Opinion ID: 2570587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: awarding attorney fees

Text: Davis argues that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to Miller. A district court's determination of the reasonableness of claimed attorney fees is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Sheila A. v. Whiteman, 259 Kan. 549, 561, 913 P.2d 181 (1996). Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. State v. Davidson, 264 Kan. 44, 56, 954 P.2d 702 (1998); Saucedo v. Winger, 252 Kan. 718, 730-32, 850 P.2d 908 (1993). The district court awarded reasonable attorneys fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $315,107.04. Fees which are not supported by meticulous, contemporaneous time records that show the specific tasks being billed should not be allowed. Case v. Unified School Dist. No. 233, Johnson County, 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998). Davis' expert testified before the trial court that the attorney fees were unreasonable. Davis also asserts that the district court ignored (1) charged expenses such as overhead; (2) inadequate or undetailed billing; (3) multiple attorney billing; and (4) conference billing where the records do not reflect the matters discussed. Davis does not support this argument with any references to the record, but merely asserts that her expert testified to such before the district court and that alone should be enough to reverse the district court's ruling on attorney fees. Davis' expert does not challenge the hourly fee of the three lawyers employed by Miller. In fact, all three charged less per hour than Davis' expert's hourly fee. All the attorneys and accountants are among the best in their professions. The district court did not allow the fee of Thomas L. Steele on the basis that he was an employee of GFS. The district court held in pertinent part: I do not find: 1. There was background research. 2. Unnecessary duplication of services. 3. Unnecessary consultation with other attorneys. 4. Unwarranted conferences. 5. Unwarranted `Westlaw' research. 6. Any dual billing where billing is for training or supervision of another attorney. 7. Any expenses charged as not relevant in the community. 8. That computer billing did not describe the work done. I find the attorneys fee were: A. Reasonable as to time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. B. The likelihood that this engagement would preclude other engagement. C. In the range of fees customarily charge[d] for similar legal services. D. Reasonable for the amount involved and the results obtained. E. The time limitations imposed by the court. F. The nature and length of the professional relationships with the client. G. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyers. H. The fee was fixed at an hourly rate. Thomas Steele: Mr. Steele performed valuable services in this case. Mr. Steele is employed by General Financial Services which has paid him a salary. General Financial Services is owned entirely by the defendant. General Financial Services has not billed defendant. There is no provision proved for Mr. Steele to be paid anything other than his salary. The Court denies this application. Defendants fees are allowed except for Thomas Steele. Counsel will prepare an appropriate order. Much of the fee allowed was deemed reasonable by Davis' expert. Davis' expert would have reduced Thomas Steele's fee to zero, which the district court did. The recommendation as to the other two lawyers was to reduce their fees to $150,482.71 and $47,487.50. Davis has several complaints, one of which is that Steele and sometimes both other lawyers appeared for depositions. Steele is not being paid, so that reduces the issue to two lawyers. Davis had two lawyers at most of the depositions, which leaves her in a poor position to complain. Miller argues the pending lawsuit caused him problems with his financial institutions, and he was in a position that he had to make a maximum effort to win the lawsuit as soon as possible. He was thus required to hire the best lawyers and accountants available and to have his case take priority over their other work. Davis also argues that some of the paralegal work was clerical in nature and should have been considered as part of the attorneys' overhead. Our view of the large record before us reveals that it would take a line-by-line review of records that are not descriptive enough for this court (or the district court) to separate paralegal work from clerical work to try and separate the two. We have previously said in Link, Inc. v. City of Hays, 268 Kan. 372, 381-83, 997 P.2d 697 (2000): The amount of an attorney fee award is within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the district court abused that discretion. Sheila A. v. Whiteman, 259 Kan. 549, Syl. ¶ 9, 913 P.2d 181 (1996). .... The City's argument lacks merit. While the district court is considered an expert on the issue of attorney fees, City of Wichita v. BG Products Inc., 252 Kan. 367, 372-73, 845 P.2d 649 (1993), the City cites no case placing a duty on the district court to disregard the evidence and use its `expertise' as a controlling element in an award determination. In BG Products we said: The trial court itself is an expert in the area of attorneys' fees and can draw on and apply its own knowledge and expertise in evaluating their worth.' (Emphasis added.) 252 Kan. at 372 (quoting Buchanan v. Employers Mutual Liberty Ins. Co., 201 Kan. 666, Syl. ¶ 9, 443 P.2d 681 [1968].) The district court observed that Link `introduced four exhibits. Exhibits 1 through 3 consist of time records, a fee agreement, and a co-counsel agreement between Kansas Advocacy and Protective Services, Inc. and David Calvert. The fourth exhibit consists of a looseleaf binder containing a thorough brief of the issue by Mr. Scott, including extensive references to pertinent case law and other authority. It is also notable that David Calvert was assisted at trial by Jim Germer, an attorney for K.A.P.S., who has not requested a fee.' By approving the fee, the district court has inferentially applied its own view as to reasonableness. Such an inference is inherent in the award. The City must show that no reasonable person would agree with the district court's decision. This, the City cannot do. In BG Products, we upheld an attorney fee of $300 per hour for 410 hours. This award of $123,000 was based on hourly fees alone; costs were also awarded. BG Products was a condemnation case. We noted the testimony that the attorney involved was an acknowledged expert in the field of eminent domain and had obtained outstanding results for his client. 252 Kan. at 375. As in BG Products, there was testimony here that Link's attorney is a recognized expert. BG Products also held that the eight factors set forth in Rule 1.5 (1999 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 312) of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct should be considered in deciding the reasonableness of an attorney fee. 252 Kan. at 374. Scott testified on the Rule 1.5 factors. The district court relied on competent evidence. Appellate courts are also experts on the reasonableness of attorney fees. However, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the district court on the amount of the fee unless `in the interest of justice' we disagree with the district court. Buchanan, 201 Kan. 666, Syl. ¶¶ 9-11. The interests of justice do not compel us to disagree with the district court. We find no abuse of discretion here. In the case at bar, the district judge carefully examined all the factors suggested in Link, Inc. While at first glance the fee seems excessive, our examination of the extensive record leads us to conclude the interests of justice does not require a reduction of the fee. Davis has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees in this matter and in the amount awarded. Affirmed.