Opinion ID: 778666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Drug Type

Text: 9 Cleaves argues on appeal that in assessing his sentence, the district court improperly determined the type of drug involved in the conspiracy, in violation of United States v. Dale. 178 F.3d 429, 430 (6th Cir.1999). Because Cleaves did not object to the jury instruction that produced a general verdict at his trial — indeed, he acquiesced in it — we review his claim for plain error only. 2 See Fed. R Crim. Pro. 52(b); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Plain error review is narrow in scope, involving (1) a finding of error (2) that is plain and (3) that affects the defendant's substantial rights. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Even if all three of these factors are present, we will reverse on the basis of such error only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732; see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). 10 Title 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides that the defendant receive the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the ... conspiracy. In United States v. Dale, we held that when a conspiracy count alleges more than one substantive offense, and the verdict is general rather than specific, the defendant may not be sentenced to more than the maximum sentence for the offense with the shorter statutory maximum. 178 F.3d at 432. 11 At the time of trial, the district judge's decision to forego a special verdict resulted from her recognition that, given the amount of both marijuana and cocaine alleged in the indictment, conviction of conspiracy related to either drug carried the same statutory maximum. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) & (B). This decision was further informed by the fact that at the time of the ruling, the trial judge was charged with the responsibility of determining the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. Accordingly, with the assent of both the prosecutor and the defendant, the district court held that a jury determination of the specific drug involved in the conspiracy was unnecessary. However, had the district court's ruling occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the court would undoubtedly have found that because the statutory maximum for undetermined amounts of marijuana and cocaine differed dramatically, the jury should have been directed to make a specific finding concerning the drug involved in the offense. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (limiting a sentence for an unknown quantity of cocaine to 30 years) with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (limiting a sentence for an unknown quantity of marijuana to ten years). 12 Under Apprendi, failure to instruct the jury to determine both the type of drug, and the drug quantity involved in the conspiracy amounted to plain error. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (Where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal, it is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration). Whether the decision affected substantial rights is less clear, 3 but we need not resolve this issue because we find that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Cotton, ___ U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1786. 13 The evidence that Cleaves was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine was overwhelming. Given the extensive testimony detailing the many trips that Cleaves made back and forth between the source city and the sale city, each time picking up several kilograms of cocaine, and the evidence related to the secret compartment in his automobile designed for cocaine transport, the record clearly demonstrates that Cleaves was a cocaine dealer. Therefore, based upon the testimony presented at trial, we conclude that no rational jury could have found that Cleaves was involved in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana rather than cocaine. See United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 314-15 (4th Cir.2000) (overwhelming evidence concerning the drug type is sufficient to uphold a conviction and sentence where the drug type was improperly determined by the trial judge rather than the jury). 14 Accordingly, the district court's post-verdict determination of the drug involved altogether fails to impugn the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in this case. As the Supreme Court recently explained in United States v. Cotton: 15 ... [T]he fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system depends on meting out those inflicting the greatest harm on society the most severe punishments. The real threat then to the `fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings' would be if respondents, despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that they were involved in a vast drug conspiracy, were to receive a sentence prescribed for those committing less substantial drug offenses because of an error that was never objected to at trial. 16 ___ U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1787. Hence, we find no reversible error in connection with the district court's decision to forego a special verdict as to the drug type.