Opinion ID: 758092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the federal arson statute

Text: 10 We review a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo. See United States v. Sahhar, 56 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1995). We also review the sufficiency of the indictment and jury instructions de novo. See United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir.1995) (jury instructions); United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir.1995) (sufficiency of the indictment);. Because Serang did not object to the jury instructions before the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. English, 92 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir.1996). 11
12 The appellant argues that the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause because it fails to require that the activity substantially affect interstate commerce. Similarly, he argues that the indictment and jury instructions failed to include the word substantial and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the restaurant affected or substantially affected interstate commerce. His claims are without merit. 13 Congress may regulate three broad categories of activities under its commerce power, including: (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). The third category is at issue in this case. In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that, to be regulated, intrastate economic or commercial activities must substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate, while non-economic or non-commercial activities must individually have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 560-61, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Therefore, even if a single instance of the regulated activity has only a trivial effect on commerce, if the class of activities regulated substantially affects commerce in the aggregate, then the conduct falls within Congress's commerce power. United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1996). Moreover, all business property has a per se substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 860-62, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985). 2 14 The importance of the distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities in the arson context is illustrated by two post-Lopez cases. In United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir.1995), we held that a private residence receiving natural gas from out-of-state resources was not a building used in an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. On the other hand, in Gomez, we held that a multi-unit apartment building was a commercial establishment and, as such, it per se substantially affected interstate commerce. See Gomez, 87 F.3d at 1096. 15 This case is akin to Gomez. A restaurant is clearly commercial property. The government established at trial that the Oregon Country Inn purchased liquor from out-of-state suppliers, entered into an equipment lease with an out-of-state company, and received substantial cash from an out-of-state investor. As a commercial enterprise, it had a per se substantial effect on interstate commerce and is subject to regulation by Congress in § 844(i). See Russell, 471 U.S. at 862, 105 S.Ct. 2455. 16 Appellant argues that Gomez is distinguishable because it did not involve a challenge to § 844(i)'s constitutionality and that it incorrectly interpreted Lopez and Pappadopoulos. Although Gomez concerned § 844(i)'s jurisdictional requirement, Russell recognized the constitutionality of the statute. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859, 105 S.Ct. 2455. Appellant points out that Pappadopoulos and Gomez inconsistently characterize the regulated conduct of § 844(i). Compare Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 526 ([T]he conduct regulated by section 844(i)--arson--is not commercial or economic in nature.), with Gomez, 87 F.3d at 1096 (As applied to a rental property, then, section 844(i) regulates conduct that is economic or commercial in nature.). But each discusses the regulated conduct more broadly than just arson. Pappadopoulos concerned the arson of a private residence, a noncommercial activity; Gomez involved the arson of an apartment building, a commercial activity. Here, the arson of a restaurant is a commercial activity that per se substantially affects interstate commerce. Therefore, that activity is subject to regulation by Congress in § 844(i). 17 In light of the above, the appellant's remaining claims that the indictment and jury instructions were insufficient because they did not contain the word substantial are without merit. 3 18