Opinion ID: 1843933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the city's claim

Text: The trial judge in this case found that Amweg violated his duty of care by failing to observe the traffic signal and by failing to keep a proper lookout for east-west traffic. In finding against the City of LaVista on its claim, the judge made no finding as to the propriety of Andersen's conduct. However, as is more fully discussed below, Andersen acted negligently as a matter of law in failing to see or hear the ambulance. Therefore, we review the trial court's determination that Amweg's negligence was more than slight when compared to that of Andersen and that Andersen's negligence was less than gross when compared to that of Amweg. See Gatewood v. City of Bellevue, 232 Neb. 525, 441 N.W.2d 585 (1989). The first issue for this court, then, is whether the trial court erred in finding that Amweg was negligent to a degree sufficient to bar the city's claim. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff amounting to a breach of the duty which the law imposes upon persons to protect themselves from injury and which, concurring and cooperating with actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, contributes to the injury complained of as a proximate cause. Maple v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 384 N.W.2d 254 (1986). In Nebraska, emergency vehicles operating audible sirens and visible warning lights are privileged to exceed posted speed limits and enter intersections against red lights if done safely. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 39-602(5) (Cum.Supp.1986) and 39-608 (Reissue 1988). However, the driver of such an emergency vehicle is under a duty to drive with due regard for the safety of others. § 39-608(5). In an action involving allegations that the driver of an emergency vehicle acted negligently, the driver's actions are measured against those of a reasonable person exercising due care under the same emergency circumstances. Gatewood, supra ; Maple, supra ; Lee v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 345, 307 N.W.2d 800 (1981). When the evidence conflicts such that reasonable minds may draw different conclusions therefrom, the questions of negligence and comparative and contributory negligence are factual determinations. Maple, supra, citing Stephen v. City of Lincoln, 209 Neb. 792, 311 N.W.2d 889 (1981). On appeal of a law action tried without a jury, the trial court's factual findings have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless clearly wrong. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Pelton, 236 Neb. 66, 459 N.W.2d 193 (1990). Moreover, in reviewing such cases this court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the successful party, resolving all conflicts in that party's favor and giving that party the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible from the evidence. Id.; Wells Fargo Alarm Serv. v. Nox-Crete Chem., 229 Neb. 43, 424 N.W.2d 885 (1988). Therefore, in reviewing this case the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellees, Armstrong and Andersen. This case is very similar to Gatewood, supra . There, an accident occurred between the plaintiff's automobile and a cruiser driven by a member of the Bellevue Police Department. The police officer entered an intersection against a red light with his lights and siren activated after first making eye contact with the drivers of vehicles in the nearest three of four lanes of cross-traffic. He collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff in the fourth lane. The officer was traveling at 20 to 50 m.p.h. as he crossed the intersection, and his view of the intersection was unobstructed for approximately one block in the direction from which the plaintiff's car came. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, and the City of Bellevue appealed. This court held the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the officer acted negligently. The court explained that a fact finder could conclude that the officer breached his duty of care by entering the fourth lane of traffic at a speed that might not allow him to avoid a collision, especially given his failure to first make a visual survey of that lane before entering. Here, Morgan testified that from his position alongside and somewhat behind Amweg's ambulance he could see west on Highway 370 for a quarter mile and that he saw Andersen's truck approaching from a couple hundred feet away. This testimony is important because it tends to negate the inference that either the tree or the white van interfered with Amweg's ability to see the approaching truck. There is also evidence that Amweg accelerated very rapidly after pausing to check the east-west traffic. Both Morgan and another witness expressed their surprise at Amweg's attempt to beat the truck across the intersection. As in Gatewood, there is evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that Amweg acted negligently in failing to adequately survey the intersection before attempting to cross at a high rate of speed. We do not think the trial court erred in finding that Amweg failed to maintain a proper lookout. The trial court also found Amweg negligent in failing to observe the traffic signal before crossing the intersection. Though Amweg had the right-of-way despite the red light, the duty of care imposed by § 39-608(5) implies that drivers of emergency vehicles cannot simply careen through intersections oblivious to conditions around them. A court could conclude that Amweg might have checked the cross-traffic more carefully had he known his light was red. Because the appellees are entitled to the resolution of conflicting inferences in their favor, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that Amweg was negligent in this regard. We therefore conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain a finding that Amweg's negligence contributed in a degree more than slight to causing the accident. Appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.