Opinion ID: 401019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Plain View Doctrine-Philip's Seizures

Text: 23 The government contends that once Agent Philip had entered the bathroom, he was entitled to seek out and seize the evidence above the bathroom ceiling under the plain view doctrine. We disagree. 24 When Agent Philip was standing on the bathroom floor, he could not see any seizable evidence. All he saw was a displaced soundproofing panel. The government has not argued that as he looked at the displaced panel, it was immediately apparent to Agent Philip that he was looking at evidence of a crime. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. Nor would such an argument be plausible, since Agent Philip did not even consider seizing the panel as evidence. Instead, Agent Philip became suspicious that he might be able to find evidence if he looked around above the ceiling. He therefore undertook a search to see what might be up there. He climbed up onto the toilet and looked inside. From that vantage point, he saw the first something. Although he could not tell what the something was, he reached inside and took it out. He then saw that it was a weapon, and a package of green weed. At that moment, it is clear that Agent Philip had evidence in plain view. But it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. The problem with the 'plain view' doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain view has legal significance rather than being the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal. Id. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 2037. 25 We do not question the reasonableness of Agent Philip's suspicion that if he searched above the ceiling he might find evidence. That is not the point. What is significant is that, without any prior approval by a detached magistrate, he launched himself on an exploratory search. And he did so at a time when (t)here was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, 437 U.S. at 394, 98 S.Ct. at 2414. In fact, the only person with a right to enter the hotel room was in custody. When Agent Philip was standing on the bathroom floor, no evidence was in plain view. His warrantless search for such evidence was not justified by any exigent circumstances  and was therefore contrary to the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1979) (officer stood in plain view of an open file drawer; his search through the file for evidence was unconstitutional, no matter how strong his suspicion that he would find evidence there). 26 In its brief, the government cites United States v. Garcia, 616 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1978); and James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.1 (D.C.Cir.1969) for the proposition that the plain view doctrine is not made inapplicable because a law enforcement agent may have to crane his neck, bend over, or squat. Examination of those cases, however, reveals that they were discussing a different plain view problem, a problem more accurately termed one of open view. They were all analyzing the question of whether an officer intrudes upon a person's privacy-whether he conducts a search-when he looks at items that are visible to the public. Thus, the complete quote in James, supra, reads as follows: 27 That the policeman may have to crane his neck, or bend over, or squat, does not render the doctrine inapplicable, so long as what he saw would have been visible to any curious passerby. James v. United States, supra, 418 F.2d at 1151 n.1. (Emphasis added.) 28 See also United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, supra, 574 F.2d at 1314 n. 1. Such cases do not have any bearing on Coolidge, which determines what evidence may be seized without a warrant after an officer has justifiably penetrated a constitutionally protected area-an area that is not accessible to any curious passerby. See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2, at 242-43. 29 Coolidge authorizes warrantless seizure of items in plain view only to supplement the prior justification for the warrantless search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. The activities an officer may undertake to expand his field of view are therefore restrained by his excuse for the warrantless entry. The restraint is not a straitjacket: many emergency situations will justify fairly energetic undertakings. But it must always be the exigency that justifies the action; the plain view doctrine cannot, by itself, permit an officer to indulge in a frolic of his own. Id. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039. In sum, where an officer's presence is limited to a particular justification or purpose, what is in plain view is restricted to what could be inadvertently seen when his movements are made pursuant to that purpose. We need not analyze what may have actually been in his mind; movements clearly outside the scope of his mandate cannot be termed inadvertent. Cf. United States v. Weber, 668 F.2d 552 at 554-555 (1st Cir., 1981). 30 The government would have us lengthen the leash between the exigency and the search; but once the nature of the exigency ceases to define the scope of plain view, the leash could be stretched without limit. A police officer who entered a student's dormitory room to break up a brawl would be allowed to clamber up the bookcases to see what sort of illicit matter might be hiding behind Madame Bovary. Such wide-ranging searches, not countenanced by the protective reflection of a neutral magistrate and not necessary to respond to an emergency, are precisely the invasions of privacy that the Fourth Amendment prohibits. 31 Since the evidence above the ceiling was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, its introduction denied appellant Guilbe a fair trial.