Opinion ID: 891666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Green's Hearsay Identification of Defendant

Text: {37} We next address Defendant's argument that Green's mother's testimony about her son's spontaneous declaration, There's Joseph, upon seeing Defendant driving next to him in Carlsbad, was inadmissible hearsay. {38} The statement was clearly hearsay, as defined by Rule 11-801(C) NMRA of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence: Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. It certainly was an out-of-court statement, and its only probative value was in establishing that, as Green indicated, Defendant was already in Carlsbad four days before the stabbing. {39} Categorization of a statement as hearsay, however, is only the beginning point of a hearsay admissibility determination. Once a statement is determined to be hearsay, it is necessary to consider whether it fits one of the numerous exceptions to Rule 11-802's default position of exclusion: Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the supreme court or by statute. Rule 11-802 NMRA. The trial court determined that the statement was admissible as a hearsay exception, observing only that the res gestae rules that the courts have followed over the years have been ... changed.
{40} The Latin term res gestae means the events at issue or others contemporaneous with them. Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 761 (2d ed.1995). It has been used historically in the context of various evidentiary and nonevidentiary issues in the case law. See, e.g., State v. Finchum, 111 N.M. 716, 717-18, 809 P.2d 630, 631-32 (1991) (holding that a res gestae theory justified joinder for trial of charges of murder of a male victim and battery against a female victim where evidence of the battery would have been admissible in a separate murder trial on a res gestae theory); State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 97, 619 P.2d 541, 542 (1980) (discussing whether the victim's provocative conduct was sufficiently within the res gestae of the killing to justify a voluntary manslaughter instruction in a murder case), overruled on other grounds by Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982); State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462, 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979) (holding in a felony-murder prosecution that a defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on second-degree murder because there was an issue as to whether the murder was committed as part of the res gestae of the felony of robbery), overruled on other grounds by State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486, 903 P.2d 228 (1995); State v. Paris, 76 N.M. 291, 294, 414 P.2d 512, 514 (1966) (holding that the confession of an accused, not a part of the res gestae, as well as a confession that is part of the res gestae of a crime, may be used to prove the commission of the corpus delicti of a crime). As many as seven distinguishable legal concepts have historically been referred to by use of this same term. 4 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803:2, at 90 (6th ed.2006). {41} When used in the evidentiary context, res gestae most commonly has referred to a cluster of judicially-created exceptions to the exclusion of evidence on hearsay grounds that first came into use in the early 1800s. See 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1767, at 181 (3d ed.1940); see, e.g., State v. Godwin, 51 N.M. 65, 71, 178 P.2d 584, 588 (1947) (holding that a spontaneous statement under stress was admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule). While widely used before adoption of the modern evidence codes, the term had been repeatedly criticized by courts and commentators. Judge Learned Hand described it as a phrase which has been accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any place whatever in legal terminology. United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir.1944). It has been described as not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful and deserving of being repudiated as a vicious element in our legal phraseology. 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1767, at 255 (James H. Chadbourn rev.1976). It is not only so vague as to create more problems than it resolves, it is a completely unnecessary term in the evidence context because every rule of evidence to which it has ever been applied exists as a part of some other well-established principle and can be explained in the terms of that principle. Id. {42} When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, they avoided any use of the term res gestae whatsoever. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972) (ordering promulgated Rules of Evidence transferred to Congress for approval). Despite our prompt adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973, see State v. Martinez, 2008-NMSC-060, ¶ 25, 145 N.M. 220, 195 P.3d 1232, the term still occasionally has crept back into judicial opinions. See, e.g., Finchum, 111 N.M. at 717, 809 P.2d at 631 (referring to the State's reliance on the `res gestae' exception of the hearsay rule set forth in State v. Mottola, 84 N.M. 414, 504 P.2d 22 (Ct.App.1972)); State v. Cozzens, 93 N.M. 559, 561, 603 P.2d 298, 300 (Ct.App. 1979) (determining that a hearsay statement was not admissible as part of the res gestae). Our Court of Appeals has accurately cautioned that both courts and commentators have largely abandoned the general haze of the res gestae doctrine. State v. Rael, 117 N.M. 539, 542 n. 1, 873 P.2d 285, 288 n. 1 (Ct.App.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {43} We agree that the phrase  res gestae, in itself, adds nothing but confusion to an already complex area of the law. The better practice is to abandon the use of the phrase altogether and to, instead, use the specific rule of evidence or statute that applies to the particular factual situation presented. State v. Hansen, 296 Mont. 282, 989 P.2d 338, 354 (1999); see also State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 948 A.2d 636, 652 (2008) (Albin, J., concurring) (cataloguing numerous federal and state appellate courts throughout the country [that] have already come to the conclusion that res gestae is outdated, is no longer relevant, and should be discarded). {44} The fact that the trial judge in this case referred to the principle justifying admission by the old term of res gestae, rather than the terms used in the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, does not mean the admission of the testimony was error, since we may uphold the judge's decision if it was right for any reason. State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804. We turn, therefore, to an analysis of the specific hearsay exceptions explicitly set forth in the rules, which by their own terms, govern proceedings in the courts of the State of New Mexico. Rule 11-101 NMRA.
