Opinion ID: 1472478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prison Litigation Reform Act and appellant's common law tort claims

Text: The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003) (hereinafter PLRA), provides that [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. The purpose of the PLRA is to give prison authorities notice of problems in correctional facilities and an opportunity to resolve them pursuant to established internal procedures prior to litigation in court. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Thus, the exhaustion requirement has been interpreted as applying [e]ven when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages. . . . [6] Id. at 524, 122 S.Ct. 983 (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001)). As the PLRA states, however, it applies only to claims pursuant to section 1983 or other federal law, not to state law claims. See, e.g., Lopez v. Smiley, 375 F.Supp.2d 19, 29 (D.Conn.2005) (allowing inmate to proceed on common law claim for battery while dismissing his federal claim, holding that a state law tort claim is not barred by . . . [a failure to meet] the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA). In addition to federal civil rights claims, appellant stated in his complaint the common law tort claims of negligence, assault and battery, and medical negligence. The trial court therefore erred in dismissing these claims for failure to meet the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.