Opinion ID: 454769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory and Pre-Termination Claims

Text: 19 Title 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1738 (West 1966) requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (footnote omitted). 8 Section 1738 requires that we apply the state of Florida's rules of res judicata to determine what effect, if any, the state court's judgment affirming the CSC order has on this case. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82, 102 S.Ct. at 1897-98. 20 Under the doctrine of res judicata as applied in Florida, a judgment on the merits is conclusive as to all matters which were or could have been determined and will bar a subsequent action between the same parties on the same cause of action. Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla.1956); see Albrecht v. State, 444 So.2d 8, 12 (Fla.1984). 21 [S]everal conditions must occur simultaneously if a matter is to be made res judicata: identity of the thing sued for; identity of the cause of action; identity of parties; [and] identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made. 22 Albrecht, 444 So.2d at 12 (citing Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163, 169 (Fla.1953) and cases cited therein). 23 On review of the CSC order, the state district court denied Casines's petition for writ of certiorari. Casines contends that the state court's judgment amounts to a denial of discretionary review and was not, therefore, a judgment on the merits. Although we find that the state district court's judgment was on the merits, we also find that the conditions required for the application of res judicata are not present in this case. 24 Casines's state appellate court action named as defendants the CSC and the FPPC. The state action challenged the CSC's failure to award Casines backpay under Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 110.061. The issue before the state appellate court was whether section 110.061 required that the CSC award backpay to an employee who was dismissed without cause. The only federal constitutional claim presented to the state court was whether the CSC and the FPPC had denied Casines due process of law by failing to provide her a prompt post-termination hearing. Casines sought only backpay under the state statute. She did not and could not seek compensatory damages for any alleged federal constitutional violation in that forum. 25 This action is brought against individual officials within the former FPPC and the director of the DOC. In this section 1983 action, Casines challenges the constitutionality of Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 110.061, the appellants' failure to accord her a pre-termination hearing, and the appellants' refusal to reinstate her in accordance with the CSC order. Casines seeks backpay for the period between her dismissal and the CSC order, as well as backpay for the period during which the appellants refused to reinstate her, and damages. Casines could not have brought an action for compensatory damages against these individual appellants in the state administrative action. 26 We hold that the elements of res judicata are not present in this case. 9 The state court action and this section 1983 action lack identity of parties, identity of the cause of action, and identity of the thing sued for. See Albrecht, 444 So.2d at 12. 27 Casines's action challenging the constitutionality of Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 110.061 and the appellants' failure to accord her a pre-termination hearing is not barred under the doctrine of res judicata. This does not end our inquiry; we turn to the question of qualified immunity.
28 The district court ruled that the appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity because Casines's right to a pre-termination hearing was clearly established at the time of her discharge. Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901, 98 S.Ct. 3118, 57 L.Ed.2d 1144, on remand, 578 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir.1978). After trial on the issue of damages, however, the district court acknowledged that Weisbrod v. Donigan, 651 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.1981), had rejected the argument that a Florida state employee's right to a pre-termination hearing or prompt post-terminiation hearing was clearly established. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139, reh'g denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 26, 82 L.Ed.2d 919 (1984). Thus, as the court stated in Weisbrod, the appellants did not act in disregard of any well-settled constitutional rights. 651 F.2d at 336. Accordingly, the district court vacated that portion of its partial summary judgment order which was inconsistent with the Weisbrod holding. 29 The district court premised its denial of qualified immunity to the appellants upon a different ground. Relying upon Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 900 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126, 103 S.Ct. 762, 74 L.Ed.2d 977 (1983), the district court concluded that the appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had violated Casines's clearly established rights under Florida state law to be dismissed only upon a showing of cause. Casines urges us to uphold the district court's denial of qualified immunity because the appellants either knew or should have known that her off-duty conduct, under circumstances where she was under no legal duty to act, did not constitute cause for dismissal under section 110.061. Appellants argue that the district court's holding is erroneous because section 1983 protects only federal rights. 30 The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the proper standard for determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity when that official's conduct violates a state law as well as a provision of the federal Constitution. As in this case, the state officials in Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 reh'g denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 26, 82 L.Ed.2d 919 (1984), did not challenge the district court's holding that they had violated the plaintiff's rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Rather, the state officials argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because under Weisbrod, the plaintiff's rights were not clearly established at the time of his discharge. The plaintiff countered, and the district court agreed, that the state officials were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had acted contrary to a state administrative regulation which required that an employee be given an opportunity to respond in writing to the charges against him and that a complete investigation of the charges be conducted prior to his dismissal. 31 The Supreme Court concluded that under the plaintiff's argument, officials would be liable in indeterminate amount for violation of any constitutional right--one that was not clearly defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time of the alleged violation--merely because their official conduct also violated some statute or regulation. Davis, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3020, 82 L.Ed.2d at 150 (emphasis in original). Such a result was unacceptable because it 32 would disrupt the balance that our cases strike between the interest and vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and public officials' effective performance of their duties. The qualified immunity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate when their constitutional conduct may give rise to liability for damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. 33 Davis, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3020, 82 L.Ed.2d at 150 (citations omitted). 34 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded, [a] plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. Davis, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3021, 82 L.Ed.2d at 151. 35 Casines does not challenge the district court's finding that her federal due process rights were not clearly established at the time of her dismissal. Rather, she argues that appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct violated clearly established state law. The mere fact that Casines's state statutory rights were clearly established at the time of her dismissal is not, however, sufficient to deny appellants qualified immunity. As the Supreme Court made clear in Davis, officials lose their qualified immunity by violating clearly established statutory rights only where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for violation of those statutory rights. Davis, --- U.S. at ---- n. 12, 104 S.Ct. at 3020 n. 12, 82 L.Ed.2d at 149 n. 12. The official's violation of a state statute must either be actionable under section 1983, or state law must govern the constitutional analysis of what process is due the plaintiff under the fourteenth amendment. Davis, --- U.S. at ---- & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 3019 & n. 11, 82 L.Ed.2d at 149 & n. 11. Casines does not claim that Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 110.061 creates a cause of action for damages or that it provides a basis for a section 1983 action. Therefore, we hold that the violation of section 110.061 does not deprive appellants Murchek, Ware, Walden, and Abbey of qualified immunity. 10