Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructional Errors Relating to the Determination of Penalty

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court committed various errors by instructing the jury as it did on the determination of penalty. We shall consider the claims seriatim.
The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (4th ed. 1979) as modified and, ultimately, in accordance with section 190.3, as follows. In determining which penalty is to be imposed on Douglas Mickey, you shall consider all the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case.... You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable:
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by Douglas Mickey which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence. (c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. (d) Whether or not the offense was committed while Douglas Mickey was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in Douglas Mickey's homicidal conduct. (f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which Douglas Mickey reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. (g) Whether or not Douglas Mickey acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. (h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of Douglas Mickey to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication.
(j) Whether or not Douglas Mickey was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. (k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. At defendant's request, the trial court gave the following instruction. You may consider pity, sympathy or mercy in deciding the appropriate punishment; however, you should not be governed by mere conjecture, prejudice or public opinion. Factors in mitigation may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. The trial court instructed in conformity with CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979) and, ultimately, in conformity with section 190.3. The following part (which was delivered twice in the course of the charge) is pertinent here. It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed upon defendant. After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.
(51) Defendant claims, in substance, that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the felony-murder-burglary and felony-murder-robbery special circumstances found as to each of the two murders arose from what he alleges was a single act or an indivisible course of conduct with one principal criminal objective ( People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 66 [201 Cal. Rptr 782, 679 P.2d 433] (plur. opn.)) and, as a result, could be considered only as a single circumstance for the purposes of determining penalty. His point is predicated on an assertion that unitary consideration of overlapping special circumstances is required by the prohibition against multiple punishment of Penal Code section 654 and also by the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claim is without merit. Its premise is unsound. To be sure, the Harris plurality supported defendant's assertion. (36 Cal.3d at pp. 62-67.) But in People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 765-768 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741], a majority of this court subsequently held to the contrary. Accordingly, the point fails. (Compare ibid. [rejecting a similar claim].)
(52a) Defendant claims in substance that by instructing the jury as it did, the trial court committed so-called  Skipper error. ( Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669].) ... [I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, [citation], requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. ( Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 304-305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961, 96 S.Ct. 2978] (lead opn. of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).) (53) To guarantee that capital sentencing decisions are as individualized and reliable as the Constitution demands, the Eighth Amendment requires that the defendant may not be barred from introducing any relevant mitigating evidence. ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 4-8 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 6-9]; see Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 112-116 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 9-12, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 597-605 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 985-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954] (plur. opn. by Burger, C.J.); Bell v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 637, 642 [57 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1016, 98 S.Ct. 2977] (plur. opn. by Burger, C.J.).) It follows that the Eighth Amendment also requires that a jury and its individual members ( McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 438-443 [108 L.Ed.2d 369, 378-381, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1231-1234]) may not ... be precluded from considering `any relevant mitigating evidence[ ]' ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 4 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 6], quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 114 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 11]; accord, McKoy v. North Carolina, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 438-443 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 378-381, 110 S.Ct. at pp. 1231-1234]; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 394, 398-399 [95 L.Ed.2d 347, 350, 352-353, 107 S.Ct. 1821]; Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 374-375 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 393-394, 108 S.Ct. 1860]). Therefore, when any barrier, whether statutory, instructional, evidentiary, or otherwise (see Mills v. Maryland, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 374-375 [100 L.Ed.2d at pp. 393-394]), precludes a jury or any of its members ( McKoy v. North Carolina, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 438-443 [108 L.Ed. at pp. 378-381, 110 S.Ct. at pp. 1231-1234]) from considering relevant mitigating evidence, there occurs federal constitutional error, which is commonly referred to as  Skipper error. (See generally Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 4-8; Hitchcock v. Dugger, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 394, 398-399; Mills v. Maryland, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 374-375; McKoy v. North Carolina, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 438-443 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 378-381, 110 S.Ct. at pp. 1231-1234].) When the claimed barrier to the jury's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence is an instruction, the crucial question for determining error is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of such evidence. ( Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. 370, 380 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198].) (52b) After close consideration, we reject defendant's claim of error. The challenged instructions told the jury that you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of ... mitigating circumstances, which may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. They also declared that You may consider pity, sympathy or mercy in deciding the appropriate punishment.... Further, in their summations both the prosecutor and defense counsel delivered the same message. Defendant argues that the challenged instructions had two flaws: first, they did not require the sentencer to consider the mitigating evidence but simply permitted it to do so, and, second, they placed the mitigating factors of character, background, history, etc., on a different plane than [ sic ] the factors enumerated in CALJIC No. 8.84.1, [factors] (a) through (k). The instructions themselves, which are quoted above, refute the assertion. In view of the foregoing, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors applied the challenged instructions in a way as to prevent themselves from considering any or all of the potentially mitigating evidence adduced at trial. (54) Under the foregoing analysis, we also reject defendant's claim that the trial court committed Skipper error by failing to delete the italicized word from each of the following penalty factors: Whether or not the offense was committed while Douglas Mickey was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (italics added); and, Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which Douglas Mickey reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct (italics added). Defendant argues in substance that the challenged instructions amounted to an incorrect statement of the law: (1) under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the jury may not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence; (2) such evidence was presented in the form of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and reasonable belief in moral justification or extenuation  and also in the form of non-extreme disturbance and unreasonable belief; and (3) contrary to the constitutional principle stated above, the instructions implied that the jurors could consider only the former and not the latter. To be sure, the major premise of defendant's argument is sound. But a crucial minor premise is not. First, the challenged instructions simply did not carry the preclusive implication he asserts they did: they did indeed state that the jury could consider extreme mental or emotional disturbance and reasonable belief in moral justification or extenuation  but not only  extreme mental or emotional disturbance and  reasonable belief in moral justification or extenuation. Second, one of the instructions given on defendant's request was expressly inclusive: Factors in mitigation may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. (Italics added.) On the record set out above, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have inferred that they could not consider disturbance or belief of any kind or degree whatever in mitigation of penalty. (55) We also reject defendant's claim that the trial court erred by refusing to give, on his request, Defense Instruction No. 23: A mitigating circumstance does not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to exist. You must find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any substantial evidence to support it. A court may  and, indeed, must  refuse an instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law. (See People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1275.) A court may also refuse an instruction that is duplicative. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 805, fn. 12.) The second sentence of Defense Instruction No. 23 is incorrect. The law simply does not so constrain the discretion of the jury or its individual members. The first sentence is duplicative. Implicit in the penalty charge as a whole was the statement expressed therein.
(56) Defendant claims that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on sympathy in accordance with his own request: You may consider pity, sympathy or mercy in deciding the appropriate punishment; however, you should not be governed by mere conjecture, prejudice or public opinion. He argues that the instruction allowed the jurors to take into account any sympathy they might have had for Hanson and/or Blount, and that in this respect it was violative of the cruel and unusual punishments and due process clauses of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the analogous provisions of article I, sections 17 and 7 and 15, of the California Constitution. We find no error. Defendant's primary, and factual, premise is unsupported. The instruction does not carry the meaning he asserts. A reasonable juror would have understood the language in question to allow consideration of sympathy for defendant. That meaning is practically declared by the words themselves. It is also confirmed by their context: immediately following is the instruction, Factors in mitigation may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. In addition, that meaning was anticipated by the prosecutor and defense counsel in their summations: they agreed that the jurors could consider sympathy for defendant  but did not even suggest that they could consider sympathy for the victims. In our view, a reasonable juror could not have understood the challenged instruction as defendant claims. [18]
