Opinion ID: 782233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: alien tort claims act-jurisdiction and cause of action

Text: 22 The ATCA provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Although enacted in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act, the ATCA received little attention until 1980, 4 when the Second Circuit, in a comprehensive analysis of the statute, held that the ATCA provided subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought by Paraguayan citizens for torture — a violation of the law of nations — committed in Paraguay. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (Filartiga I), 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980). 23 Since the Filartiga I decision, the ATCA has been invoked in a variety of actions alleging human rights violations. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment under ATCA against former Ethiopian official for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.1995) (concluding that alleged war crimes, genocide, torture, and other atrocities committed by a Bosnian Serb leader were actionable under the ATCA); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir.1984) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claims brought against the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Libyan government, and other entities for terrorist activities allegedly in violation of the law of nations); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162 (D.Mass.1995) (deeming torture, summary execution, disappearance, and arbitrary detention by Guatemalan military to be actionable violations under the ATCA). 24 Our first opportunity to address the scope of the ATCA came in Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig.) (Marcos I), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.1992), a wrongful death action against former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter for the torture and murder of a Philippine citizen. We recognized that it would be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture violate customary international law, and concluded that the plaintiff, an alien, had properly invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under the ATCA. Id. at 499 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Referencing an April 1787 letter from James Madison to Edmond Randolph, we concluded that [t]here is ample indication that the `Arising Under' Clause was meant to extend the judicial power of the federal courts ... to `all cases which concern foreigners.' Id. at 502. Because the Arising Under Clause gave Congress the power to enact the ATCA, we held that exercising jurisdiction over the claims would not run afoul of Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 502-03. 25 When the Marcos litigation returned to this court in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.) (Marcos II), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.1994), we further delineated the contours of the ATCA. 5 We resolved that the Act not only provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations: [S]ection 1350 does not require that the action `arise under' the law of nations, but only mandates a `violation of the law of nations' in order to create a cause of action. Id. at 1475 (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring)). In other words, [n]othing more than a violation of the law of nations is required to invoke section 1350. Id. (citation omitted). 26 Of course, not every violation of international law constitutes an actionable claim under the ATCA. In Marcos II, we were careful to limit actionable violations to those international norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory. Id. at 1475. This formulation, which lays the foundation for our approach to international norms, is in keeping with the narrow scope of ATCA jurisdiction and the general practice of limiting judicial review to those areas of international law that have achieved sufficient consensus to merit application by a domestic tribunal. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) ([T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it ....); cf. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820) (finding piracy universally treat[ed] ... as an offence against the law of nations and sufficiently and constitutionally defined by commentators to be punishable by Congress). 27 Sosa urges a narrow reading of the law of nations and a correspondingly strict interpretation of the specific, universal, and obligatory requirement. He argues that only violations of jus cogens norms, as distinguished from violations of customary international law, are sufficiently universal and obligatory to be actionable as violations of the law of nations under the ATCA. We decline to embrace this restrictive reading, as we are guided by the language of the statute, not an imported restriction. 28 The term jus cogens refers to a category of peremptory norms that are `accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as ... norm[s] from which no derogation is permitted.' Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 8 I.L.M. 679). Customary international law, a direct descendent of the law of nations, is a related, but distinct, concept. Id. It refers more generally to those established norms of contemporary international law that are ascertain[ed]... `by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.' Id. at 714-15 (quoting Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61). 29 We have explained the difference between these two concepts as follows: 30 While jus cogens and customary international law are related, they differ in one important respect. Customary international law, like international law defined by treaties and other international agreements, rests on the consent of states. A state that persistently objects to a norm of customary international law that other states accept is not bound by that norm 31 .... 32 In contrast, jus cogens embraces customary laws considered binding on all nations and is derived from values taken to be fundamental by the international community, rather than from the fortuitous or selfinterested choices of nations. Whereas customary international law derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms constituting jus cogens transcend such consent.... 