Opinion ID: 798871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amount of Force Employed by the SL6 Weapon

Text: To determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, we first evaluate the level of force used to arrest Phillips. The record establishes that the force exerted by an SL6 bullet is roughly comparable to a projectile from a bean-bag shotgun. Other courts of appeals have observed that baton launchers and similar impact weapons employ a substantially greater degree of force than other weapons categorized as less lethal, such as pepper spray, tasers, or pain compliance techniques. In Deorle v. Rutherford, the Ninth Circuit considered a bean-bag shotgun projectile as something akin to a rubber bullet. 272 F.3d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir.2001). Deorle concluded that the cloth-cased shot constitutes force which has the capability of causing serious injury, and in some instances does so. An officer provided expert testimony that a Use of Force Continuum . . . would list an impact weapon high on the schedule of force and that [i]t would be unreasonable for an officer to use an impact weapon on an unarmed person. Id. at 1280 & n. 17 Such force is much greater than that applied through the use of pepper spray . . . or a painful compliance hold. . . . Id. at 1279-80 (citations omitted); see also Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 451 & nn. 18-19 (7th Cir.2006) (officer testimony regarding Chicago Police Department policies limiting use of impact weapons to high-level, high-risk assailants and describing such weapons as unwarranted against a suspect resisting arrest by punching and struggling); Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir.2005) (observing that the SL6 weapon is classified as a `less lethal' munition, [but that local] police regulations recognize that it can be used as a deadly weapon.). In Bell, the district court treated bean-bag rounds used by officers as a species of deadly force. 321 F.3d at 639. But we found the record insufficient to determine whether such rounds should be considered deadly as a matter of law; we concluded only that they were less lethal than bullets or buckshot. Id.; see also Omdahl v. Lindholm, 170 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir.1999) (declining to resolve parties' dispute over whether the use of bean bag projectiles constituted deadly force or merely a higher level of force along a ladder of escalating force.) For a particular application of force to be classified as `deadly,' it must at least carry with it a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.  Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir.1997) (emphasis added) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Direct analogy to the above cases cannot be dispositive because impact weapon technology varies from case to case, as do the manner and circumstances when officers deployed impact rounds. Nevertheless, multiple SL6 shots fired with force equivalent to a .44 magnum pistol at the same part of an arrestee's body clearly have the potential to cause serious injury, even when aimed at the lower body. Indeed, this is what happened to Phillips when the SL6 rounds tore flesh from her ankle, requiring a lengthy, painful recovery. As in Bell, this record does not permit us to determine whether multiple SL6 rounds aimed at the lower body carry a substantial risk of serious bodily harm per se. But we conclude from the case law and from the extent of Phillips's injuries that the force used during her arrest was at least on the high-end of the spectrum of less-lethal force. In other words, when balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion against the governmental interest at stake, we conclude that the intrusion upon Phillips's Fourth Amendment rights was significant. [5] Such force, whether or not it inherently carries a substantial risk of serious bodily harm, is not to be deployed lightly. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1272, 1279. In Smith v. Ball State University Board of Trustees, we considered an excessive force claim brought by a plaintiff who drove onto a sidewalk and nearly hit several pedestrians while suffering from diabetic shock. 295 F.3d 763 (7th Cir.2002). After the driver failed to respond when police arrived at the scene, the officers pulled him from the car. Id. at 766. We found that officers reasonably believed the driver to be drunk and were justified in using force to remove him, particularly given the potential threat to public safety of an intoxicated driver in command of a running vehicle. Id. at 770. Although he was not actively resisting during the arrest, we held that a reasonable officer who happened on the scene could reasonably misconstrue [the driver's] unresponsiveness as resistance requiring the minimal use of force.  Id. at 771 (emphasis added); see also McAllister, 615 F.3d at 883 (finding material issue of fact over constitutionality of force used on semiconscious arrestee). The SL6 shots used on Phillips plainly exceeded the minimal force permitted for the suspected drunk driver in Smith.