Opinion ID: 1358073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: StovallSentencing

Text: Finally, Stovall argues that his sentence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is substantively unreasonable. We review the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines under a de novo standard. United States v. Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir.2008). We review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Saddler, 538 F.3d 879, 890 (8th Cir.2008).
Stovall argues that applying the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d) regarding the murder of Darryl Johnson violated his due process rights. Stovall contends that the government avoided its burden to prove the elements of the crime they actually sought to punish, and relegated the same to a mere sentencing factor to obtain the punishment for a murder they could not otherwise prove. He argues that his sentence should not have been enhanced for Johnson's murder unless the government could prove the murder beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least by clear and convincing evidence. He characterizes the application of the enhancement as the tail wagging the dog because the punishment for the enhancement exceeds the punishment for the underlying crime of conviction. But we have recently held that due process never requires applying the clear and convincing evidence standard to judicial fact-finding at criminal sentencing. United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir.2009). So long as the factor considered by the court is not an element of the offense charged, the sentencing factor may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Here, the district court sentenced Stovall for a narcotics offense under § 2D1.1. Section 2D1.1(d) contains a cross reference that is applied when a victim is killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. The district court, applying principles of accomplice liability from Guidelines § 1B1.3, found Stovall responsible for the Johnson murder by a preponderance of the evidence and applied the § 2D1.1(d) cross reference. The cross reference directs the sentencing court to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, the Guideline section for homicide. The government contends that it did not have to prove that Stovall solicited Johnson's murder but only prove that the murder was a reasonably foreseeable act in relation to the Stovall drug enterprise. We agree and hold that the district court's application of § 2D1.1(d) did not violate Stovall's due process rights.
Stovall makes numerous arguments attacking the overall reasonableness of his life sentence. We review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Saddler, 538 F.3d at 890. A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a significant relevant factor, gives significance to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers proper factors, but in weighing the factors commits a clear error of judgment. Id. Essentially, Stovall asserts that the district court improperly weighed Johnson's murder in assessing his sentence. But we have already held that the district court could consider the murder in sentencing Stovall because the murder was a reasonably foreseeable result of Stovall's drug conspiracy. See supra Parts II.A. and II.D.1. The ultimate inquiry on appeal is whether the district court considered the Guidelines advisory and properly weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Saddler, 538 F.3d at 889. Here, the district court noted its intention to weigh the § 3553(a) factors at the beginning of sentencing. Moreover, there is no indication that the district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory. Based on Stovall's plea statement referencing the drug conspiracy and the brutal murder of Johnsona foreseeable act in furtherance of the drug conspiracythe district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Stovall to life imprisonment, a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range.