Opinion ID: 1267618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Specific Intent.

Text: Tucker next complains that, because of his gross intoxication, the trial court erred in not ruling as a matter of law that the requisite element of specific intent necessary to constitute the crime of burglary was absent. NRS 205.060(1). [2] Whether intoxication is so gross as to preclude a capacity to form a specific intent is normally a fact issue for the jury to resolve. State v. Jukich, 49 Nev. 217, 242 P. 590 (1926); King v. State, 80 Nev. 269, 392 P.2d 310 (1964); Andrade v. State, 87 Nev. 144, 483 P.2d 208 (1971). There is ample evidence to support the finding that Tucker was capable of forming the specific intent required. He gained entry to the outer office by breaking a pane of glass. He managed to find implements necessary to pry open the vending machines. Upon hearing the officers arrive, he secreted himself behind a desk and placed a trash can in front of it so that he would be hidden from view. Additionally, as stated supra, the officers testified he walked properly and spoke without slurring his words. The jury was advised that the fact of Tucker's intoxication might be taken into consideration in determining intent. NRS 193.220. [3] We presume the jury did so. Tucker's claim in this regard is without merit. Finally, Tucker urges that the statutory presumption of intent as set forth in NRS 205.065 is violative of due process. [4] We have previously considered such a contention and have rejected it. Fritz v. State, 86 Nev. 655, 474 P.2d 377 (1970); McGuire v. State, 86 Nev. 262, 468 P.2d 12 (1970); Boyle v. State, 86 Nev. 30, 464 P.2d 493 (1970); White v. State, 83 Nev. 292, 429 P.2d 55 (1967); Schnepp v. State, 82 Nev. 257, 415 P.2d 619 (1966). We are not persuaded that our previous rulings were in error, and we note that a statutory presumption identical to the one at issue was recently held constitutional in State v. Livengood, 14 Wash. App. 203, 540 P.2d 480 (1975).