Opinion ID: 6215960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restitution as Part of the Sentence

Text: It is undisputed that the “judgment of conviction” includes the defendant’s sentence as well as his conviction. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (“Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”). Though Congress did not define “judgment of conviction” in § 2255, Congress has explained elsewhere that “[i]n the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k)(1). The Supreme Court has also told us that the judgment of conviction includes the defendant’s sentence. In the AEDPA context, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s judgment of conviction did not become final “until both his conviction and -7- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 8 sentence became final.” 2 Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156–57 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given this background, it is unsurprising that the parties in this case agree that the “judgment of conviction” includes both the conviction and the sentence. While the parties agree that the judgment of conviction includes the sentence, the parties disagree about whether restitution is part of the sentence. The government contends that restitution is not part of the sentence but rather a sanction that is imposed in addition to the sentence. We conclude that restitution is a component of a criminal sentence and therefore included in the judgment of conviction. Our conclusion is based on the restitution statutes and Supreme Court precedent, both of which treat restitution as part of the defendant’s sentence. The federal restitution statutes generally refer to restitution as being part of the criminal sentence. For instance, the statute setting forth the procedures for issuing an order of restitution states that a “sentence that imposes an order of restitution is a final judgment” even though “such a sentence” can later be corrected, appealed, amended, or adjusted. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o) (emphasis added). Section 3664 also provides that restitution orders may be appealed under 2 The habeas statute at issue in Burton was 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), not § 2255. Although the statutes differ slightly in their description of when a judgment of conviction becomes final, the Supreme Court has held that finality has the same meaning under both statutes. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528–32 (2003). -8- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 9 the same statute that authorizes appeals of criminal sentences. Id. § 3664(o)(1)(B) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3742). And the restitution statutes direct courts to order restitution “when sentencing a defendant.” Id. § 3663(a)(1)(A); id. § 3663A(a)(1); see also id. § 3556 (“The court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense shall order restitution[.]”). In the same vein, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) describes the determination of restitution as part of the “sentencing process” and authorizes courts to forgo ordering restitution if determining the amount of the victim’s losses would “complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process.” Id. § 3663A(c)(3)(B). Taken as a whole, these statutes indicate that a criminal sentence includes restitution. See also id. § 3611 (referring to a “person who is sentenced to pay . . . restitution”); id. § 3614(a) (authorizing courts to “resentence the defendant to any sentence which might originally have been imposed” if the defendant knowingly fails to pay restitution). The government argues restitution is not a part of the sentence but rather a sanction that is imposed in addition to the sentence. The government directs us to 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b), which provides that a defendant convicted of a federal crime shall be sentenced to (1) a term of probation, (2) a fine, or (3) a term of imprisonment. The statute does not list restitution as a sentence under subsection -9- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 10 (b). Instead, the statute states that a “sanction authorized by section 3554, 3555, or 3556 may be imposed in addition to the sentence required by this subsection.” Id. § 3551(b). Because § 3556 is a restitution statute, the government contends that Congress must have intended for restitution to be a sanction separate from the criminal sentence. In the government’s view, only a term of probation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment qualifies as a sentence. We disagree. The government misreads § 3551(b), which simply states that a federal sentence must include at least one of three components: either (1) probation, (2) a fine, or (3) a term of imprisonment. It then says a court may also order restitution “in addition to the sentence required by this subsection.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute thus does not regard restitution as distinct from a sentence. It merely states that every sentence has a mandatory component and allows for restitution as part of a sentence when circumstances warrant it. Any uncertainty surrounding § 3551 is easily resolved by looking to the Supreme Court’s treatment of restitution. 3 The Supreme Court has consistently treated restitution as a component of the criminal sentence. In Manrique v. United States, for instance, the majority opinion begins with the following 3 The government also points to several statutes where Congress chose to use the phrase “judgment of conviction” to refer to probation, fines, and imprisonment, and then refrained from using the phrase when describing restitution. See Aple. Br. at 14–16. But this is beside the point. Congress and the Supreme Court have told us unequivocally that the “judgment of conviction” includes the sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k)(1); Burton, 549 U.S. at 156–57. So if restitution is part of the sentence, it is part of the judgment of conviction. -10- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 11 explanation: “Sentencing courts are required to impose restitution as part of the sentence for specified crimes.” 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1270 (2017) (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the majority explains that when a court imposes a term of imprisonment but waits to impose restitution, there is no sentence until the court enters an amended judgment to include the “sentence of restitution.” Id. at 1273. Manrique tells us that when a court defers imposing restitution until after sentencing, “the court is declining to announce a sentence.” Id. 4 The Supreme Court has similarly observed that while the primary purpose of restitution is to make victims whole, restitution also “serves punitive purposes.” Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 456 (2014); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005) (“The purpose of awarding restitution in this action is not to collect a foreign tax, but to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct.”); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986) (“[T]he direct relation between the harm and the punishment gives restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine.”). 