Opinion ID: 2629770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The circuit court's jury instructions regarding the offense of first degree robbery were prejudicially erroneous.

Text: In connection with the first degree robbery charge, the prosecution argued to the jury that, in finding that Cordeiro used force against the person of anyone present ... to overcome that person's physical resistance or physical power of resistance, the person of anyone present could be either Michael Freitas or it could be Tim Blaisdell himself. The circuit court, for its part, did not instruct the jury that it was required unanimously to agree as to the identity of the person against whom Cordeiro used force. Rather, the circuit court generally instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous and, with respect to first degree robbery, instructed the jury as follows: In Count 4 of the indictment, the Defendant, Gordon J. Cordeiro, is charged with the offense of robbery in the first degree. A person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree if, in the course of committing theft, he is armed with a dangerous instrument and he uses force against the person of anyone present with intent to overcome the person's physical resistance or physical power of resistance. There are three material elements of the offense of robbery in the first degree, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These three elements are: one, that on or about the 11th day of August, 1994, in the County of Maui, State of Hawaii, the Defendant was in the course of committing theft; and two, that while doing so, the Defendant was armed with a dangerous instrument; and three, that while doing so, the Defendant used force against the person of anyone present with intent to overcome that person's physical resistance or physical power of resistance. The circuit court then instructed the jury regarding the statutory definitions of theft, in the course of committing theft, and dangerous instrument. Cordeiro argues that the circuit court plainly erred in three respects in giving the foregoing instructions.
First, Cordeiro argues that the circuit court plainly erred in failing to give a specific unanimity instruction, i.e., in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to agree unanimously as to the identity of the person against whom he used forceeither Blaisdell or Freitas. The prosecution concedes that the circuit court's error in this regard warrants vacating Cordeiro's first degree robbery conviction. Our review of the record confirms that the circuit court's instructions were prejudicially insufficient and erroneous, inasmuch as the prosecution (1) adduced evidence of two separate and distinct culpable acts that arguably supported the requisite use of force by Cordeiro ( i.e., shooting Blaisdell and threatening Freitas with a firearm) (2) failed to make an election as to the particular act on the basis of which it was seeking conviction, and (3) represented to the jury that only a single offense was committed but that either act could support a guilty verdict as to first degree robbery. See State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 32-33, 928 P.2d 843, 874-75 (1996) (holding that when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count ...any one of which could support a conviction thereunderand the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless .. . the prosecution is required to elect the specific act upon which it is relying to establish the `conduct' element of the charged offense[] or ... the trial court gives the jury a specific unanimity instruction[]). But see State v. Apao, 95 Hawai`i 440, 24 P.3d 32 (2001) ([A] specific unanimity instruction is not required if (1) the offense is not defined in such a manner as to preclude it from being proved as a continuous offense and (2) the prosecution alleges, adduces evidence of, and argues that the defendant's actions constituted a continuous course of conduct.); State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i 199, 208, 998 P.2d 479, 488 (2000) (holding that a specific unanimity instruction is not required if the defendant's conduct constituted a continuing course of conduct). Because the circuit court's insufficient jury instructions prejudiced Cordeiro's substantial constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict, the error was plain. See Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 33, 928 P.2d at 875. Correlatively, inasmuch as we cannot say that there was no reasonable possibility that the circuit court's error contributed to [Cordeiro's] conviction[], we hold that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.] Id. We therefore vacate Cordeiro's first degree robbery conviction and remand the matter to the circuit court for a new trial as to Count 4 of the Blaisdell indictment. However, because we hold infra in section III.A.2.b that the prosecution may only retry Cordeiro for first degree robbery on the basis that his threat to Freitas constituted the requisite use of force, there will now be no need for a specific unanimity instruction.