Opinion ID: 6110000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 862III Ward's Arguments

Text: On appeal, Ward argues that the circuit court clearly erred in granting the State's motion to dismiss his complaint. He contends that section 16-90-506(d) violates his right to due process under the United States and Arkansas Constitutions and violates the doctrine of separation of powers under the Arkansas Constitution. 2
The general rule in cases involving the constitutionality of a statute is that the statute is presumed constitutional, and the burden of proving otherwise is upon the challenger of the statute. Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep't , 339 Ark. 274 , 5 S.W.3d 402 (1999). Because statutes are presumed to be framed in accordance with the Constitution, they should not be held invalid for repugnance thereto unless such conflict is clear and unmistakable. Id. at 279 , 5 S.W.3d 402 .
For the first point on appeal, Ward argues that section 16-90-506(d)(1) is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied, and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution. Specifically, Ward contends that section 16-90-506(d)(1) unconstitutionally delegates the competence inquiry to the Director and denies an incompetent prisoner any access to the courts to obtain the evidentiary hearing necessary to determine the question of his competence to be executed. He asserts that he must be afforded access to a court capable of hearing evidence ... to make a 'substantial threshold showing' to obtain the requisite 'fair hearing' in accordance with fundamental fairness, as required by the Court's holdings in Ford and Panetti . Ward urges this court to adopt minimum procedures to comply with Ford and Panetti . There are two different ways to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. First, a plaintiff can make an as-applied challenge, in which the court assesses the merits of the challenge by considering the facts of the particular case in front of the court, not hypothetical facts in other situations. Laymon v. State , 2015 Ark. 485 , at 3, 478 S.W.3d 203 , 205. Second, a plaintiff can make a facial challenge, which seeks to invalidate the statute itself. Id. Facial invalidation of a statute is appropriate if it can be shown that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. Martin v. Kohls , 2014 Ark. 427 , at 11, 444 S.W.3d 844 , 850 (quoting United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ). Because the circuit court dismissed Ward's complaint without a hearing, the only issue for this court's review is whether the statute is facially unconstitutional. We do not determine whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Ward.
We first examine the applicable federal law. [T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Ford , 477 U.S. at 409-10 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . In Ford , the Court heard the appeal of Ford, a Florida death-row inmate, who challenged Florida's statutory scheme governing the determination of competency of a condemned inmate, which included a single meeting of three psychiatrists, who made three different diagnoses and filed their separate reports  with the governor, who ultimately rendered a final decision on competency. Id. at 403-04 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . The Court concluded that Florida's procedures for determining sanity [were] inadequate. Id. at 416 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . Justice Powell, in a concurrence to the four-justice plurality opinion, stated that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it. Id. at 422 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . He maintained that a state may require a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing process. Id. at 426 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . Later, in Panetti , 551 U.S. 930 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 , the Court reviewed Panetti's Ford claim vis-à-vis a similar statutory scheme in Texas. In Panetti , the petitioner raised an incompetency claim after his execution date had been set, and he pursued that claim to no avail in both the state court and the federal courts. The Court held that Texas procedures for preventing the execution of insane individuals failed to provide ... the minimum process required by Ford . 477 U.S. at 416-17 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . The Court acknowledged that Ford did not set forth a precise standard for competency. Id. at 956-57, 127 S.Ct. 2842 . On the procedural due-process requirements for a competency determination, the Eighth Circuit succinctly explained, Panetti instructs that  'a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal than a trial.'  Panetti , 551 U.S. at 949 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 (quoting Ford , 477 U.S. at 427 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 ) (Powell, J., concurring). The basic requirements of due process include an opportunity to submit 'evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own psychiatric examination.'  Id. at 950, 127 S.Ct. 2842 (quoting Ford , 477 U.S. at 427 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 ); see also Panetti , 551 U.S. at 951 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 ([The state court] failed to provide petitioner with an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report filed by the court-appointed experts.); Ford , 477 U.S. at 424 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that the determination of sanity appear[ed] to have been made solely on the basis of the examinations performed by state-appointed psychiatrists). Cole v. Roper , 783 F.3d 707 , 710-11 (8th Cir. 2015). Because the Panetti court concluded that Panetti's constitutional claims needed to be resolved, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings in the federal district court. Panetti , 551 U.S. at 962 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 .
