Opinion ID: 2520075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the washington county water conservancy district meet the traditional test for standing?

Text: ¶ 17 A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either show that he has or would suffer a distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the case or meet one of the two exceptions to standing recognized in cases involving important public issues. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 869 P.2d at 913; see also Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986); Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. The Conservancy District argues that the trial court erred by incorrectly applying the established common law test for standing. It also argues that the trial court erred in finding that it failed to satisfy common law standing requirements. ¶ 18 Generally, the question of whether a given individual or association has standing to request a particular [form of] relief is primarily a question of law, although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue. We review such factual determinations made by a trial court with deference. Because of the important policy considerations involved in granting or denying standing, we closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the trial court. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). Before we consider whether the factual evidence was sufficient to establish standing, we consider whether the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the rules governing standing developed in our case law. This is a question of law that we review for correctness without affording any deference to the conclusions of the trial court.
¶ 19 The trial court held that the Conservancy District could not challenge the approval of the change application or assert forfeiture of the CPB's water rights unless the Conservancy District could show that it would suffer some demonstrable or measurable harm absent a forfeiture. In other words, the trial court required the Conservancy District to show a measurable connection between the water use of the CPB and the Conservancy District's own water use or proposed water use. The Conservancy District argues that this requirement is not supported by our case law and that the trial court, in effect, created a new test for standing. ¶ 20 We have recognized that the first and most widely employed standard for establishing standing requires a plaintiff to show some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 869 P.2d at 913. This requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate such particularized injury is the traditional test for standing. Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987). ¶ 21 The trial court held that the Conservancy District could show a particularized injury only by demonstrating some connection between the water use of the CPB and that of the Conservancy District. Absent such a connection, neither the state engineer's approval of the change application nor any forfeiture of the CPB's water rights would have any impact on the Conservancy District. The trial court's holding in this respect was appropriate. The trial court did not create a new test for standing as the Conservancy District contends. Rather, it correctly applied the traditional rule.
¶ 22 In order to establish particularized injury under the traditional test for standing, the Conservancy District attempted to demonstrate a measurable connection between its own water uses and those of the CPB. The trial court found the evidence insufficient to show such a connection. In view of that failure, the trial court held that the Conservancy District lacked standing. The Conservancy District argues that these factual findings by the trial court are not supported by the evidence and therefore constitute error. ¶ 23 Whether the Conservancy District advanced sufficient evidence to establish that its water rights would be enhanced by any forfeiture of the CPB's rights is a question of fact. We must affirm the trial court's factual findings on this issue unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). ¶ 24 The Conservancy District called witnesses who testified that the Ash Creek drainage, from which both the Conservancy District and the CPB draw water, was a single, integrated hydrological unit, so that any extraction of water from wells within the drainage would affect downstream users of water both above and below ground. The CPB countered with witnesses who testified that the Ash Creek drainage is not an integrated hydrological unit, so that subsurface waters extracted from within the drainage would not necessarily affect the rights of downstream users. ¶ 25 Results of empirical testing considered by the trial court did not show any connection between the water drawn from the CPB's wells and the water sources to which the Conservancy District has rights. This testing included comparisons of the chemical composition of the water, isotopic testing, and dye testing (undertaken sometime before the litigation). The trial court found that the isotopic testing, which compared the age of various isotopes found in water from different sources, weighed against any communication of water from the CPB's wells to the water supplies of the Conservancy District because the CPB water appeared to be much older than the Conservancy District's water. The Conservancy District did not present any persuasive evidence that this finding was erroneous. Where expert witnesses disagree and where the party carrying the burden of establishing standing is unable to present empirical or measurable evidence of a direct connection between the sources from which the parties have rights to draw water, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding the evidence inconclusive. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's factual determination that the Conservancy District failed to meet its burden of establishing particularized injury.
¶ 26 Despite its inability to show that it would suffer a distinct and palpable injury if the CPB's water rights were not forfeited, the Conservancy District could nevertheless acquire standing to litigate an important public issue [5] if `no one else has a greater interest in the outcome[,] the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issues,' and the legal issues are sufficiently crystallized to be subject to judicial resolution. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 869 P.2d at 913 (quoting Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799). If the Conservancy District is unable to meet these requirements, it may nevertheless be afforded standing in those limited circumstances in which a case raises issues that are so `unique and of such great importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public interest.' Id. The trial court did not rule on the question of whether the Conservancy District was entitled to standing under either of these exceptions, but the Conservancy District has argued for their applicability, and we may consider this jurisdictional issue sua sponte. Terracor, 716 P.2d at 798. ¶ 27 Despite arguing for the applicability of these exceptions to this case, the Conservancy District has made no showing that the validity of the CPB's right to use groundwater in the Ash Creek drainage in Washington County is an issue of sufficient public importance to justify departure from traditional standing requirements. We remain open to the possibility that some issues concerning water rights might present questions of great public importance. That importance, however, likely would be found in a case where a large number of people would be affected by the outcome. The Conservancy District has not advanced any specific evidence that such is the case here. The trial court found that the Conservancy District owns and operates such significant water projects as to make it one of the principal suppliers of water to Washington County. When such a party is unable to show any connection between the disputed water use and its own, we have no reason to believe that the dispute will affect large numbers of people or involve an issue of great public importance. The Conservancy District therefore cannot rely on the public importance exceptions to the traditional rule requiring that a plaintiff show a particularized injury in order to attain standing.