Opinion ID: 799337
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: CAPTA and IDEA: Early Intervention Services (Count Ten)

Text: Count Ten seeks injunctive relief on behalf of a class of foster children who were not referred to early intervention services for which they were eligible. It seeks to enforce provisions of both CAPTA and IDEA that require States to refer certain children to early intervention services. The CAPTA provision, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxi), provides: A State plan ... shall contain a description of the activities that the State will carry out using amounts received under the grant ..., including ... an assurance in the form of a certification by the Governor of the State that the State has in effect and is enforcing a State law, or has in effect and is operating a statewide program ... that includes ... provisions and procedures for referral of a child under the age of 3 who is involved in a substantiated case of child abuse or neglect to early intervention services funded under Part C of the [IDEA].[ [14] ] The IDEA provision requires a State to have policies and procedures that require the referral for early intervention services... of a child under the age of 3 ... who is involved in a substantiated case of child abuse or neglect[.] 20 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(6)(A). The district court held that the CAPTA provision is not privately enforceable and that IDEA's comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes enforcement of that provision through § 1983. We affirm the decision of the district court. Our analysis of the CAPTA guardian ad litem provision applies with equal force to the early intervention provision. Because Congress did not unambiguously confer an individual federal right, the early intervention provision fails the first prong of the Blessing test. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268. With respect to the IDEA claim, we have previously held that the IDEA has a comprehensive enforcement scheme that forecloses enforcement through § 1983. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2007). Plaintiffs do not dispute this point, but they arguefor the first time on appealthat they are seeking to enforce the IDEA claim not through § 1983, as their complaint alleges, but through the express cause of action contained in Part C of the IDEA (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1439(a)(1)). Plaintiffs concede that IDEA's express cause of action requires parties to exhaust their administrative remedies. They urge us, however, to reverse the district court's dismissal; reinstate their IDEA cause of action; and allow Defendants to argue exhaustion as an affirmative defense on remand. See Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) (holding that IDEA's exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and must be raised as an affirmative defense). This course of action would be inappropriate. The district court correctly applied the law to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim and had no opportunity to decide whether Plaintiffs could proceed under IDEA's express cause of action. We thus affirm the district court's dismissal of Count Ten. If, on remand, Plaintiffs wish to pursue a claim under IDEA's express cause of action, they can seek leave to amend their complaint.