Opinion ID: 450679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the timeliness of the petitioners' challenge to the hrs

Text: 14 We first consider whether the petitioners' challenge is barred because it was not filed within the statutory review period. Section 113(a) of CERCLA provides that 15 [r]eview of any regulation promulgated under [CERCLA] may be had upon application by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the District of Columbia. Any such application shall be made within ninety days from the date of promulgation of such regulations. Any matter with respect to which review could have been obtained under this subsection shall not be subject to judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement or to obtain damages or recovery of response costs. 27 16 This court has repeatedly recognized that statutory time limits on petitions for review of agency action are jurisdictional in nature. 28 These limitations serve the important purpose of imparting finality into the administrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources. 29 Furthermore, timeliness requirements reflect a deliberate congressional choice to impose statutory finality on agency orders, a choice we may not second-guess. 30 We have entertained untimely claims only in a limited number of exceptional circumstances where the petitioner lacked a meaningful opportunity to challenge the agency action during the review period due to, for example, inadequate notice that the petitioner would be affected by the action, 31 confusion in the law as to the proper forum for review, 32 and lack of ripeness during the review period. 33 Proffered excuses for late filing are carefully scrutinized for, as we have noted, the court must be strict in determining what constitutes a 'legitimate' excuse [for failure to file a timely petition]; otherwise, the policy of finality underlying the [time] limit will not be achieved. 34 17 The petitioners here admit that they did not seek judicial review of the HRS during the ninety day period following its promulgation. The EPA maintains that the petitioners could have challenged the HRS during the statutory review period and that consequently present review is barred. The petitioners contend that their complaint about the HRS did not become ripe for review until the NPL was promulgated and that, because they filed a petition to review the NPL within ninety days of its promulgation, their challenge to the HRS is also timely. In support of their position, the petitioners urge that our precedents, in particular Diamond Shamrock Corporation v. Costle, 35 establish that agency rulemaking that creates a standard, such as the effluent limitation regulations in Diamond Shamrock and the HRS here, is never ripe for review--and thus the statutory petition period is tolled--until the agency applies the rule to the petitioner. Under this theory, the petitioners' objections to the HRS ripened only when, in order to develop the NPL, the EPA applied the HRS to sites with which the petitioners are associated. Counsel for the petitioners also seemed to suggest at oral argument that Diamond Shamrock can be read to waive the explicit timely filing requirement contained in section 113(a) of CERCLA. 18
19 As an initial matter, we think that the petitioners confound the obligations of the court with those of the petitioner. It is the duty of the court to make the prudential judgment whether a challenge to agency action is ripe; it is the responsibility of petitioners to file for review within the period set by Congress. While it is true that in extraordinary circumstances we have forgiven a petitioner's failure to file a timely petition, we have never suggested that petitioners may safely substitute their own notions of timely review for those of Congress. To the contrary, we have previously admonished petitioners of the wisdom of filing protective petitions for review during the statutory period, 36 and we do so again now. Diamond Shamrock, 37 so heavily relied upon by petitioners, is inapposite. In that case we simply upheld the District Court's decision that a complaint seeking review of some effluent limitation regulations issued by the EPA was not yet ripe. The court did not consider the relationship between ripeness and timeliness at all. 20 Considering that relationship here, we think it certainly is not the one implied by the petitioners--a rather casual means of circumventing timely filing requirements. Ripeness is concerned primarily with the institutional relationships between courts and agencies, and the competence of the courts to resolve disputes without further administrative refinement of the issues. 38 It is largely a prudential doctrine, whose basic rationale, as the Supreme Court explained in the landmark decision, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. 39 Timeliness requirements, on the other hand, are designed to protect a different set of interests. They are intended to prevent courts from entangling themselves in disputes which Congress has determined have been raised too late and to protect agencies from endless judicial interference with formalized administrative policy. 40 21 Because the principal function of the ripeness doctrine is to aid a court in ascertaining whether it should stay its hand until agency policy has crystallized, most of the case law explicating the doctrine is forward-looking, that is, looking into the future to determine the effects of deferring review. 41 Only rarely does case law depict the ripeness doctrine in the service of a tardy petitioner--looking backward to divine whether the court would have considered the request for review ripe had it been brought in a timely fashion. Indeed, we know of only one case from this circuit, Geller v. FCC, 42 where we explicitly evaluated the retrospective ripeness of an untimely challenge. 43 There the petitioner solicited review of an FCC regulation nearly five years after the statutory review period had expired. We dismissed all of Geller's claims for lack of timeliness, except one which had clearly just become ripe with the passage of new legislation. 44 22 We think Geller may suggest one of two kinds of cases where the court should perform a retrospective ripeness analysis for a petitioner who has failed to file a timely request for review. The Geller type can be characterized as a case in which events occur or information becomes available after the statutory review period expires that essentially create a challenge that did not previously exist. 45 The other type involves claims that, under our precedents, are without any doubt not ripe for review during the statutory period. For example, Diamond Shamrock held that certain effluent limitation regulations promulgated under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 46 were not ripe for review until applied in discharge permit proceedings. 