Opinion ID: 1453508
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instruction on the Reasons for the Penalty Retrial

Text: At the beginning of the penalty phase jury selection, defendant asked the court to inform the jury that there has been a prior trial but that no verdict on death was reached. Defense counsel expressed the concern that, given the length of time between the crime and the trial, the jurors might think that a prior death verdict had been overturned by the Supreme Court, which I think the court is well aware in today's climate would probably go against my client. The court informed the first jury panel only that defendant previously had been found guilty of murder with the special circumstance of lying in wait, and that the new jury would determine the penalty. The court did tell the second panel that the first jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict. Some, but not all, of the actual jurors heard this latter statement. At the outset of his argument to the jury, defense counsel told the entire jury, without objection, that the first jury had been unable to reach a penalty verdict. (46) Defendant argues that at the time of the penalty retrial, the summer of 1986, a confirmation election campaign was underway involving members of this court, and emotion and rhetoric ran high, focussing attention particularly on this Court's treatment of death penalty appeals. He contends the trial court should have instructed the jury that the retrial was not the result of a California Supreme Court reversal, and dispel[led] the prejudice and emotion surrounding the proceeding. He understandably does not argue the trial court should have informed the jury of the entire history of the case, including that a second jury did return a verdict of death but that the verdict was set aside because of a decision of this court rendered the very day of the verdict. (See ante, at p. 804.) This court has recently twice confronted the reverse contention, that the trial court erroneously told the jury that we had overturned an earlier death verdict in the case. ( People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 466-469 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107]; People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 639-641.) We found no error in those cases, but have never suggested that the trial court is required to inform the jury of the history of the prior proceedings, and certainly not a partial history. In any event, the court's comments to the second panel and defense counsel's argument effectively informed the jury that the first jury had been unable to reach a penalty verdict. There is no basis even for speculation that the jury's verdict might have resulted from resentment over some presumed reversal by this court.
(47) The court did not originally instruct the penalty jury on the elements of the special circumstance. During deliberations, the jury asked for the definition of lying in wait. The court gave the then-standard lying-in-wait instruction, which differed somewhat from the one the court gave at the guilt trial. [16] Defendant objected to both lying-in-wait instructions, but, if either were given, he preferred the one which the court gave. Defendant reiterates the arguments regarding lying in wait which we have previously rejected. ( Ante, at pt. II. B. 1. a.) In addition, contrary to his position at trial, he now asserts the new instruction (and the current standard instruction, see CALJIC No. 8.81.15 (5th ed. 1989)) was [w]orse than the previous instruction in that the mens rea only had to be equivalent to `premeditation or deliberation.' (Italics by defendant.) This was not error. ( People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 614-615 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854].)