Opinion ID: 2994361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill , Inc. v. NLRB, 30 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir.

Text: 1994)). The General Counsel can prove his case with direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. But the NLRB’s legal conclusions must have a reasonable basis in the law, and its factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Weiss, 172 F.3d at 442. At oral argument, the General Counsel told us that the substantial evidence test is met if the NLRB’s findings are not fundamentally unreasonable. We accept this description of the test, and conclude that the NLRB’s findings in this case were in fact fundamentally unreasonable.
No one disputes that Maney and McClinton had been engaging in protected activity at the time they were fired. But the decision-makers at Vulcan had to know of these activities. The direct evidence was undisputed that Naugle did not tell DeLaura about Maney and McClinton’s union organizing. Thus, to meet the second element of the test (employer knowledge), the ALJ either had to disbelieve Vulcan’s witnesses and infer from circumstantial evidence that Naugle did in fact tell DeLaura of the protected activity, or he had to somehow impute Naugle’s knowledge of these activities to the company as a matter of law. Citing GATX Logistics, Inc. 323 NLRB 328, enforced, 160 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1997), the General Counsel has put together a unique formula by arguing that we should impute Naugle’s knowledge to Vulcan because it is likely that he actually told the company about Maney and McClinton’s union activities./7 See Response Brief at 23 (arguing that the NLRB reasonably imputed Naugle’s knowledge to Vulcan because it is most improbable that Naugle would not have told DeLaura). The General Counsel can’t have it both ways. And it is doubtful he can have it either way. As shown below, it is not reasonable either to impute Naugle’s knowledge of Maney and McClinton’s union activities to Vulcan or to infer that Naugle in fact told DeLaura of their activities. First, regarding imputation, courts have generally rejected the NLRB’s attempts to simply attribute a foreman or supervisor’s knowledge of an employee’s union activities to the company./8 Automatically imputing such knowledge to a company improperly removes the General Counsel’s burden of proving knowledge. We have rejected other attempts by the General Counsel to so lighten his burden of proof. See Weiss, 172 F.3d at 444 (discussing adverse inference rule) (An absence of evidence does not cut in favor of the one who bears the burden of proof.). And we reject any attempt to do so here: Vulcan or its decision-maker (be it DeLaura or Smith) did not know of Maney and McClinton’s union activities just because Naugle knew about them. The General Counsel cites Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 831 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1987), as support for the NLRB imputing Naugle’s knowledge to Vulcan. But the General Counsel misreads that case. Grand Rapids said that the Board could impute the anti-union animus of a supervisor to a company when the supervisor knew of an employee’s union activities and was involved in the decision to terminate the employee. This was true even though the supervisor was not the decision-maker and there was no evidence that the actual decision-maker knew of the employee’s union activities or had an anti-union animus. Id. at 117. The rationale for doing so was that the supervisor is an agent of the company, and he (and thus the company) should not be allowed to concoct some union- neutral charge about an employee in order to get the employee fired. [A] supervisor’s unlawful, anti-labor motivation in making a false report leading to discharge must be imputed to the Company, even though the officers who actually make the firing decision do not share that animus. Thus, the Company is deemed to possess the unlawful animus. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting JMC Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 776 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 1985)). In short, the supervisor should not be allowed to launder his anti-union animus through the apparent non-discriminatory action of the decision-maker who is personally unaware of the employee’s union activism. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 692 F2d 169, 171 (1st Cir. 1982)./9 If we were to apply the imputation of animus principle with respect to Naugle, Vulcan would benefit. The animus, good or bad, should follow the supervisor. Thus, while Naugle may have had an anti-Maney and McClinton animus, he did not have an anti-union animus. Naugle was pro-union. Recall that weeks earlier he initiated the idea of having a union and later signed a union authorization card. If anything, his pro-union attitude should be attributed to Vulcan, and the fact that he recommended firing Maney and McClinton anyway underscores that Vulcan fired them for their misbehavior, not their union activities. In sum, anti-union animus attributed to Naugle cannot be imputed to Vulcan because there is not any evidence (let alone substantial evidence) that he had any. On the subject of actual knowledge, the NLRB could conceivably infer from circumstantial evidence that despite his denials, Naugle told Vulcan about Maney and McClinton’s union activities. Perhaps the NLRB concluded that Naugle reported their activity because he was involved in their firing and because it believed he would be loyal to the company when it came to union organizing. The NLRB drew such an inference in GATX (see note 7, supra). But the critical difference between this case and GATX is that the GATX supervisor who was involved in firing an employee not only knew of the employee’s pro- union activities but was blatantly hostile to the union. For instance, upon seeing the employee wearing a jacket with a union logo, the GATX supervisor stared at the union logo and commented, ’That won’t go over too well here,’ referring to the Union. 323 NLRB at 300. He later told the employee ’That’s an awfully big target you have on your back,’ referring to the larger union logo on the back of [his] jacket. Id. And he angrily commented . . . that there ’was no damn way there was going to be Union [at work], and that he would see to that.’ Id. at 331. Given that supervisor’s extreme anti-union animus, it was reasonable for the NLRB to infer that he told the decision-maker of the employee’s union activities. See id. at 333; n.7, supra. There is no comparison between Naugle and the GATX supervisor. As noted, far from being anti- union, Naugle was a union adherent. Why would a pro-union foreman attempt to malign subordinates by labeling them pro-union? And if he had any indication that the company was anti-union, why would he jeopardize his own career?/10 Similarly, we find no support for the inference that Naugle told DeLaura of Maney and McClinton’s union activities simply because Naugle disliked them and wanted them fired. Vulcan, 327 NLRB No. 170, 1999 WL 183660, at  (The ALJ surmised that Naugle falsely exaggerated the misconduct of Maney and McClinton . . . . If Naugle wanted the two drivers terminated as much as he did, it is inconceivable that he would not have reported their union activities to DeLaura.). Whether Naugle liked them or not, it is likely that he reported their misconduct because it was unacceptable. Cf. Jim Walter Resources Inc., 177 F.3d at 962-63 (NLRB could not simply assume that employee’s criticism of applicant to decision- maker was based on anti-union animus rather than another reason). The inability of the NLRB to base Vulcan’s knowledge of Maney and McClinton’s union activities on Naugle’s knowledge of them is critical because there is not substantial evidence to support a finding that DeLaura otherwise knew of these activities. The NLRB has disclaimed use of the missing witness rule; the union election petition did not list any names; Naugle testified that he did not tell Smith or DeLaura about union organizing in general or about Maney and McClinton’s union activities in particular; and Smith and DeLaura testified that they were unaware of union activity at Vulcan and of Maney and McClinton’s union activism. Even if Smith and DeLaura knew of the union movement in general--and there appears to be no evidence of that either--there is no evidence that they knew about Maney and McClinton’s involvement in it. Such knowledge is essential to the General Counsel’s case. See NLRB v. Loy Food Stores, Inc., 697 F.2d 798, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1983) (The company knew there had been a union meeting which many of the employees had attended but there is no evidence that it knew [the employees in question] had been among them . . . .The Board must and here failed to prove that the employer knew the worker in question was a union adherent . . . .). And even if the General Counsel could establish that Vulcan’s officers directly or indirectly knew of Maney and McClinton’s union activities, there is no evidence of any anti-union animus. Contrast Weiss, 172 F.3d at 443 (The record certainly establishes that Weiss’s management opposed the union in the election and encouraged employees to vote against it--as was their right.). On the contrary, the record shows only pro-union sentiment from those in supervisory positions: all the foremen, including Senior Foreman Naugle, signed union cards. The NLRB relies on the timing of the firings--on Monday, the first business day after Vulcan received the NLRB petition--to show Vulcan’s anti-union animus and causation. Vulcan, 327 NLRB No. 170, 1999 WL 183660, at . While in some cases, timing is everything, NLRB v. Joy Recovery Tech. Corp., 134 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1998), here timing is the only thing, and under these facts that is not enough. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 712, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1992) (mere coincidence is not sufficient evidence of antiunion animus). Smith considered firing Maney and McClinton before he went on vacation, and his decision not to do so eliminated a need to replace the two drivers before he left, which would have left the company in a bind and messed up his vacation plans. When he returned Sunday evening, DeLaura told him about their insubordination while he was away. The accumulated gross misbehavior during Smith’s absence led him to discharge them promptly when he (and they) returned to work. Unlike the General Counsel, we do not think it is highly suspect that Smith considered and, for the time being at least, rejected firing Maney and McClinton before he went on vacation. The General Counsel also argues that Smith and DeLaura’s failure to give Maney and McClinton a reason for their discharges, even though they repeatedly asked for one, is suspicious, as is Vulcan’s failure to investigate the charges against them. Vulcan, 327 NLRB No. 170, 1999 WL 183660, at . An employer is not required to give reasons when it fires its employees (although under some circumstances failing to do so might give rise to an inference of antiunion animus). The fact that a union is trying to organize the work force . . . does not even throw on the company the burden of proving that it had a good reason for firing. The company can fire for good, bad, or no reasons, so long as its purpose is not to interfere with union activity. Loy Food Stores, Inc., 697 F.2d at 891; accord Carry Companies of Ill., Inc., 30 F.3d at 926; Chicago Tribune Co., 962 F.2d at 716. But Smith essentially did give Maney and McClinton a reason: he told them they knew why they were being fired, as well they should have. When employees openly engage in gross misbehavior, their employer is not required to state or investigate the obvious. The General Counsel also asserts that Smith and DeLaura gave conflicting statements as to who made the decision to fire Maney and McClinton. See Vulcan, 327 NLRB No. 170, 1999 WL 183660, at . But their statements are not really inconsistent. DeLaura, as the head of the facility, was technically or formally in charge of terminations, and he was greatly displeased with Maney and McClinton’s behavior. But it was company practice for Smith to be the real decision-maker, or at least the executioner, in such matters. It was thus entirely logical for Smith to tell Maney and McClinton that DeLaura was upset with them and wanted them fired (DeLaura, after all, had to deal with their misbehavior while Smith was away). It was also logical for DeLaura to tell Maney and McClinton that, while it was Smith’s decision, he would stand behind Smith 100 percent. In short, both Smith and DeLaura wanted Maney and McClinton fired. No doubt neither wanted to confront Maney and McClinton directly, given their past behavior./11 Finally, the General Counsel claims Vulcan’s shifting reasons for the firings indicates Maney and McClinton’s union activity was a factor in their termination. The ALJ found that Vulcan’s pretrial position statement asserted that the two drivers were discharged ’for a combination of theft, insubordination and failing to show up for work.’ Id. DeLaura indicated that they were fired for these offenses, see id. at , but according to the ALJ, Smith’s testimony shifted away from and did not support that position. . . . According to Smith, the issue was the demanded use of the newer trucks. Id. at . Smith was particularly upset with Maney and McClinton for these demands, but he also indicated that Maney and McClinton’s other instances of misbehavior were factors in their termination./12 Smith’s different emphasis, as the ALJ put it, id. at , for firing them is understandable. Unlike Naugle and DeLaura, Smith did not have to put up with Maney and McClinton’s antics during November 4 to November 8; he was on vacation. What Smith had to endure before he went on vacation was their repeated complaints about being suspended from driving the new trucks. It is only natural that in discussing their termination, Smith would focus on the aspect of Maney and McClinton’s behavior that had most affected and bothered him (and for which he had considered firing them before he left). An understandably different emphasis in reasons should not be discarded as shifting reasons. Where, as here, there are multiple bona fide reasons for firing an employee, the fact that different supervisors with different experiences cite or emphasize different legitimate reasons does not give rise to a reasonable inference of an unlawful motive./13
Even if the General Counsel had proven that Vulcan’s dislike of Maney and McClinton’s union activities was a factor in its decision to fire them, substantial evidence does not support the NLRB’s finding that Vulcan would not have fired them anyway for legitimate reasons. See Vulcan, 327 NLRB No. 170, 1999 WL 183660, at . Although the General Counsel contends that Vulcan exaggerated some of Maney and McClinton’s antics, he agrees that they committed the offenses of which Vulcan accused them (see n.3): apparent theft (the missing gasoline from the new trucks), threatened theft (trying to take a company truck to go vote), insubordination (taking a new truck to a job site, not calling in timely before missing work), violence (kicking a door so hard the knob and pins pop off) and grossly obnoxious behavior (interfering with the General Manager’s use of a telephone and refusing to account for toll money). But he nevertheless argues that Vulcan would not have fired them for this gross misbehavior because it had tolerated their bad behavior in the past, including complaints about being unable to drive the new trucks./14 An employer who has tolerated bad behavior in the past is not forced to continue to do so, let alone required to tolerate increasingly bad behavior. See NLRB v. Eldorado Mfg. Corp., 660 F.2d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1981) (The Board’s case against the Company rests at bottom on the apparent notion that blatant misconduct once tolerated at all must be tolerated forever. However, as this Court has previously stated, there must be room in the law for a right of an employer somewhere, sometime, at some stage to free itself of continuing unproductive, internal, and improper harassment.). Thus, even though Smith declined to fire Maney and McClinton for their repeated complaints or for suspicion of stealing gasoline before he went on vacation, he could change his mind once he returned and learned of their escalated misbehavior while he was away. The Board applied in effect a presumption that the discharge of a union adherent during an organizing campaign is motivated by hostility to the union, a presumption that can be rebutted only by showing that the discharge was for good cause--and maybe not even then. [The company] had plenty of cause to fire [its two employees], yet that did not help it with the Board. Evidently, if a worker is a good worker he cannot be fired if he is a union adherent because the company will not be able to show good cause for firing him, and if he is a bad worker, like [the two employees here], he cannot be fired either, for since he was not fired previously this shows that the company does not fire workers because they are bad workers but only because they are union adherents. Loy Food Stores, Inc., 697 F.2d at 800. Substantial evidence, therefore, does not support the NLRB’s finding that Vulcan would not have fired Maney and McClinton anyway for legitimate reasons.