Opinion ID: 1388285
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Panitz Letter

Text: Having already addressed trial court's ruling that Dr. Panitz's letter was precluded by the discovery orders, we consider its alternative ruling that the letter did not satisfy the legal standard for admissibility of expert medical testimony on the issue of causation. [3] Rule 56(e), S.C.R.C.P., requires that on motion for summary judgment [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Thus, opinion testimony, including that of an expert, which would be inadmissible if testified to at trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit. 6-Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.22[1], pp. 56-743 to -746 (2d ed. 1988); see also Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. , 569 F. (2d) 666 (D.C. Cir.1977); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation , 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Our cases generally hold that, before expert testimony is admissible upon the question of the causal connection between plaintiff's injuries and the acts of the defendant, the testimony must satisfy the most probably rule. Armstrong v. Weiland , 267 S.C. 12, 225 S.E. (2d) 851 (1976); Martin v. Mobley , 253 S.C. 103, 169 S.E. (2d) 278 (1969); Gambrell v. Burleson , 252 S.C. 98, 165 S.E. (2d) 622 (1969). The rule has been succinctly stated as follows: It is not sufficient for the expert ... to testify merely that the ailment might or could have resulted from the alleged cause. He must go further and testify that taking into consideration all the data it is his professional opinion that the result in question most probably came from the cause alleged. Eubanks v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co. , 198 F. Supp. 522, 526-27 (W.D.S.C. 1961). In determining whether particular evidence meets this test it is not necessary that the expert actually use the words most probably. Gamble v. Price , 289 S.C. 538, 347 S.E. (2d) 131 (Ct. App. 1986). It is sufficient that the testimony is such as to judicially impress that the opinion ... represents his professional judgment as to the most likely one among the possible causes.... Norland v. Washington General Hospital , 461 F. (2d) 694, 697 (8th Cir.1972). Viewed in this light, it cannot be said that Dr. Panitz's letter rises to the most probably level. A plain reading of the letter reveals that her opinion is within the realm of possibility only, not the required standard of probability.