Opinion ID: 2543261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did prosecutorial misconduct deprive Johnson of a fair hearing?

Text: Johnson contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during the penalty hearing that deprived him of a fair hearing. Although we agree with Johnson that some remarks by the prosecutor were improper, the prejudice resulting from them was minimal, and they did not deprive him of a fair hearing. `[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone.' [18] Remarks by a prosecutor must be read in context [19] and, if improper, will constitute harmless error when there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and this court can determine that no prejudice resulted to the defendant. [20] Prejudice follows from a prosecutor's remarks when they have so infected the proceedings with unfairness as to make the results a denial of due process. [21] Johnson raises several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during both phases of his penalty hearing. We will discuss each allegation separately below.
Johnson raises three allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during the death-eligibility phase of the penalty hearing. First, he contends that the following remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments improperly compared him to others and attempted to inflame the jury and invoke social pressure: I would submit to you that if you find that his upbringing outweighs this quadruple homicide, that is disrespectful to members of South Central L.A. who didn't commit a quadruple homicide. Common sense tells us that many, many, many people in a similar upbringing haven't done what Donte Johnson has done. If you were to find that his childhood is entitled to a greater weight of this quadruple homicide, it's like telling people Johnson's counsel objected. We conclude that the prosecutor's remarks contained improper elements but did not result in prejudice. This court held in Collier v. State [22] that it was improper to urge the jurors that if they wished to be considered moral they had to give the community what it needed and give the defendant what he deserved. Here, the prosecutor argued that if the jurors found in Johnson's favor it would be disrespectful to the members of South Central L.A. How the public may react to their verdict, however, has no place in the jurors' deliberative process. And the jurors were so instructed in Jury Instruction 14: A verdict may never be influenced by prejudice or public opinion. Pursuant to Collier and Jury Instruction 14, we conclude that telling the jury that if it did not reach a particular verdict it would disrespect a group of people improperly injected public opinion into the deliberative process. Yet any prejudice to Johnson was minimal, given the correct jury instruction and the strength of the State's case against him. Second, Johnson contends that the prosecutor violated a pretrial order by the district court when he referred to the victims as boys or kids during rebuttal argument. He is correct that the prosecutor violated the order, but we conclude he was not prejudiced. The meaning of the terms boys or kids is relative in our society, depending upon the context of its use. And the terms do not inappropriately describe the victims in this case. One of the four victims was 17 years old; one was 19 years old; and two others were 20 years old. Referring to them as young men may have been the most appropriate collective description. But we conclude that the State's handful of references to them as boys or kids did not prejudice Johnson. [23] Third, Johnson contends that the prosecutor also improperly told the jury during rebuttal argument that prior to the crimes Johnson had overheard victim Matthew Mowen saying that he had made money touring with a rock band selling pizzas and drugs. Johnson objected, arguing that there was no evidence that Mowen ever sold pizzas. Johnson asserts that the argument improperly portrayed the victims in a more positive light. We agree with Johnson that the prosecutor's remark was improper, but we conclude that he cannot show any prejudice. `A prosecutor may not argue facts or inferences not supported by the evidence.' [24] Here, the State concedes that the evidence did not support its claim that Matthew once said that he made money selling pizzas and drugs, instead of just drugs. Thus, its reference to this as a fact was made in error. Nevertheless, the prosecutor's misstatement was immaterial and did not give the State any cognizable advantage. We conclude that Johnson suffered no prejudice.
Johnson raises one claim of prosecutorial misconduct during the selection phase of the penalty hearing. He contends that the prosecutor made remarks during his opening statement that referred to inadmissible evidence and were highly prejudicial, depriving him of a fair trial. We disagree. This court has stated that a prosecutor has a duty to refrain from making statements in opening arguments that cannot be proved at trial. [25] But [e]ven if the prosecutor overstates in his opening statement what he is later able to prove at trial, misconduct does not lie unless the prosecutor makes these statements in bad faith. [26] Here, the prosecutor summarized the evidence he planned to present during the selection phase of the hearing: You will hear about a phone call [Johnson] made, threatening to kill a young woman, a civilian. You will hear about a letter he wrote where he put a hit out on Scale. You heard that name in the trial, Mr. Anderson, named Scale. Johnson's counsel objected, claiming that the State failed to give adequate notice that it would be introducing evidence of the alleged threatening phone call or letter. After reviewing the relevant documents, the district court found that the State had provided inadequate notice to Johnson and the evidence was inadmissible. Johnson does not contend that the remarks were made in bad faith, nor is there evidence to support such a contention. But the question of prejudice remains. The prosecutor referred to serious allegations against Johnson, which carried some degree of prejudice because they suggested that Johnson would continue his violent criminal conduct, even while in prison. Yet the remarks were isolated, consisting of three sentences during a five-day selection phase. And there is no indication that the prosecutor again referred to these particular bad acts. Moreover, immediately after the State's opening statement the district court admonished the jury that opening statements are not evidence and should not be given evidentiary value. Given that the remarks were brief, were not made in bad faith, and occurred during a lengthy selection phase and the district court admonished the jurors, we conclude that any prejudice from these remarks was minimal.