Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Bad Acts Testimony Was Alleged with Sufficient Specificity, or Whether the State Produced Any Actual Evidence in Support Thereof.

Text: 1. ¶ 64. As stated above, Rule 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ¶ 65. Kolberg now argues Laurel's testimony was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b) because, he asserts, the evidence only proved that Madison fell and got scraped twice. Kolberg relies on Cardwell v. State, 461 So.2d 754 (Miss. 1984), Darby v. State, 538 So.2d 1168 (Miss.1989), and United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978), to support his argument that prior to admitting the prior acts of child abuse by a defendant the prosecution must first affirmatively prove the defendant actually committed the prior offense. Kolberg further alleges that the only evidence in this case was that offered by himself, which evidence revealed only accidental injuries suffered by Madison. Accordingly, Kolberg concludes this evidence was improperly before the jury. ¶ 66. In Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss.1985), we were confronted with an appeal by a mother who was convicted of killing her infant child. She raised, as one point of error, the admission of testimony regarding old injuries which did not cause the child's death and she claimed might not have been attributable to her. Id. at 1142. We referred to our previous decision in Cardwell and said: The [ Cardwell ] Court cited Aldridge v. State, 398 So.2d 1308 (Miss.1981), which was a child abuse case where there was testimony and x-rays by medical experts concerning injuries of the child which tended to establish previous abuse. The Court noted that in Aldridge it was held that evidence of prior acts was admissible in a felonious child abuse case to negate the idea that the injuries resulted from an isolated accident. The Cardwell Court concluded that such evidence was likewise admissible where death results and the prosecution is one for murder. Id. at 759, 760 (citations omitted). The Court did point out that the admissibility is subject to proof demonstrating that the defendant committed the prior offense. Id. at 760. One of the cases cited for this proposition is United States v. Colvin, 614 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.1980). In that case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said that such proof was a predicate to the determination that the extrinsic evidence is relevant. 614 F.2d at 45. That court went on to determine that a sufficient predicate had been laid in light of the evidence that showed the appellant was in exclusive control of the children prior to the time the injuries occurred and in light of the expert medical testimony contradicting her version of accidental causes. Johnson, 475 So.2d at 1143 (emphasis added). ¶ 67. This is precisely what happened in the present case. Kolberg's theory was that he had no idea what happened to Madison. He tried to convince the jury that it must have been an accident. The State introduced evidence of unexplained bruises that appeared on Madison's body when she was in the exclusive control of Kolberg. According to Laurel's testimony, Madison never had unexplained bruises prior to the time Kolberg lived in the home with them. Accordingly, this evidence was properly admitted under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) and Miss. R. Evid. 403, and this assignment of error is therefore without merit.