Opinion ID: 747770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of the Mann Act

Text: 23 Appellants rely on dicta from two Supreme Court cases involving the Mann Act to support their proposition that § 2423(b) requires the Government to prove that illegal sexual activity with a minor was the dominant purpose of their interstate travel. In both cases, the Court found that there was no immoral purpose at all in the relevant interstate transportations and had no occasion to consider the possible effect of multiple motivations. In Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 561, 54 S.Ct. 494, 494-95, 78 L.Ed. 968 (1934), a citizen of Denmark appealed her order of deportation based on an alleged entry into the United States for immoral purposes. The petitioner, a domestic servant in Los Angeles, became sexually involved with a married man. She accompanied this man on a business trip to Europe and a brief tour of the Pacific Northwest. She was arrested upon her return to America based on her admission that she intended to continue the adulterous relationship until she returned to Los Angeles. The Court held that the woman's purpose in returning to America was to resume her job as a servant, not to continue her immoral conduct. Id. at 562, 54 S.Ct. at 495. In a notable passage, the Court explained that [p]eople not of good moral character like others, travel from place to place and change their residence. But to say that, because they indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance. Id. at 562-63, 54 S.Ct. at 495. 24 The Court also reversed the Mann Act convictions of a husband and wife who operated a house of prostitution in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 372, 64 S.Ct. 1037, 1039-40, 88 L.Ed. 1331 (1944). Two young prostitutes from the house accompanied the couple on an automobile trip from Nebraska to Utah. It was undisputed that this was purely a vacation trip and did not involve acts of prostitution or other immorality. Id. When the girls returned to the couple's house, however, they resumed their wayward ways. The Court reversed the convictions because the trip itself lacked an immoral purpose; an immoral purpose could not be found automatically simply because the travelers were immoral people. To illustrate this point, the Court stated: 25 To constitute a violation of the Act, it is essential that the interstate transportation have for its object or be the means of effecting or facilitating the proscribed activities.... An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement. 26 Id. at 374, 64 S.Ct. at 1040 (emphasis added). The dicta of later Supreme Court cases included this phrase in descriptions of Mann Act violations. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79, 79 S.Ct. 136, 139, 3 L.Ed.2d 125 (1958) ([T]he only factual issue in the case was whether petitioner's dominant purpose in making the trip was to facilitate her practice of prostitution....); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20, 67 S.Ct. 13, 16, 91 L.Ed. 12 (1946) (There was evidence ... that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive.). 27 The lower courts, however, have read the Mann Act broadly and have not deemed themselves bound by the narrow interpretation that Hansen and Mortensen's dicta might suggest. Instead, many circuits have upheld jury instructions and convictions where an immoral purpose was at least one of the purposes motivating the interstate transportation. United States v. Bennett, 364 F.2d 77, 78 (4th Cir.1966). See also, e.g., Daigle v. United States, 181 F.2d 311, 315 (1st Cir.1950) (affirming conviction because district court was warranted in finding that at least one of the purposes of the interstate transportation was to engage in conduct outlawed by the Act); Long v. United States, 160 F.2d 706, 710 (10th Cir.1947) (affirming conviction because jury was warranted in finding that at least one of the purposes of the interstate transportation was to engage in conduct outlawed by the Act). Other courts have used a dominant purpose standard, but have regarded dominant as synonymous with compelling or motivating, and they have never held--as Defendants urge here--that interstate travel can have only one dominant purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 425 F.2d 996, 999 (9th Cir.1970) (approving a jury instruction that did not require the government to prove that the sole and single purpose of the alleged transportation of [the victims] was for prostitution, debauchery or other immoral purposes. It is only necessary that the government prove that such was one of the dominant purposes.); United States v. Salter, 346 F.2d 509, 511 (6th Cir.1965) (It was not necessary to prove that the interstate transportation was for the sole purpose of prostitution. It is sufficient if prostitution was only one of the dominant purposes.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 1196, 16 L.Ed.2d 206 (1966); Reamer v. United States, 318 F.2d 43, 49 (8th Cir.) (Blackmun, J.) (It must be an 'efficient purpose', albeit one of several, as distinguished from an incidental one.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 869, 84 S.Ct. 129, 11 L.Ed.2d 95 (1963); Nunnally v. United States, 291 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.1961) (Of course, prostitution or such immoral purpose need not be the sole motive for the interstate trip. It is sufficient if it is one of the principal purposes.); Dunn v. United States, 190 F.2d 496, 497 (10th Cir.1951) (It is enough that one of the dominant purposes was prostitution or debauchery. It suffices if one of the efficient and compelling purposes in the mind of the accused in the particular transportation was illicit conduct of that kind.). Indeed, courts across the country have approved dominant purpose jury instructions similar to the one challenged here by Defendants. 9 More recent cases have consistently maintained--or even extended--this broader construction of the Mann Act. See United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1083 (5th Cir.) ([M]any purposes for traveling may exist, but, as long as one motivating purpose is to engage in prostitution, criminal liability may be imposed under the Act. When no dominant purpose exists, it is because any such purpose was either non-existent or 'incidental'.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 201, 133 L.Ed.2d 135 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.) (approving jury instruction requiring the Government to prove that the defendant's immoral purpose was not a mere incident of the trip or trips, but instead was at least one of the defendant's motivations for taking the trip in the first instance.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 869, 112 S.Ct. 201, 116 L.Ed.2d 160 (1991). 28 One of the most persuasive holdings in this area has come from our circuit. In United States v. Snow, 507 F.2d 22, 23 (7th Cir.1974), with then-Judge Stevens writing, the Court affirmed a Mann Act conviction in which the Government acknowledged that the defendant had a legitimate reason alongside his immoral motivation for interstate travel. Snow addressed almost the identical issue presented by Defendants in this appeal: whether the Mann Act punishes immoral conduct that was a dominant purpose, but perhaps not the dominant purpose, of interstate transportation. The Court aligned itself with the unanimous consensus of courts by noting that [i]t now appears settled that prostitution or other immoral conduct, need not be the sole reason for the transportation; the Act may be violated if prostitution is a dominant or a compelling and efficient purpose. Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted). The use of the word dominant in Mortensen was merely dicta, the Court said, and therefore did not command a narrow reading of the statutory language of the Mann Act. Acknowledging the cognitive dissonance caused by using the word dominant in this definitional context, the court nonetheless rejected the argument put forward by Defendants on appeal in this case: Despite the contrary implication suggested by the word 'dominant,' [an immoral purpose] need not be the most important of defendant's reasons when multiple purposes are present. Id. Snow remains good law in our circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (7th Cir.1986). 29