Opinion ID: 764164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII Enforcement Scheme

Text: 14 Under Title VII, once an individual files a charge alleging unlawful employment practices, the EEOC must investigate the charge and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it is true. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1998). By filing a charge, an individual does not file a complaint seeking relief, but merely informs the EEOC of possible discrimination. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984). If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred, it must endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. If the EEOC cannot secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer, it may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1998). If the court agrees with the EEOC that the defendant-employer has intentionally engaged in unlawful discrimination, the court may order injunctive relief and such remedies as the reinstatement or hiring of employees, back pay, and compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e-5(g)(1) (1998). 15 While allowing the EEOC to bring suit against employers in federal court, Title VII retains a private cause of action--apart from any action the statute entitles the EEOC to bring--for the individual victim of employment discrimination. Where the EEOC investigates a charge and, after 180 days, either concludes that there is no reasonable cause to believe it is true or fails to make a finding of reasonable cause, the EEOC must notify the aggrieved individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1998). If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe an employer has violated Title VII but chooses not to bring suit on behalf of the federal government, the EEOC will issue a notice of right to sue on the charge to the aggrieved party. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b) (1998). Or, if after 180 days the EEOC fails to make a reasonable cause finding, the aggrieved individual may request a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See id. An individual may not file suit under Title VII if she does not possess a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir.1998). 16 Therefore, for 180 days after the filing of a charge, the EEOC retains exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of that charge. General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). This 180-day period is critical to the statutory scheme. EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir.1997). During that period, the EEOC may distinguish between those cases in which it believes it may vindicate the public interest by filing suit itself, and those in which it chooses not to file suit and instead leaves to the individual aggrieved the decision of whether to file suit in order to advance her own interests. Indeed, it is only at the termination of the 180-day period of exclusive jurisdiction that a complainant whose charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated may bring a lawsuit. See Occidental Life Ins. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). Not only does Title VII bar an aggrieved individual from suing a private employer in federal court during that period without authorization from the EEOC, see Hearst, 103 F.3d at 466, it bars an aggrieved individual from ever bringing such a suit should the EEOC choose to sue on its own. In such cases, the only right Title VII reserves to an aggrieved individual is the right to intervene in the EEOC's action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1998). 17 Moreover, an aggrieved individual may not withdraw her charge without the consent of the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1998). If the EEOC denies an individual consent to withdraw her charge, the EEOC may proceed under Title VII to prosecute its own civil action against an employer on the basis of that charge. See EEOC v. McLean Trucking, 525 F.2d 1007, 1009 & n. 2 (6th Cir.1975). Indeed, the EEOC depends on the filing of charges for notification of possible discrimination. See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69. Consequently, courts have observed that an individual may not contract away her right to file a charge with the EEOC, as such contracts are void as against public policy. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1987); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (9th Cir.1987). Significantly, an individual may not, in an effort to effectuate her own interests, take away the enforcement authority of the EEOC even if she wishes to withdraw her charge of discrimination.