Opinion ID: 2275002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: J.'s Testimony

Text: On appeal, Kelley argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting S.J.'s testimony because it was offered by the State solely to prove Kelley's propensity to engage in deviate sexual activity with children. However, in his reply brief, Kelley concedes that S.J.'s testimony was properly admitted pursuant to the pedophile exception to Rule 404(b). We hold that the testimony was properly admitted. S.J.'s testimony at trial established a sufficient degree of similarity between the acts he alleged and the conduct with which Kelley was charged in the present case. First, both S.J. and M.M. testified to forced masturbation and oral sex. Moreover, both testified that Kelley showed them pornographic videos. This court has suggested that when the sexual acts alleged are identical, there is at least some evidence of a connection between the two allegations demonstrating a depraved sexual instinct. See, e.g., Lamb v. State, 372 Ark. 277, 284, 275 S.W.3d 144, 150(2008). In addition, both S.J. and M.M. were twelve-to fourteen-year-old males at the time of the alleged abuse. This court has consistently considered similarities in age and gender of victims to be demonstrative of a depraved sexual instinct, such that the pedophile exception is applicable. See, e.g., Hamm v. State, 365 Ark. 647, 653, 232 S.W.3d 463, 469 (2006); Flanery v. State, 362 Ark. 311, 315, 208 S.W.3d 187, 190 (2005); Hernandez v. State, 331 Ark. 301, 308, 962 S.W.2d 756, 760 (1998). The trial testimony of S.J. and M.M. also revealed several similarities in Kelley's pattern of alleged abuse. Specifically, both boys testified that Kelley entered their lives as a friend of the family, eventually becoming close to them individually. He took both boys on outings, such as to eat dinner, see movies, or go bowling, and purchased various gifts for both boys, including cellular telephones. Finally, both S.J. and M.M. testified that, after the termination of their contact with Kelley, he called them numerous times. Such patterns of behavior are probative on the issue of an accused's deviate sexual instincts. In Hamm v. State , for example, the similarities between the two victims' allegations included the following: both children were female, both were nine years old when the abuse began, both met the appellant at church, both were under his supervision at church, both were frequently invited to his home, both were at times sitting on him when the abuse occurred, both reported abuse while home alone with him, and the appellant was not related to either of them. 365 Ark. at 653, 232 S.W.3d at 469. This court held that, in view of these numerous similarities, the circuit court had not abused its discretion in admitting the witness's testimony. Id. Similarly, in Flanery v. State , we noted that the specific sexual acts complained of were not identical; however, the victim and the witness were similar in age when the abuse happened, both were living in the appellant's home and looked on him as a father figure, and, in both situations, the appellant tried to rationalize his behavior. 362 Ark. at 315, 208 S.W.3d at 190. These similarities were deemed sufficient for the application of the pedophile exception. Id. In the instant case, the similarities in Kelley's conduct toward S.J. and M.M., both before and after the abuse, demonstrate his depraved sexual instincts and his proclivity for deviate sexual activity with pubescent boys whom he has befriended. In addition to establishing a sufficient degree of similarity with M.M.'s allegations, S.J.'s testimony also demonstrated the requisite intimate relationship between him and Kelley. In discussing the type of relationship required for the application of the pedophile exception, this court has stated as follows: We have noted that the misnomer, intimate relationship, does not necessarily require that the child live in the home of the accused. We have defined an intimate relationship, for lack of a better phrase, as close in friendship or acquaintance, familiar, near, or confidential. We have admitted the testimony of a child living in the same household or staying as an overnight guest in the perpetrator's home. We further have admitted evidence against a perpetrator who babysat a child, or who gained access to the child. Parish v. State, 357 Ark. 260, 270, 163 S.W.3d 843, 849 (2004) (internal citations omitted). This court has furthermore adopted the position that a relationship is sufficient to trigger the pedophile exception if the sexual abuse occurs when the victim is in the perpetrator's care or under his authority. Berger v. State, 343 Ark. 413, 420, 36 S.W.3d 286, 290 (2001). Here, S.J., like M.M., was in Kelley's care at the time of the alleged abuse. S.J. testified that the abuse occurred in Kelley's home after Kelley had taken him on outings. He further stated that Kelley's role in his life was that of a stepfather figure in the beginning and that he had lived with Kelley at various times. His testimony clearly established that his relationship with Kelley was close in friendship or acquaintance, familiar, near, or confidential. Parish v. State, 357 Ark. at 270, 163 S.W.3d at 849. For these reasons, we conclude that S.J.'s testimony was properly admitted in accordance with the pedophile exception. In addition, we have noted that if evidence of past behavior is not admissible under the pedophile exception, it is still admissible if it is independently relevant to prove motive, intent, preparation, or plan. Hamm v. State, 365 Ark. at 658, 232 S.W.3d at 472. We stated in Hamm that testimony about the appellant's prior bad act was relevant to show the appellant's plan to meet children at church, to invite them back to his home, to keep them returning by offering them treats and entertainment, then to proceed to molest them. Id. Likewise, S.J.'s testimony was relevant to show Kelley's plan to meet young boys by befriending their families, to gain the boys' trust and keep them close by taking them on outings and buying them gifts, to show them pornographic videos, and then to force them to engage in masturbation and oral sex. Because S.J.'s testimony was admissible under both the pedophile exception and the rule-based exceptions to Rule 404(b), we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it. [1]