Opinion ID: 152551
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pattern of Unconstitutional Conduct

Text: The district court concluded that Zarnow has not demonstrated a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by police officers. A customary policy consists of actions that have occurred for so long and with such frequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body's knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct. Webster, 735 F.2d at 842. In an effort to establish a pattern, Zarnow invites this Court to rely on a series of inferences. The officers' testimony concerning the plain view doctrine was given several years after the incident giving rise to this action. During the intervening period, Zarnow alleges many unconstitutional searches of the same type must have taken place. No evidence of that was offered. There is no testimony that the plain view doctrine was misused in another case. Mere improbable inferences and unsupported speculation are not proper summary judgment evidence. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994). Zarnow asserts that the Chief Coughlin and the City effectively ratified the officers' unconstitutional conduct. Among the arguments is that during this litigation, the City has defended the constitutionality and propriety of the actions taken by its officers, despite the finding of a prior panel of this Court that the officers' actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Such a defense constitutes, so the argument goes, a ratification of the unlawful conduct of its officers. Good faith statements made in defending complaints against municipal employees do not demonstrate ratification. See Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 852 (5th Cir.2009). A policymaker who defends conduct that is later shown to be unlawful does not necessarily incur liability on behalf of the municipality. Id. at 848 (citing Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (5th Cir.1986)). Zarnow also suggests that Chief Coughlin may have incurred liability on behalf of the City by failing to supervise his subordinates during the search. To support a supervisory liability claim, the misconduct of a subordinate must be conclusively linked to the action or inaction of the supervisor. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). A supervisory official is liable if he demonstrates deliberate indifference to a plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 454. Deliberate indifference is more blameworthy than negligence but less blameworthy than purposeful harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The standard is stringent and requires that the supervisory actor disregarded a known consequence of his action. Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir.1997). Here, there was no deliberate indifference. Coughlin shared the errant view of the doctrine which caused Zarnow's constitutional deprivation. Negligent misinformation is insufficient to establish supervisory liability. See id. Similarly, there is no evidence that Coughlin's failure to supervise the search rose above the level of negligent inaction. Unintentionally negligent oversight does not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 756 (5th Cir.1993) (citation omitted).