Opinion ID: 793621
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identification As a Debt Collector

Text: 36 Volden asserts IFS violated section 1692e(11) by failing to affirmatively state in its September 2002 letter to Volden that it was a debt collector. Subsection (11) defines the failure of a debt collector to disclose in its initial communication that it is attempting to collect a debt, and in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, as a false, deceptive, or misleading representation. The September 2002 letter states Federal law requires us to inform you that this is an attempt to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose. Though the letter does not say it is from a debt collector, the fact it says it is sent in an attempt to collect a debt is sufficient for even the unsophisticated consumer to understand that such a letter is necessarily from a debt collector. While the unsophisticated consumer test is meant to protect consumers of below average sophistication, it also involves an element of reasonableness that prevents bizarre interpretations of debt collection notices. Peters, 277 F.3d at 1055. We find the letter effectively conveys the fact that it is from a debt collector, and thus does not violate section 1692e(11). Id. at 1056. 37 C. Did IFS Violated Section 1692g(a)(5)? 38 Finally, Volden argues that IFS violated section 1692g(a)(5) by failing to include a required statement in IFS's written notices. That section states that a debt collector shall,  within five days following an initial communication if that communication did not contain the required information, send the consumer a written notice that includes a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g)(a)(5) (emphasis added). 3 The record reflects that IFS's statements do not contain this precise statement. 39 IFS argues, however, that the statement it gave Volden in its initial notice, [i]f you notify this office in writing, within 30 days, this office will send you verification of you [sic] debt ( see sections 1692g(a)(3)-(4)), in conjunction with identifying the McDonald's stores as the creditors to whom the debt is owed ( see section 1692g(a)(2)), and the locations of the McDonald's stores, provided all the information required by section 1692g(a)(5). While we agree with Volden that IFS did not literally comply with the wording specified in part (a)(5), we think that there was substantial compliance with the debtor-protection purposes of the statute. 40 We recognize that the Seventh Circuit appears to take a more strict approach in Huff v. Dobbins, Nos. 98-2286, 98-2861, 1999 WL 370036 (7th Cir. June 2, 1999), an unpublished opinion. The overriding issue presented in Huff was, however, whether section 1692g(a) permits an attorney exception to the specific notice requirements of the section, as argued by the Dobbins law firm. As a peripheral matter, the Seventh Circuit included a footnote that mentioned the district court's (but apparently not the parties') notice of the failure of the defendant to recite the precise words of 1692g(a)(5) in its notice. In answering the major question presented, and presumably the (a)(5) issue by implication, the court said [t]he statute `leaves no room for deviation in the language of the validation [of debts] notice.' Id. at  (quoting Jang v. A.M. Miller and Assocs., 122 F.3d 480, 482 (7th Cir.1997)). 41 While we substantially agree with the Seventh Circuit, an examination of the legislative history of the FDCPA prompts us to deviate slightly from the seeming rigidity of Huff under the circumstances of this case. There is no question that Volden was at all times fully aware that he had presented the dishonored checks to two different McDonald's restaurants. He was informed by IFS that the McDonald's stores (by location) were the creditors to whom the debt was owed. Thus, if Volden had asked in response to an (a)(5) statement for the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor the only accurate answer would have provided Volden absolutely no useful information. Thus, at best for Volden, the technical and meaningless omission by IFS could not have been seen by Congress as a purposeful violation of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Richmond v. Higgins, 435 F.3d 825, 829 (8th Cir.2006). Accordingly, we find no violation. D. State Claims 42 The district court did not reach the merits of Volden's state-law claims for fraud and deceit under South Dakota Codified Laws §§ 20-10-1 and 20-10-2. Volden asks us to remand for trial on these issues. Volden did not brief these state-law claims, though IFS did. Given the foregoing discussions, we find no reason to reverse summary judgment on the state-law claims.