Opinion ID: 1981608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Due Process and Benefit of the Bargain

Text: In the case at bar, defendant contends that his constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated because he pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, but received a different, more onerous sentence than the one he agreed to. We agree. As discussed earlier, the Court held in Santobello that, when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such a promise must be fulfilled. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433. By this holding, the Court recognized that plea agreements may be enforceable on constitutional grounds. In other words, if a defendant shows that his plea of guilty was entered in reliance on a plea agreement, he may have a due process right to enforce the terms of the agreement. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 443-44 (1984); People v. Navarroli, 121 Ill.2d 516, 522, 118 Ill.Dec. 414, 521 N.E.2d 891 (1988) (defendant who enters a guilty plea in reliance upon the promise of the prosecutor is entitled to a remedy when the prosecutor breaches that promise). This is because a plea bargain, once embodied in the judgment of a court, deprives a defendant of liberty and other constitutionally protected interests. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 507-08, 104 S.Ct. at 2546, 81 L.Ed.2d at 442. This court recognized the constitutional underpinnings of plea agreements in People v. Evans, 174 Ill.2d 320, 326-27, 220 Ill.Dec. 332, 673 N.E.2d 244 (1996), when we held: Courts must keep in mind that the defendant's `underlying contract right is constitutionally based and therefore reflects concerns that differ fundamentally from and run wider than those of commercial contract law.' [Citation.] As a result, the application of contract law principles to plea agreements may require tempering in some instances. In Evans, we consolidated the appeals of two defendants who had entered negotiated pleas of guilty in exchange for specific sentences and, subsequently, brought motions to reduce their sentences. Applying the principles first espoused in Santobello, we held in Evans that when a defendant enters a negotiated plea of guilty in exchange for specified benefits, such as the dismissal of certain counts or the promise of a certain sentence or sentencing recommendation, both the State and the defendant must be bound by the terms of the agreement. Evans, 174 Ill.2d at 327, 220 Ill.Dec. 332, 673 N.E.2d 244. Although, in Evans, we were concerned with the constitutionality of holding defendants to the terms of their negotiated plea agreements, we quoted with favor United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1986), for the proposition that [n]either side should be able, any more than would private contracting parties, unilaterally to renege or seek modification simply because of uninduced mistake or change of mind. We concluded that, [i]n effect, the defendants are seeking to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentences to which they had earlier agreed and that it would be inconsistent with constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness to allow defendants to attempt to unilaterally reduce their sentences. Evans, 174 Ill.2d at 328, 220 Ill.Dec. 332, 673 N.E.2d 244. In the case at bar, defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The terms of the plea agreement, as set forth by the prosecutor at the plea hearing, included a specific sentence of 25 years. The trial court ratified this agreement and failed to admonish defendant, as required by Supreme Court Rule 402, that a mandatory supervised release term would be added to the sentence defendant had agreed to. Under these circumstances, we conclude that adding the statutorily required three-year MSR term to defendant's negotiated 25-year sentence amounts to a unilateral modification and breach of the plea agreement by the State, inconsistent with constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness. We believe this conclusion is in conformity with earlier decisions of this court and with decisions reached by other jurisdictions. In People v. McCoy, 74 Ill.2d 398, 24 Ill.Dec. 555, 385 N.E.2d 696 (1979), the defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging that the court's failure to admonish him at the time of his plea of guilty that the mandatory parole term was a part of the sentence was per se a constitutional violation entitling him to post-conviction relief. McCoy, 74 Ill.2d at 401, 24 Ill.Dec. 555, 385 N.E.2d 696. We rejected this claim, holding that the quid pro quo for the plea of guilty was the [prosecutor's] recommendation that there be concurrent sentences of 1 to 3 years [and] defendant knew that the court was not bound to accept the recommendation and could sentence defendant to a term of not less than 1 nor more than 20 years. (Emphasis added.) McCoy, 74 Ill.2d at 403, 24 Ill.Dec. 555, 385 N.E.2d 696. We concluded that, although it was error for the court to have omitted the admonishment, the error was not of constitutional dimension because defendant was not prejudicedthe indeterminate sentence imposed, together with the mandatory parole period, [was] substantially less than the maximum of 20 years to which defendant knew he could be sentenced. Under the facts of that case, then, there were no grounds for granting the defendant relief on his postconviction petition. Defendant received a sentence that was less than the maximum sentence he was told he could receive and, as a result, the omitted admonition did not affect the voluntariness of the plea. McCoy, 74 Ill.2d at 403, 24 Ill.Dec. 555, 385 N.E.2d 696. Moreover, because the State promised only to recommend a sentence, defendant received the benefit of the bargain he made with the State. Significantly, in McCoy, we considered decisions issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir.1977), and United States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.1977), but found them to be factually distinguishable. McCoy, 74 Ill.2d at 403-04, 24 Ill.Dec. 555, 385 N.E.2d 696. In Baker and Ferris, the