Opinion ID: 6336983
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Such service”

Text: {19} The parties additionally debate the meaning of “such service” as used in Section 63-9A-8(C) and whether “such” refers only generally to telephone service, including both landline and wireless, within the purview of “such service.” The hearing examiner construed the phrase to refer to the antecedent term “basic local exchange service” requiring “symmetry” in the calculation of the numerator and denominator. In doing so, the hearing examiner relied, in part, upon this Court’s construction of the word “such” in State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868. CenturyLink asserts that Nick R. supports consideration of comparable services because there this Court explained that “such” refers to “things of the kind of those mentioned.” The Commission answers that the hearing examiner relied on a law dictionary to establish that “such” means “of this or that kind” and relates “such service” specifically to CenturyLink’s landline telephone service. We agree and explain. {20} In Nick R., a student was charged with possessing a deadly weapon on school premises. Id. ¶ 1. This Court, see id. ¶¶ 2-3, considered whether a small pocketknife constituted a “deadly weapon” under the Criminal Code, which defines the term as “any weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm, including but not restricted to any types of daggers, brass knuckles, switchblade knives, . . . and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given.” NMSA 1978, § 30-1-12(B) (1963) (emphasis added). This Court held that the Legislature did not intend to include the student’s ordinary pocketknife as a per se deadly weapon. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 48. We explained that under the principle of statutory construction ejusdem generis, “general words are not construed to their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.” Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {21} Although the holding from Nick R. supports CenturyLink’s contention that “such” refers to the same kind of things as those mentioned, the statutory language at issue here is distinguishable. The canon of ejusdem generis is used to clarify statutory language that involves “a general word or phrase following two or more specific words or phrases.” NMSA 1978 § 12-2A-20(A)(2) (1997) (codifying the principle of ejusdem generis) (emphasis added). The Nick R. Court appropriately applied this principle because the definition of “‘deadly weapon’” listed multiple examples of cutting or thrusting weapons before using the phrase “‘all such weapons’” to indicate the inclusion of weapons of like kind. See 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 2 (quoting Section 30-1-12(B)). However, Section 63-9A-8(C) references no comparable prior list and instead identifies one service (“basic local exchange service”) as a singular noun. The Legislature’s decision to rely on a singular term with a present-tense-singular verb form (“the [ILEC] provides basic local exchange service . . . where such service is available . . .”) indicates that only one type of “such service” (i.e., basic local exchange service) was intended, and therefore the principal of ejusdem generis does not apply. Moreover, “such service” in Section 63-9A-8(C) does not mean “of that kind.” Instead, “such service” is used as a demonstrative pronoun (for example, “this” or “that”) replacing the antecedent term “basic local exchange service.” See Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 332 (11th ed. 2020) (defining the adjective demonstrative as “pointing out the one referred to and distinguishing it from others of the same class” (distinguishing a house as that house) and defining the noun as “a demonstrative word or morpheme”). {22} Indeed, CenturyLink even acknowledges the potential demonstrative usage of “such,” asserting that if “such service” is being used in this way in Section 63-9A-8(C), then the words should be read as referring to the preceding words, “basic local exchange service.” Asserting that the word residential is implied, CenturyLink thus suggests that “such” is a demonstrative adjective signifying “residential,” as in “residential service.” The doctrine of the last antecedent addresses this argument. Under this doctrine, “[r]elative and qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.” Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 1990-NMSC068, ¶ 9, 110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Furthermore, a comma separating the qualifying phrase from the antecedents is strong evidence the qualifying phrase applies to all antecedents, not solely the last antecedent.” Kevin J. v. Sager, 2000-NMCA-012, ¶ 11, 128 N.M. 794, 999 P.2d 1026. {23} Applying the doctrine of the last antecedent, the words “such service” in Section 63-9A-8(C) points to the last antecedent: “basic local exchange service.” The phrase beginning with “provided, however, that findings,” (which appears subsequently to “such service” and is set off by a semi-colon) applies to both “basic local exchange service” and “such service.” Thus, in applying the doctrine to replace the word “such,” Section 63-9A-8(C) may be read as: “provides [residential] basic local exchange service . . . to less than one-half of the customer locations where [residential basic local exchange] service is available at the time the petition is filed.” {24} Therefore, we reject CenturyLink’s argument that the general definition of “effective competition” in Section 63-9A-3(F) widens the meaning of “such service” in Section 63-9A-8(C) to include comparable services. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to imbue the word “such” here with specialized meaning to inherently contemplate comparable alternative services. See NMSA 1978 § 12-2A-2 (1997) (“Unless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being construed, its meaning is determined by its context, the rules of grammar and common usage.”). The Act specifically states that the words “effective competition” are meant to be defined “consistent[ly] with the standards set forth in Section 63-9A-8.” Section 63-9A-3(F). The context of the words “such service” in Section 63-9A-8(C) likewise suggests that the Legislature intended to refer to the specific antecedent “basic local exchange service” and not the general definition of “effective competition.” Accordingly, the Commission’s construction of “such service” as referring to “basic local exchange service” is reasonable.