Opinion ID: 1061011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court's limitation at the

Text: SUPPRESSION HEARING OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SHEILA BUSH HAMMOCK VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE TENNESSEE CONSTITUTION. The appellant contends that, at the suppression hearing, he was limited and restricted from confronting [his] accuser, Sheila Bush (Hammock), and thereby denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The right to confrontation set forth in the Sixth Amendment includes the right to conduct cross-examination.12 However, we have previously observed, [I]t is elementary that the exclusion of immaterial or irrelevant evidence does not abridge an accused's right to confrontation. State v. Marquadis, 649 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986)(trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 12 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to the states through the Fou rteenth A men dme nt. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965). Moreover, our supreme court has largely adopted the standards of the United States Supreme Court under the Sixth Amendment in determining whether there has been a violation of the Te nness ee Co nstitution. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W .2d 317, 332 (Tenn. 1992 )(however, with respect to the right to phys ically confront one's accusers, our supreme court has observed that [t]he 'face-to-face' language found in the Tennessee Constitution has been held to impose a higher right than th at found in the fede ral cons titution, State v. Deuter, 839 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tenn. 1992)). -45- Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on ... crossexamination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant); Tenn. R. Evid. 611(a) ([t]he court shall exercise appropriate control over the presentation of evidence and conduct of the trial when necessary to avoid abuse by counsel). In other words, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 'an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense counsel might wish.' Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999 (1987)(citation omitted). We have already concluded that the testimony at the suppression hearing concerning the contents of the appellant's statements to Ms. Hammock would have been superfluous. Moreover, this court has held that the 'confrontation' guaranteed by the United States Constitution is confrontation at trial. Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1971). Similarly, in Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 999, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court observed that the right to confrontation is a trial right. See also United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 881 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. De Los Santos, 819 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Boyce, 797 F.2d 691, 693 (8th Cir. 1986).13 Defense counsel was able to fully and extensively cross13 In Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 738, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2663 n.9 (1987), Justice Blackmun stated that, in his opinio n, de nying a defe nda nt ac ces s to in form ation befo re tria l may hinder that defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination, thereby implicating the Confrontation Clause. However, our supreme court in Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 832, noted that [t]he right to cross-examine witnesses ... does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosu re of any an d all inform ation that m ight be us eful in con tradicting un favorab le testimo ny. In any event, the State in this case followed a policy of open file discovery and, prior to trial, informed the appe llant's coun sel of the s tatem ents m ade by the appellant to Sheila Bu sh Ha mm ock. -46- examine Ms. Hammock at trial. This claim is without merit. 4. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE TESTIMONY OF OTHER INMATES. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing jailhouse informants to testify against the appellant concerning statements made by the appellant during his incarceration. The appellant filed a motion on October 16, 1992, to exclude the testimony of William Moore, Jimmy Myers, Billy Goney, and other inmates, based on the allegation that law enforcement officers asked the inmates to elicit statements from the appellant in violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199 (1964). On November 13, 1992, an evidentiary hearing was held to resolve the appellant's motion. Billy Goney and Jimmy Myers testified at the hearing. Billy Goney stated that he was incarcerated with Michael Bush at the Putnam County Jail between September or October of 1988 and April of 1989. He further alleged that, approximately one week after the appellant was placed in the jail, Bobby Lane and Doug Burgess, investigators with the Putnam County Sheriff's Department, asked Goney and fellow inmates, Guy Ramsey and Jimmy Myers, to tape conversations with Michael Bush. The inmates were told that, if they cooperated with the police, the police would help [them] out. The inmates already had access to tape recorders and tapes, and the inmates used the equipment to tape