Opinion ID: 1166461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal of Jury Instruction.

Text: Appellant next asserts as error the trial court's refusal to give the following jury instruction: The defendant has introduced evidence of his reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. This evidence may be sufficient when considered with the other evidence in the case to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. However, if from all the evidence in this case you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, then it is your duty to find him guilty, even though he may have a good reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. Appellant is correct in his contention that an accused is permitted a jury instruction on the legal effect of good character evidence produced at trial. In State v. Kaiser, 109 Ariz. 244, 508 P.2d 74 (1973), the court stated: It is well established that the accused when presenting his case, may offer evidence of his good character as substantive evidence from which the jury may infer that he did not commit the crime charged. Id. 508 P.2d at 75. In United States v. Frischling, 160 F.2d 370 (3rd Cir.1947), the defendant requested an instruction which read: Good character, when considered in connection with the other evidence in the case, may generate a reasonable doubt sufficient to justify you in acquitting the defendant. Id. at 370. The trial court refused that instruction, substituting in lieu thereof a charge that the jury give the character evidence such weight as the jury should deem it entitled to under all the evidence in the case. Id. The circuit court reversed, stating: It has long been the rule that it is the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury in substance that reputation of the defendant's good character, when put in evidence, is a fact which they should consider with the other facts in the case and which, when so considered, may, like other facts, generate a reasonable doubt which would justify acquittal. Id. Although in the instant case the requested instruction paralleled significantly the requested instruction in Frischling, the apparent similarity was disrupted by the following additional language in the subject instruction now before this Court. However, if from all the evidence in the case you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, then it is your duty to find him guilty, even though he may have a good reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. This additional language, unfortunately for appellant, parallels the language which caused a reversal of the federal district court in United States v. Leigh, 513 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.1975). There, the offending language in the jury instruction read in part: The circumstances may be such that evidence of good reputation as to truth, veracity, sobriety and being a peaceable and law abiding citizen, may alone create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, although without it the other evidence would be convincing. However, evidence of good reputation should not constitute an excuse to acquit the defendant if you, the jury, after weighing all of the evidence in the case, is [sic] convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offenses charged in the indictment. (Circuit Court emphasis.) Id. at 785. The rationale of the Leigh court for reversal was principally premised upon the effect to be given character evidence. In reviewing the jury instruction, the court held that: Unfortunately, the final sentence of the charge is so fatally defective that it negates the entire instruction, and requires reversal of appellant's conviction. First, of course, the sentence is an erroneous statement of the law. At least since Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 17 S.Ct. 72, 41 L.Ed. 467 (1896), the rule has been that the jury must consider reputation evidence in the same manner as it considers all other evidence, not, as this instruction suggests, after weighing all of the evidence in the case... . Seizing on this sentence, the jury could easily have formed the impression that reputation evidence could only be used to tip the scales in defendant's favor if the case was [ sic ] otherwise close; this is precisely the contention rejected by the Supreme Court in Edgington, supra . Id. at 786. Our review of the proffered jury instruction equally suggests that the jury may have considered the legal effect of character evidence to be a balancing factor. Thus, the trial court was justified in refusing to give that instruction. See, Porterie v. Peters, 111 Ariz. 452, 532 P.2d 514 (1975). We note that appellant was sentenced to the Clark County Jail for a term of one year and that that sentence was suspended and appellant placed on probation. The sentence is erroneous, since appellant was convicted of a felony. See, NRS 199.280 and 208.070. Accordingly, this case must be remanded for modification of sentence consistent with law. The conviction is affirmed and the matter remanded for purposes of a felony sentencing in conformity with law. BATJER, C.J., MOWBRAY, and GUNDERSON, JJ., and ZENOFF, C.J. (Retired), [1] concur.