Opinion ID: 2613127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: drug treatment for repeat offenders

Text: The State further argues that the trial court lacked the authority under RCW 9.94A.383 to require inpatient drug treatment as a condition of Gaines's sentence. We disagree. RCW 9.94A.383 provides: On all sentences of confinement for one year or less, the court may impose up to one year of community supervision. An offender shall be on community supervision as of the date of sentencing. However, during the time for which the offender is in total or partial confinement pursuant to the sentence or a violation of the sentence, the period of community supervision shall toll. In order for this statute to authorize the trial court to require drug treatment, it must be the case that drug treatment is available as a condition of community supervision. The definition of community supervision is provided by RCW 9.94A.030(7): Community supervision means a period of time during which a convicted offender is subject to crime-related prohibitions and other sentence conditions imposed by a court pursuant to this chapter or RCW 46.61.524. For first-time offenders, the supervision may include crime-related prohibitions and other conditions imposed pursuant to RCW 9.94A.120(5). Thus, to be available as a standard condition of community supervision, drug treatment must be either: (1) a crime-related prohibition; (2) some other condition imposed pursuant to the SRA or RCW 46.61.524 (providing for treatment of drug or alcohol problems of persons convicted of vehicular homicide or assault); or (3) imposed as part of the sentence for a first-time offender pursuant to RCW 9.94A.120(5). As a preliminary matter, it is important to make clear that none of these options applies here, and therefore the trial court's exceptional sentencing powers must be relied upon. Option (1) is inapplicable because a [c]rime-related prohibition is defined to exclude rehabilitative requirements except for first-time offenders, which Gaines is not. RCW 9.94A.030(11). Option (2) is inapplicable because there is no other condition of the SRA or RCW 46.61.524 that permits drug treatment for someone such as Gaines. Option (3) only applies to first-time offenders, which, again, Gaines is not. Consequently, the trial court lacks the authority to require drug treatment as a standard condition of community supervision for a repeat offender such as Gaines. To impose a drug treatment requirement under a community supervision sentence for a repeat offender, the sentencing court must rely on the exceptional sentence provision of the SRA, RCW 9.94A.120(2). We have previously held that such reliance is proper. State v. Bernhard, 108 Wn.2d 527, 540, 741 P.2d 1 (1987), overruled in part in State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83, 776 P.2d 132 (1989). The State does not dispute that if RCW 9.94A.383 applies in the present case, then the trial court could properly require drug treatment as an exceptional condition of community supervision. The State's argument is that this statute cannot be used in that manner here. RCW 9.94A.383 states in part: On all sentences of confinement for one year or less, the court may impose up to one year of community supervision. The State asserts that this statute refers only to standard range sentences of 1 year or less, and therefore that it does not apply to Gaines because his standard range sentence was for 31 to 41 months. We reject this argument. [8] RCW 9.94A.383 does not explicitly refer to standard sentence ranges, but only to sentences of confinement. Elsewhere in the SRA where the Legislature wanted to refer to standard range sentences, the Legislature did so explicitly. See, e.g., RCW 9.94A.120. Moreover, frequently the SRA uses the unqualified term sentence in a context that makes it clear the reference is to the sentence actually imposed, not to the standard range sentence. E.g., RCW 9.94A.120. This suggests that the unqualified use of sentences in RCW 9.94A.383 should be interpreted in accordance with the unqualified use of the term elsewhere in the SRA, and therefore as referring to sentences actually imposed rather than standard range sentences. Although we have never had occasion to address whether RCW 9.94A.383 refers to sentences actually imposed or to standard sentence ranges, the Court of Appeals has directly addressed the issue. In State v. Wiley, 63 Wn. App. 480, 820 P.2d 513 (1991), the court held that the standard range sentence is irrelevant for purposes of RCW 9.94A.383, and that the statute refers to sentences actually imposed. In its decision in the present case, the Court of Appeals explicitly followed Wiley in reaching the same interpretation. Gaines, 65 Wn.App. at 802. The one decision to reach the contrary conclusion is State v. Harper, 62 Wn. App. 69, 813 P.2d 593 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1017 (1992). There the Court of Appeals reasoned that unless the statute is interpreted as referring to standard range sentences, it would permit wildly inconsistent sentences on essentially the same fact patterns. 62 Wn. App. at 76. The Harper court's concern is appropriate, but groundless in the present context. Even if RCW 9.94A.383 were interpreted as referring to standard sentence ranges, trial judges would still have the discretion either to require or not to require drug treatment as a condition of community supervision. Such inconsistencies are inherent in trial court discretion. Interpreting RCW 9.94A.383 as referring to sentences actually imposed rather than standard sentence ranges does not significantly alter this scheme. It merely means that requiring drug treatment is within the trial court's discretion as regards a defendant whose exceptional sentence is for 1 year or less, not only for a defendant whose standard range sentence is for 1 year or less. Moreover, drug addiction is not, as was argued above, a basis for a durational departure from the standard sentence range. Therefore, drug treatment as a condition of community supervision is available under RCW 9.94A.383 only in those situations where there are other circumstances besides addiction to justify an exceptional sentence of 1 year or less. Thus, the only way inconsistencies in sentencing can arise is among offenders who are drug addicts and who have received an exceptional sentence for reasons other than their addictions. This is a quite different situation than the one that would arise were drug addiction itself recognized as a ground for an exceptional sentence. While such exceptional sentencing option may be appropriate, it is the Legislature that must make it available, to include treatment funding. We hold that RCW 9.94A.383 applies to all sentences actually imposed of 1 year or less, regardless of the standard range sentence. Because Gaines's exceptional sentence was for 12 months' confinement, the statute does apply.