Opinion ID: 870200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: At issue in this appeal is whether double jeopardy1 bars the re-prosecution of a defendant for violating Hawai‘i Revised 1 Article V of the United States Constitution provides, “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . .” Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai‘i State Constitution provides, “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy. . . .”  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Statutes (“HRS”) § 291E-61 (2007 & Supp. 2009)2 (“Operating a Vehicle under the Influence of an Intoxicant” or “OVUII”), following a “judgment of acquittal” on the HRS § 291E-61(a)(3) method of proof in an initial trial in which both HRS §§ 291E61(a)(1) and (a)(3) methods of proof were tried. We reaffirm that a “judgment of acquittal” on the HRS § 291E-61(a)(3) method of proof in an OVUII trial is “in form only,” but that it serves as a factual finding that the State has not met its burden of proving the requisite breath alcohol content. Based on our recent holding in State v. Mundon, ___ Hawai‘i ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2012)(adopting the “collateral estoppel” principle from Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)), however, the collateral estoppel principle embodied in the double jeopardy clause prohibits the State from re-litigating breath alcohol content, whether in a reprosecution of the defendant on the HRS § 291E-61(a)(3) method of 2 HRS § 291E-61 provides, in relevant part, as it did at the time of Spearman’s alleged offense: Operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. (a) A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if the person operates or assumes actual physical control of a vehicle: (1) While under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair the person's normal mental faculties or ability to care for the person and guard against casualty; (2) While under the influence of any drug that impairs the person's ability to operate the vehicle in a careful and prudent manner; (3) With .08 or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath; or (4) With .08 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters or cubic centimeters of blood. 2  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  proof, or as part of the State’s evidence in a subsequent trial on the HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) method of proof. We therefore expressly overrule State v. Lemalu, 72 Haw. 130, 139, 809 P.2d 442, 447 (1991), which held otherwise. The collateral estoppel principle, however, would not prohibit the State from re-charging the defendant on the HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) method of proof, following a dismissal without prejudice based on the failure of the Complaint to allege mens rea. See State v. Nesmith, 127 Hawai‘i 48, 276 P.3d 617 (2012). Consequently, we affirm the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal.