Opinion ID: 2549383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Single Subject of I-776

Text: The first step in the article II, section 19 analysis is to determine whether Pierce County has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that I-776 violates the single-subject requirement. An initiative embraces a single subject if its parts are rationally related to one another. Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co., 69 Wash.2d 392, 404, 418 P.2d 443 (1966) (holding that [t]he relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating, fire loss, fire prevention, and fire investigation is rational and reasonable); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash.2d 275, 290, 517 P.2d 911 (concluding that a half dozen subtopics, ranging from regulation of lobbyists to inspection of public records, were reasonably related, thus satisfying the nexus requirements of the `rational unity' test), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902, 94 S.Ct. 2596, 41 L.Ed.2d 308 (1974); Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wash.2d 622, 639, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) (determining that a ban on trapping animals with certain body-gripping traps was rationally related or germane to a ban on killing animals with certain pesticides). [3] The State maintains that the sole subject of I-776 is the placement of a $30 ceiling on state and local government fees that citizens must pay to license their cars and light trucks. The State asserts that the 11 sections of I-776 are rationally related to that subject: Section 1: Policies and Purposes Section 2: Requiring License Tab Fees to Not Exceed $30 Per Year for Motor Vehicles (pertaining to cars, sport utility vehicles, motorcycles, and motor homes) Section 3: Requiring License Tab Fees to Not Exceed $30 Per Year for Light Trucks ... (amending fee schedule set forth in RCW 46.16.070) [Sections 4-5: Actions of the 2002 legislature made these sections, pertaining to RCW 35.58.273, unnecessary.] Section 6: Repealing the Local Motor Vehicle Excise Tax [MVET] (repealing authority of certain transit agencies to impose MVET under RCW 81.104.160, the statute under which Sound Transit levied MVET and thereby increased car tab fees) Section 7: Legislative Intent Relating to Outstanding Bonds Section 8: Repealing the Local Option Vehicle License Fee (repealing local option vehicle license fee previously authorized by RCW 82.80.020, under which Pierce and King Counties levied vehicle license fees) Section 9: Construction Clause (mandating liberal construction of act) Section 10: Severability Clause Section 11: Legislative Intent CP at 370-73. The superior court found that sections 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 were the operative and relevant sections and that all were germane to the single general subject of ... limiting the amount of state and local government charges that motor vehicle owners must pay upon the registration or renewed registration of a vehicle. CP at 1728-29 (emphasis added). The superior court then considered whether sections 1 and 7 were precatory or mandatory  that is whether they [were] policy expressions of no consequence or legally enforceable obligations. [4] Agreeing with the State and Sound Transit that sections 1 and 7 were pure policy expressions, CP at 1733, the superior court acknowledged that this court has not addressed the question of whether a precatory provision within an initiative can introduce a second subject. CP at 1734. The superior court implicitly answered that legal question in the affirmative and went on to conclude that one sentence in section 1 (the 8th of its 11 sentences) [5] and all three sentences in section 7 ( see Appendix B attached) introduce a separate subject into the body of the Initiative, violating the single-subject rule. CP at 1735. The court observed that the eighth sentence in section 1 calls for the re-submission of changes to transportation plans and programs to the voters, [6] but the court acknowledged that, while the four sentences express the people's wish for [a] re-vote on existing transit projects or a re-vote on future funding for transit, CP at 1736, section 1 refers to no statute or mechanism for putting such a wish into action, nor does anything in sections 1 or 7 legally bind Sound Transit to repay bonds early or to conduct a revote on light rail. CP at 1733. In fact, as the superior court noted, the State and Salish agreed at oral argument that Sound Transit was entitled to a declaratory judgment order stating that I-776 creates no legally binding obligations on Sound Transit to repay bonds early or conduct a re-vote on light rail. CP at 1731. On this issue of first impression, we reject the superior court's implicit conclusion and hold instead that policy expressions in a bill or initiative measure do not contribute additional subjects within the meaning of article II, section 19. [7] Permitting pure policy statements to yield additional subjects for article II, section 19 analysis is contrary to the constitutional provision's long-acknowledged purpose of prohibiting logrolling, the aggregate passage of two or more unrelated bills in a single vote or election. The constitutional prohibition against legislative vote swapping plainly applies to the passage of two or more unrelated laws  not to the passage of one law that contains policy expressions indisputably devoid of any legal effect. Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 212, 11 P.3d 762 (emphasis added). The dissent proclaims that, [f]or the exact reasons laid out by this court in Power, Inc., article II, section 19 prohibits combining a mandatory subject with an unrelated nonmandatory one. Dissent at 653. But, as was pointed out above, the court in Power defined the combination of an appropriation bill and a corporation income tax bill  two measures with legal effect  as the clearest possible illustration of what article II, section 19 was designed to prevent. 39 Wash.2d at 198-99, 235 P.2d 173. The dissent has, in fact, cited no case in which article II, section 19 has invalidated a piece of legislation on the grounds that its legally binding provisions were accompanied by policy expressions. Rather, the dissent demonstrates that Washington law has consistently viewed the term subject in article II, section 19 as referring to laws, measures with legal effect. See dissent at 653 (stating that [o]ur constitution protects voters `from having to vote for a law that they do not favor in order to obtain a law which they do' (quoting Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 191, 11 P.3d 762)); dissent at 653 (citing Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wash.2d 520, 523, 304 P.2d 676 (1956) (invalidating under article II, section 19 legislation that empower[ed] a state agency to establish and operate all toll roads and simultaneously provide[d] for the construction of a specific toll road)). The distinction between a proposed measure's legal substance and its policy fluff was tersely drawn in an early opinion of this court: A law is a rule of action. An argument is not.... [A] preface or preamble stating the motives and inducement to the making of [the law] .... is without force in a legislative sense.... It is no part of the law. State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court for Thurston County, 92 Wash. 16, 30-32, 159 P. 92 (1916). Just as the common inclusion of dicta in judicial opinions does not compromise the legal effect of a decision, [8] policy expressions in a bill or initiative are no part of the law. Because I-776's rule of action was $30 license tabs and because its policy statements were no part of the law, [9] I-776 did not embrace two unrelated laws or enactments. Its operative and relevant sections, as the superior court termed them, were all rationally related to the enactment of a $30 ceiling on license tab fees, and that enactment was not paired with a second bill or measure mandating a revote on light rail. CP at 1728. Allowing initiative opponents to extract additional subjects from an initiative's pure policy expressions  expressions that, by their very nature, are expansive and rhetorical  would not only be contrary to the aim of article II, section 19, but would undermine all but the most tightly worded initiative. Moreover, it would require courts to explain why some policy expressions are subjects and others are not. To take an extreme example at hand, the I-776 drafters twice insist in section 1 that [p]oliticians should keep their promises, thus introducing the topic of politicians' fidelity to their word. CP at 19. While the drafters of the initiative may well have wished to require politicians to keep their promises, the initiative provides no statute or mechanism for bringing about such a utopian notion. In that respect, the precatory language encouraging politicians to keep their promises is no different from the urging of a revote on the changes to previously approved transit plans; both remain items on the drafters' wish list. Our decision today reaffirms the purpose of the constitutional prohibition against passing separate laws in a single vote or election and forecloses the possibility that a bill or initiative could be declared unconstitutional solely on the grounds that its policy expressions raise other topics. Having determined that precatory language cannot yield additional subjects for article II, section 19 purposes, we conclude that Pierce County has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that I-776 required the people to cast a single vote on two unrelated, proposed laws. b. The Constitutional Adequacy of the Ballot Title of I-776 Having determined that I-776 has only one subject (limiting license tab fees on cars and light trucks), this court must consider the second requirement of article II, section 19  that the subject be expressed in the ballot title. Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash.2d at 555, 901 P.2d 1028. To be constitutionally adequate, the title need not be an index to the contents, nor must it provide details of the measure. Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 217, 11 P.3d 762. It satisfies the constitutional requirement if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law. YMCA v. State, 62 Wash.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963). As with the single-subject requirement, the subject-in-title requirement of article II, section 19 is to be liberally construed in favor of the legislation. Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash.2d at 555, 901 P.2d 1028. By statute, the ballot title for an initiative to the people has three parts: (a) A statement of the subject of the measure; (b) a concise description of the measure; and (c) a question in the form prescribed in this section for the ballot measure in question. RCW 29.79.035(1). The statute further requires that the ballot title substantially follow a prescribed format: `Initiative Measure No .... concerns (statement of subject). This measure would (concise description). Should this measure be enacted into law?' Id. at (2). Moreover, the statute puts a 10-word limit on the statement of the subject and a 30-word limit on the 1437 concise description. Id. at (1). Consistent with the statute, the ballot title of I-776 expresses the subject in its first sentence: Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. CP at 18 (emphasis added). The