Opinion ID: 468585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Winship, Mullaney and Patterson

Text: 12 White argues that under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and its progeny, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), Ohio's allocation of the burden of proving self-defense is unconstitutional. Winship recognized the broad principle that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072. 13 The Supreme Court elaborated on this issue process requirement in Mullaney. At issue in Mullaney was a Maine rule which required a defendant charged with murder to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce the charge to manslaughter. The defendant in Mullaney was charged with murder, which the Maine statute defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. at 1883 n. 3. The trial court instructed that if the prosecution established the killing was intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id. at 686, 95 S.Ct. at 1883. The trial court emphasized that heat of passion was inconsistent with malice aforethought and accordingly proof of heat of passion negated the element of malice aforethought. Id. at 686-87, 95 S.Ct. at 1883. The Supreme Court held that the Maine presumption unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of proving an essential element of the crime of murder in violation of the Winship rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of a crime. Accordingly, Mullaney stands for the proposition that the Due Process Clause prohibits a state from requiring an accused to disprove an element of the crime charged which the state has presumed to exist. 7 14 The Supreme Court further addressed the principle of Winship in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). In Patterson, the Court considered a New York law requiring an accused charged with second-degree murder to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence to reduce the murder charge to manslaughter. In determining whether the statute was constitutional, the Court utilized a two-step analysis. It first determined the elements which constituted the offense of murder. As defined by New York's statute, the elements the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt were death, intent to kill, and causation. Id. at 205, 97 S.Ct. at 2324. The Court then considered whether the affirmative defense of acting under extreme emotional disturbance negated any of these elements. The Court concluded that it did not, stating that the defense does not serve to negative any of the facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder. Id. at 207, 97 S.Ct. at 2325. Since the defense bore no direct relationship to any element of murder, the Court held the New York statute did not violate the Due Process Clause by shifting to defendants the burden of disproving any fact essential to the crime charged. Id. at 201, 97 S.Ct. at 2322. 15 In addition to this holding, the Court discussed, generally, allocating the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Based on notions of legislative flexibility, the Court 16 decline[d] to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative country wide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defense related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interest against those of the accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this case. 17 Id. at 210, 97 S.Ct. at 2327 (emphasis added). With respect to the growing number of states assuming the burden of disproving affirmative defenses, the Court importantly observed: 18 Nor does the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses--for whatever reason--mean that those States that strike a different balance are in violation of the Constitution. 19 Id. at 211, 97 S.Ct. at 2327 (footnote omitted). While this observation does not dictate that the Ohio law which places the burden of proving self-defense on the accused is constitutional, it certainly indicates that the choice made by Ohio's legislature is not unconstitutional simply because self-defense is an affirmative defense. 20 In sum, these Supreme Court cases provide the principles from which we must structure our analysis. We must examine whether Ohio, by requiring White to prove her defense of self-defense, unconstitutionally avoided its obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of murder. This determination turns on whether Ohio shifted to White the burden of disproving an element of murder which Ohio presumed existed. The proper approach to resolving this question, as dictated by Patterson, is first to determine the elements of murder, and second to determine whether the defense of self-defense necessarily negates any of those elements. 8 21 The first step under Patterson is to determine the elements of the crime of murder, the crime of which White was convicted. Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2903.02(A) 9 provides: 22 No person shall purposely cause the death of another. 23 As succinctly indicated by the statutory language, this crime has two elements: (1) purposely; and (2) cause the death of another. State v. Muscatello, 57 Ohio App.2d 231, 247, 387 N.E.2d 627 (1977), aff'd, 55 Ohio St.2d 201, 378 N.E.2d 778 (1978); State v. Davis, 8 Ohio App.3d 205, 209, 456 N.E.2d 1256 (1982) (The elements of murder ... are expressly delineated in R.C. 2903.02.). Purposely, the intent element of the crime of murder, is defined by Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2901.22(A) which provides: 24 A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature. 25 As defined by statute, then, the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused specifically intended to cause the death of another, and (2) that death actually occurred. These are the only facts or elements the statute expressly requires the prosecution to establish in order to convict an accused of murder. 26 Having determined the elements of murder as defined by statute, we next turn to the second inquiry in the Patterson analysis, whether self-defense negates either of the elements. We conclude that it does not. The defense has been described as being in the nature of a confession and avoidance, by which a defendant essentially admits the existence of facts which tend to establish the elements of the crime. Davis, 8 Ohio App.3d at 209, 456 N.E.2d 1256. When a defendant asserts the defense of self-defense in a murder trial, the defendant does not dispute or negate the elements of purposely or cause the death of another. Rather, the defendant solely seeks to establish the elements of self-defense, which are unrelated to the elements of murder. See Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1139 (6th Cir.1980) (en banc ) (Lively, J., dissenting), rev'd, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (The defense of self-defense admits the facts claimed by the prosecution to establish an offense but relies on the existence of a separate set of facts or circumstances which the law recognizes as an excuse. When established, this excuse exempts the defendant from liability.). The elements which must be shown to establish self-defense are (1) the slayer was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, ... (2) the slayer has a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force, ... and (3) the slayer must not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 79-80, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979). Since the defense of self-defense does not negate either of the statutory elements of murder, it appears that Ohio did not violate the Due Process Clause by requiring White, pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2901.05(A), to prove her defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 27 White argues, however, that the crime of murder includes more than these two elements. White sets forth five additional elements which she argues must be established by the prosecution to convict a defendant of murder. White further claims that self-defense necessarily negates these elements and therefore concludes, in light of Patterson, that the prosecution must bear the burden of disproving self-defense in order to satisfy the due process requirement that it prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The elements asserted by White are: (1) criminal conduct; (2) criminal intent; (3) a voluntary act; (4) unlawfulness; and (5) a requirement that the crime be against the Peace and Dignity of the State of Ohio. Based upon prior decisions of this court, we conclude that none of these elements are elements of the crime of murder and therefore self-defense does not negate any of these elements. 28 White argues that criminal conduct is an element of murder and that the defense of self-defense negates this element since it establishes that the conduct was non-criminal in nature. We rejected the same argument with respect to the crime of aggravated assault in Thomas v. Arn, 704 F.2d 865, 875 (6th Cir.1983). Even though the crime at issue in Thomas was aggravated assault, Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2903.12, 11 that case is completely applicable here. White contends that the five additional elements, including criminal conduct, are elements of all Ohio crimes. Since we have already decided that criminal conduct is not an element of aggravated assault, we must also conclude that it is not an element of murder. Accordingly, we reject White's argument to the contrary. 29 White next argues that self-defense negates the element of criminal intent. White asserts that this element, a blameworthy or guilty state of mind, must be established under Ohio criminal law in order for an act to be criminally punishable. We addressed this same argument and the same asserted case authority 12 in Thomas. As we observed in Thomas, the guilty and blameworthy states of mind required to convict an accused are specified in Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2901.22, which defines the mental elements of purposely, knowingly, recklessly and negligently. Thomas, 704 F.2d at 876 n. 14. By these specific definitions, the Ohio Legislature has supplanted the common law notions of mens rea. Id. Thus, in each crime in Ohio the requisite criminal intent is expressly provided and is not merely a general element of blameworthiness. The criminal intent element of murder is purposely, and, as we stated previously, proving self-defense does not negate this element. See id. (Although a person claiming to have acted in self-defense may not literally have a 'guilty' or 'blameworthy' state of mind, he may very well have knowledge of the probable results of his actions, and this mental state is sufficient to convict for aggravated assault.). 30 White next argues that voluntariness is an element of murder which is negated by self-defense. White observes that Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2901.21 imposes the requirement that an act be voluntary in order to impose criminal liability. 13 White contends that an act of self-defense is more of a reflex action than a voluntary one, citing State v. Hardy, 60 Ohio App.2d 325, 329, 397 N.E.2d 773 (1978), and therefore concludes that self-defense negates the voluntary act element of murder. We rejected the same argument, which was based on the same case authority, in Thomas. As we observed in Thomas, Ohio defines what constitutes a voluntary act by stating which acts are involuntary. Section 2901.21(C) provides that [r]eflexes, convulsions, body movements during unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not otherwise a product of the actors volition, are involuntary acts. In light of these examples of involuntary acts, we conclude, as we did in Thomas, that an act in self-defense is not an involuntary act and therefore does not negate the voluntary act requirement. Thomas, 704 F.2d at 876. 31 White next argues that self-defense negates the Ohio constitutional requirement that all indictments allege that the acts complained of were against the Peace and Dignity of the State of Ohio. Ohio Const. art. IV, Sec. 20. White contends that an act in self-defense is not illegal and therefore cannot be against the peace and dignity of the State. White cites no cases which support the proposition that this is an element of every crime which must be established by the prosecution, however, and accordingly we reject this argument as we did in Thomas. 704 F.2d at 876 n. 15. 32 White lastly argues that unlawfulness is an element of all Ohio crimes and that self-defense negates this element. This argument, and the cases which purportedly support it, has been rejected repeatedly. See Carter, 637 F.2d at 456 n. 6; Thomas, 704 F.2d at 876-77; State v. Morris, 8 Ohio App.3d 12, 18-19, 455 N.E.2d 1352 (1982). The Ohio appellate court in Morris explained its decision thusly: 33 Once the prosecution has proven each element of felonious assault, the prosecution has proven the unlawfulness of defendant's acts. When the accused asserts an affirmative defense as a justification for an otherwise unlawful act, the burden of proving that justification can be constitutionally assigned to the accused .... A contrary ruling would mean that the state is constitutionally required to disprove every affirmative defense, since every defense is a justification for the conduct involved which causes that conduct to be lawful. 34 8 Ohio App.3d at 18-19, 455 N.E.2d 1352 (citations omitted). We find this reasoning persuasive and conclude that unlawfulness is not an element of murder in Ohio and therefore self-defense does not negate unlawfulness. 14 35 Having found all of White's arguments in support of additional elements of murder to be unpersuasive, we are left with the conclusion that the crime of murder consists only of two elements: (1) purposely; and (2) cause the death of another. These elements are not negated by the affirmative defense of self-defense. An affirmative defense under Ohio law is either: 36 (1) A defense expressly designated as affirmative; [or] 37 (2) A defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence. 38 Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2901.05(C). This definition indicates that an affirmative defense does not negate an element of a crime; rather, it indicates that an affirmative defense excuses punishment for a crime the elements of which have been established and admitted. See Thomas, 704 F.2d at 877. No elements of murder are presumed under Ohio law, so the principles of Mullaney have not been violated. Nor have the principles of Patterson been violated, since neither of the elements of murder are negated by the defense of self-defense. Accordingly, we hold that placing the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence upon White did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.