Opinion ID: 4470839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court’s Sequence of Findings

Text: [¶18] The father next argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by first determining that termination was in the best interest of each child and then finding that he has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet their needs. The father raises this challenge for the first time on appeal. See supra Part I. Therefore, we review for obvious error. In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 9-10, 776 A.2d 1240; see Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice, § 402(a) at 310 (5th ed. 2018); see also MP Assocs. v. Liberty, 2001 ME 22, ¶ 18, 771 A.2d 1040. 12 Obvious error is that which deprives a party of a fair trial or otherwise treats a party unjustly. See Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 18, 198 A.3d 791. [¶19] Title 22 § 4055(1)(B)(2) lists two findings as prerequisites to a termination of parental rights: first, that termination is in the best interest of the child; and second, that the parent has demonstrated unfitness in one of four ways. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2). Notwithstanding the order in which these two findings are laid out in the statute, the constitution requires that “a trial court must find parental unfitness before it proceeds to consider the best interest of the children.” Adoption of Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 17, 198 A.3d 791; see also Adoption of Hali D., 2009 ME 70, ¶¶ 4-5, 974 A.2d 916; In re Michelle W., 2001 ME 123, ¶ 11, 777 A.2d 283. [¶20] In both of the trial court’s judgments, it first stated that it found termination to be in the child’s best interests. Then, in a separate sentence, the trial court found that the father “has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.” However, the language of the trial court’s order does not necessarily suggest that it made a finding as to the children’s best interests before reaching the question of fitness; the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly understood that the two findings were distinct and that a finding as to fitness 13 must be reached before it could proceed to a best interest analysis. At trial, the court stated, “[Y]ou don’t even get [to] the best interest of the child standards until you deal with the termination standard.” [¶21] The trial court’s order and the record evidence do not support a conclusion that the father was denied a fair trial or subjected to a serious injustice. The trial court made all required findings, correctly applying the standard of clear and convincing evidence to both the best interest prong and the fitness prong. The trial court understood that these findings were independent of one another and a finding as to one should not inform the finding as to the other. Therefore, any mistake made by the trial court in arranging its findings within the termination orders was not obvious error. Cf. In re Michelle W., 2001 ME 123, ¶¶ 8, 11, 777 A.2d 283; In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 8, 776 A.2d 1240.