Opinion ID: 2598484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dr simon's post-deposition affidavit

Text: Dr. Simon was deposed in January 2000. In mid-April 2000, he prepared an affidavit on the subject of the time he spent in professional pursuits. After it was filed in the district court, defendants sought to have the affidavit stricken on the ground that it contradicted Simon's deposition testimony. The district court agreed: Dr. Simon's affidavit in direct contravention of his deposition testimony should be and is stricken. Although Dr. Simon's affidavit states he is a full time clinical psychiatrist, this does not mean his time is spent `full time' on actual clinical practice as defined by Kansas law. Dawson's principal contention is that an affidavit is an appropriate means for supplementing deposition testimony, and that Simon's affidavit was intended to supplement and clarify his deposition testimony rather than contradict it. Examination of the affidavit reveals very limited references to Simon's activities during the period 1993 to 1995. The two affidavit statements specific to the relevant period assert that Simon devoted more than 50% of his professional time in 1993 to 1995 to actual clinical practice: During the two years prior to the events involved in this lawsuit, my clinical practice accounted for more than fifty percent of my professional time as well. During the two years preceding the events in this lawsuit, I had a greater outpatient load and more inpatients. My clinical practice during those two years exceeded fifty percent (50%) of my professional time. Simon's deposition testimony that he spent less than half his professional time in actual clinical practice during the 1993 to 1995 period seems to be contradicted by the affidavit. The inquiry, however, does not end there because Dawson contends that defendants' counsel's overly narrow definition of actual clinical practice accounts for the difference. Hence, it logically ought to follow that application of a proper definition of actual clinical practice will reconcile the estimated percentages of Simon's deposition and affidavit. In an effort to explain why his estimates varied, Simon averred: During the deposition of me taken on January 28th, 2000, Defense counsel defined `clinical practice' as `patient care' and `outpatient care.' He asked repeatedly if I spent less than half of my professional time in `clinical practice' as he defined it. Taking into account only the outpatient care and group therapy I conduct, as I was required to do under the questions he posed, then I appropriately answered that I spent less than fifty percent of my time in clinical practice. However, defense counsel ignored my testimony concerning other areas of clinical practice in which I am engaged including governmental evaluations, emergency room duties, increased hours when patients are admitted, clinical supervision at Suburban Hospital, case consultation and suicidality assessment at Suburban Hospital, consultation with other providers and students regarding patient care, grand rounds, and clinical classes I teach to Georgetown students. In his affidavit, particularly in paragraph 10, Simon perpetuates the failure of the deposition questions and answers to distinguish between January 2000 and 1993 to 1995 activities. Examination of his deposition shows that the items Simon listed in paragraph 10 of the affidavit have little bearing on the percentage of time he devoted to actual clinical practice during the period 1993 to 1995, insofar as can be ascertained: governmental evaluations  no mention for 1993 to 1995 emergency room duties  not taking emergency room call in 1993 to 1995 admitting patients  admitting patients from the emergency room was part of his responsibility as the on-call doctor for the department of psychiatry, he was not taking emergency room on-call duty in 1993 to 1995 clinical supervision at Suburban; and case consultation and assessment at Suburban  time spent in these activities in 1993 to 1995 was less than in 2000. Estimated time Simon spent in those activities in 2000 appears to be approximately 2 hours per month. Hence, less than 2 hours per month. consultation with other providers and students regarding patient care  no mention for 1993 to 1995 clinical grand rounds  no mention clinical classes taught at Georgetown  sporadic, one hour per week for eight weeks; no mention for 1993 to 1995 In summary, from what we can learn from the affidavit, approximately a quarter of an hour per week was all the time that was not taken into account in Dr. Simon's deposition estimate that he spent 30-40% of his working hours in actual clinical practice during the period of 1993 to 1995. An additional quarter of an hour does not significantly increase the percentage of a 50- to 67-hour workweek. The reasons offered by Simon in paragraph 10 of his affidavit for increasing his estimation of the percentage do not support the change. Thus, his attempt to reconcile his deposition and affidavit percentages fails. What remains to be considered are paragraphs 3 and 9 of the affidavit in which Dr. Simon estimated that he spent more than 50% of his professional time in actual clinical practice during the period 1993 to 1995. His averments in the affidavit contradict his deposition testimony, where Dr. Simon estimated he devoted 30-40% of his professional time to actual clinical practice during that period. Dawson's fallback position is that she can resist summary judgment through the use of Simon's affidavit even though it is at odds with his earlier deposition. She relies on Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348 (1983), and purports to quote from Mays. In fact, the principle quoted by Dawson was quoted in Mays, 233 Kan. at 46, from Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980), which the court distinguished as involving a clarifying rather than a contradictory affidavit. 233 Kan. at 45-46. The affidavits in Mays contradicted the prior deposition testimony and, like the affidavit in the present case, were filed in direct response to the filing of summary judgment motions. 233 Kan. at 46-47. In those circumstances, the court concluded that the trial court properly struck the disputed affidavits. 233 Kan. at 47. Mays governs the present case and requires the trial court's striking of Dr. Simon's affidavit to be affirmed.