Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements in Citizens Voice Article

Text: In July 2009, months after Ciavarella and Conahan entered guilty pleas, Powell also pleaded guilty before District Judge Kosik. During Powell‟s plea hearing, the District Court asked Powell whether there was “underlying consideration for the payments which was part and parcel with the concealment of the payments.” App. 29. The District Court‟s question was in response to media reports about Ciavarella and his claim that he never detained juveniles in exchange for money. Powell responded that “there was no quid pro quo per se,” that is, no detention of juveniles in exchange for payments, and that he had only acted as a conduit for Mericle‟s referral fees. App. 29. One month later, the District Court rejected Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea agreements. Days after the District Court rejected the plea agreements, the Citizens Voice newspaper published an article, which purported to detail a conversation between Judge Kosik and another individual that the reporter had overheard outside of the courtroom minutes after Powell‟s guilty plea. The article reported: 4 We review the District Court‟s denial of Ciavarella‟s recusal motions for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1980). 13 Kosik stood near an elevator outside his courtroom and casually discussed what had just happened therein, including an attempt by Powell‟s attorney to portray some payments to the judges as a “finder‟s fee”—not as an incentive for them to sent a steady stream of juveniles to the detention facilities co-owned by Powell. . . . How could there not have been a “quid pro quo?” Kosik wondered, portending the sentiments he expressed Friday in a five-page memorandum rejecting plea agreements between former Luzerne County Judges Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. and Michael T. Conahan and federal prosecutors. The evidence of Ciavarella and Conahan‟s judicial prostitution—of their so-called kids for cash scheme—was abundant and clear, Kosik continued. . . . App. 71. The article went on to quote repeatedly, with and without attribution, from the District Court‟s opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s plea agreement.5 5 The Citizens Voice article reported that Kosik said, “Conahan, pounding the same callous, iron fist he used to force the county‟s use of the private facilities in 2003, „attempted to obstruct and impede justice, and failed to clearly demonstrate affirmative acceptance of responsibility with this denials and contradictions of evidence.‟” App. 71. The article went on say Kosik referenced Conahan‟s “denials 14 After withdrawing his guilty plea, Ciavarella moved to disqualify Judge Kosik on the grounds that Judge Kosik had improperly relied on extrajudicial statements—including media reports and Ciavarella‟s presentence report—in denying the plea agreement, and that Judge Kosik‟s statements reported in the Citizens Voice article could be perceived as comments on the merits of the case and on Ciavarella‟s guilt. The District Court denied the recusal motion. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “The judge does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994). To ensure the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must scrupulously avoid making public comments on pending litigation. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges (hereinafter “Code of Conduct”) Canon 3A(6) (Judicial Conference 2009) (“A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court.”). concerning his alleged offenses, „including the receipts of money.‟” App. 72. The article also noted that Kosik “bristled” that Ciavarella “„has resorted to public statements of remorse, more for his personal circumstances. . . . Yet he continues to deny what he terms “quid pro quo” his receipt of money as a finder‟s fee.‟” App. 72. Each of these statements that the Citizens Voice article attributes to statements by Judge Kosik is contained in the District Court‟s opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea agreements. App. 21-22. 15 Ciavarella urges us to rely on the First Circuit‟s approach in In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001). There a district judge had spoken with a newspaper reporter about a pending case, and the Court held that because the case involved a “matter of significant local concern” and because the judge‟s “comments were sufficiently open to misinterpretation so as to create the appearance of partiality, even when no actual prejudice or bias existed,” recusal was warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Id. at 169, 170. This case, however, is different. Unlike in Boston’s Children First, it is not clear whether the comments attributed to Judge Kosik were ever actually made by him outside the context of a judicial proceeding. The Citizens Voice article implied that a reporter overheard Judge Kosik “casually discuss[ing] what had just happened” at Powell‟s plea hearing and “wonder[ing]” how there could “not have been a „quid pro quo?‟” App. 71. But despite the reporter‟s implication that the statements had been made outside the courtroom, every statement attributed to Judge Kosik had in fact been expressed by him in his judicial opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea agreements or in the courtroom during Powell‟s plea hearing. In fact, in its opinion denying the recusal motion, the District Court denied ever having spoken with the media regarding a case or person charged and compared the Citizens Voice article with its July 31, 2009 opinion. Judge Kosik stated that “[t]he article‟s sources were not extra-judicial, but [were] quoted from judicial filings.” App. 30. We agree. For this reason, Ciavarella‟s reliance on Boston’s Children First is unavailing. 16 Nor do Judge Kosik‟s statements in his July 31, 2009 opinion and at Powell‟s plea hearing warrant recusal on the basis that they gave an appearance of partiality. Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia is illustrative. In Cheney, Justice Scalia issued an opinion responding to a motion for recusal based on a trip and flight that he had taken the year before with Vice President Cheney. The recusal motion cited to newspaper articles, and Justice Scalia responded to correct inaccuracies and state that “largely inaccurate and uninformed opinions cannot determine the recusal question.” Cheney, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.). To the contrary, “the recusal inquiry must be „made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.‟” Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., mem.) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548)). Here, too, no reasonable person who is informed of all of the facts would believe that Judge Kosik‟s impartiality could be questioned based on the statements in the proceedings as reported in the Citizens Voice article. The statements Judge Kosik made during Powell‟s plea colloquy and in the District Court‟s opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s plea agreement were based on the knowledge he gained over the course of judicial proceedings. “[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of . . . prior proceedings[] do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Ciavarella has failed to demonstrate such a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” Id. To the contrary, Judge Kosik‟s statements were merely “assessments relevant to the case, whether they 17 are correct or not.” United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 220 (3d Cir. 2007). “As such, they do not demonstrate bias, even if they are „expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, [or] annoyance.‟” Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555) (alteration in original). Finally, we note that under § 455(a), “[d]iscretion is confided in the district judge in the first instance to determine whether to disqualify himself because the judge presiding over a case is in the best position to appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a recusal motion,” particularly when “the district court judge has presided over (i) an extraordinarily complex litigation (ii) involving a multitude of parties (iii) for an extended period of time.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks, citation and alterations omitted). Here, at the time of Ciavarella‟s initial March 1, 2010 recusal motion and subsequent renewals of that motion, Judge Kosik had presided over Ciavarella‟s highly complex case for well over a year, and over many of Ciavarella‟s co-conspirators‟ cases, and he was well-suited to understand the implications of the Citizens Voice article. We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s denial of the recusal motions.