Opinion ID: 2320989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Finality and Right to Appeal

Text: Quillens noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in both the Parker and City cases on September 21, 2005. Subsequently, the Circuit Court issued an order foreclosing the right of redemption in the City properties on October 12, 2005, from which Quillens filed an amended notice of appeal. Quillens asserts that the original notice of appeal filed was timely and that the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal in the Parker case. Further, with respect to the City cases, Quillens argues that the original notice of appeal divested the Circuit Court of jurisdiction to enter an order foreclosing the right of redemption for the City properties. It is well settled that the right of appeal is statutory. Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 247, 808 A.2d 795, 797 (2002); Prince George's County v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 358 Md. 166, 173, 747 A.2d 647, 651 (2000); Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Bd., 345 Md. 477, 489, 693 A.2d 757, 763 (1997). Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.), provides that a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. Thus, an appeal generally must be taken from a final judgment; the decision must be so final as to determine and conclude rights involved, or deny the appellant means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 614, 440 A.2d 388, 389 (1982); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 284 Md. 86, 91, 394 A.2d 801, 804 (1978). The final appealable order in a tax sale proceeding is the decree foreclosing the right of redemption. According to Section 14-844 of the Tax-Property Article, Maryland Code (1986, 2001 Repl.Vol.), entitled Final Order, [a]fter the time limit set in the order of publication and in the summons expires, the court shall enter judgment foreclosing the right of redemption. An interlocutory order is not necessary. The judgment is final and conclusive on the defendants.  (emphasis added). We explicated that the final order in a tax sale proceeding is the order foreclosing the right of redemption in Scheve v. Shudder, Inc., 328 Md. 363, 614 A.2d 582 (1992), in which we referred to Section 14-844: In addition, our prior interpretation of the tax sale statute also indicates that no additional steps are required to enter a final judgment under § 14-844 beyond those set out in the text of the tax sale statute.    The literal terms that the legislature used in § 14-844 do not encompass the Scheves' suggested second step. A complaint under Title 14 must include the certificate of tax sale, an affidavit of a title search, and requests to serve process and for the court to issue an order of publication. After the purchaser files the complaint and meets all the tax sale statute's requirements, § 14-844 provides that when the prerequisite time period expires, a time period set into motion only through filing the complaint, a judgment will be entered. There is no mention of an additional prerequisite step of reaffirming the tax sale purchaser's desire to proceed.    Permitting a circuit court to enter a final order under § 14-844 after the time period set forth in the purchaser's notice to the owner is true to both the statutory language and the policy of encouraging the foreclosure of redemptive rights at tax sales. Id. at 373-74, 614 A.2d at 587-88 (citations omitted). Quillens, nevertheless, argues that the August 30, 2005 orders establishing the validity of the tax certificates in the Parker case and setting the redemption amounts for the City properties were appealable, citing Scheve v. McPherson, 44 Md.App. 398, 408 A.2d 1071 (1979), and Kasdon v. Westbury, Inc., 259 Md. 222, 269 A.2d 625 (1970), for the proposition that appeals are permitted in tax sale proceedings before there is a final judgment foreclosing the right of redemption. In Scheve, purchasers at a tax sale filed a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption in twelve parcels of land. Two days before the deadline to redeem the property, the owners of one of the properties contacted the purchasers' attorney and informed him that they intended to redeem one of the properties. The owners, however, failed to act to redeem the property, and the circuit court entered a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption in the property. Subsequently, the owners' petition to set aside the foreclosure was granted, from which the purchasers appealed. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the purchasers could appeal the order reopening the judgment, noting that the order finally and conclusively determined the rights of the parties: The purpose and effect of striking the December decree, therefore, was to reinstate appellees' right to redeem the property, a right that had been terminated by the stricken decree. The March order clearly represented a determination by the court that appellees were entitled to redeem the property, that that right should not be foreclosed, and that, if appellees followed the statutory procedure for redemption, they would be entitled to own and possess the property to the exclusion of appellants.    