Opinion ID: 70729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The June Trial

Text: 3 At the first trial, the complaining witness on Count One, Elizabeth McNeeley, testified that on October 26, 1992, Venson invited her into his office after class was dismissed and hugged her in a way that made her feel uncomfortable. The state also introduced the testimony of three other witnesses in support of Count One. Laura Sloan, McNeeley's friend, and Kelly Smith, McNeeley's accounting teacher, both testified that they talked to McNeeley soon after her class with Venson. Sloan and Smith both testified that McNeeley was crying and that McNeeley said Venson had hugged her. Kathy Meaders, a caseworker from the state Department of Family and Children Services who interviewed McNeeley, also testified. 4 The remaining two students testified about abuse that allegedly occurred during the spring of 1992, the school year prior to the incident described by McNeeley. Both Tammy Pressley, the complaining witness on Count Two, and Cassaundra Shockley, the complaining witness on Count Three, testified that Venson touched them during class while they were seated at a table beside his desk. Shockley testified that she and Pressley discussed the incidents before together reporting them to school authorities. 5 During the cross-examination of Shockley, the following interchange occurred between the witness and Venson's attorney: 6 Q: ... [W]hy didn't you and ... Ms. Presley [sic] ... go and tell the school people then? 7 A: Because we didn't think nobody would believe us. 8 Q: You did not think anyone would believe you? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Is the reason for that they caught you forging notes out at the school and caught you telling untruths? 11 (R.Ex. A, First Trial, Vol. 2 at 226). The state immediately objected to the question and moved for a mistrial. 12 The court heard arguments on the motion outside the presence of the jury. The state argued that the question was improper for two reasons. First, the question represented an accusation which, if true, would be a part of Shockley's confidential school records. 1 Second, the state argued that it was improper to impeach a witness with a specific act rather than by evidence of general bad character. See O.C.G.A. Sec. 24-9-84 (1995). Finally, the state argued that it was impossible to cure the effect of the improper question by either disproving the accusation or instructing the jury to ignore it. The state could only disprove the accusation or explain that the incident was irrelevant by introducing the school records, which were inadmissible under a pre-trial order. A curative instruction, the state argued, would not effectively remove the taint of the accusation from the jurors' minds. 13 Venson's attorney argued that his question was proper because he was questioning Shockley about a specific act, not about the contents of her school record. He contended that he was entitled to question Shockley about why she thought the school officials would not believe her. The defense also argued that a witness properly could be impeached with evidence of prior false statements. Even if the court held that the question was improper, the defense argued, a curative instruction was sufficient to remove any prejudice from the jurors' minds. Finally, Venson's attorney contended that the improper granting of a mistrial would subject his client to double jeopardy. 14 After hearing argument on the propriety of the question, the court examined case law on the issue and reviewed the school records during a recess. The records revealed that the witness had forged a note from her mother to school officials. However, the note-forging incident occurred after the witness complained to school authorities about Venson. When the defense attorney could provide no evidence that any such incident occurred before the witness reported Venson to school authorities, the court held the question improper. 15 The trial court then addressed the question of whether a mistrial should be granted. The court considered the alternative of giving a curative instruction and expressed misgivings about declaring a mistrial. Specifically, the court stated: 16 Well, that's the question I've been wrestling with in there is can I give a curative instruction? Of course, I can say disregard the question Mr. Stroberg just asked. But is that reasonable under the circumstances and is it going to get it out of their minds? Now, I do not want to grant a mistrial in this case. 17 This is traumatic. I realize this is awful to have to put everybody through this another time. It's not something I want to do. 18 (R.Ex. A, First Trial, Vol. 2 at 233-34). In a written order granting the motion for a mistrial, the court stated that it found that the prejudice to the state could not be eradicated with a curative instruction. The court also refused to cure[ ] a wrong with another wrong by allowing the State to admit the school records to explain the incident. The court found a moral and legal necessity for a mistrial. (Appellant's R. Excerpts D at 3).