Opinion ID: 2223971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: Plaintiffs note that the FTC has never adopted a trade regulation rule approving the use of descriptors such as light or low tar, and that the FTC has never stated that the use of such descriptors has been substantiated by any cigarette manufacturer. Further, plaintiffs argue that PMUSA has never claimed to have any proof that its Lights are safer than regular cigarettes. These statements are true, but do not resolve the question whether the FTC has specifically authorized the use of these terms. Plaintiffs also assert that the FTC has, fairly recently and after entering into the consent orders, expressly disavowed any official definitions of the terms. See Cigarette Testing, Request for Public Comment, 62 Fed.Reg. 48,158, 48,163 (September 12, 1997) (There are no official definitions for these terms but they appear to be used by the industry to reflect ranges of FTC tar ratings). It is not clear to this court what the FTC meant by no official definitions, unless it was referring to the absence of a trade regulation rule. The FTC itself certainly uses these terms in its publications and its reports to Congress. Perhaps the FTC's published definitions of these terms in these contexts are considered by the agency to be unofficial. We conclude that the specific authorization required to trigger the exemption of section 10b(1) does not require formal rulemaking or official definitions. See Lanier, 114 Ill.2d at 12-13, 101 Ill.Dec. 852, 499 N.E.2d 440 (finding specific authorization in Federal Reserve Board staff interpretation of the applicable regulation). It is sufficient if the authorization proceeds from regulatory activity, including the resolution of an enforcement action by means of a consent order. The consent order provides express authority for the party that was the target of the enforcement action to engage in the conduct described in the consent order. In addition, a consent order entered into by the FTC with one member of a regulated industry, which is published pursuant to statute, provides implied authority for other members of the regulated industry to engage in the same conduct. It would elevate form over substance to say that the FTC specifically authorized American Brands to use such descriptors so long as certain conditions were met ( American Brands, 79 F.T.C. 255), but did not thereby specifically authorize other members of the industry to act accordingly. Thus, while the authorization given to American Brands was express, the authorization given to the rest of the industry was implied, but no less specific. The necessary degree of specificity is provided by the language of the consent orders and by the FTC's long-standing use, if not formal adoption, of the definition of low tar as meaning 15 milligrams or less of tar per cigarette. Because PMUSA was specifically authorized to use the disputed terms without fear of the FTC challenging them as deceptive or unfair, it is exempt from civil liability under 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act for the use of the terms so long as the other conditions set out in the consent orders were met. We find no evidence in the record that PMUSA failed to use these terms in compliance with the terms of the consent orders. The increased mutagenicity of the smoke delivered by Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cannot be a separate basis for a claim under the Consumer Fraud Act because, even if the terms light and lowered tar and nicotine do convey a message of safety, their use is specifically authorized by the FTC. In addition, any claim of fraud based on PMUSA's failure to disclose increased mutagenicity is barred by this court's long-standing rule against imposing additional disclosure requirements beyond those established by statute or agency regulation. Plaintiffs' claim under the Deceptive Practices Act must also fail. Section 4 of the Deceptive Practices Act exempts from liability conduct in compliance with the orders of a federal agency. 815 ILCS 510/4 (West 2000). Because we have concluded that the 1971 and 1995 consent orders provided specific authorization to all industry members to engage in the conduct permitted by the orders, these orders fall within the scope of section 4, even though PMUSA was not a party to either consent order. See also Mario's Butcher Shop & Food Center, Inc. v. Armour & Co., 574 F.Supp. 653, 655 (N.D.Ill. 1983) (noting parallel between exemption clauses of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Deceptive Practices Act). We have resolved the present case entirely on the basis of state law by construing and applying an exemption clause in a state statute. We do not address PMUSA's arguments that this action is expressly or impliedly preempted by federal law. Operation of section 10b(1) is not dependent on the intent of Congress. Rather, it is dependent on the intent of the Illinois General Assembly to allow regulated entities to engage in commercial conduct that might otherwise be alleged to be fraudulent or deceptive without risk of civil liability, so long as that content is specifically authorized by the regulatory body. Finally, we share the concerns expressed by plaintiffs and their amici about the devastating health effects of smoking and, in particular, the scourge of smoking among young people. We emphasize that because this action is barred by section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claim that PMUSA intentionally deceived the public. Our resolution of the present case is in no way an expression of approval of PMUSA's alleged conduct. Nevertheless, as justices, our role is to apply the law as it exists, not to decide how the law might be improved. We must defer to the policy of the legislature as expressed in the language of the Consumer Fraud Act. Therefore, plaintiffs and others who would seek to alter the conduct of tobacco companies must take their case to the General Assembly, where they might seek amendment of section 10b(1); to the FTC, where they might seek changes in regulations; or to Congress, where they might seek amendments to the Labeling Act. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand with instructions to dismiss pursuant to section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act. Circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded with instructions. Chief Justice THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.