Opinion ID: 214984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonably Safe Premises

Text: An owner has a duty to invitees to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition, but it is not the insurer of the safety of the invitees to its premises. Pigg, 991 So.2d at 1199. Among the reasons that it is appropriate to remove from the jury the issue of whether the premises were maintained in a reasonably safe condition is that the plaintiff failed to identify what specifically the landowner did negligently, or what exactly the dangerous condition was on the property. E.g., Boyd v. Magic Golf, Inc., 52 So.3d 455, 460-61 (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (affirming a directed verdict); Blanton v. Gardner's Supermarket, Inc., 45 So.3d 1223, 1231 (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (affirming summary judgment). Maddox has identified what he perceives to be the negligence and the nature of the dangerous condition. The S-hook on the chain is said to be the dangerous condition, and Townsend & Sons' inadequate inspections and failure to repair or replace the S-hook are the claimed negligent acts that caused his injuries. The district court rejected that the S-hook was the hazard and found the danger to be the five-foot drop. The drop being obvious, the premises were reasonably safe beyond any dispute of material fact: The court finds that the danger in the present case was not the chain but the height of the loading dock which was clearly visible to all on or around it. Had the chain broken on level ground, it is very unlikely that the plaintiff would have suffered any injuries at all. The presence of the chain was obviously in itself a warning sign to all business invitees and any other persons directing them to exercise caution near the edge of the dock. The defendant has stated that the sole purpose of the chain was to keep persons from backing off the edge of the dock. It was clearly not intended as a seat for deliverymen waiting their turn in line, nor foreseen that deliverymen would try to use a chain as a seat. The district court appears correct that a raised concrete platform at the back of a grocery store, constructed at a sufficient height to match the level of trucks unloading goods, would not by itself create doubts about the reasonable safety of the premises. Summary judgment appears to have been entered because of the view that no one would have perceived the chain to be completely safe to sit upon; it hung at the edge of the dock and a fall at that location obviously could cause serious injuries; liability cannot be created from the fact that the chain did not do something it was not intended to do. This is a commonsense view that jurors might accept. Nonetheless, we determine that there were fact issues under Mississippi law as to whether Townsend & Sons had an obligation to anticipate some of this kind of conduct and, having failed to do so, whether it became partially responsible for Maddox's injuries. We start with the basics. The existence of a duty is a legal issue. Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 174 (Miss.1999). We have already identified a premises owner's duty towards invitees. Whether the duty was breached by the premises owner acting unreasonably as to the condition of the property is a question of fact to be proven by a plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. See Palmer v. Anderson Infirmary Benev. Ass'n, 656 So.2d 790, 794 (Miss.1995). Even so, summary judgment is appropriate as to whether premises were reasonably safe if there is no dispute of material fact and the defendant shows entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We next examine the evidence. One deponent stated that Maddox sat on the middle of the chain for five minutes before falling. Two others stated they heard Maddox say soon after the accident that it was stupid for him to have sat on the chain. One of the deponents heard Maddox say he knew the chain was not to sit on, while another heard him say it was his fault. On the other hand, Maddox in a deposition and an affidavit swore he was next to the chain because of crowded conditions on the loading dock. He leaned simultaneously against the chain and the metal post to which the chain was attached. Without recalling precisely what happened, he heard something pop and fell to the pavement. Maddox denied making the statements about the fault being his. Both parties presented photographs of the loading dock with notations as to where each contended Maddox had sat or leaned. Both accept that the chain released when the weight placed on it caused the S-hook to straighten. Thus, the evidence is contested as to the relative strength of the chain and hook assembly. According to Townsend & Sons, for five minutes it withstood the test of bearing Maddox's entire weight of about 200 pounds. Maddox asserts that the test was much less demanding, as he placed only part of his weight on the chain as he also leaned on the vertical pole to which it was permanently attached. In whatever manner he used the chain, Maddox alone caused the hook attaching the chain to the opposite pole to straighten out and come free. Maddox argues that there was enough in these contested facts to create a jury issue. We will affirm a summary judgment if no reasonable factfinder could have found for the party opposing judgment. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 674 (5th Cir.2002). [1] Therefore, we will affirm if, after determining the conditions that caused the chain to give way, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the premises were not reasonably safe. We examine next why we conclude that the relevant hazard was more than the obvious drop-off from the loading dock. If instead of sitting on a chain, Maddox had sat on a chair placed by the premises owner near the edge of the loading dock that then collapsed because one of the wooden legs was rotten, Maddox might have fallen all the way down to the pavement. The potentially hidden hazard would have been the weakness of the chair leg. The obvious drop-off would not by itself end the issue of the owner's liability. In our case, the straightening of the S-hook, particularly if Maddox did not place all his weight on the chain, would not necessarily have been expected. We conclude that the hazard was more than the drop-off from the loading dock. One of the possibly relevant facts is that the chain was a safety device. In one case, a piece of a racetrack safety railing broke off after being hit by one of the race cars; the broken piece flew into the stands and hurt a spectator. Massey v. Tingle, 867 So.2d 235, 237 (Miss.2004). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the track owner in part because the guardrail prevented the race car, itself more dangerous than the railing, from entering the spectator area. Id. at 239-40. It appears that the court made an implicit finding that when a heavy, fast-moving race car collides with a guardrail, reasonably safe premises have been created even though some of the guardrail flies off. Moreover, the specific dangers of the racetrack that led to these injuries were obvious and known to the plaintiff. Id. at 240. We do not find in Massey an automatic exoneration of a landowner for harm that is caused by a safety device, even when the device performed as intended. Here, Townsend & Sons stated that the purpose of the chain was to stop someone from backing off the dock when maneuvering a load. Serving the intended purpose does not control the inquiry into reasonable safety. If a premises owner used a safety device to protect invitees from one kind of hazard but in so doing created a hazard of a different kind, then a fact question would remain of whether the owner should have anticipated that risk. The law [of premises liability as to invitees] still revolves around what the owner can anticipate or expect, or what is usual. Fulton v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 664 So.2d 170, 175 (Miss.1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This court recently held under Mississippi law that there could be disputes of material fact about the reasonable safety of a premises when an injury occurred due to a safety device that did not fail in its intended purpose. Wood v. RIH Acquisitions MS II, LLC, 556 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir.2009). There, the plaintiff tripped on safety reflectors placed on the pavement of a casino's entryway. Id. at 275. The safety reflectors notified car drivers of the driveway's lanes, but they were not necessarily visible to someone such as the plaintiff who was exiting from the back seat of a vehicle. Id. at 281. We reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, finding the determination of reasonable safety to be a jury question under Mississippi law. Id. at 282. The efficacy of the Wood reflectors for their intended purpose of notifying drivers of the lanes was not questioned. Instead, there was a fact question of whether the premises were reasonably safe because pedestrians could stumble on the reflectors. Id. at 281. The presence of pedestrians was foreseeable, and the difficulty individuals would have in seeing the reflectors immediately upon disembarking from their vehicles was also a fact question. Id. Arguably the central purpose of the casino's porte-cochere on whose roadway the reflectors had been placed was to encourage the discharge of passengers. We held the reasonable safety of the conditions to be a fact question. Id. at 282. The issue before us reduces to the question of whether the owner's duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition was satisfied despite the fact that this chain released when Maddox sat or leaned on it. One principle not supported by current Mississippi caselaw is that a premises owner is required to make every part of the property capable of withstanding every physical test a business invitee might give it. Even though Maddox proved this chain could not bear his weight, a premises owner is not liable for everything that happens on the property. That would make owners the insurer of the safety of invitees, which owners are not. Pigg, 991 So.2d at 1199. Reasonableness is central to the owner's obligation to invitees. The Mississippi Supreme Court elaborated on the obligations when it quoted a section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. Alexander v. Jackson Cnty. Hist. Soc'y, Inc., 227 So.2d 291, 292 (Miss.1969) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)). Accordingly, the owner is to take reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it, either to make it reasonably safe by repair or give warning of the actual condition and the risk involved therein. Restatement (Second) Torts § 343 cmt. d. As already noted, maintaining reasonably safe premises and warning of hidden dangers are separate duties. Mayfield, 903 So.2d at 738. Different phrasing for the same principles has also been used: (1) the premises owner is not the insurer of safety; (2) the owner must use reasonable care to maintain its premises ... in reasonably safe condition for those using reasonable care for their own safety; [2] and (3) the owner is not required to anticipate or foresee unusual and improbable results as a consequence of the condition of the premises. [3] McGovern v. Scarborough, 566 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Miss.1990) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v. Cutrer, 214 So.2d 465, 466 (Miss.1968)) (emphasis omitted). These Mississippi liability principles are consistent with the approach followed in other states that require a heightened duty towards invitees: While any condition on the premises can conceivably cause harm to an invitee, recovery will be allowed only when the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees. Risks are unreasonable if a reasonable person would find it necessary to take precautions against them. Glen Weissenberger and Barbara B. McFarland, The Law of Premises Liability § 4.6, at 91 (3d ed.2001). [4] We conclude that the evidence created a dispute of material fact as to the reasonable safety of the premises. On summary judgment, it must be accepted that Maddox did not put his entire weight on the chain but was partly leaning on it and on the pole in order to stay out of the way of other deliverymen. The parties agree that the S-hook straightened and caused the chain to give way. Accepting that the hook was deformed by no more force than Maddox claims  force potentially no more severe than what the chain was intended to withstand in keeping workers from backing off the dock  then jurors might also accept that a reasonable inspection by Townsend & Sons would have discovered that the hook was too insubstantial. Jurors would also need to decide whether reasonable premises owners should expect deliverymen waiting their turn might put some force on the chain, and whether the specific dangers of the S-hook and of someone leaning partly on the chain were obvious. The most difficult question is whether any reasonable factfinder would decide that this particular condition created an unreasonable risk of harm. Had Maddox sat with his full weight on this chain and only after five minutes did the S-hook straighten enough to allow the chain to become detached, the premises do not seem to us particularly unsafe. If instead the S-hook gave way without much weight being placed on the chain, such facts make a better case for the jury as to the reasonable safety of the premises. As judges, we try to discern the outer limit of what a reasonable juror could find. Whether a chain such as this, placed in a location in which it might be reasonable to expect that waiting deliverymen will place some of their weight on it, must have any particular strength for the premises to be reasonably safe, is a question for jurors. Summary judgment on reasonable safety should not have been granted. We now turn to the question of warnings.