Opinion ID: 1855796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of the Videotape of the February 16, 1995 Interrogation

Text: Appellant argues that portions of her videotaped interview should have been admitted to explain and clarify Detective Krebs' testimony that, during the interview, appellant stated that she had once tried to poison the victim and showed the detectives that she knew how to load and shoot a bolt action gun. She further asserts that the entire videotape should have been admitted to provide context and to show the jury the circumstances in which appellant's statement was made. The trial court excluded the videotape as hearsay. Appellant asserts that she should have been allowed to introduce those portions of the videotape in which appellant stated that one of my personalities tried to poison the victim and that at other times she and the victim got along great, in order to explain and clarify Krebs' testimony that she admitted to trying to poison the victim. As stated above, the rule of completeness applies only where it is necessary to give the jury a full understanding of the facts and it may not be used to introduce otherwise irrelevant statements. Appellant argues that her statement that one of her other personalities tried to poison the victim was necessary to clarify Krebs' misleading testimony that appellant admitted to the attempted poisoning. Because mental illness was not appellant's asserted defense, however, the trial court properly determined that additional information about her psychiatric history was irrelevant. As to those portions of the video-tape where appellant stated that she did not know how to shoot a gun, the trial court properly concluded that it was inadmissible self-serving hearsay. [9] See State v. Taylor, 258 N.W.2d 615, 622 (Minn.1977). Appellant's right to a fair trial was adequately protected by her opportunity to cross-examine Krebs on this issue and the trial court's assurance before trial that if the officers in any way mischaracterized appellant's statements, they would be subject to impeachment using the tape. Finally, appellant argues that, under Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), the entire videotaped interview should have been admitted to provide context and to allow the jury to observe firsthand the psychological pressure brought to bear on appellant by her interrogators. In Crane, the Supreme Court held that evidence surrounding the making of a confession bears on its credibility and a defendant therefore has a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to introduce such evidence at trial. Id. at 688, 690, 106 S.Ct. at 2145, 2146-47 (citation omitted). In so holding, the court stated that the defendant's right to present a defense: would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. Id. at 690-91, 106 S.Ct. at 2147 (citations omitted). Thus, the question is whether the videotape was competent, reliable evidence that was excluded without a valid state justification. In State v. Taylor, 258 N.W.2d 615, 622 (Minn.1977), we held that a stenographic statement given by the defendant the day after the commission of the crime was properly excluded as self-serving hearsay because [t]o permit the introduction of such statements could afford a defendant the opportunity to present his version of the facts without ever being subject to cross-examination by the state. Here, as in Taylor, much of what appellant argues should have been admitted was self-serving hearsay relating to her version of what happened on the day of the murder, and irrelevant as it related to her mental health history. It was not competent evidence and was properly excluded by the trial court. The court's evidentiary rulings represented a careful balance between allowing the prosecution to present its case regarding appellant's statements and interviews and protecting appellant's right to present a meaningful defense, and did not constitute an abuse of the court's discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.