Opinion ID: 414332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Alleged Use of Evidence Contrary to the Provisions of the Act

Text: 128 Appellant claims the government violated the wiretap statute by intercepting conversations that were not designated in the original application and authorization, and by failing to obtain judicial authorization for the use of such evidence as soon as practicable as required under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5). 129 It is necessary to set forth the sequence of what took place. On December 6, 1977, application for a wiretap of defendant's phone was made. It alleged probable cause to believe that offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1084, 1952, and 371 were being committed. Judicial authorization issued on the same day. Telephone conversations were intercepted and recorded during the period December 17 to December 22, 1977, some of which showed violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955. On July 31, 1979, almost nineteen months after the authorization issued, application was made under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5) 36 to use conversations showing violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(3). 37 Authorization for such use was granted by the district court on the same day. This evidence was then disclosed to a grand jury. On April 17, 1980, the grand jury indicted defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1955 and 1084 as well as Secs. 371 and 2. Brian was convicted on stipulated facts solely for violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955. 130 Our resolution of the issue must be made in light of the Supreme Court's holding on the basic requirements for suppression. 131 Resolution of that question [suppression] must begin with United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 [, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341] (1974), and United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 [, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380] (1974). Those cases hold that [not] every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral communications 'unlawful.'  Id. at 574-575 [, 94 S.Ct. 1855-1856]. To the contrary, suppression is required only for a failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. United States v. Giordano, supra, [416 U.S.] at 527 [, 94 S.Ct. at 1832]. 132 United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433-34, 97 S.Ct. 658, 670-671, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977). See United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1174, 51 L.Ed.2d 581 (1977). 133 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(1)(a-e) specifies the information required in an application for an order authorizing the interception of telephone conversations. Section 2518(1)(b)(i) 38 requires details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed. (emphasis added) As the facts disclose, section 1955 violations were not specified in the application and the judicial authorization for the intercept did not mention section 1955. This, however, as appellant recognizes, is not a per se ground for suppression. 134 Nor does any constitutional infirmity arise from the fact that the 27 July tap yielded much greater evidence of gambling than of narcotics activity. Officers attending a properly authorized, limited, and supervised wiretap have no obligation to close their ears to unexpected incriminating information on matters unrelated to their immediate investigation. They have a legal right to their position within electronic earshot of conversations over certain telephones within certain time limitations. Like an officer who sees contraband in plain view from a vantage point where he has a right to be, one properly overhearing unexpected villainy need not ignore such evidence. 135 United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 188 (D.C.Cir.1976) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061, 97 S.Ct. 784, 50 L.Ed.2d 776 (1977). See also United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 853 (3d Cir.1976). 136 The officers conducting the wiretap surveillance were fully justified in continuing to monitor those gambling conversations which provided evidence of section 1955 violations. The similarity between section 1955 39 and section 1084 40 offenses makes it highly probable that the same person will violate both statutes. Further, the same conversations will often show a violation of both statutes. Section 1955 subjects to fine and imprisonment [w]hoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business. Section 1084 prohibits the use of interstate wire communication facilities for betting or wagering by one engaged in the business of betting or wagering. Because of the similarity of the two statutory provisions appellant can claim no harm or unfair surprise from the monitoring of all of his gambling related telephone calls under a wiretap authorization specifying only section 1084 violations. This violation of section 2518(1)(b)(i)'s particularity requirement does not warrant suppression of the wiretap evidence. 137 The use of intercepted conversations containing evidence of section 1955 violations implicates section 2517(5) of the Act. This section was designed to cover a situation such as this in which an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire or oral communications relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval. It provides that such evidence may be used in any criminal proceeding when authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be made as soon as practicable. 