Opinion ID: 1721810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ursery II.

Text: In Ursery II, the Supreme Court began its analysis by pointing out that since the birth of this country Congress has authorized the Government to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions based upon the same underlying events. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2140, 135 L.Ed.2d at 559. The Court also pointed out that, in a long line of cases, it had consistently concluded the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to such in rem civil forfeitures. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2140, 135 L.Ed.2d at 558. The Court singled out three of those cases for discussion: Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 51 S.Ct. 282, 75 L.Ed. 558 (1931); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (per curiam); and United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). Various Items was one of the first cases to consider the relationship between the Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeiture. In Various Items, the defendant corporation had been convicted of criminal violations before there had been a forfeiture of its property because of federal law violations. The criminal violations grew out of the same transactions that formed the basis for the forfeiture. The Various Items Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause inapplicable to civil forfeiture actions. The Court reasoned that [this] forfeiture proceeding ... is in rem. It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted, and punished. The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense. The provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not apply. Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581, 51 S.Ct. at 284, 75 L.Ed. at 561 (citations omitted). The Court in Various Items distinguished between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil penalties as fines. The Court concluded civil penalties could, in some circumstances, be punitive in character and therefore barred by a prior conviction for a criminal offense involving the same transactions. On the other hand, the Court concluded, civil forfeitures could never be considered punitive. Id. at 580, 51 S.Ct. at 283, 75 L.Ed. at 561. Continuing with the trilogy of double jeopardy cases, the Court in Ursery II noted that until One Lot Emerald some forty years laterthe Court had not considered another double jeopardy case involving a civil forfeiture. In One Lot Emerald, the defendant was acquitted of smuggling jewels into this country. Later, he intervened in a proceeding to forfeit the jewelry as contraband. Rejecting the owner's double jeopardy claim, the Court in One Lot Emerald held the forfeiture was not barred because it neither involved two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments. One Lot Emerald, 409 U.S. at 235, 93 S.Ct. at 492, 34 L.Ed.2d at 442. Reaffirming the principle in Various Items, the Court in One Lot Emerald determined the forfeiture was a civil sanction, not a criminal punishment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the forfeiture provisions had been codified separately from parallel criminal provisions. Id. at 236, 93 S.Ct. at 492-93, 34 L.Ed.2d at 443. One Assortment was the last in the trilogy of double jeopardy cases dealing with civil forfeiture that Ursery II discussed. In One Assortment, the owner of the defendant weapons was acquitted of dealing firearms without a license. Later, the Government filed a forfeiture action against the firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d). The Government alleged the firearms were used or intended to be used in violation of federal law. The Court in One Assortment held the prior criminal proceeding did not bar the forfeiture. In reaching this conclusion, the Court developed a two-part test for determining when an in rem forfeiture qualifies as punishment: (1) Did Congress intend the forfeiture to be criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial? (2) Is the scheme so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate Congress' intent to establish a civil remedial mechanism? One Assortment, 465 U.S. at 363, 104 S.Ct. at 1105, 79 L.Ed.2d at 368. As to the first step, the Court in One Assortment concluded, for three reasons, that Congress designed forfeiture under section 924(d) as a remedial civil sanction. First, the action was in rem; traditionally actions in rem have been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction depending upon the seizure of a physical object. Second, because the forfeiture proceedings reached both weapons used in violation of federal law and those intended to be used in such manner, the proceedings reached a broader range of conduct than their criminal analogue. Last, the forfeiture proceedings furthered broad remedial aims. These aims included (1) discouraging unregulated commerce in firearms, and (2) removing from circulation firearms that have been used or were intended for use outside regulated channels of commerce. Id. at 364, 104 S.Ct. at 1105-06, 79 L.Ed.2d at 369. As to the second step, the Court in One Assortment concluded the owner of the guns had failed to prove Congress had provided a sanction so punitive as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered several factors it had used in the past to determine whether a civil proceeding was so punitive as to require application of the constitutional protections necessary in a criminal trial. Id. at 365, 104 S.Ct. at 1106, 79 L.Ed.2d at 370. The Court found only one of those factors present in the section 924(d) forfeiture: the behavior proscribed by the forfeiture was already a crime. The Court concluded this factor alone was not enough to turn the forfeiture into a punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 366, 104 S.Ct. at 1107, 79 L.Ed.2d at 370. Using this two-part test as a framework for analysis, the Court in Ursery II had little trouble concluding Congress intended the forfeiture statutes in question (21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)) to be civil proceedings. To support its conclusion, the Court pointed to the procedural mechanisms Congress established for enforcing forfeitures under these two statutes: the statutes provide that forfeiture provisions for violating customs laws should apply. Forfeiture proceedings under the customs laws are in rem. So Congress intended forfeiture under the statutes in question would be in rem. The property rather than the defendantwould be the target of the proceeding, with jurisdiction depending on the seizure of a physical object. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2147, 135 L.Ed.2d at 567. In Ursery II, the Court looked to other procedural mechanisms governing forfeiture under the two forfeiture statutes in question to support its conclusion that Congress intended proceedings under these statutes to be civil. For example, 19 U.S.C. § 1607 provides that actual notice of the impending forfeiture is not necessary under either forfeiture statute when the Government cannot identify any party with an interest in the seized property. Also, 19 U.S.C. § 1615 governs both forfeiture statutes. This section provides that once the Government has shown probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant. Because both procedures are distinctly civil, the Court thought Congress had indicated clearly it intended a civil, rather than a criminal, sanction. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2147, 135 L.Ed.2d at 567. The Court in Ursery II stopped short of holding that in rem civil forfeiture is per se exempt from the Double Jeopardy Clause. Rather the Court held Congress' action in (1) designating the forfeiture as civil and (2) providing that the action proceed in rem establishes a presumption that it is not subject to double jeopardy. Id. at ___ n. 3, 116 S.Ct. at 2148 n. 3, 135 L.Ed.2d at 569 n.3. The Court, however, cautioned that where the `clearest proof indicates that an in rem civil forfeiture is `so punitive either in purpose or effect' as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding, that forfeiture may be subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at ___ n. 3, 116 S.Ct. at 2148 n. 3, 135 L.Ed.2d at 569 n. 3. In the second step of the two-step analysis, the Court in Ursery II found there is little evidence, much less the `clearest proof' that we require, suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7), and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), are so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 569 (citations omitted). The Court noted the two forfeiture statutes in question are, in most significant respects, indistinguishable from those reviewed, and held not to be punitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms.  Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 569. The Court, however, believed the two forfeiture statutes in question did have certain punitive aspects. Nevertheless, the Court concluded the statutes serve important nonpunitive goals. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 569. For example, [r]equiring the forfeiture of property used to commit federal narcotics violations encourages property owners to take care in managing their property and ensures that they will not permit that property to be used for illegal purposes. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 569. In addition, the Court in Ursery II looked to four other considerations to support its conclusion that the forfeiture statutes in question are civil, not criminal, proceedings. First, the Court noted historically it had not considered in rem civil forfeiture as punishment, as the Court has understood the term under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2138, 135 L.Ed.2d at 556. Second, the two forfeiture statutes in question do not require the Government to establish scienter in order to establish the property is subject to forfeiture. A trial court may subject the property to forfeiture even though no party files a claim to it and the Government does not show any connection between the property and a particular person. Although both statutes have an innocent owner exception, the Court did not think such a provision, without more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d at 570. Third, though both statutes can be said to serve a deterrent purpose, the Court noted it has long ... held that this purpose may serve civil as well as criminal goals. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d at 570. Last, though both statutes are tied to criminal activity ... this fact is insufficient to render the statutes punitive. It is well settled that Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission. By itself the fact that a forfeiture statute has some connection to a criminal violation is far from the clearest proof necessary to show that a proceeding is criminal. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d at 570-71 (citations omitted). In Ursery II the Court spent a good deal of time distinguishing Halper and Austin, as well as Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). As mentioned, the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal relied heavily on both Halper and Austin. The Court in Ursery II commented that the two circuit courts had simply misread Halper and Austin. The Court explained away Halper, Kurth Ranch, and Austin by stating: In sum, nothing in Halper, Kurth Ranch, or Austin, purported to replace our traditional understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Congress long has authorized the Government to bring parallel criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings, and this Court consistently has found civil forfeitures not to constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. It would have been quite remarkable for this Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established practice, and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having even suggested that it was doing so. Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Kurth Ranch with a tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and Austin with civil forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause. None of those cases dealt with the subject of this case: in rem civil forfeitures for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2147, 135 L.Ed.2d at 567-68. Turning to our own forfeiture statute, we likewise employ the two-step analysis referred to in Ursery II in determining whether the statute constitutes punishment under the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause.