Opinion ID: 2481385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Authority to Issue the IDV and BCD Directives

Text: We begin by considering the claim that the UCS administrators exceeded the power granted them in the New York Constitution and relevant statutes when they issued the directives creating the BCD and the IDV Part. In Correa and Mack, the First Department majority concluded that the rules adopted by the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge amounted to ultra vires acts because the transfer of cases to Supreme Court is a matter of practice and procedure that falls within the exclusive province of the Legislature. We disagree. Article VI of the New York Constitution  the Judiciary Article  created a unified court system for the state (NY Const, art VI, § 1 [a]) and vested the Chief Judge with the authority to administer the system, with the assistance of the Administrative Board (composed of the Chief Judge and the Presiding Justices of each Appellate Division) (art VI, § 28). Together, they are empowered to appoint a chief administrator to supervise the administration and operation of the unified court system and exercise powers delegated by the Chief Judge (art VI, § 28 [a], [b]). The Chief Judge may establish standards and administrative policies for general application throughout the state, which shall be submitted to the Court of Appeals, together with the recommendations of the Administrative Board, and approved by the Court (art VI, § 28 [c]). We have previously held that the constitutional requirement that the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge consult with the Administrative Board and receive approval from the Court of Appeals before implementing broad-based administrative policies ensures critical multistage, multiperson review and is therefore an indispensable component of the constitutional scheme ( see Matter of Morgenthau v Cooke, 56 NY2d 24, 32 [1982]). When administrative authority is exercised in conformity with the consultation and approval requirements, UCS administrators possess broad express and implied powers to take whatever actions are necessary for the proper discharge of their responsibilities ( see Matter of New York State Assn. of Criminal Defense Lawyers v Kaye, 96 NY2d 512 [2001]). The Judiciary Article also specifically addresses the reassignment of cases to and from Supreme Court. Article VI, § 19 (a) states: As may be provided by law, the supreme court may transfer to itself any action or proceeding originated or pending in another court within the judicial department other than the court of claims upon a finding that such a transfer will promote the administration of justice. The authority of UCS administrators to transfer cases to and from Supreme Court is also recognized in statute. Judiciary Law § 211 (1) (a) explicitly authorizes the Chief Judge, in consultation with the Administrative Board and with the consent of the Court of Appeals, to establish standards and administrative policies for general application to the unified court system throughout the state, including but not limited to standards and administrative policies relating to ... transfer of judges and causes among the courts. Thus, the Legislature included the transfer of cases as one of the administrative actions that could be taken by the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge. Based on Supreme Court's transfer powers under article VI, § 19 (a) and the broad administrative authority vested pursuant to article VI, § 28 and Judiciary Law § 211, we conclude that UCS administrators were authorized to promulgate the IDV and BCD directives. Before the directives were issued, the Administrative Board was consulted and consent was obtained from the Court of Appeals. And although the First Department majority suggested that the BCD directives merged the Supreme Court and the New York City Criminal Court, eviscerating the latter, in reality the BCD and IDV directives accomplished only two things: they created new parts in Supreme Court and they provided that certain cases be transferred to those parts. Both actions were permissible under the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. No one has disputed the Chief Administrative Judge's power to create new parts within existing courts  a prerogative that appears in Judiciary Law § 212 (1) (c). As for the exercise of transfer authority, there has long been a question concerning whether the drafters of article VI, § 19 (a) intended to require statutory authorization before Supreme Court may transfer to itself cases arising in other courts ( see e.g. Matter of Dalliessi v Marbach, 56 AD2d 858 [2d Dept 1977] [concluding that section 19 (a) is not self-executing and that statutory authority is required]). But even assuming legislative action was necessary, the statutory predicate for the rules at issue appears in Judiciary Law § 211 (1) (a), which permits the Chief Judge to transfer cases between courts to further the efficient administration of justice. The provision contains no language preventing the transfer of misdemeanor cases to Supreme Court. In determining that the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge exceeded their constitutional and statutory powers when adopting the BCD directives, the First Department majority stated that they caus[ed] a collapse of the constitutionally created Criminal Court of the City of New York in the Bronx and impinged on the Legislature's reserved primary power to alter and regulate jurisdiction, practice and procedure under State Constitution, article VI, § 30 ( Correa, 70 AD3d 532, 534 [2010]). Contending that the Legislature has reserved to itself the power to regulate practice and procedure, the First Department reasoned that the ability of UCS administrators to direct that certain cases be heard in Supreme Court invaded that legislative domain. Again, we disagree. The Legislature certainly exercises significant control over the regulation of practice and procedure in the courts. But article VI, § 30 does not address or purport to curtail the transfer authority granted in article VI, § 19 (a) or the administrative power vested in UCS administrators in article VI, § 28. And in drafting Judiciary Law § 211, the Legislature made clear that it does not view the transfer of cases to be strictly a matter of practice and procedure  a conclusion that is especially appropriate given that UCS administrators may decide to reassign cases to alleviate court congestion (the impetus for the BCD directives). Section 211  entitled [a]dministrative functions of the chief judge of the court of appeals  includes an express reference to the transfer of cases between courts in the category of standards and administrative policies that the Chief Judge is directed to establish. The statute does not characterize transfer as a practice and procedure issue, much less indicate that policies relating to reassignment of cases fall within the sole province of the Legislature. As indicated in Corkum v Bartlett (46 NY2d 424 [1979]), the Legislature's decision to classify certain matters as administrative in the statutory delineation of the powers of UCS administrators is compelling evidence that it intended to recognize their authority over such matters. Given the historical context in which these provisions were adopted, it is not surprising that the drafters of the Judiciary Article expressly permitted the transfer of cases to and from Supreme Court and that, in Judiciary Law § 211, the Legislature vested UCS administrators with the authority to establish and implement transfer policies. The creation of the Unified Court System in 1962 was prompted in part by the uneven distribution of cases throughout the existing courts, resulting in some courts being overburdened, congested and delayed while others did not have enough work to engage the staff full-time ( see Report of State of New York Temporary Commission on the Courts [1955]). A statewide system of court administration was deemed necessary in order to efficiently marshal judicial resources and redirect cases to avoid the imbalances in workload and excessive delays that had plagued the prior system ( id. ). The constitutional and statutory transfer provisions fulfill this requirement, thereby facilitating the efficient administration of justice. Although the First Department was concerned that the BCD directives rendered the New York City Criminal Court, Bronx County, a shell of its former self (70 AD3d at 538), it appears that the court continues to have a heavy caseload and performs important functions in the criminal court system. That court still conducts arraignments and other preliminary proceedings on all informations, including those that charge misdemeanors and felonies  a transfer occurs only if a case is not disposed of at arraignment. In 2008, 76,631 arraignments were conducted in that venue and 48.9% of those cases were resolved by plea during those proceedings. Thus, the directives did not affect roughly 50% of the court's caseload. Of the cases that survived arraignment, only some met the transfer criteria and a significant number of those  any case involving a felony  would have been divested to Supreme Court for trial anyway, even absent the BCD directives, since local criminal courts lack trial jurisdiction over felony charges ( see CPL 10.30). Although the creation of the BCD certainly impacted the work of the New York City Criminal Court, we are unpersuaded that its role has been restricted to the point that it has ceased to effectively fulfill the role assigned under the New York Constitution ( see NY Const, art VI, § 15). Nor, in any event, did UCS administrators exceed their authority and impermissibly tread in the legislative domain when they issued the BCD or IDV directives. Accordingly, we decline to set aside the rules on that basis.