Opinion ID: 2996363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Indictment on Count 3

Text: Defendant Stevenson argues that his conviction on Count 3 must be overturned because the indictment did not allege any mens rea and thus fails to charge an offense.7 Stevenson failed to raise this argument below; therefore, we review it here only for plain error. Stevenson attempts to avoid the plain error standard of review by arguing that an indictment that negates an element of the offense fails to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the district court; thus, we should consider the question of jurisdiction de novo. Stevenson’s argument fails, however, because 18 U0.S.C. § 3231 confers jurisdiction on district courts to try charges framed by federal indictments, and, as we have repeatedly held, “district judges always have subject-matter jurisdiction based on any indictment purporting to charge a violation of federal criminal law . . . so errors in a non-frivolous indictment do not strip the district court of jurisdiction under § 3231.” United States v. Bjorkman, 270 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 2001). Consequently, the issue is not jurisdictional and plain error applies. Plainerror review of the sufficiency of an indictment is an extremely difficult standard to overcome because we will reverse only if the indictment “is so obviously defective 7 Count 3 of the indictment charged Stevenson with violation of § 861, alleging that he “employed, hired, used, induced and enticed” minors to assist in avoiding detection of violations of the drugs laws. Section 861, however, contains the mens rea “knowingly and intentionally,” which was omitted from the indictment. Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 23 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 as not to charge the offense by any reasonable construction.” United States v. Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1975) (quotations omitted). In United States v. Smith, we decided the identical issue that Stevenson raises here. 223 F.3d 554, 570-72 (7th Cir. 2000). In that case, Smith was charged with a violation of § 861(a). Id. at 571. The indictment in that case likewise failed to specify any mens rea element. Id. And the defendant there raised the same issue that Stevenson does here. We rejected the argument, holding that the scienter requirement was present in the context of the indictment in the words “employ,” “hire,” “use,” “induce,” and “entice,” id. at 572,8 the same words used in the indictment here. These words sufficiently convey the notion of knowledge and intent, so it cannot be said that this indictment fails to “charge the offense by any reasonable instruction.” Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d at 2. Stevenson urges us to overrule our decision in Smith, but offers us no compelling reason to do so. Consequently, his sufficiency-of-the-indictment challenge fails.