Opinion ID: 1949451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: custody of bridgforth

Text: It is the established rule of Mississippi that before any divorce decree can be modified to effect a change in child custody, the chancellor must find that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that this change has had an adverse effect upon the child in question. See e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 458 So.2d 711 (Miss. 1984); Denney v. Denney, 453 So.2d 693 (Miss. 1984); Brocato v. Walker, 220 So.2d 340 (Miss. 1969). In the present case, the chancellor made an explicit finding that Allie Rutledge's proposed move to Jackson was not a material change of circumstances which would adversely effect Bridgforth. The chancellor changed the custody of Bridgforth anyway. His explanation was: [i]t would be impossible to continue under the old custody and visitation agreement where it is agreed that Bridgforth should spend six days out of each 14 with his father. The court considers this agreement to be a joint custody arrangement and not practical nor to the best interest of the child now.  (Emphasis in original). This is a very unusual explanation. In the first place the arrangement set up by the original divorce decree lacks several of the essential characteristics of joint custody. One commentator has remarked: The essence of joint custody is that both parents share responsibility and authority with respect to the children. This involves parental consultation and agreement on all major decisions affecting the children. The decision making process thus approximates that of an intact nuclear family. Parents with joint custody make joint decisions on all matters having a significant impact on their children's lives. (Miller, Joint Custody XIII, Family Law Quarterly 345, 360 (1979). Such a description hardly applies to the situation of the Rutledges. The divorce decree by its terms unambiguously assigns primary custody of Bridgforth to Allie Rutledge and primary custody of Will to Bill Rutledge. Nothing in the decree bestows on the non-custodial parents any legal power with regard to decisions affecting the child in the other parent's custody. Moreover, the record shows that there is substantial animosity between Bill and Allie, and therefore, it is manifestly impossible for their relation, vis-a-vis the children, to approximate that of an intact nuclear family. Miller's view of the nature of joint custody is substantially similar to that subsequently adopted by the Mississippi Legislature. The applicable statute is Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 93-5-24 (Supp. 1985). It went into effect after the present case was tried. Appellee's brief asserts that because of the amount of time Bill was allowed to spend with Bridgforth, the chancellor was justified in holding that a de facto joint custody arrangement existed. No case could be found in which it was held that such a claim was valid. Miller states flatly the claim that joint legal custody and sole custody with liberal visitation rights are indistinguishable is not true. Miller, supra, at 361. Even if this was a joint custody agreement, that, of itself, does not change the standard the chancellor is bound to apply. Agreements and stipulations between parties to a divorce have binding legal force only to the degree that they are recognized by the court and incorporated into the decree. Reno v. Reno, 253 Miss. 465, 176 So.2d 58 (1965). It follows that even if there were a joint custody arrangement, the chancellor could modify the original decree only if he found there had been a material change of circumstances adversely affecting the child. Since he explicitly found that that had not occurred, his disposition of the custody of Bridgforth was manifestly erroneous. Therefore, it is subject to reversal by this court.