Opinion ID: 2084660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court Rulings

Text: The Circuit Court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the manufacturer defendants, Ryland, Summit and the Lis, ruling that as a matter of law, the enumerated and different substantial intervening acts of negligence constituted a superseding cause of the injuries. The court determined that the intervening acts interrupted the chain of causation, thereby relieving the manufacturer defendants, Summit, Ryland and the Lis of legal liability. Before the Circuit Court, for the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the manufacturer defendants, Ryland and Summit challenged only the legal causation element of the plaintiffs' claim, and did not dispute that their actions constituted a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs' injuries. [8] As a result, the Circuit Court addressed only the issue of proximate cause. As to the manufacturer defendants, the Circuit Court ruled as follows: As a matter of law, it was not foreseeable when the smoke detectors were manufactured in 1989 that so many different substantial intervening acts of negligence, including violations of law, would occur so as to link the `Manufacturer Defendants' alleged negligent act to the Plaintiffs' injuries nine years later. Those intervening acts constitute a superseding cause of the Plaintiffs' injuries. As to Ryland and Summit, the Circuit Court ruled that the Complaint did not establish legal causation, reasoning that it was inconceivable that they could foresee, nine years before the fire, that the Lis would finish the basement without providing emergency egress, in violation of building codes and that the Chapmans would allow the boys to keep candles lit while they were sleeping. The court also granted Dieffenbach and Hightower's motion for summary judgment, determining that as home-improvement contractors repairing water damage to the basement of the residence in 1994, [Dieffenbach and Hightower] did not have a legally cognizable duty on which to impose liability for damages and injuries sustained in [the] June 1998 fire, to warn the occupants that the basement rooms should not be used for sleeping. The court also ruled that the failure to obtain building or electrical permits from the City of Gaithersburg in 1994, prior to repairing water damage to the basement was neither a cause-in-fact nor a legal cause of the fire. [9] The Collins, Juster and Chapman plaintiffs noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.