Opinion ID: 2286297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondent's Due Process Challenge

Text: Respondent argues that he was denied due process in that the hearing was held in his absence in spite of his known medical condition which precluded his attendance. Thus, he contends, he was deprived of a fair hearing and the right to confront and cross examine the witnesses against him. Bar Counsel responds that respondent had an opportunity to appear and contest the charges and to have the case continued a second time, if he provided evidence of the alleged disabling condition which precluded his attendance. The `right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951)). Fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an adequate opportunity to appear and contest charges. Id. (citations omitted); In re Shieh, 738 A.2d 814, 816-17 (D.C. 1999); Jerome Mgmt. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 682 A.2d 178, 183 (D.C.1996). While respondent disputes the circumstances surrounding the process server's unsuccessful efforts to serve him initially, he does not dispute that the process server served him with a copy of the petition and Specification of Charges on March 12, 1999. His due process challenge centers upon the denial of his request for a continuance of the hearing which proceeded in his absence. We consider, therefore, the factors underlying the Board's decision denying respondent's request for a continuance. The record demonstrates, as the Board and the Hearing Committee concluded, extensive efforts by the Hearing Committee, Bar Counsel and the Board to assure that respondent had an opportunity to be heard. After successfully avoiding service for several months, respondent requested and was granted a continuance of the first hearing date, which had been scheduled for May 17, 1999. [1] Although the Board had issued an order requiring that any motion for continuance be supported by an affidavit attesting to respondent's condition, respondent did not file such an affidavit with his request for a continuance of the May hearing. Instead, he sent a letter indicating only that his condition required a continuance and that he had an appointment for re-evaluation with his physician on May 11th and an MRI set for May 13th. Nevertheless, the Board continued the hearing until June 30th with the proviso for no further continuances without the consent of Bar Counsel or the court determination that respondent was unable to attend. Respondent did not present evidence or an affidavit, as required by the earlier Order, that he was unable to participate in the hearing on June 30th because of medical reasons. Neither respondent's letter nor the attached statement from his physician indicated that he was suffering from a condition which precluded him from participating in the hearing. As the Hearing Committee noted, respondent was able to travel to London on July 3, 1999, within days of the hearing in this disciplinary case. Since the Chair, Bar Counsel and the Board had made persistent efforts to provide respondent with an opportunity to provide evidence of his claimed illness, and respondent had failed to do so, and in light of a record showing that respondent had avoided at every turn proceeding with this matter, the Board concluded that denial of the continuance request was warranted and that proceeding with the hearing was not a denial of due process. [2] We agree. In the due process context, an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time does not mean only at such time as one party finds it to be convenient. Consistent with due process, a tribunal may deny a request for continuance of a hearing, having considered various factors, including, inter alia, any lack of good faith and prejudice to the opposing party. See Daley v. United States, 739 A.2d 814, 817 (D.C.1999) (citations omitted). The decision to deny respondent's request for continuance is well supported by the record which shows that respondent had notice of the hearing and was given several opportunities to respond and participate; that he consistently sought to avoid participating in the proceedings; and that he failed to provide the requisite support for his claim of a disabling condition which prevented his participation in the proceedings. [3] As the Hearing Committee noted in this case, another continuance would have served no useful purpose for Asher and would have been detrimental to the public interest. There was ample basis to conclude that respondent absented himself voluntarily and for the purpose of avoiding the proceeding. Such a voluntary absence does not deny due process, and the administrative tribunal may require the hearing to go forward under such circumstances. See In re Herndon, 596 A.2d 592, 597 (D.C.1991). We find no abuse of discretion in its ruling in this regard. See Kimes v. United States, 569 A.2d 104, 109 (D.C. 1989) (whether constitutional right is at issue or not, the question of whether there was an abuse of discretion in ordering trial in absence of a defendant remains).