Opinion ID: 2394238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Separation of Powers Generally

Text: In this situation we are constrained to construe the meanings of the various constitutions of Maryland, the amendments thereto, and must review our cases, and perhaps foreign cases, concerning this area of constitutional law. We shall also consider treatises on certain of the issues. Underlying the arguments of the parties, is the centuries old debate as to the extent to which the Separation of Powers doctrine is to apply as a limitation in controversies between the respective branches of government. This debate has never been resolved, with the issues being driven slightly one way and then slightly the other way, generally by the decisions of this Court. But that problem was anticipated by the framers of the Federal Constitution. Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary . . . . Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science. The Federalist No. 37, at 235 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). And see: There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission [constitution] under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principle; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. The Federalist No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). The first explicit constitutional statement of the separation of powers concept in Maryland is found in Article 6 of the Bill of Rights of the Maryland Constitution of 1776. We noted in our case of Board of Supervisors of Election v. Todd, 97 Md. 247, 262-63, 54 A. 963 (1903): [T]he powers of our State government w[ere] declared in our original Bill of Rights accompanying the Constitution of 1776 in this Language, `That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.' Art. 6, Bill of Rights, 1776. . . . In the subsequent Constitutions adopted in this State in 1851, 1864 and 1867 the declaration, which has been quoted from the Bill of Rights of 1776, has been incorporated, and emphasized by adding thereto this language of exclusion `and no person exercising the functions of one of the departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.' The language of the original Bill of Rights as modified by added language, remains and is found in Article 8 of the present Declaration of Rights of the current Maryland Constitution. The book, State Constitutionalism in Maryland, by Michael C. Tolley, speaking to Article 8, notes that: This provision forbids the usurpation of one branch's power by another. In addition, because each branch must remain independent, no branch may constitutionally inhibit another's exercise of its constitutional powers. Otherwise, all power would gravitate to the branch imposing the greatest interference, subjugating the other branch. Michael Carlton Tolley, State Constitutionalism in Maryland 18-19 (Univ. Microfilms Int'l 1991). Additionally, Tolley states: The ease with which the Maryland Constitution may be altered gives to the General Assembly almost unlimited power in all areas. Where the power of the legislature is omnipotent, like that of the British Parliament, the need to preserve the distinction between fundamental laws embodied in written constitutions and ordinary legislative acts increases. One way in which the court can preserve the distinction is by jealously guarding its prerogative and maintaining its power to strike down acts in violation of the constitution. Though the relationship between separation of powers and individual liberty had been known for some time, the adoption in Maryland of this axiom of government was by no means a foregone conclusion. Article 6 of Maryland's first Declaration [Bill] of Rights, stating that the three branches of government ought to be forever separate, was adopted in convention by a margin of only one vote, 30 to 29. Id. at 247. The Convention that was working on the drafts of the 1776 Constitution was considering it during very charged circumstances. During the Convention's deliberations, the British, under General Howe, attacked Long Island and Maryland troops bore the brunt of the attack. Two hundred fifty-six Marylanders were killed or wounded in the battle; all the while the Convention was involved with drafting the Bill of Rights. In ten days the Convention presented a draft of the Bill of Rights, and two weeks later a Form of Government. [27] H.H. Walker Lewis in The Maryland Constitution 1776 (1976), notes that:  Separation of powers. One of the Proprietary grievances was that the Governor and his Council exercised legislative, executive, and judicial powers, as [] did the Proprietor, and as did Parliament. This was recognized as a potential source of oppression, and violated the political theories that Montesquieu and others had brought into vogue. Id. at 47. [28] In Section 33 of the Constitution of 1776, the relevant powers of the Governor [29] were stated as follows: That the governor . . . may alone exercise all other [] executive powers of government, where the concurrence of the council is not required, according to the laws of this State, . . . but the governor shall not, under any pretense, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any State law, statute or custom of England or Great-Britain. Lewis, supra, at 77-78. The last phrase of that original constitution has since been deleted from the Maryland Constitution. It apparently related to the situation in the Revolutionary era during which the 1776 Constitution was being debated and was considered unnecessary in later periods. The last sentence of what is now Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights was added by the Constitution of 1851. As noted earlier, it was then called the Bill of Rights. The proceedings of the Convention that drafted the 1851 Constitution include the debates on the Bill of