Opinion ID: 2211408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: People v. Carr

Text: Given our decision to remand this case for a new trial, the validity of Carr, supra, is no longer squarely before us. However, in light of the fact that the Department of Corrections is bound to follow Carr by continuing to advise inmates that their statements will not be used against them as substantive evidence in a criminal proceeding, it will be virtually impossible for this issue to be directly presented to this Court. [6] Accordingly, we are obligated to do so here. [7] In Carr, supra, the Court of Appeals, having determined that Miranda [8] warnings do not apply in the context of a prison disciplinary hearing, [9] considered whether the Fifth Amendment was violated by what the Court believed to be a Catch 22 situation in which prisoners can either testify at the prison disciplinary hearing and incriminate themselves or for[ ]go the right to offer exculpatory or mitigating statements and face the potential penalties for prison misconduct based on evidence which they cannot refute or explain. [ Id. at 658-659, 386 N.W.2d 631.] The Court reasoned that if an inmate's statements at the disciplinary hearing can be used against him in a subsequent criminal trial, it is likely that such statements will be withheld from the administrative hearing examiner for fear of being used against the inmate at a later time. Id. at 659, 386 N.W.2d 631. This, the Court of Appeals determined, constitutes an impermissible penalty for the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. Therefore, the Court decided that it would adopt the following procedure: [A]ny evidence derived from testimony at a disciplinary hearing is inadmissible at subsequent criminal proceedings on the underlying charge, save for impeachment or rebuttal, and the accused must be advised before testifying at the disciplinary hearing that his testimony will not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial on the underlying offense. [ Id. ]
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. [10] This prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also `privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). However, as the Fifth Amendment privilege speaks only of compulsion, it is not concerned `with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him. Murphy, supra at 427, 104 S.Ct. 1136.
There is no dispute that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends to inmates involved in disciplinary proceedings. Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), if inmates are compelled in those proceedings to furnish testimonial evidence that might incriminate them in later criminal proceedings, they must be offered `whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege'.... As stated, the Carr Court believed that the so-called Catch 22 choice faced by inmates in the prison discipline settingeither incriminate themselves or forgo the right to offer exculpatory or mitigating statementsconstitutes an impermissible penalty for the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 659, 386 N.W.2d 631. We disagree with the Carr Court's analysis. The United States Supreme Court has indeed held on more than one occasion that a penalty imposed on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege creates a compulsion repugnant to the constitution. For example, in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), several police officers were questioned by the Attorney General in connection with an investigation concerning the fixing of traffic tickets. Each officer was warned that refusal to answer would result in removal from office. Some of the answers given were used, over objections, in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Id. at 494-495, 87 S.Ct. 616. In reversing the defendants' convictions, the Garrity Court explained that [t]he option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or remain silent. The Court held that the officers' statements cannot be sustained as voluntary. Id. at 497-498, 87 S.Ct. 616. Thus, what Garrity and its progeny make clear is that a state `may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.' Murphy, supra at 434, 104 S.Ct. 1136, quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). Unlike the situation in Garrity, however, Michigan's prison disciplinary process does not place any direct penalty on an inmate's decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. The hearing officer's decision must be made on a preponderance of the evidence presented. MCL 791.252(k); MSA 28.2320(52)(k). An inmate at all times has the choice not to testify. We agree with Judge Markman's opinion below that [t]he tactical decision that an inmate must make regarding whether to testify at a disciplinary hearing, when his testimony might potentially be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding, while perhaps quite difficult, does not constitute `compulsion' under the Fifth Amendment. 226 Mich.App. at 692-693, 575 N.W.2d 48. The Carr Court's holding to the contrary is overruled. [11]