Opinion ID: 792259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Object to Jury Instruction

Text: 18 Defendant also contends that he received ineffective assistance when his counsel failed to object to the following instruction in the District Court's jury charge: 19 If you are satisfied that the conspiracy charged in the indictment existed, you must then ask yourselves who the members of that conspiracy were. . . . You need not determine the identity of all co-conspirators. However, you must determine whether it has been proven that the defendant was a member of a conspiracy with Eli Shtoukhamer and/or others who were not acting as agents of law enforcement. 20 Trial Tr. 966 (emphasis added). Defendant argues that by mentioning Shtoukhamer in this manner, the District Court partially direct[ed] a verdict in favor of the Government by indicating that the trial judge had determined already that Eli Shtoukhamer had the needed intent, desire and determination to import Ecstasy pills into the United States and thus was one conspirator of the two needed for the jury to convict. Appellant's Br. 22. The plain language of the District Court's charge, however, indicates otherwise. By instructing the jury to determine whether defendant had conspired with Eli Shtoukhamer and/or others, the District Court simply applied the facts of the case before it to the relevant law. See United States v. Lung Fong Chen, 393 F.3d 139, 153 (2d Cir.2004) ([T]he district court has broad discretion to decide which facts, if any, it will mention in its comments to the jury so long as the charge is fair to both sides.) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 142 (2d Cir.1999) (no error for trial judge to refer to evidence in explaining law of entrapment). Nor did the District Court err in referring generally in its instruction to others who may have conspired with defendant. Just as an individual need not know the identities of all coconspirators in order to be found guilty of being a member of the conspiracy, see Harris, 8 F.3d at 946, the jury need not determine the identity of all co-conspirators in order to find that the conspiracy in fact existed. 21 Absent actual error in the District Court's instruction, and in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial that defendant had conspired with Eli Shtoukhamer to distribute and import ecstasy into the United States, trial counsel's failure to object to the jury charge did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Frampton, 382 F.3d 213, 222 n. 8 (2d Cir.2004) (Having found no error in [the district court's] instruction, we hold [defendant's] claim [of ineffective assistance] must fail.). 22 Where a defendant fails to preserve an objection to a District Court's jury instruction, we undertake a traditional plain error review of that instruction. See United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 95-96 (2d Cir.2004). To establish plain error, a court must find (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Keigue, 318 F.3d 437, 441 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir.2001) (en banc) ([A]n error is `plain' if it is `so egregious and obvious' that a trial judge and prosecutor would be `derelict' in permitting it in a trial held today.) (citation omitted). With respect to defendant's claim that the jury instruction itself constituted plain error, it is enough to say that, for the reasons stated above, the District Court committed no error at all, much less plain error.