Opinion ID: 162083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inherent Power Sanctions

Text: The district court denied Ms. Rogler’s request for sanctions pursuant to its inherent power because it found that she did not meet her burden of proving that Standard acted in bad faith. We review the district court’s decision not to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent power for an abuse of discretion. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). It is well established that a federal district court has the inherent power to “assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. at 45-46 (quotations omitted). However, this power only extends to “bad faith conduct in litigation .” Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean , 213 F.3d 1301, 1317 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). 5 As set forth above, the record does not support Ms. Rogler’s claim 4 Ms. Rogler also alleges that the settlement agreement violated the public policy of Kansas and California because it required her to surrender all of her rights under the policy. Ms. Rogler has put forth no legal authority in support of this argument, and we reject it because the provision in the settlement agreement voiding Ms. Rogler’s disability policy is a reasonable provision given the lump sum nature of the settlement. 5 This result could be different in a diversity case such as this one if there is an underlying substantive state-law policy allowing sanctions based on (continued...) -9- that Standard and Mr. Nunn acted in bad faith or otherwise improperly during the course of the litigation before the district court. We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for inherent power sanctions.