Opinion ID: 842333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis of mcl 129.61

Text: As relevant to the question whether plaintiffs' letters constituted a demand under MCL 129.61, [5] the statute provides, in relevant part, Before such suit is instituted a demand shall be made on the public officer, board or commission whose duty it may be to maintain such suit followed by a neglect or refusal to take action in relation thereto. The Court of Appeals noted that the term demand is defined in the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) as to ask for with proper authority; claim as a right, [6] and that the statutory phrase maintain such suit indicates that the purpose of the demand requirement is to inform the appropriate party that legal action is forthcoming. 265 Mich.App. at 710, 698 N.W.2d 402. It then concluded that plaintiffs' letters did not constitute a demand because they were merely a request that the alleged misappropriation stop; they are not a demand for legal action. Id. We disagree with the Court of Appeals analysis and conclude that plaintiffs' request was sufficient to satisfy the statute's demand requirement. Indeed, a request that the Attorney General halt something asserted to be illegal can only be reasonably understood, in the context of a demand to the state's top legal officer, as a demand that he or she take steps to stop such actions up to and including bringing a lawsuit. While plaintiffs did not use the word demand in their letters, their request is properly considered a demand. Plaintiffs were not required to use the word demand. [7] All that is required is a communication that would reasonably be understood as a demand. We agree with plaintiffs that utilization of the more civil, polite term request is more likely to secure the desired result of halting an unlawful expenditure than a more provocative demand. After all, the apparent object of the statute is to halt unlawful expenditures, not to engender litigation. We reject defendants' claim that the letters were insufficient because they failed to cite the statute. MCL 129.61 includes no requirement that the demand refer to the statute. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs' letters were insufficient to meet the demand requirement because the letters did not request either an accounting or the recovery of the funds expended. MCL 129.61 provides that a taxpayer may file a lawsuit for an accounting and/or the recovery of funds or moneys misappropriated or unlawfully expended. . . . The statute, however, does not provide that the taxpayer's preliminary demand must specifically be for an accounting or the recovery of funds. Defendants further argue that plaintiffs' letters were insufficient to meet the demand requirement because they did not contain a sense of urgency, and plaintiffs did not act upon them by filing a lawsuit until almost three years later. But MCL 129.61 does not require that the demand be made with a sense of urgency. Plaintiffs requested a halt to the expenditure of public funds at your earliest possible convenience. This phrase is a request that action be taken as soon as possible. It is sufficient especially because there is no requirement in the statute that the demand convey a sense of urgency. We also disagree with the Court of Appeals suggestion that MCL 129.61 requires a demand for litigation. The statute provides that before a taxpayer may institute a lawsuit, a demand must be made on the public officer, board or commission whose duty it may be to maintain such suit for recovery of unlawfully expended funds. The statute does not expressly require that the demand be for a lawsuit. Further, just because the public body has the ultimate duty to bring a lawsuit if it is needed does not mean that the demand must be for a lawsuit. The taxpayer demand, at a minimum, calls on a conscientious public body to reevaluate whether it is carrying out its duties properly and, in fact, this may result in the public body's acting in compliance with the demand. It may do this by any number of means, only one of which is to enter into litigation. In fact, when the statute uses the phrase whose duty it may be to maintain such suit (emphasis added), it recognizes this. Moreover, the statute provides that after a demand, before the taxpayer may bring a suit, a precondition is that the public body must neglect or refuse to take action in relation thereto. This implies that the public body need not necessarily file suit, only that it needs to take some kind of action relating to the matter. [8] We therefore conclude that the demand made in this matter was sufficient to satisfy MCL 129.61.