Opinion ID: 773609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Availability of the Habeas Remedy

Text: 19 When Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) it significantly curtailed the power of federal courts to grant the habeas petitions of state prisoners. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000). A federal court may not grant a habeas petition on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 20 The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(d)(1) as giving independent meanings to both the contrary to and unreasonable application clauses. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404. A state court decision is contrary to Supreme Court precedent only if it either arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [the opposite result]. Id. at 405. 21 Clearly, the Appellate Division decision in Lainfiesta's case is not contrary to any decision of the Supreme Court. Here, the state court did not, on a question of law, reach a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court. Nor has the Supreme Court decided a case that is factually indistinguishable from the instant case. Thus, the habeas remedy is available to Lainfiesta only if he can show that the Appellate Division decision involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 22 A state court decision falls within the unreasonable application clause if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. The Supreme Court has thus far offered little guidance as to the meaning of the term unreasonable application, tautologically instructing federal habeas courts to ask whether the state court's application was objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. 23 The Supreme Court did caution, however, that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law. Id. at 412 (emphasis in original). Thus, a federal habeas court is not empowered to grant the writ when, in its independent judgment, it determines that the state court incorrectly applied the relevant federal law. The state court's application must reflect some additional increment of incorrectness such that it may be said to be unreasonable. Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000). However, the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions `so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.' Id. (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc)). 24 Under the objective standard promulgated by Williams, we conclude that the Appellate Division's decision in this matter amounted to an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Appellate Division correctly identified the qualified right to be represented by counsel of choice as the governing legal principle. Lainfiesta I, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 509 (citing People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 270-71 (1980)). The Appellate Division further recognized that a trial court should be hesitant to interfere with an established attorney-client relationship and may not do so arbitrarily. Id. at 510 (citations omitted). The court also acknowledged that interference with the defendant's right is only permissible when the counsel of choice has a conflict of interest or where the defense tactics `may compromise the orderly management of the trial or the fair administration of justice.' Id. (quoting People v. Knowles, 88 N.Y.2d 763, 767 (1996)). 25 Having articulated the correct legal standards, the Appellate Division concluded that Lainfiesta's qualified right to counsel of choice had not been unjustifiably compromised. The Appellate Division based this conclusion on the following: First, because Murphy was allowed to sit at the defense table and was present and available to assist in the proceedings, Lainfiesta was not deprived of his right to counsel of choice; the right was merely restricted. Id. Second, the circumstances surrounding O'Brien's application-principally Murphy's occasional absence from the proceedings-made it obvious that the court's ruling was based upon [] its concern that the trial be conducted in an orderly and efficient manner. Id. at 511. We agree with the district court that the Appellate Division's conclusions in this regard reflect an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of Lainfiesta's case. 26 The essence of a defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice is that it cannot be denied or restricted arbitrarily. Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12. Here, the trial judge's consideration of O'Brien's application was perfunctory. O'Brien was not even allowed to make an offer of proof as to Murphy's broader knowledge in the area of forensic evidence before the trial judge abruptly terminated the discussion by invoking the specter of O.J. Simpson and other celebrity defendants. The record is devoid of any indication that the trial judge weighed Lainfiesta's Sixth Amendment rights against any countervailing factors which might overcome the qualified right to counsel. There is no suggestion that Murphy had a conflict of interest, nor is there any indication that Murphy's cross- examination would somehow disrupt the orderly progress of the trial or otherwise impede the fair administration of justice. The trial judge's only stated justification for the refusal was his insistence that, in his court, one assistant district attorney tries a case, one defense counsel tries a case, period, that's it. 27 The district court correctly held that the trial court's refusal to allow Murphy to cross-examine the medical examiner was arbitrary and that the Appellate Division's affirmance of the trial court's decision amounted to an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Whatever the Appellate Division could glean from the context in which O'Brien made his application cannot overcome the manifest capriciousness evidenced by the trial judge's own words.