Opinion ID: 1153433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of the Defense

Text: Defendant took the stand in his own defense and, as hereinabove indicated, denied being at the scenes of the crimes and denied committing the crimes. He further testified, among other things, that there was some discoloration on his lower lip; that he had had some scars on the right side of his face since 1958; that his mustache the day he was testifying was much the same as in January and February 1969; that his sideburns were in the same condition as in January and February 1969; that they were no longer or bushier then (as several of the prosecution witnesses had testified); and that he had had a small beard the previous summer, but had shaved it off. Defendant admitted that when he told the San Diego police officers that he had purchased the gun in San Diego, he was lying; and he admitted that he was not living on Island Avenue in San Diego, as he had told the officers he was. He denied telling Sergeant Cannon that he was armed at the time he was in Rosie's Cafe. He said that he had asked to be allowed to call his wife right after he arrived at the University Station, but was denied permission. He testified that before they left the station, Sergeant Cannon said he would not last 10 minutes out with his own kind and that Sergeant Matthys, taking a gun out and holding it in his hand, said they just ought to shoot him. Defendant said that he was afraid and that he was interrogated against his will. He also stated that after he was booked about 12 o'clock the night he was brought back to Los Angeles, he did not renew his request to make the telephone call, because he wanted to rest instead. He said that although he was not ill, he could, as he told Sergeant Matthys, feel a seizure coming on and that he did have a seizure during the night after he went to sleep in his cell. Defendant's wife testified in his behalf. She said that defendant did not have long or bushy sideburns in 1968 or 1969; that he had had noticeable scars on the right side of his face for some time; that the jacket denoted People's Exhibit 51 was a Christmas present to defendant; that the gold shirt denoted People's Exhibit 26 belonged to him, and she had given it to some police officers; that defendant was employed by Certified Grocers in December 1968, but ceased to be employed during that month because he was hurt on the job; that she did not think he was employed in January 1969; that he worked for a construction company in February; that her family was not in need of money during January or February; that she was employed at the time, and her approximate income was $460 a month; that defendant usually played ball on Thursday nights, and she assumed he was going to play ball on January 16, 1969, but that she did not specifically remember that day; that she would not be able to tell where defendant was on January 28 or 29 or February 8 or 25; and that during January and February defendant did not own an automobile or have the use of one to her knowledge. Defendant's wife acknowledged that the statement purportedly taken from her by Officer Matthys on March 1, 1969, bore her signature; but she denied that she had read the statement or had it read to her. She then specifically denied that she had made certain statements contained therein, that is, that defendant had not worked since the middle of December, that he gave her $100 on a Friday in the middle of January; that he gave her $50 on Tuesday, February 25, 1969, before leaving for San Diego; and that when he left for San Diego, he had about $100 or $150 on him, and she did not know where the money came from. Several witnesses testified in support of defendant's alibi that he was at the service station near Dreskin's Liquor Store at the time of the killings there. The boxboy at Boys Market testified that he could not identify defendant as either being, or not being, the robber. Other witnesses testified that defendant was known to them as a peaceful, gentle person, whom they had never seen excited or angry. Defendant contends that the trial court, on its own motion, should have given instructions on diminished capacity and unconsciousness; but there is no merit to this contention. (1) Where substantial evidence sufficient to inform the trial court that a defendant is relying on the defense of diminished responsibility is received, the court must, on its own motion, instruct the jury as to the legal sufficiency of such evidence. ( People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 491 [35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677].) (2) In the present case, however, there was no substantial evidence sufficient to inform the trial court that defendant was relying on such defense. His own testimony shows that although he suffered from epilepsy, he had not been bothered by it for two or three months before he was arrested. He testified that after the interrogation the night of February 28, 1969, he felt a seizure coming on and had one some time that night, but that the last time he had had a seizure before this particular one was two or three months before, and that he did not recall any in January 1969. Accordingly, there being no evidence during the guilt phase that defendant had a seizure during the