Opinion ID: 657237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process Limits of Pinkerton

Text: 15 Although Leticia has not framed her challenge in due process sufficiency of the evidence terms, this court has the authority, especially in criminal cases ... [to] notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public relations of the judicial proceeding. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1935). 16 Several circuits, including this one, recognize that due process constrains the application of Pinkerton where the relationship between the defendant and the substantive offense is slight. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 1123; United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 112 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 2061, 60 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 850-51 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905, 106 S.Ct. 274, 88 L.Ed.2d 235 (1985). See also United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir.1991) (recognizing limitation's existence in other circuits), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992). The foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton is also the main concern underlying a possible due process violation. Christian, 942 F.2d at 367. Leticia's firearm convictions under Sec. 924(c) raise the question of whether the due process line has been crossed here. We hold that it has. 17 When the conspiracy is not the predicate offense in a Sec. 924(c) case, the question of foreseeability is more involved than usual. The question is, was it reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a firearm would be used in relation to the predicate offense? See, e.g., Lucas, 932 F.2d at 1219. 18 No circuit has yet found the relationship between a defendant and another conspirator's use of a firearm so remote that due process required reversing a Sec. 924(c) conviction. Christian, 942 F.2d at 367. In cases where foreseeability was an issue, however, there was substantial evidence linking the defendant with the predicate offense underlying her Sec. 924(c) conviction. See Christian, 942 F.2d at 368 (conspirator's firearm use foreseeable where defendant agreed to participate in predicate drug transaction); United States v. Gutierrez, 978 F.2d 1463, 1468 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 830 (foreseeable because defendants knew of circumstances leading to murder and were present at crime); Chorman, 910 F.2d at 105-06 (evidence showed defendants knew and approved of acts underlying predicate offenses of conspirators). 19 In our Johnson case, the defendant was involved actively in a crack house conspiracy: she was there when police broke down the door with a battering ram. During the raid, the police found a gun in the car of a codefendant in the conspiracy. This court held that the gun was foreseeable because [t]he drug industry ... is a dangerous, violent business. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 1123. But a crack house is quite different from the high-level import and distribution operation of the Castaneda clan. Their network was sophisticated, diversified and mobile. There was no need for firearms except during prearranged deals (none of which were predicate offenses for Leticia's convictions). A crack house is a fixed-location retail operation, selling small daily amounts of drugs to dozens of unstable, volatile, desperate street junkies. Potentially it is far more violent each day. Consequently, gun use is very foreseeable. 20 Although courts recognize the nexus between drugs and firearms, Johnson, 886 F.2d at 1123, there is no presumption of foreseeability, United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1136 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1107, 111 S.Ct. 1015, 112 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1991), and the burden of proving foreseeability remains on the government, id. Where a defendant has little or no connection to the predicate drug offense, another conspirator's use of a firearm in relation to the predicate drug offense may, in some fact situations, be unforeseeable. In those cases, it would violate due process to find the defendant vicariously liable for the firearm's use under Sec. 924(c). Leticia's situation is a paradigm example of such an unforeseeable use. 21 As the sentencing court emphasized, Leticia played, at best, a small part in the overall conspiracy. The government contends, however, that six telephone conversations between Leticia and other conspirators demonstrate that she acted as her husband's assistant or confidante in the conspiracy. Not so. Although she was married to Uriel, a major player, there is no evidence that she played more than a passive role in the drug operation. 22 The government argues that in one conversation, Leticia sought assurances from Meras that Barron wanted to purchase Uriel's drugs. This grossly mischaracterizes that call. In fact, Uriel placed the call, spoke to Meras about a drug transaction, handed the telephone to Leticia, who then began a social conversation with Meras. At one point, Uriel interrupted this conversation, directing Leticia to tell Meras that, if Barron did not want the drugs, he would sell them to someone else. Leticia repeated Uriel's remarks verbatim, then concluded the conversation. This does not show that she sought assurances from Meras. 23 The government also points to two phone conversations between Leticia and a suspected drug dealer, Victor Zamora (Zamora). Zamora had called Uriel at home, and each time Leticia told him that her husband was not there. In one call, Zamora asked her several questions about who had called the house and seemed confused by instructions that he had received from Uriel. Leticia engaged in no conversation, offered no help, and answered, in few words, the direct questions put to her about when Uriel would return. In the other conversation, she volunteered that a street-level dealer had been arrested and that a deal involving Uriel had fallen through. This one call is the only evidence of Leticia's active participation: volunteering information about past events and the dealings of others. 24 The other three calls are inconsequential. In one, Leticia only picked up the phone when it rang and handed it to another family member. In the other two, she spoke to her husband, mostly about family matters and his travel plans. She also answered his questions about who had called or whether a specific person had been arrested. These calls do not indicate that Leticia was much involved in the conspiracy. 25 Taken together, these phone calls demonstrate that Leticia assisted Uriel only insofar as she acted as his spouse: answering her home phone, taking messages from callers and answering his questions when he called. The evidence does not show that she knew much about Uriel's or Barron's organizations, that she knew the low-level distributors involved, that she had any knowledge of Angulo-Lopez's organization, or that she ever had more than a marginal role in the conspiracy. 26 Nor is there a grain of evidence that Leticia knew of, or was connected with, the six underlying drug possession counts forming the basis for six of her seven firearm charges. There is no evidence that she had any relationship, personal or professional, with Angulo-Lopez, Umansor-Alvarez or Omelas-Martinez. There is no evidence that she was aware of their activities, or that she participated in any act that was connected, directly or indirectly, to their drug possession offenses. It's clear she knew Zamora because she spoke with him on the telephone, but there is no evidence connecting her to his illegal conduct. 27 In the end, the only evidence that connects Leticia to the predicate offenses appears to be her marriage to Uriel. Although the marital relationship may have some relevance, see, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 960 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908, 107 S.Ct. 2488, 96 L.Ed.2d 379 (1987) (marriage to conspirator relevant to proving guilt of conspiracy), finding her guilty based solely upon her marital relationship with Uriel is impermissible, see, e.g., United States v. Ritz, 548 F.2d 510, 522 (5th Cir.1977) (guilt of a conspiracy cannot be proven solely by family relations or other type[s] of close association[s].). This general rule against establishing guilt by association equally applies in the Pinkerton Sec. 924(c) context. 28 In short, given Leticia's lack of participation in the conspiracy and her lack of involvement with the predicate offenses, the use of firearms by the other conspirators in relation to these offenses was not reasonably foreseeable to her. Accordingly, we vacate Leticia's Sec. 924(c) convictions, except Count 53 which was predicated upon the conspiracy itself. 29 Our holding today is narrow. We do not address whether foreseeability continues to suffice for the predicate offense prong of Sec. 924(c). Rather, we hold that we cannot conclude, without violating the fundamental precepts of due process, that Leticia could have foreseen the other conspirators' use of firearms in relation to the predicate offenses. 30 Although Meras, Barron and Uriel argue otherwise, we do not notice any due process error with respect to their convictions. As we discuss below, these three cannot establish any lack of foreseeability. 31