Opinion ID: 3010386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: F.R. app. S 1630.2(o).

Text: 20 registered nurse on the medical/surgical floor. That being undisputed, both of Deane's treating physicians were of the opinion that, in June of 1992, Deane was permanently disabled from heavy activity, that she could return to work but cannot do unrestricted lifting, and that her limitations should be considered permanent. 19 (See June 8, 1992 and June 16, 1992 letters of Drs. A. Lee Osterman and Carl Sipowicz, respectively.) In addition, Deane testified at her deposition that, while lifting patients was necessary for complete patient care, her restrictions would have made doing so dangerous and would have presented an awful risk to both her and her patients.20 Thus, when she felt ready to return to work, she informed PMC that she had a lifting restriction and hoped to be put on light duty assignments or be reassigned to another area of the hospital. Most importantly, she never argued before the district court on summary judgment that she could perform the requisite heavy lifting. Rather, she contended that her _________________________________________________________________ 19. The fact that these diagnoses might have changed in the years following Deane's injury is irrelevant to the issue of Deane's limitations and capabilities at the time of the adverse employment action. 20. At Deane's deposition, the following exchange took place: Q. Was it ever necessary for a total care patient to put them in a wheelchair? A. When I was working there? Q. Yes. A. Yes. Not for their bath, but -- Q. Could you have done that with a lifting restriction? A. With a lifting restriction, no. I'd like to rephrase that. I suppose anything is possible, if you think about it, we are taking an awful risk. I may or may not have been able to get that patient out of the bed and into the wheelchair. I don't think it's a worthwhile risk to take when you take a chance that somebody could fall. Q. So that would have been dangerous for the patient? A. I would think so, yes. Q. Probably dangerous for you as well, correct? A. Possibly. 21 lifting restriction easily could have been accommodated through either reassignment or job restructuring. Thus, it is clear that Deane could not perform all functions of the position without some form of accommodation. Accordingly, we next must determine whether Deane is entitled to accommodation and, if so, whether reasonable accommodations exist that would enable her to perform the essential functions of the position. Deane is at most statutorily disabled in that, while her impairment does not rise to the level of being a disability, PMC might well have perceived her to be disabled. In other words, but for her employer's misperception, she would not be afforded the protections of the ADA at all. Viewed as such, we do not believe that Congress intended that an individual who is only perceived to be disabled would be entitled to accommodation. We begin our analysis of Congressional intent on this issue with the text of the statute, itself. The core antidiscrimination provision of the ADA provides that[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual.... 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a) (emphasis added). Thus, while far-reaching, the ADA is not boundless and only prohibits discrimination engaged in because of [the individual's] disability. Id. In turn, the Act defines the term discriminate as including an employer's failure to make[ ] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.... 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). On its face, however, this definition leaves open the question of which limitations the employer must accommodate. Specifically, it does not indicate whether an employer must accommodate any limitation that adversely affects a disabled employee's performance or only those limitations caused by his or her disability. Reading the two subsections together, we are convinced that the ADA requires an employer to accommodate only those limitations caused by the individual's disability. This reading is borne out repeatedly in the appendix to the Regulations regarding reasonable accommodation. There it is stated, in explicit terms, that [a]n individual 22 with a disability is `otherwise qualified'... if he or she is qualified for a job, except that, because of the disability, he or she needs a reasonable accommodation...; that [e]mployers are obligated to make reasonable accommodation only to the physical or mental limitations resulting from the disability of a qualified individual...; and that [w]hen a qualified individual with a disability has requested a reasonable accommodation... the employer... should... ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by the individual's disability and how those limitations could be overcome with a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. app. S 1630.9 (emphasis added). Likewise, requiring accommodation only for that which actually renders an employee disabled is virtually mandated by Congress's intent to remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities. 29 C.F.R. app., Background (emphasis added). With the passage of the ADA, Congress intended not to erect impenetrable spheres of protection around the disabled, but hoped merely to level the playing field for them. Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, where an individual is actually disabled, Congress recognized that reasonable accommodations would often be necessary to, in a sense, compensate for the individual's disability and allow him or her to compete with the non-disabled. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 541 (recognizing that Congress was unwilling to confine the concept of disability discrimination to cases in which the disability is irrelevant to the performance of the disabled person's job). Once accommodated for his or her disability, an individual should be on an equal playing field with others and thereafter would be on his or her own to deal with any non-disabling impairments just as would any similarly impaired person without a disability. In the context of an individual who is not actually disabled but is merely regarded as such, i.e., one who is only statutorily disabled, that which renders him or her disabled is not the individual's impairment, if impairment there be, but the employer's unfounded stereotypes, fear or simple misperception that the impairment is serious 23 enough to be disabling. To compensate for a statutory disability, then, the employer need only be dispossessed of its misperception as it is that which renders the employee disabled. Thereafter, the individual would be neither actually nor statutorily disabled and, like any non-disabled individual, would not be able to invoke the accommodation provisions of the ADA for any non-disabling impairments -- including the impairment that initially might have given rise to the employer's perception of a disability. Accommodation, therefore, would play no role in leveling the playing field.21 Indeed, to hold otherwise would give an individual regarded as being disabled an undeserved windfall were he or she to have a right to be accommodated solely by virtue of the employer's misperception where others with the same impairment would have no such right.22 _________________________________________________________________ 21. The evil the regarded as provision was intended to combat was the effect of archaic attitudes, erroneous perceptions, and myths. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279, 285; Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385-86. As more than one court has recognized, an ADA perception claim is akin to a racial discrimination claim in which an individual is denied employment because the employer erroneously perceived that the color of the individual's skin somehow made him or her inferior. See, e.g., Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 541. Title VII proscribes such invidious discrimination and protects individuals who suffer adverse consequences as a result thereof. Such protection, however, does not include any form of accommodation because it is presumed that the individuals can perform their jobs without accommodation. Because the type of discrimination faced by those who are perceived to be disabled so closely resembles discrimination on the basis of race, with the only significant difference being the object of the misperception, we see no reason not to treat them in like fashion. 22. It is not by coincidence that this analysis dovetails neatly with the EEOC's suggestion that, once a request for accommodation is made, the employer and employee should engage in a flexible, interactive exchange whereby the employer can become familiar with the precise contours of the employee's limitations and can devise appropriate and effective accommodations. 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.9. After an employee requests accommodation, a meaningful interactive exchange could well rectify any misperceptions regarding the employee's impairments. Ideally, once the true facts are discovered, the employer could either provide reasonable accommodation if it believes the employee to be actually disabled or refuse to do so based on its belief that the employee is not, in fact, disabled. Of course, if the employer takes the latter course, it will do so 24 We are aware of only one decision of a Court of Appeals that has held that accommodation is appropriate in the context of a perceived disability claim, and no decision that has held that it is not -- until this one. In Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996), the plaintiff, a recent heart-attack victim, sought accommodation from his employer in the form of a part-time work schedule in connection with his actual and perceived disability claims. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, the First Circuit reversed on the basis that there was enough evidence to reach the jury on the perception claim. Id. at 32. In doing so, the court held that, irrespective of whether the plaintiff was actually disabled, he would be entitled to reasonable accommodation if the employer perceived him to be disabled, reasoning that Congress, when it provided for perception to be the basis of disability status, probably had principally in mind the more usual case in which a plaintiff has a long-term medical condition of some kind, and the employer exaggerates its significance by failing to make a reasonable accommodation. But both the language and the policy of the statute seem to us to offer protection as well to one who is not substantially disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly _________________________________________________________________ at the risk of an ADA lawsuit being filed against it alleging that the employee is actually disabled. The employee would not, by definition, however, be able to allege the facts necessary to make out a perception claim because the employer's position would be that the employee is not disabled. We agree with Deane that PMC's efforts in this regard were dismal and fell far below what has been suggested by the EEOC and required by us. See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1997). Had PMC engaged in a meaningful interactive process, moreover, it assuredly would have realized the minor nature of Deane's limitations. And, of course, while Deane would not have been entitled to any form of accommodation or protection under the ADA given the minor nature of her limitations, PMC may well have decided to retain her in one of a number of positions available during the relevant period of time, rendering this litigation unnecessary. PMC deserves no medals. 25 perceived to be so. And, of course, it may well be that Katz was both actually disabled and perceived to be so. Id. at 33. We disagree with both the First Circuit's reasoning and its conclusion. Initially, the court's position that an individual can be both actually disabled and perceived to be so is contrary to the unambiguous definition of a perceived disability in which an element of each of the three categories of perceived disabilities is that the individual not have an actual disability. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(l). Thus, because the finding of an actual disability would prevent one from satisfying an essential element of a perception claim, and vice versa, it necessarily follows that an individual simply cannot maintain a perception claim if he or she is actually disabled. Accordingly, actual and perceived disability claims cannot be presented as simultaneous grounds for relief.23 Moreover, the First Circuit mischaracterized the underlying intent of Congress in describing the usual case of a perceived disability as a long-term medical condition of some kind, and the employer exaggerates its significance by failing to make a reasonable accommodation. To the contrary, it is clear that a person who is not substantially disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly perceived to be so represents the paradigmatic perception plaintiff envisioned by Congress. See 29 C.F.R. app. S 1630.2(l); Senate Report at 23-24; House Labor Report at 53; House Judiciary Report at 29-31. Further, an employer's failure to make a reasonable accommodation, itself, cannot, as the court suggested, render the employee disabled, as the issue of reasonable accommodation becomes relevant to determining whether he or she is qualified only after the individual is found to be disabled. Had the Katz court steered clear of these faulty premises, it is by no means certain that it would have assumed, as it did, that an individual who is only perceived to be disabled _________________________________________________________________ 23. They can, however, be effectively pled in the alternative where, unlike the case at bar, the plaintiff does not seek accommodation. See Olson, 101 F.3d at 952-55. 