Opinion ID: 784813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of allocution

Text: 31 As Carter did not lodge an objection during sentencing, this court reviews his allocution claim only for plain error. Garcia-Meza, 315 F.3d at 685-86. 3 32 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(C) requires the court to address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence. Carter claims when the court stated it did not want to hear about the lack of evidence used to convict him, he was denied allocution. Denial of allocution is reversible error. United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 1996). A denial generally occurs when a defendant is not, personally and unambiguously, invited to address the court before sentencing, Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 305, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961), or when a court refuses to listen to the defendant's statement. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir.1997) (Rule demands that each defendant be allowed a meaningful right to express relevant mitigating information before an attentive and receptive district judge). 33 Allocution is the right to present a defendant's plea in mitigation, see Green, 365 U.S. at 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, and is not unlimited. Li, 115 F.3d at 133 ([A] defendant's right to allocution is not unlimited in terms of either time or content.); United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1025 (10th Cir.1993)([T]he judge does not have to let the defendant re-argue the case at sentencing.); United States v. Kellogg, 955 F.2d 1244, 1250 (9th Cir.1992) (Although the defendant has a right of allocution at sentencing, that right is not unlimited.). 34 Defendants may address the amount or quality of evidence adduced at trial to explain their role in an offense or the severity of their conduct, see Li, 115 F.3d at 131-35, but not merely to continue to deny guilt. See Muniz, 1 F.3d at 1024-25. Addressing the evidence to show a mitigating role is particularly apt if a plea was not entered explaining a defendant's conduct and/or mental state, or if the defendant did not testify during trial. However, as the sole contested fact in Carter's trial was whether he possessed the firearm, this is not such a case. 35 The court merely informed Carter it did not wish to hear an irrelevant sentencing argument which had already been properly made before the court during Carter's closing argument. 4 The court's ongoing interaction with Carter during allocution evidenced a substantive colloquy bearing upon the sentence. See Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d at 627. The court demonstrated attentiveness to Carter's allocution by informing him, after imposing sentence, which comments were ineffective and why, along with the court's approval of Carter's future plans. Therefore, as Carter was personally invited to address the court and then engaged in a substantive colloquy with the trial judge bearing upon his sentence, the requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(C) were fulfilled. Since the court permitted Carter to discuss any relevant matters desired in relation to his sentencing during this colloquy, Carter was not denied his right of allocution. 36 AFFIRMED.