Opinion ID: 2604077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: successful litigants under section 1021.5

Text: (5a) The Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs were not successful parties under section 1021.5. The court dismissed plaintiffs' success in obtaining the preliminary injunction as transitory and a token victory at best. The court reasoned that there was no causal connection between plaintiffs' litigation and the practical result, finding no evidence in the record to indicate that plaintiffs' lawsuit served as a catalyst for change or served to vindicate any important right. In essence, the court concluded that the preliminary injunction did not change defendants' conduct because defendants had never implemented or enforced Education Code section 6957 before plaintiffs' lawsuit. Moreover, the court believed that the Legislature's repeal of the statute, not the preliminary injunction, enabled plaintiffs to achieve their objective. The Court of Appeal's reasoning is flawed. (6) Our prior cases uniformly explain that an attorney fee award may be justified even when plaintiff's legal action does not result in a favorable final judgment. ( Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 348, 352 [188 Cal. Rptr. 873, 657 P.2d 365]; see also Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 [193 Cal. Rptr. 900, 667 P.2d 704] [although their action had become moot, plaintiffs were awarded fees under § 1021.5 because they had achieved the relief they sought through preliminary injunction].) It is also clear that the procedural device by which a plaintiff seeks to enforce an important right is not determinative of his or her entitlement to attorney fees under section 1021.5. ( In re Head (1986) 42 Cal.3d 223, 228-229 [228 Cal. Rptr. 184, 721 P.2d 65].) Similarly, a section 1021.5 award is not necessarily barred merely because the plaintiff won the case on a preliminary issue. ( Woodland Hills Resident Assn., Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 938.) In determining whether a plaintiff is a successful party for purposes of section 1021.5, [t]he critical fact is the impact of the action, not the manner of its resolution. ( Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 685.) The trial court in its discretion must realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an important right so as to justify an attorney fee award under section 1021.5. ( Woodland Hills Residents Assn., supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 938.) (7) The trial court's decision on this issue should be reversed only if there has been a prejudicial abuse of discretion. `To be entitled to relief on appeal ... it must clearly appear that the injury resulting from such a wrong is sufficiently grave to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice....' ( Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 143 [185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874], citation omitted.) (5b) Plaintiffs obtained an injunction to stop enforcement of Education Code section 6957 statewide for almost three years. The trial court specifically found that plaintiffs conferred a substantial benefit upon a large class of persons and the public at large by obtaining a preliminary injunction. Even though the Legislature's subsequent amendment of Education Code section 6957 mooted plaintiffs' case, we cannot agree that plaintiffs achieved only a token victory by obtaining an injunction. (8) As the Court of Appeal stated, there must be a causal connection between the plaintiffs' lawsuit and the relief obtained in order to justify a fee award under section 1021.5 to a successful party. ( Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 353.) `The appropriate benchmarks in determining which party prevailed are (a) the situation immediately prior to the commencement of suit, and (b) the situation today, and the role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting any changes between the two.' ( Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 685, fn. 31, citation omitted.) An award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 is appropriate when a plaintiff's lawsuit `was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought,' or when plaintiff vindicates an important right `by activating defendants to modify their behavior.' ( Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 353, original italics, citations omitted; see also Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 685-686 [plaintiffs regarded as prevailing parties when their lawsuit substantially contributed to the result achieved].) In a similar situation involving 42 United States Code section 1988, the United States Supreme Court expressed the appropriate standard as follows: `plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.' ( Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 433 [76 L.Ed.2d 40, 50, 103 S.Ct. 1933], citation omitted.) (5c) Plaintiffs' litigation aim was two-fold: (1) to prevent El Centro School District from reporting Maria P. and similarly situated children to federal authorities, and (2) to halt enforcement of Education Code section 6957 on a statewide basis by enjoining the superintendent's implementation of the statute. With the issuance of the trial court's injunction, plaintiffs clearly obtained the relief they sought. In reversing the trial court's fee award, the Court of Appeal concluded that the preliminary injunction did not change defendant's behavior because neither state nor local defendants had previously implemented or enforced Education Code section 6957. We find this conclusion unwarranted. (9) First, plaintiffs are not required to wait until they have suffered actual harm before they apply for an injunction, but may seek injunctive relief against the threatened infringement of their rights. (See, e.g., Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277 [219 Cal. Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840] [plaintiffs' action for declaratory and injunctive relief filed before enforcement date of city ordinance]; Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1960) 53 Cal.2d 674, 678, fn. 2 [3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974, 82 A.L.R.2d 385]; EWAP, Inc. v. City of Ontario (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 1108, 1116-1117 [223 Cal. Rptr. 422].) (5d) Second, an examination of the record reveals ample support for the trial court's finding of threatened harm to plaintiffs. In issuing its preliminary injunction, the trial court found that Maria P. was subject to having her identity and status disclosed to the I.N.S. and was likely to suffer irreparable harm as a result. Even though it had not previously enforced Education Code section 6957, El Centro School District admitted in court proceedings that they would report Maria's name to the I.N.S. if the state instructed them to do so. Furthermore, the superintendent sought to modify the preliminary injunction issued, asserting that he had no authority to prevent local districts from enforcing a valid state statute. In fact, the superintendent's original letter to local school districts advised them to consult with local county counsel to ascertain whether the court's order applied to them. This letter prompted plaintiffs to return to the trial court after the superintendent refused to issue a new letter without a court order. As a direct result of plaintiffs' action, the court ordered the superintendent to issue a second memorandum, mandating the local districts' compliance with the court's original preliminary injunction order. This second letter indicates the change in the state's posture as a result of plaintiffs' lawsuit. In the letter, the superintendent conceded that the trial court was correct in its interpretation of the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. Given these circumstances, it is apparent that plaintiffs' lawsuit substantially contributed to the result achieved. We conclude that the record supports the trial court's decision that plaintiffs were successful parties under section 1021.5. Plaintiffs' action vindicated an important right affecting the public interest by protecting the confidentiality of the school records of Maria P. and other similarly situated children as mandated by federal law. Their action also served to protect these children's right to equal educational opportunities, a vitally important right in our society. (See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728 [135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929]; Hartzell v. Connell (1984) 35 Cal.3d 899, 907-908 [201 Cal. Rptr. 601, 679 P.2d 35]; cf. Plyler v. Doe (1982) 457 U.S. 202 [72 L.Ed.2d 786, 102 S.Ct. 2382].) This is precisely the type of public interest lawsuit that the private attorney general doctrine of section 1021.5 was intended to foster.