Opinion ID: 749836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Compensation for Delayed Payment

Text: 45 Even though we refuse to award additional attorney's fees over the prevailing rate in the relevant community, Barjon and Duran still request compensation for the Secretary's delay in payment of undisputed fees. Wallace argues that the right to fees accrued when her clients became prevailing parties-April 18, 1994 in Barjon's case and August 17, 1994 in Duran's case. Since fees were not paid until September 14, 1995 and October 11, 1995 respectively, Wallace requests an enhancement for the delay. 46 The Supreme Court has established that an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment of fees is within the contemplation of § 1988. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989). To that end, the district court may choose to apply either the attorney's current rates to all hours billed or the attorney's historic rates plus interest. In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 19 F.3d 1291, 1305 (9th Cir.1994). 47 In this case, the district court denied Appellants any interest on the undisputed fees. Barjon and Duran argue that this constitutes an improper denial of compensation for the delay in payment. We disagree with this interpretation. 48 The $200 rate awarded to Wallace by the district court adequately compensates her for the delay in payment. First, the $200 rate constitutes the high-end rate prevailing in Sacramento in 1994 for work during January 1993 through August 1994. Wallace received this rate for all hours worked (97.25 hours), even though more than half (55.15 hours) were performed in 1993. 49 Second, the $200 rate seems reasonable since the delay itself was not very long and the amount of fees not very high. In Gates, the court upheld an award for the delay in payment when plaintiffs' attorneys had to wait over three years and their fee totalled millions. But Gates also acknowledged a case which denied compensation for a fourteen-month delay in payment of $8,139 in fees. See Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120 (10th Cir.1990). The delay and amount in this case (seventeen-month delay of $11,523.40 in fees for Barjon matter and fourteenth-month delay of $8,154.97 in fees for Duran matter) are very similar to the situation in Smith. Accordingly, we deny Appellants any further compensation for the delay in payment of undisputed fees.