Opinion ID: 684593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conditions at Danville

Text: 43 Finally, the plaintiff maintains that heating problems in Danville Correctional Center's segregation unit caused him to suffer the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. The court disagrees. 44 In assessing whether prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the court examines the totality of the conditions of confinement. DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir.1988). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials at least to maintain minimal sanitary and safe prison conditions, see DeMallory, 855 F.2d at 445, as well as to provide minimal exercise, showers, clothing, and sanitary eating conditions. Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir.1985). However, [p]risons are not required to provide and prisoners cannot expect to receive the services of a good hotel. Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir.1988). 45 The unsatisfactory heating system at Danville does not rise to the level of constitutional magnitude. The defendants admit that construction defects, as well as destructive inmates, have caused heating problems in the institution's segregation unit. However, the plaintiff admits that space heaters are provided and the defendants state that temperatures taken in the individual segregation cells, even during periods of severely cold weather, have been within acceptable tolerances [i.e., rarely, if ever below 62 degrees and generally considerably warmer]. 46 The court rejects the plaintiff's argument that steel-reinforced cells are appreciably, or at least unconstitutionally, colder. The defendants state that the reinforced cells, which were constructed when a number of incorrigible inmates destroyed cells that were not reinforced, are heated in the same manner as all other cells in the segregation unit. Even if metal is cooler to the touch than other building materials, the court is unpersuaded that the plaintiff's placement in steel-reinforced cells constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 47 As the defendants also point out, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the subjective component necessary for Eighth Amendment liability. See Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.1992). The defendants have made, and continue to make, efforts to correct the heating problems in the segregation unit. No reasonable person could find that the defendants have acted with the subjective intent to cause the plaintiff suffering. Furthermore, the court again notes that the plaintiff might enjoy more comfortable surroundings if he simply refrained from engaging in his typically destructive and disorderly behavior, which compels his placement in the segregation unit's most spartan cells. 48 In sum, no material facts are in dispute, 4 and the court concludes that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The record demonstrates that the defendants have not deprived the plaintiff of meaningful access to the courts, have not acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and have not subjected him to cruel and unusual conditions of confinement. Because no reasonable person could find in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. 49 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss (docket # 45) is allowed. The plaintiff's claim relating to the use of leg irons is dismissed with prejudice as a matter already adjudged pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket # 56) is allowed. The Clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The case is terminated. The parties are to bear their own costs. 51 /s/ Harold A. Baker HAROLD A. BAKER