Opinion ID: 4111304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discretion to Correct the Error

Text: While we will ordinarily remand for resentencing if a district court commits plain error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights by denying the right of allocution, we have “decline[d] to adopt a blanket rule that once prejudice is found under the rule stated above, the error invariably requires correction.” Reyna, 358 F.3d at 352. Instead, we “conduct a thorough review of the record to determine . . . whether the error ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’” compelling our exercise of discretion to correct it. Id. at 353. In most allocution appeals, “to prevail, defendants will have to show some objective basis that would have moved the trial court to grant a lower sentence; otherwise, it can hardly be said that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.” Id. at 356 (Jones, J., concurring); see also 6 Case: 14-40279 Document: 00513812368 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/27/2016 No. 14-40279 Magwood, 445 F.3d at 830 (determining that the defendant, who simply challenged a facial violation of the denial of the right to allocute and who did not challenge his sentence, failed to establish that a miscarriage of justice occurred). Whether this court will exercise its discretion to correct the error is a “highly fact-specific” inquiry involving a range of factors. See Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 605. “[I]f the defendant had a prior opportunity to allocute, or if the defendant fails to explain what exactly he or she would have said during allocution that might mitigate the sentence, then the case is one of those ‘limited class of cases’ in which we will decline to exercise our discretion to correct the error.” Id. at 606 (quoting Reyna, 358 F.3d at 352). We have also considered whether defense counsel offered mitigating arguments on behalf of the defendant. See Magwood, 445 F.3d at 830 (declining to correct the error where defense counsel argued mitigating information, the district court weighed that information, and the defendant failed to state what his mitigating statement would have been). Although the presence of such arguments may support affirming the sentence, such statements do not preclude this court from exercising its discretion to correct the error. See id. Here, Palacios was not given a prior opportunity to allocute. He was, however, given an opportunity to speak before the district court imposed his sentence. During the sentencing hearing, the district court reiterated to Palacios his right to raise any issues he had with the PSR and gave him the opportunity to describe “what wrongful conduct [he] did that constituted [the] offense.” In response, Palacios provided a detailed answer describing his unlawful actions. However, although the district court went beyond “barely address[ing the defendant] at all,” see Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 604, 607 (finding reversible error where the only time the defendant spoke was when he twice said “Yes, sir” in response to whether he had received and reviewed the 7 Case: 14-40279 Document: 00513812368 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/27/2016 No. 14-40279 PSR), it never gave Palacios an explicit opportunity to speak freely, see Magwood, 445 F.3d at 829. Palacios was effectively limited to talking about any issues he had with the PSR; telling the district court generally “what wrongful conduct [he] did that constituted [the] offense”; and discussing his role in the conspiracy. Thus, this consideration does not weigh definitively in either direction. However, other factors weigh strongly in favor of correcting the district court’s error. Palacios provided in his appellate brief a statement of what he would have said had he been given the opportunity to allocute. This statement is specific, thorough, and gives “detail, expression, [and] expansion” to the statements provided by defense counsel. 1 See Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 606. It provides specific facts about Palacios’s professional accomplishments, charitable activities and family life, and efforts to better himself while incarcerated—any of which might have convinced the district court to impose a lesser sentence. See id. (correcting the error where the defendant “specifie[d] precisely” what he would have told the district court to mitigate his sentence); United States v. Lister, 229 F. App’x 334, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (correcting the error where the defendant specified in his brief what he would 1For example, during sentencing, defense counsel asked the district court “to consider the age of [Palacios’s] young son.” By contrast, in his appellate brief, Palacios states that he would have said: I would like to apologize to my own family . . . . Most importantly, my son Joey, for leaving him without a father. Not a day goes by that I don’t regret all the things that I have done that has [sic] led me to standing before you today. These actions have taken me away from the most important responsibility to be bestowed upon me—fatherhood. I have failed miserably in setting a good example for him. And although I have tried to raise a little boy with a strong moral code, my actions will nonetheless affect the way he looks at me. I only hope that one day he will find it in his heart to forgive me for abandoning him when he needs me the most. Being taken into custody in his presence is something that will always tear at my heart and my conscience. 