Opinion ID: 4282326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Womble and Veal

Text: ¶16. In his briefs before the Court of Appeals and his petition for writ of certiorari, Hammons argues that Veal is an improper departure from Womble. Navarre, Velcon, Knappco and Wilden all maintain that Veal is consistent with Womble. We agree with Navarre, Velcon, Knappco and Wilden. While the two cases do not conflict, a discussion of their facts and holdings is warranted. ¶17. Womble was a wrongful-death action brought against a number of medical defendants by the heirs of Helen Womble, who died on April 11, 1986. Womble, 618 So. 2d at 1255. The original complaint, filed on March 28, 1988, included five fictitious parties who were alleged “to be unknown at that time.” Id. All of the defendants were alleged to have “committed various acts of negligence which had led to . . . Womble’s death.” Id. The trial court allowed the heirs to amend their complaint and substitute Dr. Calhoun for one of the fictitious parties on November 7, 1989. Id. at 1256. While the heirs admitted that they knew Dr. Calhoun had seen Womble, they maintained “that they had had no reason to suspect any negligence on Doctor Calhoun’s part until” another physician’s deposition testimony revealed “that . . . Womble may have stood a higher chance of survival had some method 9 been used to diagnose her illness and bring in a surgeon earlier.” Id. ¶18. At the outset of its analysis of the addition of Dr. Calhoun to the suit, the Womble Court noted that Mississippi Code Section 15–1–36 (Supp. 1991), a two-year statute of limitations, governed the heirs’ action. Id. at 1265–66. The Court recognized that “[t]he running of the statute of limitations under § 15–1–36 may be tolled for a reasonable period of time to allow plaintiff to acquire and peruse the appropriate medical records.” Id. at 1266. Concluding that Dr. Calhoun had been added to the complaint outside the period of limitations, the Court emphasized that there were medical records which reflected the extent of Dr. Calhoun’s treatment of the decedent on the day she was admitted to the hospital. The exercise of reasonable diligence should have led appellants to discern the extent of Dr. Calhoun’s involvement in this case and join him in this suit long before the passage of three years and seven months after . . . Womble’s death. Id. ¶19. With the statute-of-limitations issue decided, the Womble Court turned to the argument that Dr. Calhoun’s substitution for an original fictitious party related back to the time of filing of the original complaint under Rules 9(h) and 15(c)(2). Id. at 1266–67. After quoting Rules 9(h) and 15(c)(2), the Court recognized that: There is a dearth of Mississippi law on the application of Rule 9(h). It is a principle of general application, though, that ignorance of the opposing party for fictitious party practice extends beyond mere lack of knowledge of the opposing party’s name. Even if the plaintiff knows the true name of the person, he is still ignorant of his name if he lacks knowledge of the facts giving him a cause of action against the . . . person. 10 Id. at 1267 (citing Braceda v. Gamsby, 267 Cal. App. 2d 167, 72 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1968),5 and Columbia Eng’g v. Epsey, 429 So. 2d 955 (Ala.1983)).6 The Court then found that Rule 9(h) did not apply, noting that even the heirs “admit[] that no fair construction of the pleadings would lead to the conclusion that Dr. Calhoun was identified, even as a John Doe. For that reason this rule cannot save the action against him, in any event.” Id. In rejecting the Rule 9(h) argument, the Court also returned to its earlier, reasonable-diligence analysis: “as noted above, there were numerous medical records on file at SRH indicating the extent to which . . . [Dr.] Calhoun had participated in the treatment of Helen Womble.” Id. ¶20. Without citing Womble, this Court, in Veal, again applied Rule 9(h) to a wrongfuldeath action. Veal, 955 So. 2d at 844. In Veal, Willie Veal brought an action on behalf of 5 In its discussion of the civil procedure rule that governs fictitious parties in California, the Braceda Court cites Garrett v. Crown Coach Corp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 647, 650, 66 Cal. Rptr. 590, 592 (Ct. App. 1968). Braceda, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Garrett explains that “even though the plaintiff may know of the existence of a person, the plaintiff is ‘ignorant’ within the meaning of [the fictitious-party rule] if he lacks knowledge of that person’s connection with the case.” Garrett, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 592. Womble’s rule statement and holding is in agreement with Garrett’s interpretation of the term “ignorant” within the rule. 6 Epsey states, [A] plaintiff, in order to invoke the relation back principles of Rules 9(h) and 15(c), must meet the following criteria: . . . 2) plaintiff must be ignorant of the identity of the fictitious party, in the sense of having no knowledge at the time of the filing that the later named party was in fact the party intended to be sued. Epsey, 429 So. 2d at 958–59 (Ala. 1983) (emphasis added). 11 Willie Smith’s estate against two corporations and a number of fictitious parties.7 Id. With written consent of the two named defendants, Veal filed a second amended complaint that substituted newly named defendants, including J.P. Morgan Trust Co. (“J.P. Morgan”), for the named fictitious parties. Id. “In addition, the Second Amended Complaint included new facts and allegations regarding the ‘substituted’ defendants’ involvement [in the suit].” Id. J.P. Morgan moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion. Id. at 844–45. ¶21. On appeal, the Veal Court held that the parties added in the amended complaint were newly added parties and not substitutions under Rule 9(h). Id. at 846–47. The Court noted that the original complaint’s allegations concerning the alleged fictitious parties “provide[d] no indication that Veal was aware of the existence of any of the additional defendants added by the Second Amended Complaint. Veal simply attempted to substitute newly discovered defendants for the previously named fictitious parties.” Id. at 846. ¶22. As the Court of Appeals observed, Veal’s discussion of Rule 9(h) that led to this 7 As to the fictitious defendants, Veal, in her original complaint, had alleged: Said Defendants are named pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 9(h), insofar as their acts and/or omissions were negligent and/or otherwise tortious with respect to the care and treatment of, or in the staffing, supervision, administration and direction of the care and treatment of, [the deceased] during her residency at AUTUMN LEAVES NURSING HOME. Alternatively, said Defendants are liable for the negligent and/or otherwise tortious acts and/or omissions of others with respect to the care and treatment of [the deceased] during her residency at AUTUMN LEAVES NURSING HOME. Id. at 846 (alterations in original). 