Opinion ID: 1292236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Screening Regulation.

Text: Comried argues that the above statutory analysis is altered by Iowa Administrative Code rule 661  7.9, a recently promulgated DPS regulation. He contends that this regulation  which, as explained below, sets cutoff levels for initial screening tests for drugs in urine samples  modifies the definition of any in Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)( c ). We do not agree. The DPS regulation relied on by Comried was promulgated under Iowa Code section 321J.2(8)( c ), which states: The department of public safety shall adopt nationally accepted standards for determining detectible levels of controlled substances in the division of criminal investigation's initial laboratory screening test for controlled substances. (Emphasis added.) This statute limits the DPS's power to set cutoff levels: they are to apply only to initial laboratory screening tests, not to confirmatory tests. As directed, the DPS adopted this rule: [Federal initial test requirements] are hereby adopted as standards for determining detectable levels of controlled substances in the division of criminal investigation criminalistics laboratory initial screening for controlled substances.... Iowa Admin. Code r. 661  7.9 (emphasis added). This screening rule is limited in another way: it does not apply to blood samples. This is apparent from reading the federal regulations to which the DPS regulation refers. See Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 59 Fed.Reg. 29908 (June 9, 1994); see also Revisions to the Mandatory Guidelines, 62 Fed.Reg. 51118 (Sept. 30, 1997). Both of these federal regulations appear to be limited to urine testing. See 59 Fed.Reg. at 29921, § 2.4(e)(1) (describing the initial screening tests and setting cutoff levels to use when screening specimens); see also id. at 29917 (defining specimen as [t]he portion of urine that is collected from a donor (emphasis added)). It appears that the DPS, by referring to the federal regulations, only intended its regulation's cutoff levels to apply to initial testing of urine. In Comried's case, the test confirming the presence of methamphetamine was not an initial screening, but a confirmatory test. In addition, the test was of a blood sample, not urine, as dealt with in the DPS regulation. Comried contends that cutoff levels for blood tests should incorporate those for urine tests, but the two types of tests and their probative value are significantly different. Urine tests for drugs are relatively simple to conduct, and they do not require involvement of medical personnel. Blood tests, however, are more accurate and provide the best indication of driving impairment. One court has observed that, according to expert testimony, metabolites of a drug are a product of the body's metabolizing, or breaking down, the original drug into discrete components. It is only when the drug is in the bloodstream that it is capable of impairment of driving skills, and this impairment lasts only so long as the drug is in the bloodstream. At the metabolite stage, the metabolic component detected in the urine is inactive, in the sense that it is incapable of causing impairment. Many drugs will continue to appear in the urine in metabolite form for days or even weeks after use. A urine test, while indicative of what has been in the bloodstream in the past, says nothing conclusive about what is presently in the bloodstream. State v. Hammonds, 192 Ariz. 528, 968 P.2d 601, 603 (Ct.App.1998); accord Rodriguez v. Fulton, 190 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Iowa 1971) (stating that blood tests are generally considered more reliable than the other tests).