Opinion ID: 4208265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Concurrence

Text: While I do generally concur in the merits decision itself (including parts I and II and the portion of the opinion which precedes them), I do so with a caveat and with some exceptions as to language that I consider unnecessary, overbroad, or otherwise problematic. 1. Caveat—Throughout the opinion, the language used might be taken to declare that there must be two separate (non-overlapping) steps that a hearing officer must take in 1 To avoid referring to both financial ability and alternative conditions each time, I will hereafter just use the former to include both, unless otherwise stated. HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS 47 making a bond determination: first, the officer must determine if the alien can be released at all; 2 and second, if the alien meets the first step, the officer’s remaining determination must be made based upon the nature of the alien’s financial ability only. To the extent that the opinion could be read that way, it should not be. Rather, a myriad of factors go into deciding the release question, 3 and all we say here is that financial ability must be part of that mix. As I see it, the majority opinion merely requires that hearing officers must consider financial ability along with the rest of the farrago of factors that they consider. 2. Exceptions a. I do not join the discussion in the fourth paragraph of part II.A. For example, while there is a serious danger in a failure to consider financial ability, I do not agree that reasonable decisions are unlikely without it. Moreover, the effectiveness of various approaches is best decided at trial rather than by accepting claims in an amicus brief. b. I do not join in the discussion in the sixth through tenth paragraphs of part II.A. because I am not convinced that cases prohibiting the criminal punishment of persons who cannot afford to pay judgments of one kind or another are significantly similar to the case at hand. c. I do not fully join the discussion in the fifteenth paragraph of part II.A. because I am not satisfied that consideration of potential alternative conditions of release imposes “almost no [administrative] costs” or that the 2 See for example notes 3 and 18 of the majority opinion. 3 See, e.g., In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006). 48 HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS preliminary injunction, as written, will impose a “minimal burden” on the government. d. I do not join in the third paragraph of part II.B., or in the conclusion therein. e. I do not join the fourth and fifth paragraphs of part II.C. to the extent that they signal an approval of the full scope of the injunctive order which we are reviewing. f. I do not join the third and fourth paragraphs of part II.D., which I see as unnecessary and problematic. For example, I do not think we should be deciding public policy issues based upon how we think the government should spend its money in an area as fraught with controversy as immigration.