Opinion ID: 2611854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions Relating to Legal Causation

Text: The City contends that the trial court erred in failing to define the term legal causation for the jury. At trial, the City had requested a standard pattern instruction defining legal causation but withdrew it, [6] submitting instead a proposed instruction taken from Mitchell v. Branch and Hardy, 45 Haw. 128, 131, 363 P.2d 969, 973 (1961). The proposed instruction stated in part: To impose liability on a negligent party for an injury to another, there must be a causal connection between the negligent act and the injury.... The injury must be the result of, or flow from, the negligent act before the negligent party is held liable. Defendants' [City's] Instruction No. 3 [hereinafter, the Mitchell instruction]. The court refused the Mitchell instruction. However, the court gave no instruction defining legal cause even though it had instructed the jury that the only question for you to decide is what are the injuries and damages legally caused by the accident and the amount to award for such injuries and damages. (Emphasis added.) In its brief, the City argues that the court committed error when it refused to give a proximate or legal cause instruction based upon [ Mitchell ]. The City also noted in its brief and at oral argument that under the plain error doctrine, it was fatal for the [c]ourt to fail to offer any legal cause instruction at all. (Emphasis in original.) Therefore, we address two issues: (1) whether the court committed reversible error in refusing the Mitchell instruction, and, if not, (2) whether the court nevertheless committed plain error in not defining legal cause for the jury. In analyzing these two issues, we note that Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 51(e) (1991) provides in part: no party may assign as error the giving or refusal to give, or the modification of, an instruction ... unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. However, even the complete failure to object to a jury instruction does not prevent an appellate court from taking cognizance of the trial court's error if the error is plain and may result in a miscarriage of justice. Turner v. Willis, 59 Haw. 319, 324, 582 P.2d 710, 714 (1978) (citations omitted); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 603, 618 P.2d 283, 290 (1980).
Given the preceding standards, if the proposed Mitchell instruction incorrectly stated the law, the court properly refused to give it. Alternatively, if the City did not properly object, under HRCP 51(e) and absent plain error, the City is precluded from assigning error. The record reflects that the City objected to the court's refusal to give the Mitchell instruction as follows: Your Honor, this goes to the same argument we made earlier with respect to the negligence on the part of Mr. Montalvo subsequent to ou[r] accident. And that on the basis of Doctor Lipp and Doctor Nakano, they both said that surgery was not required as late as October of 1991. And there were subsequent incidents.... which may have aggravated or caused his condition to become worse and possibly even caused his need for the back surgery. (Emphasis added.) The same argument we made earlier refers to a discussion regarding the proffered contributory negligence instructions; thus, it appears that the City was concerned about the lack of an instruction on contributory negligence  not about an inadequate explanation of legal causation. The proposed Mitchell instruction had little, if anything, to do with contributory negligence. Nothing in the record indicates that the City objected to the refusal to give the Mitchell instruction on the ground that the court was not explaining legal causation. The objection cited above was, at best, an oblique reference to a lack of explanation of causation and should have been more precise. Cf., 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2554 (1971) ([t]he grounds must be stated with sufficient clarity that the trial judge may see what they are and follow them if well taken.... [O]bjections to a charge must be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of the alleged error.). Furthermore, even if the objection was sufficient, the proposed Mitchell instruction incorrectly defines proximate or legal cause. In the proposed instruction (and in its brief and at oral argument), the City quoted and stressed the language from Mitchell that [t]he injury must be the result of, or flow from, the negligent act[.] Mitchell, 45 Haw. at 131, 363 P.2d at 973 (emphasis added). This language, the City argues, would have helped the jury understand the concept of legal cause. However, three paragraphs following the quoted portion, the Mitchell court stated: The best definition and the most workable test of proximate or legal cause so far suggested seems to be this: The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. Id. at 132, 363 P.2d at 973 (citing Restatement of Torts, § 431 and Prosser on Torts, § 47) (emphasis added); see Knodle, 69 Haw. at 390, 742 P.2d at 186 (reaffirming that Mitchell correctly adopted the substantial factor definition). Courts have long grappled with the concept of proximate or legal cause. There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Knodle, 69 Haw. at 389 n. 9, 742 P.2d at 385 n. 9 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 41 at 263 (1984)). The [substantial factor] formula is not without critics ... [b]ut we are convinced that `substantial factor' is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the jury, and that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower terms.  Id. at 390, 742 P.2d at 386 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, although the City correctly cited to Mitchell for the definition of proximate or legal cause, it quoted the wrong language. Under Knodle, the language flow from would have insufficiently explained legal cause. Consequently, we conclude that the court properly refused the proffered Mitchell instruction.
We turn now to the question whether the trial court committed plain error in not defining legal cause for the jury. Although our appellate courts have not yet addressed this specific issue, other jurisdictions have held that failure to instruct a jury on the meaning of proximate or legal cause, when such issue is in dispute, is plain error requiring reversal. In Cline v. Kehs, 146 Ga.App. 350, 246 S.E.2d 329 (1978), the Georgia Court of Appeals remanded an auto accident negligence case because of inadequate instructions on proximate cause, holding that: Even though ... matters not requested to be charged when special verdicts are submitted to the jury are waived, this rule obviously does not extend to an element so essential as proximate cause in negligence actions. It is basic in our law that no liability attaches unless the negligence alleged is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.... it is essential that the trial judge instruct the jury as to the legal meaning of proximate cause and its application to the facts. Id. at 352, 246 S.E.2d at 331 (emphasis in original). In Enyeart v. Swartz, 218 Neb. 425, 355 N.W.2d 786 (1984) ( Enyeart II ), [7] the Supreme Court of Nebraska also found plain error in failing to instruct a jury on proximate cause. The court held that [w]hile it may not be error, per se, to fail to give a definition of proximate cause ... if the matter is not an issue, the failure to give an instruction on the definition of proximate cause where, as here, it is one of the principal issues in the case must be considered by the court to be plain error, requiring reversal. Id. at 427, 355 N.W.2d at 788 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Morris v. Getscher, 708 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir.1983), applying Iowa law, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a legal malpractice case because of plain error in jury instructions on damages and causation. Id. at 1311. Although it is not clear what instruction was given on proximate cause, the appellate court commented that [b]ecause of the centrality of the requirement that a plaintiff prove proximate cause in a malpractice case and the concommitant [sic] importance of the jury's understanding of this requirement ... we conclude that submitting the case under these instructions constituted plain error seriously affecting the fairness of the malpractice proceeding. Id. at 1311 (citation omitted). In Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094 (Del. 1991), the Delaware Supreme Court also reversed an auto accident negligence case based on plain error in jury instructions on proximate cause. [8] The court commented that because the issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact to be submitted to the jury, it is not only appropriate but necessary for the trial judge to properly instruct the jury upon that concept. Id. at 1098. The court held that giving the improper definition of proximate cause was plain and reversible error. Id. at 1099. [9] Montalvo asserts that defendant's instruction No. 1 (dealing with apportionment), [10] plaintiff's instruction No. 3 (dealing with aggravation), [11] and defendant's instruction No. 6 (dealing with unavoidable consequences), [12] were sufficient to convey the concept of causation to the jury. However, nothing in those instructions defined legal cause in terms of substantial factor, natural and probable consequence, or anything similar. Here, the jury could have easily and wrongly omitted the element of legal or proximate causation from its deliberations, thus unjustly finding the City liable for damages. See Dzurik v. Tamura, 44 Haw. 327, 329, 359 P.2d 164, 165 (1960) (the causal connection between the negligent act and the injury complained of ... must be shown. Proximate causation of an injury must be proved and is never presumed (citations omitted)). We recognize that, here, the City withdrew the correct instruction in favor of the incorrect or insufficient Mitchell instruction for purposes of imparting the construct of legal cause. Further, the City compounded its mistake by objecting improperly to the trial court's failure to explain legal cause. Consequently, the City has essentially waived the error on appeal, and, but for plain error, would be unable to obtain a reversal. See Turner, 59 Haw. at 324, 582 P.2d at 714. In State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 760 P.2d 670 (1988), this court summarized the criteria for recognizing plain error: In civil cases, the plain error rule is only invoked when justice so requires. We have taken three factors into account in deciding whether our discretionary power to notice plain error ought to be exercised in civil cases: (1) whether consideration of the issue not raised at trial requires additional