Opinion ID: 1138511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: R.C.P. 54(d)(1) provides:

Text: (A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court. (B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, ... (Emphasis added.) As the above rule provides, determination of the prevailing party for purposes of an award of costs is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 732 P.2d 355 (Ct.App. 1987). The burden is on the party disputing the award to show an abuse of this discretion, Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982), and absent an abuse of discretion, the district court's award of costs will be upheld. Martsch v. Nelson, 109 Idaho 95, 705 P.2d 1050 (Ct.App. 1985). Durrant and Sellers contend that their objective in filing this action was to establish a water use rotation schedule, and although the temporary restraining order was vacated, it established a rotation scheme which the parties have continued to follow. Thus, Durrant and Sellers argue in effect that Christensen is not the prevailing party because she continues to follow the rotation scheme established in the temporary restraining order. We find this argument insufficient to show an abuse of discretion by the district court. Christensen was not the owner of the property, and the complaint against her was dismissed and the restraining order dissolved. The district court's determination that Christensen is the prevailing party is affirmed. Durrant and Sellers next contend that an award of attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 65(c) should not apply in this case. Rule 65(c) allows the trial court to award costs and reasonable attorney fees to any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. Durrant and Sellers argue that the costs and fees awarded to Christensen were attributable in defending the merits of the case and therefore the provisions of I.R.C.P. 65(c) should not apply. They further contend because the parties continue to follow the water rotation scheme established in the temporary restraining order, that constituted an adjudication on the merits. Again, the argument is unconvincing. First, the complaint against Christensen was dismissed because she was not a proper party. If there is no valid claim to pursue, and the action was dismissed, there can be no adjudication on the merits as against the party in whose favor a dismissal was entered. Second, Idaho case law interpreting Rule 65(c) allows recovery of attorney fees if legal services necessary to defend the merits of the case were identical to services performed in dissolving a restraining order. Davidson Grocery Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 52 Idaho 795, 21 P.2d 75 (1933); McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, Inc., 113 Idaho 393, 744 P.2d 121 (Ct.App. 1989); Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho 1, 713 P.2d 437 (Ct.App. 1986). Thus, assuming there was an adjudication on the merits, recovery of attorney fees would be appropriate provided the trial court found the restraining order and merit issues were identical as in McAtee v. Faulkner . Finally, since Christensen was not a proper party to this action, any injunction or restraint against her would be wrongful and she would be entitled to an award of fees. I.R.C.P. 65(c). We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in its award of attorney fees and costs for Christensen's efforts in dissolving the restraining order. We find that the amount of the award of attorney fees is reasonable, and affirm the district court's decision awarding attorney fees and costs to Christensen in that regard.