Opinion ID: 767290
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Circumstantial Evidence of Pretext

Text: 27 Indeed, the trial record is replete with Zigelman's contradictory statements to the jury. At deposition, he testified that according to the California merit system, he was obligated to recommend the most qualified candidate. Conversely, at trial, Zigelman stated that although the merit system mandates that the most qualified candidate be promoted, he was not required to. (Tr. at 144-45.) He made the assertion without any explanation, or much less citing any specifics or examples, but only that his altered testimony was based on literature that he had read since his deposition, which he believed suggested that there is no firm requirement that the most qualified person be promoted. (Tr. at 145.) Indeed, despite his deposition testimony, Zigelman was steadfast in his statements at trial that when he promoted Smith over Hasham, he was not required to promote the most qualified candidate. (Tr. at 145-46.) Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably found that Zigelman did not follow CBOE promotion policy, or, at the very least, again found Zigelman's explanation incredulous. 11 28 At trial, Zigelman also testified that during the phone interview with Hasham, he asked him questions to determine whether his qualifications were superior to that of Smith. (Tr. at 156-57.) At the deposition, however, Zigelman testified that during Hasham's telephone interview, he asked [n]ot a single question to determine his qualifications. (Tr. at 159.) 12 Indeed, Zigelman's failure to express consistent explanations at trial or deposition could compel a jury to find that his proffered reasons for promoting Smith were pretextual for something much more invidious. See also Perfetti v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1991) (If at the time of the adverse employment decision the decision maker gave one reason, but at the time of the trial gave another reason which was unsupported by the documentary evidence the jury could reasonably conclude that the new reason was a pretextual after-the-fact justification.) We also are aware that Zigelman was the decision maker relating to the promotion and thus, his credibility, which was thoroughly impeached, was crucial to this case. 29 As we have previously stated, 30 [W]e will not second-guess a jury on credibility issues. While this court's review is confined to the cold pages of an appellate transcript, the jury had an opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the witnesses, including the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements. . . . [I]t is not the task of this appellate court to reconsider the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. 31 United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1006 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). Being particularly careful in employment discrimination cases to avoid supplanting our view of the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of both the jury (in its verdict) and the judge (in not interfering with the verdict), Hybert, 900 F.2d at 1054, we hold that CBOE was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as we must, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that CBOE intentionally discriminated against Hasham on the basis of his national origin. See Williams, 137 F.3d at 948-49. 13 32