Opinion ID: 815090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Procedural Error in the Pre-Franks Hearing

Text: It’s not always easy to draw the Franks line between sufficient and insufficient showings, so in some cases district courts have held “pre-Franks” hearings to give defendants opportunities to supplement or elaborate on their original submissions. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 154 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that in “an excess No. 11-3352 13 of caution” district court held an evidentiary hearing to enable defendant to develop his Franks argument, treating hearing as one to determine whether the preliminary showing could be met). Such hearings are well within a district court’s discretion to aid it in making a sound decision on whether to hold a full Franks hearing. The problem arises, though, when a “pre-Franks” hearing becomes a vehicle for the government to present new evidence to explain the discrepancies identified by the defense, yet the defense is not given a full opportunity to challenge or rebut that evidence. Such government evidence is appropriate for the Franks hearing itself, where the defense must have the opportunity for full crossexamination. Harris, 464 F.3d at 739 (“The opportunity to cross-examine an officer who has intentionally or recklessly made false statements to procure a search warrant is an important aspect of a Franks hearing.”). In the Harris case, the district court allowed the government to bolster its affidavits but did not allow full crossexamination by the defense. For that reason, we reversed the denial of the Franks motion and remanded for a full hearing on the merits. Harris, 464 F.3d at 740-41.3 3 The government relies on Spears, 673 F.3d at 602, in which the district court considered a new affidavit from the government to deny the defendant’s request for a Franks hearing. Spears does not help the government because the district court there had later granted a full Franks hearing after the defendant filed still more evidence. Our description of the procedures used in Spears should not be construed as having (continued...) 14 No. 11-3352 The pre-Franks hearing in this case went astray when the court allowed the government to bolster Officer Barisch’s affidavit with additional testimony to explain the discrepancies and contradictions, but then denied the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine Barisch fully on his affidavit. That overstepped the bounds of a pre-Franks hearing, but fell short of the procedures required for a full Franks hearing. The court’s restrictions on cross-examination would not have mattered if the defendant had not made a sufficient showing to obtain a full Franks hearing, but as we explain below, in this case he had already done so by pointing out the clear discrepancies and contradictions between the Barisch and Lane affidavits and their accounts of what they had told each other. To find that the defendant had not made his substantial preliminary showing under Franks, though, the district court expressly relied on the government’s new bolstering evidence. The government’s explanation may or may not be true, but for the reason we explained in Harris, the procedure used here is not acceptable. The defendant in Harris challenged the existence of the confidential informant whose statements supported the search warrant affidavit. The district court directed the govern- 3 (...continued) approved the use of the government’s new affidavit to deny the original motion for a Franks hearing. The district court’s later Franks hearing rendered that issue moot. It was not decided in the appeal. No. 11-3352 15 ment to file a supplemental affidavit from the officer who had applied for the warrant, and concluded, based on information included in the supplemental affidavit, that there had been probable cause for the search. We reversed: Considering new information presented in the supplemental filing that supported a finding of probable cause was beyond the trial court’s analytical reach. Rather, its consideration of new information omitted from the warrant affidavit should have been limited to facts that did not support a finding of probable cause. Harris, 464 F.3d at 739. We did not hold that the defendant in Harris was entitled to suppression, but we remanded for a full Franks hearing on the merits. Id. at 740-41. The same remand is needed here for essentially the same reason. Allowing the government to offer evidence to ex- plain the discrepancies and contradictions in the affidavits — without allowing the defense a full and fair opportunity to challenge the explanation, as in this case — “does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment concerns addressed in Franks.” Id. at 739. Instead, in deciding the threshold question whether to grant a Franks hearing, the court should have limited its consideration of new information to the defense’s evidence tending to refute probable cause. The court should not have considered at that preliminary step the government’s explanation 16 No. 11-3352 of the contradictions and discrepancies.4