Opinion ID: 785921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preserving Appellate Review of Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 12 The Cummings assert the trial court erred in not granting judgment in their favor, arguing that the [e]vidence of defect and causation presented at trial entitled [them] to judgment as a matter of law. I Aplt. Br. at 26. GM contends that the Cummings have failed to preserve this issue for appeal, stating (1) the Cummings moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence only on the defense of product misuse and not on liability generally, and (2) the Cummings failed to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict. I Aplee. Br. at 5, 6. 13 A party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence during a civil trial must make a motion for judgment as a matter of law before the case is submitted to the jury, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). If the court denies the motion and submits the case to the jury, the party may nevertheless renew its motion after the verdict if the jury finds for the opposing party or fails to reach a verdict. Id. 14 Because a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence and following a verdict are closely intertwined, we consider both in turn. A motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence, formerly referred to as a motion for a directed verdict, serves several purposes. Anderson v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., 933 F.2d 1500, 1503 (10th Cir.1991) (collecting cases). A motion under Rule 50(a) protects the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Such a motion alerts the opposing party to any deficiencies in the case, thereby giving the party an opportunity to rectify any deficiencies prior to the case being submitted to the jury. Id. A motion for judgment as a matter of law also alerts the court to a claim of insufficient evidence before the case is submitted to the jury so the court is not faced with such a claim after the fact when the court's ability to address the motion is limited. Id. Finally, a motion at the close of evidence preserves the issue as a question of law for appeal. Id. 15 These purposes are met when the moving party alerts the court and the opposing party to the insufficiency of the evidence prior to submission of the case to the jury. Greenwood v. Societe Francaise De, 111 F.3d 1239, 1244-45 (5th Cir.1997). Upon such a motion, the court may grant a directed verdict only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party's position, with the evidence and inferences construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Q.E.R., Inc. v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir.1989). On appeal, this court reviews de novo the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir.2000), applying the same standard as applied in the district court, Q.E.R., 880 F.2d at 1180. [W]e ... will reverse only if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis ... with respect to a claim or defense ... under the controlling law.' Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1208 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 16 Where a party fails to move for judgment as a matter of law before the close of the evidence, however, we have repeatedly held that such a failure bars appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. F.D.I.C. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir.1994); Green Constr. Co. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir.1993); Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 663 n. 11 (10th Cir.1991). The motion must also be sufficiently certain as to the issues raised. Rule 50(a) requires that a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2). The motion must include all issues challenged, as the failure to move for a directed verdict [now judgment as a matter of law] on a particular issue will bar appellate review of that issue. Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1136 (10th Cir.1999). 17 When determining whether a particular issue has been raised in a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court has liberally construed such motions, Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1993), stating that [t]echnical precision is not necessary in stating grounds for the motion so long as the trial court is aware of the movant's position, United States v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 360 F.2d 260, 266 (10th Cir.1966); see also Anderson, 933 F.2d at 1504. While technical precision is not required, merely moving for directed verdict is not sufficient to preserve any and all issues that could have been, but were not raised in the directed verdict motion. United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1229 (10th Cir.2000). Rule 50 does require that [the grounds for a motion] be stated with sufficient certainty to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the movant's position with respect to the motion. Id. 18 In this case, the Cummings moved for judgment as a matter of law with regard to the defense of misuse only and requested a jury instruction on this issue. Counsel did not move for judgment as a matter of law with regard to GM's liability generally. The Cummings assert that the motion should be read liberally in accordance with Aguinaga to include the issue of liability generally. Although technical precision is not required, the moving party must adequately notify the court of the issues being raised in order to satisfy the purposes of the rule. The Plaintiffs' motion was limited to a motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of misuse, and therefore any appeal is so limited. See Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 962 (10th Cir.2002); Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1415-16 (10th Cir.1997); United Pac. Ins., 20 F.3d at 1076. Beyond the issue of foreseeable misuse, we are limited to review for `plain error constituting a miscarriage of justice.' Dilley, 296 F.3d at 962 (quoting First Sec. Bank v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir.1992)); see also Smith, 129 F.3d at 1416. 