Opinion ID: 2032140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Existence of Factual Question on Causation.

Text: The district court ruled there was insufficient evidence of causation to generate a jury question on this issue: Because the plaintiffs are unable to present evidence other than speculation and conjecture concerning the time when the damage occurred or the manner in which it occurred, the jury would be left with no factual basis upon which to base a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. In other words, the plaintiffs have provided no set of facts which the jury could point to and find to be the instrumentality which caused the harm complained of. The Gersts argue on appeal the district court applied an incorrect standard for causation because it required proof of one, specific proximate cause of damages within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. They claim their experts identified the most probable sources of the contamination and were unable to pinpoint the exact source and the exact time of releases due in large part to limitations in scientific technology. A. Definition of causation. Any discussion of whether a factual issue exists on the issue of causation must begin with a definition of that term. Our cases defining causation have not been entirely consistent, due in part to differing terminology used by the authorities upon which we have relied. Compare W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 41-42, at 263-280 (5th ed. 1984) (using terms causation in fact, and proximate cause or legal cause, the latter two terms referring to the policy decision whether to hold the defendant responsible for consequences his conduct has in fact produced) [hereinafter Prosser ] with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) (using term legal cause to include both cause in fact and Prosser's proximate cause) [hereinafter Restatement Second ]. In any event, under any definition of causation, this element has two components: (1) the defendant's conduct must have in fact caused the plaintiff's damages (generally a factual inquiry) and (2) the policy of the law must require the defendant to be legally responsible for the injury (generally a legal question). Early Iowa tort law utilized a but-for test for causation in fact: [T]o ascertain whether or not a thing complained of is the ... cause [in fact] of an injury, it is necessary to determine what was the thing amiss, either of omission or commission, without which the injury or loss would not have occurred. Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Davis, 196 Iowa 1349, 1356, 1362, 195 N.W. 337, 340, 342-43 (1924) (essential that appellees establish by a preponderance of the evidence their claim that, but for the blocking of the street, the fire truck would have reached the fire in time) (emphasis added). In cases of concurrent causes, however, we followed the rule that the fact that some other cause operates with the defendant's negligence to produce the injury [does not] relieve the defendant if the injurious result is traceable in some material degree to his want of due care. Swaim v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 187 Iowa 466, 471, 174 N.W. 384, 386 (1919) (emphasis added); accord Gould v. Schermer, 101 Iowa 582, 588, 70 N.W. 697, 699 (1897) ([T]he mere fact that some other cause operates with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury does not relieve the defendant from liability. His original wrong, concurring with some other cause, ... makes him liable....). These rules were consistent with the general law on causation that required proof the plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred but for the defendant's negligence except where two causes concur to bring about the event, and either one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result. See Prosser § 41, at 266. In the latter situation, where application of the but-for test would allow both tortfeasors to avoid liability, courts made the policy decision to nevertheless impose liability if [the defendant's conduct] was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing [the event] about. Id. at 267 (emphasis added); see Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920) (creating a broader rule for concurrent causes). Thus, the substantial factor test was originally intended to address a legal causation issue, not one of causation in fact. Prosser § 41, at 43 (Supp.1988) (in this context substantial factor is a formulation concerning legal significance rather than factual quantum); Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unraveling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U.Balt.J.Envtl.L. 1, 4 (1993) [hereinafter Black Article]; Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L.Rev. 1735, 1781 (1985) [hereinafter Wright Article]. Under the Restatement formulation of legal cause [3] a plaintiff must prove (a) the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving [the defendant from liability]. Restatement Second § 431. Traditional causation-in-fact analysis (the but-for requirement and the substantial factor exception for concurrent causes) was incorporated into the Restatement Second's new substantial factor test in section 432: (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent. (2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about. Id. § 432. This definition of causation added a degree-of-association requirement to the cause-in-fact determination. See Restatement Second app. reporter's note § 433, at 129 (1966) (after the but-for test the only remaining problem of actual causation is the determination of whether the negligent conduct played a `substantial' part in bringing about the harm). The reporter's note to the Restatement asserts the substantial factor prong of section 431(a) is limited to causation in fact. Id. ([T]he `substantial factor' element deals with causation in fact while the other element deals with a legal policy relieving the actor of liability for harm he has, as a matter of fact, caused.). The Restatement's reformulation of causation principles has, however, been soundly criticized on the basis it confuses factual determinations with policy judgments: When [the Restatement] defines `legal cause' in terms of `substantial factor' it confuses not only the policies which control the determination of duties with the mere minor matter of causal relation, but it likewise confuses the functions of judge and jury. Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 Ill.L.Rev. 582, 606 (1935); accord Arno C. Becht & Frank W. Miller, The Test of Factual Causation in Negligence and Strict Liability Cases 16 n.8, 130-34 (1961) (criticizing assertion that Restatement's substantial factor test is confined to actual causation); Wright Article at 1781-83 (the question of limiting liability due to the extent of contribution, rather than due to the absence of any contribution, is clearly a proximate-cause issue of policy or principle, rather than an issue of actual causation (contribution to the injury)); see Vincent v. Fairbanks Memorial Hosp., 862 P.2d 847, 851 n.7 (Alaska 1993) (observing the Restatement's substantial factor test encompasses both actual cause and policy considerations); see generally Collins v. American Optometric Ass'n, 693 F.2d 636, 640 n. 4 (7th Cir.1982) (substantial factor test is a policy decision; Except for the concurrent cause situation . . ., it is difficult to imagine a situation in which . . . conduct could be characterized as a `substantial factor' in bringing about an event, yet the event would have occurred even absent the challenged conduct.). As one commentator has observed, in the area of toxic torts this confusion can obscure the requirement of causation in fact, resulting in a focus on a policy decision about who should