Opinion ID: 399438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of the district court's order under the action-forcing provisions of the APA.

Text: 8 Not every agency delay in responding to a matter presented to it warrants court action under sections 555(b) and 706(1) of the APA. A court may find agency inaction the equivalent of a dismissal or denial of the requested agency action only when the delay is unreasonable and results in serious prejudice to one of the parties. EEOC v. Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d at 1216; Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d at 747; EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F.Supp. 1002, 1004 (N.D.Ga.1976). In the instant case, the district court found both unreasonable delay and serious prejudice: 9 More than 16 months have passed since Ms. Houseton prevailed before the Appeals Review Board. Under the circumstances of this case, this delay of more than 16 months is unreasonable. 10 The failure of the Government to act ... causes plaintiff irreparable injury since she is not receiving the training to which she is entitled. 11 We cannot say that either of these findings is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, on the facts of this case, we hold that the district court acted properly when it found EEOC delay in processing the VA's reconsideration request equivalent to a dismissal of that request. 12 Once the EEOC was deemed to have denied the VA reconsideration request, the CSC decision of June 20, 1978, favorable to Houseton became the final agency action in this case and the proper subject of an enforcement order. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) (in Title VII case district court may order appropriate relief); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.235(b) (1980) (once reconsideration request denied, final agency decision shall be implemented). 13 The decision of the district court ordering the VA to provide Houseton with appraiser training and awarding her attorney's fees, is, therefore, AFFIRMED.