Opinion ID: 180076
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cumulative Brady errors

Text: In determining whether the suppression of impeachment evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to rise to the level of a Brady violation, we must analyze the totality of the undisclosed evidence in the context of the entire record. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. The cumulative effect of all the undisclosed evidence may violate due process and warrant habeas relief under AEDPA. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining the Supreme Court's requirement that the materiality of the withheld evidence be analyzed cumulatively. . . not item by item (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555)). Here, the prosecution itself admitted that the evidence against Maxwell was weak, that Maxwell had consistently maintained his innocence, and that the police testimony about the date of the palm print was speculative. For these reasons, and those explained previously, Storch's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case. The prosecution failed, however, to disclose multiple pieces of critical impeachment information that could have been used to undermine the credibility of Storch. Analyzed collectively, the withheld impeachment evidence that Storch had negotiated himself a better deal coupled with the evidence of Storch's undisclosed informant past would not simply have been cumulative of the impeachment evidence introduced at trial, which included lies about his level of education and number of felony convictions, but would have created substantial doubt as to Storch's credibility for different reasons. The withheld evidence went to Storch's sophistication and motivation in his capacity as a prosecution informant and not, like the other evidence produced at trial, to his general propensity for dishonesty. Even if the lies did not provide a novel angle of attack on Storch's credibility, which we believe they do, as we explained in Killian, the finders of fact were deprived of the fundamental inference that if [the government informant] lied about X, Y, and Z, it is quite likely that he lied about Q, R, and S. 282 F.3d at 1209. The evidence withheld revealed that Storch, like the witness in Benn, was completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system. 283 F.3d at 1059 (holding that the prosecution's failure to disclose multiple pieces of critical impeachment evidence that could have been used to undermine credibility of the jailhouse informant who testified that defendant admitted committing the murders was sufficient to violate Brady ). Because Storch's testimony implicating Maxwell was critical to Maxwell's conviction, the jury's assessment of Storch's credibility was crucial to the outcome of the trial. If the jury had not believed Storch, Maxwell may not have been convicted. The prosecution's failure to disclose this impeachment evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of Maxwell's trial, and the California Supreme Court's decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Brady.