Opinion ID: 1136887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: did the trial court err in excluding the testimony of the defense's witness vicki parker and in restricting fisher's testimony regarding a motive to lie on the part of state's witnesses?

Text: Fisher also assigns as error the trial court's exclusion of defense witness Vicki Parker, Deputy Chancery Clerk of Jackson County, and his own testimony regarding a motive to lie by the prosecution's witnesses. Parker was to testify that Fisher had signed an affidavit to have his wife committed. The State moved to prohibit her testimony based on improper notice and relevancy. The trial court granted the motion. A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless the judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse this ruling. Shearer v. State, 423 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss. 1982). The record indicates Parker's testimony would be cumulative, as Fisher himself testified that he tried to have Rhonda committed because of cocaine addiction and then dropped it. We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling. The trial judge also refused to allow Fisher to testify concerning a custody dispute between Rhonda and him over their son. Fisher argues our recent decision in McLemore v. State, 669 So.2d 19 (1996), as support for this position. McLemore sought to show evidence of bias and prejudice against him by officers of the sheriff's department. McLemore proffered that he would testify to the fact that officers already had a mind set of guilt as to him for murders occurring the same day. Because one of the murders occurred while McLemore was in custody, the officers may have had reason to lie about McLemore's participation in the second one in order to cover shoddy investigative procedures. McLemore did not seek to elicit such bias on cross-examination of the officers. We held that a party is entitled to present evidence as to bias and prejudice against him by the state's witnesses, and this should be accomplished on cross-examination. However, this is not the only time a party can show these motives. McLemore v. State, 669 So.2d at 24-25. We further upheld McLemore's right to present such evidence through his own testimony. Id. While we agree that McLemore supports Fisher's right to present evidence of bias and prejudice of the State's witnesses against him, a review of Fisher's proffer of testimony indicates no abuse on the part of the trial judge in excluding this testimony. He proffered that his testimony would show a custody dispute between Rhonda, Eartha Mayes and him over the Fishers' child, Guidera. On cross-examination of Rhonda, testimony was elicited concerning this exact issue. Evidence showing bias on the part of a witness is allowed for the purpose of affecting credibility of the witness. Id. at p. 23; Cantrell v. State, 507 So.2d 325, 329 (Miss. 1987); Sanders v. State, 352 So.2d 822, 824 (Miss. 1977). McLemore allows this evidence to come from a party as well as the actual witness. Fisher elicited the proffered testimony regarding bias from Rhonda on cross-examination. It would have been more prudent to allow the defendant to testify to his view of the bias. However, the evidence in regard to bias was developed from the testimony of the witness and was before the jury. Therefore, the failure to allow Fisher to also testify to it was not reversible error.