Opinion ID: 2902089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Butler’s Brady Claim

Text: Butler also requests habeas relief because he claims the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland by withholding evidence that would have undermined the prosecution’s presentation of aggravating circumstances during the punishment phase of his capital trial. See 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Brady prohibits the suppression of favorable impeachment or exculpatory evidence by the prosecution. Id.; Canales v. Stephens, 765 F.3d 551, 574 (5th Cir. 2014). To prove a Brady violation on the merits, Butler must show “(1) the evidence at issue, whether exculpatory or impeaching, [was] favorable to [Butler]; (2) “[the] evidence [was] suppressed by the State, either willfully or 22 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 23 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 inadvertently; and (3) prejudice . . . ensued.” Canales, 765 F.3d at 574 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)). “Unless suppressed evidence is ‘material for Brady purposes, [its] suppression [does] not give rise to sufficient prejudice to overcome [a] procedural default.’” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698 (2004) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282). In other words, “[t]he prejudice component [of a procedurally-defaulted Brady claim] is the same as materiality for Brady purposes.” Canales, 765 F.3d at 574 (citing Banks, 540 U.S. at 691). In determining materiality, courts should not simply ask whether, “after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions.” Instead, the proper inquiry is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290). As this court has observed, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “The suppressed evidence need not be admissible to be material under Brady; but it must, somehow, create a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would be different.” Id. To show a reasonable probability of a different outcome, “the ‘likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)). We assess the materiality of suppressed evidence collectively. Id.; see also Canales, 765 F.3d at 574 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436). We need not decide whether Butler procedurally defaulted his Brady claim because, regardless of any default, Butler would have to show the alleged 23 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 24 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 Brady violations were material (or prejudicial) to succeed on the merits and overcome procedural default. See Canales, 765 F.3d at 574–75 (citing Banks, 540 U.S. at 691); cf. Hooks v. Thaler, 394 F. App’x 79, 82 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because we hold that [the petitioner] has failed to satisfactorily demonstrate ineffective assistance, we need not address whether [he] properly exhausted his claim in the state courts.” (citing Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 474 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008))). Even assuming that the information Butler describes was not disclosed, we conclude that the allegedly suppressed information was not “material” within the meaning of Brady. Three groups of allegedly suppressed evidence related to witness testimony establishing Butler’s culpability in other crimes used as aggravating factors in his sentencing. While a Brady violation can be premised on the suppression of impeachment evidence, the evidence in question here would not have provided impeachment sufficient to “undermine confidence in the outcome.” Canales, 765 F.3d at 568; see also Banks, 583 F.3d at 311. With respect to Gwen Blackwell, who was a witness to a robbery, Madonna Benoit, who was a witness to a different robbery and attempted murder, and Winnie Silcox, who was a witness to yet another robbery and sexual assault, Butler confessed to all of these crimes. His confessions and other evidence the prosecution presented render the alleged impeachment evidence insufficient to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in whether Butler received a fair trial, “resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Brown, 650 F.3d at 588; see also Canales, 765 F.3d at 574. Thus, even assuming arguendo the allegedly suppressed evidence would bear on these witnesses’ credibility, Butler has failed to establish materiality. The final item claimed as suppressed Brady material is information contained in a series of published newspaper articles impugning one Louisiana 24 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 25 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 law enforcement officer and the sheriff’s office where he and another officer worked during the general time frame when these officers investigated Butler. We agree with the State that newspaper articles published about this law enforcement office and one of the officers after Butler’s trial do not constitute “suppressed” Brady materials. To the extent the prosecution is imputed with knowledge about the underlying information, it is too vague and attenuated to Butler’s investigation to be material. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no need to remand the Brady analysis to the district court and we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of relief on this basis.