Opinion ID: 1386957
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Type of Policy

Text: St. Paul argues not only that the UMA is ambiguous but that the UMA must be construed in pari materia with the SRA and that the UMA applies only to those motor vehicle liability policies defined in and issued pursuant to the SRA. Even if we were to accept St. Paul's first contention, we would have to reject its second and third. Statutory construction, of course, encompasses more than the doctrine of in pari materia. [6] There is no magic in statutory construction and no legal legerdemain should be used to change the meaning of simple English words.... Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 421, 466 P.2d 18, 26 (1970). The cardinal rule is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute, considering the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, the historical background, the effects and consequences, and the spirit and purpose of the law. Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 457, 752 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1988); Calvert, 144 Ariz. at 294, 697 P.2d at 687. The context of the SRA is important in this case because its definition of motor vehicle liability policy is explicitly limited to the term as ... used in this chapter. A.R.S. § 28-1170(A) (emphasis added). We have, therefore, an instruction from the legislature that counsels against using the SRA's definition of motor vehicle liability policy for the purposes of other acts such as the UMA. [7] Moreover, a companion provision to the UMA explicitly provides that the definitions of insurance policies are not mutually exclusive. A.R.S. § 20-251 reads as follows: Definitions not mutually exclusive. It is intended that certain coverages may come within the definitions of two or more kinds of insurance as set forth in this article, and the fact that such a coverage is included within one definition shall not exclude such coverage as to any other kind of insurance within the definition of which such coverage likewise reasonably is includable. Thus we reject St. Paul's contention that it did not write an automobile liability insurance or motor vehicle liability insurance policy because [i]t wrote a comprehensive general liability policy containing automobile liability insurance. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8 n. 1. A.R.S. § 20-251 clearly forbids such an interpretation. Under the operation of our statutes governing insurance, the type of policy is determined by the type of coverage provided, not by the label affixed by the insurer. [8] Otherwise, it would be a simple matter for insurers to evade the requirements of Arizona law by changing the title of the policy. The statutes are part of every insurance policy and mandate that policies providing specific types of coverage meet specific requirements. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 428 P.2d 98 (1967); A.R.S. § 20-1118. Therefore, the fact that AAID's policy with St. Paul is labelled as a comprehensive general liability policy does not mean it is not also an automobile liability policy under the UMA. The question is whether the coverage provided is reasonably includable within the term automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy set forth in A.R.S. § 20-259.01. We believe policy coverage providing LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR AUTOS is within the statutory scope of an automobile liability policy no matter what label is printed at the top of the policy.