Opinion ID: 2351228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: How and when the privilege was attempted to be withdrawn

Text: At the conclusion of Francis's deposition, his counsel told Wynn that Francis would promptly try to cure his deposition. But Francis made no such attempt. [5] Thereafter, in his opposition to Wynn's motion for summary judgment and at the hearing on Wynn's motion for summary judgment, Francis's counsel gave the district court only vague indications that Francis would be willing to withdraw his privilege. See Softpoint, 958 F.Supp. at 858 (precluding litigant from introducing affidavits to oppose a motion for summary judgment where he provided no firm commitment that he actually [would] submit to deposition should the Court accept his affidavits opposing summary judgment). In addition, the timing and context of Francis's attempted withdrawal was problematic. Francis waited until Wynn moved for summary judgment to indicate to the district court that he might be willing to withdraw his privilege. This last-minute attempt suggests that Francis was abusing his privilege. See 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 86-87 (affirming order barring litigant's ability to present material he previously claimed was privileged because he attempted to withdraw his privilege only after faced with a motion for summary judgment); Softpoint, 958 F.Supp. at 857 (litigant's attempted withdrawal of his privilege three months after his opponent moved for summary judgment was `a manipulative cat and mouse approach to the litigation'the type of conduct that warrants barring a defendant's testimony in opposition to summary judgment (quoting 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 85)); see also In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1308 (4th Cir.1991) ([T]he Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be invoked as a shield to oppose depositions while discarding it for the limited purpose of making statements to support a summary judgment motion.).