Opinion ID: 1959985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Leslie Dawson

Text: We turn next to the propriety of the trial court's decision not to exclude Leslie Dawson from the venire for cause based on pro-death penalty views. We then address the related issue of under what circumstances an erroneous failure to excuse a prospective juror for cause constitutes reversible error. After the court's refusal to excuse Dawson for cause, defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against her. Before the final juror was qualified, defendant had already exhausted his allotment of peremptory challenges, forcing him, he claims, to seat a partial juror, Kennedy. The threshold question that we must resolve is whether the trial court's decision not to exclude Dawson for cause was an abuse of discretion. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 589, 575 A. 2d 816; Ramseur, supra , 106 N.J. at 260, 524 A. 2d 188. We employ the same standard in reviewing the propriety of a trial court's decision to exclude or not to exclude a juror because of the juror's pro-death penalty views as we do when a juror expresses opposition to the death penalty. See Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 437-38, 550 A. 2d 1172 (The same test that applies to a juror biased against imposition of the death penalty applies to a juror biased in favor of imposing capital punishment in all murder cases. Neither can serve fairly in the penalty phase.). The standard for both a pro- and anti-death-penalty juror is whether the juror's views about capital punishment `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.' Ramseur, supra , 106 N.J. at 255, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 589); see also State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 152, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) (Although Witherspoon, Adams, and Witt dealt with the exclusion of opponents of the death penalty, we believe that the same standard should apply to jurors who are proponents of the death penalty.). Whether Dawson's views would have prevented or substantially impaired her performance as a juror is a close question. The most troubling responses elicited from Dawson concern her views on murder for hire. Q Do you have any feelings about murders that are done for hire? A Yeah. Q What are your feelings? A I believe if you're paid, if someone pays you to kill someone else, then that's another case where, for me, for the death penalty. Q Would you vote for the death penalty automatically in such a case? A Most likely, unless I heard something, some strong evidence to change my mind and most likely I would go for the death penalty.         Q Good afternoon, ma'am. Miss Dawson, my name is Peter Liquori and I, along with Michele Soto, we represent Mr. DiFrisco here. MS. SOTO: Good afternoon. Q And coming off of what Mr. Bogdanski was saying, you know, in our minds we make decisions by balancing things. Right? Would you agree with that? A Yes. Q Kind of weighing things from side to side. Would you  and I  hearing what you said, you're very concerned something about murder for hire, that that's murder in which you thought you would feel strongly about the death penalty. A Yes. Q Would your feelings about the death penalty weigh so heavily or weigh heavy enough in your mind that you would expect a lot of proof from the Defense about mitigating factors? A Pretty much, yeah. I'd expect a lot of evidence to prove otherwise that this wasn't, I don't know  Q I mean  A I would need a lot. You see, I don't know what a lot in my mind would be. I would need enough in my mind, I would feel it would be enough for me to say, okay, I'd go a different way.         Q What if I tell you, what if you hear evidence that someone took  was paid money, got the money, agreed to go kill somebody and then purposely, by their own hand, by their own conduct, walks up to somebody and basically unloads a gun into them, killing them. After hearing that, what do you think about that, I mean, after hearing those facts, could you consider anything but the death penalty? A Not if they were paid money to go up and do this, no. Yet, Dawson repeatedly indicated that she would consider all evidence presented before reaching a conclusion. Q Would that aggravating factor affect you to the degree that in reality you really couldn't consider mitigating evidence? Is that what you're telling me? A No, I would consider it. I would consider it. I would listen to it and consider it and like I said, if it was very very good evidence, to sway me in a different way, then, you know, I would take it into consideration and listen to it and maybe go another way. But if it wasn't, if I didn't feel it was good enough for me to sway me in a different way, then I'd have to go with what I feel.         Q I mean, if you hear testimony, if the testimony that you hear that's presented to you, would you consider testimony that wasn't related to the circumstances of the offense but were related to someone's  their background, their family, you know, their mental state of mind? A I would take every bit of evidence, I would take everything I heard into consideration and like I said, if it was enough to make me sway a different way, then I would, you know, I would have to consider going instead of the death penalty, for life. If it was enough to make me say that, you know, I don't think the death penalty is good for this situation, but it would have to be enough to make me want to, you know   . Ms. Dawson also indicated that she believed that her personal views on capital punishment would not prevent or substantially impair her from performing her duties as a juror. Unlike the prospective juror we felt should have been excluded for cause in Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 439, 550 A. 2d 1172, Dawson never indicated that she would automatically impose a death sentence for deterrence purposes even if circumstances warranted a life sentence. Yet, her responses did suggest the possibility that her ability to deliberate impartially was substantially impaired by her belief that those who murder for compensation should be put to death. See Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 154, 548 A. 2d 887 (holding that failure to exclude for cause juror who indicated that violent murderers should be put to death in almost all circumstances was abuse of discretion). Whether Dawson was not `nearly as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit,' Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 441, 550 A. 2d 1172 (quoting State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 158, 203 A. 2d 1 (1964) (quoting State v. White, 105 N.H. 159, 196 A. 2d 33, 34 (1963)), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1965)), is an extremely difficult question. Indeed, the trial court reserved its decision on defendant's motion to excuse Dawson until it reviewed a transcript of her testimony. Considering our deference to trial courts in voir dire, we are not convinced that the trial court erred in not excusing Ms. Dawson for cause, but, as our discussion below indicates, we need not decide that question.