Opinion ID: 1822272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying proposed jury instructions d-1 (a peremptory instruction), d-6 (self defense) and giving jury instruction c-10 (elements of armed robbery).

Text: ¶ 7. In determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1997)(quoting Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918 (Miss.1997)). Furthermore, the general rule is that jury instructions must be supported by evidence and must provide that the jury must find each element of the crime under the proper standard of proof. Turner v. State, 721 So.2d 642, 648 (Miss.1998).
¶ 8. McDowell first suggests that the trial court erred in refusing his peremptory instruction (D-1) which instructed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in Count I and capital murder in Count II. This Court applies the same standard of review for a denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a directed verdict and a peremptory instruction. Each challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence and is tested in a light most favorable to the State. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993). In passing on McDowell's request for a peremptory instruction, the credible evidence consistent with his guilt must be accepted as true, together with any favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from that evidence. We are authorized to reverse only where the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fairminded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Id. ¶ 9. A review of the record before this Court does not reveal that it was so wanting for evidence that McDowell was entitled to a peremptory instruction. Hill's testimony that connected McDowell to the crime and the fact that the .410 shotgun used to kill Whitten belonged to McDowell, provided sufficient evidence to warrant the trial court's refusal of the peremptory instruction.
¶ 10. McDowell secondly argues that his self-defense instruction (D 6) should have been given. Even though McDowell's theory of his case was that he was not there and he did not commit the crime, he nevertheless requested a self-defense instruction in response to Hill's testimony. However, Hill's testimony provided no credible evidence to support the requested self-defense jury instruction. His only statement which even remotely implies that McDowell acted in self defense was made during the State's direct examination, when the prosecutor asked him to [t]ell me what Whitten was doing. Hill responded that he was [j]ust standing there and he took a stop [sic] toward Antonio, Antonio took a step back. Hill continued by saying he went to close the front door and that was when he heard the shot. Even if McDowell was allowed to now change his testimony and say that he was at Whitten's store the day of the shooting, McDowell would still not be able to claim self-defense. A defendant is not entitled to use deadly force in self-defense based upon a subjective fear of great bodily injury unless it is determined by a jury that this fear is reasonable under the circumstances. Walters v. State, 720 So.2d 856, 862 (Miss.1998). ¶ 11. McDowell relies heavily on Dew v. State, 748 So.2d 751 (Miss.1999), where this Court reversed on grounds that the defendant's pre-arming himself did not deter him from receiving a warranted self-defense instruction. Id. McDowell also relies upon Hopson v. State, 625 So.2d 395 (Miss.1993), a case where a drug defendant denied that he sold narcotics, but then asked the trial court for an entrapment instruction. Both these cases are inapplicable to the case at hand. ¶ 12. McDowell's entire defense and the theory of his case was an alibi defense. He insisted that he was not present in the store the day that Whitten was shot and killed. He did not offer an alibi instruction. His alternate theory was only presented by defense counsel in chambers during the process of determining which jury instructions would be given to the jury. The trial court properly refused McDowell's requested self-defense instruction.
¶ 13. McDowell next suggests that the granting of the Instruction C-10 regarding the elements of robbery was reversible error. McDowell claims that the State failed to prove that he robbed Whitten while he was still alive. McDowell offers no authority to support his proposition that one must be robbed before being killed, in order to have met the elements of robbery. In Arthur v. State, 735 So.2d 213, 220 (Miss.1999), we held that it does not matter whether the taking occurred before or after the murder. ¶ 14. McDowell also asserts that there was no proof that he carried away or removed any of Whitten's property. However, the statute under which McDowell was indicted proscribes robbery by exhibition of a deadly weapon but does not require proof of asportation. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79 outlines the elements of robbery and states in pertinent part: Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the personal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery.... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79 (2000). ¶ 15. Asportation, though an element of larceny, is not an element of robbery since robbery may, on the proper facts, be proven by the mere attempt to take the property of another from his person or presence. Cooper v. State, 386 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Miss.1980). This issue is without merit.