Opinion ID: 110076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Social Security Act

Text: It follows from what we have said thus far that § 1343 does not confer federal jurisdiction over the claims based on the Social Security Act unless that Act may fairly be characterized as a statute securing equal rights within § 1343 (3) or civil rights within § 1343 (4). The Social Security Act provisions at issue here authorize federal assistance to participating States in the provision of a wide range of monetary benefits to needy individuals, including emergency assistance and payments necessary to provide food and shelter. Arguably, a statute that is intended to provide at least a minimum level of subsistence for all individuals could be regarded as securing either equal rights or civil rights. [39] We are persuaded, however, that both of these terms have a more restrictive meaning as used in the jurisdictional statute. The Social Security Act does not deal with the concept of equality or with the guarantee of civil rights, as those terms are commonly understood. The Congress that enacted § 1343 (3) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for cases dealing with racial equality; the Congress that enacted § 1343 (4) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for actions dealing with the civil rights enumerated in 42 U. S. C. § 1985, and most notably the right to vote. While the words of these statutes are not limited to the precise claims which motivated their passage, [40] it is inappropriate to read the jurisdictional provisions to encompass new claims which fall well outside the common understanding of their terms. Our conclusion that the Social Security Act does not fall within the terms of either § 1343 (3) or (4) is supported by this Court's construction of similar phrases in the removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1443. The removal statute makes reference to any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens and any law providing for equal rights. In construing these phrases in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, this Court concluded: The present language `any law providing for . . . equal civil rights' first appeared in § 641 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. When the Revised Statutes were compiled, the substantive and removal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were carried forward in separate sections. Hence, Congress could no longer identify the rights for which removal was available by using the language of the original Civil Rights Act`rights secured to them by the first section of this act.' The new language it chose, however, does not suggest that it intended to limit the scope of removal to rights recognized in statutes existing in 1874. On the contrary, Congress' choice of the open-ended phrase `any law providing for . . . equal civil rights' was clearly appropriate to permit removal in cases involving `a right under' both existing and future statutes that provided for equal civil rights. There is no substantial indication, however, that the general language of § 641 of the Revised Statutes was intended to expand the kinds of `law' to which the removal section referred. In spite of the potential breadth of the phrase `any law providing for . . . equal civil rights,' it seems clear that in enacting § 641, Congress intended in that phrase only to include laws comparable in nature to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. . . . ..... . . . As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded, § 1443 `applies only to rights that are granted in terms of equality and not to the whole gamut of constitutional rights . . . .' `When the removal statute speaks of any law providing for equal rights, it refers to those laws that are couched in terms of equality, such as the historic and the recent equal rights statutes, as distinguished from laws, of which the due process clause and 42 U. S. C. § 1983 are sufficient examples, that confer equal rights in the sense, vital to our way of life, of bestowing them upon all.' New York v. Galamison, 342 F. 2d 255, 269, 271. See also Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 585-586; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 39-40; City of Greenwood v. Peacock, [384 U. S. 808,] 825. Id., at 789-790, 792 (footnotes omitted). In accord with Georgia v. Rachel , [41] the Courts of Appeals have consistently held that the Social Security Act is not a statute providing for equal rights. See Andrews v. Maher, 525 F. 2d 113 (CA2 1975); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F. 2d 1090, 1101 (CA2 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1146 (1974). We endorse those holdings, and find that a similar conclusion is warranted with respect to § 1343 (4) as well. See McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F. 2d 246, 249 (CA2 1969). We therefore hold that the District Court did not have jurisdiction in either of these cases. Accordingly, the judgment in No. 77-5324 is affirmed, and the judgment in No. 77-719 is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.