Opinion ID: 2798272
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extradition Treaty

Text: Patterson first argues that the 1998 extradition treaty between the United States and South Korea prohibits his extradition because his prosecution would be untimely. The question is whether the treaty’s lapse-of-time provision, which states that extradition “may be denied” when the prosecution would have been barred by the relevant statute of limitations in the United States, imposes a mandatory bar to extradition. We conclude that it does not impose a mandatory bar. Article 6 of the extradition treaty between the United States and South Korea provides, in part: Lapse of Time Extradition may be denied under this Treaty when the prosecution or the execution of punishment of the offense for which 8 PATTERSON V. WAGNER extradition is requested would have been barred because of the statute of limitations of the Requested State had the same offense been committed in the Requested State. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-S. Kor., art. VI, June 9, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12,962 (“Treaty”) (emphasis added). That is, if a person cannot be prosecuted for a crime in the United States because the relevant statute of limitations has expired, extradition to South Korea for that crime “may be denied.” Id. The parties agree that Patterson has been certified for extradition for a crime for which he cannot now be prosecuted in the United States. The magistrate judge certified Patterson for extradition only for second-degree murder, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of probable cause for premeditated murder. The magistrate judge then applied the five-year federal statute of limitations for second-degree murder, see 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), for the purpose of addressing the lapse-of-time provision of Article 6. The government challenges neither the finding of probable cause nor the application of the federal statute of limitations. However, the government contends that the lapse-of-time provision of Article 6 is not judicially enforceable. We begin with the text of the treaty. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”). Article 6 provides, “Extradition may be denied.” Treaty, art. VI (emphasis added). The normal reading of “may” is permissive, not mandatory. The most natural reading of Article 6, therefore, is that untimeliness is a discretionary PATTERSON V. WAGNER 9 factor for the Secretary of State to consider in deciding whether to grant extradition. That is, the Secretary “may” decline to extradite someone whose prosecution would be time-barred in the United States, but he or she is not required to do so. Under this reading, there is no mandatory duty that a court may enforce. Cf. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]t is the Secretary’s role, not the courts’, to determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This reading of Article 6 is consistent with our decision in Vo. In that case, Vo was arrested in the United States for bombing the Vietnamese embassy in Thailand. 447 F.3d at 1238–39. When Thailand sought to extradite him, Vo argued that the relevant treaty barred his extradition. The treaty stated that extradition “may be denied when the person sought is being or has been proceeded against” (i.e., prosecuted) in the extraditing country for a related crime. Id. at 1238 (emphasis added). We rejected Vo’s argument that the “maybe-denied” language barred the judge from certifying his extradition, holding that the language meant that a proceeding for a related crime was a discretionary factor to be considered by the Secretary of State in deciding whether to extradite. Id. at 1246. We wrote that, as a general matter, [t]he two types of exception [i.e., mandatory and discretionary] are characterized by different language in extradition treaties. The use of “shall” language in a treaty indicates a provision constitutes a mandatory exception. . . . The use of “may” language in 10 PATTERSON V. WAGNER a treaty indicates a provision constitutes a discretionary exception. Id. at 1246 n.13. Patterson contends that our reading of “may be denied” in Vo does not apply to that same language in Article 6. Patterson argues that evidence from the treaty’s drafting and negotiating history demonstrate that, despite the use of the “may-be-denied” language, Article 6 was intended to be a mandatory bar to untimely extradition requests. Patterson further argues that the magistrate judge erred by ignoring this evidence. We agree with Patterson that extra-textual evidence is relevant to treaty interpretation, but we disagree with him on the significance of that evidence in this case. While “[t]he interpretation of a treaty . . . begins with its text,” Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506, it does not end there. Because the purpose of treaty interpretation is to “give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties,” Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985), courts — including our Supreme Court — look to the executive branch’s interpretation of the issue, the views of other contracting states, and the treaty’s negotiation and drafting history in order to ensure that their interpretation of the text is not contradicted by other evidence of intent. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15–20 (2010) (examining these factors following its textual analysis); Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508–13 (same); see also Vo, 447 F.3d at 1246 n.13 (consulting a letter of submittal from the Secretary of State). In this case, the extra-textual evidence, considered as a whole, reinforces the interpretation of Article 6 for which the PATTERSON V. WAGNER 11 government argues. Patterson points to evidence that he contends shows that both the Senate and the executive branch understood Article 6 to impose a mandatory bar. But this evidence falls short of establishing that either the Senate or the executive branch understood the treaty in this way. First, Patterson argues that the Senate Report accompanying the treaty shows that the Senate understood Article 6 to be mandatory. He points to the Report’s summary, which states, “The Treaty with the Republic of Korea precludes extradition of offenses barred by an applicable statute of limitations.” S. Exec. Rep. No. 106-13, at 5 (1999) (“Report”). Patterson argues that this language shows that the lapse-of-time provision of Article 6 is mandatory, not permissive. But the body of the Report calls that reading into question. The more detailed technical analysis of the treaty, contained in the body of the Report, describes Article 6 in permissive terms, stating that extradition “may be denied” and explaining that the Korean and U.S. statutes of limitations operate so differently that “this provision could be very difficult to implement.” Id. at 14. The technical analysis points to three extradition treaties that have what it characterizes as “similar provisions.” Id. Tellingly, two of those treaties use the word “shall,” and one uses the word “may.” Compare Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Fr., art. 9(1), Apr. 23, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-13 (“shall”), and Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Japan, art. IV(3), Mar. 3, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 892 (“shall”), with Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Lux., art. 2(6), Oct. 1, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-10 (“may”). When parties to a treaty intend to make an exception to extradition mandatory, in other words, they know how to state that it “shall” apply. 12 PATTERSON V. WAGNER Second, Patterson argues that the hearings on the treaty show that the Senate understood Article 6 to be mandatory. He points to an exchange between Senator Rod Grams and John Harris, the Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs at the Department of Justice, during the Senate hearing. But to the extent the exchange supports either reading of Article 6, it only weakly supports Patterson’s contention that the Senate understood the provision to be mandatory, and it shows fairly clearly that the executive branch understood it to be permissive. The exchange is as follows: SENATOR GRAMS: Article 6 of the proposed treaty bars extradition in cases where the law of the requested State would have barred the crime due to a statute of limitations having run out. ... So the question is are you confident that this article of the treaty adequately insures that fugitives cannot simply run out the clock by fleeing to Korea? MR. HARRIS: Senator, this article of the treaty was the subject of considerable negotiation. As you may recall, of the treaties that were before the Senate last fall, most of them had slightly different language. Many of PATTERSON V. WAGNER 13 our most modern extradition treaties flatly state that the statute of limitations of the requesting State will apply. We have a few in which it was not possible to reach that resolution. In this case, because of the specific provisions of Korean law, we did agree that the statute of limitations of the requested State would apply. But, as you have indicated, the specific language in the article is crafted so that those factors which toll the statute of limitations under the law of the requesting State would be given weight. Report at 37 (emphasis added). The import of the italicized portion of Senator Grams’s question is not clear. Senator Grams may have thought that Article 6 was a mandatory bar, as indicated in the italicized words, but he may have been speaking imprecisely. But even if Senator Grams was speaking precisely, he may have considered himself to have been informed to the contrary, and persuaded and corrected, by Mr. Harris’s answer. And even if he was speaking precisely, and even if he did not change his view after hearing Mr. Harris’s answer, Senator Grams was not speaking for the full Senate. By contrast, the import of Mr. Harris’s words, given on behalf of the executive branch, is fairly clear. He stated that Article 6 was the subject of “considerable negotiation,” and that the “specific language in the article is crafted” to give “weight” to a statute of limitations determination. Id. 14 PATTERSON V. WAGNER Additional evidence of the executive branch’s interpretation of Article 6 shows that the executive branch has interpreted Article 6 to grant discretion to the government to which the extradition request is made. The State Department’s official submittal letter, which accompanied the treaty when President Clinton submitted it to the Senate, described the treaty provisions. See S. Treaty Doc. No. 106- 2, at v (1999). In that letter, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott explained that “Article 6 permits extradition to be denied” when the prosecution would be untimely. Id. at vii (emphasis added). The submittal letter’s use of the word “permits” rather than “requires” indicates that the executive branch believed that Article 6 was permissive rather than mandatory. Taken as a whole, the extra-textual evidence reinforces the natural reading of Article 6. Under that reading, the Secretary of State may choose, in his or her discretion, whether to grant or deny extradition in a case where the statute of limitations in the United States has expired. Federal courts thus have no authority under Article 6 to dictate to the Secretary of State what he or she must do in such a case.