Opinion ID: 1479066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The jurisdictional issue in this case arises in an unusual posture. The plaintiff, who initially brought his suit in the United States District Court, and who filed the proceedings in this court only in the wake of the District Court's action, now asserts, in effect, that this court lacks original jurisdiction to entertain the case. [6] The Bar, on the other hand, contends that we do have jurisdiction, and asks us to decide not only the questions arising under our Rules, but Sitcov's constitutional claims as well. Whether this court, as an appellate tribunal, has original jurisdiction to hear the case in the absence of a statute authorizing us to do so is not a simple question; litigants are seldom permitted to bring their grievances initially to the highest court in the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we conclude that the matter is properly before us. As Sitcov correctly points out in his post-argument brief, we cannot rely in this case on the more conventional bases of jurisdiction: Mr. Sitcov is not seeking review of any action by the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Cf. Rules 3 and 5 of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rules. . . . Nor is Mr. Sitcov seeking review of an action by a District of Columbia agency. Cf. Rule 15. Similarly, Mr. Sitcov is not seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition directed to a Superior Court Judge or a District of Columbia officer. Cf. Rule 21(a)(1). And although this Court has jurisdiction to consider certified questions of law from the United States Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals of the United States or the highest appellate court of any state, see Rule 22, it is well-settled that the District Court cannot (and did not purport to) certify a question of law to this Court. See D.C.Code § 11-723; Georgetown University v. Sportec International, Inc., 572 A.2d 119 (D.C.1990); 3307 M St. Partners v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 782 F.Supp. 4 (D.D.C.1992). Finally, Mr. Sitcov is not complaining about the denial of an application for admission to the Bar, cf. Rule 46(g), and this is not an action brought by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law against Mr. Sitcov, cf. Rule 49(e). We agree with the Bar, however, that the foregoing litany does not end the inquiry. The District of Columbia Bar was established by this court as an arm of the court. See D.C.Code § 11-2501 (2001). Section 11-2501 provides that [t]he District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall make such rules as it deems proper respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and their censure, suspension, and expulsion. [7] In 1971, exercising this statutory authority, as well as the inherent power of the Court over members of the legal profession, this court promulgated the Rules for the District of Columbia Bar. On April 1, 1972, we officially assume[d] jurisdiction over the practice of law in the District of Columbia. [8] Although there is no statute or rule expressly providing for direct review by this court of a decision of the BOG, we conclude that this court necessarily has the authority to review a decision by an entity which this court created, when that decision pertains to an issue with respect to which the court is vested with the final authority. In essence, although the Bar is an arm of the court, the court itself is responsible for the regulation of the legal profession in the District of Columbia, and must therefore have the authority to oversee the management of the profession by that arm. Moreover, if we were to hold that this court lacks original jurisdiction over Sitcov's non-federal claims, then he would have no judicial remedy at all under District of Columbia law, regardless of the merits of his position. [ Alvin S. ] Kennedy v. Educ. Testing Serv. Inc., 393 A.2d 523, 525 (D.C.1978); District of Columbia Hous. Auth. v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 881 A.2d 600, 608 (D.C.2005) (A strong presumption exists in favor of judicial reviewability which may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent.) (quoting Martin v. District of Columbia Courts, 753 A.2d 987, 991 (D.C.2000)). Our jurisdiction to review the actions of the Bar in this case is somewhat analogous to our authority to consider challenges to decisions of the Committee on Admissions (COA), an entity which, like the Bar, was created by this court, and which is an arm or instrumentality thereof. In [ Alvin S. ] Kennedy, an applicant for membership who had failed the bar examination on several occasions brought suit in the Superior Court, claiming that the Educational Testing Service (ETS), which administered the exam for the COA, discriminated against candidates with `strong civil rights attitudes.' 393 A.2d at 524. The applicant demanded that he be permitted to inspect, and then to challenge, the objective portion of his examinations. Id. The trial court held, inter alia, that it lacked jurisdiction, [9] and this court affirmed. In sustaining the trial judge's ruling, we stated: Any order of the Superior Court which might have directed ETS to disclose those materials, and any award premised upon a failure to disclose, would necessarily call into question the validity of this court's and its Committee on Admissions' policies against such disclosure. The only purpose of the requested disclosure, as stated in appellant's complaint, relates to the failure of the Committee on Admissions to certify appellant to this court for admission to the Bar, a function within the exclusive control of this court. D.C.Code 1973, § 11-2501. This court has authority to entertain a petition for review of admission examinations even though such review is not afforded by rule. See Harper v. District of Columbia Committee on Admissions, 375 A.2d 25 (D.C.1977) (on petition for original jurisdiction, permitting review of essay portion of examination). Under these circumstances, our original jurisdiction must be exclusive of, not concurrent with, that of the Superior Court, for the Superior Court is without authority to hold or declare invalid a rule or policy of this court within the ambit of its plenary authority under § 11-2501. Id. at 525 (emphasis added; additional citations omitted). In Powell v. Nigro, 543 F.Supp. 1044 (D.D.C.1982), the plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court against present and past members of the COA, seeking to challenge in a federal forum a determination by the COA that she had failed the bar examination. The District Court recognized that [t]he [District of Columbia] Court of Appeals alone may make the final decision, whether express or implied, concerning whether to admit a particular applicant to the District of Columbia bar. Id. at 1046. The court went on to explain that [a]lthough the District of Columbia has no statutorily established procedure for petitioning the Court of Appeals for review of a final determination of the Committee on Admissions denying certification that an applicant has passed the bar examination, the Court of Appeals nevertheless does accept and consider petitions for review. Id. at 1046 (citing [ Alvin S. ] Kennedy, 393 A.2d at 525, and Harper, 375 A.2d at 27). The posture of Sitcov, who alleges that he was wrongfully suspended from membership and that he was improperly denied reinstatement nunc pro tunc, is analogous for present purposes to that of the plaintiffs in [ Alvin S. ] Kennedy and Powell, each of whom asserted that he or she had been wrongfully excluded from membership by the COA. Although there is no procedure established by statute for review by this court of decisions of the BOG which affect membership, the question before us here, namely, whether Sitcov was entitled to remain a member of our Bar, or be reinstated as a member, parallels the issue in [ Alvin S. ] Kennedy and Powell, i.e., whether the applicant may become a member. The absence of a statutorily based review procedure is no more dispositive here than it was in the COA cases. [10] Moreover, [t]he great weight of authority renders it almost universally accepted that the highest court in the jurisdiction is imbued with the inherent authority to define, regulate, and control the practice of law in that jurisdiction. Brookens v. Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120, 1125 (D.C.1988). Numerous decisions from other jurisdictions recognize that inherent authority. [11] We conclude that the claims raised by Sitcov fall within that authority. Sitcov asks the court to set aside the BOG's suspension of his membership for nonpayment of dues. He also challenges the BOG's enactment of the by-laws, and its decision, based on the by-laws, to deny his request for reinstatement nunc pro tunc. His contentions implicate the regulation and control of the practice of law. This court has final authority over the Bar and over any decision made by any of its instrumentalities, including the BOG as well as the COA, with respect to admission to or continued membership in the Bar. Accordingly, we have original jurisdiction to review the actions of the BOG challenged by Sitcov in this case.