Opinion ID: 807765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As-Applied Claim

Text: Hightower argues that she is entitled to a declaration that the Second Amendment secures the right to publicly carry a -18- handgun outside of her home for self defense, and that this right cannot be made to depend on a suitability determination by licensing officials. Hightower also requests injunctive relief. Hightower argues that the Class A license is the only form of Massachusetts license that would allow her to exercise the Second Amendment right she claims to have. For Hightower's asapplied Second Amendment challenge to the license revocation to succeed, then, Hightower must prove that denial of the additional benefits granted by an unrestricted Class A license, over and above those granted by a Class B license, amounted to a Second Amendment violation. As we understand it, although Hightower made no firm commitment on the record as to this point, she does not in fact desire a license for a large capacity firearm, and her personal firearm is not a large capacity weapon. In any event, she has presented no argument about why the possession or carrying of large capacity weapons is protected from any form of government regulation by the Second Amendment. That the license lost allowed carrying of large capacity weapons weakens the Second Amendment claim, as District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), was concerned with weapons of the type characteristically used to protect the home.7 She does wish to be licensed to carry her small 7 The D.C. Circuit has, applying intermediate scrutiny, upheld a prohibition on the possession of magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261-64 (D.C. Cir. 2011). -19- gun as a concealed weapon and argues that those interests are protected by the Second Amendment and the revocation is unconstitutional. In her favor, we examine her more limited claim. To succeed on her Second Amendment claim, Hightower would have to show that the license revocation, as applied to her ability to carry concealed handguns in public, amounts to a Second Amendment violation. The Second Amendment applies to state and local regulation of firearms. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). In Heller, the Court held, inter alia, that a law that totally bans handgun possession in the home violated the Second Amendment. 128 S. Ct. at 2817, 2821. The Court required the District of Columbia to permit [the plaintiff] to register his handgun and . . . issue him a license to carry it in the home, if the plaintiff was not disqualified. Id. at 2822. The Court stressed that the home is where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute, id. at 2817, and explained that the Second Amendment elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home, id. at 2821 (emphasis added). Courts have consistently recognized that Heller established that the possession of operative firearms for use in defense of the home constitutes the core of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 n.17 (1st Cir. -20- 2011) (While we do not attempt to discern the 'core' Second Amendment right vindicated in Heller, we note that Heller stated that the Second Amendment 'elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.' (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2012) (The core right recognized in Heller is 'the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.' (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821)); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, No. 11-10387, 2012 WL 2947817, at  (11th Cir. July 20, 2012) (to be published in F.3d) (noting that the Heller Court went to great lengths to emphasize the special place that the home -- an individual's private property -- occupies in our society); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (At the 'core' of the Second Amendment is the right of 'law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.' (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821)); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 2011) (According to the Court, the core right of the Second Amendment is 'the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.' (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1937 (2012); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2010) ([T]he Court suggested that the core purpose of the right was to allow 'law-abiding, -21- responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.' (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011). It is plain that the interest Hightower advances in carrying concealed weapons outside the home is distinct from this core interest emphasized in Heller.8 8 We do not reach the issue of the scope of the Second Amendment as to carrying firearms outside the vicinity of the home without any reference to protection of the home. Some courts appear to have held that the Second Amendment does not extend outside the home. See Shepard v. Madigan, No. 11-CV-405-WDS, 2012 WL 1077146, at  (S.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012) (to be published in F. Supp. 2d) ([T]he bearing of a firearm outside the home is not a core right protected by the Second Amendment.); Moore v. Madigan, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1101 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (holding that Heller and McDonald do not recognize[] a Second Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home); Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 829 (D.N.J. 2012) (Given the considerable uncertainty regarding if and when the Second Amendment rights should apply outside the home, this Court does not intend to place a burden on the government to endlessly litigate and justify every individual limitation on the right to carry a gun in any location for any purpose.); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1169, 1177 (Md. 2011) (holding that a statute prohibiting carrying a handgun outside the home without a permit is outside of the scope of the Second Amendment and noting that [i]f the Supreme Court . . . meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011); Commonwealth v. Perez, 952 N.E.2d 441, 451 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (The Second Amendment does not protect the defendant in this case because he was in possession of the firearm outside his home.). Other courts have remarked that the application of the Second Amendment outside the home is far from clear. See Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (referring to this issue as unsettled territory); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that [t]here may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, and that [o]n the question of Heller's applicability outside the home environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the Court itself), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that according Second Amendment protection to the carrying of an unconcealed weapon outside the home would certainly -22- Under current Supreme Court precedent, Hightower cannot make out her Second Amendment claim as to the concealed weapon aspect of her revoked license, as she must for her as-applied challenge to succeed. Under our analysis of Heller, as follows, the government may regulate the carrying of concealed weapons outside of the home. In Heller, the Court explained that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited and noted that the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under Second Amendment or state analogues. 