Opinion ID: 2794494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Fresh-complaint doctrine”

Text: ¶ 27. The State urges, as an alternative to Rule 803(3), that this Court affirm the evidentiary ruling on the basis of the “fresh-complaint doctrine.” This evidentiary doctrine—also known as the “report-of-rape,” “prompt-outcry,” or “first-complaint” rule, among other names—is an exception to the ordinary rule that “bolstering” hearsay testimony of a witness’s prior consistent statements is inadmissible. The doctrine is a vestige of a time when corroboration was a required element of rape, and evidence of a complaint soon after the crime occurred served “to explain an apparent inconsistency arising from the woman’s failure, at the time of the alleged rape, to tell someone of the crime when society perceives that it would have been natural for her to do so.” Battle v. United States , 630 A.2d 211, 216 (D.C. 1993) (tracing history of corroboration requirement and “report-of-rape” rule). In essence, the fresh-complaint doctrine ameliorated the presumption that jurors would find claims of sexual assault inherently untrustworthy. See, e.g., State v. Woodard , 769 A.2d 379, 384 (N.H. 2001) (noting that the “doctrine of fresh complaint . . . was based on the presumption that a sexual assault victim would immediately confide in someone and that if no complaint was made, it could be assumed that no assault occurred”). The question of whether Vermont recognizes the “fresh-complaint doctrine” was expressly reserved in State v. Fellows , 2013 VT 45, ¶ 22, 194 Vt. 77, 76 A.3d 608. ¶ 28. While a few courts have adopted this rule in modified form, [3] “[m]ost courts no longer recognize this theory,” Black’s Law Dictionary 782 (10th ed. 2014), and the idea of a doctrine as a distinct rule in derogation of the rules of evidence is largely a “historic artifact.” 2 Broun, supra , § 272.1 (contrasting fresh-complaint rule with “modern practice”). We reject the “fresh-complaint rule” as an independent evidentiary doctrine because the doctrine has been largely supplanted by rules of evidence. Rather than having a freestanding evidentiary doctrine apart from the rules of evidence, most courts sensibly prefer to apply the same rules of evidence in sexual-abuse cases as in other cases. Courts frequently and properly evaluate evidence of a victim’s past out-of-court statements, including statements that would fall within the “fresh-complaint” doctrine advocated by the State, under the ordinary rules of evidence. In some cases, the statements are not hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather are offered for other purposes, such as a prior consistent statement offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, Rule 801(d)(1)(B), [4] or evidence to establish the timing or circumstances of a report rather than the truth of the claim reported. [5] In other cases, the statements are admissible pursuant to an exception to the general prohibition of hearsay, such as the exceptions for excited utterances, V.R.E. 803(2), statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, V.R.E. 803(4), [6] and certain out-of-court statements made by children who are twelve years of age or under and who are the putative victims of abuse, neglect, or certain sexual crimes. V.R.E. 804a(a). [7] We join those courts that have declined to apply a separate “fresh-complaint exception” to the hearsay rule, while recognizing that the evidence sought to be admitted pursuant to the fresh-complaint doctrine is often, though not always, admissible under our modern rules of evidence. See, e.g., Brown , 883 P.2d at 950 (noting that “generally applicable evidentiary standards” adequately serve goal of ascertaining truth); Browne v. State , 132 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that “a doption of the Florida Evidence Code eliminated any common law hearsay exceptions not codified” and that common-law fresh-complaint rule is no longer a valid exception to prohibition on admitting hearsay testimony); State v. Robinson , 989 A.2d 965, 979 (R.I. 2010) (evaluating out-of-court statements in child-abuse case under ordinary hearsay rules rather than fresh-complaint doctrine) .