Opinion ID: 77354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arthur's Claims of Exception to the Statute of Limitations

Text: 34 In 2002, Arthur submitted affidavits in support of his claim of actual innocence. 8 He maintained that these witnesses could corroborate that he was not at the Wicker residence on the morning of the murder. 35 Alphonso High, the owner of Copper Mobile Homes in 1982, said that, [o]n the morning February 1, 1982 around 9 a.m., Tommy Arthur stopped by [his] place of business and they talked for approximately 30 minutes. R2-36, Exh. High Aff. at 1. High commented that he did not notice anything unusual about [Arthur]. He acted like he always did, and he did not appear to be nervous or agitated. Id. at 2. He said that, about two months after the murder, he recalled that he had spoken to [Arthur] the morning of the murder but never told anybody about [the] conversation and was never . . . approached by the police or [Arthur's] trial or appellate attorneys. Id. 36 High's testimony was corroborated by Ray Melson, who had worked for High at Copper Mobile Homes in 1982. Melson stated that Arthur visited Copper Mobile Homes [o]ne morning in 1982 between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. and that they visited for about 20 to 30 minutes. R2-41, Exh. B at 1. The following day, Melson heard the news that Troy was murdered on the same day as Arthur's visit. Id. at 2. He explained that, after he realized that he had seen Arthur on the morning of the murder, he and High had discussed Arthur's visit and commented that they would have expected [Arthur] to be nervous or agitated, but he wasn't. Id. He said that he did not tell anyone about his visit with Arthur on the morning of the murder and was not approached by Arthur's trial or appellate attorneys. Id. at 2. 37 In response to Arthur's affidavits, the state submitted their own affidavits from High and Melson. In High's second affidavit, High stated that, [u]pon further consideration, he could not say for sure whether he had seen Arthur on 1 February 1982 or another day in late January or early February of that year, and was not sure whether the time when he saw Arthur was at 8:30 or 9:00 A.M. R2-39, Exh. A, High Aff. Melson provided a second affidavit to clarify some things, specifically that, although it was true and correct that Arthur had visited Copper Mobile Homes on a day when High and Melson were leaving to deliver a mobile home to Birmingham, he was unable to say exactly the day or month the visit occurred. R3-53, Exh. D at 1. 38 Arthur responded with affidavits to clarify or discount the second affidavits obtained from High and Melson. Arthur's attorney, Suhana Han, stated that she was told by High's assistant that one of the representatives from the Alabama Attorney General's office appeared in their office carrying a gun in his holster. R2-41, Exh. A at 2, ¶ 5. After Han asked High for an affidavit clarifying his first affidavit, High said no and expressed concern that he had a family to support and a business to run, and did not want to be arrested for perjury. Id. at 3, ¶ 6. When Arthur's investigator attempted to meet with Melson after his second affidavit, Melson refused to speak to them, ordered [them] off his property, and, during a second visit, announced to them that he was answerable only to an Assistant Attorney General. R3-54, Exh. A, Gustat Aff. at 7-8, ¶¶ 19-20. 39 A habeas petitioner asserting actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar must show that his conviction probably resulted from a constitutional violation. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). The petitioner meets the probably resulted standard by demonstrating, based on the new evidence, that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 329, 115 S.Ct. at 867-68. The reasonable doubt standard is not to be determined on the basis of the district court's independent judgment, but should be based on the district court's probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Id. at 329, 115 S.Ct. at 868. The petitioner must support the actual innocence claim with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial. Id. at 324, 115 S.Ct. at 865. A petitioner meets the threshold showing of innocence justifying a review of the merits of the constitutional claims if the new evidence raises sufficient doubt about [the petitioner's] guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Id. at 317, 115 S.Ct. at 862. 40 The affidavits of High and Melson contradict the testimony that Judy Wicker gave at trial that Arthur was with her, and would show that Arthur was about an hour away on the morning of the murder. See R2-36, Exh. Gustat Aff. at 2, ¶ 10; R3-54, Exh. A, Gustat Aff. at 4, ¶ 9. Arthur contends that both High and Melson were credible. He maintains that, during High's first meeting with the investigator, High stated that his long-term memory was better than his short-term memory, recalled the make and model of the vehicle that Arthur was driving, pounded his fist on the table for emphasis, and was not provided with any information about the murder, including the date, before he gave his recollection of his visit with Arthur. See R2-36, Exh. High Aff. at 1, ¶ 3; R3-54, Exh. Gustat Aff. at 4, ¶ 9; 8-9, ¶¶ 21-22. Melson corrected the details in a draft of his initial affidavit, and spent time and energy to have his affidavit notarized. See R3-54, Exh. Gustat Aff. at 5-6, ¶¶ 13-15. During Melson's four separate meetings with Arthur's investigator, Melson never expressed any doubt about his statement and the investigator did not observe any indication that Melson was under the influence of pain medication. Id. at 2-8, ¶¶ 5-20. 41 Arthur argues that any inconsistencies between High's first and second affidavits can be explained by the Attorney General's threatening tactics. He maintains that the delay in presenting the evidence was caused by the constitutionally deficient performance of Arthur's counsel and the state of Alabama's failure to provide Arthur with postconviction legal assistance. The state responds that the contents of the affidavits are not new because Arthur has known both his whereabouts at the time of the murder and the names of the people with whom he was with at the time of the murder for over twenty years. It contends that Arthur could have presented such evidence during his third trial, when he acted as his own counsel. It also maintains that the affidavits are suspect because neither Arthur, High, nor Melson came forward with the information during Arthur's three trials or until after the district court had granted a stay of execution, and because High and Melson had recanted their statements as to the exact date on which they saw Arthur. 42 The new affidavits of High and Melson are insufficient to satisfy the threshold showing under Schlup; what little doubt they raise as to Arthur's guilt in no way undermines confidence in the result of his trial. To begin with, we observe that exculpatory affidavits produced . . . at the 11th hour with no reasonable explanation for the nearly decade-long delay are suspect. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 423, 113 S.Ct. 853, 872, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Such suspicion is especially warranted when, as here, certain important details of the affidavits were subsequently disavowed by the affiants themselves. The documents are substantively unimpressive as well. High and Melson's revised testimony would, at best, attack the credibility of Wicker, whose own statements were corroborated by other witnesses and evidence submitted at trial. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Arthur was unable to meet the standard necessary to avoid a procedural bar, and to show that his conviction probably resulted from a constitutional violation.
43 Arthur argues that he was entitled to develop his claim of actual innocence and that a hearing is necessary to assess the reliability of High and Melson's affidavits. He maintains that the district court erred by applying the due diligence requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) because he was seeking to establish a gateway claim of actual innocence to excuse his untimeliness and not a review of the merits of the claim. He also contends that he should not be held responsible for his counsel's failure to investigate or develop the record. He maintains that, because of the advancements in DNA technology since his trial, tests on the physical trial evidence could produce new evidence that could not have been developed at trial. 44 While his habeas petition was pending, Arthur moved for leave to conduct discovery related to his claim of actual innocence and good cause for his failure to raise the actual innocence claim in state proceedings. Specifically, he sought physical evidence from the murder 9 and documents concerning the Holman Prison death row library. 10 The district court denied the request for the physical crime evidence finding that the evidence regarding his actual innocence claim would [a]t best . . . impeach Judy Wicker's testimony and would not establish his actual innocence claim. 11 R3-55 at 7. The court denied the request for the Holman prison library evidence because it bore no relation to a constitutional claim. The district court held that Arthur was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to question High and Melson because he had made no attempt to show he diligently pursued the factual predicate of his alibi claim in [any] state court. Id. at 15. 45 Generally, [a] habeas petitioner. . . is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course, but may obtain leave of court to conduct discovery pursuant to Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases upon showing good cause, Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904, 117 S.Ct. at 1796-97, and diligence in pursuing the claim for which discovery is sought, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1249 (11th Cir.2002). Good cause is demonstrated `where specific allegations. . . show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he. . . is entitled to relief.' Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09, 117 S.Ct. at 1799 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1091, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969)). A petitioner claiming actual, and not legal, innocence will typically show that the wrong person was convicted of the crime. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339-41, 112 S.Ct. at 2519-20. A district court's denial of discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion where the petitioner has shown `good cause' for the discovery.' Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909, 117 S.Ct. at 1799(citation omitted). 46 In reviewing a state writ of habeas corpus in which the petitioner failed to develop the factual basis for a claim in the state court proceedings, the district court 47 shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that — 48 (A) the claim relies on — 49 . . . . 50 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 51 (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 52 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). In this statute, Congress has given prisoners who fall within § 2254(e)(2)'s opening clause an opportunity to obtain an evidentiary hearing where the legal or factual basis of the claims did not exist at the time of state-court proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 1490, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [A] failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel. Id. at 432, 120 S.Ct. at 1488. 