8 Case: 14-40279 Document: 00513812368 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/27/2016 No. 14-40279 have included in his allocution statement); cf. United States v. Neal, 212 F. App’x 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (declining to correct the error where the defendant “assert[ed] only conclusionally [that] he was not given an opportunity to discuss his ‘family, background, his conduct in prison, his activities during his months of successful supervised release, or other areas’” but failed “to allege any specific facts which, given the entirety of the transcript, . . . likely would’ve convinced the district court to levy a more lenient sentence”). Moreover, although Palacios’s defense counsel made a few, somewhat cursory, mitigating statements on Palacios’s behalf, 2 these brief points were not sufficient to supplant Palacios’s right to plead his own case at allocution. In Avila-Cortez, we exercised our discretion to correct the error where the defendant explained in his brief that he would have told the district court that he had a specific strategy to address his problem with alcohol and that he was making plans to return permanently to Mexico with his wife. 582 F.3d at 606. The defendant’s counsel, by contrast, had only “summarily referred to this mitigating evidence in his argument.” See id. Similarly, here, defense counsel “did not present to the court the same quantity or quality of mitigating evidence that [the defendant] would have given had he been able to allocute.” See id. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel only summarily referred to the fact that Palacios was taking classes while incarcerated, has a young son, and had no prior criminal history. In his appellate brief, however, Palacios adds detail and description to these assertions, presents additional mitigating evidence, and does all of this in his own voice. See Green v. United States, 365 2Specifically, defense counsel stated: “Yes, your Honor, also the classes that he’s been taking while incarcerated in Willacy County. We also ask the Court to consider the age of his young son, your Honor.” Counsel then added: “The fact that Mr. Palacios, you know, has no criminal history, your Honor.” 9 Case: 14-40279 Document: 00513812368 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/27/2016 No. 14-40279 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (As Justice Frankfurter explained, “The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.”). Further, as in Avila-Cortez, the record in this case does not indicate that the district court contemplated, or subsequently rejected, defense counsel’s mitigating statements. See AvilaCortez, 582 F.3d at 604, 606; cf. Magwood, 445 F.3d at 830. These considerations weigh in favor of correcting the district court’s error, and, consistent with this court’s precedent, Palacios has “show[n] some objective basis that would have moved the trial court to grant a lower sentence.” See Magwood, 445 F.3d at 830 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Legg, 439 F. App’x at 313 (finding the defendant failed to show such an objective basis where the facts and assertions he contended he would have presented to mitigate his sentence were either considered by the district court and deemed unpersuasive or did not undermine the court’s reasons for imposing the sentence); United States v. Coleman, 280 F. App’x 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding no miscarriage of justice where the defendant did not point to anything “that arguably would have impacted the district court’s thinking”). The Government urges us to consider, inter alia, (1) that the district court had a “comprehensive” view of Palacios through the substantial PSR, the experience of sentencing Palacios’s coconspirators, and its knowledge of Palacios’s ex-wife and family, 3 and (2) that Palacios, a former prosecutor and defense lawyer, “would have been his own best advocate if there had been anything else to say.” We do not find these factors sufficient to outweigh the previous considerations. The existence of a voluminous PSR and the presence 3Palacios’s ex-wife is a prosecutor who had previously appeared in the district court, and Palacios’s brother and father were codefendants who had been sentenced by the court. 10 Case: 14-40279 Document: 00513812368 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/27/2016 No. 14-40279 of other codefendants at sentencing do not per se negate the occurrence of a miscarriage of justice, and the Government cites no authority that would suggest otherwise. Additionally, even assuming that Palacios had been aware of his right to allocute based on his professional experience, mere awareness of that right is not the proper inquiry under Rule 32. Moreover, during sentencing, Palacios was not appearing as a defense attorney but rather as a criminal defendant facing severe penalties and likely under significant stress. Thus, while these considerations could perceivably carry slight weight, we do not find them dispositive.