Opinion ID: 789803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental Competence to Stand Trial

Text: 21 Lyons argues the district court should have set aside his conviction because the evidence demonstrates he was not mentally competent to stand trial. Lyons also claims any procedural default of this claim should be excused due to his mental incompetence. Finally, Lyons contends the trial court should have revisited the competency issue at trial, fourteen months after the initial competency determination. 22 The State argues Lyons defaulted on this claim by failing to present it to the Missouri state courts. The State also contends, even if Lyons did not default, the trial court reasonably determined Lyons was competent to stand trial. 23 It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992). To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial. Id. at 181, 95 S.Ct. 896. Still, [n]ot every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial.... Similarly, neither low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with mental incompetence to stand trial. Vogt v. United States, 88 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). The trial court must monitor a defendant's competence during trial and should consider (1) evidence of irrational behavior by the accused, (2) the accused's demeanor at trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion as to the mental competency of the accused to stand trial. Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir.1996). Additionally, the trial court may consider an express doubt by the accused's attorney, although such doubt alone is not enough to establish sufficient doubt. Id. 24 A section 2254 applicant's failure to raise a claim in state post-conviction proceedings results in procedural default of that claim. See Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (8th Cir.1997). We have recognized competency issues are subject to procedural bar. Weekley v. Jones, 56 F.3d 889, 894-95 (8th Cir.1995), aff'd in part, 76 F.3d 1459, 1461 (8th Cir.1996) (en banc). As the State points out, regardless of how incompetent Lyons now contends he was, Lyons was represented during the state court proceedings, and Lyons's incompetence did not prevent his counsel from raising the competency issue. As noted above, Lyons's defense counsel expressly recognized their obligation to monitor closely Lyons's mental fitness to proceed with the trial. See n.3, supra. Thus, Lyons procedurally defaulted on this trial competency claim. 25 However, regardless of any default, Lyons would not prevail on the merits of the trial competency claim. [T]he due process clause permits a state to require a defendant to bear the burden of proving his or her own incompetence. Rhode v. Olk-Long, 84 F.3d 284, 288 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Medina, 505 U.S. at 450-51, 112 S.Ct. 2572). Lyons had the burden of persuasion to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, he was incompetent. Vogt, 88 F.3d at 591. Lyons has failed to meet this burden. Because competence to stand trial is a factual issue, see Boyd v. Delo, 999 F.2d 1286, 1289 (8th Cir.1993), we presume the state court's finding of competence is correct, Reynolds, 86 F.3d at 800 (On habeas review of a substantive competency claim, this court generally presumes that a state court's factual finding of competency is correct.). 26 The trial court's competency finding is supported by the record. Dr. Holcomb's report and testimony at the competency hearing were sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could find Lyons was competent to stand trial. Lyons did not present contrary testimony from his family members or his counsel at the competency hearing. Although Lyons contends Dr. Harry found him incompetent to stand trial, Lyons provides no reason why Dr. Harry was not called at the competency hearing, at the start of trial fourteen months later, or at any time in between. After the competency hearing at which both Drs. Holcomb and Johnson testified, the trial court found Lyons was mentally competent to proceed. 27 Although the trial court did not explicitly revisit the issue of Lyons's competence at trial, fourteen months after the competency hearing, Lyons presents no evidence to demonstrate something should have alerted the trial court to reconsider its competency ruling. After the competency hearing, Lyons's counsel did not revisit the competency issue again in the trial court, on appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, or in any post-conviction proceeding until this collateral proceeding. Acknowledging the presumption of correctness afforded the Missouri trial court, the district court properly concluded a sufficient evidentiary basis exists for the trial court's finding of competence.