Opinion ID: 2833026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pleading of Discrimination Claims

Text: The district courtʹs decision raises the following issues with respect to the pleading of the discrimination claims: (1) the applicability of McDonnell ‐ 19 ‐ Douglas at the pleading stage; (2) the pleading standards for discrimination claims; and (3) the application of the proper pleading standards in this case.
In 1973, the Supreme Court adopted a three‐stage, burden‐shifting framework for analyzing employment discrimination cases under Title VII where a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment but does not have direct evidence of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792. Under the test, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: ʺ(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.ʺ Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a presumption arises that more likely than not the adverse conduct was based on the consideration of impermissible factors. Texas Depʹt of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253‐54 (1981). The burden then shifts to the employer to ʺarticulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasonʺ for the disparate treatment. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer articulates such a reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to ‐ 20 ‐ prove that the employerʹs reason ʺwas in fact pretextʺ for discrimination. Id. at 804; see Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (ʺIf such a reason is proffered, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the real reason for the employment action.ʺ). In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. that ʺan employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discriminationʺ at the motion to dismiss stage. 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). The Court ruled that the ʺprima facie caseʺ requirement of McDonnell Douglas applied only at the summary judgment phase because it ʺis an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.ʺ Id. at 510. As the Court explained, ʺunder a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case because the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination case.ʺ Id. at 511. ʺMoreover, the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context and were ʹnever intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.ʹʺ Id. at 512 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). In Swierkiewicz, the Court relied in part on the long‐used minimal pleading standard adopted in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See ‐ 21 ‐ Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512‐14. In Iqbal and Twombly, however, the Court abandoned Conleyʹs ʺno set of factsʺ test and adopted instead a plausibility standard of pleading. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 669‐70 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562‐63. As a consequence, a question arose as to the continued viability of Swierkiewicz. See, e.g., Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 228 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting suggestion that question was not ʺentirely settledʺ and declining to decide whether, after Twombly, Title VII plaintiff was required to plead facts sufficient to establish prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (questioning continued vitality of Swierkiewicz). In EEOC v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, we answered the question in a different context. 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014). We held as follows: [U]ncertainty lingered as to whether Twombly and Iqbal overruled Swierkiewicz entirely, or whether Swierkiewicz survives only to the extent that it bars the application of a pleading standard to discrimination claims that is heightened beyond Twomblyʹs and Iqbalʹs demand for facial plausibility. We reject the first proposition. Twomblyʹs endorsement of Swierkiewicz mandates, at a minimum, that Swierkiewiczʹs rejection of a heightened pleading standard in discrimination cases remains valid. . . . [W]e conclude that, while a discrimination complaint need not allege facts establishing each element of a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to ‐ 22 ‐ dismiss, see Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (noting that the prima facie case requirement is an evidentiary standard), it must at a minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to ʺʹnudge[ ] [its] claimsʹ . . . ʹacross the line from conceivable to plausibleʹʺ to proceed, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Id. at 254 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). As we recently noted, EEOC v. Port Authority was an Equal Pay Act case and not a Title VII case. Littlejohn v. City of New York, No. 14‐1395‐cv, 2015 WL 4604250, at  n.7 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2015). Nonetheless, the language quoted above from EEOC v. Port Authority is broad, and if Swierkiewicz survives for Equal Pay Act cases it surely survives for Title VII cases. More importantly, our decision in Littlejohn makes clear that a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, at least as the test was originally formulated, to defeat a motion to dismiss. Rather, because ʺa temporary ʹpresumptionʹ of discriminatory motivationʺ is created under the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff ʺneed only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.ʺ Id. ‐ 23 ‐ at , 8 (referring ʺto the reduced requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas in the initial phase of a Title VII litigationʺ).7 Accordingly, here, the district court erred when it granted Defendantsʹ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Vega had ʺnot established a prima facie case of discrimination.