Opinion ID: 2644492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allowing References to Polygraph Results

Text: Mr. Carbonell claims the state trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right by allowing references at trial to a witness’s failed polygraph results. Before the polygraph examination, the witness had told police she had no knowledge of the murder. Aplt. Br. at 4-5, 9-11. The witness testified at trial that Mr. Carbonell admitted to killing the victim. The trial court denied defense counsel’s objections and 4 motion for mistrial. See Carbonell I, No. 00CA1258, slip op. at 9. It instructed the jury that polygraph results are inherently unreliable, inadmissible in court, and to disregard any comments about polygraph examinations. See id. On direct appeal, the CCA recognized polygraph evidence is inadmissible but determined that the trial court’s jury instructions cured any prejudice to Mr. Carbonell. See id. at 9-11. The district court found the CCA’s determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, which requires for a due process violation that the evidence be “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). See Carbonell v. Falk, 2013 WL 5289531, at .1 Mr. Carbonell’s arguments in his combined opening brief and application for a COA mainly discuss the inadmissibility of polygraph evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 9-11. He fails to show how the pertinent testimony was “so unduly prejudicial,” Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, and why the court’s curative instructions were insufficient. We conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s resolution of this issue under AEDPA review. 3. Counsel’s Failure to Investigate Blood Evidence Mr. Carbonell claims that his lawyer’s performance was deficient and prejudicial for failure to present expert testimony about whether blood found on Mr. Carbonell’s and his wife’s mattress was menstrual blood (as opposed to blood from a violent attack, as the 1 To avoid confusion with the relevant CCA opinions in this case, we refer to the district court’s order by its full name throughout this opinion. 5 prosecution argued). See Aplt. Br. at 5-6, 11-13. The CCA rejected this claim on collateral appeal because “[d]efense counsel clearly elicited, on cross-examination of the state’s experts, that the blood found on the mattress could have been menstrual blood, and thus the evidence sought by defendant was presented.” People v. Carbonell (Carbonell II), No. 06CA1144, slip op. at 10 (Colo. App. June 14, 2012). The district court concluded that Mr. Carbonell cannot show that he was constitutionally prejudiced under these circumstances and that the CCA’s denial of this claim is consistent with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Carbonell v. Falk, 2013 WL 5289531, at . Under Strickland, a defendant is entitled to relief if (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by it. Id. at 687–88. A defendant establishes the first Strickland requirement by showing counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To meet this requirement, the defendant must overcome a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . [and] might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (quotations omitted). A defendant establishes the second requirement by showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id., and “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable,” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792. Under AEDPA, a “state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Id. at 785. 6 Mr. Carbonell argues that even though the prosecution’s expert testified that the blood may be menstrual, his counsel should have had the blood tested to determine this question more definitively. The problem with this argument is that Mr. Carbonell has failed to show how the lack of more conclusive blood analysis prejudiced him at trial. The high level of deference this court and the district court must give to the state court’s determination on this issue under AEDPA, see id., would preclude reasonable jurists from debating the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Carbonell has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). See also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. We therefore deny COA on this issue. 4. Cumulative Error Mr. Carbonell asks that we consider cumulative error. See Aplt. Br. at 6, 13-14. “A cumulative-error analysis aggregates all errors found to be harmless and analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1121 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court correctly observed that this analysis is inapplicable where, as here, no true errors occurred. See Carbonell v. Falk, 2013 WL 5289531, at ; see also Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1195 (10th Cir. 2012) (cumulative error analysis “does not apply . . . to the cumulative effect of non-errors” (quoting Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1175 (10th Cir.1999))). Reasonable jurists could not debate this conclusion. We therefore deny COA on this claim.