Opinion ID: 1373478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney's Fees Under Section 1988(b)

Text: Section 1988(b) permits reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be awarded to a prevailing party in any action or proceeding in connection with enforcing the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Supreme Court has held that a prevailing party is one who has favorably effected a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties by court order. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)); see also Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 674 (2d Cir.2005); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed.2004) (defining prevailing party as [a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded). Thus, for example, the entry of an enforceable judgment, such as a stay or preliminary injunction, may permit the district court to confer prevailing-party status on the plaintiff notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment on the underlying claim. [2] See Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 674 ([S]tatus as a prevailing party is conferred whenever there is a court ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant or a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties. (citing Pres. Coalition of Erie County v. Federal Transit Admin., 356 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir.2004) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted))); Haley v. Pataki, 106 F.3d 478, 483-84 (2d Cir.1997) (awarding attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988(b) to party prevailing on preliminary injunction). Although prevailing party is thus construed broadly, a plaintiff is not a prevailing party if he or she achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601, 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Supreme Court has explained that such a voluntary change in defendant's conduct lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change to accord prevailing-party status to the plaintiff. Id. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Moreover, a plaintiff who secures interim relief that is later reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case is not a prevailing party. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 2195, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007); see id. at 2192 (A plaintiff who achieves a transient victory at the threshold of an action can gain no award under that fee-shifting provision if, at the end of the litigation, her initial success is undone and she leaves the courthouse emptyhanded.). With these legal principles in mind, we conclude that attorney's fees were erroneously granted because the Students were not, in fact, prevailing parties. The District Court did not issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order at the September 15, 2004 hearing, and, therefore, there was nothing that could serve as a basis for conferring prevailing-party status on the Students. Further, even if the District Court had granted the Students' request for a temporary restraining order, the Students were not prevailing parties because the court never finally addressed the merits of the Students' underlying First Amendment claim.
A district court's interpretation of its own order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Spallone, 399 F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir.2005) (When an issuing judge interprets his own orders, we accord substantial deference to the draftsman, and we will not reverse the judge's construction of an ambiguity in his own words except for abuse of discretion.). Nonetheless, we do not give equal deference to every aspect of a court's decision. The abuse of discretion standard is used to evaluate the ... court's application of the facts to the appropriate legal standard, and the factual findings and legal conclusions underlying such decisions are evaluated under the clearly erroneous and de novo standards, respect[ively]. Matter of VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we review de novo the legal question of whether the district court issued a preliminary injunction or restraining order in satisfaction of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. See United States v. Camacho, 370 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir.2004) (reviewing de novo whether a criminal judgment is final for purposes of Fed. R.Crim.P. 33). Here, notwithstanding the District Court's conclusion in retrospect that it had granted the preliminary injunction at the September 15, 2004 hearing, it is unclear upon our review of the transcript whether the District Court intended to grant the injunction at the hastily convened hearing. To be sure, the District Court stated at one time that it was going to grant the temporary restraining order. Here is what I will do. And preliminary injunction. I will sign it in a few moments. In the context of the entire proceedings, however, the meaning of this plain statement is complicated by various findings and comments by the District Court made before and after the granting of the injunction and/or restraining order. See Spallone, 399 F.3d at 424 (stating that this Court examines the entire record for the purpose of determining what was decided (internal quotation marks omitted)). The transcript of the hearing reveals that, on the one hand, the District Court thought that the Students' First Amendment claims were meritorious in light of the disproportionate Level IV punishment imposed on the Students for an infraction that should have placed them at Level II or, at most, Level III. On the other hand, the District Court also noted that it was appropriate for the School District to punish the Students for violating the Code of Conduct and, in fact, that the School District may prevail in opposing the injunction if it could show that a Level IV punishment is the ordinary disciplinary action taken against all students who leave school grounds during school hours. Adding to the ambivalence of the District Court's opinion on the merits of the case, the District Court informed the School District immediately after stating that it was  going to grant the temporary restraining order .... [a]nd preliminary injunction (emphasis added) that the School District would be given an opportunity to present evidence early next week so that we can ... get a definitive ruling on this quickly. Despite its earlier indication that it would do so, it is noteworthy that the District Court did not sign either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction order. Thus, it is apparent that the District Court ultimately decided against entering a preliminary injunction at the September 15, 2004 