Opinion ID: 4203981
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims against AMSEA

Text: Because we are reinstating Ironshore's negligence claims against the United States, its claims against AMSEA, cannot survive. In order to explain this conclusion, we must briefly address the principle of sovereign immunity. The United States, as sovereign, cannot be subject to a suit unless it waives its sovereign immunity. See Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 253 (1st Cir. 2003). The provisions of such a waiver define its scope. Id. Ironshore has filed its negligence claims against the United States pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act, which includes an explicit sovereign immunity waiver for certain admiralty and maritime claims.8 But 8 Under the Suits in Admiralty Act the United States waives its sovereign immunity [i]n a case in which, if a vessel were privately owned or operated . . . a civil action in admiralty could be maintained. 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a); see also Thames Shipyard & Repair Co., 350 F.3d at 253. - 18 - the strings attached to this sovereign immunity waiver prove fatal to Ironshore's negligence claims against AMSEA. The Suits in Admiralty Act states that [i]f a remedy is provided by this chapter, it shall be exclusive of any other action arising out of the same subject matter against the . . . agent of the United States . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. 46 U.S.C. § 30904 (emphasis added); see also Ali v. Rogers, 780 F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 2015). Ironshore argues that AMSEA should not be considered an agent of the United States for purposes of the Suits in Admiralty Act's exclusivity provision because record evidence indicates it was acting entirely on its own behalf. This argument is misguided. In cases filed pursuant to the Public Vessels Act, other circuits have held that a private contractor crewing a ship that qualifies as a public vessel is necessarily an agent of the United States for purposes of the Suits in Admiralty Act's exclusivity provision. See Favorite Marine v. Marine Pers. & Provisioning, Inc., 955 F.2d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 1992) (As a matter of legal definition, 'agent' of the United States is an appropriate characterization of such a contract operator of a public vessel. (quoting In re United States, 367 F.2d 505, 509-10 (3d Cir. 1966)); see also id. ([T]he general statement of an agency concept . . . include[s] any instrumentality through and by which the public vessels are operated. (quoting In - 19 - re United States, 367 F.2d at 510) (second alteration in original)). Having already decided that the concept of a public vessel has the same meaning under the OPA and the Public Vessels Act (see supra Section II.B.), we conclude that contractors crewing a ship deemed a public vessel for purposes of the OPA are -- as a matter of legal definition -- agents of the United States for purposes of the Suits in Admiralty Act's exclusivity provision. Hence, AMSEA crewed the FISHER as an agent of the United States. As such, the Suits in Admiralty Act's exclusivity provision prevents Ironshore from advancing any claims against it.