Opinion ID: 167436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review of Mr. Sanchez-Juarez's sentence

Text: 24 Following Booker, [w]e review sentences imposed by the district court for reasonableness. United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 887 (10th Cir. 2006). In conducting this review, we consider whether the district court correctly applied the Guidelines and whether the ultimate sentence is reasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (10th Cir.2006) (per curiam). We have held that when a sentence falls within the properly-calculated Guidelines range, it is `entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.' Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d at 889 (quoting Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054). 25 As indicated above, Mr. Sanchez-Juarez does not challenge the district court's application of the Guidelines. However, he argues that the presumption of reasonableness does not apply here, even though his sentence falls on the low end of the correctly-calculated Guidelines range, and that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable, because the district court failed to state reasons for the sentence it imposed and failed to consider his arguments that the § 3553(a) factors warranted a sentence below the applicable Guidelines range. Alternatively, he contends that even if we apply the presumption, his arguments are sufficient to rebut it. 26 There is no question that, in addition to guiding our reasonableness review on appeal, the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) must be considered by the district court itself when imposing a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 5 Indeed, after Booker, these factors have a new vitality in channeling the exercise of sentencing discretion. United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir.2005). 27 As described above, Mr. Sanchez-Juarez argued at the district court's sentencing hearing that a number of factors warranted a below-Guidelines range sentence in this case and asked the court to impose a lower sentence than that calculated in the PSR. The court allowed Mr. Sanchez-Juarez to make these arguments and allowed the government to rebut them. Its decision to impose a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range may fairly be read as a functional rejection of Mr. Sanchez-Juarez's arguments and a denial of his request for a below-Guidelines sentence. However, the court stated no reasons for the sentence it imposed, other than first noting that it had reviewed the PSR's factual findings and considered the Guidelines applications, and then citing Mr. Sanchez-Juarez's offense conduct. The record indicates that at no time during the sentencing hearing or when imposing the sentence did the district court refer to the § 3553(a) factors. 6 28 Both before and after Booker, we have emphasized that we will `not demand that the district court recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider.' United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1161 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Contreras-Martinez, 409 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir.2005)) (further quotation omitted); see also United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1089, 163 L.Ed.2d 905 (2006); United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir.2004). However, this principle does not mean that we may simply presume the district court weighed a party's arguments in light of the § 3553(a) factors where the record provides no indication that it did so and no clear explanation of the sentence imposed. See McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n. 3 (noting that a district court need not use . . . magic words . . . is not a license for district courts to sentence without developing a sufficient record for appellate courts to review). 29 Before Booker, we addressed the district court's obligation to consider § 3553(a) factors when exercising its discretion in regard to sentencing decisions that were, even then, not subject to mandatory Guidelines. We held that although the district court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in § 3553(a), it must state its reasons for imposing a given sentence. United States v. Rose, 185 F.3d 1108, 1111 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation omitted); see also Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1305; United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir.2003); United States v. Zanghi, 209 F.3d 1201, 1204-05 (10th Cir.2000). We explained that the statutory requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) imposed a greater burden on district courts where their sentencing decisions involved an exercise of discretion. 7 In such cases, we stated, the court's failure to give reasons for its decision would leave us in a zone of speculation on appellate review. Rose, 185 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotation omitted). We further stated that it is not consistent with our appellate function simply to assume what the district court's reasons might be in such cases. Zanghi, 209 F.3d at 1205. 30 The Seventh Circuit has applied the same reasoning to its review of sentences imposed post- Booker, where the district court must similarly exercise its discretion in determining a reasonable sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir.2005) (observing that whenever a district judge is required to make a discretionary ruling that is subject to appellate review, we have to satisfy ourselves . . . that he exercised his discretion, that is, that he considered the factors relevant to that exercise). In Cunningham, although the district court had stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the appellate court held that its rote statement was insufficient when the court had passed over in silence the principal argument made by the defendant even though the argument was not so weak as not to merit discussion. Id.; see also Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 (adopting Cunningham rule). 31 The government argues that the question of the adequacy of the district court's explanation ha[s] been rendered moot by our decision in Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054, that a sentence within the Guidelines is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. Appellee's Br. at 22. However, we do not believe our recognition of a procedural requirement that a district court must state reasons for its rejection of a party's nonfrivolous motion is incompatible with the presumption that a sentence is reasonable in a substantive sense. 8 See McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n. 3 (distinguishing substantive and procedural components of reasonableness review). The district court record remains important to our review even applying the presumption. A district court's explanation will assist us in our determination of whether a party has successfully rebutted the presumption on appeal. Indeed, we must rely on the district court to resolve any factual disputes raised by the parties that are relevant to the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir.2005) (explaining that explicit factfinding is required if . . . contested facts are material to the judge's sentencing decision). Moreover, the fact that there is inevitably a range of sentences that could be held reasonable means that our affirmance of a sentence will necessarily defer, in effect, to the district court's exercise of discretion in choosing a particular sentence within that range. That being the case, our appellate role encompasses a limited inquiry into whether the district court did in fact exercise its discretion based on the 3553(a) factors, particularly since we have recognized that the Guidelines, though they incorporate these factors to a large extent, will not address all relevant factors in every case. United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 918-19 (10th Cir.2005). 32 We are therefore persuaded that our pre- Booker requirement that district courts provide sufficient reasons to allow meaningful appellate review of their discretionary sentencing decisions continues to apply in the post- Booker context. In particular, where a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has expressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from the record that the sentencing judge [did] not rest on the guidelines alone, but . . . consider[ed] whether the guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors. Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 676. But see id. at 678 (noting that arguments clearly without merit can . . . be passed over in silence); see also Lopez-Flores, 2006 WL 1000810, at  (holding § 3553(c) requirement was satisfied by general reference to Guidelines where the defendant has not raised any substantial contentions concerning non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors to which the district court was obligated to respond, where the defendant did not object below to the district court's failure to state reasons for its sentence, and where the sentence was at the low end of the Guidelines range). 33 Here, the argument Mr. Sanchez-Juarez raised at sentencing, and reiterates on appeal, concerning the incongruity between the actual conduct involved in his prior alien smuggling conviction and the 16-level increase suggested by the Guidelines is not clearly meritless. District courts have imposed below-Guidelines sentences because of such incongruities in other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 2006 WL 305462, at  (S.D.N.Y. Feb.6, 2006); United States v. Santos, 406 F.Supp.2d 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y.2005); United States v. Zapata-Trevino, 378 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1327 (D.N.M.2005); United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F.Supp.2d 958, 963 (E.D.Wis.2005). Furthermore, this court has indicated, when remanding a case based on nonconstitutional Booker error, that where § 2L1.2 imposed a 16-level enhancement but the actual offense conduct was relatively trivial, there was a reasonable probability that a district court exercising its discretion in light of the § 3553(a) factors would impose a below-Guidelines sentence. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 819. 9 34 Having identified one argument that is not clearly meritless and was raised at sentencing, we need not consider whether Mr. Sanchez-Juarez's other arguments might have merit. Rather, we remand to the district court with instructions to vacate Mr. Sanchez-Juarez's sentence and to resentence Mr. Sanchez-Juarez after considering his request that he receive a sentence below the applicable Guidelines range. In doing so, we in no way intend to express an opinion in regard to what the ultimate sentence should or should not be.