Opinion ID: 877457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: due process fourteenth amendment equal protection

Text: The PSC held in its order denying a protective order on April 30, 1979 (and upheld its ruling on a motion for reconsideration) that Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company is not to be considered an individual under Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution. The commission ruling took Mountain Bell out of the exception, contained in Mont.Const., Art. II, § 9, which states that the right to know does not apply in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure. The District Court, sitting in review of the PSC order declined to follow the PSC's rationale as to whether Mountain Bell was entitled to the benefit of the exception. Instead the District Court determined that the PSC would have applied the right to know provision even-handedly, both to individuals and to corporations, and that therefore, the PSC would not have made any distinction between individuals and corporations as classes. The District Court concluded therefore that no equal protection question was presented to it by the ruling. The District Court appears to base its denial of a protective order upon the premise that it is constitutionally permissible for the state in the exercise of a lawful governmental function, to regulate utility rates, and for its citizens to know how the state regulates such rates by full access to the information before the regulators. We incline to agree with the District Court that the PSC would probably have applied equally the right to know constitutional provision and required disclosure whether it had before it an individual or a corporation. Nevertheless, we put this possible corporate classification to rest, as an unequal application of the right to know provision, by stating that the demands of individual privacy of a corporation as well as of a person might clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure, and thus come within the exception of the right to know provision. We are reinforced in this conclusion by Mont.Const., Art. II, § 10, which states: The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. Showing a compelling state interest is an equal protection test, and it comes into play if the statute or state constitution affects a fundamental right. Schilb v. Kuebel (1971), 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 484, 30 L.Ed.2d 502, 511, reh. den. 405 U.S. 948, 92 S.Ct. 930, 30 L.Ed.2d 818. Since we have determined that a trade secret is a species of private property, the right to hold that property is a fundamental right. If the PSC were to be upheld in its ruling that the 1972 Mont.Const., Art. II, § 9, covers individuals but not corporations, it would be necessary that we find a compelling state interest for such classification to avoid the implications of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We find no such compelling state interest. A corporation is a person within the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), 435 U.S. 765, 780, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1418, 55 L.Ed.2d 707, 720, reh. den. 438 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 3126, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150. Even, however, if we were to agree with the District Court that no pernicious classification by the PSC is involved in this case because of its even-handed application of the right to know provision, we cannot escape the implications of the Fourteenth Amendment under our finding that a due process violation occurred in the refusal of the protective order. The Fourteenth Amendment does far more than extend equal protection in the application of state law. It also provides that no state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... . Our state constitution also guarantees due process, 1972 Mont.Const., Art. II, § 17, and equal protection of the laws, Mont. Const., Art. II, § 4. The application by the PSC of Montana's right to know provision in this instance created a conflict of that provision with the due process and equal protection clauses of the state constitution. It is not difficult to resolve the conflict if we keep in mind the federal constitutional provisions. The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution also conflict with Montana's right to know provision as applied here by the PSC. It is appropriate that state rules respecting due process principles be in harmony with federal rules on the same subject, in the same area. Matter of M.D.Y.R. (1978), 177 Mont. 521, 532, 582 P.2d 758, 765. By holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment require us to provide protection to Mountain Bell for its trade secrets to the extent not necessary for regulation, we confirm the police power of the state to regulate utilities, we resolve the seeming internal conflict in our state constitution created by the PSC in the application of the right to know provision, and we pay due accord to the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution.