Opinion ID: 1253404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Out-of-State Conduct is Admissible Under Campbell

Text: The defendants in this case loosely argued that because the plaintiffs were injured by out-of-state conduct, Campbell prevented the jury from awarding punitive damages. Campbell did no such thing. The Campbell Court made clear that only two types of out-of-state conduct cannot be constitutionally considered by a judge or jury in making a punitive damage award. First, out-of-state conduct, even unlawful out-of-state conduct, that has no nexus to the conduct at issue in the case is inadmissible. Frankly, I am not sure why this rule rises to a constitutional level because such evidence should usually be excluded as irrelevant under our Rules of Evidence, but there it is. Second, the Campbell Court concluded that out-of-state conduct that is lawful where it occurs would generally not be admissible. However, the Court expressly stated that some lawful out-of-state conduct may still be considered: Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative in a civil action when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422, 123 S.Ct. 1513. The unlawful conduct in the instant case  the defendant's actions in assisting and encouraging the plaintiffs to violate Pennsylvania law  clearly had a nexus to the plaintiffs' injuries. Further, the statement by Tom Goffoli to the plaintiffs that the out-of-state licensing scheme was something the defendants did all the time was probative evidence because it demonstrated the deliberateness and culpability of the defendants' actions. There is simply no procedural or constitutional prohibition that would prevent this evidence from being used to support a punitive damage award.