second sentence tells what the measure would do: This measure would require license tab fees to be $30 per year for motor vehicles, including light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle excise taxes and fees used for roads and transit would be repealed. Id. (emphasis added). We see no constitutional defect in this ballot title. Because we have determined that policy language does not yield additional subjects for article II, section 19 analysis, the ballot title was not obliged to address the drafters' desire for a revote on changes to Sound Transit's light rail project. Nor was the ballot title required to mention the detail that I-776 would not repeal RCW 46.01.140(4)(a) and (e), which imposed fees totaling $3.50 for license tab applications processed by agents. The ballot title, which used 38 words of the 40 permitted by statute, was sufficiently detailed to prompt an inquiring mind to read the initiative for further details. In sum, Pierce County has not met its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that I-776's ballot title failed to notify members of the Legislature and the public of the subject matter of the measure. Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 207, 11 P.3d 762. I-776's Alleged Impairment of King County's Contracts. Article I, section 23 of the state constitution provides that [n]o ... law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed. For an impairment to be found, there must be a contractual relationship, and the law must substantially impair that relationship; if these two criteria are met, the law will be declared unconstitutional unless the impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public purpose. Tyrpak v. Daniels, 124 Wash.2d 146, 152, 874 P.2d 1374 (1994). The focus here is on the second criterion, substantial impairment. King County asserted, and the superior court agreed, that I-776's repeal of RCW 82.80.020 impaired its contract with certain bondholders. Under that statute, King County (and three other counties) had adopted a $15 local fee for licensing vehicles. In October 2002, the month prior to passage of I-776, King County made the following disclosure in its Official Statement to all bond purchasers: [I-776] has qualified for the State-wide ballot for the November 5, 2002 general election. If approved, I-776 would require local option vehicle license fees to be $30 per year and would repeal certain laws allowing governments to impose taxes or fees on motor vehicles for transportation purposes, including annual local option vehicle license fees for transportation purposes. The County currently imposes an annual local option vehicle license fee in the maximum authorized amount of $15.00, which generates approximately $5 million in annual revenues. CP at 1185; see Mun. of Metro. Seattle v. O'Brien, 86 Wash.2d 339, 350, 544 P.2d 729 (1976) (referring to the official statement to assess bond contract impairment since bonds are sold on the basis of representations contained in [the] Official Statement). King County's Official Statement went on to make the following pledge to bondholders: It is impossible to predict whether I-776 will be approved by the voters, or, if approved, whether it will be implemented in such a way as to prevent the County from imposing or collecting such local option vehicle license fees. However, the County believes that even if I-776 is approved by the voters and implemented, it will nonetheless have sufficient revenues from other revenues and taxes pledged to payment of debt service on the Bonds to pay the principal of and interest on the Bonds when due. In any event, even if I-776 is approved by the voters and implemented in a manner that precludes the County from imposing the local option vehicle license fee, the County has pledged in the Bond Ordinance to pay debt service on the Bonds from ad valorem property taxes and other revenues, taxes and money of the County legally available for such purposes. CP at 1185 (emphasis added). Thus, King County advised the bondholders that I-776's enactment would repeal the statutory authority under which it had collected a local option motor vehicle fee, but it assured the bondholders that, even without that fee, the county had pledged other sources of revenue sufficient to meet its bond obligations. As this court stated in Tyrpak, the relevant question is whether the legislation detrimentally affects the financial framework which induced the bondholders originally to purchase the bonds. 124 Wash.2d at 153-54, 874 P.2d 1374 (emphasis added). In Tyrpak, the financial framework inducing the bondholders' purchase of bonds from the port district did not include any awareness of an imminent annexation of a portion of the district's land area. Rather, the bondholders were induced to purchase the bonds by the district's boundaries and tax base as they existed prior to any legislation annexing its land. In contrast, the bondholders at issue here were fully apprised of the impending vote on I-776 and on its inclusion of a repeal of the $15 local option vehicle license fee. Unlike the annexation legislation in Tyrpak, the initiative measure in the present case was plainly part of the financial framework under which the bond agreement was reached. King County's bondholders knew prior to purchasing the bonds that I-776 was on the ballot and that its passage would repeal the $15 local option vehicle license fee. Moreover, the Official Statement assured the bondholders that the county would pay the bond's debt service from other revenue sources. Given the financial framework which induced the bondholders originally to purchase the bonds, we cannot conclude that I-776 substantially impair[ed] King County's contractual relationship