Opinion ID: 1198866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the Charges Against Dann Proved?

Text: The threshold question before us is whether the burden of proof was sustained with regard to the charges that the hearing examiner found to be proved against Dann. RPC 8.4(c) provides that [it] is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Simply put, the question is whether the attorney lied. No ethical duty could be plainer. However, Dann's argument talks around the fact that he lied to clients about who was doing their legal work. He does not deny initial-switching. Rather, he offers various explanations as to why this lying occurred. That goes to mitigation and not to the truth of the underlying charges. For example, the fact that Brutoco was underbilled on the Cerritos claim does not change the fact that Dann lied to Brutoco about the participation of Graham in that claim, despite his client's stated desire that Graham not be involved. With regard to the Henderson claim, Dann argues that his motivation for lying about the fact that Graham was not working on the case was to protect Mr. Graham's privacy [following his parents' death] and to avoid giving his client any reason for unnecessary concern regarding the handling of his case. Resp't's Opening Br. at 19. This does not explain away lying to a client. Dann also argues that overbilling of clients was not proved in the Vertecs and Restec cases. However, Dann does not deny switching his initials for those of Phil Hickey in those cases to take credit for work that Hickey had done. He does not deny earning $25 to $35 more a billable hour than Hickey at the time of those cases. He argues, with no supporting documentation, that he did work similar to that of Hickey and, thus, should be paid for the same number of hours. He further argues that Vertecs and Restec were not overcharged because substantial amounts of Mr. Hickey's time was [sic] written off. Resp't's Opening Br. at 27. This time was written off, however, only to be substituted with more expensive timethat of Dann. Dann apparently advocates a system whereby attorneys need not keep their own billing records but can merely claim work done by subordinates as their own when it is convenient and then, in the absence of any records to support the claim, can excuse their actions by arguing that they are somehow doing the clients a favor by writing off the less expensive time. There is no reason why the hearing examiner or the Disciplinary Board should have been persuaded by Dann's description of his belated accounting. Guidance from two federal appellate courts is relevant here. The Tenth Circuit has written that we believe that reconstructed records generally represent an overstatement or understatement of time actually expended. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 n. 2 (10th Cir.1983). The Second Circuit has noted that [t]here is no excuse for an established law firm to rely on estimates made on the eve of payment and almost entirely unsupported by daily records. In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R. Co., 339 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1964). Furthermore, this court has consistently held that we will not disturb factual findings made by a hearing officer upon conflicting evidence. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Selden, 107 Wash.2d 246, 251, 728 P.2d 1036 (1986). The hearing officer's determination that Vertecs and Restec were overbilled was a reasonable one given the evidence before him. [2] The hearing officer found that Dann acted knowingly in his misconduct. Thus, his mental state was one of knowledge. We have written that [a] lawyer violates the rules with knowledge when he or she has `the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.' McMullen, 127 Wash.2d at 169, 896 P.2d 1281 (quoting STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Definitions, at 7 (1986)). We give particularly great weight to the question of the extent of injury involved due to the attorney's misconduct. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, 115 Wash.2d 747, 772, 801 P.2d 962, 1 A.L.R.5th 1183 (1990). We do so to maintain public confidence in our legal institutions with an eye toward enhancing respect for the law generally. We must therefore administer the rule in a manner which holds individuals accountable for the results, even unintended results, of their actions. Curran, 115 Wash.2d at 772, 801 P.2d 962 (emphasis added). Thus, for example, even if the overbilling of Vertecs and Restec was unintended, it is still censurable. The familiar benchmark of the attorney-client relationship is that [a]ttorneys have a duty of zealously representing their clients within the bounds of the law. When their clients have opposing interests with third parties, attorneys are supposed to represent their clients' interests over the interests of others. Bohn v. Cody, 119 Wash.2d 357, 367, 832 P.2d 71 (1992). After all, an attorney must continually be aware that the attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary one as a matter of law and thus the attorney owes the highest duty to the client. Perez v. Pappas, 98 Wash.2d 835, 840-41, 659 P.2d 475 (1983) (citing Liebergesell v. Evans, 93 Wash.2d 881, 890, 613 P.2d 1170 (1980); McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wash.App. 348, 356-57, 467 P.2d 868, review denied, 78 Wash.2d 993 (1970)). Dann's actions are not in keeping with the high responsibility that rests with attorneys. Lying to clients is an assault upon the most fundamental tenets of attorney-client relations. `The relation of attorney and client has always been regarded as one of special trust and confidence.' In re Proceedings for Disbarment of Beakley, 6 Wash.2d 410, 423, 107 P.2d 1097 (1940) (quoting approvingly 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 127). Dann's misconduct certainly warrants the presumptive sanction of suspension from the practice of law: Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS std. 7.2, at 14 (1991). [3]