Opinion ID: 205519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bicknese Evidence

Text: We review the district court's exclusion of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. DG & G, Inc. v. FlexSol Packaging Corp., 576 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2009). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It states that If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702. We have said that `[t]he admissibility of evidence of experimental tests rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge and [its] decision will not be overturned absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.' McKnight v. Johnson Controls, 36 F.3d 1396, 1401 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir.1987)). When a district court has discretion, `we do not mean that the district court may do whatever it pleases.' Verizon Commc'ns., Inc., v. Iverizon Int'l, Inc., 295 F.3d 870, 872-73 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir.1984)). Instead, the district court has a `range of choice,' and `its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.' Id. at 873 (quoting Kern, 738 F.2d at 970). A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight; (2) considers and gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor; or (3) considers only proper factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors. Id. Previously, we have explained that experimental evidence falls on a spectrum and the foundational standard for its admissibility is determined by whether the evidence is closer to simulating the accident or to demonstrating abstract scientific principles. McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1402. In this case, like many others, the distinction between evidence offered as a reconstruction of the accident and evidence offered to demonstrate scientific principles is very difficult to draw. There is no bright line distinguishing these two categories of evidence. Id. (internal citation omitted). `A court may properly admit experimental evidence if the tests were conducted under conditions substantially similar to the actual conditions.' Id. at 1401 (quoting Champeau, 814 F.2d at 1278). However, if the experimental tests do not purport to recreate the accident, but instead the experiments are used to demonstrate only general scientific principles, the requirement of the substantially similar circumstances no longer applies. Id. The Dunns assert that the Bicknese evidence was not intended to show how the fire began but was instead intended to show general scientific principles: that is, it was designed to show that the heated grease tray could breach the hose and the then-leaking propane could be ignited by the burner above to cause a fire. Nexgrill, however, argues that the district court properly excluded the Bicknese evidence because Bicknese's experiments were designed not to demonstrate scientific principles but to attempt to recreate the fire, because the tests were not substantially similar to the actual fire conditions, and because Bicknese did not provide the propane hose to Nexgrill, which prevented Nexgrill from reviewing and analyzing his work. The Dunns' main argument is that the tests were conducted to test scientific principles and Bicknese's hypotheses, not to show exactly how the accident occurred. As explained in McKnight, when the purpose of the test is to demonstrate general scientific principles, the substantially similar requirement does not apply. Bicknese testified that the testing was designed to establish certain scientific principles including whether the propane hose [could] deteriorate sufficiently to leak when in contact with the grease tray during the grill operation and whether propane leaking from the deteriorated hose can be ignited by the operating burner. (J.A. at 737.) He also testified that his photographs of the burning hose showing it had been compromised by contact with the heated grease tray was what happened in this case, and that the pictures taken during his tests showed what he believed had occurred inside the grill cabinet during the period from approximately 7:00 p.m. to 9:42 p.m. The district court's determination that Bicknese was not just testing scientific principles but instead was trying to recreate the cause and origin of the fire is one that we review for a clear abuse of discretion. Having reviewed the record carefully, we are unable to say that the district court clearly abused its discretion. Mr. Bicknese did not have to position the propane hose against the grease tray with a tie-down in order to test his theory that a heated grease tray could compromise the hose. Positioning the hose as he did is, in our view, a strong indicator that he was, in fact, trying to recreate how and why the fire happened, and supports the district court's determination. As in McKnight, we find this to be a case where some principles of some kind may be demonstrated but in a fashion that looks very much like a recreation of the events that gave rise to the trial. Id. at 1402 (quoting Fusco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 264 n. 5 (1st Cir.1993)). In McKnight, we relied on the fact that [t]he experiments were conducted on the same type and make of battery as the accident battery, and the experiments were used to explain what probably happened during the accident, in holding that the tests clearly were not limited to a demonstration of scientific principles in the abstract. McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1402, 1403. Much the same is true here, given the efforts by the Dunns to obtain and use an identical grill for the testing, including cooking food on the grill during the testing, and Bicknese's testimony that the tests and photographs showed what happened in this case. As a consequence, in order for the Bicknese evidence to be admissible, the circumstances of the experiments must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the fire. The Dunns do argue in the alternative that the circumstances of Bicknese's experiments were substantially similar to the conditions existing at the time of the fire. The district court's contrary determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1403. In resisting Nexgrill's argument that he was really attempting to recreate the fire (as opposed to testing scientific principles), Bicknese himself pointed out dissimilarities between his experiments and the fire, including his removal of the propane tank with its pressure relief valve from the cabinet and his use of a tie-down to secure the hose against the grease tray, conditions that obviously would not have existed in the Dunns' grill at the time of the fire. The district court relied on his re-routing of the regulator hose and his use of a plastic tie-down to hold it in what the court called an unnatural position for his experiments in determining the lack of substantial similarity. The district court also concluded that Bicknese's experiment was not substantially similar because it did not comport with the time line of the fire. Bicknese's experiment took only 70 minutes of elapsed time between the compromising of the hose, its ignition, and the resulting escaping propane-fueled 1000-degree flames imperiling the regulator when other evidence showed that over two and a half hours elapsed between the time the grill ceased to be used and the discovery of the fire. The district court was of the opinion that the lack of substantial similarity would tend to confuse rather than enlighten the jury, a quintessential judgment call committed to a trial judge's sound discretion. We pause to remind ourselves that the questions presented are not to be measured by what we may have done were we the district court. The question for us is whether or not the district court's decisions were a clear abuse of its discretion. Having studied the record in depth, including a complete reading of both of Bicknese's depositions and a careful examination of the color photographs he took of his tests, we conclude that the district court considered the proper relevant factors, did not give weight to any improper factors, and committed no clear error of judgment in its evidentiary rulings; consequently, it did not clearly abuse the discretion committed to it.