Opinion ID: 1264881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was there probable cause for the search of the Suarez home?[2]

Text: We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is only appropriate when the evidence in the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The Suarezes' illegal search claim depends on whether the police had probable cause to support a search of the Suarez home. Probable cause exists when the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that ... evidence of a crime will be found. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Lowe, 516 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir.2008). Probable cause deals with beliefs, not certainties. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). It is a fluid concept that depends on the context in which it is being assessed. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657. Probable cause is a matter of common sense, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life. Id. at 695. In making probable-cause determinations, law enforcement agents are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts before them, based on their training and experience. United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir.2003); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (The point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. (alteration in the original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948))). Probable cause is only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not a certainty that a crime was committed. Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.2003). The Suarezes do not contend that the judge Officer Trowbridge spoke to should not have issued a search warrant for their home. Instead, they challenge the veracity of the statements Trowbridge made in supporting his request for the warrant. This is tough sledding. The affidavit (in this case, the sworn telephonic testimony) supporting a search warrant carries with it a presumption of validity. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir.2003). To survive summary judgment the plaintiffs must provide evidence that the officers knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth made false statements to the judicial officer and show that the false statements were necessary to the judicial officer['s] determination[ ] that probable cause existed. Molina, 325 F.3d at 968 (quotation omitted). The same standard applies to any alleged omissions in the warrant. Id. Immaterial misstatements or omissions do not invalidate the warrant. Id. The plaintiffs' theory of the case rests in large part on the personal animus that they allege existed between Trowbridge and themselvesan animus that, they argue, had resulted in a feud that culminated in their arrest. They argue that Trowbridge lied when he told the judge that kids could be seen hiding behind furniture. He also misled the judge, they claim, by implying that he had seen kids retreat into the house, when in reality he had returned to find all the kids gone. They say that Trowbridge specifically skipped over the timing issues that made the probable cause determination in this case difficult; his statement to the magistrate implies that he had essentially seen the kids go into the house while waiting for his backup. The question is whether any statement or omission that the Suarezes challenge was intentionally or recklessly false, and whether it was material to the issuance of the warrant. Their allegations can be grouped into two basic categories. The first group concerns the timing of the warrant. The second concerns misrepresentations regarding the physical evidence at the scene. Neither category of evidence the Suarezes offer is sufficient to overturn the affidavit's presumption of validity. The first category of disputed evidence includes the Suarezes' allegations that Officer Trowbridge omitted the timing between the events with the kids in the Suarez driveway and the time the officers returned to find the house dark. They further argue that his formulation that [a]ll the kids retreated into the home misleadingly implied that Officer Trowbridge saw the kids go into the home. They also argue that Officer Trowbridge neglected to mention that Gerry Bardeson, to whom Trowbridge had referred to specifically throughout his application for the warrant, had already been arrested by the time the police sought the warrant, and that he was the only known minor drinking at the house. The Suarezes argue that Trowbridge's combination of omissions and misrepresentations elided the gap in time that made it impossible to connect anything taking place outside the Suarez home at 11:00 p.m. with what was taking place in the home at 11:53 p.m. However, the undisputed facts indicate that none of Trowbridge's statements or omissions was materially false. First, it is undisputed that there were several cars still parked around the Suarez home, both in the street and in the driveway; the presence of these cars and the fact that no one was in the street, outside the house or behind the house on the beach, provided ample basis for Trowbridge's claims that the teenagers retreated into the house. This was therefore not a misrepresentation. Second, a gap of fifty-three minutes between observing the rowdy behavior of the youths and a decision to enter into the home does not sever the connection between the illegal behavior that Trowbridge witnessed and a belief that illegal activity was occurring in the home, or that evidence of the illegal activity would be found there, particularly since the parked cars gave rise to an inference that a gathering was still taking place. The omission of the timing therefore was not material to the determination of probable cause. Finally, had Trowbridge specifically mentioned Bardeson's arrest, it would only have bolstered his claim that there was underage drinking taking place at the Suarez residence, since Bardeson was arrested for consuming alcohol and he had just left the residence. Failure to mention this fact was, again, not material to the probable cause determination. The second class of the Suarezes' claims attack the specific evidence that Trowbridge referred to in the warrant application. The Suarezes argue that only one officernot Trowbridgeactually claimed to have seen someone hiding in the house. Trowbridge, they also note, testified during a deposition in the civil case that he did not personally see bottles around the house. They complain that the kids who jumped on Trowbridge's car could not be positively traced to the gathering at the Suarez home. And they argue no plastic cups, beer bottles, or other alcoholic beverages were photographed outside the residence. But the Suarezes are nit-picking. It is true that according to some of their witnesses, there was at least one other party taking place on the beach that night, but Trowbridge's car was leapt on shortly after he had been hassled specifically by kids at the Suarez home. This allowed him to draw an extremely reasonable inference that unruly kids were present at the home he wished to search. Similarly, while it is true that Trowbridge personally did not find beer bottles, he swore in his application for the warrant that other officers found the bottles and reported it to him. He made the same statement regarding the teenagers hiding in the house, a statement that is backed up by another officer on the scene, Park Ranger Chorba. Officer Trowbridge was entitled to rely on the collective knowledge of all the investigating officers in making out his warrant request. United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir.2005). The Suarezes say that Chorba was lying, and that all the kids were upstairs in the house. Given that William admitted in his deposition to looking out of the house and seeing the cops assembling, both sides' versions of the facts are easy to reconcile and we think that this was probably not a misrepresentation. The Suarezes had been tipped off by a neighbor that a phalanx of squad cars was lining up down the street, which explains William's furtive glances at the action taking place outside his house. Furthermore, even if Chorba's statement was incorrect, the plaintiffs must show that Trowbridge's reliance on it was a reckless misrepresentation; they cannot. Finally, even if there were a genuine dispute over what Chorba actually saw, we do not think it a material one; the validity of the warrant did not hinge on the officers' ability to spot kids in the house. Given the presence of the cars outside the home, the teenagers' presence within, as noted, was a reasonable inference for the officers to make. Regarding whether or not cups or bottles were tagged into evidence, the Suarezes cannot seriously argue that the officers' reference to any of the aforementioned evidence was a misrepresentation. Given that other officers supported the assertion that bottles were outside the home and that both parties' witnesses testified at deposition that there were coolers of beer at the party, the Suarezes fall far short of establishing that Trowbridge lied when he testified that the bottles were seen in the backyard. More broadly, despite the quibbles that the Suarezes have with Officer Trowbridge's warrant request, they cannot contest that the facts on the ground were much as he described them to the magistrate. Accordingly, they fall short of establishing the intentional or reckless misrepresentations or omissions that the Franks standard requires. The grant of summary judgment in the defendants' favor was, therefore, appropriate.