Opinion ID: 4100154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Juror 24 for Cause

Text: Defendants first challenge the district court’s dismissal for cause of Juror 24. During voir dire, the district court asked if any juror had ever been arrested. Juror 24 did not raise his hand. Later, a police officer, unbeknownst to the government, ran a criminal history check on Juror 24 and found that he had been arrested nine times. The district court then asked Juror 24 if he had ever been arrested, but he only disclosed one arrest for mari‐ juana. The government then moved to dismiss Juror 24 for cause. The district court asked the government to confirm the accuracy of the criminal history report before it would grant the motion. The report was correct, so the district court dis‐ missed Juror 24 for cause because of his false statements. Generally, we review a district court’s ruling on for‐cause challenges to jurors for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 409 (7th Cir. 2011). We need not even consider whether the district court abused its discretion, how‐ ever, because Defendants have not pointed to any legally cog‐ nizable harm. See Marshall v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 573, 578 1 Several of the arguments raised apply to all Defendants. Where argu‐ ments apply to fewer than all Defendants, it will be indicated as needed. Nos. 12‐3680, 12‐3683, 12‐3747, 13‐1374 & 13‐2321 7 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[E]ven quoting the standard of review is get‐ ting ahead of ourselves. [The defendant] has suggested no re‐ motely cognizable legal harm to support this argument.”). There is “no legally cognizable right to have any particular juror participate in [a defendant’s] case.” United States v. Poli‐ chemi, 201 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000). We have repeatedly rejected the challenge Defendants raise, explaining: [The defendant’s] argument that one prospective ju‐ ror who did not sit on his jury would have been un‐ biased does not establish a violation of his constitu‐ tional rights to due process and an impartial jury; these rights are satisfied as long as a defendant is tried before a “qualified jury composed of individu‐ als not challengeable for cause.” United States v. Russell, 463 F. App’x 585, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 157 (2009)); see also United States v. Osigbade, 195 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 1999). Defendants’ reliance on cases where a district court denied a for‐cause challenge is misplaced because such a denial may have resulted in the seating of a juror who is actually partial, thereby affecting the impartiality of the jury. There are no such concerns where a for‐cause challenge may have been mistakenly granted,2 but the jury was otherwise impartial, which is the circumstance we face here.3 2 That is not to say that the for‐cause challenge was improperly granted in this case. We decline to address the merits of the district court’s decision to remove Juror 24 for cause. 3 Curiously, Defendants suggest that the harm they suffered was the dep‐ rivation “of a meritful challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 8 Nos. 12‐3680, 12‐3683, 12‐3747, 13‐1374 & 13‐2321