Opinion ID: 2647909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Equal-Protection Claim Against the County

Text: Ms. Eisenhour asserts that the County violated her right to equal protection, and the district court granted summary judgment to the County on the ground that Judge Storey was not an official policymaker. We agree with the district court’s decision. “[A] municipality can be liable under Section 1983 for the acts of a municipal official only when the official possesses ‘final policymaking authority’ to establish municipal policy with respect to the acts in question.” Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). We apply this test to the two types of alleged acts: (1) Judge Storey’s inappropriate touching, and (2) his establishment of a rule that Ms. Eisenhour had to obtain prior approval before missing work. Accordingly, we must decide whether Judge Storey had final policymaking authority for these acts. In determining whether Judge Storey had final policymaking authority, we consider two factors: (1) “whether his ‘discretionary decisions [were] constrained by general policies enacted by others,’” and (2) “whether those ‘decisions [were] reviewable by others.’” Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 22 1219, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1211 (10th Cir. 1998)). These factors involve questions of law. Id. at 1224. Judge Storey lacked policymaking authority to touch Ms. Eisenhour inappropriately under the County’s sexual harassment policy. That policy unambiguously prohibited inappropriate touching. Appellant’s App. vol. 1, at 164. Thus, Judge Storey’s decision to touch Ms. Eisenhour was “constrained by [a policy] enacted by others.” See Milligan-Hitt, 523 F.3d at 1228. Under that policy, Judge Storey’s conduct was subject to review—and was in fact reviewed—by both the County and the Judicial Conduct Commission. Ms. Eisenhour argues that the County implicitly gave Judge Storey the authority to touch her inappropriately by failing to ask Judge Storey whether he had done so. This argument confuses what the County did before and after the alleged touching. Even if the County failed to properly respond after-the-fact, this failure would not suggest that the County had authorized Judge Storey to grope Ms. Eisenhour before-the-fact. Although Judge Storey arguably had policymaking authority with regard to scheduling of his staff, Ms. Eisenhour fails to explain how Judge Storey’s work-leave policy amounted to sexual harassment or otherwise violated her equal-protection rights. On its face, Judge Storey’s policy would not have constituted a denial of equal protection. To Ms. Eisenhour, Judge Storey implemented the policy as a way to hound her. But the policy itself did not constitute sexual harassment. As a result, the County cannot 23 incur liability based on the judge’s adoption of a policy requiring Ms. Eisenhour to account for her time when she was missing work. Judge Storey lacked policymaking authority to inappropriately touch Ms. Eisenhour, and his monitoring of her whereabouts (when missing work) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, the County was entitled to summary judgment on the equal-protection claim. G. Equal-Protection Claim Against Judge Storey Ms. Eisenhour also asserts an equal-protection claim against Judge Storey. The district court concluded that Judge Storey is entitled to qualified immunity and that he did not act with the required intent. Judge Storey defends these conclusions, adding that Ms. Eisenhour did not show she had been treated differently from a similarly situated individual. We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Judge Storey, concluding that he is not entitled to qualified immunity, that there is a fact-issue about whether Judge Storey inappropriately touched Ms. Eisenhour, and that Ms. Eisenhour had no requirement to show she was treated differently from a similarly situated individual. To overcome a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant’s conduct violated the law, and (2) the law was clearly established when the violation occurred. Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995). If Ms. Eisenhour makes this showing, the burden shifts to Judge Storey to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 24 law. Id. at 1535. We hold that Ms. Eisenhour made the threshold showing and that issues of fact precluded summary judgment. In Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989), we recognized that sexual harassment could constitute an equal-protection violation. The facts in Starrett resemble those in Ms. Eisenhour’s sworn account. The Starrett plaintiff claimed that her supervisor had made sexual advances, asking to meet at secluded locations after hours, pinching her buttocks, placing his arm on her leg, and making obscene gestures. Id. at 814-15. We held that under those facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that the supervisor’s conduct discriminated against the plaintiff because of her sex, thereby depriving her of equal protection. Id. at 815. Starrett governs because Ms. Eisenhour presents evidence that would also allow a reasonable jury to infer that she had been discriminated against because of her sex. She states under oath that Judge Storey wrote an inappropriate poem about her and gave it to her to file, told her that he had a dream about her in which she was naked, and rubbed his groin against her. Under Starrett, this evidence would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Judge Storey violated her right to equal protection. And if Judge Storey committed an equal-protection violation, it would have been “clearly established” by our decision in Starrett. See Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that “with this court’s opinion in Starrett v. Wadley . . . 25 it became clearly established that sexual harassment can constitute a violation of equal protection and give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Thus, Ms. Eisenhour has made her two-part showing, and the burden shifts to Judge Storey to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Judge Storey cannot meet this burden. The district court reached a contrary conclusion based on inapplicable Supreme Court decisions and inappropriate reliance on the County’s evidence that Ms. Eisenhour had not complained about Judge Storey. In reaching its decision, the district court relied on two Supreme Court cases: City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The district court’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. City of Canton is off-point; it identifies the mental state necessary to hold a government employer liable based on a failure to train theory. 489 U.S. at 388. Daniels explains that § 1983 liability requires a deliberate act. 474 U.S. at 331. But the district court fails to explain why the acts Ms. Eisenhour testified about—writing a romantic poem and giving it to her to file, discussing a dream in which she was naked, and standing so closely to her that his groin would rub against her—cannot be characterized as deliberate. The district court also noted evidence that Ms. Eisenhour had not complained about Judge Storey’s behavior. But this evidence would not have precluded liability and was disputed by Ms. Eisenhour. Our cases do not suggest that a plaintiff’s failure to 26 report harassment precludes liability for an equal-protection violation. See Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480-81 (10th Cir. 1994); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814-15 (10th Cir. 1989). In any event, Ms. Eisenhour presented evidence that she had complained about Judge Storey’s behavior when she reported his sexual harassment to the County Attorney in July 2008. Finally, Judge Storey contends that Ms. Eisenhour’s claim fails because she did not show that she had been treated differently from a similarly situated individual. We reject this argument. In cases involving an equal-protection violation based on sexual harassment, we have not required the plaintiff to show she was treated differently from a similarly situated individual. See Lankford, 27 F.3d at 480-81; Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 272-73 (10th Cir. 1994); Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1400-01; Starrett, 876 F.2d at 814-15. It is enough that the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence that the defendant discriminated against her because of her sex, thereby depriving her of the right to equal protection of the laws. See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 814-15.