Opinion ID: 1351576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Claims of Error in the Instructions on the Determination of Penalty

Text: Defendant contends that the court committed several errors by instructing the jury as it did on the determination of penalty. It is, of course, virtually axiomatic that a trial court must correctly instruct on such legal principles as are applicable to the evidence (e.g., People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 641 [51 Cal. Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366])  and on such legal principles alone. The failure or refusal to do so constitutes error. Defendant claims that in a number of particulars, the court failed or refused to instruct as required. We shall consider his points seriatim.
The court instructed the jury on the determination of penalty, in relevant part, as follows. In determining which penalty is to be imposed on defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable:
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. (d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (e) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication. (f) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers] as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle]. (g) You may further take into consideration the information provided by family members, teachers, neighbors and friends of the defendant in determining whether the defendant has any redeeming qualities, and any events in his life that reveal those qualities. .... .... .... .... .... . . Mitigating circumstances are any circumstances that do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offenses in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. Aggravating circumstances are any circumstances are any circumstances [ sic ] attending the commission of the offenses in question which increase their guilt or enormity or adds [ sic ] to their injurious consequences, but which are above and beyond the essential elements of the offenses themselves. .... .... .... .... .... . . The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you simply determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence (circumstances) (are) so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. (Parentheses and brackets in original.)
(25) It is settled that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from imposing a penalty that is disproportionate to a criminal defendant's personal culpability. (See, e.g., People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 938.) It also bars use of procedures that create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of such disproportionality. (See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 502-509 [96 L.Ed.2d at pp. 448-452].) (26) Similarly, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from attach[ing] the `aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, ... or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty.... ( Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 885 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 255, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) Evidently, it also bars use of decision-making processes that may be understood to incorporate such mislabeling and thereby threaten arbitrary and capricious results. (27) Defendant contends that the court erred by instructing the jury as it did on aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances. His attack is directed against the court's failure to identify which circumstances were aggravating and which mitigating, and its failure to state that the absence of mitigation did not amount to the presence of aggravation. [10] He claims that in this regard the charge was inconsistent with the federal constitutional principles stated above. What is crucial for present purposes is the meaning that the instructions communicated to the jury. If that meaning was not objectionable, the instructions cannot be deemed erroneous. (See People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 487.) It now appears that we are to determine the meaning of the instructions not under the strict reasonable juror test  i.e., could a reasonable juror have understood the charge as the defendant asserts ( Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 375-376 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 394-395, 108 S.Ct. 1860])  but rather under the more tolerant reasonable likelihood test  i.e., is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury so understood the charge ( Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 329, 110 S.Ct. at p. 1198]). This is certainly true for purposes of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. ( Ibid. ) It appears to be true as well for purposes of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We must reject defendant's claim of error. Even under the strict reasonable juror test, the meaning that the instructions communicated was not objectionable. To begin with, a reasonable juror would have understood the instructions as prohibiting him from imposing a penalty that was disproportionate to defendant's personal culpability. This conclusion is virtually compelled by the plain language used in the definitions of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and in the description of the weighing process. Contrary to defendant's assertion, such a juror could not have interpreted the charge other than as barring disproportionality. Further, a reasonable juror could not have attached the `aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, ... or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty.... ( Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 885 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 255].) Defendant's claim to the contrary notwithstanding, a reasonable juror would readily have identified which circumstances were aggravating and which mitigating. Again, this conclusion is virtually compelled by the plain language used in the definitions of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and in the description of the weighing process. Certainly, such a juror could not have inferred  contrary to governing law (see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-289 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861] (plur. opn.))  that extreme mental or emotional disturbance and diminished capacity were circumstances in aggravation. Defendant argues in substance that a reasonable juror might have understood these circumstances as indicia of future dangerousness and hence as grounds for the ultimate sanction. We are not persuaded. It is pellucid in the very words of the instructions that both circumstances looked to the past, not the future, and supported life, not death. Again notwithstanding defendant's claim, a reasonable juror could not have believed  contrary to governing law (see People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 288-289 (plur. opn.))  that the absence of mitigation amounted to the presence of aggravation. The instructions made plain that aggravation required the existence of circumstances attending the commission of the offenses in question which increase their guilt or enormity or adds [ sic ] to their injurious consequences, but which are above and beyond the essential elements of the offenses themselves  and not merely the nonexistence of circumstances ... which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. [11]
