Opinion ID: 2570341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Balancing the Interests of the Parents and the Child under Amended Section 14-10-129.

Text: Having determined that the Francis presumption in favor of the majority time parent no longer applies in relocation cases, we turn next to Mother's alternative argument, namely that section 14-10-129, absent a presumption in favor of allowing her to move, discourages her from relocating, and unconstitutionally infringes upon her right to travel. It is well established that a citizen has the right to travel between states. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). This right encompasses the right to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life. Id. at 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322. [I]t makes no difference that the parent who wishes to relocate is not prohibited outright from doing so; a legal rule that operates to chill the exercise of the right, absent a sufficient state interest to do so, is as impermissible as one that bans exercise of the right altogether. Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 823 P.2d 299, 306 (1991)(citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322). Here, though section 14-10-129 does not prohibit outright a majority time parent from relocating, it chills the exercise of that parent's right to travel because, in seeking to relocate, that parent risks losing majority parent status with respect to the minor child. However, a majority time parent's right to travel is not the sole constitutional right at issue in relocation cases. In addition, a minority time parent has an equally important constitutional right to the care and control of the child. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)(The liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)(discussing [t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)(It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.). Though consideration of the parents' competing constitutional interests is important in relocation cases, the conflict is not simply between the parents' needs and desires. See Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91, 770 A.2d 214, 229 (2001). Rather, the issue in relocation cases is the extent to which the parents' needs and desires are intertwined with the child's best interests. See id. Thus, relocation disputes present courts with a unique challenge: to promote the best interests of the child while affording protection equally between a majority time parent's right to travel and a minority time parent's right to parent.
The interplay of a parent's right to travel and a parent's right to the care and control of his or her child in the context of a best interests analysis is a matter of first impression for this Court. However, as discussed below, we find the decisions of other courts that have encountered this issue to be instructive, including those of our own court of appeals. See In re Marriage of Graham & Swim, No. 03-1922, ___ P.3d ___, ___-____, 2005 WL 774412, at -4 (Colo.App. Apr.7, 2005); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn.Ct.App.2000); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo.1999); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 823 P.2d 299 (1991). Though most courts that have considered this question have acknowledged that the right to travel is implicated when a child's majority time parent seeks to remove the child from the state, [15] these courts cannot agree on how to balance the right to travel with the rights of the minority time parent in a best interests of the child analysis. Instead, three distinct approaches have developed. The first, Wyoming's, elevates the relocating parent's right to travel over the other competing interests. See Watt, 971 P.2d at 615-16. The second approach, adopted in Minnesota, eliminates the need to balance the parents' competing constitutional rights in favor of elevating the child's welfare to a compelling state interest. See LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163-64. The third approach, New Mexico's, treats all the competing interests as equal, holding that both parents' constitutional interests, as well as the best interests of the child, will be best protected if each parent shares equally in the burden of demonstrating how the child's best interests will be impacted by the proposed relocation. See Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 307-09.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Watt represents one approach to this problem. 971 P.2d at 615-16. Pursuant to Wyoming state law, a parent seeking a modification of custody has the burden of establishing that a material and substantial change in circumstances [has] occurred, following the entry of the initial divorce decree, which outweigh[s] societal interest in supporting the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 613. In deference to the custodial parent's right to travel, the court in Watt held that this burden could not be met merely by proving relocation of the custodial parent. Id. at 616. In reaching this conclusion, the court placed a higher priority on the constitutional right to travel than other states: The constitutional question posed is whether the rights of a parent and the duty of the courts to adjudicate custody serve as a premise for restricting or inhibiting the freedom to travel of a citizen of the State of Wyoming and of the United States of America. We hold this to be impossible. The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it the right of a custodial parent to have the children move with that parent. This right is not to be denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear evidence before the court demonstrates another substantial and material change of circumstance and establishes the detrimental effect of the move upon the children. While relocation certainly may be stressful to a child, the normal anxieties of a change of residence and the inherent difficulties that the increase in geographical distance between parents imposes are not considered to be `detrimental' factors. Id. at 615-16 (citations omitted). This approach is no different in practice than the approach in Francis that we now reject because it effects a presumption in favor of a custodial parent seeking to relocate. Furthermore, it is contrary to Colorado's preferred state policy emphasizing a fact-driven approach in relocation cases. See § 14-10-129(2)(c). Finally, it ignores the rights of the minority time parent. For these reasons, we decline to adopt this approach in Colorado.
