Opinion ID: 1943936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Voluntary Assent by Kitchings

Text: The Board also urges this court to reject the second stipulation because Kitchings signed it under duress, and because the hearing committee's implicit finding of voluntariness was not supported by specific findings that Respondent's participation in the negotiated disposition was voluntary, that he understood the agreement's terms and ramifications and that he admitted the misconduct to which he stipulated. We disagree with the Board on both points. First, we hold that the Board failed to accord sufficient deference to the hearing committee's findings of fact. The Board is obliged to accept the hearing committee's factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, viewed as a whole. In re Micheel, 610 A.2d at 234. The presence of duress is a question of fact, see Sind, 356 A.2d at 656; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 401 A.2d 962, 965 (D.C.1979) (quoting Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 475 (Utah 1975), for the proposition that the question of whether a party agreed to and should be bound by a stipulation is one of fact for the trial court to determine), and the hearing committee's finding was supported by substantial evidence: Kitchings testified in September that he signed the second stipulation of his own accord, and, after a three month opportunity to reconsider his testimony, he reiterated in December that he signed the stipulation voluntarily. The Board was therefore obliged to accept the hearing committee's finding. Second, although we agree with the Board that the hearing committee report lacks explicit findings on this point, it is apparent on the face of the record that the hearing committee considered, and rejected, that respondent signed the memorandum under duress. Indeed, the sole purpose of the December hearing was to explore that issue. In this context, the committee's reference to the first and second stipulations as the accepted facts of the case leaves no doubt that the committee implicitly found Kitchings's signature to be voluntary. Failure to note this expressly in the committee report was an oversight that in no way affected the outcome of the case, and does not constitute grounds for reversal by the Board. Cf. Wisconsin Avenue Nursing Home, 527 A.2d at 289 (holding that an error is reversible only if substantial doubt exists over whether the ultimate finding would be different with the error removed).