Opinion ID: 1798404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony as to Subjective Symptoms.

Text: The trial court concluded that Dr. Salinsky's services were procured exclusively for the purpose of his giving testimony. Since Dr. Salinsky did not purport to treat any of the plaintiffs, he was not entitled to testify as to subjective symptoms, pursuant to Ritter v. Coca-Cola Co. (1964), 24 Wis. (2d) 157, 128 N. W. (2d) 439. We note that the record does not disclose that any specific motion for a new trial was presented to the lower court regarding this alleged error. Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co. (1957), 274 Wis. 505, 518, 80 N. W. (2d) 380; Withers v. Tucker, ante, p. 82 at page 87, 135 N. W. (2d) 776; Dombeck v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. (1964), 24 Wis. (2d) 420, 430,  129 N. W. (2d) 185; Chapnitsky v. McClone (1963), 20 Wis. (2d) 453, 465, 122 N. W. (2d) 400. Also, there has been no request to this court for a new trial based on this alleged error. The appellants have asked that we apply the Powers rule as to the damages. Even if the claimed improper receipt of testimony as to subjective symptoms might have supported a motion to the trial court for a new trial, it would not, in our opinion, be sufficient to activate this court to apply the Powers rule as to the quantum of damages. Cf. Spleas v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp. (1963), 21 Wis. (2d) 635, 646, 124 N. W. (2d) 593.