Opinion ID: 6500414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Employee or Independent Contractor?

Text: Employers are responsible for the damage caused by their employees, 22 but a principal cannot be held liable for the acts of an independent contractor. 23 We agree with the district court that Jenkins was 20 Dehart v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 03-279, p.16 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/03); 860 So. 2d 248, 257. For an informative discussion on the confusion surrounding what duties a railroad has at a private versus public road, see Ryder, 945 F.3d at 200-01. It is sufficient for this case, however, that Jenkins neither stopped nor slowed before entering the crossing. 21 Id. at 200 (quoting Rivere v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 93-1132, p.6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94); 647 So. 2d 1140, 1145). 22 La. Civ. Code art. 2320 (“[E]mployers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.”). 23 Thompson v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 2015-0477, p. 12 (La. 10/14/15); 181 So. 3d 656, 665 (“The court of appeal correctly noted that, generally, a principal is not 12 Case: 21-30379 Document: 00516395400 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 No. 21-30379 not Heck’s employee. Heck, therefore, is not responsible for Jenkins’s actions. The question whether an actor is an employee or an independent contractor may be resolved as a matter of law when the facts are not in dispute. 24 “The element of control that distinguishes an employee from an independent contractor focuses on whether the purported employer had the right to control the method and means by which the individual performed the work tasks.” 25 It matters less what supervision and control is actually exercised; “the important question is whether, from the nature of the relationship, the right to do so exists.” 26 We follow the Louisiana Supreme Court’s guidance in considering the following factors to determine whether the relationship of principal and independent contractor exists: (1) there is a valid contract between the parties; (2) the work being done is of an independent nature such that the contractor may employ non-exclusive means in accomplishing it; (3) the contract calls for specific piecework as a unit to be done according to the independent contractor’s own methods, without being subject to the control and direction of the principal, except as to the result of the services to be rendered; liable for the offenses committed by an independent contractor while performing its contractual duties.”). 24 See Prater v. Porter, 98-1481, p. 4-8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/3/99); 737 So. 2d 102, 10406; Crews v. Blalock, 99-311, p. 1-4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99); 746 So. 2d 761, 762-64; Perkins v. Gregory Mfg. Co., 95-01396, p. 4-6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/20/96); 671 So. 2d 1036, 1038-40; Dragna v. KLLM Transp. Servs., L.L.C., 638 F. App’x 314, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 25 Hillman v. Comm-Care, Inc., 2001-1140, p. 12 (La. 1/15/02); 805 So. 2d 1157, 1164; Hickman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 262 So. 2d 385, 391 (La. 1972) (explaining that the principal test to determine whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor is “the control over the work reserved by the employer.”). 26 Hickman, 262 So. 2d at 391. 13 Case: 21-30379 Document: 00516395400 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 No. 21-30379 (4) there is a specific price for the overall undertaking agreed upon; and (5) the duration of the work is for a specific time and not subject to termination or discontinuance at the will of either side without a corresponding liability for its breach. 27 A contractee-independent contractor relationship presupposes a contract between the parties. It likewise presupposes the independent nature of his business, and is not exclusive as to the means whereby it is accomplished. It should appear that the contract calls for a specific piecework as a unit to be done according to his own methods, without being subject to the control and direction, in the performance of the service, of his employer, except as to the result of the services to be rendered. 28 No one factor is controlling, but “the totality of the circumstances must be considered.” 29 “[T]he burden of proof is on the party seeking to establish an employer-employee relationship.” 30 There was no written contract between Heck and Jenkins: Either could have terminated the relationship at will. Jenkins was one of some fourteen motorists who hauled for Heck. Each of the motorists would call a prerecorded telephone line to get the assignments for the next day. After a motorist picked up his first load of the day, a “batchman” on site would give that motorist directions as to what to load next and where to haul it. Heck did not have any control over the manner in which Jenkins (or, we assume, any of the other motorists) completed his work. Each motorist 27 Tower Credit, Inc. v. Carpenter, 2001-2875, p. 6 (La. 9/4/02); 825 So. 2d 1125, 1129. 28 Amyx v. Henry & Hall, 79 So. 2d 483, 486 (La. 1955). 29 Hillman, 2001-1140 at p. 9; 805 So. 2d at 1163. 30 Id. 14 Case: 21-30379 Document: 00516395400 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 No. 21-30379 would decide whether he wanted to work on a given day and, if so, how many loads he wanted to haul. Motorists could expect to haul three or four loads per day if they cared to do so. They did not have to deliver the loads at any particular time. The only “rules” that were explained to the motorists were safety restrictions for driving around the plants and the requirement of wearing personal protective equipment because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Heck did not require a copy of Jenkins’s driver’s license, check for any restrictions on his license, or run a background check. Heck based payment on each discrete load. Each motorist was paid a freight rate that was determined by the cost of gas and the weight of the load hauled. Heck sent out 1099’s at the end of the year and did not withhold taxes. It did not provide any equipment or personnel to Jenkins. Neither did it pay for gas or provide uniforms or safety equipment. Loads picked up by Jenkins would be charged to Heck’s account at the pit. The parties dispute whether Jenkins was hauling for Heck at the time of the accident. Whether he was or was not, however, Jenkins was still operating as an independent contractor. At least one Louisiana Circuit Court has held that independent-contractor status is not destroyed simply because an independent motorist is directed “where to deliver the loads he hauls.” 31 Heck’s informing the motorists where to deliver their loads is not enough to establish an employment relationship. Jenkins controlled his own schedule, and either he or Heck could have terminated the relationship at any point. The district court is correct that Heck did not exercise — and did not have the ability to exercise — control over the manner and means in which Jenkins completed his work. 31 Tate v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 2008-0950, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/28/09); 4 So. 3d 915, 921. 15 Case: 21-30379 Document: 00516395400 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 No. 21-30379