Opinion ID: 62392
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Salaried Retirees' ERISA-estoppel claim

Text: Next, the Salaried Retirees assert that AUSA misrepresented the existence of guaranteed lifetime medical benefits and is therefore estopped from asserting either that Plan B does not vest or that it may be amended, modified, or terminated at AUSA's will. Specifically, the Retirees argue that the language in the SPD is misleading and ambiguous because employees were led to believe that separate, personal medical accounts were created upon retirement. [9] They argue that retirees, such as Nichols, relied on AUSA's misrepresentations when they retired early because they were led to believe that they would receive medical credits for life. Once again, we agree with the district court that the Retirees are unlikely to succeed on this claim as they failed to establish the requisite elements of an ERISA-estoppel claim. In order to establish an ERISA-estoppel claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon that representation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances. Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444-45 (5th Cir.2005). ERISA-estoppel is not permitted if based on purported oral modification of plan terms. Id. at 446 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Also, there can be no reasonable reliance on informal documents in the face of unambiguous Plan terms. Id. at 447; see High v. E-Systems, Inc., 459 F.3d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 2006) ([A] `party's reliance can seldom, if ever, be reasonable or justifiable if it is inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous terms of plan documents available to or furnished to the party.' (quoting Sprague v. GMC, 133 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir.1998))). Based on our review of the record, the Salaried Retirees have not satisfied either of the first two elements. [10] First, they have not established any material misrepresentation. When the Plan documents are examined in whole it is clear that the Plan language indicates that none of the benefits in the Plan vested and that AUSA explicitly reserved the right to change or terminate the Plan at any time. Second, even assuming that there had been a material misrepresentation, the Salaried Retirees have not established the second element: reasonable and detrimental reliance upon that representation. The district court highlighted that none of the named Retirees or witnesses who testified admitted to ever reading or relying on the aforementioned provision that they claim is misleading. Thus, there could have been no detrimental reliance. Further, even assuming arguendo that some Retirees had read that provision, any reliance would have been unreasonable as the SPD explicitly states that AUSA reserved the right to change or terminate the Plan, as well as medical credits, at any time. As this Court has previously stated, the SPD must be read as a whole. It would be error to attend only to one paragraph, page, or portion of the summary. McCall v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Co., 237 F.3d 506, 512 (5th Cir.2000). Similarly, the Salaried Retirees' argument that the use of terms such as annuity and works like a savings plan misled them into thinking the medical credit was a vested benefit is unavailing. Once again, not only does the SPD explicitly state that the Plan does not create a vested right, but as noted in McCall, it would be unreasonable for a person who sees the word annuity or the phrase works like a savings account to conclude that the Plan created a vested right when those words are read in the context of the entire SPD. As AUSA observed in its brief, the Salaried Retirees' argument relies on isolated terms taken out of context and having nothing to do with the clear reservation of rights clauses. We agree.