Opinion ID: 1884007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Eliciting Prejudicial Testimony on Cross-examination

Text: ¶ 43. Golden claims that on several occasions, trial counsel elicited prejudicial testimony on cross-examination. On direct examination, Doe testified that Golden stank, but she did not think he smelled like alcohol. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Doe again about the smell, and Doe again stated that she did not think the smell was alcohol. Doe testified that Golden did not appear to be intoxicated, but after he raped her she knew something was wrong with him. Golden argues that this testimony put evidence in front of the jury that Golden was high on something other than alcohol. ¶ 44. Also, on cross-examination, trial counsel was questioning Roe about her relationship with Golden when she stated that the last time she had seen Golden was about two years ago after he got out of jail. Golden argues that this testimony was damaging, irrelevant and prejudicial, and defense counsel erred in making no attempt to stop it. ¶ 45. We find that the decisions made at trial during cross-examination are tactical decisions, and this Court will not analyze these decisions in hindsight to find that certain questions should or should not have been asked of a witness. The general rule is that an attorney's decision to call certain witnesses and ask certain questions `falls within the ambit of trial strategy and cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.' Turner v. State, 953 So.2d 1063, 1073 (Miss.2007) (quoting Bell v. State, 879 So.2d 423, 434 (Miss.2004)).
¶ 46. Golden complains of several instances in which trial counsel failed to cross-examine witnesses, once again without any citation or authority or argument that such failure was prejudicial. As stated previously, the decision of whether or not to cross-examine lies within the discretion of the trial counsel. See Turner, 953 So.2d at 1073. ¶ 47. Appellate counsel does provide some argument regarding trial counsel's failure to cross-examine Hughes and King, who testified concerning the DNA evidence. Golden argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by trial counsel's failure to cross-examine Hughes and King because the reports they testified about were not actually prepared by them. A review of the record reveals otherwise. ¶ 48. During her direct examination, Hughes stated that she actually performed the serological examination, despite her use of the term we when testifying concerning trial lab procedures. When asked by the prosecution if she tested the swabs that were taken from the rape kit, Hughes replied, that's correct. King made the same assertion, when asked if she prepared a report in this particular case she replied, yes. Therefore, we find that the testimony of Hughes and King clearly indicates that they performed the actual tests and reports that they were testifying about. ¶ 49. Thus, defense counsel's decision not to cross-examine these two witnesses, as well as the other witnesses he chose not to cross-examine, cannot be said to be unreasonable. The decision of whether or not to cross-examine a witness is a tactical one. And absent a showing of some helpful fact which clearly could  and should  have been developed on cross-examination, such decisions do not warrant a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Miss.1984). j. Numerous Failures to Object ¶ 50. Golden argues that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object, pointing to numerous instances when he claims an objection should have been made. Again, decisions such as the decision not to object are considered tactical, and do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Irby, 893 So.2d at 1048. We say no more on this point than that counsel might have many reasons for deciding not to object to a question which is technically objectionable. For instance, counsel might conclude that an objection would draw attention to the question and answer. We find this argument has no merit. k. Failure to Give an Instruction Regarding Defendant's Right Not to Testify ¶ 51. Golden complains of trial counsel's failure to prepare a jury instruction concerning the defendant's right not to testify. Again, appellate counsel has failed to provide this Court with the required authority in support of this argument. As such, this Court need not consider this argument. Edwards, 800 So.2d at 468. Even so, this claim has no merit. ¶ 52. This Court has held that the [f]ailure to ask for, or the decision not to ask for [an instruction regarding the defendant's right not to testify] cannot be said to be error, because it is subject to debate whether such an instruction helps or harms the defendant who does not testify. Schuck v. State, 865 So.2d 1111, 1124 (Miss.2003). Such a decision is considered tactical. Id. at 1125. Furthermore, and most importantly, the trial judge specifically explained to Golden on two occasions that he could give an instruction regarding the defendant's right not to testify, stating some people want that instruction, some do not . . . do you understand that, to which Golden replied uh-huh. The trial judge further asked, do you have any concerns about not getting that instruction? Golden replied, no. Therefore, this argument has no merit. l. Failure to Put on Any Defense ¶ 53. Once more, without any citation of authority, appellate counsel asserts that at trial, no defense was put on, specifically criticizing trial counsel's closing argument. As stated earlier, a defendant is entitled to reasonable and effective  not errorless  counsel. Our review of the record reveals that, as in most cases, Golden's defense was not perfect. However, we find he received reasonable representation. ¶ 54. Golden's trial counsel filed a pretrial motion to sever the two counts of rape and argued at the Corley hearing that trying two counts together would be highly prejudicial to his client. Defense counsel conducted voir dire, which included instructing the jury as to the State's burden of proof. Defense counsel objected to one of the State's for-cause strikes, arguing that the potential juror said he could be fair and impartial despite the fact he had known the defendant his entire life, with which the court agreed. Defense counsel cross-examined four of the State's eight witnesses. Although this cross-examination yielded little or no damaging testimony against the State's case, trial counsel seemingly made an effort to get some witnesses to contradict their prior testimony. The defense chose not to call any witnesses, and appellate counsel has identified no witnesses that the defense could have called to testify on behalf of the defendant. The defendant was thoroughly advised of his right to testify, and he told the trial judge he did not want to testify. In closing, defense counsel did not rehash the damaging testimony against his client, but merely reminded the jury of the State's heavy burden of proof and the defendant's presumption of innocence. Given the strength of the State's case against Golden, we find that, under the circumstances, trial counsel provided reasonable, if not perfect, representation to his client. m. Failure to Put on Any Mitigating Evidence during Sentencing ¶ 55. Golden finally argues that his trial counsel was defective in failing to put on any evidence of mitigation during sentencing. Once again, this Court is provided with no citation of authority or any viable argument that any mitigating evidence even existed. Therefore, we find that this argument lacks merit and should not be considered. Edwards, 800 So.2d at 468.