Opinion ID: 1936088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The prosecutor made improper comments about Taylor's defense counsel

Text: Taylor complains about the following remarks made during the State's closing argument: MR. DELAUGHTER: And it was said to you that these admissions that he committed this crime were not made to any law enforcement officer, no policeman to come up here and tell you we have a signed confession of this defendant. He talked to who he trusted. And I want to tell you right now, if we had put on a police officer or detective that said, I've got a confession from this guy, they would have been up there telling you that the police beat it out of him. You can't win. MR. KITCHENS: Your Honor, we object. That's improper argument. There's no such thing to support a statement like that. THE COURT: Let's don't argue outside the record. MR. DELAUGHTER: (CONTINUING) I can tell you this much, there's no way you can ever satisfy defense lawyers. If you have it one way, they will get up here and say, scream to you it should have been another. You just can't get it done  MR. KITCHENS: Your Honor, we continue to object. This is improper argument, and move for a mistrial. THE COURT: It will be overruled. Taylor contends the prosecutor was allowed to make highly derogatory comments about defense counsel, comments which also improperly deflected the jury's attention from the issues at hand. First, it must be noted that the defense counsel during opening arguments challenged Taylor's alleged admissions based on the fact that they were not made to persons in authority. Defense counsel concluded, I think you will find it exceedingly unlikely that these witnesses are being completely truthful with you. In closing argument, the State was obviously attempting to rebut the defense's inferences that the State's witnesses were not reliable or truthful because they were not law enforcement officers; the State argued no witness would be good enough in the defense's view. It could certainly be found, as the lower court did in Clemons v. State, 320 So.2d 368 (Miss. 1975), in overruling the defense's objection to such argument, that counsel for the defendants initially interjected that subject into the trial. Id. In United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.1984), defense counsel suggested the government's female witnesses had engaged in various illegal acts and intimate relationships with a government investigator and also complained that the witnesses would not answer questions before the trial. During closing arguments, the prosecutor rebutted the charges by commenting: [Y]ou observed the way they treated those ladies here in this courtroom. I mean the gall that they had to ask them the questions they did and treat them the way they did right here in front of ya'll, can you imagine  can you imagine what these gentlemen would have done if those ladies had dared talk to them out on the street. Id. at 444. The Court declined to find reversible error in the prosecutor's remarks, stating: In light of these attacks upon the credibility of the government witnesses, the prosecutor was `not obliged to sit quietly while character assaults [were] made on his witnesses; he [was] entitled to argue fairly their credibility.' Id. at 443; United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.1980). The Jennings Court concluded, Moreover, even if the prosecutor's remarks are construed as an attack upon defendant's counsel, we do not find ... error ... sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. 724 F.2d at 443-44. This Court in Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592 (Miss. 1988), discussed the wide range within which counsel may properly argue: The right of argument contemplates liberal freedom of speech and range of discussion confined only to bounds of logic and reason; and if counsel's argument is within the limits of proper debate it is immaterial whether it is sound or unsound, or whether he employs wit, invective and illustration therein. Moreover, figurative speech is legitimate if there is evidence on which it may be founded. Exaggerated statements and hasty observations are often made in the heat of debate, which, although not legitimate, are generally disregarded by the court, because in its opinion they are harmless. Id. at 601. (emphasis in original). In the above-emphasized language in Monk, the Court was specifically contemplating the kind of situation which occurred in the case at bar. Counsel's remark that defense lawyers are never satisfied with the evidence presented was obviously directed toward defense lawyers in general, and it would be difficult to construe this as a highly derogatory remark toward Taylor's counsel in particular. The trial court considered the objections, instructed counsel to stay within the record and overruled motions for a mistrial. Implicit in the trial court's ruling was a finding that any problem with the prosecutor's statements was harmless, and not of the level to support a motion for mistrial. Examples of cases in which this Court has held clearly improper arguments were made are distinguishable from those of the present case: Bridgeforth v. State, 498 So.2d 796 (Miss. 1986) (defendant referred to as scum); Ellis v. State, 254 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1971) (defendant termed professional criminal). In Dunaway v. State, 551 So.2d 162 (Miss. 1989), this Court further noted: As set forth in Craft v. State, 226 Miss. 426, 84 So.2d 531 (1956), the test to determine if an improper argument by a prosecutor requires reversal is whether the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney's improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice. Id. at 163. Under this test, it does not appear there was reversible error in the case sub judice. Although finding the prosecutor's comments did contain some cause for complaint, this Court stated in Dozier v. State, 257 So.2d 857, 860 (Miss. 1972): This is regrettable and is by no means approved by this Court. However, in the context of the whole record, we are unable to say that any or all of these things were of such a character or of such substance as to have been capable of prejudicing the right of appellant to a fair trial. Further, we note that the prosecutor was not perfect and made comments that were unfortunate, but the comments did not amount to reversible error. Appellate courts often recognize society as imperfect while at the same time attempting to hold prosecutors to absolute perfection. We affirm on this issue.