Opinion ID: 624415
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Supplemental Jurisdiction

Text: [T]wo things are necessary to create jurisdiction.... The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 252, 6 Wall. 247, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1867). Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). The Court of International Trade is a court created by statute. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (Oct. 10, 1980). It operates within precise and narrow jurisdictional limits and cannot exercise jurisdiction over actions not addressed by a specific jurisdictional grant. Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed.Cir.1993). The jurisdictional limits of the Court of International Trade are explicitly set forth in the Customs Courts Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1584. In particular, §§ 1581, 1582, and 1584 grant the Court of International Trade jurisdiction over specific types of claims mostly involving trade law that are asserted by or against the United States. It is undisputed that the claims against the Surety Defendants do not fall under any of these jurisdictional provisions. The remaining jurisdictional provision in the Customs Courts Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1583, confers a form of supplemental jurisdiction on the Court of International Trade, namely jurisdiction over any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party action where the claim involves imported merchandise that is the subject matter of [the original claims] or a recover[y] upon a bond or customs duties relating to such merchandise. The Court of International Trade concluded that § 1583 cannot provide jurisdiction over the claims against the Surety Defendants because Plaintiffs did not bring[] a cross-claim or counterclaim, nor are they asserting a `third party action,' which is in the nature of impleader. See Sioux Honey, 700 F.Supp.2d at 1339 n. 4. Plaintiffs do not dispute this conclusion on appeal. We agree that § 1583 does not vest the Court of International Trade with jurisdiction over the Surety Defendant claims. In sum, the Court of International Trade correctly concluded that plaintiffs' claims against the Surety Defendants do not fall within any grant of original jurisdiction to the Court of International Trade. Id. at 1339. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not argue to the contrary. See id. As noted above, however, the Court of International Trade concluded that another provision in the Customs Courts Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1585, provided it with the authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the Surety Defendant claims. See Sioux Honey, 700 F.Supp.2d at 1345. In particular, the Court of International Trade explained that § 1367's grant of supplemental jurisdiction to district courts was among the powers in law and equity conferred to the Court of International Trade under 28 U.S.C. § 1585. Id. at 1343, 1345 (concluding that § 1585 and § 1367, when construed together and according to their respective purposes as revealed in the legislative history, confer upon the Court of International Trade the statutory form of supplemental jurisdiction found in § 1367). Put simply, the Court of International Trade construed the power term in § 1585 to include the concept of supplemental jurisdiction. This conclusion, however, is flawed. As an initial matter, power and jurisdiction are separate and distinct concepts, a characterization that weighs against construing power to subsume jurisdiction. For example, we have stated that a distinction exists between a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its inherent powers, i.e., those incidental powers necessary and proper to an exercise of that jurisdiction. Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 880 F.2d 401, 402 (Fed.Cir. 1989). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the class of cases that the court is authorized to hear. Id. at 402-03. Power refers to the court's ability, when it has subject matter jurisdiction, to grant equitable and legal relief to a party. Id. Even the Court of International Trade has previously stated that § 1585 relates only to the powers of the Court to render an effective judgment once jurisdiction is established. Star Sales & Distrib. Corp. v. United States, 663 F.Supp. 1127, 1130 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). Thus, a court's power to grant relief is not synonymous with its ability to exercise jurisdiction, as these two concepts are separate and distinct. Power does not necessarily envelop the concept of jurisdiction. Further, that § 1585 does not contain a jurisdiction term is telling, especially because the Customs Courts Act does refer to jurisdiction numerous times in neighboring provisions (i.e., §§ 1581-1584). [W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress's use of the term jurisdiction in §§ 1581-1584 but not in § 1585 suggests that it did not intend for the powers term in § 1585 to incorporate the concept of supplemental jurisdiction. Moreover, reading § 1585 to provide a grant of supplemental jurisdiction would render another provision in the Customs Courts Act superfluous. As mentioned, 28 U.S.C. § 1583 confers a form of supplemental jurisdiction on the Court of International Trade, namely jurisdiction over counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party actions involving specific subject matter. Allowing § 1585 to incorporate supplemental jurisdiction would provide the Court of International Trade with all the authorities granted in § 1583, thereby rendering § 1583 meaningless. Indeed, one of the most basic interpretive canons is that `[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.' Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1566, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004)); see also Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2000) (It is a long-held tenet of statutory interpretation that one section of a law should not be interpreted so as to render another section meaningless.). The fact that the Court of International Trade's construction of the powers term in § 1585 would render § 1583 meaningless provides another justification for rejecting this construction. For the above reasons, we conclude that the powers term of 28 U.S.C. § 1585 cannot be construed to provide the Court of International Trade with authority to exercise 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against the Surety Defendants. Notably, the Court of International Trade relied heavily on legislative history in concluding that § 1585 and § 1367 combine to provide it with supplemental jurisdictional authority over the Surety Defendant claims. For example, the Court of International Trade emphasized the following language from the Customs Courts Act's House Report: Proposed Section 1585 provides that the Court of International Trade shall possess all the powers in law and equity of, or conferred by statute upon, a district court. In the past, there has been some doubt as to whether or not the Customs Court possessed this full judicial authority. It is the Committee's intent to make clear that the Customs Court's successor, the United States Court of International Trade, does possess the same plenary powers as a federal court [sic] district court. Sioux Honey, 700 F.Supp.2d at 1341 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96-1235, at 50 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3762). The Court of International Trade viewed the use of the terms full judicial authority and plenary powers as strongly counsel[ing] against a narrow reading of § 1585 under which the provision is confined in scope to remedial powers in law and equity. Id. at 1342. We disagree with the Court of International Trade's analysis of the Customs Courts Act's House Report and believe that the Report just as readily supports a conclusion that the Court of International Trade lacks authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Surety Defendant claims. As evident in the Report, a main purpose of the Customs Courts Act was to eliminate the inconsistent judicial decisions and jurisdictional conflicts resulting from district courts hearing some trade cases, and the Customs Court (the predecessor court to the Court of International Trade) hearing others. H.R.Rep. No. 96-1235, at 19-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3731. These inconsistencies and conflicts arose in part because the district courts had significantly greater remedial powers than the Customs Court. Indeed, the Customs Court's remedial powers [were] generally limited to agreeing or disagreeing with the final determination of an administrative agency. Id. at 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3733. To solve this problem, the jurisdictional provisions mentioned earlier (§§ 1581-1584 of Title 28) were drawn to defin[e] the demarcation between the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade and the federal district courts. H.R.Rep. No. 96-1235, at 30, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3741. Then, through § 1585, Congress conferred upon the Court of International Trade powers to grant relief in the cases before it that far exceeded the Customs Court's prior authority. Thus, the Report illustrates how power and jurisdiction were incorporated separately into the Customs Courts Act, with the power concept being embedded in § 1585 and the jurisdiction concept being embodied in §§ 1581-1584. For these reasons, we believe the House Report, if anything, supports the conclusion that the powers term in § 1585 does not subsume the concept of supplemental jurisdiction. Thus, we disagree with the Court of International Trade's conclusion to the contrary. Additionally, no grant of supplemental jurisdictional authority to the Court of International Trade can be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 itself. Indeed, this provision only confers jurisdiction on the district courts. Congress expressly defined district court to mean the courts constituted by chapter 5 of Title 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 451; Id. §§ 81-144 (establishing trial courts in fifty states and the District of Columbia). The Court of International Trade, however, is constituted by chapter 11 of Title 28. Therefore, the Court of International Trade is not a district court and cannot benefit from § 1367. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Title 28 repeatedly treats district courts and the Court of International Trade as separate and exclusive entities. See, e.g., id. § 451 (referring to district courts and the Court of International Trade separately in the definitions of court of the United States and judge of the United States). The Court of International Trade relied on the legislative history associated with 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to support its conclusion that it had authority to exercise statutory supplemental jurisdiction. See Sioux Honey, 700 F.Supp.2d at 1345. This legislative history states that [l]egislation ... is needed to provide the federal courts with statutory authority to hear supplemental claims. H.R.Rep. No. 101-734 (1990), at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874. As explained above, however, § 1367's grant of supplemental jurisdiction authority was clearly confined to district courts. Therefore, we decline to adopt the Court of International Trade's reasoning regarding this issue. In sum, in relying so heavily on legislative history, the Court of International Trade failed to properly consider the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and §§ 1581-1585. Nothing in these statutes, when viewed in combination or individually, provides a specific grant of supplemental jurisdictional authority to the Court of International Trade over the types of claims asserted against the Surety Defendants. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166 (Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.). For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of International Trade erred in exercising statutory jurisdiction over the Surety Defendant claims (Claims 1, 2, 3, and 6) under § 1585 and § 1367.