33 Because jus cogens norms do not depend solely on the consent of states for their binding force, they enjoy the highest status within international law. 34 Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 6 35 Given the non-derogable nature of jus cogens norms, it comes as no surprise that we have found that a jus cogens violation is sufficient to satisfy the specific, universal, and obligatory standard. See Marcos II, 25 F.3d at 1475. But the fact that a violation of this subcategory of international norms is sufficient to warrant an actionable claim under the ATCA does not render it necessary. Indeed, our recent cases lay out the components of an actionable violation without reference to jus cogens. See Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir.2002) (remanding case to district court to apply the applicable standard, which requires plaintiffs to allege specific, universal, and obligatory norms as part of their claim); Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (9th Cir.1998) (recognizing, without a discussion of jus cogens, that arbitrary detention meets the standard for a cognizable ATCA claim). 36 The notion of jus cogens norms was not part of the legal landscape when Congress enacted the ATCA in 1789. See Brownlie, supra, at 516 (explaining the modern evolution of jus cogens ). Thus, to restrict actionable violations of international law to only those claims that fall within the categorical universe known as jus cogens would deviate from both the history and text of the ATCA. 37 Although a strict categorical approach may have surface appeal for its apparent ease of application, it is far from certain which norms would qualify for jus cogens status. The development of an elite category of human rights norms is of relatively recent origin in international law, and [a]lthough the concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its content is not agreed. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 n. 6 (1987) (Restatement on Foreign Relations). As one respected commentator put it, more authority exists for the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular content.... Brownlie, supra, at 516-17; see also Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 A.J.I.L. 1, 14-15 (1986) (explaining the difficulties of strict categorization in defining peremptory norms). We therefore remain confident that the standard established in Marcos II and repeated throughout our case law best reflects the text and purpose of the ATCA and provides sufficient guidance for evaluating Alvarez's claim. 38 With this international law background in mind, we turn to Alvarez's contentions on appeal. Alvarez argues that he has a remedy under the ATCA for two separate violations of international law. First, he claims that state-sponsored abduction within the territory of another state without its consent is a violation of the international law of sovereignty and the customary norms of international human rights law. Second, he contends that his seizure and confinement violated the international customary legal norm against arbitrary arrest and detention. 39 In view of the dissent's rhetoric and lengthy discourse, it may not be readily apparent that the dissent is in accord with a significant portion of our holding. Ten members of the en banc court agree that Alvarez lacks standing to obtain redress for claims based on an alleged violation of Mexico's sovereignty and that his claim for transborder abduction fails. 7 These same judges also agree that there is a universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention. It is only as to the application of this latter norm that we part company. 40

41 Alvarez claims that his arrest violated Mexico's sovereign rights because Mexico had not granted the United States permission to exercise police power on its soil. Because such an encroachment on Mexico's sovereignty violates the law of nations within the meaning of the ATCA, Alvarez reasons, he is entitled to relief under that statute. The district court agreed and rejected Sosa's objection that Alvarez lacks standing to invoke Mexico's sovereignty rights. 42 We have little trouble accepting the premise from which Alvarez begins. Few principles in international law are as deeply rooted as the general norm prohibiting acts of sovereignty that offend the territorial integrity of another state. See generally 1 L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim's International Law § 119 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity 407 & n. 2 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds. 1989) (referring to this incontrovertible rule as elementary). This tenet, as Alvarez points out, can be traced to the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court. Most notably, in 1812, when faced with the question whether an American citizen could assert title to an armed French vessel found in the territorial waters of the United States, Justice Marshall began his landmark decision by emphasizing the exclusive and absolute nature of territorial jurisdiction, exceptions to which must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). 43 Twelve years later, Justice Story voiced similar sentiments. Analyzing an American seizure of a foreign ship that had sailed into Spanish waters, he observed that [i]t would be monstrous to suppose that our ... officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of nations. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371, 6 L.Ed. 111 (1824). 44 Alvarez seeks to invoke a principle, concomitant with this precept of territorial sovereignty, that prohibits a state's law enforcement agents from exercising their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent. The Supreme Court clearly recognized this proscription in The Appollon. In addition, several notable authorities are in accord. See Restatement on Foreign Relations § 432(2) (A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state.); 1 Oppenheim, supra, § 119, at 387-88 (It is ... a breach of international law for a state without permission to send its agents into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having committed a crime.); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 255 (4th ed. 2002) (recognizing the rule and noting that it is grounded in the notion that international law is designed to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states by restricting impermissible state conduct). But whatever the modern contours of this principle or its corollaries, they are inapplicable here and need not be explored because Alvarez cannot establish, as a threshold matter, that he has standing to assert Mexico's interests in its territorial sovereignty. 8 45 The Supreme Court has instructed that to meet the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing under Article III, plaintiffs must [f]irst and foremost show the existence of an injury in fact. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Related to this constitutional prerequisite is a separate prudential requirement of standing: plaintiffs must demonstrate they are proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suit. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). This requirement applies even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects the litigant also affects a third party. United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990). Although Alvarez may have properly alleged that Mexico's sovereignty was infringed during his abduction — an issue we need not resolve here — he has not demonstrated that he is a proper party to vindicate Mexico's national interests. 46 Alvarez argues that he meets the standing requirements because courts may review ATCA claims whenever an alien is injured tortiously in the course of the defendant's violation of international law. But the ATCA creates a remedy for a tort ... committed in violation of the law of nations, not in the course of any recognized international law violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The legal rights on which Alvarez bases his claim, and which the ATCA recognizes, are those that protect the individual from tortious conduct. By its terms, the ATCA provides only for suits by individual aliens; it does not allow for an individual to vindicate the rights of a foreign government. 47 To allow state-on-state injuries like the one Alvarez alleges here to be vindicated by a third party not only would read too much into the ATCA, but would lead to the judiciary's intrusion into matters that are appropriately reserved for the Executive branch. Although international human rights litigation under the ATCA inevitably raises issues implicating foreign relations, sovereigns' prerogatives are ordinarily and traditionally handled through diplomatic channels. 9 The right of a nation to invoke its territorial integrity does not translate into the right of an individual to invoke such interests in the name of the law of nations. 48 Alvarez seeks refuge in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886), the case that previously doomed his attempt to secure dismissal of his criminal indictment. See Alvarez-Machain II, 504 U.S. at 662, 112 S.Ct. 2188. Like Alvarez, Ker claimed forcible abduction from a foreign country, in his case Peru. Although the Supreme Court refused to dismiss Ker's indictment, it observed that Ker was probably not ... without redress, for he could sue [his abductor] in an action of trespass and false imprisonment. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444, 7 S.Ct. 225. The Court made no guarantees, however, regarding a claim under the ATCA or any other federal statute; nor did it intimate that Ker could sue to avenge Peru's sovereignty rights. Rather, the Court noted that Peru could pursue a separate remedy — the kidnapper's extradition. Id. Ker thus implicitly drew the distinction between vindication of individual rights and a sovereign's vindication of its rights. Ker does not bridge the gap in Alvarez's claim. 49
50 Apparently cognizant of the constitutional barrier to his claim, Alvarez offers an alternative theory: he seeks to bypass the standing hurdle by arguing that, notwithstanding any infringements upon Mexico's sovereignty, the act of transborder kidnapping was, in itself, a violation of customary international human rights law. This norm, as defined by Alvarez, creates a personal right under the law of nations. 51 Sosa, the DEA agents, and the United States all urge that this norm fails the law of nations test. They contend that the prohibition that Alvarez identifies has not reached the level of acceptance in the international community sufficient to qualify as universal and obligatory. They also argue that, whatever degree of agreement other nations have reached, the United States has affirmatively and definitively rejected this principle. We agree. The United States does not recognize a prohibition against transborder kidnapping, nor can it be said that there is international acceptance of such a norm. 52 We embrace the Supreme Court's directive that the law of nations may be ascertained by consulting the work of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900) ([W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators....). Evidence of the law of nations may also be garnered from international agreements and United Nations declarations. See Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716-17; Filartiga I, 630 F.2d at 883-84. 53 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice serves as a convenient summary of the sources of international law, although we recognize that defining [t]he `sources' of international law is a subject of much continuing scholarship. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 100-01 (2d Cir.2003). Article 38 provides, in part: 54 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 55 a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 56 b. international custom, as evidence of a general ractice accepted as law; 57 c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 58 d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 10 59 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, U.S.T.S. 993. 60 International agreements to which the United States is a signatory provide an obvious and convenient starting point. It would be, of course, a relatively simple analysis if we could pinpoint in such an agreement a prohibition against transborder abductions. Despite eloquent arguments to the contrary, we find no such support in the text of any international agreement. 