Opinion ID: 547275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the appointment of feldman

Text: 16 Plesinski argues that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment or disqualify Special Assistant Feldman. Plesinski raises three arguments as to why Feldman's appointment was ineffective: (A) the appointments clause required that the Attorney General personally appoint Feldman; (B) assuming the Attorney General may delegate his appointment powers, the chain of delegation was flawed; and (C) Feldman acted without authority because he did not renew the oath of office after the second extension of his appointment on May 2, 1988.
17 Plesinski argues that Feldman was not authorized to participate in the prosecution because he was not personally appointed by the Attorney General to serve as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney. Plesinski maintains that the appointments clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the Attorney General from delegating his power to appoint special assistant U.S. attorneys. 18 The appointments clause provides in pertinent part: 19 [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 20 U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Congress thereafter vested in the Attorney General, the head of the Department of Justice, the authority to appoint attorneys to assist United States attorneys when the public interest so requires. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 543(a). Plesinski argues that section 543 represents an exercise of Congress' power under the appointments clause and therefore the Attorney General alone had to appoint Feldman and that such appointment authority could not constitutionally be delegated to lesser officials. We disagree. 21 Congress has passed legislation which permits the Attorney General to make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 510. Several courts have held that the Attorney General may, pursuant to section 510, redelegate his authority to appoint special assistants to the Attorney General under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 515(a) 5 to subordinates in the Department of Justice. See United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 1679, 52 L.Ed.2d 377 (1977); United States v. Agrusa, 520 F.2d 370, 372 (8th Cir.1975). We have also noted in dictum that the argument the Attorney General is without authority to delegate his power to [appoint] government attorneys under section 515(a) is without merit. See United States v. Prueitt, 540 F.2d 995, 1000 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 790, 50 L.Ed.2d 780 (1977). 22 We find that section 510 also authorizes the delegation of the Attorney General's appointment powers under section 543(a). Congress expressly gave the Attorney General permission to delegate any of his functions. There is no indication Congress meant to exclude the Attorney General's section 543 appointment power from this otherwise unqualified statutory authorization of delegation. Having granted the Attorney General the authority to appoint government attorneys, it was within Congress' power to permit a delegation of that authority, and we find nothing in the text or history of the Constitution which suggests otherwise. Thus, we reject Plesinski's argument that the Attorney General's appointment power under section 543 may not constitutionally be delegated to lesser officials.
23 Assuming the Attorney General may delegate his appointment power, Plesinski argues that the person to whom the Attorney General had delegated his authority, the Deputy Attorney General, had not properly redelegated that authority either to the Director or to the official renewing Feldman's appointment on May 2, 1988. The Deputy Attorney General did not officially redelegate the appointment authority to Director Cinciotta until January 31, 1989. Thus, Feldman was not authorized to act as Special Assistant U.S. Attorney during Plesinski's indictment and prosecution. 24 The government acknowledges that [i]t is undisputed in the instant case that the Deputy Attorney General did not execute a written delegation of the power to appoint Special Assistant United States Attorneys to the Office of the Attorney Personnel Management during the period February 16, 1988 to January 30, 1989. However, it argues the absence of such a writing during that period does not invalidate Feldman's appointment. The government relies on United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1209 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095, 106 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986), in which the court held that a letter of authorization is not essential to the validity of an appointment under Sec. 515(a) if there is sufficient evidence the special prosecutor was in fact authorized to appear in the proceedings. 25 The government's argument misses the mark. The issue in this case is not whether or when a particular appointment was made as in Balistrieri, but whether the appointing official had the authority to make the appointment. It is undisputed that the Deputy Attorney General had not redelegated his appointment authority to the officer who appointed Feldman on May 2, 1988. Thus, no evidence could be presented to the effect that Feldman was in fact authorized to appear in the proceedings against Plesinski. 26 Contrary to Plesinski's suggestion, however, Feldman's unauthorized appearance on behalf of the government did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings. Granted, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 516 and 547 reserve litigation in which the United States is a party either to officers of the Department of Justice or to U.S. Attorneys. 6 However, while he appeared in court alone on several occasions, Feldman testified he was not the only government attorney assigned to the case and that he was at all times acting under the direction and supervision of an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Under these circumstances, the court retained its jurisdiction over Plesinski's prosecution despite Feldman's unauthorized participation. See United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 108 S.Ct. 1502, 1511, 99 L.Ed.2d 785 (1988) (Court lacked jurisdiction unless a proper representative of the Government participated in the action); Home News Publishing Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir.1964) (court retained jurisdiction where Assistant U.S. Attorney stands responsible for conduct of the trial); United States v. Denton, 307 F.2d 336, 338-39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923, 83 S.Ct. 292, 9 L.Ed.2d 232 (1962). 27 Nor did Feldman's unauthorized presence before the grand jury require a dismissal of the indictment. In United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 71-72, 106 S.Ct. 938, 942, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986), the Supreme Court adopted the harmless error standard of Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) 7 for violations of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(d) 8 . See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 2373, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (a District Court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants). Where a dismissal is sought for nonconstitutional errors, dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only 'if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2374 (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78, 106 S.Ct. at 945 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 28 Plesinski has not demonstrated nor does he claim that Feldman's unauthorized presence as an observer 9 substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict him. Nor does he claim the grand jury proceedings were fundamentally unfair for that reason. 10 Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in denying Plesinski's motion to dismiss the indictment. 29 Similarly, the district court properly refused to rehear previously decided motions based on Feldman's unauthorized participation. 11 Again, Plesinski does not claim that he was prejudiced by Feldman's participation in the pretrial motions. He merely claims that he is entitled to have a duly authorized and properly qualified representative of the government study, analyze, and present the government's position with respect to these motions. In fact, while Feldman may have prepared and argued the government's responses to several of Plesinski's pretrial motions, he testified that his actions were subject to [the supervising Assistant U.S. Attorney's] approval and that he did not make the final decisions in connection with the prosecution. Under these circumstances, Plesinski has already received the remedy which he requests today. 30 And finally, while the district court denied Plesinski's motion that Feldman be barred from any further participation in the proceedings, the court made it clear that any future participation was conditioned on a cure in the unauthorized appointment. Feldman did not appear on behalf of the government again until Plesinski's sentencing, at which time the defective appointment had been cured. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Plesinski's motion upon the condition of a cure.
31 Plesinski argues that the failure to readminister an oath on May 2, 1988, after the lapse of Feldman's appointment on April 30, 1988, vitiated any valid authorization he may have had to conduct proceedings as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney. Title 28, United States Code, Sec. 544 provides that each attorney appointed under section 543 of this title, before taking office, shall take an oath to execute faithfully his duties. Plesinski relies on United States v. Pignatiello, 582 F.Supp. 251 (D.Colo.1984), wherein the court dismissed an indictment based on the special prosecutor's failure to take the oath prior to appearing before the grand jury. 32 Pignatiello is inapplicable in this case. Unlike the special prosecutor in Pignatiello, Feldman had taken the oath of office upon his original valid appointment on October 26, 1986. Admittedly, he did not renew the oath of office following his unauthorized reappointment after a two-day lapse in May 1988. However, Feldman, who was not aware of any defect in the appointment until November 1988, continued to act as a special prosecutor, presumably in reliance upon the original oath. When it was discovered that the May 1988 appointment was defective, Feldman immediately renewed the oath of office on November 23, 1988. Under these circumstances, we find that Feldman sufficiently complied with the oath requirement of section 544. 33 AFFIRMED.