Opinion ID: 2082795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Actual Prejudice Established

Text: The trial judge's questioning of juror Number Twelve extended beyond the parameters permitted by D.R.E. 606(b). The trial judge should not have asked juror Number Twelve exactly how the extraneous prejudicial information affected her own deliberative process with regard to voting to convict Flonnory on each charge in the indictment. Those inquiries were harmless, however, because within the proper bounds of permissible inquiry the existence of an improper extraneous prejudicial influence that compromised juror Number Twelve's impartiality was established. [42] Consequently, the record reflects that, in addition to proving a presumption of prejudice, Flonnory has also established actual prejudice. Juror Number Twelve testified that her improper knowledge of Flonnory's alleged involvement in a prior murder actually affected her vote to find Flonnory guilty of Murder in the First Degree. The trial judge stated: I do find her to be credible. I have no reason to believe she is not credible. The trial judge also stated: I mean she said what she said. I believe that she considered it i.e., that the statement that Flonnory had been accused of murdering someone before. A defendant in a criminal case is denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury if only one juror is improperly influenced. [43] Accordingly, Flonnory's demonstration of actual prejudice through the sworn testimony of juror Number Twelve constitutes an alternative basis for our conclusion that Flonnory's convictions must be reversed. We hold that the communication of highly prejudicial improper and inadmissible information from juror Number Six to juror Number Twelve alone, outside of the courtroom, violated Flonnory's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under both the United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution.