Opinion ID: 169447
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of the Falsity of Sprint's Explanation

Text: Swackhammer first attempted to demonstrate that violation of ethical policies was not the true reason for her termination by arguing that Sprint should not have permitted Castanon to decide whether she was to be terminated because Castanon was under investigation for similar ethical violations at the time; that the evidence Corporate Security presented to Castanon and Kissinger was insufficient to support Swackhammer's termination; and that Castanon should have consulted with Swackhammer and considered her previous work record prior to making the decision to terminate her. Swackhammer's arguments fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Sprint's proffered explanation. Evidence that the employer should not have made the termination decision  for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment  is not sufficient to show that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credibility. Young, 468 F.3d at 1250; Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health, 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir.1999). The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer's proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs. Rivera, 365 F.3d at 924-25 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Although Swackhammer did not, at the summary judgment stage, have a burden to establish conclusively whether Castanon's stated reliance on the results of the investigation was pretextual, she was required to establish that there is a genuine factual dispute with regard to the truth. Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1126. Viewing Swackhammer's evidence in the light most favorable to her position, this evidence demonstrates that Sprint may have been unwise and that Castanon may have utilized questionable judgment, but it does not draw into question whether Sprint or Castanon actually relied, honestly and in good faith, upon the appearance of improprieties arising from the evidence gathered in Corporate Security's investigations. Swackhammer's arguments that Castanon should have known that the misconduct she was accused of engaging in was completely out of character and that Castanon should have reconsidered whether it was appropriate to terminate [her] employment are simply beside the point; it is not what Castanon should have known that matters, but whether he acted in good faith upon the beliefs he held. In addition, her contention that the evidence gathered by Corporate Security during its investigation was insufficient to support a good-faith belief that Swackhammer actually engaged in misconduct ignores Castanon's testimony that it was the appearance of impropriety arising from the evidence that mattered most to him. Indeed, Swackhammer implicitly conceded in her deposition testimony that she could not directly prove Castanon's reasons for terminating her were false; instead, she fell back on her differential treatment argument: the only thing I have is that Tony [Castanon] and Alan [Winters] were best friends, and that Alan was a man, and he was treated differently than I was, as was Tony (emphasis added). Without more than this, the district court correctly held that Swackhammer failed to directly raise an issue of fact regarding the falsity of Sprint's explanation. [10]