Opinion ID: 203288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Variance Between the Conspiracy Proven and the Conspiracy Charged

Text: Feliciano argues that he was prejudiced by a variance between the evidence presented at trial and the crimes charged in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. Regarding Count One, Feliciano claims that the Government's proof showed that he participated only in one of many small, unrelated drug conspiracies operating within Covadonga, rather than the single, over-arching conspiracy charged in the Indictment. Feliciano also contends that the proof impermissibly varied from the allegations set forth in Count One because the evidence showed that he acted as a co-leader with Alex Trujillo, rather than with Cristian Villegas, a/k/a Casi, as alleged in the Indictment. Regarding Count Two, Feliciano claims that the evidence failed to show that he conspired to possess guns in furtherance of the charged narcotics conspiracy with the specific individuals named in the Indictment. Further, Feliciano claims that the jury instructions on both Counts One and Two were erroneous and contributed to the prejudice that resulted from the variance on both counts. A prejudicial variance occurs when: (1) the facts proved at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment; and (2) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights (i.e., when the indictment fails to provide the defendant with sufficient detail to allow him to prepare a defense, avoid unfair surprise at trial, and plead double jeopardy when appropriate). United States v. Pomales-Lebron, 513 F.3d 262, 269 (1st Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim that the Government's proof varied impermissibly from the charges contained in the indictment is essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir.2002). As with all such claims, we `canvass the evidence (direct and circumstantial) in the light most agreeable to the prosecution and decide whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences extractable therefrom, enables a national factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime.' United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 494 (1st Cir.1997)). Where, as here, an appellant claims that the evidence showed that he participated only in one of several, lesser uncharged conspiracies, rather than the single overarching conspiracy as charged in the indictment, we pay particular attention to factors such as whether the alleged conspirators shared a common purpose, whether their actions demonstrated interdependency, and the extent to which participants overlapped during the life of the alleged conspiracy. At the end of the day, a defendant cannot succeed with a sufficiency challenge as long as a plausible reading of the record supports the jury's implied finding that he knowingly participated in the charged conspiracy. United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 314 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the Government presented sufficient proof that Feliciano participated as a drug owner in the charged conspiracy. The Indictment charged that the object of the conspiracy was to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine, cocaine base (`crack'), heroin, and marihuana, at different drug distribution locations (`drug points') in the Nuestra Senora de Covadonga Public Housing Project ... for significant financial gain or profit. The Indictment further charged that Appellant acted as one of the Leaders and Owners of the charged conspiracy. As discussed above, the testimonies of Medina and Espada, as well as the videotapes made by Espada, established that Feliciano acted as an owner of a heroin and cocaine drug point within Covadonga from April 2003 until his arrest on June 1, 2004. There was little variance (and no material variance) between the Indictment and the proof presented at trial of Appellant's drug trafficking at Covadonga. The Indictment did not, as Appellant implies, define the drug conspiracy at Covadonga as a single, master, or overarching conspiracy. Further, as the Government correctly notes, even if the Indictment could be construed as charging Feliciano with being a leader of an overarching drug conspiracy at Covadonga, the evidence established that the sub-conspiracies indeed functioned as a part of the grander drug scheme at Covadonga. Ample evidence established that the Covadonga housing project functioned as a busy narcotics bazaar in which the owners of different brands of cocaine, crack, heroin, and marijuana cooperated to sell their distinctly labeled products. The success of each owner's drug operation depended on the overall security of Covadonga, and look-outs employed by different drug owners acted for the Covadonga marketplace's benefit as a whole. Appellant's own act of firing a rifle at cars being driven through Covadonga by perceived outsiders suggests that the different drug owners at Covadonga maintained a common interest in securing the housing project against outsiders. There was also substantial evidence presented of overlap among the different drug operations, consisting not only of the common use of look-outs, but of different owners' use of the same sellers and runners. For example, Medina's testimony established that he sold heroin for two different owners and marijuana for a third owner. In addition, cohesion among the different sub-conspiracies is also implied by the fact that drugs branded with the marks of different owners were recovered from Trujillo's apartment; the jury reasonably could have inferred that the owners of different drug points used a common space to store their respective drugs and drug paraphernalia. In sum, there was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to have concluded that, although many drug owners operated within Covadonga, the Covadonga drug marketplace itself functioned as a single drug conspiracy. Even if some variance existed between the Government's evidence and the allegations contained in the Indictment, Feliciano was not unfairly prejudiced. See United States v. Twitty, 72 F.3d 228, 231 (1st Cir.1995) ([S]o long as the statutory violation remains the same, the jury can convict even if the facts found are somewhat different than those charged  so long as the difference does not cause unfair prejudice.). Specifically, no prejudice resulted from the fact that the evidence showed that Appellant was allied with Alex Trujillo, rather than Cristian Villegas, or that Appellant ran one of several drug points at Covadonga, rather than the entire drug organization. Regardless of the identity of Feliciano's alleged co-leader or the exact scope of Appellant's control of the drug activity at Covadonga, the Government was required to prove, and succeeded in proving, that Feliciano acted as a leader of a Covadonga drug point, as alleged in the Indictment, by employing different sellers and runners to sell drugs, and by carrying guns and supplying his underlings with guns. Thus, Feliciano's central defense needed to be that he was not part of [the Covadonga] organization  as [an owner of drugs], or in any other capacity. United States v. Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (finding no impermissible variance where defendant was indicted for being a conspirator/triggerman but the evidence proved him a conspirator/runner). The defense mounted by Feliciano did not center on responding to the particular charge that Appellant was allied with Casi. Nor did Appellant prepare a defense under the mistaken belief that he could concede his involvement in a smaller conspiracy and was required to contend only with the Government's effort to prove that he oversaw all of the drug points operating within Covadonga. In sum, Feliciano was not misled by the government's evidence at trial to defend himself on the wrong grounds and thus was able to prepare an effective defense and avoid surprise at trial. United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 68 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, no prejudice resulted to Appellant from the purported variance between the weapons conspiracy charged in Count Two of the Indictment and the Government's proof. Count Two of the Indictment alleged that Feliciano conspired to use guns in furtherance of the drug conspiracy charged in Count One with three co-defendants named in the Indictment (Jose Claudio Ortiz, Jorge Rodriguez Rosa, and Alfred Rodriguez Rosa) and one co-conspirator not named in the Indictment (Juan Carlos Rojas Rodriguez, a/k/a Carli). Feliciano argues that the evidence simply did not show that he conspired with any of the four named men to possess or use firearms in furtherance of the charged drug conspiracy. The Government presented sufficient proof that Feliciano conspired with others to posses firearms in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. The essence of conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). Here, the Government proved that an agreement existed between Feliciano and fellow members of the Covadonga drug market to possess guns in order to provide protection and enforcement for their drug trade. For example, Medina testified that in 2003, when he was working at the Covadonga drug point for Feliciano, Feliciano, Medina, and other sellers carried weapons. In addition, Medina testified that the use of weapons by drug point workers had to be authorized by Feliciano and his co-leader, Trujillo. The Government also proved the existence of the unlawful agreement by showing conduct, namely the fact that drug owners and sellers regularly carried guns at Covadonga while dealing in drugs, from which the agreement to possess guns in furtherance of the drug conspiracy could be inferred. See United States v. Concemi, 957 F.2d 942, 950 (1st Cir.1992) (stating that an agreement may be inferred from other evidence including a course of conduct). The Government offered no evidence, however, to show that any of the four individuals named in Count Two of the Indictment directly conspired with Feliciano to possess firearms. In addition, there appears to have been no evidence to show that Ortiz, Jorge Rosa, or Alfred Rosa actually possessed firearms. [1] Nevertheless, despite the lack of any evidence showing an agreement to possess weapons between Feliciano and the four named individuals, it is undisputed that the four individuals named in the Indictment were members of the drug conspiracy. It is also undisputed that Appellant, as well as other drug owners and sellers at Covadonga, regularly carried guns to protect themselves and their drug business. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury was entitled to conclude that the possession of firearms, given the dangerous nature of the conspiracy, was a part of that conspiracy's common course of action. United States v. Sullivan, 455 F.3d 248, 261 (4th Cir.2006). In other words, the jury reasonably could have inferred an agreement to possess guns between Feliciano and the four named individuals because they were all members of the Covadonga drug conspiracy, and members of the drug conspiracy habitually carried weapons in furtherance of the drug activity. In any event, the variance between the allegations in Count Two of the Indictment and the proof adduced at trial was slight and did not operate to mislead Appellant. Even if the jury convicted Feliciano on the basis of his conspiracy to possess firearms with another co-defendant rather than the four named individuals, this variance was