Opinion ID: 524973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Text of the ADEA

Text: 11 No language in the ADEA speaks directly to the effect of an arbitration agreement. 3 On the other hand, the statutory scheme reflects Congress' careful structuring of the procedure to be followed in enforcing the rights granted by the Act. 12 The ADEA vests primary enforcement responsibility with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626, to which the individual's right of action under the Act is secondary. Thus, individuals are not permitted to file suit alleging unlawful discrimination under the ADEA unless they first file an administrative complaint with the EEOC and wait sixty days while the EEOC considers the charge. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d). The EEOC is instructed under the Act to attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged by first attempting to effect voluntary compliance with the statute through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(b). If these methods of inducing compliance fail, the EEOC is authorized to bring suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(c)(1). Once the EEOC has exercised this option, the individual's right to file suit terminates. Id. In this respect, unlike under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), the individual's right under the ADEA to seek redress against an employer for age discrimination is subordinate to the enforcement activities of the public agency charged with the Act's administration. See also Rogers v. Exxon Research and Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022, 98 S.Ct. 749, 54 L.Ed.2d 770 (1978). 13 Although enforcement of the ADEA has shifted from the Secretary of Labor to the EEOC, see Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed.Reg. 19, 807, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. App. at 1155 (1982), and in 92 Stat. 3781, the original requirement that the ADEA be enforced pursuant to the enforcement provisions of the FLSA has been fully retained and continues to govern enforcement proceedings under the Act. Our consideration of the effect of the statutory scheme on the arbitrability of ADEA claims is, therefore, informed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981), holding that the provisions of the FLSA set forth in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b) were intended to give employees a right of access to court which could not be waived through an agreement to arbitrate. These provisions, including civil liability for employer violations of the applicable laws, a right by aggrieved employees to bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction, and the termination of this right upon the filing of a complaint for injunction proceedings by the agency in charge of enforcement of the statute, see 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b), are as fully applicable to ADEA actions as to FLSA actions. The Barrentine Court held that notwithstanding the national policy in favor of contractual dispute-resolution procedures between labor and management, [n]ot all disputes between an employee and his employer are suited for binding resolution in accordance with the procedures established by collective bargaining and stated that different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers. 450 U.S. at 737, 101 S.Ct. at 1443. 14 CPC argues that Barrentine is distinguishable in spite of its consideration of the identical remedy provisions as those involved here because claims arising under the ADEA are different in nature from those under the FLSA and because an individual rather than a collective arbitration agreement is involved. We agree that further inquiry into the arbitrability of ADEA claims is warranted, although we must give due regard to the authority provided by Barrentine.