Opinion ID: 3014449
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impermissible Retroactive Application

Text: The Ventosas claim that applying the permanent rules of the IIRIRA, as opposed to the transitional rules,3 has an impermissible retroactive effect. They assert that their 3 IIRIRA includes transitional rules providing that the new provisions do not apply to aliens against whom deportation proceedings were commenced prior to its effective date. 5 admission of unlawful status in their asylum application created a settled expectation that if asylum were denied, they would be able to request suspension of deportation relief. They claim that through their admission, they created a significant benefit to the government. The transitional rules of IIRIRA do not apply to their claims. “[R]emoval proceedings under IIRIRA do not commence upon the initial contact between the alien and the INS. Rather, they commence when the INS files a ‘charging document’ with the Immigration Court.” Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 600 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the INS issued the charging documents on December 8, 1998, the Ventosas’ claims are covered by the IIRIRA permanent rules which became effective April 1, 1997. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e). The Ventosas also contend that applying the IIRIRA rules has an impermissible retroactive effect and that they are entitled to suspension of deportation under INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). In St. Cyr, the alien was a lawful permanent resident who more than seven years after his entry into the United States, pled guilty to a felony pursuant to a plea bargain. His guilty plea rendered him deportable, but under the then current pre-IIRIRA law, he was eligible for waiver of deportation under former INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). Ten days after IIRIRA became effective, the INS placed him in removal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that IIRIRA’s elimination of the § 212(c) waiver of deportation could not be retroactively applied to aliens like St. 6 Cyr “whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for [a § 212(c) waiver] at the time of their plea under the law then in effect.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326. The Court held the repeal had an impermissible retroactive effect as applied to St. Cyr because his plea was predicated on the presumption he would be eligible for § 212(c) waiver. See id. at 321 (“Plea agreements involve a quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and the government.”). Having engaged in a bargaining process with the government in which he “waive[d] several of [his] constitutional rights (including the right to a trial) and grant[ed] the government numerous tangible benefits, such as promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial resources,” id. at 322 (internal quotations omitted), St. Cyr reasonably relied on the fact that his plea would preserve his eligibility for a § 212(c) waiver of deportation. He had a settled expectation that the waiver would be available to him, and he reasonably believed there was a substantial chance of having the waiver granted, given the high rate of success for § 212(c) waiver applications. See id. at 322-23. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has addressed how St. Cyr affects aliens who lost the right to apply for suspension of deportation relief after the passage of IIRIRA. We find their analysis apposite. In Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 599 (9th Cir. 2002), the court rejected a claim by an alien “that she [wa]s like the alien in St. Cyr, who pled guilty prior to IIRIRA’s effective date in reliance on the possibility of § 7 212(c) [suspension of deportation] relief, in that she revealed her status to the INS prior to April 1, 1997 in reliance on the availability of suspension of deportation.” Id. at 600 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). The court concluded that her circumstances differed significantly from those in St. Cyr; “[t]he factors that militated in favor of St. Cyr—in particular, his ‘settled expectations’ based on ‘transactions or considerations already past’—are not present in Jimenez-Angeles’ case.” Id. at 602. The court noted: “When St. Cyr entered into his plea bargain, he gave up valuable legal rights, including his right to trial by jury. By contrast, when Jimenez-Angeles revealed herself to the INS, she gave up only her ability to continue living illegally and undetected in the United States.” Id. The Ventosas rely on St. Cyr for the proposition that when they admitted their unlawful status in their asylum applications prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, they had a settled expectation that, if asylum were denied, they would be able to request suspension of deportation relief. Accordingly, they urge that as in St. Cyr, the government should be denied from retroactively applying the new provisions of IIRIRA against them. The Ventosas’ reliance on St. Cyr is misplaced. In contrast to permanent resident alien St. Cyr, they, like Jimenez-Angeles, are in the country without lawful status. The transaction for which the Ventosas claim a retroactive effect was their voluntary contact with the INS to apply for a benefit. The Ventosas did not give up a constitutional right when they filed their asylum applications and conceded they were aliens; they gave up 8 only their ability to continue living illegally and undetected in the United States. Their concession of alienage is not the sort of “exchange” or “tangible benefit” contemplated by the Court in St. Cyr because the question of alienage is rarely challenged or litigated. Because there was neither negotiation with the government nor adequate quid pro quo, the Ventosas’ concession of alienage does not cause Congress’s repeal of suspension of deportation as applied to the Ventosas to be impermissibly retroactive.