Opinion ID: 3134239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Ill 2d 44 (1991); Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill. 2d 266 (1986). The

Text: lower courts apparently found that neither of these requirements was met in the instant case. We disagree and find that both requirements for invoking section 2--616(b) are met here. The defendants concede in their brief that the original pleading was timely filed in the federal court within the one-year limitation period. The defendants do not argue that section 2-- 616(b) does not apply simply because the original action was dismissed by the federal court and refiled in the circuit court pursuant to section 13--217. We would reject such an argument even if the defendants had raised it. Frankenthal v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 409, 417 (1983). Both section 13--217 and section 2--616(b) are remedial in nature and should be liberally construed in favor of hearing the plaintiff's claim. Steinberg v. Dunseth, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1038 (1995); Frankenthal v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 409, 417 (1983). Both provisions were enacted to facilitate the disposition of litigation upon the merits and to protect plaintiffs from losing a cause of action because of a technical default unrelated to the merits. See Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill. 2d 266 (1986); Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338, 343 (1988); Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc., 143 Ill. 2d 44 (1991); American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Dozoryst, 256 Ill. App. 3d 674 (1993). Where the original action was timely filed, the plaintiff should not be penalized simply for availing herself of the provisions of sections 13--217. We therefore conclude that the first requirement for invoking section 2--616(b) is met here. The second requirement is likewise satisfied. The cause of action for false light asserted in counts V and VI of the second- amended complaint clearly grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading. 735 ILCS 5/2--616(b) (1992). The false light counts are based upon the same publication that formed the basis of the defamation claims raised in the original complaint. Counts V and VI allege that the Bryson article placed the Plaintiff in a false light in the public eye in that it said that she was a `slut' and implied that she was of `unchaste moral character.'  The counts further allege that the false light mentioned is something that is objectionable to a reasonable person under the circumstances. The defendants were thus clearly made aware, within the limitations period, of the relevant facts underlying the false light claim and were afforded sufficient opportunity to investigate the circumstances upon which the plaintiff was attempting to impose liability. Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc., 143 Ill. 2d 44 (1991); Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill. 2d 266 (1986). In fact, the original complaint supplied the defendant with all of the information necessary to prepare a defense to the subsequently asserted false light claim. Where the original complaint put the defendants on notice of the disputed transaction and occurrence, and the amendment arises out of that same transaction or occurrence, the purposes of section 2--616(b) are fulfilled. Because the defendants had notice of litigation arising out of the same facts and circumstances within the limitations period, the rationale for extending the limitations period pursuant to section 13--217 is likewise fulfilled. Gonzalez v. Thorek Hospital & Medical Center, 143 Ill. 2d 28, 36-37 (1991). We hold that the amendment to the pleadings relates back to the original filing pursuant to section 2--616(b), even though the original pleading was dismissed and refiled in accordance with section 13--217. The lower courts determined that the amendment was barred by the statute of limitations simply because it alleged a new cause of action. This conclusion was in error. In Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill. 2d 266 (1986), this court explained that the test for whether an amended complaint relates back under section 2--616(b) to the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes does not depend on whether the amended complaint asserts the same cause of action pleaded in the original complaint. Instead, the focus is on the identity of the transaction or occurrence. Zeh, 111 Ill. 2d at 272-73. Under the same transaction or occurrence standard, the focus is on the facts and occurrence alleged in the original complaint, not the name of the cause of action or legal theory used to support the claim for damages. Thus, those decisions which impose a same cause of action or substantially similar cause of action requirement on amended complaints are inconsistent with Zeh. See, e.g., Starnes, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 206 (An amendment asserting new causes of action will not be permitted after the statute of limitations has run); Beam v. Erven, 133 Ill. App. 2d 193, 199 (1971) (same). The trial and appellate courts erroneously relied upon those decisions in dismissing counts V and VI of the plaintiff's complaint. See Weber v. Cueto, 253 Ill. App. 3d 509, 515-16 (1995). Accordingly, we hold that counts V and VI of the second-amended complaint relate back to the original complaint and that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' section 2-- 619 motion to dismiss those counts. The defendants raise additional challenges to the sufficiency of counts V and VI which were not raised in the trial court. In the interest of fairness to the plaintiff, we conclude that those challenges should be raised and addressed in the trial court on remand.