Opinion ID: 2696081
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: De Facto Arrest and Probable Cause

Text: Massi next argues that the duration of his detention constituted a de facto arrest. A detention initially authorized by Terry can, due to its duration, transform into the equivalent of an arrest. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 579 (5th Cir. 2008). If Massi’s detention continued beyond the bounds permitted by a finding of reasonable suspicion under Terry, it “must be accompanied by probable cause” to believe that Massi had committed a criminal offense. Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2007).
We first examine whether Massi’s detention under Terry “morphed . . . into a de facto arrest” and, if so, when that arrest occurred. Zavala, 541 F.3d at 579. An arrest occurs when, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). As a factual matter, we know that Massi and Sanchez were told by law enforcement officers that they were not free to leave. The issue is solely a legal one. At the end of the officers’ investigation, the following was known: (1) the trip had been laborious – six refueling stops – from Orlando to Las Vegas, then after a 12 hour stop, the return trip began; one of the occupants had just entered the country through Tijuana, Mexico, a known center of drug activity; and the owner of the airplane had a more-than-twenty-year-old conviction for drug trafficking; (2) a canine, Gus, conducted a sniff of the airplane’s exterior at 7:20 p.m., including the luggage, and did not alert; (3) Massi and Sanchez complied with all requests, except each denied consent to search the airplane; (4) when Massi denied consent, he attempted to shut the airplane’s open door; (5) Agent Knight saw a cardboard box behind the rear seat of the airplane, 18 to 24 inches across in size; (6) Sanchez told Agent Knight he had seen Massi 10 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 put the box in the airplane; (7) Massi denied knowing about the box; and (8) once told what Sanchez said, Massi admitted to owning the box. No further questioning occurred, because by then Massi had requested an attorney. The final event in this chronology appears to have been the canine sniff at 7:20 p.m. Agent Howard arrived at 7:30 p.m. A fair estimate is that Massi and Sanchez’s encounter with MPD began once they had time to return to their airplane after getting food, and once the officers had time to arrive at the airplane upon being told at 6:00 p.m. to conduct a ramp check. The Homeland Security agents were not informed of the airplane until 6:20 p.m., so their start was later than that of MPD. It would appear that the encounter had been underway for about an hour by the time Agent Howard arrived. We noted above that we review the evidence on a motion to suppress in a manner favorable to the prevailing party, Cardenas, 9 F.3d at 1147, and uphold the ruling “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 841 (quotation marked omitted). There are uncertainties in the record regarding the length of time taken by the ramp check, a check which independently supports the initial activity at the airplane. We have also found that there were reasonable suspicions of drug activity supporting some additional inquiry. Therefore, we see no clear factual error or any legal error in the district court’s ruling that at least at the time that Agent Howard arrived, no violation of Massi’s Fourth Amendment rights had occurred. The remaining concern, of course, is that probable cause to arrest was absent as of 7:30 p.m., but Massi continued to be detained. The detention lasted until midnight, four and one-half hours after Agent Howard’s arrival. From 7:30 to 9:30 p.m., Agent Howard collected and analyzed all facts uncovered during the regulatory check and Terry investigation. Between 11 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 9:30 p.m. and midnight, Howard went to his office; prepared an affidavit; talked at least with AMOC, the United States Attorney’s office, and a Magistrate Judge; procured a search warrant; and returned to search the airplane’s interior. During all this time, Massi was not free to leave. This delay existed, ultimately, because law enforcement officers sought a warrant and warrants take time. A Terry detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerges.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507. Our caselaw presents numerous examples of automobile searches, and occasionally searches of airplanes, in which the issue is whether immediate, warrantless searches were justified by exigent circumstances. Here, law enforcement officers instead held the airplane and the occupants until evidence could be corroborated, an affidavit prepared, and the search warrant obtained. As a result of the delay that accompanied this process, the initial investigatory stop “morphed from a Terry detention into a de facto arrest” requiring probable cause. Zavala, 541 F.3d at 579. Though the ramp check and Terry-justified investigation were over by 7:30 p.m., Massi had to remain until midnight while a warrant was obtained. Thus, both men were detained well beyond the time for the ramp check and Terry investigation. Generally, absent the brief and minimally intrusive detention such as permitted under Terry, a seizure without probable cause to believe the person is guilty of a crime violates the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1970). “[W]e have never held that a police officer may detain a defendant for one hour and thirty minutes until a full-blown drug investigation is completed.” Zavala, 541 F.3d at 580. We conclude that the justification under Terry to hold Massi had ended by 7:30 p.m. when Agent Howard arrived. Thereafter, Massi was under arrest. 12 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063
