Opinion ID: 510022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Thought Reform

Text: 35 Kropinski alleges that defendants relied on a system of thought reform, which he describes as a method used by the Koreans to change the belief systems of prisoners of war, Brief for Kropinski at 10; that is to say, as brainwashing. During the trial, the allegation was put to two uses. First, he asserted, as a substantive element of his fraud claim, that the application of thought reform created a dependency on TM and brought about a change in his beliefs, id., even though defendants had promised him that TM did not involve a particular set of beliefs. Transcript (Tr.) 12/11/86 at 76. Second, Kropinski attempted to justify his failure to bring suit within three years of the time he first experienced doubts about TM's efficacy because thought reform had prevented him from perceiving the system's falsity until a later time. For a discussion of this second aspect of thought reform, see below at IV.B. 36 The district court concluded that the plaintiff has claimed that the defendants and TM changed his beliefs and promoted thought reform. Memorandum at 17 (citing Complaint at paragraphs 32, 33, 34, & 50(l )). We find no allegation of changed beliefs in the cited paragraphs, although they do reflect elements that Kropinski's expert witness later associated with the practice of thought reform. They allege that defendants intimidated plaintiff so that he believed it was not possible to leave the movement, id. at p 32, created in him a state of emotional and physical dependency and inability to think clearly that prevented him from realizing that the negative emotional, psychological and physical effects he was experiencing were the result of T.M. and the Sidhis, id. at paragraphs 33 and 34, and that they negligently and recklessly induced in him a state of dependency such that plaintiff was incapable of functioning adequately in the real world, id. at p 50(l ). 37 We read these paragraphs simply as part of plaintiff's explanation for his delay in recognizing the fraud and the causes of his injuries. They do not assert changes in belief or subjection to thought reform as substantive elements of Kropinski's claims for damages. Therefore on remand, evidence of changed belief and thought reform may not be admitted as a substantive basis for Kropinski's claims. Evidence of thought reform may be admitted, however, to establish why he failed to detect the fraud and persisted in his practice of TM after the injuries now complained of first became apparent. 38