Opinion ID: 2570657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding their breach of contract claim

Text: Appellants assert that even though they were at-will employees generally subject to termination at any time for any reason, [36] the March 28 policy contained two provisions constituting an enforceable written contract concerning conditions of their employment. In particular, appellants point to the two March 28 provisions providing that only the dealers would share tips and that the tip-pooling and distribution policy was subject to modification by majority dealer vote. With the latter provision, they argue, the Wynn relinquished to the dealers its right to change the tip-pooling and distribution policy. Consequently, they contend, when the Wynn unilaterally modified that policy, it breached the terms of their employment contract. This court has previously described at-will employment in terms of contract law, [37] and we have pointed out that contractual obligations can be implicit in employer practices and policies and as reflected in employee handbooks. [38] Nonetheless, we also have established that employers may unilaterally modify the terms of an at-will employment arrangement in prospective fashion; the employee's continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for the modification. [39] In so providing, we recognized that at-will employees have no contractual rights arising from the employment relationship that limit the employer's ability to prospectively hire and fire employees, and to change the terms of employment. Further, we have noted that employers may prevent implied contractual liability from arising in the first instance by including a disclaimer in their employment handbooks. [40] Here, appellants' breach of contract claim must fail for two reasons. First, as noted, employers may prospectively modify terms of employment. Thus, to the extent that the March 28 policy provisions constituted terms of employment, the Wynn was free to alter those terms with respect to future employment periods. [41] Second, the Wynn's employee handbook expressly stated that any policies were subject to unilateral modification, and that statement was not contradicted by the March 28 policy provisions. Although appellants contend that the March 28 policy's voting provision granted the dealers the sole right to change the tip-pooling and distribution policy, nothing therein suggested that the Wynn was relinquishing its right to change the terms of the voting provision itself. Accordingly, the March 28 policy provisions did not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of an enforceable contract with respect to future periods of employment, [42] and the district court properly granted summary judgment on appellants' breach of contract claim. [43]