Opinion ID: 1119024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Speedy Trial Expiration Date

Text: Petitioner argues that the speedy trial period expired on July 20, 1992. [28] He claims the day the trial court declared a mistrial, May 22, 1992, should be included in calculating the sixty-day period for beginning a trial under CrR 3.3(d)(3). [29] In making this argument, he compares CrR 3.3(c)(1) to CrR 3.3(d)(3), both of which identify sixty-day periods. CrR 3.3(c)(1) provides in relevant part [a] defendant not released from jail pending trial shall be brought to trial not later than 60 days after the date of arraignment.  [30] CrR 3.3(d)(3) provides that the defendant shall be brought to trial not later than 60 days after the oral order of the court [declaring a mistrial] if the defendant is thereafter detained in jail.... [31] Petitioner claims the difference in the language between the two rules is that one indicates that counting begins after the date of arraignment, and that the other indicates it begins after the oral order, thus indicating that the date of the oral order granting a mistrial is counted. [32] Petitioner cites no authority for this argument. Nor is the argument logical. CrR 3.3(d)(3) provides: (d) Extensions of Time for Trial. The following extensions of time limits apply notwithstanding the provisions of section (c): [33] . . . . (3) Mistrial and New Trial. If before verdict the superior court orders a mistrial, the defendant shall be brought to trial not later than 60 days after the oral order of the court if the defendant is thereafter detained in jail.... (Emphasis added.) When interpreting court rules, the court approaches the rules as though they had been drafted by the Legislature. We thus apply principles of statutory construction in interpreting CrR 3.3. [34] Under general principles of statutory construction, when interpreting a rule, the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the rule's language. [35] CrR 3.3(d)(3) plainly states that trial must be held within sixty days after the trial court orders a mistrial. Logically, the speedy trial period begins to run from the date the trial court orally declares a mistrial. The first day counted against the sixty-day trial period is the day after the oral order. [36] Petitioner's argument to the contrary is without merit. [37] Respondent State correctly asserts the speedy trial period expired on July 21, 1992 instead of on July 20, 1992 as claimed by Petitioner. [38]