Opinion ID: 3012166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Remaining Counts

Text: Having determined that Counts One through Six against Seif in federal court are not authorized by the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment, all that remains for our consideration is whether the District Court correctly determined that Counts Seven and Eight allege violations of federal law only and, thus, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court was correct. Count Seven, we repeat, charges Seif with failing to submit to the OSM certain information required by 30 C.F.R. S 938.16(h). Count Eight charges his failure to submit to the OSM a certain amendment to the 31 Pennsylvania program that he was required by 30 C.F.R. S 732.17(f)(1) to submit. These counts, in essence, allege that Pennsylvania, via Seif, has not complied with certain specific and ongoing federal oversight requirements, requirements that have no counterpart in state law. Accordingly, these counts may go forward against Seif under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment, because plaintiffs seek prospective relief against him for an ongoing violation of a nondiscretionary duty directly imposed by federal law. Parenthetically, this conclusion gives the lie to the federal defendants’ suggestion that the language of S 1270(a)(2), allowing a citizens suit in federal court against a state regulatory authority to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment, makes no sense if there could never be a violation of federal law once a state program is approved. Indeed, Seif conceded at oral argument that a citizens suit could have been brought in 1982 had any citizen believed that primacy had been improperly granted to Pennsylvania. In anticipation of the conclusion that Counts Seven and Eight fall within the Ex parte Young exception, a conclusion with which he did not take issue at oral argument before us, Seif contends that the Seminole Tribe exception to that exception should apply because of the detailed remedial scheme purportedly developed in SMCRA. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Under Seminole Tribe, if Congress establishes a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young. Id. at 74. The remedial scheme question has not been addressed in the context of SMCRA. In Bragg, the only other Court of Appeals’ analysis of the Eleventh Amendment issues raised here, the Fourth Circuit explicitly declined to do so. 248 F.3d at 290 n.3. Briefly, the question is whether the scope of the statutory remedy Congress established displaces the default option of an Ex parte Young suit. Where Congress explicitly outlines a detailed remedial scheme for a statutory violation, the Seminole Tribe Court cautioned hesitation before casting aside those limitations and 32 permitting an action based on Ex parte Young. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74, 76. This caution essentially defers to Congress’s authority to define remedies for rights it has defined. As the District Court pointed out, however, SMCRA does not contain a detailed remedial scheme such that a federal court’s ability to hear the case would be suspended. SMCRA merely provides for the OSM to take over regulatory authority upon the failure in whole or in part of a state program. Although both the District Court and Seif focus on the invasive nature of this remedy, more to the point is that there is no clear expression by Congress of what remedies should apply when a SMCRA violation is found other than (a) a takeover by the OSM in whole or in part, or (b) suit in federal court. Neither is there any indication by Congress of an intent to limit remedies. It must be remembered that suit in federal court is explicitly allowed to the extent allowed by the eleventh amendment, S 1270(a)(2), which further suggests that Ex parte Young suits were intended to go forward where appropriate. Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that the Seminole Tribe remedial scheme doctrine does not preclude an Ex parte Young suit under SMCRA. One final note. These are interlocutory appeals in which the ultimate question is whether Seif was or was not properly accorded Eleventh Amendment immunity. Seif suggested at oral argument that there are other reasons why Counts Seven and Eight should be dismissed -- for example, that what plaintiffs allege in those counts is an ongoing administrative process between the OSM and the DEP that, in plaintiffs’ view, is moving too slowly but, Seif says, is not something that Congress intended a citizens suit to address. Any other reasons Seif may have for seeking the dismissal of Counts Seven and Eight are not for us to consider on these appeals and must await consideration by another court on another day.