Opinion ID: 2971639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court’s Finding of Negligence

Text: Although the evidence was slim and the issue accordingly close, the district court did not clearly err in finding both negligence and causation in this case. Following a bench trial, the findings of fact of a district court will be set aside only if clearly erroneous. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). Reversal is warranted “when although there is evidence to support [the factual finding of the district court], the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In admiralty cases, negligence and causation are factual determinations reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See Grosse Ile Bridge Co. v. Am. S.S. Co., 302 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir.1982)). Although this case is brought under admiralty jurisdiction, we apply ordinary common law tort concepts. Of course, substantive maritime law applies to a cause of action brought in admiralty, and general maritime law provides the elements of negligence in the absence of statutory modification. E. River S.S. Corp. v. TransAmerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 5 Interlocutory appeals are allowed in admiralty cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (2000). -6- No. 03-6208 Hartley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., et al. (1986). However, under the general maritime law, the elements of negligence are generally the same as a common law negligence action, i.e. duty, breach, causation and damages. See Pearce v. United States, 261 F.3d 643, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2001); 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW § 5-2 at 183 (4th ed. 2004). As with many negligence cases, the elements of the tort are much easier to state than to apply to a given set of facts, especially where a question of causation is raised. Mr. Hartley argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the fire was caused by the ignition of some combustible material by the energized space heater in the main cabin. Specifically, Mr. Hartley argues that the district court’s finding of negligence was clearly erroneous because: 1) the district court ignored evidence that the space heater, alleged to be the cause of the blaze, was unplugged; and 2) the testimony of Travelers’ expert, Rick Franklin, was insufficient to establish that the space heater aboard the Nina’s Casino was the actual or proximate cause of the fire. First, the district court’s finding of negligence in leaving a space heater energized was not clearly erroneous. Mr. Hartley admits that leaving an energized space heater unattended is an unsafe boating practice and therefore negligent. However, he relies on his testimony that his habit was to unplug all of the appliances prior to leaving the boat to argue that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that the space heater was actually energized. However, Mr. Hartley testified he could not remember unplugging the space heater the morning before the fire, and the evidence showed the space heater’s control switch was in the on position. It was well within the province of the district court, as trier of fact, to reject Mr. Hartley’s testimony based -7- No. 03-6208 Hartley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., et al. on the undisputed fact that the space heater’s control switch was in the on position, combined with the evidence that the fire started in the cabin where the space heater was located. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Hartley breached his duty of care. Second, the district court did not clearly err in determining that the energized space heater was the actual and proximate cause of the fire, based on the expert testimony of Rick Franklin. Given that, “[b]y the very nature of a fire, its cause must often be proven through a combination of common sense, circumstantial evidence, and expert testimony[,]” the reliance on expert testimony to support a common sense inference is not clearly erroneous. Minerals & Chems. Philipp Corp. v. S.S. Nat’l Trader, 445 F.2d 831, 832 (2d Cir. 1971). Further, the evidentiary requirement for causation is less when there is evidence both of negligence and of the very harm that made the activity negligent in the first place (here, fire from a negligently unattended space heater). See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 173 p. 420 (“if the defendant’s conduct is deemed negligent for the very reason that it creates a core risk of the kind of harm suffered by the plaintiff, then it is often plausible to infer causation in fact”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 25, 2002) (citing David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1774-75 (1997); Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1987); Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 943 (1935)). The combination of the destruction of much of the direct evidence that would prove causation and the expert testimony -8- No. 03-6208 Hartley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., et al. placing the origin of the fire in the main cabin of the Nina’s Casino near the space heater sufficiently support the district court’s conclusion that the energized space heater in the main cabin was the actual and proximate cause of the fire. Therefore, the district court’s determination that Mr. Hartley’s negligence caused the fire is not clearly erroneous.