Opinion ID: 2351414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Complaint of Selma Mumford

Text: The respondent was retained in August of 1970 to collect $750, that being the balance allegedly due on a promissory note payment of which was secured by a conditional sales contract on a backhoe. A fee of $200 was paid. The record discloses that following his retention respondent was contacted by his client, but only with difficulty, and that during the year immediately preceding the hearing before the Committee on Complaints he failed to respond to any of the repeated attempts made on complainant's behalf to contact him. On the few occasions when contact was made, he assured his client that the case was about ready to go to court, or that action would soon follow. Those assurances were given even though respondent had neither commenced suit against nor made any attempt to communicate with the debtor. Finally, after all her attempts to obtain action from respondent were of no avail, complainant employed another attorney. That attorney requested that the papers and documents in the case be turned over to him, but respondent failed to comply with that request by the time of the May 8, 1972 hearing. The only explanation respondent offered for his conduct was that another attorney, whom he had requested to assist him, had returned the papers in the case after a delay of about 60 days. On the foregoing record the committee found that respondent had completely failed to perform the legal services for which he had accepted a fee; that he had misrepresented to his client that action was being taken; that he had failed to explain to his client why he had not acted; and that he had retained the fee paid by his client notwithstanding his complete neglect to do that which he had been employed to do. We are satisfied from our reading of the record that it is replete with evidence in support of the committee's conclusions that respondent either has not used monies entrusted to him by his clients for the purposes for which entrusted, or that he did so only after long, unconscionable and unnecessary delays; that he received funds on behalf of his clients for which he either failed to account at all, or accounted for only after his clients' charges against him had reached the hearing stage before the Committee on Complaints; that he accepted fees for professional services to be performed and that without satisfactory explanations failed either in whole or in part to perform those services, and that notwithstanding those failures he did not reimburse those clients in whole or in part for the fees so paid; and that without reasonable cause he neglected to advise his clients concerning the status of matters referred by them to him in circumstances which suggest that he may have been deliberately evading those clients. The respondent's conduct continued for more than two years. His domestic, secretarial and Internal Revenue problems are not acceptable excuses for his continued and persistent transgressions. In our judgment, he has demonstrated a moral condition which is inconsistent with a proper appreciation and discharge of the duties and obligations which inhere in the attorney-client relationship. Mulvey v. O'Neilli, 71 R.I. 309, 44 A.2d 880 (1945); Heitmanek v. Turano, 158 A. 878 (R.I.1932); Hale v. McGauley, 147 A. 889 (R.I.1929); Grinsell v. Wilcox, 98 A. 977 (R.I.1916); In re Holton, 36 R.I. 114, 89 A. 242 (1914), and his unprofessional conduct has made it impossible for clients to repose in him that trust and confidence which in Crafts v. Lizotte, 34 R.I. 543, 84 A. 1081 (1912) rehearing denied, 85 A. 384 (1912), we said was    the first and perhaps the most important element in the transaction of a legal business. Id. at 555, 84 A. at 1086. That respondent may have procured a withdrawal of some of the complaints made against him, while perhaps in some circumstances a consideration in mitigation, certainly does not condone his misconduct in these matters, particularly when the adjustments of the differences which apparently led to the withdrawal of those complaints did not occur until subsequent to his appearances before the Committee on Complaints. Upon consideration we find that respondent has not shown any good cause why the findings and recommendations of the Committee on Complaints should not be approved; and they hereby are approved. Accordingly, the respondent, Israel Moses, is indefinitely suspended as of November 17, 1972 from practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law. The effective date of respondent's suspension has been deferred in order to afford him a reasonable opportunity to make satisfactory arrangements to protect the interests of his clients. In making those arrangements he shall: 1) Promptly notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, all clients represented in pending matters, other than litigated or administrative matters or proceedings pending in any court or agency, of his suspension and consequent inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order, and he shall advise those clients to seek legal advice elsewhere; 2) Promptly notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, each of his clients who is involved in litigated matters or administrative proceedings, and the attorney or attorneys for each adverse party in such matter or proceeding, of his suspension and consequent inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order, and he shall advise the client to obtain the prompt substitution of another attorney or attorneys in his place; a) In the event the client does not obtain substitute counsel before the effective date of the order, it shall be respondent's responsibility to move expeditiously pro se in the court in which the action is pending, or before the body in which an administrative proceeding is pending, for leave to withdraw from that action or proceeding, and he shall give proper notice thereof; b) Any notice to be given to the attorney or attorneys for an adverse party shall state the place of residence of respondent's client; 3) Keep and maintain records of the various steps taken by him in compliance with this order so that, upon any subsequent proceeding instituted by or against him, proof of compliance herewith will be available; and 4) File with the clerk of this court within ten days after the effective date of this order an affidavit reporting that he has fully complied with its directives. That affidavit shall set forth the residence or other address where communications may be directed to respondent and he shall promptly notify the clerk of this court of any change in such address. In addition respondent (1) Shall not, following entry of this order, accept any new retainer, or engage as attorney for another in any new case or legal matter of any nature. He may, however, during the period between the entry date of this order and its effective day wind up and complete, on behalf of any client, all matters which were pending on the entry date; and (2) Shall not share in any fee for legal services performed by another attorney during the period of his suspension. He may be compensated, however, (a) for disbursements incurred by him prior to the effective date of this order, and (b) on a quantum meruit basis for legal services rendered prior to the effective date of this order. The amount and manner of payment of such compensation and recoverable disbursements shall be fixed by the Committee on Complaints on the application of either the respondent or the new attorney, on notice to the other as well as on notice to the client. In no event shall the combined legal fees exceed the amount the client would have been required to pay had no substitution of attorneys been required. Any application by the respondent for reinstatement shall be accompanied by a proper showing respecting adjustments of fees accepted by him for professional services which he failed to render either in whole or in part. It is so ordered.