Opinion ID: 201973
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Exercise of Jurisdiction

Text: Even if the Hospital's contacts with Maine were minimally sufficient for either specific or general jurisdiction, we would -32- still conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction here would be unreasonable. [E]ven where purposefully generated contacts exist, courts must consider a panoply of other factors which bear upon the fairness of subjecting a nonresident to the authority of a foreign tribunal. Pleasant Street I, 960 F.2d at 1088. [G]auging fairness requires an assessment of reasonableness for, in certain circumstances, unreasonableness can trump a minimally sufficient showing of relatedness and purposefulness. Ticketmaster-New York, 26 F.3d at 210. The factors to be considered, known as the Gestalt factors, Pleasant Street I, 960 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 465), include:
the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). [T]he reasonableness prong of the due process inquiry evokes a sliding scale. Ticketmaster-New York, 26 F.3d at 210. In other words, the weaker the plaintiff's showing on the first two prongs (relatedness and purposeful availment), the less a defendant need show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction. The reverse is equally true: an especially strong -33- showing of reasonableness may serve to fortify a borderline showing of relatedness and purposefulness. Id. It is true that Harlow has an interest in litigating conveniently in [her] home state, which in turn has an interest in affording its citizens a convenient forum. Cambridge Literary Props., 295 F.3d at 66. But even though Maine has an interest in protecting its residents, Massachusetts has a like interest, one made stronger by the fact that it has an interest as a sovereign in a case arising from the conduct -- here, medical practice -- that occurs within its borders. Of course, [t]he purpose of the inquiry is not to compare the forum's interest to that of some other jurisdiction, but to determine the extent to which the forum has an interest, Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 151 (1st Cir. 1995), but here Maine has only a slight interest. Although a forum state has a significant interest in obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant who causes tortious injury within its borders, that interest is diminished where the injury occurred outside the forum state. Nowak, 94 F.3d at 718 (citations omitted). Further, Massachusetts law, not Maine law, would govern this dispute. See Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 62 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing the fact that forum state's law governs the dispute as one factor in favor of exercising personal jurisdiction there); Estate of Johnson, 2001 ME -34- 39, ¶ 6, 766 A.2d 592, 594 (Maine has adopted the most significant contacts and relationships test for choice of law, providing that [i]n an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship . . . to the occurrence and the parties (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1969))). As in Donatelli, Maine's sovereignty is not threatened; apart from a generalized concern for the rights of its own domiciliaries, the state has no real interest in adjudicating the controversy. In point of fact, the opposite seems true . . . . 893 F.2d at 472. Harlow argues that recognizing jurisdiction in Maine would be fair, because her family is of limited means, whereas the Hospital has annual revenues of $400 million. Harlow also argues: Whereas litigating this case in Maine will cause little, if any, inconvenience to the Children's Hospital, Danielle Harlow has no other forum for her case to be heard. The argument is exactly backwards. Harlow did have an obvious and readily available forum in Massachusetts. The fact that she missed the statute of limitations in Massachusetts does not add to her argument at all. To hold otherwise would encourage plaintiffs to deliberately miss -35- a statute of limitations for purposes of forum manipulation.10 Such a practice should be discouraged, not rewarded. Another interest is at stake -- the common interest[] of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies. Pleasant Street I, 960 F.2d at 1088. This factor weighs against the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction in Maine. All sovereigns share an interest in promoting the social policy of having quality health care available to those who need it. One way to promote this policy is to limit the length of time during which health care providers are exposed to lawsuits arising from the care they provide. Here, for instance, Massachusetts has set a threeyear statute of limitations for malpractice claims against its hospitals. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60D. Maine has a minimal interest in seeing that this limit be avoided, and the common interest of all sovereigns (including Maine) in seeing that this limit be observed is strong, especially in light of the fact that the Hospital did not purposefully conduct business in or 10 This court has addressed concerns about manipulation and statutes of limitations in other contexts. Cf. Noonan, 135 F.3d at 95 (discussing, in the context of temporal limitations on jurisdictional discovery, the risk that undesirable exploitation of statute of limitations periods will occur and that [s]avvy plaintiffs who wait until the end of the limitations period to maximize the chance of asserting jurisdiction will be rewarded for their dilatory tactics); Seymour, 423 F.2d at 585-86 (exercise of jurisdiction unfair where plaintiff . . . is unconnected with the forum and is not 'convenienced' by being able to sue there except that she has lost her right to sue in what would otherwise have been the fair and convenient state because of the expiration of that state's statute of limitations). -36- specifically direct its activities toward another state which has a longer statute of limitations. As to the disparity in resources, that has little to do with due process limits on the extension of long-arm jurisdiction. The law is not oblivious to financial considerations. But even though the defendant's burden of appearing and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief are included among the Gestalt factors for the personal jurisdiction analysis, see Pleasant Street I, 960 F.2d at 1088, sheer disparity in wealth is not. The argument Harlow raises of relative convenience and burden is more appropriately dealt with under the law of forum non conveniens or change of venue. Where a plaintiff properly establishes jurisdiction in one federal district court, she is free to argue for a transfer to another federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.). Even under the doctrines of forum non conveniens and change of venue, it is not clear that sheer disparity in wealth is legally relevant, without proof of hardship. See Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2000). In the end, this case is about a patient who lives in Maine and was referred by a Maine doctor to a hospital in Boston, -37- and who underwent a medical procedure in Boston which gave rise to a cause of action; she returned to Maine and the procedure was paid for from Maine. That cannot be enough to subject the Hospital to suit in Maine. The question is not whether hospitals may be held responsible in lawsuits for their activities, but whether they may be haled into court out of state because they accept out-of-state patients. It would be unreasonable to conclude that they could.