Opinion ID: 77401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Fleeing Felon Statute

Text: 75 Appellants next contend that their convictions must be overturned because the district court failed to give a jury instruction concerning Florida's fleeing felon statute. See Fla. Stat. § 776.05. In relevant part, § 776.05 provides that a police officer is justified in using force against a fleeing felon in various circumstances, as follows: 76 A law enforcement officer . . . is justified in the use of any force . . . (3) When necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice . . ., and (a) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon poses a threat of death or serious physical harm to the officer or others; or (b) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to another person. 77 Id. Appellants contend that § 776.05 authorizes all of the police shootings in this case, and that the lawfulness of the shootings themselves constitutes a complete defense to the obstruction-of-justice charges. 78 The district court denied Appellants' request for a jury instruction on this fleeing felon statute. Instead, the district court decided that it would be more appropriate to introduce the fleeing felon statute itself into evidence. Accordingly, prior to closing statements in the first trial, the district court briefly reopened the case to allow defense counsel to read the fleeing felon statute to the jury. The district court then took judicial notice of the statute and provided the jurors with written copies of the statute. The district court followed the same procedure in the second trial, allowing the defense to read the fleeing felon statute into evidence, taking judicial notice of it, and providing copies to the jury. 79 The district court admitted the statute into evidence in order to ensure that the jury could consider Appellants' arguments that they had no motive to plant guns and to lie about the shootings because the shootings were arguably justified by Florida's fleeing felon statute. Appellants, of course, did not object to the statute being admitted into evidence and read to the jury, and they do not raise any issue on appeal about that procedure. Rather, Appellants' sole argument is that the statute should have also been part of the district court's jury instructions. 80 The government first argues that Appellants waived this issue in the district court. The government posits that Appellants effectively consented, or at least did not adequately object, to the district court's decision to publish the fleeing felon statute as evidence in lieu of giving a jury charge based on the statute. When the district court, during the first trial, proposed to publish the statute rather than issue a jury instruction, Appellant Beguiristain's counsel replied, [a]s long as [the fleeing felon statute] comes before the jury, I don't think we have a technical objection. The district court specifically proposed that I reopen to allow judicial notice of [the fleeing felon statute], and that can be read [to the jury]. . . . But I don't think it is appropriate just to put [the fleeing felon statute] in the instructions as something that stands alone because it doesn't relate to anything. Appellant Beguiristain's counsel responded, [w]e have no objection to that technique, your honor. After this compromise was worked out, counsel for the remaining Appellants raised no objections. 81 Likewise, when the fleeing felon statute was discussed prior to closing statements in the second trial, Appellant Gonzalez's counsel stated, [w]ith regard to the judicial notice [of the fleeing felon statute], Judge, we've agreed the way it was done last year [in the first trial] is the same way we would like it this year. According to the government, counsel for Appellants Garcia and Quintero raised no objections and thereby also effectively consented. 82 In response, Appellants argue that the government quotes part of the record out of context, ignoring other sections where Appellants preserved their objection to the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the fleeing felon statute. For example, Appellants point to the fact that they agreed to the district court's final jury instructions with the caveat of without waiving our prior objections. We need not resolve the waiver issue, because even assuming Appellants adequately objected, Appellants have failed to establish any reversible error based on the district court's not giving the requested instruction. 21 83 Appellants' primary basis for their requested jury charge is, essentially, that because the shootings were authorized under Florida's fleeing felon statute, the shootings could not have constituted violations or possible violations of federal civil rights law. 22 Appellants contend that if the shootings themselves were lawful, even assuming Appellants hindered the investigation into the shootings, Appellants nonetheless did not violate § 1512(b)(3), because they did not hinder, delay, or prevent the communication . . . of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (emphasis added). 23 84 The fatal flaw in Appellants' argument is that even if the police shootings themselves were ultimately determined to be lawful, the Appellants still violated the law by obstructing the investigations into the shootings. Essentially, Appellants' jury instruction argument presumes that it is lawful to obstruct justice so long as the obstructed investigation ultimately wouldn't have found anything criminal anyway. This misconstrues the meaning of obstruction of justice and ignores that § 1512(b)(3) criminalizes the obstruction of an investigation into either the commission of a federal offense or an investigation into the possible commission of a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). 85 As we said in Veal, [b]y its wording, § 1512(b)(3) does not depend on the existence or imminency of a federal case or investigation but rather on the possible existence of a federal crime and a defendant's intention to thwart an inquiry into that crime. Veal, 153 F.3d at 1250 (emphasis in original). The fabrication of evidence to mislead federal investigators violates § 1512(b)(3) whether or not the potential federal investigation would have uncovered sufficient evidence to prove that a federal crime was actually committed. See United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 790 (4th Cir.1990) (under § 1512(b)(3), proof of an actual commission of a federal offense is not a necessary prerequisite to, or an essential element of, the crime of obstruction of justice); United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 687 (3d Cir.1999) ([I]f the investigation or prosecution a defendant tries to hamper turns out to be federal, the witness is guilty of tampering with a federal witness even if the prosecution is unable to establish the facts necessary to establish a violation of federal law.); United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 681 (1st Cir.2000) (Section 1512(b)(3) does not require that the defendant be convicted of the federal offense. . . . [T]he dispositive issue is the federal character of the investigation, not guilty verdicts on any federal offenses that may be charged.). 86 Thus, given the nature of the § 1512(b)(3) charges being tried and all other factual circumstances of this particular case, we conclude that Appellants have shown no reversible error due to the lack of this jury instruction.