Opinion ID: 218770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Iqbal, Liability of Supervisors, and Pleading Standards

Text: We begin our analysis with the Supreme Court's own recent opinion in Iqbal. This case arose out of the federal government's response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which the Court characterized as `a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953 (citation omitted). The FBI and other entities within the Department of Justice began a massive investigation to identify the perpetrators and prevent any further attacks. Id. at 1943. A subset of 184 high-interest detainees were identified and held under special restrictions designed to prevent communication with either the general prison population or the outside world. Id. Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim (who was arrested on immigration-related charges, pled guilty, and was eventually deported), was one of these high-interest detainees. Id. The defendants [in his Bivens action] range from the correctional officers who had day-to-day contact with respondent during the term of his confinement, to the wardens of the MDC facility, all the way to petitioners [then-Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller]officials who were at the highest level of the federal law enforcement hierarchy. Id. (citations omitted). The complaint specifically alleged that `the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of its investigation of the events of September 11,' and `[t]he policy of holding post-September 11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.' Id. at 1944 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The pleading posited that the two officials `each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject' respondent to harsh conditions of confinement `as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.' Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Finally, Ashcroft was named as the policy's `principal architect,' and Mueller was identified as being `instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation.' Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Ashcroft and Mueller unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to include sufficient allegations showing their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed this denial, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1944-45. Following the example it set in Twombly, the Supreme Court indicated that, in order to assess the sufficiency of a complaint, it is first necessary to consider the underlying legal principles and elements implicated by the complaint. Id. at 1948. In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the implied cause of action is the `federal analog to suits brought against state officials under ... § 1983.' Id. (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006)). It was therefore correct, the Court noted, for Iqbal to concede[] that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.  Id. (citing, inter alia, Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269, 3 L.Ed. 329 (1812); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-16, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed. 203 (1888)). The Court accordingly stated that, [b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. Id. The Iqbal Court ultimately observed that [i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens actionwhere masters do not answer for the torts of their servantsthe term `supervisory liability' is a misnomer. Id. at 1949. As did Iqbal, Plaintiffs here admit that Appellants may not be held personally liable for damages pursuant to a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory, and the District Court likewise acknowledged as much in its rulings. It is uncontested that a government official is liable only for his or her own conduct and accordingly must have had some sort of personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. The District Court, in turn, dismissed Ontaneda's equal protection claim because there was no evidence that Appellants possessed the discriminatory intent required by Iqbal, and Plaintiffs themselves do not challenge this dismissal on appeal. However, as noted above, we assume for purposes of this appeal that a federal supervisory official may be liable in certain circumstances even though he or she did not directly participate in the underlying unconstitutional conduct. The District Court specifically concluded that a Fourth Amendment claim does not require a showing of a discriminatory purpose and that Plaintiffs could therefore proceed under a knowledge and acquiescence theory. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the terminology used to describe supervisory liability is often mixed. (Appellees' Brief at 21.) They contend that a supervisor may be held liable in certain circumstances for a failure to train, supervise, and discipline subordinates. See, e.g., Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 132-34 (3d Cir.1986) (applying § 1983 case law in evaluating and rejecting Bivens claim for failure to train, supervise, and discipline). We accordingly stated in a § 1983 action that [p]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988); see also, e.g., Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 (Instead, Santiago's allegations appear to invoke a theory of liability under which `a supervisor may be personally liable ... if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.' (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)) (footnote omitted)). It is also possible to establish section 1983 supervisory liability by showing a supervisor tolerated past or ongoing misbehavior. Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1191 n. 3 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724-25 (3d Cir.1989)). We further indicated that a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he or she implements a policy or practice that creates an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation on the part of the subordinate and the supervisor's failure to change the policy or employ corrective practices is a cause of this unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir.2001). Having considered the legal framework implicated by Iqbal 's complaint, the Supreme Court turned to the complaint itself. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a `short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. While detailed factual allegations are not required, the pleading must include more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation, `labels and conclusions,' `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,' or `naked assertion[s].' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Accordingly, the basic principle that a court must accept all allegations as true is inapplicable to either legal conclusions or [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Instead, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This plausibility standard does not require probability, but it does demand more than a sheer possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully. Id. Therefore, a complaint pleading facts that are merely consistent with liability is insufficient. Id. Following Twombly, the Supreme Court in Iqbal offered a multi-prong approach for determining whether a pleading meets the plausibility requirement. After identifying the elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a legally cognizable cause of action, see, e.g., Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 & n. 7, a court can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth (although they may provide a helpful framework for the complaint), Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. Applying that approach, the Court determined that Iqbal 's complaint has not `nudged [his] claims' of invidious discrimination `across the line from conceivable to plausible.' Id. at 1950-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). It explained that certain conclusory and formulaic allegations were not entitled to any assumption of truth (specifically the allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller knew of, condoned, and maliciously agreed to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy solely on account of his religion, race, or national origin, and the respective characterizations of Ashcroft as the `principal architect' of this invidious policy as well as of Mueller as being `instrumental' in the policy's adoption and execution). Id. at 1951 (citations omitted). The Court then explained that the remaining factual allegations in the pleadings (specifically that the FBI, under the direction of Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the investigation and that the policy of holding detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared by the FBI was approved by Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks following the terrorist attack) were consistent with Ashcroft and Mueller acting on the basis of race, religion, or national origin. Id. But, given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose. Id. The Iqbal Court specifically noted, among other things, the specific circumstances that confronted the nation's highest-ranking law enforcement officers in the wake of a devastating and unprecedented attack. Id. at 1951-52. The Supreme Court also expressly rejected Iqbal's theory that the pleading standards should be tempered where discovery purportedly was to be structured in such a way as to preserve the qualified immunity defense. Id. at 1953-54. Instead, it emphasized that the basic thrust of qualified immunity is to free officials from the concerns and burdens of litigation, including discovery. Id. at 1954 (citation omitted). If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Id. The Court emphasized that such costs are only magnified when Government officials are charged with responding to ... `a national and international emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.' Id. (citation omitted). Ultimately, the Supreme Court believed that the elusive promise of minimally intrusive discovery furnished especially cold comfort in light of the need to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties. Id. at 1954.