Opinion ID: 2164437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the appeal from the summary judgment

Text: In contending that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of ALPA, appellant argues principally that his estoppel claim raised a genuine issue as to a material fact. According to appellant, that estoppel claimappearing in the third count of appellant's complaint (Record at 7), and presented to the trial court at the March 1979 hearing (Supp. Record at 5-8) raised a genuine issue as to whether he relied on (and if so whether he was reasonable in relying on) the legend appearing at the bottom of the bills ALPA sent him, monthly, as being a binding promise that ALPA would restore him to good standing both with the union and with TWA anytime appellant paid the minimum balance due before the due date. Appellee ALPA contests both the relevance and the persuasiveness of appellant's argument. In urging affirmance of the trial court's entry of summary judgment in its favor, ALPA argues (a) that appellant is precluded from attacking the summary judgment because he failed to respond to ALPA's motion for summary judgment by setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue, as required by Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(e); (b) that even aside from this procedural bar, the summary judgment was proper because there were indeed no facts in dispute; and (c) that appellant seeks to apply common law theories to a dispute which, according to federal law, is governed exclusively by the terms of the ALPA-TWA Agreement. We find none of ALPA's arguments persuasive. We discuss below our reasons for concluding (1) that appellant's estoppel claim falls outside the bounds of the ALPA-TWA Agreement and therefore may properly be argued in the Superior Court, and (2) that in pleading that estoppel claim appellant properly presented a genuine issue as to a material fact.