Opinion ID: 4225210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶40 In evaluating Breitzman's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we consider three acts——or failures to act——of Breitzman's trial counsel: (A) trial counsel's failure to move for dismissal of count five for disorderly conduct on free speech grounds; (B) trial counsel's failure to present opening remarks consistent with Breitzman's anticipated testimony; and (C) trial counsel's failure to object to testimony regarding other uncharged conduct. ¶41 As to the first, we conclude that trial counsel's failure to move to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the basis that it violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free speech was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, because whether profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is protected as free speech is unsettled law. ¶42 As to the second, we conclude that trial counsel's theory of reasonable parental discipline, as presented in opening remarks, was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, because it reflected trial counsel's reasonable expectations, which were rationally based 22 No. 2015AP1610-CR on discussions with Breitzman, and it was part of a reasonable trial strategy. ¶43 As to the third, we conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to testimony regarding uncharged conduct was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, because declining to object was part of a reasonable trial strategy. ¶44 Because we conclude that trial counsel's performance was not deficient, we need not address whether, in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, there was prejudice to Breitzman, and we decline to do so. ¶45 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
To Move For Dismissal Of The Disorderly Conduct Count On Free Speech Grounds. ¶46 We consider first whether trial counsel's failure to move to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the basis that it violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free speech constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶47 Breitzman argues that the failure to raise a free speech claim was ineffective assistance because the disorderly conduct charge was based on the content of Breitzman's speech in the privacy of her home, which did not fall within one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech. The State argues that the failure to raise a free speech claim was not ineffective assistance because Breitzman has not demonstrated that, as a 23 No. 2015AP1610-CR matter of settled law, she had a right to engage in profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.18 ¶48 We conclude that trial counsel's failure to move to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge on the basis that it violated Breitzman's constitutional right to free speech was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, because whether profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is protected as free speech is unsettled law. ¶49 At the outset, we note that, for trial counsel's performance to have been deficient, Breitzman would need to demonstrate that counsel failed to raise an issue of settled law. [F]ailure to raise arguments that require the resolution of unsettled legal questions generally does not render a lawyer's services 'outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance' sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. Lemberger, 374 Wis. 2d 617, ¶18 (quoting Basham v. United States, 811 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2016)). Rather, ineffective assistance of counsel cases should be limited to situations where the law or duty is clear . . . . Id., ¶33 (quoting State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 85, 519 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1994)). Thus, we turn to the question of whether the 18 We note that Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) is not limited to public places: Whoever, in a public or private place . . . . Thus, the fact that Breitzman was in the privacy of her home does not necessarily affect our analysis. 24 No. 2015AP1610-CR law is clear that profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is protected as free speech. It is not. ¶50 An individual is guaranteed the right to free speech under Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states in relevant part that [e]very person may freely speak . . . his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right . . . . The same right is guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states in relevant part that Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. Despite the differences in language between these two provisions, we have found no differences in the freedoms that they guarantee. State v. Robert T., 2008 WI App 22, ¶6, 307 Wis. 2d 488, 746 N.W.2d 564. ¶51 The First Amendment case law applicable to profanity and disorderly conduct finds root in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which held: There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words——those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. . . . [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its 25 No. 2015AP1610-CR punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)). ¶52 In a series of cases post-Chaplinsky, this court upheld Wis. Stat. § 947.01 against numerous free speech challenges. In State v. Zwicker we held that § 947.01 (196768)19 did not violate defendants' free speech rights because [i]t rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech . . . extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. 