Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Yolanda N.

Text: Prospective Juror Yolanda N. was a 54-year-old Latina who worked for the Los Angeles County Sheriff‘s Department in an unspecified capacity. She was generally reticent about the prospect of putting people to death for their crimes, writing: ―Although rapist[s] and child molesters . . . are the worst crimes, still I don‘t know if all deserve the death penalty.‖ Asked the purpose of the death penalty, she wrote that it would serve as an example to other criminals. Asked what type of crime deserved the death penalty, she offered: ―Child molesters and rapists.‖ She ―agreed somewhat‖ with the proposition that someone who killed intentionally, or killed more than one person, should ―always‖ receive the death penalty, and ―disagreed somewhat‖ that such persons should ―never‖ be sentenced to death. She affirmed that she would not vote one way or the other ―regardless of the evidence presented‖ in order to reach a certain result. During voir dire, Prospective Juror Yolanda N. stated that if she thought defendant was guilty, she would not vote to acquit in order to avoid a penalty phase trial, nor would she vote to convict (or sustain a special circumstance allegation) despite entertaining a reasonable doubt simply to ensure that defendant would face a penalty trial. She was then asked whether, ―without knowing anything about how or why [a murder] was carried out, without knowing anything about the defendant, would you always vote to impose the death penalty [or, alternatively, life in prison] just because of the type of murder it was?‖ She replied in the negative, agreeing with the court that she would want to know more about the case before making such a decision. But when later asked by the prosecutor whether she would consider life and death ―on an equal basis,‖ she replied that she thought she would lean heavily in favor of life in prison, explaining that, being a religious person, she believed ―[a] person should be given a chance to repent.‖ Pressed on the point by the prosecutor, the juror said she did 33 not believe in the Old Testament teaching calling for ―an eye for an eye,‖ saying that giving someone the death penalty would be ―very much‖ against her personal beliefs. The following colloquy then occurred: ―[THE PROSECUTOR]: So if we asked you then whether or not personally you could ever vote for the death penalty, could you ever personally vote for the death penalty? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Yolanda N.]: In which case? ―[THE PROSECUTOR]: In any case of murder? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Yolanda N.]: 99.9 percent, no.‖ (Italics added.) The trial court then sought to clarify the juror‘s views, asking whether, without knowing anything else, if an adult victim was intentionally, and with premeditation, murdered for purposes of financial gain, ―do you feel you could ever see yourself voting for the imposition of the death penalty if you felt the facts surrounding the crime or the facts surrounding the defendant would call for it?‖ She replied: ―Very hard that I would vote for death.‖ The court then asked: ―You said that you would 99.9 percent [of the time] never vote for the death penalty,‖ to which she replied, ―Yes.‖ The trial court thereafter excused Prospective Juror Yolanda N. without much elaboration, saying: ―The fact that a juror [such a Yolanda N.] favors in the abstract one [penalty] or the other doesn‘t disqualify [her].‖ The important consideration, the court said, was whether the juror‘s views regarding the death penalty would ―substantially impair[]‖ her in performing the duties of a juror, and the court concluded she demonstrated such impairment when she said she would impose life imprisonment instead of death in 99.9 percent of possible cases of murder for financial gain. 34 As with several other prospective jurors excluded from the jury, although initial indications suggested Yolanda N. could fulfill the duties of a juror in a capital case, more in-depth questioning revealed she would almost never vote for the death penalty in a case of murder for financial gain. It was for the trial court to resolve these ambiguities regarding her true state of mind. Because substantial evidence—in the form of the juror‘s own statements—supported the trial court‘s finding that Yolanda N. was substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 424, we defer to the court‘s assessment (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316). In sum, although defendant challenges the excusal of seven prospective jurors due to their views on the death penalty, we find the trial court‘s determinations that they were all substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 424, adequately supported by the record. We thus reject the claims.