Opinion ID: 1547691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Posttrial Hearing

Text: Although the trial justice conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 5, 2003, and allowed defendant to present expert testimony consistent with his original offer of proof, he ultimately refused to consider the evidence and struck the affirmative defense. In a Memorandum Order and Verdict, [6] the trial justice declared that he erred by writing to counsel and permitting defendant's attorney to sign the pleading after the close of evidence. The trial justice reasoned that he had inappropriately engaged in advocacy on the part of defendant. He refused to allow defendant to reopen the case and found that the evidence in the case is comprised of the testimony and full exhibits submitted on April 9, 2003, and the testimony and exhibits introduced on June 5, 2003, shall remain a proffer. We deem this error. First, having already received an offer of proof from defendant on the issue of workmanlike performance of the contract, it was incumbent upon the trial justice to decide whether, notwithstanding the offer of proof, the affirmative defense had been waived. If he determined that the affirmative defense had not been waived, then he was vested with the discretion to reopen the case, take additional testimony, and consider the affirmative defense. Although the letter to counsel may not have been sound practice, once the trial justice realized that he had overlooked defendant's affirmative defense, he was correct in bringing that omission to counsel's attention. However, having already refused to allow the counterclaim, the trial justice should not have entertained a motion to reconsider his previous ruling and should not have taken testimony on the chance that he would reconsider his ruling and consider the counterclaim. When sitting without a jury, a trial justice is vested with broad discretion to hear evidence, pass on the merits of a claim, and to reopen the case and take additional evidence when appropriate. A trial courts exercise of discretion is reviewed to determine whether it has been soundly and judicially exercised,    with just regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances   . Geloso v. Kenny, 812 A.2d 814, 817 (R.I.2002) (quoting Debar v. Women Infants Hospital, 762 A.2d 1182, 1185-86 (R.I.2000)). When circumstances require the trial justice to exercise discretion, it is the duty of the court to consider and determine that question so that the rights of the parties may be fairly protected in an orderly manner. It is as much an abuse of judicial discretion in refusing to exercise such discretion when warranted by the facts before the court as it is to exercise that discretion improperly by means of a decision that is clearly erroneous on the facts or under the law. Strzebinska v. Jary, 58 R.I. 496, 500, 193 A. 747, 749 (1937). In his letter to counsel, the trial justice indicated that the defective affirmative defense would be cured if defendant's attorney signed the pleading. In his written decision, authored after defendants counsel signed the pleading, the trial justice found that the affirmative defense had been waived during defendant's case-in-chief. Yet, later in that decision, satisfied that he erred by writing to counsel, he struck the affirmative defense and refused to allow defendant to reopen his case. Thus, although at one point the trial justice considered the affirmative defense to be procedurally and substantively sufficient, he later declared that it had been waived and, finally, because of what he characterized as improper judicial advocacy, he ordered it stricken. We are satisfied that the trial justice erred by striking the affirmative defense. Our review of the record discloses that defendant attempted to prove that plaintiff had not fully performed the contract. When the trial justice wrote to counsel, although the evidence was closed, he had not yet issued his decision. Clearly, in a jury-waived case, the trial justice was vested with broad discretion to permit defendant to reopen his case in order to consider the affirmative defense. The testimony comprised seventy pages of transcript and included extensive examination of the expert witness by both parties. By allowing this testimony in a jury-waived case, the trial justice did reopen the case, and his subsequent refusal to allow defendant to reopen the case was meaningless. By rejecting the expert's and Raymond's testimony presented at the posttrial hearing, the trial justice committed an abuse of discretion. At that point in this rather bumpy travel, the trial justice should have considered the merits of the affirmative defense; we deem his refusal to do so to be error. If admitted into evidence, the combined testimony of the expert and Raymond would support the affirmative defense. Relevant evidence is generally admissible but may be excluded under certain recognized exceptions. State v. Jackson, 752 A.2d 5, 10 (R.I.2000). The trial justice did not base his exclusion of Raymond's or the expert's testimony on any rule of evidence or on the basis of waiver, and therefore, its exclusion was erroneous. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand this case to the trial justice with directions to consider the evidence in light of the defendant's affirmative defense. Consistent with his broad discretion in a jury-waived trial, the trial justice may accept or reject the affirmative defense and issue a new judgment. Because of our disposition of these issues, we need not reach the defendant's remaining assignment of error.