Opinion ID: 621569
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enhancement for Misrepresentation of Identity

Text: Watkins also challenges the District Court's imposition of a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2), which provides: If (A) the offense involved the knowing misrepresentation of a participant's identity to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or (B) a participant otherwise unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, increase by 2 levels. Section 2G1.3(b)(2) sets forth a disjunctive test. Therefore, application of the enhancement is proper if the District Court did not commit clear error in finding that Watkins' conduct satisfied either subsection (b)(2)(A) or (b)(2)(B).
The PSR determined that Watkins likely misrepresented his age to Doe in order to persuade [her] into having sexual relations with him, presumably in belief that if the age difference were not as great, she would be more likely to engage in such conduct. The record amply supports the District Court's adoption of this finding, and its application of the § 2G1.3(b)(2) enhancement was not error. First, there is no dispute that Watkins knowingly misrepresented his age to Doe. Early on in their communications, Watkins told Doe that he was 38 years' old when he was in fact 48. Contrary to Watkins' assertion, this constitutes a knowing misrepresentation of a participant's identity. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3, Application Note 3(A) (The misrepresentation to which the enhancement in subsection (b)(2)(A) may apply includes misrepresentation of a participant's name, age, occupation, gender, or status[.]); see also United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 445 (2d Cir.2010) (`[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.' (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993))). Second, the evidence in the record supports a finding that Watkins' primary (if not only) objective in communicating with Doe was to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with her. From the beginning of his interactions with Doe, Watkins made it clear that the purpose of his communications was sexual in nature. When Doe asked Watkins if he wanted her to . . . get him all horny and shit, Watkins said thanks, finally, of course I do want you to. . . that's the point . . . remember I only live in New York so if you ever get brave enough. . . . He also told Doe that when they met he would teach [her] the differences between fucking and making love. [6] Finally, on October 31, 2008, the day before Watkins had vaginal intercourse with Doe for the first time, Watkins sent Doe the following electronic message: I would be in your panties by now [if I were with you]. . . . I can't let you go so stay. . . . be my girl, adding  it's only [a] twenty years [age difference], it's common for couples.  (emphasis supplied). This communicationwhich followed months of graphic sexual discussionsprovides direct support for the court's finding that Watkins misrepresented his identity (i.e., his age) in order to persuade, induce, entice, [or] coerce . . . [Doe] to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(A). Moreover, because the District Court expressly adopted the PSR, it was not required explicitly to spell out any further analysis. See United States v. Ahders, 622 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir.2010) (The district court is required to rule on controverted matters that will affect sentencing, but it may do so by adopting the recommendations of the [PSR].). Finally, given the clear sexual context within which Watkins misrepresented his identity, we do not believe that the PSR's finding (and the District Court's adoption thereof) that Watkins made such a misrepresentation to persuade [Doe] into having sexual relations with him is speculative, or that we are unable to have a meaningful opportunity for appellate review. Indeed, Watkins concedes that misrepresentation of his age was part of his initial seduction of [] Doe. Def.'s Br. 14. Accordingly, application of the § 2G1.3(b)(2) enhancement under subsection (b)(2)(A) was not error. [7]
Because we conclude that the District Court did not err in applying the U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2) enhancement pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A), it is not necessary to ascertain whether the enhancement was in error under subsection (b)(2)(B). Nonetheless, subsection (b)(2)(B), which provides for a two-level enhancement where a defendant unduly influence[s] a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, provides an independent basis for application of the enhancement. Application Note 3(B) of § 2G1.3(b)(2) provides that [i]n determining whether subsection (b)(2)(B) applies, the court should closely consider the facts of the case to determine whether a participant's influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor's behavior, provided that: [i]n a case in which a participant is at least 10 years older than the minor, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that subsection (b)(2)(B) applies. In such a case, some degree of undue influence can be presumed because of the substantial difference in age between the participant and the minor. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2), Application Note 3(B). Watkins acknowledges that there is a presumption of undue influence in this case. However, he claims that the presumption was rebutted by evidence of Doe's eagerness as a participant in [Watkins'] offense and that such evidence demonstrated that Watkins failed to compromise[ ] the voluntariness of Doe. He further contends that the District Court erred in adopting, without further explanation, the PSR's conclusion that the § 2G1.3(b)(2) enhancement was applicable under the Guidelines. We disagree. Watkins is 33 years older than Doe. Therefore, the PSR correctly concluded that there is a rebuttable presumption that Watkins unduly influenced Doe to engage in prohibited sexual conduct on the basis of their substantial age difference. [8] Further, it is clear that Watkins failed to offer any evidence rebutting the presumption on this basis and concedes that he misrepresent[ed] his age [as] part of his initial seduction of Jane Doe. Def.'s Br. 14. Therefore, the District Court was free to make its finding of undue influence, without further explanation, on the basis of the unrebutted presumption alone. [9] Watkins' assertion that Doe actively was pursuing a relationship with him does not require a different conclusion, an argument considered and rejected by the PSR, and supported by a number of our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436, 446 (6th Cir.2009) (determining that the presumption of undue influence on the basis of substantial age difference was not overcome by, inter alia, evidence suggesting that the minor initiated communications and proposed meeting with the defendant); United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 737-38 (7th Cir.2010) (upholding undue influence enhancement on the basis of a substantial age disparity because the presumption was not rebutted by, inter alia, evidence that the minor had multiple prior sexual experiences and had taken the initiative in her relationship with the defendant). Accordingly, given the substantial age difference between Watkins and Doe, the District Court did not err in finding that the rebuttable presumption was not overcome by alleged evidence of Doe's eagerness to participate in Watkins' offense. Furthermore, and in addition to the degree of undue influence that can be presumed given the substantial age disparity between Watkins and Doe, see U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2), Application Note 3(B), the evidence of record supports a finding of undue influence, given Watkins' numerous instances of manipulative behavior. See Lay, 583 F.3d at 446 ([T]he extent to which [a] defendant engaged in manipulative behavior . . . bear[s] on the question of whether the defendant has rebutted the presumption that he unduly influenced the minor.). Here, Watkins picked Doe up at her home; gave her gifts, including four necklaces and two rings; took her to get free meals and clothing; told Doe that her boyfriend was not treating her well because he did not have sexual intercourse with her but only engaged in touching, which was kids' stuff; misrepresented himself as a former drug addict and as having only two children when, in fact, he smoked marijuana all day long, every day and had five children; and, of course, misrepresented his age as part of his initial seduction of [] Doe. Cf. United States v. Wise, 278 Fed.Appx. 552, 563 (6th Cir.2008) (summary order) (determining that the facts supported a finding of undue influence given that defendant provided the minor victim with clothes, meals, gifts, and picked her up at her home). We also reject Watkins' assertion that the District Court erred in adopting the PSR's conclusion that the § 2G1.3(b)(2) enhancement was applicable without further comment as to the factual findings included therein. A district court that adopts the factual findings of a defendant's PSR is not required explicitly to provide any further analysis. See Ahders, 622 F.3d at 119 (The district court is required to rule on controverted matters that will affect sentencing, but it may do so by adopting the recommendations of the [PSR].). Accordingly, we reject Watkins' challenge to the District Court's application of the § 2G1.3(b)(2) enhancement under subsection (b)(2)(B).