Opinion ID: 406740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of OAA's Copyright

Text: 8 Lawson's first challenge to the validity of OAA's copyright is that the OAA dolls are copies of the pre-existing Martha Nelson dolls and thus lack the originality essential to copyright protection. 2 We disagree. 9 The central requirement of copyright protection for a work is that the work must have an element of originality. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (copyright protection extends to original works of authorship); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1972); Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales and Service, 426 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 459, 27 L.Ed.2d 441 (1971). Accord Kamar International, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981); Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908-11 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally 1 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 2.01 (1981). Although the originality concept defies exact definition, courts generally agree that originality for copyright purposes is something less than the novelty or uniqueness necessary for patent protection. Durham Industries, supra, 630 F.2d at 910; Imperial Homes, supra, 458 F.2d at 897; Zack Meyer's, supra, 426 F.2d at 1029; Nimmer, supra. The test of originality variously has been characterized as modest, minimal, and a low threshold. Durham Industries, supra. Perhaps the most firmly entrenched definition of originality, however, is that first formulated by the Second Circuit and later adopted by the former Fifth: 10 All that is needed ... is that the author contributed more than a merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own. Originality in this context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying. No matter how poor artistically the author's addition, it is enough if it be his own. 11 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951). See Zack Meyer's, supra, 426 F.2d at 1030; Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Manufacturing Co., 421 F.2d 279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting language from Bell ). 12 Here the trial court stated in its findings of fact that OAA's dolls were substantially different from the earlier Nelson dolls, detailing several differences in design. 3 This finding was supported by a review of the exhibits and record and was not clearly erroneous. 4 We agree with the trial court, moreover, that these differences supplied the minimal degree of originality necessary for copyright protection. The OAA dolls were more anatomically correct than the Nelson dolls in several respects and were proportioned more like an infant. These variations on the idea of a human-figure soft-sculpture doll, an idea admittedly taken from the Nelson dolls, 5 were the original work of Roberts and Morehead and were more than merely trivial variations. See Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971) (although copyrighted statues bore a strong family resemblance to prior uncopyrighted works, the differences suffice(d) to satisfy the modest requirement of originality).
13 Lawson's second argument is that OAA has lost its copyright due to inadequate notice. According to Lawson, the dolls produced and sold by OAA in 1978 were copies of the dolls made by Roberts and Morehead in 1977. The dolls, therefore, were first published 6 in 1977, and because the 1977 dolls concededly lacked proper copyright notices under the 1909 Copyright Act, any copyright OAA may have had in the dolls is now irretrievably lost. 14 While the publication of a work without a proper copyright notice under the 1909 Act was considered a dedication to the public and resulted in a forfeiture of copyright, see 37 C.F.R. § 202.2(a)(2), the new Act has changed this result considerably by providing liberal savings provisions for copyright protection even if the copyright notice is omitted entirely from a work. Given this background, the initial question in assessing Lawson's argument is whether the dolls at issue here were first published in 1977 or 1978. If the 1978 dolls are merely copies of the 1977 dolls, as Lawson suggests, then the notice provisions of the 1909 Act apply and the publication of the dolls without statutorily correct copyright notices would result in forfeiture of copyright protection. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1981). On the other hand, if the 1978 dolls are new works, as OAA contends, then the 1976 Act notice provisions control, and the lack of proper notice on some early 1978 production dolls would not necessarily bar OAA's infringement action. 15 The trial court found that the 1978 dolls differed from the 1977 dolls, and despite the Toy Loft's protestations to the contrary, our review of the evidence and burdens of proof convinces us that this conclusion was not clearly erroneous. While the burden of persuasion as to the validity of the copyright rests with the plaintiff in an infringement action, once he produces a copyright certificate he establishes a prima facie case of validity of his copyright and the burden of production shifts to the defendant to introduce evidence of invalidity. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); Durham Industries, supra, 630 F.2d at 908; American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1978); Nimmer, supra at § 12.11(B). Lawson asserts that he carried this burden, relying principally on the testimony of Debbie Morehead that the 1978 dolls and 1977 dolls were basically the same. Lawson also asserts that some type of negative inference should attach to OAA's failure to produce a typical example of the 1977 dolls for comparison purposes. 16 We reject these arguments. Although Morehead testified that the 1977 and 1978 dolls were basically the same, she also admitted on cross-examination that the 1977 dolls were undergoing constant improvement. This admission coincided with the oral testimony of Roberts and Linda Allen, an OAA vice president, that the 1977 dolls were experimental dolls which were undergoing constant development in search of a perfect prototype. Even were we to find that Lawson had carried his burden of production on this issue, the testimony of Roberts, Allen, and Morehead together with other evidence would be sufficient to uphold the trial court's finding on the ground that OAA had carried its burden of persuasion. The record clearly establishes, for example, that it was not until February 1978 that Roberts had a doll which he considered suitable as a pattern for all future dolls. OAA, moreover, did introduce into evidence two dolls made during the Christmas season of 1977. Although Lawson contends these dolls were not typical of the other 1977 dolls, Morehead testified that one of these dolls, plaintiff's exhibit 19, was also basically the same as the 1978 dolls. Morehead, therefore, presumably saw little difference between the 1977 dolls in general and exhibit 19, characterizing all as basically the same as the 1978 dolls. Given the testimony of Roberts and Allen that the 1977 dolls were experimental, the admission of Morehead on cross-examination that the 1977 dolls were undergoing constant change, the fact that Roberts did not settle on a prototype until February 1978, and the court's own comparison of the dolls, we cannot say that the trial court's factual finding that the 1978 dolls differed from the 1977 dolls and thus were new works subject to the 1976 Copyright Act was clearly erroneous. 17 Having concluded that the new Act applies to OAA's dolls, we next must assess whether OAA lost its copyright protection due to inadequate notice. Lawson contends that the early copyright notices on the 1978 dolls were improper because the notices were placed on detachable name tags. Prior to the 1978 Act, such detachable notices were defective and constituted improper notice under the 1909 copyright law. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.2(b)(9) (1981) (copyright notice on detachable tag does not meet requirements of proper notice for a work published before January 1, 1978). 7 Under the new Act, however, publication of copies of a work with defective notice does not necessarily impair an author's copyright protection. Section 405 of the new Act, 17 U.S.C. § 405, provides in part: 18 (a) Effect of Omission on Copyright.-The omission of the copyright notice prescribed by sections 401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the copyright in a work if- 19 (1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number of copies or phonorecords distributed to the public; or 20 (2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are distributed to the public in the United States after the omission has been discovered; or 21 (3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express requirement in writing that, as a condition of the copyright owner's authorization of the public distribution of copies or phonorecords, they bear the prescribed notice. 22 The trial court, obviously relying on the savings provision of subsection (a) (2), found that OAA's copyright in the 1978 dolls was not invalid because OAA registered within five years of publication. This finding, however, is incomplete. In order to retain copyright protection under § 405(a)(2), the author must not only register within five years of publication, but also make a reasonable effort to add notice to all copies distributed without proper notice. The trial court failed to make any finding on this second requirement, and our review of the record revealed no evidence of such an effort. We cannot sustain the validity of OAA's copyright, therefore, on the ground articulated by the trial court. 23 The evidence provides a basis for sustaining the copyright on an alternative ground, however. Under § 405(a)(1), a copyright is not invalid if the notice has been omitted from only a relatively few copies of the work. Here the evidence showed that up to the time of trial OAA had sold approximately 40,000 dolls. The testimony of Roberts indicated that the sewn-in copyright notices were used no later than the fall of 1978. Plaintiff's exhibit 48, a ledger recording the sale of every doll from May 1977 through October of 1978 revealed that approximately 400 dolls were sold by Roberts from February through October of 1978. From this evidence it is apparent that only approximately 1% of OAA's total doll sales at the time of trial lacked the sewn-in copyright notice. We conclude that this percentage meets the relatively few test of § 405(a)(1) and accordingly hold that OAA's copyright is not invalid due to improper notice.
24 Lawson's third defense is that Roberts is guilty of fraud and unclean hands in failing to supply certain relevant information on the copyright application. Specifically, Lawson cites Roberts' failure to list Ms. Morehead as a co-author and his failure to complete item six on the copyright application headed Compilation or Derivative Work as the fraudulent omissions which make OAA's copyright unenforceable. 25 In Russ Berrie & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Elsner Co., 482 F.Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y.1980), the court found that the copyright holder had intentionally failed to inform the copyright office that his copyrighted stuffed gorilla was based on a pre-existing Japanese gorilla, and held that the knowing failure to advise the copyright office of facts which might have occasioned a rejection of the application constitutes reason for holding the copyright invalid. Id. at 988. Similar situations occurred in Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F.Supp. 609 (D.R.I.1976) (unexplained omission of pre-existing work coupled with other misleading conduct made copyright unenforceable); and Ross Products, Inc. v. New York Merchandise Co., 242 F.Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (failure to indicate prior publication of work in Japan raised issue of whether omission was purposeful thus invalidating copyright). 26 While these cases establish that omissions or misrepresentations in a copyright application can render the registration invalid, a common element among them has been intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information. Where this element of scienter is lacking, courts generally have upheld the copyright. See Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 238 F.2d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 1956) (innocent misstatement ... in the affidavit and certificate of registration, unaccompanied by fraud does not invalidate copyright); Ross Products, supra, 242 F.Supp. at 879 (cases overlooking omissions or misstatements emphasize that the errors involved were honest, innocent and not intended to be misleading.). See also Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979) (doctrine of unclean hands does not bar relief unless defendant can show he has personally been injured by plaintiff's conduct). 27 The evidence in this case fails to show the scienter element necessary for Lawson to assert his claim successfully. Roberts explained that his omission of Morehead as a co-author was due to Morehead's leaving the doll operation in February 1978 and indicating she wanted nothing further to do with the company. Given that Roberts freely admitted he and Morehead had collaborated on the dolls, and that several newspaper and magazine articles during 1977 indicated that the dolls were the joint product of Roberts and Morehead, we find it impossible to ascribe to this omission an intent to mislead. As to item 6, the pre-existing works, the undisputed evidence showed that Roberts and Allen completed this item initially in some detail, even indicating that the dolls were derived in part from viewing other artists' soft-sculpture work. 8 Although item 6 was left blank in the application that finally was filed with the copyright office, the sole reason for this omission was that after speaking to copyright office personnel, Roberts and Allen thought that the information was unnecessary. 9 Accordingly, we reject Lawson's assertion that OAA's copyright is unenforceable due to fraud on the copyright office.