Opinion ID: 2394901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leg-irons

Text: Over the objection of counsel, Bowers was in leg-irons during the trial. The issue of leg-irons was discussed in chambers. The trial judge, the same one who presided at the earlier trial, said in ruling upon the issue: This matter was discussed in chambers and we are talking about the concern of defense counsel that Mr. Bowers is in leg-cuffs, which I suppose some would describe them as leg-irons, and someone else would describe them as leg-cuffs. I have received from the Sheriff's Office a memorandum concerning this, and what they are saying is that due to the serious nature of the charges, and Mr. Bowers' prior background, and specifically as it relates to this case he is considered by them an escape risk. They have instructed the court security personnel that they are to properly protect the Defendant and courtroom attendants, and they indicate that they feel that leg-cuffs should be required at all times, and that two officers be with the Defendant during transportation and inside the courtroom. I just point out that the Sheriff's Office is charged with courtroom security, and it is indicated by the counsel representing Mr. Bowers that he has been cooperative and in no way committed any act which would indicate that he presents a security risk. However, I am aware having been involved in the prior trial that there was some difficulty that occurred when he was incarcerated in Somerset County which resulted in his being transferred to the Department of Corrections, and that after he was confined at the Department of Corrections some difficulty occurred at that institution. This was while he was awaiting trial for the offense for which he has been convicted. I conclude that there is some basis for the concern of the Sheriff's Office, and even though maybe given the same set of facts and circumstances I might reach a different conclusion, nevertheless these individuals are charged with courtroom security, and I am not saying I would have made a different decision on the issue, but I am just saying it may be that given all the facts and circumstances I might have made a different decision. Nevertheless, I don't feel that I ought to second guess the individuals charged with security where there has been some prior indication of difficulty involving the Defendant. I also point out that if something does occur which would cause some action to be taken during the course of the hearing I think that would be much more prejudicial to Mr. Bowers than what has taken place in the beginning. I conclude, based on everything that has been presented to me, that the Sheriff's Office is not being unreasonable or arbitrary in their decision in this instance, and for that reason I feel that I should not countermand their direction to the court security people. So that motion is denied. The memorandum to which the trial judge referred was to court security personnel relative to this trial from the individual in the Sheriff's Department who commanded the Court/Civil Division. It read: Cpl. E.K. Thompson has been temporarily assigned to Court Security Section for duration of Bowers' trial. Due to serious nature of charges against Bowers and his prior background, he is to be considered an escape risk, and, you are directed to take steps to properly protect the Defendant and courtroom attendants. This may include leg cuffs at all times; two officers with Defendant during transportation and inside Courtroom; and any other means you may deem necessary. The trial judge in his sentencing report listed the prior record of Bowers, beginning with a juvenile conviction in 1966 on an assault and battery charge with a knife. It came down to 1976. There were no crimes of violence listed as that term is defined in Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, ง 413(g)(1). (The trial judge, of course, would have been aware, as we stated in Bowers, 298 Md. at 140, 468 A.2d at 114, that as an outgrowth of the incident now before the Court Bowers was convicted of kidnapping in the Circuit Court for Talbot County on April 7, 1982. This is defined as a crime of violence. That case was removed from Worcester County to Talbot County for trial. Bowers was sentenced to a term of thirty years from August 4, 1981.) Under institutional history the following was reported: Institutional History 9/26/75 Interfering with Fire Drill 24 hour lock-up 12/10/75 Refused to obey orders Creating Disturbance 1/9/76 Creating Disturbance 15 days Disrespectful to Officer loss of Loud and Abusive Language privileges 5/27/76 Assault on two prison guards (see prior record) Mr. Bowers has been considered a `management problem' throughout his institutional career. During his confinement in connection with the instant case, he has been involved in one disturbance in the jail which involved several other prisoners and required the assistance of the Town Police Department and the Maryland State Police to bring under control. He has also battered a fellow inmate and a jail employee. As a result of these acts, Mr. Bowers was transferred from the Somerset County jail to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections and placed in segregation (solitary confinement). The trial judge further reported relative to Other Significant Data About Defendant: It is significant that a report by his former probation officer, dated September 15, 1981, states that Mr. Bowers was a problem throughout his probation. The report described him as `an extremely sophisticated, street-wise individual who is also a very clever manipulator.' He has also displayed continuing dissatisfaction with all attorneys assigned to represent him in the instant case. He has refused to cooperate with counsel, has discharged counsel, and has filed voluminous pleadings pro se, with his attorney as `stand-by'.[ [1] ] His maneuverings caused the trial to be delayed several times. At Bowers' request the jury was asked on voir dire whether there [was] anyone on the panel who because [Bowers was in leg-cuffs] could not render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented at the hearing. There was no positive response. Bowers personally later requested that inquiry be made as to whether from [his] appearance in the leg-shackles, if any of the jurors would draw any inferences as to [his] character. Inquiry was made with the judge's specifying: We are referring to his reputation for being truthful, as well as his character as to peace and good order other than the matter for which he has been convicted. Only one juror said he would draw such inferences. He was excused. Bowers calls attention to the language of the Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970): Trying a defendant for a crime while he sits bound and gagged before the judge and jury would to an extent comply with that part of the Sixth Amendment's purposes that accords the defendant an opportunity to confront the witnesses at the trial. But even to contemplate such a technique, much less see it, arouses a feeling that no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort. Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, but the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold. 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S.Ct. at 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d at 359. Allen must be placed in the context that the case concerned a disruptive defendant and the Court's comment involved gagging in addition to shackling. Here we have only shackles. Among other things, the defendant had told the trial judge, after a warning: `There's not going to be no trial, either. I'm going to sit here and you're going to talk and you can bring your shackles out and straight jacket and put them on me and tape my mouth, but it will do no good because there's not going to be no trial.' 397 U.S. at 340, 90 S.Ct. at 1059, 25 L.Ed.2d at 357. In that case Allen was removed from the courtroom. According to the Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that a trial judge could never expel a defendant from his own trial and that the judge's ultimate remedy when faced with an obstreperous defendant like Allen who determines to make his trial impossible is to bind and gag him. 397 U.S. at 342, 90 S.Ct. at 1060, 25 L.Ed.2d at 358. Immediately before that which has been quoted by Bowers the Court said: The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. 397 U.S. at 343-44, 90 S.Ct. at 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d at 359. The Court concluded: We do not hold that removing this defendant from his own trial was the only way the Illinois judge could have constitutionally solved the problem he had. We do hold, however, that there is nothing whatever in this record to show that the judge did not act completely within his discretion. Deplorable as it is to remove a man from his own trial, even for a short time, we hold that the judge did not commit legal error in doing what he did. 397 U.S. at 347, 90 S.Ct. at 1062-63, 25 L.Ed.2d at 361. On the issue at hand see Annot. 90 A.L.R.3d 17 (1979). [2] III American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 1982) ง 15-3.1(c) states: Defendants and witnesses should not be subjected to physical restraint while in court unless the trial judge has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order. If the trial judge orders such restraint, the judge should enter into the record of the case the reasons therefor. Whenever physical restraint of a defendant or witness occurs in the presence of jurors trying the case, the judge should instruct those jurors that such restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt. The commentary pertaining to this standard states in relevant part: As stated, the Supreme Court did not rule out physical restraint. Nor, however, did the Court provide any guidelines for when such restraint might be used. Under prior state case law, the test for special restraint is whether it is `reasonably necessary to maintain order,' which is the language used in many cases. It emphasizes that restraint should be limited to that necessary to prevent anticipated harm. There is some authority that shackles are not to be used if the danger can be overcome by armed guards and that handcuffs are not to be used if less visible leg irons will suffice. The harm to be prevented is disorder from a variety of causes, and includes such risks as escape, interruption of proceedings, attack upon the defendant or witness by others, attack upon others by the defendant or witness, and self-destruction. It is most important that there be a record of the trial judge's action that affords a sound basis for appellate review. Further, the standard adopts the view that if a trial judge allows physical restraints to be used, the judge must state for the record the basis of the decision, and the record must support the trial judge's conclusions, either by way of the individual's conduct during trial or by way of evidence adduced out of the presence of the jury on the question of physical restraint. The hearing, although informal, makes it possible for the alleged facts justifying restraint to be made a matter of record and to be challenged by the party aggrieved. Id. at 15-81 to -83. The rules governing the imposition of physical restraint upon criminal defendants are said to be rooted in the English common law. For instance, People v. Duran, 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322 (1976), states: The rules governing the imposition of physical restraints upon criminal defendants find their origin in the English common law. Thus Blackstone wrote, `.. . though