19 GM also asserts that the Cummings' failure to renew their motion after the verdict results in a waiver. While true in most circuits, 1 under Tenth Circuit precedent, even where a party fails to make a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is not barred from appealing the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, at least where an appropriate motion has been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury. See Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1246 (10th Cir.1999) (holding such a failure does not bar appellant from appealing the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence); Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1385 (10th Cir.1989) (holding failure to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not bar an appeal); Hansen v. Vidal, 237 F.2d 453, 454 (10th Cir.1956) (holding motion for judgment as a matter of law not a condition precedent to appeal from a final judgment). Thus the Cummings' failure to move for judgment as a matter of law following the adverse jury verdict does not bar their appeal regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the misuse defense. 20 In the absence of a Rule 50(b) motion, however, we are limited in the relief we may grant. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that in the absence of a motion for judgment as a matter of law following an adverse jury verdict made in the trial court within ten days after reception of a verdict [, Rule 50(b)] forbids the trial judge or an appellate court to enter such a judgment. Johnson, 344 U.S. at 50, 73 S.Ct. 125; see also Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 574, 68 S.Ct. 246, 92 L.Ed. 177 (1948); Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 218, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1947) (holding appellate court is without power to direct the District Court to enter judgment contrary to the one it had permitted to stand). Thus, [t]his court has no authority to direct a verdict contrary to that of the trial court where, as here, the complaining party has not given the trial court an opportunity to first correct its own error. Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir.1984). In this situation, the only remedy available is a new trial. Johnson, 344 U.S. at 50-51, 73 S.Ct. 125; Morrison Knudsen, 175 F.3d at 1246; Fortier, 747 F.2d at 1334. 21 As to whether the court should have granted the Cummings judgment as a matter of law with regard to GM's liability generally, because the Cummings' Rule 50(a) motion was limited to the issue of GM's misuse defense, we review the sufficiency of the evidence only for plain error constituting a miscarriage of justice. In addition, we are limited to determining whether a new trial is required, as we are without power to grant judgment in the Cummings' favor. As noted previously, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party's position. Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). This stringent standard of review is further heightened under plain error review, which has been limited to errors which seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Dilley, 296 F.3d at 963 (internal quotations and citations omitted). After a thorough review of the record in this case, we find nothing that rises to the level of such a miscarriage of justice. Therefore we conclude the district court did not commit plain error in allowing the Cummings' products liability claims to go to the jury. 22 We review the district court's denial of the Cummings' motion for judgment as a matter of law as to GM's defense of misuse de novo, although as above noted we are limited to determining whether the Cummings are entitled to a new trial. Under Oklahoma law, to establish a manufacturer's product liability, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was the cause of the injury, (2) the defect existed in the product at the time the product left the manufacturer's possession and control, and (3) the defect made the article unreasonably dangerous. Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla.1975). However, where a plaintiff is using a product for a purpose for which it was not intended, and is injured, the plaintiff may not recover. Id. at 1366. Misuse of a product is a defense subject to being pleaded and proved by defendant. Stewart v. Scott-Kitz Miller Co., 626 P.2d 329, 331 (Okla.App.1981). Abnormal or misuse of a product occurs where the method of using a product is not that which the maker intended or is a use that could not reasonably be anticipated by a manufacturer. Treadway v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 766 P.2d 938, 941 (Okla.1988). Oklahoma has drawn a distinction between use for an abnormal purpose or misuse, and use for a proper purpose but in a careless manner. Id. Use for a proper purpose but in a careless manner is considered contributory negligence, id., and contributory negligence is not a defense to a products liability claim, Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56 (Okla.1976). 23 Although GM's main defense was that there was no defect in the seat or seat restraint system, GM also asserted that Mrs. Cummings's injuries may have resulted from either her posture or position at the time of the accident. GM presented evidence that Mrs. Cummings was reclined in her seat and that the injury resulted due to her position at the time of the accident. GM presented evidence of a warning in the owner's manual against such use, which contained a picture of a person reclined and a warning that [e]ven if you buckle up, your safety belts can't do their job when you're reclined like this. I Aplt.App. at 809. The experts testified that riding with the seat reclined was not an advised use of the seat given the warning and safety concerns, id. at 406-07, and that the seat reclined for uses while the car was parked rather than moving, id. at 760-61, 998. The Cummings countered with evidence that such a use was foreseeable by manufacturers. I Aplee. Supp.App. at 319. The Cummings' own statements were that such a use was unsafe and that Mrs. Cummings would never ride in this position. Id. at 154. 24 A motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence may only be granted if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party's position. Q.E.R., 880 F.2d at 1180. Construing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to GM, and refraining from weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses, or substituting our judgment for that of the jury, Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F.3d 1559, 1563 (10th Cir.1993), we find there was evidence supporting both parties' positions, and consequently the court did not err in denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law and submitting the issue to the jury.