Opinion ID: 1224847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Court of Appeal Majority Opinion

Text: The Court of Appeal majority reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to dissolve its 1990 injunction. The court concluded that Chapter 433 contains sufficient pronouncements, directions, and safeguards to satisfy plaintiffs' earlier objections based on the private contracting restriction of article VII. The Court of Appeal majority, after reviewing the relevant constitutional and statutory principles, initially rejected Caltrans's contention that new section 14130, subdivision (a)(5), makes Caltrans's use of private consultants to assist in project delivery a new state function exempt from the civil service mandate. (See Williams, supra, 7 Cal. App.3d at p. 397.) As we subsequently explain, that holding seems clearly correct in light of the uncontradicted evidence of Caltrans's historical responsibility for project development of the state highway system. Next, the Court of Appeal majority considered and accepted Caltrans's alternate argument that, by reason of Chapter 433, although Caltrans's private contracting at issue here involves services that state civil service employees have traditionally done, nonetheless, it will result in greater efficiency and economy without compromising the integrity of the civil service. In so holding, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on legislative findings and declarations that purport to justify Caltrans's contracting activities. (See งง 14130, 14130.1, subd. (b), 14130.3.) In the Court of Appeal majority's view, these findings and declarations override or replace the trial court's earlier findings that Caltrans's inability to perform projects through the state civil service was caused by its own policy of inadequate staffing. As the majority opinion stated, ... the trial court ignored legislative findings justifying the maintenance of Caltrans's staff at levels that will not necessitate costly short-term hirings and layoffs due to workload fluctuations resulting from the volatility of funding sources. (Fn. omitted.) The Court of Appeal relied on case law presuming the validity of legislation and according great weight to legislative findings unless unreasonable and arbitrary or clearly and palpably wrong. (See, e.g., Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1252 [48 Cal. Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112]; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990]; see also American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 372 [204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670, 41 A.L.R.4th 233] [not proper judicial function to reweigh legislative facts underlying statutes].) According to the Court of Appeal majority, nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the legislative findings were clearly and palpably wrong. In the majority's view, The burden is not on Caltrans to prove the facts support the legislative determination but on plaintiffs, i.e. those who attack the statute, to prove they do not. Judicial notice of prior factual determinations of the superior court does not satisfy plaintiffs' burden inasmuch as circumstances may have changed in the interim. Similarly, the Court of Appeal majority found nothing in the record to support the superior court's assertion the Legislature failed to consider whether additional civil service staff could be obtained to perform the project delivery work adequately, competently or satisfactorily. The court may not simply rely on its finding preceding enactment of Chapter 433 that any inadequacy of staff was caused by a policy and practice of maintaining staff at an artificially low level. The undisputed fact remains, as found by the Legislature, that at the time Chapter 433 was enacted staff was inadequate to perform the work. Regardless of the reasons why this condition had existed, the Legislature was not precluded from legislating based on then-existing circumstances. There is nothing in the record to refute the implicit legislative finding that sufficient additional staff could not be obtained on a cost-effective basis. (Italics added, fn. omitted.) Responding to the trial court's doubts regarding the supposed short-term nature of the seismic safety retrofit program, the Court of Appeal majority reasoned that, although this program may be comparable to any typical Caltrans project, it has a finite life. Presumably, after all bridges are retrofitted as needed, the program will terminate. Thus it is not unreasonable for the Legislature to find it would be more economical to contract out such work than to hire additional staff who must then be laid-off when the short-term retrofit program is completed. The Court of Appeal next addressed the trial court's conclusion that section 14137 (directing Caltrans to continue contracts in force or awarded on or before July 1, 1993) is invalid because it purports to override the court's injunction without stating facts establishing the contracts at issue satisfied the civil service mandate. According to the Court of Appeal majority, the new section by itself satisfied Caltrans's earlier failure of proof: In section 14137, the Legislature has found the facts and circumstances justify each of the designated contracts. In effect, the Legislature has relieved Caltrans of the burden of presenting evidence to justify the individual contracts. In so doing, the Legislature has not overridden the superior court's earlier determination but has supplied the factual basis the superior court determined was lacking. Consistent with the previously discussed rules of judicial review of legislative enactments, we presume the facts and circumstances support the Legislature's implied findings absent contrary evidence. (Italics added.) Relying on CSEA, supra, 199 Cal. App.3d at pages 851 through 853, the Court of Appeal majority reasoned that the Legislature properly could find that, under present conditions, certain highway construction projects, even though existing state functions, cannot be performed adequately, competently or satisfactorily by state employees, but can be performed efficiently and economically if privately contracted. This is entirely consistent with the civil service mandate, a key purpose of which is to encourage efficiency and economy in state government. [Citation.] Accordingly, the Court of Appeal majority concluded that Chapter 433 is constitutional on its face, reserving the question whether its provisions are now or will be applied constitutionally. The court also concluded that the Caltrans activities that the trial court's 1990 injunction prohibited appear to be consistent with the objects and purposes of [Chapter 433] as set out expressly in legislative findings and declarations, the underlying factual bases of which were not competently challenged in the superior court. As such, they may not be enjoined absent a showing the statute is improperly applied contrary to its terms or in derogation of the civil service mandate. The Court of Appeal ordered the 1990 injunction dissolved and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.