Opinion ID: 1296397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: erroneous instructions in the light of mullaney and traditional west virginia law

Text: As to State's Instructions Nos. G and H which purport to instruct the jury as to the defense of insanity, we do not find them objectionable as of the time of the trial of Pendry in the instant case. However, upon a retrial of this case, we would find such instructions objectionable in that they do not comply with an approach based on the Model Penal Code as outlined in State v. Grimm, supra , and as approved in State v. Myers, supra . With reference to State's Instruction No. I, we find that it fails to instruct properly as to the burden of proof which is carried by the defendanthis burden being only to prove his defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, and we further find, as in State v. Myers, supra , that the instruction tends to be confusing. It diverts the jury's attention from the true measure of proof which the law requires and purports to define defendant's burden of proof in terms of his inability to rely on raising a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether or not he was insane at the time he committed the act charged to him by the indictment in the case. We are more concerned, however, with State's Instructions Nos. E and F. State's Instruction No. F does not relate to evidence which was received in the case. The record shows that the evidence did not have to do with any partial insanity on the part of the defendant Pendry. Consequently, this instruction tends to lead the jury into a consideration of matters which were not properly before it in the evidence that was adduced at trial, and is, therefore, one which constitutes prejudicial error. See State v. Bennett, W.Va., 203 S.E.2d 699 (1974); and State v. Collins, 154 W.Va. 771, 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971). State's Instruction No. E constitutes prejudicial error in this case for the reason that it does not properly state the law of this State regarding the inference which may arise from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon. This instruction, as customarily given, was required to embody the fact that the presumption would arise from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon only when the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that it was used without any or upon very slight provocation. See State v. Douglass, 28 W.Va. 297 (1886); and State v. Cain, supra . The instruction is further deficient under Mullaney in that it instructs the jury that there is a presumption of law which attaches to the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, namely, that the defendant intended the consequence that resulted from the use thereof which arises in the absence of proof to the contrary. This instruction told the jury that, when the State has introduced evidence showing Pendry's deliberate use of a deadly weapon, he was presumed to have intended the consequence in the absence of proof to the contrary. This would entitle the jury to accept proof of the use of the deadly weapon as being proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of intent and malice unless there was proof to the contrary. A presumption cannot relieve the State of proving those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, this instruction seems to require Pendry to carry the burden of proving that he did not intend the consequences that resulted from using the deadly weapon. The instruction is therefore defective under traditional West Virginia principles of law and under the Mullaney doctrine, and if there were no other errors in the case, this instruction alone would require reversal. There is no merit in defendant's contention that the court erred in refusing to give his Instruction No. 18 with reference to insanity. The test which that instruction imposed did not accurately state the law at the time of the trial and does not accurately state the law established in State v. Grimm, supra , and State v. Myers, supra . Consequently, it was not appropriate at the time of Pendry's trial and would not be appropriate at a retrial of this case. There are other instructions which were given at Pendry's trial which were not questioned on appeal and do not form the basis for reversal. However, in view of the Mullaney decision it seems clear to us that they would be improper if given at a retrial of this case. State's Instructions Nos. B and D are constitutionally defective under the Mullaney rule in that both instructions place upon the defendant not only the burden of introducing evidence but also impose upon him a burden of persuasion. For example, State's Instruction No. B requires the defendant to introduce evidence to rebut the presumption of malice which the instruction states is presumed from the fact of killing. Although malice may be inferred from the fact of killing, the defendant cannot have the burden cast upon him to introduce evidence to rebut that presumption. Further, although malice may be inferred from the fact of killing, the jury is not required to accept it as proved beyond a reasonable doubt merely because of an inference. The jury must find that malice has been proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt in the light of all the evidence in the case. State's Instruction No. D tells the jury that all murders are presumed in law to be murder in the second degree and that, in order to elevate the offense to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof is on the State, but that, in order to reduce the offense below murder in the second degree, the burden is on the defendant. This is an instruction which has been given and accepted many times as being a correct statement of the law of West Virginia. Under the doctrine of Mullaney this instruction would not be a correct statement of the law if given at a retrial of this case and would not be approved by this Court on appeal. It is our view that the doctrine of Mullaney, insofar as it affects the burden of proof which is carried by a defendant and insofar as it affects the utilization of presumptions (more properly inferences) in instructions, should be applied to all criminal cases now in the trial or appellate process and should not otherwise be retroactive. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the then Intermediate Court of McDowell County is reversed and the verdict of the jury is set aside and a new trial is awarded to the defendant, Parker Lee Pendry. Reversed, remanded, new trial awarded. FLOWERS, J., dissented.