Opinion ID: 2826086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the charge, W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)

Text: [¶13] A guilty plea is “a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Indeed, it “is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction[.]” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Upon entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, and “[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 1469. “Where a defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having been informed of the crime’s elements, this standard is not met and the plea is invalid.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 2405, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005). [¶14] “[Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 is supposed to act as a guideline for the courts in determining that a plea by a defendant is intelligent, knowing, and voluntary, and that the plea has been entered with an understanding of the consequences.” Ingalls v. State, 2002 WY 75, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 856, 860 (Wyo. 2002). Under Rule 11(b), “[p]rior to accepting a guilty plea, the district court must advise the defendant of ‘the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered.’” Duke, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 23, 209 P.3d at 571 (quoting W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1)); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (“We have long held that a plea does not qualify as intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives ‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of 4 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2015) provides: “The actor causes submission of the victim by any means that would prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary resolution.” 8 due process.’”) (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572, 574 (1941)).5 [¶15] In McEwan v. State, 2013 WY 158, 314 P.3d 1160 (Wyo. 2013), we explained the importance of the Rule 11 colloquy and advisements: Giving the required advisements and otherwise complying with Rule 11 may appear to be a tedious and repetitive process for trial judges, and we acknowledge that defendants are often inattentive and disinterested in the advisements. However, engaging them in dialogue as the rule requires creates a record establishing that the right to trial by jury and other rights associated with it have been relinquished knowingly and voluntarily, and it must be followed. Id. at ¶ 20, 314 P.3d at 1167; see also Ingalls, 2002 WY 75, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d at 860 (“Strict compliance with the rule is required to ensure due process of law[.]”). [¶16] “‘We have no hard and fast rule regarding how much information is necessary to explain the nature of a charge to a defendant.’” Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1107 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Stice v. State, 799 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Wyo. 1990)). “In some circumstances the court may discharge this obligation by simply reading the indictment or information to the defendant and permitting him the opportunity to ask questions.” Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Bryan v. State, 745 P.2d 905, 907-08 (Wyo. 1987)). However, where the circumstances surrounding the plea agreement are not simple and the elements are not self-explanatory, more explanation is required of the court. Id. at 29-30. (“[I]t may be necessary to explain the elements of the crime and define complex legal terms.”). “The actions required of the district court in any particular case depend largely on whether the elements of the offense are difficult to understand, considering both their complexity to the average person with no legal training and the sophistication of the individual defendant.” Id. at 30 (citing Bryan, 745 P.2d at 907-08). [¶17] In Ingalls, we reversed the defendant’s pleas because of a persistent lack of clarity of the charges to which the defendant pled, and a lack of any record of the plea hearing. 2002 WY 75, ¶ 13, 46 P.3d at 861. We held that without a record, we were prevented “from knowing whether the circuit court read or described the charges to Ingalls, whether the circuit court advised Ingalls as to his rights and as to the consequence of his pleas, whether the circuit court determined the voluntariness of the pleas, or whether the circuit court determined the accuracy of the pleas.” Id. at ¶ 14, 46 P.3d at 861. We concluded 5 Wyoming’s Rule 11 mirrors F.R.Cr.P. 11, and much of the jurisprudence used in interpreting the state rule originates in federal case law. “[W]hen a federal rule of criminal procedure is similar to our corresponding rule, we look to federal case law for guidance in interpreting our rule.” Smith v. State, 2008 WY 98, ¶ 9, 190 P.3d 522, 525 (Wyo. 2008). 9 that the “imprecision [in charging the defendant] carried over into the taking of [the] pleas, and it is that imprecision that requires reversal of the Judgment and Sentence.” Id. [¶18] In Peper, we acknowledged that the district court provided “only minimal help” in explaining the charge of escape from official detention at the plea hearing, instead eliciting the elements of the charge through the defendant’s own testimony. 768 P.2d at 30. Nevertheless, we concluded that “[v]iewing the arraignment proceeding as a whole,” the court “sufficiently described the charge to appellant and sufficiently made him aware of the specific conduct which led to that charge.” Id. Our conclusion rested on the simplicity of the elements “conceptually and in the manner articulated by the legislature[,]” and the “appellant had some college level education, and he had something more than a passing exposure to the courtroom and the plea taking process.” Id. [¶19] In Mehring, we acknowledged that the court’s failure to provide a complete description of the elements at the plea hearing was not the best practice, but we also held that “complete descriptions of the elements are not mandatory in accepting a plea[.]” 860 P.2d at 1108. See also Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶¶ 9, 12, 33 P.3d 1129, 1133 (Wyo. 2001) (sufficient for the court to inform the defendant that he was charged with conspiracy to commit forgery, without reading the statute or listing the elements of either conspiracy or forgery, stating “change of plea hearing did not take place in a vacuum,” and the “totality of the circumstances” indicated that the defendant was “an experienced criminal,” “represented by an experienced public defender who reviewed the evidence and plea options with him.”). [¶20] In Mr. Williams’ case, the district court’s advisement of the elements was certainly not complete. The advisement should have stepped through each element of the crime, and provided a definition of the more complex elements. However, although the charge that included ten possible statutory provisions lacked clarity, Mr. Williams was present at the hearing on his motion for a bill of particulars, at which the State clarified that it would be charging Mr. Williams under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(ii). Furthermore, at the plea hearing, in response to questions from the district court, Mr. Williams asserted that he had discussed his plea with counsel and that he was satisfied with the advice his counsel had given him. “Despite the fact that the trial court did not inquire if the discussions with counsel included descriptions of the elements of [the crime charged], we may apply the presumption that they did.” Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1108 (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2258, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)); see also United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying the presumption that defendant’s attorney explained the elements of the charge against him); Hicks v. Franklin, 546 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating the presumption that the attorney explained the elements will not be applied unless there is a factual basis in the record to support it). Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Mr. Williams was present at the hearing when the State specified the charge against him and his statement that counsel had discussed his plea agreement with him, we 10 conclude that Mr. Williams had sufficient information to understand the nature of the charge against him, and we find no transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.