Opinion ID: 2222248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Judicial Officer's Jurisdiction

Text: With this background, we come to our first question. Did the legislature intend to grant authority in the chief judge of a judicial district to assign any district court matter to a judicial officer? The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002); State v. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn.2003). Harris contends that the judicial officer never had jurisdiction to hear and try his case because the legislature never intended to expand the judicial officer's jurisdiction from minor criminal cases heard by the county courts to felony level cases under the jurisdiction of the district courts. Harris asserts that a judicial officer is limited to hearing and trying county court matters under the plain meaning of Minn.Stat. § 487.08 (2002), which states that judicial officersuntil their positions are abolishedare to continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the district under the terms and conditions of their appointment. Harris argues that permitting judicial officers to serve under the terms and conditions of their appointment refers to their original appointment in county court, and they are permitted to serve so long as they are assigned county court cases. See Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 2 (2002). Alternatively, terms and conditions could merely refer to administrative matters such as compensation and benefits and not concern a judicial officer's jurisdiction. We conclude that the terms and conditions language likely refers to administrative matters and does not express legislative intent about jurisdiction. If the legislature had intended to limit the jurisdiction of judicial officers, it could have included language to that effect. Indeed, the section on referees, enacted as part of the same act, also states that persons holding the office of referee in certain districts may continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the district under the terms and conditions of their appointment, yet contains explicit restrictions on the authority of referees to hear certain contested trials. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 484.70, subd. 1 (2002)). Because referees were allowed to continue to serve under the terms and conditions of their appointment with limitations on their authority being expressly stated, we conclude that the legislature did not intend terms and conditions to define a referee's jurisdictional limits. In re Butler, 552 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Minn. 1996) (where words of a law are not explicit, the intent of the legislature may be ascertained by considering other laws upon the same or similar subjects). Similarly, we conclude that the legislature did not intend terms and conditions to define a judicial officer's jurisdictional limits. Furthermore, Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5 (2002), subjects judicial officers to the authority of the chief judge of the judicial district: All judicial officers are subject to the administrative authority and assignment power of the chief judge of the district as provided in section 484.69, subdivision 3. They shall be learned in the law, and shall hear and try matters as assigned to them by the chief judge. Under section 484.69, the chief judge of each district has the administrative authority to assign any judge any matter in any court of the judicial district. Minn.Stat. § 484.69, subd. 3 (2002). The state contends that the chief judge's authority to assign matters to judicial officers is without limitation; if the legislature had intended to limit judicial officers to the kinds of cases they formerly heard in county court, the legislature would have said so explicitly. We agree. By the end of 1980, the legislature was made aware of the general jurisdiction of the district courts and that judicial officers were being utilized as the functional equivalent of judges. See Committee Report, supra, at 12. Had the legislature intended to modify the duties and powers of judicial officers, it would have done so explicitly, as it did for referees. See Act of June 6, 1981, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4 art. 3, § 4, 1981 Minn. Laws 2479, 2526; see Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.1995) (declining to read into statute restrictions that the legislature did not include). We therefore conclude the legislature intended to permit the chief judge of the district court to assign any district court or county court matter to a judicial officer under Minn.Stat. §§ 487.08 and 484.69.