Opinion ID: 1418556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: problems with gertz and the majority opinion

Text: Much of the majority opinion adopts as acceptable the rationale of the majority opinion in Gertz; but, in Gertz this rationale is used for the purpose of explaining why the states should have the right to determine for themselves whether to retain the malice standard in Rosenbloom or to adopt a standard such as negligence. It is still necessary to determine whether the suggested rationale of the majority opinion in Gertz, used there for another purpose, should be used in determining whether to actually adopt the nonmandated negligence standard. The majority opinion in the instant case, in adopting arguments discussed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974), provides no defense or provides an inadequate defense to the weaknesses in those arguments as pointed out by Justice Brennan. The following weaknesses should be noted. 1. Distinguishing public persons because they assume the risk of defamation bears little relationship to the values the First Amendment protects. Further reflection over the years since New York Times was decided persuades us that the view of the public official or public figure as assuming the risk of defamation by voluntarily thrusting himself into the public eye bears little relationship either to the values protected by the First Amendment or to the nature of our society. We have recognized that [e]xposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. Time, Inc. v. Hill, [385 U.S. 374, 388, 17 L.Ed.2d 456, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967)]. Voluntarily or not, we are all public men to some degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or general concern. See n. 12, supra; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Thus, the idea that certain public figures have voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal fiction. In any event, such a distinction could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of public figures that are not in the area of public or general concern. (Footnote omitted.) Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47-48, 29 L.Ed.2d 296, 91 S.Ct. 1811 (1971). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 41-43, 46-47; Anderson, supra at 480. 2. Public figures can reply rarely and ineffectively. While the argument that public figures need less protection because they can command media attention to counter criticism may be true for some very prominent people, even then it is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Denials, retractions, and corrections are not hot news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story. When the public official or public figure is a minor functionary, or has left the position that put him in the public eye, see Rosenblatt v. Baer [383 U.S. 75, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966)], the argument loses all of its force. In the vast majority of libels involving public officials or public figures, the ability to respond through the media will depend on the same complex factor on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable event of the media's continuing interest in the story. Thus the unproved, and highly improbable, generalization that an as yet undefined class of public figures involved in matters of public concern will be better able to respond through the media than private individuals also involved in such matters seems too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction. Furthermore, in First Amendment terms, the cure seems far worse than the disease. If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern. (Footnote omitted.) Rosebloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 46-47. 3. Presence of the private individual in an event of public interest doesn't make the event less significant. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 43. The court used the facts in Rosenbloom as an example: The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws, particularly in an area such as obscenity where a number of highly important values are potentially in conflict: the public has an interest both in seeing that the criminal law is adequately enforced and in assuring that the law is not used unconstitutionally to suppress free expression. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 43. This is the only way to protect the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment ... Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 43-44. 4. In terms of public interest in all appropriate information, a public-private persons distinction is artificial. [D]ecisions [after Times ] have disclosed the artificiality, in terms of the public's interest, of a simple distinction between public and private individuals or institutions: Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred.... In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions.... ... Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of `public officials.' Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 41-42. See also Anderson, supra at 480. 5. The difficulties faced by the adoption of the negligence standard are many. It will take a generation of litigation to qualify and explain what the negligence standard means. a. Uncertainties of the negligence standard. The reasonable-care standard is elusive, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, [385 U.S. 374, 17 L.Ed.2d 456, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967)] at 389; it saddles the press with the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait. Ibid. Under a reasonable-care regime, publishers and broadcasters will have to make pre-publication judgments about juror assessment of such diverse considerations as the size, operating procedures, and financial condition of the newsgathering system, as well as the relative costs and benefits of instituting less frequent and more costly reporting at a higher level of accuracy. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 422, at 425, 440, 454-56, 465-67, 480 (1975); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B, comments f & g at 31-33 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). b. States adopting the negligence standard won't be able to rely solely upon the existing negligence law developed in physical torts. Anderson, supra at 460-62; Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267. As Kalven states it at page 303: My appetite for generalization is not up to an effort to unify tort theory and speech theory. The two traditions are too different. My preference, in this novel context at least, is to accord to speech and press a preferred position among useful activities or services. In a profound sense the commitment to free speech is quixotic and gallant; it is not a matter for prudence. Mr. Justice Brennan captured the flavor exactly in New York Times when he mentioned the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. I suspect that, properly viewed, there is in the world of the First Amendment no place for the reasonable prudent man. (Footnote omitted.) c. The negligence standard could be unduly harsh on the media. Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond, 6 Rutgers-Camden L.J. 471, at 495 (1975). Uncertainty of the jury verdict in a controversial case is very great. It will lead to punishment by the jury for unpopular expression. And, most hazardous, the flexibility which inheres in the reasonable-care standard will create the danger that a jury will convert it into an instrument for the suppression of those `vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,' ... which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971). The Court does not discount altogether the danger that jurors will punish for the expression of unpopular opinions. This probability accounts for the Court's limitation that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Ante, at 349. But plainly a jury's latitude to impose liability for want of due care poses a far greater threat of suppressing unpopular views than does a possible recovery of presumed or punitive damages. Moreover, the Court's broad-ranging examples of actual injury, including impairment of reputation and standing in the community, as well as personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering, inevitably allow a jury bent on punishing expression of unpopular views a formidable weapon for doing so. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Gertz at page 356 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 389, 404 (1974). d. Undesirable burden of proof in negligence standard. The burden of proof is preponderance of evidence in negligence cases. This increases the possibility of erroneous verdicts and therefore increases the likelihood of self-censorship. In the normal civil suit where this standard is employed, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (HARLAN, J., concurring). In libel cases, however, we view an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff as most serious. Not only does it mulct the defendant for an innocent misstatement  the three-quarter-million-dollar jury verdict in this case could rest on such an error  but the possibility of such error, even beyond the vagueness of the negligence standard itself, would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate. These dangers for freedom of speech and press led us to reject the reasonable-man standard of liability as simply inconsistent with our national commitment under the First Amendment when sought to be applied to the conduct of a political campaign. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276 (1971). The same considerations lead us to reject that standard here. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50-51, 29 L.Ed.2d 296, 91 S.Ct. 1811 (1971). See also Anderson, supra at 467-68; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 580B, comment i at 33-34 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). e. Negligence standard will lead to self-censorship of media, because negligence standard is close to requiring guarantee of truth. [A]s the Court agrees, some abuse of First Amendment freedoms is tolerated only to insure that would-be commentators on events of public of general interest are not deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 279. The Court's holding ... simply [denies] free expression its needed breathing space. Today's decision will exacerbate the rule of self-censorship of legitimate utterance as publishers steer far wider of the unlawful zone, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Anderson, supra at 428-30; Kalven, supra at 304-05. f. The negligence standard inhibits summary judgment, thereby increasing the likelihood of self-censorship. Anderson, supra at 456-58, 469. Anderson states the matter at page 457: Some courts will deny summary judgment on the ground that a negligence standard requires the kind of factual determination that has always been regarded as peculiarly within the competence of juries. But uncertainty concerning the definition of negligence represents the most important obstacle to summary procedure under Gertz. Whether it will be defined with the particularity that characterizes recklessness under Times remains to be seen, but unless the courts describe the negligence standard with some precision, the purposes of the Gertz privilege will be defeated just as surely as those of the Times privilege would have been if the Court had left the determination of reckless disregard to the unquestioned judgment of juries. (Footnote omitted.) g. Appellate review of determination of negligence cannot be avoided. The real thrust of Brothers HARLAN'S and MARSHALL'S position, however, is their assertion that their proposal will not constitutionalize the factfinding process. But this clearly is not the way their test would work in practice. Their approach means only that factfinding will shift from an inquiry into whether the defamatory statements were knowingly or recklessly uttered to the inquiry whether they were negligently uttered, and if so, to an inquiry whether plaintiff suffered actual damages. This latter inquiry will involve judges even more deeply in factfinding. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 53. The determination of whether a defendant was negligent involves the application of the standard (what a reasonable person would do) to the facts which are found to exist in the particular case. This question is frequently called a fact issue and it is normally submitted to the jury. But the rule that liability cannot be imposed for a defamatory publication unless the defendant was negligent or more seriously at fault is a rule imposed by the Constitution. The application of the standard, therefore, necessarily involves a constitutional right, as in the case of the determination of whether the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a communication in a defamation action by a public official or public figure ... As in that case, the determination is subject to possible constitutional review all the way through the appellate process. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B, comment j at 34 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). See also Anderson, supra at 467-68. 6. There are great difficulties created by the new rule as to damages. The Gertz rule adopted in the majority opinion still requires a determination of whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private individual. If one is a public figure or a public official, he will be entitled to all the common-law presumptions the state allows. These presumptions include the presumption of damage. On the other hand, if he is a private person, he is only entitled to recover his actual damages. See Comment, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: Constitutional Privilege and the Defamed Private Individual, 8 John Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 531, at 544-45 (1975). There will thus be much litigation over the question of whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private person in order to determine what measure of damages applies. Actual damages may still lead to large judgments because, according to Gertz, pecuniary loss recoverable includes losses sustained by impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 350. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 422, at 472-73 (1975); 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 389, 401 (1974). An actual damages limit still serves to submit the media to expensive litigation and therefore impairs the First Amendment protection permitting the robust discussion of public issues. It is not simply the possibility of a judgment for damages that results in self-censorship. The very possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is threat enough to cause discussion and debate to steer far wider of the unlawful zone thereby keeping protected discussion from public cognizance. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S., at 526. Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 334-339 (1971). Too, a small newspaper suffers equally from a substantial damage award, whether the label of the award be actual or punitive. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 52-53. See also Anderson, supra at 424-25.