Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 48

Heading: Claims include E.26-27)

Text: Defendant claims that the refusal of law enforcement personnel to be interviewed by defense counsel seeking evidence to support defendant's PCR claims violated his rights to due process, confrontation of witnesses, and his right to a fair PCR hearing. According to defense investigator Robert Worthy, he was told by members of the Ocean County Prosecutor's office and the State Police to clear any interview requests with Investigator Dino Dettorre of the Attorney General's office. Dettorre testified at the PCR hearing that pursuant to the inquiry by Worthy he had informed law enforcement personnel that whether they spoke to the defense was up to them, that the Attorney General's office took no position on the matter, but that an attorney from the Attorney General's office would be present at an interview if the interviewee wished. Dettorre testified that he had relayed the message that law enforcement personnel had the same right as civilians to refuse to be interviewed. Worthy also stated that Dettorre had told him that any interviews would take place in the Attorney General's office. Lieutenant James McIntyre subsequently informed Worthy that state police officers had declined to be interviewed on the basis of the instructions from the Attorney General's office. Captain Churchill of the Ocean County Prosecutor's office likewise informed Dettorre that none of the county investigative personnel would consent to interviews. It is not disputed that a potential witness has the right to refuse to speak to a representative of a party in litigation. Defendant argues that by informing the law enforcement personnel that they had the right to refuse to be interviewed, Dettorre suggested that they exercise that right. He also claims that by offering the assistance of an attorney from the Attorney General's office, Dettorre, in effect, implied that an attorney must be present at an interview. Finally, defendant suggests that, as a matter of fundamental justice, law enforcement personnel should not be permitted to refuse to be interviewed in a criminal matter. Defendant claims that he is entitled to a remand for a hearing on this issue on the ground that the testimony is conflicting. We find, however, that the material factual points are not disputed. The testimony of Dettorre and Worthy's affidavit demonstrate that the instructions Dettorre relayed to the law-enforcement personnel could not reasonably have been interpreted as instructing them not to talk to the defense. McIntyre's statement that the police officers refused to be interviewed in accordance with the instructions of the Attorney General's office does not mean that the officers were ordered not to cooperate. McIntyre's statement equally may be interpreted to refer to instructions that the officers had the right to refuse an interview, and that they were exercising that right. The cases cited by defendant in which it was found that prosecutors had interfered with defendants' access to witnesses are distinguishable. See Gregory v. United States, 369 F. 2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir.1966) (holding that prosecutor's advice to witness not to speak to anyone unless prosecutor was present amounted to denial of access to witness); United States v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 655 F. Supp. 73, 78 (D.Colo. 1986) (holding that prosecutors had interfered with defendant's access to witnesses by implicitly conveying wish that witnesses not speak to the defense when witnesses were in danger of prosecution themselves). In this case, the prospective witnesses were not advised to have a representative of the prosecutor's office present, nor was that made a condition of defendant's access to them. As representatives of law enforcement, there was no motive or pressure brought to bear on them not to speak to defense counsel. More likely than not, their disinclination to be interviewed was an inevitable incident of their position as law enforcement officers and their loyalty to the prosecution's cause. We also decline to impose a new duty on law enforcement officials to consent to being interviewed by the defense. We note that the State is already under an obligation to turn over material, exculpatory evidence to the defense. Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed. 2d at 218. Furthermore, we note that no duty analogous to the Brady obligation is imposed on nongovernmental litigants. Thus, defendant's assertion that law enforcement personnel's obligation to do justice should impose a higher duty of candor to the defense is addressed in part by the State's Brady obligation. Of course, if the State were to interfere with a defendant's ability to answer criminal charges by using its influence to discourage witnesses from speaking to counsel or counsel's agents, a very different case would be presented. We are satisfied that the undisputed testimony will not support an inference that such influence was brought to bear. Defendant's claims under the Brady standard are dealt with at length elsewhere in this opinion. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that law enforcement personnel's refusal to be interviewed tainted the fairness of the PCR proceeding.
Defendant claims that the Attorney General should have been disqualified from representing the State in the PCR hearing on the ground that the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, Terrence P. Farley, was the First Assistant Prosecutor of Ocean County at the time of the remand hearing following defendant's direct appeal. Defendant argues that, because he raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct by the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office in the petition, the former First Assistant Prosecutor's presence in the Attorney General's Office precluded fair adjudication of his PCR petition, and will preclude fair adjudication of federal habeas review. Other than constitutional due process and fairness considerations, defendant does not cite any legal authority for the proposition that he may compel the disqualification of the State's counsel on PCR because the same counsel represented the State earlier in the proceedings. Defendant does not allege that Director Farley had any direct role in either the Ocean County trial or in the PCR proceeding. Nor is there an allegation of specific prejudice that resulted from the dual roles of Director Farley. The fact that defendant alleges misconduct in prior proceedings cannot entitle him to disqualify counsel for the State. Moreover, we note that the underlying allegations of prosecutorial misconduct have been found to be without merit. Accordingly, we find that the Attorney General's representation of the State on PCR did not taint the fairness of the proceeding. Defendant also claims that the refusal of the PCR court to permit defendant to amend his petition rendered the proceeding unfair. Because we address in this opinion the merits of the claims defendant proposed to add in an amended petition, the claim based on the denial of permission to amend is moot. Defendant claims that videotaping the PCR proceeding deprived him of the assistance of counsel and a full and fair hearing. He claims that his ability to confer confidentially with counsel during the proceedings was impaired by the microphone system used in the courtroom. The State responds that the fear that the microphones would not permit private conversations at the counsel table was due to a misunderstanding, and that a kill switch at the table permitted such conversations without interruption of the proceedings. Defendant does not contradict those representations. The record shows that any misunderstanding was corrected by the court. Therefore, defendant's claim is without merit.