61 Alvarez and the amici point to a number of international human rights instruments which, they argue, support an individual right to remain free of transborder abductions. But no authority cited by Alvarez recognizes an explicit prohibition against forcible abduction. 11 Rather, each of the authorities speaks to general prohibitions against restricting an individual's right to freedom and movement and security of person. For example, the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), which Alvarez cites, states that [e]very person has the right to personal liberty and security and [n]o one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto. Art. 7(1), 7(2), opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (signed but not ratified by the United States). Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that [e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. Art. 12, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by the United States Sept. 8, 1992). See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration), art. 13(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.); 12 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. VIII, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.LV/II. 82 doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992) (Every person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state of which he is a national, to move about freely within such territory, and not to leave it except by his own will.). Such general prohibitions are insufficient to support Alvarez's claim that there is an international norm against transborder abduction because an actionable claim under the ATCA requires the showing of a violation of the law of nations that is specific, universal, and obligatory. 62 Looking beyond the declarations and covenants to treaties does not yield a different result. 13 At the time of Alvarez's abduction, the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty did not extend to transborder abduction and there was no separate treaty with such a prohibition. See Alvarez-Machain II, 504 U.S. at 669-70, 112 S.Ct. 2188. The absence of any agreement is consistent with our conclusion that the United States has not embraced the prohibition urged by Alvarez. That is not to say that Alvarez's abduction went unnoticed. Indeed, it was met with a formal diplomatic protest by Mexico and considerable public outcry. 14 63 In 1994, four years after Alvarez was abducted, the United States and Mexico reached an agreement to prohibit the practice of transborder arrest. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov. 23, 1994, U.S.-Mex., reprinted in Michael Abbell, Extradition to and From the United States, at A-303 (2002). That agreement is not yet in force, however, because the President has not submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent. See id. at A-287. In any event, the proposed treaty would not help Alvarez: it would explicitly foreclose the right of abductees to sue their abductors. See id. at A-303. If anything, this development underscores the void that existed before the treaty was signed and the reality that the United States does not yet consider itself bound by the supposed norm against transborder abductions. Alvarez offers no other legislative or judicial source that supports a specific, enforceable norm against transborder abductions. 64 The United States claims that unilateral, transborder abductions are a rare occurrence. And the notion of sneaking across the border to nab a criminal suspect surely raises more than a diplomatic eyebrow. Nonetheless, our review of the international authorities and literature reveals no specific binding obligation, express or implied, on the part of the United States or its agents to refrain from transborder kidnapping. Nor can we say that there is a universal consensus in the sense that we use that term to describe well-entrenched customs of international law. Any agreement that may exist on this score has failed to surface in the declarations and accords that commonly manifest the mutual concern of states. See Filartiga I, 630 F.2d at 888 (It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the statute.). Because a human rights norm recognizing an individual's right to be free from transborder abductions has not reached a status of international accord sufficient to render it obligatory or universal, it cannot qualify as an actionable norm under the ATCA. This is a case where aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation. 15 65
66 Alvarez is not, however, without a remedy. The unilateral, nonconsensual extraterritorial arrest and detention of Alvarez were arbitrary and in violation of the law of nations under the ATCA. 67
68 Unlike transborder arrests, there exists a clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention. This prohibition is codified in every major comprehensive human rights instrument and is reflected in at least 119 national constitutions. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 235, 260-61 (1993). The Universal Declaration, perhaps the most well-recognized explication of international human rights norms, provides that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, Universal Declaration, art. 9, and the ICCPR, which the United States has ratified, 16 unequivocally obliges states parties to refrain from arbitrary arrest or detention. ICCPR, art. 9. 17 69 We recently reaffirmed the universal, obligatory, and specific nature of this norm in Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384 (recognizing a clear international prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention); see also Marcos IV, 103 F.3d at 795 (recognizing arbitrary detention ... as[an] actionable violation[] of international law). We explained, in defining the norm, that [d]etention is arbitrary `if it is not pursuant to law; it may be arbitrary also if it is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of the human person.' Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384 (quoting Restatement on Foreign Relations § 702 cmt. h). 