Opinion ID: 2576387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court properly deferred to school board action

Text: ¶ 17 The trial court held that it would overturn the Board's decision only if there was no reasonable basis for [that decision]. The Plaintiffs argue that such deference was inappropriate in this case because the decision constituted administrative, not legislative, action. Thus, they argue, courts reviewing school board decisions like the one at issue here must adopt a non-deferential substantial evidence standard. We disagree. ¶ 18 Under our case law governing school board action, the only question the courts have focused upon has been whether the action taken was within the Board's delegated powers to act, not whether the action was legislative or administrative. These cases have recognized that a local school board is empowered to `make and enforce rules necessary for the control and management of the district schools' and to `do all other things necessary for the maintenance, prosperity, and success of the schools and the promotion of education.' Bd. of Educ. v. Ward, 1999 UT 17, ¶ 9, 974 P.2d 824 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(14), (18) (2000) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(15)(a), (20) (Supp.2004))). We have repeatedly stated: `In harmony with the import of the statutes [governing the authority of school boards] is the fact that it is inherent in the nature of the board's function in managing school district business that it have a broad latitude of discretion in order to carry out its objective of providing the best possible school system in the most efficient and economical way.' Id. (quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1990) (brackets in original) (quoting Ricker v. Bd. of Educ., 16 Utah 2d 106, 396 P.2d 416, 420 (1964))). ¶ 19 Further, we have emphasized a school board's broad discretion in interpreting its own policy, stating that such management, supervision and determination of policy are the prerogative and responsibility of school officials; and that the courts should be reluctant to enter therein; and indeed not to do so unless it is shown that the complainant was in some manner deprived of due process, or that the action of the board was so entirely without justification that it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting E.M. v. Briggs, 922 P.2d 754, 757 (Utah 1996)) (further quotation omitted). ¶ 20 As found by the trial court, the Board did not act entirely without justification, nor did it interpret its FLA policy in an arbitrary and capricious way. The trial court found that the Board did in fact consider each and every policy factor that the Plaintiffs contend the Board was required to consider in making the closure decision. The fact that some members did not know the origin of those factors does not mean that they failed to consider them. Not only was the Board's action not entirely without justification, the trial court found that it was pursuant to the very factors the Plaintiffs contend the Board was required to utilize. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate clear error in the trial court's finding. ¶ 21 Though the closure of one's neighborhood school is a sad event for those affected, that disappointment does not qualify a court to reevaluate an elected school board's decision unless that decision truly was without justification. The remedy for those dissatisfied with a school board's decision is in the voting booths on election day. We accordingly affirm.