Rights. Most of the early debate centered on the issue of the compact with the people language of Article 1. When Article 6 (since amended to be Article 8) came up for debate the following occurred: The sixth article was read as follows:  Art. 6. That the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Mr. BRENT, of Baltimore City, moved the following amendment: Add at the end of the article the following words: `And no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments, shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.' Mr. DORSEY suggested that there was one difficulty which presented itself to his mind, if this amendment should be adopted. It might exclude the Senate of Maryland, that highest tribunal, appointed by the Constitution of Maryland, from sitting as a court of appeals. Mr. BRENT said he presumed that the Constitution would make provision for that case. He had offered his amendment, because the old article in the bill of rights did not prevent a member of Legislature from being a judge, or even the executive. He, therefore, desired to exclude from the Legislature, any member of the judiciary, and from the judiciary any member of the Legislature. The subject had been discussed here at an earlier state of the session; and he saw no harm that could result from his amendment. The question was then taken, and by yeas 34, noes 26, the amendment of Mr. BRENT was adopted. Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform Convention to Revise the State Constitution, vol. 1, 187 (William M'Neir, Official Printer, 1851). By an amendment to the Constitution, passed and approved by the voters in 1891, the power of the Executive was again increased when the Governor was granted veto power over legislation. By this time the constitutionalists of the day had apparently become somewhat apprehensive of the power of the Legislature in that it had been attempting to exercise the power of the Executive. The language of the amendment that was presented to the voters stated, in relevant part, `To guard against hasty or partial legislation, and encroachments of the legislative department upon the co-ordinate executive and judicial departments, every bill . . . shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor of the State. . . .' Bill of Rights and Constitution of Maryland 88 (William J.C. Dulany, 1899) (emphasis added). Thus, one of the stated reasons for the creation in the Constitution of the veto power was a fear of encroachments upon the Executive and Judicial branches by the Legislature. Alfred S. Niles in Maryland Constitutional Law, published in 1915, even then noted: A rather curious development of late years is the establishment of certain agencies of government, regarding which it is difficult to tell to which great department they belong. The Public Service Commission of Maryland, for example, has functions that are partly judicial, partly administrative and partly legislative. . . . It may be, therefore, in the future, that the difficulty of classifying a governmental agency[ [30] ] will lead to difficulties in applying the rule as laid down in this section of the Declaration of Rights. Nevertheless the rule itself is firmly established, not only by the plain words of the article, but by the decisions of the court giving these words their fullest force and effect. . . . Alfred S. Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law 21-22 (Hepbron & Haydon, 1915) Charles James Rohr, Ph.D., an assistant professor of History and Political Science, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, in 1932 published a book on the increase in power that the Executive had been granted by the various Maryland constitutions. The book, The Governor of Maryland โ a Constitutional Study, published by the Johns Hopkins Press, initially discussed the weakness of the Governor and Council setup created by the Revolutionary era Constitution of 1776. He then explains the change that occurred first in 1837, stating: Under the constitution of 1776, the governor was purely an executive officer, as we have seen, and his position was wholly a dependent one . . . . To all intents and purposes, the office of governor remained in that same dependent position until 1837, when the first great alteration occurred in the state constitution and relieved the governorship from its position of dependence. . . . By the terms of the [1776] constitution, the state was a confederation of counties, each with equal representation in the popular House without regard to population or wealth. . . . Since the executive department, which appointed most of the civil officers, was `the creature of the legislature,' it, too, was controlled by the entrenched minority. . . . . . . In the latter part of 1836 . . . the legislature, resisting successfully the calling of a convention, was coerced into offering a palliative in the form of an amendment to the constitution making many of the desired changes. . . . . . . By the amendment of 1837 the executive department was almost entirely reorganized. That part of the [1776] constitution which related to the governor and council was abrogated, abolished, and annulled. The council was abolished and the whole executive power of government was vested exclusively in the governor, subject, nevertheless, `to the checks, limitations and provisions' enumerated in the amendment. . . . With regard to appointments, the executive council having been abolished, the governor was empowered to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint all officers of the state whose appointment was not otherwise provided for in the constitution or laws. Charles J. Rohr, The Governor of Maryland 67-70 (The Johns Hopkins Press 1932) (footnotes omitted). Professor Rohr, after discussing the diminution of the Governor's appointment powers in the Constitution of 1851 and, in respect