Opinion ID: 205127
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dde

Text: Wellman first claims that DDE terminated her in retaliation for filing harassment complaints. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Wellman must present sufficient evidence to establish that: (1) she was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to DDE to present a non-retaliatory explanation for terminating Wellman. Id. at 920 n.2. Wellman must then establish that there is sufficient evidence for the factfinder to “(1) disbelieve the employer‟s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer‟s action.” Fuentes v. 5 Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). The District Court concluded that Wellman failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she could not demonstrate a causal link between her filing of the harassment charges with the EEOC and her termination. Wellman never filed an internal sexual harassment charge, and filed her EEOC charge only eleven days before her termination. Wellman maintains that even if DDE did not have notice of her EEOC charge, she had expressed her concerns about Graves and Price to human resources before her termination. However, DDE paid her short-term disability benefits for seven months after she spoke to human resources. At her August 2002 meeting with the EAC and human resources, she was offered her previous position or the option of applying for an incapability pension. She admits the parties also discussed her being moved to a different supervisor within a few months of her return to work. DDE also gave her an extension of one week to make her decision, but she did not respond, nor did she attend her final return-to-work meeting, and was eventually terminated for job abandonment. The record shows that she was aware that if she did not return to work, she would be terminated. Contrary to her retaliation claim, DDE also informed DuPont that it did not object to her applying for a new position with DuPont. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Wellman failed to show facts supporting a prima facie case of retaliation. Even assuming that Wellman established a prima facie case of retaliation, DDE offered a non-discriminatory reason for terminating Wellman, namely that she refused to 6 attend her return-to-work meeting. The District Court found that Wellman failed to rebut DDE‟s legitimate reason. She admitted that she had received disability benefits for almost seven months and refused to attend her scheduled meetings. Accordingly, the District Court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and, as such, did not err in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
Wellman also claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. To establish such a claim, Wellman must prove that: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination based on her membership in a protected class; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) a reasonable person in the same position and protected class would have been detrimentally affected; and (5) respondeat superior liability exists. See West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995). Courts are to consider the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, and determine whether it is “physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998). “Teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory” behavior. Id. at 788. The District Court acknowledged the evidence showing that Wellman found her workplace to be hostile. However, it concluded that her unsupported allegations alone did not establish a hostile work environment claim based on gender. Furthermore, the court properly held that, even if true, Graves‟ alleged conduct does not constitute 7 harassment pervasive enough to “alter the condition of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). She alleged sporadic incidences over six months; she did not allege or establish a pattern of conduct and the alleged conduct was not consistently related to her gender. The District Court thus correctly concluded that summary judgment was warranted on Wellman‟s hostile work environment claim.
Finally, Wellman claims that she was discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”). To bring a claim under the ADA, Wellman must show that she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a history of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). First, Wellman‟s treating psychologist noted that she did not have any serious mental illness or a history of such. Second, there is no indication that her condition limits a major life activity. Finally, there is no evidence that DDE considered Wellman as having a disability. She had been cleared to return to work, and DDE offered her her former position. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on Wellman‟s claim under the ADA.