Opinion ID: 187186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nathaniel Law

Text: Law argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing or allowing him to be present. We reject this challenge because the district court properly decided the motion as a question of law. Law claims the district court improperly denied his request for an entrapment instruction. We deny this claim because Law offered no evidence of inducement. Law also argues his life sentence was unlawful because (1) the district court improperly aggregated the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy; (2) the government presented insufficient evidence of Law's involvement in a conspiracy that sold each drug quantity; and (3) his prior crimes were not felony drug offenses. We reject all three arguments because the district court rightly aggregated the drug amounts, the evidence was more than sufficient, and Law waived his argument that his prior crimes were not felony drug offenses. The government concedes that Law's conviction for selling crack cocaine, Count 11, merges with his conviction for selling the same drugs near a school, Count 12. Accordingly, we reverse that conviction and remand for re-sentencing. Finally, like Farrell, Law joins both of Fletcher's challenges to the Government's expert opinion testimony, which, as discussed in Part IV, we reject.
After executing a search warrant on Law's apartment (apartment # 3) in the Rosedale building, FBI agents discovered a key seized from Law during his prior arrest fit the lock of the adjacent unit (apartment # 4). Since the warrant did not authorize the search of this apartment, they asked landlord Thomas for permission to do so. She said the apartment was currently vacant and [was] being used to store some furniture and other matters and Law might have a set of keys to Apartment # 4, but could not provide details concerning why. After further discussion, she consented to the search of apartment # 4. Inside, agents found drugs and other incriminating evidence. The district court rejected Law's motion to suppress this evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing or allowing him to be present. [7] Law argues this was error. A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress only upon factual allegations which, if established, would warrant relief. United States v. Thornton, 454 F.2d 957, 967 n. 65 (D.C.Cir.1971). Under the Due Process Clause, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure, and this can include a suppression hearing. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987); see United States v. Hodge, 19 F.3d 51, 52-53 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nevertheless, a defendant's presence is not required if the court can decide the suppression motion as a matter of law. See Valdez v. Gunter, 988 F.2d 91, 93-94 (10th Cir.1993). Accordingly, the viability of both of Law's claims the right to an evidentiary hearing and right to be presentturns on whether the district court needed to resolve any disputes of material fact to decide Law's suppression motion. Law argues the search of apartment # 4 violated the Fourth Amendment because the agents had no search warrant. The district court concluded Thomas had authority to consent to the search and, even if she did not, the FBI agents reasonably believed she did. The second theory suffices for our purposes. [C]onsent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). While a landlord cannot ordinarily consent to a search of a tenant's home, see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), she can consent to a search of an unleased apartment, see United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764 (8th Cir.1977). Even if a landlord does not have authority to consent to a search, agents may rely upon her assurance that she has such authority, if objective circumstances make reliance reasonable. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). Whether that reliance was reasonable is a question of law. United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 615 (8th Cir.2003). Thus the question for us is whether, under Law's version of events, the FBI agents reasonably relied upon Thomas's representation that apartment # 4 was unleased. According to Law's motion to suppress, Thomas told the agents apartment # 4 was currently vacant and [was] being used to store some furniture and other matters and that Law might have a set of keys. Under these circumstances, the agents reasonably relied on Thomas's representation that she had authority to consent to a search of the apartment. After all, Thomas told them the apartment was currently vacant, which is the equivalent of being unleased, see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2527 (1981) (vacant means not filled or occupied by an incumbent, possessor, or officer), and landlords have authority to consent to searches of unleased units, see Kelly, 551 F.2d at 764. It was reasonable for the agents to believe Thomas knew the occupancy status of one of only four apartment units in her building. Admittedly, Thomas's inability to explain why Law had keys to the apartment makes this a closer case; but this fact, taken by itself, was not sufficient to undermine her credibility. Law points to United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C.Cir.1991), where this court held the police did not reasonably rely on a mother's consent to search the room of her 29-year-old son. But the present case is far different because Thomas told the agents no one lived in the apartment. In sum, the district court did not err by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing and by denying Law an opportunity to be present. [8]
