Opinion ID: 2387194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expansion of Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc.

Text: In our decision in Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991), we recognized the dual persona doctrine as an exception to the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. In Thomas , the claim involved a corporation that later merged with the claimant's employer. Under those particular facts, we held that the exclusivity provisions do not bar a tort action against the employer, where the injured employee had a valid third-party claim against the alleged tortfeasor on the date of his injury and the tortfeasor later merged with the injured worker's employer. Thomas, 306 Ark. at 234-35, 812 S.W.2d 673. We also noted that the claim was not against the employer in its capacity as employer but as the successor corporation to the alleged tortfeasor. Id. The appellants' argument that our holding in Thomas should be extended to embrace a situation where the injury occurred some three years after the corporate merger is unpersuasive. First, the Thomas decision explicitly states that its holding is limited to the particular facts of that case. Second, the appellants' reliance on Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 412 N.E.2d 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980), is misplaced. Although we looked to Billy in our Thomas decision as one of the first cases to adopt the dual-persona theory, the facts underlying Billy are distinguishable from the instant case. The injured employee in Billy was permitted to maintain a suit against his employer, who had merged with two other corporations prior to the date of the injury, like the instant case. However, the product that resulted in the injury was manufactured and installed by the two merged corporations prior to the merger. Had the plaintiff in Billy not been permitted to sue the employer-manufacturer, the plaintiff would have been barred from any products-liability action against the manufacturer and installer of the defective product. In that vein, the Billy court noted that through the employer's merger with two other companies, the employer voluntarily assumed any obligations that those corporations may have had to individuals who might suffer injury as a result of a defect in their product.  (Emphasis added.) Billy, 51 N.Y.2d at 161-62, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 412 N.E.2d 934. Here, the appellees neither manufactured nor installed the die-cast machine prior to the merger, and the appellants were not barred from maintaining an action against the die-cast machine's manufacturer, Cleveland Automatic Machine Company. Third, the legislature reacted to the Thomas decision by adopting amendments to section 11-9-105(a) that abrogate the dual-persona exception. It would be unreasonable for this court to expand a doctrine that is now clearly defunct and that the legislature has unequivocally annulled. Notably, in section 11-9-107(e), the legislature stated that a purpose of the section was to annul any inconsistent case law, including Thomas . Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that the facts of the instant case do not warrant an expansion of the dual-persona exception adopted by this court in Thomas .