Opinion ID: 62903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 02(a) of the CBA provided:

Text: Either party or an Employer withdrawing representation from the Chapter or not represented by the Chapter, desiring to change or terminate this Agreement must provide written notification at least 90 days prior to the expiration date of the Agreement or any anniversary date occurring thereafter.1 On September 28, 2003, the Respondent wrote to IBEW that it was going to terminate its affiliation with the union “as a Signatory Contractor” on November 1, 2003. This letter was sent only to IBEA; not to AECA. On October 21, 2003, IBEW’s business manager, Lonnie Plott, responded that “[u]nder the terms of the [CBA], the September 28, 2003 notice was not timely. Pursuant to Section 102(a), your firm should have given at least 90 days notice prior to the expiration date of the agreement for termination.” The Respondent wrote back to IBEW, rescinded its notice, and stated its intent to remain with the union as a signatory contractor.2 1 The Board explained in its order that the notice language in Section 1.02(a) of the CBA was different from the notice language in prior labor contracts. The Board further explained that while it was well-settled law that withdrawal of bargaining authority under a letter of assent was “an action distinct from” terminating those prior contracts, it was an issue of first impression whether the recent version of Section 1.02(a) superceded or merged with the letter of assent, which would mean that the two actions were not distinct. In other words, the Respondent was “an Employer withdrawing representation from [AECA] or not represented by [AECA], desiring to change or terminate this agreement,” and only required to give at least 90 days notice under the CBA. As will be shown, this argument has not been properly raised on appeal and, even if it had been properly raised, it would still fail. 2 The record reflects that only AECA and IBEW were signatory parties to the CBA. 4 On May 27, 2004 --- which was 97 days before expiration of the one-year extension of the CBA --- the Respondent wrote to both IBEW and AECA and stated its intent to terminate its affiliation with the union and withdraw from AECA on August 31, 2004. The Respondent asserts that this action was taken due to economic necessity, and each of its four electrician employees signed a petition asking to be relieved of any union obligations. By letter of June 1, 2004, however, AECA informed the Respondent that “Atlanta Electrical Contractors Association is a voluntary association of which you are not a member” and, therefore, the Respondent’s relationship with AECA was “governed by the Letter of Assent signed by your Company.” According to AECA, the withdrawal notice was untimely under the letter of assent because written notice was required “at least one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the then current anniversary of the applicable approved labor agreement.” AECA explained that the 90-day notice provision in the CBA applied to the termination of that particular labor agreement. The Respondent honored the CBA until August 31, 2004, at which point it withdrew from AECA; attempted to bargain with IBEW on an individual basis; and unilaterally altered its employees’ terms and conditions of employment, including changes to pay rates and contributions to IBEW’s fringe benefit funds. On September 1, 2004, AECA and IBEW signed a 3-year extension of the CBA. 5 IBEW filed charges with the Board, seeking to keep the Respondent bound by the CBA and subsequent extension and to have it pay benefit contributions in accordance therewith. The Respondent protested the charges, arguing merger and estoppel. It also argued that its first notice of withdrawal from the union (which was sent to IBEW in September 2003 and subsequently rescinded) gave IBEW and AECA adequate and timely notice of its intent to withdraw. A three-member panel of the Board ruled in favor of the union and AECA. Specifically, with respect to the Respondent’s estoppel argument, the Board explained that there were two separate and distinct matters to be “borne in mind,” to wit: “the contract between the Respondent and the Union, and the agency relationship between the Respondent and the AECA. The former had a 90-day cancellation provision, and the latter had a 150-day cancellation provision.” The Board noted that the Respondent’s letter of September 2003, “reasonably read, referred only to the contract. It spoke of a termination of its affiliation with the Union as a signatory contractor. Further, the letter was sent only to the Union, not to the AECA.” These facts, according to the Board, reasonably implied that “only the contract was involved;” and since IBEW’s response dated October 21 likewise referred only to the CBA, “it was unreasonable and incorrect for the Respondent to treat the union’s letter of October 21 as an indication that the 90-day period 6 applied to the agency relationship between the Respondent and AECA.” Thus, given the imprecision of the Respondent’s own 2003 notice, it would be highly unfair to read the statements in Plott’s letter . . . as referring to the required notice period for terminating AECA’s agency. Moreover, as the General Counsel points out, Plott’s statements were accurate. It would therefore be even less fair to treat the Plott letter as an affirmative representation, on which the Respondent reasonably could have relied, that the notice period for terminating the agency was 90 rather than 150 days. The Board now seeks to have its order enforced.