41 Wis. 2d 497, 513, 164 N.W.2d 512 (1969). In State v. Maker we again upheld § 947.01 (1967-68), noting that any challenge to the disorderly conduct statute based on words spoken or conduct engaged in must balance the right to maintain the public peace with the imperative to protect constitutionally assured personal freedoms. 48 Wis. 2d 612, 615, 180 N.W.2d 707 (1970). In State v. Werstein we upheld § 947.01 (1971-72) once again, emphasizing that [i]t is the combination of conduct and circumstances that is crucial in applying the statute to a particular situation; convictions for being 'otherwise disorderly' result[] from the inappropriateness of specific conduct because of the circumstances involved, namely, where demeanor could be deemed 19 The operative language of subsection (1) of the statute, which is at issue here, has not changed substantially since these cases were decided. 26 No. 2015AP1610-CR abusive or disturbing in the eyes of reasonable persons. 60 Wis. 2d 668, 672-74, 211 N.W.2d 437 (1973); see also State v. Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 664-65, 188 N.W.2d 449 (1971); State v. Givens, 28 Wis. 2d 109, 121-22, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965). ¶53 The United States Supreme Court, however, soon after issuing Chaplinsky, narrowed its holding. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). In Terminiello, the Court held that freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. Id. But see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) ([At the time of ratification] all of [the] States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. . . . In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.).20 20 In response, Breitzman cites to Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931), for the proposition that [t]he question of what constitutes profane language . . . is usually dealt with as a branch of the common-law offense of blasphemy. Presumably, Breitzman cites this case to undermine the constitutionality of a statute which regulates speech rooted in archaic norms of propriety. We do not address this issue here, however, as Breitzman has not raised a claim that her speech was not profane, or that the statute is facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as-applied to her; her claim here is limited to whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make such a challenge. 27 No. 2015AP1610-CR ¶54 Similarly, while we need not adopt any of the following tests for the purposes of our review today, we note that our more recent case law could be read to restrict statutory regulation of speech to the well-defined categories of unprotected speech: fighting words,21 speech that incites others into imminent lawless action,22 obscenity,23 libel and defamatory speech,24 and true threats25.26 See State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶17, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725; State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶16, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712 ([The defendant's] speech can be prosecuted only if [it] is one of the limited 21 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 22 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 23 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 24 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 25 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 26 See also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (adding speech integral to criminal conduct, child pornography, fraud, and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent as other content-based restrictions that have been permitted). With regard to content-based restrictions, Breitzman also cites Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) for the proposition that the Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality. We express no opinion here, however, as to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 947.01 with regard to whether it is a content-based restriction or otherwise, because Breitzman has not made a facial or as-applied challenge to the statute; her claim here is limited to whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make such a challenge. 28 No. 2015AP1610-CR categories of speech that fall outside the protections of the First Amendment.); cf. Douglas D., 243 Wis. 2d 204, ¶24, (noting that Wis. Stat. § 947.01 is a recognition of the fact that in some circumstances words carry with them proscribable nonspeech elements, i.e., conduct); State v. Schwebke, 2002 WI 55, ¶¶29-31, 253 Wis. 2d 1, 644 N.W.2d 666 (holding that the disorderly conduct statute does not only apply to public disruptions). The depth and breadth of these restrictions on free speech are not so settled in Wisconsin law that counsel's performance could be deemed deficient in this case. ¶55 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has rejected any balancing test that may be inferred from its historical descriptions of unprotected categories of speech as being of such slight social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)); see also Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011); cf. Brown, 564 U.S. at 792 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472) ('Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.'). ¶56 This body of case law does not promulgate a clear standard as to whether a charge under Wis. Stat. § 947.01, based on profane conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance, violates the constitutional right to free speech. And, because 29 No. 2015AP1610-CR Breitzman does not raise a facial or as-applied challenge to the disorderly conduct statute,27 we are confined to