Opinion ID: 784224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Person

Text: 43 There is a second, distinct reason for concluding that the Company is covered by § 2518(4). That provision obligates not only a provider of wire or electronic communication service but also a landlord, custodian or other person to assist law enforcement in intercepting communications. The government maintains that the Company is an other person within the meaning of the statute. We agree. 44 Section 2510 et seq. do not define the term other person. Person is defined as any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation. § 2510(6). That definition, which includes almost every possible individual and entity, 20 is not helpful in delineating which such persons are obligated to assist law enforcement in surveillance activities. Other person as used in § 2518(4) is clearly not meant to apply to all persons, without restriction; otherwise there would be no point in enumerating a provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person.  (Emphasis added). 45 Other sections of the statute do apply to any person. Section 2511, for example, states that  any person can be liable for violating that prohibition. See § 2511(1) (emphasis added). That § 2518(4) uses the term  other person, and uses it following a specific list of enumerated individuals and entities, suggests a considerably more limited meaning of other person in § 2518(4) than of any person as used in § 2511(1). 46 That limited meaning can be determined by a careful reading of § 2518(4) in the context of the statute as a whole. First, § 2518(4) indicates that an other person is someone who provides services to the target: [A] provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish... all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that such service provider, landlord, custodian, or person is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted.  § 2518(4) (emphasis added). 47 Second, an other person, as that term is used in title III, § 2510 et seq., must also be an entity or individual who can provide information, technical assistance, or facilities to law enforcement. Throughout § 2510 et seq., the term other person is often followed by: who furnishes facilities or technical assistance.... Section 2518(4) itself directs the provider ..., landlord, custodian or other person to furnish the applicant ... all information, facilities and technical assistance necessary.... § 2518(4) (emphasis added). The section also provides for compensation to [a]ny provider ..., landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance ... Id. (emphasis added). Other sections of the statute use similar language. See, e.g., § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (referring to immunity provided to any provider of wire or electronic communication service, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing information, facilities, or assistance ...) (emphasis added); see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub.L. No. 107-56, § 222 (2001) (A provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person who furnishes facilities or technical assistance pursuant to section 216 shall be reasonably compensated for such reasonable expenditures incurred in providing such facilities or assistance) (emphasis added). These other uses of the term guide our interpretation of § 2518(4). See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992) (applying principle that identical terms within an act ordinarily bear the same meaning) (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484, 110 S.Ct. 2499, 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990); Sorenson v. Sec'y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986)). 48 Standard principles of statutory interpretation comport with our understanding of other person. Two of the so-called canons of statutory interpretation are of some assistance: The first, noscitur a sociis (known by its associates), suggests that a word with multiple meanings is often best interpreted with regard to the words surrounding it. Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 254-55, 120 S.Ct. 740, 145 L.Ed.2d 747 (2000). The second, ejusdem generis (of the same class), indicates that where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.17 (1991)). 21 49 The common threads among the otherwise disparate list of individuals and entities in § 2518(4) are: (1) each regularly provides some service to the target of the surveillance; (2) each has or can arrange access to facilities or technical assistance necessary to intercept communications. 50 Similarly, landlords and custodians are uniquely situated to assist law enforcement in placing interception devices in buildings they own or manage. The premises are under the landlord's control, so he or she controls access to the building, access that may be necessary to place surveillance equipment. See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 250 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 1682. A custodian is often in charge of a building when a landlord is absent. See Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (defining custodian as [o]ne who has the custody of a thing or person; a guardian, keeper). 51 The Company argues that the entities specifically named in § 2518(4) share more limited common characteristics that the Company does not, namely (1) an interest in the crime being investigated because their services or property are being used in furtherance of a crime, and (2) a property right in the facilities being used in furtherance of a crime. We disagree. While phone lines can be used to facilitate illegal transactions — as with gambling or drug dealing, for example — communications over tapped phone lines may instead simply provide law enforcement information about a past or future crime, without facilitating its commission. Similarly, oral communications discussing a past or future criminal venture can take place in an apartment or other location, although that location is not itself used to facilitate the commission of the crime. 52 For all these reasons, we read the term other person in § 2518(4) to mean an individual or entity who both provides some sort of service to the target of the surveillance and is uniquely situated to assist in intercepting communications through its facilities or technical abilities. The holding of the only other court of appeals to examine the other person language in § 2510 et seq. comports with our analysis. Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482 (1st Cir.1989), addressed the reach of the other person language in another section of the statute, § 2511(2)(a)(ii). Id. at 489-90. Its holding that the other person language includes a connecting carrier who is not a common carrier comports with our understanding of the term as used in § 2518(4). Id. 53 The Company regularly supplies to the car owner the services provided by the System. The Company is also uniquely situated to facilitate the interception of the oral communications within the vehicle; only it can contact the car and place it into stolen vehicle recovery mode by opening a phone line to the car. Even though it might be possible for the cellular phone company to assist law enforcement in monitoring the oral communications within the vehicle once the phone line is open, the Company can do so much more simply, as the System is programmed to place a call to the Company's operators. 54 The Company therefore fits our understanding of other person. Thus, for this reason as well, if the orders are otherwise proper under the statute, the Company can be obligated pursuant to § 2518(4) to assist the FBI by furnish[ing] ... information, facilities and technical assistance.... § 2518(4). 22