Opinion ID: 1913318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 37

Heading: did the prosecutor improperly invoke his position as the government's attorney?

Text: ¶ 163. Holland did not object to the following comments at trial, and therefore they are procedurally barred. The prosecutor (1) stated that the death penalty scheme was being used under an act that has been prosecuted by me since 1986, (2) stated, The State in this case, we've done our job. It's now in your hands, and (3) stated in opening argument, It is the position of the State that in this case the law allows and the facts demand a death penalty. ¶ 164. The remaining three statements were objected to on grounds which are completely unrelated to this issue on appeal. Therefore, they are procedurally barred from review. Harrison, 635 So.2d at 903. ¶ 165. The district attorney stated, I'm the chief law enforcement official for a three-county area. I take my job seriously. He later stated, I had the job of charging this crime. That has been reviewed, and we're here in court today because this is one of those rare cases. ¶ 166. On the merits, it is improper for a district attorney, in argument to the jury, to use his position or function as a basis for convicting or more severely sentencing a defendant. United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir.1979). More specifically, a prosecutor may not comment on the fact that he has only sought death in rare instances such as this one. Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1410 (11th Cir.1985), vacated on unrelated grounds, 478 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S.Ct. 3240, 97 L.Ed.2d 744 (1987). This argument implies that the district attorney has made the judgment already and that his decision should be binding and persuasive to the jury. Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1410. ¶ 167. This error does not automatically result in reversal. This statement is reviewed to see the magnitude of prejudice, the effectiveness of the curative instruction, and the strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. United States v. Goff, 847 F.2d 149, 165 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, Kuntze v. U.S., 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 324, 102 L.Ed.2d 341 (1988). The trial court and the prosecutor told the jury that it was the jury's decision to determine Holland's punishment. The prosecutor told jury it's just your decision. As such, error, if any, was cured. State v. Bey, 610 A.2d at 816 (N.J. 1992). The Eleventh Circuit found this information sufficient to lessen the magnitude of prejudice to a level below that requiring reversal. Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1413-14. Holland's guilt is not at issue. Therefore, the prosecutor's statements do not rise to reversible error. ¶ 168. More importantly, the statements in the case at bar, made during sentencing phase of the trial, are taken from different paragraphs in the record and were not made consecutively. They have been taken out of context. It is imperative that the statements be read in their appropriate context in light of that which the prosecutor was in fact arguing to the jury at the time. First, regarding the prosecutor's claim to be the chief law enforcement official who takes his job seriously, the prosecutor was talking about whose responsibility it is that we are here today. The prosecutor went on to explain, The actions of Gerald James Holland put him here. Not his daddy's. It is clear that the prosecutor was simply arguing that Holland's actions alone were responsible for him being on trial for capital murder, rather than the actions of dysfunctional family members. ¶ 169. Regarding the prosecutor's second statement that his job was to charge the crime, that such had been reviewed, and that the case was before the court because of one of those rare cases, it is clear that this statement does not affect the sentencing phase of trial. Holland might have a valid argument had this statement been made during the guilt phase. Such is not the case here. The prosecutor was merely stating that Holland had been charged with the crime and had been found guilty by the jury, thereby creating one of the rare cases which could warrant the jury in returning the death penalty. The statement does not imply that death was the only sentence, nor does it imply that the prosecutor had already determined that the sentence should be death. The prosecutor stated, Does that mean it's tough, sure it's tough. Does it mean it's just your decision, yes, it's just your decision. Clearly, the jury had two choices in sentencing, and this jury was simply told that the decision was theirs to make. ¶ 170. Finally, defense counsel did object to the prosecutor's statement that it's an act that has been prosecuted by me since 1986, but stated in the process, I don't know if he's synopsizing evidence or making testimony. Although the objection is somewhat unclear, the trial judge instructed counsel to base any legitimate objection on the law and not on facts. Here, the prosecutor was simply stating that he had been prosecuting under the law for many years and that he proceeds not upon his own personal beliefs, but rather upon the requirements of the law. This statement does not imply that Holland should automatically be sentenced to death. This issue is procedurally barred in part, and alternatively considered on the merits, there are none.