Opinion ID: 1352137
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aggravation/Mitigation Issues

Text: After holding an aggravation/mitigation hearing, the trial judge issued a special verdict under A.R.S. § 13-703(F), finding three statutory aggravating factors had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Fierro was previously convicted of a felony in the United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person (§ 13-703(F)(2)); (2) in the commission of the offense Fierro knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense (§ 13-703(F)(3)); and (3) Fierro committed the offense in the expectation of receiving property having pecuniary value (§ 13-703(F)(5)).
To qualify as an aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), a prior conviction must be for a felony that, by statutory definition, involves the use of or threat of violence on another person. State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 228, 782 P.2d 693, 704 (1989); State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985); appeal after remand, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d 655 (1984). If, under the statutory definition of the crime, the defendant could commit or be convicted of the crime without the use or threat of violence, the prior conviction cannot qualify as a statutory aggravating circumstance. State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 114, 786 P.2d 959, 965 (1990); Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704. At trial, the state presented evidence that Fierro had been convicted of three prior felonies involving violence. On July 6, 1978, Fierro was convicted in Texas of aggravated assault on a police officer. On August 23, 1978, he was convicted in Texas of robbery. On April 19, 1982, he was convicted in Arizona of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. In addition to the evidence the state presented regarding these convictions, Fierro himself admitted at the evidentiary hearing that he had been convicted of these crimes. See R.T., Nov. 18, 1986, at 20-22. In State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 579 P.2d 542 (1978), we held that violence, as used in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) (formerly § 13-454(E)(2)), meant the exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse. Id. at 51, 579 P.2d at 555. In determining whether a defendant's prior convictions under § 13-703(F)(2) warrant aggravating a life sentence to death, only those felony convictions in which force was employed or threatened with the intent to injure or abuse will be considered in aggravation. Cf. Lopez, 163 Ariz. at 114, 786 P.2d at 965 (creating substantial risk of physical injury does not necessarily involve the use or threat of violence). Ordinarily, the crimes of robbery and aggravated assault, by definition, involve the use or threat of violence. However, in 1973, the Texas legislature specifically amended the statutes creating these offenses to encompass a broader range of activity. Tex.Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.02 and 29.02 (Vernon 1974). Under the statutory definitions of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits an aggravated assault if he commits an assault and threatens with a deadly weapon or causes bodily injury to a peace officer. Id., § 22.02(a)(2). The Practice Commentary to the 1973 amendment specifically states that violence is not necessary, and there is no requirement of intent to injure. It is sufficient for conviction that bodily injury is recklessly inflicted, that fear is knowingly induced, or that the offensive nature of physical contact ought to be known. Id., Practice Commentary  1973. The 1973 definition of robbery also employs the same language concerning the reckless infliction of bodily injury. Under the Texas Penal Code, a person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 29.02 (emphasis added). Because the Texas legislature has amended its penal code so that violence is no longer required to commit these offenses, the Texas convictions for aggravated assault on an officer and robbery cannot be used to establish the aggravating circumstance enumerated in § 13-703(F)(2). Lopez, 163 Ariz. at 114, 786 P.2d at 965; Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704. Similarly, under the statutory definition of aggravated assault found in A.R.S. § 13-1204, it would be possible to commit aggravated assault without the use or threat of violence. [9] Because the state presented no evidence specifying under which subsection Fierro was charged and convicted, this conviction also fails to establish an aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). Under the circumstances, the state did not prove this aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lopez, 163 Ariz. at 114, 786 P.2d at 965; Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704. We conclude that the aggravating circumstance of the prior convictions for use of violence was not proved.
This aggravating circumstance requires that during the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to a person other than the victim of the offense. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(3). For this aggravating circumstance to apply, the person so endangered must not have been an intended victim of the crime. See State v. Johnson, 147 Ariz. 395, 400, 710 P.2d 1050, 1055 (1985); State v. Rossi (Rossi I), 146 Ariz. 359, 366, 706 P.2d 371, 378 (1985). The other person must have been within the zone of danger. See State v. McMurtrey (McMurtrey II), 151 Ariz. 105, 108, 726 P.2d 202, 205, cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107 S.Ct. 1359, 94 L.Ed.2d 530 (1987); Johnson, 147 Ariz. at 400, 710 P.2d at 1055. At the time of the shooting, Manross was seated in the front seat of the car talking to the 911 operator. Several bullets were fired in the direction of the car and Moseley. One bullet struck Moseley and two bullets struck the windshield of the car, narrowly missing Manross. The trial judge concluded that circumstances indicated that Fierro knew there was another individual in the car and that shooting toward the car would create a grave risk of death to that individual. Special Verdict, Mar. 6, 1987, at 4. We believe the record supports the finding that Fierro had to have been aware of Manross's presence in the car. According to Manross's testimony at trial, Moseley got out of the car on the passenger side and immediately fired a warning shot. One or both car doors remained open as events transpired and the interior light remained on. The transcript of the 911 call indicates Manross called out to Moseley several times and he responded to her. It is highly likely that Fierro could hear her or could at least infer that someone occupied the driver's seat. Manross was clearly within the zone of danger. Moreover, Fierro's acquittal on the charge of attempted murder establishes that Manross was not an intended victim of the shooting. Verdict, Dec. 23, 1986. Cf. Johnson, 147 Ariz. at 400, 710 P.2d at 1055. The evidence supports the finding that Fierro knowingly created a grave risk of death to Manross.
To prove this aggravating factor, the state must show that the defendant's motivation was the expectation of pecuniary gain. State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 35, 734 P.2d 563, 577 (1987). The financial motivation must be the cause of the murder and not merely a result. Id.; see also State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143, 105 S.Ct. 2689, 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985); State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 685 P.2d 1284 (1984). The defendant does not have to intend to kill beforehand to satisfy the statute. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 36, 734 P.2d at 578. When the defendant kills to facilitate his escape and to permit him to take and keep stolen items, he furthers his pecuniary gain motive. State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 588, 769 P.2d 1017, 1034 (1989); State v. Hensley (Hensley II), 142 Ariz. 598, 604, 691 P.2d 689, 694 (1984). We accept the trial judge's finding that this aggravating factor was present. Manross and Moseley interrupted a burglary in progress when they arrived home. The reason for Fierro's presence at the scene was to steal; he expected pecuniary gain, and this expectation tainted all his other conduct. The trial court's finding comports with our prior decisions in cases in which a killing occurred in connection with a robbery or theft. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 36, 734 P.2d at 578; Nash, 143 Ariz. at 405, 694 P.2d at 235; Hensley II, 142 Ariz. at 605, 691 P.2d at 695. The shooting was the result of the intended crime of burglary, and the motivation was expectation of pecuniary gain. [10]
In sentencing a defendant for first degree murder, the sentencing judge must consider, in addition to the statutory mitigating factors set forth in A.R.S. 13-703(G), [11] any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less severe than the death penalty is appropriate. State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 677 P.2d 920 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 2670, 81 L.Ed.2d 375 (1984); McMurtrey I, 136 Ariz. 93, 664 P.2d 637. The burden is on the defendant to prove any mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 408, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980). The trial judge must consider all mitigating circumstances proffered by the defendant. McMurtrey I. However, it is within the discretion of the trial judge how much weight should be given to the proffered mitigating factors. Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F. Supp. 1334 (D.Ariz. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 832 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.1987). The trial judge considered all the evidence of mitigation offered by Fierro and concluded that there were no mitigating factors, either taken alone or collectively. He further concluded that even if any of the proffered mitigating factors could have been considered mitigating, they were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Special Verdict, Mar. 6, 1987. We must independently examine the evidence offered in mitigation to determine whether it was properly weighed so that the sentence imposed was justified. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222. We discussed our role in reviewing death sentences in State v. Watson (Watson II), 129 Ariz. 60, 628 P.2d 943 (1981): Unlike appellate review of non-capital crimes, in reviewing the imposition of the death penalty, we must make an independent determination of the imposition of that penalty.... The question before us is not whether the trial court properly imposed the death penalty, but whether, based upon the record before us, we believe that the death penalty should be imposed. A finding merely that the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was factually supported or justified by the evidence is not the separate and independent judgment by this court that the death penalty warrants. This is in keeping with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court that we must review carefully and with consistency death penalty cases and not engage in a cursory or rubber stamp type of review. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960 [49 L.Ed.2d 913] (1976). Id. at 62-63, 628 P.2d at 945-46. Fierro proffered the following mitigating factors: 1. His capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired;