Opinion ID: 167560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: 7 A. Whether the district court erred in granting Lufkin summary judgment on Herrera's claim that his work environment was racially hostile. 1. Standard of review 8 This court reviews the district court's summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; in this case, in Herrera's favor. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir.2005). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 2. Analysis 9 Title VII forbids employment discrimination on the basis of race or national origin. Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 831 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). This includes an employee's claims of a hostile work environment based on race or national origin discrimination. See id. at 831-32. To survive summary judgment on a claim alleging a racially hostile work environment, Herrera must show that a rational jury could find that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, and that the victim was targeted for harassment because of [his] ... race[ ] or national origin. Sandoval v. City of Boulder, 388 F.3d 1312, 1326-27 (10th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted); see also Chavez, 397 F.3d at 832. 10 In this case, Herrera has asserted sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that his work environment was racially hostile. In particular, he has submitted sufficient evidence indicating that his workplace was pervasively discriminatory. 11 A plaintiff does not make a showing of a pervasively hostile work environment by demonstrating a few isolated incidents of racial enmity or sporadic racial slurs. Instead, there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments. Chavez, 397 F.3d at 832 (quotations, citation omitted). Nevertheless, the severity and pervasiveness evaluation is particularly unsuited for summary judgment because it is quintessentially a question of fact. 3 McCowan v. All-Star Maintenance, Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 923 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). In making this determination, we consider the work atmosphere both objectively and subjectively, . . . look[ing] at all the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position. Id. (quotations, citation omitted). 12 Herrera presented evidence of several discrete incidents of racial harassment occurring during the four years that Buddy Moore oversaw Lufkin's Casper service center while Herrera worked there. Herrera testified that when he first met Moore, in 1997, Moore refused to shake Herrera's hand. And in 1999, Moore sent Cunningham some candy with a note attached indicating it was Mexican peanut brittle. Moore directed that Cunningham give this candy to Herrera. Cunningham did so, including Moore's note. Herrera was offended. Herrera sought advice from an attorney about these incidents and complained to Lufkin's human resources attorney, to no avail. 13 Also in 1999, Moore told Cunningham to have Herrera talk to a certain customer because that customer was Mexican. Cunningham relayed this message to Herrera. On another occasion in 1999, Moore himself told Herrera to go see another customer because that customer was from San Antonio . . . so he likes Mexicans. In addition, Moore once said directly to Herrera, Spanish lover, come here. 14 On yet another occasion, Moore told Cunningham to tell Herrera not to Mexicanize Herrera's new company truck. Carolyn Coleman, the Casper service center's secretary, translated Mexicanize to mean lots of chrome, you know, dice hanging off the mirror. Moore also wanted Herrera to remove a cactus from atop the truck's antenna. Moore gave this directive several times in late 2000 and again in early 2001. Cunningham relayed these comments to Herrera. 15 In addition to these discrete incidents, however, Herrera also asserted evidence of other ongoing harassment occurring during this entire four-year time period. Moore would refer to Herrera as the Mexican or the fucking Mexican whenever Moore would speak to Herrera's supervisor, Cunningham, and sometimes when Moore spoke to the Casper service center's secretary, Carolyn Coleman, and the warehouse manager, Bill Bryant. This did not happen just once or twice. Rather, there is evidence that Moore made such comments every two to three days. 4 Although Cunningham did not tell Herrera about these comments every time Moore made such references to Herrera, both Cunningham and Coleman did occasionally tell Herrera about them. 5 Further, in light of Moore's racially charged comments, Cunningham specifically warned Herrera to be wary of Moore because he was a bigot. 6 16 Additionally, it was Moore who transferred Jason Dickerson to the Casper service center in September 2000. Herrera believed Moore had sent Dickerson to get rid of him. Herrera's suspicion was borne out when he asked Dickerson, in the midst of a heated argument, why Dickerson had been trying to get rid of Herrera since Dickerson arrived at the Casper service center and Dickerson responded Why do you think I was sent here? 7 17 There was also evidence that Dickerson treated Herrera and his son, the Casper service center's only Hispanic employees, worse than he treated other employees. 8 Dickerson spoke harshly and condescendingly to them. He enforced company policies more strictly against Herrera and his son than against any other Casper service center employee. 9 He constantly hounded Herrera to complete his paperwork when there were other employees further behind with their paperwork than Herrera. In addition, although there is no evidence that Dickerson specifically directed any racial epithets toward Herrera, there was evidence Dickerson used such terms when referring to Hispanics in general conversation. 10 18 The evidence, submitted by Herrera and Lufkin, addressing whether Moore's and Dickerson's racial harassment of Herrera was pervasive presents a close question. And it may be that a jury, after considering all of the evidence and cross-examination at trial, would find that Moore's and Dickerson's treatment of Herrera was not sufficiently pervasive to create a racially hostile work environment. But, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Herrera, he has established a genuinely disputed issue of fact as to the pervasiveness of the racially-charged hostility in this work environment sufficient to be entitled to have a jury decide the issue. 