Opinion ID: 218256
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Against the Jail.

Text: In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict against the Jail, the procedural focus of this appeal is the district court’s denial of the Jail’s post-judgment motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). “[T]his court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law[.]” Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 949 (10th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006). “We will reverse only if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis with respect to a claim or defense under the controlling law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). As we have further explained: To overturn a denial [of a motion for judgment as a matter of law], we must conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it point but one way, in favor of the moving party. That is, the [moving party] must demonstrate that there are no reasonable inferences supporting the jury’s verdict. In reviewing the record, we will not weigh the evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury. Most importantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As set forth above, Mr. Bass was being held in the Jail as a pretrial detainee at the time he was assaulted. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from unconstitutional conditions of -11- confinement to the same extent that the Eighth Amendment protects convicted criminals. See Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992); Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998). As a result, in the case of a pretrial detainee such as Mr. Bass, unconstitutional conditions of confinement can include violence at the hands of other prisoners if prison officials are deliberately indifferent to substantial risks of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994). Moreover, “[i]n the Tenth Circuit [a] . . . municipality acts with deliberate indifference if its conduct (or adopted policy) disregards a known or obvious risk that is very likely to result in the violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In this case, we review the sufficiency of the evidence against the controlling law, which we find to be properly stated in the district court’s [unchallenged] jury instructions.” Rocky Mountain Christian Church, 613 F.3d at 1236. Specifically, as relevant to the issues raised in this appeal with regard to Mr. Bass’s failure to protect claim against the Jail, the jury was instructed that Mr. Bass had to demonstrate by a greater weight of the evidence that the Jail “maintained a policy and/or custom which created a substantial risk that [he] would be seriously harmed.” See Aplee. App. at 10. Further, Mr. Bass was required to show that the Jail was “deliberately indifferent to [his] safety.” Id. With regard to the latter showing, the jury was instructed as follows: -12- Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or even gross negligence. An inadvertent failure to protect and the fact that an assault occurs is not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference is established only if there is actual knowledge of a specific and substantial risk that Plaintiff would be assaulted and Defendants intentionally, willfully or recklessly disregarded that risk. Mere negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference. Plaintiff, at a minimum, must establish that Defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. In order to meet his burden of proof, Plaintiff must show that Defendants were aware of and disregarded an excessive and specific risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Id. at 15. Having carefully reviewed the trial testimony and other evidence in this case, and viewing all the evidence in Mr. Bass’s favor, we conclude that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to support reasonable inferences that: (1) the Jail maintained a policy and/or custom of permitting jailors to commingle unclassified, intoxicated detainees with unclassified, non-intoxicated detainees, and the Jail’s policy and/or custom created a substantial risk that intoxicated detainees such as Mr. Bass would be seriously injured; (2) the Jail was aware of the substantial risk that intoxicated detainees such as Mr. Bass would be assaulted; (3) the Jail disregarded the risk by allowing jailors to inadequately supervise the drunk pod; and (4) the Jail’s deficient supervision practices were a proximate cause of Mr. Bass’s injuries. To begin with, based on the evidence introduced at trial regarding the State of Oklahoma’s Minimum Jail Standards and the Jail’s own internal policies -13- requiring close supervision of unclassified detainees, we believe the jury, relying on its own common sense and intuition, could reasonably infer that the Jail maintained a policy and/or custom that was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that commingled intoxicated detainees such as Mr. Bass would be assaulted and seriously injured. 2 This does not end our inquiry, however, because, in accordance with the jury instructions, we must also determine whether Mr. Bass presented sufficient evidence to show that the Jail “intentionally, willfully or recklessly disregarded” the risk it created and was aware of. See Aplee. App. at 15. Having carefully considered the trial testimony of Christy Gunter and Officer Goodwill, and viewing this issue as part of the deliberate indifference inquiry, we conclude that he did. Although the evidence introduced at trial showed that Christy Gunter, the booking clerk, would watch a closed-circuit television monitor that is located on her desk and hooked up to a camera in the drunk pod, Ms. Gunter testified that she only looked up at the monitor “occasionally” or “when [she] had the time.” Aplt. App. at 317. This was because Ms. Gunter had numerous other duties that she also had to perform. Id. at 98-100, 314-17. Nonetheless, Ms. Gunter readily acknowledged that commingled detainees in the drunk pod needed to be closely 2 As we have concluded, the policies and/or customs at issue in this case are sufficient in themselves to show the substantial risk of serious harm that they address. Thus, Mr. Bass did not have to put forth evidence showing that there had been similar assaults previously at the Jail. -14- supervised because it was “very foreseeable” that the pod would contain a mix of maximum security detainees and minimum security detainees, id. at 320-21, and Officer Goodwill likewise testified regarding the need for close supervision of the drunk pod, id. at 151-52. According to the testimony of Officer Goodwill, however, it was difficult for Ms. Gunter to provide the needed close supervision given all of her other job duties. Id. at 146-47. In fact, on the night in question, Ms. Gunter did not notice that anything was amiss in the drunk pod until she observed Mr. Bass lying on the floor of the pod, which was after he was assaulted by Jason Grass. Id. at 334-35. On the night Mr. Bass was assaulted, Officer Goodwill was the only other Jail employee at the intake facility. 