Opinion ID: 2617028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deviation From Presumptive Child Support

Text: Deviation from the presumptive child support is allowed when the district court finds that it would be unjust or inappropriate to apply the presumptive support obligation. WYO. STAT. § 20-6-302(b) (1997); Sharpe, 902 P.2d at 214. The father contends that the district court did not make a specific finding that applying the presumptive child support would be unjust or inappropriate. The mother argues that, even though the district court did not use the words unjust or inappropriate, it properly considered various factors and correctly determined that a deviation was warranted. In deciding to deviate from the presumptive child support, the district court reasoned: In any event, I decline to reduce his child support. And even if you consider the $1500 a month Social Security for the children, I find that I should deviate from the guidelines support and continue his support at the amount of $930 per month for several reasons. First of all, he is voluntarily underemployed. The evidence is abundantly clear that were he nothad he not committed this offense he would not have lost his job and he would be receiving substantially greater income and benefits as a result of employment at the coal mine. So I suppose you can argue that well, he didn't intentionally go out and quit his job. True, but he did intentionally commit the acts to those girls, which in a natural sequence of events resulted in his termination. So that's Number 1. Number 2 is that I think the evidence is also pretty clear that once released from the Community Alternatives program he will be capable of earning even greater income than he earns now. And unless somebody is playing fast and loose with the statutes, it would seem that his release from that facility ought to be [im]minent, because the statute says in order to be included in that program they have to be within about nine months of their release date, and he's now been in there for nine months. So unless somebody is playing games, he would be pretty close to being eligible to be released from that facility in any event. And the third factor that I've considered in that is that these children have additional expenses because of their health, health care needs because of their counseling needs, which is a direct result of his actions. Therefore for those reasons even if I were to attribute the $1500 per month Social Security to Mrs. Wood I would deviate from the guidelines. .... And by the way, that was another factor that I took into consideration in not changing his $930 per month child support amount is that he has $60,000 or so in that retirement, plus he has other retirement funds which apparently are vested and he will be the recipient of those funds either when he turns the age of retirement or apparently under some conditions that a reduced amount almost immediately. We agree with the mother that the district court was not required to use the words unjust or inappropriate in its finding that a deviation from the presumptive child support was warranted. As long as it was clear from the findings that the district court determined that applying the presumptive child support would be unjust or inappropriate, those specific words are not necessary. We must, however, analyze the reasons the district court gave for deciding to deviate so that we may determine whether or not they justify departing from the presumptive child support. [1]
The first reason the district court gave for deviating from the presumptive amount was that the father was voluntarily underemployed because he voluntarily committed a crime, thereby limiting his employment options. The statute that permits a court to consider voluntary underemployment as a reason for deviating from the presumptive child support provides: (b) A court may deviate from the presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-6-304 upon a specific finding that the application of the presumptive child support would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case. In any case where the court has deviated from the presumptive child support, the reasons therefor shall be specifically set forth fully in the order or decree. In determining whether to deviate from the presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-6-304, the court shall consider the following factors: ... (xi) Whether either parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. In such case the child support shall be computed based upon the potential earning capacity (imputed income) of the unemployed or underemployed parent. In making that determination the court shall consider: (A) Prior employment experience and history; (B) Educational level and whether additional education would make the parent more self-sufficient or significantly increase the parent's income; (C) The presence of children of the marriage in the parent's home and its impact on the earnings of that parent; (D) Availability of employment for which the parent is qualified; (E) Prevailing wage rates in the local area; (F) Special skills or training; and (G) Whether the parent is realistically able to earn imputed income. WYO. STAT. § 20-6-302(b)(xi) (1997). Although this statute does not explain how to determine whether or not a parent is voluntarily underemployed, it illustrates what types of situations qualify a parent as being voluntarily underemployed. The legislature obviously did not contemplate voluntarily committing a crime when it enacted this statute. The evidence revealed that the father tried to obtain the best paying job that he could under the circumstances. His ability to work was limited by his inability to travel overnight and by the fact that he was staying at Community Alternatives of Casper rather than in Gillette where the higher paying jobs were located. Additionally, although the father attended truck driving school and obtained his commercial driver's license during his incarceration, he was not able to utilize that license due to the restrictions at Community Alternatives of Casper. He even found temporary employment for the week when bad weather shut down his construction job. We conclude that the father made a good faith effort to find the highest paying job possible, given his situation, and that he was not voluntarily underemployed. Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 675 (Wyo. 1985).
The second reason the district court gave for deviating from the presumptive amount was that, because the father's release from Community Alternatives of Casper was imminent, his earning ability would soon increase. The statute relating to transferring an inmate to Community Alternatives of Casper provides in part: (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, and upon recommendation of the warden or superintendent of the institution, the department may transfer an adult inmate to a residential community correctional facility. (b) A transfer of an inmate to a residential community correctional facility under this section may be made only if: ... (iii) The inmate is within at least nine (9) months of his parole eligibility date and his conduct during his confinement has been such that he will likely be released on parole within nine (9) months[.] WYO. STAT. § 7-18-109 (1997). The district court misinterpreted this statute when it found that, because the father had been at Community Alternatives of Casper for nine months, his release was imminent. The statute requires an inmate to be within at least nine months of his parole eligibility date, which does not necessarily translate to being within nine months of his release. Because the record did not contain other evidence to support the district court's finding that the father's release was imminent, we conclude that the district court improperly relied upon this factor in deviating from the presumptive child support.
Another reason the district court gave for deviating from the presumptive amount was that the children will incur additional expenses for the counseling that was precipitated by the father's actions. The mother testified that the children had attended some counseling and will need periodic counseling in the future. The implication from her testimony, however, was that the children had not required much counseling in the past and that the frequency of future counseling was uncertain. Because the divorce decree required the father to pay one-half of the medical and counseling expenses the children may incur, we conclude that this factor did not justify deviating from the presumptive child support.
The last reason the district court gave for deviating from the presumptive child support was that the father had retirement funds from which he could pay child support. [2] The father asserts that the district court should have considered only his monthly net income and not his assets in determining whether or not a sufficient change in circumstances warranted modifying the existing child support order. We note that, because the father's assets were considered in determining the initial child support, his failure to appeal from the child support order makes it improper for him to assert this position now. Goody, 939 P.2d at 733. We, nevertheless, direct the father's attention to Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819 (Wyo.1993). In that case, we adopted the rule providing that an incarcerated parent's assets or income may be applied against the child support obligation. 848 P.2d at 822. Although the district court could properly consider the incarcerated parent's assets in determining whether or not a deviation from the presumptive child support was justified, a large deviation on the basis of this factor alone was not warranted in this case. We understand the district court's indifference toward the father, given the despicable crime that he committed. The father, however, is being adequately punished for his crime in the eyes of the law, and the district court should not treat him unfairly in this proceeding for the purpose of punishing him further.