Opinion ID: 170931
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spillover

Text: Mr. Wright's memorandum in support of his motion for severance did not explicitly cite a specific trial right that would be compromised by a joint trial. Instead, he articulated a fear that he would be found guilty by association because the jury could not realistically be expected to compartmentalize and segregate that which applies only to Defendant Anthony Wright as distinguished from that which implicates only co-defendant Jones. Rec. vol. I, doc. 126, at 6, 7. Yet, his filings before the court failed to discuss any specific evidence that might prejudice his defense, and he offered no explanation of his theory that jurors could not be expected to separate evidence of Ms. Jones's drug trafficking from evidence of bank fraud and conspiracy against him. On appeal, Mr. Wright argues that he was prejudiced by a spillover effect at trial, although his spillover theory before this court differs somewhat from the one articulated in his motion for severance. In particular, he observes that counsel for Ms. Jones elicited testimony from a government witness regarding his alleged drug dealing and made comments about the same in her opening and closing statements, evidently for the purpose of suggesting that Mr. Wright  and not Ms. Jones  was responsible for the marijuana Secret Service agents found in Ms. Jones's vehicle. During her opening statement, counsel for Ms. Jones forecasted, You will hear testimony from different witnesses that Mr. Wright is the person who sells marijuana. Rec. vol. VI., at 175. The district court then allowed Ms. Jones to elicit from Mr. Freeman that he had purchased marijuana from Mr. Wright in 2005 and watched Mr. Wright sell marijuana to others on more than twenty occasions. Mr. Wright further observes that counsel for Ms. Jones asked Mr. Burton, [Y]ou have known Mr. Wright to sell drugs before? Aplt. Wright's Br. at 20 (quoting Rec. vol. VII, at 171). However, the district court did not permit Mr. Burton to answer that question. Finally, Mr. Wright notes that counsel for Ms. Jones referred to his alleged drug dealing in her closing statement. Though the district court allowed Ms. Jones to establish the possibility that she was unaware of the presence of drugs in her vehicle by permitting her to suggest that Mr. Wright had placed them there, it wisely chose to hedge against possible prejudice to Mr. Wright by giving several limiting instructions. Following Mr. Freeman's testimony the court addressed the jury: Ladies and gentlemen, one limiting instruction. When Mr. Freeman was testifying about his drug transactions with Mr. Wright, you will remember that Mr. Wright is not charged with dealing drugs and, therefore, that testimony is not relevant to the charges against Mr. Wright in this case and should not be considered by you when you are considering Mr. Wright's liability or not for the charges against him. Rec. vol. VI, at 246-247. Further, the court's final jury instructions directed the members to separately consider the evidence against each defendant on each count and return a separate verdict for each count and return a separate verdict for each defendant. Rec. vol. I, doc. 172, at 5 (instr. no. 4). The court also reminded jurors that [t]he defendants are not on trial for any act, conduct, or crime not charged in the superceding indictment. Id. at 15 (instr. no. 14). The Supreme Court has observed that, in the context of joint trials, limiting instructions [ ] often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. As noted above, notwithstanding Mr. Wright's contentions, as a general rule, we presume that juries follow [limiting] instructions. Lane, 883 F.2d at 1498. See also United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 668 (10th Cir.1989) ([T]hat juries can and will follow the instructions they are given is fundamental to our system of justice.). In this case, we see no reason to conclude that the jury did not follow the court's limiting instructions. Further, Mr. Freeman's testimony and the comments of Ms. Jones's attorney would not have helped the government establish the elements of bank fraud and conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Wright has called our attention to no other evidence of prejudice with respect to his spillover claim, and our review of the record has uncovered none. As a general rule, neither a mere allegation that defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial nor an argument that evidence against one defendant would have a spillover effect on another defendant demonstrates prejudice. Small, 423 F.3d at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 ([I]t is well settled that defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.). Having found no basis to conclude either that the district court abused its discretion or that Mr. Wright was prejudiced by the joinder, we affirm the district court's decision to deny his motion for severance.