Opinion ID: 2140559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: alleged hearsay statements of a. donald fishbein

Text: Defendant argues that this court should order a new trial because damaging hearsay testimony was introduced by A. Donald Fishbein, attorney for Allied Die Casting Corporation. The allegedly objectionable testimony concerned a meeting of the board of directors on September 4, 1980. Fishbein attempted to describe what M.J. Albanese had said at that meeting, and an objection was raised by the defense attorney. The following statement was made by the trial judge during the course of the sidebar conference: I think  you have got a conference here and I think the State is entitled to at least elicit from Mr. Fishbein the fact that M.J. was the one who wanted this change    what the change was. Without getting into his conversations as to  as to things in the company. But that isn't going to stop Mr. Fishbein, Mr. Fishbein is subject to your cross-examination and anything he said can come in. The attorneys continued to argue about the pending objection until they reached the following compromise: MR. FLORO [State's Attorney]: Let me ask Mr. Kelly something, Your Honor. Dick, if you don't feel that I can get in M.J.'s conversation, would you object to my leading Fishbein to some extent away from it? MR. KELLY [Defense Counsel]: No. MR. FLORO: In simply saying  MR. KELLY: No. I think he's intelligently  I think he's intelligent enough to know where you are going to go  MR. FLORO: I'll just ask him  MR. KELLY:  without telling the exact substance of the conversation. MR. FLORO: I'll simply ask him was there  who instigated this meeting, how did it come about, M.J. wanted it. Without going into specific conversations, what was the purpose of the meeting? All right? MR. KELLY: All right. MR. FLORO: Conversation regarding the internal structure, he was unhappy with Charles. All right. Do you remember the conversation you had and  with Chuck and what Chuck had to say? All Right. What did Chuck have to say: He didn't understand what was going on, he asked his father what do you want. And did you have a conversation with Chuck? All right? I'll lead him not completely out of it, but I'll lead him away from the specific conversation. MR. KELLY: That would appear to cure any error. When the trial was resumed in the presence of the jury, the judge sustained the objection as to M.J.'s conversation but overruled it concerning everything else. Mr. Fishbein resumed his testimony, and the following statement became part of the record without an objection from the defense attorney: After M.J. Albanese had made a rather lengthy presentation to Chuck, Chuck said to M.J., what are you trying to say, Dad? At which point I interjected, and in effect clarified and somewhat amplified what M.J. had said. I explained to Chuck that in effect, Chuck, your dad is telling you that he is very unhappy with the arguing between you and he, he is very unhappy with your criticism of him, he doesn't want you to work in the plant anymore, he doesn't want you to be under the same roof with him, he doesn't want you to be an employee anymore of the corporation. That doesn't mean you can't be a shareholder or president or director because he has no power to do that, but he is taking this action as Chairman of the Board of Directors to terminate your employment and terminate your compensation from the corporation as an executive employee. No objection was raised to this testimony, and alleged errors at trial not preserved by objection are normally waived for purpose of appeal ( People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 575-76), but we will consider the merits of this issue because of the magnitude of a death penalty case. We note first that to qualify as hearsay, the evidence must be offered for the truth of the matter asserted, rather than for some other purpose. ( People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill.2d 116, 121; 6 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 1766 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976).) In the case at bar, whether M.J. intended to fire Charles or not is of peripheral importance; the important factor is the state of mind of the defendant. We agree with the State's contention that Fishbein's testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but for a nonhearsay purpose (see E. Cleary & M. Graham, Illinois Evidence sec. 801.1 (3d ed. 1979)). We next consider defendant's contention that Fishbein's testimony concerning his own out-of-court statements constituted reversible error. First, Fishbein's out-of-court statements closely parallel the statements made by M.J. that we have held to be admissible to demonstrate Charles Albanese's state of mind rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. Second, Fishbein's description of the new composition of the board of directors was independently corroborated by an exhibit admitted into evidence at trial. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in permitting Fishbein to testify concerning the events at the September 4, 1980, meeting. People v. Collins (1971), 49 Ill.2d 179, does not support defendant's theory on this issue. Collins states that prior, out-of-court, contradictory statements are admissible as substantive evidence only for impeachment purposes. (49 Ill.2d 179, 197-98.) We are not faced with this question in the case at bar. Fishbein's testimony in court is consistent with the statements made at the September 4, 1980, meeting. Furthermore, we have held that the purpose of the offered of Fishbein's out-of-court statements was to establish Charles' state of mind. The statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.