Opinion ID: 221828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Hagler's detention and handcuffing of O'Malley

Text: This leads me to the question of whether Officer Hagler is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law for his decision to detain and handcuff O'Malley. Unlike the majority, I believe that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding this issue. In this circuit, it is well established that, for appellate jurisdiction to lie over an interlocutory appeal, a defendant seeking qualified immunity must be willing to concede to the facts as alleged by the plaintiff and discuss only the legal issues raised by the case. Sheets v. Mullins, 287 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir.2002). Once a defendant's argument drifts from the purely legal into the factual realm and begins contesting what really happened, our jurisdiction ends and the case should proceed to trial. Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 564-65 (6th Cir.1998) (dismissing an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal because the defendants' appeal attempts to persuade us to believe their version of the facts). Although Officer Hagler's brief states in a footnote that the underlying facts are undisputed, his recitation of the facts regarding the detention and handcuffing of O'Malley differs in material ways from the facts as alleged by O'Malley. Officer Hagler contends that O'Malley immediately exited the Tahoe and quickly proceeded toward the back door of the residence in question. He also asserts that once O'Malley turned around, he greeted Officer Hagler with inexplicably aggressive behavior before identifying a firearm nearby. Officer Hagler further claims that he made several attempts to de-escalate the situation, but that O'Malley refused to cooperate. In light of the facts as he presents them, Officer Hagler argues that he acted reasonably when he decided to handcuff O'Malley. In contrast, O'Malley alleges that he truthfully answered all of Officer Hagler's questions and complied with his requests, but was nonetheless placed in handcuffs when he walked over to Officer Hagler. O'Malley also denies that he threatened Officer Hagler in any way, although he acknowledged in his deposition that he was mad at the way he was being treated and had raised his voice to Officer Hagler. The majority cites the fact that O'Malley turned his back and lifted his shirt as support for its conclusion that Officer Hagler permissibly handcuffed and detained O'Malley. (Maj. Op. at 670) But O'Malley testified at his deposition that he turned around to let him know I didn't have anything on me, which hardly supports Officer Hagler's actions. Given that a genuine dispute remains regarding exactly how the encounter between Officer Hagler and O'Malley unfolded, a reasonable jury could find either (1) that a reasonable officer would have handcuffed O'Malley because the circumstances warranted that precaution, or (2) that Officer Hagler acted unreasonably given that O'Malley did not pose a threat under the circumstances. See Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 399-400 (6th Cir.2008) (holding that the reasonableness of the force used must be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, which requires careful attention to the facts of the particular case, including (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) the immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect to the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). And because Officer Hagler challenges the quantity and quality of [O'Malley's] evidence ... [,] the narrow boundaries of [this court's] jurisdiction prevent us from proceeding any further. See Berryman, 150 F.3d at 564. This portion of Officer Hagler's appeal boils down to credibility determinations [that this court] cannot make. See id. I therefore conclude that a jury, and not this court, should determine whether Officer Hagler's actions were reasonable under the circumstances, or whether they constituted a violation of O'Malley's Fourth Amendment rights. For this reason, I respectfully dissent on this issue.