Opinion ID: 2563933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jurisdiction of Grand Jury

Text: Defendant contends that the grand jury lacked jurisdiction to indict her because, at the time it returned the indictment, proceedings on a previously filed complaint on the same charges had been stayed. We disagree. The prosecution originally filed, in the municipal court in San Mateo County, a complaint against defendant alleging 10 counts, including the two murders and the attempted murder of which she was convicted in the present case. Defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts and filed a demurrer alleging San Mateo County was not the proper venue for trial of the offenses committed at the workplace of Caroline Gleason, located in Santa Clara County. After the municipal court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, the prosecution filed an amended complaint alleging that acts preparatory to the commission of the Santa Clara County crimes occurred in San Mateo County. (§ 781.) Defendant again filed a demurrer challenging venue. The municipal court overruled this demurrer and proceeded to set a preliminary hearing date. Defendant then filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the superior court challenging venue for the offenses committed in Santa Clara County, and Presiding Judge Shelton issued an order to show cause and a stay of all proceedings in the municipal court. While the writ proceeding was still pending, the prosecutor initiated a grand jury proceeding, and that body subsequently returned an indictment against defendant that included the counts previously charged in the complaint as well as additional counts of burglary. Similarly to the amended complaint, the indictment alleged that preparatory acts to the Santa Clara County offenses occurred in San Mateo County, and that property taken during the commission of those offenses was brought to San Mateo County. Over defendant's objection, the superior court vacated the stay of the municipal court proceedings. The municipal court dismissed the amended complaint, and defendant was arraigned on the indictment. Defendant filed a demurrer to the indictment, challenging venue with regard to the offenses committed in Santa Clara County. Defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury lacked authority to return an indictment because proceedings on the complaint were pending and had been stayed. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. (20) Defendant contends the grand jury, as an arm of the superior court, lacked authority to act as long as the stay was in effect. To the contrary, neither the pendency of the complaint nor the stay of proceedings on that complaint affected the jurisdiction of the grand jury. In the prosecution of a felony, the People may proceed either by indictment or . . . by information. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; see Pen. Code, §§ 682, 737.) It is within the discretion of the prosecution to accept dismissal of a complaint and begin new proceedings by seeking an indictment. ( People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 664, 669 [108 Cal.Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609].) After a complaint has been filed, the prosecution is not prohibited from seeking an indictment on the same charges, even prior to dismissal of the complaint. ( Sherwood v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 183, 187 [154 Cal.Rptr. 917, 593 P.2d 862] [grand jury did not lack jurisdiction to indict the defendant while a complaint was pending against him on the same charge].) The stay issued by the superior court did not affect the prosecution's right to seek an indictment. That order stayed all proceedings in the Municipal Court of this county on the case of The People v. Celeste Simone Carrington, CRSf239675. An indictment and an information initiate separate proceedings. ( People v. Combes (1961) 56 Cal.2d 135, 145 [14 Cal.Rptr. 4, 363 P.2d 4] [error committed in connection with the complaint does not affect subsequent proceedings under an indictment for the same charges]; see People v. Grace (1928) 88 Cal.App. 222, 228 [263 P. 306] [The mere fact that the same offense was charged in the indictment that had previously been charged in the information does not establish any legal relation or connection between the information and the indictment . . . and manifestly no error committed in connection with the one proceeding could affect the other.].) The stay simply did not apply to any potential grand jury proceedings in the superior court. Defendant also contends that the prosecutor's action in convening a grand jury while a stay was in effect constituted unfair and unconstitutional forum shopping, violating her rights to due process and fundamental fairness. By seeking an indictment, the prosecution may have avoided some delay in obtaining a probable cause determination while defendant's venue challenge to the complaint was being litigated. The prosecution, however, did not obtain any unfair advantage in doing so. It did not avoid a ruling on the venue issue. Defendant demurred to the indictment, alleging that San Mateo County was not a proper venue for trial of the Santa Clara County offenses, and the superior court overruled that demurrer. (See §§ 917, 1004, subd. 1.) The prosecutor's decision to pursue an indictment was not unlawful and did not result in any unfair advantage over the defense. Consequently, defendant's constitutional rights were not violated.