Opinion ID: 6491476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Patties’Arguments

Text: On appeal, UH begins with a disquisition on sovereign immunity, implying that to hold that the Savinis’ claim did not accrue until they exceeded the medical-rehabilitative limit would exceed the scope of the State’s (and, hence, UH’s) consent to suit set forth in the STLA, HRS ch. 662: ... The language of the no-fault statutes at issue here do not purport to change the STLA’s statute of limitations[, HRS § 662-4, see supra note 1].... ... [T]he two-year statute of limitation [ (UH presumably means “the Savinis’ claim”)] “acerue[d]” at the time of the motor vehicle accident. Any attempt to manipulate [HRS § 662-4] by changing the legal meaning of “accrual” to accommodate one’s sense of public policy offends [its] plain language.... [I]ts protections should not be watered down by anyone other than the State Legislature. (Quoting Haw. Const, art. X, § 5 (“[UH] is ... established as the state university and constituted a body corporate.”); HRS §§ 304-2 (1993) (same), 30<L-6(a) (Supp.1999) (“[UH] shall be subject to suit only in the manner provided for suits against the State.... All defenses available to the State, as well as all limitations on actions against the State, shall be applicable to [UH].”); 8 Taylor-Rice v. State, 105 Hawai'i 104, 110-11, 94 P.3d 659, 665-66 (2004); Fought & Co., Inc. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection Co., 87 Hawai'i 37, 55, 951 P.2d 487, 505 (1998); Waugh, 63 Haw. at 125, 621 P.2d at 965; Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F.Supp. 707, 708 (D.Haw.1947).) (Citing Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Employees’ Ret. Sys., 106 Hawai'i 416, 106 P.3d 339 (2005).) UH’s points of error reduce to a single issue: whether the Savinis’ claim accrued at the time of the accident or when the amounts paid or accrued by virtue of Sosaiete’s injury exceeded the $13,900.00 monetary threshold, see supra section C. 9 UH argues: [T]he two-year statute of limitation “accrues” at the time of the motor vehicle accident. [[Image here]] ... HRS § 662-4 does not provide for any delay of the onset of the ... period ... by ... the Hawai'i Motor Vehicle Insurance [L]aw[, HRS ch. 431, art. 10C]. [[Image here]] Admittedly, if this Court were to reverse the ruling of the circuit court ... and hold that the two year statute of limitation is strictly interpreted, there would be a “gap” for ... persons who do not meet the dollar level threshold prior to the expiration of the two years. However, the proper forum to address this gap is the Legislature. JJH contends “that it is obvious that the term ‘accrue’ in this context means th[e] date of the ... accident.” (Quoting Waugh, 63 Haw. at 128, 621 P.2d at 968; Wollman, 637 F.2d at 547.) (Citing Bissen; Mendiola, 401 F.2d at 697; Webb Trucking, 141 F.Supp. at 575.) Quoting Whittington v. State, 72 Haw. 77, 79, 806 P.2d 957, 958 (1991), UH adds that we have previously “refused to extend HRS § 662-4.” In their answering brief, the Savinis counter that HRS § 662-4’s use of the term “accrues” contemplates that the two-year period began when they had a viable claim for relief over which the circuit court had jurisdiction, i.e., when the workers’ compensation insurer’s outlays exceeded the sum of .$13,900.00. They reiterate that HRS § 431:100-315, see supra note 5, provides that the applicable limitation period “runs from ... the accident or ... the last no-fault payment, [sic, see supra note 6,] whichever is later.” Furthermore, they urge that UH misconstrues Waugh, which “recognized” “the date when harm occurred and the date when a claim accrued ... as being two potentially different dates.” (Quoting 63 Haw. at 127, 621 P.2d at 968.)