Opinion ID: 197261
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Availability of Fourth-Level Review.

Text: this phase of our analysis by addressing Portela's halfhearted argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that a fourth level of review was not in fact available to her. The argument is bogus. The facts are as follows. The original administrative procedure, SECNAVINST 5300.22A, did not mention a fourth level of review. On November 15, 1989, however, the Secretary of the Navy promulgated SECNAVINST 5300.22B, directing subordinate commands to implement it within 120 days. The new regulation (5300.22B) explicitly canceled the old regulation (5300.22A). Nevertheless, on January 24, 1990, the Director, Officer of Civilian Personnel Management, granted an extension to the NRSSO, deferring the effective date of SECNAVINST 5300.22B until July 15, 1990. Thus, the notice of suspension issued to Portela on April 9, 1990, the notice of proposed disciplinary action issued to her on May 29, 1990, and the notice of decision dated June 22, 1990, all referenced SECNAVINST 5300.22A as the controlling regulation. From that point forward, however, Portela clearly understood indeed, urged that SECNAVINST 5300.22B, which 7 unarguably contains a fourth level of administrative review, governed her case. She mentioned it in her second appeal, dated August 12, 1990, and at the ensuing evidentiary hearing her counsel insisted that 5300.22B, rather than 5300.22A, controlled her case. While the hearing officer did not rule on the question, the ultimate decisionmaker at that level (the Commanding Officer of the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station) accepted Portela's argument and reviewed the hearing transcript in accordance with SECNAVINST 5300.22B. Throughout the remainder of the administrative process, both sides proceeded under that regulation.3 We do not aspire to add hues to a rainbow. By its terms, SECNAVINST 5300.22B applies here. And, moreover, since Portela consistently argued for its application during the latter stages of the administrative process, she cannot now be heard to complain that the agency surrendered to her exhortation. Equitable doctrines of estoppel apply in administrative and judicial fora, see generally Davis & Pierce, supra, 13.1 to 13.5, and a party cannot take one position in an underlying administrative proceeding and then disclaim it in a subsequent suit arising out of the agency proceedings. Cf. Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987) 3We cite two episodes which confirm this conclusion. In her third-level notice of appeal, Portela stated expressly that [t]his appeal arises under SECNAVINST 5300.22B. By like token, in resolving that appeal adversely to Portela, the NRSSO commandant specifically informed Portela of her right to a fourth-level appeal under SECNAVINST 5300.22B. 8 (explaining that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding which is contrary to a position it has already asserted in another).