Opinion ID: 2382036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Foster Parents' Standing to Petition for Guardianship

Text: Initially, we observe that the course of this litigation has resulted in a most unfortunate delay in the disposition of David's best interests. This matter has been in litigation since January 25, 1994 to date. It has involved multiple hearings in the Family Court and numerous administrative and judicial determinations. In the course of that litigious history, David has matured from age four months to nearly six years. The standard and scope of this Court's review of a Family Court determination extends to a review of the facts and law as well as to a review of the inferences and deductions made by the Trial Judge. [9] This Court will not disturb findings of fact unless they clearly are wrong, and [] will affirm the inferences and deductions of the trial court if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. [10] DFS argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the Butlers guardianship on the ground that foster parents do not have standing to seek or contest custody awards for foster children without the consent of DFS. According to DFS, although David was under the Butlers' care, DFS maintained legal custody over him and was responsible for his best interests. We hold that foster parents have standing to petition for guardianship of foster children under their care. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Family Court. The issue of standing for petitions for guardianship is a matter of first impression in Delaware, and the applicable statutes offer little guidance. [11] We also understand that the decisions of the Family Court are split on the issue, as another Judge of the court recently determined that foster parents do not have standing to petition for guardianship. [12] Thus, we now take occasion to clarify the law in Delaware. In the case at bar, the Family Court correctly determined that the Butlers had standing to pursue guardianship over David. The concept of `standing,' in its procedural sense, refers to the right of a party to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to enforce a claim or redress a grievance. It is concerned only with the question of who is entitled to mount a legal challenge and not with the merits of the subject matter of the controversy. [13] To achieve standing, therefore, the Butlers' interest in the controversy must be distinguished from the interest shared by the other parties of a class or the public in general. [14] Having cared for David for most of his life, the Butlers enjoy a legally protected interest, distinguishable from others having an interest, in petitioning for guardianship over David. In two cases, this Court has recognized that foster parents have standing to maintain custody actions against natural parents and DFS. We hold that this sound policy applies in guardianship cases as well. In In re One Minor Child, we recognized the standing of foster parents to petition for custody of a child who had been under their care for over seven years. [15] In that case, the Superior Court, in reversing the decision of the Family Court, placed the child in the custody of his natural parents. On appeal, this Court reversed, holding that it was not in the child's best interests to remove him from the only home he had known and from the custody of those who loved and cared for him. Accordingly, we ordered that custody be awarded to the foster parents. Although we did not address squarely the issue of standing in In re One Minor Child, this Court later made it clear that foster parents had standing to petition for custody of a foster child over the objections of the State and the natural parents, so long as it was in the child's best interests. [16] In In re C.M.D., A Minor Child, [17] we also held that the Family Court, and not the State, had the authority to hear child custody petitions despite statutory language that implied the State had exclusive decisionmaking rights regarding the care and placement of children in its care. [18] In the case at bar, the Family Court determined that it was in David's best interests to be placed under the guardianship of the Butlers. Consistent with our previous decisions, the Family Court properly recognized that the Butlers had standing to petition for guardianship. This case does not present a situation in which the foster parents seek to intervene in a case where their interests already are represented adequately. Rather, the Butlers' interests are adverse to both DFS and Father, and therefore should be represented. Furthermore, where the child was placed in her father's custody months before the lawsuit, David never has been returned to the custody of his Father. This gave the Butlers an expectation of permanency. Thus, the Butlers have a distinguishable and legally protected interest that entitles them to pursue their guardianship petition. [19] Finally, we note that the Family Court's decision to grant guardianship to the Butlers is not a permanent resolution of this situation. The Butlers now stand as David's legal guardians, not as his adoptive parents. The court ordered Father to undergo counseling at Delaware Guidance for parenting and mental health therapy. He must also complete a domestic violence/anger control course. The court granted visitation rights to both Mother and Father. Presumably, if Father or Mother can prove at a later time that David no longer is dependent/neglected, they may petition to re-establish their parental rights. In the meantime, we agree with the Family Court that it is in David's best interests to remain under the care of the Butlers. Therefore, we hold that the Family Court did not err as a matter of law in granting the Butlers standing to petition for guardianship.