Opinion ID: 1823570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applications of the Standards to this Case

Text: We note here that the ultimate question in applying either equal protection or commerce clause analysis to these facts is virtually the same. The foreign corporation franchise tax has a nexus to this state and is apportioned fairly, because only such portion of the corporation's capital as is employed in this state forms the base for the franchise tax. It is reasonably related to services provided by this state, because the corporate function depends upon the provision of services such as roads, police and fire protection, etc. Therefore, the only element of the commerce clause test that is at issue here is the discrimination against interstate commerce test. While there are certain differences between this test and the test for application of the Equal Protection Clause, they are sufficiently similar that the bulk of our analysis will not treat them separately. The question, as we see it, is whether the franchise tax on foreign corporations invidiously discriminates against them by imposing a grossly disproportionate tax on them for no other reason than to provide a competitive advantage to domestic corporations. We emphasize the term invidiously because the tax will be sustained if its classifications are rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and because, in enacting taxing statutes, legislatures are not required to reach equality with mathematical precision. [A] statutory classification impinging upon no fundamental interest, and especially one dealing only with economic matters, need not be drawn so as to fit with precision the legitimate purposes animating it. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). That [a state] might have furthered its underlying purpose more artfully, more directly, or more completely, does not warrant a conclusion that the method it chose is unconstitutional. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1727, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 2499, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, supra ; Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, supra . The guiding principles for courts to apply when legislative acts are challenged as unconstitutional were ably expressed in Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944): [7] Uniformly, the courts recognize that this power is a delicate one, and to be used with great caution. It should be borne in mind, also, that legislative power is not derived either from the state or federal constitutions. These instruments are only limitations upon the power. Apart from limitations imposed by these fundamental charters of government, the power of the legislature has no bounds and is as plenary as that of the British Parliament. It follows that, in passing upon the constitutionality of a legislative act, the courts uniformly approach the question with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government. All these principles are embraced in the simple statement that it is the recognized duty of the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 186 So. 487. See, also, Home Indemnity Co. v. Anders, 459 So.2d 836 (Ala. 1984); Crosslin v. City of Muscle Shoals, 436 So.2d 862 (Ala.1983); Thorn v. Jefferson County, 375 So.2d 780 (Ala.1979); Mobile Housing Bd. v. Cross, 285 Ala. 94, 229 So.2d 485 (1969). Thus, when testing the constitutionality of a statute, the only question for the Court to decide, under the constitutional separation of powers, is one of legislative power, not of legislative expediency or legislative wisdom. All questions of propriety, wisdom, necessity, utility, and expediency are exclusively for the legislature to determine and are matters with which the courts have no concern. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra ; Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So.2d 334, 352-53 (Ala.1980) (Shores, J., concurring in the result); Reed v. Brunson, 527 So.2d 102, 116 (Ala. 1988); Friday v. Ethanol Corp., 539 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.1988). Our legislature is faced with a difficult problem of imposing a franchise tax, because §§ 229 and 232 prescribe different methods of imposing the tax. Section 229 makes no allowance for apportionment of the domestic corporation franchise tax according to the amount of a corporation's capital stock that is attributable to activities within the state, while § 232 requires such an apportionment for foreign corporations, as it must under the Commerce Clause. The problem is compounded by the historical developments that capital stock in § 229 was held to mean only paid-in capital stock and that that measure of capital stock is no longer as appropriate a measure of the actual capitalization of a corporation as it was when the first franchise tax statutes were enacted pursuant to §§ 229 and 232. Thus, we find that the plaintiffs' claims of unequal treatment and discrimination against them are answered by two factors in the record that are not taken into account in the opinion of the trial court or that of the Court of Civil Appeals, and which presumably have been taken into account by the legislature in its efforts to enact nondiscriminatory taxes. The first is that, while it is true that there are more domestic corporations doing business in this State than there are foreign corporations doing business in this State and that, as is shown in the opinions below, those domestic corporations paid less tax, it is also true that the foreign corporations, although smaller in number, actually employ more capital in this state than domestic corporations do. The second is that the discrepancy in the franchise tax diminishes substantially when the tax on the stock of domestic corporations is taken into account. Both of these points are illustrated by the affidavit of Ernest Broadhead: My name is Ernest J. Broadhead. I am presently the Chief of the Franchise Tax Division of the Alabama State Revenue