Opinion ID: 200208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Vagueness Challenge to Local Ordinance

Text: 10 Lastly, the Donovans claim that the Haverhill ordinance governing the moving of buildings, Haverhill General Code, ch. 123-1, is void for vagueness on its face because it vests unfettered discretion in Mayor Rurak to grant permits. 4 We find that this claim lacks merit. 11 To prevail in a facial challenge to an ordinance that does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct, plaintiffs must surmount a dauntingly high hurdle. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (stating that [a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully). Thus, the Donovans have the formidable task of showing that `no standard of conduct is specified at all.' Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)). Plaintiffs cannot make this showing. 12 As a preliminary manner, we note that the terms of the Haverhill ordinance clearly specify the conduct that is prohibited: plaintiffs cannot move their house without a permit. 5 Cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (striking down an ordinance for vagueness because it failed to describe what loitering was permissible and what was prohibited). 13 Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the mayor's discretion in the grant of permits is not unrestrained. Applicable Massachusetts law dictates that selectmen grant permits upon such terms as in their opinion the public safety may require.  Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 85, § 18 (2002) (emphasis added). 6 In addition to restricting the exercise of the mayor's discretion to public safety concerns, section 18 provides applicants with notice that to secure a moving permit they may have to meet requirements necessary to ensure public safety. As we have stated before, [w]here a standard is not so vague that reasonably intelligent people `must necessarily guess at its meaning,' we must presume that state courts will give it a limiting construction that will preserve its facial constitutionality. Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115, 1123 (1st Cir.1981) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). 14 The grant of discretion in the issuance of moving permits is a practical necessity. Because every house and route is different, an individual assessment of the impact of each move on the community is required. See id. (stating that a vague factor may be reasonably necessary to embrace all of its legitimately intended objectives without creating an encyclopedic and unwieldy ordinance); see also Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 838 (1st Cir.1985) (explaining that the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have upheld catch-all clauses where it is impractical to formulate an exhaustive list of actionable conduct). In this case, the Haverhill ordinance necessarily contained a catch-all provision because inclusion of all possible conditions would have created an unwieldy ordinance. Further, section 18 put plaintiffs on notice that receipt of a moving permit would be subject to meeting conditions reasonably related to the public safety, and, in accordance with the terms of the law, city officials only imposed conditions so related.