under an indictment of the highest nature, [the prisoner] must be brought to the bar without irons or any manner of shackles or bonds, unless there be evident danger of an escape, and then he may be secured with irons.' (4 Blackstone's Commentaries 322; see also 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 219, which reiterates Blackstone's observation and adds, `[b]ut note, at this day [prisoners] usually come with their shackles upon their legs, for fear of an escape, but stand at bar unbound, till they receive judgment'; 2 Bishop, New Commentaries on the Law of Pleading and Evidence and the Practice in Criminal Cases (2d ed. 1913) 955, which states that the prisoner should be unshackled in the courtroom so as to have `use of his reason, and all advantages, to clear his innocence' Krauskopf, Physical Restraint of the Defendant in the Courtroom (1971) 15 St. Louis U.L.J. 351.) 16 Cal.3d at 288, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 621-22, 545 P.2d at 1325-26. (Emphasis in original.) To similar effect see Martin v. State, 51 Ala.App. 405, 409, 286 So.2d 80, 84 (1973); State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 162, 206 A.2d 200, 202 (1965). Although factually both dissimilar and distinguishable from the case at bar, the parties both quote from Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). That case involved a defendant who, on the morning of his trial, asked a jail officer for his civilian clothes to wear at trial. No action was taken and he was obliged to stand trial in jail attire. The Court concluded its opinion by saying: [A]lthough the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. 425 U.S. at 512-13, 96 S.Ct. at 1697, 48 L.Ed.2d at 135. The Court opened its discussion of the issue before it by stating: The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 [95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103] (1975). The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Long ago this Court stated: `The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 [15 S.Ct. 394, 402, 39 L.Ed. 481] (1895). To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 [90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368] (1970). 425 U.S. at 503, 96 S.Ct. at 1692-93, 48 L.Ed.2d at 130. Other courts, when considering issues similar to that in the case at bar, have discussed the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 482, 484, 297 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1982); State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 366, 226 S.E.2d 353, 367 (1976). It is important to bear in mind that, unlike this case, in all but one of the cases which we have encountered discussing restraint, the issue has arisen in the context of a determination of guilt or innocence. In this case there is no presumption of innocence because Bowers was convicted at the earlier trial and we affirmed on appeal. He stands in the position of a convicted felon brought before a trial court for sentencing. He thus is unlike the ordinary defendant who at trial stands clothed with a presumption of innocence. The courts uniformly rely upon an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the action of trial judges in the matter of restraints, a standard noted in that portion of Allen which we have already quoted. See, e.g., Billups v. Garrison, 718 F.2d 665, 667 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 91, 83 L.Ed.2d 37 (1984); Woodard v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 222 (1st Cir.1982); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 107, 110 (6th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974); United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615, 433 F.2d 663 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 964, 28 L.Ed.2d 229 (1971); Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867, 89 S.Ct. 151, 21 L.Ed.2d 135, and 393 U.S. 869, 89 S.Ct. 156, 21 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968); Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir.1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 873, 72 S.Ct. 116, 96 L.Ed. 656 (1951); Martin v. State, 51 Ala.App. 405, 409, 286 So.2d 80, 84 (1973); State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 288, 670 P.2d 383, 393 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013, 104 S.Ct. 1017, 79 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984); People v. Duran, 16 Cal.3d 282, 291, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 624, 545 P.2d 1322, 1328 (1976); Elledge v. State, 408 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981, 103 S.Ct. 316, 74 L.Ed.2d 293 (1982); Collins, 164 Ga. App. at 485, 297 S.E.2d at 506; State v. Moen, 94 Idaho 477, 480, 491 P.2d 858, 861 (1971); State v. Daniel, 297 So.2d 417, 418 (La. 1974); State v. Stewart, 276 N.W.2d 51, 61 (Minn. 1979), quoting State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 389, 97 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1959); Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 476, 305 N.E.2d 830, 834 (1973); Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. at 164, 206 A.2d at 203; People v. Mendola, 2 N.Y.2d 270, 276, 159 N.Y.S.2d 473, 477, 140 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1957); State v. Billups, 301 N.C. 607, 611, 272 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1981); State v. Moore, 45 Or. App. 837, 839-40, 609 P.2d 866, 867 (1980); Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 306 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 794 (1978); State v. Simmons, 26 Wash. App. 917, 920, 614 P.2d 1316, 1317-18 (1980). On the issue of discretion Judge Winter explained for the Fourth Circuit in Samuel, 431 F.2d 610: It is [the trial judge] who is best equipped to decide the extent to which security