Opinion ID: 1386737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prosecution Withheld Material Exculpatory Evidence in Violation of Brady

Text: Fautenberry next argues that the prosecution withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The State argues that this claim has been procedurally defaulted. A claim is procedurally defaulted and is thus unreviewable by a federal habeas court where the habeas petitioner fail[ed] to obtain consideration of [that] claim by a state court . . . due to [his] failure to raise that claim before the state courts while state-court remedies [were] still available. Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50 (6th Cir.2000). Fautenberry admits that he did not present his Brady claim to the state courts, but argues that the prosecution's failure to disclose the evidence is both the cause of and the prejudice resulting from the default. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct, 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (discussing cause and prejudice). A habeas petitioner shows cause where he demonstrates that he failed to raise a constitutional issue because it was reasonably unknown to him at the time. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). The district court found that most of the challenged Brady evidence had not been disclosed to Fautenberry during his state-court proceedings, and the State does not directly dispute the cause element. Thus we will assume without deciding that Fautenberry satisfied that element. The question of whether we may excuse Fautenberry's procedural default, therefore, turns on the issue of prejudice. Prejudice, for purposes of procedural default analysis, requires a showing that the default of the claim not merely created a possibility of prejudice to the defendant, but that it worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimensions. Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 388 (6th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170-71, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). Procedural default analysis on the issue of prejudice mirrors Brady materiality analysis, see id., so in determining whether Fautenberry has procedurally defaulted his Brady claim, we will follow the Supreme Court's example and proceed under a Brady materiality analysis. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Evidence is deemed material for purposes of Brady only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). In a case such as this, involving a guilty or no-contest plea, the habeas petitioner may establish prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the non-disclosure of evidence, he would not have [entered his plea] and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Alternatively, he can show that the findings and decision by the three-judge panel would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Our analysis must consider the totality of the undisclosed evidence, not each item in isolation. Id. Fautenberry contends that the prosecution failed to produce five categories of exculpatory evidence: (1) evidence suggesting that FBI Agent Ott violated Fautenberry's Fifth Amendment right to counsel by contravening the rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (upon requesting counsel, an accused may not be subjected to further questioning until counsel is provided, unless the accused reinitiates the questioning); (2) evidence indicating that the State of Ohio lacked jurisdiction and that venue was improper in Hamilton County, Ohio; (3) evidence demonstrating that victim Joseph Daron had verbal arguments with his girlfriend and another friend just prior to his disappearance; (4) evidence relating to the sexual nature of the murders; and (5) evidence indicating that Fautenberry was depressed and suicidal just prior to the murders. For the following reasons, we find that Fautenberry has failed to establish that any of this evidence is material for purposes of Brady. First, the undisclosed documents concerning Fautenberry's interaction with Agent Ott do not establish an Edwards violation. Fautenberry was arrested on May 16, 1991, and sometime during the following day, while in police custody, he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. According to Edwards and its progeny, an accused in police custody who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel is protected from further police questioning so long as the accused himself [does not] initiate[ ] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880; see also Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 415 (6th Cir.2007) ( en banc ). Here, the evidence shows that it was Fautenberry himself who initiated communications with Agent Ott, after invoking his right to counsel. Sometime in the evening of May 17, 1991, a few hours after asking to speak with a lawyer, Fautenberry called Agent Ott and left a message indicating that he wanted to talk. At this point, Fautenberry had clearly initiated further communications with the police, and Agent Ott did not violate Fautenberry's Fifth Amendment right to counsel by questioning him at that time. The alleged Brady evidence shows only that Agent Ott returned Fautenberry's call a few hours later and left a message stating that Fautenberry should call him if he still wanted to talk. After waiting for two hours without hearing from Fautenberry, Agent Ott called the jail, made arrangements to visit Fautenberry, spoke with Fautenberry (apparently without any objection or refusal on the part of Fautenberry), and received Fautenberry's confession to the four murders. Fautenberry contends that this newly discovered evidence establishes an Edwards violation. We disagree. Fautenberry's mere failure to return Agent Ott's call and confirm his desire to speak does not negate Fautenberry's prior, unambiguous initiation of further communication. To be sure, had Fautenberry reinvoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel after initiating communication with Agent Ott, he would have been protected from further questioning, but Fautenberry does not assert that he did so and the alleged Brady evidence does not demonstrate that he did so. In order to invoke one's Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel, meaning that he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel). The alleged Brady evidence does not indicate that Fautenberry renewed his request for an attorney, unambiguously or otherwise, and is therefore insufficient to establish an Edwards violation or to require the suppression of his confession to Agent Ott. Moreover, all of the events that transpired during this time were known to Fautenberry and there is no basis for assuming that the non-disclosure of this evidence affected his decision to enter his no-contest plea. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Second, the undisclosed evidence does not establish that Ohio lacked jurisdiction or that Hamilton County was not the proper venue for prosecution. The state court found that Fautenberry entered Daron's car at the on-ramp to [Interstate] 275 off of Highway 125, see Fautenberry, 1994 WL 35023, at , which is located to the east of Cincinnati, near the border of Hamilton County, Ohio, and Clermont County, Ohio. The state court concluded that Daron drove north on Interstate 275 to a destination some ten miles north of Milford, Ohio, see id., and dropped Fautenberry at a restaurant near the junction of Interstate 71, see Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d at 880. The state court determined that Fautenberry shot Daron at this location, see id., which is in Hamilton County, Ohio; and that Fautenberry dumped Daron's body on the north bank of the Ohio River, near the intersection of Highway 52 and. Interstate 275, see Fautenberry, 1994 WL 35023, at , which is also in Hamilton County, Ohio. The body was later found in this general vicinity. It is therefore clear, based on the facts as found by the state court, that Ohio had jurisdiction over this murder, see Ohio Rev.Code §§ 2901.11(A)(1), 2901.11(B) (stating that a person is subject to criminal prosecution and punishment in [Ohio] if . . . [t]he person commits an, offense under the laws of [Ohio], any element of which takes place in [Ohio], and that the elements of a homicide offense include[ the act that causes death), and that Hamilton County was the proper venue. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.12(A) (noting that venue is proper in the territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was committed). None of the proffered Brady material rebuts any of these factual findings by clear and convincing evidence; thus we must presume that these factual findings are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Fautenberry argues that two pieces of evidence indicate that the murder occurred in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. First, the prosecutor, in his recitation of the facts during the plea hearing, stated that the murder occurred at a restaurant and motel parking lot just past the junction of 71 and 1-275. Fautenberry emphasizes that. Interstate 275a highway that circles Cincinnatiand Interstate 71 intersect twice, once in the State of Ohio and once in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. This argument, of course, entirely ignores the overwhelming evidence indicating that Daron picked up Fautenberry in an eastern suburb of Cincinnati, Ohio, and drove north to Columbus, Ohio. This one arguably ambiguous statement by the prosecutor is woefully insufficient to rebut the abundant evidence indicating that this murder occurred near the intersection of Interstate 275 and Interstate 71 in Hamilton County, Ohio. Second, a psychiatric report, which contains a second-hand account of Fautenberry's description of the murder, states that Fautenberry drove to Kentucky[,] pulled over[,] . . . [and] shot the man in the chest a couple of times. This hearsay statement is contradicted by all the evidence in the record and does not amount to clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state court's factual findings. The alleged Brady evidence consists of FBI intra-department communications indicating uncertainty about jurisdiction and venue, and instructing the officers to obtain more evidence on these issues. These documents do not establish that jurisdiction or venue were proper elsewhere; at best; they call these issues into question. Even if we were to assume, as alleged by Fautenberry, that this evidence creates a genuine ambiguity as to the location of the murder, both jurisdiction and venue would nevertheless be proper in Hamilton County, Ohio. Ohio law provides that [w]hen the offense involves the death of a person, and it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdiction the offense was committed, the offender may be tried in the jurisdiction in which the dead person's body or any part of the dead person's body was found. Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.12(J). It is undisputed that Daron's body was found on the north bank of the Ohio River in Hamilton County, Ohio. Therefore, even if the evidence as to the, location of the murder were unclear, both jurisdiction and venue would lie in Hamilton County. We conclude that this evidence was not material because it did not establish an error in jurisdiction or venue. The remainder of the alleged Brady evidenceevidence regarding Daron's arguments prior to his disappearance, the sexual nature of the murders, and Fautenberry's depression and suicidal inclinationsis not material for Brady purposes. In fact, the evidence is virtually insignificant in light of the overwhelming evidence both of guilt (i.e., the confessions to Agent Ott, Officer Nelson, and Ms. Priest-Herndon and the physical evidence connecting Fautenberry to Daron's murder) and the sentencing specifications (i.e., the three-judge panel's finding that the mitigating factors pale before the simple fact that [Fautenberry's] actions were plotted, vicious, persistent[,] and utterly callous). Considering as we must the cumulative effect of all the alleged Brady evidence, we conclude that Fautenberry has failed to establish a reasonable probability that the disclosure of this evidence would have altered either his decision to enter a no-contest plea or the three judge panel's sentence of death. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Because this evidence is not material under Brady, Fautenberry cannot show prejudice to excuse his procedural default. See Jamison, 291 F.3d at 388. And because Fautenberry cannot establish prejudice to excuse his procedurally defaulted Brady claim, he is not entitled to habeas relief on that basis. [5]