Opinion ID: 1780246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ineffective assistance of counsel regarding peremptory challenges

Text: ¶ 34. Bennett next claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use available peremptory strikes on the last three jurors seated, each of whom Bennett says expressed views on the death penalty that rendered them unfit to serve on the jury. One of the jurors stated that if Bennett is convicted of capital murder, he should receive death. Another juror stated, I believe in an eye for an eye. If you pay for your crime swiftly, then the prison system would not be overcrowded. The third challenged juror stated, I believe if one person murders another, he should get the death penalty if it's proven. We are again faced here with an assignment of error that both lacks merit and is procedurally barred. ¶ 35. Evaluation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is controlled by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which requires defendants making the claim to demonstrate not only that their counsel was ineffective, but also that the ineffective representation resulted in prejudice. Id. `Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.' Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). This Court must focus on whether trial counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all circumstances, bearing in mind there is no constitutional right to errorless counsel. See Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). ¶ 36. Trial counsel is faced with many decisions in the course of representing a defendant, particularly one charged with a capital crime. The decision to file a particular motion, call a particular witness, ask a particular question, or object to a particular question, falls within the discretion of planning and developing a trial strategy. Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767, 777 (Miss.1995) (citing Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir.1984)). So it is counsel's decision to use or forego peremptory strikes. ¶ 37. Bennett's post trial challenge of his counsel's decision not to strike the three jurors includes no showing that these jurors were not fair and impartial. Bennett's counsel questioned each juror individually. Based on the record, each of these jurors appears to have taken their job seriously, stated with certainty that they could be fair and impartial, and resolved any questions concerning their opinions of the death penalty. ¶ 38. Juror thirty-six informed the court that he would be fair and impartial and would consider all sentencing options presented to him. When asked by defense counsel about his statement on the jury questionnaire indicating that if the defendant was convicted of capital murder he should receive death, juror thirty-six informed the court that he had hastily filled out the jury form and had since formed a more considered opinion regarding sentencing. ¶ 39. Juror thirty-eight noted on her jury questionnaire that she believed in an eye for an eye. However, during voir dire, she stated that she would not automatically choose the death penalty even if the victim was a child. Juror thirty-eight explained that her eye for an eye comment meant that a person should pay for their crime but not necessarily in the same manner of punishment. Juror thirty-eight also told the court that she would follow instructions and would consider the required factors. ¶ 40. Finally, juror thirty-nine noted on her questionnaire that if it's proven, a person should get the death penalty if he murdered someone. During her individual voir dire, juror thirty-nine stated that she would not automatically vote for the death penalty and that she would consider all sentencing options. Juror thirty-nine explained that she had filled out the questionnaire prior to learning how the legal process for a murder trial worked and prior to learning what the law required her to consider with respect to evidence and sentencing. ¶ 41. Bennett has not shown how his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike these three jurors. All three jurors indicated they could be fair and impartial; that they would not automatically impose the death penalty; and that they would base their verdict on the evidence presented under the control of the law on which they were instructed. Furthermore, as the State notes, defense counsel was clearly diligent and thorough throughout voir dire. The voir dire consumed five volumes of transcript, and included individual and group voir dire. Bennett's counsel questioned each juror to be sure he or she was qualified to sit on a death penalty case. Counsel made challenges for cause, successfully defended against the State's cause challenges, and struck nine jurors peremptorily. Bennett has wholly failed to demonstrate his counsel was ineffective or that he was prejudiced by any alleged ineffective assistance. ¶ 42. Additionally, Bennett's claim is procedurally barred. He provides us with no evaluation of his claim pursuant to Strickland, nor does he cite any authority for the proposition that trial counsel's decision to refrain from exercising peremptory challenges constitutes ineffectiveness of counsel. As a result of Bennett's failure to cite to controlling authority, this issue is waived. See Roberson, 595 So.2d at 1318. ¶ 43. Thus, for the reasons stated, Bennett's fourth assignment of error is without merit and procedurally barred.