Opinion ID: 694395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Testimony of Experts

Text: 214 Disputed questions of the meaning and scope of technologic terms and words of art are decided from the viewpoint of persons of skill in the specific field of technology. It is rare to come upon a technologic issue in litigation for which differing and often plausible views are not offered by qualified witnesses. The Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate the provision of specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact: 215 R. 702. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.... 216 In Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 229 USPQ 992 (Fed.Cir.1986) this court held that the trial court's rejection of expert testimony in that case was an abuse of discretion: 217 Although use of experts is generally a matter of discretion with the trial judge, that discretion is not unlimited. In a patent case involving complex scientific principles, it is particularly helpful to see how those skilled in the art would interpret the claim. 218 Id. at 657, 229 USPQ at 995 (citations omitted). In Moeller the claims related to an electronic process for measuring the concentration of cations, the dispute centering on the particular meaning of the term electrode body. Moeller too is now criticized and overruled for its statement that 219 although claim construction is a legal question, underlying fact disputes may arise pertaining to extrinsic evidence that might preclude summary judgment treatment of claim construction. 220 Id. (citation omitted). I do not see how the Federal Circuit could have decided, de novo on appeal, the meaning of electrode body in this particular invention without finding disputed technologic facts. 221 The majority's stated recognition that expert testimony may be useful, while holding that extrinsic evidence of record cannot be relied on to change the meaning of the claims, majority op. at 998, denying all deference to the trier of fact's findings based on that evidence, illustrate the confusion in the court's plan of de novo claim interpretation as a matter of law. The majority has created a procedural quandary, for extrinsic evidence can apparently be received, but no jury can weigh it. When the extrinsic evidence is in conflict--as it invariably is--what then? Will the Federal Circuit itself weigh the evidence of expert witnesses? Will we receive a collection of self-serving affidavits, without examination and cross-examination? Such a procedure surely is not optimal for cases that may require decision of complex engineering or electronics, or chemical or biological processes. 222 The Court in Daubert referred to the value of the adversary system in matters of scientific proof. The cross-examination of technical experts, with the adversarial guidance of other technical experts, can be as rigorous as any peer review process. See generally Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 Minn.L.Rev. 1345 (1994). In resolving litigation controversy by determining mechanical or chemical or electronic truth, it is hard to understand why justice should be handicapped in the Federal Circuit by replacement of a live trial with cold documents. 223 In eliminating all sources of fact that might implicate the jury right, the majority has denied to the trial of patent cases the assistance that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is designed to provide, as well as the benefits of Rules 403, 703, and 706. The purpose of these rules is that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. Fed.R.Evid. 102. It seems to me that we have constructed a Hobson's choice whereby either (1) there will indeed be factual evidence of technologic meaning entered into the trial record, for de novo decision on the record by the Federal Circuit, (2) there will be scant evidence admitted at trial, in view of our pronouncement that there is only law in claim interpretation. Either way, one might call this the omniscience of the learned man theory of dispute resolution in the Federal Circuit. 3 224 Findings of the meaning of technologic terms and words of art in particular usages are the province of the trier of fact. Discussing words and their jurisprudential treatment, Justice Holmes wrote: 225 A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. 226 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S.Ct. 158, 159, 62 L.Ed. 372 (1918). In Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 181 Ct.Cl. 55, 155 USPQ 697, 702 (1967) one of our predecessor courts remarked: The very nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous [patent] claim a rare occurrence. Justice Story explained the roles of judge and jury with respect to the meaning of words of art, and technical phrases in patent documents: 227 In respect to another objection, viz. that the court was bound to state what in point of law the invention claimed by the patentee was, I agree, that this is generally true, so far as the construction of the words of the patent, and specification is concerned. But then this doctrine is to be received with qualifications, and sub modo, as the very opinion of Mr. Baron Parke, cited by the counsel, in the case of Neilson v. Harford, Webster Pat.Cas. 295, 370, 4 abundantly shows; and the jury are to judge of the meaning of words of art, and technical phrases, in commerce and manufactures, and of the surrounding circumstances, which may materially affect, enlarge or control the meaning of the words of the patent and specification. 