Opinion ID: 1412158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doctrine of Desuetude

Text: The Appellant asserts that West Virginia Code § 61-2-14d, the statute under which she was convicted, should be rendered void under the doctrine of desuetude. Black's Law Dictionary 458 (7th ed. 1999) defines desuetude as 1. Lack of use; obsolescence through disuse. 2. The doctrine holding that if a statute or treaty is left unenforced long enough, the courts will no longer regard it as having any legal effect even though it has not been repealed. In syllabus point three of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 187 W.Va. 182, 416 S.E.2d 720 (1992), this Court explained: Penal statutes may become void under the doctrine of desuetude if: (1) The statute proscribes only acts that are malum prohibitum and not malum in se; (2) There has been open, notorious and pervasive violation of the statute for a long period; and (3) There has been a conspicuous policy of nonenforcement of the statute. Thus, any evaluation must commence with an attempt to distinguish between crimes that are malum prohibitum and crimes that are malum in se. Crimes that are malum in se will not lose their criminal character through desuetude, but crimes that are malum prohibitum may. Printz, 187 W.Va. at 188, 416 S.E.2d at 726. A crime that is malum in se is [a] crime or an act that is inherently immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape[,] Black's Law Dictionary 971 (7th ed. 1999), while a crime that is malum prohibitum is [a]n act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral. Id. In the present case, the crime of which the Appellant was convicted, concealing a minor child in violation of a court order, defines a malum in se act, rather than a malum prohibitum act. The act of concealing a child is inherently wrong, even if not criminalized by a statute. Additionally, this case fails to satisfy the second prong of the Printz test, requiring a showing of open, notorious, and pervasive violation of the statute for a long period.... 187 W.Va. at 183, 416 S.E.2d at 721, syl. pt. 3. The Appellant has presented no evidence that individuals are committing this crime without prosecution. Neither has she presented any evidence that there is a conspicuous policy of nonenforcement. Id. at 183, 416 S.E.2d at 721, syl. pt. 3. [3] Our review of the Appellant's assignment of error dealing with desuetude persuades us that the statute under which the Appellant was convicted is not void. As the Connecticut appellate court explained, [t]he doctrine of desuetude, the concept that a statute may be void because of its lack of use, is founded on the constitutional concept of fairness embodied in federal and state constitutional due process and equal protection clauses. State v. Linares, 32 Conn.App. 656, 630 A.2d 1340, 1346 n. 11 (1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 655 A.2d 737 (1995). In other words, [t]he problem [of applying, or refusing to apply, the rubric of desuetude] must be approached in terms of that fundamental fairness owed to the particular defendant that is the heart of due process. United States v. Elliott, 266 F.Supp. 318, 326 (1967). We find no fundamental fairness violation in the present case. Based upon this Court's finding that the Appellant has failed to introduce evidence sufficient to satisfy the criteria outlined in Printz, we find that the Appellant's assertion regarding the doctrine of desuetude must fail.