Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 38

Heading: Samuel Erazo (1A)

Text: On July 20, 1986, Samuel Erazo stabbed his wife to death after an evening of drinking and quarreling. Erazo and the victim were married when he was incarcerated at Rahway State Prison for killing the daughter of the woman with whom he had been living in 1974. On the night of the murder, Erazo and his wife were both intoxicated; the victim's blood alcohol level was found to be .195. At some point that evening, Erazo drove some friends home and his wife went out for a walk. When she returned home sometime after midnight, Erazo stabbed her eight times. The State theorized that Erazo's wife had purposefully cut her hand during her walk and then threatened to call the police to tell them that Erazo had inflicted the wound and thereby violated his parole. Erazo maintained that he killed his wife in the heat of passion. Erazo was charged with capital murder. At the penalty phase, Erazo offered testimony from his sister, and from a corrections officer who said that he was a model inmate. In addition, he offered into evidence a letter he had written in which he said that he had proven capable of leading a useful and productive life in prison. While previously imprisoned, Erazo acquired a GED, took vocational courses, completed a three-year correspondence course, and received recognition for his work on a toy drive for underprivileged children and on the prison representative committee. The jury found the c(4)(a) (prior murder) and c(4)(c) (extreme suffering/torture) aggravating factors as well as the c(5)(a) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance), c(5)(b) (victim participated in offense), c(5)(d) (intoxication), and c(5)(e) (duress) mitigating factors. The jury found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced defendant to death. On appeal, the Court reversed defendant's conviction and death sentence based on improper jury instructions at the guilt phase. State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991). The Court also held that the c(4)(c) factor could not be considered on remand. Id. at 137-39, 594 A. 2d 232.