Opinion ID: 2602233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This Case Is Moot, but We Review It under the Public Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine.

Text: The party bringing this appeal, the union, prevailed before the ALRA. The superior court affirmed that ruling. The city does not appeal the adverse decisions of either the agency or the superior court. The first question is whether the union can appeal a decision in its favor simply because it was dissatisfied with the reasoning of the superior court.
We have ruled that, `[u]nder ordinary circumstances, we will refrain from deciding questions where events have rendered the legal issue moot.' [6] A claim is moot if it is no longer a present, live controversy, and the party bringing the action would not be entitled to relief, even if it prevails. [7] Mootness can also occur when a party no longer has a personal stake in the controversy and has, in essence, been divested of standing. [8] The basic requirement for standing in Alaska is adversity. [9] This case presents an unusual twist on the usual mootness consideration. In most cases, mootness is found because the party raising an appeal cannot be given the remedy it seeks even if the court agrees with its legal position. [10] In this case, the union has already been given the remedy it seeks, and we cannot give it any further relief even if we agree with the union's legal argument. The union merely asks us to resolve an intermediate legal questionwhether the ALRA has the power to decide its own jurisdictiondifferently than the superior court did, while reaching the same ultimate conclusion that the superior court reached. Although the situations are not exactly the same, we have previously found that issues were moot because the appellant was able to secure relief, even though the means by which appellant secured relief were different from those argued by the appellant below. [11] The facts of the present case present an even easier case for mootness because the union has been able to secure relief. As a result, we find that the superior court's decision to affirm the determination of the ALRA has rendered the union's appeal moot.
We have held that we can choose to address certain issues if they fall under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. [12] There are three main factors that we consider in deciding whether to apply the public interest exception: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may cause review of the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine. [13] None of the individual factors is dispositive; rather, we use our discretion to determine whether the public interest dictates that immediate review of a moot issue is appropriate. [14] With regard to the first requirement, we have refused to apply the public interest exception to unusual factual circumstances that were unlikely to repeat themselves [15] or situations where the applicable statute or regulation was no longer in force and was unlikely to be reinstated. [16] Neither of those exceptions applies here. This issue is likely to repeat itself as questions of arbitrability are likely to arise with regard to other CBAs put before the ALRA in the future, and no statutory change has occurred. The second requirement for the public interest exception is that the issue will continually evade court review. This question is close. It is possible that this issue will arise again when it is not moot. In Legislative Council v. Knowles, [17] we were uncertain as to whether the issue would evade review in the future, but we were persuaded to apply the public interest exception because in that case the threatened harm resulted when a claim was brought, not when it was concluded. [18] This case presents a similar situation. Arbitrability is a threshold question; thus, the harm is caused by the means of resolution and not the resolution itself. Therefore, we find that this requirement is met. The third requirement is also satisfied. We have applied the public interest exception to situations, otherwise moot, where the legal power of public officials was in question. Specifically, in Knowles, we applied the exception to the issue whether the governor had the right to bring suit against the legislature. [19] Even though later enactments resolved the immediate conflict between the governor and legislature, we agreed to consider, under the public interest exception, the meaning of a constitutional prohibition of such suits. [20] Similarly, in Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State, [21] we considered the issuance of a permit for fishing in waters that had been closed for over twenty-five years, despite the fact that the permit was revoked prior to trial, which rendered many of the issues moot. [22] We refused on mootness grounds to consider issues of procedural error that were admitted by the Department of Fish and Game, but we did consider whether the commissioner had exceeded his authority. [23] We ruled that the scope of the Commissioner's power is an issue of public interest. [24] The present case meets the important public interest requirement. As this case raises a question of the power of government officials, the issues are sufficiently important to the public interest to merit consideration. Therefore, the issue, though moot, has met the three-prong public policy exception test.