Opinion ID: 853122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Judge's Caution to a Juror

Text: Near the end of the trial, Judge Yelton became aware that a juror was making inappropriate facial expressions. He instructed a bailiff to privately caution the juror to be more circumspect. Neither the recipient nor other jurors whom she consulted knew who asked the judge to send this message. Neither party may have been aware of either the concern or the message. After the verdict the juror stated in an affidavit that the message frightened and upset her. Majors says this was an improper and prejudicial ex parte communication, requiring reversal. We think the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of such claims is helpful: [T]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror.... ... [A] defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding `whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the ful[l]ness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.' United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (citations omitted). A presumption of harm arises only when ex parte communications with jurors relate to a substantive right of the defendant. Bruce v. State, 268 Ind. 180, 227, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1068 (1978). This relatively innocuous message in no way impaired Majors' ability to defend himself against the charges. Furthermore, [c]ontrol and management of the jury is an area generally committed to the trial court's discretion. Norton v. State, 273 Ind. 635, 661, 408 N.E.2d 514, 531 (1980) (citation omitted). We find no error here. [1]