Opinion ID: 2538744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nevada's handicapped child support statute

Text: As a general rule, court ordered support obligations cease [w]hen the child reaches 18 years of age if he is no longer enrolled in high school, otherwise, when he reaches 19 years of age. [1] The law presumes that once a child reaches majority, the child is capable of self-support. [2] Nevada's Legislature has created a statutory exception to this general rule; under NRS 125B.110, Nevada's handicapped child support statute, parents must support a handicapped child beyond majority if the child cannot support himself or herself because of a qualifying disability. The statute, with emphasis added, creates a duty of continued support under the following circumstances: 1. A parent shall support beyond the age of majority his child who is handicapped until the child is no longer handicapped or until the child becomes self-supporting. The handicap of the child must have occurred before the age of majority for this duty to apply. 2. For the purposes of this section, a child is self-supporting if he receives public assistance beyond the age of majority and that assistance is sufficient to meet his needs. 3. This section does not impair or otherwise affect the eligibility of a handicapped person to receive benefits from a source other than his parents. 4. As used in this section, handicapped means the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. [3] As we have recognized, [t]he construction of a statute is a question of law. [4] In interpreting a statute, words ... should be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act. [5] Thus, when a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, the apparent intent must be given effect, as there is no room for construction. [6] If, however, a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, it is ambiguous, and the plain meaning rule does not apply. [7] Instead, the legislative intent must be ascertained from the statute's terms, the objectives and purpose, `in line with what reason and public policy' dictate. [8] Statutory interpretation should avoid meaningless or unreasonable results, [9] and [s]tatutes with a protective purpose should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the benefits intended to be obtained. [10] Additionally, [w]hen construing a specific portion of a statute, the statute should be read as a whole, and, where possible, the statute should be read to give meaning to all of its parts. [11] In this case, our focus is on the meaning of handicapped. As set forth above, the statute's definition of handicapped involves two considerations: (1) the child must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, and (2) the inability to engage in the activity must be by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that may lead to death or that has lasted or is expected to last at least twelve consecutive months. Thus, in interpreting the statute, we must examine the language substantial gainful activity and medically determinable physical or mental impairment. With respect to the phrase substantial gainful activity, the parties offer differing dictionary definitions of the word gainful to support their interpretations of this phrase. Janice contends that gainful refers to employment [12] and that attending school is not gainful as provided under the statute. Donald asserts that gainful refers to any advantageous activity. [13] He contends that it is advantageous for Matthew to attend college. Further, Donald insists that the evidence established that Matthew was in the top half of his class in school and was capable of employment or college. Since, in Donald's view, Matthew can hold a job or go to college, Donald asserts that Matthew is not handicapped under the statute. Because the parties' differing definitions of gainful could plausibly refer to working, attending school, or both, we conclude that the portion of the statute referring to substantial gainful activity is ambiguous. We therefore turn to legislative intent, public policy and other parts of the statute to construe the meaning of the ambiguous language. Nevada's handicapped child support statute was enacted in 1987. [14] The original provision was part of a more comprehensive child support statute that did not include a definition of handicapped. Then, in 1991, the Legislature amended the statute by adding a definition of handicapped. [15] The legislative history reveals that the Legislature was concerned that courts were interpreting the statute too broadly. During a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, it was suggested that the Social Security Administration's definition of disabled be adopted to define the term handicapped. [16] At the time, the term disabled, as used by the Social Security Administration, was defined by the Social Security Act as follows: An individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months (or, in the case of a child under the age of 18, if he suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of comparable severity). [17] Thus, the Nevada Legislature adopted the federal definition of disabled to define handicapped under Nevada's handicapped child support statute. This court has recognized that [w]hen a federal statute is adopted in a statute of this state, a presumption arises that the legislature knew and intended to adopt the construction placed on the federal statute by federal courts. This rule of [statutory] construction is applicable, however, only if the state and federal acts are substantially similar and the state statute does not reflect a contrary legislative intent. [18] Here, the handicapped child support statute's definition of the term handicapped is almost identical to the Social Security Act's 1991 definition