Opinion ID: 2494143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Wealth

Text: First, Ross contends that the circuit court improperly allowed the Rosen-Ragers to place before the jury evidence of Ross's financial condition. Specifically, the Rosen-Ragers presented evidence indicating that, including the $1,612.93 MERS had paid to redeem the propertywhich money Ross refused to collectthe Madison County Probate Court was holding approximately $150,000 that Ross was refusing to collect in other such cases for similar reasons. According to Ross, he had acquired a number of tax-sale properties for which he had not been reimbursed for insurance and improvements, and he was refusing payment as in this case, because he was concerned that accepting the probate money might be construed as ratification of an incomplete redemption. Ross's brief, at 53. The Rosen-Ragers contend that the evidence that Ross was refusing to collect money held for him by the probate court was admissible to show that Ross's refusal to relinquish possession of the property in this case was part of a systematic scheme or practice calculated to deny the rights of legal title holders to peacefully possess their property, Rosen-Ragers' brief, at 61, and that, in any case, Ross did not properly object to the evidence when proffered. In connection with the non-preservation argument, the following colloquy occurred at trial during the testimony of Jan Dismuke, an accountant clerk at the Madison County Probate Office: Q. [By the Rosen-Ragers' counsel:] Did Mr. Ross ever come and pick that money up? A. [By Dismuke:] No, sir. Q. How much redemption money are you holding for Howard Ross that he has not come and picked up? [By Ross's counsel:] Objection, Judge, that's irrelevant. [The court:] Overruled. Q. [By the Rosen-Ragers' counsel:] You may answer. A. One hundred and forty-nine thousand, two hundred and thirty-seven dollars and fifty-nine cents. Q. No more questions. (Emphasis added.) It is well settled that a specific objection is a condition precedent to appellate review while a general objection is a waiver of appellate review.... A general objection to evidence is one which does not definitely and specifically state the ground upon which it is based so that the court may intelligently rule on it. II Charles W. Gamble & Robert J. Goodwin, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 426.01(7), at 2125 (6th ed.2009) (hereinafter referred to as  McElroy ). This rule applies unless the evidence is patently illegal and cannot be made legal for any purpose. Harris v. Martin, 271 Ala. 52, 53, 122 So.2d 116, 118 (1960). An objection on the ground that the proffered evidence is irrelevant is a general objection. Few v. State, 518 So.2d 835, 837 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987); Manson v. State, 349 So.2d 67, 81 (Ala.Crim.App.1977). The party who lodges a general objection at trial may not expand the objection on appeal by including specific grounds. McElroy, supra, at 2125. Dismuke's testimony was not patently inadmissible and illegal for every purpose. It bore a logical relationship to the ultimate questionwhether Ross had consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression or wantonness with regard to the Rosen-Ragers. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid. Indeed, Ross essentially concedes that evidence of multiple, similar instances of ignoring certificates of redemption would have been admissible for that purpose. In this Court, Ross states: The Rosen-Ragers could have made their point simply by asking the probate clerk how many other tax-sale properties Ross owned as to which he had not picked up funds deposited for redemption. The amount of funds deposited was ... inadmissible evidence of Ross's financial condition. Ross's reply brief, at 27-28 (emphasis in original). This is an argument that should have been made to the circuit court at the time of the proffer, not for the first time in this Court. Because Ross did not properly object to Dismuke's testimony, he is not entitled to a reversal based on its allegedly improper admission.