Opinion ID: 2453721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Preservation of Issue and Parties' Arguments

Text: Kanza only raised a cursory question about jurisdiction before the district court, placing the following short statement in its motion to dismiss: The parties are at a stand-off with each other, and under the KRTA this Court may not even have jurisdiction to decide what a reasonable escrow amount is, as the law is silent about who should make that decision in the event of a permanent difference of opinion. Regardless, to the extent subject matter jurisdiction is implied, such a question may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal or even on an appellate court's own motion. Padron v. Lopez, 289 Kan. 1089, 1103, 220 P.3d 345 (2009); Shipe v. Public Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 289 Kan. 160, 166, 210 P.3d 105 (2009). In raising the jurisdictional challenge on appeal, Kanza attacks the district court's jurisdiction from multiple angles. First, Kanza takes a plain reading approach. It argues that under a plain reading of K.S.A. 58-3215, until the parties meet the amount agreed upon criteria of K.S.A. 58-3212(b), a proceeding seeking recourse is unavailable to Miami County; therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to order the amount of the bond or escrow account. Second, Kanza argues that a writ of mandamus under K.S.A. 60-801 was unavailable to Miami County because the parties had not agreed upon the amount of the bond or escrow account. Kanza asserts that a mandamus proceeding would only be available to enforce an agreement between the parties as to the amount of the bond or escrow account. Third, Kanza argues that Miami County lacked standing to bring this action to compel Kanza's posting of a bond or establishing an escrow account because Miami County has not been aggrieved, as provided in K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 58-3215. (A few months after this action was filed, an amendment to K.S.A. 58-3215 became effective. Although there are differences in the two versions, both versions provide that any county aggrieved may bring an action to enforce the KRTA. L.2006, ch. 178, sec. 2 [now codified at K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 58-3215]. Kanza does not rely on the portions of K.S.A. 58-3215 that differ pre- and post-amendment to argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction.)