Opinion ID: 2982465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Michigan ELCRA

Text: Last, Loosvelt argues that Wells’s ELCRA claim must fail because it is predicated on federal constitutional challenges, and Michigan law dictates that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for such actions. But Wells correctly points out that we lack interlocutory jurisdiction to consider this argument because Michigan governmental immunity applies only to tort claims, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407, and so Mich. Ct. R. 7.202 provides no jurisdictional basis. Loosvelt responds that the ELCRA claim is “inextricably intertwined” with Wells’s § 1983 claims, and thus the court may exercise pendent jurisdiction. “[S]uch jurisdiction only may be exercised when the appealable issue at hand cannot be resolved without addressing the nonappealable collateral issue.” Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 797 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, Wells’s ELCRA allegations stand separate from his federal constitutional allegations (compare R. 24, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7083 with id. ¶¶ 1942); Loosvelt’s contrary characterization of Wells’s claims finds no support in the record. And none of the cases cited by Loosvelt stands for the proposition that § 1983 necessarily supplants ELCRA claims. Indeed, none even mentions the ELCRA. See Khan v. City of Flint, 800 N.W.2d 600, 600 (Mich. 2011) (holding that § 1983 “is the exclusive remedy for alleged federal constitutional violations”); Jones v. Powell, 612 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Mich. 2000) (per curiam) (no inferred damages remedy for violations of Michigan Constitution against municipalities or government employees sued in - 13 - Case No. 13-2127 Wells v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms individual capacities); Patton v. Vill. Of Cassopolis, No. 301754, 2012 WL 205832, at  (Mich.