Opinion ID: 6348939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expert “Legal” Testimony

Text: DEA financial investigator Jeff Bryan, who had a limited role in the investigation of Defendant—he testified that he “assisted sometimes with evidence 8 Defendant concedes that “many pills were recovered” but maintains that “forensic tests showed they contained compounds” different from the substance listed in the statute. Aplt. Reply Br. at 20–21. But again, this argument ignores that he effectively stipulated at trial that fentanyl was the same substance. 18 Appellate Case: 20-4116 Document: 010110695524 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 19 processing and things like that,” id. at 1223—was called as an expert witness by the government to help the jury understand “general concepts and trends in drug trafficking.” Id. at 1222. Defendant complains that Bryan’s testimony went beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony by expounding on the law for the jury. Defendant challenges Bryan’s testimony (1) that the leader or organizer of a drug-trafficking organization “receive[s] the bulk of the proceeds,” id. at 1230; (2) that the leader or organizer of a CCE “would be the person in charge of the decisions, who gets hired, what the prices are, who rents the vehicles,” id. at 1251; (3) that the five or more individuals who worked at the leader’s direction “would be people that may purchase equipment in their names[,] . . . people that ship the drugs, or drive somewhere to deliver the drugs, or pick the drugs up,” id.; (4) that one million dollars is “substantial income or resources” within the meaning of the CCE statute, id. at 1252; and (5) that sometimes a conspiracy “just starts happening” and that often “[i]t’s very fluid and it just evolves into an organization and everybody has their role that’s defined by someone,” id. at 1254. We agree with Defendant that the judge is the exclusive authority at trial on what the governing law is, and “testimony on ultimate questions of law is not favored.” Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see id. at 807 (“[I]t is axiomatic that the judge is the sole arbiter of the law and its applicability.”). But we fail to see how two of the challenged statements were testimony on the law. The comment on the leader receiving the bulk of the proceeds was unlikely to be understood as an opinion on the meaning of the CCE statute when 19 Appellate Case: 20-4116 Document: 010110695524 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 20 it preceded by 19 transcript pages any mention of the CCE statute during Bryan’s testimony. And the comment about conspiracies just happening has no apparent connection to any legal principle at issue. On the other hand, we agree with Defendant that Bryan’s testimony crossed the line when he explained to the jury his “understanding of the [CCE] statute.” R., Vol. II at 1251. Nevertheless, Defendant has failed to show how he was prejudiced by this testimony. He has not explained how any of the challenged testimony misstated the law or could have confused the jury. See United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1455 (10th Cir. 1997) (“To the extent that the expert accurately discussed the requirements of the law the defendant suffered no harm.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). The notion that the leader (organizer, supervisor, or manager) of a CCE would be in charge of making decisions is both commonsensical and consistent with the court’s instruction that “[a] relationship of supervision is created when one person gives orders or directions to another person who carries them out.” R., Vol. I at 1081. Bryan’s testimony regarding the kinds of activities that might be undertaken by subordinates in the drug operation did not misstate the law. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he government points to . . . lieutenants, runners, packagers, [and] transporters, all of whom could be considered managees” under 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A).). And certainly no one could contest that $1 million is a substantial amount of money under the jury instructions, which distinguished “substantial income or resources . . . from some relatively insignificant, insubstantial, or trivial amount.” R., Vol. I at 1081. 20 Appellate Case: 20-4116 Document: 010110695524 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 21 Finally, we reject Defendant’s overarching argument that Bryan “‘displac[ed] the jury by connecting and combining all other testimony and physical evidence into a coherent, discernible, internally consistent picture of the defendant’s guilt.’” Aplt. Br. at 48 (quoting United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 190–91 (2d Cir. 2008)). The concern expressed by the Second Circuit in Mejia was that the government would use officer experts “whose expertise happens to be the defendant.” Mejia, 545 F.3d at 191. The government did no such thing here. Bryan did not testify as an expert on Defendant’s drug operation; he explained the nature and scope of drug-trafficking organizations more generally.