Opinion ID: 506169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: contingent plea arrangements

Text: 151 Strickland agreed to testify in exchange for a promise that the government would advise the sentencing judge of the full nature, extent, and value of the cooperation provided. Tr. 79 (emphasis added). The plea agreement further provided that if Strickland made any false statements or commit[ted] any perjury ... the United States will have the right to terminate this agreement and prosecute him for any and all offenses that can be brought. Tr. 81. 152 Bell argues that Strickland's testimony should have been stricken because it represented the fruits of a prohibited contingent plea arrangement. Strickland's incentive to lie was overwhelming, says Bell, because the government's sentence recommendation would be inversely related to the value of his testimony, i.e., how many people he was instrumental in convicting. Bell points to Strickland's cross-examination as demonstrating that Strickland understood the condition as a contingent plea arrangement, but Strickland testified that he understood value to mean about what crimes that have been committed, and may be committed, am I giving information. Tr. 1464-65. Bell argues Strickland's testimony is inherently untrustworthy and must be stricken under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Brief for Bell at 46-50. 153 In United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir.1984), on which Bell largely relies, the government promised its main witness that it would recommend a reduction in his sentence if and only if his testimony led to further indictments. The court reversed the conviction, holding that the agreement between the government and the witness was nothing more than an invitation to perjury having no place in our constitutional system. 732 F.2d at 1531. The panel's opinion in Waterman was subsequently vacated following an en banc vote that produced an equally divided court. Id. at 1533, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 105 S.Ct. 2138, 85 L.Ed.2d 496 (1985). It has no precedential value, even within the Eighth Circuit. E.g., United States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932, 936 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 876, 93 L.Ed.2d 830 (1987). 154 In another case cited by Bell, United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 800 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.1986), a government informer was hired to gather information on a particular individual. The informer's pay was dependent on his effectiveness in gathering information and testifying against the targeted individual. The court held that use of the informer's testimony violated due process. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the Cervantes-Pacheco panel opinion, and held instead that an informant who is promised a contingent fee by the government is not disqualified from testifying.... [I]t is up to the jury to evaluate the credibility of the compensated witness. 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762 (1988). 155 The agreement between the government and Strickland was less akin to these contingent arrangements than to a typical plea bargain under which an accomplice agrees to testify in exchange for a promise of a reduced sentence. Courts uniformly hold that such a witness may testify so long as the government's bargain with him is fully ventilated so that the jury can evaluate his credibility. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 (citing United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 198-200 (1st Cir.1985)); see also Spector, 793 F.2d at 937 & n. 3, and cases cited; United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1240-41 (11th Cir.) (testimony permitted despite agreement in which government would inform sentencing judge of value to the Government of defendant's testimony and make a recommendation based upon a subjective evaluation by the Government of the nature and scope of cooperation), modified in different part, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1377, 94 L.Ed.2d 692 (1987). 156 Although conditioning the sentencing recommendation on the value of the witness' testimony may in some cases create a greater incentive to lie, the likelihood of perjury is clearly not enough as to require a per se rule excluding such testimony. The value of Strickland's testimony was not necessarily tied to the success of the prosecutions, and Strickland did not so testify. Tr. 1464-65. See Dailey, 759 F.2d at 197 (upholding value agreement). Moreover, the sentencing recommendation was conditioned on truthful testimony, which surely must encourage veracity. E.g., United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.1985) (requirement of truthful testimony negates inference of inducement to testify falsely (citing Dailey, 759 F.2d at 197)), amended on other grounds, 791 F.2d 707 (9th Cir.1986). Finally, the agreement itself was the subject of extensive cross-examination. The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of the witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311, 87 S.Ct. 408, 418, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966). Under the circumstances of this case, admission of Strickland's testimony was permissible.