Opinion ID: 1205031
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court's comments on the jury's numerical division.

Text: At 4 p.m. on Thursday, December 16, 1982, the first full day of deliberations, the jury conveyed a message to the court that the jury had reached an impasse and was requesting guidance as to how to proceed. The court, stating it had received the jury's message, requested that the jury foreman inform the court as to the numerical division of the jurors, without revealing the respective numbers for a guilty verdict or a not guilty verdict. [6] (21a) Defendant contends the court's inquiry into the jury's numerical division impaired the fairness of the trial. [T]he practice of inquiring into the jury's numerical division, without finding out how many are for conviction and how many for acquittal, was expressly approved in [ People v.] Carter [(1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 (69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353)]. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Such inquiry is justified in the discharge of the court's statutory responsibility of assuring that a verdict is rendered `unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree.' (Pen. Code, § 1140.) ( People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 [69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353].) Although, as defendant points out, the rule is otherwise in federal court (see Brasfield v. United States (1926) 272 U.S. 448 [71 L.Ed. 345, 47 S.Ct. 135]), we previously have explained that this federal rule is not binding on the states. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 776, fn. 14.) [7] In view of the circumstance that the court inquired in a neutral manner as to the numerical count in order to determine whether further deliberations would be productive, we decline to disapprove the practice as it was employed in the present case. We also disagree with defendant's contention that the court's order declaring a recess until the following morning, once it had ascertained the vote was split, implied the court had found something wrong with the vote which might be remedied by a night's rest. (22) The determination, pursuant to section 1140, whether there is a `reasonable probability' of agreement, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 994 [269 Cal. Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289].) Although the court must take care to exercise its power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency ( ibid. ), the court may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be perceived `as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) (21b) Nothing in the trial court's comment in the present case properly may be construed as an attempt to pressure the jury to reach a verdict; the court correctly concluded there was a reasonable probability the jurors could agree on a verdict.