Opinion ID: 2621124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction.

Text: The Talent Agencies Act specifies that [i]n cases of controversy arising under this chapter, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner, who shall hear and determine the same, subject to an appeal ... to the superior court where the same shall be heard de novo. (§ 1700.44, subd. (a), italics added.) The Commissioner has the authority to hear and determine various disputes, including the validity of artists' manager-artist contracts and the liability of the parties thereunder. ([ Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal. App.2d 347,] 357, 62 Cal.Rptr. 364.) The reference of disputes involving the [A]ct to the Commissioner is mandatory. (Id. at p. 358, 62 Cal.Rptr. 364.) Disputes must be heard by the Commissioner, and all remedies before the Commissioner must be exhausted before the parties can proceed to the superior court. ( Ibid. ) ( REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 494-95, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 639 ( REO Broadcasting) , italics in original; see also Garson v. Div. of Labor Law Enforcement (1949) 33 Cal.2d 861, 864-866, 206 P.2d 368; Collier & Wallis, Ltd., v. Astor (1937) 9 Cal.2d 202, 204-206, 70 P.2d 171; Humes v. MarGil Ventures, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 486, 494-195, 220 Cal.Rptr. 186 ( Humes ); Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 358-359, 62 Cal.Rptr. 364.) When the Talent Agencies Act is invoked in the course of a contract dispute, the Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction to determine his jurisdiction over the matter, including whether the contract involved the services of a talent agency. ( Buchwald v. Katz (1972) 8 Cal.3d 493, 496, 105 Cal.Rptr. 368, 503 P.2d 1376; see Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 360-361, 62 Cal.Rptr. 364.) [6] Having so determined, the Commissioner may declare the contract void and unenforceable as involving the services of an unlicensed person in violation of the Act. (See, e.g., Park, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1468, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 616; REO Broadcasting, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 492, 500, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 639; Humes, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 486, 492, 494-495, 220 Cal.Rptr. 186.) It follows that a claim to this effect must first be submitted to the Commissioner, and that forum must be exhausted, before the matter can be determined by the superior court. Our conclusion that section 1700.44, by its terms, gives the Commissioner exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies arising under the Talent Agencies Act comports with, and applies, the general doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. With limited exceptions, the cases state that where an adequate administrative remedy is provided by statute, resort to that forum is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial consideration of the claim. (E.g., Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316, 5 P.3d 874; Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 495, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 981 P.2d 543; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292-293, 109 P.2d 942 (Abelleira) .) Stevens nonetheless argues that referral to the Commissioner is not necessary when the artist alleges a violation of the Talent Agencies Act solely as a defense in a garden-variety court action for breach of contract. She urges that section 1700.44, subdivision (a) requires referral only of cases (ibid.) arising under the Act. In Stevens's view, a case is limited to a claim for affirmative relief that itself relies on the Act. She insists that when an artist merely asserts the Act as a defense to the agent's civil suit for breach of contract, and seeks no affirmative relief for herself, no case arises for referral to the Commissioner. Stevens misreads the statute. Section 1700.4, subdivision (a) specifies that in all cases of controversy arising under the Talent Agencies Act, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Commissioner. (Italics added.) This broad language plainly requires all such controversies] and dispute[s] between parties to be examined in the first instance by the Commissioner, not merely those controversies] and dispute[s] where the part[y] invoking the Act seeks affirmative relief. [7] A number of courts, and the Commissioner himself, have assumed that even when the Talent Agency Act is first invoked by the defendant in a civil action, and whether or not the defendant seeks affirmative relief, the matter is properly submitted to the Commissioner in the first instance. (See, e.g., Park, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1468-1469, 84 Cal. Rptr.2d 616 [breach of contract suit, defense of illegality based on Act; no indication defendant sought affirmative relief]; REO Broadcasting, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 492, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 [same; defendant originally sought, but ultimately waived, claim for damages]; Humes, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 486, 492, 220 Cal.Rptr. 186 [same; defendant sought return of commissions paid]; Ivy v. Howard (Cal. Lab.Com., Oct. 27, 1994) TAC No. 18-94 [same; no claim for affirmative relief].) [8] This assumption conforms to the general principle that the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to defenses. (E.g., South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon (1977) 18 Cal.3d 832, 836-838, 135 Cal.Rptr. 781, 558 P.2d 867 [landowner who failed to seek coastal zone building permit cannot raise vested rights defense in action for violation of Coastal Zone Conservation Act]; People v. West Publishing Co. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 80, 87-88, 216 P.2d 441 [corporation sued by state for use taxes due cannot raise tax-calculation issues after failing to pursue available administrative remedies]; Aguirre v. Lee (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1654, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 367 [landlord sued for rent control violation cannot raise exemption defense after failing to seek exemption permit from rent control board]; Coit Ranch, supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 52, 56-58, 21 Cal.Rptr. 875 [farmer sued by Director of Agriculture for past-due cantaloupe advertising assessment cannot, for the first time, raise ultra vires defense available in administrative proceedings before the director].) Stevens insists Waisbren, supra, 41 Cal. App.4th 246, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 437 supports a rule that defenses under the Talent Agencies Act need not be submitted to the Commissioner. In Waisbren, artists defending a court suit for breach of contract won summary judgment on grounds the agreement was void as involving unlicensed talent agency services. The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs claims that the mere occasional or incidental procurement of employment for artists requires no license, and that the sanction of voiding the contract was too harsh. (Id. at pp. 251-262, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 437.) As Stevens points out, there is no indication the matter was first submitted to the Commissioner, and the Court of Appeal did not suggest this barred a judicial determination of the merits. However, it appears neither party raised the exhaustion issue in Waisbren, and the Court of Appeal did not address it. An opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein. (E.g., People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 799, fn. 9, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 943, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724, 920 P.2d 669.) Stevens asserts that requiring an artist to submit a mere defense to the Commissioner contravenes the Talent Agencies Act's remedial purposes. To avoid this result, she urges, we should hold the court and the Commissioner have concurrent original jurisdiction in such cases. But the plain meaning of section 1700.44, subdivision (a), and the relevant case law, negate any inference that courts share original jurisdiction with the Commissioner in controversies arising under the Act. On the contrary, the Commissioner's original jurisdiction of such matters is exclusive. Moreover, Stevens's policy arguments are unpersuasive. No reason appears why the Talent Agencies Act's purposes to protect artists from unscrupulous and unqualified talent agencies warrant a conclusion that an artist's claims for affirmative relief under the Act must first be submitted to the Commissioner, but that an artist's defenses under the Act need not be. In both instances, referral to the Commissioner serves the intended purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remediesto reduce the burden on courts while benefiting from the expertise of an agency particularly familiar and experienced in the area. (See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 83, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373 [Department of Fair Housing and Employment]; Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465, 476-77, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 551 P.2d 410 [internal hospital board]; Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d 280, 306, 109 P.2d 942 [California Employment Commission].) The Commissioner's expertise in applying the Act is particularly significant in cases where, as here, the essence of the parties' dispute is whether services performed were by a talent agency for an artist. Stevens implies that requiring submission to the Commissioner of defenses under the Talent Agencies Act will somehow inhibit artists from availing themselves of its protective purposes. We disagree. When an issue under the Act arises in this fashion, the appropriate course is simply to stay the superior court proceedings and file a petition to determine controversy before the Commissioner. (See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 12022; REO Broadcasting, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 492, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 639; see also Park, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1468, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 616.) [9] Accordingly, we agree with Styne and the Court of Appeal that when the defendant in a court suit raises a colorable defense based on a violation of the Act, the merits of that issue cannot be considered by the court until it has first been submitted to, and examined by, the Commissioner. [10]