Opinion ID: 628318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Give Deliberate Intent Instructions

Text: 23 At Lujan's trial, both the state and Lujan requested that the court give to the jury the New Mexico uniform jury instruction on insanity. The trial court refused to include in that instruction a sentence stating that even if the jury found Lujan sane, you must still determine if he had the ability to form the deliberate intention to take away the life of another. As Lujan concedes and the New Mexico Supreme Court observed in affirming his conviction on direct appeal, this optional sentence is to be used when the defendant is charged with willful and deliberate first-degree murder and the evidence will support a finding of inability to form intent. State v. Lujan, 608 P.2d at 1115 (citing N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.00 Use Note 3). Thus, the existence of evidence supporting a finding of inability to form the requisite intent is crucial under state law, and the New Mexico Supreme Court held that [t]here is evidence in the record that the defendant was able to form a deliberate intention, with no evidence to the contrary. Id. (emphasis added). 1 24 The trial court also refused to give another instruction on deliberate intention, which refusal the New Mexico Supreme Court held was not erroneous because its use is contingent on the use of the optional sentence discussed above. Id., 608 P.2d at 1116. 25 Lujan argues that the finding by the New Mexico Supreme Court that there was no evidence of Lujan's inability to form a deliberate intention is clearly erroneous and should be accorded no deference under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(8). Additionally, Lujan argues that the New Mexico Supreme Court on direct appeal ignored its own holding in State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959), that evidence that a defendant was suffering from a mental disease must be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant could form the requisite intent in a first degree murder case. Appellant's Reply Brief at 2. 26 The result, Lujan argues, of the state court's erroneous finding as to the record in this case, and its misapplication of its own case law, is that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated because the trial court effectively directed the verdict on the element of deliberate intent by not requiring the jury to consider his mental disease apart from its decision in insanity. Id. at 6. 27 As we have recognized before, a petitioner such as Lujan bears a great burden ... when ... [he] seeks to collaterally attack a state court judgment based on an erroneous jury instruction. Hunter v. State, 916 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1693, 114 L.Ed.2d 87 (1991).  '[H]abeas proceedings may not be used to set aside a state conviction on the basis of erroneous jury instructions unless the errors had the effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally unfair as to cause a denial of a fair trial in the constitutional sense.'  Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir.) (quoting Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 854 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047, 100 S.Ct. 737, 62 L.Ed.2d 733 (1980)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 961, 111 S.Ct. 393, 112 L.Ed.2d 402 (1990). See also Estelle v. McGuire, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ( '[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law'.... [I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions.). We find no such fundamental unfairness here. 28 First, despite Lujan's vehement protestation that the New Mexico Supreme Court erred when it concluded that there was no evidence that Lujan was unable to form a deliberate intention, that state court finding is entitled to the presumption of correctness required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). Explicit and implicit findings by state trial and appellate courts 'shall be presumed to be correct' unless one of seven factors listed in section 2254(d) are present or the federal court concludes that the state court findings are not fairly supported by the record. Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 1392 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 1490, 108 L.Ed.2d 626 (1990). 29 Lujan asserts that the New Mexico Supreme Court in making that finding ignored evidence of the surrounding circumstances, such as testimony of specific instances of [Lujan's] 'blanking out,' his amnesia, and his extreme shifts in attitude and personality shortly before the time of his arrest, as well as other expert testimony that he was unable to stop himself from doing what he did. Appellant's Reply Brief at 2. Those assertions do not undermine the state court's finding that the record contained no evidence that Lujan was unable to form a deliberate intention to take the life of another. Indeed, the state supreme court carefully distinguished between evidence showing an inability to control his emotions and evidence showing a lack of the ability to form a deliberate intention. Nothing Lujan cites to us convinces us that the New Mexico Supreme Court erred in its application of that distinction to the record in this case. In short, we refuse to effectively overturn the New Mexico Supreme Court's finding after its own careful review of the record. 30 Second, Lujan argues the state supreme court misinterpreted and/or ignored its own state law. We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'  Estelle v. McGuire, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3102, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)). [I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. Id. Rather, [t]he only question for us is 'whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.'  Id., --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). We hold that the alleged instructional errors here did not. 31 The crux of Lujan's argument is that the failure to give his requested instructions caused the jury to fail to focus on the necessity of finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the deliberate intention to take the life of another. We do not believe it had that effect. Indeed, the jury in this case was given an explicit instruction defining the deliberate intent required for guilt under a first-degree murder charge in New Mexico: 32 A deliberate intention refers to the state of mind of the defendant. A deliberate intention may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the killing. The word deliberate means arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action. A calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though[ ] it includes an intent to kill, is not a deliberate intention to kill. To constitute a deliberate killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and his reasons for and against such a choice. 33 R. Vol. I tab 16 at 2. The jury can hardly have ignored its responsibility to make a determination as to Lujan's ability to form such a deliberate intention. No fundamental unfairness arose from the failure to instruct precisely as Lujan requested.