Opinion ID: 2593818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adjudication requirement of section 30-1-4.5

Text: ¶ 9 Subsequent to oral argument to the court of appeals in this case, we decided In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074, which construed subsection two of section 30-1-4.5 as requir[ing] only the filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year after the termination of the relationship. Id. at ¶ 30 (emphasis in original). Gonzalez raised the question of whether the legislature intended the unusual language of section 30-1-4.5 to be construed contrary to conventional statutes of limitation that limit the period to commence an action, not the period within which a court must reach final judgment. See id. at ¶ 24. We ruled that [t]he legislature should not be deemed to have created such a potentially unfair rule without clear and convincing language evidencing its intent to do so. . . . Id. (noting that the ambiguities created in this statute appear to be the result of nothing more than inartful drafting). Therefore, we turned to the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute. See id. at ¶ 23 (When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. (citing Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 UT 18, ¶ 25, 974 P.2d 1194)). ¶ 10 As we explained in Gonzalez, the Utah Legislature enacted section 30-1-4.5 with the aim of preventing welfare fraud by giving Utah's Office of Recovery Services an avenue to prevent exclusion of a common law spouse's income when applying for government benefits. See Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28 at ¶ 21, 1 P.3d 1074 (citing Floor Debate, remarks of Norman Angus, Director of State Social Services Admin., 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1987) (Sen. Recording No. 75)). The one-year adjudication requirement was an apparent attempt to protect the parties to a putative marriage from fraud or mistake due to long delays in adjudication. Id. (emphasis in original). It seems the Legislature was concerned with situations in which the couple never intended to be married but where, years later, most likely at the time one of them dies, [someone not a party to the marriage] is trying to prove the existence of such a marriage. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22 (citing Floor Debate, remarks of Sen. Lyle Hillyard, 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1987) (Sen. CD No. 81B)). ¶ 11 Therefore, the legislative purpose giving rise to the one-year adjudication requirement has nothing to do with a case such as this where an individual attempts to establish an unsolemnized marriage in order to divide marital assets. See id. at ¶ 24 (noting that legislative purpose is unrelated to case where individual attempts to establish unsolemnized marriage to claim insurance benefits). We further explained that a statute of limitation not tolled by the filing of an action created potential unfairness and would be subject to constitutional challenge, because an action filed in a timely manner could still fail the limitation period due to delays in discovery or a court's crowded docket. Id. We specifically relied on our obligation to construe statutes to avoid potential unconstitutionality. See id. at ¶ 30. The construction urged by the intervenor in Gonzalez would have raised questions of equal protection, due process, and separation of powers, all of which were avoided by our reading. If, indeed, we misconstrued legislative intent, it is to be expected that the legislature will tell us so. Therefore, under Gonzalez, an action to establish an unsolemnized marriage is timely if filed within one year of the termination of the relationship. Id.