Opinion ID: 1115282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: national precedent

Text: Any deep dive into the murky waters of arguable perjury, Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 (1956), and motions for new trial provide a clear justification for one determinative conclusion. Supervening from all of the thoughtful cases is the concept that the exercise of discretion should not be arbitrary within the course of events so that the judgment of conviction would be rendered unjust. State v. Knapper, 555 So.2d 1335 (La. 1990). Cf. Comment, Relief From Convictions Based Upon Perjured Testimony  A Proposal for a Reasonable Standard, 11 Santa Clara Law. 316 (1971). Louisiana follows the credibility inquiry and the probability effect criteria of the Berry rule. It is not the trial judge's duty to weigh the new evidence as though he were the jury, rather it is his duty to determine whether this new material is fit for a new jury's judgment. James, 490 So.2d at 620. Mississippi, in most current review, follows a probability test with facts and circumstances considered for determination of credibility. Where the witness' recantation undermines the [court's] confidence in the correctness of the outcome at trial, a new trial should be ordered. Yarborough v. State, 514 So.2d 1215, 1220 (Miss. 1987). See also Moore v. State, 508 So.2d 666 (Miss. 1987). Gathings v. State, 46 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1950) provided the facts and circumstance interest of justice foundation for Mississippi law. Credibility and not absolute believability seems to be the test in Alabama, although the characterization classification is not without some doubt. Bell v. State, 565 So.2d 1244 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990); Womack v. State, 541 So.2d 40 (Ala. Cr.App. 1987), judgment rev'd 541 So.2d 47 (Ala. 1988). `[R]easonableness of the allegations made in the petition and the probability or improbability of their truth.' Colvin v. State, 521 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Ala. Cr.App. 1987) (quoting Holsclaw v. State, 429 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983)). [T]he trial court must be reasonably well satisfied 1) that testimony given by a witness at trial was false; 2) that there is a significant chance that had the jury heard the truth, it would have reached a different result;   . Ex parte Frazier, 562 So.2d 560, 569-70 (Ala. 1989). That the court is reasonably well satisfied and that the jury might have reached a different conclusion is clearly the law of North Carolina. State v. Brown, 327 N.C. 1, 394 S.E.2d 434 (1990); State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 360 S.E.2d 660 (1987). See also, for reversal after the principal witness recanted, State v. Ellers, 234 N.C. 42, 65 S.E.2d 503 (1951). Credibility appears to be the test for Georgia in Young v. State, 194 Ga. App. 335, 390 S.E.2d 305 (1990) and Drake v. State, 248 Ga. 891, 287 S.E.2d 180, cert. denied 457 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 2915, 73 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1982). The New Mexico approach was the Berry standard of credibility and likely to change the result of a new trial. State v. Doran, 105 N.M. 300, 731 P.2d 1344, 1350 (1986), cert. denied 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987). See also Volpato, 696 P.2d 471. The credibility likely to produce a different result is an adaptation of the Berry approach followed in Kansas. State v. Bryant, 227 Kan. 385, 607 P.2d 66 (1980); State v. Johnson, 222 Kan. 465, 565 P.2d 993 (1977). Credibility is also recognized as the test in Alaska, Ahvakana v. State, 768 P.2d 631 (Alaska App. 1989)  trial court has duty to assess the credibility of the new evidence and its probable impact. The California standard is credibility, reasonably probable effect in recognition that the trial court is not the final arbiter of the truth or falsity of the new evidence. Minnick, 263 Cal. Rptr. 316; People v. Cole, 94 Cal. App.3d 854, 155 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979). Rhode Island likewise applies the credibility test in State v. Estrada, 537 A.2d 983 (R.I. 1988). The Pennsylvania law, as following from Mosteller, 284 A.2d 786 in reversal for retrial on the basis of recanted testimony through Com. v. Bernstein, 357 Pa.Super. 13, 515 A.2d 54 (1986) and Com. v. Nelson, 484 Pa. 11, 398 A.2d 636 (1979), appears to follow the Larrison test of reasonable satisfaction of truth. Credibility is, however, in the cases used almost synonymous with satisfaction of truth. As, for example, in Bernstein where that was the issue considered by the trial court  credible recantation. The test also applied in State v. Murray, 559 A.2d 361 (Me. 1989) was probability of effect and credibility. State v. Preston, 521 A.2d 305 (Me. 1987). Minnesota is clearly a Larrison standard state. State v. Erdman, 422 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1988); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982); Development, supra, 67 Minn. L.Rev. 1314. Conversely, the credibility and probability test is followed in North Dakota in State v. Garcia, 462 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1990). In People v. Van Den Dreissche, 233 Mich. 38, 206 N.W. 339 (1925), a case that predated most contemporary reviews and decisions, the test for analysis within the discretion of the trial court was determination of improbability or if completely discredited by its own contradictions. This was an improbability recognition which, in fact, was the early cursor of the credibility concept now generally considered as a tenet in the Berry line of cases. A consistent theory as a search for justice is continued by the reversal found in People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943). The federal cases divide generally between the Berry standard and the Larrison standard considered in Annotation, supra, 59 A.L.R.Fed. 657, to be differentiated by a probable change and might or possible standard. See likewise, Comment, supra, 35 Emory L.J. at 974-75 and Comment, supra, 11 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. at 171 (referencing United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 942, 100 S.Ct. 1337, 63 L.Ed.2d 775 (1980)). It is apparent that neither a consistency in statement of the standard nor any significantly differentiated result in application of either rule can be consistently extracted from consideration of at least a significant number of the federal court cases. As is recognized, the suggestion that the Larrison test might be more lenient is, in fact, more illusory than real. Larrison does provide a less demanding standard than does Berry  might versus probable  regarding the degree of certainty that a judge must have in the likelihood of a different result on retrial. But this easing of the standard is counterbalanced by Larrison's further requirement that the judge first be convinced of the truthfulness of the recantation. Comment, supra, 35 Emory L.J. at 978. Berry, conversely, appears to require more certainty that a different result would ensue, but does not require that the judge be as sure of the truthfulness of the recantation. The tests seem equally exacting; the difference is that Berry is more demanding regarding the probative value of the recantation while Larrison emphasizes the credibility of the witness. Hence, the two tests in actuality may present nearly equivalent hurdles to a defendant requesting a new trial. Id. Neither of these sources or the significant number of other authorities consider a standard even more exacting than the most demanding character of each of the two rules which is extrapolated to create a result which is the present effort of the majority in this decision. The thought of most current writers is that the system is built too far toward enamoring perjury and deterring efforts of the innocent to achieve corrective justice. Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 Vand.L.Rev. 20 (1952). No one seems to conceive or advocate that an even stricter standard has justification so that it should now be judicially adopted for Wyoming. The integrity of the judicial process requires that defendants be accorded a fair trial free from the taint of perjured testimony. But the viability of the system also requires that criminal justice be administered efficiently and that the public have faith in the finality of judgments. Present standards for the granting of a new trial in false testimony cases have sacrificed judicial integrity in their failure to reconcile these competing interests. The intermediate test presented in this Note offers a viable resolution to this conflict. Note, supra, 83 Mich.L.Rev. at 1949. As Dotson and the other recantation cases illustrate, recanting testimony is generally given so little weight that some of the most fundamental principles underlying our system of criminal justice are often disregarded. The virtual presumption of the invalidity of recantations sometimes results in the continuing incarceration of innocent citizens and attendant consequences even when the witness upon whose testimony the conviction rests comes forward and attempts to do justice by telling the truth. Such a result is hardly consistent with a system that avowedly would rather let 100, maybe 1,000, go free rather than send a single innocent person to prison. It is clear that it is the presumption of the incredibility of recantations that is the culprit here. Yet equally clear is the fact that an automatic granting of new trial motions based on recanting testimony would be unwarranted and inappropriate. What is needed in the judicial approach to recantations is substantial inquiry into the circumstances and possible motives in each case without preconceived notions as to whether the recantation is true or false. The current approach requires