Opinion ID: 3181874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Character of Kidnapping Offenses

Text: 2 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2005 & Supp. 2014). 3 Section 23-3-430 is found in the portion of the South Carolina Code encompassing South Carolina's sex offender registry. As we have repeatedly stated, the sex offender registry is a civil requirement separate and apart from the criminal punishments associated with sexual offenses in this state. State v. Nation, 408 S.C. 474, 481, 759 S.E.2d 428, 432 (2014) (citing In re Justin B., 405 S.C. 391, 394, 404–08, 747 S.E.2d 774, 775, 781–83 (2013)). As such, a declaratory judgment, and not post-conviction relief (PCR), is the appropriate vehicle in which to address this matter. Cf. Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 671 S.E.2d 600 (2008) (stating that PCR is intended to address constitutional violations related to the criminal conviction (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(a) (2007))). Thompson contends that in his action for a declaratory judgment, he requested two declarations: (1) that his kidnapping offenses did not involve a sexual element (the first declaration); and (2) that therefore he would not have to register as a sex offender in the future (the second declaration). Thompson asserts that the circuit court and court of appeals ignored the first declaration in their respective order and opinion, and only addressed the second. We agree. During the hearing regarding the State's motion to dismiss, the circuit court stated that a criminal defendant must request the court make a finding on the record regarding the character of a kidnapping offense at the time of a guilty plea or jury verdict. The circuit court further stated that should the defendant fail to secure a finding at that time, he forever waives his right to assert that the kidnapping was not sexual in nature. Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008). Fundamentally, due process requires notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and judicial review. Id. We find that Thompson has been denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard on whether his kidnapping offenses were sexual in nature. Section 23-3-430 is a civil statute, and we cannot imagine the General Assembly intended to allow a criminal defendant affected by section 23-3-430 the opportunity to be heard only during his criminal proceedings. While it is permissible—and even encouraged— for the sentencing court to determine the character of any kidnapping offenses at that time, the defendant is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the matter at some point, because the civil consequences follow immediately after conviction, and not merely upon his release from prison.4 4 For example, as Judge Thomas noted in her dissent, Thompson is ineligible to receive substance abuse services while incarcerated, or to enroll in the ninety-day pre-release program (a program designed to help soon-to-be-released inmates reintegrate back into society). Thompson, 409 S.C. at 391 n.7, 762 S.E.2d at 53 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Division of Behavioral Health and Substance Abuse Services, S.C. Dep't of Corrs., http://www.doc.sc.gov/programs/ substance.jsp (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). We therefore reverse the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's order with respect to the first declaration. On remand, Thompson and the State are entitled to a hearing to determine whether Thompson's kidnapping offenses were sexual in nature. At that hearing, the court should allow the victims' to testify if they so desire, and should consider the victims' opinions.