Opinion ID: 2334525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mr. lenkart's trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to investigate and present exculpatory physical evidence at trial

Text: ¶ 25 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. [10] To determine whether a defendant received this constitutionally guaranteed level of representation, we examine counsel's performance under the test announced in Strickland v. Washington. [11] Under Strickland, the defendant bears the heavy burden of satisfying both of the following prongs: `First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient' [12] Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the [outcome of his case]. [13] Although in hindsight it may be easy for us to second guess counsel's actions, we must appreciate that an attorney's job is to act quickly, under pressure, with the best information available, and that there is a wide range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. [14] Thus, as a reviewing court, we must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. [15] ¶ 26 After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that even under this deferential standard, Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel failed to render effective assistance. We first discuss and analyze the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test and then turn to the question of prejudice.
¶ 27 In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must [first] show that counsel's performance was deficient. [16] This requires a defendant to show that counsel made very serious errors. [17] Indeed, a defendant must identify specific acts or omissions which, under the circumstances, show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. [18] To determine whether counsel's performance was objectively reasonable in light of all the circumstances, we look to prevailing professional norms. In accordance with these norms, our cases recognize that counsel has an important duty to adequately investigate the underlying facts of the case. [19] This is because investigation sets the foundation for counsel's strategic decisions about how to build the best defense. [20] ¶ 28 A review of the record reveals that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel failed to fulfill his duty to conduct an adequate investigation of the facts and evidence in this case, and thus, his performance was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland standard. We have repeatedly held that one of criminal defense counsel's most fundamental obligations is to investigate the underlying facts of a case. [21] This duty is not optional; it is indispensable. As we stated in Taylor, failing to investigate because counsel does not think it will help does not constitute a strategic decision, `but rather an abdication of advocacy.' [22] ¶ 29 Mr. Lenkart has demonstrated that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case and that had his counsel done so, he would have been able to present exculpatory physical evidence at trial for the jury to consider. Shortly after hiring counsel to defend him, Mr. Lenkart asked his counsel to investigate the physical evidence in the case. A Code R kit was collected on the night of the sexual encounter and Mr. Lenkart wanted its contents analyzed. In a sworn affidavit, Mr. Lenkart states that he suggested to his attorney that he pursue testing and expert analysis of all the physical evidence in the case, because [he] believed it would confirm the truthful testimony [he] would provide in court. In response, trial counsel stated that he would consult his own experts if he thought it was necessary. However, it is undisputed that prior to trial, the physical evidence from the Code R kit was never analyzed and the results of the post-trial analysis were never presented to the jury. The reason for counsel's decision not to investigate this evidence is unclear. ¶ 30 At trial, the State called the Code R nurse to testify. Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel did not call any experts to contradict or otherwise question her testimony. The Code R nurse told the jury that during the Code R examination, she observed vaginal tearing and that K.H. had complained of tenderness. The nurse also told the jury that she had to remove a tampon from K.H.'s vagina with tweezers. The Code R nurse testified that in her opinion, these observations were consistent with the occurrence of rape. ¶ 31 Mr. Lenkart's attorney questioned the Code R nurse on cross-examination. And although the Code R nurse admitted it was possible that K.H.'s injuries could have been the result of consensual intercourse, Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel did not present any additional evidence or expert testimony to corroborate this conclusion. Thus, as to the physical evidence, the jury considered only the testimony of the Code R nurse, which strongly weighed in support of K.H.'s accusations. ¶ 32 The rest of the evidence presented to the jury primarily consisted of he-said-she-said statements from the parties involved, thus presenting a credibility contest between Mr. Lenkart and K.H. Mr. Lenkart told the jury his version of the events, and K.H. presented her conflicting testimony. The parties' testimony differed on two key points. First, was the issue of consent. Mr. Lenkart admitted to engaging in many of the same sexual acts K.H. described, but testified to the jury that K.H. consented to them. In contrast, K.H. testified that none of the acts were consensual, and that she asked Mr. Lenkart on numerous occasions to stop what he was doing. Second, although the parties agreed that they engaged in many of the same sexual acts, their testimony conflicted as to whether the parties engaged in oral sex, the act which formed the basis of Mr. Lenkart's sodomy charge. Mr. Lenkart testified that no oral sex occurred. K.H.'s testimony was the direct opposite. At trial, she stated that she specifically remembered that Mr. Lenkart put his mouth on [her] genitals and that she told him to stop. The jury must have believed K.H. because they found Mr. Lenkart guilty of all charges. ¶ 33 After trial, Mr. Lenkart fired his trial counsel and hired new counsel to prepare his motion for a new trial. His new counsel investigated the facts of the case and requested that the physical evidence be tested. The Code R kit was analyzed and Mr. Lenkart's new counsel submitted an affidavit from a reputable medical expert who concluded that the results of the Code R kit were more consistent with consensual rather than nonconsensual intercourse. Perhaps most significantly, the Code R test came back negative for the presence of salivary amylase, which directly supported the claim that no oral sex occurred. ¶ 34 The State counters that trial counsel's decision not to investigate or present physical evidence was a strategic decision. The State argues that trial counsel reasonably could have concluded that asking the state crime lab to test the Code R kit would have undermined Defendant's consent defense because if the results came back positive [] it would have constituted irrefutable proof that [Mr. Lenkart] lied about not having oral sex with [K.H.]. The State also argues that Mr. Lenkart's expert would not have added anything at trial because the Code R nurse already admitted on cross-examination that the Code R evidence was also consistent with consensual intercourse. We are unpersuaded by these arguments. ¶ 35 We cannot imagine a circumstance in which trial counsel could justify declining to test physical evidence that his client reasonably believes would be exculpatory. Mr. Lenkart asked his attorney to test the physical evidence because he was confident it would support his version of the events. Trial counsel had no reason to disbelieve Mr. Lenkart and had little to lose in performing the investigation. The decision of Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel not to investigate this evidence cannot constitute a strategic decision. ¶ 36 We conclude that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel rendered deficient performance when he failed to seek testing of the physical evidence in this case. His trial counsel should have made an adequate inquiry into the facts and available evidence in the case before making a reasonable decision on how to proceed. ¶ 37 Having concluded that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel's performance was deficient, we now turn to the question of whether this deficient performance resulted in prejudice. We conclude that it did.
¶ 38 Once a defendant demonstrates that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, we must then determine whether the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. [23] This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [24] A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [25] When we examine counsel's alleged errors, we consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether the errors alter[ed] the entire evidentiary picture and whether the verdict is supported by the record. [26] ¶ 39 While the trial court stated that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel may have rendered deficient performance, the trial judge concluded that Mr. Lenkart failed to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's errors. In its order denying Mr. Lenkart's motion for a new trial, the trial judge stated, Although Ms. Bryner Brown's affidavit might have added some credibility to [Mr. Lenkart's] account, in light of [the Code R nurse's] admissions, Ms. Bryner Brown's testimony would not have been material ... and does not change the evidentiary picture presented to the jury. We disagree. ¶ 40 We conclude that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel's failure to investigate and present an expert opinion concerning the presence of physical exculpatory evidence to the jury was a prejudicial error affecting the entire evidentiary picture at trial. This error undermines our confidence in the outcome of Mr. Lenkart's trial. ¶ 41 We conclude that if Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel had presented the Code R kit test results at trial, it would have affected the entire evidentiary picture. As discussed above, the narrative at trial was largely a credibility contest between Mr. Lenkart and K.H. K.H. presented her version of the events, which was followed largely by cumulative testimony of her statements to others. Mr. Lenkart offered a different version of the night's events. The Code R nurse's testimony on direct examination supported K.H.'s testimony, and the prosecutor heavily referenced and emphasized this