5 4 We acknowledge that in adjacent sentences with similar phrasing, Congress referred to a fine as a “sentence” but a restitution order as a “sanction.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (“A sentence to pay a fine may be imposed in addition to any other sentence. A sanction authorized by section 3554, 3555, or 3556 may be imposed in addition to the sentence required by this subsection.”). Still, the reading most consistent with the overall statutory scheme and Supreme Court precedent is what we adopt. 5 Our precedent is less clear about whether restitution serves a punitive function. We have previously held that restitution statutes such as the MVRA do not inflict criminal punishment and thus are not punitive. See United States v. Serawop, 505 (continued . . .) -11- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 12 Restitution resembles other components of a criminal sentence in that it is “imposed by the Government ‘at the culmination of a criminal proceeding and requires conviction of an underlying’ crime.” Paroline, 572 U.S. at 456 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998)); see also id. (“[D]espite the differences between restitution and a traditional fine, restitution still implicates the prosecutorial powers of government[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Like the other portions of a sentence, restitution is intended to some degree to inflict criminal punishment and serve as a deterrent. The Supreme Court’s treatment of restitution as a method of imposing criminal punishment rather than solely performing a restorative function supports our conclusion that restitution is a component of the criminal sentence. 6 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In the Tenth Circuit, restitution is not criminal punishment.”). But we reexamined this conclusion after the Supreme Court explained in Paroline that restitution “serves punitive purposes.” United States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Paroline, 572 U.S. at 456). We recognized in Ferdman that “the Supreme Court’s statement [in Paroline] regarding the general nature of criminal restitution calls into question our view that the MVRA lacks a penal element.” Id. at 1132 n.1. 6 Nearly all the other circuits also view restitution as penal and part of the criminal sentence. See United States v. Ziskind, 471 F.3d 266, 270 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[R]estitution ordered as part of a criminal sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.”); Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Restitution is a serious component of criminal punishment.”); United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[R]estitution ordered as part of a criminal sentence is criminal rather than civil in nature.”); United States v. Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Criminal restitution . . . is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally ‘penal’ in nature.”); United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 451 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Restitution under the (continued . . .) -12- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 13 Like the Supreme Court and the other circuits, we tend to treat restitution as part of the criminal sentence. We have explained that an order imposing a restitution amount greater than the total loss caused by the defendant constitutes an “illegal sentence.” United States v. Hudson, 483 F.3d 707, 710 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Delano, 981 F.3d 1136, 1137 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Delano challenges the restitution portion of his current sentence[.]”). We have also referred to restitution proceedings as a “phase of criminal sentencings.” United States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2015). Our conclusion that restitution is part of the sentence also conforms with the realities of the sentencing process. When a trial court defers ordering restitution until after sentencing, the court does not enter a separate judgment [Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA)] is a criminal penalty and a component of the defendant’s sentence”); United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Restitution is a part of one’s sentence[.]”); United States v. United Sec. Sav. Bank, 394 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2004) (“A criminal restitution order is penal, not compensatory.”); United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706–07 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.”); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The history [of the VWPA] is replete with references to restitution as part of the criminal sentence. . . . There can be little doubt that Congress intended the restitution penalties of the VWPA to be incorporated into the traditional sentencing structure.”); United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Amy is asking the court to revisit her restitution award, which is part of Monzel’s sentence.”). But see United States v. LaGrou Distrib. Sys., Inc., 466 F.3d 585, 593 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘[R]estitution for harm done is a classic civil remedy’ that is administered for convenience by the courts that have entered criminal convictions.”). -13- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 14 with the restitution amount. Instead, the court amends the initial judgment containing the defendant’s conviction and sentence so that all the defendant is left with is a single judgment containing the entire sentence. 7 The district court here acted in accordance with this standard practice. When the court sentenced Anthony to imprisonment and supervised release, it noted on the same judgment form that Anthony “must make restitution” but that the “determination of restitution is deferred until a later date.” Supp. R., Vol. 1 at 8, 11. When the district court determined Anthony’s restitution amount several months later, the court did not enter a separate judgment imposing restitution—rather, it amended the original judgment containing the initial sentence to include the restitution amount. Id. at 18–19. This shows that, in practice and in Anthony’s case, restitution is more accurately treated as part of the judgment of conviction. 8 For these reasons, we conclude that restitution is part of the criminal sentence. And because restitution is included in the sentence, it is necessarily part of the judgment of conviction for § 2255 purposes. 7 The standardized judgment form used by federal courts is Form AO 245B. See, e.g., Supp. R., Vol. 1 at 6–12. The form contains designated spaces for the court to enter a term of imprisonment, supervised release, and probation, as well as to enter fines, restitution, forfeiture, and various costs. 8 It makes further sense to view restitution as a component of the sentence because a district court may take restitution into account when imposing other parts of the sentence, such as a fine. At Anthony’s sentencing hearing, for example, the district court declined to order Anthony to pay a fine in part because the court thought it “far more important that Mr. Anthony pay restitution than that he pay a fine.” R., Vol. 3 at 36. -14- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 15