Opinion ID: 2083741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Dean Pape; Wells Ag Enterprises, Inc.; and Neil Young

Text: Pape, Wells Ag Enterprises, and Young argue on appeal that the PSC erred in denying their respective claims alleging ownership of grain sold to AEI. We reject their argument and conclude that the PSC did not err in its determination that on March 11, 2002, Pape, Wells Ag Enterprises, and Young were not owners, depositors, or storers of grain at AEI. The record reflects that each of these appellants entered into a separate Priced to Arrive Contract with AEI, in which they were listed as the sellers and AEI was listed as the buyer. The respective contracts provided for the sale of a specified amount of grain to AEI, at an undetermined price. The contracts also contained delivery dates on which the grain would be delivered to AEI. Under the terms of these appellants' priced-to-arrive contracts with AEI, these appellants agreed that title to the above grain passe[d] from Seller to the Buyer on the date of execution of [the] contract. AEI's records introduced into evidence indicate that each of these appellants had delivered grain to AEI on dates generally corresponding to the delivery dates listed in the priced-to-arrive contracts. The PSC found that each of these appellants had already sold their grain and transferred title to AEI under their respective priced-to-arrive contracts prior to March 11, 2002, and that thus, these appellants were not the owners, depositors, or storers of grain in storage at AEI at the time the PSC took title to the grain. Accordingly, the PSC determined that as to these claims, these appellants were not entitled to a pro rata distribution of the proceeds. On appeal, Pape, Wells Ag Enterprises, and Young assert that the PSC erred in denying their claims. In summary, these appellants claim that they did not understand the terms of the contract and that notwithstanding the terms of the contract they did not intend to sell grain to AEI. These appellants also argue that because the priced-to-arrive contracts did not contain a specified price, the contracts were incomplete and therefore unenforceable. We do not find merit to these arguments. It is generally held that courts will not permit a party to avoid a contract into which that party has entered on the grounds that he or she did not attend to its terms, that he or she did not read the document which was signed and supposed it was different from its terms, or that it was a mere form. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Goddard Realty, Inc., 210 Neb. 604, 316 N.W.2d 306 (1982). Thus, we reject the argument of these appellants that the contracts are unenforceable because they did not understand the terms of the priced-to-arrive contracts. Further, we have previously noted that contracts involving the sale of grain are generally governed by article 2 of the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code. See, generally, Sack Bros. v. Great Plains Co-op., 260 Neb. 292, 616 N.W.2d 796 (2000) (discussing applicability of article 2 to hedge-to-arrive grain contracts). Neb. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (Reissue 2001) provides, in part, that [e]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness.... With regard to an open price term, Neb. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (Reissue 2001) provides, in part, that parties can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if ... nothing is said as to price. Thus, although the priced-to-arrive contracts did not contain a price term, these appellants are incorrect in their assertion that this open term renders the contracts unenforceable. The interpretation of a contract involves a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach its conclusions independent of the determinations made by the tribunal below. See Professional Bus. Servs. v. Rosno, 268 Neb. 99, 680 N.W.2d 176 (2004). Based upon our independent review of the terms of these appellants' priced-to-arrive contracts, we determine that the PSC did not err in finding that Pape, Wells Ag Enterprises, and Young had each sold their grain to AEI under their respective priced-to-arrive contracts, and thus, they were not the owners, depositors, or storers of grain in storage at AEI at the time the PSC took title to the grain. Accordingly, the PSC did not err in its determination that as to these claims, these appellants were not entitled to a pro rata distribution of the proceeds.