Opinion ID: 1143496
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard sentencing authority

Text: In challenging the trial court's authority to specify the place of confinement, the State argues correctly that prior to the SRA, only correctional authorities had the power to determine in which facility a defendant would be confined. Under the old sentencing scheme, once Bernhard pleaded guilty to second degree burglary, he became a class B felon (RCW 9A.52.030(2)), subject to confinement in a state correctional institution and/or a fine. RCW 9A.20.021(1)(b). As the State has pointed out, when the trial court sentenced a defendant to a state institution, the Department of Corrections, not the trial judge, selected the appropriate facility. RCW 72.13.150. See Clark Cy. Sheriff v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 95 Wn.2d 445, 448-49, 626 P.2d 6 (1981). If a trial court wished to specify an inpatient treatment facility, it could do so, but only by suspending or deferring sentence and making participation in the inpatient program a condition of probation. See RCW 9.92.060; RCW 9.95.210; see also State v. Walker, 27 Wn. App. 544, 547-48, 619 P.2d 699, review denied, 93 Wn.2d 1017 (1980). Bernhard argues that prior to the SRA, the CCJA contemplated a trial court having the power to sentence defendants to county jails or facilities other than jails. While the CCJA did contemplate such a power, it did not apply when defendants were convicted of felonies; sentencing classifications allowed a court to sentence a defendant to county jails only for gross misdemeanors and misdemeanors. RCW 9A.20.020(2), (3). Thus, for convicted felons sentenced prior to the SRA, the Department had the power to select the specific confinement facility. The State argues further that the SRA did not alter the status quo, preserving correctional authorities' power to select the facility. We disagree. The SRA significantly altered prior sentencing law for felons by distinguishing on a length of sentencing basis. Now only felons confined for more than 1 year shall [serve their sentence] in a facility or institution operated, or utilized under contract, by the state. RCW 9.94A.190. For convicted felons like Bernhard, sentences of 1 year or less shall be served in a facility operated, licensed, or utilized under contract, by the county. RCW 9.94A.190. [2] Despite these changes, the SRA contains no express instructions on who selects the confinement facility. In construing the sentencing scheme, our function is to discover and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Stewart Carpet Serv., Inc. v. Contractors Bonding & Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 353, 358, 715 P.2d 115 (1986). To discover that intent, we look to the enactment as a whole, Stewart Carpet, at 358, along with statutes pertaining to the same subject matter, which must be harmonized if at all possible. King Cy. v. Taxpayers, 104 Wn.2d 1, 9, 700 P.2d 1143 (1985). Under the SRA, trial courts no longer have the authority to require participation in treatment programs as a condition of probation. See RCW 9.94A.130. However, several SRA provisions, along with recent statutory changes in the CCJA, provide compelling evidence that the Legislature intended for trial courts to have limited discretion to select the place of confinement when sentence was to be served in a county facility. [3] Under the SRA, after conviction and sentencing, the offender's facility classification materials must be sent to the Department of Corrections, if the offender is committed to the Department's custody. RCW 9.94A.110; RCW 9.95.028. Only persons sentenced to terms of more than 1 year come under the authority of the Department. RCW 70.48.400. Presumably, felons sentenced to state custody would be classified pursuant to RCW 72.13.150, which is how facility selection was handled prior to the SRA. Felons sentenced to county jails do not come under the authority of state correctional authorities. Neither the SRA nor the new inmate classification process, RCW 9.95.028, .030, place any classification responsibilities on local correctional authorities. Yet, when the Legislature sought to authorize local authorities to act, it did so expressly. See Laws of 1984, ch. 209, § 6(8) (codified in RCW 9.94A.120(8)) (granting local jail authorities the power to schedule court ordered intermittent sentences as space permits). In 1984, the Legislature amended the CCJA (RCW 70.48) to make it conform with and to reinforce the SRA. Washington Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual § 9.94A.190 comment, at II-18 (1984). A new section, RCW 70.48.400, contemplates trial court authority to sentence felons confined for 1 year or less to a specific type of county facility. Thus, persons such as Bernhard may be sentenced to a jail as defined in RCW 70.48.010 [and] shall be the financial responsibility of the ... county. RCW 70.48.400. The plain language of the statute authorizes trial courts to sentence Bernhard to any facility defined as a county jail under RCW 70.48.020. The CCJA defines jails as including a variety of facilities according to the length of sentence and security requirements of the defendant. RCW 70.48.020(5). Defendants subject to sentences not exceeding 90 days may be sentenced to detention facilities. RCW 70.48.020(2). Defendants sentenced to terms not exceeding 1 year may be sentenced to correctional facilities. RCW 70.48.020(4). Defendants convicted of DWI offenses or persons who do not require the level of security normally provided in detention and correctional facilities may be sentenced to special detention facilities. RCW 70.48.020(3). These facilities can use combinations of features including, but not limited to, low-security or honor prisoner status ... work release ... or alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs. RCW 70.48.210(4). Thus, defendants confined for less than 1 year in a county jail, may be sentenced to a special detention facility, if appropriate under the circumstances. The State argues that important policy reasons dictate that the power to designate a confinement facility must be lodged with an entity having the power to change the designation if certain types of problems develop (medical or psychiatric problems, good or bad behavior, problems between inmates). While this seems true, the Legislature has given the trial court the power to modify its sentence if the defendant violates any condition or requirement. RCW 9.94A.200(1). Moreover, the power to sentence a defendant to a low-security special detention center pursuant to RCW 70.48.400, implies the power to alter the sentence if the facility does not suit the defendant's needs. We hold that for all defendants sentenced to confinement of 1 year or less, the trial court has the authority to select which of the available county facilities, as defined in RCW 70.48.020, best suits the defendant's situation. Our holding furthers the Legislature's conception of the SRA as structuring, rather than eliminating, trial court discretion. RCW 9.94A.010. At the same time, we also recognize that the Legislature left facility selection for those sentenced to more than 1 year in the hands of state correctional authorities. Preserving this distinction serves two other express purposes of the SRA: (1) Ensur[ing] that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history; and (2) offer[ing] the offender an opportunity to improve him or herself. RCW 9.94A.010(1) and (5). In the instant case, the validity of the sentence depends upon whether Teen Challenge qualifies as a special detention facility under the CCJA. Such facilities can be operated by a governing unit or may be operated by a noncorrectional agency or by noncorrectional personnel by contract with the governing unit. RCW 70.48.210(4). Facility employees must meet standards of training and education established by the Criminal Justice Training Commission ( see WAC 139-36), and the facility must meet physical plant standards (WAC 289-10) and mandatory custodial care standards (WAC 289-26). Thus, for Teen Challenge to qualify as a special detention facility it must have a contract with the county (RCW 70.48.210(4)) and meet the various standards set out in the appropriate WAC regulations. The record merely establishes that Teen Challenge has been certified and licensed by the Bureau of Alcohol and Substance Abuse, and thereby has complied with unidentified WAC regulations. Thus, Teen Challenge is qualified to take defendants from the court system, and has been utilized by Snohomish County as a parole and referral agency. We agree with the trial court that both the public and Bernhard would be better served if he could receive the more appropriate rehabilitation offered by Teen Challenge, rather than the Snohomish County Jail. Undoubtedly, under the sentencing regime in force prior to the SRA, trial courts had the power to require inpatient treatment at Teen Challenge as a condition of probation for convicted offenders. Under the SRA, trial courts can no longer defer sentences, RCW 9.94A.130, and standard community supervision sentences cannot require rehabilitation for repeat offenders. RCW 9.94A.030(4), and (7). Therefore, for Teen Challenge and similar institutions to continue serving the needs of the court system in terms of standard sentences, they must conform with the statutory requirements for a special detention facility, including an express contract or license from the county to operate such a facility. We encourage Teen Challenge, if it has not already done so, to take the necessary steps to comply with applicable regulations and to enter into a special detention facility contract with Snohomish County. Ordinarily we would remand this case to the trial court to determine whether Teen Challenge qualifies as a special detention facility. However, because we conclude that sentencing Bernhard to Teen Challenge comes within the trial court's power to impose an exceptional community supervision sentence, remand becomes unnecessary.