Opinion ID: 2329620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process: Overbreadth

Text: Appellants' second argument is that the statutes against hindering prosecution and tampering with evidence are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as applied to attorneys engaged in the representation of criminal defendants, and hence their enforcement against appellants was a denial of due process. We agree. Our discussion of appellants' first argument, while holding that defense attorneys have an affirmative duty to deliver physical evidence to the prosecution, clearly demonstrates that there are conflicting concerns facing defense attorneys in possession of incriminating physical evidence. Moreover, we are not aware of any case in any state in which an attorney was convicted of a crime for conduct similar to that of appellants. Due to the fact that the statutes in question prohibit conduct of defense attorneys which is constitutionally protected, we hold the statutes [1] unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to appellants and vacate their judgments of sentence. Appellants have challenged the statutes on grounds of both vagueness and overbreadth, closely related to infirmities which often merge conceptually and in case law. Constitutionally vague statutes proscribe activity in terms so ambiguous that reasonable persons may differ as to what is actually prohibited. Examples are found in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964), which struck down a statute prohibiting subversive organizations; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974), which invalidated a statute outlawing treatment of a United States flag contemptuously; and Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971), which voided an ordinance against groups conducting themselves on sidewalks in a manner annoying to persons passing by. Overbroad statutes authorize the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct; where the language of the statute is not vague, but literally encompasses a variety of protected activity, it cannot be read literally. In an overbroad statute, the clarity of the language is delusive, for the language must be recast to separate proper from improper applications. One example of overbreadth is found in Coates v. Cincinnati, supra , which, in addition to using the vague term annoying, criminalized the exercise of the right of assembly guaranteed by the first amendment. The ordinance could be used against the association of people whose ideas, lifestyle or physical appearance is resented by their fellow citizens, and was thus aimed directly at activity protected by the Constitution. Id. at 616, 91 S.Ct. at 1689, 29 L.Ed.2d at 218. Another example is Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974), holding overbroad a statute prohibiting opprobrious language, for the statute could be applied against constitutionally protected speech  words that do not inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), rejecting an overbreadth challenge, sets forth a useful definition of the term. A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be overbroad if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. Although appellant does not claim that, as applied to him, the anti noise ordinance has punished protected expressive activity, he claims that the ordinance is overbroad on its face. Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge. The crucial question, then, is whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished. . . . Id. at 114-15, 92 S.Ct. at 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d at 231. Both overbroad and vague statutes deny due process in two ways: they do not give fair notice to people of ordinary intelligence that their contemplated activity may be unlawful, and they do not set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and courts, thus inviting arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Smith v. Goguen, supra ; Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, supra . We hold that the statutes at issue in this case are overbroad when applied to attorneys representing criminal defendants. The literal language of each section is relatively clear. Section 5105(a)(3) states that a person is guilty of hindering prosecution if, with intent to hinder the . . . conviction . . . of another for crime, he . . . conceals . . . evidence of the crime . . . regardless of its admissibility in evidence. . . . Section 4910 provides that a person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding . . . is pending . . ., he . . . conceals or removes any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding. . . . The clarity of the language is delusive, for it prohibits conduct which cannot constitutionally be prohibited along with conduct which clearly can. In certain circumstances, an attorney might conceal evidence with the intent of impairing its availability in his client's criminal trial and with the intent of hindering his client's conviction. An example of such circumstances might involve an attorney whose client gives him a handwritten account of involvement in the crime he is charged with committing. If the attorney were to destroy the statement or retain it in his file, he would be guilty of violating the literal terms of the statutes against hindering prosecution and tampering with evidence. Yet no one would suggest the attorney should give the document to the prosecutor; indeed, to do so would be an egregious violation of the attorney's duties to his client. The functions of the attorney counseling a criminal defendant have a constitutional dimension. In opposing unreasonable searches and seizures, in preventing self-incrimination and in rendering effective assistance of counsel, the defense attorney is charged with the protection of fourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights. In performing these functions, the defense attorney might run afoul of the statutes against hindering prosecution and tampering with evidence; thus he may not have adequate notice of what conduct might be a crime, and he is subject to the threat of arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution. Beyond the obvious example stated above, there is little or no guidance for an attorney to know when he has crossed the invisible line into an area of criminal behavior. There are no prior cases in this jurisdiction in which a criminal defense attorney has been convicted of violating these statutes. We have discussed many of the similar cases from other jurisdictions, none of which addresses the precise issues facing us in this case. Although we focused on the uniformity we found in those cases as to disposition of physical evidence, they express a great deal of doubt and reflect great diversity as to the grayer areas of ethical usage of evidence of all sorts. Attorneys face a distressing paucity of dispositive precedent to guide them in balancing their duty of zealous representation against their duty as officers of the court. Volumes are filled with other potential sources of guidance, such as ethical codes and comments thereto, both proposed and adopted, advisory opinions by ethics committees and myriad articles in legal periodicals. The plethora of writings exemplifies the profession's concern with the problem, and although they may help to clarify some of the issues, they fail to answer many of the difficult questions in this area of legal practice. In the cases discussed in the preceding section, we find many statements which belie the seeming consistency in their approach to the problem. People v. Belge, supra , of course, dismissing the indictment against an attorney who had withheld evidence, focused on the rights of a criminal defendant rather than the society's interest in criminal law enforcement: A trial is in part a search for truth, but it is only partly a search for truth. The mantle of innocence is flung over the defendant to such an extent that he is safeguarded by rules of evidence which frequently keep out absolute truth, much to the chagrin of juries. Nevertheless, this has been a part of our system since our laws were taken from the laws of England and over these many years has been found to best protect a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society. Belge, supra, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 801. Another example is In re Gartley, supra , wherein this court stated: Not only is effective assistance of counsel a constitutional mandate, it is also necessary to an adversary system of justice. Assuredly, counsel's assistance can be made safely and readily available only when the client is free from the apprehension of disclosure. Gartley, supra, 341 Pa.Superior Ct. at 365-367, 491 A.2d at 859-60. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Maguigan, supra , we wrote: It therefore appears that, whatever its exact dimensions, the interests of justice exception is very narrow, extending to such situations as those in which the client's rights or interests cannot be adversely affected [by disclosure]. Indeed, it is evident that this must be so. Otherwise the exception would devour the rule. For the interests of justice are always frustrated by the exercise of the privilege in the sense that the prosecutor is unable to learn from the attorney what he would like to learn. As already discussed, however, a true understanding of the interests of justice carries with it an appreciation of the fact that free communication between the client and attorney must be fostered; and as we have said, in Cohen [ v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa.Super. 456, 357 A.2d 689 (1976)] and again in Brennan, that means that any exception to the privilege must be narrowly confined, all doubts being resolved in favor of non-disclosure. Maguigan, supra, 323 Pa.Superior Ct. at 339, 470 A.2d at 622. The Maguigan opinion referred to the decision in Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa.Super. 362, 371-72, 422 A.2d 510, 514-15 (1980), in which we stated that the attorney-client privilege is not concerned with prejudice, the ascertainment of the truth, or the reliability of attorney-client communications, but only to foster a confidence between an advocate and his client that will lead to a trusting and open dialogue. . . . . Moreover, in making the determination of whether the interests of justice may be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the court should resolve all doubts in favor of non-disclosure, so that a client should not be chagrined to learn that the confidences that he conveyed to his attorney have been revealed to his detriment and without his consent. (Emphasis in original.) Finally, Hitch v. Pima County Superior Court, supra , although holding that an attorney has a duty to deliver incriminating evidence to the prosecutor, added: We note also that the lawyer's role as a zealous advocate is an important one, not only for the client but for the administration of justice. We have chosen an adversary system of justice in which, in theory, the state and the defendant meet as equals  strength against strength, resource against resource, argument against argument. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, ___ n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3390 n. 2, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 486 n. 2 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In order to close the gap between theory and practice and thereby ensure that the system is working properly, a defendant must have an attorney who will fight against the powerful resources of the state. It is only when this occurs that we can be assured that the system is functioning properly and only the guilty are convicted. Hitch, supra, 708 P.2d at 76. Two cases cited in the previous section involved attorneys who had sought advisory opinions from ethics committees when confronted with problems related to disposition of physical evidence. Their action was salutory, but underscores the dilemma facing criminal defense attorneys in similar situations. Not only is the resort to guidance from an ethics committee a time-consuming process, [2] it is a process totally inconsistent with the precision which must attend a valid criminal statute to inform its subjects of what specific behavior is proscribed. Another symbol of the dilemma is its extensive treatment in legal periodicals. Of the many articles which have been cited by the parties in this case, we have found several to be helpful and noteworthy. [3] Nonetheless, the writings exemplify a variety of approaches and suggestions, and indicate that an evidentiary problem related to incriminating evidence might arise in divers contexts in the representation of criminal defendants. It is not incumbent upon attorneys to digest the legal periodicals in order to conform their conduct to a criminal statute. The statutes involved in this case embrace conduct which is constitutionally protected as well as conduct which may validly be prohibited, and there is no line between the two which can be ascertained with any assurance whatsoever. Even if it were possible, it is not the function of this court to provide an advisory opinion as to various examples of attorney conduct not involved in this case which might or might not violate the statutes we are reviewing. We note that other jurisdictions have enacted criminal statutes which address the unique role of defense attorneys in the administration of criminal justice and do not subject them to rules identical with those applicable to the public. See Clark v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855, 74 S.Ct. 69, 98 L.Ed. 369 (1953) (statute specifically excluded from liability one who aids an offender in preparing his defense). We note, also, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court iterated in Estate of Pedrick, supra , that the courts have the power, outside the context of criminal sanctions, to regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing before them, and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has established a Disciplinary Board together with comprehensive rules for dealing with apparent attorney misconduct. Id., 505 Pa. at 542, 482 A.2d at 221. For these reasons, we hold that the statutes which prohibit hindering prosecution and tampering with physical evidence are unconstitutionally overbroad when applied to attorneys representing criminal defendants. Accordingly, the judgments of sentence are vacated and appellants discharged.