Opinion ID: 852308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Policy at Issue Here

Text: The uninsured motorist coverage section of the Affirmative policy held by Bradshaw says the coverage does not apply to any suit unless commencing within two (2) years of the accident. (App. at 33.) In contrast, the underinsured provisions say there is no coverage unless the company received actual written notice of said claim within two (2) years of the date of the accident. (App. at 35.) The uninsured provisions do not appear to require that Bradshaw even name Affirmative in the action, much less delineate explicitly at the outset that his claim is for uninsured coverage. Taken together, we read these provisions to mean that, all other requirements being met, if Bradshaw had been less specific in his initial complaint and excluded the phrase under an Under insured Motorist Coverage Endorsement, Bradshaw would not have had to amend his complaint at all. (App. at 17.) If we agreed with Affirmative that its insured should have specified at the outset that he was suing for uninsured coverage, future insureds in similar circumstances would doubtless be prompted to include a claim against the insured's carrier for both uninsured and underinsured coverage, and Affirmative would lose much of its ability to differentiate between an underinsured and an uninsured case at its commencement. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel stated that this double-barreled approach has already been taken by Bradshaw's trial lawyer in similar cases. We see requiring insured plaintiffs with similar policy provisions to assert both underinsured and uninsured claims against their insurers as likely adding paperwork of little value to litigation of this sort. An insurer might contractually require an insured to delineate specifically the provision under which he is suing, as Affirmative asserts its policy does. Strictly construed, this policy does not lend itself to an interpretation that precludes Bradshaw's uninsured motorist claim under these circumstances. Bradshaw commenced his suit within the two-year limitation, so the policy does not exclude coverage. Bradshaw relies extensively on Trial Rule 15(C) for his argument, assuming Affirmative's contract interpretation and arguing that the rule renders the amended complaint timely. (Appellant's Br. at 6-8.) Trial Rule 15(C) states Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. Ind. Tr. Rule 15(C). Because we interpret the policy's requirements more broadly, Trial Rule 15(C) plays no role in determining whether Bradshaw meets them. While Rule 15 applies to amendments generally, Bradshaw hardly needs help from Rule 15(C) because his initial complaint met the limitation requirement of the policy by commencing within two (2) years after the date of the accident. (App. at 33.) On the other hand, it was not error for the trial court to have granted Bradshaw's Rule 15(C) request as, by doing so, it established an orderly basis on which the uninsured motorist claim could proceed. Alternatively, Affirmative argues that Bradshaw cannot claim uninsured motorist coverage because, though it excluded him, an insurance policy applied to the vehicle Chandler drove. (Appellee's Br. at 10-13.) Bradshaw argues that Affirmative waived this argument because it inadequately raised it at the trial court. (Reply Br. at 7.) Affirmative did not advance the argument in the motion for summary judgment, but it asserted it in the reply supporting summary judgment. (App. at 90-91, 202-03.) Because the trial court did not explicitly address this contention, we do not address Affirmative's argument on this point and leave it for the trial court to decide.