Opinion ID: 2974275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preclusive Effect of State Court Judgment

Text: Plaintiff Joseph Hardesty was charged with being a minor in possession of alcohol in state court. The state court granted his motion to suppress and dismissed the charge on the basis that the police officers’ entrance onto the back deck of the Hardesty home was a constitutionally impermissible warrantless search. The state court reasoned that since the perceived medical emergency was not observed by the officers until after they entered the curtilage of the home, i.e., the back deck, what they saw while they were impermissibly within the curtilage could not be used to justify the entry into the home itself. The federal district court below held that it was not bound by the state court decision on the legality of the search because neither the defendants nor Plaintiff Kenneth Hardesty were parties to the state court litigation. On appeal, Joseph Hardesty argues that at least he is entitled to preclude the defendants from taking a position contrary to the ruling of the state court. Federal courts give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments as those judgments would receive in the courts of the rendering state. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). “Under Michigan law, issue preclusion applies when 1) there is identity of parties across the proceedings, 2) there was a valid, final judgment in the first proceeding, 3) the same issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in the first proceeding, and 4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding.” Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing People v. Gates, 452 N.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Mich.)). The first element is met when the litigants were parties to a prior action or were privy to parties to a prior action. Id. None of the defendants were parties to the state court prosecution. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were in privity with the State of Michigan which prosecuted the minor-in-possession case. Plaintiffs cite a footnote in an Eighth Circuit case which indicates this argument would be valid under North Dakota claim preclusion law. See Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1369 n.7 (8th Cir. 1985). However, the cases applying Michigan law have all held that police officer defendants in a § 1983 case are not in privity with the prosecution of a related criminal case and do not have a personal stake in the outcome of the criminal case. See Von Herbert v. City of St. Clair Shores, 61 Fed. Appx. 133, 136 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished); Burda Brothers, Inc. v. Walsh, 22 Fed. Appx. 423, 430 (6th Cir. 2001) No. 05-1346 Hardesty, et al. v. Hamburg Township, et al. Page 4 (unpublished); Kegler v. City of Livonia, 1999 WL 133110, at  n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished); Glass v. Abbo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705-06 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Therefore, collateral estoppel cannot be used offensively to preclude the litigation of an issue addressed in an associated criminal case. In light of this line of persuasive authority, the district court did not err in coming to the same conclusion in this case.