Opinion ID: 2585966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: utah's grandparent visitation statute is constitutional

Text: ¶19 The only U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the federal constitutionality of grandparent visitation is Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). In Troxel, the children's paternal grandparents petitioned for bimonthly visitation following the death of the children's father. Id. at 61. The grandparents brought their petition pursuant to a Washington statute that allowed any person to petition the court for visitation rights at any time and authorized the court to order visitation if it would serve the best interest of the child. Id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code. § 26.10.160 (3) (1994)). The children's mother did not oppose all visitation, but sought to limit it to one short visit per month. Id. The trial court disagreed with the mother's judgment and, over her objections, ordered visitation twice per month based on the best interests of the children. Id. at 61-62. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, and the grandparents sought review from the Washington Supreme Court. Id. at 62. The Washington Supreme Court granted the grandparents' petition and held that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it failed to require a threshold showing of harm before interfering with parental judgments and swept too broadly by allowing any person to petition the court at any time, leaving the best interest standard as the only limiting factor. Id. at 63. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court. Id. ¶20 A plurality of the Court held that, as applied, the Washington statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the mother's fundamental right to control the upbringing of her children, id. at 73, because it failed to accord proper deference to the parental presumption, [3] id. at 68-69. The grandparents did not allege or present evidence that their grandchildren's mother was unfit; therefore, the presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests applied and the mother's decisions were entitled to deference. Id. Despite her right to the parental presumption, the trial court had not given any special weight to her decision regarding grandparent visitation. Id. at 69. In fact, the trial court essentially applied the opposite presumption, assuming that grandparent visitation was in the children's best interests. Id. The trial judge specifically stated, I think [visitation with the] [grandparents] would be in the best interest of the children and I haven't been shown it is not. Id. (first alteration in original). The trial judge then reminisced about the enjoyable summers he had spent with his own grandparents and expressed his hope that grandparent visitation would be as enjoyable an experience for the children in the case before him. Id. at 72. This approach effectively required the mother to prove that her proposed visitation schedule would be in the best interests of her children rather than requiring the grandparents to prove that the children's best interests would be better served by their own, more generous visitation schedule. Id. at 69. ¶21 The plurality's conclusion that the trial court had not given the proper weight to the mother's decisions was supported by the fact that the mother had not sought to deny all visitation and that the district court had not made adequate findings to support its decision. Id. 71-73. The plurality deemed it important that the mother had not attempted to deny the grandparents all visitation, but merely wished to limit it beyond the visitation requests of the grandparents. Id. at 71. Despite her willingness to offer visitation opportunities to the grandparents, the trial court did not defer to her proposed schedule or make any findings that the mother's proposed visitation schedule was unreasonable. Id. at 72. Moreover, the trial court only articulated two formal findings to support its order to supercede the mother's decision: (1) that the grandparents were part of a large, central, loving family . . . and [could] provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music, and (2) that the children would be benefitted by spending quality time with [their grandparents.] Id. at 72. The plurality believed that such meager findings indicated that the trial court's decision hinged on a simple disagreement between the trial judge and the mother regarding the children's best interests. Id. This was impermissible because the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a `better' decision could be made. Id. at 72-73. Therefore, based on the trial court's presumption that grandparent visitation was in the children's best interests and the trial court's meager findings, the plurality held that the trial court did not afford due weight to the mother's decision and thus had unconstitutionally applied the statute. Id. at 73. ¶22 Although the plurality limited its holding to the statute's unconstitutional application, it did criticize the statute as a whole. Specifically, the plurality stated the statute was breathtakingly broad, essentially allowing any person to petition for visitation at any time and giving the court power to grant such a petition as long as it served the child's best interest. Id. at 67. According to the plurality, this language effectively permit[ted] any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court review. Id. The plurality's censure did not end there. It also disapproved of the statute's failure to require that a court afford a parent's decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever, instead leaving the decision solely in the hands of the judge. Id. The plurality recognized that this essentially meant that a Washington court could disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation, id. (emphasis in original), which is exactly what it believed the trial court had done, id. at 72. ¶23 The plurality recognized that most state court visitation adjudication occurs on a case-by-case basis and therefore declined to hold that all nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter. Id. at 