Opinion ID: 77840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Viability of Smith's Claims for Monetary Damages Under RLUIPA

Text: Having resolved which claims for injunctive relief remain viable in Smith's appeal, we now must address whether Smith could obtain additional, monetary relief in the event he were to establish a RLUIPA violation. This inquiry involves the preliminary question of whether monetary damages are provided for under RLUIPA's statutory rubric, and, if so, whether Smith may allege either an individual or an official capacity suit for damagesor bothunder RLUIPA.
RLUIPA creates a private cause of action for a prison inmate if section 3 is violated, and further provides that the complaining party, if successful, may obtain appropriate relief against a government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). While the parties do not dispute that the phrase appropriate relief would presumably entitle a complaining inmate to injunctive and declaratory reliefsuch as, for example, an order granting the inmate the right to a particular object for use in religious worshipthe question is whether that phrase also encompasses a right to monetary relief. To put it mildly, there is a division of authority on this question. Madison v. Va., 474 F.3d 118, 130 n. 3 (4th Cir.2006). Some district courts have concluded that the phrase appropriate relief as used in RLUIPA does not encompass monetary damages. See, e.g., Boles v. Neet, 402 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1241 (D.Co.2005) (It would appear, therefore, that the `appropriate relief' permitted under the statute must be limited to injunctive or declaratory relief. . . .); see also Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1337 (N.D.Ga.2007) (finding RLUIPA to be ambiguous on the question of whether it authorizes a private right of action seeking monetary damages, but rejecting a recovery of monetary damages, inasmuch as they are sought in an individual capacity lawsuit). A number of district courts have concluded otherwise, and have found that RLUIPA's phrase, appropriate relief, is sufficiently broad to include some forms of monetary relief. See Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1067 (N.D.Ind.2006); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1161-62 (E.D.Cal.2003); see also Chase v. City of Portsmouth, No. 2:05CV446, 2005 WL 3079065, at  (E.D.Va. Nov. 16, 2005) (Appropriate relief may include injunctive and declaratory relief as well as nominal damages.) (citation omitted). Still other courts have assumed that money damages are available, without actually deciding the question. See Presley v. Edwards, No. 2:04-CV-729-WKW, 2007 WL 174153, at  (M.D.Al. Jan.19, 2007); Gooden v. Crain, 405 F.Supp.2d 714, 723-24 (E.D.Tex.2005); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp.2d 937, 938-39 (W.D.Wis.2002). This was the approach taken by the district court in this case in disposing of Smith's action. See Smith, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1246. The Supreme Court has instructed that, where Congress had not given any guidance or clear indication of its purpose with respect to remedies, federal courts should presume the availability of all appropriate remedies. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 68-69, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1034, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (citations omitted). In Franklin, the issue before the Court was what types of remedies were available in a private right of action for sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX). Although the statute was silent as to what remedies were available, the court stated that it was appropriate for a court to presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. 503 U.S. at 66, 112 S.Ct. at 1032. Thus, absent any intent to the contrary reflected in the statute, the Court instructed that the presumption should be in favor of all available reliefboth injunctive and monetary. Id. at 73, 112 S.Ct. at 1036. After Franklin, courtswhen faced with a statute lacking express guidance on the question of remedieshave generally adhered to this presumption. In Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc., for example, the First Circuit concluded that the general phrase all appropriate relief, as used in section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c), embrace[d] monetary damages as well as other relevant forms of relief normally available. 26 F.3d 1187, 1191 (1st Cir. 1994). In light of Franklin and its progeny, we agree that the use of the phrase appropriate relief in section 3 of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), is broad enough to encompass the right to monetary damages in the event a plaintiff establishes a violation of the statute. Congress expressed no intent to the contrary within RLUIPA, even though it could have, by, for example, explicitly limiting the remedies set forth in § 2000cc(a) to injunctive relief only. Instead, Congress used broad, general language in crafting the remedies section of RLUIPA, stating that a prevailing party could obtain appropriate relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). We assume that, when Congress acted, it was aware of Franklin 's presumption in favor of making all appropriate remedies available to the prevailing party. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73, 112 S.Ct. at 1036. In light of that presumption, we conclude that, absent an intent to the contrary, the phrase appropriate relief in RLUIPA encompasses monetary as well as injunctive relief. Having reached that general conclusion, however, it bears pointing out that a prisoner plaintiff's right to monetary relief is severely circumscribed by the terms of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). The PLRA provides that a prisoner may not bring a federal civil action for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); see also Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2002) (construing § 1997(e) as barring a prisoner from obtaining compensatory damages for solely mental or emotional harm while he is in custody). Despite this limitation, nominal damages may sometimes be appropriate under § 1997(e). See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (stating that nominal damages may be appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a violation of a constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual physical injury sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages). Indeed, in earlier cases, we have suggested that § 1997(e) does not preclude a prisoner from seeking nominal damages if he can establish that he has suffered a constitutional injury. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.2003); see also Boxer X v. Donald, 169 Fed.Appx. 555, 558 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that the PLRA's limitation on compensatory relief does not necessarily limit other forms of monetary relief, namely, nominal damages). Here, Smith has alleged violations of RLUIPA due to the burden placed upon his religious exercise, but no physical harm. He seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. It is clear from our case law, however, that the latter two types of damages are precluded under the PLRA, Napier, 314 F.3d at 532, but that nominal damages may still be recoverable. Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1162. Thus, although we conclude, as a general matter, that RLUIPA's phrase appropriate relief contemplates monetary as well as injunctive relief, in this case it is clear that Smith's monetary award, if any, will be limited to a grant of nominal damages, in light of the limiting language of § 1997(e). Having concluded that Smith may seek nominal damages in his section 3 RLUIPA action against the ADOC, we now must address whether Smith is entitled to bring either an individual capacity action, or an official capacity action, or both, against these defendant-appellees.
The distinction between an individual capacity suitalso referred to as a personal capacity suitand an official capacity suit is a significant one. When a plaintiff sues a municipal officer in the officer's individual capacity for alleged [] violations, the plaintiff seeks money damages directly from the individual officer. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). In contrast, an official capacity suit is, essentially, pleading an action against the entity of which an officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citation and quotations omitted). Moreover, in an individual capacity suit, a defendant may, depending on his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses, such as qualified immunity. Id. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. [8] In contrast, in an official capacity action, the only immunities that can be claimed . . . are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 167, 105 S.Ct. at 3106. In this case, Smith's RLUIPA action seeks damages from the defendant-appellees both in their individual and official capacities. The case law on RLUIPA, however, is not clear as to whether the statute permits a suit for monetary damages against government employee defendants in their individual capacities. Indeed, the district courts have been split on this question. Compare Agrawal v. Briley, No. 02-C-6807, 2006 WL 3523750, at -10 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 6, 2006) (permitting an individual capacity suit for monetary damages under RLUIPA) and Orafan v. Goord, No. 00CU2022 (LEK/RFT), 2003 WL 21972735, at  (N.D.N.Y. Aug.11, 2003) (stating that [c]learly [RLUIPA] contemplates individual liability) with Hammons v. Jones, No. 00-CV-0143-CVE-SAJ, 2006 WL 353448, at  (N.D.Ok. Feb. 14, 2006) (RLUIPA only allows for official capacity actions) and Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm'n, 229 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1067 (D.Haw.2002) (stating that RLUIPA does not appear to allow causes of action against individuals). RLUIPA's section 3 provides that [a] person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim . . . in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). The term government is defined as: (i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State; (ii) a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause; and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law. Id. at § 2000cc-5. Smith cites to this language, especially the latter references to [an] official of an entity and to any other person acting under color of state law, id., as evidence that RLUIPA was designed to provide for monetary relief from individual governmental employees, in addition to permitting a recovery from the governmental entity itself. Smith contends that the phrase under color of state law in RLUIPA is similar to the under color of language that appears in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against any person who, while acting under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State, causes the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. Just as the latter provides for an action against individual government employees for damages, argues Smith, so too should the former. A flaw with this argument, however, is that section 3 of RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending Power under Article I of the Constitution; RLUIPA [s]ection 3 applies when the substantial burden on religious exercise is imposed in a program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716, 125 S.Ct. at 2118 (alterations and internal quotations omitted). Our court, in addressing other federal statutes that emanate directly from Congress' Spending Powerthat is, federal statutes that condition a state's receipt of federal funding on the state's adherence to certain conditionshas repeatedly held that Congress cannot use its Spending Power to subject a non-recipient of federal funds, including a state official acting his or her individual capacity, to private liability for monetary damages. See, e.g., Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that individual school officials cannot be held liable under Title IX, because a Title IX claim can only be brought against the grant recipient). As we discuss below, this fact strongly militates against a recognition of a private action against an individual capacity defendant for monetary damages. The Spending Clause of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 1. Pursuant to this authority, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds and may further its broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 2795-96, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987) (citation and quotations omitted). Congress' Spending legislation typically grants federal funds to state institutions in exchange for the state's compliance with certain conditions. Such legislation has been described as creating a contract between the federal government and the state that receives the federal funds. See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.1998) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802, 119 S.Ct. 33, 142 L.Ed.2d 25, reinstated at 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999). As a result, [t]he legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power [] rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accept[ed] the terms of the `contract.' Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (citations omitted). Additionally, pursuant to this arrangement, Congress may create a funding contract that conditions the award of federal monies to the state's waiver of sovereign immunity to private lawsuits seeking to enforce the legislation. See, e.g., Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75, 112 S.Ct. at 1037 (finding that the Spending Power permitted Congress to create a private cause of action against a state institution for a violation of Title IX). Congress has enacted a number of laws creating a private action in the event the federal funds recipient fails to adhere to the conditions of the contractmost notably Title IX, which allows for a private cause of action when an education program. . . receiving Federal financial assistance subjects a person to discrimination on the basis of sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). With Title IX, Congress effectively condition[ed] an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the Government and the recipient of funds. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 1997, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) (citations omitted). Courts, however, in addressing Title IX, have placed limits on its scope, holding that the statute does not go so far as to allow a private cause of action against an defendant in his individual capacity, since an individual defendant is not the recipient of the federal funds. See Floyd, 133 F.3d at 789 (Because the contracting party is the grant-receiving local school district, a Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient . . . and not an individual.) (citation, quotations, and alterations omitted). In other words, the courts have consistently recognized the limited reach of Congress' Spending Power legislation, concluding that statutes passed under the Spending Clause may, as a condition of funding, subject the grant recipient to liability in a private cause of action, but that the Spending Power cannot be used to subject individual defendants, such as state employees, to individual liability in a private cause of action. See, e.g., id. ; Hartley, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270 (same); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that Title IX does not instruct courts to impose liability based on anything other than the acts of the recipients of federal funds and finding that [w]hen the school board accepted federal funds, it agreed not to discriminate on the basis of sex, but that it is unlikely that it further agreed to suffer liability whenever its employees discriminate on the basis of sex); see also Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 268 n. 9 (4th Cir.2006), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.3d 686 (2007) ( en banc ), pet. for cert. filed, (U.S. July 9, 2007) (No. 07-43) (Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power and prohibits discriminatory acts by funding recipients. Because school officials are not funding recipients under Title IX, school officials may not be sued in their individual capacities under Title IX.). Put simply, the federal circuits are in agreement that Title IX, because of its nature as Spending Power legislation, does not authorize suits against public officials in their individual capacities. Similar to Title IX, section 3 of RLUIPA derives from Congress' power under the Spending Clause. See 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(b) (stating that section 3 applies in any case where the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716, 125 S.Ct. at 2119. [9] In Benning v. Georgia, in reviewing the constitutionality of section 3 of RLUIPA, we concluded that section 3 constituted a valid exercise of Congress' Spending Power. See 391 F.3d at 1306. In light of this Spending Clause authority, Congress may, under RLUIPA, award federal funds to state prison institutions who, as a condition of receiving federal funds, agree not to impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of its prisoners. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). It is much less clear, however, whether section 3 of RLUIPA should be construed as further providing a cause of action against individual defendants, such as the ADOC Committee members who have been sued in their individual capacities in this case. In light of our jurisprudence construing Congress' Spending Power in other settings, it is clear that the contracting party in the RLUIPA context is the state prison institution that receives federal funds; put another way, these institutions are the grant recipients that agree to be amenable to suit as a condition to receiving fundsbut their individual employees are not recipients of federal funding as we have construed that term. See Floyd, 133 F.3d at 789. [10] We agree that a construction of RLUIPA providing for individual liability raises substantial constitutional concerns. Consequently, we conclude that section 3 of RLUIPAa provision that derives from Congress' Spending Powercannot be construed as creating a private action against individual defendants for monetary damages. See id. Thus, Smith is not entitled to pursue a claim against these defendant-appellees in their individual capacities under section 3 of RLUIPA. [11]
Having concluded that RLUIPA does not provide for a suit for damages against government officials in their individual capacitiessince such an action would be incongruent with the reach of Congress' Spending Powerwe now must address whether the statute permits an action for damages against the defendant-appellees in their official capacities. A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but is rather a suit against the official's office. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1542 (11th Cir.1993) (citation, alteration, and quotations omitted). Such actions are not a suit against the officer personally, since the real party in interest remains the state entity, and a favorable monetary judgment ultimately imposes liability on the entity that state officer represents. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. So long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, however, the official-capacity suit will in all respects other than name, [] be treated as a suit against the entity. Id. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 (citation omitted). In this case, we conclude that Smith may pursue an official capacity suit against the defendant-appellees for appropriate relief. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2. RLUIPA allows for a plaintiff to seek relief in the event there is a violation by a government, which term is defined in the statute as including, inter alia, any person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii). Having already concluded that the phrase appropriate relief includes an award of monetary damagesalbeit, in Smith's case, an award limited to nominal damageswe find that nothing in the plain language of RLUIPA prohibits an action for damages against these defendants-appellees in their official capacities, that is, as officers acting under color of state law. See id. Although it is true that these officers were sued in their official capacities in name onlyas monetary liability in the event of a successful suit will ultimately be imposed on the entity that they represent, the ADOCit is undisputed that the ADOC received notice of the action and had ample opportunity to respond to it. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. Accordingly, consistent with Graham, we hold that Smith may pursue a RLUIPA action for appropriate relief against these defendants-appellees, in their official capacities as officers of the ADOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2. [12] Thus, in addressing Smith's appeal, we must consider both Smith's claims for injunctive relief, and his official capacity claims for nominal damages, in evaluating whether the ADOC defendants-appellees were entitled to summary judgment. We now turn to the merits of those claims.