Opinion ID: 1834135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Last Clear Chance Instruction in Consortium Suits

Text: With our adoption of comparative negligence in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1982), and the subsequent modified codification of that doctrine by our legislature in 1984, the doctrine of last clear chance was abolished from Iowa jurisprudence. In Bokhoven v. Klinker, 474 N.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Iowa 1991), we held the doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery. The doctrine's chief purpose was to ameliorate the harsh effects of the doctrine of contributory negligence. Id. at 556; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 66, at 464 (5th ed. 1984). In the case at bar, the Sonneks propose a new application of the last clear chance doctrine. They refer to our decision in Schwennen v. Abell, 430 N.W.2d 98, 101-03 (Iowa 1988). In Schwennen we held that in cases involving claims for lost consortium, the fault of a tort-feasor spouse cannot be imputed to the innocent deprived spouse, even for the purpose of allocating fault among multiple tort-feasors in order to reduce liability. Schwennen, 430 N.W.2d at 102. The Sonneks believe the last clear chance doctrine should be utilized to diminish the efforts on the part of consortium defendants to shift the jury's focus away from their conduct and toward the tort-feasor spouse's conduct. A last clear chance instruction would, they argue, bring the jury's focus back where it belongs: on the negligence of the defendant.... Accordingly, the Sonneks assert the trial court should have included a last clear chance instruction to the jury. The Sonneks reason further that the import of our decision in Bokhoven does not apply where we held that the doctrine of last clear chance was subsumed by the adoption of comparative fault. Bokhoven, 474 N.W.2d at 557. The Sonneks point out that the instant case does not involve comparative fault because under Schwennen there is no imputation of an injured spouse's fault to the deprived spouse who claims consortium damages. Thus, they reason, the last clear chance doctrine should not be denied consideration by contributory negligence or comparative fault rationales that have no bearing on the consortium issue in the instant case. Although this contention places the legal principles in proper order, we believe a misdirection comes from an attempt to apply the last clear chance doctrine to a consortium damages claim. The doctrine originated as a mechanism for avoiding the harsh effects of the contributory negligence doctrine. Bokhoven, 474 N.W.2d at 556. With the demise of that doctrine, no bar to the Sonneks' recovery could come from that source. Nor would the principle of comparative fault bar their recovery. Thus, there is no need to assist the viability of plaintiffs' claim by resort to an otherwise outmoded doctrine of law. Further, we believe a last clear chance instruction would unduly promote the consortium plaintiffs' evidence and legal theories to the further prejudice of defendants. In Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Iowa 1972), we stated: We have recognized that instructions should not give undue emphasis to any phase of the case favorable to either side, and even correct statements of the law, if repeated to the point of undue emphasis, may constitute reversible error. See also Coker, 491 N.W.2d at 148. Finally, we have faith that jurors are capable of focusing their evaluation of a case on the proper subject, even in the event they become aware of the possible fault of another person, not party to the instant litigation. Moreover, sound evidentiary rulings and a procedurally proper trial ought to ensure that the jury's focus will not be diverted. The trial court properly rejected the Sonneks' requested last clear chance instruction.