Opinion ID: 1182224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Adjustment to Incarceration and His Adoption of New Goals

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not finding as a mitigating circumstance his adjustment to incarceration and his adoption of new goals. The fact that a defendant is a model prisoner has previously been considered to be a mitigating circumstance. See State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 63-64, 628 P.2d 943, 946-47 (1981). However, we are not persuaded that defendant has become a model prisoner. The record indicates that defendant has not used drugs since his September 20, 1984 arrest and has, through his parents, arranged to take college courses. We agree with the Gillies II court, however, and find that [w]hile these changes are commendable, persons sentenced to death frequently change their outlook on life. Balancing these human factors against [defendant's] former behavior militates in his favor, but not such as to require leniency, given the seriousness of his crime. State v. Gillies (Gillies II), 142 Ariz. 564, 571, 691 P.2d 655, 662 (1984). We therefore find no error. D. Victim Impact Evidence Defendant argues that his death sentence must be reversed because the trial court improperly received victim impact evidence prior to trial, during trial, and at the sentencing phase of his trial. As a factual basis for his argument, defendant cites the following as victim impact evidence: (1) This community marched on the mall 3,000 strong and ... burn[ed] a trailer that [defendant] spent an evening, one night at, just because his presence was there.... (2) [T]he newspapers and the press and the feelings that were all through this case about how [defendant] is guilty.... (3) The victim's family was represented by a lawyer who was present throughout the guilt and penalty phase [of the trial]. (4) The [victim's] family appeared on [television] newscasts and in newspaper articles. (5) The Court ... received numerous letters from `We the People' and `Court Watch.' (6) The Judge received letters from the victim's mother, father, step-father, and sister.... Included in [the sister's] letter was a poem she wrote titled `For [Mary].' It read: For [Mary] Sitting here all alone just thinking about the past; the best years of my life that slipped away too fast. Growing up with you was the best thing for me. You taught me to be myself and the best that I could be. I remember all the fights (the ones I would always lose) about whose room was cleaner and whose doll was whose. But all those days are gone now they're just a memory, of me and my little sis together faithfully. So please take all my love and a great big hug and kiss cause you deserved the best in life my one and only sis. As a legal basis for his argument, defendant cites Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). Booth held that victim impact evidence may not be presented to the jury during the sentencing phase of a trial unless such evidence relates directly to the circumstances of the crime. After considering both the factual and legal bases proffered by defendant, we conclude that the trial court did not err, even though it received victim impact evidence. This conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), and this court's decision in State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 762 P.2d 519 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 708 (1989). In Payne, the Supreme Court overruled Booth and held that the constitution does not prohibit the admission of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The Court stated, a State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the ... decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. Payne, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2609. Although a state may make victim impact evidence relevant to the decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed, we do not believe that Arizona has done so. Under Arizona's death penalty statute, the trial court may give aggravating weight only to that evidence which tends to establish the aggravating circumstances specifically enumerated in A.R.S. § 13-703(F), see A.R.S. § 13-703(E) (In determining whether to impose a sentence of death, ... the court shall take into account the aggravating ... circumstances included in [§ 13-703(F)] and shall impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in [§ 13-703(F)] and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.), and we do not believe that victim impact evidence has such a tendency. Accordingly, and until the legislature says otherwise, in determining whether to impose the death penalty, the trial court may not give aggravating weight to victim impact evidence. The trial court is free, however, to rebut evidence offered in mitigation with relevant victim impact evidence. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 639 P.2d 1020 (1981). In applying these principles to this case, we first recognize that [a]bsent proof to the contrary, the trial judge [in imposing sentence] in a capital case must be presumed to be able to focus on the relevant sentencing factors and to set aside the irrelevant, the inflammatory, and the emotional factors. Beaty, 158 Ariz. at 244, 762 P.2d at 531. We have looked for proof indicating that the trial judge failed to set aside the victim impact evidence he received in imposing the death penalty on defendant. We have found none. On the contrary, the trial judge imposed the death penalty on defendant because defendant had previously been convicted of a crime which, if committed in Arizona, would have subjected defendant to life imprisonment, and no mitigating circumstances existed that were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. See A.R.S. §§ 13-703(E), (F)(1). We therefore reject defendant's argument that his death sentence must be reversed because the trial court received victim impact evidence. E. Conclusion In addition to the trial court's consideration of defendant's proffered mitigating circumstances both individually and in combination, [26] we have also considered defendant's proffered mitigating circumstances. We have found no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, and we have found no fundamental error. We therefore affirm the trial court's finding of one aggravating circumstance, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(1), and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, and because we believe that the death penalty should be imposed, see State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 552, 804 P.2d 72, 85 (1990), we affirm defendant's death sentence. 19. The Kidnapping Sentence Defendant argues that the trial court erred in classifying his kidnapping conviction as a class 2 felony and sentencing him to life imprisonment without considering whether the kidnapping should be classified as a class 4 felony under A.R.S. § 13-1304(B). This argument is without merit. Section 13-1304(B) classifies kidnapping as follows: B. Kidnapping is a class 2 felony unless the victim is released voluntarily by the defendant without physical injury in a safe place prior to arrest and prior to accomplishing any of the further enumerated offenses in subsection A of this section in which case it is a class 4 felony. Defendant argues that because the state failed to prove that he did not voluntarily release Mary without physical injury in a safe place prior to his arrest, he should have been sentenced for kidnapping classified as a class 4 felony. The majority rejects this argument because it fails to recognize that by proving that defendant killed Mary, the state a fortiori proved that defendant did not release her without physical injury in a safe place prior to his arrest. We therefore affirm defendant's sentence for kidnapping classified as a class 2 felony. [27] 20. Computerization of the Record Defendant asserts that he was denied his rights to an adequate appeal, effective assistance of counsel, due process and equal protection because this court declined to order that the record be computerized. He argues that because the record in this case exceeds 20,000 pages, failure to computerize the record deprived him of a basic tool necessary to prepare an effective appeal. We find no merit in this claim. In fact, defendant's opening brief, which was mammoth, originally consisting of 279 pages, and later edited to 120 pages pursuant to this court's order, belies his contention that his counsel was unable to review and synthesize the record effectively. Our review of the record, which was not aided by computer technology, reveals that defendant's appellate counsel did not overlook even the slightest indication of error in the record. Indeed, if defendant's appellate counsel failed her client in any way, it was in her inability or unwillingness to apply her considered judgment to evaluating the merit of many of the arguments she raised. Any shortcoming in appellate counsel's judgment, however, would not have been ameliorated by computer technology, regardless of its efficiency. Although we recognize and welcome the advent of computer technology as an ever increasing component of the judicial and criminal justice systems, we do not believe, as defendant argues, that computers fulfill such an integral role in effective legal analysis that a court's refusal to order the computerization of a trial record amounts to a deprivation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. We therefore conclude that defendant's appeal was not impeded by our refusal to order the computerization of the record. 21. Limitation on Length of Defendant's Opening Brief Defendant's final argument is that this court's limitation on the length of his opening brief interfered both with his right effectively to present issues on appeal and with his relationship with his appellate attorney. Frankly, we address this argument with a certain measure of incredulity. Defendant's appellate counsel originally requested this court's permission to file an opening brief in excess of the normal limit of 40 pages. Rule 31.13(b)(2), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; see also John Foreman & Joel M. Glynn, Criminal Appeals, Post-conviction Relief, and Habeas Corpus, 1 Arizona Appellate Handbook § 4.10, at 4-11 (L. Ray Haire & Paul G. Ulrich eds., 2d ed. 1983). Realizing that defendant's case was unusually complex, even for a capital case, the chief justice granted counsel's request and ordered that a 120-page brief could be submitted. [28] Appellate counsel responded to this order by filing a 279-page brief, which we refused to accept. We then afforded her an additional 60 days to edit the brief to comply with our original order. Ultimately, appellate counsel submitted a 110-page opening brief. The brief, however, contained 38 pages of single spaced endnotes (complete with their own table of authorities), which were little more than excised portions from the original 279-page brief. In addition, the substitute brief failed to comply with rule 31.13(b)(1), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that