Opinion ID: 2077363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Communication with Police Officer

Text: Martin argues that his statements to Officer Davies were inadmissible as privileged communications relating to a plea bargain. Davies testified, [Martin] asked if there was any sort of deal that could be worked out for him to receive a lesser charge or lesser sentence in return for him doing cases on people that he bought drugs from. Davies asked some preliminary questions but never made an agreement. Martin claims that Officer Davies had some authority to arrange a bargain because he asked preliminary questions. Statements made by a defendant as part of plea negotiations are not admissible in the trial of the charge. Moulder v. State (1972), 154 Ind. App. 248, 289 N.E.2d 522. This principle is also expressed in Ind. Code § 35-35-3-4 (Burns 1985 Repl.): A plea agreement, or a verbal or written communication concerning the plea agreement, may not be admitted into evidence at the trial of the case, should the plea agreement not culminate in approval by the court. Seven days after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this case, this Court held that statements made by a person prior to the existence of any charge against him to a police officer who had no authority to enter into a binding agreement were not part of the plea bargaining process. Chase v. State (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 784. Justice DeBruler wrote for the Court: The plea bargaining process does not start until persons having the authority to make a binding agreement have agreed to negotiate. There must be an agreement, a meeting of the minds, after the leveling of a felony or misdemeanor charge, to enter into plea negotiations. A unilateral offer of evidence to induce a party to negotiate is not protected. Id. at 786. Thus to qualify as a privileged communication, a statement must meet two requirements: first, the defendant must have been charged with a crime at the time of the statement, and, second, the statement must have been made to someone with authority to enter into a binding plea bargain. [1] The defendant in Chase met neither of these two requirements. He had not been charged at the time of his statement and the officers with whom he spoke did not have authority to make a binding plea agreement. In this case, by contrast, Martin apparently had been charged at the time he made his statement. [2] Nonetheless, Davies did not have authority to negotiate on behalf of the prosecutor. He never entered into any sort of agreement with Martin. Martin's statements were a unilateral offer of evidence to induce the State to negotiate. Officer Davies did not purport to have authority to enter into a plea agreement. Even though he asked some preliminary questions, there is no reason to think he was in a position to bargain. Appellant's statements to Officer Davies were admissible.