapter 73-120 in order to properly instruct a jury and conduct a trial under the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Miller v. California, 41 LW 4925, [413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419] and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 41 LW 4935, [413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446]. A question or proposition certified directly to this Court by a county court must be one which, if decided by the county court, would be reviewable on direct appeal from that court to this Court. Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1963). If this cause proceeded to final judgment the trial court would, of necessity, pass upon the constitutional validity of a state statute. An appeal would then lie directly to this Court. Fla. Const., Art. V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A. We therefore have jurisdiction and may answer the questions certified by the trial judge. We consider here only the constitutionality of the statute vel non, which is the manner in which it has been submitted, and not as applied to any particular factual situation. Neither is Fla. Stat. Ch. 73-120, § 1(3), involved here; it provides that material not otherwise obscene may be deemed obscene if the distribution of the material in question is a commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal. However, inasmuch as the instant case does not involve any pandering, we need not discuss the constitutionality of § 1(3) of Ch. 73-120.