Opinion ID: 2638977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Elements of Depraved Mind Murder

Text: {15} In New Mexico, first-degree murder is defined in three ways: (1) as a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) as a death caused in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; and (3) as depraved mind murder. Section 30-2-1(A). Defendant was charged with an open count of murder and indicted for deliberate murder. The court submitted jury instructions on deliberate murder, and in the alternative, depraved mind murder. The court also submitted second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter instructions as lesser included offenses. The jury did not convict Defendant of deliberate murder, but found him guilty of depraved mind murder. We focus, therefore, on whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that conviction. {16} New Mexico is one of only a handful of states to classify depraved mind murder as first-degree murder. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.7, at 486 & n. 71 (2d ed.2003). [2] First-degree murder is a capital felony, punished by life imprisonment or death, our most severe criminal penalty. See NMSA 1978, § 31-18-14(A) (1993). In contrast, second-degree murder carries a basic sentence of fifteen years imprisonment, and involuntary manslaughter only eighteen months. See NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15(A)(2) to (6) (2003). In this case, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. {17} Given the extreme differences in punishment, this Court has previously underscored the importance of distinguishing first-degree depraved mind murder from second-degree murder in New Mexico. State v. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. Not only are clear distinctions necessary for the administration of our criminal justice system, they are vital to an accused facing an open charge of murder. See Garcia, 114 N.M. at 272, 837 P.2d at 865. First-degree murder is reserved for those killings that are the most heinous, and which deserve the most serious punishment, as opposed to those which, intentional or not, lack the gravity associated with first degree murders. Id. {18} Despite the importance of construing the first-degree murder statute to punish only the most reprehensible homicides, our courts continue to struggle with making clear distinctions concerning depraved mind murder. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 734, 931 P.2d at 79 (Minzner, J., dissenting) (observing that this Court has produced the thinnest of distinctions between depraved-mind murder and second-degree murder); cf. Garcia, 114 N.M. at 272, 837 P.2d at 865 (acknowledging that the appellate courts have not been especially helpful in distinguishing first degree murder from second degree murder). See generally Leo M. Romero, Unintentional Homicides Caused by Risk-Creating Conduct: Problems in Distinguishing Between Depraved Mind Murder, Second Degree Murder, Involuntary Manslaughter, and Noncriminal Homicide in New Mexico, 20 N.M. L.Rev. 55, 60 (1990) (stating that our courts and jury instructions have not been particularly helpful in clarifying the distinctions between different degrees of unintentional homicide). {19} A comparison of the jury instructions in Defendant's case illustrates those thinnest of distinctions between depraved mind murder and second-degree murder. To convict Defendant of depraved mind murder, the State was required to show, either through direct or circumstantial evidence, that Defendant killed David without justification or excuse by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. See § 30-2-1(A)(3). The statute itself does not define the mens rea, or state of mind, required for depraved mind murder. See § 30-2-1(A). However, the jury instruction for depraved mind murder required the jury to find: 1. The defendant shot and killed David O'Brien; 2. The defendant's act caused the death of David O'Brien; 3. The act of the defendant was greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind without regard for human life; 4. The defendant knew that defendant's act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others; 5. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 24th day of December 2001. See UJI 14-203 NMRA 2005 (emphasis added). {20} In contrast, a person who kills another commits murder in the second degree, if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. See § 30-2-1(B). The second-degree murder instruction directed the jury to find: 1. The defendant killed David O'Brien; 2. The defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to David O'Brien or any other human being; 3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 24th day of December 2001. See UJI 14-210 NMRA 2005 (emphasis added). {21} As can readily be seen by comparing the two instructions, the elements describing knowledge and degree of risk are almost indistinguishable. Both require an intent to kill or an intent to do an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others or with knowledge that the act creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 565, 817 P.2d 1196, 1207 (1991). The sole difference rests with the requirement in the depraved mind murder instruction that the jury find Defendant's act indicated a depraved mind without regard for human life, for which the jury receives no further definition or guidance. {22} The lack of clear-cut distinctions between varying degrees of homicide has been problematic. Section 30-2-1(A)(3) requires an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others. Without more specific guidance from the Legislature, one way our courts have distinguished depraved mind murder is by the number of persons exposed to danger by a defendant's extremely reckless behavior. See Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 14 (observing that the number of persons subjected to the risk of death provides a factor in assessing the degree of risk disregarded). In general, our depraved mind murder convictions have been limited to acts that are dangerous to more than one person. See State v. Sena, 99 N.M. 272, 274, 657 P.2d 128, 130 (1983); State v. DeSantos, 89 N.M. 458, 461, 553 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1976); see also UJI 14-203 Committee Commentary. Quintessential examples include shooting into a crowd, placing a bomb in a public place, or similar acts of terrorism. See State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 368, 707 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Ct.App.1985). {23} In addition to the number of people endangered, this Court has construed depraved mind murder as requiring proof that the defendant had subjective knowledge that his act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others. See State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 673, 675 P.2d 120, 122 (1984). The requirement of subjective knowledge serves as proof that the accused acted with `a depraved mind' or `wicked or malignant heart' and with utter disregard for human life. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 16. Obviously, mere negligence or recklessness will not do. {24} To further narrow the class of killings eligible for depraved mind murder, this Court has concluded that the legislature intended the offense of depraved mind murder to encompass an intensified malice or evil intent. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 15. In describing that intensified malice, we have defined the phrase depraved mind used in the statute and uniform jury instructions as [a] corrupt, perverted, or immoral state of mind constituting the highest grade of malice [that equates] with malice in the commonly understood sense of ill will, hatred, spite or evil intent. Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotations omitted); cf. Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, 60 (3d ed.1982) (suggesting that one way to distinguish depraved mind murder from manslaughter when an underlying act involves extremely reckless conduct is by identifying an element of viciousness  an extreme indifference to the value of human life  in the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing death). Depraved mind murder, therefore, requires outrageously reckless conduct performed with a depraved kind of wantonness or total indifference for the value of human life. See State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 278, 694 P.2d 922, 926 (1985); Johnson, 103 N.M. at 368, 707 P.2d at 1178.