Opinion ID: 185527
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality under 47 U.S.C. 208(b)

Text: 10 Under 28 U.S.C. 2342(1) (1994), this court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47. In turn, 47 U.S.C. 208(b) states that [a]ny order concluding an investigation of, inter alia, the lawfulness of a charge commenced at the behest of a party complaining about the actions of a common carrier shall be a final order and may be appealed under section 402(a) of this title. The jurisdictional question in this case, then, is whether the Liability Order concluded the investigation that began with CFC's original 1989 complaint against the LECs. 11 All parties agree that, in the Liability Order, the FCC reached a final determination that the LECs had imposed unreasonable charges in collecting EUCL fees from the IPPs, thereby violating 47 U.S.C. 201(b). See Liability Order at 8773, p p 40-41. This decision is undoubtedly final, in the sense that there is no indication that the agency will revisit it in future proceedings. Indeed, neither the Commission's brief nor agency counsel's argument on appeal claimed that the finding of liability is subject to further review by the FCC sans a court order requiring it. Nonetheless, the Commission contends that its decision to bifurcate the damages phase of its investigation from the liability phase stripped the entire Liability Order of its finality. In other words, according to the FCC, an investigation under 208 of a single complaint that seeks a determination of liability and an award of damages is not over until the Commission has resolved both aspects of the complaint. See Br. for Respondents at 27. 12 As a general proposition, an FCC order is final if it (1) represents a terminal, complete resolution of the case before the agency, and (2) determines rights or obligations, or has some legal consequence. Capital Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 3 F.3d 1526, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, we are sure that the Liability Order, even without a concomitant determination of damages, has some legal consequence for the LECs. The actions of the FCC bear this out. Agency officials have relied on the Liability Order at least twice in unrelated cases to deny requests made by SBC Communications, one of the named LECs, to have sanctions against it mitigated. See In re SBC Communications, Inc., 16 F.C.C.R. 10963, 10968, p 15 & n.38 (Enf. Bur. rel. May 24, 2001); In re SBC Communications, Inc., 16 F.C.C.R. 5535, 5543, p 19 & n.53 (Enf. Bur. rel. Mar. 15, 2001). If the Liability Order now furnishes the basis for agency judgments in subsequent cases, the FCC is hard pressed to deny that the finding of legal liability is sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the finality test. Cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 824 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that an agency designation that became a part of [the regulated party's] permanent record, thereby exposing [it] to more severe sanctions for later violations supplied the 'modicum of injury' necessary to support jurisdiction) (quoting Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 13 The FCC is, however, quite correct to point out that, under a well-established principle of finality, when a tribunal elects to resolve the issue of liability in a particular action while reserving its determination of damages on that liability, that decision generally is not considered final for purposes of judicial review. See Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (In damage and injunction actions, a final judgment in a plaintiff's favor declares not only liability but also the consequences of liability--what, if anything, the defendants must do as a result.); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976) (holding that a summary judgment order imposing liability is not considered final under 28 U.S.C. 1291 where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved). This basic understanding of finality is the norm not only in civil litigation, but also in the administrative context, at least where the relevant statute does not embrace a non-traditional view of finality. See, e.g., Rivera-Rosario v. United States Dept. of Agric., 151 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1998) (A final decision in an adjudicatory proceeding is one that resolves not only the claim but, if liability is found, also the relief to be afforded.); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 824 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1987); accord AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc. v. Widnall, 129 F.3d 602, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that an order of the Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals was not final because it resolved only entitlement (liability) while reserving decision as to quantum (damages)). 