Opinion ID: 1224377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Separation of powerslegislative directions of factual findings

Text: ¶ 32 The federal parties argue that a number of the statutory changes violate the separation of powers clause, article III of the Arizona Constitution, by changing both substantive and evidentiary law in midstream of a pending case. Other statutes, they argue, similarly violate the constitution by dictating the court's findings on factual matters. Thus, the Legislature has attempted to control both process and result, depriving the court of its constitutional authority to find facts and to define and apply the law. ¶ 33 The concepts of due process and separation of powers are somewhat intertwined. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process due process of law, by its mere will. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1855). The United States Supreme Court long ago addressed this issue in a case in which Congress changed the rules of the game at what may be described as halftime. The Court previously had held that those who had been in rebellion during the Civil War could reclaim or obtain compensation for seized property if they could prove they received a presidential pardon. Such a pardon would satisfy the statutory condition that the claimant had not been in rebellion. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133, citing United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 19 L.Ed. 788 (1869). The claimant, Klein, had been pardoned and thus prevailed on his claim, but while the case was pending on appeal, Congress enacted a law effectively negating Padelford. The statute provided that absent express exculpatory language, a pardon was admissible as proof of participation in rebellion but inadmissible as evidence of non-participation. Id. at 133-34. With the tables turned in this manner, Klein would not have been entitled to compensation because the statute deprived the courts of jurisdiction and required dismissal. The Supreme Court made short shrift of the government's motion to dismiss. It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power.... What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way? ... Can we do so without allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it? We think not.... We must think that Congress had inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power. Id. at 146-47. [8] ¶ 34 Similarly, we believe any attempt by the Arizona Legislature to adjudicate pending cases by defining existing law and applying it to fact is prohibited by article III of the Arizona Constitution, which describes the distribution of powers of our government as follows: The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others. With these principles in mind, we analyze Judge Bolton's ruling on the separation of powers issues.
¶ 35 An entirely new § 45-258 provides for summary adjudication of certain statutorily defined de minimis uses. Stockponds with a capacity of fifteen acre-feet or less, domestic uses of three acre-feet or less, small business uses of three acre-feet or less, and stock watering uses of one acre-foot or less shall be deemed de minimis and are to be summarily adjudicated and incorporated into the final decree. The parties estimate these de minimis uses include between two-thirds and four-fifths of the total general adjudication claims. Parties whose claims are adversely affected by another's statutorily required de minimis finding will be able to object to water right attributes decreed as de minimis only in post-decree severance and transfer or change of use proceedings, or in post-decree enforcement actions. See new § 45-258(F). Moreover, those who claim that a de minimis use interferes with their water right have the burden of proving the water diverted or withdrawn would otherwise be available to satisfy their right, a burden similar to the futile call doctrine. [9] Because there were no statutorily prescribed de minimis uses prior to enactment of HB 2276, the water master previously could find different de minimis standards for particular watersheds. The master's findings of fact were made after contested hearings in which the parties were able to present evidence on the de minimis issue. See Gila River Adjudication II, 175 Ariz. at 394, 857 P.2d at 1248 ([T]rial court may adopt a rationally based exclusion for wells having a de minimis effect on the river system. (emphasis added)). ¶ 36 The state parties contend that § 45-258 is an attempt to focus the general adjudication proceedings on larger claims by establishing a summary adjudication procedure for those claimants with relatively small annual usage. The federal parties argue that the de minimis provisions violate the separation of powers and the due process clauses of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 37 The Legislature has the power to enact and create law within constitutional bounds. Chevron Chem. Co., 131 Ariz. at 440, 641 P.2d at 1284. The power to define existing law, including common law, and to apply it to facts rests exclusively within the