Opinion ID: 1668313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was the issue of contributory negligence improperly submitted to the jury?

Text: As previously stated, the court instructed the juryover Junge's objectionson the issue of Junge's contributory negligence. The court's memorandum decision, which was incorporated into the order granting a new trial, states that, The Court also finds that there was sufficient evidence of contributory negligence to let that issue go to the Jury. Junge asks that we determine whether the court erred in this regard. According to the facts as propounded by Jerzak in his brief, Junge started to pull out onto Seventh Avenue after she saw Jerzak's truck go by the supermarket driveway. Junge was nearly out of the driveway and into the lane of traffic when she saw Jerzak's brake lights come on. Junge stopped her vehicle, and turned around to see if she could back up into the parking lot so that Jerzak's truck would not collide with her vehicle. Jerzak further notes in his brief that Junge had five or six seconds to react, but Junge was unable to do so. Jerzak continued to back up and struck Junge's vehicle. A trial court is to present only those issues to the jury by way of instruction which find support competent evidence in the record. Frey, 484 N.W.2d at 868 (citations omitted). In Frey, we further noted: `Contributory negligence is conduct for which plaintiff is responsible, amounting to a breach of duty which the law imposes upon persons to protect themselves from injury, and which, concurring and cooperating with actionable negligence for which defendant is responsible, contributes to the injury complained of as a proximate cause.' Starnes v. Stofferahn, 83 S.D. 424, 432, 160 N.W.2d 421, 426 (1968). `In the absence of knowledge to the contrary, one who is conducting himself in accordance with standards of ordinary care may assume that he is not to be exposed to harm from a breach of duty which others owe to avoid injury to him.' Rikansrud v. City of Canton, 79 S.D. 592, 607-08, 116 N.W.2d 234, 242 (1962). Frey, 484 N.W.2d at 869 (citing Williams Ins. v. Dee-Bee Contracting Co., 358 N.W.2d 231, 232 (S.D.1984)). See Howard v. Sanborn, 483 N.W.2d 796, 797 (S.D.1992). This court in a case not cited by either party has previously addressed a situation where a moving vehicle backed into a stationary vehicle. Klarenbeek v. Campbell, 299 N.W.2d 580 (S.D.1980). This is a unanimous opinion written by Justice Dunn. In Klarenbeek, the plaintiff (Klarenbeek) was stopped in the driveway of a parking lot, waiting to exit the parking lot and enter the street as traffic would permit. 299 N.W.2d at 580. The defendant (Campbell) backed out of his parking stall and collided with the stationary Klarenbeek vehicle. Id. Klarenbeek brought an action based on negligence to recover for her personal injuries. Id. at 581. After both sides had rested at trial, Klarenbeek's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability was denied. Id. On appeal, this court stated: Here, Klarenbeek's vehicle was stationary. She was waiting to enter traffic.... Her duty to maintain a lookout was fulfilled. Campbell, on the other hand, was engaged in backing his automobile; his duty to maintain an effective lookout was just beginning. Moreover, the record is totally devoid of any evidence indicating that Klarenbeek was contributorily negligent, or that her stopping ... was a proximate cause of this accident. We are cognizant of the rule that when a moving vehicle strikes a stationery [sic] object which is not out of its proper place, a prima facie case of negligence is established. [Citations omitted.] We find that the evidence in this case is so clearly onesided that reasonable minds could reach no conclusion other than that the negligence of Campbell in failing to maintain an adequate lookout was the sole proximate cause of the accident and it is equally clear that if there was any contributory negligence on the part of Klarenbeek, it had no proximate causal connection with the accident. [Citation omitted.] Therefore, we hold that the trial court should have granted Klarenbeek's motion or a directed verdict on the issue of liability and submitted to the jury only the question of damages. Klarenbeek, 299 N.W.2d at 581. We previously noted that Jerzak pled guilty to DUI charges related to this accident. He was backing his vehicle, while Junge's vehicle was stationary. Jerzak's sole contention appears to be that Junge should have reacted faster and backed out of his way so that he could continue to back up. Jerzak admitted that Junge's vehicle was not out of its proper place. Klarenbeek, 299 N.W.2d at 581. Our statute provides that one may not back his vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety. SDCL 32-30-20. As did the defendant in Klarenbeek, Jerzak had a continuous duty to maintain an effective lookout as he backed his vehicle. 299 N.W.2d at 581. Jerzak failed in that duty. Junge could not reasonably anticipate that an impaired driver would back into her as she exited the supermarket parking lot. Thus, based on the facts and circumstances as presented in this case, we hold that it was improper to submit the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. Assuming that the facts are essentially the same on retrial, the contributory negligence issue should not be presented to the jury. [3]