Opinion ID: 1977406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Gattis's Motion to Disqualify

Text: Gattis first argues that the current trial judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to disqualify her from considering of his second motion for postconviction relief. The basis for the motion was the alleged personal bias of the current trial judge against Gattis's defense attorney. [13] A two-part test is required for a recusal motion under Los v. Los. [14] In Jones v. State , [15] we reiterated the two-step analysis in which a trial judge must engage to determine whether disqualification is appropriate, as well as the appropriate standard of review: The first step requires the judge to be subjectively satisfied that she can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. Even if the judge is satisfied that she can proceed to hear the matter free of bias or prejudice, the second step requires the judge to examine objectively whether the circumstances require recusal because there is an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality. On appeal, we review the trial judge's analysis of the subjective test for abuse of discretion. Because a claim of appearance of impropriety implicates a view of how others perceive the conduct of the trial judge, we review the merits of the objective test de novo. [16] On appeal of the judge's recusal decision, the reviewing court must be satisfied that the trial judge engaged in the subjective test and will review the merits of the objective test. [17] Because the current trial judge summarily denied the motion to disqualify without articulating her analysis of the subjective or objective portions of the Los test, we remanded this matter for the judge to provide a written report on her rationale. In a seventeen-page report to this Court, she detailed the reasons why she denied the motion to disqualify. We find no abuse of discretion with her explanation of the subjective prong. [18] Although we also agree with the current trial judge's assessment of the objective prong, [19] we provide further explanation of the objective portion of the test given the nature of the arguments Gattis has made on appeal. Under the objective portion of the test, for the judge to be disqualified, the alleged bias or prejudice of the judge `must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.' [20] Gattis argues that the current trial judge's attitude toward defense counsel, as evidenced by the Jones opinion, is an extrajudicial source of bias sufficient to meet this prong. To support his argument, Gattis cites two decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, [21] and represents that those decisions require disqualification where a judge's attitude toward a particular lawyer is so hostile that the judge's impartiality toward the lawyer's client may reasonably be questioned. The extrajudicial source language from Los was adopted from the case of United States v. Grinnell Corp., [22] a 1966 United States Supreme Court case evaluating the federal statutory standard for disqualification of judges. Thirty years later, in Liteky v. United States, [23] the United States Supreme Court revisited that specific language from Grinnell. There, the Court explained that because neither the presence of an extrajudicial source necessarily establishes bias, nor the absence of an extrajudicial source necessarily precludes bias, it would be better to speak of the existence of a significant (and often determinative) `extrajudicial source' factor, than of an `extrajudicial source' doctrine, in recusal jurisprudence. [24] This extrajudicial source is merely one, but not the exclusive, reason a predisposition can be wrongful or inappropriate. [25] The Court in Liteky also recognized that judicial rulings alone are an insufficient basis for recusal motions and judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. [26] In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with this general rule, [27] which is also consistent with our precedents. In Liteky, the majority opinion held that opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. [28] The concurring Justices in Liteky argued that this standard effectively asks the reviewing court to determine whether fair judgment is impossible and could be construed to require some direct inquiry to the judge's actual, rather than apparent, state of mind.... [29] Justice Kennedy advocated a more straightforward standard, to focus on the appearance of partiality, not its place of origin: [30] Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified. [31] This Court has noted that the mere fact that a Judge has made some pre-trial rulings against a given defendant is not in itself sufficient to require his disqualification. [32] We have also recognized that [t]here is no general rule that a judge is disqualified per se because of an adverse decision in a former case involving entirely different and unrelated criminal charges against the same party. [33] [A] judge's participation in prior proceedings involving a defendant does not per se disqualify his participation in subsequent, unrelated proceedings. [34] These statements are consistent with Liteky's articulation of the general proposition that judicial rulings alone will not warrant recusal under the objective test. Most recently in Jones v. State , we found that the animosity expressed toward counsel at sidebar during a scheduling discussion in the penalty phase of the trial was objectively insufficient to cause doubt as to the trial judge's partiality. [35] [J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. [36] An objective observer of a sidebar discussion would have no basis to entertain reasonable questions about the trial judge's impartiality absent something more. [37] By comparison, in Stevenson v. State , this Court held that a trial judge's request for a murder case assignment prior to indictment in view of his prior contact with the victim in the suppression hearing would raise a serious question concerning whether his continued participation created the appearance of partiality. This Court disqualified that trial judge from participating in the proceedings upon remand, [38] concluding that the trial judge's personal request for assignment of the murder cases even before the defendants were indicted [39] would cause an objective observer to entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality.
A trial judge must undertake a two-step analysis on the record when confronted with a motion to recuse or disqualify himself or herself. The first step requires the judge to be subjectively satisfied that he or she can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. Even if the judge is satisfied that he or she can proceed to hear the matter free of bias or prejudice, the second step requires the judge to examine objectively whether the circumstances require recusal because of an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality. If a judge's demeanor or actions would lead an objective observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge should recuse himself or herself. On appeal, we review the trial judge's analysis of the subjective test for abuse of discretion. Because a claim of appearance of impropriety implicates a view of how others perceive the conduct of the trial judge, we review the objective determination on its merits de novo to determine whether an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality, thus warranting recusal. In addressing whether a trial judge's actions in an unrelated case involving the same attorney may raise objective questions of bias, federal courts have recognized that bias in favor of or against an attorney can certainly result in bias toward the party. [40] We have previously decided in Jones that the current trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying a motion to disqualify where the same defense attorney argued that she was biased against him. [41] In this subsequent, unrelated case, that same defense attorney now argues that the current trial judge has carried a bias against him originating from that case, to the postconviction motion Gattis brings here. A finding of no bias in one case does not, as Gattis's attorney correctly argues, preclude us from determining that the current trial judge should have disqualified herself here. Nevertheless, it is but one factor to be considered in the calculus of our objective determination. Gattis argues that the current trial judge remained upset with his counsel, as evidenced by her reference to Jones in denying this postconviction motion. In particular, the current trial judge cited her post-trial opinion in Jones and noted: Unfortunately, this defense attorney has begun to develop a disturbing pattern of personally attacking the trial judge whenever he finds himself on the losing end of a capital case. [42] Gattis also relies upon the denial of his counsel's motion to extend the time period on his briefing schedule as well as the page limitations. Thus, we must determine whether these circumstances would lead an objective observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely. Judicial rulings alone, such as the denial of a motion to recuse or disqualify or of a request to increase the time limitation on the briefing schedule or the length of the briefs, are insufficient bases for recusal. [43] To an objective observer, these particular rulings would carry little or no weight. Likewise, the fact that similar issues have been raised in and disposed of in an unrelated proceeding does not require disqualification. Although an objective observer's interest may be piqued where a trial judge makes reference in her ruling to an unrelated case involving the same counsel, we do not find that an objective observer would consider this reference (in dicta) as an indication of demeanor sufficient to imply that the trial judge is unable to conduct a fair and impartial hearing. Because an objective observer would not entertain reasonable questions about the current trial judge's impartiality, Gattis's argument that she erred in denying his motion to disqualify is without merit.