53 The question is not whether the facts could have been discovered but instead whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts . . . . Diligence for purposes of the opening clause depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does not depend . . . upon whether those efforts could have been successful. Though lack of diligence will not bar an evidentiary hearing if efforts to discover the facts would have been in vain, and there is a convincing claim of innocence, only a prisoner who has neglected his rights in state court need satisfy these conditions. 54 Id. at 435, 120 S.Ct. at 1490 (citations omitted). 12 Although a defendant represented by constitutionally ineffective counsel will not be held responsible for attorney error, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must have first been presented to the state court before it can be used to establish cause for the default. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89, 106 S.Ct. at 2645-46. A district court properly applies § 2254(e)(2)'s diligence requirement in determining whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Isaacs, 300 F.3d at 1248-49. 55 Arthur failed to satisfy the diligence requirement of § 2254 both as to the requested discovery and as to the evidentiary hearing. He failed to pursue the testing of the requested crime-related physical evidence during his three trials or through a state postconviction relief petition. See id. at 1249-50 (affirming the denial of an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner knew of the factual basis at the time of his state appeal, and had multiple opportunities to raise the issue during state court proceedings over a period of ten years). He failed to show that his claim of actual innocence was unavailable to him before the statute of limitation expired. He also failed to demonstrate good cause for his failure to seek the requested crime-related discovery. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Arthur's request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.
56 Arthur argues that statutory tolling should apply because Alabama unconstitutionally failed to provide him with state postconviction counsel, any other form of legal assistance, or access to an adequate law library. He contends that he suffered actual harm as a result of not having counsel because he has received no state or federal postconviction review of the merits of his claims. He maintains that his habeas petition is timely because, since he was unable to locate pro bono counsel until October 2000, the federal period of limitations did not end until October 2001. He claims that he suffered an actual injury from the inadequacies in the prison law library because he was unable to timely prepare and file a state postconviction petition and a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. He asserts that this injury resulted from Alabama's failure to provide him with the procedures for requesting materials and history of providing the requested materials only after an adequate habeas corpus petition was filed. 57 The district court denied Arthur's claim of statutory tolling, holding that the state did not unconstitutionally impede the timely filing of Arthur's federal habeas petition. It found that, because Arthur did not avail himself of the [Alabama] procedure for obtaining [postconviction] counsel, he could not show that he would have been denied counsel if he had pursued such relief, and that Arthur had provided no support for his claim that Holman Prison death row inmates were provided inadequate access to the library. R3-55 at 20. It also found that Arthur's evidence that he was unable to obtain private counsel did not satisfy his burden of showing that he suffered an actual injury from the Alabama procedure for obtaining postconviction counsel. 58 A person in state custody filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus is subject to a one-year statute of limitation which 59 shall run from the latest of — 60 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 61 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action. 62 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Thus, if the petitioner was prevented from filing his habeas corpus petition as a result of illegal state action, the limitation period will not begin until the state impediment is removed. Wyzykowski, 226 F.3d at 1216. 63 Prisoners, including those under a sentence of death, have no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel for postconviction proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10, 12, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2771-72, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (holding that Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993-94, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) applied to death penalty cases). 13 We have declined to find an exception even when the state collateral proceeding was the petitioner's first opportunity to raise the claim. Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1025-26 (11th Cir.1996). 64 Such an exception is unnecessary, however, because Alabama provides for the appointment of counsel for a petitioner seeking postconviction relief. An indigent petitioner, who desires the assistance of counsel, may seek appointment of counsel if the petitioner's postconviction relief petition is not summarily dismissed. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(c). 14 Similarly, an indigent federal habeas corpus petitioner, seeking relief from a judgment punishable by death, has a mandatory statutory right to appointed counsel from the district court upon filing a motion requesting such appointment. 