Opinion ID: 3064167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Armed Career Criminal Sentence Enhancement

Text: 11 The guidelines do not confer upon a defendant a right to collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance his sentence.8 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.6; see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (1994); United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1993). However, in Roman, this Court stated that “the Supreme Court has held sentencing courts may not rely on prior convictions that are ‘presumptively void.’” 989 F.2d at 1120. Thus, “when a defendant, facing sentencing, sufficiently asserts facts that show that an earlier conviction is ‘presumptively void,’ the Constitution requires the sentencing court to review this earlier conviction before taking it into account.” Id. The Court declined to define fully the kinds of convictions that are presumptively void, but stated that such cases are “small in number and are perhaps limited to uncounseled convictions.” Id. After Roman, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant had no right to collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance his sentence “with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel.”9 Custis, 511 U.S. at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. 8 We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and the application of the Guidelines to those facts de novo. United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006). 9 The Supreme Court stated that the “failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was a unique constitutional defect” and declined to extend the exception for collateral attacks further. Custis, 511 U.S. at 496, 114 S. Ct. at 1738. Thus, the Supreme Court declined to allow the defendant to challenge his prior convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel, an invalid guilty plea, and inadequate advisement of his rights in opting for a stipulated facts trial because “[n]one of these alleged constitutional violations rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect resulting 12 Here, Edwards has not shown his 1996 conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. In fact, the transcript of the 1996 proceedings shows just the opposite. The transcript shows that the state court advised Edwards of the charges against him and that he was entitled to have a lawyer appointed by the court to represent him for free. Edwards stated that he wanted to plead without having a lawyer represent him. Additionally, Edwards had experience with the legal system prior to his 1996 proceeding. According to the PSI, Edwards had been in state court and represented by counsel on four separate occasions before 1996. Edwards has not asserted that he did not understand his right to counsel. Based on the reasons above, we agree with the district court’s determination that Edwards failed to establish that his waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary.
We also agree with the district court’s determination that Edwards’s 2003 felony conviction for possessing marijuana was a “serious drug offense” for purposes of the armed-career-criminal enhancement. Marijuana is a controlled substance under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812, Schedule I(c)(10). It is immaterial whether marijuana is a controlled substance under Georgia law from the failure to appoint counsel at all.” Id. 13 because the guidelines are governed by definitions in federal law, not state law. See United States v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that “federal, not state, definitions govern under the Guidelines”) abrogated on other grounds by Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 55-56, 127 S. Ct. 625, 630-31 (2006); United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1523 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the definition of a valid conviction for calculating criminal history under the guidelines is governed by federal law).