Opinion ID: 1394420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearing on Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees

Text: Based upon the record of the lower court's proceedings, the majority has correctly decided to remand this case to the circuit court to permit the parties to present evidence regarding Michael T.'s request for costs and attorney's fees by ... oral arguments if desired by the parties. Even though a party against whom costs and attorney's fees are to be assessed has a due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard thereon prior to their imposition, [2] it is imperative for a party to actively enforce his/her notice and hearing rights instead of sitting on his/ her laurels and effectively waiving the process to which he/she is due. Although Jean K. responded to Michael T.'s motion for costs and attorney's fees, her response was not filed until one day before the scheduled hearing thereon. This dilatoriness comes dangerously close to a waiver of the due process rights to notice and a hearing on the issues of costs and attorney's fees. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jones, 187 Ill.App.3d 206, 231, 134 Ill.Dec. 836, 853, 543 N.E.2d 119, 136 (1989) ([A] party waives his right to a hearing on attorney's fees where he did not request a hearing before the trial court and is thereby left with the judge's ruling on the basis of the fee petition and affidavits alone.). Therefore, I would caution parties and their counsel in future cases to be ever diligent in their assertion of such rights and to be mindful of their duty to speak clearly in the circuit court, on pain that, if they forget their lines, they will likely be bound forever to hold their peace. Hanlon v. Logan County Bd. of Educ., 201 W.Va. 305, 315, 496 S.E.2d 447, 457 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). That said, it should be noted that the scope of the remand hearing on the reasonableness of the costs and attorney's fees awarded to Michael T. is not without limitation. Rather than permitting parties to conduct a mini-trial on the issues of costs and attorney's fees, with endless testimony and cross-examination of attorneys and expert witnesses, a circuit court conducting a costs and fees hearing should afford the parties an opportunity to orally present their arguments on the request for costs and fees and the reasonableness thereof and to submit, in writing, documentation of the costs and attorney's fees requested. Such a practice of narrowing the scope of a costs and fees hearing has been adopted by other jurisdictions in an attempt to prevent the relitigation of the case on its merits. See, e.g., Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 799 F.2d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir.1986) ([D]ue process is afforded where ... the parties have an opportunity to present their arguments as to the propriety of sanctions, submit affidavits on the amount of such fees and costs, with an opportunity for the sanctioned party to file a motion challenging said affidavits. (citation omitted)); In re Eliscu, 139 B.R. 883, 886 (N.D.Ill.1992) (noting that the requirements of due process as to notice and scope of hearing are based primarily upon the circumstances of the case (citation omitted)); Barnett v. Barnett, 24 Kan.App.2d 342, 353, 945 P.2d 870, 878 (1997) (limiting scope of attorney's fees hearing). By contrast, a more extensive evidentiary hearing on the issues of costs and fees is permitted only where a case presents exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/501(c-1)(1) (2010) (Except for good cause shown, a proceeding for (or relating to) interim attorney's fees and costs in a pre-judgment dissolution proceeding shall be nonevidentiary and summary in nature.); Hogan v. Hogan, 58 Ill. App.3d 661, 668, 16 Ill.Dec. 265, 270, 374 N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (1978) (While a hearing on the reasonable nature of attorney's fees is not necessary in every case, especially where the trial judge is familiar with the procedural history of the case, the party contesting the award is entitled to a hearing upon request. (citations omitted)). In the interest of preserving judicial economy, I believe the better practice is to generally limit the scope of a hearing addressing costs and fees while reserving more extensive costs and fees hearings for those extraordinary cases requiring further record development. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in the majority's decision in this case.