Opinion ID: 1925175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the superior court's opinion and the parties' contentions

Text: In support of their cross summary judgment motions, the parties argued, and the Superior Court agreed, that under the objective theory of contracts, [7] a court must . . . apply the plain meaning of an unambiguous term in the context of contract language and circumstances insofar as the parties would have agreed ex ante.  [8] At issue was the plain meaning of the terms Plant and Seaford, Delaware Plant as used in the Documents. In support of its respective position, each side cited dictionary definitions and case law. The trial court concluded, however, that the definitions and cases are not helpful as there is no clear objective definition, and that [u]ltimately, `[t]he words employed by contract drafters must be evaluated in light of the apparent purposes of the drafters. [9] The trial court then reasoned as follows: Here, in looking at all the documents and using each to help construe the other, I find the plain meaning of the terms Seaford, Delaware Plant and Plant include land along with the nylon manufacturing operation. First, a reasonable party would interpret these terms as a place not the operations. A place includes the land. The description is the Seaford, Delaware Plant. Second, the parties used the language transfers all of its title and interest in and to and as long as GRANTOR continues to own. The words objectively mean that the parties understood the conditions and restrictions to remain in place until duPont was rid of all its interest. The use of this broad encompassing language supports duPont's position. Thus, when applying the ordinary plain meaning of the term Seaford, Delaware Plant, duPont cannot be found to have transferred all of its title and interest in or not continue[d] to own its Seaford, Delaware Plant when it still holds title to the land that the nylon manufacturing operation is located on. Therefore, the Deed Restriction and Right of First Refusal are continuing to be in effect. . . . [10] Having determined the plain meaning of the disputed contract language on the assumption that those terms are unambiguous, the trial court then analyzed the disputed provisions and reached the same conclusion, based on the alternative assumption that those terms are ambiguous. Specifically, the trial court held: DuPont included in its earliest communications that the restrictions would remain until total divestiture. The Club even suggested that total divestiture as used in the negotiations meant including the land. Thus, the Club contemplated and knew that the restrictions would continue as long as duPont owned the land on which the nylon manufacturing operation sits. The Club cannot now say that if the definition they suggested was not included, or their exact wording was not, then duPont must have meant for the terms not to include the land. This rationale is not appropriate because the Club believed and understood that the land was included at the time the negotiations took place and when the agreements were drafted. Further, it is unreasonable to believe that duPont would want to read the restrictions more narrowly than its original position and with less protection than what the Club had communicated to duPont through the Club's suggested language. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this was even an important issue in the negotiations. The parties were on the same page as to intent, even if duPont did not formally adopt the Club's language. Therefore, alternatively, even if the terms are deemed to be ambiguous, they are interpreted to include the land, so the Right of First Refusal and the Deed Restriction are still in place. [11]