Opinion ID: 1772012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the lower court err in ordering the parole board to grant the immediate release of read?

Text: The lower court found specifically that Read had been granted parole on several occasions, and that said parole was withdrawn in each case before her release because of Read's refusal to waive extradition to Florida. In essence, the court found that Read was granted parole to detainer only, and once the detainer was found invalid by the lower court, the Parole Board was ordered to release Read immediately. At the outset, it is clear that what the Parole Board attempted to do was beyond its statutory authority, and consequently, void from the beginning. Shillingford v. Read, 312 So.2d 717 (Miss. 1975); Miss. Code Ann., § 47-7-17 (Supp. 1988). The Parole Board attempted to grant Read her release to detainer only; that is, it was a specific condition of Read's so-called parole that she be released to the State of Florida only. Likewise, in Shillingford, the prisoner's release was to detainer only. As stated by the court: It is perfectly apparent to us that Shillingford's release to federal detainer only was not a parole but was really a transfer of custody from the State Penitentiary to a Federal Penitentiary. The State Probation and Parole Board did not even consider Shillingford from the standpoint of rehabilitation and a return to society. 312 So.2d at 719. After noting that the applicable statute, § 47-7-17, does not provide for a release to detainer only, this Court held that what the Parole Board did in this case is void from the beginning ... 312 So.2d at 719-20. The only difference in our case is that the board did not succeed in completing the transfer. However, they did condition parole eligibility on Read's willingness to voluntarily release herself to detainer only, and as noted, nothing in the statute providing for the granting of parole allows such a condition be attached. See § 47-7-17 (Supp. 1988). To compound the error, the lower court issued an order which in effect removed the condition of eligibility attached by the Parole Board, and granted Read parole. It is well recognized that the power to grant parole is a discretionary function of the Parole Board accorded by statute. In Leonard v. Miss. State Probation & Parole Board, 373 F. Supp. 699 (N.D.Miss. 1974), reversed on other grounds, 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998, 96 S.Ct. 428, 46 L.Ed.2d 373 (1975). It was recognized that the courts are without power to grant parole. 373 F. Supp. at 704. Determining the eligibility for parole is peculiarly and solely a discretionary function of the Parole Board, and absent exceptional circumstances, the court [only] has the authority to direct the Parole Board to reconsider eligibility for parole in a proper case. Id. Consequently, the Parole Board erroneously conditioned Read's parole on her willingness to voluntarily submit to the custody of her detainer, and the lower court compounded the error by removing this condition and ordering the immediate release of Read. At the most, the lower court could have ordered the Parole Board to reconsider Read's eligibility from the standpoint of rehabilitation and a return to society pursuant to the statute. Even then, however, the matter of the detainer lodged against Read by the State of Florida stands in the way. Therefore, this assignment of error has merit, and the lower court's order granting Read's immediate release is reversed, and the case dismissed without prejudice. Read's petition was improperly entertained by the County Court of Rankin County for the reason that it is governed by the provisions of the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, and is subject to the requirement that Read first file a motion in this Court for permission to proceed in the trial court. Notwithstanding, the lower court erred in concluding that the State of Florida lost jurisdiction over the petitioner for the reason that the effect of Florida's release of Read to the State of Mississippi is a question to be answered in the first instance by a proper court of the State of Florida. Further, the Parole Board was without statutory or other authority to condition Read's parole on her voluntarily submitting herself to the custody of the State of Florida, and the lower court compounded this error by entering an order which in effect granted Read parole. Therefore, the orders entered in this cause by the County Court of Rankin County are reversed, and this cause is dismissed without prejudice to allow for the initiation of proper proceedings before the proper tribunals, consistent with the opinion in this case. REVERSED AND RENDERED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ., concur. PITTMAN, J., not participating.