Opinion ID: 1777077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of previously committed offenses

Text: The appellant argues that by allowing introduction of evidence that he is serving a penitentiary sentence the court erred because such evidence shows he has been convicted of other, irrelevant crimes and he has thus been prejudiced. See Uniform Rule of Evidence 404(b). He also argues the prosecutor should not have been allowed to mention in his opening statement that the appellant was in the penitentiary. Much of the evidence in this case consisted of testimony of prison inmates as well as one guard relating admissions made by the appellant. The trial court had ruled that it would be inevitable that this evidence would show the appellant to have been in the penitentiary when the admissions were made, but that the evidence would be allowed. In Glick v. State, 275 Ark. 34, 675 S.W.2d 14 (1982), we were confronted with this situation, and we held it was not error to permit the evidence to come in. We also said that the prosecution could not make direct proof of the fact that the appellant had been in the penitentiary and should not draw needless attention to it. Given the fact that the evidence indirectly showing that the appellant was in the penitentiary was admissible, we cannot say it was error for the prosecutor to have mentioned it in his opening statement. We adhere to our statement in the Glick case that unnecessary attention should not be drawn to prejudicial evidence which is admissible only because its presentation is inevitably incidental to admissible evidence. However, we decline to say a prosecutor may not mention in opening statement any fact which it is permissible for him to present to the jury. Our view might be different if the prosecutor had gone beyond the mere mention of the appellant's imprisonment, but we need not decide that now.