Opinion ID: 2625980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the existence of a physician-patient relationship

Text: ¶ 18 The next question is whether the undisputed facts were sufficient to prove the existence of a physician-patient relationship between Dr. Schlinke and Crawford. Although the question of duty is one for the courts, Lowery, 2007 OK 38 at ¶ 12, 160 P.3d at 964, the question of the formation of a physician-patient relationship is a question of fact, turning upon a determination of whether the patient entrusted his treatment to the physician and the physician accepted the case. Fruiterman v. Granata, 276 Va. 629, 668 S.E.2d 127, 135 (2008) (citing Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1977)); Irvin v. Smith, 272 Kan. 112, 31 P.3d 934, 940-941 (2001). On a motion for summary judgment when the material facts are undisputed and the evidentiary materials and facts show one party is entitled to judgment, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law. See Glasco, 2008 OK 65 at ¶ 36, 188 P.3d at 188. ¶ 19 It is unquestioned in Oklahoma and other jurisdictions that an attending or treating physician has the requisite connections with the patient to create a physician-patient relationship. See Jackson v. Okla. Mem'l Hosp., 1995 OK 112, ¶ 12, 909 P.2d 765, 772. In Jackson, this Court set out evidence in that case which showed that the defendant doctor, a faculty physician at a teaching hospital, was the plaintiff's attending physician. Id. at ¶ 11, 909 P.2d at 771-772. This Court concluded that the defendant doctor was the attending physician and, as such, could be held liable for medical malpractice. In other medical malpractice cases previously decided by this Court, treating physicians were implicitly deemed to have the requisite relationship with a patient necessary to maintain a medical malpractice action against them. Franklin, 2000 OK 79, 19 P.3d 834; Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 1984 OK 56, 686 P.2d 285. In the present case, the plaintiffs do not assert, and there is no evidentiary material supporting a finding, that Dr. Schlinke was the plaintiffs' attending or treating physician. Thus, we turn to other indicia of a physician-patient relationship. ¶ 20 This Court has not addressed whether a physician-patient relationship exists when the physician has not examined, diagnosed, or treated the patient. However, courts generally agree that, under similar facts to those before us, a physician's discussion with a treating physician concerning a patient, without more, does not create a physician-patient relationship and, thus, does not create a duty on the part of the non-treating physician. Adams v. Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr., 270 Kan. 824, 19 P.3d 132, 139-140 (2001), and cases cited therein; Flynn v. Bausch, 238 Neb. 61, 469 N.W.2d 125, 128 (1991), and cases cited therein; Diggs v. Ariz. Cardiologists, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 198, 8 P.3d 386, 389, 391 (Generally, where a physician has been informally consulted, the courts deny recovery for negligence[, and] where treating physician exercises independent judgment in determining whether to accept or reject such advice, few policy considerations favor imposing a duty on the advising physician.). ¶ 21 In Oliver v. Brock, 342 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1977), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the question of the existence of a physician-patient relationship which would support a medial malpractice action. Id. at 3. The facts were (1) the defendant doctor had never seen the plaintiff, (2) neither the plaintiff's parents nor her treating doctor had ever requested or engaged the defendant to serve as a consultant in the plaintiff's treatment, (3) the treating doctor called the defendant about another patient; during the conversation, described the plaintiffs injuries and the type of treatment being administered; did not ask for advice about the treatment; and was told by the defendant that he was treating the injuries correctly, (4) the conversation was gratuitous, and (5) the attending doctor did not employ the defendant to treat the plaintiff. Id. The court found that there was no evidence from which it could conclude that the defendant had consented to treat the plaintiff. Id. at 4-5. ¶ 22 The evidence in Flynn v. Bausch, 238 Neb. 61, 469 N.W.2d 125 (1991), is more compelling of the existence of a physician-patient relationship than the evidence before this Court here. Nonetheless, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the record did not support a physician-patient relationship between the defendant doctor and the plaintiff. Id. at 129. In Flynn, the defendant doctor and the plaintiff's treating doctor had a conversation about the plaintiff in the hospital nursery where the plaintiff was at the time. Id. at 127. The two doctors agreed that additional tests on the plaintiff were needed. Id. The defendant did not look at the plaintiff's chart or any test results and was not aware of the plaintiff's name. Id. Although the defendant did look at the plaintiff in the nursery, he did not examine the plaintiff but noticed that he appeared jaundiced and had a rash. Id. The defendant advised the treating doctor to wait on test results before performing a blood-exchange transfusion. Id. The plaintiff alleged that he suffered brain damage and other injuries which could have been avoided had he received the transfusion earlier. Id. at 128. The court concluded that summary judgment in the defendant's favor was proper notwithstanding he had looked at the plaintiff in the nursery and had advised the transfusion be delayed, which it was. The court reasoned that the inferences were too general to support a finding that the defendant had undertaken to participate in the plaintiff's care. Id. at 129. ¶ 23 In St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.1995), the Texas Supreme Court faced the question of whether a physician-patient relationship existed under the facts in that case. Id. at 421. The defendant doctor was on call at the hospital when the plaintiff was being treated in the emergency room. Id. at 421-422. When the emergency room doctor consulted the defendant by telephone, the defendant opined that the patient should be transferred to another facility. Id. at 422. ¶ 24 The plaintiff in St. John sued the defendant for medical malpractice. See id. The court surveyed the history of medical malpractice and concluded that a physician-patient relationship was necessary to maintain a medical malpractice action. Id. at 423. It did not dispute that a physician's agreement with a hospital might require an on-call physician to treat the hospital's patients, but the fact that a physician is on call does not in itself impose such a duty. Id. at 424. The court found that the defendant had established the lack of a physician-patient relationship in his motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. The court further noted that after the defendant had submitted evidence that he never agreed to treat the plaintiff it was incumbent on [the plaintiff] to present [evidence of an agreement] in order to preclude summary judgment for the doctor. Id. ¶ 25 Here, Dr. Schlinke did not render medical advice to the plaintiffs; did not provide services to the treating physician on behalf of Shelby or Crawford; took no affirmative action to treat Shelby or Crawford; spoke only with Dr. Badgett and not to the Crawford or Jennings; did not examine Shelby or Crawford; did not receive a referral of Shelby or Crawford for treatment or consultation; was not employed by Dr. Badgett and had not been asked or contracted by Dr. Badgett to provide medical treatment to Shelby or Crawford; and had not reviewed any work, conducted any laboratory tests, reviewed any test results, prepared any reports, or billed the plaintiffs. Further, none of the plaintiffs agreed that Dr. Schlinke could treat Crawford or Shelby. Even though Dr. Badgett chose to rely on Dr. Schlinke's opinion, Dr. Badgett was free to exercise his independent judgment. ¶ 26 Dr. Schlinke submitted evidentiary materials supporting a finding that he did not have a physician-patient relationship with the plaintiffs. It was then incumbent on the plaintiffs to come forth with evidentiary materials to support the formation of the essential physician-patient relationship. The plaintiffs relied on the fact that Dr. Badgett would not have allowed Crawford to deliver early but for Dr. Schlinke's recommendation. This is insufficient to create a physician-patient relationship. The facts before us fail to show that Dr. Schlinke agreed to treat the plaintiffs or undertook treatment of any of the plaintiffs. Thus, there was not the physician-patient relationship necessary for a medical malpractice action. The district court correctly granted judgment in Dr. Schlinke's favor.