Opinion ID: 2325769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colloquy of Juvenile Witnesses in the Presence of the Jury

Text: In Appellant's second issue, he asserts that trial counsel and direct appeal counsel were ineffective for failing, respectively, to object to and to raise a claim regarding the presence of the jury during the colloquy to determine competency of the two juvenile witnesses. The witnesses in question were the victim's minor children, Desiree, a nine-year old girl, and Philip, a twelve-year-old boy, [7] both of whom had witnessed the murder of their mother. Appellant contends that the presence of the jury during the colloquy of these witnesses constituted per se error under the rule promulgated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Washington, 554 Pa. 559, 722 A.2d 643 (1998). Although competency of a witness is generally presumed, Pennsylvania law requires that a child witness be examined for competency. See Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 578 Pa. 641, 855 A.2d 27, 39 (2003) (citing Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307, 310 (1959) and Pa.R.E. 601). [8] As we have recently reiterated, this Court historically has required that witnesses under the age of fourteen be subject to judicial inquiry into their testimonial capacity. Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 300 n. 11 (Pa.2010). A competency hearing of a minor witness is directed to the mental capacity of that witness to perceive the nature of the events about which he or she is called to testify, to understand questions about that subject matter, to communicate about the subject at issue, to recall information, to distinguish fact from fantasy, and to tell the truth. Delbridge, supra at 45. In Pennsylvania, competency is a threshold legal issue, to be decided by the trial court. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 584 Pa. 396, 883 A.2d 570, 576 (2005). In Washington, supra, the decision on which Appellant relies, defense counsel raised a challenge to the competency of the two complainants, who were eight and nine years old at the time of the appellant's trial for sexual offenses against them. Defense counsel sought a competency hearing outside the presence of the jury, but the trial judge denied this motion; instead, the prosecutor and defense counsel conducted voir dire of the child witnesses before the jury. Id. at 644-45. The children were questioned about a variety of personal matters, including their ages, birthdays, siblings, schools, teachers, and Christmas presents; about discussions with the assistant district attorney regarding their testimony; and about the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie. Id. at 645. When, at the end of voir dire, defense counsel objected to the witnesses' competency, the trial judge overruled the objection and specifically stated in the presence of the jury that the witnesses were competent. Id. No cautionary instruction was given to the jury regarding the significance or limitations of this ruling. Trial proceeded, and the appellant was convicted. On appeal before this Court, the appellant argued that permitting the jury to observe voir dire and to hear the trial court's competency ruling left the impression that the trial court was endorsing the credibility of the witnesses. Id. In addition, the appellant argued that the witnesses' repeated assertions that they were telling the truth unfairly bolstered their testimony. Id. at 645-46. A majority of this Court accepted the Washington appellant's arguments and accordingly granted him a new trial. In reaching this decision, the Court first reiterated the distinction between a competency determination, which is a legal issue for the court, and a credibility determination, which is a factual issue for the jury, and then concluded that the invariable result of a jury's presence during competency proceedings is that the truth determining process exclusively reserved for the jury is influenced by the inquiry into competency. Id. at 646. Thus, even with a cautionary instruction, which was not given in Washington, when the competency proceedings take place in the presence of the jury, they inevitably permeate[ ] into the veracity determination assigned exclusively to the jury. Id. at 647. Moreover, the Court expressed concern that a trial judge's ruling of competence would be interpreted by the jury as a judicial endorsement of the witness's credibility. Id. at 646. Based on these considerations, the Court set forth a per se rule requiring that the jury not be present during a competency hearing for a child witness. Id. at 647. In promulgating this rule, the Court recognized that some foundational questioning might be duplicated during the trial proceedings. Such duplication arises from the fact that evidence relevant to the foundational requirement of competency is also relevant, in many instances, to the weight and credibility accorded to a witness's testimony. Washington, supra at 647 (citing State v. Harris, 1988 WL 38034 (Ohio App. 5 Dist.1988)); see also id. at 648 (Castille, J., dissenting