Opinion ID: 2317022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ring/Apprendi Claim

Text: Grandison argues that Maryland's death penalty statute, which permits a jury to find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, is facially unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), because Apprendi and Ring require such a determination to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. [6] Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, Section 413(h) provides: (h) weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances.  (1) If the court or jury finds that one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist, it shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. (2) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. (3) if it finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. The issue of whether Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, Section 413(h) violates due process by permitting the jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the aggravating factors found by the jury outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist has been addressed and resolved by this Court on numerous occasions, beginning with Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 729-34, 415 A.2d 830, 848-50 (1980), and ending most recently in Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017, 124 S.Ct. 2084, 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004). We have consistently determined that the weighing process based on a preponderance of the evidence does not violate due process. The actual holding of Apprendi is that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455. In Ring, the Supreme Court stated that [b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d at 576-77 (internal citations omitted). As we stated in Oken, it is clear from the Supreme Court's opinion that Ring only applies to the eligibility phase of the sentencing process. Oken, 378 Md. at 251, 835 A.2d at 1147. Thus, those aggravating factors, which serve to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in compliance with the Eighth Amendment, must be found by a proper sentencing authority beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comply with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Id. Contrary to Grandison's position, Ring does not govern the penalty selection phase of the death sentencing process. Id. This conclusion is consistent with the concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, in which Justice Thomas joined, observing that today's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today's decision says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed. Those States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so  by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or, more simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the guilt phase. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-13, 122 S.Ct. at 2445, 153 L.Ed.2d at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The holding in Ring clearly states that it is the finding of an aggravating circumstance, and only the finding of an aggravating circumstance, that results in death-eligibility. Because the Maryland death penalty statute requires that an aggravating circumstance be found by a proper sentencing authority beyond a reasonable doubt, the Maryland statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment requirements most recently stated in Apprendi and Ring. Moreover, as we stated in Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001): Notwithstanding the language in [Article 27,] § 414(e)(3) directing this Court, on appellate review, to determine whether the evidence supports the jury's ... finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the weighing process is not a fact-finding one based on evidence. Mitigating circumstances do not negate aggravating circumstances, as alibi negates criminal agency or hot blood negates malice. The statutory circumstances specified or allowed under § 413(d) and (g) are entirely independent from one another  the existence of one in no way confirms or detracts from another. The weighing process is purely a judgmental one, of balancing the mitigator(s) against the aggravator(s) to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment in the particular case. This is a process that not only traditionally, but quintessentially, is a pure and Constitutionally legitimate sentencing factor, one that does not require a determination to be made beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F.Supp. 1388, 1421-22 (D.Ariz.1995), aff'd, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903, 119 S.Ct. 237, 142 L.Ed.2d 195 (1998) (Constitution does not require weighing beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 887 (1984); Miller v. State, 623 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind.1993) (weighing is a balancing process, not a fact to be proven; reasonable doubt standard does not apply). Id. at 126-27, 786 A.2d at 652. We affirm the reasoning explicated in Borchardt that the weighing process is not a fact-finding one deducible from the evidence, but rather is a matter of judgment. Ring applies only to the finding of aggravating factors during the eligibility phase of sentencing and does not impact the selection phase of the process. Oken, 378 Md. at 259, 835 A.2d at 1152. As we noted in Oken, the Supreme Court has consistently held that as long as there are no undue restraints upon the sentencing authority's ability to consider mitigating circumstances, there are no constitutional requirements regarding the actual act of selection, or regarding the relative weight attached to the factors. Id. at 259-60, 835 A.2d at 1152. Therefore, we conclude that the jury's weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutional. Despite our repeated determinations that Apprendi and Ring do not require that a jury must find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, Grandison urges us to revisit the issue in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), wherein the Court applied Apprendi principles to reverse the sentences imposed upon Booker and Blakely. In Blakely, the Supreme Court addressed Washington State's determinate sentencing scheme. In that case, Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnaping, a class B felony punishable by a term of not more than 10 years. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296, 124 S.Ct. at 2534-35, 159 L.Ed.2d at 410-12. Other provisions of Washington law required the judge to impose a standard sentence of 49 to 53 months, unless the judge found substantial and compelling reasons justifying the exceptional sentence. Id. at 298-99, 124 S.Ct. at 2535, 159 L.Ed.2d at 411. Although the prosecutor recommended that the judge sentence Blakely within the standard range, the judge found that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty and sentenced him to 90 months. Id. at 298-99, 124 S.Ct. at 2535, 159 L.Ed.2d at 411. The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme violated the principles explicated in Apprendi because the relevant `statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Id. at 302, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d at 413-14. According to the Court, [w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts `which the law makes essential to the punishment,' ... and the judge exceeds his proper authority. Id. at 302, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d at 414 (internal citation omitted). In Booker, the sentence authorized for Booker's drug offense was not less than 210 nor more than 262 months in prison under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 543 U.S. at 227, 125 S.Ct. at 746, 160 L.Ed.2d at 639. The judge, in a post-sentencing proceeding, concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine and that he was guilty of obstructing justice, which placed Booker in a sentencing range of 360 months and life imprisonment; the judge imposed a 30-year sentence. Id. In his statement of the Court's holding, Justice Stevens stated that Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), Apprendi, and Ring made clear that the defendant has the right to have a jury find the existence of `any particular fact' that the law makes essential to his punishment. Booker, 543 U.S. at 232, 125 S.Ct. at 749, 160 L.Ed.2d at 642, quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. at 2536, 159 L.Ed.2d. at 412. Relying on the Court's holding in Blakely, the Court explained that its precedents... make clear `that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. ' Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. at 756, 160 L.Ed.2d at 650. We are not persuaded that either Blakely or Booker requires us to reconsider the viability of the weighing aspect of Maryland's death penalty scheme. Unlike the issues before the Supreme Court in Blakely and Booker, the weighing process is not a fact-finding endeavor based on evidence, but is a determination requiring the sentencing authority, in this case the jury, to exercise its judgment in balancing the aggravating factors against the mitigating ones. Borchardt, 367 Md. at 126-27, 786 A.2d at 652. Therefore, we affirm our prior holdings that Maryland's death penalty statute, which permits the jury to find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, is constitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona as previously stated in Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001).