Opinion ID: 1985823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: independent advocate attorney ad litem's role

Text: The State's final argument in this appeal is that it was error for the Court of Chancery to have permitted the attorney ad litem to join with Mrs. Tavel-Lipnick in her petition to withdraw the feeding tube from Mrs. Tavel. The State contends that the attorney ad litem 's role should have been to oppose the guardian's petition, so that the Court of Chancery would receive the benefits of a thorough and full adversarial presentation. Moreover, to the extent the Attorney General was required to undertake this role, the State contends it is entitled to recover court costs. In Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. v. Severns, Del.Supr., 433 A.2d 1047 (1981) (hereinafter Severns II), this Court held that, in cases where a guardian has petitioned for the termination of life support, the Court of Chancery has a duty to provide an attorney ad litem on behalf of the disabled person. We held that the attorney ad litem must be independent and must act for the proposed ward during the proceeding. Severns II, 433 A.2d at 1049. Court of Chancery Rule 176(a) defines the role of the attorney ad litem as follows: Upon the filing of the petition, the Court shall appoint a member of the Delaware Bar to represent the adult person alleged to be disabled if such person is not otherwise represented by counsel, to receive notice on behalf of such person and to give actual notice to such person, explain his or her rights, and the nature of the proceeding. The attorney ad litem shall represent the person alleged to be disabled as if engaged by such person. Ch.Ct.R. 176(a) (emphasis added). The language of the attorney ad litem rule provides great latitude to the attorney ad litem to determine the position he or she will advocate. The broad language of that rule, providing that the attorney ad litem should represent the person as if engaged by such person, clearly does not limit the attorney ad litem to opposing whatever position the guardian takes. In Severns II, this Court acknowledged that it is proper for the attorney ad litem to either oppose or join the guardian's petition. Therefore, if the attorney ad litem, after careful, independent review, determines that the disabled person he or she represents would have refused or terminated medical treatment, the attorney ad litem may advocate such a position. Similarly, should such investigation indicate that the disabled person would have opposed efforts to terminate his or her life, the attorney ad litem is obligated to oppose the guardian's petition. Thus, in Severns II, this Court stated that the attorney ad litem 's right to compensation should not necessarily be determined by the position he takes in the litigation. Severns II, 433 A.2d at 1050. This Court and the Court of Chancery were greatly assisted by the manner in which the Attorney General framed and argued the issues in this proceeding. We recognize the force of the State's argument that if the attorney ad litem joins the guardian's petition, the Court of Chancery will not be presented with an adversarial proceeding, with the enhanced guarantee of accurate factfinding that such a proceeding brings with it. Nevertheless, in Cruzan, the Supreme Court noted that the attorney ad litem may act in entire good faith, and yet not maintain a position truly adversarial to that of the family. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2853 n. 9, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). Consequently, in part because a treatment termination proceeding may properly be non-adversarial, the Court determined in Cruzan that the United States Constitution permitted Missouri to adopt a clear and convincing evidentiary standard of proof. Similarly, in Delaware, because there is no requirement that a treatment termination proceeding be adversarial, we hold that the trial court is required to determine if there is clear and convincing evidence of both the ward's physical condition and of the decision that the ward would have made if he or she were competent. If the attorney ad litem joins in the guardian's petition and the trial court concludes, for any reason, that it would benefit from an adversarial presentation, it may appoint a life advocate to oppose the petition. See In re Jobes, Supr., 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434, 437 (1987). Unlike the attorney ad litem, the life advocate would not be bound to represent the ward as if engaged by the ward. The record reflects that the attorney ad litem acted in good faith and properly discharged his role as an independent advocate for the ward, Mrs. Tavel. The Court of Chancery's rulings regarding the issues relating to the attorney ad litem are affirmed.