Opinion ID: 1910818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: merits of nelson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim

Text: While the Court of Appeals could have decided the merits of Nelson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it did not, and for the sake of judicial economy, we choose to do so here. [13] Nelson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of § 28-311.01. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, [14] the defendant must first show that counsel's performance was deficient and second, that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his or her defense. [15] To demonstrate that his or her counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant must show that counsel did not perform at least as well as a criminal lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the area. [16] To prove prejudice, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [17] Nelson contends that § 28-311.01 is unconstitutional because it fails to define the term terror. As we read Nelson's argument, it appears he is challenging both subsections (1)(a) and (c) of the statute, as those are the only subsections that include a form of the word terror. Section 28-311.01 provides in relevant part: (1) A person commits terroristic threats if he or she threatens to commit any crime of violence: (a) With the intent to terrorize another; [or] . . . . (c) In reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror[.] Both subsections (1)(a) and (c) have been subject to constitutional attacks in the past and have been upheld by this court as constitutional. In State v. Schmailzl, [18] § 28-311.01 was challenged as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it failed to define what conduct constituted a threat. We rejected this argument and held that the terroristic threats statute, § 28-311.01(1)(a) . . . is constitutional. [19] Similarly, in State v. Bourke, [20] we held that § 28-311.01(1)(c) was constitutional. We concluded that [s]ubsection (1)(c) of § 28-311.01 defines the crime with enough certainty [and] with sufficient definiteness and . . . ascertainable standards of guilt to inform those subject thereto as to what conduct will render them liable to punishment thereunder. . . .' [21] And again, in State v. Mayo, [22] we held that as used in § 28-311.01(1)(c), the phrase `reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or evacuation' is not unconstitutionally vague. Also relevant to our analysis, although involving a different statute, is State v. Holtan. [23] In Holtan, we addressed a claim that the phrase `serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity' is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. [24] We concluded, among other things, that the word terrorizing was a word in common usage with a meaning well fixed and generally clearly understood. [25] We conclude, as dictated by our precedent, that terror and terrorize are words of common usage and meaning capable of being readily understood by an individual of common intelligence. Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding that § 28-311.01 is not unconstitutionally vague. The statute was sufficiently clear to make Nelson aware that his conduct, as described above, was unlawful. Nelson's counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an argument that has no merit, nor was Nelson prejudiced by his counsel's failure to raise a meritless argument.