Opinion ID: 2520113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Post- Miranda Statements

Text: The defendant argues that his post- Miranda statements should also have been suppressed because they were tainted by his pre- Miranda confession made in the course of the same interview. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), is the beginning point of our analysis of this issue. In that case, the defendant made an unwarned, incriminating statement while being arrested in his home. Approximately an hour later, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and provided a full written confession at the sheriff's headquarters. He subsequently sought to suppress his oral statement and signed confession, arguing that the initial statement let the cat out of the bag had tainted the subsequent confession as fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court concluded: We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights. 470 U.S. at 314. Elstad thus applies in cases where there is no coercion or an attempt to undermine a suspect's ability to exercise free will. State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, 270, 979 P.2d 1279 (1999). In this case, the district court found that Agent Cordts' demeanor was not hostile, demeaning, offensive, or threatening, and review of the videotaped interview and the record supports this finding. Moreover, the defendant makes no claim on appeal that Agent Cordts' questioning was coercive, and a procedural violation of Miranda is only presumptively coercive rather than actually coercive. See Dang, 267 Kan. at 206 (quoting U.S. v. Singleton, 922 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-31 [D. Kan. 1996]). Absent coercion or improper tactics by the officers in obtaining the initial statements, there is no presumption of compulsion as to the subsequent post- Miranda statements. 267 Kan. at 205. The defendant would have us distinguish Elstad, because his post- Miranda confession occurred in one continuous transaction that included his pre- Miranda confession, with no hour-long gap between the two as existed in Elstad. The defendant argues this case is more analogous to three cases cited below where the warned statement was suppressed because it was made in the course of one continuous transaction that included the unwarned statement. In Lewis, the officers failed to give Miranda warnings and used deliberately coercive tactics during the first interrogation in an attempt to obtain incriminating statements from Lewis. Ten hours later, the officers continued to use improper tactics in a second interrogation until Lewis confessed. At that point, he was given a Miranda warning and confessed. This court reversed the district court's admission of the pre-and post- Miranda statements because the State failed to overcome the presumption of compulsion and because the police deliberately used coercive and improper tactics to obtain the incriminating statements. 258 Kan. at 37-38. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 494-96, local police officers interrogated defendant Westover over a 14-hour period without a warning of his rights. At the conclusion of the interrogation, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents immediately began their own interrogation, administered a proper warning, and obtained written confessions within a few hours. The statements were admitted at trial. The United States Supreme Court concluded that an intelligent waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights could not be assumed because the warning came at the end of the interrogation process in the defendant's point of view. The Court explained that the FBI interrogation was conducted immediately following the state interrogation, in the same police station, and in the same compelling surroundings. Thus, the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the state interrogation. The court suggested that [a] different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. 384 U.S. at 496. In U. S. v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989), postal inspectors interviewed a bank employee in connection with the disappearance of various pieces of mail. Prior to receiving his Miranda warning, the defendant made incriminating statements and allowed the inspectors to search his wallet. The inspectors then administered his Mirand a rights 55 minutes into the interview and the defendant provided a written confession. The district court suppressed the pre- Miranda statements and all evidence obtained. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit distinguished its case from Elstad, concluding that the second, warned confession was inadmissible: [T]here was no passage of time to speak of between the unwarned confession and the subsequent warnings and confession, all of which occurred as part and parcel of a continuous process. Thus, the second confession came almost directly on the heels of the first. Although Elstad precludes the formulation of a `rigid rule' in determining the admissibility of the second confession, [citation omitted] our review of `the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect,' [citation omitted] convinces us that the second confession cannot be allowed into evidence. 884 F.2d at 373. Lewis, Miranda, and Carter present markedly different facts from the case we now review, as the statements admitted in each were obtained after a long period of unwarned interrogation in which the investigators were deliberately trying to obtain incriminating statements prior to giving the warnings. The circumstances in each of the three cases suggested corrosive police tactics. In the present case, the pre- Miranda statement was made in response to the Agent's first question. Moreover, Miranda was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Elstad. The three cases relied on by the defendant are dissimilar and not persuasive in resolving the question presented in this case. The defendant is correct that the second confession in this case came shortly after the first unwarned confession. However, several cases have upheld the admission of the warned statement when it was made in the course of the same interrogation as the unwarned statement. In Dang, 267 Kan. 198, officers interrogated the defendant for 35 minutes, determined that he was lying, administered the Miranda warning, and continued