Opinion ID: 2434794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The substantive drug counts

Text: Rodríguez also challenges the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over the substantive drug counts, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support jurisdiction and that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding those counts. We begin with the substantive count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Martínez de León's testimony was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over Rodríguez with respect to that count. Martínez de León testified that Rodríguez was the person who handled marijuana for the drug point in 2008 and 2009, that Rodríguez was one of two owners of the weed at the drug point, and that Martínez de León therefore paid Rodríguez to be able to sell his own marijuana in Carioca at the end of 2008 and in 2009. We find that the jury reasonably could have credited Martínez de León's testimony and found sufficient evidence of post-majority activity for the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the marijuana count. See Vargas-De-Jesús, 618 F.3d at 64-65. For the substantive heroin, crack, and cocaine counts, the jurisdictional question is more complex. Here, the government points to Martínez de León's testimony that: (1) Rodríguez was a runner in late 2008 and 2009; (2) he knew Rodríguez was a runner because [Rodríguez] would handle the marijuana; and (3) he paid Rodríguez to be able to sell marijuana in Carioca. The government's brief suggests that Martínez de León said that runners provided him with drugs to sell, including cocaine, crack, heroin, and marijuana, but we find no such statement in his testimony. In the cited portion of his testimony, Martínez de León actually said, well, the runners would give the material to the . . . pushers, without specifying (or being asked by the government) what material he was referring to. The government then asked Martínez de León how he knew that Rodríguez was a runner for the drug point in 2008 and 2009, and Martínez de León responded, because he would handle the marijuana. Though Martínez de León did testify that he was able to put drugs in the housing project by paying $40.00 per week in rent to Rodríguez and another individual, when the prosecutor asked him what he meant by having to pay rent, Martínez de León testified as follows: A. Well, to pay rentto put it in this way, Bolon and Axel were the owners of the weed, so from there they were charging me 40 each one. 40, 40. Q. And they would charge you 40 each one for what? A. For the marijuana. Q. And you would pay them the 40 bucks, and what would you get in exchange for paying them the 40 bucks? A. I could continue selling the material through the Carioca [sic]. Thus, taken in context, the reasonable inference to be drawn from this testimony is that the material refers to marijuana. The evidence does not establish that Martínez de León paid Rodríguez to be able to sell anything other than marijuana, that all runners handled all four drugs (heroin, crack, cocaine, and marijuana), or that Rodríguez personally possessed or distributed any drug other than marijuana after he turned eighteen. Recognizing that the evidence is lacking, the government offers two theories to support jurisdiction over Rodríguez with respect to the substantive heroin, crack, and cocaine counts. The first is that, because each of the counts included an aiding and abetting charge, the jury could have convicted Rodríguez of aiding and abetting in the possession or distribution of crack, heroin, and cocaine. We reject that argument, because the government has pointed us to no evidence in the record demonstrating that Rodríguez aided or abetted in the possession or distribution of those drugs after he turned eighteen. The government's second argument is that the jury received an instruction regarding, and may have convicted Rodríguez under, the Pinkerton theory of liability, pursuant to which a defendant can be held liable for the substantive offenses of his co-conspirators if those offenses were reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 62 (1st Cir.2008). The government's theory seems to be that, once a juvenile defendant ratifies his participation in a conspiracy post-majority, he can be held liable for all reasonably-foreseeable offenses committed in furtherance of that conspiracy, including offenses that occurred before he turned eighteen (which, in Rodríguez's case, is when he appears to have been most active in the drug point). The propriety of exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile under the Pinkerton doctrine was not before us in Vargas-De Jesús. In that case, the government entirely failed to address the defendant's substantive drug convictions in its brief, defending them for the first time at oral argument on the grounds that there was sufficient post-majority evidence to convict. Vargas-De Jesús, 618 F.3d at 64. We thus have not yet examined whether a district court has jurisdiction over a defendant under the FJDA with respect to substantive offenses committed by the defendant's co-conspirators before the defendant turned eighteen. We find that it does not. The FJDA strips a district court of jurisdiction if the record establishes that a defendant was under the age of 18 when the offense was committed and under the age of 21 when criminal proceedings