Opinion ID: 791704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 41 We review the district court's decision to deny Walker's habeas petition de novo. Searcy v. Jaimet, 332 F.3d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir.2003). Because Walker's habeas petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. 104-132, the provisions of the AEDPA govern our review. Myartt v. Frank, 395 F.3d 782, 784-85 (7th Cir.2005). Under the AEDPA, as relevant to this case, a writ cannot be granted unless the state court adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). [C]learly established Federal law refers to the holdings of the Supreme Court's cases as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). To run afoul of § 2254(d)(1)'s contrary-to standard, the state court must have either (i) adopted a rule that contradicts the governing law of the U.S. Supreme Court or (ii) on a set of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in the applicable Supreme Court precedent, reached a different result. Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, and Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir.2000)). Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from the Court's decisions but unreasonably applies the principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Even if the state court erroneously applied federal law, we may only grant the writ if the decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004).