Opinion ID: 500077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney's Fees Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988

Text: 11 In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 reads: In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. (emphasis added). The term prevailing party is not defined by the statute, but has been judicially defined by the courts. We have held that the test for prevailing party status as it applies to plaintiffs is whether the plaintiff prevailed on the central issue by acquiring the primary relief sought. Simien v. City of San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir.1987). See also Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 720 F.2d 1383, 1385 (5th Cir.1983); Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir.1981); Iranian Students Association v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir.1979). 12 Our definition of prevailing party is narrower than that of some of the other Federal appellate courts. Prevailing parties for Sec. 1988 attorney's fees purposes has also been defined as parties who  'succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-9 (1st Cir.1978). In Hensley, the Supreme Court merely accepted the generous formulation of the prevailing party definition found in some of the circuits but did not hold it to be the only correct definition. See 461 U.S. at 433 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 n. 8. 13 Clearly the prevailing party issue is a threshold inquiry to be made by a district court prior to the exercise of its discretion in deciding whether to award attorney's fees under Sec. 1988. If plaintiffs are not the prevailing parties under Sec. 1988, then they are not even eligible for an attorney's fees award. 3 14 Applying this Court's definition of prevailing party to the facts of this case, we agree with the conclusion of the district court that appellants did not succeed on the central issue of their suit and did not obtain the primary relief sought. The main thrust of this lawsuit was appellants' attempt to open up GISD school campuses during school hours to outside representatives of employee organizations like TSTA and GEA and to allow such organizations the use of school communication facilities. Appellants failed in this attempt, and this was the primary relief sought in this lawsuit. Granted, appellants did succeed on significant secondary issues by having Regulation 412 declared unconstitutional as it applied to teacher to teacher conversation and teacher use of school communication systems. But this was not the primary relief sought. The central issue in this case was employee organization access to GISD campuses, not internal teacher communication within those campuses.