Opinion ID: 787481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's right to remain silent and to exercise his right to a trial.

Text: 110 During rebuttal argument at the end of the trial, the prosecutor explained to the jury that, even though government witness Paul Coynes (who testified as an insider who had worked with Defendant) was a sleazy telemarketer, the prosecutor had decided to call him as a witness in order to give the jury an inside view of how the telemarketing operation worked. The prosecutor said that the government had also called Coynes to give you a view to see somebody who has accepted responsibility for what he did, who has admitted to you, `Yes, I lied. I lied. I knew these were lies, and I continued to make them.' 111 Defendant argues that, in making the latter comments, the prosecutor indirectly was referring to Defendant as one who had not accepted responsibility the way Coynes admirably had. A prosecutor's statement is improper if it is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant's failure to testify, or is of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify. Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir.1987). Defendant also argues that the prosecutor, by his comments, improperly invited the jury to view Defendant disfavorably for exercising his constitutional right to plead not guilty and have a trial. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort. ...). 112 In our view, the prosecutor's comments did not call attention to the fact that Defendant did not take the stand. The comments came somewhat closer to implying that Defendant was somehow dishonorable for exercising his right to a jury trial. However, the comments are best understood as an attempt to rehabilitate Coynes in order to increase the credibility of Coynes' testimony, and we think it most likely that the jury understood the comments as bearing on Coynes' credibility. So construed, the comments were not improper. 113 Even if the comments were improper, reversal would be appropriate only where such comment is extensive, where an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to the jury as a basis for the conviction, and where there is evidence that could have supported acquittal. Sunn, 807 F.2d at 809 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the comments were isolated and not repeated, and there was no inference of guilt from silence stressed to the jury. Furthermore, the district court's instructions to the jury reminded the jury that, in reaching its verdict, it was to consider only the evidence presented during the trial, and that the arguments of counsel, including closing arguments, [are] intended to help you interpret the evidence, but [they] are not evidence. 5. The Blinkoff deposition. 114 Before trial, and pursuant to a stipulation signed by Defendant and his counsel, the parties took the deposition of investor-victim Brian Blinkoff via a video-phone connection. Blinkoff was ill, and his medical condition prevented him from traveling to Los Angeles, where the trial was conducted. The stipulation stated that the deposition would be admissible at trial as substantive evidence and that the government had provided Defendant's counsel with discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 and 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (the Jencks Act). 7 115 The deposition lasted about two-and-a-half hours. During cross-examination, in responding to a question, Blinkoff mentioned that he had contemporaneous notes of conversations with Defendant. Blinkoff testified that he had told prosecutors a month earlier that he had such notes, but at that time they did not ask for copies of the notes. Blinkoff had discussed the existence of the notes again with prosecutors the day before his deposition, when (according to Blinkoff) the prosecutor told him that he should make copies and forward them to the government. 116 In the middle of the cross-examination, at the request of defense counsel, the notes were faxed to the lawyers in Los Angeles. However, not all of the pages were faxed, and Blinkoff reported that there were more notes that had not been sent. At the close of the deposition, Defendant's lawyer stated his objections on the record: [W]e are not agreeing that this deposition is necessarily over. We may ask that it be renewed or we may ask that his testimony be stricken. Despite that reservation of an option to continue the deposition at a later date, the defense never sought to schedule a further deposition with Blinkoff. 117 The government presented the stipulation to the district court, along with a proposed order authorizing the deposition to be received as substantive evidence, the day after the deposition. When the government began to introduce the videotaped deposition at trial a few weeks later, defense counsel moved to have the videotape excluded on the ground that the government had failed to live up to its agreement to provide all Jencks Act material and Brady 8 material to Defendant before the deposition. 118 The district court held that there was no Brady violation (a holding that Defendant does not challenge on appeal). The district court held that there was a violation of the Jencks Act. The court cited United States v. Riley, 189 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.1999), for the proposition that a district court has discretion to refuse to impose sanctions for a Jencks Act violation and that the court's decision should rest on a consideration of the culpability of the government for the unavailability of the material and the resulting injury to the defendant. The district court found that it was clearly ... the government's fault that the material had not been turned over. With respect to the injury to Defendant, the district court observed that the notes were often illegible, but the gist of them could be made out in most cases. Some of the notes related directly to the case, while others were extraneous. The district court stated that it was a close call, but decided that Defendant had not shown sufficient injury to merit striking Blinkoff's testimony. In so ruling, the district court also noted that defense counsel had waited until trial to object, and had not taken advantage of the opportunity to reopen the deposition; this fact created doubt as to how much prejudice Defendant had really suffered. 119 On appeal Defendant argues that, because his agreement in the stipulation to waive his right to challenge the introduction of the deposition testimony was conditioned on the government's turning over certain materials, and because the government failed to turn over those materials in time, the court should have set aside the stipulation for lack of consent. However, Defendant did not seek that relief from the district court. Rather, Defendant argued simply that the witness should be excluded because of Brady and Jencks Act violations. The district court found no Brady violation and exercised its discretion not to strike the deposition as a result of the Jencks Act violation. The district court did not consider, because Defendant did not raise, the argument that the stipulation should be tossed out and that the admissibility of the deposition should therefore depend on the requirement that the witness be unavailable. Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(e) (2001). Defendant has therefore waived this argument on appeal. See United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 848 n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (To the extent [Defendant] rest [s] his argument on different grounds, he waived it by failing to raise it before the district court.). 120 On appeal, Defendant also argues for the first time that Blinkoff was not unavailable and that Defendant's waiver of his right to challenge introduction of the deposition under the Sixth Amendment was infirm because no judicial officer ever asked Defendant if he understood his rights and was waiving them. These arguments were not raised below and are therefore not properly before us. United States v. Keesee, 358 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir.2004) (A theory for suppression not advanced in district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.).