Opinion ID: 2320176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Seizure of Blood Samples and Test Results from the Hospital

Text: The defendant argues that she had an expectation of privacy in her blood test results and blood samples taken by the hospital. The police violated her constitutional rights, she argues, by seizing the test results and samples without a warrant and without her consent. The State responds that her expectation of privacy in her blood test results and blood samples was not reasonable. In the alternative, the State argues that, even if the police improperly seized the blood and test results, any error in admitting evidence obtained by the seizure was harmless because the State properly introduced evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol content as a business record from the hospital. Because we decide cases upon constitutional grounds only when necessary, Simplex Technologies v. Town of Newington, 145 N.H. 727, 732, 766 A.2d 713 (2001), we begin by addressing the State's claim of harmless error and assuming without deciding that the State's seizure of the defendant's blood samples and test results violated the defendant's constitutional rights. The harmless error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Thompson, 149 N.H. 565, 567, 825 A.2d 490 (2003). The harmless error doctrine promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing upon the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error. Id. It is well settled that the erroneous admission of evidence may be harmless if the State proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict was not affected by the admission. Id. An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the alternative evidence of the defendant's guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight, and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State's evidence of guilt. Id. Accordingly, it is the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the introduction of evidence that was the fruit of the police's seizure did not affect the verdict. The State argues that the introduction of evidence seized by the police did not affect the verdict because the defendant's blood alcohol content was properly admitted through the hospital's laboratory report. As explained above, the trial court properly admitted the hospital's laboratory report. That report stated that the defendant's blood alcohol level when she was in the hospital was 0.256. The State Laboratory's test, which we will assume was erroneously admitted, showed a blood alcohol content of 0.23. Both results were substantially above the blood alcohol concentration of 0.16 necessary for a conviction for aggravated driving while intoxicated under RSA 265:82-a, II. Additional evidence of the defendant's intoxication included testimony from a police officer who, while at the hospital, smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the area of the defendant's head and noticed that her eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and from a fire chief who smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant when he attempted to communicate with her while she was still in her vehicle. We conclude that the properly admitted evidence of the defendant's intoxication was of overwhelming weight, and the State Laboratory's evidence was merely cumulative. The State has thus met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the introduction of evidence that was the fruit of the police's seizure did not affect the verdict and any error that the trial court made in admitting such evidence was harmless. Affirmed.