Opinion ID: 2590700
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Prior Testimony of Donald Loar

Text: In setting aside the first death judgment, we concluded defense counsel in the first trial gave ineffective assistance for failing to object to, among other things, certain testimony by informant Donald Loar, defendant's cellmate in 1987. ( In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 955, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222.) Loar's testimony included statements defendant made (and his descriptions of defendant's demeanor) following tape-recorded telephone conversations between defendant and Frank Kovacevich, a government agent posing as a hit man. Loar arranged the telephone call between defendant and Kovacevich after Loar contacted the district attorney's office. ( People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 933, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) Because both the government and the informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks ( In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 950, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222), this part of Loar's testimony was inadmissible under Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246. ( In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 950, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222.) However, we also concluded that Loar's jailhouse conversations with defendant before Loar contacted the district attorney's office did not violate defendant's federal or state constitutional right to counsel. ( In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 952, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222.) Accordingly, petitioner's statements to Loar, concerning petitioner's desire to find a `hit man' to eliminate a possibly troublesome witness in his murder case, were not elicited improperly from him by a government agent. [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) At the penalty phase of the retrial, the prosecution requested to read into the record as section 190.3 evidence a portion of Loar's prior testimony we concluded was admissible. [7] (See In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 952, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222.) The prosecution said it could not locate Loar, and argued that he should be deemed unavailable. (Evid.Code, งง 1291, 240.) Defendant objected that the prosecution's notice did not comply with section 190.3 because it was not given in writing within a reasonable time before trial. Defense counsel requested a continuance in the alternative. Overruling the notice objection, the trial court held a due diligence hearing to determine whether Loar was unavailable. It concluded that the prosecution established due diligence. A portion of Loar's testimony on direct examination was read into evidence before the jury. This testimony included statements that defendant told him to get somebody from back east or a hit man, so to speak, to get rid of the witness so [defendant] wouldn't have to worry about โ about that guy in court. He would beat his murder case. On appeal, defendant contends admitting Loar's prior testimony violated his state and federal constitutional right of confrontation, Evidence Code section 1291, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, and Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481, his right to proper notice (ง 190.3), and other various constitutional rights.
A criminal defendant has the right under both the federal and state Constitutions to confront the witnesses against him. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15.) This right, however, is not absolute. The high court recently reaffirmed the long-standing exception that [t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. ( Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177; see People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) Evidence Code section 1291 codifies this traditional exception. ( People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 784-785, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192.) When the requirements of Evidence Code section 1291 are met, admitting former testimony in evidence does not violate a defendant's right of confrontation under the federal Constitution. [Citations.] ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 742, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2), provides that former testimony is not rendered inadmissible as hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, and [t]he party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing. In turn, Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(5), states a declarant is unavailable as a witness if the declarant is [a]bsent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the court's process. Loar's former testimony was offered against defendant, who was a party in the first trial, and defendant's interest and motive in examining Loar in the first trial was identical to that in this retrial. (Evid.Code, ง 1291, subd. (a)(2).) Defendant does not contend otherwise. However, defendant claims that the prosecution failed to show it used reasonable diligence trying to locate Loar; thus, the trial court erroneously deemed Loar unavailable as a witness. (Evid.Code, งง 240, subd. (a)(5), 1291, subd. (a)(2).) For reasons that follow, we disagree.