18 70 Sosa acknowledges the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention, but he contends that for ATCA liability to attach, Alvarez's detention must be prolonged in addition to being arbitrary. We can divine no such requirement in our precedent or in the applicable international authorities. Rather, as the language of the international instruments demonstrates, the norm is universally cited as one against arbitrary detention and does not include a temporal element. Other authorities reflect this understanding. See, e.g., Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice, supra, at 260; Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights 135-59 (1983); see also United Nations Study, supra, at 5-8 (defining elements of the norm without mention of a temporal component). 19 71 Although § 702 of the Restatement on Foreign Relations includes a reference to prolonged arbitrary detention, 20 neither the Restatement nor our cases import a separate temporal requirement for purposes of ATCA liability. Section 702 contains a short list of human rights norms that it deems sufficient to qualify as customary law violations. See Restatement on Foreign Relations § 702(a)-(g). But the comments to § 702 clarify that the list is non-exhaustive and that virtually all of the norms listed, including prolonged arbitrary detention, belong among the elite set of jus cogens norms that are non-derogable. Id. cmts. a, n. Section 702 does not state that every arbitrary detention must be prolonged to qualify as a violation of the law of nations — which is all that is required under the ATCA — and in fact implies the opposite. See id. cmt. (A single, brief, arbitrary detention by an official of a state party to one of the principal international agreements might violate that agreement.). Likewise, our holding in Martinez, which cited the Restatement, included the length of detention as but one factor among many in determining whether a violation of the law of nations had occurred. 141 F.3d at 1384. 72 This is not to say that the length of detention cannot be a factor in evaluating whether there was an actionable violation of international law. Indeed, an extended detention following an improper arrest would necessarily contribute to arbitrariness. We simply hold, consistent with international law, that there is no free-standing temporal requirement nor any magical time period that triggers the norm. 73
74 The standard then is whether the arrest and detention were arbitrary, that is, not pursuant to law. 21 Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384. In the case before us, there was, quite simply, no basis in law for the unilateral extraterritorial arrest and related detention of Alvarez in Mexico. 75 The only instrument Sosa can point to as evidence that Alvarez's abduction was pursuant to law is an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California. But a federal arrest warrant, without more, hardly serves as a license to effectuate arrests worldwide. It is no accident that the warrant is directed to The United States Marshal and any Authorized United States Officer (emphasis added). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time of Alvarez's arrest provided that [a] warrant may be executed... within the jurisdiction of the United States. Fed.R.Crim.P. 4(d)(2). 22 The language could hardly be clearer — within the jurisdiction of the United States means exactly what it says. 23 76 Despite the clear limitation on the extraterritorial reach of the arrest warrant, Sosa would have us believe that Alvarez's arrest in Mexico was authorized under American law. 24 The United States takes the same position in its defense against Alvarez's false arrest claim, which we discuss in a later section but which is also relevant here. Both parties conclude that the federal officers (and, by implication, Sosa) were authorized by statute to make warrantless arrests outside the United States. Because the criminal statutes under which Alvarez was charged have extraterritorial application, the argument goes, Congress must have granted DEA agents broad authority to enforce those statutes beyond our borders. 77 The proper starting point is, of course, the applicable statutory scheme. We begin with a well-established canon of construction. It is a longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680 (1949)). In applying this principle, `we assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.' Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993) (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227). [T]he presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not the least of which is the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind. Id. at 204 n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 1178. The canon also serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963)). 78 The Supreme Court, in recognizing this principle, has carved out an exception for a narrow class of substantive criminal statutes. In United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922), the Court reviewed a criminal fraud provision used to indict individuals who committed acts on a U.S. vessel outside of American territorial waters. The Court reiterated its presumption that, in most cases, if a substantive criminal provision is to be applied extraterritorially, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute. Id. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39. But the Court found that the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated. Id. 79 We have no doubt that the substantive criminal statutes under which Alvarez was charged apply to acts occurring outside the United States. Invoking the rules of construction just described, we reasoned in United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839-41 (9th Cir.1994), that 18 U.S.C. § 1959, the racketeering statute under which Alvarez was indicted, applied extraterritorially. Later, we applied the same principles to conclude that Congress intended to apply statutes proscribing the kidnapping and murder of DEA agents extraterritorially. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1204. 