Opinion ID: 837891
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of Subsections 2 and 3

Text: The Legislature codified Ross's grant of absolute immunity to high-ranking officials in MCL 691.1407(5). In MCL 691.1407(2), the Legislature granted immunity to individual governmental actors from tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the employee. The Legislature eliminated the Ross distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts and granted qualified immunity for both types of actions. Subsection 2 gives immunity for acts taken while in the course of employment or service if (a) the employee is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority, (b) the agency that the employee serves is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, and (c) the employee's conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. Accordingly, the Legislature replaced the Ross good faith element with a gross-negligence standard. Subsection 2 purports to apply simply to tort liability, and, ironically, even though that subsection concerns only gross negligence, defendant argued for the first time at oral argument before this Court that the broad tort reference includes intentional torts. However, when read in context with subsection 3, it is clear that subsection 2 encompasses only negligent tort liability. In subsection 3, the Legislature unambiguously expressed its intent to maintain the law of intentional torts as it existed before July 7, 1986. [26] Every provision of § 7 specifically and expressly prescribes the immunity from tort liability extended to governmental agencies and actors. In contrast, but not inconsistent with these provisions, subsection 3 indicates the Legislature's intent to confer immunity on governmental employees for intentional torts to the same extent allowed under the common law as it existed before July 7, 1986. Thus, the Legislature thereby removed immunity for intentional tort liability from the statutory grant of immunity in subsection 2. As will be discussed in more detail later, subsection 2 does alter the law of governmental immunity as it existed before the amendment of § 7 for negligent torts committed by lower-level government employees. Subsection 3 represents a deviation from the legislatively created governmental immunity scheme, but the deviation is limited to intentional torts. [I]t is a settled rule of statutory construction that where a statute contains a specific statutory provision and a related, but more general, provision, the specific one controls. [27] Because subsection 3 more specifically addresses intentional torts and subsection 2 more broadly addresses tort liability, subsection 3 must control in this case. We reject defendant's interpretation of subsection 3 as merely reiterating that a governmental employee who does not satisfy the requirements of subsection 2 remains liable for an intentional tort. This interpretation is contrary to the rules of statutory construction in that it would render subsection 3 surplusage. [28] A reiteration, by definition, creates surplus language. [29] Moreover, defendant's proposed interpretation of the statute necessarily assumes that the reference in subsection 2 to tort liability encompasses both intentional and negligent torts. If the Legislature had intended to reiterate that a governmental employee remains liable in tort when he fails to meet the standards of subsection 2, the language of subsection 3 would not have been specifically limited to intentional torts. Furthermore, defendant's interpretation cannot be sustained. As noted, subsection 2 alters the common-law test for governmental immunity. If subsection 2 had altered the common law in relation to all torts, the express terms of subsection 3 preserving the law of intentional torts as it existed before July 7, 1986, would be rendered a complete nullity. Thus, although subsection 2 abolished the Ross distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts and replaced the Ross good faith element with a gross-negligence standard, those alterations are limited to negligent torts because [s]ubsection (2) does not alter the law of intentional torts.... [30]