Opinion ID: 3046880
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prudential standing requirem ents

Text: In contrast to constitutional standing, prudential standing “embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Elk G rove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 11 (quotation omitted). Although the Supreme Court has not exhaustively defined the prudential 19 dimensions of the standing doctrine, [the Court has] explained that prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Id. at 12 (quotation omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75; Twp. of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2007). W ithout such limitations–closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance–the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even t h o u g h j u d ic ia l in te rv e n tio n m a y b e unnecessary to protect individual rights. Elk Grove U nified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12 (quotation omitted). Of import in this case, then, “even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the [Supreme] Court has refrained from adjudicating ‘abstract questions of wide public significance’ w hich amount to ‘generalized grievances,’ 20 pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” V alley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U .S. at 474-75 (quoting W arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)).