Opinion ID: 700436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-trial motion to exclude evidence

Text: 16 Before trial, Valenti was contemplating a defense that some of the funds he took from April 1991 to May 1992 were to repay himself for a $24,000 loan he had made to the Association in 1990. The government indicated that, if he pursued this defense, it would introduce evidence of seven wire transfers Valenti made from the Association's account to his wife, his mother, and his business partner in 1989 and 1990, all of which predated the purported loan. The government proffered this evidence to show that, while he had indeed put $24,000 into the Association's account, it was hardly a loan to the Association, but rather an attempt to return some of the money Valenti had stolen through the wire transfers. 17 Valenti moved in limine to preclude the government from offering, under any circumstances (and regardless of whether he testified), evidence of the seven wire transfers. The district judge declined to rule prior to trial, stating that he was going to see how the evidence is portrayed by counsel for the defendant and the prosecution and make my ruling at the time it becomes germane. Valenti never attempted to prove the loan; and the government never offered evidence of the seven wire transfers. 18 Valenti now contends that it was reversible error to leave open the possibility that the government might be allowed to introduce the evidence. His argument appears to run as follows: if he were to testify, the issue whether the funds he took from April 1991 to May 1992 were in repayment of the alleged $24,000 loan would inevitabl[y] ... have been raised. Once the issue was raised, Valenti faced the possibility that the government would be permitted to introduce evidence of the seven wire transfers. Since Valenti could not run that risk, he was effectively precluded from testifying. This argument is meritless. 19 In the first place, Valenti's briefs and appendix contain no indication that he renewed at trial his request for a ruling, a step clearly required when the trial judge had earlier stated that he would reserve judgment until he heard the trial evidence. The failure to renew the objection constituted a waiver of the objection. See 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, Sec. 12 (2d ed. 1994); United States v. Miles, 889 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir.1989) (defendant's failure to renew objection at trial constituted waiver of objection where court instructed counsel that pre-trial ruling was for present purposes only). 20 In the second place, one of the risks any criminal defendant must run is the difficult choice on whether the value of his anticipated evidence would outweigh whatever damaging rebuttal evidence the government might produce. United States v. Delia, 944 F.2d 1010, 1018 (2d Cir.1991). 21 Finally, we are in no position to evaluate the alleged damage to defendant's case, since his decision not to take the stand makes this impossible. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (defendant's election not to testify prevents appellate review of district court's decision to allow evidence of defendant's criminal record for impeachment purposes under Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1270 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Luce to Fed.R.Evid. 404). 22 Valenti also claims that the government failed to provide reasonable notice in advance of trial of evidence of the wire transfers, as required by Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The government furnished records of the transfers only four days before trial. Assuming (as Valenti does) that Rule 404(b) controls, we hold that the government provided reasonable notice by giving the documents to him the very day it obtained them. It is not without significance that Valenti failed to seek a continuance or other postponement to study the documents.