the interview. The district court suppressed the defendant's post- Miranda statements because they were the direct result of his pre- Miranda statements. On appeal, this court distinguished the case from its earlier decision in Lewis where the officers had used deliberatively coercive and improper tactics to obtain the initial statement. We reversed the district court, concluding that because the defendant's pre-and post- Miranda statements were not coerced or involuntary, his post- Miranda statements should have been admitted. In U.S. v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000), the defendant made several pre- Miranda and post- Miranda incriminating statements to officers while he was being arrested in his hotel room. As in this case, the defendant argued on appeal that his case was distinguishable from Elstad because his case involved only one interrogation. In analyzing Elstad, the First Circuit concluded: [A]lthough the elapsed time between interrogations is one factor that may dissipate the taint of a coerced confession, the lesser taint of a Miranda violation may be dissipated by subsequent warnings even if the unwarned and warned statements are obtained during the same interrogation. 208 F.3d at 319. In U. S. v. Bermudez, 2000 WL 1871676 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion), the defendant made several incriminating pre- Miranda and post- Miranda statements during a 30-minute interview at the police station, broken up only by the officer leaving the room to speak with his supervisor. In addressing the district court's concern that the reaffirmation of the earlier unwarned statements followed closely on the heels of the original statements, the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasoning of a Seventh Circuit case: [N]othing in the rationale of Elstad implies that the temporal proximity (or similarity) of the pre and post- Miranda -warning statements makes the latter any the less valid. Quite the contrary, we should think. A suspects willingness to make exactly the same statement a second time, following an advice of rights and a written waiver that drives home the seriousness of the steps about to be taken, demonstrates that the suspect is set on his course, and thus that the statement cannot be attributed to `compulsion' in violation of the Constitution. United States v. Gupta, 183 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, in Davis v. U.S., 724 A.2d 1163, 1169 (D.C. 1998), the defendant cited Carter in arguing that he was subjected to one continuous period of custodial interrogation during which he was not informed of his rights until he had confessed to the crime. The defendant made a pre- Miranda statement, the officers left him alone for 15 minutes before giving the warnings, and his videotaped statement was made 11 minutes later. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals declined to hold that what occurred was one continuous interrogation, thus requiring suppression of the post- Miranda statement, noting Elstad' s admonition that in circumstances involving the admissibility of a properly warned confession which follows an unwarned but clearly voluntary admission, a break between the two is not essential. Dang, Esquilin, Bermudez, and Davis are analogous to this case. In these cases, the pre- Miranda statements were not obtained as the result of extensive interrogation, nor were they obtained in a coercive manner. Although these cases illustrate that a break in time between the first and second statement is not necessary, it is relevant to note that a brief break did occur between the statements in this case so that the defendant could have his handcuffs removed. Although the time between the first and second statement was admittedly brief (5 minutes), the defendant's decision to confess in response to the agent's very first question, and his subsequent post- Miranda confession shortly thereafter, clearly demonstrate his intent and desire to stay on course with his admission. The weight of authority supports the application of Elstad in this case. We conclude that the district court, confirmed by the videotape of the entire interrogation, established that the defendant's statements were accompanied by no coercive police tactics. As such, the issue of admission of the post- Miranda statements rests solely upon whether they were knowingly and voluntarily made. See McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263 at 270. Voluntariness of a confession is determined from the totality of the circumstances, and where the district court conducts a full prehearing on the admissibility of extrajudicial statements by the accused, determines the statements were freely and voluntarily given, and admits the statements into evidence at trial, appellate courts accept that determination if supported by substantial competent evidence and do not attempt to reweigh the evidence. 267 Kan. at 270-71. Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary include: (1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; and (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the investigation. 267 Kan. at 270. There is no indication that the accused's mental condition was impaired when he made the post- Miranda statement. Although he complained of being hit on the head when he was arrested, he said he was not confused or injured and did not need to see a doctor. The agent acted in a professional, calm, and nonthreatening manner throughout the interview. The defendant's handcuffs were removed during the interview, and the entire interview lasted under 2 hours. Although he was informed of his right to have a lawyer present, the defendant never asked to communicate with his lawyer or anyone else during the interview. The defendant was 22 years old at the time of the interview, of normal intelligence, and had a criminal history. Nothing in the manner of questioning revealed an intent by the agent to trick or deceive the defendant into making a statement. Nothing in these factors suggests that the defendant's post- Miranda statements were involuntary. As such, substantial competent evidence supports the district court's admission of the post- Miranda statements at trial. See State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 78 P.3d 412 (2003). Our conclusion also renders the admission of the defendant's pre- Miranda statements harmless.