Opinion ID: 2469678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: davidson, et al. v. corrections cabinet

Text: This was a class action filed on behalf of convicted felons and parole violators who had been refused transfer to a state penal institution, seeking mandamus from the Daviess Circuit Court compelling the Corrections Cabinet to accept their transfer, and claiming that failure to do so is a violation of constitutional and statutory rights, the rules of criminal procedure and court judgments and orders committing their custody to the Corrections Cabinet in the state penal system. The lead plaintiffs had been held in county jail awaiting transfer, variously, 287 days, 174 days, 152 days, and 89 days. They had been refused transfer under the controlled intake procedure. Inmates similarly situated from other counties where there were court orders capping the prison population, state and federal, are given priority [5] over inmates from Daviess County where there is no court ordered population cap. CPP 17.3 prioritizes the intake of state prisoners first and primarily on the basis of whether the inmates are in a local facility under court order limiting inmate population. After that the order of admission is as follows: escapees, medical or security cases, and all other inmates. CPP 17.3 specifies no time limitation in which sentenced felons are to be accepted into the state correctional system and thus those inmates in Daviess County Jail were being held indefinitely. The position of the inmates is, regardless of the availability of beds in the state penal system, the Constitution, statutes, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and court orders of commitment, separately and collectively require the state to take custody and responsibility for the care of these convicted felons within a reasonable time, the days involved in their cases are conclusively unreasonable, and the court should fix a reasonable time in which these sentenced felons and state prisoners must be accepted into the state facilities. The position of the Corrections Cabinet is that the Constitution simply requires the state to provide for these prisoners; this is done by paying the fee established by the General Assembly to county facilities until such time as they are transferred to state custody, and the Constitution and these statutes give no substantive rights to the prisoners to demand housing and care within the state penal system. The Corrections Cabinet finally conceded at oral argument that a convicted felon does have a right at some point to be put into a state penal institution, and the ultimate question is simply the length of time before it becomes unreasonable for the Corrections Cabinet to continue to refuse commitment. The Corrections Cabinet then took the position that, since KRS 532.070(2) permits Class D felons to be committed to county jails for one year, and since misdemeanants can be held there for up to one year, housing felons up to one year is not unreasonable. The Corrections Cabinet argues acceptance of the controlled intake policy by the General Assembly implied from providing for payment of a fee to county jails to house sentenced felons in KRS 441.025(1), and in the subsequent budget appropriations. The Corrections Cabinet concedes there are certain facilities available within the state penal system which are not available in county jails: recreation, education, work opportunities, and rehabilitation programs. Some county jails make efforts in this direction, but these efforts are far short of the programs available in state facilities. One critical point made on behalf of the prisoners, which is not contested, is that state rehabilitation programs, which the Parole Board considers essential before parole, are not available in county jails. Another arguing point not substantially refuted which we have previously discussed is that the classification procedure could be significantly improved by requiring state correctional officials to come to the local jails to effect immediate classification of prisoners, thus identifying those who could be sent to minimum security institutions where there is space available, and thus eliminating at least these convicted felons from the long wait imposed by the limited capacity in medium and maximum security facilities. The Daviess Circuit Court concluded that the policy and practice of the Corrections Cabinet in delaying acceptance of convicted felons in the Daviess County Jail did not impose upon the rights of the petitioners sufficiently to mandate the granting of a writ of mandamus. The court decided it was unable to state as a matter of law that the conditions of the Daviess County Jail and/or the actions of the Defendants [Corrections Cabinet] are in violation of constitutionally protected rights. The petitioners have appealed, and we have granted transfer to consolidate with the two other cases with similar issues.