Opinion ID: 2546725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Advancement of the March 9 and 10, 2004 orders.

Text: ¶ 14 Eventually, in the March 9 and 10, 2004, orders the trial court: 1) upheld two of the disputed transactions  the lease and the use tax appropriation  as constitutional; and 2) granted a partial new trial regarding the redevelopment agreement. Nevertheless, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was no just reason for delay in advancing the March 9, and 10, 2004, orders prior to a final adjudication of all of the remaining claims. ¶ 15 This is so because the qui tam claims, with the exception of the claim asserted against the third-party defendant attorneys, are still pending. The obvious function in filing the declaratory judgment suit was to divert the filing of a qui tam suit by reaching the same issues which would have been decided, had a qui tam suit become necessary. The declaratory judgment claims and the still pending qui tam claims, under the facts of this case, largely involve the same transactions and occurrences, an identity of parties, and an identity of facts  both actions were brought to resolve the challenges in the written demand. ¶ 16 In short, because the declaratory judgment claims and the qui tam claims [30] arise from the same transactions or occurrences they are, in terms of judicial efficiency interrelated and intertwined. Because the claims have so much factual overlap, for the purpose of requiring their adjudication prior to an appeal they should be treated as the functional equivalent of non-severable claims. [31] In the cause before us, this demands that in order to serve the most judicially efficient means of reviewing all of the issues involved, the trial court must completely adjudicate all of the claims as a prerequisite to an appeal. Accordingly, the appeals should be dismissed as premature.