Opinion ID: 887749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Armstrong, 62.

Text: ¶ 16 Thus, while recognizing that the right to privacy was implicated in health care choices, Armstrong nonetheless specifically defined the right as guaranteeing access to a chosen health care provider who has been determined competent by the medical community and licensed to perform the procedure desired. Armstrong, ¶ 62. Armstrong did not hold that there is a right to see a health care provider who is not licensed to provide the services desired. ¶ 17 Appellants rely heavily on Andrews v. Ballard (S.D.Tex.1980), 498 F.Supp. 1038, a case which held that patients have a broad right to health care which includes the fundamental right to seek treatment from acupuncturists who have not been licensed or approved by the relevant licensing or medical board. Andrews, 498 F.Supp. at 1057. The court in Andrews struck down the statute at issue there, which limited the practice of acupuncture to licensed doctors, because it did not serve a compelling state interest. Andrews, 498 F.Supp. at 1055-57. Appellants correctly note that we cited Andrews favorably in Armstrong. Armstrong, ¶¶ 54-56, n. 8. However, we cited Andrews for the general proposition that individuals have the right to obtain and reject medical treatment, a holding we do not disturb today, and not for the proposition that patients have a fundamental right to obtain medical care from professionals who have not been determined by the regulating authority to be qualified to provide the desired service. [1] ¶ 18 A conclusion that Montanans have a fundamental right to seek medical care from un-licensed professionals would force the State and its licensing boards to demonstrate a compelling state interest in order to license and regulate health care professionals. The State would, in effect, shoulder the burden of demonstrating that no less restrictive set of qualifications for a license could serve the state's interest in protecting the health of its citizens. Sammon, 66 F.3d at 645, n. 9. Under such a rule, regulation of health care professions necessary for the public's protection would become very difficult, if not impossible, for the State to undertake. ¶ 19 It is clear that the State of Montana has a police power by which it can regulate for the health and safety of its citizens. State v. Skurdal (1988), 235 Mont. 291, 294, 767 P.2d 304, 306. Furthermore, this Court has recognized that the State's exercise of its police powers often implicates individual rights. State v. Rathbone (1940), 110 Mont. 225, 241, 100 P.2d 86, 92. However, when the rights affected are not fundamental, we do not utilize strict scrutiny review, requiring a compelling state interest. Peterson v. Great Falls Sch. Dist. No. 1 & A (1989), 237 Mont. 376, 380, 773 P.2d 316, 318. Instead, the State need only demonstrate a rational basis for the regulation. Peterson, 237 Mont. at 380, 773 P.2d at 318. ¶ 20 Here, Appellants argue that the right to obtain medical care free of regulation is a fundamental right, and that the State's regulation of that right must be supported by a compelling state interest. As noted above, we disagree with Appellants' contention that the fundamental right extends that broadly, and therefore, Appellants' argument must fail. Furthermore, because Appellants did not argue, and the District Court did not decide, if the Partial Denture Rule was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, we decline to reach that issue today.