Opinion ID: 1427816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intimate Association of Prosecutor's Activities With Judicial Phase of Criminal Process

Text: In our foregoing review of this important sentencing stage of the judicial phase of the criminal process, we have specifically referred to the roles played by the probation officer and the county attorney. As we have shown, under Wyoming law these officials perform vital activities of informing the sentencing judge of possible probation violations and of presenting them to the judge under the probation revocation procedures. Due process safeguards abound during this stage when the judge receives the petition for revocation from the county attorney and, based thereon, gives probable-cause consideration to the issuance of an arrest warrant, and thereafter conducts a hearing with the probationer present. Weisser, 600 P.2d at 1323. Viewing deputy county attorney White's challenged activities in this perspective, we reject the Cooneys' argument that his challenged activities are not the functional equivalent of the prosecutor's role as an advocate in a criminal proceeding. We are convinced that his challenged activities are advocatory and intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and, therefore, are functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995, 47 L.Ed.2d at 143. We find substantial support for our conviction in several decisions in the federal circuit courts of appeal. In Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737 (11th Cir.1987), an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court relied on Imbler and extended absolute immunity to a state's attorney who allegedly perjured himself and conspired with the judge and a deputy sheriff to have the probationer arrested without probable cause and to have his probation revoked. In Allen v. Thompson, 815 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam), a civil rights action, the court extended absolute immunity to a United States Attorney and an assistant United States Attorney who, at the Federal Parole Commission's request, wrote a letter to the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission allegedly falsely advising that a prisoner was guilty of additional drug trafficking for which he had not been charged or convicted, which resulted in the prisoner's parole eligibility date being enlarged and the prisoner's being reclassified to receive special monitoring. Finding that the federal prosecutor's activity of submitting information to the Federal Parole Commission falls within Imbler's protection, the Court explained: a probation officer is entitled to immunity when preparing and submitting a presentence report in a criminal case. We noted that [t]he report is an integral part of the sentencing process, and in preparing the report the probation officer acts at the direction of the court. Here, the prosecutor responsible for [the prisoner's] case forwarded information about [the prisoner] to the Parole Commission at the Commission's request. This duty is assigned to the U.S. attorney's office as part of its role in the prosecution and sentencing of federal cases. Parole decisions are the continuation of the sentencing process, and the Assistant United States Attorney's reports to the Parole Commission are part of that process. While not undertaken literally at the direction of the court, these activities are so intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process as to cloak the prosecutors with absolute immunity from suits for damages. Id. at 1434. In Hamilton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir.1985), an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court gave absolute immunity to an assistant state's attorney who allegedly forced two complaining witnesses to testify although he knew their testimony would be false and who allegedly caused an arrest warrant to issue for an alleged probation violation. Relying on Imbler, the court said: Probation revocation is a criminal proceeding. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case. Hamilton, 777 F.2d at 1213. Addressing the probationer's claim about the arrest warrant, the court observed,    we have long held that securing the attendance of witnesses is associated with the judicial process and that any claim against a prosecutor arising from that activity is barred by absolute immunity. Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 69 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2050, 60 L.Ed.2d 659 (1979). Id. See also, Taylor v. Jones, 121 Cal. App.3d 885, 175 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1981), where the court extended absolute immunity to county district attorneys who, allegedly motivated by racial prejudice, were involved in revoking probation. In our review of the more recent decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals, we find the following courts extending absolute immunity to prosecutors who make decisions in connection with the initiation of criminal proceedings: First Circuit Campbell v. State of Maine, 787 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1986) (prosecutor withholding exculpatory information in presenting case; bad faith exception does not exist). Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 107, 93 L.Ed.2d 56 (1986) (city attorney prosecuting juvenile delinquency proceeding). Second Circuit Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 805, 102 L.Ed.2d 796 (1989) (assistant district attorney mistakenly initiated grand jury indictment and filed it with the court which later dismissed it when mistake was discovered). Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.1987) (assistant state attorney general initiated criminal contempt proceeding and obtained arrest warrant leading to an unlawful arrest and imprisonment before charges dropped). Sixth Circuit Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 1910, 95 L.Ed.2d 516 (1987) (state prosecutors allegedly knowingly obtained issuance of criminal complaints and arrest warrants based on false, coerced statements). Seventh Circuit Henderson v. Lopez, 790 F.2d 44 (7th Cir.1986) (assistant state's attorney on whose legal advice county sheriff unwarrantedly arrested and jailed plaintiff who had earlier satisfied a contempt citation for failure to pay child support). Eighth Circuit Casey-El v. Hazel, 863 F.2d 29 (8th Cir.1988) (state prosecutor allegedly withheld ballistics test results that would have established accused's innocence). Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir.1987) (county prosecutor allegedly concealed autopsy report and threatened an eyewitness into giving false testimony at coroner's inquest into a black prisoner's death at the hands of his white jailers). Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987) (county prosecutor allegedly knowingly offered false, misleading or perjured testimony and destroyed evidence, and without adequate investigation initiated and presented case in child sexual abuse proceedings). Ninth Circuit McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1987) (special deputy attorneys general initiated criminal proceedings allegedly with knowledge that the statute of limitations had run). Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.1986) (alleged conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine outcome of a judicial proceeding). Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.1984) (state deputy attorney general allegedly induced witnesses to testify falsely in connection with medical license revocation administrative proceedings). Tenth Circuit Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.1988) (state attorney general failed to initiate a civil or criminal complaint against certain state officials for their alleged physical violence toward and denial of medical care for a prisoner in their custody). Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1985) (prosecutor failed to investigate independently a suspect's guilt). Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435 (10th Cir.1983) (city attorney initiated a prosecution for violations of state law he was not authorized to invoke; procured an arrest warrant from a justice of the peace who did not follow required state procedure in issuing the warrant, and advocated excessive bail before a magistrate). Eleventh Circuit Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783 (11th Cir.1988) (state attorney and assistant state attorney caused father to be arrested and jailed without probable cause when later blood tests revealed father could not have been the one who had sexually assaulted his four-year old daughter). With reference to the level of immunity accorded probation officers involved in probation revocation proceedings, we note that the Fifth Circuit recently extended absolute immunity to parole officers. [6] In Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Board, 836 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.1988), an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the parolee was arrested on warrant issued by a municipal judge. A few days later, the parolee's parole officer issued a paroled prisoner arrest warrant causing the parolee to be detained without bond. At his informal preliminary hearing the parolee requested the presence of the complaining witness. The parole officer and hearing officer said they could not compel the witness's appearance. That witness did not appear; however, that witness's hearsay statement was presented along with other evidence. The hearing officer found probable cause to exist. The parolee was held in custody for the final revocation hearing before the state parole board. At that final hearing, held a month after preliminary hearing, the complaining witness did not appear and the parole board found no reasonable cause to revoke the parolee's parole. The court concluded that the parole officer's challenged activities were prosecutorial in nature and deserving of absolute immunity. Using Imbler's functional approach, the court determined that the parole revocation process is indistinguishable from the initial parole process and, arguably, is even more adjudicatory in nature. Id., at 974. Contra, Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984) (federal probation officer who allegedly falsified parole violation report given only qualified immunity; however, the federal probation revocation scheme in question was administrative in nature and substance, unlike Wyoming's, which is judicial); and Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983) (the court held that a state probation officer, who mistakenly prepared a motion to revoke probation and caused the probationer to be arrested and jailed for twenty days, was entitled to only qualified immunity). The Galvan court failed to explain satisfactorily why it believed the probation revocation stage of the criminal process was less intimately associated with the judicial phase than the presentence stage. Both the presentence stage and the probation revocation stage