Opinion ID: 525028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Barnetta's Constitutional Claim

Text: 36 On appeal, Barnetta argues that she was invidiously discriminated against because of her indigency in violation of the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. She argues that a wealthy defendant can contact numerous experts without having to inform the government; only when the wealthy defendant intends to call an expert as a witness at trial does he need to notify the government about the expert. Thus, Barnetta claims that an indigent defendant should be able to retain an expert pursuant to Rule 17(b) without notifying the government, unless the indigent defendant intends to call the expert as a witness. 37 Barnetta contends that the government found out about her expert solely because the district court erroneously required her to serve a copy of her 17(b) motion and supporting memorandum on the government. If she was not indigent, she would not have needed to file a 17(b) motion, and thus the government would not have found out about Shipp. Barnetta further argues that, contrary to the government's claim, the government would not have independently found out about Shipp because she would have had Shipp make a preliminary determination based on photocopies of the cards and envelopes which the government produced during discovery; thus, there would have been no need for Shipp to have contacted the government to see the originals. Therefore, Barnetta argues that the district court should have precluded the government from calling Shipp as a witness, and its failure to do so violated her constitutional rights because a wealthy defendant would never find himself in this predicament. 38 Of course, the government strongly contests Barnetta's claim that her constitutional rights were violated. The government argues that the district court properly refused to make an advanced ruling on rebuttal testimony. The government further argues that because the district court did not make a definitive ruling on whether the government could call Shipp as a rebuttal witness, Barnetta waived her right to appeal this issue by calling Shipp as a witness at trial. Finally, the government claims that if the district court erred, such error was harmless. 39 Barnetta raises a very serious and important issue. Unfortunately, because the record is incomplete, we cannot give a proper resolution to this thorny issue. Therefore, we remand Barnetta's case back to the district court and instruct the court to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the alleged filing of Barnetta's first Rule 17(b) motion. Hopefully, in this evidentiary hearing, the district court will be able to elicit information which will provide answers to the following questions: (1) Did Barnetta's counsel try to file a Rule 17(b) motion in an ex parte manner? (2) With whom did he try to file it, and what action was taken? (3) Did the district court judge authorize his law clerk to reject this filing? (4) Why was this filing rejected? Other similar relevant questions may also be answered at the discretion of the district judge. At this evidentiary hearing, the district court should feel free to state on the record his own recollection of relevant evidence, and he need not disqualify himself on this ground. Our panel shall retain jurisdiction over Barnetta's case; therefore, the district court should submit the transcript of the hearing and its findings to our court so that we can properly dispose of Barnetta's appeal on this issue.