Opinion ID: 2591946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury InstructionsConspiracy

Text: [¶ 26] We next turn to Baker's fourth argument on appeal, which is that the district court instructed the jury under the wrong conspiracy statute, and thus, his convictions should be reversed. Specifically, Baker claims that these instructions were given in error, because the proper conspiracy statute is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303, which requires proof of an overt act. The State does not altogether disagree but argues mainly that the error, if any, was invited and altogether harmless. [¶ 27] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 (LexisNexis 2009) provides: § 6-1-303. Conspiracy; renunciation of criminal intention; venue. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement. (b) A person is not liable under this section if after conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intention. (c) A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the agreement was entered into, or in any county where any act evidencing the conspiracy or furthering the purpose took place. [¶ 28] In Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 896-98 (Wyo.1998) we held: While Miller primarily relies upon his claim of entitlement to relief under the law of the case doctrine, the instruction on the unilateral theory of conspiracy poses a novel question for Wyoming. For that reason we consider whether that instruction was a correct instruction on the law. The Supreme Court of North Dakota has distinguished the bilateral theory of conspiracy from the unilateral theory in this way: Under a unilateral formulation, the crime is committed when a person agrees to proceed in a prohibited manner; under a bilateral formulation, the crime of conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to proceed in such manner. See Note [Conspiracy; Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 Colum.L.Rev. 1122, 1136 (1975)]. Under either approach, the agreement is all-important to conspiracy. Under the unilateral approach, as distinguished from the bilateral approach, the trier-of-fact assesses the subjective individual behavior of a defendant   . Under the traditional bilateral approach, there must be at least two `guilty' persons, two persons who have agreed. State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (N.D.1992), citing State v. Kihnel, 488 So.2d 1238, 1240 (La.App.1986). Prior to its revision in 1982, as amended in 1983, the statute making conspiracy a crime in Wyoming read: If two (2) or more persons conspire to (a) commit a felony in the state of Wyoming or to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be a felony, and (b) one (1) or more of such persons do any act, within or without the state of Wyoming, to effect the object of the conspiracy, each, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years or both. A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the conspiratorial agreement or combination was entered into, or in any county where any act or acts evidencing the conspiracy or in any county wherein the furtherance of its purpose took place. Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-117 (1977). As revised in 1982, and then amended in 1983, this statute now reads: (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement. (b) A person is not liable under this section if after conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intention. (c) A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the agreement was entered into, or in any county where any act evidencing the conspiracy or furthering the purpose took place. Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-303 (1988). The new version was adopted from both the Model Penal Code and the laws of neighboring states. See Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Act of 1982, 19 Land & Water L.Rev. 107, 119 (1984). The Model Penal Code, like the new version of the Wyoming statute, defines conspiracy in the context of a single actor agreeing with another, and this language is said to adopt the unilateral approach. Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 5.03(b) at 382-398 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). While federal courts have continued to follow the bilateral theory of conspiracy, the modern trend in state courts is to rule that a conspiracy count is viable even when one of the participants is a government agent or is feigning agreement. See generally, Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 5.03(b) at 382-398 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(d). Compare U.S. v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th Cir.(N.M.) 1985) with State v. Null, 247 Neb. 192, 526 N.W.2d 220, 229 (1995); Com. v. Sego, 872 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Ky. 1994); State v. Conway, 193 N.J.Super. 133, 472 A.2d 588 (1984); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 275 (Mo.App.1982) ( rev'd in part on other grounds). The focus under the unilateral theory is on the culpability of the defendant, without any necessity to establish the guilty mind of one or more co-conspirators. When we compare the first sentences of the earlier and current statutes in Wyoming, we find that the old statute began [i]f two (2) or more persons conspire to (a) commit a felony in the state of Wyoming   , while the new statute reads,  [a] person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime   . (Emphasis added.) Our research discloses that most states that have adopted this second definition of the crime of conspiracy have embraced a unilateral approach to conspiracy, and we hold that is appropriate in Wyoming. Other states have justified the unilateral theory of conspiracy as sound public policy. A person who believes he is conspiring with another to commit a crime is a danger to the public regardless of whether the other person in fact has agreed to commit the crime. As one text writer has expressed the proposition, such an approach is justified in that a man who believes that he is conspiring to commit a crime and wishes to conspire to commit a crime has a guilty mind and has done all in his power to plot the commission of an unlawful purpose. Friedman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 Modern L.Rev. 276, 283 (1956), adopted in, 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(d) n.109 at 73. Miller's case furnishes a textbook example of the justification for a unilateral approach. Miller's guilty mind was not diminished by the fact that Powell had made an agreement to serve as a law enforcement informant. It is true that Miller's chance of succeeding in kidnapping his family under the circumstances was minimal, but Miller has nonetheless engaged in conduct which provides unequivocal evidence of his firm purpose to commit a crime. 