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to give the following instructions on his request. Defense Instruction No. 3: The mitigating circumstances that I have read for your consideration are given to you merely as examples of some of the factors that you may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a death sentence in this case. You should pay careful attention to each of those factors. Any one of them may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. But you should not limit your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. You may also consider any other circumstances relating to the case or to DOUGLAS SCOTT MICKEY as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death sentence. Defense Instruction No. 4: Another factor for your consideration in determining the appropriate penalty is the concept of fairness. Not only must we strive to accomplish equal justice, but, just as importantly, it should clearly appear to all observers as though justice is being accomplished. In this case, Edward Rogers, who is equally culpable as a principal in these crimes, was granted complete immunity from the charges of murder in this case and was further granted immunity from perjury with respect to statements made by him under oath and will not serve any prison sentence whatever. Measured against this, you are given a choice of only two sentencing alternatives  life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death. You may consider the disparity of treatment between Edward Rogers and Douglas Mickey in selecting the sentence to be imposed. (Paragraphing omitted.) Defense Instruction No. 8: You may consider DOUGLAS SCOTT MICKEY'S potential for contributing affirmatively to the lives of his family and friends as a mitigating circumstance. Defense Instruction No. 12: Mitigating factors were not introduced to justify or excuse the offense in question. They may, however, be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriate punishment. Defense Instruction No. 15: You may consider Douglas Scott Mickey's potential for rehabilitation and for contributing affirmatively to the lives of those around him within the prison as a mitigating circumstances [ sic ]; you may also consider the fact that he has presented no custodial problem and is unlikely to do so in the future as a mitigating circumstances [ sic ]. Defense Instruction No. 21: I have previously read to you the list of aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider if you find that any of them is established by the evidence. These are the only aggravating circumstances that you may consider. You are not allowed to take account of any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case. (57a) After review, we find no error in the trial court's refusal of the requested instructions quoted above. (58) As we have declared, a court may, and must, refuse an instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law. The same is true of an instruction that is argumentative, i.e., of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1276; accord, People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 805.) As we have also declared, a court may refuse an instruction that is duplicative. (57b) Defense Instruction No. 21 is incorrect. To be sure, the law permits the jury to consider only penalty factors (a) through (j) of section 190.3, and evidence relevant thereto, in determining aggravation. [Citation.] But the factors set out in the list the court delivered omitted [the victim-consent portion of statutory factor (e)]. Therefore, the requested instruction was incorrect in [implying] that the court's list set out the only factors the law permitted the jury to consider. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1275.) Defense Instructions Nos. 4, 8, 12, and 15 are plainly argumentative. No further comment is required. Defense Instruction No. 3 is in part argumentative  to the extent it states that a single mitigating circumstance can carry potentially dispositive weight, but does not say the same as to a single aggravating circumstance. And it is in part duplicative  to the extent it overlaps the instruction that Factors in mitigation may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. (59) Defendant claims that the trial court did indeed err by refusing the requested instructions. He argues he was entitled to the instructions under People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 189-190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847]. He is wrong. Under Sears, a criminal defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 806; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1276.) The instructions here did not do so. (60) Defendant also argues he was entitled to the requested instructions under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as construed in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586, and its progeny. Again he is wrong. Under those cases, a criminal defendant has a right to clear instructions that guide and focus the jury's consideration of the offense and the offender. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 806; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1277.) Defendant received such instructions. But under those cases, a criminal defendant does not have a right to an instruction  like those here  that invites the jury to draw favorable inferences from the evidence. ( People v. Benson, supra, at p. 806; People v. Gordon, supra, at p. 1277.) (61) Finally, defendant argues he was entitled to the requested instructions under the due process clauses of article I, sections 7 and 15, of the California Constitution and also, apparently, under the analogous provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. His premise is that the instructions were necessary to assure that the penalty phase was fundamentally fair in procedure and basically reliable in result. No such necessity appears.
