Opinion ID: 185361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary or Mandatory Submissions

Text: 10 FOIA expresses a fundamental commitment to full agency disclosure of government documents. Public access, not secrecy, is the main purpose of FOIA. United States Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 494 (1994) (quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)). Although FOIA is intended to expose agency action to public scrutiny, FOIA permits an agency to withhold information if it falls within any one of nine categories of exempted material. McCutchen v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 30 F.3d 183, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 11 NHTSA asserted that the information requested by the Center was protected from disclosure under Exemption 4, which excludes trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). This court has on a number of occasions addressed the standards governing determinations of whether information qualifies under Exemption 4. The judgment of the court sitting en banc in Critical Mass is our most significant statement on the subject. 12 In Critical Mass, the court held that material may be withheld as financial or commercial information under Exemption 4 of FOIA under two circumstances. First, financial or commercial information provided to the Government on a voluntary basis is 'confidential' for the purpose of Exemption 4 if it is of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained. 975 F.2d at 879 (emphasis added). Second, financial or commercial information provided to the Government on a mandatory basis is confidential if disclosure would be likely either '(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.'  Id. at 878. [W]hen dealing with a FOIA request for information the provider is required to supply, the governmental impact inquiry will focus on the possible effect of disclosure on its quality. Id. 13 The decision in Critical Mass explains that, with respect to information voluntarily submitted, the party opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving the information is confidential. Id. at 879. In addition, in assessing customary disclosure, the court will consider how the particular party customarily treats the information, not how the industry as a whole treats the information. Id. at 872, 878-80. A party can voluntarily make protected disclosures of information, and as long as the disclosures are not made to the general public, such disclosures do not constitute customary disclosures. Id. at 874, 880. 14 The court further noted that disclosure under FOIA balances the public's interest in maintaining an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, with the Government's interest in access to data in making intelligent well informed decisions, and private interests in protection from the competitive disadvantages that would result from disclosure. Id. at 872-73 (citations omitted). When the Government obtains information as part of a mandatory submission, the Government's access to the information normally is not seriously threatened by disclosure; the private interest is the principal factor tending against disclosure, and the harm to the private interest must be significant to prevent public access to information. Id. at 878. However, when the Government receives information voluntarily, it has a strong interest in ensuring continued access, and therefore both the Government and private interests weigh against overly broad disclosure. Id. 15 With this framework in mind, we agree with the District Court that the submissions in this case should not be treated as mandatory. At the same time, we note that this case does not involve a typical voluntary information submission--it involves a mistaken submission. NHTSA's request for information appeared mandatory on its face. The Information Request stated that NHTSA hereby requires the recipient to submit the information and explained that the recipient, must respond to the enclosed Information Request. Information Request, reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) 323. Furthermore, the Information Request explained, [f]ailure to respond promptly and fully to this Information Request could subject [recipient] to civil penalties pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30165 or lead to an action for injunctive relief pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30163. Id. The language of the Information Request clearly communicates to the recipient that submission of material was mandatory. 16 Nevertheless, NHTSA's request was not enforceable as a result of the Paperwork Reduction Act and, therefore, we find that the submissions cannot be considered mandatory. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, if NHTSA seeks to collect information from 10 or more persons or entities, NHTSA must obtain prior approval from OMB. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1998). If NHTSA fails to obtain prior approval from OMB, the request for information can be ignored without penalty. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (Supp. IV 1998). OMB regulations specifically explain that 10 or more includes any independent entities to which the initial addressee may reasonably be expected to transmit the collection of information. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c)(4) (2000). 17 On the record at hand, it is clear that NHTSA expected that the Information Request would be submitted to 10 or more entities. For example, the District Court pointed out that Volkswagen of America, as an importer, had to submit the Information Request to Volkswagen AG and Audi AG in order to respond to the questions, and all nine manufacturers who received the Information Request had to collect information from their suppliers. Mem. Op. at 36. This finding was also supported by the declaration of the executive director of NHTSA, L. Robert Shelton, who explained that NHTSA expected the recipients to send the request to their foreign parents, subsidiaries and affiliates. Declaration of L. Robert Shelton, reprinted in J.A. 463-65. 