Opinion ID: 70620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Violation by the owner

Text: 15 Proof of four elements is necessary to establish a violation of Sec. 1824(2)(D) by an owner: 16 (1) the person charged is the owner of the horse in question; 17 (2) the horse was shown, exhibited, or entered in a horse show or exhibition; 18 (3) the horse was sore at the time it was shown, exhibited, or entered; and 19 (4) the owner allowed such showing, exhibition, or entry. 20 Baird v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 39 F.3d 131, 135 (6th Cir.1994). The Secretary agrees that these four elements must be proved. 21 Our decision with respect to the owner turns on the meaning of the fourth element and the word allow. In Thornton we held that an owner could allow the entry of a sore horse into competition even if the owner had no knowledge that the horse was sore. But determination that knowledge is irrelevant solves only half the problem. Still left is a question of first impression in this circuit: Accepting that the owner need not have knowledge, what standard of liability does the fourth element impose on him? The Secretary's position is straightforward and unequivocal: entry (by the owner or by one acting for him) plus ownership and soreness are the only required elements for a violation. Allowing is made an ineluctable consequence of entry plus soring--if the horse is sore and is entered the owner has allowed under factor four, and, all factors being met, there is a violation. Stating it another way, allowing by an owner is subsumed in factors two and three. 22 The Eighth Circuit has described the Secretary's position as strict liability. Burton v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 683 F.2d 280, 282 (8th Cir.1982). The Sixth Circuit describes the Department's interpretation as effectively rewriting the statute, making a nullity of the requirement that the owner allow the horse to be entered, shown, or exhibited while sore. Baird v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 39 F.3d 131, 136 n. 10 (6th Cir.1994). That court describes the statute as not establishing strict liability, id. at 136 n. 9, but the government as arguing for something akin to strict liability. Id. at 135. 23 The Eighth Circuit, in Burton, focused on the definition of allow. The court explained that an owner could escape liability under Sec. 1824(2)(D) if the following three factors are shown: 24 (1) there is a finding that the owner had no knowledge that the horse was in a sore condition, 25 (2) there is a finding that a Designated Qualified Person examined and approved the horse before entering the ring, and 26 (3) there was uncontradicted testimony that the owner had directed the trainer not to show a sore horse. 27 Burton, 683 F.2d at 283. Under Burton the presence of these three factors, taken together, excuses liability. The Department declines to follow Burton except in cases in which an appeal would lie to the Eighth Circuit. 28 In Baird the Sixth Circuit attempted to give meaning to the somewhat protean character of the word allow. It indicated that an owner may allow by condoning or authorizing the conduct in question or failing to prevent it by looking the other way or burying one's head in the sand, and one who does not know may allow by cultivating a training atmosphere conducive to soring or doing nothing to dissuade it. Baird, 39 F.3d at 137. 29 The Baird court then formulated a burden-shifting test. It held that the government must, as an initial matter, make out a prima facie case of a Sec. 1824(2)(D) violation by establishing ownership, entry, and soreness. Once the government establishes a prima facie case the owner may offer evidence that he took an affirmative step in an effort to prevent the soring that occurred. If the owner presents such evidence and the evidence is justifiably credited, it is then up to the government to prove that the effort of the owner concerning soring of horses was merely a pretext or a self-serving ruse designed to mask what is in actuality conduct violative of Sec. 1824. But we can find no support in the Act for a burden-shifting test. Rather it seems to us that analysis of the Act does not focus on an allocation of evidentiary burdens but instead on definition of the term allow. 