Opinion ID: 2302820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Nature of the Relationship

Text: As emphasized in Santana, there is generally no duty to control the conduct of a third party to prevent injury to another person unless a defendant has a special relationship with either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or with the intended victim of the conduct. Santana, 969 A.2d at 658; see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 315. In both Volpe and Martin, the existing special relationships emanated primarily from each defendant's status as a property ownerunder § 318 of the Restatement (Second) Torts, [a] special relationship    may arise between the possessor of land and those allowed on the land because of the possessor's power of control over those allowed to enter. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 706 (quoting Chavez, 991 P.2d at 5 and citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 57 at 392 (5th ed.1984)). Here, however, possession of land is not a factor. Cognizant of this circumstance, plaintiff maintains that a special relationship between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner instead arose from [Mr.] Clukey's knowledge of [Mr.] Milner's practice of drinking to excess prior to[ [16] ] and on August 12, 2005, [Mr.] Clukey's control over [Mr.] Milner's access to his automobile that night, and [Mr.] Clukey's controlling influence over [Mr.] Milner's actions. After careful examination of the record, and viewing all evidence in favor of the plaintiff, we conclude that the facts of this case do not sufficiently give rise to a special relationship between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner. Despite Mr. Clukey's knowledge of both Mr. Milner's past social drinking habits and current intoxicated state on the evening in question, the facts do not indicate that Mr. Milner was under Mr. Clukey's charge or control. This case is distinguishable from Martin, in that Mr. Clukey, an underage drinker himself, was not an adult who furnished alcohol to Mr. Milner. [17] Nor was such alcohol consumption induced at a premises controlled by Mr. Clukey. Mr. Clukey did not have the ability to regulate Mr. Milner's drinking, nor could he control Mr. Milner's actions after he safely returned him to his vehicle at the convenience store. [18] See Santana, 969 A.2d at 665 (citing Hasenei v. United States, 541 F.Supp. 999, 1009 (D.Md.1982) (a special relationship must include the right or the ability to control the conduct of another)). Under the facts of this case, Mr. Clukey's agreement to bring Mr. Milner back to his vehicle that evening did not constitute an exercise of control equivalent to the custodial degree required to find a special relationship. See McGee By and Through McGee v. Chalfant, 248 Kan. 434, 806 P.2d 980, 985 (1991) (agreement to transport intoxicated individual to his automobile d[id] not constitute such an affirmative act as to amount to the exercise of custody or control over [that individual] despite knowledge of his intoxication). Despite the lack of a special relationship between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Milner, a duty to control the conduct of Mr. Milner may have been imposed upon Mr. Clukey if a special relationship existed between him and Mr. Johnson, giving Mr. Johnson a right to protection. Restatement (Second) Torts § 315. As explained in comment, c. to § 315 of the restatement, [t]he relations between the actor and the other which require the actor to control the conduct of third persons for the protection of the other are stated in §§ 314A and 320. The Restatement (Second) Torts § 314A (1965) designates the following special relations giving rise to a duty to aid or protect: (1) common carrier/passenger; (2) innkeeper/guests; (3) possessor of land that holds the land open to the public/member of the public; and (4) legal or voluntary custodian/ward. These relations create a special responsibility and remove such cases from the general rule, set forth in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 314 at 116 (1965), that [t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his [or her] part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him [or her] a duty to take such action. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 315; see also § 314A cmt. b. Although this list is not intended to be exclusive, it is clear that any relationship between Mr. Clukey and Mr. Johnson is far removed from these categories. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 314A cmt. b. Equally inapplicable is § 320, which addresses the duty of persons having custody of another to control the conduct of third persons. [T]his Section is applicable to a sheriff or peace officer, a jailer or warden of a penal institution, officials in charge of a state [or private] asylum or hospital for the criminally insane, or to teachers or other persons in charge of a public [or private] school. Restatement (Second) Torts § 320 cmt. a. at 130 (1965). Based on these principles, this Court concludes that no special relationship existed between Mr. Clukey (the driver who brought Mr. Milner to his vehicle) and Mr. Johnson (the victim of Mr. Milner's tortious conduct). Because no special relationship existed between the parties in this case to support a duty by Mr. Clukey to control Mr. Milner's conduct on August 12, 2005, to prevent physical harm to Mr. Johnson, plaintiff's argument based on this theory must fail. 2