Opinion ID: 201935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for an Instruction on the Abandonment or Renunciation Defense

Text: 23 We review a properly preserved objection to the failure to give a requested jury instruction de novo. Sanchez-Lopez v. Fuentes-Pujols, 375 F.3d 121, 133 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir.2002)). Such a refusal constitutes reversible error only if it was prejudicial in light of the entire record. Id. at 133. If the proffered instruction misstates the applicable law, it cannot be accepted. See United States v. Montanez, 105 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir.1997) ([A] defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense if sufficient evidence is produced at trial to support the defense and the proposed instruction correctly describes the applicable law.). 24 At trial, the defense theory was that Buttrick had never formed an intent to engage in illicit sexual contact, that he was merely a victim of his own curiosity. Nonetheless, at the close of trial, Buttrick requested an instruction 1 based on Model Penal Code § 5.01(4), which defines renunciation as an affirmative defense to attempt crimes. For shorthand we refer to the defense as one of abandonment. 25 The rationale in the Model Penal Code for recognizing such a defense to attempt crimes is said to be twofold: First, allowance of the defense recognizes that the actor's conduct no longer poses a danger to society. Second, the availability of the defense provides actors with a `motive for desisting from their criminal designs, thereby diminishing the risk that the substantive crime will be committed.' United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Model Penal Code § 5.01(4) cmt. 8 (Official Draft 1985)). 26 The district court rejected defendant's request for an abandonment instruction on a number of grounds. One of those grounds — that Buttrick's proposed instruction was not a correct statement of the applicable law — suffices to affirm. 27 Buttrick admits that the Model Penal Code defense by its terms applies to attempt crimes. 2 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (attempt to escape from custody); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (attempt to possess cocaine for resale). He relies on cases that he claims recognize the defense of abandonment or renunciation of an attempt crime. See United States v. Doyon, 194 F.3d 207, 212 (1st Cir.1999); United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Bailey, 834 F.2d 218, 227 (1st Cir.1987). These cases do not hold that the affirmative defense of abandonment is, in fact, available, but merely assume so arguendo. The government, in turn, relies on cases that explicitly reject the abandonment defense in attempt crimes. See, e.g., Shelton, 30 F.3d at 706. This circuit has reserved the question of the availability of the defense in attempt crimes, see Bailey, 834 F.2d at 227 & n. 7, and, despite the battle waged in this case using the proxy of attempt crimes, we still reserve the question. 28 It is unnecessary to address the argument to resolve the case. We expressly do not reach the questions of (1) whether the Model Penal Code defense of abandonment is ever available for an attempt crime, and (2) whether, if the answer to the first question were yes, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) is sufficiently like an attempt crime that such an affirmative defense could in theory be applicable. 29 The district court, assuming arguendo that the law on the two points above could be read in defendant's favor, nonetheless rejected the proposed instruction on the ground that it misstated the law by misallocating the burden of proof. The proposed instruction placed the burden on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Buttrick's] renunciation or abandonment of the crime was not voluntary or complete. 30 The district court gave three reasons for its conclusion. First, the court noted that while the Model Penal Code appeared to place the burden of persuasion on the government on the defense of renunciation, see Model Penal Code § 5.01(4) cmt. 8, at 358-59, 361 (Official Draft 1985), that allocation of burdens had not generally been accepted by the states, see id. at 361 & n. 282 (citing state statutes and proposals). 31 Second, the court pointed out that the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 2423, itself defined an affirmative defense to certain conduct criminalized by the statute. In that affirmative defense, set forth at § 2423(g), Congress placed the burdens of both production and persuasion on the defendant: 32 Defense. In a prosecution under this section based on illicit sexual conduct as defined in subsection(f)(2), it is a defense, which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant reasonably believed that the person with whom the defendant engaged in the commercial sex act had attained the age of 18 years. 33 18 U.S.C. § 2423(g). It would be, the court reasoned, inconsistent to alter this allocation of burdens for an affirmative defense not even recognized by the statute. 34 Lastly, the court reasoned that the allocation of burdens in the proposed instruction was inconsistent with United States v. Hartsock, 347 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2003). Following Hartsock's rule of examining both the particular crime and the particular defense to determine who has the burden of persuasion on an affirmative defense, see id. at 8-9, the district court held that the burden of proof should be on the defendant with respect to this affirmative defense instruction. 35 The court noted that the defendant's premise was that even if all of the elements of the crime had been committed — he had crossed the state line with the purpose to engage in sex with a minor — he could nonetheless be found not guilty because he had abandoned that intent by the time he was stopped by the police. 3 Accepting arguendo the premise that an abandonment offense could lie, the district court held that the defendant is more likely than the prosecution to be in possession of the information necessary to establish the defense, and so the defendant should bear the burdens of both production and persuasion. Accordingly, the court concluded that under Hartsock, Buttrick's proposed instruction incorrectly placed the burden of persuasion for the affirmative defense on the government. 4 36 The district court notified defense counsel of this problem in the proposed instruction and gave counsel a chance to propose a revised instruction that would place the burden of proof back onto the defendant. Counsel declined to do so. 37 We agree with the district court's analysis that the proposed instruction was simply wrong as to the allocation of burdens of this assumed defense under 18 U.S.C. § 2423, even indulging every preliminary assumption in defendant's favor. There is no need to add to the district court's thoughtful analysis of the problem.