Opinion ID: 71483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Writ in Miller's Case

Text: Miller sought a writ of audita querela to force the district court to reduce his restitution obligation by $170,405.00. He argues that this petition presents a legal defense that arose after final judgment in his case, because 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) requires that the amount of restitution ordered in a criminal case be offset by the value ... of any part of the property that is returned. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) (West 2000). He also contends, and the Government agrees, that the relief he seeks cannot be obtained under any other post-conviction remedy, like habeas corpus or coram nobis. Therefore, he argues, the use of audita querela is appropriate in his case to fill a gap in the federal post-conviction remedial scheme.
Initially, we note that it is perhaps possible that Miller should be estopped from making his current argument. See generally Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1635, 173 L.Ed.2d 998 (2009) (Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that `prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding.' (quoting Hall v. GE Plastic Pac. PTE Ltd., 327 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2003))). In Miller's Petition for a Reduction in Court-Ordered Mandatory Victim Restitution, which he filed on June 17, 2004, and in his first petition for a writ of audita querela, he argued that he had known the district court's restitution order was incorrect when it was issued, but that he had failed to object due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he asserted that, before his sentencing, he had returned $100,000.00 of the money he had embezzled from MSM in the form of a subordinated investment note that later matured into the $170,405.00 at issue in this appeal. The Government contested this assertion in its Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), arguing that, instead of returning this $100,000.00, he had spent it on a swimming pool in his backyard. Accordingly, the Government listed this amount as stolen in the PSR's restitution calculations. Although Miller's attorney objected to this listing in Miller's written objections to the PSR, he failed to raise the issue before the district court at sentencing. The chief problem with this argument was identified by the district court in its order dismissing Miller's first petition for a writ of audita querela. Audita querela is only available where the judgment of the district court was correct at the time it was rendered, but is undermined by facts that later come to light. If Miller knew that the restitution order was incorrect at the time it was issued and failed to object to it due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, then the judgment was infirm from the beginning. Even though the absolute proof of this infirmity did not arise until May 2004, audita querela would be inappropriate to remedy the error, because the judgment was infirm at the time it was rendered due to the ineffective assistance of Miller's counsel. However, we will ignore the issue of estoppel, because we find that Miller cannot mount a viable case for the issuance now of a writ of audita querela under the facts he has alleged in his second petition and his briefs.
In his second petition for a writ of audita querela and in his appellate briefs before this court, Miller's argument omits any discussion of a possible ineffective assistance of counsel issue, as well as any hint that he might have returned the $170,405.00 at issue in this appeal before his sentence. Instead, he states that he was the registered owner of the subordinated investment note and had dominion over it until its maturity in April 2004. Accordingly, he contends that the district court's restitution order was correct at the time it was issued. The error he seeks to have corrected is the Government's failure to credit this obligation by the amount MSM announced it had recovered in May 2004. In other words, under Miller's current characterization of the facts, the issue presented is the same as would have occurred if in May 2004 he had tendered payment of $170,405.00 towards his restitution obligation and the Government had accepted it but refused to acknowledge its receipt. We do not think that such a situation renders the district court's restitution order infirm. Under Miller's current characterization of the facts, all parties agree that the district court's restitution order correctly reflects the amount that Miller embezzled. The only disagreement is over whether or not Miller is entitled to a credit for the money recovered in May 2004. We do not think that a subsequent disputed payment renders the amount of the original restitution order infirm. Although 18 U.S.C. § 3663A provides that, when a criminal restitution order is issued, it must be offset by the value ... of any part of the property that is returned, we do not think that this language should be read to require district courts to formally modify restitution orders every time a defendant subsequent to the order makes a payment on his obligation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) (West 2000). Indeed, such a burden would be intolerable, given the number of impoverished defendants who are ordered to make modest restitution payments on a periodic basis. Similarly, where property that was accounted for in fixing the amount of a restitution order is returned after that order has already been issued, we do not think that modification of the order itself is required. This type of recovery is no different from a payment, and it should be accounted for in the same way. If it still exists, the writ of audita querela can only be applied to rectify a judgment which, though correct when rendered, has since become infirm. Because all parties to this case agree that the district court's restitution order was initially correct, and because the statute does not require the order to be modified every time a subsequent payment is made on a restitution obligation, there is no infirmity in Miller's judgment for a writ of audita querela to rectify. [3] Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing his petition.