Opinion ID: 772486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Julie Uberoi

Text: 66 Dhinsa argues that the district court improperly admitted the testimony of Uberoi, Satinderjit's girlfriend, regarding threatening telephone calls she received from an individual identifying himself as Gurmeet Singh. We find that there was a sufficient basis for the district court to conclude that the telephone calls were adequately authenticated under Fed. R. Evid. 901 and, therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that testimony. 67 Dhinsa objected to the admission of Uberoi's testimony, arguing that the telephone calls were not properly authenticated. This prompted the district court to hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury, during which Uberoi testified about the two telephone calls she allegedly received from Dhinsa. In the first call, Uberoi testified that an individual, speaking in a mix of Punjabi and English, identified himself as Gurmeet Singh and asked Uberoi if she would convey a message to Satinderjit, whom he referred to as Ladu. The caller stated that he would have Satinderjit and Uberoi shot if Satinderjit did not stay out of his business and not mess around with the case. Uberoi agreed to relay the message to Satinderjit, and did so later that day. A few days later, Uberoi received a second telephone call from an individual again identifying himself as Gurmeet Singh. The caller inquired about whether Uberoi conveyed his earlier message. Uberoi indicated that she had conveyed the message, but that Satinderjit didn't have much to say about it. The caller then asked Uberoi if [she] told [Satinderjit] that he would have us shot if [Satinderjit] didn't stop messing around and to stay out of his business. After Uberoi informed Satinderjit about the second call, he instructed her not to take similar calls in the future. 68 Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that [t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. See also Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1409 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 496-500 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the interaction between Fed. R. Evid. 104 and 901). Rule 901 does not erect a particularly high hurdle, United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 716 (1st Cir. 1992), and the proponent of the evidence is not required to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be. United States v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 248 (1999). The requirement under Rule 901 is satisfied if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification. United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1303 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted); see also Pluta, 176 F.3d at 49 ([T]he standard for authentication, and hence for admissibility, is one of reasonable likelihood.) (quotation marks omitted); Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 716 (If in the court's judgment it seems reasonably probable that the evidence is what it purports to be, the command of Rule 901(a) is satisfied, and the evidence's persuasive force is left to the jury.) (quotation marks omitted). The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether an item of evidence has been properly authenticated, and we review its ruling only for abuse of discretion. See Pluta, 176 F.3d at 49; see also Ruggiero, 928 F.2d at 1303. 69 A telephone conversation is admissible in evidence if the identity of the speaker is satisfactorily established. United States v. Albergo, 539 F.2d 860, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1976). While a mere assertion of identity by a person talking on the telephone is not in itself sufficient to authenticate that person's identity, some additional evidence, which `need not fall in[to] any set pattern,' may provide the necessary foundation. United States v. Khan, 53 F.3d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(6) advisory committee notes, ex. 6); cf. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (providing a non-exhaustive list of examples that satisfy the authentication requirement); Fed. R. Evid. 901 advisory committee note to subdivision (b) (The examples [in Rule 901(b)] are not intended as an exclusive enumeration of allowable methods but are meant to guide and suggest, leaving room for growth and development in this area of the law.). For example, [t]he authentication may be established by circumstantial evidence such as the similarity between what was discussed by the speakers and what each subsequently did. United States v. Puerta Restrepo, 814 F.2d 1236, 1239 (7th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Garrison, 168 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir. 1999) ([A] `telephone conversation may be shown to have emanated from a particular person by virtue of its disclosing knowledge of facts known peculiarly to him.') (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(6) advisory committee notes, ex. 4); United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 236 (1st Cir. 1987) ([I]t is a well settled proposition that someone familiar with the speaker's voice need not identify it before evidence of a call can be admitted.). We apply these standards in determining whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that the evidence adequately established that [Dhinsa] was more likely than not the caller. Khan, 53 F.3d at 516. 70 Following a hearing during which Uberoi testified, the district court ruled that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Dhinsa, or someone acting on his behalf, made the threatening telephone calls to Uberoi. Specifically, the district court concluded that the telephone calls were adequately authenticated based on, inter alia, (1) the fact that the caller identified himself as the defendant; and (2) the need for Dhinsa to identify himself in order to receive the benefit of the threat. Because we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Uberoi's testimony regarding the threatening telephone conversations, we reject Dhinsa's challenge. See Morrison, 153 F.3d at 56; Khan, 53 F.3d at 516. 71