Opinion ID: 165632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motion for New Trial Based on Allegations of Discovery Violations

Text: 25 Plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for a new trial based on alleged discovery violations related to the production of Ms. Tanberg's broken glasses. We review a lower court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Snyder v. City of Moab, 354 F.3d 1179, 1187-88 (10th Cir.2003). Trial courts' assessments of credibility are accorded particular deference: 26 we give due deference to the [trial] court's evaluation of the salience and credibility of testimony, affidavits, and other evidence. We will not challenge that evaluation unless it finds no support in the record, deviates from the appropriate legal standard, or follows from a plainly implausible, irrational, or erroneous reading of the record. 27 United States v. Robinson, 39 F.3d 1115, 1116 (10th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). 28 Plaintiffs allege, and Officer Sholtis does not deny, that Ms. Tanberg's glasses were broken during her arrest. 4 Plaintiffs insist that, in defiance of a trial subpoena and despite repeated requests, Officer Sholtis failed to produce the glasses until after the trial was concluded. This failure, according to Plaintiffs, deprived them of critical evidence tending to demonstrate that Officer Sholtis used excessive force in arresting Ms. Tanberg. Plaintiffs supported their motion for a new trial with three affidavits from trial counsel stating that Officer Sholtis refused to produce the glasses until after completion of the trial. Officer Sholtis supported his opposition to Plaintiffs' motion with an affidavit from his trial counsel indicating that the glasses were brought to the courtroom on the first day of trial and that Plaintiffs' counsel was made aware of their availability. 29 Plaintiffs acknowledge that dueling affidavits [were filed] below regarding whether the eyeglasses were ever brought to the courtroom during trial, but argue that the objective evidence supports their contention that the glasses were not made available until after trial. Aplt Br. 45. In their eagerness to discuss the Ninth Circuit's test for granting a motion for a new trial on the grounds of discovery misconduct, Plaintiffs neglect the effect on this Court of a trial court's credibility determination. The trial court considered these conflicting affidavits and then denied the motion. 30 Regrettably, the trial court's order does not explicitly articulate the factual findings on which it is premised. The nature of the evidence before the court strongly suggests, however, that a credibility determination informed the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiffs' motion. In supporting or opposing the motion, the parties principally relied on the evidence supplied by directly contradictory affidavits. Had the court credited Plaintiffs' affidavits and yet still ruled against them, some discussion of the legal grounds for denying the motion would have been necessary. The most natural explanation for the absence of any such discussion of legal principles in the court's order is that the court did not find Plaintiffs' account of Officer Sholtis's failure to produce the glasses to be credible. We will not overrule a trial court's determination of the credibility of affidavits unless that determination is without support in the record, deviated from the appropriate legal standard, or followed a plainly erroneous reading of the record. Robinson, 39 F.3d at 1116. The existence of affidavits on both sides of the question provides an assurance that the trial court's credibility determination has support in the record. The record does not indicate that the trial court's decision to credit Officer Sholtis's evidence was plainly erroneous or irrational. While the absence of any findings of fact or analysis in the trial court's order is less than ideal, there is nothing to suggest that the trial court deviated from the appropriate legal standard. The trial court's (presumed) determination that the Plaintiffs' affidavits were not credible thus survives scrutiny under an abuse of discretion standard. 31 Even if the trial court based the denial of the motion on its legal merits, rather than on the basis of a credibility determination, the outcome would be the same. This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Snyder, 354 F.3d at 1187-88. Plaintiffs argue that, when discovery abuse is alleged, a new trial must be granted if the complaining party can show fraud by clear and convincing evidence and show that that fraud prevented them from fully or fairly presenting their case. Aplt. Br. 42 (citing Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875, 878-79 (9th Cir.1990)). It is safe to assume that the court did not find that Plaintiffs had proved fraud by clear and convincing evidence. This conclusion finds support in the record in the affidavit contradicting Plaintiffs' account of events. The trial court's (presumed) finding is not plainly implausible, irrational, or erroneous, and we therefore have no basis to overturn it under an abuse of discretion standard. 32