Opinion ID: 1481640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Act.

Text: The invalidity of the Act is urged upon two bases: (A) its inherent invalidity and (B) its invalidity as applied to the fact situation here. (A) Inherent Invalidity. This attack is made upon each of the three here involved sections 9, 10 and 11. These sections, hereinafter set forth, have to do with the overthrow of the Government by force, the advocacy of insubordination, etc., in the armed forces, and conspiracies to effect either such overthrow or such insubordination. We agree with appellants that, in approaching the problem of validity of a statute, which appears on its face to limit exercise of a right specifically protected by the Constitution, a presumption of validity is narrowed in its scope. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234. In truth, courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation where it affects the exercise of those fundamental individual rights expressly protected by the Constitution. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155. Here the challenge is that this Act abridges the freedom of speech specifically protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, we approach the problem with the attitude just stated. Appellants state that This statute must seek its validating force in the vague and undefined `right of self-preservation'. No such extremity exists. The statute is grounded upon specific Constitutional grants of power. The Preamble, setting forth the purposes of the Constitution, includes to insure domestic Tranquility and to provide for the common defence, as well as to secure the Blessings of Liberty. Article I, § 8, cl. 1 specifically grants to Congress the power to provide for the common Defence. Clauses 12 to 16 grant the specific powers to raise and support Armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces, and covering the Militia. Clause 18 grants the power To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. Article IV, § 4 is The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion and, upon application, against domestic Violence. Thus, the Constitution expresses clearly the thoughts that the life of the Nation and of the States and the liberties and welfare of their citizens are to be preserved and that they are to have the protection of armed forces raised and maintained by the United States with power in Congress to pass all necessary and proper laws to raise, maintain and govern such forces. The serious penalties of the Act are suggested as bearing upon our consideration. If the extent of penalties has any bearing, it is purely as make-weight. If the Act is invalid, it must be because of other reasons. If it be valid, the penalties to be assessed for violation are solely matters of legislative selection so long as they do not transcend the Eighth Amendment. In addition to the above examined contentions which appellants urge to the Act in general, they make various specific attacks upon sections 9, 10 and 11 separately. We next examine these attacks upon the separate sections. Section 9 [1] makes it a crime to advise, counsel, urge, or in any manner cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval forces or to distribute any written or printed matter doing these things, with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty, morale, or discipline of such forces. As preliminary to an attack upon this section, appellants recognize the similarity of this section to a part of section 3 of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 219, 50 U.S.C.A. § 33, which has been upheld (Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 39 S.Ct. 249, 63 L.Ed. 561; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 39 S.Ct. 252, 63 L.Ed. 566), and, therefore, the necessity of avoiding here the effect of those decisions upon that Act. They rightly urge that this portion of the Espionage Act, by its express terms, was limited to periods when this country might be at war; and that the above decisions must be construed, as ruling authority, with that situation in mind. Also, they rightly contend that this section 9 is, by its terms, also applicable to a state of peace. Therefore, they urge that such decisions are not here applicable and that whether section 9 is valid or not is not ruled by these authorities. We agree that these three cases do not rule this case as direct decisive authorities. The situation here that section 9 applies to a peace status as well as to war and that the conspiracy claimed here was during time of peace sufficiently differentiates those cases to prevent them from ruling these appeals. The question of validity of section 9 is, in that respect, open. On the other hand, it does not follow that those cases contain no expressions which are useful guides for determining the character of questions present here simply because the situation dealt with in those cases was different from that here present. In this connection, a pertinent matter should be stated. Although there had long been a seditious conspiracy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 6, there was a situation in 1940 which impressed Congress with the need for this Act. That situation, known to all, was the existence of war in Europe; the apprehension that this country might be drawn into war; the knowledge of the effective use of fifth column activities by countries which might be our enemies; and the apprehension that such activities were being or might be used in this country. In stating the purposes of the Bill, it was said in the House: The officers testified before our committee that they were loath to ask for this provision in peacetime but that conditions had become worse, that propagandists were now gaining a foothold to some extent among the enlisted men of our Army and Navy, and that but for the high character and splendid loyalty that has always obtained among the rank and file of our men they would have had to ask for the enactment of this bill much sooner. So, then, title