Opinion ID: 2361900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Claims-Minded Plaintiff Issue

Text: Ms. Lewis also cites, as reversible trial error, the decision of the trial court to overrule her objection to a part of the closing argument of Mr. Voss which referred to prior personal injury claims by Ms. Lewis. Specifically, Ms. Lewis argues that: The trial court erred in permitting defense counsel, over objection in closing argument, to misuse prior claims evidence prejudicially attacking the appellant as a habitual litigant who conspired with appellant's counsel and her attending orthopedist to perpetrate a fraud, where the defense had offered no evidence of fraudulent conduct. During the cross-examination of Ms. Lewis, she acknowledged that she was involved in a bus accident in 1989 and that her current counsel had filed a claim in her behalf against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). Neither the questions of opposing counsel, nor the responses of Ms. Lewis, suggested that her claim against WMATA was meritless. Ms. Lewis also stated, in response to cross-examination questions, that in 1990 she injured her finger and was represented in a claim for damages by her current counsel. Again, no questions or responses even implied that her claim for her finger injury lacked merit. Yet, while delivering her closing argument, counsel for Mr. Voss told the jurors: The other type of analysis you will do also concerns the credibility of each of the witnesses. Ms. Lewis believes and claims that all her problems are related to this one incident despite the fact that she had significant preexisting arthritis in the knee, in other parts of her body and other problems. [10] She's made several claims before in the past. That's part of the evidence to consider. Does she have an interest or motive  Counsel for Ms. Lewis objected. During the bench conference, he challenged counsel's argument regarding a claims-minded plaintiff. When reminded that he had not objected to Ms. Lewis' testimony concerning her prior claims, he indicated that he thought [such testimony] was admissible because of Ms. Lewis' prior neck injury, but that the admission did not open up the ... door to the claims-minded plaintiff argument. The trial judge ruled that, there is [no] foundation for arguing that the evidence shows there is anything suspect just because she had a prior claim, but that the prior claim for her neck injury was relevant to her condition physically. Nonetheless, the trial judge refused to strike anything counsel for Mr. Voss said prior to the bench conference. When counsel for Ms. Lewis reminded the trial judge that Mr. Voss' counsel had argu[ed] that [Ms. Lewis] had an interest in the outcome of this case by reason of having been a claimant before, the court adhered to its refusal to strike any part of the closing argument. After the bench conference, counsel for Mr. Voss referred to Ms. Lewis' representation on two previous occasions by her current counsel, and her treatment on one of those occasions by Dr. Smith. Counsel then questioned the credibility of Dr. Smith on the ground that he was a paid expert. Furthermore, counsel implied that Dr. Hanley was not an objective witness because he and Dr. Smith were colleagues in the same area. The charge of litigiousness is a serious one, likely to result in undue prejudice against the party charged, unless the previous claims made by the party are shown to have been fraudulent. Outley v. City of New York, 837 F.2d 587, 592 (2d Cir.1988) (citing McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 196, at 578-81 (3d ed.1984)); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 963, 981 (Chadbourn rev.1970). [While] litigiousness may have some slight probative value, ... that value is outweighed by the substantial danger of jury bias against the chronic litigant. The trial court has a duty to prevent exploitation of this prejudice.... Id. (quoting Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.1985)) (other citation omitted). By allowing counsel for Mr. Voss to suggest, without a factual predicate showing fraud or frivolous complaints, that, because of two prior claims, Ms. Lewis had a motive or interest to file suit against Mr. Voss, the trial court did not adequately guard against juror prejudice against Ms. Lewis. This is particularly true since the theme of Mr. Voss' closing argument was the credibility of Ms. Lewis, Dr. Smith and Dr. Hanley, and since the testimony of Dr. Smith and Dr. Hanley depended, at least in part, on what Ms. Lewis recounted to them about the accident and her medical history. Our dissenting colleague's reliance on Murphy v. Bonanno, 663 A.2d 505 (D.C. 1995) is misplaced. Murphy is quite different from the case before us. [11] There, in a cross-examination context, we were concerned about the trial judge's categorical exclusion of evidence relating to the `litigious' or claim-minded plaintiff. Id. at 510. However, we were careful to distinguish between the trial judge's determination of relevance, and the exercise of discretion regarding admissibility. [12] We made clear that the exercise of discretion involves ascertaining whether the person asserting litigiousness ha[s] an adequate `factual predicate' for the proffered questions.... Id. The danger of an inadequate factual predicate is that some questions are of a kind that, if hurled into the proceedings recklessly, could work unfair prejudice.... Id. The same may be said for a closing argument based upon an inadequate factual predicate. Furthermore, we stated in Murphy that: appellant's factual proffer with respect to the assertedly bogus insurance claims was fairly specific (except as to dates), including the precise amounts recovered by his wife. On the other hand, the assertion that Ms. Murphy lured the doctor to her apartment to lay the ground for a false claim of sexual harassment and extort a settlement might turn out, on minimal examination, to rest on mere conjecture from the fact that the parties compromised the debt. Id. at 511. In the case before us, as indicated, Ms. Lewis objected to part of Mr. Voss' closing argument which was designed to show that she conspired to file prior fraudulent claims. The trial judge concluded that there was no factual predicate showing anything suspect about her prior claims. Since there was no factual predicate, the argument should have been excluded. It was not, and as we have shown, prejudiced Ms. Lewis. In sum, the trial judge abused her discretion by failing to strike the challenged portion of Mr. Voss' closing argument. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Ms. Lewis' motion for a new trial. See Bernard, supra, 624 A.2d at 1219 (citing Jefferson, supra, 615 A.2d at 585). Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this matter, with instruction to grant Ms. Lewis a new damages trial. So ordered. SCHWELB, Associate Judge, dissenting: I am unable to agree with my colleagues that reversal is warranted in this case. In my view, the trial judge's finding that Juror No. 477 could be impartial was not clearly erroneous, and the judge did not abuse her broad discretion in declining to disqualify this prospective juror for cause. I am also satisfied that the judge committed no error, and certainly no reversible error, in overruling an objection to a very brief portion of defense counsel's closing argument. I would affirm the judgment.
The question whether a prospective juror who has been challenged for cause will be able to perform her duties impartially is one of fact, and the trial judge's determination must therefore be accorded great deference on appeal. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-38, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). [1] A finding of impartiality may be overturned only for manifest error. Id. at 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)) (quotation marks omitted); accord, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878); Harris v. United States, 606 A.2d 763, 764 (D.C.1992); Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322, 326 (D.C.1979) (per curiam). The burden of showing partiality rests squarely upon the challenger. Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 325. Moreover, as my colleagues recognize, the trial court has broad discretion in conducting voir dire [,] and its rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion and substantial prejudice to the [appellant]. Maj. op. at 1005 (citations and ellipsis omitted). The determination of a potential juror's impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge. Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 325 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Juror No. 477 was not manifestly biased, and, in my opinion, the majority's reversal of the trial judge's decision cannot be reconciled with our deferential standard of review as described above. The record reflects that Juror No. 477 spoke openly, and with apparent candor, during her interrogation on voir dire. She volunteered that, in her opinion, the tort system might benefit from an overhaul. [2] She also disclosed that she had read THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE, a book that Ms. Lewis' attorney regarded as unduly critical of tort and personal injury plaintiffs. These disclosures may not have made No. 477 appear to be an ideal juror from Ms. Lewis' perspective, but they were not grounds for automatic disqualification. Any possible partiality suggested by the prospective juror's responses was not at all manifest, as the cases require. At most, the inference that someone with Juror No. 477's views would not be fair to the plaintiff was hypothetical  a possibility, perhaps, but hardly a certainty. That is not enough to permit appellate second-guessing. As the Supreme Court explained in Reynolds, supra, if hypothetical only, the partiality is not so manifest as to necessarily set the juror aside. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Burr's Trial (1 Burr's Trial, 416), states the rule to be that light impressions, which may fairly be presumed to yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of the testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him. 98 U.S. at 155; see also Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 326. Juror No. 477's comments might perhaps have suggested some philosophical leanings which could operate to the advantage of the defense, although even that possibility was hardly obvious or manifest. Under the authorities cited, there was no ground for reversal. The trial judge recognized that Juror No. 477's responses did warrant further inquiry regarding the woman's ability to be fair to both parties. The judge therefore followed up by propounding several more specific questions. In response, the prospective juror stated, inter alia, that she could certainly serve and, I think, be an impartial, fair judge of the events and so forth. [3] Asked whether she would treat the plaintiff's witnesses differently because they were plaintiff's witnesses, she responded No, I don't think so. Satisfied with these assurances, the judge rejected the plaintiff's challenge for cause and explained her reasons for doing so: Clearly, I was concerned when [Juror No. 477] described what she seemed to feel as a negative