Opinion ID: 209019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assignment of the '742 Patent

Text: The district court held that the Assignment unambiguously transferred ownership of all continuations-in-part of the '553 patent to Vector, including the '742 patent, even though the '742 patent had already issued. Specifically, the district court relied on the language of the Assignment assigning Issued U.S. Patent 6,033,553 along with any and all ... continuations in part together with the entire right, title and interest in and to said applications, any and to all divisional applications, continuations, and continuations in part thereof... and any and all Letters Patent which may issue or be reissued for said invention.... Euclid, slip op. at 6. According to the district court, the said invention referred to in the Assignment is the invention of the '553 patent, and the '742 patent is unambiguously a continuation-in-part of that patent. Id. Euclid argues on appeal that the contract is, at best, ambiguous as to whether already issued patents are encompassed in the assignment. This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.  Israel Bio-Engineering Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1263 (Fed.Cir. 2007). Construction of patent assignment agreements is a matter of state contract law. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2008). Under Ohio law: When confronted with an issue of contractual interpretation, the role of a court is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement. We examine the [contract] as a whole and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language used in the [contract]. We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the [contract] unless another meaning is clearly apparent from the contents of the [contract]. When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties. As a matter of law, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal meaning. On the other hand, where a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent.... Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (2003) (citations omitted and emphases added). Put another way, [a]mbiguity exists only where a term cannot be determined from the four corners of the agreement or where contract language is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Potti v. Duramed Pharms., Inc., 938 F.2d 641, 647 (6th Cir.1991) (citing Wells v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 48 Ohio App.3d 95, 548 N.E.2d 995 (1988)). We disagree with the district court that the Assignment unambiguously transferred ownership of the '742 patent to Vector. The district court was correct that the language of the Assignment purports to convey US Patent 6,033,553 and any and all divisional applications, continuations, and continuations in part. Euclid, slip op. at 4. The district court was also correct that the '742 patent is a continuation-in-part of the '553 patent, as the Related U.S. Application Data on the face of the '742 patent makes clear. Id. at 6; see also '742 patent at [63]. The Assignment, however, also includes language that suggests that it was not intended to effect an assignment of the '742 patent. In particular, the Assignment specifically assigns all interest in and to the inventor's US, Canadian, and European applications for patents and issued U.S. patent. Notably, this language refers to applicationspluralbut issued U.S. patentsingular. Had the assignee intended, through the assignment of continuations in part to assign other issued U.S. patents, it would be expected that the Assignment would have said that the inventor was assigning his issued U.S. patents pluraland even recited the patent number of the issued '742 patent. At bottom, we cannot give the Assignment a definite legal meaning. Westfield, 797 N.E.2d at 1261. Under one reasonable interpretation, the Assignment includes the '742 patent, because it issued from a continuation-in-part of the '553 patent. But under another reasonable interpretation, the Assignment excludes the '742 patent, because it was an already issued patent, not an application, at the time of the assignment. We therefore conclude that the Assignment is susceptible to at least two reasonable interpretations and is therefore ambiguous under Ohio law. See Potti, 938 F.2d at 647. Extrinsic evidence therefore should have been considered to ascertain the parties' intent. See Westfield, 797 N.E.2d at 1261. In its brief on appeal, Euclid argues that substantial extrinsic evidence supports its view that the Assignment did not include the '742 patent. Specifically, Euclid points to evidence concerning Vector's recording of the assignment of the '553 patent but not the '742 patent, the inventor's payment of maintenance fees and attempted licensing negotiations after the date of the Assignment, and the subsequent execution of a different assignment by the inventor. Vector, however, has not yet had the opportunity or the obligation to challenge Euclid's extrinsic evidence or to bring forward its own evidence of intent. We therefore remand to the district court to allow that court to determine in the first instanceeither through a subsequent motion for summary judgment, or at trial whether the Assignment, interpreted in light of relevant extrinsic evidence, transferred ownership of the '742 patent to Vector.