Opinion ID: 2598799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Former Statutory Construction

Text: Whether Wentz had entered Wheeler's home was a factual dispute at trial, but the trial court made no finding he had. It nonetheless concluded that Wentz was guilty of first degree burglary based, in part, on the following written findings of fact: 19. [The backyard] was secured by a six foot solid wood fence with locked gates.... Deputies then checked the back yard and discovered the defendant ... [hiding] in the yard armed with a Colt .357 revolver and 21 rounds of ammunition. . . . . 33. On May 29, 1999 around 9:23 p.m., the defendant, armed with the Colt firearm, jumped over the locked fence into the secured back yard.... 34. The defendant opened the rear, basement sliding glass door of the house ... which tripped the security system and caused an alarm to sound. 35. When the security alarm sounded, the defendant hid himself in the boat in the fenced backyard under a tarp to await [their] return.... 68. On May 29, 1999, the defendant had the specific intent required to commit the offense of first degree burglary and did enter and remain unlawfully on the premises or in the building ... with the intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, and, in entering and while on or in such building or premises and in immediate flight therefrom was armed with a deadly weapon.... Clerk's Papers (CP) at 33, 36-37, 44. Wentz challenges the sufficiency of these findings to support his first degree burglary conviction. To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wash.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The trial court entered no written findings regarding whether the fence around Wheeler's backyard was erected mainly for the purpose of protecting property therein, the test announced in State v. Roadhs . The issue in Roadhs was whether a defendant who unlawfully entered a fenced area could be charged under the burglary statute. Defendant and two other men were apprehended within a public utility district warehouse compound. The compound was fully enclosed by building walls and a cyclone fence topped by barbed wire. The men had cut the barbed wire and climbed over the fence. Defendant was convicted of second degree burglary. He appealed, claiming that the enclosure was not a building under the burglary statute. The second degree burglary statute in effect at the time provided: Every person who, with intent to commit some crime therein shall, under circumstances not amounting to burglary in the first degree, enter the dwelling house of another or break and enter, or, having committed a crime therein, shall break out of any building or part thereof, or a room or other structure wherein any property is kept for use, sale or deposit, shall be guilty of burglary in the second degree.... Former RCW 9.19.020 (1909) (emphasis added). As the statute addressed unlawful entry into either a building or a structure, the court first analyzed whether a fenced area was a building. The statutory definition of building stated: The word building shall include every house, shed, boat, watercraft, railway car, tent or booth, whether completed or not, suitable for affording shelter for any human being, or as a place where any property is or shall be kept for use, sale or deposit. Former RCW 9.01.010(18) (1909). Because the statute listed specific items, the court reasoned that the omission of fenced area from the building definition was intended by the legislature. Roadhs, 71 Wash.2d at 707-08, 430 P.2d 586 (citing the statutory construction principle, expressio unius est exclusio alterius). The court then turned to the issue of whether a fenced area was a structure. Structure was not defined by statute. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of structure was very broad, conceivably applying to anything from a building to an apple box. Id. at 708, 430 P.2d 586. Therefore, the court interpreted the general term, structure, in a manner consistent with the specific term, building. Id. (citing the statutory construction principle noscitur a sociis). In doing so, it concluded that: Were the fence a mere boundary fence or one erected for the sole purpose of esthetic beautification, it would not constitute a `structure' as that term was intended to be interpreted by the legislature. However, where the fence is of such a nature that it is erected mainly for the purpose of protecting property within its confines and is, in fact, an integral part of a closed compound, its function becomes analogous to that of a `building' and the fence itself constitutes a `structure' subject to being burglarized. Id. at 708-09, 430 P.2d 586. This became the test to analyze whether a defendant who entered a fenced area had entered a structure and could, therefore, be convicted of burglary. State v. Livengood, 14 Wash.App. 203, 209, 540 P.2d 480 (1975) (quoting Roadhs, 71 Wash.2d at 708-09, 430 P.2d 586). In 1975, the legislature enacted a new criminal code, Title 9A RCW. Laws of 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260. This legislation made sweeping changes to the burglary laws. The statutory definition of building now reads: Building, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods.... RCW 9A.04.110(5). Under the current statutory scheme for burglary, the most serious offense is first degree burglary: A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, the actor or another participant in the crime (a) is armed with a deadly weapon, or (b) assaults any person. RCW 9A.52.020(1). The less serious offenses are those in which the person neither has a deadly weapon nor commits assault. Ch. 9A.52 RCW. In those cases, the person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building and has the intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein is charged according to the building entered. Id. Thus, if the intent element is satisfied, entry into a dwelling is residential burglary under RCW 9A.52.025(1); entry into a vehicle is vehicle prowling under RCW 9A.52.095-.100; and entry into a building other than a dwelling or a vehicle is second degree burglary under RCW 9A.52.030(1). Fenced area is now expressly included in the building definition. RCW 9A.04.110(5). Despite the amendment, the Courts of Appeals continued to apply the Roadhs main purpose test for determining whether a fence constitutes a structure for purposes of the former burglary statute. [2] This approach fails to track the 1975 legislative change, as the current statutory scheme dispenses with that analysis. Therefore, when a person is charged under the current burglary statute for unlawfully entering or remaining in a fenced area, the State need not show that the fence was erected mainly for the purpose of protecting property within its confines.