judicial branch. Id. Although some blending of powers is inevitable given today's complex government, the separation of powers doctrine ensures sufficient checks and balances to preserve each branch's core functions. J.W. Hancock Enters., v. Arizona State Registrar of Contractors, 142 Ariz. 400, 405, 690 P.2d 119, 124 (App.1984). Article III is violated at the point where the legislative enactment unreasonably limits the judiciary's performance of its duties. See San Carlos II, 144 Ariz. at 278, 697 P.2d at 671. The court of appeals has developed a test for analyzing separation of powers claims. See J.W. Hancock Enters., 142 Ariz. at 405-06, 690 P.2d at 124-25. We adopted this test in State ex rel. Woods v. Block, finding that it provides the necessary flexibility yet still maintains the goal of the separation of powers doctrine. 189 Ariz. 269, 276, 942 P.2d 428, 435 (1997). Thus, we evaluate the federal parties' article III claims using the following four factors as guidance: (1) the essential nature of the power exercised; (2) the Legislature's degree of control in exercising the power; (3) the Legislature's objective; and (4) the practical consequences of the action. Id. at 277-78, 942 P.2d at 436-37. ¶ 38 The essential nature of the power exercised in § 45-258 is judicial. This statute directs DWR and the courts to decree de minimis use based on a bright-line, legislative standard. No provision exists for the presentation of evidence regarding what would be a true de minimis use given the amount of water actually available. For example, under § 45-258, one acre-foot would be de minimis whether diverted from the Gila River or from a spring with a yearly flow of only two acre-feet. As Judge Bolton noted, the legislature is in no position to determine the amount of water that is de minimis for domestic, business, stockpond and stockwatering uses in numerous [and vastly differing] watersheds throughout the State. This conclusion, she held, must be made after determining contested facts and applying the law to those facts, which is strictly a judicial function. We agree. ¶ 39 The Legislature took complete control under § 45-258 and required the court to decree certain uses as de minimis. The court has no power to hear the facts and make the ultimate conclusion in the context of each watershed. Nor does the ability to challenge the de minimis use in post-decree enforcement proceedings save this provision. The extended delay would violate due process by depriving the parties of the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 4; see also Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65, 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); Salas v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 182 Ariz. 141, 143, 893 P.2d 1304, 1306 (App.1995). ¶ 40 The Legislature may have had the laudatory objective of relieving the smaller water users of the financial and temporal burdens associated with the general adjudication proceedings. The practical effect of the enactment, however, was to remove all possibility of meaningful judicial conclusions based on findings of fact. This the Legislature cannot do. Compare Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-48, with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429-32, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855). We agree with Judge Bolton's conclusion that § 45-258 violates separation of powers. The following provisions are also invalid, as they have no meaning or effect without § 45-258: § 45-182(B)(4), which provides that the requirement of filing a statement of claim shall not apply to rights determined to be de minimis; and § 45-256(A)(5), which requires the director to identify those claims or uses that are de minimis as prescribed by § 45-258. [10]
¶ 41 Judge Bolton further concluded that § 45-256(A)(6), which establishes on-farm water duties based on elevation, violates separation of powers. Again, we agree. Depending on elevation, the statute mandates a finding of irrigation water quantities needed for particular crops and requires that such quantities be assigned in DWR's report to the master or court. The court must then incorporate those quantities in the decree unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. § 45-256(A)(6). We recognize that DWR may recommend that the master adopt and apply uniform quantities, but it may do so only after investigating the irrigation uses. DWR's function is to provide technical assistance to the master and trial judge. See San Carlos II, 144 Ariz. at 279, 697 P.2d at 672. Assistance, however, does not include reporting statutorily mandated factual findings based on a statute rather than factual investigation. As Judge Bolton noted, the factual determination of quantities needed for certain crops and elevations must be judicially determined on the basis of evidence; it cannot be legislatively mandated. Thus, § 45-256(A)(6) violates separation of powers for the same reasons the de minimis provisions violate the doctrine. The Legislature cannot dictate to the master, court, or DWR the factual conclusions that underlie decrees.
