Opinion ID: 3034999
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: statutory interpretation: removal and

Text: REMEDIAL ACTIONS [5] The first step under Chevron requires a straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation: “If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory interpretation, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. We begin with the statutory definitions because “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000). It has become de rigueur to criticize CERCLA as a hastily passed statute that is far from a paragon of legislative clarity. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986) (commenting that a provision in CERCLA “is not a model of legislative draftsmanship”); Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 883 (“Clearly, neither a logician nor a grammarian will find comfort in the world of CERCLA.”). The definitions of removal and remedial action exemplify this muddled language. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining “removal”); id. § 9601(24) (defining “remedial action”); id. § 9601(25) (defining “response”); see also supra notes 4, 6 (quoting definitions). The definition of “removal” is written in sweeping terms. It begins with the general statement that “removal” means “the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). The definition 15558 UNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. goes on to describe three categories of events that trigger removal: (1) “such actions as may be necessary [sic] taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment”; (2) “such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances”; and a third catch-all category, (3) “such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release.” Id. Finally, the definition lists a number of specific activities that fall within the definition of “removal”—“alternative water supplies,” “temporary evacuation and housing,” and “emergency assistance.” Although at first glance this half of the definition appears to provide concrete guidance by listing identifiable activities such as “security fencing,” this part too is left vague by the opening caveat that the term “removal” “includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing . . . .” Id. Consequently, “these examples serve only as a guide to what activities may appropriately be classified as ‘removal action.’ ” Hanford Downwinders Coalition, 71 F.3d at 1478 n.13. The definition of “remedial action” is similarly broad, but can be distinguished from “removal” because it refers to “permanent” remedies and its list of specific actions is, in large part, distinct from the list included under “removal.” (For example, “removal” is focused on temporary and emergency activities.) To begin, the definition states that a “remedial action” is an action “consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Although the section begins with this clear language, it threatens to collapse into the definition of “removal” because it includes those actions “taken instead of or in addition to removal actions” and is triggered “in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous UNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. 15559 substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment.” Id. Thus, the triggering factors begin to sound virtually similar to the triggering factors for a “removal” action. In fact, two of the triggering factors for “removal” are almost identical to the factors for “remedy”: Removal — 42 U.S.C. Remedy — 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) § 9601(24) “such actions as may be “those actions consistent necessary [sic] taken in the with permanent remedy event of the threat of release taken in the event of a of hazardous substances into release or threatened release the environment” of hazardous substances into the environment” “such other actions as may “those actions consistent be necessary to prevent, with permanent remedy minimize, or mitigate dam- taken to prevent or miniage to the public health or mize the release of hazardwelfare or to the environ- ous substances so that they ment, which may otherwise do not migrate to cause subresult from a release or stantial danger to present or threat of release” future public health or wel- fare or the environment” The definition concludes with three lists of specific examples classified as a remedy, such as “segregation of reactive wastes.” The first list details various locations of the release. As with the term “removal,” the definition for the first list diminishes the examples’ guidance with the qualifying language that the term “includes, but is not limited to,” the listed examples. Id. The second list spells out when permanent relocation of residents, businesses, and community facilities is 15560 UNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. appropriate. Finally, the third list is a list of actions included within “remedy,” ranging from offsite storage to disposition of hazardous substances. Adding to the confusion is the overlap between the two definitions. See Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d at 667 (noting listing of “provision of alternative water supplies” under both “remedial action” and “removal”); Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 927 (noting overlap). Attempting to untie the Gordian knot of these definitions solely based on their plain meanings is thus unavailing.19 In interpreting “removal” and “remedial,” we next follow the Supreme Court’s guidance in taking a comprehensive, holistic view of CERCLA because it is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). [6] CERCLA makes clear that the EPA has the tools of both removal and remedial actions at its fingertips when there is a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. Specifically, the EPA is authorized “to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to 19 Other courts have similarly been unable to extract answers from the statute’s plain meaning: [T]hose courts which have attempted to unravel CERCLA’s definitions have found no solace in either the “plain meaning” of the statute or the reams of legislative history. Instead, in an attempt to glean legislative intent, courts seem to resort to a sort of “Purkinje phenomenon,” hoping that if they stare at CERCLA long enough, it will burn a coherent afterimage on the brain. CP Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1991) (footnote omitted) (referring to “[a]n optical illusion named for Johannes E. Purkinje (1787-1869), whereby the eye retains an afterimage of an object in a different color from the original”). UNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. 