period of time when the charged offenses took place, there was no evidence entitling him to rely on the defense. (See People v. Lookadoo, 66 Cal.2d 307, 316 [57 Cal. Rptr. 608, 425 P.2d 208].) (3) Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give instructions on second degree murder or manslaughter, but we have concluded that the refusal to give the requested instructions was proper. In People v. Lloyd, 98 Cal. App.2d 305, 311 [220 P.2d 10], it was said: The facts established by the prosecution witnesses prove nothing short of murder in the first degree. Since appellant denied in toto such testimony, denied his presence on the premises of the deceased on the night of the murder, why should the court have confused the sole issue of murder in the first degree with instructions concerning, and definitions of, crimes included in the crime charged? In charging a jury, the court should be guided by the facts proved. When a person is accused of murder in the first degree, if the evidence is of such nature as to warrant a verdict for no lesser crime, if the defendant is guilty at all, the court should refuse to instruct as to crimes included within first degree murder. (See also People v. Mabry, 71 Cal.2d 430, 437-438 [78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 455 P.2d 759].) In refusing to instruct on lesser crimes included in first degree murder, the trial judge stated: It is the Court's view of the evidence that Murder 2nd instructions should not be given in this case. The Court believes that in view of the defendant's claim of alibi as to each of these counts of murder, and in view of the fact that the evidence is substantial that there was a robbery in each case, and there being nothing to indicate to the Court that a Murder 2nd instruction would be proper under the evidence, the Court therefore is going to give just the instructions on felony murder, robbery, and that alone. .... .... .... . . It seems to me to be common sense in each case that this is either a felony murder or it results in acquittal of the defendant, based on his claim of not having been involved. Under the circumstances, the trial judge's analysis was entirely correct. (4a) Defendant contends that he was not properly advised of his constitutional rights; that his right to counsel and his right to remain silent were violated; and that, as a result, his statements to the officers and the gun and items of clothing obtained by them were inadmissible. He further argues that, in determining whether there has been a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, this court should not be required to view the evidence on the basis most consistent with a waiver. (5) The burden of establishing a waiver of the right to counsel and the right to remain silent is on the prosecution ( People v. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 232, 247 [17] [57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947]; People v. Furnish, 63 Cal.2d 511, 517 [5] [47 Cal. Rptr. 387, 407 P.2d 299]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 621-622 [2] [43 Cal. Rptr. 699, 401 P.2d 4]); and the courts will not lightly find that there has been a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, but, rather, will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver ( In re Fresquez, 67 Cal.2d 626, 629 [2] [63 Cal. Rptr. 271, 432 P.2d 959]; People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 669 [58 Cal. Rptr. 614, 427 P.2d 214]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430, 434 [38 Cal. Rptr. 884, 392 P.2d 964]). On appeal, however, the burden is on the defendant to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive the right. ( People v. Hill, 70 Cal.2d 678, 688-689 [2] [76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 452 P.2d 329]; People v. Armstrong, 274 Cal. App.2d 297, 305 [5b] [79 Cal. Rptr. 223]; People v. Kranhouse, 265 Cal. App.2d 440, 447 [3] [71 Cal. Rptr. 223].) (6) Where there is no conflict in the evidence, there is no requirement that the reviewing court view it in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's determination. (See Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269 [294 P.2d 23]; People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App.3d 476, 488 (13) [83 Cal. Rptr. 771]; People v. Russell, 259 Cal. App.2d 637, 645 [6, 7] [66 Cal. Rptr. 594].) But where, as here, there is a conflict in the evidence, it is the duty of the reviewing court to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to uphold the finding of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably erroneous. ( People v. Floyd, 1 Cal.3d 694, 702-703 (2) [83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64]; People v. Duran, 269 Cal. App.2d 112, 116 [1] [74 Cal. Rptr. 459]; People v. Midkiff, 262 Cal. App.2d 734, 739 [2] [68 Cal. Rptr. 866].) As stated in People v. Debnam, 261 Cal. App.2d 206, 212 [8] [67 Cal. Rptr. 692]: The question whether an accused waived his right to counsel and his right to remain silent before making a statement to police officers is primarily a question of fact for the trial judge. Likewise, in People v. Drumgo, 269 Cal. App.2d 479, 482 [3] [74 Cal. Rptr. 761], it was said: The court in this case observed the witness (appellant), heard him testify, heard and saw the officers testify with reference to whether appellant made an intelligent waiver of his privileges and rights. It is a question of fact and the judge is the person under the circumstances in this case to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. In People v. Brockman, 2 Cal. App.3d 1002, 1008 (6, 7) [83 Cal. Rptr. 70], the Court of Appeal correctly pointed out: In determining whether there has been a waiver of constitutional rights, the issue must be resolved on the whole record [citations], and its resolution must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case under consideration, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. [Citation.] The attendant facts must, therefore, show clearly and convincingly that the accused did relinquish his rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily [citation], and the burden of making such a showing is upon the prosecution. [Citations.] Procedurally, the determination of this issue is primarily a question for the trial judge, and his determination will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless, in the light of the applicable principles, it is palpably erroneous. (4b) With respect to the trial court's receiving in evidence the gun and the clothing sought to be suppressed under defendant's motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the following statement from People v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal. App.3d 476, 488 (13), is apropos: `A proceeding under section 1538.5 to suppress evidence is one in which a full hearing is held on the issues before the superior court sitting as a finder of fact.' [Citations.] Accordingly, the duty of determining questions of fact in such a proceeding is for the trial court and its rulings will not be disturbed on appeal if the trial court had before it substantial evidence justifying the rulings. [Citation.] This rule, however, is not applicable in cases involving searches and seizures in which the facts bearing on the legality of the search are undisputed and establish as a matter of law that the evidence is or is not admissible. (See also People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App.3d 203, 209 (4) [88 Cal. Rptr. 21].) In People v. Atkins, 10 Cal. App.3d 1042, 1047-1048 (5) [89 Cal. Rptr. 588], the Court of Appeal, recognizing the trial court's power to pass on the credibility of witnesses testifying with respect to an alleged waiver of a constitutional right, said: Although Miranda states that `any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege' (384 U.S. at p. 476 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 725]), we understand the court to mean by that: any evidence believed by the trial court. No other interpretation would be practicable. In the present case, the version of events adopted by the trial judge on conflicting evidence was a reasonable one and amply warranted the findings made; and the California procedure hereinabove discussed strikes an appropriate balance between pragmatism on the one hand and adequacy on the other. (7) Defendant next contends that the gun, taken from his person in San Diego, was the product of an illegal search and seizure and was therefore inadmissible. The record shows, however, and the trial court found, that the gun was taken in a pat-down search properly conducted following a justifiable detention. (See Cunha v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 352, 355-356 [85 Cal. Rptr. 160, 466 P.2d 704]; People v. Davis, 260 Cal. App.2d 186, 188-189 [67 Cal. Rptr. 54].) The record shows that the police received a telephone call that a man dressed in a green shirt and a brown jacket was at a certain bar with a gun. Officer Abbott arrived at the bar within two minutes. He saw defendant, dressed in a green shirt and a brown jacket, leaving the front door of the bar. As the officer approached the front door, a man met him, pointed to defendant, and informed the officer that defendant was the man with the gun. The man who pointed defendant out to the police was the bartender, and it was he who had notified the police of defendant's presence at the bar with a gun. The police properly acted on the information given to them by the bartender. Thus, in People v. Gardner, 252 Cal. App.2d 320, 324-325 [7] [60 Cal. Rptr. 321], it was said: In dealing with the problem of informants whose information may or may not be sufficient to create probable cause, it should be noted that a citizen who purports to be the victim of or to have witnessed a crime is a reliable informant even though his reliability has not theretofore been proven or tested. [Citations.] The rationale underlying this principle is that such person is `more than a mere informer. He is an observer of criminal activity, who by calling the police, acts openly in aid of law enforcement.' [Citation.] Accordingly, a number of cases have held that it is reasonable for police officers to act upon the reports of such observers. Likewise, in People v. Lewis, 240 Cal. App.2d 546, 549-551 [49 Cal. Rptr. 579], it is pointed out that although with respect to bookmaking and narcotics offenses it must be shown, before the police may act on information given to them by an informant, that the informant is reliable, the police are not required, before acting