Opinion ID: 2588322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: False Evidence/Suppression of Favorable Evidence

Text: In Haddock's original K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, he alleged numerous claims of prosecutorial misconduct, including: Knowing Use of False Testimony/Subornation of Perjury by Robert Giles/GeneScreen, the improper use of Dr. Giles' testimony and report, and the failure to disclose lab test results of fingernail scrapings, eyeglasses, and the GeneScreen report. In a November 6, 1997, pro se Motion to Dismiss Judgement of Conviction, Haddock asked the court to dismiss the judgment in the 60-1507 case which set forth violations of his due process rights, including the prosecution's knowing use of false testimony and failure to disclose evidence. The district court declined to consider the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in its March 30, 2001, memorandum order, reasoning that those issues were found without merit on direct appeal. At the August 7, 2002, hearing on the motion, the court found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct as there was full and complete discovery given to Mr. Haddock and his attorneys from the get-go in this case. Of particular note, the district court at this time refused to consider any evidence regarding Dr. Wraxall's review of the GeneScreen test concerning the shoes, shirt, or slacks because it was outside the scope of the proceedings. In the December 3, 2002, order denying Haddock's motion to dismiss, the district court found no evidence of any prosecutorial misconduct and no evidence that the State was hiding evidence or failed to disclose evidence. It is significant the district court had denied Haddock's 60-1507 motion alleging this particular prosecutorial misconduct after two separate hearings before Haddock attempted to seek additional testing on the shoes, shirt, and slacks. As he continued to obtain affidavits from experts and then obtain the additional DNA testing, Haddock tried to keep his K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings alive by filing repeated motions to reconsider or to amend each court order as he further developed his arguments and obtained more information regarding the testing of the shoes, shirt, and slacks. The district court recognized this fact in an April 9, 2003, order responding to Haddock's pro se Supplemental Brief in support of motions that were properly before the court on Jan. 30, 2003: Mr. Haddock is advised that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain his arguments regarding alleged trial errors as many of them were either raised in his previous habeas petitions, or could have been raised in the previous petitions. However, if petitioner can show that any issue, which was not raised and could not have been previously raised, rises to the level of a constitutional violation, he can raise such issue(s) in a motion, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. Arguments regarding the denial of his habeas petitions or motions construed as habeas petitions are properly presented on appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals. Likewise, in its final October 25, 2004, order, the district court found that it had ruled on all previous motions and refused to issue a final decision pursuant to K.S.A. 60-254 to resurrect jurisdiction over the Court's previous rulings. The district court in this case never performed any significant analysis concerning whether the defendant's due process rights were violated because he was convicted based on false evidence or explaining the basis for its conclusion that the State failed to disclose evidence. Moreover, it does not appear that the district court ever considered the evidence regarding the shoes, shirt, and slacks in this regard because Haddock went outside the scope of the initial K.S.A. 60-1507 and K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-2512 proceedings where the parties agreed to additional testing on only the glasses, the fingernail scrapings, and the hair. In this respect, this case is analogous to Wright v. State, 2004 WL 502906 (Tex.App., unpublished opinion filed March 16, 2004), where the defendant asserted the trial court erred in denying relief under his postconviction DNA motion; however, the substance of his argument on appeal were allegations that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence. The court found these issues were outside the scope of an appeal from postconviction DNA proceedings and the court did not have jurisdiction to consider these arguments which should have been brought in a habeas corpus proceeding. Thus, in this appeal, where the 60-1507 motion had been denied by the district court, the defendant's arguments concerning the falsity and the suppression of evidence concerning the shoes, shirt, and slacks were not within the scope of the further proceedings under the second K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-2512 motion. As such, these issues are not properly before this court on appeal. As to the defendant's due process claims regarding the hair and fingernail scrapings, Supreme Court Rule 183(j) (2005 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 228) requires a district court reviewing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding each of the movant's specific issues. When the lack of findings impedes appellate review, remand is required. State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 65, 4 P.3d 618 (2000). Although the district court provided minimal analysis on this issue, this court is able to resolve the issue based on the record before us. In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), the United States Supreme Court overturned a murder conviction because a witness for the prosecution falsely testified he had received no promise of leniency in return for his testimony, and the prosecuting attorney, knowing the testimony was false, did nothing to correct it. The court reasoned: [I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment [citations omitted]. . . . The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. [Citations omitted.] 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court subsequently found: [T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.  (Emphasis added.) [T]he three components or essential elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: `The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.' Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 [1999]). The failure to disclose such information under Brady warrants a reversal only if it is material, and evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. `A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence of the outcome.' [ United States v. Bagley, ] 473 U.S. [667] at 668[, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481]. In re J.T.M., 22 Kan.App.2d 673, 680, 922 P.2d 1103, rev. denied 260 Kan. 993 (1996). Haddock does not allege that the prosecutor knew the DNA evidence presented in this case was false; however, he argues the State still bears the responsibility for the introduction of false evidence under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). In Giglio, one assistant federal prosecutor promised a key government witness immunity if he testified at trial. Another prosecutor, with no knowledge of the promise, tried the case, and the witness testified at trial that he was still subject to prosecution. Giglio appealed the denial of his motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court discussed Napue and Brady and found that nondisclosure of evidence affecting the credibility of a key witness to the verdict falls within the general rule of Brady that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial `irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' 405 U.S. at 153, 92 S.Ct. 763. The Court found that a new trial is not necessary unless a finding of materiality of the false evidence is made under Brady and the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury under Napue. The Court found that whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it was the responsibility of the prosecutor, and a promise made by one attorney must be attributed to the prosecutor's office as an entity and as the spokesman of the government. As the government's case rested almost entirely on the witness' testimony, due process required that the conviction be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 406 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 1456. Haddock also cites Matter of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, 190 W.Va. 321, 438 S.E.2d 501 (1993), where the prosecutor had no knowledge that its expert serologist witness willfully offered false testimony. Relying on Napue, Giglio, and Brady, the court concluded: [I]t matters not whether a prosecutor using Trooper Zain as his expert ever knew that Trooper Zain was falsifying the State's evidence. The State must bear the responsibility for the false evidence. The law forbids the State from obtaining a conviction based on false evidence. 190 W.Va. at 325, 438 S.E.2d 501. Contrary to Haddock's assertion, Giglio does not stand for the proposition that the State does not have to have any knowledge of the false testimony. Rather, the Giglio Court viewed the evidence under both the Napue and Brady lenses after seemingly concluding that the State's actions were not only a presentation of false evidence but a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. See State v. McCarty, 271 Kan. 510, 514, 23 P.3d 829 (2001). Moreover, unlike this case, at least one of the prosecutors in the district attorney's office had knowledge that the testimony was false in Giglio. In this case, Haddock breaks his arguments under Napue/Giglio and Brady into two separate issues. While it clearly does not matter whether the State had knowledge of its actions to establish a Brady violation, this court has subsequently interpreted Napue by stating: A conviction obtained by the introduction of perjured testimony violates a defendant's due process rights if (1) the prosecution knowingly solicited the perjured testimony, or (2) the prosecution failed to correct testimony it knew was perjured. (Emphasis added.) State v. McKinney, 272 Kan. 331, 339, 33 P.3d 234 (2001) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173). As Haddock concedes that the State had no knowledge that it was presenting false evidence through the testimony of its DNA expert in this case, our analysis under the Napue issue technically ends here. Nevertheless, as these two issues are obviously interrelated, we consider whether the State presented false evidence or suppressed exculpatory or impeaching favorable evidence in violation of Napue, Brady, and Giglio. Before considering whether the presentation or suppression of evidence under either Napue/Giglio or Brady had a reasonable probability or likelihood of affecting the jury's verdict, we must first determine whether the evidence was in fact false under Napue or was favorable and suppressed by the State under the first two steps of the Brady analysis. Although Haddock points to five key pieces of evidence, we address only the two pieces of evidence which were properly brought before the district court under the K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings: 1. Hair Found in the Victim's Hand Came from Haddock Haddock argues Dr. Giles' testimony that the hair found in the victim's hand was from a person with the DNA type 1.1/4, which was consistent with Haddock's profile and inconsistent with the victim, was false because it was inconsistent with his own GeneScreen report which found weak 1.1, 1.2, and 4 alleles in the hair, indicating a mixed specimen, and accordingly excluding Haddock as a donor. Haddock points to defense expert Dr. Dean Stetler's opinion that Dr. Giles' testimony was somewhat inaccurate and misleading in that the hair may contain a contribution from Haddock, but could not be all from him. Moreover, Dr. Giles did not disclose the well known fact the PCR test would sometimes show a weak 1.1 when none was present and that one could assume that if the 1.1 and 4 came from the same person, they would be the same intensity. However, the State responds that Dr. Giles admitted on cross-examination that it was not possible to determine if a 1.2 DQ Alpha type, such as from the victim, was also present in the hair sample. Further, he testified that 9% of the Afro-American population, 5.9% of the Hispanic population, and 7.4% of the Caucasion population had the same DNA type as Haddock, presumably suggesting that Haddock was not necessarily the donor. It further points out that Dr. Giles disclosed the presence of a third party in his report by stating that a specimen with more than two indicated genotypes is a mixed specimen coming from more than one person. Finally, the State argues that the faint 1.1 designation in the report would not necessarily preclude Dr. Giles from concluding that it existed based on the testimony by the State's expert Dirks that control tests are used on every PCR typing strip to assure the accuracy of the findings. In this case, the subsequent more discriminating STR DNA testing showed that the hair was from a third-party female and not from the victim or Haddock. However, we must emphasize at the outset that this subsequent testing has no bearing on our analysis of whether the DNA evidence admitted at trial was false. Rather, we are evaluating whether Dr. Giles' testimony based on the PCR