Opinion ID: 2542673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: This court has repeatedly announced that, when passing on the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or a jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. State v. Viglielmo, 105 Hawai`i 197, 202-03, 95 P.3d 952, 957-58 (2004) (citations omitted) (format altered). Substantial evidence is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. State v. Pone, 78 Hawai`i 262, 265, 892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). Hicks maintains that the trial court erred in denying his oral motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for new trial because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that the HYCF is a state correctional facility and that Complainant was an imprisoned person. Hicks specifically argues that no representative of the facility administration or Department of Human Services testified to the character of the HYCF or legal status of the minor wards. Thus, Hicks asserts that [c]haracterization of the facility as a prison by lay employees and the wards does not suffice to establish that [Complainant] was imprisoned. As quoted supra, HRS § 707-732(1)(e) provides that a person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if: (e) The person, while employed: (i) In a state correctional facility [] . . . . . . . knowingly subjects to sexual contact an imprisoned person, a person confined to a detention facility, a person committed to the director of public safety, a person residing in a private correctional facility operating in the State of Hawai`i, or a person in custody, or causes the person to have sexual contact with the actor[.] (Emphases added.)
Hicks appears to argue that the HYCF does not fall within the phrase state correctional facility because a youth correctional facility  like the HYCF  is separate and different from the prison system. Hicks asserts that, [i]n a juvenile facility[,] the focus is on rehabilitation. He also asserts that [t]he Department of Public Safety controls jails and prisons while the Department of Human Services is responsible for juveniles. Accordingly, Hicks submits that adult prisoners and juvenile wards are not the same for purposes of sexual assault. In other words, Hicks implicitly contends that only an adult state correctional facility under the supervision of the Director of Public Safety can be a state correctional facility. The phrase state correctional facility is not defined anywhere in the Hawai`i Penal Code, i.e., HRS chapter 701 to chapter 712A, including the pertinent definition section of HRS chapter 707, which contains the sexual assault statutes. Hicks, thus, urges this court to limit the meaning of the subject phrase essentially to only adult correctional facilities  and not juvenile facilities. Such restriction, however, is inappropriate in light of the general principles of statutory construction that courts [are to] give words their ordinary meaning unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation. Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai`i 1, 10, 889 P.2d 685, 694 (1995) (citation omitted); see also HRS § 1-14 (1993) (The words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification, without attending so much to the literal and strictly grammatical construction of the words as to their general or popular use or meaning.) By its plain and obvious meaning, the phrase correctional facility undoubtedly encompasses youth correctional facilities. Absent from the Hawai`i Penal Code, including HRS § 707-732, is any language limiting the scope of the correctional facility to adult correctional facilities. In fact, in 2002 and 2004, the legislature expanded HRS § 707-732(1)(e) to include persons employed not only in state correctional facilities, but also to those employed (ii) By a private company providing services at a correctional facility; (iii) By a private company providing community-based residential services to persons committed to the director of public safety and having received notice of this statute; (iv) By a private correctional facility operating in the State of Hawai`i; or (v) As a law enforcement officer as defined in section 710-1000(13)[.] HRS § 707-732(1)(e) (emphases added); see 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 36, § 2 at 107; 2004 Haw. Sess. L. Act 61, § 5 at 304. Specifically, the legislature stated that the purpose for the expansion of the statute was to ensur[e] that sexual offenses committed by any correctional facility employee against inmates are prohibited, regardless of the employer, Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2913, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1403 (emphasis added), and to provide[ ] needed protection to persons under the custody of the state,  Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 88, in 2002 House Journal, at 1268 (emphasis added). See also Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3162, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1509. Stated differently, the legislature's focus was on ensuring that the legislation covered employees of all correctional institutions intended to be included, and not on defining strictly exclusive categories. Thus, the type of agency overseeing the youth correctional facility is not determinative as