Opinion ID: 1923504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Second Penalty Phase

Text: Kormondy alleges that his counsel for the second penalty phase was ineffective in five ways: (1) waiving presentation of mitigation to the jury; (2) failing to present record mitigation to the court in counsel's memorandum and at the Spencer hearing; (3) failing to have Kormondy present at critical stages of proceedings; (4) failing to object to impact evidence and failing to object to lack of corresponding instructions; and (5) failing to proffer testimony of Mrs. McAdams after the trial court sustained a State objection. We find no merit in these claims and affirm the trial court's denial of relief. First, Kormondy alleges that his waiver of mitigation evidence was invalid because counsel did not investigate possible mitigation evidence and because counsel failed to inform the court of what investigation he did perform. With respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, the United States Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith that  Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Rather, in deciding whether trial counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment with regard to the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, a reviewing court must focus on whether the investigation resulting in counsel's decision not to introduce certain mitigation evidence was itself reasonable. Id. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When making this assessment, a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did investigate possible mitigation evidence by speaking with Kormondy, speaking with Kormondy's mother on a number of occasions, speaking with an expert, and speaking with previous penalty phase counsel about possible mitigation. Counsel further testified that he spoke with Kormondy extensively and discussed every possible mitigator and that Kormondy told him that he did not want to put any of the mitigation into evidence. Kormondy also told counsel that he did not want counsel to call any witnesses during this second penalty proceeding. Kormondy specifically indicated that there was evidence in regards to his drug and alcohol use that he did not want to come into the record. In denying Kormondy's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court applied the Strickland standard and concluded that Kormondy did not satisfy either prong of Strickland. We agree with the trial court's assessment that counsel's investigation and preparation of mitigating evidence was not deficient. The trial court found ample evidence that counsel did conduct a reasonable investigation and discussed all possible mitigation evidence with Kormondy, but Kormondy chose not to present any mitigation evidence. Kormondy was questioned by counsel and the trial court on the record whether he understood that he had a right to present mitigation evidence, and Kormondy replied that he understood that he had that right. Thus, Kormondy knowing and voluntarily waived his right to present mitigation evidence. Second, Kormondy alleges that counsel failed to present record mitigation evidence in his sentencing memorandum and at the Spencer hearing. The trial court found Kormondy to be mistaken on this issue, and we agree. A review of the record shows that counsel argued that the evidence demonstrated four nonstatutory mitigators; these arguments were also included in the sentencing memorandum. [6] Counsel also argued to the court that Kormondy's statement to law enforcement officers established a statutory mitigator that the capital felony was committed by another and that Kormondy's participation was relatively minor. Counsel asked Kormondy whether there were any other nonstatutory mitigators that he thought counsel should present to the court, to which Kormondy shook his head negatively. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he discussed the issues concerning other mitigating factors with Kormondy. Kormondy and counsel agreed that it was a good strategic decision not to present certain record mitigation because of statements that could come out in cross-examination of defense witnesses. The trial court found and we agree that it was a strategic choice made by both counsel and Kormondy not to present certain mitigation to the trial court for its consideration. As this Court held in Spencer, defense counsel's strategic choices do not constitute deficient conduct if alternative courses of action have been considered and rejected. Spencer v. State, 842 So.2d 52, 62 (Fla.2003). The trial court properly denied relief on this claim. As his third claim, Kormondy alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to require his presence at critical stages of the proceedings. Kormondy refers to four specific hearings where he alleges he was not presentthe Spencer hearing on June 30, 1999, and three pretrial conferences held on July 21, 1998, March 23, 1999, and April 16, 1999. With regard to the Spencer hearing held on June 30, 1999, and the pretrial conferences held on March 23, 1999, and April 16, 1999, we agree with the trial court that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective because the trial court docket indicates that Kormondy was present at these three proceedings. Kormondy did not present any evidence to the contrary. The conference on July 21, 1998, seems to be the only proceeding where Kormondy was not present. However, Kormondy has not demonstrated prejudice because of counsel's failure to have him present at this conference. Kormondy did not present any evidence or testimony at the evidentiary hearing to explain what if any decisions that were made at this conference would have been different if he had been present or how any different decisions would have resulted in a life sentence. Therefore, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief on this claim. Fourth, Kormondy alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the victim impact evidence presented and failing to object to the lack of a jury instruction. Kormondy did not identify what specific impact evidence was objectionable or irrelevant or what instruction should have been given. Moreover, he has not demonstrated how the victim impact evidence affected the outcome of the penalty proceeding. Thus, this claim is meritless. See Jones v. State, 928 So.2d 1178, 1182 n. 7 (Fla.2006). Finally, Kormondy alleges that counsel during the second penalty phase failed to proffer prior statements made by Mrs. McAdams for impeachment purposes after the trial court sustained the State's objection. Kormondy alleges that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure because Mrs. McAdams was a key State witness, and because this Court, on direct appeal, would not review his claim that his right to cross-examine a witness was violated as a result of counsel's failure to proffer. We agree with the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Kormondy has failed to demonstrate prejudice based on the failure to proffer. To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, Kormondy must show that if counsel had proffered Mrs. McAdams' prior statements and succeeded in impeaching Mrs. McAdams, there is a reasonable probability that Kormondy would not have received a death sentence. However, Kormondy fails to demonstrate prejudice because all he has done is lay out the alleged discrepancies in Mrs. McAdams' statements. Kormondy does not provide any argument or evidence to indicate that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different as a result of impeachment of the witness based on these statements. Because Kormondy fails to establish prejudice, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim.