Opinion ID: 2066238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Prosecutor's Comments/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Both appellants [35] argue that the trial court erred in failing to address the harm caused by the prosecution's closing argument: ... Judge Richter told you ... that opening statements are not evidence, they're only a prediction of what the lawyers expect the evidence to show. Talk is cheap, and I know as a lawyer that talk from the mouth of an attorney is even cheaper. So when you make an opening argument, it's a check, it's a promise, but it's got to be backed up by the evidence. Now, the judge also told you ... that the Government must give an opening argument because we have the burden of proof. The Defendants are not required, under the law, to make any opening statements because that is not our system of justice. So when they come up here and choose to make an opening statement, they're making you a promise as to what the evidence holds for you.... Mr. Evans stood up here and made an opening statement, and he told you that the evidence would show that his client, Defendant Wonson, was not at the 1800 block of East Capitol Street when this happened. He said the evidence would show that he had dinner with a young lady and then they went to a motel. Have you heard any such evidence? In evaluating appellant's claim of prosecutorial impropriety, this court must `first determine whether the prosecutor's comments constituted misconduct,' and if so, determine the effect of those comments. Edwards v. United States, 767 A.2d 241, 253 (D.C.2001) (citation omitted). The prosecutor's comments were proper and within the bounds defined in our existing case law. As a general matter, the prosecutor [is] entitled to point out that the defense counsel did not live up to its promises by citing examples of defense counsel's failure to prove what he said the defense would prove in its opening statement. Brewer v. United States, 559 A.2d 317, 323 n. 11 (D.C.1989). Here, in his rather short opening statement, Wonson's attorney told the jury, [T]hat evening my client was with his girlfriend, a young lady, out at a restaurant and then they went to a hotel and you will hear that testimony. Instead, for reasons he subsequently explained in a post-trial hearing, counsel decided not to call the girlfriend as a witness, and, in closing argument, reminded the jury that in a criminal trial the defendant does not have the burden to do anything. So even when I said that, I didn't lock us into having to put on evidence at all. The prosecutor's closing remarks did not have the potential to leave the jury with the impression that the defendants, who had presented no defense witnesses, were expected to provide proof of innocence, akin to the prosecutor's remark we disapproved in Porter that [e]very defendant is entitled to [ ] the strongest defense possible. Porter v. United States, 826 A.2d 398, 407-08 (D.C.2003). Here, the prosecutor mentioned that it was the government that had the burden of proof, not to imply that it was no longer obliged to meet that standard because counsel did not call the alibi witness, but as a means to point out the unfulfilled proffer in defense counsel's opening statement as puffery. As the comments were proper, they required no intervention from the trial court. [36] Accordingly, we affirm Brisbon's convictions. We reverse Wonson's convictions and remand for a new trial. So ordered.