Opinion ID: 2306903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury.

Text: The jury instructions were consistent with the indictment. After reading the relevant language of Section 916(b) verbatim, the trial judge instructed the jury on intent, consistent with Section 841: Now, in order to find the defendant guilty of Home Improvement Fraud you must find that all of the following elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. One, the defendant entered into a home improvement contract, to provide home improvements to Paul and Christine Berkeley. Home improvement means any alteration, repair, addition, modification or improvement to any dwelling or the property on which it is located. Home improvement contract is any agreement, written or oral in which a person offers or agrees to provide home improvement in exchange for payment of money, whether such payments have been made or not. And the second element is that the defendant received money for the purpose of obtaining or paying for services, labor, materials or equipment, and failed to apply the money for this purpose by not substantially completing the requirements of the home improvement contract, or by not paying for the services, labor, materials, or equipment furnished to the home improvement project, or by diverting the money to some other use. And the third element is that the defendant intended to appropriate the money paid by Paul and Christine Berkeley under the home improvement contract or to deprive them of itthat is, it was the defendant's conscious object or purpose to take the money. Appropriate means to exercise control, or to aid a third party to exercise control over property of another permanently or for so extended a period of time, or under such circumstances as to acquire a major portion of its economic value or benefit, or to dispose of property for the benefit of the actor or third person. And the fourth and final element is that the contract price or amount paid by Paul and Christine Berkeley was $500 or greater. Thus, the jurors were instructed that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Zugehoer failed to use the money he received from the Berkeleys to substantially complete the improvement project, pay the subcontractors or suppliers, and that he used the money for something else. The jury was also told that it must find that Zugehoer intended to deprive the Berkeleys of the value of their money. Zugehoer has not shown how an instruction under Section 841(b)that he fraudulently convert[ed] the moneywould have assisted the jury. Section 916(b)(4) itself provides the jury with specific counts which presume that the defendant fraudulently converted funds for purposes of committing the offense. An instruction based on Section 841(b) would therefore be redundant. [10] In Edwards v. State, [11] this Court rejected the suggestion that the jury should be instructed under the more generalized Section 841(b) [12] and call[ed] upon the Delaware Legislature to eliminate the `unnecessary' second paragraph of § 841 to remove the ambiguity created by that law.... [13] Accordingly, in Delaware, when the jury is instructed on the intent required by Section 841(b), the settled practice is to use the language of Section 841(a), rather than of Section 841(b). Here, the trial court ruled that the languagewith intent specified in Section 841was intended to incorporate only subsection (a), and not subsection (b) and so instructed the jury. The trial court properly instructed the jurors that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Zugehoer failed to use the money he received from the Berkeleys to substantially complete the improvement project, pay the subcontractors or suppliers, and that he used the money for some unrelated purpose.