Opinion ID: 894541
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Heading: Governmental Immunity From Nuisance Claims

Text: We next consider whether the City conclusively established governmental immunity from the Jenningses' nuisance claim. A city is immune from liability for its governmental actions unless that immunity is waived. City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex.1995). Operation of a sewer system is a governmental function. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.0215(a)(32). Therefore, the City will not be liable for damage resulting from its operation of the sewer system without a clear waiver of governmental immunity. Plaintiffs contend, however, that nuisance actions are an exception to the general rule of immunity. They cite our decision in Gotcher v. City of Farmersville for the proposition that governmental entities are not immune from nuisance claims. 137 Tex. 12, 151 S.W.2d 565 (1941). In Gotcher, parents sued the City of Farmersville after their child drowned in a city-owned cesspool; the parents alleged that the cesspool constituted an attractive nuisance. Id. We held that the City was not liable because the child was not upon the premises because of any attraction or allurement of the cesspool. Id. at 567. Nevertheless, we noted in dicta that [t]here are authorities which hold that a municipality is liable for damages caused by maintenance of a nuisance, even though the municipality in maintaining the same is engaged in the exercise of a governmental function, and we concluded that in order to create liability for the maintenance of a nuisance, the nuisance must in some way constitute an unlawful invasion of the rights of others. Id. at 566. Plaintiffs' reliance on Gotcher is misplaced, however; that case did not create an exception to the general rule of municipal immunity. The court of appeals opinion affirmed by this Court in Gotcher made clear that governmental liability for nuisance arose from Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 139 S.W.2d 361, 362-363 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1940, writ granted) aff'd 137 Tex. 12, 151 S.W.2d 565 (1941). The court of appeals explicitly noted that while cities may be held liable for depreciation in value of land and for physical discomfort resulting from nuisances in the exercise of governmental functions [and] in the operation of sewerage plants, liability in such cases is bottomed on the inhibition of the Constitution, both Federal and State, that property cannot be appropriated without due compensation, even though appropriated in the exercise of governmental functions. Id. The Dallas Court of Appeals has similarly concluded that the claimed `nuisance' exception to the rule of municipal immunity to tort liability exists only when the immunity is expressly waived, as by the Tort Claims Act, and by article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, which provides that no person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for a public purpose without adequate compensation. Bragg v. City of Dallas, 605 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (citation omitted). We agree that nuisance liability arises only when governmental immunity is clearly and unambiguously waived. In some cases, the Tort Claims Act may waive immunity from certain nuisance claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.021. In other cases, a city may be held liable for a nuisance that rises to the level of a constitutional taking. See City of Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153, 159 (Tex.1963) ([I]f the construction and operation of the plant results in a nuisance, such acts of the municipality constitute a damaging or taking of property under Section 17 of Article I of the Texas Constitution.). In this case, we have already concluded that the City lacked the requisite intent to be held liable under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Because the plaintiffs do not assert any other potential waiver of immunity, we conclude that the City is immune from the plaintiffs' nuisance claim.