Opinion ID: 2008768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the agency's jurisdiction

Text: Both of the causes of action which remain in the case, and with respect to which Mr. Atwater is appealing, are based on D.C.Code § 35-2109. Although that statute is entitled Consumer Protection, it is a part of the District's Compulsory No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance statute, D.C.Code § 35-2101 et seq. (1988) (hereinafter the No-Fault Act). The proceeding before Judge Nelson was, however, instituted pursuant to the Consumer Protection Procedures Act. The unlawful trade practices enumerated in that Act, see § 28-3904, do not include violations of § 35-2109. Concerned that under these circumstances, the administrative law judge may have been without jurisdiction to entertain the claims, we issued an order on March 10, 1989 directing Mr. Atwater to show cause why the proceeding and the appeal should not be dismissed. In response to the Order to Show Cause, briefs were filed by Mr. Atwater and by the District of Columbia but not by USAA. Mr. Atwater and the District agree that the DCRA had jurisdiction over the matter and that the proceeding should not be dismissed. The District proposes, however, that the case be remanded to the agency for administrative resolution by the Superintendent of Insurance [5] rather than by the administrative law judge. We conclude that Judge Nelson properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
The Consumer Protection Procedures Act is a comprehensive statute designed to provide procedures and remedies for a broad spectrum of practices which injure consumers. This court has called it ambitious legislation. Howard v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 708 (D.C.1981). Among its purposes is to assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices. § 28-3901(b)(1). [6] The Act contemplates that its procedures will be invoked, not simply to enforce its own substantive provisions, but also those of other consumer protection laws. The Act gives the Office of Consumer Protection authority, after investigation, to determine whether a person has executed a trade practice in violation of any law of the District of Columbia. § 28-3903(a)(1), (13). The Office is empowered to investigate what trade practice actually occurred and whether the trade practice violates  any statute, ... rule of common law, or other law, of the District of Columbia. § 28-3905(b). If the Office finds that the trade practice violates a law within the jurisdiction of the Office, § 28-3905(d)(1), (g), it must initiate an administrative proceeding with an autonomous Office of Adjudications, [7] describing each trade practice which occurred in violation of District law, the law it violates, and the relief sought. § 28-3905(e)(3). After the Office has filed its administrative complaint, every case filed with the Office and within its jurisdiction shall be decided in accordance with the procedures and sanctions of this section [of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act] notwithstanding that a given trade practice, at issue in the case, may be governed in whole or in part by another law which has different enforcement procedures and sanctions.  § 28-3905( l ). If an administrative law judge finds that the respondent has violated a law of the District of Columbia within the jurisdiction of the Office, he or she may issue an order granting relief under the Act and, in addition, relief based in whole or part upon a violation of a law... regulating a type of business. § 28-3905(g)(6). [8] The remedies available for the consumer under the Act may include contract damages, restitution, or other just relief, as well as a cease-and-desist order. § 28-3905(g)(1), (2). [9] In addition to providing administrative procedures and remedies, the Act authorizes a consumer to bring a civil action for violations of the Act and of other statutes within the jurisdiction of the Office. § 28-3905(k)(1). It provides for recovery of treble or punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other relief. Id. The Act also explicitly authorizes consumers injured by a trade practice in violation of a law ... within the jurisdiction of the Office [to] exercis[e] any right or seek [] any remedy to which the [consumer] might be entitled or [to] fil[e] any complaint with any other agency. § 28-3905(k)(2). The Act defines the term trade practice broadly, to embrace any act which does or would create, alter, repair, furnish, make available, provide information about, or, directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services. § 28-3901(a)(6). [10] Goods and services are defined to include any and all parts of the economic output of society. § 28-3901(a)(7). Although § 28-3904 makes a host of consumer trade practices unlawful, its list of such practices was not designed to be exclusive. The remainder of the statute obviously contemplates that procedures and sanctions provided by the Act will be used to enforce trade practices made unlawful by other statutes. If the § 28-3904 listing were exclusive, the references in § 28-3905 to to other laws and to the common law would serve no purpose.
The legislative history of the Act reinforces the straightforward reading of the statute itself as a measure designed to provide procedures and sanctions for violations of consumer protection statutes generally. The Committee Report provides that under § 28-3903, the Office's authority includes the power to determine whether a person has executed a trade practice in violation of any law of the District and [to] remedy any such violation determined to have been carried out, rather than in terms of any specific laws. Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs, Report on Bill No. 1-253, Mar. 24, 1976, at 16. The Report explicitly states that the listing in § 28-3904 is to be  in addition to other consumer-related laws already on the books in the District. Id. at 17. The Report also emphasizes that, in terms of enforcement machinery, the Office is not restricted to enforcement of the Act alone. It states that the only matters outside the enforcement jurisdiction of the Office are trade practice[s] beyond any District law; activities explicitly exempted by § 28-3903(c)(2); and activities that are not trade practices, or do not involve both consumers and merchants. Id. at 20. [11] In its discussion of those provisions of the Act which authorize consumers to pursue judicial remedies in the Superior Court, the Report likewise states: The subject matter jurisdiction of the Office ... may coincide with, and does not limit, that of other agencies of the District Government. On the other hand, the powers of other agencies may not be construed to detract from the powers of the Office, under any provision of the bill, to obtain relief for consumers and compliance with District laws. Id. at 23. The Report notes that the enforcement mechanisms in the Act will not be duplicative of present law when the trade practice involves professions licensed or supervised by existing boards and commissions, because [t]he boards and commissions generally have no power to order the money damages and injunctive relief which the Office has the power to do, so there is no duplication of functions proposed in this bill so far as the boards and commissions go. Id. at 21-22. Finally, with respect to D.C.Code § 28-3905( l ), which provides that the procedures specified in the Act may be used even when other laws provide different enforcement procedures and mechanisms, the Report states that this section allows other consumer protection enforcement laws to continue side-by-side with this one, while leaving the procedures and sanctions provided by section [28-3905] whenever the Office deals with or follows up on a complaint. Id. at 24. [12]