Opinion ID: 1264825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Surviving RLUIPA Claims

Text: We next consider the surviving official-capacity RLUIPA claims. [6] No claims survive in Van Wyhe's suit. In Sisney's suit, three claims for injunctive relief survivethe denial of the succah, the denial of additional group religious study time, and the denial of a tape player in his cell. On each of these, the district court found questions of material fact existing on the issue of whether the prison officials had used the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling governmental interests. As already noted, our jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal extends only to the extent the denial of summary judgment turns on an issue of law and not disputes of fact. To make out a prima facie RLUIPA claim against a state official, an inmate must `show, as a threshold matter, that there is a substantial burden on his ability to exercise his religion.' Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660, 662 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988). Absent this showing, the state retains its sovereign immunity. The district court did not identify any material questions of fact in dispute on this threshold issue. We therefore have interlocutory jurisdiction to consider this threshold legal issue on each claim, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Sisney. See Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 F.3d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir.2004) (noting we have jurisdiction to decide closely related issues of law, i.e., claims that are inextricably intertwined with or necessary to ensure meaningful review of the sovereign immunity issue (internal marks omitted)), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1032, 125 S.Ct. 2257, 161 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2005). RLUIPA defines `religious exercise' to include `any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.' Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (quoting § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). We have held, largely consistent with our First Amendment cases, that to demonstrate a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, a government policy or action `must significantly inhibit or constrain [religious] conduct or [religious] expression ...; must meaningfully curtail a person's ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a person reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a person's religion.' Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 & n. 7 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988). We alter this definition somewhat in the RLUIPA context, mindful that RLUIPA's broad protection of religious exercise extends even to religious practices that are not compelled by, or central to a certain belief system. Id. at 813 n. 7; see Gladson, 551 F.3d at 832-33 (acknowledging that we apply the definition of substantial burden set forth in Murphy and as subsequently clarified by the Supreme Court in Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113, to bar[] inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is `central' to a prisoner's religion). a. The Succah : The officials argue that Sisney failed to make a sufficient threshold showing of a substantial burden because he submitted only his own conclusory statement as evidence. In response to the summary judgment motion, Sisney explained the religious significance of the succah (or tent), and he described it as being a mandatory part of the Sukkot Festival and essential to the practice of his Jewish faith. [7] (Appellants' App. at 807.) This assertion is not devoid of the necessary factual allegationsthe succah is an expression of Sisney's faith during this religious festival and this expression of his faith is significantly inhibited, constrained, or altered by the denial of his request to use the succah during the Festival of Sukkot. Sisney provided some explanation of his faith and the religious exercise at issue. He did not rest on a conclusory allegation that his religious exercise was substantially burdened, but there is evidence from which such a conclusion could be drawn. Whether Sisney can establish the truth or sincerity of this belief is a matter to be decided at trial, but we cannot say that his evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to withstand summary judgment. See Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988 (relying on the inmate's assertions to reverse a grant of summary judgment). The district court did not err as a matter of law by concluding that Sisney met his threshold burden with regard to the succah request. We lack jurisdiction to consider further issues on which the district court found material questions of fact. b. Group Study Time : The prison officials argue that Sisney did not meet the threshold showing of a substantial burden on his religious exercise with regard to his request for additional weekly meeting time for Torah, Kabbala, and Hebrew language studies. The three-hour group worship and study time currently allotted resulted from Sisney's prior application for an additional 90 minutes each week to study the Torah. Now, Sisney asserts that the three hours currently provided is inadequate for group religious study because the time is consumed with Jewish worship services and Torah studies, leaving not enough time to study the Hebrew language. Sisney states that while Torah study is foremost and cannot be exchanged for the Hebrew study, his religion considers learning Hebrew to be a mikvah, or good deed. (Appellants' App. at 117.) The prison must permit a reasonable opportunity for an inmate to engage in religious activities but need not provide unlimited opportunities. In Gladson, Wiccan inmates argued that a three-hour limitation on their celebration of a religious holiday substantially burdened their religious exercise under RLUIPA. 551 F.3d at 834. We held that the inmates failed to offer any evidence that three hours for their religious holiday celebration significantly inhibits or constrains their conduct or expression; meaningfully curtails their ability to express adherence to their faith; or denies them reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to their religion. Id. Additionally, we have held in the First Amendment context that, where an inmate was permitted three hours of group worship time, the denial of one extra hour per week did not substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise: three hours of group worship per week provided [the inmate] with a reasonable opportunity to exercise his religious freedom. Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir.1997). We do not demand doctrinal justification to support the desired religious exercise, but the inmate does bear the burden of establishing a substantial burden on a religious exercise. Gladson, 551 F.3d at 833. The record does not support a conclusion that Sisney's religious exercise of group study has been substantially burdened. He is permitted three hours of group study and worship time with other Jewish inmates and is additionally permitted to study the language and the religion individually in his cell. His explanation that the time is inadequate does not indicate how the denial of extra group study time significantly inhibits or curtails his religious expression or deprives him of a meaningful opportunity to engage in his religious activities. We do not question his assertion that learning to speak Hebrew is a good deed that will make his religious exercise more meaningful, but he has not asserted facts from which a juror could conclude that the denial of additional group time to study the language places a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The prison officials (Weber, Block, and Wagner) are therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim. c. The Tape Player: The prison officials denied Sisney's request to have and use a tape player in his cell for religious language studies. Although Sisney's religion deems it a good deed to speak Hebrew, he does not assert that the tape player itself is a religious item or that having one in his cell is the only way he can learn the language necessary to his religious conduct. The record indicates that Sisney has reasonable access to a tape player during the group meeting times (though he has no tapes) and that he is permitted to study the language in his cell with books. RLUIPA does not require the prison to permit an inmate to possess every tangential item of property that could aid the inmate's religious exercise or learning. Depriving Sisney of a tape player in his cell does not significantly inhibit his religious expression, meaningfully curtail his ability to adhere to his faith, or deprive him of a reasonable opportunity to engage in that religious activity. Sisney has not set forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his religious exercise is substantially burdened by the denial of a tape player in his cell, and accordingly, the prison officials (Weber, Block and Wagner) are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.