Opinion ID: 2241961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Obtain Timely Ruling on Motion to Suppress

Text: In a completely different vein, defendant faults his lawyer for failing to obtain a ruling on a motion to suppress his custodial statements prior to having him take the stand at trial. In order to fully evaluate this claim, we must set forth some additional background facts. Shortly before trial, defendant's attorney filed a combined motion to suppress and motion to quash arrest. In the motion, defendant sought to exclude certain tangible evidence recovered by the police. That motion, however, was never ruled on prior to the commencement of the trial. During the trial, defendant took the stand on his own behalf and testified as to the events leading up to his arrest. Specifically, defendant stated that he had killed Barbara only after she attempted to steal his drugs. This in-court testimony differed significantly from defendant's original statement to the police, in which defendant tried to shift responsibility for the crimes to his friend Hojamoto. Defendant further testified that certain police officers had beaten him during questioning. At that point, the circuit court converted the trial into a hearing on the combined motion to suppress and motion to quash arrest. After hearing further testimony, the court denied the motion and resumed the trial. Defendant now asserts that his trial counsel should have obtained a ruling on the motion to suppress prior to advising defendant to testify in his case in chief. By failing to do so, defendant argues, the State was later able to impeach defendant's trial testimony with his prior inconsistent statements to the police. Defendant suggests that there are only two possible explanations as to why counsel failed in this regard: (i) counsel did not know the substance of defendant's incustody statements, or (ii) counsel did not consider their impeachment value very important. Defendant submits that, regardless of which of the two explanations this court accepts, his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, defendant contends that, when counsel finally did argue the motion to suppress, he did so ineffectively because he failed to seek suppression of defendant's Hojamoto statement on the ground that defendant was mistreated while in police custody. Specifically, defendant argues that his attorney erred by not presenting pathological evidence to corroborate his claim that police officers struck him in the head with a flashlight during his interrogation. Initially, we note that defendant never sought the suppression of any statements he made while in custody, nor did he raise such a challenge on direct appeal. Therefore, the issue is waived. See Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d at 9, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170. Even so, because defendant also challenges the effectiveness of his appellate counsel for not preserving the issue, we will proceed to the merits of his claim. See People v. Foster, 168 Ill.2d 465, 474, 214 Ill.Dec. 244, 660 N.E.2d 951 (1995). Contrary to defendant's contention, we agree with the State that counsel's decision not to seek a ruling on the motion to suppress prior to calling defendant to the stand does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement. As previously noted, defendant's motion to suppress did not seek the suppression of inculpatory statements made by defendant, but instead sought only to suppress certain tangible evidence. [1] Because defendant's in-custody statements were not the subject of the motion, a ruling in favor of the defendant would not have made a difference with respect to the State's ability to impeach him with his prior inconsistent statements. Furthermore, even if counsel had sought to suppress defendant's statements in the motion, the motion itself was patently without merit. During the hearing on the motion, defendant claimed that police physically abused him while he was in custody. Specifically, defendant accused Detective James Grant of hitting him on the head with a flashlight. On cross-examination, however, defendant admitted that he had received a head wound at a party approximately one week prior to killing Barbara. In addition, defendant's accusations of police mistreatment were also discredited by the testimony of the interrogating officers. For example, Detective Grant, who testified at the suppression hearing, was specifically asked whether on August 23, 1981, when you were in the interview room with the Defendant, either with Detective Dolan or by yourself, did you physically abuse the Defendant in any way? Detective Grant answered, No, Sir. The State further asked Detective Grant whether he had struck defendant in any manner, either with or without a flashlight, on any part of his body, including his head. Detective Grant again replied, No, Sir. [2] Based on this evidence, the court concluded that defendant presented no believable or credible evidence in support of his motion to suppress. Consequently, the court denied the motion on its merits, a decision which we believe was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Under these circumstances, defendant could not have suffered any prejudice as a result of his attorney's failure to obtain an early ruling on the motion to suppress. That motion, which did not even seek to suppress defendant's statements, was destined to be denied. In a related argument, defendant maintains that his trial attorney should have cited a significant line of authority [which] holds that in determining whether a statement was voluntarily made it is improper for a trial court to disregard a defendant's uncontroverted testimony. See People v. Rhoads, 73 Ill.App.3d 288, 309, 29 Ill.Dec. 249, 391 N.E.2d 512 (1979); People v. Peck, 18 Ill. App.3d 112, 116, 309 N.E.2d 346 (1974); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). Defendant points out that (i) he testified during the suppression hearing that police denied his requests for food, medical attention, a visit and a telephone call, and (ii) the State never rebutted this testimony. Defendant submits that his attorney's failure to cite the aforementioned legal authority in connection with his uncontroverted testimony resulted in the denial of effective assistance of counsel. We find this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, even if we were to agree with defendant that the trial court in this case could not disregard his testimony, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the alleged denial of defendant's request for food and medical attention had anything to do with defendant's decision to speak with the police. In fact, defendant's Hojamoto statement appears to be a deliberate attempt on the part of the defendant to steer the police in the direction of another suspect. Second, even if the Hojamoto statement had been suppressed, it would not have changed the outcome in this case in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial. Hence, defendant cannot show prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Defendant next contends that his trial counsel erred by not presenting as a defense the possibility that another person may have been involved in the crimes. In support of this contention, defendant relies upon a 911 tape recording which contains the conversation between the police officers who pursued defendant and the police dispatcher who coordinated the pursuit. That recording purportedly referred to two male white suspects in the car. Defendant believes that the [i]ntroduction of the 911 tapes would have raised a reasonable doubt about whether [he] was guilty of all or some of [his] crimes. Due to defendant's failure to raise this argument either on direct appeal or in his amended petition for post-conviction relief, this argument is waived. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill.2d 227, 233, 182 Ill.Dec. 1, 609 N.E.2d 304 (1993), citing People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992). We further find no reason to excuse defendant's waiver under the exception for plain error. See generally People v. Carlson, 79 Ill.2d 564, 576, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980).
Finally, defendant argues that his trial attorney committed a plethora of errors due to his inexperience in trying criminal matters. According to defendant, these errors include attempts to learn the basic facts of the case from the State's witnesses, ineffective cross-examination, ignorance of the adverse witness rule, ignorance on how to impeach a witness with a prior conviction, and attempts to elicit testimony, sometimes successful, that were harmful to the defense. Defendant submits that commission of the errors, cumulatively, resulted in a denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel throughout the trial proceedings. We disagree. After undertaking a thorough review of each of these errors, both individually and collectively, we conclude that defendant's contention regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. In fact, we find nothing in the record to support defendant's claim that the alleged errors in this case were the product of an inexperienced trial counsel. We are mindful of the fact that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and that `[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.' Guest, 166 Ill.2d at 393, 211 Ill.Dec. 490, 655 N.E.2d 873, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95. Having eliminated the distortion of hindsight in this case, we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness on the basis of the foregoing trial errors.