Opinion ID: 1985092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: California and Michigan

Text: As we indicated, California and Michigan have espoused a very different view than the Chagra and Croft courts. The California approach evolved through four cases. In People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940), the court concluded that a conspiracy to commit murder can only be a conspiracy to commit murder of the first degree for the obvious reason that the agreement to murder necessarily involves the `willful, deliberate and premeditated' intention to kill a human being and that [a] murder committed in pursuance of such an agreement would unquestionably be a `willful, deliberate and premeditated' murder of the first degree.... Id. at 801. In part, that conclusion was based on a statute in effect at the time (Cal.Pen. Code, § 182) that made conspiracy punishable in the same manner and to the same extent that the code provided for commission of the target felony. In 1955, § 182 was amended to provide that, (1) if the felony was one for which different punishments were prescribed for different degrees, the jury or court must determine the degree of the felony the defendant conspired to commit, and (2) if the degree was not determined, the punishment for conspiracy was to be that prescribed for the lesser degree, except that, in the case of conspiracy to commit murder, the punishment was to be that prescribed for murder in the first degree. In People v. Horn, 12 Cal.3d 290, 115 Cal. Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300 (1974), the court, in dicta, considered the effect of the statutory change, and, in so doing, determined that a conspiracy could take the form of conspiracy to commit first or second degree murder or manslaughter. [2] That conclusion was based on three factors: the then-existing availability of a diminished capacity defense, the then-existing requirement that, to establish premeditation, the State must show that the defendant could maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act, and the change to § 182. Id. at 1305-06. The conclusion in Horn was largely disavowed in People v. Swain, 12 Cal.4th 593, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994 (1996). Under California law, second degree murder could arise in three settings: (1) unpremeditated murder with express malice i.e., an unlawful killing with malice aforethought but without deliberation and premeditation; (2) murder based on implied malice, where there may have been no intent to kill but the killing results from an intentional act, the consequences of which are dangerous to human life, performed with knowledge of the danger and with conscious disregard for human life; and (3) second degree felony murder, i.e., a killing, whether intended or not, occurring during and as a result of the commission or attempted commission of certain crimes. The principal issue in Swain was whether it was possible to conspire to commit second degree murder based on implied malicethe second of the three circumstancesand the court held that such a possibility did not exist. Conspiracy, the court began, is a specific intent crime, requiring two kinds of intentan intent to agree or conspire and a further intent to commit the target crime. No problem arises with respect to express malice murder, as the intent to kill requirement for the conspiracy and the intent to kill requirement for that form of murder were the same: Simply put, where the conspirators agree or conspire with specific intent to kill ... they are guilty of conspiracy to commit express malice murder. Id. at 998. Implied malice murder, however, does not require an intent to kill; the malice is implied from the intent to do some other act dangerous to life, coupled with the fact that a killing has resulted from the commission of that act. It is precisely due to this nature of implied malice murder, the court held, that it would be illogical to conclude one can be found guilty of conspiring to commit murder where the requisite element of malice is implied. Id. at 999. Thus, the court held, a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires a finding of intent to kill, and cannot be based on a theory of implied malice. Id. at 1001. That conclusion led to a reversal of Swain's conviction, as the trial court had instructed on theories of both express and implied malice and the jury had returned a general verdict. The court noted, however, the difficult question of whether there exists a viable offense of conspiracy to commit express malice second degree murder. It was in that regard that the Swain court disavowed the conclusions reached in Horn, on the grounds that (1) the California legislature had, by statute, eliminated both the diminished capacity defense and the condition of premeditation that the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflect on the gravity of his or her act, and (2) the Horn court had misconstrued the legislative change to § 182. Although it declined to reach the issue, as being premature in the circumstance, the court noted that, with those statutory changes, the situation appeared to have returned to what it had been when Kynette was decided and that conspiring to murder with the requisite intent to kill is arguably functionally indistinguishable from the mental state of premeditating the target offense of murder. Id. at 1002-03. If that were so, then logically all conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit first degree murder. That open question was resolved in People v. Cortez, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1223, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537, where the court held that all conspiracy to commit murder `is necessarily conspiracy to commit [premeditated] first degree murder. ` Id. 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d at 538. Tracking much of what it had said in Swain, the court noted that the process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. Id. 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d at 542. The test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection, and thus, [t]houghts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly. Id. (quoting People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (1945)). The court confirmed that where two or more persons conspire to commit murderi.e., intend to agree to conspire, further intend to commit the target offense of murder ... each has acted with a state of mind `functionally indistinguishable from the mental state of premeditating the target offense of murder' and that the mental state required for conviction of conspiracy to commit murder necessarily establishes premeditation and deliberation of the target offense of murderhence all murder conspiracies are conspiracies to commit first degree murder, so to speak. Id. 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d at 542 (quoting, in part, from Swain, supra, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d at 1002-03). Specifically overruling any contrary holdings in Horn, the court expressly held that all conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated and deliberated first degree murder. Id. 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d at 546. The intermediate appellate court of Michigan has reached the same conclusion, for essentially the same reason. See People v. Hammond, 187 Mich.App. 105, 466 N.W.2d 335 (1991). It too began with the facts that (1) conspiracy is a specific intent crime, the gist being the specific, mutual agreement to perform the crime in question, and (2) second-degree murder is distinguishable from first-degree murder in that it does not require premeditation and in fact may not require a specific intent to kill. Id. at 337. Citing People v. Hamp, 110 Mich.App. 92, 312 N.W.2d 175 (1981), the court concluded that, as prior planning and agreement were necessary elements of conspiracy, it is analytically consistent to plan to commit first degree murder but logically inconsistent to `plan' to commit second-degree murder. Hammond, supra, 466 N.W.2d at 337. Prior planning, the court noted, denotes premeditation and deliberation. Accordingly, continuing to quote, in part, from Hamp: `The elements of conspiracy, conversely, are incompatible and inconsistent with second-degree murder. One does not plan to commit an unplanned substantive crime. It is not absence of the elements but the inconsistency of the elements which lead [sic] us to conclude that one conspires to commit first-degree murder but not second-degree murder.' Because of this logical inconsistency, we conclude as a matter of law that there is no crime of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. Id. at 337.