Opinion ID: 2132663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: characterization of this action

Text: We disagree with the district court's characterization of this action as not one for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but rather [one that] alleges mental or emotional damages as a result of automobile negligence. We have stated that an emotional distress claim is not a cause of action, but, rather, a separate theory of recovery or element of damage. Fackler v. Genetzky, 257 Neb. 130, 139, 595 N.W.2d 884, 891 (1999). This is a civil action for damages based upon allegations of negligent operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway. Hamilton makes no claim that the physical structure of his body was injured in the accident, and he therefore seeks no damages for mental pain and suffering related to a physical injury. Nor is this a case involving a claim for parasitic damages, which are damages occasioned by anxiety specifically due to a reasonable fear of future harm attributable to a physical injury caused by the negligence of another. See Hartwig v. Oregon Trail Eye Clinic, 254 Neb. 777, 580 N.W.2d 86 (1998). Rather, the injury claimed by Hamilton can be fairly described as mental or emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) that is caused by the negligence of another and that is not directly brought about by a physical injury, but that may manifest itself in physical symptoms. See Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). This is the only injury for which Hamilton claims damages in this action. Thus, while it is true that the negligence alleged in this case involved the operation of a motor vehicle, the injury which is claimed to have resulted from such negligence is purely an emotional one. This, then, is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, supra , the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether a purely emotional injury was compensable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which permits railroad employees to recover for work injuries caused by an employer's negligence. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000). In addressing this issue, the Court acknowledged that while nearly all states have recognized a right to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as defined by the Court in the passage quoted above, the fundamental differences between emotional and physical injuries has led to practical limitations upon the common-law right of recovery for reasons of public policy. Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 545, 114 S.Ct. 2396. For example, the Court noted that [b]ecause the etiology of emotional disturbance is usually not as readily apparent as that of a broken bone following an automobile accident, courts have been concerned ... that recognition of a cause of action for [emotional] injury when not related to any physical trauma may inundate judicial resources with a flood of relatively trivial claims, many of which may be imagined or falsified, and that liability may be imposed for highly remote consequences of a negligent act. 512 U.S. at 545, 114 S.Ct. 2396, quoting Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392, 545 A.2d 1059 (1988). Other policy considerations noted by the Court as influencing limitations upon the right to recover damages for emotional distress include the absence, in comparison to physical injury, of necessary finite limits on the number of persons who might suffer emotional injury as a result of a given negligent act, and the difficulty of predicting the incidence and severity of emotional injuries which depend on psychological factors that ordinarily are not apparent to potential tortfeasors. Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 545-46, 114 S.Ct. 2396. The Court concluded: For all of these reasons, courts have realized that recognition of a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress holds out the very real possibility of nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for defendants. Courts therefore have placed substantial limitations on the class of plaintiffs that may recover for emotional injuries and on the injuries that may be compensable. (Emphasis supplied.) 512 U.S. at 546, 114 S.Ct. 2396.