Opinion ID: 779367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Alleged Breach of a Discovery Obligation

Text: 43 At the outset we note that, although the relief DeGeorge requested in its motion for sanctions was an adverse inference instruction, which usually is employed in cases involving spoliation of evidence, and the District Court accordingly decided DeGeorge's motion using our law on adverse inference instructions in the context of spoliation, this is not a typical spoliation case. It does not appear that RFC destroyed the e-mails on the back-up tapes. Rather, RFC failed to produce the e-mails in time for trial. Accordingly, this case is more akin to those in which a party breaches a discovery obligation or fails to comply with a court order regarding discovery. 44 Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that if a party fails to obey a discovery order, the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including, but not limited to, [a]n order that ... designated facts shall be taken as established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A). Rule 37(b) also provides that, in lieu of or in addition to any other appropriate order, 45 the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 46 Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b) (emphasis added). Even in the absence of a discovery order, a court may impose sanctions on a party for misconduct in discovery under its inherent power to manage its own affairs. DLC Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 135-36 (2d Cir.1998). See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (It has long been understood that `[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,' powers `which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.') (quoting United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812)). 47 Where, as here, the nature of the alleged breach of a discovery obligation is the non-production of evidence, a district court has broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction, including the discretion to delay the start of a trial (at the expense of the party that breached its obligation), to declare a mistrial if trial has already commenced, or to proceed with a trial and give an adverse inference instruction. See Reilly v. Natwest Markets Group Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir.1999) (Whether exercising its inherent power, or acting pursuant to Rule 37, a district court has wide discretion in sanctioning a party for discovery abuses.). In the instant case, however, DeGeorge chose not to seek a delay of the trial or a mistrial, but rather sought only an adverse inference instruction. Accordingly, we will not disturb the District Court's denial of DeGeorge's motion unless the District Court abused its discretion in failing to give the requested instruction. 48