Opinion ID: 1923817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was trial court right in overruling defendant's motion for separate trial on each count?

Text: Confronted with the three-count information, defendant moved for separate trial upon each count, alleging that otherwise the jury would improperly [consider] evidence of other crimes in the determination of whether or not the Defendant is guilty of any of the alleged crimes. His allegations of constitutional due process and equal protection violations were not asserted here. Trial court overruled the motion, noting defendant failed to show any prejudicial effect . . . which would overcome the State's interest in trying the offenses at one time to preserve time and money. The grouping of controlled substance violations is governed by a special statute tailored for the purpose. Section 204.408, The Code, relevantly provides: Information, indictments, trial, and sentencing for violations of this [Uniform Controlled Substances] chapter may allege any number of violations of their provisions against one person and join one or more persons as defendants who it is alleged violated the same provisions in the same transaction or series of transactions and which involve common questions of law and fact. The several charges shall be set out in separate counts . . . . The court may grant severance and separate trial to any accused person jointly charged or indicted if it appears that substantial injustice would result to such accused person unless a separate trial was granted. The above statute is more inclusive than Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(1), which permits offenses arising out of the same transaction or occurrence to be alleged and prosecuted as separate counts in a single complaint, information or indictment, unless, for good cause shown, the trial court in its discretion determines otherwise. In State v. Evans, 248 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1976), relying on the section 204.408 series of transactions language, we held defendant's two incidents of controlled substance delivery were properly joined under separate counts in an information. A strict construction of section 204.408 arguably would permit severance only to an accused who is jointly charged. But we have indicated severance of charges may be permitted to a defendant who has carried the burden to show his or her interest in receiving a fair trial, uninfluenced by the prejudicial effects that could result from prosecuting a multicount information, outweighs the State's interest in judicial economy. State v. Trudo, 253 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 299, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); see Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(2)(e) (request for severance of charges or defendants). Defendant must show trial court abused its discretion by refusing to sever the charges. See State v. Belieu, 288 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Iowa 1980). In this case trial court instructed the jury that the charge contained in each count is to be separately considered and separately determined by you without any regard to any of the other counts. We believe the jury was capable of following, and did follow, this instruction. See State v. Hepburn, 270 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa 1978). The three cocaine sales charged in the separate counts constituted a series of transactions involving the same persons and the same law. The economy of one trial clearly outweighed any potential prejudice to defendant. We hold trial court rightly overruled the severance motion.