Opinion ID: 625083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the District Court Erred in Sending the Fee Proposal to the Jury

Text: We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, using the same standards as the trial court. Penford Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 662 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir.2011). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party without making credibility assessments or weighing the evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To sustain an entry of judgment as a matter of law, the evidence must point unswervingly to only one reasonable conclusion. This demanding standard reflects our concern that, if misused, judgment as a matter of law can invade the jury's rightful province. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ladco's central argument is that the parties' contractual arrangement was a matter of law for the district court, rather than the jury, to decide. Whether an issue was properly before the jury . . . is a legal question which we review de novo. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 53 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir.1995). Under Missouri law, determining the meaning of an unambiguous provision is a question of law for the court, determined by giving language its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to extrinsic evidence. Weitz Co. v. MH Washington, 631 F.3d 510, 524 (8th Cir.2011). A contract is ambiguous when the terms are susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning. Id. Interpretation of a contract is a jury question only when the court determines that the contract is ambiguous and that there exists a genuine factual dispute regarding the intent of the parties. Id. Ladco argues the fee proposal should not have been sent to the jury because its terms were unambiguous and thus the interpretation was a matter of law for the court to decide. According to Ladco, SHA invoiced at standard hourly rates until it discovered it would not be lead architect on the project. In other words, Ladco asserts SHA interpreted the Statement of Intent as meaningless when it became disadvantageous to abide by it. Because the proposal was unambiguous, Ladco argues the court should have enforced the Statement of Intent, which only provided for hourly compensation, and granted judgment as a matter of law on SHA's percentage fee claim. We disagree. First, [t]o determine whether a contract is ambiguous the court must consider the entire written agreement and give words their ordinary and usual meaning. Union Elec. Co. v. Sw. Bell Tel. L.P., 378 F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir.2004). The Statement of Intent provided SHA would work at  standard hourly rates and under the terms and conditions contained in this proposal until such time as a final agreement is in place or until SHA is notified that its services are no longer needed. J.A. at 27 (emphasis added). The parties advance competing contract principles in support of their interpretations of this provision. Ladco argues we must interpret this provision to give effect to the specific term dealing with hourly rates, rather than the broader language referencing the other terms and conditions of the proposal. See Phillips v. Authorized Investors Grp., Inc., 625 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Mo.Ct.App.1981) ([W]e give preference to the specific provisions over the general.). On the other hand, SHA offers support for its theory in the principle that each term of a contract is construed to avoid rendering other terms meaningless, which would effectively occur if we accepted Ladco's interpretation of this provision. Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo.2003). Given the language of the entire fee proposal, including the Statement of Intent and the separate scopes of services, the contract is susceptible to each of the meanings argued by the parties. Namely, it is reasonable to read the fee proposal in accordance with hourly or percentage-based compensation. Under either approach, determining the proper amount of compensation becomes particularly confusing under the circumstances, because SHA was tasked with replicating its efforts under separate scopes of services throughout the continual revisions and additions to the project. Indeed, even the parties acted under varying interpretations. For several months, SHA submitted hourly-based invoices that Ladco paid in full, which accords with Ladco's interpretation of the fee proposal. Shaw admitted at trial at least some of the schematic design work was billed on an hourly basis in certain invoices. Nonetheless, when Shaw demanded to be paid based on the percentage of schematic designs SHA completed, Ladco agreed SHA was entitled to such compensation, even if it disputed the exact percent SHA had completed. See J.A. at 29-30 (As we are all aware, a key issue related to this agreement is Ladco's assessment of the percent detail of the [schematic design] portion as performed by Shaw Hofstra.). We believe the parties' conduct is relevant to our interpretation of the contract, and supports a finding of ambiguity. See Press Mach. Corp. v. Smith R.P.M. Corp., 727 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir.1984) (The surrounding circumstances at the time of contracting and the positions and actions of the parties are relevant to the judicial interpretation of the contract.); Wilkinson v. Tarwater, 393 S.W.2d 538, 543 (Mo.1965) (The construction that the parties place upon a contract or an agreement as evidenced by the acts and conduct is strong evidence of the real intention of the parties.). In sum, [u]nder Missouri law, the court must first determine as a matter of law whether a contract is ambiguous. United States v. Green Acres Enters., Inc., 86 F.3d 130, 133 (8th Cir.1996). The district court performed this task here, concluding the parties' agreement was ambiguous. Given the varying reasonable interpretations of the fee proposal's language, we agree. [O]nce a contract is deemed ambiguous, a question of fact arises and the issue is reserved for the jury. Lafarge N. Am., Inc. v. Discovery Grp. LLC, 574 F.3d 973, 981 n. 3 (8th Cir.2009); see also Weitz Co. LLC v. MacKenzie House, LLC, 665 F.3d 970, 976 (8th Cir.2012) (Because of this ambiguity, the issue was properly submitted to the jury, and this court will not overturn their reasoned verdict.); Baum v. Helget Gas Prods., Inc., 440 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir.2006) (Where the contract is textually ambiguous, a question of material fact exists as to the parties' intent, which is for a jury to resolve at trial.). Accordingly, because the fee proposal was ambiguous as to the parties' intent, the district court did not err in submitting it to the jury to make the necessary factual determination. Finally, we address Ladco's contention that the proposal had been replaced by the May 2008 email, which should be interpreted as a matter of law because it was an unambiguous settlement agreement. Under the email, Ladco states two conditions precedent were not met: (1) no contract was entered between Ladco and BKA, and thus SHA's fee was unknown; and (2) financing was not obtained, and the email stated the final 50 percent was deemed at risk until such financing was put in place. Consequently, Ladco argues none of the payments in the settlement became due. Notwithstanding the drastic inequity posed by adopting Ladco's argument, we disagree the email operated as an unambiguous settlement agreement that superseded the original fee proposal. [3] Looking to the language of the email, it begins by focusing on the contract for Architectural Services that was to be entered into between Ladco and BKA. J.A. at 29. Ladco then stated, a key issue related to this agreement is Ladco's assessment of the percent detail of the [schematic design] portion as performed by Shaw Hofstra. Id. Ladco indicated it would pay SHA based on a completion rate of 40 percent of the schematic design in exchange for SHA's release of the schematic design documents to BKA. SHA disputed Ladco's assessment that it only completed 40 percent of the schematic design work, and it never signed the purported settlement, although it ultimately turned over the documents to BKA. Like the fee proposal above, it is unclear whether the parties intended to settle the schematic design compensation via the May 2008 email. The issues of whether the parties entered into a contract and, if so, what terms are included in that contract, depend on what the parties actually said and did and not upon one party's own understanding. Muilenburg, Inc. v. Cherokee Rose Design & Build, LLC, 250 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Mo.Ct.App.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The real intention of the parties is the universal rule of construction. Robson v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 391 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Mo. banc 1965). Whether an unsigned writing constitutes a binding contract depends upon the intention of the parties, which is a question of fact that is seldom capable of direct proof. Heritage Roofing, LLC v. Fischer, 164 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Mo.Ct.App.2005). This is the case here. Ultimately, while another jury may agree with Ladco that SHA was only entitled to be paid based on its hourly rates, we simply cannot say, on the basis of the record before us, that [Ladco] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim[.] Bone v. Refco, Inc., 774 F.2d 235, 245 (8th Cir.1985). [R]easonable minds could differ about the import of the evidence, and thus the district court properly denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 53 F.3d at 904. We affirm the district court.