Opinion ID: 1482267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Administrative segregation.

Text: The LRAA provides that before a resident may be placed in administrative segregation, there shall be a finding made that (a) There is a clear and present threat to the safety of the resident; or (b) The resident poses a clear and present threat to the safety of others; or (c) The resident poses a definite escape risk. 28 DCMR § 521.4. If a resident is placed in administrative segregation, that placement shall be reviewed at hearings held at thirty (30) day intervals. Id. § 527.1. It is further provided that [i]f the Board determines that there is no longer an escape risk, or a security risk to the resident or others, the resident shall be released from segregation. Id. § 527.8. Abdullah has alleged that at a hearing on August 12, 1993, the Housing Board, finding no factual basis for continuing [a]dministrative [s]egregation confinement, recommended that [he] be returned to Open Population. Abdullah has further alleged that this decision was approved by the Administrator of the Maximum Security facility. Nevertheless, according to the amended petition, Abdullah was still in administrative segregation sixty days later, apparently having been placed on a waiting list for release to Open Population. If these allegations are taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss the amended petition, then Abdullah was retained in administrative segregation for a substantial period after Section 527.8 required his release from segregation. We express no opinion as to whether, at an appropriate hearing, respondents could present some justification for their failure to return Abdullah to Open Population on August 13, 1993 or immediately thereafter. That is an issue which can be determined at a hearing on the basis of an appropriate evidentiary record. The record before the trial judge when he dismissed the amended petition on the pleadings was insufficient to enable him to evaluate any such hypothetical defense. The LRAA requires that, after there is no longer a threat to a prisoner in Abdullah's position, the prisoner shall be released. Abdullah effectively alleged in his amended petition that the Board had found that such a threat no longer existed, but that nevertheless he was not released within a reasonable time. Accordingly, Abdullah has fairly alleged a violation of the LRAA, and the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Abdullah, precludes the issuance of summary judgment in respondents' favor on this issue. [4]
In his amended petition, Abdullah has launched a blunderbuss attack on the procedures utilized to find him guilty of threats, and he has claimed that a plethora of LRAA provisions were violated. The gravamen of his complaint, however, is that he was falsely charged with threatening Ms. Pittman in reprisal for the exercise of his right to contest his retention in involuntary protective custody, and that Lorton officials placed pressure on potential exculpatory witnesses to inhibit them from testifying in his behalf. Abdullah also alleged that the disciplinary report against him was deliberately back-dated in an attempt to create a factually false appearance of compliance with 28 DCMR § 506.4. [5] The LRAA provides that, with exceptions not here applicable, [t]he resident shall be allowed to call at least two witnesses. 28 DCMR § 510.1. Counsel for the resident shall be given an opportunity to meet with potential witnesses forty-eight hours before the adjustment hearing, provided that no potential adverse witness may be compelled to meet with counsel. Id. § 510.3. Although Abdullah's allegation that witnesses were coerced may not be in direct contravention of these proscriptionsthe fit between proscription and charge is less than precisewe are satisfied that, if the allegations are taken as true and liberally construed in Abdullah's favor, then Abdullah has sufficiently claimed that he was deprived of an effective opportunity to interview and present witnesses. Accordingly, we conclude that Abdullah's allegations regarding the disciplinary proceedings against him should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. [6]
Respondents contend that even if the conduct alleged by Abdullah violated the LRAA, the amended petition was properly dismissed. They claim that the procedures prescribed in the LRAA are precatory rather than mandatory; that, even if those procedures are mandatory, the DOC's disposition of Abdullah's claims is not subject to judicial review; and that even if judicial review is available, the alleged violations are not sufficiently grave to entitle Abdullah to relief in a habeas corpus proceeding. We disagree with each of these contentions.