Opinion ID: 30755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: On the evening of August 19, 1989, Robertson shot 19year-old Sean Hill, his friend and drug supplier, in the back of the head with a .38 caliber firearm. At the time of the murder, Hill was fishing behind his grandmother’s house in Dallas, Texas. Leaving his dead friend’s body in the pond, Robertson entered the house and killed Edna Brau, Hill’s grandmother, also with a single shot, as she lay on her couch watching television. Robertson stole Hill’s drugs and Brau’s purse, car and papers, and other personal belongings. Several days later he fled to Las Vegas, Nevada, where he was apprehended by local police. Robertson was tried for these two murders and his previous killing of a 19-year-old convenience store clerk during a robbery. For the murders of the clerk and Hill, Robertson received concurrent life sentences. For killing Brau, Robertson was found guilty of capital murder. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 2, § 1, Tex. Gen. Laws 1123, amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01 (currently Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2)). 3 Under 1989 Texas law, to impose a capital sentence the jury had to answer two questions in the affirmative. First: Was the killing deliberate? Second: Does the defendant pose a danger to others? A negative answer for either special issue would result in a life sentence.2 The court also gave the jury a supplemental instruction in which it was told that Robertson could avoid a capital sentence — even if the answers to both questions were affirmative — should the jury find sufficient mitigating factors. To give effect to such a determination, the trial court instructed the jury to change its answer to either of the special issues from “Yes” to “No.”3 2 A third issue, inquiring whether the defendant was provoked into capital murder, is unnecessary to parse here. Acts 1973, supra n.1. 3 The supplemental instruction given to the jury reads as follows: You are instructed that you shall consider any evidence, which, in your opinion, is mitigating. Mitigating evidence is evidence that reduces the defendant’s personal or moral culpability, or blameworthiness, and may include, but is not limited to an aspect of the defendant’s character, record, background, or circumstances of the offense for which you have found him guilty. Our law does not specify what may or may not be considered as mitigating evidence. Neither does our law provide a formula for determining how much weight, if any, a mitigating circumstance deserves. You may hear evidence, which in your judgment, has no relationship to any of the special issues, but if you find such evidence is mitigating under these instructions, you shall consider the following instructions of the court. You and each of you, are the sole judges of what evidence, if any, is mitigating and how much weight, if any, the mitigating circumstances, if any, including those which have no relationship to any of the special issues, deserves. 4 At sentencing the state presented evidence, inter alia, relating to Robertson’s past criminal behavior, which included serious vandalism at about age 12, taking a loaded handgun to school at 13, car theft and destruction of property at 14, marijuana possession at 15 and 18 (the second resulting in conviction), an aggravated robbery conviction (using a baseball bat and knife) at 18, and passing bad checks at 19. He had also violated the terms of probation by failing to report, attend drug counseling, and perform community service. The state also presented extensive evidence relating to Robertson’s murder of the convenience store clerk and of his bad prison behavior since incarceration, including jail-cell arson and an escape attempt. You are instructed that some mitigating evidence, if any, may not be relevant to resolving the special issues but may be relevant in determining whether or not the defendant should be put to death. In answering the special issues submitted to you herein, if you believe that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the answers to the special issues are ‘Yes,’ and you also believe from the mitigating evidence, if any, that the defendant should not be sentenced to death, then you shall answer at least one of the special issues ‘No’ in order to give effect to your belief that the death penalty should not be imposed due to the mitigating evidence presented to you. In this regard, you are further instructed that the State of Texas must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death sentence should be imposed despite the mitigating evidence, if any, admitted before you. 5 Robertson presented testimony at the punishment stage from his two sisters, mother, stepfather, uncle, aunt, cousin, former girlfriend, and friends of the family. Robertson’s biological father was an alcoholic who would often come home drunk and make the children stay awake at the foot of his bed until he went to sleep; otherwise they would receive a beating. Because Robertson was a baby when most of the abuse occurred, he was spared, but as he grew, he received more abuse. He witnessed both physical and verbal abuse of his mother and siblings. Sometimes the father would beat the other children with a board. When Robertson was eight or nine years old, his mother left his father, but she reclaimed the children six months later, and his father subsequently disappeared. Robertson adapted to his new home better than did his older siblings and began calling his mother’s husband “father.” His mother and stepfather provided a good home to him and treated him well. Family and friends testified that Robertson was always respectful, polite, and helpful. Robertson also fulfilled his promise to obtain a GED if his parents would allow him to quit school. Robertson was described by his mother as being “very smart.” Robertson also offered evidence regarding his struggle with drugs. He became addicted at the age of 14 or 15. Upon 6 catching him smoking marijuana, his parents sent him to a drug rehabilitation clinic; they removed him ten days later, after he threatened to run away. He and a companion committed a robbery in November 1987 while high on cocaine. In 1988, when Robertson was on bond for aggravated robbery, he entered another drug treatment facility. Robertson almost completed the program, but left for Florida when his counselor became ill and died. After Robertson was arrested and convicted for violating the terms of his probation, he checked himself into Charter Hospital for treatment and completed the six-week program. He then went to the House of Hope in Sherman, Texas, but stayed only about forty days. Robertson also presented the testimony of several witnesses who described him as having a good character and a lack of a violent history. Despite having a psychiatrist available and being given an additional four days during the punishment phase to conduct psychological testing, Robertson presented no psychiatric or psychological testimony. For his murder of Brau, the jury answered both special issues in the affirmative. Accordingly, the court entered a sentence of death in February 1991. On direct appeal the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his capital sentence. Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Among other issues, Robertson argued that 7 the trial court erred by submitting the above-described supplemental instruction in lieu of a proposed third special issue regarding mitigating evidence. The court held that the supplemental instruction fully comported with Penry I, the controlling Supreme Court precedent, as it permitted, indeed invited, the jury to consider all of the constitutionally relevant evidence. The Supreme Court subsequently denied Robertson’s petition for writ of certiorari. Robertson v. Texas, 513 U.S. 853 (1994). Three years later, Robertson filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the state trial court. The court held an evidentiary hearing and recommended that relief be denied. It held, inter alia, that the jury instructions were adequate to satisfy the constitutional demands of Penry I and related Supreme Court cases. It also noted that this conclusion comported with a host of post-Penry I Texas cases in which similar jury instructions had been presented. In November 1998, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon the trial court’s findings to deny the petition. Ex parte Robertson, writ no. 30,077-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Robertson immediately filed a federal petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and once again alleged constitutional error arising from, inter alia, the jury instruction. The federal 8 district court dismissed Robertson’s § 2254 petition in March 2000, concluding that Robertson could not demonstrate that the decisions of the state courts were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as decided by the United States Supreme Court. Robertson filed a timely notice of appeal and a request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in the district court. The district court denied COA and Robertson filed the instant application for a COA with this court. The district court’s denial of relief was affirmed by this court, Robertson v. Johnson, 234 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2000), and he sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. In 2001 the Supreme Court decided Penry II, holding that the same set of instructions had failed to give the jurors a “‘vehicle,’” Penry II, 532 U.S. at 787 (quoting Penry I, 492 U.S. at 326), by which they might “‘consider and give effect to [a defendant’s mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence.’” Penry II, 532 U.S. at 797 (quoting and adding emphasis to Penry I, 492 U.S. at 319). The Supreme Court subsequently vacated this court’s decision and remanded it for reconsideration. Robertson v. Johnson, 533 U.S. 901 (2001). In January 2002 a panel of this court concluded that “there is no substantial difference between the jury instructions on mitigation given in this case and those given in Penry II,” granted Robertson’s motion for a COA and granted the writ, 9 requiring Robertson to be retried for the penalty phase of his prosecution. Robertson v. Cockrell, 279 F.3d 1062 (5th Cir. 2002). Upon the state’s motion, this court reheard the case en banc. Robertson v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 2002).