Opinion ID: 2219269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appropriateness of Multiple Punishments

Text: ถ 98. Often in our multiplicity analyses, consideration of the appropriateness of multiple punishments is informed by our conclusions regarding the nature of the proscribed conduct. See, e.g., Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 168-170 (overlapping the discussion of the third and fourth factors); Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 755-56 (same). This is true in the present case. There is no need to repeat extensively the analysis from the previous category. ถ 99. Because different interests are protected by imposing punishment under both ง 940.19 and ง 940.20(1), see Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 756, the legislature could have thought it appropriate to convict and punish a defendant for both offenses arising out of a prisoner's single act of battery. ถ 100. There is simply no symmetry between the battery by prisoner statute and the well-understood gradation scheme found in ง 940.19. If the legislature sensed that the general battery statute adequately punished and deterred the conduct of battery in all circumstances, we doubt that it would have created additional offenses beyond the conduct proscribed under ง 940.19. ถ 101. Wisconsin Stat. ง 940.20(1) was passed to provide more severe sanctions for prisoners who commit batteries than for non-prisoners who commit the same batteries. See C.D.M v. State, 125 Wis. 2d 170, 175, 370 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1985). The harm caused by aggravated battery and the harm caused by battery by a prisoner are significantly different to justify charging them as separate offenses, Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 169, even though the act generating these disparate harms is the same. In enacting ง 940.20(1) on top of ง 940.19, the legislature intended to punish two different, albeit overlapping evils. See C.D.M., 125 Wis. 2d at 175 (The enhanced penalty of [Wis. Stat. ง 940.20(1)] is intended to deter batteries in circumstances where the usual penalty may be ineffective.). ถ 102. Davison contends that the purpose of imposing additional punishment when a battery is committed by a designated actor ( e.g., a prisoner) or against a designated victim ( e.g., a firefighter) is not undermined by barring multiple punishments. He notes that, under ง 940.20(1), any battery by a prisoner is a Class D felony, regardless of the degree of bodily injury caused or the level of intent to cause harm. By contrast, under งง 940.19(1) and (2), a battery that causes bodily harm is only a Class A misdemeanor, while a battery causing substantial bodily harm is only a Class E felony. Therefore, Davison argues, the statute would still provide for additional punishment and deterrence, since any battery done by a prisoner would be a Class D felony. [29] ถ 103. Under Davison's view of ง 939.66(2m), however, a prisoner who commits aggravated battery will be exposed to no greater punishment than a nonprisoner who commits this same offense. Hence, the objectives of deterrence and extra protection would be undermined. The legislature may of course enact Davison's interpretation, but we are not convinced that it did. ถ 104. Wisconsin courts have previously valued the deterrence created by separate punishments for different offenses when the legislature was not clear whether multiple punishments were permitted. In Grayson, for example, we reasoned that multiple punishment for each 120-day period of continual failure to pay child support was essential for deterring long-term failure to provide support in accordance with the felony non-support statutes. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 166. In State v. Hamilton, 146 Wis. 2d 426, 432 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals allowed multiple punishment under Wis. Stat. ง 943.37(3) for each item a defendant possesses with altered or removed serial numbers, in order to make the criminal risk concomitant with the potential criminal profit. Id. at 441. If additional punishment for battery by prisoner is not allowed in cases of aggravated battery, then the greater evil of aggravated battery by prisoner is not punished proportionally to that greater evil. See Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 167 (The longer the period of nonpayment, the greater the harm that is inflicted.). ถ 105. Inability to prosecute and punish under both statues permits an offender, at least in some circumstances, to inflict a greater degree of harm without fear of additional punishment. This odd result is similar to one recognized by this court in Anderson. In explaining why multiple punishments under the bail jumping statute were appropriate when a defendant violated different and distinct terms of his bail, we explained: Without imposing multiple punishments for violating the different terms of bail, a defendant may even be encouraged to violate multiple terms, knowing that the punishment will be no different whether he or she violates one or all terms of bail. It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended this result. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 756. ถ 106. In summary, considering the appropriateness of multiple punishments for committing both aggravated battery and battery by prisoner, we do not perceive the policy basis upon which the legislature would have intended to preclude multiple convictions for these offenses in a single prosecution.