Opinion ID: 27032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Statutory Authority or Case Law Authority

Text: 16 The district court provides no federal statutory authority for appointing an independent counsel to present mitigation evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case. Instead, the district court relied upon civil cases in which federal courts permitted amicus curiae to assist in the proceedings. We closely scrutinized the amicus curiae cases. None are remotely analogous to the situation in the instant case. Therefore, we deem these cases to be of limited precedential value. 17 In the reverse but analogous scenario, the federal courts have also addressed whether district judges have the power to appoint special prosecutors when the government elects not to prosecute. In Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C.Cir. 1984), the D.C. Circuit considered whether a district court had the authority to order the Attorney General of the United States to conduct a preliminary investigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592 of the Ethics in Government Act. The only purpose of the preliminary investigation was to enable a report to be made to the court concerning the need or lack thereof for the appointment of an independent counsel. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court order which started the special prosecutor appointment process. Id. 18 In the Matter of An Application for Appointment of Independent Counsel, 596 F.Supp. 1465 (E.D.N.Y.1984), the district court determined that it had no authority to appoint independent counsel to prosecute a government informer for giving false evidence and false statements. In Application, the Department of Justice had declined to indict the government informer. The applicants, however, argued that the court had the inherent power to appoint a special prosecutor. Judge Glasser rejected this contention for several reasons. 19 First, Judge Glasser noted that the judges in the Watergate cases of O'Brien v. The Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President, et al., Civ. No. 1233-72 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1972) and United States v. Liddy, Crim. No. 1827-72 (D.D.C. November 21, 1972) found no basis for the judicial appointment of special prosecutors. Id. at 1469. Second, he determined that no federal statute provided for judicial appointment of a special prosecutor or independent counsel under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 1470. Third, he expounded upon the separation of powers problems that would arise from judicial appointment of special prosecutors. 2 Id. at 1470-71. 20 In this Circuit, we have not specifically addressed the judiciary's alleged inherent power to appoint special prosecutors. 3 However, in United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700 (1965) (per curiam), we held that a district court lacked the power to require the United States Attorney to sign indictments, and thereby dispelled the notion that the district court had the power to compel the executive branch to initiate prosecution. 4 21 We grounded the Cox holding on separation of powers concerns. Id. at 171 (It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.). In our view, allowing federal judges to appoint special prosecutors when the government elects not to prosecute would contravene the Cox holding. Therefore, we find it highly unlikely that this Circuit would allow such appointments. 22 As we have previously stated, the special prosecutor cases are not directly analogous to the instant case, but they remain instructive. In both instances, the district court judge based the decision to appoint a special prosecutor or independent counsel on an alleged inherent judicial power, not statutory authority. There is little distinction between special prosecutors and special (independent) counsel appointed to present evidence calculated to aid the defense. Therefore, the exacting appellate scrutiny applied to judicial appointment of special prosecutors must also be applied to the instant case. 23 The judiciary's alleged inherent power to appoint special prosecutors clashes with Article II, section 3 of the United States Constitution. 5 Similarly, the district court's alleged inherent authority to appoint independent counsel clashes with the petitioner's Sixth Amendment Faretta rights. In both situations, the Constitution prevails over any inherent judicial power argument. 24