Opinion ID: 2234065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Jury Instruction: Lesser-Included Offenses

Text: Vela argues that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses of first degree murder. He relies in part on ง 29-2027, which provides that [i]n all trials for murder, the jury shall ascertain whether the verdict is murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter. As we have noted, Vela was not on trial for the murder of Lundell. Vela's involvement in the Lundell murder was simply the evidence by which the State sought to prove aggravating circumstance ง 29-2523(1)(a), a substantial prior history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity prior to the five murders for which he had been convicted. While lesser degrees of homicide or other offenses against the person might well establish the existence of this aggravating circumstance, in this case, the State elected to prove that Vela had committed a prior, uncharged first degree murder. Had the State not met its burden of proof for first degree murder, it would have failed to prove this aggravating circumstance. In an appeal based on a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant. [65] Vela could hardly have been prejudiced by the failure of the court to give an instruction which would have effectively lightened the State's burden by allowing the jury to find the existence of the aggravating circumstance on the basis of lesser crimes than first degree murder.