Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Admonitions to Juan

Text: Juan also argues that the district court was specifically biased against him.
Once during jury selection and again during the trial, the district court observed Juan staring at the jury. Thinking that this was an attempt to intimidate them, the district court sent Juan's counsel a note warning Juan not to stare at the jury. Also during the trial, Juan alerted the district court that he believed the prosecutor was making improper hand signals to witnesses. When the issue was discussed outside the presence of the jury, the district court rejected the allegation, telling Juan that it was observing the prosecutor and it did not see any improper signaling. Juan was unconvinced, and asked the court for permission to raise his hand when he saw the prosecutor making these signals. The district court was having none of it, though, and chastised Juan for this request. It told Juan to not even think about it and threatened that if he dare[d] to disrupt th[e] courtroom, the district court would force Juan into his chair or make him watch the trial in front of a TV set in the jail.23 23 While the district court forbade Juan from disrupting proceedings by raising his hand, it did offer Juan the opportunity to file a motion regarding the alleged hand gestures. Juan declined to do so. -50-
[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). There is a difference between expressions of impatience, annoyance or ire, on the one hand, which are permissible, and bias or partiality, on the other hand, which are forbidden. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the allegations raised by Juan fall into the former category. Both actions -- warning Juan not to stare at the jury and prohibiting him from raising his hand in the middle of questioning by the government -- are simply efforts at courtroom administration which are well within the district court's discretion. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556. Even the district court's alleged threat that if Juan dare[d] to disrupt th[e] courtroom, the district court could force Juan into his chair or make him watch the trial in front of a TV set in the jail is nothing more than an attempt to get Juan to behave and not disrupt proceedings. To be sure, these admonishments are stern and somewhat harsh. But that alone is insufficient to establish bias. See id. (A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration -- even a stern and -51- short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration -- remain immune.); Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 35. Moreover, the district court went out of its way to ensure that the jury did not become aware of these admonishments -- it sent notes to Juan's counsel instructing Juan not to stare at the jury, and the discussion involving Juan raising his hand occurred at a sidebar. Given this discretion, we fail to see how Juan was prejudiced by the comments. See Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 35 ([A] trial judge's frustration displayed at sidebar does not deprive a defendant of a fair trial.); Logue, 103 F.3d at 1046 (holding that a statement made outside the presence of the jury does not irretrievably taint the trial).24 3. The District Court's Treatment of Alleged Improper Jury Contact Finally, Juan and Cummings (through his supplemental pro se brief) also contend that the district court was biased in its 24 Unconnected to any particular concern about these admonitions, Juan also contends that the district court was biased based on statements that Juan says show it had formed an opinion with regards to the ultimate issue of [Juan's] guilt. Juan bases that contention on statements the district court made late in the trial -- out of the hearing of the jury -- including telling Juan that Juan was in charge in Villas De Monterrey. Even if these statements could be taken to suggest that the district court had by that point formed an opinion as to Defendants' guilt, the law is clear that a judge who over the course of the trial becomes exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person, is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings . . . . Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550-51. -52- treatment of Juan's allegation of improper contact between the prosecutor and a juror. a. Relevant Facts During trial, Juan's counsel advised the district court of an alleged prohibited contact between the prosecutor and a juror in the cafeteria in which the two discussed the weapons in the case. In response, the district court questioned the prosecutors and the court security officer, all of whom denied the contact. It also agreed to hear the testimony of a witness, but would only do so in open court since the public had a right to know what was occurring. When Juan's counsel proffered that the witness was unwilling to do so (but would testify to the court in chambers), the district court denied the motion, finding the allegation was unsubstantiated and smells like a red herring. It added that it is natural for somebody who is in that circumstance to try to do whatever it takes to try to derail the procedure and that it would believe the word of an official Assistant U.S. Attorney, two of them, that says this did not happen.25 25 These comments were based, at least in part, on