Opinion ID: 2637755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: bids attorney fees

Text: First, Copes argues that the district court erred by ordering her to reimburse BIDS attorney fees without first considering her financial resources and the burden such payment will impose as required by K.S.A. 22-4513(b). See Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 132 P.3d 934. In response, the State argues that Copes effectively contracted away her rights under K.S.A. 22-4513(b) in her plea agreement. Accordingly, the district court was not required to consider Copes' financial resources or the burden paying the BIDS attorney fees would have on her. K.S.A. 22-4513(a) requires that BIDS attorney fees shall be taxed against the defendant and shall be enforced as judgments for payment of money in civil cases. In setting the amount of the fee, K.S.A. 22-4513(b) requires the district court to take into consideration the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of such sum will impose. Applying that requirement, this court has held that a district court must consider these factors on the record at the time the fee is assessed. Robinson, 281 Kan. at 546, 132 P.3d 934; see State v. Phillips, 289 Kan. 28, 43, 210 P.3d 93 (2009). According to the Court of Appeals, these same rules do not apply if a defendant waives his or her statutory rights under Robinson and K.S.A. 22-4513(b) in a plea agreement. Copes did so, according to the Court of Appeals, because her plea agreement stated that [a]t the time of sentencing, my attorney will recommend . . . [t]hat I be required to pay the costs of this action, and pay appointed counsel fees in the amount to be determined. In so holding, the panel relied upon Perry, 39 Kan.App.2d 700, 183 P.3d 12. In Perry, a plea agreement required the defendant to pay `the costs of this action, and pay appointed counsel fees in the amount of $150.' Perry, 39 Kan.App.2d at 700, 183 P.3d 12. In finding this agreement amounted to a waiver of rights granted by K.S.A. 22-4513(b), the Court of Appeals first observed that a plea agreement is akin to a contract. Perry, 39 Kan.App.2d at 702, 183 P.3d 12 (citing State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 68-69, 765 P.2d 1114 [1988]). Next, the court noted that both parties to a plea agreement are bound by its terms, and Kansas appellate courts have consistently forced the parties to abide by their agreement. See, e.g., State v. Ratley, 253 Kan. 394, Syl. ¶ 5, 855 P.2d 943 (1993). The Perry court observed that Robinson recognized a criminal defendant's statutory right to have the district court take into account the defendant's financial resources and the nature of the burden that payment will impose before determining the amount and method of BIDS attorney fee reimbursement. But in a plea agreement a defendant waives statutory rights or constitutional rights in exchange for dismissal of other criminal charges or prosecutorial recommendations at sentencing. Perry, 39 Kan.App.2d at 702, 183 P.3d 12. Consequently, the Perry court found no reason that a statutory right of this nature cannot be bargained away in connection with a plea agreement. Far more basic constitutional rights are validly bargained away in such agreements. Perry, 39 Kan.App.2d at 702, 183 P.3d 12. Applying these points, the Court of Appeals concluded that if a plea agreement is entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the terms of such an agreement are clearly enforceable as a matter of law. See State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 340-41, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007). Perry, 39 Kan.App.2d at 702, 183 P.3d 12. Therefore, the Perry court held that where the defendant has agreed, as a part of an otherwise valid plea agreement, to pay a specific portion of BIDS attorney fees, the district court may forego the statutory procedure normally required by Robinson and order such reimbursement in the journal entry of sentencing. Perry, 39 Kan.App.2d at 702, 183 P.3d 12. In the present case, although Copes' plea agreement did not specify an exact sum of BIDS fees, the Court of Appeals found Copes' situation to be comparable to that in Perry. This result is contrary to the conclusion of a different Court of Appeals panel that disagreed with the notion of applying Perry to a situation where the amount of BIDS fees is not specified in the plea agreement. In the unpublished opinion of State v. Gillespie, No. 100,570, filed September 18, 2009, a split panel found Perry to be distinguishable. There, Gillespie's plea agreement contained language identical to Copes' in that it specifically stated his attorney will recommend that Gillespie be required to pay appointed counsel fees in the amount to be determined. Like the plea agreement in our case, Gillespie's agreement did not say he agrees to pay fees, nor was a specific amount of BIDS attorney fees mentioned in the agreement. The Gillespie majority emphasized that unlike the situation in Perry, Gillespie merely agreed that his attorney would make the general recommendation regarding the payment of BIDS attorney fees. Further, the amount of fees was left open-ended in Gillespie's plea agreement. The majority remained unconvinced that Gillespie waived his rights under Robinson for the imposition of an open-ended BIDS fee. Copes, slip op. at 7-8. The attorney fee was, therefore, reversed and the case was remanded for a hearing to consider Gillespie's financial resources. Copes, slip op. at 8. The dissenting judge disagreed with the Gillespie majority's decision to remand the case to the district court for a Robinson analysis. The dissent would have followed the rationale of Perry and would have found that Gillespie bargained away his right to the financial considerations mandated by Robinson. Following the reasoning in Perry, the dissent