Opinion ID: 1138364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the court erred in giving court's jury instruction number c-3 and plaintiffs' jury instruction number p-1.

Text: Peoples Bank argues that the trial judge erred when he gave Court's Instruction C-3, a negligence instruction, to the jury. Likewise, Peoples Bank argues that Cermack failed to prove the elements of negligence at trial and therefore, C-3 and P-1 should not have been given to the jury. Finally, Peoples Bank argues that C-3 was an abstract instruction and should not have been given. There are four elements necessary to prove a claim of negligence: (1) Peoples Bank had a duty, or obligation, recognized by law, requiring Peoples Bank to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks. (2) A breach of the duty, a failure on Peoples Bank's part to conform to the standard required. (3) A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury. (4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another. Carpenter v. Nobile, 620 So.2d 961, 964 (Miss. 1993). Peoples Bank points to the fact that Cermack failed at trial to put on any evidence to establish that under the facts of this case that Peoples Bank owed Cermack a duty not to accelerate the note. Likewise, Peoples Bank argues, Cermack failed to establish that Peoples Bank breached its duty to him. We agree. Only when the first two items are shown is it possible to proceed to a consideration of proximate cause since a duty and breach of that duty are essential to a finding of negligence under the traditional and accepted formula. May v. V.F.W. Post No. 2539, 577 So.2d 372 (Miss. 1991). In the case at bar, the facts do not support a finding of negligence. Because Cermack failed at trial to support his negligence argument with credible evidence, we hold that the trial judge erred when he gave Jury Instruction C-3. Splain v. Hines, 609 So.2d 1234, 1239 (Miss. 1992). Peoples Bank also argues that the trial judge erred in giving C-3 because, even when read with all of the other instructions, the jury was only given an abstract definition of negligence. We agree. We have stated the following when confronted by an abstract jury instruction: Instructions should be tied to the specific facts of the case and when given merely in the abstract, may be grounds for error. T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 952 (Miss. 1992). Instruction C-3 given in this case reads as follows: The court instructs the jury that the word negligence means the doing of something which a reasonably prudent person would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would have done under like or similar circumstances. Likewise, Instruction P-1, also given in this case, reads in relevant part: ... . If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Container Engineering Corporation and Jerry Cermack have sustained actual damages as a proximate result of the negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith, or breach of contract, then the Container Engineering Corporation and Jerry Cermack are entitled to a verdict in an amount which will reasonably compensate them for their losses sustained. Such damages are called compensatory or actual damages and are awarded for the purpose of making the Plaintiffs whole again insofar as a money verdict can accomplish that purpose. ... . The trial judge erred when he gave the preceding instructions. These instructions did not inform the jury what actions or facts would constitute negligence on the part of the appellant and allowed the jury to determine questions of law as well as questions of fact. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 723, 150 So.2d 169, 171 (1963). Because the record did not support a negligence instruction and because the jury was given deficient instructions as to negligence, we find the trial judge committed reversible error when he gave Jury Instructions P-1 and C-3. Draughn v. Lewis, 248 Miss. 834, 841, 161 So.2d 626 (1964).