Opinion ID: 901605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶7.] Mulligan first contends that the State failed to prove the criminal intent necessary for first degree manslaughter. She concedes that the State produced motive evidence, but argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of criminal intent. The standard of review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is well settled. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in a criminal case, the issue before this Court is whether there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In making that determination, we accept the evidence and the most favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict. Moreover, the jury is. . .the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Therefore, this Court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence. State v. Laplante, 2002 SD 95, ¶19, 650 NW2d 305, 310 (internal citations omitted). Thus, [a] guilty verdict will not be set aside if the state's evidence and all favorable inferences that can be drawn therefrom support a rational theory of guilt. State v. Jones, 521 NW2d 662, 673 (SD 1994) (citation omitted). State v. Pasek, 2004 SD 132, ¶7, 691 NW2d 301, 305. [¶8.] Mulligan was acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of first degree manslaughter. As is relevant here, homicide [1] is murder in the first degree [i]f perpetrated without authority of law and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed . . . . SDCL 22-16-4. Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree if perpetrated: Without any design to effect death . . ., but by means of a dangerous weapon . . .. SDCL 22-16-15. Thus, in order to sustain the manslaughter conviction, the State must have proved that Mulligan acted without a design to effect the death of Goldade but did so by means of a dangerous weapon. The matter in dispute is whether the State proved that Mulligan acted with criminal intent. [¶9.] Manslaughter does not require specific intent. See SDCL 22-16-15. It is a general intent crime. State v. Bittner, 359 NW2d 121, 128 (SD 1984) (Morgan, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating homicide . . . is a specific intent crime . . . and the manslaughter offenses are all general intent crimes.). The difference has been described as follows: Specific intent has been defined as meaning some intent in addition to the physical act which the crime requires, while general intent means an intent to do the physical act-or, perhaps, recklessly doing the physical act-which the crime requires. State v. Schouten, 2005 SD 122, ¶13, 707 NW2d 820, 824 (quoting State v. Taecker, 2003 SD 43, ¶25, 661 NW2d 712, 718 (quoting State v. Barrientos, 444 NW2d 374, 376 (SD 1989))). Therefore, to convict Mulligan of manslaughter, there must have been sufficient evidence to find that she intended to fire the gun or that she was reckless with respect to the shooting. [¶10.] Mulligan points out that there was no evidence that she was reckless in her handling of the gun. Therefore, that method of proving intent is unavailable to sustain the manslaughter conviction. Mulligan then points out that the jury acquitted on the charge of first degree murder, which required proof of intent to kill Goldade. From this acquittal, Mulligan argues that the jury rejected the State's sole contention at trial  that Mulligan intended to shoot Goldade in order to hide her debt. As Mulligan phrases it in her reply brief, [w]e know that the jury rejected the notion that [Mulligan] intentionally shot [Goldade], as the jury rejected the murder charge. Based on this assumption, Mulligan claims that she could not be convicted of manslaughter because that crime required intent to commit the physical act of shooting Goldade. [¶11.] However, Mulligan may not use the jury's rejection of the murder charge to infer that there was insufficient evidence to justify the manslaughter charge. The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected such reasoning, holding that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count [can] not attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another count. United States v. Powell, 469 US 57, 58, 105 SCt 471, 473, 83 LEd2d 461, 464 (1984) (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 US 390, 52 SCt 189, 76 LEd 356 (1932)). Mulligan, however, points out that the State focused its entire case solely on the charge of murder, and therefore the jury must have rejected the intent to kill element when it acquitted her of murder. However, Powell also rejected this argument that examines the focus of the State's case to determine whether the jury necessarily rejected an essential element of a lesser charge. The Supreme Court concluded that even when a case is not presented to the jury under the theory that would reconcile the verdicts (in this case manslaughter), a resulting inconsistency may not be utilized to suggest there was insufficient evidence. See id . at 61, 105 SCt at 475, 83 LEd2d at 466. In discussing the reason for these holdings, the Supreme Court reiterated Justice Holmes' reasoning in Dunn that nothing can be inferred from an acquittal on one of two interrelated charges because the jury may have disposed of the inconsistent charge through leniency. 