Opinion ID: 4529083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Dooley’s Eighth Amendment

Text: Claim We first address the District Court’s decision to dismiss Dooley’s Complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Although we agree that Dooley failed to adequately state a claim against these specific individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we do not find the Complaint so baseless as to be frivolous. Further, the District Court made no finding as to whether amendment would be inequitable or futile, and thus erred in dismissing the Complaint without leave to amend. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). It is well settled that we consider dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2017). We apply the same standard to the Complaint’s dismissal as frivolous. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). In assessing the Complaint, we are mindful of our “obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings,” Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), particularly where the pro se litigant is imprisoned. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013). Dooley’s Complaint failed to state an adequate § 1983 claim because it did not demonstrate personal involvement by any of the defendants in the complained-of conduct. In advancing any § 1983 claim against prison officials, a plaintiff may not rely solely on a respondeat superior theory of liability. 12 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, a plaintiff must aver facts to show the defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged misconduct. Id. Personal involvement requires particular “allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. Here, the Complaint does not specifically allege personal involvement by any of the defendants. The only evidence to which Dooley points to show Wetzel knew of Dooley’s mental health needs is the fact that he sent Wetzel a copy of documents reflecting his GBMI verdict and request for D Code designation and Wetzel’s lack of any response or action. But this evidence does not demonstrate the personal direction or actual knowledge required under Rode, and Dooley’s allegations of Wetzel’s involvement are insufficient. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207–08. Similarly, as to Kauffman and Goss, the only involvement alleged in the Complaint is their review and denial of Dooley’s grievance. We therefore agree that Dooley failed to state a claim and conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing the Complaint on that ground. The District Court erred, however, when it dismissed the Complaint as frivolous and without leave to amend. It is well understood that “a complaint filed in forma pauperis is not automatically frivolous . . . because it fails to state a claim.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 331 (1989); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112 (3d Cir. 2002). Rather, a claim is frivolous only where it depends “on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28). Here, Dooley advanced a valid legal theory, and particularly given 13 our liberal pro se pleading standards, the factual scenario alleged was not clearly baseless or delusional. Dooley’s Complaint, construed liberally, laid out a plausibly valid theory for a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. Prison officials violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights when they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists where “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering,” and a doctor has diagnosed the condition, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a lay person. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). Officials are deliberately indifferent to such needs when they are actually aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Dooley’s Complaint turned on this Eighth Amendment legal theory, and the facts supporting it were not baseless, fantastic, or delusional. See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530. The factual scenario in Dooley’s Complaint alleged a medical need in the form of serious mental health problems. Dooley’s claimed depression, pain, trauma, lack of sleep, nightmares, paranoia, and related mental health issues could constitute the requisite serious medical need if diagnosed or if the need for greater treatment would be obvious to a lay person. See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2017); Inmates of the Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979). The jury’s GBMI finding and the sentencing judge’s comment about his mental health needs may show that, at one point, Dooley’s mental health problems were obvious to 14 lay people.4 Additional facts in an amended complaint might provide greater specificity necessary to demonstrate a serious medical need. Thus, the currently alleged facts are not so clearly baseless as to make the claim frivolous. Similarly, if the prison officials were actually aware or knew of a substantial risk of serious harm when they allegedly failed to provide Dooley with D Code resources, and they disregarded that risk, then that could constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Dooley did allege inaction on the part of the DOC Officials in the face of his repeated complaints about inadequate mental health treatment. He alleged that the officials simply told him that he was not GBMI and therefore not a D Stability Code inmate. We do not know whether the 4 In arguing that Dooley cannot state an Eighth Amendment claim, Appellees as well as the Magistrate Judge have emphasized that the jury’s GBMI finding is not a medical diagnosis and does not operate as a legal requirement of specific mental health treatment. This misunderstands the relevance of the GBMI verdict. The fact that the GBMI finding may not alone establish a serious medical need or give rise to an obligation to provide specific treatment does not preclude its relevance as a fact that demonstrates the obviousness and seriousness of Dooley’s specifically pled psychiatric problems. In addition to demonstrating that a jury recognized Dooley’s mental illness, the GBMI verdict shows that Dooley, even if not found severely mentally disabled, had mental health needs that were serious enough to require—under current DOC policy—at least temporary D Code status and regular psychiatric evaluation. See Pa. DOC Reg. § 13.8.1(2)(J)(1)(b)(2), (3). 15 officials ever considered whether Dooley was receiving appropriate mental health care or provided further evaluation to determine what level of treatment Dooley required.5 Officials became aware of his contention that he required D Stability Code treatment at least by the time Dooley availed himself of the grievance process. Goss further acknowledged involvement and knowledge of the situation beyond his role in the grievance process, and Dooley’s objections to the R&R raised new facts about the officials’ awareness of his situation and failure to intervene. Although the Complaint, as pled, is lacking specific facts regarding the officials’ actions or inaction to show deliberate indifference, additional detail could satisfy that standard. The factual scenario described by Dooley, particularly if he were permitted to amend his Complaint, could support a legally valid theory for an Eighth Amendment claim. The District Court therefore should not have dismissed the Complaint as frivolous and instead should have permitted Dooley to amend. Moreover, the Court made no finding that amendment would be inequitable or futile. We have held that district courts should dismiss complaints under the PLRA with leave to amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108, 110; see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 5 The DOC Officials repeatedly emphasize that “the jury’s nearly 20-year-old GBMI verdict” cannot be equated “with a current diagnosis by a doctor.” Appellees’ Br. at 24. But the same would be true of a sentencing judge’s nearly 20-year-old determination that a defendant was not “severely mentally disabled” so as to need continuing treatment. Whether or not Dooley needed D Stability Code treatment in 2002 does not determine the appropriateness of such treatment now. 16 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).6 That determination generally lies within the discretion of the District Court, and we thus review a district court’s decision not to grant leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. We have held, however, that “outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason [i.e., inequity or futility] . . . is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108 (emphasis added) (alteration in original). Here, the District Court engaged in no discussion about whether amendment would be inequitable or futile before adopting the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss without leave to amend.7 We conclude that amendment would not be clearly futile, and the District Court should have 6 Appellees argue that the District Court implicitly found amendment futile when it determined the claim to be frivolous. We have noted that “dismissals of frivolous claims do not require leave to amend due to the long tradition of denying leave to amend . . . when amendment is inequitable or futile.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 112–13. But where, as here, the Complaint was properly dismissed, not as frivolous, but for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs “are entitled to amend their complaint unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Id. at 111. 7 The R&R determined that leave to amend was not appropriate because it found the Complaint “legally frivolous” and because the GBMI finding serves as a “legally operative factual finding, not a medical diagnosis.” App. at 35–36. As noted above, we conclude that Dooley’s Complaint is not legally frivolous. 17 permitted Dooley to amend the Complaint. We will therefore vacate its order and remand for further proceedings.8 b. Determination that the Dismissal Constitutes a PLRA “Strike” Dooley next objects to the District Court’s determination that the dismissal of his Complaint amounted to a “strike” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We exercise “plenary review with respect to the proper interpretation of the PLRA and its three strikes rule.” Millhouse v. Heath, 866 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017). Dooley contends that the District Court lacked the authority to prospectively label the dismissal a strike under the PLRA. We agree. In examining whether the PLRA allows District Courts to prospectively—at the time of dismissal—label a dismissal a “strike” for purposes of future litigation, we turn first to the language of the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) reads: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 8 We have not considered Appellees’ exhaustion arguments, which they raised again on appeal, because the District Court did not reach them. Nothing in our decision today, however, prevents the District Court from revisiting the exhaustion issue on remand. 18 incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. (emphasis added). This language contemplates a prisoner who attempts to bring a suit after having had three prior suits dismissed. It thus envisions a determination at the time of the subsequent suit, in which a future district court evaluates whether “prior” suits “brought” by the same plaintiff were dismissed on enumerated grounds. Id. To interpret the statute otherwise would run afoul of Article III’s case or controversy requirement. Under Article III, a “claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81 (1985)). At the time of the dismissal of Dooley’s action, the question of whether that dismissal constituted a strike under § 1915(g) was premature. It had no immediate consequence because Dooley may never again seek to file a lawsuit. The question is not ripe for adjudication unless or until he seeks to file a fourth suit in forma pauperis. Deleon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2004); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 469 n.8 (7th Cir. 1998). 19 Leaving the § 1915(g) strike determination to a future court where the issue is squarely presented further avoids the risk that dismissing courts will make haphazard or erroneous determinations to which subsequent courts might defer. Deleon, 361 F.3d at 95 n.1. Appellees contend that strike determinations are straightforward, requiring no briefing and carrying little to no risk of harm from erroneous decisions. That not only misses the point but is in itself questionable. A strike carries great significance, and the gratuitous calling of a strike as happened here can clearly be damaging later on. Only when the strike question has an immediate impact should a court rule on the issue, with the benefit of briefing by the parties if necessary. The possibility for error regarding this important issue is greatly reduced before a future court considering the strike question at a moment when it carries immediate significance.9 This practical reality reinforces the natural reading of the statute, requiring that later courts make the strike determination only when the issue has become ripe 9 Here, the District Court did, in fact, err in determining that the dismissal amounted to a strike under the PLRA. Dooley brought his suit in state court and the DOC Officials removed the suit to federal court, but the PLRA speaks only to suits brought in federal court. The statute applies to prisoners who “on 3 or more prior occasions . . . brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed” on an enumerated ground. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added). We have held that, under the PLRA, “a prisoner has ‘brought an action’ when he tenders or submits his complaint to the court.” Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 661 (3d Cir. 2019). Dooley submitted his Complaint to the state court, not to “a court of the United States,” so it did not fall within the scope of § 1915(g). 20 for adjudication. We therefore hold that the District Court lacked the authority, at the time of dismissal, to declare that the dismissal constituted a “strike” for purposes of § 1915(g).