Opinion ID: 6349253
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: How Proper Deference Should Work in This

Text: Case Mimicking the majority, I could hop from buoy to buoy plucking different cases that support the agency’s decision, given that there are many decisions that illustrate neither death threats nor a single instance of physical harm, nor even a combination of the two, compel a finding of persecution. 8 Indeed, the instances that our court has recognized as rising to the extreme level of past persecution generally far surpass 8 See, e.g., Fuyong Cui v. Barr, 806 Fed. App’x 588, 590 (9th Cir. 2020) (petitioner failed to demonstrate past persecution even though he was arrested while participating in a protest, detained, kicked, punched in his face causing a tooth to fall out, and, after a subsequent protest, was hit several times with a baton and shocked with an electric baton); Saenz Martinez v. Barr, 818 Fed. App’x 767, 767–68 (9th Cir. 2020) (single beating at the hands of Sandinista supporters, which did not require medical treatment, and five or six unfulfilled threats did not rise to the level of persecution); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2009) (petitioner’s past experiences, including two beatings, even considered cumulatively, did not compel a finding of past persecution); Gu, 454 F.3d at 1021–22 (a three-day detention, two hour interrogation, and beating with a rod did not compel a conclusion of past persecution); Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1182 (harassment, threats, and “one incident of physical violence” did not compel a finding of past persecution); Prasad, 47 F.3d at 339–40 (arrest, interrogation, beating, and other forms of harassment including rocks thrown at his house and attempts to steal his property were not enough to compel a finding of past persecution); see also Samad v. Whitaker, 759 Fed. App’x 634, 636 (9th Cir. 2019) (threats and beating did not rise to the level of persecution); Argieta-Chavarria v. Barr, 780 Fed. App’x 519, 520 (9th Cir. 2019) (single beating and subsequent harassment and threats did not rise to the level of persecution); Dong v. Barr, 830 Fed. App’x 239, 239–40 (9th Cir. 2020) (arrest, interrogation, beating, and 48-hour detention did not rise to the level of persecution). 56 FLORES MOLINA V. GARLAND what Molina experienced in Nicaragua. 9 But as already explained, that is not the proper application of substantial evidence review. This case is a snapshot of how difficult it is to properly defer under our court’s immigration precedent because we have strayed so far from our limited role—gaining confidence, even expertise, at second-guessing the agency and reweighing the evidence—which is what the majority reflexively does here. In short, the majority’s three bases in support of its decision are simply three bases that could support a finding of past persecution under a different weighing of the evidence and emphasis on caselaw. But none of the bases for the majority’s decision compels that conclusion in the face of the agency’s authoritative decision otherwise. When analogous precedent goes both ways on an issue (as it frequently does in our circuit’s immigration caselaw, and does here on the scope of harms that constitute persecution), deference should dictate our decision and we 9 See Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 909–10 (9th Cir. 2018) (petitioner’s brother was assassinated, his neighbor murdered, and he was captured and beaten to the point of unconsciousness, repeatedly subjected to forced home invasions, and specific death threats toward his family—which collectively rose to the level of persecution); Bondarenko v. Holder, 733 F.3d 899, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2013) (three detentions and one severe beating constituted past persecution); Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2004) (multiple arrests, detentions (including one for fifteen days), beatings, and inability to find work after being fired rose to the level of persecution); Guo, 897 F.3d at 1215 (beating which left petitioner unable to stand on his own and required medical attention, coupled with being unable to practice his faith constituted persecution). Accordingly, while Molina’s “experiences are disturbing and regrettable, they do not evince actions so severe as to compel a finding of past persecution.” Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1182. FLORES MOLINA V. GARLAND 57 should rely on precedent that supports the agency’s decision. Just as Justice Scalia warned with respect to legislative history, we should avoid the temptation to just “look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 36 (1997) (quoting Judge Leventhal). Unless we are guided by some North Star, our precedents will often support whatever conclusion we want. That guidance—the tie-breaker between conflicting precedents—is deference to the agency. The majority cannot point to a single precedent that would require any reasonable adjudicator to find that Molina suffered persecution. Given the short duration of his harm, the singular (and relatively minor) physical encounter, vague threats, and evidence before the agency of improving country conditions—a reasonable adjudicator could have weighed the record as a whole to find that Molina suffered harassment, but not persecution, which we reserve for “extreme” suffering or harm. See Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009). “The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Leon-Hernandez, 926 F.2d at 904 (citation omitted). The agency’s conclusion may not be the result I would have reached or prefer, but again, that’s not the question before us. Applying the very deferential standard of review we should be anchored to, the record does not compel the conclusion that various indirect threats, combined with a single physical attack resulting in minor injuries, constitutes past persecution. See Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1181–82. 58 FLORES MOLINA V. GARLAND