Opinion ID: 4525104
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The victim was helpless.

Text: All murders are “senseless” because of their brutality and finality. Yet not all are senseless as the term is used to distinguish those first degree murders that warrant a death sentence from those that do not. Rather, a “senseless” murder is one that is unnecessary to achieve the Defendant’s objective. 11 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court “Helplessness” means the victim is unable to resist. You may not consider the age of the victim in any way in deciding whether the murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner. (Emphasis added). Allen argues that the italicized language is contradictory and made it impossible for the jury to both ignore A.D.’s age and find she was a child, thereby rendering the verdict void. Because Allen did not object to the jury instruction, we review for fundamental error. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19. ¶33 The jury instruction is facially contradictory because the jury had to consider A.D.’s age to decide whether she was a child.2 But “we will not reverse a conviction unless the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the jurors.” State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, 526–27 ¶ 35 (2015) (quoting State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 384 ¶ 37 (2010)); see also State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 576–77 ¶ 17 (2000) (“[E]rror in a jury instruction is reversible if the instruction, taken as a whole, supports a reasonable presumption that the jurors would be misled.”). ¶34 The record does not reflect that jurors were confused by this instruction. See Bass, 198 Ariz. at 577 ¶ 17 (“[M]ere speculation that the jury was confused is insufficient to establish actual jury confusion.” (quoting State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 11 (1994)). That A.D. was a child was not disputed at trial. Instead, the focus of the parties’ arguments to the jury regarding this aggravator was whether Allen had a caregiver relationship with A.D. See State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 417 ¶ 11 (App. 2003) (“[I]n evaluating the jury instructions, we consider the instructions in context and in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel.”). Also, the prosecutor in closing argument referred to the instruction and told the jury it could not consider A.D.’s age when determining whether she was helpless. Thus, in context, the most natural reading of the instruction was that the jury had to determine whether: (1) Allen had a caregiver 2 The trial court and the parties may have believed that the jury could not consider A.D.’s age in finding both the heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravator and the age-of-victim aggravator. This is incorrect. See State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 307 ¶ 22 (2007) (permitting the use of one fact to find multiple aggravators). 12 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court relationship with A.D., a child; (2) the murder was senseless; and (3) A.D. was helpless. In making the third determination, the jury was prohibited from considering A.D.’s age. Although the instruction could have been worded better, the trial court did not commit reversible error, much less fundamental error, by giving it. b. Sufficiency of the evidence ¶35 Allen argues the State failed to prove that A.D.’s murder was especially heinous or depraved. Because Allen did not raise this objection to the trial court, we review only for fundamental error. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19. ¶36 The State alleged the murder was especially heinous or depraved because the murder was senseless and A.D. was helpless. See Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52 (listing these factors among three others that can support an especially heinous or depraved finding). Allen does not contest the existence of these factors. But “[s]enselessness and helplessness, without more, are ordinarily insufficient to prove heinousness or depravity,” State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 250 (1997), because they are “less probative of the defendant’s state of mind” than are the other factors, State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 281 (1996). Something “more” exists when the victim is a child with whom the defendant maintained a parental or caregiver relationship, as the State asserts here. See State v. Villalobos, 225 Ariz. 74, 84 ¶ 44 (2010); State v. Prince, 206 Ariz. 24, 27 ¶ 10 (2003). Allen argues the State failed to prove he had a caregiver relationship with A.D. ¶37 Allen relies on State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104 (1993). Styers lived with a woman and her four-year-old son, Christopher, whom he babysat when his mother went to work during the week. Id. at 108. One December Saturday, Styers announced he was going to a shopping mall and agreed to take Christopher along after the child said he wanted to see Santa Claus. Id. After picking up a friend and getting lunch, Styers told Christopher they were going to the desert to look for snakes. Id. Instead, after traveling to a remote area in the desert, Christopher was shot in the head three times, and his body was left in a wash. Id. Styers was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to die. Id. at 109. Among other aggravating factors, the trial court found that the murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner. Id. at 115. 13 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court ¶38 This Court agreed with the trial court’s finding, concluding Christopher was helpless and the murder was senseless. Id. We explained: The victim, a four-year-old child, trusted defendant, his baby-sitter. Defendant used this trust and played upon the child’s favorite things—Santa Claus and hunting for snakes— to lure him into a desolate desert wash so he could execute him. Christopher was dependent upon defendant for care while he was away from his mother. He was helpless when defendant and [the friend] took him and killed him. Although there was no legal “parent/child” relationship, defendant and victim did share a special relationship in that defendant was the child’s full-time caregiver for several months before he killed him. This fact illustrates the depravity of defendant and makes the crime even more senseless and the victim especially helpless as to this defendant. Id. at 115–16. ¶39 Allen argues that unlike Styers’ role as fulltime babysitter for Christopher, he was only A.D.’s “some-time caregiver,” thus distinguishing Styers. But this Court’s analysis did not depend on the amount of time Styers babysat Christopher. Rather, Christopher’s trust in Styers due to their relationship—caregiver and child—and the betrayal of that trust formed the basis for the Court’s finding that the murder was especially depraved and thus separate from the “norm” of first degree murders. See id. ¶40 Sufficient evidence shows that Allen had a caregiver relationship with A.D. adequate to cause A.D. to trust that Allen would care for her well-being and making her murder during the exercise of that caregiver role something “more” than the senseless murder of a helpless child. See Villalobos, 225 Ariz. at 84 ¶ 44. Allen and A.D. lived in the same house. He, along with the other adults living in the house, shared in caring for A.D. and the other children, and he considered A.D. a family member. 14 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court Allen took part in decisions regarding A.D.’s welfare, such as deciding whether she should be seen by a therapist for habits attributed to an abusive background. Allen was also routinely involved in disciplining A.D., and when he did so by having her spend “time outs” in the box, she obeyed his directives. According to Allen, she initially tried to escape the box but eventually quit because “she knew [Allen and Sammantha] would eventually let her out” of the box. ¶41 At the time A.D. was murdered, Allen and Sammantha were responsible for supervising A.D. She got into the box at Allen’s direction and without protest, trusting she would be released unharmed. By locking the box to prevent A.D.’s escape and then leaving her there unsupervised while he went to bed, Allen betrayed that trust, thus demonstrating his depravity and separating this murder from the “norm” of other murders. See Styers, 177 Ariz. at 116. ¶42 Allen also argues that the “happenstance” of a caregiver relationship is insufficient to demonstrate a depraved mental state at the time of the murder. See Carlson, 202 Ariz. at 584–85 ¶¶ 53–55 (finding mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relationship coupled with helplessness was insufficient to prove depravity and cautioning against “expand[ing] the concept of relationship as an aggravating factor”). But as described, Allen was not merely an occasional babysitter; his relationship with A.D. was more akin to the one in Styers and other cases where the defendants murdered their live-in partners’ children and heinousness or depravity was found. See Villalobos, 225 Ariz. at 84 ¶ 44; State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 368 (1986). ¶43 In sum, substantial evidence supports a finding that Allen committed the murder in an especially heinous or depraved manner.