Opinion ID: 1162670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limitation Period for Section 1983 Claims.

Text: [32] The Robinsons stated a prima facie case for civil rights relief for their claims of substantive due process violations. Since these claims were improperly dismissed and may now be set for trial, the Robinsons have a valid theory of relief other than an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument under RCW 4.16.080(3). We therefore seek the applicable limitation period for what may stand as an independent theory of relief, i.e., the Robinsons' substantive due process claims under section 1983. We note that damages, if awarded, could differ in amount from refunds. Because there is no statute of limitation for section 1983 actions, federal courts formerly used the state statute of limitation applicable to a similar cause of action under the law of the State in which the action arose, as provided in Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84, 64 L.Ed.2d 440, 100 S.Ct. 1790 (1980). This rule was changed by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 85 L.Ed.2d 254, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (1985), in which it was held that the appropriate statute of limitation for section 1983 actions is the same as the forum state's limitations period for personal injury cases. See Krug v. Imbordino, 896 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.1990). Thus federal precedent under the Wilson v. Garcia, supra , rule requires the use of a single limitation period for section 1983 actions in each state. The Supreme Court has stated that courts entertaining section 1983 actions may in certain instances employ the general or residual state statute of limitation for personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 102 L.Ed.2d 594, 109 S.Ct. 573 (1989). However, this is only when state law provides multiple statutes of limitation for personal injury actions: Courts should resort to residual statutes of limitations only where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions and the residual one embraces, either explicitly or by judicial construction, unspecified personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. at 250 n. 12. See 1 S. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts  6.6(d) (Release 2 1989); see also Kibble-Smith, Statutes of Limitation and Section 1983: Implications for Illinois Civil Rights Law, 20 J. Mar L. Rev. 415 (1986-1987). The statute of limitation for personal injury actions in the state of Washington is 3 years under RCW 4.16.080(2). This 3-year period was held applicable to Bivens claims, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), arising in the state of Washington in Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir.1989). Thus the 3-year limitation period for personal injuries under Washington law applies to this section 1983 action.
[33] The next question to be addressed is when the Robinsons' substantive due process cause of action (in this instance, a class suit) accrued. While state law requires the use of state policies on tolling and revival of statutes of limitation, federal law controls the question of when a cause of action accrues when we discuss statutes of limitation for section 1983 purposes. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King Cy., 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.1986). See also 1 S. Steinglass, at 6-37; Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 70 L.Ed.2d 6, 102 S.Ct. 28 (1981) (section 1983 claim accrued when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that was basis of suit). In Norco Constr., it was held that a developer's civil rights action against King County based on the County's delay in acting on the developer's preliminary plat application accrued when the County made its final decision approving the application rather than when the developer became aware the County had treated it differently and would not act within the period provided by statute. We note that in the land use context, it has been observed that other land use claims may be stated independent of a taking claim, and it is possible for section 1983 due process or other nontaking claims to accrue earlier than taking claims; taking claims entail more stringent ripeness requirements. [10] S. Steinglass, at 6-39. There has been considerable controversy on whether the ripeness requirements for takings claims announced in Williamson Cy. Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985) and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 91 L.Ed.2d 285, 106 S.Ct. 2561 (1986) are applicable as an impediment to related, nontaking claims on the grounds that such claims have not yet accrued until taking claims are ripe. Williamson held that a Fifth Amendment taking claim is not ripe (and thus a cause of action does not accrue) until the landowner has sought and received a final judgment on state compensation procedures. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-95. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Williamson requirement that a federal takings plaintiff exhaust his or her state law remedies prior to bringing a claim did not extend to the plaintiff's claims that he or she had been denied due process by the same state action. Sinaloa Lk. Owners Ass'n v. Simi Vly., 882 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom. Doody v. Sinaloa Lk. Owners Ass'n, Inc. 494 U.S. 1016, 108 L.Ed.2d 493, 110 S.Ct. 1317 (1990). In Sinaloa, the Ninth Circuit concluded that landowners' substantive due process claims arising out of the State's breaching of a privately owned dam and destruction of a lake was ripe, notwithstanding the fact that the landowners' failure to exhaust state law remedies had precluded their federal taking claims. Sinaloa, 882 F.2d at 1407. The Sinaloa decision was cited as consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kaiser Dev. Co. v. Honolulu, 898 F.2d 112, 113 (9th Cir.1990). The Kaiser decision relied totally on the reasoning from Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City & Cy. of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926 (D. Hawaii 1986), in which it was noted that the Williamson and Yolo concepts of ripeness and exhaustion do not preclude a plaintiff's claim that arbitrary and capricious state action violated substantive due process. 649 F. Supp. at 943 n. 24. [34] Substantive due process claims differ from taking claims in that the plaintiff who has suffered a violation need not wait for the State to deny an adequate postdeprivation remedy before commencing suit. Substantive due process is violated at the moment harm occurs; thus, the existence of postdeprivation state remedies does not bar a section 1983 action. Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Rutherford v. Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.1986)).
It is also noted in commentary that some federal courts have considered tolling the running of, or delaying the accrual of, the statute of limitation in section 1983 land use actions under the continuing wrong theory. See 1 S. Steinglass  6.6(d) (citing Ocean Acres Ltd. Partnership v. Dare Cy. Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.1983); Gordon v. Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 391 (6th Cir.1978); De Botton v. Marple Township, 689 F. Supp. 477, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Moore v. Costa Mesa, 678 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Jackson v. City Coun., 659 F. Supp. 470, 474-75 (W.D. Va. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 840 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.1988)). There is a split among jurisdictions as to the function and availability of the continuing wrong theory. [35] However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected this theory in the regulatory taking and land use context. See Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 584 (9th Cir.1991); De Anza Properties X, Ltd. v. County of Santa Cruz, 936 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.1991). Since the Ninth Circuit has not embraced the continuing wrong theory, it is not available in this case. The policy behind statutes of limitation is to ensure essential fairness to defendants and to bar plaintiffs who have slept on [their] rights. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428, 13 L.Ed.2d 941, 85 S.Ct. 1050 (1965). The plaintiffs in this case did not bring state actions prior to raising their federal claims so as to toll the statute of limitation during the pendency of their state court proceedings. The nature of the wrongful conduct alleged in this section 1983 action is the enforcement of respective HPO provisions after trial courts had declared them invalid and issued injunctions against continued enforcement. Insofar as the section 1983 claim is concerned, the federal substantive due process rights of the respective class members, if violated, were violated at the instant this improper enforcement came to bear upon each of them. We are therefore not persuaded that this case presents a continuing wrong vis-a-vis the respective class members. In this case the respective class members' section 1983 causes of action accrued ( i.e., substantive due process was violated by allegedly arbitrary and capricious conduct) when they were assessed fees by the City pursuant to the HPO, as a requirement for obtaining a license, after the applicable provisions of the ordinance had been declared invalid by trial courts and further enforcement had been enjoined. [36] We hold that the moment of imposition of fees pursuant to invalidated HPO provisions by the City against each of the respective class members as a condition of removing low income housing gave each respective class member a basis for asserting a section 1983 substantive due process claim against the City. The 3-year statute of limitation began running on each of these respective claims at the moment of fee imposition, which was the moment the respective causes accrued. We accordingly hold that since the 3-year statute of limitation applies, all section 1983 claims by class members which arose prior to the period of 3 years before May 27, 1988, the date of the filing of the complaint, are time barred.