Opinion ID: 613134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crime of Violence and Career-Offender Status

Text: This court reviews de novo the district court's determinations that Mr. Perez-Jiminez's instant offense of conviction is a crime of violence, United States v. Riggans, 254 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.2001), and that Mr. Perez-Jiminez qualifies as a career offender, United States v. Patterson, 561 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir.2009). The district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Patterson, 561 F.3d at 1172.
Under the Guidelines, [a] defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Mr. Perez-Jiminez and the government agree that he meets the first and third prongs for career-offender status, and it is obvious that Mr. Perez-Jiminez's instant offense of conviction is not a controlled-substance offense. Accordingly, in deciding whether Mr. Perez-Jiminez is a career offender, we need only decide whether his instant offense of conviction  possession of a weapon in prison  is a crime of violence. A crime of violence is defined as any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that  (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). The parties agree that Mr. Perez-Jiminez's conviction ... is punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, does not involve physical force, and is not one of the crimes enumerated in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Aplee. Br. at 12; see Aplt. Opening Br. at 14 ([T]he only way this offense can be classified as a crime of violence is if it `otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.' (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2))). Therefore, in ruling on whether Mr. Perez-Jiminez's instant offense of conviction is a crime of violence  and thus whether he is a career offender  we must only determine whether his offense falls within U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)'s residual clause because the offense involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
To determine whether a past conviction is for a crime of violence, we employ a categorical approach that looks to the words of the statute and judicial decisions interpreting it, rather than to the conduct of any particular defendant convicted of the crime. United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir.2010) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3710 (2011). [I]f the statute encompasses both conduct that would qualify as a crime of violence and conduct that would not, we employ a modified categorical approach, under which we look to the statutory elements, the defendant's charging documents, plea agreement and colloquy (if any), and uncontested facts found by the district judge to determine whether the particular defendant's conduct violated the portion of the statute that is a crime of violence. Id. These categorical approaches do not involve a subjective inquiry into the facts of the case. United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 825 (10th Cir.2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3710 (2011). However, our precedent explicitly permits the use of a conduct-specific inquiry when considering whether the instant offense is a crime of violence. Riggans, 254 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 731 n. 10 (10th Cir.1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the conduct-specific inquiry, the court correctly consider[s] the facts underlying [the defendant's] conviction in determining whether it is for a crime of violence. [3] Id. Although we have explained that the practical difficulties of conducting an ad hoc mini-trial[] require application of the categorical approach to past convictions, we may apply a conduct-specific inquiry to instant offenses because these concerns do not apply when the court is examining the conduct of the defendant in the instant offense. Id. at 1203-04 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Perez-Jiminez concedes that we must apply a conduct-specific approach to determine whether his instant offense of conviction is a crime of violence. [4] See, e.g., Aplt. Reply Br. at 8 (Mr. Perez-Jiminez agrees with the government that this Court's current precedent requires it to apply a factual `conduct-specific' approach in this case.). Looking to the facts of his instant offense of conviction, we have little difficulty concluding that Mr. Perez-Jiminez's offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and, therefore, constituted a crime of violence. [5] Mr. Perez-Jiminez, a federal inmate, was found in possession of two shanks, each of which was approximately five-and-a-half inches long and sharpened to a point. It is patent that such shanks are a deadly weapon. Indeed, both the Supreme Court and this court have characterized similar weapons as deadly. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 408, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (characterizing a knife as a deadly weapon), overruled in part on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); United States v. Johnson, 967 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir.1992) (same), abrogated in part on other grounds by Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 162, 118 S.Ct. 1135, 140 L.Ed.2d 271 (1998); United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 430 (10th Cir.1981) ([T]he knife in question had a blade at least five inches long.... [S]uch a weapon was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, ... [and] no reasonable jury could find otherwise. The knife was therefore a deadly weapon as a matter of law....); United States v. Davidson, 597 F.2d 230, 232 (10th Cir.1979) (A deadly weapon was used, namely a dining room knife sharpened to a point, with a homemade handle affixed thereto.). Furthermore, the penal context in which Mr. Perez-Jiminez possessed this deadly weapon is a significant factor in our analysis. [P]risons are inherently dangerous places and they present unique problems. United States v. Vahovick, 160 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir.1998); accord United States v. Rodriguez-Jaimes, 481 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir.2007). They are necessarily dangerous places; they house society's most antisocial and violent people in close proximity with one another. Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 858, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint....). Thus, it has been said that acts of violence by inmates against inmates are inevitable, Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 273 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 980 (4th Cir.1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted), as it is virtually impossible to eliminate violence among the incarcerated, id. at 273 n. 6. In prison, contraband weapons ... facilitate more frequent acts of violence and more severe injuries. Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 991 (4th Cir.1985) (Sprouse, J., dissenting). Such weapons may embolden inmates who [otherwise] would be less aggressive, and will inflict substantially more severe injuries when they are wielded. Id. Put succinctly, possessing a dangerous or deadly weapon in prison enables violence. United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 712 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 825 (8th Cir.2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir.2010) (A prisoner in possession of a deadly weapon within a penal institution is significantly more likely to attack or physically resist an apprehender, such as a guard, or another inmate.). Outside of prison, [t]he felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm, although disobeying the law, may have a legitimate use intended for the firearm, such as target shooting or collecting. United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir.1993)); accord Marquez, 626 F.3d at 222 (A felon may be in possession of certain firearms, such as a pistol or hunting rifle, for recreational purposes, even though that possession is unlawful.); Vahovick, 160 F.3d at 397-98. But there is no similarly `innocent' purpose behind the possession of a deadly weapon by a prison inmate, Young, 990 F.2d at 472, as [t]he confines of prison preclude any recreational uses for a deadly weapon, Romero, 122 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Young, 990 F.2d at 472). [T]here is no legitimate purpose for a prisoner to carry a weapon `designed to kill, injure or disable' another. On the contrary, the only reason to carry such a weapon is to use it to attack another or to deter an attack. Romero, 122 F.3d at 1343; accord Marquez, 626 F.3d at 222-23 ([T]here is no purpose for possession of a deadly weapon in prison other than to have the means to initiate violence or respond to violence with violence.). And an inmate's possession of a weapon in prison indicates his willingness to use it. See Boyce, 633 F.3d at 712 (When a prisoner carries a dangerous weapon, that behavior indicates that he is `prepared to use violence if necessary' and is ready `to enter into conflict....' (quoting Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1335-36)); Marquez, 626 F.3d at 222 ([A]t a minimum his intentional possession of a deadly weapon signals his willingness to use it if, in his mind, the occasion warrants it.); Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1335 (Mr. Zuniga's possession of a deadly weapon in prison likely indicated that he was prepared to use violence if necessary. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Perez-Jiminez's possession in prison of a deadly weapon  two sharpened, five-and-a-half-inch-long shanks  presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. [6] Mr. Perez-Jiminez's instant offense of conviction was therefore a crime of violence, and the district court properly sentenced him as a career offender.