Opinion ID: 1658400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Disparate Impact Theory.

Text: An employment rule or practice might be neutral on its face yet have the effect of discriminating against a particular individual. For example, an apparently innocuous rule imposing minimum size standards for employees might work to the disadvantage of women. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). Or a rule imposing minimum educational or intelligence standards might have the effect of discriminating against disadvantaged blacks. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Such a rule, neutral on its face but having an impact along sex, religious, or racial grounds, is evaluated under the disparate impact test. However, a rule which discriminates on its face is evaluated under the test of disparate treatment. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854, n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396, 415 n. 15 (1977). The disparate treatment type of discrimination is said to be the most easily understood. Id. See generally Nichols, Iowa's Law Prohibiting Disability Discrimination in Employment: An Overview, 32 Drake L.Rev. 273, 383-84 (1982-83). The trial court in the present case, while expressing some doubt about the applicability of the disparate impact analysis, nevertheless discussed it in its opinion and relied on it as an alternative basis for its ruling. On appeal, American Freight argues that this was erroneous and that the rule in question must be analyzed only under the test for disparate treatment. We agree. The actual purpose of the rule is just what it purports to beto prevent the hiring of applicants with certain back conditions. In view of this, we need not search for any hidden motives or disparate impacts but analyze the case under a disparate treatment analysis.