Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Change of Venue Motions Brought in Santa Clara County

Text: After the case was transferred to Santa Clara County and before jury selection, defendant moved for a second change of venue, but the trial court denied the motion and it denied a renewed motion near the end of jury selection. Defendant challenges these rulings. (3) A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county. (§ 1033, subd. (a).) In deciding an initial motion to change venue, the trial court considers such factors as the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant, the popularity and prominence of the victim, and the nature and extent of the publicity. ( People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 434 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64].) The same factors apply to a motion for a second change of venue, except that the fact that venue has already been changed once affects the analysis. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 805; see People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 167 [276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169].) On appeal, a defendant challenging a trial court's denial of a motion for change of venue must show both error and prejudice: that is, that at the time of the motion it was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in the county, and that it was reasonably likely that a fair trial was not had. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 447 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947]; People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1126 [259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146]; People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 805-806.) We independently review the trial court's decision to deny the change of venue motion. ( People v. Cooper, supra, at p. 806.) With respect to the first factor, the nature and gravity of the offense, the kidnapping and murder of a young child and the false imprisonment of her friends are extremely serious offenses, but this factor alone does not compel a change of venue. Prospective jurors would sympathize with the girls' fate ... no matter where the trial was held, and this sympathy stems from the nature of the crime, not the locale of trial. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 808 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) As to the nature and extent of the media coverage, it is undisputed that Santa Clara County was inundated with press coverage of the case after the matter was transferred there. But this was both unsurprising and unavoidable, given the attention the case received from the state and national press, and would have occurred in any county to which the case was transferred. Consequently, a change of venue offered no solution to the publicity problem. ( People v. Manson, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 177.) To support his claim of an unduly prejudicial atmosphere in Santa Clara County, defendant emphasizes that, just before jury selection in that county, a source who was close to the case leaked details of defendant's case to a local television news station. But, as he concedes, such a leak could have occurred at any venue site. More importantly, defendant has not shown prejudice from the leaked information, as those details were admitted at trial. As to the size of the community, at the time of the trial Santa Clara County had more than 1.6 million residents and was the fifth most populous county in California. Therefore, even assuming that the county's residents were deluged with press coverage, the size of Santa Clara County's population suggests there was a reasonable likelihood of finding jurors who had relatively little knowledge of the case or who knew of the case but did not have fixed opinions. ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 523 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035].) Indeed, over a three-week period, the trial court was able to select 82 prospective jurors who were not disqualified for cause. Neither defendant nor victim Polly Klaas was a prominent member of the Santa Clara community. While Polly became well known after her death, she had no significant connection to Santa Clara County, unlike the county of her residence, Sonoma County. Defendant argues that, because both counties belonged to the same media pool, prospective jurors in Santa Clara County exhibited the same kind of personal and community involvement as prospective jurors did in Sonoma County. The record refutes this argument. The 330 Santa Clara County jury questionnaires indicate a level of personal and community involvement far below that of Sonoma County. Only 26 percent of the prospective jurors in Santa Clara County said the case had affected their lives, far less than the 72 percent who were affected in Sonoma County. Only 2 percent had improved the security around their homes as a result of the crime, a rate 10 times less than that of Sonoma County. Only 3 percent participated in the search for Polly, volunteered for the Polly Klaas Foundation, or gave money to the foundation, a rate nearly four times less than that of Sonoma County. The rate at which prospective Santa Clara County jurors knew one of the victims, the victims' families, a potential witness, or an attorney involved in the case was nine times less (1.5 percent) than that of Sonoma County (14 percent). The rate they listened to Polly's memorial service was three times less (12 percent) than that of Sonoma County (39 percent). The rate at which the prospective Santa Clara County jurors personally visited any of the crime scenes was five times less than that of Sonoma County. Among them, the social networking involving this case was over 12 times less than that of Sonoma County: Only 2 percent of the prospective jurors' family members, friends, or coworkers participated in the search; volunteered for, or gave money to, the Polly Klaas Foundation; knew the victims, the victims' families, a potential witness, or an attorney associated with the case; or visited the site where Polly's body was found. Finally, as a measure of the total personal and community involvement in this case, if we include any prospective juror who met at least one of the above criteria, 35 percent of the prospective jurors in Santa Clara County had some kind of personal or community involvement in this case, a rate far less than that of Sonoma County (84 percent). Significantly, the feelings of loss of the community's peace and security, so prevalent in Sonoma County, were virtually absent in the Santa Clara County questionnaires, which reflected the kind of sympathy one would expect in any venue for the murder of a young child (see People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 523), but not the heightened sense of loss that permeated the Sonoma County questionnaires. As evidence that he suffered prejudice, defendant claims that some of the 12 jurors selected for his trial exhibited the same kind of personal involvement found in Sonoma County, the original venue. We disagree. Defendant points out that only one of the 12 jurors, Juror No. 10, who was living in Texas when the crimes in this case occurred, knew relatively little about the case, but even she was aware of the crimes and the names involved because of national coverage. As discussed earlier, it would be an `impossible standard' to require empanelment of a jury untouched by pretrial publicity. ( People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 949-950, quoting Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at p. 723.) Although several jurors expressed sadness over Polly's death and the nature of the crime, these expressions were not unusual as [p]rospective jurors would have reason to sympathize with the victims and their families wherever the case was tried. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 225 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) That one of these jurors, a bar owner, allowed a patron to put up Polly's missing poster at the bar is hardly evidence of the kind of community involvement that was present in Sonoma County, the original venue. Defendant contends that most of the 12 impaneled jurors expressed, in either their questionnaires or on voir dire, prejudgment of defendant's guilt. For example, Juror No. 1, whom the defense unsuccessfully challenged for cause, wrote in his questionnaire that he thought defendant is most likely guilty as sin. During voir dire, however, Juror No. 1 explained that his written answer was flippant because he was anxious about the length of the trial and that he would try to set aside his preconceived notions, be impartial, and follow the law. In denying the challenge for cause, the trial court found him sincere, honest, and objective. Although a juror's declaration of impartiality is not conclusive and we are not bound by the trial court's findings, we give great weight to a trial judge's finding of fairness. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 807.) Moreover, as we discuss in greater detail below, defendant failed to exercise a peremptory challenge against this juror. The remaining jurors who expressed some preconceived notions of defendant's guilt said they could set aside their opinions and follow the law, and defendant challenged none of them. Moreover, in addition to not being challenged for cause by either party, all of these jurors expressed significant reservations about imposing the death penalty. Given that defendant conceded his guilt as to Polly's kidnapping and murder during the trial, the question of his punishment was the most critical contested issue in this case, and these jurors expressed views on capital punishment that the defense might well have regarded as favorable. (4) That defendant still had three unused peremptory challenges when the 12 impaneled jurors were seated is also significant. Unpersuasive is trial counsel's assertion that defendant was reserving these three challenges for three people who are still out there among the 42 remaining potential jurors who could not give Mr. Davis a fair trial because they prejudged this case. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 185-186 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) Even if the prosecution used one of its seven remaining peremptory challenges, the probability that one of defendant's three disfavored jurors would be called from the remaining 42 prospective jurors was low. Similarly, defendant did not use peremptory challenges to excuse any of the five alternate jurors selected. Because the existence of unused peremptory challenges strongly indicates defendant's recognition that the selected jury was fair and impartial, the failure of the defense to exhaust all peremptory challenges, without a reasonable explanation, can be a decisive factor, even in close cases, in confirming that the denial of a change of venue was justified. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 524; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 853-854 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) For the reasons given above, the trial court properly denied defendant's motions for a second change of venue, and the trial was properly held in Santa Clara County.