Opinion ID: 2510862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contract Formation Issues

Text: The superior court gave the jury the following instruction concerning contract formation: In order to find that an employment contract existed between Dan Reust and APC in April of 1998 you must find that each of the following propositions is more likely true than not true: (1) that APC made an offer of employment encompassing the essential terms of employment, (2) that Dan Reust agreed to the essential terms of employment offered by APC and accepted APC's offer of employment, and (3) that both parties intended to be bound by the offer and acceptance. APC argues that the instruction failed to include the necessary element of consideration. [3] It apparently urges us to reverse the jury's contract formation findings, contending that the jury could not have found that Reust accepted the offer and supplied return consideration because he did not actually commence work. APC's view is dependent on its conception of at-will employment as a form of unilateral contract. Reust responds that by returning the completed hire packet and thereby promising to work for APC, he accepted the offer and provided sufficient consideration; the jury instruction was therefore correct. [4] We do not need to resolve this instructional dispute because any possible error was harmless. Even if the instruction's failure to explicitly list the element of consideration tainted the jury's finding that APC hired Reust, it would not have affected the jury's preliminary finding that APC had offered Reust a position. Similarly, it would not have affected the jury's finding that APC's decision to terminate (or per APC's view, not to hire) was motivated by Reust's participation in the Jantz litigation. For reasons we discuss in Part III.B.1, such retaliatory conduct violates public policy in Alaska. Therefore, any possible instructional error regarding contract formation would not have affected the finding that APC made Reust an employment offer and then withdrew it for an illegal reason. In effect, APC is relying on the fact Reust never actually started work, a circumstance caused by APC's illegal conduct in preventing him from commencing work. APC conceded at oral argument on appeal that, under its view, a wrongfully terminated employee fired after one minute on the job would have a claim but the same employee would have no recourse if termination occurred one minute before work was to begin. We fail to see any value in this distinction and note that at least one other court has ruled that public policy violations can sustain an at-will employee's cause of action even if work was never actually commenced. [5] Moreover, the contract law principle of prevention supports our conclusion. [6] APC was free to withdraw its at-will employment offer for a legitimate reason but cannot now rely on Reust's lack of performance caused by APC's own illegal conduct as a shield against liability. Accordingly, APC would still be liable even if it were necessary for Reust to have actually commenced work in order to accept the offer and supply consideration. We therefore perceive no reversible error because APC has not demonstrated that the failure to instruct on the consideration element was prejudicial.