Opinion ID: 1867766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of a fundamentally fair trial.

Text: ¶ 12. Regarding the testimony of Officers Ross and Cannon, Miller argues that: [p]resentation of credible evidence of the continuing course of violence that James inflicted on [Miller] in an attempt to establish the reasonableness of her belief that the danger to her of death or great bodily harm was imminent was denied by the trial court, thereby eliminating the material facts that were imperative to aid the jury in understanding the dire situation that [Miller] faced, and thereby rendering a fair verdict based on all of the material evidence in this case. Furthermore, Miller insists that: [t]he trial court erroneously and with great prejudice to [Miller] refused to allow the testimony of the officers, which was absolutely essential to corroborate not only the details of [Miller's] testimony, but also her theory of defense, clearly establishing [Miller's] state of mind to the jury at the time of the incident. In total, Miller asserts that because the jury was not able to place themselves in [Miller's] position at the time of the killing and apprehend the situation as it was to her, she was prejudiced and the court committed reversible error by refusing to allow the testimony pursuant to Miss. R. Evid. 404(a)(2). In response, the State unpersuasively maintains that the testimony of Officers Ross and Cannon was cumulative and any resulting error was harmless. ¶ 13. According to this Court: [t]he admissibility of testimonial evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and it will not be found in error unless it has abused its discretion. Such error will warrant reversal only when the abuse of discretion has resulted in prejudice to the accused. Harris v. State, 861 So.2d 1003, 1018 (Miss.2003) (emphasis added). Miss. R. Evid. 404(a)(2) provides, [e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: . . . [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused. . . . Miss. R. Evid. 404(a)(2). However, such evidence is not competent until there has first been some evidence that the victim had been the aggressor. Robinson v. State, 566 So.2d 1240, 1241 (Miss.1990) (emphasis added). In the case sub judice, sufficient evidence was adduced to create a jury issue as to whether James was the aggressor in the November 23, 2000, incident. Mary's statement to the police provided that James was verbally abusive to Miller and had wielded a knife in the kitchen; Andrekia's statement to the police said that James verbally abused and hit Miller before she stabbed him; Lewis testified that James threatened Miller earlier in the day, stating that she got death around her[;] and Miller testified that James punched her in the face and was about to stab her with a butcher knife when she stabbed him. [W]here any doubt exists as to who was the aggressor in an incident which results in the death of a participant or where a defendant claims self-defense, evidence of a deceased's previous threats and harassments against defendant . . . is admissible. Day v. State, 589 So.2d 637, 642 (Miss.1991). The importance of admitting such evidence lies in the fact that it enables jurors to put themselves in the defendant's place at the time of the killing and view the situation as it appeared to him. Id. The testimony of those officers was relevant to support her testimony of prior incidents. Given that evidence was presented that James was the aggressor, this Court finds that the circuit court abused its discretion in deeming the testimony of Officers Ross and Cannon inadmissible. Furthermore, this error was not harmless, as it cannot be maintained that the same result would have been reached had [the error] not existed. Burnside v. State, 882 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss.2004) (quoting Lancaster v. State, 200 So. 721, 722 (Miss.1941)). In short, [w]ithout all the facts and circumstances surrounding the [incident], the jury was handicapped in determining what really occurred, and [Miller] was prejudiced by any decision that resulted. Day, 589 So.2d at 644. Given that prejudice, this case is reversed and remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.