Opinion ID: 1372628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Effectiveness of Counsel at the Penalty Trial.

Text: The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty trial is more difficult for us. Counsel's efforts to secure life imprisonment for his client appear perfunctory, and the referee was moved to say during the hearing, On the guilt phase, it sure sounds like Ames picked the only thing to talk about.... [¶] On the penalty phase, it sounds like Ames didn't do much of anything.... [¶] Whether the penalty phase should have turned out different, whether it would have made a difference, that is a whole different question. But just from the established point of decency and fairness, one tends to think that when it comes down to somebody's life being at stake, attorneys should at least call some witnesses, make some effort. (60a) We now turn to answer the referee's question. As will appear, we are satisfied that as a matter of constitutional law the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase must fail for want of prejudice. We are aided by the superb presentation both parties made at the reference hearing. In essence, the case was retried to the referee after an exhaustive discovery of all possible evidence that favored petitioner, including evidence relating to his background and character (§ 190.3). As mentioned above, petitioner maintains counsel failed to locate, interview and summon friends and relatives on his behalf. Petitioner argues that had counsel done so, the witnesses could have presented favorable evidence of his background and character  evidence, for instance, of acts of kindness he had performed and of the difficulties his poverty and diabetes created for him in adolescence. We are unpersuaded that prejudice could have resulted. Respondent's treatment of the parade of friends and relatives who testified at the reference hearing showed the risks of having them testify at trial, for on cross-examination the witnesses were asked devastating questions about the basis for their opinion that petitioner's character was good. Those questions, if asked at trial, would have revealed to the jury specific instances of petitioner's uncharged violent criminal acts, one of which was of a disturbing sexual nature and might well have been heard by the jury even though petitioner was a minor when the incident purportedly occurred. ( People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 906-909.) Counsel's investigator learned about the sexual incident in June 1983 while investigating the case before trial and told counsel about it. There is no reason to believe the prosecution would necessarily have overlooked it. Thus, not only was the referee's conclusion that some of the witnesses would have provided negative as well as positive information correct, but the record also establishes that the cross-examination of the witnesses could have done severe damage to the penalty defense, and that counsel was aware of that risk. [15] (61a) Nor are we persuaded that if the jury had heard more evidence of the effects of petitioner's drug use or diabetes on his mental state, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed. As we have explained, petitioner's experts could only surmise that his mental state was abnormal when he committed the murders; there was strong evidence to the contrary. [16] As already mentioned, petitioner called a psychiatrist, Dr. Rita Hargrave, to give a professional evaluation of his background and character at the reference hearing. In describing petitioner's life, Dr. Hargrave provided layers of complexity and nuance that trial counsel did not elicit in his examination of Dr. Rath. But there was nothing deficient in counsel's presentation of penalty phase evidence via Dr. Rath's testimony  in our view Dr. Rath adequately set forth evidence of petitioner's background and character. (60b), (61b) We are unable to conclude that, if trial counsel had undertaken the exhaustive and laborious efforts his appellate counsel have for the reference hearing, there is a reasonable probability the result would have been different. The jury had evidently accepted the prosecution's theory of the case: that petitioner killed Ora Mae Pope to avenge his punishment for the theft of the Popes' automobile and killed Edward Moreno to silence a witness. There was evidence that petitioner dragged Ms. Pope off to a shed to die and hosed the victims' blood off the pavement. Petitioner thus must have stood, in the jury's eyes, blameworthy for two cold, calculated killings  and the jury was aware of the possibility that petitioner, having lain in wait and with knife at the ready, was preparing to kill Byron Pope. The evidence of the circumstances of the crimes was compelling. As counsel for petitioner stated at the reference hearing with regard to the guilt trial, Watching the jurors' faces when they were shown the videotaped reenactment, where Mr. Mayfield pulled bodies out of the house and put them into a woodshed and stacked them like cordwood  I had seen that videotape a number of [times] and didn't have to look at it except as to what the jury's reaction to it was. [¶] ... And my view of the jurors' reaction was not a favorable view to my client. It is fair to say that before petitioner ever saw a lawyer, he had done much damage to his defense, both with regard to guilt and to penalty. The fact that his lawyer's efforts at the penalty phase were somewhat perfunctory disturbs us, but we discern no reasonable probability that additional evidence of background, character, or mental impairment  subject as the first two would have been to potentially devastating cross-examination and the third to the forceful contrary evidence the tapes provided  would have affected the outcome.