Opinion ID: 1464520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Abuse of Discretion Standard

Text: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that, in cases in which a party has moved for judgment as a matter of law, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(b). Our law requires us to affirm a district court's discretionary decision in granting a new trial, if any of its grounds for granting a new trial are reasonable. Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1452 (9th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). Under this standard, even if substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, a trial court may grant a new trial (1) if the verdict is (a) contrary to the clear weight of the evidence or (b) is based upon evidence which is false, (2) to prevent a miscarriage of justice, or (3) if the award of compensation is excessive. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940); United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.1999) (citation omitted); Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining the clear weight of the evidence, a district court has the duty[ ] to weigh the evidence as [the court] saw it, and to set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in [the court's] conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.... Murphy, 914 F.2d at 187 (quoting Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249 F.2d 246, 256 (9th Cir.1957)). When it is necessary to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial judge, a miscarriage of justice the district court may also weigh the evidence and set aside the verdict. Id. The district court may also grant a new trial when in his judgment the trial judge finds that the amount of compensation awarded is excessive. Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir.1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co., Inc., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir.1983) (stating [o]nce the trial court finds a verdict excessive, the court cannot allow it to stand.). Therefore, in a nut shell, the district court may grant a new trial [i]f, having given full respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.... Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1987). The law grants trial courts judicial discretion in making this decision for two reasons: (1) the trial judge is the only objective person (with legal training), who was at the trial and able to see, hear, and evaluate the situation using firsthand knowledge; and (2) it would be impossible to construct any strict rule, which would be applicable to every conceivable motion for a new trial. Therefore, to reverse a district court under the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court[has to be] convinced firmly that the reviewed decision lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.2000). I emphasize this is not the review of a trial court's determination of a motion for summary judgment (de novo review) or a motion for a judgment as a matter of law (de novo review), which motion is generally made at the same time as the motion for new trial. Instead, we are reviewing whether the trial judge (vested by law to use his discretion in the four above mentioned circumstances) abused it in granting a new trial. In this case, the district court granted the motion for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, (2) Officer Engle was protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and (3) the jury's award was excessive and based on speculation. Given this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion.