Opinion ID: 1999631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intoxication and malice

Text: Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to reinstruct the jury that intoxication may negate the malice element of the offense of malicious destruction of property. The court had previously ruledcorrectlythat malicious destruction of property was not a specificintent crime. Nevertheless, in its original instructions, the court told the jury that intoxication could be a defense to that charge if the evidence were strong enough: With regard to destruction of property that's five countsif you find that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the offense, that condition may negative the existence of the state of mind that is an essential element of the offense of malicious destruction of property. You may consider evidence of intoxication, if you find such evidence, in determining whether or not the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with malice, as I earlier defined it for you. In its third note to the court, the jury requested reinstruction on intoxication and how it related to all the offenses. Defense counsel objected when the court did not reinstruct the jury on intoxication and its relation to malice. The court replied, I am not going to give any more right now. I will let them come back if they need anything further. Appellant now argues that this failure to reinstruct the jury constituted reversible error. We hold, to the contrary, that the original instruction was erroneously given, but that since the error was in appellant's favor, he has no cause for complaint. Appellant agrees that in murder cases intoxication may not negate the malice element of second-degree murder, thereby reducing the crime to manslaughter. See McAffee v. United States, 72 App.D.C. 60, 111 F.2d 199, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 643, 60 S.Ct. 1094, 84 L.Ed. 1410 (1940); Bishop v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 132, 136, 107 F.2d 297, 301 (1939). He asserts, however, that the malice involved in malicious destruction of property is somehow different from the malice which must be proven in murder cases, and that different definitions of malice should be adopted for the purpose of deciding the availability of an intoxication defense. He suggests that malice inhabits a limbo somewhere between mere general intent and specific intent, so that the mens rea required to establish malice can be negated by evidence of intoxication. We agree with the government that Barrett v. United States, 377 A.2d 62 (D.C. 1977), is dispositive of this issue. In Barrett this court held that intoxication resulting from the voluntary use of drugs or alcohol was not a defense to a charge of arson. [18] Since arson and malicious destruction of property both require proof of the mental state known as malice, [19] and since the malice involved in both offenses is the same, see Charles v. United States, supra, 371 A.2d at 411 n. 12, we hold that Barrett applies to the instant case as well, and that intoxication is therefore not a defense to a charge of malicious destruction of property. [20]