138 Here, nineteen months passed between the recording of the implicating conversations and the application for their use as evidence. Appellant argues strenuously that the application could and should have been made long before it was, and that the nineteen-month delay constituted a per se violation of the as soon as practicable requirement of section 2517(5). The government explained the long hiatus by stating that the conversations' relevance has only become apparent upon a recent analysis of the results of the wire interceptions. We recognize that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1084, though similar, are different offenses and that a detailed study of the intercepts was necessary to determine which statute was being violated. Although nineteen months seems an inordinate amount of time for analyzing the intercepted conversations, we do not think that such a delay automatically triggers suppression. 139 We note first that appellant has not alleged that the delay prejudiced him in any way. Although this is not determinative, it shifts our focus from the effect on the appellant to a consideration of whether the delay contravenes a basic policy requirement of the Act. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433-34, 97 S.Ct. at 670-671. A determination of whether the order was obtained 'as soon as practicable' requires an examination of the purposes of section 2517(5). United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d at 855. 140 We agree with the Fifth Circuit that by enacting section 2517(5), Congress wished to assure that the Government does not secure a wiretap authorization order to investigate one offense as a subterfuge to acquire evidence of a different offense for which the prerequisites to an authorization order are lacking. United States v. Campagnuolo, 556 F.2d 1209, 1214 (5th Cir.1977). See also United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d at 855. We discern no subterfuge here. As explained above, the similarity between section 1955 and section 1084 offenses makes it difficult to determine whether a particular gambling related conversation is more appropriately proof of the violation of one statutory provision rather than another. We find that the application for authorization to use the intercepts to demonstrate section 1955 violations was sought in good faith. 141 The application procedure is also important. Here, the intercepts were disclosed to a grand jury prior to indictment. This is significantly different than the procedure followed in a case on which appellant relies, United States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214 (7th Cir.1975). Brodson concerned an authorization for intercepts showing violations of section 1955. The application for section 1084 use was filed just prior to trial. The government had disclosed the intercepts allegedly showing violation of section 1084 to a grand jury without judicial authorization. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the indictment because the Government itself has violated the key provision of the legislative scheme of Section 2517(5). 41 Id. at 216. There was no such violation here. The mandate of section 2517(5) was observed. 142 We find no reason to suppress the evidence of violations of section 1955 on either statutory or constitutional grounds. 42 143 The conviction is affirmed. KACHOUGIAN 144 Kachougian entered into essentially the same stipulation of facts with the government as did Brian. He was also found guilty by the court of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955. Other than the Franks' hearing issue, the only issue raised by appellant is that under the stipulation of facts no crime was shown. 145 Count I of the indictment, in which defendant was charged, tracked the language of the statute and charged that Kachougian (and others) was part of an illegal gambling business involving bookmaking in violation of the laws of the State of Rhode Island, 1956, 1969 Re-enactment, Section 11-19-14. The Rhode Island statute makes it illegal, inter alia, to record or register bets or wagers or sell pools upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance of man or beast. R.I.Gen.Laws Sec. 11-19-14. The pertinent parts of the stipulation stated: 146 1. The defendants John Brian, Raphael Wax, Harry Kachougian, Vincent Quinterno, Anna Quinterno and others willfully and knowingly did conduct a gambling business involving the placement and acceptance of bets and wagers on sporting events during the period November 5, 1977 through December 21, 1977 in the District of Rhode Island and elsewhere. 147 .... 148 6. It was the role of Harry Kachougian to accept bets and wagers and to record and register bets and wagers from within a private ground (house) within the state of Rhode Island and occupy said house with books, papers and paraphernalia for the purpose of receiving and recording and registering money bet and wagered for another person for the purpose of operating and conducting the gambling business. 149 Appellant's argument is a combination of ingenuity and chutzpah. He claims that his stipulation that he conducted a gambling business involving the placement and acceptance of bets and wagers on sporting events  in Rhode Island does not mean that he violated the state statute which prohibits recording bets upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance of man or beast. This contention simply cannot be taken seriously. The stipulation clearly established a violation of the Rhode Island bookmaking statute. 150 Nor is there any merit to appellant's contention that he was convicted of a crime not charged in the indictment, occupying a house containing gambling paraphernalia as set forth in paragraph 6 of the stipulation. This completely overlooks paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the stipulation which track the language of Count I of the indictment. 151 The conviction is affirmed. ANNA and VINCENT QUINTERO 152 These appellants stipulated to the same facts as did Brian and Kachougian. They were also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955. They have filed no briefs and rely entirely on the brief and argument of Brian. 153 The convictions are affirmed.