opinion) (arguing that voir dire of a child witness is more appropriately conducted in the presence of the jury because the jury, in order to assess credibility and weight to be accorded the testimony, must be able to determine whether the child understands the meaning of an oath to tell the truth). [9] In the instant case, there is no indication from the record that defense counsel challenged the competency of the juvenile witnesses at any time prior to, during, or after trial. There was no separate, formal competency hearing; rather, a brief voir dire of the juvenile witnesses was conducted at trial, in the presence of the jury, immediately prior to the witnesses' direct examination as to events on the day of their mother's murder. In its entirety, voir dire of Desiree, the victim's nine-year-old daughter, was as follows: Court Officer: What is your name? Desiree: Desiree. Court Officer: Desiree, what is your last name? Desiree: Epps Court Officer: Do you know what the deference [sic] between telling the truth and telling a lie is? Desiree: Yes. Court Officer: If I asked you to swear on that Bible that you would tell the truth, the whole truth and so help you God, would you understand that? Desiree: Yes. Court Officer: Would you say yes if I asked you that? Desiree: Yes. Court Officer: Do you promise to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Desiree: Yes. Court Officer: Thank you. The judge and these gentlemen here will talk to you. Please keep your voice up. Court: Desiree, you will have to speak into that microphone. You will have to pretend that that red box in the back of that courtroom is where you are speaking to so everybody can hear you; all right? Desiree: Yes. Court: Because we need to hear what you have to say. Prosecutor: Desiree, hello. Desiree: Hello. Prosecutor: Do you know who I am? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: Who are you [sic]? Desiree: Mr. Fisher. Prosecutor: Desiree, would you tell the jurors how old you are. Desiree: Eight, I mean nine. Prosecutor: When did you turn nine? Desiree: September 14th. Prosecutor: Desiree, you said that you know the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie; is that right? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: What's the difference between telling a lie and telling the truth; can you tell us? Desiree: (no response). Prosecutor: Let me ask you another question: If I told you this suit was red, would that be the truth or would it be a lie? Desiree: A lie. Prosecutor: If I said we were in your living room right now, would that be the truth or a lie? Desiree: A lie. Prosecutor: What grade are you in, Desiree? Desiree: Fourth. Prosecutor: How are you doing in school? Desiree: Good. Prosecutor: Some of us think C's are good. Tell us what good is. Desiree: I got all A's and one B on my report card. Prosecutor: That's actually very good. Did you get any awards or anything for doing that well? Desiree: I got distinguished. Prosecutor: You got distinguished? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: How many different kinds of awards could you get in school? Distinguished and what else? Desiree: Distinguished and meritorious and honorable mention. Prosecutor: So distinguished is the middle or highest? Desiree: Highest. Prosecutor: Then you're doing very, very, very good; right? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: And what school do you go to? Desiree: Ivy Leaf Middle School. Prosecutor: Ivy Leaf Middle School? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: How long have you gone there? Desiree: I just started going there. I used to go to Ivy Leaf Elementary School. Prosecutor: Now you graduated to middle school, right? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: Is that the same school your brother [Philip] goes to? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: Now, do you remember the last day that you saw your mom? Desiree: Yes. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 12/1/99, at 117-21. The prosecutor then proceeded immediately to question Desiree concerning what she did and what she saw on the day of her mother's murder. At no point before, during, or after voir dire did defense counsel object to the voir dire format or questioning, and the trial court made no comment as to the witness's competency. After the prosecutor's direct examination of Desiree, defense counsel extensively cross-examined her, beginning with a few general questions concerning the year her mother was shot, her grade in school at that time, and her school and after-school programs. N.T., 12/2/99, at 8-11. The next witness was the victim's twelve-year-old son, voir dire of whom consisted, in its entirety, of the following: Prosecutor: Philip, how old are you? Philip: I am 12. Prosecutor: What grade are you in? Philip: Seventh. Prosecutor: I am sorry? Philip: Seventh. Prosecutor: Seventh grade? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: What school do you go to? Philip: Ivy Leaf. Prosecutor: How are you doing in school now? Philip: Good. Prosecutor: What does good mean? Philip: A's, B's and C's. Prosecutor: In that order? Philip: Excuse me? Prosecutor: In that order, A's, B's and C's? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: Are you related to Desiree Epps? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: How are you related? Philip: I am her brother. Prosecutor: Were you related to Stephanie Coleman Epps? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: How are you related to her? Philip: I am her son. Prosecutor: Did you know a person by the name of Mr. Steve? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: How did you know him? Philip: He was my mom's boyfriend. Prosecutor: Do you see him in the room today? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: Would you please point him out for us? Philip: Right there. Prosecutor: Indicating the defendant, your honor. Prosecutor: Do you recall or do you remember when you first met him? Philip: No, I don't remember. Prosecutor: When you last saw your mom, where were you living? Philip: I was living in the Bromley House Apartments. Prosecutor: With whom were you living, Philip? Philip: With my mom and my sister. Prosecutor: Did sometimes Mr. Steve stay there Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: At your apartment with you? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: Philip, do you know the difference between telling a lie and telling the truth? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: Could you tell us what the difference is, please? Philip: Okay. The truth is like the right thing to doWell, it is like the right thing to happen, and a lie is the opposite of the truth. Prosecutor: That is pretty good. That is stated pretty good. The truth is telling about the thing the way it happened and a lie is telling something else Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: That didn't happen, okay. Philip, do you recall the last day that you saw your mom? Philip: It was in September. I think it was September 16, 1997. N.T., 12/2/99, at 52-54. The prosecutor then proceeded to ask Philip questions about his activities and his observations on the day of his mother's murder; following this examination, Philip was extensively cross-examined by defense counsel. At no point did the trial court comment on or even mention Philip's competency to be a witness. Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the presence of the jury during the above voir dire of the children, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Appellant relies on Washington, supra, wherein, as discussed above, this Court promulgated a per se rule that a competency hearing for child witnesses must be held in the absence of the jury. Although the trial court held no formal, separate competency hearing, it is obvious from the above-quoted voir dire that the children were questioned as to their understanding of the concept of truth versus a lie immediately prior to their testimony concerning the murder of their mother. The jury heard all of the questions directed to the children and their answers. Accordingly, we acknowledge, as did the PCRA court, that there is arguable merit to Appellant's assertion that the trial court's voir dire procedure violated the per se rule promulgated in Washington. See PCRA Court Opinion, dated 10/25/06, at 4. However, following careful review of the entire record, we conclude that Appellant did not and cannot establish that he suffered prejudice because of defense counsel's failure to object, and thus Appellant cannot succeed in his ineffectiveness claim. It is important to recognize that the trial court never issued an express or formal ruling that the children were competent to testify. In fact, the trial court never made any mention of the children's competency. The children's answers to questions about the distinction between truth and a lie flowed seamlessly into their testimony regarding their mother's murder. Thus, contrary to Appellant's contention, the trial court did not endorse or vouch for the credibility of any part of the children's testimony. In addition, the trial court expressly and repeatedly instructed the jury that it was the sole fact-finder and sole judge of credibility. In its initial remarks to the jury, the trial court stated the following: While you are decide [sic] on the facts of this case, you will have to judge the credibility and the weight of the testimony on the other evidence. By credibility I mean, of course, its truthfulness and its accuracy. When you judge the credibility and weight of a witnesses' [sic] testimony, you are deciding whether you will believe all, part or none of the testimony of the witness and how important that testimony is to the trial. Use your understanding of human nature and your own common sense. Please observe each witness as he or she testifies. Be alert for anything in that witnesses] testimony or behavior or for any other evidence that might help you to judge the truthfulness, accuracy and weight of that person's testimony.    