Opinion ID: 2610902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: competency phase contentions

Text: (1a) Defendant first contends that section 1369, by placing the burden on him to prove his incompetence to stand trial, is unconstitutional as a denial of due process and equal protection under the state and federal Constitutions. (In fact, none of defendant's authorities involves or discusses equal protection concerns, and he makes no separate argument on the point. Accordingly, we conclude that his argument is essentially a due process challenge to the statutory burden allocation.) Section 1369, subdivision (f), provides in pertinent part that It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent. The verdict of the jury shall be unanimous. The jury was instructed in accordance with this provision. (CALJIC No. 4.10.) Before addressing defendant's challenge, we set forth the relevant legal principles. Section 1368, subdivision (a), provides that if a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, the court shall inquire of defense counsel regarding the defendant's competence and, if counsel believes defendant may be incompetent, the court shall order a hearing on the matter. The section further provides that even if defense counsel believes his client is competent, the court may, in its discretion, order a competency hearing. (ง 1368, subd. (b).) Once the hearing is ordered, all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until the question of the present mental competence of the defendant has been determined. ( Id., subd. (c).) (2) It has long been established that the conviction of an accused while he is legally incompetent violates due process. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385 [15 L.Ed.2d 815, 822, 86 S.Ct. 836].) Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the failure of a trial court to employ procedures to protect against trial of an incompetent defendant deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial and requires reversal of his conviction. ( Ibid. ; see Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 171 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 112-113, 95 S.Ct. 896].) Our decisions hold that a competency hearing is required whenever substantial evidence of the accused's incompetence has been introduced. ( People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 538-539 [244 Cal. Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769]; People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 91-92 [184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 648 P.2d 578]; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 283 [61 Cal. Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228].) (1b) Defendant argues that because fitness to stand trial is fundamental to an adversary system of justice ( Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. 162, 171-172 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 112-113]), due process dictates that once the defendant has raised a bona fide doubt as to his competence, the state must carry the burden of proving him competent. Accordingly, defendant argues, section 1369 and its contrary allocation of the proof burden should be declared unconstitutional. The validity of section 1369, its presumption of competence and burden of proof allocation, apparently has never been discussed in a published opinion. (Cf. People v. Bye (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 569, 573-578 [172 Cal. Rptr. 186] [constitutional to permit prosecution to establish defendant's incompetence by mere preponderance of evidence]; People v. Eckstrom (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 259, 261-262 [139 Cal. Rptr. 341] [constitutional to require defendant to prove his insanity ].) The cases from other state and federal jurisdictions are in conflict on the constitutional propriety of placing on the defendant the burden of proving his own incompetence. Some cases suggest that due process principles forbid requiring a defendant whose competence is in doubt to carry the proof burden. (See United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen (7th Cir.1982) 686 F.2d 1238 ( Bilyew ); United States v. DiGilio (3d Cir.1976) 538 F.2d 972, 986-989, cert. den. 429 U.S. 1038 [50 L.Ed.2d 749, 97 S.Ct. 733] ( DiGilio ); State v. Jones (S.D. 1987) 406 N.W.2d 366, 368-369 [decision based on state constitutional law]; People v. McCullum (1977) 66 Ill.2d 306 [362 N.E.2d 307, 310-311] [same].) Other cases find no due process or other constitutional objection to placing the proof burden on a defendant who has asserted his own incompetence. (See Lowenfield v. Phelps (5th Cir.1987) 817 F.2d 285, 294, sub. opn. (1988) 484 U.S. 231 [98 L.Ed.2d 568, 108 S.Ct. 546]; State v. Pruitt (1984) 18 Ohio App.3d 50 [480 N.E.2d 499, 509] [conc. opn.]; cf. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (1984) ง 208(c), p. 505 [burden of production is usually on the party seeking to establish the incompetency; this is usually the defendant]; State v. Pedersen (Iowa 1981) 309 N.W.2d 490, 496 [same].) The first line of cases stresses the unfairness of requiring a defendant who might be incompetent to shoulder the burden of proving it. In DiGilio, for example, the court observed that the United States Supreme Court had found it contradictory to suggest that a defendant may be incompetent yet capable of knowingly waiving his right to raise the issue. (538 F.2d at p. 988, citing Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 384 [15 L.Ed.2d at p. 821].) According to DiGilio, it is similarly contradictory to argue that a possibly incompetent defendant is nonetheless presumed to possess sufficient intelligence to adduce evidence of his incompetency. (538 F.2d at p. 988.) DiGilio involved federal procedure, and thus had no occasion to discuss the constitutionality of state statutes allocating the proof burden to the defendant. But in Bilyew, supra, 686 F.2d 1238, the court found unconstitutional an Illinois statute that placed the burden of proving incompetence on the defendant. The court stated, There is little question that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State or federal prosecution to shoulder the burden of proving that the defendant is fit to stand trial once the issue of unfitness has been properly raised. [Fn. omitted.] Every court that has considered the issue has so held. [Citations.] ( Id., at pp. 1244-1245.) The Bilyew court agreed with the reasoning of Illinois state court decisions (e.g., People v. McCullum, supra, 362 N.E.2d 307, 310-311) that if we assume a defendant is incompetent and unable to cooperate with counsel, it would be a strange rule to impose on him the burden of proving his incompetence, for the very disability he seeks to prove may render him incapable of proving it. ( Bilyew, supra, 686 F.2d at p. 1245.) On the other hand, despite Bilyew 's assertion, there is substantial authority supporting a contrary view. The United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld state statutes imposing on the defendant the burden of establishing his own insanity, despite the possibility that his mental condition may well prevent an effective showing. ( Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790, 798-799 [96 L.Ed. 1302, 1308-1309, 72 S.Ct. 1002] ( Leland ); see Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228, 236 [94 L.Ed.2d 267, 275-276, 107 S.Ct. 1098] [upholding, against due process attack, Ohio statute placing proof burden on defendant claiming self-defense]; see also Rivera v. Delaware (1976) 429 U.S. 877 [50 L.Ed.2d 160, 97 S.Ct. 226] [dis. opn. on dismissal of appeal].) In Leland, the high court upheld an Oregon statute requiring the defendant in a criminal case to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The court observed that the state must prove only those facts encompassing elements of the crime charged, and that sanity is not such an element. (343 U.S. at pp. 798-799 [96 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1308-1309].) The court rejected a due process challenge, stating that we are therefore reluctant to interfere with Oregon's determination of its policy with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of sanity since we cannot say that policy violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice. ( Id., at p. 799 [96 L.Ed. at p. 1309].) Leland remains good law. As the high court recently indicated in upholding an Ohio statute requiring the defendant to carry the burden of proving self-defense, Leland has withstood repeated challenge (see, e.g., Rivera v. Delaware, supra, 429 U.S. 877) and is authority for our decision today. ( Martin v. Ohio, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 236 [94 L.Ed.2d at p. 276]; see also Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 201-205 [53 L.Ed.2d 281, 286-289, 97 S.Ct. 2319] [following Leland ].) If we applied Leland to the present case, section 1369 seemingly would survive a federal due process attack, for defendant's competence to stand trial bears only on his mental state and is no more an element of the crime charged than is his sanity. (See State v. Jones, supra, 406 N.W.2d 366, 368-369 [acknowledging Leland controls federal due process question as applied to competency proof allocation, but adopting different rule under South Dakota Constitution]; cf. People v. Fields (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538, 540 [42 Cal. Rptr. 833, 399 P.2d 369, 16 A.L.R.3d 708] [competency proceeding not criminal in nature]; People v. Bye, supra, 116 Cal. App.3d 569, 574 [same].) Thus, a recent federal case, Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra , parted company with the DiGilio and Bilyew cases previously discussed, and upheld a Louisiana statute that, like section 1369, placed on the defendant the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his incompetence to stand trial. First, the court observed that no other federal circuit had adopted a contrary approach, and noted that Bilyew uncritically adopted Illinois state court cases on the issue. Second, Lowenfield reasoned that, although Congress unquestionably had placed on federal prosecutors the burden of proving the defendant's competence (e.g., 18 U.S.C. ง 4241), that fact did not support Bilyew 's assumption that the federal Constitution requires the states to conform to federal law. Lowenfield noted that, as indicated in Leland v. Oregon, supra, 343 U.S. 790, 798-799 [96 L.Ed. 1302, 1308-1309], the states ordinarily have great latitude to decide the proper placement of proof burdens. Accordingly, the Lowenfield court concluded, We see no reason why Louisiana should be prohibited from placing the burden of proving incompetency on the defendant merely because Congress chose to place that burden on the government in federal prosecutions. (817 F.2d at p. 294.) We conclude that the Fifth Circuit's holding in Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra, 817 F.2d 285, correctly expresses the applicable due process principles under the federal Constitution. As for defendant's suggestion that we adopt a different rule under the California Constitution, we believe that sound practical and policy considerations support Lowenfield. In determining the propriety of a particular proof allocation, a critical factor is the extent to which either party has access to the relevant information. As stated in Morrison v. California (1934) 291 U.S. 82, 89 [78 L.Ed. 664, 669-679, 54 S.Ct. 281], due process generally allows shifting to the defendant the burden of proving his affirmative defenses if, upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge, the burden shift does not subject the defendant to hardship or oppression. (See also Harris v. Irish Truck Lines, Inc. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 373, 378 [113 Cal. Rptr. 489, 521 P.2d 481]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) งง 137-138, pp. 119-121 [citing cases stressing importance of one party's knowledge or access thereto in allocating proof burden].) Applying this principle to the present case, one might reasonably expect that the defendant and his counsel would have better access than the People to the facts relevant to the court's competency inquiry. Indeed, this analysis affords a satisfactory answer to Bilyew's ( supra, 686 F.2d 1238) concern about the defendant's possible inability to cooperate with his counsel in establishing his incompetence: Counsel can readily attest to any such defect or disability. The People, on the other hand, have little or no access to information regarding the defendant's relationship with his counsel, or the defendant's actual comprehension of the nature of the criminal proceedings. In addition to asserting the invalidity of the proof allocation in section 1369, defendant also challenges the presumption of competence set forth therein. According to defendant, it is irrational to preserve that presumption after a doubt arises regarding defendant's competence. We believe the issue is controlled by the cases and analysis previously set forth regarding the allocation of the proof burden. The primary significance of the presumption of competence is to place on the defendant (or the People, if they contest his competence) the burden of rebutting it. By its terms, the presumption of competence is one which affects the burden of proof and, accordingly, it remains in effect despite the introduction of some evidence of incompetence. (See Evid. Code, งง 500, 550, 603-605.) We decline to hold as a matter of due process that such a presumption must be treated as a mere presumption affecting the burden of production, which disappears merely because a preliminary, often undefined and indefinite, doubt has arisen that justifies further inquiry into the matter. We conclude that section 1369 passes constitutional muster under both the federal and state Constitutions. Accordingly, we need not address the People's alternative contention that any error in the proof allocation was harmless in light of the clear evidence of defendant's competence. (Compare Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra, 817 F.2d at p. 295, with Bilyew, supra, 686 F.2d at p. 1245.)
