Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: whether the trial court erred in accepting the duplicate transcript of the 1964 trial as a true and correct copy and in allowing the prior testimony of unavailable witnesses to be read from the transcript.

Text: ¶ 229. Beckwith argues the trial court erred in authenticating the duplicate transcript of the 1964 trial as the official transcript of those proceedings. He relies on the affidavit of Hardy Lott, the sole surviving member of the 1964 defense team, who stated therein that the 1964 trial transcript was prepared by the court reporter as quickly as possible, and that it contained many errors, was an hastily prepared, error-filled transcript, and is replete with substantive errors and is not, in my opinion, sufficiently reliable for presentation to a jury. We find this argument lacks merit. ¶ 230. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides that the authentication or identification of a document for admission into evidence is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Beckwith has never alleged, including in his brief, that the duplicate transcript was not a true and correct copy of the original 1964 trial transcript. He relies instead on Rule 1003, which provides that a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original. Beckwith contends that Mr. Lott's affidavit raised such a question. ¶ 231. The record reflects that on November 19, 1990, the trial court heard the State's motion to authenticate the duplicate transcript as the official transcript of the 1964 proceedings. The court noted that the only appearance or response Beckwith made with regard to the State's motion was a motion for continuance of the hearing, which motion was denied and of which denial Beckwith was notified. The court granted the State's motion. During trial, when the State first sought to use the 1964 testimony of an unavailable witness, Betty Jean Ellington, the defense objected. Again, although the defense objected based on the attempted authentication of a transcript, no argument was made attacking the authenticity of the 1964 transcript. It was not until after the State rested its case-in-chief, when the defense moved for a directed verdict or a mistrial, that the defense called the court's attention to Mr. Lott's affidavit attacking the authenticity of the original 1964 transcript. We can hardly view this as a timely objection raising a genuine issue as to the authenticity of the original transcript. Furthermore, in Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313, 1321 (Miss. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 962, 113 S.Ct. 2936, 124 L.Ed.2d 685 (1993), we held that a witness' affidavit disputing the record was parole evidence which could not be used to impeach the verity of judicial records. We stated: [O]fficial records required by law to be kept, import verity. [Citations omitted]. They deal with and dispose of, property, liberty and lives of litigants. There must be an end and finality to such proceedings. To permit witnesses, years after the judicial acts have taken place, to give to triers of fact who might accept them, their oral opinions that... official records were not genuine, would produce utter chaos in judicial procedure... . [I]t would cut the throat of reason and knock the brains out of common sense. Cole, 608 So.2d at 1321 (quoting Entrekin v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 203 Miss. 767, 35 So.2d 305, 307 (1948)); see also Wright v. State, 577 So.2d 387, 390 (Miss. 1991) (describing trial transcripts as unimpeachable documentary evidence). We find that the defense's objection attacking the authenticity of the transcript was insufficient to raise a genuine issue as to authenticity of the original transcript, and thus the transcript was admissible under Rules 901 and 1003. ¶ 232. Beckwith also argues the transcript was inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(1), which requires that the party against whom the former testimony is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. Beckwith contends that due to the lack of discovery rules at the time, he had no meaningful opportunity in 1964 to develop the testimony of prosecution witnesses on cross-examination by use of impeachment material available to the 1994 defense counsel. ¶ 233. In the case of Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865, 870 (Miss. 1990), where the transcript of the unavailable witness' former testimony reflected extensive cross-examination, we affirmed the admission of the former testimony despite the defendant's argument that he was unable to crossexamine the witness on matters that surfaced after the first trial but before the second trial. Likewise, in the case sub judice, because the transcript of the former testimony of unavailable prosecution witnesses reflects extensive cross-examination, [t]he testimony comes before us bearing sufficient indicia of reliability that the values that have given rise to our hearsay rules have been more than satisfied. Mitchell, 572 So.2d at 870. The trial court did not err in admitting the former testimony of unavailable witnesses.