Opinion ID: 177120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury instructions regarding damages

Text: 27 Turning to the jury instructions, we review the jury instructions as a whole de novo to determine whether the district court “correctly stated the governing law and provided the jury with an ample understanding of the issues and applicable standards.” Martinez v. Caterpillar, Inc., 572 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to give a particular instruction. Id. “We reverse only in those cases where we have a substantial doubt whether the jury was fairly guided in its deliberations.” Id. (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court instructed the jury on damages in part as follows: when determining plaintiffs’ lost profits, you should compare the amount of profit that plaintiffs would have earned in a fair and competitive market with the amount of profit that plaintiffs have earned. The difference between these two figures is the amount of profits the plaintiffs lost because of defendants’ alleged violation of the PSA. Appellees’ Supp. App. at 420. Upon reviewing the jury instructions, we conclude the district court did not err in allowing the jury to calculate damages based on the profits that the Growers actually received in comparison to profits in a hypothetical competitive market. In competitive injury cases, it is often difficult to measure business damages. See J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981). “The vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of 28 what plaintiff’s situation would have been in the absence of the defendant’s antitrust violation.” Id. In a typical antitrust competitive injury case, damages are calculated “by comparison of profits, prices and values as affected by the [unlawful act], with what they would have been in its absence under freely competitive conditions.” See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (discussing damages in monopolization under the Sherman Act); see also Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1286, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988) (“At base, an antitrust plaintiff’s damages should reflect the difference between its performance in a hypothetical market free of all antitrust violations and its actual performance in the market infected by the anticompetitive conduct.”). We find no error in the district court instructing the jury to compare what the Growers actually received with what they would have received in a competitive marketplace, absent OK’s violations of the PSA. ii. Testimony calculating damages Next, OK argues that the district court erred in admitting Taylor’s testimony regarding damages. More specifically, OK contends that testimony regarding competitive pay was irrelevant, and Taylor’s metric for calculating damages was erroneously admitted. Beginning with the issue of relevance, OK’s argument is without merit. As discussed above, the district court appropriately instructed the jury on calculating damages by comparing profits received and profits in a hypothetical, competitive 29 market. Naturally, testimony regarding underpayment in reference to such a competitive market would be relevant. Turning to Taylor’s metric for calculating damages, OK contends that there were two errors in Taylor’s methodology: (1) Dr. Taylor used cost assumptions in a model developed for Alabama, not Oklahoma; and (2) the damages model included the opportunity costs of grower labor. OK failed to object to Taylor’s use of Alabama figures in the damages model. In the pretrial motion to exclude Taylor’s testimony, OK mentioned in passing that Taylor used assumptions from Alabama in the motion to exclude his testimony, but it did not argue that the use of data from Alabama was unreliable or improper under Daubert, as is now suggested on appeal. And at trial, OK did not object to Taylor’s testimony regarding the use of data from Alabama. Consequently, we review for plain error. McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1350. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that there was no plain error in admitting the testimony regarding damages using data from Alabama. OK contends that the use of data from Alabama has previously been criticized. See Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 532, 542–43 (E.D. Tex. 2007). But in Wheeler, the district court noted that the expert made no attempt to compare the Alabama data to the relevant market or members of the class. See id. at 543. Additionally, the expert in Wheeler conceded that he did not use the best information available. See id. In the present case, however, Taylor testified that 30 the Alabama data was “the only source of actual information detail on . . . the out-of-pocket cost for raising broilers.” Appellants’ App. at 340–41. Further, Taylor also examined the operating costs on an actual OK farm and compared them to the Alabama data. Taylor testified that the Alabama data he used resulted in lower damages than if he used the figure from the actual OK farm. If the calculations are “estimated in any reasonable way” and the expert’s assumptions “are not without support in the record, the calculations may be upheld . . . .” Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1526 (10th Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, OK has not demonstrated plain error. Next, we turn to OK’s argument that the district court erroneously allowed Taylor to testify about a damages model that included opportunity costs. OK did not object to Taylor’s use of opportunity costs in either the motion to exclude Taylor’s testimony or during trial, and thus, we review only for plain error. See McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1350. OK contends that courts have disapproved of the use of opportunity costs as a matter of law. But this assertion is an extreme overstatement. Courts refer to “opportunity costs” in a wide variety of contexts, often using the term in several different ways. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 556 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The economic concept of ‘opportunity cost’ has been used in a variety of cases as a loose label for any of a number of adjustments to value involving the 31 idea that for every use of one’s resources there is an alternative use, with its own return, foregone.”). Thus, whether “opportunity costs” are admissible depends on the context of a given case. OK has not argued how the use of opportunity costs is improper in the calculation of damages using a hypothetical competitive market. Instead, OK relies on two district court cases involving predatory pricing: In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 459 F. Supp. 626, 631 (N.D. Cal. 1978), and Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 701 (S.D. Tex. 1993). Neither case, however, is relevant to the determination of whether it was plain error to use opportunity costs to calculate damages using a hypothetical competitive market. Therefore, OK has not established it was error, let alone plain error for the district court to admit testimony regarding opportunity costs. c. Testimony regarding consumer injury OK also argues that Taylor’s testimony on causation of consumer injury was inadmissible. Specifically, OK argues that Taylor testified at a professionally impermissible level of confidence, and Taylor erroneously calculated the time difference between when OK decided to produce chickens and when it obtained a price. At trial, Taylor testified that there was a 71% probability that OK’s production has an impact on the nationwide price. Appellants’ App. at 316. OK 32 does not contest the relevance of the evidence or the method used to calculate the relationship between OK’s production and nationwide prices, but instead asserts that the 71% confidence level renders the testimony inadmissible. We need not resolve the precise confidence level at which such testimony becomes inadmissible. Even assuming the challenged testimony was inadmissible, it was harmless in the context of all the evidence produced by the Growers. As noted by the Growers, they presented four regression analyses demonstrating actual harm to consumers, and OK does not challenge two of those analyses. Next, OK argues that the district court erred in admitting Taylor’s testimony regarding the relationship between OK’s production decisions and average sales prices. Specifically, OK contends that Taylor mistakenly assumed that the decision to produce was made on the day OK delivered chicks to the Growers, rather than when OK chose to hatch the chicks three weeks prior. Therefore, OK argues that Taylor correlated market prices and production levels using the wrong time interval. Again, OK has failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. At trial, OK objected to the admission of this evidence, suggesting that there were reliability questions and asked to voir dire the witness. Appellants’ App. at 307. The district court refused to allow OK to voir dire Taylor at that time, and instead told OK that it would have the opportunity to bring out issues of reliability on cross-examination. But after cross-examining Taylor, OK never moved to 33 exclude Taylor’s testimony or otherwise requested a ruling on the admissibility of his testimony under Rule 702. Thus, the district court was never asked to make specific findings on the record analyzing the admissibility of Taylor’s testimony under Daubert. Accordingly, we review for plain error. See McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1350. And, after examining the record on appeal, we are not persuaded the admission of this evidence, even if erroneous, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 5. Statute of Limitations Finally, OK argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury on the statute of limitations. However, OK did not request such an instruction on the record during the jury instruction conference. Where a party fails to make a proper objection to jury instructions, we review for plain error. Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000). “Under that standard, we will affirm unless the instructions were patently, plainly erroneous and prejudicial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). OK contends that the general verdict allowed the jury to find OK liable based on its control over building specifications. According to OK, the named plaintiffs entered into their contracts with OK outside the statute of limitations period, and thus, OK was entitled to an instruction on the statute of limitations. Although the district court noted that OK never raised this specific objection on the record during the jury instruction conference, the district court discussed the statute of limitations argument in denying OK’s motion for a new trial. The 34 district court concluded that a statute of limitations instruction was not required because of the continuing harm and speculative damages doctrines. OK argues that the continuing harm doctrine was rejected in a similar case, citing Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2004). But unlike the plaintiffs in Varner, the Growers did not allege that they were harmed based on an enforcement of the original contract entered before the statute of limitations. Rather, the Growers argued, and provided evidence, that the Growers and OK repeatedly entered new contracts throughout the period of the statute of limitations, and those contracts demanded new building specifications, which the Growers alleged violated the PSA. OK offers no other argument regarding the continuing harm doctrine save for its misplaced reliance on Varner. Therefore, we conclude that OK has failed to demonstrate that the instructions were patently, plainly erroneous and prejudicial. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Mary Beck Briscoe