Opinion ID: 891568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judicial Interpretations

Text: {29} The first reported appellate opinion to construe the statutory definition of deadly weapon, interestingly in the context of its application to a pocketknife, was Territory v. Armijo, 7 N.M. 571, 577-78, 37 P. 1117, 1118 (1894). By that time, the definition had been slightly amended by the Deadly Weapon Act of 1887 to resemble even more closely the current wording, primarily by adding the adjective dangerous before the nouns cuts and thrusts: Deadly weapons, within the meaning of this act, shall be construed to mean all kinds and classes of pistols, whether the same be a revolver, repeater, derringer, or any kind or class of pistol or gun; any and all kinds of daggers, bowie knives, poniards, butcher knives, dirk knives, and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted, including sword canes, and any kind of sharp pointed canes; as also slung shots, bludgeons or any other deadly weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted. 1887 N.M. Laws, ch. 30, § 8. {30} In Armijo, the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and was alleged to have used a pocketknife to cut, stab, and wound the victim. Id. at 574, 37 P. at 1117. Our Territorial Supreme Court held that the indictment was fatally flawed because it failed to set forth how the kind or character of the knife was a deadly weapon as defined in the statute. Id. at 577, 37 P. at 1118. The Court concluded that while many ordinary knives may become deadly weapons by virtue of their use in a particular case, not all knives are automatically deadly weapons as a matter of law. Id. Of particular relevance to the issue before us, the Court addressed whether a pocketknife could be considered a per se deadly weapon under the statutory definition: It is evident that the kind and character of the knife should be described as one of the class therein mentioned. The word such qualifies the kind of knives, and the knife used, to bring the offense within the act, must belong to that class. It was never intended by the legislature to include in the class named ordinary pocket knives as deadly weapons. Id. at 578, 37 P. at 1118. No case has ever overruled or even criticized Armijo's substantially contemporaneous holding that [i]t was never intended by the legislature to include ... ordinary pocket knives as deadly weapons. Id. {31} It should not be surprising that the Armijo Court would find unacceptable the notion that the Legislature had intended to criminalize possession of an ordinary pocketknife in the same manner as firearms or knives commonly carried for their usefulness as deadly weapons. Apparently, penknives and other folding pocketknives were commonly possessed by persons of all ages in the era when the statute was enacted. See, e.g., Sevailles, 1 N.M. at 124, 1855 WL at  (Brocchus, J., dissenting) (referring to knives commonly in use which a gentleman would carry in his pocket for the harmless purpose of making pens). {32} Mark Twain, America's popular chronicler of nineteenth century frontier life, repeatedly mentioned the ubiquitous Barlow pocketknives in his classic Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn books. See Mark Twain, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer 30-31 (Harper & Brothers 1920) (1875) (Mary gave [Tom] a brand-new `Barlow' knife worth twelve and a half cents; and the convulsion of delight that swept his system shook him to his foundations. True, the knife would not cut anything, but it was a `sure-enough' Barlow, and there was inconceivable grandeur in that ....); id. at 276 (looking for buried treasure, Tom's `real Barlow' was out at once, and he had not dug four inches before he struck wood); Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn 70 (Harper & Brothers 1912) (1884) (stocking their canoe for a river trip, Tom and Huck got an old tin lantern, and a butcher-knife without any handle, and a bran-new Barlow knife worth two bits in any store); id. at 193 (There was empty dry-goods boxes under the awnings, and loafers roosting on them all day long, whittling them with their Barlow knives....). {33} For over a century since Armijo was decided, numerous other cases have illuminated the issues before us in the course of construing the definition in a variety of contexts, most often in cases where the object was actually used as a weapon. In State v. Conwell, 36 N.M. 253, 255, 13 P.2d 554, 555 (1932), the defendant was convicted by a jury of actual assault with a deadly weapon, not its mere possession. The alleged weapon used to beat the victim was a four-inch-long rock. Id. at 254, 13 P.2d at 555. The defendant argued before this Court that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the rock used on the victim's face was a deadly weapon, as defined in the statutory catchall of bludgeons or any other deadly weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted. Id. at 255, 13 P.2d at 555. In language that is instructive here, Conwell held that [w]here the instrument used is not one declared