Opinion ID: 799901
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Herrera's Retaliation Claim

Text: Herrera contends that, even if administrative preclusion bars his race-discrimination claim, his federal retaliation claim is not barred because he never presented that claim to the Fayette HRC. Churchill McGee counters that the HRC necessarily decided that no retaliation had occurred by finding that Churchill McGee fired Herrera for excessive absences and that this reason was not pretextual. However, the HRC made no such findings. The HRC concluded only that Churchill McGee did not treat Herrera differently than similarly situated white employees. Disparate treatment is one way to show pretext, but it is not the only way. See, e.g., Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994). The HRC made no determination as to whether Churchill McGee's proffered reason for the termination had any basis in fact or actually motivated the discharge, for example. See id. The HRC did not find that Churchill McGee fired Herrera because of excessive absences, only that Churchill McGee did not fire Herrera because he is African-Cuban. Moreover, Herrera could still maintain a retaliation claim even if his excessive absences were sufficient to support termination. We held in Hollimon v. Shelby County Government that the county merit review board's determination that the plaintiff had been terminated for good cause did not preclude her from bringing Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims in federal court when she had not raised those issues before the board. 325 Fed.Appx. 406, 409-10 (6th Cir.2009) (unpublished opinion). Even though the board concluded that Hollimon had violated the policies and procedures of the Shelby County Government, ... [it] did not decide whether those stated justifications were the real reason behind Hollimon's firing or just a facade. Id. at 410 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Issue preclusion thus did not apply, because [t]he board never decided one way or another whether retaliation was involved. Id. We reached the same conclusion in Cockrel, holding that issue preclusion would not bar the plaintiff's § 1983 retaliation claim [e]ven if the appeals board had decided that the reasons proffered by the defendants for Cockrel's discharge were adequate to support the termination and that there was substantial evidence of defendants' proffered reasons in the record, because, unless Cockrel raised her retaliation claim, it would not have decided, nor even considered, whether the true motivation of defendants' actions was to retaliate against her. 270 F.3d at 1046-47. As in Hollimon and Cockrel, the Fayette HRC simply did not consider the issue of whether Herrera's termination was an act of retaliation. Because the HRC did not litigate or decide any issue regarding retaliation, Kentucky courts would not give preclusive effect to the HRC's no-probable-cause determination in a subsequent retaliation suit. See Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465. The third prong for administrative preclusion under Elliott is not satisfied. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying administrative preclusion to dismiss Herrera's § 1981 retaliation claim. [9] Although Churchill McGee urges us to rule in its favor on the merits of summary judgment if we disagree with the district court's preclusion holding, we decline to do so. The merits of Herrera's retaliation claim are best addressed in the first instance by the district court.