Opinion ID: 2067735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Reasonable Person Standard

Text: The initial question with which we are faced in examining defendants' challenge to the interview procedure is whether the defendants were in fact in the custody of law enforcement officials at the time of the second interviews. If the defendants were in fact in custody at this time, then they are entitled to the full complement of constitutional rights accorded by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966). In addition, provided they were in fact in custody at the time of the second interviews, because the defendants are juveniles they would be accorded additional procedural safeguards under Iowa Code chapter 232, Missouri Code chapter 211, and Missouri Supreme Court Rules 122.01 and 122.05, the portions of the code governing juvenile justice proceedings. Because the claims raised by defendants implicate a possible violation of constitutional rights, our review of this matter is de novo. State v. Thomas, 540 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1995). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... U.S. Const. amend. 5. In Miranda v. Arizona , the Supreme Court first addressed the scope of this privilege in the situation of custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. The Court there held the privilege against self-incrimination applied to informal coercion by law enforcement officers as well as it did to formal coercion and required a defendant be advised of his rights prior to any custodial interrogation: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id. (emphasis added). The Court then set out the now familiar litany of rights of which the defendant is entitled to be reminded: Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Id. In a footnote to the definition of custodial interrogation, the Court explained, This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused. Id. (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964)). This statement created some confusion, however, as some courts then required Miranda warnings be given whenever an investigation had focused on the defendant without requiring a separate finding of custody. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345-47, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615-16, 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-8 (1976), the Court specifically clarified the issue and held that focus of an investigation on a defendant without anything more does not require the safeguards of Miranda. The Miranda decision left in its wake much confusion on the question of the determination of custody. The Supreme Court and most state courts faced with the question seemed to basically reiterate the Miranda definition of custody and then proceeded to find or not find custody based upon the facts of the particular situation. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95, 97 S.Ct. 711, 712, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 718-19 (1977) (per curiam) (holding a parolee held at a police station for questioning was not in custody because he was free to leave at any time); Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 347, 96 S.Ct. at 1616, 48 L.Ed.2d at 8 (holding a suspect in a tax case not in custody when questioned at a private home); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 1097, 22 L.Ed.2d 311, 315 (1969) (holding a defendant placed under arrest in his own bedroom was in custody as he was not free to leave); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 1504-05, 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 384-85 (1968) (holding a suspect questioned while incarcerated for other charges was not free to leave, and therefore was in custody). Most cases decided in this time period analyzed custody under one of two approaches: a subjective test examining whether the particular defendant and/or the officer thought the defendant was in custody; or an objective or reasonable person testwhether a reasonable person in that situation would have thought he was in custody. Most courts looking at this issue applied the objective, reasonable person test. See United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 1123, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970); Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (9th Cir.1969); Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713, 715 (1974); People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468, 471 (1972) (en banc). In 1984 the Supreme Court revisited the question of custody for Miranda purposes and unequivocally adopted the objective reasonable person test as the standard in making the determination. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422-23, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3141, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 324 (1984), the Court was faced with the question whether a motorist detained for a routine traffic stop was in custody so as to be entitled to the safeguards provided under Miranda. The Court first acknowledged that even a routine traffic stop such as the one at issue was a significant curtailment of the freedom of action of the driver as it is a crime to refuse to stop or drive away from a policeman. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436, 104 S.Ct. at 3148, 82 L.Ed.2d at 332. The Court also explained due to this characteristic, such a stop was considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment even though its purpose was limited and its duration brief. Id. The Court further explained, however, that this fact alone does not establish custody. The Court said, Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Id. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3148-49, 82 L.Ed.2d at 333. The traffic stop was not one of those situations. In holding that such a stop did not result in custody, the Court explained the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336. The Court stated it was inappropriate to take into consideration a policeman's unarticulated plan as to the future arrest of a suspect as this had no bearing on the objective belief of a reasonable person in the situation. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied particularly on the Beckwith decision, in which it stated, It was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning. Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336 (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 7-8 (1976)) (citations omitted). In applying this standard, courts have examined the facts apparent in the particular case and made custody determinations on a case-by-case basis, the inquiry being whether in the absence of actual arrest something... [is] said or done by the authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates [to the defendant] that they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so. Hall, 421 F.2d at 545. This requires examination of the totality of the circumstances with no one particular fact or factor being determinative of the issue. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983); United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1320 (8th Cir.1985). For instance, courts have held custody is not implicated merely because questioning takes place at the police station or the defendant is the sole subject of a police investigation. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1279; Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493, 97 S.Ct. at 713, 50 L.Ed.2d at 718; Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 334-35 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 81, 126 L.Ed.2d 49 (1993) (suspect held not to be in custody when he voluntarily went to police headquarters and was free to leave even though the interrogation lasted seven hours and the defendant was subjected to a polygraph test); United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 956-57 (7th Cir.1990). Courts have also been reluctant to find custody where a defendant is questioned voluntarily at home or in other familiar surroundings. See Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 345-47, 96 S.Ct. at 1615-17, 48 L.Ed.2d at 6-8; Krantz v. Briggs, 983 F.2d 961, 963-64 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 807, 810 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 646-47 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Gregory, 891 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769, 772-73 (7th Cir.1988). The Eighth Circuit has also approached the custody issue on a case-by-case basis. In United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1320 (8th Cir.1985), it explained that the court is to consider the totality of the circumstances including [t]he accused's freedom to leave the scene and the purpose, place and length of interrogation.... In a later case, Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 689 (8th Cir. 1987), the court specifically indicated this test was to be performed from the perspective of a reasonable person. See also Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 865, 109 S.Ct. 168, 102 L.Ed.2d 138 (1988) (analyzing the situation from the view point of a reasonable person in the defendant's position). Our court has also utilized this approach, most recently in State v. Scott, 518 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa), cert. denied, Scott v. Iowa, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 515, 130 L.Ed.2d 421 (1994), and State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994). In Scott, we examined the question whether a brief detention and pat down search of a motorist and his passenger constituted a custodial situation. In concluding such was not the case, we explained In determining whether an individual [is] in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. Scott, 518 N.W.2d at 350 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528-29, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298 (1994)). At nearly the same time, we considered State v. Deases , in which we examined the question whether a correctional officer's interrogation of a prisoner was custodial. Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 789. After first noting the appropriate test was whether a reasonable person in the inmate's position would understand himself to be in custody, we adopted a four factor test from the Ninth Circuit as guidance in making such a determination: Relevant factors in making this determination include the language used to summon the individual, the purpose, place and manner of the interrogation, the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and whether the defendant is free to leave the place of questioning. Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 789 (citing Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir.1978)); see also United States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 732 (8th Cir.1989) (Heaney, J. dissenting) (urging application of the Ninth Circuit test to a questioning which took place at F.B.I. Headquarters). One additional factor is apparent in the present case which we deem worthy of note. In none of our cases dealing with the reasonable person standard have we been faced with the situation we have presently, that is, juvenile defendants. This brings us to the question whether the reasonable person standard should take into consideration the age of the defendants. [1] In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597-98, 68 S.Ct. 302, 303, 92 L.Ed. 224, 227-28 (1948), the Supreme Court examined the validity of a confession of a fifteen-year-old defendant who had been held fifteen hours and questioned by police in relay teams. He was also denied access to his attorney and his mother for two days. Although the Court's inquiry in this case dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment due process implications of such a scenario, we believe the reasoning applied is relevant to our case: What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child an easy victim of the lawis before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. .... He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year old lad ... is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men might possibly withstand the ordeal.... But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for police in such a contest. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600, 68 S.Ct. at 303-04, 92 L.Ed. at 228. Because we too see the danger of overwhelming a minor defendant, as has our Legislature by passing the many protections afforded juveniles in the Iowa Code, we hold it is appropriate to consider the age of the defendants as an additional factor in making a determination as to custody status.