Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue: Whether the State Failed to Comply With Discovery?

Text: Prior to trial, Holland filed a Rule 4.06 motion requesting disclosure of: The name, address and qualifications of any expert witness intended to be called by the State. The substances of their testimony and the facts that [ sic ] relies upon in support of same are also requested. Vol. I, at 42. Judge Vincent Sherry granted the motion. Id. at 53. In response, the State provided Holland with various documents: (1) a letter from Dr. Paul McGarry to the State discussing his opinion about instruments which could have caused Krystal's injuries; (2) a letter from the State informing Holland of its intention to seek[] the opinion of Dr. Paul McGarry as to the percentage of alleged rape cases wherein seminal fluid or spermatozoa are not present; (3) a copy of McGarry's Curriculum Vitae; and (4) an autopsy report prepared by Dr. Paul McGarry. At trial, the State called McGarry to testify about the autopsy he performed on Krystal. At one point, after testifying about Krystal's injuries and bruises, the State asked McGarry: Doctor, do you have an opinion about the amount of time it would take for such bruising to form? Vol. XII, at 2058; see also id. at 2186-87 (further related questioning). Holland objected to this question on the ground that: the [substance of the] doctor's opinions as to the time when [Krystal's] bruises began to form, which would lead to the doctor's opinions as to the time when the injuries must have been inflicted, were never disclosed [during] discovery. [14] Holland contended that the State had known about McGarry's opinion regarding time (and sequence) of bruises and injuries for at least a week prior to trial, and that its failure to disclose this information constituted trial by ambush. Holland consequently moved for a mistrial or exclusion of such testimony. Id. at 2059-60 & 2065. The State did not deny that it had known about McGarry's opinion; however, the State contended that McGarry's opinion is based on facts discoverable in the autopsy report  a copy of which Holland was provided. After extensively debating this issue outside the jury's presence, the judge halted the trial and granted Holland an unlimited opportunity to interview McGarry. The interview transpired overnight. Vol. XII, at 2059-88. The next morning, after the interview, the debate continued. The judge ultimately overruled Holland's motion  after which the following exchange transpired: JUDGE VLAHOS: You will agree for the motion for mistrial or exclude the evidence, that on yesterday evening you were given ample opportunity to interview with Dr. McGarry... . [Y]ou visited with him for about ten or fifteen minutes; is that correct? HOLLAND: That is correct. We did have an opportunity to talk with him. JUDGE: And an unlimited opportunity; is that correct? HOLLAND: Yes. Id. at 2095-98. In this appeal, Holland challenges the judge's decision to overrule his motion.

When confronted with an alleged Rule 4.06 violation, this Court must review the record to determine whether the judge followed the guideline enunciated in Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 22-26 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring) (now codified in Rule 4.06(i)): 1. Upon defense objection, the trial court should give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to become familiar with the undisclosed evidence by interviewing the witness, inspecting the physical evidence, etc. 2. If, after this opportunity for familiarization, the defendant believes he may be prejudiced by lack of opportunity to prepare to meet the evidence, he must request a continuance. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue. 3. If the defendant does request a continuance the State may choose to proceed with trial and forego using the undisclosed evidence. If the State is not willing to proceed without the evidence, the trial court must grant the requested continuance. Quoted in Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 367-68 (Miss. 1987), and Kelly v. State, 553 So.2d 517, 520 (Miss. 1989). [15] Rule 4.06 and the Box guideline are designed to avoid ambush or unfair surprise to either party at trial. Harris v. State, 446 So.2d 585, 589 (Miss. 1984); Ford v. State, 444 So.2d 841, 843 (Miss. 1984). The question presented here brings into direct conflict two important interests. First there is prosecution's interest in presenting to the jury all relevant, probative evidence. On the other hand, there is the accused's interest in knowing reasonably well in advance of trial what the prosecution will try to prove and how it will attempt to make its proof which, of course, includes the names of persons the state expects to call as witnesses. This state is committed to the proposition that these conflicting interests are best accommodated and that justice is more nearly achieved when, well in advance of trial, each side has reasonable access to the evidence of the other. See Rule 4.06 supra; Rules 26-37, Miss. R.Civ.P. Box, 437 So.2d at 21. Of critical import, remedies available for a discovery violation are not self-executing. Middlebrook v. State, 555 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Miss. 1990) (citing cases).
Applying the law to facts, this Court concludes that Holland's contention is devoid of merit. The State provided Holland with McGarry's autopsy report and disclosed that McGarry would be called to testify. This should have sufficed to place Holland on notice of potential line of questioning by the State. Indeed, in the section of the report entitled Provisional Autopsy Diagnosis, McGarry revealed his opinion on the general time of injuries ( i.e.,  Recently stretched lacerated abraded vaginal orifice, recently stretched abraded anus [and r ] ecent mutilating cuts of the genital region, postmortem ). Notably, Holland conceded during the hearing on his motion that the autopsy report does mention a time element. Vol. XII, at 2087-88. It would seem to go without saying that the State might delve into this matter at trial and ask McGarry to expound upon this time element in a more specific manner. Albeit Holland was not duty-bound to interview or interrogate McGarry prior to trial, his failure to do so is somewhat surprising  particularly in view of the fact that a pathologist's testimony in a case like this one would be critical to the State's case and detrimental to the defense's. Cf. Whittington v. State, 523 So.2d 966, 976 (Miss. 1988) (defense was given complete access prior to trial to Dr. McCormick, the pathologist who performed an autopsy on the victim). In sum, Holland seems to have expected too much from the State. Accord Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all ... investigatory work on a case.). This Court's rejection of Holland's contention is also based, in part, on his failure to take advantage of the trial judge's willingness to provide him with an unlimited opportunity to interview McGarry. That is, the judge had complied with the Box guideline by granting Holland a reasonable opportunity to interview the witness and to familiarize himself with the evidence. But the record indicates that Holland declined to interview McGarry about his opinions. [16] An interview or examination might have lent credence to Holland's claim upon which he based his motion; it might have yielded information supportive of his own case; or it might have led him to conclude that McGarry's testimony would not be prejudicial as originally thought. Holland's failure flies in the face of the Box guideline. Holland chose not to exercise this opportunity for reasons not made known and, thus, he rendered himself less informed or uninformed about what he was and is now claiming. This Court therefore holds him to that choice. Finally, the record reveals that Holland waited too long before raising an objection. On the seventh day of trial between 3:27 and 4:10 p.m., the State announced its intention to question McGarry about the time and sequence when Krystal's injuries occurred: Judge, we are going to have in evidence from Dr. McGarry as to when, in his opinion as a forensic pathologist, these wounds occurred. [17] Holland did not raise an objection until the eighth day of trial at approximately 5:07 p.m. when the State fulfilled its intention and asked McGarry the question. Vol. XII, at 2058-59. Thus, Holland's failure to raise an objection when he first learned of the State's intention is deemed a waiver. In sum, this Court affirms on this issue. [18]