Opinion ID: 1784402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenges to Statutory Aggravators

Text: Davis asserts that instructing the jury regarding the prior violent felony aggravator, the murder in the course of a felony aggravator, and the pecuniary gain aggravator, as well as the trial court finding these three aggravators had an impermissible tripling effect. This argument has no merit. Contrary to Davis's assertion, the record is clear that the trial court expressly instructed the jury that if they found all three aggravating circumstances were present they should still only consider them as constituting a single aggravating circumstance. In addition, the sentencing order specifically states that the trial judge merged these three aggravating circumstances and considered them as a single aggravator. See Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 137 (Fla.2001). Therefore, the trial judge neither instructed the jury to triple the aggravating circumstances nor tripled them in his sentencing order. Moreover, notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous finding that the contemporaneous robbery conviction was sufficient to support the prior violent felony aggravator, there was no impermissible doubling of the pecuniary gain aggravator and the murder in the course of a felony aggravator in the instant case because both were merged and considered as a single aggravator. See Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1106 (Fla.2004) (stating that when a homicide occurs during the course of a robbery, it is improper for the trial court to find as aggravation both that the homicide was committed during the course of a robbery and that the homicide was committed for pecuniary gain; instead these aggravators should be merged), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930, 125 S.Ct. 1669, 161 L.Ed.2d 495 (2005). Davis asserts that the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of committing a specified felony is unconstitutional because it constitutes an automatic aggravator and does not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. This Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. See Ault v. State, 866 So.2d 674, 686 (Fla.2003); Hitchcock v. State, 755 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla. 2000); Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.1997). Thus, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present a meritless claim. Davis alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest aggravator when the trial court found that this aggravating circumstance did not exist. This Court has previously rejected this same issue. See Pace v. State, 854 So.2d 167, 181 (Fla.2003) (The fact that the state did not prove this aggravator to the trial court's satisfaction does not require a conclusion that there was insufficient evidence ... to allow the jury to consider the factor.) (quoting Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 231 (Fla.1991)). Therefore, this claim is denied. Davis claims that the jury was given an invalid instruction on the CCP aggravating circumstance and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present this issue on direct appeal. At the time of Davis's trial, the CCP instruction that was given by the court was the standard jury instruction for the CCP aggravator. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11 (1987). However, in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), we held that the standard instruction, which was the instruction at the time of Davis's trial, provided insufficient guidance for the jury. See id. at 90. We further held that to assert a claim that the standard CCP jury instruction was unconstitutionally vague, a specific objection must have been made at trial and presented again on appeal. See id. This Court later specified that [t]o preserve the error for appellate review, it is necessary both to make a specific objection or request an alternative instruction at trial, and to raise the issue on appeal. Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 387 (Fla.1994). In 1997, we reiterated that to preserve a claim that a CCP instruction is unconstitutionally vague, the objection must attack the instruction itself, either by submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as worded. Pope v. State, 702 So.2d 221, 223-24 (Fla.1997). Davis's Jackson claim was not properly preserved because counsel objected at trial that there was insufficient evidence that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated, but neither specifically objected to the instruction as worded, nor did he request or submit an alternative or limiting instruction as required by Jackson and its progeny. We faced a similar scenario in Brown v. State, 755 So.2d 616 (Fla.2000). In Brown, defense counsel neither submitted a limiting instruction nor specifically objected that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague. See id. We held in accordance with Jackson that defense counsel's objection did not preserve this issue for appellate review. See Brown, 755 So.2d at 622-23; see also Jones v. State, 690 So.2d 568, 571 (Fla.1996). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Davis's Jackson claim is without merit. Davis asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to present this claim on appeal. Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present a claim which was not preserved. See Johnson, 695 So.2d at 266. Davis has not asserted that appellate counsel's failure to present this issue rises to the level of fundamental error, but any such claim would be meritless. In Jackson, this Court found the CCP instruction to be unconstitutionally vague but did not find that this was fundamental error. See 648 So.2d at 90. Moreover, in Davis's direct appeal we found that the facts supported the finding of cold, calculated, and premeditated. See Davis, 586 So.2d at 1040. Therefore, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the constitutionally infirm CCP instruction given at Davis's trial contributed to the sentence. Davis asserts that there was insufficient evidence that the murder was committed for the purpose of financial gain and claims that the jury instruction was vague. Davis was found guilty of robbery, and this Court on direct appeal determined that the robbery conviction was supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record and affirmed the conviction. See Davis, 586 So.2d at 1039 n. 1. The evidence establishing the basis for the robbery conviction was also sufficient to support the pecuniary gain aggravating factor. See Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1995) (In order to establish this aggravating factor, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain money, property, or other financial gain.); see also Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 253 (Fla.1996) (concluding that the trial court did not err in finding the pecuniary gain aggravating factor where evidence showed that the defendant bragged that he was going to steal a car, kill its owner, and use it to drive to his father). [10] At trial, no challenge was made to the sufficiency or vagueness of the instruction, and therefore this claim would have been procedurally barred on direct appeal. Davis has not alleged fundamental error, and thus his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is meritless.