Opinion ID: 2570398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: 43 Whether the videotapes of interviews with Wesley Hocevar should have been admitted into evidence.

Text: ś 44 In regard to evidentiary matters, it is within the district court's discretion to determine whether or not evidence is relevant and admissible. See State v. Beavers, 1999 MT 260, ś 20, 987 P.2d 371, ś 20, 56 St.Rep. 1035, ś 20 (citation omitted). Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn the district court's determinations on evidentiary matters. See Beavers, ś 20. ś 45 Following Wesley's overdose, Chief Robert Stabio (Stabio) of the Miles City Police Department conducted two videotaped interviews of Wesley, on May 26, 1992 and on June 2, 1992. At trial, the State did not call Wesley as a witness or attempt to introduce the videotapes. Susan sought to introduce these videotapes during the defense's case-in-chief. The District Court ruled that the videotapes were not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. ś 46 Susan contends that the videotapes of interviews with Wesley should have been admitted into evidence under one of three exceptions to the hearsay rule: present sense impression, recorded recollection, or other exceptions. Under Rule 803, M.R.Evid., the following, among others, are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness: (1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. .... (5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. .... (24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. ś 47 The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule applies to out-of-court statements that describe or explain an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, and is thus inapplicable in this case. The timing element assures the trustworthiness of present sense impressions in two ways: it reduces the likelihood of faulty recollection and precludes time for reflection. See, e.g., Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 8.34 (1995). Although we recognize that there could be a slight time lag between an event and the declarant's description of that event, the declarant's statement must nonetheless reflect a present sense impression rather than a description of events that were observed in the past. Absent contemporaneousness or near-contemporaneousness of event and statement, the inherent trustworthiness of a present sense impression is negated. In State v. Newman (1973), 162 Mont. 450, 457, 513 P.2d 258, 262, which was decided prior to the adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence but is nonetheless instructive on the timing element of Rule 803(1), M.R.Evid., we held that a statement in reference to an event that occurred the previous evening was not a present sense impression. ś 48 The videotaped interviews with Wesley were conducted five and twelve days after Wesley's Benadryl overdose. At the time of the interviews, Wesley was not describing the overdose as he was perceiving it nor immediately thereafter. Because the timing element is not satisfied, Wesley's statements to Stabio five and twelve days after the overdose cannot be considered trustworthy pursuant to the present sense impression exception. Enough time had passed that Wesley's recollection of the events could have become faulty. Wesley also had ample time for reflection during which he could have falsified or distorted the events surrounding his overdose. The admission of the videotaped interviews was properly denied under the present sense impression exception because its timing element was not satisfied. ś 49 In order to admit evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception, the party seeking to introduce such evidence must establish certain foundational requirements. By its terms, Rule 803(5), M.R.Evid., requires the declarant to be a witness and requires that the witness has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately. Wesley was not a witness at trial and Susan made no showing that Wesley had insufficient recollection of the overdose. The court noted that [t]he Defendant did not demonstrate, or even make a proffer, that Mathew could not recollect or communicate regarding the subject matter of the videotape, and held that the recorded recollection exception did not apply. The admission of the videotaped interviews was properly denied under the recorded recollection exception because its basic foundational requirement was not satisfied. ś 50 Susan finally argues that the videotapes should have been admitted pursuant the residual exception of Rule 803, which excepts from hearsay statements not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Rule 803(24), M.R.Evid. The residual exception look[s] to the circumstances surrounding a hearsay statement when it is made-the `circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' that lend reliability to the hearsay statement in lieu of cross-examination. State v. J.C.E. (1988), 235 Mont. 264, 272, 767 P.2d 309, 314. Everything that bears on the credibility of the speaker and the accuracy of his statement counts.... Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 8.65 (1995). We have held that the residual exceptions should be used sparingly, and only in exceptional circumstances. State v. Brown (1988), 231 Mont. 334, 338, 752 P.2d 204, 207. ś 51 Here, the District Court reviewed the videotapes and found that Mr. Stabio and Wesley did not communicate very well. There is a lot of inconsistencies, a lot of difficulty with times, staying focused on what Mr. Stabio wanted to say, and the Court cannot say that even at that time from that, that Wesley was a competent witness at that time. It just seems to me that he, initially, at the first interview, he was saying his mother told him-at first he said no, she didn't tell him to take them. He took them because he wanted to take them. And then she did tell him to take them. And then there was, how many were there? There were this many. And that means ten or five? It just doesn't seem to me that there is anything substantive that would assist the jury with respect to that.... The admission of the videotaped interviews was properly denied under the residual exception because the videotapes did not manifest circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. ś 52 The videotapes were not admissible pursuant to Rule 803, M.R.Evid., as present sense impression, recorded recollection, or under the residual exception. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the videotaped interviews with Wesley into evidence.