to whether the facility is a correctional facility. It follows then that Hicks's argument that the HYCF is not governed by the Department of Public Safety does not exclude the HYCF from the phrase correctional facility. Accordingly, by its ordinary meaning, we believe that the phrase correctional facility must be construed to include a youth correctional facility, such as the HYCF. However, the issue remains whether a youth correctional facility  specifically, the HYCF  is a state correctional facility. HRS chapter 352, entitled Youth Correctional Facilities, does not expressly provide that a youth correctional facility is a state correctional facility. Nonetheless, the legislature, in enunciating the purpose of the youth correctional facilities, clearly indicated that: (a) This chapter creates within the department of human services, and to be placed within the office of youth services under the supervision of the director [, i.e., the executive director of the office of youth services,] and such other subordinates as the director shall designate, the Hawai`i youth correctional facilities, in order to provide for the incarceration, punishment, and institutional care and services to reintegrate into their communities and families, children committed by the courts of the State. HRS § 352-2.1(a) (1993) (emphases added). HRS § 352-8 (1993 & Supp.2005) further provides in relevant part that the director shall be the guardian of every youth committed to or received at the Hawai`i youth correctional facilities. Accordingly, inasmuch as HRS chapter 352 clearly mandates that youth correctional facilities be placed under the supervision of a Hawai`i agency, i.e., the Department of Human Services, we hold, as a matter of law, that the HYCF is a state correctional facility. [4] The dispositive issue, however, is whether there was credible evidence of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a juror of reasonable caution to support a conclusion that Hicks was employed by the HYCF, which, as we have previously concluded, is a state correctional facility. Hicks did not dispute that he was a YCO employed by the HYCF. Indeed, Hicks testified that he worked (1) as a YCO at the HYCF since 1980 and (2) in Module B on January 21, 2004 from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Thus, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to enable the jury to conclude that Hicks was employed in a state correctional facility.
Next, Hicks maintains that there was insufficient evidence to establish that a minor  in this case, Complainant  committed to the HYCF, is an imprisoned person because, in juvenile proceedings and juvenile facilities, the focus is on rehabilitation. Hicks again states that [p]risons and [y]outh [c]orrectional [f]acilities are operated by separate department[s] of the [e]xecutive branch of government. He argues that a juvenile ward of the court is not a prisoner: Wards in the HYCF are a separate class of individuals, as evidenced by the insistence of the Department of Human Services on referral to them as such, rather than as inmates or prisoners. In response, the prosecution asserts that the plain reading of the phrase an imprisoned person as used in HRS § 707-732(1)(e) encompasses juveniles confined to a youth correctional facility because: It would be absurd to believe that the legislature intended to punish guards for sexual [contact] with adults in an adult correctional facility, but not to punish guards for sexual [contact] with juveniles confined in a youth correctional facility like [the] HYCF, simply because they fall under the supervision of a different State department. This absurd result would be inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme for sexual offenses, which evidences a strong legislative intent to provide more, not less, protection for minors against sexual offenders. Further, the prosecution contends that, [v]iewing all of the evidence in the strongest light for the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the trier of fact, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude that Complainant was an imprisoned person. Like the phrase state correctional facility, the word imprisoned is not defined anywhere in the Hawai`i Penal Code. Thus, the undefined word must be read to bear its common, ordinary or usual meaning. Saranillio, 78 Hawai`i at 10, 889 P.2d at 694; see also HRS § 1-14. The Webster Third New International Dictionary (1993) defines imprison as to put in prison: confine in a jail. Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). Consequently, the issue before this court is whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Complainant was confined to the HYCF. In the present case, the testimony of Marciel and Haina clearly support the conclusion that Complainant was confined to the HYCF. For example, Marciel testified that her YCO job duties involved security[,] custody and control of wards and further explained that the wards are troubled youths that have been sentenced to prison. . . . They're in jail, and I'm a correctional officer for the youth. Thus, the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Complainant was confined and, therefore, an imprisoned person. [5] Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Hicks' oral motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial.