Opinion ID: 3003898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Batson Claim

Text: At this point we could remand Mahaffey’s case to the district court. But instead we proceed with the merits here, because they were fully briefed by both parties and we are equally positioned with the district court to evaluate Mahaffey’s Batson claim based solely on the state record. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1792 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We do not consider denying Mahaffey’s petition on the ground that the prosecution’s claimed errors were harmless—i.e., that any juror, black or white, would have convicted Mahaffey by attending to the overwhelming horrific evidence against him—because the State of Illinois failed to pursue this argument. Although the State noted that “it is unlikely in the extreme that race played a role in [Mahaffey’s] conviction,” RespondentAppellee’s Br. at 54, it devoted only one paragraph to the harmless-error argument and cited, against a significant amount of contrary authority, no potentially helpful authority. Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived. United States v. Haynes, 582 F.3d 686, 704 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2006). So we are left to determine whether the Illinois trial court’s determination that the prosecution’s race-neutral 8 No. 08-3916 explanations were true was “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). We presume the Illinois court’s factual findings to be sound unless Mahaffey rebuts the “presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Under this deferential standard of review, we will not reverse the state trial court’s decision “simply because we would have decided the case differently, . . . and instead will reverse only if, after reviewing the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Stephens, 514 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “there is no basis for reversal on appeal unless the reason given is completely outlandish or there is other evidence which demonstrates its falsity.” Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). As we discussed above, the numbers describing the prosecution’s use of peremptories are remarkable. However, while happenstance may be “unlikely to produce this disparity,” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241, more than “bare statistics” is required to prove purposeful discrimination. Id. at 241-66. Accordingly, Mahaffey argues additionally that local prosecutors had a historic policy of systematically excluding blacks from juries. He explains that the Illinois Appellate Court recognized, in 1983, “an open secret that prosecutors in Chicago and else- where have been using their peremptory challenges to systematically eliminate all Blacks, or all but token No. 08-3916 9 Blacks, from juries in criminal cases where the defendants are Black.” People v. Gilliard, 445 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). But Mahaffey’s jury selection occurred in 1985, almost two years later. That it occurred before Batson may be of some import. Nevertheless, Mahaffey bears the burden of persuasion, which “never shifts,” United States v. Jones, 224 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2000), to identify a specific Illinois policy that was in place when his jury was selected, such as the discriminatory manual entitled “Jury Selection in a Criminal Case,” available to the prosecutor in Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 264. Mahaffey identifies no such specifics contemporaneous with his case. Without more, he must show that the prosecution’s proffered race-neutral justifications were pretextual, in order to meet his burden of persuasion on clear- error review. Indeed, Mahaffey devotes most of the merits portions of his briefs in arguing that the prosecution’s explanations are pretextual for four of the black jurors it dismissed (Mahaffey has abandoned any claims regarding the remaining three): Angela Mack, Nathaniel Howard, Bea Marshburn, and Catherine Taylor. The prosecutor offered the following race-neutral explanations for dismissing these four jurors: (1) Mack worked for a police department; (2) Howard would suffer hardship because he cared for his invalid mother-in-law, including lifting her from bed “like a baby”; (3) Marshburn had a background in psychology; and (4) Taylor had poor communication skills. These race-neutral reasons are unquestionably valid. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (finding the growing of long, unkempt hair a valid 10 No. 08-3916 nondiscriminatory reason for dismissing a juror). So for Mahaffey to prove purposeful discrimination, he would need to show that the reasons were pretextual. Id. He seeks to show pretext first by showing disparate treatment, i.e., that the prosecution failed to peremptorily dismiss white jurors similarly situated to the four black jurors. See, e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 248 (finding pretext where the prosecution dismissed black juror, but not white jurors, who were ambivalent on imposing the death penalty). But Mahaffey fails on this score because he cannot show that any serving white juror was similarly situated to the four jurors whose dismissals he challenges. Specifically, he claims that one white juror was related to police department employees, not an actual police department employee like Mack, who would have developed personal preconceptions about how police reports should look. Mahaffey claims that another white juror shopped and shoveled snow for his elderly parents, not that he would suffer hardship from jury service comparable with Howard, who cared for an invalid. He claims that another white juror taught and coached special needs children, not had a background in psychology like Marshburn. Finally, he claims that other white jurors were similarly situated to Taylor, because they did not subscribe to periodicals. But the prosecution was entitled to credit additional factors beyond Taylor’s non-subscription to periodicals, such as Taylor’s monosyllabic responses to questions and the prosecutor’s “instincts,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring), and “experienced hunches and educated guesses,” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex re. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 No. 08-3916 11 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring), in finding that Taylor lacked communications skills. Nor does Mahaffey show pretext by showing that other explanations by the prosecution were inconsistent. Specifically, the prosecution said it also excluded Taylor because she equivocated about the weight she would give police testimony, about whether she would follow the court’s instructions, and about whether she would set aside what she previously knew about the case. But the prosecution gave all its proffered reasons when required to do so at the second Batson hearing, and gave these reasons second, after emphasizing the primacy of Taylor’s lack of communication skills. 8 Supplement to R. on Appeal at 13-15. Nothing in the record suggests that these explanations were pretextual, as opposed to “secondary reasons” as the State of Illinois contends. Respondent-Appellee’s Br. at 49; cf. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246. The prosecution also added secondarily that it excluded Taylor because “she had a preconceived notion that under certain circumstances certain crimes should be punished by the death penalty,” and excluded Mack because she stated that “the defendant should prove his own innocence.” Id. at 15, 22. Mahaffey finds these reasons “obviously pretextual,” Reply Br. at 20, 22, because “a prosecutor would clearly desire to have a person with these views on the jury.” Mahaffey’s Br. at 36; see also id. at 31. But this argument assumes that prosecutors in general do not want fair trials—a proposition we do not accept. Indeed, the prosecution explained that it 12 No. 08-3916 wanted jurors who would “follow the law.” 8 Supplement to R. on Appeal at 15, 22. Anyway, we find this reason not so clearly “improbable” as to discredit the Illinois trial court’s determination that this or the other more primary race-neutral justifications offered by the prosecutor were credible. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). Finally, Mahaffey urges that the prosecution’s explanations changed over time, and that the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument took advantage of the racial sensitivity of the case and the racial composition of the jury. We find no support for these arguments in the record. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the Illinois Court did not clearly err in finding that Mahaffey failed to meet his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.