Opinion ID: 2996903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Narrowly Tailored and Reasonable Alternate

Text: Channels of Communication Additionally, the Ordinance does not appear to be narrowly tailored to affect a category of business establishments shown to produce unwanted secondary effects—or even establishments that could conceivably produce them. See Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 725 (explaining that a regulation must leave the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact). Under a narrow reading, the Ordinance regulates all persons performing an erotic dance (or other specified movements) at a business establishment while No. 03-2772 19 wearing more or less the equivalent of short shorts and, if female, an opaque bra.7 While understandably aimed at entertainers of a more “adult” persuasion, there exists the potential that mainstream performances could fall under the purview of the Ordinance. Simply, Rockford has not presented justification why it is essential to regulate such a wide universe of dance. Cf. Pleasureland Museum, Inc. v. Beutter, 288 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting a sexually oriented business’ signage from displaying anything other than the business name was not narrowly tailored to reduce secondary effects where municipality could not articulate a single reason why such a rule was necessary). Certainly, as a direct restriction on erotic expression, speech fares worse under the Ordinance than it did under the laws at issue in similar cases. In Ben’s Bar, the ordinance did not restrict erotic expression, but rather prohibited sexually oriented businesses from serving alcohol during a dancer’s performance. 316 F.3d at 726. Similarly, in G.M. Enterprises, the availability of speech was left substantially intact because the ordinances merely sought to minimize the factors that “heighten[ed] the probability that adverse secondary effects would result from nude dancing: physical proximity between the dancers and patrons, and the consumption of alcohol by patrons.” 350 F.3d at 638. Under the regulation at issue in G.M., if dancers chose to wear de minimus clothing the ordinance’s restrictions could 7 This interpretation is similar to the one advanced by Wayne Dust, Rockford’s zoning manager, at trial (i.e., the clothing clause is read to modify all three categories of conduct). While we believe Ald. Mark’s interpretation (i.e., the clothing clause applies only to the last category) is the more structurally natural reading; the outcome produces an irrational result that we will not employ. We will treat the clothing clause as modifying all three categories of conduct. 20 No. 03-2772 be avoided entirely. Id.; see also Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 447 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the ordinance extended to non-expressive activities, like massage parlors); DiMa Corp., 185 F.3d at 823 (ordinance regulated bookstore’s hours of operation). In contrast, the Ordinance here is focused on expressive conduct. Rather than targeting a non-expressive aspect of Exotic Dancing Nightclubs, like neon signs, the Ordinance targets the speech itself. As a zoning regulation we view the Ordinance as less restrictive than an outright ban; however, it is still the case that to avoid the Ordinance dancers must not convey an erotic message through their movements (or they must wear significantly more clothing than the amount we have considered to be de minimus in past cases). Like the regulation this Court struck down in Schultz v. City of Cumberland, the Ordinance “deprives the performer of a repertoire of expressive elements with which to craft an erotic, sensual performance and thereby interferes substantially with the dancer’s ability to communicate an erotic message.” 228 F.3d 831, 847 (7th Cir. 2000) (invalidating regulation that banned the performance of specified sexually explicit movements within sexually oriented businesses finding that “[b]y restricting particular erotic movements and gestures of the erotic dancer . . . [the regulation] unconstitutionally burdens protected expression.”). As we have determined that the Ordinance is not ap- propriately designed to serve a substantial government interest and is not narrowly tailored, it is unnecessary for us to separately analyze whether the Ordinance leaves open reasonable alternate channels of communication. C. Applying Renton/Alameda Books Beyond Sexually Explicit Speech As a final matter, we observe that challenging questions are raised by the Ordinance’s expansiveness. While we applied the Renton/Alameda Books framework in reviewing No. 03-2772 21 the constitutionality of the Ordinance, it is unclear how “sexual” in nature regulated speech must be to warrant the Renton/Alameda Books analysis. Even under our narrow reading of “exotic dancing,” a number of expressive activities may fall within Rockford’s definition that are not ordinarily regulated under a secondary effects theory. It is important to keep in mind that the Ordinance does not apply to nude dancing or other forms of nude entertainment. A survey of the laws challenged on secondary effects grounds in leading Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit cases illustrates the unusual breadth of the Ordinance. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 425 (prohibiting “Adult Entertainment Businesses”8 from operating in the same building); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (restricting public nudity); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (same); Renton, 475 U.S. at 41 (regulating the location of adult motion picture theaters); G.M. Enterprises, 350 F.3d at 631 (regulating nude dancing); Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 702 (prohibiting the sale, use, and consumption of alcohol on the premises of “Sexually Oriented Businesses”9). As these cases demonstrate, courts have upheld a number of restrictions on sexually explicit expression that falls 8 The city defined “Adult Entertainment Business” as an “adult arcade, bookstore, cabaret, motel, theater, or massage parlor or a place for sexual encounters.” 535 U.S. at 431. 9 The ordinance at issue in Ben’s Bar defined “Sexually Oriented Business” as “an adult arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion picture theater, adult theater, escort agency or sexual encounter center.” 316 F.3d at 708, n.8. As it regularly featured nude and semi-nude persons, Ben’s Bar fell under the sub-category of “adult cabaret.” Id. at 708. The ordinance further defined semi-nudity as “the exposure of a bare male or female buttocks or the female breast below a horizontal line across the top of the areola at its highest point with less than complete and opaque covering.” Id. 22 No. 03-2772 short of obscenity.10 However, what constitutes sexually explicit but non-obscene expression can be difficult to define. Previously, regulating nudity or semi-nudity has served as a common link in the laws enacted by municipalities pertaining to sexually explicit expression. The uniqueness of the Ordinance is that it removes nudity from the calculus and seeks to regulate clothed individuals. The challenge attendant to this legislative leap may be that it cuts a broader swath across expression and attempts to apply the “secondary effects” reasoning of Renton to laws not confined to regulating “sexually explicit” speech. Recently, the Eighth Circuit noted that First Amendment issues may be raised by classifying live entertainment by clothed dancers as sexual expression. Jake’s, Ltd., Inc. v. City of Coates, 356 F3d 896, 903 (8th Cir. 2004). Indeed, it remains questionable how and if the Renton/Alameda Books analysis would apply in a case with even more tangential of a relationship to businesses purveying sexually explicit materials and entertainment. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-35 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (objecting to implication that content-based regulations could ever be subject to “secondary effects” analysis outside the area of sexually explicit speech).