Opinion ID: 710011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: woods

Text: 19 Defendant Woods claims that the trial court erred in finding that he was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor for sentencing purposes. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. 20 As a preliminary matter, Woods incorrectly argues that the government's evidence must be limited to the conduct for which the defendant was convicted. The sentencing guidelines commentary states: The determination of a defendant's role in the offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope of 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) ... and not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.B, intro. comment. Relevant conduct includes all acts committed or aided by the defendant and, in the case of a jointly undertaken activity, all reasonably foreseeable acts of others in furtherance of the activity. U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1); United States v. Mondaine, 956 F.2d 939, 943 n. 2 (10th Cir.1992). 21 Woods' designation as a leader rested on hearsay testimony given by Hudson at sentencing, as well as Woods' own admission that he arranged, participated in and received money for drug sales. Presentence reports may rest on hearsay evidence. Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969). Hudson testified that Tiffernie Carroll brought 3 ounces of cocaine to Great Bend at Woods' request, and that Hudson himself sold the cocaine according to Woods' directions as to price and quantity. Section 3B1.1(c)'s leadership requirement is satisfied upon a showing that the defendant exercised any degree of direction or control over someone subordinate to him in the distribution scheme. United States v. Baez-Acuna, 54 F.3d 634, 639 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 870 (1990). Based on Hudson's testimony as well as Woods' own admissions, we affirm the sentencing court's finding that Woods played a leadership role.
22 Woods challenges the district court's setting of his criminal history category at III on two grounds. The first involves Woods' prior sentence for armed robbery. Woods was released from that sentence on April 18, 1991, and arrested for the present offense on April 17, 1993. If the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after being released from prison for another sentence of at least sixty days, it calls for a two-point addition. U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(e). Despite Woods' claim to the contrary, this offense occurred just before the two-year mark, meriting the two-point addition. 23 The second ground on which Woods seeks a reduction in his criminal history category is that the armed robbery offense mentioned above was committed when defendant was 20, and that he was convicted by a 10-2 jury vote. The sentencing guidelines do not provide for leniency on either ground. Therefore, the district court did not commit clear error.
24 Rule 32 mandates that, at a sentencing hearing, the court must give both sides the opportunity to comment on any sentencing matters, and rule on any objections that the parties have raised. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1) (formerly 32(c)(3)(D)). Further, 25 [f]or each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. A written record of these findings and determinations must be appended to any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau of Prisons. 26 Id. (emphasis added). Although appending the court's findings to the presentence report is purely a ministerial matter, it serves as a safeguard against the  'manifest unfairness to a defendant if false or unreliable information is relied upon by the ... Bureau of Prisons or the Parole commission'  in their custody and parole determinations. United States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir.1990), quoting United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir.1989). 27 If the record shows that the sentencing judge may have relied on controverted matters without making its own finding on that controversy, resentencing is appropriate. Wach, 907 F.2d at 1041. However, where the court did not rely on the disputed facts or did in fact resolve the dispute, but failed to append its findings to the presentence report, then the proper remedy is merely to remand for attachment of the record required by Rule 32(c)(1). Id. 28 Here, the district court made all the findings required by 32(c)(1), but it did not properly append a record of those findings to the presentence report. The court did attach an addendum to the report. However, the addendum merely lists each objection, the government's response, and the probation officer's recommendation, along with a space which reads, The Court Finds:, followed by several blank lines. 29 The court apparently intended to record its findings in the appendix. Its failure to comply with Rule 32(c)(1) could adversely affect later findings relating to Woods' custody and parole. We remand for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to attach the proper record.