Opinion ID: 1734294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Find Certain Mitigating Factors

Text: In Zack, 753 So.2d at 19, this Court, quoting Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla.1990), stated that the trial court cannot refuse to consider relevant mitigating factors: When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its sentencing order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature.... The court must find as a mitigating circumstance each proposed factor that is mitigating in nature and has been reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence.... (Footnotes omitted.) In Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1997) (footnotes omitted), this Court summarized the Campbell standards of review for mitigating circumstances: The Court in Campbell ... established relevant standards of review for mitigating circumstances: 1) Whether a particular circumstance is truly mitigating in nature is a question of law and subject to de novo review by this Court; 2) whether a mitigating circumstance has been established by the evidence in a given case is a question of fact and subject to the competent substantial evidence standard; and finally, 3) the weight assigned to a mitigating circumstance is within the trial court's discretion and subject to the abuse of discretion standard. Here, Beasley contends that the trial court erred in determining that three circumstances which the trial court found to have been proven were not mitigating in nature (Beasley's poor/rural background, the death of his father [which occurred after the murder, while Beasley was incarcerated], and his expressions of sorrow for Mrs. Monfort's death, and gratitude for her kindness to him). Additionally, Beasley challenges the trial court's finding that his claimed good behavior during trial, which the trial court determined was not unusually good, was not proven as a mitigator. With respect to the latter claim, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that this mitigating factor was not proven. A bailiff who testified during the penalty stage reported an incident in which Beasley had thrown a tantrum in his holding cell, expressing dissatisfaction with the evidence which had been presented that day. This outburst included kicking and throwing things. Based upon that testimony, the trial court did not err in determining that Beasley's trial behavior was not unusually good and, thus, was not proven as a mitigator. See Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d 1327, 1331 (Fla.1981). In Campbell, the Court, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), defined a mitigating circumstance as `any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense' that reasonably may serve as a basis for imposing a sentence less than death. 571 So.2d at 419 n. 4. Relevant to this appeal, we indicated in Campbell that an abused or deprived childhood and remorse should be considered as valid mitigating circumstances. 571 So.2d at 420. Remorse is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1921 (1993), as a gnawing distress arising from a sense of guilt for past wrongs (as injuries done to others). Given this definition, as the Fourth District (in discussing why a defendant's lack of remorse which is not repugnant, odious and accompanied by a confession, cannot be used as a reason to depart from sentencing guidelines) queried, How can one be expected to show remorse concurrently with the maintenance of innocence? Nor does a jury guilty verdict automatically extinguish the right to continued proclamation of blamelessness. Moreover, even if it did, defendants at sentencing could avoid aggravation by simply declaring their innocence and gratuitously expressing sorrow for the victim. Mischler v. State, 458 So.2d 37, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), approved, 488 So.2d 523 (Fla.1986). As observed in Robinson v. State, 520 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla.1988), a lack of remorse is not considered an aggravating factor in death penalty cases. While [a]ny convincing evidence of remorse may properly be considered in mitigation of the sentence, the absence of remorse should not be weighed either as an aggravating factor [or] as an enhancement of an aggravating factor. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1078 (Fla.1983). Here, Beasley has turned this analysis on its head, suggesting that an expression of mere sorrow (rather than remorse) should be considered as a mitigating factor. Were this factor deemed to be a mitigator, then, just as defendants at sentencing could avoid aggravation [if lack of remorse were deemed to be an aggravator] by simply declaring their innocence and gratuitously expressing sorrow for the victim, defendants at sentencing could likewise enhance their position by gratuitously expressing sorrow for the victim. Because Beasley has presented no compelling argument for recognition of this new category of mitigator, the trial court did not err in finding that Beasley's expression of sorrow for, and gratitude to, the victim was not a mitigating circumstance. The mitigating factors considered in this case fit into two categories: factors negatively impacting Beasley's life (occurring prior to the murder), and factors demonstrating his positive attributes (occurring at any time). On appeal, Beasley challenges the ruling that his claimed poor/rural background was not a mitigator. In Burns v. State, 699 So.2d 646 (Fla.1997), the trial court found in mitigation that Burns was one of seventeen children raised in a poor rural environment and consequently had few economic, educational, or social advantages, but despite these disadvantages, he is intelligent and became continuously employed after high school. 699 So.2d at 648 (emphasis supplied). Here, in contrast, Beasley does not appear to have been deprived by his childhood environment. His mother testified that Beasley had a good childhood. This is consistent with the oral history given by Beasley to Dr. Dee, which reflected that Beasley had positive childhood memories. Beasley went to baseball games with his father, was involved in sports and a church community, and was successful and well-liked in high school. On this record, the trial court did not err in finding that Beasley's claimed poor/rural background was not mitigating in character. Lastly, Beasley claims that the trial court erred in failing to consider the death of Beasley's fatherwhich occurred while Beasley was incarceratedas a mitigator. Documents showing Beasley's depression over his father's death, and a letter written to his father from prison, were admitted in support of this mitigating factor. On this record, any error which may have been committed in failing to consider this factor as mitigatingto the extent it could have shown that Beasley cared for his fatherwould be harmless. Here, the trial court considered, in mitigation, not only the fact that Beasley `maintained good family relationships while incarcerated,' and that he was a good son, but also a number of other positive social relationships which Beasley had demonstrated (such as maintaining contact with his children and grandchildren, and being a good brother and a good friend). Further in all fairness to the trial court's rulingthis factor was presented (together with the suicide of one of Beasley's friends), not as an incident reflecting Beasley's caring nature, but as a death which had affected his life. The suicide of Beasley's friend (which occurred in 1983) was considered by the court as a mitigator, and accorded some weight. In contrast, because the impact of his father's death could not have affected Beasley at the time of the murder, when viewed in this context, the trial court did not err in failing to consider it as mitigation.