Opinion ID: 359686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 8 Greene, Julia Greene and Fuel attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of their convictions. 2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict rendered, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Wofford, 562 F.2d 582, 585 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1977), and take as established all reasonable inferences which tend to support the action of the jury. United States v. Overshon, 494 F.2d 894, 896 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 96, 42 L.Ed.2d 85 (1974). It is well established that 9 circumstantial evidence does not differ in principle from direct evidence, and that in order for a jury to convict on circumstantial evidence it is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt but simply that it be sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. 10 United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893, 96 S.Ct. 191, 46 L.Ed.2d 124 (1975). See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 529-530 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 97 S.Ct. 1682, 52 L.Ed.2d 379 (1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2174, 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977). We have carefully reviewed the record with these principles in mind and have concluded that there is insufficient evidence to support the appellants' convictions on the conspiracy count, but that there is sufficient evidence to support Greene's convictions on Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII and X; Julia Greene's conviction on Count X; and Fuel's conviction on Count VII. 11
12 The indictment charged, and the government's position both at trial and on appeal, has been that the appellants were involved in a single conspiracy, over a thirty-three-month period, to defraud insurance companies. The evidence does not support this position. To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the government must establish the existence of an agreement between at least two conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy, United States v. Jackson, supra at 530; United States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833, 92 S.Ct. 82, 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971), and that at least one overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1976); Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 725 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818, 83 S.Ct. 32, 9 L.Ed.2d 58 (1962). To convict an individual of conspiracy, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the individual knew all of the conspirators or was aware of all of the details of the conspiracy, but it is necessary to establish that the individual knowingly contributed to the furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Jones, 545 F.2d 1112, 1115 (8th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 814, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977); United States v. Hester, 465 F.2d 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1972); Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147, 152 (8th Cir. 1966). 13 In this case, the government simply failed to establish the existence of an agreement between the appellants to defraud insurance companies. In so holding, we recognize that an agreement need not be express or formal, United States v. Jackson, supra at 531, and that it may be established by circumstantial evidence. Id.; United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484, 490 (8th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 417 U.S. 915, 94 S.Ct. 2616, 41 L.Ed.2d 219 (1974). Here, the government produced no statement or admission of the appellants which would indicate a common plan or agreement. 3 Nor did the government establish facts and circumstances from which the existence of an agreement could be inferred. 14 The government failed to establish that the alleged automobile accidents and burglaries either were staged or nonexistent. Thus, a conspiracy to defraud could only be proved by establishing that the appellants agreed to submit fraudulent documentation in support of any claim which might arise. We find insufficient evidence from which to infer the existence of such an agreement. Initially, we note that it is difficult to understand how an agreement to defraud could exist that would only come into play at the happening of a fortuitous event that is, the occurrence of an automobile accident or a burglary. Even if this hurdle is crossed, however, we are faced with the fact that the government also failed to establish that either Fuel or Julia Greene was aware that medical reports submitted on their behalf, or on behalf of others involved in the same accident, were fraudulent, 4 or that either of them knew that other documentation submitted with respect to automobile accident claims by Greene on his own behalf was fraudulent. While there is evidence to convict Fuel and Julia Greene on substantive counts of mail fraud in connection with respect to their individual burglary claims, there is no evidence of any knowledge or connection with the burglary claims of Greene. 15 In sum, the evidence shows that a number of related individuals, including the appellants, submitted a series of questionable insurance claims. That is not enough to satisfy the government's burden of proof and to sustain the jury's verdict. Guilt may not be inferred from mere association. United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1312 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Frol, 518 F.2d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1975). In order to sustain a criminal conviction, we must be convinced that the evidence does more than merely raise a suspicion or possibility of guilt. United States v. Blunk, 561 F.2d 111, 116 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jones, supra at 1115. As we have held (s)urmise cannot be permitted in a criminal case. Id. The evidence presented by the government is simply insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants knowingly engaged in a single overall conspiracy to defraud insurance companies. 5 16 We can understand how the jury arrived at the result it did on the conspiracy count. A large chart, which has been duplicated and is attached hereto (Government's Exhibit No. 163), was prepared by the government and used by it during the course of the trial. In our view, this chart oversimplified the evidence. It tended to indicate an association where none was established. When the verbal testimony and the exhibits are carefully examined, the inference that the government sought to establish by use of the chart simply disappears. 17 The trial court was aware of the dangers inherent in the use of the chart and was concerned throughout the trial with the government's attempt to prove a conspiracy. He refused to permit the chart to be received as an exhibit and to be taken by the jury into the jury room. He did, however, with some reluctance, permit the chart to be used during the course of the trial. We cannot say that he abused his discretion in so doing, but we have no hesitancy in holding that when the record as a whole is examined, the existence of a conspiracy simply was not proved. 18
