Opinion ID: 2258481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the commonwealth's appeal: ethnic intimidation conviction

Text: At the time relevant here, the Crimes Code provided that a person is guilty of ethnic intimidation if, with malicious intention toward the race ... of another individual or group of individuals, he commits an offense under any other provision of this article or under Chapter 33 ... or under section 3503 ... or under section 5504 ... with respect to such individual... or with respect to one or more members of such a group. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2710(a). [7] It is undisputed that the only potentially applicable predicate offense at issue in this case was Terroristic Threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. [8] The trial judge, however, acquitted Magliocco of that offense, and that acquittal formed the basis for his appellate challenge to the ethnic intimidation conviction before the Superior Court. Magliocco argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove ethnic intimidation because the Commonwealth failed to establish that he committed terroristic threats. Magliocco maintained that a convictionor at the very least a formal finding by the trier of fact that a defendant committed the predicate offense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, even if not convicted of itis a necessary element to support a conviction for ethnic intimidation. In vacating the ethnic intimidation conviction, the Superior Court panel relied upon Commonwealth v. Caine, 453 Pa.Super. 235, 683 A.2d 890 (1996) ( en banc ) (conviction for homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence (DUI) vacated where statute required conviction for DUI and defendant was acquitted of DUI), for the proposition that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if the conviction of a predicate crime is a required element of the offense but is not obtained. The panel recognized that the statute in the case sub judice required only the commission, and not the conviction, of the predicate offense. However, the panel opined that conviction of the predicate offense was required in order to properly classify and grade the offense of ethnic intimidation under Section 2710(b), which provides as follows: An offense under this section shall be classified as a misdemeanor of the third degree if the other offense is classified as a summary offense. Otherwise, an offense under this section shall be classified one degree higher in the classification specified in section 106 (relating to classes of offenses) than the classification of the other offense. Id. In the panel's view, if the defendant has been acquitted of the underlying offense, the crime of ethic intimidation logically cannot be graded. 806 A.2d at 1286-87. The Commonwealth now argues that the Superior Court misapprehended the plain language of the statute by reading the statutory phrase commits an offense as if it read is convicted of an offense. The Commonwealth submits that, in Pennsylvania law, the term convicted has a distinct meaning, i.e., `the ascertainment of the guilt of the accused and judgment thereon by the court,' implying not only a verdict but a judgment of sentence thereon. Commonwealth's Brief, 10-12 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kimmel, 523 Pa. 107, 565 A.2d 426, 428 (1989)). Moreover, the Commonwealth notes that other provisions in the Crimes Code recognize this distinction. Thus, Section 306 of the Crimes Code, which addresses accomplice liability, includes subsection (g), which governs the prosecution of [an] accomplice only, and provides that: An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(g). The Commonwealth submits that, by not adverting to the term of art conviction in Section 2710's reference to the predicate offense, but instead addressing the mere commission of a qualifying offense, the General Assembly clearly and unambiguously revealed its intention not to require a conviction of that predicate offense. The Commonwealth further argues that the evidence it produced-that Magliocco threatened to kill the children and all other people of their race on the block, while brandishing a baseball bat-was sufficient to prove that he in fact committed terroristic threats, even though the bench trial judge specifically acquitted him of that crime. The Commonwealth maintains that, since an ethnic intimidation conviction requires a finding that the underlying offense was committed, the trial judge's guilty verdict on ethnic intimidation must be construed as representing a finding that Magliocco committed terroristic threats, even though she declined to convict him of it as a separate crime. Any inconsistency in the trial court's verdicts, the Commonwealth argues, is no basis for awarding relief upon a sufficiency of the evidence claim since consistency in verdicts is not required and an acquittal `cannot be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence.' Commonwealth's Brief, 9-10, (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 539 Pa. 212, 651 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1994)). [9] Magliocco responds that the Superior Court correctly ruled that an offender cannot be deemed to have committed a predicate offense if he was both charged with, and actually acquitted of, that very offense at trial. Magliocco acknowledges that the term commit can have a different meaning than the term convict in some instances, but argues that the ethnic intimidation statute does not logically allow for a conclusion that a defendant has committed an offense for which he has just been acquitted. Magliocco further argues that a case such as this cannot be construed as posing a typical instance of inconsistent verdicts. This is so because, inter alia, the qualifying offense (here, terroristic threats) is actually incorporated into the ethnic intimidation statute as an element of the crime; accordingly, proof was required not simply that the offense of terroristic threats was committed, but that that offense was committed beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's specific verdict of acquittal on that very question, Magliocco argues, necessarily precludes a finding that the Commonwealth sustained its burden respecting that element of the crime of ethnic intimidation. [10] We agree with the Commonwealth that it was not required to secure a formal conviction for the predicate crime of terroristic threats in order to secure a conviction for ethnic intimidation based upon such terroristic threats. Indeed, as we read the statute, the Commonwealth need not formally charge the defendant with the predicate offense, as long as it makes clear which offense it is pursuing as the predicate offense for purposes of the ethnic intimidation charge, and the factfinder is so made aware and, in the case of a jury, so charged. We also agree with the Commonwealth that a mere facial inconsistency in verdicts is not a valid basis upon which to upset a conviction which is otherwise proper, since consistency in verdicts is not required. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405, 282 A.2d 375, 376 (1971) (consistency in criminal verdicts is unnecessary). [11] Our difficulty with the Commonwealth's position arises from the necessary effect of an actual acquittal of a crime in the admittedly unusual circumstance presented here, where that crime is both separately charged and prosecuted and is also a specific statutory element of another charged offense. Acquittals, of course, have been accorded a special weight in the law. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129-30, 101 S.Ct. 426, 433, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) (The law `attaches particular significance to an acquittal.') (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. D.M., 548 Pa. 131, 695 A.2d 770, 772 (1997). Thus, in D.M., this Court stated: A defendant enters a trial cloaked in the presumption of innocence and when the fact-finder reaches a verdict of acquittal, there is no justification to search for reasons to undermine the verdict. Such a defendant has achieved the strongest vindication possible under our criminal tradition, laws, and procedures[.] Id. at 772-73. Accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130, 101 S.Ct. at 433 (`We necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal-no matter how erroneous its decision.') (citation omitted). To secure a conviction for any crime, the Commonwealth must prove all necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g. Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 575 Pa. 411, 836 A.2d 871, 874 (2003). In order to find Magliocco guilty of ethnic intimidation in this case, the factfinder had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, among other things, he actually committed the offense of terroristic threats. But, the Commonwealth did not merely allege that, for purposes of an ethnic intimidation prosecution, Magliocco committed terroristic threats with a malicious racial animus. Instead, the predicate offense was actually charged and actually prosecuted, and that prosecution resulted in an acquittal-a finding that, for whatever reason, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed terroristic threats. Given the special weight afforded acquittals, since the factfinder in this case specifically found that Magliocco did not commit the offense of terroristic threats, the conviction for ethnic intimidation, which requires as an element the commission beyond a reasonable doubt of the underlying offense, simply cannot stand. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's vacatur of Magliocco's conviction for ethnic intimidation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Superior Court correctly upheld Magliocco's conviction for PIC, and correctly reversed his conviction for ethnic intimidation. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed. Former Justice LAMB did not participate in the decision of this case.