Opinion ID: 2582842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Houk Affidavit

Text: The superior court found that Dr. Houk was not qualified as an expert in this case partly because she lacked training or knowledge in correctional medicine, emergency medicine, endocrinology, orthopedics/the treatment of arthritis, or autoimmune diseases. But these fields are irrelevant to the issue before the court: Could Dr. Houk provide testimony relevant to the standard of AS 09.55.540(a)(1) and did she meet the requirements of AS 09.20.185(a) as to licensure, training and experience, and certification directly relevant to an area of practice at issue in this case? We turn now to those questions. Dr. Houk's affidavit reveals that she is a psychiatrist and psychotherapist and that she is trained in treating a variety of mental illnesses. Her affidavit discusses the relationship between depression and hypothyroidism, two conditions which Hymes allegedly experienced. She also discusses the consequences of the abrupt discontinuation of the drug, Methotrexate, which include depression. These are areas about which she is qualified to testify as a psychiatrist. Turning to the specific requirements of AS 09.20.185(a), appellees do not contest that she met subsection (1) (licensure), a concession that the superior court accepted and agreed with. Dr. Houk's affidavit reveals that she has sufficient training and experience in psychiatry and psychotherapy and related fields to meet the requirements of subsection (a)(2) (training and experience in an area directly related to a matter at issue) to testify regarding the psychological effects of failing to adequately treat Hymes's physical conditions. [45] However, as to subsection (a)(3), it appears that she lacked board certification in psychiatry. Thus, while it was an abuse of discretion for the superior court to strike Dr. Houk's affidavit on the basis that she did not have sufficient training or experience in correctional medicine or the other specialties mentioned by the court, it appears that Dr. Houk lacked the required certification in psychiatry to testify. On the other hand, Dr. Houk indicated in her affidavit that she is a diplomat[e] of the American Psychotherapy Association. On remand, Hymes should be allowed to offer a qualified expert (or show that Dr. Houk is in fact certified in a relevant area). Because the affidavit of Dr. Neuwelt met the requirements of AS 09.55.540 and AS 09.20.185, the superior court must consider it on remand. The court should also allow Hymes the opportunity to submit an affidavit of a board-certified psychiatrist in place of Dr. Houk's affidavit (or show that Dr. Houk is board-certified). [46]
The superior court granted Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy summary judgment on Rita Hymes's NIED claim, holding that she did not meet the requirements for the bystander or preexisting duty exceptions to the general requirement of physical injury. The Hymeses appear to argue that it was inconsistent for the superior court to deny Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy's motion for summary judgment regarding failure to exhaust administrative remedies in relation to the NIED claim and then grant Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy's subsequent motion for summary judgment in relation to the NIED claim. Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy respond that the superior court's denial of the motion for summary judgment regarding the failure to exhaust defense in relation to the NIED claim ... did not constitute a grant of summary judgment in the Hymes' favor, but rather merely reflected that DeRamus was not entitled to summary judgment under this legal theory. Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy assert (1) that it was not inconsistent for the court to grant the new motion for summary judgment under a different legal theory, and (2) that the Hymeses fail to make any substantive challenge to the order dismissing the NIED claim, so this court should deem any such challenge waived. We agree with both propositions. The superior court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy on Rita Hymes's NIED claim is not inconsistent with the court's earlier order denying summary judgment on the NIED claim on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the earlier order, the court denied summary judgment in relation to the NIED claim because as a non-prisoner, Rita was not obligated to exhaust administrative remedies. The court granted summary judgment in the later order based on a substantive analysis of Rita's NIED claim. Because the Hymeses fail to make a substantive argument regarding the merits of the NIED claim, they have waived the issue under our well-established rule that issues not argued in opening appellate briefs are waived. [47] This rule applies equally to pro se litigants. [48] Although we require courts to provide some procedural guidance for a pro se litigant when it is clear what action he or she is obviously trying to accomplish, the failure to raise an argument in an opening brief leaves the other party with no notice or opportunity to respond to the argument. [49]
In the order granting Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy summary judgment on the NIED claim, Judge Downes also denied the Hymeses' request for recusal, stating that he knows Hymes, bears him no ill will, is not biased against Mr. Hymes, and in fact has enjoyed [his] acquaintance. Judge Downes had earlier addressed the Hymeses' allegations of bias in his order denying reconsideration of his decision granting summary judgment for failure to exhaust. In this order Judge Downes stated that [t]his Court routinely entertains motions for summary judgment, and to do so is not misconduct, and that the Hymeses' allegation that this Court is biased against them is unfounded and unsupported.... On appeal, the Hymeses argue that Judge Downes should have recused himself because he was biased against them. Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy respond that the claims of bias were based simply on Judge Downes' adverse rulings, and, as such, the claims are not sufficient to show that the judge's decision not to recuse himself was an abuse of discretion. Alaska Statute 22.20.020(a)(9) provides that [a] judicial officer may not act in a matter in which ... the judicial officer feels that, for any reason, a fair and impartial decision cannot be given. In Amidon v. State, [50] we explained that [s]ince the initial determination has been placed in the discretion of the trial judge, his decision should be given substantial weight, and the decision not to recuse should be reviewable only for abuse of discretion. [51] Also, in DeNardo v. Corneloup, [52] we stated, [j]udges should recuse themselves if there is the appearance of bias, but `[b]y themselves, interpretations of the law are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of bias.' [53] We elaborated in DeNardo that [d]isqualification was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings. [54] The Hymeses make various references to judicial bias, but they lack a persuasive argument that it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Downes to not recuse himself from the case. Their arguments indicate that the Hymeses are merely displeased with Judge Downes's interpretations of the law and adverse rulings involving the exclusion of expert affidavits. Under AS 22.20.020(a)(9) and the cases interpreting it, the Hymeses' complaints are insufficient to show that Judge Downes's decision not to recuse was an abuse of discretion. [55]
The Hymeses argue that Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy's poor treatment of Hymes violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [56] Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy respond that the claim is waived because the Hymeses did not plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging a violation of their federal constitutional rights but rather only alleged medical malpractice and negligence. We have repeatedly held that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal. [57] In Willoya v. State, Department of Corrections, [58] we held that a prisoner waived his Eighth Amendment claim by failing to raise it in the superior court. [59] The present case is strikingly similar to Willoya. Here, like the plaintiff in Willoya, Hymes alleged negligence based on medical treatment he received while incarcerated. [60] Like the plaintiff in Willoya, Hymes alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment for the first time on appeal. As Willoya makes clear, the Hymeses waived their Eighth Amendment claim because they did not raise it in the superior court.
The superior court granted Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy's motion for summary judgment with respect to the Hymeses' claim for failure to report elder abuse. Although the Hymeses do not make any substantive argument regarding elder abuse on appeal, they do set forth the language of AS 47.24.013(a) and AS 47.24.015(a), which are provisions of the elder abuse statute. They also state, [n]o one has done anything in Appellants' case to honor the intent of the foregoing statutes. I.e., those statutes appear to be not worth the paper they are written on. Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy respond that the Hymeses have waived any challenge to the superior court's dismissal of the claim because they failed to make any kind of substantive argument. In the alternative, Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy argue that AS 47.24 does not create a private cause of action, so the Hymeses failed to plead a viable claim. The Hymeses' quotation of statutory language coupled with the conclusory statement that [n]o one has done anything to honor the intent of the statute constitutes waiver for failure to adequately brief the issue. [61] Even if they had not waived their argument, it would still be without merit. Alaska Statute 47.24.013(a) provides: If a report received under AS 47.24.010 regards the abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult who is 60 years of age or older that is alleged to have been committed by or to have resulted from the negligence of the staff or a volunteer of an out-of-home care facility, including a facility licensed under AS 47.32, in which the vulnerable adult resides, the department shall transfer the report for investigation to the long term care ombudsman under AS 47.62.015. Alaska Statute 47.24.015(a) further provides that [u]pon the department's receipt of a report under AS 47.24.010 that is not transferred under AS 47.24.013, the department, or its designee, shall promptly initiate an investigation to determine whether the vulnerable adult who is the subject of the report suffers from abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect. Nothing in these two provisions creates a private right of action for elder abuse. Rather, the provisions require reporting of elder abuse and set out the procedures that shall be taken if a report is received by the Department of Health and Social Services. As Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy point out, the Act intends to protect against such alleged abuse by ensuring that reports of harm are properly investigated and followed up by the state. Because the elder abuse statute does not create a private cause of action, the superior court did not err in dismissing the Hymeses' claim on summary judgment. [62]
Because Donald Hymes had at least one malpractice claim that may not have been subject to the exhaustion requirement, and because he raised material fact disputes regarding whether exhaustion should have been excused (for lack of meaningful access to the DOC grievance procedure or the threat of solitary confinement for continuing to complain about his treatment), we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment that was based on his failure to exhaust the DOC grievance procedure and REMAND this case to the superior court. Because the Hymeses' medical expert affidavits should not have been excluded, those affidavits must be considered on remand in order to determine the underlying merits of the Hymeses' medical malpractice claim. We AFFIRM all other decisions of the superior court.