Opinion ID: 2404710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the challenge to the photographic display on the ground of impermissible suggestivity

Text: Essentially, defendant's challenge to the identification drawn from the photographic display is based upon a statement made by Vargas. As Vargas showed Cynthia the eight photographs, he recalled saying that I had an informant, and that there was a possibility of the photos that I was going to show her that day, there is a possibility that the photograph of the person who did the robbery might be in there (sic)   . The defendant claims that this comment was so unnecessarily suggestive as to amount to a violation of due process. In rejecting this challenge, the trial justice made the following findings: There was no suggestion made to her as to anything. Naturally, we would expect that the photograph of a suspect would be included in it. Otherwise it would be a waste of time for everybody. The fact is that it was a very good job of presenting photographs of people who had certain similar features. They were all young white males. Some wore a mustache. Most of them were clean shaven. I know that as I looked at the exhibits after they were made full exhibits I was impressed by the similarity of some of the photographs. Was this demonstration of photos violative of due process? Definitely not. There was no suggestion made by either Inspector Vargas or Sergeant Bergeron of the North Providence police department. It seems to me the display was completely fair and not at all suggestive. The seminal expression of principle relating to the constitutional limitation upon the use of photographs as an identification device in criminal cases is found in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). In that case Justice Harlan, speaking for a majority of the Court, made the following observations concerning the use of photographs to identify criminal suspects: We are unwilling to prohibit its employment, either in the exercise of our supervisory power or, still less, as a matter of constitutional requirement. Instead, we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. at 384, 88 S.Ct. at 971, 19 L.Ed.2d at 1253. This standard has been cited with approval by the Court in later cases when the issue of suggestiveness of a confrontation for identification has been raised. E.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (exhibiting a single photograph); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (one person show-up). The defendant argues that Manson v. Brathwaite is controlling in this case. It must be noted that in Manson a two-step analysis was used. First, the question of whether the exhibition of a photograph to undercover officer Glover was unnecessarily suggestive was resolved. After determining that the display of one photograph was unnecessarily suggestive, the Court took the second step in its analysis and held that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre and post Stovall confrontations. Id. 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d at 154. [1] It is significant to note that in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra , the State of Connecticut admitted that the procedure of showing a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive. Thus, the first point was not really in issue. The defendant in his argument spends considerable effort on the second step in the analysis. In the case at bar, however, we are of the opinion that the evidence in the case overwhelmingly supports the trial justice's finding that the photographic display was not suggestive at all. In challenging this finding by the trial justice, defendant cites State v. Doughty, 408 A.2d 683 (Me. 1979). In that case the victim of a robbery was shown a photographic display and picked out one of the photographs as that of his assailant. Upon his doing so, the detective confirmed that a correct identification had been made. The trial judge made no findings of fact or conclusion of law concerning the suggestiveness of this identification. The Supreme Judicial Court, exercising its independent judgment, found that the procedure used by the Bangor police was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparably mistaken identification. Nevertheless, taking the second step of the analysis, as suggested in Neil v. Biggers, supra , the Court found that the use of the in-court identification was reliable and, therefore, consistent with constitutional requirements. Unlike the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, it is unnecessary for us to reach the second step in the analysis because we sustain the trial justice's finding that the photographic display was not suggestive at all. Vargas's statement that there was a possibility that a suspect might be included in the photographic display was, as the trial justice found, only a statement of the obvious. Whether explicit or implicit, it will probably be inferred by a victim in any case that a photographic display presented may possibly include one suspected of a crime. Unlike the Bangor detective, Vargas made no definite statement indicating his independent belief that any person set forth in the display was guilty of the crime. Thus, it could scarcely be said that this identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 384, 88 S.Ct. at 971, 19 L.Ed.2d at 1253.