Opinion ID: 1381947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Ineffective assistance for failing to adequately investigate Edwards' childhood

Text: Edwards' sixth point is that the motion court erred in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate adequately and to present evidence of his traumatic childhood at trial. Specifically, Edwards complains that: (1) although his mother, Mildred, was called to testify in the penalty phase, counsel was not aware of the extent of the domestic violence within the home, Mildred's depression, or the extent of odd behaviors displayed by Edwards as a child; (2) Edwards' cousin, Tangalayer Mansaw, was not interviewed or called to testify; and (3) trial counsel failed to call an expert who would have diagnosed Edwards with Asperger's Disorder. The motion court found that trial counsel's penalty phase strategy was to portray Edwards as an integral, fully functioning and connected member of a good family of decent people. The motion court found that presenting the evidence Edwards now advocates would have been contrary to this strategy because it would have portrayed Edwards and his family as unsympathetic. The motion court found that Mansaw would have added nothing significant to the penalty phase and that portraying Mildred as a severely depressed, abused woman who could not properly care for her children would have contradicted the penalty phase strategy. The motion court found that counsel did investigate [Edwards'] social history and found nothing to suggest the presence of a mental disease or defect, specifically Asparger's [sic] Disorder, and also that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call an expert who would testify that Edwards had this disorder, because such evidence would have been contrary to the trial strategy of portraying Edwards as a connected member of a loving family. The motion court found Dr. Draper's opinion to be unreliable because it was reached after meeting with other experts and post-conviction counsel. [A]s such, the independence of her expert opinion has been so seriously compromised that it carries no weight. As for Dr. Cross' contentions that he did not receive adequate records to make a pretrial diagnosis, the motion court noted that Dr. Cross never requested additional records, despite being instructed by trial counsel to contact them if he required anything else. The motion court concluded that Dr. Cross did not see the necessity for reviewing additional records, because he did not need them in order to diagnose whether or not [Edwards] had Asparger's [sic] Disorder. He did not diagnose Asparger's Disorder until he attended the group discussion ... By Dr. Cross' own admission, he did not originally diagnose Asparger's ... Yet now Dr. Cross blames trial counsel for his failure to diagnose Asparger's Disorder prior to trial even though he administered and graded a series of standardized psychological tests[.] The motion court concluded that, based on the fact that his opinion and conclusions were reached only after meeting with [Edwards'] post-conviction relief counsel, ... that the independence of [Dr. Cross'] expert opinion has been so compromised that it carries no weight. To show that his counsel was ineffective, Edwards must demonstrate, first, that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, Edwards must show that this deficiency prejudiced him, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Counsel's performance is presumed to be reasonable. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In a death penalty case, counsel are expected to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). The record supports the motion court's conclusion that a proper investigation was made into Edwards' childhood. Although a composite social history was not prepared, meaning that all of the information was not consolidated in one report, trial counsel conducted the interviews that make up the social history and prepared a chronological chart of Edwards' life. None of the three pretrial experts requested a more detailed social history. Counsel interviewed everyone that they were told about by Edwards or his family. Although trial counsel were aware of some domestic violence and other problems, they were not aware of the extent. None of the witnesses interviewed went into detail about the extent of Mildred's depression. Not only was this information not disclosed to trial counsel, it was not disclosed to the experts who were trained to elicit such information from witnesses. Dr. Cross testified that he did not believe that Mildred was capable of revealing this information during the pretrial period. Trial counsel is not ineffective for not discovering the extent of this evidence, when all reasonable interviews were conducted. This information was not reasonably available to trial counsel. Counsel made a reasonable investigation into Edwards' background, and nothing in that investigation indicated anything significantly abnormal about Edwards' childhood. To the extent that information indicating a traumatic childhood was discovered, counsel made a strategic decision not to present it. [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[.] Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Trial counsel testified that their strategy was to present Edwards as a contributing member of a loving family. The attorney responsible for the penalty phase was aware that Edwards did not cry as a child, did not play with other children, showed some obsessive behaviors, and was beaten by his father. She was also aware that Mildred had been depressed and had been abused to some extent by Emmrie. She testified that she chose not to present this information. This strategic decision was reasonable under the circumstances. See State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 123, 133 (Mo. banc 1998) (trial counsel was not ineffective for choosing to portray Johnson as the product of a good Christian family rather than the victim of a cold, unloving family); Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Mo. banc 2005) (strategic decision to pursue residual doubt rather than abusive childhood was reasonable because the two defenses would be inconsistent). The cases cited by Edwards are distinguishable. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), counsel did not begin its penalty phase investigation until one week before trial. Counsel knew about, but failed to introduce, evidence of borderline intelligence. Id. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Counsel knew about, but did not obtain, available records that showed that Williams' parents were imprisoned for criminally neglecting him, that he had been repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had spent extensive time in foster care, and that his childhood home conditions were extremely unsanitary. Id. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Similarly, in Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292, 304-06 (Mo. banc 2004), counsel did not spend any time preparing for the penalty phase, did not attempt to obtain known records, did not interview Hutchinson's psychiatrist despite knowledge of chronic psychiatric problems, and retained one expert who did not interview any other witnesses or review records and who spent only three hours with Hutchinson. In contrast, here, one attorney and one staff member were focused on preparing for the penalty phase throughout the pretrial period, three experts were consulted, and the records that Edwards complains about (Edwards' birth records and Mildred's psychiatric records) were reviewed by counsel and did not contain clearly mitigating evidence. The United States Supreme Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), held that the trial court could not refuse to consider Eddings' traumatic childhood as a mitigating circumstance. In contrast, the trial court here did not refuse to consider any mitigating evidence that was presented. In Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, trial counsel failed to conduct a background investigation because they wanted to pursue a residual doubt defense. In contrast, trial counsel here conducted an appropriate investigation and made a reasonable strategic decision based on the information they received from Edwards and his family. Edwards relies most heavily on Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), where the defendant and his family members testified that there was no mitigating evidence to be found. The defendant refused to cooperate with trial counsel in pursuing a penalty-phase defense. A close reading of Rompilla reveals that the main basis for finding trial counsel ineffective was their failure to examine prior criminal history files despite knowing that the State intended to use criminal history as an aggravating factor. Id. at 2464. These files contained references to other information that would have alerted trial counsel to the abuse that the defendant had suffered and to prior assessments of mental retardation. Id. at 2469. Trial counsel here did not fail to investigate any records that they knew about. The fact that witnesses did not disclose facts about Edwards' childhood is not the fault of trial counsel. Counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Mansaw because no one mentioned that Mansaw was a possible witness who had lived with the family. Ineffective assistance for failure to call a witness requires the defendant to show: (1) trial counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the witness; (2) the witness could be located through reasonable investigation; (3) the witness would testify; and (4) the witness's testimony would have produced a viable defense. Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292, 304 (Mo. banc 2004). Trial counsel did not know about Mansaw, and counsel took all reasonable steps to discover the names of potential witnesses. There also was no clear error in the motion court's failure to find counsel ineffective for not calling another expert. The selection of witnesses and evidence are matters of trial strategy, virtually unchallengeable in an ineffective assistance claim. Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Mo. banc 2005). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to shop for an expert that would testify in a particular way. State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 114 (Mo. banc 1992). None of the three experts found any significant mental disease that would provide a defense to the crime, and none of them identified any specific developmental disorder that would provide significant mitigation. Trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to consult additional experts.