Opinion ID: 2631230
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Political Loyalty Exception

Text: {15} In her affidavit, Garcia-Montoya averred that she never had any authority to establish any policy decisions concerning personnel, budget or budget allocations, for the State Treasurer's Office. During her deposition, she described her duties generally as overseeing the budget area, personnel, telecommunications, [and] information systems. Garcia-Montoya indicated that she formulated a budget under the Treasurer's direction, and she explained that her work on the budget included analyzing the reasonableness of the Treasurer's proposals and making recommendations based on applicable rules and regulations. Garcia-Montoya accepted defense counsel's characterization of the work as basically see[ing] that the office budget stayed on track. Garcia-Montoya's work in the areas of telecommunications and information systems essentially consisted of the purchasing of supplies. {16} Regarding her responsibilities in the area of personnel, Garcia-Montoya handled the paperwork for personnel actions. Although Garcia-Montoya indicated that she questioned certain personnel decisions made by Montoya and Andermann based on her familiarity with personnel rules, she did not indicate whether advice on personnel matters formed one of the inherent duties of her position. She stated that she was not asked directly whether a termination was appropriate under the personnel rules, but she said, That's the kind of thing I should have been involved in. Garcia-Montoya was involved in only one interview of applicants for a position at the STO under David King, and she was not involved in any interviews as director of administrative services under Montoya. On one occasion, Andermann requested that Garcia-Montoya participate in a panel interview of applicants for a position, but she refused due to her belief that the applicants had been pre-selected contrary to personnel rules. Finally, she advised Montoya concerning the addition of positions that she believed would benefit the office. Garcia-Montoya was classified as a financial manager I, a classification which applies to a group of positions and which is defined as assisting or directing agency fiscal and budget analysis activities. {17} Montoya and Andermann did not provide a detailed list of inherent duties for the position of director of administrative services. According to Andermann, the duties included advising the Treasurer on personnel issues and ensuring that the budget complies with all legal and procedural requirements. For the most part, Montoya and Andermann relied on Garcia-Montoya's description of her duties in claiming that her position is subject to political patronage. {18} Garcia-Montoya's job title is not dispositive. See, e.g., Milazzo v. O'Connell, 108 F.3d 129, 133 n. 1 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that merely being a supervisor/administrator is not sufficient to create an exception to the prohibition against political patronage dismissals). Further, it is clear from Garcia-Montoya's description of her position that her duties in relation to the areas of telecommunications and information systems were merely ministerial in nature. The purchasing of supplies does not implicate partisan issues. We more closely scrutinize Garcia-Montoya's responsibilities in the areas of personnel and the budget, however, because these duties, if sufficiently broad and discretionary, can result in a need for political affiliation for effective performance. See, e.g., Peters v. Del. River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1358 (3d Cir.1994) ([P]reparing budgets and promoting projects are duties which count in favor of finding that the exception to Branti-Elrod applies.); Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1998) (mentioning the relevance of important personnel functions). {19} Some of the facts highlighted by Montoya and Andermann indicate a substantial role in the areas of personnel and the budget. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (plurality opinion) (stating that consideration should also be given to whether the employee acts as an adviser). These facts tend to support the view that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for Garcia-Montoya's position. See Feeney, 164 F.3d at 321 (stating that the expenditure of significant tax revenues is one of the most important policymaking decisions in government); Bicanic v. McDermott, 867 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.1989) (stating that public officials must be able to count on the support of those who prepare budgets, negotiate and sign contracts, and generally run the show at a substantial component of the government). {20} However, other facts alleged by Garcia-Montoya support a contrary inference. Garcia-Montoya stated that she basically tried to keep the budget on track. As a result, it is unclear whether her use of the term formulation actually referred to the implementation of a budget that was formulated by the Treasurer. See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1255 n. 3 (distinguishing policy implementation from policy formulation for purposes of a political loyalty inquiry). Additionally, according to Garcia-Montoya, she filled out the paperwork for personnel actions, did not participate in interviews, was not consulted about personnel decisions, and had no power to hire or fire other employees. This description is supported by Montoya's deposition testimony that Garcia-Montoya's job consisted of paying the bills and filing personnel matters and adding up the hours for everybody to get them their paycheck. Further, Andermann described the position as involving internal support. Cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 178 (distinguishing positions relat[ing] to the government's activity vis-a-vis the public from those involving a largely endogenous function of the state government and as such serve[ ] an internal and practical purpose). {21} We also believe it is significant that Garcia-Montoya received an excellent performance evaluation after Montoya had been in office for approximately six months, despite the fact that she questioned several of his personnel decisions during that period. The relevant inquiry under Branti-Elrod is the effective performance of the duties of the public office, and we believe that a favorable performance evaluation completed after a significant period of time under the new administration severely undermine[s][the] summary judgment argument that political affiliation and loyalty are as a matter of law indisputably valid justifications for employment action based on political patronage. Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1253-54 (relying on actual performance based on ample proof that [the employees] did effectively perform their jobs despite political differences). Finally, we note that there is no evidence that Garcia-Montoya was authorized to speak or act on behalf of Defendants, a compelling, though not necessarily critical, factor in determining the applicability of the political loyalty exception. See, e.g., Sanders, 1999 NMCA 079, ¶ 15, 127 N.M. 465, 982 P.2d 1064; Gordon v. County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir.1997) (stating that acting or speaking on behalf of a policymaker is of primary importance in that circuit); Peters, 16 F.3d at 1358 ([P]arty affiliation is unquestionably significant to the ... duties of maintaining good public relations and acting as a liaison with public officials.). {22} These facts could be interpreted as placing some of the duties of the position highlighted by Montoya and Andermann, such as acting as an advisor, in context. As a result, we believe these facts could support Garcia-Montoya's contention that the director of administrative services does not have meaningful input into the substantive policy decisions of the Treasurer, does not serve as an important communicator on behalf of the STO, and is not privy to confidential information to such an extent as to require political loyalty. Cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 176-79 (concluding that summary judgment in favor of the public official was not appropriate in relation to a position that did not have significant input into a major governmental program and did not involve significant contact with the public because the generic duties of participating in meetings and controlling others could just as well apply to any public employee with a measure of supervisory responsibility); Milazzo, 108 F.3d at 130-33 (concluding that a human resources administrator who implemented hiring policies, worked on budget and payroll issues, provided information on job applicants, and administered a summer program was not, as a matter of law, subject to political patronage dismissal under Branti because the position was not autonomous or discretionary, did not include the power to hire or fire, and did not include the formulation of personnel policy). But cf. Feeney, 164 F.3d at 321 (discussing an employee with extensive discretion over how the public fisc would be used to achieve the aims of [the] department). {23} Based on the standard of review applicable at summary judgment, we must draw every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant. Additionally, we must bear in mind the Supreme Court's admonition that cases involving doubt must be resolved in favor of the First Amendment protection against political patronage. Montoya and Andermann have failed to provide a detailed list of inherent duties, or the duties of Garcia Montoya's replacement, that would illuminate the extent of Garcia-Montoya's involvement in personnel and budgetary matters. Thus, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to a trial on the merits, we believe that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of Garcia-Montoya's former position. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. Defendants have therefore failed to demonstrate a vitally important interest sufficient to justify infringement on Garcia-Montoya's freedom of political belief.