Opinion ID: 4557268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Witness Exclusion

Text: Finally, we address Rodriguez’s argument that the district court improperly excluded a key defense witness, Teresa Cantu, who is Rodriguez’s sister. She contends that Cantu’s testimony was relevant to her mental state and her defense that she participated in the recorded conversations not because she was a “Mexican Mafia secretary,” but because she “never turned her back on anyone.” Below, Rodriguez proffered that Cantu would testify to the sisters’ upbringing in a volatile home, Rodriguez’s tendency to act as a “rescuer” and a “fixer,” and Rodriguez’s resolve not to let down or abandon anyone. Cantu would also testify to Rodriguez’s longstanding abusive relationship with her ex-husband Tommy, and Cantu’s “belie[f] that [Rodriguez] put protecting Freddy, [her] son, above all else.” The government objected to Cantu’s testimony as relevant only to “a pure jury nullification defense” and an “appeal to the sympathies of the jury.” In reference to Rodriguez’s abusive relationship, the government added that Rodriguez had not properly noticed a duress defense—thus barring her from seeking to do so at trial. Rodriguez responded that Cantu’s testimony was relevant to her state of mind, and that her state of mind was material to the specific intent crimes of which she was accused. She further argued that Cantu’s testimony “goes to the voluntariness” of her statements and actions, amidst Tommy’s threats and persistent abuse. Reviewing the district court’s exclusionary ruling for abuse of discretion, United States v. Haischer, 780 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2015), we affirm. Most of Cantu’s expected testimony had little connection to the issues in dispute, and the district court reasonably concluded that 30 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ Cantu’s testimony would unduly target the sympathies of the jury. For example, Rodriguez’s tumultuous childhood would paint her as a more sympathetic defendant, but it had little to do with her guilt or innocence of the charges. Although the district court did not cite a specific evidentiary rule, it is clear from the record that the court undertook a Rule 403 balancing analysis and concluded that the probative value of Cantu’s proffered testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. That conclusion was a reasonable one. The district court also did not err in concluding that at least some of Cantu’s testimony went to an unpreserved duress defense. 12 Cantu would testify that Tommy (a principal conspirator) repeatedly threatened Rodriguez with violence, and that Rodriguez “lived in fear of Tommy.” To the extent Rodriguez argued this testimony “goes to the voluntariness” of her conduct, the court correctly determined that Rodriguez was putting on a duress defense in all but name. However, Rodriguez is also correct that evidence negating the mental state required for a specific intent crime is not coextensive with an affirmative defense of duress. See Haischer, 780 F.3d at 1283 (“Duress and the absence of the required mens rea are not the same thing.”). Without relying on a duress defense, Rodriguez could argue that she acted out of a desire to protect herself and her family, out of fear from Tommy, or simply because she would never leave anyone behind, rather than with the requisite mens rea. That said, the Cantu proffer was extremely weak to the extent it spoke to any issues beyond duress. Cantu could provide 12 Rodriguez does not dispute that she failed to preserve a duress defense. UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 31 only general background on Rodriguez, and Rodriguez’s claimed motives were not inconsistent with knowingly conspiring to racketeer, or acting with the purpose of maintaining or increasing her position in the OCMM. Even if Rodriguez became involved with the organization with an eye toward protecting herself and her family, or out of an impulse to “rescue” others, that would not exonerate her. We view the district court’s rulings regarding duress and Rule 403 as intertwined, and we find that the court reasonably concluded that the only proffered testimony with meaningful probative value went to duress—and that all other testimony in the proffer carried minimal probative force, substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in excluding Cantu’s testimony. Based on our foregoing assessment of Rodriguez’s claimed errors, and the totality of the evidence presented at trial, we likewise find that cumulative error does not provide a basis for reversal of Rodriguez’s convictions. AFFIRMED.