Opinion ID: 536233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-hearing Vocational Expert Interrogatories

Text: 22 On September 30, 1986, the ALJ sent Coffin's attorney a letter that stated in relevant part: 23 In the course of examining this case, I have determined it is necessary to obtain evidence from a vocational expert. I propose to do that by submitting written interrogatories or questions to a vocational expert to be answered after reviewing the file. 24 A copy of the proposed interrogatories is included for your examination. You should be aware that you have the right to object to any of the interrogatories and the right to propose your own interrogatories. If I have no response from you within ten (10) days of the date of this letter, I will assume that you have no objection and that you have no other interrogatories to propose. At that time, I will proceed with the interrogatories as enclosed. 25 App. at 36. 26 On November 6, 1986, the ALJ sent Coffin's attorney the following letter and form:Answers to Interrogatories 27 Please examine this evidence, complete the form below, and return it to this office within ten (10) days of the date of this letter. 28 . . . . . EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE 29 Claimant or representative to check appropriate statements: 30 _____________ I have examined the above evidence and have no comments to make. 31 _____________ I have examined the above evidence and my comments are as follows: (Use reverse side, if necessary.) 32 _____________ I have no further evidence to submit. 33 _____________ I am submitting the following evidence: (Use reverse side, if necessary.) 34 App. at 357. 35 Coffin's attorney did not respond to either of these letters. Rather, the attorney argued on appeal to this court that he knew that the ALJ had in the past reproached him and others for objecting to the interrogatories or for submitting their own interrogatories. The district court found that the ALJ's submission of written interrogatories did not violate Coffin's right of due process. Further, because the ALJ requested input and Coffin chose not to respond, Coffin waived his right to challenge the written interrogatories. See Coffin, No. 87-349-A, at 3-4. 36 Coffin argues that the ALJ is not allowed to consider any evidence obtained after the hearing is concluded, unless the parties agree to its use. Coffin also asserts that his attorney did not waive his right to challenge the interrogatories by not responding when he was given the opportunity. Coffin argues that the decision in Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.1984), should apply because Townley deals with the same factual language as the case at hand. In Townley, the court held that use of such a post-hearing report violates a claimant's due process rights. Id. at 114. Coffin, however, fails to note that in Townley the appellant's attorney was not informed of the need for expert vocational evidence until after the report was filed with the ALJ. Further, appellant was denied an opportunity to examine that vocational report, and, despite claimant's request, no additional hearing was held. Id. 37 In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of due process requirements in the context of physicians' reports in social security disability claim hearings. The Court approved admission of such reports and stated that they could be used as substantial evidence even if the reports were hearsay when the claimant has not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of the physician. Id. at 402, 91 S.Ct. at 1428. In Richardson, the reports had been issued before the hearing, and the physicians who prepared the reports had examined the claimant. 38 In the case before us, the report was issued post-hearing, and the vocational expert who prepared the report did not examine Coffin. The practice of allowing post-hearing reports is not uncommon. The ALJ frequently will not close the record after the hearing either to order a post-hearing examination of the claimant or to allow the claimant to introduce post-hearing evidence in support of his claim. See Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir.1988); Hudson v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 781, 783 (11th Cir.1985), cert. granted, Bowen v. Hudson, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 527, 102 L.Ed.2d 559 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, Sullivan v. Hudson, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 104 L.Ed.2d 941 (1989). Further, this circuit affirmed the decision of an ALJ who created hypothetical claimants, relied on the reports of vocational experts, and submitted post-hearing interrogatories. See Buckler v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 308, 310-11 (8th Cir.1988). Thus, we do not find that the factual distinctions of whether the reports were issued before or after the hearing, or whether the claimant was examined by the reporting expert, to be crucial to our decision. Rather, the proper focus in this case is on the requirements of due process, and whether the post-hearing interrogatories posed to the vocational expert satisfied those requirements. 39 Due process requires that a claimant be given the opportunity to cross-examine and subpoena the individuals who submit reports. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 402, 91 S.Ct. at 1427; McClees v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 451, 452 (8th Cir.1989). The ALJ, however, is not required to inform the claimant's attorney that the claimant has a right to cross-examine the vocational expert. See Hudson, 755 F.2d at 785. The ALJ is required to allow the claimant to cross-examine the witness, but if the claimant's attorney fails to object to the post-hearing reports or remains silent when the opportunity to request cross-examination arises, the right to cross-examination is waived. See Wallace, 869 F.2d at 194 (claimant's attorney objected to post-hearing reports and did not waive right to cross-examination, but this conduct must be contrasted with that of an attorney who does not object); Hudson, 755 at 784-85 (claimant's legal representative had opportunity to cross-examine doctor but did not respond and, thus, waived right). 40 As previously indicated, in this case the ALJ sent Coffin's attorney two letters which indicated that Coffin could object to the interrogatories, propose his own interrogatories, comment on the evidence, and submit additional evidence. We hold that these letters satisfied due process requirements. However, our holding is limited to the facts of this case. If Coffin had been unrepresented, he would not have waived his right to cross-examination. If a claimant represents himself, the ALJ has a special responsibility to inform the claimant that he has the right of cross-examination. Coffin, however, was represented by a lawyer, an individual who is presumed to know about the right of cross-examination. The ALJ, therefore, is not required to list and explain every option available to an attorney in order to meet due process requirements. Thus, no due process violation occurred.