on information supplied by a citizen who has witnessed a crime, to investigate the background, character, or mental capacity of the person giving the information. (See also People v. Wade, 265 Cal. App.2d 35, 39 [71 Cal. Rptr. 108]; People v. Guidry, 262 Cal. App.2d 495, 497-498 [68 Cal. Rptr. 794].) (8) In questioning the admissibility of his clothing (the jacket and the sweater-shirt) into evidence, defendant refers to their procurement as premised on a consent to a search which produced it. However, as shown by the record, the officers did not seize the items as the result of any search; rather, as to each item, defendant's wife went to a location in the house, obtained it, and gave it to the officers. Under the circumstances, the issue is not how the facts should be evaluated to determine whether there was a valid consent to a search, obviating the necessity for a search warrant, but, instead, how they should be weighed to determine whether defendant's wife acted voluntarily in turning the items over to the officers. (See United States v. Retolaza (4th Cir.1968) 398 F.2d 235 (cert. den. 393 U.S. 1032 [21 L.Ed.2d 576, 89 S.Ct. 646]).) As hereinabove indicated, where there is a conflict in the evidence we must determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to uphold the finding of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably erroneous. (9a) Clearly, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding here that defendant's wife, without any coercion on the part of the police, voluntarily turned the clothing over to the officers. On the assumption that in procuring the clothing the officers conducted a search, defendant argues that where an accused is in custody, he should be entitled to have a magistrate determine if there is reasonable cause to search his home, particularly when the search is to be conducted at night. He further contends that his wife could not validly consent to a search of the home. As hereinabove pointed out, however, no search took place. (10) In any event, since a wife normally exercises as much control over the property in the home as the husband, police officers may reasonably assume that she can properly consent to a search thereof, and her consent obviates the necessity for a search warrant. ( In re Lessard, 62 Cal.2d 497, 504-505 [42 Cal. Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39]; cf. United States v. Alloway (6th Cir.1968) 397 F.2d 105, 109.) (11) Still assuming that a search occurred, defendant further contends that in the absence of counsel his wife should have been advised that she did not need to consent to a search by the officers. Even if the procurement of the clothing is treated as having occurred in a search, there would be no merit to this contention, as California does not require a police warning as a prior condition for a valid consent to search. ( People v. Beal, 268 Cal. App.2d 481, 484-485 [3] [73 Cal. Rptr. 787]; see also People v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 265, 270, fn. 7 [78 Cal. Rptr. 210, 455 P.2d 146].) As stated in Beal, The trial court's scrutiny of the voluntariness of the consent is far more protection to a defendant than the recital of some warning by the police. (P. 485 of 268 Cal. App.2d.) (9b) While defendant's wife may have been at a disadvantage psychologically, it does not appear from Officer Matthys' version of the facts that she was under arrest or threatened therewith. Accordingly, no coercion has been established, and no circumstances militate against the validity of the action of defendant's wife. (See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484-490 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 593-596, 91 S.Ct. 2022]; United States v. Retolaza, supra, 398 F.2d 235, 238-239.) Defendant contends that his statements received in evidence were inadmissible, because the admonitions given to him as to his constitutional rights were inadequate and because he had an attorney at the time of the alleged waiver of his rights and was interrogated outside the presence of his attorney. The admonition given to defendant by the San Diego police was clearly adequate, and the trial court so found. The trial court found that the further admonition given defendant by the Los Angeles police officers in San Diego before they questioned him there was inadequate. Defendant does not appear to question the adequacy of the admonitions given to him following his return to Los Angeles. Defendant argues that the admonition given to him at the time he was arrested in San Diego for carrying a concealed weapon (a misdemeanor) could not be the basis for a valid waiver of his constitutional rights later the same day with respect to a multiple murder charge. There is, however, no merit to this contention. Before the Los Angeles police officers questioned defendant in San Diego, they asked him if the San Diego police officers had advised him of his rights, thus clearly indicating that his rights in connection with the felony charges would be the same as those in connection with the misdemeanor charge. [8] They then asked him if he understood that he had a right not to tell anything, that he could remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, and that he had a right to have an attorney present. Defendant