measures should be adopted to prevent disruption of the trial, harm to those in the courtroom, escape of the accused, and the prevention of other crimes. E.g., Gregory v. United States, 365 F.2d 203 (8 Cir.1966); Guffey v. United States, 310 F.2d 753 (10 Cir.1962). As a discretionary matter, the district judge's decision with regard to measure[s] for security is subject to limited review to determine if it was abused. We stress that the discretion is that of the district judge. He may not, as is suggested at one part in the record before us, delegate that discretion to the Marshal. Of course, he should consult with the Marshal when other than ordinary security such as the general presence of guards in the courtroom is contemplated, and he may rely heavily on the Marshal's advice as to what may be required since it is the Marshal who has the experience in the keeping of prisoners and who must provide the guards and bear the major responsibility if untoward incidents occur. Unless the district judge's discretion is to be absolute and beyond review, the reasons for its exercise so as to require special security measures, must be disclosed in order that a reviewing court may determine if there was an abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299 (4 Cir. 1970). 431 F.2d at 615. Further explanation is found in Moen, 94 Idaho 477, 491 P.2d 858: Although the sheriff has some initial responsibility for determining whether an accused should be handcuffed during a jury trial, the trial judge must, in fulfilling his duty to preside over the trial, decide the question for himself. People v. Mendola, 2 N.Y.2d 270, 159 N.Y.S.2d 473, 140 N.E.2d 353 (1957); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 165 P.2d 389 (1946), rehearing denied, 63 Nev. 118, 167 P.2d 476 (1946). In exercising his discretion, the judge need not rely only upon evidence formally offered and admitted at trial. His knowledge may properly stem from official records or what law enforcement officers have told him. State v. McKay, supra . In addition, the trial court may take judicial notice of facts generally known within the limits of its jurisdiction. State v. McKay, supra ; Makley v. State, 49 Ohio App. 359, 197 N.E. 339 (1934). However, the information relied upon should be shown on the record before trial and out of the presence of the jury, and the defendant should be afforded reasonable opportunity to meet that information. 94 Idaho at 479-80, 491 P.2d at 860-61. Some courts, such as was the case in Woodard, 692 F.2d at 222, have seen as important the fact that the trial judge polled the jurors to determine whether any of them would be prejudiced by the fact that the defendant was under restraints. Other courts have referred to the fact that a cautionary instruction was given by the trial judge. See, e.g., Billups, 718 F.2d at 668; Brown, 364 Mass. at 477, 305 N.E.2d at 834. Many of the courts which have considered the matter have stated that in order to adopt security measures it is not necessary that the trial judge's decision be based upon activity at the time of trial. See, e.g., Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 111; Loux, 389 F.2d at 919-20; Martin, 51 Ala.App. at 410, 286 So.2d at 84-85; Stewart, 276 N.W.2d at 62; Simmons, 26 Wash. App. at 921, 614 P.2d at 1318. As the court put it in Stewart, a trial judge need not wait for some event to occur in the courtroom before imposing restraints. Leg-cuffs, shackling, or other restraints have been upheld in, among others, Billups, 718 F.2d at 669; Woodard, 692 F.2d at 222; Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 111-12; United States v. Samuel, 433 F.2d 663, 664 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 964, 28 L.Ed.2d 229 (1971); United States v. Thompson, 432 F.2d 997, 998 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 944, 91 S.Ct. 955, 28 L.Ed.2d 226 (1971); Loux, 389 F.2d at 920; Martin, 51 Ala.App. at 410, 286 So.2d at 85; Harding, 137 Ariz. at 288, 670 P.2d at 393; Elledge, 408 So.2d at 1023 (Fla.); Collins, 164 Ga. App. at 485, 297 S.E.2d at 506; Moen, 94 Idaho at 481, 491 P.2d at 862; Daniel, 297 So.2d at 418 (La.); Brown, 364 Mass. at 477, 305 N.E.2d at 835; Stewart, 276 N.W.2d at 63 (Minn.); Mendola, 2 N.Y.2d at 276, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 477, 140 N.E.2d at 356; State v. Woodard, 121 N.H. 970, 974, 437 A.2d 273, 275 (1981); Billups, 301 N.C. at 614, 272 S.E.2d at 848; Moore, 45 Or. App. at 840, 609 P.2d at 867; Freeman, 556 S.W.2d at 306 (Tex.); Simmons, 26 Wash. App. at 920, 614 P.2d at 1317-18. Illustrative of an application of discretion is the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Billups, 718 F.2d 665: Nor are we persuaded by appellant's argument that the record, when viewed as a whole, fails to justify his shackling. The record, as amplified by the discovery conducted in the habeas proceeding, reveals that the Sheriff's Department, which normally provides courtroom security in North Carolina, was, as trial judge Bruce found, shorthanded the week of the trial; that the additional uniformed, armed officers, who were either in the courtroom or adjacent to it in the courthouse, were assigned duties other than guarding Billups; that the courtroom design made it an unsecure area; and that Billups posed more than an average escape risk. Finally, the record reveals that the jurors observed Billups in shackles at most one time, that Judge Bruce issued appropriate cautionary instructions to ensure that Billups would not be prejudiced by that fact, and that steps were taken to ensure that during trial the jurors would not see Billups in shackles. 718 F.2d at 668-69. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 226 S.E.2d 353, is also instructive: [I]n addition to the uncontroverted fact of defendant's prior escape attempt, the court, in making its decision, also had before it the facts that defendant was a twenty-five-year-old male, in apparent good health and physical condition, who was charged with two rapes, and that the sheriff, charged with the custody of defendant during the trial, was of the opinion that shackles were necessary. Furthermore, although it is possible, as defendant suggests, that any necessary security precautions might have been accomplished by the use of armed guards rather than shackles, the record reflects that defense counsel at no time suggested any such alternative measures. In fact, the need for shackles as opposed to some less restrictive means of security was not controverted. 290 N.C. at 370, 226 S.E.2d at 369. Elledge, 408 So.2d 1021 (Fla.), is the only case we encountered where the shackling to which objection was made was at a sentencing proceeding. In that case the original death sentence had been vacated by the Supreme Court of Florida and the case remanded for sentencing as in the case at bar. The Supreme Court of Florida said: Appellant asserts that his appearance before the sentencing jury in leg irons led to prejudice in the jury's mind. Cases which concern such prejudice deal with the adverse effects that such restraints have upon the accused's presumption of innocence. See Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974). But appellant did not stand before the sentencing jury as an innocent man; rather he stood as a confessed murderer of three persons. The critical issue in a restraint case is the degree of prejudice caused by the restraints. Here, we can find very little prejudice since the appellant was an avowed dangerous individual. See United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556, 557 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, [93 S.Ct. 2166] 36 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973). Second such restraints are within the sound discretion of the court, and the record indicates the judge had information that the appellant had threatened to attack his bailiff. Elledge through his confessed acts had proven himself a man of his word when violence was threatened, so we would be hard pressed to find the trial court abused its discretion in taking such precautions. 408 So.2d at 1022-23. This case is unlike Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 206 A.2d 200. There the trial judge indicated that because the sheriff had asked for shackling he had to do it. One of the cases relied upon by Bowers is Commonwealth v. DeVasto, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 363, 387 N.E.2d 1169 (1979). The trial judge there was found to have placed inordinate consideration on two newspaper accounts of the alleged incident.... There [was] no indication that the judge sought the recommendation of any official charged with the custody of the prisoner as to what security measures might be necessary.... The record show[ed] no inquiry by the judge into the crucial issue whether any risk existed that the defendant might attempt to escape during trial. 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 366, 387 N.E.2d at 1172. Numerous other cases are cited by one side or the other but we find them generally inapplicable. We do not regard the fact that no shackling took place at the first trial as controlling, notwithstanding that some of the conduct upon which the trial judge relied in making his decision took place prior to that trial. No request was made for shackling at that trial. At the time of that trial there had been no decision by this Court upholding the conviction of murder. What we have here is a case of mature reflection based upon somewhat different conditions prompting a different view of what might be necessary. Code (1957) Art. 87, ง 45, unchanged since its enactment by Ch. 62, ง 5 of the Acts of 1801, provides, The sheriff shall safely keep all persons committed to his custody by lawful authority until such persons are discharged by due course of law. The sheriff was vested with responsibility here. In the course of the discharge of his responsibilities his office made a decision for recommendation to the trial judge. The trial judge had before him an individual whose convictions for first degree murder and kidnapping had each been affirmed on appeal. He did not appear garbed with a presumption of innocence but as a convicted felon awaiting sentence. As the judge's sentencing report makes clear, he was aware of previous institutional difficulty with Bowers and of problems in Bowers' personality as reflected by the judge's own observations at trial and that which was said by the probation officer. Although we would prefer the bases for the judge's conclusions to have been somewhat more explicitly stated, we believe it plain that the trial judge exercised his discretion in determining that leg irons should be on Bowers during the time of trial and he was not influenced solely by the recommendation of the sheriff. We find no abuse of discretion. We see yet another reason for an affirmance on this issue and that is that prejudice has not been shown. In cases such as Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 190-97, 246 A.2d 568, 573-76 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948, 89 S.Ct. 1284, 22 L.Ed.2d 482 (1969), and Seidman v. State, 230 Md. 305, 323-25, 187 A.2d 109, 120-21 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807, 83 S.Ct. 1696, 10 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1963), we have found voir dire adequate to screen out any prejudice caused by pretrial publicity in the area from which the jury was drawn. If adequate for that, it certainly should be adequate for selection of a jury untainted with prejudice because of a defendant's shackling. Only one juror indicated that shackling would influence him and that juror was excused.