Opinion ID: 2548547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Florida Star and Other Applicable Cases

Text: We reason from Supreme Court case examples that reject the argued basis for sanctions or prior restraint. [8] These include the posited-but-rejected justifications of: removing incentives for parties to intercept private conversations, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001); minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted, Id.; protecting anonymity of juvenile offenders and encouraging their rehabilitation, Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979); and protecting the reputation of state judges and maintaining the institutional integrity of the court system, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 833, 842, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). In many of these cases, the Court pointed to the strength of the interest asserted but held that it did not satisfy the high standard required by First Amendment law, or was not supported by empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the facts and context of this case justify the District Court's prior restraint against revealing the contents of the in camera transcripts. In Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the widespread adoption of rape shield statutes, and noted that the purpose behind them is to protect victims of rape from being exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning their past sexual behavior. Id. at 146, 111 S.Ct. 1743. The Court held that this state interest was sufficient to warrant excluding even relevant evidence of the victim's sexual history, if the defendant failed to follow the procedures outlined in the statute. The Court reached this holding after acknowledging that precluding this evidence limited the ability of the defendant to confront witnesses. Id. at 149, 111 S.Ct. 1743. Nonetheless, the Court held that the state interest in protecting the victim was sufficient to justify the resulting imposition on the defendant's rights. The Court reasoned that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy. Id. at 150, 111 S.Ct. 1743. In subsequent cases, the Court has been explicit in addressing the privacy interest of sexual assault victims. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), the Court stated that short of homicide, [rape] is the `ultimate violation of self'. Id. at 597, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Likewise, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), the Supreme Court acknowledged the compelling interest of protecting a sexual assault victim's privacy. [9] In that case, a reporter obtained the name of a rape victim from a police report in a pressroom. Id. at 527, 109 S.Ct. 2603. The name was not supposed to be in the pressroom, Id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 2603, and posted signs warned reporters not to copy or print the names of rape victims. Id. at 546, 109 S.Ct. 2603 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Moreover, the newspaper had a policy not to print these names. Id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 2603. Nonetheless, the newspaper printed the name of the victim in a small blurb about the sexual assault in a police blotter. The victim sued, alleging that the newspaper was negligent per se in that it violated a statute making it a misdemeanor to publish the name of a sexual assault victim. Id. at 528-29, 109 S.Ct. 2603. The Supreme Court addressed whether the privacy of the sexual assault victim warranted the after-the-fact restraint on publication of lawfully acquired information. Id. at 526, 109 S.Ct. 2603. The Court emphasized that the case involved a clash between privacy rights and First Amendment rights  both very important  and that this clash required a careful, case-by-case, fact-specific analysis. Id. at 530, 109 S.Ct. 2603. The Court went on to say that the interests advanced by the statute in that case  the privacy of victims, the safety of victims, and encouraging victims to report crimes  were interests of the highest public order. The Court said that [i]t is undeniable that these are highly significant interests. [10] Id. at 537, 109 S.Ct. 2603. While the Court acknowledged that the privacy interests involved were highly significant, it held that imposing damages on the newspaper for publishing the victim's name violated the First Amendment. The Court left open the possibility that in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance these interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail standard. [11] Id. In the case before us, the state's interest in protecting the victim's privacy is even stronger than in Florida Star. The Defendant Bryant is an internationally-recognized professional basketball player. The press has been covering every minute detail of this case, and most of this coverage has been published or broadcast nationwide. In addition, the reported news is typically posted on the Internet, and thus available to computer users world-wide. The in camera transcribed proceedings of June 21 and 22 address the prior and subsequent sexual conduct of the victim apart from her encounter with Defendant Bryant. A victim's sexual conduct is even more private than a victim's identity, which the Court held was of utmost importance in Florida Star. Moreover, in contrast to Florida Star, the contents of the in camera transcribed proceedings were not publicly available, there was no burden on the press to determine whether it should risk publication and sanctions in light of the District Court's prior restraint order, and the specter of the press having to impose self-censorship was not an issue, as the transcripts were clearly marked private by the In Camera notation. In addition, this case is distinguishable from Near, Landmark, and New York Times because the contents of these transcripts do not implicate suppression of public policy debate or criticism of public officials. To the contrary, the testimony concerns conduct that is intensely private and personal. In Florida Star, as the Supreme Court explored the tension between First Amendment rights and statutory rights to privacy, the Court noted that First Amendment rights are not absolute. Under the proper circumstances, the scale may tip in favor of the state's interest that protects the victim's privacy. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 530, 532-33, 109 S.Ct. 2603. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we hold that this is just such a case. In his dissent in Florida Star, id. at 542, 109 S.Ct. 2603, Justice White emphasized the severity of sexual assault as compared to other crimes, as well as the fact that the ensuing publicity often multiplies the harm to the victim. He explained that even when the government attempts to protect the victim, mistakes happen and sometimes rape victims' personal information is inadvertently disclosed. Id. at 542, 547, 109 S.Ct. 2603. As Justice White observed: The Court's concern for a free press is appropriate, but such concerns should be balanced against rival interests in a civilized and humane society. An absolutist view of the former leads to insensitivity as to the latter. Id. at 547 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2603. Here, where the mistake was caught before the in camera information was further disseminated, the balance must tip in favor of keeping the information private.