73. However, the plurality's criticisms of the Washington statute's language and application provide guidelines concerning what a statute should include in order to comport with due process. Following Troxel, statutes allowing a court to award visitation over the wishes of a parent must presume that fit parents act in their children's best interests. Id. at 69-70. Likewise, the plurality implied that statutes requiring a finding that the parent has unreasonably denied or limited visitation would be more likely to be upheld. See id. at 71-72 (favorably citing to state statutes containing requirement that visitation be unreasonably denied). Finally, given the plurality's criticisms of the district court's failure to make adequate factual findings, id. at 72, statutes ought to provide guideposts to aid courts in making specific determinations regarding the rebuttal of the parental presumption. Statutes that follow these guidelines provide greater assurance that courts will allow the parent to make the decision in the first instance and accord special weight to the parent's decision when it is reviewed. Id. at 70. ¶24 The plurality's decision also provides guidance regarding what Troxel and the Due Process Clause do not require. Although the plurality recognized that as a fit parent the mother was entitled to the parental presumption, the plurality did not say that a fit parent's decision regarding visitation was absolute; rather, the plurality clearly contemplated that the presumption might be rebutted. See id. at 69. The plurality stated that the decision about whether to cultivate an intergenerational relationship is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent's decision . . . becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination. Id. at 70. Thus, the problem in Troxel was not the trial court's intervention, but its failure to give any deference to the mother's decision. Id. at 69. Similarly, the plurality decision does not impose the requirement that the parental presumption be rebutted by a showing of harm to the child. Indeed, the plurality specifically refused to determine whether the Due Process Clause requires a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. Id. at 73 (noting the plurality did not consider whether nonparental visitation statutes must include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation in order to satisfy due process). ¶25 In light of these federal constitutional standards, we now address whether Utah Code section 30-5-2 provides sufficient structural safeguards to protect the constitutional rights of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
¶26 [L]egislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and . . . they should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional frame work [sic]. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974). Therefore, when analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, the court presumes that the statute is valid and resolve[s] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191. Moreover, we will construe the statute to avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant constitutional mandates, so long as the resulting construction does not conflict with the reasonable or actual legislative purposes of the statute. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995). With these principles in mind, we hold that Utah Code section 30-5-2 (Supp. 2005) can be interpreted consistently with the principles announced in Troxel. [4] ¶27 First, the Grandparent Visitation Statute protects parental liberty interests by explicitly incorporating a presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2) (There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent's decision [concerning grandparent visitation] is in the grandchild's best interests.). Accordingly, courts must generally give deference to a parent's grandparent visitation decisions and may only override them where the petitioning grandparent rebuts the presumption. A grandparent meets this burden when the grandparent shows that there are special circumstances that permit the court to set aside the parent's decision even after the court has given it special weight. See id. We read the statute to require that a court must, as a threshold matter, specifically determine that the grandparent has met this burden in the process of considering whether the court should order visitation. The court's inquiry must acknowledge that, at all times, the burden of proof rests on the petitioner and not on the parent. ¶28 The Grandparent Visitation Statute does not specify a standard of proof by which the parental presumption must be rebutted. The degree of proof required in a particular type of proceeding has traditionally been left to the judiciary to resolve. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the parental presumption deals with parental liberty interests, and accordingly should be afforded great deference by the courts, we conclude that a clear and convincing standard of proof should apply to satisfy due process requirements. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 (mandating the application of at least a clear and convincing standard in parental rights termination cases). Therefore, a grandparent petitioning the court for visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Statute must clearly and convincingly rebut the parental presumption. [5] ¶29 In addition to incorporating the parental presumption, Utah's Grandparent Visitation Statute contains a second structural component to prevent judgments based on mere disagreement between the judge and the parent by listing several relevant factors that may justify setting a parent's decision aside. These factors are: (1) whether the petitioner is a fit and proper person; (2) whether visitation with the grandchild has been denied or unreasonably limited; (3) whether the parent is unfit or incompetent; (4) whether the petitioner has acted as the grandchild's custodian or caregiver or has a substantial relationship with the grandchild the loss of which is likely to cause harm to the grandchild; (5) whether the petitioner's child (the parent of the grandchild) has died or become a non-custodial parent; (6) whether the petitioner's child has been missing for an extended period of time; and (7) whether visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2)(a)-(g). These factors can be grouped into three categories, which we will discuss below. ¶30 The first category generally addresses situations where a family has been divided by some turn of fatedeath, divorce, loss of custody, a missing person, or a declaration that a parent is unfit or incompetent. The statute recognizes that when a family unit has been touched by these events a situation may arise where the child's interests differ from those of the parent. This is particularly true where the direct family line between grandparents and grandchildren has been severed, leaving the in-law relationship as the only remaining adult connection. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(c), (e), (f). Recognizing the potential for conflict in the relationship between the parent and the in-law and the resulting potential for interference with the grandparent-grandchild relationship, the statute provides an avenue for grandparents and grandchildren to maintain their relationship. [6] ¶31 The second group of statutory factors encompasses situations where the state has an interest in protecting the child from harm. Thus, a court may grant grandparents visitation if the grandparents can clearly and convincingly show they share a substantial relationship with the grandchild and the loss or cessation of that relationship is likely to cause harm to the grandchild. Id. § 30-5-2 (2)(d). The state's interest may also extend to situations where the child's parent has denied or unreasonably limited visitation, id. § 30-5-2(2)(b), because of the increased probability that the parent is not acting in the child's best interests. ¶32 The third category of statutory factors may be more accurately categorized as necessary threshold findings. These are findings that a court must make in order to grant visitation. For example, a court cannot order visitation if the petitioning grandparent is not a fit and proper person to have visitation with the grandchild. Id. § 30-5-2 (2)(a). Likewise, a court cannot order visitation unless it is in the best interests of the child. See id. § 30-5-2(g). This holds true even if the petitioner has satisfied other statutory factors. ¶33 We recognize that the statute describes best interests and grandparent fitness as relevant factors to the determination of whether the parental presumption has been rebutted. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(g). However, a judge could not rely solely on these factors in determining whether the parental presumption has been rebutted and still comport with due process. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 ([T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made.). Allowing these factors alone to rebut the parental presumption would come too close to allowing a judge to supercede a parent's decisions based solely on a disagreement between the parent and the judge. Thus, while a grandparent must be fit to receive court-ordered visitation, we do not believe a grandparent's fitness, standing alone, would ever properly serve as a reason to override the parent's decision. Rather, it is only one of many factors that a court can consider in determining whether the circumstances allow it to intervene in the parent's decision-making process. Moreover, in order for the statute to adhere to constitutional requirements, we read the statute to require that the parental presumption be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence before a court orders visitation based on the child's best interests. This distinction is not readily apparent from the plain language of the statute, but it is necessary to sufficiently protect parental rights. We recognize, of course, that the factual findings that support other statutory factors, such as whether the loss of a substantial grandparent relationship will affirmatively harm the child, will often overlap with facts relevant to the ultimate determination of whether grandparent visitation is in the child's best interests. ¶34 While the statute lists several means by which a grandparent can rebut the parental presumption, the presumption is most clearly rebutted when the court finds the existence of several relevant factors, such as in this case. Here, the court found that (1) Ms. Thurgood, the grandparent's child, had died; (2) the grandparents had a substantial relationship with the child, due in large part to a prior caretaking relationship, and the loss of the grandparent-grandchild relationship would harm the child; (3) the grandmother was fit; and (4) Mr. Thurgood had unreasonably limited or denied visitation. ¶35 We therefore hold that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is not unconstitutional under Troxel. The statute expressly incorporates the parental presumption, thereby ensuring that courts give special weight to the decisions of fit parents. Moreover, it provides guidance to courts in determining whether the petitioning grandparents have established circumstances under which the courts can, nevertheless, supercede the parent's decision. ¶36 Our holding that the statute is constitutional does not suggest the statute is flawless. We acknowledge that the statute is confusing, and consequently, provides very little guidance to a district judge trying to resolve a grandparent visitation dispute. [7] However, it is not our role to repair drafting defects that do not render a statute unconstitutional. This task falls to the legislature. Accordingly, we suggest, and indeed encourage, that our state legislature clarify the statute to provide more guidance to courts confronted with grandparent visitation issues. We hope that our decision in this case will assist the legislature in that undertaking. ¶37 Having determined the Grandparent Visitation Statute is constitutional, we now turn to whether the trial court's application of the statute violated the liberty interests of Mr. Thurgood.