Opinion ID: 3037886
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attacks on the 2005 Management Measures

Text: Plaintiffs’ three remaining claims attack the 2005 management measures themselves. Plaintiffs claim (1) that the management measures are inconsistent with the “national standard” under 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8) requiring that the “importance of fishery resources to fishing communities” be taken into account; (2) that they are inconsistent with the “national standard” under 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(10) requiring the NMFS “to the extent practicable” to “promote the safety of human life at sea;” and (3) that the NMFS improperly invoked a “good cause” provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 553(b)(B), to justify its decision not to open a public comment period. We take these three claims in turn.
Communities” [14] By its explicit terms, § 1851(a) requires only that FMPs and their implementing regulations be consistent with the “national standards.” The 2005 management measures are “actions,” not “regulations.” For purposes of plaintiffs’ two claims against the 2005 management measures based on national standards set forth in § 1851(a), we assume without deciding that the standards of that section apply to actions taken under regulations implementing FMPs as well as to the regulations themselves. National Standard No. 8 provides that OREGON TROLLERS v. GUTIERREZ 7415 Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation requirements of this chapter (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks) take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8). Plaintiffs claim that the Council inadequately analyzed the economic impact of its 2005 management measures, and that the NMFS inadequately reviewed the measures for consistency with National Standard No. 8. The regulation implementing National Standard No. 8 provides that an economic analysis must “identify affected fishing communities and then assess their differing levels of dependence and engagement in the fishery being regulated . . . . The analysis should discuss each alternative’s likely effect on the sustained participation of these fishing communities in the fishery.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.345(c)(3). In addition, “[t]he analysis should assess the likely positive and negative social and economic impacts of the alternative management measures, over both the short and the long term, on fishing communities[,]” id. § 600.345(c)(4), as well as “identify those alternatives that would minimize adverse impacts on those fishing communities within the constraints of conservation and management goals of the FMP . . . .” Id. § 600.345(c)(5). In 2004, the Council and the NMFS considered the socioeconomic impact of that year’s proposed management measures and issued a lengthy report titled an “Environmental Assessment.” That assessment discussed various alternatives to measures satisfying the 35,000 natural spawner escapement floor, addressing their short- and long-term impacts on fishing communities. In April 2005, the NMFS concluded that, “[f]or the fisheries to be conducted under the proposed 2005 ocean 7416 OREGON TROLLERS v. GUTIERREZ salmon regulations[,] the analysis from the 2004 [Environmental Assessment] is sufficient to understand the range of options developed and the impacts projected . . . for the 2005 season.” The NMFS’s “Supplemental Finding of No Significant Impact” updated the Environmental Assessment’s conclusions for the 2005 management measures and concluded as follows: The overall 2005 community income impact of the commercial fishery is projected to be $33.7 million, down 28% from the 2004 value of $46.8 million, and 74% below the 1976-1990 average. The overall com- munity income impact of the recreational fishery is projected to be $394 million, down 16% from the 2004 value of $471 million, and 44% below the 1976-1990 average. Community income impacts projected for both the commercial and recreational fisheries off Washington, Oregon, and California, are well above the disaster levels of the 1994 season. [15] So long as the agency appropriately updates its analysis under National Standard No. 8, there is no reason why it must start from scratch every year. Compare N.C. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647, 654 (E.D. Va. 1997) (reliance on previous year’s measures without discussion of National Standard No. 8 is improper when the agency had not assessed the previous year’s measures for consistency with the standard). Plaintiffs do not identify data missing from the 2004 and 2005 analyses or explain why the analyses in the record fall short of what the Magnuson Act requires. See Little Bay Lobster Co. v. Evans, 352 F.3d 462, 470 (1st Cir. 2003). “About the best a court can do” when it reviews the NMFS’s performance with respect to National Standard No. 8 “is to ask whether the Secretary has examined the impact of, and alternatives to, the plan he ultimately adopts . . . .” Id. We conclude the that NMFS did not abuse its discretion when it relied on a 2004 analysis, updated for 2005, to review the OREGON TROLLERS v. GUTIERREZ 7417 2005 management measures for consistency with National Standard No. 8.
[16] National Standard No. 10 provides that “[c]onservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(10). Plaintiffs contend that, by shortening the fishing season, the 2005 management measures unnecessarily obliged fishermen to go to sea regardless of the weather or other dangers. Thus, according to plaintiffs, the management measures did not, “to the extent practicable,” “promote” human safety. [17] The NMFS addressed safety concerns in an April 2005 memorandum commenting on the Council’s recommendations: The proposed action is expected to be neutral with respect to health and safety. The proposed regulations are within the range of annual regulations implemented since adoption of the salmon frame- work plan in 1984 and meet the considerations for weather-related safety and harvest opportunity . . . . Although cursory, this analysis indicates that the NMFS considered National Standard No. 10 and thus discharged its duty under § 1855(a)(10). As stated by the NMFS memorandum, the 2005 management measures do fall within the “range” of measures that have governed fisheries in past years. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 21311, 21316 (May 8, 1991) (announcing closure of Klamath Management Zone fishery for all but one month). The fact that the measures are “neutral,” and do not affirmatively promote safety, does not mean that they do not promote safety “to the extent practicable.” We conclude that the NMFS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it 7418 OREGON TROLLERS v. GUTIERREZ assessed the management measures for compliance with National Standard No. 10.
