Opinion ID: 1758546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: History of Defamation Law

Text: We begin our discussion with a review of those developments in the history of the law of defamation that are central to the issues presented in this case. The common law claim of defamation at civil law [4] sought to redress those injuries to reputation caused by the publication of false information damaging to another's reputation. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111, at 772 (5th ed.1984). Earlier in the state's history, Minnesota law followed the English common law rule, imposing strict liability for defamation. See Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Minn.1985). Under the English common law rule, [t]he defendant was liable, regardless of fault, for unprivileged publication of false and defamatory statements which injured the reputation of the plaintiff. Id. at 480-81. This strict liability rule was limited by several types of privileges that protected a publisher from liability for potentially defamatory statements. In Minnesota, these privileges generally have been divided into two categories, absolute and qualified privileges. See Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954). Absolute privileges, once established, protect a publisher of potentially defamatory statements regardless of motive and cannot be defeated by any showing of malice. See id. An absolute privilege applies to protect the public service or the administration of justice. See, e.g., id. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417 (discussing matters published in a judicial proceeding related to the subject matter of the proceeding); Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N.W. 147 (1910) (discussing publications in the course of legislative proceedings). Qualified privileges have attached to a broader range of circumstances where the interest in shielding the defendant is considered less compelling, but still requiring some protection. See Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 481. Historically, a qualified privilege has protected a publication when it was made by a person in the discharge of a public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs and in matters where his interest is concerned. See id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 593-598A (conditional privileges). Unlike absolute privileges, however, a showing of common law malice, ill will, or improper motive would defeat a qualified privilege. See Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 481. The United States Supreme Court historically treated issues of defamation as being solely within the province of the states because defamatory comments were, by definition, not protected speech under the First Amendment. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). However, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court articulated a First Amendment concern with the law of defamation as it was applied in the public forum, specifically public comment on public officials. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). [5] Our court has also recognized the tension between common law defamation and the First Amendment. We have observed that [t]he law of libel originated to promote certain interests of the state by means antipathetic to values central to our First Amendment guarantees. Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 480. The Sullivan Court, while recognizing the strong interest in redressing harms to reputation, stated that public debate on matters of general concern should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open and that such debate might well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. 360 U.S. at 270, 79 S.Ct. 1173. The Court, balancing the constitutional and policy interests in free and open public discourse and an individual's right to compensation for harm to reputation, concluded that public officials could only recover for defamation upon a showing of actual malice. See id. at 279-80, 79 S.Ct. 1173. The Court defined actual malice as a showing that the publisher of a defamatory statement acted with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. See id. at 280, 79 S.Ct. 1173. A few years later, the Supreme Court extended Sullivan's application by ruling that a state may no longer impose strict liability for defamation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-48, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). In response to Gertz, we adopted a negligence standard for private individuals asserting defamation claims in Minnesota, stating that a private individual may recover actual damages for a defamatory publication upon proof that the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the defamatory statement was false. Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 491. The Supreme Court's definition of actual malice has generated some confusion in the law of defamation. Therefore, in the context of privileges in defamation law, it is important to distinguish between actual malice and common law malice. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) (commenting on the confusing nature of the phrase actual malice). The Supreme Court provided a technical definition of actual malice as a knowing or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement that has nothing to do with motive or ill will in the publishing of otherwise defamatory statements. See id. at 666-67, 109 S.Ct. 2678. Conversely, common law malice was generally proved in a defamation matter by a showing of ill will or improper motive for the publication of defamatory statements. See Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 481 n. 5.