Opinion ID: 2635704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Relevant legal precedent addressing facial challenges

Text: When analyzing whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process, courts generally apply a two-factor test. Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 685; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Under this two-factor test, an act is unconstitutionally vague if it (1) fails to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 685. Although this test is clear for as-applied challenges, how these factors apply in a facial challenge is less certain. This uncertainty lies in the United States Supreme Court's inconsistent application of these factors in its precedent. Beginning in 1982, the Supreme Court in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), stated that a facial vagueness challenge would fail unless the complainant could demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Id. at 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186. But after stating this requirement, the Hoffman Estates opinion went on to note that [t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates ... depends in part on the nature of the enactment and that the Court has greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. Id. at 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186. One year later, in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), the Court, in a footnote, called into question the requirement that a facial challenger must establish that a statute is vague in all its applications, at least when a statute involves a constitutionally protected right or criminal penalties. Id. at 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855. Relying in part on the additional language in Hoffman Estates, the Court observed that there was a varying tolerance of vagueness, depending on the nature of the statute. Id. The Kolender Court recognized that a higher standard applied to statutes involving constitutional rights or criminal penalties, however, the Court did not articulate what constituted the higher standard. Thereafter, in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement for facial challenges, in general, that the challenger must show that the statute is void in all its applications. Id. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The Salerno opinion did not address the Kolender footnote questioning this standard. Then, in a 1999 plurality opinion, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n. 22, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court again called into question the requirement that a statute be void in all its applications for a successful facial challenge. In Morales, the Court enunciated a higher standard test, at least in cases in which the statute involved criminal penalties with no mens rea requirement and that dealt with constitutional rights, holding that such statutes would be unconstitutional if vagueness permeates the text of such a law. Id. at 55, 119 S.Ct. 1849. More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement that a statute be void in all its applications for a facial challenge to be successful. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1190, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008). The Court, however, recognized the disagreement among its members as to the proper standard to apply in reviewing a facial challenge, stating that some Members of the Court have criticized [the void-in-all-its-applications] formulation. Id. The Washington State Grange case did not involve a criminal statute, and therefore, it does not resolve the issue as to what standard applies to criminal statutes not involving constitutionally protected rights. Thus, the Supreme Court has announced differing rules for facial challenges. On the one hand, the Court in Hoffman Estates, Salerno, and Washington State Grange, stated the requirement that a statute must be void in all its applications. On the other hand, in Kolender and Morales, the Court questioned this standard, at least in cases with statutes involving constitutional rights or criminal penalties. As the Supreme Court precedent fails to explain with specificity the higher standard applicable to criminal statutes, several courts have expressed concerns as to when this higher standard applies and how the standard is measured. Some courts have concluded that the higher standard only applies when a First Amendment right is at issue. U.S. v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 130-31 (2d Cir.2003) (distinguishing Morales based on the fact that Morales involved constitutionally protected conduct and the holding in Morales was a plurality opinion and not a majority opinion); People v. Molnar, 222 Ill.2d 495, 306 Ill.Dec. 116, 857 N.E.2d 209, 225 (2006) (stating requirement that a facial challenge requires a void-in-all-its-applications showing, without addressing cases that question this requirement). Other courts have held that the higher standard applies when any constitutional right is at issue but not simply because criminal penalties not involving a constitutional right are present, again distinguishing Morales and Kolender because those cases involved constitutional rights. Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 551 n. 19 (5th Cir.2008) (distinguishing Morales on the basis that it involved constitutionally protected activity); Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1348 (9th Cir.1984) (limiting Kolender to its unique set of circumstances and that it involved substantial constitutional rights); State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families, 128 N.M. 813, 999 P.2d 1045, 1051 (N.M.Ct.App. 2000) (same). Still, other courts have held that a higher standard applies to statutes involving constitutional rights or criminal penalties. U.S. v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir.1989) (recognizing the holding in Hoffman that a higher standard applies when criminal penalties exist); Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, 160 P.3d 843, 850 (2007) (stating that a higher standard exists for a facial vagueness challenge of a criminal statute). Similarly, our prior opinions have applied the requirement that a statute be void in all its applications for facial challenges, Matter of T.R., 119 Nev. 646, 652, 80 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2003), but we have also recognized the higher standard of vagueness permeates the text for statutes involving criminal penalties. City of Las Vegas v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 859, 862, 59 P.3d 477, 480 (2002). And our prior opinions have likewise evidenced confusion over how the higher standard applies by failing to explain or sometimes apply a higher standard. Matter of T.R., 119 Nev. at 652, 80 P.3d at 1280; Sheriff v. Burdg, 118 Nev. 853, 857, 59 P.3d 484, 486-87 (2002). That the Supreme Court has not articulated a separate test for this higher standard, or provided a clear explanation of how this higher standard should apply, compounds the ongoing confusion.