Opinion ID: 768074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is McInnis either disabled or regarded as disabled?

Text: 17 The magistrate judge properly identified the relevant standards for defining and determining when one is disabled under the ADA. A disability under the ADA is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102. A major life activity, as defined by the EEOC regulations includes such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. And one is substantially limited' in a major life activity if he is: 18 (i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or 19 (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 20 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Furthermore, an individual may be regarded as disabled if he has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but nonetheless is treated by a covered entity as constituting such a limitation. See id. 21 With respect to whether McInnis is actually disabled, we note that the analysis of whether a plaintiff's claimed impairment interferes with a major life activity in such a substantial way as to constitute a disability requires an individualized inquiry. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999). ACCD argues that McInnis has failed to articulate with specificity any substantial limitation of his ability to perform everyday activities, and that what he has alleged is only mild difficulty in walking, speaking, and performing manual tasks. ACCD notes that McInnis claims only that, as a result of an automobile accident, he has somewhat slurred speech (which he calls an expressive language disorder (ELD)), a slight limp which is exaggerated when he is fatigued, and stiffness and fatigue in his hands which prohibit him from properly forming script letters. ACCD also notes that when provided an opportunity to disclose any physical limitations that would affect his ability to perform his job functions on his employment application, he responded none. 22 ACCD cites several cases in support of its contention that the mild impairmentssuffered by McInnis do not rise to the level of disability under the ADA. See Talk v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1022-1025 (5th Cir. 1999); Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 480 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2392 (1999); McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn. 1998). However, as noted above, disability determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis, without strict categorical reliance on disability determinations made in prior cases as establishing per se disability or non-disability. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 23 In the circumstances of this case, we need not reach the issue of whether McInnis was actually disabled because, even if he does not suffer from an actual disability, McInnis may still recover if his employer regards him as being disabled. As will be discussed below our review of the record of this case leads us to conclude that there remains a genuine factual issue as to whether McInnis was regarded as disabled by his employer. 24 In order to be regarded as disabled a plaintiff must: (1) have a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities, but be treated as such by an employer; (2) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, but only because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or (3) have no actual impairment at all, but be treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting impairment. See Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1121. The plaintiff also must establish that the impairment, if it existed as perceived, would be substantially limiting. See Deas, 152 F.3d at 476. 25 McInnis appropriately relies on the testimony of ACCD's ADA compliance coordinator that she could tell from his file that he was either disabled or perceived as disabled by ACCD. Perhaps understandably, ACCD fails to address this damaging testimony in its brief. McInnis also relies on former President Skinner's letter in which he told McInnis that his transfer was an accommodation for his handicap. ACCD counters that Skinner was not a decision maker in the adverse employment action taken against McInnis (contract non-renewal), that the statement was made prior to enactment of the ADA, 2 and that there is no evidence that Skinner understood the legal meaning of the terms handicap and reasonable accommodation. 26 ACCD also argues that merely because it may have been aware of a disability, that does not require a finding that it perceived McInnis as disabled. And according to ACCD, there is no evidence that President Vela or anyone whom he consulted prior to deciding not to renew McInnis's contract viewed McInnis as being substantially limited in any major life activity. 27 McInnis argues that he need only establish that he was regarded as unable to perform or significantly restricted in performing a major life activity (speech). He argues that the reasonable accommodation provided by Skinner in transferring him to teaching only was to allow him to perform his essential job functions in spite of his disability (that is, his substantially limited major life activity of speech). 28 Construing all of the evidence and factual inferences in favor of McInnis, especially the testimony of ACCD's own ADA compliance coordinator, and irrespective of whether he suffered an actual disability, there is ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that ACCD perceived or regarded McInnis as disabledbecause he was substantially limited in his major life activity of speaking. 29