Opinion ID: 2590797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: alleged defect in jury instruction

Text: ¶ 60 At trial, Pinder raised the affirmative defense of compulsion in relation to the destruction of evidence charges. On appeal, Pinder claims that the jury instruction on that affirmative defense impermissibly reduced the State's burden of proof. Pinder's argument rests on the fact that, although the instruction did provide that the State carried the burden of disproving the affirmative defense, it did not expressly require that the State do so beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 61 Pinder acknowledges that he did not object to the jury instruction at trial, but nevertheless argues that we can address whether the jury instruction constituted a manifest injustice. See Utah R.Crim. P. 19(e). While this is generally true, we have consistently declined to review allegations of jury instruction error, even under the manifest injustice standard, when the error complained of was invited. ¶ 62 A jury instruction may not be assigned as error, even if such instruction would otherwise constitute manifest injustice, if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction. State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶ 54, 70 P.3d 111; see also State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 742. This prevents a party from taking advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at ¶ 54, 70 P.3d 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 63 In this case, Pinder not only failed to object to the affirmative defense jury instruction at trial, but also stipulated to that instruction, signaling by an affirmative act that he had no objection. Because Pinder invited any error of which he now complains, we decline to reach the merits of his claim. See id.