Opinion ID: 2973168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII and Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112

Text: Ohio courts have held that the evidentiary standards and burdens of proof applicable to a claimed violation of Title VII likewise apply when determining whether a violation of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 has occurred.3 See, e.g., Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 664 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 3 The Ohio statute reads: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 8 No. 04-3465 (Ohio 1996). Consequently, this Court looks to federal case law governing Title VII actions when evaluating Chapter 4112 claims. See Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 187 F.3d 533, 538 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, a failure by Plaintiff to present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of her federal claim would be simultaneously fatal to her state law claim. This Court may therefore evaluate both claims concurrently under the Title VII jurisprudence. B. Legal Standard for Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims Plaintiff alleges intentional discrimination on the part of Defendant in its hiring for the City Safety Manager. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). In a Title VII case, a plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Unlawful discrimination need not be the only reason for an adverse employment action to violate Title VII, but rather need only be an essential component of an employer’s mixed motive. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989). A plaintiff may carry the burden by 1) introducing direct evidence which shows that in treating a plaintiff adversely the defendant was motivated by discriminatory intent, or 2) by introducing circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of discrimination. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2001). handicap, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A) (2004). 9 No. 04-3465 Where, as here, Plaintiff’s evidence is circumstantial, a disparate treatment claim proceeds through a three-step framework. In a failure to promote situation, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of making a prima facie case that 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she applied for and was qualified for the position, 3) she was considered for and denied the promotion, and 4) another employee of similar qualifications who was not a member of the protected class received the promotion. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Roh v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 241 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2001). The prima facie test is meant to be a relatively light burden. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (stating that in a Title VII case “the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous”). If Plaintiff carries that burden, then, in the second step of the framework, Defendant must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to promote Plaintiff. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. Defendant’s burden is one of production, not persuasion; it involves no credibility assessment. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). If Defendant carries its burden, then, in the final stage in the process, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason is a mere pretext for intentional discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43. To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must demonstrate both that Defendant’s rationale is incredible and that the true motivation behind her nonpromotion included intentional discrimination because of her gender. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515 (“[A] reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”). From an evidentiary standpoint, in some (but not all) cases, sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent may come solely 10 No. 04-3465 from the prima facie case. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48. The factfinder may consider the evidence and inferences from the plaintiff’s prima facie case, along with other evidence. Id. at 143. Methods of disproving the defendant’s reason include demonstrating that the reason 1) had no basis in fact, 2) was not the actual reason, or 3) was insufficient to explain the defendant's action. Logan, 259 F.3d at 567. This Circuit has adopted the “honest belief” rule, and Plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext merely by showing that Defendant’s hiring rationale was “mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless,” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998), so long as Defendant honestly believed in the rationale and based this belief on particularized facts before it at the time, id. at 806-07. C. The District Court’s Decision The district court held that Plaintiff had established her prima facie case because she was able to show that she 1) was a member of a protected class (female), 2) was qualified for and applied for the Safety Manager position, 3) was considered for and denied the position, and 4) a white male with arguably similar qualifications was hired instead. The district court also held, however, that the City had set forth legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its hiring actions and produced the associated, requisite evidence. The bulk of the lower court’s decision focuses on whether Plaintiff made a sufficient showing that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City’s reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to carry her burden in making a sufficient showing that Defendant’s reasons were mere pretext for intentional discrimination against Plaintiff because of her gender. Plaintiff appeals this finding on pretext. 11 No. 04-3465 D. Plaintiff’s Evidence of Pretext Plaintiff may carry her burden of pretext at the summary judgment stage if she can produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether the City’s reasons 1) have no basis in fact, 2) are not the actual reasons, or 3) are insufficient to explain the hiring of Brewer in lieu of Plaintiff. Logan, 259 F.3d at 567. This evidence must be such that a “jury may reasonably reject the employer’s explanation.” Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994). To carry her burden, Plaintiff challenges each of Director Christie’s proffered rationales for his hiring decision — the recommendation of the selection committee, union opposition, the applicants’ performance during interviews, and the applicants’ education and background. Plaintiff both challenges the documentation relied on by Christie for his hiring decision, and, by extension, the credibility of Christie’s reliance on that documentation in reaching his hiring decision. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that a jury could reasonably infer that Christie’s hiring rationale is pretextual in light of the entirety of the circumstances surrounding Christie’s direction to amend the position qualification.
Plaintiff argues that the authenticity of the selection committee’s recommendation memorandum of September 14, 2000 is suspect because 1) the letterhead refers to Carolyn Nellon as Director of Human Resources when, at the time of the memorandum, Chester Christie was actually Director; 2) the memorandum refers to Eugene Brundige as a member of the selection committee when Brundige had, in fact, retired by that time; and 3) the memorandum refers to 12 No. 04-3465 Plaintiff’s lack of diplomacy when a committee member, Mike Vance, did not recall discussing such during committee deliberations. The City argues that it was common practice to use up old letterhead and that the memorandum clearly refers to Christie as the Director of Human Resources. Two of the three alleged problems with the memorandum do not, in fact, provide any evidence going to the authenticity of the memorandum. The reference to Brundige was in the background section of the memorandum in the context of a discussion of the first round of interviews in 1999 and does not allude to Brundige’s current employment position with the City. Brundige had, in fact, retired just at the end of August 2000, near the conclusion of the selection committee’s process. Second, the fact that Vance could not recall in his deposition testimony, taken almost four years after the fact, whether the committee discussed Plaintiff’s lack of diplomacy at the time is not evidence that the memorandum lacks authenticity. Plaintiff correctly points out that the City fails to provide any evidence that City departments regularly use old letterhead. In this respect, Plaintiff does point to an incongruity in Defendant’s evidence that this Court should consider. Standing alone, however, this Court believes that this piece of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the memorandum’s authenticity.
Christie states that he relied, in part, on Skinner’s representation that AFSCME did not support Plaintiff’s candidacy for the position. Plaintiff contests Christie’s reliance on the Skinner representation because Plaintiff questions the authenticity of the memorandum in which this representation was communicated because 1) it appears to be the second page of a facsimile 13 No. 04-3465 transmission; 2) it was dated between the tenure of Carolyn Nellon and Chester Christie, a period of time during which the “hiring process would have been put on hold;” and 3) Skinner never “voiced his disapproval of [Plaintiff] during the interview panel’s discussion of the merits of the various applicants.” (Pl. Br. at 16-17.) In this Court’s opinion Plaintiff’s “evidence” going to the authenticity of the memorandum is not evidence on this point at all. The date of the memorandum raises no issues as to its authenticity. While the date is between the tenure of Nellon and Christie, the memorandum was addressed to Brundige, who was still heading up the Department’s efforts to fill the position, and who was overseeing the Department as Deputy Director during this interim period. Plaintiff does not dispute Brundige’s role here. Furthermore, the fact that Vance cannot recall Skinner voicing any objections to Plaintiff in the selection committee’s meeting does not go to the memorandum’s authenticity. Finally, Plaintiff produces no evidence to call into question Skinner’s signature on the memorandum, only that the memorandum appears to be the second page of a facsimile. This is not evidence going to the memorandum’s authenticity. Plaintiff also challenges Christie’s reliance on the Skinner memorandum. Plaintiff alleges that AFSCME disapproval is an insufficient reason for hiring Brewer in lieu of Plaintiff because at the time of the hiring process Plaintiff was an elected board member of CMAGE and had been recommended for the position by the president of the City of Columbus firefighters’ union. This contention by Plaintiff, however, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. The position was aimed at civilian workforce safety programs, and AFSCME represented the largest number of City civilian employees. The firefighter’s union was not on the selection committee, as AFSCME was, 14 No. 04-3465 and the CMAGE representative, Mike Vance, concurred in the recommendation for Brewer. Moreover, Plaintiff does not produce evidence that Christie is dissembling about his reliance on the memorandum.
Plaintiff also alleges that it is implausible that Christie’s interview with Plaintiff could form a rational basis for rejecting Plaintiff’s candidacy. Plaintiff contends that Christie failed to inquire into Plaintiff’s knowledge, skills, or abilities, or request documentation as to Plaintiff’s qualifications for the position. Plaintiff argues that Christie did not, therefore, perform an “interview” with Plaintiff and that a reasonable jury could infer from the “pro-forma” nature of the interview that it was insufficient to inform his decision-making process. Plaintiff is asking this Court to venture into the territory of telling employers the form and extent of hiring interviews. This Court avers that it would be inappropriate to interfere with a manager’s prerogative to conduct interviews in the form and fashion with which he or she sees fit, so long as the form and fashion do not implicate impermissible discrimination. See Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff does not allege that Christie made any discriminatory remarks or allusions during the interview. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that Defendant’s reliance on Plaintiff’s interview performance was pretextual.
