Opinion ID: 385843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: one injury or two?

Text: 33 Having concluded that the Board was correct in affirming the ALJ's decision that Bosarge was an employee and that his claim fell within the scope of the Act, we turn to the issue of whether Bosarge's later heart attacks were causally related to his first heart attack. The ALJ found that they were, and the Board affirmed that finding. We also affirm. 34 The ALJ found that the claimant's successive heart attacks were caused by his employment with petitioner. A subsequent injury is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury, as long as the subsequent progression of the condition is not shown to have been worsened by an independent cause. Although appellant relies upon the testimony of its medical witness, Dr. Justice, for the position that the second heart attack bore no relation to the first, the medical reports of claimant's treating physician, Dr. Wansley, directly supported the ALJ's finding of causal relation. Despite petitioner's argument that liability should be placed upon Bosarge's subsequent employers, the Board found no evidence establishing a causal connection between the subsequent employment and claimant's later attacks. Accordingly, we find the Board's position to be supported by substantial evidence. 13 35 The final, alternative position argued by appellant is that, should Mississippi Coast be found liable on all of the above grounds, its liability should be nevertheless limited by the second injury provision in 33 U.S.C. § 908(f). 14 This section was designed to prevent discrimination against handicapped workers by limiting the liability of an employer who hires a handicapped worker with knowledge of his disability in the event that the employee subsequently suffers a work-related aggravation of his disability. Because he retained the claimant in his employ after claimant's first heart attack, the employer argues that he qualifies for the limitation of liability permitted by this section. The argument advanced is that retention of a disabled employee after injury is equivalent to employing a disabled person. The employer cites for support of this doctrine C & P Telephone Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 564 F.2d 503, 512 (D.C.Cir.1977). While we might very well agree with the opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit in that case if the issue were before us, the facts of this case do not make the doctrine applicable, and petitioner's argument is more sleight of hand than substance. 36 In the C & P Telephone Co. case Mrs. Glover had a chronic back ailment, unrelated to her work, which caused her considerable absenteeism from her job. This disability was well known to her employer. While on the job she sustained a further disabling injury to her back, and the District of Columbia Circuit held that § 908(f) should apply because the same rule that spares an employer who hires a disabled worker should relieve an employer who retains a disabled employee. 37 The employer argues here that he retained Bosarge in his employ and that Bosarge later quit and had his second heart attack while engaged in other employment. The argument is that had Bosarge continued to work for Mississippi Coast Marine and there sustained the second heart attack, the second disability rule would apply. That the rule does not apply here is obvious on its face. Bosarge had no disability when he sustained his first heart attack, which is the causative factor requiring compensation under the Act as we have previously stated. For the so-called second injury rule to apply the employee's existing partial disability must obviously be unrelated to his work during the course of his employment with the employer against whom he claims. To accept Mississippi Coast Marine's view, we would be permitting every employer who retained an employee after a job-related injury to escape full liability for that injury if subsequent events establish that the injury was permanently and totally disabling. Obviously this is not the intent of the second injury rule. Bosarge was not already disabled when he sustained the compensable heart attack on April 21, 1973. 38 For the reasons that have been set forth, the order of the Benefits Review Board is AFFIRMED.