Opinion ID: 1727217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Erroneous Legal Ruling

Text: Finally, the Court of the Judiciary found Judge Sheffield guilty of violating Canons 2 A and 2 B because of his improperly initiated, intemperate, ill-advised and unjustified response to Ms. Cox's letter. This response, of course, was issuing the show cause order and subsequently finding Ms. Cox in contempt. The judge argues that, absent evidence supporting a finding of bad faith, a judge may not be disciplined under Canons 2 A and 2 B for erroneous legal rulings. We agree. In certain circumstances erroneous legal rulings may indeed amount to a failure to respect and comply with the law which undermines the public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon 2 A), or to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute (Canon 2 B). But to allow all erroneous legal rulings to be violations of Canons 2 A and 2 B would have serious consequences on the independence of our judiciary. Chief Justice Ben F. Overton of the Florida Supreme Court noted: To allow disciplinary proceedings to evaluate judicial decisions could force judges to walk an ill-defined and standardless line between propriety and impropriety. Clearly, such a sword over a judge's head would have a tendency to chill his independence. A judge would have to be as concerned with what is proper in the eyes of the disciplinary commission as with what is the just decision. Overton, Grounds for Judicial Discipline in the Context of Judicial Disciplinary Commissions, 54 Chi. Kent L.Rev. 59, 66 (1977). Various courts have also recognized the problem: The remedy for mistakes of law or fact in individual cases is by appeal, or certiorari, or other proper proceeding. A judge has a right to be wrong so far as any discipline by this court is concerned except as his decisions may be reversed or writs sustained. In re: Judges of Municipal Court of Cedar Rapids, 256 Iowa 1135, 130 N.W.2d 553, 554 (1964). To invoke the disciplinary power of this court against a judge as a substitute for appellate review would establish a practice dangerous to the independence of the judiciary and equally dangerous to the public's constitutional right to an independent judiciary. Moreover, permitting such a procedure could encourage individuals or groups of individuals to take action primarily for the purpose of intimidation. We take notice that in recent years, in this Commonwealth and in other jurisdictions, those few judges who have come under substantial public criticism, by reason of their exercise of judgment and discretion have in most instances been criticized for alleged leniency and alleged excessive regard for the interests of the accused. If such a judge was intimidated, by fear that disciplinary action would be lightly undertaken by this court, it is possible that he would henceforth treat some accuseds with undue harshness and severity. In re: Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203, 217 (1973). We, too, are concerned with the problem of balancing the independence of the judiciary with its discipline. But having recognized the problem, how do we resolve it? Some states have reacted by constitutionally requiring that certain conduct be willful before it can rise to the level of an ethical violation. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 18(c); Mo. Const. art. V, § 24(3); Or. Const.art. VII, § 8 (1976). In many of the states lacking such constitutional or statutory provisions the judiciary has developed differing tests for limiting the degree of conduct that will subject a judge to discipline: [W]hen there is an apparent pattern of procedure which shows a consistent disregard for the rights of litigants, or an arbitrary and capricious course of conduct in the handling of cases, or an oppressive and improper use of the power of the court, it is our duty to exercise our supervisory and administrative power to insure the correction of such abuses. In re: Judges of Municipal Court of Cedar Rapids, supra, 130 N.W.2d at 554. [I]f his decision was wrong, it was error in judgment and thus, not grounds for discipline. There was no convincing proof that Judge Dostert removed the prosecutor for improper reasons. Absent proof of improper motive, his exercise of discretionary power, though wrong, did not violate Canon 3A. West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Commission v. Dostert, 271 S.E.2d 427, 433-34 (W.Va.1980). Absent proof of malice or ill will, the question of due process should be remedied if necessary, by appeal or otherwise and not through disciplinary proceedings. In re Anderson, 412 So.2d 743, 748 (Miss. 1982). [M]ere errors of law or simple abuses of judicial discretion should not be subject of discipline by the Commission, [but] where the law is clear on its face, a judge who repeatedly imposes punishment not provided for by law is subject to discipline by the Commission. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Commission, 69 Ill.2d 445, 14 Ill.Dec. 248, 260, 372 N.E.2d 53, 65 (Ill.1977). We feel that the above tests are all commendable methods of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary without at the same time diluting its discipline. The judiciary and the people of Alabama deserve no less. Therefore, today we hold that absent bad faith ( i.e., absent proof of malice, ill will, or improper motive), a judge may not be disciplined under Canons 2 A and 2 B of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics for erroneous legal rulings. Our careful consideration of the entire record fails to disclose clear and convincing evidence that Judge Sheffield acted in bad faith in initiating this contempt proceeding. Cf. Hayes v. Alabama Court of the Judiciary, 437 So.2d 1276 (Ala.1983) (clear and convincing evidence of bad faith abuse of judicial power). In so holding, we do not wish it to appear that we are unconcerned with the improper use of the contempt power by our judges. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said, `[T]he law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive.... Judges are supposed to be [persons] of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate'.... The authority of a judge to hold one in contempt, depriving as it does a person of liberty, is an authority that should be used rarely, and with extreme caution. Matter of Johnson, 483 Pa. 227, 395 A.2d 1319,1326 (1978) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 396, 67 S.Ct. 1249,1264, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). We caution our judges to heed the above advice. In the instant case, Judge Sheffield improperly used the contempt power. But did he do so in bad faith? Bad faith, as defined by Black's Law Dictionary 127 (5th ed. 1979), contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. We simply do not find clear and convincing evidence that Judge Sheffield acted in bad faith in issuing the show cause order or in erroneously finding Ms. Cox guilty of contempt of court. Therefore, we reverse the Court of the Judiciary's finding of guilt as to Canons 2 A and 2 B. (We note that, although Judge Sheffield was found guilty of violating both Canons, these violations embrace but a single course of conduct, and, thus in reality, constitute but one ethical violation.)