Opinion ID: 626847
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subclaim (d)

Text: The only mention that Mr. Trujillo made of subclaim (d) in his brief to the CCA challenging the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief was his attorney’s “[f]ailure to call ‘expert’ witnesses (medical) to testify.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 266. The CCA held that “because [Mr. Trujillo] merely lists [this] argument[] without facts, argument, or authority, we do not address [it] here.” Id. at 322. The district court decided that Mr. Trujillo’s failure to articulate an argument before the CCA rendered subclaim (d) procedurally defaulted. The district court further found that Mr. Trujillo had not established cause and prejudice or that a failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 7 Mr. Trujillo appears to argue that there was cause for the procedural default because he was limited by Colo. App. R. 28(g)’s 30-page limit and was thus unable to present his argument to the CCA. But “pro se parties [must] follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted); see also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 185 (2008) (“A pro se defendant may not . . . fail to comply with relevant rules of procedural . . . law.”) (quotations omitted); United States v. Ceballos-Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have never interpreted [our precedent] to give litigants—even pro se litigants—carte blanche to disregard congressionally established procedural rules.”). The page limit does not constitute cause for Mr. Trujillo’s procedural default. Further, Mr. Trujillo has not shown that our refusal to consider this claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Our review of the record fails to show that Mr. Trujillo could succeed on a claim of actual innocence. We conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate with the district court’s holding that subclaim (d) was procedurally barred.