Opinion ID: 2189569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Sufficient Evidence Exists to Support Defendant's Convictions for Extortion and Blackmail

Text: Next, defendant asserts that the state did not present evidence sufficient to support his extortion and blackmail conviction. The defendant contends that the statements forming the basis of the extortion and blackmail charges against him were not credible threats, but merely his emotional outbursts. The defendant further argues that, because his threats were not credible, they are protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and that, as such, his conviction on these charges violates his right to free speech under the First Amendment. [11] We initially note that defendant's First Amendment argument is superfluous. The First Amendment does not protect against genuine threats. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969). The United States Supreme Court has defined genuine threats as those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003). Thus, the extortion and blackmail statute, § 11-42-2, criminalizes a category of speech, i.e. threats, that is not entitled to First Amendment protection. As a result, if defendant's statements were genuine threats, then they are not entitled to First Amendment protection, Watts, 394 U.S. at 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, and are prohibited under § 11-42-2. If the statements were emotional rantings rather than genuine threats, however, then they are entitled to First Amendment protection and are not criminalized under § 11-42-2. The only issue here, therefore, is whether defendant's statements were genuine threats. Extortion is (1) an oral or a written threat to harm a person or property, (2) accompanied by the intent to compel someone to do something against his or her will. State v. Price, 706 A.2d 929, 933 (R.I.1998). The reasonableness of the victim's fear is not an element of the crime; rather, the crucial question is the defendant's subjective intent as demonstrated by his    conduct and by the words he    used   . Id. The defendant's letters to Ms. Grayhurst included statements such as I love the shit out of you and I'm just praying that you'll come to your senses before it's too late; You have three options: (1) reconcile our differences; (2) pay me $373,814.81; (3) a one-way ride to Quidnessett; [12] I hope that you decide to reconcile our differences and get back together because if you don't I'm afraid you [ sic ] life wouldn't be worth a plug nickel; Don't underestimate what I'm capable of because you'll end up very, very DEAD!  These statements clearly evince defendant's subjective intent both to harm Ms. Grayhurst and to compel her to pay him money or reconcile against her will. As such, they constitute genuine threats in violation of § 11-42-2 and are unprotected by the First Amendment. Thus, we hold that there is sufficient evidence about the credibility of his threats to support defendant's convictions for extortion and blackmail.