Opinion ID: 2215646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature and Quality of the Contacts

Text: Three types of contacts are alleged in this case: Bid solicitation, inspections, and discussions of various kinds. While it appears that an allegation of bid solicitation alone would not support jurisdiction, [2] this is not merely a bid-solicitation case. Rather, the case involves inspections, negotiations, discussions, and planning sessions in Minnesota, and the question as a result is whether defendants' incursions into the state were casual and sporadic, or whether they evinced an intent to do business on a regular and systematic basis here. Nerlund v. Schiavone, 250 Minn. 160, 84 N.W.2d 61 (1957). This question could be answered either way on these facts. On the one hand, it could plausibly be argued that the inspections and discussions here were but an incidental part of the contract performance. [3] On the other hand, it seems equally plausible to conclude that the inspections and discussions were part of the regular business activity of LaCrosse in improving its airport and part of the regular business activity of Perry-Carrington in providing engineering design and supervisory services, and that defendants came voluntarily into Minnesota to perform these activities, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Minnesota law while present in the state. Northwestern Nat. Bank of St. Paul v. Kratt, Minn., 226 N.W.2d 910 (1975); American Pollution Prevention Co. Inc. v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., Minn., 230 N.W.2d 63 (1975). See, also, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). We have observed on several occasions that the jurisdictional statutes of Minnesota, including Minn.St. 543.19, extend the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts to the maximum limits consistent with due process. [4] A necessary corollary of this principle is that in doubtful cases, doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of jurisdiction. Any other position would be inconsistent with the incontestable propositions that upon a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged by complaint and affidavit are to be taken as true, and that the motion should not be granted unless the plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case. Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969), certiorari denied sub nom. Burke v. Hunt, 397 U.S. 1010, 90 S.Ct. 1239, 25 L.Ed.2d 423 (1970). Our conclusion is also supported by this statement made in the trial court's memorandum: Tested by the five factors of Aftanase, this court would have jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant[s]. [5] And as the trial judge noted in the very next sentence of his memorandum, Federal District Court Judge Earl Larson, in a companion case to the instant matter, [6] has also ruled that the contacts here are sufficient to provide a constitutional basis for jurisdiction. To quote Judge Larson's memorandum: It is equally clear that service under this long-arm statute comports with the Due Process clause. The City's contacts with the Minnesota forum include [the] solicitation of contractual bids from Minnesota entities; the supplying by Ostreng of aggregate for the construction work from its sources in Minnesota to Hardrives' asphalt plant located in Minnesota; the inspection and regulation by City officials of conditions existing at Hardrives' Minnesota plant; and negotiations between the parties concerning the project being conducted in Minnesota. These contacts satisfy the five-pronged balancing test for determining the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction under a long-arm statute such as M.S.A. § 543.19. See Aftanase v. Economy Baler Company, [343 F.2d 187] 197. In particular, the City's solicitation of bids from Minnesota contractors constituted an intentional incursion by it in to the Minnesota market place. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 [78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283] (1958). The apparently frequent appearances of its agents at Hardrives' Minnesota plant further demonstrates the City's purposeful presence in this State.    These and other contacts are not so minimal that assertion of in personam jurisdiction here would offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' International Shoe Company v. Washington, [326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102]. We find the points made by Judge Larson persuasive on the question of the quality of the contacts here present.