Opinion ID: 6356952
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown's Appeal

Text: Brown presents two issues. First, he claims that because an autopsy report is testimonial, the introduction of such a report at trial may occur only when the testifying witness is the person who prepared the report, observed the examination from which the report arose, or actively supervised its preparation and completion and is subject to cross-examination. Brown's Brief at 15, citing Yohe , 79 A.3d at 539 . Therefore, according to Brown, [w]here the person testifying neither authored the report nor participated in or supervised the examination and the author is not produced at trial for cross-examination, use of the autopsy report violates the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 12-13, citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-311 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 . Brown argues the constitutional analysis of a testimonial report is no different when an expert reads the report and makes it  the basis for her/his 'new' conclusion. Id. at 16. Brown claims the factual description of the body's condition and the results of the examination [contained in the autopsy report] neither require nor permit any independent analysis or application of expertise[,] id. at 17, and where a surrogate medical examiner merely parrots the findings of the examiner who conducted the autopsy, such parroting violates the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 17-18, quoting State v. Bass , 224 N.J. 285 , 132 A.3d 1207 , 1226-27 (2016). In sum, whether the in-court expert repeats another expert's testimonial report or adopts it into his/her own verbiage by making it the basis of the conclusions relayed in the courtroom, the result is the same-a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of Confrontation. Id. at 18, citing Bullcoming generally ; Bass , supra ; State v. Smith , 367 P.3d 420 , 432 (N.M. 2016). Second, Brown claims Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 does not permit an expert to offer an opinion based upon testimonial hearsay. Brown's Brief at 18. Brown concedes under the Rule [i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they [the facts or data] need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. Id. at 18-19, quoting Pa.R.E. 703. Nevertheless, Brown argues,  'the underlying information is not admissible for its truth or substance, but only to inform the jury of the foundation for the opinion.'  Id. at 18-19, quoting 1-703 Ohlbaum on the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence § 03.07 (2016). Relying on various federal decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and academic commentary, Brown asserts that [w]here that [underlying] inadmissible information is testimonial hearsay, however, [ Rule] 703 must bow to the right of Confrontation[.] Id. at 19, 20-21, citing United States v. Rios , 830 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Garcia , 793 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2015) ; Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, LLC , 472 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2006). 8 Finally, Brown insists this issue was directly before the United States Supreme Court in Williams , and asserts [a]t least five of the nine Justices agreed that [F.R.E.] 703 does not permit expert testimony based on testimonial hearsay where it has relevance only if true. Brown's Brief at 21. The Commonwealth responds that expert opinion testimony based on information provided by persons not in court has never been held to violate the Confrontation Clause. Commonwealth's Brief at 33, citing Commonwealth v. Baumhammers , 599 Pa. 1 , 960 A.2d 59 , 95 n.28 (2008). The Commonwealth further asserts decisions of this Court have upheld the precise evidentiary practice that occurred here, claiming  Pennsylvania law holds [a]n expert witness 'who did not perform an autopsy may testify as to cause of death as long as the testifying expert is qualified and sufficiently informed.'  Id. , quoting Commonwealth v. Ali , 608 Pa. 71 , 10 A.3d 282 , 306 (2010) ( citing Commonwealth v. Mitchell , 391 Pa.Super. 100 , 570 A.2d 532 (1990) (in homicide cases, testifying pathologists may base their opinions on facts contained in autopsy reports authored by others) ). The Commonwealth additionally notes the High Court's OAJC in Williams states it has  'long been accepted that an expert witness may voice an opinion based on facts concerning the events at issue in a particular case even if the expert lacks [ ] first-hand knowledge of those facts.'  Id. at 36, quoting Williams , 567 U.S. at 67 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 . According to the Commonwealth, because Dr. Chu's expert testimony was based on otherwise inadmissible facts upon which he relied to reach his independent conclusions, his expert opinion testimony did not offend the Confrontation Clause. With respect to Brown's arguments relying on Rule 703, the Commonwealth posits the issue is waived because Brown never relied on Rule 703 as a basis for his objection to Dr. Osbourne's report or the testimony of Dr. Chu, and in any event, the prosecution was required under Pennsylvania evidentiary rules to present the evidence upon which Dr. Chu's opinion was based. Id. at 39-43. As to the portion of Dr. Chu's testimony that referenced Dr. Osbourne's conclusions or opinions, the Commonwealth asserts any passing reference to Dr. Osbourne's cumulative opinion about cause and manner of death and the admission of his autopsy report into evidence was at most harmless error. Id. at 37.