Opinion ID: 2508633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common-Law Claims against Kaminski

Text: {28} Ocana argues that summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of Kaminski on the assault, battery, and IIED claims. We agree. As we stated in Akre v. Washburn, 92 N.M. 487, 489, 590 P.2d 635, 637 (1979) (quoting First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 80, 537 P.2d 682, 688 (Ct.App.1975)), [s]ummary judgment can be granted only where the moving party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law, upon clear and undisputed facts. In this case, Kaminski conceded that there was a factual dispute to the assault, battery, and IIED claims. Moreover, [t]he movant must establish a prima facie case showing there is no genuine issue of material fact in order to be entitled to summary judgment. State v. Integon Indem. Corp., 105 N.M. 611, 612, 735 P.2d 528, 529 (1987). Here, Kaminski did not move for summary judgment on these claims. Therefore, summary judgment was improper.