11 19 B. Whether the district court erred in granting Lufkin summary judgment on Herrera's state-law claim alleging Lufkin breached its employment contract with him. 12 1. Standard of review 20 In cases involving state-law claims, a federal court applies the substantive law of the state, but applies federal procedural law. See Ahrens v. Ford Motor Co., 340 F.3d 1142, 1145 (10th Cir.2003). As noted earlier, this court reviews de novo the district court's summary judgment decision, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Herrera. See Pepsico, Inc., 431 F.3d at 1255; Ahrens, 340 F.3d at 1145. 2. Analysis 21 Although under Wyoming law a contract exists in every employment situation ( see Ormsby v. Dana Kepner Co. of Wyo., Inc., 997 P.2d 465, 471 (Wyo.2000); see also Sierra Trading Post, Inc. v. Hinson (In re Sierra Trading Post, Inc.), 996 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo.2000)) that contractual employment relationship is presumed to be at will. In an at-will employment relationship, either the employer or the employee may terminate the relationship at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all. The presumption that the employment relationship is at-will may be rebutted by a showing that the parties entered into an express or implied-in-fact agreement that the employee would be discharged only with just cause. 22 Finch v. Farmers Co-op. Oil Co., 109 P.3d 537, 541 (Wyo.2005) (citations, quotations omitted). Stated another way, an employment relationship will not be at-will if the employer promises the employee continued employment. See Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681, 685 (Wyo.1999). 23 Herrera argues that Lufkin's employee manual created a contract promising him continued employment. We disagree. It is true that, under Wyoming law, [a]n employment handbook . . . may supply terms for an implied-in-fact employment contract which requires termination for cause .... Finch, 109 P.3d at 542 (quotation, alteration omitted). Nevertheless, before the district court, Herrera relied on only one provision of Lufkin's employee handbook: 24 Job Security: LUFKIN makes every effort to provide continuous employment. The ability to do so depends largely upon general business conditions, but continuous employment also depends to a great extent upon every LUFKIN employee. The company can remain competitive only by producing more and better products and by providing faster service at the lowest possible cost. When the price is right for quality products like ours we get more orders which means more jobs and greater security for everyone. An individual employee can increase his job security by increasing his knowledge and skills. The more knowledge and skill you acquire, the more productive you are likely to be, and naturally the more productive, the better your chance for stable employment. 25 This provision, however, does not promise Herrera continued employment. 26 For the first time on appeal, Herrera asserts there are other provisions in the Lufkin employee manual that promise continued employment. Because he did not rely upon these provisions in the district court, however, he cannot do so now on appeal. See Shell Rocky Mountain Prod. v. Ultra Res., Inc., 415 F.3d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir.2005) (noting as general rule, appellate court will not review matters raised for the first time on appeal). For these reasons, we affirm the district court's decision granting Lufkin summary judgment on this Wyoming state-law breach-of-contract claim. 13 27 C. Whether the district court erred in granting Lufkin judgment as a matter of law, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), on Herrera's state-law claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 1. Standard of review 28 As previously mentioned, in cases involving state-law claims, a federal court applies the substantive law of the state, but applies federal procedural law. See Ahrens, 340 F.3d at 1145. After Herrera had presented his evidence at trial, the district court granted Lufkin judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), on Herrera's Wyoming state-law claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rule 50(a)(1) provides that 29 [i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue. 30 A judgment as a matter of law is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party's position. Riske v. King Soopers, 366 F.3d 1085, 1088-89 (10th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted). 31 The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the nonmoving party but whether there is evidence upon which a jury could properly find for that party. For a jury to properly find for a party, the party must present more than a scintilla of evidence supporting its claim. 32 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj Int'l Inv. Corp., 315 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th 2003) (quotation, alterations omitted). 33 This court reviews the district court's Rule 50 decision de novo, see Riske, 366 F.3d at 1088, reviewing all of the evidence in the record, Stewart v. Adolph Coors Co., 217 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2000), in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; in this case, in Herrera's favor, see Riske, 366 F.3d at 1087. 2. Analysis 34 Wyoming recognizes a tort cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress: [o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 126 P.3d 886, 891 (Wyo.2006) (quotation omitted). To recover on such a claim in this case, therefore, Herrera must establish that Lufkin 1) acted in an extreme and outrageous manner, and 2) intentionally or recklessly caused [Herrera] severe emotional harm. Worley v. Wyo. Bottling Co., 1 P.3d 615, 628 (Wyo.2000). Because Herrera was unable to assert sufficient evidence at trial from which a jury could have found that Lufkin, on its own or through its supervisors, Moore and Dickerson, acted in an extreme and outrageous manner, we need not address whether Herrera presented the jury with sufficient evidence on the second element, that Lufkin intentionally caused him severe emotional distress. 