Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of uncharged robbery

Text: At the guilt phase, prosecution witness Amy Hadix started to describe a fight between defendant and a man she had never seen before that occurred in Marie Baker's apartment several hours before James Rumsey was killed. Defense counsel objected that this was irrelevant. At a sidebar conference, defense counsel further argued the evidence involved an alleged prior bad act that was unrelated to and dissimilar from the charged offenses and was unduly prejudicial. After hearing from counsel for both sides, the trial court permitted Hadix to testify that defendant obtained an unknown sum of money from the man. Later, during cross-examination of defendant, and outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor requested that the previous line of questioning be reopened. He pointed out that when defendant was arrested he was in possession of a driver's license belonging to Robert Southard, the man he had fought in Baker's apartment hours before James Rumsey's death. He also noted that by defendant's own admission, he took $52 from Southard and used it to buy drugs from June Rice. The prosecutor argued that this evidence was highly probative of defendant's intent in entering the Rumseys' apartment, particularly in light of defendant's testimony that he entered the unit by mistake and with no intent to steal. The trial court found the evidence admissible for the limited purpose of showing defendant's state of mind, concluding that the probative value of the evidence exceeded any prejudicial effect. The court also said it would give the jury a limiting instruction. When cross-examination resumed, defendant testified he bought methamphetamine from June Rice on December 24 with money he had taken from Southard after beating him up. On redirect examination, defendant explained he fought Southard after Southard had made insulting and racist comments to him. He admitted taking Southard's money while Southard was bent over on the floor with his wallet sticking out of his back pocket. Defendant said: [I]t come [sic] to me at that point to reach in his back pocket, take the wallet, take the money. Defendant contends the evidence involving Southard was admitted in violation of state evidentiary law and federal constitutional principles. Evidence of prior criminal acts is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge ...), but not to prove the defendant carried out the charged crimes in conformity with a character trait. (Evid.Code, ง 1101.) To be relevant on the issue of identity, the uncharged crimes must be highly similar to the charged offenses.... [ถ] ... [ถ] A lesser degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue of common design or plan.... [ถ] The least degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue of intent. [Citation.] For this purpose, the uncharged crimes need only be `sufficiently similar [to the charged offenses] to support the inference that the defendant `probably harbored the same intent in each instance.' [Citations.]` ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369-371, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169; see also People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 379, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) As we have observed, however, evidence of uncharged misconduct `is so prejudicial that its admission requires extremely careful analysis' and to be admissible, such evidence `must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.' ( People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) Thus, [t]he probative value of the uncharged offense evidence must be substantial and must not be largely outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a serious danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) On appeal, a trial court's ruling under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618; People v. Kipp, supra, at p. 369, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 380, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Applying these principles, we find no abuse of discretion and no federal constitutional violation in the admission of the uncharged crimes evidence. In both the charged and uncharged crimes, defendant overcame the victim by force, then reached into the victim's back pocket to obtain his wallet. Both times, after having taken the money, defendant proceeded to June Rice's apartment to buy methamphetamine. Although the incidents themselves are not particularly distinctive, they are sufficiently similar to support an inference that defendant harbored the same intent in both instances, that is, to forcibly obtain cash from the victim. Contrary to defendant's assertion, this is not a case in which the evidence relating directly to the charged crimes was so compelling on the question of defendant's intent as to render the uncharged crimes evidence merely cumulative on the issue. (See People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422-423, 27 Cal. Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777.) Furthermore, the trial court limited any prejudicial impact of the uncharged crimes evidence by instructing the jury, in the language of CALJIC No. 2.50, that such evidence could not be considered to prove defendant was a person of bad character or that he had a disposition to commit crime. In a related claim, defendant notes that although the trial court instructed the jury generally about the limited use of uncharged crimes evidence, it failed to pinpoint the particular evidence of the Southard fight in the instruction. [3] He argues that the omission denied him due process of law and other guarantees under the state and federal Constitutions because the trial court had promised to give such a limiting instruction at the time it ruled the evidence admissible. Defendant's constitutional claim is premised on what appears to have been a misstatement by the trial court. The record shows that in ruling on the admissibility of the Southard fight evidence, the trial court indicated it would give a limiting instruction to theโI think it's under 2.60, CALJIC 2.60. This particular instruction, however, does not concern the limited use of evidence of uncharged crimes. Rather, it tells the jury to draw no inferences from the defendant's failure to testify at trial. Defendant cannot seriously dispute the supposition that the trial court simply misspoke when, after indicating it would give a limiting instruction, it made reference to CALJIC No. 2.60 instead of CALJIC No. 2.50. In any event, the trial court did instruct as promised, about the limited use of the uncharged crimes evidence. Although defendant now complains the trial court never pinpointed the Southard fight evidence as the uncharged crimes evidence that was being admitted for the limited purpose of showing intent, he did not request such an instruction and therefore has not preserved the issue. ( People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249.) Nor did his attorney's failure to make such a request deny defendant the effective assistance of counsel. Because the jury was fully instructed on the limited use of uncharged crimes evidence under CALJIC No. 2.50, and there was no evidence of any incident to which jurors may have mistakenly believed the limiting instruction applied, defendant fails to make the necessary showing that, but for counsel's asserted deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that a determination more favorable to him would have resulted. ( In re Cudjo (1999) 20 Cal.4th 673, 687, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 977 P.2d 66; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.)