Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Obstruction of the defense's examination of defendant's cousin.

Text: Defendant next objects to what he perceives as the prosecution's intentional obstruction of his cousin's direct examination. Defendant called his cousin [11] to the stand to plead for his life. At its core, defendant's complaint is that, although he ultimately was able to secure from his cousin all of the testimony he sought in an uninterrupted manner, defendant views the prosecution's earlier objections during her testimony as unvarnished obstruction, in an evident attempt to circumvent the trial court's allowance of the testimony by impeding its delivery. In response, the State claims that the prosecutor made appropriate, good faith objections to the testimony of defendant's cousin . . . when her plea for mercy exceeded the permissible scope of relevant mitigating evidence [because defendant's cousin], in connection with requesting the jury to spare defendant's life, . . . began discussing the difficulties of her own childhood. The exchange on which defendant bases this objection bears setting forth in full: [Defense Counsel # 1]: If you had the opportunity, as I think you have at this point, to ask [the] jury to do something in terms of their decision, what would you like to say to the jury? [The Witness]: To allow [defendant] to live because he hasn't really lived. He hasn't had a life growing up. None of us did. [The Prosecutor]: You Honor, I'm going to object I think it has gone [Defense Counsel # 2]: I would object to him interrupting this witness after the Court already made a ruling indicating that she would be allowed to do it. [The Prosecutor]: She's talking about her life, that is not relevant. [Defense Counsel # 2]: Judge, Judge [The Prosecutor]: This Counsel is [Defense # 1's] witness. [12] [Defense Counsel # 2]: Judge, I would like to finish my objection. The Court: She may finish her answer. [Defense Counsel # 1]: Judge, quite frankly I think it was inappropriate, and I will address thisfor [the prosecutor] to interrupt this after the side-bar, I think was done deliberately to take her off The Court: I would ask counsel not to get into personalities. There was a ruling as to the subject matter that did not preclude whether the scope of the ruling was exceeded sobut I have ruled she may finish her answer. [The Witness]: None of us did really. Uhm . . . at least he is able to eat three meals a day; finish school [The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, this goesJudge, I need to approach. This is [Defense Counsel # 1]: Judge, you made a ruling. And I think that we're supposed to be bound by the rulings that this Court made. And I would ask that the prosecutor be bound by the rulings as we are and let this witness finish her answer. He keeps interrupting the plea[ ] for life which is done, I submit, deliberately so that it doesn't have the import it would have. [The Prosecutor]: The witness can't say whatever she wants. She is limited to what she can say. The Court: I would agree, and you have the right to object on that subject matter. And my ruling on it is that the scope of the Court's ruling hasn't been exceeded yet, in any event. Immediately following that exchange, the witness provided her very brief testimony on this point without interruption. We agree with the trial court that the State properly sought to enforce the limitation placed on the scope of this witness's testimony, that is, that her testimony was to be limited to the claimed mitigating factor that defendant was raised in a home without structure, boundaries or positive role models which he could emulate, a mitigating factor also presented under the catch-all provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). When there is a reasonable and good faith expectation that a witness's answer to a question will exceed what is deemed proper under the circumstances, no party is required to sit idly by and allow impermissible testimony to be spread on the record. On the contrary, to the extent possible, the obligation of an advocate is to avoid trying to undo what may be impermissibly done as [t]he failure to object promptly to questionable comments, although not fatal, may oft-times result in not having the benefit of the trial court's exercise of its remedial powers on the propriety of the statements in issue[,] State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 452 n. 14, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988), and [t]he courts have always had the obligation of preventing a jury, at least on objection, from hearing inadmissible evidence[,] State v. Phelps, 96 N.J. 500, 515 n. 3, 476 A. 2d 1199 (1984).