Opinion ID: 1895530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: law i. the chancellor committed manifest error in awarding an excessive amount to be paid as child support.

Text: Doug contends that the award of $800.00 per month in child support was excessive based on his income. In the final divorce decree, the chancellor did not make any specific finding as to Doug's income. The chancellor also did not make any reference to the child support guidelines. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101 (Supp. 1992). The guidelines shall be a rebuttable presumption in all judicial or administrative proceedings regarding the awarding or modifying of child support awards in this State... . Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(1). Furthermore, the guidelines apply unless the judicial or administrative body awarding or modifying the child support award makes a written finding or specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case as determined under the criteria specified in Section 43-19-103. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(2) (emphasis added). Finally, Section 43-19-101(4) provides that: [i]n cases in which the adjusted gross income as defined in this section is more than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) or less than Five Thousand ($5,000.00), the court shall make a written finding in the record as to whether or not the application of the guidelines established in this section is reasonable. (emphasis added). Doug maintains that since the chancellor did not make specific income findings nor explain his child support award that we must assume that the chancellor used the guidelines in determining the amount of money to be awarded for child support. In Thurman v. Thurman, 559 So.2d 1014 (Miss. 1990), this Court held that a judicial award making a written or a specific finding different from the guidelines defeats the presumption and leaves, as this Court believes the Legislature intended in the normal case, child support determination in the hands of the customary chancery court proceeding. Id. at 1017. Without such a finding the presumption provided by statute is not overcome. However, in the case sub judice the child support awarded is greater than the amount the guidelines would provide. We have said, [a]n award of child support is a matter within the discretion of the chancellor and we will not reverse that determination unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his finding of fact or manifestly abused his discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So.2d 620, 622 (Miss. 1992). Furthermore, [t]he process of weighing evidence and arriving at an award of child support is essentially an exercise in fact-finding, which customarily significantly restrains this Court's review. Id. This Court set out the factors for a chancellor to consider in child support and alimony cases in Brabham v. Brabham, 226 Miss. 165, 84 So.2d 147 (1955): (1) the health of the husband and his earning capacity; (2) the health of the wife and her earning capacity; (3) the entire sources of income of both parties; (4) the reasonable needs of the wife; (5) the reasonable needs of the child; (6) the necessary living expenses of the husband; (7) the estimated amount of income taxes the respective parties must pay on their incomes; (8) the fact that the wife has the free use of the home, furnishings and automobile, and (9) such other facts and circumstances bearing on the subject that might be shown by the evidence. Id. at 176, 84 So.2d at 153. The proof in this case speaks to the health of the parties, the income of the parties and the liabilities of each, however, the court does not relate in its decree or otherwise the proof of financial ability to the award, nor does the court make findings with regard to the needs of the child, so that we are not aware of the basis of the award. The award apparently is not based upon the application of the guidelines because the award exceeds the guidelines. There is also no finding contrary to the guidelines, so that the guideline presumption is not overcome. In Bland v. Bland, 629 So.2d 582 (Miss. 1993), this Court in affirming the Chancellor's award of lump sum alimony stated in part that: [a]s the chancellor indeed made an award of lump sum alimony and did not mention on the record the lack of financial statements, it can be assumed that the requirement of such financial statements was properly excused in this case. See Pace v. Owens, 511 So.2d 489, 492 (Miss. 1987) (when no specific findings of fact, this Court assumes trial court made determinations sufficient to support its judgment). Bland, 629 So.2d at 587 (Miss. 1993). Bland is distinguishable in that it did not deal with children or child support. In the case sub judice, we must consider the effect and the resulting requirements caused by Section 43-19-101(4). We have held that the guidelines do not control per se, however, in this record there does not appear to be any reason that Doug should have to pay more than 14% of his adjusted gross income as provided by the guidelines. In determining child support, the final decree failed to show what the chancellor based his award of child support on. Child support in the amount of $800.00 per month for a child that is now six years old seems to be excessive given Doug's financial situation unless the evidentiary support is clearly present to justify the award. Further, the court made no finding as to Doug's financial ability. In the case sub judice, the chancellor made no specific finding with respect to Doug's income. For us to justify the award we would have to deal in pure speculation to undergird the chancellor's finding. This we cannot do. Based on the fact that the child support award is greater than the amount recommended by the guidelines and not supported by the record or the chancellor's findings, the child support award should be reversed and remanded. On remand, the chancellor's findings must be more specific with respect to Doug's income and expenses. If the chancellor would make more on the record findings as to why he decides an issue or fact a certain way it would greatly decrease the chances of reversal of the decision by this Court.