Opinion ID: 2073360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Oral Contract

Text: The Superior Court, citing absence of supporting evidence, refused to instruct the jury on plaintiff's theory that Eva and the defendant had entered into an oral contract of temporary life insurance in the amount of $10,000. The court's ruling in all respects was equivalent to its granting the defendant's earlier motion for a directed verdict on that aspect of plaintiff's case. In reviewing the correctness of that ruling, we must consider the evidence, including every justifiable inference therefrom, whenever reasonably possible, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s] as the part[y] against whom the verdict was directed. Reed v. Rule, Me., 376 A.2d 445 (1977). Applying that standard, we conclude that the Superior Court correctly ruled the evidence insufficient to warrant the jury's finding any oral contract of insurance. The prepayment receipt given to Eva by Prudential at their initial November 12 meeting expressly provided her temporary insurance coverage in the amount of $10,000. In exchange, Eva paid Prudential $175.40. Although the receipt by its terms expired at the latest 60 days from issuance, plaintiff contends that prior to Eva's death Prudential had revived Eva's temporary insurance by an oral agreement to provide such coverage on terms similar to those stated in the prepayment receipt. Mr. and Mrs. Martin testified that after the February 28 meeting Eva believed that everything was all set with Prudential and that she was covered. Even if the jury believed that testimony, it was at best ambiguous as evidence of Eva's belief. She may have meant either that she was covered to the extent of $10,000 as of that time, or simply that she had finally succeeded in doing what was required effectively to convert the policies at the future time when they became convertible. In any event, even if the jury had construed those statements as an unequivocal indication that Eva believed Prudential had orally promised her temporary insurance of $10,000, such a belief on her part would have been unfounded and unreasonable. Without question the Prudential agents responsible for Eva Martin's applications made many mistakes and repeatedly gave her misinformation in the course of her attempts to convert the two family insurance policies. Nevertheless, at least after the initial November 12 meeting, all transactions between them were clearly geared toward the conversion of those policies and not toward contracting for any other type of insurance, such as temporary insurance. It is clear from the face of the initial prepayment receipt, which did provide temporary insurance coverage, that it was issued in conjunction with Eva's application for new business insurance. Although Prudential never requested that Eva return the receipt, that fact of itself would not support an inference that once the maximum 60-day period for the receipted-for temporary insurance expired in January 1975 Prudential orally agreed to continue to provide that coverage. Prudential did not, it is true, return Eva's $175.40 payment of November 12 until the February 28 meeting, at which time she endorsed Prudential's draft for that entire amount back to Prudential, even though, as recited in the one application for conversion in evidence, she was then required to make a premium payment of only $77.30. There is not a scintilla of evidence, however, to suggest that the balance of the draft was paid by Eva in consideration for an additional promise by Prudential to provide temporary life insurance. [4] To infer that such was the case would be sheer speculation on the part of the factfinder. The entry must be: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ., did not sit.