Opinion ID: 78403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Shuker's Behavior

Text: Finally, the Recusal Motion complained of Shuker's behavior and statements which allegedly violated Rules 4-3.4(g) and 4-3.4(h) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. [12] The Motion alleged Shuker made unethical threats of seeking, and promises of obtaining, the incarceration of the individual Movants and similar threats directed at Movant's Counsel. (Recusal Mot. at 3.) The bankruptcy court found that Shuker's behavior did not rise to the level of a disciplinary rule violation or create doubts about the bankruptcy court's impartiality. The record supports this finding.
After a court hearing in which Shuker sought orders directing Knight and Huggins to repatriate certain funds or be held in civil contempt, the Recusal Motion asserts that Shuker told Knight and Huggins they would end up in jail if they did not settle, and Huggins would die in jail. (Recusal Mot. at 9.) It is now clear that this never happened. Knight's own testimony belies the facts as stated in the Recusal Motion. The Motion states that Mr. Shuker approached [Knight and Huggins] outside the door of the Court and announced that... [Knight and Huggins] would `end up in jail' and that Mr. Huggins, 67-years old, `would die in jail.' ( Id. ) According to Knight, however, Shuker did not approach either Knight or Huggins, his comments were made only to Spradley and Ginsberg. (Recusal Tr. Vol. IV at 162; Knight Aff. at 2.) Knight testified that while Spradley and Shuker were speaking in the hallway, Shuker told Spradley if he did not have a settlement on his desk soon, Spradley's clients were going to go to jail and Huggins would die in jail. ( Id. ) Knight claims that although he was not part of the conversation, he was within earshot and overheard Shuker's threats. ( Id. ) Huggins, however, was in the bathroom (out of earshot) at the time. ( Id. ) Being within earshot of two lawyers negotiating is much different than being approached by opposing counsel. Further, if Huggins was in the bathroom during Shuker's alleged threats, Shuker could not have told Mr. Huggins that he would die in jail. Moreover, Shuker testified that this was a warning, not a threat. (Recusal Tr. Vol. IV at 196.) If Huggins and Knight did not make a settlement offer for the money already owed they risked being found in civil contempt and sent to jail. ( Id. ) Again, there is simply no support in the record for these allegations. Such misstatements reflect either a failure to investigate or a deliberate attempt to deceive.
In another example of Mr. Shuker threaten[ing] to use what he apparently thought was his court-granted right to threaten imprisonment, the Motion references an incident at Knight's deposition. (Recusal Mot. at 9.) Shuker was allegedly enraged when he saw Spradley at the deposition. Shuker told Spradley to leave the room and threatened that he would be arrested for trespass if he did not leave. Spradley did not leave. Shuker then left the room, calmed down, and returned a few minutes later. The deposition was taken with Spradley present. Again, the Motion fails to put the incident in context. Shuker testified that the Knight deposition at issue was not for the general Mataeka proceeding, but for the private purpose of accessing Knight's funds in aid of execution of an existing judgment. Shuker did not believe that Spradley had a right to be at the deposition. Further, Huggins was to be deposed immediately after Knight. Thus, Shuker did not want Huggins' counsel in the room for Knight's deposition. He did not want Huggins to know what Knight was being questioned about or testifying to. Shuker himself acknowledged that his behavior was improper. Spradley emailed Shuker the next day outlining the inappropriate comment and Shuker responded with an apology email. The language used in the Recusal Motion fails to tell the whole story and thereby exaggerates what occurred.
The Motion further mentioned that Shuker threatened to file a bar grievance against Ginsberg during the deposition of Charles Baron on August 9, 2005. In our view, Shuker's conduct is understandable in context. At the recusal hearing, Shuker testified that during a previous deposition Ginsberg interrupted him on numerous occasions and even stopped the deposition mid-question to take Knight (the deponent) out of the room. Knight allegedly returned to the deposition and, without being asked a related question, immediately retracted a previous answer. During the Baron deposition Shuker testified that he threatened Ginsberg with the filing of a bar grievance if Ginsberg continued with the same conduct. Shuker did not want Ginsberg to further interfere with the deposition by telling Baron how to respond to questions. Shuker explained that he threatened a bar grievance to stop this unethical conduct. Ginsberg does not contest his alleged conduct.
Finally, the Motion asserted that Judge Briskman's apparent endorsement of Shuker's behavior created the appearance of impropriety. ( See, e.g., Recusal Mot. at 10) (Mr. Shuker continued to craft his own set of procedures, as endorsed by the Court ); ( id. at 28) (The proceeding, and prior proceedings, so empowered Mr. Shuker that he felt able to threaten the individual Movants with incarceration...) ( id. at 26) (Similarly, [Shuker] appears to have received a judicial nod to continue to ignore the automatic stay...); ( id. at 9) (Mr. Shuker threatened to use what he apparently thought was his court-granted right to threaten imprisonment.) (emphasis added). Spradley and Ginsberg also testified that they believed the court endorsed Shuker's actions. During the recusal hearing, Spradley testified that he drew an inference from Shuker's conductthreatening imprisonment on two occasionsthat Shuker believed he only had to call Judge Briskman to secure an arrest. (Recusal Tr. Vol. III at 103-07.) He testified that he was not aware of any additional facts that would support these allegations, but that the allegations reflected his impression based on Shuker's behavior. ( Id. ) Ginsberg also testified that it seemed Shuker felt empowered by Judge Briskman to act as he wanted. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 104-05.) He stated: In the context of reviewing the ATN matter, the idea that Mr. Shuker felt so comfortable with threatening people and so comfortable with doing what he was doing, that he was prepared to call Judge Briskman in for assistance and effectuate Mr. Spradley's arrest raised additional red flags about what it was that caused Mr. Shuker apparently to feel so empowered in our proceedings. ( Id. ) Ginsberg later recanted this basis for the Recusal Motion (the court's endorsement of Shuker's behavior) in a letter to the court dated January 19, 2007. In the letter, Ginsberg stated: Other matters have been raised in the instant hearing, including actions by Mr. Shuker in relation to parties and counsel. However, we do not believe that any evidence has been entered regarding a relationship between your Honor and Mr. Shuker that show [sic] that you endorsed such actions, and thus believe that, although the activities were inappropriate, they do not serve as a basis for the relief requested by the Motion. We believe that Mr. Shuker was acting on his own at those times. (Letter from Ginsberg to Judge Briskman of 1/19/07.) Ginsberg testified at the sanctions hearing that the letter was only to clear up a misunderstanding, he never alleged an illicit or an improper relationship between Mr. Shuker and Judge Briskman. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 14.) Ginsberg explained that for recusal he was only required to prove that the public might perceive impropriety from Shuker's actions, not actual court endorsement. ( Id; see also Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 117.) In our view, however, even though Ginsberg presented no evidence of court endorsement, the Recusal Motion clearly accused the court of endorsing Shuker's actions. Such an allegation under these circumstances is improper. We therefore find that the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in its fact finding which is fully supported by the record.