12 conclusion “is directly applicable to the present case.” Hammons v. Navarre, 2017 WL 1392835, at  (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2017). The Veal Court explained: [W]here a plaintiff wishes to file suit against a defendant whose name is not known, the suit may be filed by providing the defendant a fictitious name. Rule 9(h) is not intended to serve as an insurance policy to plaintiffs who wish to protect themselves in case they discover new defendants in the course of litigation. Rule 9(h) authorizes the plaintiff to deviate in only one respect from the requirements of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure in bringing a claim. That is, the plaintiff is allowed to use a fictitious name, rather than the true name of the defendant. In other words, the purpose of Rule 9(h) is to allow a plaintiff to proceed with a lawsuit where the plaintiff knows and can articulate the wrongful conduct of, and claims against, the fictitious party, but simply does not know that party’s name. Rule 9(h) does not say that a plaintiff may include a fictitious party because the plaintiff suspects that there might be someone out there who might have engaged in conduct which might be actionable. For instance, if the plaintiff knew that a nurse was assisting a doctor with a procedure and that the nurse engaged in negligent conduct, the plaintiff is not prevented from proceeding with litigation against the nurse simply because the plaintiff does not know the name of the nurse. The plaintiff may sue “Nurse X” and upon learning the nurse’s name, substitute it for the fictitious party under Rule 9(h). See Miss. R. Civ. P. 9(h). However, where a plaintiff suspects that there might have been others involved in the procedure who might have been negligent, but is, at the time suit is filed, unaware of who they are or what negligent act they are alleged to have committed, the plaintiff may not include a fictitious party in the complaint. This Court has previously stated that “the purpose of Rule 9(h) is to provide a mechanism to bring in responsible parties, known, but unidentified, who can only be ascertained through the use of judicial mechanisms such as discovery.” Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So. 2d 890, 896–97 (Miss. 2006) (emphasis added). Veal, 955 So. 2d at 846–47 (emphasis in original). ¶23. This Court consistently has applied the same reasoning that underlies Womble and 13 Veal to numerous Rule 9(h) cases. See Rawson v. Jones, 816 So. 2d 367, 369 (Miss. 2001) (citing Doe v. Mississippi Blood Servs., Inc., 704 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.1997)) (“The purpose of Rule 9(h) is to provide a mechanism to bring in known, but unidentified, responsible parties who may only be ascertained through the use of judicial mechanisms such as discovery.”); Long v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 969 So. 2d 35, 42 (Miss. 2007) (“One of the benefits of Rule 9(h) is to allow a plaintiff, who is aware of his cause of action against a defendant but ignorant of the defendant’s identity, to name a fictitious party as a defendant in order to use the court’s resources to discover her true identity.”); Price v. Clark, 21 So. 3d 509, 526 (Miss. 2009) (“[A]t the time the original complaint was filed, Price neither knew the identities of the parties, nor was she aware of any facts giving rise to any cause of action against such unknown individual or corporate entity; therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that Price’s substitution did not comport with the purpose of Rule 9(h).”). ¶24. The Veal Court’s holding was consistent with precedent for three primary reasons. First, the Veal Court correctly applied the plain and ordinary meaning of Rule 9(h). As it recognized, “this Court is bound to follow the plain and ordinary meanings of the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Veal, 955 So. 2d at 845 (citing Poindexter v. Southern United Fire Ins. Co., 838 So. 2d 964, 971 (Miss. 2003) and Van Meter v. Alford, 774 So. 2d 430, 432 (Miss. 2000)). ¶25. Second, a close examination of Womble’s rule statement reveals the meaning in the statement “that ignorance of the opposing party for fictitious party practice extends beyond 14 mere lack of knowledge of the opposing party’s name.” Womble, 618 So. 2d at 1267. The Womble Court already had noted the “dearth of Mississippi law on the application of Rule 9(h)” before it cited Garrett and Epsey to explain the rule. Id. (citing Garrett, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 592, and Epsey, 429 So. 2d at 958–59). Both Garrett and Epsey support the proposition that a plaintiff may actually know the true name of an entity but still be ignorant of the entity’s name under the fictitious-party rule, where the plaintiff does not know the facts necessary to realize the true name of the entity that is liable. See supra, fn. 6, 7; Garrett, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 592; Epsey, 429 So. 2d at 958–59. A number of factual scenarios exist in which this principle might apply. ¶26. Third, the Womble Court found that Rule 9(h) did not apply to the facts before it. Womble, 618 So. 2d at 1267. While it is unnecessary to determine if Womble’s analysis is dictum, even the heirs in Womble “admit[ted] that no fair construction of the pleadings would lead to the conclusion that Dr. Calhoun was identified, even as a John Doe.” Id.; see Collins by Smith v. McMurry, 539 So. 2d 127, 130 (Miss. 1989) (“[T]his Court has held on more than one occasion that a statement which qualifies as dictum does not have a binding effect.”). In light of our analysis, we reaffirm Veal and decline to find that it was an improper departure from our precedent.