3 During the approximately forty minutes that elapsed between the time that Officer Goodwill placed Jason Grass in the drunk pod and the time that he placed Mr. Bass in the drunk pod, Officer Goodwill was passing out meals to other detainees and performing other duties, but he testified that he was always within “earshot” of the drunk pod. Id. at 172, 179. But regardless of whether he was always within earshot of the drunk pod, Officer 3 Ms. Gunter testified that there normally would be one additional Jail employee who was a “roamer-type” and would go “back and forth between the county and the city jail,” but she did not recall that person being on duty on the night in question. See Aplt. App. at 311. There was no other reference to this “roamer-type” during the trial, however, so it is not clear what the roamer’s duties entailed. -15- Goodwill acknowledged that some form of “eye-on observation” is still necessary. His specific testimony was as follows: Q. Mr. Goodwill, we have a situation where you have a crowded jail, a noisy jail, a busy night, is it your testimony that during the 40 minutes, or thereafter, that you could hear what is going on in [the drunk] pod at all times? A. A general conversation like we are having right now, probably not, but somebody whooping and hollering and yelling for help, yes, I would have. Q. Whether or not they were whooping or hollering and calling for help, there needs to be some type of eye-on observation, as well as being able to hear, would you agree? A. I understand that’s what the monitors were for. Id. at 196. Officer Goodwill further testified that, when he was performing his duties of going from cell to cell throughout the intake facility to pass out meals to other detainees, “[he] would rely on Ms. Gunter to be watching the camera.” Id. at 151. Based on the testimony of Christy Gunter and Officer Goodwill, we believe the jury could reasonably infer that the Jail’s supervision practices (i.e., only “occasionally” watching the television monitor and remaining only within “earshot” of the drunk pod) 4 were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that 4 The jury could reasonably infer that the conduct of Christy Gunter and Officer Goodwill reflected the Jail’s relevant supervision practices because, as their testimony indicated, their conduct was a function of the official job duties assigned to them. Further, the Jail put forth no evidence suggesting that they (continued...) -16- intoxicated detainees such as Mr. Bass would be assaulted. Importantly, we also believe the jury could have drawn a reasonable inference that these deficient supervision practices were a proximate cause of Mr. Bass’s injuries. With regard to causation, the most significant evidence presented at trial was the written statement of one of the other detainees who was being held in the drunk pod at the time Jason Grass was placed in the pod. As presented during the trial through a colloquy between counsel for Mr. Bass and Officer Goodwill, the statement was as follows: Q. (By Mr. Bisher) This statement was obtained through Mr. Glandon, the internal affairs investigator; is that correct? A. I would guess so, yes. Q. The second page of this is actually the handwritten statement of Mr. Martinez and then Mr. Glandon had it translated, did you understand that? A. Yes. Q. “On Wednesday, 6/5/03,” that’s the date . . . Jason Grass, and Johnny Bass were arrested, correct? A. Yes. Q. “In the evening between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m., I, Manuel Martinez, was locked up in the jail with another three young prisoners. Everybody was peaceful until another prisoner entered. He had long hair and tattoos on his body. He acted desperate. He started to scream, looked like he was talking to friends in another cell, and 4 (...continued) were in any way acting contrary to the Jail’s customary practices. -17- [was] hitting the door very hard over and over. Later, the food arrived,” that’s when you were feeding; is that correct? A. I would assume so, yes. Q. “Later the food arrived and he took two plates. He told us to take – he told us to take one of the plates he had and so I had to take the plate, because everyone had one. I was uncomfortable taking the plate. He offered me some tea and I said nicely, no. He looked at me funny and I thought he had mental problems. Later on another prisoner arrived who was older, he asked me for a place to sit. The moment the old man sat down, the man with the long hair attacked him, hitting him directly in the face.” He is referring to Mr. Bass, isn’t he, Johnny Bass? A. Yes. Id. at 148-49. In response to follow-up questions regarding Mr. Martinez’s description of Jason Grass’s behavior, Officer Goodwill testified as follows: Q. If somebody . . . was acting that way, would you be concerned? A. If I had seen it, yes. Q. Anyone who would have been able to appreciate that behavior would be able to appreciate that that person had the propensity of hurting someone, is that a fair statement? A. If that’s the way it happened, yeah. Q. At anytime did you hear this loud banging on the door that was described by Mr. Martinez? A. No, I did not. .... -18- Q. Would you agree, Mr. Goodwill, that Mr. Martinez’s statement, assuming that that’s a credible statement and the truth of what he wrote down, that wouldn’t describe someone who was calm? A. Would you repeat that? Q. Sure. Mr. Martinez, who described Jason Grass’s behavior, banging on the door, yelling, quote, “thought he was mental,” that wouldn’t describe someone who was, quote, “calm,” would it? A. No, it would not. Q. If that existed, if that behavior was exhibited, and you are aware of that behavior, you would have taken him out of the cell, right? A. Yes, I would have. Q. That is something that you knew to do? A. Yes. Id. at 150-51, 161. Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to Mr. Bass, the jury could reasonably have found that Mr. Martinez’s statement was credible, and that either Christy Gunter would have seen or Officer Goodwill would have heard the commotion that Jason Grass made after he was placed in the drunk pod if they had been closely supervising the pod. By his own admission, if this had occurred, Officer Goodwill would have removed Jason Grass from the drunk pod, and it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Bass would not have been assaulted. Because Christy Gunter and Officer Goodwill were acting pursuant to the Jail’s policies and/or -19- customs and their assigned duties, the Jail was properly found liable for the resulting assault. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court David M. Ebel