Opinion ID: 1704745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: post-election invalidation

Text: The Secretary in her supplemental brief claims that Armstrong cannot proceed with this suit because the election already has taken place and voters have approved the amendment. The favorable vote of the electors, she contends, cleansed the amendment of any defect. We disagree. Where a proposed constitutional amendment contains a defect in form, a vote of approval by the electorate may in some cases cleanse the amendment of the defect. This Court in Sylvester v. Tindall, 154 Fla. 663, 18 So.2d 892 (1944), stated the general rule: [O]nce an amendment is duly proposed and is actually published and submitted to a vote of the people and by them adopted without any question having been raised prior to the election as to the method by which the amendment gets before them, the effect of a favorable vote by the people is to cure defects in the form of the submission. Sylvester, 154 Fla. at 669, 18 So.2d at 895. [31] This rule, however, is subject to a caveat: The defect in form must be technical and minor, which was the case in Sylvester: [W]e are satisfied that if there was any irregularity in the form of the ballot with reference to the amendment now before us, it was not a serious one and was cured by the adoption of the amendment by the people at the General Election in November, 1942. Sylvester, 154 Fla. at 669, 18 So.2d at 896 (emphasis added). Where the defect goes to the heart of the amendment, on the other hand, the flaw may be fatal. In Wadhams v. Board of County Commissioners, 567 So.2d 414 (Fla.1990), the Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County (the Commissioners) sought to amend a provision of the county charter governing the Charter Review Board (the Board), which is charged with reviewing the charter on a regular basis and recommending changes directly to the people. The text of the proposed amendment was printed in full on the ballot and provided inter alia that the Board would meet every four years. [32] The Commissioners, however, neglected to mention on the ballot that the amendment would supersede an existing charter provision that allowed the Board to conduct unlimited meetings-i.e., the proposal was intended to curtail the Board's right to meet. The proposal was approved by electors at a special election, and a group of citizens subsequently challenged the amendment's validity. Both the trial and district courts approved the amendment; this Court quashed the district court decision. The Court flatly rejected the Commissioners' argument that even though the ballot did not explain the amendment's chief purpose, that information had been sufficiently disseminated via public hearings, pre-election publication, and other means: The [Commissioners argue] that the majority in the decision below correctly concluded that there was no reason to invalidate the amendment[] based on voter confusion because the voters were afforded ample opportunity to become informed on the issue before the election by public hearings, advance publication of the proposal, and media publicity. We reject this argument. As this Court stated in Askew, [t]he burden of informing the public should not fall only on the press and opponents of the measure the ballot ... summary must do this. Wadhams, 567 So.2d at 417 (emphasis omitted). [33] The Court also rejected the Commissioners' argument that the voters' approval of the amendment cleansed it of any defect: We also reject the [Commissioners'] argument that the favorable vote cured any defects in the form of the submission. This defect was more than form; it went to the very heart of what section 101.161(1) seeks to preclude. Moreover, it is untenable to state that the defect was cured because a majority of the voters voted in the affirmative on the proposed amendment when the defect is that the ballot did not adequately inform the electorate of the purpose and effect of the measure upon which they were casting their votes. No one can say with any certainty what the vote of the electorate would have been if the voting public had been given the whole truth, as mandated by the statute, and had been told the chief purpose of the measure.  Wadhams, 567 So.2d at 417 (emphasis added). And finally, the Court rejected the Commissioners' contention that the challenge should be rejected because it was filed too late: Finally, we reject the [Commissioners'] argument that the present case is distinguishable from Askew because Askew dealt with a preelection challenge to the ballot and that the petitioners should be foreclosed from relief because the present action was not instituted until after the special election. The [Commissioners] in effect argue[] that hoodwinking the voting public is permissible unless the action is challenged prior to the election. We perceive no basis for the [Commissioners'] conclusion that the holding of this Court in Askew applies only if the challenge is made prior to the election. We agree with the dissent below that although there would come a point where laches would preclude an attack on the ordinance, such is not the situation in the present case where the suit was filed only a few weeks after the election. Deception of the voting public is intolerable and should not be countenanced. The purpose of section 101.161(1) is to assure that the electorate is advised of the meaning and ramifications of the proposed amendment. Because the ballot at issue failed to comply with ... section 101.161(1), the proposed amendments must be stricken. Wadhams, 567 So.2d at 417-18 (emphasis added). Like the ballot language in Wadhams, the ballot language in the present case is defective for what it does not say: It does not tell voters the chief purpose of the amendment. The present case, however, is even more compelling than Wadhams for several additional reasons. First, unlike the situation in Wadhams, the challenge here was initiated nearly a month before the election took place, rather than after the election. Second, unlike the situation in Wadhams, the text of the present amendment did not appear on the ballot, and the title and summary-which did appear-were misleading because they implied that the amendment would promote the rights of Florida citizens [34] and they contained several factual inaccuracies. [35] Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Wadhams that a favorable popular vote standing alone does not confer automatic validity on a defective amendment. When a defect goes to the very heart of the amendment, as it did in both Wadhams and the present case, it is impossible to say with any certainty what the vote of the electorate would have been if the voting public had been given the whole truth. Wadhams, 567 So.2d at 417. In such a case, the popular vote was based not on the whole truth but on part-truth.