Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Individual Challenges

Text: Both state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on their race or membership in a cognizable group. (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) A three-step inquiry governs the analysis of Batson/Wheeler claims. ―First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612-613; see also Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168.) ―A prima facie case of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is established if the totality of the relevant facts ‗ ―gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 384.) At step two of the analysis, the prosecutor ―must provide a ‗ ―clear and reasonably specific‖ explanation of his ―legitimate reasons‖ for exercising the challenges.‘ [Citation.] ‗The justification need not support a challenge for cause, and even a ―trivial‖ reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice.‘ [Citation.] A prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons.‖ (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) However, ―race-based decisions are not constitutionally tolerable.‖ (Id. at p. 621; accord, Rice v. Collins (2006) 546 U.S. 333, 338.) The People do not dispute the trial court‘s finding that a prima facie case had been established. Accordingly, we focus on the third Batson/Wheeler prong and examine whether the African-American panelists were excused due to 25 intentional discrimination. (See People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 174; People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. 8.) ―At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, ‗the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor‘s race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor‘s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.‘ (MillerEl [v. Cockrell (2003)] 537 U.S. [322,] 339.)‖ (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. omitted.) Implausible or fantastic justifications offered at the second stage may not be sufficiently credible to pass muster at stage three. (Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768.) ―In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir dire.‖ (Lenix, at p. 613.) This assessment may also take into account ―the court‘s own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her. (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.)‖ (Lenix, at p. 613.) ―We review a trial court‘s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor‘s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges ‗ ―with great restraint.‖ ‘ [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court‘s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864.) Here, in making its ―sincere and reasoned‖ evaluation, the court carefully examined each of the prosecutor‘s explanations after independent review of the voir dire transcripts and its own notes about the jurors‘ demeanor. (See People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 283-284.) The court clearly understood its duty to scrutinize the prosecutor‘s reasons to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham 26 excuses contrived to hide discrimination. (See People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 115.) It issued an unusually detailed, careful ruling, referring to specific portions of voir dire and citing numerous authorities. Accordingly, its decision is entitled to deference and must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 571; People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) a) Prospective Juror E.T. The prosecutor used his second peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror E.T., a retired credit manager from Oakland married to a retired federal immigration agent. She stated in the questionnaire that she had been arrested for obstruction of justice but did not explain her answer. During voir dire, she explained that she and a police officer ―kind of got into a thing‖ when she was helping her sister leave her husband. She said the officer pushed her and ―made some kind of remarks.‖ She retaliated, and ―[i]t escalated from that.‖ She was arrested but the charges were dropped. In the questionnaire, E.T. described her general opinion about the death penalty as neutral but also stated, ―If you take a life be prepared to give up your life.‖ In voir dire, she said she had ―mixed feelings‖ about capital punishment. She explained that, according to the Bible, ―only God is supposed to be able to really take somebody‘s life,‖ and ―[i]t‘s not our place‖ to kill someone; however, she also believed people shouldn‘t be allowed to murder others. The prosecutor cited these mixed feelings about the death penalty as one reason for striking E.T. Another reason, related to the first, was a concern that E.T.‘s religious beliefs would make it difficult for her to impose the death penalty. The prosecutor said it raised ―a huge red flag‖ if a potential juror stated that only God can take a life. He explained that, ―as a prosecutor in a death penalty case, every single juror that makes [that] answer [has to be excused] either by cause or by peremptory challenge or I‘m not doing my job.‖ He noted no one sitting on the jury had given such an answer. 27 The prosecutor also cited E.T.‘s attitude toward law enforcement. Before voir dire, he had obtained the police report related to E.T.