Opinion ID: 901689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assumption of the RiskIntervening in a Barroom Fight

Text: [¶ 9.] Can a person be held to have assumed the risk of being stabbed, when that person shielded a friend engaged in a bar fight involving a broken beer bottle? To answer this question, we must first identify what legal responsibility businesses bear on behalf of their patrons. In South Dakota, business proprietors owe their customers the duty of exercising reasonable care for their safety. Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)) (other citations omitted). Accordingly, bar owners, though not insurers for the safety of their patrons, must exercise reasonable care to protect them from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons. See generally Joan Teshima, J.D., Tavernkeeper's Liability to Patron for Third Person's Assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 281 (originally published in 1986). When patrons assume the risk of injury, however, bar owners may not be held liable. [¶ 10.] The crucial issue in this case is whether the jury should have been given the opportunity to decide whether Duda assumed the risk of injury. Duda believes the issue should never have been submitted to the jury. [1] He contends that the court erred when it failed to grant his motion for a directed verdict on whether he assumed the risk of injury. [2] Because the entire incident occurred within a span of thirty seconds, Duda had no time, he asserts, to appreciate the character of the risk. Moreover, Duda was not a mutual aggressor or co-combatant, and therefore, he argues that as an innocent person injured by the intentional act of another, the assumption of the risk defense is inapplicable. [¶ 11.] Phatty's responds that the record supports the assumption of the risk instruction and verdict. It believes that if we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we will acknowledge that Duda saw Guerrero break the beer bottle over Bledsoe's head before Duda stepped into the middle of the fight. This fact alone, according to Phatty's, leads to a reasonable inference that Duda appreciated the nature of the risk. [¶ 12.] `Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk.' Prosser on Torts § 68 (5thed 1984) (citation omitted). Indeed, assumption of the risk imports a knowing and voluntary self exposure to a known danger. Plaintiffs cannot assume risks of activities or conditions of which they are ignorant. Id. They must not only know of the facts which create the danger, but [they] must comprehend and appreciate the danger itself. Id. The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates. In this it differs from the objective standard which is applied to contributory negligence. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496D, cmt c (1965). [¶ 13.] Under our traditional formulation, a person assumes the risk of injury when the person: (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk; (2) appreciated its character; and (3) voluntarily accepted the risk, with the time, knowledge, and experience to make an intelligent choice. Ray v. Downes, 1998 SD 40, ¶ 11, 576 N.W.2d 896, 898 (quoting Mack v. Kranz Farms, Inc., 1996 SD 63, ¶ 9, 548 N.W.2d 812, 814 (citation omitted)). A person is deemed to have appreciated the risk `if it is the type of risk that no adult of average intelligence can deny.' Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Westover v. East River Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 488 N.W.2d 892, 901 (S.D.1992)). [¶ 14.] Although Duda cites no cases directly on point, at least one court has addressed a similar question of a bystander interceding in a barroom confrontation. In Fagan v. Atnalta, Inc., the plaintiff voluntarily intervened in an altercation between a female bartender, a waitress, and a rowdy group of men. 189 Ga.App. 460, 376 S.E.2d 204, 205 (1988). One of the unruly men grabbed the bartender by the collar while she was trying to get them to leave the bar. The plaintiff grabbed the bartender to keep her from being dragged outside. In response, the men dragged the plaintiff outside and severely beat him. [¶ 15.] In his suit against the bar, the plaintiff alleged negligence in failing to provide for the safety and security of its patrons. Affirming summary judgment against the plaintiff, the Georgia Court of Appeals wrote that while summary judgment is not ordinarily granted on issues of negligence and assumption of the risk, in this case the facts were clear. Id. at 206. The plaintiff assumed the risk because he saw and recognized the risk, and deliberately interjected himself into the affray after the bartender was grabbed by a customer being ejected. [He] obviously assumed the risk of injury by voluntarily confronting four rowdy customers being ejected from a bar by management. Id. Three judges dissented, with two asserting that the assumption of risk question should have been decided by a jury. Here, in contrast, the question was submitted to the jury. [¶ 16.] Duda cites no case where, under similar circumstances, assumption of the risk was deemed an inapplicable defense. He testified that before he stepped into the fight to protect his friend, he saw Guerrero break a beer bottle over Bledsoe's head. Thus, while he claims he did not have time to appreciate the character of the risk, i.e., that he would be stabbed, we fail to see how it was an abuse of discretion for the court to submit the question to the jury. As Professor Prosser once wrote, Since in the ordinary case there is no conclusive evidence against the plaintiff on [assumption of the risk issues], they are normally for the jury to decide. Prosser on Torts § 68. Whether the plaintiff knows of the existence of the risk, or whether he understands and appreciates its magnitude and its unreasonable character, is a question of fact, usually to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496D, cmt e (1965). [¶ 17.] Because adults of average intelligence cannot deny the obvious, a plaintiff's testimony on what he or she knew or understood is not conclusive. Id. at § 496D cmt c. No one can reasonably deny that there is a risk of injury in stepping into the middle of a fight, especially one where a beer bottle is being used as a weapon. See Goepfert v. Filler, 1997 SD 56, ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d 140, 143 (obvious danger). Duda could have waited for security personnel to intervene or he could have summoned the police. Yet he chose to act on his own. A jury could reasonably conclude that, having seen the broken bottle, Duda had to have known and appreciated that the character of the risk could include that bottle. [¶ 18.] Duda also asserts that because he was not a combatant, the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a directed verdict. He cites no specific authority for the idea that an innocent bystander who intervenes in a fight cannot be held to have assumed the risk of injury. Granted, Duda was not an aggressor. But he was no mere bystander in the sense that he was incidentally injured by being in the vicinity of a barroom brawl. He deliberately placed himself between his friend and two assailants. Heroism can exact a high cost. Coming to the aid of an outnumbered friend in a fight, though understandable, and even commendable, still reflects a conscious decision to inject oneself into a volatile and dangerous situation. [¶ 19.] Through his various motions, Duda wanted assumption of the risk removed from the jury's consideration, and the trial court refused. Rulings on motions for a directed verdict, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Bland v. Davison County, 1997 SD 92, ¶ 26, 566 N.W.2d 452, 460; see also Steffen v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., 2006 SD 41, ¶ 7, 713 N.W.2d 614, 617 (citing Christenson v. Bergeson, 2004 SD 113, ¶ 10, 688 N.W.2d 421, 425) (additional citations omitted). On reviewing a motion for a directed verdict, we must determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain the action, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Steffen, 2006 SD 41, ¶ 9, 713 N.W.2d at 618 (citing SDCL 15-6-50(a); Christenson, 2004 SD 113, ¶ 22, 688 N.W.2d at 427). With motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Fechner v. Case, 2003 SD 37, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 631, 633-34. Considering all the evidence in accordance with these standards, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Duda's motions.