Opinion ID: 1231511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Unreasonable Number of Expert Defense Witnesses

Text: Appellant's remaining assignment of error involves the trial court allowing Appellees to elicit supportive testimony from a total of six expert witnesses. Appellant maintains that by consenting to this number of experts for one side in this case, the jury was permitted to be exposed to undue bias by the repeated testimony elicited by the co-defendants during direct and cross-examination of all the defense experts saying the treatment rendered to Mr. Kominar by both MCAS and Dr. Zamora met or exceeded the standard of care. [13] Thus the error assigned has two facets: the number of experts which were allowed each defendant; and the unrestricted cross-examination of the experts by the co-parties. The six defense expert witnesses included: a radiologist called on behalf of all Appellees; a trauma surgeon and an emergency medicine specialist called by MCAS; a trauma surgeon and an emergency medicine specialist called by Dr. Zamora; and an emergency medicine specialist called by WMH. [14] As previously noted in our discussion regarding embalmers, Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of testimony by expert witnesses. This rule in its entirety provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. W.Va. R. Evid. 702. Application of Rule 702 necessarily involves the determination of whether the evidence is relevant under Rule 401 and whether it withstands the balancing of interests set forth in Rule 403. See 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.02[5] (2nd ed.2007); Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 7-2(A)(2) (4th ed. 2000). Under the provisions of Rule 403, a trial court may exclude evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. W.Va. R. Evid. 403. Rule 611 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence further addresses the objectives a trial judge should strive to attain in making decisions regarding the presentation and introduction of evidence. [15] As we explained in syllabus point two of Gable v. Kroger Company, 186 W.Va. 62, 410 S.E.2d 701 (1991), [u]nder Rule 611(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence [1985], the trial judge clearly has discretion to `exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses in presenting evidence. . . .'; and in so doing, he must balance the fairness to both parties. The ultimate decision and underlying considerations of the trial court regarding admissibility will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly wrong. Syl. Pt. 4, Rozas v. Rozas, 176 W.Va. 235, 342 S.E.2d 201 (1986); Syl. Pt. 6, Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269, 406 S.E.2d 700 (1991). On the issue of cumulative expert testimony in the present case, the lower court stated at the post-trial hearing that: I probably could have legally limited the experts on both sides a little bit more than I did, but I wanted to give everybody the opportunity to present their case. . . . At some point in time, it did become cumulative. But it became cumulative also from the plaintiff's own experts. . . . I think because that there were three different defendants with three different theories of liability on them, that each one of these experts had some little different nuance as to why they believed that the defendant acted within the standard of care. . . . . . . I don't know that it could have been limited much more than it was. So, I don't think the cumulative effect of the expert testimony was prejudicial in any way to the plaintiff. Given the broad discretion afforded trial courts regarding evidentiary matters, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing each defendant to have separate experts. We do note that the hospital's expert specializing in emergency medicine essentially served to bolster the testimony of Dr. Zamora's own expert regarding whether the doctor performed in accord with the standard of care. In essence, there were three experts called to offer testimony supporting Dr. Zamora's treatment of Mr. Kominar. While it is suitable for a trial court to reconsider the number of experts a party may call when there are changes in circumstances during the course of trial such as the directed verdict granted for the hospital in this case, we do not find that refusing to do so necessarily results in an imbalance of fairness to all parties. The trial court also has broad discretion in limiting the cross-examination of multiple experts when an opposing party objects to the same as cumulative or otherwise legally questionable during the trial. The record reveals that on direct examination the witnesses called on behalf of a particular Appellee only addressed compliance with the standard of care for the party who retained them. However, on cross-examination by other defendants, the testimony of the same experts, either directly or indirectly, gave the impression that the performance of one or the other co-defendant conformed with the applicable standard of care. We considered the factors a trial court should weigh when presented with a motion to limit cross-examination in order to determine what would be fair to all parties in Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 215 W.Va. 634, 600 S.E.2d 346 (2004). Quoting from an earlier decision authored by Justice Cleckley, we said in Jackson that: In its decision to restrict or limit cross-examination, the circuit court may consider such factors as the importance of the evidence to the [party's] case, [its] relevance . . . and the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay raised by the evidence sought to be adduced. State v. Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 541, 457 S.E.2d 456, 478 (1995). Jackson, 215 W.Va. at 645, 600 S.E.2d at 357. We adopt this view as sound practice and hold that in responding to a motion to restrict or limit cross-examination, to determine what will be fair to all parties a trial court should weigh and balance such factors as the importance of the evidence to the party's case, the relevance of the evidence, and the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay that admission of the evidence may cause. Cases involving multiple co-parties pose a particularly difficult task of balancing these factors to determine whether placing restrictions on the questions which may be asked of expert witnesses by non-adversarial parties may prove necessary in order to achieve fairness to all parties. It is self-evident that cross-examination is a matter of right only when a witness is called by a party whose interests in the litigation are adverse to the party seeking to cross-examine. As summarized in 98 Corpus Juris Secundum, Witnesses § 445 (2002), [i]t is . . . undesirable for more than one attorney to cross-examine the same witness, and the right may be denied where the interests of the codefendants are identical. (Footnotes omitted.) In Klingbeil v. Truesdell, 256 Minn. 360, 98 N.W.2d 134, 140 (1959), the Supreme Court of Minnesota was faced with the question of whether the refusal of a trial court to allow cross-examination of a single witness by all co-defendants in a personal injury action constituted prejudicial error. Finding the matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the Minnesota high court reasoned: The right of cross-examination is an inviolate right, but it presupposes adversity between the party wishing to cross-examine and the party for whom the witness has been called to testify. The right, which is of fundamental importance in the discovery of truth in the trial of a case, is intended for the use of an opponent (1) for the purpose of the further examination of a witness proffered by the opposite side so as to bring to light qualifying or contradictory facts and circumstances not disclosed by the witness on direct examination and (2) for the further purpose of developing those facts which may diminish the personal trustworthiness or credit of the witness which may have remained undisclosed on direct examination. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed.) § 1368, From an examination of the authorities it appears that the right of cross-examination is an absolute right only in regard to adverse witnesses. The Ottawa, 3 Wall. 268, 70 U.S. 268, 18 L.Ed. 165 [(1865)]; Gurley v. St. Louis Transit Co., Mo.App., 259 S.W. 895 [(1924)]; Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Reid Motor Co., 216 N.C. 432, 5 S.E.2d 318 [(1939)]; Aluminum Industries, Inc. v. Egan, 61 Ohio App. 111, 22 N.E.2d 459 [(1938)]; Hall v. Crosby, 131 Me. 253, 160 A. 878 [(1932)]; Proceedings Nebraska State Bar Assn., 37 Neb. L.Rev. 149; Annotations, 38 A.L.R.2d 952, and 43 A.L.R.2d 1000; 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 614. We find this reasoning to be sound. [16] It would be virtually impossible to try complex multiparty litigation if every party had the unbridled right to cross-examine witnesses called by every other party on issues not related, or only tangentially related, to the witness' testimony in chief. We, therefore, hold that trial courts should carefully examine whether an adversarial relationship exists between co-parties at the time a motion to limit cross-examination is raised in order to avoid the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay.