Opinion ID: 1157473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The petition for writ of mandamus.

Text: In petitioning this court for a writ of mandamus, petitioner does not claim that respondent refuses to comply with its duties under the rules or request that this court order it to do so. [7] Petitioner's attack rather is on the validity of the existing scheme of suspension and reinstatement. While the legal import of the allegations in the petition is not always clear, petitioner's criticism falls into three groups. First, the petition attacks the statutory suspension for nonpayment of the assessment as a usurpation of this court's authority over the admission of attorneys. This argument in effect reaches beyond the specific provision for a professional liability fund and questions the validity of all admission and suspension provisions of the State Bar Act. We see nothing in the requirement to provide security for clients that would unduly burden or substantially interfere with the judiciary, Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or. 279, 285, 550 P.2d 1218 (1976), in performing its judicial functions under Or.Const. art. VII. [8] Second, the petition asserts that the rules of procedure unlawfully delegate power reserved to the courts to the Oregon State Bar. One difficulty with petitioner's choice of a remedy is that if he is right and only this court rather than the bar has legal authority to process his suspension or reinstatement, a writ of mandamus from this court to respondent is unnecessary and inappropriate. In any event, however, the rules summarized above leave the final decision on reinstatement to the court and delegate only the administrative procedures to the bar. The remaining criticisms may be grouped together as invoking the due process clause of the 14th amendment. [9] Some of these criticisms concern procedure, others attack the substance of the suspension provisions. It is difficult to characterize nine separately numbered allegations each of which begins with the assertion that It is unreasonable for the Oregon State Bar to do various things in the reinstatement process. They do not allege that the bar in fact has done these things, though this may be implied. Nor does an allegation that official action is unreasonable state a self-explanatory reason why the action is legally invalid. Petitioner's supporting memorandum makes the following points. (1) Suspension from the practice of law is a deprivation of liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. We agree. (2) Due process requires notice. Petitioner claims that the notice he received of his impending suspension was inadequate because it was sent on stationery of the Professional Liability Fund and did not indicate the correct deadline for payment. The letter, dated March 17, 1981, stated that petitioner's 1981 assessment remains unpaid as of March 12, 1981, and that suspension proceedings would be initiated if payment was not received by May 18, 1981. This was adequate notice both that the assessment was overdue and that the fund would report the delinquency to the bar for suspension proceedings. [10] (3) Automatic suspension for nonpayment of the assessment denies substantive due process, at least if it does not provide automatic reinstatement upon payment. For a premise for this assertion, petitioner relies on two decisions from the early years of substantive due process, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889) and Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 43 S.Ct. 303, 67 L.Ed. 590 (1923). Without stopping to discuss the later fate or the current status of the doctrines of that era, we note that these decisions sustained state laws licensing the practice of medicine and dentistry respectively. We have no doubt that the due process clause does not foreclose making the practice of a profession contingent on maintaining adequate arrangements for making good financial losses caused to clients, patients or others. (4) Petitioner cites cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that a suspension for nonpayment of dues terminates upon payment and is not an occasion for examining an attorney's character or other qualifications. These sources may accurately state the law of their respective states. They are not authority for concluding that the federal constitution requires automatic reinstatement upon late payment. [11] The reinstatement procedure under the rules provides due process if an inquiry into the suspended attorney's fitness to resume practice may be made at all. In essence, petitioner's attack on the rules contends that when the suspension results from failure to pay an assessment required in order to practice law, the state is constitutionally obliged to let him resume practice upon payment even if there is doubt about his fitness. We perceive no basis in constitutional law for this contention. There may be shortcomings in the statutes and the rules that deserve correction, see supra, notes 3, 6, but that is a matter for different proceedings. As for the present petition, we find no allegations entitling petitioner to a writ of mandamus against the Oregon State Bar. Petition denied.