Opinion ID: 2522805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Denial of Agostini's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: As indicated above, the jury in the present case, to the extent pertinent to this appeal, found Agostini liable to Manganiello for malicious prosecution and found that Agostini misrepresented the evidence to the prosecutors, or failed to provide the prosecutor with material evidence or information, or gave testimony to the Grand Jury that was false or contained material omissions, and ... knew that he ... was making a material misrepresentation or omission or giving false testimony (Verdict Sheet ¶ 2 (emphasis in original)). The jury found Manganiello entitled to compensatory damages totaling $1,426,261. Although the jury found that Abate was responsible for 10 percent of that amount, the district court ruled that Abate was entitled to qualified immunity because the jury found that he either had not made false statements or misrepresentations, etc., or, if he had, that he had not done so knowingly. The court also ruled that, in light of the joint and several liability imposed on joint tortfeasors, Agostini is liable to Manganiello for the entire $1,426,261. In connection with its initial verdict, the jury was also asked to decide whether punitive damages were appropriate, although not to determine an amount. It responded affirmatively. After Abate was dismissed from the case on the ground of qualified immunity, the jury was reconvened and heard argument on the question of the amount of punitive damages Agostini (in his individual capacity) should pay. It determined that that amount was $75,000. Following the jury's initial verdict, Agostini had moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing principally that one element of a claim of malicious prosecution is that probable cause for the prosecution was lacking; that a grand jury indictment creates a presumption that probable cause existed; and that Manganiello failed to present evidence of fraud, perjury, or other misconduct on the part of Agostini that could demonstrate that the grand jury's indictment was the result of bad-faith police conduct sufficient to rebut that presumption. Agostini also argued that Manganiello failed to present sufficient evidence of two other elements of a malicious prosecution claim, i.e., that Agostini was responsible for the initiation of the criminal case or that he had acted with malice. Alternatively, Agostini sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity. In an exhaustive discussion in Manganiello II, thoroughly annotated with citations to the trial transcript, the district court rejected each of Agostini's contentions and denied the motion. Based principally on the evidence described in Part I.A. above, the court found that Manganiello provided enough evidence at trial that a reasonable juror could conclude that Agostini ... failed to make a complete and full statement of facts to the District Attorney, misrepresented or falsified evidence, withheld evidence or otherwise acted in bad faith. Manganiello II, 2008 WL 5159776, at  (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that the jury reasonably found that Manganiello had successfully rebutted the presumption of probable cause that was created by the grand jury indictment. Id. at . The district court ruled that that evidence was also sufficient to permit the jury to find that probable cause was actually lacking. The court found that there was likewise sufficient evidence of the other elements of a malicious prosecution claim. It found that there was enough evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that Agostini commenced or initiated the criminal prosecution because he provided the District Attorney's office with all the information that led to the authorization for Manganiello's arrest and signed the felony complaint. Id. at . As to malice, the court noted that `[m]alice may be shown by proving that the prosecution complained of was undertaken from improper or wrongful motives, or in reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff,' id. at  (quoting Pinsky v. Duncan, 79 F.3d 306, 313 (2d Cir.1996)). It found that the jury could have found malice on the part of Agostini from the lack of probable cause, see Manganiello II, 2008 WL 5159776, at , as well as from Agostini's harsh treatment of Manganiello at the time of his initial arrest and Agostini's evident pique at being instructed to release Manganiello at that time, see id. at -. With respect to Agostini's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ground of qualified immunity, the district court again noted the jury's findings that Agostini had misrepresented the evidence to prosecutors, or had withheld material evidence or information from the prosecutor, or had given testimony to the grand jury that was false or materially misleading  and knew that he was making a material misrepresentation or omission or giving false testimony, Manganiello II, 2008 WL 5159776, at  (emphasis in original). The court concluded that, in light of these facts, it would not have been objectively reasonable for Agostini to believe that his actions or omissions did not violate Manganiello's clearly established constitutional rights. Put another way, there could be no disagreement among officers of reasonable competence that [Agostini's] conduct was unlawful. Id. Agostini also moved, in the alternative, for a new trial on various grounds. As discussed in Part III below, the district court denied that motion as well. On appeal, Agostini pursues his contentions that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the grounds of qualified immunity or insufficient evidence to prove the claim of malicious prosecution, and, alternatively, that he is entitled to a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we find none of his contentions persuasive.