Opinion ID: 715823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hernandez's Refusal to Sell Drugs to the CI

Text: 34 Agent Scott deliberately failed to disclose in the search warrant application that Hernandez denied having drugs to sell to the CI and that the CI arranged to meet Hernandez to repay a debt, not to buy drugs. To assess the materiality of the omitted information, we must consider the affidavit with the omitted information included. United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1992). This determination of whether the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to de novo review. Id. at 763. 35 The affidavit, revised to include the omitted information, would indicate that the CI arranged a meeting with Hernandez on April 27, 1989 to repay a debt; Hernandez denied having any drugs to sell to the CI; the CI did not believe Hernandez's denial; no one had personal knowledge that drugs were in the garage on April 27, 1989; at some time in the past, Henneberry had seen Hernandez use and sell cocaine in the garage; at some time in the past, Henneberry had seen Hernandez take small quantities of cocaine from a red toolbox; and Agent Scott saw a red toolbox bearing the name of Pedro Hernandez in the garage on April 27, 1989. 36 Although the revised information in the affidavit is less convincing, it still is sufficient to establish probable cause to search the garage for drugs on April 27, 1989. Both the CI and Henneberry had preexisting relationships with Hernandez, which provides a basis for believing their statements. Further, Agent Scott independently corroborated part of Henneberry's account following the assault by identifying the red toolbox in the garage. Consequently, the district court did not err when it concluded that the information omitted from the search warrant application was not material. 5. Vindictive Prosecution 37 Hernandez argues that the government engaged in vindictive prosecution by charging him in the present action after failing to prosecute him successfully on two unrelated counts in an earlier prosecution. 38 The standard of review in a vindictive prosecution case remains unsettled in this circuit. United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 67, 133 L.Ed.2d 29 (1995). This circuit has variously applied abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous, and de novo standards. Id. We need not resolve which standard should apply because under any of these standards, Hernandez's claim fails. 39 To establish a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must show either direct evidence of actual vindictiveness or facts that warrant an appearance of such. Id. at 1299 (quotations omitted). Hernandez has offered no evidence that shows actual vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution. Therefore, for Hernandez's claim to succeed, he must show that the facts warrant finding an appearance of vindictiveness. 40 The law of the Ninth Circuit precludes finding an appearance of vindictiveness on the basis of the government's decision to prosecute following a losing prosecution for unrelated conduct. See United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 668-70 (9th Cir.1986). In Martinez, we held that if a prosecutor, faced with a disappointing result brings an additional charge which arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the original charge, a presumption of vindictiveness is raised. If, however, the second charge is unrelated to the first, the presumption does not arise. Id. at 669 (quotations and citation omitted). The resolution of an unrelated prosecution is a legitimate prosecutorial consideration. Id. at 670. 41 The charges brought against Hernandez in the present action were based on events that occurred on April 27, 1989. Because the unsuccessful prosecution, which Hernandez contends prompted the present action, arose out of events unrelated to those occurring on April 27, 1989, we do not find an appearance of vindictiveness. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Hernandez's motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. 6. Double Jeopardy 42 Hernandez claims that the district court should have held a hearing on the issue of double jeopardy at the time of sentencing, because of the forfeiture of the firearm found in the garage. The district court's denial of a motion for a hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Montoya, 45 F.3d at 1291. 43 Hernandez presented no evidence that the government ever held a forfeiture proceeding, either administrative or judicial, regarding the firearm. Accordingly, no double jeopardy issues exist, even in light of this circuit's decision in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994), amended and reh'g denied, 56 F.3d 41 (1995), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (1996). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez's request for a hearing on the issue of double jeopardy.