Opinion ID: 6111649
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Causation Instruction

Text: The jury instructions correctly stated the causation standard under § 841(b)(1)(C). Both Defendants argue that the “results from” language requires a showing of proximate causation, which includes a foreseeability requirement. See United States v. Jeffries, 958 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2020). Defendants thus argue that the district court erred by giving the following jury instruction: In determining whether the serious bodily injury or death of these individuals resulted from the use of Heroin of Fentanyl that was distributed, the government is not required to prove that the defendant or defendants knew ahead of time that the Distribution of a Controlled Substance would or could result in a serious bodily injury, or in the death of, these individuals. In other words, the government need not prove that the serious bodily injury or death was foreseeable to the defendant or defendants. . . . If you find that one or more of the defendants is guilty of the charged [offenses], you may find that the controlled substance so distributed caused a serious bodily injury or death if he or she would not have suffered that serious bodily injury or death if he or she not used that Substance. Along those lines, if you find that the substance distributed combined with other drugs or factors to produce his or her serious bodily injury or death, you may find that the substance caused the serious bodily injury or death of the victim if the victim would have avoided that serious bodily injury or lived but for his or her use of that substance. That is, you may find the substance distributed by the defendant caused a victim’s serious bodily injury or death if, so to speak, this substance was the straw that broke the camel’s back. But the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the serious bodily injury or death would not have occurred had the substance distributed by the defendant not been ingested by the individual. (Jury Instrs., R. 662, Page ID #3588–89 (emphasis added)). At trial, Tempo asked for an additional “superseding cause instruction.” (Tempo Mot. for Jury Instr., R. 345, Page ID #1803). Sadler raises the argument for the first time on appeal. Because neither defendant specifically requested a proximate-cause instruction, we review this instruction for plain error. See Pritchard, 964 F.3d at 522 (citing Roth, 628 F.3d at 833). There is no dispute that § 841(b)(1)(C) requires but-for causation. Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218–19. At the time of the trial, this circuit had not addressed whether the sentencing enhancement also required proximate causation. But we recently took up this question and decided that § 841(b)(1)(C) does not require a showing of proximate causation, including Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 48 foreseeability. Jeffries, 958 F.3d at 520, 524; see also United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the inquiry is whether the error was plain at the time of appellate review, not at the time of trial). Thus, the district court properly instructed the jury on the applicable causation standard under § 841(b)(1)(C).