Opinion ID: 514846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: soldiers' and sailors' civil relief act of 1940

Text: 5 Texaco asserts two reasons the lower court erred in holding that the claims were not time-barred by the Kansas statute of limitations. First, the court misapplied the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.App. Secs. 501-591 (1982), to exclude from the Kansas limitation period the time during which Otis Mason was placed on the temporary disability retired list. Second, the court misapplied the Act to Otis Mason, a career military employee without any showing of disability to bring legal suit. 6 The tolling provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.App. Sec. 525, provides in part as follows: 7 The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law, ... for the bringing of any action or proceeding in any court, ... by or against any person in military service or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns. 8 The Act bars any period of military service from being included in computing a statute of limitations for or against a person in the military service. 9 The Act defines person in the military service to include those in the Coast Guard. Military service means active duty under the Act, and active duty includes the period during which a person in military service is absent from duty on account of sickness, wounds, leave or other lawful cause. 50 U.S.C.App. Sec. 511(1) (1982). 10 It is undisputed that in September 1977, Otis Mason was diagnosed as having acute myelocytic leukemia. On March 15, 1978, he was placed on the temporary disability retired list. On November 5, 1979, Otis Mason was permanently retired, and on December 10, 1979, he died as a result of leukemia. The question presented is whether placement on the temporary disability retired list is a discharge from active service or merely an absen[ce] from duty on account of sickness, as anticipated by Sec. 511(1). Under the former, a statute of limitations is not tolled; under the latter, the statute of limitations is tolled. We hold that placement on the temporary disability retired list constitutes absen[ce] from duty on account of sickness under the Act, and therefore the period of limitations provided by the Kansas two-year statute of limitations, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 60-513(a) (1983), was tolled from March 15, 1978, until November 5, 1979. See Cruz v. General Motors Corp., 308 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y.1970). 11 Texaco further argues that the lower court erred in applying the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 to Otis Mason, a career military employee. Citing Pannell v. Continental Can Co., 554 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1977), Texaco urges this court to adopt a broad rule that the tolling provision of 50 U.S.C.App. Sec. 525 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 does not apply to a career serviceman who has not shown that military service handicapped him from asserting a claim. Although the court in Pannell sought to interpret Sec. 525, the court's conclusion is predicated upon a combined reading of Secs. 521 and 525. Section 521 provides for stay of proceedings and requires the serviceman to demonstrate that his status creates an inability to fully assert or defend a claim. Section 525 contains no such condition precedent. Even so, the court in Pannell imposed upon Sec. 525 the requirement of Sec. 521 and concluded that the tolling provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 was inapplicable to a career serviceman who has not shown that he was handicapped by his military service from asserting any claim he had prior to the expiration of the prescribed period. Pannell, 554 F.2d at 225. We cannot accept this interpretation of 50 U.S.C.App. Sec. 525 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. 12 In our view, the language of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.App. Sec. 525, is clear and unambiguous. We find no reason to ignore the plain meaning of the statute, and we are persuaded that the correct course to follow is set forth in Ricard v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir.1975); and Bickford v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 321, 656 F.2d 636 (1981). The career status of Otis Mason does not negate the application of Sec. 525. The only condition to Sec. 525 is military service. That condition was met during Mason's placement on the temporary disability retired list, and therefore the period of limitations was tolled from March 15, 1978, until November 5, 1979. Mason's naming of Texaco as a party on July 14, 1980, was within the period of limitations.