Opinion ID: 2257828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Requests for Reconsideration

Text: [¶ 15] Finally, the Madores argue that the court abused its discretion when it denied their requests to reconsider the dismissal. Although the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide specifically for a motion for reconsideration to the Superior Court, we have previously held that such motions should be treated as motions made to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 972 (Me.1994). We have also recognized that a motion for reconsideration can be treated as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See Ocean Nat'l Bank v. Conley, 670 A.2d 921, 922 (Me.1996); Palacci v. Palacci, 613 A.2d 951, 953-54 (Me.1992). In either instance, we review the trial court's action for an abuse of discretion. [6] See Department of Human Servs. v. Sabattus, 683 A.2d 170, 171 (Me.1996) (Rule 60); LeClair v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 90, 92 (Me.1996) (Rule 59). When the court has correctly understood all material factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion, we will not disturb its decision unless the court has made a serious mistake in weighing those factors. See West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 1997 ME 58, ¶ 7, 691 A.2d 1211, 1213 (citing Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 78 (1st Cir.1989)). [¶ 16] The Madores did not invoke either Rule 59 or Rule 60 in their letters to the court. Instead, they argued in essence that they had no notice that mootness, rather than standing, would be an issue until they were questioned about mootness by the court. On the basis of this alleged surprise, they urged the court to set aside the dismissal and provide them with additional time to obtain a renewed agreement. [¶ 17] Justiciability requirements in land use proceedings are not applied in any unique fashion. A litigant must possess a present right, title, or interest in the regulated land which confers lawful power to use that land or control its use when invoking the jurisdiction of the court and throughout any period of appellate review. Without that interest, the controversy becomes nonjusticiable, as there is no possibility of effective relief arising from a judicial resolution of the facts before the court. See Halfway House, Inc., 670 A.2d at 1379. Whether the justiciability issue was framed in terms of standing or mootness, therefore, the Madores had precedential, oral, and written notice that the lapse of their agreement to purchase Lemoine's property affected the justiciability of their claims. Any claim of surprise or newly discovered evidence therefore fails. [¶ 18] In addition, the Madores argue that the renewal of the agreement was never seriously at risk and that the court should therefore have reopened the record upon proof of that renewal. The Madores believed, apparently throughout the proceedings below, that a renewed agreement could easily be obtained if they succeeded on appeal. Notwithstanding that belief, and although the lapse of the agreement completely divested them of a cognizable interest in the Lemoine property, the Madores went forward without completing that purportedly simple step of renewing the agreement, apparently in an effort to conserve resources. They thus have no factual basis for alleging mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. [¶ 19] Only after it became clear that the court would rule against them did the Madores take action to renew the agreement. Responding to this action, the court stated that the Madores cannot be placed on notice of a problem as a matter of law in June of 1997 and as a matter of fact in October of 1997, ignore the problem, wait to see how the court rules and then try to address the apparent legal problem. On this record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying the Madores' requests for reconsideration. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.