Opinion ID: 2332827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Give AMI Civ. 4th 903 as Modified

Text: Barnes argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give a modified version of AMI Civ. 4th 903 that she submitted below. Her proposed instruction would have informed the jury: You are instructed to assume there was in force in the State of Arkansas at the time of this occurrence a law which provided that a settlement with a[n] agent for any alleged harm by a party suing that agent, automatically releases the principal from any liability, unless it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the principal was guilty of negligence or intentional conduct, independent of and apart from that of the agent. During the proceedings below, Barnes's counsel candidly admitted that AMI Civ. 4th 903 is designed to inform the jury of the substance of a statute or code provision, as opposed to a holding from case law, and that he knew his modification was a little unusual. The trial court then asked counsel if he had any legal authority stating that the model instruction could be used in this manner, to which counsel responded that he did not. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the proffered instruction was not a proper form of AMI Civ. 4th 903. The trial court also found that the instruction was improper because the issue of whether Everett's conduct was negligent was a matter for the jury to decide based on the expert testimony presented. As Everett points out on appeal, the trial court's ruling is consistent with AMI Civ. 4th 1512, which was given in this case and provided: In performing legal services for a client, an attorney must possess and use with reasonable diligence and skill ordinarily used by attorneys acting in the same [or] similar circumstances. A failure to meet this standard is negligence. In deciding whether John Everett possessed and used with reasonable diligence the skill the law required of him, you may consider only the evidence presented by expert witnesses. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury as proffered by Barnes. In the first place, AMI Civ. 4th 903 is designed to instruct a jury that violation of a statute, while not necessarily an act of negligence, may be considered along with other facts and circumstances as evidence of negligence. Parker, 315 Ark. 307, 867 S.W.2d 436. Barnes's counsel admitted that his proposed modification was not in line with the design of the model instruction. In the second place, we agree with the trial court that the issue whether Everett was negligent was for the jury to decide based on the standard in the legal community as testified to by the expert witnesses. Our case law has consistently held that the attorney's conduct must be measured against the generally accepted standard of practice. See, e.g., Pugh, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445; Schmidt, 326 Ark. 499, 931 S.W.2d 774. Such a measurement plainly requires expert testimony as to what the standard of practice is, unless the trial court determines that such testimony is not necessary because the case falls within the common-knowledge exception. See AMI Civ. 4th 1512, NOTE ON USE. AMI Civ. 4th 1512 properly instructed the jury on this issue.