The mere striking of the December decree, reviving a right of redemption that could then be exercised merely by paying the amounts fixed by the court, was the one and final act that adjudicated the rights of the parties and, save for appellate review, terminated the justiciable controversy among them. It therefore constituted a final and appealable order. Scheve, 44 Md.App. at 403-04, 408 A.2d at 1075. Scheve is distinguishable from the case sub judice because in Scheve, the appeal was filed by certificate holders whose opportunity for appellate review of the striking of their judgment of foreclosure could have languished in a legal limbo were that order held to be interlocutory. In the instant case, Quillens appealed from the Circuit Court's rejection of his jurisdictional defense, thus permitting the action to foreclose the right of redemption to proceed, which would constitute the final and appealable order in the Parker or City cases. In Kasdon, a tax sale purchaser of twelve parcels of land belonging to Westbury, Inc. filed twelve petitions to foreclose the rights of redemption on the properties, and the property owner filed a petition to redeem and fix the amount necessary for redemption. Subsequently, the purchaser filed an answer to the petition to fix costs necessary for redemption and requested a hearing, claiming that the redemption amount was approximately $400 per property. Without notice to any party, the judge entered an order fixing the redemption amount at approximately $300 per property; the purchaser appealed the denial of his request for a hearing to set the redemption amount. Without specifically addressing any jurisdictional issue, we considered the merits of the appeal, noting that the trial judge erred in setting the redemption amount without conducting a hearing: There can be no doubt that Kasdon is entitled to be reimbursed for necessary title searches for each property, except that upon proof that the search was unusually difficult . . . (the court) may allow an amount not exceeding $25 for each search. He is entitled, also, among other things, to be reimbursed for the actual attorneys's fee, not to exceed the sum of $100. It hardly needs saying that the trial judge ought to hear what the certificate holder has to offer in this regard before fixing the amount.    An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.... The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. We made the further observation that denying . . . [the appellant] an opportunity to be heard was contrary to the provisions of Rule (7)(e)(1) of the Local Rules of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Kasdon, 259 Md. at 226-27, 269 A.2d at 627-28 (citations omitted), quoting Madaio v. Madaio, 256 Md. 80, 83-84, 259 A.2d 524, 527 (1969), quoting in turn Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950). Kasdon, however, also is distinguishable because in that case, the appeal was permitted after the trial court set the redemption amount and the property owner indicated his intention to redeem, so that there was no further action for the trial court to take; ergo, finality. Furthermore, the Circuit Court's August 30, 2005 order in the Parker case contained an express provision stating that Parker could proceed with the case and obtain a final judgment foreclosing the right of redemption after submission of an affidavit of compliance with the statute. The orders filed in the City cases also stated that the City was permitted to proceed with foreclosure if the properties were not redeemed within thirty days of the orders. In this regard, we have held that when a trial court order does not intend to finally dispose of the case with an order, the order does not constitute an appealable final judgment. See Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 311 Md. 278, 533 A.2d 1303 (1987), in which we considered whether an order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer in a wrongful discharge action, but with an express provision allowing the employee thirty days in which to file an amended complaint, was appealable, and we iterated that the appeal from the order granting summary judgment was premature because the order also contained a provision permitting the employee to file an amended complaint: If the circuit court's order of January 14, 1987, had not contained the provision for leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days, the January 14th order would have been final and appealable. Nevertheless, the express provision for amendment shows that the January 14th order granting summary judgment was not intended to finally dispose of the case; thus the order was not final and appealable. Id. at 281, 533 A.2d at 1305 (emphasis added). Thus, we hold that the Circuit Court's August 30, 2005 orders establishing the validity of the tax sale certificates in the Parker case and setting the redemption amount in the City cases were not appealable final judgments, so that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in dismissing the appeal in the Parker case. The Circuit Court, however, also subsequently issued a final order foreclosing the right of redemption in the City properties, from which Quillens filed an amended notice of appeal. Quillens argues, nevertheless, that the original, premature, notice of appeal divested the Circuit Court of jurisdiction to enter the order foreclosing the right of redemption in the City properties. We have rejected Quillens' argument that a premature, let alone timely, notice of appeal divests a trial court of jurisdiction. [12] In Makovi, 311 Md. at 278, 533 A.2d at 1303, Makovi, an employee, filed a complaint against her employer, Sherman-Williams, alleging wrongful discharge. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Sherman-Williams, but gave Makovi thirty days in which to file an amended complaint; Makovi, instead, filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, the circuit court dismissed the action. Considering whether the appellate court possessed jurisdiction, we concluded that a premature notice of appeal does not obviate the jurisdiction of the trial court: Our cases have repeatedly pointed out that, when an order of appeal is filed before there is an appealable judgment, the order of appeal is of no force and effect. Blucher v. Ekstrom, 309 Md. 458, 463, 524 A.2d 1235 (1987); Parkington Apartments v. Cordish, 296 Md. 143, 146, 460 A.2d 52 (1983); Merlands Club v. Messall, 238 Md. 359, 362-63, 208 A.2d 687 (1965). A premature ... order of appeal would ... not confer appellate jurisdiction, Md.Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 38 n. 17, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986). Makovi, 311 Md. at 282-83, 533 A.2d at 1305. As a result, we held that because a premature order of appeal is of no force and effect, and confers no jurisdiction on the appellate court, it obviously does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enter final judgment in the case. Id. Quillens, however, argues that In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198, 733 A.2d 1103 (1999) and County Commissioners of Carroll County v. Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., 384 Md. 23, 45, 862 A.2d 404 (2004), support the conclusion that the trial court's jurisdiction was divested by the original notice of appeal; he is wrong in his assertion. In In re Emileigh F., a juvenile court adjudicated Emileigh F. a Child In Need of Assistance (CINA), committed her to the Department of Health and Human Services, and placed her in the custody of her maternal grandmother. After an evidentiary hearing, the court entered a final judgment ordering that custody of Emileigh F. be awarded to her father, from which her mother noted an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the juvenile court, upon motion of the DHHS, closed the case, concluding that Emileigh F. no longer fit the description of a CINA. On appeal, we held that the juvenile court improperly closed the case because once the appeal was pending, the trial court should no longer act with regard to matters relating to or affecting the subject matter of the appellate proceeding. In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. at 203-04, 733 A.2d at 1105. As Judge Irma S. Raker, writing for the Court in In re Emileigh F., stated, [a]fter an appeal is filed, a trial court may not act to frustrate the action of an appellate court, and emphasized that this Court has consistently taken the view that, when an appeal is taken, the trial court may continue to act with reference to matters not related to the subject matter of, or matters not affecting, the appellate proceeding. Id. at 202, 203, 733 A.2d at 1105, quoting State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 80, 553 A.2d 672, 676 (1989). Further, Carroll Craft Retail involved an action brought by Carroll County against the operator of Love Craft to enforce a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult entertainment businesses in certain locations. The district court entered a permanent injunction against the operator of the store; after a motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, an appeal was filed in the circuit court in addition to a declaratory judgment action. After a hearing, the circuit court reversed the district court's decision regarding the injunction and reserved ruling on the declaratory judgment case. The County appealed the final judgment reversing the district court to the Court of Special Appeals; during the pendency of the appeal, the circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment action. Addressing the circuit court's dismissal, we stated that once the appeal in the injunction action was pending, even if it was filed in the wrong court, the Circuit Court was certainly prohibited from exercising its jurisdiction in any way that would affect the subject matter of the appeal or appellate proceeding. Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., 384 Md. at 45, 862 A.2d at 418. Neither Carroll Craft Retail nor In re Emileigh F. involved a premature notice of appeal, but both involved an appeal from a final judgment, which inhibited the circuit court from exercising its jurisdiction in a way that would affect the subject matter of the appeal or appellate proceeding. Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., 384 Md. at 45, 862 A.2d at 418; In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. at 203, 733 A.2d at 1105. In the City cases, Quillens' first notice of appeal was premature and therefore, the Circuit Court's jurisdiction was not obviated by the appeal; thus, the Circuit Court could enter the final judgment foreclosing the right of redemption in the City properties.