Opinion ID: 2167214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Hearing Committee Analysis

Text: The Hearing Committee recommended a 90-day suspension, without fitness. Its recommendation was based upon consideration of the traditional factors analyzed by the Board, i.e., (1) prior discipline; (2) seriousness of the misconduct; (3) prejudice to the clients; (4) violation of other disciplinary rules; (5) conduct involving dishonesty/misrepresentation; (6) respondent's attitude; and (7) any mitigating or aggravating factors. See In re Jackson, 650 A.2d 675, 678-79 (D.C.1994) (per curiam); In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 924 (D.C.1987) (en banc). Taking these factors in order, the Hearing Committee found no prior discipline. H.C. Rpt. at 32. In light of the Court's decision in Schoeneman, the Hearing Committee did not consider as prior discipline any of the reciprocal discipline imposed by other jurisdictions, and since the second reciprocal discipline proceeding, based upon the District Court's reprimand, was then still pending before the Board, the Hearing Committee did not consider that either. As to the seriousness of the misconduct, the Hearing Committee found a pattern of neglect and misleading conduct in Respondent's handling of the three clients, whom he was not authorized to represent during his period of suspension in the District Court. The Hearing Committee concluded this was serious misconduct. Id. The Hearing Committee found Respondent's conduct prejudiced all three clients. Id. The Hearing Committee found that violation of additional disciplinary rules was not a factor in this case. Id. The Hearing Committee found additional dishonesty in the Odom and Ratliff representations based upon evidence that, while under a continuing suspension in the District Court, Respondent lured these clients back by suggesting to them that he could resuscitate their discrimination claims years later, without any reasonable basis in fact or law for making such a claim. Id. at 28-30, 32. The Hearing Committee found it difficult to assess Respondent's attitude. Id. at 32. It noted that he was understandably concerned about the history concerning his suspensions following the revocation of his license in Virginia, and showed contrition about his handling of Ms. Odom's and Ms. Ratliff's matters, but not Mr. Snowden's. Id. at 32-33. On the question of mitigation, the Hearing Committee found the sequence of events in this jurisdiction and the District Court, based upon Respondent's voluntary surrender of his license to practice in Virginia, and specifically the Court's subsequent vacatur of the temporary suspension nunc pro tunc, to constitute unique and compelling circumstances in mitigation, citing In re Dory, 528 A.2d 1247 (D.C. 1987) (per curiam); In re Dory, 552 A.2d 518 (1989) (per curiam); In re McLain, 671 A.2d 951, 954 n. 4 (D.C.1996); In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206, 212 (D.C.1989); and In re Hessler, 549 A.2d 700, 716 (D.C. 1988). H.C. Rpt. at 34-35. On the other hand, the Hearing Committee found Respondent's misconduct aggravated by his dishonesty to his clients, in his affirmative misrepresentations and material omissions regarding the status of their matters, which were designed to conceal his suspension in the District Court. Id. at 35-36. The Hearing Committee engaged in a thoughtful review of sanctions in cases involving neglect aggravated by dishonesty. It found Respondent's conduct less egregious than that in In re Grimes, 687 A.2d 198 (D.C.1996) (per curiam), where the Court ordered a one-year suspension with fitness. It found Respondent's dishonesty less serious than that in In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226 (D.C.1986) (en banc), where a six-month suspension was imposed. Based on its review of the case law, [7] the Hearing Committee concluded that a suspension in the range of 90-180 days, without fitness, was appropriate. The Committee recommended a 90-day suspension in light of the mitigating circumstances of Respondent's interim suspension which was later vacated nunc pro tunc. H.C. Rpt. at 38. Bar Counsel contends on exception that the period of suspension should be one year. Citing In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (18-month suspension with fitness), In re Grimes, 687 A.2d 198 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (one-year suspension with fitness) and In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600 (D.C.1992) (per curiam) (nine-month suspension with fitness for unauthorized practice of law), Bar Counsel submits that the Hearing Committee's sanction is too lenient. In addition, Bar Counsel argues that the Court's interim suspension did not harm Respondent, who was engaged in federal practice and thus not affected by the suspension, and so should not be considered in mitigation. Respondent contends that no sanction should be imposed, primarily on the basis that Bar Counsel erred in seeking reciprocal discipline after deciding not to pursue Respondent in an original proceeding for the same conduct.