Opinion ID: 2293326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Establishment of a Prima Facie Case

Text: The District argues that we should affirm the award of summary judgment on a ground the trial court did not reach: namely, that appellant could not establish a prima facie case that he was disabled or that the PSC regarded him as being disabled. [72] Appellant counters that this issue was not in a posture to be resolved at the summary judgment stage and is not ripe for our consideration now, becauseas he represented to the trial court by Rule 56(f) affidavit [73] in his opposition to the District's motion for summary judgmentthe District had not yet complied with court-ordered discovery or produced key witnesses for deposition, specifically appellant's former supervisor at the PSC and the Rule 30(b)(6) [74] witnesses. Appellant stated that these requested depositions were the subject of pending motions for a protective order (based, in the case of the supervisor, on his alleged ill health). According to appellant, he needed the depositions in order to fully explore a variety of issues, including, in particular, whether Defendants `regarded' him as disabled and whether their refusal to permit his return was motivated by his disability or perceived disability. Because the trial court awarded summary judgment to the District on the grounds that appellant's claims were time-barred (as well as partly precluded by appellant's failure to give the District proper notice), the court found it unnecessary to consider whether appellant had presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived disability. The court similarly found it unnecessary to consider whether appellant genuinely needed to depose his former supervisor and obtain other discovery in order to address that issue. We agree with appellant that it would be premature for this court to entertain the District's alternative argument for summary judgment. As this court not long ago explained: An appellate court has discretion to uphold a summary judgment under a legal theory different from that applied by the trial court, and rest affirmance on any ground that finds support in the record, provided it proceeds cautiously so as to avoid denying the opposing party a fair opportunity to dispute the facts material to the new theory. That course presupposes that there will be no procedural unfairness, that is that the opposing party had notice of the ground upon which affirmance is proposed, as well as an opportunity to make an appropriate factual and legal presentation with respect thereto. We have cautioned that it usually will be neither prudent nor appropriate for this court to affirm summary judgment on a ground different from that relied upon by the trial court. Among the reasons cited for this proposition are that the issues are not ripe for consideration, not clearly presented by the record or simply because it would be better to leave to the trial court the task of sifting through the summary judgment record. [75] These considerations guide us hereespecially because of the unresolved discovery questions raised by appellant's Rule 56(f) affidavit. The resolution of those questions was committed to the discretion of the trial court. [76] The trial court not having exercised that discretion, we cannot substitute our own judgment of the matter, [77] but we can say that appellant's claimed need to depose his former superior at the PSC is not implausible. Where an employee claims that his employer mistakenly regarded him as disabled, the inquiry of necessity focuses on the reactions and perceptions of the employer's decisionmakers who worked with the employee. [78] The District complains of the somewhat conclusory nature of appellant's Rule 56(f) affidavit and asserts that appellant's former supervisor was not involved in the decision not to reinstate appellant in 2003, but these are matters best left to the trial court to evaluate. If the trial court found appellant's affidavit unduly vague or otherwise questionable, it could have required appellant to supplement or clarify it. [I]t is incumbent on the court to make sure that the parties have had an opportunity to develop the record before ruling on a summary judgment motion, particularly where, as here, a party claims the need for discovery. [79] In short, even setting to one side the genuine benefit for appellate review of having the trial court study the record first and provide us with its informed view of the sufficiency of the evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, we can have no confidence that appellant has had the requisite opportunity to make the record in support of his position. We therefore decline the District's invitation to affirm on the alternative ground that appellant cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. In so doing, we express no opinion on the merits of that question.