Opinion ID: 1434460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inclusion of Materially Adverse Requirement in Retaliation Instruction

Text: Lewis next takes issue with how the judge instructed the jury on what the term materially adverse means in the context of the retaliation claim. Lewis argues that the instruction did not correctly follow Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). Specifically, she takes issue with the following part of the retaliation instruction: To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged actions are ones that a reasonable employee would find to be materially adverse such that the employee would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity. It's difficult to make sense of Lewis's argument. The instruction is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in White. As we noted in Lewis's prior appeal, the main take-away from White is that the range of conduct prohibited under [Title VII's anti-retaliation] provision is broader than Title VII's [anti-]discrimination prohibition. Lewis, 496 F.3d at 654-55 (quoting Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 787 (7th Cir.2006)). The Supreme Court noted that for retaliation claims, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In light of this, it's hard to see how Lewis would conclude that White does not require proof of an adverse action in a retaliation case. Lewis also argues that because Lewis I found that she had provided sufficient evidence of retaliation to show a materially adverse action (under the White definition), the jury didn't have to be asked whether the actions were materially adverse. 496 F.3d at 655. But, once again, Lewis I was reviewing the evidence under a summary judgment standard to determine if there was a genuine issue of material fact. After deciding that there was such an issue, it was then up to the jury to decide the question. After all, Lewis did not win on summary judgment, she merely defeated the City's motion. This Court's finding of sufficient evidence in a summary judgment context did not end the factual inquiry. It was perfectly valid for the district court to require the jury to determine if Lewis proved a materially adverse action, and to explain that term in a manner that was consistent with White.