Opinion ID: 3002812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional two levels based on refugee victims

Text: Arnaout also argues that the district court erred when it increased Arnaout’s sentence based on harm caused to refugees who did not receive donated funds. At the initial sentencing hearing, the district court added an additional two levels based on harm caused to refugees who did not receive the donated funds. Although we did not explicitly reach Arnaout’s challenge to these two levels in our first opinion in light of our remand for resentencing, we said: We note, however, that the district court’s factual determination that Arnaout also victimized Chechen and Bosnian refugees by fraudulently diverting to the military charity funds that were meant for refugees was not clearly erroneous. Contrary to Arnaout’s argument, the district court’s determination here was not based on pure speculation. Instead, the district court reviewed actual letters from refugee victims submitted by the government to determine the harm caused by Arnaout’s diversion of funds and reasonably concluded that the diversion of the charity funds caused a tangible harm to the refugees that was not adequately represented in the Guidelines calculations. Arnaout I, 431 F.3d at 1004. After our remand, the district court calculated an adjusted offense level of 28, with a criminal history category of I. The resulting guideline range was 78 to 97 months. The government then asked that the district court impose a two‐level enhancement for the victimization of vulnerable persons as it had at the initial sentencing, namely for refugees who were the intended beneficiaries of the funds. Under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), a two‐level enhancement is appropriate “if the defendant knew or should have known that the offense involved a vulnerable victim.” The commentary to the Guidelines states that a person is a vulnerable victim if the individual is “unusually vulnerable due to age, physical, or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), comment n.2. Arnaout argued in response that refugees who did not receive donated funds were not victimized because the donors intended the money to go to the military, not to the victims. No. 06-2285 Page 6 The district court stated it could not find any support in the record to conclude that “funds were either marked for use by military in Bosnia and Chechnya. . . . I didn’t see . . . any basis for concluding that funds were segregated so that donors were solicited and their funds were used and set aside for a noncharitable purpose, that is, to support military endeavors in those two areas of the world.” The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that there were vulnerable victims who suffered as a result of what were supposed to be charitable funds used instead for military purposes. It concluded that its consideration supported “the addition of a 2 level upward adjustment because vulnerable victims were affected by this fraud and they were affected quite basically.” We find no error in the imposition of the enhancement. As the district court explained, the solicitations speak in terms of humanitarian uses, and the newsletters and solicitations to which Arnaout points give no indication that money donated to BIF would be used to support military personnel. Moreover, the district court had before it letters from widows, orphans, and refugees who wrote that even small amounts of money could have saved lives. The district court also explained that its Guidelines calculation had not accounted for harm to the intended recipients of the funds, as opposed to the donors themselves. As a result, the district court committed no clear error when it concluded that the purported recipients were harmed when the funds were instead used to support military objectives overseas and added two levels as a result.