Opinion ID: 2258923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Parents' Position

Text: In the circuit court, Clemy P. attempted to relate the deemed consent under § 5-322(d) to an affirmative consent contemplated by § 5-317 and former Rule D 73, now expressly provided for by Rule 9-102. She argued that (1) if the judgment of guardianship was based on her deemed consent under § 5-322(d), she had a right under § 5-317(e) to revoke that consent at any time prior to entry of the judgment, (2) it was incumbent upon DSS as a matter of due process to inform her that she had that right and to give her notice of all proceedings and papers filed with the court prior to entry of the judgment so that she could effectively exercise her right to revoke, (3) she was not apprised of her right to revoke and was not given notice of DSS's motion for entry of the judgment or of the entry of the judgment, and (4) the judgment was therefore defective and invalid. In this Court, the Public Defender presses that argument on behalf of Clemy P. but, in advocating the position of the parents in the three Baltimore City cases, has expanded it to include the filing of untimely objections prior to the entry of a judgment of guardianship. In that regard, he urges that (1) courts have discretion under Rules 1-204 and 2-613 to consider late-filed objections, and (2) to construe the law otherwise would cause it to constitute a violation of due process of law and equal protection of the law. That argument was not articulated by Clemy P. in her case in the circuit court.