The term reasonable diligence or due diligence under Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(5) connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest, efforts of a substantial character. [Citations.] ( People v. Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 904, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243; id. at p. 898, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243 [reasonable diligence same as due diligence].) Considerations relevant to this inquiry include the timeliness of the search, the importance of the proffered testimony, and whether leads of the witness's possible location were competently explored. ( Id. at p. 904, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) We independently review a trial court's due diligence determination. ( Id. at p. 901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) At a March 11, 1994, due diligence hearing, Detective William Collette testified that in November 1993, he made efforts over two days to locate Loar, including visiting his last known address, attempting to locate his known associates, and checking police, county, and state records with the 15 different names Loar had used. However, Detective Collette was unsuccessful in finding him. Defendant argues that once this court reversed the judgment in 1992, the prosecution should have contacted and monitored Loar, who was still in prison or recently released at that time. He reiterates his claim at trial that Detective Collette should have attempted to locate Loar's family, checked with the post office for Loar's forwarding address, followed up with his visitors in prison, and determined whether he was a party in any civil actions. As a result, defendant argues, the prosecution did not use reasonable diligence to locate Loar. Under our independent review, we conclude that the prosecution exercised due diligence. The prosecution is not required to keep `periodic tabs' on every material witness in a criminal case.... ( People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 564, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776.) Also, the prosecution is not required, absent knowledge of a substantial risk that this important witness would flee, to take adequate preventative measures to stop the witness from disappearing. ( Ibid., citing People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 232 Cal.Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180.) Except for describing Loar as unreliable and of suspect credibility, defendant does not point to any evidence that the prosecution knew of a substantial risk that Loar would disappear. Moreover, Detective Collette checked police, county, and state records using Loar's 15 aliases. He checked the records again on the day before the due diligence hearing. He also visited Loar's last known address and one of his known associates. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the prosecution used reasonable diligence in trying to locate Loar. Although defendant criticizes the prosecution for starting the search a year after we reversed the judgment in November 1992, such delay was not unreasonable. Both defense counsel and the prosecution believed the retrial could not realistically begin any earlier than September 1993, and after several continuances, the first witness testified on February 22, 1994. [I]t is unclear what effective and reasonable controls the People could impose upon a witness who plans to leave the state, or simply `disappear,' long before a trial date is set. ( People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 564, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776 [due diligence found where investigators began search for witness one month before trial testimony was needed].) Defendant's claim that Detective Collette should have made additional efforts to find Loar, e.g., checking the post office, locating Loar's family, contacting Loar's prison visitors, does not change our conclusion that the prosecution exercised reasonable diligence. That additional efforts might have been made or other lines of inquiry pursued does not affect this conclusion. [Citation.] It is enough that the People used reasonable efforts to locate the witness. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1298, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that Loar was unavailable as a witness. (Evid.Code, ง 240.)
Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have concluded that when a defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at the time of his or her prior testimony, that testimony is deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation requirement [citation], regardless whether subsequent circumstances bring into question the accuracy or the completeness of the earlier testimony. [Citation.] ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 851-852, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2, citing California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489.) In Crawford v. Washington , the high court stated that a prior opportunity to cross-examine a witness was dispositive of the admissibility of his testimonial statements, and not merely one of several ways to establish reliability. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 55-56, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Because defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine Loar at the first trial, this satisfied the confrontation clause. However, relying mainly on Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, defendant contends that Loar's prior testimony should have been excluded under the confrontation clause because his testimony was unreliable. Specifically, he claims Loar's prior testimony was unreliable because (1) at the time he cross-examined Loar in the first trial, defense counsel did not have information that Loar met with detectives in May 1987 before Loar had the jailhouse conversation with defendant; (2) the jury did not hear about Loar's reduced sentence purportedly given in exchange for his testimony; (3) defense counsel ineffectively cross-examined Loar at the first trial; and (4) Loar was an informant in, what defendant contends is, the now-notorious Los Angeles informant ring, a fact that renders the credibility of his testimony non-existent. We note that the high court has since overruled Ohio v. Roberts . ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Crawford v. Washington made clear that reliability is not part of the inquiry under the confrontation clause: To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) In other words, [w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. ( Id. at pp. 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) In any event, for reasons stated below, we reject defendant's claim that Loar's testimony was unreliable.
