Opinion ID: 2615078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: review of the commission's decision

Text: The Commission, in its Letter Memorandum Opinion dated November 17, 1978, determined that Sgt. Holloway was dismissed for cause and in good faith on the basis that: Roy D. Holloway was employed and promoted by the Ada County Sheriff and functioned as a satisfactory employee until Mr. Holloway involved himself in an activity which created a condition of public criticism of the Ada County Sheriff's Department of which Mr. Holloway maintained control and responsibility. The Ada County Sheriff is responsible for the conduct and integrity of the operations of the Ada County Sheriff's Department and a Manual of Conduct and Ethics sets forth required conditions of employee conduct. The Ada County Sheriff counseled and directed Mr. Holloway regarding the adverse effects and requested corrective measures of Mr. Holloway's action on multiple occasions. Contrary to the proper conduct of a prudent employee, Mr. Holloway failed to act in a proper manner in order to avoid conditions which would generate public criticism directed toward the Ada County Sheriff's Department and further failed to exert necessary and timely efforts within his authority, to terminate conditions generating aforementioned criticisms when identified and instructed by the Ada County Sheriff. Mr. Holloway, the employee, had the responsibility to conduct himself in an appropriate manner as identified in the Manual of Conduct and Ethics. Mr. Holloway was the responsible individual for an adverse condition unacceptable to the proper conduct of the Ada County Sheriff's Department of which E.C. Palmer, Sheriff, is the responsible authority for such proper conduct. Mr. Holloway was advised to correct the identified cause of criticism. He failed to do so and was terminated, an action within, and appropriate of the authority of the Ada County Sheriff. ... . From the foregoing it is concluded as a matter of law that the dismissal was in good faith and for cause. In determining what constitutes cause within the meaning of Ada County Ordinance No. 60 § 11, the Commission is constrained by the protections afforded an individual by the first amendment. Sgt. Holloway contends that he was terminated without cause for union activity in violation of his fundamental rights of free assembly and association guaranteed under the United States and Idaho Constitutions. If Sgt. Holloway was indeed terminated for union activities protected under the first amendment, his termination could not have been made with cause and must be reversed. The United States Constitution, Amendment 1, provides that: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. [9] The first amendment has been interpreted to protect individuals' rights to form and join labor unions and associations without fear of retaliation. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employers, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 1826, 60 L.Ed.2d 360 (1979); Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315 v. Kell, 628 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.1980); New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.1980), affirmed sub nom, Jackson Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 102 S.Ct. 2673, 73 L.Ed.2d 327 (1982). [T]he courts ... have accepted a general proposition that public employees cannot be discharged for engaging in `union activities.' Thus, if there is a discharge because of union membership, the general constitutional right of free association... and the free speech right ... are correctly applied to invalidate the discharge, since there is no reason to distinguish a union from any other association. Hanover Township Federation of Teachers Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456, 460 (7th Cir.1972). It has been established that [a]ll speech, press, and associational relationships are presumptively protected by the first amendment; the burden rests on the government to establish that the particular expressions or relationships are outside its reach. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1082 (9th Cir.1972). [F]reedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on [rational basis] grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests the state may lawfully protect. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (emphasis added). It is this Court's duty to examine the record before the Commission to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination that the Sheriff terminated Sgt. Holloway for cause and in good faith. In so doing, we must determine if the Sheriff met his burden of demonstrating that the actions of Sgt. Holloway presented such a grave and immediate danger to legitimate state interests as to constitute cause for his dismissal.
