Opinion ID: 2570625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury instruction was misstatement of Nevada law

Text: Having concluded that the Cooks properly preserved the jury instruction issue for our review, we next consider whether the proffered instruction was a misstatement of the law. We review de novo the claimed error that a proffered instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. [9] Here, the Cooks' theory of liability against Sunrise rested on Sunrise's alleged negligence in failing to provide adequate equipment, as requested by Mrs. Cook's treating doctors, and its staff's failure to follow doctors' orders, which ultimately resulted in the loss of Mrs. Cook's leg. As stated, the district court instructed the jury that the mere fact that an unfortunate or bad condition resulted to the patient involved in this case does not prove, or even imply, that by virtue of that fact, the defendant is negligent. As also stated, in Gunlock, this court reiterated negligence principles that have later been utilized in a mere happening instruction: The mere fact that there was an accident or other event and someone was injured is not of itself sufficient to predicate liability. Negligence is never presumed but must be established by substantial evidence. [10] Relying on Gunlock, this court in Carver v. El-Sabawi [11] approved language for a mere happening instruction when coupled with a res ipsa loquitur instruction. In Carver, the appellant suffered a nerve injury to his left arm sometime during or after an appendectomy, and he sued the anesthesiologist and surgeon. [12] The district court gave the jury a mere happening instruction that primarily tracked language found in Gunlock and also gave a res ipsa loquitur instruction based on NRS 41A.100(1)(d). [13] This court held that the portion of the mere happening instruction stating that negligence is never presumed must be deleted when a res ipsa loquitur instruction is also given. But this court nevertheless retained the instruction's language stating that the happening of an event with negative consequences is not of itself sufficient to establish liability. [14] Rather, the defendant's negligence must be established by substantial evidence, which this court has defined as evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [15] Accordingly, if jurors might reasonably accept the evidence that Sunrise unreasonably failed to provide adequate equipment for the physicians and that its employees unreasonably failed to follow doctors' orders as evidence that Sunrise was negligent, the jury should have been informed and permitted to consider such evidence in light of all the other evidence presented. The Cooks assert that the instruction given in their case is similar to the instruction given in Green v. Castronova, [16] an Ohio case, and Kennelly v. Burgess, [17] a Maryland case. In both, appellate courts reversed the judgments based upon incorrect statements of law in jury instructions, which could have been cured by modifying language. [18] In Green, the Ohio trial court instructed the jury in a personal injury action that the mere happening of an accident was no evidence whatsoever of negligence. [19] The Green court held that the instruction went beyond saying that no presumption of negligence arises from the mere happening of an accident. [20] In fact, the instruction admonished the jury that it could not consider the happening of the accident as evidence. Likewise, in Kennelly, the court instructed the jury that an unsuccessful result following medical treatment was not evidence of negligence. [21] The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the instruction as given negated the evidentiary value of the physician's actions during the surgical procedure. [22] In Fjerstad v. Knutson , the South Dakota decision upon which the mere happening instruction given below was based, the instruction provided, in part, that the mere fact that an unfortunate or bad condition resulted to the decedent . . . does not prove or even imply, that the defendants . . . by virtue of that fact alone, were negligent. [23] But here the instruction given removed the word alone. Thus, as phrased, the language of the instruction in this case does not embody a complete statement of negligence principles even under the foreign authority relied upon. Certainly, the meaning of the Fjerstad instruction changes when the word alone is removed. And, a correct statement of this principle would merely inform the jury that something more, or in addition to, the bad event is needed to support a claim of negligence against the defendant. The instruction here, on the other hand, informs the jury that the resulting loss of Mrs. Cook's limb does not prove or even imply that because the surgery ended tragically, Sunrise is negligent. Without the term alone, the jury is not clearly informed that it can consider the mere happening of the event, together with other evidence, in determining whether Sunrise was in any way negligent. Thus, the instruction here contains an improper statement of the law, and the district court erred in not amending Sunrise's proposed instruction to accurately reflect our mere happening instruction language under Gunlock, or Fjerstad, which is actually in harmony with Gunlock. [24]