Opinion ID: 2594969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bridges' recross-examination of Laurie.

Text: Bridges claims that the district court erroneously restricted his recross-examination of Laurie. The relevant facts surrounding the redirect and recross-examination are important to considering Bridges' claim. On redirect, the State questioned Laurie about a letter that she had written to Bridges. According to the trial transcript, Laurie indicated that she wrote the letter before she ever had a relationship outside of the person with whom. It appears from Bridges' statements and from the subsequent discussion of Laurie's testimony outside the presence of the jury that Laurie said prison rather than person. [4] The court indicated that any reference to Bridges' incarceration was unclear, but that the court would be willing to give a cautionary instruction or permit Bridges to conduct further inquiry of Laurie. Ultimately, Bridges decided not to ask Laurie any further questions. However, Bridges subsequently changed his mind after the next witness began to testify. The court permitted Bridges to conduct a limited recross-examination on the very limited area of the redirect to explore what Laurie said about meeting Bridges outside of prison. During the recross-examination, Bridges elicited testimony that established that: (1) Laurie met him while he was a prison inmate and while Laurie was a peace officer/nurse at the prison; (2) Laurie became involved in a physical relationship with Bridges; and (3) it was against the law to have such a relationship. On appeal, Bridges claims that the district court erroneously precluded questioning as to: (1) whether Laurie breached a duty of trust when she became involved in a physical relationship with Bridges while she was working at the prison; and (2) whether Laurie also breached a duty of trust by having a relationship with another inmate. We conclude that the district court did not err in restricting questioning on these two points. Although the court did not permit Bridges to ask Laurie specifically whether she breached a duty of trust, the court subsequently (as noted above) permitted him to elicit Laurie's admission that it was against the law for her to have a relationship with an inmate. Inquiry as to whether Laurie had also acted improperly with another inmate would have clearly exceeded the permissible scope of the recross-examination. Given the marginal relevance of the inquiry, the court did not err in precluding further inquiry into this area. See NRS 50.115; see also NRS 48.015-.035. We reject Bridges' argument that the district court was required to permit further questioning to show bias or emotional partiality of Laurie. The proposed questioning was of marginal relevance to the issue of Laurie's veracity and would have provided little evidence of bias or a motive to fabricate. Further, although the district court's discretion to limit cross-examination regarding potential bias is limited, [5] consistent with constitutional norms trial judges retain wide latitude to restrict such inquiry based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 320, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Bushnell v. State, 95 Nev. 570, 573, 599 P.2d 1038, 1040 (1979) (recognizing that inquiry into a witness's possible bias or motive to testify could be restricted when the inquiry was repetitive, irrelevant, vague, speculative, or designed merely to harass, annoy or humiliate the witness).