Opinion ID: 1808271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant's first argument is that taking the evidence as a whole, it was insufficient to support the verdict finding him guilty of felony murder. When the evidence adduced at the trial is considered, the first assignment must be quickly overruled. To begin with, a person charged in a criminal case may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. See State v. Buchanan, 210 Neb. 20, 312 N.W.2d 684 (1981). Furthermore, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction in a criminal prosecution, it is not the province of the Nebraska Supreme Court to resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass upon the credibility of witnesses, determine the plausibility of explanations, or weigh the evidence, as such matters are for the jury. The verdict of the jury must be sustained if, taking the view most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence to support it. See, State v. Wilkening, 222 Neb. 107, 382 N.W.2d 340 (1986); State v. Kakela, 218 Neb. 843, 359 N.W.2d 786 (1984); State v. Schroder, 218 Neb. 860, 359 N.W.2d 799 (1984). The evidence, when viewed in light of these rules, is more than sufficient to justify the case's being submitted to the jury and more than sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of felony murder. Therefore, unless some other error is found, the decision of the jury finding defendant guilty of felony murder must be affirmed. (2) Amendment of § 27-505 and Cherie Palmer's testimony. As we have already noted, in Palmer II this court held that § 27-505, as it was then constituted, prohibited Cherie Palmer from testifying against her husband. At that time § 27-505 provided as follows: (1) Neither husband nor wife can be examined in any case as to any confidential communication made by one to the other while married, nor shall they after the marriage relation ceases to [sic] be permitted to reveal in testimony any such communication while the marriage subsisted except as otherwise provided by law. This privilege may be waived only with the consent of both spouses. After the death of one, it may be waived by the survivor. (2) During the existence of the marriage, a husband and wife can in no criminal case be a witness against the other. This privilege may be waived only with the consent of both spouses. (3) These privileges may not be claimed: (a) In any criminal case where the crime charged is rape, adultery, bigamy, incest.... Following our decision in Palmer II and before the subject trial, the Nebraska Legislature amended § 27-505, and in particular amended subsection (3) to provide as follows: These privileges may not be claimed: (a) In any criminal case where the crime charged is a crime of violence, bigamy, incest.... See § 27-505 (Reissue 1985). While defendant raises some issue as to the meaning of the amendment (a matter which we will later discuss), it nevertheless appears fairly clear that unless by adopting L.B. 696 and amending § 27-505, the Nebraska Legislature has adopted an ex post facto law and thereby violated defendant's constitutional rights, Mrs. Palmer was properly permitted to testify. Both U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, and Neb. Const. art. I, § 16, clearly provide that no ex post facto law may be passed. What is not so clear, however, is what constitutes an ex post facto law. The Latin phrase ex post facto means literally a thing done afterward. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 802 (1981). In a general sense an ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in the manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810). The traditional justification for prohibiting retroactive laws is that such laws are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The Federalist No. 44, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Hamilton ed. 1882). At first blush this would seem to prohibit anything from being done after an act is committed. However, an examination of the history as it relates to the doctrine of ex post facto and the cases which have been decided from the earliest of times leads to the conclusion that not all retroactive legislation is in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The clause, as it has been interpreted, applies principally, if not exclusively, to criminal laws or laws impacting criminal prosecutions. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). The most frequently stated rendition of the ex post facto prohibition is that a legislature may not enact any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.... Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867). Approximately a decade after the ratification of the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to construe the ex post facto clause. See Calder v. Bull, supra . In doing so the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Connecticut resolution setting aside the decree of the probate court and granting a right of appeal where one had not previously existed did not offend the ex post facto clause. This ruling was somewhat modified by a later decision in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883). The case most relevant, however, to the instant case is the case of Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884). Hopt was charged with first degree murder. At the time the crime was committed, the Utah criminal procedure act prohibited the admission of testimony of convicted felons. Prior to trial, the Utah Legislature repealed that provision, thereby removing any obstacle to the competency of convicted felons. At trial Emerson, a previously convicted accomplice, was allowed to testify. Following conviction, an appeal was ultimately taken to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held that the repeal of the felon competency rule after the commission of the offense but before trial was not an ex post facto law. After discussing Kring, supra, the Court noted that Kring had been deprived of a substantial right possessed by him at the time the offense was committed. The Court went on to distinguish Hopt's situation, noting: But there are no such features in the case before us. Statutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases are not ex post facto in their application to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to their passage; for they do not attach criminality to any act previously done, and which was innocent when done; nor aggravate any crime theretofore committed; nor provide a greater punishment therefor than was prescribed at the time of its commission; nor do they alter the degree, or lessen the amount or measure, of the proof which was made necessary to conviction when the crime was committed. The crime for which the present defendant was indicted, the punishment prescribed therefor, and the quantity or the degree of proof necessary to establish his guilt, all remained unaffected by the subsequent statute. Any statutory alteration of the legal rules of evidence