Opinion ID: 1266339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Eleven, Twelve, and Sixteen Are Preempted by the RLA

Text: Claims Twelve and Sixteen allege that actions of American Airlines in negotiating the Restructuring Participation Agreement caused APFA to breach its contractual duties to its members, see Compl. ¶¶ 304-07, 325-35, while Claim Eleven alleges that APFA breached its contract with its members in the course of negotiating and ratifying the Restructuring Participation Agreement, see id. ¶¶ 299-303. These claims are akin to those discussed by the Third Circuit in Bensel v. Allied Pilots ' Association : [A]ll involve alleged interference with [plaintiffs'] employment rights as established by the various agreements that govern their wages and other benefits as well as their right to be fairly represented under [§ 152]. Thus the ... rights at issue are founded upon federal law, derive their strength and protection from federal law, and exist to effectuate a nationwide federal labor policy. 387 F.3d at 321. Such claims must rise or fall based on their merit under the RLA. [6] Parties whose conduct is governed by the RLA approach collective bargaining negotiations mindful of the incentives and penalties set forth in the Act. As in Jacksonville Terminal, the imposition of additional state regulation on core RLA conduct would alter the balance struck by Congress in this regard. See 394 U.S. at 381, 89 S.Ct. 1109. [T]he potentials for conflict, and for the imposition of inconsistent state obligations, are simply too great to allow each state to regulate conduct central to Congress's RLA goals. Id. (internal citations omitted). This task `cannot be left to the laws of the many States, for it would be fatal to the goals of the Act' if conduct were prohibited by state laws `even though in furtherance of the federal scheme. The needs of the subject matter manifestly call for uniformity.' Id. (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists AFL-CIO v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 691-92, 83 S.Ct. 956, 10 L.Ed.2d 67 (1963)). We easily conclude that the imposition of additional state liability on the defendants for conduct during collective bargaining negotiations would upset the balance of power established by the RLA, Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 619, 106 S.Ct. 1395, 89 L.Ed.2d 616 (1986), and frustrate effective implementation of the [Act's] processes, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 380, 89 S.Ct. 1109. Plaintiffs submit that there is, in fact, no conflict between their state common law claims and the RLA. Appellants' Br. at 37. The point requires little discussion. In Garmon, the Supreme Court observed that, even if application of state law in a particular situation will not, in fact, conflict with the active assertion of federal authority, the state claim is nevertheless preempted because two law-making sources may not govern labor policy. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247, 79 S.Ct. 773. Similarly, in Jacksonville Terminal, the Court held the state regulation preempted not because it actually conflicted with the RLA, but because of the potentials for conflict that would arise if each state were entitled to set its own standard. 394 U.S. at 381, 89 S.Ct. 1109. In sum, actual conflict is not a prerequisite to finding a state claim preempted by the RLA. Plaintiffs have failed to offer any compelling argument as to why their state law claims are not governed by the well-settled line of precedents deriving from Garmon and Jacksonville Terminal. [7] Nor have plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate that either of the exceptions recognized in Garmon applies to their claims. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Courts Eleven, Twelve, and Sixteen as preempted by the RLA. [8]