Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Existence of a right to self-representation at the penalty phase

Text: As noted above, after the jury returned its guilt verdict a dispute arose between defendant and advisory counsel concerning the presentation of evidence in mitigation. Advisory counsel wanted defendant to be examined by a psychiatrist, to present available testimony from family members, and to introduce into evidence available medical, prison, and psychiatric records. Defendant, however, rejected the advice of his advisory counsel. Ultimately, defendant presented no penalty phase witnesses and introduced only his transcripts from Los Angeles City College as evidence in mitigation. Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself at the penalty phase because, defendant asserts, the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation does not extend to the penalty phase of a capital trial. He contends the alleged error deprived him of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution. We consistently have held, however, that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation extends to the penalty phase. (E.g., People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1074, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1364-65, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617-618, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) In the alternative, defendant argues that permitting him to preclude any investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase violated his right to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. We have rejected this contention as well. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1227-1228, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) As we have explained, a rule requiring a pro se defendant to present mitigating evidence would be unenforceable and self-defeating. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1073-1074, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1364-1365, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Court of Appeal (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 ( Martinez ) undermines these conclusions. The high court in Martinez addressed whether the right to self-representation extends to the appeal of a criminal conviction. The high court first noted that Sixth Amendment rights are trial rights that do not apply to an appeal, which is not constitutionally compelled but is purely a creature of statute. Accordingly, any right to self-representation on appeal must be grounded in the due process clause. ( Id. at pp. 159-161, 120 S.Ct. 684.) The court in Martinez then proceeded to reason that because the status of the accused changes dramatically after he or she is found guilty  from a presumptively innocent defendant who is hailed into court by the state, to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt who initiates the appeal to attack the conviction  states are free on appeal to conclude that the defendant's autonomy interests no longer outweigh the state's interests in the integrity and efficiency of the proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 161-163.) Thus, there is no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal. ( Id. at pp. 163-164.) Defendant contends that the rationale of Martinez compels the conclusion that there is no right to self-representation at the penalty phase, because: (1) the penalty phase of a capital trial, like an appeal, is a creature of statute, and (2) at the penalty phase, as on appeal, the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and thus his autonomy interests are sufficiently diminished to be overridden by the state's interests in a fair and reliable penalty determination. We are not persuaded. First, as we have explained, for Sixth Amendment purposes the penalty phase of a capital case is `merely a stage in a unitary capital trial.' ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 194, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781, quoting People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 369, 247 Cal.Rptr. 31, 753 P.2d 1109.) For this reason, Sixth Amendment rights, including the right to the assistance of counsel, apply at the penalty stage. (See Gardner v. Florida (1977) 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393; Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128, 134, 137, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336.) Accordingly, the correlative right to self-representation applies as well, regardless of whether the existence of the penalty phase is a statutory creation or is itself compelled by the federal Constitution. Second, although the decision in Martinez speaks of the diminution of a defendant's autonomy interests after conviction and on appeal, Martinez does not address the level of autonomy interest enjoyed by a defendant during sentencing. We find nothing in Martinez to persuade us that a defendant's autonomy interests are any less compelling at the penalty phase of a capital trial than at the guilt phase. The defendant at sentencing is still in the position of being hailed into court by the state (see Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525), and thus still has an interest in personally presenting his or her defense. (See id. at p. 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Defendant cites a number of cases from other states holding that Eighth Amendment reliability interests trump a defendant's right to control the defense at the penalty phase of a capital trial. [19] We do not find these cases persuasive. Rather, we adhere to the weight of state and federal authority that concludes, consistent with our own precedent, that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation extends to the penalty phase, and that the Eighth Amendment poses no barrier to the self-represented defendant's control of the presentation of mitigating evidence. (E.g., United States v. Davis (5th Cir.2002) 285 F.3d 378, 384-385 [the right to self-representation extends to the penalty phase of a capital case; the appointment of an independent counsel to present mitigating evidence against the defendant's wishes violated that right]; Silagy v. Peters (7th Cir.1990) 905 F.2d 986, 1006-1008 [the right to self-representation applies to the penalty phase of a capital case even if the defendant chooses to forego the presentation of mitigating evidence; the Eighth Amendment is no bar to the imposition of sentence in these circumstances]; People v. Coleman (1996) 168 Ill.2d 509, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919, 937-928 [ Faretta applies in capital cases]; People v. Silagy (1984) 101 Ill.2d 147, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415, 429-432 [the defendant may waive counsel and seek death at the penalty phase of a capital case]; Smith v. State (Ind.1997) 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1274-1276 [appointment of a special counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection was not warranted]; Bridges v. State (2000) 16 Nev. 752, 6 P.3d 1000, 1012 [self-represented defendant in a capital case is not required to introduce mitigating evidence and may seek the death penalty]; People v. Gordon (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1999) 179 Misc.2d 940, 942-945, 688 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382-384 [ Faretta extends to a capital case]; State v. Reed (1998) 332 S.C. 35, 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 [capital defendant may waive the right to counsel].) [20]