Opinion ID: 6983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City Possessed Only a Servitude.

Text: According to stipulations, the streets were originally dedicated to the City by means of the sale of lots with reference to an original city plan or subdivision plan depicting the now closed streets. We agree with the district court that, by selling off the land in this manner, the owner impliedly dedicated the streets referenced in the plan to public use. See generally, 2 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 98 (3d ed. 1991). Such an implied dedication conferred a servitude of public use over the streets only; title to the land underneath the and pay $5,000 annually to the City. 6 streets was not transferred to the City.3 James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So.2d 858, 859 (1947) (holding that the sale of lots with reference to a map designating streets is a dedication creating only a servitude of passage over the streets shown); ArkansasLouisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229, 240 (1938) (comparing statutory dedication, which vests fee simple to the grantee, with implied dedication, which confers an easement or a servitude only4); City of Baton Rouge v. State Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 271 So.2d 571, 573 (La.Ct.App.1972) (same), writ denied, 274 So.2d 709 (La.1973). The district court's holding that the implied dedication granted the City full ownership of the land underneath the streets was based exclusively on Garrett v. Pioneer Production Corp., 390 So.2d 851 (La.1980). Addressing the effect of the 1896 enactment of statutory dedication, Garrett concluded that such dedication was intended to grant the same rights as formal dedication, i.e., fee simple ownership transferred to the municipality.5 In noting the prevailing view that ownership of 3 In this possessory action we need not determine who retained title to the underlying land. 4 Parker Oil discusses common law dedication, another phrase for implied dedication. See Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839, 174 So.2d 798, 801 (1965); Baton Rouge, 271 So.2d at 573; see also Yiannopoulos, supra § 98. 5 La.Acts. 1896, No. 134, now appears as re-enacted in La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 33:5051 (West Supp.1994). Because the parties in this case agree that the dedication of the streets occurred in or before 1837, statutory dedication was not possible. The City argues alternatively that the property was formally dedicated. Because this theory was not advanced to the district court, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Trial br. of City at 5-9, 3 R. 730-34; 7 municipal streets would ordinarily vest in the public body, 390 So.2d at 855 (dicta), Garrett only recognizes the fact that, because most dedications of land to municipalities have been formal, the municipality ordinarily receives land ownership. Garrett does nothing to alter the long-standing principle of Parker Oil and Delery that an implied dedication results in a servitude of passage, not transferred ownership. We therefore reject the district court's interpretation of Garrett and hold that the implied dedication granted the City a mere servitude of passage over the streets. C. The Railroad Did Not Commence Possession for the City. Though the City may have possessed its servitude with the intent to have it as its own,6 it did not possess the immovable burdened with that right, except as a precarious possessor for the owner. See La.Code Civ.Proc.Ann. art. 3656 (West 1961) (owner of a real right in immovable property possesses for himself); Board of Comm'rs of Caddo Levee District v. S.D. Hunter Found., 354 So.2d 156, 165 (La.1977) (exercise by record-owner's grantee of acts of see also Order & Reasons at 18 n. 70, 3 R. 683 (The City does not assert ... that this plan evidences a formal dedication. The City's position has been, and continues to be, that the dedication was made by means of the sale of lots with reference to plans.); Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1993) (declining to express opinion on issue not presented to district court in the first instance); Capps v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 536 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir.1976) (same). 6 Though a possessory action is available to one who enjoys a real right such as a servitude in an immovable, the Code denominates the exercise of that real right with the intent to have it as one's own as quasi-possession rather than possession. La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3421 (West 1994). 8 physical possession pursuant to grant of right of way is possession attributable to the owner); Faust v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 437 So.2d 339, 342-43 (La.Ct.App.1983) (owner of real right could maintain possessory action to protect enjoyment of real right but does not possess the land itself as owner); see also Yiannopoulos, supra § 311, at 602. Nothing in the ordinance demonstrates that the railroad commenced possession of the underlying land on behalf of the City as owner. Nor does the record demonstrate that the railroad commenced possessing the servitude of passage on behalf of the City. When the railroad commenced possession of the land, it closed the streets and erected constructions, thereby contravening all recognition of a servitude of passage. Since the day the railroad closed the streets, it possessed the land for its own operations and for leasing and related commercial purposes. Having closed the streets off from further use as thoroughfares, the railroad possessed the land as though it were free of the burden of the City's servitude. The railroad's possession of the land therefore was necessarily adverse to any possession or exercise of the real right the City had enjoyed. Yiannopoulos, supra § 313, at 607 ([W]hen the adverse possessor of the immovable ... erects constructions that contravene the possession of the real right ... the ... constructions mark the commencement of an adverse possession of both the immovable and the real right burdening it.). The City lost possession of its servitude by abandoning the 9 servitude with its consent to close the streets from further use as a passageway or by the railroad's possession of the immovable as though it were free of the servitude.7 See La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3433 (West 1994) (Possession is lost when the possessor manifests his intention to abandon it or when he is evicted by another by force or usurpation.); see also Aubry & Rau, Droit Civil Francais, in 2 Civil Law Translations § 179, at 91 (1966) (possession of apparent servitude is lost by changes made on the servient estate which make exercise of the servitude impossible or represent an obstacle to its exercise). Accordingly, we hold that the railroad did not commence possession on behalf of the City. The railroad was therefore presumed to possess as owner. La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3427. The City has not rebutted this presumption. River City is entitled to be maintained in possession of the land.