Opinion ID: 2677200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Vicarious Liability Problem

Text: Appellants contend that because the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction on the vicarious liability of all co-conspirators for substantive crimes committed by any of them in furtherance of the conspiracy,42 the trial court erred in admitting certain of their out-of-court statements under the hearsay exception for statements of party opponents,43 even with redactions and limiting instructions.44 Admission of the extrajudicial statements, appellants argue, violated this court‟s holding in Akins v. United States that “in a joint conspiracy trial where the government relies on a theory of vicarious liability, statements may not be introduced under the statements of party opponent exception to the rule against hearsay—or any other 42 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); see also Gordan v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 582 (D.C. 2001). 43 See Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 n.1 (D.C. 1988). 44 Specifically, appellants cite (1) Leaks‟s admission to McCoy that “[he] and five others” were involved in the May 17 shooting; (2) incriminating statements made by Arrington to Payne, Gardner, and Evans, and by Arrington and Hagans to Smith, regarding the May 17 shooting; (3) testimony of McCoy that Arrington asked him to “handle” Payne‟s “snitching” in order to prevent Payne from testifying; (4) Gardner‟s testimony that, shortly after the shooting on May 17, he heard an unidentified conspirator say the group “rode through, seen [sic] someone standing on the porch, started firing and left;” and (5) Arrington‟s statements, recounted by Hardie, that he did not notice when someone approached him with a gun on May 26 because he was working on his car, and that he was “lucky he had his own gun on him” so he could shoot back. 36 hearsay exception that is not reliability-based—unless they are admissible as coconspirators‟ statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.”45 The reason for this rule is that a vicarious liability instruction may undercut the condition under which a properly redacted party opponent statement may be admitted in a joint trial—namely, the condition, on which the jury must be instructed, that the statement is to be considered as evidence only against its maker and not against the other defendants.46 The problem arises when the prosecution proves that the defendants in a joint trial were engaged in a conspiracy and relies on a party opponent statement to prove that the defendant who made it committed a substantive crime in furtherance of the conspiracy. If the jury accepts that proof and finds the declarant defendant guilty of the substantive crime, vicarious liability renders the other defendants guilty of it as well on the same evidence, including the 45 Akins v. United States, 679 A.2d 1017, 1031 (D.C. 1996). 46 Under traditional rules of hearsay, a defendant‟s extrajudicial statement, offered solely as the admission of a party opponent and not under any other hearsay exception, is inadmissible against a co-defendant. (Keith) Thomas v. United States, 978 A.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C. 2009). Moreover, if the statement is testimonial in nature and the declarant defendant does not testify at trial, the statement is also inadmissible against a co-defendant under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1222-23. As we discuss further below, even with an appropriate limiting instruction, redaction of the statement may be necessary to remove incriminating references to co-defendants at a joint trial. Id. at 1223-24. 37 hearsay evidence that could not be considered against them, even if they were not personally involved in the crime themselves. In this way, the vicarious liability instruction may contradict and vitiate the limiting instruction under which the hearsay was admitted.47 Akins framed its rule against the admission of party opponent hearsay in joint conspiracy trials not merely as an application of traditional rules of evidence, but specifically to protect the Confrontation Clause rights of the non-declarant defendants as those rights were understood in the era before the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington.48 While the Akins rule as stated is no longer a 47 See Akins, 679 A.2d at 1031 (declaring that “no limiting instruction can cure” the problem); but see id. at 1037 (“We need not decide whether any limiting instruction, combined with the Pinkerton charge, would set too contradictory a mental task before the jury.”) (Farrell, J., concurring); id. at 1037-39 (Schwelb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Erskines v. United States, 696 A.2d 1077, 1080 n.4 (D.C. 1997) (explaining that, in view of the separate opinions of Judges Farrell and Schwelb, the decision in Akins “left open the question whether a more pointed limiting instruction than the one given in Akins” could avoid the problem in a case in which a vicarious liability instruction is given). 48 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See Akins, 679 A.2d at 1030 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), for the proposition, later overruled in Crawford, that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of incriminating extrajudicial statements under “a recognized hearsay exception based on the statements‟ presumed reliability”). 