Opinion ID: 1702221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether Bishop's Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the imposition of a sentence of death which was constitutionally defective in light of Tison v. Arizona

Text: ¶ 25. The imposition of the death penalty was based on the fact that the victim's death occurred while Bishop was committing a felony (kidnaping). Bishop contends that Mississippi law holds that anyone who commits a felony during which a killing takes place has contemplated that lethal force would be used and is therefore death eligible, and that this position is unconstitutional. He cites to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (7) In order to return and impose a sentence of death the jury must make a written finding of one or more of the following: (A) The defendant actually killed; (B) The defendant attempted to kill; (C) The defendant intended that a killing take place; (D) The defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed. Bishop also cites a United States Supreme Court case where the Court held that [p]articipants in violent felonies like armed robberies can frequently anticipat[e][sic] that lethal force ... might be used ... in accomplishing the underlying felony. ... Indeed, the possibility of bloodshed is inherent in the commission of any violent felony and this possibility is generally foreseeable and foreseen.... Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150-51, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1684, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). Bishop then concludes that merely contemplating that lethal force would be used is insufficient to support the imposition of the death penalty and that it is impermissible to allow the imposition of the death penalty for a felon who contemplated that lethal force would be used in the commission of a crime, but was not a major participant who showed a reckless indifference to the killing. ¶ 26. On direct appeal, Bishop argued the same issue, stating that the evidence showed that he intended only to give Gentry `a good whooping.' Bishop, 812 So.2d at 948. The Court rejected his contention, stating as follows: Bishop, on the other hand, took an active part in Gentry's murder: he provided the weapon used on the victim, kicked the victim, chased the victim down and held him while the lethal blows were being inflicted. It is reasonable to conclude that if one intends to beat someone in the head with an unusually large hammer, that person intends to use lethal force. Furthermore, the length of time between the first blow and the fatal blow indicates that Bishop not only knew that lethal force would be used, but also encouraged the use of lethal force. He also discussed burying the victim after the crime was completed. Id. ¶ 27. Bishop was an active participant in Gentry's murder. He knew that the kidnaping was committed in order to teach Gentry a lesson. He held Gentry down while another man hit Gentry in the head with a hammer. The beating lasted long enough for Bishop to finish one beer, to ask another person to hold Gentry, to go to the car to retrieve another, and then come back. When Gentry freed himself and ran, Bishop chased him, caught him and brought him back for the beating to continue. The beating was so severe that it was necessary for Bishop to dislodge the hammer from Gentry's throat. ¶ 28. The same reasoning that the Court used in considering a similar argument applies to Bishop's argument: The appellant argues, however, that only 0.5% of robberies result in homicide. Therefore, it cannot be said the robber in every case intended to kill. This may be true, but we think it overlooks the great danger the aggressor willfully imposes upon his victim. The constituent crime with its hazardous potential is that which the legislature intended to deter by permitting capital punishment if death results from the felonious undertaking. Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499, 507 (Miss.1979) (emphasis added). ¶ 29. It is clear that Bishop (1) was an aggressor; and (2) willfully imposed great danger upon Gentry. Therefore, Bishop cannot be characterized as felon who contemplated that lethal force would be used in the commission of a crime, but was not a major participant who showed a reckless indifference to the killing. Bishop's actions overwhelmingly show that he evinced a reckless indifference to Gentry's killing. This issue is without merit. ¶ 30. Bishop additionally argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he contemplated that lethal force would be used. Bishop made the same argument in his direct appeal, and this Court ruled against him. Bishop 812 So.2d at 948. Accordingly, this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and is barred from relitigation by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Jackson v. State, 860 So.2d 653, 660-61 (Miss.2003) (quoting Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 888, 893 (Miss.1992)).