Opinion ID: 342522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: removal of the action

Text: 6 Appellant first challenges the District Court's jurisdiction. Removal of the case from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia rested on the theory that the S&A firm was not suable as an entity in the District of Columbia; that there was complete diversity of citizenship between appellant on the one hand and the defendant partners on the other; that the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeded $10,000; and that since appellant's action might originally have been brought in the District Court, 7 it was properly removable thereto. 8 Since, however, an action involving no federal question cannot be removed to a federal court if any defendant is a resident of the forum state, 9 appellant contends that removal in this instance was improper. His premise is that even though none of the partners sued individually resides in the District of Columbia, S&A, qua partnership, does so reside by virtue of its business activity here. 7 Federal Civil Rule 17(b) 10 provides that in cases not seeking enforcement of a substantive right 11 existing under the constitution or a federal law, capacity of a partnership to sue or be sued is determined by reference to the law of the forum state in this case, the District. 12 Since there is no statute in the District permitting suit by or against a partnership in its common name, and since by the common law of the District a partnership is not a jural entity capable of suing or being sued, 13 this argument would appear to be foreclosed. Appellant maintains, however, that Section 13-421 of the District of Columbia Code impliedly overrules the case law on this point by conferring personal jurisdiction over partnerships and other unincorporated associations meeting certain minimum contacts requirements. 14 8 We note initially that the fact of personal jurisdiction does not ineluctably bestow legal capacity to be sued; infants and incompetents, for instance, were at common law incapacitated from suing or being sued, 15 and the fact that they were subject to personal jurisdiction did not alter the necessity of appointing a guardian ad litem. 16 More importantly, the genealogy of the District of Columbia's long-arm statute gives no indication that it was intended to do anything but codify recent case law with respect to extraterritorial jurisdiction over and service upon persons in civil litigation. 17 It was adapted by Congress from the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 18 which in its pertinent comments assures that its adoption effects no change of rules stating which persons have to be served in order to acquire jurisdiction, and that thus, local law that all members of an unincorporated association must be joined and served . . . remains unchanged. 19 Since both the Uniform Act and its District of Columbia counterpart accord identical treatment to partnerships and unincorporated associations, 20 the law governing service on partnerships remains unchanged: the partnership entity is never to be served; rather, service must be made on all partners. 21 9 A fortiori, then, the District's preexisting rules of suability are unaltered by the enactment of Section 13-421. In this connection, it is worth noting that one of Congress' purposes in adopting its provisions was closely to assimilate District law on jurisdiction to that of the neighboring states of Virginia and Maryland. 22 Virginia, though it has a nearly identical statute, denies partnerships capacity to sue or be sued, 23 as does at least one other state that has adopted the Uniform Act. 24 We conclude, then, that appellant's contention must be rejected and that removal was proper in the circumstances. 25