Opinion ID: 1756817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Cocaine in the Urine Sample

Text: More troubling, however, is the trial court's admission of evidence of the presence of cocaine in a urine sample taken from Green's body after the accident. In order to prove that Green's death resulted, at least in part, from his own negligent or inappropriate behavior, APCo and Slocomb presented the testimony of Dr. Alfredo Perades, of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, and Laura Shevlin, a toxicologist. The plaintiff contends that the evidence of the presence of cocaine was inadmissible because, she says, the defendants failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody of samples of body fluids, which were allegedly drawn by Dr. Perades, sent to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences in Auburn, and analyzed by Ms. Shevlin. We agree. This Court recently set forth the following principles governing review of chain-of-custody issues: The purpose of the establishment of the chain of custody is announced in Ex parte Williams, 505 So.2d 1254 (Ala.1987): `The purpose for requiring that the chain of custody be shown is to establish to a reasonable probability that there has been no tampering with the evidence. Williams v. State, 375 So.2d 1257 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 1271 (Ala.1979); Tate v. State, 435 So.2d 190 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Smith v. State, 446 So.2d 68 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). The evidence need not negate the most remote possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering with the evidence, but rather must prove to a reasonable probability that the item is the same as, and not substantially different from, the object as it existed at the beginning of the chain. Slaughter v. State, 411 So.2d 819, 822 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) (emphasis supplied). 505 So.2d at 1255. A showing that there was no break in the chain of custody is required to establish a sufficient predicate for admission into evidence. Ex parte Yarber, 375 So.2d 1231 (Ala.1979), reversed on other grounds, 437 So.2d 1330 (Ala.1983). The identification of the evidence and continuity of possession must be sufficiently established in order to assure the authenticity of the item, Ex parte Yarber, supra. This state employs two separate standards for testing the chain of custodythe weak link test announced in Sommer v. State, 489 So.2d 643 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), and the missing link test announced in Mauldin v. State, 402 So.2d 1106 (Ala.Crim.App.1981). Where a weak link in the chain of custody is found, the weight and credit afforded the evidence, rather than its admissibility, [are] questioned. Sommer, supra. Where a break in the chain of custody, or a `missing link' in the chain of custody is shown, the admissibility of the evidence is questioned, Mauldin, supra. Ex parte Williams, 548 So.2d 518, 520 (Ala.1989) (emphasis in original). In this case, evidence regarding the drawing and disposition of the samples of body fluids was provided by Dr. Perades and Ms. Shevlin. Because we conclude that a break in the chain of custody of the samples appears in the record in connection with Dr. Perades's preshipment procedures, we set out in toto those portions of his testimony regarding his role in the disposition of the samples. Q. [Counsel for APCo] I noticed from looking at your report that you submitted some evidence to the Department of Forensic Sciences in Auburn at that laboratory, is that correct?
Q. Did you take any samples from the body of Mr. Curtis Green? A. Yes. A. I removed eye fluid, bile, and urine. Q. And did you submit those samples to the Department of Forensic Sciences in Auburn in containers provided and used by the State of Alabama? A. Yes. Q. And you sent the samples to Auburn, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Why did you send those samples to Auburn? A. That's our toxicology lab in Auburn for this area. Mr. Cobb: I believe that's all. .... Q. [Counsel for Mrs. Green] Dr. Perades, you said that various samples were taken and sent to Auburn? A. Yes, sir. Q. Who drew those? A. I did Q. You, yourself, drew them? A. Yes. (Emphasis added.) As the record indicates, the only evidence regarding the manner in which the samples were handled in preparation for shipping was provided in response to a leading question by counsel for APCo on direct examination. The defendants then called Ms. Shevlin, who was on the receiving end of the shipment. She provided the following testimony: Q. [By counsel for APCo] All right. Ms. Shevlin, did you receive at the Department of Forensic Sciences lab in Auburn containers that were labeled as being the blood and urine specimens of Curtis Green? A. Yes. I received a plastic bag which contained specimens of blood, the eye fluid, bile, and urine, each labeled as being that of Curtis Green and with the case number. Q. With the case number? A. Right. Q. And was that case number the case number assigned by the Department of Forensic Sciences in Dothan? A. Yes. Q. And by