128 S. Ct. at 2816. We have interpreted this portion of Heller as stating that laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons are an example[] of 'longstanding' restrictions that [are] 'presumptively lawful' under the Second Amendment. United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17 & n.26); see also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (observing that the first 10 amendments to the [C]onstitution protect rights go further than Heller did). Other courts have found that the Second Amendment extends outside of the home. See United States v. Weaver, No. 2:09-cr00222, 2012 WL 727488, at  (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 6, 2012); Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674, at  (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012) (to be published in F. Supp. 2d) ([T]he Court finds that the right to bear arms is not limited to the home.); see also Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., writing separately) (stating that the Second Amendment provides a right to carry a weapon outside the home, at least in some form). -23- that are subject to certain well-recognized exceptions and stating, in dicta, that the Second Amendment right is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons).9 Licensing of the carrying of concealed weapons is presumptively lawful, and Hightower makes no serious argument to the contrary. Indeed, we do not understand her to make the implausible argument that the government may not, under the Second Amendment, ever revoke a license to carry a concealed weapon. Rather, her attack is on the standard used in the revocation of her license. We detail her arguments below. The standards for revocation of her license stem from section 131, which provides for revocation in two circumstances: A license issued under this section shall be revoked or suspended by the licensing authority, or his designee, upon the occurrence of any event that would have disqualified the holder from being issued such license or from having such license renewed. 9 See also Richards v. County of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ([T]he Second Amendment does not create a fundamental right to carry a concealed weapon in public.); Kachalsky, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 260-62 (suggesting that there is no Second Amendment right to carry concealed weapons); Martinkovich v. Oregon Legislative Body, No. 11-3065-CL, 2011 WL 7693036, at  (D. Or. Aug. 24, 2011) (The Second Amendment does not prohibit regulations on carrying a concealed weapon.); Dorr v. Weber, 741 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1005 (N.D. Iowa 2010) ([A] right to carry a concealed weapon under the Second Amendment has not been recognized to date.); Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 164-66 (D.C. 2011) (holding that there is no Second Amendment right to carry a concealed weapon); State v. Knight, 241 P.3d 120, 133 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) ([T]he Heller Court considered concealed firearms prohibitions to be presumptively constitutional under the Second Amendment.). -24- A license may be revoked or suspended by the licensing authority if it appears that the holder is no longer a suitable person to possess such license. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(f). A revocation on either basis is subject to judicial review. Id. Hightower attacks many provisions of the statute, but her key focus is on what she contends is the inherent subjectivity of the suitability requirement and its inadequacy as a standard. However, Hightower's license was not revoked because of a general finding that she was not suitable, but rather because of a particular determination that she completed the application form untruthfully.10 We conclude that the revocation of a firearms license on the basis of providing false information as to the existence of pending complaints or charges on the firearms license application form is not a violation of the Second Amendment in this case. Hightower argues that this court must apply strict scrutiny to her license revocation claim. Her claim fails whatever standard of scrutiny is used, even assuming there is some Second Amendment interest in carrying the concealed weapons at issue. We do not reach the question of what standard of scrutiny applies here. We 10 BPD has denied firearms applications in other instances upon a determination that applicants answered the general form untruthfully, denied applications upon a determination that sworn BPD officers answered the G 13-S form untruthfully, and revoked licenses for both reasons. -25- agree with Judge Wilkinson's cautionary holding in United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011), that we should not engage in answering the question of how Heller applies to possession of firearms outside of the home, including as to what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply. Id. at 475. As he said, the whole matter is a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree. Id. A requirement that firearms license applicants provide truthful information, enforced by the revocation of licenses if the applicant provides false information, serves a variety of important purposes. For one, it helps ensure the integrity of the system of keeping prohibited persons from possessing firearms. Massachusetts's licensing scheme prohibits certain categories of people from possessing firearms. See Mass. Gen. Law ch. 140, § 131(d)(i)-(vii). A licensing authority does not necessarily possess all of the information necessary to determine an individual's eligibility. The submission of false information by an applicant could make it more difficult for the licensing authority to assess whether the applicant is eligible (e.g., submission of a false name would make it more difficult to perform a background check).11 The prohibition of the inclusion of false 11 The licensing authority is empowered to make a variety of inquiries concerning license applicants. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(e). -26- information in a license application is necessary to the functioning of the licensing scheme. The Supreme Court has commented on a federal prohibition on providing material false information to a licensed dealer in connection with the acquisition of firearms, saying that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6): was enacted as a means of providing adequate and truthful information about firearms transactions. Information drawn from records kept by dealers was a prime guarantee of the Act's effectiveness in keeping these lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 13219 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings)). The same holds true for Massachusetts's licensing scheme. In Huddleston, the defendant had been convicted of providing false information in answering a form in connection with the acquisition of a firearm; the Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 815-18, 833. A requirement that information on firearms license applications be accurate is an important government interest, and it is enforced not only by the revocation scheme. Massachusetts law makes it a criminal offense to knowingly submit false information of certain types on a firearms license application. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 129 (providing a criminal penalty for anyone who gives a false or fictitious name or address or -27- knowingly offers or gives false information concerning the date or place of birth, his citizenship status, occupation, or criminal record, in any application for any form of license or permit issued in connection with a firearm); id. § 131(h) (providing a criminal penalty for [a]ny person who knowingly files an application containing false information). Such provisions are commonplace in state firearms licensing regimes, particularly as to licenses to carry concealed weapons.12 12 See, e.g., D.C. Code § 7-2507.04(a) (It shall be unlawful for any person purchasing any firearm or ammunition, or applying for any registration certificate . . . to knowingly give false information or offer false evidence of identity.); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.06(11)(a) (A person who knowingly files false information under this subsection is subject to criminal prosecution . . . .); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-2-17 (No person, in purchasing or otherwise securing delivery of a firearm or in applying for a license to carry a handgun, shall knowingly or intentionally: (1) give false information on a form required to: . . . (B) apply for a license to carry a handgun . . . .); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1379.3(C)(1) (The providing of false or misleading information on the application or any documents submitted with the application shall be grounds for the denial or revocation of a concealed handgun permit.); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-139(a) (A person may not knowingly give false information or make a material misstatement in a firearm application . . . .); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 750.232a(3) (A person who intentionally makes a material false statement on an application for a license to purchase a pistol . . . is guilty of a felony . . . .); Miss. Code Ann. § 45- 9-101(15) (Any person who knowingly submits a false answer to any question on an application for a license issued pursuant to this section, or who knowingly submits a false document when applying for a license issued pursuant to this section, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-10(c) (Any person who gives or causes to be given any false information . . . in applying for . . . a permit to purchase a handgun [or] a permit to carry a handgun . . . is guilty of a crime of the third degree.); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-19-6(I) (The department shall suspend or revoke a concealed handgun license if: (1) the licensee provided the department with false information on -28- Like the Supreme Court, we hold that this particular ground for unsuitability is not subjective, and it does not confer too much discretion on the licensing authority. See City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 783 (2004) (statute providing that an adult business license shall be denied if the applicant, inter alia, provides false information is based on objective criteria); Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002) (statute that allows denial of a large public assembly permit based on, inter alia, the application containing a material falsehood or misrepresentation is based on reasonably specific and objective grounds). Individual disputes about the accuracy of an answer may be addressed under the statute's provision for judicial review, an option that Hightower declined to use. the application form or renewal form for a concealed handgun license . . . .); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-23 (No person shall, . . . in applying for a license to carry [a firearm], give false information or offer false evidence of his or her identity.); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.186(a) (The department shall revoke a license under this section if the license holder: . . . (2) made a material misrepresentation or failed to disclose a material fact in an application submitted under this subchapter . . . .); Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-704(15) (An individual who knowingly and willfully provides false information on an application filed under this part is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and the application may be denied, or the permit may be suspended or revoked.); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.41.070(12) (In addition to any other penalty provided for by law, the concealed pistol license of a person who knowingly makes a false statement shall be revoked, and the person shall be permanently ineligible for a concealed pistol license.). -29- Further, the particular question Hightower answered inaccurately in the defendants' view -- whether Hightower had complaints or charges pending against her at the time she was a BPD officer -- was a material question. The existence of such complaints or charges could impact an individual's suitability to possess a firearm, depending on the nature of the underlying complaints. An accurate answer to the question is important to allowing the licensing authority to investigate further and make an informed decision on the licensing application. Hightower's as-applied challenge to the revocation of her unrestricted Class A license fails. We turn now to her attempt to raise a facial attack