Opinion ID: 738505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Import of the Policy Statement Concerning Plea Agreements

Text: 43 Baird contends alternatively that the policy statement outlining the standards for accepting a plea agreement prohibits, as a matter of law, consideration of conduct underlying a dismissed charge. The relevant portion of the policy statement follows: 44 In the case of a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of any charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges [Rule 11(e)(1)(A) ], the court may accept the agreement if the court determines, for reasons stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines. 45 Provided, that a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of a charge or a plea agreement not to pursue a potential charge shall not preclude the conduct underlying such charge from being considered under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in connection with the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted. 46 1994 U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a). 47 According to Baird, the first paragraph of this subpart means that, if the court believed that the counts not dismissed by virtue of the plea agreement did not satisfactorily account for the seriousness of the actual offense, then what the court should have done is to reject the plea agreement. In other words, Baird asserts, conduct underlying dismissed counts provides grounds for rejecting a plea agreement but not for departing from the applicable sentencing range. 48 Baird draws support for this argument from Castro-Cervantes. The Ninth Circuit in Castro-Cervantes reasoned that if a plea agreement does not reflect the seriousness of the offense, the court should reject the agreement at the outset; at sentencing, it is too late to seek to address shortcomings in the plea agreement. Allowing a court to depart from the sentencing range based on conduct underlying dismissed counts would violate[ ] the spirit if not the letter of the bargain represented by the plea agreement. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d at 1082. The Ninth Circuit expanded on the policy justifications driving Castro-Cervantes by noting that allow[ing] judges to depart from the Guidelines on the basis of counts that have been dropped pursuant to plea agreements would severely undermine the incentive of defendants to enter into plea agreements. United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir.1991). 12 49 We disagree. This argument begs the ultimate question. Whether a court accepts a plea agreement is dependent, to some extent, on the information it can consider at sentencing. If the court is aware that it cannot consider conduct underlying dismissed counts at sentencing, then it may be more reluctant to accept a plea agreement. The opposite is also true. If the court is aware that it may consider conduct underlying dismissed counts at sentencing, then it may more readily accept a plea agreement. At all events, we do not see Baird's argument from § 6B1.2(a) as undercutting the conclusion we have already reached regarding the use of dismissed conduct. The language of the policy statement is insufficiently specific to contradict the clearer guidance provided by other sections of the Guidelines and the Supreme Court, discussed supra. 50 Baird also argues that the second paragraph of this policy statement implies that conduct underlying dismissed counts may only be used to determine the applicable sentencing range under § 1B1.3, but may not be used to determine whether to depart from that range. Otherwise, the argument continues, the first paragraph of this subpart would be mere surplusage; no court would hesitate to accept a plea agreement that includes dismissed counts if that court could always consider the conduct underlying those dismissed counts. 51 We disagree. As noted above, § 1B1.3, § 1B1.4, and the commentary thereto make clear that the information appropriately considered in a decision to depart is broader than that considered in determining the applicable guideline range. If § 6B1.2(a) does not preclude a court from examining conduct underlying dismissed counts in determining the applicable sentencing range (in fact, the proviso contained in the last paragraph of § 6B1.2(a) seems to encourage it), then we see no reason why it should preclude the court from examining the same information when deciding whether to depart. 13 52 Moreover, even if a court actually considers conduct underlying a dismissed count, it does not automatically ensure that the remaining charges will reflect the seriousness of the actual offense conduct. The statutory maximum sentence for the remaining charges may be relatively low; in such a case, it might be of little significance that a court could consider conduct underlying dismissed counts because that court would be unable to impose a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. Under our interpretation of the Guidelines, then, a court might reject a plea agreement because it believes that the statutory maximum sentence for the remaining counts is too short to account both for the charged conduct and for the dismissed conduct. Contrary to Baird's submission, then, the first paragraph of § 6B1.2(a) is not mere surplusage.