Opinion ID: 1394852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the present proceeding

Text: On November 20, 1984, petitioner filed his petition in this proceeding. He rests his claim to relief on two broad grounds among others. The first involves prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial  specifically, the testimony of Charles Riley, Eugene Wallace, and John Gross. The second involves the introduction by the prosecution of false evidence, which includes both the introduction of false evidence properly so-called  specifically, the testimony of Andrew Powell  and the nondisclosure of inducements offered to Powell and Steven Jarrett. In support petitioner makes allegations similar to but substantially more specific than those of his earlier petitions. Attached to the petition are numerous exhibits. Many of these  including the declarations of Charles Riley, Eugene Wallace, John Gross, and Wallace Jackson  were attached to the previous petitions; several additional and more recent exhibits, however, are also attached. (1) (See fn. 3.) We issued an order to show cause. [3] The Attorney General filed a return denying the allegations of the petition. He argued in essence that it was petitioner's theory that the prosecution had entered into an elaborate conspiracy with Powell to convict a man it knew to be innocent, and that such a theory was inherently absurd. He also argued that the evidence presented by petitioner in support of his claim was obtained by money and threats. In his traverse, petitioner denied the allegations of the return, disclaimed reliance on a conspiracy theory, and denied he had obtained his evidence by either money or threats. On September 30, 1985, we appointed the Honorable Gerald Brown to take evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions of law responsive to the following questions raised by the petition: (1) Did prosecutorial misconduct interfere with petitioner's right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial? (2) Was false evidence, substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, introduced against petitioner at trial? The reference hearing opened on November 25, 1985, and closed on May 6, 1986. Before the referee by stipulation of the parties were the record of the trial and a number of documentary exhibits. The record of the evidence and argument presented at the hearing fills 26 volumes and totals nearly 5,400 pages. After the hearing the referee filed a lengthy and detailed report. To the first question, Did prosecutorial misconduct interfere with petitioner's right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial? the referee gave the following answer: Yes. Petitioner's evidence as well as the evidence presented by respondent establishes intimidation of defense witnesses Charles Riley, Eugene Wallace and John Gross. Petitioner's evidence was credible and established witness intimidation. [¶] As a result of this intimidation, none of these witnesses testified for the defense at trial although they had been subpoenaed to petitioner's trial and were initially willing to testify.... [T]hese witnesses would have been petitioner's most important defense witnesses by either impeaching Andrew Powell or by demonstrating Powell's fabrication of his story and his motivation for doing so. [4] In giving this answer to the first question, the referee made a number of specific determinations, including the following. Initially, he concluded that the prosecution's arrest of Stephen Aguilar immediately after he finished testifying on petitioner's behalf and in the presence of defense witnesses was improper insofar as petitioner's constitutional right to present testimony at trial was concerned. He next found that the prosecution had improperly threatened to charge Charles Riley with any crimes that his testimony might reveal, and that these threats, along with his knowledge of Aguilar's arrest, caused Riley to refuse to give substantive testimony on petitioner's behalf. The referee made a similar finding with regard to Eugene Wallace. He also found that John Gross refused to give substantive testimony on behalf of petitioner because he feared prosecutorial retaliation in a case then pending against him as a result of the arrest of Aguilar, the threats made to Wallace specifically, and the prosecution's general attitude of hostility toward defense witnesses. To the second question, Was false evidence, substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, introduced against petitioner at trial?, the referee gave the following answer: Yes. Andrew Powell lied at petitioner's trial. Among other things, he received the gun he used to beat Richard Crake to death from Ste[ph]en Aguilar and not, as he lied, from Martin. Powell lied at trial by concocting a story implicating Martin. In giving this answer to the second question, the referee made a number of specific determinations. At the threshold, the referee found that Powell was a liar by nature: Untruthfulness is a major component of Mr. Powell's character. He found that while in jail awaiting trial Powell fabricated his story implicating petitioner in the Crake murder with the assistance of Eugene Wallace and one Arthur Swait. He also found that Powell obtained the murder weapon not from petitioner, but from Stephen Aguilar who had himself obtained it from Charles Riley. The referee further found that the prosecution offered Powell and Steven Jarrett inducements for their testimony, but failed to disclose such inducements. Finally, he found that Kathleen Piascik lied at petitioner's trial when she testified that she had no notion anything unlawful was about to happen as she drove Powell to Crake's home on the night of May 12, 1981.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief on habeas corpus on each of two grounds: interference on the part of the prosecution with his constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial, and the introduction by the prosecution of false evidence. (2) In a habeas corpus proceeding, The burden of proof is, of course, on the petitioner for the writ.... ( In re Riddle (1962) 57 Cal.2d 848, 852 [22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304], and cases cited.) In order to secure habeas corpus relief, petitioner must allege and prove all the facts upon which he relies to overturn the judgment. ( In re Hawley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [63 Cal. Rptr. 831, 433 P.2d 919], fn. 3, and cases cited; accord, In re Riddle, supra, at p. 852.) As we shall explain, we conclude that petitioner has carried his burden on the witness-intimidation ground and hence that he has established his right to relief. Accordingly, we do not address the false-evidence ground.
