Opinion ID: 2352739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: OVERRULING MOTION TO RECUSE TRIAL JUDGE FROM PRESIDING OVER RCr 11.42 PROCEEDINGS

Text: Appellant separately raises the issue of whether the trial judge erred by failing to recuse from the RCr 11.42 proceeding. We must first address the Commonwealth's argument that Appellant's recusal claim is procedurally defaulted because he did not avail himself of KRS 26A.020 [87] after making a motion before the trial court under KRS 26A.015. We have previously rejected the Commonwealth's remedy exhaustion argument by noting that KRS 26A.020 is merely an alternative procedure to KRS 26A.015. [88] As such, Appellant has not defaulted this claim, and we must address Appellant's various claims that the trial judge's impartiality might reasonably have been questioned, thus requiring him to recuse himself from the RCr 11.42 proceeding. Appellant claims the trial judge should be recused because he had extra-judicial knowledge about some of the issues that could have affected his decision on the RCr 11.42 motion and because this knowledge made him a material witness in the RCr 11.42 proceeding. Appellant points to three areas in particular  the judge's knowledge of Sam Shepherd's other criminal cases, of his alleged meeting with jurors following the jury's death verdict, and knowledge of Appellant's juvenile record all of which have been addressed already in part in Section V(A)(2) above. Because Appellant failed to raise colorable claims as to those issues, as addressed above, it was unnecessary for the trial judge to recuse himself from the RCr 11.42 proceeding.