Opinion ID: 2597489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Does the DOC's rehearing of the infraction violate principles of double jeopardy?

Text: The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution states that no person shall be subject to the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. Amend. V. Similarly, article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution provides that [n]o person shall be ... twice put in jeopardy of the same offense. The federal and state double jeopardy clauses afford the same scope of protection. In re Pers. Restraint of Percer, 150 Wash.2d 41, 49, 75 P.3d 488 (2003); In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 142 Wash.2d 165, 12 P.3d 603 (2000). However, double jeopardy does not apply to the type of proceeding at issue in the present case. The term `jeopardy' ... signifies the danger of conviction and punishment which the defendant in a criminal prosecution incurs when he is put on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction under an indictment sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. State v. Williams, 57 Wash.2d 231, 232, 356 P.2d 99 (1960) (emphasis added). Prison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions or judicial proceedings but are civil and remedial in nature. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); State v. Williams, 57 Wash.2d at 232, 356 P.2d 99; Goulsby, 120 Wash.App. at 229, 84 P.3d 922 (citing Turner v. Johnson, 46 F.Supp.2d 655, 666-67 (S.D.Tex.1999); Gorman v. Moody, 710 F.Supp. 1256, 1266 (N.D.Ind.1989)). The double jeopardy clause is limited to criminal prosecutions. Thus, we hold that the DOC's rehearing of petitioner's disciplinary infraction hearing does not violate double jeopardy. In addition to the distinction between the nature of prison and criminal proceedings, prisoners are not entitled to the same due process rights as defendants in criminal trials. See In re Pers. Restraint of Reismiller, 101 Wash.2d 291, 294, 678 P.2d 323 (1984) (citing to Dawson v. Hearing Comm., 92 Wash.2d 391, 597 P.2d 1353 (1979)). A prisoner has a protected liberty interest in earning good time credit, Leland, 115 Wash.App. at 534, 61 P.3d 357 (citing to In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist, 138 Wash.2d 388, 397, 978 P.2d 1083 (1999)). But, as explained by the United States Supreme Court, one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison. McDonnell, 418 U.S at 560, 94 S.Ct. 2963. In contrast to a criminal prosecution, where the fundamental priority is to ensure due process, the fundamental priority in a prison setting is to maintain the peace. The reason for this difference is that [p]rison disciplinary proceedings ... take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so.... The reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those who would charge or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal antagonism on the important aims of the correctional process. Id. at 561-62, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The fact that prisoners are accorded rights different from those given to criminal defendants does not mean that prisoners have no due process rights available to them. Rather, when prisoners are subject to discipline for serious misconduct that may deprive them of liberty interests, they still must be afforded a minimum amount of procedural safeguards. Dawson, 92 Wash.2d at 397, 597 P.2d 1353. For instance, in the present case, petitioner was entitled to notice of the alleged violation and, if relevant and not unduly hazardous, a right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. See WAC 137-28-290(2). However, prisoners are not ... entitled to the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding, but rather such process as is appropriate in the circumstances. In re Young, 95 Wash.2d at 220, 622 P.2d 373. For example, in the present case, petitioner's due process rights did not include the right of confrontation and cross-examination. WAC 137-28-290(3). Also, only under certain circumstances did petitioner have a right to have a staff advisor assist him in his representation. WAC 137-28-280(2)(e). Accordingly, as long as all of petitioner's minimum due process protections were observed in the second proceeding, the decision by the DOC to rehear petitioner's infraction while a PRP is still pending does not, in itself, violate the prisoner's due process rights. Additionally, petitioner fails to cite to any authority to support his claim that the DOC is precluded from rehearing an infraction when there was insufficient evidence at the first hearing. Case law exists that is to the contrary. See Broussard v. Johnson, 253 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence in prison proceeding was insufficient to support charge and that the Texas Department of Corrections could provide Broussard with a new, constitutionally adequate hearing within ninety days); Gorman v. Moody, 710 F.Supp. 1256, 1266 (N.D.Ind.1989) (holding that Indiana's conduct adjustment board's decision to rehear a prison infraction was proper despite petitioner having been found not guilty in the first proceeding); Moore v. State, 481 So.2d 914, 916 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) (holding that a second administrative proceeding did not place prisoner in double jeopardy even though the disciplinary committee rendered a verdict of not guilty in the first proceeding). Finally, public policy dictates a prompt correction of any errors in DOC prison proceedings. Under petitioner's argument, however, some prisoners would be deprived of timely rehearings of their lost good time credit if the DOC were required to wait until their pending PRPs were decided by the appellate courts. Consequently, these prisoners may end up staying incarcerated longer than they would have been required to had the DOC conducted an immediate rehearing. In the present case, for example, petitioner received a prompt remedy. Upon notification of alleged violations in petitioner's first hearing, the DOC responded by expunging the record, thereby temporarily restoring petitioner's good time credit. The DOC then proceeded to hold a new hearing in hopes of rectifying any alleged errors it may have committed in the first proceeding. Petitioner further contends that public policy does not support allowing the DOC to rehear an infraction while a PRP is pending. He asserts that the DOC has no incentive to conduct a fair proceeding if it is allowed to rehear the case every time a mistake is alleged. Petitioner argues that the DOC can continue to expunge his record and hold multiple rehearings while, at the same time, repeating the errors of the earlier proceedings. We decline to presume such bad faith in the DOC. In the event that petitioner believes that the rehearing was still fundamentally unfair, he is not without remedy. Petitioner is free to file another PRP challenging the result of this second hearing.