Opinion ID: 852687
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Edmonson's Statements

Text: The centerpiece of Grinstead's ineffective assistance claim is his lawyer's stipulation to the admission of three incriminating hearsay statements made by Edmonson rather than requiring Edmonson to testify and be cross-examined. (Br. Pet'r.-Appellant at 7-9.) The essence of Grinstead's claim, and the Court of Appeals' opinion, is that the decision to allow the statements to be entered into evidence cannot be considered valid trial strategy because it effectively denied Grinstead his right to confront Edmonson and thereby directly challenge the evidence that was the heart of the State's case against Grinstead. Grinstead, 684 N.E.2d at 487. (Br. Pet'r.-Appellant at 9; Reply Br. Pet'r.-Appellant at 2.) We might find this reasoning more persuasive were we to agree that it is always defective strategy to keep an opponent's witness off the stand and that counsel's choice in this case did in fact leave the State's case unchallenged. In Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind.1999), during a joint trial of two codefendants, the State moved to admit the highly prejudicial videotaped statement of one of the defendants that was made in the absence of the co-defendant's counsel. Counsel for both defendants objected to the admission of the statement, but did so on the wrong grounds. Id. at 1185-86. Rather than objecting to what was clearly a violation of the Confrontation Clause under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), defense counsel objected to the admission on grounds of relevancy and the appearance of the defendant in the video. Garland, 719 N.E.2d at 1185-86. In concluding that Garland was denied effective assistance, we considered and rejected the State's argument that the failure to make a proper objection should be viewed as trial strategy given the efforts by defense counsel to minimize the harm of the statement. Id. However, our finding that defense counsel's performance fell below the required standard was actually based on counsel's attempt to object, but doing so on the wrong grounds. Id. Consequently, Grinstead's reading of Garland that the failure to object to the admission of statements by a co-defendant can never constitute valid trial strategy misunderstands that case. We considered the inclusion of the videotaped statement not to be trial strategy precisely because Garland's counsel tried to bar the evidencethus suggesting that it had never been trial strategy to admit the evidence. Put simply, Garland was denied effective assistance because her lawyer made a grossly improper objection to a highly prejudicial statement, not because it is never reasonable trial strategy to choose to allow into evidence an otherwise inadmissible statement by a co-defendant. In this case, counsel explained the decision to stipulate to the admission of the statements based on entirely reasonable grounds. As counsel explained at the post-conviction relief hearing: I definitely did not object [to] them [the statements] .... I had agreed to stipulate to their admission because I did not want Edmonson on the stand to testify, I thought it was far less damaging to our case to have just statements read as opposed to him being on the stand testifying.... I mean if you want it to be quite honest I believe that he was far more credible and believable than Mr. Grinstead. (P.C. Tr. at 16-17.) Counsel obviously had some doubts about the effect Edmonson's testimony would have on the jury, especially if the jury were able to compare the live testimony of Edmonson and Grinstead. [3] Because counsel believed that Edmonson was going to testify (he was here and he was in the jail, he was going to testify (P.C. Tr. at 18)), choosing to stipulate to the statements in exchange for preventing a potentially damaging witness from taking the stand seems to be a reasonable and professional choice. Moreover, defense counsel hardly left the State's case unchallenged. Counsel challenged Edmonson's credibility on several occasions, introducing evidence of Edmonson's appeal from his guilty plea (R. at 1061-63), and a note that Edmonson passed to Grinstead while the two were awaiting trial that indicates that Edmonson planned to give a statement to police but wanted to know what Grinstead had told the police so he could construct a story that would match up. (R. at 1059.) Moreover, throughout the trial, counsel tried to demonstrate that the State's evidence linking Grinstead to the actual killing was equivocal at best. For example, he attempted to demonstrate that the blood spatters on Grinstead were consistent with his client's account that he had not hit Cross with the tire iron. (R. at 906-07, 1194-95). He also sought to show that the State had found blood on Edmonson's shoes but not Grinstead's, despite the fact that the physical evidence suggested someone had repeatedly kicked Cross during the attack. ( See, e.g., R. at 371-72.) Although some might still say it would have been preferable to have Edmonson on the stand to challenge his credibility directly, counsel's decision on this score falls within the range of acceptable trial strategy, and we will not second-guess what appears to be the sort of reasonable choice litigators make.