Opinion ID: 1616730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process Claim: Existence of Misconduct.

Text: To assess whether the county attorney's action in this case constitutes misconduct, it is necessary first to understand the nature of the role played by the prosecutor in a criminal trial. A prosecutor is not an advocate in the ordinary meaning of the term. 63C Am.Jur.2d Prosecuting Attorneys § 1, at 114 (1997). That is because a prosecutor owes a duty to the defendant as well as to the public. See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 568 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Iowa 1997) (stating a county attorney owes a duty to do justice, not only for the accusers, but also for the accused); Webb, 244 N.W.2d at 333 (stating [p]rosecutors have a dual function); State v. Tolson, 248 Iowa 733, 734-35, 82 N.W.2d 105-06 (1957) (noting prosecutor owes a duty to the public and to the accused). The prosecutor's duty to the accused is to assure the defendant a fair trial by complying with the requirements of due process throughout the trial. DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d at 64; accord Tolson, 248 Iowa at 734, 82 N.W.2d at 106. Thus, while a prosecutor is properly an advocate for the State within the bounds of the law, the prosecutor's primary interest should be to see that justice is done, not to obtain a conviction. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935); State v. Levy, 160 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Iowa 1968); 63C Am. Jur.2d Prosecuting Attorneys § 23, at 135-36 (It is as much the prosecutor's duty to see that a person on trial is not deprived of any of his or her statutory or constitutional rights as it is to prosecute the defendant.); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-1.2(b), (c) (3d ed.1993) (stating the prosecutor is an advocate, but [t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict). An observation we made many years ago is unfortunately still true today: even though prosecutors should keep in mind their obligation to the accused at every stage of the proceeding, too often, they do not. Tolson, 248 Iowa at 735, 82 N.W.2d at 106; see, e.g., State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 767, 774 (Iowa 1999) (prosecutor asked questions in violation of pretrial order); State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 1999) (prosecutor made disparaging comments concerning defendant's alibi witnesses in closing argument); Greene, 592 N.W.2d at 32 (prosecutor misrepresented witness's testimony in closing argument); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1994) (prosecutor improperly pointed a gun at a juror during a demonstration); State v. Fox, 491 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Iowa 1992) (county attorney improperly intimidated defense witness). We turn now to the conduct at issue in this case. A. Prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant concerning the police officer's truthfulness. Courts that have considered the propriety of questioning a defendant about the truthfulness of other witnesses have reached divergent conclusions. See State v. Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600, 610 (Iowa 1996) (noting split of authority, but declining to reach issue). Nonetheless, a majority of jurisdictions considers such questioning improper. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871 (D.C.Cir.1995); United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 224 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir.1987); State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 236 (2002); Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 924-25 (D.C.Ct.App.1993); State v. Flanagan, 111 N.M. 93, 801 P.2d 675, 679 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992); State v. Casteneda-Perez, 61 Wash.App. 354, 810 P.2d 74, 79 (1991); Beaugureau v. State, 56 P.3d 626, 635-36 (Wyo.2002). Several reasons underlie this position: First, it is well established that determinations of credibility are for the jury, and not for witnesses. Consequently, questions that ask a defendant to comment on another witness'[s] veracity invade the province of the jury. Moreover, [a]s a general rule, [such] questions have no probative value and are improper and argumentative because they do nothing to assist the jury in assessing witness credibility in its fact-finding mission and in determining the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Second, questions of this sort also create the risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the witness has lied. This risk is especially acute when the witness is a government agent in a criminal case. A witness'[s] testimony, however, can be unconvincing or wholly or partially incorrect for a number of reasons without any deliberate misrepresentation being involved[,] such as misrecollection, failure of recollection or other innocent reason. Similarly, courts have long admonished prosecutors to avoid statements to the effect that if the defendant is innocent, the jury must conclude that witnesses have lied. The reason for this restriction is that [t]his form of argument... involves a distortion of the government's burden of proof. Moreover, like the problem inherent in asking a defendant to comment on the veracity of another witness, such arguments preclude the possibility that the witness' testimony conflicts with that of the defendant for a reason other than deceit. Singh, 793 A.2d at 236-38 (citations omitted). Some courts, while holding that questioning the accused as to another witness's truthfulness is generally improper, recognize an exception. These courts allow such questioning when the contradiction between the defendant's testimony and that of another witness cannot be attributed to differences in perception or inaccuracies in memory, but rather can only be explained by the conclusion that someone is lying. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 198 Ariz. 372, 10 P.3d 630, 633-34 (Ct.App. 2000); State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Minn.1999); State v. Hart, 303 Mont. 71, 15 P.3d 917, 924 (2001); People v. Overlee, 236 A.D.2d 133, 666 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575-76 (1997). These courts reason that where the defendant has created a credibility contest, a prosecutor has the right to cross-examine a defendant as vigorously as possible. Overlee, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 577; accord Pilot, 595 N.W.2d at 517-18. At least two courts have held that asking the defendant whether another witness is lying is proper, apparently under any circumstances. See Dorsey v. State, 259 Ga. 809, 387 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1990); Fisher v. State, 128 Md.App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125, 1163 (Ct.Spec.App.1999). The Georgia court gave no explanation for its holding, but the Maryland court had this to say about its conclusion that asking the defendant whether another witness was lying and then whether all these people [were] lying was not objectionable: Regardless of what literal words were spoken, [the defendant] was not being asked to assess the credibility of those who had given different accounts of events. The only credibility in issue was her own. What [the defendant] was being asked to do was either 1) to acknowledge her own falsity or 2) to look foolish in denying it. Once the final rhetorical question So all these people are lying but [you]? was asked, the skillful cross-examiner would have been turning and walking disdainfully away without waiting for an answer. The answer no longer mattered. Fisher, 736 A.2d at 1163. We disagree with this reasoning. It is inaccurate to say that only the defendant's credibility is at issue; the credibility of all witnesses is at issue. Moreover, contrary to the Maryland court's conclusion, a defendant who is asked whether another person lied is commenting directly on the other person's credibility. The issue then is whether any purpose is served in asking a defendant whether another witness is lying. We think the predominate, if not sole, purpose of such questioning is simply to make the defendant look bad, as implied by the Maryland court's observation in Fisher that the accused's answer is unimportant. See id. The accused's answer is unimportant because the accused is in a no-win situation. If the defendant says the other witness is lying, then the defendant is put in the position of calling someone a liar, a particularly unenviable state when the other witness is a law enforcement officer. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 787 (holding such questions are improper because they put the defendant in the untenable position of commenting on the character and motivations of another witness who may appear sympathetic to the jury). If the defendant says a contradictory witness is not lying, then a fair inference is that the defendant is lying. But, as any trial lawyer knows, there may be many explanations for differing descriptions of the same event. People have different perceptions of the same conversation that affect how and what they remember. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding of what was said; perhaps one person was distracted and did not fully or correctly hear the words uttered by the other person. People sometimes hear what they want to hear. It is unjust to make the defendant give an opinion as to who is lying when, in fact, it is possible that neither witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth. [2] It is also unreasonable to expect the defendant to sift through the variables of human communication to offer an alternative explanation for contradictions in witnesses' testimony. We also think the use of this tacticasking the defendant whether another witness is lyingis incompatible with the duties of a prosecutor. Unfairly questioning the defendant simply to make the defendant look bad in front of the jury regardless of the answer given is not consistent with the prosecutor's primary obligation to seek justice, not simply a conviction. Nor is such questioning consistent with the prosecutor's duty to the defendant to ensure a fair trial, including a verdict that rests on the evidence and not on passion or prejudice. [3] Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d at 79 (holding prosecutor's questions asking witnesses whether other witnesses were lying was contrary to the duty of prosecutors, which is to seek convictions based only on probative evidence and sound reason). For the reasons discussed, we find more persuasive the rationale of those courts that have held it is improper to ask the defendant whether another witness has lied. We also decline to recognize an exception to this rule as a handful of courts have done. The underlying rationale of those courts recognizing an exception is that the defendant has opened the door by contradicting testimony of government witnesses in circumstances that exclude the possibility that the prosecution's witnesses may have been mistaken or [may have] testified to events based on assumptions or faulty memory. Overlee, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 577; accord Morales, 10 P.3d at 633; Pilot, 595 N.W.2d at 518. We think, however, that whether the defendant has invited the questioning is more properly considered in assessing the prejudice element of a due process claim. First of all, the justification for admitting this evidencethat the defendant has opened the doordoes not resolve the fundamental doubt as to the probative value of such questioning. See, e.g., Flanagan, 801 P.2d at 679 (Whether the defendant believes the other witnesses were truthful or lying is simply irrelevant.); People v. Berrios, 298 A.D.2d 597, 750 N.Y.S.2d 302, 302 (2002) (Whether the defendant believed that the other witnesses were lying is irrelevant.' (Citation omitted.)). Secondly, the exception depends on a difficult determinationwhether alternative explanations exist for discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony, a decision that more properly rests with the jury. Finally, prosecutors and trial judges will have more guidance in assuring proper examination of witnesses with a bright-line rule that bars such inquiries without exception. For these reasons, we hold were-they-lying questions are improper under any circumstance. See Singh, 793 A.2d at 238-39 (rejecting exception). Applying this rule here, we conclude the county attorney's questioning was clearly improper. Before we consider whether this misconduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial, however, we discuss the other allegation of prosecutorial misconduct lodged by the defendant. B. Prosecutor's statements in closing argument that defendant lied. As set out in detail above, the prosecutor made repeated references in his rebuttal argument to the defendant's lying. Graves asserts the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal opinion on the defendant's credibility and guilt and improperly disparaged the defendant's character. A prosecutor is entitled to some latitude during closing argument in analyzing the evidence admitted in the trial. State v. Phillips, 226 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1975). Moreover, a prosecutor may argue the reasonable inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Id. A prosecutor may not, however, express his or her personal beliefs. Id. The key point is that counsel is precluded from using argument to vouch personally as to a defendant's guilt or a witness's credibility. This is true whether the personal belief is purportedly based on knowledge of facts not possessed by the jury, counsel's experience in similar cases, or any ground other than the weight of the evidence in the trial. A defendant is entitled to have the case decided solely on the evidence. State v. Williams, 334 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1983); accord State v. Martens, 521 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (stating, vouching for a witness may induce the jury to trust the judgment of the prosecutor rather than their view of the evidence since the prosecutor's opinion carries the imprimatur of the Government); Beaugureau, 56 P.3d at 632 (observing that when a prosecutor asserts his personal opinions, the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because of his position as prosecutor). As this court noted in Williams, this principle is embodied in our code of professional responsibility and in the standards governing the prosecution function. Williams, 334 N.W.2d at 744-45; see also Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility for Lawyers DR 7-106(C)(4); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (3d ed.1993). A prosecutor's duty extends beyond confining his or her arguments to the evidence. In addition, the prosecutor is not allowed to make inflammatory or prejudicial statements regarding a defendant in a criminal action. State v. Leiss, 258 Iowa 787, 792, 140 N.W.2d 172, 175 (1966); accord State v. Brewster, 208 Iowa 122, 127, 222 N.W. 6, 8 (1928) (Prosecutors should refrain from heaping unnecessary abuse upon the defendant.); see also State v. Wright, 192 Iowa 239, 245, 182 N.W. 385, 388 (1921) (stating prosecutor's argument must be kept free of undue denunciations or inflammatory utterances); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c) (stating prosecutor's argument should not be calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury). Based on these principles, the following questions must be answered to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks made in the case before us were proper: (1) Could one legitimately infer from the evidence that the defendant lied? (2) Were the prosecutor's statements that the defendant lied conveyed to the jury as the prosecutor's personal opinion of the defendant's credibility, or was such argument related to specific evidence that tended to show the defendant had been untruthful? and (3) Was the argument made in a professional manner, or did it unfairly disparage the defendant and tend to cause the jury to decide the case based on emotion rather than upon a dispassionate review of the evidence? We discuss each query in order. We think a fair inference from the divergent testimony of Graves and Steil was that Graves lied about his conversations with the officer, an inference supported as well by Graves' interest in avoiding conviction. Therefore, the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's lies or lying were legitimate inferences from the evidence. Beaugureau, 56 P.3d at 633 (holding prosecutor's statement that the defendant lied was a reasonable inference from the express contradictory testimony of the witnesses). We also conclude these comments were generally made in the context of references to the evidence and not as an expression of the prosecutor's personal opinion. At one point the prosecutor cited specific evidence that supported a conclusion the defendant had lied and he encouraged the jury to look at this evidence. Although the prosecutor might have chosen his words more carefully, we do not think he clearly expressed a personal opinion that the defendant was lying. See