Opinion ID: 3134433
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Certain Statements Made by the State During

Text: Closing Arguments Unfairly Prejudiced Defendant's Case Defendant complains next of four statements made by the assistant State's Attorney during closing arguments. Each of the statements was intended to persuade the jury that Williams and defendant planned to shoot Simenson when he opened the trunk of the white car. Defendant correctly observes that his participation in the planning was essential to the State's accountability theory of liability against defendant. Defendant insists that the prosecutor's statements were not grounded in fact or in any reasonable inferences arising from the evidence admitted at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. In pertinent part, counsel for the State argued: “He knew what was going to occur from his signal to Elton Williams. He knew Elton was going to come out shooting, and he wanted to get out of the way of the shots.    Why did he do that? Because he knows the moment the trunk comes up pursuant to their preconceived plan, the fireworks is going to start .    Gregory Shaw is behind the wheel ready to let him in the trunk, ready to take off, and prepared to have Elton Williams come out of that trunk and shoot any police officer who tries to apprehend them.    That none of these actions could have been accomplished without the complete complicity of Gregory Shaw and that the murder was a preplanned situation with regards to Gregory Shaw and Elton Williams that, if the trunk opened, Mr. Williams would take care of business.” Defendant concedes that defense counsel failed to raise contemporaneous objections to any statement but the third. As to the first, second and fourth passages quoted above, defendant relies on the plain error doctrine to earn appellate review. As previously explained, we apply the plain error doctrine only where the evidence of defendant's guilt is closely balanced, or where the alleged error is so substantial or so fundamental as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. People v. Edgeston , 157 Ill. 2d 201, 239-40 (1993); 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Convincing evidence was admitted at trial of defendant's accountability for knowing and intentional murder. Chaney, Evanoff and Smith recounted defendant's actions during the car stop at the intersection of Theodore and Burry. When told to go to the back of the white car by Officer Simenson, defendant sat on the trunk of the automobile, although he was not directed to do so. When Simenson told him to get off the white car, defendant slowly slid off, but remained leaning against it. Moreover, when Simenson said he was going to open the trunk and ordered defendant to walk to Simenson's police car, which was parked immediately behind the white car, defendant bent forward at the waist in order to lie on the hood of Simenson's car. As before, defendant was not directed by Smith or Simenson to do this. These acts, combined with defendant's utter failure to alert the police to the presence of an armed man in the trunk of the white car, give rise to legitimate inferences that defendant not only knew that Williams intended to shoot the person who opened the trunk of the automobile, but also that defendant and Williams preplanned a signal to be delivered by defendant to Williams that the trunk was about to be opened. From the foregoing, we find that the evidence supporting a theory of accountability for intentional and knowing murder was not closely balanced. Nor can we conclude that admission of the statements worked a substantial or fundamental unfairness on defendant: the State's closing argument was consistent with facts admitted at trial. Therefore, the plain error doctrine does not apply to the first, second and fourth statements. In the alternative, defendant contends that his lawyer’s failure to object to the State’s remarks amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the attorney’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice to defendant. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 320, citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 699, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2069 (1984). Because defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test, the failure to satisfy either element precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 320. We can dispose of defendant’s ineffective-assistance charge on the “prejudice” prong alone. Any objection to the prosecutor’s remarks would rightfully have been denied, since each statement was justified by evidence admitted at trial. Had defense counsel objected, therefore, the result would have been no different than the effect of his failure to object. No prejudice resulted from the defense attorney’s purportedly ineffective assistance. As to the third statement, (footnote: 0) we are reminded that, generally, courts accord wide latitude to the prosecutor during closing argument, provided counsel grounds his argument in the evidence or in inferences fairly yielded by the evidence. People v. Enis , 163 Ill. 2d 367, 407 (1994); Edgeston , 157 Ill. 2d at 240; People v. Owens , 102 Ill. 2d 88, 105 (1984). The remarks by the State that defendant now calls into question were reasonably implied by the State’s proof. No error occurred. Equally unavailing is defendant’s insistence that the only evidence supporting defendant’s alleged accountability for Simenson’s murder was introduced at the aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant’s sentencing hearing, and not at the guilt/innocence phase of defendant’s trial. Defendant refers to the testimony of Timothy Beavers, who testified in aggravation on behalf of the State. Beavers averred that, while incarcerated with defendant at the Will County jail in October 1994, defendant told Beavers that defendant and Williams robbed two persons on September 28, 1994, and that they took between $100 and $200 from one of those individuals. In his testimony, Beavers also recounted defendant’s statements that defendant and Williams decided to hide Williams in the trunk of their get away car because the police “would be looking for two people, not one.” According to Beavers, defendant further told him that, in the event defendant and Williams were stopped in their flight by the police, Williams would “take care of business.” Beavers interpreted this phrase as “do whatever you got to do.” Beaver’s testimony may have been anticipated by the prosecutor when he used the phrase “take care of business” in his closing argument at the guilt phase. Nonetheless, the colloquialism is sufficiently commonplace that the attorney might not have used it as a reference to Beavers' statements. At the time the jury heard the prosecutor's argument, Beavers had not yet testified, so any impact the State intended by use of “take care of business” would have been lost on the jury. Most importantly, the State furnished more than adequate proof during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial that defendant aided and abetted Williams in Simenson’s murder. Our review of the record satisfies us that “take care of business” at best emphasized the elements of accountability that the State had already proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ELIGIBILITY PHASE A. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Failing to Instruct the Jury That Defendant Was Not Eligible for the Death Penalty Unless the State Proved Defendant's Culpable Mental State Defendant contends that this court should find defendant “not death eligible” because the jury was improperly instructed during the first, or “eligibility,” phase of his sentencing hearing. Relying on Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987), defendant insists that a finding of eligibility for the death penalty preliminarily requires a determination by the jury that defendant possessed a culpable mental state during the commission of the crimes charged. Defendant maintains that the jury received no instructions at the hearing that would have permitted it to make such a finding and, therefore, that the death sentence must be vacated. The State responds that defendant neglected to properly preserve this question for our review. Because we choose to address the merits of defendant's argument, however, we need not decide whether this element of defendant's appeal has been waived. In Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982), the United States Supreme Court compared the individual culpability of Enmund, who had been sentenced to death for felony murder under a theory of accountability, to the culpability of his accomplices, the persons who actually killed the victim during the course of the felony murder. The Enmund court observed that pursuant to the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment, criminal punishments cannot be excessively lengthy or severe in proportion to the crime charged. Enmund , 458 U.S. at 788, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1146, 102 S. Ct. at 3372. The Court said: “It is fundamental that `causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.' ” Enmund , 458 U.S. at 798, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1152, 102 S. Ct. at 3377, citing H. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 162 (1968). Facts introduced at Enmund's trial proved that Enmund neither “kill[ed nor] attempt[ed] to kill  [and did not] warrant a finding that Enmund had any intention of participating in or facilitating a murder.” Enmund , 458 U.S. at 798, 801, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1152, 1154, 102 S. Ct. at 3377, 3378-79. To treat the actual killers and Enmund alike for purposes of imposing a capital sentence ignored that their individual degrees of personal culpability were “plainly different” and violated the eighth amendment. Enmund , 458 U.S. at 798, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1152, 102 S. Ct. at 3377. The United States Supreme Court revisited the question of proportionality in capital sentencing in Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987). There, defendants Ricky and Raymond Tison received the death penalty pursuant to Arizona statutes that (1) defined capital murder as a killing occurring during the perpetration of a robbery or kidnapping, and (2) held each participant in a robbery or kidnapping legally responsible for the acts of his accomplices. Tison , 481 U.S. at 141, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 134, 107 S. Ct. at 1679-80. Like Enmund, neither Tison committed the murders in question, yet unlike Enmund, the Tisons' “degree of participation in the [underlying] crimes was major rather than minor, and the record  support[ed] a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to human life.” Tison , 481 U.S. at 151, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 140, 107 S. Ct. at 1684. To the Tison Court, this “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life” ( Tison , 481 U.S. at 158, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 145, 107 S. Ct. at 1688), moved the Tisons' acts far beyond Enmund's conduct on the spectrum of personal culpability. Imposition of the death penalty in Tison did not violate the eighth amendment's prescriptions for proportionality, since the Tisons' purposeful criminal conduct justified a more serious punishment. Whether the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury on defendant's personal culpability for the felony murder is, in the instant appeal, moot, since we have reversed defendant's conviction for that crime. As to defendant's convictions for intentional and knowing murder, we hold that the jury made the necessary finding of defendant's individual culpability. The Enmund / Tison rule does not require that a finding of culpability be made at a particular stage of the sentencing hearing. Cabana v. Bullock , 474 U.S. 376, 386, 88 L. Ed. 2d 704, 716-17, 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 (1986). “The Eighth Amendment is satisfied so long as