Opinion ID: 1157036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Custodial Statement

Text: Next we consider the trial court's ruling that the defendant's statement to Officer Cassa was based on a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. The uncontradicted suppression testimony established that the defendant, upon being first advised of his Miranda rights, refused to make any statement to the police. [9] Moments thereafter, while being transported to the scene of the burglaries, he was questioned about where he purchased the brandy and he incriminated himself by admitting to having been in the area of the burglaries earlier that day. [10] We conclude that the record is totally devoid of any evidence from which the trial court reasonably could infer a waiver of Miranda rights. A knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of rights requires more than a silent record. An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966). Accord, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 100 S.Ct. 652, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980); Roybal v. People, 178 Colo. 259, 496 P.2d 1019 (1972); Constantine v. People, 178 Colo. 16, 495 P.2d 208 (1972). This is not to say that a waiver never may be implied solely from conduct or from a response to interrogation. The prosecution's burden, however, is to establish a clear evidential basis for the waiver in such cases. Cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (after Miranda advisement, defendant's statement that he understood rights and would talk to police but would not sign his name to any forms constitute waiver); People v. Ferran, 196 Colo. 513, 591 P.2d 1013 (1978) (after Miranda advisement and affirmative response by defendant that he understood rights, the defendant's head nod up and down in reply to question whether he wanted to talk constitutes waiver). The evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant's initial exercise of his constitutional right to silence was followed up directly with an officer's question calculated to elicit an incriminating response. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); People v. Lee, Colo., 630 P.2d 583 (1981); People v. Lowe, Colo., 616 P.2d 118 (1980). This momentary sequence of advisement, invocation of silence and then interrogation belies any notion that the defendant's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination was scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). The evidence here is strikingly similar to that in Roybal v. People, supra , where we found the record legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding of waiver: Clearly, [the defendant] was not asked if he desired an attorney and was not given an opportunity to obtain one. Nor did he expressly waive his rights. An examination of the evidence shows he did nothing verbally or by conduct from which a waiver could fairly be implied. For aught that appears in the record, [the defendant] did nothing but sit silently in the police car until he was asked the question which elicited the incriminating response. A valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings have been given. 178 Colo. at 262-63, 496 P.2d at 1021. Upon retrial of this case the defendant's custodial statement in response to Officer Cassa's question should be excluded from evidence.