Opinion ID: 1937428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Olson's Absence From Segments Of His Habitual Offender Proceedings.

Text: Olson's last argument, that there was no final disposition at all because the trial court did not, in his presence, pronounce him guilty as an habitual offender, and that he was not present when transcripts were received by the court, do not merit reversal. SDCL 23A-39-1 provides: A defendant shall be present at his arraignment, at the time of his plea, at every stage of his trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as provided by SDCL §§ 23A-39-2 and 23A-39-3. We first observe that a defendant's right to be present at return of the verdict, referenced in SDCL 23A-39-1, applies only to jury trials. See, Davis v. State, 416 So.2d 444 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) and Bailey v. State, 419 A.2d 925 (Del.1980). Secondly, Olson's absence when the trial court received these transcripts of his prior plea hearings created no prejudice. He could not confront cold, dead transcripts from court records. As the United States Supreme Court has observed: Respondent argues that his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by his exclusion from the competency hearing. The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due process right to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. (citation omitted). Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow, (citation omitted) due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be present to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, (citation omitted). Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631, 647 (1987). These transcripts were accepted by the trial court taking judicial notice of prior criminal proceedings. No real prejudice is apparent here. Constitutional error which could not affect the outcome can be deemed harmless. Miller, at 36. Importantly, the lack of prejudice is reflected in Olson's objections to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, which only asserted a lack of factual basis for plea, not constitutional issues. Reversal is not warranted on this point. Affirmed.