Opinion ID: 437447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant Courtland Jones

Text: 165 Defendant Jones raises several arguments unique to his appeal that result from the protracted procedural history of plaintiffs' case against him. Our review of the details of that history convinces us that Mr. Jones' assertions are without merit. 124 166 We begin with a summary of the procedural history of the case against Mr. Jones, the details of which are critical to our decision. Mr. Jones was not named as a defendant in the first complaint filed by plaintiffs in July 1976. By 1977, however, once discovery had begun, plaintiffs learned of Jones' role in the 'internal security' activities of the WFO, and apparently believed him to have injured them in connection with COINTELPRO effort at the WFO. Hobson, 556 F.Supp. at 1184. Plaintiffs therefore included Mr. Jones as one of the FBI defendants named in their amended complaint filed October 28, 1977. 125 Plaintiffs made several attempts thereafter to serve Mr. Jones, first at the WFO, later at his residence. Mr. Jones has admitted that on December 19, 1978, he was aware that the papers were served at his residence but, because the papers were left at his residence, and not served on him personally (or left with a person of suitable age), he has claimed he was not served. 126 In December 1978, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 50.15 (1977), Mr. Jones requested that the Department of Justice appoint counsel for him. Hobson, 556 F.Supp. at 1184. The Department assigned to him the lawyer who was then and throughout trial continuously representing all the FBI defendants. 167 In April 1979, Messrs. Jones and Schlarman, another defendant, moved for dismissal of the claims against them, on the ground that service of process was not effected upon a person of 'suitable age and discretion' at their homes in accordance with Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hobson, 556 F.Supp. at 1184 (quoting a November 9, 1979, memorandum opinion by Judge Pratt). The District Court judge granted the motion without prejudice to fresh attempts to serve process. Id. 168 In November 1980, after the case was reassigned to Judge Oberdorfer, before whom it was tried, the court directed the parties to  'propose a practical solution for the problem posed by the failure to effect service on a number of defendants,' including defendant Jones. Id. at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Wilson, No. 76-1326 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1980)). According to Judge Oberdorfer, 169 At status calls held in late 1980 and in January 1981, the Court discussed the failure of plaintiffs to serve Jones and other defendants; however, counsel for the served FBI defendant[s] declined to take any action, claiming not to represent those unserved defendants and because those defendants are not under the personal jurisdiction of the Court. 170 Id. (quoting Letter of David M. White (dated Nov. 25, 1980), filed as Attachment to Order of Dec. 8, 1980). 171 On June 21, 1981, plaintiffs perfected service of process on Mr. Jones. Pretrial orders then in effect scheduled discovery to terminate at the end of July 1981. Mr. Jones did not seek an extension of the discovery period, 127 but in August 1981 moved for dismissal of the claims against him, inter alia, for failure to prosecute under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He argued principally that he would be unfairly disadvantaged by trial in the autumn of 1981. The District Court rejected his motion: 172 [H]e will suffer no prejudice if plaintiffs are precluded from raising any claim against him not stemming from acts already involved in the litigation against other defendants who are represented by Jones' counsel, and who were with Jones in the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the time of his allegedly unlawful conduct. Counsel for Jones is invited to submit with his pretrial brief an appropriate order concerning claims to be precluded. 173 Id. at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Wilson, No. 76-1326, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 1981)). Mr. Jones' FBI counsel did not submit the proposed order to the court. 128 174 After trial, Mr. Jones renewed his argument that dismissal was required under Rule 41 for lack of prosecution. The court again disagreed. 175 On appeal, Mr. Jones raises several arguments. First, he contends that even if the statute of limitations was properly tolled as to all defendants named in the July 1976 complaint, it was not tolled as to himself, because he was not named in a complaint until the following year. In addition, he argues, the date of the amended complaint does not relate back to the original complaint because it does not meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, he argues that the statute of limitations was not tolled until service of process was perfected in 1981, and that plaintiffs surely cannot argue that they did not know of the claim until three years before 1981. Third, he again renews his assertion that the action should have been dismissed under Rule 41 for failure to prosecute. We consider each argument in turn. 176 First, as even Mr. Jones appears to concede, 129 the first official verification of the COINTELPRO program occurred in November 1974, when Attorney General Saxbe held a widely publicized press conference. That press conference led the Fifth Circuit to conclude, in United Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 153-54 (5th Cir.1980), that the statute of limitations on plaintiffs' claims challenging COINTELPRO began running in November 1974, because [w]here events receive such widespread publicity, plaintiffs may be charged with knowledge of their occurrence. Id. at 154. In United Klans, the court observed that Attorney General Saxbe had identified plaintiffs' group as one of the COINTELPRO targets. We need not consider here whether that press conference as a matter of law put all plaintiffs on notice of their claims against the FBI. We have absolutely no reason to believe that the plaintiffs whose actions against the FBI remain in light of our statute of limitations discussion had notice before that press conference. Mr. Jones has not pointed us to evidence to that effect. Thus, assuming arguendo that the conference made public sufficient information to put all plaintiffs on notice, they still filed their claim against Jones in October 1977, within three years of that press conference. 