Opinion ID: 2533183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless search of defendant's automobile

Text: ¶ 97. Pitchford argues the .38 caliber revolver used in the shooting and later discovered in his car should have been suppressed as the product of an illegal search. After receiving information that Pitchford had been involved in a previous attempt to rob the store, Investigator Conley went to Pitchford's home, where, in the driveway, he spotted a vehicle matching the description of a vehicle seen by witnesses at the store prior to the robbery. A tag search revealed that the car was titled to Pitchford and his mother, Shirley Jackson. ¶ 98. Conley asked for permission to search the vehicle. Pitchford consented orally, but refused to sign a consent form, while Jackson signed the consent form. Conley (the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing) testified that, after Jackson had signed the consent form, Pitchford stated momma, it's something in the car. It's something in the car. Investigator Conley testified that Pitchford never withdrew his oral consent. ¶ 99. Investigator Conley searched the vehicle and discovered the revolver. Pitchford moved the trial court to suppress the evidence, claiming he did not consent, and that the search was illegal. The trial court denied Pitchford's motion to suppress, finding that Conley had consent to search the vehicle and, alternatively, that Investigator Conley properly could have executed a warrantless search because of exigent circumstances. ¶ 100. Pitchford admits that he initially consented to the search. However, he claims he withdrew his consent. As evidence of the withdrawal, he points to the following trial testimony from Investigator Conley: Pitchford was  when I went to search the car he started getting kind of angry, so I had him detained and moved to the side of the house. This testimony came during the trial, but was not provided during the suppression hearing. Also, Pitchford did not offer any proof concerning his demeanor during the search, as described by Investigator Conley, nor did he inform the trial judge that Investigator Conley had him detained and moved to the side of the house. We will not hold the trial judge in error for failure to suppress evidence based on testimony and evidence not given at the suppression hearing. ¶ 101. Both the United States and Mississippi Constitutions guarantee citizens the right to be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions against unreasonable and warrantless searches and seizures. [59] While the warrant clauses of these provisions express the general rule that law enforcement must procure a warrant based on probable cause before engaging in a search, the rule has several exceptions. . . . Voluntary consent eliminates the warrant requirement. [60] ¶ 102. Pitchford argues that, because the search was conducted over his objection, the evidence should be suppressed. He cites Georgia v. Randolph, [61] in which in the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling, over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident, cannot be justified as reasonable as to him, based on consent given to police by another resident. However, because we find Pitchford consented to the search and never withdrew his consent, we need not explore the issue addressed in Randolph. ¶ 103. We find this issue has no merit.