Opinion ID: 166561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relationship of the ADEA to Title VII and the ADA

Text: 10 The text of the ADEA does not state whether a plaintiff must cooperate with the EEOC while the EEOC processes his or her charge. Thus, we must look elsewhere to answer that question. The structure of the ADEA indicates that we should look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. —and, by extension, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. —for an answer, and interpret the relevant provisions of the ADEA consistently with their counterparts in Title VII and the ADA. 11 The ADEA's enforcement scheme combines elements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and Title VII. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577-78, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). Violations of the ADEA generally are to be treated in the same manner as violations of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). For example, [a]mounts owing . . . as a result of a violation of the ADEA are to be treated as unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA, and the rights created by the ADEA are to be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures of specified sections of the FLSA. Id. 12 In another nod to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the ADEA establishes two primary enforcement mechanisms. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 579, 98 S.Ct. 866. Under the FLSA provisions incorporated in § 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), the government may bring suit on behalf of an aggrieved individual for injunctive and monetary relief. 2 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217. The incorporated FLSA provisions—together with § 7(c) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)—also authorize private civil actions for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of the ADEA. 13 However, the portion of the ADEA most relevant to this case is more similar to Title VII than to the FLSA. See 1 Lindemann & Grossman, supra, at 559. Although not required by the FLSA, prior to the initiation of any ADEA action, an individual must file a charge with the EEOC so that the agency can attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice through informal methods. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); see also Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 866. After allowing the EEOC sixty days to notify the defendant of the charge and to attempt to conciliate the alleged unlawful practice, the individual may file suit (provided the EEOC has not brought suit on his or her behalf). See id. § 626(c) & (d). 14 This scheme tracks that of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. In fact, Congress amended this aspect of the ADEA to follow Title VII more closely. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-256, § 4, 92 Stat. 189, 190 (providing that the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to bringing a civil suit, as under Title VII, and eliminating the prerequisite of a timely notice of intent to file suit); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (providing that a civil suit must be filed within ninety days from the receipt of notice that EEOC proceedings have been terminated, rather than within two or three years of the unlawful conduct, as under the FLSA); Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978 § 2 (transferring enforcement authority over the ADEA from the Department of Labor, which also enforces the FLSA, to the EEOC, which also enforces Title VII). 15 To the extent that the charge filing requirements of the ADEA and Title VII are similar, courts must construe them consistently. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, since the language of [the ADEA at 29 U.S.C. § 633(b)] is almost in haec verba with [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) of Title VII], and since the legislative history of § [633(b)] indicates that its source was § [2000e-5(c)], we may properly conclude that Congress intended that the construction of § [633(b)] should follow that of § [2000e-5(c)].); Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir.2004) (stating that the ADEA and Title VII have virtually identical requirements with respect to the filing of EEOC charges); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (observing that when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the [ADEA], the revision was modeled after Title VII). 3 16 Because we must construe the charge filing requirements of the ADEA and Title VII consistently, to the extent that those requirements are similar, we must also construe the charge filing requirements of the ADEA and the ADA consistently. This is because Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability, explicitly incorporates the powers, remedies, and procedures of Title VII, making clear that the procedural requirements of those two provisions must be construed identically. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). 17 With this framework in mind, we turn to case law addressing the charge filing requirements of Title VII and the ADA. This case law dictates the result in this case. 18