Opinion ID: 2611058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 36

Heading: The statutory delay between the guilt and penalty phases denies defendant an impartial jury

Text: ORS 163.150(1) creates a temporal gap between the guilt and penalty phases. It provides: Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of aggravated murder, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If the defendant has pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence; however, neither the state nor the defendant shall be allowed to introduce repetitive evidence that has previously been offered and received during the trial on the issue of guilt. The court shall instruct the jury that all evidence previously offered and received may be considered for the purposes of the sentencing hearing. This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Oregon. The state and the defendant or the counsel of the defendant shall be permitted to present arguments for or against a sentence of death. (Emphasis added.) Defendant claims that the statutory delay leaves the jurors vulnerable to outside influences, such as family, friends, media analysis of the guilt verdict and speculation on the sentence. Defendant asserts that a trial court's cautionary instructions are inadequate to dispel these post-verdict influences and that in the absence of sequestration, an impartial jury is not possible. ORS 163.150(1) provides that the penalty phase shall be conducted as soon as practicable after the guilt phase ends. The jury returned its verdict on the guilt phase at 9:53 p.m. on Monday evening, March 16. The penalty phase began at 9:35 a.m. on Wednesday, March 18. There was no appreciable statutory delay about which defendant complains. In any event, this issue is now moot because we hold today that the penalty phase of this case must now be tried by a new and separate jury. Any assignments of error not discussed have been considered and are either moot or without merit. The judgment is affirmed as to the guilt phase and reversed as to the penalty phase, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. LINDE and FADELEY, JJ., dissent for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinions in State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 20, 786 P.2d 93 (1990), and State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 98, 786 P.2d 111 (1990) (decided this date).