47 Obviously, other would-be petitioners in the same position as those in Diamond Shamrock --applicants for discharge permits under the same statute--can rely on the holding in that case. 23 As a general proposition, however, if there is any doubt about the ripeness of a claim, petitioners must bring their challenge in a timely fashion or risk being barred. Courts simply are not well-suited to answering hypothetical questions which involve guessing what the court might have done in the past. Furthermore, if we were routinely to conduct retrospective ripeness analyses where a late petitioner offers no compelling justification for not having filed his claim in a timely manner, we would wreak havoc with the congressional intention that repose be brought to final agency action. Consequently, except where events occur or information becomes available after the statutory review period expires that essentially create a challenge that did not previously exist, or where a petitioner's claim is, under our precedents, indisputably not ripe until the agency takes further action, we will be very reluctant, in order to save a late petitioner from the strictures of a timeliness requirement, to engage in a retrospective determination of whether we would have held the claim ripe had it been brought on time. 24 We do not believe that the instant case falls into either the Geller or clear precedent exceptions. It is not a Geller case because no events occurred after the statutory period that gave rise to an essentially new claim. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has notice during the review period that the regulation pertains to him, 48 the mere fact that the rule is applied to the petitioner after the statutory period expires will normally not be sufficient to bring a case into the Geller category. The delayed application of the rule may be relevant, however, to the clear precedent category. For example, as we noted above, other petitioners in Diamond Shamrock's position could rely on our holding that the regulations at issue in that case were not ripe until applied. 25 The petitioners argue that Diamond Shamrock also governs the ripeness issue presented by this case. We disagree. Diamond Shamrock involved pre-enforcement review by the District Court of regulations that would have been directly reviewable in this court under the review provision of the FWPCA upon the application of the regulations to the petitioner in a permit proceeding. 49 There, the court explicitly found that both the agency and the court would benefit from deferring judicial consideration until review under the organic statute was available. 50 By contrast, review here is sought under CERCLA's review provision, which expresses a congressional intent that review of regulations immediately follow promulgation and that it not take place at the enforcement stage. Furthermore, as we explain more fully in the succeeding section of this opinion, we find that both the EPA and the court would have benefitted from conducting the requested review of the HRS within the statutory period. Thus, Diamond Shamrock is in no way dispositive of the instant case. 51 26 Generally, if we determine that a petitioner's request for a retrospective ripeness evaluation does not fit into either the Geller or the clear precedent categories we will refuse to examine the petitioner's untimely claim to ascertain whether we would have found it ripe for adjudication had it been brought within the statutory period, unless our refusal to do so would cause a serious injustice to the petitioner. However, because we clearly articulate this policy for the first time in this case, we pause to demonstrate that the petitioners' challenge to the HRS was ripe during the review period.
27 Ripeness law overlaps at its borders with Article III requirements of case or controversy. 52 However, the primary focus of the ripeness doctrine as it concerns judicial review of agency action has been a prudential attempt to time review in a way that balances the petitioner's interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action against the agency's interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is subjected to judicial review and the court's interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting. 53 28 In Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court announced a twofold test for balancing these interests in order to determine the ripeness of pre-enforcement agency actions for judicial review. That test requires an evaluation of the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 54 29 Under the fitness of the issues prong, this court takes account of the institutional capacities of, and the relationship between, courts and agencies. We look, for example, to see if the issue raises a purely legal question. If it does, we assume its threshold suitability for judicial determination. 55 We also consider whether the agency or the court will benefit from deferring review until the agency's policies have crystallized and the question arises in some more concrete and final form. 56 Should we decide that either the agency or the court has a significant interest in postponing review, we will decline to hear the petitioner's claim at that time unless, under the hardship to the parties prong, the interest of those who seek relief from the challenged action's 'immediate and practical impact' upon them 57 outweighs the competing institutional interests in deferring review. 58 30 Applying the fitness of the issues prong to the instant case, we find initially that the issue presented for review--whether the HRS is arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of statutory authority--is a purely legal question and thus was fit in that respect for judicial resolution during the statutory period. We also find that neither the agency nor the court would have benefitted from postponing review beyond that period. Indeed, as we demonstrate below, both institutions had a significant interest in completing all review of the HRS during the statutory time frame. 31 The EPA's interest in obtaining review of the HRS during the statutory period, before the model was applied to specific sites, may be demonstrated in three ways--by examining the statutory review provision itself, by considering the agency's declared interest in the timing of review, and by taking account of the EPA's indications that this regulation represents its crystallized position on the HRS. 32 As noted earlier, CERCLA's statutory review provision provides that 33 [r]eview of any regulation promulgated under [CERCLA] may be had upon application [to this court] by any interested person.... Any such application shall be made within ninety days from the date of promulgation of such regulations. Any matter with respect to which review could have been obtained under this [provision] shall not be subject to judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement or to obtain damages or recovery of response costs. 