Opinion ID: 39526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fourth Amendment Motion to Suppress

Text: In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004). In reviewing findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, which in this case is the Government. United States v. Shelton, 337 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2003). If this review leads us to the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed[,]” then the district court’s factual finding must be deemed clearly erroneous. Payne v. United States, 289 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2002). Also, the trial court’s determination that the facts provided reasonable suspicion or probable cause is reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). However, in carrying out this de novo review, we must “give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id. 2. Doctrinal Framework for Analyzing Suppression Claims Related - 13 - to Traffic Stops The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Traffic stops are deemed seizures for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001). The legality of a traffic stop is analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Under the two-part Terry reasonable suspicion inquiry, we ask whether the officer’s action was: (1) “justified at its inception”; and (2) “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. See United States v. Breeland, 53 F.3d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has stated that in making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a court “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). We - 14 - have stated previously that reasonable suspicion exists when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002). In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, a court may not consider the relevant factors in isolation from each other. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. In scrutinizing the officer’s basis for suspecting wrongdoing, it is clear that the officer’s mere hunch will not suffice. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. It is also clear, however, that reasonable suspicion need not rise to the level of probable cause. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.
As for the second prong of the Terry inquiry, generally, the “detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop . . . .” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). In the course of effectuating the stop, a police officer may permissibly examine the driver’s license and registration and run a computer check on them to investigate whether the driver has any outstanding warrants and if the vehicle is stolen. Id. at 50708. An officer may also ask the driver about the purpose and itinerary of his trip. Id. at 508. Indeed, the officer’s questions need not even be related to the purpose of the traffic stop, since “[d]etention, not questioning, is the evil at which - 15 - Terry’s second prong is aimed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993)). Although an officer’s inquiry may be wide-ranging, once all relevant computer checks have come back clean, there is no more reasonable suspicion, and, as a general matter, continued questioning thereafter unconstitutionally prolongs the detention. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 510; see also Santiago, 310 F.3d at 341-42; United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1999). A recognized exception to this rule is that if additional reasonable suspicion arises in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507; United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2003). 3. Application of the First Prong of the Terry Test In the instant case, Lopez-Moreno claims that the first prong of the Terry test was not met since the stop was unjustified at its inception. The Government contends that the van’s non-functioning brake lights furnished Officer Parker with two objectively reasonable bases for the initial stop. The Government first claims that the non-functioning brake lights provided Officer Parker a reasonable basis to believe that Lopez-Moreno was violating LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:306A. At the time of the traffic stop, this statute mandated that “[n]o person - 16 - shall . . . operate on the highways of this state any motor vehicle registered in this state . . . unless it is equipped with at least two stop lamps . . . .” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:306A (emphasis added).4 The Government also contends that the non-functioning brake lights provided Officer Parker with a reasonable basis to believe that Lopez-Moreno was violating LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:53A (West 2002). This statute states: “No person shall drive . . . on any highway of this state, at any time, any vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property . . . .” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:53A. The Government claims that the most direct route from Greenwood to Atlanta would have required Lopez-Moreno to spend at least three more hours driving on Louisiana highways. The Government contends that by doing this driving in the dark without functioning brake lights, the van posed a danger. Lopez-Moreno offers two arguments in reply. First, he claims that § 32:53A cannot be used to justify the stop because it was not Officer Parker’s true motivation. Second, he claims that the district court committed clear error in finding that two, rather than one, of the brake lights were not working. With two of the three brake lights working, Lopez-Moreno claims that the van did not 4 In 2004, the phrase “registered in this state” was deleted from the statute. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:306A (West 2002 & Supp. 2005). - 17 - pose a danger. We find that § 32:53A serves as an objectively reasonable justification for initiating the stop. For this reason, we do not reach the issue of whether § 32:306A also justifies the stop.5 As an initial matter, we find that it was objectively reasonable for a police officer to suspect that the two non-functioning brake lights posed a danger to people and property. Especially considering that the van was a larger-than-normal vehicle traveling in the dark at highway speeds, the lack of functioning brake lights could be seen as increasing the risk of collision from behind. As for Lopez-Moreno’s contention that only one brake light was not operating, we have reviewed the videotape of the arrest at length. Based on our review, we find that the district court’s conclusion that both side brake lights were nonfunctioning was not clearly erroneous. Thus, had Officer Parker initially cited § 32:53A as the reason for the stop, the stop unquestionably would have been permissible. We are now left with Lopez-Moreno’s contention that § 32:53A may not serve as a post hoc rationalization for the stop. Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent has made clear that an officer’s subjective intentions have no impact on analyzing reasonable suspicion or probable cause because they are both 5 See generally United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Whaley, 781 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1986). - 18 - considered to be based on an objective test. More than twentyfive years ago, the Court stated: “[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). More recently, the Court again has made clear that an officer’s subjective motivations are irrelevant in determining whether his or her conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Devenpeck v. Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588, 594 (2004) (“Our cases make clear that an arresting officer’s state of mind . . . is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. [H]is subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” (internal citation omitted)); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases [citing, inter alia, Scott] foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”). Most clearly on point is our own prior statement that “[s]o long as a traffic law infraction that would have objectively justified the stop had taken place, the fact that the police officer may have made the stop for a reason other than the occurrence of the traffic infraction is irrelevant for purposes - 19 - of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 173 (1997) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 806). Based on this line of precedent, we conclude that even if Officer Parker’s subjective motivation for initiating the stop was his mistaken view that Lopez-Moreno was violating § 32:306A, the fact that it was objectively reasonable to suspect that Lopez-Moreno was violating § 32:53A means that the initial stop passes constitutional muster. 4. Application of the Second Prong of the Terry Test Lopez-Moreno argues that, assuming the initial stop was valid, the evidence against him nevertheless must be suppressed because Officer Parker unconstitutionally prolonged the stop. He claims that at the time the warrant check came back clean, Officer Parker had no reasonable suspicion that the passengers were undocumented aliens. According to Lopez-Moreno, it was only after the stop was improperly prolonged that any inculpatory evidence was obtained. The Government contends that several factors created reasonable suspicion to justify Lopez-Moreno’s continued detention after the warrant check came back negative. First, the Government notes that in the months preceding August 21, 2003, there were several traffic stops in Greenwood that led to the detention of vans of undocumented aliens. The Government makes particular note of the fact that approximately one month prior to Lopez-Moreno’s stop, Officer Parker had participated in a stop of a van containing suspected illegal immigrants. Second, - 20 - the Government highlights the fact that Lopez-Moreno did not know the names of his passengers. Third, Lopez-Moreno answered “might” when asked whether his passengers were present in the United States illegally. Finally, when asked the same question again, Lopez-Moreno shrugged, which, according to the Government, indicated either agreement with Officer Parker or evasiveness. We consider each of these factors in turn, mindful of the proper nature of our review. We must consider whether these factors constitute specific and articulable facts which, when considered along with whatever reasonable inferences may be drawn from them, would allow a reasonable person to suspect that LopezMoreno was engaging in illegal activity. We must pay heed to the Supreme Court’s admonition not to treat each factor in isolation, but rather to give due regard to the totality of the circumstances. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. Additionally, in drawing inferences from these facts, we must give due weight to the inferences drawn by both the trial court and law enforcement officers. Id. at 273; Ornelas, 517 U.S. 699. It is clear that based on his prior experience, as soon as Officer Parker saw that the van in question–-the same type of van as was involved in the earlier undocumented alien traffic stop-- was full of passengers and was being driven by a Hispanic immigrant, his suspicion was piqued. Also, the BICE agents’ standing request for the Greenwood Police to call them if they had a traffic stop involving suspected undocumented aliens - 21 - reflects that Officer Parker could have inferred that the prior stop in which he took part was not an isolated incident. Certainly, these considerations alone would not have provided reasonable suspicion. Any of the other factors the Government cites, taken on their own, also would not provide reasonable suspicion. However, when all of the factors are viewed in conjunction, we find that there was reasonable suspicion. The fact that Lopez-Moreno did not know his passengers’ names and was not certain whether he had eight or nine passengers was consistent with the view that Lopez-Moreno was not a commercial driver offering a completely legitimate service. Especially considering that Officer Parker already had reason to believe that vehicles full of undocumented aliens were passing through Greenwood, Lopez-Moreno’s concession that the passengers might be present in the United States illegally clearly supported the inference that they were, in fact, undocumented aliens. Finally, Lopez-Moreno’s shrug, which Officer Parker reasonably interpreted to reflect agreement with his statement that none of the passengers were legal, provided further reason to suspect the passengers’ alienage. Thus, we find that all of these factors, taken together, provided Officer Parker with an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that the passengers were undocumented aliens. For this reason, the second step of the Terry test is met. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied Lopez-Moreno’s Fourth Amendment-based motion to suppress. - 22 -