Opinion ID: 3150212
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Length of Detention and Likelihood of Removal

Text: In their cross-appeal, petitioners argue that the district court erred in failing to require IJs to consider the length of a non-citizen’s past and likely future detention and, relatedly, the likelihood of eventual removal from the United States. In our prior decisions, we have not directly addressed whether due process requires consideration of the length of future detention at bond hearings. We have noted, however, that “the due process analysis changes as ‘the period of . . . confinement grows,’” and that longer detention requires more robust procedural protections. Diouf II, 634 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Zadvydas, 634 F.3d 1081). Accordingly, a noncitizen detained for one or more years is entitled to greater solicitude than a non-citizen detained for six months. 17 On September 10, 2015, the government provided us with the only transcript of a Rodriguez hearing in this record, which took place on April 28, 2015, and concerned a Mr. Kaene Dean. There, the IJ did consider and impose conditions of release in addition to bond, including monthly reporting to DHS and enrollment in a mental health treatment plan. From the transcript, it does not appear that the government presented any evidence that these conditions would be insufficient to prevent the risk of danger to the community, or even any evidence at all. However, the IJ’s decision to release on bond a recidivist sexual offender whom the DOJ had released twice before in proceedings unrelated to this case under § 1226(a) and who had twice before violated the conditions of his release on bond is not before us. See October 2, 2015 Order. RODRIGUEZ V. ROBBINS 55 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent provides that “detention incidental to removal must bear a reasonable relation to its purpose.” Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1249 (Tashima, J., concurring) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 527; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). At some point, the length of detention could “become[] so egregious that it can no longer be said to be ‘reasonably related’ to an alien’s removal.” Id. (citation omitted). An IJ therefore must consider the length of time for which a noncitizen has already been detained. As to the likely duration of future detention and the likelihood of eventual removal, however, those factors are too speculative and too dependent upon the merits of the detainee’s claims for us to require IJs to consider during a bond hearing. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that consideration of those factors “would require legal and political analyses beyond what would otherwise be considered at a bond hearing” and is therefore not appropriate. We note that Zadvydas and its progeny require consideration of the likelihood of removal in particular circumstances,18 but we decline to require such analysis as a threshold inquiry in all bond hearings. 18 Several of our cases have addressed petitions for habeas relief under Zadvydas, which requires a detainee to prove that he “is not significantly likely to be removed.” Owino, 575 F.3d at 955; see also Diouf v. Mukasey (Diouf I), 542 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008); Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065; Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1080. Those decisions instruct IJs to consider the likelihood of removal when, for instance, a detainee is stateless. See Owino, 575 F.3d at 955–56. However, petitioners have not identified, and we have not found, authority that supports requiring this inquiry in all bond hearings. 56 RODRIGUEZ V. ROBBINS