Opinion ID: 2634308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury Instructions and Challenges to California's Death Penalty Law

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in refusing to give special instructions the defense requested that would have told the jury that the guilt and special circumstance verdicts are not themselves aggravating, and that they must reconsider the guilt phase evidence during their penalty deliberations. However, the standard jury instructions the court gave are adequate to inform the jurors of their sentencing responsibilities in compliance with federal and state constitutional standards. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1176-1177, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) No additional instructions were required. Similarly, defendant contends the court erred in refusing to modify CALJIC No. 8.85 in various respects. We have rejected similar arguments. CALJIC No. 8.85 is both correct and adequate. ( People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1266-1268, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475; see also People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 40-41, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1229-1231, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981.) The court need not give pinpoint instructions regarding what mitigating evidence the jury may consider or special instructions regarding mercy and compassion. ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 497, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 647-648, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Contrary to defendant's argument, CALJIC No. 8.88 properly instructs the jury on its sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process. ( People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 369-371, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229.) Defendant contends the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on how the jury could consider the victim impact evidence. Specifically, he argues the court had to instruct the jury that the evidence had been introduced for the specific and limited purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the [defendant's] actions or the nature of the unique loss felt by each witness, and that the victim, like the defendant, was a unique individual; that it would be improper for the jurors to assess the comparable worth of [defendant] and Mr. Cruz and his survivors; that their deliberations on the victim impact evidence must be limited to an unemotional, rational inquiry into [defendant's] moral culpability; and that it would be improper for [defendant's] sentence to be solely based upon the victim impact evidence. We disagree. Because the standard instructions adequately inform the jury of its duty, the court was not required to instruct on how the jury may consider victim-impact evidence. ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 455, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Defendant points out that in People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pages 358-359, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545, we rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in giving a prosecution-requested instruction on victim-impact evidence. But we never suggested the court was obligated to give any such instruction. Moreover, the instruction we upheld in that case was quite different from the one defendant argues the court should have given here. [10] We see no need to elaborate on the standard instructions regarding how the jury should consider any particular type of penalty phase evidence. Defendant reiterates a number of challenges to California's death penalty law that we have repeatedly rejected. The sentencing factor of circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) is not unconstitutionally vague and does not result in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 394, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) The death penalty law is not invalid for failure to provide for intercase proportionality review. ( Pulley v. Hams (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 476, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) (We do provide intracase proportionality review. Defendant does not specifically request such review, but given the crime and his long criminal record leading up to it, it is inconceivable that it would aid him. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1269, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.)) The jury need not make written findings, or achieve unanimity as to specific aggravating circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance is proved (except for other crimes), that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty. [Citations.] The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide the jury with instructions of the burden of proof and the standard of proof for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination. ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730-731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568.) The jury's consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity in aggravation (§ 190.3, factor (b)) is constitutional, and jury unanimity regarding such conduct is not required. ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 584-585, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Recent United States Supreme Court decisions do not undermine these conclusions. ( People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 212, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196, 158 P.3d 763; People v. Morrison, supra, at p. 731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568.) The court need not instruct that the jury can consider certain statutory factors only in mitigation. ( People v. Brown, supra, at p. 402, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516.) Use of the adjectives extreme and substantial in the sentencing factors (§ 190.3, factors (d) & (g)) is constitutional. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614-615, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) The death penalty law does not violate equal protection principles. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 48, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 374, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554,107 P.3d 229.)