Opinion ID: 3013697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Price Waterhouse

Text: We therefore move on to Morrissey’s argument that she was entitled to survive summary judgment under Price Waterhouse. Under Justice O’Connor’s controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse, if a plaintiff “show[s] by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision,” the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer “to show that the decision would have been the same absent discrimination.” 490 U.S. at 276. A plaintiff attempting to prove discrimination by direct evidence faces a “high hurdle.” Connors v. Chrysler Financial Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998). Specifically, the evidence must demonstrate that the “decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.” Id. Here, Morrissey relies exclusively on certain ageist remarks made by President Larson in an unrelated case brought against LCCC in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See Merkle v. Luzerne County Community College, No. 020515, (M.D. Pa. filed June 19, 2003). Morrissey asked the District Court in this case to take judicial notice of the factual findings in Merkle, which allegedly demonstrate that President Larson wanted to force the retirement of certain administrative employees in 1998 based on their age.5 While the District Court, for reasons that remain unclear, failed to rule on Morrissey’s request, we have no difficulty concluding that such a request, even 5 Because the record reflects that Morrissey relied exclusively on Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) in trying to place President Larson’s other acts in the record, we express no opinion as to whether Morrissey could have otherwise introduced such evidence by establishing its admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). -11- if considered, should have been rejected. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that courts may only take judicial notice of facts outside the trial record that are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A judicially noticed fact must either be generally known within the jurisdiction of the trial court, or be capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See id.; Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2001). Facts adjudicated in a prior case fall short of this standard. As we have previously stated, “[t]aking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of a filing from a related action could reach, and perhaps breach, the boundaries of proper judicial notice.” Werner, 267 F.3d at 295 (declining to take judicial notice of board minutes filed in separate action involving separate parties); see also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Facts adjudicated in a prior case do not meet either test of indisputability contained in Rule 201(b): they are not usually common knowledge, nor are they derived from an unimpeachable source.”); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that the effect of judicially noticing a fact is to preclude the opposing party from introducing contrary evidence and essentially direct a verdict against him as to the noticed fact). As such, we conclude that it would be improper for either this Court, or the District Court, to consider the substance of the factual record in the unrelated Merkle case. As Morrissey proffers no other direct evidence, we hold that Morrissey cannot -12- survive summary judgment on her age discrimination claims under Price Waterhouse.