Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 7
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective jurors excused for their attitudes toward the death penalty

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in excusing several prospective jurors, based solely on their questionnaire answers, as being substantially impaired to serve as capital case jurors under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. As noted above, the questionnaire had a special section on attitudes toward the death penalty. For assessing impairment under Witt for unwillingness ever to impose the death penalty, the most significant questions were Nos. 54, 56, 58, and 60. Question No. 54 asked whether the prospective juror's opposition to the death penalty was so strong that, at the guilt phase, no matter what the evidence showed, the juror would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or would refuse to find a special circumstance true, in order to keep the case from going to the penalty phase. Question No. 56 asked whether the prospective juror's opposition to the death penalty was so strong that, at the penalty phase, the juror would automatically vote against death, no matter what evidence in aggravation or mitigation was presented. Question No. 58 asked whether the prospective juror was always, never, or sometimes willing to impose the death penalty, depending on the following special circumstances: (A) murder committed for financial gain; (B) defendant previously convicted of murder; (C) defendant convicted of multiple murders; (D) murder committed upon a peace officer; or (E) murder committed during the course of a robbery. Question No. 60, the last of the section, asked about the prospective jurors' ability to impose the two options available at the penalty stage. This question first reminded the prospective jurors that under no circumstances were they required to return a penalty of death, and that they would always have the option of choosing life without the possibility of parole. Question No. 60 then presented two subparts, A and B. Part A asked whether, in the appropriate case, the prospective jurors could see themselves rejecting the death penalty and instead choosing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Part B asked whether, in the appropriate case, the prospective jurors could see themselves rejecting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and instead choosing the death penalty. As to question No. 60, each of the excused prospective jurors marked part A in the affirmative (meaning they were willing to entertain the option of life without the possibility of parole), but marked part B in the negative (meaning they were not willing to entertain the option of imposing the death penalty). Additionally, the excused jurors gave answers to the other pertinent questions, including Nos. 54, 56, or 58, that indicated their unwillingness to apply the death penalty. Finally, as explained below, the excluded jurors further indicated their unwillingness to impose the death penalty in their written explanations to various questions. Defendant acknowledges that, taken on their own, the answers of the prospective jurors discussed below to the Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment section of the questionnaire could suggest impairment under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. But he contends the heart of the Witt inquiry actually revolves around question No. 36 in the general section of the questionnaire. Question No. 36 asked: If the Judge gives you an instruction on the law that you feel is different from a belief or opinion you have, will you be able to follow and apply that instruction? Defendant contends an affirmative response to question No. 36 should have taken priority over the answers to all of the specific death-penalty attitude questions. [11] Alternatively, defendant contends an affirmative response to question No. 36 at least made it unclear that a prospective juror was categorically unwilling to impose the death penalty, and consequently the trial court should not have excused such a juror without oral voir dire to establish whether the juror was willing to set aside his or her personal views and decide the case according to the law. (See People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 789.) We dealt with the same situation in People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th 758, where the excused juror marked yes to a question asking whether, `[i]f the judge gives you an instruction on the law that differs from your beliefs or opinions, will you follow the law as the judge instructs you?' ( Id. at p. 788, fn. 4.) Like the question at issue in Wilson, question No. 36 was a general inquiry about willingness to follow the law that preceded the section of the questionnaire specifically devoted to Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment. As in Wilson, question No. 36 was grouped with others in a section testing the prospective juror's ability to follow the law concerning the presumption of innocence, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and other principles of law relating to the guilt phase of the trial. Therefore, as in Wilson, we conclude the prospective jurors' affirmative responses to question No. 36 were not necessarily inconsistent with their responses to the questions in the later section of the questionnaire dealing specifically with attitudes toward the death penalty. We turn now to the prospective jurors' responses to the questions in the death penalty section of the questionnaire. Prospective Juror P.C. When answering a question asking her to reveal her general feelings about the death penalty, P.C. wrote: I do not feel we have the right to take a life. In response to another question, she noted her philosophical position regarding the death penalty as strongly against and wrote, we don't have to kill in the name of justice. In response to other questions, she also wrote that she held the position she did on the death penalty because [t]o take a life is murder under any circumstance  (italics added) and that, I don't feel we have the right to kill. She marked question No. 56 in the affirmative, agreeing that she would automatically vote against death no matter what evidence was presented at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, she marked she would never impose the death penalty and wrote, We don't not [ sic ] have that right to kill. Answering question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror L.S. Regarding his general feelings toward the death penalty, L.S. wrote: It is barbaric! A sad reflection on our supposedly modern `civilized' society. He further noted his philosophical position as strongly against the death penalty. He also wrote: There's always a possibility a person can make a contribution to societyโif he or she is aliveโeven if it's only to warn the rest of us. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed him, he wrote: The defendant very likely needs rehabilitation, not either of the above possibilities. Answering question Nos. 54 and 56, he marked that he was so strongly against the death penalty that he would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find true a special circumstance, and he would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance he marked that he would never impose the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, he marked that he could not see himself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror D.B. D.B. responded that she generally was an opponent of the death penalty, and that, although she sometimes felt emotionally that certain murderers should die, she was rationally opposed to the death penalty. Her philosophical position was strongly against capital punishment, and she wrote that she did not want `the state' having the power to take life. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed her, she wrote: Both of them are disturbing. It assumes no possibility for a human to grow, change, amend, or repent. What a hopeless thought! Answering question No. 56, she marked that she was so strongly against the death penalty she would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. She also wrote: I would vote against death. I will not vote for the death penalty. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance she marked that she would never impose them. Then she wrote, I would never impose the death penalty, that she hoped she could be like the relatives of murder victims who had recently marched on San Quentin to oppose the death penalty, and concluded, I will never impose the death penalty. (Italics added.) Answering question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror T.T. Asked about her general feeling toward the death penalty, T.T. wrote: A life for a life is not the answer. Her philosophical position was strongly against the death penalty, and she explained that she held this position because I don't believe people should be killed although they have killed. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed her, she wrote, The death penalty should never be a factor. (Italics added.) Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, she indicated she would never impose the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror C.V. Asked about her general feelings toward the death penalty, C.V. wrote: That life and death belong to God only! She indicated she was strongly against the death penalty as a philosophical matter and because of her religious beliefs. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed her, she marked yes and wrote, I'm against the death penalty. Answering question Nos. 54 and 56, she marked that she was so strongly against the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence, she would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find a special circumstance true, and that she would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, she marked that she would never impose the death penalty. For question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror T.S. Asked about his general feelings toward the death penalty, T.S. wrote: I do not believe in the death penalty. I would find it very difficult, if I had to make that decision. He indicated he was strongly against the death penalty as a philosophical matter and wrote, I don't believe anyone has the right to take a human life and It's morally wrong. Answering question No. 54, he marked that he was so strongly against the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence, he would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find a special circumstance true in order to keep the case from going to the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for the first and last special circumstance of the five listed he marked that he would never impose the death penalty, but he left the middle three blank. As an explanation to question No. 58, he wrote: I do not believe in the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, he marked that he could not see himself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror R.S. R.S. indicated that his general feeling was he was not in favor of the death penalty. Only God has the right to take a life. In response to another question, he reiterated the religious basis for his philosophical position of being strongly against the death penalty, further noting that I believe in God, not man. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed him, he marked yes and wrote, I'm not in favor of the death penalty. Answering question Nos. 54 and 56, he marked that he was so strongly against the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence, he would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find a special circumstance true, and that he would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, he marked that he would never impose the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, he marked that he could not see himself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Based on our de novo review of the prospective jurors' responses to the death penalty section of the questionnaire, set out above, we conclude the excused jurors were impaired under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. Therefore, even though some of the excused jurors marked yes to question No. 36, the trial court did not err in excusing them without oral voir dire.