I interdicts the exertion of subversive influences with the intent to undermine the loyalty, morale, or discipline of our fighting men. Thus, while this Act is applicable to peace as well as war conditions, it was enacted on the brink of war and to correct existing dangers. The vital necessity of armed forces to maintain the National and the State governments and the liberties of the citizens is expressly recognized and provided for in the Constitution. The lack of such in the Confederation was one of the cardinal reasons for calling the meeting which became the Constitutional Convention. Congressional enactments having the purposes of raising or maintaining armed forces have high standing because of their importance. At the same time, they must not limit the constitutionally protected individual liberties of the citizen to any greater extent than is reasonably necessary and proper to accomplish the important allowable ends of preserving the life of the Government and the States and their orderly conduct. An armed force which lacks loyalty, morale or discipline or wherein is insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusals to do their duty is far worse than no armed force at all and is positively an active menace to constituted government and to the liberties of the people. Therefore, the question here is whether this section of this Act goes so far beyond what is necessary or proper to effectuate its obviously necessary and proper purposes as to infringe upon protected individual rights. The argument against validity of this section is as follows. That the threat to free speech arises from the provisions as to (1) what may not be said or written, (2) as to whom it may not be said or written, and (3) as to the extent to which the motives behind the statement or writing affect the verdict. (1) As to what may not be expressed, the argument centers around the statutory expression or in any manner cause insubordination (italics added), etc. It is urged that this expression is so broad that it includes virtually the entire range of civilian expression since it covers any utterances whose effect upon any member of the armed forces may be to sow doubts in his mind concerning his duty even if the forces were not mentioned therein; that such expressions could consist merely of opinion concerning our defense policy, the conduct of the defense program, the nature of our allies, or any other important political or economic problem; that such expression need not urge or suggest refusal of duty but be such merely as to cause him to wonder or doubt the accuracy of statements by his superior officers or the wisdom of governmental policies. (2) As to whom such expressions may not be made, the argument is that the provision includes utterances to civilians, if they later reach, or conceivably might reach, or influence, actual members of the armed forces; that there is no requirement that the utterances be made directly to members of the forces. (3) As to the extent to which motives affect the verdict, the argument is that a wicked intent can always be inferred from the nature of the words, if the jury considers those to be objectionable. The fatal weakness in the above arguments arises from the situation that they do not examine the section as a unit but seek to dissect it and destroy it piecemeal. This method avoids or slurs over the governing consideration which runs throughout. That is the intent with which the expressions are made. Intent is the cardinal characteristic and vehicle which is necessary to carry any and all interdicted expressions across the boundary line into crime. This is merely an instance of usual criminal law which protects society from evildoers when they do actsotherwise innocent with intent to harm. Thus a man may even kill another and he may be entirely unblamed or he may be executed, dependent solely upon the intent motivating the act. Another consideration is that words used must be capable of bringing about the forbidden result, since one cannot be found guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service, etc. [here create insubordination, etc.], and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his mind. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216, 39 S.Ct. 252, 254, 63 L.Ed. 566; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470. While what has been stated in the two paragraphs preceding has to do with the protection thrown around persons accused of any crime, it is apposite to the issue and has a very direct application to the question of validity here. Neither by terms nor fair intendment does this section limit expressions of opinion or of criticisms of the Government or of its policies (civil or military) or of any officials or officers (civil or military) or of their actions so long as such expressions are not made with intent to bring about the unlawful things and situations covered by the section and, in addition, so long as they do not have a natural tendency and a reasonable probability of effecting these forbidden results. Section 9 is not inherently invalid. Section 10 is as follows: § 10. Same [Subversive activities]; advocating overthrow of government by force (a) It shall be unlawful for any person (1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; (2) with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence; (3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof. (b) For the purposes of this section, the term `government in the United States' means the Government of the United States, the government of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, the government of the District of Columbia, or the government of any political subdivision of any of them. Appellants attack the expression in subsection (a) (1) [2] advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety as being so vague and sweeping that they bring within the forbidden area virtually any expression which is considered dangerous or subversive by prosecutor, court or jury. The words attacked are ordinary