Opinion ID: 811330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: compliance with statutory requirements

Text: The Portises also argue that the district court erred in determining that Deutsche Bank was excused from strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the Alabama redemption statute. Specifically, the Portises argue that: (i) the district court incorrectly excused Deutsche Bank’s failure to make a written demand for a statement of debt pursuant to Ala. Code § 6-5-252; and (ii) the district court incorrectly excused Deutsche Bank’s failure to tender payment for the Property where no written demand for a statement of debt was made.
In pertinent part, Ala. Code § 6-5-252 provides that “[a]nyone desiring and entitled to redeem may make written demand of the purchaser or his or her transferees for a statement in writing of the debt and all lawful charges claimed . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). As indicated by the district court, “the portion of the statute governing demand is written in permissive terms.” Portis, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 1221. In Spencer v. West Ala. Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court of Alabama or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.”) (quotation marks omitted). Once the Portises acquired a cognizable interest, and following the Portises’ commencement of Portises I on November 13, 2009, the district court immediately consolidated the two cases for resolution of common questions of law and fact related to the competing claims to the Property. On this record, we cannot say that the district court erred in failing to join the Portises to the Deutsche Bank I litigation. 10 Case: 11-15790 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 11 of 17 interpreted a nearly identical, older version of the same statute, § 6-5-2345, held that the provisions therein were “clearly permissive,” and allowed a party to exercise its right of redemption even after it had failed to demand a statement of the debt and lawful charges. 564 So. 2d 425, 428 (Ala. 1990). We decline the Portises’ invitation to interpret Spencer narrowly for the proposition that “a demand for a written statement is excused where tender is made within the one-year redemptive period.” In Spencer, the Alabama Supreme Court expressly stated that the redemption statutes are “remedial in nature” and therefore must be given “a liberal interpretation so as to effectuate their objectives.” Spencer, 564 So. 2d at 427. “The purpose of the redemption statutes is to allow a defaulting purchaser, with certain restrictions, the opportunity to redeem property that has been lost by foreclosure. Indeed, statutory rights of redemption are intended to rescue from sacrifice the property of a debtor.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the district court was correct in its determination that under Alabama law, § 6-5-252’s written demand provision is permissive. Thus, Deutsche Bank’s failure to make a written demand of the debt and lawful charges claimed by Citibank at the Property’s foreclosure did not void 5 The comment to Ala. Code § 6-5-252 provides that “[t]his section was essentially the prior Section 6-5-234.” Id. 11 Case: 11-15790 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 12 of 17 Deutsche Bank’s subsequent attempt to exercise its right of redemption.
We also reject the Portises’ argument that Deutsche Bank’s failure to tender payment for the Property within one year of foreclosure cannot be excused. The redemption statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]nyone entitled and desiring to redeem real estate under the provisions of this article must also pay or tender to the purchaser . . . the purchase price paid at the sale, with interest . . ., and all other lawful charges, also with interest . . . .” Ala. Code § 6-5-253. The Portises correctly state that “[p]ayment or tender to the purchaser . . . [is] a condition precedent to filing a complaint to redeem, unless excused.” Nichols v. Colvin, 674 So. 2d 576, 579 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). As the district court recognized, however, under Alabama Supreme Court precedent a redemptioner’s failure to make payment or tender prior to filing a complaint to redeem is excused if the redemptioner “submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and offers to do equity.” Robino v. Green, 119 So. 2d 897, 899 (Ala. 1960). Here, Deutsche Bank’s complaint sought a declaration that the Citibank foreclosure was void and of no effect. In the alternative, Deutsche Bank requested that “if the Court determines that Deutsche Bank is not entitled to the relief requested . . . above, Deutsche Bank be entitled to redeem the Subject property from Citibank for an 12 Case: 11-15790 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 13 of 17 appropriate redemption price.” Under Robino, once Deutsche Bank submitted itself to the court’s jurisdiction and offered to pay the appropriate redemption price, it was excused from making payment or tender prior to filing its complaint. Thus, we affirm the district court’s holding that Deutsche Bank’s failure to tender payment is excused.