Opinion ID: 1117446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: The Time Limitations Placed by the Trial Court on Drummond's Claims

Text: As a result of its ruling that the relationship between Drummond and United was a tenancy at will, the trial court concluded that the only time period relevant to Drummond's claims was that period from January 2001 until October 2002. The trial court reasoned that until United leased the Carter Mine property to TRI in 2001, Drummond's rights under the tenancy at will remained unfettered; the trial court also reasoned that once United notified Drummond in October 2002 of Drummond's alleged breaches of the agreements and terminated any leases then remaining in effect, Drummond no longer held a protectible interest in any of United's lands. This ruling impacts the issues raised on appeal in numerous ways  it impacts the correct analysis of every claim asserted by Drummond  and Drummond challenges that ruling on appeal. United also challenges this ruling in its cross-appeal, asserting that Drummond's tenancy at will was terminated when United leased the property to TRI in January 2001. As a result, United argues that Drummond's breach-of-contract claims should not have gone to the jury. (See United's brief at 56.) Because we agree that Drummond held a tenancy at will by implication, rather than a tenancy at will by express agreement, we note that the statutory 10-day termination-notice provision, found in § 35-9-3, Ala.Code 1975, is inapplicable in this case. See Womack v. Hyche, 503 So.2d 832, 836-37 (Ala.1987) (Alabama Code 1975, § 35-9-3, requires either party to a tenancy at will, in order to terminate the tenancy, to give 10 days' notice in writing to the other party. This, however, applies only to tenancies which are expressly tenancies at will, which is not the case here.). Because Drummond's tenancy at will was not expressly created but was created by implication, i.e., as a result of judicial interpretation, United was not obligated to provide the statutory 10-day notice before it could terminate Drummond's tenancy at will. We also note that Alabama caselaw contains varied statements of what constitutes proper notice to terminate a tenancy at will by implication. In Womack v. Hyche, supra, a lessor instituted a declaratory-judgment action seeking to have a lease declared void. The lease agreement in issue there purported to grant the tenant the right to renew the lease as long as the [commercial fishing] camp is run as a business for a profit. 503 So.2d at 833. Because this renewal provision created an uncertain ending date for the lease, this Court held that the agreement lacked a date certain and resulted in a tenancy at will. 503 So.2d at 837. In addressing the termination of the lease, this Court recognized that when a tenancy at will resulted by implication, the lessee was not entitled to the statutorily required 10-day notice but was entitled to reasonable notice to quit the premises. 503 So.2d at 837. The lessor in Womack had instituted the declaratory-judgment action for the purpose of terminating the tenancy; this Court recognized that that legal action was sufficient notice to the lessee. This Court remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of an order requiring the lessee to vacate the leased premises within a reasonable time. 503 So.2d at 837. However, in Brown v. Williams, 576 So.2d 195 (Ala.1991), this Court stated that the general rule is that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, a month's notice prior to the end of the leasehold period, when that period is a month or more, is adequate. 576 So.2d at 197 (citing Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 1.5(f)). However, in Industrial Machinery, this Court stated: `[T]he rule generally followed in this country is that a tenancy at will is terminated by a conveyance of the premises by the landlord. . . .' 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 79; accord, Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1006 (1939). We opine also that notice to [the tenant] to terminate was not required. Ten days['] notice is required under Title 31, § 3 of the Code of Alabama 1940 [now § 35-9-3, Ala.Code 1975] only when the tenancy at will is expressly created. 344 So.2d at 745. See also 2 Richard R. Powell & Michael A. Wolf, Powell on Real Property § 16.05[2] (2000) (any lease or conveyance of the affected property to a third party made by the landlord ends the tenancy at will). Relying on Industrial Machinery, United argues that its January 2001 lease to TRI was sufficient to terminate Drummond's tenancy at will. We decline to follow this approach here. Based on the parties' earlier course of dealing, Drummond could reasonably have interpreted United's lease to TRI as something other than a termination of the lessor-lessee relationship between it and United. United had previously leased its property to third parties and, upon Drummond's asserting a superior claim to the coal on that property, United had agreed to pay Drummond an override royalty in exchange for Drummond's release of its rights. Thus, when Drummond learned of the 2001 United-TRI lease, Drummond could have reasonably expected the same sequence of events to occur. It was not until October 2002  when United expressly terminated any remaining lease agreements with Drummond  that Drummond was unquestionably on notice of United's position regarding the leases. Thus, we disagree with United that it terminated Drummond's tenancy at will in January 2001. We agree with the trial court that United did not terminate Drummond's tenancy at will until October 2002. For that reason, we agree with the time limitations placed by the trial court on Drummond's claims. We now review the parties' specific claims, as ruled upon by the trial court, in light of the above conclusions.