Opinion ID: 1439390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of the Withdrawal Issue

Text: A few basic comments are appropriate as to what is truly at issue in these cases. It seems to us, in effect, that PDS and the two bar organizations are discussing apples, the majority is discussing oranges, and the dissenters are discussing tangerines. The positions of PDS, the majority, and the dissenters may be characterized succinctly as follows: [5] (1) PDS contends that in the absence of evidence of bad faith, counsel should be permitted to withdraw upon the naked assertion that he is in a conflict situation arising from a duty to pursue a nonfrivolous claim of ineffectiveness against a fellow member of his law firm or agency. (2) The division opinion in Angarano includes the following two statements: The threshold is certainly higher in such cases than nonfrivolity.    We think the better test is the one applied [in the trial court] when determining the necessity for a hearing on a collateral attack asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. That isdoes the contention, if true, entitle the pleader to relief; or, is a prima facie case of constitutional ineffectiveness apparent? 312 A.2d at 298 (citations omitted). Again, we state that . . . an attack upon trial counsel is not a device to be used on appeal except in the most severe cases of glaring ineptitude. 312 A.2d at 300. (3) The dissenters take a middle-ground position, rejecting the PDS position but stopping short of the majority's view: . . . it is our view that when appellate counsel finds himself in this [ethical] predicament he need only advise the court of the nature of his close relationship with trial counsel . . . and state in general terms the issue, such as, asserted failure to call an important defense witness without tactical justification. In other words, to make a good faith showing it is enough to identify a `legitimate issue' giving rise to the claim, which of course automatically excludes anything frivolous or insubstantial. Opinion of Judge Gallagher at 474-475, infra. It thus is seen that the ultimate positions of the majority and the minority are not far apart. The question is not whether PDS may be permitted to withdraw at the appellate level if a real question exists as to whether alleged ineffectiveness of a PDS trial attorney may have reached constitutional proportions. See Thompson v. United States, D.C.App., 307 A.2d 764, 766-767 (1973). If such a conflict of interest does exist, most assuredly leave to withdraw should and would be granted. What PDS seeks is carte blanche to withdraw from the appellate handling of any case which was tried by another of its attorneys, simply by stating that ethical considerations are present. That position is rejected by all members of the court. The majority goes on from there to conclude that we have an obligation to satisfy ourselves that a prima facie case of constitutional ineffectiveness exists before granting leave to withdraw. [6] Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-745, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Beyond question, none of the majority envisions having a PDS appellate attorney attack a PDS trial attorney through arguing constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel. In considering these problems, it must be borne in mind that few claims of ineffectiveness may be raised properly on a direct appeal from a conviction. Appellate courts are bound by the confines of the records before them, and the vast majority of ineffectiveness questions must be raised initially in the trial court through a collateral attack advanced pursuant to D.C. Code 1973, § 23-110 [or, depending upon the circumstances, under Superior Court Criminal Rules 32(e) or 33]. [7] See United States v. Mandello, 426 F.2d 1021, 1022-1023 (4th Cir. 1970); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81, 3 L.Ed.2d 86 (1958). [8] The correctness of proceeding in such a fashion readily is acknowledged by the minority. See Opinion of Judge Gallagher at 473, infra. To be sure, in any collateral attack advanced in the trial court under § 23-110 which is based upon allegations of ineffectiveness, if the trial court concludes that a hearing should be held, a non-PDS attorney should be appointed if the original trial counsel was with that agency. See, e. g., People v. Smith, 37 Ill.2d 622, 230 N.E. 2d 169 (1967). Yet that proposition, obvious as it is, is not what the court has dealt with in these cases. In the decision which we now decline to reconsider en banc, the court did not deal directly with the type of showing which should be made by PDS in the trial court to seek to have new counsel appointed to raise an ineffectiveness issue at that level. What the court did say is that we feel obliged to receive an adequate specific showing that a prima facie ineffectiveness issue exists before we (1) will grant leave to withdraw, and (2) will appoint new counsel (who then would decide whether to assert such an issue in this court or to seek collateral relief in the trial court). [9] Further, irrespective of this court's treatment of a particular case, there is no bar to appointed appellate counsel's going to the trial court to point out the possible need for a hearing on an ineffectiveness question. In an earlier pleading herein, PDS stated that its Board of Trustees strongly recommended that the Public Defender Service seek leave to withdraw from the specific cases, and that to avoid any prejudice to the specific clients the cases not be discussed in any detail. The contention that the disclosure which we hold to be necessary would prejudice a client strikes us as illusory. After all, if an ineffectiveness question ultimately is to be considered and decided by the court, a full presentation must be made by someone at some point. We can understand the apparent desire of PDS not to be required to say anything which might suggest a particularly poor performance by any member of its able staff, but we cannot accept the argument that a limited preliminary disclosure to a motions division would prejudice an appellant's rights. Petition for reconsideration en banc denied. GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, with whom Associate Judges KELLY and FICKLING join, dissenting: The proceeding addressed by the court's orders and statement, to which this dissent is filed, has two facets: (1) the Public Defender Service asks this court to go en banc pursuant to our Rule 40(c)(1) in order to resolve a conflict between decisions of two hearing divisions of this court, and also alleges that this court's decision in Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), adopts an analysis contrary to the fundamental premises of the adversary system and is not in accord with existing precedent; and (2) the District of Columbia Bar and the Bar Association of the District of Columbia [hereinafter D.C. Bar Association] both believe the issues raised to be of sufficient importance to ask leave of this court to file the rather extensive amicus curiae briefs which they proffered. [1] The court has denied the D.C. Bar's motion for leave to file its brief as amicus curiae but granted the D.C. Bar Association's request to do so. We disagree and will relate our views on the net effect of this ruling, viewed realistically. At the root of it all, the Public Defender Service raises a question under the Code of Professional Responsibilityan ethical question relating to the practice of law in this jurisdictionand it is this problem which is discussed in the briefs of the D.C. Bar and the D.C. Bar Association. [2] Since the court has accepted for filing the brief of the D.C. Bar Association we need refer to it no further in our discussion of the amicus issue. We confine the discussion to (1) the failure of the court to accept the brief amicus curiae on behalf of the D.C. Bar itself and (2) denial of the Public Defender Service motion for rehearing en banc on a prior denial of motions to withdraw from appellate representation in five separate criminal cases.