Opinion ID: 2621579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 2: Did Burhans' convictions violate his due process rights?

Text: Burhans next claims that if the district court were correct in holding that the bondsman privilege did not protect his conduct, then that determination violated his right to notice  that his conduct was criminal  under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process issue involves a question of law, over which we have de novo review. See Hemphill v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 270 Kan. 83, 89, 11 P.3d 1165 (2000). Burhans claims that he could not have known that entering the property of a third party, which the principal had listed as his residence, would be criminal conduct. As support he cites Lopez v. McCotter, 875 F.2d 273, cert. denied 493 U.S. 996 (10th Cir. 1989), where the court found Lopez could not have anticipated the lower court's holding that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act modified the established rule that a bail bondsman need not resort to process in rearresting his principal in another state. 875 F.2d at 277. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals found that no court had previously come to the same conclusion as the lower court and that the statute therefore did not convey a fair warning that Lopez's conduct was criminal. Burhans also alludes to Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894, 84 S. Ct. 1697 (1964) (quoting U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 98 L. Ed. 989, 74 S. Ct. 808 [1954]), in which the Court held: `The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' The State responds that the statutes at issue, K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-3721, criminal trespass, and K.S.A. 21-3408, assault, have been in effect in Kansas for decades. It also points out that K.S.A. 21-3203 clearly defines when ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law constitutes a defense: (1) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided in section 21-3202, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the crime. (2) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute a crime is a defense if: (a) The crime is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published in the Kansas administrative regulations or an annual supplement thereto, as provided by law; and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or (b) He acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined to be invalid; or (c) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of the supreme court of Kansas or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed; (d) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the crime made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute. (3) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief, as described in subsection (2) of this section, is a defense to the crime charged, he may be convicted of an included crime of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be. (Emphasis added.) The State argues that Burhans did not act in reliance upon any of these statutory factors, and therefore, he cannot claim ignorance as a valid defense. It further argues that Burhans admitted that the bondsman privilege to arrest was a gray area of law, but that he acted anyway, without knowing the law or confirming that Austin was present at the residence. Finally, the State contends that even under the broadest understanding of the bondsman privilege, Burhans' actions were not reasonable and would not constitute a defense. Although this area of law has not been thoroughly addressed by our courts, we agree with the State. The criminal statutes for trespass and assault are not being construed in a way that would have prevented Burhans from reasonably understanding that his conduct was proscribed; as the State points out, they have been in force for decades. Moreover, as stated earlier, we have been unable to find any case law from any jurisdiction which, under the facts of the instant case, would have even suggested to Burhans that his actions would be privileged. Even in Livingston, which appears to represent the outer reaches of the bondsman privilege, the defendant bondsman actually saw the principal on the property of the third party, a sighting which was confirmed by the homeowner-mother. We conclude Burhans was sufficiently placed on notice that his actions would be criminal, not privileged. Consequently, his due process rights were not violated. Issue 3: Did sufficient evidence support Burhans' convictions? Burhans also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both of his convictions. Our standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence is well-known: When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kunellis, 276 Kan. 461, Syl. ¶ 10, 78 P.3d 776 (2003).