Opinion ID: 76586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Questioning of Juror Bonilla

Text: 17 Second, Polar argues that the district court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a jury of his peers by singling out the allegedly uncooperative juror, Juror Bonilla, for questioning and by giving him what Polar characterizes as an unduly coercive Allen charge. 18 To the extent that Polar is challenging the district court's one-on-one questioning of Juror Bonilla to investigate alleged juror misconduct, the district court's action is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Prosperi, 201 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir.2000). Here, the district court had adequate reason to question Juror Bonilla in order to investigate potential misconduct. Under Rule 23(b), [a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties, if the court finds good cause to excuse a juror. Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b)(3). Just cause exists to dismiss a juror when that juror refuses to apply the law or to follow the court's instructions. United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813, 123 S.Ct. 74, 154 L.Ed.2d 16 (2002). 19 The jurors here sent the district court three separate notes complaining of an uncooperative juror. The third and final note requested that the judge dismiss the juror, who was refusing to vote and had indicated a bias against the government and the criminal justice system. The government, in turn, had moved the district court to excuse him, pursuant to Rule 23(b). Under the circumstances, the district court's one-on-one interview of Juror Bonilla was not only appropriate, but was even necessary so as to avoid premature or unjustified dismissal. Id. (Because of the danger that a dissenting juror might be excused under the mistaken view that the juror is engaging in impermissible nullification, a juror should be excused only when the district court satisfies itself, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no substantial possibility exists that the juror is basing his or her decision on the sufficiency of the evidence.). We conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in making necessary inquiry to determine whether there was sufficient cause to dismiss Juror Bonilla under Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b). 20 Polar also attempts to characterize the district court's exchange with Juror Bonilla as an unduly coercive Allen charge. An  Allen charge is a trial court's admonition to a deadlocked jury, instructing it to make further attempts to reach a verdict. See United States v. Brokemond, 959 F.2d 206, 208 n. 2 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)). The district court's dialogue with Juror Bonilla, however, was not an Allen charge — and thus need not be scrutinized as one. Polar's Allen charge objections are directed at the following exchange between the district court and Juror Bonilla: 21 THE COURT: Will you follow the law, all of the law that I have instructed you on? You recall I told you and all the jurors that, I'll read it to you, you must make your decision on the basis of testimony and other evidence presented here during the trial. You must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy or prejudice for or against the defendant or the Government. You must also follow the law as I explain it to you. Whether you agree with the law or not you must follow all of my instructions as a whole. You may not single out or disregard any of the Court's instructions on the law. Are you willing to go back and deliberate and follow the Court's instructions on the law? 22 JUROR BONILLA: Yes, Your Honor. 23 R4 at 13-14. 24 The district court, far from admonishing a deadlocked jury to make further efforts to reach a verdict, was making inquiry in response to allegations that Juror Bonilla would not follow the law or the court's instructions. And, to the extent that the district court gave him any admonition, it was merely to follow the court's previous instructions, to base his decision on the testimony and evidence and not on sympathy or prejudice, and to follow the law, whether or not he agreed with it. 25 To the extent that the dialogue between the district court and Juror Bonilla contained supplemental instructions, we do not find any error. The applicable standard of review is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the district court's instructions were coercive and whether this coercion so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. See Brokemond, 959 F.2d at 208 (citation omitted). 26 Nothing in the district court's questioning and instructions suggested that a particular outcome was either desired or required, nor was it inherently coercive. See Prosperi, 201 F.3d at 1341 (concluding that the trial court's instruction to please continue to deliberate on certain counts was not coercive). The district court, after questioning Juror Bonilla's willingness to apply the law in unbiased fashion, reiterated a portion of its original instructions to the entire jury. 5 Far from coercing a guilty verdict, the district court specifically told him that he must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy or prejudice for or against the defendant or the Government. R4 at 14. Therefore, we conclude that the district court's interview with Juror Bonilla did not violate Polar's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 27