{45} Rule 11-803(B) NMRA provides for the admissibility over a hearsay objection of [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. This common-law-based exception had been deduced and articulated by Dean Wigmore in his analysis of one of the most common applications of the res gestae exception in the case law, see 6 Wigmore, supra, §§ 1745-1763, at 131-76 (3d ed.1940), and finds abundant support in the decided federal cases. Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 803(2)[01] (1985). It was recognized through the res gestae concept by pre-rules New Mexico cases. See, e.g., Godwin, 51 N.M. at 71, 178 P.2d at 588. {46} Defendant argues that the excited utterance exception does not apply here because there was insufficient excitement in the victim's voice when he spontaneously uttered There's Joseph upon seeing Defendant driving along next to him. Defendant's argument both disregards the reasoning underlying the excited utterance exception and takes an overly narrow view of the word excited. {47} As we have recently emphasized, [t]he theory underlying the excited utterance exception is that the exciting event induced the declarant's surprise, shock, or nervous excitement which temporarily stills capacity for conscious fabrication and makes it unlikely that the speaker would relate other than the truth. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 30, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, to constitute an excited utterance, the declaration should be spontaneous, made before there is time for fabrication, and made under the stress of the moment. State v. Martinez, 102 N.M. 94, 99, 691 P.2d 887, 892 (Ct.App.1984). {48} There is nothing in the case law nor in the ordinary meaning of excited which restricts the meaning of the word to any narrow requirement of a frenzied or hyperactive state. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 620 (4th ed.2000) defines excited as [b]eing in a state of excitement; emotionally aroused; stirred and defines excite as 1. To stir to activity. 2. To call forth (a reaction or emotion, for example); elicit: odd noises that excited our curiosity. ... {49} We apply the excited utterance analysis to a particular fact situation through an examination of the totality of the circumstances, including how much time passed between the startling event and the statement, and whether, in that time, the declarant had an opportunity for reflection and fabrication; how much pain, confusion, nervousness, or emotional strife the declarant was experiencing at the time of the statement; whether the statement was self-serving[; and whether the statement was] made in response to an inquiry. Balderama, 2004-NMSC-008, ¶ 51, 135 N.M. 329, 88 P.3d 845 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {50} In this case, the totality of the circumstances surrounding Green's declaration indicates that he was making an utterance in direct and immediate response to a surprising event that triggered an emotional response. Shortly before the stabbing, Green moved over eight hundred miles to Carlsbad. The evidence at trial indicated that he did so because he had left a troubled relationship with Defendant. It is a reasonable inference that Green was startled to see that Defendant had tracked him down from Nevada to New Mexico. Green's appearance to his mother as very agitated and scared upon seeing Defendant further indicates that he responded emotionally when making his immediate and spontaneous utterance, There's Joseph. The testimony established a textbook case for application of the excited utterance exception, and Green's hearsay statement to his mother identifying Defendant as the driver of the nearby car was admissible on that ground alone.
{51} The testimony was equally admissible under the present sense impression exception. A present sense impression is a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 29, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence observe, [i]n considerable measure the [excited utterance and present sense impression exceptions] overlap, though based on somewhat different theories. The most significant practical difference will lie in the time lapse allowable between the event and statement. Fed.R.Evid. 803(1)-(2) advisory committee's notes. The theory underlying the present sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. Id. {52} Both excited utterances and present sense impressions were among the theories subsumed within the pre-rules res gestae cluster of exceptions. 4 Graham, supra § 803:2, at 75-100. As their textual elements indicate, they differ in that an excited utterance requires a reasonable inference that emotional stress has contributed to the making of the statement, while present sense impression requires instead that the statement be substantially contemporaneous with the event it is describing or explaining. 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 271, at 251 (6th ed.2006); see Salgado, 1999-NMSC-008, ¶ 13, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661 (observing that reliability of a present sense impression is enhanced by the requirement of a contemporaneous statement); see also State v. Perry, 95 N.M. 179, 180, 619 P.2d 855, 856 (Ct.App.1980) (analyzing timeliness in applying the exception). {53} The disputed testimony in this case presents no timeliness issue whatsoever. Green uttered, There's Joseph, at the very moment he was looking at Defendant in the car next to him and his mother. Cf. State v. Massengill, 2003-NMCA-024, ¶ 10, 133 N.M. 263, 62 P.3d 354 (concluding that four or more hours between an event and a statement describing that event are not sufficiently contemporaneous). There was virtually no time for Green to decide to misrepresent to his mother that Defendant was driving along the streets of Carlsbad, presumably so Defendant could be falsely accused of killing Green several days in the future. There simply was no apparent motive to lie. Perry, 95 N.M. at 180, 619 P.2d at 856 (observing that an admissibility decision should take into account the declarant's motive to lie). {54} One of the additional indicia of reliability of a present sense impression may be that the person to whom the statement is made is often in a position to verify the accuracy of the statement. 2 Broun, supra § 271, at 251. Although independent corroboration is not a foundational requirement for admission, it may be a factor in the trial judge's exercise of discretion in admitting the hearsay. State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 718, 676 P.2d 241, 245 (1984) (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by excluding an absent declarant's statement of identification after a fleeting view of a person, where the testifying witness was unable to verify the accuracy of the identification). In this case, Green's mother looked over at the adjacent driver her son was identifying and later testified that Defendant was the person she had seen. Defense counsel was unable to cast any doubt on her testimony during an unlimited cross-examination. {55} We conclude that, under these circumstances, the statement by Green to his mother contemporaneously identifying Defendant as the driver of the neighboring car as Defendant was clearly admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.