Opinion ID: 1494134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Easements

Text: We apply basic principles of contract construction and interpretation when considering an express easement's terms. DeWitt County, 1 S.W.3d at 100; Armstrong v. Skelly Oil, Co., 81 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd). The contracting parties' intentions, as expressed in the grant, determine the scope of the conveyed interest. See DeWitt County, 1 S.W.3d at 103 (stating that the scope of the easement holder's rights must be determined by the terms of the grant); see also Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Tex.1964) (holding that parties' intentions are determined by interpreting the real-property grant's language); Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957) (same); City of Dallas v. Etheridge, 152 Tex. 9, 253 S.W.2d 640, 642 (1952) (same); Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 (providing that an easement should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding the creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created). When the grant's terms are not specifically defined, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning. DeWitt, 1 S.W.3d at 101; see also Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 cmt. d ([Easement] language should be interpreted to accord with the meaning an ordinary purchaser would ascribe to it....); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(a) (Unless a different intention is manifested, where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.). An easement's express terms, interpreted according to their generally accepted meaning, therefore delineate the purposes for which the easement holder may use the property. See DeWitt, 1 S.W.3d at 100, 103; see also Coleman v. Forister, 514 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex.1974); Vahlsing v. Harrell, 178 F.2d 622, 624 (5th Cir.1949) (applying Texas law). Nothing passes by implication except what is reasonably necessary to fairly enjoy the rights expressly granted. Coleman, 514 S.W.2d at 903; Bland Lake Fishing & Hunting Club v. Fisher, 311 S.W.2d 710, 715-16 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1958, no writ). Thus, if a particular purpose is not provided for in the grant, a use pursuing that purpose is not allowed. See Coleman, 514 S.W.2d at 903; Kearney & Son v. Fancher, 401 S.W.2d 897, 904-05 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex.1966). If the rule were otherwise, then the typical power line or pipeline easement, granted for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a power line or pipeline across specified property, could be used for any other purpose, unless the grantor by specific language negated all other purposes. Kearney & Son, 401 S.W.2d at 904-05 (citing Lange, 4 Texas Practice, Land Titles § 384, at 173); see also City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal.2d 576, 110 P.2d 983, 985 (1941) (It is not necessary for [the easement grantor] to make any reservation to protect his interests in the land, for what he does not convey, he still retains.). The common law does allow some flexibility in determining an easement holder's rights. In particular, the manner, frequency, and intensity of an easement's use may change over time to accommodate technological development. Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.10. But such changes must fall within the purposes for which the easement was created, as determined by the grant's terms. See id. § 1.2 cmt. d (The holder of the easement ... is entitled to make only the uses reasonably necessary for the specified purpose.); § 4.10 & cmt. a (noting that manner, frequency, and intensity of easement may change to take advantage of technological advances, but only for purposes for which easement was created); see, e.g., Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 854-55, 858 (Wyo.1996) (holding that, under easement granted for an electric or telephone line, the easement holder could increase the electricity-carrying capacity and replace the static-telephone line with fiber-optics line as a matter of normal development of the respective rights and use); City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio v. Karp, 585 S.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ) (holding that a transformer easement permitted its holder to replace a malfunctioning underground transformer with an aboveground one as a matter of normal development); Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Ashby, 530 S.W.2d 628, 629, 632-33 (Tex. Civ.App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that, under the electric-transmission easement at issue, the easement holder could replace wooden towers with new steel towers and could increase the electricity-carrying capacity); Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.10 illus. 13 (stating that, under a 1940s telephone easement, easement holder could mount transmitters on its poles for cellular-telephone transmissions unless doing so would unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servient estate). Thus, contrary to Marcus Cable's argument, an express easement encompasses only those technological developments that further the particular purpose for which the easement was granted. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) §§ 1.2 cmt. d., 4.2 cmt. a, 4.10 & cmt. a. Otherwise, easements would effectively become possessory, rather than nonpossessory, land interests. See id. § 1.2 cmt. d (distinguishing between an easement that permits its owner to use land for only specified purposes, and a possessory land interest that permits its owner to make any use of the property). The emphasis our law places upon an easement's express terms serves important public policies by promoting certainty in land transactions. In order to evaluate the burdens placed upon real property, a potential purchaser must be able to safely rely upon granting language. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 cmt. d. Similarly, those who grant easements should be assured that their conveyances will not be construed to undermine private-property rightslike the rights to exclude others or to obtain a profitany more than what was intended in the grant. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164. Marcus Cable suggests that we should give greater weight to the public benefit that results from the wide distribution of cable-television services, arguing that technological advancement in Texas will be substantially impeded if the cooperative's easement is not read to encompass cable-television use. [1] But even if that were so, we may not circumvent the contracting parties' intent by disregarding the easement's express terms and the specific purpose for which it was granted. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 & cmt. d (indicating that a court may not adopt an easement interpretation based on public policy unless that interpretation is supported by the grant's terms). Adhering to basic easement principles, we must decide not what is most convenient to the public or profitable to Marcus Cable, but what purpose the contracting parties intended the easement to serve. See Dauenhauer v. Devine, 51 Tex. 480, 489-90 (1879). Hill County Electric could only permit Marcus Cable to use its easement so long as that use is devoted exclusively to the purposes of the grant. Cantu, 38 S.W.2d at 877. Finally, Marcus Cable contends that its use should be allowed because attaching cable-television wires to Hill County Electric's utility poles does not materially increase the burden to the servient estate. But again, if a use does not serve the easement's express purpose, it becomes an unauthorized presence on the land whether or not it results in any noticeable burden to the servient estate. See McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1934, writ ref'd) ([E]very unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass even if no damage is done or the injury is slight....); see also Rio Costilla Co-op. Livestock Ass'n v. W.S. Ranch Co., 81 N.M. 353, 467 P.2d 19, 25 (1970); Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me. 532, 175 A.2d 732, 735-36 (1961). Thus, the threshold inquiry is not whether the proposed use results in a material burden, but whether the grant's terms authorize the proposed use. With these principles in mind, we turn to the easement at issue in this case.