Opinion ID: 624808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Indictment was Incorporated by Reference in the Judgment

Text: Under Arizona law, a charging document is reliable evidence of the elements of a prior conviction only if it is incorporated by reference in the judgment. State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, 158 P.3d 263, 272 (App.2007); State v. Thompson, 186 Ariz. 529, 924 P.2d 1048, 1051 (App. 1996). [6] In Thompson the Arizona Court of Appeals held a judgment specifying that the conviction was pursuant to Count I of the Information . . . effectively incorporated Count I of the charging document by reference. 924 P.2d at 1051. Thus, the sentencing court properly considered both the information and the judgment in determining whether the defendant's prior conviction constituted a felony for purposes of an Arizona sentence enhancement provision. Id. A judgment that did not refer to the charging document in any respect, however, did not incorporate the charging document by reference, and the charging document could not be relied upon to determine the nature of the defendant's prior conviction. Id. An Arizona charging document is only reliable evidence of the elements of a prior conviction if it is incorporated by reference in the judgment because, under Arizona law, initial charges can be amended at trial or in change of plea proceedings. Id. at 1051-52 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 13.5(b)). The judgment underlying Antonio-Agusta's Arizona convictions states he was convicted of Counts 1, 2, and 3 Amended Aggravated Assault. While the judgment describes Counts 1, 2 and 3 as aggravated assaults it does not set forth the counts themselves or otherwise indicate their elements. Thus, the judgment must refer to another document that sets forth the counts in their entirety, like a charging document. In this case, the only documents in the record that do so are the complaint, dated June 12, 2006, and the indictment, dated June 16, 2006, which are identical in all relevant respects. Thus, the indictment superceded the complaint as the charging document and the judgment must refer to the indictment. See State v. Bojorquez, 111 Ariz. 549, 535 P.2d 6, 10 (1975) (An intervening indictment arising from the same activity may supercede the filing of a prior complaint.). Indeed, the indictment sets forth three counts of aggravated assault and therefore corresponds with the truncated description of the offense provided in the judgment. Aside from not actually using the words the indictment, the language of the judgment in this case is otherwise similar to the language of the judgment in Thompson, where the charging document was incorporated by reference. 924 P.2d at 1051. The judgment also states, Counts 1, 2, and 3 Amended,  indicating the counts were amended, but does not explain how. Thus, the judgment must also refer to something that reveals how the counts were amended. In this case, that must be the plea agreement because nothing else in the record sets forth the manner in which the counts were amended. Further, Antonio-Agusta makes no argument that the indictment was amended by anything other than the plea agreement. By referring to the indictment and plea agreement, the judgment necessarily incorporated those documents by reference. Thus, the indictment underlying Antonio-Agusta's prior convictions, as amended by the plea agreement, was incorporated by reference in the judgment.