Opinion ID: 1615376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Contempt action.

Text: ¶ 31. CMI contends that the trial court erred by finding it in contempt of paragraph 11(3) of the second amended final judgment and imposing $7,500 in sanctions. ¶ 32. The decision to hold a person or entity in criminal or civil contempt also is a discretionary function of the trial court. In re Spencer, 985 So.2d 330, 337 (Miss.2008). Issues of contempt are questions of law to be decided on a case-by-case basis. R.K. v. J.K., 946 So.2d 764, 777 (Miss.2007). Regarding a determination of contempt, a trial court due to its temporal and physical proximity to the parties `is infinitely more competent to decide the matter.' Id. (quoting Cumberland v. Cumberland, 564 So.2d 839, 845 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 33. The first determination is whether the alleged contempt is civil or criminal in nature. In re Williamson, 838 So.2d 226, 237 (Miss.2002). If the primary purpose of the contempt order is to enforce the rights of private party litigants or enforce compliance with a court order, then the contempt is civil. Id. When the action is for civil contempt, the standard of review is the manifest-error rule. Id. ¶ 34. On assessing attorneys' fees for contempt, this Court has stated that the trial court is the proper authority to award the fees. Mabus v. Mabus, 910 So.2d 486, 489 (Miss.2005). This Court will not disturb a chancellor's award of attorneys' fees provided the lower court is not manifestly wrong. Id. Further, [w]here a party's intentional misconduct causes the opposing party to expend time and money needlessly, then attorney fees and expenses should be awarded to the wronged party. Id. (quoting State v. Blenden, 748 So.2d 77, 87 (Miss.1999)). ¶ 35. Paragraph 11 and subsection (3) of the second amended final judgment state: CMI is ordered to submit to a full accounting of the financial affairs of the Nursing Home and the Hospital of GRHC and Greene County. No later than forty-five days from the date of the Final Judgment, CMI shall provide to the President of the GRHC Board of Trustees, the following: 3. An itemized statement showing all expenditures made by CMI from GRHC's reserve fund. The statement shall identify the date of the expenditure, the item(s) purchased, the amount paid, the reason for the purchase, and the place where the item(s) purchased was used. Following CMI and the GCHC trustees entering into an October 15, 2007 lease agreement, Greene County filed a motion for contempt and other relief on October 22, 2007. In the December 13, 2007, order on motion for contempt and other relief, the trial court acknowledged that a number of the provisions in the second amended final judgment set forth the rights, duties and obligations of the parties under the terms of the Agreements. The trial court included paragraph 11(3) as a provision in the second amended final judgment that provided for the rights, duties, or obligations under the original 2005 agreements between CMI and GRHC. ¶ 36. This Court, in Greene County, addressed the issue of contempt based on Greene County's motion for contempt and other relief filed on October 22, 2007, and the subsequent December 13, 2007 order. In Greene County, this Court stated: The chancellor held CMI and the Trustees in contempt, finding that-by entering the October 15, 2007, contract-they interfered with the court's December 31, 2007, deadline concerning the possible sale or lease of the hospital. The chancellor's deadline, however, emanated from agreements which we have found to be unenforceable. Furthermore, the order holding the Trustees and CMI in contempt did not provide for any sanctions. It merely held that they were in contempt of the final order and that they were to cease and desist from entering into any further management contracts. . . . FN13 FN13. The order did state that the Court would determine whether any damages, costs, or attorney's fees were appropriate after the Trustees and CMI produced the required financial statements. However, the record does not disclose that any sanctions were ever entered. Because we find today that the contracts were not binding, and because the contempt order resulted in no sanctions, we find the issue moot. Greene County, 10 So.3d at 432. ¶ 37. Here, the judgment finding CMI in contempt and imposing sanctions was based on the trial court's July 2008 judgment. When the parties filed their briefs on the issue of contempt, this Court had not yet rendered its decision on the consolidated appeal in Greene County, therefore, neither party, nor the special chancellor, had the benefit of this Court's decision. By the language of this Court's decision in Greene County, finding the agreements to be nonbinding contracts, arguably, any contempt action and imposition of sanctions stemming from terms of the second amended final judgment, which in turn were based on the 2005 agreements between CMI and GRHC, are now moot. However, the 2008 judgment pertains to the subsequent and continued actions or nonactions by the parties that occurred after the second amended final judgment and the December 13, 2007, contempt order. Therefore, this Court may view these ongoing and continuous actions as subject to the special chancellor's retained jurisdiction to enforce his judgments, and the contempt issue was not moot due to the Greene County opinion. Since this Court has held that a party may be in contempt even though an order or decree later is determined to be erroneous, we will address whether the trial court erred by finding that CMI was in contempt and that attorneys' fees were appropriate. ¶ 38. Notwithstanding this Court's decision in Greene County, the issue of contempt in this third appeal is based on CMI's alleged continuous noncompliance with the trial court's second amended final judgment. The 2008 judgment listed the pleadings that were before the special chancellor, in part, as: a. The Motion for Contempt and Other Relief, and for Expedited Hearing filed by Greene County, on or about October 22, 2007; b. The Supplement to Motion for Contempt and Other Relief filed by Greene County, on or about December 10, 2007; c. The Supplement to Motion for Contempt and Other Relief filed by Greene County, on or about December 26, 2007; The trial court issued a December 13, 2007, order finding CMI and GRHC in contempt for interfering with the second amended final judgment and failure to produce documents in accordance with the second amended final judgment. This order was the subject of the second appeal as noted above. ¶ 39. After the December 13, 2007, order, Greene County filed another supplement to its motion for contempt and other relief on December 26, 2007. Therefore, at least some of the pleadings concerned allegations of continued contempt for failure to produce documents pursuant to the trial court's second amended final judgment. The trial court held the motion for contempt in abeyance in its December 28, 2007, order. A hearing also was conducted on January 23, 2008. Again, the trial court held the motion for contempt in abeyance to allow time for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition from a CMI financial officer to determine what was ordered to be produced under the second amended final judgment. Thereafter, Thomas Kuluz, chief financial officer for CMI, gave deposition testimony on the production of documents. ¶ 40. While not incorporated by reference into the 2008 order, the special chancellor issued a June 11, 2008, memorandum opinion in which the special chancellor addressed the issue of contempt. In the memorandum opinion, the trial court stated: 29. On December 26, 2007, Greene County served a Supplemental Motion for Contempt that asked for relief due to CMI's failure to comply with paragraphs 11(3)-(6), 12, 13 and 15 of the final judgment. CMI responds that it has complied with the final judgment and provided the documents to GRHC. 30. According to Thomas Kuluz, CMI's 30(b)(6) designee and Chief Financial Officer, CMI has admitted that it has not produced the documents the Court required be produced in paragraph 11(3): An itemized statement showing all expenditures made by CMI from GRHC's reserve fund. The statement shall identify the date of the expenditure, the item(s) purchased, the amount paid, the reason for the purchase, and the place where the item(s) purchased is currently located or the area of operation where the item(s) purchased was used. Further, the Court has not seen this document or any attempt to comply with paragraph 11(3) and provided the itemized statement that was required. Based on the special chancellor's review, CMI failed to provide the required documentation designated under the second amended final judgment. Thereafter, in the 2008 order, the trial court stated: 10. That CMI shall be and hereby is found to be in contempt for its failure to comply with paragraph 11(3) of the court's Final Judgment, and that as a result thereof Greene County is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $7,500.00. Said amount shall be paid to Greene County, through its attorney on or before July 31, 2008. 11. CMI shall have until 5:00 p.m. on July 31, 2008, to produce an itemized statement showing all expenditures made by CMI from GRHC's reserve fund. The statement shall identify the date of the expenditure, the item(s) purchased, the amount paid, the reason for the purchase, and the place where the item(s) purchased is currently located or the area of operation where the item(s) was used. CMI shall have until 5:00 p.m. on July 31 to produce the statements and information required. If the statement is not produced, CMI shall be fined $500.00 per day until such time as the statement and information is produced. ¶ 41. This Court, in the case of In re Contraction, Exclusion and Deannexation of City of Grenada, 876 So.2d 995, 1006 (Miss.2004), determined that a city's failure to comply with a chancellor's judgment was not excused by this Court's later determination that the chancellor's ruling was erroneous. Likewise, in Stacy v. Ross , this Court held that In short, unless we can say that a judgment was void ab initio, one bound by it must either comply or gain relief from an appropriate court on the pain of contempt. Stacy v. Ross, 798 So.2d 1275, 1283 (Miss.2001). This Court has held that even when an order of decree was erroneously or improvidently granted, a party cannot use the errors as a defense to disobey the provisions of the court order. Ladner v. Ladner, 206 So.2d 620, 623 (Miss.1968) (overruled on other grounds) (citing Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 668 (2d ed.1950)); Ellis v. Ellis, 840 So.2d 806, 811 (Miss.Ct.App. 2003) (The fact that such order is erroneous or irregular or improvidently rendered does not justify a person in failing to abide by its terms). The Court further stated: It is only where the order or decree is void, or where there was absolutely no jurisdiction under any circumstances, or where there is no state of facts which make it, or the part charged to have been disobeyed, any other than utterly of no force, that any answer attacking the decree itself is allowed, it is no defense whatever that the decree is erroneous so long as not void. Ladner, 206 So.2d at 623 (quoting Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 668 (2d ed.1950)). ¶ 42. The Greene County opinion did not void the second amended final judgment or the December 2007 contempt order. Instead, this Court determined that the underlying 2005 contracts between CMI and the GRHC trustees were invalid for lack of authority by Greene County. Consequently, certain issues on the first and second appeal were moot since the arguments proposed by the parties were based on an assumption that the trial court correctly determined that the 2005 contracts were valid and enforceable. ¶ 43. The second amended final judgment obligated CMI to provide documentation in accordance with paragraph 11. The special chancellor retained jurisdiction to enforce the provision of the second amended final judgment. After reviewing the evidence, the special chancellor determined that CMI had failed to comply with paragraph 11 of the second amended final judgment and awarded attorneys' fees. This Court has held that the trial court is more competent to decide matters of contempt due to its temporal and physical proximity. Here, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce its judgments. We cannot say that the trial court was manifestly wrong in its determination that CMI failed to provide required documentation pursuant to the second amended final judgment nor that the trial court was manifestly wrong by assessing attorneys' fees where one party intentionally failed to provide required documentation resulting in needlessly expending time and money on the matter by opposing counsel. This Court affirms the special chancellor's finding of contempt against CMI and award of $7,500 in attorneys' fees to Greene County.