everyday terms with generally understood meanings. They are not vague. They are sweeping only in the sense that they endeavor to cover the different means by which Congress deemed the forbidden result might be brought about. The argument that the wording of the statute would be construed and applied as anything the prosecutor, court or jury considered dangerous or subversive has no force. If it implies that those officials would not act honestly, it is unique, unpleasant and unsound. If it means only that it is unsafe to the citizen to leave determination of such matters to those officials, then it is an argument against our system of administering justice rather than one of invalidity of this language. This objection is not well founded. Appellants call attention to the Seditious conspiracy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 6, and suggest that no statute in addition   is needed. That is a legislative and not a judicial concern. As stated hereinbefore, there was a situation at the time this Act was before Congress which would well justify the enactment  if any justification be needed. Appellants urge that the section makes no allowance for the circumstances under which an utterance is made. As shown earlier herein, that is a matter fully taken care of in the application of any criminal statute to the facts of each particular case. Appellants state: When once we eliminate, as we must, the actual or attempted use of force as the evil to be prevented by this statute, there remains nothing upon which it can operate except prophecies, speculation, and analysis of future contingencies. The defect in this statement is that we are not privileged to eliminate from the section some of its most vital words. Appellants attack subsection (a) (3) which makes it a crime to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof. One argument is that this seeks to impose guilt by association. The language is incapable of that construction. The guilt is entirely individual and personal. Another argument is stated thus: the statute permits the predication of guilt upon the later judgment of court and jury as to the doctrines of a group. No member can know, until the verdict of guilt is passed upon him in a courtroom that his group holds views contrary to law. Thus, the statute affords no ascertainable standard of guilt. The assumption that it does, and that it is a simple matter to determine whether a party's doctrines advocate violence or revolution rests upon a misconception, deliberate or unconscious, of the nature of the doctrines and credos of the `radical' groups against which the statute is ostensibly aimed. This argument is unsound. The sub-section applies to two classes of persons, to-wit, organizers and mere members. Organizers of a group certainly know, at the time, whether the organization they seek to create teaches, advocates or encourages the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence. As to mere members, the statute expressly requires that they be or become such knowing the purposes thereof. What the court and jury do is ascertain whether the organization has such forbidden purposes and whether such requisite knowledge exists and these must appear beyond a reasonable doubt before conviction can be had. It is argued further that the doctrines of radical parties are framed in a technical language which carry meaning only to the initiate, the assumption seemingly being that, therefore, it is difficult to determine therefrom whether overthrow of the Government by force is intended or not. In passing, one might wonder why obscure or doubtful or technical language is used. The English language does not lack for words to express clearly any thought which is intended to be widely understood, and party doctrines of importance are usually intended to be widely understood. However, language is sometimes purposely used to suggest or conceal meanings which, for some reason, the utterer does not care to bring entirely into the open. Appellants emphasize that this is a radical party and that opposition thereto would or might warp the judgments of triers of offenses in their construction of the meaning of language setting forth the party doctrines. For thirty-four years  long before the Communist Party in any form existed there has been a statute making it criminal to conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States 18 U.S.C.A., § 6. If a party or group  radical or otherwise  has no intention to overthrow or destroy the Government, nothing would be easier than to avoid doubtful language; and, considering existence of the above statute, nothing would be more natural and advisable; and this would seem to be peculiarly so where the party or group regards itself as radical and thinks many  even officials and juries  would grasp opportunities to weaken or destroy it. When such a group with such apprehensions consciously uses cloudy words concerning a matter of such vital importance in their doctrines and to the safety of themselves individually and to existence of their group, they do not use them accidentally but for a very definite purpose. When they use words which may or may not mean the forbidden thing, they intend just one thing and that is to squirm through the statute leaving a haze which they hope will make it impossible or difficult to find any fracture by their passage. Courts should be careful in all things  particularly and equally where basic human liberties or where the life of the country is involved  but they do neither liberty nor their country a service by being so naive or simple as not to take into account human nature and existing situations known to every alert adult in the country. But however this may be, a trial puts the language before the judge and jury with every opportunity on each side to present their several constructions and to bring to bear thereon such side lights of facts as may help to bring out the meaning. The sinister significance must appear beyond reasonable doubt. The difficulty of determining a fact is