Opinion ID: 196764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Duties Inherent in the OFP Directorship

Text: 16 Under the second prong, we examine any evidence the defendants may have adduced that the particular responsibilities of the plaintiff's position, within the [OFP], resemble those of 'a policymaker, privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement' for continued tenure. O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 17 a) Lack of Written Job Description 18 Ortiz first argues that summary judgment is precluded because the City of Gurabo has no official, written job description (a.k.a. Form OP-16) for its OFP Director, nor indeed for any of its municipal employees. He relies upon cases in which we have held that courts should determine the duties inherent in a particular position by examining the governmental entity's written, signed job descriptions, rather than the duties actually performed by the plaintiff or prior occupants of the position in question. See, e.g., Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st Cir.1987). Ortiz would have us conclude that the absence of any written job description, combined with conflicting circumstantial evidence as to the duties performed by the OFP director, leaves unresolved issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. See Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3 ([W]e have considered the OP-16 dispositive in other Puerto Rico political discrimination cases....). In so doing, Ortiz misconstrues our precedents and the nature of the issue under consideration. 19 Although written, signed job descriptions may provide highly probative evidence as to the responsibilities inherent in a particular government position, and may even prove dispositive, see id. at 3, we have never suggested that their absence is dispositive, cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 (Whenever possible, we will rely upon this document because it contains precisely the information we need ....) (emphasis added), or precludes a defendant from resorting to other evidence, see, e.g., Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3 (noting that defendant may present additional evidence at trial besides the disputed OP-16). Nor does the absence of a written, signed job description preclude summary judgment, so long as defendants adduce other competent evidence as to the responsibilities inherent in the OFP directorship from which the political nature of the position can be determined as a matter of law, see McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 93 (ultimately, the Branti /Elrod defense poses a question of law), even though some nonessential facts may remain in dispute. See Mariani Giron v. Acevedo Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114, 1117 n. 5 (1st Cir.1989). 5 20 b) The Responsibilities Inherent in the Position 21 Ortiz contends that the district court incorrectly assessed the record evidence relating to the duties inherent in the OFP directorship. He claims that he administered the OFP in a politically-neutral fashion and took no meaningful part in mayoral policymaking or political decisions concerning federal funding allocations among the various constituencies within the municipality. 22 As previously noted, probative indicia that a position is political include  'relative pay, technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders.'  O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (citations omitted). Defendants adduced evidence that Ortiz had not had to compete with other candidates for the OFP directorship. Moreover, Ortiz concedes that he was no expert in the financial and accounting aspects of the OFP's responsibilities. Thus, we think the evidence does not support a fair inference that Ortiz was selected for his managerial or technical expertise. Moreover, Ortiz' prominent PDP affiliation, see Ortiz Deposition at 179-81 (acknowledging that, at various times, he was a political activist, electoral commissioner, and campaign finance director for the PDP and PDP candidates), plainly permits a fair inference that he was selected for the OFP directorship based on his political service and talents. See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 93 (finding position political where plaintiff, formerly a clerical employee, was tapped for position as director of secretary of state's regional office, after having worked on Secretary's state senate campaign, and where Secretary did not advertise the job, solicit applications, or ... consider any [other] applicant). 23 More importantly, Ortiz was appointed to head the OFP, whose overall functions clearly involved  'decision making on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation,'  under the first prong of the Jimenez Fuentes test. See supra Section II.B.2. 6 By his own account, Ortiz was in complete charge of the OFP staff, 7 as well as the applications for, and the administering of, all federal grant and loan programs involving the City, amounting to approximately one-third of its municipal budget. See Ortiz Deposition, at 29-30. 8 24 Ortiz reported directly to the mayor, rather than through intermediaries, meeting with him on an average of six or seven times a year. Cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 (noting that plaintiff performed duties with only general instructions and superficial supervision from the administration). He served as the mayor's eyes and ears, periodically visiting public work projects and reporting back to the mayor on their progress. See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 95 (noting that employee who acted as eyes and ears for secretary of state engaged in an overtly political task[ ]). 9 Such first-person (thus, more subjective) field assessments often influence policy formulation, and policymaking influence, even though indirect, is an important indicium of political positions. 10 25 Ortiz admittedly received and reviewed copies of federal audits and oversight reports, including the Federal Transit Administration's Triennial Review of the City's federally funded transit program, which identified areas where the City was not in compliance. See Defendant's Exh. 6; see also 49 U.S.C. § 5307(i)(2). This politically-sensitive report is precisely the type of document whose contents are not likely to be shared freely with any but the mayor's trusted political confidants for fear it might become fodder for the political opposition. Cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1262-63 ([W]e believe that an official working in close contact with the head of a government agency is also more likely to be privy to a substantial amount of confidential information....). 26 Finally, Municipal Ordinance No. 3, enacted in 1981 pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1351, designates only eleven municipal offices as positions of trust or confidentiality, including the Director of the Office of Federal Programs. 11 Consistent with the ordinance, former Mayor Caraballo notified Ortiz in writing on December 24, 1992, that he was among the eleven municipal officials who must resign to make way for the incoming NPP administration. 27 Against this formidable array, Ortiz offers five arguments. First, he contends that Municipal Ordinance No. 3 is a nullity because the defendants have not shown that it was duly submitted to the Central Office of Personnel Administration for approval, as supposedly required by the Personnel Act. But see supra note 11. This claim is unavailing. 28 On its face, the ordinance reflects that it had been submitted to the Central Office of Personnel Administration (Central Office) for review. See Municipal Ordinance No. 3, § 3. Thus, the burden lay with Ortiz to show that the City did not comply with the statutory requirements, 12 and he proffered no evidence that the ordinance was not duly submitted to the Central Office. See O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 906-07 (noting that summary judgment opponent must proffer more than  'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation' ) (citation omitted). In all events, the statutory language does not purport to make submission to the Central Office a prerequisite to the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3. Rather, the requirement of post-enactment compliance review by the Central Office, in relation to a municipal ordinance, stands in sharp contrast to the heightened obligation of Commonwealth agencies to seek Central Office approval. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1351 (mayor's plan to be submitted to Central Office for the sole purpose of ascertaining that the provisions of section 1350 of this title have been complied with). See Appendix A for text of § 1350. 29 Second, Ortiz correctly notes that state laws identifying government positions as trust or confidential are not dispositive of the federal-law question whether a particular position is political. See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 243 n. 9. On the other hand, we have explained that state laws and municipal ordinances designating positions as trust or confidential--like P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1351, and Municipal Ordinance No. 3--are entitled to some deference under the Branti /Elrod formula, see Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246; accord Juarbe-Angueira, 831 F.2d at 14, especially where other evidence clearly points in the same direction. 30 Third, Ortiz attempts to estop defendants from asserting a Branti /Elrod defense by pointing to the putative assurance made to him by Mayor Caraballo in August 1991, that the OFP directorship was not a trust position, see supra p.2. Even this evidence is not hefty enough to ward off summary judgment, however. 13 31 For one thing, application of the equitable estoppel doctrine against governmental entities, including municipalities, is narrowly circumscribed. See Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford County, 467 U.S. 51, 60-62, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 2224-25, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984). Moreover, any attempt to interpose estoppel as a bar to the Branti /Elrod defense must fail, since reliance on the Caraballo representation would not have been objectively reasonable in the circumstances. See United States v. Javier Angueira, 951 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1991) (noting that even if estoppel is available against governmental entity,  'the party raising the [estoppel] defense must have reasonably relied on some affirmative misconduct attributable to the sovereign.' ) (citations omitted); A.E. Alie & Sons v. United States Postal Serv., 897 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir.1990) (same). 32 Immediately prior to his appointment to the OFP directorship, Ortiz, concededly a political activist, served for three years as City assemblyman, a position which would have brought all City ordinances within his constructive knowledge. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 781, 793 n. 25, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1986) (same); cf. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir.1989) (reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct). Similarly, Ortiz admitted to having served for four years in a previous trust position, as Regional Director of the Administracion de Derecho al Trabajo, making it highly unlikely that he was not on actual notice of P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1351, or of the fact that municipalities were required to designate certain trust positions by ordinance. 33 Fourth, without citing either authority or a policy rationale, Ortiz argues that the OFP directorship cannot be considered a political position since there is no requirement that the municipal assembly approve the mayor's selection for the post. We think this far too thin a reed to warrant rejection of the traditional Branti /Elrod criteria. Many political appointments (e.g., to the executive staff of a governor or mayor) are not subject to legislative approval, a requirement which correlates more closely to the issue of political accountability in the legislative branch, than to the partisan political attributes of an executive position. 34 Finally, Ortiz insists that the OFP directorship duties actually performed by him under Mayor Caraballo were merely administrative and technical, that Caraballo alone decided how federal funds were to be spent, and that Ortiz merely informed the mayor regarding the administrative status of federal funding applications. These claims are insufficient to overcome the well-supported legal determination, see supra pp. 14-16, that the OFP directorship is a political position. At most, Ortiz' contrary characterizations, fully credited, establish the services actually rendered by Ortiz while he served as the director, as distinguished from the responsibilities inherent in the position itself. Cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258 (actual duties not as probative as inherent duties). As the ultimate issue presented is one of law, rather than fact, McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 93, summary judgment was warranted on the political discrimination claim.