Opinion ID: 183975
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stanley

Text: Stanley had substantially more interaction with Bishop and Floyd than the other Deputies. In his deposition, Stanley stated that he was assigned to Mental Health in December 2004. He admitted that he was familiar with both Floyd and Bishop. He stated that he was aware that Floyd had been charged with criminal sexual conduct and that the police had to call a S.W.A.T. team on him on Thanksgiving. Furthermore, he testified that Floyd seemed to get along with the other inmates, interacted with them, and talked to them. In addition, Stanley stated that he talked to Bishop quite often on his rounds. Taking all of Bishop's facts at their best, a reasonable jury could find that Stanley acted with deliberate indifference under either of Bishop's two theories. First, Bishop has raised an issue of fact as to Stanley's knowledge of a risk to his safety because of Bishop's status as a vulnerable inmate and Floyd's status as a predatory inmate. Cf. Greene, 361 F.3d at 294. Bishop defeats Stanley's summary judgment motion because he points to evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude that Stanley was aware that Bishop's vulnerability made his placement in the Mental Health Step-Down Unit with more aggressive inmates such as Floyd a substantial risk to Bishop's safety. Cf. id. at 295. Bishop presents evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that Stanley was aware of Bishop's characteristics, and aware that prisoners with these characteristics are vulnerable to attack. In Taylor, this Court found it probative that the plaintiff contended that the defendant actually knew him. Taylor, 69 F.3d at 82. The Court stated that [d]rawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, as we must on this motion for summary judgment, the jury could find that [defendant] had direct knowledge of plaintiff's characteristics because he personally reviewed [plaintiff's] file. Id. Here, a jury could find that Stanley was aware of Bishop's personal characteristics because he testified that he talked to Bishop quite often on his rounds. Furthermore, Bishop presents evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that Stanley was aware that Bishop belongs to a class of prisoners particularly vulnerable to sexual assault. We have favorably cited a case from the Eighth Circuit in which [t]he court found persuasive that [the defendant] had signed an affidavit that acknowledged that there is a particular type of inmate who is vulnerable to attack. Id. (citing Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 667 (8th Cir.1992)). This Court noted that the defendant in that case had testified that small, youthful prisoners are especially vulnerable to sexual pressure. Id. Here, Stanley testified that there had been many sexual predators in the Mental Health Step-Down Unit, it was not uncommon to have four or five sexual predators there at a time, and other inmates complained about sexual pressure. In Taylor, this Court denied summary judgment to a warden because he arguably knew about the problem of widespread sexual assaults and knew that smaller, youthful prisoners were more vulnerable to attack than others. Id. at 84. Thus, whether the warden knew of a substantial risk of sexual assault was a question of fact for the jury. See id. Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Stanley was aware of a substantial risk of Bishop being sexually assaulted, summary judgment is not appropriate. In addition, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Bishop, a reasonable jury could find that Stanley exhibited deliberate indifference based on Bishop's second theory of liability grounded on the noise generated by the alleged assaults. Stanley testified that guards spend sixty percent of their shifts in D-Block in close proximity to the inmates, and guards assigned to the Mental Health Step-Down Unit can hear everything the inmates say. Stanley acknowledged that if Floyd had been aggressing on other inmates as alleged by Bishop, then he would have been aware of the situation. He had no explanation for why he did not hear the aggression other than speculation that it might not have occurred. Taking all of Bishop's facts at their best, he has made out a triable issue of fact as to whether Stanley exhibited deliberate indifference to his safety needs. Thus, the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Stanley is AFFIRMED.