Opinion ID: 2823825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mechanism vs. Location

Text: Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Second, the Report states that immunity should turn on the precise mechanism of the injury rather than the plaintiffâs location when the injury occurred: The committee concluded that a distinction should be made between (1) injuries caused by negligence in the construction, maintenance, failure to maintain, etc. of artificial, man-made objects (swing sets, buildings, etc.) and (2) injuries caused by the natural conditions of a park . . . . In other words, ordinary negligence is sifficient [sic] to impose liability for injuries caused by the dangerous condition of artificial objects. For injuries causedÂ by natural dangerous conditions, immunity should be retained. Id. at 140 (emphasis added). That is, immunity turns on whether the injury was caused by negligence in the construction or maintenance of a man-made object or by a dangerous natural condition. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Another portion of the Report reinforces this point when it assigns to the public the risk of injury from dangerous natural conditions: âIn view of the limited funds available for the acquisition and improvement of property for recreational purposes, . . . it is not unreasonable to expect persons who voluntarily use unimproved property in its natural condition to assume the risk of injuries arising therefrom.â Id. at xxiâxxii (emphasis added). The Report states that individuals assume the risk of injuries arising from unimproved property in its natural state. Nothing in the Report suggests that a personâs location on a man-made improvement shifts to the State the risk of injuries caused by dangerous natural conditions. Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Courts in other jurisdictions have also relied on a causal analysis to conclude that the exact mechanism of a plaintiffâs injury, not her location at the time of injury, determines immunity. In Meddock v. County of Yolo, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), the plaintiff argued that because he was on improved propertyâa paved parking lotâand using it as intended when a tree adjacent to the lot fell on him, the county waived its governmental immunity. In interpreting a provision nearly identical to our natural condition provision, the California Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffâs argument and held, â[A]lthough the injury occurred on improved property, that is, the paved parking lot, it was caused by the trees, native flora located nearâand perhaps superjacent toâthe improved parking lot, but themselves on unimproved property.â Id. at 800â01 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that the plaintiffâs spatial analysis reads âcaused byâ out of the statute. Id. at 801 (âProximity may inform causation, but is no substitute therefor.â). Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â In Redinger v. Clapperâs Tree Service Inc., 615 A.2d 743, 748 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), the court also interpreted a comparable immunity waiver. It held that the plaintiffâs injury did not arise out of an improvement to the land but was âcaused by a falling, decayed tree limbâ and âthis limb came from a part of [defendant]âs land which remained unimproved.â Id. at 750. It also noted, significantly, that âthe fact that the land in question was a partially developed . . . tract is of no consequence; unimproved portions of it may still come under the liability limitation of the [statute].â Id. Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â These courtsâ holdings lend support to our conclusion that a causal analysis should control immunity here.Â