Opinion ID: 1706950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: uncertainty and unreliability of sentencing phase findings

Text: ¶ 85. At sentencing, the jury was instructed that before it could impose the death penalty it must find at least one of four possible factors: that Bell actually killed, attempted to kill, intended that a killing take place, or he contemplated the use of lethal force. The jury found all four to exist. ¶ 86. Bell argues that the jury's verdict is suspect because of the erroneous instructions in the guilt phase on accomplice liability, which allowed conviction without a finding of intent by Bell. He complains that the instruction allowed conviction if Bell did anything connected with the crime, arguing in his brief that the United States Constitution requires that before the death penalty may be imposed: the focus [must] be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on `individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.' Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S., at 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368, [citation omitted] (emphasis in original). Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). ¶ 87. Here, Bell essentially reiterates the same argument which he made as to the guilt phase instructions, and which we have already addressed and found wanting. Further, the jury positively found Bell guilty under § 99-19-107(c), intending that a killing take place and under § 99-19-107(d), contemplating that lethal force would be employed. We are satisfied that the Enmund standard was achieved and that a reliable verdict was rendered