Opinion ID: 1241105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Causation Issue.

Text: In resolving the first issue it is the duty of this court to determine whether there is any credible evidence which will support the jury's finding, that Robert Behringer's negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout, was not causal. The drawing of reasonable inferences from the evidence presented constitutes part of the function of fact finding which is vested in the jury. The evidence is undisputed that Leffel had actuated his directional signal lights, which indicated that he was about to make a left turn, when the Leffel car was at least 100 feet east of the intersection, and that such signal lights continued to flash up until the occurrence of the collision. Nevertheless, Behringer testified that he did not see such flashing directional signal lights, although he testified that he saw the Leffel car when it commenced to make its left turn into the path of the Behringer car. Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of sustaining the verdict, the jury could well have based its finding of negligent lookout on the part of Behringer solely upon the fact that he failed to see the flashing directional signal lights of the Leffel car. As Behringer approached the intersection he was traveling at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour. The Leffel car had pulled out of a churchyard onto the highway not far from the intersection and was proceeding at a speed of 20 to 25  miles per hour which was reduced to 15 miles per hour when the making of the left turn was commenced. Behringer testified that he was only 30 feet west of the intersection when the Leffel car began the left turn, and that the latter vehicle was then 20 feet east of the intersection. The traveled portion of the town road was but 18 feet in width. If the jury accepted this testimony of Behringer as being true, then but 68 feet of distance separated the two cars when Leffel commenced making the left turn. Behringer testified that he immediately applied his brakes. It is apparent from the skid marks laid down by the Behringer car and the point of impact, which occurred in the southeast corner of the intersection, that Behringer also must have turned his car slightly to the right in his futile attempt to avoid a collision. The jury could well have found that, if Behringer had seen such flashing directional lights, he should have slowed down his speed so as to have his car under such control that he could have avoided a collision if Leffel did turn left in Behringer's path. However, the jury could also reasonably have concluded that Behringer had the right to continue at his existing rate of speed on the assumption that Leffel would not violate the law by turning left directly into Behringer's traffic lane. The purpose of activating directional signal lights, so as to indicate a left turn, usually is to warn traffic to the rear proceeding in the same traffic lane that the driver will be slowing down or stopping so as to permit approaching traffic in the opposite traffic lane to clear the intersection before the left turn will be begun. Because the jury could reasonably have arrived at either of these two conclusions, whether Behringer's negligent lookout was causal presented a jury issue. It cannot be resolved as a matter of law contrary to the jury's express finding. The appellants cite Wiley v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 320, 324, 88 N. W. (2d) 366, and Bailey v. Zwirowski (1954), 268 Wis. 208, 212, 67 N. W.  (2d) 262, as holding that Behringer, if he had seen the flashing left-turn signal lights of the Leffel car, would have had no right to assume that Leffel would not make a left turn in the path of the approaching Behringer car. Both the Wiley and Bailey Cases were concerned with situations of negligent lookout on the part of a driver who did not look, and, who, if he had looked, would have discovered a situation where it was readily apparent that the other driver was going to violate the law, or had already begun to do so, thereby imminently threatening a collision. This court in those cases held that the failure to look and see such threatened danger could not be excused on the ground that the party failing to look had the right to assume that the other driver would obey the law. The distinguishing feature of the instant case is that, if Behringer had seen the flashing directional lights, he would not have been apprised of a situation where there was any indication that the other driver was about to violate the law. Such violation did not occur until Leffel commenced the left turn, and Behringer, according to his own testimony, saw this as soon as it began.