Opinion ID: 218836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud (Count One) and Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count Three)

Text: The conspiracy charges, however, require a different analysis. For them, venue is proper in any district in which `an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed.' United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 896 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir.1994)). An overt act is any act performed by any conspirator for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives of the conspiracy. The act need not be unlawful; it can be any act, innocent or illegal, as long as it is done in furtherance of the object or purpose of the conspiracy. See United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir.2007); see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). The government argues that because Butler's use of Kennedy airport to attend meetings with the investors were overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracies, venue in the Eastern District was proper with respect to those counts. [4] We agree. A reasonable jury could have concluded that Butler and Tzolov's travel through the Eastern District was in furtherance of the conspiracy because, had they not done so, the face-to-face meetings with potential investors, which was a regular part of their fraudulent scheme, would not have occurred. This conclusion is consistent with the principle in our decisions that venue for a conspiracy may be laid in a district through which conspirators passed in order to commit the underlying offense. See, e.g., United States v. Duque, 123 Fed. Appx. 447, 449 (2d Cir.2005) (summary order) (finding evidence the government presented that defendant flew from JFK airport to Aruba via a flight path over Jamaica Bay, a body of water in Queens, New York and within the Southern District sufficient to establish venue in the Southern District for conspiracy to distribute heroin charge) (citing United States v. Ramirez-Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.1987)); United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456, 461-62 (2d Cir.1973) (holding that the use by the conspirators of [JFK] for flights to Miami and Detroit to obtain or sell narcotics was a sufficient basis for venue to lie in the Eastern District); see also United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir.1979) (finding that reentry by defendant into the United States at San Francisco airport to catch a connecting flight to Miami, where he intended to pick up radios containing heroin, was sufficient to constitute an overt act committed in course of alleged conspiracy so that venue was proper); United States v. Williams, 536 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1976) (coconspirator's flight over the Southern District of California, while en route to obtain marijuana, was sufficient to support venue there). Relying on Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), Butler argues that venue was not proper in the Eastern District for the conspiracy counts because the overt act must at least manifest `that the conspiracy is at work,' and that [u]sing an airport to attend business meetings did not `manifest' that any conspiracy was `at work' because he would have taken the same trips to sell ARS whether or not [he] made any misstatements. However, contrary to Butler's assertions, the act of going to the airport in the Eastern District, which allowed Butler and Tzolov to make the false statements to the investors in person, was sufficient to show that the conspiracy was at work and not a project still resting solely in the[ir] minds. Yates, 354 U.S. at 334, 77 S.Ct. 1064. We also reject Butler's argument that his flights out of JFK do not satisfy the substantial contacts test set forth in United States v. Reed, which takes into account such factors as the site of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding. 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir.1985). Though Reed refers to a `substantial contacts rule' for determining venue . . . it is clear that the [court] regarded the locale of the defendant's acts as a sufficient basis for establishing venue. Naranjo, 14 F.3d at 147. In Reed, we stated that the alleged criminal acts provide substantial contact with the district. 773 F.2d at 481. We further noted that [v]irtually all the caselaw designates the site of the defendant's acts as a proper venue and that this site may seem fair to defendants at least in the perverse sense of having been freely chosen by them as the place at which the acts were committed. Id. ; see also United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that although Reed 's substantial contacts test is not a formal constitutional test, [it] is helpful in determining whether a chosen venue is unfair or prejudicial to a defendant, especially in those cases where the defendant 's acts did not take place within the district selected as the venue for trial. (emphasis added)). Here, Butler committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracies in the Eastern District. Accordingly, we do not find venue for the conspiracy charges to be unfair or prejudicial. [5]