Opinion ID: 1287748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Mahalick devotes the majority of his brief to challenging the denial of his motion for a new trial. We therefore review that decision before turning to the sentencing enhancement.
In a somewhat strange Brady argument, Mahalick first contends that the government violated his right to a fair trial by withholding material and favorable evidence. He claims that he told Special Agent Conway about the nightcrawler during his interview. Although Conway noted in her report that Mahalick wanted the gun for his and Ollie's mutual protection, she did not mention from what until cross-examinationand the government didn't remind Mahalick that he had told her it was from the nightcrawler. Mahalick says this disrupted his trial strategy because he didn't realize until Conway was on the stand that her testimony would corroborate his account. By that point, he contends, it was too late for the information to be of any use to him (even though it still left him time to decide whether to testify). The government violates the rule set out in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when it deliberately or inadvertently withholds evidence that is material and favorable to the defense. See United States v. Wilson, 481 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir.2007). But there was no Brady violation here. There are many problems with Mahalick's argument, and we will discuss only the two most significant. First, the government cannot be said to have suppressed evidence of what the defendant himself said, because the defendant[], being part[y] to the conversation, [was] equally aware. Brady requires disclosure only of exculpatory material known to the government but not to the defendant.  United States v. Dawson, 425 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir.2005) (emphasis added); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 686 (4th Cir.2002). Mahalick is essentially arguing that the government had a duty to tell him what he had told Conway during their interview. But Mahalick knows what he said, and if he forgot (and there is no indication that he did), it was not the government's job to remind him. Equally damning to the Brady argument, the allegedly withheld evidence is not exculpatory or otherwise helpful to Mahalick. Assuming that Ollie really did buy the gun for the couple's mutual protection in fear of the nightcrawler, in these circumstances that would not be a defense to the crime of possessing a handgun as a felon. Courts, including this court, have recognized in this context a defense of justification, which encompasses duress, necessity, and self-defense. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 800 F.2d 100, 107 (7th Cir.1986), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1393 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir.1979). But it is a rare defense, for [i]f ex-felons who feel endangered can carry guns, felon-in-possession laws will be dead letters. See United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir.1996). In practice, the defense has only applied to the individual who in the heat of a dangerous moment disarms someone else, thereby possessing a gun briefly in order to prevent injury to himself, United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 271-72 (5th Cir.1982), or to another, United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1138 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir.1991). See generally Perez, 86 F.3d at 736-37. A key feature of the defense is immediacy. In Panter, for instance, the defendant was attacked and stabbed in a bar by a convicted murderer out on bond pending his appeal. The defendant grabbed a gun from the bar in order to save himself. He faced an imminent threat of bodily harm, and had no recourse to lawful action, for if he had waited for the police, he would have been stabbed to death before help arrived. Panter, 688 F.2d at 269. The defendant's brief possession of the gun therefore outweighed the greater evil of his being murdered. The requirements of an imminent threat and a lack of recourse to lawful action mean that the defense does not apply if there is a way to avoid committing the felony of possession by a felon. See Perez, 86 F.3d at 737 (felon who mistook undercover surveillance team for robbers not allowed to take pistol with him for protection on the way to the bank); see also United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322, 326-27 (7th Cir.1998) (felon who was threatened over the phone by individuals saying they would come kill him could have fled or contacted authorities rather than arming himself). Mahalick, who harbored only a general fear of living in a dangerous neighborhood, faced neither an imminent threat nor a lack of lawful options. Convicted felons are not allowed to keep a gun under the bed in the event something bad happens. We note in this regard that the nightcrawler was actually apprehended a month before Ollie bought the gun, which further undercuts Mahalick's claim to fear imminent harm  and his claim that his mention of the nightcrawler bears any relevance at all. In addition to his Brady argument, Mahalick raised two points in his motion for a new trial, and again urges them on appeal. Neither requires much discussion. He first contends that Special Agent Conway misled the grand jury by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence  Mahalick's mention of the nightcrawler to her. But as shown above, this was not exculpatory evidence, and in any event, the grand jury is an accusatory, rather than an adjudicatory, body, and so the disclosure of exculpatory evidence is not required. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-54, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992); United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 529-30 (7th Cir.2006). Second, Mahalick claims that the government suborned perjury by directing Detective Jacksonthe other officer present during the interviewto testify falsely at trial. (Jackson testified that Mahalick did not mention the nightcrawler, whereas Conway testified that he did.) This is a serious accusation, and one too lightly made by defense counsel in this case. Mahalick has no evidence whatsoever of prosecutorial misconduct or perjury, and simply contends that since Jackson and Conway remembered the interview somewhat differently a year and a half after it took place, the government must have interfered. But it takes more than two witnesses' differing recollections to sustain a perjury charge. See United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373, 1377 (7th Cir.1994). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for a new trial.
