Opinion ID: 360148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant ernesto bosch

Text: 13 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S.Const. amend. VI. It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). 14 Appellant Bosch has briefly described several incidents that occurred during the course of his trial, raising questions as to the competency of his attorney. He focuses on one to support his claim that he received constitutionally-deficient representation from his trial counsel. At the close of the defense's presentation, during which appellant did not testify, Bosch's trial counsel offered into evidence a pretrial motion for reduction of bail, Exhibit K, which contained a statement that Bosch had two prior narcotics convictions. 15 During a subsequent conference in the trial judge's chambers, appellant's counsel explained that he had submitted this motion to demonstrate foul play on the government's part in proving its case against appellant. In its original indictment against Ernesto Bosch, the government had listed the date of the alleged offense as June 9, 1975. The day after the indictment was issued appellant filed, and appeared in court for a hearing on, the motion to reduce bail. Several weeks later, a superseding indictment was issued, which listed the date of the offense as June 10, 1975. Appellant's counsel theorized that the second indictment was issued to rebut appellant's alibi defense for June 9, a defense which the prosecution allegedly learned about from a United States Marshal who overheard a conversation between appellant and his counsel during the course of the bail hearing. To prove one aspect of this theory, that he and his client were in court during the period between the issuance of the two indictments and, therefore, could have been overheard by a marshal, appellant's counsel introduced the bail motion into evidence because the clerk had stamped on the motion the date on which it was filed. 16 Trial counsel was aware when he introduced the motion that it contained references to past crimes. He made no attempt, however, to delete this from the document prior to introducing it into evidence or at any time thereafter. Evidently, it never occurred to defense counsel that he could prove his client's presence in court on June 10 without also informing the jury of the prior convictions. 17 During their deliberations, the jurors asked: 18 Are we allowed to consider the Government and Defense Exhibits? 19 I'm referring specifically to Defendant's Exhibit K which is attached. 20 The trial judge, after meeting with counsel, instructed the jury: 21 (Y)ou are to consider it, each and every exhibit admitted in evidence. 22 Sometime later, the jury sent the following message to the district court: 23 In Exhibit K it is stated that Mr. Victor Ernesto Bosch has served two sentences for violation of the Narcotics Act. Most of us have been influenced about his character with this statement. (Please see Item # 3 Exhibit K.) Are we allowed to be influenced by this statement? 24 When informed by the court of the jury's questions as to the references, appellant's counsel requested neither a mistrial, an instruction to disregard, nor a limiting instruction. He appeared content to leave the matter of how to respond to the jury's query entirely to the district judge, even when informed by the judge that he intended to instruct the jurors that they could consider the statement for any purpose, which he did. Our reading of the colloquy between defense counsel, the court and the prosecutor leads to the conclusion that defense counsel was so captivated by his own theory of government foul play that he failed to recognize the import of what the jury was saying. 25 Heretofore, we have adhered to the rule that ineffective counsel . . . means representation such as to make a mockery, sham or a farce of the trial. United States v. Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 683-84 (1st Cir. 1978). The majority of the other circuits, however, have within the last decade replaced the sham and mockery standard with a reasonably competent assistance standard, or facsimiles thereof. 3 Since incompetence confined to one aspect of a case, as it is here, cannot generally be said to render the entire proceedings a farce and mockery of justice, and, since appellant's claim has merit when considered under the reasonably competent assistance rule, we think that this appeal is an appropriate one in which to reexamine our adherence to the farce and mockery standard. 26 The farce and mockery standard appears to have been established in Diggs v. Welch, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 148 F.2d 667, Cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889, 65 S.Ct. 1576, 89 L.Ed. 2002 (1945). Rickenbacker v. Warden, Auburn Correctional Facility, 550 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826, 98 S.Ct. 103, 54 L.Ed.2d 85 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 693 (6th Cir. 1974). In the view of the Diggs court, the sixth amendment only guaranteed assistance of counsel, not effective assistance. Diggs v. Welch, supra, 80 U.S.App.D.C. at 6, 148 F.2d at 668. Therefore, the court treated the incompetence of counsel claim before it as arising under the due process clause's guarantee of a fair trial. The court held that, to constitute a violation of an accused's right to a fair trial, his counsel's incompetence had to be so gross as to render the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice. Id. 80 U.S.App.D.C. at 7, 148 F.2d at 669. 27 This view of the basis of ineffective assistance claims can no longer withstand analysis. 