Opinion ID: 3056780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Reasonability

Text: Johnson first argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not adequately explain its reasons for the upward variance. We normally review de novo the sufficiency of a district court’s explanation under § 3553(c)(1). United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2006)). The Government, however, contends that Johnson’s procedural reasonableness argument should be subject to plain-error review. 1 Yet we need not address which standard of review applies, because Johnson does not prevail under either a de novo or a plain error standard. To be procedurally reasonable, the district court must properly calculate the Guidelines range, treat the Guidelines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors,2 not consider clearly erroneous facts, and adequately explain the chosen sentence. 1 The United States contends that this court should apply plain-error review because Johnson failed to object to the alleged procedural flaws—namely that the district court failed to explain its upward variance—at the sentencing hearing. While it is true that Johnson did not object, his attorney did explicitly state that he would appeal the district court’s sentence. To date, this court has not issued a published opinion establishing the appropriate standard of review for reasonableness under these specific circumstances. 2 The § 3553(a) factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense; (3) the need to promote respect for the law and afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with education and vocational training and medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7). 3 Case: 12-11881 Date Filed: 12/10/2012 Page: 4 of 9 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596–97 (2007). Gall’s explanation element derives from § 3553(c)(1), which requires a district court to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). This includes an explanation for “any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. A “sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). The district court need not discuss every § 3553(a) factor or even explicitly state that it has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, its explanation will suffice if it is clear that the court considered a number of the sentencing factors. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007). A district court making an upward variance must “have a justification compelling enough to support the degree of the variance and complete enough to allow meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012). We will only vacate the sentence “if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range 4 Case: 12-11881 Date Filed: 12/10/2012 Page: 5 of 9 of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We are satisfied that the sentencing judge adequately explained that Johnson’s criminal history and likelihood to recidivate justified an upward variance: THE COURT: So I’m not—you know, this may be a case where an upward, whatever you call it these days, variance or departure, it may be that the Guideline range isn’t quite right in this case. In fact it may be considerably off. So I am very interested in hearing what both sides have to say about that. I am very concerned about the potential for recidivism. (D.E. 89: 9) THE COURT: As far as 3553 factors go, uppermost in my mind is deterrence of the Defendant from committing further fraud crimes. I think particularly when you look at his overall criminal record, it’s very clear that the potential for recidivism is quite high. I have taken into account the Defendant’s personal characteristics. I do believe he is a competent individual. He does have some physical handicaps. He’s using a cane and has some impairment to his vision. I’ve taken that into account as well. I think particularly given that he previously served a ten year sentence for fraud and then got out of prison and immediately committed another fraud speaks volumes about his potential for recidivism. (D.E. 89: 21). 5 Case: 12-11881 Date Filed: 12/10/2012 Page: 6 of 9 THE COURT: I believe the sentence I imposed takes into account and is driven by the 3553 factors. (D.E. 89: 23). The record convincingly demonstrates that the district court not only took into account § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, but that it more than adequately explained its reasons for an upward variance. Those reasons—Johnson’s criminal history3 and the need for deterrence 4—were explicitly explained to Johnson. Johnson’s sentence is therefore procedurally reasonable.