Opinion ID: 2353541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Spilton's Constitutional Argument

Text: Spilton argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the state because subsection 191.905.12 is unconstitutionally vague. Further, she claims that it violates due process and the prohibition on excessive fines. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, VIII; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 21. This Court reviews constitutional challenges de novo. Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748 (Mo.App.2008). Spilton brings a void-for-vagueness challenge to the section of the Medicaid Fraud statute that sets out the civil penalties for knowing violations. Subsection 191.905.12 says: A person who violates subsections 1 to 3 of this section shall be liable for a civil penalty of not less than five thousand dollars and not more than ten thousand dollars for each separate act in violation. [9] Spilton argues that subsection 191.905.12 is impermissibly vague because it provides for a range of penalties without instructing the court whether to select the low or high end of the range in any specific case. However, a statute that provides for a range of penalties is not constitutionally deficient. See e.g., Battis v. Hofmann, 832 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Mo.App.1992) (judge in landlord tenant dispute has discretion to impose penalty within statutory range provided by 535.300 RSMo 1986); Pratt v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 139 Mo. App. 502, 122 S.W. 1125, 1129 (1909) (legislature intentionally gave jury a wide range of discretion in railroad negligence statute providing for damages between $2,000 and $10,000). A statute is presumed constitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some constitutional provision and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution. Bd. Of Educ. of St. Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366, 368-9 (Mo. banc 2001). A statute is not vague because it allows for judicial discretion in imposing penalties, but rather when its language does not convey, to a person of ordinary intelligence, adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed. Cocktail Fortune, Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 994 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. banc 1999). Where a law can be supported by a reasonable or practical construction, it will be valid. Id. Further, laws imposing civil penalties rather than criminal are ... afforded more tolerance. Harris v. Hunt, 122 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Mo. App.2003). The language of subsection 191.905(12) clearly puts all individuals on notice that if they violate subsection 191.905(1), they will be liable for at least $5,000 per violation. Additionally, as it was applied to Spilton, subsection 12 was neither vague nor arbitrarily enforced. In void-for-vagueness claims, the challenged language must be evaluated by applying it to facts in the present case. Id. (quoting Cocktail Fortune, 994 S.W.2d at 958-9). Spilton received the lowest possible penalty allowed by the statute. A statute must provide fair notice ... of the severity of the penalty that the state may impose. Philip Morris v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1062, 166 L.Ed.2d 940 (2007) (quoting BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996)). This statute does exactly that. There is no question that subsection 12 provides for at least a $5,000 fine per violation. Spilton got a $5,000 fine per violation. Her vagueness argument is without merit. Finally, subsection 191.905.12 does not contravene the excessive fines provision of the Eighth Amendment or violate due process. Although the Missouri and United States Constitutions prohibit the imposition of excessive fines, [10] the Missouri General Assembly has always had wide latitude to decide the severity of civil penalties for violations of law. Missouri Public Service Com'n v. Hurricane Deck Holding Co., 302 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. App.2010) (outside of constitutional limitations, setting the amount of penalties is within the discretion of the legislature); State v. Davis, 830 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.App. 1992); Boonville Special Road Dist. v. Fuser, 184 Mo.App. 634, 171 S.W. 962 (1914); Western Union Tel. Co. v. State of Indiana, 165 U.S. 304, 17 S.Ct. 345, 41 L.Ed. 725 (1897). Statutory civil penalties are different than jury-imposed punitive damages because statutes define, in advance, the prohibited conduct and ... the legislative prescribed penalty. Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Mo. banc 2008) (statute that provides treble damages for the unauthorized practice of law does not violate due process). Further, statuteslike this onethat provide for treble damages in addition to actual damages sustained are not constitutionally invalid. Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 697 (Mo. banc 2008) (holding that sec. 484.020(2), which awards treble damages for the unauthorized practice of law, does not violate due process). Civil fines within statutory limits will not be considered excessive, as a matter of law, when the statute authorizing the punishment is valid and when the punishment imposed is within the range prescribed by the legislature. State v. Polley, 2 S.W.3d 887, 894 (Mo.App.1999); State v. Repp, 603 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Mo. banc 1980) (punishment within the range prescribed by statute cannot be considered excessive). A statutory punishment will not be considered an excessive fine in contravention of the Eighth Amendment unless it is so disproportionate as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable [persons]. Barker v. Barker, 98 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Mo.banc 2003). When a litigant receives the lowest possible penalty proscribed by a statutory range, as Spilton did, the penalty is not excessive. Missouri Public Service Commission v. Hurricane Deck Holding Company, 302 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Mo.App.2010) (because the penalty assessed was the lowest amount permitted by the statute, it was not so disproportionate as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men). Finally, it is settled Missouri law that an assessment of $5,000 per violation is not so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Trader Bobs, 768 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. App.1989) (holding that statute that provides for a fine of $5,000 per violation is not excessive). This Court is unpersuaded that the $5,000-per-violation penalty assessed against Spilton is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience. A litigant attacking the constitutional validity of a statute bears an extremely heavy burden. Linton v. Mo. Veterinary Med. Bd., 988 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Mo. banc 1999); State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. banc 1980) (When considering the constitutionality of a punishment statute enacted by our legislature, we presume its validity and those who seek to invalidate it bear a heavy burden of demonstrating that it is ... excessive). Spilton has not met that burden.