the fact that the alleged conversation -- that the juror allegedly told the Assistant U.S. Attorney that he would sign[] whatever was necessary for the weapons that were in evidence -- does not even make sense. For that reason, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that no inappropriate contact had occurred, and so we also reject Cummings's pro se argument that this incident deprived him of an impartial jury. -53- b. The District Court's Treatment of the Allegation Did Not Evince Bias There is nothing here to suggest bias on the part of the district court. The court took the allegation seriously and was willing to hold a hearing. It questioned the Assistant U.S. Attorney and the court security officer, and it was willing to question another witness as well. That the district court refused to close the courtroom to question this witness does not show bias; rather, it is just an example of the district court exercising its wide discretion to determine the scope of [a] resulting inquiry and the mode and manner in which it will be conducted. United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d 242, 250 (1st Cir. 2001). Juan and Cummings simply disagree with the court's resolution of the issue, which is insufficient to establish bias. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 ([J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.). 4. The Cumulative Effect of These Circumstances Did Not Evince Bias Even though each of the allegations raised by Defendants does not, on its own, show bias, we must still consider whether these allegations in the aggregate demonstrate judicial bias. See Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 35; Logue, 103 F.3d at 1045. After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that they do not. These isolated events, none of which showed bias, did not somehow combine to create such a biased atmosphere that Defendants were -54- deprived of a fair trial. Accordingly, we reject Defendants' arguments regarding judicial bias. And because we find no credible claim for judicial bias, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's recusal motion due to bias. See United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2009) (We review a ruling on a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion . . . . [and] will sustain the district court's ruling unless we find that it cannot be defended as a rational conclusion supported by [a] reasonable reading of the record. (internal quotation marks omitted)). D. The Sufficiency of the Evidence for Cummings's Machinegun Convictions Counts Five and Six of the superseding indictment charged Cummings with illegal possession of a machinegun and possession of firearms (including machineguns) in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, respectively. Cummings challenges his convictions on these counts, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish his knowledge that the firearms were machineguns. We review these sufficiency claims de novo. United States v. Shaw, 670 F.3d 360, 362 (1st Cir. 2012). 1. Relevant Facts On May 2, 2012, while executing a search warrant at the Housing Project, law enforcement officials discovered a closed red and black bag in Cummings's apartment. The bag contained four firearms, two of which were .40-caliber Glock pistols with visible, -55- external chips which converted the pistols into automatic firearms. During his subsequent interrogation, Cummings admitted that he often stored weapons and drugs for the organization and was going to be paid around $400 for storing this particular bag. At trial, Rivas, one of the cooperating witnesses, testified that he had seen Cummings testing fully automatic weapons, including a black pistol which was either a .40 or .45 caliber. 2. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Convict Cummings In reviewing claims of insufficiency, we consider the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Id. So long as any reasonable jury could find all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the conviction. United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 2006). Here, Cummings concedes that the evidence established that he possessed firearms and possessed firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. He argues, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish the additional element that he knew the firearms had been modified to fire automatically, thus bringing them under the definition of a machinegun. See United States v. Nieves-Castaño, 480 F.3d 597, 599 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), the government must . . . prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the weapon had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory -56- definition of a machinegun. (internal quotation marks omitted)). According to Cummings, the government provided no evidence that he opened up the bag or was told what the bag contained, and thus there is no evidence to show that he knew the guns were machineguns and not regular firearms. Though a close call, we disagree. This case is quite similar to a previous case, United States v. Azubike, in which a defendant convicted of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute narcotics argued that while the evidence established that he knew the suitcase he was transporting contained something illegal, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the suitcase contained a controlled substance. 