experience in her being involved in a lawsuit against the school she chaired the board at. When I distinguished significantly between that kind of case and this kind, she seemed to understand that there really wasn't much of an overlap in her own  between the nature of these claims. Her personal opinion, her reading in the area, I'm satisfied with her description of her ability to be impartial and fair is a reasonable one. I don't see a big overlap with her personal case and this one. I don't think that we have a basis other than speculation in which to strike her for cause. Obviously, the trial judge's ruling on the plaintiff's challenge to this prospective juror turned primarily on her assessment of the woman's responses. Juror No. 477 stated, under oath, that she could be an impartial and fair judge of the facts. If this statement was true, then there was no basis for a challenge for cause. In the final analysis, it was the judge's responsibility to decide whether, given the entire record, the prospective juror's assurance was believable. See Patton, supra, 467 U.S. at 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885. The judge did her duty, inquired further, and considered all of the prospective juror's answers. In the end, the judge credited Juror No. 477's description of her ability to be impartial and fair. This, as I have noted, was a finding of fact. Under the applicable standard of review, such a finding is insulated from assertive appellate second-guessing unless it is manifestly erroneous. Patton, supra, 467 U.S. at 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885; cf. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1997). Although my colleagues in the majority do not phrase their ruling in this way, their decision, when assessed under the manifest error standard of review, amounts to a holding that the trial judge erred by believing, rather than disbelieving, Juror No. 477's representations under oath. It is there that they and I part company. Over several pages of transcript, the judge and the prospective juror participated in a thoughtful dialogue. The judge had the obvious advantage of being able to look the woman in the eye, to observe her demeanor and mannerisms, and to consider her tone and emphasis in responding to questions. See Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 325 (emphasizing the importance of the trial judge's ability to assess a prospective juror's demeanor). By marked contrast, we, as an appellate court, have access only to the transcript  to the whole transcript, to be sure, but to nothing but the transcript. The best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried. Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1215 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (Jerome Frank, J.)) (quoting ULMAN, THE JUDGE TAKES THE STAND 267 (1933)). Where, as in this case, the merits of the plaintiff's challenge for cause turn almost entirely on the prospective juror's demeanor and credibility, an appellate court, in my view, may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. Judge Reid points out, and I agree, that [p]eople do not readily admit to bias. Maj. op. at 1005 (citation omitted). This is a fundamental fact of life with which any experienced judge is undoubtedly familiar. A prospective juror's representation that she can and will be fair therefore is not, and cannot be, binding on the trial judge. The judge must use his or her own judgment and worldly wisdom to determine whether or not the prospective juror is being truthful, or whether the juror has biases of which he or she may not be aware. But we do not have the slightest reason to believe that the experienced judge in this case was unable to appreciate the reluctance on many people's part to acknowledge their own prejudices. The fact that the judge believed this prospective juror, after receiving her responses during voir dire, does not suggest that the judge would automatically credit every self-serving declaration that might be presented to her by someone the judge regarded as less trustworthy. Indeed, the judge sustained the plaintiff's challenge for cause against another prospective juror  a former law clerk to a Superior Court Judge  on a record which, at least on paper, would have justified the woman's retention on the jury. [4] I agree with the majority that the trial judge plays an important role in detecting bias on the part of potential jurors. Maj. op. at 1005 (citation omitted). I likewise have no quarrel with my colleagues' view that voir dire ... to be meaningful, must uncover more than the jurors' bottom line conclusions [to broad questions], which do not in themselves reveal automatically disqualifying biases as to their ability fairly and accurately to decide the case, and indeed, which do not elucidate the bases for those conclusions. Id. (citation omitted, ellipsis and alteration in original). But in this case, there was a specific dialogue between the prospective juror and the judge. At the conclusion of this exchange, Ms. Lewis' attorney did not propose any additional questions to be propounded to the prospective juror, nor did he seek leave to interrogate Juror No. 477 himself. Instead, he asked the judge, on the basis of the record as it then stood, to disqualify No. 477 for cause. Having failed to suggest, in the trial court, further voir dire questions focused upon Juror No. 477's qualifications, [5] Ms. Lewis cannot now be heard to complain, for the first time on appeal, that no further interrogation of this prospective juror was conducted. See, e.g., In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 477-78 & n. 11 (D.C.1996).
The majority also holds that a new trial is required because the trial judge overruled an objection by Ms. Lewis' attorney to a very brief portion of defense counsel's closing argument by Mr. Voss' attorney. According to my colleagues, the comments to which objection was made constituted an improper claims-minded plaintiff argument. In my opinion, the relevant portion of counsel's closing was based on evidence that had been received without objection, and the argument was not improper. Even assuming, arguendo, that the objection should have been sustained, reversal is not warranted. During her cross-examination by counsel for Mr. Voss, Ms. Lewis was asked about two prior accidents in which she had been involved. She acknowledged that she had made a claim following each of these events, that her attorney in the present case had represented her in each, and that in one instance, she had been evaluated by the physician who testified on her behalf against Mr. Voss. Ms. Lewis' attorney did not object to this cross-examination, [6] and the evidence became a part of the record. During her closing argument, Mr. Voss' attorney referred briefly to the injuries suffered by Ms. Lewis in her previous accident. Counsel then continued as follows: Ms. Lewis believes and claims that all her problems are related to this one incident despite the fact that she had significant preexisting arthritis in the knee, in other parts of her body and other problems. The cyst, the osteo  tricompartmental osteoarthritis. And the doctors agree those are not all related, but despite that everything now is related to this one incident. She's made several claims before in the past. That's part of the evidence to consider. Does she have an interest or motive . (Emphasis added.) Before defense counsel could finish the last sentence and identify the alleged interest or motive, Ms. Lewis' attorney objected, complaining at the bench that the foregoing constituted an improper claims-minded plaintiff argument. The only objection made by the plaintiff on claims-mindedness grounds was to the two brief sentences plus seven words that I have italicized above. The judge pointed out that the evidence had been received without objection, and she ruled that counsel's argument to that point therefore had not been out of order. The judge added, however, that the defense did not have a foundation laid that suggests that credibility is at issue because of prior claims. [7] On this limited record, the majority apparently concludes that the closing argument made by Mr. Voss' counsel warrants reversal of the judgment. I turn first to the merits of the plaintiff's objection. The majority relies on general statements in two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. [8] Maj. op. at 1007. But ten years after the earlier of these Second Circuit cases, and seven years after the later one, this court reiterated that the courts of the District of Columbia are notably liberal in receiving evidence of claim-mindedness and allowing the jury to assess its weight. Decisions binding on us firmly indicate the relevance of such evidence to assessing the truth of the witness' present allegations. Murphy v. Bonanno, 663 A.2d 505, 510 (D.C.1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [9] In Murphy, supra, this court relied on, and cited with approval, Mintz v. Premier Cab Ass'n, supra note 9. 663 A.2d at 510. Mintz involved a scenario similar to the one now before us. In that case, the plaintiff, a passenger in a taxi, sued the taxicab company for injuries sustained in a collision between two cabs. On cross-examination, the plaintiff was interrogated regarding claims that she had made following her involvement in two prior accidents. In closing argument, counsel for the defendant challenged the plaintiff's credibility upon the ground that she was claimsminded. Mintz, 75 U.S.App. D.C. at 389, 127 F.2d at 745. There was no evidence that the plaintiff's earlier claims were fabricated or false. The trial judge nevertheless permitted the defense argument. Thereafter, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Edgerton, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment favorable to the defendant: This type of evidence, like many other types, may create prejudice but is believed to be worth more than it costs. [10] This case is within the principle. Negligent injury is not unusual, but it is unusual for one person, not engaged in hazardous activities, to suffer it repeatedly within a short period and at the hands of different persons. The court's rulings were therefore right. That all three of appellant's stories may have been true affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. It was for the jury to decide from all the evidence, and from its observation of appellant on the