Opinion ID: 3014665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Explosive Device

Text: Chief Kauffman learned about the explosive device as a result of his unmirandized interrogation of Latz, who was 10 handcuffed and sitting on his couch. The District Court declined to suppress the explosive device on the ground that physical evidence discovered through a custodial interrogation need not be suppressed even if the defendant did not receive Miranda warnings. This Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of physical evidence discovered as a result of unmirandized but voluntary statements. See United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court recently reached the same holding in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). This holding results from combining the plurality opinion of Justice Thomas with the slightly more narrow concurrence in the judgment of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor. See Patane at 641 (plurality opinion) (“[P]olice do not violate a suspect’s constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide full Miranda warnings. Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence.”) (emphasis added); id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In light of the important probative value of reliable 11 physical evidence, it is doubtful that exclusion can be justified by a deterrence rationale sensitive to both law enforcement interests and a suspect’s rights during an in-custody interrogation.”). Patane thus validates DeSumma. To distinguish Patane and DeSumma, Latz argues that his statements were involuntary, as opposed to merely unmirandized. See DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180-81 (“We hold that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to derivative evidence secured as a result of a voluntary statement obtained before Miranda warnings are issued.”) (emphasis added). As we have explained, “a statement is involuntary when the suspect’s ‘will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion.’” Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991)). To determine whether Latz’s unmirandized statements were involuntary, we consider the totality of the circumstances in which they were made. Id. at 264. The challenged interrogation was far from exemplary, and Latz should have been mirandized. Before he made the unmirandized statements, Latz had been placed on his porch by 12 three police officers, handcuffed, and then moved to his couch. Kauffman, who did the questioning, may have been holding a shotgun. However, nothing suggests, and Latz does not contend, that Kauffman pointed the shotgun at Latz during the questioning. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Latz was threatened, and Kauffman told Latz that he did not have to talk. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that Latz’s will was overborne. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Latz’s motion to suppress the explosive device.