Opinion ID: 2063659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: outer courts and basements in the ellis structures

Text: The appellees make two arguments with respect to the rehabilitation of the Ellis structures. They first claim that the developers cannot lawfully rehabilitate the structures if, after the rehabilitation, the outer courts ( i.e., the courtyards on either side of the structures) will be less than eight feet in width. It is uncontested that the outer courts will in fact be four feet in width. The appellees also argue that the developers' plans to repair the basement apartments in the Ellis structures violate the rehabilitation and building codes because they do not indicate that the units will be made impervious to water leakage. The argument as to the outer courts turns in part upon the number of apartment units in the planned rehabilitation. Section 78.1-22 of the rehabilitation code states that [i]n any residential building    the number of dwelling units may be increased by one dwelling unit above the number of units constructed at the time the building was built, providing the    [n]atural light and ventilation shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 81.1 [regarding natural light and ventilation requirements in new construction]. (Chicago Municipal Code ch. 78.1, § 78.1-22(e) (1983).) The pertinent section of chapter 81.1 requires that outer courts be eight feet in width. Thus, if the rehabilitation increases the number of dwelling units by one above the number constructed at the time the building was built, the outer courts should be eight feet in width. The outer courts in the proposed rehabilitation are four feet in width. Evidence introduced at trial established that the Ellis structures are composed of three adjoining, three-story buildings in an R4 residential district. (See Chicago Municipal Code ch. 194A, § 7.3-4 (1984-85).) The buildings were originally constructed in 1914, with 6 dwelling units in each building, for a total of 18 units in all. In 1951 the buildings were converted, pursuant to a building permit issued by the City of Chicago, from 6 units in each building to 18 units in each building. In 1952, the owner, in violation of the permit, constructed 27 apartments in the center building. By court order entered in 1961, the center building was deconverted from the unpermitted 27 units to 24 units. Before the present rehabilitation, the Ellis structures contained no actual apartments because they were essentially gutted and mere shells. The developers intended to rehabilitate the Ellis structures so that there would be seven units in each building, for a total of 21 units for all three structures. Thus it is not disputed that the intended rehabilitation would increase the number of units in the Ellis structures by one unit greater than the number in existence when the buildings were originally constructed. In the appellate court, the developers argued that other, related sections in the rehabilitation code precluded the application of section 78.1-22(e). (See Chicago Municipal Code ch. 78.1, §§ 78.1-21, 78.1-22, 78.1-23 (1983).) The developers do not repeat these arguments here, and we agree with the appellate court that all of these sections state additional requirements for rehabilitation which increases the number of dwelling units, and do not alter the requirement as to the width of the outer courts. The developers also argued in the appellate court that section 78.1-22(e) does not apply where the number of dwelling units legally authorized to exist had been converted to a number greater than that permitted when the building was originally constructed. As the appellate court reasoned, this argument conflicts with the plain language of section 78.1-22(e), which specifically refers to the number of units constructed at the time the building was built.  (Emphasis added.) (Chicago Municipal Code ch. 78.1, § 78.1-22(e) (1984).) We also agree that section 78-63 of the Chicago Municipal Code is likewise inapplicable. Section 78-63 permits alterations in preordinance buildings (those built before July 8, 1957) that did not comply[] with the requirements in force and applicable to the building at the time of its conversion (Chicago Municipal Code ch. 78, § 78-63 (1984)), so that those buildings could be made to comply with the chapter 78 minimum requirements for existing buildings. In other words, section 78-63 is designed to secure compliance with the codes by means short of total demolition. The appellate court concluded, and we agree, that section 78-63 is not applicable to a building which is not currently occupied and which effectively contains no units at all. Since it has already been effectively demolished, the application of section 78-63 would serve no purpose. Therefore the number of units permitted by the 1961 court order is irrelevant. On this appeal, the developers do not dispute the merits of the appellate court's interpretation of section 78-63 but, instead, argue that the appellate court did not give proper deference to the interpretation of the rehabilitation code by the City of Chicago and the Chicago Department of Inspectional Services (DIS). It is undisputed that the developers submitted blueprints of their plan to DIS and that DIS issued building permits. The permits themselves contain no indication of why DIS issued the permits or its interpretation of the rehabilitation code. At trial, the developers called as an expert witness the coordinating architect in charge of plan examination for DIS to testify to DIS's interpretation of the code. The trial court specifically disclaimed any reliance on his testimony, calling it disjointed, confused, and unintelligible. We have said that we will give great weight and deference to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by a public agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute. ( Illinois Power Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1986), 111 Ill.2d 505, 510-11; Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1983), 95 Ill.2d 142, 152.) Those interpretations, while not binding, are considered an informed source in ascertaining the legislative intent because of the agency's experience and expertise. E.g., Adams v. Jewel Cos. (1976), 63 Ill.2d 336, 344-45. However, we need not give such deference here. First, it is by no means clear that DIS in fact interprets the rehabilitation code as the developers suggest. DIS is not a party to this action. The building permits themselves provide no explanation for DIS' approval. It is therefore at least possible that the approval resulted from ignorance or inadvertence rather than from a principled interpretation of the rehabilitation code. Were we to hold that agency action, standing alone, constituted an interpretation, every agency action would be presumptively legal. Second, the rehabilitation code is not particularly ambiguous  it clearly states that rehabilitation which increases the number of units per building by one above the number in existence at the time of the original construction must comply with some of the requirements for new construction. Even an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute is not binding, but only persuasive. Here, the statute is unambiguous, and the interpretation nonexistent. The developers next argue that the issuance of the permit was a factual determination which should not be rejected by a court unless arbitrary and capricious. This is clearly not true; the facts at trial were virtually undisputed, and the trial court itself characterized its decision as based on a legal interpretation of undisputed facts. Therefore, this argument has no merit. The developers next argue that our interpretation of the rehabilitation code should be influenced by a subsequent amendment to the code enacted by the Chicago city council. The amendment deleted from section 78.1-22 the words constructed at the time the building was built, and added the words legally established dwelling before the word units. The amended section 78.1-22 now begins: In any residential building    the number of dwelling units may be increased by one dwelling unit above the number of legally established dwelling units provided the building complies with [various statutory requirements]. (Chicago Municipal Code § 78.1-22 (eff. Oct. 28, 1987 (as amended)).) Legally established dwelling units are defined to mean the number of dwelling units authorized to exist    pursuant to the issuance of a valid building permit or authorized by a final and nonappealable court order. Chicago Municipal Code § 78.1-21(a) (eff. Oct. 28, 1987 (as amended)). In the past we have sometimes considered a subsequent legislative amendment to an ambiguous statute as a clarification, with some bearing on our determination of the original legislative intent. However, it is equally clear that an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed. ( People v. Nunn (1979), 77 Ill.2d 243, 248.) This presumption may only be rebutted by evidence that the legislature intended only to interpret the original act.    Usually, an amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law, but no such purpose is indicated by the amendment of an ambiguous provision. ( People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill.2d 556, 563.) Here there was nothing ambiguous about the number of units constructed at the time the building was built, and the substitution of the number of legally established dwelling units, as newly defined, was a modification. Moreover, there is no indication in the legislation that the amendment was meant to be applied retroactively. (See, e.g., Rivard v. Chicago Firefighters Union (1988), 122 Ill.2d 303.) We therefore see no need to consider this subsequent change as evidence of the council's original intent. We therefore find that the appellate court's determination that the four-foot-wide courts in the Ellis structures were illegally narrow was correct. The appellees next argued that the developers' plans with regard to the basement apartments in the Ellis structures violate the Chicago Municipal Code because they provide no method for rendering the apartments impervious to water leakage in conformity with section 78.1-22(c) of the rehabilitation code. (Chicago Municipal Code ch. 78.1, § 78.1-22(c) (1983).) At the hearing the appellees presented evidence that the basements in the Ellis structures are not currently impervious to water leakage. The trial court dismissed the appellees' case with regard to this violation at the close of their case and entered a directed judgment in favor of the developers. We agree with the appellate court that this was error. The developers admit their plans did not contain a method for preventing water leakage. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in directing judgment in favor of the developers. Like the appellate court we note that the appellees' claim about the sanitary sewer pipe in the Ellis structures was dismissed without prejudice and need not be addressed here.