Opinion ID: 2615014
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Count 10: Respondent's Suits Against Harris

Text: Count 10 of the bar complaint, as amended, charged that respondent's actions in instituting and maintaining the Levine, P.C. litigation (P.C. litigation) in April 1983 against Harris, Palumbo, and their professional corporation, violated former Rule 29, DR 7-102(A)(1) [12] and DR 7-102(A)(2). [13] This count also alleged that respondent's actions in 1987 in refiling a portion of Abril's action for a declaratory judgment seeking to deprive Harris of the Abril fee, which had been previously dismissed without prejudice, violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. We have previously discussed the multiple suits that respondent filed arising out of the breakup of his seventeen-month relationship with Harris. After unsuccessfully pursuing arbitration appeals and bar complaints, respondent, as sole shareholder and director of his professional corporation, instituted suit on behalf of the professional corporation in superior court against himself, his wife, Harris, Palumbo, their wives, and their professional corporation. Respondent's reason for pursuing modification of the arbitration award through the courts was that the award was unenforceable because it did not specify a sum certain nor give a description of the specific assets awarded him. [14] He brought the additional 1983 P.C. litigation against Harris and Palumbo because he did not believe the professional corporation was a party to the arbitration litigation, and that the corporation had an independent right to a determination of its property rights in the assets divided by the arbitration award. He believed the P.C. suit was kind of a technical kind of lawsuit. It was not a lawsuit and [I] never looked upon it as being anything other than a determination of property rights, and he noted that another attorney initially represented the corporation in that action. Additionally, in 1987 respondent refiled, on behalf of Abril, the declaratory judgment portion of the Abril v. Harris litigation that had been previously dismissed without prejudice as premature. [15] After years of litigation, Harris and Palumbo eventually prevailed with sanctions against respondent for frivolous and harassing suits. In granting summary judgment for defendants in the consolidated litigation and awarding fees against respondent, the trial court specifically found that respondent's claims constituted harassment, were groundless and not made in good faith. It further found that the legal theories present were minimal, and that Harris had requested fees in the sum of $196,304. The trial court awarded $150,000 in fees against respondent, his wife, and his professional corporation. In finding these suits frivolous and brought in bad faith, the committee also determined that the suit resulted from Respondent's desire to secure for himself the fee for Harris' work in Abril's bad faith case. The committee found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent's conduct in filing the P.C. litigation in 1983 violated former Rule 29, DR 7-102(A)(1) and DR 7-102(A)(2), and that respondent's conduct in refiling the 1987 Abril suit violated Rule 42, E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. We agree with the findings of the commission on this count. The claims asserted in the 1983 P.C. litigation had been finally and fully litigated in the arbitration award, which had been confirmed by the superior court, affirmed in the court of appeals, and was the subject of a judgment on mandate; as the trial court correctly concluded, those claims were res judicata as to the professional corporation. We find incredible respondent's contention that he believed his professional corporation was not a party to the arbitration. We further find outlandish his argument that he cannot be held accountable for the P.C. litigation because he did not act as the corporation's attorney on the case. As the committee pointed out, no evidence was presented that anyone other than respondent had control over the professional corporation. Furthermore, we agree with the committee's conclusion that respondent continued the Abril litigation in 1987 not in the interests of his client, but to claim for himself Harris' portion of the contingency fee in that case. In the nine years of this litigation, respondent exhibited unusual animosity toward his former partner and his associates, coupled with a concerted refusal to acknowledge the unreasonableness of his legal position in pursuing these claims. As the commission noted, respondent's actions caused the expenditure of substantial sums, by lawyers, insurance companies and the court systems. The ethical violations alleged in count 10 of the bar complaint are supported by clear and convincing evidence.