Opinion ID: 783161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Broad Discretion

Text: 35 A fee as a condition on an assembly or demonstration in a public park is a prior restraint on speech, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992), and as such faces a heavy presumption of invalidity, see Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963). The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold expressive events, such as march[es], parade[s], or rall[ies]. Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941)). Through such a requirement, government may regulate the time, place, and manner of demonstrative public events, on the condition that the restrictions must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication. Id., 505 U.S. at 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983)). Such regulations, furthermore, may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official. Id. (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965)). 36 In Forsyth, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Georgia county ordinance, which provided for a fee of not more than $1000 for the issuance of permits for parades, assemblies, demonstrations, road closings, and other uses of public property and roads by private organizations and groups of private persons for private purposes. 505 U.S. at 126, 112 S.Ct. 2395. The ordinance authorized the county administrator to adjust the amount to be paid in order to meet the expense incident to the administration of the Ordinance and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed. Id. at 126-27, 112 S.Ct. 2395. Pursuant to this scheme, the county sought to charge the plaintiff a permit fee of $100 for a two-hour rally to be held on the steps of the county courthouse. This fee, both parties stipulated, was based exclusively on the costs associated with processing the application. The plaintiff refused to pay the fee and instead brought a facial challenge to the ordinance. Id. at 127, 112 S.Ct. 2395. 37 The Supreme Court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional on its face. It explained, A government regulation [of a public demonstration] that allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view. Id. at 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (quoting Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981)). To curtail that risk, the Court held, a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain `narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.' Id. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969)). If the scheme involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion by the licensing authority, it is unconstitutional. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 38 Section 2-10 vests exactly this sort of impermissible discretion in the Parks Commissioner. As an initial matter, the Commissioner has unrestricted discretion in deciding whether to impose a special events fee at all. And, once the Commissioner has decided to impose a special events fee, the regulations allow the Commissioner uncontrolled discretion in deciding the amount of the fee, limited only by the prescribed maximums. It is true, the ordinance prescribes a list of factors to be considered, but it assigns no weight to any of the factors. And, especially in view of the fact that the 11th prescribed factor is such other information as the Commissioner shall deem relevant, the statutory scheme effectively gives the Commissioner absolute, unregulated discretion as to the amount of the fee for any reason she deems pertinent, within the prescribed maximum limits. The Commissioner may impose a fee as high as $100,000 and as low as one dollar (or zero dollars) on a public Central Park event that enjoys commercial sponsorship, and any fee between $25,000 and zero for an identical event without commercial sponsorship. The pre-April 2001 guidelines gave the Commissioner even greater discretion in determining fees for special events held in City parks. Neither the guidelines nor § 2-10 requires the Commissioner to explain the reasoning that justified the fee or to charge similar fees to similar events. The City was unable to explain how it set fees ranging from $1,000 to $10,000 for particular events. 39 Regulations granting such broad and unchecked discretion to a government official charged with imposing fees on traditional expressive activities cannot overcome the heavy presumption of invalidity to which prior restraints on speech are subject. 40 The City contends that, because TA receives commercial support for its event and displays the logos of sponsors in some of its promotional literature, the Century Bike Tour involves commercial speech, and hence receives less robust First Amendment protection than purely political speech. This is no answer. The commercial elements of the Bike Tour are relatively trivial. By far the main thrust of the event is a political demonstration by thousands of people advocating in favor of bicycle-friendly regulation by the City. Notwithstanding the presence of minor commercial elements, such as display of corporate logos, this speech was a far distance from commercial speech undertaken to solicit a commercial transaction. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). See also Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 120 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting claim that the presence of advertisements in a newspaper rendered its expression commercial speech); Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1139 (3d Cir.1982) (The fact that a publication carries advertisements... does not render its speech commercial for first amendment purposes.). Even assuming the City would have been free to employ its discretionary regulatory scheme for such commercial events, such a scheme was not permissible as to the Bike Tour.