Opinion ID: 2069797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Prior Transactions

Text: It is well established that `the admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not interfere with the trial justice's decision unless a clear abuse of that discretion is apparent.' State v. Andreozzi, 798 A.2d 372, 374-75 (R.I.2002) (quoting Malinowski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 792 A.2d 50, 53 (R.I.2002)). In this case, the trial justice admitted evidence of Reis's and Sepe's previous drug delivery transactions pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. We will reverse the trial justice's ruling only if we find that he abused his discretion in applying Rule 404(b)'s exception to the prohibition of evidence of other bad acts. See Andreozzi, 798 A.2d at 374-75. It is well settled that evidence of past, uncharged criminal behavior of an accused is generally inadmissible in a criminal trial to prove a defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 742 (R.I.1994) (citing State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043, 1044-45 (R.I.1994)). This is because the recognition that the prejudicial effect of such evidence has been traditionally viewed as outweighing its probative value by acting to predispose jurors to believe a defendant's guilt. Id. (citing State v. Colvin, 425 A.2d 508, 511 (R.I.1981)). Additionally, admitting this kind of evidence presents the risk that jurors might convict a defendant for a crime other than the one being charged. See id. (citing State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 624, 382 A.2d 526, 531-32 (1978)). Rule 404(b) represents an exception to the above-stated general rule. See id. The rule allows the admission of prior bad acts if they are `interwoven' with the offense charged. Pratt, 641 A.2d at 742 (quoting State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I. 1993)). Past bad acts are also admissible to prove a defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident. Id. (quoting Rule 404(b)). To protect against concerns raised in the previous paragraph the trial justice must carefully weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice   . Id. If the trial justice determines that the probative value does outweigh the prejudicial effect, he should offer a specific instruction [to the jury] as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is being introduced. Id. (quoting State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I.1993)). In the instant case, the trial justice allowed Sepe to testify at trial about his previous drug transactions with Reis. Specifically, Sepe testified that he had performedsimilar operations with Reis on two separate occasions. The first such instance was in December 1997, when Reis contacted Sepe and directed him to pick up a Federal Express package sent from Arizona that contained marijuana. Sepe picked up the package that Reis had address to him. Sepe met Reis at a restaurant in Westerly, Rhode Island, across the street from Reis's home. Reis was waiting in a black Chevrolet Blazer. After signaling to Reis that he had picked up the package, Sepe drove to Reis's home and made the delivery. In exchange for the delivery services, Reis gave Sepe $300 and four ounces of marijuana. Sepe went on to testify that Reis repeated the process in February 1998. This time, however, the Federal Express package was larger than the previous package and Sepe delivered it straight to Reis's house without meeting him beforehand. Once again, Sepe received money and marijuana for his services. Before trial, Reis sough to preclude any evidence regarding prior transactions in his motion in limine. He alleged that these previous dealings with Sepe were completely different from the March 1998 deal between the two because they were to meet in Cranston rather than in Westerly. Therefore, according to Reis, the Rule 404(b) exception to the inadmissibility of prior bad acts should not apply. We disagree. There were at least three transactions between Reis and Sepe. All three times Sepe picked up a Federal Express package containing marijuana. Each time the package had an Arizona return address and Sepe was to deliver the package to Reis. Furthermore, Sepe received money and marijuana in consideration for his services in December 1997 and February 1998, and he testified that he would have been paid in the same manner had he not been arrested by the police. It is apparent to this Court that the three separatetransactions between Sepe and Reis are interwoven and represent a common scheme or plan. We do not think the differences in the meeting places change the fact that each transaction was essentially a repeat of the previous one. Furthermore, the trial justice properly issued a limiting instruction to the jury that it should consider Sepe's testimony of the prior transactions only as they related to a prior course of dealing, common scheme, plan or preparation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of prior transactions between Reis and Sepe.