Opinion ID: 757289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construction of the Term Well in the Two Patents

Text: 13 It appears to us from the evidence presented on appeal that there are three possible constructions of the claim term well, only one of which is proper: (1) a device that allows access to groundwater (Mantech's asserted construction); (2) a structure that enables either monitoring or injecting of the groundwater (Mantech's fallback construction asserted at oral argument); and (3) a structure used for both monitoring and injecting the groundwater (Hudson's and the district court's construction). 14 The district court relied solely on the intrinsic evidence in arriving at its claim construction. CleanOX, slip op. at 26. The district court reasoned that although the term well is not defined in the claim, the specification may be used as a dictionary to explain the invention and interpret the claims. Id. at 25. The court further determined that [a]lthough nothing in the specification requires that the wells be used for both purposes, implicit in it is that the wells be used in such a fashion. Id. at 26 (second emphasis added). 15 Mantech relies on the testimony at the Markman hearing of both its independent expert witness and Hudson's independent expert witness as to the established meaning of the term well to those of ordinary skill in the art. According to Mantech, this definition is not expressly modified by anything in the specification, and the written description does not provide any specialized definition for the term well. Thus, argues Mantech, the district court was required to adopt this meaning. 16 Hudson responds, however, that a construction of well as any device that allows access to groundwater would be overly broad and would ignore contrary intrinsic evidence in violation of the tenets of Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. 17 At oral argument, Mantech all but abandoned the definition of well that would equate it with access to groundwater and maintained that a structure that could either inject or monitor satisfies the term well as used in the claims and does not contradict the written description. According to Hudson, however, if each of the wells in the claimed system cannot perform both monitoring and injecting functions, the method of the invention cannot be practiced as claimed. Thus, Hudson asserts that Mantech's fall-back argument that the wells do have to provide not only access to the groundwater, but also either monitoring or injecting, contradicts the plain meaning of the claims and the written description, and thus violates Vitronics. On the other hand, Mantech's primary argument, that the court must accept the plain meaning of the term well, implies that Vitronics requires reliance on the extrinsic evidence. 18 The main issues on appeal, therefore, are (1) whether it was legally correct claim construction methodology under Vitronics for the district court to accept the extrinsic evidence as background information, but reject it as the basis for construing the claims and construing the claims solely on the basis of the intrinsic evidence; and (2) whether, assuming the court did not violate Vitronics, the dual-function construction is correct.
19 Both Mantech and Hudson argued before the district court that the dispute over the proper meaning of the claim term well could be resolved without resorting to extrinsic evidence. See CleanOX, slip op. at 4-5 n. 3. However, each side presented the testimony of an expert witness in case the court determined that extrinsic evidence was necessary. At the conclusion of the Markman hearing, however, the court advised the parties that the expert testimony was accepted only for the purpose of background in the technical area and construed the claims at issue based solely upon the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 5. 20 Mantech asserts on appeal that the established definition of well comports fully with the patents' specifications. Therefore, according to Mantech, the district court erred in not applying the established meaning. Mantech implies that under a proper interpretation of Vitronics, the district court was obligated to rely on the extrinsic evidence here. 21 Hudson responds that the extrinsic evidence of the established meaning of the term well contradicts the meaning taught by the specifications. Hudson contends that relying on such expert testimony would require ignoring clear intrinsic evidence and improperly basing the construction instead on contrary extrinsic evidence, the expert testimony, in violation of Vitronics. Hudson asserts, therefore, that it would have been improper for the judge to rely on expert testimony for more than background in the relevant art and the patents in suit because the intrinsic evidence unambiguously reveals a different meaning of the term well. In addition, Hudson argues that because the witnesses disagreed, the extrinsic evidence on application of the established meaning to the claim term is in conflict. Further, asserts Hudson, Mantech did not establish that the term well as used in the patent was ambiguous and could not be interpreted without extrinsic evidence, another requirement of Vitronics. 22 The district court agreed with Hudson that [t]he words of the claim and the specification adequately describe the scope of the term 'well,'  as used in the patents. CleanOX, slip op. at 25. Therefore, after admitting the extrinsic evidence as background in the relevant technology, the court held that the written description and the claims were not ambiguous and that the meaning of the claim term well was clear. See id. at 26-27. The district court, therefore, correctly followed the guidance set forth in Vitronics for limiting reliance on contrary extrinsic evidence. 23 Mantech's argument, that the court should have relied on expert testimony which, we hold, contradicts the plain meaning of the specification and would result in exactly what Vitronics and prior cases cited therein forbid. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1578 ([A]s we have recently re-emphasized, extrinsic evidence in general, and expert testimony in particular, may be used only to help the court come to the proper understanding of the claims; it may not be used to vary or contradict the claim language.) (emphasis added) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1331 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996)); see also Bell and Howell Document Management Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033, 1038 (Fed.Cir.1997) (holding that when the intrinsic evidence is unambiguous, it is improper for the court to rely on extrinsic evidence for purposes of claim construction). 24 In this case, the district court was legally correct both in admitting and accepting the testimony of the parties' expert witnesses for the purpose of background in the technical area at issue, CleanOX, slip op. at 5, and then basing its claim construction solely upon intrinsic evidence. Although this information always may be admitted by the trial court to educate itself about the patent and the relevant technology, the claims and the written description remain the primary and more authoritative sources of claim construction. Thus, they always must be considered and where clear must be followed. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1331 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (holding extrinsic evidence may be used for the court's understanding of the patent); see also Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454 n. 3, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1173 n. 3. In this case, the claims and written descriptions are dispositive, for they clearly define a well more narrowly than the extrinsic evidence. Therefore, it was not legal error as Mantech proposes for the district court to refuse to rely on the expert testimony for anything more than background. 25
