Opinion ID: 2581989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue Two: Whether Duke was denied a fair trial because jurors observed him in leg restraints during the trial

Text: [¶ 28] On January 14, 2003, this Court granted Duke's motion and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to enable Duke to develop a record on the issue whether he was improperly restrained at trial and whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to such improper restraint. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on March 28, 2003, receiving testimony from Duke, Duke's trial counsel, one of the prosecutors, the transport officer of the county sheriff's office, a former county sheriff, a deputy United States Marshal, the jail administrator, and jurors. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Duke was wearing leg restraints during the trial and the jurors saw him in those restraints. The trial court also found Duke's trial counsel probably made a request for removal of those restraints to the trial court at the end of an in-chambers hearing on the first day of trial; and the trial court did not respond to that request. [¶ 29] On appeal, Duke claims his having to appear in leg restraints before the jury was inherently prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial under Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo.2003), and our decisions since that seminal decision. See, e.g., Urbigkit, ¶¶ 16-24. The State recognizes the trial court's failure to hold a pretrial hearing concerning the necessity of intrial trial leg restraints, as prescribed in Asch, could be found to be an abuse of discretion and, therefore, error. The State observes, however, that in Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, ¶ 15, 78 P.3d 205, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2003), we held that, where the jury did not view or hear the accused in leg restraints during trial, a trial court's error in allowing restraints without a pretrial hearing as mandated by Asch was subject to harmless error review. We also noted that, according to State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 975 P.2d 967, 1006-07 (1999), some courts apply harmless error analysis where overwhelming evidence of the accused's guilt exists. Daniel, ¶ 15. Recognizing it bears the burden of demonstrating the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the State declares it can satisfy that burden. The State then points to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in its remand decision to the effect that, given the trial court's knowledge of the case, the accused, courtroom security concerns, the trial audience, and the potential for disturbances, a pretrial hearing would not have changed the trial court's decision to allow the leg restraints during trial. The State also points to seven factors which the trial court identified as justifying the allowance of restraints: (1) Duke was serving a ten-year federal sentence and was facing six potential life sentences on the state charges; (2) Duke was an escape risk; (3) the U.S. Marshals' policy would have required that Duke be shackled during the trial; (4) the courtroom lacked adequate security; (5) Duke, during various stages of the trial, was in close proximity to constitute a physical threat to the trial judge, the jurors, his attorney, and his attorney's wife; (6) the shock belt available to the Sweetwater County Sheriff's Office is designed to be worn over clothing, which would make it readily visible to the jury and does not incapacitate the wearer; and (7) Michael Duke, Duke's brother and federal co-defendant, had been released from federal prison prior to Duke's trial and was residing in Green River, Wyoming. [¶ 30] In response to the State's argument, Duke argues the trial court erred at the remand hearing when it received in violation of W.R.E. 606(b) juror testimony concerning the effect, if any, on the jury verdict of the jurors' having seen Duke in leg restraints for the eleven days of trial. W.R.E. 606(b) reads: (b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Duke surmises that the standard of review for the trial court's decision to allow such juror testimony may be the abuse-of-discretion standard, testing that decision as a reviewing court would when a witness's competency is tested. Duke also argues that the reliability of such after-the-fact juror testimony is highly suspect. He directs us to the advice of the United States Supreme Court in a case where a procedure is used which involves a probability that prejudice deemed inherently lacking in due process will result, little stock need be placed in jurors' claims to the contrary. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1346, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). Duke also argues that the evidence against him, particularly with respect to the first degree murder charges and the solicitation-of-murder charges related thereto, was not overwhelming. Duke asserts the verdict on those particular charges turned nearly entirely upon the jury's believing either Duke or the prosecution's key witness Roger Brauberger. Duke argues it is impossible to measure the degree to which a juror was influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by having seen and heard Duke in leg restraints each and every day of a trial that spanned two weeks; but, he asserts, a prejudicial influence of some weight is presumed. [¶ 31] The significant facts of this case, in the context of the leg restraints issue, are distinguishable from the significant facts in our prior cases involving leg restraints. In Asch, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo.2003), published February 6, 2003, the remand hearing established that only one juror observed the accused in leg restraints during a one-day trial. Id. at ¶ 56. Although we held the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the accused to be shackled in the courtroom during his trial without first requiring the prosecution to justify that practice on the record, id. at ¶ 62, we also held the accused's trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate adequately a primary defense; consequently, we reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at ¶¶ 65-66. Because of that disposition, we did not undertake a harmless error analysis. [¶ 32] In Urbigkit, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207 (Wyo.2003), published May 7, 2003, the accused, before trial and before jury selection, raised the shackling issue, the prosecution opposed the accused's request to be unrestrained in the courtroom during trial, and the trial court allowed the use of leg restraints in the courtroom during the trial. Although no testimony or evidence was presented that the jurors observed the defendant in shackles, the defendant was in leg restraints, and instructed not to move, when he testified before the jury but away from the witness stand. Id. at ¶¶ 16-21. We held that the manner in which the trial court resolved the issue generally complied with the spirit of Asch. Id. at ¶ 23. We held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the accused to wear leg restraints in the courtroom throughout his trial. Id. at ¶ 24. [¶ 33] In Daniel, 2003 WY 132, 78 P.3d 205 (Wyo.2003), published October 23, 2003, the remand hearing established that the accused was shackled during his trial without the benefit of a pretrial hearing for the prosecution to establish justification for shackling; thus, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing shackling. Id. at ¶ 14. The remand hearing also established, however, that the jury did not view or hear the accused in shackles during his trial. Id. at ¶ 15. The present case, then, tried before the Asch pretrial procedure became required, is the first case before us where most, if not all, of the jurors viewed and heard the accused in shackles during his trial, and no pretrial proceedings were held on the issue. [¶ 34] In light of our Asch discussion about the inherently prejudicial nature of a jury's viewing and hearing an accused in shackles during his trial, we can only hold here that the trial court's allowance of the use of leg restraints on Duke during his trial was an abuse of discretion and, of course, error. Although Duke argues it is impossible to measure the degree of the prejudicial influence his shackling had on the jurors who tried him, we believe it is possible to measure that degree of prejudicial impact considering the weight of the evidence supporting that jury's verdict. Therefore, we hold the trial court's error is subject to harmless error analysis. Applying that analysis, we are impressed by the strong evidence of Duke's guilt on all the charges. That Duke pleaded guilty on the federal charges of soliciting the murder of his parents made his conviction on the similar state charges a certainty. Duke makes no serious argument to the contrary. With respect to the first degree murder charges and the related solicitation charges pertaining to Duke's wife and son, we are also impressed with the strong evidence of Duke's guilt on those charges. We have recounted that evidence earlier in this opinion and need not repeat it here. As that recounting shows, the evidence of Duke's guilt on those charges was much more than a credibility contest between Roger Brauberger and Duke. Quite considerable, and independent, circumstantial evidence existed supporting his guilt on those charges. After carefully studying the record and all of the evidence, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error below was harmless. In reaching this decision, we have given no stock to the jurors' testimony at the remand hearing. We need not decide today whether, in this shackling context, W.R.E. 606(b) prohibits such testimony. Because of our judgment on the prosecution's strong evidence of Duke's guilt on all of the charges, we had no need to consider the jurors' remand hearing testimony.