testing method used at the time of trial was false. While it is easy to see from the trial transcript that Dr. Giles could have left the impression with the jury that the hair was consistent that Haddock was the sole contributor, careful review of the testimony as pointed out by the State reveals that Dr. Giles did not exclude the fact that an allele consistent with the victim (1.2) may have also been present in the sample and Haddock shared a DNA profile with a significant number of the population. As such, we conclude that Dr. Giles did not present false testimony based upon the PCR testing which was performed prior to the 1993 trial. In this same vein, Haddock's argument that Dr. Giles failed to disclose exculpatory or impeaching evidence to the jury regarding the presence of three alleles in the hair sample is without merit. Both the GeneScreen report and Dr. Giles on cross-examination disclosed the possibility that the DNA mixture contained a 1.2 in addition to the 1.1 and 4. Although Haddock argues the GeneScreen report was exculpatory, defense expert Dr. Stetler agreed with Dr. Giles that it was possible based on the report that Haddock contributed to the DNA mixture. Finally, although Dr. Giles did not testify that the testing sometimes produces a nonexistent 1.1, this information was apparently inconsequential to this case. As the State's expert Dirks explained, the presence of a weak 1.1 is established by having its intensity compared with a control test before it would have been recorded. As such, Haddock has not demonstrated that Dr. Giles or the State failed to disclose exculpatory or impeaching evidence to the defense regarding the hair sample. As this evidence was neither false under Napue nor suppressed under Brady, Haddock has not established a due process violation with regard to the hair sample. 2. Victim Scratched Haddock When She Was Attacked At trial, the State presented evidence that the bruises and abrasions on both the victim's hands and arms were consistent with defensive wounds and that Haddock had fresh scratch marks on his wrists on the day of her death. Haddock was cross-examined about this theory at trial. Haddock argues that Dr. Wraxall's posttrial DNA testing on the fingernail scrapings taken from the victim established that the scrapings were consistent with the victim. Haddock argues the absence of his DNA under the fingernails of the victim contradicted the State's evidence at trial that the victim scratched Haddock when he was attacking her and that this evidence was withheld from the jury. Haddock's argument is without merit. The fact that the victim's own DNA evidence was found under her nails was not inconsistent with the implication at trial that the victim scratched Haddock. As the State correctly points out, the officer who observed the defendant's scratches described them as having flaps of skin at the edge of the scratches. The presence of these flaps of skin still on Haddock's wrist is consistent with a finding that his DNA would not be found under the victim's nails. Moreover, Haddock makes no allegation that the State had performed similar DNA testing of the fingernails prior to trial and failed to turn it over to the defense. As such, Haddock has not demonstrated that evidence at trial concerning the scratching or the fingernail scrapings was false or withheld from the defense. In conclusion, as the defendant has not established that this evidence was in fact false under Napue or was favorable and suppressed under Brady, we need not proceed to determine whether it had a reasonable likelihood or probability of changing the result of the trial. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL In his original pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Haddock alleged nearly 90 individual points of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court's first memorandum order stated that Haddock had failed to demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below the standard set forth in Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985), and the quality of representation was well above that required in order to constitute effective assistance of counsel: `There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.' [Citation omitted.] The Kansas Court of Appeals has determined that, in a situation where the State tests DNA evidence and finds that the defendant is implicated by that DNA, defense counsel's failure to submit the DNA sample for testing by an independent expert does not automatically render counsel ineffective. Sanders v. State of Kansas, 26 Kan.App.2d 826, 995 P.2d 397 (1999). `The fact is that independent testing might, as petitioner argues, have produced evidence in his favor; however, it also might have verified that the State's evidence was accurate. . . . The decision not to have the DNA independently tested was a tactical decision and not a deficient one, and we hold that it did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.' Sanders, 26 Kan.App.2d at 829[, 995 P.2d 397]. The Court agrees with and applies the foregoing in denying petitioner's assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the August 7, 2002, hearing regarding Haddock's motion to dismiss based on the results of the first round of DNA testing under K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-2512, the court found that it had previously addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in detail in the 60-1507 motion. When defense counsel suggested that the court had not considered all of the issues (although he could not point to anything specific), the court ruled that it was denying the 60-1507 motion in its entirety, as the remaining issues were all matters that should have been addressed on direct appeal and defendant was attempting to retry the case under the guise of a 60-1507 motion. On appeal, the defendant raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The following standard of review is applicable to each: Before counsel's assistance is determined to be so defective as to require reversal of a conviction, defendant must establish (1) counsel's performance was deficient, which means counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance was less than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing counsel's errors were so serious they deprived defendant of a fair trial. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be highly deferential. To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. [Citation omitted.] State v. Hedges, 269 Kan. 895, 913, 8 P.3d 1259 (2000). These performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law and fact requiring de novo review. Easterwood v. State, 273 Kan. 361, 370, 44 P.3d 1209, cert. denied 537 U.S. 951, 123 S.Ct. 416, 154 L.Ed.2d 297 (2002).