228 Washburn v. Gould, 29 F.Cas. 312, 325 (C.C.D.Mass.1844) (emphasis added). Justice Story recognized that the meaning of words of art may depend on the surrounding circumstances. Indeed, the Federal Circuit recognized that words do not always have the same meaning when they are adapted to new uses. See Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569, 219 USPQ 1137, 1140 (Fed.Cir.1983) (patentee may be his own lexicographer). 229 Inventors' usages of words to describe their inventions, and the meaning thereby conveyed to persons skilled in the field, are questions of fact, not matters of law, in patent documents as in other written instruments. Disputes concerning the meaning and usage of technical terms and words of art arise in many areas of law. These disputes are resolved by the triers of fact, whether judge or jury, in their established roles in the adjudicatory process. For example, the role of the jury with respect to technical terms in a contract for drilling oil wells was explained in Startex Drilling Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 680 F.2d 412 (5th Cir.1982): 230 It is more apt to say that the undefined technical terms on which the contract's application to the present dispute depends convey little meaning without explanation. So, while we agree with Sohio that we are free to determine the ambiguity question anew, we also affirm the district court's ruling that the contract is ambiguous. Thus it was proper to submit to the jury the evidence from both sides as to the meaning attached to these technical terms by the parties, and by the industry. 231 Id. at 415 (citation omitted). In Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.1943), Judge Frank wrote for the court that: 232 Thayer delightfully described the fatuous notion of a lawyer's Paradise, where all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning; where men may express their purposes, not only with accuracy, but with fullness; and where, if the writer has been careful, a lawyer, having a document referred to him, may sit in his chair, inspect the text, and answer all questions without raising his eyes. 233 Id. at 648 n. 26 (quoting Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898)). 234 It has not heretofore been seriously challenged that findings of the weight and credibility of evidence are for the jury, whether the issues are technologic, scientific, or otherwise. See Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944): 235 [The weight and credibility of a witness' testimony] belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men; and so long as we have jury trials they should not be disturbed in their possession of it, except in a case of manifest and extreme abuse of their function. 236 Id. at 628, 64 S.Ct. at 729 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88, 11 S.Ct. 720, 724, 35 L.Ed. 371 (1891)). In Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 220 USPQ 929 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871, 105 S.Ct. 220, 83 L.Ed.2d 150 (1984) this court instructed a party who sought de novo appellate review after a jury trial: 237 Thus [Railroad Dynamics] misconceives our role as an appellate court. In the concert hall of justice, each musician has a part to play. When one on whim plays not his own but another's part, discord is certain. Moreover, our parts are played under well defined rules. 238 Id. at 1514, 220 USPQ at 937. 239 Implementing this court's departure from the established appellate role, in reviewing Markman's case on this appeal the majority does not mention the jury instructions, or discuss whether a reasonable jury could have reached the verdict that was reached on the evidence adduced, or decide whether there was substantial credible evidence of such content and weight as could support the jury's verdict. The majority finds for itself the disputed fact of whether the term inventory includes the invoices of the Westview system, without any deference to the trial process. Whether or not this court believes that it is a superior finder of technologic fact, that is not our place in the judicial structure. 240 I wonder how this new system will work. The majority states that the trial judge should have decided the meaning of inventory before giving the case to the jury, 5 but that the error was harmless since the trial judge reached the correct meaning as a matter of law after the jury verdict. There was no return to the jury after the trial judge re-decided what inventory meant, making the jury superfluous. The Federal Circuit now decides de novo whether inventory includes invoices, ignoring the trial. What of the trial process, if trial judge and jury are ciphers upon appellate review? In the Introduction to the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (1994), Judge Schwarzer wrote: 241 The bedrock of [the justice] system is the adversary process, which depends on attorneys to present evidence on behalf of their clients, judges to make the necessary and appropriate rulings concerning admissibility, and juries to resolve disputed issues of fact. 242 Id. at 1. 243 In patent cases, no less than for other causes of action, it is the trier of fact on whom the system of justice is founded. The extensive exposition of disputed facts that is available at trial can not be duplicated on appeal. Even were there no constitutional infirmity, I can discern no practical benefit sufficient to justify this court's departure from the established procedures of trial and appeal. Implicit in the appellate process is an expected degree of deference to the trial process. The majority's elimination of the jury as trier of fact, and elimination of the deference owed to the judge upon bench trial of disputed facts, removes from the parties the benefit of the trial process. It distorts the trial/appellate relationship in a manner unique to patent litigation, and manifests a heady misperception of our assignment as a national appellate court. 244