Opinion ID: 2320334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dying Declarations

Text: We begin with appellants' argument that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, as dying declarations by Tillman, certain out-of-court identifications attributed to him by Sgt. Butts. At a pretrial hearing, Butts testified that when he had visited Tillman at the intensive care unit of the Washington Hospital Center on May 17, 1993, Tillman had told him that he had been the victim of a drive-by shooting in front of a laundromat at 10½ Q Street. Tillman communicated that the young men who did this were Kermit (McCray), Charles (Webb), Antonio (Bell), and Denard (McClain). [14] When Butts showed Tillman six photographs, five of which were of these individuals, Tillman picked out Bell, McClain and Webb. Butts also visited Tillman in the intensive care unit on June 22, 1993just two days before Tillman died. Butts showed Tillman the same six photos, but Tillman nodded only in response to those of Bell and Webb. Tillman also communicated to Butts that four guns had been fired from a burgundy car, but that nobody had shot back at it. Tillman communicated that the four men had shot him because they were jealous of him. Butts's testimony also revealed that while at Q Street after having been shot and upon arriving at the hospital, Tillman provided the police with a false name, address, and social security number. At the time of the shooting, Tillman was on escape status from a juvenile facility. On April 12, 1994, the trial court held a hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements made by Tillman to Butts. Dr. Bikram Paul, the MedStar critical care physician at Washington Hospital Center, testified that Tillman had come to the Shock Trauma Unit on May 10, 1993, but that he had been admitted initially under the name of Kevin Buchanan. At that time, Tillman was in shock attributable to massive fluid loss and profuse bleeding from his wounds in the groin area and from arteries which the bullet struck. Doctors prepared Tillman for immediate surgery in an attempt to save his life. Tillman displayed symptoms of adult respiratory distress from the beginning of the surgery. Although his lung functions never really improved, Tillman's heart functions and blood pressure were very nicely stabilized. When Tillman stabilized initially, the medical staff thought he had a ten percent chance of survival. Throughout his hospitalization, Tillman had a number of tubes and wires protruding from his body, including a tracheotomy and breathing tube. Dr. Paul further testified that Tillman's condition had taken a downturn around the sixth or seventh day of his hospitalization, when his adult respiratory distress syndrome set in. Upon the onset of the respiratory distress, Tillman's chance of survival was less than one percent. As a result of his gradual deterioration, the medical staff lost hope that any procedure would keep Tillman alive and, after consulting with his family, instituted varying degrees of do not resuscitate orders three or four days before he died. By June 23, 1993, Tillman was suffering from respiratory failure because of his inability to excrete carbon dioxide. Dr. Paul's testimony indicated that he had no recollection of any discussion with Tillman about his prognosis for survival. Although Tillman was told that his condition was critical, Dr. Paul did not recall anyone telling Tillman that he almost definitely was going to die. Dr. Paul also testified that, with young patients such as Tillman, [i]f they survive [the initial trauma] and are not doing well, for ethical reasons I do not tell them they are going to die. Dr. Paul added that, while he sometimes informed Tillman when things didn't look good, he tempered that information with encouragement so that the young patient did not just give up and so [he tried] to help us. Patricia Hawkins, a registered nurse who had attended to Tillman in the intensive care unit, testified that when she saw Tillman communicating with his family they were discussing [m]ostly things in general, people he would talk to, or things that he would do once he was discharged or things that were going on at home. Hawkins further testified that these conversations had to have taken place within the last two weeks of his care, because that was when Tillman was more communicative. Hawkins acknowledged that Tillman's family did most of the talking, and that Tillman either nodded or shook his head in agreement or disagreement. Although Tillman could not speak normally, he communicated by moving his lips or by removing his breathing tube temporarily and trying to speak. Hawkins had no recollection of anyone telling Tillman he was dying. Hawkins added that whenever she was with Tillman while his family was there, [t]hey were claim, more positive . . . they were informing [him] of what was going on at home with the family, with friends. Hawkins also testified that she had been present during one of Tillman's visits from the police. Although she could not recall the precise date, she testified that it was near the end of his stay. Hawkins testified that during the interview Tillman was calm and didn't show a lot of emotion in his face, he just did what he was asked and then the interview was over. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge credited the testimony of all the witnesses and concluded in part: Throughout [the hospitalization], he's frail, weak, thin, unable to move and he has a tube in his throat. So, the medical condition from May 10th to June 24th, I will find he is in a shadow of real impending death; that when he was shot, he was already marked for death because of his condition, that never fully improved. In then finding that Tillman's statement during his second interview on June 22 was admissible as a dying declaration, the judge said, I think it's reasonable to infer that he knows he's in some serious, critical condition. The judge also found with regard both to May 17 and to June 22 that even though he's not told he's going to die and the knowledge that he's going to die is notspecific knowledge that he's going to die or specific evidence that he knows he's going to die is not really what's required. Certainly, combining his injury, his condition, what he's told about his condition in terms of it being critical and what he can observe when he's conscious, I think it would be reasonable to infer that Mr. Tillman knows he's in critical condition and that he could die. [Emphasis added.] After crediting some of the testimony focusing on Tillman's plans after he left the hospital, the judge stated: I don't think that . . . defeats the inference that I've made that he knows he's in critical condition and could die, since these statements could have been made at some earlier points. [ (Emphasis added.) ] With regard to the reliability of Tillman's identifications, the judge ruled that the [Herculean] effort which Tillman put forth to communicate with Butts satisfied her that the identifications were reliable. The judge summarized: There is a presumption that's acceptable to the Court. Here you've got medical interventions artificially keeping him alive, and he couldn't live without the interventions. And we're talking about a one percent chance of surviving when the police are talking to him the first time, and the second time they know he's not going to survive. All of the systems have failed and all the interventions have failed. Now, looking at McFadden, [15] that there is ayou presume that he knows he's going to die because he [McFadden] is told his condition is serious, and he's in pain, and at various times they see tears in his eyes and, you know, there's this jerking or bucking with the respirator at one point when he's shown the picture. I would say [McFadden's situation] is comparable to [Tillman] going to such efforts of voluntarily putting himself in stress, taking this tube, the respirator in and out in order to try to communicate, that that's certainly the equivalent of tears in the eyes and bucking his respirator. . . . I mean there's a lot of presumptions that are built into this, and a lot of them have to do with the serious injury that is tied and you presume based on that, and the pain and the rest of this connected to it, thatand the life-threatening condition which I found. So, there is some basis for making this presumption that the person knows [he is dying]. The judge added that Tillman would be alert enough and conscious enough, from the testimony, to make his own observations about the tubes, the respirator, the pain and the fact that he has a lifethat he would have a life-threatening condition. The judge then concluded that the identifications were reliable because of the effort with which Tillman had made them, and ruled that the identifications would be admitted in evidence as dying declaration exceptions to the hearsay rule. The dying declaration exception to the rule against admission of hearsay is based on the belief that persons making such statements are highly unlikely to lie. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). The sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of oath. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895)). This court has held that [t]o make out a dying declaration, the declarant must have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death. Lyons v. United States, 683 A.2d 1080, 1083 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 99, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933)). The declarant need not utter words acknowledging the certainty of death. McFadden v. United States, 395 A.2d 14, 16 (D.C.1978) (The court can infer the victim's sense of impending death from the circumstancesfrom the nature and extent of his wounds.). This court accords great deference to the trial judge's decision relating to the preliminary fact question of consciousness of impending death where reasonably supported by the evidence. Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 530 (D.C.1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). But the perception of impending death `must be exhibited in the evidence, and not left to conjecture.' Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1084 n. 8 (quoting Shepard, 290 U.S. at 100, 54 S.Ct. 22). While the decision to admit or exclude testimony lies within the discretion of the trial judge, the exercise of that discretion must be founded upon correct legal principles. In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C.1991) (citing Conrad v. Medina, 47 A.2d 562, 565 (D.C.1946)). It is an abuse of discretion if the trial judge rests her conclusions on incorrect legal standards. Id. (citing Jett v. Sunderman, 840 F.2d 1487, 1496 (9th Cir.1988)). Given this standard of review, we must conclude that the trial judge erred in admitting Tillman's identifications. In the first place, it appears that the trial courtby finding that Tillman knew he was in critical condition and could die, rather than knowing he was without hope of recovery, Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1083applied the wrong test; legal error on this issue is evident for that reason alone. But even if the trial court were understood to have viewed the evidence under the correct formulation, the recordas a matter of lawdoes not support the trial court's hearsay ruling. In Jenkins, the circumstances supporting the inference of the declarant's knowledge of impending death showed that he had been stabbed ten times with a double-edged knife, penetrating both lungs, spleen, stomach, arms and back. In addition, he was bleeding profusely and staggering before he ultimately collapsed on the pavement [and never regained consciousness]. 617 A.2d at 530. In McFadden, although the declarant never was told his death was imminent, his knowledge to that effect could be inferred because he had been severely burned all over his body; incisions had been made to ease the tremendous swelling; he frequently lifted the blankets and saw his charred body; he became extremely fearful and panicky and asked for help; he bucked the respirator and tried to breathe alone; and tears filled his eyes when he viewed the suspect's photograph. 395 A.2d at 15-16. Here, in contrast, the record does not support the inference that Tillman sensed his own impending death. The mere fact that Tillman understood he was in serious condition and could die is not a sufficient basis for allowing the admission of the identifications under the dying declaration exception. See, e.g., Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1083 (quoting Shepard, 290 U.S. at 99, 54 S.Ct. 22 (the declarant must have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death)). Only a declarant's state of mind, not physical condition per se, is relevant in satisfying the requirements of the dying declaration exception. The fact that one knows he or she might die, compared to knowing with certainty that one is dying, does not satisfy the traditional rationale for the exception: that [n]o person, who is immediately going into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon his lips. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (quoting Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881)). Moreover, the judge's conclusion that Tillman's ability to see his condition implied that he knew of his impending demise is, legally, too long a stretch. Although the trial judge related Tillman's condition to that of the declarants in McFadden and Jenkins, the present case is readily distinguishable on the facts. In Jenkins, the declarant was bleeding profusely immediately after being stabbed in multiple organs, and managed to utter a few words before collapsing and never again regaining consciousness. 617 A.2d at 530. In McFadden, the declarant could see almost all of his body charred, swollen and cut open. 395 A.2d at 16. In this case, however, the record does not indicate whether Tillman could see the wounds around his groin area; given that his ability to see straight down his body was impaired by breathing tubes. Even assuming he could see his wounds, there is no basis beyond conjecture, Shepard, 290 U.S. at 100, 54 S.Ct. 22, to conclude that the swelling and wounds suggested to Tillman that assuredly he would die. Furthermore, the mere fact that Tillman had tubes and wires protruding from his bodya condition common to many patients who surviveis not enough for an inference that Tillman knew he was dying. [16] On May 17, 1993, the date of Butts' first interview, the evidence suggests that Tillman was seriously ill, but there is no evidence that anyone had appraised him of a probability of death or that he was resigned to that likelihood. The medical staff, while not deluding him, consistently offered Tillman encouragement so that he would not give up hope. As well, his family remained positive around him and engaged him in discussions about what he would do once he left the hospital. By June 22, 1993, when Butts interviewed Tillman again, there was a significant deterioration in Tillman's health. But neither the medical staff nor his family appears to have informed him that it had become just a matter of time until death. Nurse Hawkins testified that Tillman was communicative that day and that the interview with Butts was as good as it could have been, given Tillman's inability to communicate easily. In sum, the admission of Tillman's photo identifications, through Butts, as dying declarations premised on a sense of impending death lacks support in the record, and the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence. In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d at 77.