Opinion ID: 2427047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of pretrial statement

Text: Statements given by accused persons who are in police custody are presumed to be involuntarily given; thus, the burden is on the State to prove voluntariness. As a part of overcoming that burden, the State must produce at a Denno hearing all of the persons who were witnesses to the taking of the statement or explain their absence. When the necessary witnesses are not produced, and no satisfactory explanation of their absence is forthcoming, we hold that evidence of the accused that his statement was involuntarily given stands uncontradicted. Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570, 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975). In our earlier decision in this case, we held that the Trial Court erred in admitting Mr. Foreman's pretrial statement to the police because the State failed to produce a material witness at the Denno hearing held before the first trial and thereby failed to sustain its burden of proof as to the voluntariness of the statement. We reversed and remanded. Our mandate provided that the case was to be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings to be therein had according to law, and not inconsistent with the opinion herein delivered. Over Mr. Foreman's objections, the prosecutor presented the testimony of the material witness at another Denno hearing held prior to the second trial. The officer denied abusing Mr. Foreman and testified that Mr. Foreman's statement had not been coerced and was voluntary. The statement was later admitted into evidence over Mr. Foreman's objection. Mr. Foreman argues that the statement was admitted in the second trial in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine. According to Mr. Foreman, our holding that the State did not prove the voluntariness of the statement on account of its failure to produce a necessary witness was in essence a finding that the statement was involuntarily given and therefore inadmissible. He asserts that, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the Trial Court in the second trial was required by this finding to suppress the statement. The question here is whether our previous holding that the State failed to sustain its burden of proof was the law of the case that barred the Trial Court from considering the voluntariness issue in a second Denno hearing and admitting the statement. In at least three cases in which we have reversed and remanded because of the State's failure to produce a witness to an accused's statement, we havealbeit without discussing the law-of-the-case doctrineeither directed that a second Denno hearing should occur or indicated that one could occur. See Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258, 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996); Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887, (1982)(Supp. Op. on Denial of Rehearing)(1983); Smith v. State, 256 Ark. 67, 505 S.W.2d 504 (1974). In the case now before us, we did neither. The law-of-the-case doctrine consists of a set of distinct rules that have developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. 18 WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4478, at p. 788 (1981). The particular rule at issue here provides that inferior tribunals are bound to honor the mandate of superior courts within a single judicial system. Id. at p. 792. As we have said, [t]he law of the case doctrine would preclude a trial court on remand ... from reconsidering earlier decisions made in the case before it. Christian v. State, 318 Ark. 813, 819, 889 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1994). See also People v. Feagans, 134 Ill.App.3d 252, 89 Ill.Dec. 267, 271, 480 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1985)(stating the trial court is bound by the appellate court's resolution of the issues decided on appeal and must proceed in a manner consistent with the reviewing court's directions). See generally Brett T. Parks, McDonald's Corp. v. Hawkins and The Law of the Case Doctrine in Arkansas, 50 ARK. L. REV. 127 (1997). The doctrine precludes the trial court on remand from considering and deciding questions that were explicitly or implicitly determined on appeal. As the commentators have observed, questions that have not been decided do not become law of the case merely because they could have been decided; at the same time, law of the case principles are applied when a court concludes that an issue was resolved implicitly despite the lack of any explicit statement. WRIGHT, supra, at p. 798. We must reject Mr. Foreman's argument because it is clear that we did not determine in Foreman I that his custodial statement was involuntary or inadmissible. We made no pronouncement in Foreman I with respect to the voluntariness of the statement. Rather, we held only that the State failed to carry its burden of proving the statement was voluntarily given, and that the statement therefore should not have been admitted at trial. Our mandate permitted the Trial Court to conduct further proceedings consistent with our opinion in Foreman I, and the decision to hold a second Denno hearing was in accordance with our mandate. An Illinois court of appeals dealt with the issue and held that an appellate decision that a conviction must be reversed because of the prosecution's failure to produce or explain the absence of a witness at a Denno hearing merely rendered the record insufficient to determine the propriety of the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress a defendant's confession. People v. Feagans, 89 Ill.Dec. 267, 480 N.E.2d at 158. Unlike the situation in which the State has done its best, but the overall proof was insufficient to go to the jury, this is an instance of trial error. Had the Trial Court held the statement inadmissible in the absence of the missing witness, the State might well have produced the witness as it ultimately did in the second attempt. There is, of course, no opportunity for a second attempt when a court has directed a verdict of acquittal due to the failure to produce sufficient evidence to go to the jury. A second trial in that instance would violate the prohibition against former jeopardy. Williams v. State, 328 Ark. 487, 944 S.W.2d 822 (1997); Foster v. State, 290 Ark. 495, 722 S.W.2d 869 (Supp. Op. on Denial of Rehearing) (1987). This situation is fundamentally different. We adopt the Illinois Court's rationale and hold that the law-of-the-case doctrine is not a bar to producing the witness at the second Denno hearing.