Opinion ID: 216847
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Heading: Definition of Point Source Discharge

Text: In 1972, in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), Congress substantially revised federal law governing clean water. Pub.L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). In 1977, the statute was renamed the Clean Water Act (CWA). Pub.L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977). Congress enacted the FWPCA to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters by replacing water quality standards with point source effluent limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.1998). Section 301(a) of the Act provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). One of these exceptions is a point source discharge authorized by a permit granted pursuant to the NPDES system under § 402 of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The combined effect of §§ 301(a) and 402 is that [t]he CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from a point source into navigable waters of the United States without an NPDES permit. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir.2008). Pollutants include rock and sand. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Defendants do not contest that sediment discharges from logging roads constitute pollutants within the meaning of the CWA. It is well settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). Section 502(14) of the Act defines point source as any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added). The term nonpoint source is left undefined. Stormwater that is not collected or channeled and then discharged, but rather runs off and dissipates in a natural and unimpeded manner, is not a discharge from a point source as defined by § 502(14). As we wrote in League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2002): Although nonpoint source pollution is not statutorily defined, it is widely understood to be the type of pollution that arises from many dispersed activities over large areas, and is not traceable to any single discrete source. Because it arises in such a diffuse way, it is very difficult to regulate through individual permits. The most common example of nonpoint source pollution is the residue left on roadways by automobiles. Small amounts of rubber are worn off of the tires of millions of cars and deposited as a thin film on highways; minute particles of copper dust from brake linings are spread across roads and parking lots each time a driver applies the brakes; drips and drabs of oil and gas ubiquitously stain driveways and streets. When it rains, the rubber particles and copper dust and gas and oil wash off of the streets and are carried along by runoff in a polluted soup, winding up in creeks, rivers, bays, and the ocean. However, when stormwater runoff is collected in a system of ditches, culverts, and channels and is then discharged into a stream or river, there is a discernable, confined and discrete conveyance of pollutants, and there is therefore a discharge from a point source. In other words, runoff is not inherently a nonpoint or point source of pollution. Rather, it is a nonpoint or point source under § 502(14) depending on whether it is allowed to run off naturally (and is thus a nonpoint source) or is collected, channeled, and discharged through a system of ditches, culverts, channels, and similar conveyances (and is thus a point source discharge). Our caselaw has consistently recognized the distinction between nonpoint and point source runoff. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Department of Transportation, 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996), we were asked to enforce an already-issued NPDES permit requiring a state agency using storm drains to control polluted stormwater runoff from roadways and maintenance yards[.] In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA ( NRDC v. EPA ), 966 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1992), we wrote, This case involves runoff from diffuse sources that eventually passes through storm sewer systems and is thus subject to the NPDES permit program. In Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.1984), we explicitly agreed with a decision of the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir.1979). We wrote: The [Tenth Circuit] observed that Congress had classified nonpoint source pollution as runoff caused primarily by rainfall around activities that employ or create pollutants. Such runoff could not be traced to any identifiable point of discharge. The court concluded that point and nonpoint sources are not distinguished by the kind of pollution they create or by the activity causing the pollution, but rather by whether the pollution reaches the water through a confined, discrete conveyance. Thus, when mining activities release pollutants from a discernible conveyance, they are subject to NPDES regulation, as are all point sources. 749 F.2d at 558 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Finally, in Environmental Defense Center v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.2003), we wrote: Storm sewers are established point sources subject to NPDES permitting requirements. ... Diffuse runoff, such as rainwater that is not channeled through a point source, is considered nonpoint source pollution and is not subject to federal regulation. Id. at 841, 842 n. 8 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The clarity of the text of § 502(14), as well as our caselaw, would ordinarily make recourse to legislative history unnecessary. The unambiguously expressed intent of Congress controls. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. However, because EPA relied on the legislative history of the FWPCA in promulgating the Silvicultural Rule at issue in this case, we recount some of that history as background to our analysis of the Rule. The FWPCA established distinctly different methods to control pollution released from point sources and that traceable to nonpoint sources. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.2002). The Senate Committee elected to impose stringent permitting requirements only on point sources because [t]here is no effective way as yet, other than land use control, by which you can intercept [nonpoint] runoff and control it in the way that you do a point source. We have not yet developed technology to deal with that kind of a problem. 117 Cong. Rec. 38825 (Nov. 2, 1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie). The House and Senate committees made clear that the term point source was not to be interpreted narrowly. By the use of the term `discharge of pollutants' this provision [§ 402] covers any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. H.R.Rep. No. 92-911, at 125 (1971). The Senate Committee Report instructed that the [EPA] Administrator should not ignore discharges resulting from point sources other than pipelines or similar conduits. ... There are many other forms of periodic, though frequent, discharges of pollutants into the water through point sources such as barges, vessels, feedlots, trucks and other conveyances. S.Rep. No. 92-414, at 51 (1971), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3760. Senator Dole explained his understanding of the distinction as it related to the problem of agricultural pollution: Most of the problems of agricultural pollution deal with non-point sources. Very simply, a non-point source of pollution is one that does not confine its pollution discharge to one fairly specific outlet, such as a sewer pipe, a drainage ditch or a conduit; thus, a feed-lot would be considered to be a non-point source as would pesticides and fertilizers. S.Rep. No. 92-414, at 98-99 (1971), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3760. (Supplemental Views of Sen. Dole). Congress did not provide the EPA Administrator with discretion to define the statutory terms. Senator Randolph, the Chairman of the Senate Committee, explained, We have written into law precise standards and definite guidelines on how the environment should be protected. We have done more than just provide broad directives [for] administrators to follow. 117 Cong. Rec. 38805 (Nov. 2, 1971). Senator Muskie, another major proponent of the legislation, clarified that EPA would provide [g]uidance with respect to the identification of `point sources' and `nonpoint sources.' 117 Cong. Rec. 38816 (Nov. 2, 1971). However, [i]f a man-made drainage, ditch, flushing system or other such device is involved and if measurable waste results and is discharged into water, it is considered a `point source.' Id. Congress also sought to require permits for any activity that met the legal definition of point source, regardless of feasibility concerns. For example, Congressman Roncalio of Wyoming proposed an amendment to exempt irrigated agriculture from the NPDES permit program because it was virtually impossible to trace pollutants to specific irrigation lands, making these pollutants a nonpoint source in most cases. 118 Cong. Rec. 10765 (Mar. 29, 1972). Opponents objected that the amendment would exclude large point source polluters simply because the channeled water originally derived from irrigated agriculture. Congressman Waldie explained: In California there is a vast irrigation basin that collects all the waste resident of irrigation water in the Central Valley and places it in a drainthe San Luis Drainingand transport[s] it several hundreds of miles and then dumps it into the San Joaquin River which flows into the estuary and then into San Francisco Bay. It is highly polluted water that is being dumped in waters already jeopardized by pollution. Will the gentleman's amendment establish that as a nonpoint source pollution or will it come under the point source solution discharge? Id. Congressman Roncalio responded that his amendment would not require permitting for this type of activity  that is, that it would redefine these agricultural point sources as nonpoint source pollution. His amendment was then rejected on the House floor. See id. Congress eventually adopted a statutory exemption for agricultural irrigation in 1977, five years after the passage of the FWPCA. See CWA § 402( l ), 33 U.S.C. § 1342( l ) (The Administrator shall not require a permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the Administrator directly or indirectly, require any State to require such a permit.); CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (This term does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture.). Congress did so to alleviate EPA's burden in having to issue permits for every agricultural point source. The problems of permitting every discrete source or conduit returning water to the streams from irrigated lands is simply too burdensome to place on the resources of EPA. 123 Cong. Rec. 38956 (Dec. 15, 1977) (statement of Rep. Roberts). Congress did not, however, grant EPA the discretion to exempt agricultural discharges from the general statutory definition of point source discharges. Rather, Congress exempted such discharges by amending the statute. Congress has never granted a similar statutory exemption for silvicultural discharges from the general definition of point source discharges. Despite the foregoing, Defendants contend that stormwater runoff from logging roads that is collected in a system of ditches, culverts, and channels, and is then discharged into streams and rivers, is a nonpoint source discharge. Defendants contend that the Silvicultural Rule exempts such discharges from the definition of point source discharge contained in § 502(14), and therefore from the NPDES permitting system. Alternatively, Defendants contend that the 1987 amendments to the CWA exempted such discharges from the permitting system. We discuss defendants' two contentions in turn.