Opinion ID: 3171894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government’s Post-Proffer Conduct

Text: Allegations that a plea agreement was violated are analyzed under contract law standards.7 This analysis requires this Court to determine “whether the government’s conduct falls within the range of expectations reasonably understood by” the Mitchells 5 United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2000). This restriction applies both to government attorneys and probation officers who prepare PSRs. Id. at 228. 6 Compare with, Taylor, 277 F.3d at 726-27 (finding that the Government failed to show that the PSR did not contain proffered information because the Government did not provide any sworn testimony to support its assertions). 7 Larkin, 629 F.3d at 186. 6 when they entered the agreements.8 We proceed by (1) considering the pertinent content of the agreements and the Government’s alleged improper conduct; (2) determining whether that conduct violated the Government’s obligations; and (3) applying an appropriate remedy if a violation did occur.9 The proffer agreements stated that the Mitchells’ proffered statements could not be used for purposes of sentencing, subject to certain exceptions. One of those exceptions was that the Government could disclose information to the probation officer or to the District Court to determine where the Mitchells should fall within their applicable Guidelines ranges. The agreements also included an exception for derivative investigations and evidence gained from those investigations. However, the parties stipulated in the plea agreements that neither party would seek a departure or variance from a total offense level of 16. On the other hand, those agreements stated that the District Court was not bound by the stipulation. The parties agree that the Government implicitly agreed to not seek a § 2B1.1 enhancement. The Mitchells contest, however, the Government’s case agent’s provision of proffered information to the probation officer. Further, they assert that the Government should have told the District Court that it could not seek out or create new evidence to support an enhancement—including providing a witness. They also argue that the Government should not have confirmed that the PSR was factually correct. 8 Id. 9 Id. 7 The Government did not violate the Mitchells’ agreements. The proffered information provided by the case agent was removed in the second revised PSR. The Mitchells were sentenced based on that PSR. Further, even when the Government is restricted from arguing for an enhancement, it is still obligated to pass along unprotected information to the probation officer.10 The Government fulfilled that obligation. The Mitchells could not have reasonably understood their agreements to require less. We have also recognized that the Government does not have to endorse a plea agreement’s terms enthusiastically but must strictly adhere to the terms of the stricken bargain.11 This is coupled with the requirement that the Government (1) respond to court orders, even if doing so requires an assessment of the law that may not support a stipulation; but also (2) consistently argue for a sentence within the stipulation.12 Here, the Government underwent a limited examination of Mayer that merely verified its assertion that it was unable to prove with specificity, at the time of the proffers, that there were 10 or more victims. The Government also consistently argued that the stipulation should apply and an enhancement should not. Finally, the Government was required to provide a correct definition of “victim” under applicable law. Thus, the Government’s actions were what would be expected with a reasonable understanding of the agreements. 10 Id. at 188. 11 United States v. Davenport, 775 F.3d 605, 609 (3d Cir. 2015) 12 Larkin, 629 F.3d at 189, 192. 8