Opinion ID: 525601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Status Requirement of the LHWCA.

Text: 18 A two-pronged test determines whether an injured worker falls under the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The claimant must satisfy both the status (33 U.S.C. Sec. 902(3)) and situs (33 U.S.C. 903(a)) requirements of the statute. The status requirement states: 19 (3) The term employee means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker.... 20 33 U.S.C. Sec. 902(3). 21 The petitioner asserts that the Benefits Review Board erred in finding the respondent an employee covered by the act. According to the petitioner, the Board specifically failed to apply the holding of Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Skipper, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.1976) to the respondent's claim for recovery under the LHWCA. Skipper stated that: 22 Our holding is that an injured worker is a covered employee if at the time of his injury (a) he was performing the work of loading, unloading, repairing, building, or breaking a vessel, or (b) although he was not necessarily carrying out these specified functions, he was directly involved in such work. 23 Id. at 539-40. 24 The petitioner argues that the respondent cannot be included in the class of employees covered by the LHWCA because he was not engaged in maritime activities when he was injured, although he had been involved in such activities at an earlier date. Skipper, who had been a welder for many years, was engaged in non-maritime activities on the day he was injured and was therefore unable to recover under the LHWCA. Skipper, supra, at 542. 25 The argument, however, fails to consider the United States Supreme Court's later holding in Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). The Court in Caputo stated:It is clear, therefore, that when Congress said it wanted to cover longshoremen, it had in mind persons whose employment is such that they spend at least some of their time in indisputably longshoring operations and who, without the 1982 Amendments, would be covered for only part of their activity. 26 Id. at 273, 97 S.Ct. at 2362 (emphasis added). 27 The respondent and the Director of the Benefits Review Board maintain that the status requirement is satisfied because a major portion of the claimants time was spent in maritime employment. In Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.1981), we held: 28 In addition, employee status may be based either upon the maritime nature of the claimant's activity at the time of his injury or upon the maritime nature of his employment as a whole. 29 Id. at 754. 30 See, also, Thornton v. Brown & Root, 707 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir.1983); Schwabenland v. Sanger Boats, 683 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir.1982); Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841, 844 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2820, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979). 31 The Benefits Review Board found that a significant portion of the respondent's time was spent in indisputably longshore operations; and since substantial evidence exists to support this finding, we will not disturb it. See Hullinghorst, supra, at 753. Our holding in Skipper has been modified both by the Supreme Court's holding in Caputo and by our own decisions subsequent to Skipper. See, e.g., Hullinghorst, supra, at 754. The Board's decision that the respondent satisfies the status requirement is therefore affirmed. 32