Opinion ID: 4513510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rasmy’s Hostile Work Environment Claim

Text: An employer violates Title VII when the “workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult … that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment … so long as there is a basis for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer.”28 To analyze whether a plaintiff meets this burden, a district court considers “the totality of the circumstances, including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 546 (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation 28 marks omitted). 13 the victim’s [job] performance.”29 This test has both “objective and subjective elements: the misconduct shown must be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and the victim must also subjectively perceive that environment to be abusive.”30 The District Court held, with respect to Rasmy’s hostile work environment claims, that “[w]hile discriminatory behavior not directed at the plaintiff can still contribute to the creation of an overall hostile work environment, general anti‐religion statements of this nature not directed at the plaintiff personally are stray remarks at best.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).31 It concluded that there were “no facts in the record to support the inference that plaintiff was personally targeted by anti‐Christian animus, nor that he experienced anything more than a petty slight in his work environment regarding his religious practice.”32
Rasmy contends that the District Court erred by disregarding all incidents of harassment that were not expressly discriminatory or not 29 Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 2014) (alteration in original). 30 Id. (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). 31 Sp. App’x 21‐22 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 32 Sp. App’x 22. 14 directed at Rasmy.33 Specifically, Rasmy maintains that the District Court refused to consider conduct not expressly based on race, religion, or national origin. Hence, Rasmy argues that it was error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law that certain Defendants calling Rasmy a “rat” or allegedly filing false workplace complaints against him did not constitute discriminatory actions. We agree. Our case law is clear that when the same individuals engage in some harassment that is explicitly discriminatory and some that is not, The EEOC, in an amicus brief in support of Rasmy and in favor of reversal, 33 noted this point. The EEOC may participate as amicus curiae in a case that “raises novel or important issues of law under Title VII …” See EEOC Amicus Curiae Program https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/amicus.cfm. Here, the EEOC has chosen to participate, taking the position that the District Court “significantly misconstrued and misapplied Title VII’s protections against discriminatory hostile work environments.” EEOC Br. at 1. Although we are not bound by the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII, we accord respectful consideration to the Commission’s views. See Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The EEOCʹs Enforcement Guidance [interpreting Title VII] is entitled to deference to the extent it has the power to persuade.”); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of [administrative agencies], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). 15 the entire course of conduct is relevant to a hostile work environment claim.34 Moreover, on de novo review of the record, we note disputed issues of material fact as to whether a rational jury could infer discrimination from the fact that Efstratiou, Tehrani, and Pongpanta also allegedly called Rasmy several names explicitly related to his religion or national origin, including “[t]he mummy,” “camel,” “Egyptian rat,” and “pretentious Christian.”35 On similar grounds, Rasmy challenges the District Court’s conclusion that “the unmistakable inference from the timing of the comments after years without incident [is] that [Rasmy’s] coworkers were likely motivated by personal animus in response to [Rasmy’s] allegations of wage theft more than any discriminatory animus.”36 Here, too, we agree that the District Court inappropriately made 34 See Pucino v. Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 118 (2d. Cir 2010) (“A plaintiff may rely on incidents of sex‐based abuse to show that other ostensibly sex‐neutral conduct was, in fact, sex‐based.”); Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 547‐48 (“Circumstantial evidence that facially sex‐neutral incidents were part of a pattern of discrimination on the basis of gender may consist of evidence that the same individual engaged in multiple acts of harassment, some overtly sexual and some not.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 35 App’x 93‐94, 200‐01, 357, 371, 484, 496. 36 Sp. App’x 24‐25. 16 factual determinations regarding Defendants’ motivations, supplanting the role of the jury.37 Concerning comments that Rasmy overheard that were not directed at him but allegedly were purposefully made to others in his presence, Rasmy testified at his deposition that Efstratiou “always made sure that [Rasmy] hear[d] comment[s] about religion[], about Egyptian[s], and [about] how superior Greeks are.”38 Rasmy claims that the record reveals numerous other references by Defendants to Rasmy’s religion and national origin—which, in his view, were “constant[].”39 The District Court dismissed these comments as “stray remarks,” stating that there were “no facts in the record to support the inference that [Rasmy] was personally targeted by any anti‐Christian animus.”40 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Rasmy’s claims raise disputed issues of material fact—as to whether the abusive comments of which Rasmy complained were in fact stray remarks or sufficiently pervasive or chronic conduct constituting consciously discriminatory animus. 37 See Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 623 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that questions regarding motives for defendant’s alleged discriminatory conduct are matters of fact that should be resolved by a jury). 38 App’x 381. 39 App’x 287. 40 Sp. App’x 22. 17 Moreover, the “stray remarks” doctrine is by no means dispositive.41 In a claim of a hostile work environment, the emphasis is on the hostility of the work environment as a whole, not the motivation of one decisionmaker, and liability is “determined only by looking at all the circumstances.”42 A plaintiff must show merely that discriminatory incidents were “sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of [the employee’s] working environment.”43 Accordingly, conduct not directly targeted at or spoken to an individual but purposefully taking place in his presence can nevertheless transform his work environment into a hostile or abusive one,44 and summary judgment for Defendants on this basis was unwarranted. In finding that Rasmy’s allegations did not constitute “severe” harassment, the District Court relied substantially on Mathirampuzha 41 See Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115‐16 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where we described remarks as ‘stray,’ the purpose of doing so was to recognize that all comments pertaining to a protected class are not equally probative of discrimination and to explain in generalized terms why the evidence in the particular case was not sufficient. We did not mean to suggest that remarks should first be categorized either as stray or not stray and then disregarded if they fall into the stray category.”) abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 42 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal 43 quotation marks omitted). 44The EEOC notes in its brief that it has long taken this position. See EEOC Br. at 13‐14 (citing cases). 18 v. Potter.45 Mathirampuzha, however, is inapposite. In that case, our analysis addressed a disparate‐treatment claim, rather than allegations of a hostile work environment. We held that an assault did not constitute an “adverse employment action” for purposes of the third prong of establishing a prima facie case in a disparate‐treatment case.46 And even if the assault in Mathirampuzha were analyzed for purposes of determining whether a hostile work environment existed, the question presented was whether a “single event, if extraordinarily severe, could alter the conditions of a working environment.”47 By contrast, here Rasmy has alleged numerous incidents of discriminatory harassment over the course of at least three years, and he claims that despite his repeated complaints to various persons in Marriott management, Marriott failed to respond appropriately.48 In examining the question of the severity of Defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct and its effect on Rasmy, we consider relevant the total impact on Rasmy of the many alleged episodes of harassment over the course of three years. The District Court’s comparison of the facts to those in Mathirampuzha created “a rigid ‘calculat[ion] and compar[ison]’ methodology [that] ignore[d] the proper role of courts 45 548 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2008). 46 Id. at 78‐79. 47 Id. at 79 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 48 See Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 606 (2d Cir. 2006) (when a plaintiff alleges ongoing harassment, the severity of any one act is not dispositive). 19 … at the summary judgment stage … [and], if strictly followed, disregards Supreme Court guidance that hostile environment analysis ‘is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.’”49
Despite finding that Rasmy had not shown “severe” harassment, the District Court acknowledged that a jury could find “pervasive” harassment that was “offensive” and “degrading.” Nevertheless, it determined that the harassment Rasmy claimed was not actionable because there is nothing in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the alleged discrimination altered the conditions of Rasmy’s employment. Specifically, the District Court concluded that Rasmy had not alleged that he had been physically threatened or that the claimed harassment, had interfered with his job performance. This analysis, in our view, misreads Title VII. As the EEOC’s brief noted, it “ignores the very reason that Title VII prohibits discriminatorily hostile work environments.”50 Although the presence of physical threats or impact on job performance are relevant to finding a hostile work environment, their 49Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 22). 50 EEOC Br. at 18; see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (“[E]ven without … tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.”). 20 absence is by no means dispositive. Rather, the overall severity and pervasiveness of discriminatory conduct must be considered.51 By its very nature that determination is bound to raise factual disputes that likely will not be proper for resolution at the summary judgment stage. In this case, there is a reasonable inference that Rasmy participated in a physical altercation as part of a deteriorating job performance caused by the alleged hostile work environment.52 Moreover, in its calculation of the severity of the discrimination Rasmy claimed, the District Court did not credit Rasmy’s sworn statements that the harassment made him “chronically nervous,” that he began to “cr[y] regularly,” and that he started seeing a psychiatrist who prescribed him anti‐anxiety medication, all of which arguably gives rise to a strong inference that Rasmy’s workplace conditions had been materially altered.53 To that extent, Rasmy presented disputed issues of material fact that should be resolved by a jury, not the court.54 51See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (discussing Title VII’s totality of the circumstances inquiry). 52Cf. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (“A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employeesʹ psychological well‐being, can and often will detract from employeesʹ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.”). 53 App’x 287‐88. 54 See Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Where reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether alleged incidents of racial insensitivity or harassment would have adversely altered the working conditions of a reasonable employee, the issue of whether a hostile work environment existed may not properly be decided as a matter of law.”). 21