Opinion ID: 1709139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: apportionment of medical services and supplies

Text: The commission correctly ordered appellees to pay the entire cost of medical services and supplies under section 7 of the act. Miss. Laws 1948, ch. 354, § 7; Miss. Laws 1950, ch. 412, § 5; Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-08 (1952). Agreeing with the majority on this point, I would suggest several other factors supporting that conclusion. Section 4 states that where a preexisting disease is shown to be a material contributing factor in the results following injury, the compensation which, but for this paragraph, would be payable shall be reduced by that proportion... . (Emphasis added.) The question is, what is meant by compensation which would be payable? Code section 6998-02 (10) contains this definition: `Compensation' means the money allowable (allowance) payable to an injured worker or his dependents as provided for in this act, and includes funeral benefits provided therein. The last amendment of this section uses the word allowable in place of allowance, which latter word was in the definition prior to the 1960 amendment. Miss. Laws 1960, ch. 276, § 1. Allowable appears to be an erroneous transcription of the correct allowance, and even if not, does not affect the meaning of the definition. Section 4 applies only to compensation which otherwise would be payable. That is defined as the money allowance payable to an injured worker. This rather  unusual phrase evidences a legislative intent of a particular type: Apportionable compensation refers to the specific weekly money payments, which are paid directly to the worker or his dependents, being a maximum of $35 per week. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 6998-09, 6998-11, 6998-12, 6998-13 (1952). These payments are made directly to the worker, or, as stated in section 6998-19, directly to the person entitled thereto, without an award, except where controverted. They are in contrast to medical services and supplies under section 7. It does not provide for any money allowance payable to the worker, but requires the employer to furnish medical, surgical and other treatment for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require. The word compensation is used only twice in section 7, where it is stated that, if the employee unreasonably refuses to submit to medical treatment, the commission must suspend payment of further compensation during such time as the refusal continues, and no compensation shall be paid during such suspension. Section 7 thus contrasts compensation with medical treatment, and considers them separate and distinct factors. Moreover, under section 7 payments of medical bills are directed to the doctor and the hospital, but cannot be paid until all forms required by the commission have been filed. In short, the apportionment act applies to the regular weekly payments of compensation payable to the injured worker or his dependents. Such weekly payments, and the furnishing of medical services and supplies, are in different categories, and are distinguishable. When these several provisions are considered together and then contrasted, they reflect a legislative intent to exclude the furnishing of medical services and supplies from the apportionment act. See Shanahan, Amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act 1956-58, 30 Miss. L.J. 105, 109 (1959).  Cross-appellants rely upon Graeber Bros. v. Taylor, 237 Miss. 691, 115 So.2d 735, suggestion of error overruled, 237 Miss. 691, 117 So.2d 469 (1959), and two related cases. Gibbs v. Bass, 237 Miss. 823, 116 So.2d 542 (1959); Trehern v. Grafe Auto Co., 232 Miss. 854, 100 So.2d 687 (1958). In Graeber payment of medical expenses by the insurance carrier and employer was held to toll the one-year statute of limitations, which provides for reopening a claim at any time within one year after date of the last payment of compensation. Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-27 (1952). This is the general rule on this particular point. 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.43 (b) (1961). Graeber stated that furnishing medical treatment constitutes the equivalent of payment of compensation, and is indicative of the recognition of liability. The opinion on suggestion of error carefully limited the holding to that point. The payment of medical benefits was sufficiently analogous or equivalent to compensation as to result in tolling the statute. Graeber recognized the plain fact that a contrary rule would mislead many injured employees, and would not accomplish the legislative purpose to bar any further claim after no benefits of any kind have been actually received for one year. That limited holding does not answer or control the present question. Idaho cases apportioning medical benefits are based upon statutes of different terminology and application. Lindskog v. Rosebud Mines, Inc., 84 Idaho 160, 369 P.2d 580 (1962); Harris v. Bechtel Corp., 74 Idaho 308, 261 P.2d 818 (1953). Gillespie, Jones, and Brady, JJ., concur in this opinion.