Opinion ID: 185686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Board's Collyer Doctrine

Text: 26 In the proceedings before the Board, DC maintained that the allegations concerning its refusal to furnish information should have been deferred under the Collyer doctrine to the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the parties' CBA. As noted above, however, the Board has long adhered to a policy of refusing to defer disputes concerning information requests. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. 829 (1984). It is also clear that the Board is not required by the NLRA or by national labor policy to defer information request cases to arbitration. Acme, 385 U.S. at 438-39, 87 S.Ct. at 569. Indeed, in Acme, the Supreme Court observed that when the Board acts to ensure the flow of relevant information, it does so in aid of the arbitral process. Id. at 438, 87 S.Ct. at 569. The Court noted that [a]rbitration can function properly only if the grievance procedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious claims, and that it would be inefficient to require the union to take a grievance all the way through to arbitration without providing the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim. Id. 27 This court is obliged to uphold the Board's policy on the scope of Collyer so long as it is rational and consistent with the Act, and so long as the Board's reasoning is not inadequate, irrational, or arbitrary. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364, 118 S.Ct. 818, 822, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998) (internal quotations omitted); accord NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Can Co., 924 F.2d 518, 522 (4th Cir.1991) (The Board's decision concerning deferral to arbitration is to be affirmed unless found to be an abuse of discretion.). The Board acts unreasonably if it departs from established policy without giving a reasoned explanation for the change. Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 285 F.3d 1073, 1075-76 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (citing ConAgra, Inc. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1435, 1443-44 (D.C.Cir.1997)). As we have already indicated, the Board's decision in this case is perfectly consistent with, not a change from, well established precedent. Therefore, the Board had no obligation to offer a reasoned explanation for any change. There was no change of Board policy in this case and DC does not suggest any. 28 DC's primary argument is that, in refusing to defer the § 8(a)(5) allegations, the Board contravened its decision in United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975). In United Aircraft, the Board held that the interpretation of the parties' CBA, particularly its provision on the duty to furnish information at the second stage of the grievance procedure, was best left to an arbitrator. Id. at 880. DC argues that United Aircraft governs, because the parties' CBA states that, at Step Two of the grievance procedure, each party will endeavor in good faith to furnish all information available with respect to the grievance. See Agreements Between Chrysler Corporation and the UAW § 21(b) (Oct. 14, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 132-33. 29 DC's argument is unpersuasive. United Aircraft is an almost 30-year-old case that does not reflect the Board's current policy on the application of Collyer to information-request cases. And United Aircraft is the only case cited by DC in support of its position. At oral argument before this court, DC's counsel acknowledged that the Board's policy since United Aircraft has been entirely consistent in holding that information cases will not be deferred under Collyer. He also acknowledged that DC was seeking to overturn this well-established policy and not that the Board's decision in this case reflects a change in policy. Indeed, counsel acknowledged that all of the Board's case law since United Aircraft supports the Board's decision in this case. 30 At most, United Aircraft stands for the unsurprising principle that the union's right to disclosure of relevant and necessary data can be waived by the union in a collective bargaining agreement. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra, at 859. And after the Court's decision in Metropolitan Edison, such a waiver must be clear and unmistakable. 460 U.S. at 708, 103 S.Ct. at 1477. Otherwise 31 United Aircraft may have been overruled sub silentio. In International Harvester Co., [241 N.L.R.B. 600 (1979)] without citing United Aircraft, the Board held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that vested the arbitrator of a grievance with authority to order disclosure of information did not require deferral of unfair labor practice charges alleging wrongful refusal to turn over information that would assist the union in determining whether to initiate the grievance process. In later decisions, the Board has refused to defer to arbitration in cases where the information sought relates directly to the subject matter of other pending grievances. Even where an employer claimed that the underlying subject matter was arbitrable, the Board refused to defer to arbitration. 32 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra, at 888 (footnotes omitted). 33 The Board's current practice appears to emanate from two cases decided in the mid-1980's. In the first, General Dynamics Corp., the Board adopted the conclusions of the ALJ, who had found that the union had a statutory right to receive the requested information. 270 N.L.R.B. at 829-30, 1984 WL 36451. The ALJ found that the union had not clearly and unmistakably waived that right in the CBA, despite the presence of a clause providing for factual investigation at Step Two of the CBA's grievance procedure. Id. at 834-35 (citing Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 708 & n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 1477 & n. 12). The Board held that it would not defer the disputes over requests for information to arbitration. The Board cited its earlier decision, also called General Dynamics Corp., in explaining its Collyer policy of refusing to defer information cases to the grievance and arbitration process: 34 [T]he procedural issue of disclosure of the [information] is merely preliminary to the resolution of the parties' substantive dispute over the [issues raised by the grievances]. In these circumstances, we find no merit in encumbering the process of resolving the pending... grievances with the inevitable delays attendant to the filing, processing, and submission to arbitration of a new grievance regarding the information request. Such a two-tiered arbitration process would not be consistent with our national policy favoring the voluntary and expeditious resolution of disputes through arbitration. 35 Id. at 829 (citing 268 N.L.R.B. at 1432 n. 2) (brackets and ellipses in original). 