Opinion ID: 4527904
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A licensed dealer's place of business;

Text: (4) An organized, scheduled firearms show or exhibit; (5) A place of formal hunter or firearm use training or instruction; or (6) A police station. “Enclosed container” means a rigidly constructed receptacle, or a commercially manufactured gun case, or the equivalent thereof that completely encloses the firearm. 56  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  If the statute provides that distinct acts constitute separate offenses, then conduct may not be charged as a continuous offense . . . . In State v. Matias, the defendant was convicted of felon in possession and place to keep. We vacated the defendant’s convictions because the circuit court failed to provide a merger instruction to the jury. As we would later explain, both offenses arose out of the same elemental conduct, i.e., what the defendant did with the object, namely, possessed it. Accordingly, in vacating the felon in possession and place to keep convictions and remanding for a new trial for failure to instruct the jury on merger, the Matias court concluded that these statutes did not preclude the charging of these offenses as continuous offenses. Implicit in the court’s holding was the conclusion that the statutes are comprised of elements--namely, the element of possession-- that may extend beyond isolated moments. . . . . Here, Lavoie was also convicted for violating the felon in possession (HRS § 134-7(b)) and place to keep (HRS § 134-23(2)) statutes, neither of which excludes charging the offense as continuous . . . . Thus, the offenses of felon in possession and place to keep may be charged as continuous offenses, and the jury was required to determine whether there was one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, and whether the two offenses merged. . . . . Here, both the felon in possession and place to keep offenses were charged as having occurred on the same date, and the court’s instructions on the elements of these offenses specified that date. Whether Lavoie’s conduct constituted “separate and distinct culpable acts or an uninterrupted continuous course of conduct” was a question of fact that was required to be determined by the jury. And, the jury should also have been required to determine whether Lavoie had one intention, one general impulse, and one plan to commit both offenses. The circuit court’s failure to instruct the jury to make these determinations was prejudicial and plainly erroneous. Lavoie, 145 Hawaiʻi at 251-53, 453 P.3d at 431-33 (citations, parentheticals, brackets, quotation marks, emphases, and footnotes omitted.). 57  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Thus, consistent with Matias, Lavoie held that although a defendant can be charged with both ownership or possession prohibited of any firearm or ammunition by a person charged with or convicted of certain crimes in violation of HRS § 134-7(b) as well as place to keep pistol or revolver in violation of HRS § 134-25(a), as these offenses can be charged as continuous offenses, a jury must determine whether “there was one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, and whether the two offenses merged[;]” if so, a defendant could only be convicted of one of the two charged offenses pursuant to HRS § 701-109(1)(e) (Supp. 1984), which provides: (1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish an element of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is an element. The defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: . . . (e) The offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods of conduct constitute separate offenses. In other words, HRS § 701–109(1)(e) interposes a constraint on multiple convictions arising from the same criminal conduct. Matias, 102 Hawaiʻi at 305, 75 P.3d at 1196. The statute “reflects a policy to limit the possibility of multiple convictions and extended sentences when the defendant has basically engaged in only one course of criminal conduct directed at one criminal goal[.]” See HRS § 701–109 cmt.; State v. Deguair, 139 Hawaiʻi 117, 128, 384 P.3d 893, 904 (2016). 58  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  In Martin’s case, the State argued slightly different time periods of possession on January 2, 2013 for Counts 7 and 9.33 Based on Matias, however, which preceded Martin’s trial, as Count 7, ownership or possession prohibited of any firearm or ammunition by a person charged with or convicted of certain crimes in violation of HRS § 134-7(b), and Count 9, place to keep pistol or revolver in violation of HRS § 134-25(a), could be charged as continuing offenses, and “both offenses arose out of the same elemental conduct, i.e., what the defendant did with the object, namely, possessed [the firearm,]” Martin was clearly entitled to a merger instruction. Lavoie, 145 Hawaiʻi at 252, 453 P.3d at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to Matias, it was for the jury to determine whether there was one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, and whether the offenses merged. In addition, in this case, Martin was also charged and convicted in Count 8 of carrying or possessing a loaded firearm on a public highway in violation of HRS § 134-26(a). Martin’s conviction on this offense while also being convicted of Counts 33 In closing argument, the State argued that Count 7, ownership or possession prohibited of any firearm or ammunition by a person charged or convicted of certain crimes in violation of HRS § 134-7(b), was based on Martin’s possession and shooting of the firearm on Maile Street. The State argued that Count 9, place to keep pistol or revolver in violation of HRS § 134-25(a), was based on Martin carrying the firearm at Pono Place as well as additional areas. 59  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  7 and 9 also implicates HRS § 701-109(1)(e) because, likewise, this “offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct” and does not “provide[] that specific periods of conduct constitute separate offenses.”34 Thus, in this case, for Counts 7, 8, and 9, Martin was entitled to a merger instruction, and it was for the jury to determine whether there was one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, and whether the offenses merged.35 Although there was no merger instruction, a new trial on Counts 7, 8, and 9 is not required. Pursuant to State v. Padilla, 114 Hawaiʻi 507, 164 P.3d 765 (App. 2007), the State has the option of dismissing two of the three charges and maintaining the judgment of conviction and sentence on one charge.36 Padilla, 114 Hawaiʻi at 517, 164 P.3d at 775.