Department, which office I have held since July, 1983. In this position, I have become acquainted with the taxation of foreign and domestic corporations for franchise tax purposes in Alabama. Foreign corporations pay franchise tax based on their capital employed in the State of Alabama and pay no tax on their corporate shares of stock, whereas domestic corporations pay both a franchise tax based on the amount of their capital stock and a share stock tax which is an ad valorem tax on the corporate shares of stock. While the legal incidence of the share tax is on the stockholder, in practice the share tax is always paid by the corporation. I know of no incidence in which the share stock tax has been paid by the shareholder as opposed to the corporation. The following table shows the impact of the share tax in Alabama: 1. Number of domestic share tax assessments by year 2. Estimated total tax using average state millage rate (.038) 3. Estimated average per corporation. 1987 1986 1985 1984 1. 45,048 42,902 41,348 39,501 2. $13,563,668 $11,470,954 $11,197,983 $11,517,468 3. 301.09 267.37 270.82 291.57 The above figures are conservative because they are based on the statewide tax rate of 38 mills. Proportionally more corporations are located in larger metropolitan areas which usually have higher millage rates. For instance, the millage rate as of October 1, 1986, in Huntsville was 68.5; in Birmingham was 70.6; in Mobile was 51.5; and in Montgomery was 34.5. The study conducted by the Department of Revenue, which is a part of the record in this case, shows that for the tax year 1983, 38,772 domestic corporations and 11,234 foreign corporations paid franchise taxes. Had both the foreign and domestic corporations paid franchise taxes based on the capital employed in this state at the rate of $3.00 per $1,000.00 capital employed, an average domestic corporation would have paid $991.70, while an average foreign corporation would have paid $4,148.79. This shows that foreign corporations on average employ in excess of four times the amount of capital in this state as domestic corporations. It further shows that all the capital employed by all the domestic corporations in this state is only 45% of the amount employed by all foreign corporations. It can be seen from this that one of the reasons that the average tax for foreign corporations exceeds that of domestic corporations is that the foreign corporations are bigger and employ more capital and that many of the domestic corporations are small by comparison to the foreign corporations. It has been my experience that foreign corporations can manipulate the amount of franchise taxes they pay in Alabama merely by forming domestic corporate subsidiaries to do business in this state or by becoming Alabama corporations themselves. The State filed a brief in support of its motion for summary judgment that included the following argument based on Broadhead's affidavit: Before a tax is subject to the rational basis test, the Taxpayer must initially show that discrimination exists. The Taxpayers have attempted to do this through the use of statistics showing that Alabama receives more franchise taxes on average from foreign corporations than it does from domestic corporations. While this may be true, it is also true that a particular corporation's franchise tax liability is determined by its capital structure and corporate make-up, and it also depends to a large extent on the size of the corporation. The Affidavit of Ernest J. Broadhead, Chief of the Franchise Tax Division, Department of Revenue, shows that for the tax year 1983, 38,772 domestic corporations and 11,234 foreign corporations paid franchise taxes. Had both the foreign and domestic corporations paid franchise taxes based on the capital employed in this state at the rate of $3.00 per $1,000 of capital employed, an average domestic corporation would have paid $991.70, while an average foreign corporation would have paid $4,148.79. What these figures mean is that foreign corporations on average employed in excess of four times the amount of capital in this state as domestic corporations. This accounts for some of the discrepancy between what an average foreign corporation pays in franchise taxes and what an average domestic corporation pays in franchise taxes. The Affidavit also shows that all the capital employed by all the domestic corporations in this state constitutes only 45% of the amount employed by all foreign corporations. It can readily be seen from this that one of the reasons that the average tax for foreign corporations exceeds that of domestic corporations is that the foreign corporations are bigger and employ more capital and that many of the domestic corporations are small by comparison to the foreign corporations doing business within the State of Alabama. This fact can be illustrated using the statistics in the record in this case. Assume that the capital employed by a corporation in Alabama is indicative of its size and that therefore foreign corporations are on average approximately 4.5 times as large as domestic corporations ($4,148.00 versus $991.00). Exhibit B to the Rawls Brief shows that for the year 1985, an average domestic corporation paid $303.28 in franchise taxes while an average foreign corporation paid $3,685.40 in franchise taxes. Assume, however, that the domestic corporation also paid $270.82 in share taxes, as shown by the Affidavit of Broadhead attached to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment. Adding the $303.28 to the $270.82 gives a sum of $574.10 in total taxes paid by the domestic corporation. If you multiply the $574.10 paid by domestic corporations times a factor of 4.5 to take into account the discrepancy between the relative sizes of domestic versus foreign corporations, the domestic corporation, were it the same size as the foreign corporation, would have paid $2,583.45 in taxes, as opposed to the $3,685.40 paid by the foreign corporation. While these two amounts are not equal, the discrepancy between the two in no way approaches the discrimination which the Plaintiffs would have this Court believe exists. The figures for the 1984 tax year are even more compelling. In that year domestic corporations paid a total of $325.29 in franchise taxes and $291.57 in corporate share taxes, for a total of $616.86. If one multiplies this figure times the factor of 4.5 one may see that a domestic corporation of a size comparable to an average foreign corporation would pay a total of $2,815.87 in taxes. A foreign corporation in that same year paid on average $3,323.08 in franchise taxes. The domestic share tax figures are estimates based on the average statewide tax rate of 38 mills. It stands to reason that proportionally more corporations are located in the large metropolitan areas, which have a higher millage rate. For instance, as of October, 1986 Huntsville had a millage rate of 68.5; Birmingham had a rate of 70.6; Mobile had a rate of 51.5 and Montgomery had a rate of 34.5. Had the estimates been weighted toward the higher millage rates which exist in the larger cities, the figures might well show that the total tax paid by domestic corporations equals that of foreign corporations. In short, the apparent discrimination argued by the Plaintiffs does not in reality exist. The Taxpayers make much of the fact that domestic corporations can manipulate the amount of franchise tax they must pay by reducing the amount of their capital stock. However, foreign corporations can likewise manipulate the amount of franchise taxes they must pay merely by forming domestic corporate subsidiaries or by becoming domestic corporations themselves. According to Broadhead, this has in fact been done. We note that Broadhead inadvertently stated that his figures showed that domestic corporations employed only 45% of the capital employed by foreign corporations. What his figures in fact show is that domestic corporations employ 45% of the entire capital employed in the state by corporations while foreign corporations employ 55%. [8] Broadhead's affidavit shows that his estimates of the stock tax are almost certainly low, because Birmingham, Huntsville, and Mobile have tax rates [9] that are substantially higher than the average figure used in Broadhead's calculations, and those three cities would certainly have the greatest concentration in the state of domestic corporations with high values of corporate stock. This means both that the figures in Broadhead's affidavit for tax paid by domestic corporations are low and that the calculation of the exact amounts would be so difficult that deference to the legislative judgment on the method for equalizing the relative burdens on domestic and foreign corporations is in order. Perhaps the most significant fact about these calculations is that they are based on figures that Broadhead derived by examining domestic corporations' stock tax returns. This illustrates the point that the legislature has instituted the domestic stock tax to overcome the perceived restrictions imposed by § 229 (the absence of an apportionment provision and the paid-in capital interpretation) and to reach a tax base that is more nearly equivalent to that of foreign corporations. Also of great significance is the fact that, in deriving a hypothetical capital employed franchise tax for domestic corporations, Broadhead was not able to apply an allocation factor: The one factor ... that we were not able to include that would normally be a part of this is the allocation. So an assumption was made that all of the tax wason these generally smaller domestic corporations were Alabama firms or had a one hundred percent capital employment factor in Alabama. Thus, his figure of $991 as a capital-employed tax on domestic corporations is obviously high, and the discrepancy between the capital employed by domestic and foreign corporations is larger than his calculations show it to be and, correspondingly, the discrepancy in allocation of the tax burden is smaller than his calculations show it to be. The point that the legislature has designed the domestic stock tax to complement the foreign franchise tax is made also by a comparison of § 40-14-41 with § 40-14-70. Although the definition of capital in § 40-14-41(b) is somewhat different from the factors set out in § 40-14-70(a) and (c) to be used in valuing a domestic corporation's stock, those methods of valuation reach largely the same elements of corporate worth. The investments of domestic corporations in other states are deducted from the value of the corporate stock before the tax is calculated, § 40-14-70(d)(1), so the domestic stock tax is apportioned to some degree as the foreign corporation franchise tax is apportioned. Another fact that shows that the legislature has treated the stock tax on domestic corporations as corresponding to the franchise tax on foreign corporations is that recent amendments have added the same deductions to both taxes. Sections 40-14-41(d)(2)c and 40-14-70(d)(1) allow deductions for investments in air and water pollution control devices. Sections -41(d)(2)d and -70(d)(3) allow deductions for investments in qualifying counties, that is, counties with high unemployment rates. Furthermore, the Department of Revenue administers the corporate stock tax through a Shares Tax Section within the Franchise Tax Division. The United States Supreme Court has upheld taxing statutes that appeared to discriminate against interstate commerce by holding that the state's tax scheme compensated for the tax by a substantially equivalent tax on intrastate commerce. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 52 S.Ct. 631, 76 L.Ed. 1232 (1932) (use tax on out-of-state purchases brought into state compensated for by sales tax on in-state purchases); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 81 S.Ct. 929, 6 L.Ed.2d 227 (1961) (exemption from tax on Alaska fish catches for fish to be canned in Alaska justified because of tax on Alaska fish canners); Public Util. Dist. v. Washington, 82 Wash.2d 232, 510 P.2d 206, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial Federal question, 414 U.S. 1106, 94 S.Ct. 833, 38 L.Ed.2d 734 (1973) (deduction, from tax on sale of electric power, for sales for resale within state not discriminatory because resales within state would be subject to the same tax). The above-cited cases are analyzed at J. Hellerstein, State Taxation, vol. 1, Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes, paragraph 4.12[5], pp. 147-48 (1983). Hellerstein questions the rationales of such cases at pages 149-51 and, in the 1988 cumulative supplement, notes that more recent United States Supreme Court cases have not allowed the comparison of complementary taxes to validate taxes that, by themselves, impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 107 S.Ct. 2829, 97 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 107 S.Ct. 2810, 97 L.Ed.2d 199 (1987); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981). Hellerstein elsewhere says, however, that a capital stock tax is a corporate franchise tax: The capital stock tax, which has had a long history in State taxation, has its roots in the property tax. The earliest form of general corporation tax in this country, the corporate excess tax, was not a special tax but a modification of the general property tax. It was a levy on the value of a corporate business in excess of the value of its assets. The excess included goodwill, doing business value, and other factors that are reflected in the market value of the corporation's stock. At first, this intangible `corporate excess' value was assessed and taxed to the shareholders. Subsequently, it was levied on the corporations themselves. This form of corporate taxation has largely given way to the capital stock tax. The capital stock tax is typically an annual franchise tax, imposed on domestic corporations for the privilege of existing as a corporation, and on foreign corporations for the privilege of doing business, or the actual conduct of business, within the taxing State. It is usually measured by the value of the business as a going enterprise, determined on a book value basis, although in some States an attempt is made to utilize the market value. Hellerstein, op cit., paragraph 11.1, pp. 691-92 (footnotes omitted). Because of the perceived restrictions in our Constitution, the legislature has divided the franchise tax on domestic corporations into the franchise tax as such and the corporate stock tax. No such restrictions exist with respect to foreign corporations, so the franchise tax on those corporations has not been so divided. There is no stock tax on foreign corporations in Alabama. When the franchise tax on foreign corporations is compared to the aggregate of the franchise tax and the corporate stock tax on domestic corporations, taking into account the large amount of capital employed in this state by foreign corporations and the relatively smaller amount employed by domestic corporations, the alleged unequal treatment of and discrimination against foreign corporations diminishes to a point that no discrimination of constitutional significance exists. The legislature is not required to reach equality with mathematical exactness, and legislation will be presumed constitutional unless shown otherwise by clear and convincing proof. Even assuming that the lack of uniformity in the taxes on domestic and foreign corporations rose to a level of discrimination that would invoke equal protection or commerce clause analysis, we would hold that § 40-14-41 does not violate those provisions, for the following reasons. The Court held in Louisville & N. R.R. v. State, supra , that the purpose behind §§ 229 and 232 and the taxes enacted pursuant thereto was to collect franchise taxes that did not discriminate against foreign corporations. That is concededly a legitimate state purpose. We find that the purpose behind the historical amendments to the foreign corporation franchise tax, the domestic corporation franchise tax, and the domestic corporation stock tax has been to maintain that lack of discrimination as nearly as was feasible within the framework imposed on the legislature by §§ 229 and 232 and the cases interpreting them. In determining whether it was reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose, Western & Southern Life, supra, we need only inquire whether the legislature engaged in invidious or hostile and oppressive discrimination, Lehnhausen, supra . There is no showing of invidious discrimination or hostile purpose. Rather, a tax that was originally imposed under an express state constitutional mandate not to discriminate against foreign corporations, and that originally did not so discriminate, developed, in its application and over time, to be somewhat more discriminatory. This came about, not through an increase of the tax on foreign corporations, but by a decrease of taxes paid under the franchise tax by domestic corporations. The decrease of the domestic franchise tax came about, not through legislative action, but through actions taken by domestic corporations to pay less money in franchise taxes. It can be seen that the legislature, rather than invidiously fostering any such discrimination, took steps within the perceived restrictions of the Alabama Constitution to offset any unequal treatment, primarily by the use of the corporate stock tax. In the ongoing efforts to maintain the constitutionally required level of equal treatment, certain legislators introduced bills in the 1983 session that would have proposed an amendment to § 229 of the Constitution and thereby imposed a capital-employed franchise tax on domestic corporations. When it became clear that those bills were not likely to pass, the legislature substituted a bill that raised the rate and the minimum for the franchise tax on domestic corporations. Other than the bare fact of that legislative activity in 1983, there is no evidence that, prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the legislature had any indication that its chosen means