Opinion ID: 3135230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant next argues the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When a court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence, it must ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). We have adopted the Jackson formulation of the standard of review. People v. Collins , 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). It applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence. People v. Pollock , 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002). In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute making it a crime to possess a picture “that  appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” because it impermissibly criminalized virtual child pornography, i.e. , realistic pornographic pictures generated entirely by computer without the use of real children. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. 234, 256, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403, 425, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1405 (2002) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. §2256(8)(B) (2000)). Applying Ashcroft , we invalidated the definition of “child” in the section of the Criminal Code that prohibits child pornography because the definition included virtual images that only appear to depict a real child. People v. Alexander , 204 Ill. 2d 472, 482-83 (2003) (invalidating section 11–20.1(f)(7) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/11–20.1(f)(7) (West Supp. 2001))). We further held the rest of the child pornography statute was severable from the statutory definition of “child.” Alexander , 204 Ill. 2d at 485. We finally held that, once severed, the statute only applies to pornographic pictures of actual children because the plain meaning of the word “child” includes only actual children. Alexander , 204 Ill. 2d at 485-86. Thus, the parties correctly agree that, as to each count, the State was required to prove that the picture in question depicts a real child and is not merely a virtual image. Defendant contends the State failed to prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the counts. The sole evidence that the pictures admitted at trial depicted real children was the pictures themselves. Defendant argues that, without other evidence, the most a trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt is that the pictures appear to depict real children, not that they do depict real children. Put another way, defendant contends that the pictures cannot stand alone as proof; rather, some further evidence, such as expert opinion, was needed to bridge the logical gap between how a picture appears and what it actually is. All of the circuits of the federal court of appeals to consider the question have held pictures may stand alone as proof that real children are depicted. See United States v. Farrelly , 389 F.3d 649, 653-55 (6th Cir. 2004) (and cases cited therein). In Farrelly , the prosecution presented expert testimony regarding the age of the children in the pictures, but the expert admitted she was not qualified to opine whether the images were of actual children or had been generated by computer. The defendant argued on appeal that, absent testimony of an expert qualified to address the possibility the pictures were virtual images, he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In rejecting this argument, the court relied on United States v. Kimler , 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003), which held that “[j]uries are still capable of distinguishing between real and virtual images.” Kimler , in turn, relies on a passage from Ashcroft , which rejects the hypothesis that virtual images are identical to real images. We will discuss that passage from Ashcroft in some detail below. Defendant argues that the question cannot be decided by consulting precedent, because the correct answer depends on the state of computer technology at the relevant time, and the state of computer technology is constantly changing. A defendant may be denied relief to which he is entitled if courts consider only the state of the law and not the state of technology . We do not understand defendant to mean precedent is completely useless, only that it cannot be the sole basis for decision. Clearly, precedent may be instructive even when it is not dispositive. Subject to that caveat , we agree with defendant’s argument. Accordingly, we will consider defendant’s argument that the pictures introduced against him could not stand alone as proof that they are pictures of real children, even though the same argument has been consistently rejected in other jurisdictions. In many instances, a particular kind of evidence may be sufficient, standing alone, to prove an element of a crime. For example, jurors may use their own reason and experience to decide whether to accept eyewitness testimony as the truth about what happened, without the aid of expert opinion regarding the reliability of eyewitnesses. People v. Enis , 139 Ill. 2d 264, 289-90 (1990). In other instances, evidence cannot stand alone. For example, the prosecution could not prove a substance is marijuana simply by introducing the substance and asking the trier of fact to apply its reason and experience. See People v. Park , 72 Ill. 2d 203, 209-11 (1978) (holding inadmissible a witness’ opinion that a substance was marijuana because the opinion was based only on four years’ experience as a police officer and not chemical or microscopic analysis). At oral argument, defendant suggested the pictures in this case cannot stand alone, just as a substance admitted in the typical drug case cannot. He suggested that, absent evidence specifically identifying the children in the pictures, expert testimony was required to prove they were pictures of real children. Defendant is certainly correct that expert testimony might have aided the trier of fact. It could conceivably have shown whether realistic virtual child pornography existed at the relevant time and, if it did, whether the pictures introduced against defendant were virtual images. However, the comparison between this case and a drug prosecution, though instructive, does not support defendant’s claim. In Park , we relied on statistics from the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory showing that 1 out of 7 samples turned in as marijuana proved to be something else. We concluded that nonexperts are unacceptably prone to mistake other plants for marijuana. Park , 72 Ill. 2d at 208. By comparison, in this case we find little or no reason to fear that realistic virtual child pornography exists and was so readily available as to create an unacceptable risk that the trial judge, unaided by expert testimony, mistook legal computer-generated images for illegal child pornography. In taking the contrary view, the appellate court dissent stressed the fact that Congress found, prior to the beginning of this case, that highly realistic virtual child pornography exists. 