the death penalty is not imposed upon a person ineligible under Enmund for such punishment.” Cabana , 474 U.S. at 386, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 716, 106 S. Ct. at 697. “At what precise point in its criminal process a State chooses to make the Enmund determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the Constitution.” Cabana , 474 U.S. at 386, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 717, 106 S. Ct. at 697. Applying this standard to appeals in Illinois, we have ruled that the necessary findings of culpability can be made by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. People v. Thompkins , 121 Ill. 2d 401, 456 (1988). We have also held that, under the Illinois death penalty statute, the responsibility for finding a defendant eligible for the death penalty rests with the jury or the trial court, but not with a reviewing court. People v. Ramey , 151 Ill. 2d 498, 544 (1992). Turning to the present appeal, we hold that the jury made the requisite finding of defendant's personal culpability for Simenson's murder. By virtue of defendant's convictions for knowing and intentional murder, the jury necessarily found that defendant, with an intent to promote or facilitate the murder, knowingly aided or abetted Williams' intentional murder of Simenson, or aided or abetted acts creating a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Simenson. These findings, compelled by instructions tendered to the jury, are, in our opinion, illustrative of a “reckless indifference to human life” ( Tison , 481 U.S. at 151, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 140, 107 S. Ct. at 1684) by defendant, and even of an intent that a “ `killing take place or that lethal force  be employed.' ” People v. Jimerson , 127 Ill. 2d 12, 48, quoting Enmund , 458 U.S. at 797, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1151, 102 S. Ct. at 3376. The guilty verdicts for knowing and intentional murder established defendant's culpable mental state for Simenson's death, even though Williams may have been the person that actually fired the shots that killed Simenson. See People v. Coleman , 168 Ill. 2d 509, 529-30 (1995) (jury's guilt phase finding of the requisite mental state satisfies Enmund requirements). Therefore, the absence of instructions directing the jury to render a finding on defendant's personal culpability was not error. Lastly, defendant cannot complain that his lawyer's failure to tender Enmund/Tison instructions denied defendant effective legal assistance. No prejudice could have flowed from that omission where defendant's mental state had already been determined by the jury. AGGRAVATION/MITIGATION PHASE A. Whether the Circuit Court Erroneously Admitted Certain Portions of a Victim Impact Statement Into Evidence Defendant argues next that he suffered irreparable harm from the introduction of a victim impact statement written and read by Susan Simenson, the widow of the victim. Defendant does not object to admission of the entire statement, only selected portions which, according to defendant, improperly characterized the crimes committed by defendant, and included an inappropriate recommendation of the type of sentence defendant should receive. We disagree. As explained below, Mrs. Simenson's statement complied with constitutional restrictions on the content of victim impact statements. Moreover, choosing as we do to dispose of this issue on its merits, we can forgo two additional questions raised in the parties' briefs, namely, whether defendant waived any objection to Mrs. Simenson's testimony, and whether defense counsel rendered ineffective legal assistance. The victim of a violent crime, including the spouse of a victim, may address the court regarding the impact which the criminal defendant's conduct has had upon the victim. 725 ILCS 120/3, 6 (West 1996). Admission of victim impact evidence does not violate the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 736, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). Victim impact evidence is consistent with our legal tradition of examining the harm caused by a crime in order to determine both the elements of a criminal offense and the appropriate punishment that should follow from that crime. Payne , 501 U.S. at 819, 820, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 731, 732, 111 S. Ct. at 2605, 2606. “Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities.” Payne , 501 U.S. at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. Further, allowing a jury to consider such evidence at the sentencing stage merely balances the State's interest in having the jury fully informed of the value of the life lost against the interest of the criminal defendant in having the jury informed of mitigating factors that weigh against execution. Payne , 501 U.S. at 822, 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 733, 735, 111 S. Ct. at 2607, 2608. “[A] State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.” Payne , 501 U.S. at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. In the case at bar, we find that the bulk of the statements to which defendant objects describe the impact the murder of Simenson had on his family, and thus fall squarely within the permissible range of victim impact evidence. In relevant part, Mrs. Simenson said: “Now my husband is only a memory due to the selfish and violent actions of Gregory Shaw and Elton Williams. On that horrifying morning of September 28, 1994, my husband's life was reduced for $200 to piles of reports, court files and bags of evidence. Because of Gregory Shaw, Stephanie and Brandon have been deprived of their father. Just recently, I realized consciously, for the first time, that I now fall into that, quote, single parent category that I often thought belonged exclusively to divorced couples, which I consider to be a position of choice. Gregory Shaw and Elton Williams made that choice for me on September 28, 1994, when they decided to murder any person who opened the car trunk. Unfortunately that person was my