facts; (2) whether its resolution will affect the integrity of the trial court's findings of fact; and (3) whether the issue is of great public import. Id. at 56 n. 2, 760 P.2d at 676 n. 2 (citing Jorgensen v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 476, 540 P.2d 978, 985 (1975) (other citations omitted)). The error here meets each of the three Fox factors. The first factor is based on the tenet that an appellate court should not review an issue based upon an undeveloped factual record. In re Taxes, Hawaiian Land Co., 53 Haw. 45, 53, 487 P.2d 1070, 1076 (1971). Here, the record clearly and sufficiently raises the issue whether the legal cause of Montalvo's injuries could have been attributed to events other than the 1988 City accident. The error here also affects the integrity of the jury's findings. Once all the evidence has been presented, it becomes the court's fundamental duty to properly instruct the jury on the law on the precise issues of fact it is to decide. [13] Here, the court failed to define one of the principle issues in the case  legal cause, a concept foreign to most non-lawyers. As the City argues in its brief, the City's entire case hinged on what injury was legally caused by the accident. As for the third factor of the Fox test, we deem preserving the integrity of our jury system to be of great public import. By failing to instruct the jury on the correct meaning of an element so essential as legal cause, the trial court allowed the jury to base its determination of damages on speculation and conjecture. The fact that the City withdrew the correct instruction, while unfortunate and misdirected, is not outcome-dispositive. As indicated above, it is the trial judge's duty to ascertain the correctness of the instructions to be submitted to the jury. The goal of preserving the integrity of the jury system far outweighs any argument that a party, who withdraws a crucial instruction, invited the error and that, thus, any adverse verdict against such party should be affirmed as an appropriate sanction. The public's confidence in the jury system obviously will not be enhanced by such a result. The minority, in its dissent, disagrees with the above analysis, concluding that because the City's misguided games-playing induced the error in the first place, Minority opinion at 304, 884 P.2d at 367, we should not reward it by recognizing plain error. Game-playing, in this context, implies a conscious effort to deceive the court and the jury and to reap the benefits of such conduct. There is absolutely no evidence in the record to support the minority's bold conclusion that the City was engaged in games-playing. The mere submission and withdrawal of a correct instruction of law can only be characterized, at best, as evidence of the lack of knowledge or experience of the attorneys involved. The minority states that [t]here can be no doubt that the City [withdrew the correct instruction] because it believed, correctly or incorrectly, that the [ Mitchell ] instruction was significantly more favorable to it. The crucial point that the minority misses is the fact that the correct instruction ( substantial factor ) would obviously have been more favorable to the City than the incorrect Mitchell instruction ( flowing from ) because it would have made more narrow the scope of the jury's consideration of the amount of damages. Without the correct instruction, the jury could only speculate as to what constituted legal causation, leaving the City vulnerable to unlimited and potentially baseless damages. Had the broader Mitchell instruction been given, the result would have been the same. The City's withdrawal of the more favorable, restrictive instruction supports our inference of a lack of knowledge or experience, rather than games-playing, on the part of the City's attorneys. We agree with the minority that [t]he plain error doctrine represents a departure from the normal rules of waiver that govern appellate review. Minority opinion at 304, 884 P.2d at 367. We also agree that the plain error doctrine is based on notions of equity and justice. Id. at 304, 884 P.2d at 367. However, in concluding that justice requires that we not recognize plain error [in this case], id. at 305, 884 P.2d at 368, the minority simply misses the entire point of our discussion regarding the trial court's failure to define legal cause for the jury. Because legal cause is an element so essential and basic in any case premised on negligence, it is crucial that the jury be properly instructed in order for it to perform its duty as judges of the fact. We agree with the substantial authority from other jurisdictions that where, as here, causation is a primary issue, it is plain and reversible error for a trial court not to explain the meaning of legal cause to a jury.