Opinion ID: 2225345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Official functions category

Text: ¶ 25 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(12) establishes that venue shall be in the county in which the defendant resides if it is alleged that he violated any other law arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation. The parties do not dispute that Jensen was charged with a violation of any other law arising from his official functions. ¶ 26 At oral argument, the State conceded: We're actually not disputing that any other law, even in this case, could be [Wis. Stat.] § 946.12(3). We acknowledge that, actually. The State further conceded in its brief that Jensen's charges arise from his official functions. Indeed, this issue was addressed by the court of appeals in Jensen I. The court of appeals explained that Jensen fac[es] prosecution for violating a criminal statute, namely [Wis. Stat.] § 946.12(3), which prohibits [an] official[ ], such as [Jensen], from violating [his] duty as [a] public official[ ]. Jensen I, 272 Wis.2d 707, ¶ 31, 681 N.W.2d 230. As the case is presented to us, the dispute between the parties focuses on whether Jensen was the subject of the investigation, as that phrase is used in Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12). ¶ 27 The State urges us to interpret the subject of the investigation as including only investigations conducted by the Government Accountability Board. We disagree. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) encompasses investigations by the Government Accountability Board, the former Elections Board, the former Ethics Board and district attorneys. ¶ 28 The legislature created the Government Accountability Board in 2007 Wisconsin Act 1. As part of that Act, the legislation abolished both the Elections Board and the Ethics Board. See Drafting File for 2007 Wis. Act 1, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 2007 S.B. 1, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. [hereinafter Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau ]. The Government Accountability Board has the power to investigate violations of the laws it administers, which includes chs. 5 to 12, other laws relating to elections and election campaigns, subch. III of ch. 13, and subch. III of ch. 19. Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1), (2m). The former Elections Board had the power to investigate possible violations of the elections laws. § 5.05(3) (2005-06). The former Ethics Board had the power to investigate possible violations of the ethics laws and lobbying regulation laws. Wis. Stat. § 19.49(3) (2005-06); Wis. Stat. § 13.74(2) (2005-06). District attorneys also have the power to investigate possible violations of chs. 5 to 12, other laws relating to elections and election campaigns, subch. III of ch. 13 and subch. III of ch. 19. See Wis. Stat. § 978.05. ¶ 29 We begin by recognizing the broad language the legislature used in drafting Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12). The statute includes the phrases for a violation of any other law and  any matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation. § 971.19(12) (emphasis added). In Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, 302 Wis.2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411, we explained that a phrase modified by the word `any' indicates broad application. Id., ¶ 25. In State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, 244 Wis.2d 582, 628 N.W.2d 820, we explained our broad interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1m)(b), which contained the phrase involving the use, by noting that `[i]nvolving' is a broad term. Id., ¶ 31. ¶ 30 To be consistent with the broad language utilized by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12), we interpret the phrase subject of the investigation broadly to encompass more than just Government Accountability Board investigations. The State's interpretation is too limited and is contrary to the broad language contained in § 971.19(12). ¶ 31 Statutory interpretation also requires that we examine the statutory language, subject of the investigation, in the context in which it is used, i.e., in relation to the language of closely-related statutes. See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. Wisconsin Stat. § 978.05 is a closely related-statute as subsection (1) was amended in 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 to reflect the language the legislature used in creating Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12). Section 978.05 sets forth duties of district attorneys, and subsection (1) states in relevant part: The district attorney shall: (1) Criminal Actions. Except as otherwise provided by law, prosecute all criminal actions before any court within his or her prosecutorial unit and have sole responsibility for prosecution of all criminal actions arising from violations of chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19 and from violations of other laws arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation or any matter that involves elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation under chs. 5 to 12, subch. III of ch. 13, or subch. III of ch. 19. § 978.05(1) (emphasis added). ¶ 32 Because Wis. Stat. §§ 978.05(1) and 971.19(12) were created to parallel one another, the two statutes should be interpreted consistently. Compare § 978.05(1) (sole responsibility for prosecution of all criminal actions arising from ... violations of other laws arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation) with § 971.19(12) (violation of any other law arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation). To interpret the subject of the investigation under § 978.05(1) to include only Government Accountability Board investigations would produce absurd results because it would limit the powers of district attorneys to prosecute crimes involving elections, ethics and lobbying regulation without any indication of such a limitation from the legislature. ¶ 33 To explain further, district attorneys possess the sole responsibility for prosecution of all criminal actions arising from ... violations of other laws arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation. [11] Wis. Stat. § 978.05(1). Incorporating the State's interpretation of the phrase the subject of the investigation to mean the subject of the [Government Accountability Board] investigation to both Wis. Stat. §§ 971.19(12) and 978.05(1) would inhibit the district attorney from prosecuting criminal violations of any other law arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation unless the Government Accountability Board first initiates an investigation. See § 971.19(12); § 978.05(1). ¶ 34 However, the Government Accountability Board is not required to investigate alleged violations; it is merely permitted to investigate such violations. See Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(a); [12] Opinion of Wis. Att'y Gen. to Todd P. Wolf, Wood County Dist. Att'y, OAG 10-08 (Oct. 29, 2008) (explaining that the [Government Accountability] Board and district attorneys possess joint and co-equal authority to investigate and that the Government Accountability Board has no statutory obligation to commence an investigation). Accordingly, under the State's interpretation, the district attorney's authority to prosecute a criminal violation venued according to Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) hinges on the Government Accountability Board's initiation of an investigation, which the Board is not required to commence. Under the State's theory, it would be the Government Accountability Board that would decide which official functions violations are subject to criminal prosecution. ¶ 35 This cannot be an accurate reading of the statute because it is at odds with the district attorney's sole responsibility for prosecution of alleged official functions violations. Wis. Stat. § 978.05(1); Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11. Stated otherwise, the State's interpretation of the subject of the investigation as referring only to a Government Accountability Board investigation inhibits the district attorney's prosecutorial authority, which § 978.05(1) expressly confirms, on discretionary investigatory action on the part of the board. The State's argument, in effect, permits the Government Accountability Board to control, and therefore limit, the district attorney's prosecutorial authority. Section 978.05(1) gives no indication that a district attorney's ability to prosecute criminal violations of any matter involving elections, ethics, or lobbying regulation should be conditioned on the Government Accountability Board's decision to investigate. The State's reading of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) and § 978.05(1) conflicts with our goal of harmonizing provisions relating to the same subject matter. See State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶ 21, 268 Wis.2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349. ¶ 36 The phrase the subject of the investigation appears in two other statutory provisions, see Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s)(d); [13] Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)14., [14] both of which were enacted by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1. The State contends such phrase in both of these statutes unambiguously refers only to a Government Accountability Board investigation. Accordingly, the State contends that Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) must be interpreted in the context of § 5.05 as a closely-related statute, and in so doing, we must also interpret § 971.19(12) as referring only to Government Accountability Board investigations. ¶ 37 Both of the provisions referred to by the State are part of Wis. Stat. § 5.05, which was enacted to describe the composition, powers, and duties of the Government Accountability Board. The above-listed provisions are not part of the context in light of which we interpret Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) because they do not involve the prosecution of a crime, as § 971.19(12) and Wis. Stat. § 978.05(1) do. See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. While all three statutes were enacted by 2007 Wisconsin Act 1, the Government Accountability Board is a separate entity, the duties and powers of which are specifically tailored to refer to that entity. A statute created to enumerate the powers and duties of the Government Accountability Board will likely be referring to the Government Accountability Board in the phrase the subject of the investigation for such entity is the focus of the statute. However, the same cannot be said for the interpretation of the phrase the subject of the investigation in § 971.19(12), a statute that is not limited, on its face or in its application, by the powers and duties of the Government Accountability Board. Accordingly, interpreting the subject of the investigation in § 971.19(12) in light of § 5.05, a statute which appears in a limited, narrow context does not assist our construction of § 971.19(12). ¶ 38 Furthermore, were we to follow the State's interpretation, venue for a violation of any other law arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation would be in the county in which the crime was committed if the Government Accountability Board does not investigate and in the county in which the defendant resides if the Government Accountability Board does investigate. However, in either circumstance, when a criminal violation is alleged the district attorney of the county of venue would prosecute the action. [15] Indeed, in its brief the State conceded: The defendant's charged conduct would fall within the ambit of this category if his conduct had been the subject of a GAB investigation, but it was not. The State contends that differing results based on which entity investigates are justified by convenience considerations. ¶ 39 The State explained that referring an alleged criminal violation to a district attorney in a county other than where the offense occurred after the Government Accountability Board has investigated allows the district attorney to resolve the case much more quickly because the district attorney benefits from the Government Accountability Board investigation. The State explained at oral argument that it is difficult to prosecute a case where the conduct, the evidence, the gravamen of the offense is in another county. Moreover, Brian Blanchard, Dane County District Attorney, [16] testified before the Senate Committee on Campaign Finance Reform and Ethics regarding his strong objections to the new venue provision created by 2007 Senate Bill 1. Testimony of Brian Blanchard, Dane County District Attorney, to the Senate Committee on Campaign Finance Reform and Ethics Regarding Assembly/Special Session Bill 1, Jan. 18, 2007, available at the Wisconsin Legislative Council [hereinafter Testimony of Brian Blanchard ]. [17] At the hearing, he contended that the proposed venue provision was unprecedented and unworkable and advocated for the application of the traditional venue rule, which requires a defendant to be tried where a crime was committed. Id. His main concern with the proposed venue provision was the inconvenience it would cause district attorneys. [18] See id. ¶ 40 Prosecuting a case may be inconvenient for district attorneys in counties distant from where the alleged crime occurred; however, the legislative history of 2007 Senate Bill 1 indicates that the legislature rejected concerns bottomed in inconvenience to district attorneys. After considering Attorney Blanchard's testimony regarding his concerns about the venue provision, the legislature voted to pass the bill without amending any portion of it. Accordingly, the legislature in effect rejected Attorney Blanchard's convenience argument. ¶ 41 We further note that neither Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) nor the statute's stated purpose in Wis. Stat. § 801.64, provide a basis for a convenience-based distinction. At oral argument, we directed the State to the legislative findings contained in § 801.64 and asked counsel to explain how the convenience of the district attorney promotes the stated purpose of the venue provision, which is to give the people who elected the defendant and whose trust was violated by the defendant an opportunity to judge him at trial. See § 801.64. The State conceded that its interpretation based on convenience for district attorneys does not further the stated purpose, and admitted they are competing interests. ¶ 42 We must interpret a statute to promote, not to contravene, its statutory purpose. See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 49, 681 N.W.2d 110. First, we note that the legislature set out a broad, unambiguous purpose. Wisconsin Stat. § 801.64 explains that the venue provision broadly applies to violations of the public trust. Such violations should be tried in the county where the offender resides so the individuals whose trust was violated by the offense will judge the defendant's guilt or innocence. To promote such a broad purpose, we must broadly interpret Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12), including the phrase the subject of the investigation. Accordingly, we conclude that venue is proper in the county in which the defendant resides when charged with a violation of any other law arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation commenced by the district attorney, the former Elections Board, the former Ethics Board or the Government Accountability Board. Such an interpretation does not base venue on who commenced the investigation of the alleged criminal violation; instead, our interpretation broadly encompasses violations of the public trust. ¶ 43 Applying that interpretation of category two of Wis. Stat. § 971.19(12) to the case before us, we conclude that venue for the crime of which Jensen has been accused is in Waukesha County Circuit Court, the circuit court for the county where the defendant resides, because it is an action alleging a violation of any other law arising from or in relation to the official functions of the subject of the investigation. Jensen was the subject of an investigation by the former Elections Board and the Dane County District Attorney for what were alleged to be violations of his official functions.