considering the narrower issue of whether the law was so well settled that counsel's performance was legally deficient. See State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) (An appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.). In that regard, trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge, because doing so would have required that there be a resolution of an unsettled question of law. See Lemberger, 374 Wis. 2d 617, ¶18. ¶57 We recognize, however, that the use of profanity alone is not enough to sustain a charge for disorderly conduct. A charge for disorderly conduct has two elements: first, that the defendant engage[d] in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct; second, that the defendant's conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance. See Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1). Profanity alone might satisfy the first element, but it does not likely satisfy the second element. Thus, it is not profanity alone that is being regulated by the statute. ¶58 We also note that the charge against Breitzman was not just that she engaged in profane conduct, but that she did engage in profane conduct, under circumstances in which 27 See supra ¶5, n.4. 30 No. 2015AP1610-CR such conduct tended to cause a disturbance . . . .28 To be clear, the crime of disorderly conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01 requires more than profane speech alone. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (holding that wearing a jacket bearing the words Fuck the Draft did not disturb the peace where the words were the only conduct, in part because there was no evidence that persons powerless to avoid appellant's conduct did in fact object to it). But, as is clear from the testimony here, Breitzman was not charged with disorderly conduct solely because she swore at her son in the privacy of her home; rather she was charged and convicted of disorderly conduct because her profane conduct was that which, under the circumstances presented, tended to cause or provoke a disturbance. See Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d at 673-74 ([C]onvictions for being 'otherwise disorderly' result[] from the inappropriateness of specific conduct because of the circumstances involved, namely where demeanor could be deemed abusive or disturbing in the eyes of reasonable persons). ¶59 Here, the jury heard evidence of other occasions where Breitzman called J.K. a fuck face, retard, and piece of shit——and on two of the five occasions charged, this profanity was punctuated by physical abuse. Conviction on count one, for 28 Additionally, we note that the State could have charged Breitzman with more than profane conduct, as it is one of many options under the statute. Had the State done so, Breitzman acknowledged at oral argument that the constitutional question here would not be in issue. 31 No. 2015AP1610-CR physical abuse, was supported by testimony that Breitzman struck J.K. on the side of the head when he was not sweeping right or fast enough, calling him a piece of shit and the dog of the house. Conviction on count two, also for physical abuse, was supported by testimony that Breitzman came into J.K.'s room and struck him in the face when he would not get out of bed, calling him a fuck face and a retard. ¶60 The jury also heard testimony from J.K.'s best friend about the impact this had on J.K., who went from always happy and nice to more stressed out and tired and just more sad.29 A situation need not escalate to violence for the reasonable person to determine that the profanity tended to cause or provoke a disturbance.30 Simply stated, were this case about profanity alone, isolated from the context and conduct out of which the charge arose, and had Breitzman made a constitutional challenge to the validity of the statute vis-à-vis profanity alone, we might be confronted with the need to resolve a free speech argument. But that is just not this case; rather 29 Additionally, J.K. testified that these interactions with his mother made him feel worthless, often making him cry, ultimately causing him to report this home situation to his counselor at school and to the police. 30 It is not necessary that an actual disturbance must have been committed from the defendant's conduct. The law requires only that the conduct be of the type that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance under the circumstances as they then existed. You must consider not only the nature of the conduct, but also the circumstances surrounding that conduct. What is proper under one set of circumstances may be improper under other circumstances. See Wis JI——Criminal 1900 (2016). 32 No. 2015AP1610-CR Breitzman's conduct, because [of] the circumstances involved, could rightfully be deemed abusive or disturbing in the eyes of reasonable persons. Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d at 673-74. ¶61 In sum, Breitzman has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient because the law in this area is unsettled. Additionally, Breitzman's conduct was more than just profanity, and the law does not support the notion that, because Breitzman engaged in profane conduct, she is to be protected from prosecution regardless of the fact that the circumstances tended to cause or provoke a disturbance. Thus, her trial counsel's performance did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness.
