Opinion ID: 1919354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jury's exposure to extraneous prejudicial information

Text: ¶ 17. In issues 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9 James raises arguments regarding the jury's exposure to extraneous prejudicial information and the procedures used by the trial court in examining the jury regarding that exposure. An accused's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. Gray v. State, 799 So.2d 53, 62 (Miss.2001) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI and Miss. Const. art. 3, §§ 14 & 26). Because on appeal we must as a matter of practical and institutional necessity defer to jury determinations of fact questions, we must be vigilant that the jury making such findings is infected by not the slightest taint or suggestion of bias or unfairness. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 226 (Miss.1985). We have stated: Where the resolution of a case comes down to factual disputes, the jury's role becomes paramount as it weighs the credibility of the witnesses and determines which factual accounts to accept or reject. Thus, it is absolutely imperative that the jury be unbiased, impartial, and not swayed by the consideration of improper, inadmissible information. We can not say, with any degree of certainty, that this was the case here because the fact of the matter is that the juror threw the proverbial skunk into the jury [room] during the deliberations by asking about other charges against Hickson. See Dunn v. U.S., 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir.1962) (`[I]f you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can't instruct the jury not to smell it'). Hickson v. State, 707 So.2d 536, 544 (Miss.1997) (emphasis added). ¶ 18. In Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So.2d 407 (Miss.1993), this Court formulated a systematic method to be used to inquire into juror verdicts pursuant to M.R.E. 606(b). Id. at 416. M.R.E. 606(b) provides, (b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. (emphasis added). Gladney first provides that the trial court and opposing counsel must be made aware of any potential juror misconduct when this evidence is manifested. 625 So.2d. at 418. Next it must be determined if an investigation is warranted. In order for the duty to investigate to arise, the party contending there is misconduct must make a threshold showing that there was in fact an improper outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information. Id. at 418-19. When the threshold showing is made, the trial court should conduct a post-trial hearing. Id. at 419. The scope of the hearing is however, limited; the proper procedure is for the judge to limit the questions asked the jurors to determine whether the communication was made and what it contained. Once it is determined that the communication was made and what the contents were, the court is then to decide whether it is reasonably possible this communication altered the verdict. Id. (emphasis added). M.R.E. 606(b) makes it abundantly clear that a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith. Gladney offers no interpretation nor explanation which is inconsistent with, or different from, M.R.E. 606(b). That is to say that it would be inappropriate, and in violation of M.R.E. 606(b), for any juror to be questioned with regard to whether or not the extraneous information actually altered his verdict. If it is reasonably possible that the communication altered the verdict, then a new trial must be ordered. United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1412 (7th Cir.1994). ¶ 19. In the case at bar, counsel for James was advised of the misconduct on July 16, 1996, the day after the trial. They followed the dictates of Gladney regarding notification and requested that the jurors be examined. In James I, the Court of Appeals correctly found that James made a threshold showing and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to examine the jurors. James I, 777 So.2d at 699-700. We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conway's testimony more than satisfied the minimum requirements of Gladney and provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to hold a hearing for the purpose of determining whether extraneous prejudicial information was introduced into the jury's deliberations concerning the death of the other child. Id. at 700. ¶ 20. The hearing required by Gladney was finally conducted on May 15, 2001, four years and ten months after the trial. One juror could not be located. All of the jurors, who could be located, stated that they could not remember certain details. James argues that the failure to fully reconvene the jury was reversible error. We agree. The constitutional right to trial by jury includes as its essential elements that the jury shall consist of twelve impartial men, neither more nor less, and that the verdict shall be unanimous. Markham v. State, 209 Miss. 135, 46 So.2d 88, 89 (1950) (citations omitted). In the present matter, James contends that all members of the jury were exposed to the prejudicial extraneous information when the jurors discussed the allegations regarding the second child in the jury room. Pursuant to Gladney, James had a right to examine the missing juror to determine whether it is reasonably possible [that the] communication altered [his] verdict. Gladney, 625 So.2d at 419. Since the trial court was unable to locate the missing juror, it should have granted James' motion for a new trial. We find that the trial court's failure to fully reconvene the jury for the hearing was reversible error and mandates a new trial. [8] ¶ 21. James also argues that the passage of time made reconvening the jury impracticable and made a new trial necessary. James cites State v. Rideout, 143 N.H. 363, 725 A.2d 8, 11 (1999) in support of his argument. In Rideout the trial court conducted a post-trial hearing, in November 1996, regarding a juror's contact with a witness for the prosecution. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the verdict based on the contact. In its February 1999 opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that further investigation should have been conducted, but based on the passage of time, reconvening the jury was impracticable and a new trial was granted. As discussed by the Court of Appeals in James II, the facts in Rideout can be distinguished. James II, 912 So.2d at 987-88, 2004 WL 1965662 at -5. However, the New Hampshire Supreme Court's discussion regarding reconvening a jury several years after a trial is concluded is helpful. See also Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 919 (7th Cir.1991) (nor is it irrelevant that the case is already a decade old.) We find that the passage of time was unfairly prejudicial to James and violated his due process rights. ¶ 22. We find, based on the standard established in Gladney, that it is reasonably possible that [the] communication altered the verdict and a new trial should be granted. Gladney, 625 So.2d at 419. Wanda Conway testified immediately after the trial and the State did not attempt to rebut her testimony. Her uncontroverted testimony and the record from jury selection reveal that neither jurors Watson, Jordan, nor any of the male jurors responded to the trial court's inquiry about knowledge of the case. Watson was later informed, during lunch recess, that James was accused of killing another child. Many members of the venire discussed the allegations regarding a second child while they were waiting in a separate courtroom. At this time one male juror was informed of the allegations regarding the second child. At no point following these exposures to extraneous information were the jurors asked again if they had knowledge of the case, or if they could set aside that knowledge and be fair and impartial. ¶ 23. Conway also testified that Watson spoke with her the day after the trial. Watson complained that some members of the jury knew about the second child and kept bringing it up in the jury room. Watson stated that several jurors argued that James was guilty because it was two children. Watson also discussed that the docket sheet supported the allegation that a second child was involved. ¶ 24. The hearing was held on May 15, 2001, to determine whether extraneous information was communicated to the jury and the content of that communication. During voir dire on July 9, 1996, jurors Pettis and John and alternate juror Owens were the only selected jurors who had heard about the case in the media. They all stated that they did not remember any details, had not formed any opinions, could put aside what they had heard, and decide the case based on the evidence. Jurors Hoff, Fazzio, Watson and Jordan admitted, during the May 2001 hearing, that they had heard that James had been accused of killing a second child. Since it can be inferred that they did not know this information during voir dire, the trial court correctly found that they had been exposed to extraneous information. ¶ 25. During the May 2001 hearing, Juror Jordan stated that she knew about the allegations regarding the second child because she heard testimony during the trial which referred to children. The record has been scoured for the word children stated during the trial in the presence of the jury. Although the word children was stated a few times during testimony, there is nothing in the record to support Juror Jordan's statement that witnesses mentioned that James was involved in the death of a second child. [9] There is also nothing in the record to indicate that the State, the Defendant, or the trial court stated or suggested that James was accused of killing a second child. ¶ 26. Jurors Watson and Jordan both stated that the docket sheet implied that two children were involved. The docket sheet states REMARKS: JUDGE TERRY TO HEAR/1ST VICTIM. Jurors Hoff, Watson and Jordan admitted that the fact that James was accused of killing another child was discussed in the jury room. The fact that, after almost five years, these jurors did not remember exactly what was said or who said it, does not lessen the fact that they did discuss the allegations regarding the second child. ¶ 27. Pursuant to Gladney, extraneous prejudicial information was communicated to the jury. The content of that communication was that James was accused of killing another child. During pre-trial hearings the trial court ruled that this information was very prejudicial and that the jury would not be allowed to hear it. [I]t is reasonably possible this communication altered the verdict. Gladney, 625 So.2d at 419 (emphasis added). Although the exact source of the communication will never be known, the fact that the skunk was thrown into the jury room mandates a new trial. Hickson v. State, 707 So.2d 536, 544 (Miss.1997) (citing Dunn v. United States., 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir.1962)). ¶ 28. We further find that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the attorneys to examine the jurors during the May 2001 hearing. Nothing in Gladney or its progeny prohibit attorneys from examining the jurors. Hickson 707 So.2d at 541; Gladney 625 So.2d at 418-19. No provision prevents a lawyer from talking to a juror or securing affidavits from jurors to the effect that an `outside influence' was brought to bear. Brake v. Speed, 605 So.2d 28, 37 (Miss.1992) (citing M.R.E. 606(b)). The breath of questioning should be sufficient `to permit the entire picture to be explored.' United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2nd Cir.1983) (quoting United States. v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2nd Cir.1978)). Within the dictates of Gladney and M.R.E. 606(b), the attorneys should have been allowed to question the jurors or the trial court should have asked additional questions submitted by the attorneys.