Opinion ID: 2982560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Negative Credibility Determination

Text: This Court reviews an ALJ’s credibility determinations for substantial evidence as well. Appellate courts generally defer to an ALJ’s credibility determination because “[t]he opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness, evaluating what is said in the light of how it is said, and considering how it fits with the rest of the evidence gathered before the person who is conducting the hearing, is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly.” Beavers v. Sec. of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978). If the ALJ finds that a claimant has “a medically determinable impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce [his or her] symptoms . . . [the ALJ] must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of [those] symptoms . . . [to] determine how [the] symptoms limit [the claimant’s] capacity for work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(1). To make this determination, the ALJ 7 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s failure to articulate particular reasons for adopting Lewis’ opinion constituted legal error because “a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007). In the instant case, it is difficult to say that the ALJ’s failure to include a full explanation for adopting Lewis’ opinion prejudiced Plaintiff on the merits or deprived him of a substantial right. 26 No. 13-4360 considers objective medical evidence and other evidence such as (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) “[t]he type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication;” (5) forms of treatment other than medication that the claimant receives to relieve his or her symptoms; and (6) other measures used to relieve the pain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)–(vi). “The claimant’s credibility [regarding the intensity and persistence of symptoms] may be properly discounted to a certain degree . . . where an [ALJ] finds contradictions among the medical reports, claimant’s testimony, and other evidence.” Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although objective evidence exists in the record to support Plaintiff’s claims regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his own PTSD and depression, substantial evidence also exists to support the ALJ’s negative credibility determination. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the severity of his symptoms and their limiting effects were not entirely credible. In making this determination, the ALJ compared Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms to the evidence in the record. The ALJ’s summary of Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his ability to do social and personal activities is accurate and properly considered the frequency with which he visited doctors for treatment, the various medical sources’ opinions, the treatment notes in the record, and Plaintiff’s own descriptions of his PTSD and depression. Although the ability to do household chores is not direct evidence of an ability to do gainful work, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572, “[a]n ALJ may . . . consider household and social activities engaged in by the claimant in evaluating a claimant’s assertions of pain or ailments.” 27 No. 13-4360 Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 1997). See also Blacha v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[A]n ALJ may consider household and social activities in evaluating complaints of disabling pain.”). At one point during the hearing and occasionally during appointments with VA doctors, Plaintiff asserted that he isolates himself and rarely leaves his house. That statement is not an accurate characterization of Plaintiff’s daily activities. In fact, Plaintiff spends a great deal of time with his family, drives or walks to the local coffee shop, meets with other veterans on a daily basis, and assists in chores around the house. Although none of these activities is direct evidence that Plaintiff is able to sustain a high level of concentration throughout the day or that Plaintiff is a social individual, they are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s descriptions of isolation and an inability to concentrate. An ALJ may also base a credibility determination on a claimant’s “longitudinal medical record demonstrating an individual’s attempts to seek medical treatment for pain or other symptoms and to follow that treatment once it is prescribed.” SSR. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at  (July 2, 1996). “Persistent attempts by the individual to obtain relief of pain or other symptoms . . . may be a strong indication that the symptoms are a source of distress to the individual and generally lend support to an individual’s allegations of intense and persistent symptoms.” Id. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s treatment history, acknowledging that although Plaintiff sought assistance from Sehbi and Hugger in 2009, he stopped visiting these individuals on a regular basis much earlier, only calling for appointments on an as-needed basis. Therefore, the longitudinal record does not contradict the ALJ’s findings regarding the intensity of Plaintiff’s symptoms. The ALJ, not this Court, weighs the evidence and the testimony to make a credibility determination. Even if this Court were to find that evidence could support an alternative 28 No. 13-4360 conclusion, the panel must affirm if the credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. In the instant case, although the ALJ was often conclusory in her analysis, her negative credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record. E. RFC and Hypothetical Question Posed to Vocational Expert An ALJ may rely on a vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical question if that question was based on limitations that were properly credited by the ALJ and supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Walton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 60 F. App’x 603, 611 (6th Cir. 2003); Brewer v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 39 F. App’x 252, 254 (6th Cir. 2002). In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exists in the economy, “the question[s] must accurately portray a claimant’s physical and mental impairments.” Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 516 (6th Cir. 2010). “[T]he ALJ is only required to incorporate into the hypothetical questions those limitations that have [properly] been accepted as credible,” McIlroy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 42 F. App’x 738, 739 (6th Cir. 2002), and “is not obligated to include unsubstantiated complaints and restrictions in his hypothetical questions,” Brewer, 39 F. App’x at 254. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s hypothetical question was insufficient to meet this standard and that his own attorney’s question, which included an assessment that Plaintiff would be off-task for at least 15% of a workday and would miss more than one day of work per month, was more accurate. To support this assertion, Plaintiff cites numerous references in the record regarding his auditory and visual hallucinations, his anger and agitation, his depression, his dreams and flashbacks to the Vietnam War, his anger outbursts at his previous place of employment, and that prior to retiring, he was missing two days per week due to stress. Plaintiff cites Papadakis’ opinion that Plaintiff has difficulty with memory, concentration, and attention. 29 No. 13-4360 He also cites to his own testimony regarding his poor concentration and inability to sleep. Plaintiff claims that “the evidence of record supports that [he] is much more limited” than the ALJ gave him credit for. Pet’r’s Br. at 54. Based on Plaintiff’s claims regarding attention, ability to follow instructions, and ability to handle stress or change in the workplace, as well as the medical source opinions in the record, the ALJ first found that “the claimant experiences ‘moderate’ limitation in his ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace because the claimant shows some limitation in his ability to sustain focused attention and concentration and to independently, appropriately, and effectively complete tasks.” A.R. 22. It is not clear that the ALJ incorporated those moderate limitations into the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert or properly considered them in making a final non-disability determination. The ALJ’s hypothetical question included limitations for “simple, repetitive tasks, low stress with no assembly line production quotas and not fast paced.” A.R. 63. Following the initial hypothetical question, the ALJ only asked whether an individual would need to maintain focus and concentration to complete those tasks. Although the vocational expert answered that focus and concentration would be required for completion of those tasks, the ALJ appears to have ignored that response. Additionally, because the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical opinions of Sehbi, Sanders, and Papadakis, it is difficult for this Court to find that the RFC and hypothetical question were supported by substantial evidence. See Cole, 661 F.3d at 940 (explaining that the Court’s “finding that the ALJ’s decision [was] not supported by substantial evidence [was] based on the ALJ’s violation of the agency’s procedural rules.”). 30 No. 13-4360