Opinion ID: 1861472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: respondents' arguments

Text: At the outset, it is significant to note that respondents have produced no precedent on the issue of an administrative agency's assumption of jurisdiction over a Supreme Court. Furthermore, in its opinion asserting its jurisdiction to bring the Supreme Court before it as a litigant, MERC summarily dismissed the separation of powers argument: Art 3, § 2 (separation of powers provision) can be dealt with summarily on the observation that clerical employees do not exercise the powers of one branch of government or another. MERC's conclusion focuses on the wrong point. It is not determinative that certain Supreme Court employees may or may not be subject to the public employment relations act, MCL 423.201 et seq., MSA 17.455(1) et seq. The point is that MERC is attempting to bring the Supreme Court before its tribunal as a party defendant. That is what is critical; it is that MERC is taking jurisdiction over the Supreme Court itself, not certain of its clerical employees. Likewise, MERC's argument in its brief is beside the point. There MERC argues that because Const 1963, art 4, § 48 [3] does not specifically exclude Supreme Court employees but does exclude state civil service employees, by negative implication Supreme Court employees are included. Whether Const 1963, art 4, § 48 includes or excludes Supreme Court employees has nothing whatsoever to do with whether 1965 PA 379 should be, or can be, interpreted to give MERC judicial jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers established by Const 1963, art 3, § 2. In addition, the Legislature in enacting 1965 PA 379 [4] pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, § 48, has not by specific reference included the Michigan Supreme Court. Since an inclusion to give such jurisdiction to MERC would contravene the requirements of Const 1963, art 3, § 2 and be unconstitutional, it would be normal interpretative practice to read 1965 PA 379 as not giving jurisdiction to MERC over the Michigan Supreme Court as in this case. [5]