Opinion ID: 2273456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: introduction

Text: We are asked to consider in the present case the implications of a fee sharing agreement, and whether such an agreement may give rise to actionable contract and tort duties between co-counsel, other than those related to the fee itself. The sharing or division of fees between attorneys appears to have deep historical roots, stemming from English custom: The genesis of such a referral or finder's fee in America may well be traceable to the practice of countryside solicitors in England who, when faced with litigation, would associate London solicitors as agents. An agent would in turn retain a barrister from the Inns of Court to take full charge of the litigation, with the custom being that the referring solicitor would share in one-third of the resulting fee. Thomas J. Hall & Joel C. Levy, Intra-Attorney Fee Sharing Arrangements, 11 Val. U.L.Rev. 1, 2 (1976) (footnote omitted). Although during that period, fee sharing between attorneys involving merely the referral of clients appears to have been accepted, by 1937 the American Bar Association expressly recognized that an attorney's payment of a referral or finder's fee to another was problematic, unless there was a division of responsibility, as witnessed in Canon 34, which stated: No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility. Id. at 5, quoting ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 34, as adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1937. The iteration of Rule 1.5(e) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), in effect at the time the fee sharing agreement with which we are concerned was executed, [4] reflects the notion that fee splitting between attorneys must have been in proportion to the work performed by each attorney, or if consented to by the client, each lawyer could assume joint responsibility: (e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if: (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and (3) the total fee is reasonable. See also Attorney Grievance v. Chasnoff, 366 Md. 250, 264, 783 A.2d 224, 232 (2001) (noting that the purpose of restrictions on fee splitting is to avoid brokering in clients), citing C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 9.2.4, at 510 (1986). Rule 1.5(e) is substantially similar to its predecessor, DR 2-107, except for the addition that the client must agree to the division of the fee in writing under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 189-90, 517 A.2d 1092, 1095 (1986) (interpreting DR 2-107). It is with this background that we review the fee sharing agreement in question.