Opinion ID: 4527710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Procedural Default Defense

Text: As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the state waived the procedural default defense. We conclude that it did not. “As a rule, a state prisoner’s habeas claims may not be entertained by a federal court when (1) a state court has declined to address those claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement, and (2) the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Maples v. 3 We granted a COA on the issues of whether the trial court violated Kimbrough’s due process rights by failing to rule on the competency motion and whether his trial counsel was ineffective for misadvising him that the court had ruled on the motion. Although our review is limited to the issues specified in the COA, Spencer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 609 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2010), we may “construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record.” Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998). Because the parties address procedural default in their briefs, and given the state postconviction court’s denial of Kimbrough’s claims on a state procedural ground (discussed below), we construe the COA to include procedural default. See also Rozelle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1009– 10 (11th Cir. 2012) (addressing a threshold issue “[n]ecessarily subsumed” within the COA, even though the COA did not expressly include the issue). Kimbrough argues that the COA includes a substantive due process challenge— specifically, that he was not competent to plead guilty. We disagree. A substantive competency claim alleges that a defendant’s due process rights were violated because he was incompetent when he stood trial or pled guilty; by contrast, a procedural competency claim alleges that the court should have conducted a competency hearing but failed to do so. See James v. Singletary, 957 F.3d 1562, 1569–72 (11th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing procedural competency claims from substantive competency claims). The COA grant—as well as Kimbrough’s successive Rule 3.850 motion and § 2254 petition—all center on the trial court’s failure to rule on the competency motion, not Kimbrough’s competency to plead guilty. Thus, from the issue specification, pleadings, and other parts of the record, we conclude that the COA incorporates a procedural competency claim only. See Murry, 145 F.3d at 1251. Kimbrough’s substantive competency claim is therefore outside the scope of the COA, and we do not consider it. 11 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 12 of 20 Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The burden is on the state to demonstrate that a procedural default occurred. Gordon v. Nagle, 2 F.3d 385, 388 n.4 (11th Cir. 1993). “Procedural default is normally a defense that the [s]tate is obligated to raise and preserve if it is not to lose the right to assert the defense thereafter.” Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also Hills v. Washington, 441 F.3d 1374, 1376 (11th Cir. 2006) (determining that the state waived its exhaustion-based procedural default defense by failing to raise it in the district court). Where the state fails to raise a procedural default defense, we are not required to raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte. Trest, 522 U.S. at 89. Here, though, we conclude that the state did raise a procedural default defense; it demonstrated that the state postconviction court’s decision rested on an independent and adequate state procedural ground. It is true, as Kimbrough points out, that in a section of the state’s responsive brief in the district court titled “EXHAUSTION/PROCEDURAL DEFAULT,” the state noted that Kimbrough’s competency claims were exhausted but failed to mention any other procedural default defenses. Doc. 28 at 9. However, in the “MERITS” section of its brief, the state argued that the state postconviction court’s denial of the successive Rule 3.850 motion was based on Kimbrough’s failure to present newly discovered 12 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 13 of 20 evidence—a state procedural requirement for filing a successive Rule 3.850 motion. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1). Thus, the state raised the argument that the postconviction court’s denial was based on a state procedural ground, even though it mislabeled the argument as merits-based. Indeed, Kimbrough recognized that the postconviction court denied his claims on a procedural ground by acknowledging in the district court that the postconviction court did not reach the “merits” of his competency claims. Doc. 35 at 33. The state raised the independent-and-adequate-state-procedural-ground defense in its responsive brief on appeal. Again, the state mischaracterized the defense as a merits-based argument. But despite that mischaracterization, the state raised the procedural default defense on appeal by arguing that the postconviction court correctly concluded that Kimbrough’s evidence was not “newly discovered” under Florida law. Appellee’s Br. at 26. Kimbrough acknowledges that procedural default defense: In his reply brief on appeal, he argued that the state’s “newly discovered evidence argument” fails because the postconviction court’s denial was not based on an independent and adequate state procedural ground. Reply Br. at 10. We conclude that the state has not waived the procedural default defense. The parties have addressed in some fashion—both in the district court and on appeal—the independent-and-adequate-state-procedural-ground defense. And 13 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 14 of 20 there is nothing in the record to suggest that Kimbrough would be prejudiced by our consideration of that defense. Therefore, we will consider it on appeal. 