Opinion ID: 1609101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i)

Text: ¶ 11. That being said, pursuant to Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i), venue is proper in Rankin County. Mississippi Code Section § 11-11-3(1)(a)(I), Mississippi's venue statute, reads as follows: Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction [2] shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, OR, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, OR in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred OR where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(I) (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added pursuant to Hedgepeth v. Johnson, 975 So.2d 235, 238 (Miss. 2008)). ¶ 12. Pursuant to Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(I), this Court holds that the plaintiff cannot establish venue in Hinds County pursuant to any basis provided for in the statute for the following reasons: (1) Holmes, the resident defendant, resided in Rankin County at the time of the accident; (2) corporate defendant State Farm's principal place of business is in Bloomington, Illinois, i.e., outside of Mississippi; (3) under the facts of this case, the communications received in Hinds County by McMillan between himself and State Farm are not sufficient to show that a substantial alleged act or omission occurred in Hinds County, pursuant to this Court's precedents in Myers [3] and Hedgepeth, and (4) the accidentwhich certainly occurred in Rankin Countyis a substantial event that caused the injury. ¶ 13. Here, there is no dispute that Holmes was a Rankin County resident. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the location where the accident occurred, giving rise to this suit, is physically in Rankin County. Even the trial judge acknowledge such by concluding: The accident occurred on International Drive and Old Brandon Road, which is physically located in Rankin County.  (Emphasis added.) The venue statute says nothing about who happens to own the property where an automobile accident occurs; nor does it concern itself with whose police officers respond to the accident scene. Therefore, venue for the action against Holmes is not proper in Hinds County, but rather in Rankin County. ¶ 14. McMillan also sued his uninsured motorist insurance carrier, State Farm, for breach of contract, claiming it breached the contract of insurance by its failure to pay the claim. According to McMillan's complaint, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is a non-resident corporation, created organized and existing [sic] under the laws of the Statute of Illinois and has its principal place of business located at One State Farm Plaza, Bloomington, IL 61710. ¶ 15. Because State Farm's principal place of business is outside the state of Mississippi, the venue issue on this claim is controlled by Myers, 956 So.2d 213 (Miss. 2007), and Hedgepeth, 975 So.2d 235 (Miss. 2008). Myers involved a lawsuit filed by an insured doctor against his insurance company for failure to renew his malpractice insurance policy. In interpreting the statutory language,  in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred, [4]  we held thatfor venue purposesthe relevant actions of the insurance company were those associated with the company's decision not to renew the policy. Myers, 956 So.2d at 218-19. We further held that other acts, such as the application for the policy, the receipt of mail, and the payment of premiums, were insufficient . . . for establishing venue. Id. ¶ 16. According to Myers, even if an act or omission did not cause the injury, it can nevertheless establish venue if it is both substantial and alleged by the plaintiff. Id. (emphasis added). However, the venue statute does not allow the piling of acts or events to establish venue. It specifically requires a substantial alleged act, omission, or injury-causing event to have happened in a particular jurisdiction in order for venue to be proper there. Id. [5] ¶ 17. In Hedgepeth, this Court distinguished the facts in Myers, but affirmed that in Myers, the substantial alleged act or omission was the failure to renew the insurance policy at issue. Hedgepeth, 975 So.2d at 239-240. In Hedgepeth, however, insurance adjusters personally visited the plaintiffs at their home and denied their claims which resulted from Hurricane Katrina. Id. Furthermore, the Hedgepeth's insurance agentthe defendant in that mattercame to their home and encouraged the plaintiffs to commit insurance fraud, leading to the plaintiff's emotional distress. The Hedgepeths filed suit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, which was the county in which their home was located. We held that substantial alleged acts and a substantial event that caused injury occurred in Jackson County, and therefore, Jackson County was a proper venue in that matter. ¶ 18. With respect to McMillan's breach-of-contract claim against State Farm, the relevant acts to be examined are those associated with the denial of the claim. The record clearly establishes that the decision to reject the plaintiff's settlement demand was made in Alabama, and was communicated by letter which bore an Alabama return addressnot in person at McMillan's residence. Nothing in the record and nothing provided by McMillan suggests that the rejection of the settlement demand was connected to Hinds County. Thus, in accord with our precedent, Hinds County is not an appropriate venue for McMillan's breach-of-contract claim. ¶ 19. In his dissent, Justice Kitchens relies on Snyder v. Logan, 905 So.2d 531 (Miss.2005). However, Snyder simply states in dictum that [t]he trial court was correct in holding that venue was proper in Adams County . . ., and neither the trial court nor this Court held the reason to be because Snyder had purchased her auto insurance there. Indeed, venue was proper in Adams County because that is where one of the defendants (Logan Insurance Agency) was located. See id. at 533 (Because there is a resident defendant (Logan Insurance Agency) in the case. . . .). Furthermore, Adams County is where the plaintiff alleged that fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations took place which formed the basis for the fraud claim in the lawsuit. Id. at 532. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the only issue before this Court in Snyder was whether venue was proper in Jefferson County, the county where the automobile accident had occurred. Id. at 534. We, of course, held that it was. ¶ 20. Because venue of this civil action clearly is not in Hinds County, venue in this case is proper in Rankin County, pursuant to Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i). Thus, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that venue was proper in Hinds County.