Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Instruction on Destruction of Evidence

Text: At the prosecutor's request, and without objection from the defense, the trial court instructed the jury regarding destruction of evidence, pursuant to the pattern instruction set forth in CALJIC No. 2.06. [22] Defendant contends that in so instructing the jury, the trial court committed reversible error, because the record does not demonstrate that evidence was destroyed. We conclude this claim lacks merit. Well settled standards apply: It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will support the suggested inference. ( People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 773, 228 P.2d 281.) Whether or not any given set of facts may constitute suppression or attempted suppression of evidence from which a trier of fact can infer a consciousness of guilt on the part of a defendant is a question of law. Thus in order for a jury to be instructed that it can infer a consciousness of guilt from suppression of adverse evidence by a defendant, there must be some evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, will sufficiently support the suggested inference. ( People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597, 138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203.) To support an inference that the defendant attempted to suppress evidence, the record need not establish that the evidence actually was destroyed. (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1139-1140, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given where circumstantial evidence suggested that defendant threw a knife from a motor vehicle, although the knife subsequently was recovered]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 304, fn 7, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given, based upon evidence of defendant's postoffense substitution of the license plates on the victim's car]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 797-798, 833, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865 [rejecting the defendant's contention that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.06 was improper absent a showing that he was aware that the items he destroyed constituted evidence, where the defendant admitted throwing his prison clothes and prison-issue tennis shoes into the ocean]; see also People v. Echevarria (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 444, 451, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given based upon evidence that, after the murder, defendant shaved off his beard and mustache and cut his hair]; People v. Fitzpatrick (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1290, 1296-1297, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given based upon circumstantial evidence indicating that defendant threw murder weapon into a gutter, where pieces of a rifle were located in a nearby storm drain catch basin].) In the present case, the record discloses evidence that, after Diane was murdered, defendant disposed of her purse, including her identification, at Lake Matthews, removed and replaced bumper stickers on his car, burned a pair of tennis shoes, and used plywood to shield his car from view. Furthermore, when defendant was arrested, he wore his hair parted in the middle, wavy and fluffy, similar to the style Amy had described, but at the in-person lineup, defendant wore his hair wet or oily, and combed straight back. The next day, defendant returned to his previously preferred dry look. The jury reasonably could infer from the foregoing evidence that defendant attempted to suppress evidence. Actual destruction of that evidence was not required. The trial court therefore properly instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.06. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1140, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) [23]