Opinion ID: 676598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: this court's jurisdiction over the appeal

Text: 8 Narey contends that the defendants' notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed before the judgment became final, and that we therefore have no jurisdiction over this appeal. We disagree. 9 The district court's December 28, 1992 judgment did not mention reinstatement, although the court had previously announced its intention to award Narey that relief. On January 7, 1993, Narey moved for entry of an order of reinstatement to his former position. The defendants then moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. On April 22, 1993, the defendants' motion was denied. On April 30, while Narey's motion for reinstatement was still pending, the defendants filed their notice of appeal. On May 4, the district court issued an order stating that Narey would be reinstated, but that the entire judgment would be stayed until the disposition of the appeal. 10 Narey then moved the district court to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the judgment did not become final until that court's May 4 ruling on Narey's motion for reinstatement--four days after the notice of appeal was filed. At that time, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) provided that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a motion to alter or amend the judgment has no effect. Narey argued to the district court that his motion to amend the judgment to include reinstatement therefore made the defendants' notice of appeal ineffective. The defendants countered by moving the district court to retroactively certify for appeal its April 22 order denying their motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law. In response, the district court concluded that it had granted reinstatement previously, although not in writing. The court therefore concluded that the April 22 order was the final decision in the case, and the May 4 order was merely a collateral ruling on when reinstatement was to occur (i.e., not during the appeal). A motions panel of this Court accepted the district court's interpretation of the events and its characterization of the May 4, 1993 order as wholly collateral to the judgment, and denied Narey's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 11 Observing that Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-1(f) gives the merits panel the power to overturn the motions panel's decision, Narey now renews his argument that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Narey argues that if the district court had not entered the May 4, 1993 order, the judgment would have become final after ten days, and the issue of his reinstatement would have been waived. He therefore reasons that the order did alter or amend the judgment by granting him a form of relief he otherwise would have lost. Because of a recent amendment to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4, we need not decide whether Narey's characterization of the May 4, 1993 order, or that of the district court, is correct. 12 Until December 1, 1993, Rule 4 provided that the filing of a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend a judgment voided any notice of appeal filed before the disposition of the motion. However, under the version of Rule 4(a)(4) that took effect on December 1, 1993, an otherwise timely notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a Rule 59 motion is not voided but instead merely lies dormant while the motion is pending, and the notice of appeal becomes effective as of the date of the order disposing of the Rule 59 motion. 13 We applied the new Rule 4(a)(4) retroactively in Virgo v. Rivera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.1994). In that decision, we noted that the Supreme Court's order adopting the new Rule 4(a)(4) provided that it was to apply to all cases then pending  'insofar as just and practicable.'  Id., 30 F.3d at 1355 n. 3 (quoting Burt v. Ware, 14 F.3d 256, 258 (5th Cir.1994)). The only limitation on the Supreme Court's power to apply procedural rules retroactively is contained in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2074, which prohibits retroactive application where the application of such rule ... would work injustice. In Burt v. Ware, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it is not an injustice for a party to lose the windfall of having an appeal dismissed because of a loophole in the procedural rules, 14 F.3d at 260, and our decision in Virgo essentially adopted that position. 14 Because the new Rule 4(a)(4) is to be applied retroactively, it does not matter whether Narey's motion was a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment. Even if it were, the defendants' notice of appeal became effective May 4, 1993--the date the district court disposed of the motion. We would therefore still have jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we reject Narey's argument that we lack jurisdiction.