Opinion ID: 414382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rights of the LCO Tribe Pursuant to the Treaties of 1837 and 1842

Text: 96
97 Initially, we note that the tribe contends the Chippewas held treaty-recognized title to their lands pursuant to the Treaty of August 19, 1825, 7 Stat. 272 (Treaty of Prairie du Chien). They reason that this recognized title included the right to use the land for traditional pursuits and, that absent specific language in the Treaties of 1837 and 1842 extinguishing such rights, they were impliedly reserved to the Indians. 98 The state defendants assert that the Treaty of Prairie du Chien was not before the district court and should this court deem it relevant, a remand is essential. We do not believe a remand is mandated on that issue. 99 We need not rely on an implicit reservation of rights because the usufructuary rights of the LCO tribe were explicitly addressed in the Treaties of 1837 and 1842. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905), on which the appellants correctly rely as involving treaty-recognized usufructuary rights, does not appear to depend on any treaty prior to that in which the cession of land and simultaneous reservation of usufructuary rights were made. Although the tribe may indeed be correct in stating both that the Treaty of Prairie du Chien conferred recognized title on the tribe, e.g., Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 19 Indian Cl. Comm'n 514, 524 (1968) (1837 treaty); Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 19 Indian Cl. Comm'n 319, 330 (1968) (1842 treaty), and that usufructuary rights were implicitly reserved in later treaties, this line of analysis is not essential to our disposition of this case. 100
101 Even though the parties agree that there was an explicit reservation of usufructuary rights in the two treaties, they disagree as to the impact of the qualifying language in the treaties: the statement in the Treaty of 1837 that the enumerated rights are guaranteed during the pleasure of the President of the United States and the language in the 1842 treaty indicating that the stipulated rights would endure until the Indians were required to remove by the President of the United States. The limiting language raised two questions. The first is whether these non-permanent usufructuary rights recognized by treaty can be abrogated by a less explicit showing of intent than permanent treaty-recognized rights. The second is the meaning of the qualifying language in the two relevant treaties. We discuss each in turn. 102 The defendants strenuously urge that because the LCO's treaty-reserved usufructuary rights were temporary, they could be extinguished by implication. The defendants support the district judge's characterization of the recognized rights as analogous to permissive occupation and rely on language in Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 906, 911 (Ct.Cl.1963), and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278-79, 75 S.Ct. 313, 316-17, 99 L.Ed. 314 (1955). Essentially the defendants are arguing that non-permanent treaty-recognized rights are like aboriginal rights. 103 The term permissive occupation is more misleading than helpful in analyzing the case at bar. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 278-79, 75 S.Ct. at 316-17 (1955), the Supreme Court employed the term in concluding that the rights of the Indian plaintiffs to Alaskan land were not legal rights and therefore no compensation was due for the taking of timber from those lands. The Court rejected the argument that treaty-recognized title had been conferred on the Indians by either of two Congressional acts, noting that the intention of those acts had been to retain the status quo until further congressional or judicial action was taken. Id. at 278, 75 S.Ct. at 317 (footnote omitted). The status quo was the Indians' aboriginal title. 104 In Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 906, 911 (Ct.Cl.1963), the court's reference to permissive occupation was a direct quote from Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, and was relevant to the court's conclusion that the Indians indeed had recognized title to disputed land. As used in both Tee-Hit-Ton Indians and Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, permissive occupation is synonymous to aboriginal title. 105 The judge below first used the term permissive occupation in the Ben Ruby case, 464 F.Supp. at 1348, which was a quiet title action decided in the same opinion with the LCO case. He relied on Mole Lake Band v. United States, 139 F.Supp. 938 (Ct.Cl.1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892, 77 S.Ct. 130, 1 L.Ed.2d 86. In Mole Lake, the Court of Claims had found that the intention of the parties to the cession Treaties of 1837 and 1842 was to pass title in the land to the United States and that the Indians were to have only a revocable license to use the land until the President required them to vacate it. 139 F.Supp. at 940. 9 106 We concur with the general proposition that if the Indians' right of occupancy is temporary, their interest in the land is more similar to a revocable license than it is to title. Even so, we do not think it necessarily follows that an expressly granted revocable license to use land confers no greater rights than aboriginal title which carries no legal right at all against the United States, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 279, 75 S.Ct. at 317. Even in the context of the Ben Ruby case, therefore, the term permissive occupation would appear less than an exact statement of the rights enjoyed by the Indians. 107 The term permissive occupation is especially inapplicable, however, to the LCO case which involves the reservation of usufructuary rights rather than a claim of title. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, Ben Ruby, Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, and Mole Lake all concerned questions of title. It is perfectly consistent with the basic tenets of property law that one may enjoy a right of use that is limited in duration. The fact that it is so limited makes it no less of a legal right. 108 We are not persuaded, therefore, that the rights of the LCO band pursuant to the Treaties of 1837 and 1842 were other than treaty-recognized rights of use which are of legal significance. Despite his use of the term permissive occupation, the district judge apparently reached the same conclusion on this point. The fact that the rights enjoyed by the LCO band were legally enforceable against the United States compels the conclusion that they should not be extinguished by mere implication. 109 The second dispute between the parties concerns the meaning of the limiting language. During the pleasure of the President and until required to remove by the President would appear to confer unbridled discretion on the Government to extinguish the usufructuary rights. As the district court recognized, however, Indian treaties must ordinarily be construed as they were understood by the Indians. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring); accord, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31, 90 S.Ct. 1328, 1334-35, 25 L.Ed.2d 615 (1970); see Section III, supra. 110 The judge below found that the Chippewas understood the treaties to mean that they enjoyed the use of their lands for an unlimited time unless they misbehaved by harassing white settlers. In reaching this conclusion, the district judge relied on the Indians' statements during the negotiations preceding the Treaty of 1837 indicating that they wished to continue hunting and fishing on the ceded lands and that they envisioned their grandchildren negotiating for further annuities in sixty-years time. He also noted that both Indians and non-Indians present at the 1842 treaty negotiations later wrote that the Indians had been assured they would not have to remove unless they misbehaved. 111 The defendants challenge Judge Doyle's conclusion as going beyond his discretion and argue that both treaties were made pursuant to the removal policy which contemplated placing the Indians on lands farther west. They also argue that Judge Doyle should not have relied on the writings of persons present at the negotiations because this is evidence of low quality. 112 The difficulty with the defendants' argument is that it does not really address what the Indians believed the treaty to mean. The fact that the treaties were conceived pursuant to a policy of removal is not inconsistent with either the assertion that the treaties were unacceptable to the Indians unless modified by an oral understanding that allowed them to stay on the land so long as they did not harass white settlers or the Government's recognition that this concession was therefore essential. Further, whether those persons who wrote of their recollections provided only low quality evidence for a trial over a hundred years later is somewhat irrelevant given that it is the only evidence of the Indians' understanding of the treaty. 113 One further point must be made although it is not explicitly argued by the defendants. A finding as to the intent of the Indians is arguably a factual finding that is inappropriate to a disposition by summary judgment. Because this aspect of the case was decided adversely to the defendants, we construe all inferences in favor of the defendants in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 664 (5th Cir.1980), remanded on reh'g on other grounds, 625 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir.). Because the defendant's evidence on this point does not address what the Indians believed the treaty to mean but, rather, the motive of the Government in seeking the treaty, we conclude that no genuine issue of fact existed. 114 We concur therefore in the district judge's conclusion that the qualifying language in the two treaties did not confer the unlimited discretion on the Executive that it appears to; rather, it required that the Indians be denied their usufructuary privileges only if the Indians were instrumental in causing disturbances with white settlers.