Opinion ID: 2570071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Establishing excusable neglect under NRCP 6(b)(2)

Text: Having concluded that NRCP 6 may permit an enlargement of the time to substitute a proper party for a deceased party after the expiration of the 90-day limitation in NRCP 25, we next consider whether the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it denied Dr. Moseley's motion to dismiss based on the Sinickis' claim of excusable neglect. Although excusable neglect has been defined in other contexts, e.g., NRCP 60(b), [43] we have not defined excusable neglect under NRCP 6. Again, we turn to federal caselaw dealing with excusable neglect to consider our guidelines for NRCP 6. [44] Under federal Rule 6(b), a party may obtain an extension of time to act under a particular rule when the time to act has expired and the party seeking an extension demonstrates good faith, a reasonable basis for not complying within the specified period, and an absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party. [45] The key factor in the federal decisions is whether the plaintiff asserted a reasonable basis for not complying. Thus, a delay in taking the necessary action, such as moving for substitution within the 90-day period, may be excused if it is shown that the delay was reasonable. For example, in George v. United States, [46] a federal district court in Connecticut found that an enlargement of time to move for substitution of the decedent's representative in lieu of the decedent was warranted under federal Rule 6(b). In that case, the plaintiff, William George, died in July 2000, and his wife executed an application for probate of her husband's will on August 4, 2000. Thereafter, the defendant filed a suggestion of death on August 8, 2000, and when no motion for substitution was filed within 90 days, the defendant moved to dismiss the deceased husband's claims. [47] The motion to dismiss was opposed by the decedent's counsel. [48] Upon a review of the record, the federal district court determined that the plaintiff attempted, in good faith, to comply with the 90-day rule. Specifically, the record showed that the decedent's wife began the appointment process before the suggestion of death was filed and even notified defendant's counsel that the decedent's wife was seeking appointment as the personal representative. [49] The defense counsel was also informed that the decedent's wife would be substituted into the action as the personal representative of the deceased plaintiff's estate once the appointment was accomplished. [50] The federal district court also concluded that any delay in moving for substitution was not due to any inaction on the part of the deceased plaintiffs counsel. The record revealed that although the decedent's wife was not appointed as the executor of her husband's estate until November 28, 2000, she moved for an extension of time to be substituted as the personal representative of her husband's estate four days after receiving the documentation reflecting the appointment. [51] Counsel for the decedent explained that the delay in appointing the wife resulted from the misplacement of documents needed for the probate court. [52] The defendant argued that since the deceased plaintiffs attorney knew there were problems with obtaining the appointment in a timely manner, the request for an extension of time to substitute should have been made during Rule 25's 90-day period. [53] Nonetheless, the federal district court stated that the defendant had not shown that it would suffer any undue prejudice if the motion to substitute were granted even though the motion for an enlargement of time to substitute was not filed within the 90-day period under Rule 25. [54] Thus, the federal district court determined that because good faith and due diligence had been demonstrated, excusable neglect was established. [55] Similarly, in Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, [56] the federal district court sitting in New York concluded that an extension of time under Rule 6(b) was appropriate because excusable neglect was established. [57] In Al-Jundi, defendant John Monahan died and his counsel suggested his death upon the record. [58] Although the federal district court held that the 90-day limitation under Rule 25 had not been properly triggered, [59] the court determined that if the limitation had been properly triggered then excusable neglect was established. [60] Specifically, any delay occasioned by the plaintiff in moving to substitute a party for the deceased's estate was due to the deceased defendant's family's and attorney's obstruction of the plaintiff's efforts. [61] Indeed, the decedent's daughter refused to be appointed, but she also objected to the plaintiff's efforts to have an administrator ad litem appointed. Also, the decedent's attorney attempted to stall any substitution by alleging that there was no estate and there was no one to be substituted in the decedent's place. [62] Based on these facts, excusable neglect on the plaintiff's part was found, and the court determined that there was no undue prejudice to the decedent's heirs in denying the motion to dismiss. [63] Based on the factors relied upon in George v. United States [64] and Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, [65] we hold that a party seeking relief from NRCP 25(a)(1) under NRCP 6(b)(2) is required to demonstrate that (1) it acted in good faith, (2) it exercised due diligence, (3) there is a reasonable basis for not complying within the specified time, and (4) the nonmoving party will not suffer prejudice. [66] In this case, it is not clear from the district court record what findings of fact the district court made when it denied Dr. Moseley's motion to dismiss and granted the Sinickis' motion for enlargement of time to substitute Wayne as the personal representative for Richard's claims. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court should reconsider this matter and determine whether the Sinickis have established excusable neglect for their failure to move for substitution of Wayne for Richard's individual claims within the 90-day limitation period under NRCP 25.