Opinion ID: 625008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withholding of Documents

Text: Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) provides that the one-year period for filing a habeas petition begins to run on “the date on which [an] impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action.” (Emphases added). Mr. Freeman contends that he was prevented from filing a timely action because the attorneys who represented him during trial and on direct appeal refused to provide him with documents from their files, despite several requests for the documents beginning in June 2002. Additionally, he argues that he was impeded from filing a timely action because the state district court denied his June 2003 and September 2004 requests to borrow his trial transcripts. Mr. Freeman therefore argues that under -7- § 2244(d)(2)(B), the one-year period for filing his habeas petition did not begin to run until sometime in 2004 when he received the documents relating to his trial and appeal. The federal district court rejected this argument, stating: “§ 2244(d)(1)(B) . . . applies [only] in the context of an impediment caused by unconstitutional state action.” Freeman, slip op. at 7. The district court concluded that Mr. Freeman had failed to demonstrate the existence of any unconstitutional state action because his attorneys were not state actors and because the denial of his motions for a loan of transcripts did not violate his constitutional rights. Additionally, the district court determined that, even if it were unconstitutional to deny Mr. Freeman access to his court records and transcripts, Mr. Freeman had failed to establish that lack of access actually prevented him from filing a timely § 2254 petition or a timely petition for state post-conviction relief. The latter would have tolled the time period for filing a § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”). In support of this conclusion, the district court noted that some of the claims asserted in Mr. Freeman’s § 2254 petition were exhausted on direct appeal. Additionally, the district court noted that in Mr. Freeman’s requests for transcripts, which he filed before receiving any documents from his attorneys, he “outlined the claims his sought to raise in [his] . . . postconviction proceedings.” Freeman, slip op. at 7-8. Finally, the district court noted that “[u]nder Colorado law, ‘[a] defendant need not set forth the evidentiary support for his allegations in his initial Crim. -8- P. 35 motion; instead, a defendant need only assert facts that if true would provide a basis for relief under Crim. P. 35.’” Id. at 8 (quoting White v. Denver Dist. Crt., 766 P.2d 632, 635 (Colo. 1988)). In his application for COA, Mr. Freeman contends that the district court erred in concluding that his attorneys were not state actors. But Mr. Freeman has not demonstrated that his attorneys’ conduct or the denials of his motions for transcripts by the state district court constituted unconstitutional state action. Additionally, Mr. Freeman has not demonstrated how this alleged unconstitutional state action impeded him from filing a timely habeas petition or a petition for state post-conviction relief. Mr. Freeman has therefore failed to establish that § 2244(d)(1)(B) should apply to his claims. See, e.g., Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a habeas petitioner’s § 2244(d)(1)(B) argument because the petitioner “failed to explain why the documents held by the State were necessary to pursue his federal claim and . . . did not show diligent pursuit of his claims even after receiving the material”); see also Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (placing the burden on the petitioner to “provide[] . . . specificity regarding the alleged lack of access [to legal materials] and the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal claims”). Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Freeman has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that § 2244(d)(1)(B) does not apply in this case.