Opinion ID: 1947702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard for Granting Writ.

Text: We may grant a writ only upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. [25] Because Epperson and Hodge do not allege that the trial court is proceeding outside its jurisdiction, our focus is on the second type of writ classification. A writ is an extraordinary remedy that should be issued only in exceptional circumstances. [26] In other words, a writ may not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate that traditional post hoc appellate procedures do not provide him or her with an adequate remedy. [27] The irreparable injury requirement is not as absolute, however. Indeed, a court may grant a writ without a showing of irreparable harm, provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration. It may be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing that if it fails to act the administration of justice generally will suffer the great and irreparable injury. [28] It appears clear to us that Hodge and Epperson have satisfied the standards necessary to the granting of a writ. Stopher and Paisley were writ cases. And a finding that Hodge and Epperson should merely raise these issues on a direct appeal seems an unreasonable burden on the proper administration of justice in that denying the writ would prevent Hodge and Epperson from presenting witnesses on their behalf at the post-conviction hearing that we have already ordered. In turn, Hodge and Epperson would likely then appeal, meaning that we would in that future appeal reverse the trial court's decision to deny funding, starting the process anew. Such needless delay is improper and unnecessary because both the Commonwealth and the petitioners herein are entitled to finality. Furthermore, the availability of funds for post-conviction petitioners is certainly a matter of great importance to the courts throughout the Commonwealth, [29] a fact that is magnified in this case since we previously deemed Hodge and Epperson's mitigation-related claim to involve a potential violation of a constitutional right. [30] Therefore, we find that Hodge an Epperson have satisfied the prerequisites necessary to the granting of a writ.