Opinion ID: 1974114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the furnishing of the medical report constitute an independent cause of action?

Text: [7] As a matter of law, Dr. Smejkal's rendition of information and opinions formed prior to September 22, 1973 cannot by itself constitute an act of negligence that would allow recovery. This is illustrated by Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, 43 Wis.2d 445-452, 168 N.W.2d 559 (1969). The court held that if the complaint sounded in tort the issuance of a final certificate for the heating contract (the only action falling within the applicable statute of limitations) was purely an administrative act  and in any event there was no allegation that that act in itself was in any way improper. Similarly in the instant action, the transcription by Dr. Smejkal of a report of his medical findings after Marie Koschnik had left his care would not give rise to an action in tort. While a medical malpractice action may sound in contract as well as in tort, Estate Of Kohls, 57 Wis.2d at 144, the cause of action would begin to run from the moment the breach occurred. Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, 43 Wis.2d at 455-456. Such a breach would have to have occurred during Dr. Smejkal's treatment of Marie Koschnik. Since by stipulation, the parties have agreed that Dr. Smejkal's only act falling within the three year statute of limitations was the transcribing of his report of medical findings, a purely administrative act, the cause of action framed in contractual terms would also be barred by the statute of limitations. By the Court.  Judgment affirmed.