Opinion ID: 1268686
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Heading: The Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Commission.

Text: The New Mexico Constitution grants the Commission the following powers: The commission shall have power and be charged with the duty of fixing, determining, supervising, regulating and controlling all charges and rates of railway, express, telegraph, telephone, sleeping car and other transportation and transmission companies and common carriers within the state and of determining any matters of public convenience and necessity relating to such facilities as expressed herein in the manner which has been or shall be provided by law   . (Emphasis added.) N.M. Const. art. XI, § 7 (Cum.Supp. 1985). It is the cable companies' position that this constitutional provision conveys jurisdiction only over enterprises that have traditionally held themselves out for hire to the public as common carriers. We disagree. In construing the New Mexico Constitution, this Court must ascertain the intent and objectives of the framers. Board of County Commissioners v. McCulloh, 52 N.M. 210, 195 P.2d 1005 (1948). Although a court may not broaden the scope of constitutional provisions beyond their intent, Board of Education v. Robinson, 57 N.M. 445, 259 P.2d 1028 (1953), the Constitution, by its very nature, has some flexibility. Words employed are not necessarily fixed in meaning, but over the years may change and grow to reflect changes in the conditions and knowledge of modern society. Humana of New Mexico, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners, 92 N.M. 34, 582 P.2d 806 (1978). Various interpretations of the phrase telephone, sleeping-car and other transportation and transmission companies and common carriers have been urged upon us. Although the Constitution does not define telephone companies or transmission companies, this Court has previously determined that transmission companies refers to companies, like telephone companies, which transmit messages. La Follette v. Albuquerque Gas & Electric Co.'s Rates, 37 N.M. 57, 17 P.2d 944 (1932). The cable companies do not contest that their data transmission services involve the transmission of messages, but rather argue that in providing such services they must also be a public utility or common carrier to fall within the scope of Article XI, Section 7. They contend that because of the nature of the cable television industry and the experimental nature of data transmission services, they will not offer the services on a common carrier basis, but will discriminately service particular clients on a contract basis, tailoring the service to meet individual customers' particular needs. Nor are they public utilities, they argue, since data transmission services are not essential services offered to the public indiscriminately in a monopoly market. We agree with the telephone companies' contention that the Commission's constitutional jurisdiction is not limited to telecommunication services which are provided only on a common carrier basis. Article XI, Section 7 gives the Commission broad powers and duties with respect to all charges and rates of telegraph and telephone companies, other transmission companies, and common carriers. See Las Cruces TV Cable v. New Mexico Corporation Commission, 102 N.M. 720, 699 P.2d 1072 (1985). As this Court has previously stated, It is difficult to conceive of a more clear and all-inclusive grant of power to a governmental agency. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. New Mexico State Corporation Commission, 90 N.M. 325, 331, 563 P.2d 588, 594 (1977). See also San Juan Coal & Coke Co. v. Santa Fe, San Juan & Northern Railway Co., 35 N.M. 512, 2 P.2d 305 (1931) (the language of Article XI, Section 7 is all-inclusive). The provisions of the Constitution should not be considered in isolation, but rather should be construed as a whole. State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968). When Article XI is considered in its entirety, we believe it becomes evident that the scope of the Commission's authority was not intended to be limited to common carriers. All references to common carriers in Article XI place common carriers in a separate category, distinct from the other terms used. Section 8 refers to telephone or telegraph company or common carrier; Section 9, to transportation and transmission companies and common carriers and to transportation or transmission company or common carrier; and Sections 10 and 11 similarly place this term apart from the other categories. Section 7 does not read and other common carriers. If a statute makes sense as written, a court will not read words into it which are not present. Burroughs v. Board of County Commissioners, 88 N.M. 303, 540 P.2d 233 (1975). This rule of statutory construction is equally applicable to constitutional provisions. See Postal Finance Co. v. Sisneros, 84 N.M. 724, 507 P.2d 785 (1973). The Commission's constitutional authority to regulate the rates and charges of motor carriers is also derived from Article XI, Section 7. This constitutional authority is implemented by the Motor Carrier Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 65-2-80 to -127 (Repl.Pamp. 1981 and Cum.Supp. 1985). The Motor Carrier Act establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme for motor carriers providing transportation services for compensation on either a common carrier or a contract carrier basis. Private carriers, carriers that are not for hire, are excluded from regulation. § 65-2-126 (Cum.Supp. 1985); Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corporation Commission, 93 N.M. 539, 602 P.2d 1026 (1979). This Court has previously recognized that the Commission may legitimately exercise its jurisdiction over both common motor carriers and contract motor carriers. See Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc.; Rountree v. State Corporation Commission, 40 N.M. 152, 56 P.2d 1121 (1936). Just as the Commission may regulate contract motor carriers, similarly we determine that it may also regulate contract telephone or transmission carriers. As the Motor Carrier Act illustrates, the Commission may validly regulate companies that clearly are not monopolies, but rather operate in a competitive market place. The constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the Commission is not limited, as is the purely statutory authority of the New Mexico Public Service Commission, to regulation of public utilities involved in the rendition of essential public services to a large number of the general public. See NMSA 1978, § 62-3-1 (Repl.Pamp. 1984); Socorro Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Public Service Co., 66 N.M. 343, 348 P.2d 88 (1959). Nevertheless, the Commission found that data transmission services are essential to a growing segment of the public and rise to a level of public interest sufficient to invoke the State's regulatory jurisdiction. See In re Southern New England Telephone Co., 59 Pub.Util.Rep. 4th (PUR) 156 (Conn. Department of Public Utility Control 1984) (public need for digital data services). A willingness to serve the public indiscriminately is not necessary; service to sufficient of the public to clothe the operation with a public interest is all that is required for state regulation to be appropriate. Griffith v. New Mexico Public Service Commission, 86 N.M. 113, 116, 520 P.2d 269, 272 (1974). Whether or not the cable companies are common carriers is an issue we need not address in this case, since we have determined that contract carriers as well as common carriers fall within the Commission's constitutional regulatory authority. Other states have permitted the regulation of data transmission companies providing intrastate services. See, e.g., In re Southern New England Telephone Co.; Data Transmission Co. v. Corporation Commission, 561 P.2d 50 (Okl. 1977). In Data Transmission Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's grant of a certificate of convenience and necessity allowing a company to provide intrastate microwave transmission services. The Oklahoma court found the company to be a transmission company as that term is used in the Oklahoma Constitution and subject to its commission's regulation. Although the Oklahoma Constitution provided that [a] `transmission company' shall include any company, receiver or other person owning, leasing or operating for hire any telegraph or telephone line, Okl. Const. Article 9, Section 34, the Oklahoma court held that it would be unwise to infer that by specifically including only telephone and telegraph companies, the founders of our constitution meant to exclude forever regulation by the Commission of companies who would transmit through a neoteric medium. Data Transmission at 57. Likewise, we determine that although digital high speed data transmission companies were not existent at the time our Constitution was adopted, the terms used were intended to be flexible and encompass such services as they developed. For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that regulation of intrastate digital high speed data transmission services, provided on a contract basis for compensation, is within the Commission's constitutional mandate.