Opinion ID: 1249422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statutory reporting immunity

Text: In order to determine whether Van Horn can claim reporting immunity, we must examine our statutes. In examining our statutes, we keep in mind the following rule of statutory construction: [i]t is our duty to ascertain the intention of the legislature as completely as possible from the language used in the statute itself, State, Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1239, 1246 (1983), and if such intent is expressed clearly and without ambiguity in the language of the statute, such intent must be given effect. Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo., 598 P.2d 432, 434 (1979). Carroll By and Through Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit Ass'n, 755 P.2d at 871-72. See also Hays v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 768 P.2d 11, 13, 78 A.L.R.4th 959 (Wyo. 1989). Appellees argue they have immunity for their actions because of the reporting immunity statute. If their actions alleged in the complaint fall within the immunity statute, there is no liability for such actions. See e.g., Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wyo.1991), Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 477 (Wyo.1990). The State of Wyoming has a strong public policy of protecting children from child abuse. City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 204 (Wyo.1991) ( citing W.S. 14-3-201 through -215 (1986)). Having deemed the prevention and detection of child abuse a priority, the Wyoming legislature has adopted a statutory scheme which requires reporting and protects those who report child abuse. A person is required to report child abuse as follows: (a) Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a child has been abused or neglected or who observes any child being subjected to conditions or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse or neglect, shall immediately report it to the child protective agency or local law enforcement agency or cause a report to be made. W.S. 14-3-205 (1986). Once a report has been made, the reporter has qualified immunity from a criminal or civil action. The immunity statute provides: Any person, official, institution or agency participating in good faith in any act required or permitted by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 is immune from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise result by reason of the action. For the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, the good faith of any person, official or institution participating in any act permitted or required by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 shall be presumed. W.S. 14-3-209 (1986). Statutory schemes such as Wyoming's which require reporting and also provide immunity are designed to encourage the reporting of child abuse. All fifty states have child abuse reporting immunity statutes. Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435 So.2d 1207, 1213 (Ala.1983). Federal legislation provides incentives for states that have child abuse reporting requirements and an immunity protection for those who report. Harris, 435 So.2d at 1213 ( citing Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5106). States must grant immunity for mandatory reporting in order to qualify for federal assistance. Id. ( citing 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)). Wyoming's reporting immunity statute fits most closely with those statutes that have been interpreted as qualified immunity statutes. Wyoming's statute only provides immunity if the report was made in good faith. W.S. 14-3-209. In contrast, absolute immunity statutes provide immunity even if the report were made with malice. See e.g., McMartin v. Children's Institute Int'l, 212 Cal.App.3d 1393, 261 Cal.Rptr. 437, 441 (1989). Some state statutes have varying levels of immunity. For example, California's statutes provide absolute immunity to mandatory reporters. Thomas v. Chadwick, 224 Cal.App.3d 813, 274 Cal.Rptr. 128, 133 (1990). Mandatory reporters are those who face a criminal penalty if they fail to report. Thomas, 274 Cal.Rptr. at 133 n. 8. Those who have a general duty to report but do not face a criminal penalty if they fail to report (permissive reporters), are provided qualified immunity. Id.; see also McMartin v. Children's Institute Int'l, 261 Cal.Rptr. at 441; Ferraro v. Chadwick, 221 Cal.App.3d 86, 270 Cal.Rptr. 379, 381 (1990). All persons who report child abuse pursuant to the Wyoming reporting statute are permissive reporters, because they do not face a criminal penalty if they fail to report child abuse. See W.S. 14-3-201 through -215 (1986). Looking to the legislative language and by comparing our statute to others, it is clear that the Wyoming legislature intended to provide qualified immunity, that is immunity for all who report child abuse in good faith. Therefore, should it appear that appellee reported this suspected child abuse in good faith, she will be entitled to qualified immunity under the statute. The reporting immunity statute contains two basic requirements. First, the report