Opinion ID: 2538135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Testimony in Penalty Phase Describing Facts and Circumstances Underlying Mullikan's Prior Convictions was Unduly Prejudicial and Merits New Penalty Phase.

Text: KRS 532.055(2)(a) states in part that, in the sentencing stage in felony cases, [e]vidence may be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing including: (1)[m]inimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor; (2)[t]he nature of prior offenses for which he was convicted.... It is clear from the statute that the legislature intended for juries to be able to consider more information about a defendant's prior criminal history than just the identification of prior convictions. This is made clear by the statute also allowing evidence as to the nature of prior offenses. Here, during the penalty phase, testimony was presented by Lieutenant Justin Horch of the Maysville Police Department who gave information concerning Mullikan's prior convictions of fourth-degree assault, second-degree fleeing or evading a police officer, and resisting arrest. Lt. Horch, however, was not the investigating officer of this case. He testified that the previous offenses took place at the Family Dollar Store near the K-Mart area where, at the time, Mullikan was working at Little Caesars, which was located next door. Lt. Horch further testified that a disagreement with one of the employees there had ended with Mullikan putting his hands around a woman's neck. He stated he believed the lady to be approximately sixty to seventy years old. All of the information about which Lt. Horch testified was acquired from police reports or other witnesses. There are two problems which immediately come to mind when reviewing this evidence. First, the testimony of the officer was clearly hearsay. KRE 602 states in part that [a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Secondly, we must address whether the information that was given is beyond the scope of the statutory term of the nature of prior offenses. This Court has been struggling for the last fifteen years, through a series of cases, to define permissible evidence which may be introduced describing the nature of prior offenses. We began this quest in the case of Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853 (Ky.1996). In Robinson, the victim of a prior assault was allowed to testify at length as to the specifics of that crime. We held that such testimony went beyond the permissible scope of the statute and stated, [A]ll that is admissible as to the nature of a prior conviction is a general description of the crime. Id. at 855. Of course, that case failed to put an end to this dilemma as there is hardly any difference between general description of the crime and the nature of [the] prior offense[s]. Two years after Robinson, we held that the information recited at the sentencing stage from the records of the defendant's convictions went beyond the limitations set forth both in Robinson and KRS 532.055(2)(a). See Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106 (Ky.1998). In the Hudson case, the witness testified as to the circumstances of each conviction from information included on the warrants and uniform citations. In the case of Brooks v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 818 (Ky.2003), this Court upheld the introduction of information regarding prior misdemeanors which had been gleaned from the criminal complaints. We distinguished that case from Robinson because no detailed testimony regarding the crimes was permitted. Finally, we arrived at our latest word on this issue in Cuzick v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 260 (Ky.2009). As evidenced by the split vote of the Court in that case, we moved no closer to a clear definition of the nature of prior offenses. The majority in Cuzick allowed information from the citation to be read to the jury at the sentencing stage. The evidence was that, in the previous burglary, the defendant utilized a baseball bat in breaking the glass and making the entry. Through a fractured Court, we held that the information regarding the prior offense could be provided to the jury. This review of prior cases clearly reveals that we have failed to provide a discernable and workable rule of law to follow when introducing evidence of prior crimes at the sentencing stage. We recognize, by our previous struggles with this issue, that trial judges and prosecutors are in desperate need of a bright line rule. We attempt here today to provide them with a more easily followed rule regarding what is permissible in showing the nature of prior offenses. It seems to us that the nature of a prior conviction is closely akin, if not identical to, the definition of a prior conviction. In Robinson, this Court went to great lengths in attempting to define the nature of prior offenses. The Court seemed to settle upon description of a general character as being as far as is allowed in dealing with these prior crimes. Therefore, we hold today that the evidence of prior convictions is limited to conveying to the jury the elements of the crimes previously committed. We suggest this be done either by a reading of the instruction of such crime from an acceptable form book or directly from the Kentucky Revised Statute itself. Said recitation for the jury's benefit, we feel, is best left to the judge. The description of the elements of the prior offense may need to be customized to fit the particulars of the crime, i.e., the burglary was of a building as opposed to a dwelling. The trial court should avoid identifiers, such as naming of victims, which might trigger memories of jurors who mayespecially in rural areashave prior knowledge about the crimes.