Opinion ID: 2808709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jennings

Text: Jennings argues she did not know that Danial was in medical distress but even if she did know, she was not deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm. Unlike Farnsworth and Earls, Jennings argues that once she learned of potential harm to Danial, she did not completely disregard the harm. Again, the discussion must begin with the relevant facts surrounding Jennings's involvement. Jennings was not in charge of medical checks or custody checks—she was in charge only of classification. She knew that Danial had previously been banging his head in his concrete cell. When she viewed Danial on a monitor at 2:00 p.m., she went to his cell. She spoke with Gastineau at Danial's cell. Gastineau told Jennings that Danial had not moved for six hours and had refused two meals. Gastineau continued, however, by telling Jennings that a nurse said Danial was okay so long as he was still breathing. Jennings also wanted the cell open but was told by Gastineau that no custody staff would do so. Jennings knew that she had the ability to call a Code 16, but she also knew a Code 16 would have medical staff take - 12 - over—the same medical staff that Gastineau claimed had stated Danial was fine so long as he was breathing. After leaving Danial's cell, she attempted to call a number of supervisors to determine how to proceed. Jennings contends she had no actual knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Like Farnsworth, Jennings relies on Krout to support her argument. Krout held prison employees were entitled to qualified immunity, in part because they reasonably relied on a medical employee's statements minimizing an injured party's risk of further injury. 583 F.3d at 568–69. Unlike Farnsworth, Jennings actually learned of Nurse Hook's views regarding Danial. The district court nevertheless concluded Jennings could not protect herself from liability because any reliance on Nurse Hook's statements was unreasonable. See McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 981 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that prison employees are protected when relying on advice from medical professionals only if such reliance is reasonable). The district court found that because Danial was laying in his cell without moving, Danial's need to be checked by medical personnel was obvious even to a lay person. It further explained that the nurse's advice was so obviously deficient even to a lay person that Jennings acted unreasonably by not confirming that medical personnel had, in fact, made the statement. Even assuming Jennings's reliance on Nurse Hook's statements was unreasonable, Jennings argues she did not act with deliberate indifference to Danial's needs. We must look at Jennings's actions in light of the information [s]he possessed at the time, the practical limitations of [her] position and alternative courses of action that would have been apparent. Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 419. To succeed on the second element of deliberate indifference, Jennings had to deliberately disregard Danial's needs. Krout, 583 F.3d at 567. The district court held that Jennings delayed taking reasonable measures to permit the door to be opened because she did not call a Code 16. The failure to call a Code 16 in these circumstances, however, does not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Jennings knew that a Code 16 would simply - 13 - transfer control of the cell to medical personnel—the same medical personnel who, by Jennings's estimate, stated Danial was fine so long as he was breathing. Instead, Jennings took other steps to abate Danial's risk of injury. Jennings began making phone calls to supervisors to determine how to proceed. While Jennings could have acted differently in the situation and while her actions may even be considered negligent under the circumstances, her conduct does not constitute deliberate indifference as a matter of law. See Jackson, 140 F.3d at 1152 ([M]ere negligence does not support a conclusion that [defendant] exercised a callous disregard or reckless indifference in responding to the risk. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Jennings is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.