Opinion ID: 40560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 24 Each of the defendants challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Each made an appropriate motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, we will hold the evidence sufficient if, but only if, a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence establishes the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir.2004). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in support of the jury verdict. Id. If the evidence tends to give nearly equal circumstantial support to either guilt or innocence then reversal is required. United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir.1999).
25 Gonzales was convicted on count two of the indictment, which charged that he: 26 while acting under the color of law, did assault Serafin Carrera by spraying him with Oleoresin Capsicum pepper spray, resulting in bodily injury to Serafin Carrera and did thereby willfully deprive him of the rights . . . protected by the Constitution . . . to be secure in his person and to be free from the use of unreasonable force by one acting under color of law. 27 Contrary to Gonzales's contention, we hold that there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gonzales willfully sprayed Carrera. Gonzales's theory at trial was that the pepper spray accidentally discharged in Carrera's face while Gonzales was carrying him onto the bus through a narrow safety cage doorway. 28 Because the bus had tinted windows, no one outside of it witnessed the discharge. However, Frank Gonzalez, an INS detention officer from the San Antonio office, testified that while Gonzales was carrying Carrera to the bus, he said Let's Mace the fucker and see if he budges. Two other San Antonio detention officers, Gilbert Rodriguez and Rene Cruz, remembered a similar statement. Rene Cruz testified that when Gonzalez, Reyna, and Gomez exited the bus, Gonzales was coughing, smirking sarcastically, and claiming that there had been an accidental discharge. At the time, neither Gilbert Rodriguez nor Rene Cruz believed him. They both suspected that the accidental-discharge story was a cover-up. 29 Gonzales presented evidence that these testifying officers had given inconsistent accounts of the Carrera incident. From initial statements given to agency investigators to later testimony before the grand jury, their stories had evolved. The testifying officers admitted that they had lied to investigators. They explained that they had stonewalled investigators, motivated by fear of reprisal and a misplaced sense of honor, in order to protect their colleagues. At trial, the officers insisted, they were telling the truth. We do not second guess the jury's credibility determination here. 30 The only substantive countervailing evidence presented by Gonzales was that accidental discharges had previously occurred with some pepper spray holders and that, on the day of the Carrera incident, Gonzales had pepper spray on his shirt. There was no testimony that the discharge was accidental. 31 We conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the discharge was intentional. 32 Gonzales also asserts that the government failed to prove, as required by the second clause of section 242, that this deprivation of Carrera's rights actually resulted in bodily injury. 33 There are, in fact, two relevant bodily injury requirements. First, an excessive-force claim, like the one here, requires a showing of some bodily injury to establish a constitutional violation. Harper v. Harris County, Texas, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994). Second, once an underlying constitutional violation is established and the prosecution invokes the second clause of section 242, it must prove resulting bodily injury in order to sustain punishment of more than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 242. Gonzales challenges only the government's evidence with respect to this second bodily injury requirement; however, the definition of bodily injury from excessive-force cases is still relevant here because this court has borrowed that definition for use in a section 242 prosecution also predicated on excessive force. Brugman, 364 F.3d at 618. 34 In constitutional excessive force cases we have applied a some injury which is more than `de minimis injury' standard. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1999). The injury necessary to satisfy this requirement, and thus to establish an excessive-force claim, is related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible in the context in which the injury occurs. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434-35. (5th Cir.1996). For example, in Williams v. Bramer, supra, this court faced the question whether the injury alleged, dizziness and shortness of breath, was sufficient to satisfy the some injury requirement. We held that the injury was insufficient for the first choking incident, which occurred during a physical search, but was sufficient for the second choking incident, which occurred after the victim threatened to report the officer. For the second choking, dizziness and shortness of breath satisfied the some injury requirement because the officer was motivated entirely by malice. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d at 704. In contrast, the first incident occurred during a search, where physical confrontation inevitably results. Id. 35 There is sufficient evidence here to support a rational jury finding of bodily injury. Carrera's mouth was foaming, he complained of stinging pain, and his eyes were swollen shut for at least three hours. The government introduced evidence that pepper spray causes intense pain. 7 The force that caused this pain, the pepper spray, was applied in a context not too different from the second choking incident in Bramer. Carrera was no longer a threat to Gonzales. He was paralyzed, handcuffed, and lying on the floor of the bus. Accordingly, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, Gonzales's excessive-force conviction. Cf. Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 903 (6th Cir.2004) ([I]t is clearly established that the Officers' use of pepper spray against Champion after he was handcuffed and hobbled was excessive.). 8 36 Nor do we find any merit in Gonzales's contention, made only in passing (and partially on evidence not introduced before the jury but only at sentencing), that the evidence is insufficient because, even if it shows he intentionally pepper sprayed Carrera, it is not adequate to show that he knew the effects of the pepper spraying would be sufficiently severe to constitute bodily injury. We conclude, however, that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer any requisite knowledge and intent on Gonzales's part. 9 37
