Opinion ID: 780836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wilson's Allegations of Collateral Consequences

Text: 19 Wilson does not challenge the punishment he received as a result of the disciplinary proceeding, which he acknowledges is no longer at issue. Rather, he contends that the existence of the 115 itself will result in adverse collateral consequences. The district court concluded that the consequences alleged by Wilson were either the result of the fact of escape or too speculative to justify relief. We agree. 20 Wilson identifies the following collateral consequences: the denial of conjugal visits, his transfer to Pelican Bay State Prison, and the increase in his classification score. 4 Wilson analogizes his case to Robbins v. Christianson, 904 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.1990), in which we concluded that the possibility of employment discrimination in the future on the basis of a prison disciplinary action for drug use was not too ephemeral to constitute a collateral consequence for mootness purposes. 5 Id. at 496. Wilson contends that the possibility of impaired job prospects is analogous to the possibility of impaired parole prospects that he faces as a result of the disciplinary violation. 21 Robbins, however, is distinguishable because the petitioner there challenged the underlying finding of misconduct — the alleged drug use — that was the basis for the disciplinary action. See id. at 495 (stating that [t]his circuit has not said what result is appropriate when a prisoner attacks the finding of misconduct that caused his parole to be revoked or his sentence to be lengthened). By contrast, Wilson has not challenged the fact that he escaped. This fact is more likely to influence Wilson's parole prospects than the existence of the 115. Similar to Lane, in which the Court reasoned that [a]ny disabilities that flow from whatever respondents did to evoke revocation of parole are not removed — or even affected — by a District Court order that simply recites that their parole terms are `void,' Lane, 455 U.S. at 633, 102 S.Ct. 1322, the consequences of Wilson's escape are not likely to be affected by an order removing the disciplinary conviction from his record. 22 Wilson next argues that the 115 is a basis for the denial of parole, citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(6). As discussed above, however, the decision to grant parole is discretionary. The regulation specifically states that serious misconduct in prison or jail is one circumstance tend[ing] to indicate unsuitability for release, and that the importance attached to any circumstance ... is left to the judgment of the panel. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c). Moreover, the regulation does not state that a rules violation charge is a circumstance to be considered, but instead cites serious misconduct as a factor for consideration. Thus, Wilson's escape, not the 115, is the circumstance that would be considered by the Board of Prison Terms. 23 The denial of conjugal visits is unrelated to Wilson's disciplinary conviction for escape. Wilson is ineligible for family visits both because he was convicted of a violent offense involving a family member, pursuant to Cal.Penal Code § 187, and because he is sentenced to a life term without a parole date. See Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3174(e)(1) & (2). 24 Wilson alleges that his transfer to Pelican Bay is an adverse consequence because it is notorious for its harsh conditions. However, Wilson was transferred to Pelican Bay, not as a result of the disciplinary conviction, but because, in 1998, several years after the disciplinary proceeding, Wilson received escape paraphernalia in a mailed package. The record also reveals that Wilson himself asked to remain at Pelican Bay due to his susceptibility to skin cancer and wanting to live in a northern, cooler climate. 25 Finally, Wilson argues that his classification was increased 14 points as a result of the disciplinary conviction. Wilson does not, however, name any specific consequence he has suffered or may suffer as a result of this score, making only vague and unsupported allegations. Wilson has failed to allege a collateral consequence sufficient to meet the case-or-controversy requirement. Cf. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-16, 118 S.Ct. 978 (rejecting the petitioner's alleged consequences as a possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability and as purely a matter of speculation).