Opinion ID: 165632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Directed Verdict on State False Arrest Claims

Text: 8 During trial the court granted Officer Sholtis's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' state and federal claims for false arrest. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred, and that when Albuquerque Police Department standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the subjective mental states of everyone involved are taken into account, Officer Sholtis lacked probable cause to arrest them. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for judgment as a matter of law [i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). We review a district court's grant of a motion for directed verdict de novo. Fry v. Board of County Comm'rs, 7 F.3d 936, 938 (10th Cir.1993). 9 Plaintiffs contend that they raised a number of factual disputes at trial which precluded the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. In Plaintiffs' formulation, Officer Sholtis's motives for arresting Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' ignorance of park closing times, and the requirements of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) SOPs regarding off-duty arrests raised disputes concerning the legality of the arrest that should have been submitted to the jury. We disagree. New Mexico law permits a police officer to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor so long as the officer has probable cause to believe the offense has occurred in his presence. State v. Salas, 127 N.M. 686, 986 P.2d 482, 486 (1999). Since the factual disputes Plaintiffs raise do not affect the determination of whether the arrest was supported by probable cause, the trial court was correct to grant Officer Sholtis's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 10 Officer Sholtis apprehended the Plaintiffs for resisting arrest, disobeying a police officer, and being in the park after it was closed. Plaintiffs attach considerable significance to the fact that Officer Sholtis's main reason for arresting them, as revealed in his trial testimony, was their failure to obey his commands, not their presence in the park. Plaintiffs argue that Officer Sholtis's motivations affect the lawfulness of the arrest because it is not clear that Plaintiffs failed to obey his commands. Thus, Plaintiffs contend, there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for them on their false arrest claims, precluding a grant of judgment as a matter of law. This theory is tenable only if the lawfulness of an arrest depends on whether the arresting officer had a defensible primary motivation for making an arrest. It does not. 11 The New Mexico Supreme Court has considered the question whether a warrantless arrest depends for its validity on the arresting officer's perfect understanding of the proper grounds for the arrest and has concluded that it does not. In State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183, 187 (1980), abrogated on other grounds, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), a police officer arrested the defendant for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting minors from allowing themselves to be served alcohol when unaccompanied by a parent. The defendant argued that the officer had no reasonable grounds to believe he had violated the ordinance in question, and while the court agreed with the defendant on this point, it nevertheless upheld the validity of the arrest. Id. at 188. The officer had observed sufficient evidence of the misdemeanors of exhibition driving and driving while intoxicated to provide him with reasonable grounds to arrest the defendant on those bases, and where there are reasonable grounds supporting the warrantless arrest of a person for the commission of a misdemeanor, the arrest is not invalidated because the officer gave the wrong reasons for the arrest. Id. at 187. If an officer's entirely mistaken understanding of which law has been broken does not render that arrest unlawful, so long as the officer did observe an offense for which arrest is permitted, the distinction between Officer Sholtis's primary, secondary, and even tertiary motivations cannot affect the lawfulness of the arrest. 12 Under the Luna rule, a warrantless misdemeanor arrest is valid if the officer has at least one valid ground justifying it. The most straightforward basis on which Officer Sholtis could have arrested Plaintiffs was their violation of the municipal ordinance setting the operating hours for Albuquerque public parks. Under New Mexico law, a police officer may make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor if he has probable cause to believe the offense occurred in his presence. 1 Boone v. State, 105 N.M. 223, 731 P.2d 366, 369 (1987); City of Roswell v. Mayer, 78 N.M. 533, 433 P.2d 757, 758-59 (1967); Cave v. Cooley, 152 P.2d 886, 889-90 (N.M.1944). 13 An officer has probable cause to believe a misdemeanor is taking place in his presence when the facts and circumstances as observed by the officer through the officer's senses are sufficient to warrant an officer of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is occurring. State v. Salas, 127 N.M. 686, 986 P.2d 482, 486 (1999). The Albuquerque ordinance governing the operation of public parks provides that parks close at the time posted or no later than midnight. Am. Ord. 27-1991 § 10-1-1-10. 2 Bianchetti Park closed at 10:00 p.m., and Officer Sholtis encountered Plaintiffs in the park at 2:30 a.m. The facts and circumstances observed by Officer Sholtis provided probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were committing the offense of being in a municipal park after closing, thus permitting him to make a valid arrest. 14 Faced with what appears to be a perfectly clear violation of a perfectly straightforward prohibition, Plaintiffs attempt to complicate matters by reading a specific intent requirement into the ordinance. In order to violate the ordinance, Plaintiffs maintain, one must be in a park after closing and know that the park is closed. Plaintiffs reason that if knowledge of the park's closing is necessary for a violation of the ordinance, an officer does not have probable cause to arrest someone for a violation of the ordinance without first ensuring those present know the park is closed. The ordinance does not require specific intent for a violation: No person shall remain in, occupy, or use any park in the city which is closed to public use. Am. Ord. 27-1991 § 10-1-1-10(A). Plaintiffs confess that they have found no specific New Mexico law suggesting that the ordinance has a specific intent requirement, but maintain that their expert's comparison of the ordinance to a typical type of trespass offense requires us to engraft such a requirement onto the language of the ordinance. Aplt. Rep. Br. 6-7. 15 Plaintiffs' first argument in support of a specific intent requirement is that their expert drew an analogy between the ordinance and other trespass-type offenses. While criminal trespass under New Mexico law can, under some circumstances, require knowledge that the trespasser does not have permission to be on the land, New Mexico law also defines other trespass-type offenses that require knowledge only of the trespasser's actions, not of their illegality. 3 The Ordinance does not contain a specific intent requirement, stating only [n]o person shall remain in, occupy, or use any park in the city which is closed to public use. Am. Ord. § 10-1-1-10. The lack of a specific intent requirement in the statutory definition of the crime means that this is a general intent offense. See State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266, 1277 (1996) (a general-intent crime is one for which no additional intent to accomplish a further goal is specified.) Under New Mexico law general intent requires only that the jury find the defendant intentionally committed the acts that the statute declares unlawful. State v. Dunsmore, 119 N.M. 431, 891 P.2d 572, 574 (1995). Plaintiffs do not contend that they did not know the time or their location, or that they did not act intentionally in being at the park at that time. Plaintiffs intended their actions and understood the facts that made those actions illegal, and that is all that is required to violate the Ordinance. 16 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Officer Sholtis's alleged violation of the APD SOPs rendered his actions a false arrest under state law. The SOPs provide that an off-duty police officer may make an arrest only when [t]here is an immediate need for the prevention of a crime or apprehension of a suspect. APD SOP § 2-15-2(B). Plaintiffs argue that Officer Sholtis violated this provision of the SOPs and that no reasonable off-duty police officer would have believed that he had cause to arrest Plaintiffs under the circumstances. Aplt. Br. 35 n.1. 17 Plaintiffs' suggestion conflates the requirements for a valid arrest under state law with the standards for a proper arrest under the regulations of one agency in one municipality. If New Mexico law made the reasonableness of an arrest turn on compliance with SOPs, Plaintiffs' argument might be persuasive. But it is the existence of probable cause, rather than compliance with the SOPs, that makes a warrantless arrest valid under New Mexico law. Salas, 986 P.2d at 486. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe an offense is occurring. Id. That the SOPs might require an officer to refrain from making an arrest under these facts does not eliminate the existence of probable cause. Thus, in light of our conclusion above that Officer Sholtis had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs, we cannot conclude that his actions were a false arrest under New Mexico law, even assuming he violated the APD SOPs. 18