Opinion ID: 4527882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: How to Prove Race Discrimination

Text: Plaintiffs rarely have eyewitness or smoking gun evidence that reveals an employer's discriminatory motives. Theidon v. Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d 477, 495 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 88 (1st Cir. 2018)). But there are several ways to do so without it. One path is the familiar McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework, named for the case that christened it. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). Under that theory, evidence that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class and qualified for the position, but that the employer chose an equally or less qualified applicant instead, creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against [him]. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (quoting Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). Once the applicant makes out this prima facie case, the employer, to avoid liability, has to give some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer provides such an explanation, the sole remaining issue is - 13 - discrimination vel non; and the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that [the employer's] proffered reason is pretextual and that the actual reason for the adverse employment action is discriminatory. Theidon, 948 F.3d at 495– 96 (internal quotation marks omitted). But McDonnell Douglas didn't pave the only road to relief for a plaintiff alleging status-based discrimination under Title VII. That's because a hirer's decision-making can violate the statute even if the plaintiff's race wasn't the single, true reason for the final decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247. Rather, in passing Title VII, Congress meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations, even if, in hindsight, a court might determine that the [hiring] decision would have been the same if [the protected trait] had not been taken into account. Id. at 241. In such a mixed-motive case, the plaintiff can prove a violation if he shows that race was one motivating factor in the rejection, even if other reasons also played a role. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94, 101–02 (2003) (holding that circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a mixed-motive verdict) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)). If the plaintiff succeeds, the employer still has a limited affirmative defense if it can show it would have made the same decision even if race hadn't factored in (meaning race wasn't the but-for cause of the - 14 - failure to hire). Id. at 94 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). But that defense is limited because it only staves off damages and compelled reinstatement — not liability, other injunctive remedies, declaratory relief, or attorneys' fees and costs. Id.