pay for damages. Black Article at 27. Beginning in 1960, we have cited to the Restatement as the law in Iowa in several cases. E.g., Winter v. Honeggers' & Co., 215 N.W.2d 316, 320 (1974); Pedersen v. Kuhr, 201 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1972); Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 172 N.W.2d 137, 144 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 189-92 (Iowa 1977); Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 298, 100 N.W.2d 624, 629 (1960). Our adherence to the Restatement has not, however, been consistent. For example, in State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 585 (Iowa 1980), we defined factual causation as the but-for test, and then, quoting Prosser, referred to the additional necessity for legal causation: `essentially a question of whether the policy of the law will extend responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred.' Marti, 290 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting Prosser § 42, at 244); see Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa 1995) (following Marti's formulation of factual causation (an issue of fact) and legal causation (an issue of law)); Sumpter v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427, 434 (Iowa App.1994) (applying Marti's but-for test to determine actual cause and applying Restatement test to determine legal or proximate cause). Several of our recent cases define the causation requirement solely as conduct which is a substantial factor in producing damage and when the damage would not have happened except for the conduct. Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994); accord Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 323 (Iowa 1992) (citing Iowa Civ. Jury Instructions 700.3 (1991)). In Nachazel v. Miraco Manufacturing, 432 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1988), we equated factual causation with the term proximate cause and required the two prong showing of but-for and substantial factor. In contrast, in Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Co., 476 N.W.2d 341, 349 (Iowa 1991), we said proximate causation is a policy question: will the law extend responsibility to those consequences which have in fact been produced by an actor's conduct. Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 349. In other words, the analytical framework we described in Kelly was to make the policy determination of proximate cause only after cause in fact had been established. The rule we applied in Kelly to make this policy determination was the Restatement's definition of legal cause: the substantial factor test and no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability. Id. In the context of factual causation, it appears the majority of our decisions require a plaintiff to meet both the but-for test of causation, with the concurrent cause exception, and the Restatement's substantial factor requirement. [4] Whether it would be prudent to eliminate the substantial factor test as a requirement in all cases in order to clearly separate the jury's factual inquiry into causal relationship from the policy question of responsibility is not a decision we must make here. See McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P.2d 869, 871 (1968) (en banc) (rejecting use of substantial factor test because it is a source of additional confusion injected into an already difficult area of law); Young v. Flathead County, 232 Mont. 274, 757 P.2d 772, 777 (1988) (using but-for test for causation in fact and substantial factor test for those rare circumstances where concurrent causes would each have been sufficient to produce the same result). It is sufficient here to observe that despite the various terms used to state the causation analysis, we have consistently required a plaintiff to meet the traditional but-for test of causation in fact. We agree with the Missouri Supreme Court when it stated [b]ut for is an absolute minimum for causation because it is merely causation in fact. Any attempt to find liability absent actual causation is an attempt to connect the defendant with an injury or event that the defendant had nothing to do with. Mere logic and common sense dictates that there be some causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the injury or event for which damages are sought. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 860-62 (Mo.1993) (en banc). Because the Gersts cannot meet this foundational requirement, we confine our discussion of the record to the but-for test. B. Proof the Gersts' damages would not have occurred but for the defendants' conduct. Although the experts agreed gasoline from the fuel delivery system on the property had contaminated the soil and groundwater, they could not identify how or when the release of gasoline occurred. The Gersts claim, however, that even if the expert testimony raises only a possibility the defendants' conduct caused the contamination, such testimony combined with other evidence is sufficient to generate a jury question. They rely on Becker v. D & E Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1976), and Winter v. Honeggers' & Co., 215 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1974). In Becker and Winter, we held an expert's opinion on the possibility of a causal connection between an incident and a condition was sufficient if there was other testimony establishing the condition did not exist before the incident claimed to be the cause of the condition. These cases are of no help to the Gersts because the Gersts cannot establish the incidentthe release of gasolineoccurred prior to their acquisition of the property; similarly, they cannot prove the conditionthe contaminationeven existed prior to their purchase of the property. Without testimony to establish when the contamination occurred, testimony identifying possible sources of contamination still leaves the jury to speculate on whether those sourcesthe fuel delivery system componentswere the responsibility of the Gersts or the Marshalls and Reif Oil at the time of the contamination. The Gersts' final argument is a plea for leniency in the quantum of proof required because the experts cannot, argue the Gersts, pinpoint the exact source and the exact time of releases due in large part to limitations in scientific technology. These limitations are no reason to abandon the basic requirement that a plaintiff prove the defendant in fact produced the plaintiff's damages. To ignore this requirement would substitute causation in fact with a policy determination that someone should pay for the unfortunate situation in which the Gersts have found themselves, even if the fact finder must speculate on whether the paying parties actually caused the problem. As we stated earlier, whatever questions may exist with respect to the substantial factor test, [5] such questions do not affect the continued viability of the but-for requirement for causation in fact. Because the record cannot support a finding the conduct of the Marshalls and Reif Oil in fact produced the contamination found on the Gersts' property, the Gersts cannot prove the causation element of their case. [6] See Griffith v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 420 Mass. 365, 649 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1995) (reversing judgment in favor of plaintiffs because there was no evidence of when the contamination occurred: Even if we accept, as we must, that the tanks caused the contamination, it is by no means clear that this occurred during the period of the defendant's lease.); Fleck v. Timmons, 374 Pa.Super. 417, 543 A.2d 148, 153 (1988) (affirming directed verdict for defendant because source and timing of leakage of gasoline from underground tank could not be established). Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. AFFIRMED.