Opinion ID: 1345745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Construction of subdivision (a)(6).

Text: Notwithstanding this evidence, the People contend that by causing the flash burn and diffuse gasoline vapor-air explosion that caused the death of David Gawronski, defendant delivered an explosive within the meaning of subdivision (a)(6). The People argue, and we agree, that Health and Safety Code section 12000 [7] defines explosive for purposes of subdivision (a)(6), as it does for the first degree murder category of murder by explosives. (§ 189.) We do not agree, however, that a gasoline vapor is an explosive under that definition. In the absence of any definition specific to section 190.2 and its predecessor, of necessity Health and Safety Code section 12000 must supply the meaning of the term explosive as used in subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(6). The term explosive had been used in the former section 190.2, subdivision (b), enacted in 1977. [8] At that time the definition of explosive contained in Health and Safety Code section 12000, had already been incorporated into section 189 which defined, inter alia, first degree murder by explosive. [9] We presume that the Legislature, and later the electorate, were aware that section 189 incorporated the Health and Safety Code definition of explosive and were cognizant of the statutory framework within which the explosives special circumstance was to operate when former section 190.2 and the current subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(6) were adopted. ( People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1012 [239 Cal. Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154]; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844 [218 Cal. Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380]; Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977, fn. 10 [140 Cal. Rptr. 669, 568 P.2d 394]; In re Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838, 845 [186 P.2d 134].) No reason appears in the history, language, or context of these special circumstances for believing that the term explosive means anything different in section 189, and nothing in the history of either statute suggests that the electorate intended a different meaning when former section 190.2 was enacted, or any change when the present section 190.2 was adopted. The only reference to the explosives special circumstance in the 1978 election materials was the statement of the Legislative Analyst that: The proposition would ... expand and modify the list of special circumstances which require either the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole. As revised by the measure, the list of special circumstances would, generally speaking, include the following: ... (2) murder involving concealed explosives or explosives that are mailed or delivered;... (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) p. 32.) The ballot argument thus recognized that subdivision (a)(4) was to apply only to murder by means of concealed explosives, and that subdivision (a)(6) was to apply to deaths caused by mailing or delivering explosives. It is clear from this history that subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(6) were intended to do no more than modify and/or expand the special circumstance category of murder by explosives, not change the nature of the substances that had been considered explosives in section 189 and former section 190.2. Health and Safety Code section 12000 therefore provides the definition of explosive for purposes of subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(6), just as it did for former section 190.2, and continues to do for purposes of section 189. No prior case, however, has considered whether a substance other than a true explosive, one that does not cause a concentrated explosion by converting a solid into gases, but is capable of causing a diffuse vapor explosion, is an explosive within the meaning of either section 189, or subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(6). The People argue that defendant's use of the combination of gasoline vapor and air within the confines of the victims' bedroom meets the criteria of Health and Safety Code section 12000 and is therefore use of an explosive. They rely in part on the provision in Health and Safety Code section 12000 that broadly defines an explosive as a substance or combination of substances the primary or common purpose of which is detonation or rapid combustion and which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.... [10] The People concede, however, that gasoline is intended principally for use as motor fuel; is not in and of itself an explosive; and, when uncontained, is designed to burn rather than explode. They argue, nonetheless, that the expert testimony establishes that gasoline, as used by defendant, meets the statutory definition of an explosive: As the gasoline vaporizes, the vapor mixes with air. When ignited in the proper proportion the combination of gasoline vapor and air is capable of producing heat rapidly, and gas is also produced in the form of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. This, the People contend, meets the literal definition of an explosive established in Health and Safety Code section 12000 as a substance capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat. The expert testimony refutes that claim. The expert testimony establishes instead that while carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are by-products of a gasoline vapor initiated flash burn and explosion, gas is not produced or generated in that process. Release of a gas from a substance contemplates that a gas will be generated from that substance, not simply that one type of gas will be transformed into another type of gas. Thus, gas is not released during the flash burn as required by the Health and Safety Code section 12000 definition. This distinction between the generation of gas from another substance and the gases which are by-products of a flash burn distinguishes true explosives. True explosives cause concentrated explosions in which the concussive force is generated by the transformation of the solid into a rapidly expanding gas. The ignition of gasoline vapor may cause a diffuse explosion, like that which occurred here, when existing gases present in the air expand on ignition causing an overpressure effect. The carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide by-products that remain after a diffuse explosion are not the cause of the pressure or explosion. The People's further argument that, as used by defendant, gasoline can be an explosive as defined in Health and Safety Code section 12000, also fails. The statute specifies that an explosive is a substance or combination of substances, ... Gasoline may be a substance, but, as the People have now conceded, it is not an explosive. It does not become such based on the manner in which it is used. Under the statutory definition of explosive, the nature of the substance, not the manner in which a substance is used, is determinative. [11] Therefore, even were we persuaded that in this context the electorate intended something other than the common meaning of deliver  to take and hand over to or leave for another which we address below, it is clear that the defendant did not deliver an explosive. The People also fail to propose a theory under which defendant's use of gasoline vapor could be deemed to meet the further requirement of subdivision (a)(6) of section 190.2 that murder be committed by means of an explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or cause[d] to be mailed or delivered, ... Assuming arguendo that throwing a substance through a window or door constitutes delivery within the meaning of subdivision (a)(6), the substance that defendant threw was not, as we have shown, an explosive. It was gasoline. The gasoline vapor was not delivered. It arose by an independent physical process after the gasoline was thrown into the home. And the vapor alone was not explosive until it combined with air in the required proportion. Manifestly, defendant did not deliver the air that was already present in the victims' home. Thus, even if gasoline vapor were an explosive, or the manner in which gasoline is used were a basis for considering it an explosive, defendant could not be found to have killed by means of delivery of an explosive, and thus his conduct was not conduct described in subdivision (a)(6). As we have explained, therefore, in using gasoline in his attempt to start a fire in the Gawronski home defendant did not commit murder by means of an explosive as that term is defined in Health and Safety Code section 12000, or used in subdivision (a)(6). Moreover, acceptance of the People's argument would make subdivision (a)(6) applicable whenever gasoline is used as an accelerant in an arson because an explosion accompanies any ignition of gasoline vapor, and would lead to arbitrary and absurd results. Any death in an arson fire started with gasoline would be murder by means of an explosive regardless of whether death was caused by a flash burn, an explosion or by an ensuing fire, but murderers who ignited lethal fires using papers or wood shavings would be deemed less culpable than those who started a fire of equal intensity with gasoline. In construing a statute we must avoid such arbitrary, unjust, and absurd results whenever the language of the statute is susceptible of a more reasonable meaning. ( People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1130 [80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677].) Finally, subdivision (a)(17)(viii) of section 190.2 creates a special circumstance of murder in the commission or attempted commission of arson. A construction of subdivision (a)(6) to encompass what is essentially a murder in the commission of arson would result in overlapping special circumstances. (4) [T]he court should construe special circumstance provisions to minimize those cases in which multiple circumstances will apply to the same conduct, thereby reducing the risk that multiple findings on special circumstances will prejudice the defendant. ( People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751 [209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 64 A.L.R.4th 723]. See also, People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910, 927 [218 Cal. Rptr. 572, 705 P.2d 1248].) [12]