Opinion ID: 166405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application to FGM

Text: 32 As acknowledged by the BIA in its decision in this case, FGM can be the basis of a claim of past persecution. An alien making such a claim must establish that (1) the FGM constituted persecution; (2) the alien belonged to a particular social group; and (3) there was a nexus between the FGM and membership in the group—that is, the FGM was performed on account of her membership in that group. We proceed to examine each of the components of such a claim.
33 The INA does not define persecution. We have held that persecution requires the infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as offensive, Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), and encompasses more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty, Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The BIA has explicitly recognized that FGM constituted persecution. In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (1996). That opinion provides the following description of such mutilation: 34 [T]he FGM practiced by her tribe . . . is an extreme type involving cutting the genitalia with knives, extensive bleeding, and a 40-day recovery period. 35 . . . 36 FGM is extremely painful and at least temporarily incapacitating. It permanently disfigures the female genitalia. FGM exposes the girl or woman to the risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications. These include, among others, bleeding, infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological trauma, and damage to the urethra and anus. It can result in permanent loss of genital sensation and can adversely affect sexual and erotic functions. 37 Id. at 361, 1996 WL 379826. 38 Although many cases construing persecution involve persecutors who had the subjective intent to punish their victims, this subjective punitive or malignant intent is not required for harm to constitute persecution. Id. at 365, 1996 WL 379826 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, whether Ms. Niang suffered the mutilation when she was 25 in an attack by her family, or at about the age of 10 as is customary for other members of her tribe, appears to be irrelevant in deciding whether her mutilation constituted persecution. 39 Other circuits agree that FGM constitutes persecution, whether for the purpose of determining past persecution or the purpose of determining well-founded fear of persecution. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir.2005) (past persecution) ([W]e have no doubt that the range of procedures collectively known as female genital mutilation rises to the level of persecution within the meaning of our asylum law.); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir.2004) (future persecution) (Forced female genital mutilation involves the infliction of grave harm constituting persecution . . . that can form the basis of a successful claim for asylum.); Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 308 (7th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (future persecution) (FGM is a horrifically brutal procedure).
40 Although Ms. Niang has added various factual embellishments, her central claim has been that she was subjected to FGM because she was a female within a tribe practicing this ritual. Even if her embellishments are disbelieved, she may be entitled to relief if females in the Tukulor Fulani tribe constitute a social group within the meaning of the INA and she suffered FGM because she is a female in that group. 41 This circuit has not yet addressed the meaning of membership in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). But the BIA did so in In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-234 (1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (1987). Acosta began its analysis by noting the ambiguity of the statutory term: 42 Congress did not indicate what it understood [membership in a particular social group] to mean, nor is its meaning clear in the [Refugee] Protocol. This ground was not included in the definition of a refugee proposed by the committee that drafted the U.N. Convention; rather it was added as an afterthought. International jurisprudence interpreting this ground of persecution is sparse. It has been suggested that the notion of a `social group' was considered to be of broader application than the combined notions of racial, ethnic, and religious groups and that in order to stop a possible gap in the coverage of the U.N. Convention, this ground was added to the definition of a refugee. A purely linguistic analysis of this ground of persecution suggests that it may encompass persecution seeking to punish either people in a certain relation, or having a certain degree of similarity, to one another or people of like class or kindred interests, such as shared ethnic, cultural, or linguistic origins, education, family background, or perhaps economic activity. The [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] has suggested that a `particular social group' connotes persons of similar background, habits, or social status and that a claim to fear persecution on this ground may frequently overlap with persecution on other grounds such as race, religion, or nationality. 43 Id. at 232-33, 1985 WL 56042 (internal citations omitted). 44 Applying the canon of construction ejusdem generis, see Black's Law Dictionary 535 (7th ed.1999) (defining ejusdem generis as [a] canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific . . . things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only. . . things of the same type as those listed.), the BIA construed membership in a particular social group in a manner consistent with the more specific grounds listed. Because race, religion, nationality, and political opinion describe[] persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed, the BIA reasoned that the characteristics defining a particular social group must also be so limited. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233, 1985 WL 56042. It concluded: 45 [W]e interpret the phrase `persecution on account of membership in a particular social group' to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership. . . . [W]hatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. 46 Id. at 233, 1985 WL 56042. 47 As we have previously stated, we must defer to the BIA's permissible interpretation of ambiguous language in the INA. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439. We agree that the term social group is ambiguous and find the BIA's above analysis to be reasonable. The BIA's construction of membership in a particular social group is therefore a permissible construction of the statute to which we must defer. See id. Five other circuits have done the same. See Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st. Cir.1990); Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 396-97 (1st Cir.2004); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3rd. Cir.1993); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546-48 (6th Cir.2003); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir.1998); Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1184-87 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). 48 We recognize that two circuits may take a different view. But the leading case in one does not even cite Acosta, much less explain why the court should not defer to the BIA's definition of social group. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir.1991) (A particular social group is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in general.). And the Eighth Circuit, although quoting with apparent approval a formulation not found in Acosta, proceeds to apply the reasoning of the Third Circuit's opinion in Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240, which follows Acosta, to deny relief. See Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir.1994). Neither of these opinions persuades us to reject or modify the Acosta definition. 49 Applying the Acosta definition of social group, the female members of a tribe would be a social group. Both gender and tribal membership are immutable characteristics. Indeed, Acosta itself identified sex and kinship ties as characteristics that can define a social group. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 50 There may be understandable concern in using gender as a group-defining characteristic. One may be reluctant to permit, for example, half a nation's residents to obtain asylum on the ground that women are persecuted there. See Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640 (rejecting claim that Iranian women, by virtue of their innate characteristic (their sex) and the harsh restrictions placed upon them, are a particular social group). Cf. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 663-64 (2d Cir.1991) (rejecting claim that women who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerillas are a particular social group). But the focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender constitutes a social group (which both certainly do) but on whether the members of that group are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted on account of their membership. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)42(A). It may well be that only certain women—say, those who protest inequities—suffer harm severe enough to be considered persecution. The issue then becomes whether the protesting women constitute a social group. 51 We are not persuaded that the BIA, contrary to the language of Acosta, requires more than gender plus tribal membership to identify a social group. The one decision that may suggest this requirement is Kasinga, in which the BIA granted asylum to a woman who feared being subjected to FGM if returned to her native land. The BIA described her social group as young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice. 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. The Board noted that its description was very similar to the formulations suggested by the parties. Id. See id. at 372 (Filppu, Bd.Mem., concurring) (the social group definition has not been a real source of dispute between the parties). It explained its ruling as follows: 52 The defined social group meets the test we set forth in Matter of Acosta [, 19 I. & N. Dec.] at 233, 1985 WL 56042. See also Matter of H-, Interim Decision 3276 (BIA 1996) (finding that identifiable shared ties of kinship warrant characterization as a social group). It also is consistent with the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, where this case arose. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir.1993) (stating that Iranian women who refuse to conform to the Iranian Government's gender-specific laws and social norms may well satisfy the Acosta definition). 53 In accordance with Acosta, the particular social group is defined by common characteristics that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because such characteristics are fundamental to their individual identities. The characteristics of being a young woman and a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe cannot be changed. The characteristic of having intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she should not be required to change it. 54 Id. at 365-66, 1996 WL 379826. We find it noteworthy that Kasinga's explanation provides no reason why more than gender or tribal membership would be required to identify a social group. Indeed, the opinion states that it is [i]n accordance with Acosta,  id. at 366, 1996 WL 379826, and Acosta specifically identifies sex [and] kinship ties as shared characteristics that can define a social group. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. This is not to say that an asylum applicant cannot include opposition to FGM as an identifying characteristic of the social group to which she belongs. She may choose to do so to assist in establishing the nexus component of her claim to refugee status. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (3d Cir.1993) (Iranian woman could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on her gender, but she might be able to show fear based on gender plus opposition to Iranian gender-specific laws). The point is only that opposition is not a necessary component of a social group otherwise defined by gender and tribal membership. We now turn to the nexus requirement.
55 For persecution to be on account of membership in a social group, the victim's protected characteristic must be central to the persecutor's decision to act against the victim. See Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir.1993) (An applicant qualifies as a `refugee' under the INA if membership in a social group is `at the root of persecution,' such that membership itself generates a `specific threat to the applicant'.). This requirement is relatively straightforward. It is important to note, however, that opposition to FGM need not be proved to establish nexus. We agree with the Ninth Circuit's discussion of this point in Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir.2005). The court held that the petitioner, a female member of a tribe that subjected its females to FGM, had established past persecution on account of being a member of a social group defined by her gender and tribal membership. It explained: 56 We believe that opposition is not required in order to meet the on account of prong in female genital mutilation cases. The persecution at issue in these cases — the forcible, painful cutting of a female's body parts — is not a result of a woman's opposition to the practice but rather a result of her sex and her clan membership and/or nationality. That is, the shared characteristic that motivates the persecution is not opposition, but the fact that the victims are female in a culture that mutilates the genitalia of its females. 57 Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d at 797 n. 16. This is not to say that an adult's voluntary submission to FGM necessarily constitutes persecution.