Opinion ID: 2321153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Tangible Evidence

Text: The defendant, who also testified at the suppression hearing, acknowledged that he gave consent to the search of his bicycle baskets after the police removed his sweatshirt from one of the baskets. He argues, however, that he gave that consent involuntarily, as the result of coercion by the police. Specifically, he argues that, once detained, he remained with the police in response to their show of official authority. The defendant further contends that, after watching one of the police officers remove the sweatshirt from his bicycle basket without his permission, his consent to a further search of his bicycle baskets must be characterized as a mere submission to their show of force. We disagree with that contention. It is well settled that a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible. State v. Hightower, 661 A.2d 948, 960 (R.I.1995); see also State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1134 (R.I.2006). A consent to search is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment if it was given voluntarily. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary   .). The state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant has freely and voluntarily given consent to a search. Casas, 900 A.2d at 1134; State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I.1990). The determination of voluntariness vel non involves a mixed question of fact and law that impacts a constitutional right, and this Court therefore reviews such determinations de novo. See State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250, 261 (R.I.2006); see also State v. Wiggins, 919 A.2d 987, 989 (R.I.2007). Notwithstanding our de novo review of the ultimate determination of voluntariness, we give deference to the findings of historical fact made by a trial justice in the context of making that determination. See In re Joseph B., 822 A.2d 172, 174 (R.I. 2003); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670, 673 (R.I.1999); State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297, 303, 405 A.2d 1192, 1196 (1979) (stating that findings of fact on motions to suppress will not be overturned unless such findings are clearly erroneous). At the conclusion of the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress the tangible evidence seized by the police, the hearing justice addressed the defendant's contention that he had given the police consent to search his bicycle baskets involuntarily, as a result of coercion. The hearing justice noted that the defendant had admitted that no one threatened him or applied any form of physical stress upon him. The hearing justice also noted that the defendant did not provide the court with any articulable basis in support of his contention that he could not have refused consent. He further noted that the defendant first gave oral consent and then later followed up by giving written consent. Consequently, the hearing justice rejected the defendant's contention that he had been coerced, and he denied the defendant's motion to suppress the tangible evidence. After independently reviewing the record, we agree with the hearing justice's ruling in this regard.