19 The substantive offense proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the mail fraud statute, is closely related to the offense of conspiracy set forth in18 U.S.C. § 371. United States v. Donahue, supra at 1135; Isaacs v. United States, supra at 725. There are, however, differences between a substantive violation of the mail fraud statute and a conspiracy to violate the statute. 6 Because of the differences, it is not necessarily inconsistent that a person be found guilty on the substantive counts but not on the conspiracy count. Cf. United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 553 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1601, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977). We must, however, carefully examine the strength of the evidence with respect to each of the substantive counts in order to insure that the appellants' convictions on the substantive counts are sufficiently supported and are not merely the result of evidence introduced with respect to the conspiracy count. Cf. United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533, 538-539 (8th Cir. 1977). 20 In order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the government must prove the existence of a scheme to defraud and the mailing of a letter for the purpose of executing the scheme. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954); United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 373 (8th Cir. 1976). Since the term scheme as used in § 1341, connotes some degree of planning by the perpetrator of the mail fraud, it is essential that the government establish an intent to defraud. United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 420 U.S, 926, 95 S.Ct. 1123, 43 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975). While the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants acted with an intent to defraud, United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1976), direct evidence of intent is not required. United States v. Arnold, 543 F.2d 1224, 1225 (8th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051, 97 S.Ct. 765, 50 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977). The requisite intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the appellants actions. Id.; United States v. Nance, supra at 618. Section 1341 reaches schemes in which the defendant did not himself place any matter in the mails; it is sufficient to show that he 'caused' the mailings. United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 903 (8th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1106, 47 L.Ed.2d 314 (1976); United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 684 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828, 91 S.Ct. 55, 27 L.Ed.2d 57 (1970). The Supreme Court set forth the appropriate standard in Pereira v. United States, supra : Where one does an act with knowledge that use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he 'causes' the mails to be used. Id., 347 U.S. at 8-9, 74 S.Ct. at 363. 21 We turn to a consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to each of the substantive counts. 22
23 Greene was charged with causing his attorney to mail a fraudulent work-loss letter to Travelers Insurance Company with respect to a claim arising out of an accident, allegedly occurring on July 4, 1974. Travelers paid Greene $2,500 in settlement of his claim. 24 Greene provided his attorney with documentation in support of this claim, including a work-loss letter from Amoco oil. The attorney then mailed the documentation to Travelers. The work-loss letter was dated September 6, 1974, and stated that Greene had lost 108 hours of work as a result of the July 4, 1974, automobile accident. It was signed by T. Noble. The fraudulent nature of the letter was established at trial through the testimony of two Amoco employees and through Amoco personnel records. Thomas Noble testified that he worked at Amoco at a desk next to Greene during the time period in question. He disclaimed any knowledge of the letter and stated that the signature on the letter was not his. He further stated that he would not have been authorized to sign such a letter in any case. The Amoco personnel records revealed that Greene was only absent from work for 13.5 hours during the relevant time period and that he received compensation for 4.5 of those hours. It was established that Travelers relied upon the work-loss letter in paying Greene $2,500 in settlement of his claim. 25 Greene contends that the government failed to establish the necessary intent to defraud because it did not establish by direct evidence that he either knew the letter was false or that he had prepared it himself. 7 He also contends that it was not established that a mailing in furtherance of the scheme was caused by Greene. Greene's contentions are without merit. Direct evidence of intent is not required, and a fraudulent intent on the part of Greene can clearly be inferred from his action in submitting the false work-loss letter. See United States v. Arnold, supra; United States v. Nance, supra. While Greene did not actually mail the false documentation, he did cause it to be mailed under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Pereira v. United States, supra. The mailing of the false documentation to Travelers by the attorney was clearly foreseeable and would be expected to follow in the ordinary course of business. 26
