Opinion ID: 2070061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: objection to certification requirement on the basis of the establishment clause

Text: In Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612; 91 S Ct 2105; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that in order to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, a statute must meet a three-part test: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. [Citations omitted.] See also Grand Rapids School Dist v Ball, 473 US 373, ___; 105 S Ct 3216; 87 L Ed 2d 267, 277 (1985) (We therefore reaffirm that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause should be measured against the Lemon criteria.). The parties here have not discussed the first two parts of this test because it is clear that the statute involved in this case has a secular purpose and that it does not have a primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. With respect to the third part of the test, the circuit court found that teacher certification did cause excessive government entanglement with religion. In reviewing this conclusion, we are aware that the United States Supreme Court has stated: Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible contacts. [ Lemon, 403 US 614. Citations omitted.] Those kinds of state actions which have been found to violate this third prong are those which create an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state. Lemon, 403 US 622. See also Walz v New York City Tax Comm, 397 US 664; 90 S Ct 1409; 25 L Ed 2d 697 (1970); Wolman v Walker, 433 US 229; 97 S Ct 2593; 53 L Ed 2d 714 (1977) (finding that the use of state funds for nonpublic school field trips would require close supervision of the nonpublic school teachers, thus creating excessive entanglement). In this case, it is clear that requiring all teachers to be certified does not impermissibly tangle government with religion. The state is merely enforcing minimum standards with regard to individuals. The requirement does not involve the government in any continuing relationship with the churches or the schools. Once the individual teacher is certified, the state does not require the individual to teach from any particular perspective. We find, therefore, that there is no unconstitutional government entanglement with religion.