¶ 42 Section 45-256(A)(7) attempts to set the quantity of an appropriative right by requiring DWR to measure an appropriator's water diversions (the amount of water appropriated) by the maximum theoretical capacity of the diversion facility. Similarly, it provides that reservoir storage quantities be set at the maximum controlled capacity of the reservoir. These findings must then be presumed correct by the master and the court and incorporated in the decree unless rebutted by evidence offered by a claimant. § 45-256(A)(7). As Judge Bolton noted, the actual diversions may never have been close to the diversion facility's maximum theoretical capacity, and some reservoir storage quantities may never have neared the reservoir's maximum capacity. The statute prevents the court from basing its judgment on the amount of water actually diverted or stored and thus beneficially used. The Legislature may not require a court to reach and decree factual conclusions based on legislative determinations rather than actual facts. This is particularly so when the statute affects pending case decisions. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-48. As with the de minimis use and on-farm water duties, § 45-256(A)(7) violates separation of powers and must fail.
¶ 43 Section 45-257(C) provides that settlement agreements made by claimants must be decreed by the court. The statute does not give the court authority to review the agreement. In an inter sese proceeding such as this adjudication, a court cannot be required to incorporate an agreement that may affect the availability of water for other claimants or interfere with senior rights. Because of the scarcity of water, this may be the result even though the statute states that the agreement shall be binding only among [its] parties. § 45-257(C). We concur with Judge Bolton's conclusion that this provision violates the separation of powers doctrine.
¶ 44 Section 45-261(A)(2) and (4) provide that DWR, the master, and the court shall accept information in prior filings as true unless DWR finds it clearly erroneous. In addition, conflicting information must be resolved favorably to the claimant unless DWR finds it clearly erroneous. Subsection (B) imposes on the objecting party the burden to prove the facts contained in the prior filing incorrect by clear and convincing evidence. We agree with Judge Bolton that these provisions, too, violate separation of powers. It is the ultimate responsibility of the court, not the government agency providing technical assistance, to determine the credibility of information in prior filings and what is clearly erroneous. DWR must be able to investigate all evidence before making a recommendation regarding water right attributes. Information contained in prior filings may constitute some factual evidence of a claimant's water right. See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6) to (10), (14) to (16). It is simply one item of evidence, however, and cannot be given determinative effect by virtue of legislative fiat. In general, the power to make rules, including rules of evidence, resides in the judicial branch. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(5); Slayton v. Shumway, 166 Ariz. 87, 89, 800 P.2d 590, 592 (1990). We will recognize a statutory rule when it is reasonable and workable and when it supplements rather than contradicts our rules. State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984). Here, however, the statute does much more than supplement our rules. It precludes the court from determining the credibility of the information in the prior filings. This it cannot do and is therefore invalid.
¶ 45 Section 45-256(B) provides that DWR's report shall list all information that is obtained by the director and that reasonably relates to the water right claim or use investigated. The report must also include the director's proposed water right attributes for each water right claim or use investigated. If no water right finding is proposed, DWR's report shall so indicate. Objections are permitted, but they must specifically address DWR's recommendations. Objections not in compliance must be dismissed with prejudice. ¶ 46 We follow Judge Bolton's analysis and uphold § 45-256(B). DWR has considerable expertise in the investigation and reporting of water rights, claims, and uses. See San Carlos II, 144 Ariz. at 279, 697 P.2d at 672 (noting that DWR's most important task is to provide technical assistance during adjudication proceedings). In preparing hydrographic survey reports (HSRs), DWR conducts an extensive historical review of all water right claims and uses, performs field investigations, and reviews appropriate treaties, filings, and all other documentation of the water right, claim, or use. Unlike the sections discussed above, § 45-256(B) does not dictate DWR's findings or require the court to accept or decree its HSR. But when DWR's investigation discloses water right attributes, or their absence, DWR is allowed to make the appropriate recommendation. This type of quasi-judicial function is constitutionally permitted of agencies such as DWR, so long as judicial review is permitted. See, e.g., Cactus Wren Partners v. Arizona Dep't of Bldg. & Fire Safety, 177 Ariz. 559, 562-64, 869 P.2d 1212, 1215-17 (App. 1994) (holding that department's hearing and resolving of landlord/tenant disputes does not usurp judicial authority so long as judicial review is available as critical check on administrative power). We realize in this case DWR is acting as a technical advisor and not as an administrative agency, but we believe the concerns are similar. Under § 45-256(B), claimants are permitted to file timely, specific written objections to DWR's recommendations and have a fair and reasonable opportunity to present evidence supporting or opposing the recommendations. The final adjudication still resides in the court. So long as DWR and the court are not required to make predetermined factual findings or decree certain rights, the statute does not violate due process or separation of powers. ¶ 47 New subsections (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G), which concern the evidentiary use of parts of the HSR, have also been added to § 45-256. If the claim or use described in the report is 500 acre-feet or less, the information describing that water right claim shall be summarily admitted into evidence, and in the absence of conflicting evidence, the report's proposed attributes are to be deemed correct and incorporated into the decree. If conflicting evidence is presented, however, DWR's proposed attributes are given the weight deemed appropriate by the master and the court. If the claim or use described in the report is more than 500 acre-feet, the HSR shall not be summarily admitted into evidence or given any presumption of correctness. Those portions of the report that do not contain DWR's recommendations are not summarily admitted, though they may be offered in evidence if relevant. ¶ 48 We have already determined that separation of powers principles prevent the Legislature from directing that the court decree certain facts or water right attributes without any opportunity for review. Thus, those provisions of § 45-256(D) that require the director's proposed attributes to be deemed correct and incorporated into the decree cannot be upheld. The remaining portions of § 45-256(C), (D), (E), (F), and (G) are valid because they do not mandate a particular conclusion by the court; thus the evidentiary admission of the HSR for the court's consideration is a lawful exercise of legislative power in this statutorily created action. See Seidel, 142 Ariz. at 591, 691 P.2d at 682 (under some circumstances, court will recognize reasonable and workable statutory rules that do not conflict with judicial rules of evidence or procedure). The HSR may be admitted in evidence under the conditions stated in § 45-256(C) through (G) and given whatever weight, if any, the court deems appropriate.
¶ 49 New § 45-255(A) gives the superior court judge the power to appoint special masters, and subsection (B) provides that if filing fees are exhausted, a line item appropriation from the state general fund will support the master. We appointed the current special master, John Thorson, for both adjudications under the previous statute. He has served since 1990, and as far as we are aware, there are neither grounds nor plans for a change in this regard. Obviously, the Legislature cannot direct the change of a judicial officer in a pending case, and we do not interpret the new statute to so require. If an additional or a new master must be appointed in the future, he or she may be appointed pursuant to the new version of § 45-255(A). ¶ 50 Section 45-257(A)(2) requires that the master file a report with the court on all determinations, recommendations, findings of fact, or conclusions of law issued. Written objections may be filed within sixty days (180 days if the report covers an entire subwatershed or reservation). Again, we find this a valid exercise of legislative power over a procedural matter in an action created by statute. We therefore affirm Judge Bolton's ruling upholding § 45-255(A) and (B), and § 45-257(A)(2).
¶ 51 Section 45-263(B) states: The public trust is not an element of a water right in an adjudication proceeding held pursuant to this article. In adjudicating the attributes of water rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a determination as to whether public trust values are associated with any or all of the river system or source. ¶ 52 Judge Bolton upheld the Legislature's prohibition against considering the public trust doctrine in the adjudications. We disagree. The public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power to give away resources held by the state in trust for its people. See Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 364-66, 837 P.2d 158, 166-68 (App. 1991) (applying both the separation of powers doctrine and the gift clause, article 9, section 7 of the Arizona Constitution). The Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doctrine inapplicable to these or any proceedings. While the issue has been raised before the master, we do not yet know if the doctrine applies to all, some, or none of the claims. That determination depends on the facts before a judge, not on a statute. It is for the courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority. See id. at 366-69, 837 P.2d at 168-71.