Opinion ID: 169653
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Matlock

Text: The Supreme Court's decision in Matlock sets forth the test for actual authority. There, the Court held that a woman who jointly occupied with the defendant a bedroom in her mother's house could validly consent to a search of that bedroom. The Court explained that when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. 988. Under Matlock, common authority is not based on the law of property but rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the cohabitants has the right to permit inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988. That language has led to varying formulations of the standard for determining a third party's actual authority to consent to a search. See Rith, 164 F.3d at 1329 & n. 1 (discussing the varying approaches adopted by the circuits). For example, the D.C. Circuit has required proof of both mutual use and joint access. See id. at 1329-30 (discussing United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C.Cir.1991)). The Second Circuit requires proof of (1) access to the area searched and (2) common authority over the area, a substantial interest in the area, or permission to gain access to the area. See id. at 1329 n. 1 (discussing United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir.1992)). In several cases, the Ninth Circuit has taken yet another approach, concluding that even if a third party lacked joint access or control for most purposes, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, she or he may nevertheless validly consent to a search of the defendant's property if the defendant assumed the risk that [the third party] would allow a search of the [property]. United States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 1583 (9th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1170 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that [w]e have rarely applied the `assumption of risk' analysis urged by the dissent, and the few cases in which we have done so have involved situations where the person whose property was searched clearly ceded authority over the property, either partially or totally, to the consenting third party). The Seventh Circuit has also followed the assumption of the risk approach on occasion. See United States v. Cook, 530 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir.1976) (stating that because [the third parties] retained such broad control over the premises, we must recognize that [the defendant] had assumed the risk that they might permit others to inspect the premises).