Opinion ID: 2187749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Should an Implied Warranty be Recognized Under These Facts?

Text: Ridgway argues that, even if we were to adopt the principles of implied warranty under other circumstances, it should nevertheless not be applied to this case. (1) Ridgway first claims the purpose of the implied warranty is to protect a buyer who is bargaining from a position of weakness. Kirk had been a real estate salesman for many years prior to this purchase, and he had inspected a great number of new houses. To Kirk, the purchase of a house was an everyday transaction and he did not fall into the category of buyers who needed protection, according to Ridgway. In effect, he argues that caveat emptor applies under these circumstances. Being a real estate salesman, however, did not make Kirk an expert on paintwood bonding. At the time he bought the house there were no signs of the problem. Even after the peeling had become apparent, the expert witnesses testifying at trial could not agree on what caused it. (The defendant's witness opined it was caused by the paint used by Kirk in the repainting projects in 1976 and 1980). Kirk lacked the knowledge that there was a problem and the expertise to determine its cause. We therefore reject Ridgway's argument. (2) Ridgway also raises a merger argument. When Kirk took title to the property without any reservation of warranty, he lost it, according to this argument. We believe the Texas supreme court aptly dealt with this argument when it said [i]t would be a strange doctrine indeed for the law to raise an implied warranty from a sale and then recognize that such warranty could be defeated by the passage of title to the subject matter of the sale. Humber, 426 S.W.2d at 556; accord Banville, 407 A.2d at 296. We reject this argument also. (3) Ridgway also raises an issue of Kirk's failure to give timely notice of the alleged defect. He argues that Kirk knew of the defect in the spring of 1981 but failed to notify him of it until April 1982. Reasonableness of a notice is ordinarily a fact issue. In order to reverse on the issue of notice, we would have to conclude that no rational fact finder could conclude that approximately a year between knowledge of the defect and a notification to Kirk was a reasonable time. This we cannot do. (4) Ridgway raises other issues which, we believe, are foreclosed by our substantial evidence rule. Specifically, he argues there is insufficient evidence of the breach of warranty and insufficient evidence to support the award of damages. We agree there was credible evidence that Kirk's problem was not caused by a construction defect, and credible evidence that the award of damages was excessive. The question, however, is whether there was substantial evidence to support the findings which the court actually made, not those which it could have made. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support these findings. We find no basis for reversal. AFFIRMED.