Opinion ID: 1232435
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Purpose and Policy Behind the Uniform Act

Text: In considering whether to give the Uniform Act a broad or narrow construction, we note that the Act's definitional section provides that the term state includes any territory of the United States. A.R.S. § 13-4091(2). A term whose statutory definition declares what it includes is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than one whose definition declares what the term means. The word includes is most often a term of enlargement, rather than limitation, and a court may find that it encompasses items that were not specifically enumerated. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 133 (4th ed. 1984 Rev.). In addition, Arizona's Uniform Act is included within A.R.S. Title 13, the criminal code. The rules of construction for provisions within Title 13 are set forth at § 13-104, which provides: The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this title, but the provisions herein must be construed according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in § 13-101. See State v. Tramble, 144 Ariz. 48, 51, 695 P.2d 737, 740 (1985) (rule of strict construction followed by other state courts in interpreting penal statutes is not consistent with Arizona's legislative policy). We note also the public policy set forth by our legislature at the beginning of the chapter containing the Uniform Act. A.R.S. § 13-101 reads in relevant part: It is declared that the public policy of this state and the general purposes of the provisions of this title are: 1. To proscribe conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests; ...       6. To impose just and deserved punishment on those whose conduct threatens the public peace. This language indicates that Arizona's public policy supports interpreting the statutes within Title 13 in a manner that will further effective criminal prosecution. This is also an underlying purpose of the Uniform Act, which requires reciprocal cooperation among jurisdictions for the enforcement of witness attendance orders. See Vannier v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.3d 163, 172, 650 P.2d 302, 306, 185 Cal. Rptr. 427, 431 (1982); Ortez v. State, 165 Ind. App. 678, 333 N.E.2d 838, 846 (1975). In New York v. O'Neill, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Uniform Act, noting that it was designed to solve the practical problems created by the constitutional division of powers, and that the `policy and necessity ... to preserve harmony between States, and order and law within their respective borders' motivated the states to adopt the Uniform Act. 359 U.S. 1, 5-6, 79 S.Ct. 564, 568, 3 L.Ed.2d 585 (1959) (citation omitted). The Court further stated: The primary purpose of this Act is not eleemosynary. It serves a self-protective function for each of the enacting States.... Today forty-two States and Puerto Rico[ [11] ] may facilitate criminal proceedings, otherwise impeded by the unavailability of material witnesses, by utilizing the machinery of this reciprocal legislation to obtain such witnesses from without their boundaries. This is not a merely altruistic, disinterested enactment. Id. at 9, 79 S.Ct. at 570; accord In re Saperstein, 104 A.2d at 846 (New Jersey's Uniform Act was enacted in aid of comity between states to assist the orderly and effectual administration of justice and prosecution of criminal conduct). In light of the articulated purposes behind the Uniform Act, we must next examine the jurisdictional nature of Indian tribes to determine whether the Uniform Act's purposes will be served by interpreting territory to include the Navajo Nation.