14 In this case, however, this norm of finality has been supplanted by statute. Congress added subsection (b) to 47 U.S.C. 208 in 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-594, 8(c), 102 Stat. 3021 (1988). This amendment converted what had been 208 which allowed a broad group of entities to bring complaints to the FCC challenging the actions of common carriers, thus triggering investigations by the Commission of the matters complained of into what is now subsection (a). In turn, the new provision, subsection (b), established time limits pursuant to which certain investigations cognizable under subsection (a) had to be concluded, and decreed that dispositions in those investigations would be subject to immediate judicial scrutiny. Thus, when the FCC conducts an investigation into the lawfulness of a (1) charge, (2) classification, (3) regulation, or (4) practice, any order concluding such an investigation is deemed to be a final order under 208(b). This case falls squarely within the meaning of this expediting amendment. 15 Our conclusion is compelled by the statutory text. The crucial word in 208(b) is lawfulness, which must be read to mean what it says, namely that which is allowed or permitted by law. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1279 (1993); cf. Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 256 F.3d 819, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (While it is fashionable in some legal circles to deride 'hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions,' this Court does not and should not move in them.) (citing Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220, 1227 (Fla. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S. 70 (2000)). As such, interpreted literally (as we think is proper), 208(b) applies to final determinations of liability of the sort that the FCC has delivered here. 16 This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that 208(b) does not mention damages. By contrast, damages are specifically covered in three other sections of the chapter: 206 makes common carriers who do anything declared to be unlawful liable for damages; 207 allows any party harmed by the actions of a common carrier to file a complaint with the FCC seeking damages; and 209 authorizes the Commission to make an order directing the carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled if it determines that damages are appropriate. Given that 208(b) was designed to render only a limited category of FCC decisions final, the failure of that provision to mention damages, set against the explicit reference to damages in these other provisions, militates in favor of applying 208(b) as it is written. 17 It is also noteworthy that 201(b) declares all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations that are unjust or unreasonable to be unlawful. The categories listed in 201(b) are coterminous with those cognizable under 208(b), further suggesting that, as to this class of investigations, a determination of lawfulness is separate and distinct from a determination of what damages (if any) should flow from a violation of the law. For, even if the FCC ultimately decides that the LECs need not pay any damages for their EUCL charges, it would not follow from such a decision that they had done nothing unlawful. One can violate the law without being made to pay for it. Accordingly, when the FCC conclusively resolved that the EUCL charges were unreasonable within the meaning of 201(b) and the Access Charge Reconsideration, see Liability Order at 8766, p 20, it simultaneously and necessarily concluded its investigation into the lawfulness of those charges, as it left nothing more to be said on the question of whether the LECs had run afoul of the statute's proscriptions. 18 To the argument that the original investigation has not been concluded because CFC's original complaint sought damages, and the agency's failure to determine damages means that it has not resolved all of the matters complained of under 208(a), our answer is simple. The class of investigations contemplated by 208(b), and subject both to that subsection's time limitations and finality rules, is narrower than the class of investigations contemplated by 208(a). Indeed, the FCC has conceded as much. See Br. for Respondents at 32. This difference in coverage is stark, and plain on the face of the statute. Under 208(a), investigations can be launched regarding anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier subject to this chapter in contravention of the provisions thereof. By contrast, 208(b) governs only the four types of investigations enumerated above. Its text refers not to investigations of thematters complained of, but rather to investigations of the lawfulness of a charge, classification, regulation, or practice. 19 Taken together, then, the language of 208(b), which speaks only of lawfulness, and the structure of the common carrier chapter, which contemplates separate determinations of lawfulness and damages, compel the conclusion that when the FCC enters an order dealing solely with the lawfulness of a charge, that order is final under 208(b)(3) even if it fails to resolve a complainant's properly presented claim for damages. Our holding in no way limits how the Commission may elect to investigate complaints under 208. No FCC order is subject to review under 208(b)(3) unless it actually terminates an investigation of the lawfulness of a common carrier's activities. Thus, had the agency not bifurcated the proceedings in this case, but instead reserved final judgment on the LECs' liability until it was in a position to consider damages simultaneously, this court would have been compelled to wait as well. But, having elected to bifurcate, and thus to render a conclusive finding that the LECs acted unlawfully, the FCC subjected its decision to immediate review. Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of the LECs' petition. 20