4 B. Independent and Adequate State Procedural Ground We now turn to whether the postconviction court’s denial of Kimbrough’s competency claims was based on an independent and adequate state procedural ground. We conclude that it was. We use a three-part test to determine whether a state court’s procedural ruling is based on an independent and adequate state procedural ground. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). First, the last state court rendering a judgment must “clearly and expressly state that it is relying on state procedural rules to resolve the federal claim without reaching the merits of that claim.” Id. Second, the state court’s decision must rest solely on state law grounds, and “may not be intertwined with an interpretation of federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, the state procedural rule must be adequate, meaning that it is not applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented fashion, nor can it be “manifestly unfair in its treatment of the petitioner’s federal constitutional claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 The state argues on appeal that Kimbrough’s claims are procedurally defaulted because they are unexhausted. By expressly acknowledging in the district court that Kimbrough’s claims were exhausted, however, the state waived its exhaustion defense. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (a state may waive the exhaustion requirement, provided that its waiver is expressly made). Thus, we do not consider the state’s exhaustion arguments. 14 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 15 of 20 The postconviction court’s denial of Kimbrough’s successive Rule 3.850 motion was based on the procedural requirements of Rule 3.850, which is an independent and adequate state procedural ground. See LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a state postconviction court’s denial of a defendant’s Rule 3.850 motion rested on an independent and adequate state ground where the court determined that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 3.850); see also Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d 1266, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 1990) (determining that the procedural requirements of Rule 3.850 constitute independent and adequate state grounds). Under Rule 3.850, a petitioner must file a motion for postconviction relief within two years of the criminal judgment, and any motion filed outside of that two-year period may not be considered unless the motion alleges that the facts on which the claims for relief are predicated could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1) (providing that no motion “shall be filed or considered pursuant to [Rule 3.850] if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final unless it alleges that [] the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant . . . and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”) 15 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 16 of 20 The postconviction court’s order clearly relied on Rule 3.850(b)(1) in denying the successive motion, as it (1) explained that Kimbrough had not demonstrated that he had newly discovered evidence, and (2) in support of that conclusion, cited Florida case law that discussed Rule 3.850’s newly discovered evidence exception to the two-year time limit. See Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313. Kimbrough notes that the postconviction court also cited his guilty plea as a reason for denying relief, which, he argues, indicates that the court did not rely solely on Rule 3.850 to deny his motion. But that is not how we read the postconviction court’s order. The postconviction court unequivocally stated—albeit without explanation—that the successive motion failed because “[t]he example given by [Kimbrough] [was] not newly-discovered evidence.” Doc. 30-6 at 68. Only after reaching that conclusion did the postconviction court cite an alternative ground for denying the motion: Kimbrough’s waiver of his right to challenge any issues arising prior to his plea by pleading guilty. The court’s identification of an alternative ground for denial does not change that it denied the motion for failure to comply with Rule 3.850. See Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a state postconviction court’s decision rested on an independent and adequate state procedural ground even where the court identified an alternative, merits-based ground for denial). 