Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Informing the Jury of the Disposition of Osborne's Case

Text: When the parties presented their penalty phase arguments and the jury began deliberating, the charges against Osborne were pending. The jury knew this. In the opening penalty phase jury argument, defense counsel stressed the plea bargain Edwards had made. Regarding Osborne, counsel said that the district attorney might still make a deal with John Osborne that will save his life.... And you [the jury] could end up with a situation where [Edwards] is out by the year two thousand ... [a]nd Osborne is alive and well ... and Charles Riel has been executed.... In the rebuttal argument counsel returned to this theme. He said, What will happen to John Osborne I don't know. He beat one homicide already, in his words, and he's going to try again. Whether it will happen or not, [is] not in my hands, not in your hands. While the jury was deliberating its penalty verdict, Osborne did in fact plead guilty to the charges in return for a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole. The prosecution and defense stipulated that the court could inform the jury of the plea. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed when the court asked, And both of you recognize that it's arguable, normally, as to whether or not this type of a factor would be under consideration, but because of the ethical considerations, both of you are agreeing to have them consider it; is that correct? Thereafter, the court informed the jury of the guilty plea. It initially forgot to mention the sentence. Defense counsel reminded the court that it had left out the most important part, in my opinion. The court apologized, informed the jury of the sentence as well, then told it, And that is a factor which the parties have agreed that you may consider in your deliberations in this matter. Defendant argues the court erred in informing the jury of the plea. He notes it is settled that [t]he punishment meted out to a codefendant is irrelevant to the decision the jury must make at the penalty phase: whether the defendant before it should be sentenced to death. ( People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 343, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121; see also People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 111-112, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311.) We need not decide whether the court erred in doing what both sides requested under the unusual circumstances of this case, for defendant invited any error. ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 931-932, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Defense counsel clearly wanted the jury to learn of Osborne's guilty plea and, most important, the sentence, and for good reason. The information meshed nicely with the defense penalty phase argument. Moreover, any error could only have benefited defendant. He speculates the jury may have considered the information aggravating because it might have felt someone should receive the death penalty for Middleton's murder, or the plea demonstrated the prosecutor's belief that defendant was the most culpable of the three perpetrators. He presents no reason, however, to believe the jury considered the information as anything but helpful to defendant. The defense argued the matter in mitigation; no one argued it might be aggravating. Defense counsel believed the information could only benefit defendant, as have defendants generally, who have long argued juries should receive and consider this kind of evidence. (E.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 62-64, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1251, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 479-480, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 810-813, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310.) Contrary to defendant's claim, counsel were not ineffective for asking the court to do what defendants have long wanted done. Defendant also claims the court erred in not instructing the jury more fully or allowing the parties to reargue the matter. Defendant did not so request at trial, again for good reason. Defense counsel had already argued as mitigation the disposition Edwards had received and further argued, without rebuttal from the prosecution, the possibility of a similar plea by Osborne and its significance in mitigation. The information that the possibility of a life sentence for Osborne had become a reality consummated that argument. Defense counsel could reasonably have believed the posture of informing the jury of the disposition without further argument from the prosecution was best for defendant.