Opinion ID: 180076
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Right

Text: Having concluded that Storch's testimony was false, we next consider whether being convicted on the basis of Storch's false testimony violated Maxwell's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392. Maxwell argues that his conviction based on false material evidence violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and we agree. First, because the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2), the AEDPA deference no longer applies. Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1059. Therefore, we proceed to `resolve [Maxwell's related due process] claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.' Id. (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007)). As we recently explained in Detrich, this makes sense and is in accord with the deference principles of AEDPA becausein light of the state court's reliance on incorrect factswe do not know what the state court would have decided . . . [and] there is no actual decision to which we can defer. Id. at 1060. In Killian, as here, the defendant was convicted of murder based, in large part, on the testimony of a jailhouse informant. 282 F.3d at 1206-07. In that case, we concluded that irrespective of whether the prosecutor knew that the informant had given false testimony, one [could not] reasonably deny that [the jailhouse informant] gave perjured testimony at [petitioner's] trial. Id. at 1208. We went on to determine whether `there is a reasonable probability that [without all the perjury] the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Id. at 1204, 1208 (citing United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1994) and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)) (alterations in the original). We concluded that the perjury of the prosecution's main witness undermined confidence in the verdict and, therefore, to permit the defendant's conviction to stand on the basis of such evidence violated the petitioner's due process rights. Id. at 1208, 1211. Accordingly, we reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief. Id. at 1211. We explained that a government's assurances that false evidence was presented in good faith are little comfort to a criminal defendant wrongly convicted on the basis of such evidence. A conviction based in part on false evidence, even false evidence presented in good faith, hardly comports with fundamental fairness. Id. at 1209 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hall similarly concerned a habeas defendant who challenged his conviction, arguing that it was based on false material evidence in violation of his due process rights. 343 F.3d at 981. In that case, the habeas defendant objected to the admission of incriminating handwritten notes that a jailhouse informant supplied to the prosecution. See id. The defendant argued that whether or not the prosecution knew that the jailhouse notes admitted into evidence at trial were false at the time of trial, to allow his conviction to stand, based on the present knowledge that the evidence was falsified, is a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392). We agreed. We first determined that the alleged written confession, which a jailhouse informant had provided, was false and material evidence. Id. at 982-85. Accordingly, we concluded that to permit the petitioner's conviction to stand on the basis of such false material evidence violated his constitutional rights, and we reversed the denial of habeas relief. Id. at 985 (reversing the denial of habeas relief [b]ecause false and material evidence was admitted at [petitioner's] trial in violation of his due process rights). The Second Circuit has similarly explained that [i]t is simply intolerable. . . if a state allows an innocent person to remain incarcerated on the basis of lies. Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 224 (2d Cir.1988) (reversing the denial of habeas relief and holding that the petitioner's due process rights were violated when the petitioner in that case was convicted based on the material testimony of a witness who recanted); see also United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 473 (2d Cir.1991) (holding that the perjury by a key government witness, irrespective of whether the government knew of the perjury at the time of trial, infected the trial proceedings and required reversal). Here, we have resolved the threshold factual question of falsity and concluded that Storch perjured himself when he testified that Maxwell confessed. We have also resolved the threshold legal question and conclude that under Hall and Killian, to permit a conviction based on uncorrected false material evidence to stand is a violation of a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. We proceed, therefore, to consider whether Storch's testimony was material. A constitutional error resulting from the prosecution's failure to correct false testimony requires a new trial only if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 985 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). In order to determine whether Storch's perjury here undermines confidence in the verdicts, we again compare this case to Hall and Killian. In Hall, there was absolutely no physical or forensic evidence connecting [the defendant] to the body or the alley in which it was found, and the notes supplied by the informant, like Storch's testimony, provided a confession in what was otherwise a weak case. 343 F.3d at 978 (noting that [u]nable to find any physical evidence to connect Hall to the murder, the prosecution relied upon two documents provided by a jailhouse informant). Because there was a reasonable likelihood that the introduction of the falsified notes affected the jury's verdict, we concluded that the jailhouse notes were material and reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief. Id. at 984-85 (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763). Like Hall, Killian required us to decide whether the use of perjured testimony. . . justifie[d] habeas relief. 282 F.3d at 1206. In Killian, the jailhouse informant made virtually the whole case for the government, and the prosecution emphasized the informant's testimony during closing arguments. Id. at 1209. Because the jailhouse informant was the make-or-break witness for the state, we concluded that there was a reasonable probability that without all the perjury the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Here, as in Hall and Killian, Storch was the make-or-break witness for the State. Storch's testimony was the centerpiece of the prosecution's case. Nearly all of the other evidence against Maxwell was circumstantial. In deciding whether to file murder charges against Maxwell, the prosecution itself acknowledged in internal written notes that were discovered during the evidentiary hearing that its case was weak from an evidential standpoint. The only evidence that linked Maxwell to the Jones murder was the in-courtroom voice identification of Maxwell by a witness who had been unable to pick Maxwell out of a lineup in which he spoke, and the fact that Maxwell possessed a knife consistent with Jones's stab wound. The only evidence that linked Maxwell to the Garcia murder was Maxwell's palm print on a nearby bench in an area Maxwell admitted frequenting, some muddy and consistent footprints, and a generic Bic lighter found in Maxwell's pocket at the time of arrest. In sum, Storch's testimony that Maxwell confessed to making a mistake in the commission of the Garcia murder was the prosecution's prize evidence. Furthermore, Storch's testimony went to both the Garcia and Jones murders; in fact, Storch's testimony was offered to establish Maxwell as the perpetrator of all ten of the Skid Row Stabber killings. Specifically, the State argued during closing arguments and continues to argue in its brief on appeal, that Storch's testimony was offered primarily to prove that [Maxwell] had admitted responsibility for each of the ten murders. Storch's testimony is significant not just because of the paucity of other evidence but also because of the content of his testimony. As this court and the Supreme Court have noted, the importance of `the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.' Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)); see also Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Fulminante and concluding that counsel's failure to move to exclude the petitioner's confession was prejudicial). The importance of Storch's testimony was underscored by the prosecution in its closing argument, when Norris emphasized Storch's testimony. See Hall, 343 F.3d at 976 (finding it significant that the prosecutor emphasized the jailhouse informant's note in his closing argument in reversing denial of habeas relief). The jury also asked to see the transcript of Storch's testimony during deliberation, highlighting its import. In sum, the Superior Court's finding that Storch testified truthfully at Maxwell's trial was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence that was presented at the state court evidentiary hearing, and Storch's false testimony prejudiced Maxwell's trial. The State's reliance on that perjured testimony undermines confidence in the verdict. See Killian, 282 F.3d at 1210 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). Because there is a reasonable probability that Storch's perjury affected the judgment of the jury, we must reverse the denial of Maxwell's habeas petition as to this claim. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392.