Opinion ID: 1822164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State-law Contract Defenses

Text: The Lewises argue that the arbitration provision is subject to state Law contract defenses and is unenforceable under the facts and law of this case. The closest they come to identifying any specific contract defense appears in this statement in their brief: The elements of Branch are surely present here. We assume from this cryptic statement that the Lewises contend that the defense of unconscionability applies in this case and makes the arbitration provision unenforceable. This contention fails, for several reasons. The arbitration provision in Branch limited the kind of damages the plaintiff could recover. No such limitation appears in the arbitration provision now before the Court. The Lewises have made no showing that they lacked a meaningful choice in obtaining financing; the plaintiff in Branch did make such a showing. Nothing in the record details the lending practices of lenders other than Green Tree in 1993, when the Lewises entered into the sales transaction. Nothing in the record suggests that the Lewises attempted to shop around for a financing arrangement that would not call for arbitration of disputes. The Lewises claim to be illiterate. [5] However, their illiteracy would not be a defense to enforcement of the contract. In Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138 (Ala.2000), this Court acknowledged a long-established rule in Alabama: `[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, [cannot], in the absence of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents; and the same rule [applies] to one who [cannot] read, if he neglects to have it read, or to [inquire] as to its contents. ' 775 So.2d at 140 (quoting Beck & Pauli Lithographing Co. v. Houppert, 104 Ala. 503, 506, 16 So. 522, 522 (1894) (emphasis added in Foster )). The Lewises invite a remand for the trial court to make specific findings, citing Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc. v. Jackson, [Ms. 1000391, April 13, 2001] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2001). The remand was warranted in Jackson, so that the trial court could make express findings as to the validity of an arbitration provision prohibiting the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages. As previously noted, the arbitration provision in this present case contains no such restriction. Consequently, based upon the facts of this case and the terms of the arbitration provision before us, we see no reason to remand for specific findings.