Opinion ID: 3011684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The parties agree that the District Court's Memorandum and Order of May 21, 1999 accurately sets forth the factual background, and we will accordingly accept these facts as accurate and summarize them here, supplemented by other uncontested facts of record. On June 6, 1986, Appel and Stanley Hertzog, pursuant to a prearranged plan, robbed the First National Bank of Bath in East Allen Township, Pennsylvania. Appel killed two tellers and a bank official, and both r obbers shot at others, injuring two other persons. Appel and Hertzog were arrested later that day and charged with murder, robbery, 2 and related crimes. On June 9, 1986, while being held in prison, Appel confessed to certain law enfor cement officers.1 On June 10, 1986, Appel filed an application for appointment of counsel with the Public Defender . It is the period between June 10, 1986 and June 20, 1986 that is critical to the writ of habeas corpus. On June 10, 1986, the Public Defender assigned Ellen Kraft and Lor enzo Crowe to serve as Appel's attorneys and they enter ed appearances on Appel's behalf. When Kraft and Crowe visited Appel in the Northampton County Prison on June 11, 1986, however , Appel immediately told them that he did not want them to serve as his attorneys. Kraft later testified that Appel had only requested a Public Defender after being told that he would need a lawyer in order to receive visitors while he was in that prison. Kraft and Crowe nevertheless accompanied Appel to a hearing before the trial judge on June 12, 1986. During that hearing, the trial judge referred to Kraft and Crowe as Appel's counsel and they did not dispute this characterization. At the hearing, Appel told the judge, I would like to represent myself. I feel I am best able to project my own thoughts and express my desires speaking for myself in the case. App. II at 14. After being told the charges against him and the possible penalties he faced, Appel again told the judge, My choice is to r epresent myself. I have no objection to [Kraft and Cr owe] as advisors. App. II at 32-33. He explained that having counsel would slow down the wheels of justice, the prosecution's case against me. App. II at 33. The judge did not accept Appel's waiver of counsel at that time, stating that before he did so, he would order Appel to undergo a psychiatric examination in order to assist the judge in determining Appel's competency to waive counsel. On June 17, 1986, Appel was examined by Dr. Janet Schwartz, a psychiatrist on the staff of Northampton County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Unit. Before that examination, Dr. Schwartz met with John Weaver, a social worker on that staff, who had interviewed Appel _________________________________________________________________ 1. The record before us shows no details of this confession, and it is not at issue. 3 following the crime and had received fr om him some background information. Dr. Schwartz received no information from either Kraft or Cr owe and, after spending an hour with Appel, found Appel to be competent to waive his right to counsel. Dr. Schwartz's r eport to the court stated, Mr. Appel appears to have made a rational and well thought out decision that he would like to r eceive the death penalty and would like this to occur as soon as possible. On the basis of my examination I feel that he is competent to make this decision and to refuse counsel. App. II at 154. On appeal, Appel makes the point that his competency evaluation was only Dr. Schwartz's second competency evaluation in a felony case, and her first capital one. She was, however, board certified in psychiatry and neurology. The judge held a second hearing on June 20, 1986. The judge questioned Appel again, and Appel repeated his intention to proceed without an attorney. Kraft and Crowe were present at this hearing, but pr ovided no information relevant to Appel's competency and specifically advised the court in response to its inquiry that they had nothing to put on the record at that time. They did not challenge the psychiatrist's conclusion. The judge then accepted Appel's waiver of counsel based on Dr. Schwartz's r eport and appointed Kraft and Crowe as standby counsel pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 318(d) (renumber ed Rule 121(D) and amended March 1, 2000, effective April 1, 2001).2 Appel pled guilty on July 20, 1986 to three counts of criminal homicide, two counts of attempted homicide, one count of robbery, two counts of aggravated assault and various other charges. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 533, 539 A.2d 780, 781 (1988) (hereafter Appel I). Under Pennsylvania law, following the defendant's plea of guilty to criminal homicide, the court fixes the degree of guilt after a hearing. In Appel's case, the hearing was held August 7 through August 9, 1986. At that hearing, Appel reiterated his waiver of counsel and stated, inter alia, _________________________________________________________________ 2. Pa. R. Crim. P. 318(d) stated, When the defendant's waiver of counsel is accepted, standby counsel may be appointed for the defendant. Standby counsel shall attend the proceedings and shall be available to the defendant for consultation and advice. 