Opinion ID: 2344458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful Trafficking in a Scheduled Drug

Text: [¶ 7] Buchanan contends that evidence of a prescription for oxycodone is relevant to the question of whether he intended to unlawfully traffick in a scheduled drug, even though he concedes that the evidence cannot be used to establish that he lawfully possessed the oxycodone pursuant to section 2383-B(1). Buchanan argues that lawful possession is not the exclusive defense to the charge of trafficking, and that the existence of a prescription is relevant to create a reasonable doubt as to whether he intended to traffick in the oxycodone pills, a necessary element of the crime pursuant to section 1103(1-A)(A). [¶ 8] Maine Rule of Evidence 401 provides that relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as limited by the constitution, statute or court rules. M.R. Evid. 402. A criminal defendant is entitled to admission of relevant evidence, and the court's choice to exclude relevant evidence is significantly limited. State v. McMahan, 2000 ME 200, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 50, 55. We review a trial court's determination regarding the relevancy of evidence for clear error. State v. Williams, 653 A.2d 902, 906 (Me.1995). A `clear error' standard is similar to a sufficiency of the evidence standard in that it asks if the trial court's ruling on evidentiary foundation is supported by or not inconsistent with the facts that appear in the record. Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 405(e) at 186 (2005). [¶ 9] A consequential fact in this case is Buchanan's intent, that is, whether he possessed the oxycodone with the intent to sell, barter, trade, exchange or otherwise furnish the oxycodone for consideration. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1101(17)(C), (D) (2006). Buchanan's lawful prescription is relevant because it may make his intent to traffick in oxycodone less probable because it supports his assertion that he possessed the pills for a reason other than to traffick  for his own personal use as an analgesic. Contrary to the State's contention, the relevancy of the evidence of Buchanan's prescription is not undermined by Buchanan's concession that the evidence of his prescription cannot be used to establish the defense of lawful possession pursuant to section 2383-B(1) because intent is an element of the crime independent of possession. Also, contrary to the State's contention, the evidence's relevancy is not undermined by the fact that proof that Buchanan possessed 800 or more milligrams of oxycodone permits the fact-finder to infer that he was engaged in trafficking in accordance with 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(3)(G) (2006). [10] Buchanan's possession of a lawful prescription may make it less probable that the fact-finder will make the inference permitted by statute. [¶ 10] [A] defendant is accorded wide latitude to present all evidence relevant to his defense. State v. Garrett, 1998 ME 7, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 393, 395 (quotation marks omitted). See also McMahan, 2000 ME 200, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d at 55. We conclude that the court's ruling failed to give Buchanan sufficient latitude to present evidence that could tend to make the existence of a consequential fact  that he intended to traffick in oxycodone  less probable than it would be without the evidence. The court's determination that the evidence was not relevant was, therefore, clearly erroneous.