Opinion ID: 2974697
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statements

Text: Mooneyham alleges that because McMahan did not testify at trial, Agent Williams’s testimony regarding statements that McMahan made during one of their car trips between North Carolina and Tennessee were admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Specifically, the defendant objected to the statement attributed to McMahan by Williams to the Nos. 04-5189/5190 United States v. Mooneyham Page 4 effect that “his supplier [Mooneyham] was a very careful man; that he had been in the penitentiary before; that he was a car thief; that he was a neat freak; that he drove a green ‘97 or ‘98 Ford F-150; and . . . [he] didn’t live but about 50 yards from the interstate.” The defendant contended at trial that introduction of such statements would violate the rule in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which prohibits the introduction of statements made by a non-testifying co-defendant that implicate the defendant because they would deprive the defendant of the right to confrontation. The defendant’s motion to exclude was granted, but only to the extent that the statements at issue did not qualify as co-conspirator statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Those, the district court ruled, were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, subject to the requirement, set out in United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1979), that the government must establish the existence of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. As a result, the specific statement set out above was admitted into evidence. We find no error in the district court’s ruling under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which provides that a statement offered against a party that is made by a co-conspirator during the course of and in furtherance of that conspiracy is admissible as a non-hearsay statement. McMahan was indisputably Mooneyham’s co-conspirator, and the statement in question was clearly made in furtherance of the conspiracy because it was directed at a potentially recurring customer (Agent Williams) with the intention of reassuring him of Mooneyham’s reliability as a supplier. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 449-50 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1342 (6th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Swidan, 888 F.2d 1076, 1081 (6th Cir. 1989) (co-conspirator statements made to an undercover officer held admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)). There remains the question of admissibility under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), an issue of constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford, the Supreme Court announced a new standard for assessing whether hearsay statements, otherwise admissible under principles of evidence, violate the mandate of the Confrontation Clause. Under this rule, “[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is . . . confrontation.” 541 U.S. at 68-69. In order to introduce testimonial hearsay in a criminal prosecution, the government must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to serve as a witness, and that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See 541 U.S. at 5455. The threshold question, then, is whether McMahan’s statement was “testimonial.” In this regard, the proper inquiry is “whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.” United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004). McMahan’s statements were admitted into evidence under the theory that they were statements made by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. By definition, such statements are not by their nature testimonial; the one making them has no “awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used at a trial.” Id. at 674 (internal quotation omitted). Indeed, the Crawford court specifically identified statements in furtherance of a conspiracy as examples of statements that are inherently non-testimonial. See 541 U.S. at 51, 56 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”). Because McMahan was not aware that Williams was a police officer, his remarks were not the product of interrogation and were not testimonial in nature. Hence, there was no Crawford error in the introduction of those remarks. Nos. 04-5189/5190 United States v. Mooneyham Page 5 After Crawford, non-testimonial statements continue to be analyzed with respect to the Confrontation Clause under the rule of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See 541 U.S. at 68; United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 337-38 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that Crawford did not disturb the rule that non-testimonial statements are constitutionally admissible if they satisfy the Roberts standard). Under this rule, statements may be admitted in absence of cross-examination only when they bear adequate indicia of reliability or when they fall within a “firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. Co-conspirator statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are both inherently trustworthy and “firmly rooted.” “[T]he Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987). For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting McMahan’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and that the defendant has failed to establish that Agent Williams’s testimony concerning the statement violated his right to confrontation.