80 These cases reinforce the established proposition that certain criminal statutes are applicable to conduct occurring outside of the borders of the United States. It was precisely this principle of extraterritoriality that led the Supreme Court to conclude that Alvarez could be tried in the United States. Alvarez II, 504 U.S. at 657 & n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2188. And it is this same concept that is invoked in case after case to assert jurisdiction over defendants — whether United States or foreign nationals — for criminal conduct occurring outside of the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421-23 (9th Cir.2002) (applying extraterritoriality principle to bring citizen of St. Vincent and the Grenadines to trial in U.S. for sexual assault on cruise ship in Mexican territorial waters after cruise ship landed in U.S.); United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 739-40 (9th Cir.2002) (applying harboring statute extraterritorially to bring to trial wife of violator of Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act arrested in U.S.); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir.1984) (applying drug importation and distribution statutes extraterritorially to prosecute Malaysian defendant extradited to U.S.); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 87-111, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 6437, at -45 (applying provisions of the Destruction of Aircraft Act extraterritorially to conduct of terrorists who, after being arrested by Philippine and Malaysian police and later turned over to the FBI, were prosecuted for their participation in a conspiracy to bomb United States commercial airliners in Southeast Asia). 25 81 This proposition is not, however, the same as the far-reaching principle advocated by Sosa and the government, namely that a statute with extraterritorial application automatically carries with it the authority for United States agents to detain and arrest suspects worldwide. Extraterritorial application, in other words, does not automatically give rise to extraterritorial enforcement authority. Such a leap is too facile. That Congress may have intended the reach of a criminal statute to extend beyond our borders does not mean that Congress also intended to give federal law enforcement officers unlimited authority to violate the territorial sovereignty of any foreign nation to enforce those laws, or to breach international law in doing so. Bowman does not countenance such an extension, and our cases have never so held. 26 82 In Bowman, the Supreme Court focused on the nature of the criminal conduct as a guide to determining the territorial reach of criminal statutes, but balanced that concern against limitations imposed by international law. The Court stated that [t]he necessary locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of nations. 260 U.S. at 97-98, 43 S.Ct. 39. The Court repeatedly made reference to the locus of the offense[] and the locus of [the] crime ... in a foreign country, not to extraterritorial enforcement powers of the United States authorities. Id. at 97, 99, 43 S.Ct. 39. The court also emphasized that, by extending the reach of the substantive criminal statutes at issue, it was not imposing upon the sovereignty of other states. 27 Id. at 102-03, 43 S.Ct. 39. 83 Similarly, when we interpreted the criminal statutes for which Alvarez was indicted extraterritorially, we did so only with regard to the location of the conduct at issue. And even then we did so cautiously to ensure that we did not unnecessarily impinge on the sovereignty of other states or ignore accepted principles of international law. See Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 839-40; Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1205-06; Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1311-12. 84 Taking the extraterritorial application of the applicable criminal laws as a given, the question then becomes whether Congress has separately authorized the unilateral, extraterritorial enforcement of those provisions in a foreign country by agents of the United States. The United States insists that such authority can be found in a provision in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 878, which grants certain powers to DEA and other law enforcement personnel. 28 85 Subsection 878(a)(3) of that provision authorizes DEA agents to make warrantless arrests on probable cause for suspected felony violations. 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3). Although this subsection grants DEA agents felony arrest power, no language in the statute provides, or even suggests, that Congress intended that power to extend outside the borders of the United States. Given that the provision applies to DEA agents as well as any State or local law enforcement officer designated by the Attorney General, it would in fact be anomalous to read subsection (3) as the statutory basis for a geographically limitless arrest power. Nor can such power be found in the catchall language of subsection (5), which states that DEA agents, as well as designated state and local officials, may perform such other law enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate. 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(5). Again, nothing in the text of the statute remotely indicates that Congress sought to extend DEA arrest authority to any territory outside American borders. 86 Although legislative silence is not necessarily dispositive, these provisions must be construed against the backdrop of Aramco's presumption against extraterritoriality. Even the narrow Bowman exception offers no safe harbor. 29 Section 878(a) regulates executive authority, not criminal conduct. And this provision can hardly be classified as a criminal statute[ ] which [is] ... not logically dependent on [its] locality for the Government's jurisdiction. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39. To hold otherwise would essentially swallow the presumption against extraterritoriality and grant, without express congressional authorization, worldwide law enforcement authority to United States officials (and to state and local officials upon designation by the Attorney General). Virtually a limitless number of statutes would have both extraterritorial reach and the prospect of extraterritorial enforcement. Surely such a result would all but eviscerate the longstanding principle that our laws generally apply only within our territorial borders. 