Opinion ID: 451934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorneys' Fees Under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act.

Text: 26 Under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 325F.69, subd. 1, and Minn.Stat. Sec. 8.31, subd. 1, subd. 3a, a private plaintiff may recover attorneys' fees and costs for an action for fraud, misrepresentation, or deceptive practices. The district court awarded Cashman $82,110.42 in attorneys' fees pursuant to this act. Allied contends that this award was improper because the district court erroneously instructed the jury that they could find that defendants made misrepresentations even if Allied did not intend to deceive Cashman. 2 27 Allied cites a Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn.1983), in support of its argument that intent to deceive is required to find liability for misrepresentation. In Jenson, the court decided that: 28 the statute does not create strict liability. Section 325F.69, subd. 1, speaks of fraud and misrepresentation, of promises that are false and statements that are misleading or practices which are deceptive. We conclude that these terms, given their plain, ordinary meaning, denote at least some degree of culpability. In the absence of a clear legislative intent, we think it is inappropriate to impose a strict liability standard here   . 29 335 N.W.2d at 728. 30 The district court's instruction to the jury on misrepresentation was as follows: 31 Silence, in other words, may be a misrepresentation if it relates to a material fact and there is a duty to disclose the matter. This duty may arise out of a relationship of trust or confidence, an inequality of bargaining position, an awareness that the undisclosed fact would prevent a previous representation from being misleading or an unequal access to information. 32 It is not necessary that the one who makes the misrepresentation knows that it is false. If an individual makes a statement which turns out to be false, and makes it of his own knowledge when in fact he does not know whether it is true or false, that is a misrepresentation. 33 Even if a misrepresentation is made innocently, it would operate as a fraud upon plaintiff if made unqualified or as of the representor's own knowledge. 34 Without ruling on the precise nature of the intent element of misrepresentation under Minnesota law, we conclude that the district court's instructions were entirely consistent with Jenson. The instructions clearly required some degree of culpability by the defendants; Jenson only holds that the consumer fraud statute does not create strict liability. We thus decline to reverse the district court's award of attorneys' fees. 35 In Cashman's cross-appeal, it argues that the district court erred in failing to add a risk multiplier to the lodestar or base fee in determining attorneys' fees. The district court determined that whatever risks counsel for Cashman undertook did not justify a multiplier above the lodestar amount. We will not overturn a district court's award of attorneys' fees absent clearly erroneous factual findings concerning the basis of the award, or abuse concerning the discretionary margin involved in its allowance. Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 643 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir.1981); International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255, 1274 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063, 101 S.Ct. 787, 66 L.Ed.2d 605 (1980). We find no such error or abuse of discretion in the district court's analysis of the risks for Cashman's counsel, nor do we find any misapplication of law involved in its determination. 36