Opinion ID: 707613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Elements of Likelihood of Confusion

Text: 17 At the core of Libman's trademark infringement claim is the assertion that broom consumers are likely to be confused about the source of Vining's brooms, and are likely to think that Vining's brooms are Libman's. The brooms marketed by Vining used color-contrasted bristles in a fashion resembling the design registered by Libman as a protected trademark in 1993. The gist of Libman's argument is that satisfied customers of its broom could be misled by this similarity when shopping for a replacement broom in a store that carries only the Vining brand. At trial, Libman presented no evidence of actual confusion among consumers (i.e., no survey data or anecdotal evidence showing that consumers were in fact confused by Vining's use of color-contrasted broom bristles), nor was it required to do so by any of the cases in which this court has defined the elements of likelihood of confusion. 18 The majority opinion disclaims any intention to make a fetish out of testimony, expert or otherwise and it concedes that proof of actual confusion is not required in a trademark infringement case unless damages are sought. Nevertheless, my colleagues lay great emphasis on the absence of actual-confusion evidence in making their case that [t]he evidence of likelihood of confusion in this case is vanishingly thin. The majority opinion notes that: 19 Vining sold several hundred thousand of the allegedly infringing brooms, yet there is no evidence that any consumer ever made such an error; if confusion were likely, one would expect at least one person out of this vast multitude to be confused, or more precisely one would expect Libman to have been able to find one such confused person. 20 This analysis, in my view, departs from well-established precedent in this circuit, which holds that [a] variety of factors may be material in assessing the likelihood of confusion and that [n]one of these factors by itself is dispositive of the likelihood of confusion question. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Productions, 787 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). The relevant factors, as they have been delineated by this court, are: 21 (1) similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; 22 (2) similarity of the products; 23 (3) area and manner of concurrent use;(4) degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; 24 (5) strength of complainant's mark; 25 (6) actual confusion; and, 26 (7) intent of defendant to 'palm-off his product as that of another.' 27 Smith Fiberglass Prods. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir.1993); AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.1993); International Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir.1988). 28 The majority's approach to the likelihood-of-confusion issue sweeps under the rug our well-established seven-factor test, and instead dwells on Libman's failure to produce evidence of actual confusion: 29 Without such evidence [of actual confusion] it would be pure speculation to conclude that anyone, let alone a significant fraction of the broom-buying public, could have been misled into believing that the Vining broom and the Libman broom were one and the same brand. 30 This fetishizing of actual confusion evidence flatly contradicts this court's oft-stated holding that the plaintiff need not show actual confusion in order to establish likelihood of confusion. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1879, 123 L.Ed.2d 497 (1993) (citations omitted); Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises, Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir.1992) (actual confusion need not be demonstrated; the test is likelihood of confusion and actual confusion is only one element of the test); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1187 (7th Cir.1989) ([T]he plaintiff need not prove every factor in order to prevail.... The weight and totality of the most important factors in each case will ultimately be determinative of the likelihood of confusion, not whether the majority of the factors tilt the scale in favor of one side or the other.). 31 Obviously, evidence of actual confusion can be highly probative of the likelihood of confusion. For this reason, our cases recognize that such evidence, when available, is entitled to substantial weight. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1070, 98 S.Ct. 1252, 55 L.Ed.2d 772 (1978). Nevertheless, the nature of a particular product can make it unlikely that this kind of evidence will ever surface. Under such circumstances, as one commentator has observed, the absence of actual confusion evidence is not particularly significant: 32 [C]ourts generally acknowledge that a plaintiff need not prove actual confusion in order to establish trademark infringement. This ... is especially true where the unavailability of such evidence is expected, for example, where the competing items are low-priced goods usually purchased on impulse and consumers would not be expected to complain about purchasing the wrong product.... In such instances, courts generally treat the actual confusion factor as a non-factor, with the absence of such evidence having no adverse impact on the plaintiff's ability to prove infringement. 33 It must [also] be remembered that in many instances the fact that a plaintiff has not adduced actual confusion evidence does not necessarily mean that actual confusion has not occurred. 34 Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Federal Trademark Infringement Litigation, 16 Campbell L.Rev. 19, 23-25 (Winter 1994) (emphasis added). Libman introduced testimony, apparently undisputed by Vining, that brooms are low-cost items generally purchased on impulse. This testimony is relevant to the likelihood of confusion because presumably consumers take less time purchasing low-cost items, and haste increases the possibility of confusion. AHP Subsidiary, 1 F.3d at 616; Maxim's Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir.1985) (risk of confusion is greater with low-cost items because purchasers are unlikely to complain when dissatisfied, thus bringing to light confusion). 35 As discussed in more detail below, it is the trial court, as trier of fact, and not the court of appeals, that evaluates and weighs the factors. Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1184 (the district court has discretion to determine the evidentiary weight to be given any single factor.). We have held that [i]t is paramount for the trier of fact to look to the totality of the circumstances and evidence and then, after careful consideration and reflection, in its own sound judgement assess the likelihood of confusion. Id. (emphasis added). 36 I am satisfied, as my colleagues apparently are not, that the district court engaged in a careful and reasoned weighing of the evidence. The court analyzed the factors as follows: 37 The two brooms are similarly designed [factor # 1], are similar products [factor # 2], and have the same sale outlets and purchasers [factor # 3]. The two products are advertised through the same media [factor # 3]. Libman has no evidence of actual confusion [factor # 6]. But as the witness Robert Libman pointed out, the purchase of a broom is not a large expense item and is not an event that is likely to cause a buyer to call up and complain about being confused about which product he or she bought [factor # 4]. There is some evidence in the record that purchasers recognize the Libman mark and occasionally call ... asking where they may purchase the broom they saw advertised [factor # 5].... While a market study of likelihood of confusion would have been helpful evidence to the court, the elements of a prima facie showing of likelihood of confusion are present and Vining has not rebutted that showing. The court finds, therefore, that it is more probably true than not that [Vining's] use of a contrast color band on its brooms is likely to cause confusion among ordinary purchasers as to the source of the brooms. 38 With respect to the question of Vining's bad faith (i.e., its intent to palm-off), the court found that while the evidence is not strong ... there was certainly no effort on its part to avoid infringement. In fact, at best it appears that [Vining] just didn't care. [factor # 7]. 39 The trial judge (as the trier of fact) thus considered each and every one of the required factors and concluded that a likelihood of confusion existed, notwithstanding the absence of actual confusion evidence. I am unable to join in the majority opinion because I believe that it elevates one of these factors--actual confusion--to a status that is clearly inconsistent with our precedent in this area. If the court wishes to embark on a new course and give actual confusion a more prominent role than the other analytical elements, 1 it should do so explicitly. 40