Opinion ID: 2609751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: parallel criminal and civil proceedings

Text: On June 20, 1972, Commissioner of Environmental Conservation Brewer notified Stock by letter of an alleged violation of AS 46.03.710 and of regulations promulgated by the department. In accordance with AS 46.03.130, [27] Stock was given 15 days to file with the department a written report as to measures taken to control the condition. Replying on June 30, Stock indicated some attempt to correct the condition. On July 21, Commissioner Brewer again wrote Stock advising that the conditions appeared to be worsening and that the sewage ditch to Duck Creek which had been closed was reopened. At the same time a compliance order was issued pursuant to AS 46.03.130(c) requiring him to fill in the lake with clear, coarse material and to establish adequate leaching capacity so that no standing sewage would result. On July 25, 1972, Stock wrote that efforts to alleviate the situation were unsuccessful due to the inadequate size of a backhoe and that attempts were being made to secure a larger one. On August 8, the criminal complaint was filed. Stock contends that the criminal complaint was necessarily the result of a determination by the Commissioner ... that [Stock had] refused to obey the compliance order of July 21, 1972 and that such a premature determination violated his right to request a hearing on the order within 30 days as provided by AS 46.03.130(d). But Stock was not charged criminally with a violation of the compliance order. AS 46.03.790 does make it a misdemeanor to wilfully violate a compliance order of the department made under the provisions of AS 46.03.130. Stock, however, was charged with a violation of AS 46.03.710 which makes pollution a crime without mention of any administrative order. Thus, the criminal proceedings against Stock were commenced under independent authority, and other than being based on the same act of alleged pollution, the charge is unrelated to the administrative action previously commenced under AS 46.03.130. Stock contends that the doctrine of administrative primary jurisdiction required the department to pursue administrative compliance remedies before commencing criminal action. Primary jurisdiction is a doctrine which requires that actions which raise issues calling for an exercise of administrative discretion or expertise in fact-finding be brought in the first instance before the proper administrative agency. [28] The authority cited by Stock indicates only that private parties must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. [29] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is only rarely applied to agencies themselves, [30] and then only when a statute specifically requires administrative enforcement actions prior to criminal prosecution. [31] The relevant statutes here involved contemplate direct prosecution of pollution violations. AS 46.03.710 makes pollution a crime without reference to violation of any department standards, rules or compliance orders. AS 46.03.760 unequivocally provides that violation of § 710 is a misdemeanor: A person who violates §§ 710 ... of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable by... . Each unlawful act constitutes a separate offense. The authorization for direct criminal prosecution is particularly clear since it constitutes an amendment of former law. The former Water Pollution Control Act prohibited pollution in a statute nearly identical to AS 46.03.710, [32] but criminal prosecutions were limited to violations of departmental orders: A person who wilfully violates a final determination or order of the department adopted under this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is punishable by... . Each day upon which a violation occurs is a separate violation. [33] Since no direct punishment was created for pollution, and since Alaska has no general criminal article but defines as crimes only those acts or omissions for which punishment is specifically provided, [34] the former statutes created no crime of pollution. At least sufficient doubt of the direct criminality of pollution under former statutes is created that the substantial change in statutory language made in 1968 and carried forward in 1971, whereby specific conduct unrelated to administrative action was criminalized (AS 46.03.710-760), manifests an intention that direct criminal prosecution be permissible. Stock was directly prosecuted for pollution without reference to a compliance order. The department was not required to exhaust the compliance-order procedure before instituting prosecution. Stock also contends that the simultaneous prosecutions of civil and criminal remedies violated his rights to due process of law. No pertinent cases were cited by Stock, and the example he gives of such deprivation of rights is chimerical. He contends that he was faced with the choice of either remaining silent at an administrative hearing on the compliance order or waiving his right as a criminal defendant to remain silent. The record, however, fails to indicate that any administrative hearing was held. Thus, Stock was never confronted with such a choice. The trial court committed no error in finding that Stock's rights were not violated by the commencement of the criminal action without completing administrative proceedings. [35]