Opinion ID: 1215322
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adverse effect on counsel's performance

Text: (3) It is important to recognize that adverse effect on counsel's performance under Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at pages 348 and 350 [64 L.Ed.2d at pages 346, 348], is not the same as prejudice in the sense in which we often use that term. When, for example, we review a traditional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (i.e., one involving asserted inadequate performance as opposed to conflicted performance), we require the defendant to show a reasonable probability that the result (i.e., the disposition) would have been different. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-696 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-699]; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583-584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) This, however, is not the inquiry called for under Sullivan. (See People v. Mrockzo (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 104, fn. 16 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835] [As a practical matter, the Supreme Court's formulation seems to envision an analysis of whether there has been some identifiable prejudice to the right of effective representation but not an analysis of whether that prejudice affected the outcome of the case.].) As we suggested in Mrockzo, supra, Sullivan requires an inquiry into whether the record shows that counsel pulled his punches, i.e., failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have had there been no conflict. (See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp (1987) 483 U.S. 776, 787-788 [97 L.Ed.2d 638, 652-653, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3121-3122] [even assuming an actual conflict, reversal not required because the record did not support claim that defense counsel's advocacy was thereby harmed].) (1c) From the time of the initial December 1983 hearing before the penalty retrial, it was obvious to all parties that the prosecution viewed defendant's involvement in the arson as a critical aggravating factor. It was the only evidence (other than that related to the murders) introduced by the prosecution at the second penalty trial. The prosecution focused on the arson evidence to support its argument that although many people were involved in the Junghanses' murders, defendant was the most culpable because he was the only one who would actually commit the murders for money, just as he committed the arson for hire. [11] Defendant asserts Hanson's conflict precluded him from effectively cross-examining Plankington, to expose his apparent bias. As noted above, between defendant's first and second trial, developments surfaced that could have been (but were not) used to impeach Plankington's testimony: Hanson failed to expose Plankington's obvious financial interest in establishing defendant's and Martin's involvement in the arson. In addition, Hanson failed to present any evidence to negate or mitigate defendant's involvement with that crime. [12] The jury was thereby left with the impression that defendant was primarily responsible for the arson. [13] Despite these two identifiable omissions (the failure to cross-examine Plankington to expose his bias or to introduce evidence negating or mitigating defendant's role in the arson) the People argue defendant has failed to establish that the conflict adversely affected Hanson's performance. In reviewing defendant's claim, we are bound by the record. ( Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 349 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 347].) (4) But when a conflict assertedly causes an attorney not to pursue an argument or defense, a reviewing court cannot see the adverse effect on the record. Consequently, we must examine the record to determine whether (i) the arguments or actions allegedly omitted would likely have been made by other counsel, and (ii) there was a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict) that might have caused the omission. (See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, supra, 483 U.S. 776, 786-788 [97 L.Ed.2d 638, 650-653, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120-3122]; Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 72-75 [86 L.Ed. 680, 700-702, 62 S.Ct. 457].) We therefore reject the People's suggestion that only affirmative evidence in the record can form the basis for a finding of adverse effect on counsel's performance. (1d) For the reasons discussed below, we believe that any reasonably competent counsel who did not have a conflict between defendant and Plankington, would have impeached Plankington with the evidence about (and circumstances surrounding) his pending federal civil suit, and/or attempted at least to diminish defendant's role in the arson. And, we perceive no tactical reason why either area of inquiry would have been neglected by such counsel. The People assert there are three reasons why defendant cannot show an adverse effect on Hanson's performance. They claim (i) there was significant evidence of defendant's involvement in the arson, hence Plankington's testimony was merely cumulative; (ii) Hanson did everything that an unconflicted counsel would have done to challenge the arson evidence; and (iii) Hanson's conflict actually helped defendant because it caused the prosecutor to refrain from introducing defendant's confession to the arson. We reject each argument. First, Plankington's testimony was highly relevant to the arson issue. He provided the only eyewitness testimony linking defendant to Martin; he testified that he saw Martin and defendant together in a Nevada bar within days of the arson. Plankington also provided the motive for the arson; he testified about a long-running dispute between himself and Martin, which included threats by Martin. Moreover, Hanson's failure to adequately expose Plankington's possible bias on cross-examination was not the only adverse effect of the conflict. Hanson also failed to introduce any of the apparently available evidence negating or mitigating his client's involvement in the arson. (See ante, fn. 12.) Next, the People assert Hanson did everything that unconflicted counsel reasonably could have done in defendant's defense. They claim that no further cross-examination of Plankington was possible because the jury would otherwise have learned of defendant's confession, and that by simply arguing that defendant had no role in the arson, Hanson adopted the strategy any competent counsel would have used. There are two flaws in the People's argument. First, as we discuss below, it is far from clear that the confession could have been used against defendant at the penalty trial. ( Post, fn. 16.) Moreover, defense counsel could have demonstrated Plankington had a bias  i.e., that it was in his financial interest to establish that defendant had been hired by Martin to commit the arson, because he had a lawsuit pending on that ground  without eliciting information about the confession. Counsel need only have asked Plankington whether he had a financial interest in proving defendant had been hired by Martin to commit the arson. The answer would have been yes, and it would have been unnecessary to discuss defendant's confession. Details about Plankington's federal civil suit  the amount of damages he sought ($300,000 in special damages and $10 million in general damages), and the type of claims asserted  could also have been elicited without reference to defendant's confession. Even assuming that for some reason the confession had to be revealed, competent defense counsel might still have chosen to impeach Plankington. Defense counsel could have argued that (i) under the circumstances the confession may have been involuntary, i.e., coerced by Plankington and his attorney, Hanson, who offered help to defendant (then on death row) if he would confess, [14] or (ii) the confession demonstrated that defendant was only marginally involved in the arson. Hanson, of course, could make none of these arguments, given his conflicting and simultaneous representation of Plankington. [15] Finally, the People assert Hanson's conflict actually benefited defendant because that conflict allegedly caused the prosecutor to stipulate that he would not present evidence of defendant's confession. The record disproves this argument. Before trial, Hanson moved to exclude defendant's testimony about the arson on the ground defendant had been granted immunity in connection with that testimony. (5) (See fn. 16.) In his response brief, the prosecutor stated: [T]his argument may have merit.... Based on the cases cited by the defense and in order to avoid any possibility of an issue on appeal in this regard, the People will not introduce the defendant's testimony or any statements he made as a result of immunity being granted to him in [the federal criminal trial]. [16] As the prosecutor realized, there was a well-founded legal reason why defendant's testimony could not be used against him at the penalty retrial  the grant of immunity. This argument would have been available to any counsel representing defendant at trial, not only to Hanson. We therefore reject the People's assertion that defendant enjoyed an advantage he would not otherwise have had, by reason of Hanson's representation. (1e) We conclude other counsel would have performed differently, and more vigorously, in his examination of Plankington and his defense of the arson evidence; that Hanson had no strategic reason for failing to do so; and that Hanson's conflict of interest adversely affected his performance as defendant's counsel. [17]