(3) Next, defendant contends the court erred in permitting the prosecutor, over objection, to elicit an opinion from a nonexpert witness regarding defendant's mental state and degree of awareness while in jail. The point lacks merit. As previously indicated, at the competency hearing both parties elicited expert and nonexpert testimony regarding defendant's state of mind. Thus, in addition to psychiatric experts, the People called J.D. Green, a deputy sheriff, who testified that he conversed with defendant in 1986 at the Orange County jail following his arrest. The conversation concerned defendant's housing situation, and his need for protective custody. According to Deputy Green, he was able to communicate with defendant, who understood the conversation and was very responsive and very descriptive in discussing his housing problem. In addition to Deputy Green and several psychiatric experts, the People called Richard Negrette, defendant's former parole officer, who testified (over defendant's objection) that defendant acted rationally during their conversations in 1984. Defendant likewise called some lay persons to testify regarding his incompetence, including his sister and a defense investigator, each of whom related defendant's difficulty in conducting a rational conversation. Defendant argues that because the sole issue at the competency hearing concerned his ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings and to assist his counsel (see ง 1367), Deputy Green's nonexpert opinion regarding defendant's state of mind was irrelevant and inadmissible. Defendant observes that Green's many years of law enforcement experience did not qualify him as an expert in judging a suspect's state of mind. (See People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 39 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]; People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal. App.3d 34, 39-40 [187 Cal. Rptr. 497] [inadmissible police testimony regarding defendant's character and veracity]; Evid. Code, ง 720, subd. (a).) Defendant also asserts that Green was unqualified to express an opinion as a lay witness. (See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741] [inadmissible lay opinion regarding defendant's veracity].) The People concede that Deputy Green was not an expert qualified to state an opinion regarding defendant's state of mind, but they argue he was adequately qualified to state a lay opinion as to whether defendant understood what Green was saying. (See Evid. Code, ง 800; People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 908 [254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940] [discretionary to admit lay opinion testimony].) The People observe that, unlike Melton and Sergill, both supra, Deputy Green was not asked his opinion regarding defendant's veracity, but simply whether defendant appeared to understand their conversation. In light of the discretion vested in the trial court to permit lay opinion testimony, the nature of the other evidence admitted at the competency hearing, and the rather limited responses elicited from Deputy Green, we see no error. Similar testimony from police or jail personnel regarding the defendant's apparent mental state has been admitted in at least one other capital case (see People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 752 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250] [testimony of interrogating officer that defendant did not seem disoriented]; cf. Evid. Code, ง 870, subd. (c) [opinion of person's sanity]), and the challenged testimony appears reasonably relevant to the question whether a defendant is presently able to communicate with his counsel at trial. As the trial court acknowledged in this case, objections to such lay testimony relate more to weight than to admissibility.
(4) Next, defendant asserts the prosecutor, during the competency hearing, committed misconduct in presenting evidence and argument regarding defendant's prior criminal acts and convictions. Defendant observes that evidence was admitted regarding (1) his 1968 conviction for firing a shotgun in a bar, (2) his 1977 rape, kidnapping and lewd conduct convictions, (3) his status as a registered sex offender and parolee, and (4) his various violent acts committed while in custody. Most of these matters were first elicited without objection, on cross-examination of defense experts, for the proper purpose of determining the facts on which they based their opinions regarding defendant's incompetence. (See People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 31-32 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249]; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836].) Defendant maintains, however, that the prosecutor should not have made further reference to these matters (which remained largely unproved or without proper foundation) in his closing arguments. Defendant observes he made proper objection to these arguments. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) He contends the prosecutor's remarks placed undue emphasis on [his] violent background, thereby shifting the focus of the hearing from competency to propensity to commit `bad' acts.... We have reviewed the record and find no misconduct. The prosecutor simply outlined the competency hearing testimony and the facts on which that testimony was based, including occasional references to defendant's prior acts and convictions. Throughout his argument, the prosecutor explained to the jurors that his comments were not evidence, that the sole issue then before them was defendant's competence and not his guilt of any crimes, and that any evidence of such crimes was introduced for the sole purpose of determining the competency issue and not to show that defendant was a bad guy. The trial court similarly instructed the jury that the prosecutor's comments were not evidence, and that any evidence introduced for a limited purpose, including the exhibits containing references to defendant's prior criminal record, should be considered only for that purpose. We conclude the jury's competency finding should be upheld.