Opinion ID: 168608
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Privacy

Text: M r. Raiser’s privacy claim appears to be premised on the public disclosure of an embarrassing private fact. See Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 558 (Utah 2000) (addressing an invasion-of-privacy claim against an employer who allowed numerous people to view a surveillance video of the employee-plaintiff’s sexual assault). Regarding the Church’s liability on this claim, there is no dispute that the disclosure about M r. Raiser’s “known . . . psychiatric history” w as not made by the Church, but by Erik Davis, a BYU attorney. M r. Raiser speculates about a number of other possible disclosures by people affiliated with the Church, but all the alleged disclosures w ere private conversations, with the possible exception of the disclosures of information to the police. M r. Raiser’s father, however, testified that the likely source of the information received by the police was M r. Raiser’s family, and there is no contrary evidence. A viable privacy claim requires a disclosure “to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks -7- omitted). As a matter of law these alleged disclosures were too limited to be considered public. A s for B YU , its disclosure in a court pleading that M r. Raiser has a “know n . . . psychiatric history” was protected by Utah’s judicial-proceeding privilege. To qualify for the privilege, the challenged statements “must be (1) made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding; and (3) be made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.” DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979, 983 (U tah 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Russell v. Thom son Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906 n.37 (Utah 1992) (extending the privilege to invasion-of-privacy claims). The statement concerning M r. Raiser’s mental health was relevant to M r. Raiser’s claim in Raiser I that the police had abused and mistreated him. M r. Raiser appears to seek an exception to the judicial-proceeding privilege when the district court has neither sealed nor conducted an in camera review of a document before allowing “a disclosure of highly sensitive information obtained through an unlawful act.” Aplt. Br. at 43. But he cites no authority for the proposition, nor are we aware of any. See Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (“To make a sufficient argument on appeal, a party must advance a reasoned argument . . . and it must support its argument with legal authority.” (internal citation omitted)). -8- To the extent that M r. Raiser is claiming that BYU made other disclosures, none were public, so there would be no liability. See Shattuck-Owen, 16 P.3d at 558. W e conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on M r. Raiser’s privacy claims.