Opinion ID: 2222013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Under What Circumstances Can Coemployee Commit Actionable Unjustified Intentional Act of Interference With At-Will Employment Relationship?

Text: In Hoschler, the Court of Appeals determined that the third element of the cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectation required an examination of what is sufficient to constitute an `unjustified' interference. 3 Neb.App. at 682, 529 N.W.2d at 826. While we agree with this statement, we conclude that it is first necessary to determine what constitutes interference with an at-will employment relationship by a supervisor or other coemployee; in other words, at what point does the coemployee become a third person subject to liability for tortious interference with the at-will employment relationship of another on the basis of an unjustified intentional act? In addressing this issue, other courts have drawn a distinction between actions which fall within the general scope of the alleged interferer's authority as an agent of the employer and those which are in furtherance of some individual or private purpose not related to the interests of the employer. For example, in Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505-06 (Minn.1991), an opinion cited by the Court of Appeals in Hoschler v. Kozlik, 3 Neb.App. 677, 529 N.W.2d 822 (1995), the court stated: The general rule is that a party cannot interfere with its own contract. [Citation omitted.] If a corporation's officer or agent acting pursuant to his company duties terminates or causes to be terminated an employee, the actions are those of the corporation; the employee's dispute is with the company employer for breach of contract, not the agent individually for a tort. To allow the officer or agent to be sued and to be personally liable would chill corporate personnel from performing their duties and would be contrary to the limited liability accorded incorporation. Similarly, under Alabama law, `[s]o long as the officer or employe [sic] acts within the general range of his authority intending to benefit the corporation, the law identifies his actions with the corporation.' Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1987), quoting Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or. 65, 439 P.2d 601 (1968). And in Wilcox v. Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 365 (7th Cir.1992), the court found that in order to constitute interference with an employment relationship under Wisconsin law, it was necessary to show that the employee was serving a master other than the employer or was pursuing some benefit to himself, at odds with the interests of the employer. We agree with these authorities and hold that in order to constitute actionable interference with an employment relationship, actions of a coemployee must be shown to have been committed in furtherance of some purpose other than the lawful purposes of the employer. If such interference is established, it must also be proved to be unjustified in order to be actionable. Koster v. P & P Enters., 248 Neb. 759, 539 N.W.2d 274 (1995); Matheson v. Stork, 239 Neb. 547, 477 N.W.2d 156 (1991). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 at 7 (1979) describes a cause of action similar to that which we have recognized for intentional interference with a business relationship or expectancy, imposing liability upon one who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract. The Restatement, supra, § 767 at 26-27, lists seven factors to consider in determining whether interference with a business relationship is improper: (a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the actor's motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and (g) the relations between the parties. In the introductory note to the Restatement, supra, ch. 37 at 7, that authority states that in making its analysis, the factfinder is to engage in a balancing process, noting: The determination of whether an interference is improper depends upon a comparative appraisal of these factors. And the decision is, whether it was improper under the circumstancesthat is under the particular facts of the individual case, not in terms of rules of law or generalizations. Furthermore, the Restatement, supra, § 767, comment b. at 28, notes: The issue in each case is whether the interference is improper or not under the circumstances; whether, upon a consideration of the relative significance of the factors involved, the conduct should be permitted without liability, despite its effect of harm to another. The decision therefore depends upon a judgment and choice of values in each situation. This Section states the important factors to be weighed against each other and balanced in arriving at a judgment; but it does not exhaust the list of possible factors. In Hoschler v. Kozlik, 3 Neb.App. 677, 529 N.W.2d 822 (1995), the Court of Appeals concluded that the factors recited by the Restatement for determining whether interference is improper should be used to determine whether interference is unjustified under our law. We agree with and adopt this conclusion. We respectfully disagree, however, with the statement of the Court of Appeals in Hoschler that the intentional interference by a fellow employee, including an officer, director, or other employee, in the employment relationship of another employee with a common employer, when it is malicious and thus unjustified or is outside the scope of authority of the interfering employee, gives rise to a cause of action for tortious interference. Hoschler v. Kozlik, 3 Neb.App. at 686, 529 N.W.2d at 828. As noted above, a showing that a coemployee acts in furtherance of interests other than those of the employer provides proof of interference but does not necessarily establish unjustified interference, as this statement suggests. Moreover, the court's equation of malicious with unjustified is inconsistent with its prior correct statement that malice is not an element of tortious interference with a business relationship. While a malicious motive is a factor which may be considered in determining whether interference is unjustified, and may indeed weigh heavily toward such a finding, it is generally insufficient standing alone to establish that fact under the seven-factor balancing test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979) discussed above. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the fact that Nebraska law does not recognize a cause of action for malicious termination of at-will employment. White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430 N.W.2d 27 (1988).