130 We therefore conclude that plaintiffs amended their complaint, and filed the amended complaint, within three years of the earliest date on which they might have had notice of their claims on the basis of public knowledge. We reject Mr. Jones' argument that the action against him was not timely filed and find it unnecessary to consider whether the filing date of the amended complaint relates back to the original complaint. 177 Mr. Jones next argues that even if the amended complaint was filed within the period of repose, the statute was not tolled until service was complete. We find that this argument is based on an incorrect view of the role of service of process in a case in this Circuit and, accordingly, reject it. 178 It is now well-established that in diversity actions, in which a federal court applies a state statute of limitations, the court must also follow the state's rule as to whether the filing of a complaint, the service of process, or some other procedural hurdle commences the action and tolls the statute of limitations. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980). While it is also quite clear that a federal court confronted with a federal cause of action, but borrowing a state statute of limitation in the absence of a federally prescribed limitation period, must follow federal law as to the procedural steps that commence an action for statute of limitation purposes, the Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. has led some litigants to argue that State law controls. 131 On this point, we note that Justice Marshall, writing in Walker, expressly stated that the holding did not extend to federal causes of action; 132 however, we need not reconsider that issue here because, under decisions both of this court in federal actions and of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, it is unquestionably the case that the filing of a complaint commences an action for statute of limitation purposes. See Jordan v. United States, 694 F.2d 833, 837 & n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1982) (appellants need only timely filing, not proper service, to toll the statute of limitations in federal tort claims action); Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 62 (D.C.1980) (en banc) (holding that D.C. law requires only the filing of a complaint to commence an action and thereby toll the statute of limitations, and that questions about plaintiff's diligence in obtaining service of process should be addressed by means of a motion for failure to prosecute). There can be no doubt that the statute tolled as to claims against Mr. Jones at the latest when the amended complaint was filed. Delay in service of process is an issue more properly addressed as an element of a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. We now turn to consider Judge Oberdorfer's ruling on that issue. 179 In reviewing a ruling of the trial court on a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b), our task is extremely limited. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we must affirm the ruling of the trial court. Cherry v. Brown-Frazier-Whitney, 548 F.2d 965, 969-70 (D.C.Cir.1976); Sheaffer v. Warehouse Employees Union, 408 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1996, 23 L.Ed.2d 449 (1969). Our inquiry is especially circumscribed when we review a refusal to dismiss; it is generally accepted that cases in that posture warrant a particularly narrow standard of review, see Finley v. Parvin/Dohrmann Co., 520 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir.1975), 133 under which discretion 180 is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. 181 Finley, 520 F.2d at 390 (quoting Delno v. Market Street Railway, 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.1942)). This narrow standard is attributed to the procedural posture that a refusal to dismiss will have when it reaches the appellate court. There is a natural reluctance to reverse a plaintiff's judgment on the merits because of a pretrial order refusing to dismiss for want of prosecution. Finley, 520 F.2d at 391. The reason is simple: a trial court's discretionary denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss is not nearly so harsh as would be an appellate court's decision that a judgment for plaintiffs must be reversed and remanded for a dismissal with prejudice. 182 In this case, while we share Judge Oberdorfer's view that plaintiffs displayed unusual indifference to the requirement of service, 134 we also find entirely reasonable his conclusion that defendant Jones was not prejudiced by the delay. Absent prejudice, we cannot find that the motion to dismiss was improperly denied, particularly since plaintiffs obviously were trying to prosecute their claim when the motion was filed. Moreover, we are persuaded that the alternative to dismissal that was imposed--limiting plaintiffs' claims against Mr. Jones to those stemming from acts already involved in the litigation against other defendants--adequately protected Mr. Jones' interests. 183 This case is immediately distinguishable from those in which delay in service causes defense counsel to rush in their preparations. See, e.g., Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir.1976). Here, Mr. Jones shared counsel with the other defendants and, because of the court-imposed limitation on claims against Mr. Jones, he received the full benefit of those preparations. Mr. Jones' failure both to request an extension in discovery, and to submit suggestions of claims to be precluded, cannot now be turned against the plaintiffs. Dismissal is a severe sanction, and alternative sanctions are not only permissible but often preferred. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Sec. 2370, at 203 (1971) (appellate courts do not look favorably on dismissal with prejudice if there are lesser sanctions that could vindicate the purpose of the rules). It simply is not for a defendant to snub the court's alternative of limiting the claims against him and then argue prejudice. 184 Moreover, this case differs from one in which a defendant on whom tardy service is perfected is unfairly robbed of an expectation that he will not have to defend a claim. Here the trial judge made clear to FBI counsel that plaintiffs sought to serve Mr. Jones and that the court wanted the parties to work out a procedure. It was undoubtedly reasonable for Judge Oberdorfer to conclude that Mr. Jones' appointed counsel relayed this information. 135 185 On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Jones' motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b).