defendants, like the defendant in the case at bar, entered pleas of guilty in exchange for the promise of a specific sentence and were not informed by the court, prior to the court's acceptance of their plea, that a statutorily required mandatory period of parole would be attached to the prison sentence. [4] Having been denied relief in state court, the defendants sought writs of habeas corpus. The Baker court ruled that the defendant's due process rights had been violated, holding: The correct test to be used in determining whether the circumstances surrounding Baker's negotiated guilty plea violated the Due Process Clause is that the plea must withstand collateral attack unless the sentence actually imposed upon Baker significantly differed from the sentence which the prosecutor and the trial court promised him. Baker, 551 F.2d at 183. Citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498-99, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432-33 (1971), the Baker court held that the addition of the mandatory parole term made defendant's sentence more onerous than what he had been promised and, as a result, he did not receive the benefit of the bargain he had made with the State. The Baker court concluded that, because the defendant had entered his plea in exchange for a specific sentence, the failure of the prosecutor and the trial court to advise Baker of the mandatory parole term created a defect of constitutional dimension in his guilty plea in that the guilty plea was unfairly induced in violation of the Due Process Clause. Baker, 551 F.2d at 181, 184. In Ferris, the court relied on its decision in Baker and concluded that Ferris, too, had been substantially prejudiced by the additional parole term, and that due process notions of fundamental fairness required that he receive the benefit of the bargain he had struck. Distinguishing Baker and Ferris from the situation in McCoy, we held that Baker and Ferris differed in that the defendants' negotiated plea agreements in those cases had been, not just for a sentencing recommendation, but for the promise of a particular prison sentence. Thus, in McCoy, we suggested that the result might have been different had McCoy's negotiated plea been for the promise of a specific sentence. Since McCoy, our appellate court has had several opportunities to consider, both in the context of direct appeals and postconviction proceedings, whether a defendant's due process rights are violated by a trial court's failure to admonish the defendant that a mandatory supervised release term will be added to the term of incarceration. Generally, our appellate court has drawn a distinction, as suggested in McCoy, between open guilty pleas and negotiated pleas for a specific sentence. [5] In situations where a defendant has entered an open plea and the trial court has admonished the defendant regarding the maximum sentence to which he would be exposed by his plea, the failure to admonish a defendant concerning the MSR is not a constitutional violation, as long as the sentence plus the term of MSR is less than the maximum sentence which defendant was told he could receive. See People v. Fish, 316 Ill.App.3d 795, 250 Ill.Dec. 72, 737 N.E.2d 694 (2000) (in a stipulated bench trial, defendant was advised that the maximum penalty was 14 years, but he was sentenced to 14 years plus two years MSR and fines; thus stipulation was not a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the consequences); People v. Brown, 296 Ill.App.3d 1041, 231 Ill.Dec. 255, 695 N.E.2d 1374 (1998) (although defendant entered an open plea, he was admonished as to a maximum sentence, but was sentenced to the maximum plus an MSR term; thus failure to admonish regarding MSR was not harmless error); People v. Coultas, 75 Ill.App.3d 137, 31 Ill.Dec. 110, 394 N.E.2d 26 (1979) (no constitutional error occurred because sentence of three years plus mandatory supervised release was less than the maximum five-year sentence defendant was advised could be imposed). On the other hand, if the defendant negotiated a plea agreement for a specified sentence, the court's failure to advise the defendant, on the record, concerning the MSR term has been held to be reversible error and a violation of due process. As explained in People v. Didley, 213 Ill.App.3d 910, 915, 157 Ill.Dec. 354, 572 N.E.2d 423 (1991): When a defendant has pled guilty in contemplation of receiving a specific sentence, imposing additional and unbargained-for terms or conditions is not permissible. See also People v. Smith, 285 Ill.App.3d 666, 221 Ill.Dec. 703, 676 N.E.2d 224 (1996) (where defendant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for an 11-year sentence, the failure to advise defendant that a 3-year MSR term would be added to his sentence made his plea unknowing); People v. Moore, 214 Ill.App.3d 938, 944, 158 Ill.Dec. 243, 574 N.E.2d 37 (1991) (because defendant negotiated for a predetermined sentence, the failure to admonish him regarding the MSR was error); People v. O'Toole, 174 Ill.App.3d 800, 801, 124 Ill.Dec. 337, 529 N.E.2d 54 (1988) (defendant entitled to postconviction relief because due process was violated when the court advised defendant that he would be sentenced to a flat ten years and did not tell him that a term of mandatory supervised release would be added); People v. Kull, 171 Ill.App.3d 496, 121 Ill.Dec. 916, 525 N.E.2d 1223 (1988) (plain error occurred because defendant pled guilty in exchange for an agreed 22-year sentence, but was given 22 years plus 3 years' mandatory supervised release). Having reviewed the above cases, we conclude that, although substantial compliance with Rule 402 is sufficient to establish due process ( People v. Fuller, 205 Ill.2d 308, 323, 275 Ill.Dec. 755, 793 N.E.2d 526 (2002); People v. Burt, 168 Ill.2d 49, 64, 212 Ill.Dec. 893, 658 N.E.2d 375 (1995)), and an imperfect admonishment is not reversible error unless real justice has been denied or the defendant has been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment ( People v. Davis, 145 Ill.2d 240, 250, 164 Ill.Dec. 151, 582 N.E.2d 714 (1991)), there is no substantial compliance with Rule 402 and due process