Opinion ID: 1768560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restricted Mitigating Evidence

Text: Hodges argues that the trial court improperly restricted the presentation of mitigating evidence on his behalf provided by his mother during the penalty phase of his trial, and that the trial court improperly commented in the presence of the jury that certain of that evidence was irrelevant. Hodges's mother, Cora Cobb, was the only witness who testified at the penalty phase of his trial. She testified as to the abuse she endured from Hodges's father and from subsequent husbands, the poverty the family endured, Hodges's emotionally abusive treatment by a mentally ill stepfather, frequent moves by the family as a result of poverty and spousal abuse, and Hodges's search as a teenager for his father and his disappointment upon locating his father. At one point during her testimony, the following occurred: Q. Ms. Cobb, where did you and the children go after you left Folkston [where Hodges was born]? A. Well, at the time I had talked at length with the pastor of the church that I wentI went to. MR. ABBETT [the prosecutor]: Your Honor, could I interpose an objection on the grounds of relevancy, Your Honor? If we could get to the life of the defendant. THE COURT: Sustain the objection. MR. ABBETT: Her prior life doesn't have any relevance THE COURT: Sustain the objection. Q. Just tell me where you went. A. Went toI camemoved to Auburn. [The witness then answered several questions from Hodges's counsel as to the various places the family had lived.] Q. Where did you go after that? MR. ABBETT: Your Honor, again, I object THE COURT: Mr. Ray [defense counsel], we need to get something that MR. ABBETT:on the grounds of relevant THE COURT:is relevant to this phase of the trial. And I don't believe this is. MR. RAY [defense counsel]: Judge, Iif I may present some authority, that the instability of the family life is certainly relevant to mitigation. I have authority on that, I will be glad to submit it. THE COURT: Well, the fact that you have moved from one place to the other I don't believe has any relevancy to that? MR. RAY: Yes, sir, it does, and II mean, it's THE COURT: Mr. Ray, please don't argue with me. MR. RAY: I am not arguing with you, Judge. I am just giving you THE COURT: Come up. MR. RAY:my opinions. THE COURT: Come up here. The trial court then held a bench discussion with the lawyers out of the jury's presence regarding the mitigating evidence being offered through the mother's testimony. The trial court expressed chagrin over testimony it characterized as a narrative of this lady and her travels without any reference to what effect, if any, it has on this defendant, and stated to defense counsel that the court would give [him] a lot of leeway, ... but I don't think we ought to be wasting a juror's time on things that don't seem to have much relevance at all. The following then occurred: MR. RAY: [T]his is a serious situation andand I would refer the Court to the Supreme Court case of Eddings v. Oklahoma, [455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982),] also McGauth[a] v. California, [402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971),] which say that the family's instability, lack of a father, and that sort of thing is a mitigating circumstance, as well as the rules inin the Code of Alabama about the evidence that is relevant to a sentencing phase. Which says that anything pertaining to thethe defendant would be relevant. And I would like to refer you to those Code sections that talk about relevance ofin the sentencing phase. THE COURT: I know those Code sections, but you are asking this lady if she moved from one place and then she moved two blocks over. And this sort of thing. [The trial court is referring to Mrs. Cobb's testimony that the family lived at an Auburn address for approximately a year and then moved `to a bigger place which was on the next road over.'] MR. RAY: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Thatthat doesn't seem to me to have any relevance at all. MR. RAY: Well, as I said THE COURT: Are you going to get to something else very shortly? MR. RAY: There is going to be some history of moving around, Judge, and the stepfathers that come in and the stepfathers that are alcoholics, and the stepfathers THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't we get to that. Thereafter, defense counsel had the opportunity to go into evidence concerning the instability of Hodges's family during his childhood. Although defense counsel did not specifically question the witness further about the frequency of the family's moves, he did ask general questions, without objection from the State, about various stepfathers who came and went from the home, from which the jury could have inferred that moves took place. Obviously, the bench discussion persuaded the trial court to reconsider its view as to the relevance of testimony about the family's moves. Nevertheless, defense counsel did not object to the trial court's previous remarks in the presence of the jury concerning the lack of relevance of evidence indicating that the family had moved from place to place and he did not request a curative instruction on that issue. In discussing the testimony of Hodges's mother, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: [Cora Cobb] was repeatedly interrupted during her testimony by the prosecution and the trial court. The trial court attempted to limit her discussion about the number of moves the family had made when Hodges was growing up. We agree with defense counsel's characterization of this evidenceit was admissible to show the instability of Hodges's home environment. However, this evidence was introduced during her testimony; thus, there is no reversible error. Hodges I, 856 So.2d at 892 n. 4. The Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that a difficult family history is a mitigating circumstance, but that the weight to be accorded that circumstance depends upon the facts of the case and the defendant's age. Id. We note that Hodges was 27 years old at the time this murder was committed. Hodges argues that even though he was eventually able to present most, if not all, of the mitigating evidence he wanted the jury to hear, the trial court erred in stating in the presence of the jury, while ruling on an objection during the testimony, that the evidence regarding the family's many moves was not relevant. That error, Hodges argues, might have affected the number of jurors who voted for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole instead of death. Had more jurors voted for life imprisonment, Hodges reasons, the trial court might have been more reluctant to override the jury's verdict. Hodges is correct that the number of jurors voting for life imprisonment is a factor this Court now requires a trial court to consider in weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances in a case in which a sentence of death is a possibility. In Ex parte Carroll, 852 So.2d 833 (Ala.2002), this Court held: We take this opportunity to further explain the effect of a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Such a recommendation is to be treated as a mitigating circumstance. The weight to be given that mitigating circumstance should depend upon the number of jurors recommending a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, and also upon the strength of the factual basis for such a recommendation in the form of information known to the jury, such as conflicting evidence concerning the identity of the `triggerman' or a recommendation of leniency by the victim's family; the jury's recommendation may be overridden based upon information known only to the trial court and not to the jury, when such information can properly be used to undermine a mitigating circumstance. 852 So.2d at 836 (footnote omitted). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Hodges was able to present to the jury the evidence regarding his difficult, unstable, and impoverished childhood. The trial court initially sustained the prosecutor's objections as to the family's frequent moves and commented in the presence of the jury that such evidence was not relevant. The evidence was, however, relevant. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 820 So.2d 113 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 820 So.2d 152 (Ala.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1966, 152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002); Powell v. State, 796 So.2d 404 (Ala.Crim. App.1999), aff'd, 796 So.2d 434 (Ala.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 904, 122 S.Ct. 236, 151 L.Ed.2d 170 (2001); Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 954 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff'd, 756 So.2d 957 (Ala.2000). Nevertheless, as the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly noted, the evidence of the Hodges family's frequent moves was ultimately admitted. The question before us, then, is whether the trial court's erroneous comments about the relevancy of the evidence require us to reverse Hodges's sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. Because Hodges's defense counsel did not object to the trial court's comments or request a curative jury instruction, we review this issue pursuant to the plain-error rule. Because Hodges was sentenced to death, the failure to object at trial does not bar appellate review of this issue, but it does weigh against any claim of prejudice he makes on appeal. This Court recently addressed the application of the plain-error rule in capital cases in Ex parte Bryant, [Ms. 1990901, June 21, 2002] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2002), where we stated: ``Plain error' arises only if the error is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.' Ex parte Womack, 435 So.2d 766, 769 (Ala.1983) (quoting United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir.1981)). See also Ex parte Woodall, 730 So.2d 652 (Ala.1998). `In other words, the plain-error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is to be `used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.'' Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d 224, 232 (Ala. 1996) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)) (quoting in turn United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14 (1982)). `To rise to the level of plain error, the claimed error must not only seriously affect a defendant's substantial rights, but it must also have an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.' Hyde v. State, 778 So.2d 199, 209 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), aff'd, 778 So.2d 237 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907 (2001). This Court may take appropriate action when the error `has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights of the appellant.' Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P. `[A] failure to object at trial, while not precluding our review, will weigh against any claim of prejudice.' Ex parte Woodall, 730 So.2d at 657 (citing Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), aff'd, 577 So.2d 531 (Ala.1991)). ___ So.2d at ___ (emphasis added). Hodges contends that without the trial court's comment that evidence of the family's frequent moves was irrelevant, the jury might have returned a recommendation in favor of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole by a vote of greater than 8-4. As previously stated, the evidence regarding the frequent moves Hodges's family made when he was a child was relevant, and the trial court should not have commented in the presence of the jury on the relevancy of the evidence of the frequency of the moves. However, the assumption that had those comments not been made the jury might have returned a vote more favorable to Hodges and, thereafter, that the trial court might have declined to override the jury's recommendation, is too tenuous a foundation upon which to base plain error. After reviewing all of the evidence in this case, especially the manner in which the 27-year-old Hodges murdered the victim, we conclude that the trial court's comments concerning the lack of relevance of the evidence of the frequency of moves made in the midst of the testimony from Hodges's mother to which there was no objection, followed by a bench conference that led to permission to pursue this avenue of inquiry, do not rise to the level of plain error. We confine the operation of the plain-error rule to those cases where the error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights of the appellant. Rule 39(a)(2)(D), Ala. R.App. P. (emphasis added). We use it sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). Speculation as to what would have happened absent the unobjected-to remarks concerning the relevancy of the evidence of the frequency of the family's moves after which general testimony about the instability of Hodges's family life was permitted does not rise to the level of error that had or probably had adversely affected Hodges's substantial rights so as to permit the conclusion that a miscarriage of justice occurred.