Opinion ID: 2735916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: [¶2] The court found the following facts, which, except where noted, are supported by competent evidence in the record and are not in dispute. See Lesko v. Stanislaw, 2014 ME 3, ¶ 17, 86 A.3d 14. The parties met in Florida, and Patrick 2 moved into Rachel’s home there in 2000. Patrick and Rachel’s son was born on October 1, 2001. In 2002, the parties moved into a rental property in Maine. Sometime thereafter, Rachel’s parents retired to Rachel’s Florida property, and Rachel deeded the Florida property to herself, her parents, and Patrick. [¶3] In 2003, Rachel’s grandmother offered to sell her home in Maine to Rachel for $75,000. Rachel believed that the price was discounted because Rachel’s grandmother wanted to keep the property in the family.1 Rachel purchased the property by executing a $75,000 mortgage to her grandmother in August 2003. Her grandmother sold the property to Rachel on the condition that the grandmother be allowed to live in the house for the rest of her life. Rachel made payments on the $75,000 mortgage directly to her grandmother. At first, Rachel, Patrick, and their son lived in another building on the property while Rachel’s grandmother lived in the house, but they eventually moved into the house. [¶4] Rachel’s grandmother died in December 2004. Rachel and Patrick were married in January 2007. Between the 2003 purchase of the home and the parties’ marriage in 2007, both Rachel and Patrick contributed funds and labor to improve the property. In 2007, after the parties were married, Rachel individually 1 There is no evidence of any appraisal at the time of the sale, and the court did not—and, on the evidence presented, could not—determine the precise market value of the property at that time. 3 obtained a $75,000 bank loan, secured by a mortgage on the property. The value of the property at that time was $245,000. Rachel used a portion of the new loan to pay off her remaining debt to her grandmother’s estate. The estate was then distributed to her grandmother’s heirs, Rachel’s mother and uncle. Following that distribution, Rachel’s mother gave Rachel approximately $30,000. Rachel used that money to add a two-car garage to the property. [¶5] In 2011, Rachel deeded the property to Patrick and herself as joint tenants, and they obtained a $100,000 bank loan, again secured by a mortgage on the property. The value of the property at the time of the new mortgage was approximately $310,000. Using some of the proceeds from the new loan, Rachel and Patrick paid off the earlier loan and applied the rest of the money to improve the property. Over the years, the parties spent nearly $184,000 to make improvements. At the time of the divorce, they stipulated that the value of the home was the value determined in the 2011 appraisal—$310,000. There remained $95,000 to be paid on the mortgage. [¶6] Patrick filed a complaint for divorce in July 2012, and the parties proceeded to mediation in September 2012. They resolved all of the issues regarding parental rights and responsibilities. They agreed that Rachel would have primary residence and receive $135 per week in child support. Patrick also voluntarily released his interest in the Florida property to Rachel and her parents. 4 The parties later agreed to a roughly equal division of accounts and personal property worth a total of about $85,000 to $95,000. No spousal support was requested or awarded. [¶7] A trial was held in February 2013 on the sole remaining issue in contention—the disposition of the real property. After hearing the evidence, the court announced its decision from the bench. In so doing, the court appears to have incorporated a concept of law that had been previously superseded. Despite the fact that the property had been deeded to the parties jointly by Rachel, the court noted, “I do believe that the concept of tracing is still alive.” Apparently applying the “source of funds” rule, see Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76 (Me. 1979), it determined that, if the concepts of tracing were strictly applied, Patrick might not be entitled to any interest in the home, but it concluded that such a disposition would be inequitable. It therefore awarded the home, with all of its equity, to Rachel and ordered her to make an equitable payment of $25,000 to Patrick. The court entered a written divorce judgment that incorporated this disposition of property. [¶8] Both parties moved for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(a). The court entered an order indicating that it would reconsider its allocation of the value of the real property. After a nonevidentiary hearing, the court vacated its earlier judgment with respect to the real property and entered a 5 judgment on October 10, 2013, that increased the equitable payment to Patrick to $77,500. [¶9] In that final judgment, the court estimated the amount that Rachel received from her mother after Rachel’s grandmother died, finding that Rachel’s “mother, who was the personal representative of the estate, gifted her portion of that payoff to [Rachel], an amount of over $30,000.” That estimate was consistent with Rachel’s testimony that she used proceeds from her 2007 loan to pay $64,000 or $68,000 to the estate to satisfy her remaining debt to her grandmother, and that her mother then “gave [her] the 30 grand,” representing the share of the proceeds that her mother inherited from the grandmother’s estate.2 [¶10] The court found that the real property was entirely marital and accepted the parties’ stipulated value of $310,000. Subtracting the $95,000 still owed on the mortgage, the court found that the parties’ equity in the property was $215,000. The court “set aside” $75,000 of the equity “as having been gifts to [Rachel] from her mother and grandmother,” and it divided the remaining $140,000 equally. The court also added $7,500 to the equitable payment owed to Patrick to account for his release of his interest in the Florida property. As a result, 2 Later in its judgment, however, the court mischaracterized the gift as an “inheritance from her grandmother’s estate of $37,500.” That exact amount, which would represent one-half of the original mortgage’s value, is not supported by the record, and the money was a gift from her mother, not an inheritance from her grandmother. 6 the court distributed $77,500 of the equity to Patrick and $137,500 to Rachel, amounting to a $60,000 difference overall. [¶11] Patrick timely appealed. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) (2013); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).