Opinion ID: 4413282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interference with Decision to Testify

Text: Mr. Justice argues that the Hearing Panel deprived him of the ability to make an intelligent choice about testifying when it delayed ruling on whether it could draw an adverse inference from his invocation of his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination in his prehearing deposition. This argument, too, is without merit. On the first day of the hearing, January 20, 2015, the Hearing Panel ruled that Akers v. Prime Succession of Tennessee, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2012) applies to attorney-disciplinary proceedings. Under Akers, “the trier of fact may draw a negative inference from a party’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil case only - 21 - when there is independent evidence of the fact to which a party refuses to answer by invoking his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id. at 506–07. The Hearing Panel reserved its ruling on whether it would actually draw an adverse inference based on Mr. Justice’s invocation of the privilege at his prehearing deposition until after the Board presented its proof so that it could determine whether the requirements of Akers had been satisfied. As already noted, the Board did not call Mr. Justice as a witness at the hearing, but it introduced excerpts of his former testimony in the District Court and also the transcript of his deposition. Mr. Justice also introduced excerpts of his former testimony in the District Court.17 When the Board closed its proof, Mr. Justice moved for an involuntary dismissal, arguing that the Board had failed to prove its case. The Hearing Panel denied this motion. Mr. Justice then asked for permission to delay the presentation of his proof until the next day so that he would have the opportunity to decide overnight, after consultation with his attorney, whether to testify in his own behalf. The Hearing Panel granted this request. When the proceedings resumed the next day, Mr. Justice chose to testify, although he asserted before doing so that the Hearing Panel had erred by ruling that Akers applies to lawyer disciplinary proceedings. In its written ruling, the Hearing Panel expressly declined to draw an adverse inference against Mr. Justice for his invocation of the right against self-incrimination and explicitly based its decision on the evidence presented at the hearing. The trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s decision. As the foregoing recitation illustrates, the Hearing Panel ruled before the hearing began on whether it could draw an adverse inference from Mr. Justice’s prehearing invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. After the Board presented its proof, the Hearing Panel allowed Mr. Justice another evening to consult with his attorney and decide whether he would testify. The Hearing Panel did not interfere with or hinder Mr. Justice from intelligently deciding whether to testify.18 17 For reasons not clear from the record, Disciplinary Counsel apparently agreed not to argue that Mr. Justice had implicitly waived his right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in the disciplinary proceeding by testifying in the District Court. 18 Because the Hearing Panel expressly declined to draw an adverse inference from Mr. Justice’s prehearing invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination, we need not address Mr. Justice’s assertion that the Hearing Panel erred by ruling that an adverse inference may be drawn from an attorney’s invocation of the privilege in a lawyer-disciplinary proceeding. See People v. Robnett, 859 P.2d 872, 875 (Colo. 1993) (“We need not resolve the question whether the fact finder in an attorney disciplinary proceeding may draw a negative inference from an attorney-respondent’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, however, because there is no indication that the hearing board below drew any such inference.”). We reserve decision on this issue of first impression for another day. We note that courts in Georgia, New York, and Wisconsin have allowed an adverse inference to be drawn in such circumstances in attorney-disciplinary cases. See In re Meier, 334 S.E.2d - 22 -