Opinion ID: 3032460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearns’s “Failure-to-Protect” Claim

Text: [1] “ ‘[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)). The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation when: (1) the deprivation alleged is “objectively, sufficiently serious” and (2) the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” acting with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotations omitted). “[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. The district court dismissed Hearns’s “failure-to-protect” claim on the ground that Hearns failed to show that the prison officials had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. According to the district court, the prison officials could not have inferred or otherwise known that the inmates who attacked Hearns in the chapel posed a substantial risk of harm to Hearns. [2] We disagree. In his amended complaint, Hearns alleged facts detailing religiously motivated violence. According to Hearns, prison officials, including Chaplain Kahn, knew as early as May 1997 that a group of ruling Muslim inmates had planned and implemented attacks against other Muslim inmates who questioned the authority of the ruling group, failed to follow the ruling group’s orders, or refused to share prayer oil. The prison officials also knew that the violence and friction involved differences between the prison’s Muslim HEARNS v. TERHUNE 7755 community over religious leadership and services at the prison, yet did nothing to remedy this situation.3 [3] Hearns also claimed that the prison officials were aware of, yet disregarded, the danger posed by the specific inmates who had orchestrated previous attacks on other inmates who did not support the ruling Muslim group. In fact, inmates from the ruling Muslim group had previously committed a violent attack against Hearns.4 [4] Next, Hearns alleged facts that, when accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Hearns, raise an inference that the prison officials created the risk and then facilitated the attacks. For example, the amended complaint alleged that Chaplain Kahn knew that the ruling Muslim group was trying to steal prayer oil from other Muslim inmates. In deciding to help Ware (a fellow Muslim inmate), Hearns specifically asked Chaplain Kahn not to tell other inmates that Ware’s prayer oil shipment had arrived or that Hearns would deliver the prayer oil to Ware. Nevertheless, Chaplain Kahn, either directly or indirectly, informed the ruling Muslim group that Hearns would secretly deliver the prayer oil to Ware. Later, Chaplain Kahn allegedly informed Muslim inmates that Hearns believed there was a prophet after Muhammad and that Hearns did not follow the teachings of Muhammad. Passing such information to the violent ruling Muslim group placed Hearns in danger and created a substantial risk that Hearns would be injured or killed. Finally, the allegations regarding the attack against Hearns 3 Although the prison officials threatened to suspend all Islamic services at the prison if the safety of all Muslim inmates could not be assured, allegedly they neither suspended the services nor took other measures to protect the Muslim inmates who were not part of the ruling group of Muslims. 4 The first attack occurred in the Facility A chapel two days after Hearns accepted a fellow inmate’s shipment of prayer oil. 7756 HEARNS v. TERHUNE at the Facility B chapel similarly raise an inference that the prison officials facilitated the attacks against Hearns. Correctional Officer Powell allegedly greeted Hearns at the chapel door and searched him for weapons. But, according to Hearns, Correctional Officer Powell was no longer present when Hearns was attacked by inmates belonging to the ruling Muslim group, even though Muslim inmates were not allowed in the chapel unsupervised. Indeed, prison officials knew that some of these same inmates had previously attacked Hearns or planned and implemented attacks on other Muslim inmates. [5] The series of planned attacks and religious-related violence at Calipatria State Prison was “longstanding, pervasive, [and] well-documented.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (internal quotations omitted). “[S]uch evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the [prison officials] had actual knowledge of the risk.” Id. at 842-43. [6] In sum, Hearns adequately informed the parties and the district court of his Eighth Amendment “failure-to-protect” claim and showed that he may have been entitled to relief. See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Specific legal theories need not be pleaded so long as sufficient factual averments show that the claimant may be entitled to some relief.”). The allegations in Hearns’s pro se amended complaint were sufficient to raise an inference that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, or knew that Hearns faced a substantial risk of serious harm and “disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Hearns’s “failure-to-protect” claim.