Opinion ID: 187080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown's Arrest Record

Text: Brown also contends that the district court erred by considering his arrest record in determining the sentence it imposed. Before reaching the merits of Brown's argument, we address the applicable standard of review for this claim.
According to the Government, the district court's reliance on Brown's arrest record should be reviewed for plain error because Brown failed to object to the use of his arrest record at his sentencing. Brown counters that we should review his claim de novo because Brown objected to the use of his arrest record at the Coles remand hearing. We have, held post- Booker that a sentencing judge who, pre- Booker, applied the Guidelines as mandatory committed a non-constitutional error. See United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 383 (D.C.Cir.2006) (We have distinguished between those misapplications of the Guidelines in which a sentencing court increases a sentence beyond the maximum that could have been imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the, jury verdict, which, because they violate the Sixth Amendment are constitutional Booker errors, and those cases in which the court's error was only the mandatory, as opposed to advisory, treatment of the Guidelines. We call these latter errors non-constitutional Booker errors . . .) (quotation omitted). If the defendant did not preserve his Sixth Amendment challenge to the Guidelines as mandatory by objecting at sentencing, as Brown did not, we apply plain error review and assess whether there would have been a materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, had the sentence been imposed in accordance with the post- Booker sentencing regime. Id. (quoting Coles, 403 F.3d at 767). [2] According to Carson, there are three types of sentencing appeals affected by Booker : First, there undoubtedly will be some cases in which a reviewing court will be confident that a defendant has suffered no prejudice such as where the judge imposes a sentence at the statutory maximum and [states] that if he could he would have imposed an even longer sentence. [ Coles, 403 F.3d] at 769 (citation omitted). In those cases, we affirm the sentence. Second, there will be some cases in which we are confident that the defendant suffered prejudice [such as] where the . . . judge indicated on the record that, but for the Guidelines, she would have imposed a lower sentence. Id. In those cases, we remand for full resentencing. Third, as was the case in Coles, there will be cases where the record simply is not sufficient for an appellate court to determin[e] prejudice with any confidence. Id. Carson, 455 F.3d at 383-84 (footnote omitted) (second alteration added). In the third category of caseswhere the record is not sufficient to gauge prejudice vel non we remand the record only and retain jurisdiction. Coles, 403 F.3d at 765, 770-71. On record remand, the district court is directed to determine whether it would have imposed a different sentence materially more favorable to the defendant had it been fully aware of the post- Booker sentencing regime. Id. at 770. The district court is not required to determine what the sentence would have been in making this determination and `need not require the presence of the Defendant.' Id. (quoting United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 120 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Fed. R.Crim.P. 43(b)(3)))), The remand thus serves the purely informational purpose of informing us whether the sentencing judge would have imposed a different sentence materially more favorable to the defendant. Id. If the sentencing judge concludes that he would have imposed a sentence materially more favorable to the defendant had the Guidelines been advisory only, we vacate the sentence and the district court then conducts a resentencing. United States v. Gomez, 431 F.3d 818, 823 (D.C.Cir.2005). As noted, after Brown appealed his sentence, we granted the parties' joint motion for a Coles remand. Brown, 455 F.3d at 267. Because a Coles remand is only a record remand rather than a resentencing, Brown's original sentencing was his only sentencing and his failure to object to the use of his arrest record at that time means that we review at this time for plain error only. See In re Sealed Case, 349 F.3d 685, 690 (D.C.Cir.2003) ([P]lain error review is appropriate when the appellant fails to raise a claim at his sentencing hearing or when he fails to object to the district court's ruling.) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)). [3] Plain error exists `where (1) there is error (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) the court of appeals finds that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' United States v. Andrews, 479 F.3d 894, 896 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 69, 74 (D.C.Cir.2006)). An error `affect[s] substantial rights' if it is `prejudicial.' United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1008 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)) (alteration in Olano. ) To establish prejudice in the sentencing context, [the defendant] `must show a reasonable likelihood that the sentencing court's obvious errors affected his sentence.' Id. (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C.Cir.1994)).
The district court imposed a sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range based on its consideration of numerous factors, including Brown's arrest record. Sentencing Tr. 24-25, Aug. 19, 2003. Brown argues that the district court erred in considering his arrest record where the record lacked any evidence that Brown had in fact committed the conduct for which he was arrested. Brown also asserts that section 4A1.3 of the Guidelines expresses a policy against reliance on arrest records. Finally, Brown contends that without evidence showing by a preponderance that he committed the conduct for which he was charged . . . the arrest record is irrelevant to the appropriate sentence. Appellant's Br. 15. In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline[s] range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. U.S.S.G. 1B1.4 (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 ( No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted Of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.) (emphasis added). The all-inclusive language of both the Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3661 makes clear that a defendant's arrest record may properly be considered as part of his background, Brown nonetheless contends that U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(3), which provides that [a] prior arrest record itself shall not be considered for purposes of an upward departure, and the holding in United States v. Joaquin, 326 F.3d 1287 (D.C.Cir.2003), that an earlier version of section 4A1.3 also prohibited reliance on an arrest record for a downward departure, together prohibit consideration of his arrest record. Section 4A1.3's prohibition, however, does not extend to the imposition of a sentence within the Guidelines range. As noted, the Guidelines' starting presumption is that the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4. Section 4A1.3, whatever it prohibits regarding departures, [4] does not prohibit the sentencing court's consideration of the defendant's arrest record when sentencing within the Guidelines range. Brown's argument that an adverse inference cannot necessarily be drawn from an arrest record, without more, merits closer consideration. The district court could have inferred that none of Brown's arrests resulted in prosecutions because Brown was innocent. See, e.g., United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60-61 (1st Cir.2006) (More generally, a mere arrest, especially a lone arrest, is not evidence that the person arrested actually committed any criminal conduct. This is because arrest `happens to the innocent as well as the guilty.' (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948))). The district court did not view Brown's arrests in isolation, however, but instead in the context of numerous other contacts with the criminal justice system. For example, the court cited Brown's violation of the conditions of pre-trial release while awaiting trial on the instant charges as well as his prior convictions and probation violation. The court's reference to Brown's arrest record simply catalogued an additional example of Brown's repeated contact with the criminal justice system over a short period of time at a young age. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in considering Brown's arrest record as one of many factors warranting a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range. See Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d at 61 ([A] series of past arrests might legitimately suggest a pattern of unlawful behavior even in the absence of any convictions. . . .); cf. United States v. Chavez-Calderon, 494 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir.2007) (district court is not precluded from considering uncontested conduct, even if uncharged, in formulating a reasonable sentence) (citing United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (10th Cir.2006)). Even assuming arguendo that the district court erred by considering Brown's arrest record, it did not plainly err. If there is no clear legal rulewhether expressed in a prior decision or elsewhere governing an issue, then the district court's decision cannot be a plain error. Whren, 111 F.3d at 960 (citing United States v. Memos, 8 F.3d 48, 51 (D.C.Cir. 1993)). Both 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4; authorize the Court to consider any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, which information, under the circumstances of this case, includes Brown's arrest record. [5] Finally, at the Coles remand hearing we originally ordered in this case, the district court determined that it would not have imposed a sentence materially more favorable to defendant had it been fully aware of the post- Booker sentencing regime at the time of sentencing, Brown, 439 F.Supp.2d at 139, and we find no plain error in Brown's sentence. See United States v, Coles, 186 Fed.Appx, 2, 3-4 (D.C.Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. So ordered.