Opinion ID: 1390176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: .Legal Standard For Reviewing Alleged Breach of Plea Agreement by Defendant

Text: Although this court has no reported decisions addressing an appeal by the government of a defendant's breach of a plea agreement, we have exercised de novo review over the question whether the government has breached the plea agreement. United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 293-94 (3d Cir.2004). In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), the United States Supreme Court analyzed a plea agreement according to contract law principles. Santobello was charged with two felony counts related to gambling. The government agreed to permit him to plead guilty to a lesser included offense rather than the felony offenses, and agreed to make no recommendation regarding the sentence. Nonetheless, at sentencing the government recommended the maximum sentence. The Supreme Court concluded that the government breached the plea agreement, explaining that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495 (noting that a plea agreement is a bargained-for and negotiated exchange of promises). In determining whether the government has breached a plea agreement, this court applies the same approach that the Supreme Court articulated in Santobello. We look to the well-established principle that [p]lea agreements, although arising in the criminal context, are analyzed under contract law standards. United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir.1998). However, we have cautioned that because a defendant gives up multiple constitutional rights by entering into a plea agreement, courts must carefully scrutinize the agreement to insure that the government has fulfilled its promises. Rivera, 357 F.3d at 294-95. [I]n `view of the government's tremendous bargaining power [courts] will strictly construe the text against [the government] when it has drafted the agreement.' United States v. Floyd, 428 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir.2000)). Thus, any ambiguities in a plea agreement must be construed against the government. Id. Under contract principles, a plea agreement necessarily works both ways. Not only must the government comply with its terms and conditions, but so must [the defendant]. United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir.1995). We have observed that a defendant should not be permitted to get the benefits of [his] plea bargain, while evading the costs . . . and contract law would not support such a result. United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 345 (3d Cir.2004) (concluding that defendant, who was contending on appeal that the District Court erred by applying a particular cross-reference under U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(c), should be held to the terms of her plea agreement, which stated that the agreed-upon guideline should apply). Under the law of this circuit, [a defendant] cannot renege on his agreement. United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir.1998). When a defendant stipulates to a point in a plea agreement, he is not in a position to make . . . arguments [to the contrary]. United States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir.1995), aff'd 518 U.S. 120, 116 S.Ct. 2057, 135 L.Ed.2d 427 (1996). We have held that we have `no difficulty in holding [a defendant] to the plea agreement for he seeks the benefits of it without the burdens.' Cianci, 154 F.3d at 110 (quoting United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir.1989)). Applying those principles, it is clear that if we did not enforce a plea agreement against a breaching defendant, it would have a corrosive effect on the plea agreement process. We have little doubt that if the government had argued for an upward departure in this case, we would have concluded that the government breached the plea agreement. Because a plea agreement is a bargained-for exchange, contract principles would counsel that we reach the same conclusion when a defendant breaches a plea agreement as we would reach if the government breached. See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (noting that a plea agreement is a bargained-for exchange). If that were not the case, the government would have no meaningful recourse if it performed its end of the agreement but did not receive the benefit of its bargain in return. See United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir.1989) (stating the fundamental principle that one party cannot be held to a bargain that the other party has breached). That scenario would make the current system of plea agreements untenable because it would render the concept of a binding agreement a legal fiction. That result would be unworkable because our criminal justice system depends upon the plea agreement process. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261, 92 S.Ct. 495 (explaining why disposition of charges by plea agreements is an essential part of the judicial process). We do not doubt that the government possesses tremendous bargaining power in the negotiation of plea agreements. That does not, in and of itself, make the plea agreement unenforceable. Our recognition that the government has a great deal of leverage in striking plea bargains is one reason why we construe ambiguities in such an agreement against the government. Floyd, 428 F.3d at 516. The relevant portions of Williams' plea agreement, however, are not ambiguous, and thus there is no reason to construe those portions against the government. After all, the government always has leverage, and yet we routinely enforce plea agreements in which defendants waive important constitutional rights, such as the right to appeal. See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir.2001) (enforcing waiver of appellate rights); see also United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 202 (3d Cir.2007). It is an important consideration in reviewing a plea agreement that a defendant generally reaps benefits by entering into such an agreement. See Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 9 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. 2680 (observing that both parties may receive substantial benefits if the plea agreement so provides). In this case, the government agreed not to file a second offender information under 21 U.S.C. § 851. That could have increased Williams' statutory mandatory minimum penalty from ten years to twenty years because he has a prior felony conviction. [4] In addition, the government agreed not to charge Williams with the separate offense of possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which carries a consecutive mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years. As a result, by entering into the plea agreement with its stipulations, Williams received a statutory minimum fifteen years lower than that which he could have faced absent agreement with the government. [5] Several courts of appeals presented with a claim that a defendant breached a plea agreement have applied basic principles of contract law to the analysis whether a breach occurred and the determination of the proper remedy. In United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1325-26 (7th Cir. 1988), Ataya and the government had reached a plea agreement that included the joint undertakings that the government would dismiss one of the three charges against Ataya, he would plead guilty to the other two and he would cooperate, including testifying against a co-defendant. He declined to testify at a second trial, and the government filed a superseding indictment based on Ataya's breach of the plea agreement. He moved to dismiss the indictment, which the district court granted after holding a four-day hearing. On the government's appeal, the Seventh Circuit stated that it has long recognized that a plea agreement is a contract . . . but a contract in which special due process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards obtain. [citing Santobello ] . . . One requisite safeguard of a defendant's [due process] rights is a judicial determination, based on adequate evidence, of a defendant's breach of a plea bargaining agreement. The question of a defendant's breach is not an issue to be determined unilaterally by the government. Id. at 1329-30 (certain internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the indictment, concluding that the district court's finding was clear error, because [i]n reading the instant plea agreement and reviewing the record at hand, we are . . . firmly convinced that the defendant substantially breached an unambiguous provision in the plea agreement accepted by the court. Id. at 1330. It based its ruling on the proposition that the contractual obligations set forth in a plea agreement impose mutual obligations on both the government and the defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was presented with a factual scenario somewhat similar to that before us here. In United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 339 (4th Cir.2001), the defendant Bowe entered into a plea agreement with the government in which both parties agreed not to seek any departures. In exchange, the government agreed not to bring further charges against Bowe. Despite the agreement, at sentencing Bowe, through counsel, made a departure motion based upon his mental condition and sought to introduce evidence to support the motion. The government then requested that the plea agreement be declared null and void, but the district court refused to do so and proceeded with sentencing. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, [i]n denying the [g]overnment's motion to have the court declare the plea agreement null and void, the district court erroneously permitted Bowe's counsel to violate the express terms of the plea agreement. Id. at 347. It stated, [w]e conclude that the court erred in denying the [g]overnment's motion to nullify the plea agreement after the defense sought permission to present evidence for the purpose of persuading the court to impose a sentence that departed from the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon remand, the court should determine whether the plea should be set aside, or whether a sentence should be imposed within the Sentencing Guideline range. Id. Thus, the court of appeals applied the same principle in a defendant breach case that it would have applied in a government breach case. See also Alexander, 869 F.2d at 91 (holding that government is entitled to similar remedies in an appeal of a defendant's breach of a plea agreement as a defendant would be in a government breach appeal). Accordingly, we hold that we will apply the same standard of review in considering a defendant's breach of a plea agreement as we would apply in a government breach case. We will review the question whether a defendant breaches his plea agreement de novo, and will impose the burden on the government to prove the breach by a preponderance of the evidence. See Floyd, 428 F.3d at 516; Rivera, 357 F.3d at 293-94. Furthermore, we will analyze the issue whether a defendant has breached a plea agreement according to the same contract principles that we would apply in analyzing a government breach, including the principle that we will construe ambiguities in the agreement against the government. See, e.g., Rivera, 357 F.3d at 294-95.