Opinion ID: 71979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: findings regarding lufthansa's negligence

Text: 37 Next, Lufthansa challenges the magistrate judge's finding that Lufthansa acted negligently in its response to the symptoms displayed by Krys. 17 In particular, Lufthansa argues that its reliance on Dr. Fischmann's analysis and advice fulfilled its duty to Mr. Krys. 18 We review the magistrate judge's application of the standard of care to the facts of the case--i.e., the determination on the ultimate question of negligence--for clear error. Daley v. United States, 792 F.2d 1081, 1086 (11th Cir.1986). 38 Lufthansa relies primarily on two lines of cases in support of its argument that its deference to Dr. Fischmann's opinion was not a breach of the duty a carrier owes to its passengers. One line of cases is easily disposed of. Lufthansa cites numerous cases establishing that under maritime law, a shipowner will not be held liable through respondeat superior for the negligence of the ship doctor. These cases are inapposite for two reasons. First, these cases establish a general rule of maritime law, and maritime law does not govern the disposition of the instant case. 19 Second, the plaintiffs do not allege that Lufthansa is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Fischmann; instead, they argue that the airline is liable for negligently deferring to Dr. Fischmann's assessment of the situation. 39 Next, Lufthansa cites two cases for the proposition that deference to the advice of a competent physician satisfies a carrier's duty of due care. In Gamble v. The New Bedford, 111 F.Supp. 8 (D.R.I.1953), a passenger on an excursion from Providence, Rhode Island, to Block Island, Rhode Island, fell down a ship staircase and was knocked unconscious. The crew placed the passenger in a canvas chair in a semi-reclining position. When he regained consciousness, the passenger complained of a pain in his hip. A doctor in Block Island directed that the passenger be kept in the position in which he had been placed until he could be hospitalized; the passenger then returned to Providence. The plaintiff complained that the care and treatment he received--namely, having been put in a chair rather than a bed--constituted negligence. The court stated the relevant standard of care as follows: The duty of a ship owner to a passenger who is injured during the voyage is to see that his injuries receive such care and treatment as is reasonably practicable in view of the facilities available. Id. at 12. 20 Applying this standard to the facts, the court found no negligence: 40 [T]he master was not a physician. The Court cannot say that the master, not knowing the full extent of libelant's injury, acted unreasonably in allowing libelant to remain in the adjustable chair. Furthermore, after Dr. Orlando's examination of the libelant, the master was acting under the doctor's direction in allowing libelant to remain in the position in which he had been placed. The Court is satisfied that at all times after the accident the libelant was maintained in a position which the master reasonably believed was proper under the circumstances.... The care and treatment which the master adopted on his own initiative prior to the time of Dr. Orlando's examination, and at the doctor's direction after said examination, appears to have been reasonable under the circumstances. 41 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). Although Lufthansa attaches much significance to the court's subsequent statement that the [c]ourts have generally held that a master fulfills his duty to exercise due care if he follows the advice of a competent physician, id., we do not think The New Bedford stands for the proposition that deference to a competent doctor fulfills the standard of care in all conceivable situations. As we read the decision, particularly the language emphasized in the quotation above, the court reviewed the reasonableness of the treatment afforded the plaintiff, giving weight to the fact that a doctor had recommended that treatment. We think this is substantially different from holding that because the crew did what the doctor recommended, it was ipso facto not negligent. 42 In The Van der Duyn, 261 F. 887 (2d Cir.1919), cited both by appellant and by the New Bedford court, a coal passer injured his arm while at sea. The officers on board treated the cut and bruise and prevented any infection. When the ship docked in Cuba, a doctor examined the injury and reported that no other treatment was necessary. Upon the ship's return to New York, however, it was discovered that the plaintiff had a fractured ulna and required surgery. In answer to the plaintiff's complaint that he was not given considerate treatment on board the ship, the court wrote: 43 The officers of the ship owed to respondent the exercise of reasonable care to furnish such aid as ordinarily prudent persons would under similar circumstances.... [The doctor] did not report a fracture, or any unusual or serious condition of the arm, and therefore it cannot be said that in the exercise of reasonable care it was incumbent upon the officers of the vessel to take the patient to a hospital in Cuba. On the return voyage to New York, the chief officer continued the treatment as directed by the doctor. 44 ... 45 ... We see nothing in the conduct of the officers of the ship which warrants condemnation, or upon which there may be fixed a liability for the shipowner. The requirement of a ship is to give reasonable medical treatment under all circumstances. There must be reasonable ground to believe that consequences more serious than the swelling, pain, and suffering which ordinarily attend a fracture or a severe laceration resulted, before liability be imposed. Medical advice received and followed, as was done by the officers of the ship, is all that could reasonably be expected from the officers here under the circumstances disclosed by this record. 