Opinion ID: 1736502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the erroneous admission of a prejudicial videotape of the inside of baker's apartment subsequent to a warrantless search of the premises constitutes reversible error.

Text: ¶ 6. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. ¶ 7. Constitutionally speaking, a search occurs when governmental action invades an area in which the person invoking the Fourth Amendment has an actual expectation of privacy which society would consider to be reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-17, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a judicially-created exclusionary rule typically precludes use of the evidence in any criminal proceedings against one subjected to an illegal search and seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). One exception to the exclusionary rule is the exigent circumstances exception which applies when three elements are met: (1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency situation exists and that there is an immediate need for police assistance in order to protect life and property; (2) the primary motivation for the search is not to make an arrest and/or to seize evidence; and (3) there is some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place searched. Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 570 (Miss. 1982). ¶ 8. Baker's first assignment of error is that the admission of videotape foot-age of the interior of his apartment violated his right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Baker concedes that Deputy Gilmer's initial search of the apartment was permissible as there were exigent circumstances necessitating the search in order to protect and preserve life. In other words, Baker does not challenge Gilmer's authority to search his home without a warrant as Gilmer had been told that two children were missing and they might have been in the apartment. Rather, Baker argues that Waggener's subsequent entry to videotape the scene to preserve evidence was too remote in time from Gilmer's and so the exigent circumstances exception does not apply. ¶ 9. At trial, the circuit court admitted the tape on the grounds that the apartment was part of the crime scene. The State concedes, and we agree, that there is no crime scene exception and that the circuit court appears to have applied the wrong legal standard. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea of a murder scene exception to the Fourth Amendment in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). Since the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, we review its ruling de novo. Butler v. State, 592 So.2d 983, 986 (Miss.1991)([T]he trial court enjoys considerable discretion, and, so long as that court exercises that discretion by reference to the correct legal standards, we will not reverse absent substantial abuse of discretion). ¶ 10. In Taylor v. State, 733 So.2d 251 (Miss.1999), police entered a dwelling in which a victim had been fatally burned by her boyfriend. Id. at 254. One officer walked through the house, left briefly to search for the boyfriend, and then returned with a camera to take pictures of the scene. Id. About 45 minutes later, police went through the house a third time, collecting various pieces of physical evidence. Id. We upheld the search's constitutionality, relying on the same reasoning applied earlier in Smith: From the time of their initial entry, the officers of the Jackson Police Department were engaged in only one search. That search had only one goal: locating [the victim] (and assisting her, if not too late). The actions of [the officer] and other members of the mobile crime lab (after the re-entry of the apartment) were merely to effectuate the physical seizure of articles in plain view which [the officers] would have been able to seize had not the circumstances been so exigent. There was no unwarranted delay in time, nor was there any expansion of the scope of the search. The fact that the actual physical taking of the items into the custody of the police was effectuated by an evidence technician who was trained to preserve the evidentiary value of the objects, rather than by the first officers to view the objects, is not significant. Taylor, 733 So.2d at 256 (quoting Smith, 419 So.2d at 572). In other words, when police are properly authorized to enter a dwelling under the exigent circumstances doctrine, they are also authorized to return and take physical evidence that was in plain view during the initial search, which they could have seized at the time but for the emergency situation that allowed them to enter the dwelling in the first place. ¶ 11. In the case sub judice, no physical evidence was taken at all. The officer who videotaped the scene testified that he did not in any way tamper with anything in the apartment once [he] proceeded inside to videotape it. Instead, the videotape simply allowed the jury to see exactly what the police saw during their initial search of the premises. This issue is without merit.