ʺ Vega, 2014 WL 2157536, at . At the pleadings stage of the litigation, Vega was not required to plead a prima facie case of discrimination as contemplated by the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Littlejohn, 2015 WL 4604250, at  (referring to ʺthe reduced prima facie requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas in the initial phase of a litigationʺ). We hold that the district court held Vega to the wrong pleading standards.8 7 The district courtʹs decision was filed before our ruling in EEOC v. Port Authority, and, of course, before our ruling in Littlejohn. Nonetheless, the district court did not discuss Swierkiewicz or acknowledge that there was a question as to its continued vitality. On appeal, Defendants continue to argue that the district court was correct in requiring Vega to plead a prima facie case, still suggesting that Swierkiewicz has been ʺdiscreditedʺ in this respect. To be clear, we do not hold that a plaintiff in a Title VII case may not rely on the McDonnell Douglas formulation in pleading a claim of discrimination; we simply hold that a plaintiff is not required to do so. See, e.g., Rodriguez‐Reyes v. Molina‐Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (ʺ[T]he elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.ʺ). 8 To compound the problem, the district court held that Vega had to ʺdemonstrate[]ʺ an adverse employment action and that he had to ʺestablish[]ʺ a prima facie case of discrimination. Vega, 2014 WL 2157536, at . Of course, at the pleading stage, Vega was not required to ʺdemonstrateʺ or ʺestablishʺ discrimination; he was required only to plead a claim ‐ 24 ‐
We turn to the question of what a plaintiff must plead in an employment discrimination case to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In Littlejohn, we held that at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ʺminimal burdenʺ of alleging facts ʺsuggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.ʺ 2015 WL 4604250, at . While we made clear that Iqbal applies to employment discrimination cases, we also clarified that Iqbalʹs plausibility requirement ʺdoes not affect the benefit to plaintiffs pronounced in the McDonnell Douglas quartet.ʺ Id. We ruled nonetheless that the facts alleged in the complaint must provide ʺat least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.ʺ Id. at . The question remains what a plaintiff must allege to meet this minimal burden. The starting point is the statute. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 (ʺ[W]e begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim . . . .ʺ). upon which relief could be granted. See, e.g., Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007). ‐ 25 ‐ Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer ʺto fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individualʹs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.ʺ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1). Title VII thus requires a plaintiff asserting a discrimination claim to allege two elements: (1) the employer discriminated against him (2) because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. As to the first element, an employer discriminates against a plaintiff by taking an adverse employment action against him. ʺA plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.ʺ Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). ʺAn adverse employment action is one which is more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.ʺ Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). ʺExamples of materially adverse changes include termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices unique to a ‐ 26 ‐ particular situation.ʺ Id. (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that the assignment of ʺa disproportionately heavy workloadʺ can constitute an adverse employment action. Feingold, 366 F.3d at 152‐53. As to the second element, an action is ʺbecause ofʺ a plaintiffʹs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin where it was a ʺsubstantialʺ or ʺmotivatingʺ factor contributing to the employerʹs decision to take the action. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102‐166, 105 Stat. 1071; Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (ʺ[A] plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ʹrace, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.ʹʺ (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(m)). While the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act must allege ʺthat age was the ʹbut‐forʹ cause of the employerʹs adverse action,ʺ Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009), the ʺmotivating factorʺ standard still applies to discrimination claims based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, see Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 n.2 (2d Cir. 2009) (ʺTitle VII, ‐ 27 ‐ on the other hand, does authorize a ʹmixed motiveʹ discrimination claim.ʺ). Hence, a plaintiff in a Title VII case need not allege ʺbut‐forʺ causation. Under Iqbal and Twombly, then, in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against him and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision. The question remains as to what ʺplausibilityʺ means in the context of employment discrimination claims. Several considerations guide the inquiry. First, as the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal, a plaintiff must plead ʺfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.ʺ 556 U.S. at 678. While ʺdetailed factual allegationsʺ are not required, ʺa formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.