Opinion ID: 710223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Police Department's Supervisory System

Text: 34 The municipal defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing Vann's claims against them, pointing in some detail to the operations of the Department's supervisory units that dealt with problem officers, including PSU; EIU; the Department Advocate's Office (DAO), which until February 1988 had primary responsibility for monitoring police officers who were on disciplinary probation; and the Central Personnel Index (CPI), which collected data on police officers that might suggest performance problems and issued warnings to EIU. Appellees contended principally that, together, its divisions form a comprehensive system for monitoring the performance of Police Officers, and that therefore the Department could not be found to have been deliberately indifferent to police misconduct. They further maintained that their treatment of the three civilian complaints lodged against Morrison after he was reinstated to full-duty status in 1986 was not evidence of deliberate indifference to the risk Morrison presented to the public because none of the complaints ultimately was substantiated. Appellees argued that [t]he mere occurrence of complaints that are not substantiated, without more, is insufficient to establish a policy of deliberate indifference. (Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 18.) 35 In opposition to summary judgment, Vann admitted the existence of the Department's supervisory units, and he admitted that the Department had taken appropriate steps to supervise Morrison until his reinstatement to full-duty status in 1986. Vann contended, however, that the Department's failure to monitor Morrison after his reinstatement to full-duty status was pursuant to a policy of deliberate indifference because, with respect to police officers who had a known history of abusive conduct and had been reinstated to full duty, none of the units on whose existence appellees relied made any meaningful effort to take heed of new civilian complaints filed against those officers. 36 In support of his contentions, Vann relied in part on deposition testimony by Dr. Archibald that the Department deemed a civilian complaint unsubstantiated whenever there was no neutral witness who could verify the version of either the officer or the civilian, and it was the word of the police officer against that of the civilian(s). (Deposition of Dr. Eloise Archibald (Archibald Dep.) at 104.) Archibald acknowledged, however, that the very fact that an unusual number of civilian complaints had been filed, without regard to how they were ultimately resolved, could create concern that the officer was experiencing psychological problems and was suffering from stress that caused him to escalate minor situations into major confrontations (id. at 47, 122). 37 Vann also cited deposition testimony from individuals who had worked with EIU, CPI, DAO, or PSU, to the effect that the Department routinely failed to inform its supervisory units of the filing of civilian complaints against officers who had a history of abusive conduct. None of these units, except PSU, attached any significance to the filing of such complaints; and PSU did not advise those who knew of the complaints to pass the information on to the supervisory units. 38 For example, Sergeant Andrew Foppiano was an investigator and then the investigating supervisor in DAO which, until February 1988, had responsibility for monitoring officers who were on disciplinary probation. He testified that in February 1988, DAO was monitoring some 200 officers on probation; the monitoring function was carried out by the equivalent of 1.25 DAO employees. In performing that function, DAO investigating personnel would receive notice of an officer's being placed on disciplinary probation and would send the officer's commander or integrity-control officer a packet of one-page forms for the officer. One form was to be filled out and returned to DAO every two months. Upon receipt of the completed form, DAO would make note of whether the officer had received any disciplinary or otherwise negative evaluations. However, commanding officers were not instructed to, and normally did not, report the filing of new civilian complaints. Nor did DAO seek or receive such information from CPI or the CCRB. Foppiano testified that DAO was not concerned about the fact that a new civilian complaint had been filed against a DAO-monitored officer unless and until the officer was found guilty. 39 Lieutenant Alfonse Pirozzi, an EIU investigator from 1985 to early 1988, testified similarly that there was no system by which the CCRB would regularly report civilian complaints to EIU. In February 1988, Pirozzi, who had received no psychological or psychiatric training, transferred to the Performance Analysis Unit (PAU) of the Department's Employee Management Division, which then took over from DAO the job of monitoring officers on disciplinary probation. PAU did not expand the scope of the monitoring function as DAO had carried it out. 40 Although copies of civilian complaints were received by the accused officers' commanding officers, Dr. Archibald testified that a commander's decision as to whether to take any administrative or other responsive action to unsubstantiated complaints was discretionary. She testified that there was some hesitancy on the part of commanders to refer problem officers to divisions such as PSU, because the commanders were afraid that in referring the officer, the officer may be unhappy about being referred. In fact, more than just unhappy. Maybe very angry about it, maybe even wanting to ... start some legal action against them.... (Archibald Dep. at 109.) Further, though the fact that a number of civilian complaints had been filed could well be an indication of psychological problems (Archibald Dep. at 47), Dr. Archibald testified that when she gave commanding officers guidance as to what kind of factors to look for in making referrals to PSU, she typically did not mention civilian complaints (Archibald Dep. at 112). 