Opinion ID: 1608509
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Motion for New Trial and Recusal

Text: ¶ 12. On March 13, 1998, Donna filed her first Motion for New or Amended Findings, or a New Trial. In her first motion, Donna argued that the chancellor mistakenly believed that she and Angela Patton had agreed or conspired to obtain custody of Ellen for Donna. For this reason, Donna alleged that this mistaken belief led to the judgment for Mark and she should be granted a new trial. As earlier stated, the denial of a new trial will be upheld unless the judge abused his discretion. Muhammad, 622 So.2d at 1250. ¶ 13. In his opinion, the chancellor found that, following the temporary hearing, Donna located Angela Patton, Mark's first wife and the mother of Ellen. The judge noted that prior to November of 1995, Angela had not seen Ellen since 1989. Coincidently, Angela surfaced and filed a complaint for intervention requesting that Mark be incarcerated, custody of Ellen be awarded to her, and visitation rights be awarded to Donna. Donna and Angela had also agreed to a temporary visitation plan where Angela would visit Ellen in Donna's home. The court ordered that it was not assuming jurisdiction of the action by Angela against Mark concerning custody of Ellen. The court finally entered an order incorporating its opinion, and Angela returned to North Carolina. Angela never returned to this litigation, however, Angela's attorney then became the attorney for Donna. Whether the chancellor was correct in believing that Angela and Donna had some sort of agreement is irrelevant to whether a new trial should be granted. Our Court has held that [e]ven if [the appellate court] disagreed with the lower court on the finding of fact and might have arrived at a different conclusion, we are still bound by the chancellor's findings unless manifestly wrong ... Pieper v. Pontiff, 513 So.2d 591, 594 (Miss.1987) (citing Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d at 668). ¶ 14. In her first Motion for Recusal Donna alleged that the chancellor clearly expressed his opinions of her and concluded that she lacked credibility. For this reason, Donna argues that the chancellor should have recused himself from this bifurcated trial due to his prejudice against her. ¶ 15. We find that the chancellor had ample opportunity to listen to the testimony of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and determine the credibility of the witnesses. This trial went on for 18 to 19 days. There is nothing in the record to establish that the chancellor committed error in finding that Mark was allowed unsupervised visitation with Erin. The standard applied to a judge's refusal to recuse himself is the manifest error standard. Burnham, 734 So.2d at 261. Our Court has held that a judge should recuse himself if a reasonable person would have doubts about his impartiality. McBride v. Meridian Pub. Improvement Corp., 730 So.2d 548, 551 (Miss.1998). Nothing in this record would make a reasonable person harbor any doubts about the chancellor's impartiality. For this reason, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in failing to recuse himself from this case.