Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: CLAIMED OVERLAP OF FACTOR (a) (CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRIME) AND FACTOR (b) (VIOLENT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY)

Text: (30a) The jury was instructed to consider both [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true (ง 190.3, factor (a)); and [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence (ง 190.3, factor (b)). Defendant claims he was prejudiced because the court did not modify factor (b) to make clear that it referred to criminal activity other than the present crime. (31) The only criminal activity that the jury could properly consider under factor (b) was defendant's conduct in connection with the rape and robbery of Linda D. in 1976. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 763; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106.) (30b) The trial judge strongly suggested that limitation when, in instructing on the requirement of proving criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt, he added that here is what the court is talking about and explained that the instruction was in regards to the testimony of the woman in regards to the alleged rape that she testified to. (Cf. People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 787.) Nothing in the prosecutor's argument stated or implied that the circumstances of the murder should be considered both under factor (a) and as criminal activity under factor (b). The argument simply analyzed the relevant evidence without undertaking to assign weight to it under a particular factor. There was no prejudice. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 763-764; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106.)