Opinion ID: 626146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Supreme Court's Decision in White I

Text: In White I, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the announce clause, which stated a candidate for judicial office shall not `announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.' 536 U.S. at 768, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (quoting Minn.Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). Because the clause was content-based, the Court examined it under strict scrutiny, asking whether the State met its burden to show the clause was (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest. White I, 536 U.S. at 774-75, 122 S.Ct. 2528. The State offered two interests, both of which this court previously recognized as compelling: preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary. Id. at 775, 122 S.Ct. 2528. In examining the asserted interests, the Court explored three potential definitions of impartiality. Id. The first possible meaning of impartiality, identified by the Court as the word's root meaning, is the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding, which guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to him in the same way he applies it to any other party. Id. at 775-76, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted interests in this sense because it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for or against particular issues. Id. at 776, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). The second meaning of impartiality recognized by the Court is a lack of pre-conception in favor of or against a particular legal view. Id. at 777, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). This uncommon use of the word could not be a compelling interest, the Court resolved, because a judge's lack of predisposition on legal issues has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice[.] Id. The Court further reasoned it would actually be undesirable to have judges who did not have preconceived views on legal issues, because this lack of introspection indicates a lack of qualification for the position. Id. at 778, 122 S.Ct. 2528. Finally, the Court discussed a third possible meaning of impartiality, which it described as open-mindedness, whereby a judge remains willing to consider views contrary to his or her preconceptions and remain open to persuasion. Id. The Court found the announce clause unsupported by this asserted purpose: In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office may not say I think it is constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages. He may say the very same thing, however, up until the very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing the objective of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous. Id. at 779-80, 122 S.Ct. 2528. Thus, the Court concluded the announce clause was woefully underinclusive, prohibiting announcements by judges (and would-be judges) only at certain times and in certain forms. Id. at 783, 122 S.Ct. 2528. In sum, no matter how impartiality is defined, the Court held the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to the State's asserted interests in maintaining the impartiality of the judiciary. Id. at 788, 122 S.Ct. 2528.