Opinion ID: 2372823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: johnson and dillon

Text: Huerta has also argued that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal because he raised constitutional claims. He contends that, under the recent Court of Appeals decision in State v. Dillon, 44 Kan.App.2d 1138, 244 P.3d 680, (2010), and our decision in State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 190 P.3d 207 (2008), a sentence that violated the constitution does not qualify as presumptive and therefore an appellate court has jurisdiction to hear the merits of a defendant's appeal. In Dillon, the defendant argued that the district judge failed to consider the proportionality of his individual sentence. The Court of Appeals stated that, in determining jurisdiction, it was faced with three questions: (1) Did the district judge consider the argument defendant made in his departure motion? (2) If not, did the district judge's failure to consider that argument deny defendant due process? and (3) If the answer to the first two questions was yes, did the district judge's violation of defendant's due process rights at sentencing provide an exception to the general rule that this court has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal of a presumptive sentence? 44 Kan.App.2d at 1140, 244 P.3d 680. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district judge failed to consider defendant's argument regarding individual proportionality, that the failure denied defendant due process, and that this violation of due process provided an exception to K.S.A. 21-4721(c). The Court of Appeals relied on Johnson to conclude that, [w]hen the district court's sentencing procedures violate the constitution, the sentence is not considered a presumptive sentence. 44 Kan. App.2d at 1144, 244 P.3d 680 (citing Johnson, 286 Kan. at 841-42, 190 P.3d 207). Dillon substantially overread our decision in Johnson. Johnson was a challenge to the statutory scheme for sentencing, arguing that the discretion granted a sentencing judge to assign the upper grid box term without requiring additional fact-finding by a jury violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Johnson, 286 Kan. at 840, 190 P.3d 207. In other words, the defendant in Johnson mounted a facial challenge to the design of the KSGA; his argument was not limited to his case alone. Johnson, 286 Kan. at 842, 190 P.3d 207. We concluded that the sentencing scheme did not violate Apprendi; and, because Johnson's individual sentence was presumptive, we did nothing further, concluding that we had no jurisdiction under K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). Johnson, 286 Kan. at 851-52, 190 P.3d 207. We have conducted the same type of analysis of the overall statutory scheme for sentencing and come to similar conclusions in cases other than Johnson. See State v. Bramlett, 273 Kan. 67, 67-68, 41 P.3d 796 (2002) (imposition of consecutive sentences does not violate Apprendi; court without jurisdiction to review presumptive sentences); State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002) (use of criminal history score to impose presumptive sentence does not violate Apprendi; court without jurisdiction to review presumptive sentences). In contrast, we do not review cases such as Huerta's on direct appeal, when a defendant merely argues that his or her individual presumptive sentence has a constitutionally based infirmity. See State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44, 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (court without jurisdiction to review presumptive sentence, when defendant argued sentence constituted cruel, unusual punishment). Dillon also relied on a prior Court of Appeals decision, State v. Cisneros, 42 Kan. App.2d 376, 212 P.3d 246 (2009), which it read to grant appellate jurisdiction to review a presumptive sentence when the district judge had misunderstood the limits of his or her discretion in sentencing after a revocation of probation. Dillon, 44 Kan.App.2d at 1145, 244 P.3d 680. In Cisneros, the defendant appealed because the district judge believed he had no power to reduce Cisneros' sentence upon a probation revocation, despite language to the contrary in K.S.A. 22-3716(b). The Court of Appeals determined that this was a question of law over which it had jurisdiction. 42 Kan.App.2d at 379, 212 P.3d 246. The court went on to state that, if it dismissed Cisneros' appeal for lack of jurisdiction under K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1), then Cisneros would have no remedy to determine whether the district court properly applied K.S.A. 22-3716(b) in his case. 42 Kan. App.2d at 379, 212 P.3d 246. Cisneros is plainly, factually, and procedurally distinct from the situation before the Court of Appeals in Dillon, and Dillon 's reliance on Cisneros was misplaced. We also observe that the Dillon panel looked to the merits of Dillon's appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction rather than determining the existence of jurisdiction before considering the merits. If subject matter jurisdiction is in question, that issue needs to be resolved first. The merits come second. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. 424, 428-29, 242 P.3d 1168 (2010) (jurisdiction a preliminary matter for court to consider); Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 Kan. ___, 244 P.3d 642, 653 (2010) (jurisdiction a preliminary question for court to consider before addressing issues argued by parties). Finally, do our holdings in this case leave a defendant who believes there has been constitutional error in arriving at his or her individual presumptive sentence but who does not challenge the facial constitutionality of the sentencing scheme with no remedy? No, not necessarily. It may be that constitutional error so infects the sentence that it qualifies as illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504; State v. Pennington, 288 Kan. 599, 601, 205 P.3d 741 (2009). And a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 remains an option, albeit one with additional hurdles for the movant to overcome. Affirmed.