‘s obstruction of justice charge. The report, which was provided to the defense, revealed a different kind of encounter than E.T. described. A uniformed police officer responded to a residence to serve a felony arrest warrant on a person inside. E.T. blocked his entry. Even after the officer physically moved her aside, E.T. continued to place herself in the officer‘s way until the subject of the warrant was able to escape. The prosecutor believed the incident showed E.T. was unfriendly toward law enforcement, and this attitude was especially problematic because the credibility of Oakland police officers would be a crucial issue in the case. The prosecutor also observed that Patterson‘s attorney questioned E.T. only briefly and defendant‘s attorney asked no questions at all. Their approach raised the concern that E.T. would favor the defense. The court found each of the prosecutor‘s reasons supported by the record and expressive of his true motives in excusing E.T. Substantial evidence supports these findings. E.T. expressed mixed feelings about capital punishment. A juror‘s reluctance to impose the death penalty has long been considered a legitimate, raceneutral basis for excusal in a capital case. (E.g., People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 572; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1123; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 230; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1222.) The trial court observed E.T.‘s statement that only God can take a life expressed a ―startling and dramatic‖ reservation about the death penalty based on what appeared to be the juror‘s strongly held religious beliefs. The court observed that no other juror had expressed such a strongly held view. We have repeatedly upheld peremptory challenges to jurors whose reservations about the death penalty are religious in nature. (E.g., People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 118-119; see People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 422 [challenge to juror whose religious beliefs would make it ― ‗hard‘ ‖ to impose the death penalty did not support a prima facie case of Wheeler error].) 28 The court found E.T.‘s negative attitude toward law enforcement was an independent reason for the strike. After reading her arrest report for interfering with a police officer, the court concluded E.T. had committed substantial unlawful conduct, which she minimized during voir dire. A juror‘s prior arrest is an accepted race-neutral reason for peremptory challenge. (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 575.) For similar reasons, a juror‘s negative experience with law enforcement can also be a valid basis for exclusion. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1124-1125; see People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 500-501.) Finally, the court noted that defense counsel‘s failure to question a juror was viewed as a valid race-neutral reason justifying the prosecutor‘s peremptory challenge in People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 75. While this reason might not be sufficient in isolation to support a challenge, the absence of any significant questioning by defense counsel is relevant and may legitimately support a prosecutor‘s feeling that the panelist would favor the defense. (See ibid.) b) Prospective Juror B.C. The prosecutor used his sixth peremptory challenge to excuse B.C., a 54year-old receptionist from Oakland. B.C. disclosed in the questionnaire that her daughter had been raped two years earlier by a ―high-profile‖ person who was not convicted. She favored strengthening the justice system to give victims justice. In voir dire, B.C. explained that her daughter‘s rapist was a professional basketball player. The case was investigated by the Alameda Police Department but was eventually ―dropped.‖ B.C. had previously served as the foreperson in a criminal case. In her questionnaire, she stated that the case resulted in a verdict; however, in voir dire, she reported that the jury hung on one count. They found the defendant guilty of attempted robbery and being a felon in possession of a firearm but could not reach a verdict on an attempted murder charge. 29 B.C. also expressed the view that minorities are not treated fairly by the justice system, explaining that minorities were usually unable to pay for the same quality of legal representation available to White defendants. In voir dire, B.C. said she thought people who can afford a private attorney ―have a better chance in court‖ than those represented by a public defender, citing the O.J. Simpson case as an example. Patterson‘s attorney then told B.C. that in addition to retained lawyers and public defenders, some defendants are represented by private lawyers who donate their time. The court remarked after B.C. left the courtroom that this colloquy was misleading. It appeared to give the juror the impression that these defense counsel were donating their time, which was not true. The court noted that the problem had only arisen with B.C. but admonished counsel, ―Don‘t do that again.‖ The prosecutor gave several reasons for striking B.C. He mentioned her experience as the foreperson of a hung jury. He gave examples of other panelists he had excused specifically because they had served on hung juries. B.C. was the foreperson of a jury that could not agree on the most difficult charge, attempted murder. However, even though the jury hung on one count, B.C. found the experience satisfying and nonstressful. From these answers, the prosecutor deduced that, ―rather than dig in[and] work her way through to a verdict, which would have been a more difficult thing to do,‖ B.C. joined with other jurors and ―agreed to take the easy way out[,] to simply agree not to agree.‖ He noted that jurors here would be confronted with a difficult decision if the case reached a penalty phase, and he did not want someone on the jury who previously ―took the easier way out‖ when she was leading deliberations. The prosecutor also feared B.C. would be elected foreperson, because of her experience in that role, ―and when she was a foreperson before, she led the jury to a hang on the difficult charge.