Opinion ID: 2613827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: rulings of the trial court and court of appeals

Text: The trial court rejected the defendant's affirmative defenses, decreed that plaintiff was entitled to specific performance, and that    plaintiff shall forthwith do all things necessary to secure the approval of the subdivision including the construction of the access road    with the cost thereof to be chargeable to the defendant  . [2] (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decree of specific performance, and also required the defendant to pay for the cost of road construction: The earnest money agreement did not contain a specific provision regarding construction or costs of an access road. However, the contract provided: `This transaction subject to purchaser obtaining septic tank approval, and building permit.' Plaintiff had a right to insist on the terms of the contract ( Wittick v. Miles, 274 Or. 1, 545 P.2d 121 (1976)), which included building permit approval. The evidence shows that an access road was necessary to obtain a permit. To impose the cost of the road on defendant under the prayer for general relief was appropriate under the evidence presented. See Stan Wiley v. Berg, 282 Or. 9, 21, 578 P.2d 384 (1978). The variance in the property description was a consequence of the subdivision and road approval and was necessary to protect the plaintiff's rights. 47 Or. App. at 243, 614 P.2d 129. The only claim asserted by the defendant in her petition for review is that the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in imposing the cost of building the road upon the defendant. She does not seek reversal of the decree ordering specific performance. Thus, the only question before us is whether the defendant should bear the cost of building the access road. The relevant facts, insofar as the resolution of this issue is concerned, are without dispute.