Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Preserve 106(1) for Appeal

Text: 17 106(1) restricts the use of unexpended campaign contributions by providing a list of approved organizations and causes to which such funds may be distributed after a campaign ends. In pertinent part, the statute provides that unexpended campaign contributions to a candidate committee may be: 18 (A) Contributed to a political party; 19 (B) Contributed to a candidate committee established by the same candidate for a different public office, subject to the limitations set forth in section 1-45-105.3(4)(b) and (c), if the candidate committee making such a contribution is affirmatively closed by the candidate no later than ten days after the date such a contribution is made; 20 (C) Donated to a charitable organization recognized by the internal revenue service; 21 (D) Returned to the contributors, or retained by the committee for use by the candidate in a subsequent campaign. 22 (II) In no event shall contributions to a candidate committee be used for personal purposes not reasonably related to supporting the election of the candidate. 23 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-106(1)(a) (2000), as amended by H.B. 00-1194 (emphasis added). In addition to the uses described above: 24 [A] person elected to a public office may use unexpended campaign contributions held by the person's candidate committee for any of the following purposes: 25 (I) Voter registration; 26 (II) Political issue education, which includes obtaining information from or providing information to the electorate; 27 (III) Postsecondary educational scholarships; 28 (IV) To defray reasonable and necessary expenses related to mailings and similar communications to constituents; 29 (V) Any expenses that are directly related to such person's official duties 30 . . . . . 31 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-106(1)(b) (2000), as amended by H.B. 00-1194 (emphasis added). 32 Of the four cases below, only the plaintiffs from No. 97-S-2973 -- the Durham Plaintiffs -- challenged 106(1). 2 J.A. 356-57, at 168-79 (Am. Compl. by Durham et al., Claim XIV, July 23, 1997). Specifically, they take issue with the portion of the statute that prohibits the donation of unexpended campaign contributions to charitable organizations not recognized by the Internal Revenue Service, Durham/CRC et al. Br. at 77-78 (Dec. 15, 1999); Durham/CRC et al. Reply Br. at 18-19 (Jan. 28, 2000), arguing that the restriction infringes on First Amendment freedoms. Because Plaintiffs have failed to preserve the issue for appeal, we have no jurisdiction to reach the merits of this claim. 33 On February 5, 1998, the district court dismissed Durham Plaintiff Phil Pankey, a Colorado State Senator, from all claims in this civil action except the following: (1) Panckey's [sic] claim is limited to the carryover provision contained in Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-106(2) (1997). 8 J.A. 1876, at 2. Of the thirteen original Durham Plaintiffs, only Senator Pankey had standing to challenge 106(1). Thus, the district court's dismissal of Pankey's 106(1) claim effectively terminated the claim in its entirety. 34 Accordingly, the district court never decided the 106(1) challenge on the merits. Indeed, the court's first and last reference to 106(1) after it dismissed the claim in February 1998 was in a footnote to its final order in August 1999. 35 Although Plaintiff Panckey [sic] continued to argue his Claim XIV in Civil Action 96-S-2973, challenging the regulation of unexpended campaign contributions set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-106(1), the court's records reflect that Plaintiff Panckey's [sic] only remaining claim is Claim XV in Civil Action 96-S-2973, wherein he challenges the carryover provision contained in Colo. Rev. Stat. 106(2). (Court's Order dated February 5, 1998). 5 36 Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Buckley, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 n.2 (1999) [CRGS-PAC v. Buckley]. 37 In their brief to this court, the Durham Plaintiffs suggest that the 106(1) claim was never dismissed: the court without explanation concluded that the challenge to 106(1) had been dismissed. Durham/CRC et al. Br. at 11 (Dec. 15, 1999) (citing CRGS-PAC v. Buckley, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 n.2). In fact, the record indicates that not only was the claim dismissed, but that Plaintiffs actually consented to the dismissal in open court: 38 Court: Mr. Pankey is staying in then as candidate/candidate committee only for the purposes of challenging the carryover provision which is what? 39 Counsel: 106. 40 Court: 106(2). Unexpended campaign contributions. 41 Counsel: Your Honor, and also for 104, contributions that he can accept. 42 15 J.A. 3422 (Tr. of Hr'g on Mot. for Summ. J., Jan. 30, 1998); see also 8 J.A. 1875-76 (Order, Feb. 5, 1998) (incorporat[ing] by reference [the] conclusions and rulings made in open court on January 30, 1998 and February 4, 1998 and dismissing Senator Pankey's 106(1) claim). Ordinarily, a party may not appeal from a consent judgment. Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 526 (10th Cir. 1992). 43 We recognize that this case involved a massive number of claims and parties, and that what appears to be consent on paper may in fact have been confusion. But even if we allow Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt as to whether they consented to the dismissal of their 106(1) challenge, we cannot ignore the fact that neither their notice of appeal nor their docketing statement referenced or attached the district court's order dated February 5, 1998. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1); cf. Trotter v. Regents of Univ. of New Mexico, 219 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000). We therefore decline to address the 106(1) claim. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (holding that the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) are jurisdictional); Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1347 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that courts must consider jurisdictional issues sua sponte, even in the absence of briefing or argument) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 537 (1978)).