Opinion ID: 531041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Achieving Unitary Status

Text: 36 In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (Brown I ), the Supreme Court pronounced that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.... [S]uch segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. One year later, the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could assert equity jurisdiction to assure that school boards carried out the dictates of Brown I. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756-57, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown II ). As the Court stated in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1693-94, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968): 37 Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that complex and multifaceted problems would arise which would require time and flexibility for successful resolution. School boards ... [were] clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. 38 District courts should not abdicate jurisdiction until a school board achieves unitary status. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 31, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1283, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Pitts I, 755 F.2d at 1426.
39 A school system achieves unitary status when it no longer discriminates between school children on the basis of race. Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1414 (11th Cir.1985) (Georgia NAACP ); Pitts I, 755 F.2d at 1426; Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 584 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir.1978). A school system no longer discriminates between school children on the basis of race when it affirmatively eliminates all vestiges of its dual system. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 2946, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979) (school board under continuous constitutional obligation to disestablish its dual school system); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15, 91 S.Ct. at 1275 (the objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation); Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38, 88 S.Ct. at 1693-94 (school board charged with affirmative duty to eliminate racial discrimination root and branch). See Georgia NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1413 n. 12 (school system achieves unitary status when it eliminates vestiges of prior discrimination and operates a non-segregated system for a period of several years). 7 The district court erred by concluding that there is no binding precedent in this circuit which articulates a precise definition for unitary status and by following the non-binding definition of unitary status in Brown v. Board of Education, 671 F.Supp. 1290 (D.Kan.1987) (Brown III ). Pitts v. Freeman, No. 11946 at 3 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1988). 40
41 Appellate courts have provided district courts with little guidance regarding how to determine whether a school system has achieved unitary status. See Note, Eliminating the Continuing Effects of the Violation: Compensatory Education as a Remedy for Unlawful School Segregation, 97 Yale L.J. 1173, 1190 (1988) (no guidelines exist for determining when school systems achieve unitary status); Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 Harv.L.Rev. 653, 662 (1987) (The Supreme Court has not, however, announced any set list of the conditions a district court judge must observe in a formerly dual school system before declaring that it is unitary.). The district court considered six factors set forth in Green: student assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. 8 Green, 391 U.S. at 435, 88 S.Ct. at 1692. A review of these six factors constitutes the best approach for determining whether a school system has eliminated the vestiges of a dual system. Therefore, we hold that district courts should review the six Green factors to determine whether a school system has achieved unitary status. If the school system fulfills all six factors at the same time for several years, the court should declare that the school system has achieved unitary status. If the school system fails to fulfill all six factors at the same time for several years, the district court should retain jurisdiction. 9 42 Before applying the Green factors to the DCSS, we make three related conclusions. 43 First, the Green factors are not entirely synonymous with the vestiges of past discrimination. State-imposed segregation affected society much more than any set of judicially-created factors can measure. As Chief Justice Warren stated in Brown I: 44 To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 45 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494, 74 S.Ct. at 691. An analysis of the Green factors simply provides a method for determining whether a school system has eliminated all vestiges of past discrimination while, at the same time, providing district courts with a degree of certainty. Application of the Green factors does not strip a district court of its responsibility and ability to consider unique circumstances in each school system. See Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 224 n. 10, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2705 n. 10, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cautioning courts to refrain from formulating hard-and-fast rules in school desegregation cases). The Green factors approach is a means towards an end. By requiring its use, we simply recognize that district courts cannot consistently apply a standardless test. 46 Second, our ruling that school boards must comply with the six Green factors simultaneously does not expand federal court equity jurisdiction beyond the scope of a school board's constitutional violation. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-82, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2757-58, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (Milliken II ). School boards violated the Constitution by operating dual systems. To remedy this violation, they must eliminate all of the dual system's vestiges. Because these vestiges encompass more than the Green factors, a district court can order relief relating to any factor until a school system achieves unitary status. The factors operate, in part, as an indicator of more intangible vestiges. Our conclusion is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's statement that: [t]he district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation. A district court may and should consider the use of all available techniques.... Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33, 37, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 1292, 28 L.Ed.2d 577 (1970) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-31, 91 S.Ct. at 1279-83). 47 Third, we reject the First Circuit's ruling which permits school systems to achieve unitary status incrementally. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir.1987). Cf. United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1176 n. 17 (5th Cir.1987) (citing Morgan when discussing a post-unitary school system); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 681 F.Supp. 730, 738 (N.D.Ala.1988) (praising Morgan, but recognizing that it does not constitute Eleventh Circuit law). A school system achieves unitary status or it does not. We will not permit resegregation in a school system that has not eliminated all vestiges of a dual system. See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2979, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (school boards possess affirmative responsibility to see that pupil assignment, school construction, and abandonment practices do not reestablish the dual school system); Columbus Board of Education, 443 U.S. at 460, 99 S.Ct. at 2948 (district court must ensure that school board actions do not serve to perpetuate or reestablish the dual school system); Swann, 402 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1278 (school systems may not perpetuate or reestablish dual system; district courts should retain jurisdiction to assure that these responsibilities are carried out). 48 The DCSS asserts that Supreme Court authority permits it to achieve unitary status incrementally. Contrary to the DCSS's assertion, Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976) does not support an incremental approach to school desegregation cases. In Spangler, the Court simply refused to approve the Pasadena School Board's rigid requirement that no minority comprise a majority of any school population. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 432, 96 S.Ct. at 2703 (All that is now before us are the questions of whether the District Court was correct in denying relief when petitioners in 1974 sought to modify the 'no majority' requirement as then interpreted by the District Court.). See Note, 97 Yale L.J. at 1191 n. 104 (criticizing Morgan court for wrongly citing [Spangler ] for proposition that a district court may confer unitary status on pupil assignments even if other facets of the school system retain discriminatory vestiges).