reiterated that a defendant can plea bargain away the most basic fundamental constitutional rights and can also bargain away far less significant statutory rights. Copes, slip op. at 9. As for the fact that the amount of BIDS fees was specified in Perry's plea agreement, the Gillespie dissent observed that the district court was not bound by the terms of the plea agreement and, thus, was not obligated to impose the agreed-upon amount of fees. For this reason, the dissent found it of no significance that Gillespie's plea agreement did not state a specific amount of BIDS fees. Copes, slip op. at 10. Both of these Court of Appeals' decisions are consistent to the extent of accepting that a defendant can waive rights in a plea agreement and that the waiver may extend to the right to have a court consider statutory factors in setting attorney fees. The first of these premises is consistent with decisions of this court. See, e.g., State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, Syl. ¶ 13, 195 P.3d 753 (2008) (knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right to appeal is generally enforceable); State v. Robinson, 233 Kan. 384, 385, 662 P.2d 1275 (1983) (same relating to statutory right to jury trial). This court has not considered the second of these premisesthat the same rule would apply to the right to have statutory findings regarding the amount of attorney fees. We note, however, other courts have reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 176 P.3d 851, 853 (Colo.App.2007) (parties to plea agreement may stipulate that the sentence will require reimbursement of court-appointed counsel costs); State v. Moore, 500 N.W.2d 75, 76 (Iowa 1993) (indicating that parties are not prevented from entering into agreement concerning payment of costs and attorney fees); State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899, 902 (N.D.), cert denied 436 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 2237, 56 L.Ed.2d 404 (1978) (agreement to pay restitution for cost of court-appointed attorney meant financial resources and other statutory factors did not have to be considered); State v. Thrower, 62 Ohio App.3d 359, 376, 575 N.E.2d 863 (1989) (defendants failed to affirmatively show that payment of counsel fees out of forfeiture proceeds was part of the plea agreement which was stated on the record). We agree with these authorities in general and find no reason to distinguish a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the statutory rights under K.S.A. 22-4513(b) from waivers of constitutional rights through the same process. Hence, we conclude a defendant may waive the right to have a district court make the findings required by K.S.A. 22-4513(b) and may do so in a written plea agreement. If there is a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, the district court may order payment of BIDS attorney fees without making the findings required by K.S.A. 22-4513 and Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 132 P.3d 934. In addition, we agree with the premise of Perry and Gillespie that a plea agreement is generally subject to contract principles. In several cases, we have noted that application of fundamental contract principles is generally the best means to fair enforcement of a plea agreement, as long as courts remain mindful that the constitutional implications of the plea bargaining process may require a different analysis in some circumstances. See State v. Boley, 279 Kan. 989, 996, 113 P.3d 248 (2005); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-62, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (accused pleading guilty must be counseled, absent a waiver). Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle of contract law that there must be a meeting of the minds regarding essential terms in order to have a binding contract. Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley, 244 Kan. 555, 572, 770 P.2d 466 (1989); see State v. Thompson, 15 Neb.App. 764, 773, 735 N.W.2d 818 (2007) (as with other contracts, courts cannot rewrite plea agreement to include terms not present). Here, there is not an agreement regarding the amount of the fees or, more significantly, as to a waiver of the rights granted by K.S.A. 22-4513(b). Although Copes' written plea agreement contained an extensive recitation of rights and an explicit waiver of those rights, that recitation made no mention of attorney fees or the district court's obligation to consider Copes' financial resources or the burden the fees would impose. In other words, the contract terms the State seeks to enforcethe agreement to waive rights under K.S.A. 22-4513(b) and the fee amountare missing from the contract. The absence of an explicit waiver of the rights granted by K.S.A. 22-4513(b) i.e., to have a district court consider financial resources and the burden of an attorney fee judgmentcreates more than a contract problem for the State: For a `waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' [Citations omitted.] State v. Moses, 280 Kan. 939, 946, 127 P.3d 330 (2006). Under the plea agreement before us, we cannot determine that there was an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Rather, Copes merely acknowledged that her attorney will recommend that she be required to pay appointed counsel fees in the amount to be determined. This portion of Copes' plea agreement placed her in the same position she would have been had the plea agreement never mentioned the BIDS attorney fees at allK.S.A. 22-4513(a) requires that all convicted indigent defendants shall be taxed the BIDS attorney fees. And with this taxing of fees comes the required consideration of the defendant's financial resources under K.S.A. 22-4513(b). This case is remanded to the district court with directions to consider Copes' financial resources and the burden of paying the BIDS attorney fees.