Opinion ID: 1270085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exclusion of the victim's journal

Text: Krivitsky had kept a journal of his travels for an extensive period of time prior to his death. At trial, Keith attempted to introduce the portions of the journal for the period during which Krivitsky was in Alaska prior to his death. He argued that the journal was relevant to his self-defense claim because they showed a continuing state of mental deterioration in Krivitsky and tendencies toward violent behavior. The superior court refused to admit the journal. Keith specifies this ruling was error, asserting that the ruling violated his constitutional rights to confrontation, [9] compulsory process, [10] and due process of law. [11] Keith's confrontation and compulsory process claims have no merit in the context of this case. As we have observed on many occasions, the essential purpose of the right of confrontation is to protect the accused's interest in being able to test, by cross-examination, the testimony of those appearing against him. [12] The right applies not only to witness testimony, but also to other evidence which the prosecution seeks to introduce against the accused. [13] However, in the present case, the state did not seek to introduce any evidence of the victim's character; it was the defense which raised Krivitsky's possible insanity and potential for violence in the form of the affirmative defenses of justifiable or excusable homicide. [14] Thus, Keith's attempt to introduce the journal does not serve to confront any evidence the prosecution was offering. [15] The compulsory process claim also fails as inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Compulsory process relates to obtaining both witnesses and documentary evidence in the accused's favor and is intended to ensure a fair trial even when the accused is indigent, [16] but it is normally a right associated with pre-trial discovery. [17] Keith was not denied access to the journal; thus, the remaining issue for this court to address is its admissibility at trial. Keith's due process argument is essentially that the exclusion of the journal affected his ability to present his defense, because it was relevant to show the deceased's mental state and his capacity for violence, and thus tended to support Keith's own testimony about Krivitsky's strange and aggressive behavior prior to the shooting. If the superior court's refusal to admit the journal did, in fact, substantially limit Keith's opportunities to prove his innocence affirmatively, the due process right to a fair trial would have been denied him. [18] However, we need not determine whether Keith's due process rights were violated, since we have determined that the superior court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. The journal contains a rambling account of Krivitsky's travels, personal observations about people he encountered, and his thoughts about himself. It does not lend itself to easy summary, but the portions which the defense sought to introduce do reflect a sense of mental instability, paranoia, hatred of women, and a violent nature. The proffered evidence was clearly relevant as tending to support Keith's testimony as to what occurred prior to the shooting. [19] A trial court has a broad range of discretion in deciding whether to exclude admittedly relevant evidence, based on its assessment of the probative value of the evidence in comparison to a number of countervailing factors. [20] Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 provides: Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. [21] The superior court indicated that it was disinclined to admit the journal because absent a better foundation as to what all of that could possibly mean, without a foundation, ... as a lay jury simply reading those documents, I think would be highly prejudiced. [22] Our review of the journal leads us to the conclusion that admitting it into evidence would not lead to unfair prejudice. The journal reveals its author, the deceased victim in this case, in a nonfavorable light, but does not do so to the extent that it would arouse the emotions of its reader and divert a jury from its obligations. The excerpts from the journal which Keith sought to admit do clearly portray the character traits mentioned above, and its probative value is such that it outweighs any concern of prejudice, confusion or waste of time. Here Keith was on trial for murder, and there were no witnesses other than Keith to the immediate events preceding the shooting. In such circumstances, Keith was entitled to present his version of the events and evidence supporting it in as full a manner as possible. The state argues that the subject evidence was cumulative to testimony by several defense witnesses that all reflected on the same character traits of the victim. We disagree. The journal passages are a record of the private thoughts of the victim. They are a different order of evidence than the testimony of several witnesses as to various actions and statements made by the deceased in the months before he met his death. When the character of the victim is so vital to the defendant's version of the events, we do not find such evidence to be cumulative. Rather, exclusion of the journal was prejudicial error. Upon remand for a new trial, such evidence should be received if offered by Keith.