Opinion ID: 704022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The failure to hold a full Kastigar hearing

Text: 35 Dudden also challenges the district court's refusal to hold a full evidentiary hearing. The court stated that such a hearing was not required when the grant of immunity was pursuant to an informal agreement, rather than under the statute. We review the court's refusal to hold a hearing for an abuse of discretion. Montoya, 45 F.3d at 1291. 36 Once the defendant has testified under a grant of statutory immunity, the government has the burden to prove that any evidence it intends to use against the defendant is derived from a legitimate source independent of the immunized statements. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62, 92 S.Ct. at 1665-66. Before trial, the government must prove the independent sources by a preponderance of the evidence. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429. A hearing usually is required to determine whether the government can meet its burden under Kastigar. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Trimiew), 9 F.3d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1993); see Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1664-65. 37 The requirement that the government demonstrate independent sources for its evidence is not limited to cases in which the defendant has given compelled testimony and therefore has formal immunity under the statute. We recently declined to draw a constitutional distinction between compelled testimony given with a grant of statutory immunity and information given under an informal immunity agreement. United States v. Camp, 58 F.3d 491, 493 (9th Cir.1995). A Kastigar evidentiary hearing is equally appropriate when the claimed immunity is informal as when the immunity is statutory. See id. (remanding for Kastigar hearing when immunity agreement was informal); see also United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1483 (7th Cir.1993) (informal immunity agreements implicate provisions of Kastigar, requiring government to show independent sources). 38 We hold that an informal immunity agreement may require a Kastigar hearing. It was therefore an abuse of discretion to deny a hearing merely because the immunity agreement was informal. We note, however, that even when statutory immunity is in issue, a hearing is not required if no factual issues are left to resolve, or if the government meets its burden to show independent sources through the use of affidavits. Montoya, 45 F.3d at 1298. The need for an evidentiary hearing when the immunity is informal also depends on the circumstances in each case. 39 The hearing on Dudden's pretrial motions stretched over two days. The district court heard testimony about the immunity agreement, and allowed cross-examination of Hinck, Dudden, and Agent Williams. Dudden's counsel argued that the government used Dudden's statement about Jacobsen's dealing in methamphetamine to bolster its presentation to the grand jury, as evidence of her knowledge of the methamphetamine distribution. The court cut short the testimony when Dudden's counsel attempted to call the other government agents involved in the investigation. In its ruling on the pretrial motions, the court made no finding whether Dudden's statements were used against her, instead concluding that the immunity agreement simply did not apply to the offenses alleged in the indictment. 40 The court's ruling therefore left unanswered questions regarding whether Dudden's statements were used in preparing the case against her. Because the informal immunity agreement was not limited to any particular type of drug offense or time period, we remand to the district court for a Kastigar hearing to determine the factual issue whether the government made direct or derivative use of Dudden's statements in its investigation and prosecution of the methamphetamine charges. If the district court finds that the government did use Dudden's immunized statements, either directly or in developing the case against her, Dudden's conviction must be set aside.