4 It is now generally accepted that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann, supra, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14, 90 S.Ct. 1441; Rickenbacker, supra; Beasley, supra, 491 F.2d at 694; United States v. DeCoster, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 331, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (1973). 28 In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), a case dealing with the validity of a guilty plea following a coerced confession, the Court stated that the proper test for measuring the competency of counsel's advice to plead guilty is whether the advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. The McMann standard has been extended to apply to sixth amendment ineffective assistance claims in general. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543, 545 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 1885, 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978) (En banc as to adoption of McMann standard); Beasley, supra, 491 F.2d at 696; DeCoster, supra, 159 U.S.App.D.C. at 331 & n.16, 487 F.2d at 1202 & n.16; Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 n.25 (3d Cir. 1970) (En banc ). In light of these circumstances, we are persuaded that the farce and mockery standard is no longer appropriate to determine the merit of ineffective assistance claims. In its stead, we follow the lead of most other circuits and adopt the reasonably competent assistance standard, which is shorthand for the tenet that the quality of a defense counsel's representation should be within the range of competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases. Marzullo, supra, 561 F.2d at 543, 544-45; United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 1977); DeCoster, supra, 159 U.S.App.D.C. at 331, 487 F.2d at 1202; Moore, supra, 432 F.2d at 736. 5 29 Under the reasonably competent assistance standard, effective representation is not the same as errorless representation. Marzullo, supra,561 F.2d at 544. Even the most skillful criminal attorneys make errors during a trial. The myriad of decisions which must be made by defense counsel quickly and in the pressure cooker of the courtroom makes errorless representation improbable, if not impossible. This is particularly so since the determination of whether there have been errors is made by a court far removed from the heat of trial combat and with the time necessary to make a reasoned judgment. Thus, a choice between trial tactics, which appears unwise only in hindsight, does not constitute constitutionally-deficient representation under the reasonably competent assistance standard. To state and prove a claim under this standard, a defendant must allege and demonstrate that his counsel's error clearly resulted from neglect or ignorance rather than from informed, professional deliberation. Id. at 544. 30 Application of this standard does not mean that a court should second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics, Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977), nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect him or herself against allegations of inadequacy, must waste the court's time with futile or frivolous motions, Wright, supra, 573 F.2d at 684. It is sufficient if (counsel) is prepared and conducts the defense with reasonable knowledge and skill with an exercise of knowledgeable choices of trial tactics. Cooper, supra. 31 In the present case, although admission of the bail motion bearing the filing date was arguably part of a defense strategy, admission of the contents of the motion, particularly the references to appellant's prior narcotics convictions, bore no relation, and clearly was not necessary, to the implementation of that strategy. It is in this respect that the cases cited by appellee are distinguishable. In those cases, the admissions of the prior convictions themselves were part of the defense strategy. Bad Cob, supra, 560 F.2d at 883; United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051, 97 S.Ct. 763, 50 L.Ed.2d 767 (1977). 32 United States v. Goodwin, 531 F.2d 347, 350-52 (6th Cir. 1976), and Marzullo, supra, are more applicable to the present case than the cases cited by appellee because counsel's performance in Goodwin and Marzullo was not attributable to a poor choice of trial strategy, but to inexcusable ignorance or senseless disregard of their clients' rights. In Goodwin, counsel's ignorance of the elements of the crime with which his client was charged resulted in him allowing the defendant to make statements at a pretrial hearing that, in fact, amounted to a confession. The Sixth Circuit held that this violated the defendant's right to effective assistance under the standard, reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. United States v. Goodwin, supra, at 348. This standard is similar, if not in effect the same, as reasonably competent assistance. In Marzullo, defense counsel failed, for no apparent reason, to move for exclusion of the jury pool from the courtroom when he knew that the court was about to be informed about information irrelevant and prejudicial to the defense. Counsel next waived some of his peremptory challenges during voir dire before he had had the opportunity to question any of the prospective jurors about whether they had been influenced by the previously revealed damaging information. Furthermore, he never requested an instruction that the jury disregard the information. The Fourth Circuit held: We are persuaded that (counsel's) representation of defendant with respect to this aspect of the case (selection of an unbiased jury) was outside the range of competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases and thus constitutes a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right. Id. at 546-47. In the present case, the admission of the reference to