Opinion ID: 183063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Search of Hambrick's Person

Text: We next address Hambrick's challenge to the validity of his consent to search his person. We determine whether consent is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, consider[ing] the characteristics of the person consenting, `including the party's age, intelligence and education, whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, whether he was informed of his right to withhold consent, and whether he was aware of rights afforded criminal suspects.' United States v. Esquivias, 416 F.3d 696, 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Almendares, 397 F.3d 653, 660 (8th Cir.2005)). In addition, we consider the environment in which the defendant allegedly provided consent, specifically: (1) the length of time he was detained; (2) whether the police threatened, physically intimidated, or punished him; (3) whether the police made promises or misrepresentations; (4) whether he was in custody or under arrest when the consent was given; (5) whether the consent occurred in a public or a secluded place; and (6) whether he stood by silently... as the search occurred. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 260 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir.2001)). After citing these factors and reviewing videotape footage of the interrogation, the district court concluded the search of Hambrick's person was not a consensual search. However, the court determined the search was a valid station house search incident to arrest. We agree with the district court's determination on this point. As discussed above, Hambrick was stopped for driving under a suspended license, which provided a basis for arrest under Iowa law. See Iowa Code § 321.485. He was taken to the station house within an hour, where he was searched within the guidelines of normal police protocol. It is ... plain that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). Hambrick's stop, arrest, and subsequent search incident to arrest squarely fit within Edwards and its progeny, and therefore, regardless of whether the search may be deemed involuntary, the district court was correct in concluding the search incident to arrest was valid. Moreover, the district court correctly held the strip search in this case was reasonable in scope, manner, and location. The Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a strip search turns on `the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.' Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 490 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). The search took place in an interrogation room in the Davenport Police Department and was based on highly reliable information from a well-known informant that Hambrick possessed crack cocaine between his buttocks. Moreover, the officers did not touch Hambrick, and they allowed him to remove the drugs on his own. Cf. United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974, 976 (8th Cir.2007) ([I]t was not unreasonable for the officers to assume the initiative by seizing the contraband that [the defendant] secreted in his underwear, rather than allow [the defendant] to disrobe and remove the drugs himself.). As a result, there is no evidence the officers were abusive or exceeded the reasonableness of the search in terms of scope, manner, and location.