Opinion ID: 1771702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Curtailment of Voir Dire

Text: Defendant claims that the court improperly restricted his questioning during voir dire. First, he complains that the court did not allow him to question juror Terry Teekell concerning his ability to judge defendant's guilt on the evidence presented at trial. Defendant asked Teekell if he could ignore news reports he had seen which led him to believe that these people are guilty. Teekell ultimately answered that exposure to the news reports would not influence his decision. The defense then asked how Teekell would be able to set those things aside. The prosecutor objected, and the court sustained the objection. Defendant later challenged the juror for cause, and the court denied the challenge. Defendant also complains about an instance when the court required his counsel to change topics while questioning prospective juror Mary Binning. The court had determined that defense counsel had already asked about Binning's alleged predisposition to return a death verdict and concluded that defense counsel was confusing her. Defense counsel first asked Binning if she would automatically vote for the death penalty if defendant were found guilty of first degree murder. When Binning answered affirmatively, defense counsel asked if she would still return a death verdict regardless of information ... offer[ed] in mitigation, and she answered, No. When defense counsel sought to clarify a perceived contradiction in her responses, Binning said she was confused by the question. The court then rephrased the question, explaining: The law requires that you as a juror before the death penalty can be returned you have to be convinced of the existence of an aggravating, at least one aggravating circumstance, and you are required to consider all of the mitigating circumstances, you then reach your determination as to what the appropriate sentence will be in this case. Can you do that ma`am? Binning said, Yes. Defense counsel nonetheless continued to pursue the issue, so the court called counsel to the bench and said: All right. That's the third time you've asked that to that juror. You asked it to the other juror four times. It's a confusing question. The lady was confused the first time. I let you ask her three separate times before I stepped in and stated it the way the law provides. She has answered that question. Move on to something else. I'll note your objection. Defense counsel later challenged Ms. Binning for cause, and the court denied the challenge, noting that when asked about a death verdict in a manner in which the law states it, and in a nonmisleading manner, she responded properly. Defendant also complains about the sustaining of the prosecutor's objection to questions to prospective juror Bahr (discussed above in the context of cause challenges.) The defense asked if Bahr would automatically vote to impose the death penalty absent mitigating circumstances, and the prosecutor objected on grounds that the question presupposed a set of facts. The court sustained four prosecution objections to essentially the same question and ultimately denied defense counsel's cause challenge of Bahr. La. Const. art. I, § 17 guarantees a defendant full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and the right to challenge jurors peremptorily. The purpose of voir dire is to determine qualifications of prospective jurors by testing their competency and impartiality in order to discover bases for challenges for cause and for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. State v. Hall, 616 So.2d 664, 668 (La.1993). The scope of examination rests within the sound discretion of the court, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent clear abuse. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 786; Hall, 616 So.2d at 669. In determining whether the trial court afforded a sufficiently wide latitude to the defendant, the court must consider the entire voir dire examination. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 786; Hall, 616 So.2d at 669. Here, the trial court did not prevent defense counsel from ascertaining prospective jurors' qualifications nor cause him to exercise peremptory challenges haphazardly. Teekell indicated that he would not let the media coverage influence his verdict. Binning, when asked in an unambiguous fashion, said she could consider both a verdict of death and life imprisonment and consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Likewise, Bahr demonstrated that he could consider verdicts of both death and life imprisonment. In these circumstances, defendant fails to show that the court abused its discretion when it curtailed the voir dire questioning in certain instances in order to clarify issues for the prospective jurors. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 786; Hall, 616 So.2d at 669.