Opinion ID: 1059808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Cap.

Text: The plaintiff's assignment of error on this point states that [a]s a matter of law, the trial court erred in failing to conclude that the cap on medical malpractice awards is unconstitutional as applied to Coastal and to Dr. DiGiovanna. [4] In considering this assignment of error, we adhere to the well-settled principle that all actions of the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional. This Court, therefore, will resolve any reasonable doubt regarding a statute's constitutionality in favor of its validity. Any judgment as to the wisdom and propriety of a statute is within the legislative prerogative, and this Court will declare the legislative judgment null and void only when the statute is plainly repugnant to some provision of the state or federal constitution. Supinger v. Stakes, 255 Va. 198, 202, 495 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1998) (citations and interior quotation marks omitted). In Etheridge, we rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the medical malpractice cap based upon contentions that the cap violates the Virginia Constitution's due process guarantee, jury trial guarantee, separation of powers doctrine, prohibitions against special legislation, and equal protection guarantee, as well as certain parallel provisions of the Federal Constitution. 237 Va. at 92, 376 S.E.2d at 527. The plaintiff makes the same challenges here, but amplifies the arguments in several respects. [5] It is clear that we cannot grant the plaintiff relief without overruling Etheridge. Immediately, therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis is implicated. In Virginia, the doctrine of stare decisis is more than a mere cliche. That doctrine plays a significant role in the orderly administration of justice by assuring consistent, predictable, and balanced application of legal principles. And when a court of last resort has established a precedent, after full deliberation upon the issue by the court, the precedent will not be treated lightly or ignored, in the absence of flagrant error or mistake. Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987) (emphasis added). The inquiry becomes, therefore, whether flagrant error or mistake exists in the Etheridge decision. The plaintiff contends that such error does exist and, therefore, that [t]he doctrine of stare decisis should not deter this Court from reversing Etheridge.  The plaintiff argues that the medical malpractice cap is unconstitutional on each of seven independent grounds. We will consider these grounds seriatim.