Opinion ID: 2584004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Application of the Two-Prong Test

Text: Kastner's car was an ordinary non-commercial passenger car with no plain and obvious inherent purpose as a vehicle other than the safe transportation of its passengers and cargo. That determination shapes the balance of our analysis. We conclude, unlike the court of appeals, that the use of the reclining passenger seat to prevent [Kastner] from signaling for help; the use of the vehicle to get to an isolated area to commit a crime; and the use of the automatic seat belts as restraints, Kastner, 56 P.3d at 1146, were all foreign to the inherent purpose of the motor vehicle as a mode of transportation. These uses, whether viewed individually or collectively, are not uses as contemplated by both the statutes and insurance policies in question. Use of a reclining passenger seat to conceal a kidnapping has little to do with using a car for transportation purposes. Use of a car to get to an isolated area to commit a crime may relate to a vehicle's general transportation purpose, but here it was not concurrent with the injury itself, and, as explained below, it lacks the requisite causal connection between sexual assault and use of a car for transportation. Finally, use of the car's seatbelts to restrain a sexual assault victim relates neither to the vehicle's transportation purpose nor to any other conceivable or foreseeable use contemplated at the time of contracting for insurance. None of these usesindividually or collectivelycomprise use of a passenger vehicle in a manner foreseeably identifiable with the ordinary use of that vehicle. In the case before us today, the most we can say about the assailant's use of the car was that it served as the site of the sexual assault and that the assailant employed the car's furnishings to help complete the assault inside the car. These uses are not foreseeably identifiable with the inherent purpose of a motor vehicle. Additionally, the facts do not establish a causal nexus between a covered use of the vehicle and the victim's injuries. Thus, Kastner's claim also fails the second prong of this analysis. The seat belt and the reclining seat served as accessories to the crime, merely assisting the assailant in a way that incidental objects or furnishings inside a house could have helped him without actually causing the assault. See Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Julie R., 76 Cal.App.4th 134, 142, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 (1999). Similarly, using the car to drive the victim to a remote location no more connects the car to the assault than if the assailant had used the car as the mere situs of the assault without moving it. See id. at 140, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 119; see also Sanchez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 31, 33 (Colo.App.1994)([T]he mere transportation of the dog [that bit the claimant] to the scene of the injury is, by itself, insufficient to support a finding that the injury arose from the use of the automobile.); see also Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. Kastner argues that her own use of the car further connects the assault to the vehicle. Specifically, she asserts that her opening of the car door made the ensuing trapping and assault possible, establishing the but for connection. She states that the assailant had not chosen her as a victim until she opened her car door. Even assuming this constitutes a use of the car, the relationship between this use and the resulting sexual assault is simply too tenuous. All of the other non-uses of the car interrupted any direct flow between this use and the injury. Accordingly, the use of the car and the injury were not causally linked so as to make the use of the car and the injury one ongoing assault. The approach recommended by Kastner raises additional concerns. She argues that each insurance claim that somehow involves both a motor vehicle and a sexual assault should be reviewed individually, letting the jury decide whether in each case the causal nexus between vehicle and injury justifies recovery. Kastner concedes that each of the uses of her car in this incident on its own may not constitute a sufficient relationship between injury and car. But, collectively, she asserts that the four facts of the case justify recovery. As amici have noted, this case-by-case approach would inevitably lead to inconsistent and unfair results. For instance, under Kastner's recommendation, she would recover because the four factsthe opening of the car door, the seat belt, the reclining seat, and the driving of the car together satisfy the causal nexus. Yet, the next victim would not recover because her assailant used his own restraints instead of the seat belt. Or, another victim would not recover because, though the assailant used the seat belt, the reclining seat, and the opening of the car to identify his victim, the assailant did not drive the car anywhere. Both the failing and succeeding combinations of facts are endless, and the point is clear. Every case of sexual assault somehow involving a car would go before a jury and, arbitrarily, some victims would recover and some would not.