Opinion ID: 894827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relatedness of Moki Mac's Contacts

Text: Betsy Drugg alleges she was induced to send Andy on the rafting trip by Moki Mac's direct solicitation, which included statements made in Moki Mac's brochures and in the release it sent to the Druggs. Specifically, Andy's mother claims she made the decision to send Andy on the trip based on Moki Mac's assurances that [y]ou don't need `mountain man' camping skills to participate in one of our trips, children age twelve or above are suited to participate, and Moki Mac has taken reasonable steps to provide you with appropriate equipment and/or skilled guides. But for these promises, the Druggs claim, they would not have sent Andy on the rafting trip and he would not have fallen on the hiking trail. Certainly on a river rafting trip safety is a paramount concern, and we accept as true the Druggs' claim that Andy might not have gone on the trip were it not for Moki Mac's representations about safety. However, the operative facts of the Druggs' suit concern principally the guides' conduct of the hiking expedition and whether they exercised reasonable care in supervising Andy. The events on the trail and the guides' supervision of the hike will be the focus of the trial, will consume most if not all of the litigation's attention, and the overwhelming majority of the evidence will be directed to that question. Only after thoroughly considering the manner in which the hike was conducted will the jury be able to assess the Druggs' misrepresentation claim. In sum, the [alleged misrepresentation] is not the subject matter of the case . . . nor is it related to the operative facts of the negligence action. Rush, 444 U.S. at 329, 100 S.Ct. 571. Whatever connection there may be between Moki Mac's promotional materials sent to Texas and the operative facts that led to Andy's death, we do not believe it is sufficiently direct to meet due-process concerns. Analogous cases from other courts support our view. Federal district courts in Texas have generally held that a nonresident's in-state advertising is insufficiently related to a negligence claim based on personal injury that occurs out of state to support an exercise of specific jurisdiction. In Kervin v. Red River Ski Area, Inc ., for example, the plaintiff fell while descending a flight of wooden steps leading to her ski lodge in New Mexico. 711 F.Supp. at 1385. The Kervins sued the ski resort in Texas alleging negligence in failing to maintain safe premises. Id. The plaintiffs asserted in personam jurisdiction based on the resort's contacts with Texas, which included television and print advertising and mailing brochures to potential customers. Id. at 1386. The court determined that  [i]n personam jurisprudence has taken a restrictive view of the relationship between causes of action and contacts, seemingly to require virtually a direct link between [the] claim and [the] contacts. Id. at 1389. Although the court ultimately determined that general jurisdiction was proper, it held that specific jurisdiction was not because there was no substantial connection between the resort's advertising in Texas and its negligent maintenance of the stairwell in New Mexico. Id. In Gorman v. Grand Casino of Louisiana, Inc.-Coushatta, the plaintiff, a Texas resident, sued a Louisiana casino in Texas claiming that its employee intentionally served her a drink containing Benzodiazepine (one of the date-rape drugs) and then made advances to her. 1 F.Supp.2d at 658. The court held that there was an insufficient link between Gorman's sexual-harassment claim and the casino's marketing scheme in Texas to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction, concluding [b]illboard advertisements of slot machine payouts . . . ha[ve] nothing to do with the conduct of that casino's employees. Id.; see also Luna, 851 F.Supp. at 832-33 (holding claim involving plaintiff's death in a plane crash over Panama arose not from her ticket purchase in Texas but from alleged negligence in Panama). Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly addressed the issue, concluding that claims arising out of personal injury that occurs outside the forum do not arise from or relate to a defendant's forum advertising. In Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc., a Michigan resident visited a Canadian ski resort after seeing the resort's advertisement in a Michigan newspaper. 246 Mich.App. 424, 633 N.W.2d 408, 411 (2001). Claiming she was injured when resort employees negligently loaded her onto a ski lift, the plaintiff filed suit in Michigan. Id. The court concluded that the resort's advertising activities in the forum were insufficient to support in personam jurisdiction, and that it would violate due process to hale the Canadian resort into a Michigan court: [n]otwithstanding defendant's purposeful availment of Michigan business opportunities through its advertising, we are compelled to find that the presence of other factors render the exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable. Simply put, the connection between plaintiff's cause of action [negligence] and defendant's Michigan advertising is so attenuated that it is unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction over defendant. . . . Id. at 416 (internal citations omitted). [4] Somewhat analogous to advertising cases are those that concern efforts to recruit forum residents. Most courts have held that merely mailing letters and exchanging phone calls in recruitment efforts is insufficient to support specific jurisdiction over nonresidents for claims that arise outside the forum, although some courts have exercised jurisdiction when the defendant physically recruited in the forum. For example, in Cassell v. Loyola University, a Florida student who was a resident of Tennessee was recruited to play basketball for a New Orleans university. 294 F.Supp. 622, 622-23 (E.D.Tenn.1968). When the university subsequently refused to grant Cassell a scholarship, he sued for breach of contract in Tennessee. Id. at 623. The only connections with the forum were that it was the student's domicile, it was where his father had signed the recruitment contract, and agents of the university had communicated there by mail and telephone. Id. The court held that the asserted cause of action does not arise out of business transacted in Tennessee and thus there was an insufficient connection between the forum and the litigation to justify personal jurisdiction. Id. at 624. [5] In Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Development B.V., two Texas oil well workers who had contracted their services to Syrian oil companies were killed while performing work in Syria. 213 F.3d at 855. Their families sued for wrongful death in Texas, but the Fifth Circuit held there was no specific jurisdiction over their claims. Id. at 844. The court noted that, even assuming the Syrian company possessed minimum contacts with Texas, including signing a contract for the well workers' services, specific jurisdiction does not exist . . . because Appellants' claims do not arise out of those contacts. Instead, they arise out of alleged tortious acts committed . . . in Syria. Id. at 855 (emphasis in original). [6] The Druggs cite our decision in Siskind to support their claim that Moki Mac's solicitations in Texas and Andy's death on the Arizona hiking trail are sufficiently related to support specific jurisdiction. Siskind, 642 S.W.2d at 437. But the operative facts in Siskind that supported liability and related to the defendant's forum contacts differ significantly from those presented here. The school solicited students in Texas through national magazines and local telephone books and the contract between Siskind and the school specifically provided that, if Siskind's son left during the school year, his tuition would be reimbursed. Id. at 435-36. When his son was expelled, the school refused to refund Siskind's tuition. Id. Siskind sued the school in Texas for the promised refund. Id. Under these circumstances, we held there was a connection between Siskind's claim for breach of contract and Villa's contacts with Texas. Id. at 437. Here, however, Moki Mac's statements in its brochures and release do not bear the same direct link to Andy's injury as did Siskind's claim to recover money lost under the contract. Moki Mac's promotional representations, while theoretically related to Andy's injury on the hiking trail in the sense that but for them he might not have been there, are not sufficiently related to the operative facts underlying Andy's injury for which the Druggs seek recovery in wrongful death to sustain the exercise of specific jurisdiction. This case more closely resembles the situation presented in Brocail v. Anderson, 132 S.W.3d 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). In that case, Brocail, a former Detroit Tigers baseball player, underwent treatment by a team physician in Michigan. Id. at 555. Of his own volition, Brocail moved to his home in Texas during his rehabilitation, and at Brocail's request, his doctor, Anderson, prescribed follow-up treatments that were administered by a healthcare group in Houston. Id. at 555-56. Brocail sued Anderson in Texas for medical negligence and fraud related to his physical therapy, and alleged Texas had specific jurisdiction because Anderson had faxed prescriptions to Texas and communicated with the Texas healthcare group regarding Brocail's progress. Id. at 558. Brocail also asserted jurisdiction was proper because Anderson had made misrepresentations in Texas by failing to fully disclose the true extent of Brocail's injuries in his forum contacts. Id. at 563. The court of appeals held that Brocail's claims did not arise from or relate to any Texas contacts because Brocail is complaining about a physical injury based on a course of treatment. Any tort occurred in the exercise of medical judgment in prescribing a course of physical therapy in Michigan, not from the communication of that prescription [to Texas]. Id. Similarly, the injuries for which the Druggs seek recovery are based on Andy's death on the hiking trail in Arizona, and the relationship between the operative facts of the litigation and Moki Mac's promotional activities in Texas are simply too attenuated to satisfy specific jurisdiction's due-process concerns.