Opinion ID: 789126
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Standard for Granting a COA

Text: 51 Because Williams made a strong prima facie showing of his Batson claim, we should have granted a COA. 52 [A] prisoner seeking a COA need only demonstrate `a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.' A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 53 Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (citations omitted); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir.2002). 54 Even if Williams' prima facie showing were no more than debatable, the court was obligated to grant a COA.[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straight-forward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (citation omitted). Here, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent on Williams' Batson claim after erroneously concluding that Petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 997-98 (C.D.Cal.1998) ( Williams II ). The district court reached this conclusion after denying Williams' discovery request, refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing, making factual errors (that the panel opinion adopts), and erroneously placing the burden on Williams to prove that the prosecution did not have race-neutral reasons for its challenges. Id. The district court's denial of the Batson claim was wrong, and the panel's denial of a COA sends a man to his death without adequate review of his substantial constitutional claims. 55 II. An Evidentiary Hearing on the Batson Claim or a New Trial Should Have Been Granted 56 Williams, at a minimum, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his Batson claim, if not a new trial. 6 If proper and timely objection is made, the course of a Batson determination would be as follows: 57 In determining whether a party impermissibly has used peremptory challenges in a way that violates the equal protection clause, we employ the Batson three-step test. First, the objecting party is required to make a prima facie showing that another party has used peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, assuming the objecting party makes its showing, the burden shifts to the challenging party to state race-neutral reasons for excusing the prospective jurors. Third, the court must determine if the objecting party has proven purposeful discrimination. 58 Montiel, 2 F.3d at 340 (citations omitted). In the Batson analysis, it does not matter that the prosecutor might have had good reasons to strike the prospective jurors, what matters is the real reason they were stricken. Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.2004) (emphasis in the original). Because Williams has presented more than sufficient evidence to satisfy step one, the court was obligated to reach steps two and three. Id. at 1089-90; see also Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 249-50 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing difficulty in determining whether there was a Batson violation years after trial occurred but holding that where petitioner made a prima facie showing of a Batson violation but was never given opportunity to reach steps two and three, petitioner nonetheless was entitled to either an evidentiary hearing or a new trial). 59 Where, as here, the habeas petitioner failed to develop the facts of his constitutional claim before the state trial court, the district court must review the answer, transcript, and record and determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. In any case, the district court may exercise its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing, but in certain cases, an evidentiary hearing is mandatory. This is such a case. 60 Williams is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he can show cause for his failure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). `Cause' is a legitimate excuse for the default; `prejudice' is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). 61 In this case, the cause for Williams' failure to develop the facts of his Wheeler 7 /Batson claim before the state trial court is the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel that rises to the level of a constitutional violation constitutes cause). 8 62 The prejudice requirement is satisfied in two ways. First, because a Batson violation is structural error, actual harm is presumed to have resulted from the alleged constitutional violation. Second, because there is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged Batson violation and the related ineffective assistance of counsel, there would have been a more racially diverse jury, Williams was actually prejudiced by the seating of an all-white jury instead of a more racially diverse one. 63 A Batson violation is structural error for which prejudice is generally presumed. As the Court explained in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991): 64 The jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors. The intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury selection process damages both the fact and the perception of this guarantee. Jury selection is the primary means by which a court may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice, or predisposition about the defendant's culpability. Active discrimination by a prosecutor during this process condones violations of the United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law. The cynicism may be aggravated if race is implicated in the trial ... 65 ... 66 The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The verdict will not be accepted or understood in these terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the outset. 67 Id. at 411-13, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 470-71 (6th Cir.2004) (Although the `plain error' standard of review generally applies to claims raised for the first time on appeal, any racial discrimination in jury selection constitutes structural error that requires automatic reversal. (citations omitted)); Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 248 (noting that racial discrimination in jury selection is structural error and therefore not subject to harmless error review; collecting cases); Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d 625, 634 n. 17 (7th Cir.1994). Because the same jury sat during both the guilt and penalty phases of Williams' trial, we can presume that both phases were affected by the Batson violation. 68 Additionally, the seating of an all-white jury, as opposed to a more diverse jury, prejudiced Williams' defense. In Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit found that trial counsel's failure to object to racial discrimination in jury selection in a capital case was ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, the court found that the procedural default of petitioner's failing to raise an equal protection claim was excused because the ineffective assistance constituted cause and the client suffered actual prejudice from that error. Id. Hollis is powerfully persuasive precedent. Like Williams, Hollis was an African-American defendant who was tried for a death-eligible crime by an all-white jury. 69 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized the prejudicial effect of [t]he systematic exclusion of blacks from jury eligibility. Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1480 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986)) (noting that to prevent prejudice, a defendant indicted by a grand jury from which blacks had been excluded was entitled to be released). 