Opinion ID: 196050
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Locus. Though Jacob is inapposite, the

Text: 2. Locus. magistrate's opinion raises another question about the existence of an actionable duty. This question emanates from a dictum in Chapman v. E.S.J. Towers, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 571 (D.P.R. 1992). There, the court refused to grant summary judgment, finding the 8 defendant hotel potentially liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff guest as a result of third-party criminal activity. See id. at 575. Nevertheless, Judge Perez-Gimenez wrote: Had the situs of the crime in this case been a place other than the hotel premises, the Court might not have been hesitant in granting the defendants' motions . . . . Id. Citing this dictum, the magistrate suggested that, even if Taber owed a duty to provide heightened security qua transporter, that duty obtained only as to acts that occurred on the hotel's premises. We place no weight on this slender reed. It is not the physical locus of the act, stricto senso, that gives rise to the hotelier's duty to furnish heightened security. Rather, the touchstone of the duty consists in roughly equal parts of the hotel's special relationship with its guests, its knowledge of incipient peril, and its ability to exercise a meaningful degree of control over the situation, regardless of the situs. We think this approach is compelled by the reasoning of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Elba. There, the court anchored the University's duty to provide adequate security to persons with whom it had a special relationship (students) in knowledge the previous occurrence of similar criminal acts [and] the fact that university authorities knew or should have known about them coupled with the nonperformance of acts within the defendant's control the failure to eliminate conditions that may give rise to sexual assaults; the total absence of a priority system to protect the students; and lack of adequately trained security 9 personnel. Elba, supra, slip op. at 16. Though the rape in Elba occurred on the campus, we believe that the court's reasoning clearly indicates that the tri-cornered combination of affinity, knowledge, and control, rather than a one-dimensional location test, is the key to determining whether a duty to provide security exists. So it is here. Affinity is a given; Taber and the plaintiff were admittedly in a host-guest relationship. Knowledge exists, at least to the extent that, as we demonstrate infra, a reasonable jury could find that Taber knew (or should have known) of the strike and the likelihood of violence that it portended. Similarly, a jury could find that Taber had the requisite degree of control; it employed the driver, rented the car, made the transportation arrangements with newly arriving guests, honored Coyne's reservation, dispatched the vehicle, and selected the route. This combination of affinity, knowledge, and control is sufficient to trigger a legally enforceable duty. We have said enough on this score. Bearing in mind the circumstances of the persons, time, and place, we think a jury could supportably find that a duty to provide security arose under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 3021. See Estremera, 109 P.R.R. at 1154 (stating that a duty to provide additional security may arise when the circumstances so warrant); see also Rivera Perez, supra, slip op. at 8. And since there is no evidence at this stage that Taber employed any special security precautions, we believe that a jury, not a judge, ought to say whether Taber 10 failed to take steps that its duty required.5 See Negron v. Orozco Rivera, 113 P.R.R. 921, 929 (1983).