Opinion ID: 2219417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of Section 172D.4(1) on the Section 335.2 Exemption.

Text: Section 172D.4(1) provides: A person who operates a feedlot shall comply with applicable zoning requirements. The applicability of a zoning requirement shall be as provided in subsection 2 of this section. A person complies with this section as a matter of law where no zoning requirement exists. This statute was enacted as 1976 Iowa Acts chapter 1121, section 4, effective November 1, 1976. The provisions of section 335.2 at issue here were first enacted in 1947. Appellants urge that because section 172D.4(1) is specific as to feedlots and was enacted after the agricultural exemption of section 335.2 it supersedes and overrides that general exemption statute. Although we find that argument to be persuasive, it does not avail the appellants of much unless the proposed hog confinement facilities in the present case meet the definition of feedlot as used in section 172D.4(1). The definition of feedlot for purposes of section 172D.4(1) is contained in section 172D.1(6). That statute defines feedlot as a lot, yard, corral or other area in which livestock are confined, primarily for purposes of feeding and growth prior to slaughter. Appellants argue that the proposed hog confinement facilities fall within the other area language of the feedlot definition. We disagree. The common dictionary definition of area is as follows: 1 a: a level or relatively level piece of unoccupied or unused ground: a clear or open space of land b: a definitely bounded piece of ground set aside for a specific use or purpose. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 115 (1993). This definition only extends to open land areas and does not include enclosed structures. The same conclusion must be drawn if the section 172D.1(6) definition is interpreted according to settled legal rules for statutory interpretation. We have recognized that, when specific words of the same nature are used in the statute followed by the use of general ones, the general terms take their meaning from the specific ones and are restricted to the same genus. DeMore v. Dieters, 334 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Iowa 1983); Fleur de Lis Motor Inns, Inc. v. Bair, 301 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Iowa 1981). The words lot, yard, and corral all refer to outdoor or open-air facilities. Thus, under the rule of interpretation last referred to, the other area language must be limited to an area of the same character. The proposed hog confinement facilities do not fall within the statutory definition of a feedlot. Consequently, nothing contained in section 172D.4(1) abrogates the exempt status of the challenged facilities under section 335.2. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the district court's declaratory judgment should be affirmed. AFFIRMED.