346 Ill. App. 3d at 499, (Slater, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Alexander , 204 Ill. 2d at 477-78, quoting 18 U.S.C. §2251, Congressional Findings, Note (5) (2000). We give Congress’ finding due consideration. However, we find the reasoning of Ashcroft to be persuasive proof that realistic virtual images are not widely available. See People v. Normand , No. 97984, slip op. at 11 (June 3, 2005). The Ashcroft Court, in pertinent part, reasoned as follows: “The Government next argues that its objective of eliminating the market for pornography produced using real children necessitates a prohibition on virtual images as well. Virtual images, the Government contends, are indistinguishable from real ones; they are part of the same market and are often exchanged. In this way, it is said, virtual images promote the trafficking in works produced through the exploitation of real children. The hypothesis is somewhat implausible. If virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice. ” (Emphasis added.) Ashcroft , 535 U.S. at 254, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 423, 122 S. Ct. at 1403-04. The italicized portion applies directly to defendant’s argument that, for all we know, there are virtual images that are indistinguishable from real ones. Moreover, the italicized passage is clearly correct. Because there is obviously substantial demand for illegal child pornography, people would be all too willing to produce a legal substitute were it readily available. The “market” for illegal child pornography would quickly be flooded with the legal substitute. Furthermore, the comparison between child pornography and illegal drugs implies a further conclusion, not expressly stated in Ashcroft . If a legal substance that does what marijuana or cocaine do ever became available, it would obviously change the drug trade dramatically. Such a change could hardly go unnoticed, at least in legal and law enforcement circles. The same applies to child pornography. If a legal substitute–realistic virtual pornography–became available, it would dramatically affect the “market” for child pornography and would surely not go unnoticed. See Normand , slip op. at 11. Therefore, because we are not aware of it now, it is highly unlikely that realistic virtual child pornography was available on the day defendant was arrested some 3½ years ago. The prosecution bears the burden of proving each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Maggette , 195 Ill. 2d at 353. However, mere possibilities or speculation are insufficient to raise reasonable doubt. See People v. Evans , 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211-12 (2004). Defendant’s suggestion that the pictures introduced against him at trial may in fact be virtual images relies on the congressional finding, made prior to his arrest, that realistic virtual images were available. He also argues, alternatively, that we simply do not know whether such images were available and therefore the prosecution had the burden of proving that they were not. We disagree. Our analysis in the previous paragraph shows that the congressional finding was likely incorrect at the relevant time, and that defendant does nothing more than raise a bare possibility that is insufficient to overturn the verdict in this case. In sum, we conclude the trier of fact in this case could distinguish real from virtual pictures beyond a reasonable doubt simply by viewing the pictures. After reviewing the pictures ourselves, we hold a trier of fact could reasonably find they depict real children. Defendant next argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to disseminate the pictures he possessed. He argues, first, that all of the evidence, including his admission to police that he exchanged child pornography over the Internet, at most proves past dissemination, not a present intent to disseminate. Defendant points out he did not have telephone service at the time of his arrest, which, he suggests, tends to show he had no ability to access the Internet, and therefore no present intent to disseminate. We disagree. Defendant’s admission he would exchange child pornography on the Internet using his computer, on its face, describes his habit or practice. It was not couched as something he used to do but had given up. It supports a reasonable inference that he intended to continue exchanging child pornography on the Internet when he could. Furthermore, defendant had his computer repaired immediately before his arrest, which implies he intended to continue using it. The computer contained software for Earth Link, which is an Internet Service Provider (ISP). Morris testified Earth Link was not defendant’s ISP, but that an unidentified “friend” of defendant had an account with Earth Link. Morris testified the friend told him defendant used the friend’s Internet service. The fact defendant had no phone service therefore does little or nothing to defeat the inference that he intended to continue his admitted practice of exchanging child pornography on the Internet. Defendant also argues his admission to police that he exchanged pornography on the Internet was insufficiently corroborated to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of possession with intent to disseminate. A criminal conviction may not be based solely on an uncorroborated confession. People v. Willingham , 89 Ill. 2d 352, 358-59 (1982). There must be some evidence, independent of the confession, tending to show the crime did occur. Willingham , 89 Ill. 2d at 358. However, there is no requirement that the corroborating evidence prove the existence of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Willingham , 89 Ill. 2d at 359. Rather, if the defendant’s confession is corroborated, then the confession and the corroboration may be considered together to determine whether the crime, and the fact the defendant committed it, have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Willingham , 89 Ill. 2d at 360. In this case there is ample corroboration of defendant’s admission that he exchanged child pornography over the Internet. The computer containing Earth Link software, Morris’ testimony that defendant’s friend told him that defendant accessed the Internet through the friend’s Earth Link account, and the numerous digital pictures on the disks discovered in defendant’s home all corroborate defendant’s admission. In sum, the prosecution introduced sufficient evidence to prove, for each of the three counts on which defendant was convicted, that defendant possessed a pornographic picture of a real child with the intent to disseminate.