14 35 When the Wyoming Supreme Court first adopted a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, it recognized that 36 [p]arties opposing the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress typically contend that its adoption will flood the courts with fraudulent claims and create potentially unlimited liability for every type of mental disturbance. While these problems are not to be dismissed lightly, they can certainly be solved without rejecting the action entirely. 37 Leithead v. Am. Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo.1986). The Wyoming Supreme Court was satisfied that, by adopting the definition of this tort from Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, this cause of action's application could be sufficiently limited. See id. at 1065-66 (discussing and adopting Section 46; noting that [t]he limits imposed in § 46 of the Restatement, together with the jury's common sense, should prove to be adequate protection against fraudulent or frivolous claims); see also Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 105 P.3d 1079, 1089 (Wyo.2005) (noting Section 46 attempts to clarify the parameters of outrageous behavior). In particular, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the limitations on that cause of action provided by comment d to Section 46, which limits actionable outrageous conduct to conduct which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, is regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 15 Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066. 38 In a further effort to limit application of this cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Wyoming Supreme Court also adopted § 46's comment h, which indicates that `[i]t is for the court to determine in the first instance whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.' Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. h). A claim, then, should only go to the jury if reasonable people could differ as to whether the conduct at issue was extreme and outrageous. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. h). 39 In subsequent cases considering claims for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Wyoming Supreme Court has specifically recognized that certain conduct in employment situations may be outrageous enough to provide [an] employee with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hoflund, 105 P.3d at 1089 (quotation omitted) (addressing such a claim in the context of termination from employment); see also Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (Wyo.1997) (recognizing inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace can, upon sufficient evidence, give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress). In fact, a number of courts have recognized the employer-employee relationship as a significant factor to determining outrageousness. It is only natural that [an employer's] position of power over a[n employee] may enhance [the employer's] ability to do harm. Loya, 35 P.3d at 1253 (citations, quotations omitted). Nevertheless, 40 [t]hat does not mean, . . . that [the Wyoming Supreme] Court wishes to lower the threshold for determining liability whenever the parties are employer and employee. The conduct must still reach the same degree of outrageousness if an employee is to prove that his or her employer has committed this tort; the employment relationship is merely one factor among many to use in analyzing individual cases. 41 Id. (quotation omitted). Under Wyoming law generally 42 liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. 43 Worley, 1 P.3d at 628 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d). This is no less true in the employment context. Indeed, the workplace is not always a tranquil world where civility reigns. Personality conflicts and angst over disciplinary actions can be expected. Id. at 629 (quotation, alteration omitted). Thus, not all unkind or inappropriate conduct in the workplace is outrageous. 44 In this case, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Herrera, see Riske, 366 F.3d at 1087, he did not present sufficient evidence at trial from which jurors could have found that Lufkin and/or its supervisors acted in a sufficiently extreme and outrageous manner. Herrera's evidence of specific incidents of racial harassment — Moore's refusing to shake Herrera's hand, directing Herrera to call on particular customers because the customer either was Mexican or liked Mexicans, sending Herrera Mexican peanut brittle, and directing that Herrera not Mexicanize his Lufkin truck — amounts to no more than the `insults, indignities, . . . annoyances, petty oppressions [and] trivialities' that are insufficient to support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Worley, 1 P.3d at 628 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d). So, too, are Moore's frequent references to Herrera as the Mexican or the fucking Mexican. Finally, Herrera's evidence indicating that Dickerson, at Moore's direction, harassed Herrera generally in an attempt to get rid of him, under the circumstances of this case, only amounts to a series of workplace disputes that also cannot support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 45 At first glance, our conclusion here — that Herrera's evidence was insufficient to establish the outrageous conduct necessary to support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress under Wyoming law — seems to be in some tension with our earlier conclusion in this opinion that Herrera was able to assert a triable issue as to whether Lufkin created a racially hostile work environment actionable under Title VII. But a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress makes actionable only the most egregious conduct. The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted this tort claim with that limitation explicitly in mind. See Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1065-66. And the Wyoming Supreme Court has never equated the existence of harassment actionable under Title VII, alone, with outrageous conduct sufficient to support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cf. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1342 n. 3 (addressing claim for the infliction of emotional distress based on allegations co-worker sexually harassed plaintiff, but also noting that the Wyoming Court was using the term sexual harassment in a more general sense than the Title VII definition); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of Workplace Bullying and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 Geo. L.J. 475, 503 (2000) (noting that the degree of severity of conduct and harm to the plaintiff required under hostile work environment and discrimination analyses is notably lower than that required under [intentional infliction of emotional distress]. In effect, the courts have said that conduct that is actionable under an employment discrimination theory often does not rise to the level of [intentional infliction of emotional distress].). 46 In addition, Wyoming specifically makes the court the gatekeeper for claims alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress, charging the court with preventing claims based upon less than outrageous conduct from even getting to a jury. See Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066 (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. h). With that in mind, we cannot conclude that the district court in this case erred in granting Lufkin judgment as a matter of law on Herrera's claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We agree with the district court that, to have done otherwise would be to shirk its gatekeeping responsibilities imposed by Wyoming law and, instead, to conclude that every time there's a case for race discrimination it follows there's a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Wyoming law does not require that result. For these reasons, therefore, the district court did not err in granting Lufkin judgment as a matter of law. 47 D. Whether the district court abused its discretion in requiring Herrera to undergo a mental examination under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35. 1. Standard of review 48 This court reviews discovery decisions pertaining to Rule 35 examinations for an abuse of discretion. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir. 1997). Under this standard, we will not disturb a trial court's decision absent a definite and firm conviction that the [district] court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. Norton v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). 2. Analysis 49 Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 50 [w]hen the mental or physical condition ... of a party ... is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner . . . . The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made. 51 Unlike other discovery mechanisms, such as interrogatories or depositions, which a party can invoke on his own, Rule 35 requires the party seeking to conduct a medical examination first to obtain the district court's permission. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117-18, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964). To obtain a court's order for an independent medical examination (IME), the party seeking the exam must show that the mental or physical condition of the party who is to be examined is in controversy, and that there is good cause for the examination. See id. at 118-19, 85 S.Ct. 234. Notwithstanding Rule 35's requirements, however, physical and mental examinations are usually arranged by stipulation of the attorneys, with the rule standing as a compulsory sanction that helps to produce stipulations. 8A Charles Alan Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2234 (2d ed.1994). And [p]laintiffs who voluntarily submit to an examination by a physician selected by defendant waive their right to insist upon a [Rule 35] motion for an order of examination. Id. 52 In this case, the parties agreed to a stipulated discovery schedule which provided that Lufkin could obtain an IME of Herrera, pursuant to Rule 35(a), within a specific twenty-day time period. 16 When Lufkin requested dates on which Herrera was available for the IME, however, Herrera failed to respond. Lufkin inquired a second time, after January 20, 2004, but this time Herrera responded that the time to conduct the IME had expired. On February 9, 2004, Lufkin filed a Rule 37 motion seeking to compel discovery of Herrera's mental condition. 17 The magistrate judge granted that motion, ordering Herrera to submit to an IME. The district court upheld the magistrate judge's decision. In doing so, the district court did not abuse its discretion. 53 On appeal, as before the district court, Herrera argues that, despite the parties' stipulated discovery schedule, Lufkin still had to file a successful Rule 35 motion before the district court could compel Herrera to undergo an IME. Even assuming for purposes of this appeal that this is true, however, Lufkin sufficiently complied with Rule 35's requirements in this case. In its reply addressing the motion to compel the IME, Lufkin did specifically request an order under Rule 35 permitting it to conduct an examination. And both the magistrate judge's ruling granting the Rule 37 motion to compel discovery, as well as the district court's decision upholding that ruling, addressed Rule 35's requirements for ordering a mental examination, determining that Herrera's physical and mental condition was in controversy and that Lufkin had shown good cause for the exam. See Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 85 S.Ct. 234. Moreover, Herrera himself stipulate[d] that his mental condition is in controversy. 18 Further, both the magistrate judge and the district court addressed the scope of the IME. 54 For these reasons, we cannot say that the district court, in requiring Herrera to undergo a mental examination, abused its discretion; that is, the district court did not make a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances, Norton, 432 F.3d at 1156 (quotation omitted). Our conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's indication that Rule 35 is to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment, to effectuate [the civil procedure rules'] purpose that civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 114-15, 85 S.Ct. 234 (citation, quotation omitted).