Opinion ID: 1934953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: combined functions

Text: The appellant contends that in these proceedings the Commission has been actively involved in the initiation, investigation, prosecution, judgment and disciplinary action. He complains that the combination of all of these functions in a single commission violates his right to a fair hearing before a fair tribunal required by due process. In Re Murchison, 1955, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942; Gibson v. Berryhill, 1973, 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488. However, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the mere combination of functions is not a per se constitutional violation. The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. They must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies in human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Very similar claims have been squarely rejected in prior decisions of this Court.    Withrow v. Larkin, 1975, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712. See also 1 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 78. The only showing made by the appellant again is found in the stipulation between the parties, to-wit: That at its regular meeting on December 9, 1971, the South Dakota State Real Estate Commission took under consideration a reported problem in the THELMA NELSON, BuyerCALVIN E. SEVERSON, Seller transaction which reportedly occurred in 1969 and by motion duly made and seconded, Mr. BURCHILL, Secretary to the Real Estate Commission, was `instructed to go to Brookings and meet with Mrs. NELSON and her attorney, Mr. McCANN and that the Commission issue an Order for an Emergency Hearing setting the date . . . ` and place. That there was no formal Complaint by Mrs. NELSON, her attorney, Mr. SEVERSON or any other person other than the action of the Commission described III above. That thereafter Mr. BURCHILL proceeded, pursuant to the informal direction of the Commission consisting of the same members named in I above plus one Mrs. FREDA K. THOMAS, to arrange for a hearing on the reported problem referred to as the NELSON-SEVERSON transaction. That Mr. BURCHILL thereafter issued a Notice of Hearing in the Matter entitled In the Matter of the Investigation of the Alleged Unprofessional Conduct of OLIVER A. GOTTSCHALK, real estate broker for a hearing to be had in Sioux Falls on February 3, 1972, which hearing was cancelled pursuant to an Order to Show Cause served upon the Commission and each of its members at said time and place. We conclude that these facts are insufficient to establish a violation of the appellant's constitutional right to due process. The appellant in his brief asserts that Mr. Burchill, the Secretary to the Commission and its principal investigator, and the attorney hired by the Commission to prosecute the proceedings were present during the decision-making process. We assume appellant refers to the deliberations of the Commission following the presentation of testimony. Certainly, such facts would have a bearing upon the impartiality of the proceedings; however, the appellant fails to point out where in the record evidence of such conduct was established, and we are unable to locate any evidence to support those assertions. The burden is upon the appellant to establish such facts in the record as will overcome the presumption that the Commission acted honestly, fairly and impartially. The record does not sustain a finding that the appellant met this burden. The judgment of the circuit court affirming the order of the Commission revoking appellant's brokers license is affirmed.