Opinion ID: 2711
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Relief Sought Would Enjoin Defendants in Their Legislative Capacities

Text: Assuming arguendo that defendants' alleged actions are substantively and procedurally legislative under Bogan, defendants must still show, before they are afforded the protections of legislative immunity as to claims for injunctive relief, that the requested relief would enjoin them in their legislative capacities. Defendants do not address this issue, other than to assert broadly that the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Scott is persuasive and should be adopted by our Court. Plaintiffs address the issue more directly when urging us to find as a matter of law that legislative immunity is inapplicable to the instant claims for injunctive relief. In particular, plaintiffs claim that they do not seek to enjoin defendants from performing any legislative functions, but seek instead merely to prevent defendants from enforcing unconstitutional legislation . . . that they participated in enacting. Appellees' Br. at 66. Consequently, plaintiffs argue that defendants may not invoke legislative immunity against the instant claims for injunctive relief at this stage, or at any future stage, in the litigation. Addressing the merits of this argument, we look first to the nature of the relief sought. Plaintiffs' amended complaint seeks relief in the form of an order that would, inter alia, compel[ ] defendants . . . in their official capacities, to reinstate [plaintiffs] to their former positions with the State of Connecticut or such other position as the Court deems appropriate, with full and appropriate restoration of seniority and benefits. Am. Compl. at 32 ¶ 9. We agree with plaintiffs that legislative immunity does not bar the requested relief insofar as it involves reinstatement to existing positions other than the positions that plaintiffs previously held i.e., reinstatement to other position[s] as the Court deems appropriate. Id.; see also Appellees' Br. at 42 ([E]ven if positions occupied by the unreinstated employees do not currently exist, these employees can be reinstated to equivalent positions . . . in any number of other State agencies); id. at 43 ([E]ven if no such vacancies in the full-time workforce exist, the District Court can order unreinstated workers to be hired as durational employees until openings arise). Because ordering defendants to hire plaintiffs into existing positions in the state workforce would not require either a new allocation of funds or the passage of new legislation, but would instead compel defendants to act only in their administrative capacities as executive branch officials with authority over the state workforce, we conclude that legislative immunity presents no obstacle to the District Court's ordering of any such relief. [13] Nevertheless, we cannot assess, at the pleading stage, the merits of plaintiffs' argument that legislative immunity also presents no obstacle to their claims seeking reinstatement to their previous positions. Whether restoring plaintiffs to those positions would compel defendants to act in their legislative capacities will necessarily hinge on the findings made by the District Court regarding the issues to be resolved under Bogan. If defendants successfully demonstrate that their actions in terminating plaintiffs' positions were legislative in nature under Bogan, plaintiffs' claims for reinstatement to their previous positions would be barred by legislative immunity. This is so because ordering such relief would require no less than a judicial order compelling defendants, in their official capacities, to re-create positions that would have been eliminated through prior legislative action. As the Third Circuit has recognized in similar circumstances, granting such relief contravenes the general policies underlying legislative immunity. See Baraka, 481 F.3d at 203 (claims against the New Jersey Governor and State Assembly seeking reinstatement to position of Poet Laureate were barred because seeking reinstatement would require . . . legislators to rescind their votes repealing the statute and to enact legislation recreating the position). Moreover, unlike the injunction in Consumers Union, which prevented enforcement of unconstitutional provisions of the Virginia Bar Code, plaintiffs' projected relief would not merely enjoin defendants from performing discretionary functions or from exercising their independent enforcement authority. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734, 100 S.Ct. 1967. Rather, it would compel the rescission of an existing budget agreement and the enactment of new budget legislationprecisely the activity which the legislative immunity privilege seeks to protect. See Baraka, 481 F.3d at 203 (concluding that because [d]ebating, voting on, and passing statutes are role[s] assigned exclusively to the Legislature . . . [defendant's] request for reinstatement was barred by legislative immunity (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because it is unclear whether and how defendants eliminated plaintiffs' positions, their entitlement to immunity from claims seeking reinstatement to their previous positions will depend on facts revealed during discovery. In sum, we dismiss defendants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it challenges the District Court's conclusion that defendants' entitlement to legislative immunity from plaintiffs' claims seeking reinstatement to their previously-held positions hinges on findings that can be made only following discovery. See Almonte, 478 F.3d at 105 (appellate jurisdiction does not exist where immunity determination depends on unresolved factual issues). However, because we conclude as a matter of law that legislative immunity presents no bar to plaintiffs' claims insofar as plaintiffs seek placement into other, existing positions in the State workforce, we affirm the District Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss this claim for relief and direct the Court, on remand, to consider this claim without regard to defendants' asserted legislative immunity defense. [14]