Opinion ID: 453004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the sandstrom error harmless?

Text: 19 The state maintains that even if the malice instruction was impermissibly burden-shifting under Sandstrom, this error was harmless. The Supreme Court has expressly left open the question whether a Sandstrom error can ever be harmless. Franklin, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1977. However, our en banc court in Davis recently reaffirmed for this circuit that a Sandstrom error, like most other errors of constitutional magnitude, can be held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v. Kemp, 752 F.2d at 1520-21; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 902 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc). Davis identified two situations where a harmless error analysis is appropriate: (1) where the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming; and (2) where the instruction concerned an element of the crime which was not in issue at trial. 8 Davis, 752 F.2d at 1521. 20 In this case, the evidence did create an issue with respect to malice; thus, we focus on the first situation. Davis clarified the fact that this first prong should properly focus on whether the evidence of intent, rather than the more inclusive issue of guilt, is overwhelming. The evidence adduced at Davis' trial overwhelmingly indicated that whoever killed the victim did so with intent and malice. Davis, 752 F.2d at 1521. Although the evidence that Davis was the killer may not have been overwhelming, in light of Davis' testimony to the contrary, the court stated succinctly that the appropriate inquiry was whether the evidence of intent was overwhelming, not whether there was overwhelming evidence that Davis was the guilty killer: 9 21 Although some opinions talk in terms of overwhelming evidence of guilt, (which will obviously always include the necessity of overwhelming evidence of intent), the analysis in the text makes it clear that the crucial inquiry relates to whether or not there is overwhelming evidence of intent. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 86 [103 S.Ct. 969 at 977, 74 L.Ed.2d 823] (Blackmun, J.) and at 90, 96, 97, 99, 101 [103 S.Ct. at 979, 982, 983, 984, 985] (Powell, J.). The jury in this case concluded that Davis was the killer, and that conclusion could not have been affected by the erroneous instruction. Thus, overwhelming evidence that Davis was the killer is not required. 22 Davis, 752 F.2d at 1521 n. 10 (emphasis in original); accord, Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (--- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1977: affirming this court's conclusion that the evidence of intent was far from overwhelming ...). 23 Davis also emphasized that the nature of the defense at trial is an important factor in assessing whether there is overwhelming evidence of intent. In Davis, the thrust of the defense was Davis' non-involvement in the killing, and the defense made no effort to rebut the overwhelming evidence that whoever killed the victim did so with intent and malice. While intent remained at issue in the sense that it was not conceded and the burden of proof remained on the state, the Davis court expressly considered as important the fact that the defense did not contest the issue of intent, thus leaving unrebutted the overwhelming evidence that the killing was intentional. 10 24 The foregoing discussion of Davis stands in contrast to the trial in this case. Brooks presented what can best be termed a hybrid defense. His lawyer, like most thorough and competent defense lawyers, cross-examined most of the state's many witnesses in an attempt to undermine their credibility, recall and perception of events. Unquestionably, the major objective of the defense was to cast blame on another man who was arrested shortly after the crimes as a material witness and who testified for the state at trial. Brooks' theory in this regard was that the failure of some witnesses to positively identify Brooks, and those witnesses' inclinations to identify the other man, 11 tended to exonerate Brooks. Brooks also attempted to show that the shirt found at the scene of the crimes would have fit the other man, a man allegedly much larger than himself. It is true that the thrust of defense counsel's closing argument, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, was that a reasonable doubt as to Brooks' guilt had been raised by reference to the evidence concerning the other man. 25 However, unlike the situation in Davis, Brooks' intent to kill was clearly put in issue at trial. The state relied heavily on a confession which Brooks gave to the police in which he admitted kidnapping, raping, robbing, and killing Carol Galloway. In fact, the only evidence adduced at trial concerning the fact of the killing itself was derived from Brooks' confession. In the confession, Brooks stated that after he raped the victim, he pointed his pistol at her to keep her from screaming and the pistol went off. Brooks never conceded that he intended to kill and he pled not guilty to the charge of malice murder. Indeed, the prosecutor in his closing argument explicitly referred to the accident defense, urging the jury to disbelieve it: 26 Now, one other thing [the judge] is going to charge you on, in [Brooks'] statement ..., he says that she was saying let me go, and screaming, and he took his gun out and pointed it at her, tried to make her hush, you will recall that, and that he pulled the hammer back, and the gun went off. He doesn't say it was an accident, but he leaves that implication. And, the Court is going to charge you on accident. We say to you when you are in that kind of situation, and you've got your finger on the trigger and you point the gun at somebody, you pull the hammer back, it ain't no accident. 