Opinion ID: 2513985
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kay's conflict was imputed to Henderson.

Text: Richard contends that, according to Alaska Professional Conduct Rule 1.10, where one attorney in a law firm would be disqualified from representing a client, the entire firm is disqualified. Thus, he concludes that because Kay was disqualified, Kay's partner, Henderson, should be disqualified as well. In contrast, the state, analyzing the situation under Rule 1.9(b), Rule 1.10, and the accompanying commentaries, argues that because Henderson himself did not have a conflict, he should not be precluded from representing Leslie.
Rule 1.9(b) governs representation of a person by an attorney whose former firm had previously represented a client with interests materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired confidential information. [24] Rule 1.10(a) bars a firm's representation of a client when any member of the firm would be prohibited from representing that client under Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2. [25] While the commentary to Rule 1.9(b) mentions vicarious disqualification (another term for imputed disqualification), the text of Rule 1.9(b) indicates that this commentary is discussing a different form of imputed disqualification than the one at issue here. The state argues that the commentary rejects any rigid per se approach to disqualification in favor of a two pronged `functional analysis' which looks at whether (i) confidences are preserved and (ii) adverse positions to the client are avoided. Maintaining that Richard and Leslie did not have legally adverse positions and that confidences were preserved under Rule 1.9(c), the state concludes that there was no reason for Henderson to have been disqualified from representing Leslie. This two-pronged functional analysis, however, does not impact our analysis under Rule 1.10(a). Once a lawyer is deemed to have a conflict under Rule 1.9, that lawyer is disqualified from representing another client with an adverse position in a substantially related matter unless the previous client consents. In situations where it is not immediately clear that an attorney has a conflict with a client of a prior firm, the functional analysis should be undertaken to determine if the attorney has acquired confidential information relevant to a substantially related matter on which the attorney would be asked to take a position adverse to that former client. Where an individual attorney is conflicted out under either of these scenarios, that conflict is imputed to the attorney's entire firm under Rule 1.10(a). Thus the functional analysis described in the comment to Rule 1.9 applies only to determine whether there is a conflict in the first place and not to ascertain whether the conflict should be imputed to other members of the conflicted attorney's firm. As the comment to Rule 1.10 explains, each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty [owed] by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. [26]
Richard argues that the purpose behind vicarious disqualification is to protect the former client's confidences where a member of a law firm had acquired knowledge material to current litigation. As Kay had an actual conflict of interest, Richard contends, Henderson's statement to the court that his firm did not have a conflict of interest because he had no knowledge of Richard's criminal matter was simply a wrong legal analysis of [Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct] 1.9 and 1.10. The state responds by asserting that since Kay no longer had access to Richard's criminal file and there was no evidence that Henderson and Kay had shared any confidences regarding Richard, there was no reason to impute to Henderson any conflict Kay might be found to have. The commentary to Rule 1.10 states that the rule of imputed disqualification found in Rule 1.10(a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client. As the comment explains: Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty [owed] by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. [27] Thus, as a plain reading of Rule 1.10(a) indicates, because Kay had a conflict in representing Leslie, that conflict must be imputed to Henderson, thereby barring either of them from representing Leslie at the CINA hearing.