Opinion ID: 1609069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Narrowly Tailored Inquiry

Text: If the government sets forth an interest which qualifies as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, we must then analyze whether the law in question is precisely drawn or narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. As these terms imply, this is an examination of the tightness of fit between the regulation and the state interest. The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the [state's] goal . . . Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. at 2791. Toward this end, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts conducting this inquiry should consider several closely related factors. A narrowly tailored rule must actually advance the interest asserted. Eu, 489 U.S. at 228, 109 S.Ct. at 1022-3 (finding that the state had failed to present any evidence that proved that a ban on party primary endorsements actually served the state's interest in preventing fraud and corruption in the political process). Second, a rule is not narrowly tailored unless it is reasonably necessary to serve the state interest. White, 536 U.S. at 775, 122 S.Ct. at 2534-5 (In order for respondents to show that the announce clause is narrowly tailored, they must demonstrate that it does not `unnecessarily circumscrib[e] protected expression.') (citation omitted); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395-396, 112 S.Ct. at 2550 (The dispositive question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests. . .); Burson, 504 U.S. at 199, 112 S.Ct. at 1852 (. . . however, a State must do more than assert a compelling state interest-it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest). [68] Third, as previously discussed, if the rule is underinclusive, that is, if it leaves appreciable damage to the supposedly vital state interest unprohibited, this weighs against a finding that the rule is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. White, 536 U.S. at 779-780, 122 S.Ct. at 2537; See also White, 416 F.3d at 750-751, 757-763 (citing several Supreme Court cases). Fourth, a narrowly tailored regulation cannot be overinclusive; the regulation cannot suppress more speech than is necessary to accomplish the compelling goal. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121, 112 S.Ct. at 511 (finding New York's Son of Sam law was significantly overinclusive). Finally, we note that a rule is not narrowly tailored if there are less-speech restrictive alternatives available that would serve the compelling state interest at least as well. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665-666, 124 S.Ct. at 2791 (. . . the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.); Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 815, 120 S.Ct. at 1887 (. . . if a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it.); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989) (The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395, 112 S.Ct. at 2550 (The existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives thus `undercut[s] significantly' any defense of a [facially content-based] statute . . .) (citation omitted). See generally White, 416 F.3d at 751 (citing several Supreme Court holdings and noting the various elements of the narrowly tailored analysis). [69]