Opinion ID: 1285964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Violation of the Circuit Court's Order on a Motion in Limine

Text: The second issue raised by the plaintiff concerns questions asked by defense counsel in violation of a pre-trial order of the circuit court. Prior to trial, counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude, among other things, [t]he time or circumstances under which plaintiff employed an attorney. At the pre-trial hearing on the plaintiff's motion, counsel for the defendant stated that she could not imagine that being a subject of cross-examination or direct examination. Accordingly, the circuit court entered an order granting the plaintiff's motion. Also prior to trial, the plaintiff indicated her intention to call as a witness Michael Wiley. Mr. Wiley, a friend of the plaintiff's family, claimed that shortly before the defendant's collision with Mr. Honaker, he had seen the defendant speeding and driving recklessly. Mr. Wiley apparently alleged that the defendant passed him in a dangerous fashion, crossing the center line, and that he had immediately written down the defendant's license number to give to the authorities. A short time later perhaps 20 minutes Mr. Wiley heard the sirens of the emergency vehicles responding to the collision between the defendant and Mr. Honaker. Upon a motion by the defendant, the circuit court initially excluded Mr. Wiley's testimony, finding that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. [5] However, when the defendant repeatedly offered evidence to the effect that the defendant was a safe driver, the circuit court allowed Mr. Wiley to testify as a rebuttal witness for the plaintiff. Upon cross-examination of Mr. Wiley, in violation of the trial court's pre-trial order, counsel for the defendant asked Mr. Wiley the following questions: Q. ... Okay, well, by April 1st, Mrs. Honaker already has hired Marvin Masters to bring a lawsuit; correct? A. That's my understanding, yes. Q. So that's just within a week or so of the accident? A. Yes. Q. And her husband is just barely in the ground; correct? Counsel for the plaintiff contends that these questions were a clear violation of the trial court's order, and prejudiced the plaintiff's case. Counsel for the defendant argues that these questions were designed to impeach Mr. Wiley's credibility by showing he had a close relationship to the plaintiff's family. In Syllabus Point 4 of Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995), we stated that: Once a trial judge rules on a motion in limine, that ruling becomes the law of the case unless modified by a subsequent ruling of the court. A trial court is vested with the exclusive authority to determine when and to what extent an in limine order is to be modified. In explaining this rule, we further stated that: Like any other order of a trial court, in limine orders are to be scrupulously honored and obeyed by the litigants, witnesses, and counsel. It would entirely defeat the purpose of the motion and impede the administration of justice to suggest that a party unilaterally may assume for himself the authority to determine when and under what circumstances an order is no longer effective. A party who violates a motion in limine is subject to all sanctions legally available to a trial court, including contempt, when a trial court's evidentiary order is disobeyed. To be clear, the only participant not bound by the in limine ruling is the trial court. Tennant, 194 W.Va. at 113, 459 S.E.2d at 390 (footnote omitted). Counsel for the defendant clearly violated the circuit court's evidentiary ruling that prohibited questioning regarding the plaintiff's hiring of an attorney. The defendant, however, argues that the plaintiff did not contemporaneously object to the questions at the time of trial, and instead, for strategic reasons, waited until after the jury had returned an adverse verdict. The defendant contends that because the plaintiff did not object, the plaintiff waived any rights to appeal this issue. See Tennant, 194 W.Va. at 114, 459 S.E.2d at 391. The plaintiff argues that the defendant's violations of the circuit court's evidentiary ruling constitute plain error, and that the plaintiff's lack of objection does not preclude this Court from reviewing the issue. The plain error doctrine creates a limited exception to the general rule that a party's failure to object waives any right to appeal an issue. For the purposes of West Virginia's `plain error' rule, a `plain' error is one that is clear and uncontroverted at the time of appeal. Syllabus Point 2, State v. Marple, 197 W.Va. 47, 475 S.E.2d 47 (1996). In Syllabus Point 7 of State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), we set forth a four-part test that an appellant must follow in order to receive the benefit of the plain error doctrine: To trigger application of the plain error doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Our review of the record presented indicates that defense counsel, by asking questions regarding the plaintiff's hiring of an attorney, plainly created error in the trial by violating the circuit court's order. Counsel's actions thereby injected prejudicial commentary into the trial which detrimentally affected the substantial rights of the plaintiff and was likely to have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. We therefore may examine the issue raised by the plaintiff, and can determine whether defense counsel's actions may form the basis for a new trial. [6] The purpose of a motion in limine is to prevent an opposing party from asking prejudicial questions, or introducing prejudicial evidence, in front of the jury without asking the trial court's permission. Jurisdictions are generally in agreement that a deliberate and intentional violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, and thereby the intentional introduction of prejudicial evidence, is a ground for reversing a jury's verdict. However, [i]n order for a violation of an in limine motion to serve as the basis for a new trial, the order must be specific in its prohibitions, and violations must be clear. Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 426 (S.D.1994). In determining whether a jury's verdict may be set aside due to a party's violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, courts consider various factors. First and foremost is a determination of whether the evidence excluded by the court's order was deliberately solicited or introduced by the party, or whether the violation of the court's order was inadvertent. See Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474-75 (Wyo.1995). For instance, courts often examine whether the violation occurred once, or whether it repeatedly occurred throughout the trial. Additionally, the violation of the court's order must have been reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Kwiatkowski, 915 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex.App.1996). Courts also consider the inflammatory nature of the violation, and whether the violation prejudiced the substantial rights of the party seeking to set aside the jury's verdict. Kjerstad, 517 N.W.2d at 426. Part of this analysis includes a consideration of whether the challenged evidence was presented to the jury directly, or merely by an oblique reference, and whether the offering party attempted to exploit the improperly introduced evidence. Warner, 897 P.2d at 474-75. Courts will review a violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine to see if it was curable by a jury instruction to disregard the evidence. If the violation was so inflammatory and prejudicial in its nature that it could not have been cured by an instruction to disregard, the jury's subsequent verdict may be set aside. [7] Dove v. Director, State Workers' Compensation Division, 857 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex.App.1993); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 915 S.W.2d at 664. Courts may set aside a verdict when a party's violation created the likelihood of jury confusion, wasted the jury's time on collateral issues, or otherwise wasted scarce judicial resources. Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Associates, Ltd., 866 F.Supp. 1086, 1093 (N.D.Ill.1994). We therefore hold that a deliberate and intentional violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, and thereby the intentional introduction of prejudicial evidence into a trial, is a ground for reversing a jury's verdict. However, in order for a violation of a trial court's evidentiary ruling to serve as the basis for a new trial, the ruling must be specific in its prohibitions, and the violation must be clear. In deciding whether to set aside a jury's verdict due to a party's violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, a court should consider whether the evidence excluded by the court's order was deliberately introduced or solicited by the party, or whether the violation of the court's order was inadvertent. The violation of the court's ruling must have been reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment. A court should also consider the inflammatory nature of the violation such that a substantial right of the party seeking to set aside the jury's verdict was prejudiced, and the likelihood that the violation created jury confusion, wasted the jury's time on collateral issues, or otherwise wasted scarce judicial resources. The court may also consider whether the violation could have been cured by a jury instruction to disregard the challenged evidence. In the instant case, counsel for the defendant admits to intentionally asking Mr. Wiley about circumstances concerning the plaintiff's hiring of an attorney, in violation of the trial court's ruling on the plaintiff's motion in limine, but argues that the questions were designed to show the jury the witness's relationship to the plaintiff and her family. We plainly stated in Tennant that a trial court's in limine orders are to be scrupulously honored and obeyed by the litigants, witnesses and counsel. 194 W.Va. at 113, 459 S.E.2d at 390. If counsel wanted to renew the request to admit any of the evidence excluded by the trial court's order, it was counsel's duty to approach the trial judge outside of the jury's presence. This was not a situation where the questions were asked in the heat of battle, or where the admission of the excluded evidence was beyond counsel's control. Instead, counsel for the defendant admits to intentionally introducing evidence, for strategic reasons, which the jury was clearly not supposed to hear. The trial court's order on the plaintiff's motion in limine specifically excluded evidence regarding the time or circumstances under which the plaintiff employed an attorney. The defendant clearly violated the court's order by asking leading questions about the plaintiff's employment of an attorney, when her husband is just barely in the ground. The evidence was, by defense counsel's admission, deliberately introduced. Furthermore, the questioning appears to have been reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment. The questions, asked in a leading format, regarding the plaintiff's actions were asked of the final witness, in the final series of questions, at the end of a week-long trial, [8] when the plaintiff herself neither testified nor was given a chance to respond to the collateral issues raised by the questions. The questions, posed in an inflammatory manner, were likely to focus the jury's attention on a collateral issue which was wholly irrelevant to whether Mr. Honaker or Mr. Mahon were negligent, and whether that negligence proximately caused Mr. Honaker's death. Lastly, a jury instruction to disregard defense counsel's questions would not have cured the violation of the trial court's order. Having reviewed the record presented in this case, we conclude that the circuit court erred in not setting aside the jury's verdict and granting the plaintiff a new trial. We therefore reverse the circuit court's orders, and remand this case for a new trial.