Opinion ID: 2583802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the labor commission has statutory authority to correct errors in an order after the time to file an appeal has expired

Text: ¶ 22 The Appeals Board determined that it lacked authority to modify an order after the deadline to appeal the order had passed. It stated, UAPA, the Labor Commission Act, and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act . . . do not authorize Frito-Lay's attempt to use Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., as a method of obtain[ing] relief from [the September 23 order]. Although the court was correct that rule 60 is not a source for this authority, we disagree with the assertion that the Labor Commission lacked authority to grant Frito-Lay the relief it sought. The Workers' Compensation Act expressly gives the Labor Commission broad authority to review Commission orders, and this authority is not only equivalent to but, indeed, exceeds the authority that district courts have through rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [29] ¶ 23 As the Appeals Board correctly recognized, section 63G-4-301 of UAPA requires a party seeking review of an ALJ's decision to file a written request for review within thirty days in accordance with applicable statutes or agency rules. [30] The statutes applicable to Commission decisions are the Labor Commission Act [31] and the Workers' Compensation Act. [32] The Labor Commission Act provides that decisions issued by Commission ALJs are subject to review by either the Commissioner or the Appeals Board. [33] It also provides that an ALJ's decision is final unless a further appeal is initiated: (a) under this title; and (b) in accordance with the rules of the commission governing the review. [34] The Workers' Compensation Act further mandates that such appeals must be filed within thirty days of the issuance of the decision. [35] Because, according to the Appeals Board, this statutory scheme constitutes a comprehensive and integrated system, the Commission lacks authority to review a case according to the type of procedures found in rule 60. ¶ 24 But the Appeals Board failed to consider that it has been granted continuing jurisdiction in section 34A-2-420 of the Workers' Compensation Act. In that section, the legislature made [t]he powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case. . . continuing and indicated that [a]fter notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board . . . may from time to time modify or change a former finding or order of the commission. [36] Under the Commission's interpretation, this power to modify or change an order is limited to the 30-day period for appeals of right. But this interpretation renders the from time to time language meaningless. Given our obligation to read this provision in accordance with other provisions that set procedures for the review of a Commission order and to reach an interpretation that gives meaning to all the provisions, [37] we determine that the from time to time language confers upon the Commission jurisdiction beyond that to review an appeal of right. Further, we find nothing within the statutory scheme that excludes the review of a decision for a clerical or other error from the authority to review decisions from time to time. ¶ 25 Indeed, we have previously determined that the grant of continuing jurisdiction encompasses the authority that district courts have under rule 60. In Carter v. Industrial Commission, we stated that the Industrial Commission, the predecessor to the Commission, has wide discretion in the exercise of its continuing jurisdiction conferred upon it, which was no doubt given for the express purpose suggested, . . . to avoid the making of excessive or inadequate awards . . . if such should occur, and the evidence warrants it . . . adequate power to correct the same. [38] Further, we held, the power of the [Commission] as to its continuing jurisdiction is not limited to consideration of changes in physical condition of workmen, but is extended to [the] right to rescind, alter, or amend orders, decisions, or awards on good cause appearing therefor. [39] ¶ 26 Nearly sixty years later, in Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, we reiterated our holding in Carter. We determined that the Commission's continuing jurisdiction provided the Commission authority comparable to that provided to trial courts by [rule] 60(a). [40] In Thomas A. Paulsen Co., an ALJ failed to explicitly order the employer to reimburse the Workers' Compensation Fund. [41] The ALJ had made this decision at a hearing. Neither party requested review of the decision within the designated review period. Then, eight months later the Workers' Compensation Fund requested that the ALJ amend the order in accordance with the reimbursement determination made at the hearing. We held that it was within the ALJ's authority to do so. [42] In so holding, we noted that such authority was consistent with the legislative instruction that workers' compensation proceedings were not to be burdened with technicalities but were to be conducted . . . to protect the substantial rights of the parties. [43] ¶ 27 The case now before us is markedly similar to Thomas A. Paulsen Co. In the case at hand, the ALJ issued an order that both Frito-Lay and Clausing agree did not reflect the ALJ's determination at the hearing. Further, the order itself, by incorporating a stipulation detailing the weeks Clausing worked during the relevant period, indicates an intent to limit the TTD award to compensate Clausing only for time she did not work. Finally, as did the Workers' Compensation Fund in Thomas A. Paulsen Co., Frito-Lay requested that the ALJ clarify the order after the deadline for review had passed. The only notable difference between Thomas A. Paulsen Co. and the present case is that Frito-Lay sought relief under rule 60(b), rather than simply requesting that the ALJ clarify his order. This difference is irrelevant, however, because courts are to look at the substance of a motion, not merely its title, to determine its validity. [44] ¶ 28 Thus, as in Carter and Thomas A. Paulsen Co., we again hold that the Labor Commission has broad authority to review Commission orders and that this authority, in the circumstances considered here, exceeds the authority that district courts have under rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This holding is consistent with the legislative intent not to burden with technicalities the Commission's ability to protect the substantive rights of its parties [45] and to empower the Commission to prevent inadequate or excessive awards. [46]