Opinion ID: 2285207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: cross-examination to show bias

Text: Ralph Cimmino, Carmel Cascio and Diane Tokarz testified on behalf of the state. Upon cross-examination they were asked whether they had refused to speak with a private detective who worked for Haskins' counsel. The trial court sustained the state's objection. Haskins claimed that he had a right to ask the question to show bias against him. Cross-examination to elicit facts which tend to show motive, interest, bias or prejudice is a matter of right, and although the extent of such cross-examination may often rest in the sound discretion of the court, a denial of the right, or its undue restriction, will constitute reversible error. State v. Luzzi, 147 Conn. 40, 46, 156 A.2d 505 (1959). In some instances the denial or undue restriction of this right could constitute constitutional error. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). Bias may be established in a variety of ways, one such way being the showing of partiality of mind. Partiality of mind whether arising out of favoritism for one side or hostility toward the other is a proper subject of inquiry on cross-examination. McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 40. Such partiality may be shown not only by direct evidence but also indirectly by conduct or language. Daggett v. Tallman, 8 Conn. 168, 177 (1830). But when partiality is claimed circumstantially the inference must be one that can be fairly drawn from the circumstances. The inference in ... [this] sort of evidence is from conduct or language to the feelings inspiring it; the only question is whether from the conduct or language a palpable and more or less fixed hostility (to one party) or sympathy (for the other) is inferable. 3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) § 950. The mere refusal of a witness to speak to an investigator for one side of a controversy, by itself, is equivocal, but when coupled with a willingness to cooperate with the other side it is quite another matter. Whether the disparate approach to the two sides of the controversy is due to sympathy or a leaning of the mind of the witness in favor of one side or antipathy for the other or neither is for the jury to decide; but it is at least a circumstance which, if unexplained, tends to support an inference of bias. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Norton, 7 Ala. App. 571, 61 So. 459 (1913). The court's ruling was correct in all three cases but even if it is regarded as erroneous with respect to any one of them the error is harmless. In the case of Ralph Cimmino, cross-examination elicited that he went to the police station at the direction of an officer of the bank where he was employed. And in the case of Carmel Cascio, on cross-examination Cascio testified that when he received a call from an investigator for one of the defendants requesting that Cascio give him a recorded statement Cascio immediately called the New Haven police department because he didn't know whether it was proper for him to talk to the defense. Upon inquiry Cascio was told that he was not required to answer any questions from representatives of the defense but that if he wished to do so there was nothing holding him back from doing that very thing. In both of these cases because the defendant was permitted to elicit the substance of the circumstances involved in his cooperation with the police, the trial court, although it might have been well advised to allow the excluded question, was acting well within its discretion. State v. McDaniel, 176 Conn. 131, 136, 405 A.2d 68 (1978). In the case of Diane Tokarz, no inquiry having been made concerning the circumstances of her speaking to any representative of the prosecution, the specific question was properly excluded.