Opinion ID: 1436385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: b. M.C.'s Involvement in the System

Text: An analysis of the record as a whole likewise invalidates the prosecutor's statement that he struck M.C. because of an alleged concern with M.C.'s involvement in the criminal justice system. Nothing in the record indicates that M.C. had had a negative experience with the criminal justice system that might bias her against the prosecution. In fact, the opposite is true: When questioned about her interactions with public officials following the attempted molestation incident, M.C. informed the court that she thought that the process that she and her daughter had gone through was fair, and that the police had treated her and her daughter with respect. In Kesser, we rejected in similar circumstances the prosecutor's alleged concerns about a juror's involvement with the criminal justice system, noting that the record show[s] that [the struck potential juror] felt comfortable with a system that had prosecuted and incarcerated her father for the offense. When she was asked if she was `satisfied with [the] conclusion' of the proceedings, she answered Yes. On her questionnaire, she also answered that she was satisfied with the response of the police, the district attorney, and the court system. Kesser, 465 F.3d at 364. In fact, we observed, the struck potential juror seems a better juror for the prosecution than others who were accepted despite minor run-ins with the law that might foster resentment. Id. at 365. As in Kesser, there were other jurors in this case who had experience with the criminal justice system but were not struck. Juror 7, for example, had actually been arrested and prosecuted (including a court appearance) for a minor crime. She described the incident as a very negative experience, although she did note that the police had been respectful and that her bitterness over the affair was directed primarily towards an ex-roommate. Nonetheless, if involvement with the system was a legitimate concern of the prosecutor, he would almost certainly have struck Juror 7. Moreover, like the juror in Kesser, M.C. was, if anything, a better juror for the prosecution than juror 7 who was accepted despite an arrest that she described as a very negative experience. Juror 6 also had experience with the criminal justice system: Juror 6's husband had been arrested for assaulting her and had spent a night in jail. Although charges were never filed, Juror 6 hired an attorney in response to the arrest, and the attorney handled the matter with the district attorney's office and the police department. Thus, Juror 6 also had some involvement with the criminal justice system. In sum, even if severed from the objectivity rationale, the prosecutor's involvement in the system explanation for his strike of M.C. is not, on the record as a whole, a plausible, race-neutral justification for the strike. No court could reasonably conclude otherwise. 2. Reason 2: M.C.'s Expectation that the Attorneys Would Act Professionally During an exchange with Ali's counsel, M.C. provided the following views on the conduct of lawyers: DEFENSE: Do you have any opinions about criminal defense attorneys? M.C.: No. DEFENSE: Do you think they will say or do anything to get their clients off? M.C.: Well, I haven't had that much experience in being in the company of defense attorneys or attorneys at all. I feel that they will do the right thing for their client. Their position is to go the last line for their client. I would hope that that would be done in a decent and respectable manner. DEFENSE: I understand that. Any opinions about prosecutors, they'll say or do anything to get a conviction? M.C.: My same statement goes for them as well. DEFENSE: You would hope that everybody would act professionally? M.C.: Yes. DEFENSE: Let me ask you this: If at sometime during this trial we, Mr. Buenaventura [the defense attorney's co-counsel] and I, have to sort of aggressively cross-examine some witnesses, how would you feel about that? M.C.: Well, I believe that as long as you don't cross the line of being disrespectful and still keep it in a professional matter. DEFENSE: You wouldn't penalize us for aggressively advocating for our client? M.C.: No. DEFENSE: Just as long as we do it in a respectful, professional manner? M.C.: Yes. DEFENSE: That seems fair. The prosecutor later asked M.C. a series of similar questions, eliciting nearly identical answers. M.C.'s expectations regarding the conduct of the attorneys during trial was the basis for the prosecutor's second race-neutral reason for his strike. As the prosecutor explained, No. 2, [M.C.] was very emphatic thataboutto Mr. Morales, and then to me later, about her concerns about attorneys and the way they conducted themselves in the courtroom; that if it was anything less than professional and respectfully done that would affect her. He further clarified that his concern was that she would view aggressive cross-examination as unprofessional conduct and hold that against one side or the other. The district court did not credit this explanation. It noted that [t]he prosecutor himself gave a short speech about the level of professionalism the attorneys would maintain during the trial, thus suggesting that [M.C.'s] expectation was not unreasonable or particularly relevant to [M.C.'s] ability as a juror. It also pointed out that Juror 1 had expressed similar expectations regarding the professionalism of the attorneys, but had not been struck. We agree with the district court. As the above excerpt reveals, M.C. simply expressed reasonable expectations concerning attorney behavior. She did not say, as the prosecutor stated during the Wheeler/Batson hearing, that unprofessional conduct or aggressive cross-examination would affect her judgment. See Wheeler/Batson Hearing Transcript (Prosecutor: [T]hat it would occur [to M.C.] to say it would affect her judgment was unreasonable). Instead, she said the opposite that she would not penalize the attorneys for aggressively advocating on behalf of their clients. The prosecutor's mischaracterization of M.C.'s testimony is evidence of discriminatory pretext. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 2317. The voir dire transcript also demonstrates that Juror 1, who the prosecutor did not strike, expressed similar expectations about the lawyers' conduct. DEFENSE: ... [Do you have] any opinions about defense attorneys or prosecutors. They'll say or do anything to win? JUROR 1: No, no. Not any more than a policeman might lie. DEFENSE: I take it you say that because we sort [sic] have been talking a lot about police officers and witnesses and stuff like that? JUROR 1: Exactly, exactly. Then you said earlier that everybody should act professionally and above-board. DEFENSE: You probably agree with that statement. JUROR 1: Absolutely. Given that M.C.'s expectations were reasonable, that they were fully consistent with the prosecutor's own views about the level of professionalism that the lawyers would maintain during the trial, and that they were very similar to those of a juror who the prosecutor did not challenge, the prosecutor's professionalism justification, like his first explanation for his strike of M.C., is contradicted by the record. We therefore agree with the district court that the attorney professionalism explanation was not genuine and that the California courts unreasonably accepted it as non-racially motivated.