Opinion ID: 793892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Newly Discovered Evidence/Insufficient Evidence to Support Conviction

Text: 94 Finally, Carter claims that he should receive a new trial because newly discovered evidence reveals that insufficient evidence exists to support his aggravated murder conviction. Carter bases this claim on the affidavits of two witnesses who testified for the prosecution at trial and on the affidavit of another inmate, Chris Isome, who did not testify at the trial. The witnesses' affidavits recant their trial testimony, claiming they lied because of the deals the prosecution promised them. Isome's affidavit states that Allen threatened revenge against Carter after their confrontation over the television. 95 The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that this claim was procedurally defaulted. Carter, Nos. C-940375, C-940835, at -11. The court also denied Carter's claims on the merits, concluding that the purported `newly discovered evidence' was merely cumulative of evidence presented previously and that it did not undermine the jury's conclusion that Carter killed Allen with prior calculation and design. Id. at . The district court found the claim procedurally defaulted and held an evidentiary hearing on the matter to determine whether Carter had established actual innocence to excuse the procedural default. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court found no reason to excuse the default and ultimately denied the claim. 96 Generally, federal courts may not consider habeas claims not considered by the state courts due to procedural default. Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50 (6th Cir.2000). This Circuit applies the familiar test of Maupin v. Smith to determine whether a claim is procedurally defaulted: (1) whether there is a procedural rule that the petitioner failed to follow; (2) whether the state courts actually enforced the rule; (3) whether the procedural default is an adequate and independent ground on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim; and (4) whether the petitioner has shown cause for his failure to follow the rule and prejudice resulting therefrom. 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1985). Even where a petitioner fails to show cause and prejudice, the court must still consider whether a miscarriage of justice would occur if the procedural default were enforced. Specifically, a court may notice an otherwise defaulted claim if it concludes that petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the crime . . . . Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 673 (6th Cir.2001). 97 Citing its decision in State v. Zuern, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that Carter's claim was barred under res judicata because it could and should have been raised in a motion for a new trial under Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(B), and not in a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Carter, Nos. C-940375, C-940835, at -16. Although the state court also denied Carter relief on the merits, [w]hen the state court relies on an independent procedural ground in order to deny relief, its discussion of the merits of the claim will not disturb the procedural bar. Clifford v. Chandler, 333 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir.2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Thus, the first two Maupin factors are met. 98 This court has consistently held that Ohio's doctrine of res judicata is an adequate and independent ground justifying default. See, e.g., Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 967 (6th Cir.2004) (finding meritless petitioner's claim that the Ohio courts do not consistently apply the doctrine of res judicata in capital cases), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1939, 161 L.Ed.2d 779 (2005); Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir.2001) (finding that Ohio's doctrine of res judicata as a procedural bar is regularly applied by the Ohio courts); Greer, 264 F.3d at 673 (noting that this court has rejected contentions that Ohio has failed to apply its [doctrine of res judicata] consistently). Carter does not argue otherwise. Thus, we conclude that Ohio's doctrine of res judicata is an adequate and independent ground on which to foreclose Carter's claim. 99 Lastly, Carter does not argue cause to excuse the procedural default, and no cause is apparent from the record. Having determined that no cause exists, we need not decide whether Carter suffered any prejudice. See Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 609 (6th Cir.2001). 100 The final inquiry is whether a miscarriage of justice would result through enforcement of the procedural default. A miscarriage of justice exists in the extraordinary case where the petitioner demonstrates his actual innocence. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Williams, 380 F.3d at 973. `[A]ctual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). 101 Carter cannot establish his actual innocence because he admitted killing Allen at sentencing. 10 Instead, he argues that this evidence creates reasonable doubt as to whether he killed Allen with prior calculation and design. However, none of the newly discovered evidence casts any doubt on Carter's conviction or sentence. Isome's affidavit merely provides evidence of Allen's state of mind prior to the altercation; it says nothing about Carter's state of mind or whether Carter acted with prior calculation and design. The affidavits of Steele and Johnson, both still inmates in the Ohio correctional system, are of little value, as they merely recant their trial testimony. See Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1233-34, 105 S.Ct. 34, 82 L.Ed.2d 925 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Recantation testimony is properly viewed with great suspicion. It upsets society's interest in the finality of convictions, is very often unreliable and given for suspect motives, and most often serves merely to impeach cumulative evidence rather than to undermine confidence in the accuracy of the conviction.); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 508 n. 16 (6th Cir.2000) (`Recanting affidavits and witnesses are viewed with extreme suspicion by the courts.' (quoting Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 997 (5th Cir.1996))). Moreover, Steele has since recanted his affidavit and pled guilty to a charge of perjury. During his plea colloquy, Steele acknowledged that the testimony he gave at Carter's trial was true and that his subsequent affidavit was false. 11 In short, Carter's evidence does not establish his actual innocence or any doubt as to his sentence. Therefore, we conclude that this claim is procedurally defaulted.