Opinion ID: 3033161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction Regarding Fraudulent Trusts

Text: Farnsworth argues that the District Court erred by failing to submit a special verdict form to the jury to establish whether the jury specifically found that Farnsworth knowingly transferred assets into fraudulent trusts. We note that, although not prohibited, “special interrogatories are disfavored in criminal trials.” United States v. Hegepeth, 434 F.3d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 2006). Farnsworth did not request any such instruction at trial, and thus must demonstrate that the failure to include the extraordinary instruction constituted plain error, and that the error was fundamental and highly prejudicial. 8 This argument rehashes Farnsworth’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, and it fails for similar reasons. As discussed above, Farnsworth was indicted for multiple affirmative acts of evasion for each of the tax years at issue. In addition to transfers to fraudulent trusts, he was charged with encumbering assets and hiding his money in overseas bank accounts. At trial, Farnsworth staked his defense not on his compliance with tax law, but on defeating the willfulness element by asserting that he believed compliance to be voluntary. In fact, Farnsworth either admitted or did not deny conduct that was probative of affirmative acts of evasion other than the knowing use of fraudulent trusts.1 Since a single affirmative act is sufficient under section 7201, we would be unable to find heightened prejudice even if the District Court had clearly erred. We must accordingly reject Farnsworth’s argument with regard to the fraudulent trust instruction. 1 For instance, Farnsworth did not deny that he earned income in the years for which he did not file tax returns. He admitted that he transferred money from his retirement account to an offshore bank account without paying taxes. He also admitted that Farnsworth Engineering Services (“FES”) received payments for Farnsworth’s personal consulting services, and that Farnsworth drew wages from FES without paying taxes on either the receipts or the wages. Farnsworth further testified that a business entity under his control took a lien out on the house he lived in, and that he did this as a means to protect his assets from collection. When asked about also transferring his cars to a business entity under his control, Farnsworth stated “I encumbered them - - I was protecting them . . . . From among others, the Internal Revenue Service, I guess.” (App. at 802.) 9