Opinion ID: 1128898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Felony Conviction Record, if Any, of Sillence

Text: (2) A motion for discovery by an accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery in the interests of justice. (See People v. Terry, 57 Cal.2d 538, 560-561 [21 Cal. Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985]; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704, 708 [312 P.2d 698]; Vetter v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App.2d 132, 134 [10 Cal. Rptr. 890].) [3] It has been stated that the basis for granting pretrial discovery to a defendant is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial (see Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [346 P.2d 407]; Powell v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.2d 704, 707, 709; Louisell/Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery, supra, pp. 881-882), and Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on the issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits. (Italics added; People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 586 [305 P.2d 1]; in accord, Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 59 [22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213]; Powell v. Superior Court, supra . ) (3) An accused, however, is not entitled to inspect material as a matter of right without regard to the adverse effects of disclosure and without a prior showing of good cause. In criminal cases, the trial court retains wide discretion to protect against the disclosure of information which might unduly hamper the prosecution or violate some other legitimate governmental interest. (See People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223, 246-247 ...; Powell v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.2d 704, 707-708.) Additionally, the court has discretion to deny discovery in the absence of a showing which specifies the material sought and furnishes a `plausible justification' for inspection. (See Ballard v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 167; cf. Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the Federal Courts, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 1113, 1118.) (See Joe Z. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 797, 804.) `A showing, however, that the defendant cannot readily obtain the information through his own efforts will ordinarily entitle him to pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evidence, or information that might lead to the discovery of evidence, if it appears reasonable that such knowledge will assist him in preparing his defense. ...' (Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery (1964) 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 228, 244; italics added.) ( Ballard v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 167.) Petitioner's showing specified the material sought, i.e., Sillence's felony conviction ... records (`rap sheet'). Evidence Code section 788 provides: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony unless specified circumstances exist which do not appear to be present here. (Italics added.) Even if a rap sheet is not the record of the judgment, it could provide information that might lead to the discovery of that record. Respondent's basis for denying the motion for discovery of Sillence's felony conviction record (i.e., that there was an insufficient showing of such a record) lacks merit. (4) It is implicit in Cash v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.2d 72, that proof of the existence of the item sought is not required. (See also Louisell/Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery, supra, pp. 885-886.) A requirement of such proof would, in many cases, deny the accused the benefit of relevant and material evidence. (Cf. People v. Chapman, 52 Cal.2d 95, 98 [338 P.2d 428].) We turn next to whether petitioner could readily obtain the information through his own efforts. (See Ballard v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 167.) The People make no claim that the public defender could have himself obtained the information regarding any felony conviction record of Sillence directly from the bureau or indirectly through the Attorney General. Penal Code section 11105 [4] requires the Attorney General to furnish to specified persons, upon application in accordance with that section, copies of summary criminal history information (commonly called rap sheets), but public defenders are not among those specified except in certain circumstances not present here. We note that section 11105 (see fn. 4) prohibits furnishing such information to persons other than those listed therein or as provided by law, but that section does not prohibit discovery to an accused of another's criminal record where a showing has been made of a plausible justification for inspection. The People do not argue to the contrary, nor do the People argue that Penal Code section 11076 prohibits such discovery. [5] The People argue instead that good cause was not shown for inspection of any felony conviction record of Sillence because the defense gave no explanation why the information sought could not be obtained directly from Sillence. In support of their argument the People point to statements in Joe Z. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 797, 806, [6] but Joe Z. did not involve a felony conviction record or indicate that it is always necessary for a party seeking discovery to explain why the information sought could not be obtained directly from the person involved. In our opinion petitioner was not required to give such an explanation. It cannot be assumed that a person will give accurate and complete information regarding any prior felony convictions he may have, and to require the defense to attempt to obtain from a prosecution witness information regarding any such convictions as a prerequisite to seeking discovery of information regarding them could have effects detrimental to the defense since such an attempt could antagonize the witness. (1b) We conclude that the information sought could not readily have been obtained by petitioner through his own efforts. And it appears reasonable that such information will assist petitioner in preparing his defense. As we have seen, it appears from the showing made in respondent court that Sillence was an eyewitness to the felony charged and so far as appears the only eyewitness other than the persons he claimed perpetrated it, and the corroboration of his report was not strong. Petitioner's showing did not disclose his defense but that was not required. Manifestly it would be of help in preparing the defense to obtain information regarding any prior felony convictions of Sillence, whose credibility was likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial. Petitioner thus showed good cause for inspection of any felony convictions in the rap sheet of Sillence, if it exists. [7] We do not hold that good cause exists in every case in which a defendant charged with a felony seeks discovery of any felony convictions in any rap sheet of prosecution witnesses. Support for such a holding might be found in Engstrom v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal. App.3d 240. There the petitioner, who was charged with certain felonies, sought discovery of, inter alia, The felony conviction records of prosecution witnesses [named in the motion] to impeach their credibility, and the court broadly concluded that the prosecution should be required, on request, to obtain and make available information concerning felony convictions of prosecution witnesses. Although Engstrom did not so state, the court in Engstrom may have believed it was apparent from the nature of the material sought, without more, that good cause existed for discovery of that material. Other authority supports the quoted conclusion of Engstrom. (See American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards of Criminal Justice (approved draft (1970), Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, §§ 2.1, subd. (a), subsec. (vi), and 2.4.) We do not believe, however, that Engstrom's conclusion is appropriate or necessary. The People assert that if, as can be expected under Engstrom, defendants routinely request any rap sheets of prosecution witnesses, the burden on the bureau would be enormous. In support of their assertion the People point to a declaration by the bureau chief. [8] Although that declaration is not persuasive as to the number of searches for rap sheets that would be required if Engstrom is followed without exception, it is clear that the burden on the bureau could be immense if defendants charged with a felony are entitled upon request to any felony conviction records of persons the prosecution plans to call as witnesses at trial. [9] Moreover, the denial of such a record in some instances would not deprive an accused of a fair trial. Prosecution witnesses include persons who will testify to facts about which it appears there will be no dispute or which have only minimum significance in the case. (5) Rather than formulate a fixed rule as was done in Engstrom we believe that discretion should reside in the trial judge to determine whether to grant a motion for discovery of felony convictions in a rap sheet of a prosecution witness. [10] Insofar as Engstrom is inconsistent with the views set forth herein, it is disapproved. (6) In determining whether to grant a motion for discovery the trial court may consider, inter alia, the timeliness of the motion. (7) Although in general motions for discovery may be made either at or before trial (see Powell v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.2d 704, 705 et seq.; People v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d 566, 584-588; People v. Renchie, 201 Cal. App.2d 1, 4-5 [19 Cal. Rptr. 734]), a motion for discovery of felony conviction records in the possession of the bureau, if made at trial, in many cases might delay the trial if the motion were granted. Such a motion ordinarily should be made at a time when it would not have that effect. (8) In the instant case respondent court exceeded its discretion in denying discovery of any felony convictions in the rap sheet of Sillence, if it exists. As we have seen, good cause was shown for such discovery, and it does not appear that discovery will unduly hamper the prosecution or violate some other legitimate governmental interest. Although the People argue that the Engstrom rule violates that interest by imposing too great a burden on the bureau, they do not, and could not properly, argue that requiring discovery of a felony conviction record of a prosecution witness on a showing of good cause violates that interest. No claim is made that the motion here was untimely. If the prosecution has, or obtains, Sillence's rap sheet, if it exists, only the record of felony convictions need be disclosed. The People also assert that if discovery is to be made of a felony conviction record of a prosecution witness, any request to such witness for necessary information and fingerprints should be made pursuant to an order of the trial court because the prosecution's relations with that witness would be jeopardized if it were required to make such a request without such an order. Statements in the bureau's chief declaration pertain to this assertion. [11] The record does not show what the prosecution submits to the bureau when it requests a rap sheet of a defense witness. If all the prosecution submits is the name and physical description of the person, that should suffice when the prosecution requests a rap sheet regarding one of its owns witnesses. The instant assertion was not made in respondent court and can be considered by that court hereafter. [12]