Comment [18] Finally, plaintiffs claim the NMFS failed to perform the economic analysis required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”), 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. When an agency has an obligation to open a public comment period during the rulemaking process, the RFA requires it to prepare a “regulatory flexibility analysis.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 604. The “initial regulatory flexibility analysis,” published after announcement of the proposed rule, must “describe the impact of the proposed rule on small entities” and discuss “significant alternatives” that accomplish the regulatory objectives while “minimiz[ing] any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 603(a), (c). The “final regulatory flexibility analysis,” published with the final rule, must discuss the reasons why the agency adopted the alternative it did. Id. § 604(a). [19] Under the APA, the NMFS must open a public com- ment period before it adopts annual management measures. See NRDC, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 50 C.F.R. § 660.411(b). The obligation is excused “when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B); see also 50 C.F.R. § 660.411(b). When the agency validly invokes the “good cause” exception, the RFA does not apply. See A.M.L. Int’l, Inc. v. Daley, 107 F. Supp. 2d 90, 107 (D. Mass. 2000). Citing irreducible time pressure to act before the fishing season began, the NMFS invoked the “good cause” exception when it adopted the 2005 management measures. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 23063. OREGON TROLLERS v. GUTIERREZ 7419 We recently addressed the “good cause” exception in NRDC, Inc. v. Evans, a case similar to this one in several respects. There, the plaintiffs argued that the NMFS’s failure to provide a public comment period invalidated annual management measures that implemented a groundfish FMP. 316 F.3d at 907-08. The NMFS did not open a public comment period and instead invoked the “good cause” exception under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). It explained that “ ‘[d]elay in implementation of the measures’ ” to allow the public to comment “ ‘could upset [the] balance’ ” between conservation and harvest exploitation “ ‘and cause harm to some stocks . . . .’ ” Id. at 908 n.4 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 2338, 2371-72 (Jan. 11, 2000)). The NMFS stated that it could not have started the rulemaking process earlier because “ ‘[m]uch of the data necessary for these specifications and management measures came from the current fishing year.’ ” Id. The NMFS has invoked the good cause exception on precisely these grounds each year for the previous decade. Id. at 911. We held that the NMFS had not adequately justified its decision not to open a public comment period. Following CalAlmond, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture, 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 2003), we declared that generic “timeliness considerations of rulemaking on an annual basis cannot constitute good cause.” NRDC, 316 F.3d at 912 (citing CalAlmond, 14 F.3d at 441-42). The agency must “demonstrate . . . some exigency apart from generic complexity of data collection and time constraints[,]” and it had not done so. Id. We took pains to note, however, that we did not need to “determine the precise contours of what constitutes good cause in this context[,]” and that “we [did] not mean to suggest that habitual invocation of the good cause exception is itself improper.” Id. We concluded in NRDC that the “NMFS should be free in future years to show that compliance is impracticable under specific circumstances pertinent to the year at issue.” Id. at 912. The district court in this case found that the grounds for the good cause exception were adequately explained. It distin7420 OREGON TROLLERS v. GUTIERREZ guished our holding in NRDC on the ground that the NMFS’s statement “contain[s] a great deal more foundational information, as well as season specific bases, than the very general statement in NRDC.” 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34084, at . We agree with the district court. In NRDC, the good cause statement simply asserted that data-gathering and timeliness concerns excused a public comment period. Too long to reproduce in full here, the good cause statement in this case fills nearly a page in the Federal Register, and it thoroughly explains why the NMFS could not solicit public comment before the measures’ effective date. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 23063. The NMFS justified its decision with specific fisheryrelated reasons, not generic complaints about time pressure and data collection difficulties. It observed that the data on which the management measures are based “are not available until January and February because spawning escapement continues through the fall[.]” The Council does not finish its process until early April, and the season must begin on May 1. The NMFS thus has only a month to finalize the Council’s proposals. Id. “Delaying implementation of annual fishing regulations, which are based on the current stock abundance projections, for an additional sixty days would require that fishing regulations for May and June be set in the previous year without knowledge of current stock status.” Id. [20] The NMFS also explained why season-specific measures, which cannot be ready until early May, must be in place by that time: [T]he 2005 forecast ocean abundance for Klamath River fall Chinook requires a reduction in the commercial season length from Humbug Mountain, OR, to the Oregon-California Border from being open from May-June 2004 to being closed in 2005. With- out these, and similar restrictions in other areas in 2005, the projected Klamath River fall Chinook escapement floor would not be met. OREGON TROLLERS v. GUTIERREZ 7421 70 Fed. Reg. at 23063. Taken together, the NMFS’s explanations set forth the “specific circumstances pertinent to the year at issue” we found missing in NRDC. See 316 F.3d at 912. [21] The fact that the NMFS regularly invokes the good cause exception for the Pacific Plan salmon management measures does not render the exception unavailable for 2005.3 So long as the NMFS continues to give season-specific reasons for why the good cause exception is needed, its “habitual invocation” is not improper. Because the NMFS properly relied on the “good cause” exception in connection with the 2005 management measures, it did not have an obligation under the RFA to issue a regulatory flexibility analysis.