conversations with the appellant. However, Goney added, [W]hat we'd do was like Jimmy would ask Michael a question, say, did you kill that old woman, and we'd have the recorder playing and we'd ease up off the play button. Then -47- they would ask him another question like, do you like karate, and he would say, yeah, and we'd push yeah when he was saying yes. Goney stated that he and his fellow informants made approximately three tapes, and that Jimmy Myers, his half-brother, delivered the tapes to Deputy Lane. Goney insisted that he never heard the appellant admit to killing Jodie Lefever. Jimmy Myers also testified at the hearing. He was also incarcerated at the Putnam County Jail in September of 1988. Indeed, he shared a cell with the appellant. However, Myers testified that neither Deputy Burgess nor Deputy Lane asked the inmates to record conversations with Michael Bush. Rather, Myers asserted that Goney and Ramsey first suggested taping the appellant and first contacted Deputies Lane and Burgess. His testimony is somewhat unclear as to whether the tapes were made before or after the inmates contacted the deputies. Myers conceded that the officers may have been aware that the tapes were being made. In any event, before the tapes were made, Myers heard the appellant admit to killing Ms. Lefever. Well, one time he was telling me and Billy and Ramsey all, I mean, he told us he tied Ms. Lefever up and stuff and stabbed her and waited on his wife. His wife dropped him off and came back to pick him up, and he went down to the dam and washed blood off of him and stuff. And, I mean, that's about all he said. And then some other times he would tell a different story. Again, Myers could not remember whether he and the other inmates spoke to the deputies before or after they overheard this statement. Finally, Myers conceded on cross-examination that it was common knowledge at the jail that inmates could -48- get help from the police if they provided information. However, he testified that he was not promised any assistance in return for his testimony. Deputy Burgess testified at the hearing that he never asked any of the inmates to tape conversations with Michael Bush, nor, to his knowledge, had any other deputy made such a request. Moreover, he never received any tapes, nor was he aware that tapes had been turned over to the Sheriff's Department until he found a tape in Bobby Lane's office the day before the hearing. He was not aware of any agreement between jailhouse informants and the police. He testified that Billy Goney and, possibly, Jimmy Myers had asked to speak with him several times. He spoke with Goney privately maybe one or two times. He told Goney to keep his ears open and if he heard anything, let us know. Goney was unable to provide any useful information. At a subsequent hearing, on December 10, 1992, Burgess stated that he would not have turned to inmates to obtain incriminating statements from Michael Bush because [t]hat's no good in court. We can't use it. At the December 10 hearing, Deputy Bobby Lane testified that, during the course of his investigation of the Lefever murder, he never asked inmates to secretly record conversations with the appellant. Goney approached him with two tapes, but [t]he tapes was garbage. There wasn't any use in keeping the tapes. Lane did not have any subsequent conversations with Goney about the tapes, nor did Lane talk to any other inmate. On December 22, 1992, the trial court denied the appellant's motion, observing, I think it's a question of credibility for the jury to decide. -49- At trial, no tapes were introduced into evidence. However, Jimmy Myers and William Roger Moore testified. Jimmy Myers again stated that he had heard the appellant admit to killing Jodie Lefever. Bush also told Myers that he was going to try to make people think he was crazy. Myers testified that these statements were not recorded, as the informants began taping the appellant only after the appellant's lawyers advised him against talking to fellow inmates about the murder. After the appellant was so advised, he changed his story several times. Finally, Myers insisted that he was never offered any form of compensation in return for his testimony. On cross-examination, he conceded that he had written a letter to an assistant district attorney, in which he stated, If you can help me out in any way, I promise you that you will not be sorry. Finally, William Roger Moore, another fellow inmate of Michael Bush following the appellant's incarceration at the Putnam County Jail, also testified at trial. Moore stated that, as there was very little to do at the jail, Bush approached him and initiated several conversations. The appellant admitted to Moore that he had killed Jodie Lefever. The appellant also stated that he was going to make a ploy for craziness. Moore imparted this information to Special Agent O'Rear, an agent with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. Moore testified that he was not offered any compensation in return for his cooperation, nor did he ask for any compensation. Again, the appellant argues that any incriminating statements made by the appellant to fellow inmates were elicited in violation of Massiah. We note, initially, that, because only Jimmy Myers and William Moore testified at trial, the denial of -50- the motion to suppress with respect to Goney and other inmates, even if erroneous, was harmless. See Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 100 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Sparks, 727 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tenn. 1987), post-conviction relief granted, No. 03S01-9212-CR-00105 (Tenn. May 10, 1993). With respect to Myers and Moore, the clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1240 (1977). Thus, in order to find a Massiah violation, a court must first determine (1) whether adversary proceedings had commenced; (2) whether the informant was a government agent; and (3) whether the agent interrogated the appellant within the meaning of Massiah. The initiation of adversary proceedings is marked by formal charge, which [has been] construe[d] to be an arrest warrant, or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant, or by indictment or presentment. State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845, 101 S.Ct. 128 (1980). Clearly, at the time the appellant allegedly made the incriminating statements to fellow inmates, he had been formally charged and, probably, indicted.14 It is arguably unclear whether Myers was acting as a government agent. This court in State v. Dunn, No. 85-356-III (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 6, 14 The appellant was arrested on September 25, 1988, and indicted the next day. The record does not reflect precisely when the appellant mad e the incriminating statements. Howe ver, the statements were made after the appellant's arrest and consequent incarceration in the Putnam Cou nty Ja il. -51- 1986) observed, Although Massiah and it progeny do not explicitly define the term 'state agent,' the conduit in each of these cases was clearly a state agent, operating as such, when the conversations occurred. Thus, any admissions made by the appellant before law enforcement officers became involved would, of course, be admissible. Hartman, 896 S.W.2d at 100. [T]he Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever - by luck or happenstance - the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 487 (1985). Again, at the suppression hearing, Goney testified that Deputies Burgess and Lane asked inmates, including Myers, to record conversations with the appellant. However, Goney's testimony was largely contradicted by the testimony of both deputies and by the testimony of Myers. 15 At trial, Myers recounted statements by the appellant, overheard prior to the recording of any conversations. At the suppression hearing, Myers could not remember whether he heard these statements before or after first talking to Burgess and Lane. Both deputies, for the most part, denied enlisting inmates to obtain statements from the appellant, although Deputy Burgess admitted that he might have asked Goney to keep his ears open. Even assuming that Myers was a state agent, the appellant at the suppression hearing also carried the burden of demonstrating that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed 15 In any even t, no tapes were ev er introduc ed either a t the supp ression hearing o r at trial. -52- deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456, 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2628, 2630 (1986). At the suppression hearing, Goney testified that he and Guy Ramsey recorded conversations with the appellant, during which they attempted, with Myers' assistance, to elicit and, indeed, fabricate a confession.16 However, Myers testified that he did not participate in the recording of any statements. Rather, he testified both at the suppression hearing and at trial that he merely overheard the appellant confess to the murder of Ms. Lefever. There is no evidence in the record that this statement was made in response to efforts by the other inmates to stimulate conversation about the crime charged. Given the conflicting testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, the record supports the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion with respect to Jimmy Myers. The findings made by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing are afforded the weight of a jury verdict; this court will not set aside the judgment of the trial court unless the evidence in the record preponderates against its findings. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Dick, 872 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1993); State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). In any event, assuming for the sake of argument that Myers was a state agent and assuming that he interrogated the appellant within the meaning of Massiah, the admission at trial of Myers' testimony was harmless error. See 16 Deputy Lane testified at the suppression hearing that the resultant tapes contained no incriminating evidence. -53- Hartman, 896 S.W.2d at 100; Sparks, 727 S.W.2d at 482. W illiam Moore testified at trial concerning almost identical statements made by the appellant to him in the Putnam County Jail. The record is devoid of evidence that Moore was a state agent at the time of his conversations with Michael Bush, nor is there evidence that he made any effort to elicit statements from the accused about the crime charged. This issue is without merit. 5. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress certain photographs of the victim. Specifically, he insists that the pictures were admitted only for the purpose of inflaming the jury, thus, their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. Additionally, the appellant argues that the photographs had no probative value in light of the vivid description of the victim's body given in Officer Lane's testimony. During a jury-out hearing, the State attempted to present four photographs of the victim. Exhibit 25 was a photograph of the victim as she was discovered by Officer Lane. Exhibit 26 was a photograph which showed wounds to the victim's head. Exhibit 27 was a photograph which showed the lower dental plate of the victim on the floor next to her body. Exhibit 28 showed a wound to the victim's left knee. The State argued that the photographs were relevant to corroborate medical testimony, to aid the jury in determining the extent of the wounds, and to -54- establish the element of malice. The appellant responded that the pictures did not add to testimonial value as Officer Lane had already described the wounds in great detail. The appellant concluded that, moreover, the pictures were more prejudicial than probative. The trial court accepted the State's argument that Exhibit 25 was probative to show the placement of the wounds on the body, Exhibit 27 was probative as to the amount of force that was used to dislodge the dental plate from the victim's mouth, and Exhibit 28 was probative to show additional wounds on the body. Furthermore, the trial court found that the probative value of these three photographs was not outweighed by their prejudicial effect. However, the trial court sustained the appellant's objection to Exhibit 26, finding it to be the most gruesome of the pictures, and finding it to not accurately depict the victim's wounds. To be admissible, a photograph must be relevant to some issue at trial, and its prejudicial effect must not outweigh its probative value. State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 403. The discretion of a trial judge in allowing the admission of a photograph into evidence will not be overturned except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citations omitted); see also State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 542 (Tenn. 1994). We conclude that it was not error to admit the photographs in this case. The photographs were relevant to supplement the testimony of the medical -55- examiner and the officer who initially investigated the crime scene in establishing the cause of death, see Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 542, and to show the brutality of the attack and extent of force used against the victim, from which the jury could infer malice. See State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 551 (Tenn. 1992). This issue is without merit. 6. WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF BASED ON ALLEGATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. A. LACK OF REMORSE The appellant first argues that the prosecutor erroneously elicited testimony concerning the appellant's lack of remorse from three witnesses. When questioned by the prosecutor as to whether the appellant had expressed any remorse for what he had done, William Roger Moore, an inmate who had been incarcerated with the appellant, answered that the appellant had expressed remorse only in that he had gotten caught. When asked whether he had observed any sadness on the part of the appellant when the appellant had shown him a newspaper account of the murder, James Mullins, a friend of the appellant, testified that he had observed no sadness. When asked whether the appellant had expressed any remorse or sadness for what he had done, Shelia Bush (Hammock) testified that he had expressed no remorse. The failure of defense counsel to make a contemporaneous objection -56- waives consideration of the issue on appeal. See Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915,926 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1989); State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1988); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). A review of the record reveals that of the three statements to which the appellant now objects, the appellant only objected to the prosecutor's question to James Mullins, and the objection was based on the fact that it was a leading question. We conclude that the appellant has waived this issue. B. IRRELEVANT OPINION EVIDENCE The appellant next contends that the prosecutor erred in eliciting irrelevant opinion evidence from Jimmy Myers, another inmate who had been incarcerated with the appellant. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Myers why he was in court testifying. Myers responded that it could be my mother or my grandmother, someone that's you know, laying there dead you know. I don't think someone should kill someone like that and just walk the streets. Get out scot free. The appellant contends that the prosecutor deliberately brought before the jury evidence which was wholly irrelevant to the appellant's guilt or innocence. However, the record reveals that on cross-examination, appellant's counsel questioned Myers extensively concerning his true motivation for testifying. We conclude that the question asked by the prosecutor was appropriate, notwithstanding the witness' nonresponsive statement. This issue is without merit. -57-