12 27 Significantly, the trial court did charge the jury on accident. Finally, in briefing this case before the panel, the state acknowledged that Brooks' defense to the malice murder charge was one of accident. The state argued that the facts and circumstances of the case properly led the jury to the conclusion that Brooks had acted intentionally, but recognized that if the jury chose to believe Brooks' version it would have exonerated him of the charge of malice murder. 28 Acknowledging, as we must, that the accident issue was squarely before the jury and that Brooks' statement indicating that the gun went off unintentionally, if believed, would have exonerated him of the charge of malice murder, we review the case to see if the Sandstrom error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts adduced at trial tended to show that Brooks abducted Carol Jeannine Galloway from her home and drove away with her in an automobile. In a statement to police, Brooks confessed, as indicated above, that he had kidnapped, raped, robbed, and killed Galloway. The statement strongly implied, however, that the killing was accidental. He pointed the gun at Galloway, he stated, to scare her into being quiet because she had begun to scream after the rape. Brooks said that at that point the gun simply went off and killed Galloway. The evidence indicates that Galloway died of one gunshot to the neck. Brooks did admit in his statement to the police that after Galloway fell to the ground he got scared and fled the scene of the crimes. 29 In support of his argument that the Sandstrom error was not harmless, Brooks cites the case of Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d 1206, 1208-12 (11th Cir.1983), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). In Franklin, the defendant admitted that he fired the gun which killed the victim. The defendant arrived at the victim's home, with a woman he had kidnapped, and demanded the keys to the victim's car at the threshold of the victim's home. After the demand, the victim proceeded to slam the door in the defendant's face at which time, the defendant testified, the gun simply went off, accidentally killing the victim. The evidence showed that the bullet travelled through the door before killing the victim. The defendant then fired a second shot into the ceiling. The court held that the Sandstrom error could not be considered harmless: 30 [The defendant's] only defense was that he did not have the requisite intent to kill. The facts did not overwhelmingly preclude that defense. The coincidence of a first shot with the slamming of the door, the second shot's failure to hit anyone, or take a path on which it would have hit anyone, and the lack of injury to anyone else all supported the lack of intent defense. A presumption that Franklin intended to kill completely eliminated his defense of no intent. Because intent was plainly at issue in this case, and was not overwhelmingly proved by the evidence ..., we cannot find this error to be harmless. 31 Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d at 1212. 13 The Supreme Court, without deciding the question whether a Sandstrom error can ever be harmless, has recently affirmed the decision in Franklin, by explicitly relying on our court's conclusion that the evidence of intent was far from overwhelming .... Francis v. Franklin, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1977. 32 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), sets out the standard by which most constitutional errors should be considered harmless. Under Chapman, a criminal conviction must be reversed if the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. In applying Chapman, we must look at the constitutional error involved. The instruction as to malice stated that [t]he law ... presumes every homicide to be malicious until the contrary appears from the circumstances of alleviation, excuse or justification .... (Emphasis added). Thus, the jury was instructed that it was required by law to presume that Brooks acted maliciously because a bullet from the gun he was holding caused the death of Carol Galloway. Brooks was thus forced into the position of having to disprove malice, an essential element of malice murder under Georgia law. This the state may not do. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (state has burden of proving every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt). Moreover, the burden of proof was placed upon Brooks on what was in fact the essential element in Brooks' case, since the evidence of Brooks' participation in the kidnapping, robbery, rape, and even the killing was otherwise overwhelming. Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780, 794 (11th Cir.1983), vacated for rehearing en banc, 728 F.2d 1358 (1984). As reflected by Brooks' statement to the police, it was the only issue, in practical effect, subject to dispute with respect to the malice murder charge. 33 Of course, the jury was free to discredit Brooks' statement as to the accidental nature of the killing. Because of the erroneous charge, however, we cannot determine whether the jury disbelieved Brooks, or whether it merely applied the erroneous presumption that every homicide is malicious. Brooks' statement was the only direct evidence as to whether the killing was accidental or malicious. The jury could reasonably have inferred that the killing was malicious from the evidence that Brooks kidnapped, robbed, and raped Galloway and from the evidence that he threatened her with a gun to stop her from screaming. However, it is of course possible to kidnap, rob, rape and even threaten without intending to kill. 14 We must insure that the jury's role is not impaired and rendered conviction-prone by an unconstitutional burden-shifting instruction. Considering all the facts and circumstances, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the [Sandstrom ] error complained of did not contribute to the [murder] verdict obtained. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. 34 Accordingly, the district court erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus with respect to the malice murder conviction only. 35 SECTION TWO: PROSECUTORIAL ARGUMENT AT SENTENCING PHASE