Opinion ID: 2718298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revocation of Permission to Work Late

Text: Solomon contends that her supervisors withdrew her de facto flexible schedule, forbidding her to work late, in retaliation either for her filing of a formal EEO complaint eleven days earlier or for the accommodation requests she made. The Secretary responds by stating that the decision not to let her work late on April 23rd was made by temporary supervisors who were unaware of any informal arrangements Solomon might have had with her regular supervisors, did not 23 know about the formal complaint, and were advised by human resources to have her follow standard policy and work normal duty hours. While it would not be unreasonable for the trier of fact to accept that explanation, the question at this juncture is whether the record forecloses any other plausible conclusion. It does not. First, Solomon came forward with “evidence discrediting” the Department’s proffered explanation for the refusal to let her work late. See Jones, 557 F.3d at 680. While the Secretary relied on the temporary status of the April 23rd decisionmakers and their alleged ignorance of Solomon’s circumstances, Solomon showed—through French’s deposition and emails among management officials—that her permanent supervisor (French) ratified and formalized the revocation of her permission to work late after consulting with Human Resources Chief Arleen Christian. Christian was a permanent employee long familiar with Solomon’s situation, and French received an email from Solomon discussing her prior arrangement several days before he ratified the decision to revoke it. Thus, Solomon casts doubt on the Secretary’s proffered justification, and “we do not routinely require plaintiffs ‘to submit evidence over and above rebutting the employer’s stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment.’” Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). Second, Solomon’s evidence that another budget analyst had been allowed to work hours outside of her normal duty schedule and similar to those Solomon had been working would allow a jury to find that the Secretary’s they-were-justfollowing-policy justification was pretextual. Even the district court thought it “odd that Solomon’s supervisors 24 voiced their objection not to her absence but to her presence, especially if other employees were permitted to work late.” Solomon, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 73. Such pretext evidence “‘usually’ is itself sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer retaliation.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 681 (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Indeed, “a plaintiff’s discrediting of an employer’s stated reason for its employment decision is entitled to considerable weight.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”). Accordingly, we hold that Solomon came forward with sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on her claim that the revocation of her permission to work late was retaliatory. In so doing, we join our sister circuits in holding that the act of requesting in good faith a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 12203, which is incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 791(g). 6 Cf. Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & 6 See, e.g., A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby County Board of Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2013); Cassimy v. Board of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2006); Coons v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, 339 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2003); Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir. 2003); Weixel v. Board of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002); Haulbrook v. Michelin N. America, 252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001); Selenke v. Medical Imaging of Colorado, 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001); Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998); see also EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 620 n.9 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting 25 Safety Fund, 478 F.3d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (assuming that accommodation requests are a protected activity under the Americans with Disabilities Act). Solomon also presses as an additional theory of retaliation the temporal proximity of her filing of a formal EEO complaint on April 12th to the revocation eleven days later of her ability to work late. But that complaint involved the absent-without-leave incident with Lawrence, who was out of the office on April 23rd and the ensuing weeks when French ratified the decision to prohibit Solomon from working late. Therefore, a reasonable jury could not find that the April 12th EEO filing motivated Christian’s and French’s decision to revoke Solomon’s permission to work late. For that reason, Solomon’s surviving retaliation claim is that her requests for accommodation motivated her supervisors to revoke her permission to work late.