Opinion ID: 852583
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Strickland Formulation of the Prejudice Prong

Text: Strickland established that prejudice from substandard performance of counsel requires a showing by the petitioner that there was a reasonable probability of a different result if counsel had met professional norms. We sometimes express the standard for prejudice from the failure to object as requiring a reasonable probability that the objection would have been sustained. See, e.g., Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1192 (citing Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 259). The standard is more precisely stated as prejudicial failure to raise an objection that the trial court would have been required to sustain. Otherwise stated, if the trial court overruled the objection, it would have committed error, and the error would have had a prejudicial effect. See, e.g., Spinks v. McBride, 858 F.Supp. 865, 877 (N.D.Ind.1994) (In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object, it must be shown that the trial court would have been required to sustain the objection had it been made. (citing Hill v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind.1982))); Kimble v. State, 451 N.E.2d 302, 306 (Ind. 1983) (Before trial counsel's failure to enter an objection may be regarded as ineffective representation, the petitioner must show that had a proper objection been made, the trial court would have had no choice but to sustain it.). In most cases there is no practical difference between these two formulations.