Opinion ID: 2508462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Reckless Means Reckless

Text: The critical question presented is the definition of operating a motor vehicle ... [i]n a reckless manner as used in the vehicular homicide statute, RCW 46.61.520(1)(b), and vehicular assault statute, RCW 46.61.522(1)(a). Construction of one compels an identical construction of the other. State v. Neher, 112 Wash.2d 347, 351, 771 P.2d 330 (1989). [1] I conclude both the Roggenkamp and Clark trial courts erred by defining this phrase as rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences. Clark Clerk's Papers (CCP) at 17 (Instruction 10); see also Roggenkamp Clerk's Papers (RCP) at 126-27 (Conclusion of Law 1). [2] The correct definition of operating a motor vehicle ... [i]n a reckless manner, RCW 46.61.520(1)(b), is governed by the reckless driving provision, RCW 46.61.500(1). My reasons follow. This statutory construction inquiry must consider our primary aim is to ascertain the legislature's intent, remembering such intent is derived solely from the plain language of the statute if it is unambiguous, accepting the legislature means precisely what it says. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003); State v. Sullivan, 143 Wash.2d 162, 175, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001). Courts may not rewrite or add statutory language. J.P., 149 Wash.2d at 450, 69 P.3d 318; see also Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash.2d 193, 203, 955 P.2d 791 (1998). However it is equally important that a court may not delete language from an unambiguous statute. J.P., 149 Wash.2d at 450, 69 P.3d 318. `Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.' Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996)). And this principle mandates a statute's plain language is to be discerned not simply from a tunnel-vision approach considering no more than the section at issue, but rather from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.  Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (emphasis added). These principles require every `provision [to] be viewed in relation to other provisions and harmonized if at all possible to [e]nsure proper construction of every provision.' State v. S.P., 110 Wash.2d 886, 890, 756 P.2d 1315 (1988) (quoting Addleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash.2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986)). Harmonization is especially necessary when `statutes relate to the same thing or class,' in which case they are in pari materia. Monroe v. Soliz, 132 Wash.2d 414, 425, 939 P.2d 205 (1997) (quoting King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 104 Wash.2d 1, 9, 700 P.2d 1143 (1985)). Only when harmonization is not possible does the court separately construe statutes dealing with the same subject matter. Id.; see also State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wash.2d 686, 690, 171 P.2d 845 (1946). We have long held: Whenever a legislature had used a word in a statute in one sense and with one meaning, and subsequently uses the same word in legislating on the same subject-matter, it will be understood as using it in the same sense, unless there be something in the context or the nature of things to indicate that it intended a different meaning thereby. Champion v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 81 Wash.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304 (1972) (quoting State ex rel. Am. Piano Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Wash. 676, 178 P. 827 (1919)). And it is to this end that when similar words are used in different parts of a statute, ` the meaning is presumed to be the same throughout. ' Welch v. Southland Corp., 134 Wash.2d 629, 636, 952 P.2d 162 (1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Cowles Publ'g Co. v. State Patrol, 109 Wash.2d 712, 722, 748 P.2d 597 (1988) (quoting Booma v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 330 Mass. 79, 82, 111 N.E.2d 742, 743 (1953))); see also De Grief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wash.2d 1, 11, 297 P.2d 940 (1956). RCW 46.61.500(1) defines reckless driving as driv[ing] any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Similarly, vehicular assault and vehicular homicide occur when injury or death results from operating a motor vehicle ... [i]n a reckless manner. RCW 46.61.520(1)(b); see also RCW 46.61.522(1)(a). Thus, all three sections of the Motor Vehicle Code cited above require reckless driving before a defendant is convicted of reckless driving, vehicular homicide, or vehicular assault. Not only does this invoke the common statutory construction principle of construing provisions in pari materia, but we are also legislatively commanded to do as much: The provisions of this title [Title 46 RCW] shall be construed in pari materia even though as a matter of prior legislative history they were not originally enacted in the same statute. RCW 46.98.020. Such a declaration evinces clear legislative intent to preclude isolationist judicial interpretation of any one provision in the Motor Vehicle Code. To the contrary, in pari materia provisions must and should be construed alike. Champion, 81 Wash.2d at 676, 504 P.2d 304. Champion is instructive. Analogous to this case, the court there construed the meaning of the term certificated employee in former RCW 28A.67.070 (LAWS OF 1970, Ex.Sess., ch. 15, § 16), recodified as amended at RCW 28A.405.210. Champion, 81 Wash.2d at 673, 504 P.2d 304. Noting Title 28A RCW's mandate to construe its provisions in pari materia, see former RCW 28A.98.040 (LAWS OF 1969, Ex.Sess., ch. 223, § 28A.98.040), recodified at RCW 28A.900.040, and the statutory construction canon to construe identical words alike, we held the term included only those with teaching certificates because all references to certificated within the code applied only to those persons holding teaching certificates. Champion, 81 Wash.2d at 676-77, 504 P.2d 304. Accordingly, we held nurses were not included within the class of other certificated employee[s], even though they were required by state law to hold personnel certificates. Id. at 679-80, 504 P.2d 304. [3] Thus, just as Champion held an identical construction of certificated employee was required in Title 28A RCW, the plain language of Title 46 RCW requires identical construction of the term reckless as used in RCW 46.61.500(1), 46.61.520(1)(b), and 46.61.522(1)(a), unless there is express language in the statute directing the court to construe it otherwise. The only section defining reckless is RCW 46.61.500(1). Nothing in the current version of RCW 46.61.500 indicates this definition does not or should not apply elsewhere in Title 46 RCW. As such, we are required by plain language and also as a matter of basic statutory construction to give identical definitions throughout Title 46 RCW. RCW 46.98.020; Champion, 81 Wash.2d at 676-77, 504 P.2d 304; cf. infra at 201-204 (discussing prior version of reckless driving statute which, unlike current version, contained express language preventing its application to other provisions in Motor Vehicle Code). Yet the majority avoids this legislative command and construction canon requiring us to construe these provisions together, holding operating a motor vehicle ... [i]n a reckless manner, RCW 46.61.520(1)(b), is different from reckless driving, RCW 46.61.500(1), and therefore requires separate definitions. For support the majority claims reckless driving, RCW 46.61.500(1), and operating a motor vehicle ... [i]n a reckless manner, RCW 46.61.520(1)(b), have different meanings because of the independent nomenclature employed. See majority at 200-202 (distinguishing reckless manner from reckless driving). While it is true the courts presume the legislature intend[s] a different meaning when it uses different words, majority at 202, the cited difference must be more than mere semantics. [4] The majority cites State v. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d 338, 60 P.3d 586 (2002) as support for its construction proposition. Beaver construed the terms minimum term and release date in the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, chapter 13.40 RCW, holding the legislature intended different meanings to attach by its use of differing language. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d at 343-44, 60 P.3d 586. In stark contrast, the majority must assume operating a motor vehicle, RCW 46.61.520(1)(b), means something other than driving, RCW 46.61.500(1), to reach its conclusion that the legislature intended different meanings to attach. I am aware of no other way to operate a vehicle than driving it, though I suppose a long, drawn out, creative inquiry might yield an answer no matter how absurd. However we are not required to wait for that answer; courts cannot follow a route to absurdity when construing statutes. J.P., 149 Wash.2d at 450, 69 P.3d 318 (courts must avoid absurd results when interpreting statutes).