Opinion ID: 1669598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Plaintiff Will be Prejudiced

Text: The second factor that a trial court must consider in ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment is whether the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if it grants the motion. Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 606-07. This prejudice cannot take the form of mere delay or increased costs, because those can be remedied by imposing additional costs on the defendant if the plaintiff later prevails. 524 So.2d at 607. Rather, the prejudice must be substantial, facilitating fraud or collusion, resulting in the loss of evidence, or hindering discovery. 524 So.2d at 607. Although common sense dictates that a plaintiff is usually in a far better position to know what prejudice might befall him from the delay, and more importantly how substantial that prejudice would be, we have placed upon the defendant the initial burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff will not be substantially prejudiced. As we have stated: We hold that when a party files a motion to set aside a default judgment, the movant has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the plaintiff will not be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside. If the movant makes a prima facie showing that the plaintiff will not be unfairly prejudiced, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present facts showing that the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside. Phillips v. Randolph, 828 So.2d 269, 278 (Ala.2002). Additionally, a defendant cannot simply state that the plaintiff will not be prejudiced if the motion to set aside the default judgment is granted. Phillips, 828 So.2d at 275. However, this case is different from both Phillips and from Triple D Trucking, Inc. v. Tri Sands, Inc., 840 So.2d 869 (Ala.2002), the only other case discussing a defendant's burden in this regard. Here, unlike each of those cases, a hearing was held on the motion, and we have a transcript of this hearing before us. Triple D, 840 So.2d at 871 n. 3 (The record contains no transcript of the hearing....); Phillips, 828 So.2d at 272 (no hearing mentioned). At this hearing, counsel for Royal presented a host of facts indicating that Crowne would suffer no prejudice if the court granted Royal's motion. Specifically, Royal stated: [T]he contractor that did the work at the nursing home is still available. The experts, the engineers for both sides who are aware of the circumstances of deterioration and the use of this plywood in the sub-flooring are available. We have complete photo documentation of the condition of the flooring and the material that was taken out. The contractor that did the work for the nursing home is still available. His witnesses are still available and the records from which they would claim damages, such as this loss of profits that they contend that they have are just accounting records that exist in perpetuity. I can't believe that anything that existed in their corporate records in 2001 is not still available here today. Counsel for Crowne did not seem to contradict this notion, in fact stating his understanding of this Court's holdings in that regard, as follows: The aspect of the prejudice to the [plaintiff] basically has been gutted by our Supreme Court to say that just mere delay, going to cost you some more money, it doesn't matter. They don't believe justice delayed is justice denied. So we don't need to talk about that aspect of it. Because apparently it's been settled up there by the boys. We believe that Royal has sufficiently met its burden of making a prima facie showing that Crowne will not suffer substantial prejudice if the motion to set aside the default judgment is granted. Once the burden shifted, Crowne failed to present facts showing that it would be unfairly prejudiced if the motion to set aside the default judgment is granted. In fact, its argument on appeal focuses solely upon the notion that Royal did not meet its initial burden. We therefore hold that Royal has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate the second factor in our Kirtland analysisthat Crowne will not suffer unfair prejudice if the default judgment is set aside.