Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motions to Suppress Evidence (Letner, Tobin)

Text: Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of the vehicle stop conducted by Officer Wightman on the night of the murder, when defendants were driving in Pontbriant's vehicle. Defendants asserted that Officer Wightman lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore his seizure of defendants was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motions, finding that Officer Wightman's observations gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in finding the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the court's failure to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. We are not persuaded. [7]
The evidence considered in ruling upon the motions to suppress was as follows. [8] Officer Wightman was patrolling the downtown area of Visalia on the night of Tuesday, March 1, 1988, in a marked police vehicle. At approximately midnight, Officer Wightman was traveling westbound on Main Street, approaching its intersection with Garden Street. As Officer Wightman drove to the corner of Main Street, he saw a red Ford Fairmont traveling southbound on Garden Street also approaching the intersection. Officer Wightman's attention was drawn to the Fairmont because its exterior was beaded with water. Although it had rained heavily earlier that night, the rain stopped at approximately 9:30 p.m., and other vehicles traveling on the roads were not beaded with water, whereas the exteriors of cars parked nearby in a carlot and on the street were still wet. Officer Wightman testified he became somewhat suspicious because the beaded water on the Fairmont indicated to him that it had been driven only a short distance from where it had been parked when it had been raining hours earlier, and he was aware that during the past three months there had been heavy criminal activity within that area of downtown. This area included approximately 10 car dealerships that had filed numerous reports of a considerable amount of vehicle tamperings and stolens [ sic ] and vehicle burglaries in the general car lot areas of downtown. Indeed, a Ford dealership with several carlots and a body-repair shop in the immediate area had reported quite a few incidents, including the theft of a vehicle from one of its lots about one week earlier. The reports of criminal activity in the area were summarized in daily bulletins that Officer Wightman received at work. Officer Wightman testified that there was a used Ford car lot at Center, between Garden and Bridge, that we've had numerous problems with as far as vehicle tamperings and burglaries, and his first thought was this car was being removed from that lot because all the other cars that were traveling on the roadway at the time were free of moisture. After the Fairmont turned in front of Officer Wightman into the eastbound lane of Main Street, he made a U-turn and followed as it proceeded to turn south on Bridge Street and then west on Mineral King Avenue, before entering the on-ramp to westbound State Highway 198. The Fairmont traveled consistent with the speed limit and made appropriate stops at the stop signs and traffic signals on the city streets. Despite the circumstance that the on-ramp was, as Officer Wightman testified, quite long enough to build proper speed to enter the freeway, [so as not to] make a danger to oncoming traffic that is going faster, upon entering the highway the Fairmont proceeded at 40 miles per hour, well below the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. Although Officer Wightman also noticed that the Fairmont's engine sounded as though it was running rough, he testified he did not believe that the sound of the engine indicated mechanical problems accounting for the vehicle's slow speed on the highway. Officer Wightman testified the main reason he was becoming more suspicious about the occupants of the vehicle was that they turned onto [Highway] 198 and were traveling only forty miles an hour with no other vehicles in sight, except for my own. Officer Wightman further testified his suspicions also were aroused because, based upon his experience, the Fairmont's slow speed possibly indicated that the driver was intoxicated. During his years of service as a patrol officer, which involved hundreds of DUI traffic stops, he became familiar with common signs and symptoms of intoxicated drivers, one of which was driving at an abnormally slow speed for no apparent reason. As he followed the Fairmont, Officer Wightman radioed a police dispatcher to check its registration, and was informed that Pontbriant was the registered owner and that the vehicle had not been reported stolen. After the Fairmont had traveled on the highway at 40 miles per hour for approximately one mile, Officer Wightman initiated a traffic stop by activating his patrol vehicle's emergency lights, and the Fairmont pulled over. When questioned by the prosecutor at the hearing on the motions to suppress, Officer Wightman agreed that his suspicion that the driver was intoxicated was the main reason for the stop, but it was [a]bsolutely the case that his suspicions concerning the possible theft of that vehicle [were] part of the reason why he stopped it. Officer Wightman identified the driver and the passenger as Letner and Tobin, respectively. During his subsequent inquiries concerning why defendants were in possession of the car, and whether Letner had been driving while under the influence of alcohol or a drug, Officer Wightman conducted a brief search of defendants and the car, which uncovered items belonging to defendants, beer bottles of the same brands later found at the murder victim's house, and Letner's buck knife, which Letner was carrying in his pants pocket. Letner told Officer Wightman that the Fairmont belonged to Ivon Pontbriant, and that she had given him permission to drive it. Letner said that Pontbriant lived on Jacob Street, but he claimed he did not know the exact address or her telephone number. In addition, defendants each made inconsistent and apparently untruthful statements concerning their destination. When the car subsequently was impounded and more thoroughly searched, a rag with blood on it consistent with Tobin's blood, and a hat belonging to Letner, also were found in the car. The trial court denied defendants' motions to suppress, finding there was reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances testified to by the officer. [¶] First of all, the Court believes that the officer had a right to be suspicious about the movement of cars in that area, in which he first encountered the Ford Fairmont in which the defendants were riding. The court noted that the daily bulletins issued by the police department reported numerous car thefts in the area. Although it was not part of the record, the court noted its own personal knowledge that various carlots were in the area, and that it was obvious that this is in downtown Visalia, that