Opinion ID: 1996268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Trial Court's Finding of Bias

Text: A finding of bias is a finding of fact. Kelley v. City Council of Cranston, 61 R.I. 472, 484, 1 A.2d 185, 190 (1938). Therefore, we afford great deference to the trial justice's finding that Tikoian, Lemont, and Zarrella were biased and will overturn her findings of bias only if they are not supported by legally competent evidence. See Sartor, 542 A.2d at 1082-83. When an administrative agency carries out a quasi-judicial function, it has an obligation of impartiality on par with that of judges. See Town of Richmond v. Wawaloam Reservation, Inc., 850 A.2d 924, 933 (R.I.2004). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, administrative tribunals must not be biased or otherwise indisposed from rendering a fair and impartial decision. Davis v. Wood, 444 A.2d 190, 192 (R.I.1982); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) (The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal   .). At the same time, as the trial justice noted, adjudicators in administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of honesty and integrity. Davis, 444 A.2d at 192. This presumption may be overcome through evidence that the same person(s) involved in building one party's adversarial case is also adjudicating the determinative issues or if other special circumstances render the risk of unfairness intolerably high. Kent County Water Authority v. State (Department of Health), 723 A.2d 1132, 1137 (R.I.1999) (citing La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 285 (R.I.1980)). Significantly, an agency adjudicator must not become an advocate or participant. Davis v. Wood, 427 A.2d 332, 337 (R.I.1981). To maintain public confidence in the fairness of the agency's decision making, an agency adjudicator also must not prejudge a matter before the agency. See Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Board of Review of Cranston, 85 R.I. 152, 156, 128 A.2d 342, 344 (1957). This Court has held that a judge must recuse himself or herself when the judge possesses a `personal bias or prejudice by reason of a preconceived and settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his [or her] impartiality seriously and sway his [or her] judgment.' Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185 (R.I.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 422, 172 L.Ed.2d 305 (2008) (quoting Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I.1999)). It is important to note that engaging in ex parte contacts alone does not automatically render a decision maker biased. See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547, 573 (D.C.Cir.1982) ( PATCO ). Moreover, the term  ex parte contact has more than one meaning in the context of this case. [12] In concert with other conduct, however, an agency adjudicator's ex parte contacts may support a finding of bias. See Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 86 P.3d 494, 500 (2004) (citing Barbara Realty Co., 85 R.I. at 156, 128 A.2d at 344) (characterizing agency adjudicator's prejudgment of proceeding, as evidenced through public statements along with the same adjudicator's ex parte communications, as a cause for concern and as factually similar to Barbara Realty ). As the trial justice correctly stated, Rhode Island's standard for disqualification based on bias or prejudice is well-settled. We are satisfied that the trial justice's factual findings of bias with respect to Tikoian and Zarrella are supported by legally competent evidence.