Opinion ID: 1247623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Remedies, Reimbursement and Procedure

Text: To the extent that plaintiffs could, within the purview of their pleadings, establish in further proceedings that the State Bar has used mandatory membership dues of objecting members in excess of its legal authority to expend funds, or in violation of the First Amendment principles I have discussed, plaintiffs should be entitled to the declaratory relief they seek. To the extent that they have established or could establish that funds were spent in excess of governing legal authority, they should also be entitled to injunctive relief to prevent such expenditures in the future. ( Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 223.)
Plaintiffs have requested no monetary relief from the State Bar itself. [11] The only monetary relief plaintiffs have requested is for an injunction [or writ of mandate to] issue compelling respondent and defendant members of the Board of Governors to reimburse the Treasury of the State Bar of California for all State Bar funds wrongly expended. The State Bar, however, has not sought reimbursement from defendant governors and the authority of plaintiffs to seek reimbursement on the bar's behalf is dubious at best, as evidenced by plaintiffs' failure to assert any such authority. In any event, I agree with the majority that the governors cannot be held personally liable for reimbursement to the State Bar in view of the historical practices of the bar and in the absence of any record showing the governors knew any expenditures were unauthorized or failed to exercise reasonable diligence in authorizing the subject expenditures. ( Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 226-227.)
As to expenditures in violation of the First Amendment, the Constitution requires the bar to adopt procedures to allow members to identify the expenditures to which they may legitimately object and to prevent the bar from utilizing objecting members' dues for such purposes. ( Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 302-303 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 244-245, 106 S.Ct. at pp. 1073-1074]; Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at p. 237, fn. 35 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 285-286].) The majority has described such a procedure as an extraordinary burden. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1165.) The procedure the majority envisions would require the bar, whenever [it] proposed to advise the Legislature or the courts of its views on a matter, [to] first ... engage in the three-step analysis set out in Ellis v. Railway Clerks (1984) 466 U.S. 435 [80 L.Ed.2d 428, 104 S.Ct. 1883]. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1165, italics added.) While the procedure envisioned by the majority might be an extraordinary burden, the procedure mandated by the United States Supreme Court is not nearly so onerous. As Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 307 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 247, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1076] makes clear, `[a]bsolute precision' in the calculation of the charge to [objecting members] cannot be `expected or required.' [Citations.] Thus, for instance, the [association] cannot be faulted for calculating its fee on the basis of its expenses during the preceding year. The [association] need not provide [objecting members] with an exhaustive and detailed list of all its expenditures, but adequate disclosure surely would include the major categories of expenses, as well as verification by an independent auditor. ( Id. at p. 307, fn. 18 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 247, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1076].) Therefore, contrary to the majority's assumption, the State Bar would not have to perform the three-step Ellis analysis prior to each instance in which it seeks to advise the Legislature or the courts of its view on a matter. Instead, according to Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292 [106 S.Ct. 1066], the the constitutional requirements for the [association's] collection of... fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending. ( Id. at p. 310 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 249, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1078].) Since the bar already is statutorily required to submit detailed budgets to the Legislature prior to obtaining approval for setting members' annual dues (Bus. and Prof. Code, § 6140.1), the argument that the constitutionally mandated procedure would create an extraordinary burden for the bar is unpersuasive. While such a procedure would likely result in some additional administrative burden to the bar and perhaps prove at times to be somewhat inconvenient, such additional burden or inconvenience is hardly sufficient to justify contravention of the constitutional mandate. It is noteworthy that unions representing government employees have developed, and have operated successfully within the parameters of, Abood procedures for over a decade. [12] (See Morris, The Developing Labor Law (2d ed. 1983) ch. 29, p. 1417.) Indeed, the Michigan State Bar has operated under a modified Abood procedure since 1985. (Admin. Order No. 1985-1 (1985) 420 Mich. lviii.) I have no doubt whatever the State Bar could, by adapting the Hudson procedures or otherwise, devise procedures that are workable, practical and meet the constitutional requirements set out in Teachers v. Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292.