Opinion ID: 2613151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Arising out of the performance of official duties

Text: Pinero next alleges error in the court's instruction on first degree murder. According to HRS § 707-701(1)(b), [a] person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of [a] peace officer, judge, or prosecutor arising out of the performance of official duties[.] As we have noted, instruction number 16 provided in pertinent part: There are four elements to this offense [Murder in the First Degree], each of which must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. These four elements are: 1. The Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of David Ronk. 2. David Ronk's death arose out of the performance of his official duties as a peace officer. A police officer is a peace officer under the law. 3. The Defendant knew that David Ronk was a police officer. 4. The Defendant's conduct was not justifiable as self defense. Pinero argues that the instruction was incomplete with respect to the arising out of the performance of official duties element of the offense. Because Pinero did not object to the instruction of this ground below, his conviction will not be vacated unless we notice plain error meriting reversal. See footnote number 4 and accompanying text, supra. Upon review of Pinero's claim and the record below, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error because Pinero's substantial rights were not affected by a deficiency in instruction number 16. Pinero's argument that instruction number 16 was erroneous is based on the following propositions: (1) arising out of the performance of official duties is an element of first degree murder, in particular, an attendant circumstance; (2) establishing that the attendant circumstance existed requires proof that a peace office was engaged in the performance of his or her official duties at the time of the offense; (3) HRS § 702-204 requires proof that the accused acted with the requisite state of mind with respect to the attendant circumstance; and (4) the state of mind that must be proved is the state of mind specified in the first degree murder statute, i.e., intentionally or knowingly. Thus, Pinero submits that instruction number 16 was defective because it failed to require proof that he knew that Ronk was engaged in the performance of official duties. Although Pinero is correct that the phrase arising out of the performance of official duties defines an attendant circumstance, the existence of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, [6] he misunderstands the nature of the attendant circumstance that must be proved. Establishing that the attendant circumstance existed does not require proof that the victim was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the commission of the offense. For example, if a person engages in conduct designed to cause the death of a police officer because of the officer's past, present, or expected performance of official duties, the person's conduct arises out of the performance of official duties, even if the officer is off-duty and involved in a purely personal activity at the time. Moreover, the mere fact that an officer happens to be engaged in the performance of official duties is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that the attendant circumstance existed. For example, if a person engages in conduct designed to cause the death of a police officer because of a personal vendetta completely unrelated to the officer's official duties, the person's conduct does not arise out of the performance of official duties, even if the officer is on-duty and involved in the performance of official duties. Thus, establishing the existence of the attendant circumstance does not require proof that the officer was engaged in the performance of official duties, as Pinero contends, but requires proof that the accused engaged in the death causing conduct because of the officer's past, present, or expected performance of official duties. [7] Despite Pinero's misapprehension of the meaning of arising out of the performance of official duties, the remainder of his analysis is correct. HRS § 701-114 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, as well as [t]he state of mind required to establish each element of the offense. See also HRS § 702-204 (1985). [8] Pursuant to HRS §§ 702-207 (1985) and 707-701, the state of mind required to establish the attendant circumstance of arising out of the performance of official duties is intentionally or knowingly. [9] Thus, instruction number 16 was incomplete because it failed to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Pinero was aware of, believed, or hoped [10] that he caused Ronk's death because of Ronk's prior, ongoing, or expected performance of official duties. Although instruction number 16 merely tracked the statutory language of HRS § 707-701(1)(b) by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Ronk's death arose out of the performance of his official duties, this deficiency in the instruction did not affect Pinero's substantial rights. When the record is viewed in light of the jury's implicit findings that Pinero knew Ronk was a police officer and, without justification or mitigation, intentionally or knowingly caused his death, the inescapable conclusion is that Pinero caused Ronk's death knowing that he did so because of Ronk's performance of official duties. Throughout the trial, from the opening statements through the closing arguments, Pinero conceded that at the time of the incident, he knew the police officers had arrived at his home, thought they were coming to arrest him, and tried to avoid them. [11] Pinero's concessions at trial concerning the point he now raises as plain error effectively foreclose any argument that his rights were substantially prejudiced by the erroneous instruction. See Burgess v. Arita, 5 Haw.App. 581, 593-94, 704 P.2d 930, 939, recon. denied, 5 Haw. App. 682, 753 P.2d 253 (1985) (where it is plain to the appellate court that the record clearly reflects what the finding must be, the court may elect to decide the appeal without further findings). Pinero has thus failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected by the court's failure to properly instruct on this issue and, therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error.