permissible. See Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d at 6 (finding no prejudice in variance because error in the indictment was not so grave as to cause [appellant] to defend himself on the wrong grounds, especially when the evidence adduced at trial showed [appellant] to be deeply involved in the charged conspiracy). Here, the Indictment charged, and thus Feliciano was on notice, that he conspired to possess guns in furtherance of the Covadonga drug conspiracy not only with the four named individuals, but also with others, known and unknown. (Indictment at 10.) As with Count One, Appellant cannot plausibly claim that he was misled into mounting a defense against Count Two on the wrong grounds. Appellant's defense against the charges in Count Two required that he contend with the Government's efforts to prove that he agreed to possess guns with other drug workers at Covadonga. No unfair surprise or other prejudice resulted from the Government's presentation of evidence that established Appellant's participation in the conspiracy to possess weapons with individuals other than the four specific persons named in the Indictment. Thus, to the extent a variance existed, it was permissible. Feliciano also argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the conspiracies charged in both Counts One and Two. We first note that Appellant failed to propose alternate jury instructions or to object in a timely manner to the district court's jury instructions. When a defendant neglects to interpose a contemporaneous objection to the trial court's jury instructions in conformity with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, subsequent claims of instructional error are, for the most part, forfeit. [2] United States v. Gomez, 255 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.2001). A narrow exception exists, however, for plain error. See United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d 242, 246 (1st Cir.2001). [T]he plain error hurdle, high in all events, nowhere looms larger than in the context of alleged instructional errors. United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001); see also United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 216 (1st Cir.1992) (While reversal of a conviction predicated on unpreserved instructional error is theoretically possible, [it is] the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.). Regarding Count One, Appellant protests that the district court's instructions erroneously authorized a conviction upon proof of a conspiracy other than that charged in the Indictment. The record indicates, however, that the district court correctly explained the elements of conspiracy and referred expressly to the conspiracy charged in the Indictment. Specifically, the court instructed that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy to distribute the charged quantities of drugs inside the public housing facility known as Covadonga. The court referred to the specific charged conspiracy, namely the conspiracy to distribute narcotics at Covadonga, several times during its instruction on Count One. Appellant has not shown how these instructions were erroneous, let alone how the instructions were so deficient as to constitute plain error. Compare Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d at 246 (noting that plain error might theoretically be found in cases of glaring omission, where, for example, a trial court fails to instruct a criminal jury on a basic point like the government's burden of proof or the presumption of the defendant's innocence). Similarly, the district court's instructions on Count Two did not constitute plain error. The court's initial instruction regarding Count Two instructed that it was a crime to conspire during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, as charged in count I, to use or carry a firearm or to conspire to possess a firearm in furtherance of such drug trafficking crime. As the Government concedes, this instruction erroneously permitted the jury to convict Appellant for a conspiracy to `use or carry a firearm,' so long as the conspiracy, rather than the use, took place during and in relation to some drug trafficking crime. In other words, the initial instruction wrongfully authorized the jury to convict by finding that Feliciano agreed with others, at some point during the drug conspiracy, to possess firearms, without also finding that the possession was intended to be in relation to the drug conspiracy. Almost immediately afterward, however, the district court repaired its error and issued a correct instruction by stating that the Government was required to prove that Feliciano willfully and intentionally conspir[ed] to commit the offense of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, or of conspiring to possess a firearm in furtherance of such drug trafficking crime.... Shortly afterward, in limning the element of specific intent for Count Two, the court repeated the correct instruction. We do not propose that the court's instruction, including as it did an initial misstatement of the applicable law, is either letter perfect or insusceptible to any improvement. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d at 246. However, in light of the district court's immediate correction and Appellant's failure to suggest an alternate instruction or interpose a contemporaneous objection to the initial, flawed instruction, we find that the instruction as to Count Two did not rise to the level of plain error. In sum, we conclude that there was no prejudicial variance between the crimes charged in Counts One and Two of the Indictment and the proof of those crimes presented by the Government at trial. We also find that the jury instructions relating to Counts One and Two were not plainly erroneous.