Opinion ID: 2119366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Tendered Penalty-Phase Instructions

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it modified one of his tendered instructions and refused to give several others during the death penalty phase of his trial. The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. Fox v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 221. Instruction of the jury is generally within the discretion of the trial court, Denton v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 576, and is reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Brendel v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 919. The defendant's tendered instruction 2 regarding burden of proof included the phrase death by electrocution. The trial court gave the instruction after deleting by electrocution. The defendant argues he had a right to inform the jury regarding the manner of execution under the Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 19, which provides that [i]n all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts. Because the manner of execution is controlled by statute and cannot be varied by the judge or jury, the court's modification of the tendered instruction was not error. The trial court refused to give the defendant's tendered instructions 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10. In reviewing the refusal of a tendered instruction, we must determine: 1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; 2) whether there was evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and 3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which are given. Jackson v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 1115. The defendant's tendered instruction 4 and 5 advised that in order to recommend the death penalty for the defendant, the jury had to find that the charged aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed in Issue 8 below, we decline to depart from precedent on this issue. Tendered instructions 4 and 5 were properly refused by the trial court. The defendant's tendered instruction 7 provided that [a] mitigating circumstance does not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be considered. You must find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any substantial evidence to support it. The defendant concedes the lack of authority supporting this position, but argues that it is implied by the absence of a statutory burden of proof standard for establishing mitigating circumstances, unlike the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for aggravating circumstances. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9. We disagree. Such an instruction might mislead the jury into thinking that they are bound to accept any alleged mitigating circumstances even if supported by only a scintilla of evidence and strongly disputed by other evidence. The trial court correctly refused defendant's tendered instruction 7. The defendant's tendered instruction 8 proposed to instruct that the jurors were bound by law to consider the following factors as evidence of mitigation, and then enumerated various factors which are not among the enumerated statutory mitigating circumstances. Apart from a very significant question of whether there was evidence to support inclusion of each of the alleged mitigating circumstances, we find that the instruction incorrectly stated the law by the use of introductory language commanding the jurors that they were bound by law to consider each enumerated factor as evidence of mitigation, even if such factor was not established by the evidence. We further find that other instructions given by the trial court fully and properly informed the jury regarding their consideration of mitigating circumstances. The defendant's tendered instruction 9 would have authorized the jury to recommend mercy for the defendant whether or not mitigating circumstances exist, and to recommend that the defendant not be electrocuted with or without any reason whatsoever. We find that the instruction was misleading and otherwise contrary to law. To the extent it contained proper information, the substance thereof was adequately covered by other instructions. The instruction was properly refused. In tendered instruction 10, the defendant sought to inform the jury that capital punishment was legal in the United States and in the State of Indiana, and to advise them that if you recommend the death penalty the defendant will be executed. The defendant presents no supporting authority or cogent argument. Furthermore, the instruction is misleading, potentially confusing, and otherwise an incorrect statement of law because, following any jury recommendation of the death sentence, both the trial court and this Court are required to independently and separately determine whether the death penalty is appropriate under the circumstances. There was no error in refusing this instruction.