(3) Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. Giving meaning to the words of the provision is the Framers's original intent that the defendant must have a meaningful opportunity, at least as advantageous as that possessed by the prosecution, to establish the essential elements of his case. (Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause (1974) 73 Mich.L.Rev. 71, 95.) In Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920], the United States Supreme Court clearly recognized the importance of the compulsory-process right. The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. ( Id. at p. 19 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1023]; accord, Webb v. Texas (1972) 409 U.S. 95, 98 [34 L.Ed.2d 330, 1023, 93 S.Ct. 351] (per curiam).) As the high court declared in Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 93 S.Ct. 1038], Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. ( Id. at p. 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 312]; see also Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 818 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572, 95 S.Ct. 2525] [holding that The rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice].) Indeed, as the Washington court held, the right of an accused to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, guaranteed in federal trials by the Sixth Amendment, is so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (388 U.S. at pp. 17-18 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1022].) The right to compulsory process is independently guaranteed by the California Constitution. In the words of article I, section 15, The defendant in a criminal cause has the right ... to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant's behalf.... In light of the similar language in which they are couched, the state constitutional right must be deemed to be at least as broad and fundamental as the federal. (4) A defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process is violated when the government interferes with the exercise of his right to present witnesses on his own behalf. ( People v. Warren (1984) 161 Cal. App.3d 961, 971 [207 Cal. Rptr. 912]; Berg v. Morris (E.D.Cal. 1980) 483 F. Supp. 179, 182.) [5] Governmental interference violative of a defendant's compulsory-process right includes, of course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution. (E.g., People v. Warren, supra, 161 Cal. App.3d at pp. 971-976; People v. Bryant (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 582, 587-594 [203 Cal. Rptr. 733]; United States v. Morrison (3d Cir.1976) 535 F.2d 223, 226-228.) The forms that such prosecutorial misconduct may take are many and varied. They include, for example, statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of their testimony. ( People v. Warren, supra, 161 Cal. App.3d at pp. 973-974 [warning concerning crime expected to be revealed]; People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at pp. 589-593 [warning concerning expected perjury]; People v. Robinson (1983) 144 Cal. App.3d 962, 967-970 [193 Cal. Rptr. 92] [warning concerning crime expected to be revealed]; United States v. Blackwell, supra, 694 F.2d at pp. 1336-1337 [warning concerning crime expected to be revealed]; United States v. MacCloskey, supra, 682 F.2d at pp. 476, fn. 16, 479 [same]; United States v. Morrison, supra, 535 F.2d at pp. 226-228 [warning concerning both crime expected to be revealed and expected perjury]; United States v. Thomas, supra, 488 F.2d at pp. 335-336 [warning concerning crime expected to be revealed]; United States v. Smith, supra, 478 F.2d at pp. 977-979 [warning concerning crime expected to be revealed].) They also include statements to defense witnesses warning they would suffer untoward consequences in other cases if they were to testify on behalf of the defense. ( United States v. Hammond, supra, 598 F.2d at pp. 1012-1013; United States v. Henrickson, supra, 564 F.2d at pp. 197-198.) Finally, they include arresting a defense witness before he or other defense witnesses have given their testimony. ( Bray v. Peyton (4th Cir.1970) 429 F.2d 500, 501.) (5) In order to establish a violation of his constitutional compulsory-process right, a defendant must demonstrate misconduct. To do so, he is not required to show that the governmental agent involved acted in bad faith or with improper motives. ( United States v. Morrison, supra, 535 F.2d at p. 227; see People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 590; People v. Robinson, supra, 144 Cal. App.3d at p. 970; United States v. Smith (D.C. Cir.1973) 478 F.2d 976, 979 ; Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d at p. 501.) Rather, he need show only that the agent engaged in activity that was wholly unnecessary to the proper performance of his duties and of such a character as to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify.... ( United States v. Smith, supra, at p. 979; accord, People v. Bryant, supra, at p. 590; People v. Robinson, supra, at p. 970.) To establish a violation, the defendant must also demonstrate interference, i.e., a causal link between the misconduct and his inability to present witnesses on his own behalf. To do so, he is not required to prove that the conduct under challenge was the direct or exclusive cause. ( Berg v. Morris, supra, 483 F. Supp. at p. 184; accord, People v. Warren, supra, 161 Cal. App.3d at p. 974; People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 590.) Rather, he need only show that the conduct was a substantial cause. (See People v. Warren, supra, at p. 974; People v. Bryant, supra, at p. 590; Berg v. Morris, supra, at p. 184.) The misconduct in question may be deemed a substantial cause when, for example, it carries significant coercive force (see Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d at p. 501 [arrest]) and is soon followed by the witness's refusal to testify ( People v. Warren, supra, 161 Cal. App.3d at p. 974). Finally, the defendant must also demonstrate materiality. To carry his burden under federal law, he must at least make some plausible showing of how [the] testimony [of the witness] would have been both material and favorable to his defense. ( United States v. Valenzuela Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867 [73 L.Ed.2d 1193, 1202, 102 S.Ct. 3440] [potential witnesses made unavailable by prosecution].) Under California law he must show at least a reasonable possibility that the witness could have given testimony that would have been both material and favorable. ( Cordova v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 177, 181-185 [195 Cal. Rptr. 758], citing cases [potential witnesses made unavailable by prosecution]; cf. Honore v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal.2d 162, 170 [74 Cal. Rptr. 233, 449 P.2d 169] [discussing the burden on a defendant seeking the disclosure of the identity of an anonymous informant].)
We turn now to the facts of this case. Relying directly on the referee's determinations and ultimately on the evidence presented at the habeas corpus hearing, petitioner argues that the prosecution interfered with his constitutional right to present witnesses at trial. In response the Attorney General asserts that the referee's findings and conclusions are unsupported. (6) Our standard of review in these circumstances is settled. A referee's legal conclusions are subject to independent review. [Citation.] As to findings of fact, they `are, of course, not binding on this court, and we may reach a different conclusion on an independent examination of the evidence produced at the hearing he conducts even where the evidence is conflicting. [Citation.] However, where the findings are supported by ample, credible evidence [citation] or substantial evidence [citation] they are entitled to great weight [citations] because of the referee's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their statements in connection with their manner on the stand.... [Citation.]' ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 219 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) This is particularly true of findings that go directly to the credibility of a witness or that depend in substantial part on an assessment of the witness's credibility. (See In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 418 [179 Cal. Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 724 [114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229]; In re Rosoto (1974) 10 Cal.3d 939, 946 [112 Cal. Rptr. 641, 519 P.2d 1065, 69 A.L.R.3d 980].) Finally, a referee's resolution of mixed law-fact questions is generally subject to independent review as predominantly questions of law  especially so when constitutional rights are implicated. ( People v. Ledesma, supra, at p. 219.) At the threshold, petitioner takes the position that the referee's determinations in their entirety are fully supported by the evidence and the law. (7) The Attorney General, by contrast, raises a general objection which he asserts shows that the report should be rejected out of hand. Specifically, he claims that the referee's determinations are undermined by the failure of the report to explain the apparent lack of contemporaneous evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. In support of his point, he argues in substance as follows: if the prosecutorial misconduct alleged by petitioner had in fact occurred, some contemporaneous evidence thereof would exist; no such evidence exists; therefore, the misconduct alleged did not occur. We are not persuaded. To begin with, the Attorney General's major premise appears untenable. Although we suspect that the existence of prosecutorial interference with a defendant's constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses may often be reflected in contemporaneous evidence, we are hesitant to accept the categorical assertion that the existence of such misconduct will always be so manifested, especially since we are presented with no compelling reason to do so. In any event, the Attorney General's minor premise is plainly erroneous: there is contemporaneous evidence of prosecutorial interference. It is true that the record contains no direct evidence. The absence of such evidence, however, is not crucial: it is likely that on at least some occasions a prosecutor who engages in such misconduct does so  either by chance or by design  off the record. It is also true that the record contains no complaints about the prosecution's conduct from the witnesses who were the targets of the alleged intimidation or from their counsel. Although in another case the lack of such complaints might be disturbing, in this case it is not: each of the allegedly intimidated witnesses was within the reach of the prosecution  because he was exposed to potential criminal liability or was presently incarcerated or both  and for that reason may understandably have declined to make any complaint. But even though the record contains no direct contemporaneous evidence of prosecutorial interference, it does contain circumstantial evidence  i.e., evidence from which the existence of such misconduct can be inferred. For example, the record reveals that prosecution investigator Wilson arrested Stephen Aguilar outside the courtroom in the presence of persons he knew to be defense witnesses immediately after Aguilar gave testimony that contradicted that of the prosecution's key witness, Andrew Powell  to the effect that it was he, and not petitioner, who provided Powell with the murder weapon. It is the Attorney General's position that in light of the peculiar facts of this case Wilson's action was not improper. Assuming for argument's sake that he is correct, we cannot conclude that the arrest does not constitute evidence tending to show that the prosecution interfered with petitioner's right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial. The prosecution effectively admitted as much: at the reference hearing, Michael Rolan, a supervising prosecution investigator, stated that the day after Aguilar was arrested and the news was reported in the press, there was discussion in the district attorney's office to the effect that Wilson may have made a mistake and thereby laid a foundation for a mistrial. Even though the evidence of Aguilar's arrest, by itself, does not establish that the prosecution interfered with petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial, it does support the inference that it did so. The record also reveals that John Gross invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to give substantive testimony on behalf of the defense, in spite of the fact that the testimony he proposed to give  to the effect that in his presence Powell admitted petitioner had nothing to do with the Crake murder  apparently could not have incriminated him. This evidence too supports the inference that the prosecution interfered with petitioner's right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial.
