Opinion ID: 703670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Money Laundering/Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 9 The jury convicted Mr. Hager of thirty-two counts of money laundering which were based upon Timberline's use of fraudulently-generated receipts to pay Timberline's rent, employee salaries, telephone bills, inventory expenses, and other costs necessary to continue the fraudulent business. See 18 U.S.C.1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Mr. Hager argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his money laundering conviction. 10 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record de novo, see United States v. Pike, 36 F.3d 1011, 1012 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1170 (1995); United States v. Coleman, 9 F.3d 1480, 1482 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1234 (1994), and ask only whether, taking the evidence--both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom--in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1514 (10th Cir.1995), (quoting United States v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1489 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 455 (1994)), petition for cert. filed, --- U.S.L.W. ---- (U.S. July 12, 1995) (No. 95-5197). To overturn a conviction, we must find that no reasonable juror could have reached the disputed verdict. United States v. Hoenscheidt, 7 F.3d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir.1993). 11 To support a money laundering conviction under 18 U.S.C.1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the government must prove the defendant (1) knew that he was using the proceeds of unlawful activity; (2) conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction using those proceeds; and (3) did so with the intent to promote unlawful activity. Id.; see United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2599 (1995). Mr. Hager asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show he was involved in conducting the financial transactions at issue. As support, Mr. Hager relies on the fact that all of the checks in question were signed by his father-in-law, Vern Clapp, and argues there was no proof that he instructed or requested that Mr. Clapp sign the checks to pay Timberline's employee expenses or operating costs. See Appellant's Br. at 19. 12 Mr. Hager is not shielded from legal responsibility for money laundering simply because his father-in-law signed Timberline's checks. Rather, Mr. Hager is legally responsible as long as he conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction. 18 U.S.C.1956(a)(1)(A)(i). For purposes of the money laundering statute, the term conducts has been defined to include initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating, or concluding a transaction. Id. 1956(c)(2). 13 The evidence at trial revealed that the creation of Timberline was Mr. Hager's idea. Lacking capital to start the new business, he approached his father-in-law, Vern Clapp, to inquire whether he would be interested in getting involved. R. Vol. XI at 132. Mr. Clapp refinanced his home to provide the funds necessary to open Timberline and thereafter Mr. Clapp apparently did Timberline's bookkeeping and had sole authority to issue checks on Timberline's bank account. Id. at 133-34. The record is clear that Mr. Clapp, a bus driver, had never been involved in any kind of phone sales or any business relating to phone sales. Id. at 132. 14 On the other hand, Mr. Hager acknowledges that he had considerable experience in the telemarketing business. Appellant's Br. at 4; R. Vol. XI at 121-25. At trial he repeatedly indicated that he started Timberline, set the budget, and actively ran and supervised all aspects of the business. See, e.g., id. at 129-36; 180, 184-89. Additionally, the record shows that Hager incurred the significant financial obligations on behalf of Timberline. For example, he purchased the premium pendant, purchased the sale products, set prices, made arrangements for processing credit card charges, wrote business contracts, determined refunds, set up phone service, hired all employees, and instructed his wife regarding payroll. See R. Supp. Vol. II, Trans. 1e at 51, 57, 84-85; Trans. 3e at 58, 62-65, 67; Trans. 10e at 13, Trans. 11e at 5-6; 9; R. Supp. Vol. I, Pl's Ex. Timb. 28, 31, 35a. Such evidence reasonably supports the conclusion that, although Clapp signed the checks, it was Hager who conducted Timberline's business and finances. 15 Taking this evidence in its totality and in a light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the jury could reasonably have concluded that Mr. Hager directed or at least participated in the writing of checks to cover Timberline's operating expenses and therefore that Mr. Hager conducted a financial transaction within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.1956. 16