Opinion ID: 168966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fair M arket Value

Text: In Oklahoma, “the measure of damages for the permanent injury to real property is the difference between the fair market value of the real property immediately prior to the injury, and the fair market value thereof immediately after such injury.” Stekoll v. Prevett, 359 P.2d 579, 580-81 (O kla. 1961); see also Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847, 849 (Okla. 1994). Farrell Cooper contends that “[t]here w as no evidence of fair market value, and therefore, there was no competent evidence on which to base any kind of damage award.” A plt. -6- Br. at 15. But M r. M cDonald testified that the $80,000 and $90,000 “property values” set by the insurance agent on the two poultry houses were “a fair deal,” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 294, and that if he had thought the values were different, he would have sought different insurance coverage, id. at 296. M r. M cDonald further testified that those values applied up until Farrell Cooper’s blasting, id., and that afterward, the poultry houses were leaning so badly that they were not safe to enter, id. at 363. There was also testimony by M r. M cDonald that he had offered to sell the entire farm before blasting for $695,000, a figure suggested by a real estate appraiser. Id. at 366. W e conclude that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that the poultry houses’ fair market value before blasting was $170,000, and that afterw ard their value was zero. See H.D. Youngman Contractor, Inc. v. Girdner, 262 P.2d 693, 696 (Okla. 1953) (“It is generally recognized that the opinion testimony of the owner of property, because of his relationship as owner, is competent and admissible on the question of the value of such property, regardless of his knowledge of property values.”). That M r. M cDonald may have expressed uncertainty when cross-examined in terms of “replacement cost” value and “fair market value,” Aplt. Br. at 9, 1 is not enough for us to discard the jury’s verdict, as we do not weigh evidence when reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d at 1 Farrell Cooper’s appendix omits the transcript pages cited in support of its uncertainty argument. -7- 1160. Indeed, this rule has particular relevance here, as we have no way of resolving the conflict between Farrell Cooper’s cross-examination of M r. M cDonald, which purportedly elicited $170,000 as the cost to “replace[ ]” the poultry houses, and Farrell Cooper’s stipulation that the cost to “rebuild” the poultry houses exceeded $275,000. In short, “[i]t was within the jury’s province to determine the value of the [poultry houses].” Cleveland v. Dyn-A-M ite Pest Control, Inc., 57 P.3d 119, 130 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).