30 The Department urges this court to adopt the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Crawford v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 50 F.3d 46 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 88, 133 L.Ed.2d 45 (1995). That court held that allow has a passive meaning, i.e., to permit by neglecting to restrain or prevent. And, if an owner allows his sore horse to enter a competition, the Secretary may assume that the owner has not prevented the trainer from soring the horse. According to Crawford, the owner may rebut the assumption and escape liability if a stranger was responsible for the soring or if the trainer was responsible and was discharged. Thus the consequence of ownership plus entry plus soreness is made ineluctable but for a small escape hatch--a stranger did it or the trainer was fired. Recognition by the Department of the first prong--the owner didn't 'allow' what a stranger did--is in itself a recognition that ineluctable consequences simply does not fit as a standard. The second prong is a throwaway rationale that may make one feel that the Secretary's position is not entirely arbitrary. But, though an owner's post-event punishment of an erring trainer may be prophylactic, it has no relation to whether the owner allowed the event. We do not follow Crawford. 31 With a slight caveat we find the Burton test persuasive. The test fits neatly into traditional judicial analysis. It carries out the purposes of the Act while providing some protection for horse owners who are cooperating in seeking compliance. The first part of the Burton test does not conflict with this court's holding in Thornton. That part requires a finding that the owner had no knowledge of the soring. Thornton held that an owner violated Sec. 1824 by allowing the entry of a sore horse into a show even if the owner did not know the horse was sore. The Burton test only protects an owner who does not know the horse was sore if a DQP examined the horse and if the owner had directed the trainer not to sore. Though an owner lacks knowledge, he may still be liable if he fails to meet the two other factors. 32 The second element of the Burton test emphasizes the importance of DQPs. Congress expressly recognized this importance in 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(c): 33 The Secretary shall prescribe by regulation requirements for the appointment by the management of any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction of persons qualified [i.e., DQPs] to detect and diagnose a horse which is sore or to otherwise inspect horses for the purposes of enforcing this chapter. 34 A horse show may be liable for not providing DQPs at horse shows. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1824(4). 35 Here, the owner fulfilled this second factor. The horse passed two DQP examinations but failed the third, and the third led to further examination and the filing of the charge. The JO considered these examinations irrelevant except the third. A DQP examination may be too remote to be accepted as probative, but it seems to us that all DQP examinations at the same show on the same day are relevant. The JO relied upon cases in which the owner attempted to show that the horse was not sore on the day in question because it had competed in other shows at other times and had not been found sore. See In re: A.P. Holt, 52 Agric.Dec. 233 (1993) ([T]he fact that 'Flashing Gold' had competed in other shows and had not been found sore is essentially irrelevant to the question of whether he was sore at the Celebration show.), aff'd per curiam, 32 F.3d 569 (6th Cir.1994); In re: Larry Edwards, 49 Agric.Dec. 188, 197 (1990) (The fact that the Respondents had shown horses many times before with only a few being written up is also not relevant to whether the horses in this case were sore on the nights in question.), aff'd per curiam, 943 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.1991) (unpublished), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 937, 112 S.Ct. 1475, 117 L.Ed.2d 619 (1992); In re Richard L. Thornton, 41 Agric.Dec. 870 (1982) (Since any horse owner or trainer could have a motive to sore a horse for a particular show, or could accidentally sore the horse a little more than planned on a particular occasion, I do not attach any weight to the fact that a horse was not written up as sore in examinations by USDA personnel at shows other than the one at issue in a particular case.). 36 The caveat we put on Burton relates to the third factor. Compliance with it (along with the other two factors), frees the owner of the ineluctable consequences of entry plus the fact of soreness and it frees him of being found to allow in the passive sense described in Baird by hiding his head or doing nothing. But compliance with the third element must be meaningful rather than purely formal or ritualistic. The owner may give firm and certain and suitably repeated directions not to sore and not to show a horse that is in sore condition. He may maintain a training environment that discourages soring or makes it impossible. He may carry out inspection practices that tend to reveal any efforts to sore. But, whatever the form, his efforts must be meaningful and not a mere formalistic evasion. 37 The record developed by the ALJ is not sufficient to evaluate the first and third factors under the Burton test. The second factor must be reconsidered with appropriate weight given to the three findings by the DQPs. 2 38 AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.