Opinion ID: 1157213
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Heading: Raymond Lee Sutton.

Text: Prior to its amendment in 1981, Code § 18.2-61 (Repl.Vol.1975) provided punishment for any person who shall carnally know a female of thirteen years of age or more against her will, by force. Code § 18.2-61 (Repl.Vol.1982), as amended (Acts 1981, c. 397), provides in pertinent part as follows: If any person has sexual intercourse with a female or causes a female to engage in sexual intercourse with any person and such act is accomplished (i) against her will, by force, threat or intimidation..., he or she shall, in the discretion of the court or jury, be punished with confinement in the penitentiary for life or for any term not less than five years. In substituting the words sexual intercourse for carnally know the General Assembly made no change in meaning. See Strawderman v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 855, 858, 108 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1959). But the definition of rape was significantly enlarged. Under the statute prior to amendment, it was necessary to prove sexual intercourse against the victim's will by force. See Snyder v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 792, 796, 263 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1980); Jones v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 983, 986, 252 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1979). Under the amended statute it is sufficient to prove sexual intercourse against the victim's will by force, threat or intimidation. The trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, based the convictions on a finding of intimidation. At the conclusion of the trial, he announced his ruling from the bench. After noting how positively Beverly had testified, both on direct examination and cross-examination, the judge made this statement: I disagree with defense counsel that there isn't sufficient evidence of intimidation. Certainly, the whole thing reeks with intimidation when the husband and wife in this case knew of the difficulties this child had had over the years and that she was horrified to go back with her parents. Raymond contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he had sexual intercourse with Beverly on July 23 against her will by force, threat, or intimidation. While the record shows that he displayed no weapon and did not verbally threaten Beverly with bodily harm, Beverly testified that Raymond forced himself on her and she was too frightened to fight him off. Nevertheless, since the trial court made only a finding of intimidation, we will focus on that aspect of the case. Intimidation is defined as follows in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at page 737: Unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. To take, or attempt to take, by intimidation means willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily harm. Such fear must arise from the willful conduct of the accused, rather than from some mere temperamental timidity of the victim; however, the fear of the victim need not be so great as to result in terror, panic, or hysteria. It is apparent that the legislative intent, in amending the statute to include a prohibition against sexual intercourse with a woman against her will by threat or intimidation, was to expand the parameters of rape. There is a difference between threat and intimidation. As used in the statute, threat means expression of an intention to do bodily harm. Intimidation may occur without threats. Intimidation, as used in the statute, means putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising such domination and control of her as to overcome her mind and overbear her will. Intimidation may be caused by the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure. Submission through fear to sexual intercourse is not consent. Even under the pre-1981 definition of rape, where the intercourse was induced through fear of a person whom the victim was accustomed to obey, such as a person standing in loco parentis, a conviction was affirmed in Bailey v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 107 (1886). In that case, a man came to his 14-year-old stepdaughter in her bedroom where other children were asleep. She forbade his actions but he forced himself upon her without further protest or any outcry or resistance by her. The record showed that the girl was accustomed to regard her stepfather as her protector and guardian. This Court said: A consent induced by fear of bodily harm or personal violence is no consent; and, though a man lay no hands on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical force he so overpowers her mind that she does not resist, he is guilty of rape by having the unlawful intercourse. Id. at 112. Raymond argues that there is no evidence of intimidation because Beverly had no reasonable apprehension of danger, measured by an objective standard. He says that the law of robbery requires this interpretation of intimidation which by analogy should be applied in this case. In Virginia, robbery is a common-law crime punishable by statute. It consists of a taking of property with intent to steal from the person or presence of another, against his will, by violence or intimidation. Comer v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 246, 250, 176 S.E.2d 432, 435 (1970); Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 254, 105 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1958). The element of intimidation requires that the victim be actually put in fear. Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 554, 189 S.E. 329, 331 (1937). But Raymond cites no Virginia authority to support his contention that the intimidation required to sustain a robbery conviction must create a reasonable apprehension of danger. There is no standard of reasonableness expressly provided by Code § 18.2-61. Moreover, the cases from other jurisdictions do not universally hold that in rape cases the fear induced by the defendant's intimidating actions must be judged by an objective standard of reasonableness. See Salsman v. Com., 565 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Ky.Ct.App.1978); State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 252 (Me.1981); Dinkins v. State, 92 Nev. 74, 79, 546 P.2d 228, 230 (1976); State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 461, 284 S.E.2d 298, 306 (1981); Dumer v. State, 64 Wis.2d 590, 609, 219 N.W.2d 592, 603 (1974). In People v. St. Andrew, 101 Cal.App.3d 450, 466, 161 Cal.Rptr. 634, 644 (1980) (conviction reversed on other grounds), the court held that a mental hospital attendant can be convicted of rape of a patient even if the victim's fear is not reasonable when tested by normal standards. In People v. Reyes, 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 807, 200 Cal. Rptr. 651, 655 (1984) (involving sexual offenses by a stepfather against his stepdaughters, ages 9 and 12), the subjective fear principle of St. Andrew was extended to parent-child and adult-child relationships. Raymond concedes on brief that the Commonwealth proved that Beverly was in fear when she consented to the initial act of intercourse, but he says that her fear arose from her temperamental timidity rather than from any act of his which reasonably could be expected to cause fear. We disagree. Beverly testified to her actual fear when she was awakened by Raymond on July 23. She feared both physical harm from him and the inevitability of further physical abuse from her father if she did not submit. Even if the fear of a victim is to be judged by an objective rather than a subjective standard, which we do not here decide, the evidence is sufficient to show intimidation within the meaning of the statute. Beverly's fear was based on Raymond's repeated attempts to have sexual intercourse with her, the warning voiced by Virginia that she would be returned to her father unless she submitted to Raymond, and her observation of Raymond's violent propensities and anger. Raymond believed her when she said she had been beaten by her father. Raymond testified that the Suttons took her into their home to remove her from her father's physical abuse. Raymond said that he would never have forced her to return to her father against her will but there is no evidence that he so informed her. It is apparent that he was aware of her fear of her father and believed her fear to be reasonable. In the Suttons' home where she sought sanctuary, however, she found herself aggressively importuned by a middle-aged soldier who with his wife exercised custodial control over her. The evidence shows that an atmosphere of fear was developed and maintained by the Suttons to intimidate this 15-year-old physically handicapped girl and that her fear of bodily harm was reasonable. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to affirm Raymond's conviction of rape.