Opinion ID: 2364711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review for Improper Judicial Influence

Text: ¶ 21 I agree with the lead opinion that Mr. Ford's claim of improper judicial influence is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right reviewable under RAP 2.5(a)(3). Lead opinion at 99. [1] I also agree that our analysis is guided by precedent. Id. Under State v. Watkins, 99 Wash.2d 166, 178, 660 P.2d 1117 (1983), a defendant demonstrates improper judicial influence by establish[ing] a reasonably substantial possibility that the verdict was improperly influenced by the trial court's intervention. The lead opinion mentions the Watkins standard at the outset but does not apply it. Instead, it imposes on Mr. Ford a burden to establish improper judicial influence by showing judicial action designed to force or compel a decision. Lead opinion at 101 (emphasis added). No authority is cited for this standard because none exists. A party challenging a verdict need not demonstrate intentional misconduct on the part of the judge. Nor does our precedent prohibit only force or compulsion; improper influence can come in many forms that do not rise to that level of judicial encroachment. ¶ 22 The lead opinion also requires a threshold showing that the jury was still within its deliberative process and that the jury was at that point still undecided. Id. Drawing from the factual context of State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash.2d 733, 585 P.2d 789 (1978), the lead opinion essentially requires an affirmative showing that the jury was undecided when the trial court intervened. Lead opinion at 99-100, 101-102. Again, no authority is cited for these new requirements. Requiring parties challenging a verdict to make a threshold showing that the jury was still deliberating is completely unnecessary. It is no more meaningful than requiring appellants asserting trial error to make a threshold showing that there was a trial below. More importantly, requiring defendants to show that the jury was actually undecided at the time of the allegedly improper conduct has no place under Watkins. A judicial officer could certainly assert improper influence over the jury's deliberations even when the jury has not sent out questions or is otherwise in apparent unity. Nor is it clear how the court could determine whether the jury was undecided without making a specific inquiry. Rather than stray from our well-settled precedent, I would adhere to Watkins as the correct standard for assessing improper judicial influence. [2]