Opinion ID: 2394474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Coercion in Deliberations

Text: Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to continue its deliberations after it had indicated that it was deadlocked. Specifically, Appellant refers to the following exchange that occurred between the trial court and the jury: The Foreman: We have come to a hung or a deadlock. The jurors have voted 11 to 1 and we need your advice. The Court: Well, let me put it this way, you said 11 to 1. I don't exactly know what you mean by 11 to 1. The Foreman: On a verdict. The Court: Well, it could mean a lot of things, 11 to 1. I don't know what you're talking about really as to 11 to 1. It could mean that you have 11 people agreeing to aggravating circumstances and one is not reaching the aggravating circumstance to make it a unanimous vote on that, it could be that 12 have found aggravating circumstances and one or more have found mitigating, one or both mitigating circumstances and that one of the 12 does not think that the aggravating outweigh the mitigating to justify death. The Foreman: That's it, sir. The Court: Pardon? That's it? The Foreman: Yes. The Court: That is what it is? The Foreman: Yes. The Court: Because it could be either B-1, B-2 or C-1, C-2. All right, look, realistically, you were out yesterday and the most you did yesterday after we heard all the arguments, et cetera, is you were out deliberating for less than an hour. This morning you all came in by 9:30 after you had been out for an hour this morning, you come back, you have been deadlocked, okay, after one hour so you haven't given it much of an effort beyond an hour, hour-and-a-half, okay. Go back, have open minds, try to deliberate and see if you can make the agreement unanimous. Continue your deliberations. An hour and-a-half does not make a sufficient reasonable length of time. N.T., July 2, 1999, at 4-5. Appellant asserts that the trial court's instruction placed an impermissible burden on the holdout juror. In this regard, he maintains that the trial court, in effect, instructed the one holdout juror to try to deliberate and see if you can make the agreement unanimous. Appellant further argues that he is entitled to relief under Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 384, 668 A.2d 97 (1995). In Johnson, this Court addressed a claim that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to end jury deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital trial when the jury indicated that it was deadlocked after deliberating less than one full day. See Johnson, 542 Pa. at 407, 668 A.2d at 108. The Johnson Court observed that the trial's guilt phase spanned six days of testimony while the penalty phase encompassed an additional full day. When the jury indicated that it was deadlocked, the trial court reinstructed the jury on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Moreover, the trial court informed the jury that if it subsequently reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked, the court would impose a life sentence. Based upon the length of the trial, the importance of the matter under consideration, and the fact that the jury did not indicate to the court that it was hopelessly deadlocked, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err by ordering the jury to continue its deliberations. See id. at 408, 668 A.2d at 109. Appellant contends that the facts here are materially different from the facts of Johnson and thus warrant a new penalty hearing. For instance, unlike in Johnson, the trial court in the present matter did not reinstruct the jury on the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. In addition, Appellant maintains that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the court could sentence Appellant to life imprisonment if the court believed that further deliberations would not result in a verdict. Finally, Appellant finds it significant that the jury panel in the present matter revealed the nature of its deadlock. All of these factors, Appellant contends, distinguish this case from Johnson and warrant a new penalty hearing. The duration of jury deliberations is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the court abused its discretion or that the jury's verdict was the product of coercion or fatigue. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 384, 407, 668 A.2d 97, 108 (1995). Relevant factors in this assessment include the charges at issue, the complexity of the issues, the amount of testimony to consider, the length of the trial, the solemnity of the proceedings, and indications from the jury on the possibility of reaching a verdict. See id. at 407, 668 A.2d at 108. Here, the guilt phase of the trial included six days of testimony, while the penalty phase encompassed an additional day. After receiving instructions to consider one aggravating factor and two mitigating factors, the jury deliberated less than two hours over the course of two days before indicating to the trial court that it was deadlocked. In similar cases, trial courts have properly directed juries to continue their deliberations when the issues are complex and where the deliberations are relatively brief. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bridges, 563 Pa. 1, 44, 757 A.2d 859, 882 (2000) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury to continue its deliberations after the jury had deliberated four hours). Notably, the jurors did not indicate that they were hopelessly deadlocked; rather, they requested the court's advice as to how to proceed. See Johnson, 542 Pa. at 408, 668 A.2d at 109 (finding it significant that the jury did not indicate that it was hopelessly deadlocked). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury to continue its deliberations after having deliberated less than two hours. Appellant specifically advances several challenges concerning the content of the trial court's supplemental charge. As Appellant observes, the jury had revealed its numerical split to the trial court. When the jury voluntarily reveals such information, a number of courts have observed that the judge has a heightened duty to avoid utilizing coercive language in its supplemental charge. See, e.g., Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 827 (Del.1994). Although the trial court sought further information concerning the nature of the jury's numerical division, see N.T., July 2, 1999, at 3-4, [10] the trial court did not utilize this information in the instructions that followed. Instead, the trial court focused upon the relatively brief amount of time that the jury had deliberated and instructed them to [g]o back, have open minds, try to deliberate and see if you can make the agreement unanimous. N.T., July 2, 1999, at 5. Although Appellant maintains that the trial court was speaking solely to the holdout juror, we conclude that the trial court's instruction was directed to all of the jurors, particularly as the impetus for the instruction stemmed from the brief period of time that the jury had deliberated. In addition, although Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by omitting several instructions in its supplemental charge, this Court has not developed any bright-line rules concerning the content of supplemental instructions. [11] Given that the jury had deliberated less than two hours, the trial court did not err by failing to reinstruct the jury concerning the mitigating and aggravating factors. Moreover, the court had previously explained that, in the event the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, it would impose a life sentence. Thus, viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury to continue its deliberations. Moreover, we hold that the content of the trial court's supplemental instruction was not coercive or otherwise improper. Finally, according to Appellant, the trial court compounded its asserted error by indicating the wrong standard of proof for aggravating circumstances. See N.T., July 1, 1999, at 100 (reflecting the trial judge's comment [t]wo or more [felonies] to make out a significant history [of violent felonies] if proven to your satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence.). The trial court, however, subsequently stated the applicable standard correctly. See id. (The Commonwealth must prove any aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.). Moreover, this claim is also waived, since trial counsel did not lodge an objection.