Opinion ID: 2019723
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Waiver for Death Sentencing Hearing: Who Decides?

Text: An Illinois criminal defendant has a statutory right to choose a jury for the death sentencing hearing, even when convicted at a bench trial. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 2006); see People v. Brown, 169 Ill.2d 132, 155-56, 214 Ill.Dec. 433, 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996). Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's request for a bench death sentencing hearing and granting defendant's demand for a jury to determine his sentence. Defendant contends that defense counsel, as a matter of trial strategy, should have made the ultimate choice of jury or bench death sentencing hearing. As we earlier recounted, prior to trial defendant signed a written jury waiver for the death sentencing hearing. However, he subsequently decided to postpone that decision until the conclusion of the guiltinnocence phase of the trial. After defendant was convicted of the charged offenses, the trial court explained to defendant the two parts of a death sentencing hearing: determining death eligibility and weighing evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The trial court repeated to defendant that he was entitled to have a jury make the sentencing determination, or defendant could waive that right and have the court decide the sentence. Defendant stated that he understood the two-step nature of the death sentencing hearing; he indicated that he had discussed his choice with his attorneys; and he requested a jury for sentencing. Defense counsel immediately asked for a recess. When the proceedings resumed, defense counsel informed the court: Judge, the issue prior to our taking a break was whether [defendant] was going to waive a jury for the sentencing phase after having been found guilty   . [Defendant] is not waiving jury. He is requesting a jury. The proceedings were continued for one week. At the next court date, defense counsel told the court that defendant wished to speak. However, before defendant could speak, the trial court again described to defendant the two-step nature of the death sentencing hearing, emphasizing that either a jury or the court, whichever defendant chooses, will make the sentencing decision. The trial court then advised defendant of the possible minimum and maximum penalties for his convictions. Defendant then stated that he wanted a jury for sentencing. The trial court asked defendant if he had spoken with counsel about his choice and if he was sure that he wanted a jury and not the court for sentencing. Defendant responded: I told her [trial counsel] a jury three times, your Honor, and I'm still telling her a jury. The court explained to defendant that once selected, the jury would remain for both steps of the death sentencing hearing, and defendant responded that he understood. Defense counsel then asked defendant in open court: Do you want the judge or the jury to decide your sentence? That is what I'm asking you. Defendant answered: The jury. The next day, prior to jury selection, defense counsel filed a written Motion for Bench Hearing on Eligibility and Sentencing Phase of Above Cause. In this motion, defense counsel requested the trial court to grant a bench hearing for the eligibility and sentencing in the above cause not withstanding [ sic ] defendant's desire for a jury for the penalty phase. Defense counsel asserted therein that the decision for either a bench or jury at this juncture is trial strategy and lies with defendant's attorney. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion and defendant received a jury death sentencing hearing. While an Illinois criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose a jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the proceedings, the defendant's right to choose a jury at the death sentencing hearing is wholly statutory. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 2006); People v. Strickland, 154 Ill.2d 489, 517, 182 Ill.Dec. 551, 609 N.E.2d 1366 (1992) (collecting cases). Defendant does not, and based on this record, cannot, contend that the trial court did not advise defendant of his option of sentencers at the death sentencing hearing. Rather, defendant posits that there are certain decision[s] involving constitutional rights that are ultimately for the defendant to decide. According to defendant, since the right to a jury at a death sentencing hearing is statutory and not constitutional, then it is not a personal decision left to the defendant. Therefore, defendant argues, the election or waiver of a jury at the death sentencing hearing is a matter of trial strategy ultimately for defense counsel to decide. We cannot accept this argument. It is generally established that certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 551, 560, 160 L.Ed.2d 565, 578 (2004). Courts have affirmed that a criminal defendant has the ultimate authority to decide one such basic trial rightwhether to waive a jury. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187, 125 S.Ct. at 560, 160 L.Ed.2d at 578; People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill.2d 228, 240, 244 Ill.Dec. 388, 725 N.E.2d 1275 (2000). Prevailing standards of practice elucidate this conclusion. Courts have widely recognized the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice as a guide for discerning professional norms. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984); Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 384 (7th Cir.2005); People v. Manning, 227 Ill.2d 403, 417-18, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492 (2008). The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide that certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the defendant and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions that are for the defendant to make after full consultation with counsel include: (i) what pleas to enter; (ii) whether to accept a plea agreement; (iii) whether to waive a jury trial; (iv) whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and (v) whether to appeal. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2, at 199-200 (3d ed.1993). The commentary to this section advises: In making each of these decisions    the accused should have the full and careful advice of counsel. Although it is highly improper for counsel to demand that the defendant follow what counsel perceives as the desirable course or for counsel to coerce a client's decision through misrepresentation or undue influence, counsel is free to engage in fair persuasion and to urge the client to follow the proffered professional advice. Ultimately, however, because of the fundamental nature of decisions such as these, so crucial to the accused's fate, the accused must make the decisions himself or herself. (Emphasis added.) ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2, Commentary, at 201 (3d ed.1993). We are hard-pressed to conceive of a decision more crucial to the defendant's fate than whether a single judge or a jury will determine whether the defendant lives or dies. Although not constitutionally required (see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-60, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3161-62, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 351-53 (1984); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill.2d 271, 289, Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987)), a jury serves two significant functions in a death sentencing hearing. First, the jury acts as a bulwark between the defendant and the State. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462, 104 S.Ct. at 3163, 82 L.Ed.2d at 354. The right to trial by a jury composed of laypersons from the community is a safeguard against a corrupt or overzealous prosecution and against a compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1905-06, 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 (1970), cited in Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462, 104 S.Ct. at 3163, 82 L.Ed.2d at 354. Second, in selecting between imprisonment and death for a capital defendant, a jury maintains a link between contemporary community values and the penal system. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n. 15, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1775 n. 15, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 783 n. 15 (1968), cited in Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462, 104 S.Ct. at 3163, 82 L.Ed.2d at 354. For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the trial court's denial of defense counsel's motion for bench sentencing notwithstanding defendant's exercise of his statutory right to a jury for the death sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 703-04, 759 A.2d 764, 792 (2000) (Whether a defendant is to be sentenced by the court or the jury is a decision for the defendant).