Opinion ID: 200671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hobbs Act and the Commerce Clause.

Text: 37 Capozzi's second appellate argument is a Commerce Clause challenge to the Hobbs Act conviction. Capozzi failed to raise this issue before the district court. Therefore, we review it only for plain error. See United States v. Newton, 327 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir.2003). Under this standard, we will reverse the Hobbs Act conviction on Commerce Clause grounds only if Capozzi can show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Capozzi's claim falters on the first prong of this analysis because the Hobbs Act, as applied here, does not violate the Commerce Clause. 38 The Hobbs Act prohibits extortion or attempted extortion where such crime in any way or degree, obstructs, delays or affects commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Hobbs Act's scope extends to the limit of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir.1979). Because of the statute's broad sweep, to prove a Hobbs Act violation, the government must show only that the extortionate conduct created a realistic probability of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. 2 (1st Cir.1992); see United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 293 (1st Cir.1990); DiGregorio, 605 F.2d at 1190. 39 Capozzi contends that, in light of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), the  de minimis effect on interstate commerce standard for establishing a Hobbs Act violation is unconstitutional. We reject this contention. 40 In Lopez, the Supreme Court addressed a Commerce Clause challenge to the Gun Free School Zones Act, a law which prohibited a person from possessing a gun while in a school zone. 514 U.S. at 552-68, 115 S.Ct. 1624. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Court identified three categories of conduct which Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause authority: (1) the use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624. The Court held that the proper test for evaluating a statute like the Gun Free School Zones Act, which neither regulated commercial activity nor contained a jurisdictional element requiring that the regulated activity be connected to interstate commerce, is whether the statute substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Applying this test, the Court invalidated the Act because the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624. 41 Relying on the Lopez Court's substantially affects language, Capozzi contends that the  de minimis effect standard for a Hobbs Act violation is no longer valid. In making this argument, Capozzi overlooks a crucial distinction between the statute at issue in Lopez and the Hobbs Act. In drafting the Hobbs Act, Congress included a jurisdictional element which it failed to include in the Gun Free School Zones Act. The Hobbs Act requires the government to prove that the extortion or robbery be connected to interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Rather than applying to all robberies or extortions, the Hobbs Act applies to only that specific subset of robberies or extortions that affects interstate commerce. 2 See United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.2002) (citing cases where robbery or extortion held not to affect interstate commerce and thus not actionable under Hobbs Act). Thus, the Hobbs Act ensure[s], through case-by-case-inquiry, that the [extortion or robbery] in question affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. 1624. 42 In the Hobbs Act, Congress expressed its self-conscious recognition of the limits on its Commerce Clause power by restricting the statute's reach to conduct squarely within its authority — a recognition notably absent from Congress' enactment of the Gun Free School Zones Act. Congress' inclusion of a jurisdictional element in the Hobbs Act addresses the Lopez Court's constitutional concern that congressional authority under the Commerce Clause not become a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Lopez 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Accordingly, the Lopez decision does not render the Hobbs Act's  de minimis effect on interstate commerce standard unconstitutional. 3 43 Our rejection of Capozzi's Commerce Clause challenge to the Hobbs Act is consistent with the decisions of several other circuits which have rejected similar challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 352 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 710-11 (3d Cir.2003); United States v. Fabian, 312 F.3d 550, 554-55 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. Lynch, 282 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Einfeldt, 138 F.3d 373, 379 (8th Cir.1998); United States v. Valenzeno, 123 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1386-87 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1465-66 (D.C.Cir.1997). Accordingly, we hold that the Hobbs Act's  de minimis effect on interstate commerce standard was constitutionally applied to Capozzi's conduct. 44