Opinion ID: 2582726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Out-of-Court Contact with Jurors

Text: [¶27] Prior to beginning the sixth day of the appellant's trial, the district court informed counsel that the bailiff had expressed some concern because when the jurors are exiting, there [are] a number of people in the hallway and they can be overheard talking. The prosecutor asked if the district court knew of any [particular] conversations that had been overheard and the district court (who obviously had spoken with the bailiff) responded that it did not have any conversations noted. In order to prevent such an occurrence thereafter, the district court stated that it would ask the jurors to exit via a different stairwell, would have any indications of any improper communication reported to the court, and cautioned the courtroom spectators in open court as follows: [W]e have jurors that come in and out of the building at various times. And it's important that you be attune[d] to those jurors so that your conversations and statements to one another do not get overheard by those jurors. It's important that they not be exposed to information or discussions concerning this case outside of the courtroom. And so I would just ask you to be aware of that so that you can be attune[d] to any juror presence and limit your conversation in terms of volume so that that is not overheard. When the jury recessed for lunch later that morning, the district court also instructed the jury (as it had throughout the trial): 1) not to discuss the case with anyone, including family, other jurors, or anyone involved in the trial; 2) not to speak with any of the parties, witnesses, or attorneys; 3) to immediately tell the bailiff if anyone attempted to talk to them about the trial; and 4) to keep an open mind until they had heard all of the evidence, the closing arguments of counsel, and the court's final instructions. [¶28] The appellant contends that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did not ask the district court to question the jurors about any conversations that they may have overheard or to admonish the jury to disregard anything that it may have overheard. Yet, it is also the appellant's burden on appeal to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this alleged deficiency. The appellant asks us to presume that he was prejudiced based on the following principle: In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) (citations omitted). [15] [¶29] In order to implicate such a presumption, however, there must be some quantum of evidence indicating that an out-of-court communication or contact occurred and that it concerned the matter pending before the jury. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1998). It appears from our review of the record that the bailiff in the instant case was merely concerned that the potential for such contact existed, and did not indicate to the district court that she was aware of any inappropriate contact that had actually occurred. [16] We decline to presume prejudice under such speculative circumstances and the appellant does not allege that he was otherwise prejudiced in this regard. Accordingly, the appellant has not satisfied his burden with respect to this issue.