Opinion ID: 2363011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability of the DOA

Text: In his cross-appeal, Mr. Russell asserts that the trial justice erred by not putting DOA on the hook for the backpay award. We agree, although we set the hook somewhat farther downstream. Having determined that Russell had acquired veteran's status under § 36-5-7, the trial justice concluded that the DOA, as the agency responsible for making available to state agencies qualified candidates for employment    [,] bore the duty to place Russell in a position of similar grade to the one he previously held at Channel 36. It follows, therefore, that the DOA also bears liability for the income that he would have received during the period of his lay off. We recognize, however, that Russell's circumstances present a rather large anomaly to the DOA. In the case of a layoff of a classified employee, an appointing authority is statutorily required to notify the personnel administrator before the effective date of the layoff. See G.L.1956 § 36-4-37. Mr. Russell, however, was a nonclassified employee and Channel 36 had no concomitant obligation to notify the DOA of his impending layoff. Moreover, even if the DOA had been notified before the effective date of his layoff, his employment records would not have reflected his status as a veteran. Nevertheless, it is clear to us, based upon the plain language of § 36-5-7, that the General Assembly intended to bestow the benefits of full status upon any honorably discharged war veteran with fifteen or more years of service credit, whether in the classified, unclassified, or nonclassified service of the state. Although we agree with the trial justice that the DOA was responsible to place Russell in state employment, we are disinclined to award any back pay to Russell for the span of his unemployment that preceded the DOA's awareness of his particular and peculiar circumstances. A review of the evidence reveals that until Russell wrote to Bucci on April 20, 1993, the DOA lacked any notice of Russell's layoff, his continuing unemployment, and his desire to assert veteran's status to secure a new position in state service. Although the DOA obviously knew about Russell's veteran's status as of the date it issued him the certificate (September 18, 1992), it cannot be charged with the responsibility of placing him in the employ of the state until it knew that he was laid off and wished to be retained within the state services. Clearly, Russell held the key to the full enjoyment of his veteran's status. Yet by misrepresenting such status on his original employment application and then remaining silent until after his layoff became effective, he chose to keep that key in his pocket. We are also of the opinion that Mr. Russell's voluntary retirement effectively relieved the DOA of the responsibility for finding him a new state job. Although it is true, as Russell asserts, that state pensioners are not precluded from reemployment with the state under G.L.1956 § 36-10-36, we do not equate the possibility of reentry into state service with a lifetime entitlement to state employment. In Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 80 (R.I.2001), this Court considered the impact of a voluntary retirement in the context of disability benefits payable to injured police officers. There, this Court ruled that police officers who retired voluntarily no longer were eligible to collect injured-on-duty disability benefits under G.L.1956 § 45-19-1. Webster, 774 A.2d at 80. Although the facts certainly are distinguishable, our rationale in Webster is both germane and instructive here: We have never held, nor do we hold today, that an on-duty injury or illness and a voluntary retirement amounts to a lifetime appointment to the police force or a lifetime pay check   . Id. A lifetime entitlement is precisely what Russell seeks. We are satisfied, however, that under the circumstances presented here, the DOA's responsibility to place Russell in state service ceased when he voluntarily retired. Accordingly, we remand the case to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment against the DOA, and to award back pay to Russell for the period from April 20, 1993, until July 29, 1996, the date of his retirement.