Opinion ID: 789142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Coordination of Efforts.

Text: 102 The Department of Public Safety, the Department of Parks, Recreation and Conservation and any other appropriate County Department shall work together in order to properly administer and effectuate the provisions of this Executive Order, including but not limited to, coordinating with state and local law enforcement agencies to review the databases, as allowable under the law, that will assist in identifying known sexual offenders. 103 Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003, WHEREAS clauses 1-4, §§ I-III, VI, VIII (emphases added). 104 Hobbs attacked all of the provisions of the Executive Order. He challenged § VI as unconstitutionally vague, unconstitutional as applied to him, and violative of both the First Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. He also argued that the second paragraph of § VI (¶ 2 or the Prohibition) lacks adequate procedural protections to prevent an erroneous deprivation of rights. 105 The district court heard argument on Hobbs's challenges to the constitutionality of Executive Order 3-2003. It also conducted evidentiary hearings as to, inter alia, the extent of the public forum areas within Playland and the damages suffered by Hobbs as a result of defendants' initial denials of a permit to Hobbs based solely on County laws that Hobbs I ruled unconstitutional. 106 G. The Final Decision of the District Court: Hobbs II 107 In an Opinion and Order dated August 13, 2003, the district court struck down § III of the Executive Order, which limited the public areas available for expressive activity by creating Designated Permit Zones, see Hobbs v. County of Westchester, 2003 WL 21919882, at - (S.D.N.Y. Aug.13, 2003) ( Hobbs II ). The court upheld § VI, ¶ 2, however, stating that [a]lthough Executive Order No. 3-2003 cannot stand consistently with the constitutional requirements stated in Hobbs I, the second paragraph of § VI can nevertheless be severed and enforced, see id. at . 108 First, the court held that ¶ 2 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause: 109 Such a provision does not impose retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto clause, provided that it is civil and non-punitive.... 110 In making that determination, the first place to look is to the County's stated intent, [ Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-93, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 1147, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003)], which clearly is to prevent an unreasonable risk to the safety and welfare of children. Executive Order No. 3-2003, § VI, ¶ 2. Like in Smith and in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislation sought to create anything other than a civil... scheme designed to protect the public from harm. Smith, [538] U.S. at [93], 123 S.Ct. at 1147. Nor has Plaintiff suggested that the ordinance has any purpose other than to keep Mr. Hobbs, and anyone else who has been convicted of sexual abuse of children, from performing an act in which they seek to interact with children in a County owned park. 111 In addition, in evaluating the constitutionality of the Prohibition, the Court must look to its effects in terms of whether, in its necessary operation, the restriction has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose. Smith v. Doe, [538] U.S. at [97], 123 S.Ct. at 1149. The Court concludes that with respect to all of these criteria, the provision clearly is civil and regulatory, rather than criminal. 112 Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at  (footnote omitted). 113 In contrast, the court concluded that ¶ 2 implicates First Amendment rights and is a content-based restriction on speech: 114 The second paragraph of § VI states that no permit will be granted to a person who has been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor if the performance ... would entice a child to congregate around that person. This blanket suppression of an entire type of speech is a content-discriminating act. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir.1999), aff'd, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002). 115 Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at  n. 6. However, the court held that the Prohibition is not unconstitutional because it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest: 116 There can be no question that protecting children from sexual predators constitutes a compelling state interest. Smith v. Doe, [538] U.S. at [103-04], 123 S.Ct. at 1153. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3355, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.). Moreover, the fact that the Prohibition creates a lifetime ban is reasonable in light of the recognition in the cases that [t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is `frightening and high,['] and that `contrary to conventional wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur within the first several years after release,' but may occur `as late as 20 years following release.['] Smith v. Doe, [538] U.S. at [103-04], 123 S.Ct. at 1153. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court stated in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 & n. 3, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2081 n. 3, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), when a legislature `undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.