Opinion ID: 1103217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the class created by the term issue in douglas w. brooks's will include the adult adopted children of douglas c. wynn.[1]

Text: ¶ 12. When a court must construe a testator's will, the first place it looks is to the will itself, giving due consideration and weight to every word. Matter of Homburg, 697 So.2d 1154, 1157 (Miss. 1997); In re Granberry's Estate, 310 So.2d 708, 711 (Miss.1975). At least two rules of construction are helpful in this case. First, the intention of the testator is controlling. May v. Hunt, 404 So.2d 1373, 1376 (Miss.1981). Second, the testator's intent must, if possible, be gathered from the entire will, giving due consideration and weight to every word in it. In re Granberry's Estate, 310 So.2d at 711. ¶ 13. This case involves a gift to a class of beneficiaries. A gift to a group whose members are not individually named is generally held to be a class gift. Lee v. Foley, 224 Miss. 684, 689, 80 So.2d 765, 766 (1955). When the time of distribution of the gift to the class is delayed because of an intervening interest, the class membership will be ascertained when the interest in the gift is deemed by the law to have vested in the beneficiaries. Branton v. Buckley, 99 Miss. 116, 54 So. 850, 850 (1911). ¶ 14. The natural children of Douglas argue there is no evidence showing Brooks intended that the subsequently adopted adult children of Douglas be considered issue under his will. In support of this assertion they point to the second page of Brooks's will where Brooks uses the language children, including adopted children, as opposed to his use of then living issue in the other portions of the will. They contend that Brooks used the explicit language to refer to Douglas, the adopted child of Margaret B. Wynn, but that Brooks had no intention of including any other adopted children. The natural children maintain that there is no other reason for the use of different terms than that Brooks did not intend to include adopted children in the term issue. ¶ 15. The natural children further claim that in order [t]o prevail, the adult adoptees had to affirmatively show that Brooks intended to include the subsequently adopted adult children ... in the term `issue' in his Will. In Dodds v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank, 371 So.2d 878, 881 (Miss.1979), this Court held that the adopted son of Edwin Dodds was his descendant and as such is entitled ... to share in the trust as a member of the class created by the trust unless there is language within the will directing otherwise. In Brooks's will, the use of a different term children, including adopted children operates to exclude adopted children when the term issue is subsequently used alone. Had Brooks intended to include adopted children in the term issue, he could have added the phrase including adopted children, as he did in the previous part of his will when referring to Douglas. ¶ 16. As the adopted children assert, Brooks had no way of knowing who would be included in the class of Douglas's then living issue which he intended to open upon the execution of his will and not close until Douglas's death. Any number of changes were possible including marriages, births, deaths, and even adoption; however, Brooks did not allow for the adoption of children to be included in his use of the term issue. ¶ 17. Next, the natural children argue the chancery court did not follow wellestablished rules of construction, mandating a holding that Brooks meant to distinguish between natural children and adoptees. In that vein, the natural children contend the chancery court was bound to hold that Brooks knew the difference between the terms in question, meant to distinguish between them and had in mind different results, according to Strickland v. Delta Investment Co., 163 Miss. 772, 137 So. 734, 736 (1931). According to the rules of construction, the intention of the testator is controlling. May, 404 So.2d at 1376. Here, the testator used the words then living issue to designate the class of beneficiaries to whom the Trust would be paid; however, Brooks did not specify to include or exclude adopted children. Then, Brooks's intent should be gathered from the entire will, giving consideration to every word in it. In re Granberry's Estate, 310 So.2d at 711. One can see that when Brooks knew an adopted child existed, he specifically included him with children, including adopted children. Since he used language of inclusion in part of the will, the absence of inclusive language in another part acts as an exclusion. ¶ 18. We find that Brooks used two different terms in his will because he intended different results for each term. When Brooks intended to include adopted children, he used the language including adopted children. When Brooks intended to exclude adopted children, he used the word issue without the words including adopted children. The trial court erred in finding Brooks intended to include Douglas's adopted children. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.