Opinion ID: 691117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admission of marijuana evidence

Text: 10 Because we conclude that the government may retry Weems, we also address Weems' contention that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the marijuana grow at the Puyallup property in order to prove appellant's motive in structuring the transactions at issue. 11 Collateral estoppel can limit the evidence the government may introduce in a criminal prosecution. See e.g., U.S. v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir.1980); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Pettaway v. Plummer, 943 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 296, 121 L.Ed.2d 220 (1992); United States v. Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218 (9th Cir.1978). In Hernandez, we explained that collateral estoppel should apply where (1) the issue sought to be litigated is sufficiently similar to the issue present in an earlier proceeding and sufficiently material in both actions to justify invoking the doctrine; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first case; and (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the first case. 572 F.2d at 220. 12 The factual issue of whether Weems knew that the tenants of the Puyallup property were using the residence to grow marijuana was precisely the same in defendant's criminal trial as it was in the earlier civil forfeiture proceeding. In addition, the issue was material in both proceedings: in the first proceeding, defendant's knowledge or lack thereof determined whether or not the property was forfeitable pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(7); and in the second, such knowledge significantly bolstered the government's case by providing a reason why defendant might have intended illegally to structure the purchase of the Puyallup property. The government actively sought forfeiture under Sec. 881(a)(7) as well as under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 981, and vigorously litigated the issue of defendant's knowledge in the prior proceeding. After all of this, District Judge Dimmick in the forfeiture proceeding clearly and specifically found that Weems has met his burden by a preponderance of the evidence that he had no knowledge of the marijuana grow operation. Weems was therefore an innocent owner.... The district court thus held that the property was not subject to forfeiture under Sec. 881(a)(7). 13 The government argues that collateral estoppel cannot be invoked here because the district court ordered forfeiture on another ground; and therefore its determination that Weems was an innocent owner was not necessary to the judgment forfeiting defendant's property. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); Pettaway, 943 F.2d at 1043-44. The government interprets that phrase too narrowly. The determination of Weems' lack of knowledge was necessary to the court's decision that forfeiture was authorized only under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 981, and not under Sec. 881(a)(7). 14 The general rule is that in order to justify invoking collateral estoppel, a factual determination must have been necessarily (and not presumably) decided in the first proceeding. Pettaway, 943 F.2d at 1044 (although [d]iscussion of the necessity prong of collateral estoppel analysis is usually framed in terms of determinations that were necessary to the 'judgment' or the 'verdict' ... [t]he primary purpose of the rule ... is to ensure that the finder of fact in the first case took sufficient care in determining the issue.); Hernandez, 572 F.2d at 220; see also Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Jurisdiction Sec. 4421 (1981). 15 In this case, it is very clear that the district court heard evidence and argument from both sides on the question of whether or not defendant knew of the marijuana grow, and specifically concluded that he did not. This conclusion was necessary to the court's decision that the Puyallup property was forfeitable on one of the government's requested grounds, but not both. The record in the forfeiture proceeding shows that the district court first decided whether the government could not succeed in its effort to forfeit the property on drug related grounds because Weems had no knowledge of the marijuana grow operation. It was only after deciding that the property was not forfeitable under Sec. 881(a)(7) that the district court went on to discuss whether the property could be forfeited under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 981. The district court thus viewed its findings on Sec. 881(a)(7) as necessary to its decision to reach the issue under Sec. 981. It could have deemed the Sec. 881 issues unnecessary and decided only the Sec. 981 issues, but it did not do so. On this record then the court's findings on knowledge were necessary to its judgment based on Sec. 981. 16 A corollary to the principle that for issue preclusion to apply, an issue must have been necessary to a prior judgment, is the principle that a determination adverse to the prevailing party is not given preclusive effect. See United States v. Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir.1994); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Int'l Market Place, 773 F.2d 1068, 1069 (9th Cir.1985). See also Restatement Second of Judgments, Sec. 27, comment h, Illustration 14, Determinations Not Essential to the Judgment (1982): 17 14. A, as owner of a trademark, brings an action against B for infringement. B denies the validity of the trademark and denies infringement. The court finds that the trademark is valid, but that B had not infringed it, and gives judgment for B. Thereafter A brings an action against B alleging that since the rendition of the judgment B infringed the trademark. B is not precluded from defending this action on the ground that the trademark is invalid. 18 In arguing that collateral estoppel may not be invoked in this case, the government relies heavily on the fact that the government was not entitled to appeal, as of right, the district court's finding, because it was contained in a judgment in the government's favor. We need not decide whether this factor should be dispositive in a case where the government assumed the burden of pleading and proving forfeiture on two independent grounds. Here the government had the opportunity to cross-appeal the court's decision in this case when defendant appealed the forfeiture. The government did not avail itself of that opportunity. See United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85, 99 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that because the prevailing party could have sought review of an adverse determination through cross-appeal, the general rule that 'determinations adverse to the winning litigant do not have conclusive effect as collateral estoppel' should not be applied.) (quoting 1B Moore, Federal Practice p 0.443(5), at p. 3923 (1965)) (cited in Wright, Miller at 307). 19 The government also suggests that the fact that there was evidence of a marijuana grow at the Enumclaw property may be a change in facts essential to a judgment rendering collateral estoppel inapplicable, citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 159, 99 S.Ct. 970, 976, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). It argues that if the district court had had the additional evidence before it, it may not have believed Weems' innocent owner defense. The evidence regarding the other property, however, is not a change in the facts essential to the Puyallup findings, however. There has been no change in the underlying circumstances pertaining to the Puyallup property. A party is not entitled to relitigate an issue simply because it has found additional evidence that might lead a trier-of-fact to a different result. 20 The district court erred in permitting the government to introduce evidence of the marijuana grow at the Puyallup property at defendant's criminal trial. At retrial the evidence should be excluded. 21 Finally, appellant asks that his case be reassigned to a different district court judge for any further proceedings. This request is denied. 22 REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. 23