Opinion ID: 1542320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Principles of Workers' Compensation Law.

Text: The District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) provides for the compensation of employees who suffer disabilities that are causally connected to workplace injuries. The WCA covers [t]he injury or death of an employee that occurs in the District of Columbia if the employee performed work for the employer, at the time of the injury or death, while in the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 32-1503(a)(1) (2001). The Act further defines injury as [A]ccidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of third persons directed against an employee because of his employment. D.C.Code § 32-1501(12) (2001). Workers' Compensation laws reflect a compromise between employees and employers regarding injuries arising out of employment. The District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979, like its 1928 predecessor, was enacted to provide a reasonably quick and efficient manner to compensate employees for disabilities resulting from employment-bred injuries. Employees and employers were both thought to gain by a system in which common law tort remedies were discarded for assured compensation regardless of negligence or fault. Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C.1987) (footnote omitted); cf. D.C.Code § 32-1504(b) (2001) (providing that compensation under the Act is the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for any illness, injury, or death arising out of and in the course of his employment). The purpose of workers' compensation laws, which is to provide financial and medical benefits to employees injured in work-related accidents, is a humanitarian one. Grayson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 516 A.2d 909, 912 (D.C.1986). This court follows the principle that workers' compensation statutes should be liberally construed to achieve their humanitarian purpose. Vieira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 721 A.2d 579, 584 (D.C.1998); see also Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 655. The aggravation rule is an obvious example of meeting the humanitarian nature of the Act. It is well-settled that `an aggravation of a preexisting condition may [also] constitute a compensable accidental injury under the Act.' King, supra, 742 A.2d at 468 (quoting Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 660) (internal quotation omitted). The fact that other, nonemployment related factors may also have contributed to, or additionally aggravated [petitioner's] malady, does not affect [the] right to compensation under the `aggravation rule.' Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 660 (internal quotation omitted). [3] If an employee experiences a work-related injury which, combined with a previous disability or physical impairment (work-related or non-work related) causes substantially greater disability or death, the liability of the employer shall be as if the subsequent injury alone caused the subsequent amount of disability. Georgetown Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 830 A.2d 865, 873 (D.C.2003). In Harris, supra, 660 A.2d at 408, the court distinguished the aggravation of a pre-existing injury from a mere recurrence of the injury by requiring some intervening work-related event: This is not a case, however, in which the `recurrence' was the result of the natural progression of the condition, unaffected by any intervening work-connected cause. See id. (internal citation and quotation omitted); see also 9 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 153.02[3] (2007) [LARSON'S] (To find that there has been an aggravation, it must be shown that the second episode contributed independently to the final disability.). The aggravation rule stems from the principle that the employer must take the employee as it finds him or her. Employers must accept with their employees the frailties that predispose them to bodily hurt . . . and if petitioner's disability arose even in part out of and in the course of [her] employment, compensation is appropriate. Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 660 (internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original). Professor Larson concurs: Preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim under the arising out of employment requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which compensation is sought. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the employer takes the employee as it finds that employee. 1 LARSON'S, supra, at § 9.02[1]; see id. at § 9.02D[1] (citing cases expressing that employer takes the employee as it finds him or her). [4] Similarly, DOES has recognized that the [WCA] covers complications flowing from a compensable injury. Brown v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 700 A.2d 787, 791-92 (D.C.1997). The rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury. Id. (internal quotation omitted); see 1 LARSON'S, supra, at § 10.01 (same test). Larson notes that cases in which an initial medical condition itself progresses into complications more serious than the original injury present no legal controversy and the added complications are of course compensable. Id. § 10.02. [O]nce the work-connected character of any injury, such as a back injury, has been established, the subsequent progression of that condition remains compensable so long as the worsening is not shown to have been produced by an independent nonindustrial cause. Id. [5] Moreover, [t]his jurisdiction has repeatedly rejected the notion that a `specific traumatic injury' is necessary to establish a prima facie case of an `accidental injury. Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 656. [T]he statutory language `accidental injury' does not require that an unusual incident be the cause of the injury, but is satisfied if something unexpectedly goes wrong within the human frame. Washington Metro. Area Trans. Auth. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 506 A.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C.1986). While the precise meaning of the `human frame' definition of `accidental injury' is undeniably elusive, it clearly encompasses two concepts. Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 656. First, the nature of the activity or event which results in or contributes to the injury may occur in the `usual and ordinary course of work.' The work need not be unusual or unexpected. Id. Second, the nature of the potential cause of the disability need not be a discrete, particularized event. Id. Indeed, the WCA features a statutory presumption of compensability. Under D.C.Code § 32-1521 (2001), it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of this chapter in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. This sound presumption, designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute, reflects a `strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.' Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 655 (quoting Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App. D.C. 177, 183, 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc)). In order to benefit from the presumption, a claimant needs to make some `initial demonstration' of the employment-connection of the disability. Id. (quoting 1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 10.33, at 3-138 (1986)). The initial demonstration consists in providing some evidence of the existence of two `basic facts': a death or disability and a work-related event, activity, or requirement which has the potential of resulting in or contributing to the death or disability. Id. (emphasis in original). The presumption then operates to establish a causal connection between the disability and the work-related event, activity, or requirement. Id. Once the presumption is triggered, the burden is upon the employer to bring forth `substantial evidence' showing that the death or disability did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Id. This court has held that expert testimony is not required to invoke the presumption. See McNeal v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 917 A.2d 652, 658 (D.C.2007) ([Claimant] was not obliged to present expert opinion of causation in order to enjoy the benefit of the presumption. It was not [his] burden to do that unless and until the employer presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed causal connection.) (internal quotation omitted). [6]