Opinion ID: 2167262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statements in the context of kre article eight

Text: Brashars and Johnston argue that Detective Stanley's investigative report containing a synopsis of the appellants' incriminating statements did not contain statements within the contemplation of Article Eight of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence because Detective Stanley's summary of the interview is not an oral or written assertion by a declarant as defined in KRE 801(a). The appellants argue, therefore, that the trial court should have suppressed their confessions because the Commonwealth could not have introduced Detective Stanley's summary under KRE 801A(b)(1)'s exception to the hearsay rule for statements of a party. Brashars and Johnston allege that they presented this argument to the trial court and preserved it for appellate review within the text of a memorandum in support of their motions to suppress. Under a heading titled Argument: Due process requires the statements made by the defendants to be suppressed since the custodial interrogations were not electronically recorded, or, in the alternative, the Court should exercise its supervisory power and exclude the statements based on the same grounds, counsel for Brashars wrote: This Court has the responsibility to ensure that evidence admitted at trial is sufficiently reliable so that it may be of use to the finder of fact who will draw the ultimate conclusions of guilty or innocence. [R]eliability is the linchpin in determining admissibility of evidence under a standard of fairness that is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977) (analyzing admissibility of identification testimony). The Kentucky Rules of Evidence specifically grant this Court the power and duty to exclude relevant evidence if necessary to facilitate the ascertainment of truth. See KRE 403, KRE 611(a). Brashars and Johnston argue before this Court that the last sentence in the paragraph quoted above presented to the trial court an issue of whether the Commonwealth could introduce the incriminating statements through an exception to the hearsay rule, and contend that both the trial court below and the Commonwealth overlooked the argument. We are not surprised that others have overlooked this argument, and believe the rash of myopia may stem from the fact that nothing resembling the argument the appellants make on appeal was even whispered in the trial court. Before the trial court, the appellants argued that, if the trial court concluded that due process did not require electronic recording of confessions made during custodial interrogations, the trial court should exercise its supervisory power and exclude the statements because of the failure of Detective Stanley to electronically record them. The memorandum filed in support of the motion to suppress the statements contains zero references to KRE 801(a)'s definition of statement, and, in fact, zero references to Article Eight of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. Appellate courts review only claims of error which the parties presented before the trial court. [24] We find the argument raised by Brashars and Johnston before this Court wholly unpreserved for our review. We would note, however, that the appellants' argument would fail on its merits, as well, because the Kentucky Rules of Evidence contain no requirement that, in order to be admissible, testimony relating to a declarant's oral statement must be a verbatim recitation of that statement. Seldom will a witness be able to recall each and every word spoken by a declarant, but, by paraphrasing, witnesses may communicate relevant evidence regarding the substance of a declarant's statement. Any dispute as to what a declarant actually said goes to the weight of such testimony and not its admissibility.