Another approach to this problem is to elevate the child's welfare to a compelling state interest, thereby obviating the need to balance the parents' competing constitutional rights. LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163. In adopting this approach, the Minnesota court of appeals in LaChapelle recognized that the right to travel is qualified, and the deprivation thereof justified, where the state acts to promote a compelling state interest. Id. at 163-64. Because the court deemed the promotion of a child's welfare to be a compelling state interest, the child's best interests effectively subjugated the relocating parent's right to travel. Id. at 164. The United States Supreme Court frequently has emphasized the stringent nature of the compelling interest test, holding that if `compelling interest' really means what it says (and watering it down ... would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). The Supreme Court also has stressed that in this highly sensitive constitutional area ` [o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation [of fundamental rights].' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)(emphasis added)(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972)([O]nly those interests of the highest order and not those otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.). In heeding these cautionary instructions from the Supreme Court, many state courts have held that [s]hort of preventing harm to the child, the standard of `best interest of the child' is insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental rights. In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 154 Wash.2d 52, 109 P.3d 405, 410 (2005)(quoting In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (1998)); see also Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 297 (Me.2000)(citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054)(holding that the best interests of the child standard, standing alone, is insufficient for determining when the state may intervene in the decision-making of competent parents with respect to a third party's request for visitation with the children); Mizrahi v. Cannon, 375 N.J.Super. 221, 867 A.2d 490, 497 (2005)(holding that absent threatening harm to a child's welfare, the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for infringing on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit). Despite this stringent standard, the Minnesota court of appeals in LaChapelle relied on earlier Minnesota decisions which held only that the the paramount nature of a child's best interests is a principle that has been part of Minnesota child welfare law for at least 100 years. In re Welfare of M.P., 542 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Minn.Ct.App.1996)(emphasis added)(citing In re Welfare of J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn.1986), which noted that the best interests doctrine has long been recognized as the common thread in cases determining ... the circumstances in which children are required to live and adopted the best interests doctrine as a paramount consideration in termination of parental rights cases), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 722-24 (Minn.1998). In addition, the Minnesota court of appeals relied on Minnesota case law, which allowed it to consider the paramount question of the child's best interests without reference to Minnesota's statutes on child custody. LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163 (citing State ex rel. Flint v. Flint, 63 Minn. 187, 65 N.W. 272, 272 (1895) for the proposition that in a custody dispute, in spite of other considerations, including application of statutory law, `[t]he paramount question was ... what would be most for the benefit of the infant' (emphasis added)). [16] Citing the holding in LaChapelle, our court of appeals adopted this approach in In re Marriage of Graham & Swim, 2005 WL 774412, at -4, ___ P.3d at ___-___ holding that a parent's right to travel yields to the state's compelling interest in protecting a child through application of the best interests standard. We decline to adopt this approach in Colorado. [17] First, in the absence of demonstrated harm to the child, the best interests of the child standard is insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling the parents' fundamental rights. See In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 109 P.3d at 410 (quoting In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d at 30); see also Rideout, 761 A.2d at 297 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054); Mizrahi, 867 A.2d at 497. Second, this approach is not consistent with the plain language of section 14-10-129, which expressly requires a trial court to balance the competing constitutional rights of the parents. Specifically, factors (I) and (II) of subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) require a trial court to consider the reasons in support of a party's wish to relocate with the child and the reasons in support of a party's opposition to a relocation. See § 14-10-129(c)(I)(directing the court to consider the reasons why the party wishes to relocate with the child); § 14-10-129(c)(II)(directing the court to consider the reasons why the opposing party is objecting to the proposed relocation). These factors are undoubtedly weighing factors because they require the court to balance the rights of the majority and minority time parents in the context of a best interests determination. In addition, factor (VIII) in subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) requires that the court determine whether the court will be able to fashion a reasonable parenting time schedule if the change requested is permitted. This factor also contemplates that the court will balance the interests of the parents and the best interests of the child. Thus, the language of the statute requires a balancing of the parental interests. Finally, from a practical standpoint, adopting the best interests of the child as a compelling state interest to the exclusion of balancing the parents' rights could potentially make divorced parents captives of Colorado. This is because a parent's ability to relocate would become subject to the changing views of social scientists and other experts who hold strong, but conflicting, philosophical positions as to the theoretical best interests of the child. [18] For these reasons, we decline to adopt this approach.
