Opinion ID: 1057972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Internal Improvements Clause

Text: We turn first to the County's argument that the development of the rail/highway intermodal facility under the terms of the Agreement is not a governmental function excepted from the internal improvements clause, and thus violates this constitutional provision. The internal improvements clause, set forth in Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia, [5] provides: nor shall the Commonwealth become a party to or become interested in any work of internal improvement, except public roads and public parks, or engage in carrying on any such work. This prohibition, along with the one set forth in the credit clause, dates back to the 1869 Constitution. See Va. Const. art. X, §§ 12, 15 (1869). It was a response to substantial financial losses the Commonwealth had sustained in previous years from its general investments in entities such as canal, turnpike and railroad companies, engaged in various large scale projects in Virginia, i.e., works of internal improvement. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 787, 91 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1956) ( Almond I ). Faced with those losses, the Constitutional Convention for the 1869 Constitution resolved that the State should no longer lend its support to such undertakings but should leave them to private enterprise, including the construction of public roads. Almond v. Day, 199 Va. 1, 7, 97 S.E.2d 824, 829 (1957) ( Almond II ). In the 1902 Constitution, however, the internal improvements clause was revised to expressly except public roads from its restrictions on the Commonwealth. Va. Const. art. XIII, § 185 (1902). The public roads exception was then retained when the current version of the Constitution was adopted in 1971. [6] By removing the prohibition on the Commonwealth from again becoming interested in public roads, the 1902 Constitution restore[d] full control of that governmental power to the legislature, Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 837, 51 S.E.2d 272, 277 (1949); and that authority continues under our current Constitution. Indeed, we have made clear that [t]he construction, maintenance and operation of a highway system is a governmental function. Unless abridged by the Constitution, that inherent power exists in the State by virtue of its sovereignty. Id. at 836, 51 S.E.2d at 277. See generally 2 A.E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia 1126-35 (1974). Thus, the County's challenge to Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1's authorization of funding for the development of the rail/highway intermodal facility under the Agreement, based on an alleged violation of the internal improvements clause, must be rejected if the development can be reasonably deemed an exercise of the Commonwealth's governmental function of constructing, maintaining and operating its highway system. As such, the development would fall within the public roads exception to the internal improvements clause. See, e.g., Almond II, 199 Va. at 5-10, 97 S.E.2d at 827-31 (holding that statutory authorization to State Highway Commission to provide bus service through or over bridge-tunnel project was a governmental function linked to State highway operations and, therefore, statute was not in violation of internal improvements clause). The declarations of the General Assembly in the resolutions described above supporting intermodal transportation initiatives, the policy statement to similar effect in Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1, and the statute's authorization for funding facilities like the Montgomery County intermodal facility, all combine to evince the General Assembly's judgment and intent underlying the statute in its provision of funds for such facilities. The General Assembly has made a policy determination that intermodal facilities such as the one proposed for Montgomery County should be developed and integrated with Virginia's highway system as roadway connectorswith the goal of establishing an intermodal transportation system in Virginia that provides for the seamless transfer of rail-to-truck and the reverse. H.J. Res. 789, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg.Sess.2005). Under this system, Virginia's highways and railroads would become inextricably interconnected in the shipment of freight between road and rail, with the intermodal facility serving as the point of transition. The General Assembly's clearest statement of support for such a system was set forth in House Joint Resolution No. 789, in 2005, where it endorsed the multi-state Heartland Corridor initiative; and that resolution was, in fact, passed shortly before Norfolk Southern submitted its application to DRPT for the funding of the Heartland Corridor projects in Virginia, which included the development of the Montgomery County intermodal facility. Furthermore, when the General Assembly declared its support for the Heartland Corridor, it specifically identified the Roanoke Valley region as the location for an intermodal facility. The General Assembly also made clear that it supports the development of intermodal facilities as a means of relieving Virginia's highways of congestion from excessive truck traffic, and particularly Interstate 81. Indeed, if the rail/highway intermodal facility in Montgomery County were utilized for the diversion of truck traffic from road to rail on the level intended by the General Assembly, it would mean that, through its support for the development of this facility, the Commonwealth would have effectively purchased a significant amount of additional capacity for traffic on Interstate 81. This diversion of truck traffic from road to rail, according to the General Assembly, would also alleviat[e] the magnitude of higher highway maintenance costs. H.J. Res. 789, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg.Sess.2005). In furtherance of these legislative objectives, Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1, in fact, requires, inter alia, that the projects funded pursuant to the statute must benefit the public by their impact . . . on traffic congestion. Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1(D). Pursuant to Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1, these legislative objectives were incorporated into the terms of the Agreement. First, the Agreement provided for the development of a rail/highway intermodal facility in Montgomery County through a DRPT grant funding a substantial portion of Norfolk Southern's capital costs for that development. Second, the Agreement also imposed performance objectives upon Norfolk Southern to operate the facility in such a way as to effectuate a large scale diversion of truck traffic from Interstate 81 to rail under a specific time frame. If the performance objectives are not met, Norfolk Southern would be required to reimburse DRPT a prorated amount of the funding it received from DRPT according to a formula specified in the Agreement. Giving Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1 its requisite presumption of constitutionality under our governing standard of review, we thus conclude that the funding for the facility under the Agreement was authorized pursuant to legislation intended to be directly related to the construction, maintenance and operation of Virginia's highways. Therefore, we hold that the statute's application in this case did not violate the internal improvements clause because it comes within the public roads exception. In so holding, we reject the County's further argument that the development of the Montgomery County intermodal facility cannot be a governmental function where the facility is to be owned and operated by Norfolk Southern. [7] When Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1 was originally enacted in 2004, it contained language, in what was then subsection E, requiring that the tracks and facilities constructed, and the property and equipment purchased, pursuant to the statute had to be owned by the Commonwealth for the life of the project. See 2004 Acts ch. 621. That language was deleted from the statute the following year. See 2005 Acts ch. 323. The General Assembly necessarily made the determination that a facility such as the rail/highway intermodal facility in Montgomery County could provide the desired public benefits with the railroad owning and operating the facility when it amended Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1 in 2005 by deleting the requirement that the Commonwealth own the facilities funded under the statute. See 2005 Acts ch. 323. That determination was within the prerogative of the legislature, and is not one that we may disturb, as we do not find it repugnant to the internal improvements clause under our narrow standard of review. Whether an enactment is wise, and matters of policy, are questions for the legislative branch of government, and not the judicial branch. Horner v. Dep't of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, & Substance Abuse Servs., 268 Va. 187, 193, 597 S.E.2d 202, 205 (2004); see Danville Warehouse Co. v. Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 143 Va. 741, 761, 129 S.E. 739, 745 (1925) (explaining that the wisdom, expediency [or] justice of a statute are questions to be determined by the legislature, not by the courts (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). [8]