Opinion ID: 76942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exclusion of law enforcement officers from the grand and petit jury pools

Text: 47 The 1968 Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1863, requires each U.S. District Court to devise and place into operation a written plan for random selection of grand and petit jurors that shall be designed to achieve the objectives of [the Act]. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (2005). The Act also requires the plan to bar 48 members of the fire or police departments of any State, the District of Columbia, any territory or possession of the United States, or any subdivision of a State, the District of Columbia, or such territory or possession ... public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Government of the United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, any territory or possession of the United States, or any subdivision of a State, the District of Columbia, or such territory or possession, who are actively engaged in the performance of official duties. 49 Id. § 1863(b)(6) (2005). 50 On the other hand, a criminal defendant enjoys a Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial, which includes a right to the presence of a fair cross-section of the community on venire panels, or lists from which grand and petit juries are drawn. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-29, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) (petit jury); United States v. Terry, 60 F.3d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir.1995) (grand and petit juries). To show a prima facie violation of this right, a defendant must prove: 51 (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; 52 (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 53 (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 54 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Terry, 60 F.3d at 1544. The state may rebut a prima facie showing that its exemption or qualification violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights if it may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the community, and that a significant state interest is manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process ... that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68, 99 S.Ct. 664. This Circuit has held that the exclusion of jurors to the extent 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) requires is constitutional, reasoning that even if a defendant could prove that a plan under § 1863(b)(6) established a prima facie violation, the state could rebut that prima facie case under the Duren standard. Terry, 60 F.3d at 1543-44. 55 The Middle District of Florida adopted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) in their entirety in its Plan for the Qualification and Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors (Jury Plan). However, the Middle District's Juror Questionnaire Form exempts federal law enforcement officers, a group that the Jury Plan and § 1863(b)(6) do not exempt. Moreover, it is undisputed that the pattern and practice in the Middle District of Florida is to exempt anyone with arrest powers, including part-time law enforcement officers and even private law enforcement officers. In support of his Sixth Amendment argument at trial, Henderson indicates that at least 0.55% of the estimated eligible juror pool in the Ft. Myers Division of the Middle District is exempt as law enforcement officers. 56 Although the exemption here is somewhat broader than the exemption considered in Terry, we believe that it is still constitutional, even assuming that Henderson can show a prima facie Sixth Amendment violation. The Middle District's exemption does not reach much further than the exemption in Terry. Even relying on Henderson's figures, federal, part-time, and private law enforcement officers would only compose a fraction of the 0.55% of eligible jurors in the pool. It thus may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the community. Moreover, a significant state interest is manifestly and primarily advanced by this somewhat broader exemption, particularly with respect to federal law enforcement officers. The exemption of individuals in part-time and private law enforcement also manifestly and primarily advances the same significant state interest of allowing police officers to perform their duties without the interruption of jury service, although not to the same extent. Thus, the Middle District's Jury Plan did not violate Henderson's constitutional rights. 57 Nor can Henderson prevail on his statutory argument that the Jury Plan exceeds the scope of the Act. A criminal defendant must show more than a technical violation of the Act to obtain relief. United States v. Tuttle, 729 F.2d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 968, 83 L.Ed.2d 972 (1985). Rather, he must show a substantial failure to comply with its provisions, which means the violation must have a significant impact on the composition of an average jury. Id. We have held that underrepresentation by an average of 1.4 persons on a 23-person jury panel does not constitute a sufficiently significant impact. United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857, 96 S.Ct. 109, 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975). Similarly, United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov.1981), 8 held that underrepresentation by two persons per 23-juror pool did not meet this standard. Id. at 443. And in Tuttle, underrepresentation of an average of 0.96 jurors from a 12-person pool was held insufficient. 729 F.2d at 1328-29. Since Henderson's figures state that law enforcement officers as a whole compose only 0.55% of the population in the division, the additional sweep of the Jury Plan in this case excludes, on average, less than one juror per 23-person panel. This does not constitute a significant enough impact on the composition of an average jury to violate the Act.