Opinion ID: 2074633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prejudice to Mr. Hartridge

Text: Relying on prejudice factors identified in Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, Mr. Hartridge argues that he was prejudiced by his pre-trial incarceration of 2 years, 3 months and 9 days. During this period he experienced anxiety and concern, as evidenced by his brutal beating by correctional officials and permanent scarring to his back and hands. In addition, he was falsely accused of attacking several corrections officers and was held in solitary confinement ... or at the isolation cellblock at the [D.C.] jail for a substantial period of time before trial. [16] He claims that his defense was hindered or impaired because studies ... have shown that defendants held without bond have a lesser chance of prevailing at trial, and that the government use[d] ... the time gained from all of the continuances ... to develop and improve its case. The government emphasizes that the trial court denied Mr. Hartridge's post-trial motion relating to his speedy trial contention, in part because Mr. Hartridge did not suffer `specific prejudice by way of loss of witnesses.' Mr. Hartridge was subjected to a long period of pre-trial incarceration, but [t]he passage of time alone ... is not dispositive, Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted), and greater ... delay ... will be tolerated in cases involving more serious and complex ... charge[s], here a charge of first-degree murder while armed (premeditated). Id. (citing Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1091). With respect to the anxiety and concern Mr. Hartridge allegedly suffered from an assault at the D.C. jail, as the government points out, [a] grand jury found probable cause to believe that he had assaulted guards at the jail. He was tried on felony charges for the assault, acquitted on some and the jury deadlocked on others. Although Mr. Hartridge may have suffered some anxiety and concern as a result of his alleged beating and permanent scarring, we have said previously that an appellant's other contact with the criminal justice system ... lessens any anxiety ... pending charges caused him. Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 679 (D.C.1993). Mr. Hartridge had several juvenile delinquency adjudications, and had two pending misdemeanor cases when he was arrested. Moreover, as in Turner, Mr. Hartridge makes no attempt to allege any particularized harmpsychological, economic, or otherto his family relationships, mental well-being, job prospects, or any other aspect of his life. Id. (footnote omitted). See also Hammond, supra, 880 A.2d at 1087 (an appellant must show that `the alleged anxiety and concern had a specific impact on [his] health or personal or business affairs') (citation omitted). Most telling, however concerning the prejudice prong, Mr. Hartridge's argument relating to the impairment of his defense lacks specificity. He had witnesses present at trial but chose not to present them; nor did he identify any potential witness whom he may have lost because of the delay in his trial. The absence of this most serious form of prejudice weighs heavily in our determination of whether appellant was deprived of his right [to a speedy trial]. Turner, supra, 622 A.2d at 679 (citing Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1103 (other citations omitted)). Any improvement in the government's case during the period of delay would not establish an impairment of Mr. Hartridge's defense. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 516-18, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Our dissenting colleague concedes, as he must, that possible impairment of the accused's defense is the most serious [form of prejudice] the speedy trial right protects against, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. But he largely discounts the absence here of any showing of prejudice of this kind by relying on Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), a case in which egregious persistence [by the government] in failing to prosecute the defendant led to a delay of nearly 8½ years between his indictment and triala delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review of a speedy trial claim. Id. at 657-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Key to the court's analysis in Doggett was the government's inexcusable oversights in attempting to track down and arrest the accused, id. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686, for as the Court pointed out, if the Government had pursued Doggett with reasonable diligence from his indictment to his arrest, his speedy trial claim would fail ... as a matter of course however great the delay, so long as Doggett could not show specific prejudice to his defense.  Id. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (emphasis added). In this case, no comparable degree of fault can be assigned to the government in failing to bring Mr. Hartridge to trial earlier. Mr. Hartridge was charged with committing a murder not by himself but with the aid of confederates, and in such circumstances, as this case aptly demonstrates, the difficulty a trial court has in attempting to schedule a reasonably timely date of trial when all of multiple defense counsel are available can be severe. Nor is that difficulty met by easy recourse to severance of defendants, for that disregards society's important interest in having persons charged with jointly committing grave offenses tried together. See Ruffin, supra, 524 A.2d at 688. On the other side of the balance, of course, is that Mr. Hartridgeunlike the accused in Doggett was incarcerated before trial. But while we do not minimize the anxiety and disruption to his life that Mr. Hartridge endured while detained, Doggett nevertheless impliesconsistent with Barker and our own decisionsthat absent either serious fault by the government in causing the lapse of time or specific prejudice to preparation of the defense, the delay of twenty-eight months in bringing Mr. Hartridge to trial does not justify the severe remedy of dismissal. [17] In sum, while there was substantial delay in Mr. Hartridge's trial, our review of all of the factors used to determine whether there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial convinces us, in this serious first-degree murder (premeditated) while armed case, that no violation occurred. Significantly, Mr. Hartridge's argument regarding prejudice is simply unpersuasive on this record.