Opinion ID: 1165326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: action under section 1021.5

Text: Defendants urge that Serrano III vindicated solely the right of plaintiffs' attorneys to a fee and, therefore, did not meet the three requirements of section 1021.5. They cite cases holding that benefits conferred did not transcend claimant's personal interest ( Marini v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 829, 836-838 [160 Cal. Rptr. 465]; see also Friends of B Street v. City of Hayward (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 988, 994-995 [165 Cal. Rptr. 514]) or were insignificant when measured against legislative goals ( Bruno v. Bell (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 776, 778 [154 Cal. Rptr. 435]). In essence defendants argue that Serrano III, wherein plaintiffs' lawyers enforced their right to the fee for winning on the merits in Serrano II, is a separate action under section 1021.5 that must independently satisfy the law's requirements. [22] (2) An action, however, is merely a form of judicial remedy sought to protect a right or redress a wrong. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 20-25; [23] see generally 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Actions, § 2, pp. 880-881.) (1b) Serrano II and III arose, as did Serrano I, from filing a single complaint; they bear the same superior court docket number. Civil code section 3523 states that [f]or every wrong there is a remedy. `This maxim of jurisprudence bestows upon the person who may be wronged the right to seek redress in an action, and the basis thereof is denominated the cause of action. ' (2 Witkin, op. cit. supra, at pp. 880-881, citing Painter v. Berglund (1939) 31 Cal. App.2d 63, 70 [87 P.2d 360], italics added.) A statutory fee motion does not create a new cause of action ... ( Kievlan v. Dahlberg Electronics, Inc. (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 951, 959 [144 Cal. Rptr. 585] [construing § 1021.5]), much less a new action. It is a collateral matter, ancillary to the main cause. ( Ibid. ); cf. Associated Convalescent Enterprises v. Carl Marks & Co., Inc. (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 116, 120 [108 Cal. Rptr. 782] [attorney fees under Civ. Code, § 1717].) It `seeks what is due because of the judgment....' ( Knighton v. Watkins (5th Cir.1980) 616 F.2d 795, 797, cited with approval in White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Empl. Sec. (1982) 455 U.S. 445, 452 [71 L.Ed.2d 325, 331, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 1166-1167].) Defendants urge that Serrano ended when, under section 1021.5, the lawsuit resulted in the enforcement of an important right and a significant benefit [had] been conferred; i.e., when the Serrano II judgment was final. Yet it is inherent in section 1021.5, as under other fee statutes, that fee applications, whenever filed, may not be heard until the benefits are secure. (See Marini, supra, 99 Cal. App.3d 829, 835 [§ 1021.5 implies jurisdiction to hear motion after judgment final].) As the court in White, supra, observed regarding a Fees Act motion (see fn. 14, ante ), [r]egardless of when attorney's fees are requested, the court's decision of entitlement to fees will ... require an inquiry separate from the decision on the merits  an inquiry that cannot even commence until one party has `prevailed.' (455 U.S. at p. 451 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 331, 102 S.Ct. at p. 1166].) It is defendants' position that no fees are recoverable for defending the fee award on appeal because the appeal did not independently meet the requirements of section 1021.5. (3) Yet it is established that fees, if recoverable at all  pursuant either to statute or parties' agreement  are available for services at trial and on appeal. (See Wilson v. Wilson (1960) 54 Cal.2d 264, 272 [5 Cal. Rptr. 317, 352 P.2d 725], citing Dankert v. Lamb Finance Co. (1956) 146 Cal. App.2d 499, 503-504 [304 P.2d 199] [A contract for a reasonable attorney's fee in enforcing its provisions embraces an allowance for legal services rendered upon appeal as well during the trial].) This rule governs whether or not the sole issue on appeal has been fee entitlement. (See, e.g., Painter v. Estate of Painter (1889) 78 Cal. 625 [21 P. 433]; Clejan v. Reisman (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 224, 241 [84 Cal. Rptr. 897].) [24] Courts routinely have awarded fees on appeals vindicating only the right to an award for trial services. At least one such award was made under section 1021.5. ( Wilkerson v. City of Placentia (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 435, 444-445 [173 Cal. Rptr. 294]; see also Gunn v. Employment Development Dept. (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 658, 665-666 [156 Cal. Rptr. 584]; Rich v. City of Benicia (1979) 98 Cal. App.3d 428, 434 [159 Cal. Rptr. 473].) (1c) Similar awards have been made under Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962 ( County of Humboldt v. Swoap (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 442, 445 [124 Cal. Rptr. 510]; Horn v. Swoap (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 375 383-384 [116 Cal. Rptr. 113]; Trout v. Carleson (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 337, 344 [112 Cal. Rptr. 282]; Roberts v. Brian (1973) 30 Cal. App.3d 427, 431 [106 Cal. Rptr. 360]), Education Code section 44944 ( Russell v. Thermalito Union School Dist. (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 880, 884 [176 Cal. Rptr. 1), and Civil Code section 1717 ( T.E.D. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 59, 64-65 [112 Cal. Rptr. 910]). [25] In Hutto v. Finney, supra, 437 U.S. 678, the Supreme Court affirmed an award under 42 United States Code section 1988 for an appeal wherein the principal issue was the propriety of the fee award against state officials for prolonging, in bad faith, their defense in a lawsuit challenging prison conditions. The contrary rule, discussed above, would permit the fee to vary with the nature of the opposition. While attributing no bad faith to the Attorney General's office for its conduct of this litigation, we join those judges who have observed that government cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response. ( Copeland, supra, 641 F.2d 880, 904.) [26] The trial court lamented here that fee litigation should not be never-ending; [27] yet as to section 1021.5 its length truly lies in defendants' hands. Fees may be awarded solely to a successful party, and awards are discretionary. [28] In sum, defendants give us no reason in law or logic why we should not follow the rule of the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the question. We hold therefore that, absent circumstances rendering the award unjust, fees recoverable under section 1021.5 ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim. [29] Thus we affirm the award for services performed in Serrano III and remand the portion of the order that denies compensation for services related to the fee motions. [30]