Opinion ID: 2974239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bowen

Text: During his trial, Bowen very briefly moved for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 at the conclusion of the Government’s case in chief. The district court succinctly analyzed the -6- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. evidence presented at that point, found the evidence showed Bowen was a member of the conspiracy charged, and denied the motion. Bowen renewed his motion at the close of the Government’s rebuttal proof (although only “perfunctorily,” according to the Government’s brief; this portion of the transcript was not submitted in the joint appendix for us to review). The motion was again denied. Because Bowen presented a defense, he has waived any objection to the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal he presented at the close of the Government’s case in chief. See United States v. Black, 525 F.2d 668, 669 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 164, n. 1, 99 L. Ed. 202, 75 S. Ct. 186 (1954); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973) (“The rule is settled that when a defendant introduces evidence, he waives any objection to the denial of his motion to acquit at the close of the government's case.”)); accord. United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 611 (6th Cir. 2004). The appeals court may only review the second motion for judgment of acquittal, and must consider not only the evidence in the Government’s case in chief, but “the record as a whole and not the sufficiency of the government's case in chief.” Id. Bowen was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(A). To establish Bowen’s guilt of this crime, the Government was required to prove (1) agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 148-49 (6th Cir. 1996)). The agreement need not have been formal; a tacit understanding among the conspirators will suffice. Id. (quoting United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 970-71 (6th Cir. 1997)). The existence -7- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. of a conspiracy “may be inferred from circumstantial evidence that can reasonably be interpreted as participation in the common plan.” Id. (quoting Avery, 128 F.3d at 971). Once a conspiracy is shown beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant need only have a “slight” connection to it. Id. (quoting Avery, 128 F.3d at 971). Additionally, a defendant’s knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from his conduct and established by circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)).
We will briefly summarize the evidence presented at Bowen’s trial.
Several police officers with the Kalamazoo (Michigan) Valley Enforcement Team testified about an investigation of Oreanda Hall (a.k.a. “Renny”) that started in 2001. Officers executed several search warrants on various residences in Kalamazoo. The first residence searched was Paketta Cannon’s, at 1817 Shire Lane, where police found drug dealing paraphernalia (baggies, digital scales, etc.), crack cocaine, a gun, and documents with Hall’s name on them. Several months later, in February 2002, police searched another residence belonging to Cannon, 1427 Concord Place, where they found handguns, ammunition, and a safe. Inside the safe were crack and powder cocaine, digital scales, and a receipt with the name “Renny” on it. Also on this same day and into the early hours of the next morning, police searched a residence belonging to Marlo Gill, 113 Wall, where police found crack cocaine in a car parked in the driveway. On the same day the search of the Wall address was completed, officers visited Bowen at his -8- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. probation officer’s office. When asked where he was staying, Bowen started to say “536” but then said “504 Clinton”, which was his mother’s residence. Later that same day, officers searched an apartment at 536 Bosker, and found drug dealing paraphernalia (Pyrex containers known to be used to cook powder cocaine into crack, digital scales, baggies, etc.), and a firearm and ammunition, as well as recent cable bills for service at the Bosker address in the name of Bowen and an income tax return for Bowen that claimed a state homestead property tax credit for renting a home at 536 Bosker. No cocaine was found at this address. Officers testified they did not see Bowen at any of these addresses when they searched them, and only found the cable and tax documents related to him at the Bosker address, but no other documents relating to him at the other residences. Several crime lab specialists also testified the substances seized from the residences were in fact crack and powder cocaine in various quantities.
