Opinion ID: 1120129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Fourth-Amendment Issue

Text: Appellant's car was searched by federal authorities pursuant to a valid federal search warrant after appellant was arrested for robbing a post office in Colorado. The search warrant authorized a search for specific items of evidence related to the post office robbery. When executing the search of the car, the postal inspector came across a liquor box bearing the address of the robbed liquor store in Buffalo, Wyoming, and containing bottles of liquor and cigarettes. He seized this box and its contents, even though the box was, of course, not described in the search warrant. (The postal inspector also seized from the car other items which were not described in the search warrant and which were either stolen in the Buffalo robbery or which had been involved in the Buffalo robbery.) At appellant's trial, the postal inspector testified for the State and the following dialogue was reported: Q (By Mr. Goddard) Mr. Huggins, what did you find in the defendant's car? A Well, among other things in the trunk of the vehicle, I found a box with the address of Ray Thorburn in Buffalo, Wyoming, and contained in that box were several bottles of liquor and cigarettes. There was also a yellow baseball cap in the trunk. Inside the vehicle, of course, was the registration I mentioned before, some coins, mint sets and an old  I think it was an 1886 dollar  and some uncirculated coins. I also found some tape, which is nylon-reinforced strapping tape, I would describe it as. Q I'm going to hand you what's previously been marked as State's Exhibit No. 7, and ask if you can identify that? A Yes. This is the box that I found in the trunk of the vehicle. It was intact at the time. It had not been flattened. Q Did it contain certain items  other items? A Yes, it did. Q And you recognize that as being the one you found in the vehicle? A Yes, sir. MR GODDARD: At this time, your Honor, we would move for admission of State's Exhibit No. 7. MR. JOHNSON: May counsel approach the bench? THE COURT: Yes. (An off-the-Record discussion was held at the bench.) At this point, the jury was excused so that the court could hear argument on the admissibility into evidence of the liquor box and other items seized in Colorado. A rather involved and confused discussion ensued. The trial judge appeared to be under the faulty impression that the box had been admitted into evidence prior to his dismissal of the jury. He stated that he would grant the suppression motion as to those items which hadn't been introduced into evidence already. The prosecutor then asked whether Exhibit 7, the box, was admitted. The court replied in the affirmative. Immediately upon resumption of the trial, the prosecutor said, Your Honor, for the Record, the State would again move for State's Exhibit No. 7. The defense counsel thereupon renewed his objection to admission of the exhibit. The court replied, All right. It may be received if it hasn't already. My understanding is that it has been received. The litigants urge upon us their opposing views as to whether seizure of the liquor box was justified under the plain-view doctrine, as well as their opposing views as to whether the trial judge violated his own suppression-motion ruling by admitting the box into evidence. We need not address these two issues. Any evidentiary value of the box as an exhibit was merely cumulative to the testimony of the postal inspector, reproduced above, to the effect that a liquor box bearing the address of the robbed Buffalo liquor store was found in appellant's car in Colorado. This testimony was not objected to and, therefore, the appellant does not and cannot complain about it now. If it was error to admit the box into evidence, it was harmless error because the box added nothing of substance to the already-admitted and damaging testimony of the postal inspector. In explaining our conclusion of harmless error, it may also be appropriate to point out that possibly the most damaging evidence against the appellant was the testimony of Nora Thorburn. Mrs. Thorburn is the mother of Ray Thorburn, the owner of the robbed liquor store, and was minding the store at the time of the robbery when she was threatened and tied up by the robbers. We mention Mrs. Thorburn's testimony because we think it undercuts any possible argument that the introduction into evidence of the liquor box sufficiently enhanced the postal inspector's testimony about the box with the result that the admission of this piece of evidence was crucial to the jury's deliberations. Not only do we view the box as cumulative evidence, but we view it as evidence which, standing by itself, had no probative value. We recently discussed the harmless-error doctrine in Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358, 367 (1979); and the United States Supreme Court has discussed the matter in Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. denied. We recognize that if the box was in fact seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, then its admission into evidence was constitutional error. However, we believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the possible error complained of did not influence the verdict. Accordingly, under Chapman and Campbell, supra, any possible error concerning admission of the box after the postal inspector had testified concerning the box was harmless error.