Opinion ID: 469900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Sec. 2412(d) Application

Text: 5 In deciding that McQuiston's motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d) was not timely in McQuiston I, we noted that the term final judgment as it appears in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(B) 1 requires a party seeking an award of attorney's fees to submit an application for fees within thirty days from the date the district court enters judgment. We rejected McQuiston's argument that the thirty-day requirement of subsection (B) means that an application need only be filed within thirty days of the expiration of the time to appeal. Id. at 1085. 6 After McQuiston I was decided, Congress amended 2412(d)(1) by adding subsection (d)(2)(G). The term final judgment was defined as ... a judgment that is final and not appealable ... See Act of August 5, 1985, Sec. 2(c)(2), Pub.L. No. 99-80, 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News (99 Stat.) 183, 185 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(2)(G)). This amendment effectively changed the law in this circuit and overruled that portion of McQuiston I in which we had defined the term final judgment in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(B) as heretofore stated. The 1985 amendment provided that ... amendments made by this Act shall apply to cases pending on ... the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 7(a), 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News (99 Stat.) at 186. This case was still pending on the date the Act was enacted, and, as a result, McQuiston's application for fees was thereby rendered timely under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d).