Massi’s de facto arrest must be supported by probable cause. “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts – not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). “We must also be mindful that probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers. We weigh not individual layers but the laminated total.” United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 895 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (quotation marked omitted). The facts and circumstances known to law enforcement by the time of Agent Howard’s 7:30 p.m. arrival were all that was known until the midnight search of the airplane. Officers at the scene knew that the airplane had displayed suspicious flight activity; that the airplane’s owner had a prior conviction for drug trafficking; and that Massi had acknowledged traveling from Tijuana, Mexico into the United States three days before the airplane left Las Vegas, Nevada. As the investigation progressed, these officers witnessed Massi’s attempt to close the airplane door after his denial of consent to search, the existence of a cardboard box behind the rear seat of the airplane, and Massi’s inconsistent statements as to his knowledge and ownership of the box. The question for us is whether such evidence constituted probable cause to arrest Massi and keep him at the airport in excess of four more hours. The Government has primarily argued that this evidence supports probable cause to search the aircraft. That is a separate question that we discuss later. Zavala is again instructive. Finding probable cause absent there, we noted: “Although [the defendant and his passenger] gave conflicting answers to several interview questions, this could not serve as the catalyst to convert 13 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 mere reasonable suspicion into probable cause.” Zavala, 541 F.3d at 575 (quotation marks omitted). While we do not require new facts be developed in order to transform reasonable suspicion into probable cause, we do require that “the totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed, or was in the process of committing, an offense.” Zavala, 541 F.3d at 575. There needed to be probable cause to believe that Massi was guilty of a drug-related offense, but we conclude that until the midnight search, all the officers had were suspicions. We conclude that Massi was subject to an unconstitutional seizure at the airport. The issue on appeal, though, is not the existence of a constitutional violation in isolation but whether the evidence obtained as a result of the midnight search pursuant to a warrant should be suppressed. To link the unconstitutional seizure to the eventual search, Massi argues that the search warrant was the fruit of a tree poisoned by the unconstitutional detention. The Government argues that the detention is irrelevant, as the search that discovered the evidence, undertaken pursuant to a warrant, was valid at a minimum under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We now turn to the resolution of those competing views. II. Interaction of Good Faith Exception and Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule provides that “evidence obtained during the execution of a warrant later determined to be deficient is nonetheless admissible if the executing officer’s reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable and made in good faith.” United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921-25). Applying the good faith exception does not resolve whether a constitutional right has been 14 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 violated; it simply is a judicial determination that exclusion of evidence does not advance the interest of deterring unlawful police conduct. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 223). In effect, the good faith exception limits the remedy of exclusion where “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Leon, 468 U.S. 922. Typically, this court conducts a two-step review of a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized under a warrant. United States v. Pena-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 1120, 1129 (5th Cir. 1997). “The first step requires the court to determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.” Id. “The second step requires the court ‘to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . concluding that probable cause existed.’” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “If the good-faith exception applies, the court need not reach the question of probable cause.” Id. at 1130 (citations omitted). “Principles of judicial restraint and precedent dictate that, in most cases, we should not reach the probable cause issue if . . . the good-faith exception of Leon will resolve the matter.” United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1988). In this appeal, we are presented with different circumstances from those traditionally animating this two-step analysis. The Government is asking us to determine whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when the search warrant was used on an airplane whose pilot and passenger had several hours earlier been seized in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The question of whether the good faith exception can permit the admissibility of evidence over a possible taint caused by an earlier-in-time detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment that would otherwise warrant 15 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 exclusion as fruit of the poisonous tree, is not territory frequented in our jurisprudence. 