Opinion ID: 1235129
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Downgraded Performance Evaluation Claim

Text: In his second claim, White alleges that Baxter violated Title VII by intentionally downgrading his 2004 performance evaluation because White is an African-American. In particular, White claims that Phillips' decision to give him a Meets Minus rating, as opposed to the Meets rating to which White claims he was entitled, was motivated, at least in part, by White's race. In other words, White challenges his allegedly downgraded performance evaluation under a mixed-motive theory pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). This section of Title VII permits a plaintiff to show that the defendant has engaged in an unlawful employment practice by demonstrat[ing] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for [the] employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). White supports his mixed-motive claim with circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence. Our Circuit, however, has not yet determined the proper summary judgment framework to apply to a Title VII mixed-motive claim supported by circumstantial evidence. [8] See Tysinger v. Police Dept. of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir.2006) (refusing to decide whether the evidence [in a Title VII mixed-motive case] is evaluated in terms of prima facie case elements, pretext requirements, or a mixed-motive analysis apart from the McDonnell Douglas framework because [u]nder any of these constructs, [the plaintiff]'s evidence clearly falls short of creating a genuine issue of material fact); Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 713 n. 4 (6th Cir.2006) (Because . . . the facts of the instant case do not require resolution of the question, we refrain today from announcing a new or modified framework for evaluation of mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage.). Accordingly, we must begin our discussion of White's downgraded performance evaluation claim with a consideration of the appropriate summary judgment framework to apply to mixed-motive claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
Since 1964, Title VII has made it an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Discrimination claims brought pursuant to this section are traditionally categorized as either single-motive claims, i.e., where an illegitimate reason motivated an employment decision, or mixed-motive claims, i.e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the employer's decision. Wright, 455 F.3d at 711. This distinction was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, when it considered the issue of whether an employment decision is made because of a protected characteristic in a mixed-motive case. 490 U.S. 228, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). A divided Court found that, while Title VII prohibits an employer from taking a protected characteristic into account at all when making an employment decision, an employer could avoid liability under the statute by demonstrating that it would have made the same employment decision even if it had not taken into account the protected characteristic. See id. at 242, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion). In response to the Price Waterhouse decision and other Title VII decisions, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 250, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994). Among other things, section 107 of this act created an alternative method of demonstrating an unlawful employment practice: Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The purpose and effect of this section was to eliminate the employer's ability to escape liability in Title VII mixed-motive cases by proving that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motivation. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); accord Wright, 455 F.3d at 711. Under the statute, such proof only enables the employer to limit the remedies available to the plaintiff-employee for the Title VII violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (prohibiting damages awards and allowing only the grant of declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees when the defendant-employer proves that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor). For the first decade after the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), many federal courts required a Title VII plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim under this section to produce direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence that consideration of a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision. See, e.g., Wexler, 317 F.3d at 571 (Under this mixed-motive analysis, the plaintiff must produce direct evidence that the employer considered impermissible factors when it made the adverse employment decision at issue. (emphasis added) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-46, 109 S.Ct. 1775)); Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (A plaintiff qualifies for the more advantageous standard of liability applicable in mixed-motive cases if the plaintiff presents `direct evidence that decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion.' (citation omitted)). As mixed-motive plaintiffs were not allowed to demonstrate their claims through circumstantial evidence, these courts did not even consider whether such plaintiffs should be required to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden shifting framework in order to reach a jury. [9] See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) ([T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.); Wright, 455 F.3d at 716 (Moore, J., concurring) (Our pre- Desert Palace view that direct evidence was required to establish a mixed-motive case, kept mixed-motive claims distinct from claims analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which was applied when the plaintiff relied on circumstantial evidence.). In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa , the Supreme Court altered this practice by finding that a plaintiff may prove a Title VII mixed-motive case by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 539 U.S. 90, 92, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). Relying on the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the Court held that in order to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction, a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that `race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.' Id. at 101, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). However, as the issue in Desert Palace concerned a jury-instruction challenge, the Court did not consider whether the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework should apply to the pretrial summary judgment analysis of mixed-motive discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence in the same way that it applies to single-motive discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence. See Tysinger, 463 F.3d at 577; Suits v. Heil, 192 Fed.Appx. 399, 408 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished). Since Desert Palace, the federal courts of appeals have, without much, if any, consideration of the issue, developed widely differing approaches to the question of how to analyze summary judgment challenges in Title VII mixed-motive cases. See generally Wright, 455 F.3d at 716-19 (Moore, J., concurring) (discussing and evaluating the responses of our sister circuits to the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace ). The Eighth Circuit has explicitly held that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework applies to the summary judgment analysis of mixed-motive claims after Desert Palace. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir.2004) ([W]e conclude that Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions.). The Eleventh Circuit seems to have joined the Eighth Circuit in this regard. See Burstein v. Emtel, Inc., 137 Fed.Appx. 205, 209 n. 8 (11th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas analysis continues to apply in mixed-motive cases without modification post- Desert Palace ); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n. 17 (11th Cir.2004) (rejecting an argument that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis . . . was radically revised by the Supreme Court in Desert Palace  and noting that after Desert Palace was decided, this Court has continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis in non-mixed-motive cases). The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has adopted a modified McDonnell Douglas  approach, under which a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case can rebut the defendant's legitimate non-discriminatory reason not only through evidence of pretext (the traditional McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden), but also with evidence that the defendant's proffered reason is only one of the reasons for its conduct (the mixed-motive alternative). See Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir.2005); Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir.2004). Adopting a sort of middle ground between these two positions are the Fourth and Ninth Circuits which permit a mixed-motive plaintiff to avoid a defendant's motion for summary judgment by proceeding either under the pretext framework of the traditional McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis or by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an impermissible factor such as race motivated [, at least in part,] the adverse employment decision. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.2005); see Hill, 354 F.3d at 284-85; McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir.2004) (finding that a mixed-motive plaintiff may proceed using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the employment decision). The D.C. Circuit appears to have recently joined this middle ground approach. See Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 & n (D.C.Cir.2007) (indicating that a plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice by showing that `discrimination or retaliation played a motivating part or was a substantial factor in the employment decision' but noting that a plaintiff may also, of course, use evidence of pretext and the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove a mixed-motive case). Failing to adopt any of these views, the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have refrained from deciding whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to mixed-motive claims. See Houser v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 216 Fed.Appx. 263, 265 (3d Cir.2007) (unpublished) (refusing to decide the issue because the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment under any mixed-motive standard); Furaus v. Citadel Comm. Corp., 168 Fed.Appx. 257, 260 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (refusing to decide the issue because the plaintiff failed to properly preserve the argument for appeal); Rodriguez v. Sears Roebuck De Puerto Rico, Inc., 432 F.3d 379, 380-81 (1st Cir. 2005); Hillstrom v. Best Western TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2003). Finally, the Second and Seventh Circuits appear not to have even considered this issue. Our Circuit, like the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits, has yet to resolve the question of the appropriate framework to apply to Title VII mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage despite having been presented with the issue in five (two published, three unpublished) prior cases. See Tysinger, 463 F.3d at 578 (finding it unnecessary to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas framework still applies in analyzing mixed-motive summary judgment challenges because the plaintiff's evidence failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the employment decision); Wright, 455 F.3d at 712-13 (same); Suits, 192 Fed.Appx. at 408 (finding that whatever the import of Desert Palace . . . [m]ixed motive analysis cannot apply here because plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence from which a trier of fact could find that discrimination was even partly a motivation for her termination); Aquino v. Honda of America, Inc., 158 Fed.Appx. 667, 674-76 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (failing to address the impact of Desert Palace on Title VII claims, but holding that  Desert Palace does not modify McDonnell Douglas in employment discrimination lawsuits filed under § 1981); Harris v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 133 Fed.Appx. 288, 297 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (finding it unnecessary to address the question of whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework should be modified in the wake of Desert Palace  because the plaintiff had not set forth sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that race was a motivating factor in the employment decision). But see Wright, 455 F.3d at 720-21 (Moore, J., concurring) (proposing that we resolve the issue by finding that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to mixed-motive claims based on circumstantial evidence). This case now presents us with the opportunity to finally clarify how Title VII mixed-motive claims should be analyzed at the summary judgment stage. We do so by holding that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to the summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims. [10] We likewise hold that to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). See Wright, 455 F.3d at 716 (Moore, J., concurring) ([A]n employee raising a mixed-motive claim can defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment by presenting evidence  either direct or circumstantial  to `demonstrate' that a protected characteristic `was a motivating factor for an employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m))). This burden of producing some evidence in support of a mixed-motive claim is not onerous and should preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff's claim. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, as it is irrelevant, for purposes of a summary judgment determination, whether the plaintiff has presented direct or circumstantial evidence in support of the mixed-motive claim, see Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99-100, 123 S.Ct. 2148, we direct that this summary judgment analysis just described, rather than the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework, be applied in all Title VII mixed-motive cases regardless of the type of proof presented by the plaintiff. Our refusal to extend the application of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework to our summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims is based upon a careful consideration of the Supreme Court's opinions in those cases. In Burdine, the Court explained that the purpose of the  McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens is to bring litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to [the] ultimate question of whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. In single-motive Title VII cases, the McDonnell Douglas shifting burdens of production effectively accomplish this task by smok[ing] out the single, ultimate reason for the adverse employment decision. Wright, 455 F.3d at 720 (Moore, J, concurring). In particular, the prima facie case requirement eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action, and thus creates a presumption that the adverse employment action was not motivated by legitimate reasons, but rather by a discriminatory animus. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Likewise, the pretext requirement is designed to test whether the defendant's allegedly legitimate reason was the real motivation for its actions. Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Such a narrowing of the actual reasons for the adverse employment action is necessary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed to trial in a single-motive discrimination case because the plaintiff in such a case must prove that the defendant's discriminatory animus, and not some legitimate business concern, was the ultimate reason for the adverse employment action. See id. However, this elimination of possible legitimate reasons for the defendant's action is not needed when assessing whether trial is warranted in the mixed-motive context. In mixed-motive cases, a plaintiff can win simply by showing that the defendant's consideration of a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). In order to reach a jury, the plaintiff is not required to eliminate or rebut all the possible legitimate motivations of the defendant as long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that an illegitimate discriminatory animus factored into the defendant's decision to take the adverse employment action. As the shifting burdens of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine are unnecessary to assist a court in determining whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to convince a jury of the presence of at least one illegitimate motivation on the part of the defendant, we conclude that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework does not apply to our summary judgment analysis of mixed-motive claims. The only question that a court need ask in determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to submit his claim to a jury in such cases is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that `race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for' the defendant's adverse employment decision. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). A Title VII plaintiff may certainly find parts of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework to be useful in presenting a mixed-motive claim. As Judge Moore has aptly noted: Although the employee need not establish a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case to defeat a motion for summary judgment on a mixed-motive claim, setting forth a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas can aid the employee in showing that an illegitimate reason motivated the adverse employment decision. [Likewise, in] assessing whether an employee has demonstrated that an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor in the employer's adverse decision, the court should also consider evidence presented by the employer that the protected characteristic was not a motivating factor for its employment decision. Wright, 455 F.3d at 720 (Moore, J., concurring). Nevertheless, we emphasize that compliance with the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine shifting burdens of production is not required in order to demonstrate that the defendant's adverse employment action was motivated in part by a consideration of the plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The ultimate question for the court in making a summary judgment determination in such a case is not whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to survive the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine shifting burdens, but rather whether there are any genuine issues of material fact concerning the defendant's motivation for its adverse employment decision, and, if none are present, whether the law  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)  supports a judgment in favor of the moving party on the basis of the undisputed facts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As [i]nquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer's decision are very fact intensive, such issues will generally be difficult to determine at the summary judgment stage and thus will typically require sending the case to the jury. Wright, 455 F.3d at 721 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir.2004)).
Having determined the appropriate pretrial legal framework to apply to mixed-motive Title VII cases, we now proceed to consider whether Baxter is entitled to summary judgment on White's downgraded performance evaluation claim. To survive Baxter's motion for summary judgment, White must be able to point to evidence in the record on which a jury could reasonably conclude that (1) Baxter's took an adverse employment action against White, for which (2) White's race was a motivating factor. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to White, we find that White is able to meet this minimal burden of production, and thus that Baxter is not entitled to summary judgment.
As indicated in the above framework, in order to present a claim, either mixed-motive or single-motive, under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an adverse employment action. See White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc), aff'd in relevant part, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). An adverse employment action is an action by the employer that constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). In general, a negative performance evaluation does not constitute an adverse employment action unless the evaluation has an adverse impact on an employee's wages or salary. Tuttle v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 322 (6th Cir.2007); see also Holt v. Morgan, 79 Fed.Appx. 139, 141 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished); Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir.1999); Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.1999). Thus, to characterize a negative performance evaluation as an adverse employment action the plaintiff must point to a tangible employment action that she alleges she suffered, or is in jeopardy of suffering, because of the downgraded evaluation. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2000). In the instant case, we find that White's allegedly downgraded performance evaluation constitutes an adverse employment action. While the performance evaluation is not nearly as negative as White's characterization of it suggests, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to reasonably conclude that White has suffered negative employment consequences as a result of the performance evaluation. In particular, the record indicates that by receiving a Meets Minus ranking, White did not receive as a high of a pay increase as he would have if he had received the Meets evaluation to which he claims he was entitled. Baxter's own 2004 PMO Grid clearly indicates that a TCS with a Meets Minus evaluation will receive only a two percent or less pay raise whereas a TCS with a Meets evaluation will receive a three percent pay raise. See J.A. at 673. Moreover, at his deposition, White testified that he did not receive as high of a pay raise as he should have for the 2004 fiscal year: Q: What are the financial consequences if you get a does not meet [on your performance evaluation]? A: There's no increase [in your salary]. Q: And if you get a meets, what happens? A: You get an increase. Q: If you get a meets minus, what happens, do you get an increase? A: I believe you get less of an increase that you would if it was a meets. Q: Did you get an increase from 2004  A: I did get an increase. Q: I'm sorry, you did? A: I did, but not the increase if it would have been a meets outside those extenuating circumstances that affected my territory. J.A. at 137. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to White suggests that, while White did receive an increase in his salary based upon his 2004 job performance, the increase was not as large as it would have been if White had received a better performance evaluation. We find this evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury that White's allegedly downgraded performance evaluation caused him to suffer a significant change in benefits. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257. By receiving a lower salary increase than he would have without the more negative evaluation, White was denied an increase in pay to which he allegedly was entitled. Under our precedent, such a deprivation of increased compensation does constitute an adverse employment action. See Clay, 501 F.3d at 710 (holding that deprivation of increased compensation as the result of a failure to train constitutes an adverse employment action); Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir.2006) ([D]enial of money would more than amply qualify as a materially adverse action to any reasonable employee for Title VII purposes.); Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir.2000) (accepting that the denial of the proper pay increase with the plaintiff's promotion constituted an adverse employment action); see also Fierros v. Texas Dept. of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that denial of a pay increase can constitute an adverse employment action). Thus, White's evidence does suggest that he has suffered a tangible employment action as a result of his downgraded performance evaluation. Morris, 201 F.3d at 798. At minimum, White has produced enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the downgraded performance evaluation in this case had an adverse impact on his receipt of wages or salary. Tuttle, 474 F.3d at 322. Accordingly, we hold that White has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he suffered an adverse employment action in the form of his downgraded 2004 performance evaluation.
The second issue we must consider with regard to Baxter's summary judgment motion is whether White has presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that White's race was a motivating factor in the issuance of his downgraded 2004 performance evaluation. As Phillips was the Baxter supervisor responsible for evaluating White's 2004 performance, the question becomes whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Phillips' decision to give White a Meets Minus rating was motivated by the fact that White is an African-American. We find that White has satisfied his minimal burden of production on this issue. At the outset, we note that White has produced sufficient evidence to suggest that Phillips harbors a discriminatory animus toward African-Americans. Indeed, the record reflects that Phillips has made several comments  such as his statement that nobody wants to be around a black man  that a jury could reasonably find to be indicative of racial bias. J.A. at 106. The more difficult question, however, is whether White has produced evidence from which a jury can logically infer that Phillips' racial animus was a motivating factor in his evaluation of White's 2004 job performance. White's evidence in support of such a conclusion stems from his claim that Phillips applied the wrong standard to evaluate his 2004 performance. White argues that he was entitled to have his performance evaluated under the 2004 PMO Grid, as opposed to the criteria in the Gold E-Mail, which Phillips claims he used to evaluate White's performance. White alleges that, while the 2004 PMO Grid was applied across the board to Baxter's other employees, the Gold E-Mail was exclusively applied to him. From Phillips' failure to apply the allegedly correct standard (the 2004 PMO Grid) and his decision to apply a harsher standard (the Gold E-Mail), White argues, a jury can reasonably infer that Phillips was motivated, at least in part, by racial animus when issuing White a Meets Minus rating. We agree with White that a jury could draw such an inference from the evidence presented. White correctly contends that under the terms of the 2004 PMO Grid, which was issued in November of 2004, he was entitled to a Meets evaluation. This 2004 PMO Grid specifies that achievement of one hundred percent of the sales target in two of four products, one of which must be Suprane or Brevibloc, equals a Meets rating. J.A. at 672 (emphasis added). In 2004, White's year end sales numbers were the following: Suprane, 92%; Brevibloc, 105%; TDS, 101%; and PSA, unknown. Thus, White did achieve over one hundred percent in two of four products, one of them being Brevibloc. Under the plain terms of the 2004 PMO Grid, White should have received a Meets evaluation. Accordingly, a jury could reasonably find Phillips' failure to issue such an evaluation suspect, and thus indicative of the presence of an improper motivation  such as racial animus  for the performance evaluation decision. However, Baxter contends that the 2004 PMO Grid must be read in light of the Gold E-Mail which was circulated to all Regional Managers, including Phillips, on October 22, 2004. The Gold E-Mail emphasized the importance of increasing sales numbers for Suprane and directed that if certain sales representatives, including White, did not bring their numbers up to a minimum of 95% to plan by the end of the year then they would receive a `DOES NOT MEET' on their PMO, receive a `0' and be placed on a [Performance Improvement Plan]. Evaluated under this standard, as Baxter claims it should be, White's 2004 performance would have merited a Does Not Meet rating because White ended the year only ninety-two percent to plan on his Suprane sales. Nevertheless, in response to Baxter's position, White has introduced evidence which might reasonably convince a jury that the 2004 PMO Grid, and not the Gold E-Mail, was the standard Phillips was supposed to use to evaluate the performance of Baxter sales representatives. First, White points to the testimony of Kunz, who explained that the PMO Grid matrix is used to produce a rating for a sales representative's performance evaluation. [11] J.A. at 603. Next, White emphasizes that the 2004 PMO Grid was created after the Gold E-Mail and thus should be viewed as controlling. Finally, White provides examples of other Baxter employees whose performance appears to have been evaluated pursuant to the 2004 PMO Grid. In particular, White points to the performance evaluations of Linda Assoey, Stacey Hord, Peter Moe, Theodore Quinn, Carey Redd, Lawrence Rome, and Melissa Slyvester, who were all supervised by regional managers other than Phillips. [12] Like White, each of these sales representatives achieved less than ninety-five percent of their Suprane goal. However, rather than being given a Does Not Meet rating for failing to achieve more than ninety-five percent of their Suprane goal, as would be required under the terms of the Gold E-Mail, these sales representatives received Meets Minus ratings. White correctly observes that, in each case, the Meet Minus rating given was consistent with the 2004 PMO Grid. [13] Such evidence reasonably suggests that the 2004 PMO Grid, rather than the Gold E-Mail, was the standard actually applied for these performance evaluations. Considering all of this evidence in the light most favorable to White, as we must, we find that there is a genuine issue of fact concerning which standard  the 2004 PMO Grid or the Gold E-Mail  Phillips should have used to evaluate White's 2004 performance. If the jury were to conclude, as it reasonably could based on the evidence presented, that the 2004 PMO Grid was the appropriate standard, then it could legitimately infer from Phillips' failure to apply this correct standard that an impermissible factor  namely White's race  served as at least a partial motivation for his decision to issue White a Meets Minus performance evaluation. Thus, we find this disputed issue of fact to be material, and we hold that Baxter is not entitled to summary judgment on White's downgraded performance evaluation claim. Because White has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude in his favor on both his single-motive and mixed-motive race discrimination claims, we find that he is entitled to present these claims to a jury and accordingly remand the case to the district court for trial. As the issue of what damages White may be entitled to should he prevail on his claims at trial has not been briefed by the parties and is not presented in this summary judgment challenge, we express no view with regard to it. [14]