Opinion ID: 1914893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Hearsay Statement

Text: Mr. Oliveira also alleges as error the admission of Barbara's testimony recounting her son's remarks to her on the morning of August 12, 2004. He contends that Phillip's statements to his mother did not properly qualify as excited utterances and thus were inadmissible hearsay. The state counters that it was not clear error for the trial justice to admit these statements under the excited utterance exception. At trial, Philip was able to testify about what had occurred in his bedroom the night of August 11, 2004, and morning of August 12, 2004. The young boy also told the jury that later that same morning he told his mother what had happened. The prosecution subsequently called Barbara to the witness stand; she repeated what Phillip had told her that morning, though their respective recollections of what Phillip said and did were not entirely consistent. [19] Even though Phillip already had told the jury what defendant did to him, the trial justice allowed Barbara to testify, additionally, about what Phillip told her had happened with defendant. It is well established that `[t]he admission of a statement under an exception to the hearsay rule is within the sound discretion of the trial justice and shall not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.' State v. Bergevine, 942 A.2d 974, 978 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Ruffner, 911 A.2d 680, 689 (R.I.2006)). See State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1222 (R.I.2002) (admissibility of an excited utterance is clearly within the trial justice's discretion and will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion). Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. R.I. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay in not admissible except as provided by law. R.I. R. Evid. 802. Our rules of evidence provide for an excited-utterance exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. R.I. R. Evid. 803(2). A statement that otherwise is hearsay is admissible if it relat[es] to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Id. The rationale behind the excited utterance exception is that a startling event may produce an effect that temporarily stills the declarant's capacity of reflection and produces statements free of conscious fabrication. Torres, 787 A.2d at 1222 (quoting State v. Krakue, 726 A.2d 458, 462 (R.I.1999)); see Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(2). A statement need not have been strictly contemporaneous with the startling event for it to be admissible as an excited utterance. State v. Momplaisir, 815 A.2d 65, 70 (R.I.2003) (quoting State v. Mendez, 788 A.2d 1145, 1147 (R.I. 2002)). The test is whether, from a consideration of all the facts, the declarant was still laboring under the stress of excitement caused by the event when he or she made the statement at issue. State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 120 (R.I.2006) (citing State v. Nordstrom, 104 R.I. 471, 476, 244 A.2d 837, 840 (1968)). This Court has noted that in cases of sexual assault the time requirement is less demanding, especially when the victim is a child of tender years. Morales, 895 A.2d at 120; see, e.g., State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I.1983) (upholding the admission of a statement by a child sexual-assault victim to a detective made roughly fourteen hours after the event); State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 778 (R.I.1983) (trial justice did not abuse discretion in admitting statements of a child sexual-assault victim to his mother made six or seven hours after the incident); Nordstrom, 104 R.I. at 472-73, 477, 244 A.2d at 838-41 (acts related by the declarant probably occurred about twenty-four hours before the admitted statement). The time requirement is more lenient in sexual assault cases under the reasoning that the shock of the event often lasts longer and the outpouring may come only later, when a parent, friend, or officer is present. Morales, 895 A.2d at 120. Nevertheless, [t]he state has the burden of proving that the statement is spontaneous and was made before the declarant had an opportunity to contrive or misrepresent. State v. Burgess, 465 A.2d 204, 207 (R.I.1983). The guarantee of trustworthiness [for the excited utterance exception] is assured as long as the declarant made the statements as an `instinctive outpouring' or an `effusion.' Krakue, 726 A.2d at 462 (quoting State v. St. Jean, 469 A.2d 736, 738 (R.I.1983)). Compare State v. Oisamaiye, 740 A.2d 338, 339 (R.I.1999) (statements by a nursing home patient made after he had calmed down from an earlier excitable experience were still given in a state of nervous excitement), with Burgess, 465 A.2d at 207 (statement declarant made to the fourth person who spoke with her after the incident not admissible as an excited utterance). Whether a statement was in response to an inquiry is a factor in determining spontaneity, but does not render the excited-utterance exception inapplicable. St. Jean, 469 A.2d at 738-39 (victim's statements made in response to police officer's questions at the scene of the crime less than five hours after the startling event admissible as excited utterances); Creighton, 462 A.2d at 982 (despite victim's initial denial of molestation during questioning, subsequent statements made during police questioning admissible because of victim's very emotional behavior). Evidence of the declarant's demeanor may be necessary to determine whether a statement was a spontaneous verbal reaction. See State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 621-22, 382 A.2d 526, 530-31 (1978); see also State v. Poulin, 415 A.2d 1307, 1311 (R.I. 1980) (prosecution's failure to introduce demeanor evidence prevented a finding of excited utterance). Evidence was presented at defendant's trial that reasonably could support a conclusion that Phillip was still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event when he spoke to his mother. Morales, 895 A.2d at 120 (citing State v. Vaccaro, 111 R.I. 59, 63, 298 A.2d 788, 790 (1973)). According to Phillip's testimony, his grandfather penetrated him that very same morning, only two or three hours before he spoke with his mother, satisfying the less demanding time requirement in cases of child sexual abuse. Phillip appeared to be in physical distress from the assault because he felt the need to go to the bathroom but nothing came out except water. His mother described his demeanor as nervous, scared, and quiet and pulled back. Unlike the child's unprompted forthcoming in Morales, 895 A.2d at 117, here Phillip did not divulge the incidents to his mother until after she inquired into his unusual behavior. Nonetheless, a response to a question can still be a spontaneous verbal reaction. See St. Jean, 469 A.2d at 738; Creighton, 462 A.2d at 982. Considering Phillip's prior good relationship with his grandfather and his fear that his mother would be upset by his disclosure, it was not unreasonable for the trial justice to find that his responses were spontaneous reactions to her questions and made while still laboring under the stress of the event. We recognize that had the trial justice excluded Phillip's statements to his mother, we more than likely would sustain the exercise of his discretion. We also are mindful of our holding that [t]he use of such terms as `tears,' `nervous,' or `upset' are not to be the `open sesame' to having a declarant's statement classified as a spontaneous utterance. St. Jean, 469 A.2d at 739 (quoting Jalette, 119 R.I. at 621, 382 A.2d at 530). Nevertheless, the admissibility of evidence as an exception to the rule against hearsay is a decision entrusted in the first instance to the sound discretion of the trial justice. Id. (quoting Creighton, 462 A.2d at 982). In this case, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by allowing Phillip's statements to his mother into evidence as excited utterances.