Opinion ID: 2192210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the Maryland Evidence as Direct Proof of Theft by False Pretense and Racketeering in Delaware

Text: To prove that Kendall had engaged in Theft by False Pretense and Racketeering in Delaware, the State filed a motion in limine to introduce the evidence of Kendall's misconduct in Maryland. Over Kendall's objection, the Superior Court held that the Maryland evidence was relevant and admitted the evidence. This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's decision to admit evidence of prior misconduct. [1] Kendall argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in ruling that the Maryland evidence was admissible to prove the Delaware offenses. He contends that the Maryland evidence was not relevant to prove any material element of the offenses in Delaware and that the prejudice of the evidence far outweighed any possible probative value. Rather, Kendall argues, the focus of the inquiry should have been on his intent at the time he dealt with his Delaware customers. We disagree. Kendall's misrepresentations to the Delaware homebuyers were belied by the truth of his past. Kendall's conduct with the Delaware homebuyers followed the precise pattern he had used to victimize homebuyers and others in Maryland during the 1980s. As he did in Delaware, in Maryland Kendall would obtain money, start construction, build incomplete and defective structures, abandon the projects, and declare bankruptcy, thereby providing him with a clean slate. Moreover, Kendall affirmatively concealed his misconduct in Maryland by changing his name and Social Security number when he moved to Delaware. The Superior Court properly admitted the Maryland evidence as direct proof of Theft by False Pretense because Kendall intentionally created a false impression as to his past conduct in order to affect adversely his victims' judgment of their dealings with him. [2] The State proved not only that Kendall failed to disclose his sordid past to the Delaware homebuyers, but also that he affirmatively misrepresented his business history. At trial, the jury heard the testimony of an expert custom homebuilder who stated, with regard to marketing new homebuilding, that [t]he company's track record is probably, more than anything else, paramount to identifying yourself in the eyes of a buyer that you're dealing with as your ability to do the job. When he solicited the homebuyers' business, Kendall was aware of the importance of reputation and he knew that he had a poor record as a homebuilder. Nevertheless, he deliberately concealed his past and made affirmative misrepresentations so as to secure contracts for seven sets of Delaware homebuyers. Kendall's false statements and omissions induced the homebuyers to part with their money and to entrust the building of their homes to Kendall. Under D.R.E. 402, Kendall's misstatements and omissions were relevant and material. [3] Indeed, the homebuyers and other victims testified that they would not have contracted with Kendall, nor paid him money, had they known of his previous misconduct in Maryland. [4] Thus, evidence of the Maryland misconduct was directly relevant and properly admitted into evidence as direct proof of an element of Theft by False Pretense. The Superior Court properly admitted the Maryland evidence as direct proof of Kendall's pattern of Racketeering under 11 Del.C. §§ 1501-1511. Section 1503 of Title 11 makes it unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity .... [5] A pattern of racketeering may be established by 2 or more incidents of conduct ... [t]hat... constitute racketeering activity.... [6] In order to show a pattern of racketeering, the State must prove that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. [7] The State may establish the threat of continued criminal activity by showing that the predicate acts themselves involve threats of long-term racketeering activity, or ... [that] the predicate acts are part of an entity's regular way of doing business. [8] In the case at bar, Kendall's misconduct in Maryland was direct proof of his pattern of racketeering because it showed that Kendall's unlawful activities in Delaware were part of his regular way of doing business. [9] That is, dating back to 1982, Kendall repeatedly obtained monies from homebuyers on the premise that he would construct a quality custom home only later to abandon the project defective and unfinished. Therefore, because he had created a scheme of improper business dealings, the Maryland evidence was admissible as direct proof of a pattern of racketeering. [10]