Opinion ID: 2390138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legislature's Power

Text: The Legislature's power to appropriate funds for the operation of State government derives from several constitutional provisions. The legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and General Assembly. [ N.J. Const. art. IV, § 1, ¶ 1.] All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the General Assembly; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills. [ N.J. Const. art. IV, § 6, ¶ 1.] No money shall be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law. [ N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2.] New Jersey courts have consistently adhered to the principle that the power and authority to appropriate funds lie solely and exclusively with the legislative branch of government. City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 148, 411 A. 2d 462 (1980). We reaffirm our commitment to that fundamental constitutional principle. The Constitution, however, sets no specific standards or rules for determining the content of an appropriations act. That allows for some flexibility and discretion in the appropriation process. Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 491, 479 A. 2d 403 (1984). Appropriation enactments customarily include conditions, restrictions, or limitations on the expenditure of appropriated funds. The power to impose such conditions is inherent in the power to appropriate. Id. at 492, 479 A. 2d 403. But as with all legislative enactments, those statutory conditions must comport with the constitutional principle of separation of powers. In 1983, New Jersey legislators took Governor Kean to court after he exercised his line-item veto on provisions of the 1983 Appropriations Act. The legislators argued that the line-item veto power extended only to items of appropriation of money and not to conditions on those appropriations. One of the vetoed conditions was similar to the provisions at issue here. Paragraph 47 of Senate Bill 1600 stated: If, as a result of an insufficiency of appropriations in any program account, it is required or determined that there will be a reduction in the number of State offices, positions or employees in that program account, the head of the department which administers the program shall effect that reduction in personnel from among all offices, positions or employment at salaries which exceed $15,000.00 in the unclassified service of the civil service before effecting any reduction in personnel from the classified service. [ In re Karcher, 190 N.J. Super. 197, 209 n. 4, 462 A. 2d 1273 (App.Div. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Karcher v. Kean, supra, 97 N.J. 483, 479 A. 2d 403.] The Attorney General successfully argued before the Appellate Division that that provision would infringe[] unconstitutionally on the Governor's day-to-day administration of government. 190 N.J. Super. at 210, 462 A. 2d 1273. That excessive intrusion[] would impede the Governor's duty to execute the law, and result in an impressible arrogation of power to the Legislature. Ibid. After citing several cases from other jurisdictions in support of the proposition that the Legislature cannot administer already-appropriated funds without usurping executive branch power, the Appellate Division held that paragraph 47 was unconstitutional because it violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. When the case came before this Court, we approved the Governor's use of the line-item veto to eliminate paragraph 47. We therefore did not reach the separation-of-powers issue, although we noted that [i]t may be that these particular provisions offend relevant constitutional doctrine   . 97 N.J. at 504, 479 A. 2d 403. In Karcher we recognized that the power of the purse is an awesome power. The scope of that power makes vital the observance of its limits, lest the power concentrated in the hands of the Legislature overwhelm the coordinate branches and upset the constitutional scheme of shared but separate powers. [I]f through the appropriation process, the Legislature were able to compel the Governor either to accept general legislation or to risk forfeiture of appropriations for a department of government, the careful balance of powers struck in [the state constitution] would be destroyed, and the fundamental principle of separation of powers    would be substantially undermined. [ Id. 97 N.J. at 507-08, 479 A. 2d 403 (citing In re Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 616, 2 N.E. 2d 789 (1936)).] Similar fears were voiced by Justice Schreiber in Enourato v. New Jersey Building Authority, 90 N.J. 396, 415, 448 A. 2d 449 (1982) (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring): Legislative control over appropriations purse strings does not warrant violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Otherwise the Legislature could through this mechanism direct the operations of all executive functions.