Opinion ID: 1365332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction on presumptions.

Text: Counsel for contestants asked the court to give the following Instruction B. You are instructed that if you find a confidential relation existed between the testatrix and Elmer Peterson no presumption of undue influence is raised and the burden of proof is not shifted by the mere fact that a beneficiary under the Will occupies as regards the textatrix a confidential or fiduciary relation such as that of a business manager. However, if, in addition to a confidential relation between testatrix and Elmer Peterson, you should further find that there exists suspicious circumstances such as the fact that the beneficiary took part in the procuring of the Will or that the testatrix was weak-minded or in frail health and partly susceptible to influence, or that the provisions of the Will are unnatural and unjust, then you are instructed that undue influence is presumed and the burden of proof shifted to the contestees to require the beneficiary to produce evidence which at least balances that of the contestant. The court refused to give that instruction, but instead gave Instruction No. 9 reading as follows: In determining whether or not any undue influence was exercised over the testatrix on December 28, 1944, or on March 25, 1951, you may consider, among other things, the following factors: (a) Whether or not the person or persons claimed to have exercised undue influence were in confidential or fiduciary relationships such as employee, business manager, and the like, and in addition thereto (b) Whether or not the testatrix was weak-minded, or in frail health, or particularly susceptible to undue influence, or (c) Whether or not the provisions of the Will are unnatural. It may be noted that the court in its instruction mentioned the same elements of influence as Instruction B. The objection made by contestants is that the court did not go far enough, but should have stated, as in the asked instruction, that if the elements existed, then it followed as a matter of law that a presumption of undue influence existed which had to be met by evidence to put the presumption in equipoise. The instruction is based, in the first place upon the assumption that a confidential relationship existed between the testatrix and Elmer Peterson. We doubt that the evidence warrants such finding even as to the will of 1944. It is held in Hyde v. Norris, 250 Ala. 518, 35 So. (2d) 181, that the confidential relationship must be a dominant confidential relationship. Blood relationship is not in itself a confidential relation. 57 Am. Jur. 287. In re Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 132 A. 786, it was held that where a brother was the main beneficiary and he managed the farm of testator, but the latter looked after his own wants, even active participation in the making of the will did not cast on the beneficiary the burden of showing lack of undue influence as it would in the case of a stranger. In re Douglass' Estate, 162 Pa. 567, 29 A. 715, testator had several farms managed by a superintendent. He gave one of his farms to the superintendent. The latter had nothing to do with the execution of the will, and the relationship between him and the testator was no more than usual between employer and employee. It was held that the burden was not shifted to the superintendent to show want of undue influence. The evidence in the case at bar would seem to show a situation in 1944 very similar to that in the cases cited. In any event, Elmer Peterson was not in the employ of testatrix when the codicil of 1951 was executed. He had done a few errands for her in seeing Mr. McMicken for her in connection with the claim of Brimmer and Bible and about changing the bank account of testatrix to another bank. That does not show any confidential relation. Even if the will of 1944 was invalid by reason of undue influence, it was validated in 1951 by the codicil when no undue influence existed. 68 C.J. 862, 863. In re Hesse's Estate, 62 Ariz. 273, 157 P. (2d) 347, 351. Undue influence must be such as destroys free agency and thereby substitutes the will of another for that of the testator. Cook v. Bolduc, 24 Wyo. 281, 157 P. 580, 158 P. 266. In re Anderson's Estate, Wyo. 255 P. (2d) 983. Elmer had nothing to do with the execution of the codicil of 1951. Hence an instruction based on the theory that a confidential relationship might have been found by the jury at that time would be wholly unwarranted, and the asked Instruction B was properly refused for that reason alone. Let us, however, examine the other statements contained in the asked instruction. It is stated in 28 R.C.L. § 100, p. 146, as follows: It is the generally accepted view that the mere existence of confidential relations