Opinion ID: 4701440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Large Capacity Magazine

Text: We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d 5 USCA11 Case: 20-10554 Date Filed: 07/06/2021 Page: 6 of 11 1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Clear-error review is deferential, and we will not disturb a district court’s factual findings unless we are left with “a definite and firm conviction that the court made a mistake.” Id. Importantly, the clearerror standard “plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Thus, we may not reverse “[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 573–74. When a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of a sentence enhancement, the Government has the burden of establishing the disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Little, 864 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2017). “This burden requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The sentencing court’s factual findings may be based upon facts admitted by the defendant’s guilty plea, undisputed statements in the PSI, or evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2009). The court may also make reasonable inferences from the evidence. United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (stating that at sentencing, a district 6 USCA11 Case: 20-10554 Date Filed: 07/06/2021 Page: 7 of 11 court could make inferences “based on common sense and ordinary human experience”). “When interpreting the Guidelines, a guideline’s meaning is derived first from its plain language and, absent ambiguity, no additional inquiry is necessary.” United States v. Gordillo, 920 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation mark omitted). “Commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Id. (alteration adopted). The district court applies a base offense level of 22 for making a false statement to a firearms dealer “if (A) the offense involved a . . . semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine . . . and (B) the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The commentary defines a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” as a semiautomatic firearm that has the ability to fire many rounds without reloading because at the time of the offense (A) the firearm had attached to it a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition; or (B) a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition was in close proximity to the firearm. 7 USCA11 Case: 20-10554 Date Filed: 07/06/2021 Page: 8 of 11 Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added). The district court concluded that Matthews’s offense involved the latter—that is, that a magazine capable of accepting more than 15 rounds of ammunition “was in close proximity” to the rifle. Neither we nor our sister circuits have published an opinion addressing how the sentencing enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(3) applies when the underlying offense is making a false statement to a firearms dealer. But we have interpreted the definition of a semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine in cases involving the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In those cases, we interpreted the phrase “capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” to be “words of possibility, not actuality,” and the phrase “at the time of offense” to modify the following subparts. United States v. Evans, 958 F.3d 1102, 1108 (11th Cir. 2020). We have also discussed the meaning of “close proximity”—based on its plain meaning and in light of our caselaw interpreting application note 14 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1—in the context of close proximity between firearms and drugs in drug trafficking offenses, and concluded that close proximity “encompasses both physical distance and accessibility.” Gordillo, 920 F.3d at 1298–1300 (emphases omitted). We adopted Gordillo’s approach to determine that a semiautomatic weapon in a case located outside a residence was in close proximity to a large capacity magazine in a bedroom drawer within the 8 USCA11 Case: 20-10554 Date Filed: 07/06/2021 Page: 9 of 11 residence. United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1109–10 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2553 (2020) (mem.). We have also discussed the history of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, which was amended in response to the expiration of the federal assault weapons ban. See Gordillo, 920 F.3d at 1298. In Gordillo, we stated that, while the amendment history did not address the “close proximity” requirement, “the Commission believed the enhanced base offense levels should continue to apply to ‘these types of firearms’ . . . . [which] suggests the Commission was concerned with identifying the type of gun—making sure the component parts were all present and could be identified as part of a corresponding firearm and magazine.” Id. We further noted that the sentencing enhancements in the Guidelines “are intended to punish firearms crimes involving particularly dangerous types of weapons.” Id. at 1300. We can find no basis in the record on which to overturn the district court’s factual findings regarding the close proximity of a large capacity magazine to the rifle Matthews attempted to purchase, nor in its legal conclusion that the offense conduct met the standard for the Guidelines enhancement. Matthews attempted to purchase a semiautomatic rifle that comes standard with a 30-round magazine and committed the offense of making false statements to a firearm dealer while inside Mike’s Gun Shop, which sells both firearms and magazines. Based on these facts, it was reasonable for the district court to infer that a magazine capable of accepting 9 USCA11 Case: 20-10554 Date Filed: 07/06/2021 Page: 10 of 11 more than 15 rounds of ammunition—that comes “standard” with the rifle—was in close proximity to the rifle Matthews sought to purchase. See Gordillo, 920 F.3d at 1300 (rejecting the argument that a firearm and magazine could not be in “close proximity” if they were stored separately); see also United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding a sentencing court was “free to make” a reasonable inference that is not “speculative to the point of being clearly erroneous”). We also find that the application of the large-capacity magazine enhancement in this context—the attempted purchase of a semiautomatic rifle by an individual subject to a restraining order—furthers the policy rationale behind § 2K2.1 of punishing firearm crimes involving “dangerous types of weapons.” See Gordillo, 920 F.3d at 1300. Because the district court’s account of the evidence “is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” we affirm Matthews’s sentence as to this issue. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.