Opinion ID: 797512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the Vienna Convention

Text: 46 Whether Torres has a claim directly under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention is a different matter. Torres invites us to recognize an enforceable right under the Vienna Convention that cannot be procedurally barred based on a pair of International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings. See Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31) (precluding the application of American procedural default rules to Article 36 claims); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Judgment of June 27) (same). We decline the invitation. Instead, we choose to follow, as we must, the dictates of the United States Supreme Court. See U.S. Const. Art III § 1. 47 Only last year, the Supreme Court noted that the ICJ's pronouncements are not conclusive on our courts, but are only entitled to respectful consideration. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2684-85, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006). The Court then reaffirmed its previous holding in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998) (dealing with state procedural bars), that, even if the Vienna Convention creates private enforceable rights, 11 such claims under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention may be subjected to the same procedural default rules that apply generally to other federal-law claims. Id. The Court reasoned that procedural default rules are an important and indispensable part of our adversary system, which relies chiefly on the parties to raise significant issues and present them to the courts in the appropriate manner at the appropriate time for adjudication. Id. at 2685. 48 Accordingly, regardless of whether Article 36(1)(b) gives Torres an enforceable right of consular notification, we hold that statutory and regulatory procedural bars apply to Torres's claim and the BIA's finding that he defaulted on his claim is conclusive. 49 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court's ruling in Sanchez-Llamas dealt specifically with state procedural default rules in the criminal setting. Yet, we do not see how the Court's rationale would dictate a different conclusion in federal removal proceedings. After all, removal proceedings before an IJ and the BIA generally are adversarial and employ many of the same procedures used in Article III courts. Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir.2006); see also Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 699 (6th Cir.2002) (It is clear that removal proceedings are decidedly adversarial.); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 223-24 (3d Cir.2002) (Scirica, J., dissenting); Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir.2005). In this case, Torres was subject to an adversarial removal proceeding and so BIA procedural bars rightfully applied. 50 In fact, the nature of removal proceedings militates more strongly for the application of procedural bars than in the criminal context. After all, a removal proceeding is a civil proceeding, not a criminal one, and the demands of constitutional or legal safeguards are accordingly less strict. Cf. United States v. Valdez, 917 F.2d 466, 469 (10th Cir.1990). 51 We close with our oft-noted admonition, it has long [been] recognized [that] the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments [is] largely immune from judicial control. Latu, 375 F.3d at 1020. If the political branches do not wish to exclude Article 36(1)(b) claims from agency procedural bars, it is not for us to say differently. 52 In sum, we find no error in the BIA's conclusion that Torres's consular notification claim was waived.