Opinion ID: 4521243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conversion of Judgment on the Pleadings

Text: Big Bear asserts that because Homestate attached extraneous documents to its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court should have applied Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d): If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion. But “the district court has broad discretion in determining whether to accept materials beyond the pleadings.” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 10 861 F.3d 1081, 1103 (10th Cir. 2017). The same abuse of discretion standard is applied to a district court’s refusal to convert either a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings to one for summary judgment. Lowe v. Town of Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1381 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1998). To hold the district court abused its discretion by refusing to convert a Rule 12(c) motion to a Rule 56 motion, we must determine it relied on material outside the complaint in rendering its decision. Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004). When outside materials are not excluded by the court, failing to convert a 12(c) motion “is reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without considering the outside materials.” GFF Corp. v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). In arguing the district court erred by not converting the motion, Big Bear references three documents attached by Homestate to its motion for judgment on the pleadings: the insurance policy itself, the Idaho vehicle collision report from Mr. Rimer’s 2014 accident, and a collateral complaint filed by Mr. Rimer against Big Bear. The Insurance Policy Big Bear did not argue below that it was improper for the district court to consider the Homestate Policy in ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. App. 283. And Rule 12(d) is not implicated when a court “consider[s] documents attached to or referenced in the complaint if they are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’ authenticity.” Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1103 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Policy is referenced in the FAC—“[i]ndeed, it is at the heart of the claims pled by Plaintiff,” App. 283—and neither party disputes its 11 authenticity. The district court therefore properly considered the Policy in ruling on the motion. The Collision Report and Mr. Rimer’s Complaint Homestate also “inadvertently” attached to its motion both the accident collision report and Mr. Rimer’s separate complaint against Big Bear. Appellee Br. at 30. However, conversion of a Rule 12(c) motion is “not triggered by the mere presence of outside materials, but by the court’s reliance on such materials.” Christensen v. Big Horn Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 374 F. App’x 821, 826 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citing Alexander, 382 F.3d at 1214). Here, the district court expressly stated that it “has not considered or relied on outside materials in rendering the decision.” App. 283. Furthermore, Homestate correctly asserts that “Appellants do not and cannot identify any portion of the district court’s order that would provide any indication that the court relied on the accident report or the Rimer Complaint.” Appellee Br. at 31. Big Bear argues the court “improperly looked outside of the Complaint to determine” that it was “‘delinquent’ on workers’ compensation premiums.” Appellant Br. at 27. But the court did not need to rely on either inadvertently attached document to learn of this delinquency. The FAC acknowledged “a Worker’s Compensation lien existed against Plaintiffs,” App. 13, and also attached as an exhibit a notice from the Division stating that Big Bear’s workers’ compensation account was “delinquent,” App. 25. The district court cited these portions of the pleadings in its order.5 In contrast, there is no evidence the 5 Because the Division notice attached as an exhibit to the FAC was central to Big Bear’s claims, and neither party disputes its authenticity, the district court properly relied 12 court relied on the collision report or Mr. Rimer’s collateral complaint in rendering its decision. See Lowe, 143 F.3d at 1381 (holding “Defendants have not demonstrated that the district court relied on matters outside of the pleadings when ruling on the motion to dismiss,” where facts allegedly “gleaned” from a deposition affidavit “were also contained in the pleadings”). In sum, the district court expressly indicated it did not consider Homestate’s extraneous attachments, Big Bear identified no section of the court’s order reliant on them, and the relevant facts regarding workers’ compensation liability were contained in the FAC and its permissible attachments. Thus, the conversion process was not triggered, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to convert Homestate’s 12(c) motion to a motion for summary judgment.