564 F.3d 59, 61-62, 64 (1st Cir. 2009) (Azubike II); 504 F.3d 30, 32-36 (1st Cir. 2007) (Azubike I). Two separate panels of this court upheld the conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds,26 explaining that a number of factors and inferences made it possible for a jury to conclude that Azubike would likely have known the contents. These included a recorded phone conversation in which Azubike did not want to talk about the stuff over the phone, the close relationship between Azubike and the conspiracy's 26 Azubike's first conviction was upheld on sufficiency grounds but reversed due to prosecutorial misstatements during closing arguments. Azubike I, 504 F.3d at 36, 40-42. After Azubike was convicted a second time, we once again concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Azubike II, 564 F.3d at 64-66. -57- leaders, the fact that Azubike was entrusted with a large amount of drugs (thus suggesting he was trustworthy), and the modus operandi of the crime. Azubike II, 564 F.3d at 64-65; Azubike I, 504 F.3d at 37-38. Many of those same factors are present here. First, Cummings admitted during his interrogation that he often stored guns and drugs for the organization. The repetitive nature of this process (his modus operandi) could lead a jury to infer that simply by being handed the bag and being told how much he would be expected to be paid, Cummings would understand what the bag contained. Second, the fact that Cummings had stored weapons and drugs before suggests that he was trusted by his co-conspirators, and positions of trust often come with increased access to information. See Azubike I, 504 F.3d at 37 ([A] reasonable inference of knowledge arises when the defendant is trusted with possession of a large amount of drugs. This is because drug organizations do not usually take unnecessary risks by trusting critical transactions to outsiders.); see also Azubike II, 564 F.3d at 65. Third, the evidence established that Cummings and Christopher -- one of the leaders of the organization -- were close. First, remember the phone calls between Christopher and Cummings while Cummings was incarcerated. Not only did Christopher -58- attempt to pay for Cummings's counsel, but he also confided in Cummings that he believed members of the organization knew that Christopher was going to be targeted, and that retribution would be taken on those who were not loyal. Second, Díaz testified that he would use Cummings's car when going on rounds for Christopher. That Cummings was willing to give up his car so that Christopher could order these activities further supports a close relationship between the two. Given this apparent closeness, a jury could rationally conclude that Christopher would have confided in him regarding the details of the bag. See Azubike II, 564 F.3d at 6465; see also Azubike I, 504 F.3d at 37. Finally, Rivas testified that Cummings had tested the organization's weapons in the past and had been seen firing .40 or .45 caliber black pistols which had been modified to fire automatically shortly before Cummings was given the bag seized during the May 2 search. Given that Cummings had been seen with machineguns previously, a reasonable jury could infer that Cummings knew that these were the types of guns he was being asked to safeguard.27 27 This last point is the key difference between the present case and Nieves-Castaño, the case relied upon by Cummings. In NievesCastaño, we found insufficient evidence of knowledge because the modifications to make the gun fire automatically were all internal and there was no evidence that the defendant was knowledgeable about firearms or had fired the AK-47 rifle previously. 480 F.3d at 600-02. Here, by contrast, the government presented evidence that Cummings had a practice of storing firearms for the organization and had been seen testing automatic weapons shortly -59- Though far from the strongest of cases, we believe that the cumulation of all of this circumstantial evidence is just enough to sustain the jury's verdict. See Shaw, 670 F.3d at 362 (Individual pieces of evidence viewed in isolation may be insufficient in themselves to prove a point, but in cumulation may indeed meet the mark.). Accordingly, we reject Cummings's challenge. E. The Courtroom Closings Christopher, meanwhile, also argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when it removed his wife and children from the courtroom. We review this allegation de novo. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1998). 