Opinion ID: 1655639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the circuit court erred in awarding attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to the litigation accountability act against aussenberg.

Text: ¶ 69. The majority asserts that the lower court was correct in awarding attorney's fees against Aussenberg based on the filing of the Third Amended Complaint, stating that these fees are justified because the complaint is without substantial justification and that the sanctions should be assessed against Aussenberg pursuant to the Litigation Accountability Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-55-7. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-55-3(a) (Supp.2000), defines without substantial justification as being frivolous, groundless in fact or in law. To determine whether a cause of action is frivolous pursuant to the statute, this Court must look to the definition of frivolous as found in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11. M.R.C.P. 11 states when an attorney signs a pleading or a motion, this constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading or motion; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. (M.R.C.P. 11, West 2000). For purposes of Rule 11, a claim is frivolous only when the pleader or movant has no hope of success for his claim. Scruggs v. Saterfiel, 693 So.2d 924, 927 (Miss.1997) (citing Stevens v. Lake 615 So.2d 1177, 1184 (Miss.1993)) (quoting Tricon Metals & Servs., Inc. v. Topp, 537 So.2d 1331, 1335 (Miss.1989); Smith v. Malouf, 597 So.2d 1299, 1303 (Miss.1992) (applying Rule 11 definition to Litigation Accountability Act context)). A case may be weak or light-headed, but that does not necessarily make it frivolous. Scruggs, 693 So.2d at 927 (citing Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Deakle, 661 So.2d 188, 195 (Miss.1995); Nichols v. Munn, 565 So.2d 1132, 1137 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 71. In this case, the lower court in its Order, dated January 5, 1999, found that the cause of action stated in the Third Amended Complaint was filed without substantial justification, and ordered attorney's fees on behalf of Wittjen assessed against Wyssbrod and Aussenberg, jointly and severally. In it subsequent Order dated February 23, 1999, the lower court determined the monetary amounts of litigation expenses, following an evidentiary hearing held on January 19, 1999. The February Order stated Wyssbrod and Aussenberg were jointly and severally liable to Wittjen for his attorney's fees. [3] The lower court also stated in this February Order, that the Third Amended Complaint filed by Wyssbrod on June 10, 1996, had been allowed per order of the court dated April 23, 1996, to allow the parties to correctly identify the plaintiffs. [4] It is also important to note that Aussenberg never signed this Third Amended Complaint, but it was signed by Wyssbrod's local counsel, Omar Craig. Craig was not sanctioned by the lower court to pay for any litigation expenses, [5] yet he was the attorney who signed the complaint in question, the Third Amended Complaint. It is not possible for the court to sanction Aussenberg, an attorney for Wyssbrod who was dismissed from this case by order of the lower court dated February 18, 1997, and not to sanction Wyssbrod's acting attorney in the action, Omar Craig, who actually signed the complaint in question. ¶ 72. Aussenberg did not file the Third Amended Complaint; and therefore, he cannot be liable for attorney's fees for Wittjen and First State Bank based on the frivolousness of this complaint. Aussenberg even stated in his deposition that he had not even seen the Third Amended Complaint, and he did not know the parties listed on that complaint. The July 8, 1999, judgment of the lower court, listing the amount of attorney's fees Wittjen is entitled to does not provide an itemization of these fees and does not indicate which fees were accrued at various dates in this trial, which began with the first complaint being filed on June 19, 1995. Although in the record, there is included a transcript of the January 19, 1999 evidentiary hearing to determine attorney's fees, and there is a list of several affidavits filed by attorneys included in the certified docket pages of the record, there is only one affidavit found in the record pertaining to relevant attorney's fees. This affidavit was filed by William P. Myers on July 8, 1999. There is also an affidavit filed by Martin Aussenberg and one filed by a paralegal, but these do not indicate an itemization of relevant attorney's fees. There are no affidavits in the record filed with this Court that itemize relevant attorney's fees. It appears that these affidavits may have been filed with the circuit court, and this is alluded to in the evidentiary hearing. However, this Court has no way of knowing which fees were assessed prior to the filing of this Third Amended Complaint. This lack of information in the record provides another basis that Aussenberg should not be held liable for Wittjen's attorney's fees. There is no itemization of the fees, and therefore, no way of knowing which fees accrued when Aussenberg was still involved in the case. Since he did not file the Third Amended Complaint, and there are no affidavits or itemization of these fees, Aussenberg should not have to pay these attorney's fees. The circuit court erred by assessing these fees against Aussenberg. ¶ 73. In addition, the bankruptcy decree dated April 4, 1998, and signed by all the parties dismissed all claims against QPI. The bankruptcy dismissal dismissed all claims against QPI, and since Aussenberg was representing the debtor in bankruptcy, claims against him are also dismissed.