Opinion ID: 778428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney-fee enhancement

Text: 9 Flagstar claims that the district court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiffs an attorney-fee enhancement of $80,000. In particular, Flagstar contends that two of the district court's reasons for granting an enhancement — the arduous and time consuming nature of the litigation and the fact that the plaintiffs' attorneys did an excellent job at trial — are improper under Supreme Court precedent. Flagstar also disputes the district court's conclusion that the hourly rates used to calculate the lodestar award were modest. 10 In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974), the Fifth Circuit enunciated 12 factors that trial courts may consider in calculating reasonable attorney-fee awards. The Supreme Court has determined that  Johnson's `list of 12' ... provides a useful catalog of the many factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees.... Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989). These 12 factors are: 11 (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 12 Id. at 91 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 939. 13 This court has held that a trial court may apply the Johnson factors during its initial calculation of the attorney-fee award or when the court is considering a request for an enhancement. United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. G & M Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 502-03, 503 n. 3 (6th Cir.1984) (stating that the trial court should first conduct the initial evaluation, then examine the award against several factors, including the Johnson factors, but also noting that trial courts usually subsume the analysis of those factors within the initial calculation). The district court should also provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for its conclusions regarding an attorney-fee award. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). 14 In support of their request, the plaintiffs emphasized that the following factors justify an attorney-fee enhancement under Johnson: (1) this was a relatively novel and difficult case, (2) the issues were complex, and (3) their attorneys incurred a significant risk in undertaking the representation. The district court began its analysis by correctly noting that the plaintiffs' third reason, the contingency risk involved in this case, is not a valid ground for enhancement under federal fee-shifting statutes. Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992). Nevertheless, the district court did conclude that there were several other valid reasons for granting the plaintiffs an attorney-fee enhancement. It stated that an enhancement was warranted for the following reasons: 15 Tomkowiak and Stanton did an excellent job at trial in proving to the jury the merits of the Edwards[es]' and Paschals' claims of discriminatory treatment in an area (residential mortgage lending) where discriminatory treatment is often difficult to prove. The marshaling of evidence was an arduous and time consuming task. Moreover, the hourly rates on which the lodestar amount is computed are comparatively modest in light of prevailing rates in this area, and not out of line with those awarded in similar cases. 16 For these reasons, the district court granted the plaintiffs a 50% increase to the lodestar, resulting in a total attorney-fee award of $240,766.80. 17 As we understand the district court's explanation, its decision to enhance the attorney-fee award rests on the following four grounds: (1) the attorneys did an excellent job at trial, (2) this case involved claims of discriminatory treatment in an area (residential mortgage lending) where discriminatory treatment is often difficult to prove, (3) [t]he marshaling of evidence was an arduous and time consuming task, and (4) the hourly rates used to calculate the lodestar are relatively modest. Contrary to Flagstar's assertions, we are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in relying on these factors in granting an attorney-fee enhancement. 18 Under Johnson, a trial court may appropriately consider the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91 n. 5 & 93, 109 S.Ct. 939. The district court stated that it did so when it noted that one of the reasons an enhancement is appropriate is that Tomkowiak and Stanton did an excellent job at trial. 19 In considering whether an attorney-fee enhancement should be awarded, a district court may also consider the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in the case. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 939. The district court stated that it was doing just that when it held that an enhancement was warranted because this case involved claims of discriminatory treatment in an area (residential mortgage lending) where discriminatory treatment is often difficult to prove. 20 Furthermore, the district court noted that it was granting an attorney-fee enhancement because [t]he marshaling of evidence was an arduous and time-consuming task. The Supreme Court has held that the skill required to present a successful case is an appropriate ground for a trial court to consider in determining the reasonableness of the attorney-fee award. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 939. (noting that the third Johnson factor takes into account the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly). 21 Finally, in evaluating whether an attorney-fee award is reasonable, a district court may also consider awards in similar cases. Id. The district court did so by concluding that an enhancement should be granted because the hourly rates on which the `lodestar' amount is computed are comparatively modest in light of prevailing rates in this area, and not out of line with those awarded in similar cases. In addition to analyzing comparable cases, the district court also relied on the sworn affidavits of three attorneys, all of whom stated that the hourly rates on which the lodestar amount was based were below the market rate. We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the successful plaintiffs an $80,000 attorney-fee enhancement. Because of our reversal of the district court's denial of Flagstar's motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the Paschals' claim, however, the attorney-fee enhancement will have to be recalculated on remand.