Opinion ID: 164304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mandatory Exhaustion of Prison Remedies

Text: We decline, with one exception noted in Part IV below, to address any of Rueb’s remaining allegations of error because the magistrate judge incorrectly concluded Rueb was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies. As a result, additional proceedings will now ensue on remand that may result in different resolutions of Rueb’s claims. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions” until a prisoner exhausts his available administrative remedies.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (defining “prisoner” to include a pre-trial detainee). The magistrate judge concluded at the outset of this case that Rueb’s complaint was not subject to PLRA’s exhaustion requirement because he sought only monetary relief, which -5- was not an available remedy to pre-trial detainees at the Adams County Detention Center. See R. Doc. 132 at 14. The magistrate judge relied upon this circuit’s ruling in Garrett v. Hawk , 127 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1997), but shortly after the R&R was issued, Garrett was overruled by the Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner , 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Booth held that even where an inmate seeks money damages and the grievance process does not permit such awards, exhaustion is required as long as there is authority to take some responsive action. Id. at 736-41. It is now clear that exhaustion of available prison remedies is “mandatory” for all “inmate suits about prison life.” Porter v. Nussle , 534 U.S. 516, 524, 532 (2002). “Congress ha[s] eliminated both discretion to dispense with administrative exhaustion and the condition that it be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Booth , 532 U.S. at 739). Neither the parties nor the court can ignore PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, even if the issue is first recognized on the eve of trial. See Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , __ F.3d __, 2003 WL 23019855, at -6 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 2003) (No. 02-1492). On remand, the district court shall address in the first instance whether Rueb satisfied his exhaustion requirements under PLRA. See id . at 5-6. -6-