Opinion ID: 6078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: On appeal, this court employs the same standard that the district court used in ruling on the defendant's motions.2 That standard was set forth memorably in Boeing Co. v. Shipman: [T]he Court should consider all of the evidence))not just the evidence which [sic] supports the non-mover's case))but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to such motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied .... A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury .... There must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question.3 Parham based his retaliatory discharge claim on article 8307c of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, which reads in pertinent part: No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be 2 Boggan v. Data Systems Network Corp., 969 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1992)(quoting Fruge v. Penrod Drilling Co., 918 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1990). 3 Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969)(en banc); accord Turner v. Upton County, 967 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992); Normand v. Research Institute of America, Inc., 927 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1991). 5 instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act or has testified or is about to testify in such proceeding.4 In pursuing a claim under article 8307c, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a causal nexus between his filing of a workers' compensation claim and his discharge by his employer.5 The plaintiff need not prove that his quest for workers' compensation was the sole reason for his discharge, but he must establish that it was a determining factor.6 In a federal case involving a state law claim, state law determines the kind of evidence that may be produced to support a verdict,7 but federal law establishes the quantum of evidence needed to support a verdict.8 Parham notes correctly that in Texas [c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence may provide adequate support for the jury's affirmative finding in a wrongful termination case.9 But even though proof in such a case need not 4 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1992). 5 Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991). 6 Id. 7 Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1173, 1175 (5th Cir. 1986); McCandless v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 779 F.2d 220, 223 (5th cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 798 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1986). 8 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 963 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1992). 9 Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.))El Paso, 1989, writ denied). 6 be direct, it must be sufficient. Here we conclude that Parham has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of a causal nexus between his filing of a workers' compensation claim and his termination by Carrier. Parham claims to have offered evidence that (a) Carrier officials knew he had filed a workers' compensation claim, (b) Carrier's motive for firing him was to reduce compensation claims, (c) Carrier retaliated against others who had filed compensation claims, (d) Carrier's absence control policy was not neutrally applied, and (e) he was physically qualified to return to work at Carrier. We find all of these evidentiary assertions to be either patently false or based on distortions of the evidence.
Parham points to no evidence that anyone involved in his termination had actual knowledge of his compensation claim. Rather, he relies on the willingness of Carrier officials to acknowledge the obvious inference that employees who have been on leave for 24 months are likely to have filed compensation claims. This inference is doubtless correct, but such a generalized inference is no substitute for hard evidence that those involved in a particular discharge actually knew that the fired employee had filed a compensation claim. Neither does such a generalized inference in any way suggest a retaliatory motive. Parham's reliance on two Texas cases for the proposition that an employer's knowledge that an employee had filed a workers' compensation claim is evidence of a retaliatory discharge is 7 misplaced.10 In each case there was considerable additional evidence of retaliatory animus; Parham can point to none. Also, in the cases cited by Parham, the employers were specifically aware of compensation claims filed by the employees who later filed suit;11 Parham does nothing more than ask us to infer that Carrier knew of his compensation claim simply because he had been out on disability leave for over two years. We decline to take such a leap of logic. In the context of this case, the mere possibility that Carrier officials might infer from Parham's leave status that he had filed a compensation claim is not probative of retaliatory discharge. We can discern no nexus between that universal truism and the retaliatory discharge alleged by Parham.
Parham next argues that Carrier's motive for firing employees who had been on leave for 24 months was to reduce compensation claims. But a generalized desire to reduce compensation claims))in itself))is not impermissible. What is impermissible is actively discouraging the filing of compensation claims. Under the right circumstances, such discouragement may be evidence of retaliatory discharge.12 But no such circumstances are present here. The only support that Parham musters to suggest that Carrier discouraged compensation claims is an isolated statement in the deposition of 10 Id., and Murray Corp. of Maryland v. Brooks, 600 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.))Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 11 Id. 12 Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658. 8 a Carrier representative, Nathaniel Ellison, who said, We were trying to eliminate the number of comp claims by improving our safety. By parroting the first clause of this statement (We were trying to eliminate the number of comp claims)))both in his brief and at oral argument))while de-emphasizing or omitting the latter clause (by improving our safety), Parham attempts to suggest that Carrier was engaged in some sort of persecution of employees who filed workers' compensation claims. That suggestion is ludicrous: improving plant safety to reduce the number of employee injuries is a very different thing from firing employees in retaliation for filing compensation claims.13
