Opinion ID: 150474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Merits of Plaintiffs' Claim of Unconstitutional Discrimination

Text: Having clarified the legal standard with which to evaluate plaintiffs' claim of unconstitutional discrimination in Count One, we now turn to the merits of that claim. As explained above, we will follow Buckley's example and assume for the sake of analysis that Buckley's version of exacting scrutiny applies. Thus we ask (a) whether the CEP was enacted in furtherance of a sufficiently important governmental interest and (b) whether the CEP burdens the political opportunity of a party or candidate in a way that is unfair or unnecessary. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-96, 96 S.Ct. 612. The answer to the first question whether the CEP furthers a sufficiently important governmental interestis straightforward. As Buckley held, public financing as a means of eliminating improper influence of large private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest. Id. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612. The District Court found that the CEP was enacted in furtherance of several goals, including to eliminate improper influence on elected officials. See Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 309 (explaining that the CEP was [s]purred in large part by the fall-out from the corruption scandals that culminated in the resignation of Governor Rowland and his subsequent indictment and conviction). Accordingly, the District Court held that the CEP was enacted to further a sufficiently important governmental interest. See id. at 351. We agree with that holding. The answer to the second question whether the system burdens the political opportunity of a candidate in a way that is unfair or unnecessaryis more complicated. Plaintiffs claim, primarily, that three aspects of the CEP impermissibly burden their political opportunity: (1) the CEP's single-election qualification criteria, (2) the CEP's statewide qualification criteria, and (3) the CEP's distribution formulae. We address each aspect of the CEP in turn. A. The Single-Election Qualification Criteria The District Court determined that the CEP's single-election qualification criteria, see generally Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-705, impermissibly burdened the political opportunity of minor-party candidates because the criteria ma[de] it extremely difficult for minor party candidates to become eligible for even partial public funding, Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 344. We cannot agree with that application of law to fact.