Opinion ID: 2548958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Motion to Reduce

Text: The defendant next argues that the denial of his motion to reduce was improper because the trial justice ignored his information concerning prescription drugs and benchmark comparisons, the trial justice failed to rule on his request for statistics about other manslaughter convictions, and because there were no aggravating circumstances to justify consecutive sentences. Our review of a trial justice's decision on a Rule 35 motion is extremely limited, State v. Sifuentes, 667 A.2d 791, 792 (R.I.1995), as [t]his Court has maintained a `strong policy against interfering with a trial justice's discretion in sentencing matters.' State v. Rossi, 771 A.2d 906, 908 (R.I.2001) (mem.) (quoting State v. Mollicone, 746 A.2d 135, 137 (R.I.2000)). A trial justice's ruling on a motion to reduce sentence will be disturbed only when the sentence is without justification. State v. Brown, 755 A.2d 124, 125 (R.I. 2000) (quoting State v. Brigham, 666 A.2d 405, 406 (R.I.1995)). It is the defendant's burden to show that the sentence imposed violates this standard. State v. Cote, 736 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I.1999) (mem.). The defendant states, as grounds for appeal, that the trial justice improperly failed to address new and substantial evidence presented in regard to the effects of various prescription drugs, specifically Effexor and Prozac, and that he failed to address information concerning sentencing benchmark comparisons. At the hearing held on November 25, 2008, the trial justice heard defendant's arguments on these matters. The defendant pointed out that the Food and Drug Administration now requires labeling for Effexor that explains it may cause homicidal ideations. In response, the state argued that this was not new information because defendant was well aware at the time of the plea agreement that the medications had an effect, and that the additional information simply pertained to the degree of effect that the medication may have had. The defendant also set forth his argument that his sentence should be more in accord with other benchmark sentences, including the 10-year threshold of benchmark number 27. [9] In response to this, the state noted that the sentence was in accord with a plea bargain that took into consideration the reduction of the charges from murder to manslaughter. The trial justice then stated that he had a clear recollection of this plea, because it was so unusual. He proceeded to explain that it was unusual in the sense that [defendant's attorney] was able to get two murder charges for first degree rolled down to manslaughter, acknowledging that there was ample medical evidence indicating the drugs that [defendant] had ingested. The trial justice concluded by explaining to defendant that, [e]ven if I had known what you're professing to tell me now, it wouldn't have made any difference, in my view, having killed two people, having had the sentences reduced to a level of manslaughter, you were the beneficiary of a marvelous effort by your lawyer to get you what you got. We agree. The effect of the drugs and alcohol upon defendant is precisely what caused the court to accept the plea agreement reducing the two counts of first-degree murder to manslaughter. The trial justice clearly indicated that defendant's new information, even presuming it was unavailable at the time of sentencing, would not have caused the trial justice to impose a lighter sentence. Although defendant correctly asserts that a plea agreement does not preclude him from later filing a motion to reduce pursuant to Rule 35, this Court has recognized that it is certainly proper for motion justices to accord this factor considerable significance in deciding whether to exercise their discretion to grant the motion [to reduce]. State v. Miller, 694 A.2d 748, 749 (R.I.1997) (mem.). In denying the motion, the trial justice explained to defendant, [y]ou got your just results that you bargained for. The record is clear, and defendant does not challenge, that he knowingly, intelligently, and upon advice of counsel, entered into the plea agreement. Certainly the trial justice was acting well within his discretionary authority to take this factor into account in denying defendant's Rule 35 motion. Furthermore, defendant argues that the trial justice improperly ignored his request for statistical information. We are satisfied, however, that any statistical information about a disparity between defendant's sentence and those imposed on others convicted of manslaughter would have had a minimal impact on defendant's sentence-reduction motion. This Court has recognized that a list of sentence comparisons is not adequate to meet the heavy burden that a defendant must satisfy on a motion to reduce. State v. Morris, 863 A.2d 1284, 1288-89 (R.I.2004). This Court acknowledges that because every sentencing presents different and potentially unique circumstances    any comparison of sentences can be misleading, especially if too much reliance is placed on this one factor in assessing whether a sentencing justice was justified   . State v. Ballard, 699 A.2d 14, 16 (R.I.1997), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Coleman, 984 A.2d 650 (R.I.2009). Therefore, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err by denying the sentence-reduction motion without first providing or considering the statistical information requested by defendant. Finally, defendant argues that the denial of his motion to reduce was improper because consecutive sentences are impermissible absent aggravating circumstances. The proposition that defendant sets forth is inapplicable to the circumstances in this case. In Ballard, 699 A.2d at 18, this Court indicated its preference for concurrent sentences when multiple offenses are committed during a single course of action, unless aggravating or extraordinary circumstances are presented; however, in Coleman, 984 A.2d at 656, this Court made clear that this holding from Ballard is of little or no precedential value. Furthermore, in State v. Collins, 714 A.2d 610, 611 (R.I.1998) (mem.), this Court explained that consecutive sentences are justified when serious harm is suffered by each victim as a consequence of a defendant's single criminal act. Here, defendant pled guilty to fatally stabbing two persons, and the imposition of the consecutive sentences was, in fact, the result of defendant's plea agreement to serve such sentences consecutively in consideration for the state amending the charges down to manslaughter. On these facts, we find defendant's argument to be unpersuasive.