Opinion ID: 849175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rejecting the Second Circuit Approach

Text: Next, the Feola Court turned to its own case law to determine whether a defendant was ever required to possess specific knowledge of the attendant circumstances when charged with a conspiracy to commit a federal offense. The Supreme Court identified prior case law that repudiated such a position. Citing In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 8 S.Ct. 1263, 32 L.Ed. 274 (1888), and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971), the Feola Court stated that historically it has declined to require a greater degree of intent for conspiratorial responsibility than for responsibility for the underlying substantive offense. Id. at 688, 95 S.Ct. 1255. The Court then turned to United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271 (C.A.2, 1941), the first case that set forth the principle that the government must prove knowledge of the attendant circumstances embodied in the substantive offense in order for a defendant to be liable when charged with a conspiracy. In Crimmins, supra, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to receive stolen bonds that had been transported in interstate commerce. 18 USC § 371; 18 USC § 415. The Second Circuit held, that in order to be convicted of conspiracy to commit the substantive offense, it was necessary that the defendant actually know that the bonds crossed interstate lines. Crimmins, supra at 273-274. To accept the view that a defendant need not have knowledge of the attendant circumstances would, according to the Crimmins court, enlarge their agreement beyond its terms as they understood them. Feola, supra at 689, 95 S.Ct. 1255, citing Crimmins, supra . To emphasize its conclusion, the Crimmins court set forth what has become the well-known traffic light analogy. While one may, for instance, be guilty of running past a traffic light of whose existence one is ignorant, one cannot be guilty of conspiring to run past such a light, for one cannot agree to run past a light unless one supposes that there is a light to run past. [ Id. at 273.] Although the Feola Court found this analogy seductive, it concluded that it was clearly bad law. Id. at 689-690, 95 S.Ct. 1255. The Court asserted that the traffic light analogy was relevant only for the category of offenses for which no mental state was required regarding any of the elements. Id. at 690, 95 S.Ct. 1255; see also LaFave, supra at 82. These cases must be distinguished from offenses, such as 18 USC § 111, that require a certain mental state as to some elements of the crime but not as to others. LaFave, supra; Feola, supra at 691-92, 95 S.Ct. 1255; see also United States v. Franklin, 586 F.2d 560 (C.A.5, 1978); United States v. Beil, 577 F.2d 1313 (C.A.5, 1978); State v. Brown, 94 Wash.App. 327, 972 P.2d 112 (1999). Indeed, like the substantive offense in Feola, M.C.L. § 333.7401 is an offense that requires a certain mental state regarding some elements of the crime, but not others. A defendant need only have the intent to deliver a controlled substance, M.C.L. § 333.7401(1), and then the substance must be in a mixture or in an amount that falls within one of the enumerated ranges, M.C.L. § 333.7401(2). The majority ascribes significance to the fact that the instant offense is one that is graduated to be more severe as the act is more antisocial.... In the majority's view, the element making the offense more severe must be shown to be known by the defendant. I do not see the point. In Feola, the offense at issue was similarly graduated. See also Franklin, Beil, and Brown, supra . The element that did not require the mental state in Feola was the same element that increased the severity of the crime. The defendant did not need to be aware of the element that ultimately determined the severity of the crime. Instead, the prosecutor only needed to prove the existence of particular facts concerning the federal officer's identity and to connect these facts to the conspiracy. Similarly, in this case, where defendant has conspired to deliver a controlled substance and where there has been an act in furtherance of this objective, he need not have been aware that the amount of the controlled substance fell within a particular statutory range in order to be convicted of the more severe crime. Instead, all that is necessary is that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount fell within a particular statutory range, and connect this amount to the conspiracy. Because neither the plain language of M.C.L. § 333.7401 nor M.C.L. § 750.157a require that a defendant specifically know the amount of controlled substance, the majority is impermissibly adding an element to two otherwise straightforward criminal statutes. In re MCI, 460 Mich. 396, 414-415, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). [9]