Opinion ID: 778451
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: St. Pierre's Challenge to Counsel's Performance at the Pleading Phase

Text: 35 St. Pierre advances three arguments supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) counsel failed to investigate and obtain eight reports from St. Pierre's childhood, some of which pertain to his mental health; (2) counsel failed to have St. Pierre examined by a mental health expert; and (3) counsel failed to advise St. Pierre about the possibility of an insanity defense. St. Pierre attempts to bolster these arguments using the district court's conclusion that counsel's performance was deficient in the sentencing hearing. We discuss each of St. Pierre's argument in turn, starting with the last. 36 According to Robert Barasa's deposition, he did discuss the possibility of an insanity defense with St. Pierre. St. Pierre dismissed the idea, just as he openly stated he did not want an evaluation or testimony about whether he was sane at the time of the crime during the post-trial motions and sentencing hearing. 37 Even if Barasa had not discussed an insanity defense with St. Pierre, that does not mean his performance was deficient. Counsel is not required to discuss every possible defense with the defendant, especially one not suggested by any evidence. 18 See Evans, 742 F.2d at 374. St. Pierre decided to plead guilty, against the advice of his attorney, and after a finding of competency. At the time St. Pierre pled guilty, there were multiple psychiatric reports available regarding his competency. Dr. Stipes testified pursuant to court order, the Associated Mental Health Services report prepared by Dr. Braun, from the first trial, was available and later used in the mitigation hearing, and the reports of Dr. Stephen R. Cann and psychologist Judy A. Condis were appended to the PSR. All of these reports, in addition to the personal observations by Barasa and Judge Neville, gave no indication of any psychological problems with St. Pierre at the time of the plea. Also, Barasa spoke with the attorneys from the first trial, who gave no indication that St. Pierre was mentally unfit at the time of the crime or first trial. Avoiding the distorting effects of hindsight and viewing this situation from counsel's perspective at the time, we conclude counsel's conduct was proper under the circumstances because there were no indications of mental instability at the time St. Pierre pled guilty. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 38 St. Pierre attempts to buttress the second and third arguments with the testimony of prison psychologist Monte Williams, and the two new psychological reports declaring him presently incompetent and diagnosing him with bipolar disorder. However, Monte Williams' opinion was contradicted by the report of two licensed psychiatrists at Menard. Thus, after the plea was accepted there were four qualified expert reports declaring St. Pierre in acceptable mental health, and the testimony of an unlicenced prison psychologist with no records to support his opinion, concluding St. Pierre possibly insane at the time of the crime. To include Williams' testimony — or the new reports for that matter 19 — in the calculus would be to engage in the distorting effects of hindsight because Williams did not testify until the penalty phase, and there is no testimony demonstrating that counsel was aware, or should have been aware, of Williams' opinion during the pleading phase. Id. 39 Moreover, St. Pierre cannot demonstrate prejudice based on his second and third arguments. In affidavits supporting his habeas petition, St. Pierre now claims that had he known about the possibility of an insanity defense he would not have pled guilty. However, the question is not what St. Pierre would do now, but what he would have done at the time had he known. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366. St. Pierre insisted on pleading guilty, despite Barasa's repeated and numerous attempts to dissuade him. Even more telling is the motion filed by Barasa to withdraw St. Pierre's guilty plea. St. Pierre interrupted the proceedings immediately after Barasa stated his intent, unequivocally stating that the motion to withdraw the plea was being filed against his wishes. 20 No matter what Barasa said or did St. Pierre intended to take responsibility for his crimes and plead guilty. Thus, St. Pierre cannot show but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366 (emphasis added). 40 Next we discuss whether counsel's failure to investigate and obtain eight reports from St. Pierre's childhood constitutes ineffective assistance. We begin by noting that counsel only has a duty to make reasonable investigations. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); Earl v. Israel, 765 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that if it is reasonable in the circumstances not to conduct a particular investigation, the lawyer's failure to do so will not establish ineffective representation.). Figuring importantly in this assessment is the influence of the defendant's words and demeanor, and information supplied by the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 41 By all accounts, St. Pierre understood and actively participated in the court proceedings and his defense. Counsel spoke with St. Pierre numerous times and learned about St. Pierre's troubled childhood and background, but St. Pierre mentioned nothing about a history of mental problems. In addition, all the available medical expert evaluations concluded St. Pierre was competent to stand trial and plead guilty. 