of disabled. We therefore presume that the Nevada Legislature knew and intended to adopt the federal interpretation of the definition. The Social Security Administration's interpretation of disability is set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Under the CFR, the applicant must have an impairment that makes the applicant unable to do previous work or any other substantial gainful activity [that] exists in the national economy. [19] The CFR also explains that [s]ubstantial gainful activity is work activity that is both substantial and gainful. [20] According to the CFR, [s]ubstantial work activity refers to work activity that involves doing significant physical and mental activities, [21] whereas [g]ainful work activity refers to work activities done for pay or profit. [22] In addition, the CFR provides that activities like taking care of [oneself], household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school attendance, club activities, or social programs are generally not considered to be substantial gainful activities. [23] Thus, under the CFR, the term substantial gainful activity necessarily means an activity that results in significant economic gain and does not generally include school attendance. With the CFR definitions in mind, we conclude that the term substantial gainful activity in Nevada's handicapped child support statute means work activity that results in the child being financially self-supporting. Our conclusion also necessarily flows from reading the statute as a whole. If substantial gainful activity included activities that did not result in the child's ability to be self-supporting, then the statute's requirement that support payments continue until the child is self-supporting or no longer handicapped would not make sense. In other words, parents would have no duty to support a child who could engage in non-economic activities but could not be self-supporting because the child would not be considered handicapped under the statute. The handicapped child support statute is designed to ensure that handicapped children have adequate ongoing financial support from their parents, if needed. Our construction of substantial gainful activity comports with this purpose. Additionally, Nevada's more general public policies concerning child support and disabled persons support our conclusion that substantial gainful activity means work activity that results in the child being self-supporting. NRS 125.460(2) declares that Nevada's policy is to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing. Moreover, [s]tate efforts to improve the circumstances of disabled citizens are indicative of the highest social charactera society attuned to the worth of an individual irrespective of physical or mental handicap. [24] In short, all rules of statutory construction point in the same direction: substantial gainful activity means economic activity resulting in self-support. The second part of our definitional analysis concerns the statutory language medically determinable physical or mental impairment. We conclude that this phrase is plain and unambiguous; therefore, we need go no further than the language itself. The term impairment is defined as a limitation that results in [a]ny loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure or function. [25] When the term impairment is read in conjunction with its modifier, medically determinable physical or mental, it is clear that impairment means any physical or mental structural or functional limitation that can be determined by medically accepted diagnostic techniques. We have concluded that substantial gainful activity means work activity that results in the child being self-supporting. Additionally, we have noted that impairment means any physical or mental limitation that can be medically established by accepted diagnostic techniques. A nexus must exist between these two terms, however. The statute requires that a handicapped child be incapable of engaging in substantial gainful activity by reason of the qualifying impairment. [26] Thus, if a child is impaired, but the impairment is not the cause of that child's inability to be self-supporting, then the child is not considered handicapped under the statute. Similarly, if a child has a qualifying impairment but is able to support himself or herself, then that child is not handicapped under the statute's definition. In the present case, the district court did not define substantial gainful activity for Dr. Lynn when eliciting his testimony. Although Dr. Lynn undoubtedly believed that Matthew's hearing impairment and his social limitations restricted the type of activity, either school or work, in which Matthew could engage, Dr. Lynn's testimony did not focus on whether Matthew could be self-supporting. Additionally, neither Janice nor Donald testified with respect to Matthew's job prospects and ability to live independently. Consequently, the record does not disclose whether, at the time of the hearing, Matthew was capable of supporting himself, and if not, whether a qualifying impairment was the cause. And, although the record includes testimony suggesting that Matthew may have a qualifying impairment, the district court made no findings in this regard. From the record, it appears that Matthew will have limitations in the type of work he can perform because of his hearing loss and social limitations. But limitations do not equate to an inability to be self-supporting. [27] Whether Matthew can or cannot be self-supporting is unclear from the record, as is the impact of his impairments on any inability to support himself. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the district court's order concluding that Matthew is not handicapped and remand for further proceedings in accordance with our construction of the statute.