Opinion ID: 1597407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admissibility of Ronald Rewis's Testimony

Text: Muehleman's next claim asserts error in the admission of the former testimony of witness Ronald Rewis, a jail inmate incarcerated with Muehleman before he was charged with the murder. Rewis's testimony, given at the first penalty phase and read into the record of the second proceeding, included incriminating statements that Muehleman made to him revealing details of the murder that had not been made public. The record establishes that Rewis was not recruited by law enforcement to obtain the statements, but did report Muehleman's statements to the authorities, who then requested that Rewis wear a body bug to record any further statements Muehleman might make. Rewis agreed and obtained a number of incriminating statements that were presented to the jury through his testimony. Muehleman objected to admission of this testimony on the grounds that the State should be precluded from presenting false testimony from this jail agent. He now argues on appeal that Rewis's testimony violated his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The claim Muehleman now makes is procedurally barred for two reasons. First, this specific contention was not made to the trial court below. See F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla.2003) (stating that for an issue to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below) (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982)). Second, and more importantly, the very same issue Muehleman presents in this appeal was raised and ruled upon in the direct appeal from the first penalty phase. The law of the case doctrine bars consideration of those issues actually considered and decided in a former appeal in the same case. Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So.2d 101, 107 (Fla.2001). In the first appeal, we stated: Muehleman's next claim involves an alleged violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel. He contends that fellow inmate Ronald Rewis became a state agent for the impermissible purpose of acquiring incriminating evidence which properly lay beyond the state's reach. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). We find in this case no violation of Muehleman's sixth amendment rights, as a review of the facts discloses that his incriminating admissions were not a product of a `stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement.' Miller v. State, 415 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1158, 103 S.Ct. 802, 74 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1983) (quoting Malone v. State, 390 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1034, 101 S.Ct. 1749, 68 L.Ed.2d 231 (1981)). First, Muehleman, apparently eager to talk, approached Rewis and began to repeatedly attempt to discuss details of the crime with him. Second, after unsuccessfully attempting to dissuade Muehleman from talking too much, Rewis approached the authorities on his own initiative. Bottoson v. State, 443, So.2d 962 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 223, 83 L.Ed.2d 153 (1984); Barfield v. State, 402 So.2d 377 (Fla.1981). Third, Rewis was at that point instructed not to initiate any conversations with the suspect. Finally, no evidence exists in the record that Rewis' efforts were induced by promises of any form of compensation. The contingent fee arrangement reflecting an improper relationship between police and informant in Henry is absent in this case. Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d at 314. Rewis's testimony in the second penalty phase was identical to that presented on direct examination in the first penalty phase. Muehleman brought up the subject of the murder and persisted in talking about it even after Rewis attempted to dissuade him from doing so. The State did not approach him with a request that he get close to Muehleman to obtain the statements, and there is no evidence that Rewis was promised anything. Just as this Court found in the first appeal, Rewis's testimony was not the result of a State stratagem, Rewis was instructed not to initiate any conversations with the suspect, and no evidence exists in the record that Rewis' efforts were induced by promises of any form of compensation. Muehleman, 503 So.2d at 314. In Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 291 (Fla.1997), we explained that whether a violation such as alleged here has occurred turns on whether the confession was obtained through the active efforts of law enforcement or whether it came to them passively. We also explained our holding in Muehleman's direct appeal by stating: Likewise, in Muehleman v. State, we interpreted the deliberately elicited standard in terms of its plain meaning and found that the defendant's right to counsel had not been violated because his statements were not a product of a stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement. Rolling, 695 So.2d at 291 (citations omitted) (quoting Muehleman, 503 So.2d at 314). We recognize that [t]his Court has the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings [made in earlier appeals] in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest injustice. Parker v. State, 873 So.2d 270, 278 (Fla.2004) (quoting State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715, 720 (Fla.1997)). However, Muehleman has provided no basis upon which we can conclude our prior ruling was erroneous or should be revisited. Because this claim is procedurally barred by Muehleman's failure to raise it below and also by this Court's decision in the first direct appeal, and because no exceptional circumstances or manifest injustice have been shown to require reversal of that ruling, relief is denied on this claim.