Opinion ID: 789267
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Property Allegations

Text: 40 The government argues that the right to compete is an economic benefit guaranteed by the collective bargaining agreement, and, according to the Third Circuit's decision in Boffa, is a property interest whose deprivation is subject to criminal consequences under the mail fraud statute. In response, the district court held that 41 the bargaining agreements, at most, guaranteed the membership the right to compete for skilled trade positions before any outside hires were considered for the positions, and that scheming to deny membership the right to compete for a job does not reach the level of scheming to deny membership wages which were promised in the agreements. 42 Basically, the court held that the right to compete for jobs may be valuable, but it is not valuable enough to constitute a property interest subject to the protections of the mail fraud statute. We must determine whether the right to compete constitutes a sufficient property interest. 43 The government explains that the collective bargaining agreement requires that skilled trade positions be filled by only qualified applicants and gives hiring preference to skilled trade employees. The government argues that this agreement guarantees wages and other financial benefits to qualified employees, and that such benefits constitute property. It cites to decisions of other circuits, including the Third Circuit's decision in Boffa, holding that wages and other financial benefits guaranteed by collective bargaining agreements are sufficient to constitute property for purposes of mail fraud convictions. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 873 n. 3 (7th Cir.1998); Boffa, 688 F.2d at 930. The district court distinguished those cases because they involved wages for active positions — i.e., positions currently filled by employees — that were subject to renegotiation, whereas this case involved only a right, held by qualified employees yet determined, to earn those wages. 44 The government disputes the court's distinction. At issue in Boffa were seniority rights that were used to determine which employee-drivers could bid on particular driving assignments. The government argues that the seniority rights at issue in that case are akin to the right to compete in this case: both rights are job-bidding rights and both fundamentally provide the right to compete for economic benefits and wages. However, in Boffa, the employees lost their wages as a result of unfair labor practices; here, the employees lost their right to compete for wages sometime in the future as a result of unfair labor practices. To the district court, the difference between workers currently employed and workers who may be employed sometime in the future was significant. The court, noting the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000), which held that unissued government licenses are not property, determined that the right to compete for a job is more akin to an unissued government license; neither rises to the level of wages and therefore does not constitute property for purposes of a mail fraud conviction. The district court found that the government, in aligning the right to compete with the right at issue in Boffa, was stretching too far — scheming to deny membership the right to compete for a job does not reach the level of scheming to deny membership wages which were promised in the agreements. 45 We disagree. Although proof at trial may undermine the government's case, for purposes of the indictment the government has pleaded sufficiently. We are persuaded by the government's argument that, were the right to compete to have such little value — indeed, value equivalent to an unissued government license — then the union would not bother to bargain collectively for this hiring system. We find this right to be similar enough to the right at issue in Boffa to follow the Third Circuit's decision. The right to compete guaranteed by the collective bargaining agreement in this case is sufficient to constitute property for purposes of the mail fraud statute. 46