Opinion ID: 2368807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Detention as Punishment

Text: The government concedes that if detention is punishment, it cannot be imposed absent conviction for the crime charged, i. e., a fair trial resulting in an adjudication of guilt with the panoply of protections guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Supreme Court recognized this fundamental principle in Bell v. Wolfish : under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Id. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 671-72 n.40, 674, 97 S.Ct. at 1412-13 n.40, 1414; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-67, 186, 83 S.Ct. 554, 565-67, 576, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237, 16 S.Ct. 977, 980, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896). Whether pretrial detention constitutes prohibited punishment turns on whether the statute is penal or regulatory in character. We conclude that appellant's contention that incarceration inevitably constitutes punishment is without merit. As the Supreme Court has said: Detention is a usual feature of every case of arrest on a criminal charge, even when an innocent person is wrongfully accused; but it is not imprisonment in a legal sense. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. at 235, 16 S.Ct. at 980. [27] The distinction between penal and regulatory sanctions is often elusive, but the compilation of traditional tests set out by the Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez , and reaffirmed and applied in Bell v. Wolfish , [28] provides authoritative guidance: Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentโretribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions. [ Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. at 567-68 (footnotes omitted), quoted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537-38, 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74.] As this test explicitly recognizes, the various factors may point in differing directions, and there can be no mechanical application of the test. Characterization of pretrial detention is a particularly close question. Nevertheless, we conclude, after considering all of the relevant factors, that pretrial detention is regulatory rather than penal in nature. Although detention pending trial invokes an affirmative restraint, historically it has not been regarded as punishment where the purpose has been to prevent flight or to prevent the coercion or intimidation of witnesses. See Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d at 584. See also Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662, 7 L.Ed.2d 769 (1962) (Douglas, J.). The critical question is whether detention pending trial for the purpose of protecting the community from the detainee's established dangerousness is an alternative purpose contemplated by the Mendoza-Martinez factors. The traditional reasons for pretrial detention, preventing flight or the intimidation of witnesses, serve the alternative purpose of preserving the integrity of the judicial process, and thus are preventive and forward-looking. [29] Similarly, pretrial detention to prevent repetition of dangerous acts under ง 23-1322(a)(1) by incapacitating the detainee seeks to curtail reasonably predictable conduct, not to punish for prior acts. The Court's opinion in Bell v. Wolfish, supra , emphasizes governmental purpose as particularly significant in determining whether the challenged conditions imposed on pretrial detainees were penal or regulatory. A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.... Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment. [441 U.S. at 538-39, 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74 (footnotes omitted).] The statutory history makes clear that pretrial detention was intended to protect the safety of the community until it can be determined whether society may properly punish the defendant. Pretrial detention was not intended to promote either of the traditional aims of punishmentโretribution and deterrence. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. at 567. [30] Nor does it seek to rehabilitate the detainee, another purpose ordinarily associated with punishment. [31] Pretrial detention does purposefully incapacitate the detainee from committing further crimes pending trial on the criminal charges, and such physical restraint is necessarily also one of the functions of imprisonment after conviction. Incapacitation, however, is distinct from general deterrence, which operates by example, not by physical restraint. See note 30, supra. Significantly, pretrial detention is closely circumscribed so as not to go beyond the need to protect the safety of the community pending the detainee's trial. Such detention is not to exceed 60 days, by which time either the detainee must be brought to trial, or bail must be set. D.C. Code 1973, ง 23-1322(d)(2)(A). Moreover, the detention may be ended whenever a judicial officer finds that a subsequent event has eliminated the basis for such detention. Id. ง 23-1322(d)(2)(B). As the legislative history makes clear, [o]ne such circumstance might be the court's granting a motion to suppress most of the Government's evidence. H.R.Rep.No.91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1970). [32]