Opinion ID: 2572524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Imposing Multiple Enhancements Based on a Single Injury Is Proper Under Section 12022.53.

Text: As with any question of statutory interpretation, in determining whether section 12022.53 calls for imposition of multiple subdivision (d) enhancements, we begin with the language of the statute. ( People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 112, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, 52 P.3d 624.) In several respects, the language of section 12022.53 supports imposing multiple subdivision (d) enhancements under the circumstances here. First, by its terms, the subdivision (d) enhancement applies to any person who, in the commission of a specified felony, personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury ... or death, to any person other than an accomplice.  (Italics added.) Based on the single injury to Barrera, the requirements of a subdivision (d) enhancement are met as to each of defendant's five attempted murder convictions, including those not involving the attempted murder of Barrera; attempted premeditated murder constitutes a specified offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (a)(1), (18)), and, in the commission of each offense, defendant personally and intentionally discharge[d] a firearm and proximately cause[d] great bodily injury to a person other than an accomplice. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) Notably, the parties here agree that the phrase, any person other than an accomplice, does not mean the victim of the underlying crime. For example, defendant asserts in his brief that the elements of a subdivision (d) enhancement require the imposition of the enhancement even if the injured person is not a victim of crime, such as if he or she was injured by a stray bullet. Thus, [i]f there is a qualifying substantive offense, if a firearm is intentionally discharged, and if anyone (but an accomplice), i.e., either the victim or a nearby `non-victim'  a person who is injured but is not the victim of an enumerated offense  suffers great bodily injury, the enhancement attaches to the offense. In other words, as defendant explains, the `any person other than an accomplice' language is sufficiently indisputable to ensure the imposition of the enhancement if a person other than the victim of the qualifying felony suffers a great bodily injury. This reading of the statute is consistent with our recent statement that, as [a]pplied to a defendant/shooter, this enhancement is arguably unambiguous: a defendant who is convicted of a specified felony and is found to have intentionally and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death when committing that felony, is subject to section 12022.53, subdivision (d). [Citation.] ( People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1173, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648.) It is also consistent with the fact that the Legislature knows how to limit enhancements to harm done to a victim when that is its intent. (See § 12022.8 [imposing enhanced punishment for inflict[ing] great bodily injury ... on any victim]; see also People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 881, fn. 5, 135 Cal.Rptr. 654, 558 P.2d 552 [enhancement statute that expressly provides for its application upon great bodily injury to a `victim' rather than to a `person' does not apply in the case of injury to persons who, unfortunately, are incidentally caught up in the events constituting the crime].) Because the requirements of the subdivision (d) enhancement have been satisfied as to each of defendant's attempted murder convictions, subdivision (f) of section 12022.53 requires that the enhancement be imposed as to each conviction. That subdivision provides in part: If more than one enhancement per person is found true under this section, the court shall impose upon that person the enhancement that provides the longest term of imprisonment. (§ 12022.53, subd. (f).) Defendant argues that we should limit the number of subdivision (d) enhancements imposed to the same number of great bodily injuries inflicted, such that he should receive one subdivision (d) enhancement for injuring Barrera and one subdivision (c) enhancement as to each of his remaining attempted murder convictions. However, because the requirements of subdivision (d) have been met as to each conviction, defendant's solution contravenes the direction of section 12022.53, subdivision (f), that the court shall impose upon that person the enhancement that provides the longest term of imprisonment. Had the Legislature wanted to limit the number of subdivision (d) enhancements imposed to the number of injuries inflicted, or had it not wanted subdivision (d) to serve as the enhancement applicable to each qualifying conviction where there is only one qualifying injury, it could have said so. In this regard, it is significant that the Legislature expressly included in section 12022.53 specific limitations on imposing multiple enhancements, but did not limit imposition of subdivision (d) enhancements based on the number of qualifying injuries. Section 12022.53, subdivision (f), provides in full: Only one additional term of imprisonment under this section shall be imposed per person for each crime. If more than one enhancement per person is found true under this section, the court shall impose upon that person the enhancement that provides the longest term of imprisonment. An enhancement involving a firearm specified in Section 12021.5, 12022, 12022.3, 12022.4, 12022.5, or 12022.55 shall not be imposed on a person in addition to an enhancement imposed pursuant to this section. An enhancement for great bodily injury as defined in Section 12022.7, 12022.8, or 12022.9 shall not be imposed on a person in addition to an enhancement imposed pursuant to subdivision (d). The enactment of this subdivision shows that the Legislature specifically considered the issue of multiple enhancements and chose to limit the number imposed only for each crime, not for each transaction or occurrence and not based on the number of qualifying injuries. Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary. [Citation.] ( Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1230, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 876 P.2d 505.) Here, there is no evidence of a contrary legislative intent. Nor is there any reason to believe the Legislature simply overlooked the kind of factual scenario at issue here, which is not particularly unusual. Defendant's construction also contravenes subdivision (h) of section 12022.53. That section provides that, [n]otwithstanding Section 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).) Because the requirements of the subdivision (d) enhancement are met as to each of defendant's attempted murder convictions, imposing that enhancement with respect to only one conviction would, contrary to the command of section 12022.53, subdivision (h), effectively strike the subdivision (d) enhancement allegations and findings as to the remaining convictions. In summary, the statutory provisions discussed above authorize and support imposition of multiple subdivision (d) enhancements under the circumstances here. Defendant cites, and we find, nothing in the statutory language supporting his contrary interpretation. Although, as defendant notes, the legislative history of section 12022.53 does not directly address the issue here, it generally supports the conclusion that imposing multiple subdivision (d) enhancements is proper under the circumstances here. An uncodified section of the enacting legislation stated: The Legislature finds and declares that substantially longer prison sentences must be imposed on felons who use firearms in the commission of their crimes, in order to protect our citizens and to deter violent crime. (Stats.1997, ch. 503, § 1, italics added.) Several legislative reports explained that [t]he purpose of [the statute] is to deter crimes in which a firearm is used and to incapacitate those who use firearms in crimes.  (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 28, 1997, italics added; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess) as amended Sept. 10, 1997, italics added.) Another report explained: According to the author [of the statute], `For far too long, criminals have been using guns to prey on their victims. [Section 12022.53] will keep these parasites where they belong ... in jail! The problem is not guns, the problem is gun violence ... criminals misusing guns to terrorize, injure and kill their victims.... With the Three Strikes law, the voters sent a clear message to criminals. With the 10-20-life provisions of [Section 12022.53], we are sending another clear message: If you use a gun to commit a crime, you're going to jail, and you're staying there.  (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 1997, italics added.) Imposing multiple subdivision (d) enhancements under the circumstances here clearly serves these legislative goals. Moreover, the evolution of section 12022.53 during the enactment process suggests that the Legislature did not intend to limit imposition of a subdivision (d) enhancement to the crime involving the person who was actually injured. As introduced, subdivision (d) applied to anyone who discharges a firearm, intentionally or accidentally, which proximately causes bodily injury to any other person, in the commission of a [specified] felony. (Assem. Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Dec. 2, 1996, § 2, italics added.) Through amendment, section 12022.53, subdivision (d), was later made applicable to anyone who in the commission of that felony intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, to any person other than an accomplice. (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 4 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 10, 1997, § 3.) Thus, regarding the injuries that would trigger the enhancement, although the Legislature narrowed the initially proposed, all-encompassing category  any other person  by excluding injuries to accomplices, it did not limit the category only to injuries to victims. The legislative history discussed above supports the conclusion suggested by the statutory language itself: that section 12022.53 calls for imposition of multiple subdivision (d) enhancements under the circumstances here. Defendant cites, and we have found, nothing in the legislative history supporting his contrary conclusion. Moreover, adopting defendant's construction would create several practical problems. In this case, it is easy to say, in retrospect, that defendant should receive one subdivision (d) enhancement with respect to the attempted murder of Barrera and subdivision (c) discharge enhancements with respect to the other attempted murder convictions. However, at the charging stage, the prosecution could not have known whether the jury would convict defendant of all of the crimes alleged or whether, as to the crime involving Barrera, it would convict defendant of some lesser offense that is not a qualifying offense. Given these possibilities, if the prosecution had been permitted to allege the subdivision (d) enhancement only in connection with the crime involving Barrera, then notwithstanding defendant's infliction of great bodily injury using a gun, defendant could have avoided section 12022.53, subdivision (d), altogether, depending on the jury's decision regarding the attempted murder of Barrera. This result would unquestionably be contrary to the Legislature's intent. On the other hand, allowing the prosecution to allege the subdivision (d) enhancement as to all of the crimes, but requiring the court to make an adjustment after the jury returns its verdict, would be contrary to subdivision (h) of section 12022.53; as already noted, that subdivision provides that [n]otwithstanding Section 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section. Moreover, even after the jury's verdict, we cannot know which convictions will survive appeal. If a subdivision (d) enhancement may be imposed with respect to only one conviction and that conviction is later overturned on appeal, then a defendant could potentially avoid section 12022.53, subdivision (d), altogether, notwithstanding his infliction of great bodily injury using a gun. Another practical problem arises if the crime involving the injured person is not a qualifying crime but the other crimes are. As discussed above, it would be contrary to the clear statutory language and the Legislature's intent to hold that section 12022.53, subdivision (d), does not apply at all under these circumstances, and even defendant does not take this position. However, if, as defendant asserts, subdivision (d) may be applied to only one crime in this scenario, then as to which crime should the subdivision (d) enhancement be alleged? If the answer is, all of them, and the defendant is convicted of all counts, then to which conviction should the subdivision (d) enhancement attach? And, what happens if that conviction is reversed on appeal? And, what is the correct procedure where all counts are not tried together? We would have to read a great deal into the statute in order to address these practical problems, and the statute's failure to address any of these questions is yet another indication that the Legislature did not intend to preclude imposition of multiple subdivision (d) enhancements under the circumstances here. Defendant argues that anomalies could easily occur if we conclude that section 12022.53 calls for multiple enhancements where only one person is injured. Specifically, he notes that under this construction of the statute, if a defendant shoots someone while attempting to rob a commercial establishment, then the number of subdivision (d) enhancements would fortuitously turn on the number of people in the store who could be considered robbery victims because they were immediately present and in constructive possession of the intended loot. Again, we find defendant's argument unpersuasive. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the consequence of our conclusion here  that the number of enhancements imposed may turn on the number of people present during a crime  is neither anomalous nor unique. Indeed, we have similarly construed section 12022.5, which prescribes an enhancement where a person personally uses a firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted felony. In In Re Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, 198, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, 990 p.2d 603 ( Tameka ), we held that multiple enhancements should be imposed under section 12022.5 where a single shot results in offenses being committed against more than one victim and the presence of one of the victims is unknown to the perpetrator. We based our conclusion on [t]he language of the statute and the intent of the Legislature in enacting it. ( Tameka, supra, at p. 196, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, 990 P.2d 603.) We also explained that a person who engages in an urban gun battle is more culpable than one who fires a weapon at an isolated individual because of the increased risk of injury to bystanders. ( Ibid. ) As Tameka demonstrates, there is nothing anomalous about applying section 12022.53 in accordance with its language, such that the number of subdivision (d) enhancements imposed turns on the number of people defendant attempted to murder. Moreover, as the People note, a trial court can mitigate concerns about sentencing inequities by imposing concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences where multiple subdivision (d) enhancements are found true. Thus, defendant's assertion regarding possible sentencing anomalies does not justify departing from the statutory language. Defendant also argues that we should construe section 12022.53, subdivision (d), like section 12022.7, which, in language similar to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), provides an enhancement for anyone who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) According to defendant, [n]o reported case has held that more [section 12022.7] enhancements than the actual number of injuries may be found and imposed or that such an enhancement may be found and imposed not only on [the conviction involving] the injured victim but also as to [the convictions involving] the uninjured victims as well. Defendant argues we should similarly interpret subdivision (d). Defendant's argument is unpersuasive. Notwithstanding his assertions, defendant concedes that [t]here is `no intimation' in section 12022.7 that `only one such enhancement could be employed in any given case' where only one person suffers injury. Moreover, defendant cites no case  and we have found none  supporting his construction of section 12022.7. On the other hand, as defendant notes, in People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 811, 815-817, 179 Cal.Rptr. 726 ( Moringlane ), the trial court imposed three bodily injury enhancements, presumably under section 12022.7, based on the defendant's infliction of a single injury on one of the three people he simultaneously assaulted. [3] Although the appellate court later held that multiple enhancements were improper, it based its decision on section 654, not on the construction of section 12022.7. ( Moringlane, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at pp. 817-819, 179 Cal.Rptr. 726.) Moreover, given Moringlane's holding in 1982 that section 654 bars imposition of multiple enhancements, it is not surprising that no reported case has considered whether section 12022.7 itself authorizes multiple enhancements under the circumstances here. Finally, defendant cites  and we find  nothing in the legislative history of section 12022.7 to support his interpretation of that statute. Because nothing supports defendant's construction of section 12022.7, his argument based on that construction fails. [4] In making his argument, defendant relies on the fact that both section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and section 12022.7 use the phrase, in the commission of a felony. He asserts that this language in section 12022.7 has not been utilized to encompass an injury to another person as being an `injury' `in the commission of a felony' as to an uninjured victim, and that it should not be employed to permit the imposition of an enhancement onto the offense against an uninjured victim based on an injury to a contemporaneous victim. Similarly, he continues, nothing in subdivision (d) ... suggests that, under the circumstances here, the injury to the injured victim has occurred `in the commission' of the felony against the uninjured victim to permit a second 25-years-to-life rather than the determinate 20 years. [I]n the instant case, it was only in the commission of one of the attempted murders that the discharge of a firearm proximately caused great bodily injury, i.e., the count involving the singularly injured victim. Defendant's argument against imposing multiple subdivision (d) enhancements is unpersuasive. [5] The phrase, in the commission of a felony, cannot mean one thing when a subdivision (d) enhancement is not imposed with respect to a crime committed against the injured party (for whatever reason), and something else when a subdivision (d) enhancement is imposed with respect to such a crime (or with respect to a crime against any other uninjured victim). That is, whether an injury to a third person occurs in the commission of a qualifying crime committed against an uninjured victim does not depend on whether a subdivision (d) enhancement is imposed with respect to a crime committed against anyone else (either the injured victim or another uninjured victim). Thus, defendant's focus on the statutory phrase, in the commission of, is unavailing. Based on the preceding analysis, we hold that section 12022.53 calls for multiple subdivision (d) enhancements under the circumstances here.