Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony regarding Canto's statements

Text: Two witnesses testified about statements Canto made after the shootings. Defendant claims the court erred in admitting the evidence. At the preliminary hearing Canto denied being a loan shark and described himself as a businessman who fixed and resold cars bought for cash at auction. Detective Davila of the Gardena Police Department impeached Canto when Davila testified for defendant on direct examination regarding a small portion of a telephonic interview he conducted while Canto was still in the hospital. He testified Canto admitted that the reason he had large quantities of cash at his house was because he was in the illegal loan shark business. On cross-examination of Davila, the prosecution established that Canto initiated the telephonic interview in the hospital by asking a nurse to call the police so he could set the record straight and tell the police information regarding his shooting and the murder of Allen, and so he could explain that at all prior police contacts, he had lied when he denied knowing the identity of his shooter. Over objection that it was beyond the scope of direct examination, Davila then testified about what Canto told him were the events of the evening of August 9, 1994, wherein Canto said that he had lent money to defendant, that defendant had contacted him that afternoon in order to repay the loan, that while driving defendant to and from his apartment in an effort to get the money owed, defendant shot him, that he lied to the police initially when he told them he did not know the identity of the shooter, that he explained if it took him the rest of his life, he was going to get even and take care of the defendant himself, but after learning while in the hospital that Allen had been murdered, Canto decided it was no longer personal and wanted the police to get involved. With the exception of his admission that he was a loan shark, this was essentially the same evidence Canto testified to at the preliminary hearing. Defendant claims the court erred in admitting the portion of Canto's hospital interview elicited during cross-examination because that testimony was beyond the scope of direct examination. A witness may be cross-examined on any matter within the scope of direct examination. (Evid.Code, § 773.) Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party . . . . ( Id., § 356.) `In applying Evidence Code section 356 the courts do not draw narrow lines around the exact subject of inquiry. In the event a statement admitted in evidence constitutes part of a conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to have placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the declarant in the course of such conversation or correspondence, provided the other statements have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission or declaration in evidence. . . . [Citation.]' ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) Further, the jury is entitled to know the context in which the statements on direct examination were made. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 520, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420 [where defense counsel elicited portions of investigative interview with witness, prosecution not foreclosed from inquiring into context of statements on redirect examination of witness and cross-examination of investigator].) Canto's admission to Davila that he participated in illegal loan shark activity contradicted his preliminary hearing testimony and was placed into evidence by defendant. The prosecution was entitled to present the entire context in which Canto made the admission, including his explanation of the events of the August 9 shooting, which he asserted arose out of his loan shark activity. The court did not err in allowing Davila to testify to the remainder of Canto's hospital admission. Defendant further claims these statements elicited on cross-examination of Davila were inadmissible hearsay. By not objecting to admission of the statements as hearsay, defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 681, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) Were we to consider the claim on the merits, it would fail. The statements were admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of placing Canto's statements into context. ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 190, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Over objection, the prosecution called in rebuttal Lyndon Bull, the owner and manager of the World Class Coach Works auto body shop where both defendant and Canto worked. He testified he had known defendant since high school; that in late 1993 or early 1994, he had given defendant a full-time job for $150 a week pick[ing] up parts; that he was training Canto to do repair estimates; and that when defendant eventually failed to show up for work following the shootings his friends and family and coworkers looked for him for nearly a month but did not find him and defendant never called or showed up at work again. Defendant argues, as he did at trial, that this was improper rebuttal evidence. The decision to admit rebuttal evidence rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of demonstrated abuse of that discretion. (Penal Code, § 1093, subd. (d); People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1232, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) `[P]roper rebuttal evidence does not include a material part of the case in the prosecution's possession that tends to establish the defendant's commission of the crime. It is restricted to evidence made necessary by the defendant's case in the sense that he has introduced new evidence or made assertions that were not implicit in his denial of guilt.' ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1199, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487, quoting People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 753-754, 312 P.2d 665.) The rebuttal testimony of Lyndon Bull as to the limited scope of defendant's job at the auto body shop properly challenged defendant's testimony that he was basically [the] assistant manager of the shop, that he helped run the place, do estimates, make sure that everybody gets paid, write the checks and pay invoices, and that he was gone from work starting August 1, 1994, because he was on vacation. We find no abuse of discretion in permitting this testimony. In addition, over a hearsay objection, Bull testified that three or four weeks after the shooting, Canto came into the auto body shop and said defendant had shot him up. Defendant argues this was inadmissible hearsay testimony. We agree. Hearsay evidence is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. (Evid.Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Unless an exception applies, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. ( Id., subd. (b).) Canto's statement to Bull was an out-of-court statement, and respondent does not suggest that it comes within any exception or that it was offered for any purpose other than to prove defendant shot Canto. The admission, therefore, was error. The error, however, was harmless. We have held the application of ordinary rules of evidence does not implicate the federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the reasonable probability standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243. ( People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222.) Because Bull merely repeated statements similar to Canto's preliminary hearing testimony, it is not reasonably probable that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Indeed, assuming defendant has preserved a claim of federal constitutional error, and the error did implicate federal constitutional rights, we would find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.