Opinion ID: 589390
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There Was A Sufficient Nexus To The Residence

Text: 13 Madiedo claims that the government must establish by direct evidence a nexus between the crime, the place to be searched and the evidence sought. He argues that the affidavit does not contain any evidence linking his residence to the drug operation described therein. He claims that the search is really justified by no more than the fact that he was associated with Roberto Castro. This argument is meritless. 14 Direct evidence that contraband or evidence will be found at a particular location is not required to establish probable cause to search the location. United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1985). A magistrate is permitted to draw reasonable inferences as to where evidence might be located based on the type of evidence sought and the nature of the criminal activity. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399; Jackson, 756 F.2d at 705; United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir.1978). In the case of drug smugglers, the evidence is likely to be located where they live. United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 459 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir.1987). When the smugglers consist of a leader and several assistants, a fair probability exists that evidence will be located at the assistants' as well as the leader's residence. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399; United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 879 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984). 15 In Hill and Fannin, as here, the search warrant was based on an affidavit of an experienced agent which stated that it is common for drug smugglers to maintain records about their activities in their homes. Therefore, following Hill and Fannin, we find that there was probable cause to support the warrant. 16 Madiedo also raises an issue as to whether the good faith exception would apply. As there was probable cause to support the warrant it is unnecessary to address this issue. Madiedo also claims that his consent to the search of his residence was invalid. As the search of the residence was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, we need not address this issue. 17 II. The District Court Did Not Err In Concluding That Madiedo Validly Consented To A Search Of His Business Address 18 The question of whether Madiedo validly consented to a search of his business address is relevant as the police did not have a search warrant for that location. Thus, the only justification for the search of that location is Madiedo's consent. 19 The government has the burden of proving that a consent to search was knowing and voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1967). In support of his motion to suppress, Madiedo introduced evidence that he was intoxicated at the time that he gave his consent. Madiedo argued that he was so intoxicated that his consent was not knowing or voluntary. Thus, the government had the burden of proving that Madiedo was not so intoxicated that he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent. 20 The government presented uncontradicted evidence that Madiedo orally gave the police consent to search the business address and also signed a consent form. None of the officers noted that Madiedo acted as if he did not understand what was happening. None of the defense witnesses testified that Madiedo was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. The only testimony was that Madiedo was intoxicated. The district court found that the government's testimony was sufficient to meet its burden despite the testimony indicating that Madiedo was intoxicated. In fact, the district court found that Madiedo was intoxicated but was not so intoxicated that he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of Madiedo's business address.