Opinion ID: 2460248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: As Big Ditch Stockholders, the Shareholders Are Immune From the City's Claims

Text: ¶ 25 The Shareholders argued in the district court that they are immune from the City's claims because the claims were brought against them in their capacity as shareholders. The district court rejected this corporate shield argument. It reasoned that the Shareholders cannot take the inconsistent position that they have individual standing to bring counterclaims against the City but that the City cannot bring claims against them. Clearly, if the Shareholders have . . . standing to assert these claims independent of Big Ditch, they can also be sued in their individual capacities. The district court apparently treated the filing of the Shareholders' counterclaims as the equivalent of a judicial determination that the Shareholders had standing to bring those counterclaims. In essence, it concluded that the Shareholders could not rely on the corporate shield doctrine to seek dismissal of the City's claims against them because they had asserted counterclaims against the City. This ruling was in error. ¶ 26 The fact that the Shareholders alleged counterclaims against the City does not legitimize the City's otherwise illegitimate claims against the Shareholders. The district court did not determine that the Shareholders actually had standing to bring counterclaims against the City in their individual capacity. If it had, perhaps it could have reasonably concluded that the corporate shield doctrine did not apply. But the City never challenged the Shareholders' standing to file the counterclaims, and the court simply did not consider the issue. Thus, the court erred when it equated the Shareholders' assertion of counterclaims with a judicial determination that the Shareholders actually had standing to bring those counterclaims. Rather, the district court should have considered the merits of the Shareholders' argument that they were immune from suit under the corporate shield doctrine. ¶ 27 Generally officers and stockholders of corporations are not held to be in privity with their corporations and are not personally bound by judgments against those corporations. Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, ¶ 37, 110 P.3d 678; see also Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (The general rule is that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its officers, shareholders and directors and that they will not be held personally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The doctrine applies to nonprofit corporations with equal force. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6a-115 (2009) (The directors, officers, employees, and members of a nonprofit corporation are not personally liable in their capacity as directors, officers, employees, and members for the acts, debts, liabilities, or obligations of a nonprofit corporation.). Thus, when an officer or director acts in his or her official capacity, he or she is immune from individual liability. Reedeker, 952 P.2d at 582. This is true whether the corporation has many stockholders or only one. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct.App.1987). ¶ 28 There are instances where a party may properly name shareholders as defendants, such as when seeking to pierce the corporate veil or attempting to establish that a shareholder is the alter ego of a corporation. See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ¶ 36, 84 P.3d 1154 (The corporate form may be disregarded when there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist . . . and the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But this is not one of those instances. ¶ 29 Here, the City is not seeking to pierce Big Ditch's corporate veil. Rather, the City has sought declaratory relief regarding the rights of certain Big Ditch shareholders. Its first claim sought a declaration that the Shareholders do not have the right or authority to file change applications over the water rights subject to the Agreement, either directly with the state engineer or by request made to Big Ditch in accordance with Utah Code section 73-3-3.5. The 1905 Agreement is a contract that Big Ditch, as a corporation, entered with the City. It is indisputable that the Shareholders are not themselves parties to the Agreement. Thus, any rights that Big Ditch shareholders have as a result of the Agreement are necessarily derivative of Big Ditch's rights. It follows that an adjudication of Big Ditch's rights vis-à-vis the Agreement is necessarily binding upon the Shareholders and that they are not entitled to sue or be sued in their individual capacities under the Agreement. ¶ 30 We held in East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan that shareholders of water companies could not independently file change applications. 860 P.2d 310, 316 (Utah 1993). Rather, consent of the corporation's board of directors is required. Id. In broad fashion, this holding was subsequently implemented by the Legislature. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3.5(2) (Supp.2010) (A shareholder who seeks to change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use of the shareholder's proportionate share of water in the water company shall submit a request for the change, in writing, to the water company.). Because shareholders' rights are derivative of the corporate entity in which they hold stock, if that entity cannot file a change application, neither can it file on behalf of its shareholders. The City concedes this much, as it has admitted in its brief that [w]here Big Ditch lacks authority to file change applications, it follows that its shareholders are even further removed from such authority. Because Big Ditch is the only entity arguably empowered to file change applications with respect to the water at issue, the Shareholders were not properly named as defendants. ¶ 31 The City also sought a declaration against the Shareholders that Big Ditch stock represents the right only to receive and use on lands historically irrigated from the Big Ditch System the irrigation water delivered pursuant to . . . the 1905 [Agreement]. Like its claim regarding the Shareholders' right to file change applications, this claim fails for the simple reason that this issue is a matter between Big Ditch, as a corporation, and its Shareholders, as owners of Big Ditch stock. See E. Jordan, 860 P.2d at 314 (stating that a shareholder's rights in, and relationship with, a water company, are dependent on and limited by the scope of [the water company's] articles of incorporation, which [the shareholder] agreed to by virtue of its purchase of shares). ¶ 32 We conclude that the Shareholders were not properly named as defendants in their individual capacities. The Shareholders are merely individuals who own stock in Big Ditch. They have no privity with, nor duty to, the City. The Shareholders can look only to Big Ditch, the entity tasked with shielding and protecting their interests. Because the City's claims against the Shareholders were legally deficient, the district court should have dismissed them.
¶ 33 The district court ruled that the 1905 Agreement conveyed to the City Big Ditch's title to its Big Cottonwood Creek water right. The district court also determined that, rather than a straight exchange of titles, Big Ditch received only a contractual right to receive irrigation water from the City. Big Ditch contends that the Agreement involved a quid pro quo exchange of titles and that Big Ditch holds legal title to the water that the City is required to deliver to Big Ditch's system. [8] We uphold the district court's construction of the Agreement. ¶ 34 Both parties asserted in the district court that the 1905 Agreement is integrated and unambiguous and should be construed as a matter of law. The district court agreed, and neither party has appealed this finding. We therefore interpret the Agreement as a matter of law. ¶ 35 The Agreement states that Big Ditch grants, bargains and sells to the City all of the right of . . . its portion of the water flowing in Big Cottonwood Creek. In return, the City agreed to perpetually and continuously deliver to [Big Ditch] from the first day of April until the first day of October a flow of water suitable for the purposes of irrigation in an amount tied to the measured flow of the creek. The Agreement further provides that the City may deliver the water to Big Ditch from any source that the City sees fit. ¶ 36 We conclude that the City holds title to the water on both sides of the exchange. While Big Ditch's promise to the City contains language of conveyance, the City's commitment to deliver water to Big Ditch is devoid of conveyance language. Rather, the City retained the right to designate the sources of the water it delivers to Big Ditch, which is a fundamental attribute of ownership. Additionally, Big Ditch is not obligated to maintain its water rights; that responsibility rests with the City. We therefore conclude that the City holds title to all of the contract water. ¶ 37 The district court correctly concluded that the 1905 Agreement was not a mere exchange of title. Rather, the Agreement effectuated an exchange of title to Big Ditch's water right for a contractual commitment by the City to deliver water to Big Ditch. Therefore, the 1905 Agreement vested in the City title to all the water rights at issue. [9]
¶ 38 Early in the litigation, the City sought a declaration that Big Ditch could use its contractual water only for irrigation purposes on the lands owned by its shareholders. The district court rejected this suggestion. While the Agreement provides that the City is obligated to deliver water suitable for the purposes of irrigation, the district court concluded that this language does not act as a limitation on the nature or place of use of the water. It therefore held that the City is required to deliver the amounts of water stated in paragraph 2 of the 1905 Agreement to Big Ditch. [10] ¶ 39 Subsequently, the City sought a declaration that Big Ditch could not demand the full amount of water to which it was entitled under the Agreement because it had failed to take the full amount in prior years. The district court agreed. It determined that the scope of the City's contractual obligations under the 1905 Agreement must be judged by the parties' subsequent conduct and assigned significant weight to the fact that the amount of water taken by Big Ditch has steadily diminished over the years. According to the district court, this fact, together with the City's reliance on Big Ditch's diminishing use in its planning and expenditures, mandated the legal conclusion that the parties had modified the Agreement. In the alternative, the district court held that Big Ditch was equitably estopped from demanding the full quantity of water to which it is entitled under the Agreement. In so ruling, the district court erred. We hold that Big Ditch, rather than the City, is entitled to summary judgment on these issues.
¶ 40 The purpose of estoppel is to rescue from loss a party who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another. Morgan v. Bd. of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976) (emphases added). Generally, application of equitable estoppel is reserved for instances of wrongdoing by the estopped party. See, e.g., Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 76 Utah 335, 289 P. 151, 154 (1930). Equitable estoppel is a disfavored remedy. See, e.g., Bruner v. Yellowstone Cnty., 272 Mont. 261, 900 P.2d 901, 905 (1995). It should be applied rarely, see, e.g., Blais v. Allied Exterminating Co., 198 W.Va. 674, 482 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1996), and only when necessary to avoid injustice, see, e.g., Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984). ¶ 41 To prevail on a claim of equitable estoppel, a party must establish three elements. Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ¶ 14, 158 P.3d 1088. First, there must be a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, estoppel requires reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, there must be injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court failed to evaluate each of these required elements. Instead, it focused exclusively on the reliance element. This was error because the City failed to establish the first element of equitable estoppelan inconsistent act. ¶ 42 The first element of equitable estoppel requires a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This element is met only when the party sought to be estopped has intentionally or through culpable negligence induced the other party to change its position by relying on the inconsistent act. See Almon, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 696 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah 1985) (stating that estoppel requires inducement through intentional conduct or culpable negligence); Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697; Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731, 734 (1938); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah Ct.App.1987); see also Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766, 772 (1917) (noting that estoppel applies only where conduct is of such character as to amount to a fraud  (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, ¶ 23, 181 P.3d 791 ([A]bsence of intent will not immunize a party from a determination that its conduct was inequitable.). Thus, to establish equitable estoppel, the City was required to show that Big Ditch's prior conduct is inconsistent with its current request for the full amount of its contractual water. And Big Ditch's conduct in this regard must have been intentional or, at a minimum, must amount to culpable negligence. ¶ 43 The City contends that Big Ditch has historically made a conscious decision to take less water than that to which it was entitled. The City argues this course of conduct satisfies the first element of estoppel because Big Ditch's historical conduct is inconsistent with Big Ditch's demand for the full quantity of water to which it is entitled under paragraph 2 of the Agreement. ¶ 44 We find no inconsistency in Big Ditch's conduct. It is true that Big Ditch has diverted a decreasing amount of water into its canal over the years. But even assuming that Big Ditch has reduced its take deliberately, it does not follow that such conduct is inconsistent with Big Ditch's current demand for the full amount of water to which it is contractually entitled. ¶ 45 The Agreement requires the City to deliver each year to Big Ditch a quantity of water proportionate to the total amount of water flowing in Big Cottonwood Creek. The formula is a fixed one. And the Agreement does not contemplate that the City's delivery obligation will vary with Big Ditch's beneficial use of the water. Rather, the Agreement is in the nature of a requirements contract. [11] As a result, Big Ditch may, but is not required to, take as much water as its shareholders desire, up to the maximum allowed under the Agreement. This makes sense given the nature and use of irrigation water. Both the level of stream flow and the demand for irrigation water will vary from year to year. Thus, Big Ditch's decision to take less water in any given year or years is not inconsistent with a later request for the full amount. In short, Big Ditch's historic conduct is not inconsistent with its current position that it remains entitled to the full amount of water should it so elect. ¶ 46 Because the City cannot establish the first element of equitable estoppel as a matter of law, we need not consider the other two elements. Rather, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that Big Ditch was equitably estopped from demanding its full contractual allotment.
¶ 47 The district court ruled in the alternative that the parties had modified the 1905 Agreement through their course of conduct and that, as such, Big Ditch was no longer entitled to its full contractual allotment of water. In so holding, the district court necessarily concluded that Big Ditch was estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense to the purported modification. This was error. ¶ 48 Where the statute of frauds requires a contract to be in writing, any modification of the contract must also be in writing. Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1986); Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489, 491 (1935), aff'd on rehearing, 88 Utah 213, 53 P.2d 1153 (1936). Utah courts have recognized a narrow exception to this general rule. It applies only where a party has changed position by performing an oral modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the other party to found a claim or defense on the original agreement as unmodified. Allen, 723 P.2d at 396. In such circumstances, a party is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. See id. ¶ 49 Here, the parties agree that the 1905 Agreement is subject to the statute of frauds. Thus, absent an applicable exception to the statute of frauds, any modification to the agreement must be in writing. The City argues that Big Ditch should be estopped from relying on the statute of frauds because the parties modified the Agreement and the City relied on the modification. We disagree. ¶ 50 The City has not alleged that the Agreement was orally modified. Rather, the City alleges the Agreement was modified through Big Ditch's course of conduct. Specifically, the City argues that Big Ditch modified the 1905 Agreement by consistently decreasing its take of water and by using the water that it did take solely for irrigation. But we have never recognized a modification by way of unilateral course of conduct; all of the cases speak in terms of an oral modification. More importantly, Big Ditch's course of conduct is not inconsistent with the 1905 Agreement. As we have already determined, the Agreement expressly allows Big Ditch to take as much water as it may desire in any given year up to the amount to which it is contractually entitled. And the district court ruled that Big Ditch's use of the water was not limited to irrigation. Because the Agreement contemplates Big Ditch's course of conduct, it is not inequitable for Big Ditch to raise the statute of frauds to defend against the City's modification claim. Because there is no applicable exception to the statute of frauds, the purported modification is unenforceable. ¶ 51 The City's equitable estoppel and modification claims fail as a matter of law. Thus, Big Ditch is entitled to summary judgment on these issues and the Agreement as originally drafted remains in force. The district court held that, as originally drafted, the integrated and unambiguous Agreement require[s] the City to deliver the amounts of water yielded by the formula stated in paragraph 2 of the Agreement, and the Agreement does not limit the nature or place of use of the water delivered to Big Ditch. The City has not appealed this construction of the original Agreement. Thus, we hold that Big Ditch may take the full amount of irrigation-quality water to which it is entitled under paragraph 2 of the Agreement and that its use of that water is not limited to irrigation.
