Opinion ID: 171316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of Discrimination

Text: A plaintiff alleging discrimination may prove her case by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2000). Direct evidence is evidence from which the trier of fact may conclude, without inference, that the employment action was undertaken because of the employee's protected status. See Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th Cir.2007) (Direct evidence is evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption.) (quotations omitted). For example, we have stated that an employer's policy, discriminatory on its face, is direct evidence of discrimination. See Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (10th Cir.1990). Usually, however, a plaintiff will not have direct evidence of discrimination and will establish her claims through circumstantial evidence. In that instance, we analyze the plaintiff's claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework to determine whether the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Adamson v. Multi Community Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145-46, 1148 (10th Cir.2008) (applying McDonnell Douglas to discrimination claims brought pursuant to the ADEA and Title VII). Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of setting forth a prima facie case of discrimination. Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 531 (10th Cir.1998). After the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1997). If the employer comes forward with a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the burden then reverts to the plaintiff to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for the challenged action is pretextual i.e., unworthy of belief. Id. (quotations omitted). A plaintiff who demonstrates pretext gets over the hurdle of summary judgment. Id.
Ms. Sanders has produced direct evidence that she was surplussed because of her age. She testified that Mr. Wooten, who had been part of the team responsible for ranking her fifth from the bottom among Band C managers in her affected work group, told her that her agenot her job performancewas the cause of her surplus. It is undisputed that when Mr. Wooten informed Ms. Sanders that her job was being eliminated, he provided her with a document that listed, by job title and age, the number of employees selected for layoff and the number who were being retained. This information is required to be given to employees by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, which is part of the ADEA. According to Ms. Sanders, however, and contrary to the purpose of the ADEA paperwork, Mr. Wooten pointed to the document, explained that she was being surplussed because of her age, and stated that this was necessary to prevent age discrimination. Although SWBT has put forth evidence that calls Ms. Sanders's recollection of events into question, it is not our province at the summary judgment stage to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. Utah L'house Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Rsch., 527 F.3d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir.2008). If the jury believes Ms. Sanders's testimony, it could concludedirectly, without the aid of any favorable inferencesthat the reason for her surplus was her age. Accordingly, SWBT is not entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Sanders's age-discrimination claim. [4]
The plaintiffs' remaining claims are supported by circumstantial evidence and therefore must be analyzed under McDonnell Douglas. As to these claims, we agree with the district court that the plaintiffs have established prima facie cases of both sex discrimination and age discrimination. [5] We also agree with the district court that SWBT has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiffs' surplus: the RIF. The central issue in this appeal, then, is whether the plaintiffs have provided evidence of pretext. We conclude they have not. Generally, [a] plaintiff demonstrates pretext by producing evidence of such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons. Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir.2005) (quotations omitted). When the employer's proffered reason for its action is a RIF, evidence tending to show that the RIF is merely a pretext for the plaintiff's surplus may take several forms. First, the evidence may demonstrate that the plaintiff's surplus is inconsistent with the RIF criteria articulated by her employer. See Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Sanchez v. Philip Morris Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir.1993) (It is conceivable that a plaintiff . . . could be so overwhelmingly better qualified than another applicant that on this evidence alone a trial court could properly find pretext); Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1169 (citing Sanchez for the proposition that [t]here may be circumstances in which a claimed business judgment is so idiosyncratic or questionable that a factfinder could reasonably find that it is pretext for illegal discrimination.). Relatedly, evidence showing that the employer inconsistently applied its RIF criteria may also support a finding that the plaintiff was terminated for discriminatory reasons. See Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1173-74. Other procedural irregularities in the RIF process may similarly evince unlawful discrimination. See Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir.2005). This, of course, is not an exhaustive list of the types of evidence that may support a finding of pretext, and we do not limit a plaintiff to any particular method of proof. Rather, when assessing whether a plaintiff has demonstrated pretext such that a jury could conclude that discrimination was the true reason for the adverse employment action, we consider the evidence as a whole. See Danville v. Reg'l Lab Corp., 292 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir.2002). We understand the plaintiffs in this caseeither individually or togetherto argue that the RIF was only a pretext for unlawful discrimination because: (1) their qualifications did not warrant their placement in Band C; (2) SWBT inconsistently applied its ranking criteria; (3) an Area Manager was permitted to take a voluntary demotion that resulted in Ms. Sanders's job loss; and (4) women and older employees were disproportionately affected by the RIF.