Opinion ID: 2751912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alleyne Errors Here

Text: Before explaining the Alleyne errors that the government concedes, we must first address the government's claim that Pizarro may have waived his Alleyne argument because of the way he conducted this appeal. The government takes the position that [w]hen Pizarro filed his appellate brief on February 13, 2013, he had the opportunity but failed to raise on appeal the claim that his sentence was imposed in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), since the 10-year mandatory minimum was based on the court's findings as to drug quantity. However, the government is simply wrong. Pizarro did raise his Alleyne claim in his opening brief by arguing that a conspiracy-wide, judicial determination of quantity by a preponderance [of the evidence] for the purpose of establishing a statutory sentencing range in a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy is error. He concluded that after 5 During oral argument, we instructed the government and Pizarro to file supplemental briefs on the Alleyne issue. -12- Apprendi, a jury should be required to make an individual determination of drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt to establish a statutory sentencing range in a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy. The argument that the statutory sentencing range was applied in error inescapably encompassed an Alleyne claim regarding the mandatory minimum. As the government says he should have done, Pizarro cited Apprendi to support this argument. Hence, under the standard set out by the government itself, Pizarro raised his Alleyne claim on appeal in his opening brief.6 Moreover, in his supplemental brief filed after oral argument, Pizarro specifically characterizes his claim as one under Alleyne. Under our precedent on Apprendi, Pizarro's supplemental brief alone would have been sufficient to raise the Alleyne claim. See United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that Apprendi issue was properly submitted for disposition where we extended an invitation to LaFreniere and the government to supplement their briefs addressing the possible relevance of Apprendi). Hence, we reject the government's position in its supplemental brief that Pizarro's Alleyne claim is potentially waived on appeal. Under Apprendi and now Alleyne, each of the subsections of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), with its associated drug quantities and 6 As the government itself implicitly recognizes, Pizarro could not have cited Alleyne as authority in his opening brief because it was filed before Alleyne was decided. -13- sentencing ranges, is a separate crime. Indeed, the Supreme Court has so held. Citing Alleyne and Apprendi, the Supreme Court in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014), explained that because an aggravating element in § 841(b)(1) -- that death results from the use of the distributed drug -- increased the minimum and maximum sentences to which [the defendant] was exposed, it is an element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887 (citing Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162-63; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).7 Burrage concluded that a violation of § 841(a)(1), without a finding on the death results aggravating element, is a lesser-included offense of the aggravated offense that includes the death results element under § 841(b)(1). 134 S. Ct. at 887 n.3. See also United States v. Pena, 742 F.3d 508, 517, 519 (1st Cir. 2014) (same). Just as the death results element makes the distribution of drugs where death results a separate crime from the distribution of drugs without a death resulting, drug quantity in § 841(b)(1) creates aggravated conspiracy and possession offenses. Under Alleyne, the operative question for a drug conspiracy is whether it is the individualized drug quantity that is a fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence, Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. We have already answered that question in United States v. Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2004), where 7 Like the aggravating element of drug quantity, death results is a distinct aggravating element in § 841(b)(1). -14- we held that a mandatory minimum is made potentially available by a finding that the conspiracy as a whole handled (or at least contemplated) the necessary triggering amount, but a mandatory minimum cannot be applied in [a particular coconspirator's] case without an individualized finding that the triggering amount was attributable to, or foreseeable by, him. Id. at 103.8 ColónSolís was decided prior to Alleyne; therefore, after Colón-Solís, that individualized finding was made by the sentencing judge. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne, the drug quantity that triggers the mandatory minimum for a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy, like the drug quantity that triggers the statutory maximum under Apprendi, must now be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.9 But, those quantities serve different purposes: while it is the conspiracy-wide quantity that governs the statutory maximum, Casas, 425 F.3d at 66 n.58, it is the individualized quantity, i.e., the quantity that is foreseeable to 8 Casas itself recognized this principle: In the absence of such an individualized finding, the drug quantity attributable to the conspiracy as a whole cannot automatically be shifted to the defendant. Casas, 425 F.3d at 57-58 (quoting Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d at 103). 9 In United States v. Paladin, 748 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2014), the defendant also made the argument that, after Alleyne, ColónSolís required the jury to find an individualized drug quantity triggering a mandatory minimum, but it was unnecessary for us to decide the issue in that case. See id. at 452-53 (Paladin urges a collective reading of Colón-Solís and Alleyne to require that the jury make an individualized finding as to the quantity of drugs attributable to a particular defendant.). -15- the defendant, that triggers the mandatory minimum, Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d at 103. Having been indicted for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 1.4 kilograms of heroin and 9,445 kilograms of cocaine, Pizarro most recently was sentenced on the conspiracy count to 23 1/3 years in prison under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which applies a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Pizarro is correct, however, that the jury did not make a finding with respect to the quantity of drugs in the conspiracy foreseeable to him.10 Indeed, we have already held that to be the case: We wish to clarify that the jury verdict of guilty did not determine the amount of drugs attributed to each defendant. Casas, 425 F.3d at 65 n.56. Therefore, Alleyne error occurred in Pizarro's case in the conspiracy conviction. There was also Alleyne error in Pizarro's possession conviction. He was indicted for possession with intent to distribute eighty-one kilograms of cocaine and, as with the conspiracy count, was sentenced on the possession count to 23 1/3 years of imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A), carrying the ten-year mandatory minimum. However, the jury did not make the requisite finding of drug quantity for that sentence. In fact, the jury was instructed that quantity was irrelevant: The United States is not 10 Pizarro's trial occurred years before the Supreme Court decided Alleyne; hence, there was no precedent at the time requiring the jury to make the individualized drug quantity finding on the conspiracy count. -16- required to prove that the amount or quantity was as charged in the indictment. It need only prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a measurable amount of the controlled substance.11 Henceforth, under Alleyne and Apprendi, the jury must find the mandatory-minimum and statutory-maximum triggering elements. In a drug conspiracy or possession conviction with a mandatory minimum and statutory maximum based on drug quantity, the jury must find those requisite drug quantities.12 For example, for a cocaine conspiracy conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A), which imposes a mandatory minimum of ten years and a statutory maximum of life imprisonment, the jury must now find that the defendant (1) conspired, § 846; (2) knowingly or intentionally to distribute 11 Again, this instruction reflected the state of the law at that time. 12 On the other hand, where the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum do not depend on drug quantity, the court, without any jury finding, may make its own drug quantity findings for sentencing purposes. For example, during sentencing for a conviction under § 841(b)(1)(C), where the indictment had not specified the quantity of cocaine or heroin or only charged small amounts, a district court may make an individualized drug quantity finding for a conspiracy charge (and a drug quantity finding for a possession charge) by a preponderance of the evidence to determine the advisory Guidelines sentence. See Ramírez-Negrón, 751 F.3d at 4849 (recognizing that the district court may make drug quantity findings by a preponderance of the evidence to calculate an advisory Guidelines sentence for a § 841(b)(1)(C) offense). After calculating that advisory Guidelines sentence, the district court must then use its discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory sentencing range mandated by the jury's verdict. If, for a conviction under § 841(b)(1)(C), the court determines that the advisory Guidelines sentence is greater than twenty years, § 841(b)(1)(C)'s statutory twenty-year maximum nevertheless caps any sentence that the district court can give. -17- cocaine, § 841(a)(1); (3) in a conspiracy that involved a total of five kilograms or more of cocaine, § 841(b)(1)(A); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; (4) where at least five kilograms of cocaine were foreseeable to the defendant, § 841(b)(1)(A); Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155; Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d at 103.13 For a possession conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A), a crime that by its nature only assesses the conduct of an individual, rather than the conduct of co-conspirators, the jury must find that the defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally possessed with intent to distribute, § 841(a)(1); (2) at least five kilograms of cocaine, § 841(b)(1)(A); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.14 13 In the case of a cocaine conspiracy, if the jury makes the required threshold findings of at least five kilograms, but does not indicate a specific quantity, and the district court chooses to sentence above the mandatory minimum, the court must make an individualized drug quantity finding by a preponderance of the evidence. The court would have to find the specific quantity of cocaine foreseeable to the defendant to determine the recommended sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. See Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d at 103. That fact-finding may require credibility assessments for any witnesses on whose testimony the court relies. See Correy, 570 F.3d at 380-81. In its discretion, the court will then impose a sentence within the statutory range. 14 As with a conspiracy conviction, if the jury makes the required threshold finding of at least five kilograms for a cocaine possession count, but does not indicate a specific quantity, and the district court chooses to sentence above the mandatory minimum, it must make a drug quantity finding by a preponderance of the evidence to determine the recommended sentence under the Guidelines. The court will then use its discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range. -18-