of implementing the corporate franchise taxes was not reasonably related to the purpose of imposing a nondiscriminatory tax system. Indeed, the evidence that was developed in this case shows that consideration of the relative amounts of capital employed (even under Broadhead's unapportioned analysis of a capital-employed tax on domestic corporations), together with the domestic stock tax, brings the relative tax burdens much closer than they would appear to be under the isolated facts cited in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals quoted the trial court's statement that, aggregating the taxes paid and the returns filed in 1982 and 1983, 29,000 foreign corporations paid $94,000,000 in franchise taxes while 82,000 domestic corporations paid less than $10,000,000. Using these figures alone, one would conclude that the average foreign corporation paid 26.6 times more tax than the average domestic corporation. However, once Broadhead's calculations of the relative amounts of capital employed by domestic and foreign corporations (45% by the 38,772 domestics and 55% by the 11,234 foreigns filing returns in 1983) and the domestic stock tax are factored in, the relative burdens are not so disproportionate that we can say that the legislative taxing method is not rationally related to the purpose of enacting a non-discriminatory tax. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in this case have not presented sufficient evidence under Lehnhausen, supra, to negate a number of legitimate purposes of the present legislation that are apparent to this Court and that are reasonably likely to be promoted by the statutory distinction. Legitimate purposes for the statutory distinction between foreign and domestic corporations could certainly include, in addition to the mandate of the Alabama Constitution, ease of regulation and enforcement, differences in the utilization of state natural resources between foreign and domestic corporations, and differences in the employment of state residents and utilization of state services between foreign and domestic corporations. With respect to the purpose of ease of regulation and supervision, we are aware that the legislature has enacted various provisions for the dissolution of domestic corporations or for proceeding against individual shareholders for collection of taxes that cannot apply to foreign corporations. The United States Supreme Court has held that ease of regulation can serve as a rational basis for a distinction between persons under equal protection analysis. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982) (difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident corporation justified distinction in statute of limitations); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S.Ct. 406, 84 L.Ed. 590 (1940) (differences in ability to enforce state remedies justifies different treatment of foreign organizations); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 55 S.Ct. 538, 79 L.Ed. 1070 (1935) (domicile of insurer relevant to limitations statutes because such insurers' offices were generally located outside of the state); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553, 27 S.Ct. 171, 51 L.Ed. 314 (1906) (state's greater control over domestic corporations justified a discriminatory inheritance tax as to foreign corporations). Thus, we hold that § 40-14-41 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Turning to the Commerce Clause, we must inquire whether the taxes in question impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. The weighing of factors pertinent to the franchise taxes and the corporate stock tax leads to case-by-case differences as to whether Alabama citizens wishing to incorporate a business would find it advantageous to form an Alabama corporation or to incorporate in another state. At oral argument, the amicus curiae indicated that, for example, if a business has large intangible assets, the domestic stock tax would be so burdensome that the incorporators would inevitably choose to incorporate in another state, such as Delaware. These considerations are affected by the kind of business the corporation would be doing in this state and by the nature of its assets, not by the distinction between intrastate business and interstate business. The same considerations would apply to the decision of a foreign corporation in deciding whether to form a subsidiary Alabama corporation to conduct its business here or to conduct its business through a division of the existing corporation. [10] In the United States, which has 50 sovereigns that tax corporations, there will inevitably be incentives for incorporating in one state for certain types of business and in other states for other types of business, regardless of the actual place of doing business or the interstate or intrastate nature of that business. Are the Delaware tax laws that provide incentives for many businesses to incorporate there necessarily unconstitutional? We think not. Similarly, the Alabama tax laws that in some cases favor domestic incorporation and in others favor doing business here as a foreign corporation cannot be said to violate the Commerce Clause. We note that Broadhead, in response to GMAC's requests for admissions, said that if GMAC had been taxed in 1986 as a domestic corporation instead of as a foreign one, it would have paid $21,650,000 under § 40-14-40 instead of the $1,370,427 it paid under § 40-14-41. Thus, Alabama's taxation of domestic and foreign corporations does not violate the Commerce Clause. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is no unconstitutional unequal treatment of foreign corporations and no unconstitutional discrimination against them. Therefore, § 40-14-41 does not offend either the Equal Protection Clause or the Commerce Clause. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is therefore reversed, and a judgment is hereby rendered for the State on its motion for summary judgment. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.