answered the officers' questions in the affirmative and told them that he wanted to talk with them and that he had never hurt anyone in his life and certainly would never commit a murder. Defendant could not reasonably have believed that with respect to a misdemeanor charge he would have a right to remain silent, anything he said could be used against him in court, he had a right to have an attorney represent him and to have the attorney present during any interrogation, and if he could not afford to pay for an attorney, one would be provided for him free of charge, but that with respect to a felony charge he would have only the first three of those rights and would not be entitled to have an attorney provided for him free of charge if he could not afford to employ one. (12) Accordingly, defendant's voluntarily talking with the Los Angeles police officers after the San Diego police had advised him of his constitutional rights earlier the same day, and he acknowledged to the Los Angeles police officers that he had been so advised and that he understood his rights, clearly constitutes a waiver by defendant. (13) Defendant, citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199], claims that the evidence was tainted because an attorney had been appointed to represent him in San Diego on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, and he was questioned with respect to the murder and robbery charges outside the presence of his attorney. We find, however, that under the circumstances of this case defendant's waiver of an attorney prior to making his statements was nevertheless effective. It will be recalled that defendant was arrested in San Diego shortly after midnight on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon and was properly advised of his constitutional rights by Officer Abbott, of the San Diego police. Defendant was again advised of his rights around 10 a.m. by Officer Smith, of the San Diego police. During the afternoon, Sergeants Matthys and Massaro interviewed defendant briefly at the San Diego police station. Matthys first advised defendant of his rights, but, as hereinabove indicated, the trial court ruled that the admonition was not complete. Before speaking with defendant, Matthys had been advised by someone in the San Diego Police Department that because of the seriousness of the charges in Los Angeles, they were probably going to drop their charges; and later in the day a court order was obtained releasing defendant from the jail in San Diego for transportation to Los Angeles, where murder and robbery charges were to be made against him. The trial court found that there was insufficient evidence to show that any of the officers knew, or should have known, at the time Sergeant Matthys had his conversation with defendant at the San Diego police station, that counsel had been appointed for defendant on the San Diego charge; and since Matthys came to San Diego on the day of defendant's arrest and was informed, before talking with defendant, that the San Diego charge would probably be dropped because of the seriousness of the Los Angeles charges, it was not incumbent upon him to make specific inquiry whether or not an attorney had been appointed to represent defendant on the San Diego charge. Under all these circumstances, the fact that counsel had been appointed to represent defendant on a completely unrelated charge did not make ineffective his clear waiver of counsel. (See People v. Wade, 35 App.Div.2d 401 [317 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124].) (14) Defendant urges that his statements were inadmissible on the further ground that as a matter of due process they should have been supplemented by some recorded means. An officer's testimony of what he has seen and heard, however, is admissible as primary evidence even though part of the same matter is incorporated into a sound recording. ( People v. Sica, 112 Cal. App.2d 574, 587-588 [247 P.2d 72].) Accordingly, an officer's testimony of a conversation with a defendant is admissible in any event; the absence of a recording or transcription would merely be one of the surrounding circumstances for the court to consider in passing on the issue. [9] In Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 [86 L.Ed. 166, 180, 62 S.Ct. 280], it was said: As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial. The omission to record a defendant's statement, however, does not amount to an act fatally infecting the trial, particularly where, as here, all the circumstances are presented for the scrutiny of the trial court. Although there is no merit to any of defendant's contentions hereinabove discussed, there is, in view of this court's decision in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628 [100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], merit to his further contention that the death penalty violates our state constitutional provision against cruel or unusual punishment. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to provide for life imprisonment and, as so modified, is affirmed. McCOMB, J. I concur in the majority opinion, except that, for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 657 [100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], I dissent from the modification of the judgment.