Opinion ID: 1720542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federalism and Federal Precedent

Text: The bar to federal jurisdiction under the facts of this case, as established by Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir.1986), and abundant additional federal authority cited below, is clear. Additionally, principles of federalism, comity, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution mandate that federal courts permit state court litigation to proceed to a resolution of state election disputes, and should not intervene to stop that state process. Judge Howard entertained the Republican candidates' Section 2 Voting Rights Act claim and federal constitutional due process and equal protection claims after the three-judge panel in Bradford refused to do so. Res judicata should have foreclosed a relitigation in a second federal court. Judge Howard, in entertaining these claims, also refused to follow the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1986), which prevents a federal court from interfering with the state courts' resolution of a dispute such as that involved in this case. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized and emphasized in Curry v. Baker , the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not provide federal courts with the authority to intervene in state elections, except in rare matters. Only in extraordinary circumstances will a challenge to a state election rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Curry, 802 F.2d at 1314. Curry v. Baker involved a primary runoff election for the Democratic candidate for Governor of Alabama in which there was massive illegal cross-over voting. Following the primary, the State Democratic Committee certified the candidate (William Baxley) receiving the majority of the legal votes over the candidate (Charles Graddick) receiving the majority of votes. Graddick and his supporters brought suit in the U.S. District Court alleging violations of due process and equal protection. The U.S. district judge ordered the Democratic Party to conduct a new primary and enjoined the disqualification of Graddick. A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed that judgment and remanded the case to the district court, stating: `The functional structure embodied in the Constitution, the nature of the federal court system and the limitations inherent in the concepts both of limited federal jurisdiction and of the remedy afforded by § 1983' operate to restrict federal relief in the state election context. [Citations omitted.] Although federal courts closely scrutinize state laws whose very design infringes on the rights of voters, federal courts will not intervene to examine the validity of individual ballots or supervise the administrative details of a local election. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078 (1st Cir.1978). Only in extraordinary circumstances will a challenge to a state election rise to the level of constitutional deprivation. In Gamza [ v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449], reh'g denied, 625 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.1980), our predecessor court `recognize[d] a distinction between state laws and patterns of state action that systematically deny equality in voting, and episodic events that, despite non-discriminatory laws, may result in the dilution of an individual's vote. Unlike systematically discriminatory laws, isolated events that adversely affect individuals are not presumed to be a [constitutional violation].' 619 F.2d at 453. ... In evaluating claims arising from `episodic events,' courts have followed the general rule that `if the election process itself reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness, a violation of the due process clause may be indicated and relief under § 1983 therefore in order. Such a situation must go well beyond the ordinary dispute over the counting and marking of ballots.' [Citations omitted.] As with much of the law of substantive due process, there are no bright lines distinguishing `patent and fundamental unfairness' from `garden variety' election disputes....  Gamza [ v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.1980)], posed this issue in clear terms. Gamza and four of his supporters alleged that election officials had negligently and unlawfully performed the vote count, thereby costing him the election. The Fifth Circuit found that plaintiff failed to state a constitutional deprivation under § 1983. `In the absence of evidence that the alleged maladministration of the local election procedures was attended by the intention to discriminate against the affected voters or motivated by a desire to subvert the right of the voters to choose their ... representative, we cannot conclude that the error constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws.' 619 F.2d at 454. Curry, 802 F.2d at 1314-15. The three-judge panel in Curry criticized the United States District Court for becoming engulfed in the morass of election details, which were held properly left to state election officials and state courts, and held: There is no evidence that plaintiffs lacked an adequate remedy in the state courts. Alabama law provides an adequate procedure for addressing election irregularities.... A federally protected right `is implicated where the entire election processincluding as part thereof the state's administrative and judicial corrective processfails on its face to afford fundamental fairness.' That is not the case here. State process was available but it was not used. . . . . Even if plaintiffs' claimed deprivation had risen to a constitutional level, ... the court below erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the substantial state interests served in this case.... Id. at 1316-17. Judge Godbold noted in Curry : Even in cases involving overt racial discrimination this court has considered the voiding of a state election to be `drastic, if not staggering ... and therefore a form of relief to be guardedly exercised.' Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.1967). Id. at 1315, n 7. The Curry court noted that Alabama law provides an adequate procedure for addressing election irregularities, citing the election contest provisions found in § 17-15-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. A state process was available, but it was not used. The same state procedure is still available in Alabama at this time. Once the election results of the November 8 election are certified, the losing candidate has a statutory right to contest the election. The Curry Court stated that federal courts should not become involved in state election disputes `in the absence of aggravating factors such as denying the right of citizens to vote for reasons of race, or fraudulent interference with a free election by stuffing of the ballot box, or any other unlawful conduct which interferes with the individual's right to vote.' Id. at 1315-16 (quoting Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District, Unionville, Mo., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir.1973)). Other federal circuits have consistently reached the conclusion that the states should be primarily responsible for regulating their own elections. In Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.1978), the First Circuit recognized that the Constitution confers the power to control the disposition of contests over elections to state and local offices. Griffin v. Burns, supra, at 1077 (quoting Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910, 93 S.Ct. 967, 35 L.Ed.2d 272 (1973) (wherein the Court stated that the U.S. Constitution confers upon the states the power to control the disposition of contests over elections to ... state and local offices (citation omitted))). However, the federal court in Griffin ruled that due process required federal action because 1) the federal court was the only practical forum for redress, 2) there was no standard state procedure for handling the claim, and 3) the state court did not confront the question. In Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970), six voters against whom the statute of limitations had run on a state claim sought federal relief under the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At issue was a close congressional primary election where, by mistake, a number of persons not members of the party holding the primary were allowed to vote. The Second Circuit rejected the § 1983 claim on the grounds that the due process clause and art. I, § 2, of the United States Constitution offer no guarantee against errors in the administration of an election. Reasoning that the federal courts are not equipped or empowered to supervise the administration of a local election, the Second Circuit ventured that if every election irregularity involved a federal violation, the court would be thrust into the details of virtually every election, tinkering with the state's election machinery, reviewing petitions, registration cards, vote tallies, and certificates of election for all manner of error and insufficiency under state and federal law. Powell, 436 F.2d at 86. The Fourth Circuit, when presented with a suit by three unsuccessful candidates for public office, upheld dismissal in favor of all defendants. The Fourth Circuit noted: Our constitution does not contemplate that the federal judiciary routinely will pass judgment on particular elections for federal, state or local office. The conduct of elections is instead a matter committed primarily to the control of states, and legislative bodies are traditionally the final judges of their own membership. The legitimacy of democratic politics would be compromised if the results of elections were regularly to be rehashed in federal court. Federal courts, of course, have actively guarded the electoral process from class-based discrimination and restrictive state election laws.... In this essentially factual dispute, we defer to those primarily responsible for elections and we refuse to authorize yet another avenue for those disgruntled with the political process to keep the contest alive in the courtroom. Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 1280 (4th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1295, 94 L.Ed.2d 151 (1987). The plaintiffs in Hutchinson alleged irregularities in the general election and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). The Fourth Circuit stated that it must refrain from considering the particulars of disputed elections, especially in a suit for damages, because: To do otherwise would be to intrude on the role of the states and the Congress, to raise the possibility of inconsistent judgments concerning elections, to erode the finality of results, to give candidates incentives to bypass the procedures already established, to involve federal courts in the details of state-run elections, and to constitute the jury as well as the electorate as an arbiter of political outcomes. These costs, we believe, would come with very little benefit to the rights fundamentally at issue herethe rights of voters to fair exercise of their franchise. Hutchinson, 797 F.2d at 1285. In Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.1985), motion to withdraw judgment denied, 777 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit ruled that a federal court should not intervene in a state election dispute where it was alleged that votes were improperly counted. Characterizing the dispute as a garden variety, the Fifth Circuit ruled that it did not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Citing Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.1980), as controlling, the Fifth Circuit held that the claim was not actionable in federal court because our federal system contemplates that states will be primarily responsible for regulating their own elections. Welch, 765 F.2d at 1317. Gamza concerned a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a candidate, who lost a school board election in Texas, and his supporters. The Fifth Circuit