Opinion ID: 3158038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion and Bifurcation

Text: We begin first with the exclusion in the trial against Henderson of prior complaints against him. It is difficult to see how such evidence would have been admissible at all. Certainly it could not have been used to support an inference that because a defendant falsely arrested or hit four other persons in the prior ten years, he likely falsely arrested or used excessive force on the occasion at issue in this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), (b)(1). Lund, therefore, attempts to argue that such evidence would have been probative of Henderson's motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge and the lack of any mistake in committing the acts complained of, and of the disputed issue of the identity of the arresting officer. How this is so, Lund does not explain, other than by implying that the evidence showed that Henderson possessed motive, opportunity, and intent on prior occasions, and thus acted similarly here. This type of reasoning, though, is precisely what Rule 404 precludes. Lund also seems to argue (though it is not clear) something like the following: Henderson had a motive to lie because there were already prior complaints against him, while the department's policy of covering up his wrongdoing made it plausible that Walcek lied to cover up Henderson's alleged impropriety here. This seems to be a stretch, and as for Walcek, it seems to suffer from the defect of arguing that Walcek on this occasion behaved as - 6 - he did because others on other occasions behaved in an analogous manner. In any event, even if we assume that the evidence might have had some permissible relevance, it also clearly would have posed a threat of unfair prejudice, thereby triggering the balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. [T]he district court has wide discretion in steadying the Rule 403 seesaw. Onujiogu v. United States, 817 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1987). More importantly, admitting this evidence would have turned this trial into a series of mini-trials as Henderson contested each of the prior complaints. Rule 403 provides the district court with the discretion to exclude relevant evidence for just these sorts of reasons. See Martínez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2010) (excluding testimony that would require a minitrial); United States v. Gilbert, 229 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (excluding evidence in part because it would lead to a mini-trial with the potential for confusion of the issues and for unfair prejudice). We review the exercise of such discretion only for its abuse, a difficult standard[] for any appellant to meet. United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d 289, 294 (1st Cir. 2014). This case does not present an extraordinarily compelling circumstance[] that would lead us to reverse a district court's judgment about the probative value and unfair effect of evidence. Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1340. - 7 - Finally, we reject what appears to be Lund's tit-fortat argument. Lund's alleged damages included emotional harm, evidence of which was provided by a psychiatrist Lund called to testify. That testimony inevitably covered Lund's pre-existing mental illness and behavior, all of which perhaps could have led jurors to question his credibility. Therefore, he reasons, the district court should have allowed him to offer evidence of prior bad acts by Henderson so that the jury might have reservations about Henderson as well. The most obvious flaw in this argument is that there is no rule that requires a trial judge to admit evidence of dubious relevance in order to offset possible prejudice caused by clearly relevant evidence on an entirely unrelated point. And the evidence of Lund's prior psychiatric condition was directly relevant to his claimed damages. Moreover, Lund presents on appeal no challenge to the admission of that evidence, nor does he argue that trial of liability and damages should have been bifurcated. Given our conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of other allegations against Henderson, Lund's remaining challenges to the district court's trial rulings fall like dominoes. Excluding evidence in the trial against the two officers of complaints against officers other than Henderson and Walcek was, a fortiori, well within the trial court's discretion. And the decision to hold for a second - 8 - phase the claims against the Town, in which such evidence might be admissible, was a classic exercise of the trial court's management discretion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), especially where there was the possibility that the resolution of the first phase would moot the need for the second phase, Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing how bifurcating trials is common when litigation of one issue may eliminate the need to try another issue). Lund is unable to cite to a case in which we have overturned a district court's grant or denial of a Rule 42 motion to consolidate or bifurcate trials. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Marin, 845 F.2d at 1145 (noting the appellant's fail[ure] to cite a single case in which an appellate court has reversed a decision for failure to bifurcate and its own inability to find any). The record provides no cause to deviate from that pattern.