which would authorize conviction upon less proof, in amount or degree, than was required when the offence was committed, might, in respect of that offence, be obnoxious to the constitutional inhibition upon ex post facto laws. But alterations which do not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the offence or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt, butleaving untouched the nature of the crime and the amount or degree of proof essential to conviction only remove existing restrictions upon the competency of certain classes of persons as witnesses, relate to modes of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a vested right, and which the State, upon grounds of public policy, may regulate at pleasure. Such regulations of the mode in which the facts constituting guilt may be placed before the jury, can be made applicable to prosecutions or trials thereafter had, without reference to the date of the commission of the offence charged. Hopt v. Utah, supra at 589-90, 4 S.Ct. at 209-10. Similarly, in the instant case nothing done by the Legislature in amending § 27-505 created any criminal act, nor altered the standard of proof necessary for conviction, nor altered the punishment prescribed for committing the crime. The decision in Hopt, supra, is wholly consistent with our holdings in this jurisdiction to the effect that no one has a vested right in a procedure and that procedural matters can be changed at any time before trial and are binding on the defendant. See, State v. Shiffbauer, 197 Neb. 805, 251 N.W.2d 359 (1977); Durousseau v. Nebraska State Racing Commission, 194 Neb. 288, 231 N.W.2d 566 (1975). The holding in Hopt, supra, was further affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898). Thompson was a case very similar to the case at bar. Thompson was charged with first degree murder. After conviction the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding the admission of certain writing samples for comparative purposes to be prejudicial error. Prior to his retrial, the Missouri Legislature enacted a statute allowing admission of such evidence. The same samples were then admitted in the second trial. Thompson was convicted, and the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the conviction. On appeal the U.S. Supreme Court held that the subsequent legislative change of the rules of evidence regarding writing samples for comparative purposes did not violate the ex post facto prohibition of the federal Constitution. The Court admitted that a number of cases containing language supporting Thompson's ex post facto argument could be found, but, [a]pplying the principles announced in former caseswithout attaching undue weight to general expressions in them that go beyond the questions necessary to be determined, 171 U.S. at 386, 18 S.Ct. at 924, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the rights abrogated were not substantial enough to render retroactive application of the statute unconstitutional. In doing so the Court said at 387, 18 S.Ct. at 924: If persons excluded, upon grounds of public policy, at the time of the commission of an offence, from testifying as witnesses for or against the accused, may, in virtue of a statute, become competent to testify, we cannot perceive any ground upon which to hold a statute to be ex post facto which does nothing more than admit evidence of a particular kind in a criminal case upon an issue of fact which was not admissible under the rules of evidence as enforced by judicial decisions at the time the offence was committed. Four states have previously considered whether a change in the marital privilege statutes constitutes an ex post facto law, and in each instance determined that it does not. See, Huckaby v. State, 262 Ark. 413, 557 S.W.2d 875 (1977); State v. Clevenger, 69 Wash.2d 136, 417 P.2d 626 (1966); Ritchey v. State, 407 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Crim.1966); Wester v. The State, 142 Ala. 56, 38 So. 1010 (1905). As part of his ex post facto argument, defendant raises two other related issues. He maintains that, in any event, L.B. 696 is unconstitutionally vague because there is no definition of crime of violence. Furthermore, he argues that the exceptions adopted by L.B. 696 apply only in cases where the spouse or child is the other party. The vagueness argument is controlled by the rule that in the absence of anything indicating the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Carlson, 223 Neb. 874, 394 N.W.2d 669 (1986). By that standard a crime is an act or omission for which one is subject to punishment by public authority. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 536 (1981). By that same standard violence is the exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse. Id. at 2554. Thus, crime of violence is an act which injures or abuses through the use of physical force and which subjects the actor to punishment by public authority. This court has said that robbery is a crime of violence. Draper v. Sigler, 177 Neb. 726, 131 N.W.2d 131 (1964). Certainly, then, murder is a crime of violence. Com. v. Ferrer, 283 Pa.Super. 21, 423 A.2d 423 (1980); People v. Manns, 12 Mich.App. 543, 163 N.W.2d 232 (1968). Accordingly, L.B. 696 is not vague. Defendant's argument regarding the application of L.B. 696 is that the crimes described in § 27-505 apply only to cases where one spouse commits a crime against the other spouse. Therefore, according to him, L.B. 696 applies only where one spouse commits a crime of violence against the other spouse. We do not read either the history of the amendment nor the language itself to so limit § 27-505 as amended by L.B. 696. The clear meaning of the statute is that the privilege may not be claimed where the crime charged is a crime of violence, bigamy, incest, or any crime committed by one against the person or property of the other. (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant's argument flies in the face of the clear meaning of the statute. If defendant's argument were correct, there would have been no need for the enumeration of not only crimes of violence but those of bigamy and incest as well, crimes which cannot be committed except by one spouse against the other or upon some other member of the family. Nothing within L.B. 696, as it amended § 27-505, limits crimes of violence to acts committed by one spouse against the other spouse. The words are clear and require no interpretation. We have consistently held that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, no interpretation is needed, and a court is without authority to change such language. See Palmer II. See, also, Kellogg Company v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 343 N.W.2d 326 (1984); State v. Schneckloth, Koger, and Heathman, 210 Neb. 144, 313 N.W.2d 438 (1981). L.B. 696, as it amended § 27-505, is clear and unambiguous and applies to all crimes of violence, regardless of who the victim may be. This assignment of error is therefore without merit and must be overruled.