Opinion ID: 1729209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: carter's retroactivity

Text: For a new rule of law to warrant retroactive application it must satisfy three elements: The new rule must (1) originate in either the United States Supreme Court or the Florida Supreme Court; (2) be constitutional in nature; and (3) have fundamental significance. State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1995), receded from in part on other grounds, Dixon v. State, 730 So.2d 265 (Fla.1999); see Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 929-30 (Fla.1980). In Carter, this Court heard an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's ruling that Carter was entitled to a competency determination to the extent Carter demonstrated specific factual matters requiring him to competently consult with counsel. 706 So.2d at 874. We agreed with the trial court's holding that a judicial determination of competency is required when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a capital defendant is incompetent to proceed in postconviction proceedings in which factual matters are at issue, the development or resolution of which require the defendant's input. Id. at 875. In so holding, this Court departed from its decision in Jackson v. State , where we rejected Jackson's claim that he was entitled to a judicial determination of his competency to understand and assist counsel in his postconviction proceedings under sections 916.11 and 916.12, Florida Statutes (1983), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210. 452 So.2d at 537. This Court found Jackson's argument under the criminal statutes and rules unavailing, noting the civil nature of a 3.850 motion: This reliance is misplaced, however, because the statutes and the rule both address the issue of a judicial determination of competency related to criminal trial proceedings. These do not apply to a 3.850 motion because the designation of the criminal procedure rule is a misnomer in that the proceeding is civil in nature, rather than criminal, and is likened to a combination of the common law writ of habeas corpus and motion for writ of error coram nobis. Therefore we hold that appellant is not entitled to a judicial determination of his competency to assist counsel either in preparing a 3.850 motion or a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted). [5] In Carter, this Court did not expressly rest its decision on a constitutional ground. The State argues that the absence of such constitutional language precludes characterization of Carter as a decision of constitutional import. Our omission of an express constitutional basis for our decision in Carter, however, is not fatal to Ferguson's claim. While the failure to express a constitutional foundation is undoubtedly relevant in the retroactivity determination, it is not dispositive. See State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1995) (retroactively applying Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993), despite this Court's failure to mention any constitutional basis for its decision in Hale and concluding that Hale implicated a defendant's due process rights and constitutional liberty interests); see also State v. Stevens, 714 So.2d 347, 349 (Fla. 1998) (Harding, J., concurring) (I would resolve this conflict by holding that the `constitutional in nature' prong of the Witt test does not require that the opinion in question be decided on constitutional grounds.). [6] Although we omitted an express constitutional basis from our discussion in Carter, we emphasized that our holding was aimed at ensuring the meaningfulness of postconviction proceedings: There can be no question that a capital defendant's competency is crucial to a proper determination of a collateral claim when the defendant has information necessary to the development or resolution of that claim. Unless a death-row inmate is able to assist counsel by relaying such information, the right to collateral counsel, as well as the postconviction proceedings themselves, would be practically meaningless. 706 So.2d at 875. At the root of this Court's concern in that regard are considerations of due process, considerations which have previously guided this Court's hand in the postconviction arena. Cf. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1999) (holding that due process entitles a prisoner to a hearing on a claim that he or she missed the deadline to file a rule 3.850 motion because his or her attorney had agreed to file the motion but failed to do so in a timely manner); State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892, 896 (Fla.1964) (holding that due process requires the appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings if the trial court determines that the petitioner's claims are meritorious and if the potential complexity of the hearing warrants the appointment of counsel and concluding that [postconviction] remedies are subject to the more flexible standards of due process announced in the Fifth Amendment, Constitution of the United States). [7] With this constitutional pedigree in mind, we conclude that our holding in Carter was constitutional in nature. Nevertheless, to qualify for retroactive application Carter must be a decision of fundamental significance. As emphasized by this Court in Witt, only major constitutional changes of law will be cognizable in capital cases under Rule 3.850. 387 So.2d at 929. These major constitutional changes in the law typically fall into one of two categories: (1) those which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or to impose certain penalties, or (2) those changes which meet the threeprong test for retroactivity set forth in Stovall v. Denno.  McCuiston v. State, 534 So.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla.1988) (citations omitted). The three factors considered under the test announced in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), are: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule. McCuiston, 534 So.2d at 1146 n. 1. As previously noted, the rule announced in Carter was aimed at ensuring meaningful postconviction proceedings. 706 So.2d at 876. Turning to the second prong, the extent of reliance on the old rule, this Court's decision in Jackson has not been relied on extensively. In fact, Medina v. State, 690 So.2d 1241, 1248 (Fla.1997), is the only reported case citing Jackson for the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to a determination of competency in postconviction proceedings. In Medina, the defendant sought a determination of his competence to proceed in the postconviction proceedings. The trial court made alternative rulings. First, the trial court found Jackson controlling. Second, the court held Medina competent after hearing the testimony of several State experts and reports of other experts offered by the State and defense. On appeal, this Court refused to revisit Jackson, reasoning that Medina failed to demonstrate the need for a competency hearing given his failure to raise an issue in his postconviction motion warranting an evidentiary hearing: We find no basis in this case to revisit our decision in Jackson. This was a successive rule 3.850 proceeding, and until there was a determination that there was an issue that warranted an evidentiary hearing, Medina was clearly not entitled to a competency determination for the purpose of counsel proceeding to a Huff hearing. Id. This Court also ruled that the trial court was within its discretion in finding Medina competent to proceed on the record before it. Stovall's final prong focuses on the effect the retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. This final consideration in the retroactivity equation requires a balancing of the justice system's goals of fairness and finality: Deciding whether a change in decisional law is a major constitutional change or merely an evolutionary refinement is reflective of the balancing process between these two important goals [fairness and finality] of the criminal justice system. State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 6-7 (Fla.1990). The balance often weighs in favor of finality: In practice, because of the strong concern for decisional finality, this Court rarely finds a change in decisional law to require retroactive application. Id. at 7. However, the considerations which normally tip the scales in favor of decisional finality need not be given their usual weight where, as here, the relief Carter affords does not upset the finality of a conviction and sentence, but instead touches on the quality of postconviction relief available to a petitioner. Moreover, Carter has limited applicability, further negating any risk that its retroactive application would destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit. Witt, 387 So.2d at 929-30. First, Carter applies solely to capital defendants. 706 So.2d at 875. Second, it only applies to capital defendants who allege grounds sufficient to give the trial court cause to reasonably question their competency to proceed. Id. Further, a competency determination of such defendants is only required to the extent the postconviction motion contains factual matters which require the defendant's input. Id. Accordingly, if such a defendant raises purely legal claims in a postconviction motion, no competency determination would be required: If a postconviction defendant is found incompetent, claims raising purely legal issues that are of record and claims that do not otherwise require the defendant's input must proceed. Id. at 876. Although we have concluded that Carter qualifies for retroactive application, its application to the instant case is complicated by the proceedings held by the trial court in Ferguson's initial postconviction motion and this Court's review of those proceedings on appeal.