Opinion ID: 2500717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: [¶ 4] In 1862, Congress passed an act authorizing organization of the Pacific railroad companies. In that legislation, the federal government provided land grants and credit to induce railroad companies to construct a transcontinental railroad. Union Pacific was established to undertake that effort and received a large grant of land in Wyoming. In the 1890s and early 1900s, Union Pacific sold some of its Wyoming property to private persons. Union Pacific included timber reservations in some of its land contracts and deeds. [¶ 5] This case involves timber reservations in three Union Pacific deeds from the early 1900s. [2] The earliest was a 1906 warranty deed from Union Pacific to James Graham for 634 acres in Uinta County, Wyoming for which he paid $463. The deed stated, in relevant part: Excepting and Reserving to said Union Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, the exclusive right to cut and remove timber from said land and the right to ingress, egress and regress upon said land and the right to use as much of the surface thereof as may be necessary for the proper conduct of said business thereon. [¶ 6] In 1908, Union Pacific executed a deed granting 15,941 acres in Uinta County to Heber Land and Livestock Company in consideration for $7,970.57. The deed contained the following pertinent language: Excepting and reserving to Union Pacific Railroad Company, the exclusive right to cut and remove all timber from said lands and the right of ingress, egress and regress upon said land, and the right to use so much of the surface thereof as may be necessary for the proper conduct of said business thereon. [3] [¶ 7] In 1909, Union Pacific executed a deed conveying 5,037 acres to James Chesney in exchange for $3,779.52. The deed excepted and reserved to: Union Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, all timber on said lands, and the exclusive right to cut and remove the same from said lands and the right of ingress, egress and regress upon said lands, and the rights to use so much of the surface thereof as may be necessary for the proper conduct of said business thereon. [¶ 8] In 2005, a dispute arose between Broadbent, the successor in interest to each of the grantees of the surface estate, and Ecosystem, the successor in interest to Union Pacific's timber interests. Initially, the district court granted Broadbent's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, holding as a matter of law that the timber reservations were limited to a reasonable time because Union Pacific did not expressly state in the deeds that the reservations were perpetual. Ecosystem I, ¶ 1, 158 P.3d at 686. The district court based this ruling on what it concluded was a majority rule across the country. Id., ¶ 21, 158 P.3d at 691. Ecosystem argued that it should have been allowed to present evidence about the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the deeds to inform the court as to the parties' intent with regard to the timber interests. Id., ¶ 7, 158 P.3d at 687. This Court agreed, citing our deed interpretation rule that facts and circumstances evidence is available to help determine the plain meaning of the deed language even if such language is not ambiguous on its face. Ecosystem I, ¶¶ 9-10, 158 P.3d at 688. [¶ 9] In Ecosystem I, we acknowledged existing authority stating that timber reservations were understood to include a reasonable time limitation. We, however, eschewed a formalistic rule based upon such case law and held that facts and circumstances evidence should be consulted to determine the parties' general intent regarding the duration of the timber estates. Appropriate facts and circumstances evidence could include case law interpreting timber reservations and conveyances from the same era as the Union Pacific deeds, the nature of the parties, the type of land covered by the deeds, the purposes of the conveyances and/or reservations, the railroad's use of timber in its business activities, and the consideration paid by the surface owners for the conveyances. Id., ¶¶ 34-36, 158 P.3d at 693-94. [¶ 10] Upon remand, the district court held a bench trial and considered facts and circumstances evidence in accordance with our direction. The court concluded the facts and circumstances demonstrated that, by using the term timber in the reservations, Union Pacific intended only to reserve the trees, then in existence, which were of sufficient size to use in its railroad operations. The district court further concluded the facts and circumstances established that Union Pacific was limited to a reasonable time to remove the timber. In the alternative, the district court ruled that Broadbent had obtained title to the timber estate by adverse possession. Ecosystem appealed.