Opinion ID: 1275377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: unavailing claimed sources of the right to arbitration

Text: Jaklinski's argument that she is entitled to arbitrate her failure to be reappointed is three-pronged. First, she argues that her right to arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining which the joint employers had a duty not to unilaterally alter prior to an impasse in negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, and which therefore survived termination of the contract. Second, she contends that her right to arbitration was a condition of employment frozen in place during the pendency of Act 312 interest arbitration. Third, she urges us to adopt lower federal court decisions holding that a presumption of arbitrability arises whenever a collective bargaining agreement fails to state expressly that the duty to arbitrate terminates automatically with the agreement.
The first prong of Jaklinski's argument is that because grievance and arbitration procedures were mandatory subjects of bargaining over which the parties were obligated to bargain in good faith the joint employers could not unilaterally change the right to grievance arbitration. It is argued that the right thus survived the hiatus between the expiration of the old agreement and the invocation of Act 312 arbitration. This was also the theory accepted by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Jaklinski was entitled to arbitrate her failure to be reappointed. It is true that public employers are required to bargain in good faith to impasse regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15). Because wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment are regarded as mandatory subjects of bargaining, once a party negotiating a collective bargaining agreement proposes such a subject, neither party may take unilateral action regarding it prior to impasse. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 54-55; 214 NW2d 803 (1974). Grievance and arbitration procedures are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674, 681; 246 NW2d 831 (1976). Under this line of reasoning, it logically follows that as part of its duty to bargain in good faith the joint employers had a duty prior to reaching impasse not to unilaterally alter the grievance arbitration mechanism in place at the time the contract expired. However, Jaklinski's grievance arose and was denied long after the parties had negotiated to impasse, at a time when the joint employers no longer had a duty not to alter the grievance arbitration mechanism. In addition, these duties are created in the public employment relations act, and are only enforceable under the mechanism set forth in the PERA by the Legislature. Breach of these duties is an unfair labor practice, and requests for an order to cease and desist from such practices are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission. MCL 423.216; MSA 17.455(16). Lamphere Schools v Lamphere Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich 104, 118; 252 NW2d 818 (1977). Jaklinski's claim in circuit court must be based on a viable contractual right to arbitration, and her claim based on statutory rights to good faith bargaining must be addressed to the MERC. [4] We thus reject the first prong of Jaklinski's argument.
The second prong of Jaklinski's argument is that her right to arbitration was a condition of employment frozen in place during the pendency of Act 312 interest arbitration. It is helpful to distinguish at the outset between grievance and interest arbitration. The former involves arbitration of disputes arising under an existing collective bargaining agreement; the latter involves arbitration of the terms to be included in a new collective bargaining agreement after the parties have negotiated to impasse. Binding interest arbitration is the statutory right of fire fighters and police officers (including sheriff's deputies) and their public employers. 1969 PA 312, MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31). After Act 312 interest arbitration is invoked, neither party to the dispute may alter existing wages, hours, [or] other conditions of employment without the consent of the other during the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration panel. MCL 423.243; MSA 17.455(43). These statutes evince the Legislature's particular concern that public employees who provide vital services to their communities, and who are therefore deprived of the right to strike, have a forum available to resolve labor disputes which is more expeditious and less expensive than the courts. This statutory scheme does not, however, support Jaklinski's claim that she is entitled to arbitrate her failure to be reappointed. First, the compulsory arbitration provided for in Act 312 is not available to individuals with grievances regarding the interpretation of an existing or expired collective bargaining agreement. Local 1518, AFSCME v St Clair Co Sheriff, 407 Mich 1, 12; 281 NW2d 313 (1979). Second, the wages, hours, [or] other conditions of employment which are frozen in place during the pendency of Act 312 arbitration are those which exist at the time such arbitration is invoked. Therefore, Jaklinski's right to arbitrate her failure to be reappointed could not be preserved under Act 312 unless it survived the expiration of the old collective bargaining agreement on December 31, 1979, and then remained viable during the hiatus between that date and the invocation of Act 312 arbitration in April, 1980. Lastly, nothing in these statutes indicates that invocation of Act 312 proceedings should revive rights which terminated at the expiration of an old collective bargaining agreement. Thus, we conclude that the second prong of Jaklinski's argument is without merit unless it can be shown that her rights survived the hiatus between January 1 and April 29, 1980, a proposition we next examine.