Opinion ID: 2826263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balance of the Remaining Factors

Text: Because the ACLU is likely to succeed on its constitutional claims, there is “no issue as to the existence of the remaining preliminary injunction factors.” Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 540 (6th Cir. 2010). As we have explained, “even minimal infringement upon First Amendment values constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify injunctive relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, “[w]hen a constitutional violation is likely . . . the public interest militates in favor of injunctive relief because it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) (“When constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed.”); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f the plaintiff shows a substantial likelihood that the challenged law is unconstitutional, no substantial harm to others can be said to inhere in its enjoinment.”). In any event, as set forth above, the Defendants’ 14-1617 ACLU v. Livingston Cnty. et al. Page 17 arguments relating to irreparable harm and the balance of equities—e.g., that the burden will “adversely impact the operation and administration of the Jail,” Appellant Br. at 50—are not persuasive. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the remaining factors support granting the preliminary injunction.