testimony throughout the proceedings. For example, in closing argument the prosecutor stated: When we look at the [Code R] Nurse['s] [testimony,], and ... the chart of those injuries that she found[,] and the one injury, the laceration which she indicates, she told you a lot of times [that it] is found in non-consensual sexual encounters because the woman is not assisting in the penetration, not tilting her pelvis, all of those things.... [S]he told you that the injuries she found are consistent with non-consensual sex. The prosecutor also used the Code R nurse's testimony to make an argument about K.H.'s tampon. She told the jury: I find it fairly compelling that [K.H. was] on her period at this time and has a tampon in. If you believe the defendant's story, she's completely lucid. She's completely with it. She's not intoxicated at all. Why doesn't she remove the tampon before she goes to have sex? I can't imagine that would feel very good. And it's almost a little embarrassing. I just can't believe you would go with a perfect stranger, completely lucid, and have sex while you're on your period with a tampon still in. And finally, the prosecutor's closing argument also emphasized the untested Code R kit to support the sodomy charge: You know we have an account that yes, oral sex occurred, and I'm thinking how is [the defendant] going to get around the tampon issue? What is he going to say about the string? Well, he just kissed her on the outside of her underwear.... Forcible sodomy, that's just oral sex. The defendant put his mouth on her vagina. These statements reveal that the limited testimony of the Code R nurse was central to the State's theory of nonconsent. Without another opinion to counter these statements or any physical evidence to refute it, the jury was left with a lopsided evidentiary picture in K.H.'s favor. Indeed, had the jury been presented with the test results of the Code R kit and the testimony of Ms. Bryner Brown, the factual picture would have been completely transformed. First, the test results strongly corroborated Mr. Lenkart's testimony that no oral sex occurred. Second, Ms. Bryner Brown's testimony would have provided an alternate explanation for the tampon. Instead of suggesting that the presence of the tampon inferred nonconsensual sexual conduct, Ms. Bryner Brown's testimony would have suggested that the presence of tampons is common in these examinations, either due to forgetfulness, or because many women intentionally leave tampons in to enhance the sexual experience. Finally, had this evidence been presented at trial, it would have undermined K.H.'s testimony and bolstered Mr. Lenkart's credibility. The jury would have had concrete physical evidence from which they could conclude that no oral sex occurred between the parties. They would have been able to evaluate testimony explaining how the presence of the tampon was consistent with consensual intercourse. We conclude that this testimony would have shifted the credibility scale in Mr. Lenkart's direction, thus changing the entire evidentiary picture at trial. ¶ 42 We also conclude that Mr. Lenkart's conviction was not strongly supported by the record. [27] A rape case where the sole issue at trial is consent presents a unique circumstance not present in many other rape trials. In consent cases, physical evidence is often sparse, and few, if any witnesses are able to aid the jury in evaluating the subjective mindset of the parties to the encounter. Indeed, many of these cases hinge on a he-said-she-said credibility contest between the alleged perpetrator and the victim. Thus, when physical evidence comes to light suggesting the alleged perpetrator may not have committed the crime, the entire evidentiary picture shifts, and we are less confident that the he-said-she-said determination was accurately resolved. We conclude that this is particularly true in Mr. Lenkart's case. ¶ 43 The rape trial was largely a credibility contest between Mr. Lenkart and K.H. At the time of trial, the Code R kit had not been analyzed. The Code R nurse was the only expert who testified about the physical evidence at trial. Her testimony on direct examination concerned only her examination of K.H. on the night of the encounter; it did not concern the results of the Code R analysis. The Code R nurse testified that her observations supported a nonconsensual encounter. But on cross-examination, she stated that the physical evidence was also consistent with a consensual encounter. Thus, the testimony surrounding the physical evidence was particularly equivocal. ¶ 44 We conclude that had the post-trial physical evidence been presented to the jury, it would have changed the record completely. It would have changed the way the jury evaluated the credibility of the parties; it would have injected doubt into the prosecution's case. We are confident that had the jury been able to consider the existence of physical exculpatory evidence in support of Mr. Lenkart's testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel's decision not to investigate or present this evidence deprived Mr. Lenkart of that opportunity. ¶ 45 We conclude that both prongs of the Strickland test have been satisfied and therefore, Mr. Lenkart was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court, vacate Mr. Lenkart's conviction, and remand for a new trial.