Opinion ID: 2461900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statement by the Appellant to D.S.

Text: [¶ 9] In his new trial motion filed on February 3, 2010, the appellant raised eight issues. The first issue was whether the State had violated two court ordersone regarding uncharged misconduct evidence and one requiring the State to set forth the proposed testimony of witnessesby eliciting testimony from D.S. that had not been revealed to defense counsel. The essence of that testimony was that, sometime after D.S. had told the authorities about the appellant's hunting camp description of the murder, D.S. and the appellant saw one another at a gas station and the appellant threatened to kill D.S. if he ever again talked to the police. [¶ 10] Defense counsel objected at trial to this testimony as being violative of W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(A)(i)(2), because the State had not disclosed the alleged threat. [2] After a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the district court admonished the prosecutor for not disclosing the statement, and then instructed the jury to disregard that portion of D.S.'s testimony. The State now contends that W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(A)(i)(2) governs only oral statements made to law enforcement officers, and that the summary of D.S.'s testimony disclosed in discovery was adequate under the rule. [3] [¶ 11] We have said many times that a trial error may be corrected by an appropriate curative instruction, and that we presume that jurors follow the court's instructions. See, e.g., Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 24, 178 P.3d 396, 405 (Wyo.2008); Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Wyo. 1998); Rubio v. State, 939 P.2d 238, 243 (Wyo.1997); and Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo. 1987). In the instant case, the district court instructed the jury as follows immediately after the appellant's objection: THE COURT: All right. You may all be seated. The jury is present again. And I want to remind the jury of initial instruction that I gave to them about when evidence is stricken. I instructed you [sic] the outset that sometimes throughout the trial I would be called upon to pass upon the question of whether or not some evidence might be admitted and that you weren't to be concerned with my reasons for such rulings. And if I do strike evidence you are number one not to consider it and certainly not to consider the reasons for me striking it because you certainly are the triers of the facts, but I am thethe Court determines the admissibility of evidence. So I am hereby instructing you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that you are not to consider any of [D.S.]'s testimony considering thewhen he saw the Defendant at the Chevron station, any statements made by theallegedly made by the Defendant, you are not to consider any of those or [D.S.]'s move to California. In other words, [D.S.]'s testimony of anything after he said he talked to the Sheriff, anything after that is stricken and you're not to consider anything after that. [¶ 12] A new trial should be granted only if required in the interest of justice[,] which standard is similar to that for granting a mistrial: Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial.  Yellowbear v. State, 2008 WY 4, ¶ 67, 174 P.3d 1270, 1295 (Wyo.2008) (quoting Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo.1995) (emphasis added)). The appellant bears the burden of proving prejudice by the denial of a new trial motion. Yellowbear, 2008 WY 4, ¶ 67, 174 P.3d at 1295. Here, in the context of the overwhelming evidence of the appellant's guilt, and the district court's detailed curative instruction, we cannot say that the post-trial motion should have been granted. The appellant has not met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by denial of the new trial motion in respect to the stricken testimony.