Opinion ID: 2402652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Getlan Complaint

Text: The first hearing on April 24, 1962 was on a complaint filed with the Commissioner by Benjamin Getlan against Caswell G. Nuger. Mr. Getlan testified before the Commissioner that on August 17, 1961, he applied for a policy of automobile liability insurance through Mr. Groupp, of the Groupp Insurance Agency, and Mr. Groupp applied to Mr. Nuger for coverage for Mr. Getlan. This application, Mr. Getlan testified, was made by telephone in Mr. Getlan's presence. Mr. Groupp then gave Mr. Getlan a UCJ 1 form indicating that Mr. Getlan was insured by National Mutual Insurance Company. In August, 1961, Mr. Getlan was involved in an automobile accident; he turned over the UCJ 1 form to the Department of Motor Vehicles. A short time later, he completed an accident report which he obtained from Mr. Groupp's office; Mr. Groupp was not then present but Mr. Nuger was. Mr. Nuger, according to Mr. Getlan, took the executed forms and stated he would have them completed and forwarded directly to the Department of Motor Vehicles. During the next several weeks, Mr. Getlan testified, he called Mr. Nuger almost every day and visited his office on numerous occasions in an effort to obtain a copy of his policy. Mr. Nuger repeatedly assured him that his policy would arrive shortly from Washington. Mr. Getlan's son, an attorney, called the National Mutual Insurance Company in Washington and was informed that that company had no record of such a policy or an application for a policy. Mr. Getlan then went to the Department of Motor Vehicles and was informed that the accident report which he said he had given Mr. Nuger to file had not in fact been filed. Mr. Nuger stated, according to Mr. Getlan, that he had given the insurance application to another agent, who had failed to place the policy, and suggested that Mr. Getlan allow him to sue the other agent and the National Mutual Insurance Company. He also offered, according to Mr. Getlan, to pay for a financial responsibility bond and to obtain witnesses. Mr. Getlan rejected the offer. Mr. Getlan's son testified that, on his father's behalf, he had called Mr. Nuger several times and was told by him that the policy from National Mutual was slow in coming over. Mr. Nuger denied telling Mr. Getlan that he was insured by National Mutual and asserted that he had told Mr. Getlan's son his father was not insured and never was. He denied issuing or signing the UCJ 1 form or any connection therewith. He admitted, however, that he had received the Department of Motor Vehicle accident report and had sent it in for Mr. Getlan, although, evidently, it was not received. At the hearing before the lower court on appeal, Mr. Groupp, who had not appeared before the Commissioner, testified that he never gave the UCJ 1 form to Mr. Getlan and could not verify the signature which appeared on the back of the form. He testified further that he had not instructed anyone to issue the form to Mr. Getlan. On cross-examination, Mr. Groupp admitted that at the time referred to, he was not a solicitor or agent for National Mutual Insurance Company and that his insurance license had been revoked in November, 1962. The credibility of the witnesses was originally for the Commissioner to determine. There was ample relevant testimony which, if believed by the Commissioner, as it evidently was, supported his finding that Mr. Nuger deliberately misrepresented to Mr. Getlan and his son that he was covered by a policy of automobile liability insurance with the National Mutual Insurance Company. As we have pointed out, the provisions in respect of the judicial review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act are applicable in this case, whether the old law is applicable, or whether the similar provisions in the new law apply. While it appears that the scope of judicial review by a trial court of the findings, inferences, conclusions and decisions of administrative agencies under the statute has been broadened to some extent, it is clear that the statute [the Administrative Procedure Act] did not intend that the court should substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken (Citations omitted). Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm., 221 Md. 221, 230, 156 A.2d 657 (1959), appeal dismissed 363 U.S. 419 (1960); State Board v. Ruth, 223 Md. 428, 436, 165 A.2d 145 (1960). It was for the lower court to decide the credibility and weight of the additional testimony before it. There was ample ground for the court to find, even in the light of the additional testimony, that the finding of the Commissioner that the Act had been wilfully violated was supported by competent, material and substantial evidence, in view of the entire record, and was not against the weight of the evidence.