Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Neutrality and general applicability

Text: Catholic Charities offers two arguments why the WCEA should be not considered neutral or generally applicable and should, thus, be subject to strict scrutiny under an exception to the rule of Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595. First, Catholic Charities contends the face of the statute demonstrates a lack of neutrality; second, Catholic Charities relies on the WCEA's legislative history and practical effect to argue the Legislature gerrymandered the law to reach only Catholic employers. We address these arguments separately, as Catholic Charities has stated them in its brief. A law is not neutral towards religion if its object ... is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.... ( Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217 ( Lukumi ).) A law is not generally applicable if it in a selective manner impose[s] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.... ( Id., at p. 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Thus, [n]eutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and ... [a] failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. ( Id., at p. 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) In determining whether the object of a law is to suppress religion or religiously motivated conduct, a court must begin with [the law's] text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context. ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Following this approach, the high court in Lukumi found that a city council's use of the words sacrifice and ritual in an ordinance regulating animal slaughter helped to show, together with other evidence, that the ordinance had been motivated by a desire to suppress the Santeria religion. The lack of facial neutrality fit into a pattern of animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious practices.... ( Id., at p. 542, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Not only did the ordinances by their own terms target [Santeria] religious exercise, so too were the texts of the ordinances ... gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings.... ( Ibid. ) Finally, the ordinances suppress[ed] much more religious conduct than [was] necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense [i.e., protecting health and preventing cruelty to animals]. ( Ibid. ) Relying on Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, Catholic Charities argues the WCEA is not neutral because its exemption for religious employers contains religious terms and terminology that lack any secular meaning or purpose. Catholic Charities specifically refers to the terms inculcation of religious values and religious tenets, both of which appear in criteria used in the WCEA to define and exempt religious employer[s]. (Health & Saf.Code, § 1367.25, subd. (b)(1)(A), (B) & (C).) Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, is inapposite. The animal sacrifice ordinance challenged in that case referred to religious practices (sacrifice and ritual) in order to prohibit them. In that context, the statute's use of religious terminology supported the court's conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances there at issue. ( Id., at p. 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) In contrast, the WCEA refers to the religious characteristics of organizations in order to identify and exempt those organizations from an otherwise generally applicable duty. Although Catholic Charities cannot claim the statutory exemption for religious employers, other Catholic organizations may be able to claim it. If the WCEA burdens Catholic Charities' religious beliefs, the burden arises not from the religious terminology used in the exemption, but from the generally applicable requirement to provide coverage for contraceptives. The high court has never prohibited statutory references to religion for the purpose of accommodating religious practice. To the contrary, the court has repeatedly indicated that it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. ( Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, 483 U.S. 327, 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 ( Amos ); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., supra, 480 U.S. 136, 144-145, 107 S.Ct. 1046; cf. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872, 890, 110 S.Ct. 1595.) Furthermore, the state may require an organization claiming the benefits of [a] religious-organization exemption from a regulatory statute to prove that [it] is a religious organization within the meaning of the [statute]. ( Larson v. Valente (1982) 456 U.S. 228, 255, fn. 30, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33, italics added.) To accomplish these purposes without explicitly defining the religious groups and practices to be accommodated, in order to distinguish them from secular groups and practices not entitled to accommodation, would often be impossible. Because a legislative accommodation benefits religion, it is tested not under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause. ( Amos, supra, 483 U.S. 327, 334-336, 107 S.Ct. 2862.) To comply with the establishment clause, a law must among other things serve a `secular legislative purpose.' ( Id., at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105.) In this context, the requirement of a secular legislative purpose does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion  that would amount to a requirement `that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups,' ... and the Establishment Clause has never been so interpreted. ( Amos, at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862, quoting Zorach v. Clauson (1952) 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954.) Instead, it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. ( Amos, at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862.) The references to religion in the WCEA have no other purpose than this. The high court has not required that legislative categories make no explicit reference to religion. ( Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) A rule barring religious references in statutes intended to relieve burdens on religious exercise would invalidate a large number of statutes. A few examples suffice. The federal statute upheld in Amos, supra, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, for example, exempted from title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a religious corporation, association, or educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such a corporation, association, education institution, or society of its activities. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).) Similarly, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act uses the term religious association or corporation (Gov.Code, § 12926, subd. (d)) in order to exempt certain employers from liability for unlawful employment practices. We recently upheld statutes that refer to religiously affiliated associations and their religious mission[s] for the purpose of exempting such associations from burdens imposed by a landmark preservation ordinance. ( East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State of California, supra, 24 Cal.4th 693, 702, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 13 P.3d 1122, quoting Gov.Code, §§ 25373, subd. (d), and 37361, subd. (c).) The rule Catholic Charities proposes would invalidate these and many similar laws. Because the high court's decisions provide no support for such a rule, we reject it.