Opinion ID: 2537725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aggravating Factors Instruction

Text: ¶ 5 Thomas argues that the aggravating factors instruction given to the jury in the resentencing proceeding allowed him to be sentenced to life without parole without [the] jury ever having found that he personally committed the actus reus of the crime or intended the death of the victim or that the aggravating factors applied to him rather than to an accomplice. Pet. for Review at 6. ¶ 6 In addressing the first part of Thomas's argument, it is important to recognize that [a]ggravated first degree murder is not a crime in and of itself; the crime is ` premeditated murder in the first degree ... accompanied by the presence of one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in the criminal procedure title of the code (RCW 10.95.020).' Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 501, 14 P.3d 713 (quoting State v. Irizarry, 111 Wash.2d 591, 593-94, 763 P.2d 432 (1988)). Aggravating factors are not elements of [a] crime; they are `aggravation of penalty' factors. State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 154, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (quoting State v. Kincaid, 103 Wash.2d 304, 307, 692 P.2d 823 (1985)); see also State v. Yates, 161 Wash.2d 714, 758, 168 P.3d 359 (2007) ([T]his court has clearly `held that under the statutory scheme in Washington the aggravating factors for first degree murder are not elements of that crime but are sentence enhancers that increase the statutory maximum sentence from life with the possibility of parole to life without the possibility of parole or the death penalty.' (quoting Thomas I, 150 Wash.2d at 848, 83 P.3d 970)). To convict an accomplice of premeditated murder in the first degree, the State need not show that the accomplice had the intent that the victim would be killed. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 431, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). The prosecution need only prove that the defendant knew his actions would facilitate the crime for which he was eventually charged. State v. Cronin, 142 Wash.2d 568, 581-82, 14 P.3d 752 (2000) (The State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] had general knowledge that he was aiding in the commission of the crime of murder.). Thus, Thomas's contention that the aggravating factors instruction given here was erroneous because it allowed him to be sentenced to life without parole without a finding that he personally committed the murder is without merit. The issue is not whether Thomas committed the murder as a principle; the issue is whether he personally committed the aggravating factors. ¶ 7 Turning to the second part of Thomas's argument, when the State seeks to sentence a defendant to death for the crime of premeditated murder in the first degree, it must prove a defendant convicted as an accomplice to the murder personally committed aggravating factors. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 508-09, 14 P.3d 713 ([W]e hold when jury instructions as used in this case allow for the possibility that the defendant was convicted solely as an accomplice to premeditated first degree murder, the defendant may not be executed unless the jury expressly finds (1) the defendant was a major participant in the acts that caused the death of the victim, and (2) the aggravating factors under the statute specifically apply to the defendant.). [5] ¶ 8 The special verdict form given to the jury at Thomas's resentencing proceeding read as follows: We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the court: QUESTION: Has the State proven the existence of the following aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt? (1) Did the defendant commit the murder to conceal the commission of a crime or to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime? ... (2) Did the defendant commit the murder in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from robbery in the first degree? ... (3) Did the defendant commit the murder in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from robbery in the second degree? ... (4) Did the defendant commit the murder in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from residential burglary? ... Clerk's Papers (CP) at 202. ¶ 9 The significant difference between this verdict form and the one we held unconstitutional for the purpose of upholding Thomas's death sentence in Thomas I is the removal of the phrase or an accomplice. Each question specifically asked if the defendant, Thomas, personally committed the aggravating factors; the jury answered yes to each question. These instructions left no chance, as there was in Thomas's first trial, that the jury could have answered yes if they thought an accomplice, rather than Thomas, committed the aggravating circumstances. See State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.2d 398, 420, 717 P.2d 722 (1986) (It is impossible for a jury to find ... aggravating circumstances without also finding that the defendant intended to commit them.). Thomas's jury in the resentencing proceeding found that he personally committed all four aggravating factors as required by this court in Thomas I