(8) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to the arrest of Stephen Aguilar are supported by the law and the evidence, and relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Aguilar's testimony at trial flatly contradicted Powell's. During Aguilar's testimony, prosecutor Pippin and investigator Wilson discussed its incriminating nature. According to Wilson, a joint decision was made to arrest Aguilar. Pippin, however, denied he told Wilson to make the arrest. Wilson decided to arrest Aguilar in the hallway of the courthouse just outside the courtroom. He did not see Aguilar exhibit any signs of flight. He did see at least two defense witnesses and a news reporter in the hallway. He did not think about the impact such an arrest might have on defense witnesses. Aguilar testified he thought he saw camera lights, but was not sure. Friends told him they had seen him on television. One of the defense witnesses present in the hallway, Marcia Sharpe, stated the arrest took place in front of her and defense witnesses Michelle Goff and Cynthia Rosenthal. As a result of the arrest, Goff and Rosenthal turned white and began shaking. Local newspapers carried news of Aguilar's arrest in the morning and afternoon editions. At least one television station carried news of the arrest during its noon coverage on the following day. The portion of the report summarized above concludes: The arrest of Mr. Aguilar, the defense's first witness at petitioner's criminal trial, was well-publicized and well-known to the three witnesses subpoenaed by the defense who later declined to testify. It is an important factor which must be considered in assessing the issue of prosecution intimidation. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations. He first argues in substance that the arrest of Aguilar was proper as a constitutionally reasonable seizure of the person and as such was proper insofar as petitioner's compulsory-process rights were concerned. Even if we assume for argument's sake that the arrest was lawful, we cannot accept the Attorney General's conclusion. The Fourth Amendment's guarantee given to all persons against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Sixth Amendment's recognition of the criminal defendant's right to present evidence on his own behalf are each designed to serve different purposes and protect different values. Hence, contrary to the Attorney General's assumption, it does not follow that conduct on the part of the government that does not violate the former constitutional provision necessarily does not violate the latter. It is clear to us that the prosecution committed misconduct under the Sixth Amendment in arresting Aguilar when and where it did: Wilson engaged in activity that was completely unnecessary under the circumstances  he was under no legal or practical compulsion to make the arrest in the presence of defense witnesses and the press  and was of such a character as to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify ( United States v. Smith, supra, 478 F.2d at p. 979). Our conclusion is strengthened by the Attorney General's concession that there might have been a more ideal setting for the arrest, and all the more so by the fact and content of the discussion, related by supervising prosecution investigator Rolan, which took place in the district attorney's office the day after the arrest. In Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d 500, the Fourth Circuit held that the prosecution committed misconduct by arresting a defense witness during trial, finding it difficult to imagine that the incident would not have had an intimidating effect not only on the person arrested but on other defense witnesses as well. ( Id. at p. 501.) In this case, we come to the same conclusion for the same reason. The Attorney General attempts to make much of the fact that the referee did not specifically find that Wilson intended to intimidate witnesses in arresting Aguilar. But as we have explained, the existence of bad faith or improper motives on the part of the governmental agent is not required. ( United States v. Morrison, supra, 535 F.2d at p. 227; see People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 590; People v. Robinson, supra, 144 Cal. App.3d at p. 970; United States v. Smith, supra, 478 F.2d at p. 979; Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d at p. 501.) The Attorney General also argues in effect that the defense was partially responsible for the arrest because it allegedly violated an agreement to bring to the court's attention potentially privileged testimony before such testimony was given, and hence that it may not now be heard to complain. The argument must be rejected. The referee impliedly found  with what appears to be adequate support in the record  that no such broad agreement existed, and that even if it did the defense committed no violation of its terms. In any event, the alleged violation plainly did not contribute in any way to the improvident manner of the arrest and therefore does not bar petitioner from making his complaint. [6] After independent review, we agree with the referee's determination that the time, place, and manner of Stephen Aguilar's arrest were improper, and accordingly adopt it as our own.
(9) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of Charles Riley at trial are supported by the law and the evidence. He relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Following Aguilar's arrest, petitioner's trial counsel informed the court that Riley had been subpoenaed and was prepared to take the stand and completely corroborate Aguilar's testimony. The court decided that Riley should speak to a lawyer before testifying, and had Matthew Lees appointed to represent him. Lees testified that prosecutor Pippin told him if Riley testified he would file charges against him. Lees believed Pippin did not want Riley to testify and would arrest Riley if he did. He did not, however, tell the court of Pippin's comments. Pippin asserted he merely told Lees that he was blanketly refusing to grant immunity of any kind to any witness in this trial, and that if Riley testified and implicated himself in any crime and could be prosecuted he would be prosecuted. He said he would have given this same admonition to any attorney for any defense witness in this case. Riley told Lees that he did not know what the gun was going to be used for when he lent it to Aguilar; he expressed at least half a dozen times his fears about the threat of prosecution and arrest if he testified. At the reference hearing, the report continues, Riley testified that shortly after entering the courtroom he was asked to accompany prosecution investigator Wilson down the hallway for an interview. Riley stated he felt pressured because Wilson was in his face and appeared angry and upset. Wilson told him that if he testified as Aguilar had, the same thing that happened to Aguilar would happen to him. Riley informed Wilson he had lent the handgun to Aguilar. His conversation with Wilson caused him to be apprehensive about testifying. He was told by Lees that the prosecution did not want him to testify and would pursue him if he did. He was also told that the choice whether to testify was his. He factored into his decision Wilson's threatening remarks and Pippin's remarks to his counsel. Because he did not want to be arrested, he chose not to testify. Wilson's story was different. He stated that Riley said he lent the gun to Aguilar and threw it away after receiving it back. Wilson informed him that he should have an attorney because he could be charged as an accessory to murder. The portion of the report summarized above concludes as follows. The testimony of prosecutor Pippin and investigator Wilson, even when examined in isolation, establish[es] witness intimidation. It is clearly coercive for a prosecutor to warn a witness he will be prosecuted, or is likely to be prosecuted, as a result of his testimony. Warning only defense witnesses they will be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal if they take the stand is clearly the type of admonition which destroys the willingness of an individual to risk testifying on behalf of a defendant. According to Mr. Pippin, he told Lees if Riley testified and implicated himself in any crime he would be prosecuted if at all possible. Mr. Pippin gave this admonition to several representatives of defense witnesses, but did not make a similar admonition to any prosecution witness.... Additionally, investigator Wilson's admission he told Riley he could be charged as an accessory to murder, coming the day after Mr. Aguilar's arrest, was blatantly intimidating. No reasonable person would testify for another after hearing a prosecution representative predict the testimony would earn the witness a murder charge. When the testimony of Mr. Lees and Riley are also factored, the case for witness intimidation becomes overwhelming. According to attorney Lees, he was told by Pippin Riley would be arrested if he testified; Riley testified he was told the same by Wilson. Both witnesses were credible; they corroborated one another and were not effectively impeached. Petitioner has met his burden of proof. Charles Riley was intimidated. Petitioner thus lost Riley's important testimony which would have corroborated Mr. Aguilar. His testimony would have shown Powell lied when he said Martin was the source of the gun used to beat the victim to death. It would also have corroborated Eugene Wallace's potential testimony which described the falsity of Powell's testimony against petitioner. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations. He first claims that the determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be rejected. Specifically, he argues that there is insufficient evidence to believe Riley's version of the encounter  which he impliedly concedes establishes misconduct  and to disbelieve Wilson's. The argument is unpersuasive. To begin with, the Attorney General urges that Riley is not a credible witness. In support he offers several points. First, he correctly notes that at the reference hearing Riley claimed he never received the murder weapon back from Aguilar, but earlier had admitted he had done so. It does not follow, however, that Riley's inconsistency on this single issue is fatal to his credibility, especially in light of the consistency with which he admitted that he had provided Aguilar with the gun and then directed him to see to its disposal. The Attorney General next asserts that at the reference hearing Riley admitted Wilson did not touch him during the encounter, but earlier had stated Wilson pushed me up against a wall and used physically abusive tactics. But Riley presented an explanation of the apparent inconsistency that the referee could credit  to the effect that Wilson took a position about 12 inches from his face and crowded him into the wall. Riley's explanation was corroborated by defense investigator Dale June, who testified that during the encounter Wilson stood closer to Riley than one usually stands in polite conversation and kept punctuating his speech with his right index finger, which he moved back and forth about four or five inches from Riley's face. The Attorney General then maintains that Riley testified he saw Aguilar's arrest on television, and that this statement was false because he asserts the arrest was not broadcast. Read in its context, however, Riley's testimony is only to the effect that he heard of Aguilar's arrest on the television news. Indeed, he specifically denied that he saw the arrest itself. Finally, the Attorney General states that Riley is not to be believed because he is of poor character. It is true that a person who would lend a weapon as Riley did is evidently not unworthy of blame. But it is precisely a person of this kind who would in fact have done such a deed. In any event, such a person's testimony cannot be rejected out of hand  as the Attorney General himself admits when it comes to the testimony of Andrew Powell. The Attorney General next urges that Wilson is as credible a witness as Riley is not. Specifically, he argues as follows: Wilson would have to be very stupid to threaten Riley with arrest and then assist in getting Riley a lawyer who would be informed of these threats and act accordingly. The report never characterizes Wilson as `stupid.' Assuming for purposes of discussion that Wilson is not very stupid, it does not follow, as the Attorney General implies, that Wilson's action is otherwise inexplicable. Quite the contrary: Wilson could have acted as he did with the intent of depriving petitioner of Riley's evidence by threatening Riley with prosecution on the basis of his expected testimony and then advising him to seek the assistance of counsel  who would undoubtedly inform him of his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Riley, of course, refused to give substantive testimony on petitioner's behalf, resting on his privilege against self-incrimination. The Attorney General also argues that the absence from the trial record of any contemporaneous complaint about Wilson's behavior establishes that no misconduct occurred. Like a similar argument presented above, this too must be rejected. The Attorney General also claims in substance that the determination that Wilson's statement that Riley could be charged as an accessory to murder amounted to misconduct must be rejected on the ground that it was a constitutionally permissible mere warning. ( United States v. Risken (8th Cir.1986) 788 F.2d 1361, 1371; see, e.g., United States v. Blackwell, supra, 694 F.2d at pp. 1335-1336.) The point lacks merit. Seen by itself and in the abstract, the statement may appear to be such a mere warning. Seen in light of the facts of this case, however, the statement appears to be simply an aspect of Wilson's threat that if Riley testified he would suffer the same fate as Aguilar. In conclusion, we hold that the referee's determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be accepted. The referee's finding that Wilson threatened Riley with the same fate as Aguilar is entitled to great weight, depending in substantial part as it does on the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and is in fact amply supported by the evidence. Moreover, the conclusion that such behavior amounts to misconduct is compelled. (E.g., United States v. Thomas, supra, 488 F.2d at pp. 335-336 [holding that a United States Secret Service Agent committed misconduct when he told a potential defense witness he would be prosecuted for the crime his testimony was expected to reveal]; cf. United States v. Hammond, supra, 598 F.2d at pp. 1012-1013 [holding that an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation committed misconduct when he told a defense witness he would have `nothing but trouble' in another matter pending against him if he continued to give testimony on the defendant's behalf].) (10) The Attorney General next claims that the determination that prosecutor Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be rejected. Specifically, he denies that Pippin told Matthew Lees, Riley's counsel, that Riley would be arrested and prosecuted if he testified. He asserts that the following occurred: in response to a request for immunity made by Lees, Pippin said immunity was not going to be given to anyone; if the witness testified and implicated himself in a crime that could be proved at trial, he would be prosecuted; if the witness got on the stand and committed perjury, the witness would be prosecuted for perjury. The Attorney General further asserts that this statement does not amount to misconduct. As we shall explain, the point is without merit. We are hesitant to reject the referee's finding crediting Lees's version of his encounter with Pippin. The finding, of course, depends in substantial part on the referee's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and hence is entitled to great weight. Moreover, contrary to the Attorney General's argument, the evidence appears to provide the necessary support. Be that as it may, the statement that the Attorney General claims Pippin made  to the effect that Riley would be prosecuted for any crime he revealed or committed in the course of his testimony  amounts to misconduct under the circumstances of this case. ( People v. Warren, supra, 161 Cal. App.3d at pp. 973-974; People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at pp. 589-593; People v. Robinson, supra, 144 Cal. App.3d at pp. 967-970; United States v. Blackwell, supra, 694 F.2d at pp. 1336-1337; United States v. MacCloskey, supra, 682 F.2d at p. 476, fn. 16, 479; United States v. Morrison, supra, 535 F.2d at pp. 226-228; United States v. Thomas, supra, 488 F.2d at pp. 335-336; United States v. Smith, supra, 478 F.2d at pp. 978-979.) That the statement that the Attorney General claims Pippin made amounts to something less than an absolutely unqualified commitment to prosecute does not remove it from the category of misconduct. (See People v. Warren, supra, at pp. 968-970 973-974.) [7] The Attorney General unpersuasively argues that the cases supporting the conclusion that Pippin's statement amounts to misconduct are distinguishable on the ground they all involve statements made directly to the witness and not to his attorney alone. First, it is not true that all the cases involve statements made directly to the witness. (See United States v. MacCloskey, supra, 682 F.2d at pp. 476, 479.) Second, it is generally immaterial how such a statement is communicated to the witness: its potentially intimidating effect depends ultimately on its content and its original source, not on the identity of the person who delivers it to the witness. Certainly, the point may not legitimately be disputed when, as here, the prosecutor admits he expected and indeed hoped the witness's attorney would communicate the statement to the witness. [8] In conclusion, we hold that the referee's determination that Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be accepted: the governing law is clear, and the facts that establish misconduct under the law are admitted. Finally, the Attorney General claims that the determination that prosecutorial misconduct was causally linked to Riley's refusal to give testimony on petitioner's behalf must be rejected. He first argues that the arrest of Aguilar could not have contributed to the refusal on the part of any witness, including Riley, to give testimony on petitioner's behalf at trial. Specifically, he relies on the absence of evidence in the trial record showing the requisite causal link. Although the absence of such evidence is not insignificant, it certainly does not establish that no causal link existed. This is especially so because the absence of such evidence may have been caused at least in part by Riley's decision to refrain from complaining about the prosecution's action  and thereby to attempt to avoid becoming its target. The Attorney General also relies on the fact that at the reference hearing the trial judge expressly stated he did not believe any of the witnesses who asserted their privilege against self-incrimination did so as a result of Aguilar's arrest. The judge, however, made no such statement. In response to the question, When the other defense witnesses came in the courtroom and took the Fifth Amendment, did it cross your mind ... that perhaps these witnesses were taking the Fifth because of what had happened to the first defense witness as that witness left the trial action? the judge merely said, Well, at least  no, it didn't. Next, the Attorney General makes a perfunctory argument to the effect that Riley's refusal to testify on petitioner's behalf was not causally linked to his encounter with Wilson or to the statement made by Pippin. Contrary to this argument, we find the conclusion that the requisite causation existed to be inescapable. Such a causal link is established when the misconduct under challenge is a substantial cause of the witness's refusal to testify. (See People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 590; Berg v. Morris, supra, 483 F. Supp. at p. 184.) At the hearing, Riley stated his decision not to testify resulted from the encounter with Wilson and the statement of Pippin. Thus to our mind, the misconduct here amounts to such cause. We also conclude that petitioner has sustained his burden of demonstrating the materiality of Riley's testimony under both federal and state standards. Specifically, he has plainly shown how [the] testimony [of Riley] would have been both material and favorable to his defense ( United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 867)  i.e., it would have squarely contradicted the testimony of Andrew Powell, the crucial prosecution witness. He has also shown  a fortiori  at least a reasonable possibility that Riley could have given testimony that would have been both material and favorable. ( Cordova v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal. App.3d at pp. 181-185, citing cases.) After independent review, we hold that the referee's determination that the prosecution interfered with petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of Charles Riley at trial was correct and accordingly adopt it as our own.
(11) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of Eugene Wallace at trial are supported by the law and the evidence. He relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Eugene Wallace was Powell's cellmate throughout Powell's confinement in the San Diego County jail during the summer of 1981, and was facing robbery charges. He would have testified at petitioner's trial that he helped Powell fabricate a story to implicate petitioner in the Crake murder. He was prepared to tell the prosecution about Powell's efforts to frame petitioner as early as mid-June 1981. He had asked his then defense attorney, Charles Adair, to inform the prosecution of information he had pertaining to another case. Adair confirmed he had such a discussion with Wallace. Following petitioner's arrest, the report goes on, Wallace read about Powell's story in the newspapers. Through another inmate, Michelle Bernard, Wallace made contact with petitioner's attorney, Leslie Osborne, and told him he had valuable exculpatory information. Osborne learned Wallace and Bernard wanted bail and an enormous sum of money in return for the information they had about Powell and an alleged document that was a script worked out by Powell and other inmates to frame petitioner. Osborne feigned agreement to the terms and immediately contacted the prosecution. The prosecution arranged a fake release  or phony roll out  of Wallace and Bernard in the hope the inmates would bring whatever documents they had with them when they were about to be freed. On September 22, 1981, the phony roll out took place. Found in the belongings of Wallace was a paper bearing Powell's handwriting which gave directions to petitioner's office and details about his family and other personal matters. Later that same day, Wallace was interviewed by investigator Wilson. Wilson and Wallace differ on their recall of the conversation. Wallace testified he told Wilson that petitioner was not guilty and that the district attorney's office was prosecuting the wrong man. He said he had helped Powell fabricate his story to frame petitioner. Wilson told him he did not know anything about the case and it sounded like he was involved in an extortion attempt which could bring on habitual criminal charges. Wilson admitted having small talk with Wallace about extortion and being handled as a career criminal. He also admitted probably talking to Wallace about sentence enhancements. Further, he admitted that Wallace claimed Powell fabricated the story. By September 1981, the report continued, Barton Sheela represented Wallace on his pending robbery charges. His representation began in mid-1981 and extended through the spring of 1982. During his negotiations with the district attorney's office, he was never told of the alleged extortion or related possible charges alluded to by Wilson in his September 22, 1981, interview with Wallace. When Wallace was subpoenaed to testify in petitioner's trial in March of 1982, however, prosecutor Pippin informed Sheela in no uncertain terms  according to Sheela  that if Wallace testified, he would be prosecuted for any crimes his testimony disclosed. Pippin also made clear he would cross-examine Wallace on the extortion. According to Sheela, Wallace was well aware of Aguilar's arrest. He advised Wallace, There was probably close to 100 percent probability that he'd be prosecuted if he testified on petitioner's behalf. Sheela was of the impression the prosecution's intent was to persuade Wallace not to testify. Wallace expressed to Sheela his concern about Wilson's threatening statements in the September 22, 1981, interview. Pippin, the report continues, testified he gave Sheela the same admonition he had previously given Riley's attorney, Matthew Lees  he was blanketly refusing to grant immunity of any kind to any witness in this trial, and if Wallace testified and implicated himself in a crime he would be prosecuted if he could be. Pippin was aware of the September 22, 1981, interview. By the time of petitioner's trial, he