Opinion ID: 1246093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: liability for misrepresentation

Text: Misrepresentation is a manifestation, by word or conduct, which constitutes an assertion not in accordance with fact. Edwin Bender & Sons v. Ericson Livestock Comm. Co., 228 Neb. 157, 162, 421 N.W.2d 766, 770 (1988). To recover in an action for fraud based on a misrepresentation of fact, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant made a representation of a material fact; (2) the representation was false; (3) the representation, when made, was known to be false or was made recklessly as a positive assertion without knowledge concerning the truth of the representation; (4) the representation was made with the intention that the plaintiff would rely on it; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; and (6) as the result of such reliance, the plaintiff suffered damage. Edwin Bender & Sons v. Ericson Livestock Comm. Co., supra at 165-66, 421 N.W.2d at 771. An intent to deceive is not an indispensable element in a cause of action for fraud based on misrepresentation of a material fact. Nielsen v. Adams, 223 Neb. 262, 388 N.W.2d 840 (1986). See, also, Edwin Bender & Sons v. Ericson Livestock Comm. Co., supra 228 Neb. at 165, 421 N.W.2d at 771: [T]he representation, when made, was known to be false or was made recklessly as a positive assertion without knowledge concerning the truth of the representation.... (Emphasis supplied.) Even Litty admits that no draintile system existed inside her house. The evidence conclusively established that Dammanns would not have purchased the Litty house without a draintile system. Hence, existence of a draintile system within Litty's house was material to Dammanns' purchase of the house. That Dammanns relied on Grabarkewitz' representations about the Litty house's draintile system, made in the highlights sheet and during the walk-through, is beyond question. The county court record contains evidence sufficient to sustain the factual findings by that court. Nevertheless, the district court, in reversing Dammanns' judgment obtained in the county court, expressed: [T]his reviewing court is not obligated to accept said findings and conclusions of the county court. The preceding expression does not reflect the appropriate standard of review applicable to the district court in its function as an appellate court reviewing a county court's factually supported decision in a law action. See, Mason v. Schumacher, 231 Neb. 929, 439 N.W.2d 61 (1989); § 25-2733. Because the evidence supports the factual underpinnings for the county court's decision, we must reverse the district court's judgment which vacated the county court's judgment in favor of Dammanns. However, reversal of the district court's decision concerning the county court judgment for Dammanns does not affect the judgment initially entered by the county court in Litty's third-party action against Grabarkewitz and subsequently vacated by the district court as the result of the appeals by Litty and Grabarkewitz. Regarding the third-party action authorized by § 25-331, we have stated: Section 25-331 authorizes a third-party action by a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, against a person, initially not a party to the action, who is or may be liable to the initial defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. A third-party claim under § 25-331 may be asserted when a third party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to the defendant. [Citation omitted.] The basic function of third-party practice is the original defendant's seeking to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted by the original plaintiff. [Citations omitted.] Schuyler State Bank v. Cech, 228 Neb. 588, 592, 423 N.W.2d 464, 467-68 (1988). See, also, Church of the Holy Spirit v. Bevco, Inc., 215 Neb. 299, 338 N.W.2d 601 (1983). Litty has taken no cross-appeal from the district court's action in setting aside Litty's judgment obtained against Grabarkewitz in the third-party action. Thus, correctness of the district court's action in reversing the third-party judgment and dismissing Litty's third-party petition and action is beyond the review authorized in the present appeal. See Young Radiator Co. v. Celotex Corp., 881 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir.1989) (appellate rule regarding a cross-appeal is jurisdictional; hence, reversal of a judgment against a plaintiff in the initial action does not entitle a defendant and third-party plaintiff, in the absence of a properly filed cross-appeal, to challenge a judgment obtained by a third-party defendant in a third-party action). Inasmuch as only Dammanns have appealed from the district court's decision, we reverse the district court's judgment which set aside the county court's judgment for Dammanns, and remand this matter to the district court with direction to reinstate and affirm the judgment obtained by Dammanns in the county court. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTION.