Opinion ID: 2521563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Confrontation Clause Case Law

Text: We first examine the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to state prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment and we have followed U.S. Supreme Court law regarding the Confrontation Clause. In addition, we outline our case law and our interpretation of the Supreme Court's case law. Until the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford, the test for Confrontation Clause violations was outlined in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), overruled by Crawford, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177,. In Roberts, the Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether prior testimony of a hearsay declarant was admissible. Id. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. First, the Court stated that the Confrontation Clause required that the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial. Id. at 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531. Second, if unavailability was established, the Court found that the Clause approves only statements that bear adequate indicia of reliability. Id. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. The Court held that reliability could be inferred where the testimony fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. Before evidence could be admitted when it did not come under such an exception, the party offering the evidence had to show that the evidence possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. Applying this test in Roberts, the Court found that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the introduction of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony where the witness had been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 73. The Court held that [s]ince there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], and counsel ... availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript ... bore sufficient `indicia of reliability' and afforded `the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.' Id. (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972)). We adopted the Roberts test in Dement, 661 P.2d at 681. In Dement, we reached only the first prong because we found that the prosecution failed to establish unavailability. Id. at 681. However, in later cases, we applied the reliability prong of the Roberts test. We stated that we must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement to decide whether it possessed the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness. Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 314 (2001), abrogated by Crawford, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)). Although we noted that courts have considerable discretion in determining what factors may enhance or detract from the statement's reliability, we pointed out several factors a court could use. People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406-07 (2001), abrogated by Crawford, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 110 S.Ct. 3139). These factors included whether the statement was detailed, how soon after the events the statement was made, whether the statement was voluntary, whether the declarant had a motive to inculpate the defendant, among others. Id. at 406-07; see also Stevens, 29 P.3d at 314. Thus, our reliability analyses considered both the procedural setting in which the contested statements were made as well as the substance of the statements. See id. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford rejects the reliability prong of the Roberts test in favor of an inquiry into whether the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Crawford, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. In explaining its abrogation of the Roberts test, the Court in Crawford begins with the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1363-64. The Court explains that the the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Id. The Court notes that the common law at the time of the Sixth Amendment's enactment conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations. Id. at 1366. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision explains that the Clause provides a procedural, not a substantive, guarantee. Id. at 1370. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Id. Therefore, the flaw in the Roberts test is that it allows judges to substitute their determinations of amorphous notions of `reliability' for a jury's determination. Id. The Supreme Court cites inconsistent decisions of reliability as a reason why allowing courts to make reliability determinations about ex parte testimony does not provide the protection envisioned by the Framers adopting the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1371 (citing Stevens, 29 P.3d at 316, and Farrell, 34 P.3d at 406-07, as examples of the inconsistent application of the Roberts test due to the wide range of sometimes contradictory factors used in the reliability analysis). Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. Id. at 1370. Crawford limits its holding to testimonial statements, noting that the Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses or those who bear testimony. Id. at 1364. Crawford explicitly declines to define testimonial comprehensively, but notes that it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing. Id. at 1374. The Supreme Court has refocused its analysis of Confrontation Clause violations, mandating not that evidence necessarily be reliable, but that its reliability be assessed in a particular mannerthrough cross-examination. The Crawford test therefore limits the admissibility of testimonial evidence, which includes preliminary hearing testimony, to that of unavailable witnesses whom the accused has had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine. In light of Crawford, we reject the Roberts reliability analysis that we adopted in Dement. Consequently, to the extent that Stevens and Farrell and any of our other prior cases employ that analysis, we overrule those cases. We therefore change our Confrontation Clause inquiry to whether a defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine, not whether the previous testimony is reliable.