Opinion ID: 1172016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Miranda Claim

Text: Shortly after defendant's arrest, Lassen County Undersheriff Lino Callegari interviewed him. The interview was tape recorded. Initially, Callegari informed defendant of his Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]) and obtained a waiver of them. The interview proceeded and defendant answered several questions. In particular, he admitted that he knew Shelton and that he had been staying with Shelton in the town of Madeline during the relevant time period. He also admitted seeing Kevin changing the tire on his trailer and seeing Laura with him at the cafe. He remembered filling his truck with gasoline and Shelton paying for it. He also recalled that the truck left the gas station and pulled off the side of the road (waiting for Kevin's vehicle). When asked if he saw Kevin's vehicle later or if defendant was driving the truck, defendant responded, I don't know. Callegari again asked defendant if he was driving the truck and defendant said, I don't know. I really don't want to talk about that. The interview continued, and Callegari asked questions involving areas other than the identity of the person driving the truck. Callegari noted that there were other areas which defendant indicated he did not wish to discuss. According to Callegari, any time I hit on an area where I'm getting into the, concentrating [on] the, homicide, [defendant] gets evasive to a point: doesn't deny, does not admit, stays in limbo. Defendant continued, however, to answer other questions. (14a) Defendant now claims that his statement, I really don't want to talk about that represented an invocation of his rights to remain silent and that any further questioning occurred in violation of his Miranda rights. The trial court properly rejected this argument. Having obtained defendant's consent to the questioning, Callegari was free to interview defendant until he exercised his privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 955 [83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114].) (15) A suspect may do so by refus[ing] to sign a waiver of his constitutional rights[,] ... refus[ing] to continue an interrogation already in progress[,] or ... [by] ask[ing] for an attorney. ( People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 535 [75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 40 A.L.R.3d 1323].) A defendant may indicate an unwillingness to discuss certain subjects without manifesting a desire to terminate an interrogation already in progress. (See, e.g., People v. Watkins (1970) 6 Cal. App.3d 119, 124 [85 Cal. Rptr. 621].) (14b) Here, the trial court listened to the tape recording and found that [I]n this case ... [defendant] does not claim that he had invoked his constitutional rights directly, but indirectly. And if you listen to the portion of the tape to which I listened, it is clear from the inflection that he was not even intimating that he wished to terminate the interrogation when he said, `I don't know, I really don't want to talk about that.' In light of the court's finding and our independent review of the tape recording, we find these statements were admissible and were not obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. (See People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218, 238 [107 Cal. Rptr. 157, 507 P.2d 1365].)