Opinion ID: 867378
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Four-Points Instruction

Text: ¶ 70 Tucker argues that the trial court's four-points instruction impermissibly created a presumption of death. The instruction stated: You can reach a verdict in any of the following ways: 1. If no jurors find the defendant proved any mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence, you must return a verdict of death. 2. If some jurors find the defendant proved mitigation, the jurors who found mitigation must weigh the mitigation they found against the aggravating factors already found. The jurors who found mitigation may disagree about what mitigation exists. If all the jurors who found mitigation find the mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and all the remaining jurors continue to find no mitigation exists, you must return a verdict of death. 3. If all jurors find mitigation exists, all must weigh the mitigation they found against the aggravating factors already found. The jurors may disagree about what mitigation exists. If all the jurors find the mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, you must return a verdict of death. 4. If all jurors find mitigation exists and all find the mitigation they found is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, you must return a verdict of life imprisonment. ¶ 71 The first paragraph of the four-points instruction, Tucker contends, is flawed because it told the jurors that they must impose death if no juror found Tucker had proved any mitigation, while Baldwin recognized that the jurors may return a verdict of life in prison even if the defendant presents no mitigation evidence. 211 Ariz. at 471 ¶ 12, 123 P.3d at 665. He also argues that the first, second, and third paragraphs of the four-points instruction are incorrect because Baldwin allows jurors to vote not to impose death even in the absence of any mitigation. These arguments misapprehend Baldwin. ¶ 72 Under our statutory scheme, the defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances, see A.R.S. § 13-703(C), but the jurors are not restricted to only facts presented by the defendant in finding mitigation. This point is reflected in Baldwin's statement that a juror could consider mitigating circumstances proved by the defendant or present in the record. 211 Ariz. at 473 ¶ 18, 123 P.3d at 667. Consistent with Baldwin, the jurors were instructed that they should consider any . . . information admitted as evidence that is relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death so long as it relates to an aspect of the Defendant's character, [sic] propensities, or record and any of the circumstances of the offense. Thus, the jurors were allowed to consider all relevant evidence, and not merely evidence presented by Tucker, in determining if any mitigating circumstances existed. ¶ 73 The four-points instruction also did not create an impermissible presumption of death by instructing the jurors to impose a death sentence if none of them found mitigation sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. Section 13-703(E) provides that the trier of fact, having found one or more aggravating factors, shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact . . . determines that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Such a directive does not violate the Eighth Amendment so long as jurors are allowed to consider any mitigating evidence. See Marsh, 126 S.Ct. at 2525-26; Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). ¶ 74 Baldwin noted that § 13-703(E) allows a juror to vote to impose death only if he or she concludes that there is no mitigation sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. 211 Ariz. at 473 ¶ 21, 123 P.3d at 667. This does not imply, however, that a juror may vote for leniency even if he or she finds there is no mitigation or no mitigation sufficiently substantial to warrant a sentence of less than death. Under our sentencing scheme, a juror must vote against death if he or she individually determines there are any mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency; conversely, given the findings of one or more aggravators, a juror must vote to impose a sentence of death if he or she determines there is no mitigation at all or none sufficiently substantial to warrant a sentence of less than death. ¶ 75 Finally, we reject Tucker's contention that the four-points instruction confusingly directed the jurors to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors. Baldwin discouraged the use of instructions informing jurors that they must find that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances before they can impose a sentence other than death. Id. Such an instruction was not used here, although the four-points instruction did direct the jury to weigh mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The language used here did not constitute fundamental error. ¶ 76 We reaffirm our statement in Baldwin that jury instructions prospectively should avoid outweighing language and should clearly explain that a juror may not vote to impose the death penalty unless he or she finds, in the juror's individual opinion, that `there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.' Id. (quoting A.R.S. § 13-703(E)).