Opinion ID: 590939
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Early proceedings in the district court

Text: 9 On March 22, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Transamerica and against each of the defendants. In addition to a five-page opinion, the court entered a formal judgment simply stating the following: 10 IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that summary judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff, TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, and against defendants RONALD M. SOUTH, WALTER E. JONES, KATHLEEN JONES, WILLIAM J. HECHT, BARBARA J. HECHT, ROY W. BRUNSMANN, IRIS I. HANNON, and WILLIAM FLACH. 11 R.43. Between April 1 and April 11, Mr. South, Mr. Brunsmann, Mr. and Mrs. Jones, and Ms. Hannon filed notices of appeal from the court's March 22 judgment. On April 16, this court entered an order stating that a preliminary review of the record had revealed that the March 22 judgment neglected to supply the declaratory relief requested and, therefore, appeared not to be an appealable judgment. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Cammon, 929 F.2d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir.1991). The order directed the appellants to file a memorandum within two weeks stating why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 12 On April 26, the district court held a hearing in response to this court's order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court entered an amendment nunc pro tunc to its previous order, directing the clerk to enter judgment in favor of Transamerica, including a statement of declaratory relief and a fee award. The same day, April 26, an amended judgment was drafted, signed, and entered on the docket. 1 13 On May 3, Transamerica filed with the district court a motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), to amend the April 26 judgment in order to clarify what it perceived to be an ambiguity. On May 10, the court granted Transamerica's motion and entered an order to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc as to March 22. An amended judgment was drafted, signed, and entered on the docket the same day, May 10. On May 17, Mr. South filed a notice of appeal from the May 10 judgment. On May 23, Mr. Brunsmann also filed a notice of appeal from the May 10 judgment. Neither Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones, nor Ms. Hannon filed a timely notice of appeal from the May 10 judgment. Thus: 14 March 22 District court enters judgment that simply grants summary judgment to Transamerica. 15 April 1-11 Mr. South, Mr. Brunsmann, Mr. and Mrs. Jones, and Ms. Hannon filed notices of appeal from the court's March 22 judgment. 16 April 26 District court holds hearing in response to this court's April 16 order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court orders the clerk to amend the March 22 judgment, nunc pro tunc as to March 22, to provide a statement of declaratory relief and a fee award. 17 May 3 Transamerica files Rule 59(e) motion to state more clearly the declaratory relief provided on April 26. 18 May 10 District court grants Transamerica's Rule 59(e) motion and orders the clerk to enter a second amended judgment, nunc pro tunc as to March 22. 19 May 17 Mr. South files notice of appeal from May 10 amended judgment. 20 May 23 Mr. Brunsmann files notice of appeal from May 10 amended judgment. 21 We must now address whether all of the parties who originally filed notices of appeal are properly before this court, and whether the district court had jurisdiction to grant Transamerica's May 3 Rule 59(e) motion. Central to both of these issues is the question: What is the effective date of the final judgment?2. Final judgment 22 On April 16, this court entered an order stating that a preliminary review of the record had revealed that the March 22 judgment neglected to supply the declaratory relief requested and, therefore, appeared not to be an appealable judgment. Further study has confirmed our suspicion: Transamerica's complaint requested declaratory relief and, while the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Transamerica on March 22, the court failed to provide the declaratory relief requested. This omission rendered the March 22 judgment non-final and unappealable. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Cammon, 929 F.2d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir.1991) (This document ... neglected to supply the declaratory relief Metropolitan Life requested--for that matter, to provide any relief. It was accordingly not an appealable judgment.); Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc. v. Director, BATF, 812 F.2d 1044, 1045 (7th Cir.1987) (The district judge must select the language of the declaratory judgment and issue the order.). 23 The district court acknowledged this problem and corrected it on April 26 by amending the March 22 judgment nunc pro tunc to include a statement of declaratory relief. This was sufficient to produce a final judgment, but generated a new concern: Can such a substantive amendment have effect nunc pro tunc such that the effective date of the final judgment is March 22? If so, then the ten-day limit for filing a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the final judgment--including the declaratory relief crafted on April 26--expired on April 1, three weeks before the April 26 amendment. This would mean that, as appellants now contend, Transamerica's May 3 Rule 59(e) motion to amend was time-barred and the April 1-11 notices of appeal were effective. 