Opinion ID: 2977920
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lasky’s Time Line

Text: According to Gooch, Lasky told him that the assault occurred at 1:45 A.M. on August 17. Lasky testified similarly at the preliminary examination, saying that the assault occurred at 1:30 A.M. But at trial she placed the assault closer to 10:45 P.M. the previous night. Rosencrantz speculates that the prosecutor coaxed this change to weaken his alibi defense. At the habeas evidentiary hearing, however, Rosencrantz failed to question Lasky about the substance of her pretrial discussion with the prosecutor, and the district court correctly declined to make any inferences favoring Rosencrantz on that subject.4 The district court then reasoned that Rosencrantz failed to prove “the time-line testimony provided at trial was false.” We agree. While Lasky vacillated in her reporting of the time, that does not establish “indisputably false” testimony at trial in the presence of prosecutors. Coe, 161 F.3d at 343 (“mere inconsistencies” do not show indisputable falsity).5 4 Aside from Burgess’s affidavit, all that we know about the pretrial discussions between Lasky and the prosecution comes from these questions, asked by counsel for the state at the evidentiary hearing: Ms. Gagliardi: You indicated in your . . . responses to the questioning that you were incarcerated prior to the preliminary hearing? Elaine Lasky: Yes, ma’am. Ms. Gagliardi: At Genesee County Jail. Could you tell the Court why you were incarcerated at that time? Elaine Lasky: I was charged with a shoplifting charge in Mount Pleasant and was under their jurisdiction . . . . Ms. Gagliardi: Did the police officers or the prosecutors ever discuss with you the shoplifting charge that you were incarcerated for at that time? Did you ever meet with them on those charges? Elaine Lasky: No. Because I was already sentenced on that. I was sentenced to one year at the county, the Mount Pleasant Jail. And Genesee County just held me in their jail. Ms. Gagliardi: Were there any discussions with the prosecutors or the investigators regarding any other case beside the one where you were the complainant against Mr. Rosencrantz? Elaine Lasky: No. 5 Rosencrantz’s argument suggests that Lasky’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing represents the truth because it occurred on a later date than her trial and preliminary-examination testimony. But our review reveals reason to doubt the credibility of Lasky’s evidentiary-hearing testimony because that testimony—made a decade after Rosencrantz’s trial—evinces signs of a failing memory. For example, the trial transcript shows Lasky insisting that she was sober at the time of the assault. But at the evidentiary hearing, Lasky could not recall having testified in that way. Also during the evidentiary hearing, Lasky had trouble distinguishing between the preliminary examination and the trial. Lasky voiced her confusion, saying: “when you’re saying preliminary, I’m trying to get it in my head which one was the preliminary hearing, which one was which. I can’t say positively.” (Admittedly, later in the evidentiary hearing, Lasky seemed to appreciate the timing of these hearings.) Finally, even at the evidentiary hearing, Lasky still could not “pin down” the assault’s exact time. Rosencrantz misapprehends not only our indisputably-false requirement, but also the nature of our appellate review. The responsibility No. 07-1403 Rosencrantz v. Lafler Page 10 Moreover, cross-examination on Lasky’s time line highlighted the inconsistencies between her trial testimony, her statements to Officer Gooch at the time of the assault, and her testimony at the preliminary hearing. The defense focused the jury on these inconsistencies, and it was up to the jury—not a federal court conducting collateral review—to sort this out. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 992 (9th Cir.