Opinion ID: 1941359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Even if there was a seizure, the community caretaker doctrine applies

Text: Assuming arguendo that Officer Brittingham's encounter with Williams constituted a seizure, his actions during the initial encounter were nonetheless reasonable and valid. Although a warrantless seizure is presumed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, this presumption may be rebutted by showing that a specific exception to the warrant requirement applies. [20] One exception recognized by many jurisdictions is the non-criminal, non-investigative community caretaker or public safety doctrine. [21] The doctrine stems from a recognition that [l]ocal police have multiple responsibilities, only one of which is the enforcement of criminal law.... [22] The modern police officer is a jack-of-all-emergencies, with `complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal offenses'; by default or design he is also expected `to aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm,' `assist those who cannot care for themselves,' and `provide other services on an emergency basis.' [23] To require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before police can investigate and render assistance in these situations would severely hamstring their ability to protect and serve the public. The role of police as community caretakers has long been recognized under federal law. [24] Forty years ago, in Terry v. Ohio, [25] the Supreme Court's seminal case on investigative stops, the Court explained that [s]treet encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity.... Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime. The Court further acknowledged in Cady v. Dombrowski, [26] that [l]ocal police officers ... frequently... engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. In response to this federal recognition, many jurisdictions have subsequently addressed the community caretaker doctrine, with a majority adopting some form that permits police officers to investigate situations in which a citizen may be in peril or need some type of assistance. [27] Some jurisdictions have reasoned that this type of police contact is not a seizure; [28] while others have concluded that it constitutes a seizure, but have upheld the seizure as reasonable. [29] We have not previously had the occasion specifically to address the effect of the community caretaker function in Delaware. [30] We agree with the majority of jurisdictions, and find, that the doctrine appropriately reflects that the role of police in Delaware is not limited to merely the detection and prevention of criminal activity, but also encompasses a non-investigative, non-criminal role to ensure the safety and welfare of our citizens. [31] In order to balance this caretaking function with the fundamental protections guaranteed by the Delaware and United States Constitutions, we must ascertain that the encounter was part of the police officer's community caretaker function; that the officer's actions during it remained within the caretaking function; and that once the caretaking function had ceased, either the encounter was terminated, or some other justification existed for its continuance. We find that the test promulgated by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Lovegren, [32] properly balances these concerns. Following an in-depth analysis of various concerns informing the community caretaker doctrine, the Supreme Court of Montana adopted the following three-part test to ensure its proper application: First, as long as there are objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is in peril, then that officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the citizen is in need of aid, then the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure implicating... the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, but more importantly, those greater guarantees afforded under [state law]. [33] We adopt this test to ensure that investigations conducted in Delaware under the community caretaker doctrine are reasonable. The community caretaker doctrine has three elements. First, if there are objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in apparent peril, distress or need of assistance, the police officer may stop and investigate for the purpose of assisting the person. Second, if the citizen is in need of aid, then the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, the caretaking function is over and any further detention constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless the officer has a warrant, or some exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Williams contends that even if the community caretaker doctrine applies to his initial encounter with Officer Brittingham, once he declined the proffered assistance, Officer Brittingham's caretaking function was at an end. Williams argues that by not terminating his questioning at this point, Officer Brittingham illegally detained Williams without any reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in any criminal activity. [34] Specifically, Williams argues that his name and date of birth were obtained in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1902. Section 1902 provides: A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who the officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person's name, address, business abroad and destination. [35] The General Assembly based this provision on the Uniform Arrest Act (UAA), which was intended to ensure that a suspect was not considered arrested when an officer conducted an investigation. [36] We have not previously addressed the interplay between Section 1902 and the community caretaker doctrine. [37] We note, however, that several jurisdictions adopting the community caretaker doctrine also have a statute based on the UAA. [38] None of these jurisdictions have used the UAA to limit the community caretaker doctrine, which, where applicable, permits identifying the person offered aid by the police. In Commonwealth v. Evans, [39] the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the community caretaker function allowed a trooper to approach a vehicle parked in the breakdown lane at 11:30 p.m. with its right blinker flashing. Intending to see if the defendant needed assistance, the trooper asked the defendant what he was doing and then requested his license and registration. The court held the request for the license and registration was not an unreasonable seizure. [40] Specifically, the court held that the officer's actions fell squarely under the trooper's community caretaking function and the officer was justified in requesting the license because: (1) officers are often required to make a written report of all encounters with citizens; (2) an officer must know who he has assisted in case a citizen files a legal claim against the officer; and (3) innocent activity can turn out later to be criminal activity. [41] Similarly, in State v. Brunelle, [42] in evaluating the extent of the community caretaking exception, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a peace officer's limited request for information [license and registration], which would enable her to maintain a record of her contact with the vehicle's owner in the event that any questions about the vehicle or her contact with the owner subsequently arose was a reasonable exercise of her community caretaking duties. [43] We agree with the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire that a police officer's limited request for information is reasonable because it enables him to maintain a record of his contact with the individual encountered. Officers are often required to make written reports of all encounters; an officer must also know who he has assisted in case someone files a legal claim against him; and innocent activity can turn out later to be criminal activity. Here, Officer Brittingham's entire initial encounter with Williams was reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. The weather conditions and early morning hour are objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that Williams was in apparent peril, distress or need of assistance. Thus, it was proper for Officer Brittingham to stop and investigate for the purpose of assisting Williams. [44] Since it appeared Williams was in need of aid, the officer could take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. We agree with the Superior Court that Officer Brittingham's actions were an appropriate effort to render assistance. He stopped his car ten feet behind Williams, approached with his flashlight, and asked Williams if he needed assistance. A two to three minute exchange followed in which Williams declined a ride and explained that his car had broken down and he was walking to meet his mother at a nearby gas station. The community caretaking function did not cease at this point. As part of it, the officer could make an administrative record of the encounter. As Officer Brittingham testified, he asked for Williams's name and date of birth so that he could create a record of the encounter and have a contact in case someone reported him missing or if a crime was reported in the area. The Officer also told Williams that he could contact him for further assistance. Once the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, the caretaking function is over and any further detention constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless the officer has a warrant, or some exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Here, Officer Brittingham terminated the initial encounter once he was assured Williams was not in need of assistance and his caretaking function was at an end. His subsequent seizure of Williams was based upon the outstanding warrants for Williams's arrest, which the officer discovered after the initial encounter. Williams's arrest was authorized by these warrants and, once the arrest had occurred, Officer Brittingham could lawfully search Williams incident to that arrest. [45] The Superior Court did not err in denying Williams's motion to suppress.