Opinion ID: 2091872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restrictions on Expressive Activity

Text: To challenge state action as violating the right to speak, a claimant must first demonstrate that the state action has, in the concrete circumstances of the case, restricted his or her opportunity to engage in expressive activity. This inquiry is governed by our Bill of Rights' free expression clause, which provides that [n]o law shall be passed... restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 9. [2] That clause contemplates a broad notion of expressive activity. First, it extends to any subject whatever, and thus it is difficult to imagine a topic it does not cover. [3] Second, because the right to speak clause also provides that expressive activity may be freely performed, the clause reaches every conceivable mode of expression. We conclude that speaking, writing, or printing, freely, on any subject whatever, includes, at least, the projection of any words in any manner. Of course, the trigger of the right to speak clause is the notion of restriction. In construing that important concept, we resist the siren song of First Amendment jurisprudence. [4] The right to speak clause articulates a liberty interest, not an equality interest. It protects against restriction of expressive activity, not discrimination because of content or viewpoint. The right to speak clause focuses on the restrictive impact of state action on an individual's expressive activity. [5] At a minimum, the clause is implicated when the state imposes a direct and significant burden on a person's opportunity to speak his or her mind, in whatever manner the speaker deems most appropriate.