Opinion ID: 2521574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Standard for Admission of Expert Opinion

Text: [¶ 16] A qualified expert witness may testify about scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge if such testimony will help the jury understand the case. W.R.E. 702. When determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the district court's gatekeeping function requires it to determine whether the methodology or technique used by the expert to reach his conclusions is reliable and, if so, the court must then determine whether the proposed testimony fits the facts of the particular case. Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Wyo.1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). [¶ 17] Daubert provided a non-exclusive list of four criteria to be used to guide the trial court's assessment of reliability: 1) whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested; 2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) its known or potential rate of error along with the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and 4) the degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Bunting, 984 P.2d at 472. Because these criteria cannot be applied in every case, [t]he initial step in reviewing the admissibility of expert testimony is the determination whether the Daubert factors apply to the specific testimony at issue. Where they are reasonable measures of reliability, these factors should be considered. Id. at 475. [¶ 18] It cannot be overemphasized that methodology should be distinguished from the conclusion of the expert. A trial judge need not and should not determine the scientific validity of the conclusions offered by an expert witness. Rather, to decide admissibility, the trial judge should only consider the soundness of the general scientific principles or reasoning on which the expert relies and the propriety of the methodology applying those principles to the specific facts of the case. Id. at 472-73. [¶ 19] In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the United States Supreme Court further clarified the scope of Daubert and discussed additional factors that may be used by a trial court in fulfilling its gatekeeping function. Bunting, 984 P.2d at 471. Bunting then considered specific factors, including: 1) The experience and specialized expertise of the proffered expert; 2) Whether or not that expert is testifying about matters occurring naturally and directly out of research conducted independent of litigation; and 3) Any non-judicial utilization of the expert methodology in question. Id. at 472 (citing Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C.Cir.1996); Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9 Cir.) (on remand), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869, 116 S.Ct. 189, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995); and In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742 n. 8 (3d Cir.1994)). [¶ 20] The United States Supreme Court favored admission of evidence on the borderline. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional, and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. At the same time, the Court recognized the significant difference between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Id. at 596-97, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. Scientific inquiry must necessarily be broad and far-reaching, with the reliability of theories under continuous study and revision. Resolution of a legal dispute, on the other hand, involves binding, final judgments that cannot be based on conjecture. Consequently, there may well be authentic insights and innovations of science that are nonetheless inadmissible in a court of law. Id. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2798-99. [¶ 21] We review de novo the question whether the district court performed its gatekeeper role and applied the proper legal standard in admitting or excluding an expert's testimony. We then review for an abuse of discretion a district court's decision to admit or reject expert testimony. Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24, 29 (Wyo. 2000); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 438-39 (Wyo.1993); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo.1993). We agree with Kumho Tire Co. that the trial court's broad discretion applies both in deciding how to assess an expert's reliability, including what procedures to use in making that assessment, as well as in making the ultimate determination of reliability. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176. Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court's ruling unless it has failed to exercise sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances or has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).