Law argues the district court improperly denied his request for an entrapment instruction. He was entitled to this instruction if there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment. United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 754 (D.C.Cir.1998) (alterations omitted). We review the district court's decision not to give the instruction de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Law. Id. at 752. The entrapment defense protects an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). This defense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct. Glover, 153 F.3d at 754. If the defendant meets the initial burden of proving government inducement, the government can rebut by demonstrating he was nevertheless predisposed to commit the crime. When a government informant buys drugs from a defendant, the defendant can show inducement by pointing to evidence of reluctance to sell the drugs or the informant's use of persuasive overtures, beyond those ordinarily present in a drug transaction. Id. While a government agent's appeal to friendship could, under some circumstances, be a persuasive overture, we have never found such a plea sufficiently strong to satisfy this requirement. See United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 90 (D.C.Cir.2000). Nor is this the case to do so. Law sold powder cocaine to his friend Mason after Mason had become a government informant. Yet, Law had never been reluctant to sell drugs to Mason, as he had sold him powder cocaine for several years before Mason ever became an informant. Moreover, while Law and Mason were longtime friends, Mason denied using this friendship to get Law to sell him drugs and Law presented no evidence to the contrary. There is similarly no evidence to support Law's claim that Mason used the threat of force to induce the drug sale. Law also sold crack cocaine to Atcherson and an unnamed informant, but Law points to no evidence he was reluctant to make this sale; and, he offers no evidence that either Atcherson or the unnamed informant appealed to Law's friendship. Moreover, any negative inference that one could draw from the government's failure to tape-record Law's transactions with Mason and Atcherson cannot make up for Law's failure to present any evidence of entrapment. In sum, Law failed to introduce sufficient evidence to meet his initial burden of showing government inducement.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful for anyone knowingly or intentionally... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. A defendant convicted of violating § 841(a) shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release if the violation involved either 50 grams or more of crack cocaine or 5 kilograms or more of cocaine powder, and the offender has two or more prior convictions for felony drug offense[s]. The jury convicted Law, under 21 U.S.C. § 846, of conspiring, in violation of these provisions of § 841, to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine (more precisely, of 150 grams or more), 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine, and 100 grams or more of heroin, and the government showed he had been convicted of three prior felony drug offenses. Accordingly, the district court imposed a mandatory life sentence. Law argues we should overturn this sentence because: (1) the district court improperly aggregated the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy; (2) the government presented insufficient evidence of Law's involvement in a conspiracy that sold each drug quantity; and (3) his prior crimes were not felony drug offenses. We reject the first two challenges and find Law waived the third.
A defendant convicted of conspiring to deal drugs in violation of § 846 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense in § 841(a). 21 U.S.C. § 846. Law claims this means the district court can sentence a defendant convicted of conspiracy under § 846 only for the largest offense (violation of § 841(a)) within that conspiracy. Thus, if a conspiracy involves five sales of 10 grams of crack cocaine, the district court can only sentence the defendant like someone who sold 10 grams of crack cocaine, not like someone who sold 50 grams. Law argues the district court erred by allowing the jury to aggregate the drug quantities throughout the conspiracy, and then by relying on this figure to impose the mandatory life sentence. Since Law never raised this argument before the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C.Cir.2005). We join our sister circuits in holding a defendant convicted of conspiracy to deal drugs, in violation of § 846, must be sentenced, under § 841(b), for the quantity of drugs the jury attributes to him as a reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy. See United States v. Pressley, 469 F.3d 63, 65-67 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam); United States v. Gori, 324 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir.2003); United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 644-45 (6th Cir.1998). As the Supreme Court has explained, a single agreement to commit several crimes constitutes one conspiracy. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570-71, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). As a result, a single violation of the conspiracy statute encompasses all of the crimes reasonably foreseeable within that conspiracy. See United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1093 (6th Cir.1998) (a conspiracy is a single violation of the drug laws, and the fact that this particular conspiracy was characterized by separate transactions is a fact of no legal significance). Here, the conspiracy was dealing drugs, and thus the entire sum of the drugs within the conspiracy constituted a single conspiracy violation. Accordingly, the district court did not commit plain error by relying on the jury's aggregated drug quantity determination in imposing the life sentence on Law. [9]
Law argues that even if the jury could aggregate the drug sales, the government did not present sufficient evidence that he took part in a conspiracy involving the alleged quantity of each of the three drug types. In evaluating Law's sufficiency challenge, [w]e review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, considering it in the light most favorable to the government, to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found [Law] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the required elements of the crime. Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1322. We find the government presented ample evidence that Law took part in a conspiracy involving at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, and 100 grams of heroin. The drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, dispenses with the usual requirement of an overt act and requires only an agreement to commit a violation of § 841(a). United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 171 (D.C.Cir.2006). Farrell supplied Law with drugs to sell, and both Fletcher and Farrell accompanied him during drug sales. Moreover, Law lived in the Rosedale building, which was a distribution center for the conspiracy. Inside of his apartment and the adjacent apartment #4, police found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and business cards for Farrell and Fletcher. This is more than enough to show Law agreed to distribute drugs with Farrell and Fletcher. In addition, the government presented overwhelming evidence as to the drug quantities in the conspiracy. We discuss only the sales in which Law personally participated, as those are sufficient to sustain his conviction: At least 50 grams of crack cocaine: Cyrus testified Law sold him 62 grams of cocaine, when Fletcher, Cyrus's regular supplier, went out of town. Law points out Cyrus only testified he bought cocaine from Law, not specifically crack cocaine. However, Cyrus testified: (1) he bought crack cocaine from Fletcher approximately 45 times, and over half those purchases were of 62 grams; (2) he bought powder cocaine from Fletcher only one time; (3) he paid Fletcher $2000 for 62 grams of crack cocaine; and (4) he paid Law $2000 for 62 grams of cocaine on the day in question. The jury could have concluded the cocaine Cyrus was referring to was crackafter all, that is what Cyrus almost always bought from Fletcher, at the same price. [10] If this is not enough, Law sometimes accompanied Fletcher when he made crack sales to Cyrusinvolvement sufficient to give Law reasonable knowledge that the conspiracy sold far more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. In addition, Law sold Atcherson a total of 181.9 grams of crack cocaine over 6 transactions. The jury could reasonably have concluded at least some of these sales were part of the conspiracy. For example, Fletcher was near the scene for one sale and Law entered Fletcher's minivan during this transaction. At least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine: Mason testified Law sold him between 125 and 250 grams of powder cocaine at least once a week between September 2000 and February 2003, which would total at least 13 kilograms. At another point, he testified he bought powder cocaine at least 20 to 30 times from Law and added that he bought at least 9 kilograms in total. Law challenges Mason's credibility because of this inconsistency and because Mason claimed some of the drug buys took place at the Center, even though it had been padlocked by 2001. However, Mason never claimed he bought cocaine at the Center after it closed. Moreover, this is merely an argument about credibility and we give full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility. United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1088 (D.C.Cir.1986). Finally, there is little doubt these sales were part of the conspiracy, as Mason testified Law told him his source was brother, which was Farrell's nickname. At least 100 grams of heroin: Mason testified Law sold him 250 grams of heroin, which Farrell supplied. [11]
Law claims the district court improperly imposed a life sentence under § 841(b) because his three prior convictions were not felony drug offenses. We conclude Law has waived this objection by failing to raise it to the district court. 21 U.S.C. § 851 establishes the procedural framework for deciding whether a defendant had been convicted of a prior felony offense. Under § 851(a), the government must file an information identifying the prior conviction. Under § 851(b), the district court must then tell the defendant he has to affirm[] or den[y] that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the information, and that  any challenge to a prior conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.  § 851(b) (emphasis added). The defendant must then respond, in writing, under § 851(c), which explains, in pertinent part,  [a]ny challenge to a prior conviction, not raised by response to the information before an increased sentence is imposed in reliance thereon, shall be waived unless good cause be shown for failure to make a timely challenge.  § 851(c)(2) (emphasis added). Here, the government alleged Law had been convicted of three prior felony drug offenses and Law did not dispute this claim. Without citing any authority, Law argues the phrase any challenge to a prior conviction in subsections (b) and (c)(2) refers only to a collateral challenge to a prior conviction, not to arguments that the prior conviction was not a felony offense. The text of § 851 and its carefully defined framework doom his argument. As explained above, the government must first allege all aspects of a prior conviction, including felony offense status; the court must then tell the defendant he has to raise any challenge; and, finally, the defendant must bring any challenge or waive the argument. It strains credulity to argue any challenge refers only to collateral attacks on the prior conviction, as opposed to any challenges whatsoever to the government's claims as to the conviction, including allegations about offense status. See United States v. Brooks, 508 F.3d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir.2007) (strongly suggesting the § 851 waiver applies to challenges to the validity or nature of [the defendant's] conviction ) (emphasis added). Indeed, courts have regularly held the § 851 waiver applies to arguments that the prior conviction has not become final, even though these are not collateral challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Van-Doren, 182 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 696-97 (6th Cir.1992) (as amended). In this case, the government filed papers, under § 851(a), showing Law had been convicted of three felony drug offenses. The district court then informed Law, as required by § 851(b), that he would waive any challenge he did not raise now. Law did not bring any challenge under § 851(c). Accordingly, since Law did not argue his crimes were not felony drug offenses before the district court, and has not shown good cause for failing to do so, he may not now raise them to attack the sentence. § 851(b). [12]
The government concedes Law's conviction for selling crack cocaine to Atcherson, Count 11, merges with his conviction for selling the same drugs near a school, Count 12. Conviction on both counts violates the Double Jeopardy Clause and we vacate the distribution conviction on Count 11 and remand for re-sentencing. See United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 548 (D.C.Cir.1996). During re-sentencing, the district court should address the inconsistency between Law's Judgment and Commitment Order, which states he was convicted for distribution on Count 13, and the indictment and jury verdict, which charge and find him guilty of possession with intent to distribute.