Opinion ID: 4377578
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title IX Claims

Text: Title IX provides that, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “Title IX is enforceable through a judicially implied private right of action, through which monetary damages are available.” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 263 F.3d 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2001)). We have recognized at least four theories of Title IX liability in cases alleging gender bias in university disciplinary proceedings: (1) erroneous outcome, (2) selective enforcement, (3) deliberate indifference, and (4) archaic assumptions. Id. We have also recognized the viability of a fifth theory, hostile environment, in other contexts, though not in the context of a suit related -5- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton to disciplinary proceedings. Id. (citing Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir. 1996)). Doe pursues four of these five theories—all but archaic assumptions.
To present a viable claim under the erroneous outcome theory, a plaintiff must allege “facts sufficient to (1) ‘cast some articulable doubt’ on the accuracy of the disciplinary proceeding’s outcome, and (2) demonstrate a ‘particularized causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender bias.’” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 585 (6th Cir. 2018) (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 592). Because Doe’s core argument is that he was subject to unfair procedures that were biased against men, this is the Title IX theory that most naturally fits his allegations. We assume for purposes of argument that Doe has satisfied the first requirement and proceed immediately to the second prong. To allege a particularized causal connection, we have generally required plaintiffs to point to some hint of gender bias in their own disciplinary proceedings. Thus, for example, it is not enough to allege that in all of one university’s sexual assault investigations during the relevant period, “the accused was male and was ultimately found responsible.” Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x 437, 453 (6th Cir. 2016). This prong is satisfied, however, when that same claim is combined with other troubling allegations, including both an affidavit that “describes a pattern of the University pursuing investigations concerning male students, but not female students” and a showing that in the plaintiff’s own case, the university “initiated an investigation into him but not” his female accuser. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 593. (In that case, there was an allegation that the accuser herself violated the University’s policies by kissing the plaintiff when he was “inebriated to the extent that he could not consent.” Id. at 591.) Similarly, alleging that a university adopted certain procedures due to pressure from the federal government is not enough on its own, see Cummins, 662 F. App’x at 452–53, but suffices when combined with an allegation that the plaintiff’s hearing body disagreed with the findings of the -6- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton initial investigator based on “exclusively female testimony,” even though the reason given for discrediting the men (membership in the accused’s fraternity) applied equally to the women (all members of the accuser’s sorority), Baum, 903 F.3d at 586. In this case, Doe contends that three of his allegations, when considered in their entirety, demonstrate a comparable causal connection to gender bias.1 First, in 2014, Dayton entered into a resolution agreement with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights, agreeing to modify its policies for handling complaints. Doe alleges that his discipline was motivated in part by a desire to avoid further federal scrutiny and negative publicity. The helpfulness of this 2014 agreement to Doe’s case is questionable. According to the news article Doe attached to his complaint describing the resolution agreement, “none of the Title IX complaints [spurring the resolution agreement] involved sexual assault.” The policy changes mandated by the resolution agreement—about the role of the Title IX coordinator, the use of informal resolution processes, the right to counsel, and the conduct of a hearing when the complainant and respondent cannot be in the same room—are not the same policies that Doe alleges were indicative of gender bias in his hearing. But even if we assume the agreement is both relevant and indicative of bias, Doe fails to draw any connection between that agreement and his hearing two years later. He does not allege, for example, that the University or the individuals involved in his hearing were facing substantial public pressure or outcry in the weeks leading up to his hearing—facts the Second Circuit found persuasive in Doe v. Columbia University, 831 F.3d 46, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2016). The 2014 agreement therefore does not provide the necessary “particularized” evidence of a causal connection between gender bias and the outcome of Doe’s hearing. See Cummins, 662 F. App’x at 452–53. 1 In Doe’s opening brief, he raised a fourth allegation, related to statistics cited by another Board member in her doctoral thesis. In his reply brief, he acknowledges that the individual mentioned did not serve on Doe’s Hearing Board and so withdraws the argument. -7- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton Next, Doe argues that one member of the Hearing Board revealed gender bias by supporting the film The Hunting Ground, which Doe alleges portrays campus sexual assault inaccurately. Just over a year before Doe’s hearing, the Board member posted on Facebook that the film was a “[m]ust see,” indicated it was unacceptable for a fraternity to be known as the “roofie frat,” and agreed with a response implying that men should masturbate instead of “hav[ing] sex with unconscious women.” A single comment made at a substantial temporal remove from Doe’s hearing is of limited value in discerning discrimination—especially when, as here, the discriminatory aspect of the statement is difficult or impossible to discern. It is not problematic for a Board member to express distaste for sex with unconscious partners or for using drugs to obtain consent—both clear violations of Dayton’s “effective consent” policy. And while Doe has alleged that the film is based on inaccurate statistics and discredited accounts, those flaws do not plausibly suggest gender bias in a supporter of the film who was not necessarily aware of the criticisms. Finally, Doe highlights his allegations that, “[u]pon information and belief, in virtually all cases of campus sexual misconduct by Dayton [sic], the accused student is male and the accusing student is female,” and “[u]pon information and belief, Dayton possesses additional documentation evidencing their refusal to discipline female students who were alleged to have sexually assaulted male students.” As previously explained, the fact that sexual assault proceedings have been brought only against male students is not in and of itself sufficient to infer gender bias. Cummins, 662 F. App’x at 453–54. And, more fundamentally, these generalized, conclusory statements, devoid of underlying factual support, do not suffice to allege a particularized causal connection between gender bias and Doe’s suspension. See Baum, 903 F.3d at 585. -8- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton In sum, Doe references events that are temporally removed from his hearing and raise little or no inference of discrimination; he then augments those allegations with speculation about evidence he might uncover later in the proceedings. Even considering all Doe’s allegations in combination, they do not show that gender bias had some causal connection to the outcome of his disciplinary hearing. The erroneous outcome theory fails.
