Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Self-Inflicted Stab Wounds

Text: Defendant challenges the trial court's admission into evidence of the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest, i.e., the self-infliction of the stab wounds and Mr. Koedatich's subsequent call to the police. The evidence to which defendant objected involved the testimony of an expert witness regarding the self-inflicted nature of the stab wounds, as well as the testimony of the patrolman who went to the wounded defendant's home shortly after his stabbing. Supra at 241. In admitting this evidence, the court found that the prosecutor has a right to give some background evidence as to some of the circumstances leading up to [the arrest]. He has an obligation to exclude certain things in that chain of evidence which would be so prejudicial as to deny the Defendant a fair trial. But I cannot put an incident in which the Defendant described a self-inflicted wound in that category; I simply cannot. Defendant claims that the court should have invoked Evid. Rule. 4 to exclude this evidence as prejudicial. The court's failure to do so, the defendant contends, constituted a denial of due process of law under Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed. 2d 29 (1984). Under Evid. Rule. 4, it is within the discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will either (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury. See State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978). In making these evaluations, the trial court has been entrusted with a wide latitude of judgment. State v. Balthrop, 92 N.J. 542, 548 (Schreiber, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 144). A trial court's ruling will not be upset unless there has been an abuse of that discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment. Ibid. Defendant argues that the evidence surrounding his arrest was prejudicial in that it contained information that could have caused the jury to associate him with the O'Brien murder. Patrolman Dormer testified that defendant reported being pulled over on the road by a vehicle with a flashing blue light on top. According to the defense, this information had the tendency to connect defendant with the O'Brien murder because Ms. O'Brien was reportedly forced off the road by another vehicle. Furthermore, there had been numerous reports following the O'Brien murder of other cars being forced off the road, in some cases by a vehicle with a flashing blue light. Since the vehicle with a falshing light was exclusively associated with the O'Brien murder, defendant argues, admission of such evidence was unduly prejudicial. We disagree. In admitting the proffered evidence, the trial court was sensitive to the potentially prejudicial effect of any connection to the O'Brien murder: We do not permit direct evidence on the State's case as to the O'Brien matter. But that does not mean that any sensible link between the reporting of this incident and the ultimate charge against Mr. Koedatich for this offense is obliterated. We believe that the trial court complied with this Court's majority opinion in State v. Balthrop, supra, 92 N.J. at 546. There, we established a rule requiring a trial court to articulate on the record the basis for its finding of substantial danger of undue prejudice, or the absence thereof, that would accrue to the objecting party if the proffered evidence were introduced. Ibid. The trial court assured defendant that admission of the evidence would not be prejudicial to him because no connection with the O'Brien murder would be permitted. Our review of the record satisfies us that the trial court complied with those assurances. We therefore find that the trial court's judgment in admitting the evidence was sound.