Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Limitations on Attack on Police Investigation

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of certain witnesses with which he hoped to show that the police had failed to consider other suspects. Defendant first complains that the trial court erroneously sustained the prosecution's objections to his attempts to question Ahmad Seihoon at the suppression motion about what Seihoon said to police when they interviewed him the day after Nicole's disappearance. Seihoon was questioned in connection with defendant's Franks challenge to the search warrant. ( Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667.) The trial court sustained the prosecution's objection that the content of Seihoon's interview with police was irrelevant for purposes of his Franks challenge and constituted an improper attempt at discovery. The trial court's ruling was correct in the context of defendant's Franks motion. Other than speculating Seihoon may have said something to the police that they omitted from the affidavit, defendant failed to establish the relevance of the content of Seihoon's interview vis-ā-vis his Franks claim. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 [A defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause].) It was therefore properly excluded. Next, defendant recycles his claim that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of Detective Price regarding the three men in the van. Since, as we have concluded, there was insufficient evidence to connect these unknown men to the crime for third party culpability purposes, whether or not Detective Price ascertained their identities was irrelevant and the trial court properly sustained the prosecution's objection on both relevance and Evidence Code section 352 grounds. For the same reason, we reject defendant's claim that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of Detective Price regarding two potential witnesses, Heather Williams and Harold Dachs, Jr. In his offer of proof, defense counsel claimed Williams and Dachs told police they had observed individuals outside the [defendant's] apartment who fit some of the statements that Mr. Panah has said to have made about other individuals being involved in this.... In response to the trial court's inquiry about whether they were going to appear as witnesses, defense counsel asserted that the police had failed to keep track of them, rendering them unavailable. The trial court sustained the prosecution's relevance objection. We perceive no error. As with the men in the van, the offer of proof as to Williams and Dachs was grossly inadequate to support the admission of the evidence as third party culpability evidence and was therefore properly excluded as irrelevant. Finally, defendant claims the trial court improperly restricted his cross-examination of Detective Price regarding whether Price had examined for fingerprints the suitcase in which Nicole's body was found. Defense counsel first asked Price if he had had the suitcase fingerprinted, to which Price answered in the negative. He then asked whether he cause[d] any part of it to be fingerprinted? Again, Detective Price answered no. Defense counsel then asked, [t]he outside? At that point the prosecutor objected on the grounds the question had been asked and answered. The court sustained the objection. The trial court's ruling was proper; the question was clearly repetitive. ( People v. Kronemyer (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 352, 234 Cal.Rptr. 442 [The control of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court, permitting it to curtail cross-examination relating to matters already covered or irrelevant].) Because we reject defendant's claim that the trial court's restrictions on the cross-examination of these witnesses deprived him of the opportunity to present a defense by attacking the police investigation, we also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial on this ground. [32]