Opinion ID: 664147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court Jurisdiction Under FIRREA

Text: 13 We now come to the main issue in this case. The RTC contends that the district court erred in ruling that it has jurisdiction to hear Homeland's breach of contract claims and, therefore, in denying the RTC's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Whether the district court has jurisdiction to consider Homeland's claims is a question of law which we review de novo. See Cooper v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 602, 611 n. 7 (10th Cir.1992); see also Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorp., 972 F.2d 1545, 1551 (10th Cir.1992) (stating that, as a general matter, we review de novo an order regarding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 14 We are presented here with a question of first impression in this circuit: does 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) bar federal district courts from considering claims such as Homeland's, which arise due to RTC action in managing an institutional asset after an institution enters receivership, pending exhaustion of administrative process provided for under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C. Secs. 1821(d)(3)-(13). 15 The RTC suggests that our decision in RTC v. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103 (10th Cir.1991) controls. However, while we held in Mustang Partners that administrative exhaustion was required for district court jurisdiction, the case involved a creditor claim that arose before the depository institution entered receivership. See id. at 106 (No interpretation [of FIRREA] is possible which would excuse [the administrative claims] requirement for creditors with suits pending....). Similarly, most of the other cases cited by the RTC for the proposition that administrative exhaustion is required involve claims arising before an institution entered receivership rather than from the actions of the RTC in managing an institution's assets after receivership, as is the case here. See, e.g., Capitol Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188 (7th Cir.1993); Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. FDIC, 962 F.2d 63 (D.C.Cir.1992); Meliezer v. RTC, 952 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir.1992); RTC v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 627 (2d Cir.1991); FDIC v. Shain, Schaffer & Rafanello, 944 F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir.1991). We therefore return to the statute to answer the somewhat different question presented in this case. 2 16 FIRREA, at 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D), contains language barring federal court jurisdiction over certain claims against the RTC as receiver for failed financial institutions pending the exhaustion of administrative process outlined in the same subsection (Sec. 1821(d)). Section 1821(d)(13)(D) reads: 17 (D) Limitation on judicial review 18 Except as otherwise provided in this subsection [i.e., after administrative process is pursued sufficiently under 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(6)(A) ], no court shall have jurisdiction over-- 19 (i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the [RTC] has been appointed receiver, including assets which the [RTC] may acquire from itself as such receiver; or 20 (ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the [RTC] as receiver. 21 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). Standing alone, this language appears very broad. The RTC argues that it is broad enough to encompass, and therefore to bar, the claims at issue here. 3 We disagree. 22 We begin with the established principle of statutory construction that, if possible, [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 447 (10th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 516, 121 L.Ed.2d 527 (1992); see also Kenneth v. Schmoll, 482 F.2d 90, 93 (10th Cir.1973). The RTC asserts that to find that the district court has jurisdiction over the claims at issue here would violate the above principle by reading Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) out of FIRREA for purposes of this case. 23 Were we to read Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) in a vacuum we might agree. However, we do not determine in a vacuum which claims are jurisdictionally barred under this subsection. In interpreting a statutory provision, context and structure are, as in examining any legal instrument, of substantial import in the interpretive exercise. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185 (D.C.Cir.1987) (citing Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-19, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540-41, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535, 100 S.Ct. 774, 780, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980)); see Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 589 (10th Cir.1990) (In interpreting ... relevant language ... we look to the provisions of the whole law....), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 916, 111 S.Ct. 2011, 114 L.Ed.2d 98 (1991) (citing Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S.Ct. 929, 934, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990)); see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 2153, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991) (stating that whether a surviving mortgage interest gives rise to a claim subject to inclusion in a Chapter 13 reorganization plan is a straightforward issue of statutory construction to be resolved by reference to 'the text, history, and purpose' of the Bankruptcy Code). In this vein we note that Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) as quoted above is one part of an integrated administrative claims process under FIRREA outlined in Sec. 1821(d)(3)-(13). In fact, the jurisdictional ban in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) is expressly tied to the remainder of the administrative claims process. It holds that no court shall have jurisdiction over claims except as otherwise provided in [subsection 1821(d) ]. Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). Jurisdiction is otherwise provided for in subsection 1821(d) only for those claims which fit under the greater administrative process outlined therein. See Sec. 1821(d)(6)(A). As a practical matter of statutory construction, then, we proceed on the assumption that Congress intended the claims barred by Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) to parallel those contemplated under FIRREA's administrative claims process laid out in the greater part of Sec. 1821(d). 