Opinion ID: 1539932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conclusion

Text: Rule 1.4(a) provides [a] lawyer shall ... (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information .... (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) because he was utterly lacking in the manner in which he explained the matter to his clients, because Gisriel, as Judge Martin found, did not explain to his clients, in a reasonable manner: the matter so as to make informed decisions; the mediation requirement; the possibility of sanctions; the results of the attorney fees hearing on September 23, 2003; Respondent's arguing the Barnharts' position at the September 23, 2003, hearing; the judgment against them; Respondent's satisfaction of the judgments; and Respondent's receipt of the $1,000 check. [15] Respondent excepts to the hearing judge's determination that he failed to explain the mediation requirement and the possibility of sanctions. Contained in the Record as Exhibit 1 is the contract signed by the Barnharts which contains a mediation provision mandating that neither party could initiate any legal action without first submitting any claim arising out of the contract to mediation. The contract also included sanctions for nonadherence, in the guise of attorneys' fees incurred: IN THE EVENT BUYER AND/OR SELLER SHALL INITIATE OR COMMENCE ANY ACTION IN ANY COURT OR BEFORE ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WITHOUT FIRST SUBMITTING THE DISPUTE OR CLAIM TO MEDIATION AS HEREIN PROVIDED, THE PARTY INITIATING OR COMMENCING SUCH ACTION AGREES TO PAY ALL COSTS AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES, INCURRED TO ENFORCE THE OBLIGATION AS PROVIDED HEREIN TO FIRST MEDIATE THE DISPUTE OR CLAIM.... Respondent testified that he had not spoken to the Barnharts about mediation because [t]hey didn't bring it up to me, although he clearly was the lawyer entrusted with the duty to interpret the contract. The hearing judge found under Rule 1.1 that Gisriel's failure to discuss the mediation clause with the Barnharts was not incompetent, but found, as well, that the same conduct was violative of Rule 1.4. Gisriel asserts that these are inherently contradictory findings. We disagree. The standard for counseling set forth in Rule 1.4 differs from the standard of care for competence. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 810 A.2d 457 (2002) (holding Rule 1.1 is violated when a lawyer, who may possess legal knowledge and skill, lacks the thoroughness and preparation necessary for a particular case, and Rule 1.4 is violated when a lawyer fails to explain a matter and the effects of orders to the extent reasonably necessary for the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation). Duty of care is different from duty to inform. Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge's finding that he was arguing the Barnharts' position at the September 23, 2003, hearing, because the results of which certainly affected them and the situation was made worse by his failing to advise them of the judgment against them, notwithstanding that Gisriel's appearance previously had been stricken. This finding was based upon Respondent's testimony at the November 19, 2008, hearing: [GISRIEL:] ... So we have the hearing [regarding attorneys' fees] or whatever and you know. So [Judge Stepler] came out with the judgments against myself and against the Barnharts.... It was like 2,642.50 against me, 1,963.57 against the Barnharts. I paid it. And by the way, at the hearing I maintained they got  should have gotten the deposit back, and we had a vigorous argument about that.    I maintained at the hearing in September that we should get the money back, that the case was a nullity. We should get the deposit back .... (emphasis added). Respondent, nevertheless, states that all of his arguments regarding the various Motions for Attorneys' Fees centered on his representation of the Barnharts in their suit ... [t]herefore, any and all arguments that he made were somewhat focused on his actions in the course of his representation and that they were so interwoven with the same arguments and positions that could have been taken by the Barnharts, that it seems extremely difficult to separate the two and it was clear to those present that Respondent did not represent the Barnharts. While it might have been necessary for Gisriel to refer to the underlying suit initiated by the Barnharts at the September 2003 hearing in order to defend himself, he still chose to vigorously argue the we and the they of an attorney who is representing clients. We overrule his exception and find by clear and convincing evidence that he was representing the Barnharts at the September 2003 hearing.