Opinion ID: 1559083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred by failing to examine individual jurors or to grant a mistrial once the jury panel was exposed to prejudicial information.

Text: ¶ 44. Both the trial judge and the district attorney conducted their respective voir dire examinations without incident. Defense counsel had almost concluded his voir dire on behalf of Tate, likewise without incident, when defense counsel asked a catch-all question of the jury venire: BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you so much. Anyone else? There's something that you should have asked me, the attorneys. If you had asked me this question, I would have told you this. I would have told you that, or  you know  I simply can't sit on this jury. Know the type of crime. I can't do it because I can't be fair. I cannot be fair. Anyone that thinks that? Somebody else want to share with us? You're sure? Juror number ten. BY JUROR HOLMES: I know Mr. Tate. Mr. Tate's cousin and my son are very good friends, and they have been friends for a while, and Mr. Tate along with his cousin and my son have had outings together, and I have heard of this before now. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I am sorry. You did what? BY JUROR HOLMES: I have heard of this  what's going on in this case. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You've heard of it? BY JUROR HOLMES: I've heard of it before now, and I heard of another case that involved Mr. Tate also. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you so much for your response. Now is there anybody else? If that lawyer had asked me this question, I would have told you this. You're juror number ten, correct? BY JUROR HOLMES: Right. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, that's all I have. Can we approach? BY THE COURT: Yes, sir. After a nonrecorded bench conference, the trial judge announced to the jury venire that he was declaring a thirty-minute recess to complete the jury selection process, and the trial judge admonished the members of the venire, inter alia, that they were to have no contact or conversation with anyone about this case during the recess. ¶ 45. In chambers, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on Juror Holmes's response that she knew about another case involving Tate. Defense counsel also informed the trial judge that at the time Juror Holmes made the comment about another case involving Tate, he (defense counsel) noticed another female member of the jury panel smiling. After arguments of counsel, the trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial, but announced that he would remove Juror Holmes for cause, and that he would also remove for cause the smiling juror once the identity of that particular juror was known, although the trial judge expressed confidence that the smiling juror was so far down the list, based on defense counsel's description of where she was seated in the courtroom, that she would never be considered as a member of the trial jury for this particular case. Likewise, the trial judge stated that the jury would be properly instructed on the law and how the jury must consider its verdict. After considering challenges for cause, the trial judge declared a recess so counsel could consider how they wanted to exercise their peremptory challenges. ¶ 46. Upon reconvening in chambers for the jury selection process, the trial judge was informed by defense counsel that during the recess, it was brought to his (defense counsel's) attention by Curtileniea that she had overheard four or five prospective jurors sitting on a bench outside the courtroom discussing what other case [Tate] had against him. The trial judge placed Curtileniea under oath, and she testified as to what she had heard and observed regarding this juror conduct. In response to questioning, Curtileniea testified that one lady mentioned to the other (three or four) venire members [w]hat other case he had, and Curtileniea testified that no one responded to this comment by the prospective female juror. The trial judge again denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, but offered to take curative action such as strongly instructing the venire members to disregard the comments made by Juror Holmes. The trial judge likewise offered to afford defense counsel additional challenges as to these jurors if the identity of the four or five jurors described by Curtileniea as discussing this other case could be ascertained. The trial judge, however, refused defense counsel's request to reopen voir dire. On the other hand, the trial judge again offered to admonish the jury venire to disregard Juror Holmes's comments, but that I have to be requested at some point to do that. At this stage of the proceedings, the trial judge was unable to ascertain if the four or five members of the venire mentioned by Curtileniea were close enough to the top of the venire list to be considered for jury service on Tate's case. ¶ 47. Once the trial jury was selected, the trial judge again offered to defense counsel that once the jury was seated in open court, if Curtileniea informed defense counsel that she recognized one or more members of the trial jury as having been among the venire members discussing the other case, defense counsel should inform the trial judge so that curative action could be taken. Likewise, the trial judge again inquired of defense counsel if he wished for the jury to receive any additional instruction regarding the comments made by Juror Holmes. After considerable discussion by the trial judge with all counsel, the trial jury was seated in open court, and the trial judge gave the customary instructions to the jurors regarding their conduct. The following then occurred: BY THE COURT: Now, also I am going to instruct you at this time that you are to completely and totally disregard any comment that may have been made on voir dire about any other case against this defendant because there is no other case. [13] Does everybody understand that? BY THE JURORS: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Can you each follow the Court's instructions in that regard? BY THE JURORS: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Let the record show that each juror has nodded affirmatively. The jury was then put in recess for lunch. The members of the jury likewise were reminded that throughout the trial, during any recess, they were to have no contact or discussions with anyone about the case. ¶ 48. As noted in our discussion of Issue I, supra, our standard of review on a claim that the trial court committed error in refusing to grant a mistrial is one of abuse of discretion. Dora, 986 So.2d at 921. As we recently stated in applying this abuse-of-discretion standard: [T]he trial court is in the best position to determine if an alleged improper comment had a prejudicial effect; therefore, absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's ruling will stand. Jones v. State, 962 So.2d 1263, 1275 (Miss.2007) (citing Stevens v. State, 806 So.2d 1031, 1057 (Miss. 2001)) (addressing alleged improper comment by prosecutor during closing arguments). See also Slaughter v. State, 815 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Miss.2002). ¶ 49. More to the point, this Court in recent times has addressed this precise issue of alleged prejudicial comments by venire members during voir dire. In Shelton v. State, 853 So.2d 1171, 1182-84 (Miss. 2003), the defendant was on trial for capital murder, and during voir dire, a venire member volunteered information that she had heard the defendant had been tried before on the same charges, resulting in a hung jury. Id. at 1183. In denying a motion for a mistrial, the trial judge acknowledged that a few prospective jurors heard that this was a second trial for [the defendant], but that the information would not affect their ability to make a decision. Id. at 1184. This Court found that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial inasmuch as [t]here was no showing of misconduct that resulted in substantial or irreparable harm to [the defendant's] case pursuant to URCCC 3.12. [14] Id. ¶ 50. In applying this law to the facts of today's case, it is clear from the record that the trial judge zealously protected Tate's rights to a fair trial, to the point of admonishing the jury that it was to completely and totally disregard any comment that may have been made on voir dire about any other case against this defendant because there is no other case, when in fact, the record reveals that there was another case pending against the defendant. The members of the trial jury responded affirmatively that they would disregard any comments about another case and that they would follow the Court's instructions in that regard. Recognizing that (1) the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the effect of any objectionable comment by the venire member; (2) the trial judge admonished the trial jury to disregard the objectionable comment; and (3) the law presumes that jurors follow the trial judge's instructions, we find that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge when he denied Tate's motion for a mistrial concerning Juror Holmes's comments that she had heard of another case that involved Mr. Tate also. Consistent with his curative action concerning the comments made by Juror Holmes, the trial judge likewise offered to consider striking the smiling juror if her identity could be ascertained. Also, the trial judge offered defense counsel additional challenges if the identity of the four or five venire members Curtileniea testified had discussed the other case against Tate during a recess became known, and/or if Curtileniea recognized any of these venire members once the trial jury was seated. The record is silent as to whether Curtileniea later came forward with any such information regarding any of the venire members who ultimately were seated in the trial jury. Stated differently, nothing in the record reveals that defense counsel thereafter requested the trial judge to remove any of the jurors who ultimately were seated. ¶ 51. For all these reasons, we find this issue to be without merit.