Opinion ID: 2318487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Kumar's Negligent or Fraudulent Misrepresentation Claim

Text: Kumar first challenges the trial court's dismissal of his negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on appellees' motion in limine. By ordering that Kumar's claim [be] dismissed because Kumar could not show any damage, the trial judge effectively granted summary judgment to the appellees on that claim. No matter how appellees' motion was styled, the trial court's conclusion essentially expressed that because there was no genuine issue of material fact on which a jury could find that Kumar was harmed by the alleged misrepresentation, he was not aggrieved as a matter of law. Despite appellees' vigorous contentions that the motion was actually a motion in limine, [4] the nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought and not ... what a party represents the motion to be. Taylor v. United States, 759 A.2d 604, 609 (D.C.2000). We will therefore construe the motion as one for judgment as a matter of law for purposes of our analysis, and determine whether the trial court erred in granting it. Because the parties had litigated the issue of harm in their pleadings at the summary judgment stage before Judge Terrell, Kumar urges us to hold that Judge Terrell's prior ruling denying summary judgment established the law of the case, such that Judge Combs Greene was prohibited from revisiting the issues before trial. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
As detailed in Tompkins v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 433 A.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C.1981) (quotations omitted): The law of the case doctrine bars a trial court from reconsidering the same question of law that was presented to and decided by another court of coordinate jurisdiction when (1) the motion under consideration is substantially similar to the one already raised before, and considered by, the first court; (2) the first court's ruling is sufficiently final; and (3) the prior ruling is not clearly erroneous in light of newly presented facts or a change in substantive law. Although we agree with Kumar that appellees' motions were substantially similar, we do not agree that the trial court's ruling on the first motion was sufficiently final to establish the law of the case, and find no error in Judge Combs Greene's dismissal of Kumar's claim.
Kumar argues that the appellees' motion on the day of trial was substantially similar to its prior motion for summary judgment that Judge Terrell denied. [5] Both Judges Terrell and Combs Greene were presented with the argument that Kumar could not show harm flowing from WASA's representation that he must immediately sign his severance agreement and waiver because Kumar was subsequently allowed to revoke his waiver and pursue his age-based claims. The only new issue raised before Judge Combs Greene was whether it was appropriate for a jury to decide whether WASA was also required by law to allow Kumar to revoke his resignation. This issue, however, was not the impetus for Judge Combs Greene's decision, [6] as demonstrated by her statement that though she tend[ed] to agree with the defense's argument on the OWBPA jury question issue, more importantly, [she] agree[d] fully with the defense that there's no damage. Judge Combs Greene went on to hold that Kumar can[not] show damage and that's a necessary element, [] so that claim is dismissed. Because this is precisely what the appellees argued in their prior summary judgment motion, we conclude that the motions were substantially similar. See Tompkins, supra, 433 A.2d at 1098.
However, regarding the finality of Judge Terrell's decision, we have long held that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, as we are presented with here, is not sufficiently final to establish the law of the case. See, e.g., Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 593 (D.C.2000) ([D]enial of a motion for summary judgment by one judge does not foreclose grant of summary judgment by another judge.) (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478 (1981 & Supp.2000)); Washington v. Government of D.C., 152 A.2d 191, 192 (D.C.App.1959) (We have held that an order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is an interlocutory and not a final order and that a final judgment is required to sustain the application of the law of the case rule.); McNeill v. Jamison, 116 A.2d 160, 161 (D.C.App.1955) (Long ago it was decided that interlocutory rulings do not settle the law of a case and are not conclusive or binding on the trial judge, who has the ultimate responsibility of deciding the case on the merits.); see also United States v. U.S. Smelting, Refining & Min. Co., 339 U.S. 186, 199, 70 S.Ct. 537, 94 L.Ed. 750 (1950) (noting that the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice and is thus not necessarily controlling under all circumstances). [7] This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Judge Terrell did not set forth in her order her reasons for denying summary judgment, and, importantly, Judge Terrell herself acknowledged in other phases of the proceedings that she expected the trial judge to reconsider her rulings. [8] On this record, we do not find Judge Terrell's ruling to be sufficiently final to justify reliance on the law of the case doctrine.
Having decided that Judge Terrell's ruling was not sufficiently final to establish the law of the case, we still must determine whether the trial court erred in granting judgment to appellees. See Elmira Corp. v. Bulman, 135 A.2d 645, 647 (D.C.App.1957) (after deciding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment did not establish the law of the case, [t]he only remaining question is whether the trial judge decided the case correctly on the merits); see also Williams v. Paul, 945 A.2d 607, 611 n. 4 (D.C.2008); Wilner, supra, 760 A.2d at 593 ([R]eversal is not warranted where ... the appellate court agrees on the merits with the second judge's analysis.); District of Columbia v. Faison, 278 A.2d 688, 690 (D.C.1971). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Phillips v. Fujitec America, Inc., 3 A.3d 324, 327 (D.C.2010). In doing so, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and ask whether the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact on which a jury could find for the non-moving party. In other words, does the evidence present a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission to a jury or is it so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 327-28 (quotations omitted). To prevail on a claim of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that his reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation was to his detriment. See Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202, 1207 (D.C. 1999); Dresser v. Sunderland Apartments Tenants Ass'n, Inc., 465 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C.1983). [9] The material facts are not in dispute. When told his employment with WASA was at an end, Kumar was given two sets of choices: first, to resign or to be terminated; and second, to sign a waiver of claims in exchange for severance pay or to not sign the waiver and preserve his claims. He resigned and signed the waiver. Regarding this second set of choices, WASA admitted that Kumar was improperly denied the period of time required by the OWBPA to review his severance agreement. Subsequently, Kumar was allowed to revoke his waiver, and he indeed filed an age discrimination claim. This is what the OWBPA guarantees, see Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427, 118 S.Ct. 838, 139 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998), and nothing more. [10] What is clear from the undisputed facts is that Kumar's employment with WASA was going to end that day, either through his resignation or his termination. Thus, even if he proved that he was deceived into choosing one alternative over the other, he has not alleged any detriment that turned on that choice other than the waiver of claims, which he was allowed to revoke. [11] We have held that [t]here can be no recovery if the plaintiff is none the worse off for the misrepresentation. Dresser, supra, 465 A.2d at 840 n. 15 (citations omitted). As a result, we are satisfied that the trial court did not err in dismissing Kumar's negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation claim as a matter of law.