Opinion ID: 1217805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether appellants may assert breach of an implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense in the action for summary possession.

Text: Appellants' answer to complaint raised breach of an implied warranty of habitability as a defense. Appellants contend that [t]he trial court's granting of possession where the defense of breach of warranty of habitability was raised was improper as a matter of law. In Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969), we held that in the lease of a dwelling there is an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use intended. Having adopted the view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship, we stated that upon breach of an implied warranty of habitability, a tenant would be entitled to the basic contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission. Id., 51 Haw. at 436, 462 P.2d at 475. We extended the holding of Lemle v. Breeden, supra , in Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969). In Lund, we held that an implied warranty of habitability exists in the lease of furnished, as well as unfurnished, dwellings. Id., 51 Haw. at 475, 462 P.2d at 483. Whether a tenant may assert breach of an implied warranty of habitability as a defense in an action for summary possession is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. We hold that where a landlord brings an action for summary possession based on a tenant's failure to pay rent, [2] the tenant may assert the landlord's breach of an implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense. Green v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 10 Cal.3d 616, 637, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 718, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182 (1974); LeClair v. Woodward, 6 Conn.Cir. 727, 728, 316 A.2d 791, 792 (1970); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 464-65, 196 N.W.2d 850, 853 (1972); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 59, 213 N.W.2d 339, 342 (1973); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa.Super. 76, 86, 384 A.2d 1234, 1240 (1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash.2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 166 (1973). The tenant's obligation to pay rent and the landlord's duty to maintain the premises in habitable condition are mutually dependent. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 380, 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at 635, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 716, 517 P.2d at 1181; Fritz v. Warthen, supra, 298 Minn. at 58, 213 N.W.2d at 341. As the court in Foisy v. Wyman, supra , stated: [T]he affirmative defense of breach of implied warranty of habitability goes directly to the issue of rent due and owing, which is one of the basic issues in an unlawful detainer action. Id., 83 Wash.2d at 31-32, 515 P.2d at 166. See Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 359, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972). However, the action for summary possession filed herein is not premised merely on the tenants' failure to pay rent due. It is undisputed that on March 11, 1975, the City Building Department sent appellees a notice to correct, citing substandard conditions which endanger the life, limb, health, property, safety or welfare of the occupants and directing appellees to demolish the building. Appellees then attempted to terminate the tenancy by sending the appellants a notice to vacate, dated April 14, 1975. [3] Appellants subsequently withheld their rent. Thus, it is clear that the appellees' primary reason for terminating the tenancy was premised on the City Building Department's order to demolish [4] the building. The record does not show that the appellees, prior to receipt of said order, planned to demolish the dwelling structures. In our opinion, in the factual context of this case, the appellants may assert appellees' alleged breach of an implied warranty of habitability, as an affirmative defense. Appellees' responsibility, if any, for the dwelling structures being in substandard conditions requiring demolition of the structure must be determined. Further, if it is determined that appellees are responsible for said substandard conditions, whether such responsibility constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability must also be determined. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellees herein.