Donald Gaddie, who at the time of his testimony was incarcerated on probation violation charges relating to an earlier cocaine delivery conviction and was cooperating with the Government, testified he knew Bowen because they had grown up in the same neighborhood in Kalamazoo. Hall was Gaddie’s supplier of crack cocaine, which Gaddie then resold. Gaddie testified he pooled his money with Curtis Shepard to buy crack from Hall. Gaddie would see Bowen with Shepard, and said Bowen and Shepard shared an apartment on Bosker Street. Gaddie spent time at the apartment on Bosker every day, where he saw Hall and Shepard, and saw Bowen cooking powder cocaine into crack, as well as crack being delivered and dealt out of the -9- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. apartment. Gaddie saw Cannon and “Marlo” (Gill) deliver drugs for Hall to this apartment. Gaddie saw Bowen and Shepard at the Bosker apartment every day, and he testified they both lived there. However, Gaddie did not himself conduct any drug business with Bowen. Gaddie made phone calls while cooperating with the police to Shepard and Hall. He also gave information to the police about the residences of Cannon and Gill, as well as the Bosker Street residence, that led to the group of searches on those residences that occurred in February 2002. Gaddie testified he was not charged in this case or a state case because of his cooperation with the police.
Paketta Cannon, who was indicted in this case and at the time of her testimony had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine but had not yet been sentenced, testified she was in a relationship with Hall during the time period of the conspiracy. Hall lived with her at the 1817 Shire Lane address, which he used for drug activities, when he was in Kalamazoo. She moved out of the Shire Lane address into an apartment at 1427 Concord Place, but took Hall’s belongings with her to the Concord Place apartment, including the safe. Cannon would deliver drugs and collect payment for Hall to and from Shepard, including to the Bosker Street apartment, where she sometimes saw Bowen and Gaddie, but Cannon did not deliver drugs to Bowen. Cannon believed Bowen resided at the Bosker Street apartment. Cannon also testified about all the co-defendants in this case, including Bowen, “running” to North Carolina after they learned they had been indicted and warrants for their arrests had been issued, where they resided with false identification for several months before being arrested. -10- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al.
T.D. Hill, a Winston-Salem, North Carolina police officer, testified about arresting the codefendants (Hall, Cannon, and Bowen) in North Carolina. Hill specifically stated Hall fled from law enforcement and he had to chase him to arrest him.
Marlo Gill, who was indicted in this case and pleaded guilty to conspiracy and attempt to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and had been sentenced at the time of her testimony, testified she knew Hall. After Cannon’s house was raided in June 2001, Hall asked her to store his drugs at her house, first at an address on South Burdick, then at 113 Wall. In addition to storing drugs, Gill delivered drugs and collected payment for Hall to and from Gaddie and Shepard. Gill would see Shepard and Bowen when she delivered drugs to the Bosker Street apartment. Gill also saw Bowen driving Shepard once when she delivered drugs to Shepard, and saw Bowen drive Hall around when she was transferring drugs or money with Hall. Gill testified the drugs police found in the car in front of her house belonged to Hall. Around midnight on the evening her home was searched, Gill went to the Bosker Street address and told Bowen, Shepard, and others her house had just been searched, and everyone scattered. Gill did not ever deliver drugs to Bowen.
Curtis Shepard, who was indicted in this case and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and had been sentenced at the time of his testimony, testified he obtained drugs from Hall, which he then resold. Shepard also testified he had known Bowen -11- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. since high school, and pooled his money to buy drugs with Gaddie and Bowen. Shepard also went to Detroit to pick up drugs from Hall on several occasions, and Bowen went with him once. Bowen lived with Shepard at the Bosker Street apartment, where he and Bowen would both cook powder cocaine into crack, package crack for sale, and personally sell it to customers. Bowen rented the apartment from his stepfather, Mac Jones1; Bowen and Shepard split the rent, but Bowen actually paid the rent to Jones. Gill and Cannon sometimes delivered drugs to them and picked up money they owed Hall. Shepard and Bowen were at the Bosker Street apartment when Gill came to tell them her house had been searched, and everyone who was there left. After the Bosker Street apartment was searched, Shepard and Bowen no longer lived or dealt drugs there, but they continued to deal drugs together on a daily basis by using their cell phones. Shepard had some trouble keeping the quantities he bought from Hall straight on cross examination but clarified his statements on redirect.
