Opinion ID: 2499553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issue 2: suppression of recorded jailhouse telephone conversations

Text: Next, Gilliland argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the recordings of his jailhouse telephone conversations with Charlotte. The same standard of review applies to this issue. The conversations at issue occurred while Gilliland was being held in the Saline County Jail on the charges in this case. During that time, his telephone conversations with Charlotte were recorded as part of jail policies and procedures. At the beginning of each conversation, the recording system sent out an audio warning to the participants, stating, This call is subject to monitoring or recording. Gilliland had multiple conversations with Charlotte about his defense strategy, his hopes that C.E. would not testify, and the possibility that Charlotte might be called to testify against him and how they could avoid it. Several recordings were entered into evidence at trial and played in open court, presumably to attack the credibility of Gilliland's defense that he was unconscious during the incident in question. In Gilliland's motion to suppress, he argued the interception of these telephone calls violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in violation of two criminal statutes, K.S.A. 21-4001 (eavesdropping) and K.S.A. 21-4002 (breach of privacy). The basic premise of Gilliland's argumentthat he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jailhouse conversationsfails to recognize the limits on a prisoner's right to privacy. The right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is measured by a two-part test: (1) The person must have a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that expectation must be one that society recognizes as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Generally, a jail or prison inmate's right of privacy, at least outside the context of communications with an attorney, fails both prongs of the Katz test. First, an inmate's privacy interest is severely limited by the status of being a prisoner and by being in an area of confinement that shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). Second, society would insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Therefore, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194. Similar limitations have been found to apply to telephone conversations of prisoners. These limitations rest on the doctrine that the Fourth Amendment prevents the government from tapping a person's telephone or otherwise eavesdropping on private conversations without good cause and a proper search warrant; if a conversation is not private, the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-59, 88 S.Ct. 507. Hence, the reduced expectation of privacy in a jail or prison setting necessarily defeats an inmate's claim of a reasonable expectation that his or her calls are private under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 519 U.S. 912, 117 S.Ct. 276, 136 L.Ed.2d 199 (1996) (holding that individuals who are incarcerated while awaiting trial do not have any expectation of privacy in outgoing telephone calls that are made on jail telephones); Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1017-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 516 U.S. 947, 116 S.Ct. 387, 133 L.Ed.2d 309 (1995) (recognizing that prison authorities must be afforded wide-ranging discretion in adopting policies designed to preserve institutional security); Jackson v. State, 18 So.3d 1016, 1030 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1144, 175 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010) (defendant was aware through automated warnings that jail would record and monitor his communication and, thus, implicitly consented to the interception; defendant did not have a legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances; interest in institutional security allowed jailhouse conversations to be monitored); State v. Maass, 275 Kan. 328, 335, 64 P.3d 382 (2003) (convicted persons have diminished expectation of privacy in the penal context). Furthermore, the State argues that Gilliland's statutory argument also fails because, through his actions, he consented to having his calls monitored, and the statutes he citesK.S.A. 21-4002 and K.S.A. 21-4001(a)(3)contain a consent exception. Gilliland does not disagree with this interpretation of the statutes but contends he did not consent. One of the statutes on which Gilliland relies, K.S.A. 21-4002(a)(1), prohibits [i]ntercepting, without the consent of the sender or receiver, a message by telephone ... or other means of private communication. (Emphasis added.) The other statute, K.S.A. 21-4001(a)(3), deals with violations of personal rights and prohibits, in part, the use of any device or equipment for the interception of any telephone ... or other wire communication without the consent of the person in possession or control of the facilities