Opinion ID: 2296554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the court err in defining what was the meaning of reasonable care required of Western Maryland in this case?

Text: Here, Western Maryland's challenge is directed against a portion of the court's charge given after it had instructed the jury on the rule of Restatement, Torts, supra, § 343: What I have said, however, does not mean that the land owner, which is the Western Maryland Railway, the Defendant in this case, must exercise the maximum care under all circumstances or that the Defendant was an insurer of the Plaintiff's safety. It means only that the Defendant must exercise reasonable care under all of the circumstances attendant to this particular case, considering all of the facts, such as the weather, the time, and the opportunity for the Defendant to correct any unsafe condition and similar matters of that kind. If you find that the Defendant knew or by the exercise of reasonable care could have known of any unsafe condition as of the time that the Plaintiff fell on the morning of March 5th, 1960, at approximately 8:00 a.m., and failed to correct such unsafe condition, or if you find that the Defendant knew or by the exercise of reasonable care could have known of an unsafe condition, which would be unknown and unapparent to a business invitee using the roadway and failed to issue a warning of such unsafe condition, then you must find that the Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to see that its property was reasonably safe for use by its business invitees. We do not agree with Western Maryland's contention that since Western Maryland's duty to keep the roads clear of snow and ice was not even as great as that owed by a municipality, the charge imposed on the defendant a duty far in excess of the general rule, citing Weisner v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 245 Md. 225, 225 A.2d 648 (1967) and Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160 (1856). This argument has the flavor of the Massachusetts Rule as to the landlord's responsibility for the removal of snow and ice, Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357, 45 Am. Rep. 344 (1883); Spack v. Longwood Apts., Inc., 338 Mass. 518, 155 N.E.2d 873 (1959), onto which the municipality standard was engrafted in New York in Dwyer v. Woollard, 199 N.Y.S. 840 (1923). We rejected the Massachusetts Rule in Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 409-10, 199 A.2d 620 (1964) and adopted the Connecticut rule as applicable to accidents occurring on common approaches. A different standard is applied to municipalities, Weisner v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, supra, 245 Md. 225, 235, and to owners of property which abut on public sidewalks. New Highland Recreation, Inc. v. Fries, supra, 246 Md. 597; Dorsch v. S.S. Kresge Co., supra, 245 Md. 697; Restatement, Torts, supra, § 349. Nor do we agree that the court erred in refusing to delineate between an owner's responsibility with respect to large areas as contrasted with small areas, with respect to interior spaces as distinguished from roads, or between the maintenance of a roadway in a ship terminal and of a parking lot in a shopping center. As we see it, the court's charge, on balance, was a correct statement of the law, and under it, the jury could have, and probably did, take into consideration the very points which Western Maryland stresses. As we pointed out in Raff v. Acme Markets, Inc., supra, 247 Md. 591, 598, it was Western Maryland's duty not only to eliminate the obvious hazards, but to seek out and correct those not readily apparent. In Raff, we quoted with approval the statement of the Colorado Court in King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, 140 Colo. 119, 342 P.2d 1006 (1959): Our cases also recognize that the landowner, in discharging his duty to a business visitor, is obligated to exercise reasonable care to discover perils [citing cases]. This duty of discovery is not satisfied by the simple expedient seemingly followed here of ignoring the hazard. 342 P.2d at 1009 What we said in Raff is especially apposite here: In the circumstances here present, we think Acme [the landowner] was under an obligation to exercise reasonable care to discover the hazardous condition of the ramp. There can be little doubt that the condition of the ramp, at least as to the ice, existed when Acme's agents reported for duty on Saturday morning and that it remained virtually unchanged until Mrs. Raff fell. After a week of unseasonably cold weather (7 to 17 degrees below normal) and in light of the freezing temperatures then prevailing, reasonable care would seem to have required a cursory inspection, at least, of the `sidewalk' and the ramps. Even a knowing glance through the front door would have resulted in the discovery of snow on the ramp. If there had been no snow then the ice would have been visible. A little sand or salt could have mitigated and perhaps eliminated the hazardous condition. 247 Md. at 598 Western Maryland would have us hold that the standard of care with which a landowner is chargeable may vary with the use to which the property is put, citing Restatement, Torts, supra, § 343, Comment e:    [If a business invitee goes] into the factory itself, he is not entitled to expect that special preparation will be made for his safety, but is entitled to expect only such safety as he would find in a properly conducted factory. at 217 and Morrison v. Suburban Trust Co., 213 Md. 64, 130 A.2d 915 (1957) (Plaintiff fell over jack handle on floor of commercial garage); Elzey v. Boston Metals Co., 189 Md. 566, 56 A.2d 692 (1948) (Plaintiff, going through dark passage of ship being dismantled, fell through an open hatch); and Riganis v. Mottu, 156 Md. 340, 144 A. 355 (1929) (Plaintiff, inspecting lumber in a lumber yard, was injured when defective railing gave way). We are not prepared to say that such a principle can be invoked under the facts before us. It seems to us that when Western Maryland suggested that a road be used by its business invitees by posting a sign indicating that this was the way to Pier 9, and provided no pedestrian sidewalks, there is but one standard of care, as applicable to a road used as a pedestrian walkway in a sprawling terminal facility as it is to a shopping center or an apartment house driveway. Compare Raff v. Acme Markets, Inc., supra, 247 Md. 591 and Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, supra, 244 Md. 590 with Abraham v. Moler, supra , and Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund, supra, 234 Md. 402.