'Consistency in the verdict is not necessary'. . . . 'We interpret the acquittal as no more than [the jury's] assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.' Id . at 62-63, 105 SCt at 475, 83 LEd2d at 467 (citations omitted). Although some of the Dunn Court's analysis is no longer followed, Powell reaffirmed Dunn's core holding that where truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, '[t]he most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt.' Id . at 64-65, 105 SCt at 476, 83 LEd2d at 468 (quoting Dunn, 284 US at 393, 52 SCt at 190, 76 LEd at 359). Therefore, even though an acquittal may have been rendered on one offense that contains a necessary element of a lesser offense, the lesser conviction will stand because: Juries are not held to any rules of logic nor are they required to explain their decisions. The ability to convict or acquit another individual of a crime is a grave responsibility and an awesome power. An element of this power is the jury's capacity for leniency. . . . [T]he mercy-dispensing power of the jury may serve to release a defendant from some of the consequences of his act without absolving him of all responsibility. People v. Vaughn, 409 Mich 463, 466, 295 NW2d 354, 355 (1980). See also People v. Arroyo, 38 AD3d 383, 833 NYS2d 18, 19 (NYApp 2007) (stating that what may appear to be an irrational verdict may actually constitute a jury's permissible exercise of mercy or leniency). [¶12.] These rules are applicable in cases like this where a defendant asserts jury error (Mulligan also contends the jury erred in determining that criminal intent was satisfied through negligent conduct, see infra ¶18) rather than jury leniency: We also reject, as imprudent and unworkable, a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of some error that worked against them. Such an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury's deliberations that courts generally will not undertake. Powell , 469 US at 66, 105 SCt at 477, 83 LEd2d at 469. Thus, Mulligan has erroneously assumed that because of the acquittal of murder, the jury found that she did not intentionally fire the gun. Instead of speculating whether the inconsistent verdicts are evidence of jury error, appellate courts should review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction that was rendered. Id . at 67, 105 SCt at 478, 83 LEd2d at 470. This review should be independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count was insufficient. The Government must convince the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy the [appellate] courts that given this proof the jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id . [¶13.] Here, the State's physical evidence, independent of the inconsistent verdicts, circumstantially established that the shooting was not accidental. The State also offered substantial circumstantial evidence that Mulligan had reason to intentionally shoot Goldade. Specifically, the evidence showed that: her theft was about to be disclosed; Goldade would not have reacted well to the disclosure; and she was about to be removed from the home by Goldade. [¶14.] Mulligan, however, contends that this was evidence of motive and that evidence of motive is not evidence of intent. We agree that motive and criminal intent are not the same in a technical sense. See State v. Lassiter, 2005 SD 8, ¶42 n8, 692 NW2d 171, 182-183 (stating that [m]otive is the 'reason a person chooses to commit a crime,' but it is not equivalent to the 'mental state such as intent' required to commit the crime.). Nevertheless, the same evidence may often prove both motive and intent. [T]here is no special evidence of intent . . . apart from evidence of emotion, of knowledge, of design. . . . So if one is charged with wife murder, his ill feelings towards the wife would be an ingredient of criminal intent, and whatever evidence would be otherwise suitable to show motive (i.e., ill feeling) would be receivable also. 2 Wigmore, Evidence §242 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). Therefore, this Court must review the State's evidence of Mulligan's theft, Goldade's impending discovery of the theft, Goldade's intent to remove Mulligan from the home, and the physical evidence to determine whether it, and all favorable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, support the theory that Mulligan acted with intent to shoot Goldade. [¶15.] The State's evidence included the fact that Goldade was fiscally conservative and did not purchase things on credit. The evidence further suggested that there would have been trouble when Goldade discovered Mulligan was stealing from him. There was also evidence that Mulligan's deception was about to