['] 117 The second paragraph of § VI also is narrowly tailored to target and eliminate no more than the exact source of the `evil' it seeks to remedy. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2503, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988); Dae Woo Kim v. City of New York, 774 F.Supp. 164, 170 [(S.D.N.Y.1991)]. The Prohibition meets this standard because it applies, by its terms, only to individuals who have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, and specifically prohibits only solicitation, performance, demonstration or other similar activity [that] would entice a child to congregate around that person. (emphasis added). Thus, consistently with this Order, even a convicted pedophile is free to go to Playland Park, or any other Westchester County park, to distribute leaflets or speak publicly regarding matters of personal or public concern, provided his activities and speech are oriented toward adults and are not of a nature that would be likely to entice a child to congregate around him. 118 Finally, as required by Turner v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2470, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994), the Executive Order can, in fact, be expected to alleviate the harm at which it is aimed in a direct and material way. The County's zero tolerance policy surely will prevent performances of the type it seeks to prohibit. 119 Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at - (emphasis in original). 120 The court concluded that any requirement of procedural due process would be satisfied by New York's ordinary civil remedies: 121 As stated in the December 23, 2002 Order [ Hobbs I ], such a provision also must offer procedural safeguards to Plaintiff and others who are denied the opportunity to perform at Playland pursuant to a county regulation enacted to protect children from pedophiles. Although the Executive Order contains no appeal procedure, Defendants' counsel represented to the Court at oral argument that review of an allegedly arbitrary and capricious decision regarding enforcement of this Prohibition, made without a reasonable basis in fact, would be subject to review pursuant to the provisions of New York CPLR Article 78. The availability of such a mechanism for appeal is adequate to satisfy this requirement. 122 Id. at . 123 Finally, the court concluded that ¶ 2 is not impermissibly vague: 124 [A]s the Supreme Court stated in Grayned[ v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)], [c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. at 2300. Moreover, it is a general rule of statutory construction that, absent a definition in the statute, courts construe words in their plain and ordinary sense. Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1042 (7th Cir.2002). Applying this rule, the Court finds that the challenged language makes sufficiently clear that it prohibits all child-oriented performances, and thus satisfies the rule stated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), that all that is required is that the language convey[] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. Any possible over breadth or over definition by County officials of the entice a child provision can be cured through case-by-case analysis and review. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,[]773-74, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3363-64, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). 125 Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at  (footnote omitted). 126 However, the court found that prior to the issuance of Executive Order 3-2003, and nearly two years before they learned of Hobbs's criminal history, defendants had denied Hobbs's application for a permit to perform his act at Playland without any investigation and without offering any alternative venue, solely on the basis of Westchester County regulations that have been held unconstitutional.... Therefore, Mr. Montalto's denial of Mr. Hobbs' request cannot be justified by those convictions. Id. at . The court concluded that Hobbs was entitled to damages for Defendants' violation of his constitutional rights, id., based on an estimate of moneys he would have received if he had actually busked at Playland, see id. at . 127 Judgment was entered awarding Hobbs $2,500 in compensatory damages, but ruling that Montalto, in his individual capacity, was entitled to qualified immunity. The court explicitly denied Hobbs's request for punitive damages and implicitly denied his requests for other relief; and the case was closed. H. The Scope of the Present Appeal 128 On this appeal, Hobbs challenges so much of the judgment as upheld the constitutionality of § VI, ¶ 2, of Executive Order 3-2003. Although his notice of appeal also stated that he was appealing from the ruling that upheld the County's ban on public speech within specified non-public areas within Playland (Hobbs Notice of Appeal dated September 11, 2003 (emphasis added)), his brief on appeal contains no argument as to why that ruling was incorrect. Accordingly, we regard that challenge as abandoned. See generally Otero v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 297 F.3d 142, 144 (2d Cir.2002); Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d 75, 76 (2d Cir.1990); Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9). 129 Defendants have not cross-appealed to challenge any of the district court's rulings that were adverse to them.