Opinion ID: 1845750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: As a permanent certificated employee, Miller had a certain degree of job security guaranteed by law. But her contract could be terminated for one of the reasons specified in § 79-829, including reduction in force. Because this was the sole reason given for the termination, we must first resolve the disputed issue of whether the School District's agreement to share an art teacher with another district constituted a reduction in force. The district court found that the School District had a .5 FTE art teacher both before and after the purported reduction in force. The district court further found: [The School District's] curriculum was not changed, its staffing needs did not change; consequently, there was NO reduction in force. The only change was a lower overall cost because the . . . School Board agreed to utilize another teacher at a lower rate of pay by sharing her salary with the Clay Center Board of Education. The . . . School District RIF reduced its costs by replacing a teacher with 23 years of experience with a probationary teacher from another school district who could be obtained at a bargain. In assigning error to this finding, the School District argues that there has clearly been a reduction in force at [the School District] as the number of teachers employed by the district has been reduced. [7] The School District further argues that it made a transparent decision to cease providing art to its students through district employees and to begin doing so through a cooperative agreement in order to save money. [8] It contends that its authority to do so is entitled to the traditional deference which this court has given to school boards in making this type of decision. [9] The threshold question we must address in this case is not whether the School District properly exercised its broad discretion in carrying out a reduction in force, but, rather, whether a reduction in force actually occurred. If it did, then we must decide whether it was carried out in the manner which the statutes require. But if there was no reduction in force, the School District's stated reason for terminating Miller's contract would disappear. We have previously held that the intent of the tenured teacher statutes, including § 79-829, is to guarantee a tenured, or permanent certificated, teacher continued employment except where specific statutory grounds for termination are demonstrated. [10] Section 79-829(2) provides that a teacher's contract may be terminated due to reduction in force as set forth in sections 79-846 to 79-849. Although the statute does not specifically define the phrase reduction in force, this court has held that as used in the teacher tenure statutes, it involves terminating a teacher['s contract] `due to a surplus of staff.' [11] School districts are statutorily required to adopt reduction in force policies, and [n]o such policy shall allow the reduction of a permanent or tenured employee while a probationary employee is retained to render a service which such permanent employee is qualified . . . to perform . . . . [12] Section 79-847 provides: Before a reduction in force occurs, the school board or board of education and the school district administration shall present competent evidence demonstrating that a change in circumstances has occurred necessitating a reduction in force. Any alleged change in circumstances must be specifically related to the teacher or teachers to be reduced in force, and the board, based upon evidence produced at the hearing required by sections 79-824 to 79-842, shall be required to specifically find that there are no other vacancies on the staff for which the employee to be reduced is qualified by endorsement or professional training to perform. By enacting these statutes, `the Legislature has attenuated a school [district's] discretion to pare its staff in the face of reduced needs and has imposed specified procedures for achieving a reduction in force.' [13] Applying these principles, we have held that a reduction in force occurred where a community college eliminated its machine shop program due to a decline in enrollment and decided not to renew the contract of the sole machine shop instructor, and no new teacher was hired to fill a position for which the former machine shop instructor was qualified. [14] But we determined that no reduction in force occurred where a teacher was told that her position had been eliminated, and the school district subsequently hired a new teacher to fill a position for which the discharged teacher was qualified. [15] We conclude that the district court correctly determined that no reduction in force occurred in this case. There was no surplus of staff in the art department, i.e., the amount that remains when use or need is satisfied, [16] as evidenced by the fact that the School District planned to replace its only .5 FTE art teacher with another .5 FTE art teacher. The School District was not paring its staff to meet reduced needs; it was changing the method by which it secured the services of a .5 FTE art teacher in order to save money. The School District would have paid its share of the new teacher's salary and fringe benefits, but the amount would have been less than it had paid Miller, primarily because the shared teacher held probationary status and earned a lower salary. We note that the School District would have been legally prohibited by Nebraska's teacher tenure statutes from terminating Miller's contract and then hiring a probationary teacher to replace her. [17] A governmental entity may not accomplish indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly, whether prohibited by constitutional or statutory provisions. [18] The School District urges us to follow other state courts which have upheld termination of tenured teachers' contracts in circumstances where their duties were assumed by other personnel. We have reviewed the cases cited by the School District and find them to be distinguishable, in that none involved reduction in force as a statutory basis for termination of a teacher's contract and all involved factual circumstances which are different in varying degrees from this case. The School District's core argument is that it should be free to structure its workforce in the most economical way possible, in this case, through an interlocal agreement for the sharing of a teacher with another school district. It may well be that under certain circumstances, a teacher-sharing arrangement between school districts would be an appropriate and effective means of controlling costs and conserving scarce resources. But under Nebraska law, reduction of personnel cost is not itself a legal basis for terminating the contract of a tenured teacher; the savings must be achieved by a reduction in force. The district court correctly concluded that no reduction in force occurred in this case.