Opinion ID: 1855302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying mr. humphrey's motion to exclude jury consideration of the death penalty after the state rested its case in chief due to insufficient proof

Text: ¶ 39. Humphrey made a motion to exclude jury consideration of the death penalty because the State failed to establish that he had intended to kill Mrs. Phillips. The State asserts that this assignment of error is not properly before this Court in view of the fact that the jury did nor return a sentence of death against Humphrey. The asserts in the alternative that, even if the issue were properly before this Court the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the criteria established in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (which have been codified in Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) (1994)). Where the jury is given an instruction which allegedly invites the death sentence, yet that instruction did not result in causing the jury to render such a verdict, the verdict will not be disturbed. Gilliam v. State, 186 Miss. 884, 192 So. 440 (1939). In this case the death sentence was more than invited, it was affirmatively requested, and the trial court correctly held a hearing outside of the presence of a jury to consider the Enmund factors pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (1994) to determine whether the State had met these factors. ¶ 40. The Enmund factors to be considered are whether the jury makes a written finding of one or more of the following: (a) The defendant actually killed; (b) The defendant attempted to kill; (c) The defendant intended that a killing take place; (d) The defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) (1994). ¶ 41. The jury heard testimony from Reggie Brooks that Humphrey told him I've killed and I'll kill again. There was an evidentiary basis for the first Enmund factor for the jury to make the determination that Humphrey killed. The jury saw pictures of the victim and heard the testimony of the pathologist, showing extensive trauma, how she was tied up, and how her mouth was taped. This is an evidentiary basis from which the jury could conclude that the defendant could have intended that Mrs. Phillips be killed or that the defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed. After considering all of these factors together the trial judge stated the following: And, again, the jury does notis not required to find all three of these Enmund factors. All the jury has to do is find that one or more of the Enmund factors existed. There's an evidentiary basis here for the jury to consider all three requirements of Enmund v. Florida and if there's sufficient evidence to undergird the jury's findings should they make it. I think the State has done what has been required to make a jury question out of the Enmund factors. ¶ 42. The State was only required to show one of the Enmund factors in order for the question of the death penalty to go before the jury. The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim requires this Court to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn in the light most consistent with the verdict. This Court has no authority to disturb the jury verdict short of a conclusion on our part that upon the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no rational trier of fact could have found the fact at issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1259 (Miss.1995). With the State's evidence taken as true, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the record does not suggest that the trial court was in error to allow the jury to consider the question of whether Humphrey should face the death penalty, and the consideration of the death penalty by the jury did not impinge on Humphrey's right to a fair trial under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.