The third approach that we consider today is illustrated in the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 307-09, and was later adopted by the Maryland court of appeals in Braun v. Headley, 131 Md.App. 588, 750 A.2d 624, 635 (2000). The court in Jaramillo considered not only the majority time parent's right to travel and the state's concerns in protecting the best interests of the child, but also the minority time parent's right to maintain close association and frequent contact with the child. 823 P.2d at 304-06. In addressing how to allocate burdens to protect these competing concerns, the court first recognized the constitutional right to travel, holding that the protection afforded the right to travel in the child-custody context has been explicitly recognized by ... this Court. Id. However, the New Mexico court also acknowledged the equal right of a parent to maintain a close association with his or her child. By the same token, we believe that the other parent's right to maintain his or her close association and frequent contact with the child should be equally free from any unfavorable presumption that would place him or her under the burden of showing that the proposed removal of the child would be contrary to the child's best interests. `[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest.' Id. at 305-06 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)(holding that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions as to care, custody, and control of their children). In discussing whether to adopt a presumption in favor of either parent, the court noted that [n]either presumption, except by happenstance, serves the statutory goal ... of determining and implementing the best interests of the child. Id. at 307. The court also discussed criticisms of procedure by presumption: Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand. Id. (citations omitted)(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). As a result, the court held that: [A]llocating burdens and presumptions in this context does violence to both parents' rights, jeopardizes the true goal of determining what in fact is in the child's best interest, and substitutes procedural formalism for the admittedly difficult task of determining, on the facts, how best to accommodate the interests of all parties before the court, both parents and children. Id. at 305. Based on this conclusion, the court in Jaramillo adopted a rule that neither party is under a burden to prove which arrangement will best promote the child's interests; both parents share equally the burden of demonstrating how the child's best interests will be served. Id. at 308.
For the reasons set forth below, we adopt the reasoning set forth in Jaramillo for relocation disputes in Colorado. Thus, we hold that both parents' constitutional interests, as well as the best interests of the child, will be best protected if each parent shares equally in the burden of demonstrating how the child's best interests will be impacted by the proposed relocation. In so holding, we are attempting to interpret the statute in a manner which is consistent with the plain language and with our understanding of the General Assemblies intentions. [19] Braun, 750 A.2d at 635. In addition, we are adopting a statutory interpretation that both effectuates the preferred legislative procedure and protects the rights of the parties before the court. See People v. Gallegos, 692 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Colo. 1984)(Such an allocation of burdens ensures in each case an affirmative demonstration that the legislatively preferred policy ... is being carried out.). We conclude that, ultimately, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider all the relevant factors to determine what arrangement will serve the child's best interests. Though the best interests of the child are of primary importance in making this determination, they do not automatically overcome the constitutional interests of the parents, which must be weighed against each other in the best interests analysis.
Child parenting disputes present agonizing decisions for trial court judges. However, as this case demonstrates, such cases are increasingly common before the courts. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, about 1 in 6 Americans moves each year. Kristin A. Hansen, U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Mobility, (last revised 2001) at http://www.census. gov/population/www/ pop-profile/geomob. html (last visited May 24, 2005). Approximately 7 million people a year move from state to state. Id. The average American makes 11.7 moves in a lifetime. Id. Because of the ordinary needs of both parents after a marital dissolution to secure or retain employment, pursue educational or career opportunities, or reside in the same location as a new spouse or other family or friends, it is unrealistic to assume that divorced parents will permanently remain in the same location. Neither the child nor the parents benefit from repeated appearances before the court or from the uncertainty caused by such appearances. Thus, the General Assembly rightly emphasized the necessity to review and decide relocation hearings promptly by giving such cases priority on the docket. [20] Because neither party is under a burden to prove which arrangement will best promote the child's interests, both parents share equally the burden of demonstrating how the child's best interests will be served. As a result, it is incumbent on the trial court to consider each of the twenty-one factors set forth by the General Assembly. In so doing, the court shall consider as much information as the parties choose to submit and may elicit further information on its own motion from other sources, including special advocates. As demonstrated by this case, however, one of the biggest concerns for the judge is the starting point for analysis. Often a parent who intends to relocate will do so only if the revised parenting plan ordered by the judge is acceptable. Consequently, relocation hearings may resemble a negotiation between the majority time and the minority time parent, with no clear-cut details or particulars upon which the judge can base findings. Consistent with the holding in this case, a court must begin its analysis with each parent on equal footing; a court may not presume either that a child is better off or disadvantaged by relocating with the majority time parent. Rather, the majority time parent has the duty to present specific, non-speculative information about the child's proposed new living conditions, as well as a concrete plan for modifying parenting time as a result of the move. The minority time parent may choose to contest the relocation in its totality, and thus seek to become the majority time or primary residential parent. Alternatively, the minority time parent may choose not to contest the relocation, but rather object to the revised parenting plan proposed by the majority time parent. In such a circumstance, the minority time parent has the responsibility to propose his or her own parenting plan. Thus, each parent has the burden to persuade the court that the relocation of the child will be in or contrary to the child's best interests, or that the parenting plan he or she proposes should be adopted by the court. The focus of the court, however, should be the best interests of the child. The court may decide that it is not in the best interests of the child to relocate with the majority time parent. Then, if the majority time parent still wishes to relocate, a new parenting time plan will be necessary. Alternatively, the court may decide that it is in the best interests of the child to relocate with the majority time parent. In that situation, the court must fashion a parenting time plan which protects the constitutional right of the minority time parent to care for and control the child. In either event, the court must thoroughly disclose the reasons for its decision and make specific findings with respect to each of the statutory factors.