Opinion ID: 1800389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Due Process Question

Text: The city urges that Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980) contravenes Minn.Const. art. 1, § 8, [6] as well as the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because the statute abrogates a common law right of action without providing a reasonable substitute. In Tri-State Insurance Co. of Minn. v. Bouma, 306 N.W.2d 564 (Minn.1981), this argument was recently presented to this court with regard to Minn. Stat. § 176.179 (1980). There we held: In other cases, we have recognized that the legislature could constitutionally abrogate a common-law right without providing a reasonable substitute if it is pursuing a permissible, legitimate legislative objective. See Tracy v. Streater/Litton Industries, 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn.1979); Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972). Id. at 566. We do not believe the legislature can pass a statute allowing a substantive remedy and yet, by adopting a procedural statute of limitations, make the remedy impossible to achieve and meaningless by barring the suit from being brought before it has matured. Our decisions have held that a cause of action for contribution accrues when the person entitled to the contribution has sustained damage by paying more than his fair share of the joint obligation. See, e.g., Grothe v. Shaffer, 305 Minn. 17, 232 N.W.2d 227 (1975). We have held that a statute of limitations in a dram shop case cannot bar a related suit for contribution. Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981). See Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.1978). If the city were barred by the statute of limitations from having a reasonable time to join third parties for contribution or indemnity, the statute would not fulfill due process requirements under our constitution. We are not required, in deciding this case, to indicate what such a reasonable time limitation should be, but a statute which does not allow any time whatever is clearly unconstitutional. See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 108, 83 N.W.2d 800, 817 (1957). However, in this case, the city was aware of the injury long before it was sued. It had 14 months after being sued in which to join these third parties. While it is true that the city's claim against the third parties would not vest or mature until its liability was determined, defendants customarily have joined third parties at the time they were initially sued. Our Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate and encourage the joining of third parties at an early stage in the proceedings. Minn.R.Civ.P. 14.01. Even though Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1965) had been declared unconstitutional in 1977 and the current Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980) was not effective at the time suit was brought against the city, the city had until August 1, 1980, to join the third parties and yet failed to do so. Thus, it cannot be said that the city was denied an effective remedy by a procedural statute. Therefore, we affirm the order for summary judgment against the city. KELLEY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.