Opinion ID: 1441925
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of the Alternatives Analysis

Text: We turn to CGV's central contention that the Board erred in rejecting the additional properties (More Mesa, Carpinteria Bluffs, West Devereaux, Naples, Dos Pueblos Canyon, El Capitan Ranch) as feasible project alternatives. CGV asserts that the Board's decision was based upon the following invalid criteria: (1) that the sites had land-use designations in the LCP which were inconsistent with the development of a major commercial resort-hotel; (2) that none of the sites was owned by Hyatt; and (3) that one of the sites lay outside of the County's jurisdiction. We find CGV's contentions to be unpersuasive. (10), (11) As noted earlier, the rule of reason can and must be understood only with reference to the statutory purpose. CGV's assertions rest on a fundamentally flawed conception of the function and purpose of an EIR. According to CGV, the primary goal of the Hyatt EIR was, or should have been, to identify and review alternative sites throughout the region which could physically accommodate a major new resort hotel, regardless of whether the alternatives could feasibly be developed by the project proponent, or even necessarily approved by the lead agency. CGV contemplates, in essence, an EIR dedicated to broad-based regional planning, identifying optimum locations for new resort/visitor-serving commercial development in light of a variety of pertinent planning and environmental factors. These are indisputably important concerns. But CGV fails to recognize that the law provides for their consideration elsewhere. The Legislature has mandated that every county and city must adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or city, and of any land outside its boundaries which in the planning agency's judgment bears relation to its planning. (Gov. Code, § 65300.) The general plan has been aptly described as the constitution for all future developments within the city or county. ( O'Loane v. O'Rourke (1965) 231 Cal. App.2d 774, 782 [42 Cal. Rptr. 283]; Friends of B Street v. City of Hayward (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 988, 997 [165 Cal. Rptr. 514]; deBottari v. City Council (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 1204, 1212-1213 [217 Cal. Rptr. 790].) [T]he propriety of virtually any local decision affecting land use and development depends upon consistency with the applicable general plan and its elements. ( Resource Defense Fund v. County of Santa Cruz (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 800, 806 [184 Cal. Rptr. 371].) To be sure, the general plan is not immutable, far from it. But it may not be trifled with lightly, as the limitation on the number of amendments to the general plan in any calendar year attests. (Gov. Code, § 65361; deBottari v. City Council, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d at p. 1213.) Like the general plan, the LCP strives to ensure planned, comprehensive development within the coastal zone, with a view to preserving  where feasible  the overall quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and artificial resources. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30001.5.) Under the coastal act, each local government must prepare and adopt land-use policies for that portion of the coastal zone within its jurisdiction. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30500, subd. (a).) After its adoption, the LCP becomes a part of the local government's general plan and is vested with the same constitutional authority. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30003, 30108.55, 30500.) Regional planning and environmental review play an integral role in the development and adoption of both the general plan and the LCP. (Gov. Code, §§ 65030, 65302; Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30001, 30001.5, 30002, 30502, 30530.) Land-use, circulation, housing, conservation, erosion and other mandatory elements address the location and distribution of land for business, industry, agriculture, recreation, open space, enjoyment of scenic beauty and other uses. (Gov. Code, § 65302.) The land-use element of the LCP must, in addition, specifically consider issues concerning public access to and along the coast, and coastal-dependent and related development. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30001.5.) By their very nature, both the general plan and the LCP embody fundamental policy decisions that guide future growth and development. Local governments must confront, evaluate and resolve competing environmental, social and economic interests. The planning process necessarily compels cities and counties to consider alternative land-use goals, policies and implementation measures. As explained in the Office of Planning and Research, General Plan Guidelines: A general plan must address the issues associated with a jurisdiction's physical development. Such issues concern the general locations, appropriate mixtures, timing and extent of land uses and supporting infrastructure. They pertain to the physical nature of a jurisdiction's environment. The broad scope of physical development issues ranges from appropriate areas for building factories to open space for preserving scenic vistas. The process, moreover, is structured to transcend the provincial. Public participation and hearings are required at every stage, in order to obtain an array of viewpoints. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30503; Gov. Code, §§ 65351, 65355.) Furthermore, each county LCP must be submitted to the state coastal commission for approval, thus ensuring not only a local but a regional and state perspective, as well. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30512, 30512.1.) The law also requires that planning efforts remain current. Local agencies must periodically review and revise their general plans as circumstances warrant; housing elements must be revised no less than every five years. (Gov. Code, §§ 65103, subd. (a), 65588, subd. (b).) LCP's must be reviewed by the coastal commission at least once every five years. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30519.5.) Amendments must undergo the same rigorous public scrutiny as the original documents. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30501, 30514; Gov. Code, §§ 65353, 65354, 65356, 65358.) In short, the County's general plan and local coastal program address the very issues which CGV claims should have been addressed in the Hyatt EIR. Identification and analysis of suitable alternative sites for the development of new hotels and resorts in the County's coastal zone was precisely the task of the LCP. A review of that document amply justifies the County's reliance on its findings and conclusions in assessing the feasibility of alternative sites. Following extensive public review and hearings, the County's LCP was approved by the Board and certified by the State in 1981. The 235-page document, complete with graphs, maps and appendices, exhaustively analyzed all of the land and resources lying within the County's coastal zone. From a myriad of environmental, social and economic perspectives  sensitive plant and wildlife habitats, flood and seismic hazards, erosion, scenic values, traffic patterns, as well as overall agricultural, industrial and recreational needs  the LCP considered suitable land uses for each of the alternative sites proffered by CGV. The LCP's analysis and conclusions fully support the Board's findings, referred to earlier, [6] that none of the sites in question was appropriate for a major resort/visitor-serving commercial development. Informed and enlightened regional planning did not demand a project EIR dedicated to defining optimal alternative sites without regard to feasibility. Indeed, such ad hoc reconsideration of basic planning policy was not only unnecessary, but would have been in contravention of the legislative goal of long-term, comprehensive planning. As earlier noted, the keystone of regional planning is consistency  between the general plan, its internal elements, subordinate ordinances, and all derivative land-use decisions. ( Resource Defense Fund v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 133 Cal. App.3d at p. 806; deBottari v. City Council, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1210-1213.) Case-by-case reconsideration of regional land-use policies, in the context of a project-specific EIR, is the very antithesis of that goal. This is not to say that EIR analysis must proceed with regional blinders. The local agency need not, indeed it may not, ignore regional needs and cumulative impacts. ( Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 283 [118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017]; Guidelines, §§ 15125, 15206 [118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017].) Had the LCP here, for example, identified alternative sites as environmentally suitable for a major resort-hotel project, the EIR could properly have noted that fact, and the reasons which underlay the LCP's conclusion. Conversely, an EIR may properly consider an inconsistent land-use designation in the general plan or coastal element in assessing the feasibility of a project alternative. (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (b) [The EIR shall discuss any inconsistencies between the proposed project and applicable general plans and regional plans.].) To be sure, the mere fact that an alternative may require a legislative enactment does not necessarily justify its exclusion from the EIR (see Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester (9th Cir.1987) 833 F.2d 810, 815; City of Angoon v. Hodel (9th Cir.1986) 803 F.2d 1016, 1021-1022); it may not be appropriate, for example, to disregard an otherwise reasonable alternative which requires some form of implementing legislation ( Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Com. v. Board of Trustees, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d at pp. 286-287) such as a zoning amendment or conditional-use permit. Moreover, in some circumstances, an EIR may consider alternatives requiring a site-specific amendment of the general plan. However, an EIR is not ordinarily an occasion for the reconsideration or overhaul of fundamental land-use policy. The EIR here considered a full range of project alternatives, including at least one reasonable off-site alternative. The LCP had characterized the project site as the most suitable location for the proposed development, and had further concluded, after an exhaustive regional and environmental survey, that no other property (with the singular exception of the one alternative site analyzed in the EIR) was appropriate for the land use under consideration. Under these circumstances, where the County has already undertaken a study of the environmental