Opinion ID: 1837273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actions of the Dispatcher

Text: Swan argues that the actions of the dispatcher for the Hueytown Police Department in using the NCIC database caused his unlawful arrest. We must determine (1) whether the dispatcher is a peace officer within the meaning of § 6-5-338 and, (2) if so, whether the dispatcher was engaged in arresting or attempting to arrest a person when he ran the NCIC check, communicated to Officer Williams that the check indicated a possible positive warrant, telephoned the City of Birmingham to confirm the existence of the warrant, and again communicated to Officer Williams that there were two outstanding warrants for Michael Swann. Swan does not dispute that the police dispatcher is a peace officer as contemplated by § 6-5-338. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal we assume that the police dispatcher in this case is a peace officer. See generally Howard v. City of Atmore, supra (a sworn law-enforcement officer who was serving as a jailer/dispatcher while recuperating from surgery was a peace officer within the meaning of § 6-5-338); see also Houston County Comm'n v. Hart, 477 So.2d 321, 322 (Ala.1985)(a dispatcher is a trained law-enforcement officer and thus entitled to the minimum starting salary for all county law-enforcement officers). Swan does not, however, address the dispositive question under Cranman: whether the dispatcher was engaged in arresting or attempting to arrest a person. Officer Williams's uncontradicted testimony is that the dispatcher's actions in receiving from Officer Williams the information necessary to run the NCIC check, running the NCIC check, communicating with Officer Williams as to whether there was a possible positive warrant, telephoning the city that issued the warrant to confirm the existence of the warrant, and again communicating to Officer Williams whether there was an outstanding warrant, are a routine part of making an arrest. Had Officer Williams had all of the information gathered by the dispatcher at hand, or had the dispatcher been another officer on the scene providing the information, no one would argue that the dispatcher's actions were not part and parcel of the arrest. Therefore, we conclude that the dispatcher in performing the duties summarized above was arresting or attempting to arrest a person and that he is, under the Cranman standard, entitled to State-agent immunity. Swan does not address the foregoing clear language of the Cranman standard. Instead, he dissects the arrest and argues that the dispatcher employed by the Hueytown Police Department failed to compare the information provided in the NCIC check with the information provided by Officer Williams. Citing City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785 So.2d 1128 (Ala. 2000), Swan argues that the dispatcher was engaged in an administrative duty [5] and thus not exercising the type of judgment that would entitle the dispatcher and hence Hueytown to immunity. [6] The Bayou La Batre case on which Swan relies is not, however, an arrest case. In Bayou La Batre, this Court held that the magistrate, when she faxed a warrant-recall order to the police department upside down so that the police department received a blank page, was performing an administrative duty that did not involve the exercise of judgment. 785 So.2d at 1133. In so holding, we noted that a magistrate is an official whose duties are a blend of judicial and administrative duties and that in faxing the recall order the magistrate was engaged in an administrative duty. In this case, the dispatcher performed the following law-enforcement duties: he received the information from Officer Williams necessary to run the NCIC check; he ran the NCIC check; he communicated to Officer Williams that there was a possible positive warrant; he telephoned to confirm the existence of the warrant, which necessarily required the relaying of certain information from the NCIC check; and he communicated to Officer Williams that two outstanding warrants had been confirmed. Breaking discretionary actions into increasingly minute ministerial components circumvents the intention of Article I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901. [7] In this case, however, even if we were to break the arrest into component tasks as Swan would have us do, we would conclude that the dispatcher was exercising discretion. [8]