Opinion ID: 1199771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Issue Five Jury Instructions

Text: [21] The Hospital challenges a number of the trial court's jury instructions. Jury instructions challenged on appeal are reviewed to determine whether they permit the parties to argue their theories of the case, whether they are misleading, and whether when read as a whole they accurately inform the jury of the applicable law. Douglas v. Freeman, 117 Wn.2d 242, 256-57, 814 P.2d 1160 (1991). The Hospital argues jury instruction 14 was misleading. This instruction told the jury that Nurse Canfield-Lucius and student nurse Menefee were employees of the Hospital and, further, their acts or omissions became the Hospital's acts or omissions. [10] The Hospital argues this instruction was improper insofar as it referred to student nurse Menefee. The Hospital contends (1) the evidence never established student nurse Menefee was employed by the Hospital, and (2) the trial court had already ruled at summary judgment student nurse Menefee did not breach the standard of care for a student nurse. [22] The trial court erred in issuing this instruction, for the record does not clearly establish student nurse Menefee was actually employed by the Hospital. For the following reasons, however, this error was harmless. Harmless error is error which is trivial, formal, or academic. See State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 543, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991). [23] The record clearly demonstrates Nurse Canfield-Lucius directly supervised, and was responsible for, student nurse Menefee's care in general. Furthermore, Nurse Canfield-Lucius testified she was closely supervising student nurse Menefee on the afternoon of Brandan's cardiac arrest. Nurse Canfield-Lucius was employed by the Hospital. Thus, even if student nurse Menefee was not the Hospital's employee, there can be no doubt she was the Hospital's agent. See Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wn. App. 98, 99, 579 P.2d 970 (1978) (holding that a hospital is responsible for acts of medical personnel at its facility if either traditional agency principles (consent and control) are met or if under the theory of ostensible agency the hospital holds out the personnel as employees); see also Douglas, 117 Wn.2d at 248 (hospitals have nondelegable duty to supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls). Another jury instruction properly informed the jury that [a]ny act or omission as an officer, employee or agent is the act or omission of the hospital corporation. The Hospital did not object at trial to this instruction. Accordingly, whether student nurse Menefee was termed an employee or an agent, the Hospital was responsible for her acts and omissions. [24] While jury instruction 14 arguably conflicts with the summary judgment ruling as to student nurse Menefee, this conflict does little for the Hospital's position. A judge may reverse or modify a pretrial ruling at any time prior to the entry of final judgment. See State v. Kinard, 39 Wn. App. 871, 873, 696 P.2d 603, review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1041 (1985). When this happens, a party must demonstrate the trial ruling itself was erroneous in order to secure a reversal. See State v. Brooks, 20 Wn. App. 52, 60, 579 P.2d 961 (if evidence is admitted at trial contrary to a pretrial order in limine, reversal is not required unless the trial ruling was erroneous), review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1001 (1978). The Hospital has not shown any reversible error was committed with regard to jury instruction 14. The Hospital next challenges jury instructions 18, 19 and 20 as a group. Jury instruction 18 told the jury a hospital's nursing staff is obligated to follow hospital rules and policies, and violation of rules or policies, while not necessarily constituting negligence, could be considered in determining negligence. Jury instruction 19 restated the requirements of WAC 246-318-440 as to maintaining adequate patient records. Jury instruction 20 restated the requirements of WAC 246-318-440(5) regarding the entries a hospital is required to make on patient medical records. [25] The Hospital contends these instructions unduly emphasized the plaintiffs' theory of the case, thereby depriving it of a fair trial. In support, the Hospital cites Brown v. Dahl, 41 Wn. App. 565, 579, 705 P.2d 781 (1985) and Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wn.2d 894, 897, 454 P.2d 406 (1969). These cases make clear that in order to obtain a reversal on this ground, the instructions on a particular point must be so repetitious as to generate an extreme emphasis that grossly favors one party over the other. Samuelson, 75 Wn.2d at 897; Brown, 41 Wn. App. at 579. By contrast, we find the instructions in this case to be balanced and nonrepetitious. Most jury instructions will naturally tend to support one party's theory over the other's. As long as the instructions allowed each party to argue its theory of the case, without undue emphasis or repetition, no error is committed. That standard is met here. [26] The Hospital also contends these instructions constituted impermissible comments on the evidence in violation of Const. art. 4, § 16 and Superior Court Civil Rule 51(j). We disagree. A trial judge does not impermissibly comment on the evidence when, as here, the instructions accurately state the applicable law. Hamilton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 111 Wn.2d 569, 571, 761 P.2d 618 (1988) (and cases cited therein). Rather, an impermissible comment is: one which conveys to the jury a judge's personal attitudes toward the merits of the case or allows the jury to infer from what the judge said or did not say that the judge personally believed or disbelieved the particular testimony in question. Hamilton, 111 Wn.2d at 571. The challenged instructions did not convey the trial court's beliefs regarding the merits of the case or any testimony. Finally, the Hospital challenges jury instruction 2. In that instruction, the trial court informed the jury that because a guardian had been appointed for Brandan, his parents cannot directly benefit from this suit nor will they have any financial interest in any judgment recovered in this case. The instruction further provided that [s]uch a judgment would be solely the property of the incompetent, subject to the control and jurisdiction of this Court. The Hospital labels this instruction misleading. The Hospital had offered to prove at trial Brandan's mother had previously borrowed money from Brandan's trust fund. The Hospital maintains the instruction is inconsistent with the offer of proof, and thus is not supported by substantial evidence. The Hospital does not argue the instruction inaccurately states the law; all the Hospital contends is the instruction is inconsistent with the Hospital's allegations about previous trust transactions. Jury instruction 2 was properly given. The jury was entitled to learn who had control over the money being awarded to Brandan. We will assume the instruction accurately states the law, inasmuch as the Hospital has not challenged that point. Moreover, the offer of proof and resulting colloquy demonstrates if such a loan occurred, it appears the loan was authorized by a court order. Thus, the transaction would have been consistent with the last sentence of jury instruction 2. We find no error in this instruction.