Opinion ID: 795247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Based on Substantive State Common-Law Standards

Text: 62 We think, though, that some of Drake's allegations that the defendants violated substantive common-law standards of may be incompatible with federal law. 63 1. Enlargements of Federal Requirements. Although we have concluded that Drake may seek state-law remedies for violations of the federal regulations, we think that state law cannot enlarg[e] or enhanc[e] the regulations to impose burdens more onerous than those of the federal requirements on matters addressed by the federal regulations. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233, 115 S.Ct. 817. Throughout his complaint, for example, Drake claims that the defendants' actions, in addition to violating applicable federal regulations, were improper[] and wrongful[]. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 102, 113. If Drake is asserting that conduct addressed by the federal regulations is wrongful under state law although it does not violate the federal regulations, such claims are preempted. Consistency and uniformity require that drug-testing laboratories be able to follow the requirements of the federal regulations exactly as they are written. A state-law enlargement or variation of any specific requirement of the regulations would interfere with the laboratories' ability to do so. It would be a state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of the FAA regulations and therefore be preempted. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). 64 2. Industry Standards and Protocols. Drake's claim that the defendants-appellants acted negligently by ignor[ing] industry standards and protocols for random drug testing also appears to be preempted to the extent that it refers to standards and protocols other than those in the federal regulations. Compl. at ¶ 89. The FAA and DOT regulations prescribe a comprehensive set of standards and components to be included in a federally regulated drug testing program. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I. State laws mandating additional or other standards and components for drug-testing programs— whether or not inconsistent with the federal requirements—would require aviation-industry employers and drug-testing laboratories to comply with two separate sets of procedures when carrying out FAA-regulated drug testing. This appears to be precisely the sort of burden that the FAA was seeking to avoid when it stated that state laws covering the subject matter of the drug testing of aviation personnel are preempted. Id. § XI(A). 65 3. Misrepresentation. Drake's claim for misrepresentation, however, does not appear from the pleadings to be preempted, notwithstanding the fact that it is based on state-law standards of behavior rather than the standards set forth in the federal regulations. At the time of Drake's termination, there was nothing in the FAA regulations concerning false statements made by drug-testing laboratories during the course of federally mandated testing. 16 Thus, the tort of misrepresentation regulates an issue on which the regulations are silent. It does not cover the subject matter of any specific federal requirement. And complying with common-law restrictions on misrepresentation would not seem to us to impose any special burdens on drug-testing laboratories that would interfere with the consistency and uniformity of the federal drug-testing program. We therefore do not think that Drake's misrepresentation claim covers the subject matter of drug testing of aviation personnel under the meaning of the FAA regulations. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A).