Opinion ID: 2507697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Submission of Voluntary Manslaughter to the Jury

Text: Dickey asserts the Court of Appeals erred in failing to reconcile that fear can constitute heat of passion under Wiggins with self-defense as a matter of law under Hendrix.  In support of this assertion, Dickey claims the fear required for voluntary manslaughter must be considerably greater in degree or kind than the rational fear required for self-defense. Specifically, Dickey believes that it must be an irrational fear that causes a person to lose control of himself temporarily. He further contends the Court of Appeals erred in finding there was ample evidence of heat of passion to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter. Essentially, Dickey avers the evidence supports a finding that he either shot with malice or in self-defense; therefore, the jury should not have been instructed on voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation. Pittman, 373 S.C. at 572, 647 S.E.2d at 167 (citation omitted). Heat of passion alone will not suffice to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. Id. Both heat of passion and sufficient legal provocation must be present at the time of the killing. Id. The sudden heat of passion, upon sufficient legal provocation, which mitigates a felonious killing to manslaughter, while it need not dethrone reason entirely, or shut out knowledge and volition, must be such as would naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Id. To warrant the court in eliminating the offense of manslaughter it should very clearly appear that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. Id. at 572, 647 S.E.2d at 168 (citation omitted). In determining whether the act which caused death was impelled by heat of passion or by malice, all the surrounding circumstances and conditions are to be taken into consideration, including previous relations and conditions connected with the tragedy, as well as those existing at the time of the killing. State v. Norris, 253 S.C. 31, 35, 168 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1969). After the Court of Appeals issued its decision as to Dickey's case, this Court clarified the law with respect to whether fear can constitute sudden heat of passion. State v. Starnes, 388 S.C. 590, 698 S.E.2d 604 (2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 1504, 179 L.Ed.2d 330 (2011). In Starnes, the defendant appealed his two murder convictions arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 596, 698 S.E.2d at 607-08. Starnes claimed he was entitled to the charge as he testified that when one of the victims pointed a gun at him, he felt threatened and was in fear; thus, the threat of imminent deadly assault was sufficient to submit the charge of voluntary manslaughter to the jury. Id. at 596, 698 S.E.2d at 608. Although the Court found the trial judge properly refused to charge voluntary manslaughter, it clarified the law concerning how a defendant's fear following an attack or a threatening act relates to voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 597, 698 S.E.2d at 608. Specifically, the Court stated: We reaffirm the principle that a person's fear immediately following an attack or threatening act may cause the person to act in a sudden heat of passion. However, the mere fact that a person is afraid is not sufficient, by itself, to entitle a defendant to a voluntary manslaughter charge. Consistent with our law on voluntary manslaughter, in order to constitute sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation, the fear must be the result of sufficient legal provocation and cause the defendant to lose control and create an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Succinctly stated, to warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge, the defendant's fear must manifest itself in an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. A person may act in a deliberate, controlled manner, notwithstanding the fact that he is afraid or in fear. Conversely, a person can be acting under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence and be incapable of cool reflection as a result of fear. The latter situation constitutes sudden heat of passion, but the former does not. Evidence that fear caused a person to kill another person in a sudden heat of passion will mitigate a homicide from murder to manslaughter-it will not justify it. This is the distinction between voluntary manslaughter and self-defense. We reiterate that evidence of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter may coexist and that a charge on self-defense and voluntary manslaughter may be warranted. Id. at 598-99, 698 S.E.2d at 609 (second emphasis added). Applying Starnes to the facts of the instant case, I find the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial judge's decision to submit voluntary manslaughter to the jury as a lesser-included offense of murder. Initially, I note that Dickey conceded the element of sufficient legal provocation; thus, I confine my analysis to the remaining element of heat of passion. I find the State presented evidence from which the jury could have determined that Dickey's fear manifested itself in an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Dickey testified that he was afraid of being hurt or killed. In addition to evidence of Dickey's fear, West and McGarrigle claimed that Dickey looked angry and appeared irritated during the encounter outside of the apartment. Furthermore, over the course of a short time-period, Dickey endured Boot's profane verbal attack and threats of violence, thus, rendering Dickey incapable of cool reflection as a result of his anger and fear of Boot. In light of this evidence, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Dickey acted in a deliberate, controlled manner. It cannot be said that there was no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.