Opinion ID: 504004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiffs' suit against Marriott

Text: 17 With the dismissal of the claim against Pan Am, we are left with the claim against Marriott for tortious inducement of breach of contract. We must examine whether there is any basis for a federal court to retain jurisdiction over this claim. Although the claim against Marriott was originally removed from state court, the plaintiffs' amended complaint in the district court alleged federal question jurisdiction only for the claims against Pan Am, and invoked ancillary and pendent jurisdiction to support the claim against Marriott. There were no allegations in the amended complaint to support the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. 18 Ancillary and pendent jurisdiction refer to the power of a federal court, once it acquires jurisdiction over a case and controversy properly before it, to adjudicate other claims sufficiently closely related to the main claim even though there is no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the related claims. See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure Secs. 3523, 3567 (1984). Traditionally, ancillary jurisdiction refers to joinder, usually by a party other than the plaintiff, of additional claims and parties added after the plaintiff's claim has been filed. It is mainly a tool for defendants and third parties whose interests would be injured if their jurisdictionally insufficient claims could not be heard in an ongoing action in federal court. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2403-04, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). Pendent jurisdiction traditionally refers to the joinder of a state-law claim by a party already presenting a federal question claim against the same defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Pioneer Lumber Treating Co., 496 F.Supp. 199, 201 (E.D.Wash.1980). The tests for when it is appropriate for a federal court to adjudicate a pendent claim were set forth in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact ... [I]f, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then ... there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. [P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.... Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (footnote omitted). 19 Since Gibbs, federal courts have often permitted a plaintiff presenting a federal claim against one defendant to assert a related state claim against a different defendant. See, e.g., Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir.1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlop, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.1971); see Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction--The Problem of Pendenting Parties, 34 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1 (1972). Such pendent party jurisdiction is a hybrid of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction which does not neatly fit the traditional definition of either. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 3567.2. The Supreme Court has twice declined to analyze whether there are any principled differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, and, if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differences. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2419-20, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); Owen, 437 U.S. at 370 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. at 2401 n. 8. We find it unnecessary to resolve that open question, however, since this case may be decided solely by reference to Gibbs and to traditional notions of pendent jurisdiction. 20 The plaintiffs have argued that the district court has the power to fashion a federal common law cause of action for tortious interference, and that the claim against Marriott is based on that federal claim. The federal courts do have the power to develop a uniform body of federal law in the process of construing and enforcing collective bargaining agreements covered by Sec. 301, of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917-18, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). Thus, some federal courts have permitted claims asserting tortious interference with labor contracts governed by the LMRA. E.g., Local 472, United Ass'n v. Georgia Power Co., 684 F.2d 721, 725-26 (11th Cir.1982); Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild, 647 F.2d 372, 379-81 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). However, under the RLA, which governs this case, there is no comparable power to create federal common law. Implying a federal claim for tortious interference would conflict with the strong policy under the RLA of keeping questions of labor contract interpretation out of the federal courts. There is no authority for creating a federal common law tort for this case and federal common law cannot serve here as a source of federal question jurisdiction. 21 What remains is the state claim for tortious interference against Marriott. Because a federal claim of tortious interference under the RLA is arguably pleaded and is at least colorable, the state tortious interference claim is pendent to it. The same plaintiffs are pleading against the same defendant (Marriott) state and federal claims arising from a common nucleus of operative fact --as Gibbs puts it. The question then is whether the district court should, as a matter of discretion, retain jurisdiction over that state claim against Marriott. 22 The basis for retaining jurisdiction is weak when, as is the case here, the federal claims are dismissed before trial. The Court in Gibbs stated that [c]ertainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. While later decisions indicate that dismissal of the state claims is not absolutely mandatory, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-05, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1213-14, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970); Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 619 n. 7, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988), when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine--judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Carnegie-Mellon, --- U.S. at ---- n. 7, 108 S.Ct. at 619 n. 7. See Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 464 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186, 106 S.Ct. 2926, 91 L.Ed.2d 554 (1986). 23 In its present posture this suit against Marriott is not one of the rare cases where retaining jurisdiction would be appropriate. At this early stage in the proceedings judicial economy, convenience and fairness do not demand that the federal courts hear this pendent claim. An alternative forum is available to the plaintiffs in the state courts. One factor that may sometimes favor retaining pendent jurisdiction is when a state claim is closely tied to questions of federal policy and where the federal doctrine of preemption may be implicated. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S.Ct. at 1139-40. However, it is not necessary at this time to reach the question of whether the state-law claim of tortious interference with contractual relationships is preempted by federal labor law. Aside from preemption, the overall balance of factors to be considered in the exercise of judicial discretion weighs against retaining pendent jurisdiction over the action against Marriott. 24 When all bases for federal jurisdiction have been eliminated from a case so that only pendent state claims remain, the federal court should ordinarily dismiss the state claims. Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. Where the state claims originally reached the federal forum by removal from a state court, the district court has the discretion to dismiss the claims without prejudice or remand them to the state court. Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720. 25 There is an alternative disposition of the case that should also be considered. The jurisdictional situation would be different if the plaintiffs' suit were based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs originally sued Marriott in the New York State Supreme Court. Marriott removed the action to the federal district court, so diversity probably existed then. However, the plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add federal claims against Pan Am and removed diversity as a basis for jurisdiction. The reasons for giving up diversity jurisdiction are not clear, but it may have been done because there was no diversity between the plaintiffs and the new defendant, Pan Am. With the case against Pan Am dismissed, diversity may again exist between plaintiff and defendant. If on remand plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint to assert diversity jurisdiction, and if the district court determines that diversity exists, the court should permit the case against Marriott to proceed as a diversity action. Bautista, 828 F.2d at 552. This could be more economical than remanding the suit to the state court for immediate removal back to the district court. 26 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' complaint against Marriott is remanded to the district court to determine (if plaintiffs are allowed to and so amend their complaint) whether diversity jurisdiction exists. In that event, the district court should decide anew (or reaffirm its earlier ruling) whether plaintiffs' state claim against Marriott is preempted by federal law. If there is no diversity jurisdiction (or if plaintiffs fail to amend their complaint to allege diversity jurisdiction) the court shall decide whether to dismiss the complaint or to remand it to the state court in conformance with Carnegie-Mellon.