Opinion ID: 3054756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: georgia state law battery claim

Text: The district court also set aside the punitive damages award for Smith under her Georgia state law battery claim because under Georgia law punitive damages may only accompany compensatory or nominal damages. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1; see also Nelson v. Glynn-Brunswick Hosp. Auth., 571 S.E.2d 557, 564 (2002). Smith contends that the district court erred in two ways when it set aside the punitive damages award. First, she argues that Metropolitan could not challenge the punitive damages award in its Rule 50(b) motion because it did not object when the jury announced the verdict and therefore “waived” its challenge. However, Smith has forfeited her right to argue that Metropolitan waived its challenge to the punitive damages award because she failed to raise that challenge before the district court. See Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2010). In this instance, not only did Smith fail to raise the issue in the district court, she went so far as to agree with Metropolitan in her response to the Rule 50(b) motion. Specifically, she stated: Plaintiff’s counsel concedes that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 prohibits Mrs. Smith’s receipt of any punitive damages for her battery claim where the jury failed to award any compensatory or nominal damages. 12 Case: 12-12711 Date Filed: 09/18/2013 Page: 13 of 15 (Dkt. 91 at 12 n.4) If the court’s ruling was error, it was invited error. Invited error precludes a court from “invoking the plain error rule and reversing.” United States v. Davis, 443 F.2d 500, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1971). Second, she contends that the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury that nominal damages are awarded in an amount that “you . . . decide [is appropriate] under all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Dkt. 96 at 312.) Smith contends that Georgia law requires a jury to award, at a minimum, nominal damages for an intentional tort. See, e.g., Norton v. Holcomb, 646 S.E.2d 94, 101 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); see also Jeter v. Davis, 127 S.E. 898, 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925) (recognizing that a plaintiff “would at least be entitled to” nominal damages by proving the elements of an intentional tort). Under Georgia law, compensatory or nominal damages must be awarded before punitive damages may be awarded. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1; see also Nelson, 571 S.E.2d at 564. Smith contends the district court’s error allowed it to set aside the jury’s punitive damage award because it did not instruct the jury that it must award, at a minimum, nominal damages before it could award punitive damages. Smith correctly recognizes, however, that she waived this contention by failing to object to the jury instruction before the district court. She accordingly frames her contention under the plain error doctrine. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(2); 13 Case: 12-12711 Date Filed: 09/18/2013 Page: 14 of 15 Iervolino v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408, 1414 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we do not consider whether a court committed plain error if the party making that contention invited the error. Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2002). We have held that a party invites error in the jury instructions when it responds to a court’s proposed instructions by saying, “[T]he instruction is acceptable to us.” United States v. Fulford, 267 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001). We have also held that a party invites error when “the instruction eventually given to the jury reflect[s] changes that [the party itself] proposed and to which they did not later object.” Ford, 289 F.3d at 1294. In this instance, Smith invited error in the jury instructions. She failed to propose any jury instruction saying that actual damages are required in the event of a finding of liability before punitive damages may be awarded. Her proposed charge, like the charge actually given to the jury, does not say that actual damages are required. And Smith did not object to the instructions as given with regard to damages for battery. Smith objected to portions of the jury instructions both before and after the district court charged the jury, but did not object to the court’s instructions on damages. In fact, before charging the jury, the district court reviewed its proposed instructions with both Smith’s counsel and Metropolitan’s counsel. After reviewing the proposed instructions on damages and hearing feedback from both parties, the court specifically asked Smith’s counsel, 14 Case: 12-12711 Date Filed: 09/18/2013 Page: 15 of 15 “. . . [H]ave I adequately covered the subject of damages[?]” (Dkt. 96 at 262), and Smith’s counsel replied, “Yes, your honor.” Id. After charging the jury, the district court again asked both Smith’s counsel and Metropolitan’s counsel if they had any objections to the instructions. Smith’s counsel again objected to another part of the instructions unrelated to damages. The district court stated, “I note your exception. Anything else?” (Dkt. 96 at 322.) Smith’s counsel replied, “That’s it.” Id. In essence, Smith, through her counsel, clearly represented her assent to the jury instruction throughout the process and in fact contributed to its formation. Only on appeal does Smith raise the alleged error. Thus, we conclude that if there was error, Smith invited the error, and we decline to review for plain error.