Opinion ID: 2276843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: We Affirm as to Count V.

Text: Count V dealt with the standing order which denied a class of persons (Toyota employees, and any person looking at the employee's salary to increase or lower support payments) access to the judicial system. The standing order was nothing more than an administrative order which attempted to deal with the rumored influx of motions for modification of child support orders. While it is true that administrative matters may be dealt with by local rules, local rules must be approved by the Chief Justice; [34] and rules, especially local rules, cannot deny individuals access to the courts or decline jurisdiction in matters where there is clear statutory authority for filing said motions. There is no doubt that it was error for Judge Gormley to promulgate the standing order. That being said, did the judicial error cross over to judicial misconduct? The Order was entered May 8, 2009. Less than a week later, Toyota announced the semi-annual bonuses would be paid. The Order was not rescinded. When a representative of the Judicial Conduct Commission contacted Judge Gormley in May about its concerns over the Order, the Order was not rescinded. Not until six weeks later was the Order rescinded. Judge Gormley offered no explanation for her delay in rescinding the Order. The Judicial Conduct Commission thought the evidence was clear and convincing of Judge Gormley's lack of good faith in handling the matter in Count V. We cannot say its decision was clearly erroneous. Had the questionable Order been rescinded immediately after the announcement of the bonuses (or shortly thereafter), or within a reasonable time after the Commission expressed its concerns to Judge Gormley, we would be more sympathetic to the good faith argument. But when a judge waits, without explanation, another six weeks to rescind a highly questionable order, an order that was based on a rumored (and now moot) fear, we can only conclude that the Commission did not err by concluding that Judge Gormley's actions in Count V crossed over to judicial misconduct ( i.e., we again accept the Commission's implicit finding that Judge Gormley acted in bad faith). We also note that even if Judge Gormley's actions in Count V were not made in bad faith, those actions were of a sufficiently outrageous and egregious nature as to satisfy the egregious error standard for judicial misconduct. Moreover, her actions in Count V also are a component of her having engaged in a pattern of misconduct. Although a public reprimand seems light, we will defer to the Judicial Conduct Commission.