36 The Board reaffirmed the policy of General Dynamics in United Technologies. In that case, the Board refused to defer any of the unfair labor practices concerning requests for information, notwithstanding the presence of an information provision in Step Two of the parties' CBA. 274 N.L.R.B. at 505 (citing General Dynamics ). The Board also found that the union had clearly and unmistakably waived its statutory right to receive certain information in connection with the preparation of a future grievance. Id. at 507. However, the clear and unmistakable waiver was not based on the Step Two grievance provision alone. Instead, the Board's decision rested on the conjunction of the CBA's Step Two information provision and a separate letter of understanding between the union and the company in which the union explicitly relinquished its right to certain requests for information. Id. United Technologies thus demonstrates that a Step Two information provision in the CBA, on its own, is not enough to constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of the statutory right to receive information. The result in United Technologies was not surprising, because the Board has long held that the mere existence of a grievance machinery does not relieve a company of its obligation to furnish a union with information needed to perform its statutory functions. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15, 16 (1962), enf'd, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir.1963). 37 The Board's policy of excluding information-request cases from Collyer 's reach has remained consistent since General Dynamics and United Technologies. See Clarkson Indus., 312 N.L.R.B. at 355 (holding that the Board has not deferred cases involving requests for information) (citing United States Postal Serv., 276 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1285 (1985)); United States Postal Serv., 307 N.L.R.B. 1105, 1108 (1992) (stating that it is the Board's general policy not to defer information requests to the parties' arbitration process) (citing Clinchfield Coal Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1985)), enf'd, 17 F.3d 1433 (4th Cir. 1994). The crystal-clear nature of the Board's Collyer doctrine was most recently highlighted by its opinion in Ormet Aluminum Mill Products Corp., 335 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 2001 WL 1203207 (Aug. 27, 2001), in which the Board adopted the ALJ's finding that the company had violated NLRA § 8(a)(5) by refusing to furnish certain requested information to the union. Chairman Hurtgen dissented, arguing that it would be more prudent to have an arbitrator decide both the contractual question at issue in the underlying grievance and the informational issue. Id. at 4. Chairman Hurtgen argued that it is not sensible to have one forum (the Board) decide information issues and another forum (the arbitrator) decide the merits. Id. He recognize[d] that the Board refuses to `Collyerize' information cases, but he advocated abandoning that policy and adopting his recommended approach, which, he urged, would prevent the waste of the Board's time and resources. Id. (footnote omitted). 38 The majority rejected Chairman Hurtgen's approach, in part because it found that his approach ignored the benefit to the grievance procedure derived from a party's prompt fulfillment of its obligation to furnish requested information. Id. at 3. The majority cited the Supreme Court's reasoning in Acme, in which the Court disapproved of forcing a union to take a grievance all the way through to arbitration without providing the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim. Id. (citing Acme, 385 U.S. at 438, 87 S.Ct. at 569). In short, the majority found that the arbitration process could only function effectively if the Board continued to enforce directly the duty to furnish relevant information. 39 We do not purport to take sides in this colloquy between Board members. The Board always will be free in the future to consider expanding Collyer to include deferment of information cases, either on a theory of exhaustion, see Hammontree, 925 F.2d at 1496-99, or because the parties agreed to arbitrate the claim, see id. at 1503 (Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that even without a clear and unmistakable waiver, the Board could still require deferment where parties agree to arbitrate a statutory claim). Such a change, however, is squarely within the purview of the Board, not of this court. That few cases challenging this aspect of the Board's Collyer policy have been brought before the Courts of Appeals in the past two decades suggests that the Board's latitude in this regard is obvious. Cf. Am. Nat'l Can Co., 924 F.2d at 522 (upholding a refusal to defer requests for information and recognizing that the Board has traditionally refused to defer in right-to-information cases); NLRB v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion by refusing to defer an information dispute to arbitration). 40 One final word is in order. The Board's refusal to depart from its Collyer policy simply because of the presence of a Step Two information provision in the CBA grievance procedure is perfectly consistent with established Board policy. First, the mere reference to information in a single step of a grievance procedure falls short of the Board's current requirement of a clear and unmistakable waiver. Indeed, DC did not mount a serious argument that the parties' CBA in this case contained a clear and unmistakable waiver of the Union's right to receive information at any stage of the grievance procedure, or even outside the context of a formal grievance. Nor could it have. The grievance procedure's clause on information at Step Two is not, on its own, the kind of express relinquishment of statutory rights that the Board requires. See General Dynamics, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1432 n. 2 (holding that the Step Two language does not constitute a `clear and unmistakable' waiver and refusing to defer the dispute over the union's request for information). 41 Second, when one considers that not all requests for information arise in the context of a formal grievance, let alone at Step Two, it would make no sense to rely on such a provision to overcome the Board's current policy under Collyer. In this case, for example, the request for last chance information was made after the employee's grievance had already been denied at Step Two. Order at 1. As discussed supra, the Union made the request in order to evaluate whether it was worth proceeding to arbitration on the underlying grievance. In other cases, a union might make a stand-alone request for information in order to determine whether to initiate a grievance at all. It is therefore unsurprising that, in United Technologies and in this case, the Board refused to defer the issues notwithstanding the presence of a Step Two information provision.