Opinion ID: 561243
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: double jeopardy; lesser included offenses

Text: 45 Appellant asserts that boarding an aircraft with an explosive or incendiary device is a lesser included offense of air piracy, and thus, his conviction on counts one and two constitutes double jeopardy. 10 He also assigns instructional error on this score. We are unpersuaded. 46
47 The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb ... U.S. Const. amend. V. This constitutional provision embodies a triumvirate of safeguards, protecting a defendant against (1) a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, after an acquittal; (2) a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, after a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651, 653 (1st Cir.1990). In asserting that his conviction on count two transgressed the double jeopardy prohibition, the appellant seeks to bring himself within the haven of the multiple punishment safeguard. The test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), still governs in multiple punishment cases. See Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d at 653-54. That test is as follows: 48 The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. 49 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. 50 Here, the offenses were readily distinguishable. Though part of the same statutory scheme, counts one and two each mandated proof of at least one distinctive fact that the other did not. The charge under 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(i)(1) (count one) required proof that Mena had seized, or exercised control over, an aircraft. The charge under 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(l )(2), incorporating Sec. 1472(l )(1)(C) (count two), required proof that Mena boarded an aircraft with a bomb (or similar explosive or incendiary device). A conviction on count one did not require proof that Mena possessed a bomb or kindred appliance; and a conviction on count two did not require a showing that Mena had seized, or exercised control over, an airplane. The mere fact that both counts required proof of some of the same elements (e.g., being on board an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction) was inadequate to invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause. By the same token, the fact that in this particular case the incendiary device constituted the means whereby Mena seized control of the aircraft was beside the point. See Grady v. Corbin, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2093 n. 12, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (The Blockburger test has nothing to do with the evidence presented at trial. It is concerned solely with the statutory elements of the offenses charged.); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1293-94 n. 17, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (Blockburger may be satisfied notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes). The simultaneous prosecution of, and multiple punishment for, counts one and two was permissible. 51
52 There is also no merit to appellant's claim that he was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction in connection with counts one and two. In relevant part, the Criminal Rules provide that a defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged. Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c). To determine when a lesser included offense instruction is appropriate under Rule 31(c), a court must apply the elements test. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). Under this test, 53 one offense is not necessarily included in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense. Where the lesser offense requires an element not required for the greater offense, no instruction is to be given under Rule 31(c). 54 Id. at 716, 109 S.Ct. at 1450. As demonstrated above, the elements of count two are distinct from, rather than a subset of, the elements of count one. Knowingly and willfully, and with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, boarding an aircraft with an explosive or incendiary device is not the same as using force, violence, or intimidation to seize, or to exercise control over an aircraft. The appellant's contention is baseless. See id. at 721-22, 109 S.Ct. at 1453-54 (to constitute lesser included offense, elements must be identical to elements of the more serious offense).