Opinion ID: 2732311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Debt Collector Victim Class

Text: Appellants next urge that the District Court erred in denying certification to the Debt Collector Victim Class. As noted above, Appellants limit their appeal for this class to their claim of an FDCPA violation. Appellants have also abandoned the first component of the class and instead only appeal the denial of certification as to the second, which includes persons who received written demands from debt collectors retained by Quest that added interest, charges or penalties in excess of the original amount billed by Quest. Appellees contend that Appellants cannot now seek this narrowed class because it was not sought below. We will not address the issue of waiver because, even assuming, arguendo, that this argument was not waived, the narrowed Debt Collector Victim Class could not be certified. The District Court denied certification as to the second prong of the class because Richard Grandalski, the only proposed representative class member, is not an adequate class representative for the FDCPA violation claim, as the class definition includes only those who received a written demand for payment from a debt collector. As the Court found, Grandalski admitted in a deposition that he “never received anything in written communications from Quantum [the debt collector]. . . .” (App. 65.) Rather, “Grandalski’s deposition testimony indicates that Quantum contacted him by telephone.” (Id.) The Court ruled that, because his claim was unlike that of the class he was supposed to represent, certification was denied. See Hayes, 725 F.3d at 360 21 (“[W]here the lead plaintiff does not fit the class definition, the class may not be certified.”). Appellants urge that this ruling constitutes a clear factual error because the District Court later granted Grandalski summary judgment as to his individual claim, finding that he had in fact shown an FDCPA violation. On this issue, Appellants point to the Court’s statement that “Quantum dunned Mr. Grandalski” on two separate occasions, and seemingly contend that this is a finding that Grandalski was billed in writing. (App. 87 n.4.) However, the cited statement does not reflect a conclusion that this “dunning” was in writing. Cf. In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 320 B.R. 541, 549 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (“[T]here were no letters, telephone calls, or any attempts whatsoever on the part of Defendant to apply pressure or to ‘dun’ Debtor to encourage more prompt payment . . . .”). Further, Appellants do not challenge or attempt to explain Grandalski’s testimony, cited in the denial of class certification, that he received no written communications from a debt collector, and that instead he communicated with them by phone. Even after full discovery, no party has produced any such written letter. We cannot conclude that the Court made a clear error in finding that Grandalski had received no written demands, and therefore was not a suitable class representative. Thus, we will affirm the denial of certification to the second prong of the Debt Collector Victim class, as to the FDCPA claim.