Opinion ID: 200868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dismissal with Prejudice and Without Leave to Amend

Text: 59 Karvelas argues that even if his complaint failed to meet the pleading obligations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court nonetheless erred when it dismissed his case with prejudice and without affording him an opportunity to amend his complaint. We disagree. 60 First, we reject Karvelas's argument that a ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion is not a ruling on the merits; [but rather] only a non-merits ruling on the propriety of the pleadings. It is well settled in this circuit that dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is a final decision on the merits. Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384, 388 (1st Cir.1994). As we have explained, the dismissal of the complaint fits comfortably under the Supreme Court's definition of a `final decision' ... as one that `ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' Id. (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981)). Moreover, in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary, a dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is presumed to be with prejudice. See Andrews-Clarke v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 157 F.Supp.2d 93, 99 (D.Mass.2001)(A dismissal for failure to state a claim is a dismissal on the merits.... This type of dismissal, presumed to be with prejudice unless the order explicitly states otherwise, has a claim preclusive effect.); c.f. Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 628 (1st Cir.2000)(In this circuit, the phrase `without prejudice,' when attached to a dismissal order, is ... to be read ... as a signification that the judgment does not preclude a subsequent lawsuit on the same cause of action either in the rendering court or in some other forum.). Thus, in dismissing with prejudice Karvelas's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court did not depart from established precedent but simply stated explicitly what in any event would have been presumed. 61 Similarly, the district court did not err by failing to invite Karvelas to amend his complaint prior to dismissing the case with prejudice. Although the denial of a motion to amend is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, district courts do not customarily aim to defeat valid claims. Eastern Food Servs. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Assoc., Inc., 357 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004). Some courts have, in their discretion, allowed relators to amend FCA complaints to cure a lack of particularity. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McCoy v. Calif. Med. Rev., Inc., 723 F.Supp. 1363, 1366 (N.D.Cal.1989). 62 In this case, however, Karvelas never filed a motion to amend pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), which provides for amendments as of right in the absence of a responsive pleading. 29 Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the district court erred in failing sua sponte to provide Karvelas an opportunity to amend before dismissing his complaint with prejudice. 30 Absent exceptional circumstances, a district court has no obligation to invite a plaintiff to amend his or her complaint when the plaintiff has not sought such amendment. See Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu de P.R. Inc. v. Consumers Union, 233 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that district court did not commit error by failing to invite Emerito to replead where despite its awareness that [the defendant] had called for dismissal [for failure to state a claim based on deficient pleadings], Emerito never amended its complaint as of right ... nor did it formally ask the district court after judgment to permit such an amendment) (emphasis in the original); see also Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.2002) (A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.). In this case, Karvelas chose not to file a motion to amend his complaint at any stage of the litigation. Instead, he stood upon his 93-page complaint, even after the defendants filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that focused on deficiencies in the pleadings. 31 Indeed, the district court had already afforded Karvelas a generous opportunity to sharpen his pleadings when it did not dismiss with prejudice the plaintiff's first FCA retaliation complaint against the defendants. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err by failing sua sponte to provide Karvelas an opportunity to amend his complaint before dismissing the case with prejudice. 32