Opinion ID: 1850348
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Concluded Matter

Text: ¶ 44. The Partnership takes the position that the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF cannot intervene to challenge the chancery court order of December 22, 2000, because intervention is not a means to relitigate concluded matters. In addition, the Partnership contends that allowing intervention may possibly jeopardize the Settlement Agreement between the State of Mississippi and the various tobacco defendants. ¶ 45. However, it is readily apparent that the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF are not attempting to relitigate issues already decided. The chancery court order of December 22, 2000, has never been litigated. While it is true that the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF could not now seek to vacate the Settlement Agreement entered into between the State of Mississippi and the various tobacco companies, they are not asking us to take the action of vacating the Settlement Agreement. In fact, the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF desire that the original Settlement Agreement be enforced according to its terms. What the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF are asking us to do is to uphold the chancery court's decision to vacate that court's order of December 22, 2000. Therefore, based on what the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF are requesting by way of relief from this Court, if such relief be granted, the Settlement Agreement would not be jeopardized, but actually enforced. ¶ 46. While the Partnership cites various Fifth Circuit decisions to support its proposition, reliance on such cases is misplaced. For instance, the Partnership cites Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 560 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir.1977), for the proposition that a motion to intervene should be denied where a third party is seeking to relitigate matters that already have been decided. In Cisneros, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioners had no statutory right to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) because the petitioners' interests were adequately represented by existing parties. [13] Id. However, in today's case, the Partnership cannot assert that the interests of the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF are adequately protected. In fact, the Attorney General denied the request of the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF to challenge the chancery court order of December 22, 2000. ¶ 47. Accordingly, since the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF were not seeking to intervene in a concluded matter which had already been litigated, the Partnership's assertion lacks merit. By allowing intervention, the payments made by the tobacco companies each year would not be altered; and therefore, the Settlement Agreement would not be jeopardized. ¶ 48. We also feel compelled to address the dissent, wherein it is stated that [t]he intervenors seek to participate in a case over four years after it was finalized.  (Emphasis added). First of all, as we have noted, this case was not finalized at the time of intervention. The Governor was seeking a cessation of future, $20 million disbursements to the Partnership; the Governor was not seeking to reach back and recoup the annual $20 million disbursements already made as approved by the chancellor. Secondly, we emphasize that the Partnership was likewise not a party, but instead, an intervenor, just as were the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF. In fact, although close in time, it appears that the Governor was actually allowed to intervene before the Partnership.