Opinion ID: 2167302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Framework of the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act.

Text: In enacting the DCWPA, the Council found that the public interest is served when employees of the District government are free to report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violations of law, or threats to public health or safety without fear of retaliation or reprisal. D.C.Code § 1-615.51 (2001). [3] To that end, the DCWPA prohibits a supervisor from threaten[ing] to take or tak[ing] a prohibited personnel action or otherwise retaliat[ing] against an employee because of an employee's protected disclosure or because of an employee's refusal to comply with an illegal order. D.C.Code § 1-615.53. The Act defines a prohibited personnel action to include a list of various actions adverse to an employee, such as termination, demotion, or suspension. See D.C.Code § 1-615.52(5). Here, the allegation was that the appellant's supervisor took a prohibited personnel action against him for making a protected disclosure. One of several means of redress available to an employee whose supervisor has taken a prohibited personnel action is a civil lawsuit, the means that the appellant chose here. [4] See D.C.Code § 1-615.54. Section 1-615.54(a) provides various remedies for an employee who can show that he or she has been harmed due to violation of the DCWPA, including compensatory damages, injunctive relief, reinstatement and reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The Act also provides that [a]s part of the relief ordered in [a] judicial proceeding, a supervisor found to have violated § 1-615.53 [by taking a `prohibited personnel action'] shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action including dismissal and shall be subject to a civil fine not to exceed $1000. D.C.Code § 1-615.55(a), (b). Section 1-615.54(b) of the Act lays out the shifting burden of proof that must be met to prevail in a civil lawsuit. It provides: In a civil action . . . once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity proscribed by § 1-615.53 [5] was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited personnel action against an employee, the burden of proof shall be on the employing District agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities protected by this section. (emphasis added). Thus, after a plaintiff makes a prima facie case that his protected disclosure was a contributing factor in his dismissal, the burden shifts to the defendant to show by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff's dismissal would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if he had not engaged in activities protected under the Act. The most obvious reading of this provision would appear to be that if the jury finds that those legitimate and independent reasons exist, a plaintiff is barred from relief in the civil action. The appellant, however, argues against that position, interpreting the statute differently. Thus, we proceed to examine the statute as a whole. [6]