Opinion ID: 1924710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instruction on Age Element

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice violated his constitutional rights by directing a verdict on an element of the offense. As previously stated, at the close of trial, the trial justice instructed the jury that the first element of first-degree child abuse is that the victim must be a child under age eighteen. With respect to that element, the trial justice stated, I charge you as a matter of law that that issue and that element has been proven, and there is no dispute on that element. He then reiterated his charge to the jury, stating [n]ow, the first element I have indicated to you, you must accept as proven, proven already. At the side bar, defense counsel said, As to the age   , age still has to be proved.    There is still an element that has to be proven. They have to accept [the testimony concerning John Jr.'s age] to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, so I object to that. In response to defendant's objection, the trial justice stated, [t]he date of birth was issued. There is no question in this Court's mind that the age of the child has been determined and fits the statutory scheme. They don't have to go through that element. It has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court has said that the Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995)). Concerning this same notion, this Court has held that a jury instruction that relieves the state of its burden of proving each element of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt violates a defendant's due process rights. See State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I.2000). Nevertheless, a trial justice's error in removing an element of the crime from the jury's consideration does not automatically warrant reversal. Rather, this Court will affirm the conviction as long as it concludes the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hazard, 745 A.2d at 752. Under this approach, `an instructional omission, misdescription, or conclusive presumption can be subject to harmless-error analysis   : (1) where the defendant is acquitted of the offense on which the jury was improperly instructed   ; (2) where the defendant admitted the element on which the jury was improperly instructed; and (3) where other facts necessarily found by the jury are the functional equivalent of the omitted, misdescribed, or presumed element.' Id. at 753 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 13, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). In this case, although it was error for the trial justice to instruct the jury that the child's age was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that error was harmless. Throughout defendant's closing argument he repeatedly referred to the victim as a child. Furthermore, at trial, the victim's parents both testified to their son's date of birth, yet defendant did not object to this testimony and did not cross-examine or offer disputing evidence on that issue. The only time defendant objected to the classification of John Jr. as a child was at the close of trial when the trial justice rendered his jury instructions. Finally, throughout trial it was uncontroverted that the victim was treated by a pediatrician at a children's hospital. This evidence makes it inconceivable that a jury could have found this element unproven even absent the trial justice's erroneous instruction. Because no prejudice resulted to defendant, we are of the opinion that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not require a new trial.