Opinion ID: 2513966
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The exception for parents caring for a child under the age of two would be inapplicable in this context.

Text: John next contends that the court erred by imputing his income under Rule 90.3(a)(4). Because we are vacating the prospective child support award, we need not determine whether the court in fact imputed John's income or merely determined John's future earning capacity. [13] However, to provide guidance to the court should it decide on remand that John was unreasonably underemployed, we now address John's principal argument, namely that the court was prohibited from imputing his income because he was caring for a child under the age of two. Rule 90.3(a)(4) states: A determination of potential income may not be made for a parent ... who is caring for a child under two years of age to whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility. John's argument is relevant only for the period from October 2000, when the court ordered prospective child support, to July 2001, when Noah turned two. John owed a legal responsibility to Noah, since a parent's duty of support `commences at the date of the birth of the child.' [14] Because there was shared physical custody, both Kristeen and John could also be said to be caring for Noah. However, although Rule 90.3(a)(4) applies to cases of shared custody, [15] the caring for a child exception is not meant to apply to situations like the present one. If each of the parents sharing physical custody of a child under the age of two could stop working and claim that his or her income could not be imputed under Rule 90.3(a)(4), then no support would be provided for that child. This result would be contrary to the very purpose of the Rule 90.3 guidelines, namely to ensure that child support orders are adequate to meet the needs of children, subject to the ability of parents to pay. [16] Cases and guidelines from other states support the view that caring for a child exceptions are only intended to prevent the penalization of one parent who stays home virtually full-time to act as the primary caregiver. [17] The court below may thus impute John's potential income should it deem such action necessary on remand, although it can of course consider John's care of Noah and his difficulty in finding employment when determining whether John was voluntarily and unreasonably ... unemployed or underemployed. [18] c. The court's use of the manifest injustice exception was not an abuse of discretion. John contends that the court exacerbated its error by increasing to $1,000 under Rule 90.3(c) the $900 award it had estimated under Rule 90.3(b). [19] Rule 90.3(c)(1) permits variance from the usual Rule 90.3 calculations for good cause upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result without the variance. The good cause inquiry  must focus first and foremost on the needs of the children. [20] John maintains that the court's findings of manifest injustice and good cause were insufficient and that the court's focus on Kristeen's move from Karluk to Kodiak resembled alimony more than child support because it focused on Kristeen's needs instead of Noah's. John alleges that Kristeen had to move to Kodiak anyway for her older son's schooling and that the court's findings fail to consider the sacrifices that John made to spend time with Noah. The court's findings, however, are not clearly erroneous. Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A) states that good cause could include a finding of unusual circumstances; the Rule's commentary notes that examples of unusual circumstances could include extraordinary expenses. [21] In an affidavit, Kristeen estimated her expenses for moving to and living in Kodiak. John countered the assertions in Kristeen's affidavit in an e-mail to his lawyer, but although the subject line of this e-mail was affidavit, it cannot be considered one. [22] Regardless, it was within the court's discretion to find Kristeen's affidavit to constitute clear and convincing evidence that her expenses for moving to Kodiak would be extraordinary, particularly factoring in Kristeen's income as required by Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A). [23] Furthermore, the court acknowledged the distinction between child support and alimony, noting that Dr. Koller has a duty to financially support Noah, not Ms. Reft. The court's recognition that Kristeen's move was so that Noah can be with his father about half the time further manifests the court's awareness of the child's needs. [24] Accordingly, because the court recognized the distinction between child support and alimony and acted within its discretion in finding Kristeen's moving expenses to constitute unusual circumstances, we conclude that the court did not err in varying the award under Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A). [25] If the court determines on remand that such a variation is still required to avoid manifest injustice, it may again use Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A) to vary the award to an amount it believes is just and proper for [John] to contribute toward the nurture and education of [his] child[ ]. [26]