Opinion ID: 1167064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: renfro

Text: In Renfro the commission concluded that petitioner committed wilful misconduct by abusing the contempt power and failing to disqualify himself. The master had concluded that both acts constituted prejudicial conduct; whether he found that the failure to disqualify also constituted wilful misconduct is unclear. Attorney Stephen Keller represented Renfro on a drunk driving charge (Veh. Code, § 23102, subd. (a)). Trial was set for May 5, 1977. On April 29 Keller filed a motion for peremptory disqualification of petitioner (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6). [5] The jury trial then was assigned to Judge Hamilton in petitioner's court. Keller phoned Hamilton and said he had to appear that morning in another county and might be late for the trial. Hamilton said he would call the case and, if Keller were late, would decide what to do. Keller arrived at 10:30, and the case was tried. While waiting for Keller, Hamilton discussed Keller's tardiness with petitioner, who expressed concern that Keller (1) had disqualified him, and (2) claimed an appearance in another county simply to get a continuance of the trial. Petitioner contends that the disqualification was motivated by his having denied Keller such a continuance. But Keller gave good reason for the disqualification: the undisputed fact that at pretrial conference petitioner expressed skepticism of Renfro's version of alcohol consumption in light of the blood report and indicated the standard fine would be imposed in case of a plea, but if he tries this thing and I think he lied, it'll be a whole lot more. That Keller did request a continuance is supported only by petitioner's uncorroborated testimony; it is not reflected in the court docket. However, the master (but not the commission) found that when Keller informed Hamilton of his probable tardiness he did not disclose that [petitioner] had refused a request for additional continuance. Petitioner ascertained from the district attorney's office the circumstances of Keller's arrival at and conduct of the trial. Without consulting Hamilton, petitioner on May 11 sent Keller a Notice of Order to Show Cause Hearing that purported to arise from a case in petitioner's court, People v. Keller (unnumbered), and announced a hearing on May 25 at 9 a.m. with no indication of the subject matter. Petitioner concedes he issued that notice simply as a device to bring Keller in to discuss concerns about Renfro, namely Keller's (1) lack of candor about conflicting court appearances in relation to his need for a continuance, (2) failure to disclose petitioner's denial of the continuance request to Judge Hamilton, and (3) tardiness at the trial. The master (but not the commission) accepted petitioner's testimony that he tried to phone Keller before issuing the notice. Keller testified he phoned petitioner in response to the notice; petitioner denied that. Keller on May 13 filed a motion to disqualify petitioner in People v. Keller (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6). Petitioner replied by letter of May 17 that the motion has been denied and a review of contempt procedures is suggested for the noticed May 25 hearing. Keller, through counsel, on May 23 petitioned the superior court for a stay and writ of prohibition against the hearing. Judge Byrne issued a stay on May 23 and an alternative writ on May 25. Petitioner withdrew the order to show cause, and the writ matter was dismissed as moot. Petitioner clearly abused the contempt process. That Judge Hamilton had power to treat misrepresentation to obtain a continuance or tardiness at trial as a direct contempt ( In re Ciraolo (1969) 70 Cal.2d 389, 393 [74 Cal. Rptr. 865, 450 P.2d 241]; Arthur v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 404, 408-409 [42 Cal. Rptr. 441, 398 P.2d 777]; Vaughn v. Municipal Court (1967) 252 Cal. App.2d 348, 358 [60 Cal. Rptr. 575]) did not confer that power on petitioner. Nor is there evidence of any misrepresentation as to Keller's conflicting obligations in another court. Both master and commission found that petitioner was of the belief that his administrative responsibility for controlling the calendar of his court justified his intervention despite the assignment of a visiting judge for the trial. That belief did not justify misuse of the contempt power. (3) We adopt the commission's conclusion that petitioner's initiation of contempt proceedings against Keller for conduct he speculated to have occurred at the trial presided over by Judge Hamilton, without contacting Judge Hamilton or in any way ascertaining the actual facts, was an abuse of the contempt power and constitutes wilful misconduct in office. The commission also concluded that failure to disqualify constituted wilful misconduct in that it was an act which he should have known was beyond his lawful jurisdiction. He testified he denied Keller's motion to disqualify on May 13 because he concluded that the 170 and 170.6 did not apply to a direct contempt proceeding. In light of Blodgett v. Superior Court (1930) 210 Cal. 1, 9-15 [290 P. 293, 72 A.L.R. 482], which holds that a judge may not be disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170 from summary contempt proceedings, we dismiss the charge of failure to disqualify.