Opinion ID: 1980309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Enforcement of Russian custodial decree.

Text: A foreign custody decree shall [be] recognize[d] and enforce[d] by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia provided that the decree was rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations and all affected parties are given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. D.C.Code §§ 16-4513, [11] -4523. [12] These provisions, as adopted from the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), reflect the notion, in the child custody context, that recognition of a foreign judgment or decree can only be based upon judicial action which comports with our own notions of due process of law. Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431, 437 (D.C.1972), overruled in part on other grounds by Bazemore, supra note 10, 394 A.2d 1377, and superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized by Albergottie v. James, 470 A.2d 266, 269 (D.C. 1983); see also Stock v. Stock, 677 So.2d 1341, 1345 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996); Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 147 N.J. 190, 685 A.2d 1319, 1324 (1996); Hovav v. Hovav, 312 Pa.Super. 305, 458 A.2d 972, 974 (1983); Oehl v. Oehl, 221 Va. 618, 272 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1980). Mr. Bliss does not contest that the Babushkin Inter-Municipal district court and Moscow Municipal appellate court are appropriate authorities to render a custody decree and concedes that he was given adequate notice of the custody proceeding. He contends, however, that the Russian custody order should not be recognized and enforced by our courts, because he was denied an opportunity to be heard when the Russian court proceeded with the custody hearing in his absence, despite his assertions that he desired to be present. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order enforcing the Russian custody decree after concluding that Mr. Bliss's failure to be present at the Russian custody hearing was volitionally made and not due to impossibility. With the trial court having made that factual determination, this court cannot set aside the judgment unless it is clearly erroneous or without evidence to support it. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1997); cf. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a). See Vereen v. Clayborne, 623 A.2d 1190, 1192 (D.C.1993) (D.C.Code § 17-305(a) indistinguishable from the `clearly erroneous' standard of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a)); see also Hosain, note 11, 671 A.2d at 997. We conclude that the evidence presented during the hearing was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Mr. Bliss was given an adequate opportunity to be heard by the Russian court, but chose not to take that opportunity. See Hovav, supra, 458 A.2d at 974. The trial court noted that Mr. Bliss had been granted several continuances by the Russian court which gave him ample time to secure a visa. Although the initial date for the start of the proceedings was December 5, 1996, just ten days after appellant received his first court summons, the actual hearing did not take place until January 20, more than 45 days later. Mr. Bliss's representation that he was prevented from obtaining a visa because he could not get an official invitation from a Russian agency does not avail him because, as he conceded to the court, he never attempted to verify with the Russian consulate that in order to get a visa, he did indeed need an official invitation in addition to the court summons. The trial court chose to credit Ms. Bliss's testimony that she had told her husband that the court summons would be sufficient for him to get a visa. Moreover, though Mr. Bliss also testified that he and his attorneys made several requests to the court in Moscow to enlist its aid in securing the invitation he thought he needed, he did not submit any documentation to the trial court which evidenced any of these attempts. In contrast, Ms. Bliss introduced into evidence a January 1997 letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stating that [Mr.] Bliss did not apply for a visa in Washington and his references to any difficulties occurring with obtaining it are not true. Given these facts in the record, and because Mr. Bliss was represented by Russian counsel at the hearing, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in determining that Mr. Bliss had an adequate opportunity to be heard in the Russian court. See Custody of a Minor (No. 3), 392 Mass.728, 468 N.E.2d 251, 255 (1984) (upholding Australian custody order in favor of husband when wife had sufficient notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel and order was based on the best interests of the child); Klont v. Klont, 130 Mich.App. 138, 342 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1983) (plaintiff could not claim that he did not have reasonable opportunity to be heard in West German custody proceeding when he had prior notice and purposefully failed to attend hearing by taking child and returning to the United States); Hovav, supra, 458 A.2d at 974 (custody decree upheld when wife chose not to avail herself of opportunity to be heard at Israeli proceedings).