Opinion ID: 4420932
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ‘descendant’ means a person who has

Text: proceeded by birth, such as a child or grandchild, to the remotest degree, from any ‘Chamorro’ as defined above, and who is considered placed in a line of succession from such ancestor where such succession is by virtue of blood relations. 2000 Plebiscite Law § 12. 12 DAVIS V. GUAM the United States of America, and to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Id. § 2105. Finally, the 2000 Plebiscite Law states that “[t]he intent of [the law] shall not be construed nor implemented by the government officials effectuating its provisions to be race based, but founded upon the classifications of persons as defined by the U.S. Congress in the 1950 Organic Act of Guam.” 3 Guam Code Ann. § 21000. Rather, the intent of the law is “to permit the native inhabitants of Guam, as defined by the U.S. Congress’ 1950 Organic Act of Guam to exercise the inalienable right to self-determination of their political relationship with the United States of America,” as that “right has never been afforded.” Id. One subsequent amendment to the plebiscite relevant to this case followed. In 2010, the Guam legislature passed a law providing that individuals who received or had been preapproved for a Chamorro Land Trust Commission (“CLTC”) property lease would be automatically registered in the Guam Decolonization Registry. Guam Pub. L. No. 30102, § 21002.1 (codified at 3 Guam Code Ann. § 21002.1). The CLTC was created in 1975 to administer leases for lands that the United States had seized from Guam inhabitants during and after World War II and had later returned to the Guam government. See Guam Pub. L. 12-226 (codified as amended at 21 Guam Code Ann. §§ 75101–75125). Persons eligible to receive CLTC leases must be “Native Chamorros,” defined as “any person who became a U.S. citizen by virtue of the authority and enactment of the Organic Act of Guam or descendants of such person.” 21 Guam Code Ann. §§ 75101(d), 75107(a). DAVIS V. GUAM 13 Arnold Davis, a non-Chamorro resident of Guam, sought to register for the Guam Decolonization Registry and thereby to qualify as a voter in the plebiscite. He was denied registration because he did not meet the definition of “Native Inhabitant of Guam.” Davis filed suit in 2011, challenging the 2000 Plebiscite Law on grounds that it violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Organic Act. At the time the suit was filed, the plebiscite had not yet occurred, and no date was set for it to take place. Davis v. Guam, Civil Case No. 11-00035, 2013 WL 204697, –3 (D. Guam 2013) (“Davis I”). Relying on the uncertain timing of the plebiscite, the district court initially dismissed the case for lack of standing and ripeness. Id. at . We reversed that dismissal on appeal, holding that Davis’s alleged unequal treatment was a sufficient injury to establish standing and that his claim was ripe because he adequately alleged that he was “currently being denied equal treatment under Guam law.” Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Davis II”). After remand to the district court the parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court granted Davis’s motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined Guam from conducting a plebiscite restricting voters to Native Inhabitants of Guam. Davis v. Guam, No. CV 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at  (D. Guam 2017) (“Davis III”). The district court concluded, first, that the plebiscite was an election for Fifteenth Amendment purposes because the result of the vote would decide a public issue. Id. at . Next, the court determined that although “Native Inhabitants of Guam” is not an explicit racial classification, the history and structure of the 2000 Plebiscite Law reveal that “the very 14 DAVIS V. GUAM object of the statutory definition in question here . . . is to treat the Chamorro people as a ‘distinct people.’” Id. at  (quoting Rice, 528 U.S. at 515). The 2000 Plebiscite Law therefore used “ancestry as a proxy for race,” the district court held, in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. The court also decided that the 2000 Plebiscite Law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held the law was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest as all inhabitants of Guam, not just its “Native Inhabitants,” have an interest in the results of the plebiscite. Id. at –. The district court concluded that less restrictive alternatives exist, including “conducting a poll with the assistance of the University of Guam.” Id. at . This appeal followed. “We review a district court’s decision on cross motions for summary judgment de novo.” Commonwealth Election Comm’n, 844 F.3d at 1091.