Opinion ID: 419923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reconsideration of Prior Appellate Decision

Text: 31 Appellee Bureau urges that if we find the prior decision controlling on the district court, we should nevertheless reconsider it. A second prong of the law of the case doctrine, however, encompasses adherence by an appellate court to its own decision at an earlier stage of the litigation. United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 n. 6 (2d Cir.1977). As we have noted on numerous occasions, we view this aspect of the law of the case doctrine as one of sound, albeit not inexorable, practice. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 87 (2d Cir.1980); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir.1979) (Crane III ); United States v. Fernandez, 506 F.2d 1200, 1203 (2d Cir.1974). Accord Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 329 U.S. 607, 612, 67 S.Ct. 583, 585, 91 L.Ed. 547 (1947). We have repeatedly stated we will not depart from this sound policy absent cogent or compelling reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 506 F.2d at 1203-04; Dale v. Hahn, 486 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826, 95 S.Ct. 44, 42 L.Ed.2d 50 (1974). The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 4478, at 790 (1981) (footnote omitted); see Melong v. Micronesian Claims Commission, 643 F.2d 10, 17 (D.C.Cir.1980); White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir.1967). 32 In the previous section we discussed and rejected the Bureau's new evidence claim. We similarly reject the Bureau's characterization of the prior appellate decision as clear error leading to manifest injustice. 7 33 We turn then to the Bureau's claim that the intervening decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), has altered the applicable standard of liability under section 1983. 8 Romeo involved a section 1983 damage suit. The Court held that mentally retarded persons involuntarily confined in a state institution for the retarded have substantive rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated that professional caretakers violate these rights only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. Id. 102 S.Ct. at 2462 (footnote omitted). In so stating, the Court adopted what is essentially a gross negligence standard. 34 Even if the Romeo standard of liability is applicable outside of an institutional setting, it is not more favorable to the Bureau than the deliberate indifference test which was applied in Doe I. The deliberate indifference test stemmed from the decision in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), where the Court held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and stated a cause of action under section 1983. The Romeo Court, however, stated that it was error to apply the deliberate indifference standard when considering the due process rights of retarded persons involuntarily committed. 102 S.Ct. at 2456 n. 11. Such persons are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. 102 S.Ct. at 2461 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291). Thus the standard of liability which Anna was required to meet in this case may have been stricter than that suggested by the Romeo opinion. Consequently, we reject the Bureau's assertion that the Romeo decision has effected a change in the controlling law so as to make our prior decision clear error, 9 and hold that the plaintiff was entitled to her jury verdict under the law of the case.