Opinion ID: 2621923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retrial for Extreme Emotional Distress Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense Manslaughter

Text: ¶57 As previously noted, double jeopardy does not generally bar a second trial when a conviction [is] successfully vacated on appeal. Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1230-31. Thus, when a criminal defendant is charged with murder but convicted of manslaughter, and the manslaughter conviction is reversed on appeal, double jeopardy does not bar retrial for manslaughter. See Price, 398 U.S. at 329 (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial for murder, but not for manslaughter); United States v. Larkin, 605 F.2d 1360, 1368 (5th Cir. 1979) ([I]t is . . . well settled that a defendant may be retried on a lesser offense, of which he was convicted at an initial trial, after that conviction was reversed on appeal. . . .). Because Low was convicted of manslaughter, double jeopardy would ordinarily not bar retrial for manslaughter. ¶58 While double jeopardy protections do not prevent the State from retrying Low for manslaughter, the statutory framework prevents the State from retrying him for extreme emotional distress manslaughter or imperfect self-defense manslaughter. Low was convicted of manslaughter based upon either extreme emotional distress or imperfect self-defense. [4] But under the plain language of the Utah Criminal Code, extreme emotional distress and imperfect self-defense exist only as affirmative defenses to murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(a) (Supp. 2007). As such, extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter are no longer chargeable offenses. It would be improper to allow the State to retry Low for offenses with which he could not have been originally charged. We therefore conclude that the State cannot retry Low for extreme emotional distress manslaughter or imperfect self-defense manslaughter. [5]