Opinion ID: 1190178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Public Defender

Text: The trial court found that the defendant in a contempt for non-support proceeding is entitled to court-appointed counsel if he is indigent, a finding which is in agreement with our recent decision in Otton v. Zaborac, supra . The Public Defender recognizes that the defendant has the right to counsel, but argues that the agency is not empowered to provide such representation. The legislation creating the Public Defender Agency states that the services of an attorney and concomitant legal services are to be provided by the Public Defender Agency to (a) An indigent person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer in connection with a serious crime, or is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of a serious crime, or is on probation or parole, or is entitled to representation under the Supreme Court Rules of Children's Procedure, or against whom commitment proceedings for mental illness have been initiated .... AS 18.85.100. AS 18.85.170(5)(A) defines a serious crime as including a criminal matter in which a person is entitled to representation by an attorney under the Constitution of the State of Alaska or the United States Constitution. This court has defined a criminal prosecution as any offense for which incarceration could be a direct penalty, and from this definition have flowed the rights to jury trial and court-appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases, based upon constitutional considerations. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970); Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1971). In Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1971), we went beyond traditional classifications and, in essence refused to classify contempt for non-support as either totally civil or totally criminal. [8] In Otton v. Zaborac, supra , we held that the indigent defendant in a non-support contempt proceeding is constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel. Thus, under AS 18.85.170(5)(A), the Public Defender is empowered to represent Mr. Johnson; the agency is to act in criminal matters, and a criminal matter under that statute is one in which a person is entitled to representation either under the state or federal constitutions. The agency's primary argument is that, since the passage of the empowering statutes antedates our judicial decisions concerning right to counsel, [9] the legislature could not possibly have intended this class of defendant to be represented by the Agency. This argument is at odds with general precepts of statutory interpretation. Legislation is most often prospective in nature and couched in terms broad enough to embrace future applications which are not and cannot be foreseen with precision at the time of enactment. Continuous, contemporaneous and practical interpretation by executive officers and the courts is a valuable aid in determining meaning, and judicial interpretation is conclusive. Legislative inaction can be evidence of intent, although it is not always a reliable guide. [10] In Alexander v. City of Anchorage, supra , our interpretation resulted in significantly expanded authority for the Public Defender Agency. That case reasoned that since an indigent defendant is entitled to representation by counsel when a direct penalty may be incarceration, it follows that any such offense is a serious matter and a serious crime within the meaning of the Public Defender Act. 490 P.2d at 916. Although the legislature, at the time of enactment of the act, may not have foreseen the development of the law in this area and, therefore, might not have foreseen this precise application of the act, there is also no indication that it intended to exclude this class of defendants from representation. To so include them does no violence to the rules of statutory construction. [11] As we have noted above, the enforcement of child support orders is affected with the public interest. This is an area in which the legislature could fashion a new and more effective system to enforce the parental obligation to furnish child support. We recommend that the legislature consider the enactment of new legislation in this field. In particular, we note that, under the present scheme, the custodial parents and children are often unable to afford private counsel and are thus unable to enforce child support orders. We hope that the legislature will rectify this situation as soon as possible by providing a means of efficiently and effectively enforcing a child's right to support payments. Until such a system is created, a child's right to support will be unfairly burdened in that, unlike the non-custodial parent, the child and the custodial parent will have no guarantee that a publicly supported attorney will vindicate their rights under the child support order. Reversed in Part and Affirmed in Part. FITZGERALD, J., not participating.