Opinion ID: 1525226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Evidence Relating to Parole

Text: At the sentencing proceeding, Doering sought to place before the jury evidence relating to his eligibility for parole in the event a life sentence was imposed. By means of a letter and an affidavit, he proffered the testimony of Philip G. Dantes, Chairman of the Maryland Parole Commission. According to the proffer, Mr. Dantes was prepared to testify that a person in Doering's circumstances who received a sentence of life imprisonment could not be considered for parole until he had served at least 19 years. [9] The witness was also prepared to testify that parole could not be granted to such a person without the approval of the Governor, and to testify concerning the statutory criteria that the Parole Commission is required to consider in making an advisory recommendation to the Governor. See Maryland Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol.) Art. 41, § 4-506. Finally, Mr. Dantes would have testified that the parole consideration date would be extended by one-fourth the length of any consecutive sentences Doering might be given for related offenses. Judge Fader, although sympathetic to Appellant's arguments in favor of the admissibility of this evidence, felt bound to exclude it in its entirety, citing our holdings in Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 216-18, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), sentence vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 151-53, 507 A.2d 1072, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 292, 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 529-530, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986); Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983); and Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962). We re-visit our holdings on this issue in those cases as well as in the later case of Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 250-51, 539 A.2d 637 (1988), to determine whether those precedents, when viewed in light of the foundation upon which they rest and when contrasted with the current policy of this State as announced by the Legislature, should control the result in this case. Shoemaker dealt with the impropriety of a State's Attorney's argument to a jury in a rape case. In urging the jury to convict, the State's Attorney argued that the defendant could be sentenced to as little as eighteen months and no more than twenty years imprisonment, and that the defendant could be released on parole after, and perhaps even before, he had served one-third of his term of imprisonment. In reversing the conviction, our predecessors said: The chief vice of the reference in this case to the possibility of parole is that it suggested to the jury that it might in part shift its responsibility for a finding of the defendant's guilt to some other body.... [T]he natural tendency and effect of the statements about parole was to suggest to the members of the jury that they might resolve any question about the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with the thought that, even if they made a mistake, no great harm would be done since he might soon be paroled. Shoemaker, supra, 228 Md. at 469, 180 A.2d 682. The Court carefully distinguished cases in which the jury had a function in fixing the penalty and noted that argument concerning parole in those cases involved no effort to have the jury shift responsibility in case of doubt to someone else. Id. The Court then said: In the instant case the prosecutor's request (to which the jury acceded) that the death penalty be not imposed, for practical purposes (even though not theoretically), took the case out of the class of cases in which the jury had any function in fixing the penalty. 228 Md. at 473, 180 A.2d 682. Poole likewise dealt with a prosecutor's argument to the jury. Together with other claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellant in that case contended that the State's Attorney's argument to the jury, which included reference to the possibility of parole, constituted error. The prosecutor's argument included the following statements: Is the revolving door jail, parole, jail, parole, jail, parole going to protect you and .       Will a life sentence protect us from Mr. Poole? Can you be sure, can you be sure in your own minds that that silver Cadillac won't someday be gliding quietly in the night in someone's residential community again with Mr. Poole in it?       I think a life sentence in this case would only send Mr. Poole back to Baltimore laughing, laughing at this proceeding, knowing that he only has to bide his time. All he has to do is wait, be a good inmate, do everything he has to do. Poole, supra, 295 Md. at 195, 453 A.2d 1218. We found the argument of the prosecutor improper. In doing so we cited Shoemaker, notwithstanding that the principal rationale of Shoemaker dealt with the impermissible shifting of responsibility for the decision of guilt or innocence, an issue that was not involved in Poole. Evans, like Poole, involved the sentencing proceeding in a capital case. Unlike Poole or Shoemaker, it was the defendant in Evans who attempted to place the matter of possible parole before the jury. The defendant did so on the basis that the evidence was relevant to the statutory mitigating circumstance involving future dangerousness. We held that the trial judge had properly rejected the evidence, noting that one might be