Bowen put on several witnesses who testified in varying degrees of certainty that he lived with his mother at 504 Clinton, not on Bosker Street, including Tamara Flowers, Bowen’s probation officer; Mcherlich (“Mack”) Bowen, Bowen’s half-brother who lived at 504 Clinton during the relevant time period; Mirietta Irving, a neighbor of 504 Clinton who also drove Bowen to work on occasion; Lee Buchanan, Bowen’s stepfather; and Jean Buchanan-Bowen, Bowen’s mother. Some witnesses testified they knew Bowen had rented the Bosker Street residence, but did not believe he 1 Although Shepard testified M ac Jones was Bowen’s stepfather, Mr. Jones himself later testified he was actually Bowen’s half-brother’s father. -12- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. lived there. Some witnesses also testified Bowen had a full-time job during some portions of the alleged conspiracy period. Additionally, Mcherlich (“Mac”) Jones, Bowen’s half-brother’s father, testified he rented the upstairs apartment in the Bosker Street property he owned to Bowen, the tenants in a downstairs apartment complained about the amount of traffic to the upstairs apartment, and Bowen told him he had subleased it to Shepard. Jones never personally checked on who was living in the apartment. Jones was prepared to evict whomever was living there, but the police searched the property before he had a chance, and whoever was living there vacated it. The defense intended to call Hall to testify, but he indicated he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right if called, and the defense chose not to call him as a witness.2 Bowen did not testify on his own behalf.
The evidence, viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” was more than sufficient such that “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . .” Clay, 346 F.3d at 176. Co-defendant Donald Gaddie testified he saw Bowen and co-defendant Curtis Shepard cook powder cocaine into crack at the Bosker residence, and also that he saw Bowen sell cocaine. Codefendants Paketta Cannon and Marlo Gill testified they delivered drugs for Hall to Shepard at the 2 Bowen for the first time at oral argument requested a new trial in order to call Hall again to testify on Bowen’s behalf, in the hopes he would not invoke his Fifth Amendment right now that he has been sentenced. The Government objected, noting this argument was not raised in Bowen’s briefs. This argument was waived by Bowen’s failure to raise it at any time before oral argument. See United States v. Bender, 265 F.3d 464, 475 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to consider argument under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) raised for first time at oral argument without any written submission regarding the merits of the argument). -13- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. Bosker residence, where they believed Bowen lived because they saw him there. Gill also testified she saw Bowen driving Shepard once when she delivered drugs to Shepard, and saw Bowen driving Hall around when she was transferring drugs or money with Hall. The strongest witness against Bowen was Shepard, who testified he and Bowen lived together at the Bosker apartment, pooled their money to buy cocaine from Hall, drove to Detroit together once to obtain cocaine from Hall, cooked powder cocaine into crack together, packaged crack for sale, and personally sold crack and powder cocaine to customers, both from the Bosker residence and using their cell phones. Government witnesses’ testimony regarding Bowen’s participation in the conspiracy was largely consistent, and they corroborated one another’s testimony. None was seriously discredited on cross examination, except as to the fact they were testifying in hopes of reduced sentences for their participation in this same conspiracy. Further, documents found at the Bosker residence, including tax returns and cable bills in his name, linked Bowen to that residence and further corroborated the co-conspirators’ testimony. Even though drugs were not found at the Bosker residence, officers did find two Pyrex containers consistent with the cooking of powder cocaine into crack, which witnesses testified they saw Bowen do at this residence. Bowen’s witnesses testified largely about his living situation, rather than his lack of involvement in the drug trade. Even if all of Bowen’s witnesses were believed and he did actually lay his head at his mother’s house at night, they did nothing to refute the testimony he cooked crack and dealt drugs out of the Bosker apartment; several of his witnesses in fact testified they knew he had rented that apartment. Bowen in his appeal brief argues “the only evidence of Bowen’s involvement came from -14- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. alleged accomplices. Law enforcement found no drugs on Bowen nor at the apartment the Government alleges he lived in. There was scant evidence that Bowen even lived at the apartment; in fact, numerous witnesses testified that he lived elsewhere with his mother” (Bowen’s brief at 14). These points were reiterated at oral argument. However, the testimony of an accomplice, even if uncorroborated, can sustain a guilty verdict. United States v. Spears, 49 F.3d 1136, 1140 (6th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 137 L. Ed. 2d 107, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997); see also United States v. Stubbs, 11 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lee, 991 F.2d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 1993). United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Graewe v. United States, 474 U.S. 1069, 88 L. Ed. 2d 800, 106 S. Ct. 828 (1986). Bowen’s accomplices’ testimony was strong and was corroborated by one another’s testimony and physical evidence found at the Bosker residence and others. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . .” United States v. Clay, 346 F.3d 173, 176 (6th Cir. 2003). Therefore the denial of Bowen’s motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 is AFFIRMED.
