Opinion ID: 3155749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination of Billy Carper

Text: In his second assignment of error, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in not allowing him to introduce evidence or question the State’s witness, Billy Carper, on what activity if any took place immediately prior to P.L. going into the house where she was allegedly assaulted. Petitioner alleges that during the cross-examination 23 of Billy Carper, it became obvious that P.L. expressed some interest in him. Mr. Carper testified that on their way home from Doc’s bar, he was in the front seat and the Petitioner was driving. Mr. Carper stated that P.L. began pulling on Mr. Carper’s arm to try to get him into the backseat. Mr. Carper further testified that he was pulled into the backseat with P.L., whereupon defense counsel inquired as to what happened. At that point, the State made a rape shield objection.5 The circuit court stated that this testimony 5 Our rape shield statute, W. Va. Code § 61-8B-11(b) (1986) provides, In any prosecution under this article evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct and reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admissible: Provided, That such evidence shall be admissible solely for the purpose of impeaching credibility, if the victim first makes his or her previous sexual conduct an issue in the trial by introducing evidence with respect thereto. Recently, in Syllabus Point 8 of State v. Robert Scott R., Jr., 233 W.Va. 12, 754 S.E.2d 588 (2014), this court reiterated its holding regarding the standard for evaluating the exclusion of evidence pursuant to the rape shield law codified at West Virginia Code § 61-8B-11 and in West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(a)(3): “The test used to determine whether a trial court’s exclusion of proffered evidence under our rape shield law violated a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial is (1) whether that testimony was relevant; (2) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect; and (3) whether the State’s compelling interests in excluding the evidence outweighed the defendant’s right to present relevant evidence supportive of his or her defense. Under this test, we will reverse a trial court’s ruling only if there has been a clear (continued . . .) 24 was not covered by rape shield, but rather was a statement of what happened at a time close to the alleged assault. Specifically, it stated, Many of the things at least in my experience that the rape shield law is meant to protect against is the use of things that have to do with a person’s reputation or previous actions or things of that nature. But it appears to the Court that what we are hearing so far is things that might be illustrative of the degree of intoxication or mental state going into an evening. ... I think as long as the direction of this inquiry has to do with the state of mind of the victim on the night in question, the actions of the victim on the night in question, that it may be relevant to the activities of the evening. I don’t see the rape shield laws being implicated. abuse of discretion.” Syllabus Point 6, State v. Guthrie, 205 W.Va. 326, 518 S.E.2d 83 (1999). This Court in State v. Green, 163 W.Va. 681, 693, 260 S.E.2d 257, 264 (1979), wrote: We would suggest that evidence of consensual sexual activities with others, not specifically and directly related to the act of which a victim complains, should never be admissible; and that such evidence that is specifically, directly related to the act for which a defendant stands charged, must be of a quality that its admission is necessary to prevent manifest injustice and therefor outweigh the State’s interest in protecting persons who have been sexually abused from attempts at besmirchment of their character by ones who have trespassed upon their bodies. 25 The State’s counsel noted its concerns that the Petitioner’s counsel may elicit irrelevant testimony regarding whether P.L. and Mr. Carper were kissing in the back of the truck, and that this evidence of consensual activity with others which is not specifically related to the act of which P.L. complains was protected by the rape shield statute. The Petitioner’s counsel reiterated that he believed this information was necessary to set the scene as to what happened that night. He stated that he needed “to have those answers to questions because it explains basically why [P.L.] did what she did, not necessarily to prove her character, because that [was] not the purpose for which [he was] asking this, it is why she did what she did. He argued, I think, again, as the Court pointed out at a sidebar, what she did at the bathroom at Doc’s would be extrinsic to the act in question, whereas what she did in the truck that caused her to walk into the house and race upstairs is intrinsic to this particular set of facts and basically could maybe explain that or may help the jury understand what happened. This is not remote in time. This isn’t character evidence. This is the gist of this charge against Mr. Wakefield. The State’s counsel countered that, [t]he state of mind of [P.L.] has nothing to do with the charges against Mr. Wakefield. . . That is not relevant and it does not go to any of the elements of the offense. What goes to the elements of the offense is what happened in that upstairs bedroom when [P.L.] was sexually assaulted, not what happened in the back seat of a truck on the way to the house. The Petitioner’s counsel went on the argue, 26 [t]his has nothing to do with reputation, has nothing to do with her physical or sexual contact with somebody else, because I believe there is not going to be any indication that there was sexual contact but I don’t know. But even if there were, if she had capacity to give consent, the State has not brought any kind of civil action or criminal action against Mr. Carper, so if she had the capability of giving consent to sexual activity in the truck, which I don’t know whether it did or didn’t, I don’t think there was, then that would be relevant as to whether or not within a certain period of time, and we don’t know how long that is because the victim doesn’t remember, I think all of that becomes relevant and it becomes critical to our case and would be a manifest injustice to use the rape shield to say that the physical actions of the alleged victim immediately prior to the alleged crime would not be admissible. After some discussion by the circuit court regarding the function of the rape shield law and its necessity in protecting rape victims from scurrilous character attacks, it ultimately ruled that, [w]e are moving into a period of time very, very close to the actions complained of. We are dealing with essential issues in the case which are consciousness, awareness, physical capacity, mental capacity. There is a concept in the law called the rule of completeness which I think would rather suggest that, especially in an instance where the State’s case may have a period of time that cannot be spoken to, that to preclude a witness from testifying as to something that happened that may have the capacity of showing and reflecting upon the abilities or awareness and degree of consciousness or whatever else of the victim in this case, that it just seems so relevant and so far from an attempt to besmirch character and so really sort of right at the issues at hand, that I think Mr. Kratovil doesn’t put too fine a point on it, that it could work a manifest injustice in the case in not 27 allowing the case to be presented. I am persuaded that would be the case. Now Mr. Kratovil and Madam Prosecutor, both of you upon making this ruling, Madam Prosecutor I note the State’s objection, but, Mr. Kratovil, that is not a license for you to, depending upon what this witness’ response may be to some of these questions, to ask inflammatory follow up questions or questions which may attempt to sort of link some kind of comment upon a connection or sort of salacious connection or anything of that nature. I don’t think I have to caution you of that, but I am just saying it to let it be known. You argue, first of all, that you don’t know what his response is going to be, and, secondly, what you suspect them to be, within that limited window of your purported expectation and use, I think that you have a right to do it. I will note the State’s objection to that. Petitioner contends on appeal that as a result of the circuit court’s admonishment, a weak record was made about what happened in the backseat. The Petitioner contends that Mr. Carper was then asked what happened when he and P.L. were locked in the truck, but he really did not answer the question. The Petitioner maintains that based upon the court’s ruling, he was unable to effectively cross-examine the witness. Petitioner alleges that he would have asked a follow-up question regarding any sexual activity that may have occurred between P.L. and Mr. Carper. The Petitioner contends that it was important to determine what happened in the truck after it was locked because it might explain the bruising identified by the forensic nurse and P.L.’s slight vaginal tearing. 28 We find the Petitioner’s argument unconvincing. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not preclude the Petitioner from fully cross-examining Mr. Carper on what took place in the truck. Rather, as the above-quoted record demonstrates, the trial court merely cautioned the Petitioner not to ask any inflammatory questions. In other words, it merely limited how the Petitioner was to frame the questions presented to Mr. Carper. Following the circuit court’s ruling, the Petitioner’s counsel had the opportunity to ask Mr. Carper what happened, if anything, while he was in the back seat with [P.L.]. Mr. Carper testified as follows: A. There was a conversation. There were some –[P.L.] was a very – she is a very happy person, she is very, if I can explain, sometimes I am at the office she will just come by and – Q. Why don’t you focus on what happened that night and just tell the jury what happened that night. A. Well, I was trying to base a foundation as to why she was – Q. What was the nature of the conversation? A. There was really not a lot of conversation. She is a very happy person. She was laughing. She was giggling. Like I said, she has a habit of smacking me on the top of the head, rubbing the top of my head. She does it all the time. I was going to say in the office a lot. So there was some of that going on. But then she was pulling at me. So that it what I was really referring to. As far as when I got in the back, that way she is not a distraction because, I mean, it is just her nature, the way she is. Then there was a short drive home, so less than a mile, so doesn’t take a whole lot of time to get there. 29 Q. So my understanding is you were in the back seat with [P.L.], she was rubbing your head and giggling, and then when you got to your house, Mr. Wakefield backed the truck into the parking spot there? A. Yes, he backed his truck in. Q. And he got out of the truck and he walked up to the house and turned and locked the doors? A. Yes, he walked into the back door. I think when he got out of the truck, he must have hit the door locks. Q. Okay. And how long was it before you recognized that Mr. Wakefield was gone? A. It wasn’t very long at all. In fact, I knew that he had exited the vehicle and I almost immediately knew that because I heard the doors, the door lock mechanism go down, so I knew we were locked in the truck at that point. Q. And what did you do, if anything? A. Well – Q. While you were locked inside the truck? A. Well, I remember telling [P.L.], and I was joking, I said, I think he locked us in the truck. Of course, she didn’t really respond to it. I knew I had to find a way to get out. I couldn’t call him back over. So that is when I reached up to hit the door locks on the side of the door so I could get us – we could get out. Q. How long did it take you from the time that Mr. Wakefield left the truck to the time that you got out of the house? A. I would say less than five minutes. It wasn’t very long. Q. Once you got out of the truck and walked up to the house, what happened next? 30 .... To the extent that the Petitioner had specific questions that he believed he could not ask Mr. Carper given the circuit court’s ruling, the Petitioner should have made a proffer on the record during trial so that this Court would have opportunity to review the alleged excluded questions on appeal. Based upon the record before us, however, we cannot conclude what specifically the Petitioner alleged he could not ask Mrs. Carper during cross-examination. Accordingly, we find that the Petitioner failed to preserve the issue, in the context in which he currently presents it, for appellate review. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling.