Opinion ID: 60298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Application of AEDPA

Text: On appeal, the Director argues multiple points of procedural error, all based on his contention that the district court did not correctly apply AEDPA. The first of these challenges is that the district court actually considered Buntion's bias claims de novo instead of under AEDPA's stricter standard. Additionally, the Director urges that the district court applied a more lenient standard when reviewing the state court's factual determinations than is required by AEDPA. Finally, the Director contends that the district court incorrectly relied on sources other than clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court. In applying AEDPA to this case, the district court determined that the state court's application of the law was objectively unreasonable. The district court's finding constitutes legal error for two reasons. First, the district court relied on sources outside of clearly established Supreme Court precedent as required by AEDPA. The district court evaluated Judge Harmon's behavior using the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, [2] stating that the provisions of the Code track the protections guaranteed by the Constitution, as well as opinions from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits. Reliance on these sources is misplaced under AEDPA, which allows federal review only if the state habeas court rendered a decision contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (holding that AEDPA allows reliance only on the holdings, not dicta, of Supreme Court opinions). Second, even if the district court had considered only Supreme Court case law, there is not a basis under Supreme Court precedent for finding that the state court's ultimate determination is objectively unreasonable. See infra Part II-C. Finally, it should be noted that the district court determined that the state court's factual findings were also unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This is a clear legal error because very few factual determinations are in dispute; even for those that are, such as whether or not Judge Harmon threatened defense counsel, Buntion would be required to present clear and convincing evidence that the state court's factual determinations were incorrect. Id. at § 2254(e)(1). Buntion has not done so. The district court found that the factual findings were unreasonable because the state court considered Buntion's claims of judicial bias as individual, secluded events. While it arguably may have been legal error for the state court to analyze the bias claims in isolation rather than cumulatively, [3] there is no unreasonable factual determination that the district court relies on to justify its finding that Buntion has satisfied § 2254(d)(2). Therefore, this determination is incorrect as well, although because the facts are basically agreed on, this error does not have much effect on the outcome of this case.