Opinion ID: 4191525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to Brandishing Charges

Text: “We review sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirming the defendant’s convictions if, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Bankston, 820 F.3d 215, 235 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 369 (6th Cir. 2012)).
In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that “the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (footnote omitted). This “inquiry does not require a court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 318–19 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)). “Instead, the relevant question is whether, after 11 No. 16-2063 viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. In this case, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to his three convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), which provides: (c)(1)(A) . . . any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence . . . ... (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years[.] At trial, the government argued that Benson brandished a firearm during his robberies on May 29, 2014, July 29, 2014, and January 8, 2015, and that Defendant aided and abetted those crimes. We have held a “defendant may be found to have brandished a firearm under an aiding and abetting theory of liability.” United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 554 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2004). To sustain a conviction under § 924(c) for aiding and abetting: The government must prove that the defendant, as the accomplice, associated and participated in the use of the firearm in connection with the underlying . . . crime. The government must show that the defendant was a participant rather than merely a knowing spectator, that his presence at the scene of the crime was not surplusage, and that the crime would not have transpired without him. This can be satisfied if the accomplice knows that the principal is armed and acts with the intent to assist or influence the commission of the underlying predicate crime. Franklin, 415 F.3d at 554 (quoting Rattigan v. United States, 151 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1998)). In addition, the Supreme Court has recently held that a defendant “has the intent needed to aid and abet a § 924(c) violation when he knows that one of his confederates will carry a gun.” Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1249 (2014). 12 No. 16-2063
Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to prove that he had “advance knowledge”—as required by Rosemond—that Benson would brandish a gun during the three successful robberies committed by the brothers. See Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1251. Rather, he argues that the evidence at trial showed only that he knew that Benson would use a gun during the robberies. He does not argue that the government failed to satisfy its burden to prove the other elements of a § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) offense with respect all three of the robberies.3 Defendant’s argument misreads Rosemond and misstates the law. In Rosemond, the Supreme Court explained the mens rea necessary to satisfy § 924(c)’s intent requirement as follows: . . . An active participant in a [crime of violence] has the intent needed to aid and abet a § 924(c) violation when he knows that one of his confederates will carry a gun. In such a case, the accomplice has decided to join in the criminal venture, and share in its benefits, with full awareness of its scope—that the plan calls not just for a drug sale, but for an armed one. In so doing, he has chosen . . . to align himself with the illegal scheme in its entirety—including its use of a firearm. And he has determined . . . to do what he can to “make [that scheme] succeed.” [Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)]. He thus becomes responsible, in the typical way of aiders and abettors, for the conduct of others. He may not have brought the gun to the [crime] himself, but because he took part in that deal knowing a confederate would do so, he intended the commission of a § 924(c) offense—i.e., an armed [crime]. Id. at 1249 (emphasis added). As this reasoning makes clear, the government was not required to prove that Defendant had advance knowledge that Benson would brandish a gun as opposed to use it in some other way. Rather, as long as the government proved that Defendant “decided to join in the criminal venture . . . with full awareness of its scope . . . including its use of a firearm,” Defendant is liable as an aider and abettor under § 924(c) regardless of whether Benson ultimately brandished the gun, or made some other use of it. Id. Because the evidence here shows that Defendant 3 For example, he concedes that Benson brandished a gun during the robberies. 13 No. 16-2063 knew that Benson would use a gun in the course of the brothers’ robberies—indeed, the evidence shows that Defendant planned the robberies—and still agreed to act as the getaway driver, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) convictions. See id. (collecting cases for the proposition that an “unarmed driver of a getaway car ha[s] the requisite intent to aid and abet armed bank robbery if he ‘knew’ that his confederates would use weapons in carrying out the crime”); United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting sufficiency of the evidence challenge to conviction for aiding and abetting § 924(c) offense where defendant knew that his co-conspirator “was armed to further the underlying . . . offense”); Franklin, 415 F.3d at 555 (same).

Defendant did not challenge the jury instructions issued as to his § 924(c) charges before the district court. Our review is therefore for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We have explained that: [P]lain error review “involves four steps.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). “First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of ‘[d]eviation from a legal rule’—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1993)). “Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. “Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). “Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). Atkins, 843 F.3d at 632–33.
At trial, the district court instructed the jury that that the government was required to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt in order to carry its burden on the 14 No. 16-2063 § 924(c) charges: (i) “that [Benson] committed the corresponding crime of violence” for each of the three brandishing charges—in other words, the May 29, 2014, July 29, 2014, and January 8, 2015 bank robberies; (ii) “that [Benson] knowingly brandished a firearm;” (iii) “that the brandishing of the firearm was during and in relation to the corresponding crimes charged in Counts Two, Four, and Six [the successful bank robberies];” (iv) “that [Defendant] helped to commit or encouraged someone else to commit the crime of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence;” and (v) “that [Defendant] intended to help commit or encourage the crime of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence” by having “advanced knowledge that [Benson] would brandish a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.” (R. 145-7, Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, PageID #2306–09.) The district court separately instructed the jury as to the elements of armed bank robbery. Citing our recent decision in United States v. Henry, 797 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2015), Defendant argues that these jury instructions were plainly erroneous because “there was no instruction that the intent [element] must go to the brandishing of a firearm during and in relation to armed bank robbery[.]” (App. R. 40, Appellant’s Br., at 30.) Put differently, Defendant appears to argue that by using the words “crime of violence” instead of “armed bank robbery” in the instructions, the district court permitted the jury to find Defendant guilty without finding that Defendant intended to aid and abet an armed bank robbery. As the government rightly points out, this argument is nonsensical. As we explained in rejecting Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge, all that the government was required to prove in order to carry its burden on the § 924(c) charges was that Defendant intentionally aided and abetted three armed bank robberies with advance knowledge that the robber (Benson) would be carrying a gun. The instructions in this case thoroughly and accurately explained those requirements to the jury, and we can discern no error, plain or otherwise. Moreover, even if the instructions had been erroneous, any such error would not have affected Defendant’s substantial rights. The jury was separately and accurately instructed as to 15 No. 16-2063 the elements necessary to find that Defendant aided and abetted the three bank robberies (Counts 2, 4, and 6.) The jury convicted as to each of those counts. Thus, the jury necessarily found that Defendant intended to aid and abet the robberies, which, combined with Defendant’s advance knowledge that Benson would be armed, was sufficient for the jury to convict on the § 924(c) charges. Finally, we note that Henry provides no support for Defendant’s argument. In that case, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm by his accomplice during a bank robbery. Henry, 797 F.3d at 374. However, the jury was not instructed that it was required to find that the defendant had advance knowledge that his accomplice would be armed during the charged bank robbery in order to sustain the § 924(c) conviction. Id. at 375. We thus found plain error because the jury instructions squarely violated Rosemond. Id. In this case, by contrast, the jury was explicitly instructed that it was required to find that Defendant had advance knowledge that Benson would be using a gun during the robberies. We therefore reject Defendant’s challenge to the jury instructions.