Opinion ID: 776544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel/Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: 44 Martin raised his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in post-conviction proceedings rather than by direct appeal. Thus, these claims were barred by res judicata pursuant to Perry. See Byrd, 209 F.3d at 520. Nonetheless, he argues that these claims are not procedurally defaulted because the last state court rendering judgment on the case did not clearly and expressly state that its judgment rested on a procedural bar See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989). This contention is not accurate. When addressing these claims, the court held: 45 We find that these were all matters that could have been addressed on defendant's direct appeal since defendant was represented by new appellate counsel and are therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata as found by the trial court. 46 State v. Martin, 1995 WL 66698,  (Ohio App.1995). Martin simply ignores this opinion and focuses on a lower court opinion that was not the last state court rendering judgment on the case. Thus, this argument is without merit. 47 Martin also argues that the ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel is cause and prejudice for not raising his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. In Martin's post-conviction application for delayed reconsideration, he raised claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, based upon the failure of his appellate counsel to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel for not challenging his warrantless arrest, objecting to jury instructions, obtaining the attendance of Rieves-Bey, and performing effectively at the mitigation phase. If Martin can show that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that rose to the level of a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, it would excuse his procedural default. See Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). In Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408 (6th Cir.1999), we provided guidance on considerations relevant to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 48 The cases decided by this court on the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel suggest the following considerations that ought to be taken into account in determining whether an attorney on direct appeal performed reasonably competently. 49
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54 (6) Did appellate counsel testify in a collateral proceeding as to his appeal strategy and, if so, were the justifications reasonable? 55 (7) What was appellate counsel's level of experience and expertise? 56 (8) Did the petitioner and appellate counsel meet and go over possible issues? 57 (9) Is there evidence that counsel reviewed all the facts? 58 (10) Were the omitted issues dealt with in other assignments of error? 59 (11) Was the decision to omit an issue an unreasonable one which only an incompetent attorney would adopt? 60 Id. at 427-28. 61 The government responds by arguing that Martin waived this issue by not arguing cause and prejudice before the district court. Martin submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court which included the general statement, In this case, the ineffective representation received by Ernest Martin both at trial and in his direct appeals resulted in any procedural default found to exist and was so egregious as to produce a miscarriage of justice and to justify the exercise of this Court's equitable discretion to grant habeas review of any and all claims found to be otherwise defaulted. However, his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on his habeas petition were limited to the failure of appellate counsel to have the transcript of the hearing on his new trial motion made part of the record on appeal. 62 Excusing procedural default for cause and prejudice and a grant of relief for ineffective assistance of counsel involves an examination of whether prejudice occurred, see Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-69, 102 S.Ct. 1584; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Thus, if Martin's underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel arguments lack merit, he cannot show cause and prejudice via ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Of course, our procedural default analysis is ultimately complicated by the fact that, although Martin apparently preserved ineffective assistance of appellate counsel arguments for federal review through his Murnahan application, he only presented one such argument with specificity on his habeas petition and that argument did not include his claim that appellate counsel should have raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel with regard to the merits he attempts to present in this action. 63 Just prior to the Mapes court's recital of the considerations relevant to the constitutional effectiveness of appellate counsel, it noted that Mapes's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the mitigation stage was procedurally defaulted, but could be addressed in considering whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it on direct appeal. Mapes, 171 F.3d at 427. Like Martin, Mapes raised ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, with regard to mitigation, in a post-conviction proceeding, id. at 412; however, unlike here, Mapes's habeas petition also sought relief on this specific ground. 64 Another concern in this regard is the fact that our COA did not grant review of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims that charged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Of course, we would have no reason to do so since these specific issues were not raised in the habeas petition or considered by the district court. The COA did provide that the parties could address the question of procedural default related to the merit issues upon which the COA was granted. Inasmuch as the merits of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel arguments are hopelessly intertwined with the procedural default arguments regarding the merit claims upon which we granted review, our grant of review on procedural default encompasses these claims. 65 At oral argument, the State conceded that Martin's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments that relate to the performance of his counsel at the mitigation stage required an examination of evidence dehors the record and that these claims therefore were not procedurally defaulted. 66 Martin makes essentially the same procedural default argument with regard to his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. In claim O(c) of his post-conviction application for delayed reconsideration, he argued that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel had not argued that the prosecutor had improperly commented on his failure to testify. He argues that appellate counsel's ineffectiveness in this regard is cause and prejudice and thus excuses his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. He did not raise this argument before the district court. 67 Martin's failure to raise ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal resulted in procedural default. He raised the merits of these claims in his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on his Murnahan application, but he did not petition the district court for habeas relief in this regard. Thus, our discussion of the merits of these claims, save the effectiveness of his counsel at mitigation, is limited to his cause and prejudice arguments.