for such wire communication. (Emphasis added.) In this appeal, the parties have not discussed the meaning of the phrase the person in possession or control of the facilities for such wire communication and whether Gilliland would qualify. Because the parties have assumed Gilliland is in possession or control, we will proceed on this assumption, even though this point seems subject to debate, and will consider the parties' arguments regarding whether Gilliland consented. Gilliland, in arguing that he did not give adequate consent to the recordings, asserts the simple warning that the calls are being monitored or recorded is insufficient to put the jail inmate on notice that those calls may ultimately be utilized in his or her prosecution. Gilliland acknowledges a similar argument was rejected in State v. Andrews, 39 Kan.App.2d 19, 176 P.3d 245 (2008), in the context of Kansas' wiretapping statutes, K.S.A. 22-2514 et seq. Nevertheless, Gilliland contends, without citing any supporting authority, that Andrews was wrongly decided. In Andrews, the defendant filed a motion to suppress recordings of his jailhouse telephone conversations. Citing the wiretap statutes, Andrews contended the Johnson County Sheriff's Department was required to get judicial approval before it could record or listen to his outgoing telephone calls. At the suppression hearing, testimony established that a prisoner's telephone calls were monitored as a way to assist in maintaining the security of the jail. The jail policy handbook, which was available to inmates, discussed the telephone monitoring system and advised that calls were recorded. During all conversations, the system sent out an audio warning informing both parties that the call was being recorded. The trial court denied Andrews' motion to suppress and ruled that Andrews, by using the jail telephones, consented to his conversations being monitored and recorded. The court concluded that fair warnings were given to inmates and there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Consequently, there was no violation in light of the valid consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that Andrews' consent meant the wiretapping statute did not prevent the recording. Andrews, 39 Kan.App.2d at 25, 176 P.3d 245. The Andrews court quoted K.S.A. 22-2515(c), which allows the contents of a conversation to be disclosed in court if the information was received by any means authorized by this act or by chapter 119 of title 18 of the United States code. Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code includes 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006), which states: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. (Emphasis added.) The Andrews court reiterated the various warnings that were given and concluded: [B]ased on all the warnings in the case, Andrews gave consent. Andrews, 39 Kan. App.2d at 24, 176 P.3d 245. In support of this conclusion, the Andrews court looked to a decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in State v. Riley, 287 Wis.2d 244, 704 N.W.2d 635 (2005), where the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law (WESCL), a statute mirroring the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), was applied to hold that a prisoner consented to a recording when he used the phone after hearing a recording that stated the call may be recorded. The Riley court reviewed federal circuit court cases applying the consent exception of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) in prison settings because the WESCL, like K.S.A. 22-2514 et seq., was patterned after Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Riley, 287 Wis.2d at 251, 704 N.W.2d 635; see generally State v. Farha, 218 Kan. 394, 398, 544 P.2d 341 (1975), cert. denied 426 U.S. 949, 96 S.Ct. 3170, 49 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1976). Summarizing these cases, the Riley court noted that the federal circuit courts have overwhelmingly concluded that an inmate has given implied consent to electronic surveillance when he or she is on notice that his or her telephone call is subject to monitoring and recording and nonetheless proceeds with the call. [Citations omitted.] Riley, 287 Wis.2d at 251, 704 N.W.2d 635. The Wisconsin court spoke of the notice requirement as one of meaningful notice. In discussing what meaningful notice meant for purposes of providing implied consent to surveillance of institutional telephone calls, the Wisconsin court stated: Meaningful notice may include a signed acknowledgment form, an informational handbook or orientation session, a monitoring notice posted by the outbound telephone, or a recorded warning that is heard by the inmate through the telephone receiver, prior to his or her making the outbound telephone call. See [ United States v. ] Footman, 215 F.3d [145,] 154 [1st Cir.2000] (signed form, notices on phones and prerecorded messages played when phone calls placed); [ United States v. ] Amen, 831 F.2d [373,] 379 [2d Cir.1987] (federal prison regulations, orientation lecture, informational handbook and signs posted); [ United States v. ] Willoughby, 860 F.2d [15,] 20 [2d Cir.1988] (orientation lecture, signs posted, signed form); [ United States v. ] Workman, 80 F.3d [688,] 693 [2d Cir.1996] (posted signs, orientation handbook and signed form); [ United States v. ] Hammond, 286 F.3d [189,] 191-92 [4th Cir.2002] (handbook, consent form, orientation lesson, and notices posted near phones); [ United States v. ] Horr, 963 F.2d [1124,] 1126 [8th Cir.1992] (orientation handbook and lesson, consent form, posted signs); [ United States v. ] Van Poyck , 77 F.3d [285,] 292 [9th Cir.1996] (posted signs, consent form and prison manual); People v. Kelley, [103 Cal.App.4th 853, 858-59,] 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 206-07 (Ct. App.2002) (citing federal cases for proposition that meaningful notice would include a monitoring notice posted by a phone ` or a recorded warning that is heard by the inmate ') (emphasis added; citation omitted) [, overruled on other grounds by People v. Windham, 145 Cal.App.4th 881, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 (2006)]. Riley, 287 Wis.2d at 253-54, 704 N.W.2d 635. See also United States v. Faulkner, 323 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1117-18 (D.Kan.2004) (discussing other cases and holding notice before use of phone was sufficient to satisfy consent exception to federal wiretapping act). In Andrews, our Court of Appeals applied these authorities and held that Andrews knowingly consented to the monitoring of his telephone calls by using the phone after hearing the recording. Andrews, 39 Kan. App.2d at 24-25, 176 P.3d 245. Because of this consent, the federal wiretap laws allowed the recording of the conversation. And, the Andrews court concluded, because the recording was allowed under the federal law, the Kansas statute allowed the introduction of the recordings into evidence. This conclusion is not directly applicable in this case because Gilliland does not rely on the wiretap statute, as Andrews did, but on K.S.A. 21-4001 (eavesdropping) and K.S.A. 21-4002 (breach of privacy), and neither of these statutes are mentioned in Andrews. Nevertheless, the analysis is applicable because K.S.A. 21-4001 and K.S.A. 21-4002, like Kansas' criminal procedure wiretapping statutes, closely parallel the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). See State v. Wigley, 210 Kan. 472, 474, 502 P.2d 819 (1972). And K.S.A. 21-4002(a)(1) provides for an exception to the statutory right of privacy if one party to the communication consents. Likewise, K.S.A. 21-4001(a)(3) does not apply if there is consent from the person in control or possession of the facilities for the wire communication, who the parties interpret to be Gilliland. Gilliland argues we should not adopt the Andrews reasoning and should impose a Miranda -like requirement notifying an inmate that anything he or she says can be used in court. Gilliland cites no support for this contention, however. Nor does he explain a reason such a warning would be required, and we can discern no doctrinal basis for extending the right in this circumstance. The Miranda rights are designed to protect constitutional rightsrights that are not at issue here. But an inmate does not have a constitutional right to privacy in a jail settingthe only constitutional right mentioned by Gilliland. See Faulkner, 323 F.Supp.2d at 1118 (use of phone in jail a privilege; neither pretrial detainee nor sentenced prisoner have full range of freedoms of unincarcerated individual). Consequently, we find no basis to impose the Miranda -style warning in the situation of a jail or prison recording an inmate's telephone conversation. We adopt the analysis in Andrews and apply it to the statutes relied upon by Gilliland. Under the Andrews analysis, reasonable notice was given to Gilliland. Testimony from a surveillance officer at the county jail established that the jail telephones were wall-mounted and were not located in any type of privacy enclosure. Further, the officer testified Gilliland and the other inmates were warned that telephone calls they made from the county jail were being recorded. The same audio warning was played when inmates and visitors communicated by telephone through glass panels inside the jail. Additionally, the jail's written policies made it clear that conversations were recorded except for conversations between inmates and their attorneys, which are not recorded due to the attorney-client privilege. Given the warnings at the beginning of a telephone conversation that telephone conversations would be monitored and might be recorded, Gilliland knowingly consented to the recording of his phone conversations through his action of using the phone, and whatever rights he had under K.S.A. 21-4001 and K.S.A. 21-4002 were not violated. The trial court did not err in denying Gilliland's motion to suppress the recorded jailhouse conversations.