hearing. We also note that even the Students' counsel believed that the District Court had not entered a preliminary injunction at the hearing, as made clear in his motion for attorney's fees. In that motion, counsel did not argue that a preliminary injunction had issued; rather, he argued that the temporary restraining order ripen[ed] into a preliminary injunction. Most significantly, the purported preliminary injunction was lacking in the required form and content. Rule 65(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires every injunction and restraining order to: (A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail  and not by referring to the complaint or other document  the act or acts restrained or required. In this case, the District Court's statements at the hearing do not describe in reasonable detail the extent of the acts restrained, such as whether the School District would be restrained from imposing a lesser punishment. In this respect, it is noted that the School District was not ordered to expunge from the Students' educational records the Level IV notations at issue. See Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.2008) ([Rule 65(d)] reflects Congress' concern with the dangers inherent in the threat of a contempt citation for violation of an order so vague that an enjoined party may unwittingly and unintentionally transcend its bounds. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rosen v. Siegel, 106 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir.1997) ([Rule 65(d) ] is designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those to whom the injunction is directed, and to be sure that the appellate court knows precisely what it is reviewing. (quoting Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Further, although the District Court remarked at some length on the merits of the Students' First Amendment claim, it was ultimately interested in awaiting further facts before making any factual determinations: So, I'm troubled. So I think that, as I've said, I think there is irreparable harm. And I think that there is a likelihood of success on the underlying case that the desire of the school to punish this particular kind of speech was  and this particular activity, even if it's one that they agreed with, but they didn't want these students to do it  I would be interested  and I'll say in a minute what I'm going to do here. If counsel wants to produce for me indications where other students who left during the school day  I have been informed by counsel that, in the previous academic year, numbers of students left, I take it for this very same type of activity. If they were given Level IV disciplinary punishment, that would persuade me that, at least with respect to this activity, they always do it. Thus, no specific findings of facts were made to support the District Court's grant of the preliminary injunction as is required. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(1); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(2) (stating that a court must state the findings and conclusions that support its action when granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction). Requirements for the form and content of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders are properly met by a written order, a document lacking here. See, e.g., Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir.2000) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), which provides the standards for the form and scope of injunctions, contemplates the issuance of a written order.); Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424, 1427 (7th Cir.1990) (Oral statements are not injunctions.). Compounding the District Court's failure to comply with Rule 65(d) is the lack of adequate notice given to the School District to oppose the preliminary injunction. Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [t]he court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party. This provision has been construed to require the district court to allow [the adverse] party sufficient time to marshal his evidence and present his arguments against the issuance of the injunction, i.e., the adverse party must be afforded a fair opportunity to oppose the preliminary injunction. See Rosen, 106 F.3d at 31 (quoting Weitzman v. Stein, 897 F.2d 653, 657 (2d Cir.1990) (citing 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949, at 468 (1973))); e.g., Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. Nat'l Farmers Org., Inc., 446 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir.1971) (considering the complexity of the case and the substantial volume of submitted evidence in concluding that a week was insufficient time to afford the adverse party a fair opportunity to oppose the preliminary injunction). Here, the facts clearly show that the School District did not have a fair opportunity to oppose the entry of the preliminary injunction at the hearing. The hearing was held at noon on the same day the plaintiffs filed their complaint. The plaintiffs' legal memorandum and supporting evidence  which included ten affidavits, an excerpt of the Code of Conduct, and a disciplinary review form  were handed to the School District's counsel as he was entering the court to attend the hearing. Thus, there was insufficient time for the School District to undertake a proper review of the Students' claims. Cf. All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989) (in complex antitrust action requiring precise presentation of numerous facts, finding that two-days' notice and oral presentations limited to thirty minutes can hardly be said to constitute a meaningful opportunity to oppose appellees' motion for preliminary injunction). Indeed, the School District's counsel was without doubt unprepared for the hearing through no fault of his own. He was unfamiliar with his client's position on the case and, at various times during the hearing, had to confer with his clients about basic questions posed by the District Court. For example, at one point, counsel for the School District contradicted his client's position on the critical  but basic  issue of whether the Students' conduct constituted a Level IV disciplinary infraction. Accordingly, considering the shortness of the time afforded to the School District to absorb the legal allegations made against it, and counsel's actual unpreparedness resulting from such lack of time, we conclude that adequate notice was not provided in this case as required by Rule 65(a). Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we hold that no preliminary injunction was entered in this case. The District Court thus erred when it granted attorney's fees based on the existence of a preliminary injunction.
