Opinion ID: 1979104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: D.C.Code Title 50, Chapter 23: Traffic Adjudication

Text: The stated purpose of the traffic adjudication statutes is to decriminalize and to provide for the administrative adjudication of certain violations, D.C.Code § 50-2301.01, such as the moving violations involved in this case. An infraction subject to this section of the Code is defined as any conduct subject to administrative adjudication under the provisions of this chapter and with respect to which the [Attorney General] does not commence a proceeding in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 50-2301.02(4). The statute defines operator and owner as follows: (6) The term operator means: (A) Any person, corporation, firm, agency, association, organization, federal, state or local governmental agency in the business of renting or leasing vehicles to be used or operated in the District; (B) An owner who operates his own vehicle; or (C) A person who operates a vehicle owned by another. (7) The term owner means: (A) Any person, corporation, firm, agency, association, organization, federal, state or local governmental agency or other authority or other entity having the property of or title to a vehicle used or operated in the District; or (B) Any registrant of a vehicle used or operated in the District; or (C) Any person, corporation, firm, agency, association, organization, federal, state or local government agency or authority or other entity in the business of renting or leasing vehicles to be used or operated in the District. Id. § 50-2301.02(6)-(7). Applying these statutes to moving violations, Subchapter II of this code chapter specifies that [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, all violations of statutes, regulations, executive orders or rules relating to the operation of any vehicle in the District . . . shall be processed and adjudicated pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter. . . . D.C.Code § 50-2302.01. For any such alleged traffic violation, Subchapter II provides for a hearing: (a) Each hearing for the adjudication of a traffic infraction pursuant to this subchapter shall be held before a hearing examiner in accordance with Chapter IX of Title 18 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations except as provided by this chapter. The burden of proof shall be on the District and no infraction shall be established except by clear and convincing evidence. (b) If a person to whom a notice of infraction has been issued fails to appear at a hearing for which he or she received notice, the hearing examiner may enter a default judgment. . . . . . . . (d) After due consideration of the evidence and arguments presented, the hearing examiner shall determine whether the infraction has been established. Where the infraction is not established, an order dismissing the charge shall be entered. Where a determination is made that an infraction has been established or where an answer admitting the commission of the infraction or admitting the commission of the infraction with explanation has been received, an appropriate order shall be entered in the Department's records. (e) An order, entered pursuant to a determination that an infraction has been established or pursuant to the receipt of an answer admitting the infraction or admitting the infraction with explanation, shall be civil in nature but shall be treated as an adjudication that an infraction has been committed. . . . Id. § 50-2302.06. An appeal from an adverse decision by the examiner may be made to an Appeals Board, D.C.Code § 50-2304.02, and ultimately to the Superior Court, D.C.Code § 50-2304.05. See generally Kovach v. District of Columbia, 805 A.2d 957, 961-63 (D.C.2002) (describing procedures for motorists challenging traffic tickets).