this is not an area in which there is housing in which you expect people to be leaving their residences and going to other places. [¶] There are no supermarkets, and theso what you are left with is the downtown area in which there are probably a couple bars in the vicinity, and some car lots. In the trial court's view, that in itself wouldn't have given the officer any right to stop this car. But he certainly had every right to follow it. The court stated that Officer Wightman, however, did develop a reasonable suspicion based on slow speed. [¶] Thewe have had a lot of testimony and diagrams [regarding the area], and this Court has come onto the freeway at the location which these defendants went on it, and which the officer followed. [¶] That is a rather long descending ramp onto the freeway. There's adequate opportunity to accelerate from that point, up through the Mooney overcrossing, and thethe speed, plus the location [at] which these defendants were originally observed, plus the fact that in my opinion the opportunity that they would have had to get this car up to speed but didn't, and thethe fact that the officer was aware of thefts in the area, . . . all gave the officer reasonable opportunity reasonable suspicion to stop this car. [¶] And once stopped, then the observations he made of the driver gave more than adequate grounds to proceed as he did.
(4) As an initial matter, we observe that the evidence and arguments presented by defendants at the pretrial proceedings attempted to establish primarily that the reasons Officer Wightman offered for the stop were merely pretextualessentially defendants contended that Officer Wightman had a grudge against them from prior encounters, recognized them when the Fairmont first turned in front of the patrol car at the intersection, decided to stop them at the beginning of the encounter, and that the officer emphasized the possibility that the car had been stolen and the driver had been intoxicated as pretexts to justify his conduct. The United States Supreme Court, however, has since made clear that Fourth Amendment challenges based upon a claim that a seizure or search was pretextual are without merit. (See Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 [135 L.Ed.2d 89, 116 S.Ct. 1769].) Defendants, properly, do not on appeal renew their contentions of a pretextual stop. [9] To the extent, however, that they contend that Officer Wightman subjectively had abandoned the notion the car was stolen before stopping it, and that therefore we must evaluate the reasonableness of the stop solely on the basis of whether there was reasonable suspicion the driver of the Fairmont was intoxicated, this contention is without merit both as a matter of fact and of law. First, Officer Wightman ultimately testified that when he initiated the traffic stop, he harbored suspicions of both an intoxicated driver and a stolen car. Second, [a]n action is `reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, `as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.' [Citation.] The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant. ( Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 404 [164 L.Ed.2d 650, 126 S.Ct. 1943]; see also Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 814 [the Fourth Amendment's concern with `reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent of the officer]; People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496].) (5) In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. ( People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1133-1134 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 136 P.3d 859].) On appeal we consider the correctness of the trial court's ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial court's reasons for reaching its decision. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704] [if the trial court's ruling is correct `upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion']; People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 700-701 [159 Cal.Rptr. 684, 602 P.2d 384].) (6) The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. [Citations.] `A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.' [Citation.] Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for which the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed. [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] Law enforcement officers may `draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 105, 196 P.3d 806].) As the United States Supreme Court has stated: The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined `by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.' [Citation.] ( Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 187-188 [159 L.Ed.2d 292, 124 S.Ct. 2451].) This court has recognized that [t]he level of intrusion of personal privacy and inconvenience involved in a brief vehicle stop is considerably less than [an] `embarrassing police search' on a public street, and that `in light of the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public thoroughfares.' [Citation.] ( People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1087 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810].) (7) Even in a general sense, the reasonable suspicion standard of Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868] is not a particularly demanding one, but is, instead, considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. ( United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [104 L.Ed.2d 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581].) In reviewing the propriety of an officer's conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. ( Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124-125 [145 L.Ed.2d 570, 120 S.Ct. 673].) Further, as the high court repeatedly has explained, the possibility of innocent explanations for the factors relied upon by a police officer does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. ( United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274 [151 L.Ed.2d 740, 122 S.Ct. 744] ( Arvizu ) [Although each of the series of acts [in Terry ] was `perhaps innocent in itself,' we held that, taken together, they `warranted further investigation.']; Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 9 [holding that factors that by themselves were quite consistent with innocent travel collectively gave rise to reasonable suspicion]; see also People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 373 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729] [that a person's conduct is consistent with innocent behavior does not necessarily defeat the existence of reasonable cause to detain. [Citation.] What is required is not the absence of innocent explanation, but the existence of `specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'].) In determining whether a search or seizure was supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, `the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.' ( Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 10.) Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that by allowing the police to act based upon conduct that was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation, the court in Terry accept[ed] the risk that officers may stop innocent people. ( Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 125-126; see, e.g., In re Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 306-308 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 110, 196 P.3d 810] [police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop on a vehicle displaying no rear license plate or a temporary operating permit in the rear window, despite the circumstances that the vehicle otherwise was being driven in a lawful manner and there was a temporary permit in the front window].) (8) In the present case, the relevant factsthat is, setting aside the irrelevant issue of Officer Wightman's subjective beliefs concerning the justification for the stopare as follows. When Officer Wightman first observed the Ford Fairmont at the intersection of Main and Garden Streets, its exterior, unlike other cars traveling in the area, was beaded with water, although it had stopped raining hours before. A reasonable officer could suspect from this circumstance that the car had been parked nearby until fairly recently. Officer Wightman knew that in the immediate area were a number of car dealerships that had reported vehicle tamperings, burglaries, and thefts in the preceding months. Indeed, the Ford dealership adjacent to that intersection had reported the theft of a vehicle approximately one week earlier. It was midnight on a Tuesday, when relatively few persons are working or otherwise away from home and hence when vehicle thefts from a car dealership more readily might be committed. Officer Wightman, following the Fairmont in his marked patrol car, observed that after the vehicle entered the highway (at that point a freeway), it accelerated to a speed of only 40 miles per hour, well below the speed limit, and traveled at that speed for approximately one mile, that is, for more than one minute. In these circumstances, a reasonable officer might suspect the driver of the car was attempting to avoid contact with the police. (See U.S. v. Villalobos (5th Cir. 1998) 161 F.3d 285, 291 [noticeable deceleration in the presence of a patrol car can contribute to reasonable suspicion, even though drivers often slow when they see law enforcement personnel]; U.S. v. Lopez-Martinez (10th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1481, 1486 [maintaining a noticeably slow speed in the presence of a police officer may suggest nervousness . . .]; People v. Gibson (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 15, 20 [33 Cal.Rptr. 775] [The fact that a driver proceeds at a speed slower than the speed limit under circumstances where he might normally proceed at the higher speed also is a factor appearing to justify an officer's investigation.].) We therefore conclude Officer Wightman pointed to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provided some objective manifestation that one or both of the individuals in the Fairmont may have been involved in criminal activity, including theft of the automobile, and were attempting to avoid apprehension. (9) Defendants point to various details that, they contend, diminish the suspicious nature of the articulable facts listed above. For example, Officer Wightman had learned prior to the traffic stop that the Fairmont had not been reported stolen and was registered to a private person (not a dealership). Defendants also assert that the car might have been traveling on the highway at a slow speed because of mechanical difficulties, made apparent to the officer by the sound of the engine running rough, possibly unsafe road conditions because of the rain that had fallen earlier that night, or because the driver was anticipating an upcoming reduction in the speed limit when the freeway ended. As mentioned above, however, such possible innocent explanations for an officer's observations do not preclude the conclusion that it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. `Indeed, the principal function of [police] investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal. . . .' [Citation.] ( People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 233 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 885 P.2d 982]; see also Arvizu, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 274 [the totality-of-the-circumstances standard precludes a divide-and-conquer analysis under which factors that are readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to `no weight'].) Moreover, in the present case several of the cited circumstances do not undercut the suspicion of criminal activity. A reasonable officer in Officer Wightman's circumstances might surmise that the Fairmont had been stolen within the previous minutes, at a time when the dealerships were closed and most persons were asleep, and that therefore it would be unlikely the owner had discovered the theft, let alone reported it to the police. The circumstance that the Fairmont was registered to a private person did not signify that it could not have been taken from a dealershipthe dealer might have recently purchased it and not yet updated the ownership records, or the car could have been at the dealership for repairs. There was no evidence presented at the hearing suggesting that the roads (as opposed to cars parked in the downtown area) were wet or unsafe to the point where it would be necessary or prudent for a driver to travel on the freeway at a significantly reduced speed. Similarly, as to the performance of the Fairmont's engine, Officer Wightman testified that its sound did not indicate to him that the vehicle was incapable of achieving a speed greater than the 40 miles per hour it was traveling on the highway, and defendants presented no evidence to the contrary. In addition, although it might not appear that the driver of the Fairmont had been trying to avoid the officer when driving on the city streets before entering the freeway, a reasonable officer in these circumstances nonetheless might suspect that traveling at a slow speed on the freeway reflected an attempt by the driver to avoid contact with the police. (10) For these reasons, we conclude the trial court properly found that Officer Wightman was aware of specific articulable facts that, viewed in their totality, supported a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the Fairmont might be engaged in criminal activity, justifying his action in stopping the vehicle. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, [a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. ( Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 146 [32 L.Ed.2d 612, 92 S.Ct. 1921].) The trial court correctly denied defendants' motions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the vehicle stop.