Opinion ID: 1379772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: guilt phase assignments of error

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court, over his objection, erred in admitting evidence during the guilt phase of the trial concerning his previous robbery of Randy Brown. Specifically, defendant argues that the introduction into evidence of the Brown robbery was highly prejudicial, inadmissible propensity evidence. After hearing evidence at a pretrial omnibus hearing, the trial court ruled that evidence of the Brown crime was relevant and admissible to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the charged (Ruffner) crime. [17] Our task is to determine whether the record supports the trial court ruling. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts that tend to establish a criminal propensity, but which is independently relevant on a noncharacter theory such as identity, may be admissible for that limited purpose, OEC 404(3), under the doctrine of limited admissibility. See supra note 11. Before evidence of other crimes offered to prove identity based on modus operandi is admissible, [m]uch more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated murders, robberies or rapes. McCormick, supra, at 559-60. The prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is a very high degree of similarity between the charged and uncharged crimes; and (2) the methodology is attributable to only one criminal, that is, the methodology is distinctive so as to earmark the acts as the handiwork of the accused. Imwinkelried, supra, at 21, § 3.10. See State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 551, 725 P.2d 312 (1986) (evidence of other crimes to prove identity is strictly limited to crimes committed `by the use of a novel means or in a particular manner' so as to earmark the acts as the handiwork of the accused. In other words, to prove identity the prior acts must be a `signature' crime); State v. Pratt, supra, 309 Or. at 210, n. 4, 785 P.2d 350 ([t]o be admissible on the issue of identity [the uncharged] crimes must be nearly identical or sufficiently similar to constitute a `signature crime'). [18] Whether the two requirements, similarity and distinctiveness or unusual characteristics have been established is a preliminary fact question for the trial court under OEC 104(1). [19] In deciding whether the first requirement has been met, i.e., whether there is a very high degree of similarity between the charged and uncharged crimes, three factors are relevant: (1) the time lapse between the two crimes; (2) the geographic distance between the two crimes; and (3) the resemblances between the methodologies of the two crimes. Imwinkelried, supra, at 23-24, § 3.11. The three factors are just thatmerely factors in the trial court's discretionary determination of the degree of similarity. Id. at 24. [S]imilarities cannot be considered in a vacuum. The circumstances of each crime as a whole must be compared.    [D]issimilarities [also] must be as fully considered as the similarities   . State v. Pratt, supra, 309 Or. at 214, 785 P.2d 350. Determining what constitutes a very high degree of similarity is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. [T]he third factor, the resemblances in methodology, is the most important consideration.    If both crimes are committed in the same, unique fashion, [that] factor alone is sufficient to support a permissible inference of the identity of the two criminals. The ultimate test is one of logic: Are the similarities in time, place, and methodology sufficient to sustain a rational inference of the identity of the two criminals? Imwinkielreid, supra, at 24. Proof of a very high degree of similarity between the two crimes is insufficient by itself to justify admitting the uncharged crime to prove the accused's identity, however. As Professor Imwinkelreid states: Even if the crimes are identical, it just may happen that every safe robber or counterfeiter is familiar with that technique. Id. at 26, § 3.12. Before evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove identity, the prosecutor must establish the second requirement, i.e., that the methodology is so distinctive that both crimes can be attributed to one criminal. Here again, the prosecutor may attempt to establish the distinctiveness or unusual characteristics of the modus by listing all the points of similarity between the two crimes. As a general proposition, the greater the number of similarities, the stronger are the inferences of identity and distinctiveness. Even a long list of similarities does not necessarily establish an inference of distinctiveness. Id. In the final analysis, the issue is the rationality of the inference of distinctiveness rather than the sheer number of similarities. Id. In applying these standards, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that evidence of the uncharged (Brown) crime is relevant to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the charged (Ruffner) crime. Numerous points of similarities exist between the two crimes. Those similarities, when taken together and considered with the few dissimilarities, establish both a very high degree of similarity between the two crimes and the distinctiveness or unusual characteristics of the modus so as to earmark the two crimes as the handiwork of the defendant. The two victims lived only a few miles from each other and near where defendant was residing. Both victims were males who had placed advertisements in Swing N Sway magazine soliciting homosexual encounters. The victims' advertisements were on the facing pages of the same issue of the magazine. Each victim provided his telephone number in his advertisement. Each victim was contacted by telephone on the day of the crime in response to their separate advertisements. The same telephone charge card was used to call both victims. In each instance, the caller made an appointment with the victim to meet him late in the night, and both the Brown robbery and the Ruffner crime were committed in the late night through early morning hours. Both Brown and Ruffner were tied securely with their hands and feet behind their backs and gagged. In each crime, the victim was tied with electrical cords ripped off lamps and appliances in the residence and with other materials taken from the victim's home. Each victim was struck hard in the face while tied and physically helpless. In each crime, the victim was left tied up in the bathroom after the robbery. The perpetrators spent several hours in each victim's house. In each crime, the victim's home was ransacked. In each crime, large amounts of personal property was taken from the victim's residence. The crimes occurred only nine days apart. During the Brown robbery, the victim was repeatedly threatened with death; Ruffner died during the robbery. There was evidence that both crimes were committed by defendant with the same accomplice, Donald Cornell. The only dissimilarities are: Brown's assailants did not stuff paper in Brown's mouth or place a ligature around Brown's throat; Brown was blindfolded and Ruffner was not; and Brown did not die. Our conclusion that there is evidence in the record sufficient to support the trial court's finding that evidence of Brown's crime is logically relevant to prove identity does not end our inquiry. Under OEC 403, relevant evidence is admissible so long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. OEC 403, like its federal counterpart, FRE 403, requires the trial judge to go through a conscious process of balancing the costs of the evidence against its benefits. Unless the judge concludes that the probative worth of the evidence is `substantially outweighed' by one or more of the countervailing factors, there is no discretion to exclude; the evidence must be admitted. If, on the other hand, the balance goes against probative worth, the judge is not required to exclude the evidence but he `may' [in the words of OEC 403] do so. In other words, the process of balancing is a prerequisite to the exercise of discretion but it is not a formula for its exercise; the rule presupposes a two-step processbalancing, then the discretionary judgment. Obviously the factors in the balancing test are to be taken into account in the exercise of discretion but they do not purport to control it. Discretion is an intuitive process not susceptible to the quantification presupposed by the metaphor of the scales. Wright & Graham, supra, at 263-64. In making his decision under OEC 403, the trial judge carefully engaged in the steps this court outlined in State v. Mayfield, 302 Or. 631, 645, 733 P.2d 438 (1987), and State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or. at 557-559, 725 P.2d 312. He assessed the state's need for the evidence. He considered the strength of the state's evidence establishing the Brown crime and defendant's involvement in it. He analyzed the quantum of probative value of the evidence, that is, the extent to which the evidence of the Brown crime helps prove defendant as the perpetrator of the Ruffner murder. He considered the risk of unfair prejudice to defendant, that is, the extent to which the evidence would invite the jury to convict defendant on the improper basis that he is a bad person. He considered the time required to present the evidence and whether it would distract the jury. He articulated on the record his balancing analysis and the reasons for admitting the evidence. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusions. The trial court did not err in permitting the state to introduce evidence of the Brown crime to identify defendant as the person who committed the Ruffner murder. Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly permitted the state to introduce into evidence the transcripts of Lee Edger's and Anthony W. Stinsman's testimony given during a security release hearing that was conducted approximately four months prior to trial. At the security release hearing, Edger testified that he saw defendant and Cornell at a tavern on September 22, 1985, and that defendant attempted to sell him a television set for $75. At the time of trial, Edger was residing in Missouri. The whereabouts of Stinsman, whose testimony recounted a meeting with defendant the morning after the Ruffner murder and the request that Stinsman cash checks on Ruffner's account, [20] was unknown. The trial court, citing OEC 804(1)(d), [21] ruled that Edger was unavailable to testify at the trial due to existing physical and medical infirmities [22] and that both the transcripts of Edger's and Stinsman's security release hearing testimony qualified for admission as former testimony under OEC 804(3)(a). [23] Defendant challenges both of those rulings. [24] The former testimony exception to the hearsay rule set forth in OEC 804(3)(a) may be invoked only when the declarant, the person who makes a statement out of court, OEC 801(2), is unavailable as a witness within the meaning of OEC 804(1). Whether the requirement of unavailability has been satisfied is a preliminary fact question for the trial court to decide under OEC 104(1). State v. Douglas, supra, 310 Or. at 443, 800 P.2d 288. The proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing the unavailability of the witness by a preponderance of the evidence. OEC 104(1) provides that [i]n making its determination the [trial] court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. The trial court evaluates the evidence submitted in support or opposition to such a claim and acts as a trier of fact. Id. When it is contended, as in this case, that the witness is unavailable because of then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, the trial court may consider, for example, testimony, affidavits from physicians, medical records, or the informed word of counsel. This court is bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact that are supported by the record, but not by its legal conclusions. Id. We consider defendant's arguments with those principles in mind. In this case, the only evidence presented to the trial court on the issue of Edger's unavailability as a witness was that presented by the state. Detective Schultze testified in a hearing out of the presence of the jury that, following the security release hearing, Edger traveled to Missouri and was hospitalized temporarily there for alcoholism and some related mental problems. At the time Schultze learned of Edger's whereabouts, Edger had been released from the hospital and was living with his mother in Missouri. Schultze did not speak with Edger but spoke with Edger's mother on one occasion. She told Schultze that Edger's memory was bad and that he had no long-term memory to speak of and that his physical and mental health would not allow him to travel.  (Emphasis added.) Edger's medical records obtained from the hospital in Missouri stated that Edger suffered from a moderate impairment of his gross memory abilities and is unable to store new information in long term memory. Based on that evidence, the trial court, without making any findings of historical fact, ruled that Edger was unavailable to testify due to existing physical and medical infirmities under [OEC] 804(1)(d). While we would have preferred specific findings on the question, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support that ruling. The next question that we need to address is whether the trial court properly admitted the transcripts of Edger's and Stinsman's security release hearing testimony under OEC 804(3)(a). OEC 804(3)(a) qualifies, as an exception to the hearsay rule, former [t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding    if the party against whom the testimony is now offered    had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. When a defendant is charged with murder, his right to release on security pending trial will be denied if the state establishes at a security release hearing by clear and convincing evidence that the likelihood of the defendant's guilt is strong. Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 78-79, 619 P.2d 632 (1980) (construing Article I, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution and ORS 135.240(2)). [25] In this case, the security release hearing was extensive. It consumed four days of testimony. Defendant was present and was represented by counsel. The parties in the security release hearing and trial were identical. The issues at the security release hearing and trial were substantially identical. [26] Two of the persons who appeared and testified for the state during the security release hearing were Edger and Stinsman. Defendant had an opportunity [27] to cross-examine both Edger and Stinsman and did so quite extensively and vigorously. Defendant's motive [28] to develop the testimony of Edger and Stinsman at the security release hearing was similar to his motive at trial. The trial court properly permitted the state to introduce into evidence the transcripts of Edger's and Stinsman's security release hearing testimony. See State v. Douglas, supra, 310 Or. at 442-445, 800 P.2d 288 (testimony given in a security release hearing met the requirements of OEC 804(3)(a), because the security release hearing provided the accused with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and suggested a motive to do so that was similar to the motive at trial). [29]