Opinion ID: 216984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Regarding Threats to Witnesses

Text: Next, Vazquez-Villa argues the district court abused its discretion in permitting testimony regarding threats to prosecution witnesses. He asserts this testimony was more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He specifically contends the testimony was only marginally relevant and was designed to inflame the passion of the jury. Because Vazquez-Villa advances this argument for the first time on appeal, we review only for plain error. 2 See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 52(b); United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1128 (10th Cir. 2009). Under plain error review, we may not reverse unless we find “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, [we] may then exercise [] discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” United States v. Balderama-Iribe, 490 F.3d 1199, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 1 Even absent waiver, evidence supported the reasonableness of the traffic stop, and no showing was made that the canine sniff prolonged the stop. 2 Vazquez-Villa appropriately concedes that “no contemporaneous objection was made to the admission of [threat] evidence and thus it must be reviewed under the plain error standard.” Aplt. Br. at 20. -6- Under the third prong, the error affects substantial rights only if it has affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005). Vazquez-Villa bears the burden of demonstrating plain error. Id. Given this standard, the district court did not commit reversible error by admitting testimony regarding alleged threats to witnesses because (1) testimony regarding threats to Vazquez-Villa’s brother-in-law was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (2) the admission of testimony regarding alleged threats to Jose Aranda-Meza, a governmental witness, was harmless and did not affect the outcome of the proceedings.
Vazquez-Villa’s brother-in-law, a prosecution witness, testified that his sister threatened him in an attempt to dissuade him from testifying. According to the brother-in-law, his wife threatened that if he testified for the prosecution, he would never see his children again. Another prosecution witness corroborated this account. Vazquez-Villa purportedly told the witness that if his brother-in-law testified, “[Vazquez-Villa] would make sure that he lost his wife and his kids.” R., Vol. V at 618. The district court did not err in admitting this testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in -7- conformity therewith.” Under this rule, however, “[e]vidence of threats to a prosecution witness is admissible as showing consciousness of guilt if a direct connection is established between the defendant and the threat . . . .” United States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 651 (10th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also F ED . R. E VID . 404(b) (evidence of bad acts is admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident”). Accordingly, we have held that “a defendant’s threat against a potential witness is generally admissible under Rule 404(b)” because “such threats show the defendant’s intent to prevent the witness from testifying, and are thus an implicit acknowledgment of the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005). Because Vazquez-Villa is closely related to his sister and her husband, and because of the corroborating testimony, a “direct connection” existed between the threats and the defendant, and the content of the threats was evidence of VazquezVilla’s “consciousness of guilt.” See Smith, 629 F.2d at 652. Although the threat was made by Vazquez-Villa’s sister, the threat was traceable to Vazquez-Villa, independently corroborated, and probative of Vazquez-Villa’s guilt. Thus, evidence regarding the threat to Vazquez-Villa’s brother-in-law was admissible under Rule 404(b). Further, even if the district court did err in admitting the testimony, the error was not plain. Vazquez-Villa points to no -8- authority—and indeed, we find none—stating that testimony regarding threats of the sort made are categorically inadmissible. See United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1297–98 (10th Cir. 2009) (to constitute plain error, the district court’s decision must have been contrary to well-settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court).
The jury also heard that Vazquez-Villa indirectly threatened Jose ArandaMeza, a governmental witness and one of Vazquez-Villa’s close acquaintances. Aranda-Meza testified that, while in jail, an unidentified inmate told him Vazquez-Villa knew Aranda-Meza was “talking.” R., Vol. IV at 460. In response, Aranda-Meza said he “had not talked yet” and called the inmate’s suggestion “a lie.” Id. The inmate then remarked, “You know how this is.” Id. Aranda-Meza interpreted this as a threat, even though he did not know the identity of the person issuing the threat or the threat-maker’s relationship to Vazquez-Villa. Nothing the inmate said directly connected the threat to VazquezVilla, and further, it is was not clear from Aranda-Meza’s testimony whether the exchange unequivocally constituted a threat. Aranda-Meza acknowledged on the stand that the inmate did not threaten violence. Even if the district court ‘s decision to admit this testimony was erroneous, the testimony did not affect the outcome of the trial. Under the third prong of the plain error standard, a defendant must show the error prejudices “substantial -9- rights” by affecting the outcome of the district court proceedings. MoralesFernandez, 418 F.3d at 1124. The record here demonstrates Aranda-Meza’s threat-related testimony was, at most, a marginal aspect of the government’s case, and in any event it did not send a clear message to the jury that Vazquez-Villa threatened a prosecution witness. It suggested only that Aranda-Meza had some fear of reprisal for his testimony. Vazquez-Villa himself acknowledges ArandaMeza testified in a “convoluted fashion,” and it is plain the jury would have had to make a significant inferential leap before concluding Vazquez-Villa threatened Aranda-Meza. See Aplt. Br. at 21. Most importantly, any improper inference the jury may have drawn from the testimony was rendered inconsequential by the overwhelming evidence inculpating Vazquez-Villa—including the detailed testimony of many prosecution witnesses, recordings of wiretapped conversations, and physical evidence seized from Vazquez-Villa’s property. As a result, Vazquez-Villa suffered no prejudice from Aranda-Meza’s testimony. Finally, it is clear from the record that Aranda-Meza’s testimony did not prejudice the district court’s sentencing decision. In sentencing Vazquez-Villa, the district court explicitly disregarded testimony regarding threats to witnesses, and it applied a significant downward variance. For these reasons, Vazquez-Villa has not shown the district court committed plain error. -10-