27 Greene and Fuel were charged with causing their attorney to mail a demand letter accompanied by fraudulent medical reports concerning an alleged accident on October 22, 1974, to Farmers Insurance Group. The attorney represented both Greene and Fuel. He did not recall ever meeting Fuel. Fuel did sign the contract retaining the attorney and a medical authorization form for the attorney. She was not identified as having indorsed either the check or the release in connection with the settlement of her claim. 28 Claims arising out of the accident were submitted on behalf of six individuals, including Greene, his wife, his niece and Fuel. It was established that Farmers relied upon the fraudulent medical records provided in settling the claims for $1,000 each. 29 The medical records were purportedly prepared by Dr. L. Virgil Miller. In 1973, Dr. Miller had been declared incompetent and placed under guardianship. He continued, however, in practice. Greene testified that Miller had treated him for injuries arising out of the October 22 accident. Employees from Dr. Miller's office recalled seeing Greene, but not Fuel, at the office. An employee in Dr. Miller's office testified that the medical records submitted were not prepared in the office format or medical report style. A United States Postal Service document analyst testified that the reports had not been typed on the typewriters in Dr. Miller's office. He gave his expert opinion that Dr. Miller did not sign the reports, and that the reports had been signed by someone else in simulation of his handwriting. The document analyst could not eliminate the possibility that the signature on Fuel's medical report was not an unnatural signature of Dr. Miller caused by arthritis, old age or hardening of the arteries, conditions which Dr. Miller suffered from. He was positive, however, that the signature on Greene's medical report was not that of Dr. Miller. He was unable to identify the simulated signatures of Dr. Miller with anyone. The document analyst was, however, able to link Greene's writing to one of the reports. He testified that, with the exception of the word released, all the writing on the patient card of Greene's niece had been done by Greene. 30 Both Greene and Fuel contend that the government failed to establish the necessary intent to defraud. After carefully examining the record, we are convinced that the government did present sufficient evidence from which the requisite fraudulent intent on the part of Greene could be inferred because of the identification of his writing with that on one of the medical reports submitted. The government did not present sufficient evidence, however, from which the requisite fraudulent intent could be inferred on the part of Fuel as it failed to establish she had any knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the medical reports. 31
32 Greene and Fuel were charged with causing their attorney to mail false medical reports, and an altered automobile repair estimate and bill, to Hertz Rental Company in connection with an alleged accident on February 10, 1975. The attorney had previously been retained in connection with the accident out of which Count III arose. The attorney did not recall meeting Fuel, but it was stipulated by the parties that she had retained the attorney. Eight individuals submitted claims arising out of the accident and Hertz paid $2,843 in claims. Fuel received $368 for medical expenses, and Greene received $221 for medical expenses and $209 for property damage. Fuel could not be identified as signing the settlement draft and release of her claim for $368. 33 Some of the medical reports were again purportedly signed by Dr. Miller. An employee from Dr. Miller's office testified that these reports were not of the format of reports prepared by that office. The United States Postal Service document analyst testified that the typewriting on the reports did not match the typewriting of the machines in Dr. Miller's office. He further testified that one of the medical reports submitted on behalf of Fuel did, however, contain an authentic signature of Dr. Miller. 34 The automobile repair estimate submitted was from Major Cadillac for repairs on Greene's 1972 Cadillac. It was stamped paid in the amount of $1,364.53. The document analyst stated that the repair estimate was an alteration of a repair estimate of $1,364.53 from Major Cadillac submitted to American Family Insurance in connection with an accident occurring on December 11, 1974. 8 He further testified that another alteration of the same estimate was submitted by Greene to Cumis Insurance Company in another claim in connection with the February 10, 1975, accident. See discussion of Count V, Infra. 35 There is ample evidence from which to infer the requisite fraudulent intent on the part of Greene through his contact with the attorney, the submission of the false medical reports and the submission of the altered repair estimate for his 1972 Cadillac. There is insufficient evidence to infer the requisite intent on the part of Fuel. She retained the attorney, but did not actively pursue the claim. She could not be identified as signing the settlement draft and the release of her claim. Moreover, the medical report submitted on her behalf does at least bear an authentic signature of Dr. Miller. 36
37 Greene was charged with submitting an altered automobile repair estimate and bill to Cumis Insurance Company in connection with a claim arising out of the same accident in which the claims in Count IV allegedly arose. The claim was submitted by Greene, Julia Greene and Fuel to Cumis after receiving a settlement from Hertz. Cumis was Greene's insurance company. 38 As we have previously mentioned, the document analyst testified that the automobile repair estimate and bill for $1,364.53 that was submitted was an alteration of a document that had previously been submitted in connection with other claims. Greene testified that he paid for the repairs with his Diners Club credit card. However, the records of the Diners Club only reveal a charge of $1,364.53 on his December, 1974, billing. That billing would correspond only to payment in connection with the December 11, 1974, accident and not with respect to the February 10, 1975, accident out of which the claims forming the basis for Counts IV and V arose. 39 Again, there is sufficient evidence from which to infer the requisite intent on the part of Greene. 40
