Opinion ID: 153666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant Sealander's Jury Instruction on the Defense Theory

Text: 26 Defendant Sealander claims the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his defense theory which concerned the issue of intent. We review jury instructions as a whole de novo. A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defense theory finding support in the evidence and the law, and failure to so instruct is reversible error. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990). Still, trial judges have considerable discretion in tailoring and formulating jury instructions. Id. (citations omitted). Although the trial court does not have to use the exact wording of the instruction tendered by the defendant, the instructions must correctly state the law and fairly and adequately cover the issues presented. Id. (citations omitted). We are satisfied that, considering the instructions as a whole, the jury was adequately instructed and took Mr. Sealander's defense into account. 27 Defendant Sealander requested the following jury instruction: You are instructed that mere knowledge that an individual uses a fictitious name to open an account at a bank is insufficient to convict a person of the crime of executing a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution. (R., doc. 352) (emphasis added). Mr. Sealander relied upon United States v. Orr, 932 F.2d 330 (4th Cir.1991), in tendering the jury instruction. The Fourth Circuit held in Orr that the defendant's use of a false name in opening an account upon which he wrote bad checks was not bank fraud in and of itself. Id. at 332. In Orr, the bank suffered no loss, and no evidence was produced showing that the fictitious name was used with the intent to defraud the bank. Also, the Orr court stated that it was focusing on whether a federal bad check law was established by 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Orr, 932 F.2d at 332. Orr is clearly distinguishable from this case. Here, Security National Bank was defrauded of more than $96,000 as the result of a complex scheme involving a credit card merchant account under a fictitious name. Evidence--other than the use of the false name--was presented from which a jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Sealander had the intent to defraud Security National Bank. In refusing to give the instruction, the district court said that it did not find the facts of Orr applicable to the fact of this case. We agree. Mr. Sealander's proffered instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. We believe a jury should be able to draw a reasonable inference that Mr. Sealander knowingly executed the scheme to defraud the bank based on his knowledge that Mr. Veatch used Mr. Dion's name to open the merchant account at Security Bank. This reasonable inference was supported by other evidence showing that Mr. Sealander knew Mr. Veatch was misusing the merchant account in Mr. Dion's name. 28 As explained by the district court, Mr. Sealander's proposed jury instruction was a matter for argument to the jury rather than a statement of the law. (R., vol. IV at 704). The instructions given were a complete and accurate statement of the law in relation to the issue of intent. The court's instruction defining intent to defraud states, To act with an 'intent to defraud' means to act willfully and with the specific intent to deceive or to cheat, ordinarily for the purpose of causing some loss to another, or bringing some financial gain or benefit to oneself. (R., Doc. 370 (Jury Instruction No. 27)). This definition was followed by a good faith defense instruction: 29 Willful intent to defraud is an essential element of Count 3 and thus good faith on the part of a defendant is a complete defense. The burden of proving good faith does not rest with the defendants because the defendants do not have any obligations to prove anything in this case. It is the government's burden to prove to you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that each defendant acted with the specific intent to defraud as charged in the Indictment. 30 One who expresses an opinion honestly held by him, or a belief honestly entertained by him, is not chargeable with fraudulent intent even though his opinion is erroneous or his belief is mistaken; and, similarly, evidence which establishes only that a person made a mistake in judgment, or an error in management, or was careless, does not standing alone establish fraudulent intent. 31 In determining whether or not the government has proven that a defendant acted with an intent to defraud or whether that defendant acted in good faith, the jury must consider all evidence in the case bearing on that defendant's state of mind. 32 If the evidence in the case leaves the jury with a reasonable doubt as to whether a defendant acted with an intent to defraud, the jury must find that defendant not guilty as to the appropriate charge. 33 (R., Doc. 370 (Jury Instruction No. 28)). We conclude that the district court properly instructed the jury on the issue of intent to defraud, and the court was correct in refusing to give the tendered instruction.