Opinion ID: 2367661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: We Adopt the Strickland Standard

Text: Courts that recognize a right to the effective assistance of counsel in a proceeding to terminate parental rights by and large have applied one of two standards; some have chosen the fundamental fairness standard articulated in State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Geist, 310 Or. 176, 796 P.2d 1193 (1990), but most have adapted the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Calkins, supra note 4, at 212-28 (surveying decisions); see also, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (seeing no reason not to apply [the Strickland test ] in our civil parental-rights termination proceedings.); In re E.H., 880 P.2d at 13 (applying Strickland in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings). The parties to this appeal have expressed a preference for the Strickland standard, which is well-known to the courts of this jurisdiction, and we think this is a sensible recommendation. Strickland is clear, familiar to lawyers and judges, and carries with it a developed body of case law.... New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 929 A.2d 1034, 1038 (2007). We therefore adopt Strickland, recognizing that this standard developed in criminal law will have to be tailored in some respects when used to judge the effectiveness of appointed counsel in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. We will not attempt to summarize our volumes of case law applying Strickland. Nevertheless, we reiterate that a claim of ineffective assistance has two components. First, the [parent] must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed by the statute. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To satisfy the second prong-demonstrating prejudice-the parent must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [him or her] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. In other words, the parent must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. However, it bears repeating that the parent is not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the errors of counsel... determined the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In assessing counsel's performance, it will be instructive to consult the Standards of Practice for CCAN Appointments developed by the Superior Court, but we caution that [t]hese basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [7] We emphasize, moreover, that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, [and] ... a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... Id. Furthermore, when examining a claim of prejudice, a reviewing court must never lose sight of the principle that governs in this context-the best interest of the child. See Wilkins v. Ferguson, 928 A.2d 655, 667 (D.C.2007) (As our cases have emphasized, `in all proceedings affecting the future of a minor, the decisive consideration is the best interests of the child ....') (citation omitted). We have recognized that it is generally contrary to a child's best interest `to take a child out of a loving home, when she ha[s] lived at that home for a substantial period of time as a result of her biological parents' inability or unwillingness to care for her.' In re An.C., 722 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1998) (quoting In re Application of L.L., 653 A.2d 873, 883 (D.C.1995)).