Opinion ID: 4469314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lead petition, 17‐1495

Text: In the lead petition, Enoh argues that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) breached its own confidentiality regulations when it disclosed to the Cameroon Embassy his membership in the outlawed Southern Cameroon National Council (“SCNC”) as part of an effort to obtain travel documents relevant to Enoh’s asylum application. The BIA concluded that there was no breach because DHS did not expressly reveal that Enoh had applied for asylum. We disagree. The regulations prohibit disclosure of information that is “contained in” or that “pertain[s] to” any asylum application. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6. This includes information sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant applied for asylum. For instance, this inference may arise from information that (1) reveals the applicant’s identity, (2) strongly suggests the applicant’s basis for 3 asylum, and (3) reveals the applicant’s presence in the United States or contact with the U.S. government. See, e.g., Zhen Nan Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 262, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006). In Enoh’s case, the government submitted Enoh’s name, the fact that he was in contact with U.S. immigration, and a document that reflected his membership in the SCNC, now outlawed in Cameroon, which was the basis of his application for asylum. This request revealed facts “that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum,” in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6. Id. Because the BIA failed to provide a reasoned basis for denying Enoh’s claim in light of the government’s clear violation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6, we hold that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Enoh’s motion to reopen. Kaur, 413 F.3d at 233‐34. Moreover, we find that Enoh has met his burden of presenting a prima facie case that he is eligible for asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT based on a new risk of persecution or torture in light of the government’s disclosure of his SCNC card and the treatment of SCNC members in Cameroon. See Zhen Nan Lin, 459 F.3d at 268; see also Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 564 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[While w]e might ordinarily remand for application of the proper standard[,] . . . in this case, we conclude as a matter of law that the evidence . . . in support of 4 [petitioner’s] motion to reopen constitutes prima facie evidence.”). This claim must be considered on remand. As we stated in Zhen Nan Lin, “[o]n remand . . . the BIA should consider the significant evidence – and any additional evidence [Enoh] produces – that points to [Enoh] having a well‐founded fear of persecution” or that Enoh will more likely than not be tortured “based on the governmentʹs violation of section 208.6, as well as any reliable evidence that may be produced by the government to the contrary.” Id. at 268.