87 Faced with congressional silence on the matter, the United States analogizes this case to United States v. Chen, 2 F.3d 330 (9th Cir.1993). The issue in Chen was whether agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service acted outside their statutory authority by conducting an undercover investigation into the smuggling of Chinese aliens into the United States from international waters. The operation involved planting undercover agents on a chartered boat (the Corinthian) that rendezvoused with a Chinese ship some 320 miles off the coast of California. The agents watched and videotaped as the Chinese aliens boarded the Corinthian, keeping the aliens under surveillance during and after their entry into the United States. Id. at 332. 88 In evaluating whether the INS exceeded its statutory authority, we looked to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), the statute charging the Attorney General with enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and determined that Congress had given the Attorney General extremely broad powers to administer and enforce the immigration laws by directing the Attorney General to perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter. Chen, 2 F.3d at 333 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We inferred from the broad language of § 1103(a) that Congress intended to grant the Attorney General the corresponding power to enforce the immigration laws both within and without the borders of the United States. Id. We also pointed to § 1103(b), which specifically authorizes the Attorney General to delegate this broad authority to the Commissioner of the INS. Finally, we were careful to note that the Attorney General had in fact exercised this authority and had explicitly delegated her broad enforcement powers to the Commissioner under 8 C.F.R. § 2.1. Id. at 334. This chain of authority, we reasoned, provided the legal basis for the INS and its agents to undertake offshore undercover investigations such as this one. Id. 89 But this case is not Chen. First, the INS operation in Chen, which consisted solely of observing and recording events, did not take place within the boundaries of another sovereign, but rather in international waters. That operation — unlike the abduction of a foreign citizen from a friendly neighbor — did not trigger any allegations of a breach of a law of nations. In fact, Chen did not even address international law, as traditional sovereignty concerns were not at issue. This distinction is critical, for one of the bedrock principles embodied in the presumption against extraterritoriality is that we must protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227; see also Kollias, 29 F.3d at 70 (applying the same rationale). If Chen's expansion of INS authority to the high seas did not raise concerns about clashing with laws of another sovereign, the case before us most certainly presents that danger. 90 Second, the demonstrated chain of delegated authority on which Chen relied, extending from Congress to the Attorney General to the INS Commissioner to the INS agents, has not been shown to exist with respect to the DEA. Section 878(a)(3) does grant DEA agents broad authority to make warrantless arrests, and § 878(a)(5) does confer the authority to perform such other law enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate.  21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(5) (emphasis added). But even if Chen were to direct us to infer extraterritoriality from this bare language — a proposition that we do not accept — there is no evidence in this record that the Attorney General has in fact authorized the DEA Administrator to perform whatever extraterritorial enforcement powers the Attorney General may have—either generally or as to this abduction. 30 91 The importance of obtaining specific authorization for extraterritorial law enforcement operations is brought into sharper relief by the fact that had the INS operation in Chen occurred within the boundaries of a foreign nation, rather than in international waters, the Attorney General (or the Commissioner, acting under delegated authority) would have been statutorily required to consult with the Secretary of State before deploying INS agents abroad. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7) ([A]fter consultation with the Secretary of State, [the Attorney General] may, whenever in his judgment such action may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this chapter, detail employees of the Service for duty in foreign countries.). Such a restriction on the Attorney General's extraterritorial enforcement power, even in an area as obviously international as immigration, is evidence that Congress did not contemplate giving field agents the authority to act unilaterally in deciding to cross the borders of a friendly nation and abduct one of its citizens over that nation's objection. If the Attorney General must consult with the Secretary of State before dispatching INS agents to foreign lands, then surely, absent explicit statutory authorization, the Deputy Administrator of the DEA is not free to take it upon himself to send agents across the border into Mexico or to hire Mexican bounty hunters to act as surrogates to abduct a suspect. 92 Chen thus stands for only the proposition that the INS possesses limited delegated authority to conduct an operation on the high seas. At no point did we hold or even suggest that Congress has given license to the executive branch to violate international law in the course of enforcing criminal statutes that have extraterritorial reach. And surely Chen does not support the proposition that Congress has sub silencio delegated to the executive branch the authority to unilaterally enter a friendly nation and abduct one of its citizens in violation of international law. 93 Reading a generally worded statute like 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(5) as evidence that Congress has given the DEA carte blanche to effectuate arrests within any sovereign state would require us to make the untenable assumption that Congress, in drafting such a statute, turned a blind eye to the interests of equal sovereigns and the potential violations of international law that would inevitably ensue. 31 This we cannot do. See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21, 83 S.Ct. 671 (1963) (`[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.' (quoting Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804))). 