Opinion ID: 2160205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: application of continuous representation doctrine

Text: Schoenrock argues that a continuous representation occurred in March or April of 1981, at which time Tappe made the disputed comment that he would take care of the easement problem thus saving Schoenrock's case from the statute of limitations. Schoenrock further argues that Tappe's unsuccessful attempt to resolve the matter through South Dakota's congressional delegation in November, 1984, could be viewed (by a jury) as evidence of the continuing representation. First, statute of limitations questions are normally for the jury. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.1982); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.1970); Sam v. Balardo, 411 Mich. 405, 308 N.W.2d 142 (1981); Noland v. Freeman, 344 N.W.2d 419 (Minn.1984); Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240 (Minn.1982); McCarthy Bros. v. Hanskutt, 29 S.D. 535, 137 N.W. 286 (1912). Schoenrock asserts that there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Tappe agreed to do something to assist him with the easement problems in March or April of 1981. Even assuming such a factual dispute, the statute of limitations issue still remains, under the facts of this case, a question of law within the exclusive province of the court. Tonegatto v. Budak, 112 Mich.App. 575, 316 N.W.2d 262 (1982). Reiterating, the statute of limitations period for legal malpractice actions is three years (SDCL 15-2-14.2) and a cause of action for negligently examining a title accrues at the time the attorney provides the client with the erroneous information (occurrence rule). Further, under the continuous representation doctrine, the accrual of a malpractice cause of action will be tolled until the representation (or treatment in medical malpractice cases) terminates. Legal Malpractice, supra, § 391 at 462-63; see cases cited in Koffler, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical Analysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20:2 Akron Law Review 209 (1986); Annot., 32 A.L.R.4th 260, supra. We hold, however, that the continuous representation doctrine applies only to malpractice actions when there is a clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney.... Muller v. Struman, 79 A.D.2d 482, 485, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 (1981) citing Citibank, NA v. Suthers, 68 A.D.2d 790, 418 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1979); Grago v. Robertson, 49 A.D.2d 645, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1975); Siegel v. Kranis, supra ; see also Peduto v. Durr, 97 A.D.2d 959, 468 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1983). This relationship is one which is not sporadic but developing and involves a continuity of the professional services from which the alleged malpractice stems. Muller, supra 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208. Furthermore, the application of this doctrine should only be applied where the professional's involvement after the alleged malpractice is for the performance of the same or related services and is not merely continuity of a general professional relationship. Muller, supra 437 N.Y.S.2d at 207 citing inter alia Naetzker v. Brocton Central School Dist., 50 A.D.2d 142, 376 N.Y. S.2d 300 (1975) rev'd on other grounds 41 N.Y.2d 929, 394 N.Y.S.2d 627, 363 N.E.2d 351 (1977); Tool v. Boutelle, 91 Misc.2d 464, 398 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1977); Dura-Bilt Remodelers v. Albanese, 86 Misc.2d 172, 382 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976). See generally Wells v. Billars, 391 N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 1986). The above considerations, which are normally indicative of a continuous attorney/client relationship, simply are not present in this case. Here, three years and seven months had passed with no contact whatsoever between the parties. The Tappe-Schoenrock relationship was sporadic, at best. During the three-year seven-month gap, Tappe did nothing to make Schoenrock believe he was doing anything to remedy the easement problem. Nor did Schoenrock, who knew of the problem and was constantly in battle with the Wildlife Service over the situation, contact Tappe or in any manner inquire whether Tappe was doing anything to alleviate the problem. In fact, Schoenrock dealt with another attorney. There simply was no continuity in the parties' relationship. The record does not support that the attorney/client relationship was in effect (if ever) after April, 1981. See Muller, supra . Tappe's alleged comments made in April of 1981 were definitely related to the work performed in February of 1981. The November, 1984, work was also related to the February, 1981, work. However, the continuity element is missing from the November, 1984, representation. Obviously, there was a three-year nine-month gap between the November, 1984, work and the February, 1981, act (alleged erroneous title opinion) and a three-year seven-month gap if we apply the continuous representation doctrine to the April, 1981, contact. Therefore, the statute of limitations had run. Bennin v. Ramapo General Hospital, 72 A.D.2d 736, 421 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1979) (medical malpractice); Tool v. Boutelle, 91 Misc.2d 464, 398 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1977). Additionally, Schoenrock's contact with Tappe in November of 1984, purportedly to seek help in rectifying the error previously made, will not revive the cause of action after the statute of limitations has already run. See Tonegatto, supra ; Bennin, supra ; Tool, supra citing Naetzker, supra . Schoenrock argues that Tappe's unsuccessful attempt to resolve the matter through South Dakota congressional delegation in November of 1984 might be viewed by a jury as a continuous representation. We disagree. As stated earlier, by November of 1984, the statute of limitation had already run. How long should Tappe's alleged comment, even if agreed to be true, remain effective? Three years? Six years? The legislature has said three years and we so hold, unless there is a continuous representation within the period of limitations. See generally Wells, supra . This is the most important factor in this case (i.e., a total absence of any claimed continuing representation within the period of limitations ). The only claimed negligence is the alleged negligent title opinion, which was completed in February of 1981. Schoenrock's return to Tappe's office in April of 1981 could arguably be characterized as a continuing representation, within the limitation period, which would toll the statute from running until that time. Citibank, supra . However, Schoenrock's return to Tappe in November of 1984 does not toll the statute to this date, as this contact was at least seven months past the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Citibank, supra ; Peduto, supra ; Tool, supra ; Bennin, supra ; Wells, supra . Although the attorney cannot terminate the attorney/client relationship unilaterally by simply failing to provide services, the relationship does not continue indefinitely simply because there is no formal termination. Vollgraff v. Block, 117 Misc.2d 489, 492, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (1982). Schoenrock relies on Wells, in asserting that Tappe was still representing Schoenrock in November of 1984, and claims that this may toll the cause of action for the negligent February, 1981, act. However, the complaint alleges nothing about the November, 1984, visit. Furthermore, in Wells, there was a continued treatment (as it was a medical malpractice case) within the original period of limitations. Here, the alleged continued representation was not within the period of limitations and thus the statute bars Schoenrock's action. [3] Lastly, even considering the alleged conversation between Tappe and Schoenrock in March or April, 1981, together with the fact that Schoenrock did not go see Tappe until November of 1984, the only possible way Schoenrock could prevail is if he could make some type of a discovery time argument, by establishing that he did not discover the malpractice until some time which appropriately tolled the statute. See Glad v. Gunderson, Farrar, Aldrich, 378 N.W.2d 680 (S.D.1985). In Glad, we stated that this statute of limitations ... will be tolled until the cause of action is discovered or might have been discovered, if there is fraudulent concealment of the cause of action. Id. at 682 (citations omitted). Here, however, there was no claim of fraudulent concealment and no evidence of the same. Therefore, the trial court is affirmed. WUEST, C.J., and KONENKAMP, Circuit Judge, concur. MORGAN, J., concurs specially. HENDERSON, J., dissents. KONENKAMP, Circuit Judge, sitting for SABERS, J., disqualified.