Opinion ID: 3013485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the District Court erred by granting an

Text: upward departure of two criminal history categories without adequate consideration of a one category departure. The basic calculation of Freeman’s criminal history score placed him in Criminal History Category I. Coupled with a final offense level of 24, Freeman’s Category I guideline sentencing range was 51 to 63 months. The District Court departed upward from that range under U.S.S.G. S 4A1.3 based on its conclusion that Criminal History Category I did not adequately represent Freeman’s criminal background or risk of recidivism. Thus, the court sentenced him to 70 months, the middle of the range for a person with Criminal History Category III and a final offense level of 24. The District Court was justifiably concerned about Freeman’s extensive molestation of children in the past and his likelihood of committing such crimes in the future, especially in light of his recent activity in babysitting and 8 taking nude photographs of young boys. Unfortunately, however, the court failed to follow the procedures set forth under S 4A1.3 for departing in such cases. Section 4A1.3 allows a district court to consider departing from the applicable guideline range ifreliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.3 The Sentencing Commission has also made clear that courts, in considering a departure under S 4A1.3, must use[ ] as a reference[ ] the guideline range for a defendant with a higher . . . criminal history category. Id. Thus, we have explained that this regime requires a district court to determine which category (of those higher than the category originally calculated for the defendant) best represents the defendant’s prior criminal history. United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir. 1993). If the court is considering departing by more than one category, moreover, it is obliged to proceed sequentially, and it may not move to the next higher category before it finds that all lesser categories are inadequate. Id. This ratcheting requirement is not intended to have the District Court pay mere lip service to a discussion of each criminal history category that it rejects en route to the one finally selected. Indeed, too cursory a statement dismissing each lesser category would also be inadequate. United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1212 (3d Cir. 1995) (vacating sentence where district court stated that the application of criminal history categories two, three, four and five are too lenient for the conduct in this case.). The ratcheting requirement is instead designed to ensure that the sentencing court’s reasons for rejecting each lesser category be clear from the record as a whole. Id. The District Court must provide an adequate basis for us to ascertain whether it completed its task of identifying the category encompassing those defendants whose criminal histories _________________________________________________________________ 3. Although S 4A1.3 is a policy statement, this Court has noted that it is an authoritative guide for the application of the Guidelines. United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1113 n.7 (3d Cir. 1993). 9 most closely resemble the defendant’s own. Id . at 1213; see also United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1118-19 (3d Cir. 1992). Under this standard, the District Court’s sentencing decision is clearly inadequate. When the District Court departed from Category I to Category III, it never considered whether the sentencing range provided by Category II would be more appropriate to address Freeman’s criminal history and likelihood of committing further crimes. We do not mean to intimate that Category III is inappropriate for Freeman. The District Court may well find that Category II understates his criminal history. We must vacate the District Court’s current sentencing decision, however, because the District Court failed to exercise its discretion in determining which of the higher guideline sentencing ranges most accurately represents Freeman’s profile. On remand, the court must consider whether Category II or Category III most accurately addresses Freeman’s criminal history and proclivity to commit further crimes.