Opinion ID: 2978059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witness Sequestration Agreement

Text: Pope asserts that when government agents met with Peake during a break they coached her into changing key parts of her testimony, violating either a witness sequestration order or the parties’ private witness sequestration agreement, and thereby prejudicing the defense and entitling Pope to a new trial. The government correctly notes that the district court never entered a witness sequestration order, but concedes that “[a]t some point in time during the trial,” it privately agreed with defense counsel to sequester witnesses. The agreement was “not necessarily” reached before Peake testified. In any event, the government contends that the agents’ conduct was proper. -7- No. 08-1219 United States v. Pope Federal Rule of Evidence 615 provides for sequestering witnesses, thereby “preclud[ing] coaching or the influencing of a witness’ testimony by another witness.” United States v. Rugiero, 20 F.3d 1387, 1392 (6th Cir. 1994). Even when a sequestration order violation occurs, courts do not automatically bar the affected testimony. United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 593 (6th Cir. 2003). The district court retains discretion to exclude or allow the testimony and, because exclusion is a drastic remedy, a party will only receive a new trial by demonstrating that the error prejudiced its right to a fair trial. Id. at 593–94. While considerable doubt exists as to whether Rule 615 applies to out-of-court meetings like the one between Peake and the government agents, and circuits have split on the question, see id. at 592, we need not resolve the issue here. Even if we assume that the rule applies, Pope fails to establish a violation. Pope’s assertion that government agents improperly influenced Peake’s testimony finds no support in the record. Peake admitted meeting with the government’s agents during a break, but she testified that they merely tried to calm her nerves and reminded her to tell the truth. According to Peake, during the meeting, she told the agents that she was confused by some of the questions about her interactions with Pope. The AUSA subsequently attempted to clarify Peake’s testimony by alleviating her confusion. No evidence suggests that the government agents used the meeting to coach Peake. Indeed, her post-break testimony corroborated statements she made to investigators during previous interviews, strongly suggesting that the earlier questioning confused her, and that -8- No. 08-1219 United States v. Pope Pope’s claim that he was surprised by the change is unfounded. Nor does the record reveal an attempt to coerce Peake into testifying consistently with the government’s witnesses. The case agents with whom she met never testified about the statements Peake made during pre-trial interviews. And while the defense suggests that the government intended its questions to bring Peake’s testimony into line with Fance’s, Peake testified before Fance, and the record contains no indication that she knew what Fance would say. Thus, Peake was in no position to conform her testimony to that of any other witness. Moreover, even if the government violated Rule 615, Pope fails to demonstrate prejudice. Exclusion constitutes a severe sanction, making trial courts reluctant to impose it. See id. at 593. Here, defense counsel learned immediately of the contact between Peake and the government agents and questioned both Peake and the case agents about the encounter. The defense cross-examined Peake about her change in testimony and commented on it during closing argument. These remedies adequately redressed any potential prejudice. Even if the government violated Rule 615, the district court had discretion to allow Peake’s testimony. Without any showing of prejudice to Pope’s receipt of a fair trial, no abuse occurred.