Opinion ID: 1664907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mitigating Evidence and Expert Witness Testimony

Text: Israel contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation of Israel's background for possible nonstatutory mitigating factors, by failing to present adequate mitigating evidence at trial, and by failing to properly prepare the sole defense mitigation witness, psychologist Dr. Krop, for his testimony at trial. The lower court concluded that counsel's trial performance was not ineffective because counsel was able to establish the two statutory mental mitigators. The court rejected the failure to prepare the witness part of this claim as conclusory and insufficient. The order denying relief on this claim detailed the testimony from the trial and the evidentiary hearing that refuted Israel's claim, including the evidentiary hearing testimony of trial counsel Wolfe and postconviction mental health experts Dr. Fisher and Dr. Lipman. At the evidentiary hearing, Wolfe testified about his trial strategy relating to mitigation. Wolfe testified that he hired an experienced investigator who contacted Israel's two sisters and his mother, but that their testimony would have been harmful to the case. Israel's mother told the investigator that if her son committed this crime, he deserved whatever sentence was imposed. Wolfe also explained that Dr. Krop, who was appointed as a mental health expert to evaluate Israel, had been involved with Israel since 1993. During the penalty phase of trial, Dr. Krop had testified about Israel's substance abuse, low intellectual functioning, and possible brain damage. Wolfe had offered this evidence in support of the statutory mental mitigators, which he believed the jury would find more compelling than nonstatutory mitigation. Wolfe also made a tactical decision not to focus on Israel's drug history because he believed the jury would not be sympathetic to a drug user who committed violent crimes to get drug money. Dr. Fisher testified that he agreed with the diagnosis presented by Dr. Krop at trial, i.e., that Israel has low intellectual functioning, suffers from organic brain damage, has a personality disorder and other deficits, and has a long history of substance abuse. Dr. Lipman also agreed with Dr. Krop's trial testimony that Israel's psychological disorders would be exacerbated by his cocaine use. Even the State's expert witness, Dr. McClaren, agreed with Dr. Krop's trial diagnosis to a great extent. All three postconviction experts testified that Israel had been uncooperative with them, which is also what Dr. Krop reported at trial. In fact, it appears that Dr. Krop was able to conduct a more comprehensive evaluation than the postconviction experts were. Dr. Krop successfully administered seven psychological tests and was able to offer fairly comprehensive evidence and testimony at trial regarding Israel's psychological impairments. Based on Dr. Krop's testimony, the trial court found the two statutory mental health mitigators to be applicable. Based on the postconviction record, we conclude that Israel did not produce any mitigating evidence that was not presented at trial. Additionally, Dr. Krop did testify at trial about Israel's borderline intellectual functioning, organic brain damage, and drug use. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel offered strategic reasons for not presenting family testimony (it would be more harmful than helpful) and for not emphasizing Israel's drug problems (the jury would not be sympathetic to a drug abuser who committed violent crimes to get drug money). Based on all of the above, the postconviction court was correct in finding that trial counsel was not deficient in his presentation of mitigating evidence. Israel also argues that counsel was ineffective in preparing Dr. Krop to testify at the penalty phase. Israel complains that Dr. Krop based his trial diagnosis in part on psychological reports filed by other mental health experts who had evaluated Israel for competency to stand trial. He also asserts that Dr. Krop should not have testified about Israel's failure to cooperate in these evaluations or about the conclusions reached by the other evaluators, including one psychiatrist who found no evidence of psychiatric illness. Dr. Krop testified at trial that he had reviewed three previous evaluations by mental health professionals, that he would always review prior evaluations in making an evaluation of an individual, and that Israel had not been cooperative during these previous evaluations. While Dr. Krop testified that one of the experts had detected no psychiatric illness, he also testified that the other two doctors had diagnosed drug abuse, serious depression, paranoid personality disorder, and antisocial personality disorder, which were consistent with Dr. Krop's diagnosis. Even Israel's own postconviction defense experts had to rely on previous reports and information in making their evaluations because Israel refused to cooperate with them. As noted by all of the experts, Israel limited their evaluations by his lack of cooperation. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective because his client refused to fully cooperate in psychological evaluations. Thus, we agree with the trial court's ruling that Israel is not entitled to postconviction relief on this claim.