Opinion ID: 2085388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kotecki

Text: We agree with the City that Pension Code section 22-307 must be interpreted in accord with the Kotecki court's interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act. The cardinal rule of interpreting statutes, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In determining legislative intent, a court first should consider the statutory language. Moreover, a court will avoid an interpretation of a statute that would render any portion of it meaningless or void. Also, a court presumes that the legislature, in enacting a statute, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill.2d 190, 194-95, 172 Ill.Dec. 200, 595 N.E.2d 561 (1992). Reference to another statute by analogy is also a common method of interpretation and has been relied upon by this court on many occasions. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 145 Ill.2d 345, 351, 165 Ill.Dec. 875, 585 N.E.2d 606 (1991). As a noted authority has explained: On the basis of analogy the interpretation of a doubtful statute may be influenced by language of other statutes which are not specifically related, but which apply to similar persons, things, or relationships. By referring to other similar legislation, a court is able to learn the purpose and course of legislation in general, and by transposing the clear intent expressed in one or several statutes to a similar statute of doubtful meaning, the court not only is able to give effect to the probable intent of the legislature, but also to establish a more uniform and harmonious system of law. 2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 53.03, at 233 (5th ed.1992). Illinois courts have long recognized that the system for the compensation of injured police officers and firefighters under article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code is analogous to that established by the Workers' Compensation Act. Mitsuuchi, 125 Ill.2d at 493-94, 127 Ill.Dec. 1, 532 N.E.2d 830; accord Sweeney v. City of Chicago, 131 Ill.App.2d 537, 542, 266 N.E.2d 689 (1971). In the Pension Code, the legislature intended to motivate municipalities to provide police officers and firefighters with protections available to private employees under the Workers' Compensation Act. To encourage municipalities to enact ordinances pursuant to the Code, the legislature gave them the same protections available to employers under the Workers' Compensation Act. Fligelman v. City of Chicago, 275 Ill.App.3d 1089, 1091, 212 Ill.Dec. 329, 657 N.E.2d 24 (1995). Because of the similarity of language in the Pension Code and the Workers' Compensation Act, and because of the analogous compensation systems established in both statutes, the standards developed under the Act apply to the Code ( O'Donnell v. City of Chicago, 126 Ill.App.3d 548, 552, 81 Ill.Dec. 849, 467 N.E.2d 971 (1984)) and guide courts in interpreting the Code ( Fligelman, 275 Ill.App.3d at 1092, 212 Ill.Dec. 329, 657 N.E.2d 24). The appellate court did not consider these holdings to be relevant to the present case. 286 Ill.App.3d at 810, 222 Ill.Dec. 195, 677 N.E.2d 8. However, we agree with the City that, given the significant similarities between the Workers' Compensation Act and the Pension Code, an accommodation between the Pension Code and the Contribution Act should be made similar to that made between the Workers' Compensation Act and the Contribution Act in Kotecki. See Kotecki, 146 Ill.2d at 165, 166 Ill.Dec. 1, 585 N.E.2d 1023. As noted, Pension Code section 22-307 and section 5(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act use almost identical language to limit employers' exposure to suits. The plain language of section 22-307 limits the City's liability to any plaintiff seeking to recover damages for a firefighter's injury or death. The City's liability is limited to the payment of the allowances of money and of the medical care and hospital treatment provided in [the City's pension] ordinance. 40 ILCS 5/22-307 (West 1996). In addition to the largely identical language in these sections of the Pension Code and the Workers' Compensation Act, the purpose and operation of both statutes are identical. Both statutory schemes provide compensation on a no-fault basis to employees injured in the scope of their duties. In return, both statutory schemes sharply limit rights of action. And both statutes provide the employer with a statutory lien on a portion of the damages that an employee might obtain from a third party. So as the employer in Kotecki was entitled to the liability limitation that the Workers' Compensation Act provided as a trade-off for the no-fault compensation scheme, the City is entitled to the Pension Code's liability limitation because it participates in the no-fault compensation scheme under article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code. The appellate court stated several reasons to avoid this natural conclusion. These reasons are unpersuasive. The appellate court noted that the liability limitation of Pension Code section 22-307 applies to injured police officers and firefighters and, among others, `anyone who would otherwise be entitled to recover damages for such injury' or death. 