husband. My children live in fear that when I leave the house something bad might happen to me. We all have nightmares. Stephanie's had nightmares and worries that these defendants will get out of prison and come and get us. He was a police officer for about 19 years. He received numerous awards and commendations. Tim was a true professional. Even drug dealers he helped convict came to Tim's wake and funeral out of respect for him. Tim didn't deserve to die. Just as all police officers do, Tim put his life on the line to protect the good and innocent members of society. He made the ultimate sacrifice. The impact of our last means of protection being annihilated on our streets is frightening to my family. Please renew our faith in the criminal justice system which will bring a phase of closure to this ongoing nightmare that fills our lives.” We do not read the testimony quoted above as a request that the jury recommend that defendant be sentenced to death. In fact, substantially similar testimony by Mrs. Simenson was examined by this court in People v. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d 297 (1998), the direct appeal initiated by defendant's codefendant, Elton Williams. In that case, Williams insisted that, in the passage quoted below, Mrs. Simenson was improperly allowed to urge the jury to find Williams eligible for the death penalty. “ `My family and I are very confident that all of you will return a quick verdict which will send a message to my children, society, and the law enforcement community that we simply will not tolerate or accept our last means of protection being annihilated on our streets. Renew our faith in the criminal justice system and bring a phase of closure to this ongoing nightmare that fills our lives.    It hurts and upsets my family terribly to know I can never talk to Tim again and my children will never see their dad again. Elton Williams' attitude is a slap in the face to not only my family but to those–but to those of police officers as well.” Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 324. This court did not construe the impact statement admitted in the Williams trial as recommending the death penalty to the jury. The court interpreted Mrs. Simenson's pleas for “closure” and a “quick verdict” as an appeal to bring an uncomfortable chapter in the life of her family to an end. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 325. Further, Mrs. Simenson did not intend to imply that failure to find Williams death-eligible would demonstrate a lack of support for the law enforcement community. Rather, the court read these remarks as being an expression of concern for the community at large. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 325. Likewise, in the instant case, we interpret Mrs. Simenson's statements as a request that the jury deliberate quickly to end a painful ordeal for her family, and not an improper suggestion of a sentence for defendant. Mrs. Simenson's description of her husband as an officer may also fairly be construed as her assessment of the loss to the community as a result of the defendant's acts. In Payne , 501 U.S. at 822, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 733, 111 S. Ct. at 2607, the United States Supreme Court included “loss to  society which has resulted from the defendant's homicide” as an appropriate counterbalance to evidence adduced by a defendant in mitigation at the sentencing phase. Similarly, the only instance we find of “characterizations” of the crime by Mrs. Simenson is the phrase “the selfish and violent actions of Gregory Shaw and Elton Williams.” To the extent this phrase expresses the Simenson family's anger and sense of helplessness at the death of Officer Simenson, the phrase is consistent with the legislative purpose animating the victim impact statement statute. 725 ILCS 120/6 (West 1996). Any extra meaning that could be read into the phrase is, in our opinion, muted by the instruction given by the circuit court to the jurors not to allow sympathy, passion or prejudice to influence their deliberations. B. Whether the Circuit Court Erroneously Permitted Argument That Reduced the Jury’s Responsibility in Recommending the Death Penalty for Defendant Over defendant's objection, the State made the following rebuttal argument during the aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's capital punishment hearing: “Now why are we here? How did we get here? We get here because the system works. Because Tim Simenson, Tom Evanoff and Ralph Smith were good cops and they did their jobs. They are out there on the street. What do Tom and Ralph see? They see their supervisor, their sergeant and their friend, shot in the face in cold blood for no reason, unprovoked, in violation of law, right in front of them, and they are armed with .40 caliber Glock handguns. They have the ability at that point–think about it. They can fire two to three shots a second. They could have cut Elton Williams in half and they could have shot Gregory Shaw, too, saying he was going for something. They could have executed them both right on the street. But what did they do? These guys showed restraint beyond all belief. The moment that Elton Williams was down and they were out of harm's way they stopped shooting. In fact, Tom Evanoff even took Elton Williams' word for the fact that–he asked him if he had another gun. His hand was underneath him. And Williams shook his head no and he put his gun away. My God, there could have been another gun. These officers showed a lot of restraint. They don't even know where Shaw is at this point. Certainly they could have easily taken care of business right there on the street, but they didn't.     