Opinion ID: 1830315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues and contentions of the parties

Text: Before we begin our analysis, it is important that we refine and state the dispositive issue in the context of the arguments of the parties. These respective arguments are based on a common premise: The interest acquired by Doris was a fee simple subject to defeasance. That is to say, the testator's will devised to his daughter Doris the subject property in fee simple, provided, that at her death she leaves bodily issue or heirs of her body. If this condition failed, then the testator provided, title to said lands shall revert to my other heirs or descendants, according to the present Laws of Descent & Distribution, in the Statutes of Alabama. Therefore, the ultimate question is: Did the conveyance of all the right, title, and interest in the subject lands by the heirs-at-law of Robert S. Dickson, Sr., determined as of the time of his death, operate to vest in the grantee, under that deed, a fee simple absolute? In other words, was the interest acquired in the subject property by the heirs-at-law (other than Plaintiff), at the time of the testator's death, of such character and nature that, upon their joint conveyance to Doris, she is empowered to convey a fee simple title without further limitations or restrictions? If not, both parties agree that her deed to General Electric will convey an absolute fee simple title only in the event she leaves, at her death, bodily issue or heirs of her body. Both parties further agree that the ultimate decision rests on the meaning of the term heirs or descendants, as that term is used in the subject will. Defendants/Appellants claim that the alternative use of the term heirs or descendents manifested an intent to determine the devisees at some future time, i.e., at the date of Doris's death, should she die without issue. Doris on the other hand, argues that these alternatives were intended as two ways of saying the same thing.