Opinion ID: 1931018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The admissibility of the brown paper bag containing the muscular dystrophy collection box

Text: Cress first contends that the contents of the paper bag were not identified at trial. In this, he is in error. Mr. Pilotte explained that the crushed cardboard in the paper bag was part of the only muscular dystrophy plastic container which was missing from the V.F.W. building. The defendant's objection to the effect that this exhibit had no probative value and was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial is not well taken. The paper bag with its contents, dropped as it was by the defendant Cress near the scene of the crime, supplied a link in the chain of circumstances tying the defendants to the crime. The situation in the instant case is not unlike the factual pattern in State v. Mimmovich, 1971, Me., 284 A.2d 282. In that case, articles of personal property, known to have been in a pool hall prior to its being burglarized, were found in close proximity to the spot which the defendants had selected as a hiding place and where the police apprehended them. On that occasion, this Court had this to say: The jury might properly consider the presence of the hammer on the second floor and the breadpan on the third floor of the building on the roof of which the Defendants were hiding as valid links in the chain of circumstantial evidence which led them to the conclusion that Defendants' guilt had been proved. Their admission into evidence was not error. That the manager of the canteen could not identify the coins, nor the muscular dystrophy container, as the particular items taken from the V.F.W. building for lack of personal marks or other identifying characteristics does not under the circumstances of the instant case render such evidence irrelevant. Ownership of personal property or possessory rights therein need not necessarily be established by direct proof, but may be proven by circumstances and inferences as well as by direct evidence. State v. Small, 1970, Me., 267 A.2d 912. Cress further impugns the integrity of this exhibit on the basis that the chain of custody was not shown to be intact. It does appear from the record that, for a period of fifteen to twenty minutes during a luncheon recess at trial, the brown paper bag and its contents (exhibit #1), after having been marked for identification and identified as a Muscular Dystrophy container that I was talking about by Mr. Pilotte, were left unattended in a closed but unlocked desk drawer in the court room. After the recess, the jury matron testified that she saw no one enter or leave the court room from her location in the room, conceding, however, that she did not have a complete view of all the entrances and that it was possible someone could have entered the room unobserved. The presiding Justice stated for the record that he had seen the exhibit placed in the drawer prior to the recess and saw it removed from the same drawer by a court officer when the trial resumed. [3] Cress further claims that several officers in the Waterville police department had access to the evidence locker in which the exhibit was stored. In its consideration of such an issue of continuity of possession of exhibits proffered for admission in evidence, this Court made the following comments: It suffices to say that by identifying markings and description the exhibits were adequately shown to be the same stolen in Turner and later found in the seat of the car in which the defendant rode. State v. Mosher, 1970, Me., 270 A.2d 451, 453. There is no suggestion in the record of any careless handling of the exhibits by anyone or that the exhibits had been tampered with in any way. State v. Lafferty, 1973, Me., 309 A.2d 647, 657. In State v. Carvelle, 1972, Me., 290 A.2d 190, the record was silent respecting the use of the exhibit (Cannabis) in the District Court at the preliminary hearing, but this Court ruled the objection to its admissibility meritless, stating there was no evidence that the exhibit was not properly protected during the short interval that it was in the custody of the District Court, a responsible agency of government.  (Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, even though the record shows that the exhibit was not given absolute and complete protection for the short period of 15 to 20 minutes, it does appear that the evidence was stored in a desk drawer in the court room, where an officer of the court was stationed and had a substantial overview of the area, making any tampering therewith very unlikely. In order to protect the rights of the accused, such measures should be taken which are conducive to preserve real evidence in substantially the same condition as when originally obtained by the authorities and to shield it against substitution or tampering. The purpose of the chain of custody and possession rule is, of course, to vouchsafe assurance that the exhibit has not been altered or tampered with and that there has been no substitution.    To meet this burden, the state is not required to exclude every possibility of these occurrences,    nor to show that some credible witness retained the exhibit in his personal possession or under constant watch,    Evidence which provides a reasonable assurance that the exhibit is the same and in the same condition meets the test,   . State v. Lemon, 1973, Mo.App., 504 S.W.2d 676 at 684 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Real evidence, like testimonial evidence, is open to attack by way of impeachment of its value, and De minimis breaks in the chain of custody go to the weight to be given such evidence, rather than to disqualify it entirely for admissibility. In this case, Officer Charles testified that the materials which made up the exhibit appeared to be the same after the luncheon recess as they were before. As stated in State v. Clukey, 1951, 147 Me. 123, 128, 83 A.2d 568, 570: The objections raised by the respondent to the introduction of the exhibits if they have any merit, go solely to the weight to be given to the exhibits. They were properly admitted.