Opinion ID: 1613673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Existence of Fraud.

Text: The trial court concluded Mash did not sustain his burden of proving fraud. Mash asserts the court erred. He argues, although an intentional breach of contract does not give rise to tort liability, fraud and deceit in the inducement of the contract is tortious conduct. SDCL 20-10-1 (1987) provides: One who willfully deceives another, with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damages which he thereby suffers. SDCL 20-10-2 (1987) provides: A deceit within the meaning of § 20-10-1 is either: (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; (3) The suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or (4) A promise made without any intention of performing. [T]he foregoing statutes are declaratory of the common law and comprehend an intention to mislead. Rist v. Karlen, 90 S.D. 426, 241 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1976); Waggoner v. Midwestern Develop., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1967). Questions of fraud and deceit are generally questions of fact and as such are to be determined by the fact finder. Rininger v. Bennett Cty. School Dist., 468 N.W.2d 423, 426 (S.D.1991); Garrett, 459 N.W.2d at 847; Laber v. Koch, 383 N.W.2d 490, 492 (S.D.1986); Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Johnson, 87 S.D. 411, 416, 209 N.W.2d 548, 551 (1973). In 1987, the Cutlers agreed to purchase on behalf of Mash 187 head of Simmental crossbred heifers suitable for breeding. As was the case for Herd I, Mash instructed them to buy the cattle at a price a few cents below market price. Dan testified numerous cattle in Herd II came from his own herd and were full-blooded Simmental. The Cutlers claimed Tom Phillips, Mash's previous ranch manager, approved a later substitution of crossbred cattle for the full bloods. Phillips denied he would have approved such a substitution without Mash's approval. In any event, Dan admitted buying cattle shortly before shipping Herd II to the St. Charles in order to replace the unacceptable full-blooded Simmentals which were included in Herd II. Unlike the stipulation entered into regarding Herd I, the Herd II agreement was never reduced to writing. As such, the trial court's assessment of each witness' credibility was crucial. The trial court chose to believe the Cutlers. The trial court believed the Cutlers were guilty of poor record keeping, probably poor management and of breach of contract, but not of intentional misrepresentation. The same analysis applies to the substitution of cattle in Herd I. In fact, Mash's argument is weaker in regard to Herd I given the fact it was his decision to switch to a cow-calf operation which necessitated the substitution of cattle. Again, determining the credibility of the witnesses is the role of the fact finder. Where the trial court has resolved conflicts in evidence, we cannot change its findings. Gross, 361 N.W.2d at 266. Mash simply failed to meet his burden of proving fraud and deceit. It is thus unnecessary to take the next step and discuss whether this case [is a] proper one for the imposition of punitive damages.... Rist, 241 N.W.2d at 720. Mash's last argument does not merit discussion. We affirm. MILLER, C.J., and HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur.