Opinion ID: 76700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Title VII Employee

Text: 15 The University argues that Cuddeback was not an employee for purposes of Title VII. Title VII defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). This court has not addressed the specific issue of whether a graduate student assistant constitutes an employee for purposes of Title VII. However, generally, this circuit has adopted the economic realities test to determine whether a Title VII plaintiff is an employee. See Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340-41 (11th Cir.1982). Under this test, the term employee is construed in light of general common law concepts and should take into account the economic realities of the situation, viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the employee. Id. Specifically, the court should consider factors such as whether the defendant directed the plaintiff's work and provided or paid for the materials used in the plaintiff's work. Id. at 341. Because the question presented is whether Cuddeback, as a graduate research assistant, is an employee, we conclude that the economic realities test should apply. 16 Applying the economic realities test, the fact that much of Cuddeback's work in Dr. Wang's lab was done for the purpose of satisfying the lab-work, publication, and dissertation requirements of her graduate program weighs in favor of treating her as a student rather than an employee. However, the following facts weigh in favor of treating Cuddeback as an employee for Title VII purposes: (1) she received a stipend and benefits for her work; (2) she received sick and annual leave; (3) a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement governed her employment relationship with the University; (4) the University provided the equipment and training; and (5) the decision not to renew her appointment was based on employment reasons, such as attendance and communication problems, rather than academic reasons. Although the record does not indicate the amount that she was paid for the year in which she was terminated, the record does demonstrate that she was paid during that year, and was also paid $15,000 in her first year with Dr. Wang. 17 Courts that have considered whether graduate students constitute employees for the purposes of Title VII have distinguished between their roles as employees and as students, and have typically refused to treat them as employees for Title VII purposes only where their academic requirements were truly central to the relationship with the institution. Compare Stilley v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 968 F.Supp. 252, 261-62 (W.D.Pa.1996) (finding that a plaintiff was an employee when she was a student researcher); Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 863 F.Supp. 581, 585-86 (N.D.Ohio 1994) (finding that a graduate student researcher was an employee where she was under an employment contract, was paid biweekly, and had retirement benefits withheld); with Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a volunteer graduate student researcher was not an employee because she was not financially compensated for her work); Pollack v. Rice Univ., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1273, 1982 WL 296 (S.D.Tex.1982) (finding that paid research or instruction by the plaintiff was attendant to his capacity as a graduate student because it was a central part of the graduate program and, therefore, the plaintiff's status was that of student rather than employee). Therefore, even though Cuddeback's course work obligations required her to complete a rotation in three laboratories and much of her work in Dr. Wang's lab was to fulfill the program's requirements, the economic realities of this particular situation lead us to conclude that the district court correctly found that Cuddeback was an employee for Title VII purposes. See United States v. New York City, 359 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2004) (holding, in an analogous situation and in the first circuit ruling of its kind, that people required to work to receive welfare benefits are employees entitled to federal protection against sexual and racial harassment because the benefits they receive constitute remuneration for their work and because they meet the other elements of the common law definition of employee).