Opinion ID: 277859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Scope of the Duty Imposed by Strict Liability

Text: 36 The favored policy of jury trials in federal courts compels articulation of the other basis for our holding that Appellee should take nothing. Even if the jury could have properly found the mixture defective, there are additional obstacles to recovery. Specifically, the question presented is whether Appellants are responsible for the sale by the beauty shop to Appellee. What must therefore be decided is whether Mrs. Pruitt was a foreseeable user and whether the sale by the shop was foreseeable. 37 There is no 'true rule' which will prevent the prostitution of the doctrine of strict liability into a form of absolute liability under which the maker is liable for all accidents resulting from unknown causes. Indeed, whether the ambit of responsibility will be the same as it is in negligence cases is still unsettled. Courts have attempted to answer this problem by again resorting to the intended use doctrine. This doctrine is composed of two factros: The marketing scheme of the maker and foreseeability of harm. Courts have defined foreseeability as the kinds of risks which the enterprise is likely to create, Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 5th Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 19, or those risks which are inherent in the proper use of the products for the purposes for which they were intended. Spruille v. Boyle Midway, Inc., 4th Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 79. It is these normal consequences which are a cost of doing business. 38 The dual concept of appropriate use and foreseeability of harm is traceable to Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960). The court asserted that the interests of the person who could reasonably be contemplated to use the product demanded that society remove the doctrine of privity as a defense. This decision rested on the policy that it would be unjust to allow the maker to create a demand for the product by mass advertising and then evade liability with the shield of privity. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1942). 39 The scope of responsibility envisioned by Henningsen is still in conflict. The battle has been waged around the rights of the innocent bystander who is neither a consumer nor user of the products. Some courts have focused on the advertising and marketing rationales of strict liability to deny the bystander recovery. These courts reason that since the bystander is not in the distribution chain he has no reason to expect protection from harm caused by the product. To them privity has been abandoned only in the marketing sense and there must still be some nexus between the maker and the injured party besides the injury. Comment, products Liability-- Proceeding Apace, 33 Tenn.L.Rev. 341 (1966). The essential nexus is that the maker by his advertisements must have attempted to induce the injured person to purchase the product. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966). In support of this position, it has also been argued that the warranty of fitness does not extend to the public in general. Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27, 126 N.W.2d 350 (1964). However, in Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), the implied warranty was extended to cover a bystander who was hurt when the gun his brother was shooting blew up. 15 The court in Piercefield reasoned that foreseeability of harm was the test for the scope of liability. Moreover, since the warranty was implied by law, the doctrine of the best-risk-bearer also justified imposition of liability when the injury was foreseeable. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn.Sup. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965). Apparently the rationale is that the maker can know that not all of his products are perfect and in light of this expectation can foresee that people within the vicinity of expected use will be hurt if the product is defective. Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 5th Cir. 1963, 322 F.2d 267, 274; Cudmore v. Richardson-Merell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.Civ.App.-- Dallas, 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Comment, Products Liability-- Proceeding Apace, 33 Tenn.L.Rev. 341, 355 (1966). 40 The intended marketing scheme is one basis for deciding which users can be foreseen. In the instant case the uncontradicted testimony shows that these products were not marketed for use by the ordinary consumer. The bleach was sold through the Beauty Division of Helene Curtis which sells directly or through distributors only to beauty shops. The Cosmair expert also stated that the cream peroxide was sold solely to beauty shops. Mr. Thompson, the manager of the beauty shop supply house for the Terrell area, confirmed the validity of these company policies. He is the sole Helene Curtis distributor in the Terrell area and has only one competitor for the Cosmair products. The professional beautician was also uncontradicted in her testimony tnat these products were not for public sale. It is this scheme which made the professional the foreseeable user and, as stated previously, it was only to this professional that directions about proper use had to be given. Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman, 1st Cir. 1965, 340 F.2d 402, 404. 41 Appellee has confused the doctrines of adequate directions and adequate warnings. Directions tell how to use the product efficiently while warnings tell the dangers involved. Dillard & Hart, Products Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 Va.L.Rev. 145, 147 (1955). Here, the directions on both products, including the technical terms referring to the peroxides, were adequate for the professional. It is only in relation to the professional that the adequacy of directions must be judged since a manufacturer does not have to give directions for use to a consumer when he has not employed his advertising to induce this consumer to make a purchase. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 8th Cir. 1934, 73 F.2d 26; Dillard & Hart, supra, at 161. Consequently, Appellants were not required to give directions which would allow Mrs. Pruitt to use the products safely. Indeed, they could confine their products to beauty shops, and incur liability only if a consumer were injured when the solutions were applied there. Cf. Stottlemire v. Cawood, D.C. 1963, 213 F.Supp. 897. Beyond that context they could not foresee any other use, unless it were determined that they could foresee the resale by the beauty shop. Even then the only additional duty would be to give adequate warnings that the product was not for use by a non-professional beautician. 16 The decisions dealing with the foreseeability of harm to allergic users are analogous. It is clear that the maker does not have to give directions which allow the allergic person to use the product. All that is required is a warning that the product is harmful to persons having a particular allergy. Wright v. Carter Products, 2d Cir. 1957, 244 F.2d 53, 57; Crotty v. Shastenberg's New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960); Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth, Inc., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash.2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963) 42 Two decisions provide further support for holding that Appellee was not a foreseeable user. In Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862 (Sup.Ct. 1935) the manufacturer sold shells which were made solely for testing guns. The shells were sold to the plaintiff, who did not realize that the words 'Proof Load' meant that the shells had an abnormal explosive force. The court found no liability, reasoning that the manufacturer was required to foresee only that class of persons who in the usual course of business would come within the orbit of danger. It could not foresee resale of the shells by the dealers to anyone except an arms manufacturer. In Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 N.J.Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658 (1961), the plaintiff purchased from a druggist a dandruff control product which was intended to be sold only by prescription. Although the druggist assured the plaintiff that there was no danger, harm still occurred. The plaintiff contended that it was reasonably foreseeable that the product would be used on the consumer market despite the warning to the druggist. The court disagreed, holding that the warning did not run to the plaintiff since the manufacturer had not promoted his product through advertising to the public. See Stottlemire v. Cawood, D.C. 1963, 213 F.Supp. 897. 43 Harper and Kaspirowitz suggest that a warning to the beauty shop terminated the makers' responsibility for the future sale of the product. While it is certain that appropriate words of caution are a part of the obligations incurred in producing and selling commodities, Wright v. Carter Products, 2d Cir. 1957, 244 F.2d 53, the warning need only be reasonably calculated to reach and be understood by the person likely to use the product. James, Products Liability, 34 Texas L.Rev. 45 (1955). These words of caution have to be placed so as to catch the attention of the user and give a fair indication of the danger. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 4th Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 79. The only beautician who testified knew that the products were not for public sale. The double warning on both sides of the Helene Curtis container imports this fact beyong any dispute: 'FOR PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY-- NOT FOR PUBLIC SALE.' This was the only warning read by the parties before use. Both Mrs. Hendren and Dr. Majors testified that they understood the labels meant that the products were not for one unskilled in beauty applications. The Cosmair label contained the warning on the front: 'FOR PROFESSIONAL USE.' These words were sufficient, in light of the beautician's training and status as an expert, to apprise any beautician that the products were not for amateurs and thus not for resale. 17 Therefore, the resale by the beauty shop amounted to an intervening cause which severed the causal chain and insulated Appellants from liability for any subsequent harm. Mrs. Hendren's failure to take the safety precautions an expert would have taken constitutes another intervening cause. The Restatement of Torts 402A, which confines liability to products that have not been substantially altered after leaving the maker's control, supports this holding. Cf. Grey v. Hayes-Semmons Chemical Co., 5th Cir. 1962, 310 F.2d 291; Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 2d Cir., 1963, 320 F.2d 821; Comment, Products Liability-- Proceeding Apace, 33 Tenn.L.Rev. 341, 355 (1966). Surely this doctrine applies both to the product's composition and to its method of distribution. The question of intervening cause has arisen often when the distribution chain is composed of the maker, several intermediate parties, and finally the consumer. These cases uniformly hold that when one of the intermediate parties is notified of the danger and proceeds to sell the product anyway, the manufacturer is insulated from liability. 18 44 Although the foregoing considerations are sufficient to deny Appellee recovery, there are even more compelling reasons for our holding. These additional considerations grow out of the doctrine of foreseeability of harm. That doctrine is a judicial explanation of the social policies which limit liability. Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 2d Cir. 1939, 104 F.2d 183, 123 A.L.R. 933. Once fault is removed as a limitation on liability, these policy considerations should be candidly explained. Until Americans have a comprehensive scheme of social insurance, courts must resolve by a balancing process the head-on collision between the need for adequate recovery and viable enterprises. Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Calif.L.Rev. 809 (1955). This balancing task should be approached with a realization that the basic consideration involves a determination of the most just allocation of the risk of loss between the members of the marketing chain. 45 It has been argued that the manufacturer should absorb the 'typical risks' of marketing his product. Wilson, THE DIFFERENCE    YOUR (1955). Is the chance that a non-professional would use the product a typical risk? Several factors are pertinent: The nature of the ultimate transaction; the methods employed in distributing the product; and the type of activity in which the user was engaged when harm occurred. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). In the instant case the products were marketed through distributors to innumerable beauty shops all over the country. The distributor in the Terrell area was clear that the products were to be sold only to beauty shops. The warnings on the packages supported this testimony. Indeed, the advertisements used by Helene to induce the purchase by the beauty shops stated: 'YOU'LL SEE THE DIFFERENCE    YOUR PATRONS WILL FEEL THE DIFFERENCE WITH HELENE CURTIS NEW BLUE BLEACH.' In this type of market, it would be impossible to police the prohibited reselling by trade agreements. Nor can the single sale by a beauty shop in Terrell, Oklahoma be indicative of such a widespread practice in the industry that we can hold that the makers knew or should have known of the practice and should have taken additional precautionary steps. Noel, Manufacturers Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816 (1962). With only one injury since 1960, it would appear that reliance on the distributor to sell exclusively to beauty shops, the training of the beauticians, and the warnings on the package is adequate to prevent the mishandling of the products. James, Products Liability, 34 Texas L.Rev. 45, 48 (1955). 46 The type of activity in which the user was engaged when harm occurred also cuts against the makers' responsibility. There is no doubt that the primary 'assault on the citadel of privity' has been led by consumer pressure. The decisions have suggested that the maker should be responsible for harm only when a consumer who has been induced through advertising to purchase the commodity is injured. See Henningsen and Decker, supra. That factor is not present here. Indeed, it is clear that these products were not household goods and not intended for public sale. Furthermore, if the judicial opinions are in conflict on whether the public will be willing to absorb the cost of injuries to innocent bystanders, there can be no doubt that the public will be unwilling to pay higher prices for products when the injured plaintiff is an unforeseen and unauthorized user. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn.Sup. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965). This consumer's expectations would never have been frustrated if she had exercised any precaution in seeing whether this product was meant for her. Cf. Marathon, supra, 418 P.2d at 915. It is not unreasonable to demand that the user exercise minimum precaution. Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis.2d 323, 103 N.W. 64. 19 All prior cases have assumed that the consumer is incapable of finding out about the dangers. That rationale does not hold true here. See Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 5th Cir., 1946, 155 F.2d 855. In fact, Appellee simply took a cursory glance at the directions on the Helene product and did not even read the Cosmair label. When the product is a bleaching solution specifically designed for burning all the hair pigment, surely the manufacturer can expect more self-protection than that. If Appellee chose to entrust herself to the care of a friend, she cannot hold the maker liable for the friend's inadequacies. Therefore, although consumers' expectations are relevant, the expectations frustrated in this case are not the ones which have been the impetus behind the imposition of strict liability. Alternative ways existed for Mrs. Pruitt to satisfy her desire to be a blonde. Cf. Comment, Strict Products Liability and The Bystander, 64 Colum.L.Rev. 916 (1964). She could have simply gone to a qualified beautician. 47 The paramount reasons for denial of recovery in this case are the principles which have been traditionally employed to invoke the doctrine of strict liability. These policies compel our holding that the imposition of strict liability on these Appellants simply because they are the best-risk-bearers would be an undue impediment to business and an intolerable injustice. The policy that the maker has the greatest capacity to distribute the risks of loss is not such a blanket rule that it applies even though justice demands that another member of the marketing chain take the risk of loss for the injury. Confining the makers' responsibility to harm incurred by use of the products in a beauty shop is not a revival of the doctrine of privity of contract. It is simply an attempt to confine the scope of liability to the zone of danger which could reasonably have been foreseen before these products were sold. Even the decisions which give the broadest definitions of the intended-use doctrine do not go as far as Appellee urges. The decisions have expanded the doctrine of intended use to include the environment in which the product is used and the incidental and attendant consequences that accompany normal use. Spruille v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 4th Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 79; Boyl v. California Chemical Co., D.Or.1963, 221 F.Supp. 669; Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill.App.2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681, 12 A.L.R.3d 1033 (1964); Haberley v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.1958). The environment of the products in this case is a beauty shop. Their attendant use and incidental consequences do not include resale by the beauty shop, a mixture contrary to directions, and application by a novice. The risk created by this resale was neither the kind which the product was likely to create, nor inherent in proper use. Any other holding would twist the doctrine of foreseeability of harm into that degree of clairvoyance which hindsight alone can give. Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 2d Cir. 1961,296 F.2d 623; James, Products Liability, 34 Texas L.Rev. 45 (1955). Moreover, were we to bridge the gap between the present decisions and the instant situation, we could no longer say that manufacturers are not absolute insurers for all physical harm which occurs during use of the product. See Goldberg v. Killsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 442, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81, 86-87 (1963); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961). The judicial doctrine of strict liability was not created to sanction such results. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and render judgment in favor of the Appellants. 48 NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE