Opinion ID: 2275936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Imprisonment Claim

Text: The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it granted the defendants' motion for JNOV upon his false imprisonment claim. False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal freedom. Hickox v. J.B. Morin Agency, Inc., 110 N.H. 438, 442, 272 A.2d 321 (1970). Any period of unlawful confinement, however brief, may result in liability for false imprisonment. 32 Am. Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 15 (2007). Confinement for an appreciable length of time, however short, ... may be sufficient. Id. Even if no `appreciable' length of time elapses, the necessary element of false imprisonment is proven, if enough time elapses for the plaintiff to recognize the illegal restraint. Id. An essential element of the offense is the absence of valid legal authority for the restraint imposed. Welch v. Bergeron, 115 N.H. 179, 181, 337 A.2d 341 (1975). To prevail upon his claim for false imprisonment, the plaintiff had to show that: (1) defendant Linehan acted with the intent of confining him within boundaries fixed by defendant Linehan; (2) defendant Linehan's act directly or indirectly resulted in the plaintiff's confinement; (3) the plaintiff was conscious of or harmed by the confinement; and (4) defendant Linehan acted without legal authority. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1965); Welch, 115 N.H. at 181, 337 A.2d 341. In the instant case, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, established that when he attempted to leave the hearing room, defendant Linehan stood in front of the door, with his hand on the doorknob, and prevented him from doing so. When the plaintiff asked defendant Linehan to move, defendant Linehan said something like: [W]hat are you going to do shove me out of the way[?] The plaintiff, feeling shocked that he was being held against his will, moved to cross the table and offered to shake the hands of the officers present. When none of the officers would shake his hand, the plaintiff walked back to the door and once again asked defendant Linehan to move away from it. Defendant Linehan eventually moved away from the door, and the plaintiff left the room. Based upon this evidence, a rational fact finder reasonably could have found for the plaintiff upon his false imprisonment claim. A rational juror reasonably could have found that defendant Linehan intended to confine the plaintiff in the hearing room, that his act of standing in front of the door with his hand on the knob resulted in the plaintiff's confinement to the room and that the plaintiff was conscious of being confined. A rational juror could also have found that defendant Linehan acted without legal authority. We are not aware of any legal authority that would have allowed defendant Linehan to block the door as he did. The trial court ruled for the defendants upon the plaintiff's false imprisonment claim based upon its finding that the plaintiff was still an employee and subject to defendant Linehan's control when defendant Linehan physically blocked the door. Until the plaintiff was officially terminated, the court ruled that defendant Linehan was liable for the plaintiff's conduct and had the legal authority to block the door to ensure the plaintiff's continued attendance at the hearing. See RSA 104:28 (2001) (sheriff's liability for deputy's conduct continues until the sheriff records deputy's discharge); RSA 104:27 (2001). The plaintiff argues that this was error, and we agree. Even if the plaintiff were still an employee and subject to defendant Linehan's supervision, this would not have given defendant Linehan the legal authority to detain him in the hearing room by physically blocking the door. While courts in other jurisdictions have held that an employer may suggest, and even insist, that its employees perform certain tasks in certain locations at certain times, Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex.1995), reasonably detain an employee suspected of theft, see Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 701, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559, 572 (1994), or decline to terminate an investigative interview, see Branan v. Mac Tools, No. 03AP-1096, 2004 WL 2361568, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004), the defendants have not cited, and we are unaware of, any court that has held that the mere fact of employment gives the employer the right to detain an employee in a disciplinary hearing room by physically blocking the door. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it granted JNOV to the defendants upon the plaintiff's false imprisonment claim. Because the jury in this case returned a general verdict, the remedy for this error is to reverse and remand. See Welch v. Gonic Realty Trust Co., 128 N.H. 532, 537, 517 A.2d 808 (1986); Vachon v. New England Towing, 148 N.H. 429, 435, 809 A.2d 771 (2002). While some jurisdictions have adopted the general verdict rule, see 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 776 (2007), which states that when the jury returns a general verdict involving two or more issues and its verdict is supported as to at least one issue, the verdict will not be reversed on appeal, Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472, 473-74 (1985), New Hampshire has not done so. See Welch, 128 N.H. at 537, 517 A.2d 808. The rule in New Hampshire with respect to general verdicts is that when we are in doubt as to whether the jury would have found as it did if the error had not been committed, the case should be reversed. Id.; see also Vachon, 148 N.H. at 435, 809 A.2d 771 (where trial court's instructions to jury wrongly led it to believe that it could award damages for lost earning capacity and where jury returned general verdict, making it impossible to determine whether jury's damage award included such damages, damage award would be reversed and case would be remanded for new trial on damages). Here, because we cannot tell whether the jury would have found the defendants liable on the false imprisonment claim and/or awarded $500,000 for that claim alone, we reverse and remand for a new trial on that claim. See Vachon, 148 N.H. at 435, 809 A.2d 771. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.