Opinion ID: 1309837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pretrial competency issue

Text: (1a) Defendant persuasively argues that the court's failure to hold a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368 constituted a denial of due process under Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 377 [15 L.Ed.2d 815, 817-818, 86 S.Ct. 836]. Specifically, defendant contends that the failure to hold a competency hearing before trial, following the court's explicit expression of doubt as to defendant's competency and its subsequent order requiring a section 1368 hearing, cannot be cured by a retrospective appellate determination of his probable competence to stand trial. Rather, defendant asserts, the conviction must be set aside and, if the prosecution wishes to retry him, a hearing must be held to determine his present competence. The People respond that a competency hearing was not required in this case because defendant failed to present substantial evidence of his mental incompetence as required under Pate and our decision in People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 516-517 [58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942]. We disagree. (2) It has long been established that the conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process. ( Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 377 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 817-818].) [7] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the failure of a trial court to employ procedures to protect against trial of an incompetent defendant deprives the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial and requires reversal of his conviction. ( Ibid.; Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 171 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 112-113, 95 S.Ct. 896].) Prior to the decision in Pate, we had interpreted section 1368 to permit a trial judge, in determining whether to conduct a competency hearing, to resolve conflicting evidence concerning a defendant's competence to stand trial. ( People v. Merkouris (1959) 52 Cal.2d 672, 678 [344 P.2d 1].) (3a) In Pennington, however, we specifically reinterpreted section 1368 and held,  Pate v. Robinson stands for the proposition that an accused has a constitutional right to a hearing on present sanity if he comes forward with substantial evidence that he is incapable, because of mental illness, of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him or assisting in his defense. Once such substantial evidence appears, a doubt as to the sanity of the accused exists, no matter how persuasive other evidence  testimony of prosecution witnesses or the court's own observations of the accused  may be to the contrary .... [¶] [W]hen defendant has come forward with substantial evidence of present mental incompetence, he is entitled to a section 1368 hearing as a matter of right under Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. 375. The judge then has no discretion to exercise.  ( Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518, italics added.) Moreover, our subsequent decisions have consistently held that despite the discretionary nature of the language of section 1368, a competency hearing is required when substantial evidence of the accused's incompetence has been introduced. ( People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 91-92 [184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 648 P.2d 578, 23 A.L.R.4th 476]; accord, People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 283 [61 Cal. Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228].) [8] We see no reason to hold otherwise under the facts presented here. Section 1368 provides that if a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, the court shall inquire of defense counsel regarding his client's competence and, if counsel believes that defendant may be incompetent, the court shall order a hearing on the matter. The section further provides that even if defense counsel believes that his client is competent, the court may, in its discretion, order such a competency hearing. Once the hearing is ordered,  all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until the question of the present mental competence of the defendant has been determined.  (§ 1368, subd. (c), italics added.) (1b) In the present case, there were enough indications of defendant's mental and emotional instability to trigger the trial court's sua sponte obligation to order a competency hearing. Once the trial court ordered the hearing, as it reasonably did, it could not simply vacate the order, sub silentio. The People present several arguments in rebuttal, none of which convinces us a competency hearing was not required under the facts of this case. First, the People argue that a competency hearing was not required because substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence to stand trial did not appear at the preliminary hearing. We cannot agree. Of the five psychiatrists who examined defendant by court appointment, two concluded that he was not competent to stand trial. The other three disagreed, although at least two of those doctors observed schizophrenic behavior in defendant and believed he should be committed to a state hospital. Unquestionably, these psychiatric reports (particularly when considered in light of the court's expression of doubt as to defendant's competency and defendant's history of mental illness and bizarre behavior at pretrial hearings) constituted substantial evidence within the ambit of section 1368. In a related context, the People assert that the change in defendant's mental condition before trial obviated the need for a competency hearing. This argument is misplaced. As stated earlier, section 1368 requires that if at any time during the pendency of a criminal case a doubt arises as to mental competency, all criminal proceedings must be suspended until a hearing has been conducted to determine whether the defendant is presently mentally competent.  ( Stankewitz, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 91, italics added.) (3b) Indeed, once a doubt has arisen as to the competence of the defendant to stand trial, the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the defendant without first determining his competence in a section 1368 hearing, and the matter cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel. ( Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 808 [106 Cal. Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018].) (1c) Further, even if we were to assume hypothetically that the court's initial expression of doubt as to defendant's competence was mitigated by defendant's stabilization through drug therapy, the fact that Drs. Davis, Hofman and Stalberg submitted reports indicating defendant was competent to stand trial did not permit the trial court to vacate or otherwise ignore its previous order for a section 1368 hearing. Such a contention, if accepted, would allow the court on its own motion and without a full airing of the evidence to reject substantial psychiatric evidence of [defendant's] mental incompetence [i.e., the reports submitted by Drs. Faerstein and Moskowitz] and credit conflicting evidence to deny a hearing on competency. The Pate and Pennington decisions rejected this line of argument in holding that once substantial evidence in the form of a psychiatric opinion of incompetence was presented, the court was required to hold a competency hearing. ( Stankewitz, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 93; Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518.) Finally, the People insist that defense counsel abandoned the competency issue after determining that pursuit of the issue would be fruitless. Such an argument, however, overlooks the fact that the matter is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived by counsel. ( Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 521; § 1368, subd. (c).) Moreover, as pointed out in Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at page 384 [15 L.Ed.2d at p. 821], it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently `waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial. In sum, substantial evidence indicating defendant's inability to understand the nature of the proceedings and rationally assist his counsel had been presented at the preliminary hearing. The court explicitly demonstrated its own doubt as to defendant's competence and ordered a section 1368 hearing. The sub silentio disposition of the section 1368 proceedings without a full competency hearing rendered the subsequent trial proceedings void because the court had been divested of jurisdiction to proceed pending express determination of the competency issue. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings pursuant to section 1368 to determine defendant's present competency to stand trial.