Opinion ID: 2086340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Delegation Generally: Act 312 Standards Are as Reasonably Precise as the Subject Matter Requires or Permits

Text: The Michigan doctrine of delegation was succinctly stated by this Court in Osius v St Clair Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25 (1956), in terms of the following standards test: [29] There is no doubt that a legislative body may not delegate to another its lawmaking powers. It must promulgate, not abdicate. This is not to say, however, that a subordinate body or official may not be clothed with the authority to say when the law shall operate, or as to whom, or upon what occasion, provided, however, that the standards prescribed for guidance are as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits. [30] (Emphasis supplied.) Factually addressing the adequacy of Act 312's legislatively prescribed standards, we need only highlight our precis of Act 312's provisions in Part III, B, supra, that Act 312: specifically enunciates its guiding purpose, MCL 423.231; defines the parties to whom it is and is not applicable, MCL 423.232; establishes specific time limits circumscribing arbitral initiation and resolution, MCL 423.233, 423.236 and 423.238; provides a detailed procedure for both the appointment and removal of a permanent MERC panel of potential chairpersons as well as for the selection of the arbitration panel's representative delegates and public chairperson, MCL 423.234 and 423.235; formulates procedural guidelines relative to the arbitral hearing and remand, MCL 423.236, 423.237 and 423.237a; narrowly channels the panel's scope of decisional authority to eight specific factors in its review of last-offer economic issues, MCL 423.238 and 423.239; mandates the application of eight specific factors in rendering a finding, opinion and order relative to both economic and non-economic issues, MCL 423.238 and 423.239; and details the effect of an arbitral decision subject to the availability of judicial review, MCL 423.240 and 423.242. It is generally acknowledged that the instant and similar statutory schemes are directed toward the resolution of complex contractual problems which are as disparate as the towns and cities comprising the locations for these critical-service labor disputes. [31] The Legislature, through Act 312, has sought to address this complicated subject through the promulgation of express and detailed standards to guide the arbitrators' decisional operations. [32] We must conclude that the eight factors expressly listed in § 9 of the act provide standards at least as, if not more than as, reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits in effectuating the act's stated purpose to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes. MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31). These standards must be considered by the panel in its review of both economic and non-economic issues. In its resolution of noneconomic issues, the panel  shall base its findings, opinions and order upon the following factors, as applicable, MCL 423.239; MSA 17.455(39) (emphasis supplied). See MCL 423.238; MSA 17.455(38), The findings, opinions and order as to all other issues [i.e., non-economic issues] shall be based upon the applicable factors prescribed in section 9. (Emphasis supplied.) When these eight specific § 9 factors are coupled with the § 8 mandate that [a]s to each economic issue, the arbitration panel shall adopt the last offer of settlement which, in the opinion of the arbitration panel, more nearly complies with the applicable factors prescribed in section 9, MCL 423.238; MSA 17.455(38) (emphasis supplied), the sufficiency of these standards is even more patent. [33] Four Justices of this Court have already, in Dearborn, individually recognized that Act 312 provides sufficient standards to guide the exercise of delegated authority. [34] In Dearborn, each of the four participating Justices agreed to this proposition even before the § 9 factors had become operative to both non-economic and § 8 last offer economic issues alike. [35] As Justice LEVIN remarked in this regard: All that is generally required has been done. Dearborn, supra, 259 (opinion of LEVIN, J.). Applying the Osius explication of the delegation doctrine, all that is required to constitutionally sustain this dispute resolution mechanism is that the statutory scheme provide standards at least as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits. We have found that the standards embraced by the § 9 factors fulfill this requirement. The Legislature has determined that these express and detailed § 9 standards must be considered in the panel's resolution of economic last best offer issues as well as non-economic issues alike. Although the Legislature has chosen to provide for the resolution of economic issues on a last offer of settlement basis expressly circumscribed by the applicable § 9 standards in an apparent attempt to effectuate the act's § 1 purpose of afford[ing] an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes, we do not believe that either the presence or absence of this last best offer provision is necessary to the act's constitutionality under the dictates of the delegation doctrine or otherwise. [36] However, we are unaware of any court which has declared a similar critical-service act unconstitutional on the basis of the inclusion of such an economic issue provision but can point to two cases which have considered last-best offer settlement and have willingly sustained their act's constitutionality provided sufficient standards are enumerated to focus arbitral decision-making. [37] In reaching this conclusion, we are also persuaded by the fact that the Act 312 standards are patently more precise than those which this and other courts have previously upheld under similar modes of delegation analysis and involving subject matters at least as complex as that considered here. [38] Other jurisdictions have sanctioned their compulsory interest arbitration schemes even though presented with less precise [39] or even nonexplicit standards for decision. [40] Furthermore, in two cases where standards identical to those codified in Act 312 were subjected to judicial scrutiny, their sufficiency was upheld. [41] Also, in another case where the prescribed standards were found insufficient, the court expressly indicated that its decision would have been otherwise had the Legislature modeled its standards after those found in Michigan's Act 312. [42]