Opinion ID: 6494576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board’s Grant of a Conservation District Use Permit Prior to the Contested Case Hearing Constitutes Actual Prejudgment or the Appearance of Prejudgment

Text: Kilakila raises the question, “[d]id the BLNR prejudge the issue by granting the CDUP before the contested case was held and then authorizing some construction activities to proceed pursuant to that permit prior to completion of the post hoc contested case hearing?” This court recently examined a similar issue in Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Board of Land & Natural Resources, 136 Hawai'i 376, 363 P.3d 224 (2015). In Mauna Kea, the Board voted to grant a CDUP to the applicants prior to, and despite repeated calls for, a contested case hearing. Id. at 381-82, 363 P.3d at 229-30. The Board subsequently granted a contested case hearing, assigned it to a healing officer, and issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision and order granting the conservation district use permit for construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) on Mauna Kea. Id. at 384-87, 363 P.3d at 232-35. This court held that, under the facts of Mauna Kea, the appearance of prejudgment rendered the contested case hearing an inauthentic exercise of the contested case process. Accordingly, the conservation district use permit was vacated and the case remanded for a new contested case hearing. Id. at 399, 363 P.3d at 247. The series of events in this case that culminated in the contested case hearing likewise suggest the reality or appearance of prejudgment. Although Kilakila repeatedly requested a contested case hearing through both written and oral requests, the Board took no action on Kilaldla’s requests for a contested case hearing. Kilakila I, 131 Hawai'i at 196, 317 P.3d at 30. Instead, the Board held public hearings—rather than a contested case hearing—in November 2010, and voted to grant the application at the final public hearing. Id. Thus, as in Mauna Kea, the Board issued the 2010 permit to UHIfA without a contested case hearing. Id. Also, as it did in Mauna Kea, the Board in the instant case granted the request for a contested case hearing after the permit had been issued. Id. at 198, 317 P.3d at 32. Accordingly, the Board’s actions in this case—granting the 2010 permit and subsequently holding a contested case hearing—are substantially similar to the agency actions that caused the appearance of prejudgment in Mauna Kea. In Mauna Kea, this court held that the approval of the CDUP prior to the contested case hearing demonstrated that the Board appeared to have prejudged the permit and thus violated due process. Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 396-9, 363 P.3d at 244-7. “[S]imply stated, sequence matters.” Id. at 393, 363 P.3d at 241. The sequence of events in which a permit is granted prior to a contested ease hearing—“whether events were separated by two minutes or two months—plainly gives rise to the appearance of prejudgment[.]” Id. Prejudgment and the appearance of prejudgment is a form of bias that is “constitutionally unacceptable” and prohibited as a violation of due process. Id. at 389, 363 P.3d at 237. There are few situations that “more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the perception that a litigant never had a chance due to some identifiable potential bias.” Id. at 390, 363 P.3d at 238. Where “there exists any reasonable doubt about the adjudicator’s impartiality at the outset of a ease, provision of the most elaborate procedural safeguards will not avail to create [an] appearance of justice.” Sussel v. Honolulu Civil Service Comm’n, 71 Haw. 101, 108, 784 P.2d 867, 870 (1989) (citation omitted). This case presents greater evidence of an appearance of prejudgment than the record in Mauna Kea. The Board, in deciding whether to grant a permit for the TMT project, included a condition in its approval of the permit that anticipated the permit would be revoked during a subsequent contested case hearing: “[i]f a contested case proceeding is initiated, no construction shall occur until a final decision is rendered by the Board in favor of the applicant or the proceeding is otherwise dismissed.” Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 385, 363 P.3d at 233. The Board’s grant of the permit for the ATST project contained no such condition. Rather, the 2010 permit for the ATST project remained in effect even though the Board later granted the contested case hearing. 21 As this court explained in Kilakila I, “[b]ecause the permit remains in effect despite BLNR’s failure to hold a contested case hearing before voting to grant the permit, UH can still build on Haleakala[.]” 22 Kilakila I, 131 Hawai’i at 199, 317 P.3d at 33 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the revoked CDUP in Mauna Kea, the ATST CDUP remained in effect during the contested ease hearing that followed the Board’s initial approval of the permit. See Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 398, 363 P.3d at 246. The appearance of prejudgment in a contested case hearing violates due process. To reach that conclusion in Mauna Kea the court analyzed whether the appellants “were given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 390, 363 P.3d at 238. The procedures of a contested case hearing “are designed to ensure that the record is fully developed and subjected to adversarial testing.” Id. at 391, 363 P.3d at 239. But, “that purpose is frustrated if ... the decisionmaker rules on the merits before the factual record is even developed.” Id. The Board’s approval of the 2010 permit before the contested ease hearing indicates that the hearing officer for the contested case hearing knew “BLNR’s position on the permit before the first witness [was] sworn in.” Id. The Board members are also susceptible to the appearance of prejudgment as they are aware of their earlier vote when they act on the hearing officer’s recommendation. Such a process “does not satisfy the appearance of justice, since it suggests that the taking of evidence is an afterthought and that proceedings were merely ‘mov[ing] in predestined grooves.’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The similarity between the conditions of the 2010 permit initially granted without a contested case hearing and the conditions of the 2012 permit granted after the contested case hearing also creates the appearance of prejudgment. The majority noted in Mauna Kea that “the high level of detail” that the Board provided in its findings, conclusions, decision and order was not sufficient to mitigate an appearance of prejudgment. Id. at 398, 363 P.3d at 246. The 2011 permit and the 2013 decision for the TMT project that the Board issued were “virtually indistinguishable documents.” Id This similarity indicated that “none of the testimonies, arguments, or evidence submitted to BLNR” during the contested case proceedings “were seriously considered.” Id. In this case, as in Mauna Kea, the two sets of conditions upon which the Board granted the permits are “virtually indistinguishable.” Id. Sixteen of the conditions are exactly the same with language mirroring each other. The post-contested case healing 2012 permit does contain two additional conditions that solely affect the use of the area by Native Hawaiian practitioners. These two additional conditions were the only conditions added after months of deliberation, hundreds of pages of briefing, and four days of contested case hearings. Thus, the Board’s 2012 permit contains all but two of the same conditions contained in the previous decision of the Board granting the 2010 permit without a hearing. The similarity suggests “less than full consideration was given to the voluminous legal and factual arguments and materials presented in the contested ease hearing.” Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 393, 363 P.3d at 241. The concurrence contends that the first permit was “invalid” and that the second permit “superseded” the first permit. Concurrence at 409, 382 P.3d at 221. This is not reflected in the record. Kilakila I remanded to the circuit court to stay or reverse the permit, but the permit was not invalidated prior to the commencement of the contested case hearing. Kilakila I, 131 Hawai'i at 206, 317 P.3d at 40. Rather, the first and second permits were both issued prior to this court’s 2013 decision in Kilakila I. The Board failed to invalidate the first permit, the 2010 permit, prior to the contested case hearing despite requests from Kilakila beginning on February 11, 2011. Additionally, the stipulation by the parties rendering the first permit void did not occur until January 30, 2014, and was not approved by the circuit court until February 7, 2014. The parties and the Board stipulated that the initial conservation district use permit, the 2010 permit that was granted by the Board in December 2010, was void. 23 Although generally the invalidation of the first permit might ensure that Kilakila’s due process rights were adequately protected in the contested case hearing on the second permit application, this is not the case here. The first permit was not rendered void until more than one year after the second permit—the 2012 permit at issue in this case—-was granted by the Board on November 9, 2012. Thus, the first permit was valid throughout the course of the contested case hearing. Any suggestion that, prior to the Board’s second approval of the permit, a stipulation rendering the 2010 permit void between Kilakila, UHIfA, and the Board removed the possible appearance of prejudgment is not persuasive. And the proposition that our Kilakila I decision invalidated the first permit before the Board’s decision granting the second permit of November 9, 2012 is not possible given that the Kilakila I decision was not filed until 2013. The concurrence also appears to suggest that the Board did not engage in prejudgment in granting the second permit. Concurrence at 409, 382 P.3d at 221. The concurrence states that the second permit was issued “after a contested case hearing and report by the second hearing officer, and a new vote by a reconstituted BLNR, which had several new members, including a new Cham.” Concurrence at 409, 382 P.3d at 221. Although a new hearing officer issued a new report, the new hearing officer did not hold new hearings. 24 The facts addressed in the original hearings were considered and incorporated into the Board’s Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order. In addition, the 2012 permit was voted on by substantially the same board members as had reviewed the 2010 permit. 25 To consider the composition of the Board is to acknowledge that like the Board in Mauna Kea, 26 the composition of the Board is substantially the same. However, unlike in Mau-na Kea, one of the new members to the Board—the Chair—engaged in ex parte communication. This court indicated in Mauna Kea that because the Board granted the permit before holding the contested case hearing, “Appellants were denied the most basic element of procedural due process—an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 391, 363 P.3d at 239. As stated in Mauna Kea, the justice system must “be fair and must also appear to be fair.” Id. at 389, 363 P.3d at 237. The assignment of the conservation district use application to a hearing officer to conduct a contested case hearing does not cure any appearance of prejudgment arising from the issuance of the permit prior to the contested case hearing. Id. at 393, 363 P.3d at 241. Due to the Board’s grant of the 2010 permit prior to commencing the contested ease hearing and the Board’s subsequent refusal to void the 2010 permit upon the commencement of the contested case proceedings, the 2010 permit was valid and operative throughout the deliberations process of both hearing officers and the Board. The existence of a valid permit during the contested case hearing for the second permit renders the instant record more replete with evidence of prejudgment than that in Mauna Kea. Moreover, unlike Mauna Kea, this case raises issues of ex parte communication and political pressure that may constitute further due process violations of the contested case hearing process. And, unlike Mauna Kea, discovery was improperly denied the permit opponent who sought to understand the extent of ex parte communications with the Board by those who favored the permit. Thus, the due process infirmity in Mauna Kea that necessitated a new hearing is surpassed by the infirmity apparent in the instant record. No less a remedy is due Kilakila. The conservation district use permit should be vacated and a new hearing ordered.