Opinion ID: 2378317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Even If Refusing To Repeat The Statutory Reliance On Counsel Language In Successive Jury Instructions Was Error, It Was Harmless.

Text: Henrichs argues that it was error to fail to instruct the jury on the statutory safe harbor defense [10] in AS 10.06.450(b). [11] This argument focuses on two jury instructions, # 13 and # 14. Instruction # 13 was entitled, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and it was patterned on AS 10.06.450(b). It included the statement [a]n officer is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, prepared or presented by counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters that the officer reasonably believes to be within the person's professional or expert competence. Instruction # 14 was entitled Breach of Fiduciary Duty_Misleading Proxy. Instruction # 14 focused on the late-bird proxy solicitation letter and explained that Chugach claims that one way that Henrichs breached his fiduciary duty was by authorizing a false and misleading proxy solicitation. At trial, Henrichs presented evidence that the late-bird letter may have been reviewed by attorneys before it was mailed but he did not present evidence that the late-bird letter was actually approved by counsel or that he relied on the advice of counsel when he authorized the letter. Henrichs nevertheless urged the superior court to include the reliance on counsel language from AS 10.06.450(b) in both Instruction # 13 and Instruction # 14. The superior court included the language in Instruction # 13 but did not repeat it in Instruction # 14. On appeal, Henrichs contends the superior court's decision not to repeat the safe harbor language in Instruction # 14 caused the jury to fail to consider whether Mr. Henrichs was relying on the advice of counsel when he authorized the distribution of the late-bird proxy statement to shareholders. We do not find this argument persuasive. We have consistently held that [j]ury instructions are to be analyzed as a whole, rather than in isolation and [i]n reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions inform the jury of the applicable law. [12] But we need not decide whether in this case the two instructions, analyzed as a whole, informed the jury of the applicable law because Henrichs did not provide evidence at trial to support that the letter was approved by counsel, or that he relied on counsel's advice when he authorized it. As such, the evidence did not show that Henrichs could avoid liability because he relied on the advice of counsel. Moreover, Henrichs failed to demonstrate that any error in the superior court's refusal to repeat the reliance on counsel language probably affected the judgment of the jury and was therefore prejudicial. [13]