Opinion ID: 77679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alternative Argument: Impermissible Time, Place, & Manner Restrictions

Text: 49 Having determined that the County noise ordinance is content-neutral, we may now review the ordinance to see whether it contains permissible time, place and manner restrictions. The pertinent test requires that we apply intermediate scrutiny as our standard of review— whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. 50 In their Joint Pretrial Stipulation, the parties stated that the [g]overnment has a substantial interest in protecting citizens from unwelcome noise. The Supreme Court has endorsed this view, noting that the government may act to protect traditional public fora such as city streets and parks from excessive noise. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 109 S.Ct. 2746. 9 Accordingly, we find, as the district court did, that the County has a significant government interest in regulating reproduced sound.
51 Once we have satisfied ourselves that the ordinance reflects a significant government interest, we must ask whether the government narrowly tailored the ordinance to achieve that interest. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the government does not need to show the regulation utilizes the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest. A speech-restrictive regulation will satisfy this requirement so long as it promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)). 52 Section 21-28 of the County Code addresses excessive noise in a comprehensive fashion. It regulates noises from such disparate sources as the horns and signaling devices that generate traffic noise to power tools and landscaping equipment used for residential maintenance, and from the noises emitted by caged animals to raucous shouting on residential streets. The subsection that regulates noise from devices that reproduce sounds such as televisions, radios, phonographs and musical instruments contains a standard that is specifically tailored to that particular category of sound. Thus, it proscribes unreasonably loud noise in terms that address the needs and welfare of both involuntary and voluntary listeners, making it unlawful to use sound reproduction devices: 53 in such a manner as to disturb the peace, quiet and comfort of neighboring inhabitants, or at any time louder that is necessary for convenient hearing for the person or persons who are in the room, vehicle or chamber in which such machine or device is operated and who are voluntary listeners thereto. 54 Id. at § 21-28(b). It also sets forth a rebuttable presumption to aid compliance officers in enforcing the standard: 55 The operation of any such set, instrument, phonograph, machine or device between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. in such manner as to be plainly audible at a distance of one hundred (100) feet from the building, structure or vehicle in which it is located shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section. 56 Id. Accordingly, we find that the ordinance is narrowly tailored.
57 The last factor that we must consider in evaluating the validity of the ordinance's time, place and manner restrictions on reproduced sounds is whether it leaves open ample channels for alternative expression. We find that it does. The ordinance does not impose a total ban on the use of reproduced sound devices. It only restricts the volume at which these devices may operate so as not to intrude on the peace and quiet of neighborhood residents or affect the comfort of voluntary listeners. Nor does the ordinance bar the use of devices that reproduce sound at certain times of the day or prohibit persons from operating them within certain areas of the county. The Supreme Court upheld a municipal guideline that addressed sound amplification for concerts at public parks for this very reason, noting that the guideline [d]oes not attempt to ban any particular manner or type of expression at a given place or time. Ward, 491 U.S. at 802, 109 S.Ct. 2746. 58 L.C. argues that the ordinance fails to leave it any effective way to communicate music outdoors and that the City has licensed it to operate Opium Garden as an open-air entertainment venue. Opium Garden is not an open-air venue in the way that a ballfield grandstand is, however. The record indicates that L.C. operates the club from the open atrium of a two-story structure. The surrounding structure, which is roofed and which houses a restaurant, offices and other clubs, walls off the atrium from the public street outside, and undoubtedly blocks much of the noise that emanates from the atrium. The ordinance does not prohibit L.C. from communicating music into the open-air atrium of its building, it prohibits it from disturbing the neighbors with music that is plainly audible well outside the building. L.C. need only lower the volume to comply. This should not impact the ability of the patrons to hear and enjoy whatever is being played. 59 Similarly, those who wish to listen to their televisions, phonographs, or radios at a volume that would be prohibitively loud under the ordinance are not precluded from listening through headphones or wireless devices and those who wish to share their music, television broadcasts and the like with guests, passengers or patrons need only lower the volume. There is nothing unreasonable about accommodating the interests of all concerned. 60 In view of these facts, we affirm the district court's ruling on the validity of the County noise ordinance, section 21-28(b) of the County Code. The County noise ordinance is content-neutral and it sets permissible time, place and manner restrictions on the use of sound reproduction devices. It conforms to the requirements of the First Amendment. 61