appellate briefs have a margin of 1.5 inches on each side. Thus, the opening brief finally submitted by appellate counsel on behalf of her client was in essence little more than a reconfigured, slightly less bulky, more tightly printed version of the first, unacceptable brief. Had the second version of the brief demonstrated a well-reasoned, thoughtful and legally supportable analysis of the record generated in this case, we perhaps would have been hesitant to do more than simply dismiss as nonmeritorious the argument that the page limitation violated defendant's constitutional rights. In our opinion, however, defendant's opening brief simply threw at this court every conceivable argument. Each member of this court is acutely aware of the gravity of the decisions we are called upon to make in capital cases. Therefore, to argue that such deviations from professional appellate practice as occurred in this case are justifiable because the death penalty is at issue is unpersuasive. Rather than aiding our review of defendant's case by judiciously selecting, fully researching, and concisely arguing the colorable issues raised by the trial record, appellate counsel has bombarded this court with a salvo of dubious claims serving little purpose other than to detract from those issues having arguable legal merit. As Justice Robert O. Jackson once commented: Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate through over-issue. The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error. But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one.... [E]xperience on the bench convinces me that multiplying assignments of error will dilute and weaken a good case and will not save a bad one. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 Temple L.Q. 115, 119 (1951), quoted in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3313, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). We do not suggest that defendant's case was either a good one or a bad one. We do concede, however, that the sheer volume of paperwork generated by this case has made the appellate process somewhat unwieldy, although not unworkable. Our task would have been neither more effective nor more efficient had defendant been permitted to file a more extensive brief. Indeed, defendant does not indicate how he was actually prejudiced by the page limitation placed on his brief. Considering, however, that minimal substantive difference exists between the first and second opening briefs, we fail to see how defendant could have been prejudiced by an order of this court with which his counsel, in substance if not in form, failed to comply. Accordingly, we find no deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights resulting from the page limitation applied to his opening brief. See State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 182-83, 800 P.2d 1260, 1290-91 (1990) (court-mandated editing of defendant's appellate brief did not violate defendant's constitutional rights). DISCUSSION OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL In its cross-appeal, the state raises three issues. Initially, the state argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the testimony of an informant to whom defendant made incriminating statements. Next, the state argues that the trial court erred in finding that the state did not establish that defendant killed the victim in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). Finally, the state asks us to overrule the rule set forth in State v. Gillies (Gillies I), 135 Ariz. 500, 511, 662 P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983), that, [i]n order to constitute an aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), the prior conviction must be for a felony which by its statutory definition involves violence or the threat of violence on another person. 22. The Informant's Testimony The state argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the testimony of an informant to whom defendant made incriminating statements. The majority declines to address this argument because the record  even without the informant's testimony  requires us to affirm defendant's conviction for first degree murder and his death sentence. [29] 23. The Especially Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Aggravating Circumstance The state argues that in the sentencing phase the trial court erred in finding that the state did not establish that defendant killed the victim in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, see A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), and asks this court to make such a finding. In support of its argument, the state cites exclusively the informant's testimony. See supra Part 22. Because the majority of justices have declined to address the admissibility of the informant's testimony because the death sentence is affirmed on another ground, the majority also declines to address the state's especially heinous, cruel, or depraved argument based on that testimony. [30] 24. The Rule in Gillies The state requests this court to overrule State v. Gillies (Gillies I), 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983), and hold that in determining whether a prior conviction establishes a § 13-703(F)(2) aggravating circumstance, a trial court may look behind the statutory definition of the offense to the facts underlying the conviction. We recently refused an identical request, State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 819 P.2d 909 (1991), and do so again today. We reaffirm Gillies I.