Opinion ID: 482020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeal of Defendant Solmor

Text: 18 Solmor argues, citing United States v. Hernandez, 591 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc), that the district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for possession on or about December 7, 1985, of eight kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute it (count IV) and for aiding and abetting Carrion's distribution on or about December 7, 1985, of three kilograms of cocaine (count V). 1 The contention is unfounded. 19 In Hernandez, the defendant was convicted both of possession with intent to distribute and of distribution. Hernandez, 591 F.2d at 1020. The Court observed that the defendant was never shown to have had actual possession of the controlled substance but constructive control during the course of the transaction was proved by the acts of his co-defendant, a sale of heroin to undercover agents. Id. The evidence of the sale was relied upon to prove both [defendant]'s constructive possession of the heroin and his intention to distribute it. There was no evidence of [defendant]'s possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it apart from the evidence of the actual sale. Id. at 1022. The Court concluded, When the intent to distribute was executed by a successful sale, the possession with intent to do so merged into the completed offense. Id. The Court affirmed the conviction, but vacated one of the sentences. Id. at 1020, 1022. The Hernandez Court was careful to note that its opinion [did] not concern the situation where there is separate evidence of possession with intent to distribute and evidence of distribution in one or more different transactions. Id. at 1022 (footnote omitted). 20 Later cases have shown that consecutive sentences for the two offenses (possession with intent to distribute and distribution) may be imposed when there is independent evidence of [the defendant's] prior possession of the [contraband] before the actual time of distribution. United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1141 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Foundas, 610 F.2d 298, 301-02 (5th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 615 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir.1980). In the present case, there was evidence tending to show that Solmor had driven a van containing eight kilograms of cocaine from California to Texas before Carrion's delivery on the afternoon of December 7. Further, there was evidence tending to show that this cocaine was in the van driven by Solmor on the morning of December 7 before Carrion's delivery. This evidence, all of it independent of Carrion's delivery, when taken together with the equally independent evidence of the five kilograms seized in Solmor's hotel room, permits an inference of Solmor's prior possession of the eight kilograms. 2 Finally, the large quantity is evidence, also independent of Carrion's delivery, of Solmor's possession with intent to distribute. See Berkowitz, 662 F.2d at 1141 n. 16.
21 Solmor also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion to sever his trial from Carrion's trial. Solmor argues that Carrion's anticipated defense of entrapment conflicted with Solmor's own defense, that is, general insufficiency of the evidence. Generally, to compel severance the defenses must be antagonistic to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. The essence or core of the defenses must be in conflict, such that the jury, in order to believe the core of one defense, must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other. United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.1984) (citations omitted). 22 This case does not present for decision the asserted irreconcilability per se, as it were, of the entrapment defense and the defense of insufficiency of the evidence. 3 Although Carrion's counsel anticipated, as evidenced by his opening statement, making the entrapment defense, in the end the district court, as noted, declined to instruct the jury on the issue of entrapment and Carrion's counsel was thereby foreclosed from promoting the entrapment defense in his closing argument. 23 Solmor also tends to argue that certain statements made by Carrion's counsel during his opening and closing statements prejudiced Solmor. 4 In his opening statement, Carrion's counsel, anticipating making an entrapment defense, asked the jury to pay attention to the enticement that the Government [had] utilized in causing a crime to be committed. Here, Carrion's counsel spoke only generally, but at one point, he specified that there had been substantive crimes on the date of October the 15th and then December the 7th. In his closing statement, Carrion's attorney again argued that Carrion had been directed into ... committing criminal acts by the Government. Again, he specified at one point that the Government had caused 6 or 8 kilos to be distributed. 24 Throughout his opening and closing statements, counsel for Carrion maintained his focus exclusively on Carrion. Under these circumstances, the statements that a crime had been committed on December 7 and that six or eight kilograms had been distributed directly implicated Carrion, not Solmor. Cf. United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1336 (11th Cir.1982) (counsel for two defendants, in admitting matters in prosecution's opening statement, qualified their statements as being applicable to only their respective clients), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082, 103 S.Ct. 1771, 76 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983). Moreover, the crimes charged in three (counts IV, V & VII) of the four counts naming both defendants are crimes Carrion could have committed whether or not Solmor had committed a crime. Only an admission by Carrion's attorney that Carrion had committed the conspiracy in count I would tend to imply that Solmor, too, had committed at least physical activity showing conspiracy. Carrion's counsel was not so specific, however, and the logic of this rather abstract implication, if any, of Solmor under count I was nowhere spelled out for the jury. Further, Carrion's attorney made no affirmative statements implicating Solmor, a circumstance the courts have often looked for in reviewing severance denials for prejudice. See Romanello, 726 F.2d at 181; Vadino, 680 F.2d at 1335; United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1065 (5th Cir.Unit A 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 1617, 71 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982); United States v. Russo, 455 F.2d 1225, 1227 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846, 93 S.Ct. 49, 34 L.Ed.2d 86 (1972). The district court instructed the jury that the statements of lawyers are not evidence and that the Government had the burden of proving the guilt of each defendant. See Vadino, 680 F.2d at 1336. Under these circumstances, the question of [Solmor's] guilt depended, not on the statements by Carrion's attorney, but on the prosecutor's success in establishing that [Solmor] had also participated. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 546 (9th Cir.1983). 25 Only upon a showing of compelling prejudice may the trial judge's denial of severance be reversed. Sheikh, 654 F.2d at 1065; United States v. Eastwood, 489 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir.1973). A denial of severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Berkowitz, 662 F.2d at 1135; Sheikh, 654 F.2d at 1066: We cannot say that we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court abused its discretion. 5 3. 26 Solmor contends that the evidence was insufficient to show a continuous course of conduct and that his conviction of a Travel Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952) violation under count VII must therefore fall. The contention is unfounded. 27 The essential elements of a Travel Act violation are travel in interstate commerce, specific intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on unlawful activity, or to distribute the proceeds of unlawful activity, and knowing and willful commission of an act in furtherance of that intent subsequent to the act of travel. 28 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1351 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 996, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984). Section 1952(b) states that unlawful activity embraces any business enterprise involving ... narcotics or controlled substances. Moreover, the term 'business enterprise' as it is used in section 1952 means 'a continuous course of conduct, rather than sporadic casual involvement in a proscribed activity.'  United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 202 n. 10 (5th Cir.Unit B 1982) (quoting United States v. Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344, 348 (9th Cir.1971)). 29 In the present case, there was evidence tending to show three deliveries of cocaine: on October 14 and 15 (by Carrion) and December 7 (by Carrion, aided and abetted by Solmor). There was also evidence tending to show that Carrion had distributed cocaine in the past. See United States v. Corbin, 662 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir.1981). Further, a reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that there was a drug distribution enterprise headquartered in California and that the above transactions, including the December 7 delivery aided and abetted by Solmor, were part of that enterprise. Finally, there was evidence tending to link Solmor, not only to Carrion, but to the sources behind Carrion. We have no difficulty concluding that the evidence sufficiently established a continuous course of conduct. Moreover, we reject any implication by Solmor that only direct evidence of multiple deliveries personally undertaken by or aided and abetted by him would suffice to sustain his Travel Act conviction. It suffices that the December 7 delivery was shown to be part of a continuous business enterprise. By promoting that delivery, Solmor was promoting the enterprise of which it was a part. 6 See United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1434-35 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed.2d 889 (1986). 4. 30 Finally, Solmor contends that the district court should have suppressed on fourth amendment grounds evidence of the items seized during Solmor's arrest and evidence of the five kilograms and related items seized later at the time the search warrant was executed on Solmor's hotel quarters. We hold that the evidence was properly admitted. 31 In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1374-75, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ... prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. The Paytonwarrant requirement applies 7 to guest rooms in commercial establishments. United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 175-76 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Newbern, 731 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 479, 486-87 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106, 103 S.Ct. 2453, 77 L.Ed.2d 1333 (1983). In the present case, agents Harrington and Gee arrested Solmor without a warrant. 