Opinion ID: 2809688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instructions for Aggravated Assault

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial court gave incorrect instructions to the jury on the mens rea component of aggravated assault. Because he did not object (…continued) See, e.g., Walls, 773 A.2d at 429-30; Tabron, 410 A.2d at 212-13; Smith v. United States, 392 A.2d 990, 992-93 (D.C. 1978). Under the circumstances of this case, there is no need to reconsider those decisions, even if we, as a panel of the court, were free to do so. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). 12 on this ground at trial, we review only for plain error. Graham v. United States, 12 A.3d 1159, 1167-68 (D.C. 2011).6 Under this standard, “appellant first must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected appellant’s substantial rights. Even if all three of these conditions are met, this court will not reverse unless (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Lowery v. United States, 3 A.3d 1169, 1173 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute describes alternative mental states for the crime: (1) “knowingly or purposefully caus[ing] serious bodily injury to another person”; or (2) “[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, . . . intentionally or knowingly engag[ing] in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious bodily injury to another person . . . .” D.C. Code § 22-404.01. The court instructed the jury that the crime of aggravated assault required that appellant either, “A, intended to cause serious bodily injury to Timothy Conrad, or B, knew that serious bodily injury to Timothy Conrad would result from his conduct, or C, was aware 6 At trial, appellant did object to the aggravated-assault instruction, contending that the court should only read the first portion of the instruction on mens rea because the other two parts were “redundant and repetitive.” However, that objection was not precise enough to preserve the specific issue that he now raises on appeal. See Williams v. United States, 858 A.2d 984, 991-92 (D.C. 2004). 13 that his conduct created an extreme risk of serious bodily injury to Timothy Conrad, but engaged in that conduct nonetheless.” Appellant contends that the jury instructions given in this case improperly left out the requirement that the assault take place “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” We are inclined to agree. The government contends there was no error because the instruction given to the jury follows the model jury instruction, which was revised in 2012 to reflect this court’s reasoning in Perry v. United States, 36 A.3d 799 (D.C. 2011). See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.103 cmt. (5th ed. rev. 2013). In Perry, Judge Ruiz, writing the lead opinion, said that subsection (a)(1) of the aggravated-assault statute requires that the actor intend to cause serious bodily injury, while subsection (a)(2) requires “a different type of mental element—gross recklessness—as shown by ‘intentionally or knowingly’ engaging in conduct that, in fact, ‘creates a grave risk of serious bodily injury’ . . . .” 36 A.3d at 816. Judge Farrell, in a concurring opinion, said that the mens rea requirement in subsection (a)(2) “is substantively indistinguishable from the minimum state of mind required for conviction of second-degree murder . . . .” Id. at 823. Because “malice” is defined as a subjective awareness that one’s conduct creates an extreme risk of death or serious bodily harm, see Comber v. 14 United States, 584 A.2d 26, 39 (D.C. 1990), the committee revising D.C.’s model jury instructions chose to remove the language “extreme indifference to human life” from the previous pattern instruction and replace it with “was aware that his/her conduct created an extreme risk of serious bodily injury . . . but engaged in that conduct nonetheless.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.103. Careful attention to the statute and a close reading of the opinions in Perry lead us to question the committee’s choice. The statutory provision relating to “grave risk” clearly states that the person’s actions must be “[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” D.C. Code § 22-404.01 (a)(2) (emphasis added). Creating an extreme risk of serious bodily injury does not necessarily manifest “extreme indifference to human life.” Judge Ruiz’s opinion in Perry duly noted that there must not only be “gross recklessness” as shown by intentionally and knowingly engaging in conduct that creates a grave risk of serious bodily injury, but also that the defendant must do so “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Perry, 36 A.3d at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Farrell also stated that subsection (a)(2) of the statute requires that the defendant “‘intentionally or knowingly’ engaged in conduct that in fact created ‘a grave risk of serious bodily injury,’ and he did so 15 with ‘extreme indifference to human life.’” Id. at 823 (quoting D.C. Code § 22404.01 (a)(2)) (emphasis added). However, assuming for the sake of this appeal that it was clear or obvious that this portion of the instruction was erroneous, appellant has failed to show how it affected his substantial rights. According to the evidence at trial, Timothy Conrad was shot seven times at close range. The doctor who treated Conrad said he lost forty to fifty percent of his circulating blood volume by the time he entered the operating room, and would have died absent medical treatment. The circumstances of the shooting powerfully demonstrate a violation of subsection (a)(1)—a knowing or purposeful effort to cause serious bodily injury. “Gross recklessness,” the mental state coupled with “extreme indifference to human life,” did not come into play. Moreover, appellant contended at trial that he was not the shooter. He did not argue that the person who shot Conrad had not committed aggravated assault. He has therefore failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the wording of the instruction materially impacted the jury’s verdict. See Kidd v. United States, 940 A.2d 118, 128 (D.C. 2007) (on plain-error review, incorrect jury 16 instruction was not reversible error because there was no reasonable probability that it had a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial).