Opinion ID: 2994693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Due Process--Familial

Text: Relations In addition to suing under the Fourth Amendment, C.A. presents a substantive due process claim. To the extent that this claim is premised on his seizure from his home, however, it cannot succeed because, as the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, substantive due process should not be called upon when a specific constitutional provision protects the right allegedly infringed upon. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) ([I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.). As to C.A.’s initial removal, the Fourth Amendment specifically addresses that seizure, and thus his claim should be considered under the Fourth Amendment, not under the rubric of substantive due process. However, C.A. also asserts that his constitutional rights were violated during the entire (near) four-month period of government- forced separation from his parents. This forced separation implicates substantive due process, or more specifically C.A.’s constitutional right to familial relations./14 The Supreme Court has long recognized as a component of substantive due process the right to familial relations. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (there is a fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child.). See also, Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (Parents and children have a well- elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference.); Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (We recognize the constitutionally protected liberty interests that parents have in the custody, care and management of their children.). See generally Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). The Due Process Clause includes a substantive component that provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Id. at 2060. These decisions recognize that the right of a man and woman to marry, and to bear and raise their children is the most fundamental of all rights--the foundation of not just this country, but of all civilization. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.); id., (This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ([T]he institute of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.). Equally fundamental is the substantive due process right of a child to be raised and nurtured by his parents. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) ([U]ntil the state proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of the natural relationship.) (emphasis added); J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 1997) (We recognize that the forced separation of parent from child, even for a short time, represents a serious infringement upon both the parents’ and child’s rights.) (internal quotations omitted); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 2000) (a child’s right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent)./15 Thus, substantive due process provides the appropriate vehicle for evaluating the constitutionality of the nearly four-month government-forced separation of C.A. from his parents. See, e.g., J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 927 (10th Cir. 1997) ([I]t is evident that there was interference with plaintiffs’ rights of familial association because L.B. was physically removed from her home and from her parents for a period of almost 18 hours, which included an overnight stay in a pre- arranged shelter home.); Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125 (The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from interfering in the familial relationship unless the government adheres to the requirements of procedural and substantive due process.). However, like Fourth Amendment rights, the constitutional right to familial integrity is not absolute. See Weller v. Department of Soc. Serv., 901 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1990) (Substantive due process does not categorically bar the government from altering parental custody rights.). Indeed, this liberty interest in familial integrity is limited by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of children particularly where the children need to be protected from their own parents. Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125. Thus, a balance must be reached between the fundamental right to the family unit and the state’s interest in protecting children from abuse, especially in cases where children are removed from their homes. Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) (the fundamental interest in the familial relationship must be balanced against the state’s interest in protecting children suspected of being abused). The balance here, however, is no different than that developed in the Fourth Amendment context. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986). See also, Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (the same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children). In balancing these competing interests, courts have recognized that a state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse. Croft, 103 F.3d at 1126. But in this case and at this stage, we lack sufficient factual details from which we can decide whether the government was justified in interfering with C.A.’s familial relations. Therefore, for the same reasons that C.A.’s Fourth Amendment claim survives, his substantive due process claim covering the approximately four-month time period during which C.A. was separated from his parents, does as well. At this point, we again must consider which defendants are subject to suit for the alleged violation. We need not dwell on each individual defendant’s involvement, however, because, as detailed above, C.A. alleged that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights-- including his right to familial relations--and he presented sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that each defendant (other than Hansen) joined the conspiracy, and thus was responsible for causing the alleged substantive due process violation. For the reasons discussed above in the context of the Fourth Amendment claim, Judge Gende is entitled to absolute immunity.