Opinion ID: 732313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The majority writes:

Text: 118 Just as the Court in Wickard [v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122, 125 (1942),] sustained the regulation of wheat intended wholly for home consumption because it was connected to an overall interstate market which it could depress, 317 U.S. at 128-29 [63 S.Ct. at 90-91], and the Court in Perez [v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1362, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971),] sustained the regulation of purely intrastate loansharking because in the aggregate such local loansharking substantially affected interstate commerce, 402 U.S. at 155-57 [91 S.Ct. at 1362-63], so also § 922(o) can be sustained because it targets the possession of machine guns as a demand-side measure to lessen the stimulus that prospective acquisition would have on the commerce in machine guns. 119 Maj. Op. at 281-82. In other words, the majority argues in effect that the private, purely intrastate possession of machine guns has a substantial effect on the interstate machine gun market. 120 This theory, if accepted, would go far toward converting Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce into a plenary police power. Lopez, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1633. If there is any sort of interstate market for a commodity--and I think that it is safe to assume that there is some sort of interstate market for practically everything--then the purely intrastate possession of that item will have an effect on that market, and outlawing private possession of the item will presumably have a substantial effect. Consequently, the majority's theory leads to the conclusion that Congress may ban the purely intrastate possession of just about anything. But if Lopez means anything, it is that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause must have some limits. Cf. Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV.L.REV. 13, 36-37 (1995). 121 The Lopez Court of course recognized the potential sweep of Wickard, on which the majority's theory is chiefly based, and the Lopez Court sought to place reasonable limits on that theory. Observing that Wickard represents perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over interstate activity, the Court noted that Wickard involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not. 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. The Court then added: 122 Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. 123 514 U.S. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31 (footnote omitted). 124 The activity that the Lopez Court found was not economic or connected with a commercial transaction was a type of intrastate firearm possession, i.e., the possession of a firearm (including a machine gun) within a school zone. At issue here is another type of purely intrastate firearm possession, i.e., the purely intrastate possession of a machine gun. If the former must be regarded as non-economic and non-commercial, why isn't the same true of the latter? Is possession of a machine gun inherently more economic or more commercial than possession of other firearms? 4 Is the possession of a firearm within a school zone somehow less economic and commercial than possession elsewhere--say, on one's own property? 5 If there are distinctions of constitutional dimension here, they are too subtle for me to grasp. It seems to me that the most natural reading of Lopez is that the simple possession of a firearm, without more, is not economic or commercial activity in the same sense as the production of wheat in Wickard and that therefore such possession cannot be regulated under the Wickard theory. Cf. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 601-02 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 125 B. The majority's second theory appears to be that Congress could have rationally concluded that the purely intrastate possession of machine guns increases the incidence of certain crimes--the majority specifically mentions violent crime, racketeering, and drug trafficking--that are of national concern. See Maj. Op. at 280-81. In order to bring this case within the third Lopez category, it is not enough to observe that violent criminals, racketeers, and drug traffickers occasionally use machine guns in committing their crimes and that these crimes have interstate effects. Rather, there must be a reasonable basis for concluding that the regulated activity (the purely intrastate possession of machine guns) facilitates the commission of these crimes to such a degree as to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 126 I take this theory very seriously, but my problem with it is that it rests on an empirical proposition for which neither Congress, the Executive (in the form of the government lawyers who briefed and argued this case), nor the majority has adduced any appreciable empirical proof. 127 I would view this case differently if Congress as a whole or even one of the responsible congressional committees had made a finding that intrastate machine gun possession, by facilitating the commission of certain crimes, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. But despite the resources at their command to investigate questions such as this, neither Congress nor any of its committees did so, and indeed Congress never even identified the source of constitutional authority under which 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) was enacted. Of course, Congress is not obligated to make findings. But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here. Lopez, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1632. 128 Likewise, the Justice Department, which has been litigating the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) in courts across the country, has not brought to our attention any studies or reports by federal law enforcement agencies or others that establish that the purely intrastate possession of machine guns has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 129 Without assistance from Congress or the Executive, the majority has combed the legislative history of federal firearms legislation going back more than a half century, but in my view the majority has not found anything of significant value for present purposes. The majority cites congressional findings made in connection with prior firearms legislation concerning the problems resulting from the interstate movement of firearms. See Maj. Op. at 279 (emphasis added) (findings that link both the flow of firearms across state lines and their consequential indiscriminate availability with the resulting violent criminal acts that are beyond the