Opinion ID: 2972155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The only issue presented in this appeal is whether reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing existed to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. We review reasonable suspicion determinations de novo. United States. v. Jacob, 377 F.3d 573, 577 (6th Cir. 2004). An investigatory stop of a vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Since an investigatory stop is less intrusive to one’s personal security than an arrest, the level of suspicion necessary for such a stop is thus “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). For purposes of determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Supreme Court has instructed that a reviewing court must consider the “totality of circumstances . . . to see whether the 4 detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). The Defendant raises two arguments in support of his position that he was unlawfully seized without reasonable suspicion. First, he claims, when the officers activated their lights while on Third Street, before the Defendant turned into the Extended Stay hotel lot, that he was seized. Since the officers’ activation of their lights effected an investigatory detention, the argument continues, the officers needed reasonable suspicion at this point to justify it; any of the bases supporting the finding of reasonable suspicion discovered after this detention, the defendant notes, could therefore not be used to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Because reasonable suspicion did not exist to justify the stop when the officers activated their lights, the Defendant concludes, he was unlawfully seized. The Defendant recognizes that for one to be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, either physical force must be used or, where force is absent, submission to the assertion of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). The Defendant maintains, however, that he submitted to the officers assertion of authority when they activated their lights. He notes that, unlike the defendant in Hodari D., he did not flee when the officers made an assertion of authority, but rather rolled his vehicle slowly to the back of the Extended Stay parking lot and stopped. Although it is certainly true that the Defendant did not flee, the evidence does not show that he submitted to the officers’ show of authority. While it is possible that a person driving a vehicle may be considered seized before he comes to a complete stop, for this conclusion to be reached the person driving the vehicle must submit to the officer’s show of authority by, for 5 instance, pulling over to stop as soon as reasonably possible. In this case, the evidence shows that the Defendant did not pull over and stop as soon as reasonably possible after the officers activated their lights and sirens. Rather, the Defendant not only pulled into the Extended Stay’s parking lot, but drove across the front lot, around the side, and nearly halfway across the rear of the hotel before coming to a stop. Moreover, this stop did not occur until a police car came around the hotel from the opposite side and blocked the exit. Since the Defendant was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officers activated their vehicles’ lights and sirens, at that point, the officers did not need to have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. The Defendant next argues that the district court erred when it ruled that the Defendant’s act of rolling his car to the back of the parking lot gave the officers reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The Defendant mischaracterizes the district court’s ruling. The district court did not hold that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle merely on the ground that the Defendant rolled his car to the back of the hotel. Rather, the district court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant because of the following factors: 1) After being advised to keep an eye on the hotels in the downtown Covington area because a hotel had been robbed in that area the previous night and because a hotel in a nearby city had been robbed twice five days prior, all of which occurred between midnight and 2:00 a.m., Officer Wietholter received information around 1:30 a.m. that the Defendant’s vehicle was potentially “casing” the Hampton Inn; 2) after Officer Wietholter located the suspect vehicle and activated his vehicle’s lights and sirens, the Defendant did not stop his vehicle where he could have easily done so, but rather drove across the front of the 6 hotel’s lot, around the side, and nearly halfway across the back lot before finally coming to a stop, and 3) upon illuminating the Defendant’s vehicle, Officer Wietholter observed the Defendant make suspicious movements, leading Officer Wietholter to believe that he was either trying to conceal something or that he might bail out and flee. Based upon these facts, the district court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and thus we AFFIRM. 7