Opinion ID: 473759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's motion

Text: FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS OF PURPORTED INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES? Plaintiff contends that the amount of damages awarded her by the jury was inadequate to compensate her for her permanent injuries and medical expenses. This argument was presented to the trial court in the motion for a new trial and was rejected. The question in this court is thus whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. Federal district judges have broad discretion on the question of whether to grant a new trial. The trial judge's decision on this issue will not be disturbed, absent a gross abuse of discretion. Garrick v. City and County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 971-72 (10th Cir.1981). In reviewing the district court's use of its discretion regarding inadequate verdict claims, as in excessive verdict claims, we must determine whether the award shock[s] the judicial conscience and ... raise[s] an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial.... Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 228 (10th Cir.1962); Garrick, supra, at 971-72; Whiteley v. OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir.1983). Plaintiff draws our attention to her exhibit 21, which is a compilation of her medical bills and expenses. The total of the bills in exhibit 21 is $15,885. The jury awarded Ms. Grant only $12,000 for all medical bills, past and future. Plaintiff claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to grant a new trial given this difference between the evidence presented to the jury and the amount of damages awarded. This court may reverse the judgment of the trial court and order a new trial when the jury returns a verdict in an amount which is at variance with the undisputed evidence presented at trial. Brown v. Richard H. Wacholz, Inc., 467 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir.1972). In this case, however, the $15,885 in medical bills was disputed by the defendants, who presented evidence upon which the jury could have relied to reach its $12,000 award. The testimony of Dr. Thomas C. Howard, for example, was that There was one point in there about six weeks following her accident where it was noted that she had no muscle spasm and no discomfort, and that is what I would expect from a person who has a cervical strain such as what I thought she had.... R.Vol. VI p. 180. Believing this, the jury could have disallowed any medical bills for treatments received by the plaintiff more than six weeks after the accident. There was also evidence that the plaintiff received treatment in excess of what was reasonable under all the circumstances. Her own witness, Dr. Jack Honaker, testified as follows on cross-examination: Q. Now, Doctor, in July of 1984, I believe your records make a comment concerning your thoughts relative to the treatment [plaintiff] was receiving in Oklahoma City, do they not?
Q. Would you quote that language as it appears from the records, please? A. This is, I suspect this patient has been grossly overtreated and needs psychiatric care and pain-clinic treatment rather than myelograms, electromyography, et cetera. R.Vol. VI pp. 268-69. From this testimony, the jury could have concluded that the plaintiff received more medical treatment than was reasonable, and for that reason may have awarded her less than the total of her medical bills. The jury also may have found that some of the plaintiff's medical bills were the result of her chronic asthma, rather than the accident. The record reveals that plaintiff went to the Tillman County Hospital emergency room on November 26th, 1984, complaining of an asthma attack. That night she suffered a muscle spasm brought on by that attack. R.Vol. VI pp. 334-36. This muscle spasm was similar to those the plaintiff attributes to the accident. The jury could have concluded that some of the treatment plaintiff received was asthma related rather than accident related. The resolution of disputed issues of fact is for the jury, not for the trial judge or this court. Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394 (10th Cir.1985). The jury made its determination of damages, and that determination is supported by the evidence. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant the new trial motion. III. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR IN DISALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF DR. STEPHEN ANDRADE? The trial court conducted a pre-trial conference pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 on May 2, 1985. A pre-trial order including a list of all witnesses to be called at trial was filed May 16, 1985. On July 2, 1985, while taking the deposition of Dr. R.C. Brown, counsel for both parties became aware that Dr. Brown had referred plaintiff to Dr. Stephen Andrade for treatment. Trial was scheduled to begin July 8. Without moving for an amendment to the pre-trial order, plaintiff's counsel sent defendants' counsel a letter purporting to endorse Dr. Andrade as a witness to be called at trial. Dr. Andrade's deposition was taken July 11, and trial commenced July 15. At trial, plaintiff's counsel moved to admit the deposition of Dr. Andrade into evidence. The defense objected on the grounds that Dr. Andrade's name was not included in the pre-trial order and that the defense had not had sufficient time adequately to prepare to defend against this testimony. The court sustained the defendant's objection. Plaintiff contends that this was error, and that she was prejudiced thereby. The purpose of the pre-trial order is to insure the economical and efficient trial of every case on its merits without chance or surprise. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 795 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 1363, 67 L.Ed.2d 344 (1981), quoting Case v. Abrams, 352 F.2d 193, 195 (10th Cir.1965) (emphasis in original). The standard of review of the district court's refusal to allow a witness not included in the pre-trial order to testify is clear. When there exists a 'properly drawn, detailed pre-trial order, a trial court's determination that certain facts or issues must [or should not] be excluded from trial on the basis of a pre-trial order may be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion. See James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 58 (10th Cir.1979) (pre-trial order specifying the witnesses to be called may be used to bar the calling of unlisted witnesses).' Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d 815, 817-18 (10th Cir.1979). Smith v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 795. As the James case makes clear, whether the question is one of issue exclusion or witness exclusion, our standard of review is the same: we will reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court may modify the pre-trial order during trial to prevent manifest injustice. 1 Rock Island Improvement Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 698 F.2d 1075, 1081 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied 461 U.S. 944, 103 S.Ct. 2121, 77 L.Ed.2d 1302. Thus, to find that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the exclusion of the Andrade deposition resulted in manifest injustice. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Andrade's deposition testimony would have put evidence before the jury that plaintiff suffered from reflex sympathetic dystrophy. The record reveals that Dr. Flescher, one of plaintiff's witnesses, testified: The cause of her numbness and various complaints I think are two-fold. Number one is an inflammatory reaction of the musculature of the myofascitis that can cause this type of problem....