Opinion ID: 1823510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the Will Properly Executed?

Text: Pirtle and Prchal argue that they presented substantial evidence showing that the will is invalid because it was not properly witnessed. They assert that because there existed a copy of the signature page containing only Miller's signature and Moorehead's notarization, a jury could infer that the witnesses did not see Miller sign or acknowledge the will. Tucker argues that because their argument is based upon impermissible speculation, the circuit court's judgment was proper in this regard. In Ala.Code 1975, § 43-8-131, the legislature has stated the requirements for the execution and witnessing of a will: Except as provided within section 43-8-135 [not applicable here], every will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will. [1] In order to overturn the summary judgment on the basis that the will was not properly executed, Pirtle and Prchal must show by substantial evidence that the witnesses did not see the signing or [Miller's] acknowledgment of the signature or of the will. The evidence showed that the notary saw Miller sign the will; that she notarized the will; that her employees signed the will as witnesses on the same day; and that Miller did not stay at the notary's office very long. Additionally, the witnesses attested to the following statement: The testator has signed this will at the end and on each other separate page, and has declared or signified in our presence that it is his/her last will and testament, and in the presence of the testator and each other we have hereunto subscribed our names this ___ day of _____, 20 ___ The record does not reveal whether the witnesses did or did not see Miller sign or acknowledge the will. Pirtle and Prchal offered no testimony from the witnesses themselves, and the notary was not asked during her deposition whether the witnesses were present when Miller signed the will or whether he acknowledged signing it in their presence. Pirtle and Prchal argue that a summary judgment was improper because, they argue, a jury could infer that the witnesses signed the will after Miller had left, and, based on that inference, could infer that the witnesses did not see him sign or acknowledge it. We have held: An `inference' is a reasonable deduction of fact, unknown or unproved, from a fact that is known or proved. See, Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. McCardle, 277 Ala. 100, 167 So.2d 274 (1964). `[A]n inference cannot be derived from another inference.' Malone, 277 Ala. at 107, 167 So.2d at 281. An inference must be based on a known or proved fact. Id.  Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So.2d 1220, 1224 (Ala.1992); accord Systrends, Inc. v. Group 8760, L.L.C., 959 So.2d 1052 (Ala.2006). The inference upon which Pirtle and Prchal rely  that the witnesses did not see Miller sign or acknowledge the document is  not based on known or proved facts, but upon an inference that Miller left the notary's office before the witnesses signed Miller's will. Such an inference is not based on substantial evidence sufficient to withstand a summary-judgment motion. Furthermore, the witnesses signed a statement attesting that Miller had signed or acknowledged in their presence signing the will. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly entered a summary judgment as to this issue.