Opinion ID: 2999780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ross Thacker

Text: On appeal, Thacker argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting a government motion in limine to block all evidence concerning his state court plea negotiations and the ensuing agreement. Although Thacker took the stand, he did not seek to describe the agreement himself; instead, he wanted to introduce this evidence through examination of the Illinois detective or by way of testimony from the state prosecutor and his state defense attorney. He contends that evidence of the plea agreement would have bolstered his credibility by showing that he had no incentive to lie when he denied participating in the Casey’s robbery during the interview with the Illinois detective. Had he participated in the Casey’s robbery, he maintains, he would have confessed because he faced no threat of state prosecution under his plea deal: he was simply required to admit to the Colonial Pantry robbery and tell the truth about any other robberies. The district court held that the evidence was irrelevant, see Fed. R. of Evid. 401, and that whatever minor relevance it might have had was outweighed by a likelihood of confusing the jury, see Fed. R. Evid. 403. Thacker’s basic theory of relevance – that the state authorities’ promise not to prosecute him for any additional robberies would necessarily lead him to come clean about other crimes, especially those for which there was not yet any evidence of his involvement – is shaky. We can think of a number of reasons why he might have refrained from confessing to the Casey’s heist: perhaps he feared a federal prosecution, or that three armed robberies rather than two would subject him to liability under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), or that state authorities would renege on the deal if they realized that he had committed a string of offenses rather than just one or two. Thacker argues, nevertheless, that the jury should have been able to weigh this evidence. He contends that his situation is simply the mirror image of cases in which the government is permitted to introduce the plea agreement of one of its cooperating witnesses in order to show that the witness has agreed to tell the truth or lose his own plea arrangement. See United States v. Montani, 204 F.3d 761, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2000). But in the latter situation, a cooperating witness must face cross-examination by the defense, which can explore the entire deal rather than just the particulars that the government wishes to introduce. Here, by contrast, Thacker wanted to use the Illinois detective and state court attorneys to bring in evidence of his plea agreement, rather than Nos. 05-1645 & 05-1666 Page 4 testifying himself about the matter and facing impeachment. See United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 798–99 (8th Cir. 1993). At argument, Thacker’s counsel represented (and the government conceded) that the district court’s decision blocked any potential testimony about the agreement, including his own, but the fact remains that Thacker attempted to introduce the evidence only through the testimony of others. Moreover, even assuming that the district court’s order also covered Thacker’s own testimony and that his analogy to the government’s practice is apt, the fact remains that the district court relied in the alternative for its ruling on Rule 403, which bars relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury. The court reasonably concluded that evidence of the state plea agreement would confuse the jury by leaving the impression that the authorities went back on their word not to prosecute Thacker for other robberies. Although it was a state prosecutor who told Thacker that he could plead to the Colonial Pantry robbery and admit his other offenses without risk of prosecution, this subtlety may have been lost on the jury. In support of his argument, Thacker cites United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990). (He did not mention this case until his reply brief, but it supports arguments that he had already presented.) That case involved the Defense Department contractor Wedtech. In it, the district court excluded evidence that the defendant, Wedtech’s former president, refused an offer of complete immunity in exchange for implicating others in a scheme to bribe government officials to secure a lease. Id. at 690. Defendant’s primary defense at trial was that he was unaware of his subordinates’ wrongdoing, and he argued that his rejection of the immunity offer showed a “consciousness of innocence.” Id. The Second Circuit agreed, finding the evidence relevant, and reversed: “Though there may be reasons for rejecting the offer that are consistent with guilty knowledge, such as fear of reprisal from those who would be inculpated, a jury is entitled to believe that most people would jump at the chance to obtain an assurance of immunity from prosecution and to infer from rejection of the offer that the accused lacks knowledge of wrongdoing.” Id. But even assuming that there are some pertinent similarities in the two cases, in Biaggi the evidence against the defendant was quite weak, making the question of the excluded evidence critical. See Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 692. Here, by contrast, the evidence against Thacker was overwhelming, and so any possible error in excluding testimony about the plea agreement was harmless. See United States v. Holt, 460 F.3d 934, 938–39 (7th Cir. 2006). All three of Thacker’s compatriots testified that he participated in the Casey’s robbery. Thacker argues that their testimony was hardly impartial, but other evidence tied him to the Casey’s job as well. The clerk who was on duty at the Casey’s store during the robbery described one of her assailants as wearing the same clothes and bandanna that were shown in Nos. 05-1645 & 05-1666 Page 5 a video of the second robbery that evening, at the Colonial Pantry store—clothing and a bandanna that Thacker admitted to wearing. The clerk also testified that she was “positive” that the bag carried by the man wearing the bandanna in the video was the same that had been carried by the man wearing the bandanna during the Casey’s robbery. Finally, the modus operandi for the Casey’s robbery was exactly the same as for the two other robberies to which Thacker admitted, including one just several hours earlier. See United States v. Seals, 419 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). In each one, the girlfriends went in to scope out the store and then the defendants entered wearing a mask and bandanna and proceeded to steal roughly the same amount of cash and the same brand of cigarettes. Any error in excluding the evidence was harmless in light of the government’s strong case.