Opinion ID: 2653226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Extent of the Record

Text: We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings—including its refusal to consider part or all of an affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment—for abuse of discretion. See Briggs v. Potter, 463 F.3d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 175 (6th Cir. 2013). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on erroneous findings of fact, applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard when reaching a conclusion, or makes a clear error of judgment.” Briggs, 463 F.3d at 511 (citation omitted). Reed challenges the district court’s striking of his original affidavit, (R.44-4), from the -8- Case No. 13-5797 Reed v. Procter & Gamble Mfg., Inc. record, as well as its refusal to consider, first, deposition testimony in which Reed recounts a conversation with Brandy Lennon, and second, his submission of an internal P&G memorandum. Looking first to Reed’s original affidavit, the court noted that it failed to conform with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), which requires an affidavit to be “made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Instead of following these guidelines, Reed’s original affidavit read like an additional response to P&G’s statement of undisputed facts. It also frequently cited to Reed’s deposition testimony without providing page or line numbers, and without supplying the deposition transcript. Furthermore, it made conclusory assertions not based on personal knowledge, such as stating that management’s rationale for reducing the number of extended roles was “pretext to mask the true retaliatory motive,” and that “Frank Napadek did not thoroughly investigate” Reed’s complaints. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion in striking from the record an affidavit that partially neglected to conform to Rule 56(c)(4) and that functionally duplicated another filing—Reed’s response to P&G’s statement of undisputed facts—where the court gave Reed the opportunity to file a new affidavit. Cf. Briggs, 463 F.3d at 511–14 (no abuse of discretion in striking portion of affidavit making “argumentative interpretation of statements of fact”); Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying abuse of discretion standard to appellant’s claim that the court granted summary judgment before discovery was complete, and considering whether appellant was prejudiced by his inability to obtain desired discovery). Significantly, Reed does not demonstrate that he was in any way prejudiced by the court’s decision. As for Reed’s other two evidentiary claims, we likewise find no abuse of discretion. The district court refused to consider Reed’s submission of an internal P&G memorandum from 2000 -9- Case No. 13-5797 Reed v. Procter & Gamble Mfg., Inc. on the basis that it was not properly authenticated. Furthermore, it disregarded Reed’s testimony that Lennon had reported his concerns about racial discrimination to Massey on the grounds that Lennon’s statements to Reed were inadmissible hearsay. While “[t]he submissions”—such as affidavits—“by a party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not themselves be in a form that is admissible at trial,” that party must “lay[] out enough evidence that will be admissible at trial to demonstrate that a genuine issue on a material fact exists.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (4) (requiring an affidavit or declaration to “set out facts that would be admissible in evidence”). Therefore, hearsay evidence not subject to any exception “must be disregarded.” Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For the same reason, unauthenticated documents do not suffice. Id. at 558–59. Reed failed to authenticate the internal memorandum and neglected to obtain an affidavit or any other statement from Lennon; accordingly, we cannot say that the district court erred in declining to consider this evidence. Thus, we agree with the district court as to the scope of the record, and we review the same evidence considered below.