are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process under Wyoming law. As we are not called upon in this case to decide the appropriate level of immunity to which a probation officer is entitled, under the circumstances of this case we need not further discuss Ray, Galvan, or the similar case of Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983), urged on us by the Cooneys as analogically supportive of their position. As we have explained, in view of the nature and substance of the sentencing procedure and the probation, supervision and probation revocation stages within that procedure, and in view of the closely related roles within that procedure played by the sentencing judge, the probation officer and the county attorney, the county attorney's challenged activities are advocatory, not administrative, and are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Because both the probation revocation stage and the presentence stage of the sentencing procedure are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, we find further substantial support for our holding in the numerous decisions extending absolute immunity to probation officers involved in the presentence stage of the sentencing process. Federal probation officers have been held absolutely immune in their preparation and submission of presentence reports. See Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.1987); Tripati v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 784 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028, 108 S.Ct. 755, 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.1979). State probation officers have been held absolutely immune for their preparation and submission of presentence reports in other courts. Turner v. Berry, 856 F.2d 1539 (D.C. Cir.1988); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir.1985); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir.1970); Friedman v. Younger, 282 F. Supp. 710 (C.D.Cal. 1968) (also extending absolute immunity to district attorneys); Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.1984), Shelton v. McCarthy, 699 F. Supp. 412 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). The Shelton court identified three factors which justify absolute immunity for state probation officers acts involving presentence reports: (1) the nature of the function performed, (2) the impossibility of guaranteeing the accuracy of the information to be reported, and (3) the routine adversary review and judicial scrutiny of the reports. We think these last mentioned factors are equally applicable to the probation revocation stage and lend support to extending absolute immunity to the county attorneys who prepare and present petitions for revocation of probation to the judge. Shelton, 699 F. Supp. at 415. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Demoran which afforded immunity to a state probation officer who allegedly deliberately falsified a presentence report, applies as well to the deputy county attorney in this case. This reasoning is closely paralleled by the Tenth Circuit's Tripati opinion, which involved a federal probation officer. Applying that reasoning here, we believe that the deputy county attorney's challenged activities serve a function integral to the independent judicial process. He acts as an arm of the sentencing judge. He is required by law to investigate and report to the judge upon the circumstances of any possible probation violation. The prospect of damage liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would seriously erode the county attorney's ability to carry out his independent fact-finding function and thereby impair the sentencing judge's ability to carry out his judicial duties. A plethora of procedural safeguards surrounds the filing of a probation revocation petition. The petition is reviewed by the judge who makes an ex parte probable-cause determination. The probationer receives a copy of the petition and is entitled to counsel, to consult with persons whose assistance he reasonably desires, to confront complaining witnesses, to present evidence on his own behalf and to the sentencing judge's decision on the merits after conscientiously hearing the facts. In addition to that first level of judicial review, the probationer is afforded review by this court to ensure that the sentencing judge's revocation decision was not the result of an abuse of sound discretion. We believe it evident that a deputy county attorney who assists the court in making these determinations during the sentencing process is performing activities which are exclusively for the benefit of the court. We hold, therefore, that these challenged activities are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and are functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. [7] We close our discussion of this issue with these words: The purpose of absolute immunity is to protect the function of the prosecutor as the key participant in the criminal process. The doctrine involves a choice between protecting all prosecutors from harassing lawsuits over their official acts and providing redress for all injuries occasioned by those acts. When such a choice is made in the law, it is inevitable that someone will be hurt. But the choice must be made, and it has been long decided that it is better to allow a few wrongs to go unredressed than to expose all prosecutors to the risk of retaliation for their occasional honest mistakes. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950). Williams, 827 F.2d at 1208.
The district court dismissed the Cooneys' state tort claims against all of the appellees after it concluded that no statutory waiver of sovereign immunity existed under the Claims Act upon which those claims could be based. The Claims Act did not create new causes of action against the State of Wyoming, its employees, agencies, or political subdivisions; rather, it statutorily affirmed the idea that those parties generally enjoy sovereign immunity from civil liability with the exception of certain conduct for which that immunity is specifically waived. Pickle v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 266 (Wyo. 1988). Cf. Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Wyo. 1978). The Claims Act provides a close-ended waiver of immunity from liability, and an injured party suing an arm of the State of Wyoming under the Act must first establish that the conduct complained of fits into a specific statutory waiver of immunity for liability. W.S. 1-39-104(a); Abelseth v. City of Gillette, 752 P.2d 430, 433 (Wyo. 1988) (citing Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 709 (Wyo. 1987)). Appellees rested their motion to dismiss the Cooneys' state tort claims on the assertion that the conduct complained of did not fit into any of the enumerated exceptions to immunity. They argued that the only applicable exception the Cooneys could assert would be the one set out in W.S. 1-39-112 (Cum.Supp. 1985), which provided: A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their duties. (emphasis added). See 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 74, § 2. Appellees also argued that a plain interpretation of this statute would be proper in light of this court's opinion in Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132-33 (Wyo. 1985). In Hurst, we faced the issue whether the plain language of the same statute subjected members of the Wyoming State Board of Parole or its parole officers to civil liability for their alleged negligence in allowing a parolee to leave the state, after which he committed numerous murders. This court's analysis in Hurst noted that the legislature had not given the phrase law enforcement officers a statutory definition. Hurst, 698 P.2d at 1133. This court resolved that problem by looking to the plain meaning of law enforcement officer which led us to the phrase peace officer. Id. That phrase indicated a legislative intent to limit peace officers to those persons with the direct authority to make arrests or keep the peace, and this court upheld the trial court's determination that parole officers were not vested with that kind of authority. That interpretation of the plain language of W.S. 1-39-112 (Cum.Supp. 1985) was also compared with case law from other jurisdictions defining the class of persons considered law enforcement officers, which case law generally supported that distinction. Id. at 1134. Relying on this information this court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity under the phrase law enforcement officer did not extend to the Parole Board or its officers. Id. Appellees have asserted that under either the unambiguous language of W.S. 1-39-112, or the holding in Hurst, or both, no statutory waiver of immunity existed to allow the Cooneys' state tort claims. The Cooneys have countered those arguments by urging a broader waiver of sovereign immunity under W.S. 1-39-112, premised on a review of its subsequent legislative history. They explained that this court published its opinion in Hurst in April 1985. In the next year, during the 1986 legislative session, the legislature amended W.S. 1-39-112 by substituting the phrase peace officers for law enforcement officers. That amendment became effective on March 18, 1986, three days after Mr. Cooney was incarcerated. The Cooneys further noted that the amendment went on to provide for an automatic repealer that would change the phrase peace officers back to law enforcement officers effective June 16, 1988. See 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 74, § 4. The Cooneys theorized that this legislative maneuver was intended to create a two year time period during which the legislature could set up a state self-insurance program to provide monies to be available to pay for the liability of a peace officer. See W.S. 1-41-101 through 1-41-111 (Cum.Supp. 1986). They also argued that the 1986 amendment's automatic resuscitation of the phrase law enforcement officer into the current version W.S. 1-39-112 stands as evidence of legislative intent to give that phrase a broader meaning than the one articulated by this court in Hurst. Under this line of reasoning, they concluded that the legislature intended the phrase law enforcement officers in W.S. 1-39-112 to have a broader meaning from the inception of the statute and that it waived tort sovereign immunity for the appellees in this case and any other governmental officials who assert a more general authority to enforce the laws. The district court considered the arguments of both parties on this issue and ruled for appellees. In its decision letter it rejected the Cooneys' approach to statutory interpretation of W.S. 1-39-112, and dismissed their state tort claims against all appellees finding them to be barred by sovereign immunity. In this appeal, the Cooneys advance essentially the same arguments they made before the district court and candidly request that we overrule our decision in Hurst to reach the result they desire. The Cooneys' theory is creative, but, stripped of its trappings, advocates placing this court in the role of legislative clairvoyant when the unambiguous language of the controlling statute, W.S. 1-39-112, plainly does not waive tort immunity for persons who are not law enforcement officers as we defined that phrase in Hurst. The legislative intent that might have been lurking behind recent changes to the language in W.S. 1-39-112 is not a substitute for upholding a plain reading of an unambiguous statute. Hurst does that, and stare decisis demands that we follow Hurst in this case. We do not see any statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for appellees under the plain language of W.S. 1-39-112. We affirm the district court's W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of the appellants' complaint. URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., filed dissenting opinions.