To Present Opening Remarks Consistent With Breitzman's Anticipated Testimony. ¶62 We consider second the issue of whether defense counsel's theory of reasonable parental discipline at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in light of Breitzman's denial that she struck J.K. on the two charged occasions. ¶63 Breitzman argues that it was inconsistent to argue in opening remarks that striking J.K. was reasonable parental discipline where she planned to testify that she did not strike J.K. on the two charged occasions, and that, but for this inconsistency, the jury would have been presented with a more straightforward credibility comparison. The State argues that Breitzman's counsel's theory of reasonable parental discipline, 33 No. 2015AP1610-CR as presented in the opening remarks, was not ineffective assistance because it was short, vague, and struck a careful balance between Breitzman's plan to deny that she struck J.K. on the two charged occasions and trial counsel's reasonable anticipation that the uncharged incident in the car would likely arise during testimony; moreover, Breitzman agreed with this strategy and any unfair prejudice was addressed by the circuit court's jury instruction that attorney arguments are not evidence. ¶64 We conclude that defense counsel's theory of reasonable parental discipline, as presented in opening remarks, was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, because it reflected trial counsel's reasonable expectations, which were rationally based on discussions with Breitzman, and it was part of a reasonable trial strategy. ¶65 At the outset, we note that, for trial counsel's performance to have been deficient, Breitzman would need to overcome the strong presumption of reasonableness of her defense counsel's trial strategy by demonstrating that counsel's incorporation of the reasonable parental discipline defense was irrational or based on caprice. Trial strategy is afforded the presumption of constitutional adequacy. See, e.g., Balliette 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶26; State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶43, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583. Reviewing courts should be 'highly deferential' to counsel's strategic decisions and make 'every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of 34 No. 2015AP1610-CR hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.' See Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 (quoting Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22). This court will not second-guess a reasonable trial strategy, [unless] it was based on an irrational trial tactic or based upon caprice rather than upon judgment. Id., ¶49. In fact, where a lower court determines that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy, the strategy is virtually unassailable in an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, ¶23, 275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 N.W.2d 620. Thus, we turn to the question of whether trial counsel's defense theory of reasonable parental discipline was an irrational trial tactic or based on caprice. It was not. ¶66 The parties focus their arguments on defense counsel's opening remarks, which discussed the jury instruction for reasonable parental discipline and framed the issue as whether [Breitzman] is a criminal or just a struggling parent[.] I believe the evidence will show that she is not a criminal . . . . ¶67 Trial counsel testified at the Machner hearing that he pursued the reasonable parental discipline theory in part because of his concern about the credibility battle that would play out at trial. He also testified that he discussed the reasonable parental discipline theory with Breitzman, and Breitzman testified that she agreed to it. Trial counsel did not specifically recall whether Breitzman had categorically 35 No. 2015AP1610-CR denied striking J.K. on the two charged occasions, but did recall that it was important to Breitzman to bring up the uncharged incident in the car to explain J.K.'s level of animosity toward his mother such that he would falsely accuse her of abuse and neglect.31 ¶68 Given this testimony, defense counsel's decision to incorporate the theory of reasonable parental discipline in his opening remarks was not ineffective assistance. First, [i]n light of the not uncommon practice of lawyers to argue inconsistent theories, we cannot say that the decision [to do so] deprive[s a defendant] of the right to constitutionally effective assistance, irrespective of whether we or the trial court view that strategy as the best. State v. Marks, 2010 WI App 172, ¶17, 330 Wis. 2d 693, 794 N.W.2d 547; see also Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490, 494–95 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel where the defense theory was that Brown either did not commit the murders or did so while drunk because the use of inconsistent defenses was objectively reasonable under prevailing professional norms). ¶69 Second, trial counsel's decision was based on a discussion with Breitzman about her relationship with J.K. and the evidence that she expected and wanted to come out at trial; 31 At the Machner hearing, defense counsel testified that [s]he also told me that she believed that [the car incident] was part of the . . . animus [] he had against her to try to create these other issues such as when he was injured lifting dumbbells and claimed she had struck him, et cetera. 