Opinion ID: 2634701
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Turner test

Text: The superior court held that Spring Creek's visitation rules limiting physical contact do not violate the federal free exercise clause because, following the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley , it reasoned that the rules were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. [7] In Turner the Supreme Court reasoned that this deferential standard was required to prevent courts from becoming unduly involved in the intractable problems of prison administration. [8] The Court listed four factors that are relevant to determining whether a regulation is reasonable. [9] We hold that Spring Creek's visitation rules satisfy each factor. The first factor requires a `valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. [10] Prison security is a compelling governmental interest, [11] and limitations on contact visits are rationally related to this interest. [12] Superintendent Armstrong stated in his affidavit that the types of contact Larson seeks are specifically prohibited, because they facilitate the smuggling of contraband. Larson does not contest this assertion, and we have been given no basis for second-guessing the judgment of prison administrators on this score. [13] Larson asserts that correctional officers are primarily responsible for introducing contraband into Spring Creek and correctional facilities generally. But this proposition, if true, is beside the point. Larson does not argue that contact visits do not also create a significant risk of contraband smuggling. Furthermore, Larson does not directly counter the defendants' argument that the types of contact Larson desires would exacerbate this problem. Thus, any dispute about whether correctional officers are responsible for more smuggling than visitors is not material to the issues properly before us. The second Turner factor requires courts to examine whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates. [14] Larson argues that Spring Creek's contact limitations leave him no alternative means of practicing Physical Religious Worship with his wife. But the alternative means factor merely requires that adherents not be deprived of all forms of religious exercise, not that they remain free to engage in the prohibited activity. [15] In this case, the contact limitations do not otherwise prevent Larson from fully practicing his religious beliefs. The third Turner factor requires courts to consider the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally. [16] Cooper and Armstrong provide evidence of several likely impacts, principally increased security risks from expanded contact visits and the commensurate burden on prison resources created by the need to mitigate those risks through increased searches, monitoring, or both. Larson claims that his requested religious visits would not pose additional security risks and would not require additional security measures, but these arguments fail to create genuine issues of material fact for several reasons. We note preliminarily that Larson did not offer any admissible evidence regarding his religious practices to counter the affidavits Cooper and Armstrong offered in support of their motion for summary judgment. Rather, his opposition to their motion and affidavits relied exclusively on his own unsworn contentions. Ordinarily this would be cause for affirmance, because non-movants may not rely upon assertions of fact in unverified pleadings and memoranda to oppose a motion for summary judgment. [17] But we have held that the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less stringent standards than those of lawyers, and have held that pro se litigants should be informed of the need to submit affidavits or other evidence to preclude summary judgment. [18] The superior court's ruling did not rely on Larson's failure to produce admissible evidence, and instead appeared to treat Larson's pleadings as counter-affidavits. We will do the same in this appeal. Larson asserts that his wife would voluntarily submit to a strip-search before visiting him, that he is always strip-searched following contact visits, and that he could be placed in a dry cell to further ensure that he had not received contraband. But the governing regulations and constitutional law do not permit strip-searches of visitors unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the visitor possesses contraband. [19] Larson emphasizes that his wife would voluntarily submit to such searches. Larson cannot waive his wife's Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches. But even if she unconditionally agreed to submit to pre-visit strip-searches, we are not convinced that her submission would require prison officials to grant Larson's request for extended contact visitation privileges. Suspicionless searches of visitors and prisoners [20] would impose additional burdens on prison staff. Superintendent Armstrong's affidavit established that the prison staff is already short-handed. Intrusive searches are normally not cross-gender, and searches of female visitors would be disruptive, considering that only twelve of the 127 correctional officers are female. Likewise, using a dry cell to prevent the introduction of ingested contraband is even more resource-intensive, because the inmate must be placed under observation in the designated cell until the inmate excretes any ingested contraband. Finally, the impacts resulting from Larson's own visitation requests cannot be considered in isolation. Based on the statements in Superintendent Armstrong's affidavit, we assume that a significant number of other Spring Creek prisoners would ask for similar privileges. [21] Accordingly, the superior court did not err in analyzing the third factor when it held that the impact of allowing for an exception is unduly burdensome to the prison. The final Turner factor requires courts to consider whether there are any ready alternatives to the policy in dispute. [22] The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that [t]his is not a `least restrictive alternative' test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint. [23] The Court further suggested that only those alternatives that would accommodate the prisoner's rights at  de minimis cost to valid penological interests could be considered relevant to a court's inquiry into whether a regulation is reasonable. [24] Larson's proposed alternative of intensified searches imposes more than de minimis costs. The only other alternative that might accommodate Larson's claim would be increased monitoring, which is also a resource-intensive undertaking. Either way, Spring Creek would have to invest more resources in security or simply accept the risk of increased contraband smuggling that Larson's claimed exemption would entail. There is no obvious, easy alternative to Spring Creek's visitation rules. [25]