Opinion ID: 608834
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Conspiracy and Possession.

Text: 14 Sanchez contends that the government did not introduce enough evidence to support his conviction under Count 1 (conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846) and Count 2 (possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, id. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2), but that the evidence instead proved mere presence at the site of the crime, and that he was therefore entitled to judgments of acquittal. On review of a district court ruling under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, we evaluate the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 890 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1395 (1st Cir.1992). 15 Our review satisfies us that the jury supportably could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sanchez was the individual who transported the cocaine to Rodrigo's apartment on February 19, 1991. Vegas and Agent Roberto had asked to be summoned by beeper as soon as the cocaine arrived. They were summoned at approximately the same time Sanchez arrived at the apartment, giving rise to a reasonable inference that Sanchez was the source, or that a person in charge of the transaction had finally arrived. 4 Moreover, inside the apartment, it was Sanchez who advised Agent Roberto: That's the way I do business. In the circumstances revealed by the evidence, this admission would support a jury determination that Sanchez not only participated in the transaction but was in charge of supplying the cocaine to Rodrigo for sale to Roberto. 5 16 In an effort to negate the latter evidence, Sanchez contends that, without his alleged incriminatory statement to Agent Roberto, the government would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. Citing two allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings, Sanchez argues that the district court improperly restricted his defense, by which he sought to establish that Agent Roberto was less than fluent in Spanish and may have mistranslated Sanchez' Spanish statement into English during direct examination at trial. 6 17 The trial court has broad discretion over the scope and extent of cross-examination. United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1457 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Berrio-Londono, 946 F.2d 158, 160 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1223, 117 L.Ed.2d 459 (1992). Sanchez contends that the district court cut short his cross-examination of Agent Roberto concerning his proficiency with the Spanish language. We do not agree. Out of the hearing of the jury, the district court merely questioned the relevancy of defense counsel's line of questioning, which had become mired in minute detail concerning the identity of Agent Roberto's neighbors while he was residing in Monterey during 1986. At no time did the court prohibit defense counsel from continuing the line of questioning, nor does the record reflect any objection to the district court's statements. In fact, when the jury was returned to the courtroom, defense counsel posed a follow-up question along the same line. There was no error. 18 Sanchez also claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the court's refusal to allow him to call the person who was serving as the court-appointed interpreter during Agent Roberto's direct examination. 7 Sanchez argues that the interpreter could have testified that Roberto's translation of Sanchez' incriminatory statement was unreliable, or that Sanchez' statement was susceptible to a less incriminating English rendition. However, defense counsel neither objected to the district court's exclusionary ruling nor made an offer of proof pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 103(d), notwithstanding the court's express statement that it could not understand why the [interpreter] would be asked to testify in the first place. See supra note 7. Accordingly, we review for plain error affecting the fundamental fairness of the trial. United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279, 1285 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. McGill, 952 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir.1991). 19 Sanchez argues that the interpreter's testimony was the only practicable way to convey to a non-Spanish-speaking jury the untrustworthiness of Agent Roberto's testimony. Even discounting defense counsel's unexplained failure to come forward with either an objection or the invited offer of proof, cf. Hernandez-Garza v. INS, 882 F.2d 945, 948 (5th Cir.1989) (immigration judge erred by refusing to allow party to test INS agent's fluency in Spanish, and by dismissing party's observation that a qualified interpreter was present), 8 Sanchez does not explain why it was necessary that the court-appointed interpreter testify, particularly in light of the district court's plainly stated concern that the interpreter might be placed in the position of appearing to vouch for or against a translation previously rendered in his role as court-appointed interpreter. Agent Roberto's proficiency in Spanish could as well have been tested on cross-examination 9 or through an interpreter selected by the defense, as indeed could other possible translations of Sanchez' incriminating remark. Therefore, even if defense counsel believed the district court was adamantly opposed to calling the court-appointed interpreter, there was no apparent reason for neither explaining the defense's position nor requesting a continuance to obtain an interpreter. Finally, since Sanchez has never suggested another English translation of the incriminating statement, there has been no showing of plain error. 20