ʺ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. At the same time, the court must assume the factual allegations in the complaint to be true, ʺeven if [they are] doubtful in fact,ʺ id., and a complaint may not be dismissed ʺbased on a judgeʹs disbelief of a complaintʹs factual allegations,ʺ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (ʺWhen there are well‐pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity . . . .ʺ). ‐ 28 ‐ Second, in making the plausibility determination, the court is to ʺdraw on its judicial experience and common sense.ʺ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Of course, the court must proceed at all times in a fair and deliberative fashion, alert to any unconscious bias that could affect decisionmaking.9 In making the plausibility determination, the court must be mindful of the ʺelusiveʺ nature of intentional discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8. As we have recognized, ʺclever men may easily conceal their motivations.ʺ Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because discrimination claims implicate an employerʹs usually unstated intent and state of mind, see Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985), rarely is there ʺdirect, smoking gun, evidence of discrimination,ʺ Richards v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 668 F. Supp. 259, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affʹd, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988). Instead, plaintiffs usually must rely on ʺbits and piecesʺ of information to support an inference of discrimination, i.e., a ʺmosaicʺ of intentional discrimination. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated in part on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1988). Again, as we made clear in Littlejohn, at the initial stage of a litigation, the 9 In the case at hand, we do not question the district courtʹs fairness in approaching its work. ‐ 29 ‐ plaintiffʹs burden is ʺminimalʺ ‐‐ he need only plausibly allege facts that provide ʺat least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.ʺ 2015 WL 4604250, at . Finally, courts must remember that ʺ[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ʹprobability requirement.ʹʺ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; accord Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (ʺAsking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage . . . .ʺ); Littlejohn, 2015 WL 4604250, at . On a motion to dismiss, the question is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail, but whether the well‐pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., whether plaintiffs allege enough to ʺnudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.ʺ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678‐80. Accordingly, to defeat a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a Title VII discrimination case, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision. As we have long recognized, the ʺʹultimate issueʹ in an employment discrimination case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that ‐ 30 ‐ the adverse employment decision was motivated at least in part by an ʹimpermissible reason,ʹ i.e., a discriminatory reason.ʺ Stratton v. Depʹt for the Aging for City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 869, 878 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff can meet that burden through direct evidence of intent to discriminate, see, e.g., Stratton, 132 F.3d at 878 & n.4, or by indirectly showing circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, see, e.g., Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 436‐37 (2d Cir. 2015). A plaintiff may prove discrimination indirectly either by meeting the requirements of McDonnell Douglas and showing that the employerʹs stated reason for its employment action was pretext to cover‐ up discrimination, see, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1334 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998), or by otherwise creating a ʺmosaicʺ of intentional discrimination by identifying ʺbits and pieces of evidenceʺ that together give rise to an inference of discrimination, Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 342. At the pleadings stage, then, a plaintiff must allege that the employer took adverse action against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason, and she may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination. See ‐ 31 ‐ Littlejohn, 2015 WL 4604250, at  (requiring facts ʺsuggesting an inference of discriminatory motivationʺ).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides public employees with the right to be ʺfree from discrimination.ʺ Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2006). Consequently, public employees aggrieved by discrimination in the terms of their employment may bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any responsible persons acting under color of state law. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122‐23 (2d Cir. 2004). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) ʺthe violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,ʺ and (2) ʺthe alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.ʺ Feingold, 366 F.3d at 159 (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state employee acting in his official capacity is acting ʺunder color of state law.ʺ Id. Once the color of law requirement is met, a plaintiffʹs ʺequal protection claim parallels his Title VII claim,ʺ except that a § 1983 claim, unlike a Title VII claim, can be brought against an individual. Id. Thus, for a § 1983 ‐ 32 ‐ discrimination claim to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plausibly allege a claim under the same standards applicable to a Title VII claim ‐‐ and that the adverse action was taken by someone acting ʺunder color of state law.ʺ
