Opinion ID: 1770491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Juror Schenk

Text: Mr. Isom next posits that venireman James Schenk was excused for cause, yet he never stated that he could not sign the verdict form. The relevant colloquy follows: Mr. Schenk: I could vote for it, but it comes up to the hang up, though, of signing your name. That's  DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. What's the problem with that? MR. SCHENK: To me it, I guess, it's my upbringing and everything. Now, I'm not against the death penalty and he may need it. I don't know. I hadn't heard the case yet. But to me it's kind of just putting my seal that I approve of death. I don't have control over death. God has that. And I don't want to interfere with Him. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. MR. SCHENK: But, now, if it gets right down to it, I, you know, it could possibly go either way. But I'm not going to stand here and tell you I can sign, sign it and then get in the courtroom and can't or get into a place where I can't. So it's a question. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Sure. It's not something that we think about very often that, what we would do if we're in that situation. But after you determined that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of capital murder, and you determined that there is ample justification for imposing the death penalty, and the eleven other jurors plus you all agree, could you not then sign it? MR. SCHENK: Possibly I could. I won't guarantee that. DEFENSE COUNSEL: You know, it's an extremely difficult job that you're asked to do, and I don't minimize it at all. But it seems to me if you can vote to impose it, signing your name if you believe that it's appropriate, I don't see where there's that big a problem. But I want you to explain it to me other than when you think it seals their fate? MR. SCHENK: It's just kind of a seal to me when you, when you sign your signature, you're just kind of a seal. And I, you know, it's what the state law says. But when I have to sign my name to what the state law says, it is  Well, it's confusing me and I probably can't answer it. DEFENSE COUNSEL: You can't say one way or the other then? MR. SCHENK: No, I can't. DEFENSE COUNSEL: So while you might lean toward not being able to sign, under certain circumstances you might be able to sign? MR. SCHENK: You can leave it at that. Defense counsel argued that Mr. Schenk wavered on his ability to sign the verdict form and should not be excused for cause. The circuit judge then said: If someone says they do not know whether they could, it infers the possibility that they can't, so I'm going to grant that on cause on Mr. Schenk. Again, this court's focus must be on whether the circuit judge abused his discretion in excusing Mr. Schenk for cause. We conclude that the judge did not. This is not a case where Mr. Schenk was merely expressing conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra . Nor did Mr. Schenk typify a jury organized to return a verdict of death. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Here, Mr. Schenk expressed reservations three times that signing a death-verdict form was akin to placing his seal on death. In response to defense counsel's questions, he said possibly he could, but he would not guarantee it. There was a substantial question here as to whether Mr. Schenk's views would impair his performance as a juror. Wainwright v. Witt, supra ; Pickens v. State, 301 Ark. 244, 783 S.W.2d 341, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3257, 111 L.Ed.2d 766 (1990). There was not abuse of discretion by the circuit judge.