Opinion ID: 2320012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Garcia's Juvenile Adjudication

Text: [¶ 10] Mills asserts that the trial court misapplied M.R. Evid. 609(d) to exclude Garcia's juvenile adjudication because she was a crucial witness for the State and he should have been allowed to explore the theory that she was an alternate suspect in the case. M.R. Evid. 609(d) states: (d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of a juvenile adjudication in a proceeding open to the public may be admitted under this rule. Evidence of a juvenile adjudication in a proceeding from which the public was excluded may be admitted under this rule only in another juvenile proceeding from which the public is excluded. A juvenile conviction that is not admissible pursuant to Rule 609(d) may remain admissible for impeachment purposes if it demonstrates a strong tendency for bias. State v. Ouellette, 544 A.2d 761, 763 (Me. 1988); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-19, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); [5] State v. Sampson, 387 A.2d 213, 217 (Me.1978). [¶ 11] Mills argues that our interpretation of Davis in Ouellette and Sampson is subject to an unconstitutionally narrow reading because we limited the Davis decision to situations where the defendant wanted to admit a juvenile adjudication to reveal the witness's possible bias. See Ouellette, 544 A.2d at 763; Sampson, 387 A.2d at 217. Mills fails to cite to anything in Davis that suggests our interpretation should be broader. In fact, Davis states: We do not and need not challenge the State's interest . . . to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender . . . [p]etitioner sought to introduce evidence of Green's probation for the purpose of suggesting that Green was biased and, therefore, that his testimony was either not to be believed in his identification of petitioner or at least very carefully considered in that light. . . . In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105. [¶ 12] In this case, however, we need not reach Mills's constitutional challenge or rule on the scope of Davis v. Alaska . [6] Mills's challenge is based on the assumption that if he had been able to ask Garcia about her juvenile adjudication and her past experience with knives, Garcia would have lied. Then, because of the trial court's ruling, he would have been prevented from using the convictions and the Department records to impeach her. At trial, however, the defense was not allowed to ask Garcia if she had a habit of carrying knives in the past or if she was ever adjudicated delinquent for carrying a concealed weapon. [7] The trial court explained, I am not going to let you [use] Isabel's conviction on the existing record. You can say was it your habit at this time to carry a knife, were you carrying a knife on this day, but something she did four years earlier . . . that's too far to go back and say have you carried a knife at any point in your life. [¶ 13] Therefore, the real issue in the present case is whether the trial court committed clear error or abused its discretion in precluding the defense from asking Garcia whether she had a history with knives four or more years in the past. [¶ 14] Admission of evidence supporting an inference that another person may have committed the crime for which the defendant is charged is subject to a threshold ruling of relevance which is largely discretionary with the trial court. Field & Murray, Maine Evidence, § 401.3 at 92 (2000); see also M.R. Evid. 401-402. [8] Although a criminal defendant has the right to present evidence of an alternative suspect if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's culpability, we will uphold the exclusion of evidence that is too speculative or conjectural. Reese, 2005 ME 87, ¶ 10, 877 A.2d at 1092-93. The defendant must reasonably establish the connection between the alternative perpetrator and the crime through admissible evidence.  Id. (quoting State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 39, 829 A.2d 247, 258) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Robinson, 628 A.2d 664, 667 (Me.1993). [¶ 15] In the present case, Mills's argument that he should have been able to ask Garcia about her juvenile conviction to support his theory that she was an alternative suspect fails because this theory was wholly speculative. There was no evidence that Garcia had any recent experience with knives, and there was no evidence to suggest that Garcia could have been responsible for the stabbing of her brother. This line of questioning was not relevant pursuant to M.R. Evid. 401-402 and therefore the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence.