Opinion ID: 2002399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offense

Text: The second issue for appeal, whether the trial justice incorrectly instructed the jury on the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon, requires a re-evaluation of Rhode Island law on the issue of the lesser included offense. The defendant urges us to abandon our present law in favor of the standards applied in other jurisdictions. [1] Notwithstanding jurisdictional variations, we find Rhode Island statutory and case law sufficiently clear on this issue and hold that the trial court's instructions were proper. By way of introduction, in order for a court to obtain the necessary jurisdiction to convict a criminal defendant, the defendant must first be put on notice of all the charges against him. State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1260 (R.I. 1981). The notification, accomplished by a formal indictment or information, serves to inform the accused of the nature of the offense with which he is charged so that he can make an adequate defense as well as be able to avail himself of the conviction or the acquittal so that he can avoid the threat of double jeopardy. State v. Walsh, 113 R.I. 118, 122, 318 A.2d 463, 465-66 (1974). However, on previous occasions this court has stated that it is unnecessary for an indictment to contain each and every element of a lesser offense for it to be properly included within the charge. State v. Raposa, 100 R.I. 516, 519, 217 A.2d 469, 471 (1966); see also State v. Waite, 484 A.2d 887, 890 (R.I. 1984) (technical precision in criminal pleading no longer required). Therefore, the fact that assault with a dangerous weapon was not specifically alleged in the information against defendant does not preclude a jury from considering that charge. The statutory authority for a conviction of a lesser offense included within the indictment of a greater offense is found in G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 12-17-14 and provides: Conviction of lower offense or attempt.  Whenever any person is tried upon an indictment, information, or complaint and the court or jury, as the case may be, shall not be satisfied that he is guilty of the whole offense, but shall be satisfied that he is guilty of so much thereof as shall substantially amount to an offense of a lower nature, or that the defendant did not complete the offense charged, but that he was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same, the court or jury may find him guilty of such lower offense or guilty of an attempt to commit the same, as the case may be, and the court shall proceed to sentence such person for the offense of which he shall be so found guilty, notwithstanding that such court had not otherwise jurisdiction of such offense. Additionally, Rule 31(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:  Conviction of Less Offense. The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense. Thus, existing statutory authority provides an accused with the right to an instruction on a lesser included offense, if warranted by the evidence. State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 930 (R.I. 1987). However, [a] charge to the jury should be confined to propositions of law related to material issues of fact which the evidence tends to support. The jury's attention should not be directed to various propositions of law unless the record contains evidence which supports and requires it. State v. Infantolino, 116 R.I. 303, 307, 355 A.2d 722, 724 (1976). Because there is sufficient authority for a jury instruction on a lesser included offense to the crime charged, defendant is effectively put on notice of the possible conviction of a lesser offense supported by the evidence, and may adequately prepare a defense. State v. Sundel, 121 R.I. at 646, 402 A.2d at 590. Furthermore, the required instruction on a lesser included offense is for defendant's own protection. This court in Hockenhull pointed out that absent such an instruction, a jury may erroneously convict a criminal defendant of the principal offense charged, despite the prosecution's inability to prove an element of that offense, when the jury is convinced that defendant's conduct was criminal. 525 A.2d at 930. With specific regard to this appeal, defendant contends that under both § 12-17-14 and Rule 31(c), assault with a dangerous weapon is a separate offense and, therefore, the trial justice should not have instructed the jury to consider it within the charge of assault with intent to murder. However, this court held, in State v. Raposa , that to charge one with assault with intent to murder is to charge by necessary implication that the assault was or could have been committed through the use of some instrument or device capable of causing death or substantial bodily injury. 100 R.I. at 519, 217 A.2d at 471. This proposition was cited with approval in State v. Walsh, 113 R.I. at 122, 318 A.2d at 466, and later in State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d at 1261. As early as 1909, our court has recognized that assault with a dangerous weapon is included within a charge of murder, if the facts can support the conviction. State v. Casasanta, 29 R.I. 587, 598, 73 A. 312, 317 (1909). Describing the charges in ascending order, the court stated that `[t]he lowest offence will be assault, the next above it will be battery, the next will sometimes be assault with a dangerous weapon, the next assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill, the next manslaughter, the next murder, and the last murder in the first degree. Each one of these, except the last, will be a less crime included in the greater.' Id. Although § 12-17-14, in its present form, was not yet enacted, the statute under consideration in Casasanta was essentially the same. See G.L. cap. 285, § 24, as amended by C.P.A. § 1185. Notwithstanding the guidance provided by earlier case law directly on point, defendant urges this court to adopt one of the tests employed in other jurisdictions to determine when an offense should be included in the greater offense charged. The defendant addresses two approaches in particular. The first is known as the statutory elements test. State v. Roden, 384 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Minn. 1986) (cannot commit greater offense without also committing lesser offense); State v. Cimino, 126 N.H. 570, 575-76, 493 A.2d 1197, 1202 (1985) (lesser included offense cannot contain elements different from greater); State v. Spearin, 477 A.2d 1147, 1158 (Me. 1984) (impossible to commit greater offense without committing lesser). In these states it is impossible to be convicted of a lesser offense unless each statutory element of the lesser offense is also present in the greater offense. State v. Cimino, 126 N.H. at 576, 493 A.2d at 1202 (driving a vehicle while possessing controlled substance not lesser included offense to transporting a controlled substance with intent to dispense because elements different); cf. People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24, 28-29, 525 P.2d 431, 434 (1974) (although statutory elements not identical no error in instruction to jury when lesser offense supported by evidence). Therefore, the lesser offense must necessarily be committed whenever the greater offense is. The defendant, in the alternative, requests that we adopt a pleading or indictment theory used in several other states in determining when an offense is properly before a jury as one that is a lesser included offense. This approach allows a jury to consider a lesser offense if such an offense is contained in the indictment as the means by which the greater offense was committed. See Dorsey v. State, 490 N.E.2d 260, 268 (Ind. 1986) (instruction on lesser offense unnecessary if lesser offense not contained in information); State v. Madrid, 108 Idaho 736, 702 P.2d 308, 309-10 (1985) (lesser offense alleged in indictment as means of committing greater). The defendant cites State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639, 653, 462 A.2d 1021, 1029 (1983), for a clear enunciation of the pleading theory. The Marino court stated that, [t]he trier may not find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense unless (1) it is not possible to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the charging documents, without having first committed the lesser   . Id. Therefore, unless the lesser offense is sufficiently described in the indictment or information, the jury may not properly be instructed on such an offense. In his efforts to convince this court to embrace an approach similar to the statutory elements or pleading theories employed in other jurisdictions, defendant failed to note the courts that apply a standard not unlike our own when facing a dilemma on a lesser-included-offense instruction. See United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir.1971) (impractical to use strict statutory elements approach); [2] Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Alaska 1979) (cognate approach focuses upon facts in indictment to determine whether defendant had notice of possible lesser offense). For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in rejecting a strict statutory-elements approach, firmly stated: A more natural, realistic and sound interpretation of the scope of `lesser included offense,' in line with our own views on the subject, is that defendant is entitled to invoke Rule 31(c) when a lesser offense is established by the evidence adduced at trial in proof of the greater offense, with the caveat that there must also be an `inherent' relationship between the greater and lesser offenses, i.e., they must relate to the protection of the same interests, and must be so related that in the general nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the greater offense. Whitaker, 447 F.2d at 319; see Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d at 1226 (notice to defendant is key issue); see also People v. Steele, 429 Mich. 13, 19-22, 412 N.W.2d 206, 208-10 (1987) (citing Whitaker decision with approval and rejecting need for strict mechanical formula). Accordingly we decline to follow the stricter approaches employed in other jurisdictions specifically for the reasoning espoused in Raposa. In 1966 we emphatically stated: This court will not, even by indirection, reintroduce technicality into the pleading of criminal offenses. It was the purpose of the legislature in enacting the pertinent provisions of G.L. 1956, chap. 12 of title 12, to eliminate such technicality in criminal pleading. We do not propose now to burden the state with the task of alleging specifically in an indictment    a description of every mechanism by which an assault intended to accomplish murder may be committed. Raposa, 100 R.I. at 519, 217 A.2d at 471. In this particular case, the state charged the defendant with two counts of assault with intent to murder in violation of § 11-5-1. The statute requires only that the intent to murder be accompanied by some type of assault. It is undisputed that the defendant effectuated the assault with a gun, and he should not now be able to assert that the state, in charging him with assault with intent to murder, failed to put him on notice of a possible conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment of the Superior Court affirmed.