Opinion ID: 2798934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Role of the Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art

Text: EON also argues that a microprocessor can serve as sufficient structure for a software function if a person of ordinary skill in the art could implement the software function. This argument is meritless. In fact, we have repeatedly and unequivocally rejected this argument: a person of ordinary skill in the art plays no role whatsoever in determining whether an algorithm must be disclosed as structure for a functional claim element. See Noah Sys. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1385; Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337. To elaborate, “our case law regarding special purpose computer-implemented means-plus-functions claims is divided into two distinct groups: First, cases in which the EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC 1 3 specification discloses no algorithm; and second, cases in which the specification does disclose an algorithm but a defendant contends that disclosure is inadequate.” Noah, 675 F.3d at 1313. Where the specification discloses no algorithm, the skilled artisan’s knowledge is irrelevant. Id. (citing Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337). Where the specification discloses an algorithm that the accused infringer contends is inadequate, we judge the disclosure’s suffi- ciency based on the skilled artisan’s perspective. Id. (citing Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337; AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The parties agree that the ’757 patent’s specification discloses no algorithms, so this case falls in the first category, in which the skilled artisan’s knowledge is irrelevant. EON’s argument, identical to many we have previously rejected, “conflates the definiteness requirement of section 112, paragraphs 2 and 6, and the enablement requirement of section 112, paragraph 1.” Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1385. “Enablement of a device requires only the disclosure of sufficient information so that a person of ordinary skill in the art could make and use the device. A section 112 paragraph 6 disclosure, however, serves the very different purpose of limiting the scope of the claim to the particular structure disclosed, together with equivalents.” Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1336. Accordingly, “[t]he question before us is whether the specification contains a sufficiently precise description of the ‘corresponding structure’ to satisfy section 112, paragraph 6, not whether a person of skill in the art could devise some means to carry out the recited function.” Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1385. C. Application of the Algorithm Requirement to this Case In light of the foregoing discussion, resolution of this case is straightforward. The district court made explicit factual findings, based on expert testimony, that each of 14 EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC the eight claim terms at issue recited complicated, customized computer software. We see no clear error in any of the district court’s factual findings, nor any error in the district court’s ultimate conclusion of indefiniteness. Significantly, EON does not contend on appeal that the terms at issue recite functions that are coextensive with a microprocessor. EON also does not differentiate between any of the claim terms in its argument. In fact, EON cites to testimony from its expert that a person skilled in the art would need to consult algorithms outside the specification to implement the claimed functions. Similarly, based on expert testimony, the district court found that “special code would have to be written in order to accomplish the claimed functionality.” EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. FLO TV Inc., No. CV 10-812-RGA, 2014 WL 906182, at  (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2014). As discussed above, this finding proves more than is necessary, as the defendants must only show by clear and convincing evidence that the terms at issue do not recite basic functions of a microprocessor. Therefore, the ’757 patent’s disclosure of a microprocessor does not lend sufficient structure to the means-plus-function terms at issue, and the ’757 patent’s claims are indefinite.