Opinion ID: 1387356
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Harris v. United States

Text: Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides in relevant part: Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the fire arm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. Thompson's Apprendi argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's holding in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002). In Harris, the Court held that subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) were sentencing factors that may be found by a preponderance of the evidence by a judge, rather than elements of the crime that must be found by a jury under the higher standard. Id. at 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406. The petitioner in Harris had argued that the Court's decision in Apprendi conflicted with its earlier decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). In Apprendi, the Court explained, [O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, fourteen years earlier, the Court in McMillan had declined to adopt a more restrictive constitutional rule. McMillan sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, when the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had possessed a firearm. Harris, 536 U.S. at 550, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (discussing McMillan ). The two earlier decisions could be reconciled, according to the Court: . . . McMillan and Apprendi are consistent because there is a fundamental distinction between the factual findings that were at issue in those two cases. Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict would have been considered an element of an aggravated crimeand thus the domain of the juryby those who framed the Bill of Rights. The same cannot be said of a fact increasing the mandatory minimum (but not extending the sentence beyond the statutory maximum), for the jury's verdict has authorized the judge to impose the minimum with or without the finding. As McMillan recognized, a statute may reserve this type of factual finding for the judge without violating the Constitution. Id. at 557, 122 S.Ct. 2406. Blakely, in turn, applied the holding of Apprendi in reviewing a state judge's enhancement of a defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum. 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Supreme Court distinguished McMillan, explaining that the decision was not on-point because it involved a sentencing scheme that imposed a statutory minimum if a judge found a particular fact. Id. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Harris in support). Pointedly, Blakely did not reverse either McMillan or Harris. Likewise, when presented with a similar question in Booker, the Court did not overturn or otherwise comment negatively about the continuing vitality of McMillan or Harris. Prior panels of this court have recognized that Harris is still controlling, even post- Blakely and Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 630, 643 (6th Cir.2007) (The application of this mandatory minimum [of five years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)] creates no Apprendi problem, moreover, because five years does not exceed the statutory maximum of twenty years' imprisonment that can be imposed . . . under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). (citing United States v. Wade, 318 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that Harris confined the constitutional requirements of Apprendi to factors that increase a defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum))); United States v. Bowen, 194 Fed.Appx. 393, 404 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that the court could see no reason to hold Harris has been implicitly overruled by Booker and Blakely ). Other courts have similarly recognized the vitality of Harris. United States v. Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 449 (3d Cir.2006) ( Harris remains binding law in the wake of the Booker decision.); United States v. Estrada, 428 F.3d 387, 391 (2d Cir.2005) ([W]e are bound by the Supreme Court's rulings in Almendarez-Torres and Harris.); United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.2005) (We cannot question Harris' authority as binding precedent.); United States v. Jones, 418 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir.2005) (Under Harris, which the Supreme Court did not disturb in Booker, imposition of the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for violation of 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) did not violate the Sixth Amendment.). While Thompson asks us, in effect, to find that Harris has been implicitly overruled by Blakely and Booker, we do not have the authority to do that. Williams, 464 F.3d at 449 (citing cases); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (reaffirming the rule that [i]f a precedent of [the] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions). Accordingly, we deny Thompson's Apprendi challenge.