Opinion ID: 1572758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MEANING OF SECTION 627.727(6)(b)

Text: On the merits, I believe that the majority utilizes an improper plain meaning analysis to determine that resolution of a UM claim is a condition precedent to bringing a subrogation claim. As the Second District accurately observed in Dominion, the Florida Legislature uses more plain language than what exists here when it wishes to impose a condition precedent. Dominion, 754 So.2d at 856-57 (noting that the statute does not impose final resolution as a condition precedent or employ language that no action for subrogation may be filed until then, listing examples). Importantly, the Legislature expressly utilizes condition precedent language throughout the Insurance Code, but it is conspicuously missing in section 627.727(6)(b). See e.g., § 624.155(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008) (As a condition precedent to bringing an action under this section, the department and the authorized insurer must have been given 60 days' written notice of the violation.); § 627.4136(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (It shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance of a cause of action against a liability insurer by a person not an insured under the terms of the liability insurance contract that such person shall first obtain a settlement or verdict against a person who is an insured under the terms of such policy for a cause of action which is covered by such policy.); § 634.3284(3), Fla. Stat. (2008) (As a condition precedent to bringing an action under this section, the department and the insurer shall be given written notice of the violation.). Even without using the exact phrase condition precedent, the statute does not state that the subrogation claim can be brought only upon final resolution of the UM claim. See Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So.2d 1089, 1094 (Fla. 2008) (We conclude that if the Legislature had intended for section 440.20(11)(c) to constitute an explicit exception, it would have been explicit....). Accordingly, I do not agree that the Florida Legislature used plain language to create a condition precedent. See Fla. Wildlife Fed'n v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 390 So.2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1980) (If the [Legislature had meant for the special injury rule to be preserved in the area of environmental protection, it could easily have said so.). With section 627.727(6)(b), the Legislature stops short of making final resolution of the UM claim a substantive condition precedent to filing a subrogation claim. In this case, I agree that the statutory language would prohibit Metropolitan from bringing a third-party action because the UM policy does not provide otherwise. However, the absence of condition precedent language in section 627.727(6)(b) leaves open the possibility that contractual language could alter the timing of when a subrogation claim could be brought. See generally Bodden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 F.App'x 858 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing a UM policy requiring the insured to file a lawsuit against both the tortfeasor and UM carrier and to secure a judgment in that action). Reading a condition precedent requirement into the statute improperly eliminates the opportunity for parties to contractually modify the timing of a subrogation action to be consistent with when a third-party action is available pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.180. See Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 943 So.2d 823, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ([I]nsurance policies are deemed to incorporate applicable statutes, and conflicting policy provisions must give way.), quashed on other grounds, 967 So.2d 815 (Fla.2007).