Opinion ID: 2745150
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Heading: the juvenile expungement statute

Text: The General Assembly has set forth the procedures governing applications for the expungement of a juvenile record in §§ 1014-1019 of the Delaware Code. We refer to these sections collectively as the “juvenile expungement statute.” A person may seek expungement of her juvenile record under 10 Del. C. § 1017 or 10 Del. C. § 1018, depending on the nature of the juvenile record.13 Both § 1017 and § 1018 allow the Family Court to grant a petition for expungement provided the petitioner has no “subsequent adjudication of delinquency or adult conviction.” 8 App. to Answering Br. at 2. 9 App. to Answering Br. at 21. 10 Del. Supr. No. 460, 2013, DI 8. 11 Fam. Ct. Order (Del. Supr. No. 460, 2013, DI 11). 12 Id. 13 Section 1017 provides for mandatory expungement of misdemeanors or violations of Title 4, 7, 11, 16, or 23, and § 1018 provides for discretionary expungement of these same offenses. Both provisions preclude a grant of expungement if the petitioner has a “subsequent adult conviction.” 3 Section 1016 defines “subsequent adjudication of delinquency or adult conviction” as “an adult conviction resulting from the commission of a separate and distinct offense that occurs after a prior adjudication of delinquency” “unless the context otherwise requires.” It does not define “offense” or “adult conviction,” nor does it refer to any other part of the Delaware Code. Likewise, § 1016(5) defines a “prior adjudication of delinquency” as “an adjudication of delinquency entered by the Court, that occurs prior to the commission of a separate and distinct offense” without defining “offense” or “adjudication of delinquency” or referring to any other part of the Delaware Code. Section 1015 of the juvenile expungement statute requires the person seeking expungement to file a petition with the Family Court.14 The petition must include a copy “of that petitioner‟s criminal history as maintained by the State Bureau of Identification.”15 If the expungement petition meets the requirements of § 1018(a), the Family Court‟s inquiry shifts to whether the “continued existence and possible dissemination of information relating to the arrest of the petitioner causes, or may cause, circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice to the petitioner.”16 If the Court so finds, it may grant the expungement request. The statute incorporates a rebuttable presumption that “juvenile arrest records cause a manifest injustice for the petitioner.”17 This presumption accords with the Delaware General Assembly‟s Statement of Policy within the juvenile expungement statute, which reads: 14 10 Del. C. § 1015(b). 15 Id. 16 10 Del. C. § 1018(c). 17 Id. 4 The General Assembly finds that juvenile arrest records are a hindrance to a person‟s present and future ability to obtain employment, obtain an education, or to obtain credit. This subchapter is intended to protect children and citizens from unwarranted damage which may occur as a result of a juvenile arrest record, even if the arrest resulted in an adjudication of delinquency.18 That policy presumption may well have influenced the State‟s position in the case below. The State did not oppose Fuller‟s petition before the Family Court. But the Family Court nonetheless denied the request, feeling obligated to do so by its reading of the juvenile expungement statute. In its decision to deny Fuller‟s petition, the Family Court adopted the reasoning of a prior decision of that court in M.S. v. State, which concluded that a motor vehicle offense constitutes a “subsequent adult conviction” precluding expungement under Title 10.19 In interpreting the juvenile expungement statute in this way, M.S. v. State relied on a dictionary definition of “conviction,” which is a “judgment . . . that a person is guilty of a crime.”20 The Family Court then compared that general definition to the general definition of a criminal conviction found in the Delaware Code, which is set forth in 11 Del. C. § 233. Because § 233 states that a “crime” or “offense” is an act punishable by a fine or imprisonment, and because Title 21 offenses are punishable by a fine or imprisonment, M.S. v. State concluded that Title 21 violations committed after the age of majority are “subsequent adult convictions.”21 The decision also noted that certain 18 10 Del. C. § 1014. 19 Fam. Ct. Order (Del. Supr. No. 460, 2013, DI 11); M.S. v. State, 2012 WL 6765557 (Del. Fam. Dec. 21, 2012). 20 Id. at  (citing Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). 21 Id. 5 violations in Title 21 are explicitly designated as civil, and that the General Assembly‟s determination that the remainder are criminal under the meaning of § 233 could therefore not be seen as inadvertent.22 The Family Court, however, has also reached a different conclusion on this issue. In C.M. v. State, the Family Court held that the petitioner‟s adult speeding violation did not constitute a “subsequent adult conviction” for purposes of § 1017 because a contrary interpretation would lead to an unreasonable result.23 In so holding, the Family Court compared § 1017 with the statutes that provide for discretionary expungement of an adult record, all of which allow persons to seek expungement despite having convictions for other criminal offenses.24 Thus, under the M.S. court‟s interpretation of the juvenile expungement statute, a person with a traffic violation could have her adult record expunged in the discretion of the Superior Court, but the same traffic violation would serve as a total bar to the expungement of her juvenile record. The Family Court concluded that this reading of the statute was unreasonable in light of the General Assembly‟s express intent “to treat juveniles and juvenile arrest records in a relatively lenient manner for expungement purposes. . . .”25 22 Id. 23 2013 WL 6174800 (Del. Fam. May 14, 2013). 24 Id. at . The statutes that provide for discretionary expungement of an adult record require the Family Court to consider a subsequent conviction as evidence “that the continued existence and possible dissemination of information relating to the arrest in question does not constitute a manifest injustice to the petitioner.” 11 Del. C. § 4374 (discretionary expungement in Superior Court); 10 Del. C. § 1025 (discretionary expungement in Family Court). 25 C.M. v. State, 2013 WL 6174800, at . 6