Opinion ID: 614681
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror Garcia

Text: Garcia initially told the trial judge she could not vote for the death penalty. This response provided the prosecution with a valid reason to remove this juror in a possible death penalty case; in California, the jury, not the judge, then and now decides whether to impose the death penalty. A Wheeler motion by defense counsel as to Garcia would have been futile. In his comparative analysis,14 Carrera contends that Garcia’s equivocal answer as to whether she could vote for the death penalty was a pretext, as other non-Hispanic jurors gave similarly equivocal answers but were not stricken. Thomas Yale, Juror #9, was asked: “Could you consider the imposition of the death penalty?” Yale responded, “I believe I could, sir, yes.” To the question “And do you believe in the death penalty, sir?” he answered “I don’t like to take another life, but I guess under certain circumstances it is probably justified.” Vincent Colaustro, an alternate juror, stated he was not opposed to the death penalty philosophically. To the question “Could you vote for [the death penalty]?” he responded, “That is a tough question, a very tough question,” and a “tough decision.” When asked “Some murderers may warrant the death penalty, don’t you think?” Colaustro answered “It is hard for me to judge.” The prosecutor accepted both Yale and Colaustro. Carrera contends the answers from Yale and Colaustro are no less equivocal than Garcia’s, and thus any contention that the prosecutor struck Garcia based on her equivocal answer 14 In his brief, Carrera performs a comparative analysis as to four of the six stricken Hispanics in an effort to show the prosecution’s peremptory challenges were based on group bias. A comparative analysis compares the questions to, and answers from, similarly situated jurors in an effort to uncover the actual motivations behind a peremptory challenge. See generally Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 18722 CARRERA v. AYERS was a pretext for group bias. This contention fails on the merits. Garcia was asked whether she could vote for the death penalty if she was “convinced that the death penalty should be imposed,” and Garcia answered “No.” When asked whether she could vote for the death penalty under any circumstances, she answered “No, I don’t think so.” When the judge asked whether Garcia could “think of a case where the crime for instance is so vicious that the death penalty should be imposed,” Garcia finally answered “Well, yeah, in that case, yeah.” Garcia’s answers were more unfavorable to the prosecution than either Yale’s or Colaustro’s answers. The prosecution would want to remove any juror who was unsure as to the death penalty; thus it was reasonable for defense counsel to decline to make a futile Wheeler motion.