Opinion ID: 1201613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Outcome of the Balancing Test

Text: It is clear that CU has asserted important interests to justify its drug-testing program for student athletes and that student athletes, as a group, have diminished privacy expectations based on their unique circumstances. Based on the interests CU has asserted, it designed a drug-testing program for student athletes to minimize the impact on their privacy interests by reducing the intrusiveness of the collection process. Because the drug testing contemplated in this limited context does not constitute an undue infringement on the student athletes' expectations of privacy, I conclude that CU's asserted interests outweigh the privacy concerns. The examination of the asserted governmental interests and the privacy expectations is only the initial step under the test delineated by the Supreme Court. The purpose of balancing these factors is to determine whether it is impractical to require the government to obtain a warrant or establish some level of individualized suspicion before it is permitted to conduct the search. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66, 109 S.Ct. at 1390-91; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20, 109 S.Ct. at 1414-15; Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1313. In this case, the student athletes do not contend that either a warrant or probable cause is required by the balance of privacy and governmental interests. Nor does it appear that such an assertion could withstand scrutiny. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-68, 109 S.Ct. at 1391-92; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. at 1417; cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (stating that the probable-cause standard is peculiarly limited to criminal investigations); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097 n. 5, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (same). Rather, the student athletes assert that CU must, at a minimum, premise its drug-testing program for student athletes on reasonable suspicion. I disagree. In my view, suspicionless drug testing of student athletes in this limited context is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. To achieve the important interests asserted by CU, it is necessary to accurately detect drug use among the student athletes. As the trial court suggested, however, it is nearly impossible to ever establish reasonable suspicion of drug use among student athletes. Cf. O'Halloran, 679 F.Supp. at 1006. The important interests asserted by CU therefore would be placed in jeopardy, and CU's efforts to achieve these goals significantly hampered, if it were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion before testing a student athlete. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, 109 S.Ct. at 1392; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 631, 633, 109 S.Ct. at 1417, 1420, 1421; see also Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 685; Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1322; cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (noting that requiring particularized suspicion before routine stops on major highways near the U.S.-Mexico border would be impractical). These facts, combined with the diminished privacy interests implicated by the drug testing of intercollegiate student athletes, lead me to conclude that the suspicionless drug testing of student athletes in this limited context is a reasonable search. Because suspicionless drug testing of intercollegiate student athletes in this context is reasonable, CU's drug testing program is constitutionally permissible. Even were I to agree, however, that a drug-testing program based on no individualized suspicion was unreasonable in this context, such a search nevertheless could be constitutionally permissible based on the valid consent of the student athletes. [6] It is therefore necessary to examine the question of the student athletes' consent in this case. II Based on its reading of the trial court order, the majority affirms what it characterizes as the trial court's finding of fact that the individual student athletes within the certified class did not voluntarily consent to CU's drug-testing program for student athletes. Maj. op. at 947. [7] As a result, the majority does not reach the second issue on which we granted certiorari. See maj. op. at 935. Because I disagree with the majority's characterization of the trial court order, and instead would find that the trial court concluded as a matter of law that no student athlete could validly consent to the drug testing program, I am compelled to address the second question on which we granted certiorari. I would conclude that CU may validly condition a student athlete's participation in intercollegiate athletics on a student athlete's knowing and voluntary consent to a drug-testing program.