Opinion ID: 1784514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prejudice to Walker

Text: Because pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable, Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686, the fourth Barker factor examines whether and to what extent the delay has prejudiced the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The United States Supreme Court has recognized three types of harm that may result from depriving a defendant of the right to a speedy trial: `oppressive pretrial incarceration,' `anxiety and concern of the accused,' and `the possibility that the [accused's] defense will be impaired' by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, and citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-79, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966)). Of these forms of prejudice, `the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.' 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182). Walker contends that the delay in this case caused her to suffer this third and most serious type of harm  the impairment of her defense. Walker, however, has neither alleged nor proved how the delay actually impaired her defense, and both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Walker's speedy-trial claim because of her failure to establish actual prejudice. Even so, Walker argues that because the first three factors weigh in her favor, she is not required to prove actual prejudice under the fourth Barker factor. We reject this argument. Of course, no single Barker factor is determinative. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (We regard none of the four factors . . . as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. (footnote omitted)). Thus, Walker's argument is partially correct: to prevail on a speedy-trial claim, not every accused must prove actual prejudice. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim). But Walker is incorrect to the extent that she argues that any weighting of the first three Barker factors in her favor automatically relieves her of the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice caused by the delay. The United States Supreme Court in Doggett used three hypothetical cases to demonstrate the accused's burden under the fourth Barker factor. 505 U.S. at 656-57, 112 S.Ct. 2686. See Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 570 (5th Cir.1993) (discussing Doggett ). The accused's burden of proof in each situation varies inversely with the [State]'s degree of culpability for the delay. Robinson, 2 F.3d at 570 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In the first scenario, where the state pursues the accused with reasonable diligence, the delay  however long  generally is excused unless the accused demonstrates specific prejudice to his defense. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Thus, when the state acts with reasonable diligence in bringing the defendant to trial, the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice caused by the delay. The second situation recognized in Doggett involves bad-faith efforts by the state to delay the defendant's trial. For example, intentional delay by the state in order to gain some impermissible advantage at trial weighs heavily against the state, and a bad-faith delay the length of the delay in Doggett likely will present an overwhelming case for dismissal. 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182). Obviously, the burden on the accused to establish prejudice in this scenario would be minimal at most, and depending on how heavily the other Barker factors weigh against the state, the fourth factor's inquiry into prejudice could be rendered irrelevant. See Hoskins, 485 F.2d at 1192 ([T]here must be some point of coalescence of the other three factors in a movant's favor, at which prejudice  either actual or presumed  becomes totally irrelevant.); Turner, 378 So.2d at 1179. The third scenario recognized in Doggett involves delay caused by the state's official negligence. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-57, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Official negligence occupies the middle ground between bad-faith delay and diligent prosecution. Id. In evaluating and weighing negligent delay, the court must determine what portion of the delay is attributable to the [state]'s negligence and whether this negligent delay is of such a duration that prejudice to the defendant should be presumed. Robinson, 2 F.3d at 570 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686). The weight assigned to negligent delay increases as the length of the delay increases. United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-57, 112 S.Ct. 2686). Negligent delay may be so lengthy  or the first three Barker factors may weigh so heavily in the accused's favor  that the accused becomes entitled to a finding of presumed prejudice. 352 F.3d at 231 (citing Robinson, 2 F.3d at 570, citing in turn Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686). When prejudice is presumed, the burden shifts to the state, which must then affirmatively show either that the delay is extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, or that the delay left [the defendant's] ability to defend himself unimpaired. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 & n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Walker's case occupies this middle ground between bad faith and reasonable diligence  the State's negligence delayed her case for approximately 50 months. Thus, resolution of Walker's case depends on the weight to be given the State's negligence, because, as Doggett explains, negligence is not an automatic ground for relief under the balancing test of Barker. 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (While not compelling relief in every case where bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him.). Because the record in this case points to no specific acts of negligence by the State or to any specific cause of the delay and because the third factor weighs in Walker's favor but not heavily so, the length of delay is essentially the only measure we have for evaluating the State's negligence and whether it relieves Walker of her burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. Doggett endorses an inverse-variance rule for using the length of delay to evaluate the State's negligence. Id. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686. See Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at 233. Under the inverse-variance rule, the reviewing court's toleration of [governmental] negligence varies inversely with its protractedness . . . and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused's trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686. In other words, the longer the delay resulting from the state's negligence, the greater the likelihood that the accused's speedy-trial right has been violated, even without the accused affirmatively demonstrating actual prejudice. Closely related to the inverse-variance rule is Doggett's recognition of a second inquiry, under the first Barker factor, regarding the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533-34, 92 S.Ct. 2182). See supra note 5. [9] Doggett explains that the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time. 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. At some point, the length of pretrial delay crosses a threshold, and, in addition to a finding of presumptive prejudice under the first Barker factor, an accused becomes entitled to a finding of presumed prejudice under the fourth Barker factor. Walker argues that the 50-month delay caused by the State's negligence in her case crossed that threshold and that she is thus relieved of her burden of establishing actual prejudice under the fourth Barker factor. However, we reject Walker's argument for two reasons. First, Walker's case is distinguishable from Doggett in at least two important ways: (1) the length of the delay, and (2) proof of the accused's knowledge of the indictment. As noted, approximately three years passed from Walker's indictment until her arrest, and four years and two months passed from her indictment until she entered her guilty plea. Both of these delays are substantially less time than the 8 1/2-year delay between the indictment and the arrest in Doggett. 505 U.S. at 657-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Accordingly, the longer delay in Doggett created a much greater presumption than is present here that the negligent delay prejudiced the accused's ability to present a defense. [10] 505 U.S. at 652, 657-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686. In addition, the record in Doggett revealed that the accused had no knowledge of the indictment against him during the 8 1/2 years from his indictment until his arrest. 505 U.S. at 653-54, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Thus, the Court in Doggett concluded that the accused was not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest. 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686. But as we concluded in our discussion of the third factor, Walker has not established that she did not know of the charges against her during the time between the issuance of the indictment in her case and her arrest. See supra Part III.C. Thus, her situation is distinguishable from that of the accused in Doggett. The second reason for our refusal to presume prejudice under the fourth Barker factor relates to the recognition in Doggett that to warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice. 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686. The Court concluded that the Government's egregious persistence in failing [for 8 1/2 years] to prosecute Doggett [was] clearly sufficient to entitle the accused to relief. 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686. The Doggett Court did not, however, establish a bright-line rule for the length of delay caused by governmental negligence that will warrant a finding of presumed prejudice under the fourth Barker factor. Even so, when an accused alleges solely that her trial was delayed because of governmental negligence  as is the case here  lower federal courts applying Doggett generally do not presume prejudice under the fourth Barker factor unless the postindictment delay is five years or more. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at 232 (refusing to presume prejudice under the fourth Barker factor in a case in which prosecutorial negligence delayed the accused's trial for three years and nine months and citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (presuming prejudice after six-year delay caused by the government's negligence); United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 489-91 (5th Cir.2002) (presuming prejudice after a five-year-and-three-month delay caused by the government's negligence, but noting that [h]ad the delay been considerably shorter, [the accused] might well have been properly required to demonstrate prejudice); United States v. Cardona, 302 F.3d 494, 498-99 (5th Cir.2002)(presuming prejudice where governmental negligence resulted in a delay of more than five years); United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 344, 349-51 (6th Cir.1999)(presuming prejudice where governmental negligence resulted in 5 1/2-year delay); United States v. Shell, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir.1992)(presuming prejudice where governmental negligence resulted in a six-year delay)). Like the Doggett Court, we do not adopt a bright-line rule for the length of delay that will result in a finding of presumed prejudice. But we note that the four-year-and-two-month delay in Walker's case is well within the five-year time period generally established by federal cases for presuming prejudice. Further, [t]here is no indication from this record that either the [State]'s negligence or the resulting length of the delay here adversely affected the evidence so as to undermine the fairness of a trial. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at 233. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that Walker is not entitled to a finding of presumed prejudice under the fourth Barker factor. We turn now to address Walker's claim that this decision conflicts with Alabama caselaw. Walker relies primarily on three Alabama cases  Ex parte Clopton, 656 So.2d 1243 (Ala.1995), Ex parte Carrell, 565 So.2d 104 (Ala.1990), and Turner v. State, 378 So.2d 1173 (Ala.Crim.App. 1979)  to support her argument that she is not required to prove actual prejudice. Walker correctly points out that in Clopton, Carrell, and Turner the first three Barker factors weighed against the State, and that the defendant in each case was not required to prove actual prejudice under the fourth factor. But Walker is incorrect in reading these cases as establishing a rule that any weighting of the first three Barker factors against the State requires a finding of presumed prejudice when evaluating the fourth factor. Instead, the courts in those decisions balanced the Barker factors and did not require the defendants to demonstrate actual prejudice under the particular circumstances of each case. Additionally, Walker's case is distinguishable from Turner, Carrell, and Clopton.