Opinion ID: 1172620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Standard of ReviewScope of Review

Text: The scope of review limits the area we may question in reviewing an agency decision. See In re Hood, 252 Kan. 689, 690, 847 P.2d 1300 (1993). The standard of review refers to the legal scale we use in weighing a claim of error. See Dillon Stores v. Lovelady, 253 Kan. 274, 275, 855 P.2d 487 (1993). Here, the district court and Court of Appeals limited their scope of review to the same evidence that was presented to the HO. Neither side takes issue with the scope of review applied. We focus on the standard of review, i.e. , the degree of deference the HO's decision should receive. The Court of Appeals opinion sets out the proper factors the HO must consider, the standard of review, and the definition of good cause applied in teacher due process hearings as follows: The three factors that should have guided the hearing officer in his decision were: (1) The burden of proof was on the school board, (2) the school board's reasons for termination had to constitute good cause, and (3) the decision had to be supported by substantial evidence. See U.S.D. No. 434 v. Hubbard, 19 Kan. App.2d 323, 326, 868 P.2d 1240, rev. denied 255 Kan. 1007 (1993). The standard of review of a due process hearing officer's decision is limited to deciding if: (1) the hearing officer's decision was within the scope of the officer's authority; (2) the hearing officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the hearing officer did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily, or capriciously. See Hubbard, 19 Kan. App.2d at 326. When a district court's decision is appealed, we review the hearing officer's decision as though the appeal has been made directly to us, and we are subject to the same limitations of review as the district court. See Butler v. U.S.D. No. 440, 244 Kan. 458. 464, 769 P.2d 651 (1989). 22 Kan. App.2d at 894-95. We agree. In exercising judicial review, we may not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the HO. U.S.D. No. 434 v. Hubbard, 19 Kan. App.2d 323, 328, 868 P.2d 1240, rev. denied 255 Kan. 1007 (1994) (citing City of Topeka v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 252 Kan. 432, 446, 845 P.2d 663 [1993]). Amicus curiae Kansas Association of School Boards (KASB) suggests that the administrative standard of review applied by the Court of Appeals may be too restrictive because the HO is not required to have any expertise on school administration. KASB argues that the broader, more de novo standard of review used in Murray v. Montrose County School Dist., 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 1995), should apply. Murray involved a student's challenge to a change of schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994). The school district decided to move the student who had cerebral palsy from his neighborhood school to a more distant school with a program for children with severe disabilities. The IDEA contains its own standard of review. Unlike the IDEA, the Act here contains no standard of review provision. However, K.S.A. 72-5443(b), which grants the right to appeal the HO's decision to the district court, references K.S.A. 60-2101 (judicial review of an administrative agency decision). In Brinson v. School District, 223 Kan. 465, 469, 576 P.2d 602 (1978) we viewed the school board as an administrative agency or tribunal. In Butler v. U.S.D. No. 440, 244 Kan. 458, 463, 769 P.2d 651 (1989), in reviewing a school board's nonrenewal decision (the board rejected the hearing committee's 2-1 recommendation for reinstatement), we applied the same administrative tribunal standard of review as in Brinson. A HO does not fit smoothly into the K.S.A. 60-2101(d) term political or taxing subdivision, or any agency thereof, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. However, under K.S.A. 72-5438(f), the Commissioner of Education maintains a list of qualified HOs to be used when a teacher requests a due process hearing. The teacher and the board of education are given input into the process of selecting the HO from the list. K.S.A. 72-5438(a)-(d). Attorneys interested in serving as HOs submit their applications to the Commissioner of Education. K.S.A. 72-5438(g). K.S.A. 72-5438(h) sets forth the statutory requirements for HOs. The legislature did not amend K.S.A. 60-2101(d) in 1991 or 1992 or provide a standard of review for the HO's decision. We reason that the legislature intended that the standard of review applied to a HO's decision remains as established by Brinson and Butler. The District, citing Gillett, 227 Kan. at 79, argues that if the Board presents substantial evidence to establish good cause, it has met its burden of proof and the HO must accept the decision to nonrenew, even if the HO would reach a different conclusion. The