Opinion ID: 2003518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Expressing Reservations About the Death Penalty

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to exercise peremptory challenges against certain prospective jurors who expressed some reservations about the death penalty, but whose views did not rise to the level of cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, and its progeny. Under Witherspoon, a prospective juror may not constitutionally be excused for cause based on general objections to the death penalty on moral or religious grounds. Defendant contends that through the use of peremptory challenges the State was able to achieve what it could not achieve through the use of challenges for cause: a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die ( Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521, 88 S.Ct. at 1776, 20 L.Ed.2d at 784). On several occasions, this court has held that Witherspoon does not limit the use of peremptory challenges. ( People v. Williams (1994), 161 Ill.2d 1, 55-56, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296; People v. Howard (1991), 147 Ill.2d 103, 136-38, 167 Ill.Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044; People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill.2d 463, 481-82, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227.) Defendant acknowledges these decisions but urges us to reconsider them. However, we find no persuasive reason to depart from this court's holdings in this area. Accordingly, the circuit court properly dismissed this post-conviction claim.