were commenced. Id. (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Though the continuing offense of conspiracy may span a defendant's eighteenth birthday, a non-continuing substantive violation generally will not. Welch, 15 F.3d at 1207. We will allow evidence of acts comprising an offense to be admitted even if those acts occurred before the defendant turned eighteen, but the government cannot rely entirely on pre-majority acts to establish jurisdiction over an offense. See id. at 1207 n. 5. There must be sufficient proof of post-majority activity. See, e.g., Vargas-De Jesús, 618 F.3d at 65. Thus, when a defendant has participated in a conspiracy both before and after his eighteenth birthday and the government fails to obtain a certification from the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, the defendant cannot be held liable for the substantive crimes of his co-conspirators unless there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that each substantive crime occurred after the defendant turned eighteen, was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, and was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See id.; Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180. The district court must, in turn, properly instruct the jury regarding the government's burden and the jury's inability to consider the substantive crimes of co-conspirators committed before the defendant's eighteenth birthday in assessing the defendant's liability. As mentioned above, the jury here received a Pinkerton instruction, which Rodríguez does not challenge on appeal. Though we find this to be a very close case, the evidence on the record ultimately supports Rodríguez's conviction on the substantive crack count under a Pinkerton theory of liability. Specifically, the government introduced evidence that the police seized 150 vials of crack from Rodríguez-Romero, a co-conspirator, on October 24, 2008, which was after Rodríguez ratified his participation in the conspiracy post-majority. We will assume that the jury properly followed the court's Pinkerton instruction and found that Rodríguez-Romero's possession of crack was reasonably foreseeable to Rodríguez and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Salley, 651 F.3d 159, 167 (1st Cir.2011). We thus affirm Rodríguez's conviction on the substantive count of possession with intent to distribute crack. However, the government has pointed us to no evidence on the record demonstrating that Rodríguez's co-conspirators committed the substantive acts of possessing with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine after Rodríguez turned eighteen. The government introduced general evidence that the drug point operated in 2008 and 2009, as well as specific evidence tying Rodríguez to heroin and cocaine before he turned eighteen, but neither of those will suffice to support jurisdiction. The government had the burden of introducing at trial, and highlighting on appeal, specific pieces of evidence, with dates, tying Rodríguez or his co-conspirators to the possession or distribution of heroin and cocaine at the drug point after August 18, 2008, when Rodríguez was released from juvenile detention. [6] It has failed to do so. For the reasons discussed above, that omission is fatal, and the court thus lacked jurisdiction over Rodríguez with respect to the heroin and cocaine counts. See Vargas-De Jesús, 618 F.3d at 64-65. Having reached that conclusion, we need not address in any detail Rodríguez's claim that the district court failed to instruct the jury that it could not hold Rodríguez liable for the substantive acts of his co-conspirators unless the jury first found that those acts occurred after Rodríguez turned eighteen. This claim now only applies to Rodríguez's convictions on the substantive crack and marijuana counts, since we are vacating his heroin and cocaine convictions. Though Rodríguez is correct, he failed to make the argument before the district court, so we review the instruction for plain error. See, e.g., Meadows, 571 F.3d at 145. Rodríguez has not cleared the high hurdle of plain error review, because he has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the result of the district court proceeding would have been different. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004); Vargas-De Jesús, 618 F.3d at 67. Though certainly not overwhelming, the evidence was sufficient to support Rodríguez's convictions on the crack and marijuana counts, regardless of the omitted instruction. See Vargas-De Jesús, 618 F.3d at 66-67 (affirming conspiracy conviction despite lack of jury instruction under plain error standard of review, because evidence was sufficient). We thus affirm Rodríguez's convictions on Counts One, Three, and Five, and vacate his convictions on Counts Two and Four. That leaves only the question of whether to remand Rodríguez's case for resentencing. We choose to do so, because we find that the vacated counts may alter the dimensions of the sentencing `package,' United States v. Genao-Sánchez, 525 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir.2008), and that the district court should have the opportunity to consider whether a new sentence is warranted. [7] We therefore need not reach Rodríguez's remaining claim that the district court erred in calculating the amount of crack attributable to him as a result of his participation in the conspiracy.