21 Under the circumstances it was certainly reasonable for counsel not to conduct any further investigation into St. Pierre's childhood regarding mental competence at this stage in the proceedings. See Jones, 76 F.3d at 841-45; United States ex rel. Rivera v. Franzen, 794 F.2d 314, 316-17 (7th Cir.1986) (noting defense attorneys have no general Sixth Amendment duty to explore their clients' mental capacity in every case); Earl, 765 F.2d at 93; Wright v. Walls, 288 F.3d 937, 947 (7th Cir.2002) (An attorney's investigation need not be unlimited in scope or unerring in execution, but merely reasonable.). 42 More importantly, it was St. Pierre himself who precluded counsel from even putting on a defense. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective when a competent defendant makes the informed choice not to put on a defense and instead plead guilty to the charges. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.) (emphasis added); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (`And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.') (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052); Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that a defendant's informed choice of strategy, precluding counsel from putting on a particular defense, cannot later constitute the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Weaver, 882 F.2d 1128, 1140 (7th Cir.1989). St. Pierre's decision also precluded Barasa from having the time to develop facts favorable to St. Pierre. Barasa first appeared on behalf of St. Pierre May 19, 1988, and less than two months later St. Pierre voluntarily pled guilty on August 8, 1988. Counsel's performance was not ineffective by failing to obtain the additional reports because St. Pierre's strategic decision to plead guilty prevented further investigation by counsel. 43 St. Pierre cannot demonstrate prejudice. St. Pierre's argument regarding the failure to obtain these documents is built on a number of assumptions, not the least of which is that these documents would have been admissible, 22 shown a mental disorder 23 and provided St. Pierre with an insanity defense, 24 and St. Pierre would not have still pled guilty. The argument fails because many of the documents St. Pierre now claims would have changed the outcome were previously examined and noted in the Associated Mental Health Services report by Dr. Braun. Even with those documents Dr. Braun concluded that St. Pierre's mental status ... [was] basically within normal limits. As noted before, counsel did suggest an insanity defense, which was struck down by St. Pierre, deciding to plead guilty instead. Regardless of the introduction of these documents the proceedings would not have been different. 44 St. Pierre attempts to parlay the district court's determination that counsel's performance was ineffective at the penalty phase into a finding that counsel's performance during the pleading phase was likewise incompetent. The two findings do create an apparent inconsistency. Cf. Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406, 419-26 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). The inconsistency is primarily explained by the differing performance standards between trial and death penalty mitigation hearings. See id. at 412, 415 (majority opinion) (stating death is different). See also Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 359 (1997) (appropriately titled). In Strickland, the Supreme Court applied the same standard to a trial and a separate penalty hearing. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding). In later cases, the Court has continued to apply the same standard to determine ineffectiveness of counsel at both trial and sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184-87, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (reaffirming the Court's adherence to, and continued application of, the Strickland standard). 45 Nevertheless, this circuit has held defense counsel to a higher standard at the sentencing phase where death is a possible sentence. See, e.g., Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir.1989) ([W]e hold that defense counsel must make a significant effort, based on reasonable investigation and logical argument, to ably present the defendant's fate to the jury and to focus the attention of the jury on any mitigating factors.). Even this inconsistency is potentially explained by the fact that nearly anything is admissible in mitigation, regardless of whether it would be admissible at trial. See 720 ILCS § 5/9-1(e) (West 2000) (Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.); People v. Jones, 94 Ill.2d 275, 68 Ill.Dec. 903, 447 N.E.2d 161, 165-67 (1982) (quoting the 1979 version, which would have applied at St. Pierre's hearing, which is exactly the same standard as the current statutory version). While a defendant's mental state at the time of the crime might not rise to the level of a defense to the crime, it can be relevant in a mitigation hearing. See 720 ILCS § 5/9-1(c)(1) (West 2000) ([T]he murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution). Hence, the availability of additional evidence increases counsel's duty to investigate, within reasonable limits. See Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 135-37 (7th Cir.1996) (Presumably the lawyer is not required to investigate the defendant's past with the thoroughness of a biographer.). 