Opinion ID: 2081618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Overbreadth

Text: Wien first contends that the statute under which he was charged and convicted is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The statute, 7 Del. C. § 6604(a), provides that: Any activity in the wetlands requires a permit from [DNREC] except the activity or activities exempted by this chapter. The term activity is defined as any dredging, draining, filling, bulkheading, construction of any kind, including but not limited to, construction of a pier, jetty, breakwater, boat ramp, or mining, drilling or excavation. [5] Wien was convicted of two counts of constructing a barrier without a permit, and one count of filling the wetlands without a permit. This Court reviews questions of statutory construction de novo. [6] Where such review is of a constitutional nature, there is a strong presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional. [7] A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of government control, but sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise of protected expressive or associational rights. [8] Wien contends that Section 6604 is overbroad because it unnecessarily restricts his constitutional right to access navigable waterways. We conclude that Section 6604 does not restrict constitutionally protected conduct. Where a statute is challenged for overbreadth, the threshold inquiry is whether the statutory reach encompasses a substantial category of constitutionally protected conduct. If not, the statute is not constitutionally overbroad. [9] In this case, Wien's overbreadth argument fails, because Section 6604 does not regulate conduct that is constitutionally protected. The State has legitimate power to regulate private riparian rights. [10] That is what Section 6604 regulates. Wien's argument is faulty because it mischaracterizes the nature of the statute. The wetlands statute does not prohibit access to navigable waterways; rather it requires property owners to obtain a DNREC permit before conducting activities on their wetland property. If Wien believed that the regulation restricted his property rights to such a degree as to constitute a taking, he had an adequate remedy under the takings clause of the United States Constitution. [11] Wien also contends that Section 6604 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not precisely define what conduct qualifies as construction. A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated behavior is forbidden by the statute, or if it encourages arbitrary or erratic enforcement. [12] Courts review constitutional vagueness challenges within the context of the defendant's own conduct. [13] Therefore, the question is whether a reasonable person in Wien's position should have understood that the barrier he erected using concrete bags was construction for which he needed to obtain a permit. Although the term construction is not specifically defined in Section 6604, the ordinary meaning of the term is commonly understood. The dictionary definition of construction is a structure, such as a building, framework, or model. [14] The statute clarifies that meaning by providing that construction includes a pier, jetty, breakwater, boatramp, or mining. Because the erection of a permanent erosion barrier is similar to the examples set forth in the statute, the term construction would inform a reasonable person that such a permanent structure requires a permit. Therefore, Wien should have known that the erection of a 406 foot long barrier was construction for which he needed to obtain a permit, and the statute is not impermissibly vague. Lastly, Wien contends that the statute is vague because it does not provide minimum guidelines for enforcement. [15] The legislature may delegate to an administrative agency the power to apply legislative mandates, but in so doing, it must provide adequate safeguards and standards to guide discretion. [16] Section 6604 satisfies that standard, because the statute articulates six criteria that the Secretary of DNREC must consider in determining whether to issue a permit for wetlands activity. [17] Because those criteria provide a definite standard that the DNREC Secretary must apply, Section 6604 is not unconstitutionally vague. [18]