46 ... 47 The ship will not be held responsible for an error of judgment on the part of the officers, if their judgment is conscientiously exercised with reference to conditions existing at the time. 48 Id. at 889-90. We think that The Van der Duyn, like The New Bedford, falls short of saying that reliance on a doctor fulfills the carrier's duty in all circumstances. 49 The parties do not cite, and our own research has not disclosed, more recent analogous cases. We therefore proceed to determine whether the magistrate judge's finding of negligence was clearly erroneous. Under Florida law, 21 a common carrier must exercise the highest degree of care, foresight, prudence and diligence reasonably demanded at any given time by the conditions and circumstances then affecting the passenger and the carrier during the contract of carriage. Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, 46 So.2d 173, 177 (Fl.1950). 50 We agree that whether Lufthansa breached this duty is a close question. We are not unsympathetic to the defendant's argument that the crew's deference to Dr. Fischmann's analysis was reasonable under the circumstances--especially in light of the recognized difficulty of distinguishing a heart attack from other conditions that cause similar symptoms. Were we deciding the question of negligence de novo, perhaps we would resolve the issue differently. However, we do not sit in the place of the factfinder; we are only to ask whether the finding is clearly erroneous in view of the entire record. That much, we cannot say. 51 Plaintiff adduced expert testimony to the effect that the Lufthansa crew deviated from the airline industry standards which prevailed at the time of the incident. 22 Captain Paul Roitsch, an expert in aviation standards, testified: 52 It's my opinion ... that the mere fact that a person appears and announces that he's a doctor does not relieve the crew of their responsibilities whatever. They must still continue to monitor and see what's happening and make sure that it's correct, which was not done in this case, and I think the results show what happens when the crew decides to walk away from a situation because there's a doctor on the scene. 53 It's my feeling that Purser Freund should have immediately gone into his books and said to himself, I'm going to read and see what Lufthansa tells us to do about a heart attack, about a person with these symptoms, so that he could monitor what was happening. 54 Captain Roitsch summarized the failings of the crew as follows: 55 [B]asically I see this as a failure to communicate. The airline established procedures for handling situations like this. 23 The captain must bear the ultimate responsibility as the person in charge ... who abrogated his responsibility and handed it over to another individual. 56 ...[T]he captain should have made absolutely sure that he was getting good information at every point in the affair with Mr. Krys. 57 This did not happen for some reason.... [I]f [the captain] had information that Mr. Krys was suffering the way he was suffering and has been described as suffering, that captain would have turned immediately and landed.... 58 I guess what I'm trying to say is that the defense has said that if the doctor hadn't been there, Captain Schnabl would have landed, which tells us basically it's too bad the doctor was there, because his presence affected this event adversely in several ways, the most important one of which was it diverted apparently every person in that crew from pursuing his or her responsibilities, and I take that down to the last person in the cabin. Roitsch further testified: 59 I am impressed by the fact that two lay witnesses were able to describe Mr. Krys's symptoms in a manner that absolutely fulfills the description of a heart attack by the AMA, by Lufthansa German Airlines, and by Dr. Fischmann himself. 60 I cannot believe, it's so difficult to believe that these were not evident also to that cabin crew, and being evident to the cabin crew, they should have passed on to the captain and to the doctor and the question asked should we not rethink our decision to land and land immediately. 61 There was one other thing that I wanted to say in here, and I think this is very crucial: That airplane was a full airplane. Everybody was very, very busy.... I think the volunteering of this doctor provided a means by which all of these crew members could say, fine, everything is wonderful, we can proceed as we normally would, and that to me is an abrogation of the responsibility that's placed in their hands. 62 Asked whether, based on industry standards, he believed the flight should have landed, the witness testified: Yes, I believe they should have landed on the East Coast of the United States, or even farther up into Nova Scotia or Newfoundland would have been acceptable. 24 63 We have upheld the magistrate judge's finding that Krys displayed all of the symptoms of a heart attack as outlined by the AMA and by Lufthansa's operating manual. See section III above. In light of that fact and the entirety of the evidence, we think the magistrate judge could conclude that notwithstanding Dr. Fischmann's impressions, Lufthansa's employees knew or should have known that Mr. Krys was suffering a heart attack, and thus that an unscheduled landing was necessary. Therefore, we cannot say that the magistrate judge's finding of negligence was clearly erroneous. 64