Opinion ID: 1462658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the Court err in permitting Detective Krause to testify to incriminatory and prejudicial hearsay statements made by him to appellant in order to elicit from appellant the statement he made on December 9, 1960?

Text: On December 9, 1960, Detective Krause, of the Reading Police force, one of the investigating officers, had a conversation with defendant in which Krause told him (inter alia) that the investigation he had made in Baltimore of appellant's previous statements about a car stolen by Smith showed appellant's statements to be false. Appellant contends that the introduction of this evidence and his reply was error. In order to determine whether a statement or confession was voluntary or coerced, all the circumstances and conditions existing at and prior to its making are admissible. The totality of the circumstances under which they are given must be considered: Commonwealth v. Bryant, 367 Pa. 135, 143, 79 A. 2d 193; Wigmore on Evidence Vol. III (3rd Ed.) § 822; Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 162, 182 A. 2d 727; Commonwealth v. Ballem, 386 Pa. 20, 27, 123 A. 2d 728; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 372 Pa. 266, 272-274, 93 A. 2d 691; Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 524, 113 A. 2d 464. Furthermore, prior false or contradictory or conflicting statements by the accused are admissible [] since the jury may infer therefrom that they were made with an intent to divert suspicion or to mislead the police or other authorities, or to establish an alibi or innocence, and hence are indicatory of guilt: Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 217, 161 A. 2d 861; Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102, 107, 176 A. 2d 421; Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 524, 113 A. 2d 464; Commonwealth v. Sauders, 390 Pa. 379, 388, 134 A. 2d 890; Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 158, 94 A. 2d 743. Unless Krause could testify what he said to appellant and what appellant said to him  without a full disclosure of the entire conversation between appellant and him as to this possible crime and appellant's connection with it  it would have been impossible for the jury or the Court to decide whether appellant's second statement was voluntary, coerced, or the result of inducements offered by Krause. We are convinced that this testimony was properly admitted and there is no merit in this contention of appellant.