believed Wallace could have been charged with attempted extortion. To Pippin's knowledge, however, Wallace had not been informed, prior to petitioner's trial, that he would actually face such a charge. It appears a real threat to prosecute Wallace for the alleged plot to commit extortion arose when he was about to testify for petitioner. Wallace explained his refusal to testify at petitioner's trial: he felt threatened by Wilson's September 22, 1981, statements; he believed on the basis of Pippin's statements that if he testified he could be prosecuted; he felt sure that the prosecution would make good on its threat because of Aguilar's arrest. The portion of the report summarized above concludes as follows. Petitioner has sustained his burden of proof in demonstrating witness Eugene Wallace was intimidated and refused to testify based upon such intimidation. Here, the prosecution was well aware of Wallace's alleged effort to extort money beginning from September 22, 1981. At no time during the months which followed did the prosecution mention bringing such charges against Wallace. The issue of extortion arose only when Wallace appeared as a witness for Martin. As with Mr. Riley, Mr. Pippin's statements alone are sufficient to find witness intimidation. Telling only defense witnesses they will be prosecuted if they testify and implicate themselves in any crime is far too threatening and over broad a statement, and completely unnecessary as a response to a question on whether he will grant the witness immunity. A simple no would have sufficed. Additionally, Mr. Wilson's admitted statements to Wallace concerning possible extortion charges, a career criminal act prosecution, and sentence enhancements, were hardly calculated to encourage later cooperation of Wallace with petitioner's defense. Coupled with the arrest of Aguilar and Mr. Pippin's announced position to Sheela, Wallace reasonably would believe his testimony for Martin would bring on a plague of criminal charges. Further, the testimony of attorney Bart Sheela corroborates Martin's claim Wallace was intimidated. Sheela, a former Assistant United States Attorney and county prosecutor, testified Mr. Pippin did not merely state a position of his office, but went out of his way to say Wallace would be prosecuted if he testified. Eugene Wallace should have been permitted to make his decision to testify without the intimidating influence of such heavy-handed prosecution statements. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations. He claims at the threshold that because there was apparently no contemporary complaint about prosecutorial misconduct the determination that misconduct occurred must be rejected. As we have explained above, such a claim lacks merit, especially when as here the misconduct alleged constituted a successful attempt to silence a witness. The Attorney General next claims that the determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Wallace cannot be accepted. He impliedly concedes that if Wilson made the statements at issue he would have committed misconduct, but argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that Wilson in fact made those statements. Specifically, he asserts in essence that the finding turns on the credibility of the witnesses and that Wallace is a bad man and a liar and hence cannot be believed. But even if the premise of the argument is sound, the conclusion does not follow: even a bad man and a liar can tell the truth  as the Attorney General himself argues when he urges us to credit the testimony of Powell. [9] In conclusion, we hold that the referee's determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Wallace must be accepted. The referee's finding that Wilson threatened Wallace with, among other things, prosecution for extortion is entitled to great weight, depending as it does on an assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and is in fact amply supported by the evidence. It is plain, as we have explained above, that such behavior amounts to misconduct. The Attorney General also claims that the determination that prosecutor Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Wallace cannot be accepted. Specifically, he maintains that the finding that Pippin told Sheela, Wallace's counsel, that Wallace would be prosecuted if he testified is based on a misinterpretation of Sheela's testimony. He further asserts that in response to a request for immunity made by Sheela Pippin simply made the same statement he made to Riley's counsel, Matthew Lees  viz., if a witness testified and implicated himself in a crime that could be proved, he would be prosecuted; if the witness committed perjury and there was sufficient evidence to prove perjury, he would be prosecuted. The point lacks merit. To begin with, the referee's finding does not appear to be based on a misinterpretation of Sheela's testimony. Sheela testified: I recall Mr. Pippin using words that let me know in no uncertain terms that Mr. Wallace would be prosecuted, but not saying, `Mr. Wallace will be prosecuted if he testifies.' The Attorney General argues that Sheela's testimony reveals only his subjective belief that Mr. Pippin would prosecute Wallace.... Given a reasonable reading, however, Sheela's testimony is to the following effect: Pippin told me Wallace would be prosecuted if he testified  but he did not use those precise words. [10] In any event, the statement that the Attorney General claims Pippin made to Sheela  like the same statement he claims Pippin made to Lees  amounts to misconduct: for the same reasons we held that statement improper we must hold this statement improper as well. Accordingly, we conclude that the referee's determination that Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Wallace must be accepted: the governing law is clear, and the facts that establish misconduct under that law are admitted. Finally, the Attorney General claims that the determination that prosecutorial misconduct was causally linked to Wallace's refusal to give testimony on petitioner's behalf must be rejected. He first argues that the arrest of Aguilar could not have contributed to the refusal on the part of any witness, including Wallace, to give testimony on petitioner's behalf at trial. For the reasons we rejected this argument when he made it with reference to Riley, we also reject it now. The Attorney General next argues as follows: Wallace was prepared to testify for petitioner if he was granted immunity or if he was examined on only those matters on which he would not incriminate himself; when his conditions were not met, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege; the fact that his testimony would be incriminating was not the fault of the prosecution; moreover, his willingness to testify on petitioner's behalf after the September 22, 1981, interview belies the conclusion he was afraid to testify because Wilson threatened him. The argument misses the point. That Wallace may have been willing to testify on petitioner's behalf if he was granted immunity or if he was examined on only those matters on which he would not incriminate himself does not show that his decision to invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was not substantially caused by the threats of the prosecution. Indeed, Wallace's willingness to testify only on conditions shows he took the prosecution's threats seriously and therefore is consistent with the conclusion that those threats were a substantial cause of his making his decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to testify on petitioner's behalf. We conclude that petitioner has sustained his burden of showing a causal link between prosecutorial misconduct and Wallace's refusal to testify on his behalf. To carry that burden, as we have explained above, all he need do is to demonstrate that the misconduct under challenge was a substantial cause of the witness's refusal to testify. Petitioner has demonstrated that the misconduct here amounted to such a cause. We also conclude that petitioner has carried his burden of demonstrating the materiality of Wallace's testimony under both federal and state standards: that testimony would have squarely contradicted the crucial testimony of Powell. After independent review, we hold that the referee's determination that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of Eugene Wallace at trial was correct and accordingly adopt it as our own.
(12a) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of John Gross at trial are supported by the law and the evidence. He relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Gross was an inmate in the San Diego County jail in the summer of 1981 facing robbery charges. He met Powell and asked him why, if petitioner had paid him to go to the Crake residence, petitioner did not bail him out. Powell responded by disclaiming petitioner's involvement: he said that he went out to the Crake residence on his own and that petitioner had nothing to do with the matter. Gross testified that his appointed attorney, Fred Corbin, would have had him testify. He was afraid, however, to take the stand because his case was still pending sentencing; he was aware of the prosecution's apparent disdain for people who testified for petitioner; he was also aware of Aguilar's arrest and of the threats made to Wallace by prosecution investigator Wilson  he could see that Wallace was a changed man as a product of that act of intimidation. Prosecutor Pippin did not recall giving his admonition to Gross's counsel, but did state that if he had been asked for immunity, he must have said the same thing that he said to the other attorneys. It does not appear that Gross's testimony would have incriminated him. His fears of prosecution retaliation motivated his refusal to testify more than any concern about incriminating himself. The portion of the report summarized above concludes as follows. By the time Gross was called to the stand, the pool of witness intimidation had spread. Aguilar had been publicly arrested. Riley had refused to testify. Gross had noticed the intimidation register on his friend Eugene Wallace stemming from his September 22, 1981, Wilson interview. Given the lack of any prospect for incriminating testimony, it is clear intimidation is what moved him to decline to testify. Petitioner has carried his burden. John Gross was intimidated by the actions of the prosecution in publicly arresting Ste[ph]en Aguilar, Mr. Wilson's threats to Eugene Wallace, and in Mr. Pippin's remarks to the various defense counsel as to his position should witnesses testify for Martin and say anything incriminating. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations relating to Gross. He first claims in substance that the prosecution committed no misconduct toward Gross. In support he relies on the evidently undisputed fact that the prosecution did not threaten Gross, and that indeed it did not know of his existence until he took the stand. Contrary to the Attorney General's apparent assumption, there is no requirement that the prosecution must be found to have committed misconduct toward the individual witness before it can be held to have interfered with the defendant's constitutional right to present the testimony of that witness. The Attorney General also claims that the determination that prosecutorial misconduct was a cause of Gross's refusal to give testimony on petitioner's behalf must be rejected. He first maintains that the arrest of Aguilar could not have contributed to the refusal on the part of any witness, including Gross, to testify at trial. For the reasons we rejected this argument when he made it with reference to Riley and Wallace, we also reject it now. The Attorney General next argues there were no contemporaneous charges or other evidence that Gross refused to testify as a result of prosecutorial misconduct and hence that his refusal to testify could not have resulted from such misconduct. For the reasons we found unpersuasive similar arguments above we find this argument unpersuasive as well. The Attorney General also asserts that Gross is a bad man and a liar and hence cannot be believed when he testifies that prosecutorial misconduct caused him to refuse to testify. The argument is empty because, as we have explained, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Finally, the Attorney General argues that evidence in the record establishes that Gross's testimony on the effect of prosecutorial misconduct on his invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege is unbelievable and therefore must be rejected. Neither of the points on which he relies, however, provides sufficient support to his argument. The first point is that Gross falsely testified he was facing trial at the time he was called as a witness by petitioner when in fact he was facing sentencing. We fail to see  and certainly have not been shown  how such a falsehood could cast substantial doubt on the truth of Gross's statement that he feared the effect his testimony might have on his own case. Moreover, we find it difficult to conclude that Gross gave false testimony in the first place. The Attorney General's point rests on the premise that it is clear that the word trial does not include sentencing. That premise, however, is unsupported. (13) As a plurality of this court stated, while the word `trial' has long been interpreted to refer to the process culminating in the determination of guilt, particularly in bail cases [citation], the word has also been interpreted to include the sentence or judgment in other cases [citation]. Accordingly, we recognize that the word is ambiguous.... ( People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) The Attorney General's second point is as follows: Gross'... claim  that he was afraid to testify because of the impact his testimony would have on his sentence  is unbelievable. The resolution of Gross' case ... included a stipulated sentence.... Gross' testimony for petitioner could not have affected his case. Gross was represented by counsel at petitioner's trial and any possible concern about his case could be taken care of by counsel. We are unable, however, to conclude that Gross's fear is unbelievable. After he learned that Aguilar had been arrested and saw the effects of the prosecution's threats on Wallace, Gross  who had just suffered his only felony conviction and therefore was no criminal sophisticate  could reasonably have believed, as he stated, that testifying for petitioner would provoke the prosecution and thereby cause it to attempt to adversely affect his sentence. (12b) The Attorney General may be understood to claim that even if prosecutorial misconduct was an actual cause of Gross's refusal to testify, the prosecution cannot be deemed legally responsible for his decision. We cannot agree. We recognize that the prosecution evidently committed no misconduct aimed at Gross specifically. We believe, however, that where, as here, the prosecution has engaged in misconduct toward a substantial number of defense witnesses, it is highly probable other defense witnesses would learn of its actions, apply the implications to their own situations, and thus be deterred from testifying. Prosecution investigator Wilson unnecessarily arrested Aguilar in front of three defense witnesses and a representative of the press; and prosecutor Pippin publicly and repeatedly declared that he was blanketly refusing to grant immunity of any kind to any witness in this trial, and would prosecute any witness for any crime he revealed or committed in the course of his testimony. We also believe that the prosecution's misconduct was a substantial factor in Gross's decision not to testify; indeed, the facts do not reveal the presence of any other factor. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the prosecution must be deemed legally responsible for that decision. We conclude that petitioner has sustained his burden of showing a causal link between prosecutorial misconduct and Gross's refusal to testify on his behalf. To carry that burden, as we have explained above, all he need do is demonstrate that the misconduct under challenge was a substantial cause of the witness's refusal to testify. Petitioner has demonstrated that the misconduct here amounts to such a cause. We also conclude that petitioner has carried his burden of demonstrating the materiality of Gross's testimony under both federal and state standards: that testimony would have squarely contradicted the crucial testimony of Powell. After independent review, we hold that the referee's determination that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of John Gross at trial was correct and accordingly adopt it as our own.
