Opinion ID: 2424724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntary Intoxication Evidence and Instruction

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's objection to testimony of William Rogers that he used drugs with appellant prior to the murder. Testimony about intoxication may be relevant and admissible on issues of conduct. Sec. 562.076.3. [1] However, testimony that a party was not intoxicated during any relevant time is irrelevant and immaterial. See Sampson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 560 S.W.2d 573, 587[21] (Mo. banc 1978). Rogers would have testified that, in the weeks before the murder, he and appellant often used crack cocaine togetherthe last time being between one and three days before Martin's death. Appellant's expert testified that the crack user is intoxicated for 15 to 30 minutes after ingestion, and crashes until 24 hours after ingestion. Therefore, Rogers would not have testified that appellant was intoxicated during any of the events in question. This testimony was not relevant or material to appellant's case. In any event, testimony of voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate the mental state of an offense. State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 588[6] (Mo. banc 1997) (citing sec. 562. 076. 3), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 711, 139 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). The exclusion of Rogers' testimony was not error. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting his proposed instruction on intoxication evidence: You may consider evidence that Bernard Rhodes was in a drugged condition to evaluate his conduct. You may not consider evidence that Bernard Rhodes was in a drugged condition when evaluating whether the state has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt mental states which are elements of the offense. Appellant did not offer any evidence of intoxication relevant to his conduct. Appellant did offer evidence of intoxication relevant to his mental state, as demonstrated by the words of his argument: The evidence that Bernard had been ingesting crack cocaine was thus relevant since, as Dr. Evans explained, the brain chemistry when an individual crashes from a crack high causes him to try to find more crack to alleviate the pain caused by the crash. Evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate the mental state of the offense. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d at 588[6] (citing sec. 562.076.3 ). Because no evidence of intoxication relevant to conduct was introduced, the court properly did not instruct the jury to consider such evidence. Id. Evidence of appellant's cocaine addiction was admitted to show his motive to rob Martin: to buy more crack cocaine. The court properly limited the jury's consideration of this evidence with the following instruction: a drugged condition from drugs will not relieve a person of responsibility for his conduct. This is an accurate statement of the law in Missouri. Id.