Opinion ID: 3050870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cocaine Sentencing Disparity

Text: [1] In recent months, both the United States Sentencing Commission and the Supreme Court criticized the 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between offenses involving crack and powder cocaine. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 8 (May 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/ cocaine2007.pdf; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 568. “[T]he crack/ powder disparity produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e., sentences for crack cocaine offenses ‘greater than necessary’ in light of the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a).” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575. Consequently, the Court held that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary.’ ” Id. Indeed, “[t]o reach an appropriate sentence, . . . disparities must be weighed against the other § 3553(a) factors and any unwarranted disparity created by the crack/powder ratio itself.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574. [2] In the instant case, Medina-Casteneda asked the district court to consider the 100-to-1 disparity when determining his sentence for offenses involving crack cocaine. The judge responded, I don’t believe it’s appropriate for the Court to specifically reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) on the basis that the Congress and the U.S. Sentencing Commission are wrong in establishing different penalties for different types of controlled substances. . . . To the extent the difference in penalties are out 536 UNITED STATES v. CASTENEDA of whack, it’s for the Congress to change them, not this trial court. These statements demonstrate that the district court did not foresee the extension of its Booker discretion that would be announced two years later by the Supreme Court in Kimbrough. Thus, the district court did not feel free to consider whether “any unwarranted disparity created by the crack/ powder ratio” produced a sentence “ ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes.” Id. at 574-75. [3] We vacate the sentence and remand to the district court to reconsider the sentence in light of the Kimbrough decision and to determine whether the disparity between crack and powder cocaine produced a sentence “greater than necessary” under § 3553(a). As noted above, this issue comes before the panel as a Petition for Rehearing. We grant the Petition for Rehearing with respect to the foregoing issue and we reproduce the relevant portions of our Memorandum Disposition issued July 18, 2007, to address the remaining arguments in this case.