Opinion ID: 2636802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether substantial evidence in the record supports the appeals officer's alternative ruling

Text: Peterson also asserts that this case falls within the purview of NRS 616C.025(2), regardless of whether the appeals officer interpreted NRS 616C.025(1) erroneously. Thus, Peterson argues that the appeals officer's alternative ruling is supported by substantial evidence in the record. We agree. It is well-settled that [a]dministrative agencies may receive and weigh evidence and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment on questions of fact. Southwest Gas v. Woods, 108 Nev. 11, 15, 823 P.2d 288, 290 (1992); see also NRS 233B.135(3) (The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on a question of fact.). Therefore, [t]he central inquiry is whether substantial evidence in the record supports the agency decision. Brocas v. Mirage Hotel & Casino, 109 Nev. 579, 583, 854 P.2d 862, 865 (1993). Substantial evidence is `that quantity and quality of evidence which a reasonable [person] could accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608 n. 1, 729 P.2d 497, 498 n. 1 (1986) (quoting Robertson Transp. Co. v. P.S.C., 39 Wis.2d 653, 159 N.W.2d 636, 638 (1968)); see also Maxwell v. SIIS, 109 Nev. 327, 331, 849 P.2d 267, 270-71 (1993). Accordingly, if the agency's decision lacks substantial evidentiary support, the decision is unsustainable as being arbitrary or capricious. See NRS 233B.135(3)(f). In the present case, the appeals officer ruled in the alternative that Peterson's circumstances qualified as an excuse for failure to file the claim under NRS 616C.025(2). NRS 616C.025(2) operates independently of NRS 616C.025(1) and expressly provides: An insurer may excuse the failure to file a notice of injury or a claim for compensation pursuant to the provisions of this section if: (a) The injury to the employee or another cause beyond his control prevented him from providing the notice or claim; (b) The failure was caused by the employee's or dependent's mistake or ignorance of fact or of law; (c) The failure was caused by the physical or mental inability of the employee or the dependent; or (d) The failure was caused by fraud, misrepresentation or deceit. It is undisputed that Peterson did not associate his leg pain with his back injury. Because of his mistake or ignorance concerning the continuing nature of his back injury, Peterson sought medical attention belatedly, which caused his failure to file a claim for compensation within ninety days of the actual injury. Indeed, Peterson did not move to file a claim for compensation until medical evidence demonstrated that his pain was the result of the September 11, 1996, accident. Thus, the appeals officer alternatively ruled that Peterson's situation qualified as a mistake or ignorance of fact, thereby falling under excusable conduct pursuant to NRS 616C.025(2)(b). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record clearly supports the appeals officer's alternative finding that Peterson's failure to file a timely claim for compensation was excused under NRS 616C.025(2). Barrick contends that this case is controlled by our decision in Bally's Grand Hotel & Casino v. Reeves, 113 Nev. 926, 948 P.2d 1200 (1997). In Bally's, an injured employee failed to file a timely notice of injury, and her employer's insurer denied her benefits for this reason. On appeal, the employee argued that her failure should have been excused by the insurer pursuant to an earlier version of NRS 616C.025(2). We noted in Bally's that the statute gives broad discretionary powers to employers as to whether they should accept or reject employees' excuses for failing to comply. Id. at 929-30 n. 4, 948 P.2d at 1203 n. 4. Nonetheless, we stated that this does not, mean, however, that the insurer's decision is inviolate. Id. Thus, the insurer's decision to deny an excuse is reviewable de novo by an administrative officer. See id. Because it was unclear from the record whether the insurer actually considered the employee's excuse, we remanded the matter to the insurer for a reconsideration of the employee's excuse. See id. at 929, 948 P.2d at 1203; see also Bullock v. Pinnacle Risk Mgmt., 113 Nev. 1385, 1389, 951 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1997) (holding that Bally's requires remanding to the employer's insurer to consider the employee's excuse under NRS 616C.025(2)). Essentially, Barrick argues that under Bally's, remanding this case to its insurer is necessary. We disagree for the following reason. Although our holding in Bally's suggests that we must remand this matter to the insurer, [4] the appeals officer already concluded that Peterson's failure to file a timely claim fell within the excuse provisions of NRS 616C.025(2). More importantly, at oral argument on this appeal, Barrick categorically stated that it would reject Peterson's excuse upon remand. In enacting the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (the Act), which includes NRS Chapters 616A to 616D, the legislature expressly declared that the Act  must be interpreted and construed to ensure the quick and efficient payment of compensation to injured and disabled employees. NRS 616A.010(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, remanding this case to Barrick's insurer would only further delay the payment of Peterson's workers' compensation benefits because the insurer would inevitably deny Peterson's excuse, and the appeals officer would then reverse the insurer's decision and accept the excuse. Accordingly, we now clarify our decision in Bally's and conclude that NRS 616C.025(2) does not require remand to the insurer in all cases. Thus, in light of Barrick's concession and the appeals officer's alternative ruling, we further conclude that remanding the case to Barrick's insurer risks non-compliance with the legislature's declaration and would merely serve to foster needless and continued litigation at that level. Consequently, we conclude that the appeals officer properly considered Peterson's excuse de novo and that substantial evidence in the record supports the appeals officer's alternative finding that Peterson's failure to file a timely claim for compensation is excused under NRS 616C.025(2). See Bally's, 113 Nev. at 929-30 n. 4, 948 P.2d at 1203 n. 4.