Opinion ID: 198820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Three or more Photographs

Text: 18 McKelvey challenges his plea on the grounds that there was no factual basis for the court's finding that he possessed 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes or other matter, a requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). After the briefs on appeal were filed, McKelvey filed a motion with this court, entitled Defendant-Appellant's Motion for an Order (1) Directing the Government to Produce, For This Court's Inspection, the Strip of Negatives Seized From the Defendant From Which the Government Created Government's Exhibits 3, 4, and 5, and (2) Allowing Defendant-Appellant to Argue Therefrom that the Requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) that the Defendant Possessed '3 or More Books, Magazines, Periodicals, Films, Video Tapes or Other Material' Was Not Satisfied. This argument was offered for the first time on appeal, but we do not deem it waived. 19 Ordinarily, we do not consider arguments proffered for the first time on appeal. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) (If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.). While we recognize that our decision in National Ass'n of Social Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627-29 (1st Cir. 1995), allows this court the discretion to hear claims not raised below, we believe that this discretion is best used sparingly. See New York State Dairy Foods v. Crowley, 198 F.3d F.3d 1, 10 n.9 (1st. Cir. Nov. 30, 1999). Instead, we find that the argument has not been waived because McKelvey could not possibly have raised it at an earlier date. Because there were, initially and continuing to the final sentencing hearing, a large number of photographs involved, see supra, page 69 and note 2, the issue appeared, if not moot in the technical sense, at the very least irrelevant. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir. 1996) (Were we to establish a rule precluding subsequent inquiry upon remand into such findings, then defendants would be forced to litigate every aspect of the sentencing report in the original hearing, even though irrelevant to the immediate sentencing determination in anticipation of the possibility that, upon remand, the issue might be relevant.). See also United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Jennings). 20 Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2252(a)(4)(B) criminalizes the knowing possession of 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes or other matter which contain any visual depiction [of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.] We have assumed that the matters at issue in this case contain such a depiction; the question remains whether the one negative strip containing three images may be deemed 3 or more . . . matter[s]. The precise issue is one of first impression. 21 In United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 846-47 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit held that unprocessed, undeveloped film constituted a visual depiction within the meaning of the statute. The court stated: 22 [W]e conclude that the exclusion of unprocessed film from the statute's coverage would impede the child pornography laws by protecting a necessary intermediate step in the sexual exploitation of children. The interpretation urged by Smith would allow unrestricted interstate commerce in child pornography so long as the pornography was still in the form of undeveloped film. Such a loophole is inconsistent with congressional intent; the undeveloped state of the film does not eliminate the harm to the child victims in the film's production or the incentive to produce created by the film's trafficking. 23 Id. While instructive, Smith does not end our inquiry. It tells us that the negative strip in this case is a matter, but leaves open the question of whether the negative strip constitutes three matters. 24 The Supreme Court has stated, in a case involving interpretation of an obscenity statute: 25 [T]his is a criminal statute and must be strictly construed. This means that no offense may be created except by the words of Congress used in their usual and ordinary sense. There are no constructive offenses. The most important thing to be determined is the intent of Congress. The language of the statute may not be distorted under the guise of construction, or so limited by construction as to defeat the manifest intent of Congress. 26 United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 681-82 (1950). We think that it would be a distortion of Congress's intent to find that one negative strip constitutes three matters. Under the plain language of the statute, a book containing hundreds of photographs would not violate the statute. By the same token, neither can one negative strip. Both are physical media on which are contained multiple images. Had Congress meant for the number of images to be the relevant criterion, it would have likely stated as much. Moreover, § 2252(a)(4)(B) punishes possession of 3 or more . . . matter[s] which contain any visual depiction, (emphasis added), and not the visual depictions alone. To find that the negative strip constituted three matters, we would have to count the visual depictions individually, which seems to us contrary to the language of the statute. 27 The principle of ejusdem generis supports our interpretation. This principle states that where general words (other matter in this case) follow the enumeration of particular classes of things (books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes), the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated. The particular things mentioned in the statute are all physical media on which images are stored; so too is a negative strip. To interpret other matter to refer to visual images would be to ignore the plain language of the statute. 4 28 Congress, in the version of the statute at issue here, used language that left open the possibility that one might possess one or more items of child pornography without incurring liability under the statute. Again, assuming that the images are lascivious, that is exactly what has happened here. When Congress realized this possibility, it changed the statute. See supra note 1. As one representative stated: 29 What is wrong? Present Federal law, which says it is legal to possess one or two pieces of child pornography, but not three or more. Now, that was said to be the result of a compromise with civil libertarians, but I would say that it was an insane compromise with the devil, a compromise which exposes every American child to pedophiles and child predators who lurk in every American community. Let us also say that any item of child pornography, one item, is the ultimate example and evidence of the ultimate child abuse. 30 144 Cong. Rec. H4504 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bachus). Another member remarked: 31 [T]he gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus) and I are offering an amendment that will eliminate a loophole in the current law that currently allows individuals to legally possess child pornography. . . . . Mr. Chairman, under existing Federal law, an individual can only be prosecuted for possessing child pornography if they have three or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, videotapes or any other matter which contain a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Unfortunately, that means a pedophile can legally possess a book or magazine with literally hundreds of pictures of children being sexually abused. Worse yet, it is also possible that these predators can legally possess two videotapes up to several hours long featuring children being molested. 32 144 Cong. Rec. H4503 (1998) (statement of Rep. Riley) (emphasis added). As the legislative history of the amendment demonstrates, Congress knew what the original statute required, and exercised its prerogative to alter the statute so that conduct such as McKelvey's could be punished in the future. Fortunately for McKelvey, Congress did so after McKelvey's indictment. 33 Accordingly, the requirement of the statute under which McKelvey was prosecuted - that the defendant possess three or more items - is not satisfied in this case. Lacking a factual basis for acceptance of McKelvey's plea then, the district court erred in accepting that plea. This constitutes a fundamental defect in the plea proceeding, thus meeting the standard enunciated in United States v. Japa, 994 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1993).