what means did you receive those plastic bags? A. They were received in a styrofoam carton sealed inside a cardboard carton; it was a unit that comes that way. They were shipped by U.P.S. and received at our lab in a sealed cardboard container. Q. Anywhere on that package did it indicate where the containers and where the samples had been sent from? A. No. Normally, U.P.S. removes a portion of their mailing label at the time of delivery, so, we don't actually see that part of it, but the paperwork that I have here was inside the box. Q. What did the paperwork reveal? A. The paperwork indicatedwas signed by Dr. Perades indicating shipment by U.P.S. on June 7, 1988. Q. What date did you receive those samples? A. I received them June 8, 1988, at 9:30 in the morning. Q. And is that the customary and normal handling or way that the Department of Forensic Sciences handles the shipment of body fluids such as blood and urine from one lab to the other? A. This is the way that we handled it between the Dothan lab and the Auburn [lab] for several years now. Q. Was the container that you received these samples in, in any way damaged before you opened it? A. Not from my observation, no. Q. Did it look like it had been tampered with in any way since the time it was shipped from Dothan? A. No. Your Honor, I've laid the predicate [for admission of the toxicology report]. Q. [Cross-examination by counsel for Ms. Green] Ms. Shevlin, you know it was received at your lab in the sealed container? A. Yes. Q. And you know it was properly taken care of at your lab? A. Well, I would have been the one that opened it. Q. And there is no question about that, but you don't know what happened before that time do you? A. No. Q. As to who put it in that container? A. No, I don't. .... Q. As to who turned it over to U.P.S.? A. No. Q. As to the procedure whereby U.P.S. received it? A. No. That information might be available from one of the people through the Dothan lab but I don't have it. Q. Or where it might have beenthe state of the substances from the time they were taken and the time they were put in the hands of U.P.S.? You don't know that either, do you? A. No. I know that the Dothan lab submits their specimens inside the cardboard boxes and that they do send cooling packs in the boxes also. Q. But as far as between the time it was taken and the time it was turned over to U.P.S., you don't have any personal knowledge of that? A. No. (Emphasis added.) Information absent from Dr. Perades's testimony was not supplied by the testimony of Ms. Shevlin. On the contrary, the package that she received contained samples not only of eye fluid, bile, and urine, but of blood. Thus, her testimony not only failed to supply vital information missing from Dr. Perades's account of the preshipment disposition of the samples, but, also injected an additional element of uncertainty. In support of their contentions that the evidence was admissible, the defendants cite Snowden v. State, 574 So.2d 960 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), and Moorman v. State, 574 So.2d 953 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). In Snowden, the alleged break in the chain of custody of biological samples extracted from a rape victim and her alleged assailant occurred under the following circumstances: Elaine Scott [forensic serologist] received [in Mobile] two sealed `packets' from Officer Jean White [in Fairhope] on July 28. Sometime later (the record does not indicate when), Ms. Scott broke the seals, opened both packets, and performed several tests on the specimens. Ms. Scott detected the presence of semen on two vaginal swabs, on the panties, and on a pair of shorts collected from the victim. She made a cutting from the panties, stapled it to a card, and sealed it. She then resealed the packet containing the shorts, other items from the victim's rape kit, and samples that had been collected from the defendant. All these materials were packaged for shipment to Lifecodes Corporation in New York. Ms. Scott did not remember whether she personally had packaged the materials for shipment after sealing them, or whether one of her assistants had done so at her direction. She testified that the package was `picked up at the laboratory by either Federal Express or United Parcel Service.' There was no testimony regarding the date on which the package was shipped. On August 11, Chris Aird, the evidence technician at Lifecodes Corporation, received a package shipped by United Parcel Service (UPS) `next day air' service from Elaine Scott.... The items he examined corresponded exactly to the items Elaine Scott had placed in the package. Id. at 961-62 (emphasis added). