Opinion ID: 1194691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Threats of Violence.

Text: The prosecutor presented evidence that on March 17, 1974, defendant threatened to kill Arthur Castillo as Castillo was preparing to drive defendant to the juvenile hall. Defendant was restrained, and did not attempt to carry out his threat. That threat might nevertheless constitute a violation of section 71, which provides that [e]very person who, with intent to cause ... any public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a public offense.... The prosecutor made no attempt to show that defendant made his threat to cause Castillo to refrain from performing his duties, and thus that defendant violated section 71. The defense, on the other hand, did not object to the admission of Castillo's testimony. We need not now decide whether the defense's failure to object bars it from raising this point on appeal. The prosecution also offered evidence that on April 8, 1975, defendant threatened Alvin McKinley, the high school locker room attendant, when McKinley told defendant to stop kicking the Coke machine. As in the matter of the threats to Castillo, the evidence may have been admissible to prove a violation of section 71. Again the defense did not object. Finally, the prosecution offered evidence that on March 18, 1974, defendant threatened the counselors at the Riverside County Juvenile Hall. Since defendant was locked in his room at the time, he was not in a position to carry out the threat, so the conduct posed no violation of section 71. The prosecutor, however, offered the theory that the evidence proved the crime of inciting to riot (§ 404.6). [9] Defense counsel, however, demonstrated through cross-examination that while defendant threatened the counselors and other boys made similar threats, defendant did not urge the others to riot or to threaten the counselors. (We note also that all of the boys were locked in their rooms at the time of the disturbance, so there was probably not a clear and present and immediate danger of acts of force or violence or the burning or destroying of property as required by section 404.6.) (7) Counsel then moved to strike the evidence on the ground that it was insufficient to prove incitement to riot. The court denied the motion, and submitted the matter to the jury with instructions defining the elements of the crime and cautioning that they could not treat it as an aggravating factor unless the crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion to strike. Our requirement for reasonable doubt instructions on proof of uncharged crimes at the penalty phase (see People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55) necessarily implies that the trial court will not permit the penalty jury to consider an uncharged crime as an aggravating factor unless a `rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255], quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) In our opinion, the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence to prove two elements of the crime of inciting a riot: that the defendant urged others to riot, and that he did so under circumstances which presented a clear and present danger of violence.