70 As Justice Jackson noted in Cassell v. Texas: 71 It is obvious that discriminatory exclusion of Negroes from a trial jury does, or at least may, prejudice a Negro's right to a fair trial.... The trial jury hears the evidence of both sides and chooses what it will believe. In so deciding, it is influenced by imponderables — unconscious and conscious prejudices and preferences — and a thousand things we cannot detect or isolate in its verdict and whose influence we cannot weigh.... A trial jury on which one of the defendant's race has no chance to sit may not have the substance, and cannot have the appearance, of impartiality, especially when the accused is a Negro and the alleged victim is not. 72 339 U.S. 282, 301-02, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) Jackson, J. dissenting. The Eleventh Circuit further reasoned that it would have greater confidence in the result reached by a racially mixed jury containing members of the defendant's own race, particularly where the black defendant is on trial for an offense against a white person. Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1483. 73 That Williams was facing the death penalty only heightens the prejudicial nature of racial discrimination in the selection of his jury. As the Court noted in Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986): In a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is called upon to make a highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves. Id. at 33-34, 106 S.Ct. 1683 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, at least as to sentencing, there is a probability of a different result, but for the unconstitutional jury selection, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome ... [and that] the improperly selected jury infected [the defendant's] entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1483 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 74 III. Williams' Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on Counsel's Failure to Raise Batson/Wheeler Objection 75 Williams argues, and I agree, that his counsel's failure to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges constituted ineffective assistance. Without explanation, the opinion ignores this constitutional claim. 76 A. Failure to Object to the Batson Violation 77 In his federal habeas petition, Williams alleged that his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 9 78 The district court correctly concluded that Williams' trial counsel could have provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a Batson objection even though that case had not been decided at the time of trial. Williams II, 48 F.Supp.2d at 998. 79 However, the district court, inexplicably, granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding that Williams failed to establish that any reasonable attorney under the circumstances would have objected to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges and cannot establish that the objection would have been sustained. Id. This is simply not so. Because jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or ... could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further, Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 323, 123 S.Ct. 1029, a COA on Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claims should have issued. 80 B. No Reasonable Professional Judgment Was Involved 81 Any reasonable attorney under the circumstances of this case would have objected to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to rid the jury of African-Americans. The California Supreme Court cases reversing the judgments of death obtained by the very same prosecutor that tried Williams' case make clear that defense attorneys were making  Wheeler motions under similar circumstances at that time. These cases also make clear that if Williams' trial counsel had made a Wheeler motion, there is a reasonable probability that he would have succeeded. 82 Indeed, trial counsel admits as much. In a sworn declaration, counsel admitted that he was well aware of People v. Wheeler,  that he noted that the prosecution was striking African-Americans, and that he knew he could make a prima facie showing based on the prosecutor's striking of three African-Americans under Wheeler. [Declaration of trial counsel, Mar. 23, 1994] (I ... do not recall why I did not make a motion pursuant to Wheeler in order to have the prosecutor justify his removal of the black jurors in Mr. Williams' case. I knew that the exclusion of three jurors of the same race as the defendant in a cross-racial prosecution constituted a prima facie case, which should have shifted the burden to the prosecutor to justify each challenge exercised against one of the black jurors. I was unhappy with the jury in this case. Co-counsel and I exercised all of our peremptory challenges in an attempt to obtain a jury representative of Mr. Williams' community. The jury that was sworn was not such a representative cross-section.) 83 We cannot characterize the failure of Williams' counsel to object to the prosecutor's discriminatory strikes as a permissible strategic choice or tactical decision. While [trial counsel] was not totally clear as to why he did not challenge the jury composition, it is impossible to conclude from his statements that he had made a reasoned, professional judgment that not raising the issue was in [Mr. Williams'] interest. Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1478 (finding failure to object to racial discrimination in jury selection was ineffective assistance of counsel). 84 How the district court could have held that it was not established that any reasonable attorney would have objected under the circumstances is inexplicable. Williams' trial counsel knew about Wheeler. He cannot claim ignorance or lack of clarity in the law. Making a Wheeler motion would have preserved a critical constitutional right. The trial attorney missed more than one opportunity to make that simple motion: he could have made the motion after the first strike, the second strike, the third strike, or at the conclusion of jury selection — when he knew the prosecutor's challenges had resulted in the seating of an all-white jury. Any way you slice it, counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and we should not hesitate to say so. C. Actual Prejudice to Williams' Defense 85 A petitioner shows prejudice due to ineffective assistance of counsel when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, but a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 86 There is a reasonable probability that, had counsel objected to the prosecutor's discriminatory strikes, Williams would have succeeded in proving that the prosecutor was engaging in impermissible racial discrimination as prohibited by Batson. This probability is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial because a Batson violation is structural error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (noting that structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism defy analysis by `harmless-error' standards); see also United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that [w]e only review for plain error or assess whether an error is harmless when the error is not structural (citation omitted)). Additionally, there is prejudice because there is a reasonable probability that had the motion been made, racial discrimination in the jury selection process would have been remedied, and the outcome of either the guilt phase or the penalty phase would have been different. See Part II, supra. 87 The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury ... [R]acial discrimination in the selection of jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt. 88 ... 89 A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge is a constitutional violation committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings. The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause.... 90 Powers, 499 U.S. at 411-13, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 91 If our judicial system is to inspire a sense of confidence among the populace, we must not, we cannot permit trials to proceed in the face of blatant, race-based jury selection practices. Failure to grant a COA in this case sends an unmistakable message that the dictates of Batson may be disregarded with impunity. I cannot join that message.