Opinion ID: 2789648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony.

Text: Blessum argues the commission erroneously excluded the anticipated testimony of his expert witnesses, attorneys McCormick and Pearson. He urges us to accept and consider McCormick’s and Pearson’s opinions in our de novo review of this matter. Our prior caselaw has addressed when expert testimony is admissible to assist the trier of fact. 4 In Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., we indicated an expert could testify regarding cause and effect in areas of specialized knowledge such as scientific, mechanical, or professional areas of study. 232 Iowa 328, 343, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655 (1942). We stated this was true even if the expert opinion touched upon a so-called “ultimate fact” in the case. See id. at 343–44, 5 N.W.2d at 655. Thus, in Grismore, we upheld the trial court’s admission of expert testimony on what had caused the sickness and death of the plaintiff’s turkeys, even though causation was an ultimate issue in the case. Id. at 340–41, 361, 5 N.W.2d at 654, 663. More recently, we clarified that while Grismore abolished the blanket rule prohibiting experts from testifying on ultimate issues, there remain limits on the admissibility of expert testimony. See In re Det. of 4The Iowa Rules of Evidence apply in grievance commission hearings. See Iowa Ct. R. 36.14(4). 12 Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 2005) (citing Grismore, 232 Iowa at 343, 361 5 N.W.2d at 655, 663). An expert witness “cannot opine on a legal conclusion or whether the facts of the case meet a given legal standard.” Id. at 419. Opinions couched in legal terms are problematic because they may lead the jury to misunderstand the law. See id. Therefore, “[w]hether an opinion couched in legal terms is excludable . . . depends on ‘whether the terms . . . have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular.’ ” Id. at 420 (quoting Torres v. Cnty. of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985)). Such specialized legal terms are not properly the subject of expert opinion testimony. See id. Our court went on to apply this rule to the facts of that case. In Palmer, the expert was permitted to give her opinion on “whether the respondent’s pedophilia makes it likely that he will engage in predatory acts of a sexually-violent nature” if he were not civilly committed. Id. at 420 (internal quotation marks omitted). The language “likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses” came directly from the statute under which the state was seeking to commit the respondent. See id. (quoting Iowa Code § 229A.2(11) (2003)). Yet, we determined the expert could testify as to whether the defendant was likely to commit an act because the statutory definition of “likely”—more likely than not—mirrored its popular meaning. Id. at 421. At the same time, we found the expert should not have been permitted to testify regarding “predatory” and “sexual[ly] violent offenses,” however, because these were legal terms with precise definitions that were more specialized than the common vernacular. See id. In a case of sexual exploitation by a counselor, where one of the issues was whether the defendant had counseled the victims within the 13 meaning of the criminal statute, we upheld a trial court ruling barring an expert from testifying as to whether the pastor defendant’s actions amounted to “pastoral counseling.” State v. Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421, 426, 436–37 (Iowa 2014). In an offer of proof, the expert testified that the theological community recognized an important difference between pastoral care and pastoral counseling. Id. at 436. We concluded that the specialized definition given to these terms within the theological community was irrelevant to whether the defendant’s actions fell within the legal definition of “mental health services.” Id. at 437. We have also applied the principles of Grismore and Palmer to proposed expert testimony in attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Baudino, 452 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Iowa 1990) (citing Grismore, 232 Iowa at 361, 5 N.W.2d at 663). In Baudino, the attorney failed to properly file his state and federal income tax returns. Id. at 456. At the hearing before the ethics commission, Baudino called a law professor to testify as an expert witness on his behalf. Id. at 459. The professor opined that Baudino should not be subject to a disciplinary sanction because his failure to file taxes was due to confusion, not an intentional disregard of the law. Id. We stated the professor’s testimony was of “questionable admissibility” because it was an opinion on whether Baudino’s conduct met the legal standard warranting a sanction. See id. at 459–60. However, we ultimately found it unnecessary to consider the expert’s testimony anyway because it was grounded on a factual assumption—the attorney’s genuine confusion— that we did not accept. See id. at 460. In light of the foregoing, we believe the commission properly excluded McCormick’s testimony. McCormick’s letter indicated that he would be testifying on an ultimate issue that was a purely legal one— 14 namely, whether there was a nexus between Blessum’s criminal conduct and the practice of law. It is difficult to see what an expert opinion would add to this analysis. Nexus in this context is a legal term of art, and we have adopted the following multifactor test to resolve the nexus question: There must be some rational connection other than the criminality of the act between the conduct and the actor’s fitness to practice law. Pertinent considerations include the lawyer’s mental state; the extent to which the act demonstrates disrespect for the law or law enforcement; the presence or absence of a victim; the extent of actual or potential injury to a victim; and the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal conduct. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Khowassah, 837 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Iowa 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Factors such as “mental state,” “disrespect,” the “presence or absence of a victim,” the “extent of actual or potential injury to a victim,” and the “presence or absence of a pattern of criminal conduct” are simply not ones where the testimony of a legal expert is likely to be helpful. See id.; cf. Iowa R. Evid. 5.702 (allowing expert testimony that “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). Pearson’s proposed expert testimony presents a closer call. His letter sets forth the opinions of a domestic-relations attorney on the timeliness of Blessum’s work on the QDRO. The Board argues that because Pearson opined on Blessum’s “diligence”—the same term used in rule 32:1.3—the commission properly excluded his testimony. However, unlike “sexually violent offense,” Palmer, 691 N.W.2d at 420–22, or “mental health services,” Edouard, 854 N.W.2d at 436–37, or even “nexus,” Khowassah, 837 N.W.2d at 653, the term “diligence” does not have a specialized legal definition. To the contrary, a review of our caselaw indicates “diligence” in the context of an attorney disciplinary 15 proceeding pursuant to rule 32:1.3 has been given a commonsense meaning. See, e.g., Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d at 483 (indicating that this rule requires an attorney to “handle a client matter in a reasonably timely manner”). Whether an attorney acted with proper diligence can be the basis for a malpractice action, and we normally require expert testimony on the standard of care in those cases. See Crookham v. Riley, 584 N.W.2d 258, 266 (Iowa 1998). Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed below, we find Blessum did not violate rule 32:1.3. Therefore, even if Pearson should have been permitted to testify on that issue, it did not affect the proceeding.