Opinion ID: 788213
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Officers' Unconstitutional Entry into Washington's Room

Text: 46 The district court found that Washington's responses to Officer Sceirine's two verbal requests to enter Washington's room were not statements of consent to enter or to search it. Thus, the district court also found that the RPD officers entered Washington's room in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Government does not challenge any of these findings on appeal, even though it was free to do so. See, e.g., Engleson v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1041(9th Cir.1992) (`[A]rguments that support the judgment as entered can be made' ... even where the argument being raised has been explicitly rejected by the district court. (quoting 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3904, at 195-96 (1992))). Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, we take as given that the officers violated Washington's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his room without first obtaining valid consent. 47 4. Whether the Officers Violated Washington's Fourth Amendment Rights When They Began Physically Searching His Room Without His Consent 48 After the officers unconstitutionally entered Washington's room, Detective Chittenden asked Washington if he had anything unlawful in the room. Washington admitted that he possessed a line of methamphetamine and indicated its general location. While Officer Sceirine and Detective Chittenden continued to question Washington about whether he was involved in manufacturing and/or distributing methamphetamine, one of the officers in Washington's room moved Washington's coat and discovered a line of methamphetamine. 49 Washington's admission that he possessed methamphetamine certainly permitted the officers to look in the area Washington indicated to see if the line was in plain view, but it did not provide the officers a legal basis for lifting his coat. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (moving something even a few inches constitutes a search and falls within the plain view exception only if the officer had probable cause to believe the thing being moved is evidence of a crime at the time he moved it); see also United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1168 n. 3 (9th Cir.2003) ([E]ven if the bag [containing a prohibited shotgun] had been open, the fact that it was stored under the bed, thus requiring the police to move it, would have required probable cause, since such movement would constitute a search. (citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324-25, 107 S.Ct. 1149)). Thus, the officers' movement of Washington's coat was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. 50 5. Whether the Officers' Repeated Violations of Washington's Fourth Amendment Rights Require Suppression 11 51 After the officers repeatedly violated Washington's Fourth Amendment rights, Washington signed a permission to search form, which purportedly gave his consent to search his room. 52 During their search, the officers found the gun that resulted in his arrest and conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court found that Washington's signature on the permission to search form was freely given within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and that it purged any taint that resulted from the officers' prior violations of Washington's Fourth Amendment rights. We need not address whether Washington's signing of the permission to search form was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. 12 Even if it was voluntary, the district court erred in concluding that the consent purged the taint of the officers' prior violations of Washington's Fourth Amendment rights. 53 `Under the Fourth Amendment ... evidence obtained subsequent to an illegal investigation is tainted by the illegality and thus inadmissible, notwithstanding ... consent, unless subsequent events have purged the taint.' United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 592 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 727(9th Cir.2001), amended by, 279 F.3d 1062 (2002), and holding that consent was tainted and the evidence obtained pursuant to it should have been suppressed); see also United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.1998) (Consent to search that is given after an illegal entry is tainted and invalid under the Fourth Amendment.). Put another way, 54 [u]nder established law, evidence obtained through the exploitation of illegal behavior by the police cannot be admitted into evidence.... [O]nce an illegality has been shown, we must decide whether the evidence has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. 55 United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1092(9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (W.Fletcher, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 599). The test for determining whether the primary taint of a prior constitutional violation has been purged is commonly referred to as an attenuation analysis or an attenuation test. E.g., id. at 1092-94, 95 S.Ct. 2254(W.Fletcher, J., dissenting) (referring, interchangeably to attenuation analysis and attenuation test). An attenuation analysis advances the exclusionary rule's twin aims of deterrence and judicial integrity. Id. at 1054, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254); see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 599-600, 95 S.Ct. 2254(noting that considerations of deterrence and of judicial integrity, by now, have become rather commonplace in the [Supreme] Court's [exclusionary rule] cases (citations and quotation omitted)). Upon a finding that evidence is tainted by illegal behavior by the police,  all evidence obtained ... as a direct causal result of it must be suppressed. Grubbs, 377 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis in original) (citing Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1228; Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1053-54; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). 56 To determine whether a prior illegality is sufficiently connected to the subsequent consent, we look to three factors: (1) the temporal proximity between illegality and consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d at 727-28 (citations omitted). 57
58 The lack of a significant intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation, United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir.1981), but it does bear ... directly on the probability of taint, Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d at 1300. Here, the temporal proximity between the officers' violations of Washington's Fourth Amendment rights and his written consent weighs heavily in favor of suppressing the fruits of the officers' search. At most, fifteen minutes separated the officers' unconstitutional seizure of Washington and Washington's signing of the permission to search form. 13 Even less time separated Washington's signing of the permission to search form from the officers' unconstitutional visual search of Washington's room, their unconstitutional entry into Washington's room, and their unconstitutional search for methamphetamine. Such little time between the officers' repeated violations of Washington's Fourth Amendment rights and Washington's signing of the permission to search form was insufficient to purge the taint of the officers' repeated unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (less than two hours insufficient to purge taint); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (six hours insufficient); United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1290(9th Cir.1979) (three hours insufficient); see also George, 883 F.2d at 1416 (As best we are aware, no court has weighed the first factor against a defendant when his inculpatory statement followed illegal police conduct by only a few hours.). 59
60 Next, in determining whether intervening circumstances may have purged the taint of a prior illegality, we look not at the defendant's conduct, but rather at intervening event[s] of significance that render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial integrity purposes that justify excluding tainted evidence. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d at 1289, 1290 n. 3 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)); see also United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 343(9th Cir.1990). Intervening circumstances that militate in favor of attenuation must be sufficiently important to ensure that potentially tainted evidence was come at by way of some process other than the exploitation of an illegal search. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407; see also Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1054 (Evidence obtained by ... illegal action of the police is `fruit of the poisonous tree,' warranting application of the exclusionary rule if, ... `the evidence ... has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254)). Examples include release from custody, an appearance before a magistrate, or consultation with an attorney, such that we would be able to say that [a defendant's] consent to search was an `unconstrained, independent decision' that was completely unrelated to [the] initial unlawful violation. George, 883 F.2d at 1416. 61 The Government argues that when Washington signed the permission to search form, which advised him of his right to refuse to consent, that act was an intervening event sufficient to purge the taint of the officers' prior illegal conduct. 14 62 We disagree. Washington's act of signing the permission to search form, which advised him of his right to refuse to consent, is distinct from examples of intervening circumstances that have been considered sufficient to purge the taint of prior constitutional violations. See id. Unlike releasing an individual from custody, bringing an individual before a magistrate, or allowing an individual to consult with an attorney, signing a permission to search form, which advises of the right to refuse to consent, does not have a tendency to distance the suspect from the coercive effects of temporally proximate constitutional violations. Rather, the suspect's desire to avoid suffering additional constitutional violations and/or a continuing unconstitutional detention, as in this case, is what may prompt the suspect to avoid further confrontation by giving consent. 63 Additionally, we perceive significant problems with the Government's argument that Washington's signing the permission to search form purged the taint of the officers' unconstitutional conduct. Consent is often sought, as it was in this case, to sanction the officers' prior illegal conduct. 15 A suspect's knowledge of a prior illegal search can give rise to a sense that refusing to consent would be futile. See Furrow, 229 F.3d at 814([A] person might reasonably think that refusing to consent to a search of his home when he knows that the police have, in fact, already conducted a search of his home, would be a bit like closing the barn door after the horse is out.). Moreover, if we were to adopt the Government's position, all an officer would have to do to purge the taint of earlier illegal conduct would be to notify (or, in some cases, remind) the suspect before they consent that they are free to refuse to do so. This would effectively eviscerate the exclusionary rule's goal of deterring police misconduct because it would give officers who recently violated a suspect's constitutional rights a chance to grant themselves a free pass by uttering a few magic words and encourage—rather than discourage—investigatory shortcuts. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 602-03, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the [ Miranda ] warnings, in effect, a `cure-all,' and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to `a form of words.'). Cf. Missouri v. Seibert, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (plurality opinion) (suppressing confession where officers intentionally delayed giving Miranda warnings until after confession was obtained). 64 Significantly, in the Miranda -warning context, the Supreme Court rejected in Brown an argument analogous to the Government's argument here— viz., that Miranda warnings by themselves may purge the taint of a temporally proximate prior illegal arrest at which a confession was obtained. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254(Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will [and] break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited.). Following Brown, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected precisely the Government's argument here. See United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that written consent was tainted by illegal entry of five federal agents where request for consent was made [i]mmediately after [a protective] sweep). We agree with the Seventh Circuit that [t]he government's attempt to turn all written consents into an `intervening circumstance' breaking the causal chain is inconsistent with ... the Supreme Court's rejection of a similar argument with respect to Miranda warnings in Brown.  16 Id. 65
66 Finally, courts favor suppression if law enforcement officials conducted the illegal search with the purpose of extracting evidence against the defendant or if they flagrantly broke the law in conducting the search. 17 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254. 67 On one hand, courts frequently hesitate to find that an officer's violation of the law was purposeful or flagrant when the officer broke the law acting in good faith. See, e.g., United States v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323, 325 (10th Cir.1995) (noting that a mistaken belief that the defendant had consented to the search ... rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, [but] it does not qualify as flagrant misconduct that would favor suppression); United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that attenuation existed where, among other considerations, the officer's conduct was in good faith); United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 252 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that attenuation existed where, among other considerations, both agents reasonably believed that they had consent to search the defendant's motel room). Here, the district court appears to have concluded that the officers acted in good faith. It commented that 68 [t]he transcript ... indicates th[e officers] were trying to investigate crime, doing it in a professional way. Their demeanor, tone and dress all indicated a professional approach to this, and not an oppressive action that would overbear the defendant's ability to resist and cause him to consent when he didn't intend to do so. 69 On the other hand, we do not think that substantial evidence supports such a conclusion. Officer Sceirine admitted that he and the other officers approached Washington's room without probable cause to search it. Yet, he and the other RPD officers repeatedly attempted to—and eventually did—gain access—first visually, and later, physically—to Washington's room in violation of Washington's Fourth Amendment rights. It is particularly significant that Sceirine thrice indicated to Washington that the officers could arrest him for failing to register with the RPD as a gun-crime convict. As Sceirine testified at the district court's suppression hearing, he was conveying to Washington ... that [he] could arrest him. But Sceirine never arrested Washington for failing to register with the RPD. 18 Thus, Sceirine's repeated reminders to Washington that the officers could arrest him at any time, in our view, appear to have been given as a tactic to coerce Washington into consenting to the search of his room. Through this approach, Sceirine was hoping to get around the warrant requirement for residential searches because, by his own admission and as the parties agree, the officers did not have probable cause to obtain a search warrant. We also find significant that, once the officers were unconstitutionally inside Washington's room, Sceirine used the fruits of the officers' unconstitutional entry and unconstitutional recovery of Washington's methamphetamine line to coax Washington into signing the permission to search form. 70 On this record, we find it difficult to conclude that the officers acted in good faith towards Washington. Indeed, contrary to the district court's findings, the officers—once they had completed their pat-down search of Washington and finished questioning him in the hallway outside his room about his involvement in methamphetamine manufacturing and/or distribution—unconstitutionally capitalized on their prior violations of Washington's Fourth Amendment rights. 71 Further, the record is clear that the purpose of the officers' encounter with Washington was to obtain evidence of criminal activity—in particular, evidence of a methamphetamine lab—in Washington's room. As noted above, the audio tape and transcript of Washington's encounter with the RPD officers is replete with statements by Officer Sceirine that he and the other officers wanted to search Washington's room for such evidence. Yet, at the time that the officers unconstitutionally entered Washington's room, nothing that Washington had said or done and nothing that the officers observed transformed their lack of probable cause to search Washington's room into probable cause. Against this backdrop, the impropriety of the officers' unconstitutional entry of Washington's room—much less, their continued presence and extended encounter with Washington—becomes obvious.... The [entry], both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254. 72 Because the purpose of the officers' encounter with Washington—in particular, the officers' repeated efforts to conduct a warrantless search of Washington's room—was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), and because there is strong evidence that the officers did not act in good faith toward Washington, we conclude that the purpose and flagrancy factor weighs in favor of suppression. Indeed, only suppression will serve the deterrence principle inherent in the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir.1999).