Opinion ID: 3046794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The June Waiver Was Intelligently Executed

Text: and is Valid We have not before addressed whether the government has the burden of proving the validity of a written waiver in an immigration proceeding or whether the burden falls on the alien to prove that the waiver is invalid. We do so now and conclude that the burden is properly placed on the alien. An alien validly waives his rights associated with a deportation proceeding only if he does so voluntarily and intelligently. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 840 (1987) (“Because the waivers of their rights to appeal were not considered or intelligent, respondents were deprived of judicial review of their deportation proceeding.”); United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2004) (waiver of right to administrative review of deportation will bar collateral review under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) only when it is voluntary and intelligent); c.f. United States v. Muro-Inclan, 7 249 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001) (Section 1326(d)’s exhaustion requirement “cannot bar collateral review of a deportation proceeding when the waiver of right to an administrative appeal did not comport with due process.”). However, such appellate rights and administrative remedies can be waived, and one way to signify a knowing and intelligent waiver is a written document to that effect. Other circuit courts, as well as the District Court here, have exercised the presumption that, when there is a written waiver, the waiver is valid, thereby implicitly placing the burden on the alien of proving any claim that the waiver was invalid. C.f. United States v. Martinez-Rocha, 337 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2003) (considering appellant’s evidence that his waiver was unintelligent); United States v. Rangel de Aguillar, 308 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[Appellant] presented no evidence to demonstrate ... that the waiver she gave was not knowing and voluntary.”).4 Contrary to Richardson’s suggestion, we do not regard the result reached here by the District Court as in conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United 4 The government would have us draw the same inference from United States v. Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1992). However, such an interpretation would be inappropriate as that court was merely reciting the government’s argument that “[appellant] failed to show ... that his waiver ... [was] unknowing and unintelligent,” rather than endorsing a theory of burden allocation. 964 F.2d at 406. 8 States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1993). In any event, we find ourselves unpersuaded by the rationale of that case. The Lopez-Vasquez Court held that “the government bears the burden of proving the waiver,” id., and that evidence of a mass, silent waiver was insufficient alone to carry that burden. The waiver at issue in Lopez-Vasquez was neither written nor individual. There, the immigration judge asked, “Gentlemen, if any of you do not understand about appeal, or if you have any questions about appeal, please stand now so that I can talk to you.” Id at 753. After no one in the assembled group rose, the judge continued, “If any of you want to appeal your case to the higher court, ... please stand so that I can talk with you about that.” Id. Again, no one rose. In rejecting the government’s argument that the waiver was knowing and intelligent, the Court focused upon the particular risks created by such mass silent waivers: The immigration judge made no effort to determine whether Lopez-Vasquez individually wished to waive his right to appeal, and the mass waiver by silence made it impossible to determine whether he made a voluntary and intelligent decision to do so. Mass silent waiver creates a risk that individual detainees will feel coerced by the silence of their fellows. The immigration judge’s directive that to preserve the right to appeal a detainee must stand up “so that I can talk to you about that” did nothing to lessen this risk. Indeed, it tended to stigmatize detainees who wished to appeal and to convey a 9 message that appeal was disfavored and contingent upon further discussion with the