Opinion ID: 548937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consistency of the Special Verdicts

Text: 14 Our review of the proceedings before the district court leaves us with an unmistakable impression that the jury was confused in its findings. The jury concluded in question six that Fountain had acted in good faith, applying no more force than he thought necessary, but, on the very next day, it found that Fountain acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively. 15 The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial precludes entry of a judgment based on an inconsistent jury verdict that thereby disregards any material jury finding. See Auwood v. Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884, 890-91 (2d Cir.1988). If an irreconcilable inconsistency is not noticed until after the jury has been dismissed, an appellate court on review must vacate the judgment and order a new trial. See id. at 891. 16 We are of course mindful that [w]here there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962). Before we consider whether there is any view of the case that might reconcile the jury's findings, we pause to observe that neither of the parties moved before the district court or have requested on this appeal that a new trial be ordered on grounds of inconsistency of the verdicts. In fact, both parties seek to explain away the seeming inconsistencies to justify a verdict in their favor. We are presented with the issue, therefore, whether the parties' failure to request a new trial by post-trial motion or on appeal precludes us from considering whether the verdicts were inconsistent. 2 At least one circuit has found that it does. See Alderman v. Tandy Corp., 720 F.2d 1234, 1236-37 (11th Cir.1983). We do not agree. When the bases for a final judgment are self-contradictory, we think the preferable rule to be that an appellate court has the power to review that judgment, notwithstanding failure of the parties to object or to move before the district court. See Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (5th Cir.1977) (failure to move for new trial before district court does not preclude appellate review of whether answers to special verdict questions were inconsistent and thus failed to support judgment entered); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2515 (1990). 17 We are unable to reconcile the second verdict with the first. The jury's finding in the second verdict that Fountain acted maliciously or wantonly or oppressively plainly contradicted its answer to question six that Fountain acted with a good faith belief that the force he used was reasonably necessary and was, as the district court instructed, in accordance with established law. 3 See Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1152 (7th Cir.1984) (jury finding that officer's actions were shocking, callous, or brutal not reconcilable with finding that officer did not know actions were unlawful). 4 18 Fountain argues that even if the first and second verdicts are inconsistent, we may not properly take into account anything the jury found in the second verdict, because it was error for the district court to have even submitted it to the jury. The district court erred, Fountain suggests, because the finding of the good faith defense in the first verdict was decisive of the outcome of the case, and no further factfinding should have been made. See McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869, 870-71 (4th Cir.1978) (resubmission of questions to jury not permissible, despite apparent inconsistency, where answer to one question is decisive of the case), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 1225, 59 L.Ed.2d 460 (1979). But see Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 444 (1st Cir.1989) (resubmission of questions to jury permissible even if answers to first questions were decisive so long as the answers were inconsistent under any view). Whether or not it was error for the district court to have submitted the second verdict, we cannot give effect to one jury finding directly contradicted by another the very next day. To do so would be inconsistent with the parties' right to trial by jury. We cannot pretend the jury thought Fountain acted in good faith, and allow entry of judgment upon this basis, given the jury's subsequent finding that he acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively. Even if the district court should not have allowed the jury to make the latter finding, this does not inspire any more confidence in the former. Therefore, we conclude that we may properly consider the jury's findings in the second verdict and, accordingly, vacate the judgment due to the irreconcilability of the answers to the first and second special verdicts.