Opinion ID: 1736768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Photographs as circumstantial evidence

Text: The general rule in Louisiana, and elsewhere, regarding the introduction of photographic evidence is based on an analogy to visual aids. Indeed, one author notes that visual aids rode the coattails of photographs into the courtroom. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 64 (1998)(noting the inherently persuasive force of photographs and that [t]he sheer force of doctrine alone could not keep the photograph secure in a box labeled `illustration.') This analogy has formed the basis for introducing the general run of photographs. 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 214 (5th ed. 1999). [21] Photographs directly displaying material facts connected to the case are routinely introduced based on this analogy. Illustrative are the cases, such as this one, in which gruesome autopsy pictures of the victim are allowed to be introduced. See George W. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law, 66-75(1974)(discussing liberal introduction of gruesome photographs of victim). Such photographs are allowed despite their obvious ability to inflame the jury based on the eminently satisfactory character of such direct evidence. McCormick, supra at § 212. In contrast, demonstrative evidence, including photographs, may also be offered for its circumstantial value, i.e., as the basis or an inference beyond those facts which are perceivable. Id. In disallowing the photographs of bite marks on others (not the victim), the trial judge reasoned that it was the circumstantial use of such photographs that he found objectionable, stating: [i]f you're going to use a picture now, look here's a bite mark made on so and so over her [sic] just look at the difference? Now, how is that fair? The implication, the judge stated, is that all bite marks have got to be like this. Now, the picture of Haley Oliveaux doesn't look like that so that's not a bite mark. Still further, the judge reasoned that while Dr. Souviron could voice his opinion that there were no bite marks based on photographs of the victim I don't want him to show a picture of somebody else that's bitten almost all the way through or more pronounced bite and say now here's a bite mark, that's not a bite mark. The trial judge's decision to disallow the defense to use these photographs was thus based, at least in part, on the potential for such photographs to be used as circumstantial evidence. When circumstantial evidence is involved, in the present context [of demonstrative pictorial evidence] as elsewhere, the trial judge will generally be viewed as possessing a broader discretionary power to weigh the probative value of the evidence against whatever prejudice, confusion, surprise and waste of time are entailed, and to determine admissibility accordingly. McCormick, supra at § 212. We conclude that, at the very least, confusion and prejudicial effect outweighs any probative value these photographs may have had as circumstantial evidence in rebuttal to the state's bite mark evidence. We therefore find no merit to defendant's argument that the trial judge's decision disallowing these photographs from being used as circumstantial evidence was an abuse of discretion.