Opinion ID: 780618
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Same-actor inference

Text: 36 The district court concluded its analysis by emphasizing that the same-actor inference favored White's. In Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transportation Co., 61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir.1995), this court adopted the same-actor inference, which allows one to infer a lack of discrimination from the fact that the same individual both hired and fired the employee. Id. at 463. But the facts in Buhrmaster did not contain any direct evidence of stereotyping from which a discriminatory intent could be proven. The evidence against the employer, in fact, was rather weak. Moreover, the Buhrmaster court was reviewing a jury verdict and jury instructions. Rather than weighing the evidence, as the district court did in this case, the court in Buhrmaster was simply evaluating the rationality of the jury's verdict, and whether or not the jury could properly apply such an inference. 37 Our sister circuits are split on the amount of weight that should be given to the same-actor inference. Some have found it quite persuasive. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the strong same-actor inference); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir.1992) (The most important fact here is that plaintiff was a member of the protected age group both at the time of his hiring and at the time of his firing, and that the same people who hired him also fired him.); Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir.1991) (urging the early dismissal of cases where the same individual both hired and fired the plaintiff). A number of these courts have concluded, however, that the same-actor inference was sufficient to warrant summary judgment only where the plaintiff's evidence of discrimination was otherwise weak, even though sufficient to survive summary judgment but for the fact that the same person both hired and fired the plaintiff. Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270 (noting that the plaintiff produced no meaningful evidence indicating either that [the employer's] proffered explanation was false or that her supervisor harbored discriminatory animus towards her because she was a woman); Lowe, 963 F.2d at 174-75 (holding that the same-actor inference warranted summary judgment because the plaintiff's evidence of pretext was thin). 38 Other circuits have minimized the importance of the same-actor inference, emphasizing that although a court may infer an absence of discrimination where the same individual hired and fired the plaintiff, such an inference is not required. Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir.1996) (While evidence of [same actor] circumstances is relevant in determining whether discrimination occurred, we decline to establish a rule that no inference of discrimination could arise under such circumstances.); Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n. 6 (3d Cir.1995) (noting that the same-actor inference is simply evidence like any other and should not be afforded presumptive value). 39 This latter approach is more consistent with the requirement that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). We therefore reject the idea that a mandatory inference must be applied in favor of a summary-judgment movant whenever the claimant has been hired and fired by the same individual. Such an approach strikes us as being contrary to the Supreme Court's opinion in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.). Although the factfinder is permitted to draw this inference, it is by no means a mandatory one, and it may be weakened by other evidence. Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir.1995) (describing how the length of time between hiring and firing an employee may weaken the same-actor inference). We therefore specifically hold that where, as in this case, the factfinder decides to draw the same-actor inference, it is insufficient to warrant summary judgment for the defendant if the employee has otherwise raised a genuine issue of material fact. 40