Opinion ID: 1824606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Division of Estate.

Text: In making division of the estate the trial court divided the estate of the parties as follows: [1] To the Plaintiff: 1. Homestead..................$28,800.00 Less net balance on mortgage............. 8,144.31 _____________ Net value.......... $20,665.69 2. Household goods in her possession, including garden mower ...............2,185.00 3. Diamond rings in her possession ................ 250.00 4. Cash ........................3,500.00 ___________ Total........ $26,600.69 To the Defendant: 1. Four unimproved lots........$15,400.00 2. Household goods in his possession ............ 500.00 3. Diamond rings in his possession .............. 700.00 4. Interest in profit-sharing trust .................... 9,749.00 5. Gassner property ........... 2,000.00 6. Badger Northland stock 400.00 7. C. O. F. paid up life insurance .................. 718.96 8. Cash surrender value Travelers life insurance ... 3,220.00 __________ Total ......... $33,687.96 In setting forth the above division we have accepted the value determinations made by the trial court. While some of the values are attacked by defendant we do not find the same against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. From the $33,687.96 awarded to defendant there should be deducted therefrom the following: Cash payment awarded to plaintiff ....... $3,500.00 Amount defendant is ordered to pay for arrearages under the family court commissioner's order for temporary alimony and suit money together with additional attorney fees and costs..... 1,678.30 ___________ Total.......................... $5,178.30 After deducting this $5,178.30 from the $33,687.96 of estate awarded to defendant it results in defendant's being awarded a net estate of $28,509.66. In percentages, plaintiff was thus awarded approximately 49 percent, and defendant approximately 51 percent, of the net estate. Plaintiff contends that the $1,678.30 representing the arrearages under the temporary order, and additional attorney fees and costs, should not be deducted from the amount of estate awarded defendant in computing his net estate under the division, and cites the following statement made by this court in Hoffman v. Hoffman (1955), 270 Wis. 357, 361, 71 N. W. (2d) 401: It is claimed that the amount of arrearage and the plaintiff's attorney fees, which defendant was ordered to pay, increase the property division to more than 50 per cent in plaintiff's favor, but the argument has no merit. These amounts are no part of the final division of assets. We deem it advisable to qualify the above-quoted statement in the Hoffman Case to the following extent: While arrearages under the temporary order for alimony and attorney fees and costs, which the husband is required to pay, do not constitute part of the wife's division of the estate, nevertheless, they are a charge against the entire estate and should be deducted either from the gross estate in determining the net estate available for distribution between the parties, or from the assets awarded to the husband. Defendant complains that the division made by the court does not take into consideration the $1,400 bank indebtedness of defendant representing the loans he claims to have made in order to comply with the temporary order of the family court commissioner. The trial court refused to take this indebtedness into consideration because of defendant's failure to account for the $7,500 proceeds of sale of land in 1961. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in so doing. The division of estate made in a divorce or legal separation is always subject to review by this court on the ground that it is excessive. Lindahl v. Lindahl (1963), 19 Wis. (2d) 379, 389b, 120 N. W. (2d) 142, 121 N. W. (2d) 286. See also Bruhn v. Bruhn (1928), 197 Wis. 358, 361, 222 N. W. 242. If this court determines that the division of estate is excessive under all the circumstances, such division is held to constitute an abuse of discretion. This court has repeatedly recognized that the division of an estate in this type of action is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court, and that it is difficult to lay down guidelines that can be translated into mathematical fractions or percentages. However, one of the guidelines which this court has laid down is that in general a third of the net estate is a liberal allowance to the wife subject to be increased or decreased according to special circumstances. Wagner v. Wagner (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 23, 27, 109 N. W. (2d) 507; and Gauger v. Gauger (1914), 157 Wis. 630, 632, 147 N. W. 1075. There were special circumstances in this case which warranted the trial court's granting more than one third of the total of that estate to plaintiff. One of these is the long period of the marriage, thirty-four years. For parties that are married but a short time this factor may warrant a division of considerably less than one third of the estate. Steinbach v. Steinbach (1929), 200 Wis. 208, 210, 227 N. W. 879. Here we have a marriage of thirty-four years' duration which is considerably above the average length of marriage confronting a trial court in divorce and legal-separation cases. Another factor properly to be considered is the complete lack of any separate estate in the plaintiff coupled with her inability to support herself by employment in the future. A third factor is that the legal separation has been brought about by defendant's wrongful conduct. Wrongful conduct by either party is a proper factor to be considered. Manske v. Manske (1959), 6 Wis. (2d) 605, 607, 95 N. W. (2d) 401. However, it is not to be utilized as a means of punishment to the guilty party. Knutson v. Knutson (1961), 15 Wis. (2d) 115, 121, 111 N. W. (2d) 905; and Yasulis v. Yasulis (1959), 6 Wis. (2d) 249, 253, 94 N. W. (2d) 649. It is extremely difficult to draw the line between a division of property that takes into account misconduct of one of the parties from one that goes beyond this and utilizes the division as a means of punishment. All that we deem it advisable to say is that seldom will the single factor of misconduct on the part of a husband alone justify an award of half the net estate. For example, in the recent case of Lindahl v. Lindahl, supra , the wife obtained the divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment by defendant husband and was given an award of approximately 50 percent of the net estate. Under the facts in that case the division was held to be excessive and was modified so as to award her approximately 40 percent of the net estate. Another factor to be considered is the amount of permanent alimony awarded to the wife. Because of the disability of the husband, his present income consisting of the $121 per month social-security benefits is so small as to prevent any award of substantial alimony to plaintiff. While the trial court did grant substantial alimony, this part of the judgment must be reversed. Therefore, consideration has been given to the fact that plaintiff is presently denied alimony in deciding to affirm the division of estate. In view of the foregoing factors this court concludes that the division of estate made in favor of plaintiff wife is not excessive and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.