Opinion ID: 2037940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting jacobson's blood test results into evidence?

Text: In making evidentiary rulings, the trial court has broad discretion. [Appellant] must show an abuse of discretion to reverse the trial court's ruling. State v. Bennis, 457 N.W.2d 843, 846 (S.D.1990). Here, Jacobson argues that because he refused the blood test and the arresting officer did not know the arrest was for his third DUI, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the results of the forced blood test into evidence. SDCL 32-23-10 provides: Any person who operates any vehicle in this state is considered to have given his consent to the withdrawal of blood or other bodily substance and chemical analysis of his blood, breath or other bodily substance to determine the amount of alcohol in his blood and to determine the presence of marijuana or any controlled drug or substance. The person shall be requested by the officer to submit to the withdrawal of blood or other bodily substance for chemical analysis or chemical analysis of his breath and shall be advised by the officer that: (1) If he refuses to submit to the withdrawal or chemical analysis, no withdrawal or chemical analysis may be required unless he has been arrested for a third, fourth or subsequent violation of § 32-23-1, constituting a felony offense under § 32-23-4 or § 32-23-4.6; (2) If he refuses to submit to the withdrawal or chemical analysis, his driver's license shall be revoked for one year, unless pursuant to § 32-23-11.1 he pleads guilty to a violation of § 32-23-1 prior to a revocation order being issued; and (3) He has the right to have a chemical analysis performed by a technician of his own choosing at his own expense, in addition to the test requested by the officer. (emphasis added). We have recognized that SDCL 32-23-10... eliminate[s] the right of a third offense DUI suspect to refuse a blood test, under the implied consent law. State v. Lanier, 452 N.W.2d 144, 145 n. 2 (S.D.1990). Under SDCL 32-23-10, the predicates for admission of the results of a forced blood test are simple. Once an individual has been convicted twice for a violation of SDCL 32-23-1 [DUI], a trooper is only required to inform an arrested person of the warnings outlined in SDCL 32-23-10, and the result of a compulsory blood alcohol test is admissible. State v. Heinrich, 449 N.W.2d 25, 27 (S.D.1989). State submits that the requirements of Heinrich were complied with in this case, i.e., that Jacobson had been convicted twice for DUI and that the arresting officer advised him of the warnings outlined in SDCL 32-23-10. Therefore, State argues that the blood test results were properly admitted into evidence under Heinrich, and that the arresting officer's lack of knowledge of Jacobson's prior DUIs was irrelevant. We disagree. State ignores significant language in Heinrich. Heinrich contains a detailed discussion of an officer's initial determination of whether an individual is being arrested for a third DUI and whether that determination is an exercise of unreviewable judicial power. Although that issue is not involved in this appeal, the following language within that discussion is notable: The trooper is merely making a preliminary determination as to whether an individual is entitled to the statutory grant of the right to refuse to submit to a blood alcohol test. This determination is simply a preliminary judgment necessary to enforce the statute. Heinrich, 449 N.W.2d at 27 (emphasis added). It is clear from the above language that in order to enforce the implied consent law in SDCL 32-23-10 it is necessary ( id. ) for a law enforcement officer to make a preliminary determination as to whether an individual is entitled to the statutory grant of the right to refuse to submit to a blood test. An officer can only do that by taking steps prior to administration of a forced blood test to confirm whether an individual has a history of DUI convictions sufficient for forfeiture of his statutory right of refusal. As Jacobson submits, absent such a preliminary determination, every driver in South Dakota is subject to administration of a blood test with only a subsequent judicial remedy available to protect his statutory right of refusal (already violated). Clearly that could not have been the legislature's intention in enacting the implied consent law. Thus, we hold that an initial determination by a law enforcement officer that an individual is being arrested for his third or a subsequent DUI offense is a necessary component of the implied consent law in SDCL 32-23-10. Here, although the officer testified that Jacobson admitted he had two prior DUI convictions, there is no record finding of fact relating to that testimony. Further, the credibility of the testimony is clearly in question, given the inconsistent versions of the arrest testified to by the officer during the trial court proceedings. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court for a determination, on the present record, of the factual question of whether the arresting officer had information prior to administration of Jacobson's blood test that the arrest was for his third DUI offense. See, State v. Holiday, 335 N.W.2d 332 (S.D.1983); State v. Stumes, 90 S.D. 382, 241 N.W.2d 587 (1976). If he did not, a new trial is required and the penalties for law enforcement noncompliance with the implied consent law should be imposed, i.e., loss of State's right to revoke Jacobson's driver's license for his refusal of the blood test and State's forfeiture of the statutory under the influence presumptions in SDCL 32-23-7. See, State v. Parker, 444 N.W.2d 42 (S.D.1989). This disposition also resolves Jacobson's contentions concerning the giving of the jury instruction on the under the influence presumptions in SDCL 32-23-7.