Opinion ID: 452180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Request for a Continuance

Text: 13 Eleven days prior to trial, Garmany requested that his trial be postponed. In support of the motion for continuance, Garmany's counsel, J. Wilson Dinsmore, stated that circumstances prevented him from devoting time to his client's case until the middle of December. Further, Garmany was in Talladega's Administrative Segregation Unit during the pretrial period, which, according to Dinsmore, limited Garmany's access to a telephone. Prisoners with information relevant to Garmany's defense were scattered throughout the country, which, Dinsmore asserted, made it impossible to interview them. Finally, counsel urged that the prosecution had refused to permit discovery of government witnesses, further contributing to the defense's inability to prepare its case. Simultaneously with the filing of this motion, Garmany sought several writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum in an effort to obtain witness testimony. 14 On January 3, 1984, at a hearing on the motion for a continuance, counsel vigorously pursued his request for additional time. According to Dinsmore, in the early part of December, he was unable to discuss the case with Garmany because of prison rules limiting the number of phone calls made by inmates in administrative segregation. On several occasions when Garmany was able to use the phone, Dinsmore was not at his office. Each time Garmany contacted counsel by phone, prison guards stood close by, inhibiting Garmany from discussing the case freely. On one occasion, a prison guard had even ordered Garmany to discontinue a phone conversation with Dinsmore. Counsel admitted that since the middle of December he was able to discuss the case in person with Garmany by traveling to Talladega. Efforts to interview potential witnesses among the Talladega inmates, however, were frustrated. Counsel stated that he was told on December 17, 1983, that he could not speak with any inmate unless he was acting as that inmate's attorney or was on a visitation list. Two weeks later, counsel drove to the prison expecting to discuss Garmany's case with several inmates, but a prison official turned him away. 15 At the continuance hearing, the government attempted to rebut Dinsmore's assertions that he was denied access to his client and witnesses. According to the government, Garmany was permitted to make numerous phone calls despite his presence in the administrative segregation unit of the prison. That he did not always choose to call his attorney is a problem created by his own action. The government also contended that on the date Garmany's attorney was prevented from interviewing inmates, counsel in fact had shown up at the prison, unannounced, during a holiday period. Under the circumstances, the government urged, it was unrealistic for Dinsmore to expect that he could meet with whomever he wanted. 16 The district court denied the motion for a continuance, but assured Dinsmore that any writ sought for production of an inmate-witness would be granted. The court recessed until the next afternoon when the jury was impaneled. Trial began the morning of January 5, 1984. Some inmates were not produced until the trial began, requiring counsel to interview them at that time. Only four of the thirteen inmates for whom writs were granted ultimately testified at trial. 17 Appellant now contends that the district court's actions denied him due process, in that he was not prepared to go to trial. Because of the great latitude that must be afforded a trial judge in scheduling matters, a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on requests for continuances. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). As a reviewing court, we will disturb a trial court's ruling on a continuance only if it amounts to an abuse of discretion. United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1521 (11th Cir.1984). This issue must be decided in light of the circumstances presented, focusing upon the reasons for the continuance offered to the trial court when the request is denied. United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281, 1286 (5th Cir.1976). 18 The Uptain court delineated numerous considerations relevant to reviewing the denial of a continuance when the request was based upon a claim of inadequate preparation time: 19 We have deemed the following factors highly relevant in assessing claims of inadequate preparation time: the quantum of time available for preparation, the likelihood of prejudice from denial, the accused's role in shortening the effective preparation time, the degree of complexity of the case, and the availability of discovery from the prosecution. We have also explicitly considered the adequacy of the defense actually provided at trial, the skill and experience of the attorney, any preappointment or preretention experience of the attorney with the accused or the alleged crime, and any representation of the defendant by other attorneys that accrues to his benefit. 20 531 F.2d at 1286-87 (footnotes omitted). Uptain involved a request for a continuance to enable counsel to interview potential witnesses, among other things. The Fifth Circuit noted that this was a particularly common reason offered to justify a request for postponement, and the court made additional observations that guide our inquiry: 21 The panels of this court that have ruled on such claims have considered the diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 22 531 F.2d at 1287 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Miller, 513 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir.1975). Applying the pertinent factors to the case before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's requests. 23 To the extent appellant's claim is based upon his inability to interview witnesses, it must be rejected. We assume for purposes of this case that counsel was diligent in his efforts to locate witnesses prior to trial. The fatal flaw in appellant's argument remains. The district court granted every request made by counsel to compel the presence of potential witnesses. Appellant does not suggest the name of even one other witness who could have been located if a continuance had been granted. This alone is sufficient to refute appellant's contention that postponement was necessary. Uptain, 531 F.2d at 1289. Compare Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir.) (denial of continuance, which prevented defense from presenting non-cumulative, relevant testimony of alibi witness, violated right to compulsory process), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878, 103 S.Ct. 173, 74 L.Ed.2d 142 (1982). It is true counsel's questionings were conducted on the eve of trial, and in some cases, after proceedings had commenced. Yet we find nothing to indicate that this somehow inhibited his ability to conduct these interviews, many of which could have taken place during a weekend recess. 24 We also reject the claim that the general lack of time to prepare for trial requires that we conclude the district court abused its discretion. Garmany was indicted on November 9, 1983, his attorney entered an appearance two weeks later, and trial did not commence until the first week in January. The record indicates that Garmany and his attorney met at least once prior to the indictment. It is true that the adequacy of preparation time was decreased for a number of reasons. According to Dinsmore, he had to attend to other matters for the first three weeks following the entry of his appearance. We are, however, wary of countenancing eleventh-hour requests for additional time made by lawyers who claim they have been too busy to prepare for trial. 25 More important are the allegations that prison officials denied counsel access to his client during the post-indictment period. These contentions, although serious if true, are not sufficient to persuade us to reverse Garmany's convictions, as we are not convinced that denial of the continuance prejudiced Garmany's defense. See United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (11th Cir.1984). The case against Garmany was relatively straightforward, both factually and legally. To be sure, the government's case, bolstered with the testimony of several of Garmany's partners in crime, was a strong one. Therefore, appellant had a difficult task indeed in attempting to avoid conviction. Yet, Dinsmore, an experienced criminal defense attorney, subjected nearly every government witness to rigorous cross-examination. In fact, appellant does not suggest any specific deficiencies in Dinsmore's performance. Nor is there any indication that more time would have permitted Dinsmore to prepare additional necessary pretrial motions, or to develop a stronger case for the defense. 26 Finally, with respect to discovery from the prosecution, although the government did not provide much material to the defense through this process, there is no indication that the government violated any discovery order or that the lack of discovery was in fact prejudicial. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's denial of appellant's request for a continuance did not constitute an abuse of discretion.