Opinion ID: 2972845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Associational Discrimination under the ADA

Text: As the defendant points out, and as the plaintiff candidly admits, Title II (governing public services) of the ADA – unlike Title I (employment) and Title III (public accommodations) – does not contain an explicit provision prohibiting discrimination by association with a qualified person with a disability.2 One could argue, as the defendant 2 See Title I, in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), defining discrimination to include the “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association,” and the parallel Title III provision in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E), making it discriminatory to deny accommodations “to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.” -4- No. 04-3734 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court does here, that this difference in the plain language of the ADA titles reflects a deliberate choice by Congress not to permit an action under Title II for associational discrimination. If accepted, such an argument would foreclose standing to the plaintiff in this case. However, we have previously held that Title II does encompass a prohibition against associational discrimination, adopting the Second Circuit’s analysis in Innovative Health Systems, Inc., v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 46-48 (2d Cir. 1997). In Innovative Health Systems, the Second Circuit noted the absence of an express prohibition in Title II’s definition and discrimination sections but gave a broad reading to Title II’s enforcement provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12133, which extends relief to “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.” (Emphasis added.) The Second Circuit also noted the existence of regulations implementing Title II, one of which provides that “[a] public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g). That regulation, the court pointed out, was intended to incorporate “the prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of association from Titles I and III.” Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 47, citing H.R.Rep. No. 485(III) at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 474. We applied the reasoning of Innovative Health Systems to a similar fact situation in MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2002). In both cases, a drug rehabilitation center was denied a zoning permit and brought suit under Title II of the ADA, -5- No. 04-3734 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court claiming a denial of rights based on association with qualified individuals with a disability, i.e., recovering drug addicts. In both cases, the reviewing courts found standing to sue on the basis of the plaintiff’s association with disabled persons. Our opinion in MX Group is inapplicable to the facts in this case, however, and the plaintiff’s reliance on it to establish her standing to sue in this action is misplaced. Unlike the treatment centers in Innovative Health Systems and MX Group, both of which were denied permits to operate, Lauren Popovich has not been denied access to or participation in any of the public services covered by Title II. In other words, Lauren Popovich – although allegedly deprived of her father’s companionship because of delays in her custody case – has not suffered an “ADA injury.” It was for this reason that the district court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish standing under Title II, given the fact that her association with her father did not result in her exclusion from the custody proceedings. The trial judge also noted that the complaint filed in this case alleged that Lauren had been denied her father’s companionship for five years not as a result of the proceedings in the custody case – indeed, there is no indication in the complaint concerning the outcome of the custody dispute. Instead, the complaint alleges that Lauren was removed from father’s home as the result of the protective order issued in a separate case and based on allegations of domestic violence committed against the plaintiff’s mother. The complaint further alleges that it was this protective order that prevented the plaintiff from seeing her father for some five years. And although Lauren Popovich echoes her father’s criticism that -6- No. 04-3734 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court it was “unfair” to issue the protective order in an ex parte proceeding and later to renew it over Joseph Popovich’s objection, there is no claim that the issuance or enforcement of the protective order violated the ADA in any respect. Hence, there is no causal connection shown on the face of the complaint between the discrimination allegedly suffered by Joseph Popovich and the injury alleged by his daughter. B. Associational Discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act Although the plaintiff purported to appeal the district court’s ruling on her standing under the Rehabilitation Act, she did not discuss that decision in her brief before this court and, thus, appears to have abandoned her appeal of this issue. We nevertheless note that the district court incorrectly concluded that the Rehabilitation Act does not have an associational discrimination component. In fact, just as Title II of the ADA extends relief to “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 1233, the Rehabilitation Act’s remedies are available to “any person aggrieved” by discrimination based on disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). As a result, we noted in MX Group that associational discrimination claims are viable under the Rehabilitation Act, just as they are under the ADA. See MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d at 332; see also Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997) (because “standards under both of the acts are largely the same, cases construing one statute are instructive in construing the other”); Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d -7- No. 04-3734 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress has instructed that both acts are to be interpreted consistently).