Opinion ID: 1988985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Act's One-Year Statute of Limitations Barred the Plaintiffs' Claims Challenging the Validity of the 1994 Amendments to the GIS Condominium Declaration

Text: IDC recorded the Fifth Amendment to the GIS declaration on December 29, 1994. The plaintiffs did not file this action challenging its validity until May 29, 1999, approximately four years and five months after the applicable one-year statute of limitations period expired. See § 34-36.1-2.17(b) (No action to challenge the validity of an amendment adopted by the association pursuant to this section may be brought more than one year after the amendment is recorded.). Assuming, arguendo, that the parties' tolling agreement  deeming this action to have been filed on December 1, 1997  was valid and enforceable, it still would avail plaintiffs nothing because the stipulated filing date of December 1, 1997, occurred more than one year after IDC publicly filed the last of the challenged 1994 amendments to the GIS condominium declaration. The majority's opinion simply disposes of this one-year statute of limitations by declaring that actions challenging the validity of amendments that are alleged to be invalid ab initio are not subject to the one-year limitation period specified in the act for challenging the validity of amendments. As legal authority for this remarkable conclusion, the majority cites to our recent decision in Theta Properties v. Ronci Realty Co., 814 A.2d 907 (R.I.2003) ( Theta ), even though that case provides no support whatsoever for such a proposition. Theta holds that service of process on a dissolved corporation after the statutory period for doing so had expired is void ab initio and that the period to accomplish such service of process cannot be extended by retroactive legislation enacted after the statutory period for initiating such service has expired. Theta, 814 A.2d at 913. But Theta provides no support whatsoever for the proposition that claims challenging the validity of amendments to a condominium declaration, which are alleged to be void ab initio, are exempt from the applicable statute of limitations. Indeed, if Theta has any application whatsoever to this case  and it has none  it would be that, after a statutory period for suing a party has expired, any attempt to do so should be declared void ab initio and deemed of no legal consequence whatsoever  at least when, as here, defendants have invoked this defense in their answer and vigorously argued it to the trial court and to this Court. Thus, based on Theta and on other cases holding that the expiration of an applicable statute of limitations is a valuable property right that cannot be revived on an ex post facto basis, plaintiffs' attempt to sue IDC based on the alleged invalidity of the 1994 amendments should have been declared void ab initio. I have great difficulty with the majority's holding to the' contrary on this point. Is not a claim alleging that an amendment to a condominium declaration is void ab initio a claim that challenges the validity of the amendment? Is not a claim alleging that an amendment is void because it was adopted in a procedurally invalid manner a claim challenging the validity of the amendment? If a claim that an amendment is void ab initio is not subject to the one-year period for filing claims challenging the validity of an amendment, then what type of claim challenging the validity of an amendment is subject to the one-year period? Just to pose such questions is to expose the underlying problem with the Court's holding that plaintiffs' claims challenging the validity of amendments that are alleged to be void ab initio are exempt from the act's one-year period for challenging the validity of amendments to condominium declarations. But this is not simply a matter of logic and of interpreting statutes according to their plain meaning. The interests of basic fairness also argue in favor of applying the one-year statute of limitations period to bar these claims. Although plaintiffs were fully aware in 1994 of the fact that they needed to attack the validity of these amendments within one year of their recording, their board representatives voted in favor of the amendments while the associations sat on their hands until May 1999 without taking any legal action to invalidate them. In the interim, while they dawdled and while they obtained the benefit of the many thousands of dollars in condominium fees paid by IDC as the owner of three of these master GIS condominium units, IDC justifiably acted in reliance for years on the validity of the amendments in question. In its separate capacities as the declarant of the GIS condominium and as the owner of various condominium units on Goat Island, IDC sold condominium units, acquired ownership interests in units, approved budgets, maintained common areas, paid assessments, granted mortgages to banks, and committed millions of dollars toward building, opening, and operating the Newport Regatta Club on the premises of the north, or reserved, master unit of the GIS condominium. Thus, even if the applicable statute of limitations had not expired many years before plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, the doctrine of laches would appear to estop them from challenging the validity of these amendments. So many changes in position have occurred  affecting so many people and so many financial institutions and so much invested capital  that it is grossly unfair and unjust for plaintiffs to be allowed to undo all that has happened at this project with respect to the property involved so long after their representatives voted in favor of the amendments and the GIS master association lawfully adopted them. So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no steps to enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable and operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right. Pukas v. Pukas, 104 R.I. 542, 546, 247 A.2d 427, 429 (1968) (quoting Chase v. Chase, 20 R.I. 202, 204, 37 A. 804, 805 (1897)). The majority counters this suggestion of laches by referring to the fact that IDC proceeded to build the Regatta Club on the north unit in 1998  knowing that plaintiffs still might file a lawsuit at some later date that would challenge IDC's right to do so as of December 1, 1997. But even December 1, 1997 was more than two years after the one-year statute of limitations for filing such an action had expired and more than three years after the GIS master association adopted the amendments in question! Moreover, plaintiffs have not challenged the validity of the amendment that created the unit on which the Regatta Club sits and that vested IDC with ownership of that unit. Thus, even if the one-year statute of limitations did not bar plaintiffs' claims, which it clearly did, I still would reverse and remand this case for trial to decide whether IDC so changed its position in reliance on the validity of the amendments that it would be inequitable to allow plaintiffs to maintain this lawsuit as if it had been filed on December 1, 1997.