Opinion ID: 3031327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Foreman has failed to cite, and we have not found, any reported case that supports his contention that deprivation of a specific shower chair is a violation of the Eighth Amendment or any other constitutional provision. The leading circuit court decision on this point is Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987). In that case, Shockley, a paraplegic inmate, requested a shower chair in September 1981, and the prison provided him one later that month. Before receiving the chair, Shockley fell twice and broke the skin on his left buttock. The injury developed into a neurogenic ulcer which, because it was not properly cared for, required several surgical procedures. The Seventh Circuit found there was no constitutional violation even though Shockley suffered “serious injury.” Id. at 1072. In his complaint, 9 Shockley failed to allege deliberate indifference, claiming only that the defendants refused to provide him with needed supplies. The court would not imply deliberate indifference on the facts of the case. The officials’ delay in providing Shockley with a shower chair may or may not have been negligent, but the court found it certainly was not deliberately indifferent. Foreman distinguishes Shockley by pointing out that the inmate eventually received a shower chair. This distinction is immaterial because Foreman has received a shower chair from the prison; it is just not the specific type that Foreman believes is appropriate for a T-5 paraplegic. Furthermore, the court in Shockley declined to find a constitutional violation even though the inmate suffered “serious injury.” In this case, the medical records indicate that Foreman has received only “minor scratches.” Following Shockley, the Eastern District of Virginia considered a quadriplegic prisoner’s claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because, among other things, he was not provided with an appropriate shower chair. Staples v. Va. Dept. of Corrections, 904 F.Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1995). The court declined to find a constitutional violation, noting that Staples had a wheelchair other than his personal one for showering. Additionally, Staples failed to show that he suffered any serious harm. Foreman distinguishes Staples by arguing that he, unlike Staples, must use his personal wheelchair to shower. This distinction is unpersuasive because FCI Fairton has not forced Foreman to use his personal wheelchair in the shower. Rather, Foreman chooses to use his personal wheelchair because he believes it is safer than the shower chair he was 10 provided, padded bench, and wall railings. Moreover, Foreman has not alleged “serious harm.” He fell out of his chair once and received only minor scratches. The other harm he alleges is future harm which he speculates will result from continued use of his wheelchair in the shower. Although not cited by Foreman, there are a few cases where the failure to provide a shower chair to a disabled inmate was found to be a constitutional violation. However, the conditions in those cases were significantly worse than those faced by Foreman. See Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F.Supp. 2d 1014, 1031 (D.Kan. 1999) (Schmidt, a double amputee, was denied a shower chair for 6-7 months, despite his doctor’s request that the prison provide him with one. He was forced to crawl on the shower floor and/or stand on his knees, which was extremely painful. As a result, he developed a rash on his buttocks (which lasted for several months) and a cellulitis infection. The court found that the delay in providing a shower chair resulted in the “unnecessary infliction of pain ... and a needless indignity that a jury could find was inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment”); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022 (5th Cir. 1998) (Bradley, a disabled inmate who wears a leg brace, was not provided with a shower chair for over two months. During that time period he used the toilet water in his cell to bathe, which resulted in a fungal infection and blisters. The Fifth Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing Bradley’s complaint because the alleged facts, if proven, may warrant relief under the Eighth Amendment). We agree with the District Judge that there was no constitutional violation here. 11 However, even if there were, there is no clearly settled case law concluding that Foreman suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right under these circumstances. Moreover, the non-medical prison officials - Lappin, Miner, Belefonti, Ingram, Jones, and Kitka - are entitled to qualified immunity because Foreman was under the care of medical professionals - Morales and Medina. (Id. at 12-13). See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official ... will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.”). Regarding the shoes, because there is no evidence that the shoes have caused Foreman any physical harm, his complaint simply amounts to a request for a different type of shoe. Appellant has cited no case law in support of the proposition that a prisoner is entitled to wear the shoes of his choice. Ultimately, Foreman disagrees with the prison’s choice of treatment for his podiatric problems. This does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Davidson v. Scully, 155 F.Supp.2d 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to find an Eighth Amendment violation where inmate received extensive treatment for his podiatric problems but alleged that the prison did not properly treat him because it denied him particular orthopedic shoes, orthotics, and surgery).