Opinion ID: 216989
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Watkins’s Identification

Text: Waters argues that the procedure used to garner Watkins’s identification violated the Constitution because it was unduly suggestive and there was no good reason for not using less suggestive procedures. Waters asserts that the identification was unduly suggestive because, at the location of the identification, Watkins saw the getaway vehicle and, then, officers presented Waters in handcuffs, bringing him out of a police vehicle. Waters argues that this identification is not sufficiently reliable because Watkins saw the perpetrator’s face for four to seven seconds at the crime scene and he gave a generalized, inaccurate description of the perpetrator. Similar to any other show-up procedure, the show-up procedure for Watkins’s identification of Waters was suggestive because a show-up procedure is inherently suggestive. Brownlee, 454 F.3d at 138 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)). This identification procedure was unduly suggestive because “there is no reason 16 evident why [Waters] and [Watkins] could not have been taken to the police station for a less suggestive line-up or photo array.” Brownlee, 454 F.3d at 138. The identification procedure, however, did not create a substantial risk of misidentification when considering the totality of the circumstances. Although Watkins did not see the perpetrator for a significantly long period of time during the robbery, the identification was reliable because Watkins’s view of the perpetrator’s face was sufficient for him to give a fairly accurate description to the police, the identification was made within seven to ten minutes of the robbery, and Watkins had no doubt in his mind that Waters was the man who shot Goodman. Thus, the District Court properly denied Waters’s motion to suppress Watkins’s identification testimony. C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding the Hobbs Act Violation The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), under which Waters was convicted, prohibits a robbery or extortion that “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). This Court has rejected the argument that there must be “proof of a ‘substantial effect’ on commerce in an individual case in order to show a Hobbs Act violation.” United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 766 (2005) (citing Clausen, 328 F.3d 708 (3d Cir. 2003)). Instead, we have adopted the approach of other circuits that “legislation concerning an intrastate activity will be upheld if Congress could rationally have concluded that the activity, in isolation or in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.” Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1211 (5th Cir. 1997)). “[P]roof of a 17 de minimis effect on interstate commerce is all that is required” for a robbery or extortion to meet the Hobbs Act threshold. Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711 (citations omitted). “[S]uch a ‘de minimis effect’ in an individual Hobbs Act case need only be ‘potential.’” Urban, 404 F.3d at 766 (citing United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209–10 (a robbery or extortion has a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to uphold a Hobbs case if it “produces any interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential” (citation omitted)). Pursuant to the depletion of assets theory, “[a] jury may infer that interstate commerce was affected to some minimal degree from a showing that the business assets were depleted.” Haywood, 363 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted); Urban, 404 F.3d at 765. Waters asserts that the government failed to establish that the robbery of Goodman substantially affected interstate commerce because the robbery took place outside of the business. Waters asserts that Goodman missing work due to his injuries and Goodman leasing his interest in the business was not sufficient to establish an effect on interstate commerce and that there was no evidence of any disruption of, or decrease in, business. Thus, Waters alleges that the District Court erred by denying his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, “‘[w]e determine whether there is substantial evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to 18 convict.’” United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 238 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 410 (3d Cir. 1995)). Waters’s argument fails because a rational trier of fact could have found that the robbery had the required, potential de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Goodman’s business involved interstate commerce by offering international and interstate money transfers. As Goodman entered his business, Waters robbed him of $108,700 that Goodman planned to use for his business payroll. The robbery involved “the depletion of assets of a person engaged in interstate commerce [that] has at least a ‘potential’ effect on that person’s engagement in interstate commerce.” Urban, 404 F.3d at 767. That the money was recovered after the crime does not change that the robbery had a potential, de minimis effect on interstate commerce by at least temporarily depleting Goodman of assets he planned to use for his business. Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711–12 (holding that evidence of robberies and attempted robberies of businesses involved in interstate commerce was sufficient to show that the robberies “affected or had the potential to affect interstate commerce”). Moreover, the robbery had an actual effect on interstate commerce. After the robbery, Goodman testified that he “just can’t go back to [the business]” and the business closed temporarily while another check cashing agency obtained a license to run the business. (Appellee’s Supp. App. at 46.) There is substantial evidence such that a rational trier of fact could conclude that Goodman’s refusal or inability to return to the business and the temporary closure of the business are actual effects of the robbery, 19 regardless of how slight those effects may have been. Thus, the evidence that the robbery affected interstate commerce was sufficient to convict Waters under the Hobbs Act. D. Exclusion of Joel Goodman’s Statements to Police at the Robbery Scene Waters contends that the District Court erred when it declined to allow defense counsel to question Officer McCabe regarding a statement, indicated in his report, that Goodman made to him shortly after the shooting — that he was robbed by two black men in their twenties. The District Court rejected defense counsel’s argument that the statement was admissible as an excited utterance. 1. Excited Utterance Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that an excited utterance is admissible despite the general inadmissibility of hearsay statements if it is a “statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” FED. R. EVID. 803(2). The elements this Court requires for a hearsay statement to constitute an excited utterance are: “(i) a startling occasion; (ii) a statement relating to the circumstances of the startling occasion; (iii) a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to observe personally the events; and (iv) a statement made before there has been time to reflect and fabricate.” United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985)). Waters asserts that Goodman’s statement met every requirement for admissibility as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2). Waters contends that, despite Goodman’s 20 testimony to the contrary, Goodman was under the stress of excitement due to the robbery even though he may not have been conscious of his state of mind because almost any individual would be in a state of excitement shortly after being robbed and shot. Goodman’s hearsay statement is only admissible as an excited utterance if it was made while Goodman “was under the stress of excitement” caused by the startling event. Rule 803(2) requires that the statement be contemporaneous “with the excitement caused by the event.” Brown, 254 F.3d at 460 (noting that the critical question is whether the statement “likely occurred during the period of excitement engendered” by the event). This Court considers evidence regarding the state of the declarant when we have examined whether a statement was admissible as an excited utterance. See, e.g., id. at 459–61 (holding that statements were excited utterances where “declarants were still visibly in an excited state” and appeared to be “very nervous” and “hopping around”). Goodman’s testimony that he was calm and no longer in pain by the time he made the statement to Officer McCabe provides support for the District Court’s conclusion that the statement does not qualify as an excited utterance because he was no longer under the stress of excitement even though a short period of time had passed since the robbery and shooting. Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the statement was not admissible as an excited utterance. 21 2. Present Sense Impression Waters argues that Goodman’s statement is admissible as a present sense impression. 8 Defense counsel did not make this argument to the District Court and is raising it for the first time on appeal. As noted above, we can only review this alleged error if Waters “demonstrates that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute’; . . . (3) the error ‘affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings,”” Riley, 621 F.3d at 322 (quoting Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164); and “(4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467. Waters does not specifically assert the existence of any of the four conditions required for appellate review of an error not raised at trial. The District Court allowed defense counsel to question Officer McCabe about reporting that the perpetrators were two black males in their twenties and defense counsel did so. The only information that did not come in from Goodman’s statement is that Goodman allegedly gave Officer 8 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides that a present sense impression is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is a “statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” FED. R. EVID. 803(2). The requirements for a hearsay statement to be admitted as a present sense impression are that: “(1) the declarant must have personally perceived the event described; (2) the declaration must be an explanation or description of the event rather than a narration; and (3) the declaration and the event described must be contemporaneous.” Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576 (citing 5 J. McLaughlin, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 803.03 (2d ed. 1997); 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 271 (4th ed. 1992)). 22 McCabe that description of suspects. Given the substantial amount of evidence against Waters and that defense counsel questioned Officer McCabe about the descriptions he broadcasted, Waters has not established that the exclusion of the information that Goodman made the statement affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. Thus, Waters has not demonstrated that this alleged error affected his substantial rights and this Court cannot exercise its discretion to review the forfeited alleged error.