Mahalick also challenges the district court's imposition of a four-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). [1] That provision calls for an enhanced sentence if the defendant transferred any firearm or ammunition with . . . reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. We review the district court's finding for clear error. United States v. Caldwell, 423 F.3d 754, 761-62 (7th Cir.2005). Mahalick first argues that there was no evidence that he had reason to believe that the gun he sold to Foster would be used in another felony offense. We note that the [ ]other felony offense cannot simply be that the buyer was a felon and upon purchasing the gun became a felon in possession of a firearm. See id. cmt. n. 15. But here Foster actually attempted an armed robbery with the gun that he bought from Mahalick. That fact does not, of course, shed light on whether at the time he sold the gun Mahalick had reason to believe that it would be used in a felony. See United States v. Cicirello, 301 F.3d 135, 141 (3d Cir.2002). But it was certainly foreseeable. Mahalick sold the gun to a gang member, which in itself may be enough to hold that the district court did not clearly err. See United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 918 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1255-56 (7th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Molloy, 324 F.3d 35, 39-40 (1st Cir.2003). But that's not all. Foster offered to pay Mahalick in crack, which shows Foster's propensity to commit crimes. See United States v. Wagner, 467 F.3d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir.2006) (sales of guns in return for cocaine indicates awareness that guns will be used in felonies). Indeed, Foster was a convicted felon, and had done drugs with Mahalick and committed acts of violence in his presence. The district court noted many of these points, stating: [T]here is absolutely no way to imagine that Samuel Foster had a licit use for this gun. He's a bad actor, and he's a street guy and a gang member, and he does crimes. At a minimum, he was going to have that gun with him somewhere he wasn't supposed to have the gun with him. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Mahalick had reason to believe the gun would be used in a felony. Mahalick also argues that since he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) of selling a gun to a felon, the district court engaged in impermissible double counting by imposing the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement for transferring a gun with reason to believe that it would be used in a felony. The two provisions do cover similar ground, for although selling to a felon and selling to one who will commit a felony are not exactly the same, felons are more likely to make illegal use of guns, and so Congress passed § 922(g) in order to keep guns out of their hands. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862-63, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985); United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 906 (7th Cir.2001). But even assuming for argument's sake that the substantive offense and the enhancement do punish the same behavior, Mahalick's four counts of conviction were grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) in such a way as to overcome any fears of double counting. According to the introductory commentary to Chapter 3, Part D of the Guidelines, one of the key purposes of grouping is to prevent multiple punishment for substantially identical offense conduct. When courts group several counts to which different guidelines apply, they calculate the base offense level using the count that would produce the highest offense level. The other counts essentially fall away for sentencing purposes. See § 3D1.3(b). [2] This prevents any double counting between one of several substantive offenses and an enhancement that punishes similar conduct. See United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 517 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (9th Cir.1999). For example, in United States v. Taylor , the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of drug crimes, and he received a sentencing enhancement for using the gun during the drug crimes. On appeal, he claimed that the enhancement double counted his firearms offense. But the firearm and drug crimes were grouped for sentencing, and since the drug counts carried the higher offense level, the district court effectively disregarded the firearms offense in calculating the sentence. 248 F.3d at 517. Therefore any overlap between the firearm offense and the firearm enhancement had no impact on the sentence. Id. A similar result obtains here, even though Mahalick's firearms offenses all fall under the same guideline, § 2K2.1. He was charged with several offenses, including possession of a firearm by a felon and selling a gun to another felon. But each offense carried the same base offense level of 20, and the enhancement would only double count the offense of selling a gun to a felon. The district court therefore only needed to pick one of the other offenses to form the base level. Since all the substantive offenses carried the same level, they were essentially interchangeable. Cf. United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (10th Cir.1995) (affirming sentence where one count produced ex post facto problem but other count did not and resulted in the same base offense level). Had Mahalick only been convicted of being a felon in possession, his sentence would be exactly the same and the enhancement would apply without any problem. Now, if Mahalick had been charged with multiple gun salessay, selling six guns to person X under count one, and two guns to person Y under count two for a total of eight gunsthen the number of guns would have been aggregated to come up with a base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(b). In that situation, it would be inaccurate to say that a count could fall out because the aggregate quantity involved in all the counts would determine the sentence. See id. § 2K2.1(b)(1). Here, however, as the district court found, Mahalick's count for selling the gun to a felon did not extend his base offense level, which would have been the same using all of his counts as it would have been using any one count. The district court therefore stated that it would consider the felon-in-possession charge as the substantive offense for calculating the base offense level. Since the enhancement did not overlap with that offense, Mahalick was not punished twice for the same behavior.