Opinion ID: 550363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arbitrary or Capricious Government Action

Text: 25 An individual's challenge to the government's exercise of discretion in the context of civil administrative action is not as narrowly circumscribed as a challenge to the government's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the context of criminal proceedings. A selective prosecution challenge by a criminal defendant questions the propriety of a particular government decision to prosecute. As already stated, [t]he fact that not all criminals are prosecuted is no valid defense to the one prosecuted. Manno, 118 F.Supp. at 515. Because of the broad presumption of prosecutorial discretion, discovery into particular facts of an individual prosecution is not often relevant to raising genuine issues of material fact in a selective prosecution claim. 26 But a civil administrative challenge to the propriety of government agency conduct questions the fairness and consistency of discretion in the implementation of general government policy. Agency policy must be implemented and rules enforced consistently and predictably. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1073, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). Discovery of information concerning the general parameters of government policy could be material to a statutory claim of arbitrary and capricious government conduct. 27 The Administrative Procedure Act allows a person who has been adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action to seek judicial review of that action if (1) review has not been precluded by statute, and (2) the agency action is not committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701(a)(1)-(2). See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2051, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988). In the case of civil forfeiture actions commenced by the government under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881, Congress has not passed legislation that precludes judicial review, nor has it committed forfeiture decisions to Department of Justice discretion. 3 28 Civil forfeitures, then, as the product of administrative agency action, are subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A)-(B) (1977). Where the government does not act in a consistent and predictable manner, it runs the risk of violating these statutory requirements and of having its action invalidated under these provisions. 29 A court reviewing agency action shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (1977). In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court must determine whether the agency examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 824, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). 30 Glenn's Mercedes was seized in response to discovery of a personal use quantity of cocaine found on his person during a search incident to a lawful arrest. Though Glenn was arrested for charges of drug trafficking, those charges were not the basis for the forfeiture of his automobile. The forfeiture is predicated on the fact that a quantity of controlled substance was discovered on Glenn's person directly after he was observed driving his car. The car therefore transported the substance under the relevant forfeiture statutes, 4 potentially a valid basis for forfeiture under zero tolerance policies, despite the small quantity of substance found. See United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir.1979). 31 Glenn admits the existence of the cocaine on his person at the time of his arrest. He does not question that the government has established probable cause to believe that the cocaine was transported under the relevant statutes. Neither does he question the validity of the initial seizure of his car under the forfeiture laws as they now stand. 32 He does challenge the government's pursuit of the forfeiture action against his Mercedes automobile, and views the forfeiture as punishment for a crime of which he was eventually acquitted. Glenn contends that when his Mercedes was seized in 1986, policies may have existed in the Northern District of California regarding forfeiture enforcement for personal use quantities of illicit drugs. Information concerning these policies may reflect upon the appropriateness of government action in Glenn's case, and Glenn's contention is that, but for the dismissal of the criminal case against him, the government would not have pursued the forfeiture based on a personal use quantity of cocaine. 33 His contention may not be far-fetched. Controversy has arisen in recent years concerning the appropriateness of the government's pursuit of forfeiture actions based on de minimis amounts of controlled substances. The controversy centers on the distinction between de minimis quantities discovered as sweepings, i.e., the residual evidence of previously transported larger drug quantities, and personal use quantities of drugs. Authorities stand firm that sweepings should serve as valid bases for forfeitures. 54 Fed.Reg. 37607-08 (1989). But concerns persist that forfeiture for personal use quantities do not serve the underlying purposes of the forfeiture laws. 5 Because of these concerns, it is quite possible that when Glenn's Mercedes was seized in 1986 there were agency guidelines in existence to assist government personnel in determining which forfeiture actions should be pursued and which should be dropped. 34 To prevail on his claim that the agency impermissibly departed from its own policy in seizing his property, Glenn must establish that the policy in question had the force and effect of law, i.e., that the policy (1) prescribe[d] substantive rules--not interpretive rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice--and, (2) conform[ed] to certain procedural requirements. Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 210, 74 L.Ed.2d 168 (1982) (emphasis in original). As we explained in Rank, the second requirement means that the agency policy must have been promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority, so that a policy that was neither published in the Federal Register nor disseminated to the public for scrutiny and comment will not have the force and effect of law. Id. An agency policy that can only be unearthed by discovery of the agency's internal workings cannot be a policy that was disseminated to the public. Consequently, no policy that Glenn might find through discovery would have the force and effect of law. 35 Glenn's argument that he is entitled to discovery to prove that the government had no policy regarding forfeitures for casual drug use is also without merit. The government was not required to have such a policy. [T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1771, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580, 91 L.Ed.2d 1995 (1947)). Thus, Glenn would not have benefitted from discovery proving the absence of a policy regarding forfeitures for personal use quantities. 36 Because discovery could not have established that the government acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA, either by deviating from, or failing to have, a policy with respect to forfeitures for personal use quantities; and because Glenn failed to produce evidence of improper government motivation sufficient to justify discovery in his vindictive prosecution claim, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. 37 AFFIRMED.