Opinion ID: 213369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Board Review of Prima Facie Case

Text: Jung also argues that the Board's review was improper. After accusing the Board of improperly framing the issues before it as questions of claim construction and the reasonableness of the examiner's decision, Jung himself frames the issue as whether the examiner failed to reasonably construe the claims and failed to adduce any evidence or syllogistic argument in support of Kalnitsky's alleged teachings, as opposed to Kalnitsky's bare disclosure. Br. of Jung, at 33-34. This court is at a loss to identify the distinction between these two framings of the issue. What a reference teaches is reflected in its disclosure, and, as discussed above, the extent to which the examiner fails to provide syllogistic argument to fill the gaps between the prior art and the rejected claims is dependent upon a substantive showing that such gaps exist in the first place. Moreover, whether the examiner reasonably construe[d] the claimswhich this court agrees is the true issue in this caseis without doubt a substantive issue, which the Board properly addressed in its opinion. In no way do the Board's actions here put applicants in a position in which they are required to speculate as to the full nature and scope of the rejection and put on a full substantive rebuttal even if the full nature and scope of the rejection remains unformed and unclear. Br. of Jung, at 38-39. Such concerns only arise where the examiner has failed to meet the notice requirement of § 132. Here, as discussed above, Jung was on notice of the full basis for the examiner's rejection. Jung does not and could not argue that the Board's decision constituted a new ground of rejection such that further prosecution was required. Instead, Jung argues that the Board assumed the position of super-examiner in making, among all its findings of facts, the following five findings relevant to the well-charge-level controller limitation. These findings of fact are reproduced verbatim below: 4. In describing the well-charge-level controller, the Specification describes example processes and implementations and how the controller typically works ( see, e.g., Spec. 5:6-19). 5. The Specification does not precisely or deliberately define or limit the identity of a well-charge-level controller. (Spec. in its entirety.) 6. The controller of Kalnitsky controls the level of charge within a well during a two step process including an image integration step (where light energy is collected and converted to an electrical charge) and a read out/reset step (where the electrical charge is read from the cell and the cell is simultaneously reset for the next integration cycle (Kalnitsky, col. 4, ll. 40-45). 7. During the read out/reset step, the controller 340 directs oscillator 320 to output a series of positive electrical pulses to lower the potential on the p-well 213 (charge well), monitors the potential level, and stops the pulses when the potential reaches the level required for the integration step (Kalnitsky, col. 5, ll.22-39; col. 6, ll. 38-40; col. 6, ll. 64-66). 8. By directing the output of charge pulses, monitoring potential level, and stopping the pulses at a predetermined point, Kalnitsky's controller 340 controls the charge level within a charge well (p-well 214) (Kalnitsky, col. 5, ll. 22-39; col. 6, ll. 38-40; col. 6, ll.64-66). Decision at 8-9. Two things are immediately apparent from an examination of these findings of fact. First, they are simple factual assertions drawn from either the Kalnitsky reference or the application itself. Second, those assertions sourced from Kalnitsky are substantially the same, down to the line and column number, as the examiner's objections. The Board merely made explicit in its findings of fact the bases for a rejection that would have been apparent to one with even a cursory command of prosecution practice from the examiner's office actions. To assert that the Board's thoroughness in responding to his explanation put it in the position of a super-examiner would limit the Board to verbatim repetition of the examiner's office actions, which would ill-serve the Board's purpose as a reviewing body. It is well-established that the Board is free to affirm an examiner's rejection so long as appellants have had a fair opportunity to react to the thrust of the rejection. In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (CCPA 1976). See also In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (In calculating the overlapping values, the Board found facts not found by the examiner regarding the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, which in fairness required an opportunity for response.). Before the examiner, Jung merely argued that the claims differed from Kalnitsky, and chose not to proffer a serious explanation of this difference. The examiner disagreed, and rejected the claims, equating Kalnitsky's controller and the well-charge-level controller in the claims. It was not until he arrived at the Board that Jung explained the difference more thoroughly, implying that his claims should be read as limited to a preferred embodiment wherein the controller more or less continuously adjust[s] the control signal inputs, in contradistinction to Kalnitsky's reset controller. In response to this argument, the Board further explained the examiner's rejection, noting that nothing in the claims limited the controller to this embodiment. The Board's thoroughness in responding to Jung's delayed explanation did not change the rejection, and Jung had the fair opportunity to respond. Finally, Jung argues that the Board gave improper deference to the examiner's rejection by requiring Jung to identif[y] a reversible error by the examiner, which improperly shifted the burden of proving patentability onto Jung. Decision at 11. This is a hollow argument, because, as discussed above, the examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation and the burden was properly shifted to Jung to rebut it. Moreover, even assuming that the examiner had failed to make a prima facie case, the Board would not have erred in framing the issue as one of reversible error. As recently acknowledged by the Board, it has long been the Board's practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner's rejections, and the Board's actions in this case were entirely consistent with that long-standing practice. See Ex Parte Frye, Appeal no. 2009-006013, at 9-10, 2010 WL 889747 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 26, 2010) (precedential), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/prec/fd09006013.pdf (The panel then reviews the obviousness rejection for error based upon the issues identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon.). See also Oral Arg. at 22:23-24:23, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.us courts.gov/Audiomp3/2010-1019_1142010.MP3 (acknowledging that reversible error means that the applicant must identify to the Board what the examiner did wrong, but that the Board reviews the examiner de novo, and the examiner retains the burden to show invalidity).