‖ The prosecutor also struck B.C. because of her views on the criminal justice system. She expressed concern in both the questionnaire and voir dire about the 30 quality of representation received by people who could not afford private lawyers. After this discussion, Patterson‘s attorney made comments that gave B.C. the clear impression that he was working on the case for free. The impression that defense counsel were working for free was damaging because B.C. seemed to have a ―fullfledged belief that if an African-American defendant can‘t pay his lawyers in the way that O.J. did, [he‘s] not getting a fair shake.‖ B.C.‘s views on money in the criminal justice system were highlighted by her assertion that the police or district attorney‘s office failed to pursue charges against the professional basketball player who had raped her daughter. The prosecutor summarized: ―So here‘s a juror who‘s been in this situation before as a foreperson, who was willing to take the easy way out of a hung jury on a difficult count, who has very strongly held views expressed in her questionnaire and her oral voir dire that money gets you good representation, and she has concerns about that in African-American context. . . . And then we have a defense attorney who stands up and misleads her, leaves her with the impression that he‘s working for free along with the other lawyers here. That‘s a race-neutral reason, your honor. That‘s a situation where that juror was poisoned.‖ The court found that these reasons reflected the truth of why the prosecutor excused B.C. Again, the court‘s careful findings are amply supported by the record. The court found B.C.‘s prior service as the foreperson of a criminal jury that hung on the most serious charge justified the use of a peremptory strike. As the court observed, many cases have held service on a hung jury to be an appropriate, race-neutral reason for excusing a juror, and this reason alone could have justified the excusal of B.C. (E.g., People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 644; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 265-267; People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 138.) Prior experience on a hung jury ―constitutes a legitimate concern for the prosecution, which seeks a jury that can reach a unanimous verdict.‖ (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 170.) 31 The court found that B.C.‘s views about the fairness of the criminal justice system were also a substantial reason justifying the strike. In many of her answers, B.C. expressed ―real fears‖ that an indigent defendant would suffer a significant disadvantage and only people who can pay for private lawyers will receive a good defense. ―A prospective juror‘s distrust of the criminal justice system is a race-neutral basis for excusal. (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171.)‖ (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 907; see People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 230.) Further, the court believed defense counsel‘s statements about private attorneys donating their time created the irrevocable impression that the defense lawyers in this case were working for free. The prosecutor was justifiably concerned that B.C. would feel sympathy for the defendants because she would believe they were not receiving adequate representation. Finally, the court observed that B.C.‘s views on the disparity of representation available to the wealthy were probably reinforced by the fact that her daughter‘s rapist, a high-profile and presumably wealthy person, avoided prosecution. Skepticism about the fairness of the criminal justice system to indigents and racial minorities has also been recognized as a valid race-neutral ground for excusing a juror. (E.g., People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 850852; People v. Calvin (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1386.) c) Prospective Juror T.W. Immediately after Prospective Juror T.W. was called into the jury box, the prosecutor used his tenth peremptory challenge to excuse him. T.W., a 57-yearold maintenance supervisor from Oakland, answered ―yes‖ to questionnaire items asking if he knew anyone who had been investigated or charged with a crime or if anyone in his family had been arrested or convicted of a crime. When asked to explain these answers, however, he simply drew question marks. In response to a question about particular types of crimes that upset him, T.W. said, ―Innocent people going to jail.‖ He stated, ―I think the system is unfair to Black[s]‖ when asked about the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and checked ―no‖ 32 when asked if the system treats minorities fairly. Expounding on this answer, he wrote: ―So much to say[.] The history of slavery go[es] to[o] deep in this country.‖ Asked if he would like to see changes to the justice system, T.W. responded ―no‖ and explained, ―It [is] the people I want to see changed.‖ T.W. said he was ―neutral‖ on the death penalty and thought it appropriate in some cases. When asked if his views on the death penalty had changed, however, he answered ―yes‖ and commented ―because of the number of Black[s] on death row.‖ The trial court explored some of these responses during T.W.‘s voir dire. Asked about his comment that innocent people are going to jail, T.W. said, ―We seem to be hearing a lot of it lately‖ and recalled hearing that another state had released many prisoners from death row for this reason. He also mentioned he was upset by the Riders scandal, a highly publicized case involving allegations of serious misconduct by four Oakland police officers. He affirmed that he held a strong view ―that African-Americans have not been and are not now being treated fairly‖ in the criminal justice system. When asked about his comment that it was ―the people‖ in the justice system he wanted to see changed, he told the court, ―Well, I guess I‘m talking about White people,‖ although he conceded that ―probably a lot of Black people‘s minds are made up as well, and maybe they‘re not capable of making decisions based on facts.