Opinion ID: 2240349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leventhal's Exceptions.

Text: On November 12, 1965, six months after sentences were imposed, Leventhal moved for a new trial. The basis of the motion was that, through the mistake or inadvertence of his counsel, he was deprived of his right to have exceptions which were properly saved at his trial reviewed by this court, and that he was thus denied due process of law and substantial justice. [3] The motion was denied. The correctness of this ruling is the sole question presented. The verdicts of guilty against Leventhal were returned on March 10, 1965. During the trial his counsel saved exceptions to rulings of the trial judge and to portions of the charge to the jury. [4] On March 26, counsel for Leventhal filed a motion to extend the time for filing a bill of exceptions up to and including April 26, 1965. This motion was allowed, but within that period no bill of exceptions was filed and no motion was made to extend the time of filing. No bill of exceptions was ever properly filed. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, there was the following evidence: Leventhal's trial counsel, having been allowed one extension of time for filing a bill of exceptions, prepared a motion for another extension. This second motion was shown to the assistant district attorney, who assented to it, but it was never filed. Counsel was aware that the first extension expired on April 26. Leventhal was told he would need another extension if a bill of exceptions was to be filed, but he was not aware of the exact date on which the first extension expired. Prior to the judgments, defence counsel had discussed with both Leventhal and the trial judge a desire to withdraw from the case. On May 1, he signed a letter purporting to withdraw. The judge, however, persuaded him to remain in the case until sentencing. There was no error. Leventhal enjoyed the assistance of counsel of his own choosing at all stages of the proceedings. The only aspect of this assistance now complained of is that the time for filing a bill of exceptions was allowed to lapse. There is nothing to show that the exceptions saved at the trial merited appellate review. For aught that appears Leventhal and his counsel may have determined not to press the exceptions. We are of opinion that there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's denial of the motion for a new trial. Since it could have been found that the failure on the part of counsel to perfect the exceptions was neither due to his inadvertence or mistake nor was contrary to the desire of his client, we do not reach the contention that Leventhal's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel was denied. Exceptions overruled.