Opinion ID: 2299396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prior-Acts Evidence

Text: In his second point of contention on appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice abused his discretion by admitting evidence of two prior instances of defendant's violent acts against Hilario. To support this argument, defendant maintains that the evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against Hilario was insufficiently relevant and unnecessary to prove motive or intent to kill. Further, defendant argues that this evidence should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because its admission was improper, as unfairly prejudicial. Lastly, defendant maintains that, even if some evidence of prior wrongs was admissible   , the state went much too far with its presentation in this case, which itself [constitutes] prejudicial, reversible error. After similar arguments were articulated by defendant at the pretrial hearing on his motion in limine to exclude such evidence, the trial justice ruled that evidence of defendant's two prior instances of violence against Hilario, both occurring in May 2007, were admissible. The trial justice concluded that the two acts clearly go to intent, and the probative value of this evidence far outweighs any prejudice to the defendant because it really does create a complete picture of the relationship between the parties, and the acts are so intertwined    that [such evidence] should be admitted. As a result, the state introduced evidence at trial about an event in early May 2007, when defendant pushed Hilario to the ground, an event that precipitated the breakup, as well as an incident occurring on May 18, 2007, two days before the murder, when defendant stabbed Hilario's mattress with a knife. It is well settled that evidentiary determinations remain within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not interfere with the trial justice's decision unless a clear abuse of [that] discretion is apparent. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147 (R.I.2009) (quoting State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I. 2005)). Applying this deferential standard, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the prior-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of proving defendant's intent. Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable. This language unequivocally prohibits the use of propensity evidence; that is, evidence to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. Rule 404(b); State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 150 (R.I.2010). However, the rule also makes clear that such evidence is admissible to show a fact that tends to prove that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d at 151 (quoting State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412, 424 (R.I.1998)). Further, [e]vidence of other conduct, even of a criminal nature, may be received if it is interwoven with the current charge in a way that tends to establish `guilty knowledge, intent, motive    or the like.' State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (quoting State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 926 (R.I.2005)). In this case, evidence of defendant's prior conduct was integrally related to the murder of Hilario on May 20, 2007. As an initial matter, both earlier events involved the same parties and occurred in the same place, within only weeks or days of the murder in question. Further, the May 18, 2007 incident during which defendant repeatedly stabbed decedent's mattress involved the same or similar instrumentality that eventually was used in the murder. These facts were carefully and properly weighed by the trial justice, which led him to conclude that the prior acts were intertwined with what ultimately took place on [May 20, 2007]. Each event precipitated the next and culminated in the gruesome murder of Hilario. The incident of violence in early May resulted in Hilario ending her relationship with defendant, which infuriated defendant and escalated into the May 18, 2007 incident. At that time, defendant harassed Hilario and stabbed her mattress numerous times. This violent outburst was followed, only days later, by the vicious stabbing murder of Hilario. The extent that these prior acts are interwoven reflects directly upon, and is highly probative of, defendant's motive and intent to murder Hilario. Evidence of a prior threat made by a defendant is relevant to the question of whether the defendant `acted with malice or premeditation, or whether he had a motive to commit the crime.' State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1098 (R.I.1982) (quoting 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 201 at 414-15 (13th ed.1972)); see also State v. Rios, 996 A.2d 635, 639 (R.I.2010) (holding that the defendant's previous threatening behavior toward the victim was highly probative of his motive). Contrary to defendant's contention, this evidence's high probative value clearly outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. [34] [I]t is only when evidence is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that a trial justice must exclude it. State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 997 (R.I.2011) (quoting State v. DeJesus, 947 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I.2008)). Therefore, we find no error in the trial justice's decision to allow admission of this evidence. Moreover, we recognize that the trial justice carefully weighed the risk of unfair prejudice and took affirmative efforts to ensure that the testimony offered was not unfairly prejudicial. First, he barred the introduction of evidence of a more remote incident of violence against Hilario, fearing that admitting such evidence would extend Rule 404(b) too far and create an unnecessary and substantial risk of unfair prejudice against defendant. See Mlyniec, 15 A.3d at 998 (holding that admittance of prior-acts evidence was not unfairly prejudicial after observ[ing] that in an effort to ensure that the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial, the trial justice carefully excluded the testimony because of its remoteness and its potential to be cumulative). Additionally, the trial justice further safeguarded against the risk of unfair prejudice by issuing an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury. [35] Consequently, we discern no clear abuse of discretion in the introduction of the evidence of defendant's two prior acts of violence against Hilario.