Opinion ID: 1907107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Order Frye Hearing and Atkins Claim

Text: Zack next makes two claims. He first argues that the trial court should have sua sponte ordered a Frye hearing on the issue of DNA evidence. On this claim, we find that the trial court properly summarily denied relief. Zack also argues that he is effectively mentally retarded and cannot be executed under Atkins. We also find relief was properly denied on this issue.
Zack argues that although defense counsel failed to request a Frye hearing on the issue of whether PCR DNA was generally accepted in the scientific community, the trial court should have conducted a hearing sua sponte. Because counsel did not request a Frye hearing, this is simply a rewording of Issue 1 above. Zack argues that pursuant to Arnold v. State, 807 So.2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the failure to order a Frye hearing on new or novel scientific evidence is fundamental error. Actually, Arnold states that the trial court needs to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard at a Frye hearing, and that the opposing party should be permitted to offer evidence in rebuttal. Arnold does not address a trial court's duty to sua sponte order a Frye hearing. We have considered and rejected Zack's claim that a Frye hearing was necessary. We will not reverse this conviction based on the trial court's failure to order its own Frye hearing when we have determined that the admission of the disputed evidence was not prejudicial.
The evidence in this case shows Zack's lowest IQ score to be 79. Pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, and it is up to the states to determine who is mentally retarded. Under Florida law, one of the criteria to determine if a person is mentally retarded is that he or she has an IQ of 70 or below. See § 916.106(12), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining retardation as a significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age eighteen, and explaining that [s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning means performance which is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the department); Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Fla.2000) (accepting expert testimony that in order to be found retarded, an individual must score 70 or below on standardized intelligence test). Zack does not dispute the facts in the record. Zack argued at the Huff [4] hearing that although this Court did a proportionality analysis on direct appeal, it is unclear whether it considered all the factors that render Zack effectively mentally retarded. As stated in our opinion on direct appeal, this Court reviewed the evidence of Zack's brain damage and his mental age in considering mitigation. Postconviction counsel admitted there was no new evidence to support the argument that Zack is mentally retarded. Additionally, at the postconviction hearing, the State pointed out that Zack's mental health was explored at trial and nothing in the evidence offered at trial establishes that he is mentally retarded under the Florida statute. The prosecutor stated that if there was any new or different evidence than that presented at trial, it should be explored in the evidentiary hearing. Zack's postconviction counsel offered no new or different evidence. In order to prevail on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Zack must establish that counsel was deficient in some regard. Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 516 (Fla.1999). Zack has not done that. In this claim, Zack alleges that he is mentally retarded, which is a bar to the imposition of the death penalty. Such a claim falls under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and should be addressed pursuant to the procedures set forth in that rule. Therefore, the trial court properly summarily denied relief on this claim, and we affirm the trial court's denial.