Opinion ID: 167957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppressability of identity-related evidence as fruit

Text: 25 In arguing that identity evidence should never be suppressible as fruit of the poisonous tree, the Government relies almost exclusively on a single sentence in Lopez-Mendoza: 26 The body or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred. 27 468 U.S. at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479. 5 Here, of course, the district court suppressed statements and fingerprints along with files located using such evidence of identity. At first blush, the above-quoted language in Lopez-Mendoza appears to control the case at bar; however, a closer analysis indicates that the issue is more complex than the Government presents it to be. 28
29 In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court reviewed two civil deportation proceedings that took place following unlawful arrests. 468 U.S. at 1034-35, 104 S.Ct. 3479. In the first case, respondent Adan Lopez-Mendoza (Lopez) argued that the immigration court did not have personal jurisdiction over him by virtue of the fact that his arrest had been unlawful; he did not object to the specific evidence offered against him: namely, his oral and written admissions to law enforcement officers concerning his identity and citizenship. Id. at 1035, 104 S.Ct. 3479. The immigration court held that the legality of Lopez's arrest was irrelevant to its jurisdiction and overruled the objection. Id. 30 In the second case, respondent Elias Sandoval-Sanchez (Sandoval) argued that incriminating statements regarding his nationality and identity were fruit of an illegal arrest and should be suppressed. Id. at 1037, 104 S.Ct. 3479. Ultimately, the lower courts held that Sandoval's detention violated the Fourth Amendment and held that the statements could not be used against him in his civil deportation proceedings. Id. 31 Thus, by the time the cases came to the Supreme Court, two questions readily presented themselves for review: (1) whether an illegal arrest deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction over the respondent's person; and (2) whether the exclusionary rule, which is typically a remedy in criminal cases, would be extended to apply to civil deportation proceedings. 32 Dealing with the Lopez claim first, the Court held that the immigration court retained jurisdiction because [t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding. Id. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (quotation omitted). It was in this context in which the Court noted that the body or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as fruit of an unlawful arrest. Id. at 1039-40, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (citing, inter alia, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952)). Based on the cases the Court cited, it appears that the majority was referencing the long-standing rule, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, that illegal police activity affects only the admissibility of evidence; it does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court or otherwise serve as a basis for dismissing the prosecution. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886) (holding that the constitution does not prevent criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who was forcibly abducted from another country); Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522, 72 S.Ct. 509 (This Court has never departed from the rule announced in [ Ker ] that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a `forcible abduction.'); see also Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119, 95 S.Ct. 854 (reiterating the Court's established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction). 33 The Lopez-Mendoza Court then turned its attention to Sandoval's claim, which was not directed to the jurisdiction of the immigration court, but rather to the admissibility of statements regarding Sandoval's citizenship and identity that were made following the illegal arrest. 468 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. 3479. The Court first undertook to decide if the exclusionary rule itself extended to non-criminal, civil deportation proceedings. Id. at 1041, 104 S.Ct. 3479. After applying the factors in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), the Court held that the exclusionary deterrent should not apply to civil deportation proceedings. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050, 104 S.Ct. 3479. 34 The language in Lopez-Mendoza concerning the suppressability of a defendant's body or identity has been the cause of much consideration by the lower courts. The Ninth Circuit has relied upon this language to justify denying suppression of either a defendant's identity or his governmental files in prosecutions brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir.1994). The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, upheld the suppression of physical fingerprint evidence obtained after an illegal arrest, but not in the context of a routine booking, and further concluded that the identity language in Lopez-Mendoza referred only to jurisdictional challenges and did not foreclose suppression of all identity-related evidence. United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir.2001). We find the Eighth Circuit's analysis persuasive.
35 We do not read Lopez-Mendoza as exempting from the fruits doctrine all evidence that tends to show a defendant's identity. Rather, the Supreme Court's statement that the body or identity of a defendant are never suppressible applies only to cases in which the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the court over him or her based upon the unconstitutional arrest, not to cases in which the defendant only challenges the admissibility of the identity-related evidence. This much is evident simply from looking at the cases the Court cites in support of its proposition. See Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522, 72 S.Ct. 509; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119, 95 S.Ct. 854. As the Eighth Circuit noted in Guevara-Martinez: 36 These cases [relied upon by the Court in Lopez-Mendoza ] deal with jurisdiction over the person, not evidence of the defendant's identity illegally obtained. The language in Lopez-Mendoza should only be interpreted to mean that a defendant may be brought before a court on a civil or criminal matter even if the arrest was unlawful. 37 262 F.3d at 754. 38 The limited scope of Lopez-Mendoza is also clear from analyzing the two separate proceedings in that case. Lopez argued only that the immigration court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to the illegal arrest. 468 U.S. at 1035-36, 104 S.Ct. 3479. He did not challenge the admissibility of his statements to officers disclosing his identity. See id. Sandoval, on the other hand, specifically raised an evidentiary challenge to identity-related statements he sought suppressed. Id. at 1037, 104 S.Ct. 3479. If the identity language (which is first mentioned in connection with Lopez's jurisdictional challenge) applied with equal force to Sandoval's evidentiary challenge, there would have been no need for the Court to dispose of Sandoval's case separately. See id. at 1040-41, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (referring to the general [exclusionary] rule [to be applied] in a criminal proceeding in discussing Sandoval's evidentiary challenge, without distinguishing between identity-related evidence and other types of evidence). 39 Seeking to suppress one's very identity and body from a criminal proceeding merely because of an unconstitutional arrest is the sort of jurisdictional challenge foreclosed by Lopez-Mendoza. The language in Lopez-Mendoza merely says that the defendant cannot suppress the entire issue of his identity. A defendant may still seek suppression of specific pieces of evidence (such as, say, fingerprints or statements) under the ordinary rules announced in Mapp and Wong Sun. A broader reading of Lopez-Mendoza would give the police carte blanche powers to engage in any manner of unconstitutional conduct so long as their purpose was limited to establishing a defendant's identity. We do not believe the Supreme Court intended Lopez-Mendoza to be given such a reading. 40 Furthermore, specifically with regard to fingerprint evidence, the Supreme Court has made it clear on two occasions that fingerprint evidence (which is undeniably identity evidence) obtained after an illegal arrest may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule if obtaining the fingerprints was the objective of the illegal arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985). Because Lopez-Mendoza did not expressly overrule Hayes and Davis, we are bound to apply those earlier cases. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (warning that the circuit courts should not conclude that more recent Supreme Court cases have, by implication, overruled earlier precedents). 41 Our conclusion from Lopez-Mendoza, Davis, and Hayes, considered together, is that the identity language in Lopez-Mendoza refers only to jurisdiction over a defendant and it does not apply to evidentiary issues pertaining to the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest and challenged in a criminal proceeding. Instead, we utilize the normal and generally applicable Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to determine whether challenged identity-related evidence should be excluded under the circumstances present in the particular case. 42