Opinion ID: 773161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability Of The Marital Communications Privilege

Text: 22 On January 30, 1997, Heidi Werch met with Agent Hejny of the FDA. Hejny questioned Heidi as to whether Barry Werch had ever spoken ill of NBP. Heidi recalled to the agent that one day during the course of their marriage, Barry had returned home quite upset. Barry informed Heidi that a grinder at the plant had broken down and that he had been required to go in and fix it. While inside the grinder, Barry said, there were maggots dropping all over him. 23 At trial, Lea sought to call Heidi to testify to the statements made by Barry concerning the maggots at the NBP plant. Lea attempted to introduce the testimony to bolster his claim that Barry Werch was the author of the May 14th letter--which likewise referenced maggots at the plant-- and thus the culpable party. However, Barry Werch's counsel invoked the marital communications privilege, and the court instructed Heidi not to respond to any of Lea's questions. Lea argues on appeal that the decision of the district court to allow Barry Werch to invoke that privilege was in error. Lea asserts that Barry Werch waived the privilege during an interview with the FDA, wherein he mentioned maggots at the NBP plant. 24 In a criminal trial, the availability of any privilege is governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the Courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. Fed. R. Evid. 501; United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1984). One privilege that is firmly rooted in our common law is the marital communications privilege, which reflects the value our society places on uninhibited communications between spouses. See United States v. Short, 4 F.3d 475, 487 (7th Cir. 1993). The privilege, which can be asserted by either spouse, applies only to communications made in confidence between the spouses during a valid marriage. See Byrd, 750 F.2d at 590. We encourage married people to confide in each other by protecting their statements from later scrutiny in court. See id. In order to fully foster this level of trust between married couples, the Supreme Court has held that a couple's divorce does not terminate the privilege for confidential marital communications. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954). Yet, the cost of that privilege is a reduction in truthful disclosure. It is because privileges are in derogation of the search for truth, which lies at the heart of a criminal trial, that the Supreme Court has held that they must be construed narrowly. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 25 Once again, special deference is given to the evidentiary rulings of the district court. Thus, we will not reverse such rulings unless the decision of the district court constituted an abuse of its discretion. United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, the district court stated that it did not have any reason to believe that the communication was intended to be communicated to third parties, or that the privilege was waived at any point in time. When analyzing whether the district court properly invoked the marital communications privilege to bar testimony, we begin with a premise of confidentiality regarding communications made during a marriage. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951). Simply put, Lea has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. 7 Despite Lea's assertion, the record does not reflect that the statements made by Barry Werch to Heidi Werch were categorically and literally identical to those statements Werch provided FDA agents. Rather, both statements merely dealt with a similar topic, namely maggots in the NBP. While we remain steadfast in our position that the necessary element of confidentiality is lost when a spouse divulges to a third party the communication which he or she seeks to exclude from evidence, see Short, 4 F.3d at 478, we do not believe that to have occurred in this instance. Thus, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude these statements as having been made in the absolute confidence of a valid marriage. 8