16 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 17 of 20 Further, the denial rested solely on state procedural grounds rather than federal law. The postconviction court did not cite to or otherwise reference federal law in its denial; its ruling was not intertwined with federal law. See Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313. And the procedural rule was adequate to support the denial. See id. For his successive motion to be timely, Kimbrough was required under Rule 3.850(b)(1) to demonstrate that newly discovered evidence—that is, evidence that he could not have discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence— supported his competency claims, and the postconviction court concluded the purported new evidence failed to meet that standard. Further, Kimbrough has pointed to nothing in the record showing that the postconviction court’s denial on that ground was arbitrary, unprecedented, or manifestly unfair.5 We are satisfied that the decision rested on an independent and adequate state procedural ground; we next consider whether Kimbrough can overcome the procedural default such that we can review his claims on federal habeas. 5 Kimbrough argues that the postconviction court’s “finding that [his] claims were not based on newly discovered evidence is manifestly unfair” because it was based in part on “an incorrect understanding that [he] previously raised the same competency claim” in his prior Rule 3.850 motions. Reply Br. at 13. We disagree that the postconviction court’s application of Rule 3.850 was manifestly unfair. Even if, as Kimbrough now argues, the postconviction court incorrectly concluded that he was raising the same competency claim as his earlier Rule 3.850 motions, he nonetheless was required to comply with Rule 3.850(b)(1) because his motion was filed more than two years after the state court entered judgment. 17 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 18 of 20 C. Cause and Prejudice To overcome this procedural default, Kimbrough must “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (1991).6 Kimbrough advances two reasons why he had cause for any default of his due process claim: (1) Reid’s ineffectiveness in misadvising him that the trial court had ruled on the motion; and (2) an “objective external impediment.” Reply Br. at 8–9. As to (1), Reid’s ineffectiveness cannot supply “cause” for the purposes of overcoming the procedural default on his due process claim. That is because, as we determined above, his ineffective assistance claim itself is procedurally defaulted. That claim could only serve as cause to excuse the procedurally-defaulted due process claim if the ineffective assistance claim itself satisfied the cause and prejudice standard. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (holding that an ineffective assistance claim can only supply cause to overcome the procedural default of another constitutional claim if the petitioner can show that cause and prejudice excused the procedural default of the ineffective 6 On appeal, Kimbrough does not argue that a fundamental miscarriage of justice excuses the procedural default. Thus, he has abandoned that argument, and we do not consider it. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that, when an appellant fails to raise an issue on appeal, the issue is deemed abandoned, and we will not consider it). 18 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 19 of 20 assistance claim itself). Kimbrough has not argued that the ineffective assistance claim itself is excused by cause and prejudice, so he cannot rely on it to show cause to overcome his procedural default of the due process claim. See id; see also Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). As to (2), Kimbrough asserts that the trial court’s failure to properly manage its case docket constitutes an objective factor that prevented him from raising his procedural due process claim earlier. Whether the trial court’s mismanagement of its docket constitutes “cause” is a closer question, but we conclude that Kimbrough has not made the requisite showing. True, it was through no fault of Kimbrough’s own that the trial court never acted on the motion for a competency hearing. See Alexander v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 371, 374 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that petitioner demonstrated cause for procedural default where his attempt to comply with a state procedural rule “was frustrated through no fault of his own”). But even though Kimbrough mistakenly thought the court had granted his competency motion and then vacated its ruling, he could have raised essentially the same due process claim in his initial Rule 3.850 motion that he raised in his successive Rule 3.850 motion—namely, that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing. Nothing about his claim was particularly novel, such that he was prevented from raising it on direct appeal or in his first Rule 3.850 motion. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that, “where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is 19 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 20 of 20 not reasonably available,” a defendant has “cause” to overcome procedural default). Nor was Kimbrough unfamiliar with the essential facts of his claim; he knew that his original counsel had filed a competency motion, and he knew that the court never held a hearing to determine whether he was competent. Kimbrough could have raised the issue of his competency at any time after his counsel filed the competency motion once he realized that he had not gotten a hearing, yet he failed to do so. We are unconvinced that the court’s mismanagement of its docket prevented Kimbrough from raising his competency claim before the two-year time for filing a Rule 3.850 motion expired. In sum, Kimbrough has failed to show “cause” to overcome the procedural default. His due process claim is thus procedurally barred from federal habeas review.