Opinion ID: 414387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Heroin Withdrawal.

Text: 10 In the briefs presented to this court Holleman has advanced the argument that the confessions of October 21 and 26 were the product of his withdrawal from heroin. This argument, which was not presented to the Indiana Supreme Court, 1 raises the possibility that Holleman's petition contains an unexhausted claim that would require dismissal of the entire petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). We need not address this issue, however, as this claim was similarly not presented to the district court. It is a well-established general proposition that 'a litigant cannot present to this court as a ground for reversal an issue which was not presented to the trial court and which it, therefore, had no opportunity to decide.'  Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (quoting Desert Palace, Inc. v. Salisbury, 401 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir.1968)); United States ex rel. Moore v. Brierton, 560 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1285, 55 L.Ed.2d 794 (1978). 2 11 Even if the issue is properly before us the argument that Holleman confessed on October 21 and 26 because of his withdrawal from heroin is unpersuasive. Holleman has provided us with an impressive array of scientific authorities for the proposition that withdrawal from heroin is a lengthy and painful process. While we cannot quarrel with this as a general proposition, the record in this case indicates that the symptoms of withdrawal had diminished by October 21 and that, according to Holleman's own testimony, had disappeared by October 26. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the trial court erred in holding that these statements were not the product of heroin withdrawal. 12