Opinion ID: 197155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Police Superintendent Betancourt-Lebron

Text: 86 Plaintiff asserts that Betancourt-Lebron, the superintendent of police for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, should be held responsible because he failed to provide adequate training, and because that failure was due to gender-discriminatory bias. 14 This claim is based largely on Betancourt-Lebron's public statements. For example, when Law 54 had been in effect for eight months, Betancourt-Lebron, was quoted in the press as saying: 87 I don't believe that [Law 54] is solving anything because it has not lessened the fights between husbands and wives. On the contrary, there is evidence that it continues to increase. 88 He went on to say that domestic violence should not be treated with laws that punish the aggressors, but with psychologists and social workers. This statement of disagreement with the law's decision to criminalize such conduct is not, in itself, a statement of discriminatory intent. Plaintiff posits that the statement in context should be read as discriminatory. 89 Soto's expert witness, Mercedes Rodriguez, opined that, because one of the most dramatic changes achieved by Law 54 was the criminalization of domestic violence, this statement by Betancourt-Lebron was one of the most severe blows, that a public official of [his] stature could give to the law. Rodriguez called these statements a deviation on the part of the institutional leadership. It was the position of the Women's Affairs Commission that Betancourt's public statements would promote rank and file's negative attitudes toward women victims and their rights under Law 54. The Superintendent's public statements, in opposition to a law he was charged with enforcing, were widely disseminated. It is reasonable to infer, as Soto's expert and the Women's Affairs Commission suggest, that they influenced many of the rank and file in the police. But that the statements had influence does not mean that they were motivated by discrimination. 90 Additionally, Betancourt-Lebron acknowledged that he foresaw that police officers would have problems implementing Law 54 because its procedures differed from other laws, and because of active resistance from some members of the Force toward the law. There is no evidence, however, that he was aware of discriminatory attitudes at the Rio Grande precinct, much less that, in the face of such knowledge, he failed to act to curb those attitudes. Nor is there any comparative evidence as to what, if any, training Betancourt-Lebron implemented when other new laws went into effect. Evidence that Law 54, which was specifically intended to assist abused women, was handled differently than other new major law enforcement initiatives could, perhaps, support an inference of discriminatory intent. But the record is devoid of such evidence. 91 Somewhat more probative of Betancourt-Lebron's intent is his relationship with the Women's Affairs Commission. Betancourt-Lebron declined to meet, for a year after approval of Law 54, with the Women's Affairs Commission. Law 54 directs the Commission to evaluate implementation of the law and to promote the response of law enforcement agencies to victims. See P.R. Laws ann. tit. 8, § 651 (Supp.1995). The initial report of the Commission, covering the first year of implementation, noted: Coordination with the Police of Puerto Rico to train personnel as to domestic violence problems and Law 54 has been virtually impossible. In fact, Betancourt-Lebron returned none of the numerous phone calls or letters to him from the Executive Director of the Commission, who was concerned about the Police Department's apparent lack of interest in implementing the law. 92 In the end, this evidence, while painting an unwholesome picture, is not enough to meet the strict standards imposed by the Supreme Court for showing discriminatory intent in equal protection claims. As Feeney says, the intent to be shown must be more than an awareness of consequences. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 2296. The defendant must have selected ... a course of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects on an identifiable group. Id. An expression of disagreement with Law 54 and a failure to meet with the Women's Affairs Commission, while some evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of Betancourt-Lebron, is too slender a stalk on which to rest. 93 Thus, we conclude that plaintiff has fallen short of her difficult burden of proving discriminatory intent against these defendants as required to establish a constitutional tort. In so saying, we do not of course condone the actions and failures of duties we have described. The deaths of children, which may have followed from risks arguably created by the actions of public officials, are very serious matters. Whether this deplorable scenario is actionable under Puerto Rican law we leave, as we must, to others. 94 Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment against plaintiff is affirmed. 95