Opinion ID: 1180863
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Other-crimes Instructional Error

Text: (92) As amicus curiae notes, we have held that when the prosecution introduces other crimes evidence in aggravation under former section 190.3, the court must instruct sua sponte that the jury may not consider such evidence unless such crimes are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 53-54; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]; see Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 97-98.) As Justice Broussard's concurring opinion in Robertson stated, however, a reasonable doubt instruction should be required only when evidence of other crimes is introduced or referred to as an aggravating factor pursuant to former Penal Code section 190.3, [factor] (b). When such evidence is introduced and used only for other purposes, a defendant is not entitled to a reasonable-doubt instruction, but may be entitled to an instruction limiting the use of that evidence to the purpose for which it was admitted. (33 Cal.3d at p. 60; Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 72.) In this case, all of the other crimes evidence was admitted during the guilt phase of defendant's trial. Most of this evidence was presented by the defense in an effort to establish diminished capacity, and except as noted below the prosecutor did not ask the jury to consider it in determining defendant's sentence. No reasonable doubt instruction was required as to these crimes. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 958-959 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) Amicus curiae also notes that the list defendant gave to Lieutenant Eoff, purporting to contain every crime defendant committed, referred to two crimes that were not charged in this case. As explained above, the jury was specifically instructed that it should not concern itself with the reasons these two crimes were not charged in this case. As with the other crimes evidence just discussed, these two crimes were not introduced or referred to at the penalty trial; the prosecutor did not ask the jury to consider these crimes in making its sentence determination. Again, a reasonable-doubt instruction was not required. Finally, amicus curiae notes that in closing argument the prosecutor urged the jury to consider the strong evidence that Slavik and Moore had been raped, even though it had not found that Slavik or Moore were murdered during the commission of a rape. Amicus curiae argues this was improper because the jury had already determined that these other crimes had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Attorney General concedes error but insists it was harmless. He notes that the following evidence was properly before the jury: the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Slavik; the rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, and the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, of 11-year-old Selix; the murder of Edwards during the commission of rape; the second degree murder of Moore; the kidnap, rape, sodomy, and forcible oral copulation of Kelly M.; the kidnap, rape, and forcible oral copulation of Robin H.; the kidnap, sodomy, forcible oral copulation, and attempted rape of Lisa S.; the rape of Marla Y.; and the assault on Donna W. In view of this properly admitted aggravating evidence, we do not believe it reasonably possible that the jury would have reached a different result in the absence of the prosecutor's argument that defendant may have raped Slavik and Moore. We conclude the improper argument was harmless.