Opinion ID: 393167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: availability of alternative means of communication

Text: 46 As further support for its decision in this case the NLRB notes that Helton had ready access to other, equally effective, means of distributi(ng) PROD material. 69 It suggests that Helton could have posted the material on the sick fund board, or simply left stacks of literature in the breakroom. This argument lacks merit. 47 In the first place, it is not clear that Helton actually did have access to equally effective alternatives. He was not permitted to use the locked company board. Items posted on the sick fund board, which is no longer available, might not have had the same impact as items posted on the union board. Leaving stacks of literature in the breakroom would have been an inadequate substitute because company custodians would have removed the literature whenever they cleaned up. 70 Moreover, there is no assurance that the union itself would not have removed such material. In any event, this approach would have been relatively expensive. 48 More important, the existence of alternatives is irrelevant. It is well established that the availability of other channels of communication does not justify employer restraint of employees' Section 7 rights in nonwork areas at nonwork times. In NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 94 S.Ct. 1099, 39 L.Ed.2d 358 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that unless the employer could show that productivity or discipline required restraint of Section 7 rights, it would not be appropriate to balance the availability of alternative channels of communication against a legitimate employer business justification for barring or limiting in-plant communications. Id. at 326-327, 94 S.Ct. at 1102-1103. See also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570-576, 98 S.Ct. 2505, 2514-2517, 57 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113, 76 S.Ct. 679, 685, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945). 71 We see no reason why a different rule should apply here, where union conduct is at issue. 72 The simple fact that the union has attempted to restrain an employee in the exercise of his Section 7 rights is enough to justify a finding of a Section 8(b)(1)(A) violation. 73