by the statute to be a deadly weapon, it is ordinarily a question for the jury to determine whether it is so, considering the character of the instrument and the manner of its use. Id. The Court noted with approval that the rock had been passed among the jurors, enabling them to know its dimensions, weight, sharpness of its edges, and potentiality for infliction of dangerous wounds from the manner in which it was claimed to have been used. Id. at 255-56, 13 P.2d at 556. {34} In State v. Mitchell, 43 N.M. 138, 139-40, 87 P.2d 432, 433 (1939), the defendant was charged with assaulting a victim with a certain deadly weapon, to-wit: a certain knife, with which dangerous cuts could be given, and with which dangerous wounds and thrusts could be inflicted. Mitchell endorsed Conwell's application of the well settled rule that where an instrument is not specifically named in the statute as a deadly weapon, whether it is an unlawful deadly weapon is a fact question for the jury to resolve by considering the instrument's use by an accused and the other circumstances of a particular case. Id. at 140, 87 P.2d at 433. {35} This approach has been recognized and applied repeatedly over the years in a long line of opinions by the courts of this State up to the present day. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 57 N.M. 174, 176, 256 P.2d 791, 792 (1953) (holding that it was for the jury to determine whether a knife with a two-inch blade was a deadly weapon as used by the defendant in the circumstances of the case); State v. Gonzales, 85 N.M. 780, 781, 517 P.2d 1306, 1307 (Ct.App.1973) (concluding that because the statute does not specifically define a tire tool as a deadly weapon, the determination whether the tool was a deadly weapon in the context of a robbery prosecution was for the jury). {36} Although fewer in number than the actual use cases, the simple possession cases follow a similar approach, holding the jury must determine whether the accused had the intent to carry or to use the [unlisted] object as a weapon. Blea, 100 N.M. at 239, 668 P.2d at 1116. In Blea, the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for simple possession of a voltage tester, even though it could have been used to stab someone: A voltage tester, or other utilitarian tool or object is not per se a weapon; it may, however, become a weapon by its actual use ... or by the purpose for which it is carried. Hence, a factual finding as to defendant's intent or purpose in carrying the object is necessary to determine guilt or innocence of an accused charged with carrying a concealed article not expressly listed as a deadly weapon.... Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Anderson, 2001-NMCA-027, ¶ 32 (reversing a conviction for carrying a stick as a deadly weapon and thereby committing the offense of aggravated stalking). [W]hen the object or instrument in question is an unlisted one that falls within the catchall language of Section 30-1-12(B), the jury must be instructed (1) that the defendant must have possessed the object or instrument with the intent to use it as a weapon, and (2) the object or instrument is one that, if so used, could inflict dangerous wounds. Id. {37} In short, our cases hold that in an actual use case involving an unlisted weapon, the jury must find, among other elements, that an object was actually used as a weapon and that it was capable of causing the wounds described in the statute. In a simple possession case, the jury must find that the object was possessed with intent to carry it as a weapon and that it was capable of causing the wounds described in the statute. These are determinations that cannot be ruled on by a trial court as a matter of law and taken from the jury's consideration, no matter how obvious the existence of any essential element of an offense may seem. It is impermissible to enter a partial directed verdict against a defendant because it is the fundamental right of a criminal defendant to have the jury determine whether each element of the charged offense has been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 786, 833 P.2d 1146, 1152 (1992) (determining that a trial court had not removed an essential element of an offense from a jury's consideration in a sex offense prosecution). {38} We have found no New Mexico case that has ever interpreted the deadly weapons definitional statute inconsistently with this large body of precedent. Neither court below ever addressed the statutory history or the relevant New Mexico case law interpreting and applying the deadly weapon definition. Instead, the Court of Appeals cited this Court's opinion in State v. Baca, 114 N.M. 668, 674, 845 P.2d 762, 768 (1992), in support of its position that the public policy of ensuring safety for certain segments of the population eliminated any use requirement in certain weapons possession crimes. Nick R., No. 27,145, slip op. at 4. Neither Baca nor any other precedent has stood for that proposition. The issue in Baca had nothing to do with the statutory definition of deadly weapon or its proof requirements. The only issue in Baca was whether a defendant could avail himself of a duress defense against a charge of intentional possession of a conceded deadly weapon, a purposeful weapon known as a shank, by a prison inmate who claimed he needed to arm himself for self-defense. 