Opinion ID: 2634394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants Received Effective Assistance of Counsel

Text: ¶ 20 We have adopted the two-part Strickland [5] test to determine whether a defendant had constitutionally sufficient representation. State v. Cienfuegos, 144 Wash.2d 222, 226, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001). First, the `defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.' Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under professional norms. . . . State v. Townsend, 142 Wash.2d 838, 843-44, 15 P.3d 145 (2001). Second, the `defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.' Cienfuegos, 144 Wash.2d at 227, 25 P.3d 1011 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). This requires the defendant to prove that, but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Id.
¶ 21 In Townsend, 142 Wash.2d at 840, 15 P.3d 145, this court held that it is error to inform the jury during the voir dire in a noncapital case that the death penalty is not involved. In Townsend, the trial court at the prosecutor's request, instructed the jury `[t]his is not a case in which the death penalty is involved and will not be a consideration for the jury.' Id. at 842, 15 P.3d 145 (quoting Suppl. Partial Report of Proceedings at 2). We reasoned that where the jury has no sentencing function, it should not be informed on matters that relate only to sentencing. Id. at 846, 15 P.3d 145. We found [t]his strict prohibition against informing the jury of sentencing considerations ensures impartial juries and prevents unfair influence on a jury's deliberations. Id. ¶ 22 In Townsend, we also rejected the argument that revealing this information was part of a legitimate tactic, reasoning that [t]here was no possible advantage to be gained by defense counsel's failures to object to the comments regarding the death penalty. On the contrary, such instructions, if anything, would only increase the likelihood of a juror convicting the petitioner. Id. at 847, 15 P.3d 145. We further noted if jurors know that the death penalty is not involved, they may be less attentive during trial, less deliberative in their assessment of the evidence, and less inclined to hold out if they know that execution is not a possibility. Id. ¶ 23 Recently, in State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910, 929, 162 P.3d 396 (2007), we also declined to recognize a distinction between a court or counsel-initiated and a juror-initiated discussion of the inapplicability of the death penalty. Thus, under our precedent, in response to any mention of capital punishment, the trial judge should state generally that the jury is not to consider sentencing. [6] ¶ 24 Applying both Townsend and Mason, we hold that the defense counsel's performance was deficient insofar as counsel informed the jury that the case was noncapital and failed to object when the trial court and prosecution made similar reference.
¶ 25 Proving that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ¶ 26 In the instant case, there is no showing that the defendants were deprived of a fair trial or that the trial outcome likely would have differed. There is no indication that the jurors failed to take their duty seriously. In declaring a mistrial on the attempted murder charges, the trial court particularly noted the active deliberation of the jury. [7] There is also abundant evidence in the record to support the conviction of both Hicks and Babbs. A guilty verdict was likely even if the jury had not been informed that the case was noncapital. Most notably, a different jury in the second trial on the attempted murder charge, with no mention of the death penalty, found the evidence convincing enough to identify and convict both Hicks and Babbs as the shooters. ¶ 27 Moreover, since Hicks and Babbs were not convicted by the first jury of the most serious charges (aggravated murder concerning Chica and attempted murder concerning Jonathan), the harm feared in Townsend that a jury might be more likely to convict was not manifest. We find defense counsel's deficient performance in this case nonprejudicial.