Opinion ID: 844251
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to the adequacy of the questionnaire

Text: Initially, defendant contends the jury questionnaire was defective because none of the questions directly address[ed] the pertinent constitutional issue in Witt i.e., whether the prospective juror could temporarily set aside his or her personal beliefs and follow the court's instructions in determining penalty. (See Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447.) As explained above, defendant forfeited this claim by expressing agreement in the trial court with the form of the questionnaire. In any event, his argument lacks merit. In Stewart, we held that the trial court erred by excusing for cause five prospective jurors based upon their [written] answers to a jury questionnaire that asked whether the prospective juror's views on the death penalty would prevent or make it very difficult for him or her to impose the penalty. ( Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1261, citing Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 442, 444-445 and Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 530.) The make it very difficult language in the Stewart questionnaire precluded the trial court from ascertaining whether a juror's response supported disqualification under the Wainwright v. Witt standard requiring that such person's views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair that person's ability to perform his or her duties. ( People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 444-445; Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) ( Russell, supra, at p. 1261.) That is not the case here. Question No. 46 directly asked prospective jurors whether they would always vote for either life or death. [22] The wording of this particular question is equivalent to that which we approved in Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 531, and fully enabled the trial judge to ascertain whether a prospective juror was substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt. (See Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 787.) In addition, unlike in Stewart, the questionnaire as a whole included expansive and detailed questions on capital punishment and gave jurors the clear opportunity to disclose views against it so strong as to disqualify them for duty on a death penalty case. ( Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531; see Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1261.) (8) As defendant observes, the questionnaire also inquired whether prospective jurors would have difficulty in voting to impose the death penalty. Inclusion of such a question, however, does not necessarily render a questionnaire inadequate to screen for disqualified prospective jurors, provided other questions are framed in such a way as to elicit the information necessary for a proper excusal under Witt. (See Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 789.) In any event, the trial judge did not excuse the challenged prospective jurors based solely on their answers to question No. 46. We find no basis to conclude that the questionnaire was inherently inadequate.