Opinion ID: 2453006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of Section 1.160 New Trial

Text: Section 1.160 applies in this case, and requires a new trial under Cline , Sumlin and Whardo, supra . The amendatory law was in place before trial. The trial court instructed the jury on the old law both with regard to finding of guilt and the applicable sentence. The legislature in the amendatory law distinguished between sodomy and child molestation. The element of penetration separates the crimes. Sodomy requires digital penetration while child molestation requires only sexual contact touching for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. [4] With the old law, this distinction was irrelevant. Neither of the parties raised the issue at trial. Whenever the legislature revises criminal statutes, there may be some awkwardness in applying the new punishment provisions to offenses that have already occurred but sentencing has not. [5] Nevertheless, in the new trial in this case, the approved instructions should be modified as to sentencing in order to comply with section 1.160, Cline , Sumlin and Whardo . The jury should be instructed on the elements of the offense as they existed on the date of the defendant's alleged conduct, as was done in Pritchard's original trial. As to the range of punishment, the change in law will require a modification of the punishment portion of the verdict director with additional fact findings therein in order to accommodate section 1.160 and our precedents. The jury should be instructed that if it finds that there was penetration of the victim's sex organs by Pritchard's fingers with the requisite purpose, the jury may set his punishment from five years to life imprisonment under section 566.062.2. If the jury does not find that the state has proved digital penetration with the requisite purpose, beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury should be instructed that it may recommend punishment up to one year in the county jail, pursuant to section 566.068, if the state proves sexual contact, that is, touching for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.... We reject the state's argument that section 1.160 is inapplicable because the punishment for sodomy was not lessened in the new law. If the state proves that Pritchard's act was a sexual contact touching, but does not prove digital penetration, the punishment under the new law is a maximum of one year in the county jail, a significant reduction from the maximum of life imprisonment for the same conduct under the old law. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the sodomy charge, in accordance with this opinion. We affirm Pritchard's other convictions for second degree assault, second-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, and both counts of armed criminal action. All concur.