Opinion ID: 3030137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Object to the Batson Violation

Text: In his federal habeas petition, Williams alleged that his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.9 The district court correctly concluded that Williams’ trial counsel could have provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a Batson objection even though that case had not been decided at the time of trial. Williams II, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 998. However, the district court, inexplicably, granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Williams “failed to establish that any reasonable attorney under the circumstances would have objected to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges and cannot establish that the objection would have been sustained.” Id. This is simply not so. Because “jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or . . . could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 1034, a COA on Williams’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims should have issued. 9 Williams raised and exhausted this claim in his fourth state habeas petition. WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1337 B. No “Reasonable Professional Judgment” Was Involved Any reasonable attorney under the circumstances of this case would have objected to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to rid the jury of African-Americans. The California Supreme Court cases reversing the judgments of death obtained by the very same prosecutor that tried Williams’ case make clear that defense attorneys were making “Wheeler motions” under similar circumstances at that time. These cases also make clear that if Williams’ trial counsel had made a Wheeler motion, there is a reasonable probability that he would have succeeded. Indeed, trial counsel admits as much. In a sworn declaration, counsel admitted that he was “well aware of People v. Wheeler,” that he noted that the prosecution was striking African-Americans, and that he knew he could make a prima facie showing based on the prosecutor’s striking of three African-Americans under Wheeler. [Declaration of trial counsel, Mar. 23, 1994] (“I . . . do not recall why I did not make a motion pursuant to Wheeler in order to have the prosecutor justify his removal of the black jurors in Mr. Williams’ case. I knew that the exclusion of three jurors of the same race as the defendant in a cross-racial prosecution constituted a prima facie case, which should have shifted the burden to the prosecutor to justify each challenge exercised against one of the black jurors. I was unhappy with the jury in this case. Cocounsel and I exercised all of our peremptory challenges in an attempt to obtain a jury representative of Mr. Williams’ community. The jury that was sworn was not such a representative cross-section.”) We cannot characterize the failure of Williams’ counsel to object to the prosecutor’s discriminatory strikes as a permissible “strategic choice” or “tactical decision.” “While [trial counsel] was not totally clear as to why he did not challenge the jury composition, it is impossible to conclude from his statements that he had made a reasoned, professional judg1338 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD ment that not raising the issue was in [Mr. Williams’] interest.” Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1478 (finding failure to object to racial discrimination in jury selection was ineffective assistance of counsel). How the district court could have held that it was not established that any reasonable attorney would have objected under the circumstances is inexplicable. Williams’ trial counsel knew about Wheeler. He cannot claim ignorance or lack of clarity in the law. Making a Wheeler motion would have preserved a critical constitutional right. The trial attorney missed more than one opportunity to make that simple motion: he could have made the motion after the first strike, the second strike, the third strike, or at the conclusion of jury selection — when he knew the prosecutor’s challenges had resulted in the seating of an all-white jury. Any way you slice it, counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and we should not hesitate to say so. C. Actual Prejudice to Williams’ Defense A petitioner shows prejudice due to ineffective assistance of counsel when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” but “a defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). There is a reasonable probability that, had counsel objected to the prosecutor’s discriminatory strikes, Williams would have succeeded in proving that the prosecutor was engaging in impermissible racial discrimination as prohibited by Batson. This probability is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial because a Batson violation is structural error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (noting that structural defects in the constitution of the WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1339 trial mechanism “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards”); see also United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “[w]e only review for plain error or assess whether an error is harmless when the error is not structural”) (citation omitted)). Additionally, there is prejudice because there is a reasonable probability that had the motion been made, racial discrimination in the jury selection process would have been remedied, and the outcome of either the guilt phase or the penalty phase would have been different. See Part II, supra. The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury . . . [R]acial discrimination in the selection of jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process and places the fairness of a criminal pro- ceeding in doubt. ... A prosecutor’s wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge is a constitutional violation committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings. The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause . . . . Powers, 499 U.S. at 411-13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If our judicial system is to inspire a sense of confidence among the populace, we must not, we cannot permit trials to proceed in the face of blatant, race-based jury selection practices. Failure to grant a COA in this case sends an unmistakable message that the dictates of Batson may be disregarded with impunity. I cannot join that message. PRINTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS BY THOMSON/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted © 2005 Thomson/West.