Opinion ID: 518814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ambiguity Issue

Text: 39 The ambiguity issue in this appeal involves the interpretation of the phrase termination of your employment contained in one portion of the Agreement. Eastern argues it means termination of your employment as an Eastern employee while Shipner urges it means termination of your employment as an officer. A review of the entire Agreement, however, makes it plain that Eastern created the lucrative golden parachute packages at issue in this case for its officers and key management officials, not for its pilots or other employees. These agreements were crafted for the purpose of retaining these officers and other key management officials who could be terminated or demoted following a change in Eastern's control. 40 Both the majority and the district court, however, have little difficulty in upholding Eastern's interpretation of the golden parachute Agreement as a matter of law despite acknowledging that Eastern drafted the Agreement to specifically apply only to its officers. The district court stated that the preamble to the Agreement makes it clear that these severance agreements were intended only for officers who filled critical management positions. The agreements were not to be offered to lower level employees who had no voice in the management of Eastern. Memorandum Opinion, at 5. The district court further interpreted the preamble to mean that the Agreement's clear purpose is to induce [Shipner and other officers] to remain in the employ of the company. Id. at 6. The district court conceded that the Agreement was intended only for officers and senior management yet held that the Agreement's use of the phrase termination of your employment unambiguously means termination of your employment as an employee rather than termination of your employment as an officer. The district court further conceded that extrinsic evidence supports Shipner's interpretation. Id. 41 My interpretation of the provisions in the Agreement is contrary to the district court's and majority's views. Because the Agreement fails to specify the meaning of the phrase termination of your employment, an inquiry into the four corners of the entire document is necessary. Shipner argues that the phrase is unambiguous or, alternatively, that it has the two equally reasonable interpretations the parties advance. He further argues that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to explain a latent ambiguity. In support of his position, Shipner also asserts that the following intrinsic factors indicated that the phrase was intended to mean termination of your employment as an officer rather than termination of your employment as an Eastern employee. 42 First, the Agreement's purpose, as indicated in its preamble, was to induce Shipner and other officers to remain with Eastern as officers during the pendency of a friendly or hostile takeover attempt. The golden parachute packages became effective only if an officer remained with Eastern but was subsequently terminated following a change in control. Shipner, however, argues that he needed no inducement to remain with Eastern as a pilot because his pilot position was protected by a collective bargaining agreement that required a grievance and arbitration procedure for termination. Thus, Shipner contends that the Agreement applies only in the situation where Eastern terminates his employment as an officer following a successful takeover attempt. 43 Second, the Agreement was a standardized form contract that Eastern drafted to provide golden parachutes to Shipner and twenty other key management officials none of whom had an entitlement to an Eastern pilot's position. Shipner argues that this factor also indicates that the Agreement applies only in his capacity as an officer and does not explicitly or implicitly contemplate Shipner's unique situation. 44 Third, the Agreement erroneously states that Eastern could terminate Shipner at any time. Although Eastern had the power to terminate Shipner from his officer position, it did not have the power to terminate Shipner from his pilot position due to the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, another termination provision in the Agreement states that Eastern may terminate Shipner for cause (such as the commission of a felony). Again, Eastern cannot terminate Shipner as a pilot except through the grievance and arbitration procedures under the collective bargaining agreement. 45 Fourth, the term retirement as used in the Agreement is defined as termination of employment based on having reached the age of sixty-two which is retirement age for Eastern officers. Eastern pilots must retire at age sixty. Finally, the Agreement prohibits Shipner from disclosing proprietary processes ... or other confidential information. Shipner argues that he is likely to possess such information as an Eastern officer but not as an Eastern pilot. 46 Under Florida law, the interpretation of a contract is for the court when the contract is unambiguous; when a contract's term is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, however, it is ambiguous and the resolution of its meaning is for the jury. Fabrica Italiana Lavorazione Materie Organiche, S.A.S., v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 684 F.2d 776 (11th Cir.1982); Laufer v. Norma Fashions, Inc., 418 So.2d 437, 439 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (a contract phrase is ambiguous when it is uncertain of meaning and disputed; its meaning must be determined as an issue of fact). A true ambiguity, however, does not exist merely because a contract can possibly be interpreted in more than one manner. Amer. Med. Intern, Inc. v. Scheller, 462 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984), review denied, 471 So.2d 44 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 947, 106 S.Ct. 345, 88 L.Ed.2d 292 (1985). 47 Shipner's recitation of factors intrinsic to the document raises a factual issue regarding which of the two competing interpretations must prevail. Because Shipner's interpretation of the phrase at issue is not just merely a possible interpretation but an equally reasonable interpretation, an ambiguity exists which a jury must resolve. Furthermore, because an ambiguity exists, extrinsic evidence is also admissible to resolve the latent ambiguity. Ace Elec. Supply Co. v. Terra Nova Elec., Inc., 288 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1973) (latent ambiguity arises where language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests a single meaning but some extrinsic evidence creates a necessity for interpretation among two or more meanings). 48 Ironically, the majority supports its holding by citing Fabrica Italiana, a case in which this court upheld the trial court's submission to the jury of an issue regarding the meaning of a contract term that had two reasonable interpretations. Because it is abundantly clear to me that the phrase termination of your employment is ambiguous as a matter of law, I similarly cite Fabrica Italiana in support of my conclusion. The district court erred in deciding that the Agreement was unambiguous and summary judgment was inappropriate. I would therefore remand the case to the district court for a trial on the merits.