Opinion ID: 2631141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural requirements for civil recommitment under the MDO Act

Text: With this backdrop, we turn to the procedural requirements necessary to civilly recommit an MDO under the Act. As a condition of parole, a prisoner may be designated and civilly committed as an MDO for involuntary treatment of a severe mental disorder [4] if certain conditions are met. (§§ 2962, 2966; see also In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 23, 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 780, 81 P.3d 224; People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 444, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (Williams) .) Section 2962 provides that a prisoner is subject to the MDO Act if: (a) The prisoner has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; (b) The severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the commission of the crime for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison; (c) The prisoner has been in treatment for the severe mental disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the prisoner's parole or release; (d) a mental health professional evaluated the prisoner and concluded that criteria (a), (b) and (c) above have been met, and that due to the severe mental disorder, the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others; (e) the prisoner received a determinate sentence for the crime referenced in subdivision (b), and the crime is one of the enumerated crimes in subdivision (e). (§ 2962, subds.(a)-(e).) If such are found to exist, the prisoner may request a de novo hearing before the Board of Prison Terms. (§ 2966.) If the Board of Prison Terms concludes that the criteria are met, the prisoner may request a jury trial in the superior court. (Ibid.) The standard of proof shall be beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the trial is by jury, the jury shall be unanimous in its verdict. (§ 2966, subd. (b); see Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444, 458, fn. 10, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) Before an MDO's current commitment period expires, the district attorney may petition to extend that commitment by one year. (§ 2970.) To do so, the medical director of the state hospital, the community program director, or the Director of Corrections first shall submit to the district attorney a written evaluation of the prisoner [n]to later than 180 days before the prisoner's termination of parole or release, unless good cause is shown for delay. (Ibid.) If the district attorney files a petition for continued involuntary treatment for one year (ibid.), the trial court will hold a hearing on the petition, and the trial shall commence no later than 30 calendar days before the time the prisoner would have been released, unless the time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown. (§ 2972, subd. (a).) If the MDO's commitment is continued (§ 2972, subd. (c)), the district attorney may file subsequent petitions to extend the MDO's commitment in one-year increments. (§§ 2970, 2972(e).) The recommitment proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section. (§ 2972(e).) At issue here, section 2972(e) provides: Prior to the termination of a commitment under this section, a petition for recommitment may be filed to determine whether the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and whether by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (Italics added.) Unlike sections 2970 and 2972, subdivision (a), section 2972(e) does not provide for a waiver and/or good cause exception. Section 2972(e) also does not specify the number of days prior to expiration of the commitment in which the petition must be filed by the district attorney. ( Zachary, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 532.) Moreover, the MDO Act, including section 2972(e), does not expressly provide for any type of sanction, such as dismissal, for untimely recommitment petitions. After acknowledging guiding principles on the directory-mandatory distinction, which we discuss further below (see post, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 130-131, 164 P.3d at pp. 562-563), the Court of Appeal majority ultimately concluded that section 2972(e)'s time limit was mandatory because it was a matter of substance rather than one of convenience. (See Francis v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 19, 28, 43 P.2d 300 (Francis) .) While the 180-day and 30-day time limits (§§ 2970, 2972, subd. (a)), are intended to expedite resolution of pending recommitment petitions, the majority concluded that section 2972(e)'s requirement that a petition to extend a commitment be filed, thereby initiating an action, before the commitment terminates is a matter of substance which, in our view, must be deemed mandatory. The majority discussed several decisions, that arguably supported a contrary conclusion. (See, e.g., Zachary, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th 1026, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 532; see also People v. Fernandez (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 117, 129, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 469 (Fernandez ).) It also found decisions interpreting other statutory schemes inapposite. Allen urges us to adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeal majority. While we do not necessarily agree with all of the majority's reasoning, we do agree with the majority and Allen that the time restriction of this section is mandatory. In this case, there is no question that the district attorney failed to comply with section 2972(e)'s mandatory time deadline-he filed a recommitment petition on January 21, 2004, over three months after Allen's commitment ended on October 14, 2003. His petition does not provide any explanation for the delay. As discussed above, we must decide the consequences of failing to comply with section 2972(e). Echoing the Court of Appeal majority, Allen argues that because section 2972(e) is mandatory, the district attorney's failure to file a timely petition precluded the trial court from extending his commitment. The Attorney General disagrees the section is mandatory; instead, the court has authority to extend an MDO's commitment after it has expired because section 2972(e)'s time requirement is directory. The Attorney General also claims this statutory interpretation furthers important public policy interests, such as public safety. We first explain the directory-mandatory distinction, and the significance of each.