Opinion ID: 2050890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Abandoning the Special Relationship Doctrine

Text: As noted above, in arguing that their negligence claim should not have been dismissed, plaintiffs offer an alternative argument. They contend that our recent case law demonstrates that the special relationship doctrine has been eroded in this state and that the evolution of our case law has clearly been away from the formulaic application of the special relationship doctrine. Plaintiffs argue that the special relationship doctrine, in particular, and the no-duty rule, in general, are antiquated and out of step with contemporary societal morals. Thus, according to plaintiffs, the existence of an affirmative duty to warn or protect, particularly in situations where the parties are not strangers, should be a policy determination, made on a case-by-case basis, upon consideration of factors commonly used to determine the existence of a duty in ordinary negligence situations, i.e., the reasonable foreseeability of the injury; the likelihood of the injury; the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendants. Plaintiffs urge us to abandon the special relationship framework for determining whether to impose an affirmative duty to protect against third-party attacks and to find a duty in the case at bar by applying the above four-factor negligence test. Earlier in this opinion, we noted this court's long history of adherence to the rule that private persons owe no duty to act affirmatively to protect others from criminal attack by third persons absent a special relationship between the parties. Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill.2d 203, 126 Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988); Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975); Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 314A (1965). Abandonment of this rule, therefore, would necessarily implicate stare decisis. We held in Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill.2d 502, 510, 204 Ill. Dec. 301, 641 N.E.2d 525 (1994): The doctrine of stare decisis is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. Stare decisis permits society to presume that fundamental principles are established in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals. The doctrine thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government both in appearance and in fact. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command. However, a court will detour from the straight path of stare decisis only for articulable reasons, and only when the court must bring its decisions into agreement with experience and newly ascertained facts. Vasquez v. Hillery (1986), 474 U.S. 254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624-25, 88 L.Ed.2d 598, 610. Plaintiffs contend that we would not be straying very far from the path of stare decisis because the special relationship doctrine has already been eroded by Illinois courts, including this court, which have eschewed the special relationship analysis and, instead, applied the traditional negligence factors when deciding whether a duty exists. Plaintiffs cite as examples Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill.2d 179, 262 Ill.Dec. 815, 766 N.E.2d 1118 (2002), Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 208 Ill.2d 414, 281 Ill.Dec. 554, 804 N.E.2d 519 (2004), Kohn v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 347 Ill.App.3d 746, 283 Ill.Dec. 598, 808 N.E.2d 564 (2004), and Orrico v. Beverly Bank, 109 Ill.App.3d 102, 64 Ill.Dec. 701, 440 N.E.2d 253 (1982). However, we find that these cases do not support plaintiffs' erosion theory. In none of these cases was the question at issue whether an affirmative duty should be imposed on a person to warn or protect another against the criminal acts of a third party. In Happel, the plaintiff, a regular customer of the defendant's pharmacy, brought suit because the pharmacy dispensed to her a prescription medication which was contraindicated based on her allergy to aspirin. The pharmacy maintained a computer database that was programmed to alert the pharmacist if a contraindicated medication was accidentally prescribed by a customer's physician and this database contained the plaintiff's allergy information. Although the pharmacy knew or should have known of the contraindication, it dispensed the medication without any warning either to the customer or to the prescribing physician. Based on these special circumstances, we affirmed the appellate court's finding of a narrow duty to warn, which was encompassed within the pharmacist's duty of ordinary care. Happel, 199 Ill.2d at 189, 262 Ill.Dec. 815, 766 N.E.2d 1118. In Bajwa, a wrongful-death claim was brought against the defendant insurance company, alleging that the defendant had negligently issued an insurance policy on the life of the plaintiffs' decedent, who had been murdered for the proceeds of that policy. The alleged facts established that the defendant's agent had misrepresented on the policy application that he had witnessed the proposed insured's signature, although he had not, in fact, done so. As a result, a life insurance policy was issued in favor of a beneficiary who did not possess an insurable interest and the insured was never seen personally or provided notice of the policy. We held that an insurer had a duty to refrain from providing `coverage on someone's life without undertaking reasonable precautions to ascertain whether the insured [was] aware of and [had] consented to the issuance of the policy.' Bajwa, 208 Ill.2d at 427, 281 Ill.Dec. 554, 804 N.E.2d 519, quoting Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 333 Ill.App.3d 558, 578, 267 Ill.Dec. 237, 776 N.E.2d 609 (2002). In Kohn, the plaintiff alleged that a school bus driver employed by the defendant transit company had been negligent because she failed to extend the mechanical arm and stop sign on the bus when she dropped off a minor-passenger. The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result of that negligence, he proceeded past the bus, struck the minor, and then was, himself, attacked by bystanders as he attempted to assist the minor. The plaintiff brought suit against the transit company to recover for injuries he suffered at the hands of the bystanders, which the plaintiff claimed were proximately caused by the defendant's negligent operation of the bus. Although the defendant argued that it owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from third-party attacks absent a special relationship, the court addressed the plaintiff's claim that a duty arose because the defendant's negligence caused the attack. In response to that argument, the court considered the four negligence factors and found that a physical attack was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct. Kohn, 347 Ill.App.3d at 755, 283 Ill.Dec. 598, 808 N.E.2d 564. Finally, in Orrico, a 31-year-old mentally disabled man was found murdered shortly after he withdrew a large sum of money from his account at the defendant's bank. When the bank dispensed the money to the decedent, it had in its possession a court order appointing the plaintiff (the decedent's mother) conservator of the decedent's account. In addition, the bank had actual knowledge that the plaintiff did not want the decedent to have access to his funds. Based on these circumstances, it was held that the defendant had an obligation to dispense the decedent's funds in a manner which was not in contravention of the court-appointed conservator's demands. Orrico, 109 Ill.App.3d at 106, 64 Ill.Dec. 701, 440 N.E.2d 253. Unlike the case at bar, Happel, Bajwa, Kohn and Orrico are not affirmative duty cases. In each instance, it was the defendants' negligent affirmative conduct (dispensing medication, issuing a life insurance policy, failing to extend the mechanical stop sign, dispensing money) which was alleged to have created or contributed to the risk of harm to plaintiff. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 37, Comment d, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (April 6, 2005) (when defendant's conduct creates the risk of harm, an affirmative duty of reasonable care exists. This duty is not imposed as an exception to the no-duty rule, but derives from the general duty of ordinary care which an actor owes when his affirmative conduct creates the risk); see also D. Robertson, Negligence Liability for Crimes and Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 Tul. L.Rev. 135 (1992) (discussion therein of the difference between conduct that creates a risk and exceptions to the no-duty rule). For this reason, Happel, Bajwa, Kohn, and Orrico are inapposite. Further, we can find no case in which this court has recognized an affirmative duty, based upon consideration of the four factors cited by plaintiffs, in the absence of a special relationship. Rather, the special relationship doctrine has been cited by this court in a number of recent cases, indicating our continued adherence to its general principles. See, e.g., Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (2006); Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill.2d 433, 290 Ill.Dec. 504, 821 N.E.2d 1078 (2004); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195 Ill.2d 210, 253 Ill.Dec. 632, 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000). Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs' claim that the special relationship doctrine has been eroded in Illinois. Plaintiffs only remaining argument for abandoning the special relationship doctrine is that the doctrine and the no-duty rule, in general, are antiquated and out of step with today's morality. While it is true that the no-duty rule has suffered criticism from a number of legal scholars, criticism of the rule is not new. Legal pundits have assailed the rule, citing its lack of social conscience, for as long as it has existed. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 37, Comment e, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (April 6, 2005); J. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L.Rev. 867, 867 (1991) (For more than eighty years, commentators have argued about whether courts should require one to act affirmatively to protect a stranger in peril). Plaintiffs cite Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal.App.3d 443, 190 Cal.Rptr. 310 (1983), and Lombardo v. Hoag, 237 N.J.Super. 87, 566 A.2d 1185 (1989), in support of their position that the current trend in the law is toward the abandonment of the no-duty rule and special relationship exceptions. But Lombardo, and the affirmative duty it recognized, were expressly overruled in Lombardo v. Hoag, 269 N.J.Super. 36, 634 A.2d 550 (1993), and Soldano, though not overruled, has not been well received. Subsequent California courts have criticized the Soldano opinion, limiting it to its specific facts. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 37, Reporter's Note, at 718, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (April 6, 2005). Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the no-affirmative-duty rule, as a common law tort principle, has been retained in every jurisdiction. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 37, Reporter's Note, at 719, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (April 6, 2005) (no court has adopted an affirmative duty to assist in a rescue); J. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L.Rev. 867, 868 (1991) (But in spite of early and repeated calls for reform, no recorded case has expressly adopted the requirementwhich at first blush would appear to be relatively harmlessthat people have a responsibility to engage in even an `easy rescue'). Some states have legislatively created narrow exceptions to the no-affirmative-duty rule, imposing criminal sanctions if a person who is present when certain violent crimes are taking place fails to notify police or, in some instances, fails to render assistance to the victim. [6] However, none of these statutes provide for a civil cause of action. [7] Thus, given the wide acceptance of the no-duty rule and the special relationship doctrine, it cannot be said that they are antiquated or outmoded. Moreover, abandonment of the no-duty rule would create a number of practical difficultiesdefining the parameters of an affirmative obligation and enforcement, to name just two. See Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill.2d 213, 234, 216 Ill.Dec. 703, 665 N.E.2d 1260 (1996). See also S. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 Vand. L.Rev. 673, 675 (1994). As noted by Prosser and Keeton, the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty people might fail to rescue one, has limited any tendency to depart from the rule to cases where some special relation between the parties has afforded a justification for the creation of a duty, without any question of setting up a rule of universal application. W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 56, at 376 (5th ed.1984). In Rhodes, we said, the impracticality of imposing a legal duty to rescue between parties who stand in no special relationship to each other would leave us hesitant to do so. Rhodes, 172 Ill.2d at 234, 216 Ill.Dec. 703, 665 N.E.2d 1260. That statement is no less true today. We may not depart from stare decisis without special justification. Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill.2d 76, 82, 282 Ill.Dec. 335, 806 N.E.2d 632 (2004), citing Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill.2d at 510, 204 Ill.Dec. 301, 641 N.E.2d 525. Where the rule of law has been settled and does not contravene any statute or constitutional principle, it may be disregarded only for good cause or compelling reasons. See Vitro, 209 Ill.2d at 82, 282 Ill.Dec. 335, 806 N.E.2d 632. In the case at bar, plaintiffs have not provided good cause or compelling reasons to judicially abandon the special relationship doctrine for finding an exception to the no-affirmative-duty rule. We will continue to adhere to its principles.