Opinion ID: 8414540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Supervisory Liability and Monell Claims

Text: Gill’s remaining claims are against Chief of Police Flynn for supervisory liability and against the. City of Milwaukee for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The district court held that Gill’s complaint did not plausibly allege the necessary elements of either claim. To succeed on a claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional violation. Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). That means the supervisor “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Gill’s complaint fails to plausibly allege that Chief Flynn had such personal involvement in the detectives’ conduct. It states only that Chief Flynn failed to train the detectives adequately and that he was “deliberately and recklessly indifferent” to the detectives’ actions. There is, however, no allegation or plausible inference that Chief Flynn knew about or was personally involved in the specific conduct. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Gill cannot maintain a claim for supervisory liability. Gill also failed to plead a plausible Monell claim. His complaint states that the City of Milwaukee has a de facto policy of “placing an emphasis on clearing cases and convicting suspects over seeking truth,” which led to the coercion of his confession and the concealment of exculpatory evidence. A municipal body may be liable for constitutional violations “pursuant to a governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018. To succeed on this defacto custom theory, the plaintiff • must demonstrate that the practice is widespread and that the specific violations complained of were not isolated incidents. Jackson v. Marion Cty., 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995). At the pleading stage, then, a plaintiff pursuing this theory must allege facts that permit the reasonable inference that the practice is so widespread so as to constitute a governmental custom. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Gill’s complaint fails to do so. It does not provide examples of other Milwaukee police officers taking actions similar to those complained of here. More importantly, it does not plausibly allege that such examples exist. Instead, it simply states that this de facto policy caused the “Defendant Detectives named supra to commit the aforesaid wrongful acts against Plaintiff.” The specific actions of the detectives in Gill’s case alone, without more, cannot sustain a Monell claim based on the theory of a de facto policy. Id.; see also Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “isolated acts of misconduct will not suffice; a series of violations must be presented to lay the premise” for a widespread practice claim under Monell).