Opinion ID: 687361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Robertson's Plea

Text: 39 The district court based its decision to reject Mr. Robertson's guilty plea on four independent grounds: (1) the local rule had not been complied with; (2) the internal rule had not been complied with; (3) considerations pertaining to the docket and scheduling calendar of the district court; and (4) the court categorically would not accept any pleas pursuant to 11(e)(1)(C). We address each rationale in turn. 40 Local Rule 40.1H United States District Court for the District of Colorado, provides: No plea agreement involving dismissal of charges will be accepted unless written notification of the agreement is received by the court no later than ten (10) days before the Monday of the week set for the trial. On Friday, May 7, Mr. Robertson presented written notification a plea agreement had been reached. Trial was set to commence on Monday, May 17. The ten-day notification requirement of the local rule was met. 41 The district court's order suggests, however, the local rule was not complied with because the notification given was inadequate. At the May 13 trial preparation conference, the district court, in affirming the conclusion that the local rule had not been complied with, referred not to dates and the ten-day notification requirement but rather, that the Local Rule require[s] not that I get a little piece of paper two sentences at the last minute telling me that the case has been disposed of. 42 The little piece of paper referred to was the government's notification, filed on May 7, which stated: 43 COMES NOW the United States of America (hereinafter Government), by and through its undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, to notify the court that a plea disposition has been reached in the above-captioned case. Undersigned counsel is filing this notice at the request of counsel for the defendant, Mr. Japha, who is out of the state on legal business. 44 We find nothing ambiguous about this document. It states a disposition had been reached between Mr. Robertson and the government and notified the court Mr. Robertson intended to change his plea of not guilty to guilty. While it is clear the notification could have said something more about the terms of the plea agreement, it is equally clear the failure to do so is immaterial. Local Rule 40.1H requires not that the terms of an agreement be detailed, only that a district court be informed of the existence of an agreement. There is no doubt but Mr. Robertson's written notification of the agreement, Rule 40.1H, was just that--written notification of the agreement. Mr. Robertson's notification that a plea agreement had been reached complied with Local Rule 40.1H and, therefore, can not support the district court's decision to reject the plea. 45 The district court's second rationale for rejecting Mr. Robertson's plea agreement was the failure to comply with the court's internal rule regarding plea agreements. The rule provides:7. Changes of Plea. I strictly enforce the provisions of local rule 40.1H and require that all proposed pleas of guilty be heard no later than ten days before the beginning of the week in which trial is set to commence. In order to avoid last-minute uncertainty in the scheduling, travel, and appearance of trial witnesses and jurors in the event that the plea of guilty is not accepted, such hearings will ordinarily be set for the Friday of the penultimate week before the week of trial. A copy of the Plea Agreement and Statements of Facts Relevant to Sentencing (see General Order 1987-5 [D.Colo. Dec. 1, 1987] shall be delivered to my chambers no later than (a) 5:00 o'clock p.m. on the Wednesday preceding a Friday hearing or (b) 48 hours before any hearing which may, because of extraordinary circumstances, be scheduled at another time. 46 Rule III.7. 47 Mr. Robertson argues this internal rule cannot be given effect as it conflicts with the applicable Local Rule for the District of Colorado. In response, the government asserts it makes no difference whether the rule violated was the local rule or the court's internal rule because Mr. Robertson was on notice of what was required, and the parties did not attempt to comply until just before trial. This is untimely. 48 Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 49 Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.... In all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrate judges may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act. 50 F.R.Crim.P. 57 (emphasis added). 51 Local Rule 40.1H prescribes the requirements for notifying a court of the existence of a plea agreement. Adoption of that rule clearly is within the District of Colorado's power under Rule 57. Rule 57, however, permits the adoption of internal rules only when two circumstances exist. First, the district as a whole has not adopted a rule bearing on the same matter, and second, so long as the internal rule is not inconsistent with the federal rules or other district-wide rules. 52 The district court's internal rule governs cases for which a local rule is provided. Both address the procedural requirements for notification a plea agreement has been reached. 12 As such, adoption of the district court's internal rule is proscribed by Rule 57. The fact defendants had notice of the district court's internal rule, as the government points out, is inapposite. The district court's internal Rule III.7 cannot be given effect as it violates the dictates of Rule 57. Thus, noncompliance with that rule does not provide a permissible basis for the refusal to accept the proposed guilty plea. 53 The district court additionally rejected Mr. Robertson's plea agreement on the grounds it would not accept[ ] 11(e)(1)(c) plea agreements in this case and concerns relating to the court's calendar. Mr. Robertson argues the district court erred in rejecting the tendered plea agreement without articulating a sound reason for doing so. The gravamen of the government's response is that blanket prohibition of particular pleas likely is not error and given the district court's long involvement in the case, it is likely the court did not err in rejecting the pleas. 13 54 In addressing the question of whether, and under what circumstances a district court may reject a plea agreement entered into between the defendant and government, our starting point is Rule 11 which describes the procedures for the acceptance or rejection of those agreements. Rule 11(e)(2) provides the court may accept or reject the agreement. While Rule 11 vests district courts with the discretion to accept or reject plea agreements, the rule does not define the criteria to be applied in doing so. See 1 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 175.1 (1982). On the contrary, so long as district courts exercise sound judicial discretion in rejecting a tendered plea, Rule 11 is not violated. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498-99, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). 55 In attempting to identify the parameters of the abuse of discretion standard in this context, it is important to distinguish between the four types of plea bargains contemplated under Rule 11(e)(1): charge bargains, predicated on the dismissal of some counts; sentence bargains, predicated either on the recommendation of or agreement not to oppose a particular sentence; bargains predicated on the guarantee of a particular sentence; and hybrid bargains containing part charge and part sentence bargains. The different types of plea bargains implicate different types of discretion and power. 