Opinion ID: 1265589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conduct Instruction

Text: The second instruction proposed by the defense defined the term conduct. The proposed instruction stated that the conduct, which is referred to in the . . . instruction [which defined the elements of the offense], is the Defendant's driving. Appellant claims that this is a correct statement of the law and that the absence of the instruction improperly permitted the jury to conclude that Appellant's alcohol and marijuana use was the proximate cause of the accident. Section 6-2-106 defines the crimes of homicide by vehicle and aggravated homicide by vehicle. That section provides in part: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is guilty of homicide by vehicle . . . if he operates or drives a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another person. Evidence of a violation of any state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, except for evidence of a violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 and XX-XX-XXX, is admissible in any prosecution under this subsection. (b) A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle . . . if: (ii) He operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another person. Since the district court gave instructions to the jury which accurately described the elements of homicide by vehicle and aggravated homicide by vehicle according to the language found in § 6-2-106, [3] the district court properly refused to give Appellant's proposed instruction. See Gilliam, 890 P.2d at 1109.