United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 683, 685 (1st Cir.1993) (rejecting argument that prosecutor's statements in closing argument that defendant and his witness were lying were improper because the context of the statements suggested inferences the jury might draw from the evidence). On the other hand, the prosecutor personally vouched against the credibility of Graves' testimony that he did not live at Quick's house when the prosecutor asserted that hethe prosecutordid not leave his cash at other people's house. This irrelevant fact was outside the record in this case and improper. See Williams, 334 N.W.2d at 745 (stating prosecutor may not vouch personally as to a witness's credibility, but rejecting claim of misconduct because the prosecutor did not in any statement insinuate that his opinion was based on non-record facts nor can it fairly be said that he personally vouched against the credibility of defendant's testimony). That leads us to another troubling aspect of the prosecutor's closing argument: notwithstanding adequate support in the record for a finding that the defendant lied, did the prosecutor unfairly disparage the defendant in an effort to inflame the passions of the jury? Some courts have held it is misconduct to accuse the defendant of lying or to call the defendant a liar; others have held it is not. Compare United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 63-64 (2d Cir.1973) (holding that characterization of the accused's defense as preposterous and calling the defendant and his witnesses liars was misconduct); Williams v. State, 803 A.2d 927, 930 (Del. 2002) (holding prosecutor's remarks characterizing the defendant as lying were patently improper); State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 61 P.3d 701, 710 (2003) (It is improper for a prosecutor to accuse a defendant of lying.); People v. Skinner, 298 A.D.2d 625, 747 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858-59 (2002) (holding prosecutor's repeated references to defendant being a liar and characterization of defendant's expert as a puppeteer with defendant as his puppet was misconduct), with People v. Boyette, 29 Cal.4th 381, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391, 433 (2002) (holding prosecutor's repeated references to the defendant as a liar was a permissible argument); Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 107-08 (Fla.2003) (holding prosecutor's statements that defendant was a liar were appropriate comments on the evidence); State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 56 P.3d 692, 727 (2002) (holding not improper to argue defendant and his witnesses were lying so long as comments did not suggest statements were prosecutor's personal views); Commonwealth v. Coren, 437 Mass. 723, 774 N.E.2d 623, 631 n. 9 (2002) (holding prosecutor may call the defendant a liar so long as the evidence supports this inference and the comments do not indicate prosecutor's own opinion); see also Smith, 982 F.2d at 684 n. 3 (government conceded that it impermissibly used pejorative language in repeatedly characterizing the testimony of the defendant and his witness as lies). A review of this court's prior cases reveals Iowa has joined those jurisdictions holding it improper to call the defendant a liar. In a 1966 case, this court frowned upon statements by the prosecutor that the defendant was a liar and a crook. Leiss, 258 Iowa at 792, 140 N.W.2d at 175. Although we did not label such argument improper, we examined the propriety of the prosecutor's comments in the context of the entire record and the contested issues in the case, concluding sufficient prejudice had not been shown to warrant a new trial. Id. More recently, however, we condemned similar statements by a prosecutor, finding them clearly improper. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d at 325. In Rutledge, the prosecutor not only characterized the defense witnesses as liars and druggees, but also stated that these witnesses can't tell the truth, couldn't be candid with you if they tried, outright lied ... through their teeth, and would lie to save their own hides. Id. at 325-26 (holding prosecutor's attack on defense witnesses was plainly out of bounds). We conclude from these cases that Iowa follows the rule that it is improper for a prosecutor to call the defendant a liar, to state the defendant is lying, or to make similar disparaging comments. Notwithstanding this prohibition, a prosecutor is still free to craft an argument that includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence and ... when a case turns on which of two conflicting stories is true, [to argue that] certain testimony is not believable. Davis, 61 P.3d at 710-11. The county attorney here did not, however, limit his argument to a discussion of whose testimony was most believable based on reasonable inferences from the evidence; rather, he improperly resorted to inflammatory characterizations of the defendant's testimony. See Williams, 803 A.2d at 930 (stating prosecutor's continued characterization of [defendant] as `lying' was both inflammatory and improper). These improper characterizations included the prosecutor's assertion that Graves had virtually called Officer Steil a liar. See State v. Barrow, 60 Wash.App. 869, 809 P.2d 209, 213 (1991) (stating prosecutor's argument that the defendant in essence called the police witnesses liars was misconduct). As noted earlier, prosecutorial misconduct does not automatically prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial. Thus, we now turn to the prejudice prong of Graves' due process claim to determine whether the prosecutor's improper cross-examination of the defendant and his improper closing argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial.