Opinion ID: 1387721
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Supplemental Instruction on Burglary Charge

Text: During closing arguments in the guilt phase, defense counsel set forth his personal theory of the case, namely, that although defendant may have committed a burglary of the construction site homes and may have stolen three lamps, he did not rob or shoot anyone at the gas station. The jury thereafter interrupted its deliberations to inquire regarding the effect of defense counsel's concession that defendant had committed burglary; the jury asked whether the concession indicated that defendant was pleading guilty to the burglary charge. Trial counsel each stipulated that the court could respond to these inquiries in their absence, and the court subsequently instructed the jury without objection that (1) defense counsel in his argument had conceded defendant's guilt of burglary, and that If the jury so finds, then they would find him guilty, (2) defendant had not changed his not guilty plea to the burglary charge, and (3) because of counsel's concession, unless the jury does not believe that the evidence shows [commission of burglary], the jury will so find. (21) Defendant now contends that the court's latter remarks created a presumption of guilt, thereby nullifying the court's previous instructions regarding the People's burden of proof. The trial court's remarks were indeed confusing, but no prejudicial error occurred in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt of burglary, an offense to which he offered no defense. Moreover, the jury was given proper instructions regarding the People's general burden of proof in criminal cases. For these reasons, any subsequent instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.) (22a) Defendant also questions the propriety of counsel's concession that he committed burglary; defendant suggests that such a concession is tantamount to a guilty plea requiring defendant's personal waiver of his constitutional rights. (Cf. Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 604-605 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086].) We disagree. Counsel's tactical decision to argue a particular personal view of the evidence, indicating that his client may have committed only a lesser offense, is not akin to pleading guilty to that offense. (23) Once a defendant has elected to proceed with a contested trial, rather than plead guilty or accept sentencing based upon a preliminary examination transcript, the manner of presenting evidence to the jury becomes one of trial tactics properly vested in counsel, at least in the absence of a conflict between counsel and his client. (See People v. Hill (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 306, 315-316 [96 Cal. Rptr. 813].) (22b) As we stated in People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149], it is entirely understandable that trial counsel, given the weight of incriminating evidence, made no sweeping declarations of his client's innocence but instead adopted a more realistic approach, namely, that although defendant and others may have committed both burglaries, and may have aided and abetted the acts of violence which caused the victims' deaths, nonetheless any such acts were unpremeditated and lacked the requisite deliberation and intent to kill.... `[G]ood trial tactics demanded complete candor' with the jury. [Citation.] Under the circumstances we cannot equate such candor with incompetence. (Italics added.) Imposition of a duty to obtain personal waivers of constitutional rights whenever such tactics are anticipated could substantially interfere with counsel's tactical conduct of the trial. Accordingly, we decline to require such personal waivers in these circumstances. (See People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 818, fn. 8 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396] [no personal waivers required where defense counsel elects to rest his case without putting on a defense].)