Opinion ID: 167914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A pplication to this C ase

Text: The employm ent practice challenged by Plaintiffs is the exercise of discretion by supervisors in assigning overtim e. As stated in Smith, “[T]he proper 2 The statute provides another avenue for plaintiffs when the particular aspect of the process that is claimed to be objectionable cannot be isolated: [T]he complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). Plaintiffs argue in their reply brief to this court that they “presented facts below that defendant’s collective bargaining agreements imposed no meaningful objective standards on supervisors in assigning overtime” and that “[s]uch a showing is sufficient to trigger subsection 2000e2(k)(1)(B)(i).” Rep. Aplts. Reply Br. at 10. But they provide no citation to the record showing that they raised this issue in district court, and we cannot find in the record anything indicating to that court that they were attempting to make the required showing of analytical inseparability. W e will not address the potential application of § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) to Plaintiffs’ claim, because our general rule is not to address arguments that were not first presented to the district court, see Cummings v. Norton, 393 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005) (the “general rule that issues not raised below are waived on appeal” is particularly important on appeal of summary judgment); Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. M osher Steel of Kansas, Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 798-99 (10th Cir. 1996) (“W here a litigant changes to a new theory on appeal that falls under the same general category as an argument presented at trial or presents a theory that was discussed in a vague and ambiguous way the theory will not be considered on appeal.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)), and we particularly frown on the making of new arguments in a party’s reply brief, see Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000). -29- population for analysis is the . . . eligible labor pool.” 196 F.3d at 368. The Boeing hourly employees eligible for an overtim e assignm ent are those who satisfy the CBA requirements for the assignm ent; that is, the challenged practice operates only w ith respect to employees eligible under the CBA. The CBA requires that overtime first be offered to “the em ployee regularly assigned to either the machine, job, crew, or position” for which overtim e is to be scheduled, and then to others within the sam e “shop or shift.” Rep. Aplts. Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 10. The Siskin Study, however, did not incorporate the CBA’s eligibility requirements in its analysis. Instead, it controlled for “job,” “grade,” “budget code,” and “shift.” R. Doc. 346 at 23. The implicit assum ption is that two hourly workers with the same job, grade, budget code, and shift have equal opportunities for overtim e assignm ents under the CBA, subject to the supervisor’s discretion. There is certainly overlap between the Siskin Study variables and those used to determ ine overtim e assignm ents. But the tw o sets of variables are not the sam e. Am ong the qualifications included in the CBA, the Siskin Study controlled for only “job” and “shift.” It did not account for whether wom en worked on the “machine” or were in the “crew,” “position,” or “shop” to which the overtim e was assigned. This failure can skew the results. If, for exam ple, overtim e assignm ents were concentrated in a handful of shops and alm ost no wom en worked in those shops, a discrepancy found in the Siskin Study between the overtime worked by m en and by wom en would not at all represent a disparate -30- impact created by the supervisor’s discretionary choice am ong eligible employees. Rather, it could sim ply be a reflection of the gender distribution among those eligible for overtim e. At the outset, therefore, it appears that the Siskin Study cannot establish a prim a facie case based on a com parison “between (a) the [gender] composition, caused by the challenged em ploym ent practice, of the pool of those enjoying a . . . job benefit; and (b) the [gender] composition of the qualified applicant pool,” Crum, 198 F.3d at 1312, because the study is not lim ited to data regarding those qualified people subject to the challenged practice. The study does not isolate the effect of supervisor discretion from the effect of the CBA requirem ents. See Anderson, 406 F.3d at 260. Accordingly, we look to whether Plaintiffs have adequately established that (1) reliable data on the omitted CBA criteria were unavailable and (2) they used a reliable proxy. They have not. To begin with, Plaintiffs have not established that the data necessary to establish the im pact on CBA-qualified workers were unavailable. Plaintiffs acknowledge that variables such as crew, position, and shop are relevant to qualification for overtim e under the CBA but claim that they cannot be held responsible for including them in their statistical analysis because “Boeing did not m aintain electronic data on any of the omitted variables.” Rep. Aplts. Br. at 35. But data m ay be available in nonelectronic form . Electronic data are undeniably m ore convenient, especially for use in statistical studies, but inconvenience does not excuse failure to collect the data. Plaintiffs have -31- presented no reason why the omitted inform ation could not have been procured through other m ethods, such as depositions or interrogatories. It appears that they were sim ply satisfied with Boeing’s indication that the data w ere unavailable in their electronic payroll records. Furtherm ore, even were we convinced that the data are unavailable, Plaintiffs have failed to dem onstrate that the variables in the Siskin Study’s statistical analysis produce a reliable surrogate for qualifications for overtim e; that is, that the results accurately reflect comparisons between individuals who were equally eligible for overtim e assignm ents under the CBA. Plaintiffs m ake the bald claim that the “grade” and “budget code” variables used by the Siskin Study are equivalent to the omitted variables “crew,” “position,” and “shop.” See Rep. Aplts. Reply Br. at 5 (“[I]n the absence of specific electronic data m aintained by Boeing identifying employees’ ‘shops’ or ‘crews,’ [Dr. Siskin] closely tracked this inform ation by using as a proxy budget codes and grade levels that reflected their area and level of w ork.”). But they m ake no attem pt to explain the basis of this claim . W e cannot agree that those relationships are as self-evident as Plaintiffs apparently believe them to be. The record does not even indicate what a “budget code” is. Plaintiffs’ “m ere assertion” will not suffice. See York, 95 F.3d at 955. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the Siskin Study was insufficient to establish a prim a facie disparate-im pact case. -32- Plaintiffs rely on Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986), and Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1314, to argue that failure to define perfectly the population of qualified employees does not prevent the Siskin Study from establishing their claim . Both decisions are distinguishable, however, because the m issing variables considered by the two courts did not relate to m inimal, objective qualifications. A jury could decide that the m issing variable in those cases w as not likely to affect the exercise of discretion to a significant extent— a rather different matter from ignoring a factor that disqualifies a candidate before discretion comes into play. In Bazemore the United States and others brought a pattern-or-practice suit against the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, alleging racial discrim ination in salaries; the plaintiffs offered statistical evidence that controlled for race, education, tenure, and job title. See 478 U.S. at 398. The court of appeals had upheld the district court’s rejection of the statistical evidence, ruling that “‘the regression analysis presented here must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrim ination,’” because it “‘om itted . . . variables which ought to be reasonably viewed as determ inants of salary,’” id. at 399-400 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 672 (4th Cir. 1984)), particularly geographic variations in salary, Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 399. The Supreme Court disagreed. Introducing its analysis it noted that “if the defendants have not succeeded in having a case dism issed on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prim a facie case, -33- and have responded to the plaintiffs’ proof by offering evidence of their own, the factfinder then must decide whether the plaintiffs have dem onstrated a pattern or practice of discrim ination by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 398. It then said, “[I]t is clear that a regression analysis that includes less than ‘all m easurable variables’ m ay serve to prove a plaintiff’s case . . . . W hether, in fact, such a regression analysis does carry the plaintiff’s ultim ate burden will depend in a given case on the factual context of each case in light of all the evidence presented by both the plaintiff and the defendant.” Id. at 400 (internal citation om itted). The Court remanded for consideration of the particular characteristics of the regression analysis to determ ine whether it was sufficiently probative. A s we understand the opinion, the regression analysis was not used to establish the prim a facie case, but to prove discrim ination once the presence of a prim a facie case was established, or at least uncontested. The prim a face case required a showing that qualified blacks were receiving lower salaries than qualified whites. The regression analysis then exam ined whether other factors— such as education, tenure, and job title— could account for this difference. Failure to take into account all potential factors did not necessarily render the regression analysis unprobative. M oreover, there was no question in Bazem ore, as there is here, regarding whether the data concerned persons who were not qualified or eligible for the benefit at issue— namely, a higher salary. The statistical study compared salaries -34- of persons employed by the extension service. The issue was whether discretion in setting salaries was exercised in a discrim inatory m anner. The statistical study took into account som e factors that m ight influence the exercise of discretion and om itted others; but there is no indication that it om itted any factor that was a nondiscretionary determ inant of salary (such as a maxim um salary established for a specific job title). Bullington considered a disparate-impact claim of gender discrim ination in the hiring of airline flight officers. See 186 F.3d at 1312. The plaintiff offered statistics indicating that the interview pass rate for wom en was only 60% of the pass rate for m en. See id. The district court rejected the statistical study and granted sum m ary judgm ent to the airline, because the pass rates were not adjusted for hypothesized differences in aeronautical experience betw een m en and wom en. Id. at 1312-13. W e reversed, concluding that the statistics were “sufficiently reliable” because the study was properly lim ited to individuals who were m inim ally qualified for the positions (otherwise they would not have been given an interview in the first place). Id. at 1314. Again, the statistical study examined only the exercise of discretion— this tim e in the interview process. A jury can weigh whether om ission of a factor that could affect the exercise of discretion renders an analysis unpersuasive. But no one could disagree that an objective eligibility requirem ent is a necessary com ponent of the analysis. -35- Thus, the variables om itted from the regression analyses in both Bazemore and Bullington related to characteristics that did not affect whether the population studied was “m inimally qualified” for the benefit sought. The geographic variations in salary at issue in Bazem ore had nothing to do with whether a particular individual was m inim ally qualified to receive a higher salary. See 478 U.S. at 398. In Bullington the level of aeronautical experience was certainly a perm issible consideration in the interview process, but it was only one of m any factors considered in a subjective determ ination, not a mandatory criterion for being hired. In contrast, the Siskin Study did not confine itself to the persons eligible for an overtim e assignm ent. See Ortega, 943 F.2d at 1245 (statistics not probative because they did not take into account qualifications for the jobs available). Our conclusion is not undermined by the “m assive overtim e disparities” that Plaintiffs allege are revealed by the Siskin Study’s analysis. Rep. Aplts. Br. at 38. They contend that these disparities are so large that a substantial disparity would certainly be present even if the statistical analysis were adjusted to account for the CBA requirements. Plaintiffs argue: Boeing’s expert report affirm atively demonstrated that the gender of the employee regularly assigned to the machine or position for which overtim e w ork w as needed w as largely irrelevant to the overtim e disparities. Boeing’s expert determ ined that, for 78% of overtim e opportunities, m ore than one em ployee was eligible to work the overtim e. Thus, even if there had been reason to believe that more m en than wom en were the sole employees regularly assigned to the -36- m achine or position for which overtim e work was required, less than 25% of the overtim e opportunities studied by Siskin would have been affected by his om ission of this variable. Viewed in the light m ost favorable to plaintiffs, this fact casts grave doubt on whether the om ission of this variable explains the massive overtim e disparities found by Siskin, precluding the district court from rejecting Siskin’s analysis on this ground. Id. at 37-38 (record citation om itted). As we now proceed to explain, however, this argum ent misapprehends the statistical evidence by confusing the magnitude of the disparities w ith their level of statistical significance, as m easured in standard deviations. There is no dispute that the Siskin Study’s regression analysis reflected a difference in the amount of overtim e worked by men and wom en that was m any standard deviations removed from equality. The Siskin Study computed departures from equal treatm ent of m en and wom en whose statistical significance ranged from 7.95 standard deviations (weekend overtim e during 2002) to 38.03 (weekday overtim e during 1999). That statistical significance, however, does not necessarily m ean that the departure from equality was large. For example, the Siskin Study calculated that wom en worked an average of 19% fewer hours of weekday overtim e in 1999, 17% fewer in 2000 and 2001, and 11% fewer in 2002. For weekend overtim e it calculated that wom en worked an average of 18% fewer overtim e hours in 1999, 19% fewer in 2000, 18% fewer in 2001, and 10% fewer in 2002. Although notable, these are not what m ost would call “massive disparities”— it is nothing like men receiving proportionately even twice as m uch -37- overtim e as wom en. Indeed, guidelines from the Equal Em ploym ent Opportunity Com m ission draw a line (albeit not a rigid one) at a 20% disparity: A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5)(or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than fourfifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse im pact. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D); accord 28 C.F.R. § 50.14(4)(D) (Departm ent of Justice Guidelines); see Smith, 196 F.3d at 365 (treating “four-fifths” guideline as persuasive); Thom as v. M etroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1511 n.4 (identifying the EEOC guideline as “[o]ne possible index of substantial disparity”); cf. M aldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305 (“EEOC guidelines, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and inform ed judgm ent to which courts and litigants m ay properly resort for guidance.” (internal quotation m arks om itted)). W hat the large num ber of standard deviations m eans is that the departure from equality, w hatever its magnitude, is highly unlikely to be random. Of course, when there are m assive disparities, the difference m ay be m any standard deviations. But when, as here, there is a great deal of data, even a relatively sm all difference m ay be highly statistically significant (that is, unlikely to be random). Consider an experim ent involving 1,000,000 flips of a coin. The canonical result, of course, would be 500,000 heads and 500,000 tails. Say, the -38- results were 510,000 heads and 490,000 tails. Although the magnitude of the difference is sm all, only about 4% m ore heads than tails, the odds of such a difference occurring in the absence of a weighted coin are exceedingly sm all— the departure from equality is 20 standard deviations. The difference strongly indicates som e influence on the results other than the operation of pure chance. Likewise, under the Siskin Study’s analysis, it is very, very unlikely that the difference in the assignm ent of overtim e to m en and w om en w ith the sam e job, grade, budget code, and shift is a random event. As the Siskin Study observed, “Clearly, som ething in the overtime process consistently results in males obtaining more overtime and working more overtime than females.” R. Doc. 346 at 23. The large number of standard deviations tells us nothing about what that “som ething” is, however, other than that it is not based on differences in job, grade, budget code, or shift. As a result, it could be very im portant, contrary to Plaintiffs’ brief, that nearly a quarter of the overtim e opportunities were in work done by only one person if, as im pliedly assum ed in the above-quoted passage from Plaintiffs’ brief, men disproportionately held those positions or the offers of overtim e w ere concentrated in such positions held by m en. (In such situations there is very little, if any, supervisor discretion in the assignm ent of overtim e, because the CBA provides that the person who norm ally perform s the work should be offered it first.) Similarly, it could be quite im portant if men are disproportionately -39- em ployed in crew s in w hich overtime is available to everyone in the unit. Of course, such gender disparities in these positions could indicate discrim ination in hiring for those jobs, but that is not the claim m ade by Plaintiffs. See Price v. City of Chicago, 251 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff’s statistical showing that eligibility test may produce disparate im pact could not establish prim a facie case w hen the test’s use is not the em ploym ent practice com plained of). An illustration m ay m ake this proposition clearer. Boeing’s expert, Dr. W ard, conducted a study on overtime assignments that controlled for the CBA criteria by surveying individual managers about the actual offers m ade to eligible employees. For each overtim e assignm ent, Dr. W ard’s study determ ined who was eligible under the CBA and then m easured whether m en were disproportionately selected for the overtim e. These data were collected for only a portion of the W ichita facility and only for a two-m onth period in 2003, so the study is hardly dispositive of whether discrim ination occurred. But the results are instructive. W hen only one employee norm ally perform ed the work and was eligible for the overtim e assignm ent, wom en received 14% (76 of 535) of the overtim e offers, precisely what would be expected (according to the report) given their representation in the jobs from which those overtim e assignm ents were m ade. W hen multiple workers were eligible under the CBA for the assignm ent, wom en received 23% (430 of 1855) of the offers, very slightly more than would be expected. Overall, w om en received 21% (506 of 2390) of the overtim e offers. -40- From these data it appears likely that wom en were significantly underrepresented in those jobs for w hich only one w orker w as eligible for particular overtim e assignm ents, and even though those jobs accounted for only 22% (535 of 2390) of the overtim e assignm ents studied, this underrepresentation