Opinion ID: 2277075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Voir Dire/Racial Prejudice

Text: Feddiman contends that there was error in the jury selection process because the voir dire questions did not sufficiently address the issue of racial prejudice. Feddiman's defense counsel submitted written requests for the trial judge to ask two voir dire questions concerning possible racial prejudice. The first question submitted by defense counsel was: The victim in this case is a white person. The defendant is black. Do you have any prejudice, however slight, against black people which would [a]ffect you in any[ ]way in deciding this case in regarding their sexual proclivities? This question was asked of the venire panel in exactly the same form that it was submitted by defense counsel. The second voir dire question proposed by defense counsel was: Do you have any prejudice against black people, excluding any prejudice relating to sexual proclivities? The trial judge did not ask this question. However, the trial judge did ask the venire panel the following questions: Do you have any bias or prejudice either for or against the State or defendant? Is there any reason why you cannot give this case your undivided attention and render a fair and impartial verdict? Feddiman contends that it was reversible error for the trial court not to ask the second voir dire question which he submitted, concerning prejudice against black people. It is well established that  [v]oir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981). An adequate voir dire is necessary to discover bias in prospective jurors and to assist the trial judge in his responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to hear the case impartially. Id. Similarly, lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges.... Id. [16] However, trial judges have been reluctant to question jurors concerning possible racial prejudice in fear that such an inquiry would create the impression that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the accident of birth. Ristanio v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1021 n. 8, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the conflict between this justifiable hesitancy by trial judges and the need for the discovery of a juror who might be disqualified because of racial or ethnic prejudice. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310-11, 51 S.Ct. 470, 471-72, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931). The question of whether, upon the defendant's request, the trial court must inquire into any possible racial prejudice against the defendant, has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. The special circumstances under which the federal Constitution requires the question on racial prejudice were described in Ristanio v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976). Special circumstances exist if racial issues are inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. at 189, 101 S.Ct. at 1634 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 597, 96 S.Ct. at 1021). [17] In the absence of special circumstances, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal Constitution does not require a voir dire inquiry into the possible racial prejudice of potential jurors. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. at 187-88, 192-94, 101 S.Ct. at 1636-37. Nevertheless, in its supervisory capacity, the same plurality opinion in Rosales-Lopez announced a non-constitutional requirement that federal courts must grant a defendant's request for a special voir dire inquiry, if the circumstances of the case reveal a reasonable possibility that racial prejudice may influence the jury. Id. at 190-91, 101 S.Ct. at 1635-36. The Court held that Aldridge and Ristaino read together, fairly imply that a reasonable possibility of racial or ethnic prejudice always exists, and therefore that federal trial courts must make an inquiry into that possibility, when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups. Id. at 192, 101 S.Ct. at 1636. Federal trial courts are therefore held to a higher standard than that which is required by the United States Constitution. Id. at 190, 101 S.Ct. at 1635. That same higher standard is applicable in the courts of this State by virtue of Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution. This Court has previously held that the improper injection of race into a criminal proceeding violates a defendant's right to due process and the right to a trial by an impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Constitution of this State. Del. Const. art. I, § 7. Weddington v. State, Del.Supr., 545 A.2d 607, 615 (1988); Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1012 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3339, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986). In this case, Feddiman was accused of a series of violent crimes. Feddiman and the victim are members of different racial groups. Feddiman's attorney specifically requested the trial court to question the jurors during voir dire concerning the possibility of racial prejudice. Accordingly, the trial judge was required to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice. Del. Const. art. I, § 7. Feddiman argues that the trial court's refusal to include in its voir dire the specific questions framed by his attorney, constituted an abuse of discretion. We disagree. The trial court was not required to adopt defendant's proposed voir dire as its own. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1007 (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527, 93 S.Ct. 848, 850, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973)). Subject to the essential demands of fairness, the trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and form of questions to be asked on voir dire. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. at 528, 93 S.Ct. at 851; Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1006. With respect to the inquiry into possible racial prejudice, as in all other cases, the trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1688, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986). A defendant in a criminal case has no right to have all of his proposed voir dire inquiries asked by the Court. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. at 310, 51 S.Ct. at 471; Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 824, 829 (1977). A judicial ruling on the scope of voir dire questioning will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion which prejudices the defendant's rights. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1006. In this case, the voir dire questions which were actually asked by the trial court revealed to the venire panel that the defendant and the victim belonged to different racial groups. The voir dire questions which were actually promulgated also inquired into the possibility of racial prejudice. In fact, one juror responded affirmatively to the question about racial prejudice and was promptly excused by the trial judge. [18] We find no abuse of discretion in either the form or the number of voir dire questions which were asked of the venire panel by the trial judge. In our view, the voir dire questions actually asked by the trial court were adequate and properly afforded Feddiman all of the rights that he is entitled to under both the federal Constitution and the Constitution of this State. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. at 1688; Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. at 192, 101 S.Ct. at 1636; Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1007. Since Feddiman has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, his argument for a reversal of his convictions based upon an inadequate voir dire into the subject of possible racial prejudice must fail. Id.