Opinion ID: 2198250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Meaning of Section 32-1535

Text: Before 1980, persons employed in the District of Columbia were covered by workers' compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. See Triplett v. George Hyman Construction Co., 565 A.2d 83, 84-85 (D.C. 1989); D.C.Code §§ 36-501, 36-502 (1973). In 1980, however, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), which borrowed heavily from the LHWCA. Nguyen v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 611 A.2d 541, 544 (D.C. 1992). Section 36 of the Act, now codified at D.C.Code § 32-1535, was virtually identical to section 33 of the LHWCA (33 U.S.C. § 933) before that section was amended in 1984. As a result, cases interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 933 prior to 1984 may be treated as `persuasive' precedent in determining the meaning of D.C.Code § 32-1535. Nguyen, 611 A.2d at 544 (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Grayson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 516 A.2d 909, 911 n. 2 (D.C.1986) (federal cases interpreting provisions of the LHWCA that are virtually identical to corresponding sections of the Act are persuasive authority). D.C.Code § 32-1535 allows a worker injured on the job by a third party to sue the third party without forfeiting the right to workers' compensation from his or her employer, so long as the amount recovered from the third party is less than the entitled employer compensation. D.C.Code § 32-1535(a), (b), and (f). Section 32-1535(g), however, prohibits the injured employee from recovering workers' compensation benefits if the suit against the third party is settled without the written approval of the employer. [5] Although petitioner in this case settled her claim without the approval of her employer, she argues that D.C.Code § 32-1535, when read in its entirety, does not bar her claim because it does not apply to settlements when no compensation order has been filed. Section 32-1535 states, in relevant part: Compensation for injuries where third persons are liable. (a) If, on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter, the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person other than those enumerated in § 32-1504(b) is liable for damages, he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover damages against such third person. (b) Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order filed with the Mayor shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all rights of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third person unless such person shall commence an action against such third person within 6 months after such award.       (f) If the person entitled to compensation institutes proceedings within the period ascribed in subsection (b) of this section, the employer shall be required to pay as compensation under this chapter a sum equal to the excess of the amount which the Mayor determines is payable on account of such injury or death over the amount recovered against such third person. (g) If compromise with such third person is made by the person entitled to compensation or such representative of an amount less than the compensation to which such person or representative would be entitled under this chapter, the employer shall be liable for compensation as determined in subsection (f) of this section, only if the written approval of such compromise is obtained from the employer and his insurance carrier by the person entitled to compensation or such representative at the time of or prior to such compromise in a form and manner prescribed by the Mayor. Petitioner's argument focuses on the language in subsection (g) stating that the employer shall be liable for compensation as determined in subsection (f) of this section. She maintains that this phrase limits the applicability of subsection (g) to situations in which, under subsection (f), persons entitled to compensation institute[] proceedings within the period ascribed in subsection (b).... Subsection (b), in turn, states that a person may institute proceedings against a third party within six months of accepting compensation under an award in a compensation order filed with the Mayor. Petitioner reads these three sections together to mean that an employee is not barred from receiving compensation under an unauthorized settlement when no compensation order has yet been filed i.e., that a compensation order must be filed before subsection (g) has any effect. The statute acts as a bar to recovery of workers' compensation benefits, she asserts, only when a case has been settled by the employee after the compensation order has been filed and the employer's rights have been subrogated. [6] In cases in which the statute does not bar recovery, petitioner argues, the unauthorized settlement is a defense, and the examiner must determine whether the settlement prejudiced the employer by impairing its subrogation rights. See Haden, 418 A.2d at 1084 (Absent a statutory consent requirement, the determinative question is whether the compromise prejudiced the employer by impairment of his subrogation rights); see also Chapman v. Hoage, 296 U.S. 526, 529, 56 S.Ct. 333, 80 L.Ed. 370 (1936). Since no compensation order was ever issued in petitioner's case, she argues that the statutory bar of section 32-1535(g) does not apply, and that the case should be remanded to the agency so that the hearing examiner may consider the prejudice, if any, resulting from the settlement. Although petitioner's interpretation is plausible, it is not compelled by the plain meaning of the statute, particularly when one looks at the Act in its entirety. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988) (In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole). First, aside from the reference to subsection (f), subsection (g) contains strong language limiting the liability of the employer when the employee has entered into an unauthorized settlement. This language can reasonably be read as a reflection of the statutory purpose of preventing prejudice to the employer in the form of low settlements. See note 5, supra. Second, petitioner's interpretation is not plain in that it creates an unnatural double cross-reference: the reader must first refer to subsection (f) and then look back at subsection (b). Most significantly, the statute itself does not support an inquiry into prejudice. As the Director noted, the drafters of the Act included explicit language when they intended to require an analysis of prejudice. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 32-1513(d)(1) (stating that failure to give notice of injury or death will not bar compensation if the employer was aware of the injury and has not been prejudiced by failure to give such notice). Because no such language was included in section 32-1535, we cannot say that petitioner's interpretation is compelled by the statute's plain meaning. These problems with petitioner's interpretation lead us to conclude that the statutory language is ambiguous. As a result, the Director's interpretation of D.C.Code § 32-1535 is not contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, and this court must uphold that interpretation as long as it is reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Smith, 548 A.2d at 97.