Opinion ID: 2403031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the second conviction

Text: The defendant alleges the indictment charging him with conspiring to obstruct justice was fatally defective in various respects and that the trial judge wrongfully removed one of his prime defenses from the consideration of the jury. The validity of these contentions need not be decided since we have determined to reverse the second conviction upon another and wholly unrelated ground. In the Appellate Division the defendant specifically refused to impugn the second conviction upon the theory that its obtention should have been barred by the application of res adjudicata or collateral estoppel. Now, however, he urges there was error in the Appellate Division's not acting on its own motion to set the conviction aside. Apparently the defendant's reluctance to accept the suggestion made below that he argue principles of res judicata  was traceable to the thought that such acceptance would necessarily have entailed the recognition on his part of the validity of the first judgment. This is not so. The defendant's dilemma was illusory and self-imposed. Alternative arguments would have been in order in the Appellate Division. The State contends the defendant should not be permitted to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel as invalidating the second conviction since he not only failed to raise this issue at the trial level but expressly disclaimed any intention of doing so even in the Appellate Division. The factual inconsistencies of the two judgments make it apparent that an injustice has been done by the rendition of one of them. The defendant has been convicted of two offenses on findings of fact which are utterly irreconcilable. With knowledge of the conflict between the two stories concerning the identity of the driver, the State chose to prosecute the drunken driving charge upon the thesis that Edward had been driving. In these circumstances, the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the proper and equitable administration of criminal justice require that the matter of inconsistency be resolved under the plain error rule. See City of Newark v. Pulverman, 12 N.J. 105, 108 (1953). If the illegality of a conviction is apparent, the defendant's protestations, although belated, must be observed. Because of his prior conviction in the municipal and County Courts of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the State was collaterally estopped from convicting the defendant for conspiring to state falsely he was the driver of the automobile on the occasion in question. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, under these circumstances, precludes the relitigation between the same parties of the identical factual question previously tried between them, where it is isolated and determinative of the basic factual issue involved. Restatement, Judgments, § 68. See Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., 26 N.J. 307 (1958). It applies in criminal as well as in civil cases. State v. Leibowitz, 22 N.J. 102 (1956); State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496 (1956), affirmed 78 S.Ct. 829 (1958). The identity of the driver of the car was an ultimate fact directly in issue in the magistrate's court, and the judgment there depended upon the finding that Edward was the driver, cf. Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., supra , while the success of the conspiracy prosecution depended upon the contrary finding that Edward was not the driver of the car in question. One cannot be a drunken driver if he is not the driver at all. The State, therefore, could not again litigate the issue as to whether Edward was or was not driving when the accident occurred. This is the very course it followed in the conspiracy prosecution and thus the second conviction, which is factually inconsistent, must be set aside. Admitting the factual inconsistency between the two judgments, the State nevertheless maintains it is immaterial, looking for support to State v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 333 (1953). The rationale of the Shoopman case does not apply. Here, there is no incongruous disparity between the nature and gravity of two offenses having an essential element in common, and there is, therefore, no reason to suppose the Legislature intended to allow the obtention of judgments based upon inconsistent findings of fact. The first conviction is affirmed, and the second reversed. For affirmance of first conviction and reversal of second conviction  Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices HEHER, WACHENFELD, BURLING, FRANCIS and PROCTOR  6. Opposed  None.