Opinion ID: 1433952
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Respondeat superior for Father Ronan's tortious acts

Text: In his complaint, Doe alleges that the Holy See employed priests, including one Father Andrew Ronan and that Ronan was under the direct supervision and control of the Holy See. The Holy See was further responsible for the work and discipline [of] ... priests. According to the complaint, the Holy See on at least one occasion was responsible for controlling where Ronan performed his functions: the Holy See placed Ronan in [the] Archdiocese at St. Albert's Church in Portland, Oregon. The Holy See maintains that Doe has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Ronan was an employee of the Holy See for purposes of the tortious act exception, because the word employee is a legal conclusion we are not required to accept as true. We are highly skeptical of the notion that, under notice pleading, use of the word employee in a complaint is insufficient to establish an allegation of an employment relationship. True, in addition to being a word used in everyday speech, employee does have a common law legal definition. See, e.g., Schaff v. Ray's Land & Sea Food Co., 334 Or. 94, 45 P.3d 936, 939 (2002) (defining employee for purposes of Oregon law). But then, of course, so do the words person, corporation, citizen, and molest, also used in this complaint  and, undoubtedly, in many other complaints filed each year in federal courts  without further definition. Were we to require that every such word used in a complaint be broken down into its constituent factual predicates, we would undermine the purpose of notice pleading  that is, to focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on procedural requirements. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, while we do not accept Doe's legal conclusions as true, we also do not engage in a hypertechnical reading of the complaint inconsistent with the generous notice pleading standard. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir.2002). Although there is undoubtedly a line beyond which the legal definition of a commonly used term is so complex or contentious that failure to allege each element of the definition would prevent a defendant from understanding the factual basis for the claim, use of the word employee falls well short of that line.
More complicated under Oregon law is the question of whether Ronan's actions were within the scope of employment as the FSIA requires. In Joseph, we indicated that the `scope of employment' provision of the tortious activity exception essentially requires a finding that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to the tortious acts of individuals. 830 F.2d at 1025. This determination is governed by state law. Id.; see also Randolph, 97 F.3d at 327. As it happens, the Oregon Supreme Court has directly addressed whether a church can be liable under respondeat superior for the actions of a priest who sexually assaults a parishioner. In Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or. 367, 977 P.2d 1163 (1999), the plaintiff alleged that he had been sexually molested by a Catholic priest who used his position as youth pastor, spiritual guide, confessor, and priest to plaintiff and his family to gain their trust and confidence and [b]y virtue of that relationship... gained the opportunity to be alone with plaintiff and sexually assault him. Id. at 1166. Fearing began its analysis from the proposition that, in a respondeat superior action, an employer can be liable for intentional as well as unintentional torts of an employee if committed within the scope of employment. Id. Generally, under Oregon law, three requirements must be met to demonstrate that an employee was acting within the course and scope of employment: (1) the act must have occurred substantially within the time and space limits authorized by the employment; (2) the employee must have been motivated, at least partially, by a purpose to serve the employer; and (3) the act must have been of a kind which the employee was hired to perform. Id. at 1166. Applying these three factors, Fearing stated that the priest's alleged sexual assaults on plaintiff clearly were outside the scope of his employment under the traditional test, but held that the inquiry does not end there. Id. at 1166. Instead, the court went on to ask whether acts that were within [the priest's] scope of employment resulted in the acts which led to injury to [the] plaintiff. Id. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court concluded that because a jury could infer from the facts alleged that performance of ... pastoral duties with respect to plaintiff and his family were a necessary precursor to the sexual abuse and that the assaults thus were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that was within the scope of ... employment, id. at 1168, the complaint satisfied all three ... requirements for establishing that employee conduct was within the scope of employment. Id. at 1167. The Oregon Supreme Court has since clarified that Fearing created a scope of employment test specifically applicable to intentional torts. Minnis v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 334 Or. 191, 48 P.3d 137 (Or. 2002), observed that, in Fearing, there was no question that the first requirement of the within the scope of employment test was met, because the abuse occurred within the time and space limits of the priest's employment. 48 P.3d at 144-45. But because Fearing involved an intentional tort, it was inappropriate to focus on whether the tort itself was committed in furtherance of the employer's objectives or was an act of the kind the employee was hired to perform: Rather, for the purpose of determining whether a complaint meets the second and third ... requirements ..., the focus properly is directed at whether the complaint contains sufficient allegations of employee's conduct that was within the scope of his employment, that is, conduct that the employee was hired to perform, that arguably resulted in the acts that caused plaintiff's injury. Id. at 144-45 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). Minnis thus makes clear that, rather than holding that sexual abuse is not within the scope of employment, Fearing created an alternative test with respect to the second and third factors of the within the scope of employment standard, applicable when a plaintiff has alleged an intentional tort: An intentional tort is within the scope of employment, and can support respondeat superior liability for the employer, if conduct that was within the scope of employment was a necessary precursor to the intentional tort and the intentional tort was a direct outgrowth of ... conduct that was within the scope of ... employment. Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1163. Doe's allegations meet this standard. Doe has asserted that he came to know Ronan as his priest, counselor and spiritual adviser, and that Ronan used his position of authority to engage in harmful sexual contact upon Doe in several places including the monastery and surrounding areas in Portland, Oregon. His allegations are thus very similar to those in Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1166. Under Oregon law, then, Doe has clearly alleged sufficient facts to show that his claim is based on an injury caused by an employee of the foreign state while acting within the scope of his ... employment, as required to come within the FSIA's tortious act exception. § 1605(a)(5). The Holy See is therefore not immune from Doe's respondeat superior claim. [9]