Opinion ID: 1692753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Second Motion for Summary Judgment Proper

Text: Whalen argues that even if we fail to agree with his assertion on the merits of this case, the district court erred by reentertaining U S West's motion for summary judgment. Whalen claims that once the district court ruled on the initial motion for summary judgment, it did not have jurisdiction to address a second motion. Specifically, Whalen asserts that a district court abuses its discretion by reconsidering a summary judgment motion where the second motion was filed after the term in which the initial motion was decided. It appears that Whalen is relying upon Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 1995) in making his argument. Section 25-2001 governs a court's power to vacate or modify a judgment or an order after the end of a term. We have long held that § 25-2001 governs only final orders and does not bar the reconsideration of interlocutory orders. See Godfrey v. Cunningham, 77 Neb. 462, 109 N.W. 765 (1906). Denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final order and therefore not appealable. Moulton v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 251 Neb. 95, 555 N.W.2d 39 (1996). Thus, under Godfrey v. Cunningham, supra, U S West's second motion for summary judgment was not governed by § 25-2001, and the determination of whether to entertain a second motion for summary judgment is entrusted to the discretion of the district court. See Bringewatt v. Mueller, 201 Neb. 736, 272 N.W.2d 37 (1978). The overruling of a motion for summary judgment does not decide any issue of fact or proposition of law affecting the subject matter of the litigation, but merely indicates that the court was not convinced by the record that there was not a genuine issue as to any material fact or that the party offering the motion was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953).