Opinion ID: 4289970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Material Variance from the Indictment

Text: In a closely related claim, Morrissey argues that the evidence presented at trial resulted in a material variance from the charge listed in the indictment. Once again, the indictment charged Morrissey with receipt “[f]rom an unknown date, but beginning a[t] least as early as May of 2015, continuing up to and including January of 2016, in the Southern District of Iowa.” However, the evidence at trial—specifically the prosecutor’s closing argument and the court’s instruction that the jury could convict Morrissey for receipt after March 29, 2011—encompassed conduct before Morrissey moved to Iowa in September 2014. This, Morrissey argues, changed the theory of the case, allowing him to be convicted for receipt based on conduct that occurred years ago in Washington. “[A] variance in the evidence affects the defendant’s right to adequate notice, that is, the Sixth Amendment right ‘to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.’” Stuckey, 220 F.3d at 981 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). “A variance arises when the evidence presented proves facts that are materially different from those [alleged] in the indictment.” Starr, 533 F.3d at 997 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he charging document does not change, only the evidence against which the defendant expected to defend varies . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We “review[] the variance to determine if defendant’s right to notice has been prejudiced.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The primary consideration in this determination is whether the indictment fully and fairly apprised the defendant of the charges he or she must meet at trial.” United States v. Begnaud, 783 F.2d 144, 148 (8th Cir. 1986). We will reverse “only if the variance actually prejudiced” Morrissey. Id. We find the indictment “fully and fairly apprised” Morrissey of the evidence the government presented at trial. Id. It is true that in closing the prosecutor referred to Morrissey’s pattern of obtaining child pornography over the course of many years. -13- But, Morrissey admitted to this pattern of behavior at trial. And, the prosecutor apparently referred to it in closing to refute Morrissey’s defense that the files on the Dell laptop were automatically downloaded without his knowledge. The jury was specifically instructed that it could not convict Morrissey based on his prior conduct, but could consider evidence of such conduct for the limited purpose of deciding “motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Thus, we find these statements did not change “the evidence against which [Morrissey] expected to defend.” Starr, 533 F.3d at 997 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecutor also referred to three images on the Dell laptop that were downloaded in June 2014. These images were within the time period specified in the indictment and well within the statute of limitations period for the receipt charge, which the court’s instruction accurately reflected. Cf. Stuckey, 220 F.3d at 982 (“[W]e have held on many occasions that a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period, and prior to the return date of the indictment.”). Moreover, these images were found on the Dell laptop, and Morrissey knew he would have to defend against a charge of receiving child pornography based on the Dell laptop seized from him. Thus, we find these images were “evidence against which [Morrissey] expected to defend.” Starr, 533 F.3d at 997 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude that Morrissey’s “right to notice [was not] . . . prejudiced.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).