be discovered. The State's forensic accountant testified that Mulligan was only going to realize income of $17,147 per year, while having credit card and debt management program payments approaching approximately $1,000 per month. Finally, there was evidence that Goldade was going to make Mulligan and her son move out of the home. [¶16.] In addition to this evidence of intent, the State's physical evidence tended to establish that the revolver could not have fired accidentally. An expert testified that the revolver would not fire unless the trigger was pulled with significant force. Evidence was presented that the gun could be fired as either a single or double action handgun, and that even in single action mode, it would have taken four to five pounds of pressure to fire. There were also burn marks on the towels that indicated that the gun had been held between the two towels when fired, evidence inconsistent with Mulligan's first version of what occurred. [¶17.] Finally, a friend of Goldade's testified that Mulligan's alleged reason for wanting to keep the gun concealed as she approached Goldade was implausible because the three-year-old would have been accustomed to seeing the many guns that were kept in this home. And, with respect to Mulligan's alleged surprise at finding the gun in the closet, there was contrary evidence that Goldade had kept the gun in the closet so that Mulligan would have access to it if she needed it for protection. The evidence also reflected that Goldade and Mulligan had previously discussed needing to move the gun for their son's safety. Thus, the implausibility of Mulligan's story, the physical evidence, and the circumstantial evidence of intent were inconsistent with Mulligan's defense that the gun had accidentally discharged. Instead, that evidence allowed the jury to infer that Mulligan intentionally shot Goldade to avoid the impending disclosure of her thefts and her removal from the home. [¶18.] Mulligan, however, also speculates that the jury incorrectly convicted her, believing that she was merely negligent, a level of mens rea insufficient to constitute intent to commit the act. Mulligan's argument is based on a jury question asking whether lawful action done without usual and ordinary caution and resulting in a death constitute[s] criminal intent? However, rather than suggesting that the conviction was erroneously based on a finding of negligence, this question and the trial court's response merely demonstrated that the jury was properly performing its duty to consider whether Mulligan's act was excusable homicide. [2] [¶19.] Homicide is excusable if committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act, with usual and ordinary caution. SDCL 22-16-30. In this case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on how to distinguish between negligent conduct in an accident under circumstances involving usual and ordinary caution and intentional conduct. In responding to the jury's question, the court incorporated Mulligan's request that the jury be directed to review Instructions 29 and 30 on excusable homicide and specific intent. Instruction 29 reiterated the statutory definition of excusable homicide (accident and misfortune in doing a lawful act, with usual and ordinary caution). Instruction 30 also instructed that Mulligan must have intentionally [done] the act of shooting Goldade: In the crime of first degree manslaughter the defendant must have criminal intent. To constitute criminal intent it is not necessary that there should exist an intent to violate the law. When a person intentionally does an act which the law declares to be a crime, the person is acting with criminal intent, even though the person may not know that the conduct is unlawful. [¶20.] Thus, although the jury obviously had questions concerning this factual dispute, the record reflects that it was performing its required duty to determine whether the shooting was intentional or accidental. Considering the jury's questions and the trial court's response, we do not believe that the jury mistakenly found guilt based upon negligence. [¶21.] Mulligan finally argues that the jury was overcome by passion, prejudice, and mistake of law because after rejecting the first degree murder charge, there was no other evidence that would support the manslaughter charge. Although Powell, supra , forecloses that argument, Mulligan more specifically argues that the State's evidence of motive moved the jury to have sympathy with the victim resulting in a compromise verdict that was unsupported by law or evidence. However, as previously discussed, the evidence of motive was also evidence of intent. Therefore, that circumstantial evidence of intent together with the physical evidence can be used to support a rational theory of guilt. Ultimately, this was a case of credibility and 'the jury is . . . the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.' Pasek , 2004 SD 132 at ¶7, 691 NW2d at 305 (citation omitted). We therefore affirm this issue.