Opinion ID: 2799553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim One – Collateral Estoppel

Text: Wade argues in his first claim for relief that principles of collateral estoppel barred the admission in his second trial of evidence suggesting that he possessed a firearm. 1 First, a few words on procedural default. Wade objected at trial to the admission of the firearm evidence under principles of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy, and both the trial court and the Ohio Court of Appeals considered this claim on the merits. See Wade II, 2008 WL No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 12 366143, at –. Thus, Wade has not procedurally defaulted this claim and we will proceed to the merits.4 2 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Constitution’s protection against double jeopardy “embodie[s]” the “extremely important principle” of collateral estoppel, which provides “that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 445 (1970). In Ashe v. Swenson, a group of masked men armed with guns robbed six men who were playing poker. Id. at 437. State prosecutors unsuccessfully tried Ashe for robbing one of the men at the poker game but, in a second trial held six weeks later, Ashe was convicted of robbing another one of the players. Id. at 438–40. The Supreme Court determined that Ashe’s acquittal in the first trial barred the prosecution from trying him again for the robbery “because, in the circumstances of that case, the acquittal verdict could only have meant that the jury was unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was one of the bandits.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990). Thus, the “second prosecution was impermissible because, to have convicted the defendant in the second trial, the second jury had to have reached a directly contrary conclusion.” Ibid. The Supreme Court in Ashe set out an approach for applying collateral estoppel in criminal cases that “requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” 397 U.S. at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). As recognized by the Ohio Court of Appeals, collateral estoppel serves as a complete bar against a subsequent prosecution where a fact necessarily determined in the first trial “is an essential 4 Appellee agrees that “Claim [O]ne is not procedurally defaulted.” Appellee Br. 30. No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 13 element of the subsequent prosecution.” Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at  (citing Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446). As is relevant here, “collateral estoppel can also bar certain evidence in a subsequent trial” where such evidence involves “an issue of ultimate fact that was determined by a valid and final judgment.” Id. at  (citing Dowling, 493 U.S. at 347). a In its collateral-estoppel analysis, the Ohio Court of Appeals first considered Wade’s contention that the jury in his first trial necessarily determined that he did not possess a gun during the relevant course of events. Id. at . The court explained that Wade admitted to stealing C.B.’s property, but was still acquitted by the first jury of aggravated robbery (defined as “attempt[ing] or commit[ing] a theft offense while possessing a deadly weapon”) and all firearm specifications. Ibid. Moreover, “the jury asked during its deliberations whether [Wade] must have had a deadly weapon to find him guilty of aggravated robbery . . . [and t]he trial court replied in the affirmative.” Ibid. Therefore, according to the Ohio Court of Appeals, “the first jury actually decided that appellant did not possess a gun during the offenses and it is not conceivable that a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on any other issue.” Ibid.5 The Ohio Court of Appeals then analyzed whether this issue addressed in the first trial was an issue of ultimate fact in Wade’s subsequent prosecution for kidnapping. As the court correctly recognized, to find Wade guilty of kidnapping in this case, the State had to prove that he “restrained [C.B.’s] liberty using force,” ibid. (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.01); however, the statutory definition of “force” did not require the State to prove that Wade used a firearm. Ibid.; see Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.01(A)(1) (“‘Force’ means any violence, compulsion, or 5 We do not necessarily agree that this is the case. In a brief filed before the Supreme Court of Ohio in the instant case, the State argued that the first jury did not necessarily find that Wade did not possess a gun, but instead could simply have believed that Wade’s gun was inoperable or fake because there was no evidence presented at trial about operability. Thus, the first jury could have declined to convict on the firearm specifications and aggravatedrobbery count because it did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was a deadly weapon. This would not be relevant to the rape, the State argued, because the gun would not have to be operable to convict on that count: To establish the compulsion by force necessary for rape, it would be enough for Wade to have compelled C.B. to submit by causing her to perceive a danger. The Supreme Court of Ohio did not reach the issue, and the Ohio Court of Appeals maintained at all stages that the first jury concluded that Wade did not possess a firearm. As a result, we will assume Wade’s characterization of the first jury’s verdict to be true for the purposes of this appeal. Cf. Hardy v. Beightler, 538 F. App’x 624, 631 (6th Cir. 2013) (Ordinarily, “the burden is on the defendant ‘to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.’”) (quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at 350). No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 14 constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.”). In fact, Wade could have been convicted of kidnapping without the State ever proving that he had a gun. Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at –6. Therefore, according to the Ohio Court of Appeals, the State was not barred under collateral-estoppel principles from admitting evidence that Wade possessed a gun during his attack of C.B. After resolving the collateral-estoppel issue, the Ohio Court of Appeals went on to determine that the firearm testimony was “otherwise admissible” under Ohio rules of evidence because it was “inextricably related to the charges and provides a complete picture of the sequence of events.” Id. at . As the parties recognize, these determinations by the Ohio Court of Appeals are subject to deference under AEDPA because they resulted from “adjudicat[ion] on the merits in State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, this court must deny habeas relief on Wade’s collateralestoppel claim unless the Ohio courts’ adjudication was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Ibid. b Wade contends that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied the ultimate-fact inquiry of Ashe v. Swenson to the issue of “force” in the kidnapping charge by failing to conduct its analysis in a “practical” manner. Appellant Br. 22. According to Wade, the Ohio court failed in this regard when it stressed that there were “other ways to establish the element of force for” kidnapping besides Wade’s use of a firearm, Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at , while ignoring that the State “did not [actually] rely upon any alternative theory of force.” Appellant Br. 23. Wade maintains that “the State could have argued that [he] committed kidnapping without the gun testimony. That theoretical case, however, is irrelevant. What matters for the purposes of collateral estoppel is what the State did argue.” Id. at 24. Furthermore, Wade contends that the Ohio Court of Appeals reached a legal conclusion—i.e., that Wade’s firearm possession was not an issue of ultimate fact in the second trial—incompatible with its recognition that “‘[t]here is a substantial likelihood that the [second] jury considered [Wade’s] alleged use of a gun in finding the element of force.’” Id. at 27 (quoting Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at  n.7). Thus, according to Wade, “the State necessarily asked the second jury to reach ‘a directly contrary conclusion’ to No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 15 that of the first jury on the question of whether Wade possessed a gun.” Ibid. (quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348). It is true that collateral estoppel should not be applied in a “hypertechnical” manner, “but with realism and rationality.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444. The Supreme Court has stressed that the collateral-estoppel “inquiry ‘must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.’” Ibid. (quoting Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)). After engaging in this “practical” analysis, we conclude that the determination by the Ohio Court of Appeals that the State was not barred from admitting evidence that Wade possessed a firearm did not involve an unreasonable application of Supreme Court doctrine or an unreasonable determination of the facts. i The Supreme Court has described “ultimate facts” in the estoppel context as being those that are “necessary to the judgment” at issue. Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 835 (2009). Under this approach, a “determination ranks as necessary or essential only when the final outcome hinges on it.” Ibid.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 629 (8th ed. 2004) (An “ultimate fact” is simply “[a] fact essential to the claim or the defense.”). Here, it is undisputed that possession of a firearm is not an essential element of kidnapping under Ohio law. Rather, for the charge of kidnapping in this case, the State was required to prove “force” beyond a reasonable doubt, and such proof may or may not involve the use of a gun. Thus, we must examine whether, in this particular case, the State’s theory of force made it necessary to prove that Wade possessed a firearm to establish that essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 285 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A fact previously determined in a criminal case is not an ‘ultimate fact’ unless it was necessarily determined by the jury against the government and, in the second prosecution, that same fact is required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.”). While it is true that the central focus of the State’s theory of force at both trials was Wade’s possession of a firearm, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that other evidence could reasonably have supported a jury’s conclusion that Wade committed the force necessary for kidnapping without having a