Opinion ID: 725571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of McKenzie's State Law Wrongful Discharge Claim

Text: 39 McKenzie next argues that the district court erred in dismissing, for failure to state a claim, her state law tort claim for discharge in violation of Oklahoma public policy. We review de novo the district court's grant of a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 543 (10th Cir.1995). 40 McKenzie's state law claim is predicated upon Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla.1989). In Burk, the Oklahoma Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the Oklahoma employment-at-will doctrine by recognizing a tort cause of action where an employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of an established and well-defined public policy or for performing an act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy. 770 P.2d at 29. McKenzie alleges that she was discharged for reporting her concerns that the company was not properly paying overtime pay to sales associates and department managers. Assuming this allegation is true, 9 McKenzie can prevail on her Burk claim only if she can show that Oklahoma has a clearly established public policy regarding maximum work hours and overtime pay. 41 McKenzie has not pointed us to any specific Oklahoma statute establishing a public policy of this sort. Moreover, we find no Oklahoma constitutional, statutory or decisional law which would require an employer such as Renberg's, Inc. to pay overtime compensation to its employees. The absence of any Oklahoma law on this subject is underscored by the fact that although the Oklahoma legislature has adopted the federal standards for minimum wages, see Okla. Stat. tit. 40 § 197.2 (making it unlawful for an employer in Oklahoma to pay any employee a wage of less than the current federal minimum wage for all hours worked), it has not adopted the FLSA standards governing maximum hours and overtime, see 29 U.S.C. § 207. 42 We also reject McKenzie's argument that the comprehensive Oklahoma statutory scheme governing the employer/employee relationship establishes a clear and compelling public policy mandating the payment of overtime compensation. Of the entire body of Oklahoma statutory law governing the employment relationship, McKenzie directs our attention to only one specific provision mentioning overtime pay, Okla. Stat. tit. 40 § 165.1. Section 165.1 is the definitions section of the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act and defines the term wages as compensation owed by an employer for labor or services rendered, including salaries, commissions, holiday and vacation pay, overtime pay, severance or dismissal pay, bonuses and other similar advantages agreed upon between the employer and the employee.... Okla. Stat. tit. 40 § 165.1(4) (emphasis added). In light of the Burk court's admonition that the public policy exception be tightly circumscribed and reserved for violations of established and well-defined public policy, 770 P.2d at 29, we believe section 165.1(4)'s passing reference to overtime pay is far too slender a reed upon which to base a public policy tort. Although it mentions overtime pay, section 165.1(4) does not prescribe a limit for maximum working hours, nor does it set forth a specific formula for calculating overtime pay. 10 The absence of any clearly articulated overtime pay policy in the Oklahoma statutory scheme suggests that the Oklahoma courts would not entertain a Burk claim founded upon a discharge for reporting an employer's failure to pay overtime. 43 Despite the lack of a well-defined state policy, McKenzie argues that her Burk claim is cognizable because it is predicated upon a public policy found in a combined regime of both state and federal law. McKenzie relies on two cases of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to support this argument, Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla.1992), and Todd v. Frank's Tong Serv., Inc., 784 P.2d 47 (Okla.1989). In Tate, the court held that a plaintiff who alleged a discriminatory discharge in violation of the Oklahoma and federal anti-discrimination statutes stated a claim under Burk. 833 P.2d at 1222-25. In Todd, the court upheld a Burk claim where the plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged for refusing to operate a vehicle that did not comply with both state and federal safety regulations. 784 P.2d at 50. 44 We believe Tate and Todd are distinguishable from the case at bar. Unlike the present case, the alleged wrongful discharges in both Tate and Todd not only violated applicable federal law, but they also violated a mandate of state public policy clearly expressed in the Oklahoma statutes. In Tate, for instance, the plaintiff alleged he had been fired because of his race--an action contrary to both the federal policy expressed in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the state policy expressed in the Oklahoma anti-discrimination statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 25 § 1101 et seq. Similarly, in Todd, the plaintiff alleged he was unlawfully discharged for refusing to operate an unsafe vehicle in violation of the federal Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C.App. § 2305 (recodified at 49 U.S.C.App. § 31105(a)), and for refusing to operate a vehicle that was not in compliance with state safety regulations, Okla. Stat. tit. 47 §§ 12-201, 12-301. Here, by contrast, McKenzie cannot direct our attention to any specific Oklahoma policy or statute mandating the payment of overtime compensation to private employees. The most she can do is allege a violation of the federal FLSA. We therefore affirm the dismissal of McKenzie's Burk public policy claim. 11 CONCLUSION 45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.