Opinion ID: 4367046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Recordkeeping Requirements

Text: Next, the DOL appeals the district court’s conclusion that ODPS did not violate the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements. Under § 29 U.S.C. 211(c), employers must “make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons employed by [them] and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment maintained by [them] . . . as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of” the FLSA. At trial, the DOL’s investigator testified that Nos. 17-5995/6071 Acosta v. Off Duty Police Servs., et al. Page 17 many records of the hours worked by ODPS’s employees were either missing, inaccurate, or incomplete. Spurgeon admitted that some of ODPS’s records were inaccurate or incomplete.4 And the district court agreed that ODPS had failed to maintain accurate and complete records. The post-trial decision, however, held that ODPS had not violated the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements because the evidence did not show that ODPS had “knowingly failed to maintain accurate records.” Section 211(c) does not contain a knowledge requirement. Another provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5), does make it unlawful to: . . . violate any of the provisions of section 211(c) of this title, or any regulation or order made or continued in effect under the provisions of section 211(d) of this title, or to make any statement, report, or record filed or kept pursuant to the provisions of such section or of any regulation or order thereunder, knowing such statement, report, or record to be false in a material respect. This provision does proscribe “knowing[ly]” making false statements in employment records. But that knowledge requirement applies only to an employer’s material misrepresentation in a “statement, report, or record.” To violate § 211(c), by contrast, an employer could (as ODPS did here) fail to maintain certain records at all or fail to preserve them properly. And by its plain terms, § 215(a)(5) makes it unlawful “to violate any of the provisions of section 211(c) . . . or to make any statement, report, or record . . . knowing such statement, report, or record to be false in a material respect.” (emphasis added). The statute thus makes it unlawful both to fail to make, keep, or preserve records under § 211(c) or to make those records with the knowledge that they are false. That the statute expressly imposes a knowledge requirement for only the latter violation suggests that violations of the former do not carry the same requirement. See, e.g., S. Rehab. Grp., P.L.L.C. v. Burwell, 683 F. App’x 354, 363 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court 4On appeal, ODPS briefly argues (without citation) that “ODPS has met the recordkeeping requirement by maintaining time records in the form of the invoices that officers submitted in order to receive payment for services provided.” Apart from this unsupported sentence, ODPS makes no effort to explain why these invoices were sufficient or to refute the trial testimony demonstrating that ODPS’s records were often missing, inaccurate, or incomplete. Without more, this argument is forfeited. See, e.g., Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed [forfeited].” (citation omitted)). Nos. 17-5995/6071 Acosta v. Off Duty Police Servs., et al. Page 18 assumes different meanings were intended.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 83 (2011)).5 This is also consistent with the wellestablished principle that “it is the employer who has the duty under [the FLSA] to keep proper records of wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment and who is in position to know and to produce the most probative facts concerning the nature and amount of work performed.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946). We therefore vacate the district court’s determination that ODPS did not violate § 211(c) and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.6 On remand, the district court shall reconsider the DOL’s request for injunctive relief and, as necessary, exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 217.