Opinion ID: 1406050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Clear Expression Requirement

Text: The appellants also claim that House Bill No. 1333 violates the clear expression requirement of section 21. They argue that the title fails to express clearly the subject matter of the bill because it appears to relate solely to business practices of advertising, and gives no notice to health care providers who do not advertise that they may be engaging in criminal conduct. As such, they claim, a health care provider who did not advertise his willingness to waive these patient fees would be unaware that he could nevertheless be prosecuted under House Bill No. 1333 simply for engaging in the regular business practice of waiving patient fees. The appellants point to the title of the bill in support of the argument that House Bill No. 1333 violates the clear expression requirement of section 21. The title of the bill is: An act concerning advertising by health care providers relating to third-party payments as grounds for disciplinary actions, and, in connection therewith, providing that certain business practices are illegal.  (Emphasis added). The appellants argue that the phrase and, in connection therewith, providing that certain business practices are illegal modifies the words advertising by health care providers. The appellees argue that such a grammatical construction is not compelled. Instead, they argue that this phrase modifies the words third-party payments. For the purpose of passing constitutional scrutiny under the clear expression requirement of section 21, particularity in the titling of bills `is neither necessary nor desirable; generality is commendable.' ... [I]f the legislation `is germane to the general subject expressed in the title; if it is relevant and appropriate to such subject,... it does not violate [the clear expression requirement of section 21 of article V] of the Constitution.' Tinsley v. Crespin, 137 Colo. 302, 309, 324 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1958) (emphasis added) (quoting H.L. Shaffer & Co. v. Prosser, 99 Colo. 335, 339, 62 P.2d 1161, 1163 (1936)). The word germane means closely allied, appropriate, or relevant. Dahlin v. City & County of Denver, 97 Colo. 239, 240, 48 P.2d 1013, 1013 (1935); Roark v. People, 79 Colo. 181, 185, 244 P. 909, 910 (1926). The matter covered by legislation is to be clearly, not dubiously or obscurely, indicated by the title. Its relation to the subject must not rest upon a merely possible or doubtful inference. The connection must be so obvious as that ingenious reasoning aided by superior rhetoric will not be necessary to reveal it. Such connection should be within the comprehension of the ordinary intellect as well as the trained legal mind. Nothing unreasonable in this respect is required, however; and a matter is clearly indicated by the title when it is clearly germane to the subject mentioned therein. In re Breene, 14 Colo. 401, 406, 24 P. 3, 4 (1890) (emphasis in original). An appropriate general title which is broad enough to include all the subordinate matters considered is safer and wiser than an enumeration of several subordinate matters in the title. Edwards v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 13 Colo. 59, 65, 21 P. 1011, 1013 (1889). Finally, section 21 should be liberally construed so as to avert the evils against which it is aimed and at the same time avoid unnecessarily obstructing legislation. In re Breene, 14 Colo. at 404, 24 P. at 3. The legislation in House Bill No. 1333 pertains to the regular business practice of waiving patient fees and to the advertising of this practice. It is within the comprehension of the ordinary intellect that the phrase certain business practices modifies the words third-party payments in the title. Such a construction becomes evident when the bill is read in conjunction with the title. From this context, we can say with assurance that the title of House Bill No. 1333 is clearly germane to the subject of criminalizing the regular business practice of waiving patient fees. We therefore conclude that House Bill No. 1333 does not violate the clear expression requirement of section 21 of article V of the Colorado Constitution.