Opinion ID: 172792
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State-law violations and the Fourth Amendment

Text: We have made clear that [a] state-law violation does not . . . necessarily rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.2008). Indeed, in our analysis of the constitutionality of Rector's alleged conduct, the question . . . is not whether the search was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). Just as a search authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a search not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one. Id. In short, while states may choose[] to protect individual privacy and dignity more than the Fourth Amendment requires, a state's restrictions on search and seizure do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections. Virginia v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1606, 1607, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008); see also United States v. Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890, 899 (10th Cir.2006) (explaining that in the context of claims that violations of state law constitute violations of the Fourth Amendment, [t]he touchstone of our jurisprudence remains whether the conduct in question contravenes the federal constitution); United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir.1999) (It is. . . well established in this circuit that . . . the test of reasonableness in relation to the Fourth Amendment . . . must be determined by Federal law even though the police actions are those of state police officers. (quotations omitted)). While state law thus is not determinative of the federal question of a Fourth Amendment violation, state law may or may not be relevant to the determination of the federal question. Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 899; see also United States v. Mikulski, 317 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir.2003) (`A police violation of state law does not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. However, the question of compliance with state law may well be relevant in determining whether police conduct was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.') (quoting United States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854, 856 n. 1 (8th Cir.1994) (in parenthetical)). We have explained that state law is most relevantand that it becomes highly determinative of Fourth Amendment questionsonly when the constitutional test [at issue] requires an examination of the [pertinent] state law or interests. Gonzales, 535 F.3d at 1182 (quotation omitted). Such constitutional tests include those for exigent circumstances justify[ing] a warrantless search and those for inventory searches, both of which involve a special incorporation of state law into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 1182-83 (quotation omitted). In this case, the federal test at issuethat for search and seizure pursuant to a warrantinvolves no such special incorporation of state law, id. at 1183, into the Fourth Amendment analysis. The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be issued only `upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Finding these words to be precise and clear, the Supreme Court has interpreted them to require only three things: First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates. Second, those seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense. Finally, warrants must particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be searched. Id. (citations, quotations omitted). We have explained that these requirements serve at least two distinct purposes: ensuring that no `intrusion in the way of search or seizure' occurs `without a careful prior determination of necessity,' and preventing the `specific evil [of] the general warrant abhorred by the colonists.' Cassady, 567 F.3d at 634-35 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). Because this constitutional test does not require[] an examination of . . . state law or interests, Gonzales, 535 F.3d at 1182, Rector's alleged violation of Oklahoma law is not, without more, significantly relevant to our Fourth Amendment analysis.