Opinion ID: 351559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: retrial of michael j. tiche

Text: 63 After the jury in the first trial reported that it was unable to agree upon a verdict as to Michael J. Tiche, Judge Newman granted his motion for a mistrial on February 11, 1976. In due course the case was transferred on April 13 to the Northern District of New York for a retrial which began on June 7 before Judge Werker and a jury. Following the jury's return of a verdict on June 18 convicting him on the four counts referred to above, Tiche was sentenced on July 6 to a term of 6 years under the Youth Corrections Act. 64 Tiche's chief claim on appeal 19 is that Judge Werker in his decision of May 28, 1976 erred in denying Tiche's motion to dismiss the indictment prior to the commencement of his second trial. In short, he claims that failure to commence the second trial within 60 days of the declaration of the mistrial in the first trial violated paragraph 7 of the District of Connecticut Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. 20 For the reasons below, we hold that Judge Werker did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. We affirm Tiche's conviction. 65 (A) Causes of the Delay 66 When Judge Newman granted Tiche's motion for a mistrial on February 11, he specifically noted and directed the government's attention to the 60 day limitation period. We find that the ensuing events reflect an intent to comply on the part of the district court and the government. 67 On March 4 the case was reassigned to Judge Zampano for trial. On March 11 Tiche was given until March 26 to file motions. On March 15 the government filed its Notice of Readiness. 68 Backing up for a moment, on February 19 Tiche's counsel at the first trial, Thomas D. Clifford, Esq. of the Connecticut bar moved to be relieved of his appointment under the Criminal Justice Act. On March 24, however, Mr. Clifford moved for a change of venue in view of the extensive publicity in the District of Connecticut. At the hearing on the change of venue motion, the government did not oppose the motion but pointed out that, in view of the appointment of new counsel for Tiche who would require additional time for trial preparation, the retrial may not be begun within the required sixty-day period. At this hearing, Mr. Clifford, who had moved to be relieved as Tiche's counsel, declined to waive any of his client's speedy trial rights. On March 31 Judge Newman relieved Mr. Clifford and ordered the case transferred to the Northern District of New York for retrial. 69 The indictment was filed in the Northern District on April 13 (61 days after the declaration of the mistrial in the first trial). On April 14 new counsel, William J. Quinlan, Esq. of Schenectady was assigned to represent Tiche. On April 19 Mr. Quinlan informed Judge Werker 21 that the voluminous materials in the case would require a delay to allow preparation for retrial. 22 He requested and was granted until May 17 to make any motions. Mr. Quinlan filed his motions on May 12. They were argued on May 17. Among the motions filed and argued was the motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to commence the retrial within 60 days of the declaration of the mistrial. On May 17, however, Mr. Quinlan requested and was granted a continuance of the trial to June 7 in the event his motion to dismiss the indictment should be denied. 70 On appeal Tiche attacks the leisurely timetable of the District of Connecticut. We fail to see how responsibility for the expiration of the 60 day period can be attributed to either the district court or the government. Even if there had been more expeditious treatment of Tiche's motions by all hands, in the realistic world of the trial court, to have anticipated the change of Tiche's counsel, the granting of the motion for a transfer and the scheduling of motions by his new counsel all within a period of 60 days from February 11 would have required a district court equipped with the power of crystal ball gazing. 71 (B) Application of Paragraph 7 72 Tiche's argument is deceptively simple and straightforward. He says that the 60 day limitation for the commencement of a new trial provided for in the first sentence of paragraph 7 is clear and not subject to any exceptions. He points to the excluded periods in paragraph 6, such as the general provision for delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances, but notes that these exceptions apply only to the time limitations for the initial trial provided for in paragraph 5. From this he draws the inference that the 60 day limitation in paragraph 7 was intended as an absolute bar not to be relaxed even to permit a substitution of counsel or a change of venue at the request of a defendant or his counsel in connection with a retrial. We disagree. 73 We reject out of hand Tiche's argument that certain of our prior decisions with respect to delayed retrials under Rule 50(b) plans compel us to accept his construction of paragraph 7. United States v. Yagid, 528 F.2d 962 (2 Cir. 1976); United States v. Roemer, 514 F.2d 1377 (2 Cir. 1975); United States v. Drummond, 511 F.2d 1049 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975). These cases are readily distinguishable. They were concerned with the applicability to administrative delays caused by the courts and the prosecutors of the good cause escape provision in earlier Rule 50(b) plans. The delay in question here would qualify for such a good cause exception even under the increasingly exacting standard established by those cases. In our view, they provide little guidance on the question of interpretation presented here. 74 Our more recent decision in United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182 (2 Cir. 1976), although in one respect closer in point, in essence falls into the same category as the three cases referred to above. Paragraph 7 of the revised Southern District Plan, which is identical to paragraph 7 of the District of Connecticut Plan, went into effect during the period of delay which preceded Didier's retrial. In applying the 60 day limitation period there, we stated: 75 Further delay was also prohibited by the (revised Plan). . . . This Plan eliminated extensions 'for good cause' in retrials after mistrial and reduced the period for retrial to 60 days. . . . Here the retrial did not take place for more than 180 days after the revised Plan went into effect. 