must be made pursuant to W.S. 14-3-205, which requires that a person immediately report abuse if they kno[w] or ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe or suspect that abuse has or is occurring, and second, that the reporter be acting in good faith. W.S. 14-3-209 (1986); see also Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1990). Under Wyoming's statute, good faith is presumed. W.S. 14-3-209. We agree with the district court that appellees' actions met the requirements for statutory reporting immunity. Van Horn reported the abuse for purposes of the statute when she telephoned Detective Owen of the Cheyenne Police Department. Van Horn also requested and Detective Owen did observe two sessions with MJ at Van Horn's office. Detective Owen then made a report and referred the matter to Campbell County DPASS. The statute provides a presumption that the report was made in good faith absent any contrary allegation or showing from appellants. W.S. 14-3-209. There is no claim of a malicious motive on Van Horn's part. Instead it appears that Van Horn acted in good faith on the basis of what the child had told her. Van Horn, therefore, is protected by qualified immunity to the extent the complaint alleges actions based on or stemming from the act of reporting. Appellants argue that Van Horn is liable because she was negligent in reporting abuse and thereafter did not report in good faith. We hold that W.S. 14-3-209 provides immunity, though negligence may be involved in reporting, for the report may still be made in good faith. The material facts found in affidavits and evidence presented when considered in a light most favorable to appellants establish at most negligence which is insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption and evidence of good faith. There is no evidence of bad faith to defeat the immunity provided her. This construction of the statute does not afford immunity for deliberately false accusations, yet still protects those who report in good faith. Were we to construe the statute in a different fashion, the result might be to chill legitimate reports of child abuse. The district court's rationale is persuasive here: In this case, the trial court ruled against the mother and found that there was not sufficient evidence of child abuse. The trial court did that twice, two different judges. That doesn't mean that just because a judge disagrees with you that you're to run back into your hole and not try again. And certainly I would think that if I were not to grant summary judgment in this case, a substantial number of child abuse cases would simply go by the wayside. I don't believe that Fleming Associates would ever touch a child abuse case again. Accord, City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d at 204 and n. 3, and Leonard v. Converse County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Wyo.1990) (Golden, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Other states have adopted this same policy argument in construing their statutes to provide immunity for those who report child abuse. Lux by Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (8th Cir.1989); Brown v. Pound, 585 So.2d 885 (Ala.1991); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1990); Gross v. Myers, 229 Mont. 509, 748 P.2d 459, 73 A.L.R.4th 771 (1987); Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435 So.2d 1207 (Ala. 1983); Dunning v. Pacerelli, 63 Wash. App. 232, 818 P.2d 34 (1991); Gross v. Haight, 496 So.2d 1225 (La.App.1986); Davis v. Durham City Schools, 91 N.C.App. 520, 372 S.E.2d 318 (1988). Because the statute provides qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity, sufficient flexibility is afforded to protect against reporting outside the statute or in bad faith. See e.g., Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990) (social worker went beyond the reporting statute and sent letter to the city mayor); Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 289 (Colo. App.1988) (if action not taken in good faith, the immunity is removedcounselor advising the mother to terminate father's visitation); F.A. by P.A. v. W.J.F., 248 N.J.Super. 484, 591 A.2d 691 (1991) (neighbors made a report of abuse about one year after child's leg had been broken). A California appellate court summarized the difficult situation we face: [W]e are obligated to honor the determination of the Legislature that protection of one innocent segment of society warrants occasional injury to another. The mute and powerless victims of child abuse have long suffered at the hands of their tormenters. Society's protective voice, the Legislature has found, has been silenced by the fear of retaliation. The protection of the young victims, the Legislature has determined, requires that uncompensated injury occasionally result to an adult. Thomas, 274 Cal.Rptr. at 138. The legislature has provided qualified immunity for those who report child abuse in the manner specified in W.S. 14-3-205. Van Horn's report was within the purview and in accord with the statute. Appellees are protected by statutory qualified immunity for reporting child abuse in good faith.