Opinion ID: 2632408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jesse Smith's Unavailability

Text: Defendant contends that he was denied his right to present a defensethat Joseph had admitted to Jesse Smith that he had murdered Dorsey and Martin because the trial court allowed Jesse to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when called as a witness for the prosecution. He argues that the trial court erred in allowing Jesse to invoke his right against self-incrimination because Jesse's testimony would not have tended to incriminate him, and that such error violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. This claim is not cognizable on appeal because defendant failed to object at trial to Jesse Smith's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. [A] defendant who fails to object to a court's permitting a witness to assert the privilege against self-incrimination may not challenge the ruling on appeal. ( People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 301, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; see also People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 34-35, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249.) This bar is but an application of the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal. ( People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548, 146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048.) Even had defendant preserved this claim for appeal, it would fail on the merits. Defendant never indicated to the court he wanted to call Jesse as a defense witness. Indeed, the court merely ruled that Jesse could invoke his Fifth Amendment right when called as a prosecution witness. It is not clear from the record that Jesse would have refused to testify as a defense witness on his brother's behalf. Without more, merely permitting a witness called by the prosecution to invoke the right against self-incrimination does not violate a defendant's right to present a defense. Furthermore, even if defendant had called Jesse as a defense witness, and the court had permitted him to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, the claim would still lack merit. As we have previously held, [i]t is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) As the United States Supreme Court has stated, this privilege must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure. ( Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118.) In order to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, a witness must have reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. ( Ibid; see also People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 305, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) In assessing whether the court properly allowed Jesse to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, we need not decide whether his testimony actually would have incriminated him, but rather whether it would have given him reasonable cause to apprehend danger from the testimony. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 306, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) The questions regarding Jesse's interaction with defendant and Joseph on the evening of the murders clearly would have given him reasonable cause to apprehend danger from answering questions related to his activities on that night. Here, it was reasonable for Jesse to apprehend a danger of self-incrimination from almost any question related to the events on the night of the murder. He had sheltered defendant and Joseph, helped them open a safe that he knew was stolen, and discussed with, defendant the possibility that Martin could snitch if he remained alive. In the instant case, because all partiesthe prosecution, [the witness's] own attorney, and defense counselbelieved that [the witness's] testimony might be self-incriminating, the court correctly concluded that he reasonably apprehended danger if he testified. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 306, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493,114 P.3d 742.) [9] We also reject defendant's contention that, even if the trial court correctly allowed Jesse to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, his constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense trumped Jesse's right to remain silent. As we have previously held, a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him does not supersede a witness's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 993, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984.) Furthermore, the absence of Jesse's testimony did not deprive defendant of his ability to present a defense; because Joseph testified at defendant's trial, defense counsel was free to cross-examine Joseph about his alleged confession to Jesse. We therefore reject defendant's claim that the trial court erred in allowing Jesse Smith to invoke his right against self-incrimination, as well as his claim that the trial court, in so deciding, violated defendant's right to confront witnesses and right to present a defense.