Opinion ID: 6323357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Operation of a Function-based Approach

Text: [¶31] A function-based approach begins with the dictionary definition of appurtenance that we cited in Sanford: a thing belongs to—and, thus, is appurtenant to—a public building if that thing is “integral” or “significantly connected” to the building’s function or purpose.3 2004 ME 73, ¶¶ 5, 9, 850 A.2d 325. We recognized in Sanford that appurtenances must be something other than personal property, but we mistakenly limited the definition to fixtures without considering that a parking lot, or similar realty, may be an appurtenance to a building. Id. ¶ 11. We explained: Appurtenances are things belonging to another thing as principal and which pass as incidents to the particular thing . . . . The term is commonly employed in connection with land conveyances to describe objects or things that pass to a grantee as an incident of the transfer. As used in conveyances, the term passes nothing but the land and such things as belong thereto and are a part of the realty. Alternatively, a thing may be an appurtenance if it is attached to a public building. See Sanford v. 3 Town Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d 325. To determine if an object is attached to a public building under a function-based approach, follow the fixture analysis outlined in Searle. 2010 ME 89, ¶¶ 16-21, 3 A.3d 390. 21 Id. ¶ 9 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 99 (1977)). In other words, an appurtenance belongs to a principal thing if it is incidental to the principal thing. In this context, “incident” means “[d]ependent upon, subordinate to, arising out of, or otherwise connected with.” Incident, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). An appurtenance is integral or significantly connected to a principal thing if it serves that principal thing’s essential purpose. [¶32] Our recent decision in McDonald highlights the practicality of a function-based approach, which we essentially employed to determine whether a plaza was a fixture. See 2020 ME 119, ¶ 16, 239 A.3d 662. We used the definition of fixture to determine whether a plaza “‘belong[ed]’ to” the Portland Police Department and, therefore, was an appurtenance to that public building. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15. We held the plaza was an appurtenance because it was (1) annexed to the Department, serving as the roof to a portion of the building; (2) “necessary for the proper function of the building” because the “lobby would be wholly inaccessible without the plaza”; and (3) “‘an irremovable part’” of the building as shown by “the annexation and essential nature of the plaza to the functioning of the Department building.” Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 22, 3 A.3d 390). 22 [¶33] This result was correct under our precedent only because we used a fixture-based approach, but the fact remains that a plaza is obviously not a fixture. As noted above, a fixture is “[p]ersonal property that is attached to land or a building and that is regarded as an irremovable part of the real property.” Fixture, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The plaza was intended to be irremovable not because of the purpose it serves when attached to the building, but because it is actually a part of the building. See McDonald, 2020 ME 119, ¶ 5, 239 A.3d 662. It never was and never could become freely movable personal property, and therefore it could never become a fixture as that term is commonly understood. But our reliance upon a fixture-based approach forced us to pretend otherwise. [¶34] In contrast, under a function-based approach, we would be free to hold that the plaza was an appurtenance not because it was a fixture but because it served the building’s essential purpose by enabling access and acting as a roof to a portion of the building. See id. ¶ 14 (“Our caselaw suggests that whether the plaza is an external part of the building or an appurtenance to the building is a distinction without a difference.”). It is integral to the building’s essential purpose because of its function, not because of the legal fiction that it 23 is a fixture. A function-based approach avoids the absurd fiction that we created in McDonald—that a plaza is a fixture. [¶35] Contrary to what this Court has previously said, a function-based approach does not “expand governmental liability by including personal property integral to the activities undertaken at a public building without regard to whether the property belongs or is attached to the building.” Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 11, 850 A.2d 325. Rather, a function-based approach confers the exact degree of liability the Legislature intended by immunizing governmental entities from negligent acts for which insurance is unavailable or too expensive while simultaneously affording citizens a remedy for injuries suffered through no fault of their own. 2 Legis. Rec. 1827 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Collins). A judicially-created, narrowly construed fixture-based approach to the public building exception to immunity results in an interpretation that contradicts the plain meaning of the statute and the clear intent of the Legislature. It expands immunity for the government and frustrates citizens who seek a remedy for injuries caused by the government’s negligence. Those fortunate enough to be injured in the government’s building will be compensated, while those injured in the government’s parking lot will not. 24