Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Open Courts

Text: Allegations of conspiracy among government agencies that must often work in secret inevitably implicate a lot of classified material that cannot be introduced into the public record. Allowing Arar's claims to proceed would very likely mean that some documents or information sought by Arar would be redacted, reviewed in camera, and otherwise concealed from the public. Concealment does not bespeak wrongdoing: in such matters, it is just as important to conceal what has not been done. Nevertheless, these measures would excite suspicion and speculation as to the true nature and depth of the supposed conspiracy, and as to the scope and depth of judicial oversight. Indeed, after an inquiry at oral argument as to whether classified materials relating to Arar's claims could be made available for review in camera, Arar objected to the supplementation of the record with material he could not see. See Letter from David Cole, Counsel for Maher Arar (Dec. 23, 2008). After pointing out that such materials are unnecessary to the adjudication of a motion on the pleadings (where the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true), Arar protested that any materials submitted ex parte and in camera would not be subject to adversarial testing and that consideration of such documents would be presumptively unconstitutional since they would result in a decision on the basis of secret information available to only one side of the dispute. The court's reliance on information that cannot be introduced into the public record is likely to be a common feature of any Bivens actions arising in the context of alleged extraordinary rendition. This should provoke hesitation, given the strong preference in the Anglo-American legal tradition for open court proceedings, a value incorporated into modern First and Sixth Amendment law. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to a  public trial (emphasis added)); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that the First Amendment secures a right of access to civil proceedings). The risk of limiting access, of course, is that where a proceeding has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). [T]he appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe proceedings. Id. at 572, 100 S.Ct. 2814. People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. Id. This is especially true in the courts, where the guarantee of a public trial has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). Granted, there are circumstances in which a court may close proceedings to which a public right of access presumptively attaches. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984); United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 199-200 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 127-28 (2d Cir.1995). And the problems posed by the need to consider classified material are unavoidable in some criminal prosecutions and in other cases where we have a duty, imposed by Congress, to exercise jurisdiction. But this is not such a circumstance or such a case. The preference for open rather than clandestine court proceedings is a special factor that counsels hesitation in extending Bivens to the extraordinary rendition context.