Opinion ID: 1251241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: well drilled with reasonable diligence and dispatch

Text: Appellants' contention, that even if the well was timely commenced it was not drilled with reasonable diligence and dispatch, being a direct attack on the findings of the trial court, faces the same hurdle and burdens as mentioned in the Jassman and Murphy cases, supra, and the rule that the same will not be disturbed as set out in Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. May, supra. This court has heretofore observed that reasonable diligence in any particular instance depends upon a variety of circumstances, and further suggested that these circumstances be considered in light of what would be reasonably expected by operators of ordinary prudence, Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 41, 95 P. 846, 849, which leaves the clear inference that diligence is a question of fact and intention which must be developed and decided in each case. Because of this court's recognition of the prudent-operator rule, we find the following statement most applicable and demonstrative that this is a factual question: In cases questioning the development done by an operator under the prudent operator rule, the actions of the operator are examined item by item. This is essentially a comparison of his acts with standards or practices then prevailing in the area all in the context of economics. These items constitute fact questions and on appeal the findings made in such a suit must be treated accordingly.    Chenoweth v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 10 Cir., 314 F.2d 63, 65-66. We see the application of the rule that diligence is a factual question in Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 10 Cir., 283 F.2d 169, 175. The case of Foster v. Atlantic Refining Company, 5 Cir., 329 F.2d 485, 493, involved a claim that the producer had failed to reasonably or diligently develop a producing horizon, but the court sustained the judgment of the trial court based upon a finding of fact, as in this case where the trial judge is the fact finder. Thus we cannot disturb the finding of the trial court as to the reasonableness and diligence of appellees, and appellants' second contention cannot stand.