Opinion ID: 1142570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: law has changed

Text: Notwithstanding the fact that the prior Gentry deeds of trust were extinguished by operation of law, the majority would have us return to ancient Mississippi case law and breathe life into a decision that was long ago overruled. If this were to be allowed, Credithrift and others neglecting to do business properly under the laws of our state would be rewarded, and those who properly check land and judgment records may well have wasted their time and money. In justification for this, the majority states: It is true that Miss. Code Ann. § 89-5-21 (1972) requires one such as Credithrift to cancel its deed of trust upon its receipt of full payment of the money due by the mortgage or deed of trust. The 1985 renewal no doubt paid the earlier note in a formalistic sense, but it was hardly full payment within the language of the deed of trust nor the imperatives of § 89-5-21. See Whiteway Finance, 434 So.2d at 1353. Again I beg to differ. Credithrift prepared all of the instruments and was in complete control of all aspects of the transactions in question, formalistic or otherwise. Credithrift was in control of whether the new loans were renewals of prior debts or new transactions. Credithrift chose to structure these transactions in such a manner as to exchange the old notes for new ones. Credithrift chose to receive and record a new deed of trust after each transaction. Credithrift could have made renewals of the old loans, instead of structuring the transactions as it did. These are exactly the types of transactions §§ 89-1-49 and 89-5-21 were designed to prevent from occurring. The majority makes much ado about citations to old cases. I see no problem with citations to cases decided long ago, as long as the cases are still good law. However, such is not the case today, as the majority puts great weight upon a case which was overruled in 1949. The case in question is Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841 (1876), which held that optional future advance clauses will be enforced over the rights of later lien creditors. Of course, this rule was never applied when the prior deed of trust had been extinguished by payment in full of the underlying debt. Witczinski is easily distinguished from the case at bar because Witczinski dealt with a debt which was still owing at the moment the third party became involved. However, the law as defined and interpreted by our courts is ever fluid and is constantly changing to meet the needs of new generations of citizens and to adapt to modern behavior and business practices. Witczinski was overruled in 1949 by North v. J.W. McClintock, Inc ., wherein we find the following: As to the applicable law, it is said in 36 Am.Jur. p. 808, Par. 234, The greater array of authority, however, is found on the side of the doctrine that advances made after notice of subsequent interests do not have priority over such interests. The rule is re-announced in 45 Am.Jur. p. 473, Par. 96. The rule is stated in 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, Section 230, page 299, in this language: In accordance with the general rule, after notice of the attaching of a junior lien, the senior mortgagee ordinarily will not be protected in making further advances under his mortgage given to secure such advances, at least, where he was under no binding engagement to make such advances. These pronouncements have reference to actual notice. Neither Gray v. Helm, 60 Miss. 131, nor Liberty Mercantile Co. v. Allen, 134 Miss. 354, 98 So. 774, announces a different rule. In both cases the mortgage contract obligated the mortgagees to make future advances. However, in the case at bar the provision for advances was a blanket provision. It in no way bound the mortgagee to advance further money. Such advancement was purely optional with McClintock.... Neither party had it in mind... . We think the announced rule is just and equitable. The only amount named in the McClintock trust deed was $500.00. McClintock was not obligated to advance any more. If he then had actual knowledge Harper had given another a trust deed on the same property, he should have declined to make further advances, but having done so, his security became second to the lien he knew was on the mortgaged property. We adopt the stated rule as being equitable and just. It is uncertain from the report of the case of Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841, whether it announces a different rule than the one here adopted. We have been unable to find the original record. North v. J.W. McClintock, Inc., 208 Miss. 289, 299-300, 44 So.2d 412 (1949).