Opinion ID: 1599516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Proper Test for Double Jeopardy under Section 775.021(4)(b)(2)

Text: In Valdes and Lopez-Vazquez, the Third and Fifth Districts applied the primary evil test, as set forth in the Gordon, Florida, and Paul line of cases, to determine whether a defendant's dual convictions under sections 790.15(2) and 790.19, arising out of the same episode, violate double jeopardy. Despite the fact that both the Third District and the Fifth District used the same primary evil test, the appellate courts reached different conclusions as to what constituted the primary evil of each statute. This occurred in part because the primary evil is not specifically found in any one source and the Legislature does not define new criminal offenses by stating the primary evil the statute addresses. Not only have the district courts struggled with the application of the primary evil test, but over the years this Court has also struggled to craft a consistent interpretation that would provide guidance to trial and district courts. We conclude that the primary evil test defies legislative intent because it strays from the plain meaning of the statute. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are `multiple' is essentially one of legislative intent.); Anderson, 695 So.2d at 311 (Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues....); State v. Sousa, 903 So.2d 923, 928 (Fla.2005) (The fundamental rule of construction in determining legislative intent is to first give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used by the Legislature.). By applying the primary evil gloss to the second statutory exception, we have added words that were not written by the Legislature in enacting the double jeopardy exceptions of section 775.021(4) and specifically subsection (4)(b)(2). Rather, this exception simply states that there is a prohibition against multiple punishments for offenses which are degrees of the same offense. There is no mention of core offense and certainly no mention of primary evil. Further, there is no rule of construction that would compel this Court to require such an analysis based on constitutional considerations. Compare Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 107 (Fla.2008), as revised on denial of rehearing, No. SC06-139 (Fla. Jan. 29, 2009) (Although Larimore has not raised a constitutional challenge to the Act, because the Act can impose on an individual substantial deprivation of liberty-one that is of indeterminate duration  our construction of the Act must be conducted with due regard to the basic tenets of fairness and due process.') (quoting State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2002)). There is no constitutional prohibition against narrowly interpreting double jeopardy exceptions precisely because there is no constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal episode, as long as the Legislature intends such punishments. See Hayes, 803 So.2d at 699. We therefore adopt the approach proposed by Justice Cantero in his special concurrence in Paul  an approach we deem to be both easy to apply in practice and deferential to the legislative prerogative inherent in defining crimes and crafting punishments. With these overarching principles in mind, we conclude, as Justice Cantero did in his special concurrence in Paul, that the plain meaning of the language of subsection (4)(b)(2), providing an exception for dual convictions for [o]ffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute, is that [t]he Legislature intends to disallow separate punishments for crimes arising from the same criminal transaction only when the statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees. 934 So.2d at 1176 (Cantero, J., specially concurring). When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary. Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001). The term degree has a plain meaning in this context  a level based on the seriousness of an offense. Black's Law Dictionary 456 (8th ed.2004). In providing an exception to Blockburger for those offenses that are degrees of each other, subsection (4)(b)(2) does not mention whether two offenses share a core offense or whether two offenses share a primary evil. Instead, The statute itself creates an exception for crimes that are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.  § 775.021(4)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). By its very language, this exception is intended to apply narrowly. It prohibits separate punishments only when a criminal statute provides for variations in degree of the same offense, so that the defendant would be punished for violating two or more degrees of a single offense. See Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153, 156 (Fla.1994) (Grimes, J., dissenting) (highlighting the phrase as provided by statute and concluding that the Court's obligation is to apply the statute as it is written). One example is the theft statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of grand theft and two degrees of petit theft. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). Another is the homicide statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of murder, as well as multiple forms of manslaughter. See id. §§ 782.04, 782.07. Yet another is arson, which has two degrees. See id. § 806.01. It is in such cases, and only such cases, that the exception was intended to apply. Paul, 934 So.2d at 1177-78 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (footnote omitted). It is not necessary for the Legislature to use the word degree in defining the crime in order for the degree variant exception to apply. There are other statutory designations that can evince a relationship of degree-for example, when a crime may have aggravated forms of the basic offense. See id. at 1178 n. 5. We acknowledge that stare decisis counsels us to follow our precedents unless there has been `a significant change in circumstances after the adoption of the legal rule, or ... an error in legal analysis.' Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty Co., 911 So.2d 1181, 1188 (Fla.2005) (quoting Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192, 1199 (Fla.2003)). Nonetheless, the presumption in favor of stare decisis may be overcome upon a consideration of the following factors: (1) Has the prior decision proved unworkable due to reliance on an impractical legal fiction? (2) Can the rule of law announced in the decision be reversed without serious injustice to those who have relied on it and without serious disruption in the stability of the law? And (3) have the factual premises underlying the decision changed so drastically as to leave the decision's central holding utterly without legal justification? Strand v. Escambia County, 992 So.2d 150, 159 (Fla.2008) (quoting North Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003)); see also State v. Green 944 So.2d 208, 217 (Fla.2006) (Fidelity to precedent provides `stability to the law and to the society governed by that law.' However, the doctrine `does not command blind allegiance to precedent.' Stare decisis yields `when an established rule of law has proven unacceptable or unworkable in practice.') (citations omitted). We conclude that the factors that favor adherence to precedent are not met in this case, and therefore we recede from our precedent in Gordon, Florida, and Paul, in which we announced and applied the primary evil test. The primary evil test has proven unworkable, as evidenced by the difficulty experienced by trial courts, district courts, and this Court in attempting to apply the test. Moreover, abandoning the test will not result in a serious injustice to those who have relied on it or cause disruption in the stability of the law. The test was first introduced only eight years ago in Gordon and represented yet another approach in a long line of conflicting tests set forth to aid interpretation of the second statutory exception. In fact, our decision to recede from this precedent will bring a stability to the law concerning this exception, and to double jeopardy in general, that has been absent for the last twenty years. Also, it will bring such stability in a manner that most comports with legislative intent and the plain meaning of the second statutory exception. Accordingly, we conclude that the only offenses that fall under subsection (4)(b)(2), are those that constitute different degrees of the same offense, as explicitly set forth in the relevant statutory sections. [9]