between a testator and a beneficiary under his will does not raise a presumption that the beneficiary has exercised undue influence over the testator, and does not cast upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue influence. Those consequences follow only when the beneficiary has been actively concerned in some way with the preparation or execution of the will. It may be noted that activity of the beneficiary is required. The same rule is stated in the annotations in 66 A.L.R. 228, and 154 A.L.R. 583, citing scores of cases. Counsel call this the minority rule, seem to think that it is out-dated and is superseded by the text in Corpus Juris and American Jurisprudence. The text in 68 C.J. 759 to 761 is as follows: However, it is the general rule in practically all jurisdictions that undue influence is presumed and the burden of proof shifted so as to require the beneficiary to produce evidence which at least balances that of the contestant, when, in addition to the confidential relation, there exist suspicious circumstances, such as the fact that the beneficiary took part in the preparation of procuring of the will, or actually drafted it or assisted in its execution, or that the testator was weak-minded or in frail health and particularly susceptible to influence, or that the provisions of the will are unnatural and unjust. (Italics supplied.) This text differs from that in Ruling Case Law in the italicized portion. The text is substantially repeated in 57 Am. Jur. 280, which, however, refers to sections 396 and 398, pages 285 and 286. The rule when an unnatural will is involved is stated more cautiously in 57 Am. Jur. 286 as follows: But the circumstances of inequality or unfairness in the will, coupled with a confidential relation between the testator and a favored beneficiary, as a result of which the beneficiary had dominated and controlled the testator for some time, has been held sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence.    (Italics supplied.) The same statement is found in 68 C.J. 1099, which also states that if the proponent of the will does not produce any evidence, the court should not rule as a matter of law that undue influence has been established. We have read all the cases cited in Corpus Juris and American Jurisprudence, bearing on the italicized portion in Corpus Juris. We are unable to say that the text is not sustained by decisions of some of the courts, although, as will appear later, it is probable that some of the decisions have been superseded by later decisions in the respective jurisdictions. Nor can we say that it is the prevailing rule. The asked instruction speaks of partly susceptible which counsel for contestee criticize as incorrect. It is clear that what was meant was particularly susceptible, following the text in Corpus Juris, and we shall disregard the slight mistake. Confidential relationship and weakened physical condition do not give rise to a presumption of undue influence, unless perchance the weakened bodily condition is so extreme as to make testator particularly susceptible to undue influence. In re Lavelle's Estate, Utah, 248 P. (2d) 372. In re King's Estate, 369 Pa. 523, 87 A. (2d) 469, 473, where no weakened intellect was shown, the court stated: Nor is the burden of proof placed upon a legatee, in the case of a confidential relation, unless it be shown that he was instrumental in procuring the legacy. Where there is no evidence that the beneficiary solicited the bequest herself or wrote the will or procured it to be written, or that her advice was sought or taken, the existence of intimate friendly relations between the testatrix and beneficiary, such as living with her, nursing her and managing her business do not import undue influence or shift the burden of proof. None of the cases cited in Corpus Juris and American Jurisprudence hold that the court should tell the jury that the combination of facts stated in asked Instruction B raised, as a matter of law, a presumption of undue influence, except the case of Moore v. Spier, 80 Ala. 129, where the court held that the jury should be instructed that if the testator had a weakened intellect and confidential relation existed, these factors gave rise to a presumption of undue influence. As will be seen later, it is doubtful that the case is now the law in Alabama. As to whether or not the rule of Ruling Case Law is superseded by the text in Corpus Juris may be judged more accurately after an examination of cases from various jurisdictions. It must be remembered that a confidential relation may be loose or close, may not show any dominance on the part of the beneficiary, and may have no relation to the will at all. Weakness of mind may be of small or large degree. Unnaturalness of a will may be accentuated or may exist in but small degree, or not at all, depending on the view taken by men. And it may well be questioned whether the same instruction should be given under each of these varying circumstances. For example it is held that only when a will is grossly unreasonable in its provisions and plainly inconsistent with testator's duty to his family will the inequality have any effect on the question of undue influence. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Froment, 114 Vt. 523, 49 A. (2d) 111; In re Le Gault's Estate, 99 Or. 621, 196 P. 254. It is clear that asked Instruction B ignores the rule stated in these cases entirely. In re Kajewski's Estate, 134 Neb. 485, 279 N.W. 185, the court approved of the text in Corpus Juris heretofore cited. The statement to that effect was mostly dictum. It was held in that case that since the evidence failed to disclose that the beneficiary was active in procuring a will, it was error to submit the case to the jury on the question of undue influence. If we should follow that case we should have to say, we think, that the question of undue influence should not in the case at bar have been submitted to the jury at all. The rule in Nebraska according to late rulings is that to warrant the rejection of a will by reason of undue influence it is necessary to show (1) that the testator was subject to such influence; (2) that the opportunity to exercise it existed; (3) that there was a disposition to exercise it; (4) that the result appears to be the result of such influence. A will contestant must produce evidence to prove each of these elements as a prerequisite to have the case submitted to the jury on the question of undue influence. In re Hagan's Estate, 143 Neb. 459, 9 N.W. (2d) 794, 154 A.L.R. 573; In re Bainbridge's Estate, 151 Neb. 142, 36 N.W. (2d) 625. In view of the fact that particularly the third element can seldom be proven except by facts showing participation in the procuring of the will, the rule seems but little different from the California rule hereafter mentioned. The rule in Wisconsin seems to be the same as that in Nebraska. In re Stanley's Will, 226 Wis. 354, 276 N.W. 353; In re Sowka's Will, 247 Wis. 498, 19 N.W. (2d) 898. In the case of In re Llewellyn's Estate, 83 Cal. App. (2d) 534, 189 P. (2d) 822, 839, 191 P. (2d) 419, the court stated: Before there is imposed upon the proponent of a will the obligation of presenting evidence of volition, and before the question as to undue influence becomes one of fact for determination by a jury, there must be evidence, the probative force of which establishes (1) the relations between the one charged with exercising the undue influence and the decedent affording the former an opportunity to control the testamentary act; (2) that the decedent's condition was such as to permit of a subversion of his freedom of will; (3) that there was activity on the part of the person charged with exercising undue influence; and (4) that such person unduly profited as beneficiary under the will. Estate of Graves, 202 Cal. 258, 262, 259 P. 935; Estate of Hampton, 39 Cal. App.2d 488, 498, 103 P.2d. 611. It is also the law that evidence must be produced that pressure was brought to bear directly upon the testamentary act. Estate of Arnold, 16 Cal.2d 573, 577, 107 P.2d 25. To the same effect are In re Hull's Estate, 63 Cal. App. (2d) 135, 146 P. (2d) 242, and other cases. In re Doty's Estate, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 747, 201 P. (2d) 823, 829, citing other cases the court stated: In the absence of evidence of activity on the part of the beneficiaries, or either of them, no presumption arose of the exertion of undue influence by them. To that effect, also, is In re Lingenfelter's Estate, Cal. App., 234 P. (2d) 125, 129. In Kahalley v. Kahalley, 248 Ala. 624, 28 So. (2d) 792, 795, the court stated: We have observed that in order to raise the presumption of undue influence of the beneficiary and cast the burden on her of showing the contrary, there must have been shown an active interference on her part in procuring the execution of the will, the mere activity and interest in following and complying with testator's instructions or directions being insufficient to this end. The recent case of Mindler v. Crocker, 245 Ala. 578, 18 So.2d 278(8), 281, re-emphasized the principle and pointed out that there must be `Confidential relations, accompanied with activity of a favored beneficiary in the preparation and execution of a will.' To the same effect are: Raney v. Raney, 216 Ala. 30, 112 So. 313, 316; Jones v. Brooks, supra; Coghill v. Kennedy, supra; Bancroft v. Otis, supra. To the same effect is Hyde v. Norris, 250 Ala. 518, 35 So. (2d) 181, where the confidential relationship is required to be a dominant one. See further, and to like effect Shelton v. Gordon, 252 Ala. 187, 40 So. (2d) 95. In Powell v. Raleigh, Mo. App., 244 S.W. (2d) 387, 390, the court stated: To state the matter more accurately (since the so-called presumption is in reality an inference which may or may not be drawn as the situation warrants), the established fact of a confidential or fiduciary relation and a benefaction to or in the interest of the fiduciary are insufficient, standing alone, to afford a substantial basis for an inference of the exercise of undue influence by the fiduciary in the execution of a will. On the contrary, the existence of a confidential relation is only to be regarded as supporting a charge of undue influence where, in addition to proof of such relation and of a benefaction to or in the interest of the fiduciary, there are further facts and circumstances in the case from which it can be reasonably inferred that the fiduciary was himself actively concerned in some way which caused or contributed to cause the execution of the will. The case cites numerous Missouri cases. In Doll v. Fricke, 237 Mo. App. 1148, 171 S.W. (2d) 755, 758, the court stated: Mere proof of confidential relations raises no presumption of undue influence. Larkin v. Larkin, Mo. Sup., 119 S.W.2d 351, loc.cit. 356. To render a will invalid because of undue influence, in addition to proof of a fiduciary relation and of a benefaction to the fiduciary or in his interest, there must also be proof, direct or circumstantial, that the fiduciary was active in causing the execution of the will and that, in fact, undue influence was exerted. Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, loc.cit. 316, 85 S.W.2d 400, loc.cit. 401; Winn v. Matthews, 235 Mo. App. 337, loc.cit. 346, 137 S.W.2d. 632. In Lake v. Seiffert, 410 Ill. 444, 102 N.E. (2d) 294, 296, the court stated: Presumption of undue influence arises not from the fact of fiduciary relationship, or of the mental condition or habits of the testator, but from participation in procuring execution of the will. Powell v. Bechtel, 340 Ill. 330, 172 N.E. 765. (Italics supplied.) To the same effect are Powell v. Weld, 410 Ill. 198, 101 N.E. (2d) 581; Cunningham v. Dorwart, 317 Ill. 451, 148 N.E. 314. In Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P. (2d) 692, it was held the evidence that beneficiary of a will had been attorney for testator for ten years did not establish undue influence in the absence of evidence disclosing any pressure or urging by the beneficiary on testator to effect a will in beneficiary's favor. This seems to hold a rule like that in, for example, California. In Kiefer v. Deibel, 292 Ky. 318, 166 S.W. (2d) 430, it is held that in Kentucky, the burden to prove undue influence never shifts from the contestant even if active participation on the part of the beneficiary in procuring the will is shown. In re Aldrich's Estate, 148 Fla. 121, 3 So. (2d) 856, 858, one of the Justices stated that he was convinced that in most jurisdictions there must not alone exist confidential relations, it must further appear that the beneficiary was also active in procuring or drafting the will, although there is still considerable division of judicial opinion on the subject. This statement was apparently approved in In re Peters' Estate, 155 Flo. 453, 20 So. (2d) 487, 491. In re Lillie's Estate, 195 Okl. 597, 159 P. (2d) 542, the court appears to agree with  at least cites with approval  28 R.C.L. 146, and the annotation in 66 A.L.R. 228 to the effect that the presumption of undue influence arises only when the beneficiary has been active in some way in procuring the will. See also In re Knutson's Will, 149 Or. 467, 476, 41 P. (2d) 793, 800; In re Estate of Andersen, 192 Or. 441, 235 P. (2d) 869, 877; In re Hill's Estate, Oregon, 256 P. (2d) 735, 751. In Gehm v. Brown, 125 Colo. 555, 245 P. (2d) 865, 869, the court stated: The generally accepted view is that the mere existence of confidential relation between a testator and a beneficiary under his will does not raise a presumption that the beneficiary has exercised undue influence over the testator, and does not cast upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue influence. Those consequences follow only when the beneficiary has been actively concerned in some way with the preparation or execution of the will. It is quite clear from an examination of the cases that the rule stated in 28 R.C.L. 146 is still the prevailing rule in at least many jurisdictions, and that rule should be applied in the case at bar. The evidence, if any, concerning the weakness of the mind of testatrix is slight and it is not at all clear that, under the circumstances in this case, the will is unnatural. Whatever rule should govern in case of stronger evidence in that connection, we can find no justification for the jury to base a presumption