Opinion ID: 4503038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Complaints About Staffing

Text: [¶17] As relevant to Pushard’s claim, the WPA applies where [t]he employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports to the employer or a public body, orally or in writing, what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of that employee or any other individual. 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(B). In Cormier v. Genesis Healthcare LLC, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 11, 129 A.3d 944, we explained that “[a]lthough this provision is not triggered by every complaint that relates to safety, it protects employees who, in good faith, make safety-related complaints when the employee reasonably believes that a dangerous condition or practice exists.” To satisfy the reasonable cause requirement, an employee must show that he has both “a subjective and objectively reasonable belief that a dangerous condition or practice exists.” Id.; see Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hosp. Ass’n, 2011 ME 26, ¶ 11, 13 A.3d 773. § 833(1)(A) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to take an adverse employment action against an employee who reports a violation of the law). We find no merit to Pushard’s contention. As we will explain, see infra ¶¶ 17-22, neither Pushard’s nor the assistant director’s complaints about understaffing qualify as protected activity. Even if Pushard subjectively believed that he was reporting a violation of the WPA when he complained about Harper’s mistreatment of the assistant director, this is not enough to bring him within the WPA’s scope. See Galouch v. Dep’t of Prof’l & Fin. Reg., 2015 ME 44, ¶¶ 13-15, 114 A.3d 988 (explaining that a “subjective belief alone is insufficient to meet the WPA’s reasonable cause requirement”). 9 [¶18] Pushard argues that he made whistleblower protected complaints when he told Harper that replacing mental health workers with acuity specialists4 and replacing two full-time nurse educators with two-part time nurse educators compromised patient and employee safety. [¶19] Pushard’s staffing complaints were not whistleblower protected activity because he was not exposing a concealed or unknown safety issue. Instead, he was simply giving his opinion concerning his supervisor’s attempts to address well-known problems related to staffing. In Cormier, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 12, 129 A.3d 944, we explained that an employee had presented evidence sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment because she had shown facts “sufficient to support a finding that [she] held a reasonable belief that staffing levels compromised the safety of the residents and that her complaints would bring the safety issue to [her employer’s] attention.” (Emphasis added.) [¶20] Similarly, the First Circuit has explained that the WPA applies only if an employee’s “report was made to shed light on and ‘in opposition to’” an illegal act or unsafe condition. Harrison v. Granite Bay Care, Inc., 811 F.3d 36, 4 Pushard argued in his brief and at oral argument that acuity specialists are harder to recruit than are mental health workers and that the resultant delay in hiring contributed to unsafe conditions caused by understaffing. However, there is no support in the statement of material facts for this proposition. We must therefore disregard Pushard’s assertion. See Berry, 2019 ME 27, ¶ 7, 202 A.3d 1195. 10 51 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Cormier and Harrison thus support the proposition that an employee does not enjoy whistleblower protection simply because he disagrees with his employer about whether the employer’s policy decisions cause safety concerns. Instead, a “report” under the WPA is one that “would bring the safety issue to the [the employer’s] attention,” Cormier, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 12, 129 A.3d 944, or is “made to shed light on and ‘in opposition to’” a safety-related concern. Harrison, 811 F.3d at 51. [¶21] Pushard’s conduct does not meet that standard because he was simply engaged in a policy dispute with his employer about how best to handle Riverview’s staffing issues. That Riverview was understaffed was known to the public, the Legislature, and Riverview employees. Even if the specific staffing decisions about which Pushard complained were not widely known, it is uncontroverted that Pushard “did not believe that he was making Harper or anyone else aware of anything they were not already aware of.” For this reason, Pushard was not reporting; he was complaining. [¶22] Because Pushard’s complaints about Harper’s staffing decisions fall well short of being “reports” as that term is used in the WPA, we have no occasion here to articulate a comprehensive standard for what qualifies as a protected report. In particular, we decline to adopt an “initial reporter” rule for 11 WPA cases, as urged by Riverview.5 Under the particular facts of this case, summary judgment was proper because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Pushard intended, at the time he made his complaints, to expose an unknown or concealed safety issue. See Cormier, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 12, 129 A.3d 944; Harrison, 811 F.3d at 48-51.