Opinion ID: 1959789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of Ms. Lamare and Ms. Briggs

Text: With respect to the testimony of Ms. Lamare and Ms. Briggs, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of Mrs. Peters under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See V.R.E. 803(2). Defendant contends that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule must be construed to relate only to the underlying startling event or condition. Defendant reasons that because the admitted hearsay statements were uttered upon learning of the battery, rather than upon the event of the battery, the declarant could not, as a matter of law, be under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Id. The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule under V.R.E. 803(2) is characterized by: A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. There are two essential requirements for the excited utterance exception: (1) a startling event or condition, and (2) a spontaneous utterance in reaction to the event or condition made under the stress of excitement and not as a result of reflective thought. See State v. Solomon, 144 Vt. 269, 272, 476 A.2d 122, 124 (1984). The underlying rationale for the exception lies in the assumption that a person's powers of reflection and fabrication will be suspended when she is subject to the excitement of a startling event, and any utterances she makes will be spontaneous and trustworthy. See id.; State v. Ayers, 148 Vt. 421, 424, 535 A.2d 330, 332 (1987). We have previously rejected the argument that a declarant's excited utterance under V.R.E. 803(2) must be contemporaneous with a sexual assault. See State v. Shaw, 149 Vt. 275, 281, 542 A.2d 1106, 1109 (1987) (contemporaneousness with the exciting event is not required for statements to be admissible as excited utterances); State v. Longe, 133 Vt. 624, 626, 349 A.2d 232, 234 (1975) (modern legal thinking is that the term `contemporaneous' is not used in a completely restrictive sense, but rather in a broadly descriptive one). In Shaw, we noted the key consideration is the condition of the declarant. Shaw, 149 Vt. at 281, 542 A.2d at 1109. Rule 803(2), relies [for trustworthiness] on the exciting quality of the event. The statement must thus have been made while the declarant's state of excitement continued, on the theory that his mental condition prevents fabrication. Reporter's Notes, V.R.E. 803. The relevant inquiry is whether Ms. Peters' statements were made while she was in a highly excited, agitated state sufficient to suspend her powers of reflection and fabrication. Shaw, 149 Vt. at 281, 542 A.2d at 1109. Ms. Lamare's testimony established that there was, at most, a three-hour gap between the time defendant called Mrs. Peters to inform her that he had violated her, and the time Mrs. Peters arrived at her daughter's apartment. Ms. Lamare's testimony that Mrs. Peters was visibly upset, crying and rocking back and forth as she repeatedly said I can't believe he raped me, supports the trial court's determination that the declarant was under the influence of the startling event. See Ayers, 148 Vt. at 424, 535 A.2d at 332 (trial courts have wide discretion to determine whether declarant was under the influence of the excited event). See also United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 317-18 (9th Cir.1975) (admitting exclamation He killed me, he killed me! by kidnap victim hospitalized for seven weeks with head injuries, upon seeing newspaper picture of defendant for first time one week after returning home); State v. Moats, 156 Wis.2d 74, 457 N.W.2d 299, 309-10 (1990) (admitting testimony offered by mother of five-year-old assault victim who learned about sexual assault on daughter one week afterward). Accordingly, Ms. Lamare's testimony regarding her exchange with Ms. Peters on August 10th was properly admitted. Ms. Lamare's testimony that, in the weeks that followed, Mrs. Peters told her that she was frightened by defendant and wanted to get away from him, was not admissible under the excited utterance exception. Although she was understandably still upset from learning of the battery, this conversation was too remote to fall within the exception. Similarly, Ms. Briggs' testimony that Mrs. Peters told her on a day in August 1993 that defendant had raped her the other night should not have been admitted under 803(2). [5] Although portions of Ms. Lamare's testimony, as well as the testimony of Ms. Briggs, were not admissible under the excited utterance exception, the trial court's error was harmless. See V.R.C.P. 61; Imported Car Center, Inc. v. Billings, 163 Vt. 76, 83, 653 A.2d 765, 770 (1994). Given the overwhelming, admissible evidence produced from witnesses Ms. Lamare, Mr. Fitzgerald and Ms. Teale, in addition to the critical fact that defendant admitted in writing to [taking] advantage of Mrs. Peters without her consent, the admission of the erroneous portion of Ms. Lamare's and Ms. Briggs' testimony did not affect the substantial rights of defendant nor cause manifest injustice. See Imported Car Center, 163 Vt. at 83, 653 A.2d at 770; State v. Weller, 162 Vt. 79, 84, 644 A.2d 839, 842 (1994).