Opinion ID: 2632541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entrapment by estoppel

Text: Entrapment by estoppel, based on principles of federal due process, has been recognized by the federal courts and in some sister states. The defense evolved from three United States Supreme Court opinions, although none used the term entrapment by estoppel. The concept was first applied in Raley v. Ohio (1959) 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344. Defendants there were convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions before Ohio's Un-American Activities Commission. The defendants had invoked their privilege against self-incrimination after being advised of their right to do so by the commission chairman. ( Id. at pp. 424-425, 79 S.Ct. 1257.) The advice, however, was contrary to the Ohio immunity statute, which eliminated the availability of the privilege for persons testifying before legislative committees. ( Id. at p. 431, 79 S.Ct. 1257.) The United States Supreme Court held that the contempt convictions violated due process: After the Commission, speaking for the State, acted as it did, to sustain the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the Stateconvicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him. ( Id. at pp. 425-426, 79 S.Ct. 1257.) In Cox v. Louisiana , the Supreme Court applied Raley to reverse the convictions of protestors arrested for picketing across the street from a courthouse. The leader of the demonstration had been given permission by the police chief to demonstrate at the location. The demonstrators were nevertheless arrested and convicted under a state statute barring certain demonstrations near any courthouse. ( Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at pp. 568-571, 85 S.Ct. 476.) In reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court observed: [T]he highest police officials of the city, in the presence of the Sheriff and Mayor, in effect, told the demonstrators that they could meet where they did... . In effect, appellant was advised that a demonstration at the place it was held would not be one `near' the courthouse within the terms of the statute. ( Id, at p. 571, 85 S.Ct. 476.) The Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained under such circumstances. ( Ibid. ) In United. States v. Pennsylvania Chem. Corp. (1973) 411 U.S. 655, 93 S.Ct. 1804, 36 L.Ed.2d 567, the court considered the defense in a regulatory setting involving a corporate defendant found to have discharged refuse into navigable waters. The Supreme Court, relying on Raley and Cox, held the defendant should have been allowed to present a defense that it had been misled by administrative regulations which appeared to permit the defendant's actions. ( Id. at pp. 670-675, 93 S.Ct. 1804.) Federal cases applying the entrapment by estoppel defense, while varying slightly in their formulation, rest on the premise that the government may not actively provide assurances that conduct is lawful, then prosecute those who act in reasonable reliance on those assurances. [10] Under these limited circumstances, fundamental fairness supports the defense, even when the prosecution can prove each element of the crime. Courts have cautioned that the defense is narrowly circumscribed. (See e.g., U.S. v. Spires (5th Cir.1996) 79 F.3d 464, 466.) [The defense is a narrow exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse....]; U.S. v. Corso (2nd Cir.1994) 20 F.3d 521, 528 [Judicial decisions indicate great caution should be exercised when it comes to the application of the defense]; U.S. v. Howell (7th Cir.1994) 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 [Entrapment by estoppel ... is a defense that is rarely available]; U.S. v. Smith (1st Cir.1991) 940 F.2d 710, 714 [entrapment by estoppel is recognized as applicable under certain, relatively narrow, circumstances].)