46 Of course, the availability and admissibility of practically any evidence is a double-edged sword. If counsel introduces mitigating evidence the prosecution can rebut with other evidence, which may turn out to be substantially more damaging. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 185-86, 106 S.Ct. 2464; Foster, 223 F.3d at 631-39 (As we have noted before in cases like this one, there is a strong possibility that the defendant's mitigation evidence might turn out to be aggravating.); Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 906-07 (7th Cir.1996) (The narratives that defense counsel and their `mitigation specialists' present often contain material that the jury is likely to consider aggravating rather than mitigating.). Because of the increased investigative burden, St. Pierre's counsel could be found to have been deficient for not uncovering mitigating evidence of childhood mental illness at the penalty phase, but not be deficient for failing to present the same evidence during the pleading phase. 25 47 Just about all of the cases relied upon by the district court found counsel's performance deficient in the penalty phase because counsel failed to present any evidence in mitigation. See Kubat, 867 F.2d at 368 (finding defense counsel's performance deficient by contacting only two of the known fifteen character witnesses before trial and calling none to testify in mitigation, relying instead on a plea for mercy); Emerson, 91 F.3d at 907 (affirming the grant of habeas as to the sentencing phase because no evidence whatsoever in mitigation, or even argument, was presented.); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 856-58 (7th Cir.1991) (finding that counsel's failure to investigate and present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase prejudiced the defense); Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1365-68 (8th Cir.1995) (upholding the conviction but finding counsel ineffective at the sentencing phase for failing to present evidence of defendant's mental illness and presenting only a plea for mercy); see also Patrasso v. Nelson, 121 F.3d 297, 303-05 (7th Cir.1997). In contrast, St. Pierre's counsel presented significant evidence in mitigation, including three live witnesses (Monte Williams, Fr. Smyth, and St. Pierre), testimony by stipulation (Raymond Chodorowski), and the Associated Mental Health Services report. These witnesses provided substantially all of the same evidence regarding St. Pierre's childhood experiences that St. Pierre now asserts is in the reports and would have made the difference if it was investigated and introduced. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 185-87, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (finding counsel's decision not to introduce a psychiatric report and instead rely on a plea of mercy was reasonable); Foster, 223 F.3d at 631-39 (holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective for deciding not to call an expert to testify about defendant's mental state because it might do more harm than good); Stewart, 74 F.3d at 135-37 (finding attorney's failure to fully investigate defendant's history of drug use or potential brain damage was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the additional evidence would not have made a difference). 48 Simply because there is additional evidence of a rough life, deprived childhood, or mental instability does not necessarily make it less likely the death sentence will be imposed. Historical facts that show a defendant has a condition or proclivity toward violence are often aggravating, not redeeming or mitigating factors. See Stewart, 74 F.3d at 134 (And since it obviously is not the theory of capital punishment that murderers are compelled to murder by their past and therefore should not be punished, it cannot be right that anything brought out at a death-penalty hearing is certain or even likely to help the defendant to save his life.); Brewer, 935 F.2d at 860-61 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that [t]rying to persuade the jury that the accused is mentally ill is worse than no defense at all.). Judge Neville, after considering mitigating evidence similar to that which St. Pierre now proffers and the brutality and nature of the crimes, concluded the death penalty was the appropriate sentence. 49 Counsel for St. Pierre wanted to put on a defense at trial, and even sought to withdraw the guilty plea. It was St. Pierre who made the decision to plead guilty to the charges. Several psychologists, the judge, and counsel all agreed that he was competent to do so. Based on all the available evidence at the time of the plea and the Strickland standard, it is impossible to say that counsel's performance was deficient. In fact, counsel's overall performance at the pleading stage, considering his client's attitude and intent, was commendable. See Balfour v. Haws, 892 F.2d 556, 562-63 (7th Cir.1989) (noting that for specific allegations of ineffective assistance courts must weigh the overall quality of representation provided to the defendant and not individual shortcomings). The district court's conclusion, finding counsel's performance did not fall below objective standards of reasonableness, was correct.