Opinion ID: 769328
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury's Finding on Intent

Text: 11 Paul argues that the jury was instructed improperly because it was not required to make the requisite finding of intent at the penalty phase of the trial. For Paul to be death penalty eligible under the FDPA, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Paul either: 12 (A) intentionally killed the victim; (B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of the victim; (C) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used in connection with a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, and the victim died as a direct result of the act; or (D) intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence, knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a direct result of the act . . . . 13 18 U.S.C. 3591(a)(2). 14 At the penalty phase, the jury was instructed: 15 Before you may consider the imposition of the death penalty, you must first unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted in the killing of Sherman Williams. 16 Paul asserts this instruction authorizes a death sentence on a finding of intent to aid and abet, and not intent to cause death. He argues the instruction does not satisfy any of the four intent requirements of the FDPA. In its brief, the government counters that Paul did not object to this instruction in the punishment phase on this basis, and thus plain error analysis applies. However, at oral argument, counsel for the government conceded that failure to utilize the language of the statute was plain error, but argued that it did not affect Paul's substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993) (three prongs to plain error analysis: there must be error, which is plain, and it must affect substantial rights). 17 The government argues that, considering the totality of the instructions given to the jury, together with the jury's actual finding in the guilt phase that Paul aided and abetted in the killing, the jury had to have found the requisite conduct and mental state necessary to satisfy any statutory or constitutional intent requirement. Specifically, the government argues that the definition of aiding and abetting in the guilt-phase instructions encompasses the language required by at least one of the four statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. 3591(a)(2). The guilt-phase instructions were included with the penalty-phase instructions in the notebooks the jurors took into the jury room. 3 According to the government, when the instructions from each phase of the trial are read together, it is obvious that the jury was given sufficient instructions on the issue of intent to fulfill the requirements of section 3591(a)(2). Therefore, because the jury actually found in the guilt phase of the trial that Paul aided and abetted the killing, the government contends that Paul's substantial rights were not affected by any instructional error. 18 A conviction will not be reversed due to allegedly erroneous jury instructions unless, viewed in their entirety, the instructions fail to correctly state the law. See United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 322 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, jury instructions are evaluated in the context of the entire charge and a jury is presumed to follow all instructions. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 391 & 394 (1999). 19 The best way to comply with section 3591(a)(2) is to actually use the language of the statute in the jury instruction. Because the language of the statute was not used here, we must review the totality of the jury instructions to decide whether the jury made a finding of intent adequate to satisfy the requirements of section 3591(a)(2). In the guilt phase, the jurors were instructed that to aid and abet in the commission of a crime, the person must know the crime was being committed or going to be committed, and that the person knowingly acted to cause, encourage, or aid in the commission of the crime. The instructions further stated that merely being present is not enough, instead, the person must know the crime is occurring. 20 We hold that the jury's penalty-phase findings together with its guilt-phase conclusions are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the FDPA. The jury found that Paul intentionally committed an act (aided and abetted), which he knew would kill Sherman Williams. This finding clearly satisfies section 3591(a)(2) because it closely tracks the language of subsection (C) of section 3591(a)(2) requiring that Paul intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of [Sherman Williams] would be taken. 18 U.S.C. 3591(a)(2)(C). 21 If anything, to know that a life will be taken requires greater awareness than merely contemplating that a life will be taken. The dictionary definition of know which most closely corresponds to this situation is to perceive or understand as fact or truth; to apprehend clearly and with certainty. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1064 (Random House 2d ed. 1997). The definition of contemplate most analogous to this situation is to have in view as a future event. Id. at 438. 22 Under the aiding and abetting instruction at the guilt phase, the jury made a finding that Paul knew with certainty that his acts would take the life of Sherman Williams. The jury was then again instructed at the penalty phase that it must unanimously find that Paul intentionally aided and abetted in the killing of Sherman Williams. When the two instructions are viewed together, it is manifest that the jury was satisfactorily instructed on the intent requirements of the FDPA. Accordingly, we hold that Paul's substantial rights were not affected by the district court's failure to use the express language of section 3591(a)(2). 4 See, e.g., Jones, 527 U.S. at 394-95 (assuming the jury was erroneously instructed that the defendant would receive less than a life sentence if the jury could not unanimously agree on either a sentence of death or life in prison, this arguably plain error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights). 23 It is also clear that Williams died as a direct result of Paul's acts. The medical examiner testified the cause of Williams' death was a gunshot wound to the head. The evidence showed, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, that either Paul or Ingle, or both men shot Williams. Either way, the evidence established, and the jury agreed, Paul aided and abetted in the shooting of Williams. Because the gunshot wound was the cause of Williams' death and the jury found that Paul aided and abetted in that act, the requirement in section 3591(a)(2)(C) that the victim died as a direct result of the act is satisfied by the jury's findings.