Opinion ID: 1058682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of the Text Amendment

Text: We first address the City's contention that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Text Amendment violated the vested rights statute, Code § 15.2-2307. That section states [n]othing in this article shall be construed to authorize the impairment of any vested right. We have applied the principle of vested rights on a number of occasions, stating that a landowner acquires a vested property right to conduct a nonconforming use on its property if that use was in existence on the effective date of a zoning ordinance which would make the use nonconforming. See, e.g., Holland v. Board of Supervisors, 247 Va. 286, 289 n. , 441 S.E.2d 20, 22 n.  (1994) (A landowner may . . . acquire a vested property right to conduct a nonconforming use on its property if that use was in existence on the effective date of the zoning ordinance.). In this case, the property in issue has been used for the operation of a power plant since 1949, at which time the City had no comprehensive zoning. Thus, a vested right to use the property for operation of a power plant existed at the time of both the 1963 and 1992 zoning ordinances. Neither of those ordinances affected the exercise of this right. Unlike the prior zoning amendments, however, the 2004 Text Amendment did affect Mirant's ability to continue operating the Plant. The question before us is whether the conditions imposed by redesignating the use of the property from noncomplying to nonconforming impaired Mirant's vested right to use the property for the operation of a power plant in violation of Code § 15.2-2307. The City argues that requiring Mirant to secure a comprehensive SUP for continued operation of the Plant beyond seven years was a legitimate exercise of its zoning authority and did not violate Code § 15.2-2307. In the posture of this case, however, we need not decide whether requiring a comprehensive SUP would impair Mirant's vested right to operate the Plant on the property. At trial, in response to the City's argument that Mirant's declaratory judgment action was not ripe for adjudication because Mirant had neither applied for nor been denied a comprehensive SUP, the circuit court held that any attempt by Mirant to acquire an SUP would have been futile and, therefore, Mirant did not have to pursue such action before seeking the declaratory judgment. The City did not appeal this holding; therefore, under the law of this case, Mirant does not, and could not, have a comprehensive SUP because any application to acquire such permit would be futile. Consequently, the Text Amendment requires that Mirant cease operation of the Plant in seven years. Our review is thus limited to whether this requirement impairs Mirant's vested right to use the property for the operation of the Plant. The answer is obvious; termination of the use allowed by virtue of an established vested right impairs the vested right and therefore violates Code § 15.2-2307. Accordingly, the circuit court's conclusion that the Text Amendment violated Code § 15.2-2307 was correct. Nevertheless, the City argues that the circuit court's conclusion is in error because § 9.09(g) of the City Charter authorizes the City to terminate nonconforming uses within a reasonable time and, under Code § 15.2-100, provisions of the City Charter supersede Code § 15.2-2307. Although the City asserts that this argument was presented to the circuit court on three occasions, none of the instances upon which the City relies apprised the circuit court of the position now advanced regarding the application of § 9.09 of the City Charter. At trial, the City's discussion of City Council of Alexandria v. The Lindsey Trusts, 258 Va. 424, 520 S.E.2d 181 (1999), Code § 15.2-100, and § 9.09(g) of the City Charter was in the context of the City's closing argument supporting the reasonableness of its actions in adopting the Text Amendment, specifically the argument that a seven-year abatement period was reasonable. The City's objections to the final order, as relevant here, stated only that the circuit court erroneously interpreted Code § 15.2-2307. At no time was the circuit court asked to hold that the provisions of § 9.09 of the City Charter superseded the requirements of Code § 15.2-2307 and no argument was directed to the source of authority for the City's claim. Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument because the City makes it for the first time on appeal. Rule 5:25. In light of our holding that the circuit court correctly held the Text Amendment invalid as a violation of Code § 15.2-2307, we need not address the alternative grounds cited by the circuit court as a basis for its holding regarding the Text Amendment.