Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Three Easily Applied Factors

Text: Comes now, finally, the dispositive question: on the basis of the non-record sources supplied by the parties and augmented by this court's own research, are we in a position to decideby applying constitutional norms to legislative factswhether homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to strict or intermediate scrutiny of the marriage statute that allegedly discriminates against them, in violation of the equal protection clause? As discussed above, with respect to the four relevant factors, there is really no dispute about the first two: homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful discrimination, and they have been the object of such deep-seated prejudice that they are often subjected to disabilities based on inaccurate stereotypes that do not truly reflect their abilities. I am also satisfied that a hearing with live testimony would add little, if anything, to evaluation of the fourth factor. At least when compared with racial minorities (in particular, African-Americans) and womentwo groups constitutionally entitled to intensified scrutiny of alleged discrimination against themI can say to a virtual certainty that homosexuals evidence no greater political power and would appear, on balance, to evidence less. I doubt a court will learn more from a hearing on this factor than it can from noting the interplay of political forces, documented in the sources cited in this opinion, concerning political advocacy of so-called gay rights. With this said, I note that a federal district court has found testimonial evidence on the political power issue useful, concluding, after the hearing, that gays, lesbians and bi-sexuals do not enjoy that type of legislative success, political representation, or political alliances building capability necessary to be considered a politically powerful group. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, 860 F.Supp. at 439.