Opinion ID: 1195395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight

Text: [We] review[ ] the district court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines de novo and the district court's findings of fact at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Hunt, 487 F.3d 347, 350 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Tocco, 306 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir.2002)). Because the question of what constitutes endangerment is a mixed question of law and fact . . . [that] is highly fact-based, we give significant deference to the district court. United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
Dial raises one issue on appeal: whether the district court erred when it determined that a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight applied to him. When determining a defendant's sentence, the district court first ascertains the base offense level and then applies adjustments (if any) related to obstruction of justice. The United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines) include an obstruction-of-justice adjustment that states the following: If the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, increase by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 (2006). The courts look to general principles stated in the Guidelines when determining if an enhancement, such as § 3C1.2, should apply. In this case, the relevant-conduct provision, U.S. S.G. § 1B1.3, is particularly important. Section 1B1.3 provides in pertinent part: (a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless otherwise specified, . . . adjustments in Chapter Three[ ] shall be determined on the basis of the following: (1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. . . . U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (emphasis added). The district court held that the two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight applied, based on the events of April 8, 2004, because Richardson testified that he feared for his safety and that an informant had told Richardson that Dial would have drugs in his car at that time. J.A. at 204-05 (Sent. Hr'g Tr. at 160-61). Dial argues that the enhancement should apply only when there is a nexus between the offense of conviction and the reckless endangerment during flight. Appellant Br. at 15-16. Dial argues that there was not a nexus between his methamphetamine and firearm convictions and his avoidance of Richardson on the rural road. He argues that there were no overt acts or alleged transactions in furtherance of the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine that occurred on the day that he drove up an embankment to go around Richardson's vehicle. Finally, Dial argues that there was no risk of death or serious bodily injury to anyone when he drove down the embankment. Only the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has addressed in detail the issue of whether there must be a nexus between the crime of conviction and any reckless endangerment during flight in order to enhance a defendant's sentence under § 3C1.2. [1] In United States v. Southerland, 405 F.3d 263 (5th Cir.2005), the Fifth Circuit held that there is a nexus requirement embedded in § 3C 1.2 because enhancements should be added pursuant to the general principles of the Guidelines. Southerland, 405 F.3d at 268. Specifically, § 1B1.3(a) instructs that adjustments to offense levels should be made when there is a connection between the act or omission at issue (such as reckless flight) and the underlying offense of conviction. However, Southerland did not require the government to demonstrate that the underlying offense caused either the reckless endangerment during flight or the flight itself; the government needed to show only that a sufficient nexus existed between the underlying offense and the reckless flight. Id. (emphasis added). Southerland developed a five-part test for determining if a § 3C1.2 enhancement should apply to a defendant: [T]he government must show that the defendant (1) recklessly, (2) created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, (3) to another person, (4) in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (5) and that this conduct occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3). When determining whether the flight and the offense of conviction were connected sufficiently for the reckless-endangerment enhancement to apply, the Southerland court looked primarily to any evidence of the defendant's state of mind while fleeing. Id. To supplement the inquiry into the defendant's state of mind, the Fifth Circuit examine[d] the temporal and geographic proximity of the reckless endangerment during flight to the offense of conviction. Id. at 269. Today, we adopt the Southerland approach. When applying § 3C1.2, the district court must find a nexus between the offense for which the defendant was convicted and the conduct that involved reckless endangerment during flight. [2] Southerland, 405 F.3d at 268. The general principles of the Guidelines require sentencing courts to consider acts and omissions involving the offense for which the defendant was convicted. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The general principles do not suggest that causation should enter into the analysis. Id. Thus, as Southerland held, [t]he government need not demonstrate that the underlying offense caused either the reckless endangerment during flight or the flight itself, only that a sufficient nexus lie between the underlying offense and the reckless flight. Southerland, 405 F.3d at 268. All of the parts of the Southerland test are satisfied here. First, the district court implied that Dial was reckless when it found that Dial drove his car in such a manner that Richardson was in fear of being seriously hurt. J.A. at 205 (Sent. Hr'g Tr. at 161:17). Indeed, Dial conceded in his brief that [s]uch conduct may be deemed reckless. Appellant Br. at 12. Second, the district court found that Dial created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury because Dial's actions could have forced Richardson's car to hit Richardson. Dial drove up an embankment and back down again in order to avoid being stopped by Richardson, who was wearing a vest labeled POLICE across the front and standing outside his vehicle in the middle of a rural dirt road. When Dial descended the embankment, his car struck Richardson's vehicle in such a manner that Richardson got back into his vehicle in order to prevent his own vehicle from hitting him. Dial argues that there are insufficient facts to establish that there was substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury for Richardson and attempts to support this argument with the facts that Richardson was not injured and that Richardson's car was not moved a great distance by the impact. In addition, Dial argues that there was no one present in the vehicle when Dial began his attempt to go around Richardson's vehicle. Appellant Br. at 13. However, the district court's finding that Richardson justifiably was in fear of being seriously hurt by his own car being forced into him by Dial's car is supported by Richardson's testimony at the suppression hearing and at the sentencing hearing. J.A. at 205 (Sent. Hr'g Tr. at 161:16-19). In addition, actual harm to Richardson and the distance of movement of the vehicle are irrelevant; the provision at issue, § 3C1.2, is not concerned with actual harm, but with the  substantial risk  of serious bodily injury. Also, that Richardson was outside his vehicle when Dial began his attempt to drive around it does not eliminate the substantial risk of serious bodily harm that Richardson faced; in fact, Richardson testified at both the suppression and sentencing hearings that the risk of injury was sufficiently great that he felt unsafe outside his vehicle, and he got into his vehicle in order to avoid injury from the vehicles. Based on this evidence, the district court found that Dial created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The third part of the Southerland testcreation of a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury for another person is easily met here. Clearly Richardson was the specific other person at risk on these facts. The fourth part of the Southerland test requires that Dial created the risk of bodily harm to Richardson while Dial was fleeing from a law enforcement officer. The district court found that Dial had reason to believe that Richardson was standing in the middle of the road near his vehicle with a vest labeled POLICE at least to question him, if not arrest him, at the scene, J.A. at 205 (Sent. Hr'g Tr. at 161:11-13); thus, Dial's decision to evade Richardson by trying to drive around him led the district court to find that Dial was fleeing from the officer when he created the risk. Id. (Sent. Hr'g Tr. at 161:24-25). Finally, we conclude that this situation meets the fifth part of the Southerland test because there is a sufficient nexus between Dial's flight on April 8, 2004 and his underlying offense for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The district court's findings of fact about Dial's mindset at the time of his flight, supported by the temporal and geographic proximity between the flight and the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, lead to this conclusion. Officers had used an informant to purchase methamphetamine from Dial on two occasions in April prior to his encounter with Richardson on April 8, 2004; indeed, an informant had indicated that Dial would be carrying a quantity of methamphetamine down the road when Richardson attempted to stop Dial on April 8. As noted above, the district court found that Dial had reason to believe that [Richardson] was at least to question him, if not arrest him, at the scene. J.A. at 205 (Sent. Hr'g Tr. at 161:11-13). Thus, Dial's attempt to avoid Richardson (by going around Richardson's vehicle) connected directly to the ongoing methamphetamine conspiracy of which he was a part: Dial was attempting to prevent detection of the ongoing conspiracy. In addition, temporal proximity can be established because Dial's flight on April 8, 2004 fell within the time period of the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, which ran from April 2004 to April 20, 2005, to which he pleaded guilty. Finally, there is geographic proximity between the location of the conspiracy and the location of his reckless flight. Thus, although Dial argues that there were no overt acts or alleged transactions in furtherance of the conspiracy on April 8, 2004, it appears that the enhancement should apply because Dial's attempt to go around Richardson's vehicle and his hasty departure were an attempt to avoid detection or responsibility for the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, an offense for which he was convicted in this case. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Therefore, we conclude that all parts of the Southerland test are satisfied, and the district court did not err in applying the enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 in calculating Dial's sentence.