Opinion ID: 795173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Collateral Challenge to the 2001 Reinstatement

Text: 14 Turning to the sufficiency of Charleswell's collateral challenge, Charleswell specifically argues that [t]he 2001 reinstatement of the deportation order also violated [his] rights because he was never informed of his right to appeal to a federal court of appeals, and the `reinstatement statute' ought not be applied retroactively to [his] conduct. As noted earlier, the District Court analyzed only the first two Mendoza-Lopez requirements, concluding that, although Charleswell did satisfy the first requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies (First ... there were no practicable administrative remedies that Charleswell could have exhausted), he could not establish that he was denied judicial review of the reinstatement order. 6 As set out below, we conclude that Charleswell was denied the opportunity of judicial review of the reinstatement order and, additionally, that the proceeding, if prejudicial, was fundamentally unfair.
15 In concluding that Charleswell could not meet the second requirement, the District Court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) conferred appellate jurisdiction over reinstatement orders to federal courts of appeal and that Charleswell has provided no evidence to this Court that he was denied access to judicial review, either through a direct appeal from the reinstatement order or a petition for habeas relief. Therefore, according to the District Court, because judicial review was available in some form and Charleswell could offer no reason why he did not appeal, he could not meet the second prong. 16 It is certainly true that there is a statute conferring appellate jurisdiction on the courts of appeal over reinstatement orders and it is also correct that Charleswell did not directly appeal the reinstatement order. However, it is not the case that Charleswell failed to offer any evidence that he was denied access to judicial review. Charleswell contends that his failure to appeal stems from the fact that he appeared 7 pro se at the time of the reinstatement order and that he was never informed he could appeal the reinstatement order to the federal courts of appeal. (The government summarily deported Charleswell from the United States with ... no notification of the right of judicial review....). This is important because while what constitutes an effective denial of judicial review has not been definitively determined, 8 in Mendoza-Lopez, the Court held that an IJ's failure to adequately explain to the alien that he had the opportunity to appeal, which then resulted in an uninformed waiver of that right, was an error that deprived the individuals in that case of their opportunity for judicial review. Luna, 436 F.3d at 319. In other words, in Mendoza-Lopez, the Court ruled that a collateral attack could be made by aliens who had effectively been denied direct appeal because they were not given proper notice of the right to appeal. United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1992). According to Charleswell, the failure to inform him of his right to take direct appeal of the reinstatement order denied him the opportunity for meaningful judicial review. 17 The right to proper notice and the somewhat more capacious right to notice, generally, of the availability of judicial review, however, are not necessarily coextensive in their constitutional or Mendoza-Lopez collateral challenge implications. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently declined to find that an alien has a right to notice of the availability of judicial review over a deportation hearing. United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90, 2006 WL 853261 (2d Cir. 2006). There, an IJ informed the alien of his right to BIA review but neglected to inform him of the availability of habeas review. Id. at . The court rejected his claim that this lack of notice established that he was denied the opportunity for meaningful review because the receipt of a final order of deportation ordinarily would put an alien on notice to look for remedies for that order and where judicial remedies are readily available in case law and statutes, due process is not offended where no notice of those remedies is provided. Id. Under this reading, Mendoza-Lopez will not support a collateral challenge where the only claimed defect is the failure to inform the alien of his right to appeal. Id. (Nothing in Mendoza-Lopez ... requires a right to notice about the availability of judicial review.). 9 We need not now decide whether the mere lack of notice concerning the right to take a direct appeal from an administrative order can ever be considered an effective denial of meaningful judicial review because we consider the defect in this case to be considerably more significant. 18 The reinstatement procedures, as established by INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), and 8 C.F.R. § 241.8, are quite summary. 