Opinion ID: 2669163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Need for a Scientific Methodology

Text: The Defendants argue that Officer Merino’s testimony violated Rule 702 because it was not based on scientific methodology. But we have elsewhere rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the officer–expert’s testimony was unreliable because “no conceivable ‘science’ could illuminate” the subject matter of the expert’s testimony and “recognizing that police officers can acquire specialized knowledge of criminal practices and thus the expertise to opine on such matters as the use of firearms in the drug trade”). The district court allowed Officer Merino’s testimony after finding that it helped the jury by providing insights into the distinctive traits of TCG, a topic beyond the knowledge of most jurors. This ruling fell within the district court’s discretion; accordingly, we reject the Defendants’ arguments based on Rule 702. 18 3. The Introduction of Officer Merino’s Expert Testimony Did Not Violate the Confrontation Clause Defendants Kepa Maumau, Daniel Maumau, and Sitamipa Toki 12 also invoke the Confrontation Clause, arguing that Officer Merino based his testimony on interviews with cooperating witnesses and other gang members. We disagree. Introduction of expert testimony violates the Confrontation Clause only when the expert is simply parroting a testimonial fact. That did not occur here. Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a criminal defendant enjoys “the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. art. VI. This right has been refined in Supreme Court precedent. For example, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). “Testimonial statements” include statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations or given by a confidential informant. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 730 (10th Cir. 2010). Introduction of a testimonial statement is unconstitutional only when it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. 12 Mr. Tuai joins in his codefendants’ Confrontation Clause argument. Tuai’s Opening Br. at 47. 19 We have stated that a “prime example of where an out-of-court statement might be admitted for a purpose other than to establish its substantive truth . . . is when an expert witness testifies regarding the out-of-court development of facts or data on which the expert’s opinions were based.” United States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280, 1287-88 (10th Cir. 2012). Introduction of opinion testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the experts rely on their independent judgment—even when this independent judgment is based on inadmissible evidence. United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2009). But if the expert is simply “parrot[ing] ‘out-of-court testimonial statements of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants directly to the jury in the guise of expert opinion,’” the testimony would be inadmissible. Id. at 635 (quoting United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2007)). The distinction between the two “is a question of degree.” Pablo, 696 F.3d at 1288. Accordingly, we must determine whether Officer Merino was: (1) basing his opinion on his independent judgment, or (2) simply “parroting” testimonial hearsay. Mr. Daniel Maumau, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Toki generally describe Officer Merino’s testimony, but they do not identify the parts that involved the recitation of testimonial hearsay. See Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 49-50 (stating, without any supporting citation, that “Merino simply parroted information” received from others); Kepa Maumau’s Opening Br. at 37 (claiming, 20 without any supporting citation, that “the District Court allowed Officer Merino merely to parrot the statements of his[] alleged sources, with no opportunity for cross-examination, rather than conveying independent judgment”); Toki’s Opening Br. at 39-40 (citing passages in Officer Merino’s testimony as inflammatory, but failing to identify the parts that violated the Confrontation Clause). Without such guidance, we are hard-pressed to find testimony by Officer Merino that simply parroted a testimonial fact learned from a particular interview. Like the district court, we conclude that Officer Merino applied his expertise, formed by years of experience and multiple sources, to provide an independently formed opinion. 4. The Defendants’ Statements Implicating Rule 403 Finally, in their opening briefs, the Defendants say that Officer Merino’s testimony was “prejudicial.” E.g., Toki’s Opening Br. at 41-42 (noting that Officer Merino’s testimony was found to be unduly prejudicial in an appeal of Mr. Toki’s Utah state conviction arising from the same conduct). These references implicate Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which allows the district court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Though the Defendants suggest prejudice, they have not briefed the issue in a meaningful way. For example, Mr. Toki mentions a state court decision (where 21 much of Officer Merino’s testimony was considered inadmissible) and referred once to Rule 403. Toki’s Opening Br. at 41-42 & n.22. But Rule 403 is never discussed in the brief. Similarly, Mr. Tuai refers to Rule 403 in a heading and introduction, but fails to discuss the rule. Tuai’s Opening Br. at 47. Because the Defendants did not sufficiently brief an appellate argument under Rule 403, we decline to address the Defendants’ characterization of the expert testimony as “prejudicial.” See United States v. Banks, 451 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2006).