likely to engage in criminal activity constituting a threat to those around him whether he is confined in a penal institution or is on parole. Evans, supra, 304 Md. at 530, 499 A.2d 1261. Harris and Booth followed Evans in holding that evidence relating to parole was not relevant to the question of future dangerousness. We conclude that the basic rationale of Shoemaker, entirely correct in its own setting, is not directly applicable to proceedings involving determination of sentence by a jury. This conclusion justifies a fresh look at the issue, and, in our re-appraisal of the relevant factors bearing on that issue, we take into consideration the current policy of the State with respect to the involvement of the capital sentencing jury in matters concerning parole. By the passage of Chapter 237 of the Laws of 1987, we think the Legislature clearly articulated a policy in favor of greater jury involvement in matters of parole where the jury determines the sentence. That Act, codified at Article 27, §§ 412-13 of the Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), permits the sentencing authority, when appropriate notice has been given by the State, to determine whether the sentence shall be death, life imprisonment, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Although the Act did not take effect until July 1, 1987, and thus could not have been applied in Doering's case, the shift in policy is apparent from the date of enactment, and may be considered in connection with this related question. See Anne Arundel County v. Fraternal Order of Anne Arundel Detention Officers, 313 Md. 98, 543 A.2d 841 (1988) (statute inapplicable by its terms, but legislative policy underlying the statute considered and common law rule modified accordingly). We also note that Doering's approach to the admissibility of this evidence differs significantly from that taken by defendants seeking the introduction of similar evidence in our earlier cases. The only justification for admission offered in the past was that the evidence had a direct bearing on the issue of future dangerousness  an argument we did not then find persuasive. Doering's argument, which rests on a much broader base, is that evidence relating to parole is material to the question of the appropriateness of a life sentence, and therefore may operate as a mitigating circumstance. Maryland's death penalty statute is structured to give very broad discretion to the sentencing authority in determining the circumstances that will be deemed relevant to the ultimate question of whether death is the appropriate penalty. We have said that [i]f the sentencing authority perceives anything relating to the defendant or the crime which causes it to believe that death may not be appropriate, it may treat such factor as a mitigating circumstance and decide that it [is not outweighed by] the aggravating circumstances. Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 475, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986). See also Harris v. State, supra, 312 Md. at 252, 539 A.2d 637; Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 756, 506 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). Our statute permits the sentencing authority wide discretion to decline to impose the death penalty, but at the same time it carefully channels and directs the consideration of factors that would permit its imposition. We interpret our statute as being wholly consistent with the principles of Hitchcock v. Dugger, ___, U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and unaffected by the holding of Franklin v. Lynaugh, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) which addressed the effects of a more restrictive statute. Moreover, this Court has recently held that the appropriateness of sentences other than death may be considered by the sentencing authority as a mitigating circumstance. Harris v. State, supra, 312 Md. at 251-52, 539 A.2d 637. Upon consideration of these various factors, we now conclude that a jury seeking to determine the appropriateness of a life sentence will be aided by information correctly describing the legal and practical effects of such a sentence, and that the existence of an appropriate alternative sentence must certainly be considered a relevant mitigating circumstance. We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding seeks to place before the jury relevant and competent information concerning his eligibility for parole in the event a life sentence is imposed, that request should be granted. We do not suggest that all the evidence proffered by Doering should have been admitted. We do not believe, for example, that Dantes should have been permitted to give a specific computation of a parole eligibility date predicated upon the assumption that the trial judge would impose maximum and consecutive sentences for all related offenses. That computation would involve speculation as to sentences not yet imposed, and perhaps even involve matters of merger, or possible modification of verdicts as a result of post-trial motions. As we have noted, however, the matter never progressed to the point of a determination, or the exercise of discretion, concerning the part or parts of the proffered testimony that might be admitted. The trial judge ruled that no testimony relating to parole eligibility would be admitted, and under the circumstances of this case that was error. We shall vacate the sentence, and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.