Opinion ID: 2038627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing

Text: ¶ 5. On December 31, 1999, the effect of sentencing on the amount of time a convicted defendant actually serves in prison changed dramatically, as 1997 Wis. Act 283, commonly referred to as Truth-in-Sentencing I (TIS-I), became effective. This legislation was the first of two truth-in-sentencing acts. The second, 2001 Wis. Act 109 or TIS-II, became effective February 1, 2003, and modified TIS-I. See State v. Cole , 2003 WI 59, ¶ 4, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700. Crochiere was sentenced under TIS-I. He has not argued that any aspect of TIS-II is at issue in this appeal. ¶ 6. Prior to TIS-I, Wisconsin used indeterminate sentencing, whereby a convicted defendant was sentenced to serve up to a stated number of years. Generally, an inmate was eligible for parole after serving the greater of six months or one-quarter of the sentence. Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1)(b) (1999-2000); Michael B. Brennan & Donald V. Latorraca, Truth-in-Sentencing Comes to Wisconsin , Wis. Law., May 2000, at 14 [hereinafter TIS Comes to Wisconsin ]. An inmate's time in confinement could be reduced due to his or her good behavior. Wis. Stat. § 302.43 (1999-2000). The parole commission decided when an eligible inmate would be released on parole. Wis. Stat. § 304.01, et seq. (1999-2000); TIS Comes to Wisconsin , supra , at 14. [2] Additionally, unless there were extenuating circumstances, an inmate reached his or her mandatory release date after serving two-thirds of the stated sentence. [3] Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1) (1999-2000); TIS Comes to Wisconsin , supra , at 14. ¶ 7. TIS-I eliminated indeterminate sentencing and established determinate sentencing whereby a convicted defendant serves each day of the sentence imposed. Wis. Stat. § 973.01(4) and (6) (2001-02); [4] see TIS Comes to Wisconsin , supra , at 14. Under TIS-I, all felony sentences except life imprisonment are bifurcated, with at least one year of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended supervision in the community. Sections 973.01(1) and (2)(b). [5] TIS-I eliminated reduction in confinement time based on an inmate's good behavior, and it abolished parole. Sections 973.01(4) and (6); [6] see also TIS Comes to Wisconsin , supra , at 17 (noting that in addition to the elimination of good time, TIS-I provides that `bad time' in the form of extra days in confinement before release to [extended supervision] can be assessed). ¶ 8. A related change brought about by TIS-I was to increase the role of the judicial branch in sentencing. Prior to TIS-I, sentencing was a responsibility shared by all three branches of government: the legislature, in setting the maximum penalties for crimes; the courts, in imposing indeterminate terms on individual convicted defendants; and the executive branch, through the parole commission, in deciding how much of the term imposed an inmate actually would serve. State v. Gallion , 2004 WI 42, ¶ 28, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. After TIS-I, where the legislature opted for more certainty in sentencing through the elimination of parole, Wis. Stat. § 973.01(6), the executive branch's participation in sentencing was significantly diminished. Gallion , ¶ 28. The overriding theme became certainty in sentencing: a convicted defendant sentenced to one year in confinement will serve precisely one year in prison. See TIS Comes to Wisconsin , supra , at 16 (explaining that TIS-I establishes an informationally accurate system of sentencing. A sentence to one-year confinement in prison means the offender will be incarcerated for exactly 365 days before being released to a term of extended supervision) [7] . The shift away from executive branch participation in sentencing placed more responsibility on the courts because of the removal of the safety valve provided by the parole commission that once could have corrected a sentence that proved to be longer than was necessary to achieve the sentencing court's objectives. [8] ¶ 9. Crochiere bases his argument for sentence reduction, in part, on this shift away from the executive branch's participation due to the legislature's elimination of parole. He contends that this change brought about through TIS-I requires courts to examine rehabilitative progress and to conclude that since there is no longer any other way to review it, rehabilitation must become a new factor upon which a circuit court may base sentence modification. The State contends that to hold that Crochiere's conduct after incarceration is a new factor would strike at the very heart of TIScertainty in sentencing. It would give courts the discretion to modify sentences based on post-incarceration conduct of inmates, which is the same discretion the legislature took from the executive branch by enacting TIS-I. It is within this framework that we review Crochiere's and the State's contentions.