Opinion ID: 2977281
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wealth-Based Classification

Text: In his second equal protection based challenge to the Act, Molina argues that the Act impermissibly discriminates on the basis of wealth, and that strict scrutiny should apply to his claim. No. 07-3745 Molina-Crespo v. United States Page 7 Merit Systems Protection Board The Supreme Court has recognized that wealth discrimination alone does not provide an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). Further, a class of less wealthy individuals is not a suspect class warranting strict scrutiny review. Id. at 28. Thus, § 1502(a)(3) does not trigger heightened scrutiny on the grounds that it creates a wealth-based classification. Acknowledging that wealth is not a suspect classification, Molina instead argues that this Court should apply strict scrutiny review because the “choice between running for elective office and keeping one’s job is, as a practical matter, essentially a wealth-based restraint on the exercise of fundamental constitutionally-protected [sic] rights.” Appellant Br. 30. Molina compares the Act’s restriction to property ownership and filing fee requirements that the Supreme Court has found violate the Equal Protection Clause because they impact fundamental constitutional rights, or because the requirements are unsupported by “any rational state interest.” The cases on which Molina relies, however, are distinguishable. Molina argues that Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), supports his argument that § 1502(a)(3)’s prohibition creates an unconstitutional wealth-based classification. Harper held unconstitutional a state poll tax. The Court concluded that “a State violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.” Id. at 666. Thus, Harper addressed a state law provision that impacted voting rights, not the constitutional rights of a candidate. The Court’s decision in Harper, therefore, does not support Molina’s argument that strict scrutiny should be applied in this case. Molina also relies on Bullock v. Carter to argue that strict-scrutiny review is appropriate. In Bullock, the Court held unconstitutional a Texas law that required candidates in a primary election to pay a filing fee. 405 U.S. at 144. The law required the candidates to raise money, sometimes as much as $8900, from constituents. Id. at 145. The Court found that the law’s “patently exclusionary character” had a “real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise,” and that its impact was “related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate.” Id. at 143-44. Thus, because the law impacted voters’ choice based on the voters’ wealth, the Court required the state to show that the requirement was necessary to serve a legitimate state interest. Id. at 144. The Court found that, because “other means . . . [we]re available” to protect the state’s “valid interests” in controlling the number of candidates on the primary ballot, the law violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 146. While Bullock establishes that laws creating a classification based on a candidate’s wealth will sometimes impact a fundamental constitutional right making strict scrutiny review appropriate, Molina has failed to demonstrate that the Hatch Act implicates such a fundamental right. As noted above, an individual does not have a fundamental right to run for elected office. Further, Molina cannot show that, by prohibiting him from seeking elective office while serving as an appointed official, the Hatch Act infringes voters’ constitutional rights as in Bullock. Thus, heightened scrutiny is inapplicable. Accordingly, the Hatch Act will “be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313, and the “classification is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Gilday, 472 F.2d at 217. In Quinn v. Milsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989), and Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), the Court held unconstitutional laws requiring property ownership in order to seek certain government positions because no rational basis supported the restrictions. The Court in Quinn held that a city could not make real-property ownership a requirement for serving on a government board with the mandate “to reorganize the entire governmental structure of St. Louis city and county.” Quinn, 491 U.S. at 109. Similarly, in Turner, the Court considered a state requirement that candidates for the No. 07-3745 Molina-Crespo v. United States Page 8 Merit Systems Protection Board county board of education be property owners. Turner, 396 U.S. at 363. The Court concluded that it was “impossible to discern any interest the qualification can serve” and, accordingly, held that the law was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 362, 363. While § 1502(a)(3) also imposes a financial burden on candidates, unlike the laws in Turner and Quinn, § 1502(a)(3) is rationally related to legitimate government interests, and therefore survives rational-basis review. As discussed above, the federal government has a legitimate interest in preventing the appearance of partisan influence in the administration of federal funds, and could have rationally concluded that prohibiting certain employees from being candidates for elective office would achieve that goal. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 n.5 (noting that a state must have “some leeway in determining which of its positions require restrictions on partisan political activities and which may be left unregulated”). Thus, the Hatch Act’s prohibition on candidacy while serving in an appointed office is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and is not arbitrary or capricious. We therefore conclude that Molina has failed to show that the Hatch Act violates the Equal Protection Clause.