District misunderstands the HO's scope of authority. Gillett considered a teacher termination under the previous statutory procedure, in which the hearing committee only made a recommendation and the school board retained final authority to terminate. Under that earlier procedure, the school board functioned in a dual (and conflicting) capacity as its own advocate at the due process hearing and the reviewer of its own decision after the hearing committee made its recommendation. The board's decision was final, subject to appeal to the district court. See Kelly v. Kansas City, Kansas Community College, 231 Kan. 751, 759-60, 648 P.2d 225 (1982) (describing this dual role). The 1991 statutory amendment placing the authority to make the final good cause determination in an independent hearing committee (HO after the 1992 amendment) eliminated the conflict of interest the board faced under the earlier procedure. The statements in Gillett that the district court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the school board, pertained to the board's reviewing authority, not the board's advocacy role, under the earlier statutory procedure. The District's reliance on Gillett for the contention that the HO cannot substitute his judgment for that of the school board is misplaced. K.S.A. 72-5443 gives the HO authority to make the final good cause determination. In arguing that the HO had exceeded his statutory authority, the District advances a modified version of the constitutional argument we rejected in McMillen, 252 Kan. 451. The District contends that if the HO can decide what persons deliver educational services to Kansas students, then the District's constitutional authority to determine if teachers are performing their duties capably is being usurped. In McMillen, we rejected the argument that the 1991 amendment to the teacher due process statute (giving a hearing committee the final authority to make the good cause determination) violated the school board's mandate under Article 6, §§ 2 and 5 of the Kansas Constitution to maintain, develop, and operate the local school system. 252 Kan. at 464. The Hubbard court, applying the 1991 amendment, said: [A] due process hearing committee is the factfinder. Accordingly, a hearing committee must decide whether the reasons given by a school board in its decision to terminate or nonrenew a tenured teacher's contract constitute good cause. 19 Kan. App.2d 323, Syl. ¶ 1. The District decided not to renew Robinson and notified her of the reasons for nonrenewal. The HO was to determine whether the reasons given by the District for nonrenewal showed good cause and, if so, whether substantial evidence supported those reasons. The HO's decision that the District failed to meet its burden of proof was based on his finding that the District failed to present substantial evidence supporting the stated reasons for nonrenewal. The District argues that the HO did not conclude the basis for nonrenewal was irrational, unreasonable, arbitrary, or unrelated to the District's task of building up and maintaining an efficient school system. The District is correct; however, the HO found that the District had not sustained its burden of proof in establishing the basis for nonrenewal. The reasons for nonrenewal relied upon by the District do not lend themselves well to objective determination. The District, through Dr. Kibby and Dr. Berry, presented evidence that Robinson failed. Robinson, through her testimony and that of Eva Tucker and Debbie Parker, presented evidence that she had not. The District asserts that the HO and the District applied different standards of performance. One problem with the District's different standards argument is that it is difficult to pin down what the District's standards are and how they differ from the HO's, other than in the ultimate conclusions reached. As the HO stated, satisfactory teacher performance is what the administrator says is satisfactory. The District did not give Robinson any additional reasons for the nonrenewal, other than what was stated in the notice. Either there was substantial evidence that Robinson failed to satisfactorily plan and teach lessons and failed to provide an orderly teaching and learning climate, or there was not. The HO concluded that there was not. The evidence was conflicting. We do not agree that the HO applied different standards of teacher performance to reach his conclusion. Absent any showing that the District's and HO's standards were different, the fact that the HO considered the evidence presented at the hearing and reached a different conclusion should not, by itself, establish that the HO applied different teacher performance standards. It is for the HO, not the district or appellate courts, to weigh the evidence and make findings of fact and determine if Robinson's termination was for good cause.