Opinion ID: 1969960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Excluded The Hearsay Statement Walton Made To The Psychiatrist Retained To Evaluate Walton's Mental Competence

Text: Walton contends that the trial judge erred by refusing to admit in evidence the offer by Walton of a hearsay statement he made to a psychiatrist who evaluated Walton's competence to stand trial. During the evaluation, Walton told the psychiatrist that shortly before the robbery Walton's alleged drug dealer held a gun to Walton's head and threatened to kill him if he did not repay his $500 debt. Although the State presented a videotaped confession to the jury in which Walton recounted an identical statement to the police, Walton argues that the exclusion of the statement prejudiced his right to a fair trial because Walton was forced to testify in order to present these statements to the jury. Walton's testimony permitted the State to impeach his credibility by introducing into evidence his dishonesty crimes. Walton relies on DRE 803(4), which permits the admission of hearsay statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms... or the inception or general character of the cause or external course thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. We review for an abuse of discretion the trial judge's refusal to admit the hearsay statement. [26] A statement made to a psychiatrist may be admissible under DRE 803(4). [27] To admit the statement, Walton was required to show that (1) his motive in making the statement was consistent with the purpose of treatment and that he was aware that the diagnosis depended on the accuracy of the statement; and (2) the psychiatrist reasonably relied on this kind of information in reaching his diagnosis. [28] If these requirements were satisfied, the trial judge would conduct a DRE 403 analysis to ensure that the probative value of the statement is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [29] Walton did not make his statement with the purpose of promoting treatment. Walton's statement was relayed to a court-appointed psychiatrist on the eve of trial. Under some circumstances, a hearsay statement may be admissible when made to a psychiatrist in anticipation of litigation, but the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding Walton's statement because defense counsel did not plan to use the psychiatrist as an expert witness at trial. While we recognize that DRE 803(4) abolishes the distinction between statements made to a treating physician and statements made to a physician hired in anticipation of litigation, [30] this departure from the common law is justified only as a practical acknowledgment that a jury may be unable to parse the distinction between admitting a statement for its truth and admitting the statement merely as a basis for an expert's opinion. [31] Because Walton neither sought treatment from the psychiatrist nor did he wish to introduce the statement as a basis for the expert's conclusions, the trial judge properly excluded the statement because its admission would stray too far from the purpose of DRE 803(4). This was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we deny Walton's request for a new trial.