Opinion ID: 182275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial Procedural Hiccups

Text: On April 20, 2004, Franklin entered a plea of not guilty, and on October 14, 2004, he moved to suppress the fruits of the agents' search of the car, arguing that he had not actually consented to the search. Franklin also requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue. The government opposed the motion and argued that there was no need for a hearing. In the meantime, on October 28, 2004, Franklin was also indicted on another possession-with-intent-to-distribute charge, this time stemming from the drugs the agents found in the car; the new indictment also added a felon-in-possession-of-ammunition charge. Franklin entered a plea of not guilty to the additional counts in the superseding indictment. In January 2005, the district court first addressed the motion to suppress, suggesting that there was no real need for an evidentiary hearing. Eight months later, however, the court granted the request for a hearing, which took place over three days in November and December 2005. [3] In early March 2006, having received no ruling from the district court, Franklin filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162. Finally, on March 15, 2006nearly a year and a half after Franklin filed his suppression motionthe court denied the motion on the alternate grounds that Franklin had given consent or that the officers had probable cause to conduct the challenged search. Two days later, the court denied the motion to dismiss, finding no violation of the Speedy Trial Act. However, following a request for reconsideration, the court reversed course, found a violation, and dismissed the indictment without prejudice. In November 2006, a grand jury re-indicted Franklin on three counts of cocaine possession-with-intent-to-distribute and one count of felon-in-possession-of-ammunition, all stemming from the three episodes set forth in the facts above. Under the new indictment, Franklin moved again for dismissal, this time with prejudice, for violations of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The court denied the motion, and Franklin was convicted on all counts after a six-day trial. On appeal, Franklin raises only the Speedy Trial Act and suppression issues. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.