‖ Asked to explain his comments about race and capital punishment, T.W. said Black people have not been treated fairly in the judicial system and are disproportionately represented on death row. On the subject of whether he could vote to impose the death penalty on an African-American defendant, T.W. stated that sentencing someone to death would be ―a very difficult decision‖ regardless of the defendant‘s race. He told the prosecutor that he could conceivably impose the death penalty for the murder of a single adult, but the facts would have to be ―pretty heinous‖ and ―ugly.‖ He also said ―it seem[ed] unlikely‖ that he could vote for death for two defendants if only one person had been murdered. 33 Finally, the prosecutor asked if T.W. himself had any experience with being arrested or taken to jail. He answered that around 20 years earlier, after having too much to drink, he was arrested during an altercation with a cab driver. Although the police took him to jail, T.W. stated that he had ―probably‖ been treated appropriately. Neither of the attorneys conducting voir dire for the defense asked T.W. any questions. After this voir dire, the prosecutor challenged T.W. for cause. In the questionnaire, which had been signed under penalty of perjury, T.W. stated that he had not been arrested for any crime and had never ―visited or been incarcerated in, any jail, prison, or juvenile detention facility.‖ The prosecutor argued T.W.‘s prompt and detailed voir dire answers indicated he clearly remembered his previous arrest and trip to jail. His failure to disclose these facts in the questionnaire could not be attributed to faulty memory. The prosecutor was also ―deeply concerned‖ about the juror‘s views on race. He remarked that T.W. was very candid about his view that African-Americans are treated unfairly in the criminal justice system and disproportionately placed on death row. The court denied the cause challenge but said it was ―not totally satisfied . . . that this man is a totally impartial juror.‖ The court understood the prosecutor‘s concern about having T.W. on the jury, noting it would stretch credulity to assume that T.W.‘s views on racism and African-Americans on death row would not enter into his deliberations and judgment. However, it could not conclude as a matter of law that T.W. was too biased to serve. The prosecutor repeated these reasons in explaining why he used a peremptory challenge to excuse T.W. He noted the juror had markedly negative views about the police and had mentioned a recent scandal involving Oakland police officers in particular. Because T.W. said he thought the Oakland Police Department was ―a whole lot better now than it had been‖ despite the egregious misconduct alleged in the case, the prosecutor concluded he held a negative view of the department. The prosecutor‘s case depended heavily on the credibility of 34 Oakland police officers, and he did not believe T.W. would fairly consider their testimony. Negative views about the Oakland police were also evident in T.W.‘s description of his arrest. The prosecutor argued that T.W.‘s failure to disclose this incident in the questionnaire reflected a lack of honesty that was an independent, race-neutral ground for excusal. The prosecutor also cited T.W.‘s reluctance to impose the death penalty and his clear belief that the criminal justice system is racist. The prosecutor also observed that defense counsel did not ask the juror a single question, which suggested their belief that T.W. leaned heavily in their favor. Before ruling on the Batson/Wheeler motion, the court reviewed the transcript of voir dire and the cause challenge hearing as well as its own notes about the juror. Remarking that perhaps the cause challenge should have been granted after all, the court concluded the prosecutor had ample reasons for striking T.W. and his race-neutral justifications were sincere. When a prospective juror‘s hostility to law enforcement and the criminal justice system is not sufficient to support a dismissal for cause, it may well justify a prosecutor‘s peremptory challenge. (See, e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 287.) The court noted T.W. had been arrested by the same police department that investigated the murder. T.W.‘s own arrest was a valid race-neutral reason for excusal. (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1186, 1189.) Moreover, the juror‘s failure to disclose his arrest in the questionnaire could reflect a lack of candor, a legitimate concern for the prosecutor. (See, e.g., People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 114; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 166-167; People v. Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 266.) T.W. also expressed a very low opinion of the Oakland Police Department. Even if T.W. truly believed the department had improved in recent years, the relevant events took place seven years earlier. Moreover, T.W. strongly believed that nonwhite defendants cannot receive a fair trial. A prospective juror‘s views that the criminal justice system is biased, and that the death penalty has been disproportionately imposed against minorities, can 35 validly support a peremptory strike. (Williams, at p. 285; People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.) Based on this record, the trial court reasonably concluded T.W.‘s mind was already made up against the prosecution.