Opinion ID: 1947347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statutory obstruction

Text: The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment presented the Justice with an issue of law as to whether that part of Mr. Kaler's will which directed his executor to erect the mausoleum described in the will was prohibited by the provisions of 13 M.R.S.A. Section 1341 which read: Every community mausoleum, other than a structure containing crypts erected or controlled by a church or a religious society and used only as a repository for the remains of the clergy or dignitaries of such church or religious society, and every crematory, columbarium or other structure intended to dispose of, or hold or contain the bodies or remains of the dead, shall be located only within the limits of a cemetery containing not less than 20 acres, which shall have been in existence and actually used for burial purposes for a period of at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of the erection thereof. Section 1341 prohibits not only community mausoleums (with the exception relating to the clergy) but also all other structures intended to contain the bodies of the dead, unless located within the limits of an established cemetery of not less than 20 acres. The will's description of the proposed edifice and its purpose brings it within the prohibited classification unless it is located within an established cemetery of not less than 20 acres. Defendant's answer to plaintiffs' complaint admits that the proposed structure is not within such a cemetery. No issue of fact remained. Section 1341 forbids the structure proposed by Mr. Kaler. We do not reach the question of the right of the executor to disinter and move the remains of the other proposed occupants of the mausoleum or of the absence of a named cestui que trust. We do consider it useful, however, to discuss the plaintiffs' contention that the testator's directions that the mausoleum shall be maintained forever are barred by the rule against perpetuities which, if needed, would provide additional support for the Justice's decree. The rule against perpetuity is a restriction which for reasons of public policy the common law has placed on the disposal of private property. The purpose is to prevent the tying up of property to the detriment of society in general. The rule permits the vesting of an interest or estate to be postponed only for a period of a life or lives in being and 21 years and 9 months thereafter. Any limitation over that period is void. Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 A. 898, 56 L.R.A. 103 (1901); 41 Am.Jur., Perpetuities, Section 3; 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities § 3. The rule has been modified somewhat by statute in respects with which we are not here concerned. 33 M.R. S.A. Sections 101-106. There are exceptions to the rule which concern trusts created for charitable purposes. Snow v. President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, 133 Me. 195, 175 A. 268 (1934); 15 Am. Jur.2d, Charities, Section 19, 22; 70 C.J.S., supra, § 30. In 1881 our Court applied the rule to an issue concerning a bequest of a sum of money in perpetual trust to keep the testator's burial lot in forever good order and condition. The Court concluded that the bequest was not for any public purpose, beneficial to all and therefore that the bequest, not being of a charitable nature, was void under the rule. Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155. This decision is in accord with the general rule. Re Byrne's Estate, 98 N.H. 300, 100 A.2d 157, 47 A.L.R.2d 591 (1953); Clark v. Portland Burying Ground Association, 151 Conn. 527, 200 A.2d 468, 471 (1964). In the present case no affidavit was filed by the defendant which would suggest the existence of facts from which it could be concluded that, in spite of the clear language of the will, the proposed creation of a mausoleum would be for a public purpose, beneficial to all. Shortly after the decision in Piper v. Moulton, the Maine Legislature enacted P.L.1883, Chap. 117, Sec. 1 (now, with amendments which do not now concern us, 13 M.R.S.A., Sec. 1222) which modified the application of the rule against perpetuities to permit trusts in perpetuity for care of small, private cemetery lots. It reads, in part: Any city, town, cemetery corporation, trust company or trustee may accept any conveyance of land not exceeding ½ acre, to be forever held, kept and used for a private or family burying ground for the grantors and such of their heirs and relatives by blood or marriage as the conveyance shall designate. It was noted by the Justice in his decree that Paragraph Second directs that the mausoleum be constructed upon a lot of land which, if circular, must contain more than one-half an acre. It would also necessarily exceed one-half acre if rectangular, even without the access right of way reserved across other land of the testator. Thus the proposed burying ground is not within the exemption created by Section 1222 and the bequest must fail as an attempt to create a perpetuity. Appeal denied. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for allowance of reasonable counsel fees.