declined federal involvement in the case, stating: We must, therefore, recognize a distinction between state laws and patterns of state action that systematically deny equality in voting, and episodic events that, despite non-discriminatory laws, may result in the dilution of an individual's vote. Unlike systematically discriminatory laws, isolated events that adversely affect individuals are not presumed to be a violation of the equal protection clause. Gamza, 619 F.2d at 453. The Fifth Circuit noted: The very nature of the federal union contemplates separate functions for the states. If every state election irregularity were considered a federal constitutional deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate every state election dispute, and the elaborate state election contest procedures, designed to assure speedy and orderly disposition of the multitudinous questions that may arise in the electoral process, would be superseded by a section 1983 gloss. [Citations omitted.] Section 1983 did not create a delictual action for the torts of state officials, see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695-96, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), and it did not authorize federal courts to be state election monitors. For these reasons we have concluded that the denial of a nominee's right to a position on a ballot by an episodic election irregularity in a county primary election does not deprive his supporters of a federal constitutional right. [Citations omitted.] Id. at 453-54. The Seventh Circuit in Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861 (7th Cir.1975), refused to act in a case involving the malfunction of voting machines in a county election. The Court distinguished the voting machine problem in that case from willful conduct, which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected. The Court reasoned that only the latter type of claim could give rise to a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District, Unionville, Mo., 472 F.2d 121 (8th Cir.1973), the plaintiff claimed that the right to vote had been diluted by the defendant's improper counting of ballots. The Eighth Circuit determined that it was not the federal court's role to oversee the administrative details of a local election. Pettengill, 472 F.2d at 122. The Court found no constitutional grounds for intervention in the absence of aggravating factors such as denying the right of citizens to vote for reasons of race, or fraudulent interference with a free election by stuffing of the ballot box, or any other unlawful conduct which interferes with the individual's right to vote. Id. (citations omitted). In support of their claims of constitutional deprivation, the plaintiffs rely upon Griffin v. Burns, supra, and Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.1981). These cases are clearly distinguishable from the present case, however, since, in both cases, state action had disfranchised a substantial portion of the electorate, whereas the plaintiffs in this case are complaining that a portion of the electorate has been improperly enfranchised by the state court order. In Griffin and Duncan, once the voters were disfranchised, no other legal remedies existed for them to pursue under state law. Here, however, adequate post-election procedures exist under Alabama law. There is no constitutional deprivation because state remedies exist that adequately protect any interest the plaintiffs may have. The plaintiffs have a fair remedy under state law that protects their interests, while not automatically disfranchising an entire class of voters, in the election contest procedure. § 17-15-1 through § 17-15-63, Ala. Code 1975. This procedure has been held to be adequate and fair by the Eleventh Circuit in Curry v. Baker, supra at 1316-17. The ruling of Curry v. Baker is supported by the Eleventh Circuit's recent holding in McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, McKinney v. Osceola County Bd. of Comm'rs, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995), in which the Court of Appeals emphasized that if state law provides a means by which an action in question may be challenged, then one does not have a procedural due process claim in the federal courts. By issuing and upholding an injunction in this case, the federal courts have violated the basic tenets of federalism and the long-standing rule against interference by federal courts in state election matters. Such action violates the  Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine was explained by the Eleventh Circuit in Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison County, Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1545 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting from District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315-16 n. 16, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)): Lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions. If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial [of a claim] in a judicial proceeding ... then the district court is in essence being called on to review the state court decision. This the district court may not do. The Republican plaintiffs seek to evade the Rooker-Feldman doctrine on the grounds that it is not they, but their party, that intervened in Odom v. Bennett. This argument has no merit. The interests of these Republican candidates are identical to the interests of the Republican Party, and to permit them to evade Rooker-Feldman on this basis would destroy it. In addition to having the same lawyers, the plaintiffs have the closest possible relationship to the Republican Party. They are executive officers of the Republican Party. In addition to the above-discussed principles of federalism, the federal courts have developed a doctrine of abstention. The abstention doctrine, like recusal, involves perhaps a more subjective analysis by federal courts, but, in this case, it appears that the federal courts should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). [11]