Opinion ID: 2816281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second-Degree Domestic Assault

Text: The ACCA enhances the sentences of defendants convicted of being a felon in possession of a weapon or ammunition who has 'three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both.' United States v. Deroo, 304 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Griffin the door to Griffin's current appeal on the ACCA issues because we have already decided the issue on direct appeal. See English v. United States, 998 F.2d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 1993) (In the absence of an intervening change in the law, or newly discovered evidence, we will not reconsider any claim that was resolved on direct appeal in a [§] 2255 habeas proceeding. (citation omitted)). Upon closer review, this court has not decided the legal issues being argued by Griffin in his habeas petition. On direct appeal, Griffin argued that the district court erred by counting his first-degree and second-degree domestic assaults as two separate predicate crimes and that his drug offense should not count as a predicate crime because he was only 17 years old at the time he committed it. This court specifically certified the following, different issues raised in Griffin's habeas petition: whether the District Court properly concluded that Mr. Griffin's December 31, 2002 conviction for domestic assault in the second degree . . . is a crime of violence for purposes of the ACCA and whether Appellant's prior state drug conviction qualified as a serious drug offense for purpose of the [ACCA]. We reject the government's argument and proceed to consider the merits of Griffin's appeal. -8- argues that the government cannot reach the required threshold of predicate offenses because his conviction of second-degree domestic assault in Missouri, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.073, is not a violent felony. Crimes are classified as violent felonies based on their elements. In Griffin's case, his second-degree domestic assault conviction was classified as a violent felony because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(I). Certain statutes, as the Missouri statute here, criminalize[] multiple kinds of behavior, United States v. Wilson, 568 F.3d 670, 672 (8th Cir. 2009), some of which qualify as a violent felony, and others that do not. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283–85 (2013). When a statute criminalizes both qualifying and non-qualifying conduct, courts apply a modified categorical approach and may consider the charging document, plea agreement, plea-colloquy transcript, or 'some comparable judicial record of this information' to determine under which portion of the statute the conviction arose. United States v. Bynum, 669 F.3d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)). Section 565.073.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes criminalizes the following types of actions: (1) Attempt[ing] to cause or knowingly caus[ing] physical injury to such family or household member by any means, including but not limited to, by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or by choking or strangulation; or (2) Recklessly caus[ing] serious physical injury to such family or household member; or (3) Recklessly caus[ing] physical injury to such family or household member by means of any deadly weapon. -9- Viewing the statute of conviction alone, one cannot readily discern under which subdivision Griffin was convicted. While subdivision (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), subdivisions (2) and (3) criminalize only reckless conduct. Thus, while subdivision (1) is clearly a violent felony for ACCA purposes,4 reckless conduct proscribed in subdivisions (2) and (3) arguably would not qualify. See United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895, 903 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that an Arizona conviction of aggravated assault based on merely reckless use of a vehicle was not a crime of violence); see also United States v. Hennecke, 590 F.3d 619, 621 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010) ([W]e construe the statutory term 'violent felony' and the Guidelines term 'crime of violence' as interchangeable. (citation omitted)). Thus we will apply the modified categorical approach to determine which subsection was used to convict Griffin. See United States v. Montgomery, 701 F.3d 1218, 1223 (8th Cir. 2012) (using the modified categorical approach when dealing with § 565.073). The Missouri indictment—to which Griffin eventually pleaded guilty—reveals that Griffin attempted to cause physical injury to [his victim] by pushing her, and such conduct was a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of attempting to cause physical injury. The indictment makes clear that Griffin was convicted under § 565.073.1(1) for attempting to cause physical injury. We find this qualifies as a violent felony because Griffin was convicted of a crime that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 4 See United States v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546, 552 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that a conviction for second-degree domestic assault under § 565.073.1(1) constitutes a violent felony). -10- 2. Possession of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute Like violent felon[ies], there is more than one way a crime can be classified as a serious drug offense. Id. § 924(e)(2)(A). In Griffin's case, his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.211, was classified as such because it is an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Griffin concedes his conviction under § 195.211 was for a Class B felony,5 which under Missouri law is punishable by a maximum term of years . . . not to exceed fifteen years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.011.1(2). Griffin argues, however, that this should not end the inquiry because of the specific sentencing circumstances unique to his case. Specifically, Griffin pleaded guilty through a plea agreement that only called for five years' imprisonment; thus, according to Griffin, the maximum punishment for his specific crime was five years. We reject Griffin's argument. In United States v. Rodriguez, the defendant argued that his convictions in the state of Washington for delivery of a controlled substance were not serious drug offenses for ACCA purposes. 553 U.S. 377, 380–81 (2008). The Washington statute stated that the penalty for the defendant's drug offense could not exceed five years, but another provision specified that [a]ny person convicted of a second or subsequent offense could be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized. Thus, by virtue of this latter, recidivist, provision respondent faced a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. Id. at 381 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court held that the 5 Section 195.211 distinguishes between Class C felonies, in which a defendant possesses five grams or less of marijuana, and Class B felonies, in which a defendant possesses any other controlled substance or more than five grams of marijuana. Griffin's concession that he was convicted of a Class B felony makes any inquiry into the statute's divisibility between Class B and C felonies unnecessary. -11- recidivism enhancement of ten years qualified the crime as a serious drug offense for ACCA purposes. Id. at 383. In Rodriguez, the defendant received a sentence of only 48 months' imprisonment but that did not change the maximum term of imprisonment as prescribed by law. Id. Similarly, we find that Griffin was convicted of a crime for which Missouri's statutes prescribed a maximum sentence of ten years or more. Whether Griffin himself was sentenced to ten years or more is not determinative. On this ground alone, we reject Griffin's argument.