Opinion ID: 170931
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Jones

Text: In the case of a defendant who, like Ms. Jones, moves for severance because she wishes to testify as to one or some counts but not as to others, no need for severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing that [s]he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. United States v. Martin, 18 F.3d 1515, 1518-19 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). In order to demonstrate convincing need, the defendant must present enough information ... to satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it to intelligently weigh the considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. Id. at 1519. Ms. Jones's memorandum supporting her motion for severance explained that she needed to testify on the drug and firearm counts in order to prove that she was not in knowing possession of drugs when Secret Service Agents arrested her. First, she claimed she would testify that she did not state I know I'm in a lot trouble for that stuff in reference to the drugs in the back seat of her car. Rec. vol. I, doc. 134, at 3. Second, Ms. Jones said she would explain that she carried a gun to protect herself and did not use it in connection with drug deals. Id. at 3-4. In support of her strong need not to testify on the bank fraud counts, Ms. Jones contended simply that she did not have any involvement with this conspiracy. Id. at 3. She tersely continued: It is [Ms. Jones's] contention that she has been wrongly identified by the government witnesses who allege that she was somehow involved in this scheme. Ms. Jones intends to exercise her right to have the government prove its case against her beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Ms. Jones made a convincing showing that she had important testimony to give with regard to the firearm and drug counts, her stated desire to force the government to meet its burden of proof with respect to the bank fraud and conspiracy counts did not establish Ms. Jones's purportedly strong need to refrain from testifying with respect to those counts. If a defendant's desire not to testify on a particular count, without more, amounted to a compelling need not to testify, then required severance would be the rule, and not the exception. Notably absent in her memorandum, submitted with the motion, was a discussion of evidence that the government might introduce if she chose to testify on the bank fraud counts. Moreover, we see no reason why counsel for Ms. Jones could not have endeavored to clarify the meaning of Ms. Jones's alleged comment through cross-examination. In short, Ms. Jones failed to demonstrate that she would be strongly prejudiced if the counts remained joined. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Jones's motion to sever counts one through six from counts seven and eight. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we need not consider whether Ms. Jones was in fact prejudiced by the court's ruling. See Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1197.