We conclude that Vega pleaded a plausible discrimination claim under Title VII and § 1983, based on his allegation that the District assigned him classes with higher numbers of Spanish‐speaking students and, in doing so, assigned him a disproportionate workload. None of Vegaʹs other claims plausibly state a claim on their own, but they help create context for his discrimination claim. Vega has plausibly alleged that his assignment to classes with increased numbers of Spanish‐speaking students was an ʺadverse employment actionʺ taken ʺbecause ofʺ his Hispanic ethnicity. First, Vega alleges that he was forced to spend disproportionately more time preparing for his classes and therefore experienced a material increase in his responsibilities without additional compensation. He contends that these assignments required him to do ʺtwice as much workʺ and that he was assigned class preparations on a basis ‐ 33 ‐ that exceed ʺDistrict policy.ʺ App. at 11. We have previously held that the assignment of ʺan excessive workloadʺ as a result of ʺdiscriminatory intent,ʺ Feingold, 366 F.3d at 153, can be an adverse employment action because it is ʺmore disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities,ʺ Terry, 336 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted). Vega has thus plausibly alleged an adverse employment action. Second, Vega has also plausibly alleged that the adverse action was taken ʺbecause ofʺ his Hispanic ethnicity, that is, that his Hispanic ethnicity was a motivating factor in the employment decisions. He contends that he was assigned a large percentage of Spanish‐speaking students because he is Hispanic and bilingual, while his similarly‐situated co‐workers were not assigned additional work. Vegaʹs other allegations of discrimination, even if they do not independently constitute adverse employment actions, provide ʺrelevant background evidenceʺ by shedding light on Defendantʹs motivation and thus bolster his claim that Defendants treated him differently because of his ethnicity. See Natʹl R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 112 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that ʺan invidious discriminatory purpose ‐ 34 ‐ may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant factsʺ).10 For example, the District placed a ʺUniversity of Puerto Ricoʺ banner outside his classroom and attempted to transfer him to a Hispanic principalʹs school. These actions are plausibly connected to Vegaʹs Hispanic background and therefore provide a contextual basis for inferring discrimination. Vega has thus plausibly alleged that his Hispanic background was a ʺmotivating factorʺ contributing to his being assigned extra work. See Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 628 (2d Cir. 2001). The District may contend that Vega was assigned a disproportionate number of Spanish‐speaking students solely because of his language ability, and not because of his Hispanic background, but these competing explanations are better evaluated at the summary judgment stage or beyond, and not on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Brown, 756 F.3d at 230 (ʺThat there may be other explanations for [a defendantʹs] employment decisions does not render [a plaintiffʹs] allegations of discrimination inadequate as a matter of law.ʺ). 10 Some of these actions could also be relevant to a hostile environment claim, as Title VIIʹs prohibition on discrimination covers more than ʺeconomicʺ or ʺtangible discriminationʺ and more than the ʺterms and conditionsʺ of employment in the ʺnarrow contractual sense.ʺ Natʹl R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115‐16 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But no such claim has been asserted in this case. ‐ 35 ‐ Finally, the parties do not dispute that Defendantsʹ actions are ʺunder color of state lawʺ as Davidson and Artiles are employees of a public school. The Complaint alleges that Davidson and Artiles ʺacting under color of state law . . . violated his constitutional rights.ʺ App. at 19. Because the Complaint also alleges that Davidson and Artiles each had ʺinput into personnel decisions at [the High School] including hiring, firing, evaluations and discipline of employees,ʺ id. at 9‐10, Vega has plausibly alleged state action for the purposes of § 1983. Accordingly, the Complaint plausibly pleads under both Title VII and § 1983 that Defendants discriminated against Vega by assigning him, on or after the time‐bar dates, to classes that required additional preparation because they had large numbers of Spanish‐speaking students. Vegaʹs other allegations of discrimination do not plausibly state a claim for relief under Title VII or § 1983. He complains that he was unable to use his regular classroom for his first period class in October 2010 and therefore had to teach in an ʺexcessively noisyʺ media center; he was assigned a classroom with a ʺUniversity of Puerto Ricoʺ banner above the door; he was unable to access a school computer in October 2011 because his password had been de‐activated; ‐ 36 ‐ and the District twice unsuccessfully attempted to transfer him out of the High School. These actions did not, however, ʺmaterially . . . change . . . the terms and conditions of employment.ʺ Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, these were mere inconveniences or annoyances that did not alter Vegaʹs employment in a materially adverse way. See Terry, 336 F.3d at 138. Accordingly, while the district court applied the incorrect pleading standard, it did not err in dismissing Vegaʹs claims of discrimination, except with respect to the disproportionate workload claim.