Opinion ID: 1044033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Allegations

Text: Defendant argues in his brief to this Court three separate grounds in support of his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty plea: (1) counsel's failure to inform him about the community supervision sentence; (2) counsel's inadequate preparation and advice concerning trial strategy, leaving Defendant confused and feeling compelled to take the plea bargain; and (3) counsel's pressuring Defendant to plead guilty. [12] We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that Defendant is not entitled to relief on the latter two grounds. Defendant has failed to establish the factual allegations of confusion or pressure by clear and convincing evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). Rather than indicating confusion, the record instead supports the post-conviction court's findings that counsel explained to Defendant the charges and potential sentences as well as the terms of the plea agreement, which Defendant agreed to accept in open court despite subjectively disagreeing that his conduct met the legal definition of rape. Nothing in the transcript from the plea hearing suggests that Defendant was in a fog or that his mother was acting hysterically in the courtroom. Similarly, the record does not establish that counsel pressured Defendant into accepting the guilty plea. Instead, the record supports the post-conviction court's findings that counsel met with Defendant on multiple occasions to discuss Defendant's options, including the right to proceed to trial and testify on his behalf. Counsel also discussed concerns about how the jury might react to Defendant's behavior around minors, but those concerns were relevant regardless of Defendant's sexual orientation. Defendant's claim that he felt rushed at the plea hearing is directly contradicted by his own testimony that his plea hearing really seemed to drag on and he pled guilty just to end that day. Therefore, the crux of this case is the legal significance of counsel's failure to inform Defendant of the mandatory lifetime community supervision sentence triggered by his convictions of rape (or aggravated sexual battery, to which Defendant initially intended to plead guilty). Clear and convincing evidence in the recordi.e., the testimony of both Defendant and Lead Counselestablishes that, before Defendant pled guilty, counsel did not inform Defendant of any community supervision sentence to commence after the completion of probation. Therefore, we proceed with the two-pronged Strickland inquiry.
In Grindstaff, this Court similarly undertook an examination of whether defense counsel's performance was deficient in conjunction with advising the defendant about the sentence resulting from a guilty plea. Specifically, the defendant was charged with five counts of aggravated sexual battery. He agreed to plead guilty with no agreement as to his sentence. His lawyer testified at the post-conviction hearing that he had told the defendant that, if the trial court sentenced him to no more than eight years, he would be eligible for an alternative sentence, including probation. The defendant pled guilty with the understanding that it was possible for him to be put on probation and not spend any time in confinement. As noted above, however, aggravated sexual battery is not eligible for a probationary sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and we reversed, finding that the defendant had established both prongs of the Strickland test. Grindstaff, 297 S.W.3d at 222. In addressing the first prong, we initially acknowledged that [t]here are no specific guidelines for determining whether trial counsel's performance was deficient other than that the assistance of counsel must meet `an objective standard of reasonableness.' Id. at 220 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). We then turned to the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice for guidance, emphasizing Standard 4-8.1(a): Defense counsel should, at the earliest possible time, be or become familiar with all of the sentencing alternatives available to the court and with community and other facilities which may be of assistance in a plan for meeting the accused's needs. Defense counsel's preparation should also include familiarization with the court's practices in exercising sentencing discretion, the practical consequences of different sentences, and the normal pattern of sentences for the offense involved, including any guidelines applicable at either the sentencing or parole stages. The consequences of the various dispositions available should be explained fully by defense counsel to the accused. Id. (emphases added) (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function Standard 4-8.1 (3d ed.1993), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/%1 criminaljusticesection archive/crimjuststandardsdfuncblk.html). In Grindstaff, we also turned to federal cases for additional guidance. In United States v. Morris, defense counsel's performance was found deficient where he failed to recognize that the prosecutor's estimate under the federal sentencing guidelines was wrong. 470 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir.2006). In Moss v. United States, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that defense counsel's failure to provide professional guidance . . . regarding. . . sentence exposure prior to a plea may constitute deficient assistance. 323 F.3d 445, 474 (6th Cir.2003). In Magana v. Hofbauer, the Sixth Circuit found that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because he provided erroneous advice concerning sentence exposure. 263 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.2001). Taking this guidance into account, we held in Grindstaff that defense counsel's performance was deficient because he did not tell the defendant of the mandatory nature of his sentences and that he was ineligible for an alternative sentence. 297 S.W.3d at 221. In addition to our explication in Grindstaff of what constitutes deficient performance in conjunction with advising a criminal defendant about the consequences of a guilty plea, we find guidance in a recent case by the United States Supreme Court. In Padilla v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), the Court considered a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel following a legal immigrant's plea of guilt to a drug charge. Defense counsel did not inform his client that the conviction carried with it the likelihood of deportation; indeed, defense counsel told his client that he did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long. Id. at 1478 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant subsequently claimed that, had he known that his guilty plea could lead to his deportation, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on a trial. The Court acknowledged that deportation was not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction, but also recognized that deportation is a particularly severe penalty. Id. at 1481 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then determined that [t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. Id. at 1482. And, in the case before it, the Court determined that the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction. Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands removal for [most] controlled substances convictions. . . . This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect. Id. at 1483 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). That is, defense counsel's performance on behalf of his client Padilla was deficient because the relevant law set forth in succinct, clear, and explicit terms a significantly adverse consequence of the proposed plea, about which counsel failed to inform his client. Finally, our analysis of whether defense counsel's failure to inform Defendant about the community supervision requirement amounted to deficient performance implicates our recent decision in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn.2010). In Ward, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery. During the plea colloquy, the trial court did not inform the defendant that his conviction resulted in a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life. The defendant subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the grounds that his plea was not made knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that ruling. We reversed the lower court's judgment and granted relief, concluding that community supervision was an additional part of a defendant's sentence and an undesirable and punitive consequence of the guilty plea. Id. at 474-75. We explained that the lifetime community supervision requirement is punitive in effect, requiring an offender to regularly report to a parole officer who is granted wide discretion in imposing supervisory requirements, and to pay a monthly fee. Id. at 474. We described as significant the requirement of lifetime supervision and the attendant consequences placed on an individual after having served his or her entire sentence of incarceration and/or regular parole. Id. Because of the trial court's constitutional duty to ensure that a criminal defendant understands the sentence that he will be forced to serve as the result of his guilty plea and conviction, Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tenn.1993), and because the trial court had failed to discharge that duty, we held that the defendant's guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Ward, 315 S.W.3d at 464, 477. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the original trial court to vacate the judgment of conviction so that the defendant could withdraw his guilty plea and stand trial on the original charge. Id. at 477. Although the Ward defendant also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, our holding rendered that issue moot and pretermitted. Id. at 464 n. 1, 477. This case presents that issue squarely before us. Lead Counsel admitted that he did not believe either he or co-counsel informed Defendant about the community supervision requirement. The record of the plea hearing also reflects that the trial court did not inform Defendant of the community supervision requirement. Reviewing this case without the benefit of our decisions in Grindstaff or Ward, and without the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court that counsel's failure to inform Defendant about the mandatory lifetime community supervision consequence of his plea did not constitute deficient performance. Calvert, 2009 WL 890891, at  (citing Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 350 (Tenn.Crim. App.1994)). In light of Grindstaff, Ward, and Padilla, we now hold that a lawyer's failure to advise his or her client about the mandatory lifetime community supervision sentence, where the client is considering a plea to one or more of the relevant offenses, is deficient performance. As we pointed out in Ward, our community supervision statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-135-24, sets forth the community supervision requirement as an additional part of a defendant's sentence  for certain specifically enumerated offenses. 315 S.W.3d at 474 (emphasis added). The statute succinctly, clearly, and explicitly describes community supervision as a mandatory part of the sentence. The community supervision requirement is punitive and carries significant consequences, including the payment of a supervision fee and regular reporting to a parole officer who has the discretion to impose conditions of supervision. Id. Although Defendant's counsel could have determined this significant and punitive consequence of Defendant's plea from the plain language of the community supervision statute, counsel did not inform Defendant about this requirement. [13] Cf. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. Defense counsel's performance was, therefore, deficient.
Having determined that Defendant has established the first of the two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, we turn now to the second prong, which focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally deficient performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. In other words, we must determine whether Defendant has established by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel's failure to inform him of the mandatory lifetime community supervision aspect of his sentence, he would have declined to plead guilty. We begin by noting that, in its discussion of Defendant's decision to accept the plea agreement, the post-conviction court found that Lead Counsel believed that [Defendant's] predominant consideration was the amount of jail time he could face. The Court of Criminal Appeals accredited this finding. Calvert, 2009 WL 890891, at . However, after careful review of Lead Counsel's testimony, we conclude that the post-conviction court's finding is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. We have not located any testimony concerning Lead Counsel's beliefs about Defendant's priorities in accepting the plea agreement. In response to a question, Lead Counsel testified only that the nine-month sentence in the plea agreement was significantly less than the sentence Defendant likely would have received if he had been convicted of the same charges at trial. Lead Counsel also testified that he told Defendant about some of the requirements of sex offender probation, but did not recall telling Defendant about the community supervision sentence after the completion of probation. Nothing in this testimony indicates Lead Counsel's belief concerning what information Defendant considered most important in deciding to accept the plea agreement. Nor does it indicate Lead Counsel's belief concerning the importance Defendant would have assigned to information that counsel failed to communicate to him. Additionally, the post-conviction court did not acknowledge Defendant's own testimony when specifically asked about how the community supervision sentence would have affected his decision to plead guilty. Granted, Defendant testified that several aspects of his representation led him to regret his plea, but that testimony is attributable to the way that Defendant's post-conviction attorney phrased some of the questions on direct examination. Certain questions lumped together various aspects of defense counsel's representation that Defendant found objectionable and asked Defendant about their collective effect on his decision to plead guilty. However, there is one instance in the direct examination when Defendant's post-conviction attorney specifically asked how knowing about the community supervision sentence would have affected his decision to plead guilty. Defendant responded, I think that would have made differences [sic] in my decision, as well. Furthermore, Defendant testified that he began contacting attorneys about undoing his guilty pleas as soon as he was released on probation, rather than waiting until he was found in violation of his probation and ordered to serve the balance of his sentence in prison. [14] Based on Defendant's uncontradicted testimony, we believe that Defendant has carried his burden of demonstrating prejudice resulting from counsel's deficient performance. That is, Defendant has established a reasonable probability that, had counsel informed him about the mandatory lifetime community supervision sentence that would follow after his probation, he would not have pled guilty. Under these circumstances, Defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief.