Opinion ID: 450747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Pistol, Bullets, and Pistol Case

Text: 31 The district court below held that the discovery of the .32 caliber pistol, the bullets, and the pistol case were inevitable because as of December 8, 1982, FBI agents had more than enough probable cause to obtain a search warrant for Defendant's specific area of the barracks, and they had good and sufficient reason to make a specific search of the false ceiling where the gun was found. Record Vol. I, at 53. No finding was made, however, that the agents were actively pursuing a warranted means of searching the ceiling at the time the misconduct occurred. In fact, uncontradicted testimony elicited at the second suppression hearing makes clear that, at the time Cherry's barracks and ceiling were searched for the second time, the agents had not even begun taking notes for the purpose of drafting an affidavit, a necessary prerequisite to the procurement of a warrant. 12 Thus, because at the time of the warrantless search the agents could have obtained a warrant but had made no effort to do so, we find under Brookins that the district court erred in holding the evidence admissible under the inevitable discovery exception. 32 The government on appeal makes the additional argument that, even if the known availability of a warranted entry does not by itself satisfy the requirements of the inevitable discovery exception, the agents at the time of the seizure were poised, relying entirely on investigatory leads gathered independently of Cherry's incriminating statements, to conduct a search of the ceiling of Cherry's barracks. According to the government, this allegedly imminent search would not have required a warrant since Cherry did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the space above his ceiling. Because an investigation was already being conducted that in the near future would have led to the discovery of the evidence independently of Cherry's statements, the government contends, the discovery of the pistol, the bullets, and the pistol case was inevitable. 33 Although we find no flaw in the government's argument on a theoretical level, it must ultimately be rejected on the ground that the government failed to carry the applicable burden of proof. In asserting that at the time of the second search the agents had independently been planning on conducting a search of Cherry's ceiling, the government explicitly acknowledges 13 that certain items of information obtained during the first search--specifically, the structure of the ceiling and the dusty footprint on Cherry's dresser--were most important in alerting the agents to the need for a second search. In his motion to suppress, however, Cherry alleged that his consent to both searches and all products thereof were tainted by his illegal arrest. It is firmly established that, once the defendant goes forward with specific evidence demonstrating taint, the government has the final burden of persuasion to show that the evidence is untainted. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183, 89 S.Ct. 961, 972, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir.1984); see generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure Sec. 11.2 (1978). Cherry's allegations, together with the district court's conclusion that the arrest was in fact illegal, therefore suffice to create a prima facie case that the leads obtained during the first search and any subsequent evidence gathered through their use are tainted. This presumption has not been rebutted. Thus, insofar as we are left with no choice but to deem as tainted the roots of the alternate investigative path and any evidence that would have been thereby obtained, we conclude that the government has not shown that the pistol, bullets, and pistol case would inevitably have been discovered by entirely lawful means, and the inevitable discovery exception cannot be applied.