Unlike a preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining order is not constrained by Rule 65(a)'s requirement of notice to the adverse party. See Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir.1990) (Where speed is needed, the rules of procedure provide for temporary restraining orders, even without notice, to prevent irreparable harm. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65)). For many of the reasons discussed supra Part II(B)(1), however, we conclude that the District Court's statements at the September 15, 2004 hearing did not constitute a temporary restraining order because they did not detail the acts restrained or required and were not reduced to a written order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(1) (providing specificity requirements applicable to restraining orders); 65(b)(2) (requiring temporary restraining order issued without notice to adverse party or its counsel to be promptly filed in the clerk's office and entered in the record); cf. Lau, 229 F.3d at 123. Furthermore, the District Court failed to explain why the ruling should have been issued without adequate notice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(2). Regardless, even if a temporary restraining order had issued, such an order was not a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have previously suggested that a grant of a plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order may be sufficient grounds to grant attorney's fees to the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See, e.g., LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1990)). In so suggesting, however, we have explicitly rejected claims for attorney's fees where the temporary restraining order merely maintained the status quo. See, e.g., Christopher P., 915 F.2d at 805 ([T]he procurement of a [temporary restraining order] in which the court does not address the merits of the case but simply preserves the status quo to avoid irreparable harm to the plaintiff is not by itself sufficient to give a plaintiff prevailing party status.); cf. Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 673 (holding that prevailing party status may be conferred by interim judicial relief that alters the parties' legal relationship); LaRouche, 20 F.3d at 74-75 (holding that a grant of provisional relief that merely preserves the status quo does not merit an award of attorney's fees). Here, although the District Court referred to the Students' likelihood of success on the underlying case before orally stating that it would grant their request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, it is unclear whether the District Court intended to grant the temporary restraining order based on the finding of a likelihood of success on the merits of the case. In this connection, we note that a temporary restraining order serves a purpose different from that of a preliminary injunction. The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve an existing situation in statu quo until the court has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for a preliminary injunction. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n, PAA Chapter, 306 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir.1962); 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2951, at 253 (2d ed. 1995) (The [temporary restraining order] is designed to preserve the status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction....). Unless extended, even a temporary restraining order properly issued without notice to the adverse party or its counsel expires within no more than ten days after entry. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(2). There is no claim that any extension was granted here. See Garcia, 499 F.Supp.2d at 423 (observing that the district court took no formal action on the submitted memoranda, one of which included a request to extend the temporary restraining order). As explained above, the District Court reneged on its initial determination to grant the preliminary injunction by indicating that a definitive ruling would be made after further evidence by the School District was submitted. No preliminary injunction was signed despite the District Court's prior statement that it would do so. Thus, assuming arguendo that a temporary restraining order was granted at the September 15, 2004 hearing, the District Court would have granted the temporary restraining order only to preserve the status quo  i.e., permit the Students to continue attending school  until after the presentment of further evidence on the merits of the Students' claims to determine the propriety of granting their request for a preliminary injunction. See Christopher P., 915 F.2d at 805 (holding that plaintiffs cannot be said to have prevailed on the basis of the [temporary restraining order] because it simply preserve[d] the status quo by directing the State of Connecticut to re-admit plaintiff to its school). Under the circumstances, any temporary restraining order that the District Court might have granted would not have been based on the merits of the Students' underlying First Amendment claim. Accordingly, even if the District Court had granted the Students' request for a temporary restraining order, such a grant could not serve as an alternative basis for according them prevailing-party status for purposes of granting attorney's fees.
We are unpersuaded by the Students' remaining argument that they are prevailing parties because they did not receive further suspensions subsequent to the September 15, 2004 hearing. The record amply supports the School District's characterization that its decision not to further suspend the Students was voluntary. Thus, because a voluntary change in behavior after the filing of the lawsuit is insufficient to confer prevailing-party status for purposes of granting attorney's fees, see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (holding that a voluntary change in behavior occurring after the filing of the lawsuit does not confer prevailing-party status on the plaintiffs), we reject the Students' argument as without merit. Until the District Court's 2006 decision, both the Students and the School District believed that no preliminary injunction had issued at the September 15, 2004 hearing. And because we conclude that there was no valid preliminary injunction issued, the only order made in this case, arguendo, was the temporary restraining order. However, even assuming that a temporary restraining order was entered at the September hearing, there was no court order that could have prevented the School District from suspending the Students between October 2004 and until the Students' graduation in June 2006. See Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 674 ([S]tatus as a prevailing party is conferred whenever there is a court ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant or a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). The School District's act of not suspending the Students was, therefore, entirely voluntary. Accordingly, the School District's voluntary change in behavior cannot serve as the basis for conferring prevailing-party status to the Students for purposes of granting attorney's fees.