Opinion ID: 6352033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disability-Based Claims

Text: We further conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Thomas’s disability-based claims. 4 Thomas’s surviving disability claims were limited to discriminatory discharge and failure-toaccommodate claims based on Principal Lacey-Berman’s actions in 2009 — a period when LaceyBerman assigned Thomas to tasks including answering telephones, asked her to teach yoga classes, directed her to obtain a medical clearance after Thomas declined to teach the yoga class for reasons related to a recent hip replacement surgery, and ultimately placed Thomas on an unpaid medical leave until she received clearance to resume teaching physical education in January 2010. To make a prima facie case of either claim, Thomas must establish a genuine dispute of fact as to whether she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and whether she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. See McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2013). Thomas concedes that she was unable to teach physical education classes during the relevant period, so the only issue was whether a different teaching assignment was a “reasonable accommodation.” But the undisputed evidence showed that no health class — the other subject Thomas was qualified to teach — was available. Thomas’s failure-to-accommodate claim, and any other disability discrimination claim premised on her 2009 unpaid leave, was thus properly dismissed. See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prod. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that an ADA plaintiff “must demonstrate the existence, at or around the time when accommodation was sought, of an existing vacant position to which she could have been reassigned”). The summary judgment record also included evidence regarding an injury Thomas experienced in 2011, a negative performance evaluation she received in 2012, and her decision to retire later that year. To the extent that she sought to assert a constructive discharge claim under the ADA based on these events — and to the extent that she should have been permitted to amend the complaint in order to do so — that claim fails because she does not establish that she was disabled after January 2010. See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125. Thomas presented evidence of a torn tendon in her shoulder as of June 2011, but she failed to put forward any evidence about whether that injury affected her “major life activities” or whether she was viewed as having a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining “disability” for the purposes of the ADA). Nor did she ever allege that her earlier hip condition was in any way related to the events of 2012. See id. § 12102(1)(B) (disability includes a person having “a record of such an impairment”). E. Racial Discrimination Claim Finally, Thomas argues that the District Court erred in declining to consider a racial discrimination claim, which was not alleged in her complaint and instead raised in her summary judgment briefing. Thomas points out that she discussed that claim during two conferences before the District Court. This is of no moment; Thomas failed to seek leave to amend her complaint to assert such a claim. See Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 n.3 (2d Cir. 2020) (declining to consider merits of claim premised on events not alleged in the complaint, where the plaintiff did not seek leave to amend the complaint to include them); Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 5 361 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to reach merits of argument raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment). The fact that there are stray references to “Title VII” in Thomas’s complaint does not compel a different result because there are no factual allegations regarding racial discrimination and no related requests for relief; moreover, the complaint — which was drafted by an attorney and filed while Thomas was represented by counsel — was not entitled to the “special solicitude” otherwise given to pro se parties. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010).