Opinion ID: 1288587
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Juror Dismissal

Text: Wilson next argues that the trial judge improperly dismissed a potential juror for cause because her statements regarding her inability to impose a death sentence were equivocal. The State concedes that Wilson has preserved this argument. He contends that O.R.C. § 2945.25(C) incorporates the standard set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), for the dismissal of a juror unable to impose a death sentence. Wilson claims that by applying the standard announced in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the Ohio Supreme Court erred in two ways: (1) applying the more lenient Witt standard violated Wilson's liberty interest in the stricter Witherspoon standard, and (2) by applying the Witt standard the Ohio Supreme Court violated the Separation of Powers doctrine by overruling the Ohio legislature. In Witt, the Supreme Court explained that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment when the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court elaborated that this standard . . . does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the Court noted that deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 844. The Court in Witt made clear, however, that it was merely clarifying its previous Witherspoon decision. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. (We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon . . . . ). Moreover, we have explained that a petitioner must show that the selected jury was biased to succeed on this claim: When reviewing a trial court's dismissal of potential jurors for cause, this court must determine whether the trial court's decision prevented the empaneling of an impartial jury. It is not enough for the defendant to show that the decision to exclude the two jurors was improper. He also must show that the jury selected was biased. Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 844 (6th Cir.1999). Wilson has made no claim that the jury empaneled was biased. Without a showing that his jury was biased, merely arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing a prospective juror for cause is insufficient to warrant habeas relief. Hill, 199 F.3d at 844-45. This claim is without merit.