Opinion ID: 1358073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: StovallPlea Agreement

Text: Stovall argues that the government violated the spirit of the plea agreement by seeking a sentencing enhancement for the murder of Darryl Johnson. He also asserts that the government violated the plea agreement because he pleaded guilty to Count 1, which did not include Johnson's murder as part of the conspiracy to distribute marijuana. We review the interpretation of a plea agreement de novo. United States v. Parker, 512 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir.2008). Stovall's plea agreement contained these stipulations: 5. STIPULATIONS: The United States and the defendant stipulate to the following: A. The parties agree on the fact that Defendant Stovall conspired with individuals including Darryl Johnson, Benito Naito-Gastelum-Gastelum, Robert Arnett, and Nicholas Mendez-Morales to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana. Therefore, a trial is not necessary to determine guilt or innocence as to Count 1of the Fifth Superseding Indictment. B. The parties, however, disagree about the potential sentence in this matter and specifically the United States Sentencing Guidelines enhancements that may or may not be applicable. Therefore the parties request that the Court hold a sentencing hearing for both sides to present evidence regarding the application of any guideline enhancements. In exchange for Stovall's guilty plea, the government dismissed Counts 2 and 3 pertaining to Johnson's murder. But Section 5B of the plea agreement reflects that the government disclosed its intent to pursue enhancements to his drug conviction. The agreement does not exclude Johnson's murder as a potential consideration for a Guidelines enhancement at sentencing. The record reflects that Stovall was aware of this fact at the time he signed the plea agreement. After the plea agreement was signed, the district court, when scheduling a date for sentencing, stated, I guess it will be litigated as to whether or not Mr. Stovall was involved with Mr. Clay in the homicide that he was involved in. Stovall's lawyer responded, Well, to the extent that it's allowable. The court then said, I'll allow you to object, but I may hear evidence pertaining to that. Do you understand that? Stovall responded, Yes sir. I understand. This colloquy demonstrates that the court apprised Stovall that there might be sentencing ramifications for his participation in the activities leading to Johnson's death despite the language in the plea agreement. Moreover, although Stovall's plea agreement does not explicitly identify Clay and Walker as part of the drug conspiracy to which Clay admitted participation, their acts in furtherance of that conspiracy are not necessarily excluded from consideration by the court at Stovall's sentencing. The plea agreement states that Stovall conspired with individuals including.... The list does not include the names of Clay or Walker but does not appear to be exhaustive and did not specifically exclude them. The agreement expressly leaves the application of enhancements for resolution by the district court following a sentencing hearing. Stovall cites United States v. Garcia for the proposition that conditions may not be read into a plea agreement which would work a material change. 698 F.2d 31, 36 (1st Cir.1983). In Garcia, the appellant agreed to plead guilty pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. Id. at 35. The plea agreement stated that if the appellant cooperated, the recommendation might include a recommendation of probation and fine. Id. at 35 n.3. On appeal, the government argued that the plea agreement included a requirement that the appellant pay restitution. Id. at 35. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that restitution is a material condition unlikely to be left to implication. Id. at 36. Because that condition would work a material change to the plea agreement, the district court disallowed it. Id. (citing United States v. Runck, 601 F.2d 968, 969-70 (8th Cir.1979)). Unlike the appellant in Garcia, Stovall was aware that his sentence could be enhanced despite the dismissal of Count 2 and Count 3. He was even aware that he could be sentenced to life imprisonment. With regard to potential punishment, Stovall affirmed at the plea hearing, I understand that no less than ten years and life. That's what I understand. Stovall admittedly participated in the underlying drug conspiracy including the defalcation of Naito-Gastelum. Once discovered, Johnson's duplicity, shown by his continued allegiance to Naito-Gastelum, made him a threat to that conspiracy. Johnson's murder was foreseeable as a means of furthering the conspiracy's illicit enterprise. The absence of a more explicit reference to Johnson's death as a basis for a potential sentencing enhancement did not cause the government to violate Stovall's plea agreement by later advocating for the enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Gamez, 301 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the enhancement applies even absent a factual finding that the defendant committed the murder so long as the murder was both reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy). The district court found that Stovall was involved in the Johnson murder and that this murder furthered the conspiracy. The government was not forbidden by the plea agreement to seek the enhanced sentence. Therefore, we hold that the government did not violate the plea agreement and that the district court did not improperly enhance Stovall's sentence.