effective control of the states); Maj. Op. at 279 (emphasis added) (findings of an extensive interstate commerce in firearms and the need for adequate federal control over such traffic); Maj. Op. at 280 (emphasis added)(findings emphasizing the connection between the increasing rate of crime, the growing use of firearms, and interstate firearms traffic ); Maj. Op. at 281 (connection between the interstate flow of firearms [and] the increasing serious crime in this country). However, the question here is not whether the interstate flow of firearms substantially affects interstate commerce; rather, the question is whether the entirely intrastate possession of machine guns has such an effect, and none of the findings noted above speak to that question. Indeed, Congress had no occasion to consider that question when it made those findings, since none of the laws in connection with which those findings were made reached purely intrastate possession without requiring proof in court of a jurisdictional link. 130 The remaining underpinnings of the majority's analysis are three snippets from a committee report and one comment made on the floor of the Senate. The committee report, H.R.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, concerned a bill, H.R. 4332, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), that lacked any provision similar to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Instead, H.R. 4332 dealt with machine guns by providing (sec. 11) for enhanced penalties for defendants who used or carried a machine gun during and in relation to a federal drug trafficking offense or a federal crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). This provision did not raise any new Commerce Clause problems, because the statutes creating the underlying federal drug trafficking offenses or crimes of violence had presumably been enacted pursuant to one of the federal government's delegated powers (whether the Commerce Clause or some other provision). Accordingly, the committee had no need to consider the general question of the relationship between machine guns and interstate commerce, much less the specific question of the relationship between intrastate machine gun possession and interstate commerce, and there is no indication that the committee explored either of these topics. 131 Not surprisingly, however, since H.R. 4332 provided for enhanced penalties in certain cases involving machine gun use, the committee did mention machine guns, and it is upon these fleeting references that the majority relies. The first reference, which appears in a portion of the report captioned BENEFITS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT simply summarizes the enhanced penalty provision. H.R. Rep. 495, supra, at 2, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1328. This statement obviously has nothing to do with interstate commerce. 132 The next reference concerns another bill, H.R. 3155, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), entitled the Racketeer Weapons and Violent Crime Control Act of 1985, that contained a provision (sec. 3(b)) very much like 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The report states that this bill would have prohibited the transfer and possession of machine guns used by racketeers and drug traffickers for intimidation, murder and protection of drugs and the proceeds of crime. H.R. Rep. 495, supra at 4, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1330. I do not think that it is reasonable to conclude based on this brief statement that the committee looked into the question and found that there was a substantial link between the conduct prohibited by that bill (the intrastate possession of machine guns) and interstate commerce. After all, the committee did not recommend adoption of the prohibition on intrastate possession contained in H.R. 3155. 133 The final reference in the committee report concerns the need for more effective protection of law enforcement officers from the proliferation of machine guns and high-powered 'assault-type' weapons that are increasingly being used by criminals. H.R. Rep. 495, supra at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1333. This statement, which lumps together machine guns and assault weapons, says nothing about interstate commerce or particular types of crimes that have substantial interstate effects; and since the committee did not recommend banning the private, intrastate possession of machine guns, the committee presumably felt that the needs of law enforcement would be met by the more limited machine gun provision that it favored. Viewing all three of the statements in the committee report together, I do not think that it is reasonable to conclude that the committee considered or drew any conclusions concerning the relationship between intrastate machine gun possession and interstate commerce. 134 Nor do I see any value for present purposes in the last bit of congressional material unearthed by the majority, a statement made by Senator Kennedy in a colloquy concerning 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Voicing opposition to a proposal to grant amnesty to people who now possess machineguns outside the law, Senator Kennedy stated: The only thing that has changed about the machine gun situation since the 1968 act, and the limited amnesty granted then, is that machine guns have become a far more serious law enforcement problem. 132 Cong. Rec. 9,602 (1986). This observation by a single member of Congress says nothing about interstate commerce or crimes having substantial interstate effects. 135 In sum, we are left with no congressional findings and no appreciable empirical support for the proposition that the purely intrastate possession of machine guns, by facilitating the commission of certain crimes, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and without such support I do not see how the statutory provision at issue here can be sustained--unless, contrary to the lesson that I take from Lopez, the substantial effects test is to be drained of all practical significance. 6 As Lopez reminded us, the constitutionally mandated division of authority [between the federal government and the states] 'was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.'  Lopez, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1626, quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring). And even today, the normative case for federalism remains strong. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich.L.Rev. 752, 756-790 (1995). Out of respect for this vital element, we should require at least some empirical support before we sustain a novel law that effects a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971).