Opinion ID: 625857
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Regarded As”

Text: The applicable version of the ADA requires an employer to believe that an employee is substantially limited in a major life activity in order for that employee to be “regarded as” disabled under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. An employer so regards his employee if: “(1) [the employer] mistakenly believes that [the employee] has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) [the employer] mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). Importantly, however, the fact that an employer offers an employee an accommodation does not necessarily prove that the employer believed the employee suffered a substantial limitation in a major life activity. Kupstas, 398 F.3d at 614. To succeed under the “regarded as” prong, a plaintiff must establish an accepted major life activity under the ADA and prove that his employer believed him to be substantially limited in that major life activity.
The EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA list as major life activities “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007). This list has not been interpreted as being exclusive, see Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2009), but, prior to the Amendments, courts were careful not 14 No. 11-2664 to refer to life activities as being major unless they were “of central importance to daily life.” Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002); see also Winsley, 563 F.3d at 603 (“[T]he listed activities are so important to everyday life that almost anyone would consider himself limited in a material way if he could not perform them.”). Notably, Steffen, in his brief, does not expressly identify the major life activity in which he is allegedly limited. In his Second Amended Complaint, how- ever, he claims that he was limited in the “major life activities of engaging in motor skills, including repetitive bending, stooping, climbing, reaching and twisting.” He also claims that he was limited to lifting no more than 25 pounds, that he could not stand for more than 2 hours, and that he needed to alternate between sitting and standing. Steffen also implies that he would not have been able to return to “full duty” work, suggesting that he may have been asserting a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Assuming arguendo that Steffen has not waived his proposed major life activities by omitting them from his brief, he has not proven that, for any activities that qualified as major life activities prior to the Amendments, the USPS regarded him as substantially limited in his ability to perform them.5 5 We note that with respect to the major life activities Steffen identifies in his Second Amended Complaint, if they qualify as major life activities at all, Steffen was not substantially limited as defined by the ADA and Rehab Acts. That is, the USPS’ beliefs aside, he was not legally handicapped. This Circuit’s pre-Amendment jurisprudence clearly indicated that (continued...) No. 11-2664 15 5 (...continued) an inability to lift 25 pounds was not a substantial limitation on a major life activity. See, e.g., id. (inability to lift 35 pounds was not a substantial limitation); Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2007) (inability to lift 25-30 pounds not a substantial limitation); Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2002) (expressing doubt that an inability to lift 10 pounds could be considered a substantial limitation). As with lifting, this Circuit’s pre-Amendment precedent did not explicitly comment on bending as a major life activity. In light of the standard established in Toyota, however, we do not think that bending is central to one’s daily life. 534 U.S. at 197. Furthermore, Steffen is precluded only from engaging in bending, stooping, climbing, reaching and twisting repetitively, fostering doubts not only about whether repetitive bending, independent of bending, is a major life activity, but also about whether the inability to perform these movements repetitively is a substantial limitation on the acts. This Court, in Williams v. Excel Foundry & Machine, Incorporated, recognized standing as a major life activity. 489 F.3d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 2007). In Williams, however, we rejected as a substantial limitation the inability to stand for 30 to 40 minutes—a hindrance much greater than Steffen’s inability to stand for over two hours. Finally, Steffen does not qualify as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. To be substantially limited in one’s ability to work, one must be significantly restricted in the ability to perform more than just a single job or the particular job that one held before he acquired a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3)(I). Steffen was not precluded from performing a broad range or an entire class of jobs. In fact, the USPS provided an accommodation for Steffen based on the same injury he had when he was fired for the several years prior to (continued...) 16 No. 11-2664
The EEOC’s regulations interpreting the ADA, define “substantially limits” as: Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or . . . [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2007); see also Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 765 (7th Cir. 2001). The regulations further provide that in determining whether someone is substantially limited in a major life activity, one should consider the following factors: “(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the ex- pected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2007). Steffen contends that the USPS regarded him as substantially limited in a major life activity because, in a single line from the deposition of the USPS representative that signed the Settlement Agreement, the USPS 5 (...continued) his three-year absence, indicating that he could perform other jobs for the USPS. No. 11-2664 17 representative stated that she believed that Steffen was receiving an accommodations for a disability. The following is an excerpt of Emma Hughes’ deposition: Q: What accommodations do you recall that he re- ceived prior to going on AWOL? A: I’m not sure what his duties involved, but he did not do the full duties of his position prior to—of his position. I’m not sure what his duties were, but they were not full. Q: At the time that you negotiated this agreement then, Exhibit No. 11, did you believe that Mr. Steffen was receiving accommodations for a disability that he had acquired through an on-the-job injury? A: No. Q: Okay. Did you believe that he was receiving ac- commodations for a disability that he had acquired through an off-the-job injury? A: Yes. Steffen argues that Hughes admitted she believed that Steffen “was receiving accommodations for a disability,” so, he maintains, the USPS must have “regarded [him] as” disabled. For further support, Steffen underscores that Hughes discussed her understanding of when the USPS was required to offer accommodations to disabled employees, both illustrating her familiarity with the ADA and indicating that she must have known what “disability” meant under the ADA. When she affirmatively answered the final question quoted above, he posits, she knew that disability meant “substantial limita18 No. 11-2664 tion on a major life activity.” Consequently, he argues, her answer must be read as “Yes. I believed that Steffen was receiving accommodations for a substantial limitation on a major life activity. I believed that he was disabled.” Setting aside the fact that Hughes’ understanding of the ADA’s accommodations requirements was incorrect, there are several reasons why this single line in her deposition is insufficient to prove that the USPS regarded Steffen as being substantially limited in a major life activity. First, many impairments that are con- sidered “disabilities” under the term’s colloquial meaning are not “disabilities” for the purposes of the ADA and the Rehab Act, see, e.g., Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and nothing about the context of Hughes’ deposition suggests that either she or her questioner was referring to the strict definition of “disability” found in the ADA. Moreover, the question eliciting Hughes’ allegedly damning answer centered on whether Steffen had received accommodations in the past and whether those accommodations were the result of an on-the-job or off-the-job injury. The fact that Steffen previously received an accommodation–or that Hughes believed he had—does not prove that she believed that he suffered a substantial limitation in a major life activity. See Kupstas, 398 F.3d at 614. The question did not prompt her to contemplate whether Steffen’s impairments rose to the level of a substantial limitation on a major life activity, and Steffen’s suggestions that she entertained this line of analysis strain credulity. No. 11-2664 19 Finally, Hughes’ deposition affirmatively suggests that she did not consider Steffen disabled under the ADA, or, at the very least, that she did not know either way. She stated, for example, that she did not know the extent of his injuries; that she believed his union representative had told her that he would be able to return to full duty; that she did not believe that it would be impossible to return to work; and that she did not know the seriousness of his injuries. Her testimony does not indicate that the USPS mistakenly believed that Steffen suffered from an impairment he did not have, nor does it suggest that the USPS mistakenly believed that the impairments he did have were more limiting than his doctors had expressed. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. In short, Hughes’ deposition does not prove that the USPS regarded Steffen as disabled. Steffen fails to prove that he falls within the ambit of the ADA and Rehab Acts. He did not provide evidence by which a reasonable jury could conclude that the USPS regarded him as substantially limited in a major activity. Thus, Steffen’s claim must fail.