Opinion ID: 786677
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Parole Conditions

Text: 211 The Fourth Waiver form signed by Crawford contained two clauses: 212 You [Crawford] and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by an agent of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer. Parolee's Initials You agree to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause. Parolee's Initials 213 Clause 1 specifies that you and your residence and any property under your control may be searched; authorizes searches by law enforcement officers and agents of the Department of Corrections; and authorizes searches without a warrant. By contrast, Clause 2 specifies only that you (Crawford) agree to be searched; authorizes searches by parole officers and other peace officers; and authorizes searches and seizures both with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause. 214 Three different readings of the two clauses are possible. The first two readings understand the clauses as part of an integrated whole in which each clause has a distinct meaning. The third reading understands the clauses as having synonymous meanings. Under none of these readings does the Fourth Waiver form authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford's residence to investigate a pre-parole crime. 215 The first reading focuses on the fact that Clause 1 is narrow and relatively protective. Clause 1 specifies that it applies to searches of Crawford, his residence, and property under his control; and it dispenses only with a requirement for a warrant. By contrast, Clause 2 is general and relatively non-protective. It does not specify any particular kind of search, and it dispenses with both a warrant and a cause requirement. The reference in Clause 1 to a search of a residence suggests that a residential search is authorized under Clause 1, but not under Clause 2. Further, the absence of a statement in Clause 1 that a search may be conducted with or without cause suggests that a search under Clause 1 requires cause, unlike Clause 2. Under this reading, Agent Bowdich's search was not authorized under either clause because Clause 1 does not authorize suspicionless searches at all, and Clause 2 does not authorize suspicionless searches of residences. 216 The second reading focuses on the nature of a parole search under California law. Clause 2 clearly authorizes a conventional suspicionless parole search as described and authorized under California case law. See, e.g., Bravo, 738 P.2d 336. It allows searches at any time with or without a search warrant and with or without cause, and it specifically refers to searches by a parole officer. If Clause 1 is to have some independent meaning, it must refer to other kinds of searches. Searches to investigate pre-parole crimes, not specifically authorized by California case law, would be among these other searches. Under this reading, Agent Bowdich's search was not authorized under either clause because Clause 1 does not allow suspicionless searches at all, and because Clause 2 does not authorize suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes. 217 The third reading abandons the attempt to read the Fourth Waiver form as an integrated whole in which Clauses 1 and 2 have independent meanings. As seen above, Clause 2 authorizes a standard suspicionless parole search under California case law. Clause 1 may be read, redundantly, to authorize exactly the same type of search. In several cases, the California Supreme Court has interpreted a parole condition worded precisely as Clause 1 is worded to authorize a suspicionless parole search. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 31 Cal.4th 318, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496, 499 (2003); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 446. In these cases, the court has interpreted the phrase without a warrant to mean not only without a warrant but also without cause. However, the court in these cases did not discuss any other parole conditions that might also have been present. I therefore do not know whether the court would interpret the phrase without a warrant to dispense with a requirement for cause if there had been an additional parole condition, comparable to Clause 2, dispensing with both warrant and cause. 218 But even if I read Clause 1 to dispense with a requirement for cause, I should not read the clause more broadly than the California Supreme Court has read it. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purposes of parole and probation searches are to ensure current compliance with law and with probation and parole terms. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027. Given this case law, I would require a very clear statement in the Fourth Waiver form that it authorizes a suspicionless search to investigate pre-parole crimes. There is no such clarity in the form Crawford signed. Thus, under any reading consistent with California law, Agent Bowdich's search was not authorized under either Clause 1 or Clause 2, because neither clause authorizes suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes. 219 During oral argument, the Deputy Attorney General told us that the Fourth Waiver form signed by Crawford is no longer used for California parolees. That fact may lessen the long-term importance of this case, but it does not change the parole conditions of which Crawford was given notice. Under any of the possible readings of the Fourth Waiver form, the form does not authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford's residence to investigate a pre-parole crime. The question posed in this case is thus whether the suspicionless search of Crawford's residence was valid in the absence of an explicit parole condition authorizing such a search. 220 B. A Parolee's Expectation of Privacy in the Absence of a Controlling Condition of Parole 221 We know that a parolee has a reduced expectation of privacy, and that a State may condition parole on compliance with often strict terms and conditions of ... release. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). This expectation of privacy may be reduced but not entirely eliminated. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21, 122 S.Ct. 587(balancing privacy interest of probationer). Pursuant to the special needs doctrine, a State may require, as an explicitly stated condition of probation, that a probationer's residence may be searched without a warrant. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). However, the Supreme Court has never held that a parolee can be subjected to a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-parole crime. 1. United States v. Knights 222 The opinion closest on point is the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). That opinion strongly suggests — indeed, almost compels — the conclusion that at least in the absence of an explicitly stated condition of parole providing otherwise, any search of a parolee's residence to investigate a pre-parole crime must be based on at least reasonable suspicion. A California court sentenced Knights to probation subject to the condition that Knights would `[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.' Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. Pursuant to this condition, State authorities conducted a warrantless search of Knights's apartment and found evidence of a current crime. 223 The search of Knights's apartment was not based on probable cause, but merely on reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. The Court construed the terms of the explicit probation condition to permit a suspicionless search, but, because the search in the case was supported by reasonable suspicion, it did not reach the question whether such a suspicionless search condition was valid. Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587. Nor did the Court reach the question whether Knights's purported consent to a search contained in the explicit conditions of probation was, in and of itself, a valid waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 112, 122 S.Ct. 587. 224 The Court did consider the condition of probation a salient circumstance under a totality of the circumstances test because it provided notice to Knights of the searches to which he might be subject. Id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. Weighing the probationer's interest in privacy against the government's interest in the intrusion, the Court held that the balance of ... considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house. Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587(emphasis added). Using an ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis, id. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, the Court concluded: 225 Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term probable cause, a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable. Those interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard here. When an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable. 226 Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 227 In Knights, the probationer was subject to an explicitly stated condition of probation allowing suspicionless searches of his residence for evidence of current crimes, which the court treated as a salient circumstance. Id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. In this case, by contrast, Crawford was subject to no explicit condition of parole that allowed suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes. The argument in favor of the suspicionless search in this case is thus much weaker than in Knights. Not only was Knights subject to an explicit condition of probation; he was also searched for evidence of a current crime. Both of these circumstances indicate that the balance of interests under the totality of the circumstances would require greater justification for a valid search in Crawford's case than in Knights's. 2. Special Needs Doctrine 228 Judge Trott contends that the special needs doctrine allows a suspicionless search in this case. I disagree for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has authorized suspicionless searches only in a narrowly defined class of cases, where special needs of the state beyond the normal need for law enforcement justify the program of searches. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The purpose of the search here — investigation of a bank robbery that took place over two years earlier — clearly served the normal need for law enforcement to solve past crimes. 229 Second, in addition to Knights (discussed above), Judge Trott relies on Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998), and Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). Scott and Griffin both involved enforcement of explicit conditions of parole or probation. Neither Scott nor Griffin supports the application of a special needs analysis to uphold a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-parole crime. 230 In Scott, an explicit condition of parole prohibited Scott from owning or possessing firearms or other weapons. When firearms, a compound bow, and three arrows were found in his bedroom, his parole was revoked. The Court did not need to reach the question of the constitutionality of the search of Scott's bedroom because its narrow holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply in parole revocation hearings was sufficient to decide the case. Id. at 362 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 2014. Without mentioning the phrase special needs, the Court wrote, [t]he State ... has an `overwhelming interest' in ensuring that a parolee complies with [conditions of parole] and is returned to prison if he fails to do so. 524 U.S. at 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014. 231 In Griffin, an explicit condition of probation permitted a warrantless search of probationer Griffin's residence so long as there were reasonable grounds to believe Griffin possessed contraband. 483 U.S. at 870-71, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Court held that supervision of probationer Griffin was a `special need' of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large. Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Reasonable grounds, as interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, required less suspicion than probable cause, but more than no suspicion. In Griffin's case, the reasonable grounds requirement was satisfied by the presence of a detective's tip that contraband might be present. The Court upheld a search of Griffin's residence: 232 We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by reasonable grounds, as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 233 Id. at 875-76, 107 S.Ct. 3164. 234 In this case, by contrast to Scott and Griffin, the State cannot rely on an explicit condition of parole. Without such a condition in the Fourth Waiver form, we have no formal expression of need — special or otherwise — by the State. Moreover, the explicit search condition whose constitutionality was sustained in Griffin — based on the State's formal expression of its special need — did not permit a suspicionless search. It permitted only a search based on reasonable grounds. Finally, and perhaps most important, the searches in both Scott and Griffin were for evidence of current crimes. By contrast, Crawford's residence was searched because Agent Bowdich was investigating a pre-parole crime. In sum, neither Scott nor Griffin supports allowing a suspicionless search here.