As I told you earlier, you are the sole judges of the facts and of the credibility and weight of the evidence. You must rely on your own recollection and evaluation of the evidence during your deliberations and not mine or counsel's. You are not bound by any opinion that counsel or I might express during the trial about guilt or innocence, credibility or weight of evidence, facts proven by the evidence or the inferences to be drawn by the facts. N.T., 12/1/99, at 93-94, 96. Similarly, in the charge to the jury just prior to the start of its deliberations, the court stated as follows: You will recall that I have told you that you are the sole determiners of the facts except where there are stipulations that have been reached by counsel.    Where there is a conflict in the testimony, you, the jury, have the duty of deciding which testimony to believe.... If you cannot reconcile the conflict in the testimony, it is up to you to decide which testimony, if any, to believe and which to reject as untrue or inaccurate.    As judges of the facts, you are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. This means that you must judge the truthfulness and the accuracy of each witnesses] testimony and decide whether to believe all or part or none of that testimony. And you should consider the following factors as indicators as to whether or not testimony is believable: Was the witness able to see, hear and know the things about which he or she testified; how well could the witness remember and describe the things they [sic] testified about; was the ability of the witness to see, hear, know, remember or describe these things [a]ffected by youth or old age or by a physical, mental or intellectual deficiency; did the witness testify in a convincing manner; how did they look, act, speak; did a witness have any interest in the outcome of the case; bias, prejudice or other motive that might [a]ffect their [sic] testimony; how well did the testimony of a particular witness compare with the other evidence in the case, including the testimony of other witnesses.    While you are judging the credibility of each witness, you are likely to be judging the credibility of other witnesses or evidence. If there is a real irreconcilable conflict, it is up to you to decide which, if any, conflicting testimony or evidence to believe. N.T., Jury Charge, 12/8/99, at 113-17 (emphasis added). Thus, the court's instructions to the jury, both before testimony began and at the close of all testimony, were absolutely clear: the juryand the jury alonewas responsible for evaluating and deciding upon credibility of the witnesses. The court explicitly instructed the jury to consider whether the ability of a witness to see, hear, know, remember, or describe things was affected by, inter alia, youth. The jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 896 A.2d 1191, 1224 (2006). Appellant has provided not the slightest evidence that the jury did not do so in this case. We recognize the importance of the children's testimony to the Commonwealth's case against Appellant. They were the only eyewitnesses to the murder, and the defense attempted to undermine the credibility of their testimony as inconsistent with Appellant's alibi. However, it must be noted that other evidence admitted at trial was consistent with the testimony of the children. Jennifer Pugh, the victim's sister, testified that Philip called her immediately after the murder, very anxious and excited, and said that Steve had shot his mother. N.T., 12/7/99, at 12. [10] Ms. Pugh then dialed 911 to report what her nephew had told her, and the 911 tape was played for the jury. N.T., 12/2/99, at 50-51; N.T., 12/3/99, at 122-24. Detective James Dougherty, who interviewed Desiree after the murder, testified that she named Mr. Steve as the man who shot her mother and identified Appellant from a photograph as Mr. Steve. N.T., 12/3/99, at 151-53. Officer Etienne Starling, who brought Melvin Epps, the children's father and the victim's estranged husband, to the crime scene shortly after the murder, testified that the children ran to him and hugged him, and that Philip stated that Mr. Steve had shot his mother. Id. at 169, 172-73, 177-78. Furthermore, and very importantly, the children were unwavering in their testimony that Appellant shot their mother after she had entered their apartment building and was waiting for an elevator. The children knew Appellant as their mother's boyfriend who had stayed at their residence on some occasions, and they identified him in court without hesitation. They also knew the type of car that Appellant drove. Their direct examination and cross-examination at trial were lengthy and detailed and revealed some minor inconsistencies. However, the essence of their testimony remained absolutely steadfast and unshakablethat Appellant, the man they knew as Mr. Steve, shot their mother. The following few excerpts of testimony illustrate the essence, and the consistency, of the children's testimony. Defense Counsel: When your dad was with you with the police officers, there came a time when the police officers showed you a picture of Mr. Steve; is that correct? Desiree: Yes. Defense Counsel: They showed you one picture of Mr. Steve; right? Desiree: Yes. Defense Counsel: They didn't show you pictures of anybody else; right? Desiree: No. Defense Counsel: After they showed you the picture, your dad said that is Mr. Steve and you said that is Mr. Steve; right? Desiree: No. I just said it was him. Defense Counsel: You just said it was him? Desiree: Yes. N.T., 12/2/99, Cross-examination of Desiree, at 17-18. Prosecutor: Who shot your mom? Desiree: Mr. Steve.    