Opinion ID: 794334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Medical Expert Testimony

Text: 11 Robinson challenges the admissibility of Dr. Horenstein's testimony, which was critical to the outcome of the case. Specifically, Robinson contends that Dr. Horenstein, a neurologist, testified outside of his expertise and thus was not a qualified expert within the meaning of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We disagree. Rule 702 provides 12 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 13 Rule 702 was amended in 2000 in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) and its progeny. Fed. R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note. Daubert charged trial judges with acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Daubert provides a district court with the discretion necessary to close the courtroom door to junk science and to admit reliable expert testimony that will aid the trier of fact. Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir.2002). A review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule. Fed. R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786. We review a district court's decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cawthorn, 429 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir.2005). 14 The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the testimony of Dr. Horenstein. Rule 702 does not require a defense medical expert to be of the identical medical specialty as the plaintiff's expert. Instead, Rule 702 only requires that an expert possess knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to assist the trier of fact, which is satisfied where expert testimony advances the trier of fact's understanding to any degree. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6265 (1997). Gaps in an expert witness's qualifications or knowledge generally go to the weight of the witness's testimony, not its admissibility. Id.; see also Lauria v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 598 (3d Cir.1998) (holding trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony simply because the trial court did not deem proposed expert to be the best qualified or because proposed expert did not have the specialization that the trial court considered most appropriate). However, Rule 702 does require that the area of the witness's competence matches the subject matter of the witness's testimony. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra § 6265. Most courts have held that a physician with general knowledge may testify regarding medical issues that a specialist might treat in a clinical setting. Id. 15 Although not an orthopedist, Dr. Horenstein assisted the trier of fact with relevant testimony from his expertise in neurology. Dr. Horenstein's testimony pertained to the cause of the shoulder problems that made Robinson's surgery necessary. His testimony regarding the usual onset of shoulder pain was within his realm of expertise as a neurologist. As a physician, he could testify regarding the likely type of injury one would sustain by the impact of the arm into the shoulder joint. Also, Dr. Horenstein's study of the subject qualified him to testify regarding the direction one would be forced in a rear-impact collision. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting his testimony.