Opinion ID: 1453510
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Received a Fair Trial.

Text: Appellant argues that the guilty but mentally ill verdict adds nothing to the existing gradations of the law  the traditional verdicts of guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity cover the spectrum of criminal responsibility. She then concludes that the verdict does not clarify and, indeed, confuses the concept of degrees of criminal responsibility and leads to compromise verdicts. We already have determined that the legislature legitimately could determine that the traditional verdict of guilty required clarification so that a jury could understand that the classification of guilty encompasses those with mental illness, but not those who are criminally insane at the time the crime is committed. Whether the verdict inserted a degree of confusion to the extent that defendant was denied a fair trial is a different question, although nonetheless one we answer negatively. Appellant argues that the verdict of guilty but mentally ill deprives defendants of a fair trial because it misleads the jury, which naturally believes the verdict has consequences, and deflects its attention from questions of guilt and innocence. In appellant's view, juries believe that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity results in immediate release, whereas a guilty but mentally ill verdict results in treatment in a setting that protects public safety. Appellant asserts that this compromise lures juries into a conviction unwarranted by the facts. We, of course, find it unquestionable that a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial. The guilty but mentally ill verdict, however, does not implicate that right. The statute authorizes different treatment for a defendant found guilty but mentally ill, and therefore, the jury makes a decision that affects the status of the defendant. Section 31-9-4, pertaining to sentencing upon a finding of guilty but mentally ill, is permissive. It states that a court may impose any sentence upon a defendant which could be imposed pursuant to law. (Emphasis added.) Because the legislature left to the discretion of the trial court the determination of whether the legally-mandated sentence for a straightforward guilty verdict should be applied to the guilty but mentally ill convicted defendant, we believe that the guilty but mentally ill verdict is more than a verdict without a distinction. [7] The jury is not sent to consider questions of guilt, innocence, and criminal responsibility in a standardless vacuum. Section 31-9-3(A) defines mentally ill as: a substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he did not know what he was doing or understand the consequences of his act or did not know that his act was wrong or could not prevent himself from committing the act. The standards governing the defense of insanity differ: [I]n order for a jury to find an accused blameworthy for his acts, it must be satisfied that: the accused, as a result of disease of the mind    (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it. State v. Dorsey, 93 N.M. 607, 609, 603 P.2d 717, 719 (1979) (quoting State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 330, 270 P.2d 727, 731 (1954)). [8] The legal definition of insanity is distinct from a medical definition  through the legal definition, the law seeks to assess accountability, whereas psychiatry's purpose is to diagnose and cure mental illnesses. Id. [9] Comparison of the definitions of insanity and mental illness clearly illustrates the difference and demonstrates that the jury has found an element of causation when it finds a defendant legally insane that is not present if the defendant has been found guilty but mentally ill. For a defendant to be determined insane, the jury must find a lack of criminal responsibility because, as a result of the illness, the defendant did not know the nature and quality of the act and that the act was wrong, or the defendant was not capable of preventing herself from committing the act. To be found guilty but mentally ill, on the other hand, the jury must determine that the defendant, although suffering from impaired judgment, did not meet the additional criteria for legal insanity. We hold that, when the jury is properly apprised of the legal standards to determine insanity and mental illness, the right to a fair trial is not infringed. The role of the jury is to determine facts. The jury is asked only to determine whether as a matter of fact the defendant was guilty of the crime charged but mentally ill, or not guilty by reason of insanity, as those options are defined for them. There are valid distinctions between the two definitions, and the jury is provided with standards and guidance to properly draw the appropriate legal conclusions from the facts presented to it. We conclude that the legislature pursued legitimate goals in enacting the statute allowing the guilty but mentally ill verdict and that the statute is reasonably designed to achieve that goal; it neither inserts confusion nor encourages compromise verdicts, and it does not impinge upon a defendant's right to a fair trial.