Opinion ID: 799366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statutory Age Discrimination Claims

Text: The plaintiffs allege that the union's conduct violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(1), and the Michigan state law corollary, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2204(a), both of which prohibit a labor organization from [e]xclud[ing] or expel[ling] from [] membership, or otherwise discriminat[ing] against its members because of their age. The same analysis governs both claims. See Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 626 (6th Cir.2009). A plaintiff can prove an intent to discriminate using either direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of intentional discrimination is evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the [defendant's] actions whereas circumstantial evidence allow[s] a factfinder to draw a reasonable inference that discrimination occurred. Id. at 620 (internal quotations omitted). With either direct or circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that age was the `but-for' cause of the ... adverse action[,] which excludes mixed-motive cases from liability. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 2351, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) (four members of the Court disagreed and would have allowed liability in mixed-motive cases). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act also authorizes recovery in a narrow band of disparate impact cases. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236-38, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005). A plaintiff who proceeds under a theory of disparate impact is not required to present evidence of a subjective intent to discriminate. Rather, a prima facie showing of disparate impact requires proof that a challenged practice, neutral on its face, had a disproportionately adverse effect on the members of a legally protected group. See Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1990); Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 803 F.Supp.2d 690, 695 (E.D.Mich.2011). Statistical evidence alone can suffice in a disparate impact case if it is of a kind or degree sufficient to correlate a specific employment or union practice with the complained-of adverse effect. See Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 830 (6th Cir.2000); Abbott, 912 F.2d at 872. The plaintiff, however, is responsible for isolating and identifying the specific ... practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989); superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); see Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 100, 128 S.Ct. 2395, 171 L.Ed.2d 283 (2008). The plaintiffs in this case argue that they have furnished material proof of both intentional discrimination and disparate impact. We address each theory in turn.
The plaintiffs reassert on appeal that certain statements by union decisionmakers constitute proof of intentional age discrimination. See Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 621 (6th Cir.2009) (Statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself [cannot] suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's burden ... of demonstrating animus.) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). However, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to them, no intent to exclude or otherwise discriminate against the plaintiffs emerges. If anything, the statements evince the union's willingness, albeit grudging, to grant certain Northwest pilots (including Second Officers and participants in the Pilot Early Retirement Program) full claim shares despite the fact that many of these pilots would retire well before the Bankruptcy Restructuring Agreement's termination in December 2011. For example, Eligibility Committee Member Bill Bartels indicated that `the really bad news is ... that many pilots retiring soon will get full credit for the concession period. We tried to find a way around it but couldn't.' (Br. of Pls.-Appellants 32.) Similarly, Master Executive Council Vice Chairman Ray Miller wrote an e-mail to a colleague resignedly stating that `I didn't write the law; and it doesn't matter how either of us feel with regard to the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] ... We are concerned about potential (and possibly successful) litigation.' Id. Because these allegedly discriminatory remarks did not relate to the plaintiffs and actually indicate the union's recognition of the need to comply with applicable law and avoid discrimination based on age, we agree with the district court that they cannot be construed as clear, direct evidence of discrimination. See Bondurant, 718 F.Supp.2d at 842. Further, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertions, the statements also fail to support an inference that the union used active employment status as a pretext to hide age animus when it created the claim eligibility rules. See Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 395 (6th Cir. 2008). It was reasonable for the union to provide some distinction based on the amount of time that a pilot worked during the seven-year concessionary period. The plaintiffs' age discrimination claims, insofar as they rely on evidence of the union's subjective intent to discriminate, do not present any trial-worthy questions of fact.
Next, the plaintiffs invoke statistical evidence to support their age discrimination claims based on a theory of disparate impact. They indicate that out of a pool of approximately 6,000 pilots, only 176 younger pilots (who quit or otherwise left Northwest employment prior to the cutoff date) received smaller claim shares than the plaintiffs, and only 73 older pilots (presumably those who secured Second Officer positions after reaching the then-mandatory FAA retirement age of 60) received larger claim shares than the plaintiffs. (Br. of Pls.-Appellants 36.) Thus, according to the plaintiffs' interpretation, the correlation between money received and age held true 95% of the time. Id. But of course, the plaintiffs' statistic fails to capture the fact that any older pilot who reached the age-60 threshold and retired after July 31, 2006 received a full claim share. So even though the cutoff date may have harmed the plaintiffs, it benefitted many more older pilots than the plaintiffs' statistic suggests. However, even if we presume, without deciding, that the plaintiffs have put forth sufficient statistical evidence to survive summary judgment, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act explicitly states that an employer or union may avoid liability if it can show that the challenged action was based on reasonable factors other than age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). The reasonable factors other than age clausean affirmative defense rather than an element of the discrimination claim that a plaintiff must disprove indicates that Congress took account of the distinctive nature of age discrimination, and the need to preserve a fair degree of leeway for employment decisions with effects that correlate with age.... Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102, 128 S.Ct. 2395; see Allen, 545 F.3d at 404 ([O]nce a plaintiff has satisfied the nontrivial burden of identifying a specific employment practice, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that the practice is supported by a [reasonable factor other than age].). Notably, the inquiry is one of reasonableness, and [u]nlike the business necessity test [applicable to Title VII cases], which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the [reasonable factors other than age test] includes no such requirement. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 243, 125 S.Ct. 1536. The then-mandatory, FAA age-60 retirement rule is an example of such a factor. Applying this statutory provision to the present case, the plaintiffs' age discrimination claims fail. The union was forced to come up with some method for distributing the $888 million Northwest claim. Its decision to create an eligibility cutoff date that was based on active employment and that coincided with the beginning of the Bankruptcy Restructuring Agreement was a reasonable, although imperfect, attempt to reconcile conflicting objectives. Specifically, it was a mechanism that allowed the union to distribute the claim shares quickly while avoiding a `full credit for all approach' [that] would have given a pilot active for one month the same share (worth more than $100,000) as one working 85 months. (Letter Br. of Defs.-Appellees 2.) Thus, while it may have created effects that correlated with age, the union has met its burden of demonstrating that the distribution scheme was based on reasonable other factors. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). We understand why the plaintiffs look longingly at the pilots who reached age 60 only a few months after the cutoff date, and feel underpaid by comparison. But we do not think that this line-drawing exercise as applied to older pilots was the result of discrimination. It was based on reasonable factors arising from limited bankruptcy funds to be distributed according to written criteria. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.