24 The answer to this query turns on the scope of the district court's authority to give an order retroactive, or nunc pro tunc, effect. As a general rule, district courts may issue nunc pro tunc orders to show what was actually done but not properly or adequately recorded. LeBeau v. Taco Bell, Inc., 892 F.2d 605, 609 n. 3 (7th Cir.1989). See United States v. Taylor, 841 F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir.) (A court may issue a nunc pro tunc order to correct the record so that it reflects what was actually done but never recorded due to clerical inadvertence.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1236, 108 S.Ct. 2904, 2905, 101 L.Ed.2d 937 (1988). Thus, a nunc pro tunc order is typically used to correct clerical or ministerial errors or a failure of the court to reduce to judgment what it stated orally or in an opinion. See LeBeau, 892 F.2d at 609 (making explicit that dismissal was with prejudice); Local 1545, United Mine Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1292 n. 4 (7th Cir.1989) (the nunc pro tunc order is a correction of a clerical error); Krull v. Celotex Corp., 827 F.2d 80, 82 (7th Cir.1987) (We believe this subsequent memorialization of an oral decision may be appropriately considered here as nunc pro tunc.). As a general rule, however, the district court may not make substantive changes affecting parties' rights nunc pro tunc. As this court stated in King v. Ionization International, Inc., 825 F.2d 1180, 1188 (7th Cir.1987), [t]he office of a nunc pro tunc ('now for then') order is to clean up the records by showing what was previously done with effect from the time done; it is not to alter substantive rights. As the Tenth Circuit stated in W.F. Sebel Co. v. Hessee, 214 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir.1954), [t]he Latin phrase is merely descriptive of the inherent power of the court to make its records speak the truth--to record that which was actually done, but omitted to be recorded. It is no warrant for the entry of an order to record that which was omitted to be done. See also United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1240 (7th Cir.) (A judge may correct a clerical error at any time.... But he may not rewrite history.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 510, 112 L.Ed.2d 522 (1990); Crosby v. Mills, 413 F.2d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir.1969) (An order may be entered nunc pro tunc to make the record speak the truth but it cannot supply an order which in fact was not previously made.); Board of Educ. v. Admiral Heating & Ventilation, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 165, 168 (N.D.Ill.1981) (It is familiar doctrine that a nunc pro tunc order is not a permissible synonym for retroactivity but rather is limited to current correction of the record to speak an earlier truth: an order made earlier but not formally entered.). 2 25 As stated, the March 22 order was not a final judgment. It neglected to supply the declaratory relief requested. The April 26 order created the substance as well as the language of the declaratory relief. The April 26 order added an essential missing element to the March 22 order and, in the process, transformed a non-final judgment into a final judgment. Thus, the April 26 order effected a substantial change in the rights of the parties, rather than correcting a clerical error or memorializing something that was actually done but never recorded. Such a substantial change cannot have effect nunc pro tunc. Thus, the effective date of the April 26 order was April 26. 26 3. The effect of Transamerica's 59(e) motion 27 On May 3, seven days after the district court amended its judgment on April 26, Transamerica filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the April 26 judgment. Appellants contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Transamerica's May 3 motion, because the April 26 nunc pro tunc amendment made the March 22 judgment final and thus made April 1 (ten days after March 22) the last day upon which a Rule 59(e) motion to amend that judgment could be filed, and the April 1-11 notices of appeal were effective to transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals. Because we have concluded that the April 26 amendment did not take effect nunc pro tunc on March 22 but, rather, took effect on April 26, we also conclude that Transamerica's Rule 59(e) motion was timely. Thus, the district court did have jurisdiction to entertain Transamerica's Rule 59(e) motion, which, as a valid Rule 59(e) motion, wiped out any prior notices of appeal. 3 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4). As Mr. South and Mr. Brunsmann were apparently aware, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) requires appellants to file a fresh notice of appeal after the court enters an order granting or denying a Rule 59(e) motion. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). Because Mr. and Mrs. Jones (No. 91-1908) and Ms. Hannon (No. 91-1909) failed to file a notice of appeal after the May 10 amended judgment, we dismiss their appeals for want of jurisdiction. See Weiglos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir.1989). 28 Thus, we are left with the April 26 final judgment, as amended by the May 10 order, and three parties: appellants Mr. South and Mr. Brunsmann, and appellee Transamerica.