Opinion ID: 2581989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue One: Change of Venue

Text: [¶ 22] About four and one-half months before trial, Duke moved under W.R.Cr.P. 21 for a change of venue from Sweetwater County to another county in the Third Judicial District. To his motion he attached five newspaper articles concerning his case that had appeared on January 24, January 26, January 31, February 28, and March 2, 2002, in either the Green River Star or the Dailey Rocket Miner, newspapers of general circulation in Sweetwater County. These newspaper articles reported, among other things, that Duke had plead guilty to, or had been convicted of, a felony in federal court for the same or similar crimes which were pending against him in state court; and the articles also contained purported testimony of alleged witnesses indicating Duke's involvement in the alleged crimes. Duke asserted that the information in these articles had prejudiced prospective jurors against him which prejudice could not be overcome in Sweetwater County. During a hearing on April 25, 2002, the trial court acknowledged the pretrial publicity about the case but concluded a change of venue was inappropriate absent Duke's showing of actual prejudice. The trial court deferred ruling on Duke's motion until jury selection. [¶ 23] Jury selection began on the morning of the first day of trial, August 12, 2002. Prosecution counsel and Duke's counsel examined the jury panel for cause and exercised their peremptory challenges. The transcript of jury selection consists of 207 pages. During the examination, most of the venire stated they had heard about the case from relatives, friends, or news media (radio and newspaper) coverage. Nine of the thirty-eight potential jurors indicated they had formed an opinion about Duke based upon what they had heard or read. Of those nine, the trial court excused five for cause; two were excused following peremptory challenges, and two were seated on the jury. One of those potential jurors excused for cause was excused on Duke's motion. The two seated jurors who had formed an opinion about Duke stated unequivocally that they could set aside such opinions and render a fair verdict based exclusively on the evidence presented at trial. Of the remaining prospective jurors, each stated that, despite the publicity surrounding the case, he or she could render a fair and impartial decision based solely on the court's instructions and the evidence presented at trial. Each also indicated he or she would hold the prosecution to its burden of proving Duke's guilt as to each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. At the close of jury selection, Duke's counsel did not object to the jury as empaneled and did not renew his pretrial motion for a change of venue. [¶ 24] Duke insists that, despite what occurred during jury selection, he did not receive a fair trial because of the excessive pretrial publicity. He argues that neither the trial court's inquiry, nor counsels', was sufficient to evaluate the jurors' assurances of impartiality. He claims that community feeling was running very high and all the major participants involved in the case were long-time community residents. He contends that the degree of pretrial publicity was great and the trial court, in the exercise of reasonable caution, should have recognized that prejudice against Duke was so great within the small town of Green River and Sweetwater County that venue should have been moved, regardless. [¶ 25] In Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207 (Wyo.2003), we stated our standard of review and summary of Wyoming change-of-venue law: We review the denial of a motion for change of venue under an abuse of discretion standard, meaning we will not interfere with the trial court's decision unless the trial court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Wyo.1999). The party moving for change of venue has the burden of showing actual prejudice in the minds of the jurors so great that a fair trial cannot be obtained. Id. at 327. We have summarized the law in Wyoming relating to change of venue as follows: Criminal defendants in Wyoming have a constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. Wyoming's constitutional provision grants the right to trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10. The legislative provision mirroring the constitution requires [e]very criminal case shall be tried in the county in which the indictment or offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided by law. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-7-102(a) (LEXIS 1999). Trial proceedings are transferred to another county only if the court is satisfied that there exists within the county where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in that county. W.R.Cr.P. 21(a). This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether a change of venue should be granted after voir dire because of pre-trial publicity: `First, the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered; second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination.' Sides [ v. State ], 963 P.2d [227], 231 [(Wyo.1998)] (quoting Murry [ v. State ], 713 P.2d [202,] 208 [(Wyo.1986)]). Urbigkit, ¶¶ 26-27 (alterations in original). [¶ 26] Applying the first prong of the test, we note that Duke relied on five newspaper articles from the county's general circulation newspapers, the first one of which appeared approximately seven months before his trial and the last one of which appeared five months before his trial. We have read the articles; they are generally factual in nature, reporting information obtained from court documents and from a potential witness. We do not find them to be sensational, inflammatory, or prejudicial. Neither the nature nor the extent of the news coverage justifies a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Duke's motion under the first prong of the change-of-venue test. [¶ 27] Applying the second prong of the test, we also see nothing in the record requiring reversal. The prosecutor, Duke's counsel, and the trial court appropriately and properly examined the venire. The potential jurors responded to that examination in a forthright manner. There is simply no indication in the record that the pretrial publicity in this case made jury selection difficult or created such prejudice that a change of venue was necessary. Duke's first issue has no merit.