gun. Specifically, testimony that Wade, who was taller and heavier No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 16 than C.B., forcibly pushed his way into C.B.’s apartment and blocked her exit could reasonably have convinced a jury that Wade restrained his victim’s liberty by force. See Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at ; Wade III, 2008 WL 1723671, at . The State clearly introduced direct and pervasive testimony that Wade possessed a gun throughout his attack and used that weapon to compel C.B.’s compliance; however, the State elicited other important testimony regarding C.B.’s compliance as well. On redirect examination, C.B. testified that even if Wade did not have a gun, “[f]or the most part [she] would have put up a fight, but if [she] felt like [her] life was in danger, [she] would have complied,” and she called attention to her “comparison [in] size” to Wade. Thereafter, she confirmed as “correct” that she might still have feared for her safety with Wade in her apartment even if he were not armed. On recross-examination, C.B. disputed defense counsel’s characterization that “if [Wade] didn’t have the gun [she] wouldn’t have complied,” stressing that “being [her] size . . . [and] depending on the situation, [she] could have possibly complied . . . without the gun.” When asked again whether she would not have complied but for the gun, C.B. said that she “wouldn’t have complied as much, but if [she] felt that [her] life was in danger or if [Wade] was going to do something to [her, she] would have [complied], depending on the situation.” Based on such evidence, we cannot say that the Ohio court’s determination was unreasonable. Wade makes much of the statement by the Ohio Court of Appeals that the “evidence other than the gun testimony that could support a finding of force in this case . . . was minimal.” Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at  n.7. Appellee correctly points out that this statement technically was made in reference to the rape offense, and not the kidnapping, see Appellee Br. 26; see also Sheets I, 2012 WL 870221, at  (“This statement . . . relates to [Wade’s] rape conviction, not to evidence of force involved in the kidnapping charge.”)—though, as Wade suggests, there was considerable overlap between the State’s narrative of force for the kidnapping and rape offenses. In any event, the question is not whether the non-firearm evidence was minimal in relation to the firearm-related evidence of force, but rather whether it was independently sufficient to support a jury’s conclusion that the State proved force beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, could a reasonable jury have heard all the evidence presented at trial and concluded both that Wade did not possess a gun and that Wade committed the force required for a kidnapping conviction? The Ohio Court of Appeals answered this question in the No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 17 affirmative, see Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at ; Wade III, 2008 WL 1723671, at , and the reasonableness of this conclusion is difficult to question because that is what the Ohio courts and the parties here contend the jury did in Wade’s first trial. See Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at  (“[A]lthough the first jury determined that appellant did not have a gun, it nevertheless found appellant guilty of rape and kidnapping, thereby finding the element of force beyond a reasonable doubt even without a gun.”).6 As a result, Wade’s argument that “the State necessarily asked the second jury to reach ‘a directly contrary conclusion’ to that of the first jury on the question of whether Wade possessed a gun,” Appellant Br. 27 (emphasis added), is, under Wade’s own theory, mistaken: The second jury could have concluded that Wade forcibly restrained C.B.’s liberty while believing that Wade did not have a gun, just as the first jury is presumed to have done.7 ii A brief survey of decisions by other circuits supports the conclusion that Wade’s possession of a firearm is not an issue of ultimate fact in this case. Under closely analogous circumstances, the habeas petitioner in Clarke v. Spencer argued that the prosecution in a subsequent trial for rape and kidnaping was barred from presenting evidence that he had a gun during the offenses because a previous jury had acquitted him of “assault and battery with a 6 See also Appellant Br. 16, 7 (“[T]he first jury exonerated Wade of possessing a gun,” but “found Wade guilty of rape and kidnapping.”). Our approach does not involve giving improper “deference to the first jury’s kidnapping conviction.” Appellant Reply Br. 11 n.1. Rather, the first jury’s verdict simply lends empirical support to the Ohio court’s determination that the non-firearm evidence could support a determination of the force element beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, it demonstrates that Wade’s assertion that “it was not possible to convict this defendant without proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a gun,” Appellant Br. 30, is tenuous. 