4 I would like to state for the record, that during the entire proceedings and/or hearings in this matter, I have been very much aware of what is going on. That is to say, I am rational, sane, competent and alert. I have had plenty of opportunities to discuss and consult with stand-by counsel, Mr. Cr owe and Ms. Kraft. And I have consulted with them on various occasions. I feel that by cooperating with the prosecution and by pleading guilty to all charges, that I have done the honorable thing. And, I hope that I have set a precedent here today for all futur e defendants in so doing. The only mitigating factors that I wish to enter into the record, would be: One, that I have had no prior felony convictions against me; and, Two, that I was gainfully employed at the time of my arrest. I would also like to say that I will not appeal your decision or any decisions that you made. Further more, I trust that the American Civil Liberties Union will not interfere with this matter and that no other outside legal aid groups will make any appeal [on] my behalf. Commonwealth v. Appel, 547 Pa. 171, 182, 689 A.2d 891, 896 (1997) (brackets in original) (quoting Degr ee of Guilt Hearing Tr. 8/9/86, at 367) (her eafter Appel II). The trial court found Appel guilty of three counts of first degree murder for the deaths of the thr ee bank employees. See id. On August 19, 1986, after the degree of guilt hearing, Appel was examined at the request of Kraft and Crowe by Dr. Paul Kenneth Gross, another psychiatrist. Dr. Gross found no evidence of any psychosis, sever e depression, agitation or paranoia, App. II at 71, and stated in his written report that there was no evidence that [Appel] was suffering from any mental disease or defect at the time of the crime and that, at that time, he was fully awar e of his 5 behavior, could appreciate the natur e and quality of it, and knew the wrongfulness of his behavior. App. II at 71. At sentencing, Appel again waived his right to counsel and requested that he be sentenced to death. The court imposed three sentences of death on September 3, 1986. Appel did not file any post-verdict motions but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed Appel's conviction and sentence based on an automatic direct r eview, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9711(h), and affir med, finding that the evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt the trial court's findings that defendant was guilty of thr ee counts of first degree murder. Appel I, 517 Pa. at 536, 539 A.2d at 783. Governor Tom Ridge signed Appel's death warrant on February 28, 1995, which set the execution date for the week of April 4, 1995. However, shortly after the death warrant was signed, Appel requested counsel andfiled a petition under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9541 et seq., in which Appel argued, among other things, that he was mentally ill and incompetent during the 1986 proceedings r esulting in his guilty plea and death sentence, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the 1986 proceedings. The PCRA trial court conducted hearings from May 6 to 19, 1995. At these hearings, Appel presented a number of psychologists and physicians who examined Appel eight or nine years after the murders. They testified that he had suffered from Graves' disease, a for m of hyperthyroidism, during the summer of 1986. This condition is characterized by an enlarged thyroid, a rapid pulse, and increased metabolism due to excessive thyroid secr etion. Appel's experts testified that the Graves' disease caused him to become paranoid and delusional. He told them that the bank robbery had been part of a CIA mission to eliminate CIA moles and that he was bound to keep his mission secret. Appel had also repeatedly told them that he was part of a special operations unit of the military. See, e.g., PCRA Tr. 5/6/95, at 23-37 (testimony of Dr. James Merikangas); PCRA Tr. 5/8/95, at 355-73 (testimony of Dr. Henry Dee); PCRA Tr. 5/12/95, at 35-42 (testimony of Dr. Frank Dattilio); PCRA Tr. 5/16/95, at 20-55 (testimony of 6 Dr. Jethro Toomer). Appel's mother , girlfriend, and other acquaintances corroborated that Appel had acted strangely in 1986. In support of Appel's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which Appel based on the failure of Kraft and Crowe to investigate Appel's mental illness in 1986 that allegedly would have led them to discover his mental illness from his family, friends, and employment records, Appel presented Kraft and Crowe as witnesses at the PCRA hearing. They testified that they did not consider themselves to be Appel's counsel at either the June 12, 1986 or June 20, 1986 hearings, and never considered themselves to be his counsel. Kraft testified that Mr. Appel waived counsel from day one. PCRA Tr. 5/12/95, at 162 (testimony of Ellen Kraft). She stated that they refrained fr om investigating Appel's background because we were not his attorneys. PCRA Tr. 5/12/95, at 165. Crowe also testified that no investigation was made because [w]e wer e, I felt that we were standby counsel. I didn't think [investigation] was necessary. PCRA Tr. 5/15/95, at 9 (testimony of Lorenzo Crowe). The Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appel's motive for the robbery was to get money fast, and that he had rational reasons for wanting to plead guilty and be executed. Specifically, the Commonwealth intr oduced excerpts of an interview Appel gave in 1987 for a television documentary entitled In the Mind of a Mur derer, in which he admitted that his motive for the crimes was to get money and kill potential witnesses. The Commonwealth also introduced a transcript of a taped interview with Appel in 1993 in which he explained that he robbed the bank to get money for his girlfriend, sought the death penalty so that she could get the insurance proceeds, enjoyed being in control of the court proceedings and assisting the Commonwealth, and got the idea to use Graves' disease as the basis of an appeal from a former death row inmate. See Appel II, 547 Pa. at 195, 689 A.2d at 902-03. The trial court denied Appel's PCRA petition on June 14, 1995. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later affirmed this denial. See Appel II, 547 Pa. 171, 689 A.2d 891. Appel then filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 7 U.S.C. S 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court granted the writ on May 21, 1999, but stayed the execution of the writ for 180 days in order to permit the Commonwealth to provide Appel a new trial. See Appel v. Hor n, No. 97-2809 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 1999) (hereafter District Court Memorandum).3 The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal.