Opinion ID: 2036059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's Post-Conviction Claims

Text: As we have stated, in his present attack on the denial of post-conviction relief, defendant alleges three errors, the first two of which are raised in the context of ineffective-assistance claims. We will address the viability of petitioner's third claimed error first.
Defendant's third claimed error is that the application of the armed robbery as an aggravating factor to support the imposition of the death penalty was arbitrary. Initially, we note that this issue was not presented to the trial court in defendant's present post-conviction petition. Further, this issue was not raised on direct appeal or in defendant's first post-conviction petition. Because this issue could have been raised in defendant's first post-conviction petition, it is res judicata. (See Free, 122 Ill.2d at 376, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184.) Additionally, even if the issue were not res judicata, because defendant could have presented the issue on direct appeal, in his first post-conviction petition and, certainly, in his second post-conviction petition, the issue is waived. See Neal, 142 Ill.2d at 146, 154 Ill.Dec. 587, 568 N.E.2d 808; Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122-2.1. We next address petitioner's ineffective-assistance claims. Petitioner asserts that prior appellate counsel's omission of certain errors on direct appeal and in the first post-conviction proceeding constituted ineffective assistance. The State argues that the alleged errors which underlie defendant's ineffective-assistance claims could have been raised in defendant's first post-conviction proceeding. The State urges that defendant couches the alleged errors in a claim of ineffective assistance merely to avoid the bar of res judicata and waiver. True, the errors which underlie petitioner's current post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance could have been raised in the prior post-trial proceedings. However, it is the failure to raise those claimed errors which forms the basis of defendant's ineffectiveness claim. Obviously, because defendant's ineffective-assistance claims concern errors which allegedly occurred on direct appeal and in the first post-conviction proceeding, and are asserted against the attorney who represented defendant in those proceedings, defendant's present claims could not have been raised in those prior proceedings. Thus, defendant's ineffectiveness claims are neither res judicata (see Free, 122 Ill.2d at 376, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184) nor waived (see Stewart, 121 Ill.2d at 104, 117 Ill.Dec. 187, 520 N.E.2d 348). (See People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868 (holding that petitioner's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal would not be barred as res judicata where same attorney represented defendant at trial and on direct appeal because it would be unreasonable to expect appellate counsel to raise and argue his own incompetency).) Moreover, in People v. Frank (1971), 48 Ill.2d 500, 503, 272 N.E.2d 25, this court noted its earlier suggestion that the doctrine of waiver ought not to bar consideration of issues under the Act where the alleged waiver stems from incompetency of appellate counsel. The court stated that this notion comports with related holdings that waiver will not apply where it would act as a denial of due process [citations]. Incidentally, we note that in this case, because all claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel could have been presented in this present post-conviction proceeding, absent a showing that fundamental fairness requires consideration, an attempt to raise any such claim in a subsequent post-conviction petition would be effectively barred by operation of waiver and res judicata. Notwithstanding defendant's motivation, we believe that his present claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are now properly before us. We conclude, for purposes of complete disposition of the issues presented in this appeal, that because defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel are beyond the scope of the Act, they are not properly before us. We therefore confine our discussion, solely, to defendant's claimed errors arising on direct appeal.
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, established a stringent two-pronged test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which this court adopted in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill.2d 504, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246. Under Strickland, a defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.) Secondly, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance substantially prejudiced his defense. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.) A defendant who contends that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance, for example by failing to argue a particular issue, must show that the failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable and that, but for this failure, his sentence or conviction would have been reversed. ( People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill.2d 248, 270, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 533 N.E.2d 1089.) Both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied before a defendant can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A court need not consider whether counsel's performance was deficient prior to examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699.) Where the ineffectiveness claim can be disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not suffer sufficient prejudice, the court need not determine whether counsel's performance constituted less than reasonably effective assistance. People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill.2d 501, 512, 161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952; Albanese, 104 Ill.2d at 527, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246.