Opinion ID: 1936088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the prosecutor's misconduct violated taylor's rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments

Text: During cross-examination, witness Josephine Magee, an acquaintance of Taylor, and the defense attorney had the following exchange: Question: But he came all the way over to your house, ever how far it is, and we don't know, but he came all the way over there in his sister's truck and told you what you said. Answer: Well, there C.W. is. Ask him didn't he tell me this. Question: I'm asking you, ma'am. Answer: Well, I just want you to know that I don't have to lie up on the witness stand. In closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following reference to Magee's testimony: As Josephine sat right up there and said, `He's just like my brother, but let me tell you this: If he didn't tell me that, you ask him, because I'm sitting right here and I'm looking him in the eye and I'm telling you he told me he killed that girl, and if you don't believe it, ask him. The prosecution is prohibited from making a direct comment, or reference by innuendo or insinuation to a defendant's failure to testify on his own behalf. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1991). As stated in Ladner, the question is whether the comment of the prosecutor can reasonably be construed as a comment on a failure to take the stand. Statements made by the prosecution must also be considered in light of this Court's observation that counsel should be given wide latitude in their arguments to a jury ... Courts should be very careful in limiting the free play of ideas, imagery and the personalities of counsel in their argument to a jury. Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 209 (Miss. 1985). However, counsel is clearly limited to arguing facts introduced in evidence, deductions and conclusions he or she may reasonably draw therefrom, and the application of the law to the facts. Ivy v. State, 589 So.2d 1263 (Miss. 1991). It is within these guidelines that the prosecutor's reference to Magee's testimony must be considered. Although this issue presents a close question, there is authority to support a decision that there was no reversible error. This Court has stated that although a direct reference to the defendant's failure to testify is strictly prohibited, all other statements must necessarily be looked at on a case by case basis. Jimpson v. State, 532 So.2d 985, 991 (Miss. 1988). In Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314 (Miss. 1992), the defendant did not take the stand but had made more than one statement to the authorities which were admitted into evidence. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated: Ladies and Gentlemen, that is an admission of guilt, but I submit to you she hasn't told you the whole truth yet. ... . Ladies and Gentlemen, those bruises were not inflicted by the same wound that created the massive internal injuries that subsequently killed this child. It could not have happened. So, Ladies and Gentlemen, she has not yet told you the whole truth of the torment she subjected her son to. You still don't know the whole story. Incredible, unbelievable evasion from start to finish... . Id. at 318. (emphasis added). This Court concluded: The prosecution could hardly have made the point plainer if it had simply come out and said, There is a lot more to tell, but Butler has not seen fit to get on the witness stand and tell you. These comments were reversible error, so egregious in fact that even if there had been no objection at trial, we would nevertheless have been obligated to reverse. Id. at 319. First, it must be recalled that it was during cross-examination by the defense counsel that Magee's unelicited comments were made. It is suggested that by taking no affirmative steps to correct what would later become a valid part of the evidence, the defense counsel erred. Instead of objecting to the witness' answer as being unresponsive and requesting the court to instruct the jury to disregard Magee's statements, defense counsel simply continued asking questions. Second, the prosecutor's statements involved in the case at bar are not comparable to the egregious, and direct comments easily found to constitute reversible error in Butler. The prosecutor is allowed, as the Butler Court noted, to properly evaluate the weight and worth of what was in evidence, while at the same time he must refrain from impermissibly referring to the defendant's failure to testify. Butler, 608 So.2d at 318. (emphasis in original). In this case, the prosecutor was clearly referring to the testimony of Magee, in evidence. As such, the prosecutor's remarks could more easily be characterized as a summary of Magee's testimony rather than a reference of his own to the defendant's failure to testify. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), extensive comments by the prosecutor and instructions by the trial judge allowed the jury to draw adverse inferences from the petitioners' failure to testify. The United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions, finding petitioners are entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The significance of the case, however, was in the Court's approval and use of a harmless error analysis to determine whether reversible error results from reference to a defendant's failure to testify. First noting that every state has a harmless error rule or statute, the Court stated: All of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. The Supreme Court went on to hold, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. In reversing, the Court noted that the machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners' version of the events worthless, could not be considered harmless. The record indicated that direct comments on the petitioners' failure to testify occurred no less than thirty (30) times throughout the trial. The Court concluded: And though the case in which this occurred presented a reasonably strong `circumstantial web of evidence' against petitioners, ... it was also a case in which, absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts. Under these circumstances, it is completely impossible for us to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's instruction did not contribute to petitioners' convictions. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. This Court, in the recent case of Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114 (Miss. 1991), utilized the authority recognized in Chapman to hold offenses to certain of an accused's constitutional rights do not per se require reversal. Id. at 135. The Court in Hansen stated the reviewing court must first objectively examine the instructions and evidence considered by the jurors in reaching their verdict. The final analysis is whether: the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the ... [rights violation]... . Hansen, 592 So.2d at 136, citing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 405, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449 (1991), disapproved on other grounds by, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 73 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482 n. 4, 116 L.Ed.2d 385, 399 n. 4 (1991). The jury in the instant case was instructed that in order to convict Taylor for capital murder it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) Taylor was under sentence of life imprisonment, and 2) Taylor without authority of law and not in reasonable self-defense, murdered Mildred Spires. The jury in this case had sufficient evidence to support its finding of Taylor's guilt, and that the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Looking at the evidence before the jury, we find:
(b) On July 11, 1987, Taylor had two heated confrontations, one in person with his ex-wife, Edith Taylor, and within an hour of the last confrontation, Taylor had telephoned Edith's daughter, Mildred, the victim in this case. (c) Taylor could not establish an alibi for his whereabouts from 5:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. on July 11, the date Mildred was last seen alive. (d) Taylor gave several conflicting explanations for fresh claw marks appearing on his face and body noted by Detective Knowles on July 12, the day following Taylor's conversation with Mildred and her disappearance. None of the explanations could be verified. (e) Taylor requested that his girlfriend, Fairy Warren, lie to the police and tell them she had scratched him in an argument. (f) Taylor asked a friend to find a prostitute whom he could pay $50 to say she had scratched him. (g) During questioning, Detective Knowles pointed out that if Taylor was responsible for Mildred's disappearance, his fingerprints would be found on her car. When recovered, the steering wheel, dashboard, doors and door handles of Mildred's car had been spray painted white. (h) Most significantly, Taylor confessed to a close personal friend that he had killed Mildred Spires. The evidence, coupled with the proper instructions issued the jury, allowed it to clearly find Taylor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. Having overcome the first step, this Court is then left to evaluate the persuasive force of the prosecutor's impermissible references to Taylor's failure to testify, that is, the effect of his reference to witness Magee's testimony. Hansen, 592 So.2d at 137. Here, the prosecutor, in a trial transcript of some twelve hundred pages, was said to have impermissibly commented on one occasion, albeit indirectly, on Taylor's failure to take the stand. It seems beyond question that the probability of this one reference to Magee's testimony, when balanced against the evidence permissibly before the jury, having had any persuasive force in this verdict is next to none. The prosecutor's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nearly twenty years after Chapman, in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, (1983) the Court stated: Since Chapman, the Court has consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations. Id. In finding that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the convictions based on a finding that the prosecutor's statements improperly commented on the defendants' failure to testify, the Supreme Court noted: Here, the Court of Appeals, while making passing references to the harmless-error doctrine, did not apply it. Its analysis failed to strike the balance between disciplining the prosecutor on the one hand, and the interest in the prompt administration of justice and the interest of the victims on the other. Id. Looking at the entire record in the case at bar, the prosecutor's summary of Magee's testimony is not at all comparable to the situations presented in cases like Butler or Chapman, where the prosecutor's statements certainly prejudiced the defendants. Here, the one possible, indirect reference to Taylor's failure to testify was indeed harmless. The comment was isolated, indirect and merely a paraphrasing of a witness' earlier testimony. Further, the failure of the defense to have witness Magee's comments stricken from the record should be considered. Without such action, the testimony remained a valid part of the evidence and could be summarized or commented upon by the State. The error presented is clearly not of the magnitude to constitute reversible error.
