Opinion ID: 887710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issue 3: Whether the District Court erred when it failed to compel production of the Ravalli County Attorney's files concerning Russell.

Text: ¶ 55 According to Prindel, in response to the District Court's order requiring the County Attorney to produce [a]ll files and records concerning Richard Russell, the County Attorney produced some records but specifically declined to produce work product, notes, correspondence and things of that nature unless specifically ordered to do so by the District Court. In the District Court, the County argued simply that Prindel had requested only criminal justice information from the County Attorney and that work product and notes do not constitute criminal justice information under § 44-5-103(8), MCA. The District Court later completed an in camera review of the files and records that had not been producedpresumably to ascertain which of them contained work product and other privileged information and expressed concern over only one of these documents: a letter written by the County Attorney after Russell stabbed Prindel. The court found that this letter is colored by hindsight, and denied Prindel's motion to compel production of additional files possessed by the County Attorney. ¶ 56 Prindel argues that the District Court erred when it declined to issue an order compelling production of all of the Ravalli County Attorney's files concerning Russell, despite having issued two previous orders to produce such files. Prindel notes that the court's second order related to more than just criminal justice information and ordered the County Attorney to produce all of his files concerning Russell. The County argues that Prindel sought the County Attorney's files through an order to release criminal justice information under § 44-5-303, MCA, rather than by way of a request for discovery. The County maintains that the District Court properly exercised its discretion when it determined, after an in camera review, that the requested files, with the exception of one letter, were not relevant. As to that letter, the County contends that the District Court properly determined that it was colored by hindsight, and therefore not relevant. ¶ 57 The County's contentionthat Prindel sought access to the County Attorney's files only through an order to release criminal justice information under § 44-5-303, MCA, and not via a discovery request lacks merit. After Prindel initially requested access to the criminal justice information regarding Russell contained in the County Attorney's files, specifically excluding attorney work product and any other information otherwise privileged, the parties jointly filed a second motion, indicating that Prindel would need additional information ... to properly prepare his case. The court then ordered the County Attorney to release [a]ll files and records concerning Richard Russell. The court order, in stating that to the extent applicable, the requirements for disclosure under § 44-5-303, MCA, have been met, contemplates production of more than just the criminal justice information contained in the County Attorney's files. Even if the request had been limited to criminal justice information, this would not necessarily exclude letters, notes and memos prepared by the County Attorney. See § 44-5-103(8), MCA (defining criminal justice information as information relating to criminal justice collected, processed, or preserved by a criminal justice agency but excluding the administrative records of a criminal justice agency). The sole letter flagged by the court communicates the County Attorney's understanding of Russell's assault against his neighbors. Thus, it qualifies as information collected and processed by a criminal justice agency. Without viewing the remaining fileswhich, as a result of the District Court's ruling, are not included in the record on appealwe cannot say whether or not they constitute criminal justice information. ¶ 58 To the extent that Prindel's request covered criminal justice information, the District Court should have weighed the demands of individual privacy against the merits of public disclosure. See § 44-5-303(1), MCA. As with the records compiled by the Center, the District Court should have ordered release of the County Attorney's files, excepting those individual files that failed to satisfy the statutory criteria. The District Court abused its discretion when it declined to order release of the County Attorney's files containing criminal justice information. ¶ 59 To the extent that Prindel's request covered more than criminal justice information, it is governed by the rules of discovery. A party may obtain discovery of information that is relevant or that appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant information. Rule 26(b)(1), M.R.Civ.P. Rule 34, M.R.Civ.P., provides that a party may serve on another party a request to produce designated documents. A party's failure to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). Rule 37(d), M.R.Civ.P. ¶ 60 Prindel properly served a request for inspection of [a]ll files and records concerning Richard Russell, under Rule 34, M.R.Civ.P. The County did not apply for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), M.R.Civ.P. The County also did not serve a written response to Prindel's request. Its failure to do so, therefore, may not be excused on the grounds that the discovery sought by Prindel is objectionable. ¶ 61 Without question, the opinion of the prosecutor, a county employee, that Russell had used a handgun and knife when he assaulted his neighbors in 1997 is relevant to what the County knew or should have known about Russell in December 1998. Consequently, this information is relevant to the issue of causation. Moreover, the County Attorney is listed as a defense witness, so his recorded impression and recollections of the initial criminal case against Russell are doubly relevant, as these may provide means of impeaching him as a witness. Without scrutinizing them, we cannot say whether the other notes, correspondences and work product concerning Russell appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant information and the District Court never made such a determination. Instead, the District Court's order reflects an implicit conclusion that because the County Attorney's letter is colored by hindsight, it lacks the requisite relevance to be discoverable. The District Court abused its discretion when it determined, ex parte and despite the absence of a filed motion requesting such a determination, that the County Attorney's files are not sufficiently relevant to be admitted into evidence. Such error is compounded by the fact that the parties had already stipulated to production of those files. ¶ 62 Finally, the fact that the withheld documents may contain the County Attorney's work product, should not preclude discovery of these documents. Rule 26(b)(3) provides that a party may obtain discovery of documents prepared for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Rule 26(b)(3), M.R.Civ.P. Nevertheless, [a] party may obtain without the required showing a [written and signed or otherwise adopted] statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Rule 26(b)(3), M.R.Civ.P. In applying these limits on the scope of discoverywhich are identical to the limits contained in the Federal Rulesmany federal courts have found the work-product privilege unavailable when a prosecutor in a prior criminal investigation later objects to discovery by a litigant in a related and subsequent civil lawsuit. Ostrowski v. Holem, 2002 WL 31956039 (N.D.Ill.2002), , and cases cited therein. A person who is neither a party to the litigation in which discovery is sought nor a representative of a party to that litigation may not claim work product immunity. In Re California Public Utilities Comm'n (9th Cir.1989), 892 F.2d 778, 781; Doubleday v. Ruh (E.D.Cal.1993), 149 F.R.D. 601, 605-06 (noting that the People of California, rather than a particular county, is the plaintiff in a criminal prosecution; therefore, the work product of the district attorney may be discovered in a subsequent action against a county). A basic purpose behind the work product privilege is the concern with interfering with an ongoing criminal investigation. In re Dept. of Investigation of City of New York (2d Cir.1988), 856 F.2d 481, 484. When the underlying criminal case has been closed, however, this concern disappears. Ostrowski, . ¶ 63 Here, Russell has been convicted of attempted deliberate homicide. He has appealed, and his conviction has been affirmed by this Court. State v. Russell, 2001 MT 278, 307 Mont. 322, 37 P.3d 678. Thus, the criminal case against Russell has been closed by the County Attorney and we assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that any preceding prosecutions against Russell have likewise been closed. Moreover, the State of Montana was the plaintiff in the prosecutions of Russell, for the stabbing and for the assault against his neighbors, though these cases were handled by the Ravalli County Attorney on behalf of its client, the State. Accordingly, Prindel should have access to the County Attorney's files regarding Russell, including the County Attorney's work product. On remand, the District Court should protect against disclosure of opinion work product prepared in anticipation of the present litigation with Prindel. See Palmer v. Farmers Insurance (1993), 261 Mont. 91, 117, 861 P.2d 895, 911, (distinguishing between ordinary and opinion work product and allowing disclosure of opinion work product only if the mental impression is directly at issue in the case and the need for the material is compelling); see also Rule 26(b)(3), M.R.Civ.P. (the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation [in which discovery is sought]). ¶ 64 In evaluating Prindel's request for access to the County Attorney's files regarding Russell, the District Court failed to apply any of the relevant rules or statutory criteria. It did not ascertain whether the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure of criminal justice information contained in the withheld files. It did not conclude that the information contained in the withheld files was not reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable information. Finally, it did not determine that Rule 26(b)(3), M.R.Civ.P., precludes discovery of any work product contained in the withheld files. Instead, it made an ad hoc, ex parte assessment of the relevance of the contents of the files themselves and decided that they were not relevant, and so would not be admissible. The District Court thereby abused its discretion by wrongly employing the admissibility standard in lieu of criminal justice information, discovery, or work product standards. We reverse.