Opinion ID: 2124098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probative value outweighed prejudice.

Text: Although evidence is deemed relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Such determination by the trial court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Grooms at 361; State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d 565, 68-69 (S.D.1985); SDCL 19-12-3. During a hearing outside the jury's presence, Judge Hurd stated that although he would permit the use of the overlays, he could not permit the jury to conclude that the composite drawing with the overlays is what the victim saw because the victim did not describe the suspect that way. Immediately prior to Deputy Toft taking the stand, Judge Hurd explained the limited purpose of the overlays to the jury: I am receiving this evidence, however, for a limited purpose. And that limited purpose is this: You may consider and give it such weight as you deem it deserves in support of the officer's testimony as to those parts of the drawing, Exhibit 19, which are significantly similar to or significantly different from Exhibit 18, the photograph. And I am cautioning you in that regard that the overlays were not contributed by the alleged eye-witness in this case, the victim. These overlays came from the skill of the police artist and the photograph and not from the victim. And the best that the victim was able to do during the process creating Exhibit 19 is Exhibit 19 itself. Thus, the jury was informed that the overlays had no connection to the Reimnitz's description. This warning may have been unnecessary. [I]t is necessary neither to instruct the jury that they should receive certain identification testimony with caution, nor to suggest to them the inherent unreliability of certain eyewitness identification. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.1973); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 526 (3rd Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 327, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971). Despite the precautionary instructions, McCord claims that the trial court, in effect, permitted Deputy Toft to make the drawing look more like McCord, thus prejudicing him. According to McCord's brief, the overlays could only lead to confusion to the jury on what exactly the eyewitnesses saw and who exactly the eyewitnesses described. Had the use of the overlays and composite drawing been the only identification evidence, this Court might tend to agree. We disagree, however, as the evidence strongly suggests otherwise. We determine if the identification procedure in the totality of the circumstances was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [McCord] was denied due process of law. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); State v. Jaeb, 442 N.W.2d 463 (S.D. 1989). See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); State v. Phinney, 348 N.W.2d 466 (S.D.1984). Recall, two days after the robbery, Reimnitz viewed a photograph lineup and confirmed that the man in photograph # 5 (McCord) was the culprit. Three other people had previously selected McCord's photo from that lineup as the man with the abundance of one dollar bills. Each lineup was preceded by the following statement: You will be asked to look at a group of photographs. The fact that the photographs are shown to you should not influence your judgment. You should not conclude or guess that the photographs contain the picture of the person who committed the crime. You are not obliged to identify anyone. It is just as important to free innocent persons from suspicion as to identify guilty parties. Please do not discuss this case with other witnesses nor indicate in any way that you have identified someone. Reimnitz was plainly aware that the culprit might not be in the lineup. Despite her previous description, she chose a photo of a man with a mustache and receding hairline the same photo that three other people had previously chosen. All four witnesses further identified the defendant in the courtroommustache, hairline, and scar all presentas the man they encountered on October 19, 1991. All of this information identifying McCord was elicited prior to Toft being called to the stand. Prejudicial error is error which in all probability must have produced some effect upon the jury's verdict and is harmful to the substantial rights of the party assigning it. Phillips at 617; State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 818 (S.D.1987). Though Reimnitz did not select McCord based upon any alleged prejudicial overlays, she did identify him as the robber in an independent line-up two days after the crime. It is this fact that is most compelling. In light of all the evidence presented prior to Toft's use of the overlays, we hold that use of the overlays was not prejudicial. Evidence which has any tendency to prove any material fact has rational probative value. Amaral at 112. The balancing of the probative value of the tendered expert testimony against its prejudicial effect is committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge whose actions will not be disturbed unless there has been abuse of discretion. State v. McDowell, 391 N.W.2d 661, 666 (S.D. 1986); State v. McNamara, 325 N.W.2d 288, 291 (S.D.1982). In United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979, 84 S.Ct. 1885, 12 L.Ed.2d 747 (1964), although a hijacking victim contradicted himself concerning the absence or presence of prominent tatoos on the accused's arms, the victim, prior to trial, picked the suspect out of a lineup with the latter's tatoos in full view, and thereafter made a positive identification before the grand jury, at the first trial, and on other occasions. Judge Friendly found the jury to be superbly equipped to evaluate the impact of the evidence which warranted a variety of inferences that would sustain [the victim's] identification and discredit his doubts. Id. at 934. Upon review, especially concerning all identification testimony, we likewise find the jury to be superbly equipped to sift through any confusion sensed by McCord. It is well-known, and this jury was so instructed, that the jury is not bound to accept expert or authoritative opinion testimony and may disregard it if they so choose. State v. Baker, 440 N.W.2d 284, 287 (S.D.1989); State v. Swallow, 350 N.W.2d 606, 609 (S.D.1984). Whereas, no abuse of discretion occurred, we hold there was no unfair prejudice in the use of the overlays. State v. Smith, 458 N.W.2d 779, 784 (S.D.1990).