Opinion ID: 49956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The As-Applied Challenge

Text: As discussed above, only Heinkel can properly maintain an as-applied challenge to the Policy. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the School Board on Heinkel’s claim arising out of Browder’s denial of her request. While Browder’s letter denying Heinkel’s request referred to the Policy, it specifically stated that Browder had reviewed the materials Heinkel wished to distribute and was denying her request, not on the basis of the Policy alone, but because Browder had determined “that the documents would tend to create a substantial disruption in the school environment.” (R.1-26, Ex. I.) This standard, originally stated in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, 89 S. Ct. at 740, is the appropriate 11 measure for restraint of student expression.7 In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that schools must tolerate student expression unless it would “‘materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’” or “collid[e] with the rights of others.” Id. (citation omitted). Although an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” is not sufficient to meet this test, schools need not wait until disruption actually occurs in order to prohibit student expression if they reasonably forecast that the expression will cause substantial disruption or material interference with school activities. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S. Ct. at 737; Shanley, 462 F.2d at 970. Applying the Tinker standard, the district court held the School Board acted constitutionally in denying Heinkel’s request to distribute pro-life literature to her classmates. Finding that Browder reasonably concluded that distribution of such materials would cause a material and substantial disruption to the discipline in Heinkel’s school, the district court found particularly persuasive the fact that Heinkel was a middle school student who wished to distribute materials about abortion and 7 Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has refined the framework for analyzing First Amendment claims in the public school context. As we have explained, “[w]ithin scholastic nonpublic fora, there are four clear categories of expression: vulgar expression, pure student expression, government expression, and school-sponsored expression.” Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2004). Tinker involved pure student expression. As this case also involves only pure student expression, we need not address the tests for the other forms of expression. 12 abortion alternatives to her classmates who ranged in age from 11 to 14. See WalkerSerrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A]ny analysis of the students’ rights to expression on the one hand, and of schools’ need to control behavior and foster an environment conducive to learning on the other, must necessarily take into account the age and maturity of the student.”). The record also shows that birth control and abortion are not part of the middle school curriculum. (Tutko Dep. at 21-22, 33-34.) The School District’s lead health education teacher explained in her deposition, “we don’t discuss abortion in the school setting” because it is “a very emotional issue” that “creates some anger,” “polarizes a class,” and “becomes disruptive to the educational setting.” (Tutko Dep. at 27-28.) These are valid considerations. See Shanley, 462 F.2d at 973-74 (“If the content of a student’s expression could give rise to a disturbance from those who hold opposing views, then it is certainly within the power of the school administration to regulate the time, place, and manner of distribution with even greater latitude of discretion.”) We do not find clear error in the district court’s finding that the record thus reflects “facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514, 89 S. Ct. at 740. As we have stated in the past, “the balancing of expression and discipline is an exercise in judgment for school administrations and 13 school boards, subject only to the constitutional requirement of reasonableness under the circumstances.” Shanley, 462 F.2d at 975. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed to the extent that it grants the School Board summary judgment on Heinkel’s claim based upon the denial of her request to distribute literature.