32 Solmor's arrest in this case was not in violation of the Payton warrant requirement since the arrest was effected before the agents entered Solmor's hotel room and Solmor had no protectible expectation of privacy at the time the arrest was effected. When agents went to Solmor's room they had probable cause to arrest, 8 their investigation had focussed on Solmor, and it was their subjective intent to arrest him. Most important, when agent Gee drew his weapon, aiming it at Solmor, and ordered him to raise his hands, Solmor must have understood that he was under arrest. See generally United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir.1982). Thus, Solmor's arrest occurred as he stood in the doorway of his hotel room and was first confronted by agents Harrington and Gee, who were standing in the hallway. See United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir.1980), judgment aff'd, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). Under this Court's decision in United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.1981), Solmor had no protectible expectation of privacy at the open door to his hotel room. In Mason, a law enforcement agent had arrested the defendant Mason's common law wife or paramour Mitchell. Accompanied by three colleagues, the agent then took Mitchell to the house where she and Mason were living. The agents had neither an arrest or search warrant. ... Mason came to the front door as Mitchell and the agents approached the house. Mason, 661 F.2d at 46-47. The defendant Mason was arrested at the door. The Mason Court concluded that the defendant had been permissibly arrested at the front door, noting that the Supreme Court [had] found such a warrantless arrest consistent with the fourth amendment in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), because the defendant in Santana [had been] in a public place and had no protectible expectation of privacy. Id. at 47. 9 33 Under the foregoing analysis, Solmor's warrantless arrest was legal. The search of Solmor's person at the time of arrest was therefore a lawful search incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and the items found on Solmor's person were thus admissible evidence. Whether the agents' entry into and their limited security search of Solmor's hotel quarters violated the fourth amendment is a question we need not consider. The evidence later seized upon execution of the search warrant was admissible against Solmor under the Supreme Court's decision in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), even if the agents' initial entry and security search were illegal. 34 In Segura, law enforcement agents, having arrested the defendant Segura in the lobby of his apartment building, went to his apartment and entered it with Segura, without requesting or receiving permission. Four persons were in the apartment, among them defendant Colon who was also arrested. The agents conducted a limited security check to ensure that no one else was in the apartment who might pose a threat to their safety or destroy evidence. Segura, Colon, and the other occupants were taken to DEA headquarters. Agents then remained in the apartment for some nineteen hours until a search warrant had been issued. Segura, 104 S.Ct. at 3383-84. 35 The Supreme Court did not review whether the initial warrantless entry and limited security search were illegal as the courts below had determined. Id. at 3385. Instead, the Court concluded first that, 36 assuming that there was a seizure of all the contents of the petitioners' apartment when agents secured the premises from within, that seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, we hold that where officers, having probable cause, enter premises, and with probable cause, arrest the occupants who have legitimate possessory interests in its contents and take them into custody and, for no more than the period here involved, secure the premises from within to preserve the status quo while others, in good faith, are in the process of obtaining a warrant, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures. 37 Id. at 3382-83 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). Second, the Court held 38 that the evidence discovered during the subsequent search of the apartment the following day pursuant to the valid search warrant issued wholly on information known to the officers before the entry into the apartment need not have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal entry because the warrant and the information on which it was based were unrelated to the entry and therefore constituted an independent source for the evidence. 39 Id. at 3383. 40 The Segura decision controls the present case. The securing operation, which followed Solmor's arrest, the entry, and the limited security search, was based on probable cause 10 and merely preserved the status quo for some five to six and one-half hours--a period shorter than the nineteen hours in Segura--until a search warrant was obtained. 11 Under the terms of Segura 's first holding, this securing operation, although it may have been a seizure, was not an unreasonable seizure. 12 41 Finally, even if it is assumed 13 that the initial entry into and security search of Solmor's hotel quarters were illegal, the evidence discovered during the warrant search of Solmor's quarters was nonetheless admissible under the terms of Segura 's second holding because the information underlying the warrant was, as we have noted, 14 unrelated to the entry. Segura, 104 S.Ct. at 3383. In Segura, the district court had found causation between the initial illegality and the later discovery of the evidence. The Segura Court disputed this finding, but held that, even if causation were conceded, it was too attenuated to justify suppression of the evidence. Id. at 3392. Here, the district court has made no findings on causation. Under this Circuit's case law, this circumstance might call for a remand. See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir.1985). Nevertheless, the plausible theories of causation in the present case are no different from those in Segura. 15 In light of Segura 's conclusion on attenuation, suppression of the evidence would be unwarranted even if the district court were to find causation. We, therefore, decline to order a remand on the issue of causation.