Opinion ID: 895408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether a Schlup -type Claim Merits Compensation Under the TCA

Text: The first issue presented to this Court is whether habeas relief from a Schlup -type claim is a writ based on a court finding of actual innocence. If it is, it merits compensation under the TCA. A claimant is entitled to compensation if relief has been granted in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus that is based on a court finding or determination that the person is actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 103.001(a)(2)(B). The Comptroller asserts that the Legislature never intended persons like Allen, claimants who present Schlup -type claims, to be eligible for compensation under the TCA. Instead, the Comptroller argues that only Herrera -type claimants are eligible for compensation, as their claims are bare-innocence claims of actual innocence. Whether compensation may be awarded under the TCA depends, in the first instance, on determinations in the criminal courts of the merits of the applicant's conviction. The judgments of the criminal courts are taken as established for our purpose, and we thereafter apply the civil law component of the TCA. We, therefore, first review the relevant criminal law. Claims of actual innocence are categorized either as Herrera -type claims or Schlup -type claims. Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). A Herrera claim is a substantive claim in which the person asserts a bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence. Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 (citing Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim.App.2002)). A Herrera petitioner asserts that newly discovered evidence establishes an applicant's innocence. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 390, 113 S.Ct. 853. The most familiar Herrera -type cases are those in which DNA testing leads to exoneration of the applicant. In addition to Herrera, a habeas applicant may raise actual innocence claims that are asserted constitutional violations in his trial but are procedurally barred by Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Review of subsequent applications for habeas corpus relief are prohibited, as Section 4 of Article 11.07, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, restricts habeas applicants to `one bite of the apple' except in specified circumstances.... Ex parte Santana, 227 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (quoting Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); see also Ex parte Brooks, 219 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Tex. Crim.App.2007)). The subsequent-application provision limits an inmate to one application for writ of habeas corpus except in exceptional circumstances. Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 399. Once an applicant files an application challenging the conviction, all subsequent applications regarding the same conviction must meet one of the two conditions set forth in § 4(a)(1) & (2). Santana, 227 S.W.3d at 703; TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 4(a)(1), (2). [3] This second type of innocence claim  a Schlup claim  is one that `does not by itself provide a basis for relief,' but is intertwined with constitutional error that renders a person's conviction constitutionally invalid. Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544-45 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)). Unlike a Herrera claim, which is substantive, a Schlup -type claim is procedural: it provides a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315, 115 S.Ct. 851. Allen pursued a Schlup -type claim in the Court of Criminal Appeals. He asserted a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, which coupled with a proper defense of his case at trial would probably have concluded in a not guilty verdict. The Supreme Court defined actual innocence in a Schlup -type claim. According to Schlup v. Delo , actual innocence: does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. It is not the district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 513 U.S. 298, 329, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). In Schlup, the petitioner raised a claim of actual innocence in an effort to bring himself within `the narrow class of cases' implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice as an exception to a showing of cause and prejudice for failure to raise the claim in an earlier writ. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 208 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 298, 115 S.Ct. 851). Successful Schlup claimants are the extraordinary cases. Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 400. The Court of Criminal Appeals recognizes that Texas law allows review of the merits in the exceptional circumstances of a constitutional violation resulting in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the offense. Id. at 401. To grant Schlup relief, an applicant must meet the threshold requirement of showing that a constitutional violation led to a miscarriage of justice due to the incarceration of someone who is actually innocent. Id.; see also Ex parte Thompson, 179 S.W.3d 549, 557 n. 19 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (Applicant argues that his `factual innocence' claim is cognizable under Schlup v. Delo .... But it is not. Applicant makes no showing that he is innocent of capital murder or that the State violated his constitutional rights by trying him before his accomplice, Sammy Butler.). The two claims require applicants to meet different burdens of proof to obtain habeas relief. Establishing a bare claim of actual innocence, or a Herrera claim, is a Herculean task. Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 545. To succeed on a Herrera claim, the habeas applicant must unquestionably establish his actual innocence, and show  clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209. Herrera applicants are required to meet a higher threshold to obtain relief because, when the trial has been constitutionally error free, the conviction is entitled to the utmost respect. Ex parte Spencer, 337 S.W.3d 869, 877-78 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). A Schlup claimant, on the other hand, need only show that he is probably actually innocent, meaning more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209; see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326-27, 115 S.Ct. 851. The lower standard is justified because the conviction may not be entitled to the same degree of respect of one, such as Herrera's, that is the product of an error-free trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316, 115 S.Ct. 851. To obtain relief on a Schlup claim, the claimant must therefore show that the constitutional error at trial probably resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent. Spencer, 337 S.W.3d at 878.