Opinion ID: 2195278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The McDonnell Douglas Framework

Text: ¶ 24. McDonnell Douglas established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), in order to progressively... sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089. At the outset, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Boulton v. CLD Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 2003 VT 72, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. ___, 834 A.2d 37; Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 159, 624 A.2d at 1127. This step serves a screening function: it eliminates the most patently meritless claims  i.e., where the plaintiff was rejected for common nondiscriminatory reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The evidentiary burden required of the plaintiff at this stage is a relatively light one. See id. (burden at prima facie stage is not onerous); Beckmann v. Edson Hill Manor, Inc., 171 Vt. 607, 608, 764 A.2d 1220, 1222 (2000) (mem.). ¶ 25. The specific elements of a prima facie case may vary depending on the claim and the particular facts of the case. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (prima facie standard is not inflexible and may differ given differing factual situations). In general to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding this adverse employment action permit an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Bennett v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 136 F.Supp.2d 236, 246 (S.D.N.Y.2001); see also State v. Whitingham Sch. Bd., 138 Vt. 15, 19, 410 A.2d 996, 998-99 (1979); Carpenter v. Cent. Vt. Med. Ctr., 170 Vt. 565, 566, 743 A.2d 592, 594-95 (1999) (mem.) (elements for age discrimination). ¶ 26. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 159, 624 A.2d at 1127 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). This second step serves to respond to the plaintiff's prima facie case as well as to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The employer's burden at this second stage is solely one of production, not persuasion. Id. ¶ 27. If the employer meets his burden at this stage, the presumption of discrimination disappears, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's justification is a mere pretext for discrimination. Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 159, 624 A.2d at 1127. This third step is in keeping with the fact that [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089.