26 is entitled to accommodation from his or her employer. As a result, we do not find the opinion persuasive. Accordingly, we hold that where an individual claims only to have been regarded as being disabled, that individual is not entitled to accommodation under the ADA. Thus, if an individual is perceived to be but is not actually disabled, he or she cannot be considered a qualified individual with a disability unless he or she can, without accommodation, perform all the essential as well as the marginal functions of the position held or sought.24 Of course, unlike the plaintiff in this case, the vast majority of ADA plaintiffs claim to have an actual disability. They must show simply that, once accommodated, they can perform the essential functions of the position. Individuals who are not actually disabled but are merely perceived to be so are not entitled to accommodation. Only they must demonstrate their ability to perform all the functions of the position held or sought. As a final matter, we must address a few points raised by the dissent that, in our view, are misplaced. The dissent repeatedly argues that a nondisabled individual with a limiting impairment is precisely the individual that the regarded as claim was designed to protect and that this class of individuals will be precluded from bringing suit under the ADA. That interpretation of the ADA is entirely unsupportable, and the dissent recognizes that it leads to a result even it concedes that some would call untoward. Dissent at 41. As we discussed at footnote 11, supra, none of the examples provided by Congress indicates a concern for nondisabled individuals who are impaired so as to require accommodation. Nevertheless, the dissent claims to find _________________________________________________________________ 24. Given the state of the law at the time the district court issued its opinion, it is understandable that the court framed its analysis in terms of whether lifting was an essential function of Deane's position. As this opinion should make clear, however, the issue of whether a particular task is essential or marginal is irrelevant in a perception case. Once it is determined that an individual who is only perceived to be disabled cannot perform all the functions of the position held or sought, he or she is per se unqualified. 27 support for its interpretation in two examples provided by the Supreme Court in Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.9. The first is a child with cerebral palsy who was academically competitive and was not physically threatening. That child, however, had been excluded from public school not because he needed accommodation, but because his physical appearance `produced a nauseating effect on his classmates.'  Id. (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (1971)). The second of the Supreme Court's examples cited by the dissent is of a woman crippled with arthritis who could nevertheless do the job she sought. Like the prior example, however, that woman was denied a job not because of her limitations or need for accommodation, but because the college trustees [thought] `normal students shouldn't see her.'  Id. Ironically, the dissent is correct that these two individuals would be archetypal regarded as plaintiffs. And, under today's holding, both could establish a prima facie case under the ADA with ease. Significantly, however, and consistent with today's holding, neither of those individuals, nor any of those mentioned in the legislative history or the regulations, required accommodation to perform their jobs. Indeed, the dissent's concern for nondisabled individuals who require accommodation, as we believe it wrongly assumed the child and the woman did, appears to be no one's but the author's. Finally, we are among those who the dissent recognizes will find that its interpretation impermissibly leads to a result that is untoward; indeed, we suggest that its interpretation impermissibly leads to a result that is absurd. The dissent concedes that a regarded as plaintiff can be terminated for not performing nonessential functions, but only after establishing at trial that he or she can perform the essential functions of the job and prevailing in his or her ADA suit. In other words, the dissent wishes to recognize a statutory right to reinstatement for regarded as plaintiffs for whom it, in the end, concedes that there is no lasting remedy. If Congress did not create a meaningful remedy in a remedial statute such as the ADA, however, we simply cannot believe that Congress intended to create the right. That said, we are wholly unpersuaded by the dissent's position that such plaintiffs should retain the ability to bring ADA lawsuits, 28 see Dissent at 41, when the only tangible benefit that can possibly be derived therefrom rests on an assumption that, after years of expensive litigation, an employer who once fired an individual for not being able to perform nonessential tasks would have a change of heart and not fire that individual again after being told by the court, or its counsel, that it is free to do so. For the same reason, we believe that the dissent's invocation of the mischief rule is misplaced. Sir Edward Coke's mischief rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The Office of Judges is always to make such construction as to suppress the Mischief and advance the Remedy. Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7a, 7b, Magdalon College Case, 11 Co. 66b, 73b (quoted in United States v. Second Nat'l Bank of N. Miami, 502 F.2d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 1974) (Emphasis supplied). Given its own recognition that its position fails to guarantee any lasting remedy, the dissent's reliance on the mischief rule is, at best, strained. More importantly, the dissent misconceives the mischief that the regarded as prong was intended to prevent in the first instance. While the elimination of prejudice and misconceptions might have motivated Congress to enact the ADA, the mischief addressed was the exclusion of qualified individuals from the workplace, mischief the dissent, in our view, does not adequately address.