Opinion ID: 1713505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Justification as a revenue measure.

Text: The collection of excise taxes on malt beverages under Section 563.05, Florida Statutes (1975), is a substantial source of state revenue. In its fiscal year 1975-76, the State of Florida collected more than $76,000,000 in beer excise taxes. It is appropriate that the Legislature provide reliable methods of tax enforcement. Cf. Dominion Land & Title Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 320 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1975). Tax collection for malt beverages is achieved by so-called depletion control, whereby the tax is computed by reference to the number of taxable malt liquor containers withdrawn from the warehouses of distributors for delivery to retailers. The requisite tax is paid by distributors to the Division on a monthly basis, accompanied by suitable reports, and is periodically verified by audits and inspections. Belk-James basically argues that since the state neither places nor supervises the placement of Florida designations on beer containers, it cannot know which malt beverage containers have been taxed. The Division argues that Section 563.06(1) is one facet of an integrated statutory scheme for regulating and taxing beer sales, and that the Legislature might reasonably have concluded that malt beverage containers marked by the manufacturer with an approved Florida designation are more likely to follow closely monitored channels of distribution, from which the tax is collected. To evaluate these competing claims we must examine the total regulatory scheme to see if it reasonably assures distribution only within regulated channels. The Florida Beverage Law begins by establishing qualifications and procedures for the licensure of all persons in the chain of distribution. [6] It then makes it unlawful to sell malt products without strict adherence to the terms of a license, providing significant penalties for non-compliance. [7] Beer manufacturers who ship their product into Florida for sale or resale, aside from being required to affix a pre-approved Florida designation, are required to submit detailed reports on the amount of beer shipped into the state. [8] Moreover, those who may transport beer into Florida for sale or resale, and those who may receive beer shipments from outside the state, are rigidly controlled [9] and also subject to strict reporting requirements. [10] The Division argues that it can ascertain and control taxability on the basis of documents received from licensees, and that the regulatory scheme provides a stringent set of controls by which it can enforce compliance with the beer excise tax laws. The Division also notes that it performs field audits on distributors, bonded warehouses, and retailers, and in this respect monitors the presence or absence of Florida designations on beer container tops. [11] These audits thus provide a viable means for the detection of beer which enters the Florida market through unregulated, illegal channels. We are satisfied that the requirements of Section 563.06(1) bear a sufficient relationship to revenue collection to withstand the due process attack. The arguments advanced by Belk-James, which essentially question whether the best means of regulation has been chosen, can be seen as directed more to the wisdom of the legislation than to its asserted rationality. This inquiry, of course, is inappropriate for our judicial function. Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1970). Since we begin with a presumption that acts of the Legislature are constitutional, [12] and that all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of their validity, [13] we have no difficulty concluding that Section 563.06(1), Florida Statutes (1975), meets the due process requirements of the United States and Florida Constitutions. As a final point, Belk-James has suggested that if this statute is constitutional, it is entitled to a declaration that it has substantially complied with Section 563.06(1) because its exclusive distribution contract for Florida effectively makes Belk-James the manufacturer of Coors beer for state regulatory purposes. The trial judge, we think, quite properly rejected this construction of the statute. The order of the Leon County Circuit Court, dismissing Belk-James' complaint, is affirmed. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.