Bowen presented a lengthy argument in his brief regarding the illegality of his sentence in -15- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. light of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Booker, 543 U.S. 220, and Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.3 However, he conceded at oral argument circuit precedent is contrary to his argument, and presented it on the briefs merely to preserve it as an issue if this circuit’s precedent changes. Bowen in this argument asserts Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002), was implicitly overturned by the Booker and Blakely decisions. Harris held the subsections in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) that raise the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing or discharging a firearm were sentencing factors that may be found by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than elements of the crime that must be found by the higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard, as they did not raise the statutory maximum for the crime. 536 U.S. at 557. Further, Harris held § 924(c), which allowed for a two-year increase in a defendant’s minimum sentence based on a judicial finding a weapon was brandished, did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. Id. at 568. Booker, of course, held the Sixth Amendment prevents judges from making factual determinations, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict under the mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, and its remedy was to hold the Guidelines 3 In our own research in preparation for oral argument, we discovered this section of Bowen’s brief, close to 20 pages, was copied almost verbatim from a published district court decision, United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315 (D. Mass. 2005) (Hall’s Brief at 15-35). Malouf was not even cited by Bowen, much less was it notated in any way that would indicate the argument was lifted largely word for word from it. W hen our discovery of this outright plagiarism was called to the attention of Bowen’s counsel, Robert Little, at oral argument, he did little to explain it, stating only he did not cite the case because it does not constitute binding precedent in this circuit, and he copied from it verbatim because he would lose the essence of the argument if he changed even one word. W hile our legal system stands upon the building blocks of precedent, necessitating some amount of quotation or paraphrasing, citation to authority is absolutely required when language is borrowed. W e made it very clear to Mr. Little during oral argument this behavior is completely unacceptable and reiterate it here as an admonishment to all attorneys tempted to “cut and paste” helpful analysis into their briefs. -16- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. to be advisory rather than mandatory. 543 U.S. 220. Bowen argues after Booker, Harris’s distinction between mandatory minimums and statutory maximums is no longer good law, and the Sixth Amendment now requires the drug quantity (in excess of 50 grams) attributable to him and his status as a double felon to be submitted to the jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt, as both of these findings raise the mandatory minimum sentence he faces. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits and several district courts have explicitly held Harris was not overruled by Booker or Blakely. United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We agree that Harris is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but Harris has not been overruled.”); United States v. Jones, 418 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under Harris, which the Supreme Court did not disturb in Booker, imposition of the . . . mandatory minimum sentence for a violation of 924(c)[] . . . did not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. Duncan, 413 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Nothing in Booker or Blakely suggests that the Court reconsidered, much less overruled, its holding in Harris.”); United States v. Perkins, 421 F. Supp. 2d 209, 218-219 (D. Maine 2006) (“The Supreme Court has never formally overruled Harris and Malouf appears to be the only decision against its continuing validity.”); United States v. Ezell, 417 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671 (D. Pa. 2006) (“This Court concludes that, although the reasoning of Harris . . . has been undermined by Booker and Blakely, it is not the role of this Court to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court, or even to anticipate such an overruling by the Supreme Court.”). -17- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. However, this appears to be an issue of first impression in this circuit.4 We will address Bowen’s arguments separately. As none of them was raised during the district court proceedings, they are reviewed for plain error. Mahon, 444 F.3d at 532.