Plaintiff alleges that a jury could reasonably infer that Defendant’s reliance on Brewer’s educational attainment was pretextual in light of Plaintiff’s extensive experience. Plaintiff alleges that no reasonable hiring official could find Brewer more qualified than Plaintiff. Plaintiff 15 No. 04-3465 misconstrues the evidence before this Court. Christie does not assert that Brewer’s experience is more extensive than Plaintiff. Rather, Christie notes that Brewer far exceeded the minimum requirements for the position, given his experience and educational attainments, and further noted, by comparison, Plaintiff’s high school diploma. The City never represented that it would hire the most experienced candidate without consideration of other factors. Rather, education and experience were only two of a number of factors considered by Christie. Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence, beyond Plaintiff’s own opinion, that Brewer was not qualified for the position. This Court has consistently held that it will not second-guess the business acuity underlying management’s personnel decisions. See Smith, 220 F.3d at 763.
Plaintiff argues that the sum of the circumstances give rise to an inference that Defendant’s hiring rationale is pretextual. Plaintiff relies heavily on the fact that despite being qualified at the time of her interview, after the ascendancy of Christie, a male, into the hiring position, the minimum qualifications underwent a modification which permitted Brewer, also a male, to qualify for the position when he was previously not deemed qualified. Plaintiff argues that the sequence of events raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether this modification was intended to discriminate against Plaintiff because of her gender. Plaintiff implies that had Carolyn Nellon remained Director of Human Resources, Plaintiff would have been hired and no modification to the qualifications would have been made. Plaintiff makes a myriad of arguments about the timeline of the qualifications modification, the strongest of which lies with the false assertion in the Civil Service Commission staff 16 No. 04-3465 recommendation memorandum that the national recruitment effort had “failed to yield any qualified candidates” for the position. While the Civil Service Commission Executive Director explains that this statement was a result of a miscommunication between departments, the inconsistency is real evidence going to the truth behind the City’s rationale for the qualifications modification. None of Plaintiff’s other issues with the timeline, however, support the contention that the modification was part of a plan to discriminate. The fact that the Health Department was concerned about the removal of the certification requirement does not undermine the Department’s asserted rationale for the modification (to attract a broader array of viable candidates). Neither does Plaintiff present any evidence to counter Defendant’s rationale for the removal of the position discussion at the July 2000 Civil Service Commission meeting (that the matter had been settled). Finally, Plaintiff points to the original modification to the position which would have removed Plaintiff’s eligibility for the position. Plaintiff presents no evidence, however, that Defendant’s explanation for this modification — its misunderstanding that the CSP and CIH certifications required a bachelor’s ab initio — was false. In any event, Defendant revised its modification to the position to include applicants in Plaintiff’s position before reposting the opening.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court understands Plaintiff to have produced two pieces of evidence in support of pretext, 1) the old letterhead going to the authenticity of the selection committee recommendation memorandum, and 2) the false assertion in the Civil Service Commission memorandum that no qualified candidates had been found for the position. Neither piece of evidence is dispositive and both are countered by Defendant in the form of deposition 17 No. 04-3465 testimony and affidavits. The old letterhead is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the memorandum’s authenticity. Christie gave a statement under oath that the memorandum is a true and correct copy of what he received on that date. The memorandum is initialed and is consistent with deposition testimony of Vance and the affidavit of Christie. The memorandum was kept in the ordinary course of business. The use of 9-month old letterhead is insufficient to override these indicia of reliability. The incorrect assertion in the Civil Service Commission memorandum is a closer issue. The inconsistency between the statement therein and the undisputed concession that Plaintiff was qualified for the Safety Manager position is some evidence going to Plaintiff’s claim, despite Defendant’s explanation for the statement. In this Court’s opinion, however, this single inconsistency amounts only to a scintilla of evidence when viewed in the context of the evidentiary record as a whole. This evidence is not sufficient such that a “jury may reasonably reject the employer’s explanation.” Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing that Defendant’s true motivation was discriminatory. None of Plaintiff’s evidence points to gender discrimination. Plaintiff has alleged no statements or references by Defendant management or employees which go to gender discrimination or even animus. Plaintiff relies exclusively on the fact that a white male ultimately received the promotion. Yet another white male, Keith Nichols, was affected in the same way as Plaintiff throughout the hiring process. In fact, Keith Nichols was the successful candidate’s direct supervisor prior to the candidate’s promotion. Plaintiff points to the entirety of the circumstances 18 No. 04-3465 surrounding the hiring process, but this Court has held that temporal proximity, standing alone, is “insufficient in and of itself to establish that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason” was, in fact, pretextual. Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F3d 309, 317 (6th Cir. 2001).