Opinion ID: 2612956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issue threethe predicate felony was inherently dangerous

Text: NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1984) broadly sets forth the concept of felony murder: Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused ... in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony.... Bankert asserts that the felony of trafficking and possession of cocaine does not present the requisite mens rea for a conviction of first degree murder; it is not an inherently dangerous crime. This concern was addressed in State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977). In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. Id. at 442, 564 P.2d at 1324. Harrison adopted the natural and probable consequences test. If the felony is one that is inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life, then the mens rea is sufficient for a conviction of felony murder. Id. This standard was further explained in State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991), which declared, [T]here must be proof that the defendant intended to kill (or was knowingly heedless that death might result from his conduct). (Emphasis omitted.) In his brief, Bankert all but ignored these well established standards. In the present case the jury was instructed that it could find Bankert guilty of felony murder only if it found [t]he defendant intended to cause the death of Robert Martin. It is irrelevant that, in the abstract, trafficking a controlled substance by possession with intent to distribute is not necessarily a dangerous crime. The standard applied to Bankert was that, while engaging in that particular felony, and as a consequence of that felony, he intended to kill Martin. The conclusion that Bankert, before pulling the trigger, sought to kill Martin is strongly supported by the evidence. We may rely on inference from the facts to establish intent. Muniz, 110 N.M. at 800, 800 P.2d at 735. The murder was predicated by Bankert's mounting rage. He armed himself with the gun that he kept under the driver's seat of his car. At the very least he was, at this point, planning the threat, if not the use, of deadly force. Martin, acting as the negotiator on behalf of Smith, was the logical object of Bankert's rage when he demanded to know if they wanted their money back. Saying, I want it all! Bankert jumped up and grabbed Martin around the neck so he could not speak. He intended to use force to close the deal, even after Hall attempted to stop him saying, This is Bob's house. Bob's my friend. Leave him alone. Bankert's response was an express intent to kill: I'll shoot you, implying, I'll shoot you instead of Martin. He then pulled the trigger, an act preceded by a willful decision. The shot to the head at point blank range and again in the face was meant to kill. No mere warning or injury was intended. He then threatened Smith, asking him if he was ready to die; Bankert still planned murder. Only after being disarmed in a violent struggle did Bankert give up this plan. The conviction for the intentional killing of Martin is strongly supported by the facts.