Opinion ID: 2388738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Child Custody Jurisdiction

Text: Traditionally, jurisdiction to determine a child custody dispute was based on the child's domicile (which, under the common law, was the father's domicile.) [1] Because of the nature of such disputes, however, the rule of domicile was considered unworkable by many courts, because, strictly applied, it left them without authority to act in the best interest of a child who was before the forum and in grave need of protection. Gradually, courts began to assume and exercise jurisdiction in those custody-related matters involving children who were present in the state. But this solution soon proved unworkable, too, because it unintentionally fostered child-snatching  the search for a friendly forum by a non-custodial parent or guardian seeking to overturn an unfavorable decree from another state. As divorce because more common and society more mobile, the volume and complexity of interstate child custody decrees increased dramatically. The courts in most states did not extend full faith and credit to the custody orders of their sister states, because of the inherently modifiable nature of those decrees. The full faith and credit doctrine requires the forum state to enforce a foreign decree, but only to the extent that it was enforceable in the rendering state. Because child support decrees are subject to modification in the rendering state until the child reaches the age of majority, the forum state considered itself equally free to modify the decree. This rule was approved by the United States Supreme Court on several occasions. See, e.g., People v. State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947). As the interstate trafficking in competing child custody decrees became more serious, there was some hope that the United States Supreme Court would remedy the situation by reversing its previous position and holding that such orders were entitled to enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But, given the opportunity to do so in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953), the Court instead decided the case on an alternative ground, holding that a custody order is not entitled to full faith and credit if the rendering state lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. [2] More significant than the majority opinion in May, however, was Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, in which he suggested that even if full faith and credit is not constitutionally required, comity should be extended to foreign decrees in order to avoid child-snatching, forum-shopping, and the like. Id. at 535, 73 S.Ct. at 844 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A large number of state courts acted on this suggestion, at least for a time. But comity in child custody cases turned out to be more honored in the breach than in the application, as local courts found ways to avoid enforcement of existing out-of-state orders on one legal pretext or another. In response to mounting concern, the Uniform Commissioners promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 1968, with the express intent of eliminating interstate competition over custody matters, child-snatching, and unauthorized holdovers following authorized visitation periods. The various state legislatures were slow to adopt the measure, however, and momentum in favor of the UCCJA did not pick up speed until the late 1970s. Finally, by 1980, most states had adopted the UCCJA, or some variation of it, but there were still a number of holdouts. At this point, the United States Congress stepped in, enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Framed in much the same language as the UCCJA, although not identical to it, the PKPA was meant to make child custody jurisdiction uniform throughout the 50 states and thus prevent the non-UCCJA states from becoming havens for forum-shoppers and child-snatchers. In effect, the PKPA requires that full faith and credit be given to foreign custody decrees, to the extent that the other state's child custody determination [was] made consistently with the provision of [the PKPA]. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). The significance of this provision has been diminished by the adoption of the UCCJA in some form in all 50 states. Nevertheless, as federal law the PKPA is pre-emptive, and it controls in any case in which there is a conflict between federal and state law. As this opinion demonstrates, the most significant difference between the PKPA and the UCCJA is the fact that under the Uniform Act, more than one state may have jurisdiction over a child custody matter at any given point in time, while under the PKPA, jurisdiction is theoretically limited to a single state, depending on the facts of the case. Tennessee's version of the UCCJA is codified as T.C.A. §§ 36-6-201  225. Since its enactment in 1979, there have been no amendments to and relatively few reported decisions concerning the statute. It bears the title Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act despite the fact that it is nonuniform with the original UCCJA in one very important respect. The purposes of the UCCJA and the Tennessee statute are identical, however. And, because the need for uniformity among jurisdictions is so pressing, it can be argued that the statutory purposes set out in T.C.A. § 36-6-201 carry more than ordinary weight in the interpretation of other provisions in the act. They speak of the need to [a]void jurisdictional competition and conflict with the courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being; the need to [p]romote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child; the need to [a]ssure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and [assure] that [Tennessee] courts decline exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state; the need to [d]iscourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child; and the need to [d]eter abductions and other unilateral removals of children, to [a]void re-litigation, to [f]acilitate enforcement of custody decrees of sister states, to promote cooperation between courts, and to make the custody laws uniform. T.C.A. § 36-6-201. The Tennessee statute tracks the UCCJA's definitional provisions closely, the most significant section for purposes of this opinion being that found in T.C.A. § 36-6-202(5): Home state means the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his or her parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six (6) consecutive months.... Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the six (6) months. .. . The home state definition is vital to an understanding of the two cases involved in this appeal, because under the Tennessee statute (but not the UCCJA), the courts of this state have jurisdiction to make or modify a child custody order if Tennessee is the home state of the child at the commencement of the proceeding or was the child's home state within six (6) months before commencement of the proceeding and the child has been taken outside Tennessee by a person claiming custody, leaving one parent (or a person acting as parent) in Tennessee. T.C.A. §§ 36-6-203(a)(1)(B). In other words, if Tennessee has been the child's home state and the child is now in another jurisdiction, Tennessee continues to be the child's home state for an additional period of six months following removal, at which point the other state becomes the child's home state, based on the child's presence there for a period of six consecutive months. If Tennessee is not the child's home state, a Tennessee court may assume jurisdiction only upon a finding that no other state qualifies as the child's home state, or that the home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction and deferred to Tennessee as the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child. T.C.A. § 36-6-203(a)(2)(A) and (3). Upon such a finding, a Tennessee court has jurisdiction to determine or modify custody if it also finds (1) that [t]he child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with this state, (2) that [t]here is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationship, and (3) that [i]t is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction. T.C.A. § 36-6-203(a)(2). Tennessee thus sets up a priority of circumstances to establish jurisdiction. Only if there is no home state jurisdiction or the home state defers to Tennessee can a Tennessee court exercise jurisdiction based on a significant connection with the child. Under this scheme, jurisdiction exists in only one state at a time. As it turns out, this approach is identical to the jurisdiction provision in the PKPA, but it is significantly different from the UCCJA's jurisdictional scheme, and thus different also from the Hawaii provision taken from the UCCJA that figures prominently in the Brown case and the Georgia provision, also taken from the UCCJA, that applies in the Hall case. Under the UCCJA, jurisdiction may exist in more than one jurisdiction at a time. To avoid conflict, competition, and relitigation, the UCCJA encourages courts with simultaneous jurisdiction to communicate and cooperate with each other and, when appropriate, to defer to one another. Hence, under Hawaii Revised Statute § 583-3 and Georgia Code Annotated § 74-504 a court in those states could exercise jurisdiction on either a home state or a significant connection basis, while Tennessee could assume significant connection jurisdiction only if there were no home state. Perhaps because Congress recognized that courts with simultaneous jurisdiction might not cooperate or defer, as the UCCJA requires, or that it was unrealistic to expect full cooperations or deference, the PKPA follows the prioritized model also utilized by the Tennessee statute. In most other respects, however, all the statutes  the UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Tennessee version of the Uniform Act  are consistent with each other. Thus, the statutes of all three states (Tennessee, Hawaii and Georgia) provide, in those parts pertinent to this litigation, that a court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this [act] if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this [act], unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this state is a more appropriate forum for other reasons. T.C.A. § 36-6-207(a); H.R.S. § 583-6 (1985); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-507 (1981) (emphasis added). The PKPA likewise mandates deferral: A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (emphasis added). Under all three state statutes, the trial court is required to make a full inquiry of the parties and the pleadings, to determine whether there are simultaneous proceedings pending in other states, including a direct ... inquiry to the state court administrator or appropriate official of the other state. T.C.A. § 36-6-207(b); H.R.S. § 583-6(b); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-507(b). Moreover, [i]f the Court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum. T.C.A. § 36-6-207(c); H.R.S. § 583-6(c); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-507(c). Even if a court in one state has entered a custody decree before being informed of a proceeding pending in [the other state], that court must communicate with the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more appropriate forum. Id. Finally, all three states require the recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this [act], T.C.A. § 36-6-214; H.R.S. § 583-13; Ga. Code Ann. § 74-514, and restrict the jurisdiction of the forum court to modify an initial custody decree or a modification order of the rendering state. See T.C.A. § 36-6-215(a), H.R.S. § 583-14(a), and Ga. Code Ann. § 74-515(a), which prohibit modification of a foreign decree unless (1) it appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this [act] or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this state has jurisdiction. The PKPA modification provision is substantially the same. It permits modification by the forum state of an existing decree of the rendering state only if (1) [the forum court] has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and (2) the [rendering] court no longer has jurisdiction to modify [the] custody determination [in question]. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f). Finally, the statutory provisions of Tennessee, Hawaii, and Georgia regarding the guidelines for the finding of inconvenient forum are identical. See T.C.A. § 36-6-208, H.R.S. § 583-7; Ga. Code Ann. § 74-508. They permit [a] court which has jurisdiction under this [act] to make an initial or modification decree [to] decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the circumstances of this case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. Id. at subsection (a). Such a finding may be made sua sponte, as well as on the motion of either party or a guardian ad litem. Id. at subsection (b). The factors to be taken into account in determining the issue of deference to a more convenient forum are generally predicated upon a determination of the best interest of the child. Id. at subsection (c). They require the forum court to consider, specifically, the following: (1) If another state is or recently was the child's home state; (2) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants; (3) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another state; (4) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and (5) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any of the purposes stated [in the first section of this act]. T.C.A. § 36-6-208(c); H.R.S. § 583-7(c); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-508(c). In determining which of two fori is the more convenient and whether to exercise or decline to exercise jurisdiction, courts are also encouraged to communicate with each other, to dismiss or stay proceedings upon a finding of inconvenience, and to maintain a registry for pertinent interchange of such information. Id. at subsections (d)-(i). Finally, the state statutes incorporate a clean hands doctrine, permitting a court to decline jurisdiction [i]f the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct. T.C.A. § 36-6-209(a); H.R.S. § 583-8(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-509(a). Moreover, the statutes require a court to decline jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. T.C.A. § 36-6-209(b); H.R.S. § 583-8(b); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-509(b). This somewhat superficial summary of key provisions of the relevant statutes provides a general idea of what turns out to be a fairly complex scheme  complex in the sense that the state and federal statutes, while espousing the same goals, are not a perfect fit. As one noted commentator has observed, the terms of the UCCJA and the PKPA are full of loopholes and technical enough to delight a medieval property lawyer. Clark, Domestic Relation § 13.5, 822, 825 (2d ed. 1985). Nevertheless, those terms can be divined to require that we affirm the trial court's judgment in each of the two cases before us and reverse that of the Court of Appeals in both cases.