Opinion ID: 1418188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Charge of Vagueness of The Code of Ethics.

Text: Appellant contends that the provisions of the Code of Ethics, Part I, subsection 2, requiring a licensee to do his utmost to protect the public against fraud, misrepresentation or unethical practices in the real estate field and to endeavor to eliminate in his community any practices which could be damaging to the public or to the dignity or integrity of the real estate profession are too vague and uncertain to provide a constitutional basis for imposition of discipline. In Stevens v. Hocker, 91 Nev. 392, 536 P.2d 88 (1975), this court described the due process limitation upon use of vague and uncertain language in personnel or professional disciplinary rules. Such rules must not be so vague and ambiguous as to provide a substantial danger of arbitrary discrimination in their application or so illusive as to embrace an almost unlimited area of conduct. 91 Nev. at 394, 536 P.2d at 90. In Stevens, we ruled that such general phrases as notoriously disgraceful personal conduct and conduct detrimental to the good of the institution could provide a valid basis for dismissal of a state employee if they were interpreted to relate directly to the issue of the employee's fitness to perform his job. We noted that in Moore v. Board of Trustees, 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879, 93 S.Ct. 85, 34 L.Ed.2d 134 (1972), and Meinhold v. Clark County School District, 89 Nev. 56, 506 P.2d 420, cert. denied sub nom. Meinhold v. Taylor, 414 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 247, 38 L.Ed.2d 167 (1973), we sustained disciplinary action for `unprofessional conduct', ... [when] the conduct in issue bore directly upon fitness to perform the profession involved. 91 Nev. at 394-95, 536 P.2d at 90. In the instant case, the rules in question are not so vague as to invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Greyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). As in Moore and Meinhold, the terms were interpreted with particular reference to appellant's fitness to practice her profession. We hold that appellant's right to due process of law was not violated by the application of the standard contained in the Code of Ethics, Part I, subsection 2, to her conduct.