past convictions was not only not a part of any trial strategy, but also, as defense counsel himself admits, not due to oversight. Trial counsel was aware that this harmful information was in the motion at the time he offered it into evidence. Given that appellant did not take the stand, and that no purpose beneficial to appellant has been suggested or is apparent as a rationale for admission of these references, we can only reach the conclusion that it would have been clear to a reasonably competent criminal attorney that admission of these notations of past, related convictions could only cause significant harm to the appellant's case. Counsel's subsequent failure to move for a mistrial, after the jury clearly stated that the prior convictions had influenced its view of appellant's character, thus making clear the critical importance of the offending references, commands this conclusion. Consequently, we find that trial counsel's offer of these references into evidence clearly resulted from neglect or ignorance, rather than from informed, professional deliberation, and thus deprived Ernesto Bosch of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 33 The circuits are split on the question of whether an infraction of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance can ever be treated as harmless error, and if so, which party has the burden of proof. 6 We shall not deal with that issue here, however, because, regardless of which position we took, our decision that appellant's conviction should be reversed would remain the same. Upon reviewing the record, we are unable to declare a belief that (the sixth amendment ineffective assistance error) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The evidence against appellant, although perhaps sufficient to sustain the verdict under the substantial evidence rule, was not overwhelming. United States v. Taylor, 508 F.2d 761, 765 (5th Cir. 1975), Appeal after remand, 530 F.2d 49 (5 Cir. 1976). The government's case consisted primarily of the testimony of admitted accomplices, whose credibility was attacked. Moreover, the jury stated to the court during the course of its deliberations that most of its members had actually been influenced by the references to past convictions in judging appellant's character. Accordingly, since the error was clearly not harmless in the present case, we leave for another day the issue of whether deprivation of effective assistance can ever constitute harmless error. 7 34 There is another aspect to this case which must be discussed. The court's instructions to the jury in response to both questions about Exhibit  K were clearly erroneous. Evidence of other crimes . . . is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 248 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 611 (1st Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987, 96 S.Ct. 396, 46 L.Ed.2d 304 (1975). Thus, the district court should not have instructed the jurors, as it in effect did, that they could consider the references to appellant's past crimes in terms of whether he was disposed to commit the offense with which he was then charged. 35 The rationale for the court's instructions was, at least, partially based on the invited error doctrine: (w)hen a defendant, acting through competent counsel, chooses to open up constitutionally forbidden subject matter, he may not effectively complain that his own trial strategy denied him his constitutional rights. United States v. White, 377 F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir.), Cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884, 88 S.Ct. 143, 19 L.Ed.2d 180 (1967). The court's reliance on the invited error doctrine was, however, misplaced. In the instant case, appellant was not acting through competent counsel and the court should have become aware of that during the conference in its chambers on the jury's query regarding Exhibit K. First, appellant's counsel admitted during the conference that he had been aware when he introduced the Exhibit that it contained the references to appellant's prior narcotics convictions. It appears from his statements at the conference that he had simply never thought of attempting to delete the references before admitting the motion. Second, when he was informed during the conference that at least some members of the jury were influenced by these references, he made no attempt to mitigate this harm by seeking a curative instruction or mistrial. 36 Although a court is entitled to rely to a great extent on the parties' attorneys to protect their own clients' interests, the court, too, has a duty to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cuevas, 510 F.2d 848, 850 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir.), Cert. denied sub nom., Ditter v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S.Ct. 690, 42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974); ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 1.1(a) (Tent. Draft 1972). Since the court should have become aware during the conference in chambers that counsel's performance was less than adequate, and since the jury was obviously prejudiced by its consideration of the references to the prior crimes, we find that the court by adhering to the invited error doctrine failed in its duty to ensure a fair trial. Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); United States v. Plante, 472 F.2d 829, 831 n.3 (1st Cir.), Cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 1932, 36 L.Ed.2d 411 (1973); Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878, 882 (5th Cir. 1967). 37 Since prejudicial constitutional errors occurred during the course of the trial, Ernesto Bosch's conviction is reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. 8