Opinion ID: 1964676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reviewing the Gulf Oil Factors

Text: Two categories of factors are considered in forum non conveniens cases, the private interests of the litigants, and the public interest of the forum. See Coulibaly, 728 A.2d at 599 (citing Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839). Factors relevant to the private interests of the litigants are: 1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; 2) the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; 3) the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; 4) the possibility of viewing premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; 5) all other practical problems concerning the ease, expedition and expense of the trial; 6) the enforceability of a judgment once obtained; 7) evidence that the plaintiff attempted to vex, harass or oppress the defendant by his choice of forum, and 8) the relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. Id. at 600 (quoting Mills, 511 A.2d at 10); accord Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839. The public interest factors are: 1) administrative difficulties caused by local court dockets congested with foreign litigation; 2) the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; 3) the unfairness of imposing the burden of jury duty on the citizens of a forum having no relation to the litigation, and 4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws and in the interpretation of the laws of another jurisdiction. Coulibaly, 728 A.2d at 601 (quoting Mills, 511 A.2d at 10). The trial court was required to review each of the applicable Gulf Oil factors and to balance the private and public interests in its analysis. See Coulibaly, 728 A.2d at 604 (citing Mills, 511 A.2d at 12). In reviewing the trial court's order, we look to the factors considered to determine whether it failed to consider a relevant factor, relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion. Id. at 603. In plaintiff's opposition, relied upon by the trial court, appellee discussed only three of the Gulf Oil factors. First, that plaintiff's residence in the District is a private factor that is a formidable hurdle to dismissal. Second, that D.C. law would apply to the case, and, third, that the fact that plaintiff first filed a wrongful death suit in Maryland is not relevant since she could not have filed it in the District of Columbia at the time. Consideration of only these factors does not comprise a complete Gulf Oil analysis, and a remand ordinarily would be proper to permit the trial court's exercise of discretion based on all relevant factors. However, in previous cases where the trial court conducted an incomplete or partially erroneous analysis, we have noted that this court may conduct the analysis based on the facts of record if there is but one permissible conclusion. See Coulibaly, 728 A.2d at 605. In this case, we have sufficient clear facts on the record to follow the same procedure. We review first the private and then the public Gulf Oil factors. Most of the private Gulf Oil factors can be summarized as dealing with the practicalities of trial in the chosen jurisdiction, e.g., whether the court will have available to it the evidence and witnesses necessary to try the case. The parties and the events in this case are all located within a few miles of the District, so there is not any imbalance of convenience to either party which would decide the issue. The fact witnesses to the alleged negligence work in Silver Spring, Maryland, within the subpoena power of the Superior Court, should it be necessary to compel their testimony. Both defendants do business in the District. There are no allegations that a judgment obtained in the District would not be enforceable against defendants, nor is there any allegation that the plaintiff attempted to vex, harass, or oppress the defendants by her choice of forum. Where the plaintiff's choice of forum is between the District of Columbia and one of the counties in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, as here, the public interest factors predominate for the obvious reason that the relative ease or difficulty in getting to a D.C. court and a metropolitan court outside D.C. is usually the same. As the Carr court explained: [T]he inconvenience to the parties and witnesses of long distance travel  the factor regarded as of major importance by federal circuits in other jurisdictions, is not the only ground for dismissing an action in the Superior Court. As the county seats in such adjacent areas as Arlington and Fairfax, Virginia, or Montgomery and Prince George's, Maryland, are all within a 20 mile radius of the District, travel problems pale into insignificance as compared to such factors as the public interest in reducing the volume of difficult cases on court calendars already overcrowded. Id. at 1092 (quoting Frost v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 327 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C.1974)). Thus, we turn to consider the public interest factors. The first public interest factor concerns potential administrative difficulties caused by local court dockets congested with foreign litigation. While this is a legitimate problem for the District as with most urban courts, this litigation cannot fairly be characterized as foreign due to the decedent's domicile in the District. The second public factor, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, should be considered in the context of significant integration of the city of Washington with its neighboring counties. It is not atypical for a resident of the District to seek health care services across the state line in Maryland, and vice versa. Appellants argue that their liability is the  sole issue in this case and that the interest of the state of Maryland in deciding an action involving the liability of its health care practitioners in treating patients in Maryland is far greater than any tie with the District. That argument is incorrect, however, because this controversy cannot be construed as a conflict involving only Maryland litigants. Where the decedent was domiciled in the District and died at D.C. General Hospital from complications alleged to have been caused by appellants' negligent care in Maryland, the District of Columbia, no less than the state of Maryland, has a significant interest in how resident corporations conduct business, especially where, as here, defendants also provide similar medical care in the District and the health and safety of a domiciliary are at issue. As the controversy is affected with D.C. as well as Maryland interests, we must evaluate the contacts with the two jurisdictions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maryland's interest is embodied in its law favoring preliminary arbitration in malpractice claims against health care practitioners. [5] Maryland's interest in resolving the underlying claim through arbitration is unlikely to have been satisfied, however, in light of the fact that the personal representative had a court action for wrongful death pending against appellants in Maryland. [6] Moreover, to the extent Maryland has an overriding policy interest in the litigation, which is different from the District, conflict of law analysis can resolve the issue. Appellee argued in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that D.C. law should apply, and appellant argued that Maryland law is applicable. We review questions of choice of law de novo. See District of Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C.1995); Atkins v. Industrial Telecomm. Ass'n., 660 A.2d 885, 888 (D.C. 1995). Although the trial court generally adopted appellee's position, it did not specifically rule that District of Columbia law would apply to this case. We decline to decide the matter now because even if this case is tried in the District and, under our choice of law rules, Maryland law were found to apply, [o]ur courts are not unfamiliar with applying the laws of other jurisdictions, especially Maryland upon whose common law our common law is based, and therefore it may not be inappropriate to require them to do so. Jimmerson, 663 A.2d at 544 (footnote omitted). Finally, we consider the unfairness of imposing the burden of jury duty on the citizens of a forum having no relation to the litigation. [7] It is easily decided in favor of appellee, as the plaintiff was a domiciliary of the District of Columbia, and the defendants are present and doing business in D.C. Thus, it is not unreasonable to impose jury service on District citizens to decide this case. See Jimmerson, 663 A.2d at 547. It bears repeating that the ultimate question in a forum non conveniens analysis is not whether the District is the best forum, but whether the District has so little to do with this case that its courts should decline to hear it. Jimmerson, 663 A.2d at 543 (quoting Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C.1987)). Although some of the facts in this case have significant contacts with Maryland, they do not so outweigh those with the District that we must decline to hear the case.