Opinion ID: 40560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Sentencing: Vulnerable Victim

Text: 113 The finding of vulnerability is a fact question that is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir.2004). 114 The district court's finding that Carrera was a vulnerable victim is plausible. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level adjustment if the defendant should have known that the victim was vulnerable. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). This vulnerability must be an `unusual' vulnerability which is present in only some victims of that type of crime. United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (5th Cir.1990). See also United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 747 n. 5 (5th Cir.2005) (approving of the Ninth Circuit definition of vulnerable victim as one who is `less able to resist than the typical victim of the offense'). Gomez argues that this adjustment is inapplicable because it is only intended to punish targeting a vulnerable victim. He argues that Carrera was not vulnerable to begin with; instead, he was made vulnerable by the offense. 115 The guidelines were amended in 1995 to clarify that there is no targeting requirement. United States v. Burgos, 137 F.3d 841, 843-844 (5th Cir.1998). This court has not required a specific `targeting' of a vulnerable victim beyond the requirement that the defendant knew or should have known of the vulnerability. Id. Moreover, Carrera was vulnerable. He was quadriplegic, an unusual vulnerability among section 242 victims. 20 Because Carrera was paralyzed he was limited in the ability to seek help from other officers and was particularly at the mercy of the defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the sentencing court's finding that Carrera was a vulnerable victim.