Opinion ID: 492687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Current Rates

Text: 24 The state also challenges the court's use of current rates. In Sec. 1988 cases, payment of attorney's fees is contingent upon success and is delayed until after the litigation has ended. In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 810 F.2d 601, 608 (7th Cir.1986). To compensate for the delay in payment and to simplify its calculation, courts often calculate fee awards using current market rates as opposed to historic rates. The current market rates of the relevant legal community may approximate the value today of the historic rates charged at the time when the legal services actually were rendered. Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1433 (D.C.Cir.1984). This circuit has approved the use of current rates in similar, multiple-year litigation, see, e.g., In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 810 F.2d at 609; Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 690 F.2d 601, 612 (7th Cir.1982); and Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 764 and n. 6 (7th Cir.1982), and, absent some compelling reason, we are unwilling to disturb the court's use of current rates here. See also Strama v. Peterson, 689 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.1982); Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931. Of course it is important in using current rates to avoid providing the attorneys with a windfall. See Ohio-Sealy, 776 F.2d at 662. Aware of this concern, the district court here determined that the use of current rates would compensate the attorneys for the delay in payment without creating a windfall. The court based this on its finding that the award at current rates was less than it would have been had the court utilized historic rates multiplied by the applicable interest rates. Lightfoot II, 619 F.Supp. at 1489. 25 The state argues, however, that a windfall results where as here the prevailing party is responsible for the delay in payment. While this may generally be true, we have already determined that the plaintiffs in this case were not responsible for protracting the litigation by refusing to settle. Moreover, even if the parties had settled, there is no guarantee that the settlement would have been expeditious. When broad equitable relief is sought to remedy a constitutional violation, it is not unusual for the parties to struggle, often for years, over the scope and details of injunctive relief. Gautreaux, 690 F.2d at 609-10. 26 Nor were the plaintiffs' attorneys dilatory in pursuing their fee petition as the state asserts. Shortly after the underlying litigation ended, but before the state had substantially complied with the court's remedial order, Grossman and Flynn began pursuing their Sec. 1988 claim. Unfortunately, as the district court noted, the fee issue erupted into a second major litigation. Our review of the record suggests that the state was at least equally responsible for the fact that five and one-half years elapsed between the issuance of the district court's underlying order and its fee orders. 8 The state wants to accept no responsibility for the delay, however, arguing that plaintiffs' counsel intentionally failed to press their claim until 1984, when the Supreme Court decided in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) that nonprofit attorneys should be paid prevailing market rates under Sec. 1988. We disagree. Although the trial ended in late 1976, the court did not enter its order until 1980. For some time after that the plaintiffs' attorneys assisted in monitoring compliance with that order and, in October 1981, they filed their fee petition requesting a ruling without a hearing. Thereafter, the state requested a hearing and the state, after a hearing date was initially set for June 1984, requested a continuance. This, combined with the briefing schedule and the district court's own busy docket, pushed back the fee hearing until November 1984--about eight months after Blum was decided. The delay thus cannot reasonably be blamed on the plaintiffs' attorneys. Moreover, there was no reason to await the outcome of Blum since this circuit had previously approved the payment of market rates to nonprofit attorneys. See, e.g., Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir.1975); Brown v. Stanton, 617 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir.1980); Gautreaux, 690 F.2d 613. We therefore conclude that payment for all hours at current rates adequately compensated these nonprofit attorneys by mitigating the delay in payment.