Opinion ID: 2013856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Dr Solomon Fulero

Text: Defendant next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dr. Solomon Fulero as an expert witness on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. At defendant's first trial, the State moved in limine to preclude Dr. Fulero's testimony. The trial court granted the motion. On direct review to this court, we held that the expert testimony would not have aided the trier of fact in reaching its conclusion, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Fulero's testimony. Enis, 139 Ill.2d at 288-89, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155. Of the several misconceptions about eyewitness testimony to which Dr. Fulero would have testified, only one had any relevance to defendant's case. That misconception involved jurors' beliefs that the more confident a witness appears to be while testifying, the more likely the witness is to be accurate in the identification. Enis, 139 Ill.2d at 289, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155. Although witness confidence may have been a factor in the case, we did not believe that this factor alone demanded that defendant receive a new trial. Enis, 139 Ill.2d at 289, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155. We also cautioned against the overuse of expert testimony, explaining: Such testimony, in this case concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, could well lead to the use of expert testimony concerning the unreliability of other types of testimony and, eventually, to the use of experts to testify as to the unreliability of expert testimony. Socalled experts can usually be obtained to support most any position. The determination of a lawsuit should not depend upon which side can present the most or the most convincing expert witnesses. We are concerned with the reliability of eyewitness expert testimony [citations], whether and to what degree it can aid the jury, and if it is necessary in light of defendant's ability to cross-examine eyewitnesses. An expert's opinion concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony is based on statistical averages. The eyewitness in a particular case may well not fit within the spectrum of these averages. It would be inappropriate for a jury to conclude, based on expert testimony, that all eyewitness testimony is unreliable. Enis, 139 Ill.2d at 289-90, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155. Defendant argues in his post-conviction petition that, as indicated in Dr. Fulero's affidavit, the doctor could have testified at defendant's second trial not only regarding the misconception of witness confidence as a predictor of the accuracy of identification, but also regarding the difficulty of cross-racial identifications. The offers of proof made at defendant's first trial did not touch on cross-racial identification problems. Defendant, who is black, alleges in his post-conviction petition that of the five eyewitnesses who testified for the State, four were white. The State does not dispute the accuracy of this allegation. In light of this court's holding that the exclusion of Dr. Fulero's testimony at defendant's first trial was proper, and our admonition against the overuse of expert testimony, we conclude that counsel's decision not to seek additional opinions from Dr. Fulero, beyond those several opinions disclosed in the first trial, was not deficient. Even if counsel's decision was objectively unreasonable, defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that he suffered resulting prejudice. Three witnesses identified defendant as the man seen in the parking lot on the morning of August 10, 1987. Even if all three witnesses are white, Dr. Fulero's affidavit does not indicate that cross-racial identifications are necessarily inaccurate or that the eyewitness testimony of these particular witnesses is necessarily suspect. Moreover, defendant's counsel capably placed the issue of the fallibility of the testimony of the State's eyewitnesses before the jury. On cross-examination and in closing argument, defendant's counsel aggressively explored the question of the accuracy and reliability of the witnesses' identification of defendant, as well as the witnesses' overall credibility. Counsel also argued that misidentification is a common occurrence in every day life. On this record, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different had Dr. Fulero testified. [1] Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as well as his related claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 3. Failure to Introduce Evidence From Illinois Crime Laboratory As his next post-conviction claim, defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony or other evidence that there was no blood on defendant's clothing, that defendant's fingerprints did not match those found at the crime scene, and that there was no other physical evidence connecting defendant to the crime. Defendant supports this claim with copies of reports from the Northern Illinois Police Crime Laboratory, which set forth the results of various tests and analyses performed in connection with this case. The record discloses that defendant's counsel, in his opening statement, called attention to the lack of physical evidence in the State's case. Counsel told the jury that there would be no fingerprint evidence, no blood evidence, and no footprint evidence linking defendant to the crime. Counsel elaborated on this theme in his opening, stating, in part, that no police officer, no laboratory technician, no evidence technician, no chemist can come into this courtroom to say that there's any evidence that any lead, barium, antimony, copper, things discharged from a gun by gas after firing, were found on any of [defendant's] clothing. In closing argument, counsel continued his attack on the lack of physical evidence presented by the State. Counsel argued to the jury that, despite evidence of extensive blood splattering at the crime scene, the victim's blood was not found on defendant, on his clothing, on his shoes, on his possessions, or inside Gonzales' car. Counsel's decision to challenge the State's lack of physical evidence, rather than calling a member of the police crime laboratory to testify, was a matter of trial strategy and was not deficient. Accordingly, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise, on direct appeal, these allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. 4. Failure to Object to Testimony and Photographic Evidence Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the identification testimony of Dan Thacker, to the evidence that Merlinda Entrata took additional security measures at her apartment shortly after the alleged sexual assault, and to the State's impeachment of its own witness, John Twardy. Defendant could have raised each of these claims on direct review. We thus agree with the State that defendant has waived review of these issues. See Olinger, 176 Ill.2d at 365, 223 Ill.Dec. 588, 680 N.E.2d 321. Defendant maintains, however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Accordingly, we must determine whether these claims would have succeeded, had they been raised on direct appeal. See Childress, 191 Ill.2d at 175, 246 Ill.Dec. 352, 730 N.E.2d 32.