Opinion ID: 1146796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court err in granting a punitive damage instruction?

Text: Though we affirm the award of actual damages, the good faith which provides Walker no defense to conversion nonetheless absolves him from liability for exemplary damages. This Court has variously stated that punitive damages are recoverable where the defendant has done to the plaintiff a wrong which imparts insult, fraud, oppression or reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights, or where there was a showing of a willful intentional wrong, or such gross negligence and reckless conduct as is equivalent to such a wrong. Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So.2d 207, 212 (Miss. 1986); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 465 (Miss. 1983); T.G. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So.2d 481, 485 (Miss. 1972); Seales v. St. Regis Paper Co., 236 So.2d 388 (Miss. 1970). This in essence means that the plaintiff must prove a wrongful act intentionally performed or a gross disregard of the rights of plaintiff. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc., 431 So.2d at 460 (Miss. 1983); Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Brent, 207 Miss. 892, 43 So.2d 654 (1950). In other recent cases, this Court has characterized the rule by stating that the defendant may be subject to punitive damages where he acted with malice or with gross negligence or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Bell v. First Columbus National Bank, 493 So.2d 964 (Miss. 1986); Weems v. American Security Ins. Co., 486 So.2d 1222, 1226 (Miss. 1986). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) (1979). Applying these standards to the defendant Ralph Walker yields the conclusion that the case against him is not an appropriate case for punitive damages. This Court in Wood v. Mississippi Power Co., 245 Miss. 103, 119, 146 So.2d 546, 552 (1962), stated [W]hen an act has been done in good faith, even though it may have resulted in injury to the plaintiff, in general there cannot be recovery of punitive damages. Here it is clear that Valentine Truck Brokers, Inc. through its agent Robert Knipe, exhibited, if not intentional wrongful conduct, then, at the least, such reckless disregard of Raymond Brown, Jr.'s right to his trailer that a punitive damage instruction was appropriate as to it. However, the same is not true of Ralph Walker. The testimony is undisputed that Walker removed Brown's trailer from the weigh station at the urging of Valentine Truck Brokers and under the mistaken belief that Knipe had authority to have someone move it. The fact that Walker knew the trailer belonged to someone else did not rob him of his good faith reliance on Knipe. The undisputed evidence shows that Walker had dealt with Knipe before in moving distressed perishable loads, and he thought Brown's plight presented a similar situation. In this case, though Walker knew that neither he nor Knipe owned the trailer, there is nothing to indicate that Walker was unreasonable in his belief that the driver affiliated with Knipe would approve his efforts to salvage the perishable produce after the shipment was cancelled. Raymond Brown, Jr. did notify Walker of his interest in having the trailer returned. However, at that point the trailer was on its way to Atlanta. Walker told Brown to speak with Knipe to resolve their differences, and Walker reasonably thought that Brown did so when he heard nothing for almost three days. This conversation did not change the character of Walker's acts, especially considering that Walker did promptly return the trailer after authorities informed him that Brown reported it stolen. No doubt, Walker could have exercised more caution before taking the trailer. Prudence would normally dictate consulting the owner before appropriating his property for even a short period. However, given the exigent circumstances of a perishable load, the course of dealings between Knipe and Walker and Walker's prompt return of the trailer when he learned of Brown's dissatisfaction, the proof does not show the kind of totally unacceptable conduct we require to subject a defendant to exemplary damages. [1] To instruct the jury concerning the award of punitive damages was error upon these facts and requires reversal of the punitive damages award.