Opinion ID: 1696163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Chapman Harmless Error Standard Was Misapplied

Text: That a reasonable-doubt instructional error of constitutional dimension pervades the case, defies Chapman harmless-error analysis and has been misclassified by the majority as a trial error emerges in sharp relief when the majority confronts the problem of applying the harmless error rule to the present case. After rehearsing selected passages from Chapman and other cases, my colleagues do not seriously attempt to apply the actual holding of Chapman but instead retreat quickly into what closely resembles a Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency of evidence review. They do not pause to demonstrate how they know that this particular jury applied the reasonable-doubt measure of persuasion even though the Supreme Court has held it was never correctly instructed on this measure. Nor do they attempt to explain why there is no reasonable possibility in this case that the instructional error may have contributed to the jury's returning a verdict of first-instead of second-degree murder. In conducting a proper harmless error analysis, courts focus not solely upon the sufficiency of the evidence indicating defendant's guilt, but also consider the effect of the error at the trial. The appellate court does not play the role of the jury in substituting its opinion based upon the evidence in the record as a whole, but rather its duty is to focus upon the erroneously admitted evidence or error and determine whether beyond a reasonable doubt that error had no impact on the ultimate finding of guilt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (The beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.); T. Stacy & K. Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 Colum.L.Rev. 79 (1988). Following these teachings, this court in the past has refused to deem harmless a violation simply because of overwhelming evidence in the record indicating that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herman, 304 So.2d 322 (La.1974); State v. Michelli, 301 So.2d 577 (La.1974). The majority opinion therefore does not even approach a correct application of the harmless error standard because it fails to focus upon the effect of the improper instruction in this case. Instead, the majority conducts a Jackson v. Virginia and perhaps a de novo review of the evidence to determine defendant's guilt. In discussing the error in the guilt phase, the majority contends, [b]ecause of the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's guilt, the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial judge ... was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (emphasis added). Moreover, in discussing the penalty phase the majority holds that [c]onsidering the entire record, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances. (emphasis added). In State v. Gibson, 391 So.2d 421, 426 (La.1980), the court stated that our state constitution prohibit[s] the weighing of evidence by this Court in criminal cases. The court noted that despite the amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 921, which gave reviewing courts greater leeway in reversing criminal convictions, our state constitution, nevertheless, still extends appellate jurisdiction only to questions of law in criminal matters. La. Const. 1974, art. V, § 5(C). Moreover, the Court, in Gibson, noted that despite the fact that an error shall be deemed harmless unless it `affect[s] substantial rights of the accused', this court constitutionally, however, still may not act as a surrogate jury; it is not free to substitute its determination of what the jury, in the absence of the error, would or should have decided in place of the jury's actual verdict. Id. at 426-27. Although the [harmless error] standard requires a reviewing court to consider the evidence in order to determine if there is a reasonable possibility that the error had prejudicial effect, it does not permit a court to substitute for the verdict its judgment of what the jury would or should have decided in the absence of error. Id. at 427; accord Monagham, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 Sup.Ct.Rev. 195, 200 (special concern exists that judicial toleration of harmless error is not a license for judicial invasion of the issue-resolving province constitutionally reserved to the jury.); Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define, 90 Colum.L.Rev. 1716, 1735, n. 141 (quoting Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2422, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (Error cannot be cured by an appellate court's determination that the record evidence unmistakably established guilt, for that would represent a finding of fact by judges, not by a jury. As with a directed verdict, `the error in such a case is that the wrong entity judged the defendant guilty.') The majority in this case, has completely ignored all of these teachings. Even though the constitutionally erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction defies proper application of the harmless-error standard and should never be considered harmless error for the reasons stated above, a diligent attempt to apply the Chapman analysis in the present case would have raised more doubts and concerns than does the majority's sufficiency of evidence review. Although the case was not close on the question of guilt or innocence of a homicide, it was closer on whether a responsive lesser verdict of second degree murder could have been returned in the guilt phase and whether a life sentence could have been recommended in the penalty phase. The estimation of the defendant's chances of avoiding the death penalty had the jury been correctly instructed on reasonable doubt must be elevated further when it is considered that the case was tried in a judicial district in which capital murder prosecution juries historically have returned lesser verdicts in approximately 30.3% of the cases, recommended life sentences in approximately 54.5%, and condemned the defendants to death in only approximately 12.4% of the trials. Brief for Appellee, Appendix to Sentence Review Memorandum at 1-7, State of Louisiana v. Tommy Cage, No. 87 KA 2778 (La.1991).