suitability of alternative sites for commercial development and has embodied its findings in the LCP, we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion in relying on the LCP to help it assess the feasibility of potential project alternatives. (12) CGV's remaining objections to the LCP may be easily disposed of. They argue that the County should have been required to demonstrate that, as the Court of Appeal stated, the conclusions in the LCP still relate to current conditions. The argument overlooks the fact that general and coastal plans must be updated periodically. (Gov. Code, § 65103; Pub. Resources Code, § 30519.5.) To require a reexamination of basic land-use policy with every permit application would impose an unnecessary and wasteful burden on local governments. (13) CGV also asserts that the County could not legitimately characterize certain alternatives as infeasible, based in part upon inconsistent land-use designations, when the project site itself, Haskell's Beach, required LCP and zoning amendments prior to development. As noted in the Board's findings, however, the critical distinction is that Haskell's Beach constituted a white hole in the LCP; although the coastal commission considered it to be the best location for future resort development, the site had not received a resort/visitor-serving designation because of an earlier, inconsistent recommendation by the County. Finally, CGV argues that the Board improperly considered that Hyatt did not own any of the alternative sites, and that one of the sites, Carpinteria Bluffs, lay outside of the County's jurisdiction. We disagree. As earlier noted, a project alternative which cannot be feasibly accomplished need not be extensively considered. A feasible alternative is one which can be accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21061.1; Guidelines, § 15364.) Surely whether a property is owned or can reasonably be acquired by the project proponent has a strong bearing on the likelihood of a project's ultimate cost and the chances for an expeditious and successful accomplishment. (14) This is not to suggest that private projects are categorically exempt from alternative-site review. Understandably, the government's power of eminent domain and access to public lands suggest that alternative sites may be more feasible, more often, when the developer is a public rather than a private agency. (See, e.g., Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 403-404 [EIR defective which failed to consider whether state university either owned or could acquire alternative sites for location of biomedical research facilities]; Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Com. v. Board of Trustees, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d at p. 288 [EIR properly considered alternative sites on public university campus for the construction of an athletic stadium]; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway (2d Cir.1975) 524 F.2d 79, 92-93 [environmental impact statement for naval dump site must consider alternative sites]; Porter Cty. Chapter of Izaak Walton League v. A.E.C. (7th Cir.1976) 533 F.2d 1011, 1017 [public utility must consider alternative sites for location of nuclear power plant]; see generally Horn v. Intern. Business Machines Corp. (1985) 110 A.D.2d 87 [493 N.Y.S.2d 184, 190-191].) (15) Nevertheless, there may be cases involving proposed development by a private entity in which the consideration of alternative sites is necessary and proper. The private developer may own or control feasible alternative sites, may have the ability to purchase or lease such properties, or may otherwise have access to suitable alternatives. (See, e.g., San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal. App.3d 738, 751 [202 Cal. Rptr. 423] [EIR found to be defective which mentioned but failed to discuss possibility of land trade between private developer and United States Forest Service to preserve sensitive habitats]; Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, supra, 833 F.2d at pp. 815-816 [environmental impact statement review of private developer's application to construct ski resort within national forest must consider alternative sites].) In-depth analysis of alternative sites may also be appropriate where two or more private developers are seeking the approval of a local agency for the same type of development at different locations. ( Horn v. Intern. Business Machines Corp., supra, 493 N.Y.S.2d at p. 191.) Other circumstances may necessitate review of alternative properties, as well. Thus, we conclude the Board did not abuse its discretion in simply considering whether the project proponent owned or had reasonable access to alternative sites in assessing their feasibility. (16) Nor did the Board err in noting that one of the alternatives, Carpinteria Bluffs, lay outside of the County's planning jurisdiction. Again, we emphasize that an EIR may not ignore the regional impacts of a project proposal, including those impacts that occur outside of its borders; on the contrary, a regional perspective is required. ( Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 283; Guidelines, §§ 15125, 15206.) But the law does not require in-depth review of alternatives which cannot be realistically considered and successfully accomplished; the County could properly find that a property located outside of its decision making authority was not a feasible project alternative. [7]