Opinion ID: 2459828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Avoiding arrest aggravating circumstance

Text: We now consider the assignments of error involving the penalty phase. Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence of the aggravating circumstance that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody as set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-604(5) (Repl.1993). On appeal, we review the sufficiency of the State's evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 527, 533, 804 S.W.2d 348, 351-52, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829, 112 S.Ct. 102, 116 L.Ed.2d 72 (1991) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780-82, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3102-03, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)). Whenever there is any evidence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, however slight, we have held that the matter should be submitted to the jury for consideration. Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430, cert. denied 450 U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 1750, 68 L.Ed.2d 232 (1981). At least one commentator has recognized that the statutory aggravating circumstance at issue is apparently designed to deter deliberate murderous acts subversive of the criminal justice system in particular and social order in general, and to protect certain persons deemed especially important to the integrity of both, including law enforcement officers, prison guards, and actual or potential witnesses in judicial proceedings. See Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation: Sufficiency of the Evidence, for Purposes of Death Penalty, to Establish Statutory Aggravating Circumstance that Murder Was Committed to Avoid Arrest or Prosecution, to Effect Escape from Custody, to Hinder Governmental Function or Enforcement of Law, and the LikePost-Gregg Cases, 64 A.L.R.4th 755, 763 (1988 and Supp.1995) (footnotes omitted). Many courts, according to this commentator, follow the rule that, where the victim is not a law enforcement officer, the State must clearly show that prevention of detection and arrest for the offense was the dominant or only motive for the killing. Id. at 766 (footnotes omitted). We recognize that a consequence of every murder is the elimination of the victim as a potential witness. However, avoiding arrest is not necessarily an invariable motivation for killing. See Whitmore v. Lockhart, 834 F.Supp. 1105 (E.D.Ark.1992), aff'd 8 F.3d 614 (8th Cir.1993). A common thread in many of our prior decisions involving the avoiding arrest aggravating circumstance is that the murder was committed in order to avoid arrest or eliminate a witness to another offense committed in connection with the murder. See e.g., Porter v. State, 321 Ark. 555, 905 S.W.2d 835 (1995) (the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant killed victim to avoid being arrested for robbery due to nature of victim's head wound and the fact that appellant had spoken to victim, who could have identified him as one of the robbers); Coulter v. State, supra (child victim obviously knew appellant and would have been able to identify him as the man who raped her; the ends to which appellant went in trying to hide the body, coupled with his almost immediate departure from the area where the offense occurred, was clear evidence of his other efforts to avoid arrest); Wainwright v. State, 302 Ark. 371, 790 S.W.2d 420, cert. denied 499 U.S. 913, 111 S.Ct. 1123, 113 L.Ed.2d 231 (1990) (sufficient evidence presented where appellant had prior dealings with the victim, and knowing his name, the victim could have identified appellant as having committed the robbery); Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230, cert. denied 484 U.S. 917, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987) (overwhelming evidence that appellant and his accomplices intended to kill their victims in order to avoid identification, apprehension, arrest and conviction for the robbery where they fatally shot a store customer during the robbery and wounded several other people as they lay helplessly on the floor; one of the surviving victims testified that after appellant was told there was no place in the store in which the victims could be locked up, the robbers commented that they would have to do away with the victims because if they get loose they'll burn us); Hill v. State, 278 Ark. 194, 644 S.W.2d 282 (1983) (the jury was justified in finding that petitioner shot victims Teague and Ward to increase his chances of avoiding arrest after he had robbed Ward's service station); Miller v. State, supra (sufficient evidence that appellant killed the deceased to eliminate a witness and thus hopefully avoid arrest for robbery where he confessed that immediately prior to the shooting, thoughts of being identified by the victim ran through his mind, and no evidence was discovered to corroborate appellant's explanation that he shot the victim because the latter reached for an iron pipe). In at least one case, the victim had knowledge regarding an offense not committed in connection with the murder. Sheridan v. State, supra (overwhelming evidence that appellant killed the victim because she had informed narcotics agents that he was involved in drugs). The Attorney General asserts that, based on Bill Stuckey's testimony, the jury could have inferred that appellant returned to Helton's trailer for the purpose of retrieving his girlfriend, Becky Mahoney, and that he shot and killed the four victims at issue in order to prevent them from having him arrested if he used force to remove Mahoney from the trailer. To accept the State's argument would require an exercise in speculation as to appellant's motive, and is contrary to Stuckey's testimony during the penalty phase: DEPUTY PROSECUTOR: Did he tell you who he shot? WITNESS: Yes ma'am. DEPUTY PROSECUTOR: Whom did he shoot? WITNESS: Wayne and Sonny and Cheryl and some guy that he didn't know. DEPUTY PROSECUTOR: Okay. Specifically with reference to the guy he didn't know, did he make any comments about that particular person? WITNESS: Yeah. He said that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. DEPUTY PROSECUTOR: Did he give you any particular reason for shooting these people? WITNESS: Yes. DEPUTY PROSECUTOR: What was that? WITNESS: That they had run him off and kept Becky and wouldn't let him take Becky with him. DEPUTY PROSECUTOR: Was he looking for Becky? WITNESS: Yes. In addition to the quoted passage, our review of the record reveals no testimony at trial, from Stuckey, Mahoney, or any other witness, that appellant made any attempt to forcibly remove Mahoney from the trailer, or that he shot and killed the four victims in order to prevent them from having him arrested if he used force to remove Mahoney from the trailer. Moreover, the State's argument contains an obvious flawthe appellant never used force to remove Mahoney from the trailer, thus the killings could not have been committed to avoid being arrested for an offense that did not occur. To accept the State's argument would be to ignore the evidence of appellant's motive that is in the recordthat appellant killed the victims because they had run him off and kept Mahoney and would not let him take Mahoney with him. However, with respect to victim Richard Falls, the jury could take into account Stuckey's testimony that appellant had stated to him that Falls was in the wrong place at the wrong time. In light of this evidence, the jury could have inferred that appellant killed Falls, a person he did not know, for no logical reason such as revenge or accident. See Miller v. State, supra . Thus, while we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the submission of the avoiding arrest aggravating circumstance to the jury on the counts relating to Wayne Helton, Cheryl Phegley, and Robert Phegley, we find no error in the submission of this aggravator on the count relating to victim Falls. We can perform the statutory harmless error analysis in the penalty phase only if jury found no mitigating circumstances. Greene v. State, 317 Ark. 350, 878 S.W.2d 384 (1994); Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603(d) (Repl. 1993). Here, the jury unanimously found two mitigating circumstances on each count: (1) Appellant grew up in an environment of abuse and alcoholism; and (2) Appellant grew up in an environment where his father provided an example of extreme violent reactions to situations. Thus, we must reverse for resentencing the death sentences on the counts relating to Wayne Helton, Cheryl Phegley, and Robert Phegley.