Opinion ID: 445512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the board's regulations.

Text: 20 Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 43-2804 (1977), which describes the Duties of the Parole Board, provides that [a]ll policies, rules and regulations regarding parole shall be formulated by the Parole Board. Pursuant to this authority, the Board has prepared what it describes as a comprehensive handbook for parole procedure in the State of Arkansas. Board Regulation Sec. 1.02. We are specifically concerned with whether a protected liberty interest is created by Board Regulation Sec. 3.09. This regulation provides: 21 Parole Board Decisions.--(1) Whenever the [Parole Board] considers the first release of [an inmate] eligible for release on parole, it [is] the policy of the Board to order his release unless the Board is of the opinion that release should be deferred because: 22 (a) there is substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole; or 23 (b) his continued correctional treatment, medical care or vocational or other training in the institution will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date; or .... 24 (c) he has served a short time; or 25 (d) the nature and seriousness of his offense warrants a deferral; or 26 (e) his prior criminal history warrants a deferral; or 27 (f) his adjustment to the institution has been poor; or 28 (g) he has received disciplinary reports; or 29 (h) a detainer has been filed against him (see Sec. 3.15); or 30 (i) other considerations require that parole should be deferred. 31 (2) In making its determination regarding [an inmate's] release on parole, it [is] the policy of the [Parole Board] to take into account the following factors: 32 (a) institutional adjustment in general, including the nature of any disciplinaries; 33 (b) the record of previous criminal offenses, the frequency of such offenses and the nature thereof[.] [Citations omitted.] 34 Parker and Yancey argue that this regulation establishes a protected liberty interest in parole. Before we can reach this issue, we must address the state's preliminary arguments that: 1) we should not consider whether the regulation establishes a protected liberty interest because this question was not considered by the district court; and 2) the regulation does not establish a protected liberty interest because it is merely an internal policy memorandum which was not promulgated or published pursuant to the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.), Ark.Stat.Ann. Secs. 5-701 through 715.3 (1976 & Supp.1983), and was not intended as a specific rule of law which would control the Board's discretion. 35 First, we do not believe that the district court's failure to examine the regulation precludes our consideration of it. Although we are reluctant to decide on appeal an issue not reached below, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), both parties at oral argument, and the government on brief, addressed the question of whether the regulation establishes a protected liberty interest in parole. This is primarily a legal question which we may address on appeal. See Lucas v. Hodges, 730 F.2d 1493, 1501 (D.C.Cir.1984). 36 Second, although the record does not indicate when the regulation was adopted, it does indicate that the Board, at some point in time, did adopt it with the intent of following it and that the Board did follow it up until the time this appeal was brought. The regulation was contained in a section of Board regulations preceded by the statement The following memorandums shall constitute the policy of the Board of Pardons and Paroles for the State of Arkansas, and shall remain in full effect and force until such time as superseding policy is adopted. Superseding policy was not adopted until this appeal was pending. 6 Accordingly, we find that the Board did intend to follow the regulation. 37 The state nonetheless argues that the regulation cannot create a liberty interest because it was not promulgated or published as required by the Arkansas A.P.A. and thus, under Ark.Stat.Ann. Secs. 5-702(b) and 5-703(e) (1976), is invalid. The record, however, does not indicate whether the A.P.A. was followed, or whether the Board was subject to the A.P.A. at the time it issued the regulation. 7 It is also unclear whether the Board may claim that the regulation is invalid under Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 5-702(b) (1976) which provides that [t]his provision [that no agency rule shall be valid unless filed and published] shall not apply in favor of any person or party [including agencies] with actual knowledge of an agency rule, order or decision. Cf. Bushong v. State, 267 Ark. 113, 589 S.W.2d 559 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938, 100 S.Ct. 2157, 64 L.Ed.2d 791 (1980). 38 In any event, our review of the case law indicates that while it may be necessary that a regulation be promulgated or published under A.P.A. standards in order to become a rule of law, a regulation or policy statement need not necessarily be a rule of law in order to create a liberty interest. In Lucas v. Hodges, 730 F.2d 1493 (D.C.Cir.1984), for example, the Court held that official statements of prison policy contained in internal directives of officials at the District of Columbia Detention Facility and the Lorton Reformatory could give rise to a liberty interest, even though the statements were not promulgated under A.P.A. standards or published in the District of Columbia Register or elsewhere. Id. at 1501-04. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the policy memorandums were authoritative statements of the criteria by which prisoner classification decisions are made. The Sixth Circuit, in Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1254-56 (6th Cir.1977), found a liberty interest in policy statements issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the warden of a federal institution even though neither had been promulgated under A.P.A. standards or published in the Federal Register or in any other body of federal regulations. See also Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1291 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that a liberty interest was established by a prison rule contained in an Adult Service Policies and Procedure Manual of the Department of Corrections (Guidelines)). The Tenth Circuit, in Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 785 (10th Cir.1980), found a protected liberty interest in an official statement of policy issued by the Administrator of one Colorado penitentiary. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that a liberty interest may be created by intra- and inter-institutional directives containing guidelines for allowing and denying compensatory good time. Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 47 (7th Cir.1978). See also Harris v. McDonald, 737 F.2d 662, 664 (7th Cir.1984); Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1369 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121, 99 S.Ct. 1033, 59 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). Dicta from cases in several other Circuits support these holdings. 8 39 Additionally, although neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has determined precisely what kind of administrative pronouncement is necessary to create a protected liberty interest, dicta from Supreme Court cases 9 and Eighth Circuit cases 10 suggest that the policy statements or internal regulations of an agency or institution may create liberty interests, even if they have not been promulgated or published under A.P.A. standards as formal rules of law. In Olim, the Court held that a liberty interest arises when particularized standards or criteria guide the State's decisionmakers, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d at 823, quoting Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 2465 (Brennan, J., concurring). 40 We agree with every Circuit that has squarely considered this issue that these particularized standards or criteria which give rise to liberty interests may be found not only in a state's statutes or administrative code but also within official policy pronouncements which are intended to guide the exercise of discretion. Because we find that the regulation is an official policy pronouncement which the Board intended would guide its discretion, we find that it is irrelevant to the liberty interest question whether or not the Board complied with the Arkansas A.P.A. We now turn to the question whether the regulation establishes a liberty interest. 41 In Section I, we held that the Arkansas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest. We concluded that the controlling case law sets forth two standards which determine whether a parole statute creates a protected liberty interest: 1) does the statute contain particularized substantive standards or criteria which significantly guide the exercise of discretion; and 2) does the statute use mandatory language similar in substance or form to that used in the Nebraska statute which the Supreme Court in Greenholtz held established a protected liberty interest? We believe that these are also the relevant factors for determining whether a parole regulation establishes a protected liberty interest. Evans, 662 F.2d at 526. See also Olim, 75 L.Ed.2d at 813; Lucas v. Hodges, 730 F.2d at 1503. 42 Because Regulation Sec. 3.09 provides that the Board will base its decision on certain substantive criteria, it satisfies both standards. First, the regulation sets forth particularized substantive criteria which significantly guide the Board's discretionary decision to grant or deny parole release. Evans, 662 F.2d at 526. See also Olim, 461 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d at 813. Second, the language of the regulation is similar to the language of Neb.Rev.Stat. Sec. 83-1, 114(1) (1976), 11 which the Supreme Court in Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12, 99 S.Ct. at 2105-2106, held was sufficient to create a liberty interest entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. There is little or no significant difference between Neb.Rev.Stat. Sec. 83-1, 114(1) (1976) (which provides that the Board of Parole shall order parole release unless it determines that one or more of four substantive reasons for deferral applies) and the regulation (which provides that when the Board considers the first release of an inmate, it is the policy of the Board to order    release unless one or more of nine substantive reasons for deferral applies). Accordingly, the regulation establishes a protected liberty interest. We now turn to whether it applies to Parker and Yancey. 43 Parker and Yancey must be considered for parole under the Board guidelines in use at the time they committed the first crimes for which they are now imprisoned. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 9; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-9, 101 S.Ct. 960, 963-4, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Ark. Const. art. 2, Sec. 17; Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 672 S.W.2d 52 (1984); Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 43-2830.3 (Supp.1983). The record does not indicate when the regulation was first adopted, or when Parker and Yancey committed the first crime for which they are now imprisoned. Accordingly, the district court on remand must determine whether the regulation had been adopted at the time Parker and Yancey committed the first crimes for which they are now imprisoned. 12 The regulation also appears to apply only to those inmates who are being considered for their first parole release. It provides that it is applicable when the Board considers the first release of an inmate. The district court, on remand, must determine whether Parker and Yancey fall within this provision. 44 In sum, the district court on remand must determine if the regulation applies to Parker and Yancey. If so, they are entitled to its protection. Assuming that the regulation was in effect when Parker and Yancey committed the first crimes for which they are now imprisoned, and that they are eligible for their first parole release as provided in the regulation, we now must decide whether there were sufficient procedural safeguards to protect the liberty interest which the regulation accords them. 45