Opinion ID: 1405352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether Wilson irrigation right perfected

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the Wilson irrigation right was never perfected and therefore is not subject to transfer or change under RCW 90.03.380. The Board held that the right had not been perfected. The superior court reversed. We uphold the Board's determination because substantial evidence supports its factual determinations which support its conclusion that the right was never perfected. The superior court improperly substituted its own factual determinations in reaching its opposite conclusion. On appeal from a decision of the Board, the superior court must uphold agency findings unless [t]he order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.... RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). Agency findings on factual matters are entitled to great deference. Penick v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 82 Wash.App. 30, 37, 917 P.2d 136 (1996). The Board found: The Wilson irrigation right is based upon a 1915 notice of water right which described a point of diversion on Early Winters Creek, just below the diversion for the Early Winters Ditch Company ditch which begins at the creek and runs along and past the western boundary of the homestead property allegedly irrigated under the Wilson irrigation right. A homestead survey of this property in 1917 does not indicate a separate diversion ditch from the ditch company's ditch, and later assessor records similarly do not indicate any such ditch. Jack Wilson used diverted water from the ditch company's ditch to irrigate 10 acres of pasture. However, no evidence indicates any water was diverted under the 1915 notice and put to beneficial use. Although conflicting evidence was presented, Wilson possibly used water under the ditch company's claim, rather than under the 1915 notice. Testimony concerning the chain of title to the homestead property and the ditch company partnership agreement indicated no shares were held in the ditch company. However, the notice of water right for the ditch company recorded in 1907 and the company's 1974 registration form indicated that the homestead property was part of the land where the ditch company's right was to be used. Further, evidence was presented that Wilson early during his ownership paid for use of the ditch company's ditch and later acquired ditch company shares to irrigate another piece of property. Finding of fact VI, Vol. 5, at 9 (Apr. 26, 1995) ( Knight v. Ecology, Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB) No. 94-61). All of these findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The superior court said, however, that the owners of the homestead property claimed a right independent of the ditch company right, conveyed the water through the ditch company's ditch, and beneficially applied the water to the land. The court also said that the owners of the property did not claim any other right for that purpose, and no owner of the property ever owned shares in the ditch company for purposes of irrigating the homestead property. The problem with the superior court's findings is that the court made its own findings despite substantial evidence supporting the Board's findings. Further, the superior court drew the conclusion that the owners of the property must have been using their own claimed right because, the court reasoned, they had no right to use the ditch company's water. As the Board found, though, there was conflicting evidence. Regardless of whether the owners of the property owned shares in the ditch company, the ditch company's claims included irrigation water for the homestead property, and no separate diversion works were constructed under the 1915 notice, even though that notice expressly said that a separate diversion would be made. The superior court failed to defer to the agency's factual determinations as it should have. The Board's legal conclusion that the Wilson irrigation right was not perfected is supported by its findings. At the time this water right was claimed, perfected surface water rights for irrigation use could be established under 1891 legislation by posting a notice of claim at the proposed point of diversion, filing a copy with the county auditor, commencing the work associated with the notice within prescribed times, and diligently completing the work. Charles B. Roe, Jr. & Peter B. Anderson, Water Law, in 1C Kelly Kunsch Washington Practice: Methods of Practice § 91.6 (4th ed.1997) (discussing Laws of 1891, ch. 142). [S]trict compliance with the requirements was necessary, and a failure to comply [with the requirements] deprive[d] the appropriator of the right to the use of the water as against a subsequent appropriator.... Laws of 1891, ch. 142, § 4 at 328. Perfection of a water right could also occur in accordance with community custom, requiring (1) an intent to appropriate, (2) implementation of that intent by an actual diversion of public waters, and (3) an application of the diverted water to a beneficial use within a reasonable time based upon the concept of due (or reasonable) diligence. Roe & Anderson, Supra, § 91.8, at 330 (discussing appropriation predating the 1917 water code). The evidence does not establish that there was an actual diversion of water under the claimed right nor that water diverted under the claimed right was used to irrigate the homestead property. While it may be possible for owners of water rights to make a joint diversion, see Jurupa Ditch Co. v. San Bernardino County, 256 Cal.App.2d 35, 63 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1967), here there is no evidence that a joint diversion was intended; to the contrary, the 1915 notice provided that a separate diversion would be made. There is no evidence that any separate diversion was ever constructed. The evidence thus indicates that intent to appropriate water under the 1915 notice was not carried out. The claimed right was never perfected in accord with either the 1891 statutes or community custom. The superior court held, though, that the Board erred in applying the law, reasoning that application of water to beneficial use is the important consideration and that the means of diversion are incidental. First, the court's statement of the law does not answer the problem that the evidence does not adequately support the proposition that water under the 1915 notice was ever diverted and applied to beneficial use, regardless of the means of diversion. Second, insofar as water rights claimed prior to the 1917 water code are concerned, diversion was, as noted above, a key requirement of a perfected water right. [8] Third, the case relied on by the superior court for the principle that diversion is only an incidental matter does not support the proposition. In that case the court said that [a]ppropriation of water consists in the intention, accompanied by reasonable diligence, to use the water for the purposes originally contemplated at the time of its diversion. Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 280-81, 57 P. 809 (1899) (emphasis added). The court then explained that the fact that the point of diversion may have been changed does not affect the right. Id. It was in that context that the court said [t]he right to use the water is the essence of appropriation; the means by which it is done are incidental. Id. Offield actually involved an already perfected right and later changes in the point of diversion. In fact, the case was later cited for the proposition that the point of diversion may be changed and not affect the right to the entire appropriation. In re Water Rights in Ahtanum Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 100, 245 P. 758 (1926). That rule, the court further noted in Ahtanum Creek, is now embodied in RCW 90.03.380, which concerns transfers and changes of water rights, not perfection of such rights. Id. (citing Laws of 1917, ch. 117, § 39 (now RCW 90.03.380)). The holding in Offield does not involve the question of perfection of a pre-1917 code right and the superior court erroneously relied upon it to overturn the Board. We uphold the Board's determination that the Wilson irrigation right was not perfected and that no change of right is permitted under RCW 90.03.380 because no valid right existed to change.