Opinion ID: 208357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: STANDARDS OF PROOF and REVIEW

Text: Whether a particular term is generic, and therefore cannot be a trademark or service mark, is a question of fact. In re Reed Elsevier Props., Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2007). The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) bears the burden of establishing that a proposed mark is generic, In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1987), and must demonstrate generic status by clear evidence. See Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 1209.01(c)(i) (4th ed. 2005) (The examining attorney has the burden of proving that a term is generic by clear evidence.); 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:12 (4th ed. 2008) (As Judge Posner remarked [in Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir.2003)]: `To determine that a trademark is generic and thus pitch it into the public domain is a fateful step.'). As the Court explained in California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, [t]he purpose of a standard of proof is `to instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' 454 U.S. 90, 92-93, 102 S.Ct. 172, 70 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). See Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362-63, 49 S.Ct. 173, 73 L.Ed. 419 (1929) (A mere preponderance of evidence in such a case is not enough [and] the court ... should therefore require clear evidence....); Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 401 U.S. 302, 309, 91 S.Ct. 658, 28 L.Ed.2d 64 (1971) (stating that clear evidence or clear proof is equivalent to clear and convincing evidence); Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (Fed.Cir.2002) (explaining that clear evidence is equivalent to clear and convincing evidence, which is a heavier burden than preponderance of the evidence). Rulings of the PTO tribunals are reviewed in accordance with the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999). We give plenary review to the TTAB's legal conclusions, and review its factual findings to determine whether they are arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Automobile Club De L'Quest De La Fr., 245 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2001). On appellate review of the Board's factual finding of genericness, we determine whether, on the entirety of the record, there was substantial evidence to support the determination. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir.2005) (This court reviews a holding of genericness or descriptiveness for substantial evidence.). When a fact is required to be found by clear evidence and not a mere preponderance, the review for support by substantial evidence must take this heightened burden into account. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence, which would be party's burden at trial, must be considered when evaluating sufficiency of evidence on motion for summary judgment).