Opinion ID: 766175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Zachary Roan

Text: 30 Roan makes three additional arguments on appeal. First, he argues that officers violated his Miranda rights by approaching him after he terminated the interrogation, and that the district court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress the confession he made to officers in Chicago. Roan also contends that he was deprived of a fair trial when counsel for codefendant Logan improperly commented on Roan's failure to take the stand at trial. Finally, Roan asserts sentencing errors. 31 Roan initially answered questions during the first interview, but according to the questioning officer, when the interview got to questions about the crime itself . . . he told me that he wasn't ready to talk about that at that time. The same officer approached Roan ten hours later and Roan again talked with him generally at first, but when the subject of the murders was again raised, Roan stated, I don't think right now. Approximately ten minutes later several officers brought Roan to the evidence room where he then confessed. 32 Roan argues that his statements invoked his right to remain silent and that the subsequent questioning in the evidence room violated this right. Roan cites Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), for the proposition that once he asserted his right to silence, questioning could not resume, particularly not in the next ten minutes. In Mosley the Court held that once the suspect asserts his right to remain silent, it must be 'scrupulously honored.' See id. at 103 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)). The Court ultimately found that the suspect in Mosley could be approached again for questioning about a different crime after having asserted his right to remain silent in an earlier interview regarding the crime about which he was taken in for questioning. See id. at 104-06. Roan argues that this is the only situation in which officers do not violate Miranda when they resume questioning after a suspect has ended an interrogation. The Mosley case does not support this conclusion, however, because it fails to discuss under what circumstances questioning may resume about the same crime. It simply states that the answer to the question of when interrogation may resume is neither never nor immediately. See id. at 101-02. Instead, the courts must examine whether the assertion of the right was scrupulously honored. 33 The district court found that Roan's declaration did not unequivocally express an interest in having his questioning end. We review this determination for clear error. See United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 1997). We agree that the right to remain silent was never evoked given the nature of Roan's statements. This case is analogous to United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1989), in which the suspect indicated that he wanted to sleep on it before he talked with police and that he would wait a little while before he was interviewed. Id. at 270. He was moved shortly thereafter and interviewed approximately thirty minutes after he had made the request to wait. He signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and confessed this court held that Thompson's statements were not sufficient to invoke his right to silence. See id. at 271. Roan's statements are similar and require the same conclusion. 34 Roan next argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial after counsel for Logan inappropriately commented during closing argument on Roan's failure to take the stand in his own defense. Specifically, Logan's counsel pointed out to the jury during his closing statement that Logan had been questioned and requestioned about the offense for six years, whereas all the jury had from Roan was a piece of paper with his post-arrest statement implicating Logan. Counsel continued: [J]ust how in the hell do I cross examine this statement? How do I cross examine this piece of paper and find out what's true and what's false? (Tr. at 2402-03.) Later in closing counsel stated, I can't ask [Roan] why he said the things he said. I can't cross examine Mr. Roan. Wouldn't I like to be able to. (Tr. at 2425.) 35 The Fifth Amendment protects Roan's choice to remain silent and not testify in his own defense. See United States v. Harris, 956 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1992). And a comment by a codefendant's counsel regarding a defendant's failure to testify violates the defendant's right to a fair trial, if not the defendant's Fifth Amendment right. See United States v. Anderson, 879 F.2d 369, 379 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Hayes v. United States, 329 F.2d 209, 222 (8th Cir. 1964)). Roan looks to de Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962), in support of his argument that the comments of Logan's counsel warrant reversal. In de Luna, one codefendant, Gomez, testified and the other, de Luna, did not. Gomez claimed that he had been an innocent victim of circumstance when de Luna-a passenger in Gomez's car-saw the police coming, tossed Gomez a package of narcotics, and told him to toss it out the window. De Luna did not testify, but his lawyer theorized he had never tossed the package to Gomez.In response, counsel for Gomez argued to the jury, Well, at least one man was honest enough and had courage enough to take the stand and subject himself to cross examination and tell you the whole story, and You haven't heard a word from this man (de Luna). Id. at 142. The de Luna court held that the improper comments warranted reversal, enumerating several factors that were critical to its decision, including the head-on collision between the two defendants, the repetition of the comments, and the extended colloquy over the comments between the trial judge and the lawyers. Id. at 154. 36 In this case, the government concedes and the district court agreed that the remark was improper. The government argues, however, that Roan was not denied his right to a fair trial since the comments only referred to Roan's refusal to testify in an attempt to undermine the reliability of his confession, which implicated Logan, and did not imply that Roan was guilty. The government further argues that the comment could not have affected the jury's verdict, given the overwhelming evidence of Roan's guilt and lack of an articulable theory of innocence. We agree that the facts of this case differ significantly from de Luna. The improper comments here were not as inflammatory or suggestive of guilt as the comments in de Luna or repeated and emphasized in the same manner. Furthermore, we agree with the reasons advanced by the government supporting the conclusion that the statements did not affect the verdict. See United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987). 37 Finally, Roan challenges his lengthy sentence, which resulted from the application of United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 5G1.2(d) (1998). Section 5G1.2(d) provides: 38 If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. 39 Thus, although the statutory maximum penalty for robbery is twenty years, Roan was sentenced on each count concurrently until he arrived at the life sentence provided for under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(c)(1), which states: If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. 1111 [defining murder in the perpetration of robbery as first degree murder] . . . apply 2A1.1. Section 2A1.1 assigns the offense level for first-degree murder at 43. Roan does not challenge the application of 5G1.2(d) to his sentence; he rather claims that the provision is unconstitutional. Numerous circuits have upheld the constitutionality of this provision against due process challenges. Our court has also upheld sentences applying the provision. See United States v. Rodgers, 122 F.3d 1129, 1131 n.2, 1132 (8th Cir. 1997). We see no error in this application of the guidelines and affirm.