36 No. 2015AP1610-CR therefore, it was not based on caprice. Nor was it irrational: the record reflects that the State pled a number of other acts in its criminal complaint, including the uncharged incident in the car; that Breitzman in fact wanted this other act to come in to establish J.K.'s motive to lie; and that Breitzman never unequivocally told trial counsel that she intended to deny striking J.K. on the two charged occasions.32 Thus, it was rational for her trial counsel to formulate a strategy and argue a theory of defense with the expectation that some other acts would come out at trial. Such a strategy had to account for the possibility that Breitzman's credibility would be undermined by evidence of other acts, and giving the jury an alternate ground for acquittal in the event that they had doubts about Breitzman's credibility and questions about the other acts was a reasonable means of accommodating such contingency. ¶70 Additionally, there are many aspects of a trial which make its outcome uncertain and we cannot let our judgment of trial strategy be clouded by the clarity of hindsight. See, e.g., Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 (Reviewing courts should . . . make every effort to eliminate the distorting 32 In this regard, we note that the circuit court found that defense counsel's testimony at the Machner hearing was credible. In light of Breitzman's bias, both from hindsight and as an interested party, we cannot hold that such a finding was clearly erroneous. See State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, ¶31, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93 ([T]his court will not exclude the circuit court's articulated assessments of credibility and demeanor, unless they are clearly erroneous.). 37 No. 2015AP1610-CR effects of hindsight.) We have concluded here that defense counsel's decision to argue the reasonable parental discipline defense in his opening remarks was not ineffective based on the record. We note that the record also reflects that Breitzman's trial counsel adjusted his strategy based on the development of evidence at trial: after Breitzman's testimony concluded, her trial counsel adjusted course, successfully advocating for the inclusion of reasonable parental discipline as a therapeutic instruction for other acts and limiting his discussion of reasonable parental discipline during closing argument to the other acts.33 These adjustments were appropriate. ¶71 In sum, Breitzman has failed to demonstrate that her trial counsel's performance was deficient because pursuing a theory of reasonable parental discipline was rationally based on counsel's discussions with Breitzman and his expectations for what evidence would come out at trial. Additionally, when trial 33 After testimony concluded on day two, and before testimony began on day three, the circuit court conferred with the parties outside the presence of the jury regarding jury instructions. The court expressed concern that there was not enough evidence to give the reasonable parental discipline instruction because Breitzman was denying striking J.K. on the two charged occasions. The State agreed. Defense counsel argued that the instruction was appropriate because the State had introduced other acts, namely the uncharged incident in the car, which entitled Breitzman to assert the reasonable parental discipline defense. The court ultimately agreed to incorporate part of the jury instruction for the reasonable parental discipline defense, see Wis JI——Criminal 950 (2014), as a therapeutic instruction responsive to other acts. See infra ¶78. 38 No. 2015AP1610-CR did not proceed in accordance with counsel's expectations, he adjusted course and the court's limiting instructions——discussed below——appropriately addressed any potential juror confusion. Thus, trial counsel's performance did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness. C. Trial Counsel Was Not Deficient For Failing To Object To Testimony Regarding Other Uncharged Conduct. ¶72 We consider third the related issue of whether trial counsel's failure to object to testimony regarding other uncharged conduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶73 Breitzman argues that the failure to object to testimony about acts other than those underlying the charges was ineffective assistance because the testimony was inadmissible other acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04 and, but for admission, the jury would have been presented with a more straightforward credibility comparison. The State argues that the failure to object was not ineffective assistance because allowing this testimony was a reasonable means of accomplishing trial counsel's strategy to undermine J.K.'s credibility by depicting him as a rebellious teenager who was making grandiose allegations; moreover, Breitzman agreed with this strategy. ¶74 We conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to testimony regarding uncharged conduct was not deficient performance, and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, because declining to object was part of a reasonable trial strategy. 39 No. 2015AP1610-CR ¶75 At the outset, we note that this is again a question of trial strategy, and, as such, that Breitzman must overcome the strong presumption of reasonableness afforded to trial counsel's decisions regarding trial strategy; for trial counsel's performance to have been deficient, Breitzman would need to demonstrate that counsel's decision not to object to other acts was inconsistent with a reasonable trial strategy, that is, that it was irrational or based on caprice. As noted above, trial strategy is afforded the presumption of constitutional adequacy. See, e.g., Balliette 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶26; Maloney, 281 Wis. 2d 595, ¶43. Reviewing courts should be highly deferential to counsel's strategic decisions and make every effort 'to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.' See Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 (quoting Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22). This court will not second-guess a reasonable trial strategy, [unless] it was based on an irrational trial tactic or based upon caprice rather than upon judgment. Id., ¶49. In fact, where