Opinion ID: 1238393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of District Court's Analysis

Text: Showalter argues the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it failed to analyze two of the three fair and just reasons he offered as grounds for withdrawing his plea. He contends the district court focused on only whether there was newly discovered evidence despite his presentation of three distinct fair and just reasons: (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) newly available evidence; and (3) change in circumstances.
Although Showalter argues the district court ignored his newly available evidence argument, he does not make clear how that argument differs from his newly discovered evidence argument. Although he presents the two arguments separately, both rely on the same witness declarations, and both are assertions that these new declarations are a fair and just reason justifying withdrawal of the guilty plea. The district court's analysis and conclusion that Showalter's proffered evidence was not new adequately resolved both contentions. The district court made a factual finding that Showalter was aware of the potential evidence[the witnesses] could supply and could have not pleaded guilty and compelled these same witnesses to testify on his behalf at trial. This finding was not clearly erroneous. Even if the district court had failed to address Showalter's newly available evidence argument, that argument is meritless because newly available evidence does not constitute newly discovered evidence justifying withdrawal of a guilty plea. See United States v. Lockett, 919 F.2d 585, 591-92 (9th Cir.1990). In Lockett, we affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea where a co-defendant, who previously asserted her right not to testify, offered newly available testimony that exculpated the defendant. Id. We stated that great caution must be exercised in considering evidence newly discovered when it existed all along. Id. (citing United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 286 n. 33 (2d Cir.1973)).
Showalter also contends the district court ignored his argument that there was a change in circumstances that constituted a fair and just reason for him to withdraw his guilty plea. He does not make clear how such change in circumstances or intervening circumstances differs from the newly discovered evidence on which his motion was based. The district court reasonably assumed that the alleged intervening circumstances were the proffered declarations of witnesses and Showalter's alleged realization that the government had overstated the strength of its case against him. He argued that, Between the new facts that have emerged and Mr. Showalter's realization that the SEC/Government have been overstating their case at best if not flat out creating facts at worst, Mr. Showalter is in a significantly different position today than he was one year ago when he pleaded guilty. Just as the proffered declarations do not constitute newly discovered evidence, they do not constitute an intervening circumstance. As we have stated, the district court properly addressed this argument and concluded the witnesses were known to Showalter at the time he pleaded guilty and could have been called to testify for him at trial. Showalter does not explain how witnesses known to him at the time he entered his plea can be considered an intervening circumstance.
The district court also thoroughly addressed Showalter's argument that the SEC and government exaggerated the strength of their case against him. It explained why it was not persuaded by the argument: In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a defendant could withdraw his guilty plea simply upon discovering that the State would have a weaker case against him than anticipated. Specifically the Court stated: Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. . . . A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action. Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-57, 90 S.Ct. 1463. Defendant has merely shown that he has reevaluated the government's purportedly rock solid case against him and second-guessed his decision to plead guilty. But Defendant's claim that he did not see all the government's cards before pleading guilty does not entitle him to withdraw his plea. United States v. Schmidt, 373 F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2004). For the reasons set forth in the district court's order, Showalter's belief that the government had a weaker case than he originally thought does not constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea.
Lastly, Showalter mentions a new fact, which appears to be related to his changed circumstances argument. He asserts that, after he pleaded guilty, the properties that he represented would be improved were developed and sold, reducing the amount of the previously anticipated loss. He characterizes this as a material change in circumstances. The government addresses this argument accurately: [Showalter] is mistaken, however, that this `new fact' constitutes a material change in circumstances. [Showalter] was charged with and pled guilty to wire fraud for misappropriating investors' money. That properties he used to lure people to `invest' their money in High Park Investments may have sold is in no way connected to whether [Showalter] defrauded investors and whether he intended to defraud them. Even if Showalter were correct in asserting that the loss amount turned out to be less than it was anticipated to be, the only possible impact from that would be to decrease the applicable Guideline range, and potentially lessen his sentence. But, a defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea because his sentence may be different from that which was originally anticipated. See Nostratis, 321 F.3d at 1211. The district court adequately considered and correctly resolved all of Showalter's arguments pertaining to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.