Opinion ID: 1757793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: assault & battery exclusion

Text: Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, it is understood and agreed that this policy excludes claims arising out of Assault and Battery, whether caused by or at the instigation of, the insured, his employees, patrons, or any causes whatsoever. Much of the discussion in this case in the lower courts has centered around whether Ms. Ledbetter sustained any damages solely from the wrongful entry into her motel room, separate and apart from the rape and kidnapping, apparently based on the interpretation that the policy specifically provides coverage for personal injury arising out of wrongful entry into a room. However, we believe such an interpretation ignores a fundamental distinction in the policy between bodily injury and personal injury. For purposes of this policy, personal injury is injury other than bodily injury. Damages which arise out of bodily injury include general damages, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and distress and special damages. W. McKENZIE AND H. JOHNSON, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 163. Ms. Ledbetter's damages fall within the scope of Coverage A bodily injury coverage. Therefore, it would be incorrect to fit these damages under Coverage B personal injury coverage, since that coverage, by definition, excludes bodily injury. Having concluded that Ms. Ledbetter's injuries would fall under Coverage A (bodily injury) of the policy, we now turn to the central issue in this case, namely, whether the policy's assault and battery exclusion precludes coverage. Similar exclusions have been found unambiguous by our courts. Alvarado v. Doe, 613 So.2d 166 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 64 (La. 1993); Wallace v. Huber, 597 So.2d 1247 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1992); Williamson v. Kovac, 591 So.2d 788 (La.App. 5th Cir.1991). Nonetheless, Ms. Ledbetter argues that the exclusion is ambiguous under the facts of this case, since it is not clear whether a rape or a kidnapping is an assault and battery. Turning first to the question of rape, we recognize that under our criminal code, assault, battery and rape are separate and distinct crimes. However, we also recognize that the same act may constitute a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, although principles of double jeopardy may bar multiple convictions and sentences. State v. Dubaz, 468 So.2d 554 (La.1985). Therefore, the mere fact that McGraw's act may have been charged by the district attorney as rape does not mean, at least for civil purposes, that it could not be considered as an assault and battery. This same conclusion has been reached by other courts which have interpreted assault and battery exclusions in the context of rape. In Paul v. Montesino, 535 So.2d 6, 7 (La. App. 4th Cir.1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1222 (La.1989), the court stated: A rape necessarily requires the intentional use of force and/or violence upon the person of another. Although all batteries are not rapes, all rapes necessarily are batteries. The allegations of plaintiff's petition clearly show the physical contact and struggle associated with the incident. Even if penetration, a necessary element of rape, had not been accomplished, the allegations of the petition would still set forth an assault and battery. We find no ambiguity. Likewise, in United National Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1993), the court held: It does not matter that the penal law lays down specific elements for the various offenses or degree of offenses that entail unwanted touching, or that the crime of rape, as compared to assault and battery, entails other or additional elements. In the civil context in which the insurance contract was made, the common meanings of assault and battery subsume all forms of tortious menacing and unwanted touching. While it is true that ambiguities are often construed against insurers, a clause may be general without being ambiguous, and even a vague clause may be ambiguous only at its edges. It is neither possible nor desirable for an insurance contract to enumerate the various kinds and degrees of attacks encompassed by the assault and battery exclusion. The clause need not mention rape or strangulation or mayhem, or other greater or lesser invasions of the person; all are subsumed in the broad language employed. See also United National Ins. Co. v. Entertainment Group, Inc., 945 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1991). Based on this reasoning, we conclude that the assault and battery exclusion in Classic's policy is unambiguous as applied to rape. A clear and unambiguous provision in the insurance contract limiting liability must be given effect. Gunn v. Automotive Casualty Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 154 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1993); Foret v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Co., 582 So.2d 989 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991). Therefore, the court of appeal properly held that the assault and battery exclusion bars coverage by Classic for Ms. Ledbetter's injuries resulting from the rape. However, turning to the kidnapping, we believe a different result must be reached. In contrast to rape, which necessarily involves a battery, a kidnapping does not necessarily involve the intentional use of force and/or violence upon the person of another. [3] Based on this reasoning, we find that the exclusion is ambiguous as applied to Ms. Ledbetter's damages arising from the kidnapping. Exclusionary provisions in insurance contracts are strictly construed against the insurer, and any ambiguity is construed in favor of the insured. Garcia v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, 576 So.2d 975, 976 (La.1991). Therefore, we conclude that Classic's assault and battery exclusion does not exclude coverage for Ms. Ledbetter's damages resulting solely from the kidnapping. Although the trial court did not delineate which damages arose from the rape and which arose solely from the kidnapping, our review of the record indicates that approximately forty percent of Ms. Ledbetter's damages arose solely from the kidnapping. Accordingly, we hold that the insurer is liable for damages arising from the kidnapping in the amount of $96,000.