Opinion ID: 2204777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doe's Intoxication

Text: As the court of appeals recognized, there is ample evidence from which a jury could conclude Doe was intoxicated at the time of her attack upon Smith. Although intoxication is a somewhat nebulous concept, A person is . . . . intoxicated when one or more of the following are true: (1) the person's reason or mental ability has been affected; (2) the person's judgment is impaired; (3) the person's emotions are visibly excited; and (4) the person has, to any extent, lost control of bodily actions or motions. Garcia v. Naylor Concrete Co., 650 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Iowa 2002) (defining intoxication for purposes of defense to workers' compensation award) (quoting Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1995) (defining intoxication for purposes of an insurance-policy exclusion)); accord State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa 85, 88, 21 N.W. 195, 197 (1884) ([A] person is drunk in legal sense when he is so far under the influence of intoxicating liquor that his passions are visibly excited or his judgment impaired by the liquor.); State v. Huxford, 47 Iowa 16, 18 (1877) (When any person, from the use of intoxicating liquors, has affected his reason or his faculties, or has rendered him incoherent of speech, or has caused him to lose control in any manner, or to any extent, of the action or motions of his person or body, such person, in contemplation of law, is intoxicated.) Evidence of a person's blood-alcohol level, if available, is important evidence of intoxication. Garcia, 650 N.W.2d at 90; Benavides, 539 N.W.2d at 355. No particular degree of intoxication is required. Benavides, 539 N.W.2d at 355. [T]here are degrees of intoxication varying all the way from slight stimulation to complete coma. State v. Yates, 132 Iowa 475, 478, 109 N.W. 1005, 1006 (1906). [1] Utilizing the four Garcia/Benavides subjects of inquiry, the question is simply whether the person is under the influence of liquor so as not to be . . . [herself], so as to be excited from it, and not to possess the clearness of intellect and that control of [herself] that [she] otherwise would have. . . . Benavides, 539 N.W.2d at 355 (quoting State ex rel. Cosson v. Baughn, 162 Iowa 308, 311, 143 N.W. 1100, 1101 (Iowa 1913)). In the case at bar, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Doe was intoxicated at the time of her attack upon Smith. Smith and Isaac thought Doe was intoxicated. Doe was a loudmouth who hurled opprobrious epithets at Smith. Cf. Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co., 648 N.W.2d 137, 148 (Iowa 2002) (increasingly loud and obnoxious behavior evidence of intoxication for dramshop claim); Baughn, 162 Iowa at 312, 315, 143 N.W. at 1101, 1102 (mayor repeatedly made use of expressions such as `damn it,' `God damn,' `sons of bitches,' and the like; sufficient evidence a mayor, in 1913, was intoxicated, thus warranting removal from office, when he used profane language and indulged in opprobrious epithets, and talked so loudly that he could be heard far away). Doe was also bumping into everybody in the restroom. Cf. Baughn, 162 Iowa at 313, 143 N.W. at 1102 (pointing out intoxicated man could not stand steadily). Her actions culminated in a sudden and vicious attack upon another human being. Cf. Catania v. 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 A.D.2d 476, 731 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (proof of intoxication where assailant suddenly turned around and struck plaintiff in head with brass knuckles). Importantly, Doe was holding a beer in a bar that sold alcohol. This fact tends to show that alcohol may have played a role in Doe's actions, and not some other substance. In sum, there was sufficient evidence to show Doe was intoxicated, [2] and summary judgment for want of proof on this issue is not justified.