Taylor complains about the following remarks made during the State's closing argument: MR. DELAUGHTER: And it was said to you that these admissions that he committed this crime were not made to any law enforcement officer, no policeman to come up here and tell you we have a signed confession of this defendant. He talked to who he trusted. And I want to tell you right now, if we had put on a police officer or detective that said, I've got a confession from this guy, they would have been up there telling you that the police beat it out of him. You can't win. MR. KITCHENS: Your Honor, we object. That's improper argument. There's no such thing to support a statement like that. THE COURT: Let's don't argue outside the record. MR. DELAUGHTER: (CONTINUING) I can tell you this much, there's no way you can ever satisfy defense lawyers. If you have it one way, they will get up here and say, scream to you it should have been another. You just can't get it done  MR. KITCHENS: Your Honor, we continue to object. This is improper argument, and move for a mistrial. THE COURT: It will be overruled. Taylor contends the prosecutor was allowed to make highly derogatory comments about defense counsel, comments which also improperly deflected the jury's attention from the issues at hand. First, it must be noted that the defense counsel during opening arguments challenged Taylor's alleged admissions based on the fact that they were not made to persons in authority. Defense counsel concluded, I think you will find it exceedingly unlikely that these witnesses are being completely truthful with you. In closing argument, the State was obviously attempting to rebut the defense's inferences that the State's witnesses were not reliable or truthful because they were not law enforcement officers; the State argued no witness would be good enough in the defense's view. It could certainly be found, as the lower court did in Clemons v. State, 320 So.2d 368 (Miss. 1975), in overruling the defense's objection to such argument, that counsel for the defendants initially interjected that subject into the trial. Id. In United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.1984), defense counsel suggested the government's female witnesses had engaged in various illegal acts and intimate relationships with a government investigator and also complained that the witnesses would not answer questions before the trial. During closing arguments, the prosecutor rebutted the charges by commenting: [Y]ou observed the way they treated those ladies here in this courtroom. I mean the gall that they had to ask them the questions they did and treat them the way they did right here in front of ya'll, can you imagine  can you imagine what these gentlemen would have done if those ladies had dared talk to them out on the street. Id. at 444. The Court declined to find reversible error in the prosecutor's remarks, stating: In light of these attacks upon the credibility of the government witnesses, the prosecutor was `not obliged to sit quietly while character assaults [were] made on his witnesses; he [was] entitled to argue fairly their credibility.' Id. at 443; United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.1980). The Jennings Court concluded, Moreover, even if the prosecutor's remarks are construed as an attack upon defendant's counsel, we do not find ... error ... sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. 724 F.2d at 443-44. This Court in Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592 (Miss. 1988), discussed the wide range within which counsel may properly argue: The right of argument contemplates liberal freedom of speech and range of discussion confined only to bounds of logic and reason; and if counsel's argument is within the limits of proper debate it is immaterial whether it is sound or unsound, or whether he employs wit, invective and illustration therein. Moreover, figurative speech is legitimate if there is evidence on which it may be founded. Exaggerated statements and hasty observations are often made in the heat of debate, which, although not legitimate, are generally disregarded by the court, because in its opinion they are harmless. Id. at 601. (emphasis in original). In the above-emphasized language in Monk, the Court was specifically contemplating the kind of situation which occurred in the case at bar. Counsel's remark that defense lawyers are never satisfied with the evidence presented was obviously directed toward defense lawyers in general, and it would be difficult to construe this as a highly derogatory remark toward Taylor's counsel in particular. The trial court considered the objections, instructed counsel to stay within the record and overruled motions for a mistrial. Implicit in the trial court's ruling was a finding that any problem with the prosecutor's statements was harmless, and not of the level to support a motion for mistrial. Examples of cases in which this Court has held clearly improper arguments were made are distinguishable from those of the present case: Bridgeforth v. State, 498 So.2d 796 (Miss. 1986) (defendant referred to as scum); Ellis v. State, 254 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1971) (defendant termed professional criminal). In Dunaway v. State, 551 So.2d 162 (Miss. 1989), this Court further noted: As set forth in Craft v. State, 226 Miss. 426, 84 So.2d 531 (1956), the test to determine if an improper argument by a prosecutor requires reversal is whether the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney's improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice. Id. at 163. Under this test, it does not appear there was reversible error in the case sub judice. Although finding the prosecutor's comments did contain some cause for complaint, this Court stated in Dozier v. State, 257 So.2d 857, 860 (Miss. 1972): This is regrettable and is by no means approved by this Court. However, in the context of the whole record, we are unable to say that any or all of these things were of such a character or of such substance as to have been capable of prejudicing the right of appellant to a fair trial. Further, we note that the prosecutor was not perfect and made comments that were unfortunate, but the comments did not amount to reversible error. Appellate courts often recognize society as imperfect while at the same time attempting to hold prosecutors to absolute perfection. We affirm on this issue.