to those same powers, the Constitution of 1864, notes that the present constitution, the Constitution of 1867, restored much of the power to the Governor: With the framing of the last constitution, the powers of the governor of Maryland received their greatest advance. Id. at 79. Additionally: Every one of the Constitutions of Maryland has marked some changes in the position and power of the governor. In some instances, these changes have been of a retrogressive character; but, on the whole, the tendency has been to strengthen the position of the governor as a component part of the State Government, and to augment his powers and prerogatives. In none of the Constitutions is this tendency more marked than in the Constitution of 1867. Id. at 85 (footnotes omitted). After briefly discussing the addition of governmental power, Professor Rohr discusses the reasons for the increase in the appointment power of the governor: Offering several interesting reasons for this increase in gubernatorial appointing power, the argument of one of the members of the Convention [of 1867] is herein given. Mr. Henry F. Garey, of Baltimore, said, in brief: The Democratic Party, in its reforms, by making nearly all the offices elective by the people has done much to demoralize them. The desire for office which had been generated by this action has so taken hold of the people that it has weaned many of them from their occupations and caused much sorrow and trouble, and the Democratic Party is to blame for it by committing so much to the people. . . . It is time to return to the old constitutional landmarks. . . . The concomitant power of removal is carried over with two important changes. The present constitution states that the governor may `remove for incompetency or misconduct all civil officers who received appointment from the Executive for a term of years; ' whereas, the Constitution of 1864 specified officers appointed `for a term not exceeding two years.' This change is especially significant because it obviously broadens the range of the governor's removal power to include a much larger number of officers than was included under the old Constitution. Id. at 88-89 (footnotes omitted). Modern commentators, while acknowledging this Court's different discussions of the doctrine of separation of power over its history, nonetheless, adhere to its basic principles. Friedman, in The Maryland State Constitution โ A Reference Guide, while recognizing that this Court (according to him) has taken a somewhat elastic concept of the separation of powers doctrine, [31] qualifies that use of the term by affording a higher degree of constitutional strictness when it comes to the core functions of a respective branch. Friedman notes that: In evaluating the appropriate flexibility, Maryland courts appear to apply three levels of separation of powers analysis under which the constitutionality of a delegation or assignment of authority is determined by how close a function is to the `core' functions of a given branch. At the first level are the core functions assigned to a given branch. In determining the core functions of each branch, courts look first to the constitutional text creating each branch. . . . Core executive functions include the administration and enforcement of the laws. Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution 19 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Praeger 2006). In addition to the treatises above as to the history of Maryland's specific experiences with the separation of powers doctrine, the doctrine has been discussed, generally, in several Law Review articles. Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L.Rev. 1079 (2004); G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 329 (2003), John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 Temp. L.Rev. 1205 (1993). In the view of these commentators, the separation of powers principle in state constitutions is different than that of the Federal Constitution and, as a result, is subject to a different and stricter type of analysis. This is particularly important in states such as Maryland where the separation of powers doctrine is expressly included in the State Constitution. Professor Tarr explains that the express mandates require that those interpreting state constitutions must be prepared to act as constitutional geologists, examining the textual layers from various eras in order to arrive at their interpretation. [32] Tarr, supra, at 332. Professor Tarr also points out that: [B]oth federal and state constitutions agree with Montesquieu in positing three branches of government โ legislative, executive, and judicial โ each invested with a distinct function. The institutions created at the national and state levels also have a surface similarity: state legislature and Congress, governor and president, state supreme court and U.S. Supreme Court. But when one proceeds below the surface, one finds that these apparently analogous structures of government and separations of power quickly evaporate. Id. at 333 (footnotes omitted). In his view, the evolution of the Executive and especially the practice of electing Executive officers makes the states' approach to separation of powers very different than that of the federal government. In addition, states' legislatures, unlike Congress, have more limited resources and meet in shorter sessions, which, according to Tarr, serves as a control on the legislature and its ability to do harm. For a comparison between the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Constitution, see Charles A. Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Judicial Relief for Violation of Rights, 10 U. Balt. L.Rev. 102, 106-11 (1980). Professor John Devlin, from the Paul M. Herbert Law Center of the Louisiana State University, analyzed the separation of powers doctrine in relation to the appointment of state officials. As he explains, separation of powers principles in state constitutions differ greatly from that of the Federal Constitution. As a result, state courts should be especially careful in using federal cases and other states' cases in their analysis of separation of powers issues. He describes the different approaches utilized in state constitutions dealing with the issue: Ten state constitutions follow the federal pattern by omitting any express requirement of separation of powers, incorporating that principle instead only by implication from provisions establishing the three branches of the state government and `vesting' each type of power in one of those branches.[ [33] ] Twelve states go beyond this to include an express statement that governmental powers shall be separated, either standing alone[ [34] ] or coupled with an express prohibition against any department exercising any powers belonging to another, except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the constitution.[ [35] ] The remaining state constitutions are even more pointed, coupling an express statement of the separation principle with an additional clause explicitly prohibiting `any person' belonging to or exercising power under any branch from holding any office[ [36] ] or exercising any power or function[ [37] ] belonging to another. Devlin, supra at 1236-37 (footnotes omitted). The Maryland Constitution reflects the more stringent approach and, thus, situations where separation of powers questions are involved should be carefully scrutinized and the doctrine afforded a high degree of protection. Professor Devlin compared the different states' approach to appointment of Executive officers, which is important in the analysis of the power of removal and for determining to whom such power belongs: Other textual provisions relevant to this analysis also show marked variations from state to state. Virtually all states have constitutional provisions that vest executive authority in the governor and impose upon the governor a duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Yet states disagree on what specific powers their respective governors will be given to carry out this duty. Some states vest a general power to make administrative appointments in the governor[ [38] ] or specifically debar the legislature from making such appointments,[ [39] ] while others leave it to the legislature to decide the method by which officials will be appointed โ including, in some cases, reserving that power to itself.[ [40] ] Some states carefully differentiate those administrators who must be gubernatorial appointees from those for whom the legislature may determine the method of appointment,[ [41] ] while in other states the text is, on its face, remarkably unclear as to which branch controls the mechanisms of appointment.[ [42] ] Devlin, supra, at 1237-38. Professor Devlin recognized that some states have adopted a formalist approach to separation of power questions, where one must attempt to assign a specific classification to the office in question, i.e., Executive, Legislative or Judicial. Id. at 1246. Other courts, however, take a functionalist approach in which the analysis turns on who has control of the office in question. Id. At 1247. Professor Devlin proposed that these two approaches are flawed, as the formalist approach is difficult to apply in most instances and the functionalist approach does not necessarily lead to a complete analysis of the separation of powers issue. He favors, instead, a third approach in which the crucial inquiry does not focus solely on any conceptual classification of functions, but rather considers all of the specific facts of the case to determine whether the challenged arrangement constitutes a `usurpation by one department of the powers of another department,' defined as whether a department is being `subjected directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of' another, and whether there is `a significant interference by one department with the operations of another department.' Devlin, supra at 1249 (quoting Parcell, 620 P.2d at 836 (quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786, 792 (1976))). The Legislature's termination of the current Commissioners in the case sub judice fails all three of the separation of powers tests suggested by Devlin. First, the Public Service Commission is an Executive agency as expressly provided in the statute and under the formalist approach the removal of the Commissioners is a power reserved to the Executive. The functionalist approach is also violated as the Legislature was clearly attempting to control the actions of an agency in the Executive Branch. The General Assembly's decision to terminate the current Commissioners was purely for the purposes of controlling or supervising the Commission it created as an Executive Branch agency. Were the Legislature free to terminate Executive non-constitutional officers in such manner, a precedent would be created in which all non-constitutional officers with a definite term would be serving in fear of Legislative action and therefore unable to discharge their duties independently. In such a case the Legislature would be able to control a large portion of the functions of the Executive Department of State Government. Finally, the Legislature's action in the case sub judice also fails the more pragmatic approach, favored by Devlin. Article II, ง 15 of the Maryland Constitution provides that it is the Governor who has removal authority of all civil officers. The Legislature's attempt to remove the Commissioners through the use of Senate Bill 1 constitutes a `usurpation by one department of the powers of another department[.]' See, Devlin, supra. Such action clearly interferes with the functions specifically granted to the Governor by the Maryland Constitution.