Opinion ID: 2065766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: development of the due process analysis

Text: The majority's determination that this case is not subject to the same due process analysis as is applied in other lost/destroyed evidence cases is troubling. (See California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413; Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281; People v. Ward (1992), 154 Ill.2d 272, 181 Ill.Dec. 884, 609 N.E.2d 252; Hobley, 159 Ill.2d 272, 202 Ill.Dec. 256, 637 N.E.2d 992.) Essential to any due process analysis is an understanding of what process is due. A review of the pertinent case law, out of which the analysis developed, is helpful to that understanding. In Mooney, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, the Court ruled on what nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates due process. There, the State purposefully presented false testimony against a defendant. The Court stated: [Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation. (Emphasis added.) Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112, 55 S.Ct. at 342, 79 L.Ed. at 794. Later in Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, the Court was confronted with a case in which the government deliberately failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. The Court held that the government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence within its possession, whether in good faith or bad, violated the defendant's due process rights. See also United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342. Subsequently, the Court had occasion to address the government's due process obligation to preserve evidence which came into its possession during an investigation. In Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413, which for obvious reasons is set out in some detail, the defendants were stopped by the police on suspicion of drunk driving and submitted to an Intoxilyzer test. The test showed a blood-alcohol concentration level substantially higher than the level at which a driver is presumed to be intoxicated. The defendants were then arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress the Intoxilyzer test results, on the basis that the State's failure to preserve samples of defendants' breath was a violation of due process. In finding no due process violation, the Court first noted that the State did not destroy the breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny; rather, it acted `in good faith and in accord with their normal practice.' Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2533, 81 L.Ed.2d at 422, quoting Killian v. United States (1961), 368 U.S. 231, 242, 82 S.Ct. 302, 308, 7 L.Ed.2d 256, 264. The Court next noted that the government's failure to preserve the breath samples was without constitutional defect because the evidence was not of constitutional materiality. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. (Emphasis added.) Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. at 2534, 81 L.Ed.2d at 422. In that regard, the Court noted the unlikelihood that the samples would have been exculpatory. Additionally, the Court reasoned that [t]he evidence to be presented at trial was not the breath itself but rather the Intoxilyzer results obtained from the breath samples and that the defendant wanted the breath samples in order to challenge incriminating test results produced with the Intoxilyzer. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2533, 81 L.Ed.2d at 421. Even assuming that the Intoxilyzer results were inaccurate and, therefore, the breath samples might have been exculpatory, it did not necessarily show that the defendants were without alternate means of demonstrating their innocence. The Court noted that the defendants had identified only a small number of ways in which an Intoxilyzer may malfunction and that they were able to raise these issues without resort to the breath samples. Additionally, the defendants were able to cross-examine the police officer who administered the test to attempt to raise doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to whether the test was administered properly. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 490, 104 S.Ct. at 2535, 81 L.Ed.2d at 423. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, built upon the Trombetta reference to bad faith in analyzing the due process implications of the loss of evidence where the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. There, the State failed to preserve identification evidence which might have eliminated the defendant as the perpetrator. The lower court held that since the main issue at trial was that of identity and since the State was responsible for the destruction of evidence that could have conclusively eliminated the defendant as the perpetrator, due process precluded conviction. The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning. Where evidence is lost or destroyed, the due process concerns are different from those in Brady and other nondisclosure cases where there has been a deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. The Court stated that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. ( Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337, 102 L.Ed.2d at 289.) Where the evidence was destroyed in bad faith, such conduct [may] indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant ( Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337, 102 L.Ed.2d at 289), hence a deprivation of due process. Illinois adheres to the Federal due process analysis applicable in access-to-evidence cases. In People v. Ward (1992), 154 Ill.2d 272, 181 Ill.Dec. 884, 609 N.E.2d 252, the defendant claimed a due process violation for the State's failure to preserve alleged brain matter of one of the victims. The defendant asserted that the State's failure to preserve the matter denied him his right to have access to material evidence. Guided by the analysis in Youngblood, the court held that the police's failure to preserve the evidence could at worst be described as negligent. Consequently, no due process violation occurred because there was no evidence presented which demonstrated bad faith on the part of the police. This court was next confronted with a due process claim for lost/destroyed evidence in Hobley, 159 Ill.2d 272, 202 Ill.Dec. 256, 637 N.E.2d 992. There, the defendant requested that State `supply any report and results of any and all scientific test,    including such tests as    fingerprints.' ( Hobley, 159 Ill.2d at 306, 202 Ill.Dec. 256, 637 N.E.2d 992.) The State provided no fingerprint reports. We there noted that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. We further noted that the policy considerations which underlie Youngblood were analogous to those which underlie Hobley. In order to promote the preservation of exculpatory evidence, there must be the possibility of a sanction where evidence is lost or destroyed. On the other hand, a defendant should not be rewarded for the inadvertent loss of a piece of evidence where other evidence sufficient to support his conviction remains. Hobley, 159 Ill.2d at 307, 202 Ill.Dec. 256, 637 N.E.2d 992. As is apparent from these several cases, the overriding due process concern in a defendant's entitlement to access evidence is that a guilty verdict not be contrived by deception. Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and its progeny relate only to concealing evidence favorable to the accused, not to providing the defense with notice that will improve its preparation for meeting the government's evidence. (See Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30.) Hence, the requirement, in lost/destroyed evidence cases, that for purposes of due process, there be a showing of bad faith on the part of the State. Simply put, a defendant has no due process right to have incriminating evidence not used to secure his conviction.