Opinion ID: 462381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Verdict and the Motions.

Text: 12 Both parties agree that the dispositive issue is whether appellees were terminated without a hearing. If so, the appellants admit they are liable. Appellants repeatedly moved for directed verdict on this question at trial, which the court rejected, finding sufficient evidence to warrant sending the case to the jury. The appellants argue that the evidence produced at trial was no more than a mere scintilla and not enough, under our decision in Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964, 970 (11th Cir.1982) (relying on Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc) ), to support the refusal to direct a verdict. 13 The test for determining whether a court properly withheld judgment n.o.v. is the same as that for determining if it properly denied a motion for a directed verdict. We must examine evidence in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion. ' [I]f there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied.... Boeing Co. v. Shipman....'  Williams v. United Insurance Co. of America, 634 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 14 Likewise, as to the denial of the motion for a new trial, on appeal we are not reviewing 'sufficiency' in its technical sense.... we are reviewing whether the district judge has abused his judicial discretion in denying a new trial or whether as a matter of law the denial of a new trial was erroneous because there was an 'absolute absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict.'  Collins by and through Kay v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 675 F.2d 1185, 1197 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting Urti v. Transport Comm. Corp., 479 F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir.1973) ). 15 These standards of appellate review are stringent indeed. A very thorough review of American case law fails to disclose a single instance where, due to insufficient evidence, a court of appeals overturned a jury or bench verdict granting relief under Section 1983. This is hardly surprising, for sound jurisprudential considerations require that we find the trial court indiscrete only in circumstances of egregious error. This is especially so in a case, such as that instant, involving simple issues, [and] highly disputed facts, ... [where] there is an absence of 'pernicious occurrences,' ... [in which case courts] should be considerably less inclined to disturb a jury verdict. Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d at 974. 16 Even if we review the substantiality of the evidence in this appeal under the standard most favorable to appellants, that of Williams and Boeing, it is our province to disturb the judgment below only if we find a lack of evidence sufficiently substantial to support the conclusion that the jury drew. Appellees did not make out the strongest conceivable case; on de novo review reasonable courts might come to contrary conclusions. But because the evidence is not insubstantial, we must affirm the trial court's refusal to grant any of the forms of post judgment relief sought. 17 The most important evidence is the admission, on the record below, of appellant Curtis that he told an Alabama Unemployment Compensation appeals referee that the decision to lay off appellees was predicated not only on lack of funds for salaries but also because appellees' uncooperativeness had created hostility. The decision to let them go, due to their inability to get along with Mr. Curtis, was made [b]efore I even realized there was a lack of funds. On objection from counsel for the defendants-appellants, the court at side bar recognized that the statement was not completely inculpatory So I will let the jury decide what he is saying. Record Vol. 3, pp. 378-80. 18 At another point in Curtis' testimony he conceded that he told the U.I. referee that Grandison was terminated for dishonest acts in office relating to missing files and keys. Vol. 3, p. 390. Here too the statement was somewhat ambiguous, but the court allowed it to come in for the jury's consideration. 19 Beyond this is the fact that Smith took control over the CDP, allowed former campaign workers who were not staff members to use office space in the CDP building, and hired these supporters for CDP work shortly after appellees were laid off, despite the supposed paucity of funds. There were multiple incidents of harassment and intimidation by the mayor, not only of appellees but also of other CDP workers who subsequently resigned. From the record, reviewed in its totality, the decision to submit this case to the jury, and to uphold its decision that appellees were terminated for political reasons, was not clearly erroneous. The quantum of evidence was sufficient to rise to the level of substantiality. 20