21 U.S.C. 848(q)(4)(B), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(h) and 2261; 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 858-59, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2573-74, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994). 65 To guarantee prisoners their constitutional right of access to the courts, prison authorities are required to provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or legally trained assistance to prepare and file meaningful legal papers. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). The primary focus is to protect[] the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or complaint, [and] it is irrelevant that the state provides for the appointment of counsel in some proceedings. Id. at 828 n. 17, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 n. 17 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The required prison law library must supply the tools and, thus, a capability that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355-56, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). An inmate who shows that a desired actionable challenge to his sentence was lost or rejected. . . because th[e] capability of filing suit [w]as not . . . provided, . . . demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Id., 116 S.Ct. at 2182 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). 66 Arthur did not seek appointment of counsel under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.7(c) or 28 U.S.C. § 2254(h), but instead sought counsel through letters to various organizations and postings on the internet. In the letters and internet postings, he asked that the case not be referred to either the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta, Georgia, or to the Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, in Montgomery, Alabama. 15 The statute of limitation expired during his search. Arthur provided no reasons in his petition for not filing a pro se petition while seeking counsel. The Holman Prison law library has one room reserved for death row inmates. R2-40, Exh. G. The death row room is used more as a day room instead of a library and contains legal materials which are neither maintained nor updated. Id. If a death row inmate needs specific materials, the inmate can request the materials from the maintained and current library. Id. The materials were, therefore, available to Arthur upon his request. Further, Arthur was aware of time limits for filing his petition and the consequences for missing those times. In an internet posting seeking counsel, Arthur asked for help . . . now I'm running out of time for appeals. R2-40, Exh. E (also stating the time for appeal on my case is critical to me.) Based on the record, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that Arthur failed to avail himself of the Alabama procedures for obtaining postconviction counsel or to show that he was provided inadequate access to the prison law library, or abused its discretion in denying Arthur statutory tolling relief.
67 Arthur argues that equitable tolling is warranted and that we should apply a more lax standard in capital cases because of the heightened importance of the potential punishment. He contends that he never received notice of the judgment which triggered the limitations period, and was unable to file a timely petition as he was not represented by counsel. He maintains that extraordinary circumstances are presented because Alabama cannot appoint counsel for postconviction proceedings until after the filing of a petition containing the grounds with full disclosure of the factual basis for those grounds. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.6(b), 32.7(c). He maintains that he was unable to obtain the alibi evidence which he seeks to present until after his current counsel performed an extensive factual investigation. He claims that he was placed in a Catch-22 situation when he was prevented from meeting with an investigator without obtaining counsel, and was unable to obtain counsel until he had set forth the factual basis for his claim or met with an investigator. 68 In the district court, Arthur argued that his failure to file a timely petition was due to Alabama's failure to provide him with notice of judgment, legal assistance, visits with investigators, or an adequate law library. The district court noted that Alabama's evidence tended to show that Arthur was aware of the Alabama Supreme Court's final ruling, even though no certificate of judgment issued on 7 April 1998. It found that, in light of the long period of time in which Arthur did nothing, Arthur had not demonstrated diligence in obtaining the status of his Alabama Supreme Court appeal. It also found that Arthur had not demonstrated that the lack of notice prevented him from timely filing a petition. It found that Arthur's efforts to obtain private counsel and to meet with private investigators did not show diligence in pursuing his habeas claims. It found that, because Arthur had not shown that he was denied materials from the general prison library or had made any independent efforts to learn of the limitations period, he failed to show that the circumstances were outside of his control and that he was diligent. It concluded that, even in combination, the factors did not show extraordinary circumstances or that Arthur had exercised due diligence to warrant equitable tolling. R3-55 at 21-25. 69 In a letter received by the United States Supreme Court on 11 June 1998, Arthur stated that he had been informed that he had 90 days from the Alabama Supreme Court's final ruling of 20 March 1998 to file some sort of document in the United States Supreme Court. R2-40, Exh. C at 1. He explained that he had spent time trying to get exact-correct mailing address for the Supreme Court, had received the address on 2 June 1998, and had been unable to mail the letter at that time because he had used his weekly mail allowance. Id. He said that he did not have an attorney but was trying desperately to get one using every mailing allowance writing to organizations requesting representation. Id. at 2. He requested an extension of six months to one year to allow for him to obtain counsel and for the attorney to become familiar with Arthur's case, or 30 days to allow him to submit something on his own. 16 Arthur did not subsequently file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 70 In April 2000, legal investigators Robert C. Long and Glenn Taylor requested permission to visit Arthur to investigate certain aspects of his case and [for the purpose] of obtaining legal counsel for him. R2-40, Exh. F at 1. Two days later, the Holman Correctional Facility warden advised Long that the request was not approved and that [v]isits for investigators are allowed, but by attorney request. Id. at 2. In May 2000, attorney James G. Curenton wrote to the prison, indicating that he was contemplating representing Arthur and requested permission for his investigators to visit . . . and interview Arthur. Id. at 3. The next day, the warden responded that Curenton would be accommodated [w]hen and if you make a decision to become . . . Arthur's attorney or wish to come see him yourself but that he could not at this time . . . approve investigators to visit Arthur. Id. at 4. 71 After the Alabama Supreme Court's 20 March 1998 affirmance of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal's decision affirming Arthur's conviction, a certificate of judgment was to have issued 18 days later, which was 7 April 1998. See Ala. R.App. P. 41(a). It is unclear when or how Arthur received information of the Alabama Supreme Court's decision, but in any event, he was aware of it when he wrote to the United States Supreme Court on 2 June 1998, and believed that he had until 20 June 1998 to file his petition for writ of certiorari. He did not, however, timely file such a petition. 72 The time period specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is a statute of limitations [and] not a jurisdictional bar, which permits equitable tolling when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence. Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted). As an extraordinary remedy, equitable tolling is typically applied sparingly. Id. It may be applied if the petitioner demonstrates (1) diligence in his efforts to timely file a habeas petition and (2) extraordinary and unavoidable circumstances. Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam). A petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based on a showing of either extraordinary circumstances or diligence alone; the petitioner must establish both. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1815, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005); Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1478-79 (11th Cir. 1993). We review the district court's legal decision on equitable tolling de novo and factual determinations, including that of diligence, for clear error. Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1625, 164 L.Ed.2d 332 (2006). 17 73 A determination as to whether rare and exceptional circumstances are presented requires the examination of the facts in each case. Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam). The focus of the inquiry regarding extraordinary circumstances is on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition and not on the circumstances of the underlying conviction, Helton v. Secretary for the Dep't. of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam), and whether the conduct of others prevented the petitioner from timely filing, see Lawrence, 421 F.3d at 1226. 18 74 To show diligence, a petitioner claiming deficiencies in the prison law library must provide details of the specific actions taken toward filing the petition. Helton, 259 F.3d at 1314. He must show when he found out about the library's alleged deficiency, must state any independent efforts he made to determine when the relevant limitations period began to run, and must demonstrate how the prison thwarted his efforts. Id. Absent such evidence, the connection between the petitioner's untimely filing and any alleged inadequacies in the library is insufficient. Id. 75 The record shows that Arthur was aware of the deadline to file his habeas petition and that, although he continued to seek counsel, he neither timely filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief nor filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel. Although he may have been unable to present the testimony of the alibi witnesses until an investigation had been performed, he was in a position to proffer the names of the individuals with whom he spoke on the day of the murder. The record does not reflect any repeated efforts to learn the status of his case or any acts by others which prevented him from timely filing his petition. In fact, the record does not reflect any specific actions, other than seeking pro bono counsel and requesting an extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari, that Arthur took to timely file a petition for postconviction relief, to seek counsel through either the state or federal avenues available to him, to obtain the information regarding the limitations period (or the options for seeking counsel through the state or federal systems) from the prison library or to gain the assistance of others, outside of prison, who had the ability to obtain the information for him. Absent any such evidence of diligence, — the district court did not clearly err in finding that Arthur was not entitled to equitable relief.