Opinion ID: 2820819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Roman contends that he could not violate § 2422(b) as a matter of law because he communicated only with an adult law enforcement agent playing the role of a decoy parent and he did not utilize the means or facilities of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, or entice a minor child directly to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. Roman raised this legal issue prior to trial by making motions to dismiss the indictment and superseding indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v). We review de novo the district court’s decision to deny the motions. See United States v. Ali, 557 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2009). Roman’s argument requires us to interpret the meaning of § 2422(b). Statutory construction always begins with the plain language of the statute, and if that language is “clear and unambiguous,” the court “will usually proceed no further.” United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 638 (6th Cir. 2000). The statute provides: Whoever, using . . . any facility or means of interstate . . . commerce, . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The elements of this crime are that (1) the defendant used a means or facility of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade a person under the age of 18 to engage in No. 14-4129 United States v. Roman Page 6 sexual activity or to attempt to do so; (2) that the defendant believed the person was under the age of 18; and (3) that if sexual activity had occurred, the defendant could have been charged with a criminal offense under state law.2 United States v. Hart, 635 F.3d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 2011). Roman points out that the object of each verb used in § 2422(b)—persuades, induces, entices, or coerces—is “any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.” He denies attempting directly to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor child. Because the legislative history of the statute does not mention adult intermediaries, Roman contends that any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved in his favor under the rule of lenity. We do not agree with Roman’s reading of this unambiguous statute. See Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639. “Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the attempt to persuade, not the performance of the sexual acts themselves.” Id. As a result, the focus always remains on the defendant’s subjective intent because the statute is “designed to protect children from the act of solicitation itself.” United States v. Hughes, 632 F.3d 956, 961 (6th Cir. 2011); Hackworth, 483 F. App’x at 977. We have held that the statute is violated even if the targeted minor is not a real person as long as the defendant demonstrates that he is, or is attempting to, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the minor to engage in sexual activity. Hughes, 632 F.3d at 960, 962 (upholding a conviction under § 2422(b) where the defendant attempted to entice an undercover agent posing as a minor female); Hart, 635 F.3d at 852 (same); Hackworth, 483 F. App’x at 973 (same); United States v. Edington, 526 F. App’x 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding conviction where agent posed as a minor boy). See also United States v. Beckman, No. 14-2058, 2015 WL 4231595, at  (6th Cir. July 13, 2015) (upholding conviction where defendant attempted to entice an adult male posing as an adult female with a minor daughter). Accord United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 465–69 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding conviction where agent posed as a minor female); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717–20 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming 2 The superseding indictment charged Roman with using the Internet and a cellular telephone, both facilities of interstate commerce, in an attempt to persuade, induce or entice a minor child to engage in sexual activity that would violate two Ohio statutes prohibiting sexual activity with minor children, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2907.02 & 2907.04. See United States v. Fuller, 77 F. App’x 371, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2003). The elements of these state offenses, however, are not incorporated into the elements of the federal crime under § 2422(b). United States v. Hackworth, 483 F. App’x 972, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012). No. 14-4129 United States v. Roman Page 7 conviction where agent impersonated a minor boy). Accordingly, the essence of the crime is the defendant’s communication or attempted communication with a minor child with the intent to transform the minor into a sexual victim. See Hughes, 632 F.3d at 961. We agree with our many sister circuits that have held that a defendant violates § 2422(b) by communicating only with an adult intermediary if the defendant’s communications with that intermediary are intended to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the minor child’s assent to engage in prohibited sexual activity. United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. McMillan, 744 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 292 (2014); United States v. Caudill, 709 F.3d 444, 446–47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013); United States v. Olvera, 687 F.3d 645, 647–48 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 140 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1298– 99 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 912–16 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Douglas, 626 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Spurlock, 495 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 2007). In applying criminal laws, courts generally “must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language” absent an extraordinary showing that Congress intended otherwise. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The ordinary meanings of the verbs persuade, induce, entice, and coerce demonstrate that § 2422(b) is intended to prohibit acts that seek to transform or overcome the will of a minor.” Hite, 769 F.3d at 1161 (citing dictionary definitions). We presume that Congress gave these words their ordinary meaning when it drafted § 2422(b), and the circuits agree that these statutory terms “naturally incorporate the use of intermediaries.” See id. (citing McMillan, 744 F.3d at 1036 (“One particularly effective way to persuade or entice a person to do something is to enlist the help of a trusted relative, friend, or associate.”); Nestor, 574 F.3d at 162 n.4 (“Businesses and individuals regularly seek to persuade others through advertising intermediaries and negotiating agents.”)). Because in passing § 2422(b) Congress “made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the attempt to persuade,” Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639, and we follow its plain meaning, Salinas, 522 U.S. at 57, we need not examine the legislative history in detail, despite Roman’s urging to No. 14-4129 United States v. Roman Page 8 do so. In any event, nothing in the legislative history warrants a different interpretation of the meaning of the statute’s terms, and the history of the statute’s passage and later amendment is fully consistent with congressional policy to prohibit “the use of intermediaries to induce minors (or to attempt to induce them).” See Hite, 769 F.3d at 1163 (discussing legislative history of § 2422(b)); Nestor, 574 F.3d at 162 (same). The circuits further agree that “communications with an intermediary aimed at persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexual activity fit within [the] common understanding” of a criminal attempt that is prohibited by § 2422(b). Hite, 769 F.3d at 1162. To establish attempt, the government must prove that the defendant had the intent to commit criminal solicitation of a minor in violation of § 2422(b) and that he took a substantial step towards committing that crime. See United States v. Evans, 699 F.3d 858, 867 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419–20 (4th Cir. 2012). Because § 2422(b) “criminalizes an intentional attempt to achieve a mental state—a minor’s assent,” United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2007), the government’s burden of proof does not “change when a defendant, like [Roman], communicates only with an adult intermediary who can influence” the minor. Lee, 603 F.3d at 914. Congress has criminalized persuasion and the attempt to persuade. Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639. The crime is complete when the defendant both intends to persuade the minor child to assent to sexual activity and the defendant takes a substantial step toward completing the crime—for example, by engaging in communications with an adult intermediary who can exert influence to help achieve the child’s assent. See Lee, 603 F.3d at 915–16; Berk, 652 F.3d at 140 (observing that the defendant’s communications with a purported father about renting a child out, coupled with a request to know what the minor thought of the idea, was an attempt to “achieve the requisite mental state in the minor”); Douglas, 626 F.3d at 164 (observing that a minor’s assent can be obtained through a guardian who could help lead the child to participate in sexual activity); Spurlock, 495 F.3d at 1014 (noting that the defendant “intended to entice minor girls to have sex with him, and . . . his conversations with their purported mother were a substantial step toward that end”). Like the defendants in these cases, Roman took substantial steps to persuade, induce, or entice the 11-year old Katie to give her assent to engage in sexual activity with him. First, No. 14-4129 United States v. Roman Page 9 Roman tried to flatter Katie’s father and agree with any parameters he set. Roman then sought to utilize the influence of Katie’s father on Katie by promising him that he did not have any diseases, that he could not cause pregnancy, and that he would use condoms. Roman described similar sexual conduct he had engaged in with other minor females to assure the father that he would not injure his child. Roman tried to achieve Katie’s assent to sexual activity by asking the father if he had told Katie about Roman, asking whether she was ready to engage in sexual acts, and seeking to find out what she liked sexually. Roman expressed a desire that the minor child be comfortable with him before attempting any sexual conduct with her. Roman also planned to take the child shopping for clothes to encourage her to engage in sexual conduct with him. He seemed pleased that the father was grooming the child so that Roman could engage in prohibited sexual conduct with her. See United States v. Fox, 600 F. App’x 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2015) (“courts have used the term [grooming] to describe a variety of behaviors that appear calculated to prepare a child for a future sexual encounter.”). In addition to seeking Katie’s assent by communicating with her father, Roman took substantial steps toward completing the § 2422(b) offense. He purchased a flower and the child’s favorite Butterfinger candy to help “break the ice” and to obtain her assent to engage in sexual activity with him. See United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 419–26 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing the type of conduct that qualifies as a substantial step in violating § 2422(b)). In a recent unpublished case, we held that similar conduct was sufficient to convict a defendant of attempting to violate § 2422(b). United States v. Harmon, 593 F. App’x 455, 458– 59 (6th Cir. 2014). In that case, undercover agent Spadafora posed as the father of a fictitious fourteen-year-old female, “Brooke,” when he responded to Harmon’s internet advertisement. Id. at 458. Harmon communicated with Spadafora through emails, internet chatrooms, text messages, and phone calls and sent a nude photo of himself to Spadafora to show to his “daughter.” Id. He asked for photographs of the child in her underwear, expressed interest in her “thoughts, preferences, and feedback” and repeatedly asked Spadafora about her response to his nude photo and whether she liked it. Id. Harmon wanted to know if he should take Brooke out to dinner and spend the entire night with her. Id. When Harmon learned that both the father and daughter enjoyed Coors Light beer, he offered to supply some for their upcoming meeting. No. 14-4129 United States v. Roman Page 10 Id. Harmon assured Spadafora that his daughter “would be in experienced, safe, and disease-free hands.” Id. On the day of the arranged meeting, Spadafora allowed Harmon to speak on the telephone with a female undercover officer who pretended to be Brooke. Id. at 458–59. After the call, Harmon drove to the prearranged meeting site where he was arrested. A search of his vehicle turned up Coors Light beer, condoms, and other items of a sexual nature. Id. at 459. After Harmon’s motion to dismiss the indictment was denied, a jury convicted him of an attempt to violate § 2422(b). Affirming Harmon’s conviction on appeal, we observed that Harmon’s communications with the adult intermediary—the undercover agent posing as Brooke’s father—were intended to gain the minor’s assent to prohibited sexual activity and that the evidence was admissible at trial to prove Harmon’s state of mind. Id. at 460, 463–66. Because Harmon intended to achieve the minor child’s agreement to engage in sexual acts and because he took substantial steps to obtain that assent, we affirmed his attempt conviction, relying on our own prior precedents and on many of the cases from other circuits cited above. Id. at 462, 463 n.1, 467 (citing cases). The holding of Harmon thus supports our decision to affirm the denial of Roman’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. Contrary to Roman’s argument, our decision is consistent with the dissent in part in United States v. Laureys, 653 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Roman contends that the dissent demonstrates that he could not have been indicted for communicating only with an adult intermediary. We disagree. Judge Brown’s disagreement in Laureys stemmed from the majority’s statement that “Laureys attempted to persuade [the adult intermediary] to grant him sexual access to a child and then travelled to the District for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with her.” Id. at 343. Judge Brown clarified that the defendant’s persuasion must be directed to the minor child, not the adult intermediary, id. at 351–52, and our decision is consistent with that view. Judge Brown, moreover, acknowledged that a defendant can be convicted under § 2422(b) if the defendant’s communications with an adult intermediary are aimed at obtaining the assent of the minor child to engage in sexual conduct. Id. That view is consistent with the position we take today. No. 14-4129 United States v. Roman Page 11