Opinion ID: 184342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New's Jurisdictional Challenge

Text: 20 New claims that the Army no longer has jurisdiction over him because of the military's allegedly unlawful attempt to require him to serve as a part of a U.N. mission. There appear to be two parts to New's claim on this point: first, the alleged unlawful action by the military relieved him from having to exhaust court-martial proceedings before filing a habeas petition in federal court; and, second, the Army's actions relieved him from all further commitments to the military and, thus, as a civilian, he is no longer subject to court-martial. New's positions are without merit. 21 In Councilman, the Supreme Court made clear that military courts are capable of, and indeed may have superior expertise in, considering challenges to their jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 760, 95 S.Ct. at 1314 (question of whether service member's alleged offense is service related and therefore within jurisdiction of military courts raises issues as to which the expertise of military courts is singularly relevant); see also Apple v. Greer, 554 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir.1977) ([T]he claim that there is a lack of jurisdiction can be made to a military tribunal.). Thus, New must argue to the military authorities reviewing his case that the orders in question were unlawful and absolved him of any remaining military service obligations. For this court to hold otherwise would produce a rule allowing service members to circumvent the exhaustion requirement merely by contending, without reference to an applicable statute or regulation, that an action by the military released them from further service. This result would encourage premature federal judicial intervention in the affairs of the military, a scenario that was expressly rejected by the Court in Councilman. 22 The exhaustion requirement aims to give a military tribunal a full opportunity to consider the multitudinous claims that might be brought by service members regarding the terms and conditions of their service. Comity demands that we give due respect to the military tribunal to carry out its congressionally prescribed responsibilities. If the orders resulting in New's court-martial were unlawful, as he claims, that is a matter that can be addressed by the military tribunal in their consideration of the charges against him. 23 Furthermore, notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, New is still a member of the military and subject to military discipline. His contention that the disputed orders effectively discharged him from the military and rendered him a civilian before the occurrence of any administrative or judicial proceeding, and, therefore, that his case is controlled by McElroy v. U.S. ex rel. Guagliardo, et al., is meritless. In his Statement submitted on September 19, 1995, New indicated that he had requested an honorable discharge as a secondary alternative to transfer to another unit; by requesting the [327 U.S.App.D.C. 154] transfer, he acknowledged that he still was a member of the military. In any event, as New's counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no authority to support the suggestion that New became a civilian immediately upon issuance of the allegedly unlawful orders. On the record at hand, it is clear that when New disobeyed his orders, he was still in the service, and he cannot now present a substantial argument[ ], Councilman, 420 U.S. at 759, 95 S.Ct. at 1313-14, that he is not subject to military discipline and court-martial. 24