Opinion ID: 1518504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court commit prejudicial error in admitting opinion evidence as to appellant's guilt?

Text: Paul Bryant, an employee of Nugent Sand Company, testified for the prosecution. His testimony disclosed that he had given two statements to the police: one on Friday, October 3, 1980, and another on Tuesday, October 7, 1980. On direct examination, no reference was made to the first statement and the second statement was used only to refresh the witness's memory. On cross-examination, in an attempt to impeach his credibility, defense counsel introduced a handwritten change which had been made in the second statement. The change described appellant's statement to Bryant that the middle man (Kelly) was going to be dead when he was found. Emphasis was placed on the fact that Bryant had told the interviewing officer that he had always wanted to be a policeman. This fact was used by defense counsel in an attempt to show that Bryant was playing detective in the investigation of the Kelly murder, and in so doing, had been influenced by the police. Specifically, defense counsel was attempting to show the witness' state of mind at the time of the first statement. Because of the prosecution's belief that the defense counsel had put the witness' state of mind at issue, on re-direct examination, Bryant was asked to read a previously undiscussed portion of the statement. It disclosed that in response to the interviewing officer's question as to whether Bryant thought that appellant had dropped the hammer on Kelly, Bryant had stated I think he did, you know if you want the honest to God truth. In essence, the trial court permitted the introduction of a written statement which elicited the opinion of a witness as to appellant's guilt. The Commonwealth argues that since the defense counsel had opened the door by inquiring into the witness' state of mind (as appeared in the first written statement) the prosecution had the right to bring out all that was said on the subject. We do not agree. A witness, in a criminal case, may be impeached by showing he made a prior contradictory statement or by contradictory evidence. Such evidence is not admissible for that purpose unless it pertains to a material matter. Caulder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 644 (1960). Moreover, where the value of evidence for a legitimate purpose is slight and the jury's probable misuse of the evidence for an incompetent purpose is great, the evidence may be excluded altogether. Caulder, supra , McCormack on Evidence, (1954), Sec. 59, p. 136. Clearly Bryant's opinion as to appellant's guilt is not admissible. Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 340 (1878), Koester v. Commonwealth, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 213 (1969); Deverell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 539 S.W.2d 301 (1976). As we examine this issue, it is unnecessary to decide whether the entire written statement of Bryant's is admissible to show his state of mind. We hold that it was clearly erroneous to admit into evidence Bryant's opinion as to appellant's guilt. Kennedy , Deverell and Koester, supra . Even if the statement is technically admissible into evidence, it is obvious that the purpose was incompetent. Caulder , McCormack, supra. The issue of guilt or innocence is one for the jury to determine, and an opinion of a witness which intrudes on this function is not admissible, even through a route which is, at best, back door in nature. As we said in Kennedy , in reference to similar testimony, No lawyer would think of offering such evidence in chief. Id., at p. 359. Due to the nature of the evidence, and its highly prejudicial effect on the jury, we believe the trial court erred in admitting the evidence.