286 Ill.App.3d at 811, 222 Ill.Dec. 195, 677 N.E.2d 8, quoting 40 ILCS 5/22-307 (West 1996). The court concluded that this provision does not include third-party plaintiffs seeking contribution for two reasons. First, citing the Contribution Act, the appellate court reasoned that a third-party contribution plaintiff does not recover damages for such injury, but rather is entitled to an apportionment of damages based on his or her pro rata share of the common liability. 286 Ill.App.3d at 811, 222 Ill.Dec. 195, 677 N.E.2d 8, citing 740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1996). However, this court has held that actions for damages include actions for contribution. Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill.2d 450, 457, 145 Ill.Dec. 894, 557 N.E.2d 873 (1990); accord Bradley v. Sandoz Nutrition Corp., 274 Ill.App.3d 381, 384, 210 Ill.Dec. 663, 653 N.E.2d 858 (1995). The appellate court also noted that the current version of the Pension Code (1963 Ill. Laws 161) predates the availability of contribution among tortfeasors in Illinois (see Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill.2d 1, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977)). According to the appellate court, since contribution was not recognized here when the legislature enacted the Pension Code, the legislature could not have intended to limit to any extent a third party's right of contribution against the City. 286 Ill.App.3d at 811, 222 Ill.Dec. 195, 677 N.E.2d 8. The appellate court's interpretation of Pension Code section 22-307 allows the City to be liable in contribution for the full amount of its percentage of fault. This interpretation essentially nullifies that section's plain language, which establishes limits on the City's liability. However, where there is an alleged conflict between two statutes, a court has a duty to construe those statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible. Lily Lake Road Defenders v. County of McHenry, 156 Ill.2d 1, 9, 188 Ill.Dec. 773, 619 N.E.2d 137 (1993); accord Jahn v. Troy Fire Protection District, 163 Ill.2d 275, 279-80, 206 Ill.Dec. 106, 644 N.E.2d 1159 (1994). The appellate court's conclusion that the liability limitation of Pension Code section 22-307 does not apply to third-party contribution plaintiffs contravenes this court's reasoning in Kotecki. In Kotecki, this court concluded that the liability limitation of section 5(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, which applies to any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 1996)), includes third-party contribution plaintiffs. Also, the Kotecki court found accommodation between the Workers' Compensation Act and the Contribution Act, notwithstanding the fact that the Workers' Compensation Act, like the Pension Code, predates the adoption of contribution among tortfeasors (1951 Ill. Laws 1060). The appellate court next found crucial differences between the plain language of the Pension Code and the Workers' Compensation Act. To the appellate court, these differences were sufficient to preclude an application of Kotecki to article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code. The appellate court first noted that the Workers' Compensation Act contains section 11, which provides that [t]he compensation herein provided    shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer. 820ILCS 305/11 (West 1996). The court then stated that the Pension Code does not contain similar language. Therefore, the court concluded, the liability of a municipal employer was not intended to be limited to the compensation provided for in article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code. 286 Ill.App.3d at 812, 222 Ill.Dec. 195, 677 N.E.2d 8. The appellate court's dissection of the Workers' Compensation Act was erroneous. Generally, a court determines the legislative intent in enacting a statute by examining the entire statute and by construing each material part or section of the legislation together, and not each part or section alone. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill.2d 304, 318, 138 Ill.Dec. 270, 547 N.E.2d 437 (1989); Huckaba v. Cox, 14 Ill.2d 126, 131, 150 N.E.2d 832 (1958). Specifically, in construing the Workers' Compensation Act, all portions thereof must be read as a whole, and in such a manner as to give them the practical and liberal interpretation intended by the legislature. Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill.2d 437, 444-45, 3 Ill.Dec. 715, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976), quoting Vaught v. Industrial Comm'n, 52 Ill.2d 158, 165, 287 N.E.2d 701 (1972). The plain language of section 5(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act clearly includes the purpose and meaning of section 11. As previously quoted, section 5(a) includes the phrase: other than the compensation herein provided. This obviously means that [t]he compensation herein provided    shall be the measure of the employer's responsibility. 820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 1996). The two phrases say the same thing. Section 5(a) limits an employer's responsibility to the requirements of the Act exactly as does section 11. Based on this plain language, it is quite settled that the meanings of these two provisions are closely related. In construing any one of them, they must be considered together. See 2 T. Angerstein, Illinois Workmen's Compensation §§ 952, 1831, 1832 (rev. ed.1952). We note that this court and commentators long have spoken of sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers' Compensation Act as operating together to limit the employer's liability to that provided by the Act. See, e.g., Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill.2d 455, 462-63, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222 (1990); W.C. Ropiequet & T. Keefe, Coverage of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 169, 183-84. Courts have also described section 5(a) alone as both (1) providing a substitute for an employee's previous rights of action against an employer and extending the liabilities of the employer, and (2) fixing limits to the amount to be recovered and covering the whole ground of the employer's liabilities. Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill.2d 15, 18, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969); see also Villanueva v. O'Gara, 282 Ill.App.3d 147, 152, 218 Ill.Dec. 105, 668 N.E.2d 589 (1996); Bloemer v. Square D Co., 8 Ill.App.3d 371, 372, 290 N.E.2d 699 (1972). The appellate court also misapprehended the plain language of Pension Code section 22-307. Sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers' Compensation Act have a clear analogue in Pension Code section 22-307. As previously quoted, section 22-307 includes the phrase: other than the payment of the allowances of money and of the medical care and hospital treatment provided in [the City's pension] ordinance. 40 ILCS 5/22-307 (West 1996). By this language, as with section 5(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, section 22-307 provides a substitute for a police officer's or a firefighter's previous rights of action against a municipality and extends the municipality's liabilities, but also limits the amount to be recovered under article XXII, division 3, and covers the whole ground of the municipality's liabilities under that article. The appellate court also concluded that a municipality's lien rights under the Pension Code were so different from those under section 5(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act as to preclude the application of Kotecki to article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code. The appellate court noted that, under Pension Code section 308, the City's lien against a firefighter's award from a third party is limited to the amount of medical and death benefits that the City paid out previous to such judgment or settlement. 40 ILCS 5/22-308 (West 1996). The appellate court stated that the City's lien would not include any money paid or payable after the judgment or settlement, or payments from the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund (see 40 ILCS 5/6-101 et seq. (West 1996)). The appellate court surmised that a private employer's liability under the Workers' Compensation Act could be much broader than a municipality's limited lien under Pension Code section 22-308. The court viewed Kotecki as balancing the competing interests of the employer, as a participant in a no-fault system of recovery, and the third party, who seeks to pay no more than its established fault. To the appellate court, the City's lien under section 22-308 does not reflect the fairest and most equitable balance between the competing interests of the tortfeasors. Since the City's lien does not reflect the full measure of the City's liability, then the rationale of Kotecki does not apply to this case. 286 Ill.App.3d at 812-13, 222 Ill.Dec. 195, 677 N.E.2d 8. We conclude that the difference in the lien rights of section 5(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act and Pension Code section 22-308 does not preclude an application of Kotecki to article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code. We agree with the City that Kotecki was not based on the reasonableness of that employer's lien, or the determination of any particular amount of compensation. Rather, this court looked to the underlying purpose of the workers' compensation scheme, which is in part to limit an employer's liability to what it is already paying in benefits under a no-fault system. That this purpose also applies to article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code can hardly be doubted. Mitsuuchi, 125 Ill.2d at 493, 127 Ill. Dec. 1, 532 N.E.2d 830. Kotecki reconciled this legislative intent to limit an employer's liability with a third party's right to contribution. Likewise, it can hardly be doubted that this reconciliation should apply to article XXII, division 3, of the Pension Code and the Contribution Act.