Opinion ID: 1917563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL vs. SECTION 768.28(13)

Text: It is well settled in Florida and other jurisdictions that the statutes of limitation can be deflected by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. [9] This proposition is supported by vast precedent from this Court, [10] Florida district courts of appeal, [11] and federal courts. [12] HRS asserts that, despite this precedent, the statute of limitations in section 768.28(13) is somehow different from all other statutes of limitation in that it applies only to suits filed against the State as opposed to private persons. We find this claim disingenuous in light of the plain language of section 768.28(1), which provides that the State consents to be sued in accordance with the general laws of this state for any tort in which a private person would be liable to the claimant. This consent, we conclude, evinces an unequivocal intent on the part of the State to abide by the traditional lawsincluding the equitable canons governing tort actions in any claim filed under section 768.28. This conclusion is borne out by several considerations. First, equitable estoppel is a basic tenet of the common law [13] and any statute enacted in derogation of the common lawsuch as a statute of limitationsmust expressly so provide: [A]s noted above, equitable estoppel is a deeply rooted, centuries old tenet of the common law. On the other hand, fixed time limitations for filing suit, i.e., statutes of limitation, were unknown at common law and are a creature of modern statute. This Court has held that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed and that, even where the Legislature acts in a particular area, the common law remains in effect in that area unless the statute specifically says otherwise: The presumption is that no change in the common law is intended unless the statute is explicit and clear in that regard. Unless a statute unequivocally states that it changes the common law, or is so repugnant to the common law that the two cannot coexist, the statute will not be held to have changed the common law. Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914, 918 (Fla.1990). Major League Baseball, 790 So.2d at 1077-78 (footnote omitted). In the present case, not only does the plain language of section 768.28(13) not expressly change the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel, it does not mention or allude to that doctrine. And second, the basic purposes served by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of equitable estoppel are in harmony. [T]he fundamental purposes served by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of equitable estoppel are congruent. As noted above, a main purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect defendants from unfair surprise and stale claims. A prime purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is to prevent a party from profiting from his or her wrongdoing. Logic dictates that a defendant cannot be taken by surprise by the late filing of a suit when the defendant's own actions are responsible for the tardiness of the filing. Major League Baseball, 790 So.2d at 1078 (footnote omitted). In the present case, section 768.28(13) and the doctrine of equitable estoppel work hand in hand to achieve a common goalthe preservation of a viable and fair legal system.