Opinion ID: 1942787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meaning of Paragraph 7(e)

Text: The focal point of the parties' disagreement is that language in paragraph 7(e) of the Pasquale-Sun lease which dictates certain consequences if Mrs. Pasquale, the lessor, at any time during the term or any renewal or extension thereof, wishes to accept a bona fide offer from a third party to lease the premises therein demised  for any term including a term to begin subsequent to the present demised term or any extension or renewal thereof. (Emphasis added) Fortunato's and Mrs. Pasquale insist that the emphasized phrase for any term be given its literal meaning, with the result that Mrs. Pasquale may, if T-M Oil does not elect to lease on the same terms within thirty days of notice, make the proposed lease with Fortunato's to commence immediately, notwithstanding the fact that the original lease term has not expired. The referee found that indeed paragraph 7(e) does have the meaning placed upon it by Fortunato's, the lessee hopeful, and by Mrs. Pasquale, the lessor. On this record we cannot say that the referee erred in that interpretation of the disputed lease provision. Contract language that is unambiguous must be given its plain meaning, and the question of that meaning is purely one of law. E. g., Lewiston Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 785 v. City of Lewiston, Me., 354 A.2d 154 (1976). However, when the contract language is ambiguous and that ambiguity does not disappear when examined in the context of the other provisions in the instrument, see, e. g., Sun Oil Co. v. Franklin Co., Me., 311 A.2d 269 (1973), it is proper for the factfinder to entertain extrinsic evidence casting light upon the intention of the parties with respect to the meaning of the unclear language. Cf. Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Authority, Me., 385 A.2d 189, 197-99 (1978). In the Pasquale-Sun lease, we cannot say that the disputed paragraph 7(e) is completely free of ambiguity. The phrase for any term is immediately followed by the language  including a term to begin subsequent to the present demised term or any extension or renewal thereof. (Emphasis added) That language makes the initial for any term phrase open to at least two plausible interpretations. On the one hand, the phrase beginning with including a term can be regarded as merely illustrative of the timing of those leasehold estates which may be the subject of a bona fide offer to lease. According to that interpretation, the phrase for any term would be given the broadest possible meaning and would be only illustrated, and not limited, by the phrase that follows it. On the other hand, however, the word including can be read to mean which includes, an interpretation to some degree supported by the absence of a comma between for any term and including. If read in the latter sense, the including phrase would limit the term for which a supervening lease offer could be entertained to only those terms that in length extend beyond the termination date of the original lease's term, plus any extension or renewals thereof. [8] Although we have scrutinized the remaining terms of the lease for guidance in interpreting paragraph 7(e), that inquiry has not been of material assistance. True, we can infer from the lease as an entirety that Sun made a substantial investment when it leased the Pasquales' unimproved property and constructed the service station on it. That fact to some extent militates favorably toward plaintiff's contention that Sun would have accepted a provision permitting the divestment of its leasehold at any time only on the condition that the new lease extend in length beyond the maximum remaining term of Sun's leasehold. By contrast, however, the somewhat modest rent set in the original lease supports a construction of paragraph 7(e) as a type of competitive optional acceleration clause empowering the lessor at any time during the existing term to escalate the rent upon receipt of a bona fide offer for any term . ., which latter phrase, to implement fully the acceleration scheme, must be construed in the way contended for by Fortunato's and Mrs. Pasquale. [9] In short, the inherent ambiguity in paragraph 7(e) cannot be resolved from the four corners of the lease itself. Although extrinsic evidence would clearly have been admissible on the question of the parties' intent, none saw fit to offer any such evidence. Lacking any guidance that such evidence might have provided, we see no reason in the present case not to consider our decision controlled by the familiar principle of construction requiring the wording of a written instrument, in the event of ambiguity, to be construed against the drafter of the disputed provision. See, e. g., Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.Supp. 262, 270-71 (D.Me.1977); Hills v. Gardiner Savings Institution, Me., 309 A.2d 877, 881 (1973). As we have heretofore made clear: The rule that an ambiguous contract will be construed more strongly against him who uses the words concerning which doubt arises is more than an arbitrary rule. Its purpose is to give effect to the intention of the parties. To the maker of an instrument is available language with which to adequately set forth the terms thereof. It is presumed that he will not leave undeclared that which he would claim as his right under the agreement. . . . Monk v. Morton, 139 Me. 291, 295, 30 A.2d 17, 19 (1943). The lease in the present case is a standard printed form obviously drafted by Sun. The disputed paragraph 7(e) reads exactly as printed on the form, no special deletions or additions having been made. Sun, and its successor in interest T-M Oil, are therefore bound to that construction more favorable to the lessor, Mrs. Pasquale. Thus, in the absence of any extrinsic evidence whatsoever to the contrary, the referee properly ruled that paragraph 7(e) permits Mrs. Pasquale to entertain the bona fide offer of Fortunato's, Inc., to lease the demised premises for a term of, at most, fifteen years' duration commencing June 1, 1977.