Opinion ID: 1594000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Feature of the Trial

Text: Wright urges this Court to hold that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the collateral evidence to become a feature of the trial or by allowing the prejudicial effect of the collateral evidence to far outweigh its probative value. Even when inextricably intertwined, such evidence cannot become a feature of the trial. See Morrow v. State, 931 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988)). To determine whether collateral-crime evidence became a feature of the trial, we do not solely measure the number of references the prosecution made to such evidence. See Morrow, 931 So.2d at 1022-23 (citing Snowden v. State, 537 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)). However, voluminous references to a collateral crime may indicate a prohibited transgression, even if it is not the sole determining factor. See Fitzsimmons v. State, 935 So.2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (evaluating the number of witnesses who testified concerning the collateral-crime evidence or the prosecutor's references to it during closing argument to determine whether it became a feature of the trial). Wright asserts that this case is similar to those instances in which courts have held that inextricably intertwined evidence erroneously became a feature of the trial. For example, in Thomas v. State, 959 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the Second District remanded for a new trial where the evidence of drive-by shootings subsequent to the charged offense became a prejudicial feature of the trial. The defendant was involved in a war with the victim, who was a drug dealer. See id. at 427. More than a year prior to the murder, the defendant had stolen $95,000 from the victim, causing the victim to place a contract for the murder of the defendant. See id. The defendant later shot the victim in a drive-by encounter. See id. The two days following the murder involved multiple drive-by shootings between associates of the defendant and the victim, which resulted in the defendant's apprehension and the discovery of the murder weapon. See id. at 428. A distinguishing feature of Thomas is that the defendant there stipulated to killing the victim but argued the killing was in self-defense, which reduced the litigation to only the issue of the defendant's mental state at the time of the murder. See id. at 427-28. The defense agreed to the introduction of the stolen money, which explained why the murders occurred, and to limited details of the chase that led to the defendant's apprehension. See id. at 429. These admissible facts are very similar to the circumstances of Wright's case, where the Providence Road foot chase established Wright's arrest and the recovery of the murder weapon. The Second District did not deem those facts irrelevant; instead, the court reversed because the State introduced voluminous evidence of the drive-by shootings, which did not have any relevancy to the limited issues before the jury and was unnecessary to adequately describe the deed for which the defendant was being tried. See id. at 430. Thus, Thomas is clearly distinguishable from the present case because Wright's guilt remained an issue during the trial, which required the State to introduce evidence of the collateral events to connect Wright to possession of the weapons used in the murders and that he had been in the victim's car. Unlike Thomas, the volume of detailed testimony of the collateral events here did not equate to the State proceeding almost as if it had ... consolidate[d] the various charges. Id. at 430. Wright incorrectly asserts that more than half of the witnesses who testified during trial related in whole or in part to the collateral-crime evidence. Approximately fourteen of the fifty-five witnesses testified exclusively with regard to collateral crimes. Some witnesses who testified with regard to direct evidence of the murders also mentioned the collateral crimes in passing. The trial court did not consider the testimony regarding the Providence Road foot chase to be a collateral crime because mere possession of a firearm by a non-felon is not a crime, and the court did not admit testimony relating to the collateral crime for which Wright was acquitted. The testimony of the remaining witnesses was directly related to the double homicide, and one State rebuttal witness disputed Wright's testimony. Even a quantitative analysis of the number of witnesses utilized does not indicate that the inextricably intertwined collateral-crime evidence became a voluminous feature of the trial beyond its relevant scope. Another area that may reveal whether collateral crimes became a feature of the trial is the closing argument. See Fitzsimmons, 935 So.2d at 129. The State referenced the collateral crimes during its closing argument for two purposes: (1) to show that Wright possessed the firearm throughout the crime spree, and (2) to refute Wright's testimony that Samuel Pitts was in possession of the firearm during the time the murders occurred. The collateral crimes were discussed only for a few moments during the closing argument. This alone does not demonstrate that evidence of the collateral crimes became a feature of the trial. We caution the State that some of the arguments appear to have crossed the line into asserting that Wright's propensity for violence proved that he committed the murders. For instance, the State maintained that Wright doesn't have any problems shooting people. This theme was mentioned again in reference to the carjacking. [18] In Consalvo v. State, 697 So.2d 805 (Fla.1996), this Court stated that inextricably intertwined evidence may be admissible for one purpose, yet inadmissible for another purpose. See id. at 813 (citing § 90.107, Fla. Stat. (1995)); see also Parsons v. Motor Homes of Am., Inc., 465 So.2d 1285, 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Admission of material evidence does not automatically mean that such evidence may be received for any probative value that it may have on any issue before the court. The State in Consalvo improperly argued a collateral burglary as collateral-crime evidence in closing argument. The State had highlighted the similarities between the collateral burglary and the charged burglary and murder. We held that the State presented improper argument because the collateral burglary was admitted as evidence inextricably intertwined with the murder, not as collateral-crime evidence. Thus, the State's use of evidence of the collateral burglary exceeded the scope of its admission, which was to establish the entire context out of which the criminal action occurred. Here, the evidence of collateral crimes was admitted for the limited purpose of tracing the possession of the firearm and the victim's vehicle to Wright and to map a geographical nexus of the murder. Multiple statements that Wright certain[ly] doesn't have any problems shooting people lean toward an impermissible propensity-toward-violence argument. See § 90.404(2)(a) (classifying as inadmissible evidence that is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity). The State had received the benefit of each evidentiary ruling in that it was allowed to fully present its case, which included detailed testimony of the collateral crimes. However, when it cast Wright as a violent character who acts upon his desire to shoot people, the State abused this benefit by inappropriately taking it beyond the edge of propriety in contradiction of the evidence doctrine of Florida. Ultimately, in Consalvo, we determined that the prosecutor's improper comments constituted harmless error because no objection was raised to that usage throughout the trial, and the similarities between the two crimes did not become a feature of the trial. We reach the same result here. Defense counsel did not object to the State's use of the evidence during closing argument. As a general rule, failing to raise a contemporaneous objection when improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim concerning such comments for appellate review. Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 898 (Fla.2000); see also Poole v. State, 997 So.2d 382, 390 (Fla.2008). The exception to this general rule is where the unpreserved comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which this Court has defined as error that `reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty ... could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.' Brooks, 762 So.2d at 899 (quoting McDonald v. State, 743 So.2d 501, 505 (Fla.1999)). However, here it has been conceded that the prosecutor's closing argument was not so egregious as to be the basis for a challenge on appeal. In light of this concession and the lack of contemporaneous objection at the trial court level, we determine that the suspect comments during closing argument here were not properly preserved for appellate review and do not constitute fundamental error.