is violated when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence and the trial court fails to advise the defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a mandatory supervised release term will be added to that sentence. In these circumstances, addition of the MSR term to the agreed-upon sentence violates due process because the sentence imposed is more onerous than the one defendant agreed to at the time of the plea hearing. Under these circumstances, the addition of the MSR constitutes an unfair breach of the plea agreement. In reaching this conclusion, we reject the appellate court's holding that a due process violation was not established in the case at bar because defendant never raised a good-faith argument that he would not have pled guilty had he been made aware of the MSR term. The appellate court relied on People v. Smith, 285 Ill.App.3d 666, 221 Ill.Dec. 703, 676 N.E.2d 224 (1996), wherein the court held that a due process violation is shown only if (1) the record discloses the court informed the petitioner he would receive a specific sentence of incarceration upon a guilty plea; (2) the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term greater than the agreed term, taking into account and including any period of MSR; and (3) petitioner raises a good-faith argument that he would not have pled guilty if he had been fully and correctly informed by the court of his potential sentence. The Smith court purported to rely on United States ex rel. Williams v. Morris, 633 F.2d 71 (7th Cir.1980), vacated as moot, 455 U.S. 624, 102 S.Ct. 1322, 71 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982), and United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir.1977), as legal support for the three-prong test it promulgated. Upon examination, the Baker decision reveals that the court explicitly rejected the argument that Baker cannot now attack the validity of his guilty plea unless he can affirmatively demonstrate that he would not have entered the pleas if he had known of the mandatory parole term. Baker, 551 F.2d at 183. The Baker court reasoned that, when a defendant enters a plea in exchange for a specific sentence, rather than an open plea as in Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1975), no additional showing is necessary because prejudice has already been shown. The court stated: In contrast [to Bachner], Baker did suffer a detriment. He agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the promise of a specific sentence by the prosecutor, which was then ratified by the trial judge. Yet he was given a more onerous sentence than he had been promised. Baker, 551 F.2d at 183. In United States ex rel. Williams the habeas petitions of three defendants were consolidated for consideration. Analyzing the facts of each defendant's plea in comparison to Baker (negotiated plea) and Bachner (open plea), the court found that, in all cases but one, relief should be granted because the plea of guilty had been entered, as in Baker, in exchange for a specified sentence and the total sentence, with the addition of the parole term, exceeded the sentence that was promised. Clearly, neither Baker nor Williams supports the holding in Smith that, where a defendant enters a negotiated plea for a specific sentence, a finding that due process has been violated is contingent on the defendant's ability to demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty had he known about the MSR. [6] Accordingly, we reject it. Moreover, contrary to the State's argument, we find that the recent Supreme Court decision United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004), does not support a finding that a defendant, such as the one in the case at bar, must plead and prove that he would not have pled guilty had he known about the MSR. In Dominguez Benitez, the defendant (who spoke only Spanish) was arrested after he sold drugs to a confidential informant. He was charged with conspiracy to possess more than 500 grams of methamphetamine and possession of 1,391 grams of methamphetamine, both with the intent to distribute. As a result of plea negotiations, the government agreed, in writing, to drop the possession charge and to stipulate to a safety-valve reduction of two levels if defendant pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. The safety-valve reduction would have allowed the district court to give defendant a sentence below the 10-year minimum. Eligibility for the safety-valve reduction was contingent on satisfying five conditions, one going to defendant's criminal history. The contingencies, however, were not listed in the written agreement. At the plea hearing, defendant was admonished in accord with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in all respects but onedefendant was warned that the agreement reached with the government was not binding on the court, but he was not advised that he would be unable to withdraw his guilty plea if the government's recommendations were not followed. The written agreement, however, which had been read to the defendant in Spanish, provided the defendant with this specific warning. Defendant pled guilty but was not immediately sentenced. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of 10 years, the mandatory minimum without the safety-valve reduction. Defendant was told that at this time that he was ineligible for the safety-valve reduction because the probation report revealed that he had a more extensive criminal history than was previously known. Defendant did not object to the sentence at the time of the hearing, but later appealed, claiming that the court's failure to advise him properly at the plea hearing pursuant to Rule 11 was plain error and grounds for allowing him to withdraw his plea. On review, the court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction, finding that the district court's error affected defendant's substantial rights. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question: `[w]hether, in order to show that a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 constitutes reversible plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred.' Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 79-80, 124 S.Ct. at 2338, 159 L.Ed.2d at 166. In deciding the issue before it, the Court noted that Rule 11, itself, provides that [a] variance    is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights. Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 11(h); Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 79-80, 124 S.Ct. at 2338, 159 L.Ed.2d at 166. The Court concluded that the omission of a single Rule 11 warning, without a showing of prejudice, was not a structural error, i.e., an error which `affects substantial rights' or has `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the ... verdict.' Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81-82, 124 S.Ct. at 2339, 159 L.Ed.2d at 167, quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1572 (1946). [7] The Court then held that, to show prejudice, a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 82-84, 124 S.Ct. at 2340, 159 L.Ed.2d at 168. The Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, finding that it had applied the wrong standard and remanded for further proceedings. Dominguez Benitez is inapposite to the case at bar. Similar to Bachner and Timmreck, the defendant in Dominguez Benitez entered an open plea and was advised by the court, prior to the time that he entered his plea, that the court was free to impose any sentence available under the law and that the court was not obligated to follow the sentencing recommendations proffered by the government. Thus, the district court's failure to advise defendant that he could not withdraw his plea if the government's recommendation was not followed had no direct effect on the validity of the plea or the sentence imposed. Simply stated, Dominguez Benitez could not establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the faulty admonishment. Unlike the defendant in the case at bar, Dominguez Benitez was never promised by the government and the court that he would receive a particular sentence, only to learn later that the actual sentence imposed was more lengthy. The Court's decision in Dominguez Benitez is not inconsistent with our holding in the case at bar. Finally, we reject the State's argument that we must remand defendant's postconviction petition for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The State argues that, although defendant alleged that he did not know that a mandatory supervised release term would be added to his sentence and although it is uncontested that MSR was not mentioned at defendant's plea hearing, defendant should be required to prove, at an evidentiary hearing, that he was not actually aware that a period of MSR would be added to his sentence. We disagree. First, it is unclear what sort of additional showing defendant could provide which would establish his lack of knowledge. Secondly, even if, as the State speculates, defendant had some level of general knowledge about MSR terms as a result of his criminal history or evidence could be mustered which would show that MSR was discussed during plea negotiations, it would not establish what defendant reasonably understood the terms of his plea agreement to be at the time he pled guilty. Finally, and most importantly, due process requires that it be evident from the record that a defendant's plea of guilty is entered with full knowledge of the consequences. See People v. Day, 311 Ill.App.3d 271, 274, 244 Ill.Dec. 106, 724 N.E.2d 994 (2000) (Due process is violated where a court admonishes a defendant that he will receive a shorter sentence than he actually receives; this includes the failure to advise a defendant of the three-year MSR attached to his sentence). Where, as here, the record contains no evidence which affirmatively shows that defendant knew that he would be subject to an MSR term, defendant's alleged unawareness must be taken as true. We recognize that MSR terms are statutorily required and that the State has no right to offer the withholding of such a period as a part of the plea negotiations and    the court has no power to withhold such period in imposing sentence. People v. Brown, 296 Ill.App.3d 1041, 1043, 231 Ill.Dec. 255, 695 N.E.2d 1374 (1998). We have little doubt that, in the case at bar, neither the prosecutor nor the court intended to impose a sentence without the statutorily required MSR. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Anderson, 970 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.1992), a present inability to fulfill a promise does not mean a breach of the plea agreement has not occurred. See also United States v. Cook, 668 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir.1982) ([a] plea induced by an unfulfillable promise is no less subject to challenge than one induced by a valid promise which the Government simply fails to fulfill). Here, the court was required to admonish defendant regarding the MSR term. Failing to do so was an uninduced error by the State. In sum, we find that, in the case at bar, defendant has established a substantial violation of his constitutional rights. The record shows, and the appellate court found, that defendant pled guilty to murder in exchange for the promise of a 25-year sentence. It is uncontested that the circuit court failed to admonish defendant, as required by Supreme Court Rule 402 and due process, that a three-year MSR term would be added, by operation of law, to the negotiated 25-year sentence defendant agreed to when he pled guilty. As a result of the circuit court's error, defendant was never advised that the sentence he was told he would receive in exchange for his plea of guilty was not the sentence which he would ultimately receive. Defendant was prejudiced by the omitted admonition because he received a more onerous sentence than the one he was told he would receive. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary for defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty. Based on the record, defendant's guilty plea was induced by the promise of a specific sentence, which he did not receive. Thus, defendant has established that this constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated.