Opinion ID: 853293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Matthew's complaint against DNR

Text: The Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) allows suits against governmental entities for torts committed by their employees but grants immunity under the specific circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3. Peavler v. Monroe County Bd. of Comm'rs, 528 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ind.1988). Whether a governmental entity is immune from liability under the ITCA is a question of law for the court to decide. Gibson v. Evansville Vanderburgh Bldg. Comm'n, 725 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. Because the ITCA is in derogation of the common law, we construe it narrowly against the grant of immunity. Greater Hammond Community Servs., Inc. v. Mutka, 735 N.E.2d 780, 781 (Ind.2000). The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing that its conduct comes within the ITCA. Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 46. DNR asserts that it is immune from liability in this case under subsection nine of the ITCA which dictates: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from: ... the act or omission of anyone other than the governmental entity or the governmental entity's employee. Ind.Code § 34-13-3-3(9). Relying on Spier v. City of Plymouth, 593 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), DNR argues that it is immune under this subsection because the proximate cause of Matthew's injuries is the act of Matthew's father in leaving live ammunition accessible to his son while he was at work. Br. of Appellee at 8. We addressed subsection nine immunity in Hinshaw v. Board of Commissioners of Jay County, 611 N.E.2d 637 (Ind.1993), and specifically rejected the rationale in Spier that subsection nine confers immunity to governmental entities and employees when an unforeseeable act of a third party is an intervening, proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 638. In determining when governmental entities and employees may seek immunity under subsection nine, we observed that [t]he law has long recognized a number of circumstances in which tort liability may be vicariously imposed upon persons for the conduct of agents who are not employees or subject to any right of control by the employer. Id. at 640 (collecting cases). Therefore, we narrowly construed subsection nine immunity, finding that it only applies in actions seeking to impose vicarious liability [2] by reason of conduct of third parties other than government employees acting within the scope of their employment. Id. Under such circumstances, the alleged basis of governmental entity liability is the act or omission of a third person not within the scope of employment as a government employee. Id. In this case Matthew is not seeking to impose vicarious liability on DNR by reason of conduct of a third party other than [a] government employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment. Id. Rather, Matthew's complaint is founded upon the acts of the officer acting within the scope of his employment for DNR. Therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DNR cannot be sustained on the ground that DNR is immune under subsection nine of the ITCA.