38 Gonzales, Reyna, and Gomez each dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions for the willful deprivation of Carrera's due-process right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (counts three, four, and five). 39 Under the Due Process clause, pretrial detainees enjoy a constitutional right not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of confining officials. See Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir.2001)(defining the right under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause). Deliberate indifference, as defined in due process cases, requires both that the government official have subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee and that the government official respond with deliberate indifference to that risk. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir.1996)(en banc). Finally, if this due process right is willfully violated, and if bodily injury results, then the offender is guilty of a felony under section 242. 40 1. The officers had actual awareness. There is sufficient evidence for a jury to have found that Officers Gonzales, Reyna, and Gomez were actually aware that Carrera had serious medical needs which posed a substantial risk of serious harm to him. Under the evidence, the jury could have so concluded from the very fact that this was so obvious. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-44, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). 41 All three defendants had close contact with Carrera while he lay handcuffed on the floor after his injury. Carrera made his injury known to the defendants, screaming they broke me . . . Tell them to take me to a hospital and the like. In response to his frequent pleas, the officers taunted him, calling him cabron and inviting people to wipe their feet on him. 42 At trial, the defense argued that Gonzales, Reyna, and Gomez believed Carrera was drunk and faking injury. Witnesses testified that it is common for detainees to feign injury in hope of avoiding immediate deportation; that other officers at the scene also believed Carrera was faking injury; and that it is extremely difficult for laymen to recognized the symptoms of quadriplegia. 43 But, two of the officers, Reyna and Gomez, were trained in trauma management and taught both how to identify the symptoms of spinal injury and how to treat those symptoms. Moreover, although some testifying officers did concede that they thought Carrera was faking injury, those officers reminded the jury that the defendants were in close contact with Carrera and everyone else at the scene just believed what the defendants told them about Carrera's condition. 44 After the takedown, the three defendants had extended contact with Carrera: they dragged his limp body from the house to the van; they dragged him off the van and onto the bus; and they witnessed his reaction to being pepper sprayed. The jury could have easily inferred from both this close physical contact and Carrera's evident distress and frequent cries for help that the defendants knew he was seriously injured. 45 2. Substantial risk of serious harm. There is sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that Carrera faced a substantial risk of serious harm. The government need not prove that Carrera actually suffered serious harm. It is enough, for these purposes, that Carrera was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm even if that harm never materialized. See, e.g., Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 341 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that a Eighth Amendment prisoner-civil plaintiff did not have to prove that he was actually injured by exposure to raw sewage, only that the exposure posed a serious health risk). 46 A defense witness, Dr. Hirshberg, testified that immediately upon being taken down, Carrera's spinal facets locked and his spine was stable. Because of this stability, he explained, there was no risk associated with dragging Carrera from the kitchen, to the van, to the bus. 47 The government's expert disagreed. Dr. Gitterle testified that Carrera might have benefited had he reached the hospital sooner and that, by moving Carrera without stabilizing him, the officers exposed him to a risk of harm. Furthermore, because excruciating pain also qualifies as a serious harm, the jury could have inferred that the defendant's failure to seek medical care for Carrera further exposed him to a substantial risk of increased severe pain. See Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159-60 (5th Cir.1999). Moreover, after being pepper sprayed, Carrera was left alone on the bus floor, handcuffed, eyes swollen shut and foaming at the mouth, despite INS training that, due to the risk of potentially fatal asphyxiation, those pepper sprayed should be continually monitored and placed upright, never in a prone position, particularly if handcuffed. 48 3. The officers responded with deliberate indifference to the risk. There is sufficient evidence to permit a finding of deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. Domino v. Texas Dept. Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir.2001). The government must show that the officials `refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.' Id. at 756. 49 Only Reyna disputes the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to deliberate indifference. We reject his contention that under the evidence it could not be found that he had any ability or opportunity to respond to Carrera's serious medical needs or to do anything looking to their alleviation. 50 4. Bodily injury. There is sufficient evidence to permit a finding of bodily injury. A finding of bodily injury is not required to establish deliberate indifference, the constitutional violation underlying counts three, four and five. However, as noted above, for a section 242 conviction to constitute a felony, bodily injury must result from the underlying violation. 10 With respect to count 2, the underlying violation was employment of excessive force and we followed Brugman and applied to section 242's bodily injury requirement the some injury test used in the excessive force cases. As explained in Brugman, what satisfies the some injury requirement varies according to the amount of force that was constitutionally permissible under the particular circumstances. See Brugman, 364 F.3d at 618-19. We decline to extend Brugman's approach to section 242 cases in which employment of excessive force is not any part of the underlying constitutional violation. Brugman is simply not meaningful in such a context. In a section 242 prosecution based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, use of force is no part of the underlying constitutional violation, and we accordingly do not apply Brugman's definition of bodily injury. 51 We instead follow the First and Eleventh Circuits in applying to bodily injury as used in section 242 the definition of bodily injury provided in four other sections of Title 18 namely, (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary. 18 U.S.C. §§ 831(f)(5); 1365(h)(4); 1515(a)(5); 1864(d)(2). See United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1572 (11th Cir.1992). 52 Applying this statutory definition of bodily injury, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to prove either physical pain or impairment of function. The defendants argue that their failure to provide medical care for Carrera did not result in bodily injury because Carrera's injury was painless, instantaneous, and irreversible. The government, however, presented contrary evidence. Several witnesses, including several INS officers, testified that Carrera was moaning and complaining of severe pain. And, Dr. Gitterle testified that Carrera might have benefitted from treatment had he reached the hospital sooner. 53 We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support all three deliberate-indifference convictions.