Opinion ID: 1891312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Case Law Addressing the Admissibility of Collateral Crime Evidence

Text: In Williams, we enunciated the general rule on the admissibility of collateral crime evidence: [ R]elevant evidence will not be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy. The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy. 110 So.2d at 659-60. In other words, evidence of any facts relevant to a material fact in issue except where the sole relevancy is character or propensity of the accused is admissible unless precluded by some specific exception or rule of exclusion. Id. at 663. [4] However, in Heuring we explained that [s]imilar fact evidence that the defendant committed a collateral crime is inherently prejudicial because it creates the risk that a conviction will be based on the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit crimes, rather than on proof that he committed the charged offense. 513 So.2d at 124. To minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, the similar fact evidence must meet a strict standard of relevance. Id. In cases after Williams, we explained that the relevance of collateral crime evidence is often a function of similarity. See Williams v. State, 621 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1993) (Evidence of other crimes or acts may be admissible if, because of its similarity to the charged crime, it is relevant to prove a material fact in issue.); Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988) (The requirement that similar fact crimes contain similar facts to the charged crime is based on the requirement to show relevancy.). Specifically, in cases where the purported relevancy of the collateral crime evidence is the identity of the defendant, we have required identifiable points of similarity between the collateral act and charged crime that have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant. Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981). This is because [t]he mode of operating theory of proving identity is based on both the similarity of and the unusual nature of the factual situations being compared. Id. Thus, [a] mere general similarity will not render the similar facts legally relevant to show identity. Id. [S]ubstantial similarity is also required when the [collateral crime] evidence is sought to be admitted for the specific purpose of establishing absence of mistake or accident. Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 909 (Fla.2002). We have also explained that [a]lthough similarity is not a requirement for admission of other crime evidence, when the fact to be proven is, for example, identity or common plan or scheme it is generally the similarity between the charged offense and the other crime or act that gives the evidence probative value. Williams, 621 So.2d at 414. Thus, the similarity of the collateral act and charged offense goes to both the preliminary determination of relevancy and to the evidence's probative value. As with any other relevant evidence, evidence of a prior bad act is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Williams, 621 So.2d at 415 ([E]vidence of other crimes that is relevant and therefore not barred by section 90.404(2)(a), may be excluded under section 90.403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.). Before allowing Williams rule evidence to be presented to the jury, the trial court must find that the State has proved that the defendant committed the collateral acts by clear and convincing evidence. See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1964) (concluding that the district court's requirement that proof of the connection between the defendant and the collateral act be by clear and convincing evidence did not conflict with Williams ); Henrion v. State, 895 So.2d 1213, 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (The offering party is required to prove the defendant's connection with the similar act by clear and convincing evidence.). Further, in order to reduce the risk that the jury will convict based on the defendant's bad character, the State cannot make the collateral act a feature of the trial. See Steverson v. State, 695 So.2d 687, 689 (Fla.1997) ([T]he prosecution should not go too far in introducing evidence of other crimes. The state should not be allowed to go so far as to make the collateral crime a feature instead of an incident.) (quoting Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 189 (Fla.1984)). Finally, at the time the evidence is admitted the trial court shall, if requested, charge the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be considered. § 90.404(2)(c)(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Robertson, 829 So.2d at 908. This cautionary instruction shall be repeated to the jury at the close of evidence. See § 90.404(2)(c)(2). [5] Because of the commonly held belief that individuals who commit sexual assaults are more likely to recidivate as well as societal outrage directed at child molesters, the admission of prior acts of child molestation has an even greater potential for unfair prejudice than the admission of other collateral crimes. However, beginning with our decision in Heuring, we have recognized that in cases involving sexual abuse against children, the child victim is typically the sole eye witness and corroborative evidence is scant. Credibility becomes the focal issue. 513 So.2d at 124. Further, because the victim knows the perpetrator, who is often another family member or close family friend, identity is not an issue. See id. Accordingly, we held that in cases where the defendant is accused of a sexual battery committed in the familial setting, [6] evidence of a prior sexual battery committed within the familial setting is admissible under the Williams rule because this evidence is relevant to corroborate the victim's testimony. See 513 So.2d at 124-25. Applying this holding, we ruled in a trial on the charge that the defendant sexually battered his stepdaughter when she was between seven and twelve that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that the defendant sexually battered his daughter when she was between seven and fifteen. See id. at 123, 125. Although the two offenses occurred approximately twenty years apart, we recognized that the opportunity to sexually batter young children in the familial setting often occurs only generationally and when the opportunity arises. Id. at 124. Significantly, we discussed in Heuring a relaxed standard of admissibility for collateral crime evidence under these circumstances. See id. However, as we later explained, we did not specifically address the question of how similar the charged offense and the collateral sex crime must be in order for the collateral crime evidence to be admissible. Saffor, 660 So.2d at 671. Nor did we discuss the additional requirement in section 90.403 that hinges admissibility on whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or misleading the jury. We have since made it clear that [b]efore admitting Williams rule evidence, it is incumbent upon the trial court to make multiple determinations, including. . . whether the prior crime meets the similarity requirements necessary to be relevant as set forth in our prior case law,... and ... whether the prejudicial effect of the prior crime substantially outweighs its probative value. Robertson, 829 So.2d at 907-08 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted). In State v. Rawls, 649 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1994), we extended Heuring to allow the admission of similar fact evidence in nonfamilial sexual battery cases where the identity of the defendant is not an issue. We concluded that because the credibility of the victim was very much an issue .. . the similar fact evidence was properly admitted to corroborate his testimony. Id. at 1354. We did not discuss the relaxed standard of admissibility alluded to in Heuring. Instead we concluded that the charged and collateral offenses were strikingly similar and therefore met the strict standards of the Williams rule. Id. at 1353-54. We did not engage in a detailed weighing of the similar fact evidence under section 90.403. We simply stated that the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its potential for undue prejudice. Id. at 1354. Shortly thereafter, in Saffor, we explained how the relaxed standard of admissibility discussed in Heuring should be applied in cases where both the charged and collateral offenses occurred in the familial setting: We hold ... that when the collateral sex crime and the charged offense both occur in the familial context, this constitutes a significant similarity for purposes of the Williams rule, but that these facts, standing alone, are insufficient to authorize admission of the collateral sex crime evidence. There must be some additional showing of similarity in order for the collateral sex crime evidence to be admissible. The additional showing of similarity will vary depending on the facts of the case and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, we do not eliminate the requirement of similarity which undergirds the Williams rule. However, the strict similarity in the nature of the offenses and the circumstances surrounding their commission which would be required in cases occurring outside the familial context is relaxed by virtue of the evidence proving that both crimes were committed in the familial context. 660 So.2d at 672. We held that the trial court erred in admitting the collateral crime evidence under the relaxed standard for familial cases because there was only one similarity between the charged and collateral offenses other than the familial context. See id. In sum, under this Court's decisions, evidence of a collateral act of child molestation is relevant under the Williams rule to corroborate the victim's testimony in both familial and nonfamilial child molestation cases. We have relaxed the requirement for strict similarity between the charged and collateral offenses in the familial context, but there must be some similarity other than the fact that both offenses occurred in the family. We have not extended the relaxed standard of admissibility to nonfamilial cases. However, in both familial and nonfamilial cases, the required showing of similarity must be made on a case-by-case basis, and the collateral act evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.