Opinion ID: 202265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Defendants' Failure to Timely Raise Legal Defenses

Text: 79 Plaintiffs argue that, whatever the legal deficiencies of the punitive and compensatory damages awards, defendants waived any challenge to those awards by failing to object in a timely manner to the jury instructions and verdict form. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(b)(2), (c)(2) (stating that a party that has been informed of an instruction before the jury is instructed and before final jury arguments must object to the instruction on the record before the instructions and arguments are delivered); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(d)(1)(A). However, [f]ailures to object, unless a true waiver is involved, are [mere forfeitures that are] almost always subject to review for plain error. Chestnut v. City of Lowell, 305 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir.2002) (en banc) (per curiam); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 51(d)(2) (A court may consider a plain error in the instructions affecting substantial rights that has not been preserved as required ....). It is clear here that there was no knowing waiver by defendants, merely forfeiture. 80 To succeed under the plain error standard, defendants must show that: (1) an error was committed; (2) the error was `plain' (i.e.[,] obvious and clear under current law); (3) the error was prejudicial (i.e.[,] affected substantial rights); and (4) review is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice, meaning that the error `seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Rivera Castillo v. Autokirey, Inc., 379 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1999); Muñiz v. Rovira, 373 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2004)) (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 advisory committee's note (listing at least four factors relevant to a finding of plain error: (1) the obviousness of the mistake, (2) [t]he importance of the error, (3) [t]he costs of correcting [the] error, and (4) the impact a verdict may have on nonparties). The standard is high, and it is rare indeed for a panel to find plain error in a civil case. Chestnut, 305 F.3d at 20. 81 The present case is one of those rare occasions when the standard is met. Here, the errors of law were plain: punitive damages and tort-like compensatory damages were not authorized under any of the causes of action alive at the time of trial against any of the defendants. Moreover, the legal errors were clearly prejudicial to defendants: the jury would not have granted the $100,000 punitive damages award and over $30,000 in tort-like compensatory damages had it not been instructed, contrary to law, that such damages were available. Finally, the errors, while compounded by defendants' silence, were in major part created by plaintiffs' active misleading of the court as to the law. 82 Allowing the award to stand would be a miscarriage of justice. See id. (reviewing for plain error and vacating a punitive damages award, in part because allowing the award to stand would be a miscarriage of justice); Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 123-24 (3d Cir.1999) (same); Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 362 (2d Cir.1974) (vacating punitive damages award against defendant municipality on plain error review because of the demonstrable deviation of the court's instruction here from the appropriate standard, the serious harm suffered by the defendant as a result of this error, and the remediability of this error without a new trial below). 83 This is especially so because the windfall of such awards to IDEA plaintiffs would likely come at the expense of other educational benefits for other schoolchildren by diverting from them scarce educational resources. See Chestnut, 305 F.3d at 20-21. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), in which it vacated, on plenary review, an award under § 1983 of punitive damages against a municipality, even though defendants failed to object to the charge at trial, in part because punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill. Id. at 267. The Court also observed that [n]either reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers. Id. In Chestnut, this court, sitting en banc, vacated damages on plain error review in similar circumstances. 26 See 305 F.3d at 22. 84 We are also influenced by the fact that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow an award to stand, where that award was brought about by plaintiffs' misleading the court about the law. See id. at 20 (finding a miscarriage of justice where [p]laintiff's counsel, quite erroneously, represented to the district court at the charge conference that punitive damages were permissible against a municipality). Had plaintiffs not misled the court as to the law and defendants not stood silent, we doubt the jury would ever have been asked to award punitive damages. Counsel have a duty to be candid about the law, and the trial court, bearing a heavy caseload, relies on counsel to meet that duty. Given the press of work, our trial court system would break down if the court had to stop and independently research every point of law on which counsel appear to agree or, at least, not to disagree. The situation here is especially egregious because the district court explicitly asked whether punitive damages were available and gave both parties an opportunity to respond. 85 Further, to let this award stand would contravene Congress's intent as expressed in the IDEA. In choosing not to authorize tort-like monetary damages or punitive damages in cases under the IDEA, Congress made a balanced judgment that such damages would be an unjustified remedy for this statutorily created cause of action. No doubt Congress had in mind that public elementary and secondary education have access to only limited resources and that a sizeable damages award would divert resources to litigants and away from direct expenditure on education. In this case, the public interest in not sustaining the award outweighs the public interest in a smoothly functioning judicial system, which generally requires parties to state their defenses or lose them. 86 Defendants should take little comfort in this outcome. A continuing pattern of poor advocacy by the Commonwealth in IDEA cases could lead to the balance tipping the other way in future cases. One understands the palpable frustration of the trial judge. 87 As to the monetary relief authorized by law, we cannot know whether the jury would have awarded any damages to plaintiffs had defendants not been precluded from presenting evidence as a result of the default order. Perhaps defendants would have won on liability. We leave in place the monetary relief awarded by the jury that was available under the law and remand to the district court for such adjustments as are appropriate.