Opinion ID: 564392
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Heading: pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of:

Text: 21
22 . . . . . 23 caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of your car.... 24 Policy No. 355 5075-D23-42A, Policy Form 9942.2 Sec. 1 (emphasis added). 25 In Partridge, the Supreme Court of California addressed similar language in an automobile insurance policy. The court found coverage where a gun discharged injuring a passenger while the vehicle was being driven off-road in pursuit of rabbits. The court noted that a use of a vehicle need not be the proximate cause of an injury in order to require coverage. 3 It was sufficient if some minimal causal connection between the vehicle and an injury existed. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d at 100 n. 7, 109 Cal.Rptr. at 815 n. 7, 514 P.2d at 127 n. 7. 26 In addition, the court recognized that other courts had denied coverage in shooting cases where there was absolutely no causal relationship between the firing of the gun and the use of the automobile but concluded that coverage had been found where the insured vehicle did bear some, albeit slight, causal connection with the shooting injury. Id. at 101 n. 8, 109 Cal.Rptr. at 816 n. 8, 514 P.2d at 128 n. 8. 27 In a more recent case, an intermediate California court of appeal found coverage where some boys were throwing eggs from a moving vehicle and injured a pedestrian. The court noted that the movement of the vehicle enhanced the speed of the eggs thrown and therefore the risk of injury to those hit. The court also noted that the vehicle aided the boys in initially avoiding capture while egging. National Am. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 74 Cal.App.3d 565, 140 Cal.Rptr. 828 (1977). 28 These cases persuade us that the Supreme Court of California would find coverage in this case. Davis's shooting of Keukelaar was not merely incidental to his use as a passenger of the GMC van. At the time of the shooting, Keukelaar was proceeding rapidly down the highway in his Corvette. Had Painter not heeded Davis's request to overtake and pass the Corvette, Davis would not have been in a position to shoot at Keukelaar. Further, it is not unreasonable to assume that Davis counted on the speed of the van to escape after the shooting. Under the facts of this case, the van was more than minimally connected with the injuries Keukelaar suffered. 29 We are reinforced in this conclusion, by a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, based on similar facts, which we believe the Supreme Court of California would find persuasive. See Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1987). 4 The facts of Klug are particularly instructive. Klug, while driving his vehicle home from work, was chased by Bahe a significant distance down the highway. Bahe menaced Klug with a shotgun before shooting him. The court considered three factors significant in determining whether coverage existed: first, the causal nexus between the vehicle and the shooting; second, whether an intervening act broke the causal link; and third, whether the assailant was using the vehicle for transportation at the time of the shooting and whether the driving facilitated the shooting. The court found coverage and concluded that the vehicle was an active accessory to the shooting since Bahe had to keep up with Klug and drive for two miles in order to shoot him. 30 The court rejected the argument that Bahe's intentional act in shooting Klug broke the causal link. It reasoned that had Bahe drove ahead and waited to ambush Klug, the causal link might have been broken. However, it concluded that Bahe's driving and shooting were inextricably linked. In making this determination the court apparently reasoned that Bahe was using his car to keep abreast of Klug at the time he shot him. Finally, the court concluded that Bahe was not merely using his vehicle as a gun rest or as the situs for an assault, but as a necessary part of the assault. The court noted that Bahe used his car to maneuver himself and Klug into position for the successful assault. Id. at 878-79. 31 The same three considerations are present in this case. Painter had to chase Keukelaar so that Davis could shoot at him. Davis did not leave the vehicle, but shot Keukelaar while both were traveling down the highway. Finally, Painter had to drive the van into position next to the Corvette, giving Davis the opportunity to fire his gun. The presence of these factors supports our conclusion that the vehicle was more than incidental to this shooting. 32 We find the cases cited by State Farm distinguishable or unpersuasive. 5 Most involve situations where a tortfeasor used a vehicle to get to the scene of the tort but had exited the vehicle before committing the tort. Illustrative are Truck Ins. Exch. v. Webb, 256 Cal.App.2d 140, 63 Cal.Rptr. 791 (1967) (driver used vehicle to transport boxes to building, removed them and started fire which damaged building) and United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Ledger, 189 Cal.App.3d 779, 234 Cal.Rptr. 570 (1987) (two motorists in separate vehicles became involved in a dispute while driving down the highway, stopped and exited their respective vehicles in order to fight and one stabbed the other). 33 Closely related are cases in which the vehicle is at rest at the time of the incident and plays no real part in bringing about the harm. See Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 103 Cal.App.3d 694, 163 Cal.Rptr. 219 (1980). We agree with the Supreme Court of Minnesota that a tortfeasor leaving his vehicle prior to committing the tort might serve to break the causal nexus between the use of the vehicle and the subsequent tort. In the case of the vehicle at rest, we might conclude that there was absolutely no causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the subsequent shooting. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d at 101 n. 8, 109 Cal.Rptr. at 816 n. 8, 514 P.2d at 128 n. 8. Neither of these situations is present here. 34 Additional cases from this and other jurisdictions have reached varying decisions in deciding whether shooting incidents involved the use of an insured vehicle. Those that deny coverage are in our view distinguishable. First, there are the cases similar to those discussed above in which an assailant left his vehicle before assaulting the other party. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 779 F.2d 984 (4th Cir.1985); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fernandez, 767 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir.1985); Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Higginbotham, 95 Mich.App. 213, 290 N.W.2d 414 (1980). Second are the closely related cases where the vehicle merely provides a situs for the tort. See, e.g., Fowler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 548 So.2d 830 (Fla.App.1989); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 18 Ariz.App. 486, 503 P.2d 962 (1972). Finally, there are the cases from jurisdictions that require a much stronger causal relationship between the injury and the use of the vehicle than California requires. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Melton, 357 F.Supp. 416 (D.S.C.1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir.1973); Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Howser, 727 F.Supp. 999 (D.S.C.1990) (recognizing that California and Minnesota require less of a causal nexus to establish that an injury arises out of the use of an insured vehicle than is required in other jurisdictions such as South Carolina). 35 In conclusion, we are satisfied that Painter's and Davis's use of the GMC van insured by State Farm had more than a minimal causal connection with the incident leading to Keukelaar's injuries. 36 We therefore REVERSE the decision of the District Court and REMAND this case in order for that court to consider State Farm's other defenses.