Opinion ID: 2401702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction of the Act

Text: Morrison argues that the period of limitations stated in the statute runs from one of three events: one, the occurrence of the breach; two, the occurrence of the tort; and three, the date of completion of the health care treatment made the basis of the claim. Morrison's argument in this case is that the statute of limitations begins to run with the occurrence of the last of the three events. In conjunction with this argument, Morrison urges that the tort did not occur until early September of 1980 when a hole was discovered in her bladder. The rationale of this argument is that until the discovery of the hole, Gray suffered no damage or injury which would entitle her to a judicial remedy. Morrison argues that tort as used in the Medical Liability Act requires the accrual of a right to a judicial remedy. In evaluating the language of Art. 4590i, § 10.01, it is our duty to construe statutes as written, and, if possible, ascertain the Legislature's intent from the language of the act. Gov't. Pers. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wear, 151 Tex. 454, 251 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1952). To ascertain legislative intent, we must look to the statute as a whole and not to its isolated provisions. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex.1981). The Legislature enacted the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act to alleviate a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis in the State of Texas. Art. 4590i, § 1.02. In an effort to accomplish this goal, the Legislature adopted an absolute two-year limitations period. In assessing Morrison's argument that the statute of limitations begins to run when the tort accrues, it must be remembered that the 64th Legislature had before it the accrued language from Article 5526, and the judicial interpretations thereof, when it passed article 5.82, section 4, the predecessor to Art. 4590i, § 10.01. The term accrual, however, that appears in article 5526 was excluded from article 5.82, section 4, and was subsequently excluded from Art. 4590i, § 10.01. Every word excluded from a statute must be presumed to have been excluded for a reason. Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 540. Thus, we must presume the Legislature did not intend the term tort to refer to the time a cause of action accrues. In Nelson v. Krusen , we observed that: In Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1967), a medical malpractice case, this court adopted the discovery rule, providing that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the patient learned of, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of, the alleged malpractice. Id. at 580. The rule in Gaddis was adopted as a matter of statutory construction, because the limitations provision, article 5526, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., provided that suit must be brought within two years of the date the cause of action accrued. We held that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of his injury. In contrast, article 5.82, section 4 contains no accrual language and thus imposes an absolute two-year statute of limitations regardless of when the injury was discovered. Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d at 920 (emphasis added). If we were to accept Morrison's definition of tort, the statute of limitations would never run until Gray discovered or reasonably should have discovered her injury. Morrison would have us reinstate the discovery rule. We hold that the Legislature's intent in passing Art. 4590i, § 10.01, was to abolish the discovery rule in cases governed by the Medical Liability Act. The act or omission that is the basis of this law suit occurred on February 13, 1980. Approximately six months later, Gray was diagnosed as having a hole in her bladder. She had approximately eighteen months left within the limitations period to bring suit. We hold that Gray's failure to file suit within the applicable period bars recovery. On motion for rehearing on application for writ of error, Morrison asserts that the deceased's illness should toll the statute of limitations. This point, however, has not been preserved for review. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.