Opinion ID: 787516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Decision in Blakely

Text: 118 In October 1998, Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. accosted his wife at their home, binding her with duct tape and forcing her at knife point to climb into a coffin-like plywood box in the bed of his pickup truck. State v. Blakely, 111 Wash.App. 851, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (2002). As he did so, he importuned her to dismiss the divorce suit and trust proceedings she had instituted against him. After the couple's son, Ralphy, arrived at the home, Blakely drove away with his wife in the back of the truck. Blakely forced 13-year-old Ralphy to follow in Mrs. Blakely's car, threatening to harm Ralphy's mother if he did not comply. Ralphy escaped when the family stopped at a gas station; Blakely continued with his wife to a friend's house in Montana. The friend subsequently called the police, and Blakely was arrested without incident. 119 Blakely pleaded guilty to one count of second degree domestic violence kidnapping and one count of second degree domestic violence assault. Under the felony classification system, second degree kidnapping (committed without a sexual motivation) is a Class B felony subject to a maximum penalty of ten years. See Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.40.030(3)(a) (Westlaw 2004). Under the Sentencing Reform Act, second degree kidnapping is a level V offense; this level, combined with Blakely's offender score, resulted in a statutory sentencing range of 49-53 months. Thus, according to Washington State law, the statutory maximum sentence was 53 months. The prosecution recommended that Blakely be sentenced at or near the maximum. Instead, the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months based on its finding that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty and that he had committed domestic violence in front of his son. See Wash. Rev.Code § 9.94A.535(2)(a), (2)(h)(ii) (Westlaw 2004). 120 After the state court of appeals affirmed and the state supreme court denied discretionary review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the exceptional sentence violated the constitutional principles articulated in Apprendi. See Blakely, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 124 S.Ct. at 2536-38. The Court began by noting the precise manner in which the sentencing scheme at issue in Apprendi had offended the Constitution: the judge had imposed a sentence greater than the maximum he could have imposed under state law without the challenged factual finding. Id. at 2537. The Court found the same defect in Blakely's sentence, noting that the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence because Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty — a fact not admitted by Blakely in connection with his plea. 121 The Court rejected the State's claim that there was no Apprendi problem because even the exceptional sentence was within the ten-year maximum applicable to Class B felonies: 122 Our precedents make clear ... that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. 123 Id. (citations omitted). The Court concluded that this statutory maximum was 53 months, the top of the statutory sentencing range, because the sentencing judge could not exceed that maximum without making additional factual findings. See id. at 2538 (Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he would have been reversed.). Therefore, the Court ruled, [t]he `maximum sentence' is no more 10 years here than it was 20 years in Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate crime) or death in Ring [ v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)] (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding an aggravator). Id. The Court also rejected as immaterial the State's assertion that the sentence did not run afoul of Apprendi because the list of aggravating factors in the state sentencing guidelines is illustrative rather than exhaustive: Whether the judge's authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi ), one of several specified facts (as in Ring ), or any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. Id.