Defendant requested the court to delete the adjective extreme from the penalty factor concerning Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (Italics added.) The court refused. (28) Defendant contends that the court erred. He argues in substance that the instruction as given, without the deletion requested, amounted to an incorrect statement of the law: (1) under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7, 15, and 17, of the California Constitution, `the sentencer ... [may] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death[]' ( Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6, 106 S.Ct. 1669], quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 869], quoting in turn Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990, 8 S.Ct. 2954], italics in original (plur. opn. by Burger, C.J.) [construing federal constitutional provisions]); (2) defendant proffered mental or emotional disturbance, nonextreme as well as extreme, as a basis for life imprisonment without possibility of parole; and (3) contrary to the constitutional principle stated above, the challenged instruction implied that the jury could not consider mental or emotional disturbance less than extreme in mitigation of penalty. The point must be rejected. To be sure, the major premise of his argument is sound. But a crucial minor premise is not: the instruction as given, without the deletion requested, did not carry the preclusive implication defendant claims it did. Again, what is crucial for present purposes is the meaning that the instruction communicated to the jury. As noted in part IV.G.2, ante, insofar as the claim rests on the United States Constitution, the standard for determining the instruction's meaning is the reasonable likelihood test of Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190]. Insofar as it rests on the California Constitution, our recent cases compel the conclusion that the same standard is applicable. The jury was expressly told that they could take into account Any ... circumstance  in addition to those specified  which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers] as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. (Brackets in original.) Defendant's argument to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have inferred from the foregoing that they could not consider mental or emotional disturbance of any degree whatever in mitigation of penalty. (Compare People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 901-902 [rejecting a claim similar to defendant's].)
Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury as follows. You may consider as further mitigating factors, the following facts or circumstances:

(i) Richard Benson confessed in detail as to what he did and cooperated with the detectives of the District Attorney's Office and investigators of the San Luis Obispo Sheriff's Department as to his involvement. (j) That in his lengthy confession, Richard Benson repeatedly expressed remorse for his crimes. (k) Any other circumstance or circumstances arising form [ sic ] the evidence which you, the jury, deem to have mitigating value. Subsequently, defendant withdrew his request as to factor (j), which dealt with remorse. Determining that the instruction proposed was substantially argumentative, the court denied the request and refused to charge the jury accordingly. Defendant contends that the court erred. We do not agree. (29) A court may  and, indeed, must  refuse an instruction that is argumentative, i.e., of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1276.) As noted, the court determined the instruction was in fact substantially argumentative. We need not resolve the question of the appropriate standard of review. Under any standard, the court's conclusion was plainly sound. (Compare ibid. [holding proper the refusal of a similar instruction on the same ground]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1323-1324 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221] [same].) [12] Defendant claims the court did indeed err by refusing the requested instruction. He argues he was entitled to the instruction under People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 189-190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847]. He is wrong. Under Sears [a criminal defendant] ha[s] a `right to an instruction that pinpoint[s] the theory of the defense.' ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1276, italics in original.) The instruction here did not do so. (Compare ibid. [holding proper the refusal of a similar instruction on the same ground]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 442 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279] [same].) Defendant also argues he was entitled to the requested instruction under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment as construed in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586, and its progeny. Again he is wrong. Under those cases [a criminal defendant] ha[s] a right to `clear instructions which not only do not preclude consideration of mitigating factors, [citation], but which also guid[e] and focu[s] the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender ... [citation].' ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1277.) Defendant received such instructions. But under those cases [a criminal defendant does] not have a right to an instruction  like the one here  that invites the jury to draw favorable inferences from the evidence. ( Ibid.; see People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 442-443.) Finally, defendant argues he was entitled to the requested instruction under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He maintains: he had a state created entitlement to such an instruction under Sears; by refusing his request, the court arbitrarily denied him that entitlement and thereby violated due process. We are not persuaded. As explained above, he had no such state created entitlement under Sears. He also maintains the court assertedly gave a pinpoint instruction favorable to the prosecution; by refusing his request for a similar instruction favorable to the defense, it created an imbalance of forces between the accused and his accuser offensive to due process. Again, we are not persuaded. There was no imbalance attributable to pinpoint instructions: no such instructions were given. (Compare People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1277, fn. 15 [finding a similar argument unpersuasive].)
Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that In deciding whether death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence you may not consider for any reason whatsoever, the deterrent or non-deterrent effect of the death penalty or the monetary cost to the state of execution or maintaining a prisoner for life. The court refused. (30) Defendant contends that the court erred. As implied in the introduction to part IV.G, ante, it is error for a court not to give an instruction if that instruction is both correct in law and applicable on the record; it is not error if either condition is lacking. Defendant claims the requested instruction was correct. He is right. Certainly, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Questions of deterrence or cost in carrying out a capital sentence are for the Legislature, not for the jury considering a particular case. ( People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 132; see Spaziano v. Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 461 [82 L.Ed.2d 340, 353, 104 S.Ct. 3154] [implying that the deterrent function [of capital punishment] is primarily a consideration for the legislature]; Tucker v. Zant (11th Cir.1984) 724 F.2d 882, 890 [stating that Protection of the public fisc is not a proper justification for capital punishment].) Defendant then claims the requested instruction was applicable. He is wrong. The issue of deterrence or cost was not raised at trial, either expressly or by implication. In People v. Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, footnote 12, we effectively held that the issue of commutation must be deemed raised at the penalty phase of all capital cases. Our evident assumption was that there was a significant possibility that some jurors might be aware of the possibility of commutation and proceed to take it into account in determining penalty. By contrast, we do not believe that the issue of deterrence or cost must be deemed raised at the penalty phase of all capital cases. Surely, we have no basis on which to make an assumption similar to that which we made in Ramos. Defendant may be understood to argue that such a basis does in fact exist. For support, however, he relies on little more than speculation and conjecture. [13]
(31) Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury to the following effect: (1) they could consider a circumstance in aggravation only if they were satisfied of its existence beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) they could fix the penalty at death only if they found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) they could so fix the penalty only if they determined that death was appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt. The court refused. Defendant contends that the court erred. He claims that the requested instruction correctly stated the law. In support, he argues that imposition on the People of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the issues identified above is required by the 1978 death penalty law. He is altogether unpersuasive. He then argues that imposition of the burden is required by the Constitutions of the United States and California, specifically: (1) the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17; (2) the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, sections 7 and 15; and (3) the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7. That is not the case. (E.g., People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 935-936.)
(32) Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that In this part of the trial you may consider pity, sympathy, or mercy for the defendant in deciding on the appropriate penalty for him. (Italics added.) The court refused. Defendant contends that the court erred. He claims that the requested instruction was legally correct: the law, he says, grants the jury authority to choose life over death simply because the former is desirable and the latter is not. We disagree. Neither statute nor Constitution gives the jury the right to exercise what is essentially godlike power. Defendant argues to the contrary. He says that the 1978 death penalty law grants the jury authority to dispense mercy. We are not persuaded: there is no adequate support for the assertion. He then says that the Eighth Amendment grants such authority. Again we are not persuaded. To be sure, Nothing in any of [the] cases [of the United States Supreme Court] suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. ( Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 199 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 889, 96 S.Ct. 2909] (lead opn. of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); accord, McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 307 [95 L.Ed.2d 262, 288, 107 S.Ct. 1756].) But nothing in any of those cases suggests that such a decision is in fact authorized by the Constitution. At its root, the Eighth Amendment is simply prohibitory: it bars imposition of punishment that is unduly severe. (See, e.g., People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 938.) It does not grant power, and hence does not authorize imposition of punishment that is unduly lenient. (Compare People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 227-228 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285] [rejecting a similar claim of instructional error].)