Opinion ID: 1961286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Vicarious Liability for Murder Conviction

Text: At the close of the state's evidence, the trial justice granted Teixeira's motion for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, on the first-degree murder count on an aiding and abetting theory, specifically stating: The Court is required to consider the evidence to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to permit a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. After a consideration of the evidence, the testimony, as well as the evidence, the Court is unable to agree that the State has met its burden with respect to the defendant Gildo Texeira on the Count 1 [murder] of the indictment. At sidebar, the prosecutor raised the issue of coconspirator liability, to which the trial justice responded: Certainly the crime of conspiracy is a separate, substantive offense from the committed offense. One can conspire with others to commit the offense and take no further act in furtherance of a conspiracy and be convicted. The evidence in order to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as an aider and abettor, the evidence must be such that the person did something affirmatively more than by just being there. From the evidence, I am not satisfied that Mr. Texeira did anything before the stabbing other than perhaps agree with the other defendants to do something. I realize that's a fine hair that is being split, but it is, nevertheless, a hair on a bald head. The prosecutor thereupon pointed out that if a defendant has not withdrawn from the conspiracy, he may be guilty of all acts committed by his coconspirators. The trial justice attempted to clarify his ruling and stated: And my ruling is that he cannot be held liable as an aider and abettor as much [as] he could be held liable as a conspirator if, in fact, the jury is satisfied that a conspiracy existed. And if he is found liable as a conspirator, his liability is the same as the actors.     As to [the] aiding and abetting, I granted the motion [for judgment of acquittal on the murder count]. I denied it with respect to the conspiracy.    As to Depena, as to Monteiro, all two counts, both counts [murder and conspiracy], are present. As to Texeira, only Count 2 [conspiracy]. (Emphases added.) Whereupon, the prosecutor again addressed the issue of coconspirator liability: If    there is any evidence to go to a jury that he is a member of a conspiracy to commit murder and then the murder is committed and there hasn't    been a finding that he has withdrawn from that conspiracy, than [ sic ] he is still responsible for that conspiracy; notwithstanding the fact that he may not have been aiding and abetting when it was committed, he was still part of that conspiracy if his co-conspirators executed that conspiracy. After further comments by the prosecutor, the trial justice decided to postpone this discussion on the state's theory for Teixeira's murder charge. When the court revisited this issue on the following day in the jury's absence, defense counsel referred the trial justice to State v. Iovino, 554 A.2d 1037 (R.I.1987), for the proposition that there were no due process or double jeopardy impediments to the court's reversing its ruling. The trial justice then made the following ruling: The Court, having reconsidered its ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to Mr. Texeira as to Count 1, will reverse itself. The jury will be permitted to determine whether or not the evidence is sufficient to prove that Mr. Texeira conspired with others in the murder of Mr. Resendes.  (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel neither objected at trial to the trial justice's reversal of his ruling, nor raised the issue of double jeopardy on appeal. Rule 12(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the defense of double jeopardy    be raised only by motion before trial.    Failure to present any such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. The clerk entered the reversal reinstating the charge in the Criminal Case Action Report, having entered a judgment of acquittal on the previous day. The trial justice, however, never instructed the jury on vicarious liability in the context of a conspiracy, and he never told the jury that in order to find Teixeira guilty of murder, it must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in the course of and in furtherance of the unlawful agreement. State v. Barton, 424 A.2d 1033, 1035-36 (R.I.1981) (establishing elements of vicarious liability). The trial justice simply instructed the jury that the aiding and abetting murder instruction did not apply to Teixeira, stating, Ladies and gentlemen, in instructing you on the theory of criminalresponsibility under the so-called aiding and abetting theory, I have instructed you as a matter of law; and you, therefore, must accept this, that those instructions did not apply to Mr. Teixeira. Moreover, at a sidebar conference, after he was reminded by the prosecutor that he failed to instruct on the vicarious liability for murder charge, the trial justice responded to counsel: As to aiding and abetting, I did specifically instruct them as to conspiracy because, as we know, I did grant a judgment of acquittal as to Teixeira, and I will instruct the jurors that the instruction of aiding and abetting would only apply or does not apply to Mr. Teixeira. So, I am going to decline your request to go back over this. (Emphasis added.) During its deliberations, the jury requested a clarification of the instruction with respect to Teixeira, and the trial justice responded, You've asked for clarification with respect to Mr. Texeira. The Court has instructed you that as a matter of law, you may not consider whether Mr. Texeira aided and abetted anyone in the commission of the crimes for which he has been charged. Indisputable evidence that the jury did not consider the murder charge against Teixeira is apparent from the jury verdict form, which did not include a count of murder against Teixeira. Only the following questions on the jury verdict form referred to Teixeira: QUESTION 4: First Degree Murder  Has the State proved that Gildo Texeira conspired with Jorge DePena to commit Murder in the First Degree?    QUESTION 9: Conspiracy to Commit Second Degree Murder  Has the State proved that Gildo Texeira conspired with Jorge DePena to commit Murder in [the] Second Degree? When reading the verdict in open court, the clerk stated: THE CLERK: Question 4: First-degree murder. Has the State proved that Gildo Texeira conspired with George DePena to commit murder in the first degree? MR. FOREPERSON: Yes.    [The clerk then finished reading the jury's findings on the remaining questions.] THE CLERK: Mr. Foreperson, hearken to your verdict as recorded by the court    [a]s to defendant Texeira to Count 1, murder in the first degree, jury finds the defendant guilty. As to Count 2, conspiracy to murder in the first degree, the jury finds the defendant guilty.    Mr. Foreperson, is this your true verdict? MR. FOREPERSON: Yes. Teixeira's counsel did not object. On appeal, Teixeira has raised three claims of error with respect to jury instructions: (1) the jury instructions wrongfully omitted instructions on the elements of vicarious liability for murder; (2) the jury instructions wrongfully omitted instructions on assault; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors yielded an unconstitutional conviction. We agree that no instructions on the vicarious liability for murder charge were presented to the jury and that the verdict form omitted the murder count against Teixeira for the jury's consideration. We further agree that because the trial justice failed to instruct the jury on the vicarious liability for murder count, he could not undertake the required new-trial motion review of the evidence in light of the charge to the jury. Snow, 670 A.2d at 243. We are evenly divided, however, on whether the murder charge was properly reinstated by the trial justice. Two justices are of the opinion that the murder charge was properly reinstated, but because of the instructional errors and the failure of the jury to return a verdict on this count, the conviction should be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial on this charge. Two justices are of the opinion that the charge was not properly reinstated, the jury did not return a verdict on this count, thejudgment of acquittal on aiding and abetting of murder was a final adjudication on the murder charge and, therefore, Teixeira's conviction on the murder charge should be vacated, without remanding this case to the Superior Court for a new trial on this charge.