3 We recently discussed whether the good faith exception is applicable when “the magistrate’s probable cause finding is based on evidence that was the product of an illegal search or seizure.” Woerner, 709 F.3d at 534. There, the court considered whether evidence obtained as a result of the execution of a search warrant should be suppressed where the affidavit included information gained from a defendant during a custodial interrogation that was later suppressed as the fruit of an earlier-in-time, unlawful search. Id. Both the interrogation and unlawful search were undertaken by a different law enforcement entity than that of the officers who pursued the search warrant at issue; the two investigations were parallel and the officers seeking the search warrant did not know of the other officer. Id. Such separation did not exist here between the improper detention and the processing of the search warrant. Also relevant to Woerner’s analysis was an assessment of the objective good faith of the law enforcement officer in pursuing the warrant. See id. We concluded, under the circumstances presented, that suppression was not justified and that the good faith exception applied. Id. at 535. While differing from Massi’s scenario in both the context – an unlawful search – and the existence of a parallel investigation, Woerner signals an openness to applying the good faith exception where an earlier-in-time constitutional violation exists alongside a search warrant that was sought and executed in good faith. 3 We say “possible taint” because there is not a clear causal connection between the unconstitutional detention and the acquisition of evidence used to support the search warrant. We have found that the evidence used to obtain the search warrant was acquired but not fully corroborated for the purposes of Agent Howard’s affidavit prior to the improper detention. The unconstitutional detention did allow the plane and its occupants still to be at the airport for the midnight warrant to be executed, so there is that clear link. We will discuss the issue as if the fruit of poisonous tree doctrine applies. 16 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 We will discuss the details of the good faith exception momentarily. To understand Woerner, though, we need to give a brief summary of those principles. The Supreme Court in Leon identified four situations, or “exceptions,” that would prevent admission of evidence obtained through a search warrant: the affiant misled the magistrate who issued the warrant; the magistrate “abandoned his judicial role”; the affidavit is patently inadequate to show probable cause; or the warrant is so deficient on its face that officers could not presume its validity. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921-25. The Woerner court stated that the facts of that case required it “to answer whether the good faith exception applies in a fifth situation: when the magistrate’s probable cause finding is based on evidence that was the product of an illegal search or seizure.” Woerner, 709 F.3d at 534. The court did not answer the question of whether a fifth exception should be recognized. Instead it held that the facts did not support that the magistrate had acted on information that was tainted: “the police misconduct leading to the inclusion of [the illegally obtained statements in the] warrant application was at most the result of negligence of one or more law enforcement officers.” Id. at 534-35. As we will discuss later, we conclude that a preferable way to consider facts such as these is not as a fifth exception but as a corollary to the first exception – did the affiant mislead the magistrate? The dissent notes distinctions between Woerner and the current case, and from those distinctions concludes that a different result is required. Distinctions do not always make a difference, and these do not. It is true that Agent Howard and his agency, ICE, were involved throughout that evening, while in Woerner there were two different though parallel investigations by different officers. The observation is made in Woerner that “if the officer applying for the warrant knew or had reason to know that the information was 17 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 tainted . . . then suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant ‘pay[s] its way by deterring official lawlessness.’” Woerner, 709 F. 3d at 534 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 258 (White, J. concurring)). As we will discuss, we do not agree that Agent Howard’s knowledge of what transpired at the airport equates to knowledge that what occurred was unconstitutional. We will also discuss that Agent Howard’s affidavit disclosed the basic facts of the delay, that delay being the source of the alleged taint to the later search. There was no misleading of the magistrate. Other circuits have considered similar scenarios. The Sixth, Second, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that in certain circumstances, the good faith exception can overcome a taint from prior unconstitutional conduct. See United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 564-566 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that “the Leon good faith exception should apply despite an earlier Fourth Amendment violation”); United States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d 48, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the Leon exception was applicable to a subsequent warrantauthorized search of luggage when the initial detention of the luggage was a Fourth Amendment violation); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding Leon applicable to a warrant-authorized search of an apartment where the affidavit supporting the warrant contained evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, though, have held that the good faith exception does not apply where a search warrant is issued on the basis of evidence that is fruit of the poisonous tree. See United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1987). One of the recent cases to address this issue is persuasive. See McClain, 444 F.3d 556. There, the Sixth Circuit stated that it must “reconcile the ‘good faith’ exception established in Leon . . . with the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ 18 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 