542 F.2d at 1188. 76 Obviously this application of paragraph 7 of the Southern District Plan to significantly different facts cannot be taken as a construction of the in any event, not later than 60 days clause so as to be conclusive on the facts presently before us. Didier was a case in which the government sought much of the delay for tactical purposes and the district court failed to insist that deadlines be met. . . .  Id. at 1189. The question raised here by a delay resulting from measures taken to protect a defendant's rights was not involved in Didier. See also United States v. Amendola, 558 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2 Cir. 1977). 77 Paragraph 7 of the district court plans superseded a 90 day retrial provision which had a good cause escape hatch. Drafted with an obvious eye to the 60 day retrial provision of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (Supp. V, 1975), paragraph 7 reflects the view that as a general matter retrial after mistrial is a situation where delays at the behest of the court and of the government are least excusable. The court and the government, having been ready for trial in the immediate past, are presumed to be in a position to commence a retrial within 60 days. 78 It requires but a moment's reflection, however, to recognize that there are certain situations where, to apply the 60 day limitation provision of paragraph 7 as an absolute bar, would result in a gross miscarriage of justice most assuredly contrary to the intent of the drafters of the provision. For example, the 60 day period could run out because a defendant became sick or had fled the jurisdiction. Under the literal reading of paragraph 7 urged by Tiche, such a defendant would be rewarded by dismissal of the indictment. In our view, an exception to the 60 day limitation period for acts of God and misconduct on the part of a defendant clearly is a necessary implication. That being so, we see no justification for limiting the implied exception to those situations. Necessity of a different but equally compelling character arises when the district court is called upon to protect a defendant's rights. It makes no sense in terms of the speedy trial interests of either a defendant or the public to construe paragraph 7 so as to hobble the district court with a Hobson's choice whenever a defendant makes a proper request for a delay. Such a result could not have been intended. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) and (h) (Supp. V, 1975). 79 These considerations lead us to hold that paragraph 7 should be construed to permit an exception to cover the circumstances of the instant case. We exclude from the retrial limitation period the entire time from March 24 (when Tiche moved for a change of venue) to June 7 (the date to which Tiche moved for a continuance). This is to allow for the dual purpose of accomplishing the change of venue and the trial preparation by Tiche's new counsel. 80 Our conclusion in this respect is fortified by the revised Plans for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases enacted pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act which became effective in both the District of Connecticut and the Northern District of New York on July 1, 1976. These Plans, which go further than the 1975 revised Plans toward compliance with the pretrial requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, provide in paragraphs 5 and 10 that the periods of delay set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) shall be excluded in computing the 60 day period for retrials. Section 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act provides for certain exclusions from the time limitations of the Act. Among them are exclusions which would have been applicable here e.g., for delay resulting from proceedings relating to transfer from other districts, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (F); for delay attributable to the consideration of pretrial motions, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E) and (G); and for delay resulting from a continuance granted at the defendant's request. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). 81 The incorporation in the 1976 Plans of the § 3161(h) exclusions for retrials, viewed in the context of the overall purpose of gradual compliance with the Speedy Trial Act, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3163-66, 23 is a cogent indication that the more restrictive in any event language of the 1975 Plans should not be read literally. Viewed in this historical context, that language appears to have had the purpose of signalling the final demise of the good cause escape hatch. 82 We reject the claim of Michael J. Tiche that failure to commence his second trial within 60 days of the declaration of a mistrial in his first trial violated paragraph 7 of the District of Connecticut Plan for Prompt Disposition Of Criminal Cases. 83 We have considered appellants' other claims of error and find them without merit. 84 Appellants were convicted after fair trials on the basis of overwhelming evidence of serious crimes committed more than two years ago. We order that the mandate issue forthwith. 85 Affirmed.