Opinion ID: 1253350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impermissible Jury Contact

Text: ¶ 21 Cardall asserts that the witness stand incident constituted impermissible jury contact which created a presumption of prejudice. To support his assertion, he relies on State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), and State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987). However, Cardall incorrectly applies the law of these cases to the case at hand. In both Pike and Erickson, we reversed convictions after key state witnesses engaged in unauthorized direct conversation with jurors. The rule established in those cases is that improper juror contact with witnesses or parties raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. No presumption of prejudice arises, however, in the present case. Here there was no conversation between witnesses and jurors, just a quiet exchange between S.F. and her mother. ¶ 22 Cardall has failed to produce any evidence which would raise a presumption of prejudice which the State must rebut. He has also failed to cite any Utah case which holds that incidents like the witness stand incident invoke a presumption of prejudice. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to find prejudice. Cardall further argues that the witness stand incident was a demonstration or an emotional outburst which denied him his rights to a fair and an impartial jury. To support this assertion, Cardall cites a host of cases from other jurisdictions where an extraordinary variety of irregularities has been held to require a new trial. These irregularities include demonstrations and emotional outbursts such as laughter, hostile and impassioned epithets, witness hysteria, loud weeping during closing statements, witness kneeling and praying for guidance, and a rape victim yelling at the defendant. See State v. Gevrez, 61 Ariz. 296, 148 P.2d 829 (1944) (weeping mother of victim seated near jury cried out, Stop it! She's dead!); Rodriguez v. State, 433 So.2d 1273 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1983) (hostile, impassioned epithets of victim's widow) Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197, 106 N.W.2d 22 (1960) (rape victim's hysteria on witness stand and during recess; father of victim standing up during his daughter's examination and yelling That's enough! and then going to the witness stand to assist his daughter down); State v. Stewart, 278 S.C. 296, 295 S.E.2d 627 (1982) (crowded, noisy courtroom, outbursts of laughter, spectator glaring toward jury); State v. Baker, 48 S.D. 636, 205 N.W. 666 (1925) (rape victim holding up a baby and yelling to defendant, Here's your sonny); Cooper v. State, 72 Tex.Crim. 645, 163 S.W. 424 (1914) (witness kneeling and praying to be guided while giving her testimony). ¶ 23 Giving full effect to the cases cited by Cardall, the witness stand incident does not reach the level of a demonstration or an emotional outburst. On the contrary, the incident which took place between S.F. and her mother was a very private and quiet exchange of affection. ¶ 24 Cardall charges that the witness stand incident improperly and prejudicially bolstered S.F.'s credibility with the jury. The trial court found no evidence to support this claim, and Cardall has not demonstrated on appeal that the court abused its discretion. We therefore conclude that S.F.'s testimony was not bolstered or otherwise made more credible after the witness stand incident.