Opinion ID: 2510597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue One Denial of Right to Confrontation

Text: [¶7] Miller alleges that he was denied his constitutional right to effectively confront Justin Miller during trial. Miller's constitutional claim presents a question of law. We review questions of law de novo. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004). [¶8] The primary right secured by the Confrontation Clause of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions is the right of cross-examination. Hannon, ¶ 16, 84 P.3d at 329 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)). In order for there to be a violation of the right of confrontation, a defendant must show more than just a denial of the ability to ask specific questions of a particular witness. Rather, a defendant must show that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness . . . `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Hannon, ¶ 18, 84 P.3d at 330 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 295, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) ( per curriam ) (emphasis in original)). A defendant's right to cross-examination of a witness is not unfettered, but is subject to the trial court's discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination to prevent, among other things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance. Hannon, ¶ 22, 84 P.3d at 331-32 (quoting United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) ( per curiam ). [¶9] Two weeks before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to prohibit the defense from inquiring into criminal charges then pending against Justin Miller. In that motion, the State revealed that two charges of battery and one charge of assault on a peace officer had been filed against Justin on July 6, 2004. The State contended that evidence of those charges was neither admissible nor relevant to any issue at Miller's trial. During a hearing on the motion on August 26, the prosecutor indicated that the charges arose out of a domestic dispute Justin had been involved in during the 4th of July weekend. The prosecutor explained: [PROSECUTOR]: Basically, what happened  it's alleged that [Justin] was assaulting his girlfriend. A citizen tried to intervene. It's alleged that he assaulted the citizen and then left. The police went looking for him, found him hiding under a truck. They tried to get him to come out from under the truck. When he came out, he charged the police officer. And when he hit the police officer, then they went to the ground in a fight, and he was arrested and taken to jail. [¶10] The prosecutor revealed that, pursuant to a plea agreement not yet approved by the district court in charge of the case, Justin would be entering a plea of guilty to one count of felony interference with a peace office later that day, that the disposition of that charge would be pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2005), and that he did not expect the district court to accept or reject the plea agreement until after a presentence investigation report had been completed in the case. The prosecutor also noted that, even if the district court accepted the plea agreement, Justin would not be convicted of the felony offense. Additionally, the prosecutor reported that law enforcement found no drugs on Justin when he was arrested, and there was no evidence suggesting Justin was under the influence of any drug at the time. [¶11] In response, defense counsel stated: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:    Certainly, his behavior is so out of the ordinary and bizarre as to indicate a continuation of his drug habit. That has some importance, because his allegations against his uncle, my client, Kirk Miller, is that he obtained his drugs from Mr. Miller. And he's indicated by his activities that he may be continuing his drug habit, which indicates he's getting his drugs from somewhere else. My only connection  my only concern is that this appears to me to be drug-induced activity. It certainly is out of the ordinary, and I want to be able to look at his drug habits and where he gets his drugs. Defense counsel, however, had no direct evidence that Justin's behavior was drug induced. The district court refused to accept defense counsel's speculation as to the relevancy of Justin's criminal conduct: THE COURT: Well, unless there is something more in the assault case that would indicate drug usage, other than the criminal activity itself of assaulting a police officer, I don't see where that would take you, [Defense Counsel]. You say it's unusual or his behavior was unusual; but unless you've got something more to tie it to drug usage, I'm failing to see how that fits into your theory that he continues to use drugs or buys his drugs from somebody else or still is  still has the habit.     So I'm going to deny the motion  or I guess I'm granting the motion for the State. That kind of testimony will not come in, unless there's something further that would lead me to change my mind. Otherwise, I just think it's too far of a stretch, and it would be highly prejudicial. [¶12] On appeal, Miller contends that the district court erred in granting the State's motion. Miller argues that, given Justin's admission at trial that methamphetamine made him violent, and given Justin's violent behavior that weekend, the conclusion could be drawn that, contrary to his testimony, he was using drugs again. Miller also suggests that evidence of the lenient disposition of the charges against Justin under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 could have affected the jury's view of his credibility. According to Miller, the district court's liminal ruling prohibiting him from inquiring into the criminal charges against Justin deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence relevant to Justin's truthfulness and his possible motives for testifying in favor of the State and, thus, denied him his constitutional right to confront a witness against him. [¶13] Miller's argument misses the mark. Miller's argument approaches the issue from hindsight and is based on matters never brought to the attention of the district court. The district court's ruling was premised solely on the argument presented at the hearing on the motion in limine, several days prior to trial. At that time, the district court simply told defense counsel that, given the argument presented, it could find little relevancy in Justin's criminal conduct to the charges pending against Miller. The district court expressly stated that it would revisit the issue if defense counsel could produce a more significant reason for the introduction of the evidence. The record discloses that defense counsel never availed himself of this opportunity before or during trial. Under the circumstances, we fail to see how Miller's right to effectively cross-examine Justin was impaired by the district court's liminal ruling.