Opinion ID: 775415
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recognition of a Post-Mortem Right of Publicity under Michigan Common Law

Text: 144 This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard employed by the district court. See Daddy's Junky, 109 F.3d at 280.
145 Palazzetti contests the district court's decision recognizing a post-mortem right of publicity under Michigan common law. In its third motion for summary judgment, Palazzetti argued that Herman Miller's right of publicity claim should be dismissed because neither Michigan nor New York law recognizes a post-mortem right of publicity. The district court denied the motion, finding that the interests of Michigan (Herman Miller's home state) predominated over the interests of New York (Palazzetti's home state) and that the law of Michigan should apply. Although the district court recognized that Michigan courts had not addressed either the right of publicity or the post-mortem right of publicity, the court concluded that Michigan courts would recognize such rights. 146 To support its claim, Palazzetti relies on precedent from this court interpreting the right of publicity under the law of other states in this Circuit. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957-59 (6th Cir. 1980) (right of publicity not devisable under Tennessee law); Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1234-35 (N.D. Ohio 1983),aff'd, 765 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (relying on Memphis Development and Ohio right of privacy law in holding no post-mortem right of publicity under Ohio law). The holding of Memphis Development was subsequently undermined when the Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected its reasoning and declared that the right of publicity was descendible under Tennessee law. See State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). This decision was acknowledged in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., No. 85-5767, 1987 WL 37216, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1987) (unpublished table decision). 147 This court has speculated that Michigan courts would recognize the right of publicity. In Here's Johnny I, 698 F.2d at 834 n.1, this court acknowledged that Michigan courts had not addressed the right of publicity, but speculated that Michigan courts would recognize such a right since they had recognized a right of privacy. This court vacated the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's right of publicity claim, stating Michigan law . . . has not yet clearly addressed the right of publicity. But the general recognition of the right . . . suggests to us that the Michigan courts would adopt the right. Ibid. Quoting from Memphis Development, the court stated that [t]he famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the commercial use of their name and personality. Here's Johnny I, 698 F.2d at 835 (quotingMemphis Dev., 616 F. 2d at 957). The fact that the court used the words during life does not prevent us from concluding that the district court did not err in concluding that the right of publicity is descendible under Michigan law. 11 148 Although the right of publicity is an outgrowth of the right of privacy, the two rights protect fundamentally different interests and must be analyzed separately. See Here's Johnny I, 698 F.2d at 834. The right of privacy, which protects the right to an individual's self-esteem and dignity, typically ends at death. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1965) (rejecting right of privacy claim brought under Illinois law by relatives of Al Capone and stating that [i]t is anomalous to speak of the privacy of a deceased person); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1979) (It is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded, that is, plaintiff must plead and prove that his privacy has been invaded.); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6521 (1977) (Except for the appropriation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded.). 149 The right of publicity, however, is a right that protects the pecuniary right and interest in the commercial exploitation of a celebrity's identity. See Here's Johnny I, 698 F.2d at 834. These interests reflect property rights, as opposed to dignitary rights, and therefore can extend beyond death. See Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1541 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1983) (recognizing right of publicity as a personal property right); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §391.170(1) (a person has property rights in his name and likeness which are entitled to protection from commercial exploitation); State ex rel. Elvis, 733 S.W.2d at 97 (Unquestionably, a celebrity's right of publicity has value. It can be possessed and used. It can be assigned, and it can be the subject of a contract. Thus, there is ample basis for this Court to conclude that it is a species of intangible personal property.); McCarthy, supra n.2, at § 28:1 (The right of publicity is property and is properly categorized as a form of intellectual property.). 150 The only common law decision not recognizing a post-mortem right to privacy is Reeves, in which the district court was influenced by an Ohio Supreme Court decision that rejected the concept of the right of publicity as a property right. See Reeves, 572 F. Supp. at 1235, aff'd, 765 F.2d at 80. We do not have similar law to guide us since Michigan courts have yet to address the right of publicity. Moreover, no jurisdiction other than Ohio has reached a similar conclusion. See McCarthy, supra n.2, at § 28.45 (Ohio law stands as a lonely minority of one.). In addition, Reeves effectively has been overruled by statute since, in 1999, Ohio enacted a right of publicity statute that incorporates a post-mortem right of publicity. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.02. We believe that the weight of authority indicates that the right of publicity is more properly analyzed as a property right and, therefore, is descendible. 151 In reaching our decision, we are also influenced by the number of states that have recognized a post-mortem right of publicity. Indeed, [a]s case law on [the] right [of publicity] is exceedingly rare . . . and because of the general constitutional policy of maintaining uniformity in intellectual property laws, courts typically give attention to the entire available body of case law when deciding right of publicity cases. Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). One observer has stated that [t]he overwhelming majority rule under either statute, or common law is that the right of publicity is descendible property and has an unconditional postmortem duration. McCarthy, supra n.2, at § 28:45. McCarthy notes that fourteen states have recognized a post-mortem right of publicity under statute or common law. Ibid. 12 In addition, two other states have recently enacted right of publicity statutes that recognize a post-mortem right of publicity. 13 Given the number of states that are agnostic as to the issue of a post-mortem right of publicity it may be something of an overstatement to state that sixteen states constitute an overwhelming majority rule. However, it is true that, of the states that have addressed the issue of a post-mortem right of publicity by statute or caselaw, the majority have recognized the right. 14 152 The district court did not err in recognizing a post-mortem right of publicity under Michigan common law. 153