Opinion ID: 2638722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preemption as Applied in this Case

Text: As discussed above, there are six ways that Congress can preempt state law. We discuss each one in turn to determine whether the FLSA preempts the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions. First, it is clear that Congress did not express a clear intent to preempt state law in enacting the FLSA. The Mill, 887 P.2d at 1004. The FLSA contains no statutory language that expressly forecloses the state from requiring plaintiffs to comply with the notice-of-claim provisions of the CGIA before asserting an FLSA claim. Second, because the FLSA lacks a notice provision, there is no outright or actual conflict between federal and state law. Id. Third, compliance with both the CGIA notice-of-claim provisions and the FLSA is [not] physically impossible. Id. There is nothing to prevent a plaintiff from complying with the requirements of both statutes before bringing suit. Fourth, there is not an implicit barrier within the [FLSA] to state regulation. Id. In fact, the FLSA contains a savings clause that allows states and municipalities to enact stricter wage and hour laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). Fifth, Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field when it enacted the FLSA as evidenced by the FLSA's savings clause. Therefore, the issue of preemption in this case turns on whether enforcement of the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress. The Mill, 887 P.2d at 1004. Instructive on this issue is the United States Supreme Court decision in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). In Felder, the plaintiff initiated a § 1983 action against the City of Milwaukee and certain of its police officers in a Wisconsin state court. Id. at 135, 108 S.Ct. 2302. Wisconsin law required a plaintiff suing a governmental entity or its agents to give written notice to the intended defendants within 120 days of the claimed injury. Id. at 136, 108 S.Ct. 2302. Failure to comply with the Wisconsin notice-of-claim requirements constituted grounds for dismissal. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that dismissal of the action was proper because the plaintiff failed to comply with the statute. Id. at 137, 108 S.Ct. 2302. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Wisconsin notice-of-claim requirements were preempted as inconsistent with federal law. Id. at 134, 108 S.Ct. 2302. The Court explained that the enforcement of the Wisconsin statute stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress for two reasons. First, the Court held that the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute conflict[ed] in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983. Id. at 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302. The Court stated that the core purpose of § 1983 is to provide compensatory relief for those deprived of their federal rights by state actors. Id. at 141, 108 S.Ct. 2302. Section 1983 accomplishes this goal by creating a form of liability that, by its very nature, runs only against a specific class of defendants: government bodies and their officials. Id. The Court found that Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute undermined this uniquely federal remedy by protecting governmental defendants and thus condition[ing] the right to bring suit against the very persons and entities Congress intended to subject to liability. Id. at 141, 144-45, 108 S.Ct. 2302. Second, and more importantly here, the Court held that the enforcement of the Wisconsin statute would frequently and predictably produce different outcomes depending on whether the plaintiff sued in federal court and, therefore, avoided the statute, or whether the plaintiff sued in state court and was thereby prevented from pursuing a claim under § 1983 because of the Wisconsin statute. The Court noted that while states may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts, a federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice. Id. at 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302. Thus, although [f]ederal law takes state courts as it finds them, it does so only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not `impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal law.' Id. at 150, 108 S.Ct. 2302 (quoting Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949)). Because [s]tates may not apply such an outcome-determinative law when entertaining substantive federal rights in their courts, the Court held that the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute was preempted. Id. at 141, 108 S.Ct. 2302. Like the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute at issue in Felder, the CGIA's notice-of-claim requirement is an outcome-determinative rule. Application in cases such as this may lead to inconsistent results in state and federal courts. Thus, claims brought in federal court could proceed regardless of whether the plaintiff complies with the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions. However, suits brought in state court would be subject to dismissal unless the plaintiff complied with the CGIA's notice-of-claim requirements. Because enforcement of the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions in state court would result in the barring of a federal claim while the same action could proceed in federal court, the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress and must yield to federal law. Thus, we conclude that the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions are preempted by the FLSA. Middleton and Travis argue that Felder is distinguishable because in finding preemption, the Court relied on the conflict between the purpose of § 1983 and the purpose of the notice-of-claim provisions. Middleton and Travis argue that such a conflict does not exist in this case. And, in fact, they argue that the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions further the aim of the FLSA by safeguarding the working conditions of employees. The core purpose of the FLSA is to protect all covered workers from substandard wages, oppressive working hours and detrimental labor conditions. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981)(citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). Thus, we agree with Middleton and Travis that one of the purposes behind the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions, to allow a public entity to investigate and remedy dangerous conditions, see Feeney, 974 P.2d at 1003, is consistent with the FLSA's purpose of safeguarding the working conditions of employees. However, as discussed previously, the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions serve additional purposes, which are not identical to the purposes of the FLSA. In Felder, the Supreme Court noted that the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute was enacted primarily for the benefit of governmental defendants, and [was] intended to afford such defendants an opportunity to prepare a stronger case. Felder, 487 U.S. at 145, 108 S.Ct. 2302 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, one of the purposes of the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions is to allow the state to prepare the defense of claims. Mesa Valley Sch. Dist., 8 P.3d at 1204. In addition, the CGIA makes compliance with the notice requirements jurisdictional; consequently precluding those claims that fail to comply with the notice requirements. Thus, like the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute at issue in Felder, the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions undoubtedly benefit the state by protecting state coffers. The protection of state coffers, while not contrary to the purposes of the FLSA, does not further the purposes of the FLSA. After weighing the above considerations, we conclude that, despite some similarity of purposes, the outcome-determinative implication in this case is sufficient to find preemption. Admittedly, the argument for preemption is stronger when the application of the state statute would lead to different results in state court than in federal court and the state statute also serves different purposes than the federal statute. These two considerations were both present in Felder; the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute would have produced different outcomes in federal and state court and it conflicted with the purposes of § 1983. However, Felder recognized that a state statute that produces different outcomes depending on the forum may interfere with the purposes of Congress. The Felder Court stated that state statutes that significantly inhibit the ability to bring federal actions and frequently and predictably produce different outcomes based solely upon whether pursued in state or federal court stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress, and are thus preempted. We agree that the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions have some similarity of purpose with the FLSA. Nonetheless, the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions interfere with the purposes of Congress in enacting the FLSA because they prevent injured employees from recovering under the FLSA in state court in situations such as this case. Moreover, the outcome-determinative nature of the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions appear to be more closely related to the state's interest in protecting state funds than it is to the state's interest in investigating and remedying dangerous conditions. For theses reasons, we hold that the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress, and they are preempted by the FLSA. Additionally, we find support for our holding in the decisions of other courts that have considered this issue and have held similarly. In Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 149 F.Supp.2d 677, 683 (E.D.Wis.2001), the court held that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the same Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that was at issue in Felder did not bar the plaintiff's FLSA claim. In reaching its decision, the court stated that state procedural rules cannot be used to defeat a federal right. Id. (citing Brown, 338 U.S. at 296, 70 S.Ct. 105). Similarly, in Mitchell v. La Barge, 257 A.D.2d 834, 684 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1999), the court held that a municipal notice-of-claim statute was preempted by federal law and thus did not apply to plaintiffs' FLSA claim. Based on the foregoing, we hold that a plaintiff filing an FLSA retaliation claim against a state employee in his individual capacity need not comply with the CGIA's notice-of-claim provisions.