Opinion ID: 4014803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: strickland and wiggins

Text: Strickland analysis is, of course, central to this COA application, especially as applied in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003). Because Wiggins demonstrates the basis for Trevino’s entire claim, we examine the case in some detail. 42 The petitioner, Wiggins, was convicted in August 1989, after a four-day jury trial, for a murder he committed in 1988. Prior to sentencing, his trial counsel moved for bifurcation of sentencing into two phases: in the first, counsel proposed to prove that Wiggins did not act as the principal in the murder, and in the second, they intended to present mitigating evidence. Counsel argued that bifurcation would prevent mitigation evidence from undercutting their argument that Wiggins was not primarily responsible for the murder. The trial judge denied the motion, and sentencing commenced in a single phase. On October 12, the court denied the bifurcation motion, and sentencing proceedings commenced immediately thereafter. In her opening statement, Nethercott told the jurors they would hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins actually killed Lacs. Counsel then explained that the judge would instruct them to weigh Wiggins’ clean record as a factor against a death sentence. She concluded: “‘You’re going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life. It has not been easy for him. But he’s worked. He’s tried to be a productive citizen, and he’s reached the age of 27 with no convictions for prior crimes of violence and no convictions, period. . . . I think that’s an important thing for you to consider.’” During the proceedings themselves, however, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins’ life history. 42 The facts in this section all come from Wiggins, with citations provided only for quotations. 19 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 20 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 Before closing arguments, Schlaich made a proffer to the court, outside the presence of the jury, to preserve bifurcation as an issue for appeal. He detailed the mitigation case counsel would have presented had the court granted their bifurcation motion. He explained that they would have introduced psychological reports and expert testimony demonstrating Wiggins’ limited intellectual capacities and childlike emotional state on the one hand, and the absence of aggressive patterns in his behavior, his capacity for empathy, and his desire to function in the world on the other. At no point did Schlaich proffer any evidence of petitioner’s life history or family background. 43 The jury returned a sentence of death. In 1993, Wiggins sought state habeas relief, “arguing that his attorneys had rendered constitutionally defective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background.” 44 In support, he submitted testimony by a licensed social worker who had prepared an extensive social history report detailing severe physical and sexual abuse by his own father and mother as well as various foster parents. During these proceedings, one of Wiggins’ trial attorneys testified that he did not recall retaining a forensic social worker to prepare a social history, even though the State of Maryland made funds available for that purpose, and he testified that the trial team had, “well in advance of trial, decided to focus their efforts on ‘retry[ing] the factual case’ and disputing Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder.” 45 The state habeas courts denied relief on the ground that the decision not to investigate was “a matter of trial tactics” and therefore did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland. The state appellate court focused on the fact that trial counsel knew at least the general contours of Wiggins’ 43 539 U.S. at 515-16 (citations omitted). 44 Id. at 516. 45 Id. at 517. 20 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 childhood, and that at least one mitigating factor, Wiggins’ lack of prior convictions, was presented to the jury. Wiggins filed a habeas petition in federal court, arguing that the state habeas courts’ rejection of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim was based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The federal district court agreed, concluding that trial counsel’s decision not to investigate Wiggins’ social history further could only be reasonable if it was “based upon information the attorney has made after conducting a reasonable investigation.” 46 Reviewing de novo, the Fourth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Fourth Circuit. After setting out the Strickland standards and emphasizing the “heavy measure of deference” accorded to the judgments of trial counsel, the Supreme Court explained the limits of that deference: Our opinion in Williams v. Taylor is illustrative of the proper application of these standards. In finding Williams’ ineffectiveness claim meritorious, we applied Strickland and concluded that counsel’s failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating evidence at sentencing could not be justified as a tactical decision to focus on Williams’ voluntary confessions, because counsel had not “fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” 529 U.S., at 396, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed.1980)). While Williams had not yet been decided at the time the Maryland Court of Appeals rendered the decision at issue in this case, cf. post, at 2546 (SCALIA, J., dissenting), Williams’ case was before us on habeas review. Contrary to the dissent’s contention, ibid., we therefore made no new law in resolving Williams’ ineffectiveness claim. See Williams, 529 U.S., at 390, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (noting that the merits of Williams’ claim “are squarely governed by our holding in Strickland”); see also id., at 395, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (noting that the trial court correctly applied both components of the Strickland standard to petitioner’s claim and proceeding to discuss counsel’s failure to investigate as a 46 Id. at 519 (quoting Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 558 (D. Md. 2001)). 21 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 22 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 violation of Strickland’s performance prong). In highlighting counsel’s duty to investigate, and in referring to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as guides, we applied the same “clearly established” precedent of Strickland we apply today. Cf. 466 U.S., at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (establishing that “thorough investigation[s]” are “virtually unchallengeable” and underscoring that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations”); see also id., at 688-689, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable”). In light of these standards, our principal concern in deciding whether Schlaich and Nethercott exercised “reasonable professional judgmen[t],” id., at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052, is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case. Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins’ background was itself reasonable. Ibid. Cf. Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 415, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring) (noting counsel’s duty to conduct the “requisite, diligent” investigation into his client’s background). In assessing counsel’s investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their performance, measured for “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen “from counsel’s perspective at the time,” id., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (“[E]very effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight”). 47 The Court noted that trial counsel drew its mitigation case from three sources: an IQ test conducted by a psychologist, which revealed Wiggins had an IQ of 79; a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which included a brief summary of his miserable personal history; and records kept by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“DSS”), which showed his various placements in the foster care system. They did not, however, develop any further social history, despite the availability of funds for that purpose. 47 Id. at 522-23 (emphasis in original). 22 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 23 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 The Court held that this constituted constitutionally deficient investigation in light of not only Maryland’s standards but ABA Guidelines in place prior to his sentencing, including the admonition that “investigations into mitigating evidence ‘should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.’” 48 Despite these well-defined norms, however, counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner’s background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources. Cf. id., 11.8.6, p. 133 (noting that among the topics counsel should consider presenting are medical history, educational history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences (emphasis added)); 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1982) (“The lawyer also has a substantial and important role to perform in raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing . . . . Investigation is essential to fulfillment of these functions”). 49 Moreover, the Court found that “the investigation was also unreasonable in light of what counsel actually discovered in the DSS records,” including the fact that Wiggins’ mother was an alcoholic, that he had spent time in different foster homes, that he displayed emotional difficulties, that he was frequently absent from school, and that he was left without food for days at a time. 50 As the Federal District Court emphasized, any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses, particularly given the apparent absence of any aggravating factors in petitioner’s background. 164 F.Supp.2d, at 559. Indeed, counsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation 48 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), p. 93 (1989) (emphasis added in Wiggins)). 49 Id. at 524-25. 50 Id. at 525. 23 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 24 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless; this case is therefore distinguishable from our precedents in which we have found limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable. See, e.g., Strickland, supra, at 699, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (concluding that counsel could “reasonably surmise . . . that character and psychological evidence would be of little help”); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1987) (concluding counsel’s limited investigation was reasonable because he interviewed all witnesses brought to his attention, discovering little that was helpful and much that was harmful); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1986) (concluding that counsel engaged in extensive preparation and that the decision to present a mitigation case would have resulted in the jury hearing evidence that petitioner had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail). Had counsel investigated further, they might well have discovered the sexual abuse later revealed during state postconviction proceedings. 51 In sum, the Court concluded that Wiggins’ trial counsel’s investigation was constitutionally inadequate under the performance prong of Strickland: In finding that Schlaich and Nethercott’s investigation did not meet Strickland’s performance standards, we emphasize that Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case. Both conclusions would interfere with the “constitutionally protected independence of counsel” at the heart of Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052. We base our conclusion on the much more limited principle that “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable” only to the extent that “reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id., at 690691, 104 S. Ct. 2052. A decision not to investigate thus “must be 51 Id. 24 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 25 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances.” Id., at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052. 52 The Court then turned to the prejudice prong of Strickland: In order for counsel’s inadequate performance to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must show that counsel’s failures prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052. In Strickland, we made clear that, to establish prejudice, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052. In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence. 53 The Court concluded that the failure to investigate and discover the “powerful” mitigation evidence was indeed prejudicial, in that it showed a history of severe abuse, starting with his “alcoholic, absentee mother” and continuing through an unbroken series of extreme hardships. 54 In the Court’s words, Wiggins “thus has the kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a defendant’s moral culpability.” 55 Given both the nature and the extent of the abuse petitioner suffered, we find there to be a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, would have introduced it at sentencing in an admissible form. While it may well have been strategically defensible upon a reasonably thorough investigation to focus on Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder, the two sentencing strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Moreover, given the strength of the available evidence, a reasonable attorney might well have chosen to prioritize the mitigation case over the direct responsibility challenge, 52 Id. at 533. 53 Id. at 534. 54 Id. at 534-35. 55 Id. at 535 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978)). 25 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 26 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 particularly given that Wiggins’ history contained little of the double edge we have found to justify limited investigations in other cases. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1986). 56 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the mitigating evidence, considered as a whole, could have resulted in a different sentence, and it reversed and remanded.