Asserting that Loar was more of a police agent than was suspected, defendant emphasizes that his original trial counsel did not know that Loar met with Detectives Collette and Miller [8] on May 6, 1987. Defendant points to a declaration by Forest Elliott, Jr., an attorney who represented both defendant and Loar at some point. The parties discussed the contents of this declaration in the retrial. In his declaration, Elliott claimed that on May 6, 1987 he was representing Loar in a matter at a Long Beach courthouse. Detectives Collette and Miller were at the courthouse on that date, waiting for Loar. Loar voluntarily spoke to the detectives alone. Elliott's declaration did not assert he heard what Loar and the detectives talked about, or that Loar or anyone else told him what was discussed in that conversation. However, Elliott stated he now understands why Loar wanted to talk to the detectives; Elliott posited that Loar testified against defendant and collud[ed] with Prosecutor Hodgman and Judge Sheldon to obtain an illegal reduction in sentence to `time served' (none of which was served in a state prison). Defendant argues it is significant that Loar met with these detectives at this time because Loar had testified he had the jailhouse conversation with defendant in the late summer to early fall of 1987. He asserts that Loar should have been questioned about this earlier meeting with detectives because an inquiry into this area was crucial to assessing credibility, for it brings up the question of whether Mr. Loar was attempting to elicit information as a police agent. Even if the prosecution or detectives did not promise Loar anything in exchange for his testimony, defendant claims the issue is Loar's expectation of what benefits he would receive. We disagree. Contrary to defendant's contention, this information of a May 6, 1987 meeting between Loar and detectives, which was not disclosed at the first trial, does not undermine the reliability of Loar's testimony. As the Attorney General points out, Elliott's declaration only shows that Loar may have met with Detectives Collette and Miller on May 6, 1987. Nothing suggests that this conversation between Loar and the detectives was about defendant, as opposed to any other matter. Moreover, Loar's testimony revealed that he previously cooperated as an informant with at least two district attorney's offices over the years. Finally, Loar's prior testimony revealed that he was โ at the time he testified โ in the custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff for violating probation arising from a fraud conviction, and that he had previously been convicted of burglary and possession of heroin with the intent to sell. The evidence of Loar's prior convictions would have already exposed his credibility to impeachment. ( People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 34, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843; see Evid.Code, ง 788; CALJIC No. 2.20.) Given the evidence of Loar's prior cooperation with law enforcement, the evidence of Loar's prior convictions, and the lack of any evidence that the May 6, 1987 meeting was about defendant, we conclude that had the first jury known about the meeting, this would not have significantly altered the jury's view of Loar's credibility.
Next, defendant claims that the trial court exacerbated the unfair prejudice by ordering that Loar's prior testimony be read without reference to any subsequent reduction in Loar's sentence. Defendant asserts that after Loar testified in the 1988 trial, the original prosecutor, Mr. Hodgman, asked a superior court in secret to modify Loar's previously imposed sentence in another case based on his assistance in the Wilson case. In the retrial, the prosecution conceded Loar received a reduced sentence, but maintained there was no prior deal made in exchange for Loar's testimony. The prosecution explained that Hodgman assisted Loar in reducing his sentence because Loar spent time in jail awaiting his trial testimony and lost credits he would have otherwise earned in state prison. The trial court here concluded that from its reading of all the documents, it may be that Mr. Loar hoped for a reduction in his sentence, but there is no evidence that there was any agreement or promise from the district attorney. However, the court suggested that defendant could subpoena Hodgman to question him about any prior deal Loar had in exchange for his testimony. There is no evidence in the record that defendant did so. As noted above, the prosecution explained the reason why Hodgman subsequently requested leniency for Loar. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that there was no agreement, we must defer to it. (See People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1249, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) Indeed, on appeal, defendant mainly asserts that Loar was hoping to gain special treatment in exchange for his testimony; he does not argue that there was a `preexisting arrangement,' either explicit or implicit, between Loar and the prosecution. [9] ( Id. at p. 1247, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) Thus, defendant's claim that the trial court improperly failed tell the jury about Loar's subsequent sentence reduction is without merit.
Defendant also contends that defense counsel's allegedly ineffective cross-examination of Loar rendered this testimony unreliable. He complains that prior defense counsel never asked Loar, among other things, how many times he testified in other cases, whether he expected any leniency or benefit for his testimony, about his ability to remember, and about his meetings with detectives or prosecutors. Defendant argues the cross-examination of Mr. Loar in the first trial failed to adequately and zealously confront his testimony, and failed to test Mr. Loar's credibility in any meaningful way. For reasons that follow, we disagree. Contrary to defendant's contention, defense counsel's failure to explore certain areas on cross-examination does not render Loar's testimony inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1291. As long as defendant was given the opportunity for effective cross-examination, the statutory requirements were satisfied; the admissibility of this evidence did not depend on whether defendant availed himself fully of that opportunity. [Citations.] ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 975, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704, italics added; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 611, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302 [it is the opportunity and motive to cross-examine that matters, not the actual cross-examination].) Moreover, the admission of ... testimony under Evidence Code section 1291 does not offend the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution simply because the defendant did not conduct a particular form of cross-examination that in hindsight might have been more effective. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 851, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2, citing People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 975, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) We reject defendant's claim that we must nonetheless examine the effectiveness of the cross-examination under Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, and Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293. In Ohio v. Roberts , the high court explained that in an extraordinary case, for example, where a court had already determined that a defendant received ineffective representation from counsel appointed only four days before trial (see Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 209, 92 S.Ct. 2308), it was necessary to explore the character of the actual cross-examination to ensure that an adequate opportunity for full cross-examination had been afforded to the defendant. [Citation.] ( Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 73, fn. 12, 100 S.Ct. 2531.) Absent such unusual circumstances, no inquiry into effectiveness is required. ( Ibid. ) We conclude that no such unusual circumstances are present here. For instance, unlike in Mancusi v. Stubbs , the record does not indicate, and defendant does not suggest, that his prior defense counsel had minimal time for trial preparation and therefore could not effectively cross-examine Loar. Moreover, as the Attorney General contends, defense counsel's ineffective assistance in the first trial, which was based on his failure to object to certain testimony under Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, did not bear directly on his actual questioning of Loar. Defense counsel's failure to identify a meritorious Massiah claim does not necessarily indicate an inability to effectively cross-examine a witness.
We also reject defendant's unsubstantiated assertion that Loar was an informant in, what defendant describes as, the now-notorious Los Angeles informant ring. We have consistently rejected claims that informant testimony must be excluded because it is inherently unreliable. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) In sum, because we conclude defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine Loar in the first trial, and Loar was unavailable under Evidence Code section 240, Loar's former testimony was admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291. As such, admitting this testimony did not violate defendant's right of confrontation under the federal Constitution. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354; People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 742, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Moreover, even assuming that the reliability of Loar's testimony is pertinent to the issue of confrontation, defendant fails to show that Loar's former testimony was unreliable to justify its exclusion at the retrial. Significantly, defendant himself testified that he and Loar discussed eliminating a witness, i.e., Robert Berrie, who could tie defendant and the victim together before the murder. Although in contrast to Loar's prior testimony defendant denied actually wanting to eliminate Berrie, it was up to the jury as trier of fact to determine what weight to assign each person's testimony and to resolve any conflicts in testimony. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1164-1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.)
In reversing the original judgment, we concluded that Loar's initial jail-house conversation with defendant, before Loar contacted the district attorney's office, did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment's right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246. ( In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 952-953, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222.) However, defendant maintains that new information of the May 6, 1987 meeting Loar had with detectives, along with Loar's reduced sentence, undermine the assumption that the jailhouse conversation occurred before Loar had contact with the district attorney's office. As such, he asserts that the use of Loar's prior testimony constituted Massiah error. (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 991-992, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Defendant forfeited this Massiah claim because he failed to object on this ground at the retrial. Moreover, the claim lacks evidentiary support on this record. To prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant `must establish that the informant ... was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage.' [Citation.] ( People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1247, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) A witness's reduced sentence, without more specific proof of a deal, has little probative value of the witness's state of mind or improper motive. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 204, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 [subsequent, favorable treatment of informant's sentence insufficient to show informant was motivated to inform by prosecutorial promises of leniency].) The trial court here found there was no evidence that Loar had a prior deal with the prosecution to give his testimony in exchange for leniency. (See ante, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 539, 114 P.3d at p. 779, fn. 7.) Elliott's declaration did not establish that the May 6, 1987 conversation Loar had with detectives was about defendant. The fact that Loar met with detectives did not by itself make him a police agent. ( People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1248, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) Nor was Loar's subsequent sentence reduction evidence that Loar had a prior deal with the prosecution. (See ante, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 543-544, 114 P.3d at pp. 783-784; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 204, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Based on the foregoing, we conclude there was no Massiah violation.
As relevant here, section 190.3 provides that no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. (ง 190.3, 4th par.) During voir dire at the beginning of the guilt phase, the prosecution listed Loar as a possible witness. During the guilt phase, it again verbally informed the court and defense counsel that it anticipated introducing the prior testimony of Loar. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, this notice was sufficient pursuant to section 190.3. (See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1015-1016, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.)