Opinion ID: 1955771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the admission of character evidence.

Text: The trial court allowed a portion of the personnel records of Clinical Lab to be submitted to the jury. This evidence came in by way of deposition testimony of Karen Baer, a cytotechnologist who had been a co-worker of Norma Hellman, the cytotechnologist who had examined Kim's 1984 and 1986 pap smear slides. The evidence tended to show Hellman was sloppy in her work habits in that she hurried through the screening process. It also reflected that Baer had conveyed her concerns and observations about those work habits to a supervisor at Clinical Lab. Other evidence from that personnel file was withheld from the jury by the trial court. Sander asserts this evidence was properly before the jury on its claim of negligence by Clinical Lab in failing to adequately monitor, supervise, screen and employ safeguards and procedures to insure accuracy in the interpretation of cytologies. Clinical Lab asserts the trial court erroneously admitted this evidence over its objections. When reviewing evidence presented by deposition, we do not apply the clearly erroneous rule but review that testimony as though presented here for the first time. Day v. John Morrell & Co., 490 N.W.2d 720, 723 (S.D.1992). Clinical Lab relies on Rocky Mt. Helicopters v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir.1986), as support for its position that the disputed evidence is inadmissible. In that case, the evidence sought to have been admitted would have shown the employer may have known that the employee in question was not properly trained and was potentially unsafe. Id. at 916. On appeal, it was found the proffered evidence was relevant and arguably admissible on that issue. Therefore, the district court erred in ... exclud[ing] evidence that Rocky Mountain may have known that [its employee] was an unsafe pilot. Id. at 916-17. As did the Rocky Mt. court, we also determine the disputed evidence in the instant case is relevant to the question of negligent monitoring by Clinical Lab. However, that does not end our inquiry. Nor did it end the inquiry of the Rocky Mt. court. That court went on to note the trial court had other reasons for excluding the evidence regarding the employee's work habits and noted that under Federal Rule of Evidence 404, an individual's alleged substandard work habits generally are not admissible for the purpose of proving that a person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion [as such] evidence is generally regarded as being of slight probative value and potentially very prejudicial. Id. at 917. Thus, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 also came into play: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We have adopted this Rule in its entirety at SDCL 19-12-3. Rocky Mt. continued: The notes of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence for Rule 404 indicate that where character evidence is offered for a purpose other than showing actions consistent therewith, there is no mechanical solution for admitting or excluding the evidence. According to the Committee, the determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence, a determination which lies squarely with the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 917 (emphasis added). The Rocky Mt. court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that under the circumstances of that case the evidence, which was otherwise arguably admissible, was unduly prejudicial. Clinical Lab asserts the disputed evidence should have been excluded as it was used improperly in Sander's closing argument as direct evidence of Clinical Lab's negligence in screening the slides at issue. We have said that SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403) allows the trial court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if the evidence, as admitted, would provide the jury with an undue tendency to decide the case on an improper basis. Shamburger, 380 N.W.2d at 661. The relevant portion of Sander's closing argument to the jury was: [The defense's expert] has indicated in his testimony that [the pap smear] isn't a very good test, if you will recall that, but that it makes up for itself over time. In other words, that time takes care and justifies missing pap smears, misreading them. That may bemaybe that's true, generally, that time would take care of that, unless, because of that assumption the test is taken for granted. And if you start out with the assumption that time is going to cure your mistakes so that you then are less careful and somebody is going to pick it up the next time, or if not the next time, then the next time after that, what happens is you start getting careless. And that's what happened in this case. People started getting careless. The court's instructed you that it is the duty of one who undertakes to perform the service of a pathologist or a cytotechnologist to have the knowledge or skill ordinarily possessed and to exercise the care and skill ordinarily used in like cases. Failure to do that is negligence. The key word is care. You have to be careful to not rush through screening to look at the entire slide when you are doing this. So that until you are able to rule out cancers, you better check them out. Its care we are talking about. (Emphasis added). Clinical Lab asserts the emphasized language was so prejudicial as to require a new trial. A review of the extensive record before us reflects that, with the exception of the phrase not rush through screening, the emphasized language is as likely to be in reference to, and attributable to, the testimony of witnesses other than that obtained from the personnel records. Regarding the phrase not rush though screening, and a subsequent reference a short time later by Sander to Baer's concern about Hellman's rushing through pap smears, we note that a party is not prejudiced merely because his position is harmed by the evidence. Rather, there must be an unfair advantage gained by the opposing party through evidence which persuades the trier of fact by illegitimate means. Kaarup v. Schmitz, Kalda & Assocs., 436 N.W.2d 845, 850 (S.D.1989). There were repeated references by witnesses to the fact that Clinical Lab did not always look at pap smear slides in their entirety. Evidence that Kim's cytotechnologist may have rushed through pap smears may have been damning, but in view of other evidence before the jury, we are not persuaded its relevance was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the personnel records. We now turn to issues raised regarding the verdict and a subsequent tender by Clinical Lab to deposit the judgment amount with the court. [9]