Opinion ID: 778069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Weapons Possession Charge

Text: 93 Jenkins was also convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. In granting the writ under § 2244, the district court did not say specifically that it granted the writ as to both convictions. Indeed, there is no analysis in the opinion or the briefs on appeal of the interrelationship among the false testimony of Morgan, the misbehavior of the prosecution, and Jenkins's conviction on the weapons charge. But inasmuch as the court directed the respondent to release the petitioner from custody unless he is retried within 90 days, it is apparent that the court granted the writ for both the murder and the weapons possession convictions. 94 Our scrutiny of the trial transcript compels the conclusion that the district court was correct. Jenkins's weapons possession conviction rested on the same evidence as did his murder conviction: the testimony of Morgan and Napoleon. The indictment charged Jenkins with second degree weapons possession solely for the night of April 11, 1992, when Reese was murdered. Justice Giaccio instructed the jurors that to convict Jenkins on the weapons charge, they had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins on or about April 11, 1992, in the County of Queens, knowingly and unlawfully possessed a loaded firearm to wit a handgun, with intent to use unlawfully against another. Justice Giaccio told the jury that second degree weapons possession does not include possession of the weapon at home or at a workplace. In her opening argument, ADA Lendino also described Jenkins's crime as recklessly engag[ing] in conduct which created a grave risk of death to Michael Reese by shooting him with a handgun and causing his death. 95 The only testimony proffered at trial that demonstrated Jenkins's possession of a firearm outside his home or workplace on April 11, 1992 came from Napoleon and Morgan. Unless the jury believed that Jenkins was the person who approached and shot Reese on April 11, 1992, it could not have found him guilty of the weapons possession charge. The prejudice flowing from Morgan's false testimony and the prosecutorial conduct that enhanced his credibility tainted the testimony that was central to the weapons possession charge. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court granting the writ of habeas corpus for both the murder and weapons possession charges.