Opinion ID: 2378953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Did the trial court deny Mr. Breazeale his constitutional right to present his defense of a medical cause of his unconsciousness?

Text: [¶ 30] As his sixth issue, Mr. Breazeale claims that the district court erred when it precluded three defense witnesses from testifying at trial. The witnesses, two doctors and a nurse practitioner, were offered by the defense to testify that Mr. Breazeale suffered from a seizure disorder. The district court ruled that the witnesses would not be allowed to testify because the defense had not complied with the disclosure and discovery requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a). [T]he applicable standard of review is whether the district court abused its discretion in deciding that the appropriate sanction for a discovery violation was to exclude [the] testimony of a defense witness. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 946-47 (Wyo. 2000), quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 31] W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a) provides as follows: Upon written demand of the attorney for the state, stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve within 10 days, or at such different time as the court may direct, upon the attorney for the state, a written notice of the defendant's intention to offer a defense of unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic automatism. Such notice by the defendant shall state with particularity the facts upon which the defendant relies to justify the defense of unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic automatism and the name and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish such defense. On July 29, 2009, the prosecution filed a demand pursuant to this rule. The defense did not respond within the ten-day period specified by the rule. It did not respond by October 20, 2009, the date set by the district court for both sides to provide discovery information. It did not respond by November 2, 2009, the deadline set by the district court for filing all pretrial motions. In a hearing held on November 20, 2009, the prosecution pointed out that the defense had failed to respond. The district court extended the time, allowing the defense until November 24, 2009, to file its notice if it intended to offer a defense of unconsciousness. [¶ 32] On November 24, 2009, approximately two weeks before the trial was scheduled to begin, the defense filed its notice. It set forth Mr. Breazeale's contention that on March 15, 2009, he suffered from the effects of a seizure [that] rendered him temporarily unconscious causing him to lose control of the vehicle he was operating. It stated that Information to support this allegation has been forwarded to the State on this day and consists of medical records from Casper Wyoming Neurology. The notice listed three witnesses, two doctors and a nurse practitioner, to provide information relating to the Defendant's seizure diagnosis and treatment. The prosecution filed an objection, claiming that the notice was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a). The district court agreed, and ruled that the three defense witnesses could not testify at trial. [¶ 33] On appeal, Mr. Breazeale contends that the district court's ruling impinged upon his constitutional right to present his defense. We have previously observed that the right to offer testimony is grounded in the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause and can be violated by imposition of a discovery sanction that excludes defense witness testimony. Lawson, 994 P.2d at 946, citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409-10, 108 S.Ct. 646, 653, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). Applying this rule, we held that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding defense witnesses solely on the basis of a missed discovery deadline. Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo.2003). But while the right to present a defense may be fundamental, it is not absolute, and can be outweighed by countervailing public interests. Lawson, 994 P.2d at 946. The factors to be weighed in the balance include, but are not limited to those relevant to the integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process. Id., quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15, 108 S.Ct. at 656. [¶ 34] In Mr. Breazeale's case, the three witnesses were not excluded because of a missed discovery deadline. The defense had missed deadlines for filing its notice, but the district court granted an extension, and the notice was filed by the extended deadline. Instead, the district court excluded the witnesses because the notice did not state with particularity the facts upon which the defendant relies to justify the defense of unconsciousness, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a). [2] [¶ 35] Based upon our review of the record, we believe the district court's conclusion was reasonable. The notice filed by Mr. Breazeale stated that the witnesses can provide information relating to the Defendant's seizure diagnosis and treatment, but provided no other details about the testimony they were expected to give. It listed the witnesses' names and addresses, but provided no information about their qualifications to provide medical testimony. The notice did not list any of the facts relied upon by the defense, but only indicated that such information could be found in Mr. Breazeale's medical records. As the district court observed, the parties knew from the beginning of the case that Mr. Breazeale claimed to have suffered a black out. Accordingly, the minimal information contained in the notice was not new to anybody. Further, the district court said, a broad reference to medical records is not particularly helpful to the prosecution's efforts to respond to a defense of unconsciousness. Because the notice did not state with particularity the facts upon which Mr. Breazeale's defense was based, the district court reasonably determined that it did not comply with W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a). Mr. Breazeale has not demonstrated that it was an abuse of discretion to rule that the three medical witnesses could not testify at trial. [3] [¶ 36] Affirmed.