Opinion ID: 47038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Confrontation Clause and Crawford

Text: On appeal, Springer first argues that the district court erred by allowing Agent Polak to establish an interstate nexus for the firearms forming the basis for Springer’s conviction because her opinion relied upon testimonial hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). He argues that prior to Crawford, an expert could rely, in part, on hearsay when forming an opinion, but post-Crawford, and in particular in light of this Court’s unpublished opinion in United States v. Buonsignore, 131 Fed. Appx. 252 (11th Cir. 2005), an expert may not rely on testimonial hearsay unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination of the declarant. Springer further argues that, while Crawford appears to permit the use of “business records,” the government in this case did not lay the foundation to prove that the records relied upon in this case were business records rather than records compiled for litigation purposes. Springer argues that Polak’s expert opinion relied exclusively on testimonial evidence that was not “unavailable” for trial or cross-examined by him, and, therefore, the expert’s 11 opinion was inadmissible and his conviction should be reversed. At the outset, the parties disagree as to the proper standard of review. The government’s position is that Springer objected at trial solely on grounds that an expert’s opinion could not be based solely on hearsay, and, therefore, the Confrontation Clause challenge being raised on appeal was not preserved and should be reviewed for plain error. In reply, Springer argues that raising a hearsay objection, if sufficient in a habeas petition to place a state court on notice of a subsequently raised Confrontation Clause claim, should be sufficient to have raised the claim in the instant case, citing Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512, 518-19 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding, in a state habeas context, that a petitioner’s repeated objections to the use of out-of-court statements of an unidentified informant, while obliquely stated, was sufficient to alert a state court of a Confrontation Clause claim). Recently, we held that, where the defendant at sentencing objected on hearsay grounds, but did not mention the Confrontation Clause or Crawford, it was insufficient to preserve the objection, and review would be for plain error only. United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we conclude that Springer’s single hearsay objection at trial was insufficient to preserve the constitutional challenge under the Confrontation Clause, and we will 12 review for plain error only. “An appellate court may not correct an error the defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 125 S.Ct. 2935 (2005) (quotation and citation omitted). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. Furthermore, in order for an error to be plain, it must be clear under current law. See United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2000). “[W]here neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it, there can be no plain error in regard to that issue.” Id. The Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. As we recently discussed, the Supreme Court, in Crawford, “explained that the founding generation understood the right to confrontation in the light of the common-law tradition of ‘live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing.’” United States v. Cantellano, No. 05-11143, slip op. at 464 (11th Cir. Nov. 15, 2005). “The common-law tradition of confronting one’s 13 accusers in court recognized that ex parte testimony raised issues of justice and fairness. Because testimony is accusatory and delivered in contemplation of criminal proceedings, it is adversarial. An accused, therefore, should have the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses face-to-face.” Id. at 464-65, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-45, 124 S.Ct. at 1359-60. In Cantellano, the issue was whether, under Crawford, the defendant had the right to cross-examine the government agent who witnessed the defendant leave the country and recorded the warrant of deportation that was admitted at trial over his objection. Id. at 465. After noting that the issue boiled down to whether the warrant of deportation was “testimonial” or “non-testimonial” evidence, we held that the defendant had no right to confront and cross-examine the agent because the routinely recorded warrant of deportation was “non-testimonial,” and, therefore, not subject to the confrontation clause. Id. As we have noted, the Supreme Court in Crawford left “for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ [footnote omitted]. Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374; Cantellano, slip op. at 465. However, “[b]ecause non-testimonial evidence is not prepared in the 14 shadow of criminal proceedings, it lacks the accusatory character of testimony.” Cantellano, slip op. at 465. Therefore, we concluded in Cantellano that “[b]ecause a warrant of deportation does not raise the concerns regarding testimonial evidence stated in Crawford, we conclude that a warrant of deportation is non-testimonial and therefore is not subject to confrontation.” Id. When it comes to expert testimony, we held, prior to Crawford, that “hearsay testimony by experts is permitted if it is based upon the type of evidence reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.” United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002), citing Fed.R.Evid. 703.4 In Floyd, a government expert in establishing the interstate nexus requirement for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) testified that, after examining ammunition seized from the defendant and consulting a Winchester catalog, he determined that the ammunition had traveled in interstate commerce. Floyd, 281 F.3d at 1347. The expert also testified that, to verify the information he obtained, he contacted a technical advisor at the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners, and stated that his determination that the ammunition moved in interstate commerce 4 Providing, in relevant part: “If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.” Fed.R.Evid. 703. As the Committee notes make clear, Rule 703 “governs only the disclosure to the jury of information that is reasonably relied on by an expert, when that information is not admissible for substantive purposes. It is not intended to affect the admissibility of an expert’s testimony.” Fed.R.Evid. 703, Adv. Comm. Notes, 2000 Amendments. 15 was based, in part, on what he was told by the technical advisor. Id. The expert told the court that it was his opinion that the ammunition moved in interstate commerce, and the information gleaned from the technical advisor was the kind reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Id. We affirmed, and held that, because the information was reasonably relied upon by experts in the field and the expert had testified that his opinion was not based exclusively on his conversation with the technical advisor, the testimony was properly admitted. Id. at 1349. While Floyd did not explicitly address the Confrontation Clause issue, Springer nonetheless argues that Floyd’s holding regarding the use of hearsay testimony by an expert is no longer precedent. Springer cites to an unpublished opinion in support of his argument, United States v. Buonsignore, 131 Fed.Appx. 252 (11th Cir. 2005) petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 29, 2005) (No. 05-5603).5 Notwithstanding that Buonsignore is nonbinding and, therefore, cannot be used to prove that any error was plain, the instant case is unlike Buonsignore. The expert in Buonsignore was not offering his own expert opinion– he was offering the expert opinion of an unidentified individual in Washington D.C., which means that the wrong expert was on the stand. Id. at 257. Here, as to at least two of the firearms, the H&R shotgun and the Marlin Glenfield 5 Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2, unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but may be cited as persuasive authority. 16 rifle, Agent Polak formed her own opinion based on her education, training, knowledge, and personal experience in consultation with books and records, as well as a consultation with an individual in the National Tracing Center. Even if Polak’s opinion as to the Remington rifle were based solely on the testimonial evidence of a Remington historian and that evidence were excluded, the books, CDs and personal knowledge of Polak do not appear to be testimonial evidence subject to the Crawford rule. In addition, Springer appears to challenge the “interstate commerce nexus,” however, he neglects to mention that each of the firearms forming the basis for his conviction were stamped with the city and state in which they were manufactured. Since each of the firearms was stamped with a state other than Florida, and Polak’s expert opinion was that the guns were not restamped, when the guns were discovered and found by a jury to be in Springer’s possession in Florida, sufficient admissible evidence supported his conviction. Again, to the extent that the evidence relied upon by Polak was testimonial in nature, Springer’s argument may find some support in Crawford, and even in Cantellano. Neither case, however, involved expert testimony, and, more importantly, neither case addressed Crawford’s holding in the context of expert testimony and an expert’s ability to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence when 17 forming an opinion under Rule 703. As best as can be discerned, neither this Court, the Supreme Court, nor any other circuit court has issued a published opinion regarding what otherwise inadmissible sources, testimonial or nontestimonial, an expert may rely upon when forming an opinion in light of Crawford. Thus, we conclude that any error the district court may have committed by permitting Polak’s testimony was not plain.