Bowen first argues, after Booker, the Sixth Amendment requires his status of a double felon must be submitted to the jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt, as this finding raises the mandatory minimum sentence he faces. In Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the Supreme Court held a trial court’s factual findings regarding prior convictions do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. 530 U.S. at 488. Further, the Sixth Circuit has concluded Booker implicitly adopted Apprendi’s understanding regarding prior convictions. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2005)(“there is no language in Booker suggesting that the Supreme Court, 4 In United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 414 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit addressed the type of firearm enhancement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and held this was an element of the crime that must be charged to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, unlike the brandishing or discharging enhancements found to be sentencing factors by the Supreme Court in Harris v. United States. However, the Sixth Circuit expressly declined to “address the general constitutionality of mandatory-minimum sentences imposed through judicial fact-finding,” noting that was “a practice explicitly approved by the Supreme Court prior to Booker when traditional sentencing factors, rather than elements, are involved,” and citing Harris for this proposition. Id. The Sixth Circuit further pointed out its holding was narrow and applied only to the § 924(c) firearm-type enhancement. Id. In a recent unpublished case, the Sixth Circuit reiterated Harris’s holding “only exposure to a higher maximum sentence, not the triggering of a mandatory minimum, will necessarily affect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.” United States v. Diaz, 2006 W L 1228696 at  (6th Cir. May 8, 2006) (unpublished) (citing United States. v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 602 n.5 (6th Cir. 2003)(“W e read [the Harris] opinion to indicate that a majority of the Justices agree that Apprendi [v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)],does not apply to mandatory minimum sentences, and thus consider that holding to be binding.”)). However, that case did not explicitly consider Booker or Blakely’s impact on Harris. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has recently quoted Harris approvingly in discussing mandatory minimums under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) although, again, it did not consider Booker or Blakely’s impact on that decision. See United States v. Van Hoosier, 442 F.3d 939, 944 (6th Cir. 2006). -18- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. as part of its remedial scheme adopted in that case, intended to alter the exception to Apprendi allowing district courts to consider the fact and nature of prior convictions without submitting those issues to the jury”). The district court here did just what Apprendi, even after Booker, allowed it to do, in finding Bowen had at least two prior felony convictions that qualified for a higher mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A). Therefore the district court did not commit plain error in finding Bowen had committed at least two prior felonies that, combined with the drug quantity of which he was found guilty, made him eligible for the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Bowen next argues, after Booker, the Sixth Amendment requires the drug quantity for which he is held responsible (in excess of 50 grams) to be submitted to the jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt, as this finding raises the mandatory minimum sentence he faces. This argument is without import, because the drug quantity used in sentencing of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine actually was submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. The verdict form specifically asked the jury whether Bowen was guilty of “the offense of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack) . . .” (JA at 78). Even if Bowen prevailed on this argument, he would be without remedy as the district court already did what he is now seeking. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error when it sentenced Defendant Bowen to the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment required where a defendant was convicted -19- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. of a crime involving in excess of 50 grams of crack, in conjunction with his two prior felony convictions.
Bowen also argues the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for drug quantity. However, he failed to flesh out this argument thoroughly enough in his brief for this court to evaluate it. Further, as noted above, the quantity that triggered the mandatory minimum sentence at issue here was in fact submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, so even if he prevailed on this argument it would not merit a reversal and remand. For all the above reasons, the district court did not commit any error in sentencing Defendant Bowen and therefore there was no plain error. Mahon, 444 F.3d at 532.
In conclusion, we see no reason to hold Harris has been implicitly overruled by Booker and Blakely here, particularly considering one of the bases for the mandatory minimum life sentence, Bowen’s prior convictions, has been upheld as a sentencing factor a judge may find without submission to a jury, and the other basis for his sentence, the drug quantity, actually was submitted to and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. If there were a case in which to consider whether Harris’s reasoning has been overruled by Booker and Blakely, this is not it. We AFFIRM Bowen’s sentence.