Opinion ID: 1201607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threshold for Recovery

Text: (12) For guidance of the lower courts should the Court of Appeal determine that a retrial on this claim is appropriate, we hold that recovery of fear of cancer damages in actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress should not depend on a showing of a medically corroborated belief that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will develop the feared cancer as a result of the toxic exposure. The reasons for not applying the more likely than not threshold are obvious. First, the intentional infliction cause of action requires a showing of extreme and outrageous conduct which is directed at the plaintiff. ( Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903.) Thus, a high degree of culpability is required which justifies recovery of greater damages by a broader group of plaintiffs than allowed in an ordinary negligence action. (See id., at p. 906.) Moreover, where a defendant undertakes extreme and outrageous conduct toward the plaintiff, the concern that liability will be imposed out of proportion to fault is not present. Finally, the requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct directed at the plaintiff places adequate limitations on the class of potential plaintiffs who might sue for fear of cancer under this theory. Therefore, the public policy concerns supporting application of the heightened threshold (see pt. II.A.2.c., ante ) are not implicated. (13) Of course, even though the heightened threshold is not applicable in intentional infliction actions, it must nevertheless be established that the plaintiff's fear of cancer is reasonable, that is, that the fear is based upon medically or scientifically corroborated knowledge that the defendant's conduct has significantly increased the plaintiff's risk of cancer and that the plaintiff's actual risk of the threatened cancer is significant. Reasonableness of the fear is required because in intentional infliction actions, recovery is allowed only for severe or extreme emotional distress. ( Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903.) Severe emotional distress means `emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.' ( Girard v. Ball (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 772, 787-788 [178 Cal. Rptr. 406], citing Fletcher v. Western Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 397 [89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 47 A.L.R.3d 286]; see Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. j, p. 78 [distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances].)