Opinion ID: 805414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Claims as Abandoned

Text: Gomez-Medina argues that the IJ's dismissal of her claims for relief as abandoned was improper and that the dismissal -- in conjunction with the BIA's affirmance -- violated her right to a full and fair hearing under the Due Process Clause. She is incorrect on both fronts. -8- The IJ dismissed Gomez-Medina's claims on the basis of her failure to comply with three separate court orders: (1) to submit a declaration on the time, place, and manner of her entry; (2) to submit a brief on the one-year limit for her asylum claim; and (3) to update her biometric data. Generally, we review an IJ's dismissal for abuse of discretion where, as here, it is based upon a petitioner's failure to abide by court-ordered filing deadlines. See Karim v. Mukasey, 269 F. App'x 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Alsamhouri, 484 F.3d at 123; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (The Immigration Judge may set and extend time limits for the filing of applications and related documents . . . . If an application or document is not filed within the time set by the Immigration Judge, the opportunity to file that application or document shall be deemed waived.). The IJ did not abuse his discretion here. Petitioner's application for asylum was her strongest claim for relief. However, she failed to submit either of the court-ordered documents necessary to resolve that claim. Moreover, the petitioner conceded that she had not filed for asylum within the one-year time limit and offered no grounds for a finding that she was subject to any exception. It is also clear that there were no good reasons for any of the petitioner's failures to comply with the IJ's outstanding orders. Indeed, several of the excuses offered suggested a lack of candor on the part of both the petitioner and -9- her counsel. One continuance had already been given, and there was ample time to prepare for the November hearing. The system for hearing cases for relief from removal takes considerable time. There is a strong public interest in compliance with immigration court deadlines, whether they are statutory, regulatory, or those set by judges. See, e.g., Caldero-Guzman v. Holder, 577 F.3d 345, 348-49 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal for failure to abide by regulatory deadline); Alsamhouri, 484 F.3d at 123. There is also a strong interest in not allowing manipulations of the system in order to cause delay. See Herbert v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that immigration regulations were adopted, in part, to combat dilatory tactics by aliens that effectively extended their stay in this country). We have specifically noted disapproval of continuances sought for purposes of delay. See Alsamhouri, 484 F.3d at 123 (affirming denial of continuance and dismissal where delay resulted from petitioner's disregard of a known deadline); see also Kaweesa v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (permitting delay where petitioner had not made deliberate efforts to delay [the] proceedings); Herbert, 325 F.3d at 72 n.1 (permitting delay where it was not a ploy to avoid the deportation hearing). This case evokes such dilatory purposes. -10- Beyond petitioner's failure to submit a declaration and brief, updated biometric data is a prerequisite for every form of relief she sought. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(b)(1), (7). Failure to update biometric data within the time allowed by the immigration judge's order[] constitutes abandonment of the application . . . unless the applicant demonstrates that such failure was the result of good cause. Id. § 1003.47(c). This circuit has not set the standard of review for a dismissal of claims under section 1003.47(c). However, other circuits have applied an abuse of discretion standard in affirming dismissals on this ground. See Quinteros Ramos v. Holder, 412 F. App'x 2, 3-4 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Umezurike v. Holder, 610 F.3d 997, 1001-02, 1004 (7th Cir. 2010). In light of these holdings, and the section's discretionary language, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(c) (an IJ may enter an appropriate order dismissing the application for failure to update biometric data) (emphasis added)), an abuse of discretion standard is appropriate for our review in these circumstances. There was no abuse here. Finally, there was no denial of petitioner's due process rights. As the BIA noted, Gomez-Medina was given the opportunity for a full hearing under the governing regulations. By her conduct in not complying with a series of reasonable and clear deadlines, and not being ready for her scheduled hearings, she ran a considerable risk. There was nothing unfair about the consequences -11- that followed. Umezurike, 610 F.3d at 1004 (denying due process claim where IJ dismissed application for relief as abandoned for failure to abide by court-imposed deadlines); Alsamhouri, 484 F.3d at 124-25.