Opinion ID: 2594521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The failure to give Honeycutt's consent instruction

Text: It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to an adequate instruction on the defense theory of the case, no matter how weak or incredible the evidence supporting the theory may appear to be. [12] Recognizing this, the majority states that Honeycutt's proposed instruction on reasonable mistaken belief of consent must be given as long as there is evidence to support this theory. However, the majority concludes that the district court did not err in refusing Honeycutt's proposed instruction because it was an incomplete statement of the law which, according to the majority, equates to an incorrect statement of the law. I believe that the majority's conclusion, which basically requires a perfect instruction, is inconsistent with the underlying policy entitling a defendant to an instruction on the defense theory of the case. We have required that the defendant's proposed instruction on the defense theory of the case must correctly state the law. [13] However, we have not required a perfect instruction. Such a requirement is inconsistent with our policy that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case even if the evidence supporting his theory is weak or slight. If the proposed instruction is poorly drafted, a district court has an affirmative obligation to cooperate with the defendant to correct the proposed instruction or to incorporate the substance of such an instruction in one drafted by the court. [14] Indeed, the Court of Appeals of Mississippi has stated: [T]he trial court cannot simply reject the poorly-drafted instruction, thus depriving the defendant of his defense, but the court has the duty to make reasonable modifications of the requested instruction or, at the very least, to point out to [the defendant] wherein it may have been deficient and allow reasonable opportunity for correction. [15] Here, Honeycutt's proposed instruction placed the district court on notice regarding the issue of reasonable mistaken belief of consent. [16] In addition, Honeycutt provided the district court with the legal authority in support of giving the instruction. The majority notes that Honeycutt omitted the bracketed portion of the proposed instruction, which was based on instruction 10.65 from the California Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases (CALJIC). In support of its conclusion that Honeycutt's proposed instruction was incomplete, and therefore an incorrect statement of the law, the majority cites to the comment to CALJIC 10.65. However, the comment does not require that the bracketed part be included when there is conflicting evidence, but instead suggests that it should be utilized in situations where there is conflicting evidence on the issue of consent. Because the bracketed part of CALJIC 10.65 is not required, I conclude that Honeycutt's proposed instruction was not an incomplete statement of the law and more significantly, I conclude that Honeycutt's omission does not equate to an incorrect statement of the law. Even assuming that Honeycutt's proposed instruction was technically deficient in form, it was substantially correct. Honeycutt should be provided the opportunity to make any corrections to his proposed instruction, and not simply rejected based on an omitted portion, which is not required. Accordingly, I conclude that the district court's refusal to give Honeycutt's proposed instruction was erroneous, and thus reversal is mandated.