Opinion ID: 2791970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Franks Violations

Text: In Franks, the Supreme Court held that a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains “deliberate falsity or . . . reckless disregard” for the truth. 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684 (concerning a search warrant affidavit); see United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 327-29 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Franks to an arrest warrant affidavit). 5 However, only false statements which are necessary to the finding of probable cause will invalidate a warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. The reasoning of Franks also applies to omissions from a warrant affidavit. Martin, 615 F.2d at 328. “Thus, a warrant affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment when it contains omissions made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit.” Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without direct evidence of intentional or reckless conduct, a plaintiff may raise an inference of recklessness where “the facts omitted from the affidavit are clearly critical to a 5 All cases from the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). 8 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 9 of 25 finding of probable cause.” Martin, 615 F.2d at 329. Omissions that are made negligently will not invalidate a warrant. Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327. And “even intentional or reckless omissions will invalidate a warrant only if inclusion of the omitted facts would have prevented a finding of probable cause.” Id.; see also Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.”). Elmore contends that Sauce omitted the following facts about the incident from the warrant affidavits: (1) the nurse made no complaint at the time of the spraying incident; (2) Sauce previously prepared a memo stating that “Teacher was observed by special needs nurse spraying a special needs student in the face for acting out in class”; and (3) Ms. Morrow had told Sauce that Elmore did not spray the student. As the district court did, we proceed directly to the question of whether Elmore’s allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from them show that “inclusion of the omitted facts would have prevented a finding of probable cause.” Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327; see also Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances, of which the official has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007). “No officer has a duty to 9 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 10 of 25 prove every element of a crime before making an arrest. Police officers are not expected to be lawyers or prosecutors.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Rather, in assessing probable cause, we deal with “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sauce made out two warrant affidavits in this case, one for simple battery and the other for cruelty to children in the third degree. A person commits cruelty to children in the third degree when he is the “primary aggressor” and commits a “forcible felony, battery, or family violence battery” knowing or intending that a child under the age of 18 will witness the act. See O.C.G.A. § 16–5–70(d). A person commits simple battery when he either “(1) Intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another; or (2) Intentionally causes physical harm to another.” O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23. Sauce swore to the same supporting facts in each affidavit. When we consider the facts alleged in the affidavits, as well as the omitted facts about which Elmore complains, the universe of facts includes the following: (1) Elmore sprayed a severe and profound juvenile repeatedly about the arms and face because he was agitated that the radio was turned down; (2) Elmore used the spray to try and stop the juvenile from screaming only to further agitate him; (3) a nurse 10 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 11 of 25 witnessed the student being sprayed and later made a complaint, but did not complain at the time; (4) Sauce’s initial memorandum regarding the complaint stated that “Teacher” sprayed the student; (5) the classroom teacher told Sauce that Elmore did not spray the student; and (6) the nurse and a juvenile student stated that Elmore had sprayed the student. We agree with the district court that the warrant affidavit does not establish even arguable probable cause to believe that Elmore committed the crime of cruelty to children in the third degree. The affidavit does not allege the requisite forcible felony or battery, see, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23.1(a) (requiring for the offense of “battery” the intentional causing of “substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to another”), nor could the facts known to Sauce lead a reasonable person to believe that a forcible felony or battery had been committed. But including the omitted facts when determining whether probable cause existed to believe that Elmore committed the offense of simple battery does not negate the probable cause that the magistrate judge found for that offense. See Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327. The conduct alleged fits within the definition of simple battery as intentional physical contact of a provoking nature with the person of another. See O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23. And the revised affidavit provides sufficient grounds for a prudent person, based on the facts and circumstances, to believe that Elmore, not the classroom teacher or another person, committed the offense. 11 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 12 of 25 The revised affidavit provides that two witnesses confirmed that Elmore sprayed the student, while the teacher and Elmore stated that he did not. Although Sauce’s initial memo reflects that “Teacher” sprayed the student, Sauce was not present and did not witness the incident. Moreover, Sauce is not an educator, and Elmore, a “paraprofessional educator” could fairly have been considered or described by her and others such as the nurse to be a “teacher.” In addition, during the interview, the nurse apparently named Elmore as the person who had sprayed the student. Significantly, the nurse’s account of the incident was also corroborated by a juvenile student. Nor do Elmore’s allegations provide any reason to doubt that the nurse and the student in fact identified Elmore to Sauce. The fact that the nurse “made no complaint at the time” does not, without more, undermine the nurse’s credibility, particularly when we do not know the length of time between the incident and the complaint. As for Elmore and Ms. Morrow’s conflicting statements, each arguably had an interest in a determination that Elmore was not involved. Thus, while we agree that it certainly would have been better for Sauce to have included the alleged inconsistencies in the warrant affidavit, consideration of the omitted material would not have precluded a finding of probable cause to believe that Elmore committed the offense of simple battery. 12 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 13 of 25 In any event, even if consideration of all of the facts did not establish actual probable cause for the offense of simple battery, the facts are adequate to establish arguable probable cause to believe that Elmore violated O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23. See Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327. Sauce conducted an investigation and interviewed pertinent witnesses. Despite the conflicting witness statements, and even if Sauce had been mistaken, the facts could have led a prudent officer to believe that reasonably trustworthy information established probable cause for simple battery. See Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1234 (“[A]rresting officers, in deciding whether probable cause exists, are not required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present a sufficient basis for believing that an offense has been committed.”); Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining the “arguable probable cause” standard). In other words, Sauce is entitled to qualified immunity because the omitted facts were not “so clearly material that every reasonable law officer would have known that their omission would lead to [an arrest] in violation of federal law.” Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327 (quotation marks omitted). Elmore also contends that Sauce should have disclosed to the magistrate his status an educator and the existence of educator immunity under O.C.G.A. § 20–2– 1001. That contention assumes that Elmore’s potential immunity was relevant to the probable-cause analysis. We turn to that question now. 13 Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 14 of 25