Opinion ID: 1892409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: second degree murder and malice

Text: The majority opinion, quoting State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 18 N.W.2d 203 (1945), states: The different degrees of homicide as defined by our statute are all carved out of murder and manslaughter as known to the common law. No new offense has been created, and no homicide which was not criminal at common law is made so by statute, but it is divided into degrees and the punishment graded to meet the circumstances of the particular case. The decisions of this court clearly hold to this view. It is my position that common-law voluntary manslaughter was subsumed by the crime of second degree murder. The majority states, The usual type of voluntary manslaughter involves the intentional killing of another while under the influence of a reasonably-induced emotional disturbance (in earlier terminology, while in a `heat of passion') causing a temporary loss of normal self-control. Except for this reasonable emotional condition, the intentional killing would be murder. (Emphasis supplied.) (Quoting 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.10(a) (1986).) LaFave and Scott also point out: [V]oluntary manslaughter is often defined in the cases (and, sometimes, by statute) as if intent to kill were a required ingredient. But, theoretically at least, they might be of the intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury, or of the depraved-heart, types. Thusto take the most common sort of voluntary manslaughter, a killing while in a reasonable heat of passion in most cases the defendant intentionally kills the one who has aroused this passion in him. But if, in the throes of such a passion, he should intend instead to do his tormentor serious bodily injury short of death, or if he should, without intending to kill him, endanger his life by very reckless (depraved heart) conduct, the resulting death ought equally to be voluntary manslaughter rather than murder or no crime. The great majority of modern statutes, either by a reference to all cases which would otherwise be murder or by similar general language, take this broad view. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 253. In my view, Nebraska case law and Nebraska's homicide statutes reflect that Nebraska has done away with the common-law distinctions of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Moreover, in Nebraska, a person is only exempt from criminal responsibility when he kills another while the killer is insane (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2203 (Reissue 1985)) or is justified in killing under Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 28-1406 to 28-1416 (Reissue 1985), Nebraska's justification of use of force act. The Legislature has not seen fit to exempt from criminal responsibility a person who kills another upon a sudden quarrel even though the killing was unintentional. The majority has by judicial fiat made such an exemption.