Opinion ID: 1192491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Receipt Counts

Text: In the event that we vacate the new trial order on the receipt counts, Polizzi urges us to instruct the district court to enter judgment on a single conviction for receipt or a single conviction for possession. This argument has two components: (1) that the conduct charged in the indictmentโreceiving images on February 20 and March 5, 16, and 20, 2005โconstitutes only a single violation of 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(a)(2), so that only one conviction under that section may be entered; and (2) that his ง 2252(a)(4)(B) violation is a lesser-included offense of his ง 2252(a)(2) violation because receipt necessarily entails possession. No convictions have been entered under ง 2252(a)(2); therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense has not yet been triggered. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 859-60, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668 (noting that the Government may seek a multiple-count indictment ... for violations of งง 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same weapon where a single act establishes the receipt and possession, but [s]hould the jury return guilty verdicts for each count,... the district judge should enter judgment on only one of the statutory offenses); United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the district court is likely to be faced with these issues on remand, we offer the following observations. Polizzi's argument that only one receipt conviction may be entered is analyzed in the same way as his argument that only one possession conviction may stand. Thus, with regard to the multiple receipt counts, the question is whether the facts underlying each count were intended by Congress to constitute separate `units' of prosecution. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 124 (citing Bell, 349 U.S. at 83-84, 75 S.Ct. 620). Title 18, section 2252(a)(2) of the United States Code, in relevant part, makes it a crime to knowingly receive[ ] ... any visual depiction ... if ... the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and ... such visual depiction is of such conduct. 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(a)(2). [6] In contrast to the language of ง 2252(a)(4)(B), which criminalizes the possession of 1 or more matters containing prohibited images, the language of ง 2252(a)(2), which criminalizes the receipt of any prohibited images, is ambiguous as to the intended unit of prosecution. See Coiro, 922 F.2d at 1014 ([T]he word `any' has `typically been found ambiguous in connection with the allowable unit of prosecution.' (quoting Kinsley, 518 F.2d at 668)). Where ambiguity or doubt exists about Congressional intent regarding the unit of prosecution, we apply the rule of lenity, which dictates that `if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.' United States v. Wallace, 447 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir.2001)). Thus, absent evidence of a contrary congressional intent, or an indication that the statutory structure precluded such a result, the rule of lenity requires the conclusion that a person who receives multiple prohibited images in a single transaction can only be charged with a single violation of ง 2252(a)(2). In this case, the indictment alleged, the evidence at trial established, and the jury found that Polizzi received prohibited images on four distinct occasions, that is, on February 20 and March 5, 16, and 20, 2005. But the evidence did not show, and the jury was not asked to determine whether Polizzi's receipt of multiple images on any one of these dates reflected a single simultaneous transfer or discrete and distinct transfers. Such a record would appear to support Polizzi's conviction on four receipt countsโone for each date on which he received imagesโbut not multiple receipt counts per day. Polizzi's argument that he may not be convicted both for receipt and possession of child pornography requires a slightly different analysis than that employed to assess whether multiple convictions under the same statute may be sustained, although both analyses turn on congressional intent. Where, as here, a defendant has violated two separate criminal statutes, whether the defendant may be punished for both violations turns on whether the legislature intended to authorize separate punishments for the offensive conduct under separate statutes. Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 96-97 (2d Cir.2001); see also United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir.1999). Thus, [t]o determine `whether convictions under separate sections of the federal criminal law arising from the defendant's involvement in a single event or a common series of events violate double jeopardy principles,' we analyze the following three factors: `the language of the statutes, how those statutes fare under the Blockburger test, and express congressional intent, if any, on the issue of multiple punishments.' Gore, 154 F.3d at 44 (quoting United States v. Muhammad, 824 F.2d 214, 218 (2d Cir.1987)). Under the Blockburger test, we determine `whether there are two offenses or only one [by] whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' Id. (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). Recently, the Ninth and Third Circuits have applied this analysis and concluded that ง 2252A(a)(5)(B) (possession of child pornography) is a lesser-included offense of ง 2252A(a)(2) (receipt of child pornography), because receiving an item necessitates taking possession of it. See United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 943-44 (9th Cir.2008); Miller, 527 F.3d at 71-72; see also United States v. Kamen, 491 F.Supp.2d 142, 150 (D.Mass.2007) (discussing ง 2252(a)). Each circuit court concluded, therefore, that the defendant could not be convicted both of receipt and possession under ง 2252A. See Davenport, 519 F.3d at 943-48; Miller, 527 F.3d at 70-74. Our Circuit has not decided this question. See Irving, 554 F.3d at 78 (assuming without deciding that possession is a lesser-included offense of receiving such pornography under ง 2252A). And we need not decide this question with regard to ง 2252(a) in this case because although we find the reasoning of Davenport and Miller persuasive, that reasoning does not apply perfectly to the circumstances of this case. Here, Polizzi was charged with possessing certain images of child pornography the receipt of which do not form the basis for a separate receipt count. Specifically, he was charged in Count Fourteen with possession of one image file (C: MY Site Little Sites MIXEDLOLITAS_files 07.jpg) and in Counts Fifteen, Sixteen, and Seventeen with possession of three video files, but he was not charged with receiving those files. Because Polizzi was not charged with the receipt of these four files, his possession of those files is not merely incident to an act of receiving for which he already has been punished. See id. at 77-79 (concluding that no double jeopardy violation would exist so long as the possession conviction was based on an image the receipt of which did not form the basis of the receipt conviction). In such circumstances, it would appear that Congress intended to allow separate convictions.