Opinion ID: 2995027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admissibility of Statements

Text: Made by Mrs. Skidmore Skidmore first challenges the validity of his conviction by contending that the district court abused its discretion and denied him a fair trial by admitting Theresa Wolfe’s testimony that Skidmore’s wife made incriminating statements regarding his status as a convicted felon. Wolfe was employed as a secretary at the Southside Gunshop (gun shop), a federally licensed firearms dealer in Muncie, Indiana. Wolfe met the Skidmores at the gun shop and became friends with them on a social level. At Skidmore’s trial, Wolfe testified that the Skidmores came into the gun shop together and examined various firearms with the gun shop’s owner, William Crowder. During these visits, Crowder would hand different firearms to Wolfe instructing her to fill out a Form 4473/1 for each firearm. Mrs. Skidmore would then complete the portion of each of these forms designated for purchaser information, indicating that she was purchasing the firearms. Wolfe indicated, however, that she never saw Mrs. Skidmore give Crowder any money. While filling out one of these forms, Wolfe asked Mrs. Skidmore why she was signing the form. Wolfe testified that Mrs. Skidmore told her that her husband could not sign for the firearms because he had been in prison. Skidmore’s counsel objected to the admissibility of Wolfe’s testimony regarding Mrs. Skidmore’s statements as to why she was signing the forms. The district court overruled this objection, however, allowing these statements to be admitted as a declaration of a co- conspirator pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence./2 We review the district court’s decision to admit Wolfe’s testimony pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Maholias, 985 F.2d 869, 878 (7th Cir. 1993). For coconspirator statements to be admitted pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, that both the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statements were made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Ladd, 218 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000). We review the district court’s findings with regard to these elements for clear error. See United States v. Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 1997). While the Supreme Court has not determined whether a hearsay statement on its own and without other independent evidence is enough to establish the existence of a conspiracy such that the statement may be properly admitted under 801(d)(2)(E), the Court’s decision in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987), held that a court, in making a preliminary factual determination under 801(d) (2)(E), may examine the hearsay statements sought to be admitted. Id. at 181. To satisfy the existing conspiracy requirement, [t]he Government need not . . . charge a conspiracy in order for a coconspirator statement to be admitted. Godinez, 110 F.3d at 454. In examining what constitutes a statement in furtherance of a conspiracy, we have explained that a wide range of statements qualify, includ[ing] comments designed to assist in recruiting potential members, to inform other members about the progress of the conspiracy, to control damage to or detection of the conspiracy, to hide the criminal objectives of the conspiracy, or to instill confidence and prevent the desertion of other members. United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2000). The government’s theory in this case was that Mrs. Skidmore was a straw purchaser for her husband, designating herself as the purchaser and owner of firearms that Skidmore wanted to acquire but could not do so legally because he was a convicted felon. Thus, the government contends that Mrs. Skidmore’s statement to Wolfe about her husband was made during the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy to unlawfully obtain firearms for Skidmore. The government established that Skidmore and his wife visited the gun shop on numerous occasions viewing firearms with the store’s owner, William Crowder. If a decision was made to purchase a firearm, Crowder would hand the firearm to Wolfe, with whom Mrs. Skidmore would then fill out the required Form 4473 for that particular firearm. Wolfe testified that she never saw Mrs. Skidmore ever give Crowder any money. These facts, taken with Mrs. Skidmore’s explanation that she was filling out the forms required for the purchase of a firearm because her husband had been in prison, validate the government’s theory. Wolfe, a friend of the Skidmores, was obviously curious about the peculiar process by which the Skidmores purchased firearms when she asked Mrs. Skidmore why she was filling out the mandatory forms. Mrs. Skidmore’s decision to reveal to Wolfe the actual reason she repeatedly designated herself as the purchaser of these firearms can be characterized as an expression of trust as well as an attempt to secure the confidence of her friend, thereby preventing further detection of what she and her husband were doing. It was not clear error, therefore, for the district court to find that this statement was made in furtherance of the Skidmores’ conspiracy to acquire firearms for Skidmore. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Wolfe’s testimony of Mrs. Skidmore’s explanation as to why she was designating herself as the purchaser of multiple firearms pursuant to Rule 801(d) (2)(E).