Opinion ID: 1187127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of ors 607.510

Text: The accident occurred on a section of the coast highway which is governed by ORS 607.510, which provides: No person shall allow cattle, horses, mules, sheep, goats, swine or other livestock of any kind, to run at large, be pastured, staked or tethered upon the following state highways: (1) That part of the Oregon coast highway, state highway No. 9, extending from the north boundary of Tillamook County to the south boundary of Lane County.   . Violation of ORS 607.510 is punishable as a misdemeanor. ORS 607.992. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court should have given the following instruction: You are instructed that the injury to plaintiff occurred within the area designated by this statute. The evidence in this case shows that the defendants' cow was upon the highway at the time of the plaintiff's injury. This fact indicates a violation of the statute I have just read to you. You are instructed that if a party is in violation of this statute, such party is negligent as a matter of law unless such party introduces evidence from which you conclude that the party was acting as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. In other words, the defendants would have the burden of proving that there was an excuse for violating the statute, and that such excuse is reasonable. The effect of this instruction would be to instruct the jury to find the defendants at fault from the presence of their cattle on a highway unless they proved that they had an excuse for violating the statute and that the excuse was reasonable. Although ORS 607.510 is not a part of the Oregon Criminal Code, provisions of the Oregon Criminal Code nonetheless relate to its application. ORS 161.035(2) provides that unless otherwise provided, or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of the Criminal Code of 1971 govern the construction and punishment of any offense outside the Criminal Code. ORS 161.095(2) provides: (2) Except as provided in ORS 161.105, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. ORS 161.105(1)(b) provides: (1) Notwithstanding ORS 161.095, a culpable mental state is not required if:    (b) An offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement for the offense or for any material element thereof. As stated above, ORS 607.510 is an offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code. In construing ORS 607.510, our first inquiry must be whether ORS 607.510    clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement   . ORS 161.105(1)(b). Culpable mental state is defined in ORS 161.085(6) as follows: `Culpable mental state' means intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence as these terms are defined in subsections (7), (8), (9) and (10) of this section. [9] Parker v. Reter, 234 Or. 544, 383 P.2d 93 (1963), although decided before the enactment of the Criminal Code in 1971, is relevant to whether ORS 607.510    clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement   . ORS 161.105(1)(b). Parker v. Reter involved a statute which is similar to ORS 607.510. There, as here, the defendant raised cattle on a ranch near a public highway. The applicable statute was ORS 607.045(1), which provided: (1) No person owning or having the custody, possession or control of an animal of a class of livestock shall permit the animal to run at large or to be herded, pastured or to go upon the land of another in a livestock district in which it is unlawful for such class of livestock to be permitted to run at large. In Parker, the plaintiff's automobile collided with two cows which had escaped from the defendant's barn and went upon the adjoining highway. The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law. On the appeal, we construed the statute to extend to cattle running upon a highway and held that the statute was not violated unless the owner was at least negligent in permitting livestock to run at large. 234 Or. at 549, 383 P.2d 93. Quoting from Lemery v. Leonard, 99 Or. 670, 678-679, 196 P. 376 (1921), we stated: `   The precedents cited by the plaintiff ignore the fundamental reason of the definition of running at large. In most instances they depend upon the attendant principle that one cannot be said to have permitted a thing of which he has no knowledge or means of knowledge, so, that, if his animals escape from his inclosure without his knowledge or negligence, he does not come within the prohibitions of the statute against permitting his stock to be at large. To permit means to allow by tacit consent or by not hindering, taking no steps to prevent, or to grant leave by express consent or authorization: Holly & Co. v. Simmons, 38 Tex.Civ.App. 124, 85 S.W. 325.' (Emphasis added.) The verb allow, as used in ORS 607.510, has essentially the same meaning as the verb permit, as used in ORS 607.045(1). Therefore, the words of ORS 607.510  No person shall allow cattle    to run at large, be pastured, staked or tethered     do not    clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement. On the contrary, these words, our holding in Parker v. Reter, supra , and ORS 161.095(2) and ORS 161.105(1) compel the conclusion that one of the culpable mental states defined in ORS 161.085 must be proved. The plaintiff's requested instruction is inconsistent with the requirement that at least criminal negligence must be shown before the statute would be violated. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to give the requested instruction. The plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in receiving the verdict over the plaintiff's assertion of jury misconduct and in its instruction on lookout. We concur with the Court of Appeals' discussion and resolution of these issues, 50 Or. App. at 541-542, 545-546, 623 P.2d 1121, and will not otherwise discuss them herein. Affirmed.