Opinion ID: 2287155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: impeachment of thomas drawdy

Text: Individually, defendant Burke assigns error to the trial justice's allowance of the state to impeach its own witness. The state called upon Thomas Drawdy (Drawdy) to testify concerning the events occurring on June 15, 1985. The prosecution then proceeded to impeach Drawdy's credibility with evidence of past crimes. The defendants objected to this line of questioning as improper, irrelevant and immaterial. We agree with defendants' contentions; however, the error does not rise to a level requiring reversal. The longstanding rule that a party may not impeach its own witness has been abrogated to facilitate the interests of justice. Rule 607 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides: Who may impeach.  The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness, except that the party, calling the witness shall not impeach the witness' credit by evidence of bad character unless, in the view of the trial justice, the interests of justice so require. The rule, however, does not grant counsel an absolute right to attack the credibility of its own witness. In State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 812 (R.I. 1980), we held that [i]t is now well settled in this jurisdiction    that a party who is surprised by his own witness's testimony may be permitted, in the discretion of the trial justice, to confront the witness with prior inconsistent statements.    The rule that a party may not ordinarily impeach his own witness may also be relaxed even in the absence of an allegation and finding of surprise when, in the view of the trial justice, the interests of justice so require. In the case before us we see neither surprise nor an affront to the interests of justice sufficient to have permitted counsel to engage in the impeachment of Drawdy with past convictions. The trial justice was in error to allow the direct examination to proceed in this manner. As we shall explain, however, this error does not warrant a reversal of defendant Burke's conviction. When substantial rights are unaffected by an error during the course of a trial, that error may be disregarded. Super. R. Crim. P. 52. The defendant Burke contends that the state introduced the record of Drawdy in order to show the undesirable character of the people with whom defendant was associating. This testimony would offer the jury the adverse inference that birds of a feather flock together. We disagree. We find that the trial justice effectively cured any potential prejudice with a curative instruction on the effect of Drawdy's testimony. In addition to explaining the limited purpose for which the evidence was admissible, to impeach credibility, the trial justice stated specifically that [t]here's no relationship between what this gentleman [Drawdy] may have done in the way of committing crimes and their [defendants'] innocence or guilt. They [defendants] are presumed to be innocent and what he's done in the past has no reflection upon them and you may not draw any inferences with respect to these two defendants. Accordingly, the initial error of allowing the state to impeach its own witness was rendered harmless by the adequate limiting instruction given to the jury.