Opinion ID: 1473997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attenuation of the taint of the illegal seizure

Text: As we noted above, the prosecutor conceded at the suppression hearing that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest appellant for kidnapping at the time they took her from her home to the Robbery Branch, and we may assume that this concession precludes our considering the record facts ourselves to determine whether the probable cause standard was actually satisfied. Hicks, supra, 480 U.S. at 326 n., 107 S.Ct. at 1153 n.. We turn, therefore, to the only remaining question: whether the taint of the illegal seizure was sufficiently attenuated to admit appellant's confession and the subsequent lineup identifications into evidence. We agree with the trial court that the intervening identification of the baby, coupled with the totality of circumstances here, constituted such attenuation. We recently had occasion to recapitulate the relevant legal principles. Patton v. United States, 633 A.2d 800, 816-17 (D.C. 1993). Evidence which has been obtained by the police through unlawful means generally must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. This rule applies to both physical evidence and testimonial evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). If, however, `an intervening event or other attenuating circumstance purge[s] the taint of the initial illegality,' the evidence need not be suppressed. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 52, 981 F.2d 536, 541 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 294 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 231, 958 F.2d 1085, 1089 (1992)). The government bears the burden of proving that the causal chain was sufficiently attenuated by an independent act to dissipate the taint of the illegality. Id. at 52, 981 F.2d at 541. The underlying inquiry is whether a confession made after the improper seizure is a product of free will. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The question whether a confession is a product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test [as the per se or `but for' rule]. The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the [illegal] arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. Id. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62 (citation and footnotes omitted). The relative importance of each of these factors in any particular case of course depends on the circumstances of that case. United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1211 (5th Cir.1985). [21] Unquestionably, as the trial court observed, the key intervening circumstance here was the lawfully obtained positive identification of the baby at the hospital as the baby which had been kidnapped the previous day and its aftermath. [22] This devastating information was conveyed to Ms. Oliver and she was formally placed under arrest. [23] Thereafter, following further questioning, she was allowed to talk in private with her boyfriend for ten or fifteen minutes, and to her brother for fifteen to twenty minutes. The meeting with the brother appears to have been very emotional since appellant was crying upon its conclusion. At that point, appellant gave the confession, which the trial court found to be voluntary but which she seeks to suppress. Turning to other factors illustrated in Brown, we note that on three separate occasions Ms. Oliver was given Miranda warnings and waived her rights. These three instances were upon her arrival at the police station for questioning, when she was formally placed under arrest, and prior to giving her official statement (the confession). Thus, appellant was adequately apprised of her constitutional rights and voluntarily spoke with the police. At least three hours passed between the unlawful arrest and the confession. Furthermore, looking at the officers' conduct during the illegal arrest, there is no claim of coercion or brutality. Weapons were never displayed and Ms. Oliver was never handcuffed. The initial seizure, albeit unlawful, was mild and carried out with consideration of its tentative nature pending identification of the baby. In short, the totality of the circumstances leads us to conclude that the confession was `sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.' Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 602, 95 S.Ct. at 2261 (quoting Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. at 416). See Patton, supra, 633 A.2d at 817. Affirmed. FERREN, Associate Judge, dissenting: There was neither an emergency, as defined by the case law, nor consent to a warrantless entry. The trial court accordingly erred in denying the motion to suppress the identity of the baby and the confession ultimately taken from appellant at the police station. Specifically, the baby's identification was not lawfully before the court because the police violated appellant's constitutional rights in entering her home to take the baby and, thus, in obtaining the resulting identification. Appellant's confession also was not lawfully in evidence because it followed a concededly unlawful arrest, without sufficient attenuation of that taint to allow its admissibility. Absent this evidence, there was no basis for conviction, and reversal is therefore required.