Opinion ID: 770875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tantamount to guilty plea

Text: 48 Second, DiPina challenges the district court's conclusion that his admission of sufficient facts in the heroin disposition was tantamount to a guilty plea. In our earlier opinion, we said that in order to so conclude, the court must have found that the defendant has confessed to certain events or that other evidence proves such events, and that the events constituted a crime. DiPina, 178 F.3d at 75 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, we recommended that the district court examine factors such as whether the prosecutor recited what the state would prove if the case were to proceed to trial; whether the defendant accepted the prosecutor's version of the events; and whether the family court judge determined that the admitted facts, if proved, would constitute an offense. Id. at 74. If these factors were present, the admission of sufficient facts would likely be tantamount to a guilty or nolo plea. If, on the other hand, the prosecutor and the defendant or his counsel . . . [did] little more than tell the judge that the parties have agreed to dispose of the matter by a continuance, admission to sufficient facts, and a treatment program it would not appear that the defendant had admitted to a crime. Id. 49 The record permits no conclusion other than that DiPina's admission of sufficient facts on the heroin charges, given what transpired at the hearing, effectively constituted a confession to events that constituted a crime. See id. at 75. During the family court hearing, the prosecutor recited what the state would prove if the matter were to proceed to trial: that DiPina did deliver unlawfully heroin to an undercover officer from the Providence Police on July 1st, July 7th, July 8th and July 14th of [1992]. DiPina expressly and without qualification admitted those facts. Furthermore, he affirmed in the RFA that he would be admitting sufficient facts to substantiate the offense(s) which [have] been brought against me in the cases to which these pleas relate. Finally, the family court determined that DiPina's conduct constituted an offense under Rhode Island law, R.I. Gen. Laws 21-28-4.01(2)(a). Hence, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that the heroin disposition was equivalent to a guilty plea for sentencing purposes. We do not hold that a simple admission to sufficient facts is automatically enough in the absence of safeguards such as occurred here. 50 DiPina complains that the family court failed to inform him of all of the rights enumerated in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Nowhere in our earlier opinion, however, did we suggest that compliance with Rule 11 is a prerequisite to determining that an admission of sufficient facts is tantamount to a guilty or nolo contendere plea, and DiPina cites no authority to support his position. We have, in fact, previously stated that any sequence that gives reasonable assurance that the defendant had confessed to certain events and that the events constituted a crime . . . would make the admission effectively an admission of guilt under the guidelines. United States v. Roberts, 39 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1994). As it happens, the record supports the conclusion that the family court substantially complied with Rule 11 in the heroin disposition. The court effectively informed DiPina of the nature of the charges against him; the maximum possible penalty; his right to contest the charges and choose to proceed to trial; his right to assistance of counsel; his right against compelled self-incrimination; that by entering the plea he was waiving his right to trial; and that he was waiving his right to appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). Moreover, the family court addressed DiPina and ascertained that he understood the rights he was giving up, that the plea was entered voluntarily and was based on sufficient facts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d).