Opinion ID: 490025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001

Text: 15 Initially, appellant argues that his conviction may not stand because his actions do not constitute a crime under Sec. 1001, as charged in the indictment. First, appellant argues that, because the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) ordinarily does not use Form 6059-B as one of its prescribed forms, and he never otherwise falsely identified himself to I.N.S. Inspector Drengson, there is no jurisdictional basis for the indictment which charged him with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of that agency. Second, although he concedes that his false statements were made orally to Customs Inspector Radig and in writing on Form 6059-B, he asserts that such statements were not material to the Customs Service within the meaning of Sec. 1001 and hence the indictment was defective as to that agency. 16 The origin and history of Sec. 1001 have been thoroughly reviewed in a number of cases, familiarity with which is assumed. E.g., United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941). The statute, of necessity, is couched in the broadest terms to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described. United States v. Gilliland, supra, 312 U.S. at 93. We turn to an application of the statute's terms to the instant case.
17 [T]he term 'jurisdiction' should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for purposes of 1001. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70 (1969) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we have held that there is jurisdiction, within the meaning of Sec. 1001, if the false statement is made in some intended relationship to a matter that is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Ebeling v. United States, 248 F.2d 429, 434 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). Further, the false statement need not be made directly to the government agency; it is only necessary that the statement relate to a matter in which a federal agency has the power to act. E.g., United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183 (8th Cir.1984); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.1967). The initial question posed by appellant, therefore, is whether giving a false identification, both orally and on a Customs Form to a Customs Inspector, relates to a matter in which the I.N.S. has the power to act. We answer in the affirmative. In so doing, we review briefly the roles of these officials. 18 Customs inspectors are employees of the Customs Service, which is under the aegis of the Department of the Treasury. Immigration inspectors are employees of I.N.S., which is under the aegis of the Department of Justice. The investigative powers of both agencies are broad; although somewhat disimilar, they are harmonious. Congress has granted customs inspectors broad authority to examine vehicles, beasts, persons and their belongings crossing the national boundaries. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 482 (1982). See also 19 U.S.C. Secs. 1496, 1581(a) (1982). Customs agents are authorized to prevent the importation of aliens and contraband into the United States. United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir.1979). Immigration inspectors stationed at ports of entry, such as Noyes, Minnesota, in the instant case, are authorized to search any vehicle in which they believe aliens are being brought into the United States. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1225 (1982). Under the immigration laws, I.N.S. inspectors do not have the authority to search bags, containers, or compartments too small to conceal persons. By a series of proper delegations, however, I.N.S. inspectors may be designated as customs inspectors by the Secretary of the Treasury. [A]ny officer of the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department ... or any agent or other person authorized by law or designated by the Secretary of the Treasury to perform duties of an officer of the Customs Service ... serves as a customs inspector. Likewise, a customs inspector may be designated to perform the duties of an immigration inspector. [A]ny employee or class of employees of the Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney General ... to perform the functions of an immigration officer ... serves as an immigration inspector. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(18) (1982). It appears that Border Patrol agents wear two hats, one as an immigration officer and the other as a customs officer. United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973). 19 In the instant case, both inspectors testified that they had been cross-designated as inspectors of each other's respective agencies. Such cooperation between agencies sharing like concerns is both mandatory and laudable. We hold, therefore, that when appellant concealed his true identity from Inspector Radig he made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the I.N.S., within the meaning of Sec. 1001. That agency clearly has the power to make a final determination to exclude or admit properly identified aliens. That is the source of its jurisdiction. Appellant's subterfuge was an attempt to inhibit the lawful exercise of that power. 20 It matters not whether we consider appellant's oral statement of false identity or his false written signature, for the law does not recognize any distinction between oral and written statements under Sec. 1001. United States v. Beacon Brass, 344 U.S. 43, 46 (1952). Appellant's conduct was equally culpable when he committed either act, or both of them. 21 Turning to appellant's final jurisdictional argument, he invites us to hold that, because the form on which he placed his false signature had not been designated as an immigration form, the I.N.S. lacked jurisdiction over his conduct. We decline the invitation. To accept this argument would be to view Sec. 1001 with myopic vision, in derogation of the intent of Congress. Both inspectors testified that they use Form 6059-B for identification and entry purposes for individuals desiring to enter the United States. As one court has recognized, Form 6059-B is used as a first line defense to keep contraband and narcotics from entering the United States by identifying suspected or wanted individuals. United States v. Parten, 462 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972) (rejecting argument that appellants' use of fictitious names on Form 6059-B did not violate Sec. 1001). The national interest of self protection reasonably requires that an individual wishing to claim the privilege of entering this country identify himself truthfully.
22 Appellant next contends that any false statement he made in connection with his attempted entry into the United States was not material to the Customs Service within the meaning of Sec. 1001 because his fictitious identification had nothing to do with the declaration of dutiable goods. We reject the narrow construction of the functions of the Customs Service urged on us by appellant. Realization of customs officials' special problems has resulted in courts giving the broadest interpretation compatible with our constitutional principles in construing the statutory powers of customs officials. United States v. Stanley, 45 F.2d 661, 666 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978). 23 [M]ateriality involves only the capability of influencing an agency's governmental functions, i.e., does the statement have a 'natural tendency to influence or is it capable of influencing agency decision?'  United States v. Richmond, supra, 700 F.2d at 1188 (citations omitted). Appellant claimed the privilege of entry into this country. It cannot be seriously asserted that the use of a fictitious identification did not have the capability of influencing the inspector's decision as to whether to grant him that privilege. The statement, accordingly, was material within the meaning of Sec. 1001. 24