26 Mantech here challenges the district court's construction of the claim term well. According to Mantech, the district court improperly limited well as used in the claims to the dual-function structure disclosed in the preferred embodiment. Mantech initially asserts on appeal that the proper construction of the term well as used in the patents in suit is any device that allows access to groundwater. Mantech refers specifically to the '141 patent at column 6, lines 20-24, which states that [i]t will be appreciated that a monitoring flow can be withdrawn from the well, as can a treating or test flow be injected via the well into the groundwater which the well intersects, to show that a well as used in the patents does not have to both monitor and inject. Mantech emphasizes the use of the word can in the specification instead of must or shall to indicate that each function is possible but is not required. 27 Hudson asserts that another patent term, borehole, describes a structure by which groundwater merely is accessed, and applying that construction to well would make use of the term borehole elsewhere in the specification unnecessary and hence contrary to the expressed intent of the inventor. 28 Under proper claim construction methodology, we look first to the language of the claims. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1816, 1819 (Fed.Cir.1995). For example, step (a) of claim 1 of the '141 patent requires:(a) providing a plurality of mutually spaced wells intersecting said groundwater region; 29 '141 pat., col. 8., ll. 27-28. This limitation itself requires neither monitoring nor injecting at any of the mutually spaced wells. Step (b), however, requires: 30 (b) determining the existence of acceptable continuity and well interflow paths for said region by generating a test flow of a solution of hydrogen peroxide from one of said wells and monitoring pH changes at each other of said wells as a function of time to detect a pH drop of at least 0.2; and 8 31 Id. at col. 8, ll. 29-34 (emphasis added). The emphasized phrases indicate that one well must be used for testing, i.e., injecting the test fluid, and the rest of the wells for monitoring. Step (c) then requires: 32 (c) subsequent to detecting said pH drop, providing a treating flow of said hydrogen peroxide solution from one or more of said wells. 33 Id. at col. 8, ll. 35-37 (emphasis added). The second emphasized phrase indicates that only one well need be used for providing the treating flow, i.e., injecting the treating flow; all the wells need not inject. Indeed, all but that one well could merely monitor. Step (c), therefore, could read on several alternative systems, ones with only dual function wells, ones with only single function wells, and ones with some single function and some dual function wells. For example, in an array of four wells, well A might inject only and wells B, C, & D monitor only. First, A would inject the test fluid while the others monitored. Then, A would inject the treating fluid. Claim 1 would read literally on this system. 34 As the district court correctly determined, therefore, a method in which all of the wells both monitored and injected would be covered by this claim. Mantech, however, conceded at trial that Defendants' wells do not all perform both functions. The construction of well originally asserted by Mantech, i.e., any device that provides access to groundwater, is too broad because it would include structures that neither monitor nor inject. All the wells recited in claim 1 perform at least one such function. A structure which merely provides access, therefore, is not a well covered by claim 1. A system incorporating wells that either monitor or inject and possibly, but not necessarily, do both, however, still would be covered by claim 1 of the '141 patent and claim 1 of the '483 patent. 9 35 Finally, we must look to the written description, to determine what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term as used in the patent to mean. 10 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 983, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335. If the written description supports the definition of the term that is apparent from the claim limitation, then reading in a further limiting definition would be improper. 36 The wells are introduced in the written description as monitoring and injecting wells, '141 pat., col. 5, ll. 34-35, and, indeed, the preferred embodiment of the invention as shown in Figure 3 discloses a well that both monitors and injects. This passage is consistent with the wells as performing both monitoring and injecting; it hardly mandates, however, that each and every well used to perform the method must both inject and monitor. Later it is stated that a monitoring flow can be withdrawn from the well, as can a treating or test flow be injected via the well into the groundwater which the well intersects. Id. at col. 6, ll. 20-24. This passage indicates that the inventor expressed an intent that a well be used for either injecting or monitoring, or both. 37 Hence, although the definition of well adopted by the district court, a structure used for both monitoring and injecting the groundwater, CleanOX, slip op. at 43, may at first seem to be in accordance with the language of the specification, it is actually narrower than that intended by the inventor when the entire patent is read in light of the nature of the invention as described and claimed. The claims do not require such a narrow construction of the term well and neither does the written description. In fact, both support a broader construction. 38 The district court erred because it, in essence, incorporated from the preferred embodiment into the claims a narrow definition for the claim term well, as a structure used for both monitoring and injecting groundwater. CleanOX, slip op. at 43 (emphasis added). In the context of the written description and the claims, however, it is clear that the term well has a more inclusive meaning than that given by the district court: as used in the patents, a well is a structure connecting the surface to the groundwater that can either monitor or inject, or both, but it need not do both. 39 We thus hold that the meaning of the claim term well in the patents in suit is a structure that enables either monitoring or injecting of groundwater, or both. 11 Therefore, the methods practiced by the Defendants could indeed infringe the patents, contrary to the district court's summary judgment. We therefore vacate the district court's summary judgment of noninfringement and remand the case for further determination of infringement consistent with the correct claim construction. 12 40