Opinion ID: 2527692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Attempt to Present Mitigation Solely to Trial Judge

Text: {¶ 74} In his second proposition of law, Short contends that the trial court violated his right to present mitigating evidence by denying Short's request to present mitigating evidence to the judge alone, after the penalty phase. {¶ 75} Short waived his right to present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of trial. On May 8, 2006, the jury returned a recommendation of death and was discharged. Sentencing was scheduled for May 24, 2006. On May 23, the defense filed a motion for continuance, in part because defense counsel desired to interview several witnesses    that maybe [sic] testifying on Mr. Short's behalf. {¶ 76} In court the following day, the defense requested that the trial court hold a sentencing hearing under [former R.C.] 2929.19(A)(1) [which addresses felony sentencing] and all that that includes. 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5707, 5741. [1] Specifically, the defense wanted the opportunity to introduce evidence before the trial judge. The state opposed the request, arguing that R.C. 2929.19 did not apply to capital sentencing. {¶ 77} The trial judge denied Short's request on authority of State v. Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 26, 535 N.E.2d 1351. In Roe, the appellant argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred by refusing to permit presentation of more mitigating evidence subsequent to the jury recommendation. Id. at 26, 535 N.E.2d 1351. We rejected Roe's claim: R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) [imposing sentence for a capital offense] provides that all mitigating evidence must be presented to the jury, if the offender was tried by a jury   . A defendant may not wait for an unfavorable jury recommendation before presenting all relevant evidence in mitigation of sentence. Id. {¶ 78} Short argues that Roe was incorrectly decided on this point and asks that we reconsider it. At trial, he based his argument on R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). On appeal, he bases his argument on Crim.R. 32(A)(1) (imposition of sentence), and he further argues that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment, requires that a capital defendant be permitted to present mitigating evidence to the trial judge even if that evidence was withheld from the jury in the penalty phase. We consider each of these arguments in turn.
{¶ 79} Before it was amended effective April 29, 2005, R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) provided: The court shall hold a sentencing hearing before imposing a sentence under this chapter upon an offender who was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony   . At the hearing, the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim or the victim's representative in accordance with [R.C.] 2930.14   , and, with the approval of the court, any other person may present information relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case. The court shall inform the offender of the verdict of the jury or finding of the court and ask the offender whether the offender has anything to say as to why sentence should not be imposed upon the offender. 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 5741. {¶ 80} Aggravated murder is a felony, R.C. 2901.02(C), and a sentence for aggravated murder with aggravating circumstances is imposed under this chapterthat is, R.C. Chapter 2929. R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(a), (D), and (E) (setting forth sentences for aggravated murder with one or more aggravating-circumstance specification). Hence, Short argued at trial, capital cases fall within the literal terms of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). Moreover, according to Short, neither R.C. 2929.19 nor R.C. 2929.03 specifically exempts capital cases from the scope of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). Therefore, Short argued at trial, a capital defendant is entitled to a hearing under R.C. 2929.19(A)(1), at which he may present information relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case. {¶ 81} Short's reading of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) is unpersuasive. Were we to accept it, capital defendants would be entitled to two evidentiary hearings: one before the judge and jury (the penalty phase), and a second before the judge alone. Short fails to explain why the General Assembly would have intended to create such a system. There is no reason to believe that a system of dual evidentiary hearings would make capital sentencing more fair, reliable, or consistent. {¶ 82} Moreover, had the General Assembly intended R.C. 2929.19 to apply in capital cases, we believe it would have said so expressly. The comprehensive procedural scheme set forth in R.C. 2929.03 predates the enactment of R.C. 2929.19 by 22 years. [2] Short's reading of R.C. 2929.19 would work a major change in that comprehensive scheme. The General Assembly would not have intended to make such a change in a statute dealing with noncapital sentencing procedures without clearly saying so. We therefore reject Short's contention that R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) applies to capital sentencing.
{¶ 83} Although Short's argument at trial focused on R.C. 2929.19(A)(1), he claims on appeal that Crim.R. 32(A)(1) also entitles a capital defendant to a sentencing hearing in front of the judge without a jury. {¶ 84} We disagree. Crim.R. 32(A)(1) grants the defendant in a criminal case the right to address the court in allocution, either in person or through counsel. The rule permits counsel to speak on behalf of the defendant and entitles the defendant to make a statement in his or her own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment. {¶ 85} However, the right to present any information in mitigation does not imply a right to an evidentiary hearing. The purpose of allocution is to permit the defendant to speak on his own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment. State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 684, 687 N.E.2d 1358. See also State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 325-326, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (allocution involves defendant's ability to make a personal appeal to sentencing judge). Moreover, the plain wording of the rule does not encompass anyone other than the defendant presenting information in mitigation. State v. Lowe (May 3, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78021, 2001 WL 468536, . {¶ 86} Thus, neither R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) nor Crim.R. 32(A)(1) entitles a capital defendant to withhold mitigating evidence from the jury and then present it to the trial judge alone. Accordingly, we decline Short's invitation to overrule Roe.
{¶ 87} Finally, Short contends that by refusing to permit him to present evidence after the penalty phase, the trial court violated his Eighth Amendment right to present evidence in mitigation. However, he cites no authority in support of this proposition. {¶ 88} It is well established that the Eighth Amendment requires that a sentencer in a capital case not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1. {¶ 89} Unquestionably, then, Short had a right to present mitigating evidence to the trial judge. But he had his opportunity to do so in the penalty phase of his trial when, as provided by R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), he could have presented his evidence to both the judge and jury. He declined to take that opportunity. Nothing in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence entitled him to a second opportunity to present before the judge alone mitigation that he had chosen to withhold from the jury. {¶ 90} Short's second proposition of law is overruled.