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(d) at 73 (footnote omitted). It is our conclusion that we should follow the majority rule of our sister states, and we hold that valid public policy as well as the language and the legislative history of our conspiracy statute make the unilateral approach to conspiracy the law of Wyoming. [¶ 29] Wyo. Stat. Ann § 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2009) provides: § 35-7-1042. Attempts and conspiracies. Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within the state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. [Emphasis added.] [¶ 30] In Palato v. State, 988 P.2d 512, 513-16 (Wyo.1999) (emphasis in original) we held: The question we must resolve is whether Wyoming's controlled substances conspiracy statute, § 35-7-1042, embraces the unilateral or bilateral theory of conspiracy. Under a unilateral formulation, the crime is committed when a person agrees to proceed in a prohibited manner; under a bilateral formulation, the crime of conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to proceed in such manner. Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 896 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (N.D.1992)). Therefore, under a unilateral theory, a conspiracy count is viable even when one of the participants is a government agent or is feigning agreement. Miller, at 897; Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(d) (1986). This court recently considered the unilateral-bilateral question as it pertains to our general conspiracy statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 (Lexis 1999). Miller. Based on the language and legislative history of the statute, as well as public policy considerations, we held that § 6-1-303 adopts the unilateral approach to conspiracy. Id. Our evaluation of those same considerations, and others, leads us to conclude that the legislature had a different intent when it enacted § 35-7-1042. This court's primary focus when interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent upon enactment. Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 953 (Wyo.1996). The initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation    is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed, according to their arrangement and connection. Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and need not consult rules of statutory construction. [W]hile a determination that the meaning is not subject to varying interpretations will usually end our inquiry, we may resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation, such as legislative history and rules of construction, to confirm our determination. Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Wyo.1994) (citing Parker, 845 P.2d at 1045). [I]n ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute    the court    must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking body. Carter v. Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 279, 291, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942); see also Parker, 845 P.2d at 1044. We presume that the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. Parker, at 1044. Wyoming's controlled substances conspiracy statute provides: Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article [the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act] within the state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added). We find that § 35-7-1042 is ambiguous with respect to whether it adopts a bilateral or unilateral theory of conspiracy. The ambiguity in the statute arises from the use of the singular [a]ny person language, which since the adoption of the Model Penal Code has been said to be indicative of the unilateral approach to conspiracy, and the traditional, common law view that it takes at least two guilty parties to conspire. See, e.g., Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1332 (Wyo.1977) (quoting Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624 (10th Cir.1971)) (A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act.). The history of Wyoming's drug conspiracy statute provides some insight into the legislature's intent at the time of its enactment. Section 35-7-1042 was derived, not from the general conspiracy statute or the Model Penal Code, but from the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 846. When the Wyoming legislature adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's case law construing the statute is considered persuasive authority and an aid to determine legislative intent. Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1981); Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 845-46 (Wyo.1977). As such, we have looked to the case law interpreting the federal conspiracy provision as persuasive authority when interpreting § 35-7-1042. Apodaca, 627 P.2d at 1027; Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1053-54 (Wyo.1989). The federal courts have consistently adhered to the Sears rule, a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that there can be no conspiratorial liability imposed when the only other person involved is a government agent. Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir.1965); see also United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38 n. 2 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (9th Cir.1984). The federal rule, which takes a bilateral approach, is grounded in the traditional definition of conspiracy as an agreement between two or more people to commit an unlawful act. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d at 1199. The reasoning behind the federal approach is that the act of agreeing is a group act requiring at least two people, and when one of two persons merely pretends to agree, there is neither a true agreement nor a meeting of the minds. Id. This was the conventional view of conspiracy law, and the view espoused by a majority of states, including Wyoming when § 35-7-1042 was enacted in 1971. In Miller, we determined the modification of the language in Wyoming's general conspiracy statute from the traditional [i]f two (2) or more persons conspire to the Model Penal Code formulation of [a] person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if evidenced the legislature's intent to move to the unilateral approach. In contrast, § 35-7-1042 has not been amended since its enactment, and we find no similar evidence of legislative intent to depart from the federal bilateral position. We acknowledge that this construction results in divergent treatment of conspiracies in Wyoming, depending on whether controlled substances are involved. However, the adoption of the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act, §§ 35-7-1001 et seq., suggests the legislature intended to treat drug crimes differently. The preamble of the Act describes it as providing a comprehensive codification and revision of the laws of the State of Wyoming relating to controlled substances and the use and abuse of drugs, providing for, among other things, crimes and offenses. 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 246. At the time it was enacted, the legislature removed from the criminal code those provisions governing crimes and enforcement relating to controlled substances and placed them in the Act. Id. In addition, we note that § 35-7-1042 has already been determined to alter the general law of conspiracy in an important respect. Apodaca, 627 P.2d at 1026-27. Specifically, the drug conspiracy statute includes no overt act requirement. When a defendant is charged under § 35-7-1042, the government is not required to allege and prove an overt act to sustain a conviction. Apodaca, 627 P.2d at 1027. An overt act requirement affords at least a minimal added assurance, beyond the bare agreement, that a socially dangerous combination exists and that a person is not punished for a mere evil state of mind. Deirdre A. Burgman, Unilateral Conspiracy: Three Critical Perspectives, 29 DePaul L.Rev. 75, 102 (1979). With respect to unilateral conspiracies, the overt act requirement is conceivably a protection to insure that police activity is not abused. See id. at 101. The Model Penal Code does not require an overt act for conspiracies to commit first and second degree crimes. Model Penal Code, supra, § 5.03(5). Although the legislature generally followed the Model Penal Code approach when it modified the general conspiracy statute in 1982, the legislature saw fit to retain the overt act requirement for all conspiratorial objectives. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(b). That being the case, and given the omission of an overt act protection in the drug conspiracy statute, we cannot ascribe to the legislature the intent to adopt the unilateral conspiracy theory absent a clear expression of that intent. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the controlled substances conspiracy statute embraces the bilateral theory of conspiracy, in accordance with federal case law. The certified question, whether a defendant can be found guilty, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042, of conspiring to deliver a controlled substance when the only other member of the alleged conspiracy is a government agent, is answered no. Also see Holzheuser v. State, 2007 WY 160, ¶ 18, 169 P.3d 68, 78 (Wyo.2007) (intimating that unilateral conspiracy theory might apply, but only concluding that there was no evidence in the record to support any kind of conspiracy theory). [¶ 31] We review issues regarding jury instructions under the following standard: Jury instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the instructions confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and prejudiced the defendant. Prejudicial error must be demonstrated, and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law. Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 7, 178 P.3d 396, 399 (Wyo.2008) (internal citations omitted). Also, A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing a jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found. Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation. Prejudice will be determined to exist only where an appellant demonstrates that the instruction given confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law. Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 31, 150 P.3d 1202, 1212 (Wyo.2007). [¶ 32] At trial the jury was instructed regarding the crime of conspiracy in accordance with § 35-7-1042: Instruction No. 23 YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the elements of the crime of Conspiring to Commit the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing a List I and/or a List II controlled Substance Precursor, as charged in Count Three of the Information, are: 1. From on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 20th day of December, 2006: 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming; 3. The defendant, David Dale Baker; 4. Agreed with one or more other persons; 5. That they, or one of them, would commit the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing a List I and/or a List II controlled Substance Precursor, to wit: (A) List IEphedrine or Pseudo-Ephedrine; and/or (B) List IIAcetone and/or Iodine; 6. With the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. In arriving at your decision on Count Three, you must also consider the specific elements of the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing a List I and/or List II Controlled Substance Precursor, which are set forth in Instruction No. 24. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty of Count Three. Instruction No. 28 YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the elements of the crime of Conspiring to Commit the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing Laboratory Equipment or Supplies With Intent to Engage in a Clandestine Laboratory Operation, as alleged in Count Four of the Information, are: 1. From on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 20th day of December, 2006: 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming; 3. The defendant, David Dale Baker; 4. Agreed with one or more other persons; 5. That they, or one of them, would commit the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing Laboratory Equipment or Supplies With Intent to Engage in a Clandestine Laboratory Operation. In arriving at your decision on Count Four, you must also consider the specific elements of the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, which are set forth in Instruction No. 29. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty under Count Four. [¶ 33] Some factual background may be helpful to the reader on this issue. Baker was originally charged with two counts of conspiracy pursuant to § 35-7-1042. About one week prior to trial, the State moved to amend the Information to charge Baker with two counts of conspiracy pursuant to § 6-1-303, in place of the former statute. The State discussed, on the record, its confusion surrounding the issue of when each statute should be properly used and concluded that the general conspiracy statute would be the more appropriate statute upon which to proceed. A hearing was held on the matter at which the State demonstrated its indifference as to which statute was used. Defense counsel, however, was adamant that § 35-7-1042 was the appropriate charge. Both the district court and the State were willing to accept defense counsel's position on the matter: The Court: Okay. So that part of the amendment, everybody is clear, we're operating under the conspiracy as charged and governed by the Controlled Substances Act, which means an overt act does not have to be established, but it has to be a bilateral operation. .... Mr. Marken: And the State is comfortable with that. The Court: Okay. Mr. Marken: Just so the record is clear and I think it is at this pointthe defense has had an opportunity to call whichever direction we want; and as I understand it, he has been saying the law of this case should be governed by 1042 and not 6-1-303. The Court: That's what I understand. Mr. Tolin: And, Your Honor, I think it would be improper for me to sit here and disingenuous to say that because it benefits the defendant, we want you to use this law even though it is clearly not the appropriate law. I think that is inappropriate for me as a defense counsel. And so I think I'mI'm stuck with that position of what the Supreme Court said. And I you know, even though The Court: Okay. I understand, Mr. Tolin. [¶ 34] With respect to a conspiracy, the jury heard testimony of Zachary Wolf and Crystal Merck, who both admitted to conspiring with Baker to obtain items for a methamphetamine lab. Also, the jury heard both of those witnesses testify regarding the overt acts that were taken in furtherance of the conspiracy ( i.e., searching for a methamphetamine recipe; holding bottles of anhydrous ammonia at home to manufacture methamphetamine; driving to purchase as much cold medicine as was possible; Baker supplying money for the purchase of such cold medicines; Merck crushing the cold medicine to place in alcohol as part of the methamphetamine-making process). Furthermore, the jury heard DCI Agent Wetzel testify about the presence of equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine in Baker's home, some of which actually tested positive for methamphetamine. [¶ 35] In light of the discussion above, we conclude that § 6-1-303 does not apply to this case, in light of the discussion in Palato (the general conspiracy statute and the general drug conspiracy statute are distinct). However, we also agree with Baker that § 35-7-1042 does not apply. We arrive at this conclusion after considering the structure and language of the challenged statutes. First, we consider the structure of the Act. Statutes as a whole are divided into titles, chapters, and articles. The Act is contained in Title 35, Chapter 7, Article 10. Statutory Article 10 is not confined simply to the Act. It contains two further provisions dealing with controlled substances: § 35-7-1061 (Pilot program for real-time database data access) and § 35-7-1062 (Pilot program for implementation assistance). [4] [¶ 36] Turning to the confines and actual language of the Act, it is divided into ten articles. [5] Section 35-7-1042 is found in article V. By its language, § 35-7-1042 is limited in scope to offenses under this article. Considering the structure of the Act, the term this article as used in § 35-7-1042 looks to mean article V of the Act. Beyond the plain language, we find it is unlikely, too, that the Wyoming Legislature intended for § 35-7-1042 to apply to all provisions in statutory Article 10 in light of the fact that Article 10 contains provisions outside the confines of the Act. [¶ 37] Even if § 35-7-1042 applied to all provisions contained in statutory Article 10, it still would not apply given the facts of this case. The substantive offenses Baker was charged with violating are contained in § 35-7-1059. This section is found in article IX of the Act and contains its very own conspiracy provision, which states: It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:... Conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. § 35-7-1059(a)(iv). By well-settled rules of statutory construction, the specific statutory provision always prevails over a more general statutory provision. See e.g. Schafer v. State, 2008 WY 149, ¶¶ 13-15, 197 P.3d 1247, 1250-51 (Wyo.2008). Thus, we conclude that § 35-7-1042 is inapplicable in this instance. [¶ 38] The fundamental problem of this case is this: Counts III and IV charged Baker with conspiracy to possess precursors and laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. The conspiracies charged, however, are not crimes unless prohibited by the conspiracy provision of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv). Under the language of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv), this is not the case. As defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009), clandestine laboratory operation means: § 35-7-1058. Definitions. (a) As used in this article: .... (ii) Clandestine laboratory operation means: (A) Purchasing or procuring chemicals, supplies, equipment or a laboratory location for the illegal manufacture of controlled substances; (B) Transporting or arranging for the transportation of chemicals, supplies or equipment for the illegal manufacture of controlled substances; (C) Setting up supplies or equipment for the illegal manufacture of controlled substances; or (D) Distributing or disposing of chemicals, equipment, supplies, or products used in or produced by the illegal manufacture of controlled substances The crime of conspiracy under § 35-7-1059, as defined by the legislature, is comprised of conspiring to engage in the purchase, procurement, transportation, or distribution of chemicals, supplies, or laboratory equipment associated with the manufacture of controlled substances, or conspiring to set up equipment or supplies in preparation for the manufacture of controlled substances. [¶ 39] From this language, it is apparent that Baker's charged conduct of conspiring to possess precursors and laboratory equipment or supplies is not delineated as a crime under the conspiracy provision of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv). The end result is that Baker was charged with and subsequently convicted of crimes that do not legally exist. Lacking a legal basis, those convictions must be reversed, and Baker should be sentenced accordingly.