Prosecutor: Who was the man who caught the door, walked in the apartment building and shot your mom? Defense Counsel: Objection; leading. Court: Overruled. Prosecutor: Who is the man? Desiree: Mr. Steve. Prosecutor: Have you seen him here today? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: Is this the guy? Desiree: Yes. Id., Re-direct examination of Desiree, at 34-35. Prosecutor: You talked to me before coming to court; right? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: You talked to your dad before coming to court, too; right? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: You talked to the police at sometime [sic]; right? The night that this happened, you talked to the police; is that correct? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: Now when you talked to the police the night that this happened, did you tell them the truth? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: You gave a statement to the police that night; right? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: You told the police that night in your statement that it was Mr. Steve who shot your mom, didn't you? Desiree: Yes. Prosecutor: Did anybody tell you to say that? Desiree: No. Prosecutor: Why did you say it? Desiree: Because it is the truth. Prosecutor: When you talked to me about this case, what did I tell you was the most important thing? Desiree: To tell the truth. Id. at 44-45. Defense Counsel: Do you remember anything that [the prosecutor] asked you from the time that you met [him]? Do you remember anything that [he] said to you or asked you? Desiree: He said to always tell the truth. Defense Counsel: Anything else? Desiree: I don't remember. Id., Re-cross examination of Desiree, at 47-48. Prosecutor: Now you are in that door [to the apartment building] and where are you going? Philip: To the elevator.    Prosecutor: Where was Mr. Steve then? Philip: He washe catch the door. Prosecutor: He what? Philip: He had caught the door, and then we had went into the apartment building. Then my mom had pressed the button. He shot her.    Prosecutor: What happened after he shot your mom, Philip? Philip: He had ran out the door. N.T., 12/2/99, Direct examination of Philip, at 59-60. Prosecutor: Incidentally, the Mr. Steve who shot your mom that night, is he in the courtroom today? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: Where is he, Philip? Philip: Right there.    Court: Let the record indicate that Philip has identified [Appellant]. Id. at 66-67. Prosecutor: Each one of those times when you were talked to by the police officers, when they first arrived on the scene before you talked to anyone, you said [Appellant] shot your momma; right? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: When you talked to your aunt, who did you tell shot your mom? Philip: Mr. Steve. Prosecutor: When you talked to the police down at the station an hour and a half after you saw your mom killed, who did you say shot your mom? Philip: Mr. Steve. Prosecutor: Then in April, 1998, when you went to that preliminary hearing, you told the people at the preliminary hearing, the judge and the lawyers and, by the way, I wasn't the lawyer then for the Commonwealth, was I? Philip: No. Prosecutor: It was some lady; right? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: You told them all through there [Appellant] shot your mom? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: Then when all those lawyers asked all those questions to you in February of 1999, you told them at least ten times that [Appellant] shot your mom, didn't you? Philip: Yes. Prosecutor: Did you ever tell anybody that [Appellant] didn't shoot your mom? Philip: No. Prosecutor: Why? Philip: Because he did. Id., Re-direct examination of Philip, at 139-40. The above excerpts present only some examples of the extensive testimony of the children, consistent in its essence despite lengthy and aggressive cross-examination, and corroborated by other evidence admitted at trial. Based on our review of the entire record, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Appellant's trial would have been different but for trial counsel's failure to object to the presence of the jury during the voir dire of the children, which consisted of brief questioning primarily regarding their schooling and their understanding of the distinction between truth and a lie. See Commonwealth v. Dennis, 597 Pa. 159, 950 A.2d 945, 954 (2008). Because Appellant has not established prejudice, his claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness fails, and accordingly his derivative claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness has no merit. Appellant is entitled to no relief on his second issue. [11]