Opinion ID: 2628160
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Closeness of connection of means to the state's interest in public safety

Text: Finally, we determine whether [ASORA] appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. [133] In analyzing this factor the Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of individuals subject to ASORA and the breadth of its dissemination provision; it determined that ASORA makes information as to all sex offenders . . . available without any restriction and without any regard to whether the individual poses any future risk. [134] The Ninth Circuit consequently concluded that ASORA's non-punitive purpose, while of unquestioned importance, does not serve to render a statute that is so broad and sweeping non-punitive. [135] The Supreme Court also addressed the scope and magnitude of ASORA's registration requirements and its dissemination provision, but concluded that ASORA is not excessive in relation to the state's interest in public safety. [136] In so deciding it determined that [t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences, [137] and that the duration of ASORA's reporting requirements and what the Court called ASORA's passive notification system are not so excessive as to be effectively penal. [138] The Court stated that the excessiveness inquiry is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective. [139] As the legislature found when enacting ASORA, protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest. [140] The state certainly has a valid interest in addressing not just the egregious and highly publicized crimes that gave rise to the Megan's Law movement, [141] but also other crimes of which the risk of repetition and grave harm is sufficiently predictable to justify the protections afforded by ASORA. But in the context of our ex post facto inquiry, we have an obligation to determine whether the means chosen to carry out legitimate purposes are excessive, i.e., not close enough to be classified as non-penal. We use means here to include the scope of the statute and the obligations it imposes on those subject to it and what the state can or must do in enforcing it. It is significant that ASORA's scope is broad; it encompasses a wide array of crimes that vary greatly in severity. [142] Moreover, ASORA provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the state or a court for relief from the obligations of continued registration and disclosure. [143] Offenders cannot shorten their registration or notification period, even on the clearest determination of rehabilitation or conclusive proof of physical incapacitation. [144] Doe successfully completed a treatment program and was granted early release from mandatory parole. A superior court granted him legal custody of his minor daughter based on its determination that he was successfully rehabilitated and posed a very low risk of re-offending. [145] Despite this evidence of rehabilitation, ASORA requires Doe to register quarterly and requires the state to publicly disseminate his personal information for the rest of his life. [146] Under ex post facto analysis we further conclude that the statute's chosen means are excessive in relation to the statute's purpose because the statute is also underinclusive. As we discussed in Part III.C.5, ASORA only applies to those convicted of specified offenses. [147] It therefore excludes from its requirements individuals who may have committed the same acts and may pose threats to the public but who avoided conviction by pleading to a lesser charge or whose convictions were overturned. We do not mean to suggest that making the statute more inclusive would necessarily resolve ex post facto issues or that such changes would otherwise be constitutionally unobjectionable, but we point to this feature to illustrate that ASORA has a punitive effect. ASORA also imposes obligations that, for ex post facto purposes, are excessive in relation to the state's legitimate public safety interest. It is significant that the registration and re-registration requirements are demanding and intrusive [148] and are of long duration. [149] Finally, the provisions authorizing or requiring the state to disseminate the information are sweeping. ASORA is much broader than the Connecticut statute that authorizes courts to order the state to restrict dissemination if the court finds that dissemination is not required for public safety and that publication of the information would likely reveal the identity of the victim. [150] ASORA is much closer to the Kansas statute struck down on ex post facto grounds by the Kansas Supreme Court because of its unrestricted public access . . . [that] goes beyond that necessary to promote public safety. [151] We are not balancing the rights of sex offenders against the rights of their victims. [152] Rather, we are determining for ex post facto purposes whether the means chosen to protect the public have consequences to sex offenders that significantly go beyond the state's valid interest in public safety, and exclude individuals who may pose equivalent threats to public safety. Some sex offender registration statutes employ means that have been held to relate rationally and closely enough to the state's interest in public safety. For example, the Second Circuit concluded that the notification policy adopted by the Connecticut Office of Adult Probation was not excessive in relation to its purpose of enhancing public awareness and helping to prevent the recovering offender from harmful relapses. [153] Connecticut allows certain sex offenders convicted between October 1, 1988 and June 30, 1999 to petition the court to order the Department of Public Safety to restrict the dissemination of the registration information to law enforcement purposes only and to not make such information available for public access. [154] Connecticut also provides certain sex offenders the possibility of avoiding registration and dissemination upon a judicial determination that registration or public dissemination is not required for public safety. [155] A statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance. [156] Although the non-punitive aims are undeniably legitimate and important, ASORA's registration and dissemination provisions have consequences to sex offenders that go beyond the state's interest in public safety; we must therefore conclude that the Alaska statute is excessive in relation to the state's interest in public safety.