24 In examining the whole of this process it is evident that the term claim as used in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) should be interpreted to exclude claims such as Homeland's arising from management actions of the RTC after taking over a depository institution. As the district court and Homeland suggest, much of Sec. 1821(d) indicates that in requiring administrative review--and in the meantime forbidding federal court jurisdiction--of claims, Congress had in mind creditor and related claims arising before an institution enters receivership. Most importantly, Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B) requires that, after taking over as receiver, the RTC give notice to creditors who then have a limited amount of time (not less than 90 days) to present their claims to the RTC. 4 Claims not filed within the prescribed time limit are to be disallowed with such disallowance being final. See Sec. 1821(d)(5)(C) (directing that the RTC disallow any claims not filed before the deadline established under Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B), except in very limited circumstances). Obviously, claims such as Homeland's arising after receivership and in the indeterminate future due to management actions of the RTC cannot have been contemplated when such deadlines for filing administrative claims were set. Put another way, by the plain language of the statute, FIRREA's administrative process is closed to Homeland for purposes of the claims at issue in this case. 5 25 The claims filing deadlines of Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B) have already led several courts to hold that the jurisdictional ban of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) is inapplicable in certain circumstances. For example, in RTC v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 4 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit held that, even though the defendant has not exhausted the administrative procedures established by FIRREA, Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) does not divest a district court of jurisdiction where an affirmative defense is presented in response to an RTC claim. The court said: 26 [T]he court's consideration of subsection d of Section 1821 in its entirety leads the court to conclude that even if the plain language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) were read or understood to include affirmative defenses, an exception to the plain meaning rule of statutory construction would apply because such a literal application of the statute would produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters evidenced in the remainder of Section 1821(d), and would lead to the 'patently absurd consequence' of requiring presentment and proof to the RTC of all potential affirmative defenses that might be asserted in response to unknown and unasserted claims or actions by the RTC. 27 Id. at 1497 (quoting RTC v. Conner, 817 F.Supp. 98, 102 (W.D.Okla.1993)). In Heno v. FDIC, 996 F.2d 429 (1st Cir.1993), the First Circuit, though in the context of a Sec. 1821(e) contract repudiation by the RTC, suggests an analysis similar to the Ninth Circuit's. 6 The court found that unless Heno's claim is 'against the assets' of the Bank, rather than against the FDIC, it need not (indeed could not) have been filed prior to the ... bar date [established pursuant to Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B) ] since the FDIC did not repudiate the Bank's agreement with Heno until almost six months after the bar date. Id. at 433-34 (emphasis added). This reasoning is equally applicable to claims such as Homeland's that arise from management actions of the RTC after a depository institution enters receivership. 28 Significant portions of the remainder of Sec. 1821(d) also suggest that claims, as used therein, does not include claims such as Homeland's. For example, Sec. 1821(d)(10)(A), discussing the payment of claims found to be valid in the administrative process, mentions only creditor claims. Additionally, the statute outlines claim preferences putting the claims process in the context of a conventional winding up of the debts accrued by an institution before entering receivership. See 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(8)(A) (discussing preferences for claims involving security interests); 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(11) (discussing distribution of assets in general and in particular the payment of depositor claims and the distribution of remaining amounts to shareholders). Finally, throughout Sec. 1821(d) the RTC is referred to primarily in its capacity as receiver. See, e.g., Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) (barring court jurisdiction over any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the [RTC] as receiver) (emphasis added). This is significant because Sec. 1821(d)(2) defines the RTC's duties as conservator and as receiver differently. As conservator, the RTC may take such action as may be--(i) necessary to put the insured depository institution in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business of the institution and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the institution. Sec. 1821(d)(2)(D). By contrast, as receiver, the RTC may place the insured depository institution in liquidation and proceed to realize upon the assets of the institution, having due regard to the conditions of credit in the locality. Sec. 1821(d)(2)(E). Though the lines between the two functions may blur at times, the management actions taken by the RTC giving rise to Homeland's claims fall more squarely under the RTC's powers as conservator. That the RTC is referred to in Sec. 1821(d) primarily in its capacity as receiver suggests that Homeland's actions are not covered by the jurisdictional bar therein. 29 None of these factors standing alone necessarily dictate the outcome we reach today. However, taken together and especially in light of the time bar established in Secs. 1821(d)(3)(B) and (d)(5)(C), they lead us to the conclusion we reach here. We note that in reaching this conclusion we split with one of our sister circuits which has addressed a similar question. See Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383, 392 (3d Cir.) (holding that FIRREA's jurisdictional bar does encompass a claim arising from post receivership actions of the RTC), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 582, 116 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991). We believe that our reading of the statute more accurately reflects its language as a whole.