Opinion ID: 1152837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sentencing reform act of 1981

Text: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA) imposes a regime of structured discretion. RCW 9.94A.010; State v. Shove, 113 Wash.2d 83, 88-89, 776 P.2d 132 (1989) (A principal purpose of the SRA is to establish guidelines for sentencing judges' discretion, thereby making the exercise of that discretion more principled....). The SRA contemplates the sentencing court will, in most cases, impose a standard range rather than an exceptional sentence. RCW 9.94A.120(1). [5] Indeed, RCW 9.94A.370 refers to the standard range as the presumptive sentence. The presumptive standard range sentence is a legislative determination of the applicable punishment range for the crime as ordinarily committed. The sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range if it finds substantial and compelling reasons to justify an exception. RCW 9.94A.120(2). However, when imposing an exceptional sentence the court must first consider the presumptive punishment as legislatively determined for an ordinary commission of the crime before it may adjust it up or down to account for the compelling nature of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the particular case. RCW 9.94A.390. [6] See State v. Brown, 60 Wash.App. 60, 69, 802 P.2d 803 (1990) (It is obvious from the wording of the statute that the sentencing court must first determine the standard range before deciding to impose an exceptional sentence.), review denied, 116 Wash.2d 1025, 812 P.2d 103 (1991), overruled on other grounds in part by State v. Chadderton, 119 Wash.2d 390, 832 P.2d 481 (1992); State v. Worl, 129 Wash.2d 416, 918 P.2d 905 (1996) (`Imposition of an exceptional sentence is directly related to a correct determination of the standard range. That determination can be made only after the offender score is correctly calculated.') (quoting State v. Collicott, 118 Wash.2d 649, 660, 827 P.2d 263 (1992) ( Collicott II)). See David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington: A Legal Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 at 5-1 (1985) (The starting point in the application of the Sentencing Reform Act to an individual case lies in determining the sentence range applicable to the particular case at hand.). Other jurisdictions analyzing comparable sentencing statutes are in accord. [7] If the sentencing judge were to set an exceptional sentence without first properly calculating the legislatively designated standard sentence she would redesignate the punishment for the crime without reference to the legislative standard to which the court must defer absent exceptional circumstances. State v. Freitag, 127 Wash.2d 141, 144, 896 P.2d 1254, 905 P.2d 355 (1995) ([I]t is the function of the judiciary to impose sentences consistent with legislative enactments.). An exceptional sentence is exceptional because it differs from the underlying presumptive sentence. State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388, 397, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995) (Use of the word `exceptional', by definition, implies a deviation from the norm.). We conclude that the sentencing court must first correctly determine the standard range before it can depart therefrom. The SRA and case law mandate this conclusion.