Opinion ID: 1298680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: viability of the negligence claim

Text: In a products-liability action premised on negligence, as in any negligence action, the plaintiff must prove the defendant breached a duty owed the plaintiff thereby proximately causing injury to the plaintiff. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1983); Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980). This court also determined in Donahue that as specific to a negligence products-liability action, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective, that the plaintiff's injury was caused by a defect in the product, and that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise due care. 5 F. Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 28.22 (2d ed. 1986). The existence of a duty is a question of law and unless reasonable men could not disagree, the question of whether the defendant exercised reasonable care and proximate cause is one for the trier of fact. Bettencourt, 735 P.2d 722. The threshold inquiry, in a negligence context, is the nature of the duty that Michelin, as manufacturer/seller, and Cobre Tire, as supplier/seller, may have owed to appellant upon product sale. With respect to the duty of a manufacturer: We have previously recognized that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to those who use its product. The manufacturer is required to exercise reasonable care in the planning, designing, and manufacturing of a product in order to ensure that it is reasonably safe to use. Donahue, 674 P.2d at 1280. As elaborated in defined duty: The manufacturer must exercise due care in the planning and design of the product, in its selection of materials, in the production or assembly process, in making reasonable tests and inspections to discover latent hazards involved in the use of its products, in preparing a product for the market, and in warning potential users of any dangers associated with the product. A manufacturer has a duty to know all of the hazardous qualities of its product and is responsible for making those hazards known to purchasers even when the product itself is not inherently dangerous. 1 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 10:14 at 27-28 (footnotes omitted). Further: A manufacturer has not necessarily satisfied its duty of care because its product functions as intended, since this would mean that there would be no liability for negligent design of a product which functioned as intended but which was designed in a fashion more dangerous than acceptable. Id. at § 10:12 at 24. The duty of care of a non-manufacturing seller is somewhat different. It is described generally as: Sellers of products of all kinds are subject to a duty of ordinary and reasonable care, that is, the duty to exercise the care that a prudent person in the same circumstances would exercise. Id. at § 10:40 at 60 (footnote omitted). More specifically: Where the seller of an article reasonably must know that if it is defective it will be imminently dangerous to persons likely to come into contact with the article, the seller has a duty to use ordinary care to ascertain the condition of the article and to see that it is safe, especially where by representations or warranties that the article is safe the seller induces the sale.    A seller of a product manufactured by another is not presumed to have knowledge of a defect in the article sold, and if a product is received from a reputable source of supply the retail seller may assume that the manufacturer has done its duty in properly constructing the product and in not placing upon the market a product which is defective and likely to inflict injury, and is under no affirmative duty to inspect or test for a latent defect.    A seller will seldom be liable for negligent design, since design in most instances involves questions of specialized knowledge which the retailer cannot be expected to have. Id. at § 10:40 at 61 (footnotes omitted). In Controlled Atmosphere, Inc. v. Branom Instrument Co., 50 Wash. App. 343, 748 P.2d 686, 690 (1988), that court said: A seller of an item which was manufactured by a third party is not generally liable for harm caused by the dangerous character of the item if the seller did not know or had no reason to know the item was, or was likely to be, dangerous. Pertinent to the facts of the instant case, however, is the observation that a higher than ordinary degree of care is required of a seller who installs or otherwise services a product. See Kitchener v. Williams, 171 Kan. 540, 236 P.2d 64 (1951). Following discernment of an issue of defect, the next inquiry requires analysis whether a congruent factual issue exists regarding Michelin's alleged failure to exercise due care in placing these tires upon the market. Appellant contends that no evidence was presented by Michelin that they had tested these tires on this type of scraper nor was a tire history established. This contention has merit because, in a products-liability action based on negligence, if a product is shown to be defective, it may be inferred that the defect was due to negligence in the manufacture or inspection of the product. Morris v. Chrysler Corp., 208 Neb. 341, 303 N.W.2d 500 (1981) and cases therein cited. Once negligence can be inferred, the burden of production of evidence to rebut the presumption shifts to the manufacturer. Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Jones, 246 Ala. 478, 21 So.2d 327 (1945). See Davies v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 91 Mich. App. 347, 282 N.W.2d 172 (1978) and 1 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 14:2 at 13 and § 14:18 at 24. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Michelin submitted the affidavit of Gary Workman. Workman testified that he had never received complaints or criticisms concerning the use of these specific Michelin radial tires in connection with earth-moving operations prior to the sale of Cobre Tire who, in turn, sold them to Bridger. He further testified that other customers had expressed satisfaction with the tires. It is observed, however, that evidence of no prior accidents is not admissible to prove due care. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Ferguson, 271 Ala. 120, 122 So.2d 356 (1959); Edison v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 168 Cal. App.2d 429, 336 P.2d 286 (1959). I conclude that Michelin did not present sufficient evidence to exclude the inference of negligence. Summary judgment was inappropriate on the issue of Michelin's exercise of reasonable care in the design and sale of these tires for this machine as involved in this use. The third criterion for liability within appellant's negligence theory invokes analysis of the nature of proximate cause. Proximate cause may be established by circumstantial evidence in conjunction with or in the absence of direct evidence. Bettencourt, 735 P.2d 722. This court has said that whether a breach of duty is a proximate cause of injury is a question of fact by the jury to determine unless the evidence demonstrates that reasonable minds could not disagree. England, 728 P.2d at 1143 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983). In Buckley, 703 P.2d at 1091-92 (quoting Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 794 (1921)), we defined proximate or legal causation as: [T]hat conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries identified in the complaint.    [I]f the conduct is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause produces the injury without which the result would not have occurred, it must be identified as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. In McClellan, 666 P.2d at 414, we observed that: [T]he ultimate test concerning proximate cause will be whether the vendor could foresee injury to a third person.             A defendant is usually relieved of liability by an unforeseeable intervening cause.    However, an intervening cause does not relieve an earlier actor of liability if it was reasonably foreseeable. Finally, we have said in regard to the grant of summary judgment upon the issue of causation in a negligence case that where the discovery materials or unrefuted allegations disclose a duty and a breach of that duty, we treat the existence of the element of causation as more probable than its nonexistence; and we require the issue to be submitted to the trier of fact. Bettencourt, 735 P.2d at 729. [7] The evidence established that before the accident, Michelin and Cobre Tire were aware of and had made unavailing attempts to remedy the abnormal bounce and vibration problems associated with the dirt-hauling usage of the Michelin radial tires. Clearly, upon the evidence in the record, reasonable men could disagree as to whether negligence in sale as well as the tires was a proximate cause (related and reasonably related) of appellant's injury, and thus the claim of initial negligence in sale was not amenable to summary judgment. Cf. England, 728 P.2d 1137. [8]