Opinion ID: 1390193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Goldblum's Right to an Evidentiary Hearing

Text: Goldblum's attorney at the oral argument before us said that all he was asking for was a hearing. Goldblum believes that he is entitled to a district court evidentiary hearing for two reasons: (1) we already found that Goldblum made a prima facie showing as to section 2244(b)(2)'s substantive requirements; and (2) the state court did not permit him to develop the record fully. We find these arguments unpersuasive for the reasons that follow. Goldblum first argues that our determination that he has made a prime facie showing under section 2244, thus allowing him to file his second petition, somehow required that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing in making its threshold determination under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). Appellant's br. at 17. More specifically, he states, This Court, based on specific factual allegations, permitted [Goldblum] to file a successor habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)(prima facie case that petitioner had either cause and prejudice to excuse failure to raise issues earlier or a demonstration of actual innocence). The district court nevertheless denied Goldblum an evidentiary hearing on these fully supported allegations and, on this incomplete record, ruled that Goldblum had `abused' the writ. Id. at 15. In reaching this conclusion, Goldblum misunderstands our gatekeeping role in authorizing the filing of second or successive petitions under the AEDPA. Though it well may be that we have made neither the meaning of prima facie showing under section 2244(b)(3)(A) nor how that meaning impacts the district court's section 2244 obligations clear, many other courts of appeals have. Courts often have cited Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468 (7th Cir.1997), as an instructive opinion in this field. In Bennett, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held: By `prima facie showing' we understand (without guidance in the statutory language or history or case law) simply a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court. [9] All that we usually have before us in ruling on such an application, which we must do under a tight deadline (see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)), is the application itself and documents required to be attached to it, consisting of the previous motions and opinions in the case. We do not usually have a response from the government, though such a response is authorized. 7th Cir. R. 22.2(c). [10] If in light of the documents submitted with the application it appears reasonably likely that the application satisfies the stringent requirement for the filing of a second or successive petition, we shall grant the application. The grant is, however, it is important to note, tentative in the following sense: the district court must dismiss the motion that we have allowed the applicant to file, without reaching the merits of the motion, if the court finds that the movant has not satisfied the requirements for the filing of such a motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). The movant must get through two gates before the merits of the motion can be considered. Bennett, 119 F.3d at 469-70. At least seven other courts of appeals have adopted this interpretation of prima facie showing. See In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 432-33 (6th Cir.2004); Williams, 330 F.3d at 281-82; In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (11th Cir.2003); Bell v. United States, 296 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir.2002); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 898-99 (5th Cir.2001); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir.1998); Rodriguez v. Superintendent, Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 273 (1st Cir.1998), overruled on other grounds by Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). Today, we join them in adopting the meaning of prima facie showing discussed in Bennett. In light of these principles, it is clear that Congress did not intend to bind the district court in any way by a court of appeals' preliminary examination of the substantive requirements under section 2244(b)(2), except to the extent that if a court of appeals finds that a petitioner has made a prima facie showing, the district court is obligated to conduct an independent gatekeeping inquiry under section 2244(b)(4). This limited effect of a court of appeals' initial determination is required because a court of appeals should make its determination within an extremely tight deadline and on the basis of a limited inquiry; thus, it is clear that Congress did not intend that the court of appeals' preliminary authorization determine how a district court conduct its subsequent analysis. The district court will need to make a more extensive inquiry under section 2244(b)(4) and it must conduct a thorough review to determine if the motion conclusively demonstrates that it does not meet AEDPA's second or successive motion requirements, Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 899 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But a court of appeals is obliged only to make a preliminary determination as to whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing with respect to those same requirements, i.e., whether the petition makes a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court, Bennett, 119 F.3d at 469. Nevertheless, notwithstanding a district court's obligation to make an independent gatekeeping inquiry, a district court does not face a requirement that it always conduct an evidentiary hearing in undertaking this more thorough review. Rather, the decision of whether or not to hold an evidentiary hearing is within the district court's discretion. See Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1940. Goldblum also contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section 2254(e)(2) because the state court did not permit him to develop the record fully as the court precluded the testimony of two forensic experts who would have provided expert opinions similar to those of Dr. Wecht. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), [i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that  (A) the claim relies on  (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. [11] Thus, under section 2254(e)(2), if an applicant has developed the factual basis of his claims in the state court, he is not entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, even if the factual basis is not sufficiently developed, a petitioner must demonstrate that his case falls within the very limited circumstances listed in section 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B), and only then is the district court permitted under the AEDPA, though not required, to grant an evidentiary hearing. See Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2000). We reiterate that the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing is left to the sound discretion of district courts. Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1939. Additionally, the Supreme Court has made clear that an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court record, as [i]f district courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to develop even the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary hearings, district courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were conclusively resolved in the state courts. Id. at 1940 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With these principles in mind, we review Goldblum's evidentiary hearing contention. We disagree with Goldblum that the factual basis of his claims was not developed sufficiently in the state-court proceedings. The state court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing in which it heard the testimony of Goldblum's trial attorney, Mr. Rothman, his forensic expert, Dr. Wecht, and the Commonwealth's rebuttal forensic expert, Mr. Wolson. The matter was on remand to the PCRA court on the sole issue of the potential impact of Dr. Wecht's testimony on the jury had it been presented at trial. The state court on the remand permitted Dr. Wecht to testify unimpeded with respect to his opinions. The court, however, did not permit testimony from two other experts who Goldblum planned to introduce to buttress Dr. Wecht's findings because their testimony exceeded the scope of the remand, although it did admit their affidavits. We conclude that the testimony of Dr. Wecht in conjunction with the affidavits of the proposed experts sufficiently established the factual basis of Goldblum's claims such that the issues he presented in his habeas corpus petition can be resolved by reference to the state court record. Id. at 1940. Thus, Goldblum was not entitled to a district court evidentiary hearing. Moreover, even if the state court should have regarded the remand as broader in scope so that it permitted the other experts to testify, a conclusion that the state courts did not reach, it is clear that the experts' opinions would have suffered from the same fatal flaw as Dr. Wecht's-the lack of photographs or other physical evidence depicting the blood stains would have made their testimony tentative and essentially amount[ing] to speculation, as the state court concluded. [12] Thus, their testimony likely would have been excluded for, under Pennsylvania law, a court only must entertain expert testimony that would assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, PA. R. EVID. 702, and relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed . . . by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. PA. R. EVID. 403. The state standards are similar to those followed in the district courts. Here, after concluding that Dr. Wecht's findings were unreliable, it would have been completely appropriate for the court to have explained its discretion in precluding cumulative expert testimony on the basis that it would not have been helpful to it in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. [13] Even if we agreed with Goldblum that he has been denied the opportunity to develop the factual record through no fault of his own, and therefore section 2254(e)(2) did not preclude an evidentiary hearing, such a finding does not necessarily entitle him to one. See Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287. Rather, it merely means that while a hearing is not prohibited under section 2254(e)(2), the district court still retains the discretion to grant a hearing or not. See Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1937 (In cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a hearing rests in the discretion of the district court.); Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287. In exercising that discretion, courts focus on whether a new evidentiary hearing would be meaningful, in that a new hearing would have the potential to advance the petitioner's claim. Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287. For example, in Campbell we discussed the case of Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), in which the court held that an evidentiary hearing was permissible under section 2254(e)(2) because it was the state's fault that the factual record was incomplete, but concluded that it was within the district court's discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing as the petitioner ha[d] failed to forecast any evidence beyond that already contained in the record that would help his cause, or otherwise to explain how his claim would be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. Likewise, in this case, the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to grant Goldblum a new evidentiary hearing, even if one was permitted under section 2254(e)(2). Goldblum does not have any evidence beyond that already contained in the state-court record that would help his cause. While the state court did not permit two of Goldblum's experts to testify, their affidavits are part of the state-court record submitted to the district court. Essentially then, Goldblum seeks an evidentiary hearing on the sole ground that he has two more experts, whose affidavits were before the district court, who will present testimony echoing that of Dr. Wecht. The bolstering testimony of the other experts does not have potential to advance Goldblum's claims as such testimony cannot overcome the fatal flaw found by the state court, the magistrate judge, and the district court-that absent forensic evidence confirming the distribution of the blood stains, their findings are inconclusive and unreliable. It would not be prudent to hold an evidentiary hearing to reach a conclusion already inevitably reached, and, thus, the magistrate judge certainly did not abuse her discretion in refusing to hear such duplicative testimony on an issue that could readily be resolved by reference to the state court record. Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1940. Goldblum makes two additional arguments related to this point. First, Goldblum contends that the district court could not fairly adjudicate the claims of actual innocence because it failed to consider the experts' affidavits that would confirm and bolster Dr. Wecht's findings. Appellant's br. at 23. To the contrary, the Report and Recommendation demonstrates that the magistrate judge did consider the affidavits. See App. at 48 (Indeed, Dr. Wecht's affidavit, and the affidavits of other forensic experts, do appear to make a strong case. . . .). However, she agreed with the PCRA court that these affidavits were not probative in light of the finding that the lack of physical evidence depicting the blood stains made their opinions indeterminate. Second, Goldblum believes that the magistrate judge applied the wrong standard in determining whether Dr. Wecht's testimony supported a claim of actual innocence as, according to Goldblum, the testimony need not unequivocally or absolutely exonerate him, but an expert need only present opinions to a reasonable degree of certainty. Appellant's br. at 25-26. Goldblum has confused the standard governing the admissibility of expert testimony at trial under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 with the high burden that he must meet to excuse his failure to raise his claim in his first habeas petition under the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. The district court properly concerned itself only with the latter point.