Opinion ID: 3013832
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The testator indicated an

Text: the plaintiff but was prevented from doing intent to change his will to so by the defendant. The tort claim, provide a described benefit therefore, does posit that the distributive for plaintiff, scheme that the Orphans’ Court found to (2) The defendant used be in place at the time of the testator’s fraud, misrepresentation or death is different from the one the testator undue influence to prevent at some point intended. execution of the intended But this is not the same as a will, challenge to the validity, enforceability or (3) The defendant was interpretation of a testamentary document successful in preventing the passed on by the Orphans’ Court. Id. To execution of a new will; and the contrary. The theory of the tort is that the will actually probated was valid and (4) But for the Defendant’s enforceable because it reflected [sic] conduct, the testator testamentary intent at the time it was would have changed his made, but that the alleged tortfeasor will. wrongly induced the testator to maintain Cardenas, 783 A.2d at 326. In no event that will. Whatever the outcome of an does an action for tortious interference action for tortious interference with with inheritance in Pennsylvania challenge inheritance, the Orphans’ Court’s the Orphans’ Court’s determination of determinations of testamentary document value of the estate. Cf. Mangold, 91 A.2d validity, enforceability and interpretation at 907. Nor may a plaintiff use an action will, as they must, remain unaffected. Id. for tortious interference with inheritance An example will help to clarify the to challenge the validity or enforceability point. Take a hypothetical testator who of the testamentary documents (if any) adopts a valid testamentary distributive admitted to probate, or the testamentary scheme that does not provide for person P. scheme established by those documents. 17 At some point, Testator contemplates elements of tortious interference with changing the testamentary distributive inheritance do not call into question the scheme to add a legacy for P, but person D probate court’s determination of somehow intentionally prevents the testamentary document validity or change. Thus, at the time of Testator’s enforceability.17 The probate of a will, death, the only scheme providing for the therefore, does not prevent a party from distribution of Testator’s assets is the bringing an action for tortious interference earlier—and valid—scheme leaving with inheritance in the Pennsylvania nothing to P. courts of general jurisdiction. The original testamentary scheme To be sure, while an action for was a true and correct expression of tortious interference with inheritance does Testator’s then-intent. Because Testator not challenge the validity or enforceability never revoked or superseded the earlier of the distributive scheme affirmed by the testamentary scheme, that scheme probate court, recovery on that theory remained valid, and the Orphans’ Court may, de facto, alter the distributive was required to probate it. Independent of scheme. It was this consideration that the validity and enforceability of gave us pause in Moore. 843 F.2d at 710. Testator’s earlier scheme, D harmed P, There, we affirmed the dismissal of the because, but for D’s actions, Testator plaintiff/appellant’s claim for tortious would have amended the testamentary interference with inheritance because such scheme and P would have received a an action would be “so inconsistent with legacy. If P sues D for tortious the Delaware statutory plan for exclusive interference, that suit does not impeach the review of probate proceedings that validity or enforceability of the original allowing it would subvert the probate will. To the contrary, it relies on that law.” Id. Central to our reasoning, validity to support the claim that D damaged P by preventing the testamentary 17 scheme from being changed. Cf. Georges, Indeed, this is one of the key, 856 F.2d at 974 (finding jurisdiction over outc ome-dete r minative distinc tio ns a claim for legal malpractice in between Appellants’ fraud claims and their preparation of a trust because the claim tortious interference with inheritance “does not seek to disturb the finality of the claims. Recovery on Appellants’ fraud . . . probate proceedings”). claims would require the District Court to directly contradict the Orphans’ Court’s Under Mangold and Cardenas, P determination that the Will, the Trust, the may sue D in the Pennsylvania courts of Addendum and their combined distributive general jurisdiction for tortious scheme are valid and enforceable. interference with inheritance. Mangold, Appellants’ tortious interference with 91 A.2d at 907; Cardenas, 783 A.2d at inheritance claims, by contrast, require no 325-26. Put simply, in Pennsylvania, the such contradiction. 18 however, was the fact that the Delaware The District Court has jurisdiction courts did not unambiguously permit to consider Appellants’ claims for slander tortious interference with inheritance and tortious interference with inheritance. claims in the courts of general jurisdiction. Of course, we take no position as to Id. at 710 & n.4. That being so, it was not whether the Appellants have alleged the province of the federal courts to sufficient facts to meet the elements of entertain actions whose de facto effect those torts as the Pennsylvania courts have would be to re-allocate estate assets post- defined them. That inquiry is for the probate. District Court. 19 But unlike in Moore, the state courts in this case do unambiguously Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). recognize the viability, outside the probate Even though “Indiana law would require context, of claims for tortious interference [his] tort claim be heard in the probate with inheritance. State law, therefore, [court],” plaintiff/appellant Storm sued in compels a different result in this case. federal court rather than wait for the will Pennsylvania law permits actions for to be admitted to probate. Id. at 945. tortious interference with inheritance in Storm failed, therefore, to meet the state the courts of general jurisdiction and a law jurisdictional prerequisite that “a will federal court must adjudicate such claims contest [be] unavailable to supply an just as they would any other tort claim adequate remedy.” That being so, the brought pursuant to our diversity Indiana courts of general jurisdiction— jurisdiction.18 a n d , by e xte nsion, the f e d e r a l courts—could not entertain Storm’s action for tortious interference with inheritance. 18 State law also compels the Id. at 945-946. The Seventh Circuit difference between our result and the dismissed the claim, calling the action “in Seventh Circuit’s holding in Storm. 328 substance a will contest.” Id. at 945. F.3d at 945. Storm was strongly guided by By contrast, the Pennsylvania courts the fact that the plaintiff/appellant failed to contemp late no such jurisdictional meet a state law jurisdictional prerequisite prerequisite to bringing a claim for tortious for his tortious interference w ith interference with inheritance. The inheritance claim. concerns that guided the result in Storm, [Tortious] interference with therefore, are not present here. inheritance is a recognized 19 tort in Indiana; such an For example, in resolving the action may be brought in a still-undecided cross motions for summary court of general jurisdiction, judgment as they apply to Appellants’ provided a will contest is claims for tortious interference with unavailable to supply an inheritance, the District Court will have to adequate remedy. determine whether the facts as alleged 19