By repeating the same quotation that failed to support his last argument, Parham attempts to support his charge that Carrier retaliated against other employees who had pursued workers' compensation claims. But again, Carrier's desire to reduce the number of comp claims by improving . . . safety, is just not evidence of retaliation by Carrier against employees who had filed compensation claims. A pattern of firing employees who have filed compensation claims could be probative of retaliatory discharge,14 but not when all the employees have been discharged pursuant to the same leave 13 Carrier also rightly points out that Mr. Ellison's statement was made in response to a question that had nothing to do with the new CBA termination policy, and that he denied that the new policy was at all linked to compensation claims. 14 See, e.g., Chemical Express Carriers, Inc. v. Pina, 819 S.W..2d 585, 590 (Tex. App.))El Paso 1991, writ denied). 9 of absence policy. Here the pattern reflects application of the policy, not some invidious retaliatory motive. If Carrier had discharged twenty employees for a variety of proffered reasons, and all of them had previously filed compensation claims, we might suspect an ulterior motive. But, as all Carrier's employees on disability leave were discharged pursuant to the same written policy, the evidence demonstrates nothing more than that Carrier was applying the terms of the 1989 CBA as it understood them.15
Parham next argues that Carrier's policy of firing employees who had been on leave for more than 24 months was not neutrally applied. In support of his claim Parham states: In our case, Carrier admits this policy was not neutrally applied. Instead, it was implemented to eliminate workers' compensation claims, targeted at those who had filed such claims, and, in fact, applied only to those who had filed such claims. Parham favors us with no references to the record to substantiate this statement, and we can find none. If Carrier did fail to apply the 1989 CBA neutrally, it failed in a way that benefitted Parham. The 1989 CBA grants employees only twenty-four months of disability leave. But Parham was given notice of termination approximately twenty-nine (29) months after he began his leave of absence. He therefore received a five-month 15 Parham does not dispute that each of twenty discharged people had been on leave for more than 24 months before they were fired. Neither does he respond to Carrier's claim that over 100 of its 600 employees had previously filed compensation claims without being terminated by Carrier. 10 moratorium.16 Moreover, after Parham received the termination letter he was afforded an additional six months before his termination became final in which to secure a full-duty release from a physician. This, coupled with his five-month moratorium, gave him a leave of absence eleven months longer than he was entitled to under the literal terms of the 1989 CBA, as understood by the parties that negotiated the agreement.17 Thus, even if Carrier did fail to apply its new policy rigidly and uniformly, such a flexible and inconsistent application of the 1989 CBA actually inured to Parham's benefit; he cannot be heard to complain about that.
Finally, Parham claims to have established that he could have returned to work at Carrier. In support of this claim, he points only to his own self-serving testimony that he obtained similar employment at McDonald's after he was fired from Carrier, and that he believed he could do everything physically necessary to work at Carrier. In response, Carrier points to several critical pieces of 16 An additional six months of leave are granted to injured employees with over five (5) years seniority . . . where there is a reasonable expectation that the employee will be able to return to work within this . . . period. Based on Parham's inability to secure a full-duty medical release to return to work at Carrier, however, the additional five months of leave granted Parham must be regarded as a windfall. He got them without having to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that he would be able to return to work, a demonstration that he was unable to make. 17 Parham did not respond to evidence that another employee was allowed to return to work at Carrier because he was able to secure a full-duty medical release within the six-month extension provided by Carrier. 11 evidence))evidence that Parham conveniently fails to address. First, Parham was never able to obtain the requisite physician's full-duty release to return to work, even as of the time of trial.18 Second, while he was on leave, Parham actively sought to be classified as permanently and completely disabled: he probably should be estopped now from claiming to be capable of full-duty employment.19 Third, Parham's own testimony reflects that, although his job at McDonald's is similar to his job at Carrier, it is less strenuous. And, finally, Parham admitted that he still suffered from some disability.20 Parham's bald assertion that he could have returned to work at Carrier thus suffers from a fatal defect: it flies in the face of all objective evidence, and is supported by none. In summary, Parham failed totally to satisfy his burden of establishing a causal nexus, as required under Article 8307c, between his filing a workers' compensation claim and his discharge.21 His evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 18 The requirement that employees who have been on unpaid leaves of absence secure full-duty medical releases before returning to work at Carrier is contained in both the 1986 and the 1989 CBAs, as well as several earlier CBAs. 19 Alternatively, perhaps his earlier claim of permanent disability was fraudulent. 20 During questioning Parham admitted, I can't lift like I used to lift. 21 Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991); accord Swearingen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 968 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1992). 12 support his claim of retaliatory discharge. To the extent that Parham's evidence tends to show anything, it is that Carrier terminated Parham in accordance with a neutrally-applied absence control policy, an action that we have expressly held not to violate article 8307c.22 We conclude that the facts and inferences favor Carrier to such an overwhelming extent that an impartial and reasonable fact-finder))fully apprised of all relevant information))could not reach a verdict for Parham. We are therefore constrained to reverse the jury's verdict and render a take-nothing judgment against Parham on his retaliatory discharge claim.