Opinion ID: 4520638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cdta

Text: We consider first Hoit’s hostile work environment claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). The NYSHRL prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual “because of . . . sex . . . in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). To establish a hostile work environment claim against an employer, a plaintiff must show, first, that “the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2013) (for purposes of determining existence of hostile work environment, “[h]ostile work environment claims under both Title VII and the NYSHRL are governed by the same standard”). “Although isolated incidents ordinarily will not rise to the level of a hostile work environment, even a single incident of sufficient severity may so alter the terms and conditions of employment as to create such an environment.” Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 227 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Feingold, 366 F.3d at 150 (“[A] single act can create a hostile work environment if it in fact works a transformation of the plaintiff’s workplace.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the plaintiff must 6 show that the employer “encourage[ed], condon[ed], or approv[ed]” the sexually harassing conduct. Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 311 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hoit argues that the terms and conditions of his employment were altered “when he was forcibly pinned to the ground, dry-humped by his co-worker, and tea-bagged by his supervisor.” Appellant Br. 38. He does not contend that the CDTA failed to respond appropriately to the Incident but, rather, that the CDTA should be held liable because it “knew or should have known about the sexually explicit environment that permeated the CDTA workplace” leading up to the Incident. Id. at 23. Even assuming the Incident altered the terms and conditions of Hoit’s employment, his hostile work environment claim fails because the evidence of preIncident misconduct does not provide a basis for concluding that the CDTA encouraged, condoned, or approved the kind of conduct that Hoit suffered during the Incident. Nothing like the Incident had ever happened to Hoit before at the CDTA. Nor does Hoit claim to have ever observed such conduct prior to the Incident. Instead, he relies largely on rumors about Baez and Clanton and on observations of conduct less serious than the Incident. See, e.g., J. App. 1023–25, 1036–1038 (Hoit heard that Baez dry humped someone else and routinely exposed 7 his penis on the job); id. at 1138–42 (Mancini heard rumors that Baez inappropriately exposed his penis); id. at 669 (Clanton heard rumors about Baez engaging in “sexual harassment stuff” but did not know any details); id. at 914 (Another mechanic heard through “[s]hop talk” that Baez exposed himself at work); id. at 415–16 (Baez testified that he heard rumors that Clanton had dry humped another employee before Hoit); id. at 1575 (One CDTA employee regarded Clanton as “one of the most inappropriate people at CDTA”: “[s]macking people on the butt, grabbing people, throwing them to the ground, horsing around, fake wrestling with guys, knocking tools off your box and things of that nature”). There is, moreover, no evidence that the CDTA received any complaints about such conduct except for one harassment complaint against Baez in 2009, to which the CDTA responded appropriately. 3 Even if the CDTA was aware of all the other conduct, we cannot conclude that the CDTA should have acted upon it as gender-based discrimination in the absence of complaint. Cf. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 321 (2d Cir. 2015) (For sexually hostile work environment to exist, “the victim must subjectively perceive the work 3 The complaint alleged that Baez showed pornography to the complaining employee while at work. In response, Baez was counseled regarding appropriate use of the Internet, issued a written warning, and enrolled in a course for “Management Skills for First-Time Supervisors.” J. App. 254. 8 environment to be abusive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (cautioning courts not to “mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace—such as male-on-male horseplay . . .—for discriminatory ‘conditions of employment’” and emphasizing “the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target”). Hoit also challenges the dismissal of his § 1983 claim alleging that the CDTA violated the Fourteenth Amendment by implementing policies or practices that caused the sexual harassment or by failing to implement or enforce policies or practices to prevent or remedy it. We affirm dismissal of this claim for substantially the same reasons discussed above. See Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 744 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Section 1983 sexual harassment claims that are based on a ‘hostile environment’ theory . . . are governed by traditional Title VII ‘hostile environment’ jurisprudence.”). We note, too, that the CDTA had a harassment prevention policy and annual training for employees addressing discrimination and harassment in the workplace.4 4Our analysis with regard to the CDTA also forecloses Hoit’s § 1983 claims against Basile, Wacksman, and Zarcone, who were not directly involved in the Incident and therefore could only be held liable under a policy/practice theory or for failing to remedy a known violation. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013). 9 Finally, Hoit argues that the District Court should have directly imputed liability to the CDTA because the conduct at issue was engaged in by supervisors. It is true, under Title VII, that an employer can be held strictly liable for the discriminatory conduct of a supervisor if the supervisor’s conduct culminates in a tangible employment action. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). But Hoit does not assert a Title VII claim here, and the strict liability rule does not apply in the NYSHRL context or the § 1983 context. See State Div. of Human Rights on Complaint of Greene v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 684, 687 (1985) (“An employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“[L]ocal governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the CDTA cannot be held liable merely because Baez and Mancini were supervisors.