We next consider whether Doe has made out a Title IX claim under the hostile environment theory. Such a claim “is analogous to a Title VII hostile-environment claim.” Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 590. To succeed, Doe must allege “that his educational experience was ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of [his]’ educational environment.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Doe points to a series of film screenings and on-campus events that he argues amounted to a “campaign of intimidation and insult which altered the educational environment of males like Doe by portraying them as sexual deviants.” We are dubious that programming highlighting sexual violence, even when focused on sexual violence committed by men, could create a hostile environment absent unusual circumstances. After all, though Doe vigorously disputes how often sexual violence on college campuses occurs, he concedes that some women are sexually assaulted on college campuses. One instance of sexual assault is too many, and it is logical and appropriate for universities to host events confronting an acknowledged problem. Indeed, such actions appear to be mandated by federal regulation. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(j) (requiring each covered university to “include in its annual security report a statement of policy that addresses the institution’s programs to prevent dating violence, domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking”). -9- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton The aspects of the events that Doe takes issue with do not rise to the level necessary for a hostile environment claim. Making available or distributing allegedly inaccurate information does not equate to intimidation or insult. Using male pronouns when highlighting problematic statements such as “he said if I really loved him, I would have sex with him,” is not equivalent to accusing all male students of committing or condoning sexual assault. Nor does highlighting sexual assault of women by men negate the possibilities that women can commit sexual assault or that men can be sexually assaulted. Indeed, the first line of the description of sexual harassment in Dayton’s Handbook states that the offense “[c]an be committed by a man or woman against a person of the same or opposite sex.” Doe therefore does not plausibly allege that the events hosted at Dayton crossed the line into “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 590 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Moreover, Doe fails to allege that he was even aware that these events took place while he was a student at Dayton, much less that they meaningfully changed the conditions of his educational environment. We hesitate to deem an environment hostile to a plaintiff when “there is no evidence that plaintiff was aware” of what occurred. Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, 159 F.3d 246, 249 n.4 (6th Cir. 1998). Though Doe was not required to allege that he personally attended the events or even that he knew about them at the time they occurred, see Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 661 (6th Cir. 1999), he had to connect those events to his personal educational environment. The conclusory allegation that these events “interfere[] with males’ ability to participate in or benefit from various activities including learning on campus” is insufficient. Doe also appears to argue that his hearing and ultimate suspension interfered with his ability to participate in campus life. But we have already explained that “allegations of gender -10- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton bias in the University’s sexual-assault disciplinary process” do not constitute the sort of intimidation, ridicule, or insult that can sustain a hostile environment claim. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 590. Doe’s criticisms of that process have already been analyzed in their proper place, under the erroneous outcome rubric.
Doe next advances the deliberate indifference theory. Here, he must allege that the school “acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities” and that the harassment “is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “[W]e have held that to plead a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, ‘the misconduct alleged must be sexual harassment,’ not just a biased disciplinary process.” Baum, 903 F.3d at 588 (quoting Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 591). Thus, to the extent this claim is premised on procedural flaws in the proceedings themselves, it fails. Doe argues that his deliberate indifference claim is also based on the programming about sexual violence that formed the basis for his hostile environment claim. He does not, however, allege that the University “had actual knowledge” about any sexual harassment that occurred at those events. Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch., Inc., 678 F. App’x 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2017). And, for the same reasons described above in the hostile environment context, permitting campus events discussing sexual assault—even with some inaccuracies—is not “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” harassment. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
Doe’s final Title IX theory is selective enforcement. “To prevail on a ‘selective enforcement’ claim, the plaintiff must show that a similarly-situated member of the opposite sex was treated more favorably than the plaintiff due to his or her gender.” Cummins, 662 F. App’x -11- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton at 452. Doe has not identified any woman accused of sexual assault at Dayton University who was not referred to disciplinary proceedings. Instead, he returns to his allegation that, “[u]pon information and belief, Dayton possesses additional documentation evidencing their refusal to discipline female students who were alleged to have sexually assaulted male students.” Doe provides no factual content to underpin this allegation. The bare allegation, unsupported by facts, does not suffice to state a claim. See 16630 Southfield L.P. v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he plaintiffs have not identified any similarly situated individuals whom [the defendant] treated better. They have merely alleged their ‘belief’ that such people exist. These ‘naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement’ contribute nothing to the sufficiency of the complaint.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). In sum, Doe has not stated a claim for a violation of Title IX under any of these four theories. The district court properly dismissed Doe’s Title IX claims.