Opinion ID: 2752196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Maes

Text: 13 Perhaps more crucially, both Officer Maes and Officer Elder are entitled to qualified immunity because there was probable cause to support Sperry’s arrest. Sperry argues on appeal that Maes did not have probable cause because Maes made material misstatements in and omissions from his arrest affidavit regarding Sperry’s cognitive disability and capacity to have the mens rea for theft. On the issue of false statements within or omitted information from arrest affidavits, this court has stated: Where false statements have been included in an arrest warrant affidavit, the existence of probable cause is determined by setting aside the false information and reviewing the remaining contents of the affidavit. In a case involving information omitted from an affidavit, the existence of probable cause is determined by examining the affidavit as if the omitted information had been included and inquiring if the affidavit would still have given rise to probable cause for the warrant. Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Federal law requires that Maes knowingly or recklessly made a false statement. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. The only statements in the arrest affidavit that Sperry points to as false are (1) Maes’ characterization that Mark Bigler of H&R Block stated Sperry “must have” provided a pre-authorization code to the gas station attendants and (2) Maes’ statement that Sperry “somehow obtained a pre-authorization code.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 322-23. Given that Porter stated that Sperry “scammed” the gas station employees and repeatedly used the same “1932” code to override the system, and that Porter represented himself as someone who knew the company’s credit card system well, Maes’ statements 14 in the arrest affidavit were plausible, non-reckless characterizations of the information he gleaned from his investigation. Id. at 78. Thus, it is questionable whether this information could be considered knowingly false, but even construing it in that light, it is not material. “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (parentheticals in original). Setting aside the two challenged statements, the arrest affidavit offers ample evidence to indicate Sperry had engaged in theft, including but not limited to the high number of transactions in a relatively brief period of time, the consistency of the encounters, the victim statements, the statement from Bigler that Sperry should not have been able to spend more than his refund with the card, and that Sperry never returned to the gas station after the clerk who first checked with the bank told Sperry that the card had no money on it. Moreover, all of the district attorneys who provided affidavits indicated their own assessments of probable cause were based on the totality of the circumstances, not just the use of a pre-authorization code. Thus, the statements in question are not material to the probable cause determination. Maes’ alleged omission is a slightly more challenging question. However, even considering the record in the light most favorable to Sperry, there is no evidence that 15 Maes knew Sperry was incapable of understanding a bank account. It is also not clear that an officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s unspecified cognitive disability would negate probable cause. We have found no case standing for the proposition that an officer must take a suspect’s potential mental disability into account in determining probable cause.8 Even someone who cannot manage his finances is capable of forming the mens rea for theft, and Sperry’s repeated use of the debit card at the very least indicated that Sperry understood that the card represented money and that he was receiving goods and services by using it. While it is possible that Maes could have uncovered Sperry’s alleged inability to maintain his finances prior to requesting an arrest warrant, a police officer who has reasonably concluded that probable cause exists to arrest a suspect is not required to further investigate all possible defenses or claims of innocence. See Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1995). As one circuit court noted, “the practical restraints on police in the field are greater with respect to ascertaining intent and, therefore, the latitude accorded to officers considering the probable cause issue in the context of mens rea crimes must be correspondingly great.” Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2004). All the evidence Maes uncovered in his investigation pointed to probable cause 8 This lack of cases also indicates an omission of this kind is not “clearly established” as a constitutional violation for purposes of qualified immunity. Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th Cir. 2011) (requiring the well-defined right be established “beyond debate” based on existing Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent or a significant number of cases from outside the circuit). See also Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2007). 16 that Sperry intentionally committed theft, and Maes was not required to investigate the extent of Sperry’s cognitive disability to negate that. To the extent Maes omitted information about Sperry potentially having a cognitive disability, it is therefore not material. Thus, the existence of probable cause defeats Sperry’s claims that Officers Maes and Elder violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With no constitutional violations at issue, both officers are entitled to qualified immunity. As for the remaining claim against the town, the district court correctly concluded that because the malicious prosecution claims against Elder and Maes fail, any resulting municipal liability for the Town of Castle Rock also fails. Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 239 F.3d 1150, 1154-56 (10th Cir. 2001). B. ADA claim Sperry argues this court’s decision in Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 1999), supports his claim that the Castle Rock police wrongfully arrested him after misperceiving his disability as unlawful conduct. There, this court confirmed that the test to apply in evaluating an ADA claim against police officers under Title II9 requires a plaintiff prove: (1) that he [or she] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he [or she] was either excluded from participation in or 9 The statutory language reads: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 17 denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1219, quoting Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849 F. Supp. 1429, 1439 (D. Kan. 1994). In Gohier, we discussed, but did not expressly adopt, two theories regarding police accommodation of disabilities that other courts had proposed as circumstances in which an individual may demonstrate they were denied the benefit of police services due to their disability. The first is that police wrongly arrested someone with a disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity. The second is that, while police properly investigated and arrested a person with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they failed to reasonably accommodate the person’s disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees. Id. at 1220-21 (citations omitted). We need not go further here than we did in Gohier in discussing these theories because Sperry has failed to meet the first prong of the test, which requires him to demonstrate that he is a “qualified individual with a disability.” The ADA requires that a person establish that he has or is regarded as having “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). In particular, we have held that the “substantially limits” portion of a disability claim must 18 indicate how a person’s disability affects him as “compared to the average person in the general population” and that “courts must take into account: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long term impact resulting from the impairment.” Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In this case, there is not sufficient evidence in the record regarding Sperry’s impairment such that we could adequately conduct this analysis, nor is Sperry’s disability so obvious from the facts that we may assume it substantially limits a major life activity. The extent to which Sperry pleaded his disability include statements in his Third Amended Complaint that “The United States Social Security Administration has classified Mr. Sperry as a person with a mental disability (mild retardation),” and “Mr. Sperry is a disabled person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 & 12102 and C.R.S. §§27-10.5-101 &102 [sic].” Aplt. App. at 177, 194. Of the evidence that appears to have been available to the district court in the motion for summary judgment, only the affidavit of a family friend provides any additional insight into Sperry’s disability.10 Adam Devone stated in the affidavit that “Todd is mentally challenged, has trouble reading and adding simple numbers. Todd receives federal funds from the Social Security Administration as a mentally disabled person. Todd’s disability is evident to the 10 On appeal, Sperry provides further documentation of his disability from the Social Security Administration, but such evidence does not appear to have been before the district court. Aplt. App. at 283-91. “In reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, we will not consider evidence that was not before the district court.” Wilburn v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003). 19 average person, because of the way he talks and acts.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 415. Such broad, bare assertions do not establish that Sperry is a qualified individual with a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Even if this court could assume that Sperry is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, there is similarly insufficient evidence that the Castle Rock police officers knew about his disability to the extent of knowing that they must provide an accommodation. “Before a public entity can be required under the ADA to provide a disabled individual an auxiliary aid or service, a public entity must have knowledge of the individual’s disability and the individual’s need for an accommodation.” Robertson v. Las Animas Sheriff’s Dept., 500 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). As discussed above, the evidence in the record shows that Castle Rock police officers had, at best, only some knowledge that Sperry had an unspecified cognitive disability or emotional disorder. In the context of police investigations, such an amorphous level of knowledge does not impose on police officers the duty to further investigate the extent of a suspect’s disability, particularly when all of the evidence uncovered indicates the suspect’s behavior was intentional. Thus, we decline to apply either theory of ADA liability for police officers discussed in Gohier. With regard to Sperry’s failure-to-train claim, it must be noted that Gohier only briefly noted the possibility of such a claim. 186 F.3d at 1222 (“Gohier might have argued that Title II required Colorado Springs to better train its police officers to recognize reported disturbances that are likely to involve persons with mental 20 disabilities, and to investigate and arrest such persons in a manner reasonably accommodating their disability”). Nonetheless, we do not have to determine whether such a claim exists because, even assuming it does, Sperry has not demonstrated the “deliberate indifference” required to prove a failure-to-train claim by showing that the Town of Castle Rock was “on notice” of the need for “more or different training.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 397 (1989). Given the dearth of case law on police investigations of people with cognitive disabilities, much less claims against this town in particular, Castle Rock can hardly be considered to have had such notice. Moreover, Sperry does not address what type of training police could or should be required to undergo to better recognize and consider mental disabilities when conducting investigations. The only training that Sperry points to as being available is crisis intervention training, which pertains to police interactions with mentally ill suspects in high-intensity situations, not routine criminal investigations. Thus, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Sperry’s ADA claims against Maes, Elder, and the Town of Castle Rock must also fail.