Opinion ID: 2220070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: No double jeopardy problem is presented by a retrial of this cause. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have addressed the question of how erroneously admitted evidence affects the appropriateness of a retrial in terms of compliance with the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Lockhart v. United States, 488 U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that where the trial court erred in admitting a particular piece of evidence [without which] there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment of conviction [and where] clearly with that evidence, there was enough to support the sentence[,] ... a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court in deciding whether retrial is permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause... . Id. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 290-91, 102 L.Ed.2d at 273 (emphasis in original). This Court has held that where the appellate court reverses the conviction for `trial error' and the evidence offered by the State and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, no double jeopardy question is presented on a retrial. Perkins v. State (1989), Ind., 542 N.E.2d 549, 551, citing Lockhart, 488 U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 287, 102 L.Ed.2d at 269-70. See also Phillips v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 925; Henson v. State (1989), Ind., 535 N.E.2d 1189; Small v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 498. Here, the evidence presented at appellant's trial, the testimony of Mrs. Crockett describing the episode and identifying appellant as the robber together with the erroneously admitted informant testimony of Detective Hilligoss, was sufficient to support appellant's conviction. This cause can be remanded for retrial without offending the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded for retrial. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, J., concur. GIVAN, J., dissents in part and concurs in part with separate opinion, in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs. PIVARNIK, J., dissents with separate opinion in which GIVAN, J., concurs.