doctrine first coined in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).” Id. at 564. “[P]articularly instructive” was the Eighth Circuit’s explanation of Leon that “evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, even if in fact obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is not subject to the exclusionary rule if an objectively reasonable officer could have believed the seizure valid.” McClain, 444 F.3d at 566 (quoting United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989)). As in the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the McClain court “refused to apply the exclusionary rule because the facts surrounding the initial Fourth Amendment violation were ‘close enough to the line of validity to make the officer’s belief in the validity of the warrant objectively reasonable.’” McClain, 444 F.3d at 566 (quoting White, 890 F.2d at 1419). In McClain, officers had responded to a neighbor’s call about a light on in a house that was supposed to be unoccupied; after initial inspection outside discovered an open door, the officers entered the house to determine if there had been an intruder. Id. at 560. That entry, which uncovered evidence of a marijuana grow operation but no drugs themselves, was later found to be invalid. Id. at 561. The evidence formed the basis for an investigation, search warrant, and later entry that uncovered 348 marijuana plants and growing equipment. Id. at 560. The Sixth Circuit found that the good faith exception applied to permit the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant’s execution despite the taint that resulted from the unconstitutional initial entry of the house. Id. at 566. In considering that initial entry, the McClain court concluded that it “did not believe that the officers were objectively unreasonable” in believing that criminal activity was afoot and there was “no evidence that the officers knew they were violating the Fourth Amendment” in conducting their warrantless activity. Id. The court emphasized that, “importantly, the officers who sought and executed the 19 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 20 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 search warrants were not the same officers who performed the initial warrantless search, and [the officer’s] warrant affidavit fully disclosed to a neutral and detached magistrate the circumstances surrounding the initial warrantless search.” Id. The court determined: Because the officers who sought and executed the warrants acted with good faith, and because the facts surrounding the initial warrantless search were close enough to the line of validity to make the executing officers’ belief in the validity of the search warrants objectively reasonable, we conclude that despite the initial Fourth Amendment violation, the Leon exception bars application of the exclusionary rule in this case. Id. We adopt the following reasoning, drawing on McClain, as our understanding of the interaction of the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree with Leon’s good faith exception, as each apply to evidence obtained as the result of the execution of a search warrant. Two separate requirements must be met for evidence to be admissible: (1) the prior law enforcement conduct that uncovered evidence used in the affidavit for the warrant must be “close enough to the line of validity” that an objectively reasonable officer preparing the affidavit or executing the warrant would believe that the information supporting the warrant was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct, and (2) the resulting search warrant must have been sought and executed by a law enforcement officer in good faith as prescribed by Leon. The dissent here insists that a necessary element of this interaction between good faith use of a search warrant and a taint to the evidence supporting the warrant is that the officers engaged in the prior conduct be different than those who acquire the warrant. It argues that our review of McClain makes a “glaring omission” in failing to recognize the importance of the fact that “the officers who sought and executed the search warrants were not the same officers who performed the initial warrantless search.” Id. at 566. 20 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 21 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 We see no basis for creating such a requirement, though the precedents we have cited have those facts. What is important is that the officer presenting the information to a magistrate be objectively reasonable in concluding that the information being used to support the warrant was not tainted. It is not awareness of the existence of the conduct that later is found to be improper that is important, but awareness at the time of presenting the affidavit that the conduct violated constitutional rights that would affect the application of the good faith exception. A. Objectively Reasonable Belief in the Validity of Prior Police Conduct We turn to whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing the search warrant to believe that Massi’s detention was valid. Agent Howard was the law enforcement officer who sought and executed the search warrant. Unlike the warrant-seeking officers in McClain, Agent Howard was present during some of Massi’s detention and, therefore, was present while the constitutional violation occurred. We analyze whether an objectively reasonable officer who assumed a role in an ongoing investigation, obtained a search warrant, and executed that search warrant would have been aware of the constitutional invalidity of this detention. Upon Agent Howard’s 7:30 p.m. arrival at the airport, there was no reason for him objectively to believe that any improper law enforcement conduct occurred prior to his arrival. Indeed, we have held that there was no such conduct. Howard did not initiate and continue the encounter for the purpose of eventually gaining sufficient new information to use in obtaining a search warrant. Rather, at 7:30 p.m. he joined a completed investigation during which no constitutional violation had occurred. Turning next to whether Agent Howard should have been aware of an invalidity as a result of continued detention (post-7:30 p.m.) arising from the 21 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 22 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 warrant-preparing process, we note the absence of precedent on holding suspects and their “vehicle” in order to prepare a proper warrant request, as opposed just to searching under exigent circumstances without a warrant. We are addressing those issues for one of the first times in this circuit. It is clear that detention cannot be prolonged just to investigate, but Agent Howard was corroborating information already known by law enforcement in order to be the affiant when requesting a search warrant. We earlier observed that Agent Howard’s testimony was somewhat ambiguous, first asserting three things he knew early on but then correcting some unstated part of that assertion. Regardless, we “should uphold the district court’s ruling to deny the suppression motion ‘if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.’” Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 841 (citation omitted). The ruling of the district court, while determining Massi’s detention not to be unconstitutionally prolonged, found in the alternative that the good faith exception would apply “because there was a relatively large amount of persuasive evidence presented to the magistrate judge, and Agent Howard subjectively believed he had acted in accordance with the law.” We do not find that the ambiguity in Agent Howard’s testimony prevents a reasonable view of the evidence that would support the district court’s ruling as to the applicability of the good faith exception. When Agent Howard arrived at the airport, it was objectively reasonable for an officer in his position to believe that no constitutional violation had yet occurred, that probable cause for a search existed, and that he was justified in taking the steps needed to confirm known facts, prepare an affidavit to present to a magistrate, and obtain a search warrant. Our examination of caselaw addressing unlawful detention does not clearly signal whether or how the delays inherent in obtaining a warrant interact with unlawful seizures under 22 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 23 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 the Fourth Amendment. As McClain noted, “[s]ometimes the line between good police work and a constitutional violation is fine indeed.” Id. at 563. Complicating a reasonable officer’s objective awareness is our prior observation that the “poisoned tree” of improper law enforcement did not cause the discovery of the evidentiary “fruit” summarized in the affidavit. Massi’s constitutional rights were violated when he was detained while the affidavit was prepared and a search warrant issued, but the evidence relied upon by the affidavit had been uncovered prior to then. The prolonged detention was “close enough to the line of validity” that an objectively reasonable officer preparing the affidavit for the warrant would believe in the validity of the prior conduct. B. Leon Exceptions to the Good Faith Exception We next consider whether the search warrant executed by Agent Howard was properly obtained and executed so as to be within the ambit of the good faith exception. In Leon, the Supreme Court identified four situations in which the good faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply: (1) when the issuing magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew or reasonably should have known was false; (2) when the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) when the warrant affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Woerner, 709 F.3d at 533-34 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921-25). In determining whether the good faith exception applies, “we do not attempt an ‘expedition into the minds of police officers’ to determine their subjective belief regarding the validity of the warrant.” United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). Rather, the analysis “is 23 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 24 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” Id (quotation marks omitted). Massi’s arguments about the good faith exception discuss only the third and fourth Leon scenarios. We similarly limit our analysis but also address an implicit argument that arises from the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 1. The affidavit’s indicia of probable cause and the reasonableness of official belief in the existence of probable cause Massi states that the affidavit was merely “bare bones,” contained conclusory statements, and lacked the richness of detail necessary for the establishment of probable cause such that no reasonable officer could have reasonably relied on it. He argues that the sole corroborated fact which was brought to the attention of the warrant-issuing magistrate was the airplane’s suspicious flight pattern. The reasonableness of an officer’s reliance on a warrant is a question we review de novo. United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1990). “When a warrant is supported by more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit, officers may rely in good faith on the warrant’s validity.” United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992). “‘Bare bones’ affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause.” Id. In reviewing the affidavit, we agree with the district court’s assessment that it contains “ample evidence” and find that its content was sufficient to permit a reasonable officer to rely on the resulting warrant. Agent Howard provided information based on his observations as well as