Opinion ID: 2302690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Alleged Preemption by State Law

Text: The defendant asserts that § 16-93 is preempted by state law. A municipal ordinance is preempted by statute when either the language in the ordinance contradicts the language in the statute or when the [General Assembly] has intended to thoroughly occupy the field. Coastal Recycling, Inc. v. Connors, 854 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2011) (applying principles of Rhode Island law regarding preemption); Amico's Inc. v. Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, 907 (R.I. 2002). See generally 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 30:1 at 658 (7th ed.2009). The defendant bases his preemption contention on the following two arguments: (1) that § 16-93 is in direct conflict with G.L.1956 § 11-45.1-2 and G.L.1956 § 31-45-5; and (2) that § 16-93 invades a field of regulation that is fully occupied by state law.
An ordinance is invalid when it is in direct and material conflict with a state law. Town of Glocester v. R.I. Solid Waste Management Corp., 120 R.I. 606, 607, 390 A.2d 348, 349 (1978). The presence or absence of such a conflict depends on what the Legislature intended when it enacted the statute. Id. [8] See generally Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (stating that conflict preemption may exist when it is impossible for a    party to comply with both    requirements or when a law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [the Legislature] (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defendant argues that § 16-93 directly conflicts with § 11-45.1-2 of the General Laws. That section of the General Laws provides as follows: It shall be unlawful for any person to operate any equipment as set forth in § 11-45.1-1 from which the sound created by this equipment is capable of penetrating a closed vehicle from twenty (20) feet away from the location at which the sound is being generated, or heard from one hundred (100) feet away by a person outside from which the sound is originating. This section shall include, but not be limited to, sound electronically generated by autos, trucks, motor homes, mobile homes, houses, apartment buildings, condominiums, commercial buildings, or from any type of portable sound producing equipment that can be carried or placed outdoors which through its operation exceeds the provision of this chapter. All state and municipal vehicles shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter, nor any person firm, corporation or other legal entity which holds a valid state or municipal entertainment license to sponsor a parade, carnival or other similar special event. Section 11-45.1-2. The defendant additionally contends that § 16-93 directly conflicts with § 31-45-5 of the General Laws. That section of the General Laws reads in part as follows: It shall be unlawful for any motor vehicle with a radio, stereo or audio system to produce sound which exceeds those limits specified in this chapter. Police cars, ambulances and fire engines shall not be subject to this section. Local cities and towns may, at their discretion, issue temporary exemption by special permit upon a showing of good cause. Section 31-45-5. It is our opinion that § 16-93 is not in conflict with either § 11-45.1-2 or § 31-45-5. Instead of conflicting with the cited statutory provisions, § 16-93 actually furthers the General Assembly's policy (as that policy is articulated in the cited statutes) by creating a specific standard for a particular set of devices in a specific area. We accordingly conclude that the requirements of § 16-93 control a specific type of noisethat which emanates from certain devices and which is unreasonably loud in a residential areain furtherance of the objectives of state law, rather than being in conflict with the less exigent provisions of § 11-45.1-2 or § 31-45-5.
To determine whether state law preempts a municipal ordinance, we must also consider whether the General Assembly intended that its statutory scheme completely occupy the field of regulation on a particular subject. Grasso Service Center, Inc. v. Sepe, 962 A.2d 1283, 1289 (R.I.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police v. Providence External Review Authority, 951 A.2d 497, 504 (R.I.2008); Coastal Recycling, Inc., 854 A.2d at 715. The defendant contends that § 16-93 cannot coexist with state law because § 11-45.1-2 and § 31-45-5 have statewide application[s] and are not limited in their reach, indicating that [noise] is a statewide concern. In addition, defendant avers that municipal noise ordinances will create inconsistent regulation which could undermine the legislative intent that is reflected in the cited statutes. In considering defendant's contention with respect to field preemption, it must be determined whether, with respect to the regulation of noise, it was the expressed intent of the General Assembly that the state control is to be exclusive or whether the control is to be exercised concurrently by the state and by the municipality. Wood v. Peckham, 80 R.I. 479, 483, 98 A.2d 669, 671 (1953); see also Grasso Service Center, Inc., 962 A.2d at 1290 (When interpreting a statute, this Court's task is to give effect to the expressed intent of the General Assembly.). [9] The General Assembly chose to employ a rifle rather than a shotgun when it enacted the two statutes cited by defendant with respect to the subject matter of excessive noise from personal broadcasting devices; it certainly did not enact a complex regulatory scheme, as occurred in the cases in which we have held that the General Assembly intended to occupy the field. See, e.g., Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 110 (R.I.1992) (recognizing the complex regulatory scheme within the statute to be evidence of implied preemption). In addition, nowhere in the cited statutes did the General Assembly vest  exclusive power and authority in one body [10] or set forth a comprehensive approach to regulation and enforcement through a statutory scheme. See id. at 109-10 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also South County Gas Co. v. Burke, 551 A.2d 22, 25 (R.I.1988); In re Woonsocket Water Department, 538 A.2d 1011, 1014 (R.I.1988). [11] It is further our view that defendant's contention as to preemption cannot be readily reconciled with the language of article 13 of the Rhode Island Constitutionthat [t]he people of every city and town in this state [have] the right of self government in all local matters. See Coastal Recycling, Inc., 854 A.2d at 715; see also Bradley, 877 A.2d at 607-08 (Cities and towns with home rule charters    are vested with the authority to legislate matters of public health and safety,    as long as those regulations are not inconsistent with the constitution or statutes of the state   .). In our judgment, noise in residential areas can be the subject of local regulation because it is related directly to preserving the public peace, safety, comfort and welfare   . Bradley, 877 A.2d at 608. For these reasons, it is our opinion that § 16-93 does not constitute an impermissible invasion of a field of regulation that has been fully occupied by state law.