Opinion ID: 739941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Incidental Seizure of Electronically Stored Materials

Text: 24 Plaintiffs appear to argue that even if the warrant authorized the seizure of the computer equipment, such a seizure was nonetheless illegal because of the concomitant incidental seizure of e-mail and software stored therein. 5 We can discern no doctrinal support for this proposition. The argument appears to draw its force from plaintiffs' efforts to distinguish between the computer hardware--the container--and its contents. They repeatedly urge that the seizure was unlawful because no probable cause was asserted to seize the contents independent of the probable cause asserted to seize the computer equipment. The question then is whether the incidental temporary seizure of stored electronic materials invalidated the seizure of the computer within which they were stored. We hold that it did not. 25 Plaintiffs' argument fails for the simple reason that the computer equipment was more than merely a container for the files; it was an instrumentality of the crime. In the typical case, the probable cause supporting seizure of a container is probable cause to believe that the container's contents include contraband or evidentiary material. Here, in contrast, the probable cause supporting the seizure of the computer/container related to the function of the computer equipment in distributing and displaying pornographic images, not to its function in holding the stored files. The fact that a given object may be used for multiple purposes, one licit and one illicit, does not invalidate the seizure of the object when supported by probable cause and a valid warrant. 26 We also note the obvious difficulties attendant in separating the contents of electronic storage from the computer hardware during the course of a search. Perhaps cognizant of the potential burdens of equipment, expertise, and time required to access, copy, or remove stored computer files, plaintiffs have not suggested any workable rule. In short, we can find no legal or practical basis for requiring officers to avoid seizing a computer's contents in order to preserve the legality of the seizure of the computer hardware. 27 In any event, we are well able to distinguish between the legality of the initial seizure of a container, and any subsequent search or retention of the contents. See, e.g., United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1436 (10th Cir.1991). Even in the typical case, seizure of a container need not be supported by probable cause to believe that all of the contents of the container are contraband. The seizure of a container is not invalidated by the probability that some part of its innocent contents will be temporarily detained without independent probable cause. We will not hold unlawful the otherwise constitutional seizure of the computer equipment in order to prevent the temporary deprivation of plaintiffs' rights to the contents. However, our conclusion that the seizure of the computer equipment pursuant to a warrant here allowed the incidental seizure of files stored therein should not be read as approval of any subsequent efforts by the police to search or retain the stored files without a warrant. 6 28 Finally, plaintiffs suggest that once the CD-ROMs and CD-ROM drives were seized, the officers lacked cause to remove the remainder of the computer equipment. Again, we are unable to discern a practical or doctrinal basis for this proposed rule of minimization. The computer equipment as a whole was an instrumentality of the crime of distributing obscenity, and the equipment was covered by the warrant. 29 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the conduct of the officers did not rise to a constitutional violation. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment to the officers on plaintiffs' constitutional claim. IV Privacy Protection Act 30 Plaintiffs assert that the seizure of the stored electronic materials constituted a violation of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa--2000aa-12. The PPA provides that 31 it shall be unlawful for a government officer or employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to search for or seize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of publication. 32 42 U.S.C.2000aa(a). 7 The PPA requires law enforcement officers, absent exigent circumstances, id. § 2000aa(a)(2), to rely on subpoenas to acquire materials intended for publication unless there is probable cause to believe that the person possessing [work product] materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials relate, id. § 2000aa(a)(1). 33 The statute creates a civil cause of action for damages resulting from a search or seizure of materials in violation of the Act. Id. § 2000aa-6. This cause of action is available against the United States, against a State (if the State has waived sovereign immunity), or against any other governmental unit. Id. § 2000aa-6(a)(1). A cause of action is available against the officers or employees of a State only if the State has not waived its sovereign immunity. Id. 2000aa6(a)(2). 8 The Act provides that [i]t shall be a complete defense to a civil action [against a government officer or employee] that the officer had a reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(b). The district court here granted summary judgement for the officers, holding them entitled to the good faith defense due to their reliance on a warrant. 34 We hold instead that we lack subject matter jurisdiction over defendant officers under the PPA. The statute provides: 35 The remedy provided by [section 2000aa-6(a)(1) ] against the United States, a State, or any other governmental unit is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for conduct constituting a violation of this chapter, against the officer or employee whose violation gave rise to the claim, or against the estate of such officer or employee. 36 Id. § 2000aa-6(d). Thus, an action under the PPA may only be brought against the governmental entity, unless the state has not waived sovereign immunity in which event state employees may be sued. Id. § 2000aa-6(a)(2). The PPA by its terms does not authorize a suit against municipal officers or employees in their individual capacities. The statute therefore provides no cause of action against these defendants. Although the parties stipulated below to subject-matter jurisdiction, no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). We dismiss the PPA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. V Electronic Communications Privacy Act 37 Plaintiffs claim that the seizure of the e-mail on the bulletin board violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711. Title II of the ECPA, id. §§ 2701-2711, bars unauthorized access to stored electronic communications. Section 2701 provides criminal penalties for whoever 38 (1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or 39 (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system. 40 Id. § 2701(a). In addition to criminal penalties, the ECPA provides a civil cause of action for any provider of electronic communication service, subscriber, or other person aggrieved by any violation of this chapter. Id. § 2707(a). However, [a] good faith reliance on ... a court warrant or order ... is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law. Id. § 2707(e). 41 Plaintiffs contend that by seizing the e-mail and dismantling the bulletin board, the officers obtain[ed] ... or prevent[ed] authorized access to a[n] ... electronic communication while it is in electronic storage within the meaning of section 2701(a). 9 This claim raises a question of first impression in this or any circuit. There are few cases interpreting the reach of the substantive provisions of the ECPA or applying the good faith defense to violations of Title II of the ECPA, although a body of decisions does address the parallel good faith defense in Title I of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d). 10 See, e.g., Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (10th Cir.1991); Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 183-88 (D.C.Cir.1986); Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 394-95 (1st Cir.1979). 42 Plaintiffs rely heavily on the decision in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F.Supp. 432 (W.D.Tex.1993), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.1994), which contains the most extensive discussion of the substantive provisions of the ECPA we have found. In that case, federal law enforcement officers sought a sensitive computer document stolen by computer hackers as well as evidence of related code-breaking activity. The officers had reason to believe that a suspect employed by Steve Jackson Games may have uploaded such documents to the company's computer bulletin board, which the suspect used and helped operate. No illegal activity by the company itself was alleged. The officers obtained a warrant to seize a variety of computer files and documents from the company's bulletin board. The trial court found that, despite their denials, Secret Service personnel did in fact read all electronic communications seized, including private e-mail not mentioned in the search warrant or affidavit, and also deleted some of the seized files. The court held that the Secret Service's conduct with respect to the private e-mail failed to comply with the requirements of Title II of the ECPA relating to the disclosure of the contents of stored electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The court also declined to find the defendants entitled to a good faith defense for their reliance on the search warrant. Although the Title II issue was not appealed, the circuit court in its discussion of other issues on appeal referred approvingly to the district court's conclusion that Title II of the ECPA clearly applies to the conduct of the Secret Service. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.1994). 43 We do not find this scant precedent helpful. The circumstances here are far different from those in Steve Jackson Games. Most centrally, that case involved both a seizure of electronic communications and the subsequent review, reading, and deletion of files in electronic storage. The court focused on the provisions of section 2703, which establishes the procedures for government access to the contents of an electronic communication. 11 We assume without deciding that an additional warrant in compliance with section 2703 would have been required for the law enforcement officials in the instant case to gain access to the contents of the seized e-mail. Plaintiffs have not alleged that the officers attempted to access or read the seized e-mail, and the officers disclaimed any interest in doing so. We are therefore faced with the entirely distinct question of whether an incidental seizure of electronic communications, standing alone, is a violation of the ECPA. Section 2703 does not appear to address this situation. 12 44 We assume without deciding that plaintiffs have described conduct which constitutes a violation of section 2701, that is, that the officers intentionally access[ed] without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided ... and thereby ... prevent[ed] authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it [was] in electronic storage in such a system. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). 13 We further accept as true plaintiffs' assertion that a reasonable officer with the computer skills of defendant officers should have known that seizure of computer hardware would result in the seizure and disruption of e-mail. Nevertheless, we hold that the officers were entitled to summary judgment because they qualify for the statutory good faith defense as a matter of law. 45 Plaintiffs suggest that the officers could have made a lawful seizure of the electronically stored communications only by satisfying one of the listed exceptions to liability under section 2701 of the ECPA. 14 The exceptions listed contemplate that no liability attaches for obtain[ing], alter[ing] or prevent[ing] authorized access to a ... electronic communication, § 2701(a), if such disruption is incident to the government's access to the contents through the procedures for disclosing, § 2703, copying, § 2704, or intercepting, § 2518. In short, these exceptions all excuse government officers from liability based upon a required showing to a magistrate that the intrusive activity is necessary for a law enforcement purpose. 46 In addition to the enumerated exceptions, however, the statute contains the general good faith defense of section 2707(e) for reliance on a warrant. The officers relied on the warrant to seize the computer equipment, and the seizure of the stored electronic communications was incidental to the execution of the warrant. To be in good faith, the officers' reliance must have been objectively reasonable. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 344-45, 106 S.Ct. at 1098. We have already concluded in our discussion of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim that the warrant was valid and encompassed the computer equipment. The officers' reliance on the warrant was therefore objectively reasonable. 47 Finally, plaintiffs contend the officers are not entitled to a good faith defense because they did not inform the magistrate of the possible existence of the stored electronic communications. We have held in our discussion of plaintiffs' constitutional claim that plaintiffs' inference of subjective bad faith in the officers' omission of information from the affidavit does not eliminate the officers' ability to rely on a valid warrant supported by probable cause. The plaintiffs have not persuaded us the statute imposes a requirement stricter than the Fourth Amendment in this respect. To the extent plaintiffs' contention is based on their view that the warrant must contain probable cause to seize the contents independent of the probable cause supporting the seizure of the computer, we have likewise concluded otherwise. The officers established a good faith defense as a matter of law. 15 VI