Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Dismiss Four Death-leaning Prospective Jurors on Their Questionnaires Alone

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution because it applied a different standard for evaluating the questionnaires of those who strongly favored the death penalty than for those who strongly opposed it. Defendant contends that, whereas prospective jurors who expressed strong opposition to the death penalty were excused on the basis of their questionnaires alone, prospective jurors who expressed equally strong sentiments in favor of the death penalty were examined in an oral voir dire. Defendant identifies four pro-death prospective jurors, G.G., L.R., E.V., and M.P., who, he contends, should have been dismissed on the basis of their questionnaires alone had the trial court been applying the same standard to pro-death prospective jurors that it applied to those who were pro-life. Insofar as defendant's equal protection argument implies that the trial court's basic approach to substantial impairment was flawed and that all of the exclusions based on it are suspect, we reject the claim for the reasons discussed above. Insofar as defendant argues the trial court was more inclined to excuse pro-life prospective jurors on the basis of their questionnaires alone than it was pro-death prospective jurors, defendant fails to show how he was prejudiced. As defendant acknowledges, none of these four assertedly pro-death prospective jurors sat on the jury in this case: G.G. was excused for cause and defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges against the other three.