Opinion ID: 6108657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 79II Issues on Appeal and Applicable Legal Authority

Text: The issues on appeal stem from the trial court's decisions with respect to two pretrial motions. The first was Mouton's rape-shield motion, which sought to introduce evidence of the sexual nature of KV's relationship with EP. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that Mouton could present evidence that KV and EP were close friends, but not evidence of their previous sexual relationship. Mouton appeals this decision, arguing that the evidence should not have been excluded under Rule 411, and that its exclusion violates his constitutional right to present a defense. The second pretrial motion was Mouton's motion to exclude Rule 404(b) testimony from one of the State witnesses, Brittany Perry. Perry would have testified that she and Mouton had engaged in physical interactions while Perry was a high school student, some eighteen years prior, that were similar to those alleged to have occurred between Mouton and KV. The trial court granted this motion, ruling that Perry would not be permitted to testify at trial. The State appeals this decision, seeking either (1) if this court reverses the trial court's decision pursuant to Mouton's arguments, a ruling on this issue to bring back to the trial court on remand, or (2) if this court affirms the trial court's decision with respect to Mouton's arguments, a declaration of error for the purported benefit of the bench and the bar. We begin with Mouton's arguments, both of which deal with Rule 411, Arkansas's rape-shield rule. Some of our prior cases have addressed these arguments in tandem, so to obviate the need for multiple discussions of the same cases, we will first review all the applicable legal authorities and then apply the relevant provisions of those legal authorities to Mouton's arguments, one at a time. Mouton's first argument is that evidence of the sexual nature of KV and EP's relationship should not have been excluded under the procedure and analysis set forth in Rule 411(c). Rule 411 provides in relevant part as follows: (b) In any criminal prosecution under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101 et seq. or § 5-26-202, or for criminal attempt to commit, criminal solicitation to commit, or criminal conspiracy to commit an offense defined in any of those sections, opinion evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true, or evidence offered by the defendant concerning prior allegations of sexual conduct by the victim with the defendant or any other person if the victim denies making the allegations is not admissible by the defendant, either through direct examination of any defense witness or through cross-examination of the victim or other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent or any other defense, or for any other purpose. (c) Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in subsection (b) of this rule, evidence directly pertaining to the act upon which the prosecution is based or evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person may be admitted at the trial if the relevancy of the evidence is determined in the following manner:(1) A written motion shall be filed by the defendant with the court at any time prior to the time the defense rests stating that the defendant has an offer of relevant evidence prohibited by subsection (b) of this rule and the purpose  for which the evidence is believed relevant. (2)(A) A hearing on the motion shall be held in camera no later than three (3) days before the trial is scheduled to begin, or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit. (B) A written record shall be made of the in camera hearing and shall be furnished to the appellate court on appeal. (C) If, following the in camera hearing, the court determines that the offered proof is relevant to a fact in issue, and that its probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature, the court shall make a written order stating what evidence, if any, may be introduced by the defendant and the nature of the questions to be permitted in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence. The general purpose of the rape-shield rule is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. McCoy v. State , 2010 Ark. 373 , at 9, 370 S.W.3d 241 , 247. Subsection (b) of Rule 411 identifies several types of evidence that will be inadmissible unless the admissibility of the evidence is established through the procedure and analysis set forth in subsection (c), by showing that the evidence is relevant and that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial or inflammatory effect. Interpreting these provisions in Marion v. State , this court ruled that a defendant can present to the jury evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by the rape-shield rule if the defendant can establish a legitimate evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts. 267 Ark. 345 , 348-49, 590 S.W.2d 288 , 290 (1979). There, the defendant was charged with rape, and he filed a pretrial motion for an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of the victim's prior sexual conduct. Id. at 346 , 590 S.W.2d at 289 . The trial court denied the defendant's motion, and the defendant then brought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's decision to deny his motion. Id. This court made two important observations. First, with respect to the defendant's argument that the proffered evidence should have been admissible pursuant to the procedure and analysis set forth in subsection (c) of the rape-shield rule, this court held as follows: Appellant's defense to the rape charge was that no sexual intercourse occurred between them on the alleged occasion. He proffered evidence that the charge against him was made by the prosecutrix because of a fight they had as a result of his contracting a venereal disease from her. At the time of the fight, she threatened she would get even with him. Consequently, the present charge resulted. We cannot agree with the court's exclusion of this proffered evidence. Certainly, upon sufficient proffer as here, the victim's bias, prejudice or ulterior motive for filing the charge is relevant or germane to the question of whether the alleged act of sexual intercourse actually occurred and the probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. Id. at 348 , 590 S.W.2d at 290 . Accordingly, this court held that the evidence should have been admitted pursuant to the procedure and analysis set forth in subsection (c) of the rape-shield rule. The Marion court also acknowledged the defendant's second argument, that the trial court's application of the rape-shield rule to the evidence in question violated  the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. [A]ppellant's counsel was denied effective cross-examination of a constitutional magnitude when he, after stating an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts, was refused the right to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand[.] Id. at 348-49 , 590 S.W.2d at 290 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, this court held that excluding the evidence of bias and motivation to lie violated the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Mouton also cites several United States Supreme Court cases in support of his argument that the trial court's application of the rape-shield rule violated his constitutional right to present a defense. He points to Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where the Supreme Court held: Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi , supra , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 23 [ 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967) ; Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ] (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S., at 485 [ 104 S.Ct. 2528 ] ; cf. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 684 685 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984) (The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment). We break no new ground in observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. In re Oliver , 333 U.S. 257 , 273 [ 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 ] (1948) ; Grannis v. Ordean , 234 U.S. 385 , 394 [ 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 ] (1914). 476 U.S. at 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 . Mouton also directs our attention to Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and Olden v. Kentucky , 488 U.S. 227 , 109 S.Ct. 480 , 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988), cases in which the Court has emphasized the importance of the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witnesses testifying against him. In Davis , a burglary case in which the trial court prevented the defendant from using the fact that a witness was on juvenile probation for burglary to impeach that same witness, the Supreme Court stated: On the basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness ... On these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Petitioner was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination which would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it. 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 (emphasis added). Olden is also instructive. There, James Olden and Charlie Ray Harris, both of whom were black, were indicted for kidnapping, rape, and forcible sodomy. 488 U.S. at 228 , 109 S.Ct. 480 . The alleged  victim, Starla Matthews, had traveled with her friend to Princeton, Kentucky, to exchange Christmas gifts with Bill Russell, Olden's half-brother. Id. After exchanging gifts with Russell at a car wash, Matthews went with her friend to a local bar. Id. Much of the remaining facts were in dispute, but the gist is that Matthews left the bar with Olden and Harris in Harris's vehicle, and Olden and Matthews engaged in sexual intercourse multiple times over the remainder of the evening. Id. at 228-29 , 109 S.Ct. 480 . Olden asserted that Matthews had propositioned him and that the sex was entirely consensual; Matthews asserted that the sex was nonconsensual and that Harris had assisted Olden by holding Matthews's arms. Id. Afterward, Olden and Harris drove Matthews back to Russell's house, dropped Matthews off, and drove away. Id. at 229-30 , 109 S.Ct. 480 . When Russell met Matthews at the door as she approached Russell's house, Matthews told Russell that she had just been raped by Olden and Harris. Id. At trial, Olden sought to introduce evidence of the fact that Matthews was living with Russell in an effort to show Matthews's motivation to fabricate the allegations. Id. at 230 , 109 S.Ct. 480 . The Court observed, Although Matthews and Russell were both married to and living with other people at the time of the incident, they were apparently involved in an extramarital relationship. By the time of trial the two were living together, having separated from their respective spouses. Petitioner's theory of the case was that Matthews concocted the rape story to protect her relationship with Russell, who would have grown suspicious upon seeing her disembark from Harris' car. In order to demonstrate Matthews' motive to lie, it was crucial, petitioner contended, that he be allowed to introduce evidence of Matthews' and Russell's current cohabitation. Over petitioner's vehement objections, the trial court nonetheless granted the prosecutor's motion in limine to keep all evidence of Matthews' and Russell's living arrangement from the jury. Moreover, when the defense attempted to cross-examine Matthews about her living arrangements, after she had claimed during direct examination that she was living with her mother, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection. Id. at 229-30 , 109 S.Ct. 480 . The jury acquitted Harris of all charges and acquitted Olden of kidnapping and rape, but in a somewhat puzzling turn of events, the jury convicted Olden of forcible sodomy and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Id. at 230 , 109 S.Ct. 480 . Olden appealed, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the trial court's restriction upon Olden's ability to cross-examine Matthews violated Olden's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 231 , 109 S.Ct. 480 . The Court noted, The Kentucky Court of Appeals did not dispute, and indeed acknowledged, the relevance of the impeachment evidence. Nonetheless, without acknowledging the significance of, or even adverting to, petitioner's constitutional right to confrontation, the court held that petitioner's right to effective cross-examination was outweighed by the danger that revealing Matthews' interracial relationship would prejudice the jury against her. While a trial court may, of course, impose reasonable limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness, to take account of such factors as harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that [would be] repetitive  or only marginally relevant, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra , [ 475 U.S. 673 ] at 679, 106 S.Ct. [1431] at 1435 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) ], the limitation here was beyond reason. Speculation as to the effect of jurors' racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of Matthews' testimony. Id. at 232, 109 S.Ct. 480 . The Court then added that a constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias must be reversed unless the appellate court finds that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon factors including the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id. at 232-33 , 109 S.Ct. 480 ( referencing Van Arsdall , supra , and Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ). Applying those factors to Olden's case, the Court reasoned, Here, Matthews' testimony was central, indeed crucial, to the prosecution's case. Her story, which was directly contradicted by that of petitioner and Harris, was corroborated only by the largely derivative testimony of Russell, whose impartiality would also have been somewhat impugned by revelation of his relationship with Matthews. Finally, as demonstrated graphically by the jury's verdicts, which cannot be squared with the State's theory of the alleged crime, and by Judge Clayton's dissenting opinion below, the State's case against petitioner was far from overwhelming. In sum, considering the relevant Van Arsdall factors within the context of this case, we find it impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the restriction on petitioner's right to confrontation was harmless. Olden , 488 U.S. at 233 , 109 S.Ct. 480 .