Opinion ID: 1670616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Reasonableness of Classification under Article XI, Section 8 of the State Constitution

Text: The plaintiffs further allege that the provisions of T.C.A. § 6-54-114 violate Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. That section provides: The Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit of individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass any law granting to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges, immunitie, [immunities] or exemptions other than such as may be, by the same law extended to any member of the community, who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law. No corporation shall be created or its powers increased or diminished by special laws but the General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization of all corporations, hereafter created, which laws may, at any time, be altered or repealed and no such alteration or repeal shall interfere with or divest rights which have become vested. As the courts of Tennessee have long recognized, this constitutional provision does not prohibit the legislature from making distinctions in the law based on classification. Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S.W. 767 (1922). It does, however, prohibit classifications that are capricious, unreasonable, or arbitrary, Martin v. Martin, 213 Tenn. 345, 373 S.W.2d 609 (1963), whether or not the basis for the classification is apparent on the face of the statute. Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1978). By their terms and effect, the constitutional provisions apply only in situations in which legislation seeks to suspend any general law, to subject entities to the burden of certain disabilities, duties, or obligations, not imposed upon the community at large, The Stratton Claimants v. The Morris Claimants, 89 Tenn. 497, 522, 15 S.W. 87, 92 (1891), or to grant a privilege not available to any member of the community, who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law. The defendants, the City of Knoxville and its mayor, correctly contend that in order to trigger analysis of a statute under the provisions of Article XI, Section 8, that statute must contravene some general law which has mandatory statewide application. Leech v. Wayne County, 588 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn. 1979). They argue further that in order to qualify, the general law of statewide application in question must be a statute. Because the plaintiffs allege only that T.C.A. § 6-54-114 contravenes a constitutional provision rather than a statute, the defendants ask us to hold that no general law has been violated and Article XI, Section 8 analysis is not implicated. Indeed, the plaintiffs have not been able to direct the Court to any statute whose provisions are violated or undermined by T.C.A. § 6-54-114. We therefore conclude that analysis of T.C.A. § 6-54-114 under the provisions of Article XI, Section 8 is not appropriate. Cf. Frazer v. Carr, supra, 360 S.W.2d at 452 (statute applicable to all counties with population over 200,000 is itself a general law, not one arbitrarily suspending the general law for the benefit of one county and, thus, it does not violate Article XI, Section 8).