Opinion ID: 728969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lisle letters

Text: 27 In determining whether reasonable jurors could have made the findings needed to support the verdict of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct, we apply the rule established in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 9 USPQ2d 1384 (Fed.Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067, 109 S.Ct. 2068, 104 L.Ed.2d 633 (1989). Kingsdown requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that material information was withheld from the patent examiner, with the intent thereby to deceive or mislead the examiner into granting the patent. 28 Lisle's expert witness testified that Mr. Hebert was required to provide the patent examiner with the information in the Lisle letters as quoted supra, whether or not it was prior art and whether or not Mr. Hebert had the intent to withhold the letters in order to deceive or mislead the examiner. Lisle's expert testified that It doesn't matter whether or not the applicant was uncertain whether it was really prior art, and that it didn't matter whether Mr. Hebert acted in good faith. These were not correct statements of law. 29 To establish inequitable conduct the information that is known to the applicant and not provided to the PTO must be both material to patentability, and withheld in order to deceive or mislead the examiner. An applicant can not be held to have acted inequitably for not providing the examiner with information that was not material and that was not culpably withheld. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 872, 9 USPQ2d at 1389 (Inequitable conduct resides in failure to disclose material information, or submission of false material information, with an intent to deceive,....) 30 Indeed, Lisle's patent expert did not testify that the omitted information was prior art. On cross-examination he read from his deposition, at which he stated: I am still not able to conclusively determine that any of the earlier submissions to Lisle are, in fact, prior art. No witness, actual or proffered, filled this gap. Although Lisle's expert witness and Lisle's counsel repeatedly referred to the various submissions to Lisle as prior art information, it was conceded that most of the submissions were made after Mr. Hebert's patent filing date. No submission was offered or described as prior art to the Hebert invention. 31 Despite the absence of any evidence that Mr. Hebert possessed information about prior art, Lisle's patent expert testified that Mr. Hebert had the obligation to submit the Lisle prior art information to the examiner, and that his failure to do so was inequitable conduct under the law. That was an incorrect statement of the law. As stated in Therma-Tru Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc., 44 F.3d 988, 996, 33 USPQ2d 1274, 1279 (Fed.Cir.1995), [t]here can not have been culpable intent in withholding information that the inventor did not have. 32 Lisle also referred at trial to its advertisement of the accused tool, published shortly before issuance of the '940 patent. Lisle suggested that Mr. Hebert was required to tell the patent examiner of the advertisement, and that this omission was evidence of inequitable conduct. That too was incorrect. When the advertisement appeared, Mr. Hebert's patent application had been pending for more than three years. Lisle does not suggest on this appeal that the advertisement was prior art, or relevant to the examination of the '940 patent. 33 Lisle also stated that Mr. Hebert committed inequitable conduct because he elected not to disclose the results of [a prior art] search to the Patent Office, [leaving] the task of uncovering prior art to the Patent Examiner. That was an incorrect statement of the applicant's obligation. The patent examiner is always required to conduct a prior art search. As explained in Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 874 n. 8, 9 USPQ2d at 1390 n. 8, nothing in the statute or Manual of Patent Examining Procedure would justify reliance on counsel's candor as a substitute for an examiner's duty to examine the claims. 34 Lisle does not state that Mr. Hebert knew, through a prior art search, of closer prior art than was cited by the examiner. Lisle mentions no prior art on this appeal, and does not suggest that there was material prior art in Mr. Hebert's search. 35 In sum, there was not substantial evidence to support findings of material withholding and the intent to deceive, as must undergird a verdict of inequitable conduct. As discussed in Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876, 9 USPQ2d at 1392, a finding of deceptive intent can not be based on mere inference or even on gross negligence; there must be conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, [that] must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive. Intent to deceive can not be inferred solely from the fact that information was not disclosed; there must be a factual basis for a finding of deceptive intent. See Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp., 975 F.2d 815, 822, 24 USPQ2d 1121, 1127 (Fed.Cir.1992).