those of other law enforcement officers. He described the suspicious flight pattern; the resultant ramp check and Massi’s response to a requested search; the prior conviction of the airplane’s owner for cocaine trafficking and money laundering; Massi’s 24 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 25 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 travel to Tijuana, Mexico in the days prior to his boarding the airplane; the existence of a cardboard box inside the airplane; and the contradictory statements about the ownership of the box. Taken collectively, these facts are far from a “bare bones” recitation of conclusory statements. Rather, they represent an assemblage of facts discovered during the investigatory stop that were corroborated by Agent Howard and were appropriately presented and considered as probable cause to proceed with the process of obtaining a warrant to search the airplane. 2. Facial deficiencies of the warrant and an executing officer’s reasonable presumption of validity Massi also argues the good faith exception is inapplicable under the fourth Leon scenario, where a warrant fails “to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized” and “the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. The warrant specified that the 1990 Mooney M20J airplane with tail number N201SE was to be searched for evidence of a crime, contraband, fruits of a crime, or other items illegally possessed. Further, the warrant incorporated the facts in Agent Howard’s affidavit and its discussion of the airplane, the cardboard box within the airplane, and the facts that supported the probable cause finding that led to the issuance of the warrant. The warrant was sufficient in its particularity to permit an executing officer to presume it to be valid and thereby forecloses Massi’s challenge to the warrant’s facial sufficiency. 3. The good faith exception and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine under Leon Our analysis of the good faith exception, first under McClain and then under Leon, has separated those two lines of precedent. We find it equally valid, and perhaps simpler in concept, to join the two, focusing on the first element of Leon. We determine that this approach is consistent with both 25 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 26 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 cases, though we are chary to engraft anything onto settled Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, we undertake this final discussion as a means to understand the interaction of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and a warrant-executing officer’s knowledge of an earlier-in-time constitutional violation that would invalidate the search warrant. Had Agent Howard knowingly hidden or misrepresented the course and duration of the investigation at the airport to the magistrate judge, making him unaware of a constitutional violation, such action could be seen as equivalent to misleading the magistrate by falsities in the affidavit or statements that are in reckless disregard of the truth under the first Leon scenario. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. The first element of Leon focused on omissions or falsities that distort the finding of probable cause; we are suggesting that failure to acknowledge constitutional violations that led to the discovery of the evidence in the affidavit could similarly lead to the unavailability of the good faith exception under Leon. We addressed a related argument in Woerner, considering whether an infirmity in the warrant existed if “the magistrate’s probable cause finding is based on evidence that was the product of an illegal search or seizure.” 709 F.3d at 534. That panel noted but did not hold that this issue could give rise to a fifth scenario in which the good faith exception would be inappropriate. Id. We conclude that the issue presented by Massi’s circumstances is more easily considered under Leon by equating the misleading of the issuing magistrate as to a possible constitutional violation through an omission with the first Leon scenario, submission of an affidavit with affirmatively misleading information. Considered under this paradigm, Agent Howard properly explained the timeline in his affidavit. He said that “at approximately [7:30 p.m. he] received 26 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 27 Date Filed: 08/01/2014 No. 12-51063 information about an airplane with suspicious flight patterns” that was parked at Midland International Airport. He then recounted the events at the airport prior to his arrival that involved MPD and Agents Knight and Garnett. Though the specific time at which Massi’s encounter with law enforcement began was not stated, it was clear from the affidavit that multiple interactions between law enforcement and the suspects occurred prior to 7:30 p.m. Additionally, the magistrate of course knew what time it was when he was ruling on the application. We find nothing about the affidavit, through either affirmative statement or omission, to have been misleading about the length of Massi’s detention. Agent Howard did not have the benefit of our judicial hindsight as he worked to obtain and execute a search warrant. To suppress the evidence derived from this warrant would not serve the interest of deterring future constitutional violations. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here where the search warrant, though ultimately obtained as a result of an illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment, was obtained and executed by a law enforcement officer in good faith and under an objectively reasonable belief that it was valid and relied upon appropriately obtained evidence. Under the good faith exception, the evidence obtained as a result of the execution of the search warrant was properly admitted. AFFIRMED. 27 Case: 12-51063 Document: 00512719470 Page: 28 Date Filed: 08/01/2014