Opinion ID: 1959985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion of Proposed Mitigating Factors

Text: At various points in the penalty-phase proceeding, defendant sought to introduce two specific factors under the statutory catch-all mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(5)(h). Specifically, defendant sought to introduce as a mitigating factor the fact of the State's failure to prosecute Franciotti and also the devastating emotional effect that defendant's execution would have on his mother. The trial court denied defendant's request to introduce those two factors under the catch-all category, holding that neither related to defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense as defined by this Court in State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988). We agree with the court's ruling. The catch-all category, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), permits a capital defendant to introduce [a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. The catch-all category tracks the language of the Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978), in which a plurality of the Court held that the federal Constitution require[s] that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.[ [3] ] Although the Lockett Court recognized that the Constitution affords capital defendants wide latitude in introducing mitigating factors, the Court warned that [n]othing in [its] opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of the offense. Id. at 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. at 2965 n. 12, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990 n. 12. In State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 620, 477 A. 2d 308 (1984), we acknowledged that the statutory catch-all factor was necessarily broad in scope, allowing the defendant to introduce expert testimony regarding his potential for rehabilitation as compared to the rehabilitative potential of similarly-situated defendants. Yet, in Gerald, supra, although we reaffirmed our general position that the scope of the catch-all factor was broad, we recognized that it was not unlimited. 113 N.J. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792. We held that the sentences received by the co-defendants plainly [were] not relevant to either Gerald's character or record. Ibid. In addition, we held that the sentences received by the co-defendants were not relevant to the circumstances of the offense. Ibid. We [were] satisfied that the phrase `circumstances of the offense' [was] limited in its application to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime itself. Id. at 104, 549 A. 2d 792. For example, a defendant's relative degree of participation in the crime is a circumstance of the offense. Ibid. The sentence imposed on a co-defendant, however, is peculiar to the co-defendant and has nothing to do with the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's involvement therein. Ibid. Similar to a sentence received by a co-defendant, the State's decision not to prosecute a co-conspirator is wholly unrelated to a defendant's character or record. Moreover, the State's failure to prosecute a co-conspirator does not implicate the circumstances of the offense prong as defined in Gerald, because it is irrelevant to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime itself. Ibid. The failure to prosecute a suspect generally reflects the State's determination of the seriousness of the offense and the probability of conviction. In this case, the State was convinced that it could not successfully prosecute Franciotti because no one would testify against him. The post- Gerald cases cited by defendant in support of his argument that the trial court should have permitted the jury to consider the State's failure to prosecute Franciotti as a mitigating factor under the catch-all category are inapposite. In Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed. 2d 812 (1991), the Supreme Court reversed a Florida death sentence and remanded the case for a proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. The issue before the Court was whether the trial court had found any non-statutory mitigating factors, including the sentences received by co-defendants. Id. at 313-14, 111 S.Ct. at 735-36, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 821-22. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had found non-statutory mitigating factors, which should have been weighed against the aggravating factors. Under Florida law, defendants may present any mitigating evidence, regardless of whether it relates to the defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense. Songer v. State, 365 So. 2d 696, 700 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 956, 99 S.Ct. 2185, 60 L.Ed. 2d 1060 (1979). Therefore, the Supreme Court's determination that the trial court found Parker's co-defendants' sentences to qualify as a non-statutory mitigating factor is irrelevant for the purposes of construing the limits of our catch-all mitigating factor. In Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed. 2d 411 (1992), the Supreme Court, in its recitation of the facts, noted that an Arizona trial court had found that the State's failure to prosecute another person involved in the crime was a mitigating factor. Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 533, 121 L.Ed. 2d at 418. The opinion contains no further reference to or discussion of the Arizona court's finding. Thus, at most, Richmond reflects the Supreme Court's understanding that some jurisdictions consider the more advantageous treatment of co-defendants, co-conspirators, or accomplices as a mitigating factor. When we decided Gerald, we too were aware that some other jurisdictions consider a co-defendant's sentence or the State's failure to prosecute an accomplice or co-conspirator to be a mitigating factor. See 113 N.J. at 105, 549 A. 2d 792. As it was then, the law in those jurisdictions is irrelevant to the construction of our capital punishment statute. With regard to defendant's attempt to introduce as a mitigating factor the potential that defendant's execution would cause excessive emotional hardship to his mother since she had already lost one son, we conclude that the catch-all category does not encompass such a factor. It neither relates to defendant's character or record, nor to the circumstances of the offense, but rather focuses on the potential impact on a third party. Its exclusion was entirely proper.