Opinion ID: 170256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Traditional Sex-Based Discrimination under Title VIIPatricia and Jessica

Text: As previously noted, neither Patricia nor Jessica articulated their disparate treatment claims under this standard, opting instead simply to assert that discrimination against them as wife and daughter was sex-based and therefore within the purview of prohibited discrimination under Title VII. We have rejected this theory, and look now to determine whether the female Adamsons have articulated viable claims for discrimination independently of their claims based on familial status. Generally stated, a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII requires plaintiff to demonstrate that she (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) was discharged; and (4) her position was not eliminated after her discharge. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir.2000)(applying McDonnell Douglas). See Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir.2005). The standard is flexible, however, and may vary depending on the context of the claim and the nature of the adverse employment action alleged. Plotke at 1099 (citing McDonnell Douglas ). Thus, the fact a plaintiffs job was or was not eliminated after her discharge is not necessarily conclusive of her prima facie case. The critical prima facie inquiry in all cases is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the adverse employment action occurred 'under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.' Id. at 1100 (quoting Kendrick and. Burdine). The only evidence offered by Patricia and Jessica to establish this inference is the undue influence remark and the fact Defendants did not apply the MCDS anti-nepotism policy to fire a father and son also working for the company to support claims that they were fired because they were women. Neither fact, alone or together, raises the necessary inference of invidious intent necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. As previously stated with respect to Mr. Adamson, Plaintiffs revile the undue influence remark less as a sexist statement suggesting discriminatory motives visa vis men or women, and more as a judgment disparaging of family members such as themselves working together as supervisor and subordinates. To the extent it can be viewed as the former, we note the remark is gender-neutral on its face and will not, without more, support an inference of discriminatory intent. As the district court noted, an isolated and ambiguous comment is generally considered too abstract to support an inference of discrimination. Aplt. App. III at 575 (citing Stone, 210 F.3d at 1140). Without more, moreover, an employee's subjective belief in a comment's invidious nature also does not support an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. (citing Debs v. Northeastern Illinois Univ., 153 F.3d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1998)). Patricia and Jessica's reliance on evidence of inconsistencies in Defendants' application of the anti-nepotism policy raises thornier issues. Plaintiffs articulate this evidence in terms of pretext, but there is no proscription in an appropriate case against using pretext evidence to support a prima facie case if it indeed gives rise to an inference of actionable discriminatory intent. See Mickelson, 460 F.3d at 1317 (considering the employer's proffered reason for firing the plaintiff at the prima facie stage); see also Wells v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003)([B]y considering an employer's proffered reasons for taking adverse action in the causal-connection portion of the prima facie case, we are assessing pretext evidence typically considered in a later phase of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.) Specifically, Patricia and Jessica contend they were treated differently in the terms and conditions of their employment as a result of their gender, female, as compared to male employees . . . [in] the discriminatory application of an anti-nepotism policy with defendant. R. I, 50-51. They point to two examples of nepotism at MCDS that they assert support their position, one involving a lower level male employee who supervised his part-time employee son, and another involving. Sherry Plenert who supervised her daughter. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' use of the anti-nepotism policy to terminate them and not these other employees creates an inference of discriminatory intent actionable under Title VII. [3] In an appropriate case, evidence that a gender neutral anti-nepotism policy is applied in a manner that disproportionately impacts women may give rise to an inference of sex-based discrimination without proof of discriminatory intent. Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (10th Cir.1987)(citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977)). To establish a prima facie of discrimination under this theory of relief, a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral standards in question selects applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern. Id. at 1509 (quoting Dothard at 329, 97 S.Ct. 2720). Unlike plaintiff's burden in a disparate treatment case, the burden is onerous, requiring her actually to `prove the discriminatory impact at issue'  before availing herself of the presumption of discrimination afforded by the establishment of a prima facie case. Id. at 1509 (citing Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 293, 74 L.Ed.2d 277 (1982)(emphasis original)). Once established, however, a prima facie case of disparate impact shifts the burden of proof and is conclusive on the issue of discrimination unless defendant proves business necessity for the challenged practice to rebut the prima facie case. Id. (emphasis original). This is not such a case and Plaintiffs' evidence falls far short of establishing any significant or statistically supported inference of discrimination in Defendants' application of their anti-nepotism policy. Under Plaintiffs' own view, the policy was applied to fire one man and his wife and daughter who were in a supervisory-subordinate status (the Adamsons) and not applied to fire a father and son or a mother and daughter in similar supervisor-subordinate roles. No discriminatory pattern or disproportionality as between men and women is evident at all on these facts, and the inquiry could end on that basis alone. See Thomas, 814 F.2d at 1509-10 (discussing disagreements among various authors and authorities regarding what constitutes substantial or significant discriminatory impact in a given case, but ruling application of anti-nepotism rule in two instances to impact two women insufficient to prove violation of Title VII); see Roche v, Wareham, 24 F.Supp.2d 146, 153 (D.Mass.1998)(collecting cases). The different allocations of the burdens of proof and production in disparate treatment and disparate impact cases stem precisely from the different requirements for establishing the prima facie case. Thomas at 1509. Allowing Patricia or Jessica to create their inference of intent in a disparate treatment case with disparate impact evidence that would not support such an inference in its own right conflates the concepts. Disparate impact evidence cannot support an inference of sex-based discriminatory intent in a wrongful discharge case if it is insufficient to support an inference of sex-based discrimination in a disparate impact case. To hold otherwise allows two of the three Plaintiffs in this case to turn not-actionable familial status claims into actionable sex-discrimination claims without any nexus between Defendants' proffered reason for their termination and sex-based discrimination. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that neither Patricia Adamson nor Jessica Curl has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination and affirm the entry of summary judgment against them on their claims without reference to MCDS's proffered reasons for their terminations. Assuming, for the sake of argument, however, that they had established a prima fade case of discriminatory discharge under Kendrick and Plotke based on their status as women, we agree with the district court that their circumstantial evidence is insufficient to raise an inference of pretext under McDonnell Douglas and any direct evidence of discrimination (in the form of comments that they would be unduly influenced by Mr. Adamson) is insufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory intent independently of McDonnell Douglas. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the female family members' Title VII discrimination claims.