Opinion ID: 148501
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: SVPA: Civil or Criminal?

Text: In determining whether the SVPA should be properly categorized civil or criminal in nature, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In Hendricks, the Supreme Court considered various constitutional challenges to a statute enacted by the State of Kansas which provided for the involuntary confinement of persons classified as “sexually violent predators.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5929a01 et seq. (2009).9 The Hendricks Court began its analysis of the Kansas statute at issue (hereinafter a hearing within twenty days of the commitment order. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.29(a). The maximum length of commitment that may result before a hearing and the participation of the offender/defendant is therefore twenty days. Moreover, in the case of an inmate scheduled for release, like Aruanno, the temporary commitment is accomplished by the submission of two statements prepared by medical professionals, one of whom must be a psychiatrist, certifying that he is a sexually violent predator in need of involuntary commitment. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.28(c). Indeed, In re Commitment of M.M., 894 A.2d 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), cited by the dissent, is largely inapposite and in any event acknowledges that the twenty-day statutory period is constitutionally reasonable. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), is not apposite either. Vitek merely held that a prisoner is entitled to due process protections before being transferred to a psychiatric facility. As noted in text, we have followed Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), holding that the Kansas SVPA does not violate constitutional guarantees of due process, and we have therefore concluded that the New Jersey SVPA is similarly constitutional. 9 The Hendricks analysis is of particular significance to the instant case, since New Jersey’s SVPA “is virtually identical to the language of the Kansas SVPA challenged in Hendricks . . . .” In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 211 (N.J. 2002); compare N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.24 et seq. with Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq. 9 “K-SVPA”) with an examination of “whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” 521 U.S. at 361. The Court observed the K-SVPA’s placement in the Kansas probate code rather than the criminal code, and the Kansas legislature’s own reference to the legislation as creating a “civil commitment procedure.” Id. The Court suggested that the statute served neither of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment – not retribution because the statute did not “affix culpability for prior criminal conduct” or require a finding of scienter – and not deterrence because by definition, committees suffered from “mental abnormality” which prevented them from controlling their behavior. Id. at 362. Next, the Court rejected Hendricks’ contentions that the potentially indefinite length of his commitment and the presence of certain procedural protections more typically found in criminal statutes rendered the proceedings essentially criminal. Id. at 363-65. Finally, the Court was unpersuaded by Hendricks’ argument that the statute’s failure to provide treatment for committed offenders revealed its criminal character. The Court concluded: Where the State has disavowed any punitive intent; limited confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated from the general prison population and afforded the same status as others who have been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive intent. We therefore hold that the Act does not establish criminal proceedings and that involuntary confinement under the Act is not punitive. 10 Id. at 368-69. Like the K-SVPA, the SVPA is not part of New Jersey’s criminal code,10 and the language of the statute describes its procedure as a civil commitment process which recognizes “the need for commitment of those sexually violent predators who pose a danger to others should they be returned to society.” N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.25(c). Although this label is not entirely dispositive, it places the burden on Aruanno to provide “the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)) (alterations and internal quotations omitted). Aruanno cannot meet this burden. Although facilities housing committed sex offenders are managed by the Department of Corrections, the SVPA requires that offenders subject to civil commitment be housed separately from offenders under the general supervision of the Department of Corrections. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.34(a). The SVPA also requires that the Department of Human Services provide treatment that is “appropriately tailored to address the specific needs of sexually violent predators.” N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.34(b). Finally, like the K-SVPA, the SVPA provides for reevaluation of involuntarily committed persons every year. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.35. Committees may also be 10 Title 30 of the New Jersey Statutes is captioned “Institutions and Agencies.” 11 authorized by members of the treatment staff to file a petition for discharge from involuntary commitment. N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.36. Under the framework established in Hendricks, we hold that the New Jersey SVPA serves an essentially regulatory civil function. Having thus established the proper context in which to evaluate the constitutionality of the SVPA, we now proceed to analyze the merits of Aruanno’s four challenges to its procedures.