Opinion ID: 835812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failing to Disclose Certain Communications to Judge

Text: The Bar further alleges in its first cause of complaint that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), and DR 7-102(A)(3) (professional misconduct knowingly to conceal or fail to disclose that which lawyer is required by law to reveal) in the course of her communications with Judge Harris. We turn first to the conduct allegedly involving dishonesty and misrepresentation. DR 1-102(A) provides in part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:      (3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.] A lawyer violates DR 1-102(A)(3) either when the lawyer makes an affirmative false statement or when the lawyer remains silent despite having a duty to speak. In re Claussen, 331 Or. 252, 261, 14 P.3d 586 ( Claussen II ); Gustafson I, 327 Or. at 647, 968 P.2d 367. A misrepresentation, whether direct or by omission, must be knowing, false, and material in the sense that the misrepresentations would or could significantly influence the hearer's decision-making process. In re Eadie, 333 Or. 42, 53, 36 P.3d 468. As this court stated in Gustafson I, in the context of misrepresentation by nondisclosure under DR 1-102(A)(3), the `knowing' element requires that the accused lawyer know both that the lawyer is failing to disclose information that the lawyer has in mind and that that information is material to the case at hand. 327 Or. at 648, 968 P.2d 367 (emphasis in original). A misrepresentation to a court by nondisclosure also may constitute conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). [11] To conclude that a lawyer has violated DR 1-102(A)(4), this court must determine the existence of each of three elements: (1) the lawyer engaged in conduct, that is, the lawyer did something that he or she should not have done or failed to do something that the lawyer should have done; (2) the conduct occurred during the administration of justice, that is, during the course of a judicial proceeding or another proceeding that has the trappings of a judicial proceeding; and (3) the lawyer's conduct resulted in prejudice, either to the functioning of the proceeding or to a party's substantive interests in the proceeding. In re Haws, 310 Or. 741, 746-48, 801 P.2d 818 (1990); Gustafson I, 327 Or. at 643, 968 P.2d 367. Prejudice may result from repeated acts that cause some harm to the administration of justice or from a single bad act that causes substantial harm. Gustafson I, 327 Or. at 643, 968 P.2d 367. At the May 1996 hearing on the motion to dismiss the charges against Warren Battle, the accused knew that Kelly had presented Patricia Battle with the Article I, section 42 (1996), theory and that Patricia Battle had not been aware before that time that she might have some constitutional right to have the charges against her husband dismissed. The accused was aware that Kelly had drafted the letter and the affidavit. The accused was aware that she herself had added substantive paragraphs to the affidavit. The accused was aware that she had met with Patricia Battle earlier on the day of the hearing and had told Patricia Battle what would happen at the hearing, including telling her that the accused would not permit Patricia Battle to be sworn in and coaching her concerning what to say at the hearing and how to say it. Nonetheless, when Judge Harris brought the accused and the prosecutor into his chambers during the hearing and pointedly asked the accused whether she had advised Patricia Battle, she failed to disclose any of the foregoing. Instead, according to Judge Harris, she spoke in terms of her authorization to do as she was doing; that is, that she believed that Measure 40 gave certain rights to the victim and that Ms. Battle had the right to pursue dismissal of the case; that [the accused], in her involvement in it, was, I believe, attempting to facilitate that. As Judge Harris later testified before the trial panel, he may not have asked the accused specifically to disclose all the contacts that the accused and other lawyers at her firm had had with Patricia Battle, but the tenor of where [he] was going was to explore the nature of those contacts. Given the events in open court that first had preceded it, we think that the circumstances of the meeting in Judge Harris's chambers clearly called for the accused at least to inform Judge Harris of any and all facts pertinent to the question whether she had given Patricia Battle legal advice. Rather than do so, however, she knowingly concealed from the judge the details of her contacts with Patricia Battle. The accused had a duty to respond completely and candidly to the judge's questions; instead, the accused dissembled, as she consistently was to do thereafter in her letter to Judge Harris and in her dealings with the Bar. The accused maintains that she did not think that she had given Patricia Battle legal advice and, therefore, strictly speaking, she was truthful in her responses to Judge Harris. That argument entirely misses the mark. The question during the meeting in Judge Harris's chambers was not whether the accused thought that her conduct had violated the disciplinary rules. Rather, as discussed, the question was whether the accused's responses to Judge Harris were dishonest. As to that question, there is no doubt that the accused knew that the nature and content of her contacts with Patricia Battle were the reasons for the meeting in chambers and, therefore, would be material to Judge Harris's determination whether the accused had a conflict of interest. By deliberately avoiding giving Judge Harris the full picture of her contacts with Patricia Battle, the accused knowingly withheld material information that would have allowed Judge Harris the opportunity to assess the situation for himself. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that information concerning the nature and extent of the accused's and her firm's contacts with Patricia Battle was information that would or could significantly influence the hearer's decision-making process. Eadie, 333 Or. at 53, 36 P.3d 468. Indeed, Judge Harris later testified that, had he known the full story, he would have come to a different conclusion than did the accused about whether she had given Patricia Battle advice. We conclude that, under the circumstances, the accused's answers to Judge Harris in chambers, and her statements in her subsequent letter to him, were misleading and amounted to misrepresentations by nondisclosure. As this court stated in In re Hiller, 298 Or. 526, 534, 694 P.2d 540 (1985), [a] person must be able to trust a lawyer's word as the lawyer should expect [the lawyer's] word to be understood, without having to search for equivocation, hidden meanings, deliberate half-truths or camouflaged escape hatches. The accused's half-truths to Judge Harris, both in chambers and in her subsequent letter, constituted misrepresentations by nondisclosure in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). The trial panel also held that the accused's conduct in misrepresenting to Judge Harris the nature and extent of her and her firm's contacts with Patricia Battle was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), but the trial panel did not support its conclusion with any written analysis. As discussed above, the Bar must establish three elements to demonstrate that a lawyer has violated DR 1-102(A)(4): (1) the lawyer engaged in conduct covered by the rule; (2) the lawyer's conduct occurred in the course of a judicial or some similar proceeding; and (3) the lawyer's conduct caused prejudice. Haws, 310 Or. at 746-48, 801 P.2d 818. In this case, we agree that the accused's misrepresentation to Judge Harris at the meeting in chambers constituted conduct under the rule and that it occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding, viz., the effort to have the charges against Warren Battle dismissed. However, the Bar has failed to prove the final element, prejudice. To conclude that a lawyer's conduct resulted in prejudice under DR 1-102(A)(4), we must find that the lawyer engaged either in repeated acts causing some harm to the administration of justice or a single act that caused substantial harm to the administration of justice. Haws, 310 Or. at 748, 801 P.2d 818. Here, the accused's conduct caused some harm to the functioning of the proceeding, insofar as it deprived Judge Harris of the ability to evaluate his legitimate concern that Patricia Battle's motion to obtain dismissal of the charges against Warren Battle might have been ill-advised and might have worked an injustice. However, given that Judge Harris denied Patricia Battle's motion, we do not think that any harm that the accused caused thereby was substantial, and the Bar has not argued otherwise. The Bar does not point to any other acts of the accused that, taken together with the misrepresentation to Judge Harris in chambers, would constitute repeated conduct causing some harm to the administration of justice. [12] The Bar, then, has failed to prove that the accused engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Accordingly, we find the accused not guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(4). The Bar also alleged, and the trial panel found, that the accused's misrepresentations to Judge Harris constituted a violation of DR 7-102(A)(3). That rule provides in part: In the lawyer's representation of a client or in representing the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall not:      (3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal. The trial panel did not include any written analysis of DR 7-102(A)(3) in its opinion; instead, the panel simply concluded that the accused's conduct violated that provision. For its part, the Bar asserts only that, because DR 1-102(A)(3) obligated the accused to respond truthfully to the court and to reveal her firm's involvement with Patricia Battle, her knowing failure to do so also constituted a violation of DR 7-102(A)(3). However, in the absence of any persuasive argument by the Bar or analysis by the trial panel, we are not satisfied that DR 7-102(A)(3) is pertinent to the accused's conduct. [13] Finally, the Bar also contends that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(3), as well as DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4), when she permitted Patricia Battle's affidavit and letter to be filed with the court without indicating that her firm had prepared them. The trial panel found that the evidence as to why both the letter and the affidavit did not indicate that they had been prepared by the accused's firm was ambiguous. We agree with that assessment. Based on that finding, the trial panel concluded, and we agree, that the Bar failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the facts that the two documents were printed on plain white paper and did not identify their authors amounted to a violation of either DR 1-102(A)(3), or DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(3).