Opinion ID: 2159609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Founded on Promissory Estoppel.

Text: Faced with these statutory impediments to a claim founded on actionable misrepresentation, plaintiffs urge that we should permit recovery against the State in the present action under a theory of promissory estoppel such as that embraced within Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). We reject this claim for two reasons. First, we believe that in adopting the exceptions set forth in section 25A.14 the legislature intended to preclude all claims based on the type of conduct described in the exclusionary language. See Greene, 406 N.W.2d at 436. The statute is designed to relieve the State from liability for the false or inaccurate representations of its employees to the extent that such liability would extend to the acts of private parties. There would be little purpose in such a statutory scheme if it could be circumvented merely by a shift of legal theory. A second reason for failing to allow a claim against the State under plaintiffs' promissory estoppel theory is that the facts fail to meet the criteria for waiver of state immunity in contract cases. In Kersten Co. v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 207 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1973), this court based the right of individuals to recover against the state on express contracts on the need for mutuality of remedy in order to insure fairness. As we expressly noted in that decision: [T]he ... [State] cannot function without countless day-to-day contractual dealings. Of course, the State expects the other contracting parties to honor these obligations. It canand doesseek redress when they fail to do so. Just as certainly they expect faithful performance by the State; but they have been left without adequate recourse when these expectations are unfulfilled. We do not consider a request for legislative allowance to be a satisfactory remedy for breach of a contractual duty. We agree with those courts which say the State, by entering into a contract, agrees to be answerable for its breach and waives its immunity from suit to that extent. Id. at 119-20. Citizens who contract with the state for a specific performance should be fairly accorded enforcement of the state's obligations in the courts. Citizens do not contract with the state or its agencies, however, in order to obtain necessary permits for governmentally regulated activities. These plaintiffs did not contract with the state for the benefit of a rendering plant in Adair County. The need to assure mutuality of remedy is therefore nonexistent in the present situation. In deciding the present case, we need not consider plaintiffs' contention that the type of quasi-contractual recovery permitted against municipal corporations in some instances, see Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids, 326 N.W.2d 355, 358-60 (Iowa 1982), should also be available on claims against the state. The type of quasi-contractual liability recognized in Dolezal involved unjust enrichment of the public agency. The present case is not grounded on unjust enrichment.