Opinion ID: 2321756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Castillo

Text: Petitioner contends that Castillo participated knowingly, voluntarily, and with common criminal intent in the murders. Petitioner bases that contention, first, on Castillo's testimony that he got into Salmeron's car knowing of the plan to disappear the victims. Petitioner also directs our attention to Castillo's testimony that I went right over there to the bottom of the step, and they tell [sic] me to look out so that no cars coming [sic], and [w]hen there was a car coming and everything, they were, like, everything done [sic], and we just get [sic] into the car and left from that place. Petitioner views this testimony as establishing as a matter of law that Castillo admitted his participation in the murders as a lookout and, consequently, an accomplice. The State concedes that Castillo's testimony was sufficient to generate a question for the jury as to whether he was an accomplice to the murders. The State, though, takes issue with Petitioner's claim that the evidence was so clear and unequivocal as to warrant a finding that Castillo was an accomplice as a matter of law. The State highlights what it considers to be inconsistencies in Castillo's testimony regarding both his purported knowledge of the group's criminal intent as well as his actual participation as a lookout. With respect to knowledge of the murders, the State explains that there are several reasons why the question was appropriately submitted to the jury. First, Castillo repeatedly testified that, despite overhearing Garcia's conversation, he did not know the group would murder the victims. Second, when asked why he got into Salmeron's car knowing of the plan to disappear the victims, Castillo replied that he had no other way of getting home. As for the inconsistencies regarding his participation, the State points to Castillo's response when Petitioner's counsel asked if Castillo acted as a lookout: I didn't say nothing like that. According to the State, these conflicts in Castillo's testimony must be weighed and balanced by the trier of fact-in this case, the jury. To permit otherwise, the State contends, would allow the trial court to improperly assume[ ] the jury's role as fact-finder. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990). Petitioner is correct that someone serving as a lookout could be considered an accomplice to a crime. But, evidence suggesting that someone acted as a lookout, as is the case here, is a far cry from evidence that is so clear and decisive that reasonable minds could not differ in coming to the same conclusion. In re Anthony W., 388 Md. at 278, 879 A.2d at 732. This Court's reasoning in Foster is illustrative. In Foster, the petitioner appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming that the record clearly indicated that both [witnesses,] Smoot and Simms[,] were accomplices and the State presented no corroborative evidence sufficient to find him guilty. 263 Md. at 393, 283 A.2d at 413. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that Smoot knew the petitioner was angry with the victim for putting the police on his trail, but she did not participate in the murder because she was asleep in the car. Id. at 392, 283 A.2d at 412-13. With regard to Simms, who was also under indictment for the murder of the victim, the evidence indicated that, although he handed the gun to the petitioner when the petitioner asked to see it, he remained in the car during the shooting. Id. at 392, 283 A.2d at 413. Based on the evidence, this Court rejected the petitioner's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 395, 283 A.2d at 414. Explaining our decision, we stated that, from the testimony of Simms which exculpated Smoot and Smoot's testimony (which) exculpated Simms, the jury could conversely decide that either or both, were not accomplices. Therefore, the trial judge was correct in denying the [petitioner's] motion for judgment of acquittal. Id., 283 A.2d at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the State that the evidence adduced at trial regarding Castillo's knowledge and participation in the murders of the two victims, like the evidence in Foster, is open for interpretation by the jury, particularly given its inconsistencies. At one moment in his testimony, Castillo admitted that he overheard Garcia discuss the plan to disappear the two victims; at the next, Castillo denied knowledge that the group would actually harm the two men. Castillo explicitly denied that he acted as a lookout, but he also described how he stood at the bottom of the steps when the group told him to look out for cars. These inconsistencies in Castillo's testimony are precisely what precludes a finding that he was an accomplice as a matter of law. See Trovato, 36 Md.App. at 187, 373 A.2d at 81 (To say that Johnson [a State's witness] might be an accomplice... is not, however, to say that he must be an accomplice....); Williams v. State, 19 Md.App. 582, 595, 313 A.2d 700, 708 (1974) (holding that [t]he record did not establish that [the witness] was an accomplice as a matter of law because the jury could find, as [the witness] testified was the case, that he was unaware of any intent and purpose by [the defendants] to kill [the victim]); People v. Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154, 365 N.Y.S.2d 836, 325 N.E.2d 156, 159 (1975) (holding that the trial court properly left the issue of complicity to the jury because, [a]lthough one of the perpetrator's told [the witness] to act as a `lookout' and he waited for them to come back, there is no proof that he agreed to such an arrangement or did actually so act). [7] Although we agree with Petitioner that a reasonable jury may well find that Castillo participated in the murders, we also recognize that a reasonable jury may conclude otherwise. We therefore agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the trial court properly denied Petitioner's request that Castillo be deemed an accomplice as a matter of law.