Opinion ID: 1462522
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness Balancing

Text: The totality-of-the-circumstances test requires the court to determine the reasonableness of the subject search based on a balancing of the state's interests against Wilson's privacy interests. In Conley, the Sixth Circuit undertook this interest-balancing exercise in connection with a Fourth Amendment challenge to the federal DNA Act by a supervised releasee. The court characterized the government's interests in establishing a nationwide DNA database as compelling. Conley, 453 F.3d at 680 (quoting with approval United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir.2005)). The court identified several purposes served by the federal Act's DNA collection and indexing requirements: obtaining reliable proof of convicted felons' identities; promoting increased accuracy in the investigation and prosecution of crimes; deterring convicted felons from committing additional crimes, thereby protecting communities in which they are eventually released; and aiding in the solving of crimes by serving to exculpate the innocent and inculpate the guilty. Id. at 678-80. Considering the minimal intrusion implicated by the drawing of a blood sample, the court concluded that the government interests outweighed Conley's greatly diminished privacy interests as a convicted felon. Id. at 680-81. Wilson attempts to distinguish Conley by arguing that Ohio's interests in enacting the Ohio DNA statute should be judged by its legislative history, not by the purposes served by the federal DNA Act. He argues the legislative history demonstrates that the collection of DNA samples from convicted felons in Ohio was authorized to promote the administration of criminal justice and aid in deterring, preventing and solving crimes. Obviously, these purposes are substantially similar to those identified in Conley. Wilson does not argue that these interests are not compelling, but maintains they are ordinary law enforcement objectives that do not qualify as special needs. The argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, the governmental interests need not qualify as special needs under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, which, as indicated above, is properly applied in this case. Second, even courts that have applied the special-needs test have found that the very purposes identified both in Conley and in the cited legislative history are not ordinary, but special law enforcement concerns that do qualify as special needs. See e.g., Amerson, 483 F.3d at 81-83; Hook, 471 F.3d at 772-73. Further, Conley is not materially distinguishable on the basis of the extent of intrusion, as the swabbing of saliva to obtain a DNA sample is even less invasive than the drawing of a blood sample. Amerson, 483 F.3d at 84. Finally, Wilson's privacy interests, first as a prisoner and now as a parolee, are less substantial or certainly no greater than those asserted by Conley, a supervised releasee. Unable to distinguish Conley, Wilson argues that it is wrongly decided. Yet, his arguments are the same arguments that have been consistently and conclusively rejected by the overwhelming weight of authority. Hence, even if we were free to depart from the precedent established in Conley, we have been presented no persuasive reason to do so. Because the Ohio DNA statute appears to be materially indistinguishable from the federal DNA Act and other similar state statutes that have been uniformly upheld by the federal courts against Fourth Amendment challenge, we find no error in the district court's judgment in favor of the state defendants on Wilson's Count I claim.