(62a) Defendant claims that the trial court committed so-called Brown error by instructing the jury as it did on the process by which penalty is to be determined. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], revd. on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].) The final paragraph of section 190.3 declares in relevant part: the trier of fact ... shall impose a sentence of death if it concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. (Italics added.) In Brown, we construed the statutory provision as follows. In this context, the word `weighing' is a metaphor for a process which by nature is incapable of precise description. The word connotes a mental balancing process, but certainly not one which calls for a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of the imaginary `scale,' or the arbitrary assignment of `weights' to any of them. Each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each and all of the various factors he is permitted to consider.... By directing that the jury `shall' impose the death penalty if it finds that aggravating factors `outweigh' mitigating, the statute should not be understood to require any juror to vote for the death penalty unless, upon completion of the `weighing' process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. Thus the jury, by weighing the various factors, simply determines under the relevant evidence which penalty is appropriate in the particular case. (40 Cal.3d at p. 541, fn. omitted.) Stated simply, the statutory provision requires jurors to make a moral assessment on the basis of the character of the individual defendant and the circumstances of the crime and thereby decide which penalty is appropriate in the particular case. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 856.) Although in Brown we construed the statutory provision thus, we nevertheless recognized that when delivered in an instruction its mandatory-penalty-determination language might mislead jurors as to the scope of their sentencing discretion. (40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17.) Specifically, a juror might reasonably understand that language to define the penalty determination as simply a finding of facts ( id. at p. 540) or a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of the imaginary `scale[ ]' ( id. at p. 541). In other words, he might be misled as to the nature of the process by which penalty is to be determined. A juror might also reasonably understand the language to require him to vote for death if he finds that aggravation outweighs mitigation  even if he determines that death is not the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. (See id. at pp. 540-544.) That is to say, he might be misled as to the character of the ultimate question to be resolved in the process of determining penalty. (63) To mislead jurors as to the scope of their sentencing discretion, as Brown itself makes plain, is error under state law. (See 40 Cal.3d at pp. 540-544.) But as a general matter at least, it is not error of federal constitutional dimension: it does not implicate the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment or apparently any other provision of the federal charter. (See People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 534, fn. 2, 535, fn. 3 [273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In deciding whether the jurors in any given case were in fact misled, we examine the whole record and in particular the arguments of counsel ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1034 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]; see People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17) as they would or could have been understood by the hypothetical reasonable juror ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 535 & fn. 3 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Brown, supra, at pp. 540-544). (62b) After review, we are of the opinion that the jurors in this case were not misled as to the scope of their sentencing discretion. At the outset, we recognize that the trial court's instruction  which it gave at two points in its charge  followed the potentially misleading language of the final paragraph of section 190.3. We also recognize that the prosecutor paraphrased that language in his summation  and had previously paraphrased it during voir dire of prospective jurors. Be that as it may, both the prosecutor and defense counsel made it clear in their summations that the jurors were required to make a moral assessment of defendant and his crimes and thereby decide which penalty was appropriate. Indeed, both delivered a message on that point that was all but express. Moreover, neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel suggested to the jurors that the penalty determination was simply a finding of facts ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 540) or a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of the imaginary `scale[ ]' ( id. at p. 541), or that it was somehow compelled by the law regardless of their individual views on the appropriateness of death. Quite the opposite  as the statements quoted above reveal beyond peradventure. Accordingly, on this record we cannot find Brown error. The jurors here were not misled as to the scope of their sentencing discretion. Having heard the summations by the prosecutor and defense counsel, a reasonable juror would have come to a proper understanding of both the nature of the process by which penalty was to be determined and the ultimate question to be resolved in that process. Such a juror could not have formed any other view. [19] (64) In a related point, defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to give, on his request, Defense Instruction No. 19: You are instructed that a life without parole verdict means exactly what it says: that the defendant shall be imprisoned for the rest of his life. And you are instructed that a death verdict means exactly what it says: that the defendant will be executed. For you to conclude otherwise, would be to rely upon speculation or conjecture and would be a violation of your oath as a juror. We find no error. As stated above, a court may, and must, refuse an instruction that is incorrect. Defense Instruction No. 19 is such: It is ... incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of death or life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out ( People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 130 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37]). Defendant argues the court should have given the instruction because: (1) at least one of the jurors had assertedly expressed a belief during voir dire that life imprisonment without possibility of parole might not mean what it said; and (2) the meaning of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was assertedly of critical significance in this case. The fact remains, however, that the instruction is incorrect. Hence, it was properly refused. (See People v. Thompson, supra, at p. 131.)
(65) Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to give, on his request, Defense Instruction No. 17, which states in relevant part: You may impose a penalty of death only where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and only where you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment. Defendant's position is that Defense Instruction No. 17 correctly states the law. In support, he may be understood to argue that imposition on the People of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the following issues is required by the 1978 death penalty law: (1) a circumstance in aggravation may be considered only if its existence is proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the penalty may be fixed at death only if the aggravating circumstances are found to outweigh the mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the penalty may be fixed at death only if death is determined to be the appropriate punishment beyond a reasonable doubt. That is not the case. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 808.) He then argues that imposition of the burden is required by the Constitutions of the United States and California, specifically: (1) the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17; (2) the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, sections 7 and 15; and, apparently, (3) the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7. That, also, is not the case. (E.g., People v. Benson, supra, at p. 808; People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 935-936.) [20]