59 34 It is abundantly clear from the plain language of this provision that Congress intended to provide prompt, uniform pre-enforcement review of CERCLA regulations to a broad class of petitioners, in order to avoid needless delays in the implementation of an important national program. 60 This provision constitutes compelling evidence that Congress has, in effect, decided that the interest of the EPA in effectuating CERCLA's purposes will generally be furthered by review during the statutory period and, by implication, hindered by postponing review. Indeed, Congress underscored its intention that review be expeditious by proscribing review at any stage of enforcement. 61 In determining a regulation's ripeness for review, courts should accord heavy weight to this sort of strong congressional proclamation of an agency's interest in the timing of review of its regulations. This is particularly true in a case such as this, where the agency does not contend that it would benefit from deferral. 35 In fact, the EPA asserted at oral argument and in its brief that it would benefit if review of the legality of the HRS were confined to the statutory period. If, as the agency explained, the HRS could be challenged by different petitioners each time the NPL is updated, the EPA would be forced, contrary to the will of Congress, to defend the HRS repeatedly, wasting both time and funds that would be better spent cleaning up hazardous wastes that threaten human health and the environment. 62 36 A final consideration bearing on the agency's interest in the timing of review is whether the HRS represented the agency's final position on the methodology to be used in evaluating sites for inclusion on the NPL. As we observed in Continental Air Lines, Inc., v. CAB, 37 [t]he interest in postponing review is strong if the agency position whose validity is in issue is not in fact the agency's final position. If the position is likely to be abandoned or modified before it is actually put into effect, then its review wastes the court's time and interferes with the process by which the agency is attempting to reach a final decision. 63 38 We find that, at the time of the HRS's promulgation, there existed every indication that it constituted the agency's final position. It was issued as a regulation, after notice-and-comment proceedings, and contains no equivocal or tentative language as to the EPA's intention to employ it in evaluating sites for inclusion on the NPL. The EPA's commitment to this model was also manifested by its use of an earlier version of the HRS to score sites for listing on the Interim Priority List (IPL). 64 39 Given the strong congressional preference for timing of review of CERCLA regulations expressed in section 113(a), the likelihood that postponing review would interfere with the agency's ability to fulfill its statutory responsibilities, and the fact that the HRS represented the agency's final position, we find, without reservation, that the agency possessed no interest in deferring review until application of the HRS to produce the NPL; on the contrary, the EPA had a positive interest in completing review of the HRS during the statutory period. 40 Furthermore, we find that the court had no compelling interest in postponing review until the NPL was issued. First, because the issue presented for review is purely a legal one, it was suitable for review at the time the HRS was issued. Second, since the HRS represented the agency's final position, review would not have wasted the court's time. Third, the court has an interest in conserving its own resources by resolving challenges to agency action during the statutory period, rather than stretching them out over an indefinite period of time. Fourth, as we can confirm through hindsight, the application of the HRS to produce the NPL would not have significantly advanced our ability to deal with the legal issue presented nor would it have aided us in its resolution. 65 The issue is the same today as it was during the statutory period and our understanding of it has not been enhanced by the development of a more specific factual background. While we have sometimes chosen to defer review of a general standard 66 when we believed it beneficial to wait until the controversy had a more developed factual context, 67 it is clear beyond peradventure that the validity of a rule can be ripe for review whether or not it has actually been improperly applied and enforced in a concrete factual setting. 68 41 We need not proceed in this case to the second prong of the Abbott Laboratories test. As we previously explained, the purpose of the hardship to the parties analysis is to ascertain if the harm that deferring review will cause the petitioners outweighs the benefits it will bring the agency and the court. Because we have determined that the EPA and, to a lesser extent, the court had a positive interest in review during the statutory period, there are no conflicting interests to balance. The interests of the EPA, the court, and the petitioners in immediate review of the HRS would have coincided. Thus the ripeness doctrine would not have barred our review of the HRS within the statutory period. 69 42 In some of our decisions we have suggested that the court should consider the hardship to the parties, even where the first prong of the Abbott Laboratories test is met. 70 In none of these cases, however, did we explicitly find that both the agency and the court had a positive interest in immediate review. Nor did we consider the relevance to our ripeness determination of a statutory review provision that expresses a strong congressional preference concerning the timing of review. Where the first prong of the ripeness test is met and Congress has emphatically declared a preference for immediate review, assuming that constitutional case or controversy requirements have been met, no purpose is served by proceeding to the second prong. 43 Indeed, the mechanical application of the second prong of the Abbott Laboratories test could work mischief in such a situation. If we were to defer review in such a case merely because we could find no significant harm to the petitioner from delay, we would achieve the perverse result of postponing review to the detriment of the agency and the court and in contravention of the express preferences of Congress, in the name of a prudential doctrine that is intended to protect the institutional needs of courts and agencies. As we have repeatedly observed, the ripeness doctrine requires a pragmatic and commonsense application. 71 1] Common sense, and the underlying goals of the ripeness doctrine, are both furthered by finding that the HRS was ripe for review during the statutory period. 44 We conclude that the petitioners were not justified in failing to seek review during the statutory period. We recognize, however, that the relationship between the ripeness doctrine and statutory review provisions that exhibit a strong congressional preference for pre-enforcement review was largely uncharted before this decision. For this reason, we proceed to consider the merits of the petitioners' challenge.