38 good fit with Confrontation Clause principles,49 it retains its logic and validity under non-constitutional rules of evidence.50 Hence we consider Akins applicable even where no Confrontation Clause issue is presented because, as in the present case, the hearsay at issue—appellant‟s statements to fellow gang members and associates—was not testimonial in nature.51 However, although appellants objected on other grounds to the introduction of their out-of-court statements, an objection under Akins was never made at trial. We do not mean to suggest that appellants needed to cite Akins by name to preserve their objection for appellate review; but “appellants‟ failure to either cite to Akins or object that the combination of the admission of [their co-defendants‟] redacted statements and the Pinkerton instruction would violate their . . . rights 49 This is primarily because, per Crawford, the Confrontation Clause applies to testimonial hearsay regardless of whether it falls within an exception (reliabilitybased or otherwise) to the rule against hearsay, but not at all to non-testimonial hearsay. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). 50 See (Keith) Thomas, 978 A.2d at 1225 (“Whether or not it is testimonial, a defendant‟s extrajudicial statement directly implicating a co-defendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury against that co-defendant.”). 51 See id. at 1226-27; see also Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 77 n.43 (D.C. 2009) (“Because the statement was made not to police, but to a perceived ally who was not then a government informant or witness, it was not testimonial and there was no right to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause.”). 39 meant that the trial court was not fairly apprised that appellants sought relief based on that claim.”52 Accordingly, we review appellants‟ claim of an Akins violation only for plain error.53 Under the established four-part test for plain error, an appellant must demonstrate not merely that there was an error, but also that the error was “clear” or “obvious”— “so egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in permitting it, despite the defendant‟s failure to object.” In addition, the appellant must demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights by showing a reasonable probability that it had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of his trial. Lastly, even if the appellant succeeds in those demonstrations, he also must show that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.54 Importantly, “it is inherent in the nature of plain error review that appellant must make that showing based on the record on appeal.”55 52 Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 1001-02 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 53 Id. at 1002. 54 Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1189-90 (D.C. 2008) (footnotes omitted). 55 Lowery v. United States, 3 A.3d 1169, 1173 (D.C. 2010). 40 We cannot find plain error on the record here. For one thing, the record does not show clearly that the Akins rule was violated by the admission of the hearsay statements at issue here. There is every reason to suppose that at least some of those statements would have been “alternatively admissible” under a reliabilitybased hearsay exception (as contemplated by the Akins rule)—namely the exception for statements against penal interest.56 Some of the statements also may have been admissible under the exception for statements by co-conspirators during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy (as also contemplated by Akins).57 And one of the statements in issue, Arrington‟s alleged request that 56 Akins, 679 A.2d at 1033. As we explained in (Keith) Thomas, 978 A.2d at 1227: The exception, a species of “statement against interest,” provides that if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, the rule against hearsay does not exclude “a statement which at the time of its making so far tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in the declarant‟s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.” The premise of this exception is that reasonable people usually do not make statements against their penal interest unless the statements are true; the statements are reliable, and therefore admissible, precisely insofar as they genuinely increase the declarant‟s exposure to criminal sanction. (Footnotes omitted.) 41 McCoy prevent Payne from testifying, does not appear to have been hearsay at all.58 In any event, in order to establish that the asserted error affected their substantial rights (the third requirement of plain error), appellants must show a reasonable probability that, but for the admission of their extrajudicial statements under the party opponent exception, the outcome of the trial would have been different.59 They cannot make such a showing here. The statements were cumulative of other direct, compelling evidence of each appellant‟s personal involvement in the substantive crimes with which he was charged; we are confident that no appellant was found guilty of any offense in which he did not (continued…) 57 See Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431, 439-41 (D.C. 1984); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 367 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing that statements recounting past violent acts to fellow conspirators may fall within the exception for co-conspirator hearsay where they keep the co-conspirators informed or motivated). 58 See Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 993 (D.C. 2013) (explaining that statements between conspirators not offered for the truth of the matter asserted are non-hearsay verbal acts). 59 See (Michael) Thomas, 914 A.2d 1, 21 (D.C. 2006). 42 participate based on a theory of vicarious liability for the acts of another.60 For this reason too, appellants‟ claim that the admission of their co-appellants‟ extrajudicial statements was plain error falls short.