Opinion ID: 2003896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The law making gang assault a crime was enacted in 1996 and contains two degrees of severity (L 1996, ch 647, § 2). Gang assault in the first degree is defined as follows: A person is guilty of gang assault in the first degree when, with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person and when aided by two or more other persons actually present, he causes serious physical injury to such person or to a third person (Penal Law § 120.07). Gang assault in the second degree is defined identically, except that it requires the accused to act with the lesser intent to cause physical injury: A person is guilty of gang assault in the second degree when, with intent to cause physical injury to another person and when aided by two or more other persons actually present, he causes serious physical injury to such person or to a third person (Penal Law § 120.06). Both crimes require that the defendant be aided by two or more other persons actually present and the proper interpretation of that phrase is the core issue on this appeal. The gang assault statutes were modeled in part on the crime of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10 [1]). In particular, the element of aided by two or more other persons actually present is taken from the current robbery statute, which requires the defendant to be aided by another person actually present ( see Penal Law § 160.10 [1]). The robbery statute once required that the defendant be aided by an accomplice actually present. (Penal Law of 1909 § 2124 [2].) That requirement was revised when the Legislature replaced the word accomplice with the phrase another person ( see Penal Law § 160.10 [1]). The deliberate revision to the robbery statute has been viewed by some courts, including the Appellate Division in Sanchez, as showing a clear intention by the Legislature to establish that for the crime of robbery, the aider need not share the specific intent and mental culpability required for accomplice liability ( see also People v Green, 126 AD2d 105, 106 [2d Dept 1987] [concluding that one may aid in the commission of a robbery within the meaning of Penal Law § 160.10 (1) without engaging in conduct sufficient to support a finding of guilt on the basis of accessorial liability]). In other words, a defendant can be found guilty of the crime of robbery in the second degree even when his codefendant is acquitted. This Court, analyzing the language aided by another person actually present in the robbery statute, has held that constructive presence is insufficient to sustain a conviction ( People v Hedgeman, 70 NY2d 533 [1987]). In People v Dennis (75 NY2d 821 [1990]), we further explained that when another person is in a position to render immediate assistance to the defendant, his or her presence poses a sufficient risk of additional violence, so as to satisfy the element of another person actually present. Thus, for the purposes of the element another person actually present in the robbery statute, the other person must actually be present, at least in the immediate vicinity of the crime, and be capable of rendering immediate assistance to an individual committing the crime. The interpretation of the robbery statute is equally applicable to the similarly worded gang assault statutes. Before anything else, we must look to the language of the gang assault statutes. Each statute, on its face, speaks only to the intent of the defendant and not to his aiders. No particular mental state is expressly required of those who comprise the gang. They must simply be present and render aid to the defendant. The Legislature did not provide that they must share defendant's intent to cause physical injury. This interpretation is also supported by the legislative history of the statutes, which reveals that the purpose of the gang assault crime was to enhance public safety . . . in recognition of the severity of assaults committed by gangs (Governor's Program Bill Mem, at 1, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647, at 6, 1996 NY Legis Ann, at 476). Gang assaults, particularly by youths, had been increasing, and such assaults pose a greater threat to public safety than assaults committed by individual actors (Governor's Mem approving L 1996, ch 647, 1996 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 1919). The Governor's supporting memorandum noted that the joint action of numerous assailants is not only terrifying to victims but tends to increase the likelihood that severe or lethal injuries will be inflicted (Governor's Program Bill Mem, at 2, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647, at 7, 1996 NY Legis Ann, at 476-477). The Governor's supporting memorandum recognized that to commit an assault with the aid of others is tantamount to committing an assault by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument ( id. ). Thus, one of the primary purposes of the crime of gang assault was to recognize that when a victim is confronted by a group of individuals, rather than one individual, he or she is confronted with a more threatening, intimidating and dangerous situation that increases the possibility of escalating violence and physical harm ( see Hedgeman, 70 NY2d at 541). That enhanced fear is present even if the aider does not have the same criminal intent or purpose of the defendant. So long as a person is aiding another to commit the crime, regardless of whether that aid is rendered with the intent to cause physical injury, the victim is still facing a more threatening scenario. In other words, even though the person may not have the intent to cause physical injury to the victim, they are still aiding the defendant for purposes of the statute by assisting defendant in causing that harm. [] Even more, gang assaults are often spontaneous and frenzied events undertaken by a number of individuals, many of whom may never be identified. They are dangerous precisely for their chaotic nature. Therefore it makes sense for the Legislature to require the People to prove only that the charged defendant, not other participants in the assault, had the requisite criminal intent to cause physical injury. Thus, we hold that a defendant can be found guilty of gang assault, if he or she acts with the requisite mens rea and aid, even if one or more of the persons who aid do not share his or her intent to cause physical harm. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not hold today that no mens rea is required of an aider. The only issue presented by defendants is whether the persons who provide aid must share the mental culpability of defendant. We thus have no occasion to define the exact intent needed, if any, of the persons aiding the defendant. We now turn to each particular case.