Opinion ID: 1127349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The trial court's rejection of defense instructions relating to specific intent.

Text: (18) Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing two jury instructions requested by the defense  a special instruction formulated by the defense and former CALJIC No. 8.79  relating to whether defendant's mental or physical condition prevented his forming the specific intent necessary to establish his commission of the charged offenses. [9] At trial, defense counsel argued that the evidence of defendant's voluntary intoxication resulting from his ingestion of excessive amounts of cocaine warranted the proffered instructions as bearing upon the issue whether defendant formed the specific intent relevant to the crimes charged. In rejecting the instructions, the trial court observed that, although evidence was presented relating to defendant's use of cocaine on the day preceding the commission of the crimes, there was no testimony or other evidence relating to his diminished capacity or any other state of mind at the time the crimes were alleged to have occurred. The court further concluded that, without expert witness testimony as to the effects of cocaine consumption upon defendant's mental state, there was no basis for giving the requested intructions. Defendant asserts that, because specific intent was an element of the charged offenses of murder and robbery, the trial court was obligated to instruct on whether defendant actually formed the requisite specific intent. Defendant maintains that, because evidence of voluntary intoxication was relevant to show he did not have the required intent to rob or murder Bowser, the trial court erred in refusing the defense instructions, thereby denying defendant the opportunity to present the defense that, as a result of voluntary intoxication, he lacked the requisite intent. Defendant contends the asserted error was compounded by the trial court's instruction, pursuant to former CALJIC No, 3.34, [10] informing the jury that [t]he intent with which an act is done is shown [by] ... the soundness of mind ... of the person committing the act, and that [f]or the purposes of the case on trial, you must assume that the defendant was of sound mind at the time of his alleged conduct. It is defendant's position that the giving of this instruction, in the absence of the instructions requested by the defense relating to defendant's lack of specific intent by virtue of his intoxication, operated to shift the burden of proof on the issue of intent to defendant, while preventing him from meeting that burden by establishing that he lacked the intent required for the offenses, as a result of intoxication. We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing the instructions requested by the defense. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the proffered instructions  regarding whether, as a result of defendant's mental or physical condition, he had the capacity to form, or was prevented from forming, the requisite specific intent or mental state  technically were improper in that they pertained to the theory of diminished capacity. The defense of diminished capacity was abolished by legislative enactments in 1981, prior to the commission of the crimes in the present case in 1982. (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, pp. 1591-1592; see People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1111-1112 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) As part of this legislative enactment, section 22 was amended to provide that [e]vidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged (§ 22, subd. (a)), and that [e]vidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged. (§ 22, subd. (b); see People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1178 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965] [trial court properly refused to instruct under former CALJIC No. 8.41, an instruction dealing with the effect of diminished capacity caused, for example, by voluntary intoxication].) Notwithstanding the abolition of the diminished capacity defense, evidence of voluntary intoxication is relevant to the extent it bears upon the question whether the defendant actually had the requisite specific mental state required for commission of the crimes at issue. (See People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1108, 1115-1116.) Even had the instructions requested by the defense been rephrased to pertain specifically to evidence of voluntary intoxication as bearing upon whether defendant actually formed the intent or mental state to rob or murder, however, the record supports the trial court's determination that the evidence at trial was insufficient to warrant the giving of such instructions. At the guilt phase of the trial, the defense did not introduce any evidence as to defendant's mental state at the time the murder and robbery allegedly occurred, or any evidence that would have informed the jury regarding the effect of defendant's freebasing cocaine on his actual formation of the specific intent and mental state involved in robbing, killing, premeditating, or deliberating, or any other mental state relevant to the crimes charged. Defendant contends, however, that the evidence presented by the prosecution at the guilt phase was sufficient to support the giving of such an instruction. We disagree. Although McLaurin's testimony indicated that both McLaurin and defendant had freebased cocaine on the day prior to the commission of the crimes, McLaurin was not present with defendant at the time the crimes occurred, and he provided no testimony with regard to whether defendant was intoxicated at that time. Moreover, the additional evidence presented by the prosecution concerning the circumstances surrounding the robbery and murder did not suggest that the perpetrator lacked the specific intent or mental state required to commit the crimes. To the contrary, the circumstantial evidence indicated that the crimes were carried out in accordance with a predesigned plan, and McLaurin's testimony relating the statements made by defendant following the murder and robbery helped support a finding that defendant was fully aware of his actions and intended their fatal consequences. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly found the evidence insufficient to warrant an instruction directing the jury to consider the effect of intoxication with regard to whether defendant actually formed the specific intent or other mental state relevant to the commission of the charged offenses. This conclusion undermines defendant's related claim pertaining to the instruction corresponding to former CALJIC No. 3.34. That instruction directed the jury's attention, in determining intent, to the circumstances attending the act, the manner in which it [was] done, the means used, as well as the soundness of mind of the defendant. Because the defense presented no evidence relating to defendant's voluntary intoxication at the time of the commission of the crimes, the instruction's reference to soundness of mind, and its assumption that defendant was of sound mind, likely would have been understood by a reasonable juror as pertaining only to defendant's sanity, and would not have misled a reasonable juror with regard to the separate issue whether, in light of the evidence of intoxication, defendant harbored the requisite mental state or specific intent to murder or rob. (See People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 669-671 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84] [a reasonable juror would have understood the presumption under former CALJIC No. 3.34 as pertaining to sanity].) For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing the instructions on intoxication requested by defendant.