Opinion ID: 1058220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preservation of Appellate Issue

Text: The defendants maintain that Rule 5:25, Code § 8.01-384, and this Court's precedents require only that a party state his/her objections and the grounds therefor and that their motions to stay and accompanying memoranda satisfied those requirements. The Court of Appeals erred, the defendants maintain, in holding that they were also required to specify the relief sought. According to the defendants, the circuit court had the opportunity to consider their argument objecting to the summary contempt proceeding and in fact ruled on that argument at the July 26 hearing. They also contend that pursuant to Code § 8.01-384(A), they had to indicate either the action which [they] desire[d] the court to take or their objections to the action ... and [their] grounds therefor, not both. Code § 8.01-384(A). The Commonwealth counters that the Court of Appeals correctly applied Rule 5A:18 in holding that the defendants waived their argument that the circuit court deprived them of due process by conducting a summary contempt proceeding. The Commonwealth asserts that the defendants were required to specify in the circuit court the relief they sought and could not merely rely on their motions to stay. The Commonwealth also argues that the purpose of Code § 8.01-384 is not to define what constitutes a `specific objection,' but merely to eliminate the previous requirement that a formal `exception' is necessary, after a litigant has already made a specific objection below. The provisions of Rule 5:25, in relevant part, state: Error will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial court ... unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling. Rule 5:25; see also Rule 5A:18. The purpose of the rule is to afford the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991). A party must state the grounds for an objection so that the trial judge may understand the precise question or questions he is called upon to decide. Jackson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 179 Va. 642, 651, 20 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1942). Thus, the provisions of Rule 5:25 protect the trial court from appeals based upon undisclosed grounds. Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1988). To satisfy the rule, an objection must be made ... at a point in the proceeding when the trial court is in a position, not only to consider the asserted error, but also to rectify the effect of the asserted error. Johnson v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 33, 563 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2002). In addition, a specific, contemporaneous objection gives the opposing party the opportunity to meet the objection at that stage of the proceeding. Weidman, 241 Va. at 44, 400 S.E.2d at 167. The rule is not intended, however, to obstruct petitioners in their efforts to secure writs of error, or appeals, but ... to put the record in such shape that the case may be heard in this [C]ourt upon the same record upon which it was heard in the trial court. Kercher v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 150 Va. 108, 115, 142 S.E. 393, 395 (1928). In analyzing whether a litigant has satisfied the requirements of Rule 5:25, this Court has consistently focused on whether the trial court had the opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue. If [the] opportunity [to address an issue] is not presented to the trial court, there is no ruling by the trial court on the issue, and thus no basis for review or action by this Court on appeal. Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518, 526, 636 S.E.2d 416, 420 (2006). An appellate court can only determine whether or not the rulings and judgment of the court below ... were correct. Jackson, 179 Va. at 651, 20 S.E.2d at 493. For example, in Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 561 S.E.2d 663 (2002), the trial court twice ruled that the language in a particular agreement was ambiguous and permitted the introduction of parol evidence before reversing its previous rulings and holding that the language was unambiguous. Id. at 628-29, 561 S.E.2d at 665-66. In rejecting a claim that the plaintiff had waived one of her appellate arguments, this Court stated that, [h]aving ruled on the issue three times, the trial court clearly had the opportunity `to rule intelligently' on the issue, and therefore the case did not implicate the concerns underpinning Rule 5:25. Id. at 631-32, 561 S.E.2d at 667. In George v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 767, 667 S.E.2d 779 (2008), this Court held that although a defendant had failed to use the term fatal variance in his argument to the trial court, he nevertheless sufficient[ly] put that court on notice of his position regarding the inconsistency between the indictments and the jury instruction. Id. at 773, 667 S.E.2d at 782. Similarly, in Weidman, the plaintiffs failed to object when the trial court orally granted a motion to dismiss. 241 Va. at 43, 400 S.E.2d at 166. However, this Court held that the plaintiffs repeatedly made known to the court [their] position both at the hearing when the motion to dismiss was granted and in a motion to rehear. Id. at 44, 400 S.E.2d at 167. Thus, the opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented [was] afforded... the trial court. Id.; see also Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217-18, 688 S.E.2d 185, 189 (2010) (holding that the Commonwealth made known its position to the trial court, which acknowledged it and thus had the opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue); Raviotta, 264 Va. at 33, 563 S.E.2d at 732 (holding that the trial court was aware of the plaintiff's objection before a matter was submitted to the jury and if the court had agreed with the plaintiff, it could have given the jury a different instruction); Kaufman v. Kaufman, 12 Va.App. 1200, 1204, 409 S.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1991) (holding that although the appellant failed to endorse the final decree or state any objections thereto, he had made known to the trial court his position through memoranda and written correspondence prior to the issuance of a final decree and the trial court had specifically acknowledged the existence of [the appellant's] objections). Although Scialdone asked the circuit court at one point in the proceeding whether he was being charged with civil or criminal contempt and indicated that he might want an attorney, and later also told the court that he believed the defendants had the right to be represented by counsel, we will focus on whether the motions to stay execution of the sentences and accompanying memoranda satisfied the requirements of Rule 5:25, as did the Court of Appeals. Although a motion to vacate or a motion for reconsideration would have been more precise, the defendants' motions to stay clearly encompassed the arguments they now present on appeal: that the circuit court improperly conducted a summary contempt proceeding and thereby violated their due process rights. In identical motions to stay and memoranda, each defendant argued that he had a defense to the charge and that summary contempt was improper because all of the alleged contemptible conduct did not occur before the court, thereby requiring the court to gather evidence before finding the defendants in contempt. Thus, asserted the defendants, the circuit court should have conducted a plenary contempt proceeding and provided them with certain due process rights. The Commonwealth argues, however, as the Court of Appeals held, that presenting those arguments in motions to stay execution of their sentences did not preserve the issue for appeal. However, numerous cases from this Court regarding the reasons for Rule 5:25 belie the Commonwealth's position. In the motions to stay, the defendants objected to the actions of the circuit court and made the court aware of the grounds for those objections. See Rule 5:25; Code § 8.01-384(A). The motions unquestionably afford[ed] the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue because the court in fact did so. [5] See Weidman, 241 at 44, 400 S.E.2d at 167. The circuit court stated: I have ... read all of the papers and information submitted.... It appears [the] position is that this is not summary contempt but some other form of contempt. But I do not find [the] arguments persuasive. The court responded to the defendants' assertions that all of the alleged contemptible conduct did not occur before the court and that the court had improperly called witnesses and collected evidence. Finally, if any doubt remained, the circuit court held: I do not believe that you have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on appeal and thus your request for a stay is denied. In finding the defendants' arguments without merit, the circuit court necessarily contemplated whether the defendants were entitled to a plenary hearing and was well aware that prevailing on appeal in this instance would result in the defendants' receiving a new hearing. Therefore, the circuit court manifested its awareness of the precise question [it was] called upon to decide: whether a summary contempt proceeding was proper. See Jackson, 179 Va. at 651, 20 S.E.2d at 492. Furthermore, the circuit court acknowledged at the July 24 hearing that it had received the motions to stay last Monday, which was July 17, 2006, the date the defendants filed the motions. Thus, the court was aware of the defendants' objections to the summary contempt proceeding before the court entered its July 19, 2006 written order finding them in contempt. In this respect, we agree with the dissent in the Court of Appeals: [W]here a party makes his objections known to the court prior to or at the time of entry of a final order or decree and does not specifically disclaim the desire to have the court rule on those objections, entry of a final order or decree adverse to those objections constitutes a rejection of them and preserves them under Rule 5A:18 [and Rule 5:25] for purposes of appeal. 53 Va.App. at 253, 670 S.E.2d at 765 (Elder, J., dissenting). In Eure, we stated that [t]he purpose of Rule 5:25 is `to protect the trial court from appeals based upon undisclosed grounds, to prevent the setting of traps on appeal, to enable the trial judge to rule intelligently, and to avoid unnecessary reversals and mistrials.' 263 Va. at 631, 561 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting Fisher, 236 Va. at 414, 374 S.E.2d at 52). Here, as in Eure, the concerns served by Rule 5:25 are not present. Id. This Court is not hearing the case on a different record than that before the circuit court, Kercher, 150 Va. at 115, 142 S.E. at 395, nor is this appeal on undisclosed grounds. Fisher, 236 Va. at 414, 374 S.E.2d at 52. And, because the defendants filed their motions to stay before the circuit court entered its final order, the trial court [was] in a position, not only to consider the asserted error, but also to rectify the effect of the asserted error. See Raviotta, 264 Va. at 33, 563 S.E.2d at 731. The trial court's having had the opportunity to address the defendants' arguments, and then in fact ruling on them, provides a basis for review ... by this Court on appeal. See Riverside, 272 Va. at 526, 636 S.E.2d at 420. We recognize that in some circumstances, an appellate issue may be waived if a party merely voices disagreement with the action of the trial court and does not state the specific relief requested. See, e.g., Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38, 393 S.E.2d 599, 606 (1990) (holding that improper comments or conduct during argument will not be considered on appeal unless the opposing party moves for a cautionary instruction or for a mistrial). But, because of its particular facts and procedural history, this case does not present such a circumstance. In sum, however imprecise the vehicle by which the defendants raised their objections, their motions to stay presented their arguments squarely to the circuit court, which then ruled on them. The purposes of Rule 5:25 as articulated by this Court were satisfied: the circuit court was on notice of the defendants' objections and it had the opportunity to rule intelligently on those objections. The Commonwealth argues, however, that the holding in Nusbaum v. Berlin compels affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment. Like the defendants, Nusbaum was found in criminal contempt and argued on appeal that the summary contempt proceeding violated his due process rights. 273 Va. at 402, 641 S.E.2d at 503. On at least two separate occasions after being found in contempt, Nusbaum articulated the particulars of his due process objections regarding the summary contempt proceeding but nevertheless specifically told the trial court that he was not asking the court to reconsider its ruling based on those objections. Id. at 396-97, 641 S.E.2d at 499-500. Instead, Nusbaum stated that he was only mak[ing] sure he preserved issues for appeal. Id. at 404, 641 S.E.2d at 504. This Court held that, by affirmatively advising the trial court he was not seeking a reconsideration of the contempt finding, Nusbaum did not allow the trial court to rectify what he subsequently asserted as error and therefore did not afford the [trial] court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the due process issues he raised on appeal. Id. at 406, 641 S.E.2d at 505. The case now before us is distinguishable from Nusbaum in two respects. First, Nusbaum affirmatively told the trial court he was not asking it to reconsider the finding of contempt based on his due process objections. In contrast, the defendants here made no such disclaimer while articulating their position that they were entitled to a plenary contempt proceeding with accompanying due process rights. In addition, unlike Nusbaum, Scialdone expressed his desire for procedural rights when he advised the circuit court that he might want an attorney. Second, the circuit court in this case actually decided the merits of the defendants' objections to the nature of the proceeding. Even if, as the Court of Appeals held, the trial court in Nusbaum had the same opportunity to rule on the objections as the circuit court in this case did, the circuit court here in fact ruled on the issue. In sum, Nusbaum's affirmative disavowal of any request for a ruling on the merits of his arguments deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rule intelligently on his objections. Id. The same cannot be said in regard to the situation presented in this appeal. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the defendants waived their argument that the circuit court violated their due process rights by conducting a summary contempt proceeding. The defendants' motions to stay squarely presented their arguments to the circuit court and the court ruled on the merits of the objections. For these reasons, we hold that the defendants satisfied the requirements of Rule 5:25 and 5:18 and preserved their arguments for appeal.