with its bondholders. Tyrpak, 124 Wash.2d at 152, 153-54, 874 P.2d 1374. We therefore hold that Pierce County has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that I-776 violates article I, section 23 of the state constitution. Additional Constitutional Issues Raised by Pierce County and Sound Transit. The superior court left some of the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges undecided. Pierce County and Sound Transit renew those issues on direct appeal as alternative grounds for affirming the superior court's decision. Ertman v. City of Olympia, 95 Wash.2d 105, 108, 621 P.2d 724 (1980). First, Pierce County contends that I-776 violates precepts of local home rule set forth in our state constitution under article XI, section 4 (granting local voters the right to create their own governments) and section 12 (denying the state legislature any power to impose taxes on local governments for local purposes). The thrust of this argument is that, by repealing the statutory authority under which some counties had imposed the $15 local option vehicle fee and under which Sound Transit had levied the MVET, I-776 imposed a tax on those local governments by requiring them to find other funding sources for local transportation projects. The argument lacks merit. Article XI, section 12 permits the state to legislate what taxes and fees local governments are authorized to impose: The legislature ... may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities [of counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations], the power to assess and collect taxes. Each local government, in its discretion, then decides whether to impose the taxes and fees authorized by the State's general laws. The legislature  or the people legislating by initiativemay rescind by general laws the authority previously granted. When that happens, as here, no violation of article XI, section 12 occurs. Sound Transit argues that, in repealing the MVET, I-776 exceeded the scope of the initiative power prescribed in article I, section 1 of the state constitution. Sound Transit relies on Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973), which concerned the efforts of citizens to stop the Kingdome's construction by filing an initiative under the King County charter. The Ruano court determined that only administrative acts remained and that the charter's initiative power did not extend to administrative acts. Id. at 823-25, 505 P.2d 447. However, whereas the Ruano initiative was a local effort to stop administrative acts of a local government, I-776 is a statewide initiative that repeals a general act of the legislature and has no legal effect on any legislative or administrative act of Sound Transit. As a general law repealing an existing general law (RCW 81.104.160), I-776 does not exceed the scope of the people's constitutionally granted initiative power. Finally, Sound Transit suggests that I-776's repeal of the MVET violated the transit agency's due process rights, guaranteed in article I, section 3 of the state constitution and in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The claimed deprivation of life, liberty, or property caused by I-776 presupposes that, when a local government decides to embark on a public project, the people of that jurisdiction acquire a vested property right in the completion of the project, regardless of subsequent state law. No authority exists for that proposition. Sound Transit argues vaguely about the voters' due process rights because case law establishes that article I, section 3 does not insulate cities from state action. See, e.g., Moses Lake Sch. Dist. No. 161 v. Big Bend Cmty. Coll., 81 Wash.2d 551, 503 P.2d 86 (1972) (upholding state authority to transfer community college ownership from school district to state without compensation), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 934, 93 S.Ct. 2776, 37 L.Ed.2d 393 (1973). Local governments find protection for completion of their public works in article I, section 23, which prohibits passage of any law impairing the obligations of contracts. Sound Transit has no basis for asserting that I-776 caused a deprivation of a vested property right. In sum, Pierce County and Sound Transit are unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that I-776 violated constitutional precepts of local home rule, exceeded the scope of the initiative power, or deprived the voters of a vested property right. Salish's Request for Attorney Fees. Salish requests attorney fees under the common fund principle set forth in Weiss v. Bruno, 83 Wash.2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974). The Weiss court endorsed the recovery of a reasonable attorney fee where the court is presented with: (1) a successful suit brought by petitioners (2) challenging the expenditure of public funds (3) made pursuant to patently unconstitutional legislative and administrative actions (4) following a refusal by the appropriate official and agency to maintain such a challenge. Id. at 914, 523 P.2d 915. Salish cannot show, however, that the continued collection of the $15 local option fee in King and Pierce Counties was an unconstitutional expenditure of public funds, since it was, first of all, a collection of funds and, second, was made pursuant to superior court orders. Additionally, because the State has challenged the collection, the fourth element above would not be met as to that claim. Nor can a basis for an attorney fee award be found in Salish's complaint against Sound Transit (that the transit agency had been formed unconstitutionally and had thus been illegally collecting the MVET under RCW 81.104.160), since that claim was beyond the scope of the proceedings before the superior court.