Opinion ID: 779007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The money laundering charge

Text: 40 Caldwell contends that the money laundering charge is insufficient because it (1) fails to name the financial institution through which he allegedly laundered the $225,000, and (2) fails to provide adequate factual specificity regarding the mail fraud from which the money was allegedly derived. Both of these arguments allege inadequate factual detail regarding elements of the offense — namely, the monetary transaction element and the specified unlawful activity element. In assessing whether an indictment contains adequate factual information regarding the elements of a charged offense, this court has explained that although an indictment must allege that the defendant committed each of the essential elements of the crime charged so as to enable the accused to prepare his defense and to invoke the double jeopardy clause in any subsequent prosecution for the same offense, [i]t is not necessary for an indictment to go further and to allege in detail the factual proof that will be relied upon to support the charges. United States v. Crippen, 579 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir.1978); see also United States v. Williams, 679 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir.1982) (stating that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) does not mean that the indictment must set forth facts and evidentiary details necessary to establish each of the elements of the charged offense). 41 In evaluating whether the monetary transaction element of a money laundering offense has been alleged with sufficient factual specificity, it is important to bear in mind that [t]he core of money laundering, which distinguishes one such offense from another, is the laundering transaction itself. United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1265 (4th Cir.1995). Caldwell maintains that United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500 (5th Cir.1996), requires that the financial institution through which money is allegedly laundered be named in the indictment. However, as the government points out, the Pettigrew court did not hold that an indictment must include the name of the financial institution in charging a § 1957 offense, but rather noted in dicta that the district court constructively amended the indictment by naming in the jury instructions a bank other than the two banks named in the indictment. See 77 F.3d at 1513 n. 11. 42 The money laundering count in Caldwell's indictment, which closely tracks § 1957, includes the date of the offense and the amount of money. In these circumstances, the absence of the name of the financial institution does not render the charge constitutionally insufficient. The specification of both the date of the offense and the amount of money is sufficiently precise to (1) provide Caldwell with adequate notice of the monetary transaction on which the government based the money laundering charge and (2) preclude the possibility of Caldwell's being charged in the future with money laundering for the same transaction. 43 Caldwell also argues that the indictment's allegation that the unlawful activity was mail fraud in violation of Section 1341, Title 18, United States Code was not sufficient to give him adequate notice of the factual basis for this element of a money laundering offense. In support of this argument, he relies on United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 1994). In Knowles, this court reaffirmed the rule that an allegation made in one count of an indictment may be incorporated by reference in another count of the indictment only if expressly done. Id. at 952. According to Caldwell, because the money laundering count does not expressly incorporate any of the mail fraud counts, the factual allegations in those counts may not be considered in assessing the sufficiency of the money laundering count. Without these factual allegations, he argues, the mere reference to the offense of mail fraud in the money laundering count insufficiently alleges the unlawful activity element. 44 Although this court has not yet addressed the precise incorporation issue that Caldwell raises, the Fourth Circuit has assessed the sufficiency of an indictment's allegation of unlawful activity in a context quite similar to the instant case. In United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir.1995), the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the charge that he caus[ed] $374,578.00 to be transferred and deposited to the Grimm-Gray Trust account at the Sun Bank, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, which funds were the proceeds of a wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). Reasoning that the requirement that the funds be illegally derived is not the distinguishing aspect and therefore does not lie at the core of the offense, the Fourth Circuit concluded that details about the nature of the unlawful activity underlying the character of the proceeds need not be alleged. Id. at 1265. The Fourth Circuit further explained that the term `specified unlawful activity' is a defined term referring to a list of offenses which qualify as unlawful activity for purposes of stating a money laundering offense. Id. Thus, because wire fraud in violation of § 1343 is included as a `specified unlawful activity' for purposes of money laundering, the Fourth Circuit held that [n]othing more need be alleged than that the laundered money was the proceeds of wire fraud in violation of § 1343. Id. 45 We agree with the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the specified unlawful activity element in Smith. Accordingly, we conclude that the statement in Caldwell's indictment indicating that the $225,000 was derived from mail fraud in violation of § 1341 sufficiently alleges the unlawful activity element of money laundering. 46