Opinion ID: 1860459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Goodspeed Planted in Defendant's Cell by State

Text: In addition to alleging that Goodspeed's testimony was unreliable, Defendant further contends that Goodspeed's testimony should have been excluded because he was acting as an agent of the State. Specifically, defendant argues that while he was incarcerated at Rapides Parish Detention Center awaiting trial, defense counsel filed a Motion to Prevent Creation of Snitch Testimony, requesting that defendant be placed in a cell by himself and not exposed to anyone except defense counsel. Defendant argues that the State intentionally placed Goodspeed in a cell with him, long after the right to counsel attached in an attempt to create snitch testimony. We disagree, and find that Goodspeed was not acting as an agent of the State in violation of defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Further, the trial court did not err in allowing Goodspeed to testify to the jury regarding defendant's confession. When a defendant has been formally charged with a crime and has invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the government may not use an undercover agent or informant to circumvent these rights. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); see also State v. Brown, 434 So.2d 399, 402 (La.1983). In Massiah, the Supreme Court ruled that the government overstepped constitutional bounds by outfitting an informant's car with a radio transmitter and arranging a meeting with the accused. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206-07, 84 S.Ct. at 1203. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits deliberate elicitation by the government or its agents of incriminating information from a defendant after he has been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199. Defendant relies upon Massiah v. United States , arguing that placing Goodspeed in his cell violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. This reliance is misplaced. The Court in Massiah found active governmental participation to elicit incriminating statements; in the instant case, there is no evidence of active involvement by the State. The record reflects that Goodspeed was placed in the cell with defendant through normal procedures. Specifically, the testimony of Warden Vernon Creecy of the Rapides Parish Detention Center established that the jail has only two cells which inmates may occupy by themselves. One of those cells is reserved for inmates under suicide watch, and the other is used for protective custody. Therefore, the facility could not readily comply with the defense request for privacy because of limited accommodations. Warden Creecy further testified that during the nearly five years defendant was incarcerated at his facility awaiting trial, over 100 inmates shared the cell with defendant. To claim that the State intentionally paired Goodspeed as defendant's cell mate defies logic. In an attempt to qualify Goodspeed as an agent of the State, defendant alleges that Goodspeed was granted a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony. However, the trial court heard testimony from Goodspeed's attorney, W.T. Armitage, in which he testified that when he entered into plea bargain negotiations with the District Attorney's office the fact that Goodspeed was a possible witness in defendant's trial was never discussed, nor was the judge made aware of the fact that Goodspeed was prepared to testify in defendant's case. Furthermore, during a motion hearing to exclude Goodspeed's testimony, Loren Lampert, the assistant district attorney prosecuting Goodspeed, testified that his status as a witness against defendant was not a consideration in the plea bargain negotiations.