Opinion ID: 1650856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statutory Mitigation

Text: I also do not agree with the majority that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating circumstance that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See generally Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 416 (Fla.1996) (The trial court, in considering allegedly mitigating evidence, must determine whether the facts alleged in mitigation are supported by the evidence.) (citing Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526, 534 (Fla.1987)). The decision as to whether a mitigating circumstance has been established is within the trial court's discretion. Bonifay, 680 So.2d at 416 (citing Preston v. State, 607 So.2d 404 (Fla.1992)). Obviously, Williams appreciated the criminality of his conduct given the extreme measures he undertook to conceal his actions. See Salvatore v. State, 366 So.2d 745, 748, 752 (Fla.1978) (finding no error in the trial court's rejecting mitigationdefendant failed to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law based upon the fact that the defendant went to great lengths to conceal the crime). Here, Williams stole a boat; tied the boat to the victim's car; attached and positioned concrete blocks on the victim's body; drove to Lake Cassidy; placed the weighted body in the boat; maneuvered the boat out into the lake and dumped the body overboard; and drove back to the victim's home where he unloaded the boat out of plain sight, behind the residence. Further, the evidence does not support that Williams' ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Williams has a history of voluntary drug use. Yet, Dr. Larson testified that Williams had no history of mental illness and that he had never received psychiatric treatment. He also testified that Williams had no psychotic symptoms, delusions, or hallucinations. On the contrary, Dr. Larson testified that Williams' cognition is intact; he has an average IQ; and he has no well-defined personality disorder. Any minor issues, such as some antisocial personality features, stemmed entirely from Williams' voluntary drug use. In addition, Dr. Larson testified that he thought Williams could appreciate the criminality of his conduct. However, Dr. Larson also testified that because Williams was on a cocaine binge at the time, his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. The trial court rejected Dr. Larson's opinion that Williams' ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, concluding that the facts of this case show otherwise. Evidence of a history of drug abuse and testimony that Williams was on drugs at the time of the crime, without more, does not support finding this mitigator. See Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 42 (Fla.2003) (Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the instruction on the impaired capacity mitigator, despite evidence that Duest had a history of drug abuse, including addiction to heroin, and testimony that he used drugs and alcohol near the time of the crime. Evidence of consumption of intoxicating substances, without more, does not require an instruction on this mitigator. (citing Cooper v. State, 492 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla.1986))); cf. Rogers, 783 So.2d at 995 (giving some weight to this statutory mitigator was appropriate where Rogers suffered from brain damage, mental illness, schizophrenia, mania, paranoia, head trauma, and porphyria, a condition precipitated by alcohol abuse that causes confusion, frustration, and distress). Although there was evidence that Williams was smoking crack cocaine, as in Duest, there was no evidence indicating that he was substantially impaired at the time of the murder or that his ability to control his behavior was reduced by his use of drugs. Duest, 855 So.2d at 42. In fact, Williams' actions in draining Ms. Dykes' accounts, making purchases at retail stores, operating a motor vehicle and a boat without incident, and going to the extensive lengths that Williams did to cover up his crime indicate that Williams was able to conform his conduct. Accordingly, the evidence does not support that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, and the trial court did not err in rejecting this statutory mitigating circumstance.