Opinion ID: 2812075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Rosado

Text: The district court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the facts and circumstances within Rosado's knowledge would have led a prudent person into believing that Fernández committed a crime. In coming to this conclusion, the district court determined there was probable cause to arrest Fernández for two independent crimes: (1) grabbing Rosado's firearm -19- and attempting to pull it out of its holster; and (2) obstructing police activity by restricting access to the School. Regarding the first -- grabbing and attempting to remove Rosado's firearm -- we agree with the district court that such an act would constitute probable cause to arrest Fernández. However, we cannot accept the district court's determination that this material fact was not in dispute. To help streamline the summary judgment process and create a simplified and easy way to navigate the record, the district court's local rules require a motion for summary judgment to be supported by a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried. D.P.R. R. 56(b). The party opposing summary judgment, meanwhile, must submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts which shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment and support each denial or qualification by a record citation. D.P.R. R. 56(c). Here, Paragraph 12 of Defendants' statement of uncontested material facts stated that [w]hen Agent Jennette Rosado-Parrilla (Rosado) was going to walk by the gate, Fernández grabbed her regulation firearm, tried to pull it from the holster and told Rosado that she could not go in. Plaintiffs emphatically denied this fact in their counterstatement, stating as follows: -20- It is plaintiff Valerie Fernández' testimony that this never happened. According to Valerie, defendant Jeanette Rosado spoke to her in a rough manner (as if she was annoyed) and pushed her aside, Valerie told Rosado not to speak to her in such a rough tone, Rosado answered that she (Rosado) could speak to her (Valerie) in whatever way she felt, Valerie complained again about the rough manner in which Rosado was adressing [sic] her and it was then that Rosado shoved Valerie against a wall and placed a handcuff on her left wrist. Thus, according to Valerie Fernández, she was an innocent bystander who never touched defendant Rosado nor attempted to grab her gun, and that it was Rosado who exercised excessive force and subsequently arrested her without having any reason to do so. As support, Plaintiffs cited to the specific pages of Fernández's deposition where her account of the encounter could be found. Unlike the district court, we believe this citation was adequate to deny the alleged uncontested fact as required by Local Rule 56. Fernández was asked in her deposition to describe the events, and Fernández described what happened from her point of view. She never mentioned reaching for Rosado's gun, and nowhere did Defendants' counsel ask Fernández if she did. Given Fernández's complete silence on the issue, it is possible to read the deposition testimony as describing a version of events in which Fernández never reached for the gun. Indeed, because Plaintiffs are the ones opposing summary judgment, and all inferences must be drawn in their favor, that is exactly how the district court should -21- have interpreted it.7 See, e.g., Asociación de Periodistas de P.R. v. Mueller, 529 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that the appropriate standard is whether plaintiff's [Fourth Amendment] claim survives in light of all the uncontested facts and any contested facts looked at in the plaintiff's favor (alteration and emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Calvi v. Knox Cnty., 470 F.3d 422, 426 (1st Cir. 2006) (The court must draw all reasonable inferences from the assembled facts in the light most hospitable to the nonmovant.). We conclude, therefore, that Paragraph 12 was adequately denied, thus creating a genuine dispute of material fact. In light of this dispute, any probable cause finding cannot, at this stage of the litigation, be based on Fernández reaching for Rosado's gun. As to the district court's second basis for granting summary judgment -- that probable cause existed to believe that Fernández was obstructing police activity by restricting access to the school -- we disagree with the district court that the record contains the undisputed facts necessary to support a probable cause determination. An officer has probable cause to arrest an individual if, at the moment of the arrest, the facts and 7 To be sure, a better practice would have been for Plaintiffs to submit along with their opposition to summary judgment a sworn statement from Fernández explicitly denying ever reaching for Rosado's gun. That a different approach probably should have been taken, however, does not mean that the approach actually taken was insufficient. -22- circumstances within the relevant actors' knowledge and of which they had reasonably reliable information were adequate to warrant a prudent person in believing that the object of his suspicions had perpetrated or was poised to perpetrate an offense. Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 254 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.). Here, taking into account the admitted portions of Defendants' statement of uncontested material facts, the record citations provided in support of them, and making all inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, Rosado was aware of the following facts at the time of Fernández's arrest: (1) a number of unidentified students were throwing objects from the School into the street separating the School from the housing project; (2) when the PRPD entered the School, all students -- both those who were throwing objects and those who were not -- began running; (3) Rosado came upon Fernández standing behind a closed gate blocking entry into the School's hallway; (4) Fernández opened the gate upon Rosado instructing her to do so. These facts, with nothing more, do not support any crime, let alone the alleged crime of restricting police activity by restricting access to the School, and thus probable cause for an arrest would be lacking. -23- The district court and Defendants emphasize, however, that there was more. They point out that Fernández admitted closing the gate, and by closing the gate, Fernández was obstructing the investigation, thus creating probable cause for her arrest. This would no doubt be true if Rosado knew that Fernández was the one who closed the gate. But while we now know that Fernández closed the gate, the record is silent as to whether or not Rosado knew that fact at the time she arrested Fernández. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 254 (holding that probable cause exists where at the moment of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the relevant actors' knowledge . . . were adequate to warrant a prudent person in believing that the object of his suspicions had perpetrated or was poised to perpetrate an offense (emphasis added)). The only evidence cited by Defendants to establish that Fernández closed the gate is Fernández's own testimony. This after-the-fact admission, however, does nothing to support the probable cause determination because it does not prove Rosado's contemporaneous knowledge of that fact.8 See id. (explaining that 8 At oral argument, Defendants repeatedly directed us to Rosado's interrogatory responses, specifically her answer to Interrogatory 3, where Rosado stated that she had been following two other officers and one of them told a female student to open a gate that she was trying to close in order to block the access. Had this fact and corresponding citation been included in Defendants' statement of uncontested material facts, the outcome today may very well have been different, since this fact could suggest that Rosado learned from the other officers that Fernández closed the gate. See Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that an officer may act[] upon apparently trustworthy information -24- the existence of probable cause is not to be undertaken from the perspective of hindsight but from the perspective of a hypothetical 'reasonable man' standing in the reporting person's shoes at the time when that person acted.). Based on the summary judgment record, therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not Rosado knew that Fernández closed the gate, and thus it was inappropriate for the district court to conclude as a matter of law that probable cause existed and no constitutional violation occurred. See Asociación de Periodistas de P.R., 529 F.3d at 56 (Reversal is required if 'there existed any factual issues that needed to be resolved before the legal issues could be decided.' (quoting Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396, 399 (1st Cir. 1990))). This is not, however, the end of our discussion. Defendants posit that even if Rosado did violate Fernández's constitutional rights, summary judgment was still appropriate because Rosado is entitled to qualified immunity. We disagree. Qualified immunity is a doctrine that shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly to conclude that a crime has been or is about to be committed and that the suspect is implicated in its commission); Roche, 81 F.3d at 254. Defendants, however, failed to include either the fact or the citation, thus preventing Plaintiffs the opportunity to deny or rebut Rosado's claim of knowledge and to present any contrary record support. -25- established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 167 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In assessing qualified immunity, we apply a two-prong analysis. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2011). First, we must decide whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. (quoting Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, assuming a constitutional violation exists, we determine whether the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged violation. Id. (quoting Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269) (internal quotation marks omitted). This second step is further divided into two inquiries:
question were sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would have understood that what he [or she] was doing violated the right, and (b) whether in the particular factual context of the case, a reasonable officer would have understood that his [or her] conduct violated the right. Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648 F.3d 24, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2011). Notably, due to a somewhat recent change in the law, we may address these issues in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). As discussed above, there are genuine disputes over material facts which prevent us from evaluating whether Rosado -26- violated Fernández's rights. Those same disputed facts also prevent us from evaluating the qualified immunity question. Even assuming probable cause for Fernández's arrest was lacking, thus satisfying the first requirement for qualified immunity, we would then look to whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. There is little question that it is clearly established law that an individual cannot be arrested absent probable cause. See, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (per curiam); United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 3378255, at  (1st Cir. May 26, 2015). However, whether or not a reasonable officer, similarly situated, would have understood that Rosado's actions violated this right is a factintensive question. It involves understanding what Rosado knew as she approached the gate and exactly what transpired upon Fernández opening it. These are questions for a factfinder, and until they are answered, we are unable to determine, as a matter of law, whether Rosado's conduct was 'so deficient that no reasonable officer could have made the same choice[] under the circumstances.' Estate of Bennett, 548 F.3d at 168 (quoting Napier v. Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 183 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 272. Accordingly, the district court's entry of judgment against Rosado on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment unconstitutional arrest claim must be reversed and remanded for trial. -27-
Plaintiffs are not as fortunate regarding their excessive force claim. Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Accordingly, to establish a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation, Plaintiffs must show not only that Rosado employed force in arresting Fernández, but also that that level of force was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. See Asociación de Periodistas de P.R., 529 F.3d at 59. In conducting this analysis, there is no mechanical application for us to follow. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Instead, we must pay careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [or she] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. We judge the reasonableness of an officer's actions from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id.; see also Calvi, 470 F.3d at 428. Assuming the encounter occurred as Fernández describes -- as we must in the summary judgment context -- Fernández was -28- seemingly arrested for, at best, obstructing a police investigation and/or disorderly conduct by disrespecting Rosado and talking back to her. Either, obviously, is not a severe crime, and -- at least based on this version of events -- Fernández never posed an immediate threat to Rosado or others. As such, only a minimal level of force by Rosado would be reasonable under the circumstances. Yet even with this low threshold, Plaintiffs are unable to establish a constitutional violation. In effectuating the arrest, Rosado shoved Fernández face-first against a wall and proceed to handcuff her left wrist.9 There is no evidence in the record that this technique deviated from standard police practice. See Calvi, 470 F.3d at 428 (Standard police practice [in Knox County, Maine] called for cuffing an arrestee's hands behind her back and [the officer's] decision not to deviate from this practice was a judgment call, pure and simple. . . . That is the end of the story.). And, even if it did, the Supreme Court has recognized that [n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation marks). Rosado's shove of Fernández may have been unnecessary, but it was not unreasonable. 9 Rosado did not handcuff Fernández's right wrist because Fernández wriggled free and slipped through the gate before Rosado could do so. -29- Similarly, there was no Fourth Amendment violation when Rosado pulled Fernández's arm, effectively creating a tug-of-war between Rosado and the other students. Fernández was attempting to escape arrest, and Rosado had a right to prevent Fernández from doing so. We see nothing unreasonable with Rosado's refusal to let go of Fernández or her decision to pull Fernández away from the other students trying to help her escape. See id. (explaining that whether an individual is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest is a relevant consideration in the use-of-force calculus). Because Rosado never used excessive force during Fernández's arrest, there was no constitutional violation. Accordingly, the district court properly entered judgment for Rosado on this claim.