Opinion ID: 2353279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Apprendi to Consecutive Sentences

Text: [¶ 22] The United States Supreme Court has yet to reach the question presented here: whether the rule of Apprendi applies to the imposition of consecutive sentences. [9] We find it significant, however, that the Supreme Court explicitly narrowed the issue in Apprendi so as to render the issue of consecutive sentences irrelevant to its analysis: It is appropriate to begin by explaining why certain aspects of the case are not relevant to the narrow issue that we must resolve. First, the State has argued that even without the trial judge's finding of racial bias, the judge could have imposed consecutive sentences on counts 3 and 18 that would have produced the 12-year term of imprisonment that Apprendi received; Apprendi's actual sentence was thus within the range authorized by statute for the three offenses to which he pleaded guilty. The constitutional question, however, is whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count 18 was permissible, given that it was above the 10-year maximum for the offense charged in that count. The finding is legally significant because it increasedindeed, it doubledthe maximum range within which the judge could exercise his discretion, converting what otherwise was a maximum 10-year sentence on that count into a minimum sentence. The sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts. 530 U.S. at 474, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (citations omitted). Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court did not intend its holding in Apprendi to be extended outside the narrow issue before it: whether a court has impermissibly exceeded the statutory maximum sentence for a particular crime based on factual determinations not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 857, 124 S.Ct. 158, 157 L.Ed.2d 104 (2003); United States v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921, 123 S.Ct. 311, 154 L.Ed.2d 210 (2002); United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir.2001). Furthermore, because the Supreme Court did not address the issue of consecutive sentences in Blakely or Booker, these cases did nothing to expand the rule of Apprendi, which addressed only sentences for individual crimes. [¶ 23] The federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue before us agree that the holdings in the Apprendi line of cases do not apply to consecutive sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 925, 124 S.Ct. 330, 157 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003); Chorin, 322 F.3d at 279; United States v. Noble, 299 F.3d 907, 909-10 (7th Cir.2002); Saccoccia v. United States, 42 Fed.App'x. 476, 482 (1st Cir.2002) (per curiam), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1031, 123 S.Ct. 576, 154 L.Ed.2d 447 (2002); United States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680, 684-85 (8th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 940, 123 S.Ct. 43, 154 L.Ed.2d 247 (2002); McWaine, 290 F.3d at 275-76; United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 401-02 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 570-72 (9th Cir.2002); White, 240 F.3d at 135; cf. United States v. Jackson, 60 Fed.Appx. 726, 728 (10th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 851, 124 S.Ct. 136, 157 L.Ed.2d 92 (2003); United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518-19 (4th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 937, 122 S.Ct. 309, 151 L.Ed.2d 230 (2001). Nor does it appear that the federal circuit courts view Blakely or Booker as having changed the analysis of how consecutive sentences are ordinarily viewed under Apprendi, as evidenced by post- Booker decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 854 (3rd Cir.2006); Abrams v. United States, 194 Fed.Appx. 718, 722 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 1012, 166 L.Ed.2d 763 (2007); United States v. Benson, 186 Fed.Appx. 648, 655 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Woods, 440 F.3d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Fifield, 432 F.3d 1056, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1122, 126 S.Ct. 1937, 164 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006); United States v. Carr, No. 02-0106, 2006 WL 401818, at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6407, at -17 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2006). [¶ 24] The majority of other state courts that have addressed this question are in agreement that Apprendi and its successors are limited to sentences for individual crimes, and Apprendi does not apply to judicial determinations regarding the sequence in which discreet sentences for multiple crimes are to be served. See, e.g., Vandergriff v. State, 125 P.3d 360, 363 (Alaska Ct.App.2005); Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 764 (Fla.2002); State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawai`i 267, 141 P.3d 440, 452-53 (2006), reconsideration denied, 111 Hawai`i 316, 141 P.3d 489 (2006); State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Iowa 2001); State v. Bramlett, 273 Kan. 67, 41 P.3d 796, 797-98 (2002); Commonwealth v. Lepper, 60 Mass.App.Ct. 36, 798 N.E.2d 1030, 1040 (2003), review denied, 441 Mass. 1102, 803 N.E.2d 332 (2004); State v. Higgins, 149 N.H. 290, 821 A.2d 964, 975-76 (2003); cf. People v. Murray, 5 Misc.3d 636, 785 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2004), aff'd, 37 A.D.3d 247, 829 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106 (N.Y.App.Div.2007). [¶ 25] One state in disagreement is Ohio, which distinguished its own consecutive sentencing law as unique because the law mandated that the court make certain findings of fact before it could depart from imposing concurrent sentences. [10] State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 845 N.E.2d 470, 491 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 442, 166 L.Ed.2d 314 (2006). We are not persuaded by the Ohio court's analysis. See State v. Tanner, 210 Or.App. 70, 150 P.3d 31, 37 n. 6 (2006) (noting that several jurisdictions have held that Apprendi does not apply to sentencing statutes that require factual findings before a court may impose consecutive sentences). The threshold question is whether the court has impermissibly increase[d] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum by using factual determinations not found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, other than from a prior conviction, a guilty plea, jury verdict, or admission by the defendant. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; see Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738. The court's decision to require that separate sentences be served consecutively in no way increases the penalties for the individual crimes. [¶ 26] Specifically addressing Maine law, we find no basis for applying Apprendi and its progeny to the manner in which consecutive sentences were imposed pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2). Consecutive sentences are separate punishments for different offenses, State v. Senske, 692 N.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Minn.Ct. App.2005), review denied, 2005 Minn. LEXIS 302 (May 17, 2002), and two sentences do not become a single sentence by virtue of their running consecutively, see People v. Wagener, 196 Ill.2d 269, 256 Ill. Dec. 550, 752 N.E.2d 430, 441-42 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1011, 122 S.Ct. 498, 151 L.Ed.2d 408 (2001); cf. State v. Prewara, 687 A.2d 951, 955-56 (Me.1996) (vacating consecutive sentences for the failure to articulate the maximum periods of incarceration for each sentence). Thus, the principles underlying Apprendi do not apply to consecutive sentences because a judge's decision on how two separate sentences for two distinct crimes shall be served is entirely different from the jury's determination of whether the elements of a crime, necessary for a particular sentence for that crime, have been committed. See United States v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 220 n. 1 (2d Cir.2001) ([T]he vice in Apprendi was the imposition of a sentence on a single count (Count 18) in excess of the statutory maximum for that count.); Tanner, 150 P.3d at 39 (the core concern of Apprendi is that the jury determine every element for each crime charged, not that the jury determine the manner in which sentences for separate offenses are to be served). Although a defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine whether all the elements of a crime have been committed, including those relevant to an elevated sentence, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to serve concurrent sentences for multiple violent offenses. McWaine, 290 F.3d at 276; White, 240 F.3d at 135.