Opinion ID: 463221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ex Parte Communication

Text: 25 The failure of the court to notify appellants or their counsel of the jury's deadlock vote, and the court's ex parte message to the jury to continue its deliberations, violated appellants' constitutional rights. Nevertheless, we are required to affirm their convictions. 26 The Constitution, the fundamental principles of jury trial, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantee a defendant the right to be present at every stage of trial. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (right of presence secured by the confrontation clause); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (presence guaranteed by due process clause); Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2094-95, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (rule of orderly conduct of jury trial requires defendant's presence); Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a) (The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence....). 27 Ex parte communications from the judge to the jury violate a defendant's right to due process of law. As the Supreme Court said recently, the constitutional right to presence ... is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. United States v. Gagnon, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). The Court also held that, in certain limited stiuations, the defendant's right of presence may be adequately protected by the presence of his or her counsel. Id. at 1484-85; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). Here, since defendants' counsel as well as the defendants were absent we need not decide whether the presence of counsel alone would have been sufficient. In this case, the absence of both is constitutionally fatal. 8 28 A defendant's participation in formulating a response to a deadlocked jury, whether through his counsel or by his personal presence as well, may be important to ensuring the fairness of the verdict. Certain jury deadlock situations require the calling of a mistrial. The defendant should be given the opportunity to analyze the particular circumstances and assess whether a mistrial is appropriate. Furthermore, minority members of a deadlocked jury are especially susceptible to pressure from the majority to change their views. A defendant should be afforded the opportunity to request that the jury be reinstructed on the burden of proof or on its members' duty to decide according to their own consciences. 29 A violation of a defendant's due process right to be present at all stages of trial is subject, however, to the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 826-27, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). United States v. Gagnon, 721 F.2d 672, 678 (9th Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (per curiam). In order to establish harmlessness, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. 30 To determine whether the failure of the court to consult with appellants (and hereinafter we use the term appellants to refer to defendants and their counsel collectively) before responding to the deadlocked jury contributed to the jury's return of the verdict, we analyze several factors. First, we consider the probable effect of the message actually sent, second, the likelihood that the court would have sent a different message had it consulted with appellants beforehand and third, whether any changes in the message that appellants might have obtained would have affected the verdict in any way. Applying the Chapman standard, we conclude for the reasons given below that the error in this case was harmless. 31 Judge Thompson's note asking that the jury continue its deliberations did not suggest that the jury must reach a verdict, or that the court would not ultimately accept a deadlock. The note was not, therefore, inherently coercive of the verdict obtained. Furthermore, upon releasing the jurors the previous afternoon, Judge Thompson had told them that another judge would be taking the verdict, should they arrive at one the following day. He had also already acknowledged the possibility that the jury might be required to continue its deliberations beyond Friday. 9 His note was consistent with that expectation; it meant just what it said--that the jury should continue deliberating, not, that it must reach a verdict. 32 Facially non-coercive ex parte messages from the court to the jury may, however, be deemed coercive in light of the jury's response. In Krische v. Smith, 662 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.1981), an initially deadlocked jury returned its verdict 1 hour and 20 minutes after receiving an ex parte note, essentially identical to the one before us, instructing the jury to continue its deliberations. The sending of the note to the jury was held to constitute reversible error. The court distinguished other cases, in which convictions were affirmed, where the trial court had instructed a deadlocked jury to continue its deliberations, on the ground that the juries in those cases deliberated for a longer period of time following receipt of the ex parte message. Id. at 179 (distinguishing United States v. Rodriguez, 545 F.2d 829, 830-31 (2d Cir.1976) (deliberations lasted 3 hours after receipt of message), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819, 98 S.Ct. 58, 54 L.Ed.2d 74 (1977), and United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1366 (2d Cir.) (deliberations lasted 2 days), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2958, 53 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1977)). In the present case, the jury's response to the court's instruction does not suggest that the instruction had a coercive effect upon the jury's deliberations. The jury returned its verdict 3 1/2 hours after the note was delivered. Given all the circumstances before us, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that in this case the length of time the jury deliberated following its receipt of the court's message demonstrates that it reached its decision based solely on its own reasoned consideration of the evidence and the law, and not as the result of actual or perceived judicial pressure. 10 33 Appellants argue, however, that had they been present and been afforded an opportunity to present their views the court might have taken a different course. Appellants offer several possible results that might have followed had they received proper notification of the deadlock: The court might have granted a motion for a mistrial, instructed on a lesser included offense, reread the reasonable doubt instruction to the jury, or counselled the jurors not to surrender their honest beliefs. We consider these possibilities either unlikely to have occurred or unlikely to have affected the jury's verdict. 34 Given the brevity of the jury's deliberations prior to the time it sent its note to the court, and the court's anticipation that the jury might be out through at least Monday, it is apparent that the court would have considered a mistrial motion premature and would have denied the motion. For the same reason, it is clear that the court would have been unlikely to instruct on a lesser included offense. The requested instructions regarding the standard of proof and the duty to decide according to individual beliefs were repetitive of the court's instruction given the previous day and upon dismissing the jury the previous evening (the defendants as well as the government count on you to keep your own consciences relative to this case, and that goes before you go in, all the time you're in, and after you're out.). Accordingly, we conclude that there is almost no possibility that the court would have given those instructions again early the next morning. Finally, even had the court decided to reinstruct the jury on reasonable doubt and individual responsibility, we are fully persuaded that its doing so would not in any way have affected the jury's deliberations or its return of the verdict. 11 35 It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the court's erroneous denial of appellants' right to participate in the process of determining the appropriate response to the deadlock note did not contribute to the verdict obtained in this case. However, as we have emphasized, our conclusion that the error was harmless rests on the particular facts before us. A court's communication with a deadlocked jury in the absence of the defendant and counsel could well, under a different set of facts, require reversal of a conviction. Ex parte communications with a jury undermine basic principles of due process. Every court has a duty assiduously to avoid them. 36 AFFIRMED.