114 N.M. at 673-74, 845 P.2d at 767-68. {39} Similarly, State v. Padilla, 1996-NMCA-072, 122 N.M. 92, 920 P.2d 1046, did not analyze the statutory definition of deadly weapon. Instead, it specifically addressed whether stealing and carrying away a deadly weapon constituted arming oneself during a burglary. Id. ¶ 1. The opinion therefore never had occasion to address what proof would have been necessary if there had been an issue as to whether the item possessed met the statutory definition of a deadly weapon. {40} New Mexico's case law is consistent with that of other jurisdictions, which routinely distinguish between legislatively designated per se deadly weapons and a vast array of tools and other ordinary items that could become deadly weapons if used offensively. See, e.g., Grass v. People, 172 Colo. 223, 471 P.2d 602, 605 (1970) (shoe as deadly weapon); Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ind.1994) (plastic flashlight); Johnson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ind.1983) (automobile); State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. 370, 571 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (1990) (carpet-cutting razor); People v. Elijah B., 28 A.D.3d 312, 813 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (N.Y.App.Div.2006) (work boots); People v. Buhagiar, 185 Misc.2d 203, 713 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (App.Div. 2000) (pestle); Bald Eagle v. State, 355 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Okla.Crim.App.1960) (beer bottle); Strahan v. State, 284 P.2d 744, 749 (Okla.Crim.App.1955) (metal automobile window crank); State v. Barrientos, 444 N.W.2d 374, 377 (S.D.1989) (race car); Bui v. State, 964 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (Duraflame log); Broom v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 65, 242 S.W. 236, 238 (App.1922) (breast yoke of a wagon); State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis.2d 718, 595 N.W.2d 330, 333 (1999) (dog). Our own actual use cases have included such situational deadly weapons as a human mouth, a trivet, a brick wall, and a screwdriver. See Neatherlin, 2007-NMCA-035, ¶¶ 13, 15 (reviewing precedents and concluding that the statutory catchall language is broad enough to include an individual's mouth in the factual context of a particular case). {41} This Court recently reaffirmed the long-standing approach of New Mexico case law that it effectuates the legislative intent to give Section 30-1-12(B) a narrow construction. Traeger, 2001-NMSC-022, ¶ 12. In Traeger, we held that because a baseball bat was not specifically named in the statute as a deadly weapon per se, it was for the jury to decide whether a baseball bat was sufficiently dangerous to be a deadly weapon when used in an aggravated battery. Id.; see also ¶ 26 ([W]e retain the rule that if the item is not specifically listed in Section 30-1-12(B), then a jury should make that determination considering the character of the instrument and manner of its use.). {42} Of particular significance to the case at bar, Traeger cautioned that if this Court were to make a baseball bat a per se deadly weapon under the general definitional statute in the Criminal Code, it would have far-reaching implications for other statutes and would criminalize the mere carrying of a bat in a variety of situations. Id. ¶ 15. We believe that to criminalize the carrying of a baseball bat, without a jury finding that the baseball bat was a deadly weapon and that the baseball bat was in fact being carried because it could be used as a weapon, is incongruent with New Mexico law. Id. {43} Traeger's concerns apply with equal force here. If we were to hold that a pocketknife is a per se deadly weapon, it would mean a person who carried one at work, on a fishing trip, or virtually anywhere else would commit the criminal offense of carrying a deadly weapon, in violation of Section 30-7-2. It would increase that statute's potential six-month penalty to a potential jail sentence of up to a year if the defendant took a bus to work while carrying the pocketknife, under the provisions of Section 30-7-13. And in this case, if Nick's father had gone to pick his son up at school or had gone to a parent-teacher conference with his own utilitarian work knife in his pocket, he could have been imprisoned and lost his civil rights for the felony of carrying a deadly weapon on school premises, under the terms of the same statute that was applied to Nick below. Indeed, the same far-reaching theory could result in criminal liability for innocently possessing any of the tools, other objects, and even body parts that have been found to constitute deadly weapons when used offensively. We simply cannot attribute to the Legislature any such unexpressed objectives in enacting New Mexico's deadly weapons statutes.