Opinion ID: 1189955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was an appropriation initiated by four counties?

Text: This question is answered in the affirmative. An appropriation of water for beneficial use thereof is effected as of the time the first step is taken to secure it. Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901. We have held that what constitutes the first step is not the same in every proposed diversion because the facts must be taken into consideration in each case on an ad hoc basis; although projects of the scope of Four Counties have been before this court in previous years. For example, in Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel, etc., Co., 106 Colo. 384, 106 P.2d 363, we affirmed the granting of conditional decrees on the basis that appropriations were effected by the conducting of surveys in pursuance of a plan to bring water from the Western Slope to the South Platte Basin on the East Slope. In that case we said:    All the facts and circumstances surrounding these claims indicate an enterprise of considerable magnitude. Only under the circumstances before us would it be possible for private enterprise to bring water from the Western Slope to the South Platte basin on the Eastern Slope. Until there is a reasonable assurance culminating in conditional decrees, such as are before us, it would not be possible for any private enterprise to risk such a large amount of capital as is necessary to complete the same.    The first step taken in the instant case toward acquiring decrees was the making of a survey of the project, which is not an unusual practice.    (Emphasis supplied.) Thus it is clear that Four Counties was entitled to an appropriation date as of the time of its field survey. The trial court characterized these as merely reconnaissance surveys and being preliminary in nature. However, we find from the record that they were, in fact, the basis for filing of maps and statements with the State Engineer: the first within three months timein Septemberand the others the following January, a total of six months for surveys and detailed maps. A survey of such depth as to be the basis for detailed maps is one that we have said can be used as the date of the initiation of the appropriation. As we said in Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association, supra: The District commenced work on its Red Cliff Project by survey on August 10, 1956, and on October 4, 1956, filed with the state engineer its map and statement in conformity with the provisions of CRS '53, 147-4-1. Counsel for the District vigorously and persuasively argue that, having strictly complied with the Map and Statement Act, CRS '53, 147-4-1, it is entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of relation of its priority date back to the date it commenced its survey. We subscribe to this contention providing there has been due diligence as required by CRS '53, 147-10-6, supra. (Now C.R.S. 1963, 148-10-6). (Emphasis supplied.) This evidence of survey work commenced in June, 1958, followed by preparation and filing of maps and statements as early as September, 1958, also constitutes due diligence since the initial survey. It was error for the court to ignore this earlier six-month period in its finding that due diligence had been shown only since January 26, 1959. Third Question To Be Determined: DOES THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT THE COURT FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE WATER; THAT THE SHOWING OF NEED WAS AT MOST SPECULATIVE, AND THAT THE PROJECT WAS NOT FEASIBLE, WAS FANTASTIC AND WITHOUT REASONABLE PROMISE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.? This question is answered in the negative. The finding of the trial court in this regard was, at most, only an opinion and not a finding of fact. The answers to most of the questions in the mind of the trial court lie in the future. The court applied yardsticks outside those set forth in the Metropolitan case; and, if the trial court's reasoning was to apply, there would be required certainty about the future when no forthright man could make such a judgment. The court, in effect, required proof of future needs for water with certainty at the time of the application for the conditional decree; and further required that no changes be made in the project once commenced; and that detailed planning for every phase of the multi-million dollar project be completed. The court, in effect, required proof with certainty that the project would be constructed, and that the construction would be financially feasible As we said in Metropolitan, supra: Similar views and fears prevailed with reference to the Big Thompson, Moffat Tunnel, Roberts Tunnel and other major projectsto many if not to most people, these projects appeared to be the dreams of visionaries; today they are beneficent realities. The trial court had no right to substitute its opinion as to the course of future events, for that of those charged with the duty of supplying adequate water for municipalities and other public bodies, who have made careful studies of the questions and problems presented and have in good faith put their vision, work, money and energies into a program by which they seek to put the public waters of the state to beneficial use. If they have miscalculated and fail, the loss is theirsif they succeed, it will be for the eternal benefit of the peoples of the state of Colorado. We further commented on similar findings of the trial court in the Metropolitan case as follows: Passage of time and events occurring prior to granting any final decree will produce definite answers to the questions upon which the trial judge made findings based on speculative and unsupporting evidence, and used as the basis for denying any decrees. Only time can definitely determine whether all, a part, or none of the claimed water is needed. Time and work will demonstrate whether the engineering and construction plans are feasible and can be successfully completed. Time will tell whether finances can be made available. If these prerequisites to a final decree are not brought to pass within a reasonable time, the conditional decrees must be cancelled or modified as only partially established. No final decree can be awarded until the water is put to beneficial use, and then only for such amount as a put to such use. It is inconceivable that any development of the magnitude of that proposed by the Association    can be completed without the aid of the conditional decree statutes. Assurance of a decree on completion of a project is a prerequisite to complete financing, engineering and construction.    The evidence at the hearing was about as certain as it was possible to present. It was shown that $245,602.40 had been expended up to the date of the hearing; most of the rights of way had been obtained; 2.25 miles of the ditch for which claim was made had been constructed, including measuring of flumes and diversion dams; construction of 3.9 miles of ditch in the southeast corner of North Park was completed, concrete indications of a present and completed intention to take. Surveys were made to determine the future water needs of persons living in the Four Counties area, showing that on projected population growth 395,000 persons would be living within the proposed Four Counties to be served by the year 1970 and 740,000 by 1985. It was estimated that 1,145,000 people would be in the area by the year 2000. This would create demands for additional water of from 35,000 to 45,000 acre feet by the year 1970; from 85,000 to 146,000 acre feet by the year 1985; and between 156,000 and 268,000 acre feet by the year 2000. In view of the fact that waters from the natural streams in the area are virtually 100% appropriated, the only source of water available would be from a transmountain diversion project such as here presented. Aware of the problems presented in projects of such magnitude and that their solution is not always resolved in detail, either from the outset or at the time of the hearing for a conditional decree, we further said in the Metropolitan case:    The conditional decree statute is designed to meet the very problems confronting the Association, and it should be construed and applied so as to aid and encourage, rather than to block development and early use of the water resources of the state. Fourth Question To Be Determined: DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WERE CHANGES IN THE PLAN OF SUCH NATURE AS TO INDICATE NO FIXED INTENTION TO TAKE OF IF THERE WAS SUCH AN INTENTION IT HAD BEEN ABANDONED? This question is answered in the affirmative. There is nothing in the evidence that would support a finding of abandonment. Of the changes referred to, all but one involved amendments to the storage and transmission system first envisioned by Four Counties. A change of diversion is not involved. Evidence such as shown herein could not form the basis for abandonment of claimant's intention to take water from a particular source. If a contemplated or actual diversion of water is not altered at its source, the doctrine of relation back should apply. Apparently relying on some of the language in City and County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Conservancy District, 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992, the court also concluded that the abandonment of headgates on ditch No. 1 and an increase in the take from headgates on ditch No. 3 constituted such a major change in plans that the initiation of the appropriation could not relate back to the first step taken, i.e., the survey. The court thus advanced this as another reason for adopting the January 26, 1959 date as the first date from which due diligence had been shown. The alterations in the plans on subsequent maps filed did not change the source from which the water was to be taken nor the amount claimed. It was effected in such a short period of time as to be not a change at all. In fact, the evidence was that the only revision in the maps and statements originally filed with the State Engineer was made because further engineering studies showed that it was more efficient to transport the waters for which claim was made by gravity to a single reservoir than to transport the waters to North Park at two places. The revision claimed no new water and changed no point of diversion. It does, however, result in several points of diversion not being used. The differences actually result in a more efficient, economical plan; and rather than showing no fixed intention to take, they demonstrate continuous engineering studies with a purposeful, deliberate and diligent effort to take all steps necessary to divert the water and apply it to beneficial use. On the evidence here presented, what was said by Mr. Justice Moore in his dissenting opinion in City and County of Denver v. Northern Colorado District, supra, applies to these facts and not the language in the majority opinion. The dissent discussed the following ruling: As will be seen    there are some changes which can be made in the plan of a water development which will not constitute a relinquishment of the project. One criterion for determination of this problem was used by the United States Supreme Court in the case of State of Wyoming v. [State of] Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 42 S.Ct. 552, 66 L.Ed. 999, where the changes planned had to do with the determination of `whether' the would-be appropriator would proceed at all with the diversion project. Such changes are to be distinguished from those which go rather to selection of the most economical or effective means to be employed for the accomplishment of a diversion and use of water, concerning which there already is a fixed and definite intention to take. Once the decision has been made to proceed with the project, continuing investigations and changes are simply evidence of diligence and endeavor to accomplish the greatest good at a minimum of cost to the public, not abandonment of the project. Fifth Question To Be Determined: IS THE ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF COMPLETING THE PROJECT A TEST TO BE APPLIED UPON APPLICATION FOR A CONDITIONAL DECREE? This question is answered in the negative. As has been indicated earlier, the purpose of the conditional decree statute is to determine if an appropriation has been initiated. The requirement that the parties appear before the court under C.R.S.1963, 148-10-8, to report on the diligence pursued and the additional steps taken is designed to enable the court to check on whether evidence of insufficient finances or the economic non-feasibility of the project appear in more concrete form. One cannot reasonably expect a water diversion plan of this size to be without problems and difficulties. Claimant is under an obligation to exert reasonable diligence to overcome these obstacles or lose his claim. At each of the statutory reviews of the prosecution of the claim, there will have to be presented progress reports of financial plans and sufficient work to prove that the project can and will be completed. As we said again in the Metropolitan case, If they have miscalculated and fail, the loss is theirsif they succeed, it will be for the eternal benefit of the peoples of the state of Colorado. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a conditional decree in accordance with the claim filed and prayed for.