15561 such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time . . . , or take any other response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the [EPA] deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). The statute as a whole, however, does little to clarify how to categorize a given response action except to suggest that remedial actions may be “long term.” See, e.g., id. § 9604(a)(2) (indicating that any removal action should contribute to the efficient performance of any “long term” remedial actions without further elaboration). Nor does the purpose of the statute provide definitive guidance, though it points towards a liberal reading of “removal” in order to effectuate CERCLA’s underlying purpose of “protect[ing] and preserv[ing] public health and the environment by facilitating the expeditious and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites.” Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 880 (quoting Pritikin v. Dept of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 794-95 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2004) (advocating that CERCLA be interpreted liberally so as to accomplish its remedial goals). Specifically, because a removal action can be initiated promptly after notification of a threat, a liberal reading provides the EPA with greater flexibility to use this tool for the protection of the public health. Last, we turn to CERCLA’s legislative history for guidance. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n.8 (2004) (noting “longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text”). But see Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 723 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s reliance on legislative history because “[o]ur obligation is to go as far in achieving the general congressional purpose as the text of the statute fairly prescribes—and no further”). 15562 UNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. [7] Unfortunately, legislative history is particularly unhelpful because of the haphazard passage of CERCLA with many of the more lucid descriptions of the statute falling under the oxymoronic category of post-enactment “history.” See, e.g., 126 Cong. Rec. S16,428 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1980), reprinted in 1 The Environmental Law Institute, Superfund: A Legislative History 87 (Helen Cohn Needham & Mark Menefee eds., 1982) (hereinafter “Superfund History”) (post-passage “clarification” by Sen. Stafford that “the purpose of [CERCLA] and the response plan is to protect the public health and welfare in its broadest sense”); see also Alfred R. Light, CERCLA Law and Procedure 12-18 (1991) (describing the “unusual back-room congressional compromise process” behind CERCLA); 1 Superfund History, supra, at xiii (“The emergence of this last-minute compromise hampers the ability of researchers to draw definitive conclusions from the otherwise extensive legislative history of CERCLA.”). Considering that no committee or conference reports address the version of CERCLA that ultimately became law, it is apt to describe the search for legislative history as “somewhat of a snark hunt.” Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 885. Without the benefit of a definitive committee report or other deliberate congressional documents describing the genesis of the final bill, we are hesitant to rely on legislative history for guidance, especially in regard to the nuanced inquiry as to which side an action falls on the removal/remedial line. See United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024, 1032 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (warning that subsequent legislative history is a “hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress”) (quoting United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)). What we can take away from the legislative history is the drafters’ overarching concern that aggressive action be taken to protect the public health. See, e.g., 126 Cong. Rec. S14,714 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980), reprinted in 1 Superfund History, supra, at 90 (statement of Sen. Mitchell) (“The Surgeon GenUNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. 15563 eral of the United States has stated that toxic wastes may be the most serious threat to public health in our country in the next decade. So it is in this spirit of urgency that I cosponsor this substitute [bill] today.”); S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 2 (1980) (stating in report for unadopted draft of CERCLA that “the potential impact of toxic chemicals on the general public and environment through unsound hazardous disposal sites and other releases of chemicals is tremendous”); see also 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8725 (Mar. 8, 1990) (statement in comments to 1990 amendments to the National Contingency Plan that “Section 121 of CERCLA makes clear, and the legislative history confirms, that the overarching mandate of the Superfund program is to protect human health and the environment from the current and potential threats posed by uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.”). Such statements encourage us to construe “removal” liberally to effectuate CERCLA’s remedial purpose, but they do not illuminate the removal/remedial distinction. Cf. Seaboard Farms, 387 F.3d at 1172 (“[CERCLA] must be interpreted liberally so as to accomplish its remedial goals.”); Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We conclude that Congress intended that the term ‘removal action’ be given a broad interpretation.”). [8] In sum, we are unable to discern Congress’s clear intent through the normal tools of statutory interpretation. The meanings of “removal” and “remedial action” under CERCLA are inescapably vague.