Opinion ID: 797065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breach of Express and Implied Warranties

Text: 38 Plaintiffs allege that the Manufacturers marketed light cigarettes to induce Plaintiffs into believing that in purchasing them, they were avoiding certain health risks. Plaintiffs assert that Manufacturers breached their express and implied warranties of fitness because light cigarettes were not fit for the purpose for which they were marketed. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs' express and implied warranty claims were not pre-empted by the Labeling Act. Again, we disagree.
39 Cipollone indicates that in some circumstances, claims for breach of express warranty may not be pre-empted by the Labeling Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Cipollone Court reasoned that: 40 [w]hile the general duty not to breach warranties arises under state law, the particular requirement . . . based on smoking and health . . . with respect to the advertising or promotion [of] cigarettes in an express warranty claim arises from the manufacturer's statement in its advertisements. In short, a common-law remedy for a contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken should not be regarded as a requirement . . . imposed under State law  within the meaning of § 5(b). 41 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 526, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (alterations in original). Relying on this language, and without reference to the allegations pled, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs' express warranty claim was not pre-empted. 42 Because the complaint is not explicit in how its claim avoids pre-emption, and because the district court provided no explanation as to the relevant Louisiana law, nor any discussion of the factual basis of Plaintiffs' claim, we can only conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to properly allege a breach of express warranty under Louisiana law. The record indicates, however, that the sole basis for this claim is Manufacturers' use of the FTC-sanctioned terms and measurements in their advertising. We therefore consider as a preliminary matter whether breach of express warranty can ever be claimed on the basis of the Manufacturers' use of these descriptors. 43 The analysis here mirrors our earlier discussion of the Plaintiffs' fraud claims. The use of FTC-approved descriptors, based on the FTC method, cannot be inherently deceptive. To conclude that it is deceptive would be to hold the Manufacturers liable for the inadequacies of the federal testing method, an outcome other courts have declined to accept. See, e.g., Johnson v. Philip Morris, 159 F.Supp.2d 950, 953 (S.D.Tex.2001) (holding that [d]efendants' warranty . . . cannot conceivably extend to the validity of a government sanctioned testing method); Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 2006 WL 933394, at  7 (Pa.Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2006) (manufacturer did not expressly warrant that [low tar] cigarettes were a safe alternative to other brands or that smoking [low tar] cigarettes reduced the risk of contracting lung cancer where it accurately advertised the fact that [this brand of cigarettes] was lowest in tar and nicotine among all brands tested under the FTC method); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F.Supp. 1515, 1527-28 (D.Kan.1995) (finding that plaintiffs' evidence did not support their contention that defendants had expressly warranted that smoking cigarettes does not present any significant health consequences.); Rodarte v. Philip Morris Co., 2003 WL 23341208 at  6 (C.D.Cal. June 23, 2003) (finding that plaintiff failed to allege breach of express warranty when the only basis of his claim was that defendant had marketed cigarettes as lower in tar and nicotine). 44 We thus conclude that an express warranty claim arising solely out of the use of descriptors based on the FTC method is pre-empted. In Cipollone, where the plaintiff was permitted to proceed with his express warranty claim, the plaintiff had produced advertisements explicitly stating that there was proof that that brand of cigarettes never . . . did you any harm. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 549 (3d Cir.1990). The defendant in that case was held liable for the additional representations that it made with respect to the safety of its products, not for its use of the FTC-approved descriptors. We therefore hold that the district court erred in finding that Plaintiffs' express warranty claim is not pre-empted by the Labeling Act.
45 The district court also held that Plaintiffs' claims based on alleged breach of implied warranty are not pre-empted. This holding finds no support in the Cipollone opinion. As Plaintiffs failed to explain the basis of this claim in their pleadings or to argue in support of this claim on appeal, and as the district court failed to provide any discussion of the pre-emption analysis with respect to the claim in its order, we will not consider it for the first time here. We therefore hold that this claim is dismissed with prejudice.