Opinion ID: 597141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Taped Conversations

Text: 13 On appeal, Pontillo principally contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the procedures authorizing the TNP to conduct the electronic surveillance fell short of Fourth Amendment standards. Pontillo's claim is premised on the notion that the TNP was acting either as an agent of the United States when it conducted the wiretap, or was involved in a joint venture with the DEA to a degree which mandates adherence to constitutional protections for the conduct of wiretap surveillance. 14 When conducted in this country, wiretaps by federal officials are largely governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, which does not apply outside the United States. See Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2862, 61 L.Ed.2d 299 (1979). Pontillo therefore challenges the propriety of the TNP wiretaps on the basis of the Fourth Amendment doctrine relating to the participation of United States officials in foreign investigations. Thus we look to our relevant Fourth Amendment precedents, involving both wiretap and nonwiretap situations. 15 At the outset, we note that wiretap evidence may be admissible when foreign officials, acting on their own to enforce foreign law, properly follow their own law in obtaining the evidence, see e.g., United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711-712 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906, 96 S.Ct. 2226, 48 L.Ed.2d 830 (1976), even where the subject of the foreign search is an American citizen. See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1602, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977). 16 As Pontillo correctly notes, however, this Court has recognized two circumstances where evidence obtained in a foreign jurisdiction may be excluded. First, where the conduct of foreign officials in acquiring the evidence is  'so extreme that they shock the judicial conscience' a federal court in the exercise of its supervisory powers can require exclusion of the evidence so seized. Stowe, 588 F.2d at 341. Second, where cooperation with foreign law enforcement officials may implicate constitutional restrictions, evidence obtained by foreign officials may be excluded. United States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S.Ct. 1197, 84 L.Ed.2d 342 (1985). Pontillo concedes that the conduct of the TNP was not so extreme as to shock this Court's conscience, and, therefore, relies on the latter category. 17 Within the second category for excluding evidence, constitutional requirements may attach in two situations: (1) where the conduct of foreign law enforcement officials rendered them agents, or virtual agents, of United States law enforcement officials, see United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 23 n. 7 (2d Cir.1978); or (2) where the cooperation between the United States and foreign law enforcement agencies is designed to evade constitutional requirements applicable to American officials. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 69 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 133, 134, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983). 18 Here the district court made a finding that the TNP was not acting as an agent of the DEA in initiating the wiretaps. This finding is examined under the clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 769 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193, 105 S.Ct. 969, 83 L.Ed.2d 973 (1985). Pontillo contends that several factors compel the conclusion that the TNP was acting as an agent for the DEA. First, the TNP commenced the wiretap surveillance soon after the DEA requested the background information on the Turkish telephone numbers. Second, prior to this request, the TNP had never wiretapped these phones, even though it was purportedly investigating these numbers. Third, Pontillo asserts that the DEA tacitly requested a wiretap. Finally, Pontillo contends that the claim that the TNP was conducting an independent investigation is merely a pretext concocted to avoid constitutional restrictions. This final claim is bolstered by the government's concession that any evidence obtained from the wiretaps would be inadmissible in a Turkish court, and the fact that the TNP never acted on the information it obtained. 19 Conversely, several factors strongly militate against a finding of agency. Perhaps most significantly, the TNP sought the assistance of DEA agents in translating English conversations that were intercepted. Logically, such activity would be unnecessary if the TNP did not plan to use the information in furtherance of its own independent investigation. In addition, there is no evidence that the DEA was, in any way, involved in the decision to seek a wiretap. At most the evidence shows that the DEA requested background information on the Turkish telephone numbers, with the hope that the TNP would wiretap the numbers. Furthermore, the fact that the TNP did not initiate the wiretap until the DEA gave them the numbers demonstrates only that the TNP was unaware that these individuals were using their phones to traffick narcotics. In light of the evidence presented, we can not hold that the district court's conclusions were clearly erroneous. Indeed, as this Court has noted, [t]he investigation of crime increasingly requires the cooperation of foreign and United States law enforcement officials, but there is no reason to think that Congress expected that such cooperation would constitute the foreign officials as agents of the United States. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d at 998 (discussing the Jencks Act). See also, United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F.Supp. 1253, 1260 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (holding that a foreign search prompted by information from U.S. officials does not trigger Fourth Amendment requirements), aff'd sub nom., United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.1987). 20 In attempting to circumvent the district court's finding that the TNP was not an agent of the DEA, Pontillo asserts that the DEA participated in the surveillance to such a degree that it made the endeavor a joint venture, subject to constitutional protections. This Court has not adopted the joint venture theory advanced by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.1987), and relied upon by Pontillo. Even were we to adopt this doctrine, the record readily reveals that the level of cooperation between the DEA and the TNP falls far short of the level needed to find the existence of a joint venture. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.) (holding that there was no joint venture where DEA agent was present and armed while defendant was interrogated in a foreign country), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 2993, 64 L.Ed.2d 858 (1980). In any event, it is clear that the TNP's wiretapping of phones in Turkey was prompted not by a desire to circumvent constitutional constraints, but by the logistical problem caused by Pontillo's random selection of pay phones. 21 In light of the abundant evidence in support of the district court's findings, its conclusion that the TNP was neither an agent of nor in a joint venture with the DEA was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, because the TNP acted of its own accord, we need not reach Pontillo's claims that the wiretap surveillance did not comport with Fourth Amendments standards and decline to do so.