Opinion ID: 1642921
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to present any defense

Text: ¶ 15. Knox next argues that his trial counsel failed to present an adequate and sufficient defense and failed to provide any meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's case. Knox argues that the non-existence defense resulted in deficient performance. Knox cites United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), as authority. Knox points out that trial counsel failed to call any witnesses during the guilt phase of the trial, and presumably this sub-issue is confined only to counsel's performance in the guilt phase of the trial. ¶ 16. Knox told Deputy Sheriff Donald Butler that he woke up on the morning of the murder of Ella Mae Spears, went outside to a field, and the next thing he remembered was waking up in the field several hours later with blood on his clothes and no memory of how the blood got on his clothes. Knox now does not say how his trial counsel were supposed to fashion a defense out of this version of events. ¶ 17. The State cites Branch v. State, 882 So.2d 36 (Miss.2004), where this Court discussed the difference between an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington and a claim under Cronic: The Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the prejudice requirement when (1) assistance of counsel has been denied completely, (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, or (3) counsel is denied during a critical stage of the proceedings. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2039; see Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1240-41, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Freeman v. Graves, 317 F.3d at 900. In this case, because the errors were committed by his own counsel, Branch argues that there was no meaningful adversarial testing of prosecutor's case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1851, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (discussing egregious trial conduct necessary to remove a case from Strickland analysis and apply a Cronic analysis). When applying Strickland or Cronic, the distinction between counsel's failure to oppose the prosecution entirely and the failure of counsel to do so at specific points during the trial is a difference ... not of degree but of kind. [ Bell, 122 S.Ct. at 1851 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039)]. Under this rationale, when counsel fails to oppose the prosecution's case at specific points or concedes certain elements of a case to focus on others, he has made a tactical decision. Id. at 1851-52. By making such choices, defense counsel has not abandoned his or her client by entirely failing to challenge the prosecution's case. Such strategic decisions do not result in an abandonment of counsel, as when an attorney completely fails to challenge the prosecution's case. Under the Court's reasoning, then, Cronic is reserved only for those extreme cases in which counsel fails to present any defense. We presume prejudice in such cases because it is as if the defendant had no representation at all. In contrast, strategic or tactical decisions are evaluated under Strickland's traditional two-pronged test for deficiency and prejudice. Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2002). A defendant is not entitled to errorless counsel. Hansen v. State, 649 So.2d 1256, 1259 (Miss.1994), Johnson v. State, 511 So.2d 1333, 1339-40 (Miss.1987). This Court must look to the entire performance of counsel to determine whether he or she was competent and conscientiously fulfilled the role as advocate. Branch, 882 So.2d at 65-66. This Court found that a review of the record showed that Branch was represented by competent and zealous counsel who challenged the State's evidence at all stages of this case, and there was no merit to the issue. Branch, 882 So.2d at 66. ¶ 18. The State contends that Knox's trial counsel challenged the State's case and there was no violation under Cronic. The State points out that defense counsel filed numerous pre-trial motions; cross-examined nine out of eleven prosecution witnesses; points out a long colloquy between the circuit court and defense counsel on whether one defense witness might be located and called (the witness ultimately was not called because he would have corroborated the State's witnesses as to what happened when Knox was taken into custody); notes that Knox was thoroughly examined on whether or not he wanted to take the stand; and that the physical evidence in the case was overwhelming in favor of the State. The State attaches to its Response an affidavit from Gus Sermos, one of Knox's trial attorneys, wherein Sermos states that he met with Knox on numerous occasions and even discussed a plea offer from the State with Knox, which Knox ultimately rejected. The terms of the plea offer are not supplied. ¶ 19. As Knox has not suggested any new evidence or testimony which should have been offered by his trial counsel, we find that there was no violation of Knox's right to counsel under Cronic or Strickland.