The foregoing discussion makes plain that petitioner has carried his burden of showing that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with his constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial. First, he has established prosecutorial misconduct. Second, he has shown a causal link between that misconduct and the refusal of Riley, Wallace, and Gross to testify. Third, he has demonstrated materiality under both federal and state standards. The Attorney General argues that even if petitioner was denied his federal constitutional right to compulsory process through the prosecution's intimidation of potential defense witnesses, he is not entitled to relief if the People can show, under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065], that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. He further argues that the People can make that showing. In response, petitioner maintains that a violation of a criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to compulsory process is prejudicial per se. (14) We need not, however, resolve the issue whether the violation is prejudicial per se. Prejudice appears here not only under the federal Chapman standard but also under the state law standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243]. First, the case was evidently very close. The fact that the jury deliberated almost 22 hours over 5 days practically compels the conclusion. ( People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 907 [184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569] [stating that the fact the jury deliberated for twelve hours was a graphic demonstration of the closeness of this case]; People v. Rucker (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 391 [162 Cal. Rptr. 13, 605 P.2d 843] [implying that the fact the jury deliberated for nine hours evidenced the closeness of the question of guilt]; People v. Woodard (1979) 23 Cal.3d 329, 341 [152 Cal. Rptr. 536, 590 P.2d 391] [stating that jury deliberations of almost six hours were an indication that the issue of guilt was not open and shut].) Second, the verdict plainly turned on whether or not Powell's testimony was believed. As prosecutor Pippin himself admitted to the court during pretrial proceedings  and in spite of comments to the contrary in closing argument  [Powell's] credibility is what this case is going to be all about. And as the trial judge observed in ruling on petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case: [T]he People are relying on the murderer [i.e., Powell] as their chief tie-down witness. If [the jurors] don't believe him, they are not going to convict [petitioner]. Third, the testimony that Riley, Wallace, and Gross would each have given was of not insignificant persuasive force, consistent as it was with itself and generally with the facts of the case. Moreover, if believed by the jury, it would have completely destroyed Powell's credibility. The Attorney General claims in substance that the testimony of Riley, Wallace, and Gross is not worthy of consideration. He directs our attention to Crake v. Martin (San Diego Super. Ct. No. 482172), in which Crake's widow and daughter sued petitioner, Powell, and others for damages arising from the alleged wrongful death of Crake. In that case, a jury  having heard testimony of Riley, Wallace, and Gross  returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and against petitioner and Powell. We cannot accept the Attorney General's point. That the testimony may not have prevented civil plaintiffs from carrying their preponderance-of-the-evidence burden does not render that testimony unworthy of consideration  and certainly does not establish that it is insufficient to prevent the People from meeting their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the prosecution's violation of petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of witnesses at trial, an outcome more favorable to the defense was reasonably probable. [11] In conclusion, we hold that petitioner has established his claim to relief on the ground of prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of Charles Riley, Eugene Wallace, and John Gross. [12]
Petitioner contends that in view of the prosecutorial misconduct committed in this case he is entitled not simply to the vacation of the judgment of conviction but also to a dismissal of the charges and a bar to reprosecution. (15) It is the general rule that even when on habeas corpus it is determined that the judgment is void, the petitioner is nevertheless subject to retrial unless he has effectively been acquitted of the offense in question. ( In re McCoy (1948) 32 Cal.2d 73, 77 [194 P.2d 531].) As we shall explain, petitioner does not establish that the rule is not applicable here. Petitioner first claims that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy entitles him to dismissal. The point must be rejected. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that No person ... shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... This provision is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 793-796 [23 L.Ed.2d 707, 715-717, 89 S.Ct. 2056].) (16) The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the double jeopardy clause imposes no limitation upon the power of the government to retry a defendant who has succeeded in persuading a court to set his conviction aside, unless the conviction has been reversed because of the insufficiency of the evidence. ( Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, 676, fn. 6 [72 L.Ed.2d 416, 425, 102 S.Ct. 2083].) Petitioner argues that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case raises a double-jeopardy bar to reprosecution. Specifically, he first derives a general rule from Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667  in which the court considered the question when does the double jeopardy clause bar retrial after a defendant's successful motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct  to the following effect: the double jeopardy clause bars reprosecution when the prosecution `intended ... to subject [the] defendant[] to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions' ( id. at p. 674 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 423]), or, in other words, inten[ded] ... to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause ( id. at p. 676 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 424]). He then asserts that under this rule retrial is barred in this case. Even if petitioner's rule is sound, its application to the facts of this case does not lead to the result he seeks. The referee did not find, nor do the facts establish, that the prosecution as an entity or any of its agents acted with the requisite intent. We do not overlook, less still condone, the serious misconduct that occurred here. But from the evidence in the record we are able to infer, as did the referee implicitly, that the prosecution acted as it did out of a desire to insure that a man whom it sincerely believed to be guilty was convicted at all costs  and not in order to `subject [petitioner] to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions' ( Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 674 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 423]) or to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause ( id. at p. 676 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 424]). Petitioner maintains that even if the federal double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial in this case, the state double jeopardy clause (Cal.Const., art. I, § 15) does. Specifically, he derives a general rule from Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Kennedy, to the effect that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution engage[s] in `overreaching' or `harassment' (456 U.S. at p. 683 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 429]), i.e., misconduct that amounts to the intentional manipulation of the defendant's double jeopardy interests ( id. at p. 690 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 434] [conc. opn. of Stevens, J.]). He then claims that this rule constitutes the proper test for implementing the independent state constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Finally, he concludes that under this rule retrial is barred in this case. Even if the rule is sound and constitutes the proper test for implementing the independent state constitutional guarantee, its application to the facts of this case does not result in the outcome petitioner seeks. As we have stated above, although petitioner has clearly demonstrated that the prosecution engaged in prejudicial misconduct at his trial, he has simply failed to show that it intentional[ly] manipulat[ed] ... [his] double jeopardy interests.... ( Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 690 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 434] [conc. opn. of Stevens, J.].) Petitioner's next major claim is that prosecutorial misconduct violated each of several constitutional rights and therefore warrants a dismissal. He first asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated. On a superficial view at least, it appears plain that although he did not receive a fair trial he did indeed receive a speedy trial. In any event, he fails to show that dismissal would be justified on the facts of this case. In each of the cases on which he relies  United States v. Heath (9th Cir.1958) 260 F.2d 623, and United States v. Seafarers International U. of No. Amer. (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 343 F. Supp. 779  the court justified dismissal at least in part on the ground that the prosecutorial action in question prejudiced the defense by undermining the defendant's ability to mount a defense. ( Heath, at pp. 626-632; Seafarer's International Union, at p. 791.) Here, by contrast, no such prejudice appears or is even alleged. Petitioner next asserts that his right to counsel was violated. Although he apparently means to argue that the prosecution somehow interfered in his attorney-client relationship, he does not allege with sufficient clarity the nature of such interference, less still prove that any such interference took place. Be that as it may, he simply fails to show that dismissal is warranted here. Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742 [157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818], on which he relies, is in apposite: in that case, a governmental agent's intrusion by trickery into confidential attorney-client conferences justified dismissal; in this case, no such  or even similar  intrusion appears. Lastly, petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated. For purposes of argument only, we shall assume that the prosecution's misconduct did amount to a constitutional violation. Petitioner then proceeds to argue for dismissal on the basis of dicta in the entrapment cases of United States v. Russell (1973) 411 U.S. 423 [36 L.Ed.2d 366, 93 S.Ct. 1637], and People v. McIntire (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742 [153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527], to the effect that the conduct of law enforcement agents [might be] so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from involving judicial processes to obtain a conviction ( Russell, at pp. 431-432 [36 L.Ed.2d at p. 373]), and that sufficiently gross police misconduct could conceivably lead to a finding that conviction of the accused would violate his constitutional right to due process of the law ( McIntire, at p. 748, fn. 1). But petitioner fails to establish that the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred here, although undeniably serious, was sufficiently outrageous or gross to justify the relief he seeks. Petitioner's final claim is that dismissal is appropriate under Penal Code section 1385, which provides in relevant part that The judge or magistrate may, either on his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. It is unclear whether the statutory provision authorizes an appellate court to order an action dismissed. By its very terms it seems to refer to trial judges, and not to appellate courts or to the judges who sit on those courts. Moreover, it is generally so understood. (See Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 302, p. 296 [stating that the purpose and result of Pen. Code, § 1385, giving the judge the authority to dismiss, and Pen. Code, § 1386, abolishing the district attorney's power to enter a nolle prosequi, is to place the power to `discontinue or abandon a prosecution' [citation] in the trial judge (italics added)].) Finally, as far as our research has been able to determine the provision has never been held to refer to appellate courts. Even if we are authorized to dismiss under Penal Code section 1385, we would not exercise that power in this case. Petitioner rests his claim to relief, in large part, on the presence of gross prosecutorial misconduct. But, as we have stated, the misconduct in this case, although certainly serious, was not gross.