Opinion ID: 1372476
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of the STEP Waiver Agreement

Text: Hampton first contends that she did not intend for the Waiver to bar her Title VII claims. She provides the following reasons to support this assertion: she filed an EEOC charge reporting the alleged harassment prior to signing the Waiver; she could not file a lawsuit until she received a right-to-sue letter; her lawyer was not involved in negotiating the waiver; the waiver was not expressly conditioned on the release of her Title VII claim; and the waiver agreement was ambiguous. A release is simply a particular type of contract, and Illinois law governs questions regarding the parties' intent and the proper construction of the agreement. See Newkirk v. Vill. of Steger, 536 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir.2008). Our primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Vill. of S. Elgin v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., Inc., 348 Ill.App.3d 929, 284 Ill.Dec. 868, 810 N.E.2d 658, 670 (2004). Illinois follows the objective theory of intent, whereby the court looks first to the written agreement and not to the parties' subjective understandings. Newkirk, 536 F.3d at 774. The status of a document as a contract depends on what the parties express to each other and to the world, not on what they keep to themselves. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814-15 (7th Cir.1987). Thus, we must not interpret contractual language in a way contrary to the plain, obvious, and generally accepted meaning of its terms. Krilich v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 334 Ill.App.3d 563, 268 Ill.Dec. 531, 778 N.E.2d 1153, 1164 (2002). A standard principle of contract law is that we will not disturb an unambiguous agreement. Where a contractual release is clear and explicit, we must enforce it as written. Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Ill.2d 317, 84 Ill.Dec. 654, 472 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ill.1984); Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Wroblewski, 382 Ill.App.3d 688, 320 Ill. Dec. 772, 887 N.E.2d 916, 923 (2008). A contract is ambiguous if its terms may reasonably be interpreted in more than one way, Krilich, 268 Ill.Dec. 531, 778 N.E.2d at 1164, but it is not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties disagree upon its proper construction, Whiting Stoker Co. v. Chi. Stoker Corp., 171 F.2d 248, 250-51 (7th Cir.1948). Rather, an ambiguous contract is an agreement obscure in meaning, through indefiniteness of expression, or having a double meaning. Id. at 251. In Hampton's case, we need look no further than the Waiver. According to its language, in exchange for the STEP benefits Hampton agreed to release any and all rights or claims she may have had against Ford, and not to institute any proceedings of any kind against Ford relating in any way to her employment. The Waiver then expressly stated that Hampton did not waive any rights or claims that may arise after she signed the Waiver. First, we find no ambiguity in the Waiver. Both our court and Illinois courts have determined that releases with similar language were unambiguous. See, e.g., Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (Pierce I), 65 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.1995) (finding agreement that released any and all claims of any nature sufficient to release plaintiff's federal claim); Rakowski, 84 Ill.Dec. 654, 472 N.E.2d at 794 (finding release of any and all claims unambiguous). Hampton argues that the parties did not intend for the Waiver to release all claims in the usual sense because it was intended as a company-wide buyout, printed on a form agreement, with no negotiation between the parties. But these extrinsic circumstances do not affect the plain meaning of the Waiver's language and provide us with no reason to believe that the parties couldn't have meant what they seem to have said. Pierce I, 65 F.3d at 568 (quotations omitted). Second, the scope of the Waiver's any and all language encompassed Hampton's discrimination claims. A general release typically covers all claims of which a signing party has actual knowledge or that he could have discovered upon reasonable inquiry. Fair v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 905 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir.1990) (quotations omitted); see also Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir.1996). Neither party disputes that Hampton was aware of the alleged wrongful acts prior to the date she signed the Waiver. Her claims fall within the Waivers's scope unless Hampton presents a persuasive reason for construing the Waiver to exclude them. Hampton's primary assertion is that the Waiver did not release her Title VII claims because they did not arise until after she received her EEOC right-to-sue letter allowing her to file suit in federal court. Hampton is incorrect. See, e.g., Pierce I, 65 F.3d at 567-68 (holding that a general release covered plaintiff's claim, even though he had already filed an EEOC charge). The natural meaning of the term arise in the Waiver is that Ford intended for Hampton to release any potential claims based on conduct that occurred prior to the execution date. Cf. Wagner, 95 F.3d at 533 (In release cases, the question is not when was the date of accrual [for the statute of limitations], but rather whether the plaintiff is knowingly giving up the right to sue on some claims, or all claims that are in general terms predictable.); Capocy v. Kirtadze, 183 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.1999) (Illinois courts read general releases to include claims of which the parties were aware at the time of the release's execution.); Myers v. Health Specialists, S.C., 225 Ill.App.3d 68, 167 Ill.Dec. 225, 587 N.E.2d 494, 499 (1992) (noting that no justiciable claim arose until plaintiff suffered injury or a real threat thereof). Filing an EEOC charge and awaiting a right-to-sue letter do not alter that the conduct giving rise to Hampton's Title VII claims occurred before she signed the Waiver, and she was well within her rights to voluntarily release those claims. Furthermore, Hampton agreed not only to waive any claims that arose before signing the Waiver, but also not to institute any proceedings of any kind against Ford. The Title VII administrative scheme is distinct from a federal lawsuit. Although filing a charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to bringing a federal action, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), such a charge does not automatically institute a lawsuit. In fact, a component of Congress's original plan in drafting Title VII and creating the EEOC was to facilitate conciliation and settlement. See id. A mere two months after signing the Waiver, Hampton filed a complaint in the district court alleging wrongdoing that occurred prior to the execution date. In so doing, she initiated a proceeding in violation of the clear terms of the Waiver. Hampton's remaining arguments regarding the scope of the Waiver are unpersuasive. Ford's failure to refer expressly to Hampton's Title VII claims does not exclude them from the Waiver's scope; a party need not enumerate the specific claims an employee is waiving in a general release. See Wagner, 95 F.3d at 533; Constant v. Cont'l Tel. Co. of Ill., 745 F.Supp. 1374, 1380 (C.D.Ill.1990); Rakowski, 84 Ill.Dec. 654, 472 N.E.2d at 794. The Waiver also expressly excluded claims under the ADEA, which provides further support that it included all other claims. Next, Hampton suggests that Ford provided no consideration for relinquishing her Title VII claims, but she fails to explain why $100,000 does not qualify. Finally, despite her unfounded assertions that the Waiver was a contract of adhesion, Hampton does not allege that she signed the Waiver under duress or that it was otherwise invalid under state law. Therefore, we find that the Waiver unambiguously covered any and all claims arising prior to the date Hampton signed, including her discrimination claims.