Opinion ID: 415488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Common to All Appellants: Single v. Multiple Conspiracies.

Text: 22 Mont argues that the evidence established multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. Carson and Thomas adopt this argument; in addition, they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions on the conspiracy count. Judge Brieant charged the jury on the issue of multiple conspiracies, and no appellant claims error in the charge. Our inquiry, therefore, is directed to whether the evidence supports the jury's finding that the government proved the conspiracy charged in Count 1 and each defendant's participation in it. 11 United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 472-73 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Salley v. United States, 432 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2958, 53 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1977). 23 The law regarding claims that the proof demonstrates multiple conspiracies was recently summarized by us in United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 472-73. We inquire whether the evidence 24 supports a finding that the alleged conspiracy was proved and that each appellant was a member of it and, if not, whether the variance substantially prejudiced any of the appellants. Having in mind that the gist of the offense remains the agreement, United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied sub nom. Mogavero v. United States, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965), we must, in order to resolve these issues, examine the evidence to determine what kind of agreement or understanding could reasonably have been found to exist as to each appellant. This requires a review of the defendants' activities as a whole in order to determine the scope of the criminal enterprise or enterprises and whether any of them fits the pattern of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The next step is to review each appellant's conduct and statements to determine whether it could reasonably be inferred that he participated in the alleged enterprise with a consciousness of its general nature and extent.... Proof of an appellant's membership depends upon the extent of his knowledge, given the scale of the criminal enterprise (citations omitted). 25 Count 1 charged the defendants with a conspiracy, extending from June 1980 through October 1981, to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin. There was evidence from which the jury could have found the existence of a single conspiracy. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the proof showed that Fred Galloway and Fred Chaffin distributed large quantities of heroin that they received from sources identified only as the Italians. 12 The connection between Galloway and Chaffin, on the one hand, and Guy Wilkins, 13 on the other, was evidenced during a sale of $45,000 worth of heroin to the agents on May 28, 1981. The agents paid $40,000 14 to Wilkins, who placed it in a shoulder bag. After the sale, Chaffin entered the residence of Galloway carrying the bag but emerged shortly thereafter without it. 15 The relationship between Chaffin and Carson was admitted by Carson--by her own account, they had been partners. Moreover, Carson and Wilkins admitted to a partnership relation between them after the ties between Carson and Chaffin had been severed. It was at this time that Carson established direct connections to the Italians. The outlines of the conspiracy at its lower levels was also established at trial: Mont served as source and partner to David Wilkins, and as a source to Guy Wilkins prior to his rise through the organization. Moreover, there is evidence that Carson operated a heroin mill out of her home and employed Hillside, the Thomas brothers and others as lower-level distributors. 26 Denying any connection between Chaffin and himself and claiming that Guy Wilkins had multiple unrelated sources, Mont argues that the proof showed multiple conspiracies. There was evidence, however, from which a Mont-Chaffin connection could be found. Thus, in October 1980, when Wilkins introduced Chaffin to the agents as his new source, Wilkins, nevertheless, indicated that Mont and Chaffin were affiliated and further stated that Mont and David Wilkins did not wish to be cut out of their profit as intermediaries. This suggests strongly that Mont had been receiving heroin from Chaffin. Moreover, on February 23, 1981, Shawn Lovett, who worked for David Wilkins, spoke with Chaffin immediately prior to picking up a kilogram of heroin for David. During this period, Mont and David Wilkins were partners in the heroin business. Finally, both Carson and Guy Wilkins acknowledged the irony of Wilkins' dealing Carson's narcotics for over a year when neither knew the other personally. During this period, Wilkins was distributing heroin for Mont and Carson was Chaffin's partner. 27 In any event, there was substantial cooperation between Mont and Guy Wilkins even after Wilkins established his relationship with a new source of heroin, Chaffin, in October 1980. Wilkins obtained some of the quinine that Mont and David Wilkins had purchased from the agents and used it to cut heroin he received from Chaffin. David's arrangement to pick up heroin from Chaffin in February 1981 further demonstrates the mutual assistance between Mont and David Wilkins, on the one hand, and Chaffin and Guy Wilkins on the other. In short, the proof at trial revealed the existence of ... unlawful operations by functional interlocking groups ... who were virtually dependent on one another for overall success. United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 473. The inference that there was one loose-knit conspiracy as alleged is justified. See United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 452-53 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1128, 51 L.Ed.2d 533 (1977); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1106-07 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir.1974); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 495-97 (2d Cir.1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903, 94 S.Ct. 2598, 41 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974). 28 Turning to appellants' knowledge and participation, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's conviction of Mont, Carson and Thomas on the conspiracy charge. The proof shows that Mont conducted a substantial heroin business from the Our Place Bar. In addition to the transactions outlined above, there was testimony from which the jury could infer that Wilkins and his brother David received from Mont and sold a kilogram of heroin every week. Moreover, in his conversation with Agent Baker, Mont indicated that he anticipated no problem in satisfying Baker's demands for heroin. Mont had subordinates, such as David and Guy Wilkins, who assisted him in the distribution chain. Mont also observed the advancement of Guy Wilkins through the organization, providing him with assistance in the form of quinine. The evidence, therefore, sustains the jury's finding that Mont had knowledge of the outlines of the enterprise, United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 474, and knew from the scope of [its] operation that others were involved in the performance of functions vital to the success of the business. United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337, 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008, 95 S.Ct. 328, 42 L.Ed.2d 283 (1974) (quoting United States v. Bynum, supra, 485 F.2d at 496; United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 982-83 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926, 93 S.Ct. 1358, 35 L.Ed.2d 587 (1973)). The government, of course, was under no obligation to show that Mont knew every other member or was aware of all acts committed in furtherance of it. United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 473. 16 29 Regarding Carson's involvement, she was, by her own admission, a partner of Chaffin, and then Wilkins, in the heroin trade. Carson's initial partnership with Chaffin dissolved after Chaffin became substantially indebted to both Carson and the Italians. She also admitted dealing directly with customers from Washington, D.C. Moreover, the evidence showed that Carson used her residence as a cutting mill, where six or more people diluted and packaged heroin, and that she employed Hillside and the Thomas brothers as lower-level distributors. The jury was warranted in concluding that Carson knowingly participated in the conspiracy. 30 Evidence of Thomas' participation in the conspiracy is less compelling. However, the standard for appellate review of an insufficiency claim placed a very heavy burden on the appellant. United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2945, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982). Our inquiry is whether the jury, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, may fairly and logically have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 572 (1979); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 157 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 1833, 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980). In making this determination, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680, 704 (1942), and construe all permissible inferences in its favor, United States v. Dazzo, 672 F.2d 284, 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 81, 74 L.Ed.2d 77 (1982). Moreover, participation in a conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Barnes, supra, 604 F.2d at 156 and cases cited therein. Applying these standards, we hold that the evidence supporting Thomas' guilt on the conspiracy charge is sufficient. 31 Indicative of Thomas' membership in the conspiracy were, of course, his furtive street-corner activities, which the jury could infer were drug transactions. Although this proof, taken alone, is insufficient to support the conclusion that Thomas was dealing conspiracy heroin, there is more. Thomas' activities on August 6, 1981 are of great significance. The agents, as noted above, were looking for Howard Thomas pursuant to a prearranged agreement to purchase heroin from him. Fully aware of the agents' purpose, because Howard had told him, Thomas successfully assisted the agents in their search. From this, the jury was entitled to conclude that Thomas was knowingly facilitating a heroin sale between Howard Thomas and the agents. 32 The same conclusion could be drawn with respect to Thomas' participation in an aborted heroin sale on August 10. On that occasion, Thomas, along with Howard Thomas and an unidentified woman, approached and stared at a DEA agent parked across the street from the heroin seller who occupied the Lincoln Continental. Thereafter, Howard cautioned the agents concerning the police presence. This seemingly innocent act, when viewed in the context of surrounding circumstances, justified an inference of complicity. United States v. Calabro, 449 F.2d 885, 890 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047, 92 S.Ct. 728, 30 L.Ed.2d 735 (1972). When this evidence of knowing assistance is viewed in conjunction with Thomas' street-corner activities, which take on color in light of Howard's extensive heroin dealing, United States v. Tramunti, supra, 513 F.2d at 1108-09, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Thomas was a member of the conspiracy, albeit at the retail level. This inference is strengthened upon consideration of evidence that the location where Thomas transacted his business was a heroin market--thus, the presence on this block of the heroin supplier in the Lincoln Continental and the proximity of the grocery store operated by Howard's heroin partner, Hillside. 33 Thomas urges exculpatory explanations for each strand of evidence. However, pieces of evidence must be viewed not in isolation but in conjunction. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028, 90 S.Ct. 1276, 25 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970). In this case, as in United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400, 401 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953, 82 S.Ct. 395, 7 L.Ed.2d 386 (1962), each of the episodes gained color from each of the others. See also, United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir.1977). The government's proof need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis, other than that of guilt to support a conviction. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.1972); see also, United States v. Lubrano, 529 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 61, 50 L.Ed.2d 78 (1976). 34 Thomas also contends that the government has failed to prove that he had knowledge of the overall conspiracy in which he participated. However, Thomas' membership was evidenced by continuing street-corner sales along with isolated instances in which he attempted to further or protect the business. Therefore, [t]he jury could properly infer that [Thomas] had knowledge of others above him in the chain of distribution and that he was dependent on their activities.... United States v. Barnes, supra, 604 F.2d at 159. See also, United States v. Taylor, supra, 562 F.2d at 1352-53, 1354; United States v. Tramunti, supra, 513 F.2d at 1110, 1112. Thus, the single act doctrine upon which Thomas relies, see United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 (2d Cir.1974) and cases cited therein, is inapposite here. Moreover, there is evidence that Thomas was aware of drug transactions in which he did not participate directly--those involving his brother Howard and the agents. In short, it could reasonably be inferred that [Thomas] participated in the alleged enterprise with a consciousness of its general nature and extent. United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 473. Again, it is not the government's burden to prove that Thomas knew all the conspirators or each of their activities. 35 Even if a variance existed between the conspiracy charged and the conspiracies proved at trial, we would reverse as to an appellant only upon a showing that he had suffered substantial prejudice. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247-48, 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1566-67 (1946); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S.Ct. 629, 630, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1318 (1935). There is no such showing here. There was no charge here based on Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), which allows one member of a conspiracy to be convicted for substantive crimes if committed by another in furtherance of the conspiracy. We have found no hearsay statements uttered by a member of one of the conspiracies that was used to the detriment of a member of another. United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Vavrigos v. United States, 423 U.S. 842, 96 S.Ct. 75, 46 L.Ed.2d 62 (1975). There was also no prejudicial spillover effect. Evidence that each appellant conspired to distribute heroin was substantial. Moreover, although nineteen defendants were indicted, only four went to trial, and there were at most two conspiracies. Thus, the number of persons tried together was small enough to enable the jury to give individual consideration to each. See, United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 475 (ten defendants, conviction affirmed); United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Indiviglia v. United States, 431 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1697, 52 L.Ed.2d 389 (1977) (twelve indicted, three unindicted co-conspirators, five went to jury, two conspiracies, conviction affirmed). 17 36 That the defendants were accorded such consideration appears from the verdicts: Carson was acquitted on one of the two substantive counts against her, and the jury acquitted Gayburnetta Galloway on the conspiracy count and was unable to reach a verdict on the substantive count against her. United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 475; United States v. Toliver, 541 F.2d 958, 963 (2d Cir.1976). Finally, no shocking or inflammatory evidence was introduced against any of the defendants. See, United States v. Alessi, supra, 638 F.2d at 475; cf. United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 158 (2d Cir.1975). Rather, the crimes of the various appellants were not markedly different, United States v. Miley, supra, 513 F.2d at 1209, and the evidence introduced at trial against all defendants consisted mainly of real and testimonial evidence pertaining to drug transactions. See, United States v. Ricco, supra, 549 F.2d at 271. 37