Opinion ID: 2361926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kersey mitigation.

Text: In order to qualify for a reduced sanction under the Kersey doctrine, Lopes was required to demonstrate (1) by clear and convincing evidence that he had a disability; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability substantially affected his misconduct; and (3) by clear and convincing evidence that he has been substantially rehabilitated. See, e.g., In re Stanback, 681 A.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C.1996). As Bar Counsel correctly states in her brief, it was incumbent upon [Lopes] to show that his illnesses, however labeled, deprived him of the meaningful ability to comport himself in his professional conduct in accordance with the basic norms of professional responsibility. The Kersey issues have been vigorously contested before the Hearing Committee and the Board, and they have been ably briefed in this court. Without reciting in detail all of the relevant testimony, [2] we are satisfied, upon careful consideration of the record as a whole, that the Board's analysis and recommendation are reasonable and consistent with our precedents. Under these circumstances, we must defer to the findings of the Board. We begin our consideration of this issue with the first element of Lopes' burden under Kersey. It is substantially undisputed that, at the relevant times, Lopes was suffering from depression, [3] a disability that has been held to warrant Kersey mitigation. See, e.g., In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627, 631-32 (D.C.1989). Bar Counsel and counsel for the Board have energetically debated whether Lopes' depression was comparable to the depression suffered by the respondents in Peek and in some of our other cases. In our view, however, there was clear and convincing evidence to support the Board's finding that Lopes' depression, together with his reactions to Prednisone and Prozac and his extreme fatigue and other symptoms, amounted to a disability cognizable under Kersey. We must therefore sustain that finding. [4] With respect to Kersey's causation prong, Lopes claims, and the Hearing Committee found, that Lopes' various infirmities substantially caused all of his misconduct, including not only his neglect of his clients' matters, but also his acts of dishonesty and forgery in the Correia and Byers cases. The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee in part: [A]s to the neglect and related misconduct, there was evidence that [Lopes'] combined ailments substantially affected his misconduct. As the Hearing Committee noted, Respondent testified that, due to his health problems, he could not get out of bed to do work, he did not return phone calls on a timely basis, he filed pleadings late, and failed to respond to Bar Counsel in a timely manner. HC Report at 39. The Hearing Committee found it self-evident that Respondent's health problems, both physical and the resulting mental effects, were devastating to him and imposed an enormous burden of pain and uncertainty on his life. It is hardly a surprise that Respondent's law practice would suffer as a result. The Board found no evidence, however, that Lopes' ailments caused him to forge signatures on documents he filed with the court. The Board continued: [W]e are not satisfied that Respondent's conclusion that there was a causal link between the Prednisone and his dishonesty is supported by the medical and other evidence in this case. Respondent's conclusion that Prednisone causes people to have bad judgment appears to be an inference from Dr. McKoy's testimony that the side effects of Prednisone include depression, confusion, disorientation and transient amnesia. We do not find that evidence sufficient to conclude that those side effects caused Respondent's dishonesty. Dishonesty cuts away at the heart of the legal profession. We are not inclined to diminish the seriousness of that misconduct by relying on too tenuous a link between dishonesty and physical or psychological impairments. The physical and psychological impairments under which Respondent labored undeniably were extremely difficult. We agree with the Hearing Committee that the picture Respondent painted of what he felt and experienced for a number of years was credible and sympathetic. There is no evidence, however, that the physical and psychological impairments, separately or in combination, either rendered Respondent unable to understand that he was being dishonest or unable to behave otherwise. Absent such evidence, we cannot conclude that the ailments were sufficiently determinative of his conduct to support a Kersey defense. See In re Temple, 596 A.2d 585, 590 (D.C. 1991). We are satisfied that the Board's analysis of causation issues was comprehensive, balanced, thoughtful, and rational. We so conclude even though it was the Hearing Committee, and not the Board, that heard the witnesses. We agree entirely with the Board's refusal to apply Kersey to Lopes' dishonesty violations, but we also find substantial support in the record for the Board's finding that Lopes demonstrated the requisite causal nexus between his disabilities and his neglect and related violations. In its initial Report, the Board also sustained the Hearing Committee's finding on Kersey's third element, namely, that Lopes had presented sufficient evidence of rehabilitation: Finally, the Committee found clear and convincing evidence of Respondent's rehabilitation. The Committee noted the testimony that Respondent was not then suffering from depression and had been stable since September 1996. In addition, Respondent had developed an awareness of his illness and the connection between his medical problems and his ability to perform professionally, so that he was unlikely to allow problems to go untreated or to take on more than he could handle. In its supplemental report, issued following this court's remand, the Board elaborated: The evidence now available concerning Respondent's employment, access to health care and physical and mental condition all indicate that Respondent is doing all he can to maintain his health, that he is in good shape physically and mentally and that if he wants to practice law again, he will be able to do so successfully. Although we are troubled by Lopes' failure to comply with the conditions of his reinstatement in Maryland, which soon resulted in a second suspension, we cannot say that the quoted findings lack substantial support in the record.