on the evidence in this case either in whole or in part. We think, as heretofore stated, that there is no evidence that Elmer Peterson participated in any way in procuring the will in question here, and asked Instruction B was, accordingly, properly refused. We think we should consider another feature of the case, namely, whether the court was required to give an instruction on the so-called presumptions in the case at all. It is held, in at least many authorities, that the so-called presumptions are but inferences of fact. In re Lillie's Estate, supra; In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. (2d) 602; Powell v. Raleigh, supra; 50 Mich. L.R. 756. In the late Iowa case of Olsen v. Corporation of New Melleray, 60 N.W. (2d) 832, 837, decided November 17, 1953, the court specifically stated that when an attorney, a beneficiary under a will, is active in the preparation of a will, a suspicious circumstance arises which does not, however, amount to a presumption and the weight is further governed by other circumstances. This court, speaking through Mr. Justice Kimball in Hoge v. George, 27 Wyo. 423, 450, 200 P. 96, 105, which involved a presumption of law, stated: The phrase `presumptions of fact' is of frequent occurrence in the books, but it is now well understood that, accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a `presumption' of fact (4 Wigmore, Ev. § 2491), and the term should be discarded as useless and confusing. When used it can mean only inferences of fact, or mere arguments which may or may not be acted upon by the jury, who, under our system of jury trials, need not usually be instructed in regard thereto. (Italics supplied.) In 2 Page on Wills, supra, § 819, p. 622, the author states: The so-called presumptions of undue influence which arise out of certain classes of confidential relations between the testator and the beneficiary, and in some jurisdictions, in connection with additional facts, are presumptions or inferences of fact, in most jurisdictions, and not presumptions of law. It is, therefore, not necessary and not proper to charge the jury that they must find undue influence unless the proponent has introduced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. This statement of the author is fully corroborated and approved by the Ohio Court of Appeals in Board of Education v. Pendleton, 80 Ohio App. 249, 75 N.E. (2d) 182, 185, and Haley v. Dempsey, 14 Ohio App. 326, 331, 332, 333. In the latter case, fully approved in the former, the court said: It is claimed that where a confidential relation is established and a gift made to a person in whom confidence is reposed, and such person participates in the drafting of the will, or makes suggestions for drawing it, a presumption of fraud or undue influence arises which the proponent has the burden of proof to overthrow. The word presumption' is to some extent an ambiguous word, and many instances are found in the decisions in fraud cases, and in will contests, where it is used in more than one sense. Presumptions may be either of fact or of law. A presumption of law is a rule of law that a particular inference shall be drawn by a court or jury from a particular circumstance. A presumption of fact is a rule of law that a fact, otherwise doubtful, may be inferred from a fact which is proved. (Lawson on Presumptive Evidence (2 ed.), 639.) This distinction is adverted to in the case of Hutson v. Hartley, 72 Ohio St. 262, 268, 269, 720, 74 N.E. 197. Under the Ohio law the order of probate is prima facie evidence of the due attestation, execution and validity of a will, and when the order of probate is introduced in evidence the burden of proof in respect to all of these subjects rests on the contestants of the will.    In the further progress of the trial there is no such change in the burden of proof and law as to require the court in its charge to the jury to instruct them that in respect to any particular issue or items of evidence the burden of proof is thrown back from the contestants to the proponents. While it is argued here that the effect of a charge as now contended for does not affect the burden of proof, the effect of such a charge would be to require the court to instruct contradictory presumptions in respect to the same subject-matter at the same time. Hutson v. Hartley, 72 Ohio St. 262, 268, 74 N.E. 197. The so-called presumption of undue influence arising out of confidential relations is neither a conclusive presumption nor a presumption of law. It is a mere inference of fact which the jury may draw. `While the jury may find undue influences as a fact from the fact that a beneficiary in confidential relations with testator drew the will, the court must not charge the jury as a matter of law so to find.' Page on Wills, Section 414, page 482.