10 No hearing is associated with the reinstatement order and the alien is not entitled to appear before an IJ. Instead, the alien is served with a single piece of paper titled Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order. An immigration officer is required to ascertain three facts: (1) whether the alien is subject to a prior order of deportation, exclusion, or removal; (2) whether the alien has been correctly identified; and (3) whether the alien has illegally reentered the United States. Additionally, the officer must communicate to the alien that he has a right to make a written or oral statement contesting th[e] determination. If the alien wishes, he may make a statement contesting the determination and then check the box stating that he made the statement. Nowhere on the Notice of Intent form is there a statement alerting the alien that he may seek judicial review, pursuant to § 1252(a)(5), in the federal courts of appeals. The corresponding regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8, likewise fail to require that an alien be given notice that he has a right to appeal. Moreover, the alien is usually deported immediately, precluding any real attempt to obtain judicial review unless that alien has counsel immediately available to secure an emergency stay of removal. See Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1040-43 (9th Cir.2000). But most importantly, for our purposes, the Notice of Intent form states: 19 In accordance with Section 241(a)(5) of the Act, you are removable as an alien who has illegally reentered the United States after having been previously removed or departed voluntarily while under an order of exclusion, deportation or removal and are therefore subject to removal by reinstatement of the prior order. You may contest this determination by making a written or oral statement to an immigration officer. You do not have a right to a hearing before an immigration judge. (Emphasis added). 20 This language is misleading. We are persuaded that reasonable persons reading this Notice would be led to believe that their only avenue for relief if they desire to contest the reinstatement order would be to make either a written or oral statement to the immigration officer. The presence of an affirmative statement concerning an avenue of relief (You may contest this determination by ...) immediately followed by a negative command concerning what the alien may not do, creates the impression that these are the options. Absent any affirmative notice to the contrary, and combined with the velocity of the reinstatement process, it is simply unrealistic to expect an alien to recognize, understand and pursue his statutory right, pursuant to § 1252(a)(5), to direct judicial review in the appropriate court of appeals. 21 We therefore find analogous the line of cases beginning with Copeland establishing that where an alien is misled to believe that he has no opportunity for judicial review, the lack of an affirmative notice of the right to an appeal may combine to constitute a denial of the meaningful opportunity for judicial review, satisfying both § 1326(d)(2) and Mendoza-Lopez. United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 68-69 (2d Cir.2004); see Lopez, 445 F.3d at ___; United States v. Calderon, 391 F.3d 370, 375-76 (2d Cir.2004); Sosa, 387 F.3d 131; see also Vargas-Garcia v. INS, 287 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir.2002) (finding that language contained in a Notice of Appeal form misled aliens to believe that they need only make a brief statement of their desire for appeal rather than state the specific allegations of error). For example, even though the court in Lopez rejected the argument that the mere absence of notice of the right to appeal denied the alien the opportunity for meaningful review, it accepted the claim that affirmative misstatements ... functioned as a deterrent to seeking relief. Lopez, 445 F.3d at 99. Thus, based on the speed with which the deportation order was effectuated and the fact that the deportation proceeding's administrative nature makes it less likely that an alien would immediately look outside the administrative process for relief[,] the court concluded that where an alien has been misled to believe that no relief exists he will have been denied the opportunity for meaningful judicial review. Id. 22 Here, Charleswell appeared pro se and indicated his desire to contest the reinstatement order by checking the appropriate box. He was never informed that he had relief beyond this box and its corresponding statement. Consequently, the lack of any notice concerning his right to a direct appeal in combination with the misleading nature of the explicit language of the reinstatement order and the speed with which aliens are deported following a reinstatement process leads us to conclude that he was effectively denied an opportunity to seek judicial review, thereby meeting Mendoza-Lopez 's second requirement. 23 We are simply unable to fathom or rationalize a legitimate reason why the government would not want to fully inform aliens of their statutory right to appeal. Although it would require a slight change in the Reinstatement forms, a sensibly easy way to cure this glaring deficiency would be to amend the regulations governing the reinstatement process to include, directly on the Notice/Intent form, some notice that an alien may seek review of the reinstatement determination in the appropriate court of appeals while at the same time changing the language that would seem to convey that the exclusive remedy for the alien is to make a statement to the immigration officer. Although this would not address the more fundamental, and potentially unconstitutional, concerns expressed by numerous courts concerning the procedures associated with the actual reinstatement proceeding, it would have cured the claimed defect in this case and would satisfy our concerns regarding the effective denial of Charleswell's opportunity to obtain judicial review. While there are other, more troubling, questions concerning the adequacy of the reinstatement procedures we need not reach them today because we find that the failure to notify Charleswell of his right to appeal, when combined with the misleading language, is determinative. Because the District Court based its denial of Charleswell's attempt to collaterally attack the 2001 Reinstatement entirely on the second requirement of § 1326(d), and because this was in error, we must reverse on this point and move to the third requirement, whether the proceeding was fundamentally unfair. 11
24 We turn next to the third requirement, under Mendoza-Lopez and § 1326(d)(3), that the proceeding be fundamentally unfair. 12 Section 1326(d)(3) does not define the term fundamental fairness. Thus it is necessary to briefly discuss the contours of the term. At this juncture, while we have yet to specifically address whether 1326(d)(3), in addition to proof of some fundamental defect, also requires a showing of prejudice, it is essentially a foregone conclusion that this is so. Indeed, here, both parties agree that in order to succeed on a collateral challenge, under § 1326(d)(3), an alien must show not only that the underlying proceeding suffered some fundamental defect, but also that the result of the defect was prejudicial. To the extent that we have not explicitly held that prejudice is a necessary component under 1326(d)(3), we do so today. See Torres, 383 F.3d at 103 n. 13 (noting that every circuit to have addressed the issue has found that § 1326(d)(3) does require a showing of prejudice). Thus, under § 1326(d)(3), in order for a proceeding to be fundamentally unfair, the alien must establish both that some fundamental error occurred and that as a result of that fundamental error he suffered prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2003) (To show fundamental unfairness, a defendant must show both a fundamental procedural error and prejudice resulting from that error.) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir.1995) ([T]he establishment of a fundamentally unfair hearing in violation of due process requires a showing both of a fundamental procedural error and that the error caused prejudice.). 25 Before reaching the substance of the fundamental unfairness inquiry, we pause to address the argument that § 1326(d)(3) requires a showing that the error in the deportation hearing has resulted in a deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Luna, 436 F.3d at 319 (citing Torres, 383 F.3d at 103). To the extent that it might be argued that, for our Circuit, the sole way to establish fundamental unfairness is through proof of a deprivation of a liberty or property interest, we respectfully disagree. It is true that, in Torres, we held that [w]ithout more, an error of law will ordinarily not rise to the level of a due process violation, and that because it is axiomatic that discretionary relief is discretionary, there was no due process liberty right in consideration for such relief and thus, no fundamental unfairness in failing to consider an alien for [discretionary] relief. Id. at 105-06. 13 However, the question we addressed, in Torres, was whether an error of law denying an alien discretionary relief to which he may have been entitled rendered an otherwise procedurally fair proceeding unfair. 14 Consequently, we did not address the meaning of fundamental unfairness in the context of a defendant who was challenging some procedural defect in the underlying proceeding. 26 There are at least two avenues by which a proceeding can be fundamentally unfair. First, as addressed in Torres, a proceeding may be fundamentally unfair where it deprives an alien of some substantive liberty or property right such that due process is violated. Thus, in Torres, had section 212(c) use[d] explicit mandatory language in its regulations directing the decisionmaker to reach a particular outcome if the substantive predicates [were] present, we would likely have found that a state-created liberty interest had been denied to the alien, rendering the proceeding fundamentally unfair if prejudice ensued. 383 F.3d at 105 (quoting Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 925 n. 7 (3d Cir.1997)). Because we held that the statutory language providing for discretionary relief was not mandatory, and because we viewed the right at issue to be substantive, we concluded that it did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness. 27 Second, a proceeding may be fundamentally unfair where an agency has violated procedural protections such that the proceeding is rendered fundamentally unfair. See Torres, 383 F.3d at 106. We have not yet addressed what procedural protections, if denied, rise to the level of fundamental fairness. 15 However, as noted in United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir.2004) ( en banc ), the Supreme Court has suggested that errors that are so fundamental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judicial review[] may establish fundamental unfairness. Id. at 1204 (quoting Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 2148). Thus, some procedural deficiencies are so core to the fairness of a proceeding that their deprivation, if prejudicial, will render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. For instance, an alien's right to counsel in an immigration hearing before an IJ is so fundamental to the proceeding's fairness that a denial of that right could rise to the level of fundamental unfairness. Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2001) ([The right to counsel] is an integral part of the procedural due process to which an alien is entitled.) (quoting Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1993)); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir.1990); see Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir.2001) (Congress has long recognized the importance of counsel in immigration proceedings.). The ability to build an administrative record before an IJ during his deportation hearing is likewise so fundamental such that a denial, if prejudicial, may also render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. See Getachew v. INS, 25 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir.1994). Some procedural defects, however, are not so fundamental that they could render the underlying proceeding fundamentally unfair. For example, the right to be told of the possibility of being free on bond pending appeal, while a procedural defect, is not fatal to the entire proceeding. See United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir.2004) (holding that the denial of this procedural right did not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair). 