Opinion ID: 696656
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duke

Text: 117 Duke makes two arguments for why his Sec. 1962(d) RICO conspiracy conviction must be reversed. First, he contends that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that he agreed to participate in the RICO conspiracy. Second, Duke contends that even if the government proved such an agreement, his conviction must be reversed because he proved that he withdrew from the Outlaws in the spring of 1980, more than five years before the grand jury indicted him in this case. Therefore, he argues, his conviction was time-barred. We reject both contentions. 118 First, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to establish that Duke agreed and manifested his agreement to participate in the conduct of the national Outlaw Motorcycle Club (the enterprise charged in the conspiracy count) through a pattern of racketeering activity. Indeed, the government proved more than was necessary to establish Duke's agreement to participate in the conspiracy. Even though a defendant need not commit any predicate acts in order to be convicted of RICO conspiracy, Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d at 524-25, the government proved Duke did commit two predicate acts. 13 The jury was entitled to infer from Duke's commission of these acts that he agreed to participate in the Outlaws through a pattern of racketeering activity. Furthermore, in addition to proving two of the predicate acts charged, the government presented witnesses who testified that Duke bought and sold narcotics with several Outlaws, and that most Outlaws dealt in drugs and worked their women as prostitutes. Considering all of this evidence together, the jury was entitled to find that Duke agreed to an overall conspiracy objective as well. See Church, 955 F.2d at 694-95. Therefore, the government's evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of Duke's RICO conspiracy violation under Sec. 1962(d). 119 Duke further argues, however, that even if we conclude that he agreed to participate in the conspiracy, he proved that he withdrew from the Outlaws more than five years before he was indicted on July 29, 1986. The law of this circuit is that a conspirator's participation in a conspiracy is presumed to continue until all activity relating to the conspiracy is ceased. Accordingly, [each defendant] is presumed to be a participant for the duration of the conspiracy unless he can overcome the presumption by proving his withdrawal. LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1563-64 (citation omitted). Furthermore, [w]ith respect to conspiracy statutes that do not require proof of an overt act, the indictment satisfies the requirements of the statute of limitations if the conspiracy is alleged to have continued into the limitations period. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d at 1548 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The conspiracy may be deemed to continue as long as its purposes have neither been abandoned nor accomplished. Furthermore, the conspiracy is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that it has terminated. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Wong, 40 F.3d at 1367 (no predicate acts within the five-year period required for RICO conspiracy as long as defendant has not withdrawn); Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d at 524-25 (same). To establish the affirmative defense of a withdrawal from the conspiracy, the defendant has the substantial burden of proving: (1) that he has taken affirmative steps, inconsistent with the objectives of the conspiracy, to disavow or to defeat the objectives of the conspiracy; and (2) that he made a reasonable effort to communicate those acts to his co-conspirators or that he disclosed the scheme to law enforcement authorities. See LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1564; United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 589 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 948, 108 S.Ct. 338, 98 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). A mere cessation of activity in the conspiracy is not sufficient to establish withdrawal. Id. (emphasis added). 120 As evidence of his withdrawal from the Outlaws, Duke offers the following: he added a 1980 out date to his Outlaw Charlie tattoo; he sold his motorcycle; he joined a church and got a job; and he moved out of Florida and cut off virtually all contact with the Outlaws. Even if this evidence is sufficient to satisfy this circuit's first requirement for proving withdrawal from a conspiracy--that he took affirmative steps to disavow the conspiracy--it is insufficient to satisfy the second requirement. Duke has not pointed to any evidence in the record to indicate that he made a reasonable effort to communicate his withdrawal to his co-conspirators, or that he disclosed the Outlaws' criminal schemes to law enforcement. See LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1564. 121 Prior to becoming a probate with the South Florida Outlaws in 1980, Duke was a member of the Outlaws' Louisville, Kentucky chapter, as evidenced by his Outlaw Charlie tattoo bearing the Louisville rocker. 14 This tattoo has two dates on it,  '78 on the right side of the skull, and  '80 on the left. Duke contends that this means he became a member of the Outlaws in 1978 and that he left in 1980, and that this out date is the normal means by which an Outlaw communicates his withdrawal to the club. However, the government presented testimony from which the jury could have found that the so-called out date pertained to the date Duke left the Louisville chapter to go to Florida, not the date he left the Outlaws altogether. Thus, the jury could have concluded that this evidence did not establish Duke's withdrawal from the conspiracy. 122 Duke has never cooperated with law enforcement regarding the Outlaws' criminal activity, and none of the persons to whom Duke claims to have communicated his withdrawal were ever members of, or associated with, the Outlaws. The government presented evidence that on at least one occasion after Duke's purported withdrawal he had an opportunity to tell two South Florida Outlaws that he was through with the club, but he failed to do so. Thomas Belcher testified that he and another Outlaw saw Duke in Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1982 and that Duke gave Belcher some cocaine. Duke presented no evidence that he said anything to Belcher or the other Outlaw present about having left the Outlaws. Because Duke did not present any evidence that he disclosed any Outlaw activities to law enforcement or made a reasonable effort to communicate his withdrawal to his co-conspirators, the jury was entitled to reject Duke's withdrawal defense. See LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1564.