Opinion ID: 4543084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶17 We begin by discussing the law pertinent to Crim. P. 12(b)(2) and waivers thereunder and conclude that Wester-Gravelle did not waive her unanimity claim. We thus proceed to review Wester-Gravelle’s claim for plain error. In doing so, we decline to address the People’s invitation to adopt the plain error standard articulated in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993), because the People did not raise that argument below and we did not grant certiorari to address it. We then turn to the merits of this case, and we conclude that Wester-Gravelle has not established reversible plain error on the facts presented here.
¶18 The People contend that Wester-Gravelle waived her present contention because (1) her argument is in the nature of a duplicity claim; (2) pursuant to 8 Crim. P. 12(b)(2) and (3), she was required to raise such a claim by motion within twenty-one days following arraignment or else the claim would be deemed waived, absent a showing of good cause; and (3) she did not timely raise the claim or show good cause. ¶19 Crim. P. 12(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part: Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information or complaint, or summons and complaint, other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, may be raised only by motion. The motion shall include all such defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to present any such defense or objection constitutes a waiver of it, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. ¶20 Crim. P. 12(b)(3), in turn, dictates, “The motion shall be made within 21 days following arraignment.” ¶21 Under Crim. P. 8(a)(1), a defendant is entitled to have each offense alleged against him or her “prosecuted by separate counts in a single prosecution.” See also Sweek v. People, 277 P. 1, 3 (Colo. 1929) (“No more than one offense should be charged in one count.”). A count charging the commission of more than one distinct and separate criminal offense is duplicitous. United States v. Miller, 891 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2018); see also Melina v. People, 161 P.3d 635, 644 (Colo. 2007) (Coats, J., concurring in the judgment only) (“Any count charging the commission of more than one offense is therefore subject to challenge as duplicitous.”); Marrs v. People, 312 P.2d 505, 508 (Colo. 1957) (“To be duplicitous 9 an information must join two or more distinct and separate offenses in the same count of an indictment or information.”). ¶22 Here, the People view Wester-Gravelle’s unanimity contention as raising a duplicity issue, and they assert that such an issue is an inherent defect in a charging document, even when the issue is not apparent on the face of that document. The People thus contend that Wester-Gravelle was required to raise her present contention in a Crim. P. 12(b) motion and, having failed to do so, she waived that contention, even if the duplicity problem did not become apparent until the introduction of evidence during trial. For several reasons, we disagree. ¶23 First, the charge as filed by the prosecution in this case was not inherently duplicitous. The charge as written properly alleged a single count of forgery based on a Home Care Aide Shift Charting Sheet completed between and including July 11, 2015 and July 31, 2015. Nothing on the face of the charging document revealed a defect to which Wester-Gravelle could properly have objected. ¶24 Second, as we explained in Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 43, 390 P.3d 816, 823, “we perceive nothing in Crim. P. 12(b)(2) that requires a defendant to file a motion regarding any error that might later flow from the charging document . . . .” Nor have the People cited any area of law “in which parties are required to take action to preserve an issue before the issue has arisen and before 10 any error has occurred.” Id. at ¶ 44, 390 P.3d at 823. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) simply does not require such prescience. ¶25 Third, to the extent that the People are arguing that Crim. P. 12(b)(2) sprang back into play after the pleading stage and in the course of discovery, they cite no applicable law to support such a theory, and the language of Crim. P. 12(b)(2) is to the contrary. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) is directed to defects in the information or complaint. As noted above, we perceive no such defect here, nor did the information become retroactively defective based on the evidence that the prosecution ultimately chose to present. Simply stated, at the time Wester-Gravelle allegedly knew or should have known, based on the discovery that she had received, that the evidence might present a unanimity issue, the issue was no longer a pleading matter governed by Crim. P. 12(b)(2). Rather, it was an issue regarding Wester-Gravelle’s entitlement to a prosecutorial election or a modified unanimity instruction that could be raised at trial. ¶26 For all of these reasons, we conclude that Wester-Gravelle had no obligation to file a Crim. P. 12(b)(2) motion here, and therefore she did not waive her right to object on the basis of a lack of juror unanimity at trial. ¶27 This is not to say, however, that Wester-Gravelle preserved the issue now before us. She did not demand a prosecutorial election or request a modified unanimity instruction, and therefore she forfeited any such claim of error. See 11 People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 44, 416 P.3d 893, 903 (concluding that a defendant’s acquiescence to an alleged constructive amendment amounted to a forfeiture and not a waiver, when the defendant’s lack of objection resulted from neglect and not intent). Accordingly, we will review her claim for plain error. See id. at ¶ 47, 416 P.3d at 903 (reviewing a forfeited argument for plain error). ¶28 As we have previously explained, “An error is plain if it is obvious and substantial and so undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Id. at ¶ 48, 416 P.3d at 903. Generally, an error is obvious when it contravenes a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal principle, or Colorado case law. Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16, 390 P.3d 832, 835. ¶29 We note that the People have asked that, if we review Wester-Gravelle’s contention for plain error, we adopt the Supreme Court’s articulation of the plain error standard in Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. The People, however, did not raise this issue before the division below. To the contrary, they relied on the same plain error standard that we apply here. Moreover, the People did not seek certiorari asking us to consider whether to adopt Olano’s plain error formulation, and we did not grant certiorari on that issue. Accordingly, the issue is not properly before us. 12
¶30 Turning then to the merits of the issue before us, in Archuleta, ¶¶ 20–24, also decided today, we set forth the pertinent law regarding juror unanimity. As we explained at some length in that opinion, a Colorado criminal defendant is entitled to a unanimous jury verdict. Id. at ¶ 20. “Unanimity in a verdict is required, however, ‘only with respect to the ultimate issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged and not with respect to alternative means by which the crime was committed.’” Id. (quoting People v. Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375, 1387 n.5 (Colo. 1981)). Thus, as we reiterated in Archuleta, “a jury need not unanimously decide ‘which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element’ or ‘which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.’” Id. (quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)). ¶31 When, however, the prosecution presents evidence of multiple distinct acts, any one of which would establish the offense charged, “and there is a reasonable likelihood that jurors will disagree regarding which act was committed, then the People may be compelled to select the transaction on which they are relying for a conviction.” Id. at ¶ 21. Alternatively, the defendant may be entitled to a modified unanimity instruction, informing the jurors that to convict the defendant, they “must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts 13 or that the defendant committed all of the acts described by the victim and included within the time period charged.” Id. at ¶ 22 (quoting Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144, 154 (Colo. 1990)). ¶32 When a defendant is charged with engaging in a single transaction of criminal conduct and the prosecution proceeds at trial on that basis, however, neither a prosecutorial election nor a modified unanimity instruction is required. Id. at ¶ 23; see also Melina, 161 P.3d at 641–42 (considering a solicitation charge and concluding that no unanimity instruction was required when the prosecution did not present two discrete, mutually exclusive, and independent crimes of solicitation but rather the evidence and the prosecution’s theory of the case were that the defendant had engaged in a single transaction of solicitation to murder another person). ¶33 The foregoing requirements serve “both to give the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense and to assure juror unanimity.” Archuleta, ¶ 24. ¶34 As pertinent here, the forgery statute provides: A person commits forgery, if, with intent to defraud, such person falsely makes, completes, alters, or utters a written instrument which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent if completed: .... (c) a deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument, promissory note, check, or other instrument which does 14 or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status. § 18-5-102(1)(c). ¶35 The parties agree that the prosecution charged Wester-Gravelle with a single count of forgery based on the alleged falsification of signatures on three shift charts. They disagree, however, as to whether such evidence represents multiple transactions or multiple incidents comprising a single transaction of forgery. Wester-Gravelle asserts that it was the former and that she was therefore entitled to either a prosecutorial election or a modified unanimity instruction. The People, in contrast, assert that it was the latter and that no such election or instruction was required. Even if the trial court erred, however, the People contend that any error was not plain. For several reasons, we agree with the People’s latter contention and need not address the former. ¶36 First, in light of existing case law, we cannot say that any error was obvious. By way of example, in Melina, 161 P.3d at 641, we considered a scenario in which, like here, the prosecution charged several separate acts (there, solicitation to commit murder) as a single transaction. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had made numerous statements to several individuals expressing his desire to have the intended victim killed, we concluded that the defendant’s statements, when taken together, constituted a single transaction of solicitation. Id. And because the evidence presented and the prosecution’s theory of the case 15 were that the defendant had engaged in a single transaction of solicitation to commit murder, we determined that the trial court did not need to give the jurors a unanimity instruction. Id. at 641–42. ¶37 Because the circumstances in Melina parallel those at issue here (i.e., separate acts charged and tried as a single transaction), we cannot say that the trial court in this case contravened a well-settled legal principle or Colorado case law in not acting on its own to require an election or give a modified unanimity instruction. See Scott, ¶ 16, 390 P.3d at 835. ¶38 Second, as noted above, the trial court gave the jury the current version of the standard model criminal jury instruction regarding unanimity, which informed the jury that any verdict had to be unanimous as to “all parts of it.” Because this instruction could be read to have required the jurors to reach unanimous agreement on every part of their verdict, we perceive no obvious error in the trial court’s not, sua sponte, giving a modified unanimity instruction. ¶39 Finally, based on our review of the record, we cannot say that any error here was so substantial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. From the very beginning of this case, the prosecution treated Wester-Gravelle’s conduct as a single transaction in which Wester-Gravelle forged her work record so that she would be paid for having worked three weeks in July of 2015, despite the fact that she had not worked any portion of that time. The 16 prosecution charged the case that way. The prosecution’s witnesses then testified that Wester-Gravelle did not work any of the dates covered by the shift charts. An expert in questioned document examination testified that, in his opinion, it was highly probable that W.M. had not authored any of the signatures on the pertinent shift charts. The prosecution entered the three charts into evidence as a single exhibit. And during closing argument, the prosecution informed the jury that it had to find forged signatures on all three shift charts in order to convict Wester-Gravelle. Specifically, the prosecution told the jurors: [O]ne thing that may be creating some confusion is we’ve talked about a number of these signatures on the various forms. . . . I do not have to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that each and every one of those signatures was forged. Not every one of those signatures has to be forged, but each of those forms has to contain a forged signature in order to complete the three different time sheets from [the weeks ending] July 17th, from July 24th, from July 31st, which created the obligation for Interim Healthcare to pay the defendant for services she did not perform. (Emphasis added.) ¶40 In light of the foregoing, we perceive no reasonable likelihood that the jurors would have disagreed about which of the charts Wester-Gravelle had falsified when they voted to convict her of the single count of forgery. The prosecution’s evidence demonstrated that all three charts were forged. The prosecution argued to the jurors that to convict Wester-Gravelle, they had to find that each of the charts had a forged signature. And the prosecution did not suggest that the forged charts 17 reflected separate and distinct criminal transactions. Rather, consistent with the way in which it charged the case, it tried the case as involving a single transaction. ¶41 Accordingly, we conclude that any error in this case was not plain and Wester-Gravelle is not entitled to reversal of her conviction.