Opinion ID: 2461173
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Heading: The public trust doctrine's emergence and development

Text: As noted, whether the disputed land is transferable turns on whether it is subject to the public trust doctrine and, if so, how that doctrine applies in Nevada. To answer those questions, we begin with a discussion of the public trust doctrine's origins and development.
The public trust doctrine is an ancient principle thought to be traceable to Roman law and the works of Emperor Justinian. See State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa 1989). Justinian derived the doctrine from the principle that the public possesses inviolable rights to certain natural resources, noting that [b]y the law of nature these things are common to mankindthe air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. The Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans. 5th London ed. 1876). He also stated that rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers, is common to all men. Id. § 2. The doctrine was thereafter adopted by the common law courts of England, which espoused the similar principle that title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high-water mark, is in the King and that such title is held subject to the public right. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894).
Courts in this country have readily embraced the public trust doctrine. In 1821, in the first notable American case to express public trust principles, the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed that citizens have a common right to sovereign-controlled waterways: The sovereign power itself ... cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J.1821). Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court similarly recognized that when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use. Martin et al. v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410, 16 Pet. 367, 10 L.Ed. 997 (1842). Fifty years later, in what has become the seminal public trust doctrine case, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892). In Illinois Central the Court noted that because the State of Illinois was admitted to the United States on equal footing with the original 13 colonies, it, like the colonies, was granted title to the navigable waters and the lands underneath them. Id. at 434, 13 S.Ct. 110. For Illinois, that meant that upon its admission, it held title to its portion of the waters of and lands beneath Lake Michigan. Id. at 434, 452, 13 S.Ct. 110. However, the waters and lands underneath Lake Michigan were not freely alienable by the State of Illinoisits title to those areas was different in character from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. Id. at 452, 13 S.Ct. 110. More specifically, it possessed only title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. Id. As a result, the Court concluded that the Illinois Legislature's attempted relinquishment of such trust property to the Illinois Central Railroad is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public.... The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace. Id. at 453, 13 S.Ct. 110. While the Court noted that such lands need not, under all circumstances, be perpetually held in trust, it recognized that in effecting transfers, the public interest is always paramount, providing that [t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. Id.
Although Nevada has never expressly adopted the public trust doctrine, our caselaw has adhered to several principles relevant to the existence of the public trust doctrine in this state. The following three cases illustrate that, while the doctrine was not formally adopted, this state has previously embraced the tenets on which it is based.
The first case in which we recognized concepts foundational to the public trust doctrine is a 1970 case, State Engineer v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 86 Nev. 872, 478 P.2d 159 (1970). Cowles involved an application with the State Engineer by the owner of lands adjoining the dry bed of Winnemucca Lake ... to drill a well on property located in the dry Winnemucca Lake bed. Id. at 873, 478 P.2d at 160. In determining whether the State Engineer could permissibly grant such an application, we noted that the state owns the waters and the beds beneath them, based on their navigable status at the time of statehood, providing that [w]hen a territory is endowed with statehood one of the many items its sovereignty includes is the grant from the federal government of all navigable bodies of water within the particular territory, whether they be rivers, lakes or streams. If the body of water is classified as non-navigable at the time of the creation of the state, the underlying land remains the property of the United States, but if it is navigable under the definition hereinafter stated, the water and the bed beneath it becomes the property of the state. Id. at 874, 478 P.2d at 160. Thus, Cowles set the foundation on which future cases involving public trust doctrine principles rest, by recognizing that navigable waterways are owned by the state.
We furthered the application of public trust doctrine principles with respect to state-owned navigable waterways two years later in State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 503 P.2d 1231 (1972). In Bunkowski, we reiterated `[i]t is settled law in this country' that, by virtue of a state's admission into the United States, `lands underlying navigable waters within [the] State belong to the State in its sovereign capacity.' Id. at 627, 503 P.2d at 1233 (quoting United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54, 46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465 (1926)). Significantly, we then pointed out that the state holds those lands in trust for its citizens, which prevents the transfer of those lands, absent proper legislative determination: It has been held, in what appears to be a majority of cases, that the states hold title to the beds of navigable watercourses in trust for the people of their respective states. Titles to navigable water beds are normally inalienable. In Alameda Conservation Association v. City of Alameda [264 Cal.App.2d 284], 70 Cal.Rptr. 264 (Cal.App. 1968), it was held that while the state owns land under bays, such lands can be transferred by the state free of trust upon proper legislative determination, citing People v. California Fish Co. [166 Cal. 576], 138 P. 79 (Cal.1913). Id. at 634, 503 P.2d at 1237-38 (citations omitted). In so recognizing, we implicitly acknowledged the public trust doctrine, ultimately concluding that [t]he State holds the subject lands in trust for public use.  Id. at 635, 503 P.2d at 1238 (emphasis added). Although we recognized that under certain circumstances the Legislature could alienate public trust lands without breaking the public trust, we did not further elaborate on that concept, apart from indicating that the Legislature must make an express and proper determination. Id. at 634, 503 P.2d at 1237-38. The cases we referenced, however, indicate that legislative conveyances of trust lands must account for the public's interest in maintaining such waterways for their public use. See, e.g., California Fish Co., 138 P. at 88.
The most recent case dealing with issues connected to the public trust doctrine, Mineral County v. State, Department of Conservation, 117 Nev. 235, 20 P.3d 800 (2001), was an original writ proceeding concerning rights to withdraw surface or groundwater from Walker River and Walker Lake. Id. Although this court denied the petition on procedural grounds, Justice Rose issued a concurring opinion expressing his belief that this court should finally affirmatively address the existence and role of the public trust doctrine in the State of Nevada. Id. at 246, 20 P.3d at 807 (Rose, J., concurring). Citing the seminal Supreme Court case, Illinois Central, Justice Rose emphasized that the state holds all land beneath Nevada's navigable waters in trust for the benefit of the state's citizenry, as an incident of Nevada's statehood. Id. Justice Rose further asserted that the public trust doctrine in Nevada is contained in NRS 533.025, which provides that `[t]he water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.' Id. at 247, 20 P.3d at 808. Regarding NRS 533.025, he wrote: This court has itself recognized that this public ownership of water is the most fundamental tenet of Nevada water law. Additionally, we have noted that those holding vested water rights do not own or acquire title to water, but merely enjoy a right to the beneficial use of the water. This right, however, is forever subject to the public trust, which at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible government action with respect to public trust resources. In this manner, then, the public trust doctrine operates simultaneously with the system of prior appropriation. Id. (quoting Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State of Nevada, 113 Nev. 1049, 1059, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (1997), and Kootenai Environ. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (1983)). Justice Rose noted that every Nevada citizen has a vested interest in the water from Walker River and expects the state's natural resources to be preserved. Id. at 248, 20 P.3d at 808. Finally, he described this court's vital role of ensuring the continuance of this stewardship: If the current law governing the water engineer does not clearly direct the engineer to continuously consider in the course of his work the public's interest in Nevada's natural water resources, then the law is deficient. It is then appropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to expressly reaffirm the engineer's continuing responsibility as a public trustee to allocate and supervise water rights so that the appropriations do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. [T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust. Our dwindling natural resources deserve no less. Id. at 248-49, 20 P.3d at 808-09 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892), and Nat. Audubon Soc. v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal.Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (1983)). [1]