Opinion ID: 2637986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Self-defense and reckless manslaughter

Text: Justification, which includes self-defense, subject to limitations set forth in HRS chapter 703 (1993), is a defense in any prosecution for an offense. HRS § 703-301(1) (1993). Self-defense is not an affirmative defense, and the prosecution has the burden of disproving it once evidence of justification has been adduced. HRS § 702-205(b) (1993) (prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt includes negativing relevant non-affirmative defenses); see also State v. Lubong, 77 Hawai`i 429, 431, 886 P.2d 766, 768 (App.1994). Culkin was charged with, and testified to, inflicting numerous stab wounds upon Thomas with a kitchen knife. HRS § 703-300 (1993) defines deadly force to include force which the actor knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Culkin's conduct thus constituted deadly force. See Lubong, 77 Hawai`i at 432, 886 P.2d at 769. The use of deadly force is justified only if the actor believes that deadly force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, rape, or forcible sodomy. HRS § 703-304(2) (1993). [7] HRS § 703-300 defines believes as reasonably believes. The Supplemental Commentary to HRS § 703-300 (1993) explains that: The definition adopts the reasonable man standard with respect to justification for the use of force in self-protection, in the protection of property, and in the protection of others. It is your Committee's finding that the requirement that a person's belief be reasonable for these defenses to be available will provide an objective basis by which to gauge whether or not the use of force was justified. (Citation omitted and emphasis added.) The test for assessing a defendant's self-protection defense thus involves two prongs. The first prong is subjective; it requires a determination of whether the defendant had the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary to avert death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, rape, or forcible sodomy. .... If the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary, the factfinder must then proceed to the second prong of the test. People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 114, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 29, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (1986). This prong is objective; it requires a determination of whether a reasonably prudent person in the same situation as the defendant would have believed that deadly force was necessary for self-protection. Id. Lubong, 77 Hawai`i at 433, 886 P.2d at 770.