Opinion ID: 2091215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right of Sexual Privacy under the State Constitution

Text: The defendant next claims that the state constitution provides greater protection for the right of privacy than does the federal constitution, and that this protection includes the right of a teacher to engage in consensual sexual intercourse with students over the age of consent enrolled in the school system in which the teacher is employed. [12] We disagree. It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . . . Furthermore, although we often rely on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the amendments to the constitution of the United States to delineate the boundaries of the protections provided by the constitution of Connecticut, we have also recognized that, in some instances, our state constitution provides protections beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. . . . The analytical framework by which we determine whether, in any given instance, our state constitution affords broader protection to our citizens than the federal constitutional minimum is well settled. In State v. Geisler, [222 Conn. 672, 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)], we enumerated the following six factors to be considered in determining that issue: (1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) the text of the operative constitutional provisions; (3) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other state courts; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or as otherwise described, relevant public policies. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 560-61, 881 A.2d 290 (2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1798, 164 L.Ed.2d 537 (2006). The first Geisler factor, federal precedent, favors the state. As explained in part I A of this opinion, even if we were to assume arguendo that a fundamental right of sexual privacy exists under the federal constitution, that right would not extend to sexual acts performed on or by persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472. In light of our determination in part I A of this opinion that the teacher-student relationship is an inherently coercive relationship wherein consent might not easily be refused, the defendant's sexual conduct in the present case is not entitled to federal constitutional protection. [13] The second Geisler factor, the textual approach, also favors the state. The right of privacy, which cannot be found in any specific guarantee either of the federal or state constitution, is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); and the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. The text of these two constitutional provisions is virtually identical. Compare U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 ([n]o [s]tate shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law), with Conn. Const., art. I, § 8 ([n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law). The textual similarity between the federal and state due process clauses undermines the defendant's claim that the state constitution affords greater protection of the right of sexual privacy than the federal constitution and, instead, support[s] a common source [14] and, thus, a common interpretation of the provisions. State v. Ledbetter, supra, 275 Conn. at 562, 881 A.2d 290. The third Geisler factor, the historical approach, is neutral. Neither the defendant nor the state has identified any relevant evidence of the intent of our constitutional forebears with respect to the right of privacy. Id., at 563, 881 A.2d 290. The fourth Geisler factor, Connecticut precedent, favors the state. In determining the scope of our state constitution's due process clauses, we have taken as a point of departure those constitutional or quasi-constitutional rights that were recognized at common law in this state prior to 1818. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 838, 761 A.2d 705 (2000). The defendant has not provided any historical evidence that a right of sexual privacy between a teacher and a student was recognized in this state prior to 1818. Additionally, the defendant has not pointed to any case law in which this court has construed the right of privacy protected by the due process clause of the state constitution to be broader than its federal counterpart. Cf. id., at 837-38, 761 A.2d 705 (although state constitution may provide greater substantive due process protection than federal constitution, plaintiff failed to establish that our state constitution contains greater rights of `family autonomy' than does the federal constitution). In support of his constitutional claim, the defendant relies on cases such as State v. Donahue, 251 Conn. 636, 645, 742 A.2d 775 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 924, 121 S.Ct. 299, 148 L.Ed.2d 240 (2000), and State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 646-53, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992), in which this court concluded that article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the state constitution provide greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the fourth amendment of the federal constitution. [15] Although these cases support the proposition that the state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is broader than its federal counterpart, they do not support the proposition that the state constitutional right of privacy protected by article first, § 8, provides greater protection than the federal constitutional right of privacy guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The fifth Geisler factor, sister state precedent, favors the state. As the defendant points out, various state courts have concluded that the right of sexual privacy is a fundamental right protected by their respective state constitutions. See, e.g., B.B. v. State, 659 So.2d 256, 258 (Fla.1995) (statute that criminalized minor's carnal intercourse with [another] unmarried minor of previous chaste character violated right of privacy protected by Florida constitution); Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 336, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998) (statute that criminalized private noncommercial consensual sodomy violated right of privacy protected by Georgia constitution); Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 447-56, 942 P.2d 112 (1997) (statute that criminalized consensual sexual acts between adults of same sex violated right of privacy protected by Montana constitution); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 258-66 (Tenn. App.1996) (statute that criminalized consensual homosexual acts violated right of privacy protected by Tennessee constitution). These courts, however, have construed their state constitutions to protect the right of freely consenting adults to engage in noncommercial sexual acts in the privacy of their own homes. [16] Notably, no state has concluded that a state constitutional right of sexual privacy exists when a significant disparity of power is inherent in the prohibited sexual relationship, such as the disparity of power endemic to the teacher-student relationship. See part I A of this opinion. Indeed, as the defendant concedes, numerous states have enacted penal statutes prohibiting elementary or secondary schoolteachers from having sexual intercourse with their students, regardless of the allegedly consensual nature of the sexual relationship. See, e.g., Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(6) (Michie 2006); Iowa Code Ann. § 709.15(3) (West Sup. 2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3520(a)(8) (Sup. 2005); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(F) (West 2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 750.520d (1)(e) (LexisNexis 2003); Miss.Code Ann. § 97-29-3 (LexisNexis 2006); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 201.540 (2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-13(D)(2) (Michie 2004); N.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 14-27.7(b) (LexisNexis 2005); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(8) (West 2002); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.12 (Vernon Sup.2006); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9A.44.093 (1)(b) (West Sup.2005); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.095 (West 2005). Accordingly, we conclude that this Geisler factor tips in favor of the state. Finally, the sixth Geisler factor, economic and sociological considerations, favors the state. Elementary and secondary schoolteachers are entrusted with the important task of cultivating and educating impressionable young minds. Thus, not only are teachers afforded unique access to students, they also are vested with significant authority and control over those students. As such, a teacher easily could use his or her position of trust and authority to coerce a student into a sexual relationship. Indeed, in light of the significant disparity of power inherent in the teacher-student relationship, a student reasonably may not be able to refuse a teacher's sexual advances. Because the state has a strong interest in protecting and educating the elementary and secondary school students of this state, and because the defendant has failed to highlight any societal interest furthered by a recognition of a state constitutional right of sexual privacy between a teacher and a student, we conclude that this Geisler factor weighs heavily in favor of the state. See State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 540, 628 A.2d 567 (1993) ([i]n effect, [the sixth Geisler] factor directs our attention to considerations of public policy). None of the Geisler factors weighs in favor of the defendant's claim that the state constitution confers a fundamental right of sexual privacy on an elementary or secondary schoolteacher to engage in consensual sexual intercourse with students over the age of consent enrolled in the school system in which the teacher is employed. Accordingly, the defendant's state constitutional claim must fail.