Opinion ID: 800677
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Transfer Coordinator Curtis Chaffee

Text: Chaffee's potential involvement in increasing King's security level also came in multiple forms, none of which are factually disputed: (1) he emailed Central Office the information it ultimately relied on in making the decision to increase King's security level, (2) he implemented the decision to increase King's security level by issuing and then editing the initial security screen, and (3) he subsequently edited the screen several months later with a new reason for the increase. Just like Wells, he could be liable for the first action if an increase in security was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his actions and proximately caused by them, and if he intended to retaliate against King for his protected conduct. Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 702. Chaffee could be liable for the latter actions if he knew or should have known that implementing his superior's orders would violate King's rights. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 393.
Just like the Wells Memo, Chaffee's email to Central office proximately and actually caused the resulting security increase by Central Office. There is no indication in the forty minutes between Zamiara's receipt of Chaffee's email and Zamiara's reply issuing the security increase that Zamiara received any additional information regarding King. See R. 172 (Trial Tr. II at 166:19-167:20). For the same reasons discussed above in addressing the Wells Memo, we disagree with the district court's conclusion that Chaffee was not involved in the increased security level. That conclusion is the result of a misapplication of the correct law to the undisputed facts giving rise to the increase in King's security level. The next inquiry is whether the district court committed clear error in finding that Chaffee was not motivated by King's exercise of his constitutional rights. Compared to Wells, Chaffee appears to have held no specific malice or ill-will toward King. However, the desire to punish someone for protected conduct does not require malice. The record clearly reflected that Chaffee was motivated at least in part by King's protected conduct, even if he did not realize that doing so would constitute retaliation. [15] We therefore take no issue with the district court's finding that Chaffee's testimony was credible, King IV, 2009 WL 3424221, at , because Chaffee's statement that he took no action for the purpose of retaliating against Mr. King, R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 154:6-8), says nothing about whether Chaffee understood that the legal definition of retaliation included taking an adverse action against King in response to his protected conduct, which included assisting others in filing grievances. Indeed, if Chaffee is credible, his testimony directly establishes that he was improperly motivated by King's protected conduct. In his email to Zamiara, Chaffee specifically cites King's assistance with filing grievances and participation in the Warden's Forum as examples of the problems King was causing that required him to be transferred: It seems he can instigate them to create problems (grievances, complaints to Warden's Forum, etc.) while he remains uninvolved directly. Currently, he is printing out grievances about various issues and having other prisoners sign them and send them in. R. 130-3, Ex. 18 (Chaffee/Zamiara Email). Chaffee also acknowledged being told that King was being transferred because he was instigating other prisoners to file grievances. R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 139:9-12). Chaffee testified that if Harry had told him of other forms of misconduct or manipulative behavior, he would have included it in the email, and that if King had not been involved in the Warden's Forum and had not been assisting other prisoners file grievances, he likely would not have been transferred at all. Id. at 142:13-16. [16] An adverse action, like an increase in security, was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Chaffee's request, and the record clearly demonstrates that King's assistance in filing grievances motivated Chaffee to comply with his superior's order requesting the transfer. [17]
With respect to implementing the increase in security, Chaffee admits making the change to King's transfer order to increase him to a level III. R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 140:3-11). These changes were necessary to effect the transfer and increase in security ordered by Central Office. We have already held that Chaffee is not entitled to qualified immunity, King III, slip op. at 4, and the evidence supports that he knew or should have known that increasing a prisoner's security level in response to protected conduct would be a violation of King's First Amendment rights. The question is therefore whether he knew or should have known the increase was in fact impermissibly motivated by the protected conduct. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 393. Chaffee could not recall having any discussions with Zamiara outside of his email. R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 146:1-5). However, only forty minutes passed between Chaffee's email and Zamiara's response. Chaffee testified that he had no reason to believe Zamiara's response to increase security was for retaliation, and that he assumed that [Zamiara] knew something I didn't know. R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 156:18-25). However, this assertion is not factually plausible in light of Chaffee's other statements that are directly contrary. [18] He conceded at trial that absent a few narrow exceptions, increasing a prisoner's security level was a punitive act. Id. at 136:13-137:15. And he conceded at his deposition that he believed Zamiara's response was based entirely on the underlying email that he himself had sent. R. 130, Ex. 7 (Chaffee Dep. at 38:24-39:20). This is consistent with the testimony of Deputy Warden Harry that Central Office would have relied solely on information coming from Brooks regarding what action to take against King. R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 122:6-14). The record establishes that Chaffee knew or should have known that Zamiara's rapid response of increasing King's security level was motivated by King's assistance with the grievance process, because the evidence is clear that the increase was the result of Chaffee's email, which was itself motivated by King's assistance with the grievance process.
Chaffee's last relevant action was editing King's security screen to replace the initial notation with the notation that King was manipulative. Here, Chaffee was clearly following the order of a superior, Warden Berghuis, to revise the screen. R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 147:24-148:3; 149:7-11). Unlike the forty-minute window we discussed above, the passage of time here was almost a month. Even if Berghuis's action was retaliatory, nothing in the record suggests that at this point Chaffee knew or should have known that Berghuis's order was meant to retaliate and not based on additional information obtained during the course of the intervening month. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 393 (citing Villanueva, 659 F.2d at 854).
The district court's conclusion with respect to Chaffee suffered from the same legal error regarding proximate causation in a retaliation case as the district court's conclusion with respect to Wells. In light of the overwhelming record evidence demonstrating Chaffee's actions were motivated by King's protected conduct, the district court also clearly erred in finding that Chaffee was not improperly motivated. We therefore hold that the district court erred in entering judgment against King in favor of Chaffee with respect to some, but not all, of his undisputed acts in this case. The judgment in favor of Chaffee is vacated, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.