Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial denial of requests for substitution of trial counsel

Text: Six times before trial, defendant requested, or appeared to request, substitution of his appointed counsel. The trial court denied all but the final request. Defendant now challenges these rulings. We conclude, however, that the trial court did not err in failing to replace defendant's counsel earlier in the proceedings. The San Diego County Public Defender's Office first represented defendant in this case, but withdrew within weeks of the appointment based on a conflict of interest. The trial court then appointed Mary Ellen Attridge of the office of the San Diego County Alternate Public Defender to represent defendant. Six months later, at a pretrial hearing on January 25, 1996, Attridge told the trial court that defendant might not be competent to stand trial and requested a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. [1] Attridge indicated defendant was uncooperative, uncommunicative, delusional, and paranoid, and had told her he was experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations. When defendant responded that he believed counsel had turned against [him], Attridge asked that the district attorney be excused from the courtroom. The trial court dismissed the request, saying, this is not a Marsden hearing. [2] Nonetheless, defendant continued to complain about counsel, calling her insubordinate and claiming he had asked her constantly to do what I say as an attorney and [she had] not. As defendant continued to complain, counsel attempted to talk over him so as to prevent his comments from appearing on the record. The trial court quickly interceded, declared a doubt as to defendant's mental competence, and ordered the proceedings suspended. In response to the trial court's ruling, defendant stated: Excuse me, Judge. I have fired this attorney. The trial court brushed aside the comment, stating, I know you have, and proceeded to schedule the mental competency evaluation. After the trial court set an evaluation date and ended the hearing, defendant rose from his chair, lunged at Attridge, and yelled, You have no client, you fucking cunt. At a subsequent hearing one month later on February 22, 1996, the trial court indicated it had reviewed and agreed with a report by the court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Gregg Michel, who concluded that defendant suffered no mental infirmities that rendered him incompetent to stand trial. When defense counsel requested jury trial on the issue and asked to make an offer of proof outside of the prosecutor's presence, the trial court granted the request. Following defense counsel's offer of proof, the trial court asked defendant if he understood what was happening. Defendant replied, So far my attorney believes that I am incompetent and for that reason I decide that I need another attorney. The trial court reminded defendant that another attorney, John Lee, had been added to the defense team to help resolve defendant's apparent dissatisfaction with lead counsel. But defendant was not appeased, noting, Mr. Lee works with Mrs. Attridge and . . . [w]e don't get along at all. Defendant reiterated that he did not believe Attridge could represent him, and referred to her as insubordinate and rude. The trial court responded, Because of the mental competence problem, I do not feel a Marsden [hearing] would be proper at this point so we have to settle the 1368 problem and then we'll handle the Marsden problem. Later in the hearing, with the courtroom now reopened to the public and the prosecutor present, defendant renewed his request for another attorney, saying, I no longer accept her legal advice. The trial court indicated that it would not change counsel at this point, but defendant persisted, blurting out, They are all against me and She is not helping me. However, the trial court ignored defendant's remarks and conferred with the attorneys about various issues concerning the competency trial. The parties were in court again the next day to select their experts and set competency trial dates. Once those arrangements had been made, the prosecutor brought to the trial court's attention legal precedent establishing that a defendant seeking substitution of counsel is entitled to a Marsden hearing even when proceedings have been suspended under section 1368. Confirming with defendant that he wanted a hearing to determine whether new counsel would be appointed, the trial court cleared the courtroom except for defendant and his counsel. At the Marsden hearing, defendant detailed his complaints about counsel. According to defendant, counsel was providing him with misleading legal advice and lashing out at him when he asked for something. He called her brutal and insubordinate and claimed she ignored his requests, including his request for a speedy trial. Upon the trial court's request for a response, counsel first expressed the view that defendant's dissatisfaction was based on a mental defect. She had no idea what defendant meant by lashing out and believed he called her insubordinate because she expressed a doubt as to his competence. As for not acceding to his requests, counsel explained that she refused to give defendant a copy of the police report in his case because she feared it might fall into the hands of another inmate who would use it to testify falsely against defendant. Regarding defendant's demand for speedy trial, counsel indicated that the case was not ready to go to trial and she believed defendant was more lucid when he initially agreed to waive his speedy trial rights. Defendant declined the trial court's invitation to reply to counsel's explanation, stating, She said it all. Finding no breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and no reason counsel could not adequately represent defendant in the future, the trial court denied defendant's motion for substitution of counsel. It remarked that counsel was highly competent and well respected, and expressed the view that any problems between attorney and client were the result of defendant's willful and defiant attitude or a mental problem, whether feigned or not. On April 8, 1996, the section 1368 trial began. Initially, the parties prepared for a jury trial. However, after the noon recess, counsel announced she would waive defendant's right to a jury trial. Defendant objected, and again expressed his dissatisfaction with counsel. When the trial court explained to defendant that the law permitted counsel to waive a jury, even against his wishes, defendant responded: I fired her. I have constantly repeated that she is not my attorney. The trial court reminded defendant, You do have an attorney. But defendant took issue with the trial court, saying, No I don't, [not] one that will defend or represent me in the manner that I need to be represented. One week later, on April 15, 1996, the trial court determined that defendant was competent to stand trial and ordered reinstatement of criminal proceedings. The parties then discussed setting the guilt phase trial for a date in July. Noting that July was three months away, defendant asked how long it would be before he could see another attorney. He stated that the trial court's competency finding means I can fire [trial counsel] now. After defendant confirmed he wanted another attorney, the trial court cleared the courtroom and conducted a second Marsden hearing. At this hearing, defendant reiterated his earlier assertion that counsel was not representing him. He complained that the competency hearing was a proceeding he had not wanted. Things that she said to you, defendant remarked, my public defender would have not. . . . My public defender would not have questioned my sanity. The trial court found insufficient grounds to relieve defense counsel of her appointment and denied defendant's motion for substitution of counsel. However, the next morning, April 16, it reconvened with defendant and his counsel and announced it had changed its mind regarding the Marsden motion. The trial court noted that it had conducted the competency hearing at defense counsel's request over defendant's objection, and that both members of the defense team had testified about their contacts with defendant. Given these developments, the trial court found more validity to defendant's asserted distrust of his attorney. In the trial court's view, although counsel had handled the case appropriately, the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated and the breakdown warranted appointment of new counsel. [3] Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant his request to substitute counsel until April 16, after the competency hearing, and that the error resulted in an unreliable competency hearing. He argues that despite his repeated and clear expressions of distrust of counsel and desire for a new attorney, the trial court first ignored, then never fully addressed, his concerns over an irreconcilable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. (1) When a defendant seeks substitution of appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302]; see also People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683].) We review the denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384].) Denial is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the defendant's right to assistance of counsel. ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for substitution of counsel on February 23, before the competency hearing. Immediately upon being apprised of its duty to conduct a Marsden hearing even though it had suspended the proceedings pursuant to section 1368, the trial court provided defendant with an opportunity to air his complaints. After then considering counsel's responses to each of defendant's grievances, the trial court was entitled to credit counsel's explanations and to conclude that defendant's complaints were unfounded. ( People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192].) For instance, the trial court reasonably could find that counsel had properly refused to provide defendant with the police reports in his case because of concern the documents would fall into the hands of a would-be jailhouse informant who might use the police reports to fabricate evidence against defendant. The trial court reasonably could conclude, moreover, that replacement of counsel was not required because any deterioration in the attorney-client relationship that had occurred was due to defendant's willful, defiant attitude or to a mental problem that was either feigned or real. [A] defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict. ( Ibid. ) Defendant posits that the trial court's decision to replace counsel after the competency hearing supports his argument that it should have ordered substitution before commencing the hearing. Indeed, he asserts, if his cursing and lunge at counsel did not irretrievably damage the attorney-client relationship, it is hard to imagine anything that would. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, however, heated words alone do not require substitution of counsel without a showing of an irreconcilable conflict. ( People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) And whereas defendant's earlier requests for new counsel were supported by generalized expressions of distrust and dissatisfaction, the competency hearing both crystallized and validated the reasons for his distrust. The trial court could reasonably conclude that allowing counsel to continue to represent defendant after testifying against him at a competency hearing held against his wishes would substantially impair defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. But the trial court's decision to replace counsel at that point does not call into question its earlier denial of defendant's Marsden motion. The mere  `lack of trust in, or inability to get along with,'  counsel is not sufficient grounds for substitution. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].) Nothing in the record supports defendant's assertion that a desire to expedite trial drove the trial court's refusal to substitute counsel before the competency hearing. (2) We agree with defendant that the trial court erred when it brushed aside his initial requests for substitution of counsel in the belief that the question of defendant's competence to stand trial first had to be resolved. [4] [W]hile the trial court may not `proceed with the case against the defendant' before it determines his competence in a section 1368 hearing [citation], it may and indeed must promptly consider a motion for substitution of counsel when the right to effective assistance `would be substantially impaired' if his request were ignored. [Citation.] ( People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 88 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].) However, contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court's error does not compel reversal. This is not a case like People v. Solorzano (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1063 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 735], in which the trial court refused to hold any Marsden hearing until after the results of a competency hearing. In Solorzano, the defendant's complaints about his counsel pertained to counsel's deficiencies in handling the competency hearing, at which, over the defendant's objection, he was adjudged competent. On these facts, the Court of Appeal concluded it could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had not affected the competency hearing's outcome. ( Id. at pp. 1069-1071.) Here, by contrast, the trial court conducted a first Marsden hearing in which defendant communicated his complaints about counsel before the competency proceedings occurred, and as previously discussed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing substitution of counsel at that point. Defendant thus fails to show that the trial court's initial failure to hold a Marsden hearing prejudiced him. The facts here closely resemble those in People v. Govea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 57 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 511], in which the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's error in refusing the defendant's requests for a Marsden hearing while criminal proceedings were suspended under section 1368 was not prejudicial. There, as here, the defendant claimed he had a conflict with his attorney after counsel declared a doubt as to the defendant's competence, and he made numerous requests for substitution of counsel. ( People v. Govea, supra, at pp. 59-61.) Although the trial court initially refused to consider the defendant's grounds for seeking new counsel, it conducted a Marsden hearing before the competency proceeding and did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for substitution of counsel at that time. ( Govea, at p. 62.) Like the trial court in this case, the trial court in Govea ultimately found the defendant competent and appointed new counsel. Given that the trial court gave defendant everything he sought, the Court of Appeal concluded, the trial court's delay in conducting a Marsden hearing did not prejudice the defendant. ( Govea, at p. 62.) We reach the same conclusion here.