Opinion ID: 494575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the first amendment and access to the ballot

Text: 23 Petitioners contend, however, that this analysis is thwarted by what they assert as a newly-emergent social fact: that participation in nationally-televised presidential and vice-presidential debates is now a prerequisite to election. They insist, therefore, that their exclusion from the debates effectively excluded them from the ballot and denied voters sympathetic to their cause their First Amendment right to associate through the election and to cast their votes effectively for the candidate of their choice. They rely upon prior decisions of the Supreme Court striking down restrictions on a candidate's access to the ballot as violative of the First or Fifteenth Amendments. 24 Petitioners' First Amendment claims thus differ from those asserted in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee and the other broadcast access cases. Safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process is a fundamental task of the Constitution, and we must be keenly sensitive to signs that its validity may be impaired. Petitioners' argument, if valid, could affect the balance of First Amendment rights struck in the Communications Act, and might force a reappraisal of competing interests. We need not address questions of that sort, however, for petitioners have not demonstrated a restriction of access to the electoral process that the First Amendment proscribes. 25 In Terry v. Adams, 44 the Supreme Court held that a racially-exclusionary primary held by a private county political organization trespassed upon the Fifteenth Amendment. 45 Black citizens were excluded from voting in primary elections for nominations to county offices conducted by the all-white Jaybird Party. Since the winners of Jaybird Party elections typically ran without opposition in Democratic primaries and general elections, 46 black voters were effectively deprived of meaningful participation in the selection of county officials. 47 No such barrier was present in this case, where voters were not hindered in their ability to cast their votes for petitioners or otherwise take part in the electoral process merely by virtue of petitioners' exclusion from the televised debates. 26 In Anderson v. Celebreeze, 48 the Supreme Court discussed the First Amendment implications of restrictions upon a candidate's eligibility for listing on the ballot. The Court recognized that the First Amendment right of voters to associate and to cast their votes effectively could be heavily burdened if candidates were to be excluded from the ballot. 49 Nevertheless, the Court held, not all eligibility requirements established by the states impose constitutionally-suspect burdens on political suffrage. 50 The injury to First Amendment rights, the Court said, must be examined  'in a realistic light [of] the nature and extent of their impact on voters.'  51 27 So scrutinized, it is immediately apparent that exclusion from the televised debates has a far lesser effect than would exclusion from the ballot. The former removes only one of the great number of avenues for candidates to gain publicity and credibility with the citizenry, while the latter drastically restricts voters' ability to choose the omitted candidate. The exclusion of petitioners from the debates did not prevent them from waging an effective campaign or deny voters the opportunity to exercise their First Amendment rights by casting their votes for petitioners. As it was, petitioners were able to gain ballot access in nineteen states, qualify for public campaign financing, and receive enough votes to finish fifth in the field of 228 presidential candidates. 52 Nor did petitioners' nonparticipation in the debates exclude them altogether from television campaigning. The fairness doctrine applied to discussion of the issues, the equal-time rule entitled them to the opportunity to match any nonexempt use of broadcast facilities by their opponents, 53 and as much as any candidate they were entitled to purchase advertising time at the lowest available rates. 54 28 In Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation. 55 Standards governing eligibility for public campaign financing were challenged as an invidious discrimination against third-party candidates, and the ballot-access holdings were urged in support. 56 The Court put these decisions aside: 29 These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates is not restrictive of voters' rights and less restrictive of candidates'. [The funding provision] does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, if any, of minor-party candidates to wage effective campaigns will derive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise private contributions. 57 30 Petitioners' claims are functionally indistinguishable from the one found lacking in Buckley. Petitioners' supporters were not hindered from casting their ballots for them, nor were petitioners hobbled in waging their campaign. While their inclusion in the televised debates undoubtedly would have benefited their campaign, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not demand that all candidates be subsidized to the point that all are equal in terms of financial strength and publicity. 58 Terry and Anderson were concerned with banishment of candidates and voters from the political arena, not with overcoming disadvantages in money and image frequently encountered by minor-party candidates. 31 We decline petitioners' invitation to embark upon the complex and hazardous task of recasting the First Amendment balance embodied in the Communications Act and the policies of the Commission. We remain mindful that the Communications Act reconciles not only competing policy choices, but also interests of constitutional stature in constant tension with each other. While we will not turn a deaf ear to any plausible assertion of constitutional right, we must be circumspect in any effort to vindicate an alleged constitutional infraction at the expense of constitutional interests at least equally valid and compelling. In the present case, we find the First Amendment interests of candidates, broadcasters and the public adequately served by the adjustments made in the Communications Act, and perceive no basis for disturbing the Commission's denial of petitioners' complaint. The order under review is accordingly 32 Affirmed.