Opinion ID: 1805723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Kemmler StandardMere Extinguishment of Life

Text: The United States Supreme Court last confronted a method of execution case in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890), the case that inaugurated electrocution as a method of execution in this country. [13] That case is still the seminal case in this field and, contrary to popular belief, does not stand for the proposition that electrocution is per se lawful ad infinitum if there is no pain. [14] Rather, the Court in Kemmler simply acceded to the state court's finding thatgiven the available options at that point in time in the nineteenth centuryelectrocution was permissible as a more humane form of execution than hanging. As explained below, the enduring legal principle articulated in that casei.e., the Kemmler standard is far more broad and goes to the very heart of the Eighth Amendment. The Court in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890), was asked to invalidate New York's newly enacted statutory scheme, which replaced hanging with electrocution as the official method of execution. The Court declined to invalidate the statute. First, the Court noted that death by hanging had been recognized by the governor of New York to be barbaric, and that the governor had called upon the state legislature to find a better method: It appears that the first step which led to the enactment of the law was a statement contained in the annual message of the governor of the State of New York, transmitted to the legislature January 6, 1885, as follows: The present mode of executing criminals by hanging has come down to us from the dark ages, and it may well be questioned whether the science of the present day cannot provide a means for taking the life of such as are condemned to die in a less barbarous manner. I commend this suggestion to the consideration of the legislature. Id. at 444, 10 S.Ct. 930. Second, the Court pointed out that the state legislature had acted faithfully on the governor's commendation: The legislature accordingly appointed a commission to investigate and report the most humane and practical method known to modern science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases. This commission reported in favor of execution by electricity, and accompanied their report by a bill which was enacted and became chapter 489 of the Laws of 1888. Id. And finally, the Court noted that: (a) the state legislature had determined that electrocution was a more humane method of punishment; (b) the trial court had collected a voluminous mass of evidence on both sides of the issue and had reached the same conclusion, and (c) the state courts at every level had agreed with that conclusion. In addressing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in this context, [15] the United States Supreme Court set forth what has become known as the Kemmler standard. That standard, which bars anything more than the mere extinguishment of life, is now the abiding criterion for evaluating the constitutionality of a method of execution: Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. [Cruelty] implies... something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Id. at 447, 10 S.Ct. 930 (emphasis added). In short, to comport with the constitution, a method of execution is limited to the mere extinguishment of lifeto the extent that this is reasonably possible. Any adverse effect beyond that point (i.e., any undue pain, violence, mutilation, or disgrace) is gratuitous and thus inhuman and barbarous. The Court ultimately deferred to the state legislature's and courts' determination that electrocution was a more humane method of execution than hanging and declined to invalidate the New York statute. Id. at 449, 10 S.Ct. 930. Although the United States Supreme Court has not confronted a method of execution case since Kemmler, the Court has ruled on a number of other government practices under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, as explained below. The Kemmler standard is reaffirmed in many of these cases. In reviewing these cases, a broad schematic for construing the Clause in method of execution cases emerges, embracing the following points: (1) While pain is a relevant indicator of cruelty, it is not the only indicator; (2) violence, mutilation, and disgrace are also relevant indicators of cruelty; and (3) the legal dimensions of cruelty are measurable against evolving standards of decency.