Opinion ID: 2083898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, Banks claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because the evidence that Banks knew he was suspended as an habitual traffic offender was based on an unsigned entry in the certified records from BMV, and the conviction was based on the uncorroborated testimony of the police officer. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that an element of the offense of driving while license suspended as an habitual traffic offender is that the defendant know that his license is suspended because he was an habitual traffic offender. State v. Keihn (1989), Ind., 542 N.E.2d 963. To prove the suspension, the State must show that the BMV sent notice of suspension to defendant's last known address upon its determination that defendant was an habitual offender. Proof of mailing the notice is an evidentiary prerequisite to proving that the suspension was valid. The evidence here consists of two documents admitted into evidence to prove that the BMV mailed notice of the suspension to Banks. One of the documents was a copy of a letter addressed to Banks at his last known address. The second document was a computerized printout of Banks' driving record with the following typewritten notation added: The Habitual Traffic Violator Notice of Suspension was mailed on 08/26/87 to 2001 Lincoln Way West, South Bend, Indiana, which was the last known address listed with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. This Notice was not returned to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles by the United States Post Office as undeliverable. The Court of Appeals noted, and we agree, that it was apparent from the difference in typeface between the driving record and the statement of notice that the notice entry was not a part of the original driving record in the sense that the above-quoted portion was obviously not computer generated. The Court of Appeals decided that the above-quoted entry was inadmissible hearsay on the basis of Chambers v. State (1989), Ind. App., 547 N.E.2d 301, and thus concluded that there was insufficient admissible evidence to support Banks' conviction. We disagree. As pointed out by Judge Buchanan in his dissenting opinion, the record clearly reflects that Banks did not object to the admission of the typewritten notation, but only to a computer printout showing Banks' complete driving history, including all prior traffic violations. After the State concealed such prior traffic violations from the exhibit, it was admitted without objection. Because Banks did not object to the admission of the typewritten notation, it was admissible as substantive evidence on the issue of whether a notice of suspension had been mailed to him in accordance with the requirements of Ind. Code § 9-12-2-1. Otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence may be considered for substantive purposes and is sufficient to establish a material fact at issue when the hearsay evidence is admitted without a timely objection at trial. Kinnaman v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 622, 366 N.E.2d 165; Mack v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 468, 139 N.E.2d 434. Admittedly, the typewritten notation here was nearly identical to that which was introduced in Chambers, supra . However, defense counsel in Chambers posed a proper and timely objection when the State sought to introduce the hearsay evidence. Failure to properly object at trial waives any error on appeal. Andrews v. State (1989), Ind., 532 N.E.2d 1159. Banks' second attack on the sufficiency of the evidence relates to testimony of the police officer. Banks claims that because the officer's testimony was inconsistent and was contradicted by the testimony of defense witnesses, such evidence requires corroboration to support the conviction. Our standard for reviewing claims relating to sufficiency of the evidence is firmly established: on appeal, we do not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. We consider only that evidence most favorable to the State, together with all reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be disturbed. Alfaro v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 670, 672. Clearly, Banks asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do. Accordingly, we now grant transfer. The Court of Appeals' Opinion reported at 549 N.E.2d 1072 is vacated, and the conviction entered by the trial court against Banks is hereby reinstated. SHEPARD, C.J., and GIVAN and DICKSON, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., concurs with opinion.