94 We are not suggesting that Congress lacks the power to enact laws authorizing extraterritorial law enforcement powers. Nor do we question the powers of the political branches to override the principles of sovereignty in some circumstances, should the need arise. Rather, we are simply saying that we cannot impute such an intent where it is not expressed, and Congress has expressed no such intent here. 32 95 Congress has shown that it is quite capable of making clear when arrest powers should have extraterritorial effect. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (Congress' awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute.). In defining the law enforcement powers of the Coast Guard, for example, Congress provided that [t]he Coast Guard may make ... arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). The powers of customs officials on the high seas have likewise been clearly articulated. See 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (permitting customs officials to seize or arrest in those areas of the high seas designated as customs-enforcement areas by the President). 96 More recently, in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 33 Congress included clear and separate provisions pertaining both to the extraterritorial scope of the substantive crime and the executive agency's power to arrest. Section 3261(a), relating to certain members and employees of the Armed Forces, addresses the extraterritorial scope of the substantive crime: 97 Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... shall be punished as provided for that offense. 98 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (emphasis added). Section 3262(a), pertaining to arrest and commitment, explicitly lays out the scope of arrest powers: 99 The Secretary of Defense may designate and authorize any person serving in a law enforcement position in the Department of Defense to arrest, in accordance with applicable international agreements, outside the United States any person described in section 3261(a) [of the Act] if there is probable cause to believe that such person violated section 3261(a). 100 18 U.S.C. § 3262(a) (emphasis added). 34 If Congress thought it could rely on courts to supply extraterritorial scope through searching interpretations of vague statutes, no such language would be necessary. 101 Wishful thinking is no substitute for clear congressional authority. Congress surely knows how and when to expand the reach of its laws beyond our borders. There is little doubt that Congress has the authority to do so; there is also little doubt that it has not done so here. Thus, although we recognize that the kidnapping and murder of DEA agents abroad necessitates the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, absent a clear directive, we cannot conclude that Congress has given the DEA unlimited enforcement powers abroad. Finding no basis in law for the DEA's actions, and left only with a warrant issued by a United States court, we conclude that Alvarez's arrest, and hence his detention, were arbitrary because they were not pursuant to law. Consequently, Alvarez established a tort committed in violation of the law of nations. 102 II. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT — SUBSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DEA AGENTS 103 We next consider whether the district court appropriately substituted the United States for the individual government defendants. The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act), 28 U.S.C. § 2679, provides that, for civil actions arising out of the wrongful act of a federal employee acting within the scope of his official duties, the United States is to be substituted as a defendant and the claims may proceed only under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). This exclusive remedy provision does not apply, however, in an action which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B). Alvarez argues that the ATCA falls within this exemption. 104 But we agree with the three-judge panel's conclusion that the exemption does not apply here, and that the United States was properly substituted for the individual DEA agents. Alvarez-Machain IV, 266 F.3d at 1053. Accordingly, we adopt the relevant portion of that opinion: 105 The district court held that an action under the ATCA was not exempt from the exclusive remedy provision of the Liability Reform Act. It reasoned that it is international law, not the ATCA, that gives individuals fundamental rights. Therefore, a claim under the ATCA is based on a violation of international law, not of the ATCA itself. 106 This reading is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991). In Smith, the Court rejected the argument that a claim for medical malpractice was authorized by the Gonzalez Act and therefore fit the 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B) exception for violations of a statute. The court explained: [n]othing in the Gonzalez Act imposes any obligations or duties of care upon military physicians. Consequently, a physician allegedly committing malpractice under state or foreign law does not `violate' the Gonzalez Act. Smith, 499 U.S. at 174, 111 S.Ct. 1180. 35 The same can be said of the ATCA. The language of § 1350 creates no obligations or duties. Admittedly, the ATCA differs from the Gonzalez Act in that it creates a cause of action for violations of international law, whereas the Gonzalez Act limited the common law liability of doctors. See Marcos II, 25 F.3d at 1475 (rejecting the argument that the ATCA is merely jurisdictional); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.1996); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-86. Nonetheless, we find nothing in this distinction to cause us to deviate from the plain language of the statute. We therefore agree with the district court that Alvarez's claims under the ATCA were subject to substitution under the Liability Reform Act. Accordingly, Alvarez's exclusive remedy against the United States, in lieu of the DEA agents, is through the FTCA. 107 Id. at 1053-54. 108 Because the United States is substituted for the DEA agents, we treat the claims brought against the agents within the context of the FTCA. See § IV infra.