Opinion ID: 180884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lockridge v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 597 F.3d 464, 469 (1st Cir.2010). We may affirm a district court's ruling on any grounds supported by the record. Carreras v. Sajo, García & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of North Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2004)). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party makes a sufficient preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must show a factual dispute without relying on improbable inferences, conclusory allegations, or rank speculation. Ingram v. Brink's, Inc., 414 F.3d 222, 228-29 (1st Cir.2005). Faiola appears to assert two theories of disability discrimination: (1) she was terminated because of her disabilities, and (2) APCO failed to provide a reasonable accommodation because it did not excuse Faiola from flying to and attending the sales conference. We find that both theories of liability fail because Faiola did not make the required threshold showing of disability under the statutory schemes at issue. To prove disparate treatment under both Title I of the ADA and Chapter 151B, [2] a plaintiff must first show that: (1) she suffers from a disability as defined by the ADA and Chapter 151B; (2) she was nevertheless able to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) her employer took an adverse employment action against her because of her protected disability. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2002). To make out a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff must establish the first two prongs set forth above and also that the employer knew of her disability but did not reasonably accommodate it upon a request. Id. at 237-38; see also Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir.2001). [3] Faiola sought to prove that she suffered from a disability by demonstrating a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. Carreras, 596 F.3d at 32. In assessing this standard, we use a three-part test: (1) whether the plaintiff suffered a mental or physical impairment, (2) whether the life activity limited by the impairment qualifies as major, and (3) whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity. Id. The inquiry is individualized. Id. at 33. A substantial limitation is one that is permanent or long-term. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). [4] Pursuant to the ADA regulations, a person must be unable to perform, or significantly restricted in the performance of, a major life activity that an average person in the general population can perform. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); see Carreras, 596 F.3d at 33. Relevant factors include the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration or expected duration, and its actual or expected permanent or long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2); see Carroll, 294 F.3d at 239. Faiola premised her disability discrimination claims on the fact that flying to and attending the APCO sales conference would be stressful, and that Dr. Levitan told her to avoid undue stress. The parties disagree as to what major life activity these claims implicate. On appeal, Faiola characterizes them as impacting her ability to work, and she asserts that the district court erred by addressing only travel and not work as her major life activity affected. APCO counters that Faiola's claims asserted at the district court concerned only an inability to travel by airplane and that any claims related to work are undeveloped and waived. Although we find vague the major life activity or activities that Faiola pled and argued at the district court, no matter how the claims are cast, they fail. No record evidence exists to demonstrate that Faiola's impairments substantially limited any alleged major life activities. [5] To the extent that Faiola's claims rest on her inability to work, they are unavailing. To determine a substantial limitation as to work, this court looks to whether the plaintiff can show that she is significantly restricted in her ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Carroll, 294 F.3d at 239-40 (citations omitted). An inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. at 240 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Here, Faiola's alleged inability to attend the APCO sales conference does not constitute a substantial limitation as to work. It was not a restriction relating to the performance of a class of jobs or broad range of jobs, nor was it even a single, particular job that she was restricted in performing. Moreover, the supposedly substantial nature of her impairment is undercut by her ability to perform all the essential aspects of [her] job, from managing her sales assistant to handling menial tasks. She was under no physical or behavioral restrictions, and her treating healthcare providers explained that she was stable and capable of engaging in any of life's activities. Although Faiola peppers her briefs with her symptoms and diagnoses in an attempt to prove disability, [i]t is insufficient for individuals ... to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment to prove a substantial limitation. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681. To the extent that Faiola's claims rest on her inability to fly, they also fail. No healthcare provider restricted Faiola's ability to fly, and Dr. Levitan stated that someone with Faiola's blood pressure readings would not be at risk on an airplane. Moreover, Faiola traveled frequently by airplane before the APCO sales conference at issue, and she has made business trips to Florida and New Jersey since her termination.