Opinion ID: 625008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discovery of the Johnson Letter

Text: -9- Mr. Freeman next argues that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), he had one year from the day he discovered the Johnson Letter to file a habeas petition in federal court. As noted above, § 2244(d)(1)(D) provides that the one-year period for filing a § 2254 petition begins to run on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” The federal district court concluded that Mr. Freeman was not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2241(d)(1)(D). The district court first noted that the Johnson Letter was dated January 13, 1997. The court then explained that Mr. Freeman had not “explain[ed] the circumstances of his alleged discovery of the [Johnson] [L]etter in October 2008.” Freeman, slip op. at 10. The court stated that it was therefore “unable to conclude that Mr. Freeman could not have discovered the [Johnson] [L]etter earlier through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. In his application for a COA, Mr. Freeman argues that when he filed his § 2254 petition, he did not understand that he needed to explain the circumstances of discovering the Johnson Letter to qualify for statutory tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D). But even after the district court explained its basis for denying Mr. Freeman’s § 2244(d)(1)(D) argument, Mr. Freeman has not attempted to clarify how he discovered the Johnson Letter or attempted to explain why he could not have discovered the Johnson Letter at an earlier date. Thus, it is unclear whether the Johnson Letter could have been discovered at an earlier date through the exercise of due diligence. We therefore hold that Mr. Freeman has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that § 2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply in this case. -10-