28 Here, we must conclude that the INS's failure to inform Charleswell of his statutorily prescribed right to seek an appeal of his reinstatement order, combined with the misleading language contained in the reinstatement Notice of Intent form, is a fundamental defect of the nature that, if prejudicial, renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Under the Supreme Court's own suggested test, see Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 2148, if a procedural defect is fundamental where it functionally deprives the alien of judicial review, it is a fortiori that the functional deprivation of a statutory right to appeal is itself a fundamental defect. United States v. McCalla, 38 F.3d 675, 680-81 (3d Cir.1994) ([A] severely deficient deportation proceeding which effectively deprives the defendant of his right of direct appeal may preclude use of that deportation as a predicate to prosecution under section 1326.); see United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.1992) (finding that the denial of an alien's right to appeal, if prejudicial, is fundamentally unfair); United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir.1992) ( en banc ); see also United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir.1989) (We disagree . . . that the denial of judicial review alone renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair. However, we do agree that if a defendant is denied judicial review, a court must look closely at the proceeding on a collateral attack to ensure that no errors seriously prejudiced the defendant.) (internal citations omitted). 29 We thus turn, finally, to the question of prejudice. Whether Charleswell will be successful in his collateral challenge of the 2001 Reinstatement order hinges on whether he is able to show that he was prejudiced by the procedural deprivation. See Fares, 978 F.2d at 57. Because the District Court made no findings on this question, we will remand so that the District Court, the more appropriate venue for the specific factual inquiry that will need to be developed, has an opportunity to address this question. 30 However, because our Court has never spoken directly to the issue of prejudice, we are compelled to offer some guidance. 16 For the majority of courts that have addressed it, the standard an alien must meet to establish prejudice is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if the error in the deportation proceeding had not occurred. Loaisiga, 104 F.3d at 487; see United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 138 (2nd Cir.2004); United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 73 (2004); United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 485 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Perez-Ponce, 62 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir.2004). As the Court in Copeland noted, this standard appears analogous to the standard required of a defendant to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Copeland, 376 F.3d at 73. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, has held that an alien must only show that he had a plausible ground for relief from deportation. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotations omitted). This standard appears to require the alien to make a showing merely that there was some plausible legal challenge he could have pursued had he not suffered the defect. Id. Thus, while there is some disagreement over the exact burden an alien carries when attempting to establish prejudice, on balance we agree with the majority of courts that prejudice requires a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if the error in the deportation proceeding had not occurred. 17 31 Just how the District Court will resolve this query, we cannot say. However, because [r]esolution of the prejudice issue in the Section 1326(d)(3) context is somewhat akin to a trial within a trial, the District Court will have to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that Charleswell would have obtained relief had he not been denied the opportunity for direct judicial review of his reinstatement order. Copeland, 376 F.3d at 73. Importantly, this inquiry should not be limited merely to the predicate facts underlying the reinstatement order. 18 Because Charleswell was denied the opportunity to directly appeal his reinstatement order, he was denied the opportunity to contest the predicate elements leading to his reinstatement (specifically, that he was subject to a prior order of removal, that he was the same alien who was previously removed, and whether he had entered illegally). But he was also denied the opportunity to argue that the new reinstatement provision, § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), and its corresponding regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8, were impermissibly retroactive as applied to him. 19 32 Here, as noted above, the District Court declined to address the third Mendoza-Lopez requirement and made no findings on the question of prejudice. In short, if, after obtaining all the facts necessary to determine Charleswell's exact posture, the District Court determines that there is reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different had the error in the deportation proceeding not occurred, the reinstatement order will have been fundamentally unfair within the meaning of § 1326(d)(3).