Opinion ID: 1561252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Drawing an adverse inference from the exercise of a constitutional right.

Text: The prosecutor argued that Coreas changed his story after having heard the prosecution's medical testimony. She said: The defendant, he heard that testimony too, Polo Perez, after that last shot, wasn't going anywhere. So now we [meaning Coreas] say, He got up and struggled and then I shot him. This, according to the majority, was an attempt to persuade the jury to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's exercise of his right to confront witnesses. In Jenkins v. United States, 374 A.2d 581 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894, 98 S.Ct. 274, 54 L.Ed.2d 182 (1977), one of the cases on which my colleagues rely, [4] the prosecutor said: Defendant was the one and only witness who sat for all the testimony during trial. . . He had an advantage over everybody. He already knew what the evidence was, and he knew exactly what he had to explain away and did everything he could to explain it. Id. at 584. The court questioned the propriety of these remarks and directed trial courts not to countenance such conduct in the future. Id. Nevertheless, the court affirmed Jenkins' conviction, noting among other things that the trial judge's view was entitled to some reliance because only he had the opportunity to appraise the effect of the remarks in their setting. In Fornah v. United States, 460 A.2d 556 (D.C.1983), on which my colleagues also rely, the prosecutor had suggested that Fornah's presence during the prosecution testimony enabled him to tailor his own testimony to present the most plausible defense available. There was no objection, but, on appeal, Fornah asserted plain error. This court disagreed. In the words of Judge Kern, writing for a unanimous court: [w]e have held that it is impermissible to attempt to cause the jury to draw adverse inferences from appellant's exercise of his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 131 (D.C.1980). Perhaps, from certain of the prosecutor's closing remarks in this case, in isolation, that intent could be ascribed to her. The sorts of remarks we have held objectionable, however, have been far more explicit comments. See, e.g., Jenkins [ supra ]. 460 A.2d at 560-61. The court noted that the remarks in question were buried in a lengthy closing, id. at 561, and that the prosecutor's comments were part of an attempt to supply an explanation of the pertinent events which was different from Fornah's exculpatory account. Under these circumstances, and relying on the passage from Donnelly v. DeChristoforo discussed supra at p. 607, the court concluded that the prosecutor's remarks simply do not rise to the level of `plain error' affecting substantial rights. Id. In my opinion, this case is much like Fornah. The prosecutor's allusion to Coreas' exercise of his rights, if that is what the remark was, consisted of the words he heard that testimony too. As in Fornah, the remark was buried in a long argument. It was a far more restrained and isolated comment than the remarks in Jenkins which this court found to be improper. Moreover, the prosecutor's alleged impropriety occurred in the midst of a discussion of what she described as a major change in the defendant's story. I think it permissible for counsel, in discussing the defendant's veracity, to highlight any contrast between the defendant's account before he has been apprised of the government's evidence and his version thereafter. Here, the allusion to Coreas' presence in court was incidental to the prosecutor's main theme of exposing the alleged inconsistency between his two accounts. She simply explained the circumstances under which, in the government's view, the defendant's story had changed. In my opinion, the prosecutor's remarks, in this particular context, were not improper. They would not have been understood by a reasonable juror as an attempt to penalize or discredit Coreas for exercising his right to confront the witnesses against him. Even if her comments were inappropriate, I do not think they would provide any significant support for reversal of this conviction for plain error.