that the court deny a new trial motion based on recanting testimony unless the defendant meets his or her burden of proving that the initial testimony was false. This approach has the effect of allowing a conviction to stand even where the judge reviewing the recantation finds that it is equally as credible as the original testimony, without allowing a jury the opportunity to pass on that credibility. More consistent with the principles of our criminal justice system would be an approach permitting the granting of new trials unless the judge is satisfied that the recantation is false. In other words, the elimination of the presumptions regarding recanting testimony and a slight adjustment in the burden of proof in motions for new trials would result in better safeguards for innocent citizens who are wrongfully accused and hence would add to the integrity of the criminal justice system. A fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice demands that such a refinement be made. Comment, supra, 35 Emory L.J. at 1008-09 (quoting Mesarosh, 352 U.S. at 14, 77 S.Ct. at 8) (footnotes omitted and emphasis in original). See likewise Comment, supra, 11 Santa Clara Law. 316. See also Murray, Convictions Obtained by Perjured Testimony: A Comparative View, 27 Ohio St.L.J. 102 (1966); Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts, 59 Dick.L.Rev. 127 (1955); Black, Why Judge Samuels Sent Gary Dotson Back to Prison, 71 A.B.A.J. 56 (Sept. 1985); and Comment, supra, 134 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1433. In an article which initiated recognition of the problems involved in People v. Dotson, 99 Ill. App.3d 117, 54 Ill.Dec. 416, 424 N.E.2d 1319 (1981), the author concludes: Our courts need to rethink carefully the current treatment of recantations, especially in those cases in which a victim or sole prosecuting witness recant apparently without threat, bribe, or other improper influence. The courts must structure the credibility inquiry in recantation cases to provide a realistic judicial solution for instances in which an arguably innocent person has been incarcerated for a crime which may not have even occurred. Until judicial provision is made for such instances, denials of motions for new trials in these unusual' cases will continue to arouse public outcry and erode confidence in our judicial system. Comment, supra, 134 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 1459 (footnote omitted). Within the volume of cases, the asserted criteria of decision is frequently delineated by contentions of abused discretion. Obviously what we address here is not discretion, it is the question of the test to be applied. Discretion as the process of distinguishing between available choices is not the subject addressed. Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986). The parameter of responsibility of the trial judge in determining whether reasonable credibility exists for recanted evidence is the decision of the court when it grants a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1986); Cimoli v. Greyhound Corporation, 372 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1962); Chandler v. Dugan, 70 Wyo. 439, 251 P.2d 580 (1952). Even in examining credibility as a concept for the recanted testimony/new trial motion review, it is also apparent that differentiated concepts are advanced without necessarily having the benefit of judicial recognition of an orderly procedural method for decision. One course of examination to determine credibility is to review the transactional events as they would define probability of validity, what is the explanation for the original perjured testimony, why the change, what external factors are existent, is there anything in the nature of the conduct that relates to probable validity and what corroboration or other justification and supporting evidence can be applied to the impossible effort to assess absolute validity of anything. Smallwood, 10 N.W.2d 303; Martin, 246 P. 647. The second concept is simply to address the recanted testimony in relation to the original testimony as an assessment of its validity. [6] United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir.1954); Recent Case, Criminal Law  Judicial Discretion in Considering Recantation as a Ground for a New Trial, 39 Minn.L.Rev. 316 (1955). The rule which these cases [ Smallwood and Martin ] suggest represents an abrupt departure from the requirements of both the Berry and the Larrison tests. It seems reasonable to assume that this newly proposed rule implicitly contains some of the Berry-Larrison requirements, such as the necessity that the recantation be material and that it became available to the defense only after the conclusion of the trial. But it contemplates a significant shift in the duty of the trial judge who is reviewing the new trial motion: it does not require the judge to make an absolute determination regarding the truth or falsity of the recanting testimony. Rather, whenever he or she is in doubt, the motion should be granted. The effect of the adoption of such a rule can be seen most clearly in a case like Troche, where the trial judge was clearly undecided as to when the witness was lying. Yet, he felt compelled to deny the defendant's motion for a new trial, since he was not fully convinced that the witness's trial testimony was false. Under the approach suggested by Smallwood and Martin, the judge would have been fully justified in granting the defendant's motion, as he clearly wanted to do. Comment, supra, 35 Emory L.J. at 999 (footnotes omitted and emphasis in original). If one general trend can be found through the multitude of cases where credibility is considered, there is utilized dual concepts of both a process, United States v. Leibowitz, 919 F.2d 482 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1428, 113 L.Ed.2d 480, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2049, 114 L.Ed.2d 133 (1991), [7] and actual events analysis. United States v. Mazzanti, 925 F.2d 1026 (7th Cir.1991). If the events are definitive, credibility is lacking. Ahvakana, 768 P.2d 631; Van Den Dreissche, 206 N.W. 339. If the changed testimony in itself denies belief, credibility is also lacking. Bell v. State, 90 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1956); Bryant, 607 P.2d 66; Estrada, 537 A.2d 983. A broad use of the facts and circumstances test relates to how the change occurred as equally considered with what was the change. Cole, 155 Cal. Rptr. 892; Nelson, 398 A.2d 636. This embodies the thesis of analysis of I care not what you say, but I wish to know why in order to determine the speaker's purpose to understand the content. Clearly, Lacey, 803 P.2d 1364 follows this approach. Volpato, 696 P.2d 471. Cf. Mosteller, 284 A.2d 786. There is another undefined aspect which justifies recognition in the results in the recanted evidence cases. Do you first apply the Larrison three part test or the Berry five or six part test and then assess credibility or absolute validity? Or should the examination first address general credibility or intrinsic validity before the other criteria have been separately examined? It may well be in analysis of the cases that credibility or accepted validity is a considerably more difficult burden upon the trial court than is the procedural criteria leaving the appellate court to seek the easiest decision first. Dunbar, 522 P.2d 158. Be that is it may, it appears to me that the proper approach in these kinds of cases and particularly when related to recanted testimony should address the foundational basis to first assess credibility or, if the other test, to be determinably valid and then only if necessary to move in review to further criteria whether it is newly discovered material and not just impeaching, etc. If the trial court makes an initial determination of credibility and then finds the other criteria of Opie, Berry, or Larrison does exist, justice requires jury reexamination. Dennis, 2 N.E. 349; Smallwood, 10 N.W.2d 303; Volpato, 696 P.2d 471. These concepts and concerns are presented for particular examination in the cases involving the sole witness recanted testimony case which come specifically into this case. I find the discussion on this issue in the majority opinion to be both unpersuasive and unjustified by existing case law. If we have credibility and materiality and then a sole witness basis of guilt determination, we are obviously looking at a horrifying question of whether an innocent man may be improperly punished by the criminal justice system. Mesarosh, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1. This process is found in most cases  first to address credibility and then next whether the case factually presents a sole witness basis of guilt determination or provides a body of corroboration and supporting evidence sufficient separately to sustain conviction. Dunbar, 522 P.2d 158; Smallwood, 10 N.W.2d 303. The superseding facet of this case is first that the prosecution related to a time identified event totally dependent upon the testimony of the recanting witness and secondly that the corroborating evidence disproved that the event could have occurred on the stated date. Brown was convicted by a one witness case supported only by an overview of bad acts in a prior occurrence with the expert witness vouching for the credibility of the prosecutrix while other evidence disproved occurrence. Solis, 262 So.2d 9; Mullins, 375 S.W.2d 832; York, 704 P.2d 1252. On this confined subject of a sole witness recantation within the broader subject of motions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence, the majority is wrong on applied Wyoming and national precedent and in constitutional and philosophical concepts requiring jury fact finding. Unfortunately, we write here not just for this result-oriented decision to send Brown to prison, but as a creation for injustice in future cases.