Opinion ID: 606336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the unambiguous-statute bar

Text: 75 The majority recasts Chevron's threshold inquiry as whether the language of the statute is determined to be either ambiguous or silent on the choice between identicality and equivalence. Maj. Op. at 1363 (emphasis added). 12 By so transforming the inquiry, the majority justifies avoiding the legislative history of section 466(d), id. Maj. Op. at 1363-1364 n. 28, and the policy implications of construing section 466(d) to adopt an identicality standard. Id. Maj. Op. at 1365. To excuse its exclusion of legislative history and policy, the majority relies on a passage from Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992): [w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, ... 'judicial inquiry is complete.'  Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 428, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981)); see Maj. Op. at 1363. 76 For three independent reasons, Germain does not limit this court's ability to fully consider legislative history and policy in this case. Foremost, as I have demonstrated, same does not have a singular meaning even within the structure of the PPIA. See Part I, supra. 77 Second, Germain and the cases from which it is derived say nothing about whether courts may consider legislative history and policy to answer the threshold question in Chevron. These cases only state a canon of construction that presupposes a finding of no ambiguity. See Germain, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149; Toibb v. Radloff, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); Burlington Northern Ry. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1860, 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987). 78 In the Germain line of cases, parties attempt to use sources other than statutory text to contradict what everyone agrees a statute says. See Germain, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149-50 (no need to consider the argument that legislative history points to a different result when there was no argument about what statutory text says); Toibb, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2200 (no need to address argument that legislative history and structure engraft a requirement which proponent acknowledges is absent from statutory text); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1031-33 (unnecessary to consider argument that pre-statutory practice should alter meaning of unambiguous statutory text); Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 462, 107 S.Ct. at 1860-61 (legislative history irrelevant after Court finds no legitimate challenge to the text's meaning). By contrast, the Secretary offers evidence of legislative history and policy to show that Congress did not choose between identicality and equivalence in enacting section 466(d). 13 The line of cases that Germain exemplifies is inapposite. Neither the majority, nor the district court, nor the plaintiffs cite any authority for the proposition that legislative history and policy are irrelevant to whether a statute's text is ambiguous. Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-65, 104 S.Ct. at 2790-93 (considering whether Congress directly spoke to the precise question at issue under the subheadings Statutory Language, Legislative History, and Policy). 79 Finally, even if the majority believes that it may not rely on legislative history and policy to decide this case, I question why it has not followed the Supreme Court's custom of treating legislative history and policy arguments even after declaring a statute unambiguous. See Germain, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149 (rejecting the policy argument that Congress would not enact redundant statutes [b]ecause giving effect to both ... would not render one or the other wholly superfluous before applying the unambiguous-statute rule) (emphasis added); id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1150 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting legislative-history argument on the merits that the Germain majority refused to consider); Toibb, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2200-01 (discussing merits of legislative-history and policy arguments after stating that the unambiguous-statute rule applies); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 245, 109 S.Ct. at 1033 (discussing merits of argument based on pre-statutory practice after stating unambiguous-statute rule). But see Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 462, 107 S.Ct. at 1860-61 (no legislative-history discussion after statute found unambiguous). Courts of Appeals have been no less reticent in considering the merits of legislative-history and policy arguments even after finding a statute unambiguous. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912-13 & nn. 3-4 (9th Cir.1988); Doctors Hospital, Inc. of Plantation v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1448, 1453 (11th Cir.1987). 80 These cases establish that a court risks nothing by discussing the merits of legislative-history and policy arguments even after declaring a statute unambiguous, and that such discussions represent appropriate responses to parties' concerns on appeal. A court can only strengthen its analysis by explaining how its construction is consistent with legislative-history and policy arguments. Thus, the Court has explained: When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in [a] statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'  Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10, 96 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 48 L.Ed.2d 434 (1976) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940)). Even the Germain majority characterized canons of construction, including the unambiguous-statute rule, as no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149. 81 A rule that precludes courts from considering legislative history and policy when construing statutes amounts to a quasi-evidentiary limitation. But rather than hold that a lower court has considered improper evidence of statutory meaning, a reviewing court merely decides for itself what a statute means. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 (de novo determination of whether Congress addressed a disputed point in a statute). Given this de novo review, evidentiary limitations are pointless. Thus, while the Court has found that a lower court has erred by refusing to consider legislative history in discerning a statute's meaning, Train, 426 U.S. at 9, 96 S.Ct. at 1942, the Court has not held that a lower court has erred because it considered excessive evidence of statutory meaning. 82 The majority's decision to ignore considerations of legislative history and policy in this case is indefensible. 83