Opinion ID: 1184518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Crim.P. 16 II(c)

Text: The basic attack on subsection (c) is that the discovery afforded the prosecution contravenes the right of the defendant to remain silent and not provide self-incriminatory material to the prosecution. U.S.Const. Amend. V; Colo.Const. Art. II, § 18. However, subsection (c) of Crim.P. 16 II satisfies the requirements of the constitution. By its direct and uncontradicted terms, the rule permits discovery of defense theories and the names of supporting witnesses only when the defendant intends to introduce them at trial. Therefore, the timing rationale developed in Williams v. Florida, supra , and Jones v. Superior Court, supra , sustains the facial constitutionality of the subsection. Our rule is more expansive than the one sanctioned in Williams, for it allows discovery of all defenses which the defendant intends to use at trial. However, in view of the Williams decision, there is no apparent reason why a general requirement of disclosing the nature of any defense ought not be . . . valid, if disclosure of one defense (alibi) is constitutional. ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial 5 (Supp.). See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 165 (1970). In challenging the constitutionality of subsection (c), the defendants have raised an argument which extends beyond those addressed to subsection (b). The defendants contend that the rule is unconstitutional because it lacks the necessary reciprocity features. We disagree. In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973), the Supreme Court held that criminal discovery by the prosecution would be constitutional only when it was reciprocal, and the respective positions of the accuser and the accused thereby balanced, unless the state could show a strong interest in preventing reciprocity. Thus, it struck down the Oregon statute under scrutiny which compelled the defendant to provide the district attorney with notice of an intention to rely on the alibi defense at trial, but which did not command the prosecution to provide, in turn, the names and addresses of rebuttal witnesses. The defendants claim that subsection (c) of the Colorado rule does not incorporate the reciprocity aspect and, thus, is unconstitutional. They maintain that the rule expressly exempts the prosecutor's work product from discovery, but does not provide the work product of defense counsel with similar protection. The fear expressed by the defendants is unfounded. First, the presence of such a protective provision does not authorize the court to permit discovery of the work product. The scope of subsection (c) is limited by its terms to the nature of the defenses which the defendant intends to use at trial and the names and addresses of any supporting witnesses who will be called. It does not purport to extend to the work product. Second, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would protect the defendant from having to disclose information of the kind protected by the prosecutorial work product exemption. See Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the ProsecutionThe Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L.Rev. 437 (1972). Since Crim.P. 16 II(c) is facially constitutional, we make the rule absolute in both cases. In Bellmann v. District Court, the trial court improperly granted the prosecutor's motion without conducting a hearing to gauge the impact on the defendant's Fifth Amendment right of the discovery which was requested. In People v. District Court, the court summarily ruled that Crim.P. 16 II(c) was unconstitutional. Under the circumstances, a hearing must be held in the trial court on the discovery issues raised in both cases.