41 After his reinstatement, Morrison was not monitored by PSU, and the filing of the three new civilian complaints against him was not communicated to PSU. With respect to the first two complaints--filed while Morrison was still on disciplinary probation--Morrison's commanding officer did not refer him to any of the Department's supervisory units or initiate any other type of administrative response to lessen the risk that Morrison would engage in future misconduct. In response to the third complaint, the commander restricted Morrison's assignment and relieved him of his firearms; but Morrison was reinstated to full-duty status with firearms when the complaint was deemed unsubstantiated. The commander did not refer Morrison to PSU for evaluation. The officials in the supervisory units, if they knew of the complaints, elected to take no action whatever. 42 Vann also submitted an affidavit from Dr. Guy Seymour, Chief Psychologist for Atlanta, Georgia, and the Atlanta Police Department, who had been a consultant for many municipal police departments in a number of states. Dr. Seymour concurred with PSU's 1984 conclusions as to Morrison's personality disorder and with its suggestion that future misbehavior be dealt with by administrative dismissal. In Dr. Seymour's view, the postreinstatement complaints filed against Morrison indicated that Morrison was following his established tendency to escalate mild altercations into verbal confrontations and ultimately to resort to force; the filing of those complaints should have prompted Morrison's dismissal, his reassignment to restricted duty, or, at the very least, his referral to PSU. The Department's failure to take any action was unreasonable, especially since the first two incidents occurred soon after Morrison's reinstatement to full-duty status and while he was still on disciplinary probation. (Affidavit of Dr. Guy Seymour dated February 20, 1993 (Seymour Aff.), pp 5-8, 10-11, 14.) Given his continued inappropriate behavior, Morrison put[ ] the public at risk simply by his continued employment as a police officer. (Seymour Aff. p 15.) 43 Dr. Seymour stated that, particularly in view of the postreinstatement complaints, it was foreseeable that Morrison would continue to engage in misconduct, and some mechanism should have been put into place to forestall that result: 44 6. The failure to implement meaningful and effective oversight procedures is reflected in the fact that not two months after defendant Morrison's restoration of firearms and removal from restricted duty occurred, but while he was still on disciplinary probation, Morrison was the subject of two civilian complaints in August, 1986: one for excessive force and one for the threat to use force inappropriately. 45 7. .... These complaints are similar to those that had been made against defendant Morrison over the years of his tenure in the police department, and were similar to the types of confrontations that defendant Morrison, as documented in the defendant City of New York's records, had admitted was a problem for him in the past. This pattern of complaints is typified by Morrison's tendency to escalate a mild altercation to a verbal confrontation and ultimately to resort to force to exert his point of view in the situation. Administrative action should have been taken, or at least contemplated, and the PSU should have at least been contacted for an assessment of the meaning of this type of repetition of inappropriate behavior.... 46 8. Events in April, 1987, should also have triggered, but did not, a review of defendant Morrison's behavior and/or some kind of administrative action by the Department. In April, 1987, defendant Morrison was the subject of a force complaint of almost the exact kind that occurred with the plaintiff in this case, and which also had striking similarities to prior complaints against Morrison. Clearly this should have, but did not, trigger a referral to PSU, or some other administrative oversight or action to protect the public from the type of foreseeable behavior Morrison had demonstrated a propensity to engage in since his appointment to the police department. 47 (Seymour Aff. pp 6-8 (emphasis in original).) 48 12. At the very least, the incident of April, 1987, which so classically recapitulated the behavior and disordered conduct which had gotten Officer Morrison into trouble before, should have triggered a review by a number of individuals including the Early Intervention program, and PSU. All evidence I have reviewed point [sic ] to the fact that it was painfully well known at least by that time that Officer Morrison's behavior was only going to be kept in check and within appropriate bounds by the imposition of disciplinary action. 49 13. The defendant City of New York has asserted in its papers in support of their motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff has adduced no evidence suggesting any systemic failure on the part of the City of [sic ] monitor officers' conduct or to discipline them for misconduct..... The evidence that I have reviewed in this case, including but not limited to the personnel files on defendant Morrison and the depositions of Dr. Archibald, Sgt. Andrew Foppiano and Lt. Alfonse Pirozzi, supports just the opposite conclusion. The evidence ... suggests that the defendant City of New York's monitoring system is woefully inadequate to monitor and supervise officers with the kind of behavioral history like Morrison. For example, any system that allocates 1.25 persons to monitor 200 officers on disciplinary probation ... is no system at all. Any system where the monitors perform only clerical functions is no system at all.... This evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the system of monitoring officers like Morrison is, in fact, not a system at all. 50 (Seymour Aff. p 12-13.) Dr. Seymour concluded: 51 The failure to effectively monitor and oversight an officer on disciplinary probation who is the subject of two civilian complaints of a kind similar to conduct that had been deemed problematic in his past by the Department is more than just an aberration. This failure is a systemic failure which amounts in my judgment to callous indifference on the part of the defendant City of New York to the constitutional rights of the citizens of this City. 52 (Id. p 7.)