Opinion ID: 2198154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Court's Findings of the Intentions of the Proceks in 1978

Text: In reaching the conclusion that Anna Procek had rebutted the presumption of a gift, the trial court relied primarily on the undisputed circumstances surrounding the 1978 transaction and on her testimony at the 1998 trial concerning the intent of the parties in 1978. The trial court found the following undisputed facts to be significant. The Proceks were in their mid-seventies at the time of the transaction. They did not speak English as their first language. They were not experienced with the American legal system. They relied on Helen to secure the purchase of a home for them in Delaware. They gave Helen cash from the sale of their New Jersey home to pay the entire amount of the purchase price of the property. The money given to Helen represented most of the Proceks' assets. There was no record of a gift tax filing. At the time of the acquisition of the property, Helen hired the real estate lawyer (now deceased) who handled the settlement and was paid by the Proceks' funds. The lawyer did not meet with the Proceks and thus never discussed with the them the consequences of, or any alternatives to, deeding the property to Helen outright. The Proceks did not attend the settlement. After settlement, they immediately moved into the property and treated it as their home. The Proceks lived in the property continuously and exclusively until 1996, paying all of the expenses associated with the property, including taxes, utilities, sewer, insurance, upkeep, and maintenance. Helen never lived in the house. The Court of Chancery found Anna Procek's testimony to be highly credible, notwithstanding her advanced age and thick accent. At the trial, when she was asked whether she intended to give Helen the house in 1978, Anna responded: I don't know. See, I pay every penny for my house. She not pay nothing, just take care of me, you know. Similarly, Anna testified that she thought the house belonged to her because I pay every penny for this house. When asked why the Proceks put their house in Helen's name, Anna responded: I think she needs to take care of me but she die so quick. When asked whether she wanted Helen to have the house after the Proceks died, Anna testified that she could take care of me. I could give, you know, but I still living. And she died so quick. Obviously Anna Procek had not considered it likely that Helen would predecease her. From this live testimony, the trial judge found as a fact that the Proceks did not intend in 1978 to make a present unconditional gift of the property to Helen. Instead, the trial court found that the circumstances of the 1978 transaction, together with Anna's testimony, reflected an intent that, upon their deaths (which the Proceks assumed would be before Helen's), the Proceks wanted to be able to reward Helen by giving her the house for the care they anticipated she was going to provide to them in their last years. The trial court found that title to the house had been placed in Helen's name in 1978, not as an expression of an outright gift, but to facilitate the initial purchase of the house with the proceeds of the sale of the Proceks' New Jersey home, to facilitate Helen assisting the Proceks by paying bills related to the house, and to facilitate transfer of ownership of the house to Helen upon the Proceks' deaths. The Court concluded, based on the trial testimony, as well as the circumstances that existed in 1978, that Anna had rebutted the presumption of a gift by producing sufficient evidence that the Proceks intended that beneficial as well as legal title to the house would pass to Helen after, and only after, she survived both her parents. [16] Although the Court of Chancery considered evidence of the parties' conduct after the 1978 transaction, the Court did not find this later conduct to be persuasive or even particularly useful evidence of the parties' intent in 1978. [17] Furthermore, the Court of Chancery concluded after remand, for the second time, that Procek's claim was not barred by laches. The Court held that Anna Procek's delay in bringing suit was not unreasonable under the circumstances because she had no reason to know that Hudak claimed a fee simple interest in the property until 1996. The Court also found that Hudak was not prejudiced by any delay.