Opinion ID: 1985253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Slattery challenges the jurisdiction of the Board and this court to address the rules violations asserted by Bar Counsel, arguing that in this disciplinary proceeding he is in effect being tried and convicted for the crime of theft. Relying on United States v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955), and In re Stiller, 725 A.2d 533 (D.C.1999), he contends that neither the Board nor this court is authorized to determine whether he has in fact violated a criminal statute. In Quarles, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress has no power to subject a discharged serviceman to trial by court-martial for offenses committed while in the service. 350 U.S. at 22, 76 S.Ct. 1. Rather, as a civilian, the serviceman could not be deprived of the constitutional safeguards protecting persons accused of crime in a federal court, notably trial by jury. See id. Thus, the Court limited the scope of Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which provided that a discharged serviceman could be charged and convicted in the military tribunal. Quarles is inapposite because neither the Board nor this court actually convicts an individual during disciplinary proceedings. In Stiller, the division opinion noted by way of dictum that neither the hearing committee nor the Board nor this court is authorized to decide whether Mr. Stiller violated [a federal statute]. Under our legal system, that decision is entrusted exclusively to federal courts and federal juries. Any suggestion by us that Mr. Stiller violated (or did not violate) [that statute] would have no legal force or effect; at best, we would be rendering only an advisory opinion if we even attempted to address the question. Stiller, 725 A.2d at 539 (footnote omitted). [2] Slattery seizes on this language to argue that by determining that he has violated Rule 8.4(b) by committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness, absent an actual conviction of the substantive crime, this court would be rendering an improper advisory opinion and usurping the function of juries to decide guilt. We are not persuaded by this argument, which erroneously equates criminal and disciplinary proceedings. The penal and bar disciplinary regimes have different burdens of proof (beyond reasonable doubt versus clear and convincing evidence), different consequences as a result of an adverse determination (potential deprivation of liberty versus deprivation of a property interest), and different disciplinary goals (punishment and/or deterrence versus policing the profession). Accordingly, we do not understand Stiller to signal such a radical departure from our disciplinary jurisprudence. Rather, Stiller simply enunciates a first principle of our disciplinary jurisprudence under Rule 8.4(b): we discipline for conduct, not for any supposed violation of a criminal statute with which [a lawyer] has never even been charged. Id. at 540. Cf. D.C.Code § 11-2503. [3] Rule 8.4(b) provides that it is professional misconduct to [c]ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Rule 8.4(c) subjects a bar member to discipline for professional misconduct if the lawyer engage[s] in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation. There is no requirement in either provision of the rule that an attorney actually have been convicted of a crime for the rule to apply. Cf. D.C.Code § 11-2503(a), supra note 3; D.C.Bar R. XI, § 10 (disciplinary proceedings based upon conviction of crime). Although Rules 8.4(b) and (c) are applicable in cases in which an attorney has been convicted of a crime, an attorney is not immune from bar discipline under Rule 8.4 merely because a complainant or prosecuting authority has chosen not to bring criminal charges. Rather, an attorney may be disciplined for having engaged in conduct that constitutes a criminal act that reflects adversely on his or her fitness as a lawyer under Rule 8.4(b) or engaging in dishonest or deceitful conduct, despite not having been prosecuted for such actions. See In re Gil, 656 A.2d 303, 305 (D.C.1995); In re Pierson, 690 A.2d 941, 947 (finding violation of Rule 8.4(b) for misappropriation of client funds). A finding by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct at issue was a criminal act that merits disciplinary sanction is something altogether different than a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct merits conviction and a criminal penalty. The first is within our disciplinary province; the second is not.