Opinion ID: 852075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Actual Prejudice vs. Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice.

Text: In concluding that Respondent had committed no misconduct, the hearing officer considered highly relevant his finding that the Commission made no showing that any of the criminal defendants suffered actual prejudice from the statements at issue. The rules at issue, however, do not require a finding that an otherwise improper statement cause actual prejudice to a criminal defendant or to an adjudicative proceeding. Rather, Rule 3.6(a) requires a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding, and Rule 3.8(f) requires a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused. (Emphasis added.) Even if the passage of time, preventative measures by the trial court, and other factors prevent actual prejudice from occurring in a particular case, it does not necessarily mean that a prosecutor's statements did not meet the substantial likelihood standard when made. In considering the propriety of a prosecutor's extra-judicial statement, the court determines the likelihood that a particular statement will cause prejudice at the time made, not whether, in hindsight, it actually worked to the detriment of a defendant. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 835 A.2d 548, 571 (2003). The following types of statements are rebuttably presumed to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding under Rule 3.6(d):  Statements concerning the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a suspect in a criminal investigation.  Statements concerning the performance or results of any examination or test or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented.  Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case.  The fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime unless there is included a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. Rule 3.6 applies to all attorneys, not just to prosecutors. See Matter of Litz, 721 N.E.2d 258 (Ind.1999) (defense attorney reprimanded for statements in letter published in newspapers). Rule 3.8(f) supplements Rule 3.6. . . . In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Prof. Cond. R. 3.8, cmt. [5]. A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Prof. Cond. R. 3.8, cmt. [1]. A prosecutor's opinion of guilt is particularly likely to create prejudice, given that his or her words carry the authority of the government and are especially persuasive in the public's eye. See Gansler, 835 A.2d at 572. Although we defer to the hearing officer's finding the Commission did not offer clear and convincing evidence that Respondent made the statements alleged in Count 1, for future guidance we note that a large part of alleged statements are of the type rebuttably presumed to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding under Rule 3.6(d). Regarding Count 2, we note that the press release did not include the required explanation that a charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and much of the undisputed statements Respondent made in the press release are also of the type rebuttably presumed to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. We find nothing in the record to rebut this presumption in this case.