1. Relevant Facts During the fourth day of trial, the district court ordered that Christopher's wife and two minor children -- aged ten and fourteen -- be removed from the courtroom. Christopher's counsel learned of this exclusion after the day had ended, so he brought the issue to the district court's attention at the start of day five. Upon raising the issue, the district court acknowledged that it had ordered all three family members removed, stating that they had been disruptive. Regarding Christopher's wife, the before the search. Thus, while there was no evidence from which to infer knowledge in Nieves-Castaño, there was here. -60- district court explained that it had observed her moving her lips at the witness with great distaste and that the witness had seen her doing so. As to the children, the district court explained that they were disrupting a little bit. It added that it d[id]n't want the children here, because this is not a place for children . . . . [to] listen to th[ese] kind of conversations that are recorded, nor to see drugs distributed at a drug point . . . . [b]ecause I don't think that -- nobody should validate or let children be exposed to that to begin with. It went on to note that it would never let a child of mine listen to this thing, nor hear the language spoken on this tape. After hearing this explanation, Christopher's counsel asked if Christopher's wife was barred from returning, to which the district court responded in the negative. The court instructed Christopher's counsel that if Christopher's wife wants to come in and behave like a person should . . . and stay seated and put, then she could come back. However, it warned that a court officer would be seated behind Christopher's wife and if this happens again, [the court will] get her out, and she will be banned forever. Christopher's counsel never asked if the children could return, nor did he object to their continued exclusion. 2. Christopher's Sixth Amendment Right Was Not Violated The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and -61- public trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right was 'created for the benefit of the defendant,' as openness in criminal proceedings 'encourages witnesses to come forward,' 'discourages perjury,' and 'ensure[s] that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly.' Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)). Accordingly, closing a criminal trial to the public is rare, and before a closure is permitted, a four-part inquiry must be satisfied: [1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Id. (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 48). This test, however, applies to total closures -- where all members of the public are excluded during some portion of the trial. Id. In partial closures -- i.e., where courtroom access is restricted but some members of the public are permitted to attend -- this court and several of our sister circuits have held that a 'substantial' interest, rather than a 'compelling' one, will justify [a] partial closure. Id. Because only Christopher's wife and children were removed from the courtroom, we analyze the -62- exclusions under the modified Waller test for partial closures.28 Id. at 27. a. Christopher's Wife The exclusion of Christopher's wife complied with the modified Waller test. First, the district court explained that it observed Christopher's wife making faces and mouthing words of disapproval at the witness, and that the district court believed that the witness saw these actions. We agree that such actions could be seen as an attempt at witness intimidation, and the prevention of witness intimidation is clearly a substantial interest. See Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871, 873 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding the exclusion of defendant's family members during the reopening of a witness's testimony where the witness stated that her initial testimony had been untrue because she had been given looks by defendant's family and felt intimidated); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 1997) (requiring that the public identify themselves before entering the courtroom constituted a partial closure but was permissible because the district court observed individuals coming into the courtroom and staring at witnesses); Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding a partial, temporary closure where 28 We reject the government's argument that there was never a closure of any kind. Christopher's wife and children were removed from the courtroom and forbidden from returning on that day. The courtroom was closed to them, and thus a partial closure existed. -63- defendant's family was excluded because, after observing the family members and the witness and having a brief exchange with the witness, the district court believed family members were intimidating witnesses). Second, we believe that the district court's requirement that Christopher's wife leave until she promised to behave herself was no broader than necessary to protect this substantial interest. As soon as Christopher's wife stopped mouthing words and staring at witnesses, she was to be allowed back in, and thus, the removal was neither broader nor longer than was reasonably necessary to end this . . . harassment and secure the witness's accurate testimony. Martin, 118 F.3d at 875. Third, while it would have been better for the district court to have explicitly stated that it had considered reasonable alternatives to removing Christopher's wife, we have previously held that such a consideration can be implicit. See id. at 875 & n.4. This is especially true here, where no reasonable and lessbroad alternative existed. Christopher suggests that the court should have publicly admonished his wife and warned her to stop before removing her, as opposed to making that a condition for reentry, and that it should have questioned the witness to determine whether he had seen Christopher's wife's actions and been intimidated by them. However, we believe neither of these alternatives to be reasonable under the circumstances. The -64- district court was concerned that