Opinion ID: 1790179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mistrial Issue

Text: Georgia Casualty next argues that its motion for mistrial should have been granted after counsel for the Whites referred, in the presence of the jury, to settlement negotiations regarding the bad faith claims. Generally, statements regarding settlement negotiations are considered to be highly prejudicial and are typically sufficient grounds for a mistrial. See Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Pappas, 219 Ala. 332, 122 So. 346 (1929); Hester v. Ford, 221 Ala. 592, 130 So. 203 (1930). However, this Court has held: [E]ach case of this character must be decided upon its own merits and ... there is no horizontal rule by which these qualities can be ascertained in all cases. Much depends on the issues, the parties, and the general atmosphere of the particular case. Kilcrease v. Harris, 288 Ala. 245, 249, 259 So.2d 797, 799 (1972). Before the Whites' counsel referred to the settlement negotiations regarding the bad faith claims, the trial court had admitted testimony, without objection, concerning prior settlement negotiations regarding the contract claim for $110,000. In denying Georgia Casualty's motion for a mistrial, the trial court based its decision on its conclusion that the jury probably did not understand the statement objected to as being anything different from the testimony regarding the prior settlement negotiations concerning the contract claim. Further, the trial court determined that any curative statements would serve only to bring the statement to the attention of the jury. The trial judge heard the testimony before, during, and after the statement by the Whites' counsel, and then made his decision to deny Georgia Casualty's motion for a mistrial upon a consideration of the issues, the parties, and the general atmosphere of the particular case. Id. In considering a motion for a mistrial, the trial judge has much discretion. On review, this Court will not reverse the trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial based on a party's improper statements unless it affirmatively appears from the entire record that the statements involved were probably prejudicial to the [complaining party], either as to the result or the amount of damages assessed. Birmingham Electric Co. v. Perkins, 249 Ala. 426, 430, 31 So.2d 640, 642 (1947) (emphasis added). The trial court's rationale in denying Georgia Casualty's motion is well based and, in reviewing the circumstances under which the allegedly prejudicial statement was made and the likelihood of any undue prejudice or bias resulting from it, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Georgia Casualty's motion for a mistrial.