7 It is true that the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that the [second] jury considered [Wade’s] alleged use of a gun in finding the element of force,” Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at  n.7—though, as discussed above, this statement refers to the rape count, and not the kidnapping. See supra p. 16. Thus, “[t]here is at least a theoretical possibility that in the second trial” each juror convicted Wade of kidnapping “based on individual determinations that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he used the [gun], resulting in a verdict contrary to that rendered by the first jury.” Santamaria v. Horsley, 133 F.3d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). However, as explained by the Ninth Circuit in a similar case, “even if we should rest our decision upon such a theoretical possibility, such a verdict would be directly contrary to that of the first jury only if no juror would also find [the defendant] guilty under . . . the other . . . theories” of the crime, id. at 1248—here, that Wade restrained C.B.’s liberty by forcibly entering her apartment and blocking her exit. As determined by the Ohio Court of Appeals, a reasonable juror could have concluded exactly that based on the other evidence of force presented. Even if a juror believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Wade used a gun, that is not mutually exclusive with the belief that Wade also committed other acts of force in restraining C.B.’s liberty that did not involve the gun. No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 18 dangerous weapon, rape by penetration with a gun, and aggravated rape, which may be proven by the use of a gun during the rape.” 582 F.3d 135, 145 (1st Cir. 2009). The First Circuit rejected the collateral-estoppel claim, stressing that neither the rape nor the kidnapping counts required the prosecution to prove that the petitioner had or used a gun. Id. at 146. Therefore, there was “no double jeopardy problem, even assuming the [previous] jury . . . determined that [the petitioner] did not use a gun during these crimes.” Ibid. Similar to Wade, the defendant in Santamaria v. Horsley was acquitted of a sentenceenhancement charge for “us[ing] a deadly weapon (a knife) in the commission of a felony,” but convicted of the underlying felonies of murder and robbery. 133 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). After the murder conviction was overturned because of an error in jury deliberations, the prosecution retried the defendant and again introduced evidence that he used the knife to commit the murder. Ibid. On habeas review, the Ninth Circuit stressed that under the applicable state law, the prosecution need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a knife to convict for murder. “Therefore, the use of a knife [was] not an ultimate fact for the retrial, and the State cannot be precluded from presenting evidence that [the defendant] stabbed the victim.” Id. at 1247. In United States v. Gil, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a collateral-estoppel claim raised by a defendant who argued that his acquittal on a charge of possession of cocaine meant that the government was foreclosed from introducing evidence suggesting that he came into contact with cocaine during retrial for conspiracy. 142 F.3d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir. 1998). The court stressed that touching cocaine was not an element of conspiracy to possess cocaine. Ibid. “Thus, even if the jury found that [the defendant] did not touch the cocaine, it did not determine an ultimate issue with regard to the conspiracy count . . . .” Id. at 1401–02; see also id. at 1402 (“[R]egardless of whether the jury found reasonable doubt as to whether [the defendant] touched the cocaine, the government may introduce the . . . evidence because ‘touching’ is not an essential element of the conspiracy charge.”). Similarly, in United States v. Brackett, the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel did not bar the government from reintroducing evidence in a drug-conspiracy prosecution where the defendant was previously acquitted of knowingly possessing drugs. 113 F.3d 1396, 1401 (5th No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 19 Cir. 1997). While evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed drugs was “relevant to establish [his] voluntary participation in the conspiracy,” it was “not required to prove the essential elements of the offense.” Ibid. Like the Ohio Court of Appeals in the instant case, each of the circuit courts in the cases discussed above relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). See Clarke, 582 F.3d at 147 (citing Dowling); Santamaria, 133 F.3d at 1247 (same); Gil, 142 F.3d at 1402 (same); Brackett, 113 F.3d at 1400–01 (same). In Dowling, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution was not barred from introducing evidence of a prior robbery of which the defendant was acquitted as evidence of other crimes or bad acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Id. at 349–50. Crucially, the Dowling Court “decline[d] to extend Ashe v. Swenson and the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances . . . relevant and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted.” Id. at 348. This decision was “consistent” with the principle that a prior acquittal “does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Id. at 349. In this case, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that the testimony asserting that Wade possessed a gun was “otherwise admissible” because it was “inextricably related” to Wade’s crimes and provided the jury with “a complete picture” of the relevant events. Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at . Even if we view the outcome of Wade’s first trial in the manner that Wade and the Ohio courts suggest, “all that can be determined from the . . . verdict is that the jury found the government had failed to prove the existence of a gun ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Clarke, 582 F.3d at 146 (emphasis added). However, the standard for admitting relevant evidence is lower: relevant evidence is admissible if it is probative, “mak[ing] the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence.” Ohio R. Evid. 401; see also Clarke, 582 F.3d at 146. Thus, the Supreme Court’s holding in Dowling supports the conclusion that the “relevant and probative” firearm evidence in this case is not barred by collateral estoppel “simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted.” 493 U.S. at 348. No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 20 This is because “the standard governing the admissibility of evidence” in Wade’s second trial was “lower than was the burden of proof in the first trial.” Brackett, 113 F.3d at 1402. “Under . . . Dowling, therefore, the government [was] not collaterally estopped from introducing the same evidence in the [second] prosecution.” Ibid.; cf. Gil, 142 F.3d at 1402 n.5 (Assuming it is “otherwise admissible,” “a juror might find the . . . evidence to be probative of [the defendant’s] alleged knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy to possess cocaine . . . , even if that juror did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime of possession of cocaine . . . .”). Wade’s argument that Dowling’s “narrow holding” provides only a limited exception to Ashe in cases where “evidence from a prior acquittal in an unrelated proceeding” is admitted in a subsequent case “as ‘other-acts evidence’ under Rule of Evidence 404(b),” Appellant Br. 28, is not persuasive. First, there is no clear Supreme Court precedent establishing that the central principle of Dowling is limited solely to the Rule 404(b) context. Moreover, Wade’s argument is inconsistent with the approach taken by the other circuits cited above, which each applied Dowling in situations that did not involve 404(b) evidence. See, e.g., Brackett, 113 F.3d at 1402 & n.11 (“In Dowling, the contested evidence concerned extrinsic evidence of other bad acts, admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). In the instant case, however, the evidence is intrinsic evidence directly relevant to the conspiracy charge and thus is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 401– 03.”). In light of these facts, the Ohio court’s reliance on Dowling in this case, and its conclusion that “Dowling clarified the scope of the Ashe holding,” 2008 WL 366143, at  n.4, is not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA. iii Our conclusion is not undermined by Wade’s reliance on Rice v. Marshall, 816 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1987), a case that admittedly does involve circumstances that are “strikingly similar,” Appellant Br. 24, to those here. In Rice, the defendant was acquitted of having a weapon while under disability (i.e., being a felon), but the jury failed to reach a verdict on related rape and kidnapping charges. At retrial, defense counsel failed to object to the evidence regarding the use of a firearm during the rape and kidnapping because “[i]t did not occur to” him that Ashe might bar the use of such evidence and because “there was other evidence of force and No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 21 threats of force sufficient to satisfy these elements of the kidnapping and rape charges.” 816 F.2d at 1129–30. This court concluded that defense counsel was deficient in not seeking exclusion, and that the defendant was prejudiced, because “[w]hile there was some evidence of other force and threats of force, testimony about the presence of the gun and the way it was handled and brandished was far more pervasive and direct.” Id. at 1132. Despite these factual similarities, there are crucial factors that militate against applying Rice in the instant case. Importantly, Rice predates AEDPA, under which habeas relief is now inappropriate unless “the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000) (Section 2254(d)(1) “modifies the role of federal habeas courts in reviewing petitions filed by state prisoners.”); Garcia v. Dretke, 388 F.3d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 2004) (Ashe’s requirements “must be considered under the AEDPA standard.”). Here, unlike in Rice, Wade’s trial counsel objected to the firearm evidence. Thus, the state courts addressed Wade’s collateral-estoppel claim on the merits and made a determination, to which this court owes deference, that the other evidence of force was sufficient to support a jury’s verdict.8 Furthermore, Rice also predates Dowling, which, at the very least, clarifies the scope of the Supreme Court’s collateral-estoppel doctrine. Cf. Brackett, 113 F.3d at 1401 n.9 (“Dowling effectively limits the doctrine of collateral estoppel to cases in which the government seeks to relitigate an essential element of the offense.”). To the extent that Rice evinces a more expansive view of collateral estoppel, we must heed the Supreme Court’s admonitions against “relying on [our] own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly established’” for AEDPA purposes. Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam). Therefore, we reject Wade’s collateral-estoppel claim and conclude that the State was not barred from introducing the firearm evidence in Wade’s second trial. 8 As explained above, this determination is directly supported by the verdict reached by the jury in Wade’s first trial, a circumstance also not present in Rice. See supra pp. 16–17. No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 22 B. Claim Two – Limiting Instruction and Due Process Wade argues in his second claim for relief that even if the State were permitted to introduce the firearm evidence in his second trial, federal constitutional principles of due process required “a limiting instruction prohibiting the jury from considering Wade’s alleged firearm possession in determining his guilt.” Appellant Br. 30. 1 Wade’s due-process claim is subject to procedural default, as there is no dispute that Wade’s trial counsel did not request a limiting instruction at trial on the kidnapping count and failed to raise an independent due-process claim before the Ohio courts regarding the lack of a limiting instruction.9 Following the State’s reconsideration application, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that Wade forfeited any error regarding the lack of a limiting instruction for the non-rape counts, and thus the court reviewed the claim only for plain error. Wade III, 2008 WL 1723671, at –2. That the state court engaged in plain-error review “does not save a petitioner from procedural default.” Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[P]lain error review does not constitute a waiver of state procedural default rules.”). Moreover, Wade’s state appellate counsel failed to raise trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance stemming from the forfeiture of the due-process claim on direct appeal before the Ohio courts, leading to the procedural default of the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim as well. In order to overcome a procedural default, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate both cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged error of federal law. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). To establish cause, a petitioner must demonstrate “that an ‘objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply’ with the state procedural rule.” Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Murray v. 9 See Wade III, 2008 WL 1723671, at  (Wade’s counsel “did not request a limiting instruction for the gun testimony for any count other than the rape count.”); Appellant Br. 36 (“Wade presumes for the sake of argument that trial counsel’s failure to ask for a limiting instruction resulted in a default of his due-process claim.”). No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 23 Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).10 To establish prejudice, a petitioner must “sho[w] that the trial was infected with constitutional error.” Ibid. Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute “cause” and “prejudice” in this context, but the claim of ineffective assistance itself must have been fairly presented in the state courts or it too is subject to procedural default. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000). Thus, in order to rely on an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim to excuse the default of the underlying due-process claim regarding the limiting instruction, Wade must also demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default of that ineffective-assistance claim by showing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See ibid. To succeed in making the necessary showing of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Wade must demonstrate that his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel rose to the level of a constitutional violation under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir. 2004). To meet this burden, Wade must demonstrate both that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that he was prejudiced by the representation—i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. In the appellate context, “[c]ounsel’s failure to raise an issue on appeal could only be ineffective assistance if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue would have changed the result of the appeal.” McFarland, 356 F.3d at 699. Normally, we would “decide the procedural question of whether [Wade] is entitled to pursue [his] claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel before we reach the merits of that claim.” Ibid. However, on occasion, this court has reached beyond the procedural-default analysis to address the underlying claim on the merits when it “present[s] a more straightforward ground for decision.” Arias v. Hudson, 589 F.3d 315, 316 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). Here, Wade cannot establish prejudice from the alleged 10 In this case, the relevant state procedural rule is Ohio’s contemporaneous-objection rule, pursuant to which trial counsel’s failure to raise the instruction issue before the trial court resulted in forfeiture. See LeFort v. Century 21-Maitland Realty Co., 512 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ohio 1987) (“An appellate court will not consider any error which a party complaining of a trial court’s judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court’s attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.”). No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 24 errors of counsel regarding the due-process claim unless the underlying claim itself had a “reasonable probability” of success if raised. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “Because that [prejudice] inquiry necessitates delving into the actual merits of the claim, it makes sense here . . . to consider those merits in the first instance.” Young v. Trombley, 435 F. App’x 499, 502 (6th Cir. 2011). 2 In his due-process claim, Wade contends that submitting the firearm evidence to the jury without a limiting instruction subjected him to a trial so unfair as to violate his due-process rights under the Constitution. Wade faces a very high burden on this claim. The Supreme Court has made clear that “not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). As expressed by this court, a habeas petitioner’s claimed error regarding “jury instructions must be so egregious that [it] render[ed] the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Without such a showing, no constitutional violation is established and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). In our review, “[t]he only question” is whether the absence of the limiting instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Furthermore, we must “bear in mind” the Supreme Court’s “admonition” that it has “‘defined the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly.’” Id. at 72–73 (quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352). When viewed in the context of the jury instructions and trial record read “as a whole,” id. at 72, we cannot say that the failure to give a limiting instruction on the kidnapping charge was an error “so egregious” that it rendered Wade’s “entire trial fundamentally unfair.” White, 431 F.3d at 533. There was sufficient other evidence of force—namely, that Wade was significantly larger than C.B., forced his way into her apartment, blocked her exit, lay on top of her, and raped her, as well as C.B.’s testimony that she could have feared for her safety and complied without the gun—for a reasonable jury to conclude that Wade kidnapped C.B. without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a gun. Indeed, as stressed earlier, adopting Wade’s understanding of the first jury’s verdict all but compels this very conclusion. See Wade No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 25 II, 2008 WL 366143, at  (“[A]lthough the first jury determined that appellant did not have a gun, it nevertheless found appellant guilty of rape and kidnapping, thereby finding the element of force beyond a reasonable doubt even without a gun.”). In fact, when reviewing for plain error following the State’s application for reconsideration, the Ohio Court of Appeals itself could not “say that the outcome of [Wade’s] kidnapping conviction clearly would have been different but for a limiting instruction as to the gun testimony.” Wade III, 2008 WL 1723671, at . After reviewing the other evidence of force in the record, the court determined that a reasonable jury could have found the force required for kidnapping even without evidence of the gun. Ibid.11 Similarly, following Wade’s application for reopening, the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected Wade’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel regarding the limiting instruction in light of “[t]his same evidence” of force unrelated to the gun. Wade IV, No. 06AP-644, slip op. at 5. The parties 11 Wade argues that the differing outcomes of Wade II (reversing his convictions) and Wade III (reinstating his non-rape and non-aggravated-burglary convictions) following the State’s application for reconsideration clearly demonstrate that Wade’s kidnapping conviction was only reinstated because trial counsel’s failure to object led to plain-error review regarding the lack of a limiting instruction. See Appellant Br. 39–40. In Wade II, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed all of Wade’s convictions after determining that the trial court “abused its discretion” by not giving a limiting instruction on the rape offense. 2008 WL 366143, at . The court also stated that the non-firearm evidence of force was “minimal,” id. at  n.7, and that absent a limiting instruction, “there was a significant danger that the jury in the second trial would find the element of force for rape based upon evidence that the appellant had a gun.” Id. at . After the State stressed in its reconsideration application that Wade’s counsel failed to object on the kidnapping charge, the court reviewed for plain error and reinstated his conviction on that count. It is true that the Court of Appeals reinstated the kidnapping conviction after reviewing for plain error; however, the change in standard of review was not the only basis of the State’s application for reconsideration or of the court’s resulting decision. In addition to the plain-error forfeiture issue, the State argued that the Wade II court’s reversal on all counts was flawed simply because it went “beyond what the claimed error regarding the rape count can justify.” And, in its decision granting the State’s application, the court held that “[t]he trial court’s error in not providing [the] instruction [on the rape charge] did not necessarily implicate [Wade’s] other convictions.” Wade III, 2008 WL 1723671, at . It is not necessarily true, then, that the Court of Appeals would have affirmed the reversal of Wade’s kidnapping conviction under a more generous standard of review. Cf. Sheets I, 2012 WL 870221, at  (The statements in Wade II regarding “minimal” evidence and “substantial likelihood” “relat[e] to [Wade’s] rape conviction, not to evidence of force involved in the kidnapping charge.”). Moreover, the Wade III court also affirmed the reversal of Wade’s aggravated-burglary conviction, even under plain-error review, because, unlike for kidnapping, there was “no other evidence” to establish a threat of physical harm for that charge besides the gun. Wade III, 2008 WL 1723671, at . This lends further support to the notion that the change in standard of review was not the only dispositive issue on reconsideration. No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 26 dispute the extent to which we may apply AEDPA deference to such determinations made in a plain-error context.12 In any event, given the presence of the other evidence of force, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury to restrict its view of the firearm evidence rises to the level of a constitutional-due-process violation. This is especially true in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). Furthermore, our decision comports with recent holdings by the Supreme Court and this court establishing that a defense counsel’s failure to request—or a trial court’s failure to give—even an appropriate limiting instruction will not require reversal where other evidence in the record supports conviction. For example, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Supreme Court reversed a grant of habeas corpus after determining that, even if defense counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction regarding the outcome of an accomplice’s prior trial were deficient representation, the failure was not prejudicial because there was still “ample evidence in the record to support [the defendant’s] guilt under either theory” of the crime. 560 U.S. 370, 390–91 (2010) (noting that the defendant was identified by a surviving victim, was captured on a surveillance camera, and had confessed to a friend). Notably, the Supreme Court reached this result even under a de novo standard of review without having to determine whether AEDPA deference applied. Ibid. Similarly, in Leberry v. Howerton, this court determined that trial counsel’s failure, even if deficient, to request a jury instruction explaining that accomplice testimony must be corroborated did not “cas[t] doubt on the fairness of [the defendant’s] trial” or “undermin[e] confidence in the outcome” because other “corroborating evidence,” including medical testimony and victim and witness identifications, supported the defendant’s conviction. 583 F. 12 Compare Frazier v. Jenkins, 770 F.3d 485, 496 n.5 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[P]lain-error review is not equivalent to adjudication on the merits, which would trigger AEDPA deference.”), with id. at 506 (Sutton, J., concurring in part) (“[A] state court’s plain-error review of an issue may receive AEDPA deference when the state court addresses the merits of the federal claim.”), Lee v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1210 (11th Cir. 2013) (State court plain-error review that reaches the merits of a federal claim “is an adjudication ‘on the merits’ for purposes of § 2254(d) and thus AEDPA deference applies to it.”), and Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2009) (Plain-error review “can be considered [an] ‘adjudicat[ion] on the merits’ for the purpose of receiving deference under AEDPA.”). No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 27 App’x 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2014). As a result, the defendant could not “show a substantial chance that even if the proper instruction had been given, the outcome of the trial would have differed,” and, therefore, the failure to give the instruction did not violate his federal constitutional rights. Ibid. In addition, even where a state appellate court had concluded that a limiting instruction regarding certain evidence should have been given by the trial court, this court in Puertas v. Overton affirmed the denial of habeas relief because the failure to instruct the jury “did not result in a miscarriage of justice,” in part because of the existence of other relevant and powerful evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 168 F. App’x 689, 703 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the defendant participated in several controlled buys of illegal narcotics). Given the Ohio courts’ view that the jury in Wade’s first trial determined that he did not have a gun, it might have been desirable for the trial court to have instructed the second jury to limit its consideration of the firearm evidence—though the proper wording of such an instruction is difficult to envision. However, for Wade to succeed on his due-process claim on federal habeas review, it is not enough that “the instruction[s]” as given were “undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we reject Wade’s due-process claim on the merits, and do not need to determine whether the procedural default of this claim was excused.