no argument against the validity of a statute. Another argument is that many members of groups are without true comprehension of the actual program or doctrine thereof. Generally speaking, this is certainly true  even where group or party tenets are couched in non-technical terms and intended to be and easily understood. The protection here is that the statute does not cover such members unless they have knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the group. If they have that knowledge, they are adding their weight to the accomplishment of such unlawful purposes, whether those purposes are approved by them or not and whether any of such purposes were or were not the incentive for their becoming or remaining members. Appellants say that requirement of such guilty knowledge is of little value but their supporting argument is only repetition of their argument that prosecutors, judges and juries will not do their duty in judging the facts. Finally, it is argued that every member of a group or party is penally responsible for the conduct of every other member and for every phrase in the statements and documents which are adjudged to reflect party views. If by this is meant the responsibility of a co-conspirator under a conspiracy charge for what is said or done to effectuate the conspiracy, the statement is true. If, as seems likely, it is meant that such acts and expressions of others could be used to prove the unlawful purpose of the group, then the statement is too broad. Such responsibility is not indefinitely sweeping. It attaches only to authoritative statements of which the member has knowledge; and it depends upon what he does or does not do or say, as manifesting his approval or disapproval, after he has such knowledge. Section 10 is not inherently invalid. Section 11 is as follows: § 11. Same: attempting or conspiring to commit prohibited acts It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of sections 9-13 of this title. The attacks upon this section are (1) it extends into illimitable fields to punish evil thinking and not even speech or writing but simply an agreement to speak or write; and (2) that the legal machinery to determine violation will lead to misconstruction through the influences of background, temperament, prejudice, emotional pressure and fear of public criticism. These are ill-founded. The section merely makes criminal all attempts or conspiracies to commit the acts declared criminal by sections 9 and 10 and extends those sections not at all. The legal machinery is simply that which works out justice in all criminal cases  the prosecutor, grand jury, judge and jury. Section 11 is not inherently invalid. (B) Invalidity as Applied. The attack upon the validity of the Act which appellants base on the application of the Act is the contention that the clear and present danger doctrine of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470, controls a statute of this character and that the facts here fall outside of that doctrine. Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 742, 84 L.Ed. 1093. Whether the Act is of a character to be measured by the above doctrine and, if so, whether it meets such measurement are pertinent to the issue of validity. While the doctrine of the Schenck case has afforded practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of constitutional protections of freedom of expression was in issue (Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193, 86 L.Ed. 192), yet it is by no means of universal application. Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138, definitely determines that the Schenck case doctrine is not applicable in situations where the legislative body has, by statute, determined that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished. 268 U.S. at page 670, 45 S.Ct. at page 631, 69 L.Ed. 1138. The distinction between such cases and those to which the Schenck case doctrine is applicable is clearly stated in the Gitlow opinion at pages 670 and 671 of 268 U.S., 45 S.Ct. at page 631, 69 L.Ed. 1138. This distinction has not been departed from nor weakened by any subsequent holding of the Supreme Court but, to the contrary, has been recognized and applied. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256-258, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066; Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A. L.R. 1484; Whitney v. People of State of California, 274 U.S. 357, 371, 372, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095. The problem here is whether this Act falls within the rule of the Schenck case or the rule of the Gitlow case. We think it is within the Gitlow case. That the Nation may protect the integrity of its armed forces and may prevent the overthrow of the Government by force and that it may, as a means to those ends, punish utterances which have a tendency to and are intended to produce the forbidden results is not open to question. Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357; Whitney v. People of State of California, 274 U.S. 357, 371, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095; Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138. This Act does nothing more. The language defining the offences is clear, understandable and definite. To avoid the effect of the Gitlow and following cases appellants argue that a stricter scrutiny of validity should be exercised in instances of a National statute under the First Amendment than in those of a State statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no foundation for such contention. It is the First Amendment which protects freedom of utterance. The effect of the Gitlow and subsequent cases was simply to recognize in the Fourteenth Amendment the application to the states of the same standards of freedom of expression as, under the First Amendment, are applicable to the federal government. Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 268, 62 S.Ct. 190, 196, 86 L. Ed. 192. Our conclusion is that sections 9, 10 and 11 of this Act are valid.