These officers, acting the way they did, making sure that the system worked, not taking care of business on the street, they let the system do its work, they let the case be charged. They let it be brought to court. They let a jury, you, be selected to hear this evidence, and then objectively look at all the evidence and apply the law to that evidence objectively .” (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in failing to sustain defendant's objection to the italicized statements. Defendant interprets the State's remarks as an impermissible violation of defendant's eighth amendment right to have the jury bear sole responsibility for its capital sentencing decision. According to defendant, the State told the jury that it should feel no remorse about recommending the death penalty for defendant, because the police could have killed defendant immediately following Simenson's death. In Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), the United States Supreme Court reviewed comments made by the State’s Attorney in closing argument in a capital punishment hearing. In that case, the defendant asserted that opposing counsel’s assurances to the jury that any death sentence they recommended would be subject to automatic appellate review violated defendant’s eighth amendment rights. The Supreme Court agreed. The Caldwell Court observed that because of the severity of the death penalty, the eighth amendment subjects any capital sentencing determination to a high degree of scrutiny. Accordingly, many of the safeguards placed on the imposition of capital punishment are born of a concern that “the sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discretion.” Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 329, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 239, 105 S. Ct. at 2639. Eighth amendment analysis “take[s] as a given” that capital sentencing bodies “[will] view their task as the serious one of determining whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the State.” Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 329, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 240, 105 S. Ct. at 2640. The Supreme Court enumerated several dangers inherent in the suggestion that a jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court. Bound as it is to a record on appeal, a reviewing court cannot evaluate the intangibles of aggravating and mitigating evidence that only a jury is uniquely situated to decide. Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 330, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 240, 105 S. Ct. at 2640. Additionally, if it is led to assume that another court will scrutinize its decision, a jury might fulfill its obligations with less care or ground its decisions on factors unrelated to “legitimate sentencing concerns.” See Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 331-33, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 240-42, 105 S. Ct. at 2640-42. In light of these dangers, the prosecutor’s remarks in Caldwell were “fundamentally incompatible with the Eighth Amendment’s heightened `need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' ” Caldwell , 472 U.S. at 340, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 246, 105 S. Ct. at 2645, quoting Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S. 280, 305, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976). This court has read Caldwell as “stand[ing] for the proposition that the prosecution may not lead a jury to believe that responsibility for a death sentence rests elsewhere, when State law places that responsibility on the jury.” People v. Pasch , 152 Ill. 2d 133, 205 (1992). Also, as we examine prosecutorial arguments for constitutional violations, we must read the arguments in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding. See People v. Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d 401, 461 (1993). Contrary to defendant's interpretation of the State's rebuttal, the State did not suggest that the jury could relieve itself of responsibility for defendant's sentence. In fact, we discern quite the opposite message in the passage quoted above. The section opens with a reference to “the system,” a theme the State then embellishes by reminding the jury how easily the police at the scene of the crime could have dispensed a “justice” of their own, had they wanted to do so. Instead, it is argued, the police allowed the system to function as intended, saving the determination of whether defendant will live or die for the jury, the body designated by our laws to execute this weighty responsibility. These remarks are consistent with the State's repeated references, elsewhere in its closing arguments, that the jury would decide whether any mitigating evidence precluded imposition of the death penalty. Too, the jury was reminded of its responsibility in instructions that the circuit court read and tendered to the jury. The jurors' duty was made plain again in the verdict forms they took with them to their deliberations. We have previously found instructions, verdict forms and directions by counsel adequate indicia that the jury was not relieved of its singular responsibility of passing judgment on the defendant. See Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d at 462; Pasch , 152 Ill. 2d at 206. C. Whether Defendant's Death Sentence Is Excessive Defendant maintains that the death sentence entered against him is excessive and should be reversed. Defendant argues that mitigating evidence admitted in his favor, a criminal record free from violent crimes, and “unique” circumstances surrounding Simenson's murder favor a more lenient penalty. The State counters that this case lacks the unusual and sympathetic factors that would normally render a death penalty excessive. The humanitarian impulse underlying the eighth amendment demands that we consider “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” People v. Leger , 149 Ill. 2d 355, 408 (1992); see also People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 534 (1992); People v. Johnson , 128 Ill. 2d 253, 277-78 (1989). The Illinois Constitution of 1970 similarly prescribes that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11; Leger , 149 Ill. 2d at 408. Moreover, while “[a] capital sentencing jury's decision will not be lightly overturned” ( People v. Johnson , 146 Ill. 2d 109, 145 (1991)), we will vacate a death sentence if relevant mitigating factors demonstrate that a capital sentence is inappropriate. Leger , 149 Ill. 2d at 408. We must be persuaded that the deterrent and retributive functions of the “ultimate sanction” will be served by imposing it on the defendant. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d at 534. At the aggravation and mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing, the State produced witnesses to describe defendant's criminal history preceding September 28, 1994. Defendant's record included arrests for possession of stolen property in 1985, for possession of cannabis in 1987, for residential burglary and for possession of cocaine in 1990, for burglary in 1992, and for possession of drugs with intent to deliver in 1994. Additionally, defendant had pleaded guilty to the following crimes: a misdemeanor drug sale in 1984, unlawful use of weapons in 1985, misdemeanor retail theft in 1990, and burglary in 1994. The 1994 guilty plea for burglary arose from a crime that occurred in 1992. For that incident, defendant received a three-year sentence in the Illinois Department of Corrections. According to Detective Robert Brenczewski of the Joliet police department, defendant was on parole from that sentence at the time of the Simenson murder. Two other criminal charges arose from defendant's relationship with his girlfriend, Kari, who was also the mother of defendant's son. In 1990, defendant slapped his girlfriend in the presence of two police officers and was arrested for battery. In 1994, Officer Michael Smyth of the Joliet police department witnessed “a physical struggle” between defendant and Kari. Smyth used pepper spray on defendant to separate them and place him in handcuffs. For this incident, police charged defendant with obstructing a peace officer. In mitigation, defendant called his elder sister, Brenda Marshall, to the witness stand. Marshall stated that defendant was the youngest of nine children, raised in a fun, loving home. Defendant's father died when defendant was 11, and when defendant was 9, defendant's elder brother, Ellis, died of a heart attack. Marshall said defendant had been very close to Ellis. Marshall and defendant's mother made her children attend church, and attempted to impart the value of hard work to her children. Marshall testified that all of her other siblings work hard and work every day. According to Marshall, defendant had been employed in the 11 years preceding the trial. She stated he worked as a parking lot attendant for four years, but left that job for another, because he wanted to better himself. Marshall testified that defendant had also worked in a warehouse in Romeoville, and for the Sunny Hill Nursing Home, but she did not know what he did there. Defendant had talked to Marshall about wanting to work as a Will County sheriff. Defendant occasionally lived with Marshall and her husband. Defendant “looked up to” Marshall's husband and helped him remodel Marshall's home. Marshall has never seen defendant act violently or abuse drugs. She stated that his biggest problem is that he is a “follower.” Defendant will do what others want him to do because he does not want to be called a “square.” Concerning defendant's relationship with his girlfriend, Kari, Marshall averred that, initially, their relationship was a good one. She said that defendant's son, Brandon, is a well-mannered child and an “A” student. However, Marshall asserted that defendant and Kari's mother, who resided with Kari, would drink excessively when defendant was at Kari's home, causing problems within the household. Wade Hill, defendant's brother and 20 years defendant's senior, also testified. Since May 1992, Hill has seen defendant on at least a weekly basis, when defendant was not in jail. Defendant worked with Hill on construction projects, including some roofing projects in 1994. Hill described defendant as a reliable and good worker. In Hill's opinion, defendant has all the skills necessary to hold a job in the construction trade and could have earned a living using those skills. Although Hill testified that he had never seen defendant abuse any substance other than alcohol, Hill conceded that defendant had a lot of friends who liked to drink. Hill said that defendant would gather with six or seven of these friends in an empty lot and drink beer or whiskey. Veronica Files is Barbara Marshall's daughter and defendant's niece. She testified that before defendant was “in and out of prison,” she would see him regularly, at least once a day. She said that during the time defendant was out of prison, but before September 28, 1994, defendant was working in a factory and seemed happy. Files maintained that defendant was very close to her two sons and was very generous to her. She described defendant's relationship with his own son as close, and said father and son “interacted” “just about every day.” Files believed that defendant's relationship with Kari turned bad only after Kari had a child by someone other than defendant. Files never saw defendant in a fight, and believed he would avoid one if possible. She portrayed defendant as a follower, not a leader. He could be easily persuaded, depending on the situation. The defendant employed an investigator James McNamara, who interviewed two inmates at the Department of Corrections facility at Menard. McNamara stated that Jermaine Ammons and Brian Ralph were held at the Will County jail in October 1994, during the same period in which defendant discussed the Simenson murder with Timothy Beavers. Ralph and Ammons occupied the same “pod” as Beavers and defendant at the Will County jail. Ralph and Ammons saw defendant on almost a daily basis, and neither ever heard defendant discuss his case with Beavers. However, McNamara also admitted that neither Ralph nor Ammons accompanied defendant everywhere defendant went in the pod. It is possible that defendant could have had a conversation with Beavers that neither Ralph nor Ammons heard. Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, testified in mitigation. Gelbort examined defendant's police and Department of Corrections records, and conducted numerous tests on defendant individually. Gelbort found defendant's “full scale IQ” to be 78, which Gelbort described as “upper end of borderline mentally deficient range of functioning.” Test results showed defendant to be someone who was well behind his peer group in academic performance and had trouble focusing his attention and concentration. Defendant processes information more slowly than a normal person and has abnormal mental control, meaning a poor ability to focus on a subject. Defendant is also a person that will act on impulses that other persons would inhibit. Persons with defendant's personality profile have difficulty making it through school and difficulty holding a job. Their aspirations exceed what they can achieve, leading to frustration. Defendant is in contact with reality. Defendant exhibits no signs of psychosis or schizophrenia. He is neither aberrant nor abnormal, with the exception that he lacks self-confidence and exhibits very low self- esteem. Defendant tends to be a fairly passive person. While Gelbort admitted the existence of some aggressive behavior in defendant, he did not believe this behavior was significant, since defendant has never caused significant bodily harm to someone else. Defendant is most interested in making himself happy and feeling good. Gelbort described defendant as “more a follower than a leader.” He is not skilled at anticipating the consequences of his actions. Gelbort opined that he would not expect to find, in someone with defendant's personality profile, a person who would instruct another to shoot a police officer. Gelbort believed that, had there been two Gregory Shaws at the intersection of Theodore and Burry on the night of the murder, the murder would not have occurred. Gelbort interpreted defendant's actions on September 28, 1994, as defendant's attempt to keep Elton Williams away from the police, because “if the two mixed there was going to be a problem.” Nevertheless, Gelbort conceded that defendant's IQ would not prevent defendant from planning an escape route from a robbery, nor would it prevent defendant from including in the plan an intent to “take care of business” in case he was caught. Gelbort testified that defendant has expressed remorse for the murder of Officer Simenson. Defendant talked about the incident on many occasions, and displayed a heartfelt concern for “the children that will grow up without a father.” In the case sub judice , the evidence presented at defendant's sentencing hearing differs materially from the fact patterns that typically prompt this court to vacate a death sentence. In People v. Leger , 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992), for example, this court vacated a death sentence imposed on the defendant for the murder of the defendant's ex-wife and attempted murder of the ex-wife's husband. Record evidence suggested the murders resulted from an explosive, synergistic combination of defendant's marital conflicts, prescription medications and history of alcohol abuse. Significantly, defendant Leger's criminal record was limited to two battery convictions, both of which were related to defendant's marital problems. In People v. Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986), this court was confronted with a defendant who had served without incident in the armed services for 21 years and who possessed a record unblemished by “serious criminal activity.” Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d at 295. However, the defendant suffered from a significant history of alcohol abuse and marital discord. The court found that the defendant's “problems with his family and with alcohol obviously bore on the defendant's mental state in October of 1980” ( Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d at 295), when during an argument with his wife, the defendant doused his wife and part of their home with gasoline and set the house on fire. The court ruled that, in the absence of the defendant's “marital disharmony and a dispute which triggered [the] tragic sequence of events,” the defendant would likely have led a law-abiding existence. Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d at 295. These actions did not “ `bespeak a man with a malignant heart who must be permanently eliminated from society.' ” Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d at 295, quoting People v. Carlson , 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 (1980) (death sentence imposed for murder of defendant's wife and arresting officer vacated where defendant had no criminal record, defendant's mental and physical health deteriorated seriously before murders, and murders were prompted by the last event in a long history of marital troubles); see also Johnson , 128 Ill. 2d at 278 (“Where a murder for which the defendant has been convicted seems to be an aberration brought on by special circumstances, which in all likelihood will not be repeated, neither the deterrent nor retributive functions of the death penalty are served”); People v. Smith , 177 Ill. 2d 53 (1997) (plurality opinion). We do not read Leger , Buggs and like cases as immutable formulas for the vacatur of a death sentence. The holdings of those decisions, like the result we reach in the instant appeal, do not stand for the proposition that only those defendants with unblemished or insignificant criminal records, and only those defendants who kill in response to unusual or extreme emotional crises, can avoid the death penalty. See, e.g. , Smith , 177 Ill. 2d at 104 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Rather, these decisions remind us that each capital case is unique, and that we are obliged to release from the death penalty any individual who is undeserving of the most extreme punishment our state can impose. Nevertheless, these cases also teach us that the circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime, and the facts yielded by a defendant's life history preceding the event, are our