the witness was being intimidated and wanted to take action to ensure that that did not happen. Had the court stopped the proceedings, questioned the witness, and scolded Christopher's wife, all this would have done is disrupt the proceedings, draw attention to the situation, and possibly even enhance the intimidation felt by the witness. Nothing in Waller or in any other case cited by [Christopher] suggests that a trial judge, presented with evidence of . . . witness intimidation . . . must undertake an assessment of the exact level of affrightment . . . before closing a courtroom. Id. at 875. In fact, the law is to the contrary. See id. Finally, as already explained, the district court informed Christopher's counsel that Christopher's wife was removed because she was staring at the witness moving her lips with great distaste and that the witness had seen her doing so. This is an adequate finding to support the partial closure. See Martin, 118 F.3d at 873; Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1155-56; Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d at 77-78. Accordingly, the exclusion of Christopher's wife during the fourth day of trial met the modified Waller test and did not violate Christopher's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. b. Christopher's Children In stark contrast to his wife's exclusion, where Christopher's counsel asked specifically whether she was barred and -65- if she could return, Christopher's counsel remained silent with regards to Christopher's children and never sought to have them readmitted. This silence is fatal to Christopher's claim. When the subject matter [is] unmistakably on the table, and the defense's silence is reasonably understood only as signifying agreement that there was nothing objectionable, the issue is waived on appeal. United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138, 142 (1st Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d 179, 187 (1st Cir. 2013) (The judge put the exclusion matter squarely on the table for all the defendants' lawyers at sidebar . . . . Each attorney had the chance to speak up. . . . So [defendant's counsel's] silence constitutes classic waiver . . . .); Martineau v. Perrin, 601 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (1st Cir. 1979). Given that the closure issue was front-and-center -- indeed, it was the entire point of the colloquy -- Christopher's counsel's silence as to Christopher's children can only be understood as implicit agreement that they should remain barred from the courtroom. Accordingly, this argument is nothing but an afterthought on appeal, and thus waived. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1960) (Due regard generally for the public nature of the judicial process does not require disregard of the solid demands of the fair administration of justice in favor of a party who, at the appropriate time and acting under advice of counsel, saw no -66- disregard of a right, but raises an abstract claim only as an afterthought on appeal.). We pause for a moment, however, to sound a note of caution. A defendant has a clear right to have his family present during proceedings -- and we know of no exception for minor children. See United States v. Negrón-Sostre, --- F.3d ---, Nos. 10-1974, 10-2042, 10-2055, 10-2057, 10-2129, 2015 WL 3898794, at  (1st Cir. Jun. 25, 2015) ([W]ithout exception all courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see also United States v. Rivera, 602 F. App'x 372, 377 (9th Cir. 2015); Downs v. Lape, 657 F.3d 97, 108 (2d Cir. 2011) (Chin, J., dissenting). Whether any individual child should be allowed to observe proceedings and possibly be exposed to harsh language, violence, and other untoward situations is a decision for that child's parents, not for the district court.29 The court's troubling blanket view that the courtroom was not a place for children is not only overly paternalistic, but also potentially in contradiction with the Sixth Amendment. 29 Indeed, the child's parents may find such observation to have educational benefits despite the adult themes. Observing the judicial system in action can be a valuable civics lesson for a person of any age, and especially for an adolescent. -67- F. Cumulative Error Finally, Defendants argue that even if no single error warrants reversal, the cumulative effect of these errors form an interconnected web of unfairness. While we agree that [i]ndividual errors, insufficient in themselves to necessitate a new trial, may in the aggregate have a more debilitating effect, United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1993), that is not the situation presently before us. Defendants allege a host of errors, but only one has any potential merit: Agent James's testimony as to Christopher's involvement in the conspiracy which was both beyond his personal knowledge and beyond the scope of the question asked. But as we discussed above, any error was harmless. And there can be no cumulative error when multiple errors do not exist. See United States v. DeSimone, 699 F.3d 113, 128 (1st Cir. 2012) (The cumulative error doctrine is of no use to [defendant] because the only identified error was harmless.); United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1997) (By definition, cumulative-error analysis is inappropriate when a party complains of the cumulative effect of non-errors.).