Opinion ID: 2285907
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Heading: The intent of the Legislature.

Text: As to the first issue, we seek the Legislature's intent. Legislative intent is the fundamental rule in the construction or interpretation of statutes. . . . Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as may best answer the intention which the Legislators had in view, and when determinable and ascertained, the courts must give effect to it. . . . King Resources Co. v. Environmental Improvement Commission, Me., 270 A.2d 863, 869 (1970). In 1970 the 104th Legislature, meeting in special session, enacted several pieces of legislation directed toward reducing the destruction of our natural environment. One of the pieces of legislation introduced was L.D. 1834 entitled AN ACT to Regulate Site Location of Development Substantially Affecting Environment with which we are now concerned. After amendment it was enacted as P.L.1969, ch. 571, § 2 and became 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488. The Legislature's concise statement of its Findings and Purpose [5] makes clear to us the basis for its conclusion that state action was essential to insure that commercial and industrial developments, which because of their nature or their size, will impose unusually heavy demands upon the natural environment, shall not be located in areas where the environment does not have the capacity to withstand the impact of the development. But did the Legislature intend to bring residential developments within the application of the law? If so, did it intend to include mere subdivisions? In seeking the legislative intent we turn first to the language which the law-makers chose to use to carry out their purpose. In reference to real estate, a development may be defined as a developed tract of land and to develop as to convert (as raw land) into an area suitable for residential or business purposes. . . to alter raw land (into an area suitable for building). Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. When we analyze the legislative definition of developments which may substantially affect environment we find that the Legislature saw fit to concern itself with two kinds of developments1) those the operating procedures of which include the consumption of the natural resources themselves or which have a propensity to discharge, in the course of their processes, wastes and residues which lower the quality of surrounding air, soil or water and 2) those which are not inherently ecologically destructive but which because of their size are likely to impose great demands upon the environment. The Legislature's concern for the first class is obvious. The operation of many industrial and some commercial developmentswhether large or smallare likely to be direct assaults upon the environment itself. The ecological danger from the members of the second group, unlike the first, comes not principally from the type of activity to be performed on the property after it is developed but rather from the size and concentration of such developments. The Legislature's concern was that large developments, apart from the type of activity located thereon, have an inherent potential for over-taxing the involved land, air and water upon which the public depends to sustain an acceptable quality of human living. But the Legislature chose to apply the Act only to large developments which are industrial or commercial. The word commercial broadly means from the point of view of profit . . . having profit as the primary aim. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. We think that the use of the word commercial was intended to describe the motivation for the development and not the type of activity to be performed on the property after it is developed. We consider that the Legislature chose to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial developments for a sound reasonit doubtless concluded that a greater need for supervision exists in the case of a commercially motivated development where the dominant factor is the hope for profit than in a non-commercial development where land is being prepared for public enjoyment or divided for family distribution or for some other purpose than profit. In other words, commercial residential developments have a propensity for being big, concentrated and exhausting to the resources of the environment. It seems to us that the business of subdividing large tracts of land and selling the lots must be considered a commercial venture. The Legislature doubtless so viewed it. Certainly, this construction best accords with the purpose of the statute. Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 275, 68 A. 2d 241, 250 (1949). This interpretation finds support in the history of the legislation we are examining. This legislation was originally proposed to the 104th Legislature in the form of L. D. 1782 which stated that its purpose was to enable the State to guide and control the location of commercial developments which substantially affect local environment. Such developments were described as including any recreational, commercial, educational, industrial or residential development which by reason of its size, purpose, manufacturing process or use or handling of natural resources or products may tend to harm or adversely affect the natural environment of a locality to a substantial degree. The Joint Select Legislative Committee on Natural Resources reported the bill back in a new draft, as L.D. 1834 and that it Ought to pass. The new draft stated that its purpose was to enable the State to guide and