Opinion ID: 2058374
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Diminished Capacity Aggravated Manslaughter.

Text: Expert psychiatric testimony offered on defendant's behalf included a diagnosis of defendant's mental and emotional condition as well as an opinion concerning defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicides. See supra at 591-592. Although defendant did not argue before us the defense of diminished capacity, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2; see State v. Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. 591, nor assert that the testimony of defendant's psychiatric expert supported a charge of aggravated manslaughter, we requested supplemental briefs on these questions. In response to that request, defendant now contends that the testimony of Dr. Cooke concerning defendant's cyclothymic personality disorder, supra at 591, combined with that expert's opinion of defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims, supra at 592, compelled the trial court, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on diminished capacity and aggravated manslaughter. The State disagrees sharply, arguing that defendant's psychiatric expert did not establish any connection between defendant's personality disorder and his state of mind when the homicides were committed. Moreover, the State asserts that throughout the trial defendant conceded that he killed the victims knowingly, infra at 612-613, but based his entire defense on the theory that the homicides occurred in the heat of passion, induced by reasonable provocation. Finally, the State contends that since defendant did not request instructions on either diminished capacity or aggravated manslaughter, the trial court had no duty meticulously [to] sift through the entire record to determine if some combination of facts and inferences might support such jury charges. See State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299 (1985). In State v. Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. 591, we considered the diminished capacity defense and concluded that [it] was designed by the Legislature not as a justification or an excuse, nor as a matter of diminished or partial responsibility, but as a factor bearing on the presence or absence of an essential element of the crime as designated by the Code. The Legislature contemplated that all are not born with equal mental capacity, and it would want a jury to consider whether a mentally defective person would be as practically certain as would another that death would result from the infliction of a serious blow. [ Id. at 608.] We also observed that the mere presence of mental disease or defect does not perforce reduce murder to an unspecified degree of manslaughter. For the purpose of determining criminal guilt, diminished capacity either negates the state of mind required for a particular offense, if successful, or it does not. [ Id. at 609.] Although the discussion in Breakiron does not amplify the meaning of the phrase mental disease or defect, as it is used in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, we adverted to the difficulties inherent in attempting to correlate mental diseases with the categories of criminal culpability contained in the Code: Not every mental disease or defect has relevance to the mental states prescribed by the Code. The variety and forms of mental disease are legion. They range from paranoia and schizophrenia to affective disorders and psychopathy. Some, such as depression or anti-social disorders, have little or no relevance to knowledge. Others, such as schizophrenia, are clearly relevant. Some states have attempted to define the relevant mental diseases or defects. Our Code does not. But [b]oth jurists and mental health professionals recognize that there is no perfect correlation between legal standards of `insanity' and psychiatric classifications of mental disorder. [108 N.J. 618-19 n. 10 (citations omitted).] Defendant's psychiatric expert Dr. Cooke diagnosed defendant as having a cyclothymic personality disorder, a condition classified as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association. APA, DSM III-R: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders (DSM III-R) 226-28 (3d ed. Rev. 1987). Dr. Cooke described the condition as a mood disorder that at times causes significant depression, but does not cause one to lose contact with reality the way a manic depressant might. In addition, Dr. Cooke testified that defendant had a chronic anxiety disorder, and above-average level of anxiety on a chronic basis, a condition also recognized by the American Psychiatric Association, DSM III-R at 251, and characterized by unrealistic or excessive anxiety manifested by tension and hyperactivity. Ibid. After testifying to his diagnosis of defendant's mental condition, Dr. Cooke was asked his opinion of defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicides. He explained that that opinion was based on diagnostic tests of defendant, physical evidence at the crime scene, and defendant's statements to him. Although quoted above, supra at 592, the relevance of Dr. Cooke's opinion to the issues under consideration warrants its restatement: [U]nder that situation he experienced some of that feeling from Vietnam, not a specific flashback, but a feeling in which he perceives himself to be in danger, perceives himself as having to strike out to protect himself in part. But even more important, that he had an emotional response there, an impulsive emotional response, not a response where he stopped and thought and decided, I will do this, I will do that, but, rather, a loss of control under the influence of extreme emotions and what I would say, combining all that data, a rage reaction, a reaction in which his anger reached the point of rage, which I would define as an anger that goes out of control and an anger which interferes with the cognitive ability a person has, planning, judgment, recognizing consequences, deliberating, that in my opinion, he experiences such a loss of control. Dr. Cooke did not expressly connect his opinion of defendant's state of mind to his diagnosis of defendant's mental condition, but observed that his testing revealed defendant's potential for loss of control. On this record, we cannot conclude that it was plain error for the trial court to have failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on diminished capacity and aggravated manslaughter on the hypothesis that defendant's mental condition was the cause of the loss of cognitive ability described in Dr. Cooke's testimony. As Justice O'Hern noted in Breakiron, supra : Not every mental disease or defect has relevance to the mental states prescribed by the Code. 108 N.J. at 618 n. 10. We also observed in Breakiron that the only evidence of mental disease that should be admitted in respect of diminished capacity is that relevant to the question of whether defendant had the requisite mental state to commit the crime. Id. at 618. Dr. Cooke did not testify that defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims was caused by his mental disorders; rather, he based his opinion on what defendant had told him about the homicides and on the physical evidence, as well as on his testing of defendant. Nor did Dr. Cooke testify that defendant's particular mental disorders were generally acknowledged among psychiatrists to be capable of affecting one's ability to possess the state of mind required by the Code for murder. Rather, the thrust of Dr. Cooke's testimony was that defendant committed the homicides in a state of rage, provoked by his emotional reaction to the encounter with Reynolds. Inasmuch as defense counsel did not request a diminished capacity charge, and the evidence offered did not significantly relate defendant's mental disorder to the state of mind described by defendant's psychiatric expert, we hold that it was not plain error for the trial court to have failed, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on diminished capacity and aggravated manslaughter on the theory that defendant's mental condition afforded the jury a rational basis for convicting defendant of the lesser charge. See State v. Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 299; cf. State v. Juinta, 224 N.J. Super. 711 (App.Div. 1988) (plain error for trial court to fail to charge diminished capacity in murder prosecution where principal issue at trial concerned insanity defense).