Opinion ID: 764883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Perjury By Government Witnesses

Text: 14 Both defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial because two government witnesses, Simon Enoa and Reyes, committed perjury. Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a district court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. The motion must be made within 7 days after verdict . . . or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period, or, in the case of newly discovered evidence, within two years after final judgment. Id. 15 In this case, the defendants failed to make a new trial motion before the District Court within seven days. Instead, counsel for Hernan Moreno suggested that he would make such a motion at a sentencing hearing on December 16, 1997-six months after the guilty verdicts-in response to the District Court's refusal to credit Enoa's testimony for sentencing. The District Court rejected this suggested motion and stated that such a motion would amount to wasting your client's time because even without Enoa's testimony the evidence against the defendants was overwhelming. The District Court also stated that Enoa was one among many informants who took the stand in this case....There [was] certainly nothing intentional about the government's use of a confidential informant who comes forth with the type of information this one did. 16 Because this purported motion for a new trial was made far outside the seven-day time limit, and there is no suggestion that the motion is based on newly discovered evidence, it was untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to consider the defendants' argument on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Bramlett, 116 F.3d 1403, 1405 (11th Cir. 1997) (The time limits imposed by Rule 33 are jurisdictional. District Courts therefore lack jurisdiction to grant a new trial . . . unless the motion is filed [in timely fashion].); United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 512 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Graham, 97 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, even if the half-hearted motion before the District Court could be deemed a request to extend the time in which to move for a new trial, the District Court was not permitted to grant such an extension since the extension was not fix[ed] during the 7-day period following verdict or finding of guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b) ([T]he court may not extendthe time for taking any action under Rule[] . . . 33 . . . except to the extent and under the conditions stated in [it].). Since Rule 33 provides no relevant basis for extending the time to make the motion, the motion was untimely and was barred. 17 Even if the Morenos' claim were not barred, it lacks merit. Whether the introduction of perjured testimony requires a new trial initially depends on the extent to which the prosecution was aware of the alleged perjury. United States v. Damblu, 134 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1998). If the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury, a new trial is warranted if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. United States v. Wong, 78 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 939 (1993). Where the government knowingly permitted the introduction of false testimony reversal is 'virtually automatic.' Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456 (quoting United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)). However, [e]ven assuming . . . that the government knowingly introduced the perjured testimony . . . where independent evidence supports a defendant's conviction, the subsequent discovery that a witness's testimony at trial was perjured will not warrant a new trial. Wong, 78 F.3d at 82; see also United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court's alternative holding that newly discovered evidence did not warrant a new trial because the new evidence did not directly refute a witness's testimony against the defendant and because another witness provided even greater inculpatory evidence). On the other hand, if the government was unaware of the perjury at the time of trial, a new trial is warranted only if the testimony was material and the court [is left] with a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. Wong, 78 F.3d at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); accord Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456. 18 In this case, when the potential perjury of Enoa was raised at the December 16, 1997 hearing, the District Court concluded that [t]here [was] certainly nothing intentional about the government's use of a confidential informant who comes forth with the type of information this one did and that [t]he evidence . . . was overwhelming against [the defendants]. We agree on both counts. Similarly, we conclude that, even assuming that Reyes' testimony was untruthful, the government neither knew nor should have known of his perjury and the perjured testimony had no effect on the jury's verdict. Thus, the defendants are not entitled to a new trial based on the alleged perjury of Enoa and Reyes.