Opinion ID: 2603647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: In January 1989, Robin Rose Barnes was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and aggravated assault. The State also alleged 4 prior felony convictions. Although Barnes initially pleaded not guilty to the possession and assault charges, she subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State through which she pleaded guilty to the possession charge, a class 6 felony, with one prior felony conviction in exchange for dismissal of the aggravated assault charge and the allegations of the 3 other prior felony convictions. The parties stipulated that Barnes would receive an aggravated term of 3 years' imprisonment. At her change of plea hearing, the trial judge advised Barnes that for possession of drug paraphernalia with one prior felony conviction she could be sentenced to a presumptive term of 2.25 years, a maximum term of 3 years, and a minimum term of 1.5 years, and in addition that she could be fined up to $150,000 plus a 37% surcharge. The judge further advised her that probation was not available and that she would be ineligible for parole or release on any other basis until she had served one-half of any sentence imposed. This advice had been set forth in the plea agreement. The judge did not specifically explain to Barnes how the prior conviction affected the length of her sentence, nor did he inform her of possible sentences she might receive if she chose to revoke the plea agreement. See rule 17.4(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. He ascertained, however, that Barnes understood she could be convicted on both the possession and assault charges with 4 prior felony convictions if she elected to revoke the plea agreement and proceed to trial. In response to the trial judge's inquiry, Barnes indicated that she understood the provisions of her plea agreement and that, by entering into the agreement, she was waiving her right to a jury trial. The judge, however, did not advise her that this right to a jury trial included the right to have the jury separately determine (1) her guilt or innocence on the felony possession charge and (2) the existence of the prior felony conviction alleged by the State. See rule 19.1(b). Barnes pleaded guilty to the possession charge and admitted the prior conviction. The trial judge determined that she acted knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in pleading guilty and admitting the prior, and he concluded that a factual basis supported the plea and the admission. The trial judge sentenced Barnes to the stipulated aggravated term of 3 years' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a sentence she was serving for another conviction. He noted that the aggravated sentence was appropriate in view of Barnes' prior convictions. Court of Appeals' Opinion On appeal, Barnes' counsel filed an Anders brief requesting the court of appeals to search the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Upon reviewing the record, the court concluded that, although the trial court had adequately advised Barnes of her rights regarding the guilty plea for the possession charge, it had failed to inform her of the rights she waived by admitting the prior conviction. State v. Barnes, 165 Ariz. 111, 112, 796 P.2d 913, 914 (App. 1990). The court noted: Our review of the transcript reveals that the trial court did not comply with [rule] 17.6. Defendant was not separately advised of her rights pertaining to the prior conviction. At a minimum, the trial court should have advised defendant that if she elected a jury trial at which she did not admit the prior conviction, she would be entitled to a further jury determination as to whether the state proved the existence of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 165 Ariz. at 112, 796 P.2d at 914 (footnote omitted). Initially, the court affirmed the conviction, but remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether [Barnes] understood the effect a prior conviction would have upon her sentence. Id. The court reasoned that, if the hearing revealed that Barnes was fully aware of her rights, failure to comply with rule 17.6 would be merely a technical error. 165 Ariz. at 112-13, 796 P.2d at 914-15. In contrast, if the trial court determined that Barnes was unaware of the effect of admitting the prior conviction, the admission and sentence should be set aside, and the trial court should proceed in accordance with rule 17. 165 Ariz. at 113, 796 P.2d at 915. Barnes filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the appropriate remedy for a rule 17 violation is to vacate the plea. Agreeing with Barnes, the court vacated the plea and remanded the matter to the trial court. See State v. Barnes, 165 Ariz. at 113, 796 P.2d at 915 (App. 1990) (supplemental opinion), citing State v. Carr, 22 Ariz. App. 407, 527 P.2d 1250 (1974).