Opinion ID: 6109767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prohibition of Aggravating Circumstances

Text: For his first point, Smith argues that prejudicial error occurred when the circuit court permitted the jury to consider the death of Allbright's unborn child as an aggravating circumstance. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-604 sets forth the aggravating circumstances that the jury may consider for the imposition of the death penalty. Bowen v. State , 322 Ark. 483 , 496, 911 S.W.2d 555 , 561 (1995). The specific provision in question states that it is an aggravator if [t]he person in the commission of the capital murder knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim or caused the death of more than one (1) person in the same criminal episode. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-604 (4) (2013). Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a) contains the definition of person as it relates to the homicide statutes and states, As used in §§ 5-10-101 -- 5-10-105, 'person' also includes an unborn child in utero at any stage of development. Smith argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion prohibiting the aggravating circumstance from being presented because the definition of person in section 5-1-102 could not apply to section 5-4-604. The State in turn argues that this issue is not preserved for appeal because it was abandoned below. At trial, Smith filed a motion to prohibit the State from submitting an aggravating circumstances form to the jury. Attached to the motion was the form the State intended to submit to the jury, which included the definition of person in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102 (13). However, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the court inquired whether Smith objected to the definition or its placement on the form. Smith responded that he was objecting to the placement. 2 In his reply brief, Smith acknowledges that  his argument was abandoned, but nevertheless contends that he may raise it on appeal based on our decision in Singleton v. State , 274 Ark. 126 , 623 S.W.2d 180 (1981). The general rule is that this court will not address errors raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 129 , 623 S.W.2d at 181 ; Hicks v. State , 2017 Ark. 262 at 10, 526 S.W.3d 831 , 838. Likewise, parties cannot change their grounds for an objection on appeal, but are bound by the scope and nature of their objections as presented at trial. Hicks , 2017 Ark. 262 at 10, 526 S.W.3d at 838 . However, in death-penalty cases we will consider errors argued for the first time on direct appeal when prejudice is conclusively shown by the record and this court would unquestionably require the trial court to grant relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Singleton , 274 Ark. at 128 , 623 S.W.2d at 181 ; Hill v. State , 275 Ark. 71 , 77, 628 S.W.2d 284 , 287 (1982) ; Hughes v. State , 295 Ark. 121 , 122, 746 S.W.2d 557 , 557 (1988). In Singleton the defendant was sentenced to death for felony murder and life imprisonment for aggravated robbery. 274 Ark. at 128 , 623 S.W.2d at 181 . We affirmed the conviction for capital felony murder but set aside the conviction for the lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. Id. We noted that our recent decision in Swaite v. State , 272 Ark. 128 , 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981), prohibited the entry of a judgment for capital felony murder and the underlying specific felony. Id. We therefore applied our holding to Singleton's case by invoking the death penalty exception. Id. We decline to extend the exception to the circumstances argued here. Smith has not conclusively shown prejudice and he has failed to show that we would unquestionably grant him Rule 37 relief on the issue. 3 We note that enforcing a narrow interpretation of the death penalty exception ensures that it remains an exception and does not swallow the rule.