Opinion ID: 1371864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Inculpatory Statements Made During Pre-Arraignment Detention.

Text: Appellant next contends that his incriminating statements given to police are inadmissible because, although they were given after his arrest, they preceded his arraignment. Our statutory scheme has long provided that an accused must be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. NRS 171.178. But while this court has recognized the statutory requirement, we have also held that in the absence of a statutorily-fixed period of time, a reasonable time is presumed before an arraignment must be conducted. [7] Tellis v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 557, 560, 459 P.2d 364, 365 (1969). And the mere passage of time, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, does not constitute a deprivation of a defendant's rights. Id. Appellant was held in custody six days before his arraignment; however, he confessed to the crime after two and one-half days of detention. We find no prejudice as appellant was constantly advised of his rights and acknowledged that he understood them. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1942), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), confessions which resulted from an unreasonable pre-arraignment detention were excluded because the confessions resulted from a flagrant disregard of federal procedure. Although we are not bound by these decisions which deal with federal criminal procedure, it is clear that they were intended to avoid the adhesive practices which would spawn from administrative detention without judicial examination. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 584-85, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1960). It has been held, however, that these fears are not valid when an accused, as here, makes a voluntary confession after being fully informed of his Miranda rights. Appellant was informed of his Miranda rights on several occasions prior to his confession, signed a waiver card and acknowledged that he fully understood the import of the waiver. Moreover, the Miranda warning was amplified by the L.V.M.P.D. detectives as follows: I advised Mr. Deutscher that he had the right to remain silent; that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law; that he had a right to an attorney; if he could not afford one, one would be provided for him free of charge before any questioning. I also advised him that if he agreed to talk to us, at any time during that interview he wished to revoke those rights, he had a right also to do that. Asked him if he understood what I was telling him, that he understood these rights, and he indicated in the affirmative. Additionally, the several interrogations were of reasonable duration, conducted in a reasonable atmosphere and no irregularities were discernable from the record. We subscribe to the rule of law which provides that when an accused voluntarily waives his right to silence and his right to counsel, he concurrently waives his right to be seasonably arraigned. United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841, 99 S.Ct. 131, 58 L.Ed.2d 139 (1978); United States v. Woods, 468 F.2d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir.1972, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045, 93 S.Ct. 544, 34 L.Ed.2d 496 (1972); Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 419 F.2d 651, 655-56 (D.C. Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058, 90 S.Ct. 1383, 25 L.Ed.2d 676 (1970). The reason for this rule is that the primary purpose of an arraignment is to inform the defendant of his rights. But a delay in arraignment is not prejudicial when a defendant has already been advised of his rights, was promptly so advised, and voluntarily waived those rights. See Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. at 73-4, 419 F.2d at 655-56. This is particularly so when the delay is not flagrant and the record is silent relative to any other irregularities which go to the issue of voluntariness. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 334-38, 63 S.Ct. 608 (in which defendants in a custodial setting, were interrogated for periods of time in discomfort and without counsel and advice as to the right to counsel; confessions held inadmissible). Because the voluntary nature of a confession is the primary test for admissibility, State v. Boudreau, 67 Nev. 36, 46, 214 P.3d 135, 141 (1950), we now focus on whether the prearraignment delay affected the voluntariness of appellant's confession. The appellant only feebly challenges voluntariness here. In reviewing the particular circumstances gleaned from the record surrounding the statements and resulting confession, including the education, experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the credibility of the police officers, it is patent that the waivers were voluntary. The subsequent delay in arraignment did not retroactively result in prejudice so that appellant's rights were violated. Morgan v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 544, 546, 554 P.2d 733, 735 (1976); Brown v. Justice's Court, 83 Nev. 272, 276, 428 P.2d 376, 378 (1967).