Opinion ID: 2632589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶12 This appeal presents a concise question: did the City provide adequate notice to [its] residents concerning the retention of the option such that the residents had an opportunity to initiate a referendum? Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 90, ¶ 31, 54 P.3d 1153. The rationale underpinning the adequate notice requirement is obvious. See Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117, 1123 (Utah 1994). Voters are statutorily granted the right to be notified of changes and developments in their community's . . . laws. Id. In the context of legislative changes, voters must be given adequate notice . . . so that they may institute referendum procedures promptly. Id. In this case, neither party contests the importance of providing adequate notice. Rather, the parties dispute whether the notification provided meets due process standards and, therefore, constit utes adequate notice. See Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ¶ 49, 13 P.3d 581 (The minimum requirements [of due process] are adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.). [5] ¶13 Appellants stress their position that the notice provided to City residents fell short of the requirements of due process. Appellants conceded, however, both before the district court and in oral argument before this court, that the City complied with all statutes related to the validity of ordinances, as well as all statutes related to public notification of the passage of ordinances. Absent this concession, the City's compliance with the Utah Code when it passed Ordinance 79-11 may have been an issue. The Utah Code outlines various requirements that a municipality must satisfy when codifying an ordinance [6] and noncompliance with those requirements may be relevant to an inquiry into whether residents were given adequate notice of a legislative change in municipal law. However, Appellants' concession that the City satisfied the applicable statutory provisions not only focuses our due process analysis by eliminating the need to address the potential relevance of noncompliance with codification requirements, but additionally disposes of any allegation that Ordinance 79-11 was invalid due to noncompliance with the Utah Code. [7] ¶14 Appellants' claim of inadequate notice is not dependent, however, upon a showing that the City failed to comply with the Utah Code. Rather, Appellants' claim is based on the proposition that, due to the unique circumstances present in this case, mere statutory compliance was insufficient to meet due process standards. Consequently, we must determine whether the City's compliance with statutory notice requirements alone was sufficient to adequately notify its residents of the repurchase option and therefore satisfy the demands of due process. We conclude that it was. ¶15 Due process is not a rigid concept. See V-1 Oil Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997) ([D]ue process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. (internal quotations omitted)). Instead, due process is flexible and, being based on the concept of fairness, should afford the 'procedural protections that the given situation demands.' Dairy Prod. Servs., 2000 UT 81 at ¶ 49 (quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996)). The extent of notice required in this case is merely adequate notice, which provides an important, but relatively low, threshold to satisfy. Adequate notice is defined as [n]otice reasonably calculated to apprise a person of an action, proceeding, or motion. Notice sufficient to permit an objection or defense. Black's Law Dictionary 37 (5th ed. 1979). Our case law further illuminates this definition. ¶16 In Dairy Product Services, for example, we held that notice of a city's decision to not renew a business license was adequate when the city complied with notification procedures that it had adopted by ordinance. 2000 UT 81 at ¶¶ 50-51. In that case, the ordinance outlining notification requirements specified that the city was required to inform the business that its license was in jeopardy and that it was entitled to have the presence of counsel and to provide evidence in its defense at a public hearing. Id. at ¶ 50. We concluded that the notice provided pursuant to the ordinance reasonably informed [the business], in a timely fashion . . . . It also afforded [the business] the opportunity to present any evidence or objections. Id. at ¶ 51. Because the notification procedure outlined in the ordinance was reasonable and allowed an opportunity for objection, we held that mere satisfaction of the ordinance's requirements met due process standards. Id. ¶17 More on point is this court's decision in Naples City v. Mecham, 709 P.2d 359 (Utah 1985). In Naples City, we held that a city gave adequate notice of its adoption of a traffic ordinance by virtue of its compliance with section 10-3-711 of the Utah Code, which required that a summary of any passed ordinance be published in a newspaper within the municipality, or, if no newspaper was published in the municipality, be disseminated by posting complete copies in three public places within the municipality. Id. at 360. The appellant in Naples City was convicted of violating the traffic ordinance and argued that the city, which had posted copies of the ordinance on two telephone poles as well as in the city offices, had failed to provide him adequate notice of the ordinance's passage. Id. In holding that adequate notice was provided, we focused on the city's compliance with the Utah Code's notice requirements and concluded that the statute establishes a reasonable means of providing general notice of the prohibited conduct. Id. ¶18 In the instant case, the parties agree that the City complied with all statutes relevant to notice, but Appellants assert that simple compliance was insufficient to satisfy due process under the unique facts of this case. This assertion is based on Appellant's belief that City residents were not provided with enough information about the details of the repurchase option to put them on notice that the option might, at some point in the future, be exercised in an objectionable manner. Appellants fail to recognize that the dearth of details itself could have provided a basis for a valid objection to Ordinance 79-11 and that voters had every right to initiate a referendum on that ground alone. Instead, the City's voters allowed the statutory time frame for petitioning for a referendum to run its course and acquiesced in the City's retention of discretion in exercising the repurchase option. ¶19 While it is true that the text of Ordinance 79-11 made reference to agreements that were not published, due process does not require municipalities to inundate residents with information about every possible detail of a given action or to foretell all potential consequences of that action. The published ordinance provided City residents with enough information to allow them to object and initiate a referendum if they so desired. In 1979, the Utah Code expressly permitted a municipality to publish a summary of any passed ordinance in order to notify residents of its passage. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-711 (Supp. 1979). As in Naples City, we are unwilling to declare this form of notice unreasonable. As a result, we hold that the City's compliance with the notification requirements of the Utah Code, including the publication of Ordinance 79-11 pursuant to section 10-3-711, satisfied the demands of due process in the present case. ¶20 Although our decision rests only on the City's compliance with the publication requirements of the Utah Code, we note that the City actually provided more notice to the public than was required by statute. For example, instead of publishing a mere summary of Ordinance 79-11, the City published the ordinance in its entirety. Further, prior to the passage of Ordinance 79-11, the City published a notice of sale for four consecutive weeks, which alerted residents to the City's intention to secure the repurchase option. [8] Both of these actions exceeded the requirements placed upon the City by the Utah Code. However, although taking reasonable steps beyond the requirements of the Utah Code to inform citizens of legislative action taken by municipalities should be encouraged, such steps were not required in the present case.