Opinion ID: 2744103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stipulation to Charge 2

Text: Charge 2 alleged that Mr. Wrocklage copied Ms. Berglund on an email having the TECS report as an attachment. It noted that the TECS report contained Mr. Miller’s protected personal information and stated that WROCKLAGE v. DHS 5 Mr. Wrocklage was “not authorized to disclose this information to Ms. Berglund.” During an oral reply to the Agency regarding the proposed removal, Mr. Wrocklage’s Union representative stated that “the Union does not dispute that the Agency will likely be able to prove the charges of improper possession of TECs information and unauthorized disclosure of TECs information.” J.A. 45. The deciding official at the Agency found that “there is no factual dispute regarding either charge 1 or charge 2.” J.A. 56. Mr. Wrocklage appealed his removal to the Board. The AJ sustained Charge 2 indicating that the parties had “stipulated to the factual accuracy of this charge.” J.A. 119. As the Board explained, Mr. Wrocklage argued that “the administrative judge erroneously treated his stipulation to the underlying facts regarding his disclosure as a stipulation to the legal conclusion that his actions were unauthorized.” J.A. 9. The Board nonetheless found that when Mr. Wrocklage “stipulated to the factual circumstances as stated in charges one and two,” the charges could be sustained. J.A. 9. We do not agree. As an initial matter, neither the statute nor the regulations governing appeals to the Board limit the defenses that an employee can raise to only those raised before the Agency. Thus, Mr. Wrocklage is free to argue his interpretation of “disclosure” to the Board regardless of whether he made this argument to the Agency during its determination of what action to take against him. It is not waived when presented for the first time to the Board. On appeal, the government argues that Mr. Wrock- lage conceded Charge 2 and that therefore the agency did not need to demonstrate that any disclosure actually occurred. Resp. Br. 11. The government points to two purported concessions. First, the government relies upon a statement in a status conference with the administrative judge that “the parties stipulated to the factual accuracy of this charge.” Resp. Br. at 10. We do not interpret this as a concession that Charge 2 has been 6 WROCKLAGE v. DHS established. It is correct that parties in a Merit Systems Protection Board proceeding “may stipulate to any matter of fact.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.63. Mr. Wrocklage stipulated to the facts of Charge 2 – that he sent the email with the TECS report attached. However, stipulating to the underlying facts does not satisfy the Agency’s burden where, as in this case, Mr. Wrocklage was contesting whether those facts gave rise to a violation. In his Brief in Support of Appellant’s Defense filed with the Board, Mr. Wrocklage argued that “TECS information was never disclosed . . . the information in question must be imparted before a disclosure can be complete. . . . Since Ms. Berglund did not view the attachments, the information contained therein was never imparted and there was never the disclosure necessary to trigger the Privacy Act.” J.A. 116. Stipulating to the facts is not a concession to the charge that the conduct constituted an unauthorized disclosure, which requires a legal analysis. The Board’s finding of “unauthorized disclosure” in this case depends on whether the conduct constituted a disclosure under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The second “concession,” according to the government, came during Mr. Wrocklage’s deposition when he characterized what his Union representative had said at the oral hearing before the Agency prior to the initiation of the Board appeal. Resp. Br. at 10. We agree with Mr. Wrocklage that his deposition testimony is not a concession that his conduct constituted an unauthorized disclosure. Mr. Wrocklage’s testimony was not that he was conceding Charge 2 before the Board, but rather his interpretation of what his Union representative had stated to the Agency before it had even decided to remove him. This is not a concession which prevents him from disputing Charge 2 in his Board appeal. WROCKLAGE v. DHS 7