Opinion ID: 1706879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: errors in the sentencing order

Text: While declining to address proportionality at this time, we point to two deficiencies in the sentencing order. [10] First, the trial court gave Ramirez's age little weight, despite the fact that Ramirez was only one month over the age of seventeen at the time of the crime, and even though there was uncontroverted evidence of his emotional, intellectual and behavioral immaturity. In addition, although the trial court acknowledged that Ramirez had no significant history of prior criminal activity, it found that this factor did not deserve significant weight because Ramirez had been prosecuted as a juvenile for a prior auto burglary. [11] In regard to Ramirez's age the trial court found: At the time this murder was committed, the defendant was seventeen years old. Relevant expert testimony in this regard indicates that the defendant is more immature emotionally, intellectually and behavior-wise than his chronological age, but there was no evidence that he was, or is, in any way retarded or has a subnormal I.Q. The defendant's age at the time of he crime, while a mitigating factor, is given little weight. We have explained that age is simply a fact, every murderer has one. Echols v. State, 484 So.2d 568, 575 (Fla. 1985) (defendant was fifty-eight years old at the time of the crime). However, while we noted in Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 367 (Fla.1986), that the defendant's age of twenty, without more, was not significant mitigation, we have held that when the murder is committed by a minor, the mitigating factor of age must be found and given full weight. Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 1001 n. 7 (Fla.1993) (emphasis supplied). [T]he weight can be diminished by other evidence showing unusual maturity. Id. at 1001; see also Shellito v. State, 701 So.2d 837, 843 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1537, 140 L.Ed.2d 686 (1998). Compare Mahn v. State, 714 So.2d 391, 400 (Fla.1998) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider defendant's age of twenty as a statutory mitigating factor in light of the fact that Mahn had an extensive, ongoing, and unrebutted history of drug and alcohol abuse, coupled with lifelong mental and emotional instability); with LeCroy v. State, 533 So.2d 750, 758 (Fla.1988) (finding that the weight of the mitigating factor was diminished by Le-Croy's unusual mental and emotional maturity). In this case there was no evidence to suggest unusual maturity such that the weight of this mitigator should have been diminished. See Ellis, 622 So.2d at 1001. To the contrary, the evidence revealed that Ramirez was immature for his age. Ramirez had the emotional, intellectual and behavioral maturity of a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old, and suffered from learning disabilities that evidenced an organic problem in his brain. Moreover, Ramirez's youth is linked not only with his emotional and intellectual immaturity, but also with his unrebutted history of huffing. [12] See Mahn, 714 So.2d at 400; Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 418 (Fla.1998). Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in giving little weight to the defendant's age at the time of the crime, despite the uncontroverted testimony of defendant's emotional, intellectual and behavioral immaturity. See Shellito, 701 So.2d at 843; Ellis, 622 So.2d at 1001. The trial court further erred in finding that the defendant's arrest as a juvenile for stealing a ten-dollar bill from the dashboard of a pick-up truck militat[ed] against giving significant weight to the mitigating factor that Ramirez had no significant history of prior criminal activity. Adjudication on the juvenile arrest was withheld, and Ramirez successfully completed an alternative program. See supra note 4. The circumstances of the crime do not militate against giving this statutory factor significant weight. The trial court abused its discretion in so finding. See Ellis, 622 So.2d at 1001.