Opinion ID: 4582841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collado’s Out-of-Court Identifications

Text: Diaz argues that the district court erred by allowing NYPD Detective Michael Lagiovane to read to the jury prior consistent statements by Collado, regarding his identification of Diaz and another individual as involved in the murders, because there was insufficient evidence in the record that Collado was the person who made the identifications. It is a well settled principle that the district court has “broad discretion” over the admission of evidence. United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309, 318 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus, a district court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion and reversed only when the district court has acted “arbitrarily or irrationally.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). When an objection has not been raised below, it is reviewed on appeal for plain error. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010). Diaz’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, is without merit. After the murders, Collado became an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and told his DEA handler about his involvement in the killing of Ventura and Almonte. Collado explained to him that Acosta ordered the murders and that two individuals, whom he knew only by nickname, were responsible – “Cano” (Diaz) and “Chucky” (Sanders). App’x at 849. Collado further testified that he was then interviewed and shown photobooks over the course of 11 several days, by NYPD detectives investigating the murders, to determine if he could identify the perpetrators. Collado ultimately identified Diaz and Sanders. Detective Lagiovane was present for both identifications and prepared reports memorializing them, but by the time of trial did not recall the identifications or the identity of the informant, and thus read the reports of the identifications into the record as prior recollections recorded under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5). The reports read into the record did not contain Collado’s name, but rather referred to an unnamed confidential informant identifying photos of Diaz and Sanders as those responsible for the murders. Diaz objected to the admission of this evidence as “double hearsay.” App’x at 1145. After hearing argument, the district court overruled the objection under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) because the statements of Collado memorialized in the NYPD reports were prior consistent statements offered “to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant, meaning Mr. Collado, recently fabricated or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in testifying in this case.” App’x at 1151. On appeal, Diaz does not argue that the elements of a prior consistent statement, or the foundation for past recollection recorded, were not met in connection with this testimony. Instead, he contends that the testimony was inadmissible because there was an insufficient basis to establish that Collado was the confidential informant who made the prior statements and identifications. That particular argument, however, was not raised before the district court. In fact, in objecting to the evidence at trial on “double hearsay” grounds, Diaz’s counsel accepted that Collado was the declarant of the statement and identifications. See App’x at 1146 (“[A]ll of this is just information that was told to [Detective Lagiovane] by Mr. Collado.”). In any event, it is axiomatic that “[i]dentity can be inferred through circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Kwong, 14 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, there was sufficient 12 circumstantial evidence in the record to support a rational inference that Collado was the unnamed confidential informant in the reports who had made the statements and identifications. In particular, both Collado and his DEA handler testified that Collado provided information to the NYPD detectives about the murders, and there was no evidence that the NYPD had more than one informant during the initial investigation into the murders. Moreover, there were many consistencies between the NYPD reports and Collado’s testimony regarding the timeframe and substance of the interviews. For example, the dates of the reports, January and February 2000, were consistent with Collado’s testimony that he met with the NYPD several times in November or December of 1999 after returning from the Dominican Republic, when he identified Diaz and Sanders. In addition, the reports were consistent with Collado’s testimony that he identified the photographs of the two individuals on different dates and only by their nicknames. Diaz argues that the confidential informant was someone other than Collado because the reports do not reference all the officers with whom he recalled speaking, and one of the reports states that the identification occurred at a different precinct from the one Collado mentioned. Given that Collado was testifying at trial more than 18 years after making the identifications, and in light of the strong circumstantial evidence that Collado was the declarant in those reports, any such discrepancies go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the records. See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[F]actors which make evidence less than conclusive affect only weight, not admissibility.” (quotation mark omitted)). In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion, much less plainly err, in its admission of this evidence.