Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mental Condition Evidence

Text: At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the court instructed the jury pursuant to a modified version of CALJIC No. 3.32, as follows: Evidence has been received from which you may find that the defendant was affected by a mental condition at the time of the crimes charged. You may consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed any intent or mental state which is an element of the crimes charged. Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to specifically name for the jury the intent or mental state to which defendant's mental condition evidence was relevant. He argues that without such an instruction, it is likely the jury did not understand that premeditation and deliberation and the specific intent to commit rape were the intent and mental states to which this instruction referred. [35] As an initial matter, defendant failed to preserve an objection to the adequacy of the instruction given at the guilt phase, and therefore has forfeited that challenge. ( People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168 ( Hudson ) [`Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language'].) To the extent we may review defendant's claim despite his failure to preserve the issue, it is without merit. (See § 1259 [The appellate court may ... review any instruction given, ... even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.].) When we review challenges to a jury instruction as being incorrect or incomplete, we evaluate the instructions given as a whole, not in isolation. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) For ambiguous instructions, the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction. ( Ibid. ) We previously have rejected challenges similar to defendant's regarding the failure explicitly to define the term mental states in instructions concerning the effect of a mental defect upon the defendant's ability to form mental states required for the commission of various offenses. Thus, we have found no error in cases in which a mental defect instruction merely mentioned the term mental state in a generic sense, but the trial court elsewhere either specifically explained that premeditation and deliberation were mental states necessary for a conviction of first degree murder ( People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1247-1249, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475 ( Musselwhite); People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1145, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757), or generally instructed that `[t]he mental state required is included in the definition of the crime charged.' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 988, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171 ( Smithey ).) Defendant observes that in the present case, the trial court did not specifically define premeditation and deliberation or the intent to rape as mental states, rendering Musselwhite and People v. Jones inapplicable. He further argues the trial court did not clearly instruct the jury that the mental states were defined in the instructions concerning the charged offenses. The trial court did give a modified version of CALJIC No. 3.31 regarding the concurrence of act and mental state, with language similar to the instruction on which we based our decision in Smithey, but there was a slight variance in the oral reading of the instructions. The written version stated in relevant part: These specific intent and mental states are set out in the instructions pertaining to the specific crimes. The oral version was: These specific intents and mental states required in each of these crimes are set out in the instructions pertaining to a specific crime which I'll be giving you. Defendant argues the jury likely was confused by the oral version because it referred to a specific crime's instructions, in the singular, which was not possible because there were two specific crimes charged. He claims this potential for confusion makes Smithey inapplicable as well. Even assuming the transcription is completely accurate and the instructions did not clearly inform the jury that the mental states referred to in the mental condition instruction were defined in the instructions on the crimes (plural), we still conclude there is no possibility the jury failed to realize this connection. Recently, we found no error even when the jury neither was informed that premeditation and deliberation were mental states, nor told that the mental state required for each crime was included in the definition of that crime, because no reasonable juror, when properly instructed on the elements of first degree murder, could fail to realize that premeditation and deliberation are mental states at issue in such a charge and to make the connection between the elements of the crime and the limited purpose of the admission of mental defect evidence. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 881, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135, citing People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1017, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.) Although in People v. Jones, Musselwhite, and Smithey other instructions were given lessening the chance of confusion, the absence of such instructions in the present case, as in Rogers, does not suggest the jury was unable to make the connection between the mental states referred to in the mental condition instruction and those described in the instructions on the charged offenses. In the present case, the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning the concepts of premeditation and deliberation required for an express-malice first degree murder finding, the specific intent to commit rape required for an attempted-rape finding and an associated felony-murder finding, and the elements of the attempted-rape special circumstance allegations. The primary issue at trial, moreover, was defendant's mental state at the time he killed Garcia and Sorensenwhether he intended to rape them then and/or whether he premeditated and deliberated before killing themand the arguments of counsel further clarified the connection between defendant's asserted mental condition and the relevant mental states. (See Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 882, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135.) We therefore conclude no reasonable jury would have failed to realize these were the mental states to which the mental condition instruction referred. Accordingly, the absence of specific reference to them in the instructions was not error.