Opinion ID: 1060994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: retaliatory or wrongful discharge

Text: The doctrine of employment-at-will is a long standing rule in this State which recognizes the concomitant right of either the employer or the employee to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, without being guilty of a legal wrong. Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Center, 784 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tenn. 1990); Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1989). Both by statute and case law in this and other states, however, some restrictions have been imposed upon the right of an employer to terminate an at-will employee. In Tennessee an employee-at-will generally may not be discharged for attempting to exercise a statutory or constitutional right, or for any other reason which violates a clear public policy which is evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision. See e.g., Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1997); Conatser v. Clarksville Coca-Cola, 920 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. 1995); Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1994); Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1993); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992); Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984). This cause of action for retaliatory or wrongful discharge, which was first recognized by this Court in Clanton, supra , strikes the balance between the employment-at-will doctrine and rights granted employees under well-defined expressions of public policy. Anderson, 857 S.W.2d at 556. The employment-at-will doctrine recognizes that employers need freedom to make their own business judgments without interference from the courts. Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474. [A]n employer's ability to make and act upon independent assessments of an employee's abilities and job performance as well as business needs is essential to the free-enterprise system. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (1984). In contrast, the action for retaliatory or wrongful discharge recognizes that, in limited circumstances, [3] certain well-defined, unambiguous principles of public policy confer upon employees implicit rights which must not be circumscribed or chilled by the potential of termination. See Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 555-57 (Tenn. 1988)(citing examples). Therefore, the tort action of retaliatory or wrongful discharge is available to employees discharged as a consequence of an employer's violation of a clearly expressed public policy. Reynolds, 887 S.W.2d at 823; Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 899. This Court has explained its role with respect to discerning public policy as follows: This Court can know nothing of public policy except from the constitution and the laws, and the course of administration and decision. It has no legislative powers. It cannot amend or modify any legislative acts. It cannot examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, or as politic or impolitic. Considerations of that sort must, in general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions of policy determined there are concluded here. There are cases, it is true, in which arguments drawn from public policy must have large influence; but these are cases in which the course of legislation and administration do not leave any doubt upon the question what public policy is, and in which what would otherwise be obscure or of doubtful interpretation, may be cleared and resolved by reference to what is already received and established. Watson, 789 S.W.2d at 540, (quoting Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Lawson, 144 Tenn. 78, 91, 229 S.W. 741 (1920)). This Court does not engage in hypothetical guessing to fashion public policy. Unlike other jurisdictions, [4] Tennessee courts do not, in the context of wrongful discharge actions, attempt to discern public policy from the common law. See e.g., Reynolds, 887 S.W.2d at 823. Therefore, to prevail in this appeal, Stein must point to a clear mandate of public policy, [5] evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision, which Davidson violated when it discharged her for testing positive on a random drug test. Id. Stein argues that Davidson's dismissal of her contravenes her right to privacy evidenced by Article I, Sections 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. In support of her claim, Stein also relies upon decisions [6] of the United States Supreme Court which address random drug testing of government employees, and statutes [7] from other states relating to random drug testing of private employees. Davidson responds that constitutional provisions protect citizens from abusive and intrusive government action but do not control relationships between private individuals, including employer  employee relationships. Secondly, Davidson argues that, in Tennessee, there is no well-defined public policy evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision which precludes employers from dismissing at-will employees who test positive for drug usage on a random drug test. Initially, we address Stein's contention that the constitutional right of privacy represents a clear public policy which prohibits a private employer from terminating employees who test positive for drug use. It is well-settled that constitutional guarantees restrain government conduct and generally do not restrain the conduct of private individuals. State v. Hudson, 849 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tenn. 1993); Freshwater v. State, 2 Tenn. Crim. App. 314, 320, 453 S.W.2d 446, 449 (1969); see also, Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir.1992); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 365 (Ok. 1994); Roe v. Quality Transportation Services, 67 Wash. App. 604, 838 P.2d 128, 130 (1992); but see Luck v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 218 Cal. App.3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627 (1990) (ballot arguments showed that constitutional provision applied to both business and governmental activities). Contrary to Stein's claim, therefore, the state constitutional guarantee of privacy is not a source of public policy which restricts the right of private employers to discharge terminable-at-will employees who test positive on random drug tests. The United States Supreme Court decisions upon which Stein relies are not applicable to this appeal. Those decisions involved random drug testing of public employees by government actors; therefore, constitutional principles of privacy and search and seizure were implicated. Since this appeal involves a private employer/employee relationship, those important constitutional considerations are not at issue. Moreover, we have not discovered a statutory or regulatory provision which represents a well-defined public policy that is contravened by employers discharging at-will employees who test positive for drug use on random drug tests. There is certainly no statutory provision expressly prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee who has tested positive on a random drug test. Unlike some other state statutes upon which Stein relies, Tennessee has not enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to govern random drug testing by private employers. As the Court of Appeals recognized, existing Tennessee statutes which relate to random drug testing in other contexts appear to favor the practice. The Legislature has specifically authorized drug testing for public high school students and the security personnel employed by the Department of Corrections and Youth Development. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4213 (1996); Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-1-122 (1990 & Supp. 1996). Moreover, in 1995, the General Assembly enacted a statute which provides that private sector employees who left their most recent job either to avoid taking a drug or alcohol screening test, or after receiving a positive result to a drug or alcohol screening test are not entitled to unemployment compensation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-302(a)(9) (Supp. 1996). Though not directly addressing random drug testing of private employees, the most straightforward expression of public policy with respect to dismissing employees for drug use was contained within a statute enacted on May 13, 1996, following the release of the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. In that statute the General Assembly declared: It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote drug-free workplaces in order that employers in the state be afforded the opportunity to maximize their levels of productivity, enhance their competitive positions in the market place and reach their desired levels of success without experiencing the costs, delays and tragedies associated with work-related accidents resulting from drug abuse by employees. It is further the intent of the General Assembly that drug abuse be discouraged and that employees who choose to engage in drug abuse face the risk of unemployment and the forfeiture of workers' compensation benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-9-101(a) (1996 Supp.) (emphasis added). Considering this unambiguous pronouncement and other relevant statutory provisions, we find no well-defined public policy which is violated by a private employer discharging an at-will employee who tests positive for drug use on a random drug test. Gilmore, supra .