Opinion ID: 216172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Participation Claims

Text: Plaintiffs advance three arguments regarding their public participation claims: first, that a private right of action exists to sue for violations of the DOT's ongoing public participation regulation; second, that the district court erred in concluding that the public participation requirements did not apply to additional services; and third, that defendants violated § 37.137(c) by failing to create an adequate mechanism of public participation before eliminating the portions of the Able-Ride service not required by the ADA. As set forth below, we are not persuaded that a private right of action exists. Because this conclusion resolves the appeal, we need not reach the remaining arguments. [5] Our analysis is driven by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). In Sandoval, the Supreme Court addressed whether a private right of action existed to enforce a DOJ regulation promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 278, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Section 601 of Title VI barred recipients of federal funding from intentional invidious discrimination; section 602 authorized the DOJ to effectuate § 601 by promulgating regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1. One such regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2), went beyond intentional discrimination and prohibited recipients of federal funding from utilizing criteria which had a discriminatory effect. The plaintiffs, who were non-fluent English speakers, challenged an Alabama policy of administering driver's license examinations exclusively in English on the ground that the policy had a discriminatory effect on non-English speakers and, consequently, violated § 42.104(b)(2). The Court concluded that the regulation was not enforceable through a private right of action. It first noted that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress and the statute in question must evidence congressional intent to create a private right of action. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Absent such intent, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. Id. at 286-87, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Next, the Court observed that although it previously had held that Congress intended § 601 to be enforceable through a private right of action, that right did not automatically extend to the statute's implementing regulations. Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not. Id. at 291, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Concluding that § 601 prohibited only intentional discrimination, the Court held that the discriminatory effect regulation was not enforceable through private action under § 601 because the regulation did not simply apply § 601's prohibition on intentional discrimination but went further and prohibited conduct that § 601 did not. Id. at 285, 293, 121 S.Ct. 1511. In other words, the Court held that the private action available for enforcing § 601 did not extend to a regulation that substantively expanded the provision. The implications of Sandoval are clear: If a private right of action exists to enforce the DOT's public participation regulation, plaintiffs must show that the right originates in 42 U.S.C. § 12143, the underlying statute regulating paratransit services. Plaintiffs must also show that the regulation appliesbut does not expandthe statute. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed whether § 12143 supports a private right of action, it held in Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002), that Congress intended to create a private right of action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Title II's general anti-discrimination provision. See id. at 184-85, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (Thus, the remedies for violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with the remedies available in a private cause of action brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . .). In this Circuit, [t]o discover whether Congress intended that the Act be enforceable by a private right of action, we look to the `text and structure' of the statute. George v. N.Y.C. Dep't of City Planning, 436 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir.2006); see Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir.2002) (The Supreme Court has established that courts must look to the intent of Congress in determining whether a federal private right of action exists for violations of a federal statute.). As we have noted, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 broadly bars discrimination on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of a public entity. Section 12143 defines discrimination for purposes of section 12132 as follows: It shall be considered discrimination . . . for a public entity which operates a fixed route system (other than a system which provides solely commuter bus service) to fail to provide with respect to the operations of its fixed route system, in accordance with this section, paratransit and other special transportation services to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, that are sufficient to provide to such individuals a level of service (1) which is comparable to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system; or (2) in the case of response time, which is comparable, to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(a). By tying this subsection to the definition of discrimination in § 12132, we conclude that Congress intended the statute to confer a private right of action to enforce § 12143, including § 12143(c)(6)'s public participation requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(e) (defining a failure to provide public participation under subsection (c)(6) as discrimination under § 12143(a) of the ADA). Having found a private right of action under § 12143, we now must determine whether 49 C.F.R. § 37.137(c), the regulation promulgated pursuant to § 12143 that requires ongoing public participation in the management of paratransit services, enforces § 12143 or imposes obligations not found in the statute. [6] Looking first to the language of § 12143, we see that the statute requires public participation in connection with the development and submission of a public entity's initial paratransit plan and annual plan updates. But that is all § 12143 requires in terms of public participation; it does not require any other ongoing form of public participation. Section 12143 contains a single reference to public participation: The regulations issued under this section shall require that each public entity which operates a fixed route system hold a public hearing, provide an opportunity for public comment, and consult with individuals with disabilities in preparing its plan under paragraph (7). 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(6) (emphasis added). Paragraph (7) requires that public entities submit an initial plan for meeting the requirements of the ADA, see id. § 12143(c)(7)(A), and an annual update, see id. § 12143(c)(7)(B). Reading §§ 12143(c)(6) and 12143(c)(7) together, it is apparent that the statute's public participation requirements only apply when a public entity is submitting its initial plan or an annual plan update. But neither of these situations applies to the MTA. It is undisputed that the MTA had already developed, submitted, and implemented an ADA-compliant paratransit plan, and because the plan was ADA-compliant, the MTA was not obligated to submit an annual plan update. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.135(c)(1). Therefore, the MTA fully satisfied § 12143's public participation requirements. Turning to the regulation at issue, we find that it does not simply apply the express mandate of § 12143. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285, 121 S.Ct. 1511. To the contrary, by its own terms, the ongoing requirement of 49 C.F.R. § 37.137(c) has a broader application than the implementation of an initial plan or the submission of annual updates. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.137(c) (The entity shall create an ongoing mechanism for the participation of individuals with disabilities in the continued development and assessment of services to persons with disabilities. This includes, but is not limited to, the development of the initial plan, any request for an undue financial burden waiver, and each annual submission. (emphasis added)). Tellingly, a public entity may be in full compliance with § 12143's public participation requirements, while simultaneously violating § 37.137(c)'s ongoing public participation requirement. Although § 37.137(c) may create a procedural requirement that a public entity permit ongoing public participation in developing and assessing the paratransit services it offers to individuals with disabilities, the absence of such a requirement from § 12143 indicates that Congress did not provide that an entity's failure to do so constituted discrimination under § 12143. If this failure to permit public participation does not constitute discrimination under § 12143, § 37.137(c) may not, we hold, be enforced in a private right of action based on § 12143. [7]