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the totality of the circumstances sufficiently established the continuity of the chain of custody and the integrity of the procedure. Id. at 963. In Moorman, it was alleged that the following circumstances constituted a break in the chain of custody of a blood sample drawn from the defendant charged with vehicular homicide: The injured defendant was taken to the East Alabama Medical Center. Wanda Johnson, a registered nurse on duty in the emergency room, testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 that afternoon she simultaneously drew at least three blood samples from the defendant for `diagnostic purposes' and for `legal purposes.' Each sample was placed in a prepackaged tube and each tube had a different colored top.... She did testify that she sealed each tube and identified each sample with the defendant's name and hospital number. She then gave one sample to Opelika police detective John Richardson. She gave the other samples to the `unit secretary to be sent to the lab.' She testified that `[s]omebody from the lab picked it up.' Johnson testified that tests for the emergency room were `automatically done stat [as soon as possible.].' Neither the unit secretary nor the person from the laboratory who picked up the sample testified at trial. Jane Trip was the `toxicology coordinator' for the hospital laboratory.... She tested the one sample of the defendant's blood she received from `laboratory personnel.' This sample had a red and grey speckled top and appeared to be `intact.' She testified that the information on the sample container indicated that the sample had been taken at 3:30 p.m. Moorman, 574 So.2d at 954-55. Notwithstanding the fact that two `links' in the chain of custody did not testify and were only generally identified as a unit secretary and a person from the laboratory, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the totality of the circumstances ... establish[ed] a reasonable probability of the identity of the blood sample and the integrity of the continuity of possession. Id. at 956. The factual distinctions between those cases and the one under consideration are apparent. Unlike the record in Moorman, which indicated precisely when the blood samples were taken, the record in the case before us merely reveals a four-day period, any part of which could have constituted the time of the extraction. Unlike the records in Snowden and Moorman, which set forth in detail the procedures employed in labeling and sealing the individual samples, the record in this case reveals only that Dr. Perades submit[ted] those samples to the Department of Forensic Sciences in Auburn in containers provided and used by the State of Alabama. It reveals nothing whatever of the procedures employed in drawing the samples, whether or when the samples were sealed, or when they were labeled and shipped. Finally, unlike Moorman, which involved a very short time span between the drawing and the testing of the samples, this case involves an interval of undetermined duration spanning, perhaps, several days. The interval between the sealing, labeling, and shipping of the samples involved in Snowden was also of uncertain duration; however, unlike the discrepancy involved in this case, the items that arrived in New York corresponded exactly to those that Elaine Scott had packaged. We find no support, therefore, in those cases for the defendants' contentions. In chain-of-custody cases involving specimens taken from the human body, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate `where and by whom the specimen was kept and through whose hands it passed.' J. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence, Section 13.14a (2d ed. 1974). Gothard v. State, 452 So.2d 889, 890 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. stricken, 450 So.2d 479 (Ala.1984). Suttle v. State, 565 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (reversing vehicular homicide conviction for failure of prosecution to account for blood sample during four-day interval between delivery of unsealed sample to police officer and reception at laboratory). If `the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and the analysis.' Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1955) (emphasis added). Suttle, 565 So.2d at 1199. As Mrs. Green correctly observes, if Dr. Perades drew the samples on June 4, the day of the accident, a significant and unexplained period of time intervened before the shipment arrived in Auburn on June 8, 1988. That fact, coupled with the patent discrepancy in the testimony regarding the content and substance of the samples, leads to conjecture as to whether the samples received in Auburn were, indeed, those taken in Dothan from the body of the decedent, Curtis Green. We, therefore, are not confronted by a chain of custody comprised of weak links, but by a chain from which links are entirely missing. Ex parte Williams, 548 So.2d 518, 520 (Ala.1989). Over Mrs. Green's continuing objection, the trial court admitted highly prejudicial evidence regarding the results of the toxicological tests performed on the samples purportedly taken from Curtis Green's body. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Therefore, that portion of the judgment based on the jury verdict in favor of APCo and the Town of Slocomb is reversed, and the cause is remanded for retrial as to those defendants. [1] That portion of the judgment based on the directed verdict for Storer is affirmed. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur. MADDOX, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.