One of the grounds stated by the Commission for upholding Sgt. Holloway's dismissal was that Mr. Holloway involved himself in an activity which created a condition of public criticism of the Ada County Sheriff's Department... . The Sheriff testified before the Commission that he received complaints from citizens that they were confused by the solicitation and did not know whether the Union was sponsoring the fund raiser or whether the Department was sponsoring it. However, it is uncontroverted that the Sheriff had received similar citizen complaints when fund raisers were previously sponsored by the Deputy Sheriff's Association and the Sheriff's Reserve, both of which are non-union organizations connected with the Sheriff's Department. All of the businesses contacted which ultimately purchased advertising space accurately made their checks payable to the Union rather than to the Sheriff's Department. [10] Additionally, at least some of the controversy engendered by the solicitation was the result of erroneous statements made by the Sheriff himself. The following testimony was received at the Merit Commission hearing: MR. O'ROURKE [Commissioner]: [I]t was reported in the news media, evidently at the time of this controversy, that the promoter did, in fact, leave town with the receipts and the show was cancelled and that somehow people were bilked out of funds. I don't know if that is something that was alluded to in the media or whether it was actually fact. Do you have any knowledge of that? THE WITNESS [Sgt. Holloway]: I saw a television broadcast in that Sheriff Palmer said that these people had left town with $18,000... . MR. O'ROURKE: Do you think that Sheriff Palmer's statement there had impugned the character of the people in Wildwood Productions? THE WITNESS: I believe so, yes. ... . MR. O'ROURKE: Do you also think that possibly some of the complaints were generated by Sheriff Palmer's comments? THE WITNESS: I believe so... . Sheriff Palmer admitted making such a comment: Q. [By Mr. Stoppello to Sheriff Palmer] Well, did you not in fact, in front of Channel 7 news, make a statement after this promotion began in August that you understood that the proceeds from the advertising sales had left town? Did you ever make that statement? A. [Sheriff Palmer] Yes. It is uncontroverted that Wildwood did not leave town with the funds and that the Union received all funds rightfully belonging to it from the fund raiser. [11] Although outwardly concerned with public criticism engendered by the solicitation, Sheriff Palmer never notified Sgt. Holloway that he would be disciplined or terminated if the source of the criticism continued. In fact he did not terminate Sgt. Holloway until six days after Wildwood had, on its own initiative, stopped the solicitation, thereby removing any grounds for any further public criticism of the Department. Sheriff Palmer originally handed Sgt. Holloway a termination letter which stated that Sgt. Holloway had failed to obey three direct orders and that to that date, September 14, 1978, the solicitation was continuing. Sgt. Holloway testified that: I, you know, explained to him that no, the solicitation had been stopped last Friday, which was the 8th of September, was the last day that there was soliciting. And he lined that out and said that if that's so, you know, I'll just redraft the letter and make it correct. The Sheriff failed to offer sufficient evidence to show that there had been any public criticism differing from that received when other non-union departmental organizations had previously sponsored fund raisers. There was insufficient evidence to show that the Sheriff was indeed concerned about unfavorable public criticism, having himself engaged in actions guaranteed to result in such criticisms. There was also insufficient evidence offered to support a finding that the Sheriff acted in response to the public criticism engendered by the fund raiser when he neither took action nor threatened Sgt. Holloway with any action during the course of the solicitation. Sheriff Palmer did not terminate Sgt. Holloway until six days after the solicitation had been stopped by Wildwood on its own initiative. It is thus clear that there is not substantial evidence to support a finding that any public criticism engendered by the solicitation constituted such a grave and immediate danger to a legitimate state interest that Sheriff Palmer had cause to terminate Sgt. Holloway.
The Commission upheld Sgt. Holloway's dismissal on the further ground that Sgt. Holloway failed to exert necessary and timely efforts within his authority, to terminate conditions generating aforementioned criticisms when identified and instructed by the Ada County Sheriff. There was no evidence presented to the Commission that Sgt. Holloway did not immediately act on each and every one of the Sheriff's requests or orders. There were three meetings at which the Sheriff voiced opposition to some facet of the solicitation scheme. At the first meeting, the Sheriff essentially told Sgt. Holloway not to go through with the telephone solicitation at all. However, this order or request was rescinded by the Sheriff at later meetings at which he told Sgt. Holloway that [i]f he was going to do it, he had to be legal. In response to the question by counsel for Sgt. Holloway: But he could go ahead with the promotion as long as it was legal? Sheriff Palmer answered, Yes, I guess he could. I couldn't stop him. After the second meeting on August 30, 1978, Sgt. Holloway notified Wildwood of the Sheriff's complaints and requested that the cause of the complaints be rectified. It was at this time that Wildwood applied for a solicitation license with the Boise City License Commission. After the third meeting on September 7, 1978, Sgt. Holloway contacted Wildwood and again asked that no reference be made in the solicitation to the Sheriff or the Department. In addition, he composed a letter which again spelled out a proper solicitation format which would comply with the Sheriff's wishes. [12] The following day, the solicitation was discontinued by Wildwood on its own initiative after it was notified that a $5,000 bond would have to be posted in order to obtain a license from the Boise City License Commission. Six days after the solicitation was discontinued, on September 14, 1978, Sgt. Holloway was on duty when he was called to the office of Sheriff Palmer. As he stepped into the office, Sgt. Holloway was handed his termination letter notifying him of his dismissal, effective immediately. The record clearly demonstrates that Sgt. Holloway did everything within his power to comply with the Sheriff's wishes and to not bring either the Sheriff or the Sheriff's Department into any disrepute. Thus, we hold that there is not substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that Sgt. Holloway failed to exert necessary and timely efforts ... to terminate conditions generating aforementioned criticisms when identified and instructed by the Ada County Sheriff. Therefore, the record cannot support a determination that there existed such a grave and immediate danger to legitimate state interests as to constitute cause for Sgt. Holloway's dismissal.