stand, whether she was merely unlucky or was claim-minded. Id., 75 U.S.App. D.C. at 390, 127 F.2d at 745. [11] In light of these authorities, it cannot fairly be said that the challenged portion of defense counsel's closing argument was contrary to District of Columbia law. A careful reading of what Mr. Voss' attorney actually said (as distinguished from what opposing counsel obviously apprehended that she might say) reveals that the claims-minded plaintiff theme, if it emerged at all, was implicit rather than explicit  counsel asked rhetorically whether the plaintiff had an interest or motive. Murphy, supra, and Mintz, supra note 9, as well as other decisions surveyed in Murphy, would have permitted a far more direct articulation of the theory than defense counsel ever attempted. I should think that if my colleagues share Justice Ginsburg's discomfort with Mintz and with Mintz's District of Columbia progeny, see note 9, supra, then our court should address the problem directly, en banc. In the meantime, however, we are required to follow binding precedent. Even if one were to construe the holding in Mintz as inconsistent with the later decision in Roundtree, supra note 11, which it is not, Mintz would control. Where a division of this court fails to adhere to earlier controlling authority, we are required to follow the earlier decision rather than the later one. Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 420 n. 6 (D.C. 1999). But even if the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's closing argument had been well-taken  and, for the reasons that I have stated, I am convinced that it was not  reversal would still be unwarranted. The jury, as I have noted, was well aware that Ms. Lewis had made two prior accident claims, that her attorney was involved in both of them, and that the doctor who testified on her behalf at the trial in this case had been consulted in one of the two. This testimony was admitted without objection. Counsel for Ms. Lewis never moved to strike this evidence, nor did he request a limiting instruction regarding the purpose for which the jury could consider it. During the trial, the only objection made by Ms. Lewis' attorney regarding the issue now under discussion was to the two short completed sentences and one short incomplete sentence in defense counsel's closing that are quoted and italicized on page 1012, supra. It takes quite a stretch to construe these twenty-four words [12] as a claims-minded plaintiff argument. But even if counsel's remarks are so interpreted, the probability that an attorney's very cryptic comment (about facts well-known to the jury) appreciably affected the result of a three-day trial is surely somewhere between negligible and nil.
In a civil case, as in a criminal prosecution, [t]he reversal of a [judgment] entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, [counsel], and the [parties] to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; [parties or witnesses] may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences. The passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible. ... These [and other] societal costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence when an error in the first proceeding has deprived a [party] of a fair determination of the [merits]. But the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (phrases in brackets inserted to replace criminal case terminology; internal citations omitted). In my opinion, Ms. Lewis received a fair trial, and there is simply no sufficient basis in law for a reversal that will entail so much cost in time and treasure to so many people. I am prepared to assume that this trial was not perfect, for perfection in any human endeavor is a rare commodity. Allen v.. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1228 (D.C.1992) (en banc). But any retrial will probably be even less perfect. The accident in this case occurred on September 25, 1995. The new trial is unlikely to take place less than six years after the fact. By then, the memories of the witnesses may well have eroded considerably. For reasons that I have explained, I differ with my colleagues significantly with respect to the doctrinal principles applicable to this case. But looking at the case realistically, the practical consequences of this reversal strike me as most unfortunate. In conclusion, I suggest that en banc review may be appropriate of 1. the contrast between the majority's approach and what I consider to be the well-established standard of review applicable to a judge's denial of a challenge of a prospective juror for cause; and 2. the status in this jurisdiction of the claims-minded plaintiff doctrine, in light of the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan . In the meantime, I respectfully dissent.