Opinion ID: 1120045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidence of prior similar acts

Text: At trial, prosecution and defense witnesses offered differing accounts of how the shooting occurred. Butts' two companions testified that Adkinson was upset as he approached them, and that although they were conciliatory, Adkinson was belligerent, waving his shotgun around, and eventually, when he was within inches of Steven Butts, pointing the gun directly at him moments before it discharged. Adkinson took the stand in his own defense and denied pointing his gun at Butts. Both Adkinson and his wife testified that the weapon was pointed to the side of Butts. Adkinson testified that Butts was agitated, building himself up into a frenzy, and attempted to grab the weapon from Adkinson's hands, thereby pulling it towards himself when it discharged. The Adkinsons also testified that Adkinson was very careful in the use of weapons, would never point a gun at another person, and had never done so. On rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimony of two witnesses who described two separate incidents when Adkinson pointed a gun at suspected trespassers on his land. Adkinson objected to the admission of this evidence on grounds of irrelevance and prejudice, but the trial court ruled against him. Adkinson's first claim on appeal is that the admission of evidence of purported prior similar acts towards trespassers was error because it was character evidence, which is prohibited by Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) [3] except in certain specific cases which do not apply here. He contends that the introduction of the evidence was for the purpose of portraying him as a person with a predisposition to commit this sort of crime. It is beyond dispute that where evidence of other crimes or acts is relevant only to prove one's character, to show that on the occasion in question he acted in conformity with that character, it is not admissible. [4] This is because of the unfair impact such evidence tends to have. It may give rise to a persuasive inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged because he is a bad person. When this occurs, the defendant has been effectively denied his right to defend against the particular crime with which he is charged. [5] However, it is equally well-established that where the evidence of prior crimes or acts is relevant to a material fact in the case at trial, it does not fall within the prohibition. [6] This court has admitted evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts where it has been offered to prove motive, [7] intent, [8] identity [9] or has set the stage for the crime being tried. [10] In this case, the prosecution called two witnesses. The first was Tommy Banks, a surveyor who testified that he and an associate had gone out to Adkinson's homestead to survey the land. Adkinson appeared at their rear, and asked them what they wanted. Banks turned around to see Adkinson armed with an upraised shotgun pointed at him, which was lowered after Banks explained his presence. The second witness was William Blessington, who was crossing Adkinson's land with a man and his young son on their way to the river when they met Adkinson about seventy yards away. Adkinson had a shotgun which he discharged above their heads, and as he approached them, he shouted at them to get off his land. When Blessington's companion asked if they could cross his land to reach the river, Adkinson brought his shotgun to within a foot of the companion's face, pointing it at him, and demanded that they leave immediately. The trial judge ruled that this evidence regarding prior confrontations between Adkinson and trespassers was relevant to show that Adkinson's pointing of his shotgun at Butts was not accidental or inadvertent. [11] We agree with this determination. Here, unlike the situation presented in Oksoktaruk v. State, 611 P.2d 521, (Alaska 1980) and Eubanks v. State, 516 P.2d 726, 729 (Alaska 1973), Adkinson's prior acts are so related to the crime charged in point of time or circumstances that evidence thereof is significantly useful in showing the defendant's intent in connection with the crime charged. [12] However, this does not end the inquiry. As we stated in Eubanks v. State, 516 P.2d 726, 729 (Alaska 1973), [e]ven when such evidence is relevant, the probative value must outweigh its prejudicial impact. [13] This is a question which is left to the trial court's discretion, and reversal is required only where it is found that the trial court has abused that discretion. [14] It cannot be denied that the testimony by Banks and Blessington was highly damaging to the defense. The evidence was probative of a material fact in this case, i.e., whether Adkinson intentionally pointed his gun at Butts. The testimony itself was clear and convincing. It rendered Adkinson's version of the incident much less believeable in a case which largely turned upon his credibility and that of the other witnesses. While there is always a danger of jury misuse of this sort of evidence, in this case the evidence was not of the type to arouse the jury to overmastering hostility. [15] We cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. The defense contends that even if the evidence was admissible, the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding its proper use to the jury. There is no merit to this claim. Absent a finding of plain error, [16] which Adkinson does not urge, appellant's failure to request a limiting instruction at trial waived that claim. [17]