56 Both forms of sentence bargains implicate judicial discretion by limiting the sentencing power of the district court. United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir.1983). Within the statutorily prescribed range, imposition of sentence is a matter of discretion for the district court. 3 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 526 (1982) (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972)). Thus, the prosecution's role in sentencing bargains is strictly advisory. United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835 (5th Cir.1981). 57 In contrast, charge bargains implicate executive discretion with respect to charging decisions. Charging decisions are primarily a matter of discretion for the prosecution, the representatives of the executive branch of government, who are not mere servants of the judiciary. Miller, 722 F.2d at 565. Case law clearly establishes that separation of powers mandates the judiciary remain independent of executive affairs and vice versa. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700 (1965). This principle is also established by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 14 58 Though charging decisions implicate executive power, they also implicate the sentencing discretion of district courts. See Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1464 (recognizing, in dicta, that charging decisions restrict the district court's ability to impose what it considered an appropriate sentence.). However, the court's sentencing discretion is implicated only as an incidental consequence of the prosecution's exercise of executive discretion. In fact, a court's sentencing discretion is implicated in this situation in precisely the same manner it is implicated by prosecutorial decisions to bring charges in the first place, where prosecutorial discretion is nearly absolute. As such, charge bargains directly and primarily implicate prosecutorial discretion whereas judicial discretion is impacted only secondarily. Thus, while district courts may reject charge bargains in the sound exercise of judicial discretion, concerns relating to the doctrine of separation of powers counsel hesitancy before second-guessing prosecutorial choices. 59 Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at which time, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 793-94 [97 S.Ct. 2044, 2050-51, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C.Cir.1973), or the relative strengths of various cases and charges. See Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1521, 1547 (1981). 60 Miller, 722 F.2d at 565. 61 A district court's discretion to reject plea agreements is not without limit and varies depending on the content of such a bargain. Accordingly, we hold that in order to insure district courts exercise sound judicial discretion and adequately respect the principle of prosecutorial independence, courts must set forth, on the record, the prosecution's reasons for framing the bargain and the court's justification for rejecting it. See Moore, 916 F.2d at 1135-36 (requiring district courts to articulate a sound reason for rejecting a guilty plea on the record); Miller, 722 F.2d at 566 (same); United States v. Delegal, 678 F.2d 47, 50 (7th Cir.1982) (same); Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 623 (same). Requiring district courts to articulate the reasons for rejecting a plea agreement not only helps insure the court is aware of and gives adequate deference to prosecutorial discretion, it is the surest, indeed the only way to facilitate appellate review of rejected plea bargains. Mindful of these principles, we turn to Mr. Robertson's proffered plea agreement and the district court's rejection of it. 62 Mr. Robertson's plea agreement was neither a pure charge bargain nor a pure sentence bargain, but a hybrid. In exchange for dismissing certain charges, he agreed to plead guilty to others. In addition, the government agreed a particular sentence was appropriate for the charges to which Mr. Robertson pled. Thus, the plea agreement directly implicates both judicial and prosecutorial discretion. 63 The district court expressed concern pertaining to its docket as a rationale for rejecting the plea agreement. The court stated: 64 I don't have the luxury, as I said, of continuing this case for another week. And what you all have done by this last minute maneuvering is put the Court in a position where I can't schedule anything else at this point. I can't get any other case to go to trial. I already tried. I tried yesterday to get another case to go to trial next week in the event that this one could be tried at another time, and nobody can do it. An you all understand that because if the roles were reversed, you wouldn't be able to do it either, I dare say. 65 So I'm just not going to permit it. 66 In our judgment, rejecting Mr. Robertson's plea agreement for this reason constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136 n. 11 (when no plea cutoff date has been missed and the Government makes its first plea offer to a defendant the morning of trial and defendant accepts, the rejection of the plea under those circumstances may well constitute an abuse of discretion.). While there is no doubt a district court has considerable authority in managing its docket, scheduling concerns alone are not of sufficient importance to justify the infringement of prosecutorial discretion resulting here. As explained above, Mr. Robertson's plea agreement directly implicated both judicial and prosecutorial discretion. While the district court has considerable leeway in rejecting the bargain based on its sentencing aspect, its discretion is more limited when its decision is based on the bargain's charging aspect. In our judgment, rejecting a plea implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the district court's scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible. 67 Lastly, in rejecting the plea, the district court flatly stated that no 11(e)(1)(c) plea agreements would be accepted in the case. While no rationale for doing so was articulated, the import of the district court's statement is clear. Rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreements are those in which the government guarantees a particular sentence to a defendant. As such, 11(e)(1)(C) pleas directly and unequivocally infringe on the sentencing discretion of district courts. In our judgment, the court's categorical refusal to accept pleas pursuant to subsection (C) can only be understood as its refusal to completely yield its discretion in sentencing. There can be little doubt that rejecting a plea agreement due to the court's refusal to permit the parties to bind its sentencing discretion constitutes the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 68 As noted above, a district court's discretion to sentence within the applicable range is extremely broad. Because 11(e)(1)(C) agreements attempt to completely curtail that discretion, a district court's decision to preserve that aspect of judicial power is not an abuse of discretion. We conclude, therefore, the district court's refusal to accept Mr. Robertson's plea of guilty was based, in part, on reasons that constitute the sound exercise of judicial discretion and thus, the court's rejection of the plea agreement cannot be overturned on appeal.