Opinion ID: 162752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adverse Employment Actions under Federal Law

Text: Mr. Freeman also invokes federal decisions holding that an employee may pursue a retaliation claim based on an adverse employment action less severe than termination. In particular, he cites this circuit’s decision in Sanchez v. Denver Public Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998). There, in discussing Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims, we explained that: The Tenth Circuit liberally defines the phrase “adverse employment action.” Such actions are not simply limited to monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits. Instead, we take a case-by-case approach, examining the unique factors relevant to the situation at hand. Nevertheless, we will not consider a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities to be an adverse employment action. Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corrs., 301 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing what constitutes an adverse employment action under Title VII). Sanchez and similar cases applying federal statutes are not controlling in this diversity case, which is governed by Colorado law. Because Colorado courts have not extended wrongful discharge actions based on violations of public policy -15- to actions less severe than termination, we may not apply the broader “adverse employment action” standard here. Moreover, as United has noted, the issue of whether wrongful discharge actions should be available outside the termination context involves important policy questions that, in a case governed by Colorado law, would be inappropriate for this court to address in the first instance. Compare Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to create the tort of wrongful failure-to-promote and stating that “‘[r]ecognizing a retaliation tort for actions short of termination could subject employers to torrents of unwarranted and vexatious suits filed by disgruntled employees at every juncture in the employment process’”) (quoting Ludwig v. C&A Wallcoverings, Inc., 960 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1992))) with Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054, 1059 (Kan. 1997) (stating that “a new cause of action [under Kansas law] for retaliatory demotion is a necessary and logical extension of the cause of action for retaliatory discharge”). Finally, even under the case-bycase approach of Sanchez, there are serious questions as to whether Mr. Freeman’s EIS placement would constitute an “adverse employment action.”