Opinion ID: 2494456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The warnings in this case satisfy the dictates of Miranda and its progeny

Text: To protect the individual right against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Courtin Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)outlined procedural parameters that police must employ with a suspect before and during a custodial interrogation. The Miranda court summarized those parameters as follows: [T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned [1] that he has a right to remain silent, [2] that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and [3] that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, [4] either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. Id. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Miranda court discussed further the extent of the prophylactic protections afforded by the right against self-incrimination, stating that because [t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators . . . the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. Id. at 469-70, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added). [T]his Court and the United States Supreme Court have stressed that there is no talismanic incantation required to ensure [that Miranda ] warnings are sufficiently conveyed. Miller, 42 So.3d at 221. A court does not examine a Miranda warning as if `construing a will' or `defining the terms of an easement.' Id. at 222 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989)). Rather, [t]he inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably `conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda. ' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981)). The crucial test for determining whether police gave a proper warning `is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights.' Id. (quoting Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.1967)). In Powell II, 130 S.Ct. at 1206, for example, the determinative issue was whether the police administered an improper Miranda warning because they failed to explicitly inform the defendant before a custodial interrogation that he had the right to counsel both before and during the interrogation. This Court found the Miranda warning at issue in that case insufficient because it did not include a clear instruction that the defendant had the right to counsel during the interrogation. See Powell I, 998 So.2d at 537-41. The United States Supreme Court, however, affirmed that Miranda warning because it found that the warning reasonably conveyed to the suspect his right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation. See Powell II, 130 S.Ct. at 1205. In that case, the police read the suspect his Miranda warning from a form, which stated: You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added). In reversing Powell I, the United States Supreme Court found that this warning was proper because it reasonably conveyed to the suspect his right to have counsel present during the interrogation by not entirely omitting any information that Miranda requires the police to convey. See id. at 1204-06. More specifically, the United States Supreme Court found that because the officers told the suspect that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [their] questions and the right to use any of [his] rights at any time [he] want[ed] during th[e] interview, the police provided the defendant with the information that Miranda required. Id. at 1204-05 (alterations in original). The Supreme Court admitted that these warnings were not the clearest possible formulation of Miranda's right-to-counsel advisement, but held that when this warning was given a commonsense reading, it sufficiently conveyed to the defendant that he had the right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation. Id. at 1205. Its reasoning was that [i]n context, . . . the term `before' merely conveyed when [the defendant's] right to an attorney became effectivenamely, before he answered any questions at all. Id. The Court noted that [n]othing in the words used indicated that counsel's presence would be restricted after the questioning commenced. Id. In fact, the Court decided the opposite, stating the warning communicated that the right to counsel carried forward to and through the interrogation, conveying to the defendant his ability to seek his attorney's advice before responding to ` any of [the officers'] questions' and ` at any time . . . during th[e] interview.' Id. (alterations in original). Furthermore, the catch-all phrase at the end of the warning in Powell II, when taken in combination with the part of the warning denoting the right to counsel before the custodial interrogation, arguably made the warning sufficient. See id. (In combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell's right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.). However, the sufficiency of the warning in Powell II did not hinge on the catch-all phrase. Rather, the catch-all phrase merely confirmed that the defendant in Powell II could exercise his right to counsel during the custodial interrogation. See id. (stating that the catch-all phrase confirmed that [the defendant] could exercise [the right to counsel] while the interrogation was underway). The statement that the defendant had the right to counsel before the custodial interrogation, when taken alone in context, was sufficient to satisfy Miranda, as it, in and of itself, reasonably conveyed to the defendant that his right to counsel began before the custodial interrogation and logically continued throughout the interrogation. See id. (In context, however, the term `before' merely conveyed when Powell's right to an attorney became effectivenamely, before he answered any questions at all. Nothing in the words used indicated that counsel's presence would be restricted after the questioning commenced. Instead, the warning communicated that the right to counsel carried forward to and through the interrogation. . . .). In this case, the Miranda warnings administered to Rigterink by the police were sufficient under Miranda and its progenyespecially when considered in light of Powell II because they reasonably conveyed Rigterink's right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation. In Powell II, the police advised the defendant that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [their] questions. Powell II, 130 S.Ct. at 1204 (emphasis added) (alteration in original). Synonymously, Rigterink's warnings provided that Rigterink had the right to have an attorney present prior to questioning. Rigterink I, 2 So.3d at 234. As with the synonymous warning in Powell II, when Rigterink's warning is given a commonsense reading, it reasonably conveys to a suspect that he or she has the right to the presence of counsel both before and during an interrogation. This is because the use of the word present, along with the before and prior to, convey to a suspect that his or her right to counsel begins before the custodial interrogation and, as a result, will logically continue during the interrogation. The use of prior to, like the use of before in Powell II, is a mere temporal requirement providing when the right to counsel begins. As with the term before, nothing in the use of the phrase prior to indicates that the right to counsel's presence ends when questioning begins. Furthermore, when examining the entire context within which the police used the phrases prior to and present, Rigterink's warning is a clearer instruction regarding the right to counsel than the instruction in the warning the police administered in Powell II. This necessitates its validity under Miranda and its progeny, as the Supreme Court held that the warning in Powell II falls within Miranda's parameters, making a Miranda warning that is a more clear conveyance of the right to counsel just as, if not more, sufficient. The augmented clarity of the Rigterink warning is in the part of the warning that precedes the words prior to, which is the following phrase: right to have an attorney present.  (Emphasis added.) By placing the language denoting counsel's presence immediately before the prior to phrase, the police, when giving the warning a commonsense reading, conveyed to Rigterinkwith more clarity than did the police in Powell II that he had the right to not only obtain counsel, but also have the attorney present before the custodial interrogation began, with that presence reasonably expected to continue throughout the duration of the interrogation. It is indefensible that Rigterink believed that the warnings stood for the proposition that he could have counsel present before questioning began and that, once questioning began, counsel must leave. This would have presented both Rigterink and the police with an untenable situation, as the police would have had to cease questioning and allowed counsel to come to and from the room whenever Rigterink sought counsel's advice during questioning. Such a situation would have confounded the purpose of the police advising Rigterink of his right to have counsel present, and it would have spawned an illogical result that neither the police nor Rigterink could have reasonably believed that the warning conveyed. The Court in Powell II, which did not use the word present, reached a similar logical conclusion, stating: To reach the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the attorney would not be present throughout the interrogation, the suspect would have to imagine an unlikely scenario: To consult counsel, he would be obliged to exit and reenter the interrogation room between each query. A reasonable suspect in a custodial setting who has just been read his rights, we believe, would not come to the counterintuitive conclusion that he is obligated, or allowed, to hop in and out of the holding area to seek his attorney's advice. Instead, the suspect would likely assume that he must stay put in the interrogation room and that his lawyer would be there with him the entire time. Powell II, 130 S.Ct. at 1205 (footnotes omitted). Hence, by advising Rigterink that he may have counsel  present prior to questioning, the police reasonably conveyed to Rigterinkwith more clarity than the police in Powell II that counsel, if Rigterink so desired, would have been present with Rigterink both before and during the custodial interrogation. Therefore, the right to counsel warning the police administered to Rigterink was sufficient under Miranda and its progeny.