a lower court determines that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy, the strategy is virtually unassailable in an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. Maloney, 275 Wis. 2d 557, ¶23. Thus, we turn to the question of whether trial counsel's failure to object to otheracts evidence was an irrational trial tactic or based on caprice. It was not. 40 No. 2015AP1610-CR ¶76 Here, the trial strategy was to demonstrate that J.K. was making false and grandiose allegations against Breitzman. As a part of this strategy, trial counsel did not object to other acts involving slapping, failing to provide medical care, and/or profanity, because he intended for that evidence to undermine J.K.'s credibility and cast Breitzman as a single parent doing the best she could with a rebellious teenager. In other words, the testimony as to other acts was central to the defense's strategy for bolstering Breitzman's credibility, and its theory of reasonable parental discipline, because, for the defense to be successful, the jury needed to understand the context of the relationship between Breitzman and J.K. so as to appropriately assess credibility and determine culpability. Thus, failing to object to other acts testimony was not deficient performance because it was rational in light of trial counsel's strategy and theory. ¶77 In general, it can be quite effective for a defendant to say 'I did this and I did that, but I did not do what the State has charged me with,' because it tends to establish a defendant's credibility. But, there are many aspects of a trial which make its outcome uncertain and we cannot let our judgment of trial strategy be clouded by the clarity of hindsight. See, e.g., Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 (Reviewing courts should . . . make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.). Furthermore, Breitzman agreed to the defense theory of reasonable parental discipline and [a]n accused cannot follow one course of strategy at the time of 41 No. 2015AP1610-CR trial and if that turns out to be unsatisfactory complain [she] should be discharged or have a new trial. Cross v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 593, 605, 173 N.W.2d 589 (1970). Thus, Breitzman cannot now complain just because a strategy that was reasonable at the outset turned out to be unsuccessful. ¶78 Additionally, the circuit court gave jury instructions that limited any unfair prejudice that may have resulted from the other acts testimony. With regard to other acts, the court instructed as follows: Evidence has been presented regarding other conduct of the defendant for which the defendant is not on trial. . . . If you find that this conduct did occur, you should consider it only on the issues of intent and context or background. You may not consider this evidence to conclude that the defendant has a certain character or a certain character trait and that the defendant acted in conformity with that trait or character with respect to the offense charged in this case. The evidence was received by [sic] the issues of intent, that is, whether the defendant acted with the state of mind that is required for the offense charged, and to prove context or background that is to provide a more complete presentation of the evidence related to the offense charged. With regard to the uncharged incident in the car, the court additionally instructed as follows: As to [the] striking of [J.K.] with the back of the hand in the car, discipline of a child is an issue. The law allows a person responsible for the child's welfare to use reasonable force to discipline that child. Reasonable force is that force which a reasonable person would believe is necessary. Whether a reasonable person would have believed that the amount of force used was necessary and not 42 No. 2015AP1610-CR excessive must be determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the time of the defendant's acts. The standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's position under circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense. These limiting instructions were sufficient to address any unfair prejudice that may have resulted from the other acts testimony, and in fact bolstered Breitzman's defense regarding reasonable parental discipline. See State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶41, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399 (We presume that juries comply with properly given limiting and cautionary instructions, and thus consider this an effective means to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing admission of other[-]acts evidence.). ¶79 In sum, Breitzman has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient because admission of other acts testimony was central to a reasonable defense theory and strategy. Additionally, any unfair prejudice was appropriately addressed by limiting instructions from the court. Thus, defense counsel's performance did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness. D. We Need Not Consider Prejudice Because Trial Counsel Was Not Deficient. ¶80 To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must establish both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 43 No. 2015AP1610-CR ¶81 Where the petitioner fails to satisfy either prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis we need not consider the other. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Because we conclude that Breitzman has not established that trial counsel's performance was deficient, we need not address whether, in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, the alleged errors individually or cumulatively prejudiced Breitzman, and we decline to do so.