Opinion ID: 3028645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pennsylvania Law

Text: To recover for defamation under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the following elements: (1) The defamatory character of the communication. (2) Its publication by the defendant. (3) Its application to the plaintiff. (4) The understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning. (5) The understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the 8 plaintiff. (6) Special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication. (7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8343(a) (2000). The defendant, on the other hand, bears the burden of showing the truth of the defamatory communication, the privileged nature of the communication, and that the communication touched on a matter of public concern. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8343(b). Furthermore, under Pennsylvania law, “a publisher of a defamatory statement is not liable if the statement was made subject to a conditional privilege and the privilege was not abused.” Elia v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 634 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109, 1112-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)). One instance in which a conditional privilege arises is “when a recognized interest of the public is involved.” Id. In a 1963 opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that negligence on the part of the defendant in making defamatory statements is sufficient to show that a conditional privilege has been abused and, thus, has been lost. Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 191 A.2d 662, 668 (Pa. 1963). The Purcell Court stated, “[t]he failure to employ such ‘reasonable care and diligence’ can destroy a privilege which otherwise would protect the utterer of the communication.” Id. Accordingly, Pennsylvania cases following Purcell regularly stated that abuse of a conditional privilege occurs when: the publication is actuated by malice or negligence, is made for a purpose other than that for which the privilege is given, or to a person not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the privilege, or includes 9 defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Miketic v. Baron, 675 A.2d 324, 329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d 583, 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)) (emphasis added). However, more than a decade after Purcell was handed down, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), holding that a private-figure plaintiff must show some fault (i.e., at least negligence) to recover against a defendant where the speech at issue relates to matters of public concern. In light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Gertz, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized that where the allegedly defamatory speech relates to matters of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff is required to show more than mere negligence to defeat a conditional privilege. Am. Future Sys. Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 872 A.2d 1202, 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (citing Banas v. Matthews Int’l Corp., 502 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Rutt v. Bethlehems’ Globe Publ’g Co., 484 A.2d 72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)); see also Moore v. Cobb-Nettleton, 889 A.2d 1262, 1269-70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (rejecting the argument that a conditional privilege can be lost on a showing of negligence where the challenged speech related to a matter of public concern) (citations omitted). This view finds support in section 600 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states, in relevant part, “one who upon an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege publishes false and defamatory matter concerning another abuses the privilege if he (a) 10 knows the matter to be false, or (b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600 (1977). As the Comment to this section explains, One consequence of the holding [of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.] is that mere negligence as to falsity, being required for all actions of defamation, is no longer treated as sufficient to amount to abuse of a conditional privilege. Instead, knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity is necessary for this purpose. Id. cmt. b. Based upon this authority, we are comfortable predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would now require a private-figure plaintiff suing on matters of public concern to show that the statements were made with actual malice to defeat a conditional privilege under Pennsylvania law.