Opinion ID: 173774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Remand Order

Text: After determining that Fernandes had established past persecution, the BIA remanded the record to the IJ to allow the DHS an opportunity to establish that since the time the persecution occurred conditions in the respondent's country have changed[.] The order instructed that the record be remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. Fernandes claims that the IJ's consideration of the motion to reopen on remand was improper because the remand order clearly and expressly required that the proceedings resulting from the order should be consistent with the BIA' [sic] opinion and that [r]e-assessing once again [Fernandes's] credibility was not consistent with the BIA's order to allow DHS to rebut the presumption of future harm. We disagree. In Matter of Patel, the BIA established the standard for the scope of remand orders, holding that: unless the Board qualifies or limits the remand for a specific purpose, the remand is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all matters which the Service officer deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations. 16 I. & N. Dec. 600, 601 (BIA 1978); see also Matter of MD, 24 I. & N. Dec. 138, 141 (2007) ([W]e have historically treated a remand as effective for consideration of all matters unless it is specifically limited to a stated purpose.); see also id. at 142 (In other words, the [IJ] has authority to consider new evidence [on remand] if it would support a motion to reopen the proceedings.). Here, the BIA remanded to allow the government to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. However, as the Board noted in its subsequent decision, the remand order did not limit or qualify the IJ's ability to consider new evidence or motions. It simply directed the IJ to conduct further proceedings consistent with the Board's opinion. In Matter of MD, the Board remanded with directions for the IJ to conduct background checks. Although the purpose of the remand was to determine whether the requisite background checks had been completed, the scope of the remand was not restricted and did not prohibit the IJ from considering new evidence. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 141. In fact, in Matter of MD, the BIA held that the IJ erred in declining to consider the new evidence. Id. at 141-42. The Third Circuit has articulated a similar rule, holding that an IJ's jurisdiction is only narrowed when the Board expressly retains jurisdiction and qualifies or limits the remand to a specific purpose. See Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 701-03 (3d Cir.2002) (remand for consideration of a CAT claim did not limit the IJ's jurisdiction to consider other forms of relief). As a matter of first impression in our circuit we agree with the reasoning of the Third Circuit, and hold that the IJ's jurisdiction on remand from the BIA is limited only when the BIA expressly retains jurisdiction and qualifies or limits the scope of the remand to a specific purpose. An articulated purpose for the remand, without any express limit on scope, is not sufficient to limit the remand such that it forecloses consideration of other new claims or motions that the IJ deems appropriate or that are presented in accordance with relevant regulations. The BIA is free to impose a different rule, but in the absence of such a rule we will construe a BIA remand to an IJ in the manner just described. In this case, the BIA did not retain jurisdiction and did not expressly limit the scope of the remand. Accordingly, we affirm the BIA's holding that the IJ properly considered the motion to reopen on remand.