41 Greene was charged with mailing a certified letter to Farmers Insurance Company enclosing various receipts in support of his claim with respect to an alleged burglary at his residence on December 2, 1973. 9 Farmers paid out $2,500 with respect to the claim. Greene had previously submitted claims to Allstate Insurance Company with respect to a burglary at the same residence on January 1, 1973. Allstate paid Greene $4,780 in settlement of that claim. The document analyst testified that thirty-nine of the exhibits submitted by Greene in support of his claim with respect to the December 2, 1973, burglary were copies from the same original documents from which copies had previously been submitted by Greene to Allstate as documentation for his claim with respect to the January 1, 1973, burglary. 42 The requisite fraudulent intent can be inferred from the submission of documentation that was shown to be duplicated from that used in support of a prior burglary claim. The mailing by Greene of a certified letter satisfied the requirement of causing the use of the mails. 43
44 Fuel was charged with causing the General Adjustment Bureau to mail to Cumis Insurance Company a report with respect to her claim arising out of an alleged burglary of her residence on February 6, 1975. The investigator from the General Adjustment Bureau testified that there was some evidence of the burglary. 45 Fuel gave the adjuster documentation in support of the claim, including a jewelry appraisal from Jaccard's Jewelry Store for a ring in the amount of $950 and a receipt from Woolf Brothers for $57.56. Both receipts were again used by Julia Greene in support of a subsequent claim against Allstate Insurance Company arising out of a burglary of her residence on April 23, 1975. An employee of Jaccard's testified that the appraisal form had been supplied to Julia Greene when she purchased a ring. The company records did not list a purchase by Fuel. In the claim submitted by Fuel, she stated that the burglary occurred at 3894 Chelsea. However, the Cumis policy she claimed against covered thefts from 3707 Prospect. The claim was withdrawn. 46 Fuel contends that the requisite fraudulent intent was not established and that the mailing of the report by the General Adjustment Bureau was not in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. We do not agree. The requisite intent can be readily inferred from the submission by Fuel of a claim for a ring that was not owned by her and for an address that was not covered by her insurance policy. Any inference that Fuel had received the ring from Julia Greene by gift or purchase was negated by the fact that Julia Greene subsequently submitted a claim for the same ring. Fuel admittedly did not place any matter in the mail herself. She did, however, cause the mailing of the report by the General Adjustment Bureau as such a report would be expected to result from her claim in the ordinary course of business. See Pereira v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. at 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358; United States v. Calvert, supra at 903; United States v. Brickey, supra at 684.7. Count VIII. 47 Greene was charged with causing Turpin Associates to mail a letter to Cumis Insurance Company relating to an automobile larceny allegedly occurring on September 9, 1975. The claim was made against a homeowner's policy on 3108 East 63rd Street. Greene had stated that he had owned the property since 1970 when he obtained the policy. The policy was obtained by phone. Testimony established, however, that Greene only rented the property and that the owner had not authorized him to procure insurance. The claim was withdrawn. Greene contends that there was no foundation laid to establish that he was the person who called and obtained the policy and, thus, that the government failed to satisfy its burden of proof of a fraudulent scheme. This contention has little merit since Greene, in effect, acknowledged his application for the policy when he submitted the claim on the policy. 48 8. Count X. 49 Greene and Julia Greene were charged with causing an attorney representing Allstate to write a letter to Julia Greene demanding that she provide substantiation for her claim with respect to burglary of her residence occurring on April 23, 1975. Documentation provided to Allstate in support of the claim included receipts from Jaccard's Jewelry and Woolf Brothers which were copied from the same original and previously submitted by Fuel in support of her burglary claim, and a receipt from Stix, Baer & Fuller for the purchase of a television. Greene supplied Julia Greene with the Woolf Brothers receipt. The Stix, Baer & Fuller receipt was written out to Julia Greene. An employee of Stix, Baer & Fuller testified that the receipt was not in the correct form since it contained a false salesman's number and because it was not the form of receipt used by the television department. The United States Postal Service document analyst testified that the Stix, Baier & Fuller receipt to Julia Greene was handwritten by Merle Greene. 50 The existence of fraudulent intent on the part of both Merle and Julia Greene can clearly be inferred from the use of duplicated and falsified receipts. There is also sufficient evidence to support an inference that the defendants caused matter to be mailed in furtherance of the scheme. The use of the mails was clearly foreseeable either by the insurance company, its agents or adjusters, or by an attorney employed by the company to handle the claim. See Pereira v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. at 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358; United States v. Minkin, 504 F.2d 350, 353-354 (8th Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926, 95 S.Ct. 1122, 43 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975); Fisher v. United States, 324 F.2d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1963), Cert. denied, 377 U.S. 999, 84 S.Ct. 1935, 12 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1964). 51 9. Conclusion. 52 In summary, there is sufficient evidence to support Fuel's conviction on Count VII, Julia Greene's conviction on Count X and Greene's convictions on Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII and X. 53