chief guideposts in deciding whether the twin goals of retribution and deterrence would be advanced by putting the criminal defendant to death. We conclude that the record before us compels an affirmance of defendant's capital sentence. Although defendant's prior criminal history is unremarkable for violence, it is lengthy. For at least 10 years before the murder of Officer Simenson, defendant displayed a consistent and active disregard for the rule of law. Whether these crimes are merely the acts of a “follower, not a leader,” as defendant's family and retained psychologist might suggest, we cannot say. What this record does imply, however, is that the events of September 28, 1994, were not just the isolated, aberrant acts of an individual who otherwise strived to act in conformance with society's rules. Smith , 177 Ill. 2d at 101. Indeed, defendant's participation in the murder of a police officer occurred while on probation from a recently imposed prison sentence for burglary. Further, unlike the defendant in Leger , whose contacts with police before he killed his victims were all related to the emotional disturbances that ultimately drove him to murder, there is no such nexus here between crimes committed by defendant before September 28, 1994, and whatever impulse drove him to aid and abet Williams on the night of the murder. Equally, if not more, compelling are the events surrounding the murder of Officer Simenson. As we relayed in a prior section of this opinion, the jury found sufficient evidence that defendant and Williams agreed and intended to shoot anyone who would impede their flight from the Arbor Club complex. We cannot ignore, either, the obvious and plentiful opportunities available to defendant to warn the officers of Williams' armed presence in the trunk of the getaway car. At any point between the time Simenson stopped the white car at the intersection of Theodore and Burry and the time Williams fired his weapon, defendant could have informed the officers that they might be shot if they opened the trunk. Even after Simenson announced his intention to search the trunk, defendant remained silent. Unlike defendant, we find no significance in the fact defendant might have been in custody during the roadside stop. In the first instance, Smith and Evanoff testified that defendant was not under arrest at any point before Williams emerged from the trunk, and that he was free to leave the scene had he chosen to do so. Further, whether defendant was in fact in custody is immaterial to our analysis here. Even under arrest, defendant could have simply told Simenson or Smith not to open the trunk, or at least informed them that a man armed with a shotgun lay hidden there. D. Whether the Illinois Capital Punishment Statute Is Unconstitutional Defendant concludes with a two-pronged argument that the Illinois death penalty statute (720 ILCS 5/9–1 (West 1996)) is unconstitutional. While the gist of defendant's contentions is not entirely clear, he appears to maintain that the statute improperly places a burden of proof on defendant that precludes a meaningful consideration of mitigation. Defendant avers further that the statute impermissibly allows the jury to weigh a vague aggravating factor, namely, “any other reason why a defendant should be sentenced to death.” See 720 ILCS 5/9–1(c), (e) (West 1996). According to defendant, the “vague” aggravating factor “creates the risk that the jury or judge will treat the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be by relying upon the existence of a vague or illusionary [ sic ] circumstance.” Both arguments have been rejected by this court on numerous occasions. In People v. Bean , 137 Ill. 2d 65, 139-41 (1990), this court explained the fallacy of the “burden of proof” argument defendant raises here. To the extent defendant may be viewed as bearing a burden of persuasion in the final phase of the capital sentencing hearing, it is entirely constitutional. Bean , 137 Ill. 2d at 139. At the last sentencing phase, the jury has already determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a statutory aggravating factor exists rendering defendant eligible for the death penalty; the jury's remaining task is to weigh factors in aggravation and mitigation presented by the State and the defendant. Bean , 137 Ill. 2d at 139. This is precisely the capital sentencing process approved by the Untied States Supreme Court. Bean , 137 Ill. 2d at 139, citing Jurek v. Texas , 428 U.S. 262, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976). The procedure precludes arbitrariness in the sentencing process by specifying the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty and by ensuring that the jury will consider mitigating factors “unique to the offense and offender.” Bean , 137 Ill. 2d at 139. Further, the State shares a burden of persuasion at the second phase. As the movant, the State must show that no mitigating factors exist that would preclude imposition of the death penalty. Bean , 137 Ill. 2d at 139. Lastly, the Bean court ruled, the defendant in fact has no burden of proof at the aggravation/mitigation phase. After the State presents evidence to persuade the jury of the propriety of the death sentence, the defendant may choose to present evidence in mitigation, but is under no legal obligation to do so. Bean , 137 Ill. 2d at 140; see also People v. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 332-33; People v. Edgeston , 157 Ill. 2d at 247. Nor are defendant's constitutional rights abrogated by reason of a vague aggravating factor. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 333. The sentencing statute identifies specific aggravating factors for the jury's consideration. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 333. While the jury may consider the additional factor of any other reason the death sentence may be imposed, it is also bound to consider only matters supported by the evidence ( Williams , 181 Ill. 2d at 333), so that the jury cannot arbitrarily create an aggravating factor not based in fact.