control the location of commercial and industrial developments substantially affecting local environment. Such developments were characterized simply as commercial and industrialthe L.D. 1782 recreational, educational and residential development language being dropped. The new draft as reported back also would have excluded from the operation of the Act developments intending to locate in the appropriate zoned area of any municipality which had adopted a municipal plan and zoning and sub-division ordinances based thereon. The Legislature eliminated the latter provision [6] thus rejecting the concept that local zoning is capable of protecting the public from ecological harm. The new draft, as amended, was then enacted and was the law existing at the time of the present problem here under consideration. [7] In the 105th Legislature, two attempts were made to remove certain classifications of residential developments from the operation of the Act passed by the previous Legislature. L.D. 963 was introduced in the 105th Legislature. Its sole purpose was to exclude by amendment permanent year-round housing occupying less than 40 acres from the operation of the Site Location Law. L.D. 963 was defeated. At the same session L.D. 1061 was introduced. Its sole purpose was to exclude from commercial developments all residential developments in municipalities which have planning boards. The Statement of Fact accompanying L.D. 1061 explained the purpose of the Bill as follows: The Environmental Improvement Commission has asserted authority under the site location law passed at the Special Session over residential developments, even though the statute is limited to `commercial and industrial developments.' This bill would clarify that this is not the intent of the law. This clear attempt in L.D. 1061 to remove some residential developments from the Site Location Law was also defeated. In considering both L.D. 963 and L.D. 1061 the Legislature had its attention specifically directed to the inclusion of residential developments. It is significant that, even if enacted, neither of them would have removed all residential developments from the operation of the law. The Legislature, with its attention specifically directed to the fact that the Commission was then construing the Act to give it authority over residential developments of over 20 acres, still refused two opportunities even to limit the Commission's power to exercise this authority. It is a well accepted principle of statutory construction that when an administrative body has carried out a reasonable and practical interpretation of a statute and this has been called to the attention of the Legislature, the Legislature's failure to act to change the interpretation is evidence that the Legislature has acquiesced in the interpretation. Androscoggin Savings Bank v. Campbell, Me., 282 A.2d 858 (1971); Burrough of Matawan v. Monmouth County Board of Taxation, 51 N.J. 291, 240 A.2d 8, 13 (1968); 2 Sutherland, J. G., Statutes and Statutory Construction, (3rd Ed.) Frank E. Horack, Jr., § 5109. The 105th Legislature also had before it L.D. 1257, L.D. 710 and L.D. 1790 (a new draft of L.D. 710). The significance of its action on these measures is obscure. L.D. 1257 concerned itself in part with proposing some nine changes to the Site Location Law. One such change defined a development which may substantially affect environment as one specifically including municipal, educational, commercial or industrial developments including real estate subdivisions. The Committee on Natural Resources reported L.D. 1257 in a new draft under the same title which no longer made reference to the Site Location Law, and it thus becomes irrelevant to the present discussion. L.D. 710 proposed some eleven changes to the Site Location Law, one of which was to alter the definition of development which may substantially affect environment to specifically include any state, municipal, quasi-municipal, educational, commercial or industrial development, including subdivisions. L.D. 710 defined a subdivision as meaning a division of an existing parcel of land into three or more parcels within any 5-year period. The Committee on Natural Resources reported L.D. 710 in a new draft, L.D. 1790, under the same title, which contained some ten changes to the Site Location Law. Among others, it would have amended the definition of developments which may substantially affect environment to read any state, municipal, quasi-municipal, educational, charitable, commercial or industrial development, including subdivisions, but excluding public ways. L.D. 1790 then defined a subdivision as meaning the division of a parcel of land into two or more parcels within a 5-year period. The Statement of Fact accompanying the new draft included this explanation of purpose: (6) to make it clear that subdivisions are covered by the Site Law and to define `subdivisions'. L.D. 1790 was defeated. While the earlier actions of the Legislature in defeating the two attempts to exclude some residential developments from the Site Location Law appears to indicate clear-cut approval of the Commission's interpretation of the Act as including such developmentsthat is, L.D. 963 and L.D. 1061the defeat of L.D. 1790 contributes little if anything to our understanding of legislative intent. L.D. 963 and L.D. 1061 were specific attempts to remove some residential developments from the operation of the Act tacitly recognizing the Commission's authority over residential developmentsand both failed. L.D. 1790, on the other hand, not only would have made it clear that subdivisions are covered but would have given the word subdivisions a drastically wide meaning and would have worked several other important changes in the Site Location Law. [8] We simply cannot say what one or more of these proposed changes or additions may have motivated the Legislature to reject L.D. 1790. The Legislature met in special session in 1972 and considered L.D. 2045 which would amend the Site Location Law in several respects. One of these proposed changes added in section 482(2) after commercial or industrial developments, the words including subdivisions. The amendment's statement of purposes included (2) to make it clear that subdivisions are within the coverage of the law. . . . The attention of the Legislature was again specifically directed to the fact that the Commission was interpreting the Act to include residential developments (Statement of fact accompanying House Amendment A to L.D. 2045) and that this present appeal from the Commission's order, involving a determination of legislative intent, was then pending in court (Remarks of Representative Owen L. Hancock, Legislative Record-House, 105th Legislature, 1st Special Session, 1972 at 799). The House was informed by Representative Louis J. Marstaller that the purpose of the bill was to make it clear that residential subdivisions are within the application of the Site Location Law (Legislative Record-House, 105th Legislature, 1st Special Session, 1972, at 798). Representative Earl H. Smith told the House in debate that 85% of the applications acted upon by the Commission in the past two years had been residential subdivisions (Legislative Record-House, 105th Legislature, 1st Special Session, 1972, at 886). With this information before it, the Legislature enacted the amendment. [9] We find it significant in our assessment of legislative intent that the 105th Legislature, aware that the Commission was interpreting the Act to include residential subdivisions, took no affirmative action to indicate a contrary intent, rejected two attempts to remove some residential subdivisions from the operation of the Act and finally acted to add the specific words including subdivisions. In our opinion the 104th Legislature intended to include commercial residential developments among those developments which may substantially affect environment. But did the Legislature intend the Act to affect commercial residential developments where the developer merely plots the tract, subdivides it into lots by plan and offers the lots for sale to the public? We consider that this was the Legislature's intention. The basic theory of the Act, as disclosed by the Legislature's Statement of Purpose, is to insure that such developments will be located in a manner which will have a minimal adverse impact on the natural environment of their surroundings. (Emphasis supplied.) The Legislature found that the location of such developments is too important to be left only to the determination of the owners of such developments. Section 483 requires a notification to the Commission by any person intending to construct or operate such a development before commencing constuction or operation. The Commission is then empowered to approve the location or schedule a hearing thereon. The language of the Act and its clear underlying purpose reflect the Legislature's intention that a development with a particular propensity to damage the environment should not be located in areas where the environment is particularly incapable of sustaining the impact without public injury. The Appellant argues to us that it was the Legislature's intention to prevent acts being done to the land which would harm the land and that, therefore, the law is directed to the person who will do the act such as the builderand not to the person who merely subdivides and sells the land. With this we cannot agree. The Legislature intended the Commission to scrutinize the proposals before the harmful act could be done. The Act is a preventive measure and the injury sought to be avoided can best be prevented as soon as plans for development reveal the harm which will occur upon its completion. We would hardly expect that the Legislature intended to postpone the determination of suitability of an area for a residential development until the lots had been sold to purchasers who will, upon starting construction, discover that they are participants inas well as victims ofa local environmental disaster. Furthermore, if a subdivider has sold the lots to numerous individual purchasers each of whom, among other things, is to construct his own building, grade his own land, build his own driveway to the street, and provide for his own sanitary sewage disposal, there would be no one intending to construct or operate a development who could be held responsible under the statute. We do not ascribe to the Legislature an intention that legislation so important to the public welfare would suffer from such inherent futility. We consider that both the legislative intent and the statutory language of the Act encompass residential developments in which the developer merely subdivides the land into lots and offers the lots for sale without any intention to construct buildings or to provide additional improvements or services on the lots. We do not find that the Act as so interpreted and applied is constitutionally impermissible. The subdividing is the initial step in such a development. The Commission correctly ruled as fact that this particular residential development is a commercial development which may substantially affect environment requiring compliance with the provisions of the Site Location Law.