decreased wom en’s percentage of overtim e offers from 23% (when more than one em ployee was eligible) to 21% (the overall rate). That is approxim ately a 9% reduction in the offer rate to wom en (21 is 91% of 23). In other words, contrary to what one would expect if the above-quoted argum ent of Plaintiffs were valid, wom en received 9% fewer offers than one would expect if one looked only at positions for which more than one worker was eligible. Dr. W ard’s study illustrates how disparities of the m agnitude of those found in the Siskin Study could result solely from underrepresentation of wom en in jobs for w hich only one em ployee is eligible for overtim e assignm ents. Likew ise, even in situations in w hich several employees are eligible to w ork overtim e, wom en could be underrepresented in the crews m ost likely to receive calls for overtim e work. Yet, Plaintiffs have not shown how the Siskin Study parameters would account for such underrepresentation. W e do not mean to m ake too m uch of Dr. W ard’s study. W e certainly are not saying that it disproves Plaintiffs’ allegations of disparate im pact. But that study clearly shows the flaws in the reasoning of Plaintiffs’ brief— that the large num ber of standard deviations calculated in the Siskin Study m akes it -41- unnecessary to determ ine whether the parameters used in that study are good proxies for the CBA eligibility requirements. To repeat, the very large number of standard deviations does not m ean that the gross difference in the amount of overtim e worked by men and wom en is itself large; it just m eans that the difference is very unlikely to be random. But since the CBA requirements not included in the Siskin Study m odel are not random, and may well im pact m en and wom en differently (as Dr. W ard’s study suggests), the results of the Siskin Study are consistent with the CBA requirem ents being the cause of the disparity in overtim e assignm ents— at least in the absence of evidence that the Siskin Study’s parameters are reliable proxies for the CBA requirements. There being no such evidence, the Siskin Study does not satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to establish a prim a facie case. IV . C L AIM S OF D E A N P L AINT IFFS Also on appeal are claim s by the Dean Plaintiffs. They ask us to review the district court’s denial of reconsideration of their removal as class representatives and denial of their m otion for recusal of Judge Brown. The district court included these rulings in its certification of a final judgm ent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). W e review the rulings on both m otions for an abuse of discretion. See Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005) (m otion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion regardless of whether it is construed as raised under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 or 60); Fymbo v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 213 F.3d -42- 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that individual is not adequate class representative is subject to abuse-of-discretion review); Higganbotham v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003) (denial of m otion to recuse is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Neither decision by the district court was incorrect, let alone an abuse of discretion. The district court based its initial ruling removing the Dean Plaintiffs as class representatives on their ongoing demand to be paid a “consultant’s fee” of 15% of any attorney fees obtained by class counsel. In its denial of their m otion to reconsider, the court stated that the Dean Plaintiffs’ repeated public references to privileged conversations with class counsel only strengthened its initial conclusion that they put their own interests above those of the class. Given such conduct, we agree with the district court that the Dean Plaintiffs w ould not “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” as required by Rule 23(a)(4). See Rutter & W ilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Resolution of two questions determ ines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class m embers and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” (internal quotation m arks om itted)). Sim ilarly, the district court did not err in denying the D ean Plaintiffs’ m otion for recusal. As the court thoroughly explained in its order, their “unsubstantiated suggestions, speculations, [and] opinions,” are insufficient to -43- establish even the appearance of any bias, prejudice, or m isconduct that would warrant judicial recusal. Rep. Aplts. Supp. App. Vol.1 at 73 (Dist. Ct. Order of 1/7/2004); see Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659-60 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing the standards for recusal). “[A] judge . . . has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitim ate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Bryce, 289 F.3d at 659 (internal quotation m arks om itted). The district judge correctly recognized his duty to continue to sit in this case.