Opinion ID: 2598373
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background on RS 2477

Text: The superior court held that a public right-of-way existed over Price's property under 43 U.S.C. § 932, Revised Statute (RS) 2477. Congress enacted this provision, commonly referred to as RS 2477, in 1866 as part of the Lode Mining Act. [6] Under RS 2477, the federal government granted rights-of-way, providing: [T]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted. [7] The grant was self-executing, meaning that an RS 2477 right-of-way automatically came into existence if a public highway was established across public land in accordance with the law of Alaska. [8] Although Congress repealed RS 2477 in 1976, the statute governs this case because the claimed right-of-way would have existed before then. [9] We have noted that [t]he operation of § 932 is not obvious from its terms. [10] Indeed, the statute itself is simply an offer to dedicate land to public use. [11] To effect the grant of a right-of-way, either the public or the appropriate state authorities must take positive action. [12] Specifically, the public must use the land for such a period of time and under such conditions as to prove that the grant has been accepted, or appropriate public authorities of the state must act in a way that clearly manifests their intention to accept the grant. [13] RS 2477 specified that it provided for the construction of highways over federal public lands, not reserved for public uses. [14] Public lands means lands open to settlement or other disposition under federal land laws. [15] Therefore, a valid RS 2477 claim could only have been made on the land in question before December 29, 1959, when the State of Alaska filed a land selection application with the Bureau of Land Management for lands encompassing Price's land. As soon as the state filed its application, the lands it selected were segregated from all applications and appropriations under the public land laws. We therefore must determine whether the trial court erred in holding that an RS 2477 right-of-way existed prior to 1959. To determine whether sufficient public use exists to establish an RS 2477 right-of-way, courts usually consider two factors: evidence of use and evidence of the route's definite character. [16] However, a preliminary issue in this case makes it unnecessary for us to reach the merits of the RS 2477 claim. Neither of the parties raised the issue of an RS 2477 right-of-way at the trial court level. Rather, the trial courtdeclining to rule upon the prescriptive easement claim Eastham presentedfound on its own that an RS 2477 right-of-way existed over Price's land. This lack of notice raises serious due process concerns. The Alaska Constitution provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. [17] We have held repeatedly that [p]rocedural due process under the Alaska Constitution requires notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. [18] Parties must have notice of the subject of proceedings that concern them so that they will have a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [19] A hearing is required in order to give the parties an opportunity to present the quantum of evidence needed [for the court] to make an informed and principled determination. [20] Because Price did not have notice that an RS 2477 right-of-way was at issue, his due process rights were violated. Here, Price did not have an opportunity to be heard on the RS 2477 matter; in fact, he reasonably believed that RS 2477 was not at issue. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's failure to give Price notice and an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence on the RS 2477 issue at trial violated his due process rights, and we therefore reverse the superior court's finding of an RS 2477 right-of-way on Price's land.