Opinion ID: 3018252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: JAML Issues.

Text: Hicks resolved a conflict among the circuits by holding that a finding of pretext does not compel a finding that the employer was guilty of intentional age discrimination.12 Focusing on the passage in Hicks quoted at page 7 and again in footnote 5 of the court's opinion, some circuits have concluded, erroneously in my 12 In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996), the Court noted that it has never held that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm applies to ADEA cases. But the Court continues to use that analysis in age cases, and so do we. See Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310, 315 (8th Cir. 1996). -36- view, that submissible evidence of pretext will always defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment or JAML. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-72 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). Other circuits disagree. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Panel opinions of this court have consistently held that the district court may grant summary judgment or JAML for the employer even if plaintiff has some evidence of pretext if that evidence, for one reason or another, falls short of proving intentional discrimination. Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1335 (8th Cir. 1996), succinctly stated this rule: Intentional discrimination vel non is like any other ultimate question of fact: either the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the fact has been proven, or it is not. The Supreme Court concluded its opinion in Hicks by stating that we should not treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact. 509 U.S. at 524, quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). That is direct support for the rule in Rothmeier, because a factfinder's finding of intentional discrimination is subject to meaningful judicial review. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), 52(a). Though an implausible interpretation of the passage quoted on page 7 of the court's opinion could support a contrary view, the Court in Hicks explicitly warned us not to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the United States Code. 509 U.S. at 515. The final paragraph of Part II of the court's opinion confirms that Rothmeier is the law of this circuit. In Part III of its opinion, the court then properly reviews Ryther's pretext and other -37- evidence in great detail before concluding, there exists substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's finding of intentional age discrimination. Supra, at 36. Though I disagree with the result the court reaches in this case, I concur in the legal standard it has adopted and applied.13
My prior panel dissent discussed at length why I would hold that the district court erred in denying KARE 11's motion for JAML. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074, 1090-92 (8th Cir. 1996). To summarize briefly, ten years of professional market research suggested that Ryther as lead sportscaster did not attract Twin Cities viewers. In 1988 and 1989, the station brought in two new managers, Janet Mason and Linda Rios Brooks, who retained a different market research organization to survey Twin Cities viewers. When Gallup reported that Ryther had again fared poorly, Mason, Brooks, and the third decisionmaker, Richard Modig, made the rational decision not to rehire Ryther when his fourth three-year employment contract expired. At trial, all three decisionmakers testified that their decision was based upon the market research. There is no suspicion of mendacity here, not even a hint that this testimony was untruthful. Instead, the district court and this court labor 13 To summarize, under this standard, while plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination, that evidence must be sufficient to prove that the employer is guilty of intentional discrimination. Therefore, a trial judge may decide on a motion for summary judgment or JAML that the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer unlawful discrimination, even if plaintiff has presented some evidence of pretext. We review rulings on such motions under our traditional summary judgment and JAML standards. -38- mightily to demonstrate that the reason is not credible because Ryther was out of favor before the Gallup survey began (a true red herring), and because the market research was flawed. But evidence of an unsound decision is not probative of intentional age discrimination. To prove intentional discrimination, pretext evidence must call into question the veracity of the defendant's ultimate justification. Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 444 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1092-94 (1st Cir. 1995); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff must produce evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that the company lied). Here, Ryther's weak prima facie case and unconvincing pretext evidence are insufficient for any reasonable factfinder to conclude that Ryther's age was a determining factor in KARE 11's refusal to renew his contract.