Opinion ID: 1689270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether an overt act sufficient to constitute attempted sexual battery was proven?

Text: ¶ 5. Ishee contends that the indictment fails to allege that he attempted to commit sexual battery. The indictment alleges that Ishee attempted to commit sexual battery by asking the said C.G. to engage in fellatio and pointing to his penis.... He also contends that the statutory overt act must be alleged in the indictment as an essential element of the crime. This Court has stated that, [i]n prosecution for an attempt to commit an offense,... it is necessary to charge and prove some overt act done toward commission of offense; an `overt act' being one which manifests intention to commit crime. Dill v. State, 149 Miss. 167, 170, 115 So. 203 (1928). The indictment contains no allegation of acts other than Ishee asking the boy to engage in fellatio and pointing to his penis. Ishee contends that this is not an overt act sufficient to constitute an element of the offense. We disagree. ¶ 6. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-95 (2000), defines sexual battery. It states that [a] person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with: ... (d) [a] child under the age of fourteen (14) years of age, if the person is twenty-four (24) or more months older than the child. Id. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-97 (2000), includes fellatio in its definition of sexual penetration. An attempt consists of three elements: (1) an intent to commit a particular crime; (2) a direct ineffectual act done toward its commission; and (3) the failure to consummate its commission. Bucklew v. State, 206 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss.1968). ¶ 7. It is clear from the facts below that the first and third elements of attempt are met. It is the second element that is the bone of contention between Ishee and the State. As explained by this Court in Bucklew, what is required is an act which goes beyond mere preparation and which is suited for the intended purpose-here, sexual penetration. Id. at 202-03. As we clearly stated in Bucklew, the act may be any act in the series of acts which would ordinarily result in the commission of the crime, and need not be the last or final step in the sequence. Id. In a further attempt to define what constitutes an overt act, we stated: [A]n attempt is a direct movement toward the commission of the crime after the preparations have been made; the defendant's act must be a direct, unequivocal act toward the commission of the intended crime; that his acts must have progressed to the extent of giving him power to commit the offense and nothing but an interruption prevented the commission of the offense; that the defendant's act must reach far enough toward the accomplishment of his intention to commit the offense to amount to a commencement of the consummation or to be a step in the direct movement toward its commission; and that some appreciable fragment of the crime must be committed so that the crime would be completed if the defendant were not interrupted. Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted). ¶ 8. It is clear that [w]henever the design of a person to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in furtherance of this design constitute an `attempt'. Id. at 203 (quoting Williams v. State, 209 Miss. 902, 48 So.2d 598 (1950)). Ishee was charged with attempted sexual battery. According to the statutory definition of this crime, the State had to prove that Ishee attempted to sexually penetrate C.G., but either failed to or was prevented from doing so. From the facts below, there was sufficient evidence that Ishee's intent was to take C.G. to the Wal-Mart bathroom and perform fellatio on him. Toward this goal, Ishee wandered around Wal-Mart, found a young boy alone, approached him, asked him if he could perform fellatio on him, and gestured to his own genitals to explain his request. Ishee's actions went beyond mere preparation to where he clearly began to commit the crime. The only thing that halted the commission of this crime was the boy's refusal, coupled with his leaving Ishee's presence. It would be a stretch of the imagination to accept Ishee's argument that because he did not grab C.G. or attempt to detain him that no overt act occurred. ¶ 9. Ishee further argues that our holding in West v. State, 437 So.2d 1212 (Miss. 1983), supports a claim that he abandoned any attempt to commit the crime by allowing C.G.'s refusal to end the encounter. We stated in West that [t]he gravamen of this offense of attempt is that the accused have done an overt act toward sexual penetration `and be prevented from its commission.' Id. at 1214 (quoting State v. Lindsey, 202 Miss. 896, 899, 32 So.2d 876, 877 (1947)). We further stated that such prevention must result from extraneous causes. Id. In West, the defendant's failure to penetrate was not the product of his victim's admittedly ineffective resistance or the intervention of extraneous causes. Id. Here, the crime involved was perpetuated on a child. And, as a general rule, children react differently than adults. Ishee's request constituted an overt action toward the attempted sexual penetration of a willing child. His attempt was thwarted by the extraneous cause of the boy's refusal. ¶ 10. Based on the evidence presented at trial, a sufficient overt act occurred to justify Ishee's conviction for attempted sexual battery.