Opinion ID: 561802
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Testimony of HUD and Air Force Investigators

Text: 44 The magistrate did not admit the deposition testimony of the HUD investigator, Johnson, or the live testimony of the Air Force investigator, Jean Smallman. The magistrate stated that he considered the testimony a backdoor attempt to get the two untrustworthy reports before the jury, which would undermine his exclusion of the two reports. He also found Johnson's deposition cumulative and untrustworthy. The Mosses proffered the deposition of Johnson. They made no proffer of Smallman's testimony because the magistrate refused to hear the proffer. 10 Therefore, the absence of a proffer cannot be held against the Mosses. 45 The magistrate used a misguided approach in excluding the testimony of Smallman and the deposition of Johnson. Trustworthiness or reliability is not an issue in deciding whether to admit witnesses' testimony. Competency is the focus; and Johnson and Smallman are clearly competent under Rules 601 through 606. The concern that the witnesses' testimony would undermine the exclusion of the two reports should have been met in the court's ruling on the defendants' motions in limine. For example, the court could have simply ruled that no witness could refer to the existence or the conclusions of a government investigation. 46 On retrial, the testimony of Smallman and Johnson is admissible unless other grounds of valid objection are raised. Since the Air Force report will be admitted, Smallman may properly testify about the compilation of the Air Force report. Such testimony is critical for the defendants to attack the credibility of the Air Force report. In light of the fact that the Air Force report should have been admitted, the exclusion of the testimony of Smallman is plain error. 47 Even though the HUD report was properly excluded, parts of Johnson's deposition should have been admitted. The relevant parts of Johnson's deposition, i.e. not the sections involving her investigatory technique or the results of her investigation, primarily addressed what individuals told her about the case. These quoted statements in Johnson's deposition are a classic example of hearsay within hearsay. Both levels of hearsay must conform to a hearsay exception to be admissible. See Fed.R.Evid. 805. The first level of hearsay consists of Johnson's statements as to what people told her. These statements are hearsay because the declarant, Johnson, who is not available as a witness, 11 made the statements outside of the courtroom, and because the statements are offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801. Johnson's statements, however, are excluded from the application of the hearsay rule under Rule 804(b)(1) because she is unavailable as a witness. Rule 804(b)(1) provides: 48 (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 49 (1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 50 The second level of hearsay consists of the statements made by other persons to Johnson. These statements are generally inadmissible as hearsay, even though they were reported in the Johnson deposition, because they are statements made outside the courtroom and are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Fed.R.Evid. 801, 802. If parties to the lawsuit or agents of the parties made the statements, however, the statements are not within the definition of hearsay and are admissible against the parties. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). 51 The defendants can still argue that such statements are inadmissible under other evidence rules, i.e., the statements may be irrelevant, cumulative, or unduly prejudicial. We properly leave these determinations to the trial court.