Opinion ID: 772296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Stop of the Car

Text: 31 Defendants also challenge the stop of the rental car, arguing that the police lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the car. They further argue that the lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion rendered Gomes' consent to search invalid and that, as a result, the drugs that they found in her purse and the incriminating statements that she made about Dorais must be suppressed. 32 This court recently clarified that the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, we examine only whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Gomes' car. Reasonable suspicion is formed by `specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1996)). 33 In this case the police stopped Gomes' car after they had received a report from Dollar Rent-a-Car, the car's owner, that the car was overdue. Had Dollar intentionally made a false police report, it would have been subject to criminal penalties under Hawaii law. See Haw. Rev. Stat. S 7101015 (defining the crime of false reporting to law enforcement authorities). Based on the report, the police were reasonable to suspect that Gomes may have been committing a crime because, under Hawaii law, a person who keeps a rental car for more than 48 hours after it is due commits a misdemeanor. Haw. Rev. Stat. S 708-836. Thus, the police had reasonable suspicion when they stopped Gomes. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34 (1983) (holding that if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity -which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability -we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary); United States v. Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that police had probable cause to stop a Camaro and arrest the driver without a warrant when they were acting on a report from an identified citizen that the Camaro had been stolen). 34 Defendants argue that the officers had an affirmative duty to determine whether Gomes' car was a full 48 hours overdue and that, because the car was not yet quite 48 hours late, the officers lacked jurisdiction to make the stop. Defendants' argument fails under the reasoning of Gates. Because the officers were acting on a police report from Dollar, whose honesty has not been questioned, they had reasonable suspicion to stop the car even if the report turned out to be mistaken due to its timing. 35 Defendants further contend that this court's decision in United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000), establishes that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Gomes. Defendants misapprehend Twilley. In that case, a police officer stopped the defendant based on his mistaken belief that defendant was violating California law by displaying only one license plate; but, in actuality, California law required the defendant to display only one license plate. Id. at 1096. This court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because reasonable suspicion cannot be premised on a mistaken understanding of the law. Id. 36 Unlike in Twilley, the officers here stopped Gomes not because of a mistaken understanding of the law, but because of a mistake of fact. The officers correctly understood that Hawaii law criminalizes the possession of a rental car more than 48 hours beyond its return time; the officers simply made a mistake of fact as to how long overdue the car was. That mistake of fact does not defeat the officers' reasonable suspicion. Cf. United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car with tinted windows when California law prohibited certain tinted windows, even though it was later established that the windows were not sufficiently tinted to violate the law). 37 Because the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Gomes' car, the stop neither tainted Gomes' consent to search her purse nor required the suppression of the incriminating statements that she made about Dorais. The district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the statements and the drugs found in Gomes' purse. 38 AFFIRMED.