18 Although NHTSA expected that the Information Request would be submitted to 10 or more entities, NHTSA did not get prior approval from OMB. As a result, NHTSA had no authority to enforce the information request. Had the intervenor-defendants ignored the agency's request for information, NHTSA could not have compelled them to respond to the request. Because NHTSA could not enforce its Information Request, the material submitted in response to the Information Request cannot be considered mandatory. 19 In determining that the submission was not mandatory, we hold that actual legal authority, rather than parties' beliefs or intentions, governs judicial assessments of the character of 20 submissions. We reject the argument that, in assessing submissions for the purpose of Exemption 4 analysis, we should look to subjective factors, such as whether the respondents believed that the Information Request was voluntary, or whether the agency, at the time it issued the request for information, considered the request to be mandatory. Focusing on parties' intentions, for purposes of analyzing submissions under Exemption 4, would cause the court to engage in spurious inquiries into the mind. On the other hand, linking enforceability and mandatory submissions creates an objective test; regardless of what the parties thought or intended, if an agency has no authority to enforce an information request, submissions are not mandatory. 21 In distinguishing between voluntary and mandatory submissions, the court in Critical Mass emphasized that the Supreme Court has favored the development of categorical rules whenever a particular set of facts will lead to a generally predictable application of FOIA. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879 (discussing United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 779 (1989)). We also noted the Court's suggestion of a practical approach in interpreting FOIA, and defended the voluntary versus mandatory distinction as an objective test. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879 (quoting John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 157 (1989)). The distinction between voluntary and mandatory submissions that was delineated in Critical Mass was rooted in the importance of establishing clear tests in interpreting FOIA, and we continue in that tradition today. 22 We cannot accept the Center's argument that if recipients do not assert that a submission is voluntary before submitting information in response to an agency's request, they have implicitly waived their entitlement to subsequently assert that the submission was not mandatory. Critical Mass emphasizes our concern with an agency's continuing ability to secure ... data on a cooperative basis. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879. Although NHTSA in this case purported to seek data pursuant to its statutory mandate, the response by the manufacturers was certainly cooperative in the sense that they readily supplied the data without making legal objections. Indeed, at least two of the manufacturers acquiesced while maintaining that their responses were voluntary. Surely there is an important policy interest in minimizing resistance by a manufacturer to an agency's request for information; insisting that a respondent identify and air legal objections in response to any request in order to preserve its rights would tend to frustrate the cooperati[on] that Critical Mass values. Beyond, that it would needlessly waste resources to require that respondents identify legal defects that have no practical bearing unless and until a FOIA dispute materializes. 23 The Center also argues that intervenor-defendants have waived their entitlement to assert a claim under the Paperwork Reduction Act because claims under the Paperwork Reduction Act cannot be raised once the information is submitted. Permitting a party to raise a Paperwork Reduction Act claim after having submitted information to an agency does not support the purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act; after information is submitted, the Paperwork Reduction Act's goal of reducing paperwork by mandating OMB review is moot. We disagree. 24 The Paperwork Reduction Act directly addresses when a claim can be raised. Although it does not expressly refer to claims arising after submission of the information, the statute provides that [t]he protection provided by this section may be raised in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (Supp. IV 1998). In Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we explained that, by explicitly allowing parties to raise a Paperwork Reduction Act claim at any time during ongoing proceedings, the Paperwork Reduction Act prevents an agency or court from refusing to consider a [Paperwork Reduction Act] argument on the ground that it is untimely. 25 Saco River is not directly on point, as it involved a Paperwork Reduction Act defense that was raised when the party had not submitted the information. However, the expansive language of the Paperwork Reduction Act itself, along with this court's explication in Saco River, militates against the Center's position and supports our finding that a Paperwork Reduction Act claim can be raised after information has been submitted. In addition, the Center's argument ignores the deterrence effect that permitting parties to raise their Paperwork Reduction Act claim can have on future agency actions. Although the paperwork may already have been produced in response to the particular Information Request, permitting parties to raise their Paperwork Reduction Act claim, even after submitting the information, further encourages agencies to comply prospectively with the Paperwork Reduction Act.