¶ 52 Section 73-3-3 of the Utah Code provides that [a]ny person entitled to the use of water may make permanent or temporary changes in the: (i) point of diversion; (ii) place of use; or (iii) purpose of use for which the water was originally appropriated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(2)(a) (Supp. 2010). [12] The district court concluded that Big Ditch was not entitled to file change applications under this section. It reasoned that Big Ditch was not entitled to the use of water because it was neither an appropriator nor owner of a water right. In so holding, the court relied on two cases from this court, East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993) and Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 2003 UT 56, 82 P.3d 1119. It did not, however, consider more recent precedent. We conclude the district court erred. ¶ 53 In East Jordan, we faced the question of whether a shareholder in a mutual water corporation had a legal right to file a change application in its own name without the consent of the corporation. 860 P.2d at 310-11. We held that it did not. Id. at 316. First, we reasoned that the shareholder was not an appropriator of the water right. Id. at 313. Second, after applying principles of corporate law, we concluded that only the corporation may initiate a change application because it alone is empowered with the right to manage and control the affairs of the company. Id. at 314. ¶ 54 In Prisbrey, we considered whether a lessor of water rights was entitled to the use of the leased water such that it could file a change application at the lessee's request. 2003 UT 56, ¶¶ 22-23, 82 P.3d 1119. We concluded that it was. Id. ¶ 23. We noted that we had previously held that the phrase person entitled to the use of water refers strictly to a party who `alone owns the right as an appropriator to the use of public waters.' Id. (quoting E. Jordan, 860 P.2d at 313). Because only [the lessor had] made application to the state engineer for use of the water rights in question, it properly filed the change application. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Our conclusion was bolstered by the fact that allowing a lessee to file a change application would derogate the rights of the lessor because the lessee's interest is only a terminable possessory one. Id. ¶ 24. ¶ 55 Although East Jordan and Prisbrey can be read to have equated the phrase person entitled to the use of water with appropriator or owner status, we retreated from this narrow reading in Strawberry Water Users Ass'n v. Bureau of Reclamation, 2006 UT 19, 133 P.3d 410. In Strawberry, the United States initially appropriated water, then accepted applications from homesteaders to use the water. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 18. A homesteader whose application was approved was contractually entitled to a certain quantity of water in perpetuity. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. Later, an association of water users who had succeeded to the homesteaders' rights filed change applications. Id. ¶ 21. The United States protested, claiming ownership of the water rights. Id. ¶¶ 21, 30. The association countered, claiming equitable title. Id. ¶ 27. ¶ 56 We recognized that [i]n navigating a course through Utah water law, it is easy to be misled by the word `ownership,' id. ¶ 34, because one can never own water. Rather, one can only own the right to use water. See id. (`All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.' (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2004))). We therefore concluded that it is not sufficient to ask only who has title to water or in whose name a certificate of appropriation has been issued. Id. ¶ 35. And we repudiated any suggestion in Prisbrey that one must be either an owner or appropriator of water in order to be one entitled to the use of water for the purposes of a section 73-3-3 inquiry. See id. ¶¶ 39-40. We similarly distinguished East Jordan, noting that it illustrates the importance of asking not only the `title' or `ownership' question, but also the second question, which probes roots, purposes, and entitlements. Id. ¶ 36. ¶ 57 After analyzing all of our cases on the issue East Jordan, Prisbrey, and Strawberry we conclude that owner or appropriator status is not determinative of whether one may file a change application. Rather, one's right to use water is significant. While there are times when one's right to use is subsumed to other competing interests, as in East Jordan and Prisbrey, it remains the case that one with an entitlement to use water may file a change application. This framework is consistent with the statutorily prescribed practice of the State Engineer, which focuses on entitle[ment] to the use of water, thereby largely avoiding the ownership question. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3. This practice acknowledges that ownership of water is far more complex than ownership of other forms of property, and the mere existence of legal title does not determine all the rights of ownership. Indeed, even the term `ownership' is an oversimplication. E. Jordan, 860 P.2d at 317 (Durham, J., dissenting). ¶ 58 We conclude that Big Ditch is entitled to file change applications regarding the water to which it is contractually entitled under the 1905 Agreement. Under the 1905 Agreement, the City is obligated to provide to Big Ditch a measured flow of water in perpetuity. And, unlike in East Jordan and Prisbrey, Big Ditch's right to use is not subsumed to other competing interests. As a result, Big Ditch is entitled to file change applications with the State Engineer. [13]
¶ 59 Big Ditch and the Shareholders contend that the district court erred in dismissing their antitrust counterclaims. They each raise several issues, but we need address only one: whether the district court erred in concluding that the City's alleged anticompetitive activities are exempt from the Utah Antitrust Act. ¶ 60 The Utah Antitrust Act defines anticompetitive activities as follows: (1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal. (2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of trade or commerce. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-914 (2008). ¶ 61 Section 76-10-915 exempts from this definition the activities of a municipality to the extent authorized or directed by state law. Id. § 76-10-915(1)(f). [14] When construing the provisions of the Utah Antitrust Act, we look to interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes and by other state courts to comparable state antitrust statutes. Id. § 76-10-926. ¶ 62 We construed the municipal status exemption of section 76-10-915 in Summit Water Distribution Company v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, 123 P.3d 437. After surveying relevant federal precedent, we identified the range of state authorization that suffices to immunize anticompetitive municipal actions from antitrust laws. Id. At one end of the spectrum, we noted that a municipality need not show `a specific, detailed legislative authorization' to engage in the particular anticompetitive conduct at issue in order for the exemption to apply. Id. ¶ 39 (quoting City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978)). On the other end of the spectrum, we noted that the exemption will not apply where [a] state . . . allows its municipalities to do as they please, because in such circumstances the state can hardly be said to have contemplated the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Out of this range of conduct, we concluded that the exemption applies when the alleged anticompetitive conduct is a `foreseeable result' of the authority granted the municipality under state law. Id. ¶ 40. ¶ 63 Here, it is undisputed that the City is a municipality. Thus, the question is whether the City's alleged monopoly over the Big Cottonwood Creek water market and other related anticompetitive activities are the foreseeable result of the authority granted the City under state law. The Legislature has expressly granted Utah municipalities authority to acquire, purchase or condemn any water, waterworks system, water supply or property connected therewith. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-7-4(1) (Supp.2010). In addition, municipalities may purchase corporate stock of irrigation companies and are authorized to take the necessary steps to bring the land owned or controlled by an irrigation company within any conservation or conservancy district formed by the municipality. Id. § 73-1-19 (1989). A municipality may not sell water rights, UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 6, but it may market surplus water to persons or entities located outside of its boundaries. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-14(1)(d) (2007); see also Cnty. Water Sys., Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285, 290-91 (1954). ¶ 64 This statutory framework evinces a state policy of displacing competition with regulation in the area of municipal control over water and water rights. The Legislature has contemplated municipalities having broad authority to invest in and manage their water systems so as to ensure their ability to furnish current and future residents with sufficient water. And the Legislature has not limited how much water a municipality may acquire, nor has it placed any geographical limitations upon the area in which the municipality may operate its water system. Against this backdrop, we have little trouble concluding that the City's alleged monopoly over the Big Cottonwood Creek water market and other alleged related anticompetitive activities are a foreseeable result of the authority granted the City by the state. We therefore conclude that the district court properly dismissed the antitrust counterclaims. ¶ 65 The district court properly applied the municipal status statutory defense to dismiss the antitrust counterclaims. This holding moots Big Ditch and the Shareholders' remaining arguments regarding the dismissal of the antitrust claims. [15] We therefore need not, and do not, reach these arguments.