Opinion ID: 2182764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State's Overriding or Compelling Interest.

Text: If the state shows it has a compelling or overriding interest for the burdensome regulation it can prevent a religious-based exemption from that regulation. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58, 102 S.Ct. at 1055-56; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 83 S.Ct. at 1793-94. If the state interest is compelling, it will overbalance any burden on religious beliefs. [2] The question thus is whether the State of Minnesota has a compelling or overriding interest in enforcing the Human Rights Act's prohibition of marital status discrimination in rental housing. Relying on very old cases from other jurisdictions, appellant contends the only possible state interest is promoting public health, safety, or morality, but this completely ignores the Human Rights Act and controlling precedent from both this court and the U.S. Supreme Court. Courts have repeatedly recognized there is a compelling state interest in eradicating invidious discrimination. E.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626, 104 S.Ct. at 3254 (gender); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (race); Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 38 (D.C.App.1987) (sexual orientation); see also EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir.1982) (elimination of all forms of discrimination [is a] `highest priority.'    [the] purpose to end discrimination is equally if not more compelling than other interests that have been held to justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious convictions.) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court case most similar to the present case is Bob Jones University, where discriminatory practices were defended on a free exercise of religion basis. The University claimed the IRS Commissioner's policy cannot constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. 461 U.S. at 602, 103 S.Ct. at 2034. Despite finding sincerely held religious beliefs and a burden on these beliefs, id. at 602-04 & n. 28, 103 S.Ct. at 2034-35 & n. 28, the Court held that preventing discrimination clearly is a compelling state interest using the least restrictive means, and thus held that invidious discrimination cannot be justified by religious beliefs. Id. at 604, 103 S.Ct. at 2035. Providing equal access to housing in Minnesota by eliminating pernicious discrimination, including marital status discrimination, is an overriding compelling state interest. The majority outlines numerous situations where the state, not private individuals, treats people differently because of their marital status. The facts of this case involve one individual discriminating against another individual because of marital status. Housing is a basic human need regardless of a person's personal characteristics, and the legislature has properly determined that it should be available without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or familial status. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2(1)(a). [A] court cannot lightly dispute a determination by the political branches that the    interests at stake are compelling. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C.Cir.1986), aff'd sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). An individual's marital or familial status, just like the other prohibited classifications, is irrelevant to holding a job or renting a house, because it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2762, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976). The Human Rights Act is to be construed liberally for the accomplishment of [its] purposes, Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1988), which include secur[ing] for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination [i]n employment [and i]n housing. Id. § 363.12. In interpreting the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: [A]cts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent  wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit.    such practices are entitled to no constitutional protection. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628, 104 S.Ct. at 3255. The Act reflects [Minnesota's] strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services. Id. at 624, 104 S.Ct. at 3253. The Roberts Court found Minnesota, under the Act, had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens. Id. at 626, 104 S.Ct. at 3254. In Sports & Health Club, where one of the Human Rights Act violations was a refusal to hire people living together, we stated the government clearly has an overriding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment and public accommodation.    In a pluralistic and democratic society, government has a responsibility to insure that all its citizens have equal opportunity for employment, promotion, and job retention without having to overcome artificial and largely irrelevant barriers occurring from gender, status, or beliefs to the main decision of competence to perform the work.    The [state has an] overriding compelling interest [in] eliminating discrimination based upon sex, race, marital status, or religion   . 370 N.W.2d at 853. The majority ignores the Sports & Health Club's holding. Since it is not overruled, we are obliged to follow its precedent. The Supreme Court has emphasized, Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 2813, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (emphasis added). This is not to say, however, that enforcement of laws that ban discrimination will always be without cost to other values, including constitutional rights. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2236 n. 4, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984). Both our court's and the Supreme Court's precedents support an affirmance. The majority fails to point to a single discrimination case that has been successfully defended on free exercise of religion grounds or a single case holding that the state's interest in eradicating any type of invidious discrimination is less than compelling. Preventing marital status discrimination is a compelling state interest, Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 853, and discrimination in rental housing is not permitted by the Human Rights Act or the first amendment. Religious and moral values include not discriminating against others solely because of their color, sex, or whom they live with, avoiding unnecessary emotional suffering, showing tolerance for nontraditional lifestyles, and treating others as one would wish to be treated. This supposedly immoral couple were married by the time of the ALJ hearing, furthering the values the majority promotes. It may be difficult for some individuals to recognize invidious discrimination, but one must not lose sight of the continuing fight of minorities to be protected from a probable majority point of view. It was not long ago that blacks and women were widely viewed as second-class citizens. Discrimination usually comes in less obvious forms  such as against single parents, those with AIDS, homosexuals, the elderly, and those living together  but no less invidious forms. The majority, in effect, would have us return to the day of separate but equal where individuals such as French would be permitted to keep their neighborhoods free of undesirables and nonbelievers. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10-13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 840-42, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers    as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties   .). Although French admits his conduct constituted marital status discrimination in violation of the Human Rights Act, he would have us completely ignore the Act, instead contending the central question of this case is: what compelling interest does the State of Minnesota have in promoting cohabitation and/or fornication? French contends the state's interest should be Minnesota's fornication statute, which makes it a misdemeanor for any man and single women [to] have sexual intercourse with each other. Minn.Stat. § 609.34 (1988). While we rejected this argument in Sports & Health Club, the majority decision rests upon it. A refusal to rent based solely on a prospective tenant's clear violation of a criminal statute is not prohibited by the Human Rights Act. This is not the situation here, however. The Department is not applying the fornication statute, there was absolutely no evidence of fornication, and fornication is not the prima facie discrimination case proven. French admits he did not know whether Parsons and Jenson were going to have sexual relations on the property when he refused to rent, but he states even if Ms. Parsons and Mr. Jenson were not planning to have sex on the premises    their    living together on the premises constitutes the `appearance of evil' to which I am also opposed. There was only speculation about sexual relations, no facts, but [d]iscriminations are not to be supported by mere fanciful conjecture. Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 462, 57 S.Ct. 838, 840, 81 L.Ed. 1223 (1937). The appearance of evil argument is without merit. The Act prohibits marital status discrimination, here French concludes living together status assumes certain conduct, which he can then use to discriminate. There is nothing, however, in the fornication statute outlawing unmarried couples from living together or saying only couples living together are capable of fornication. French had previously rented to married couples and single people; people equally capable of fornicating on his property. There is nothing inherently suspect about two unmarried people of the opposite or same sex living together. While we do not choose between competing moral values, the majority equates the recent proliferation of unmarried couples living together with a loosening of our social fabric. Surely the legislature intended this group to also be deserving of protection from invidious discrimination. The decision to marry is a fundamental right, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 680, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978), and the right to privacy includes personal decisions `relating to marriage.' Carey v. Population Servs. Int., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2015-16, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977). The Human Rights Act prohibited appellant from even inquiring about Parsons' marital status, Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2(1)(c) (1988), and Parsons and Jenson had absolutely no duty to protest their innocence when illegally questioned. In addition, enforcement of Minnesota's criminal statutes is not left up to the suspicions of individual landlords, as appellant admits [t]he Human Rights Act in no way prevents the State from prosecuting charges of fornication. Had Parsons told French she planned to have sexual relations on the property this may be a different case, but those are not the facts before us. This is not a case involving discrimination against fornicators, rather it is a case involving discrimination against single people living together. Because Minn.Stat. § 609.34 makes fornication a misdemeanor, French also contends he would be aiding and abetting the commission of fornication and thus subjecting himself to criminal liability if he rented to Parsons and Jenson. The majority somehow believes the state is enforcing or promoting the fornication statute in this case, but it has failed to point to what facts in the record make the fornication statute applicable here. The enforcement of criminal laws, such as fornication, by the state, should occur only in a court of law, where defendants have constitutional protections such as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right of a defense, the right to a jury trial, and the right to challenge the constitutionality of such statutes. Moreover, to be liable as an aider or abettor, one must encourage another person to take a course of action which he might not otherwise have taken. State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn.1981); see also Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1988). Leasing property to a tenant does not create criminal liability for aiding and abetting. People of Kane County v. Midway Landfill, Inc., 23 Ill.App.3d 1080, 1083, 321 N.E.2d 91, 94 (1974); 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 10 (1970). Although the legislature has refused to repeal Minnesota's fornication statute, and it may be of questionable constitutionality, it has fallen into disuse. Not only are there just two reported convictions for fornication in Minnesota, the last in 1927, see State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 222, 213 N.W. 920 (1927); State v. Gieseke, 125 Minn. 497, 147 N.W. 663 (1914), and no reported convictions for aiding and abetting fornication, we recently noted that police and prosecutors generally consider the fornication statute unenforceable. In re Agerter, 353 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Minn.1984). The majority cites one case, State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875 (Minn.1986), to suggest the fornication statute remains sound. That the defendant in Ford ultimately pleaded guilty to other offenses does little to bolster the majority's position. While a challenge to the fornication statute is not before us, other states have struck down their fornication statutes under equal protection. E.g., Purvis v. State, 377 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla.1979); Commonwealth v. Staub, 461 Pa. 486, 491-92, 337 A.2d 258, 261 (1975). Appellant also would have us distinguish between bad types of discrimination, such as based upon race, gender, or handicap, and good discrimination, such as against drug dealers, child abusers, and fornicators (people living together). French cites no cases breaking up an anti-discrimination statute into discrete parts and finding the interest in eradicating certain types of discrimination to be less than compelling. In fact, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to single out its prohibition of sexual preference discrimination as less than compelling. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 38. We should reaffirm that the prevention of invidious discrimination in Minnesota, including on the basis of marital status, is a compelling state interest.