Opinion ID: 48995
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actual or Constructive Possession

Text: 16 The government can prove possession by showing that a defendant exercised either direct physical control over a thing (actual possession) or dominion or control over the thing itself or the area in which it was found (constructive possession). 11 Jones insists that, because Detective Pollard claimed to have seen him remove something from his waistband and dispose of it in the spot where a firearm was later found, his was exclusively an actual possession case. The district court nevertheless concluded that, because Detective Pollard's testimony was arguably suspect, the government might have to offer evidence in support of the alternative theory that Jones constructively possessed the firearm found under the house. This formed the basis of the court's ruling that evidence of Jones's prior crime was admissible to show the knowledge and intent elements of constructive possession, even though they are not separate elements of actual possession. 17 In constructive possession cases, knowledge and intent are frequently at issue. A defendant will often deny any knowledge of a thing found in an area that is under his control (e.g, a residence, an automobile) or claim that it was placed there by accident or mistake. The government then must offer evidence to prove that the defendant (1) knew that the thing was present, and (2) intended to exercised dominion or control over it. 18 In contrast, the only knowledge that the government must show in an actual possession prosecution is the defendant's awareness that (1) he physically possesses the thing, and (2) the thing he possesses is contraband. 12 Intent is not an element of actual possession under § 922. 13 More to the point in this firearms case, once the government has shown that the defendant had a firearm under his immediate physical control, any contention that he did not know the nature of what he possessed is effectively precluded. 14 19 Jones insists that, as his is exclusively an actual possession case, the district court erred in allowing the 404(b) evidence to prove his knowledge or intent. We agree. Two cases from the D.C. Circuit are illustrative of our reasoning on this issue. 20 In United States v. Linares, the defendant was prosecuted for firearms possession on the basis of three eyewitness accounts of his having wielded and fired a handgun, and then tossed it away. 15 The district court allowed the government to offer evidence of Linares's prior conviction for firearms possession as proof of intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake. 16 In appealing his conviction, Linares insisted (as Jones does here) that, because his was exclusively an actual possession case, such evidence had no probative value on any of those issues. 17 The D.C. Circuit agreed with Linares and reversed his conviction, reasoning that, because the government's evidence consisted entirely of eyewitness accounts of actual possession, the jury could find either actual possession or no possession, but that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendant possessed a firearm either unknowingly or mistakenly. 18 21 The facts of Jones's case are quite similar to those in Linares and leave no doubt that his is exclusively an actual possession case. The prosecution's only substantive fact witness, Detective Pollard, testified that both (1) his initial suspicion that Jones had a gun and (2) his ultimate discovery of the firearm under the house were prompted by his contemporaneous observations of Jones's actual possession of an object later determined to be a firearm. As in Linares, if the jury believed Detective Pollard's testimony in toto, the government would have established, albeit circumstantially, Jones's direct physical control of the firearm. 22 The district court nevertheless anticipated the possibility that, because Jones's arrest occurred at night in a poorly lit area, the jury might discredit the accuracy of some of Detective Pollard's observations but credit the accuracy of others. This possibility, the district court reasoned, could compel the government to present evidence supporting an alternative basis for conviction: Jones's constructive possession of the firearm found under the house. (At this juncture, we note that the record is devoid of evidence that Jones owned, rented, or occupied the house or had any relationship with it whatsoever that could conceivably support the dominion or control needed in a constructive possession case.) 23 Linares involved three eyewitnesses to actual possession (including a passenger in the car that the defendant was driving while he fired the gun) and little if any question of the reliability of those observations. The D.C. Circuit rejected the government's concern that a jury that credited some of the government's evidence and some of [the defendant's] testimony might have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] constructively possessed the weapon. 19 The Linares court concluded that, given the defendant's unconditional denial of any possession and the government's evidence of actual possession only, the jury could find either actual possession or no possession, but never constructive possession. 20 24 Although Jones's case differs from Linares in some respects, we reach the same conclusion as did the D.C. Circuit. Keva Peters testified that Jones did not have a gun and did not go into the alley by the house where the gun was recovered. Detective Pollard testified that he saw Jones go into the alley and throw something under the house where the gun was later found. As this was the extent of the material evidence presented, the jury could have either believed Detective Pollard and found actual possession or believed Peters and found no possession. As in Linares, the conflicting versions of events (devoid of any evidence of dominion or control by Jones over the alleged location of the gun) make illogical any contention that, as a third alternative to actual possession or no possession, a jury might somehow find constructive possession by believing some (but not all) of Detective Pollard's testimony and some (but not all) of Peters's testimony. 25 The government doggedly insists, though, that it is at least theoretically plausible that the jury could have found constructive possession if it disbelieved all of Peters's testimony and believed some, but not all, of Detective Pollard's testimony. We think not. 26 In United States v. Garner, 21 a subsequent D.C. Circuit case relied on by the government and the district court, an officer testified that he looked through a darkly tinted car window and saw the defendant place a firearm under his seat. The trial court allowed the government to introduce 404(b) evidence of the defendant's prior firearm offense to prove the knowledge and intent elements of constructive possession in the event that the jury discredited as unreliable the officer's observations of the defendant's actual possession made through the heavily tinted window. 22 As in this case, the government primarily relied on the officer's testimony at trial, and the defendant argued on appeal that evidence of his prior crime was not relevant to his actual possession case. 27 In Garner, the appellate court affirmed, holding that, even though the government relied almost exclusively on the officer's testimony of the defendant's actual possession of the firearm, 28 . . . unlike in Linares, the trial evidence here, at the time the district court ruled on [the 404(b) evidence], did not force the jury to a disjunctive choice between actual possession or no possession at all. At the time the district court admitted [the 404(b) evidence], it could reasonably have believed the jury might discredit [the officer's] testimony (based on his observations through a tinted window and smoke-filled compartment) and nevertheless convict Garner based on the undisputed testimony that the gun was found under Garner's seat when the car was searched. In that event, the jury would have faced a paradigmatic constructive possession scenario in which contraband (here, a firearm) is found in proximity to a defendant who may or may not have been `knowingly in a position to, or [have] had the right to exercise dominion or control over the [contraband].' 23 29 The D.C. Circuit concluded that, without the officer's testimony, the key facts (a firearm found under passenger's seat) presented `a classic case for introducing prior instances of gun possession, since the government would otherwise find it extremely difficult to prove that the charged possession was knowing.' 24 30 Jones's case is similar to Garner's in some respects, but it differs from it in at least one crucial respect. If, in the instant case, the jury were to discredit Detective Pollard's observations of Jones's actual possession yet believe that the officer followed a fleeing Jones into the alley, the credited facts would present neither a paradigmatic constructive possession scenario (contraband found under defendant's seat in a car) nor a classic case for introducing 404(b) evidence. Instead, the jury would be left with the picture of a man walking, running, or standing next to a house that he did not own, rent, occupy, or otherwise exercise any dominion over, underneath which a gun just happened to be found. Without significantly more, such facts simply cannot support a finding of constructive possession. 31 This case shares some key factual elements with Linares and shares others with Garner, a pair of cases from the same court that produced opposite holdings on the question of the relevance of 404(b) evidence. Nevertheless, given the fundamental difference between the picture painted by the evidence here and those that emerge in the vast majority of constructive possession cases, we conclude that (1) Jones's was exclusively an actual possession case (albeit one based on circumstantial evidence), and (2) evidence of Jones's prior crime was not relevant to proving actual possession.