Next, we review the applicable state law. Ward contends that section 16-90-506(d)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates his due-process rights under the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, Ward contends that the statutory scheme mandated in section 16-90-506(d)(1) erroneously places the Director as the arbiter of a competency decision without an evidentiary hearing. Section 16-90-506(d)(1) provides, (d)(1)(A)(i) When the Director of the Department of Correction is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an individual under sentence of death is not competent, due to mental illness, to understand the nature and reasons for that punishment, the Director of the Department of Correction shall notify the Deputy Director of the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services. (ii) The Director of the Department of Correction shall also notify the Governor of this action.  (iii) The Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services shall cause an inquiry to be made into the mental condition of the individual within thirty (30) days of receipt of notification. (iv) The attorney of record of the individual shall also be notified of this action, and reasonable allowance will be made for an independent mental health evaluation to be made. (v) A copy of the report of the evaluation by the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services shall be furnished to the Mental Health Services Section of the Division of Health Treatment Services of the Department of Correction, along with any recommendations for treatment of the individual. (vi) All responsibility for implementation of treatment remains with the Mental Health Services Section of the Division of Health Treatment Services of the Department of Correction. (B)(i) If the individual is found competent to understand the nature of and reason for the punishment, the Governor shall be so notified and shall order the execution to be carried out according to law. (ii) If the individual is found incompetent due to mental illness, the Governor shall order that appropriate mental health treatment be provided. The Director of the Department of Correction may order a reevaluation of the competency of the individual as circumstances may warrant. (2) When the Director of the Department of Correction is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a female convict under sentence of death is pregnant, he or she shall suspend the execution until it appears that she is not pregnant or until she has delivered the child. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-506 (d)(1) (emphasis added). In Arkansas, the standard for determining competency for purposes of execution is whether a condemned person understands the nature and reasons for that punishment. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-506 (d)(1)(A)(i). In Singleton v. Endell , 316 Ark. 133 , 870 S.W.2d 742 (1994), this court decided whether Singleton was entitled to a hearing as provided in Ford , 477 U.S. 399 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . The circuit court had denied the relief requested by Singleton, and this court affirmed. We considered only Singleton's challenge that section 16-90-506(d)(1) was procedurally insufficient to comply with the requirements of Ford and stated that [w]e cannot know that Mr. Singleton and his counsel would be precluded from participating and presenting evidence of his insanity if such a hearing were held pursuant to § 16-90-506(d)(1). Singleton , 316 Ark. 133 , 870 S.W.2d at 747 . We emphasize that our decision in Singleton predates the Court's decision in Panetti , 551 U.S. 930 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 . Since Singleton , this court has not revisited the constitutionality of section 16-90-506(d)(1).
Mindful of this well-established precedent, we review the language of section 16-90-506(d)(1)(A) : (d)(1)(A)(i) When the Director of the Department of Correction is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an individual under sentence of death is not competent, due to mental illness, to understand the nature and reasons for that punishment, the Director of the Department of Correction shall notify the Deputy Director of the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services.  This statutory provision authorizes the Director to initiate a determination of competency [w]hen the Director ... is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that [the death-row inmate] is not competent, and at that time, the Director ... shall notify the Deputy Director of the Division of Aging ... of ... [DHS]. 3 Simply put, section 16-90-506(d)(1)(A) is devoid of any procedure by which a death-row inmate has an opportunity to make an initial substantial threshold showing of insanity ... to trigger the hearing process pursuant to Ford , 477 U.S. at 426 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 . Nor does the language of section 16-90-506(d)(1)(A) provide for an evidentiary hearing that comports with the fundamental principles of due process, as articulated in Ford and Panetti . Therefore, we hold that section 16-90-501(d)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and violates the due-process guarantees of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. We overrule Singleton , 316 Ark. 133 , 870 S.W.2d 742 , to the extent that it conflicts with our holding in this opinion. Because we reverse the circuit court's dismissal and hold that section 16-90-506(d)(1) is unconstitutional, we decline to address Ward's remaining argument on the doctrine of separation of powers.