Opinion ID: 864436
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the alleged delay in

Text: DEMANDING ARBITRATION OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE NURSING PLLC CONSTITUTED A WAIVER OF THEIR RIGHT TO ARBITRATE. ¶24. Congress' clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, [was] to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 927, 941, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983) (quoted with favor in Miller Brewing, 781 F.2d at 496). In Miller Brewing, Fort Worth Distributing Company first sued Miller Brewing, and then, three and a half years later, after losing in court, sought arbitration. The Fifth Circuit held Miller Brewing could hardly be seen as moving the parties into arbitration 'as quickly and easily as possible.' Id. at 497. ¶25. Phillips argues that University and the Nursing PLLC waived their right to arbitrate by their delay in asserting their right to arbitration. She contends that the dispute originated in June of 2000 and that the University and the Nursing PLLC “chose to dispute this matter with Phillips outside the arbitration process by resorting to an internal grievance process. The University and the Nursing PLLC argue that they did not waive arbitration but, rather, timely made their demand. ¶26. Phillips initially brought up her dissatisfaction with the University and the Nursing PLLC and her request for an accounting in a letter to the Dean of Nursing on August 11, 13 2000. Phillips was terminated by letter dated August 31, 2000. On September 15, 2000, Phillips filed the petition for accounting. On November 9, 2000, the University and the Nursing PLLC asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense in their answer, but the issue was not brought before the chancellor until the hearing on the motion to compel in March of 2001. The chancellor found that Phillips was prejudiced as this matter was not expeditiously referred to arbitration. ¶27. We disagree with the chancellor's finding that University and the Nursing PLLC did not “expeditiously” refer the matter to arbitration. The Fifth Circuit has held that a delay of 13 months did not constitute a waiver, Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1991), but that a delay of 17 months did constitute a waiver. Price, 791 F.2d at 116062. There was no undue delay by the University or the Nursing PLLC in asserting arbitration before the chancellor. We therefore reverse the chancellor's finding that the delay of the University and the Nursing PLLC in raising arbitration constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate.