Opinion ID: 1207983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Of the Standards of Review

Text: Following Booker, we are constrained to review sentences for reasonableness. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61, 125 S.Ct. 738; see also United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 26-27 (2006). Reasonableness review requires an examination of the length of the sentence (substantive reasonableness) as well as the procedure employed in arriving at the sentence (procedural reasonableness). See United States v. Canova, 485 F.3d 674, 679 (2d Cir.2007). In our review of district court sentences, we are required to apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 591. We recently stated that [a]s to substance, we will not substitute our own judgment for the district court's on the question of what is sufficient to meet the § 3553(a) considerations in any particular case and that the substantive determination of a District Court will be set aside only in those special cases where the range of permissible decisions does not encompass the District Court's determination. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc). Accordingly, when conducting substantive review, we take into account the totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district courts. Id. at 190. However, the deference due the district court in sentencing requires that we first be satisfied that the procedural requirements for sentencing have been satisfied. Id. at 189. Procedural error occurs when the district court (1) fails to calculate the Guidelines range; (2) is mistaken in the Guidelines calculation; (3) treats the Guidelines as mandatory; (4) does not give proper consideration to the § 3553(a) factors; (5) makes clearly erroneous factual findings; (6) does not adequately explain the sentence imposed; or (7) deviates from the Guidelines range without explanation. Id. at 190. We have noted that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if a district court committed an error of law in the course of exercising discretion, Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114 (emphasis supplied), erred in determining the applicable Guideline range or the availability of departure authority, United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis supplied), or misapprehended its ability to impose a non-Guidelines sentence, see United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 661-62 (2d Cir.2008). Our identification of significant procedural error may be a cause for remanding to the district court for explanation or correction. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190. We undertake a reasonableness review even after a District Court declines to resentence pursuant to Crosby. United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 474 (2d Cir.2007). Such a review is precluded, however, where (1) the court determines that the discharge of its obligations under post- Booker procedures, treating the Guidelines as advisory only, would not result in a sentence materially different from the sentence imposed under the mandatory Guidelines procedure; or (2) the law of the case doctrine applies to bar challenges to sentencing rulings that were, or could have been, adjudicated in the initial appeal. Id. at 475. The law of the case doctrine will not, however, bar a defendant who is not resentenced after a Crosby remand from challenging the procedures used by the district court during the Crosby remand, and one not resentenced may therefore challeng[e] the manner in which the district court conducted the Crosby remand. Id. at 476.