Opinion ID: 172597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: AEDPA Standard for an Evidentiary Hearing

Text: Under AEDPA, a federal habeas court may not grant an evidentiary hearing to a defendant who failed to develop his claim in state court, except in a few, narrowly defined circumstances that are not at issue here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Young, 486 F.3d at 679. But if the petitioner did not fail to develop the factual basis of his claim in State court, ... a federal habeas court should proceed to analyze whether a hearing is appropriate or required under pre-AEDPA standards. Young, 486 F.3d at 679 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to develop the claim means a lack of diligence, or some greater fault on the petitioner's part. Williams v. Taylor (Michael Williams), 529 U.S. 420, 432, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Diligence ... depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court. Id. at 435, 120 S.Ct. 1479; cf. Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1202-03 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that a federal habeas petitioner who filed his state petition in the state Supreme Court, where review is discretionary, rather than the district court, where review is mandatory, had failed to exhaust all available state remedies). Although not an absolute prerequisite, a petitioner typically must request an evidentiary hearing in state court. Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479 (Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.). We have sometimes found such a request, by itself, to be sufficient proof of diligence. See Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1176 (10th Cir.2004) (citing examples). But requesting an evidentiary hearing does not ipso facto satisf[y] the diligence requirement. Id. To determine diligence, we look to a petitioner's efforts to develop facts in compliance with state law. See Barkell v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684, 694 (10th Cir.2006) (holding that if petitioner complied with what reasonably appeared to be the established state-law requirements, he cannot be said to have failed to develop the factual basis of his claim, even if his reasonable interpretation of state law turned out to be wrong (alterations, citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But whether a habeas petitioner has shown `a lack of diligence'... is a question of federal law decided by the federal habeas courts. Boyle v. McKune, 544 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1630, 173 L.Ed.2d 1011 (2009). There is a strong argument that Mr. Fairchild was not diligent. He did not present his ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, as Oklahoma law generally requires. In his state post-conviction proceeding, he presented the claim and supported it with documentary evidence, including medical records. But as explained more fully below, the evidence he presented at this stage was far less specific and probative than evidence he later sought to present in federal court. He has not explained why he did not submit to the state court the best evidence which presumably would have been available to himaffidavits from a psychiatrist and psychologist who personally examined him. However, the State has not argued that Mr. Fairchild was less than diligent. See Wilson v. Sirmons (Wilson I), 536 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir.2008) (citing the State's failure to claim a lack of diligence as a relevant factor), aff'd, Wilson II, 577 F.3d at 1300, 2009 WL 2623336, at . The State did challenge Mr. Fairchild's diligence in its response to the district court. R., Vol. I, Doc. 27, at 102-04 (Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed Aug. 5, 2002). But it has effectively abandoned the argument by failing to make it in its appellate brief. See Allen, 568 F.3d at 1199 n. 3 (We do not consider the issues raised by Allen in his original filing. By not including those issues in his supplemental brief, Allen has abandoned them.); see also Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) ([W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant's opening brief.); Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 31 F.3d 958, 960 n. 1 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that claims and arguments that are not specifically address[ed] on appeal are deemed to be abandoned). Therefore, we find that the State has forfeited reliance on Mr. Fairchild's neglect in not submitting the doctors' affidavits and will proceed as if Mr. Fairchild had been diligent in the presentation of his ineffective assistance claim.