Opinion ID: 549855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-1985 Authority

Text: 35 Prior to the 1985 reenactment and amendments to the EAJA, 6 the requirement for filing a timely attorney's fee application merely provided that a party seeking such an award shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application.... 7 No definition of what should be considered a final judgment to start the EAJA clock ticking, however, was included in the Act. As a result, courts assumed divergent definitions as to what constituted a final judgment. Some courts interpreted this statutory directive as requiring a private party who prevailed in the district court to file a request for EAJA attorney's fees within thirty days of the judgment entered by the district court. See, e.g., McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir.1983). Accord Gold Kist, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 741 F.2d 344 (11th Cir.1984). Under this line of cases, first suggested by the Ninth Circuit in McQuiston, the phrase final judgment in the EAJA was construed in accordance with that phrase's common usage in contexts such as 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 54. McQuiston, 707 F.2d at 1085. 36 Other courts took strong exception with this conclusion. See McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir.1983). Accord Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir.1985); Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 764 F.2d 341, 344-49 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds on reh'g, 775 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir.1985); Feldpausch v. Heckler, 763 F.2d 229, 232 (6th Cir.1985); Massachusetts Union of Public Housing, Inc. v. Pierce, 755 F.2d 177, 180 (D.C.Cir.1985); Taylor v. United States, 749 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir.1984). The position of these courts was articulated in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in McDonald. The McDonald court noted that the phrase final judgment has no fixed meaning, but instead takes on varied definitions depending upon the context. Accordingly, the court approached the issue by looking at the practical consequences of the Ninth Circuit's rule in McQuiston. The McDonald court noted that the EAJA's legislative purpose was to facilitate the ability of individuals with limited economic resources to vindicate their rights. 726 F.2d at 315. In contrast, the court observed, a rule requiring successful parties to file an EAJA application within thirty days of the district court's judgment had the potential of placing an undue and unnecessary burden on the private party. Such a rule, the court reasoned, could require private parties to file multiple fee applications--one at the close of the district court proceedings, and additional applications should the party successfully defend the district court's judgment on appeal. See id. at 314. 37 Additionally, the court noted that the McQuiston rule could frequently place the claimant at a distinct strategic disadvantage: 38 An additional consideration is that to force the claimant to put in his fee application within 30 days of the filing of the final judgment in the district court, which is to say before the government need file its notice of appeal, delivers into the hands of the government a potent, acknowledged, and from the standpoint of the policy of the Equal Access to Justice Act perverse weapon for discouraging meritorious fee applications. As this case demonstrates, the government is unlikely to pursue an appeal where the stakes are only $652.50. Its adversary knows this and knows also that if he increases the stakes to the government by applying for fees, the government (as it emphasized to us in its briefs and at argument) will be more likely to appeal the underlying judgment. Thus, if Mrs. McDonald's counsel had to decide whether to apply for fees before the government had to decide whether to pursue the appeal, he would have faced an exquisite dilemma: forgo any fee application and thereby preserve the wretched pittance that his client had wrung from the Social Security Administration only after bringing a review proceeding in a federal district court, or jeopardize her judgment in the hope of getting a reasonable fee for his work. The framers of the Equal Access to Justice Act could not have meant to create such a dilemma when they used the words final judgment without in all likelihood considering what the words might mean in the setting of the present case. They wanted to make it easier, not harder, for people of limited means to collect their small claims from the government. See H.R.Rep. No. 1418[, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4953]. 39 Id. at 315. 40 Because the McQuiston rule ill-served the purposes underlying the EAJA, the McDonald court declined to adopt its rather stringent filing requirement. Instead, the McDonald court adopted a significantly more functional approach: in order for an EAJA fee to be considered timely filed, the court required claimants to file their petitions no later than thirty days after the trial court's judgment was no longer contestable through the appellate process. Id. at 313. Under this rule, a claimant could elect to file a fee petition within thirty days of the district court's judgment; however, a fee petition filed within thirty days after it became evident that the government would not be taking any additional appeals of the district court's judgment--e.g., the government's time for taking an appeal expired or the government gave clear notice that it would not be pursuing an appeal--would also be considered timely filed. See id. at 314-16. 41