Opinion ID: 34467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: When officers are refused entry after

Text: demanding admittance, they may forcibly enter the premises in order to execute a felony warrant and secure the premises. Maddux did not premise the City’s liability on either the global import of section 90.06, or the specific language in subsection (E.), which is the portion of the written policy that this Court finds problematic in light of Steagald. Though the entire Rules and Procedures Manual was admitted into evidence, Maddux urged below that it was subsection (B.) that by its terms rendered the written policy facially unconstitutional after Steagald. The Court disagrees. Section 90.06 must be read as a single, cohesive, progressive statement of the City Police Department’s written policy respecting the planned execution of arrest warrants. -31- Subsection (A.) establishes that officers are not restricted as to when an arrest warrant may be executed; an arrest warrant may be served at any time. In logical sequence, subsection (B.) adds the requirement that officers must have a reasonable belief that the subject will be found at the place referenced in the warrant. Subsection (C.) then distinguishes the procedure to be followed when officers reasonably believe that the subject is located at a private premises: Officers must identity themselves, explain why they are at the residence, and seek (demand) consent to enter. Exceptions to the prescriptive content of subsection (C.) round out the written policy. Subsection (D.) advises that when exigent circumstances exist or officers have secured a felony arrest warrant, the identity and purpose requirements may be dispensed with. And, under subsection (E.), officers in possession of a felony arrest warrant that is to be executed at a private premises are expressly licensed to effect a forcible entry if consent to enter is denied. It is the second caveat to the general requirements governing entry of a private premises that is objectionable. Subsection (E.) permits forcible entry of a private premises without consent, exigent circumstances, or a search warrant when officers are in possession of a felony arrest warrant. But if the subject of a felony arrest warrant does not actually reside at the private premises, then an officer’s reasonable belief that the subject may be found there at the time the warrant is being executed does not -32- go far enough to protect the privacy rights of the third-party owner of the premises. This is the issue to which the United States Supreme Court turned its attention in Steagald. In Steagald, the Court reasoned that an arrest warrant constitutes only a judicial finding of probable cause to believe that the subject committed a felony and a concomitant authorization to seize the subject.26 An arrest warrant issues to protect the subject from an unreasonable seizure.27 The Court had already sanctioned reliance on an arrest warrant alone to enter a person’s home to effect his arrest, having found in that case that it was “constitutionally reasonable to require him [a person for whom probable cause of commission of a felony had been established] to open his doors to the officers of the law.”28 But if the subject of an arrest warrant is reasonably believed to be at the home of a third party, as opposed to a public place or the subject’s home, the limited authority to enter the premises where the subject is reasonably expected to be is not implicit; more is required to safeguard the third party’s “privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home.”29 The arrest warrant, in such circumstances, does not carry 26 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981). 27 Id. 28 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). 29 Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213. -33- with it any derivative authority to deprive the third party of his privacy interest because the warrant did not issue to protect the third party from an unreasonable search of his home. Officers must justify such a deprivation with additional evidence that the subject of the arrest warrant is reasonably believed to be in that third person’s home.30 A judicial officer has to make such a determination. An officer’s personal determination — “a judicially untested determination” — that probable cause exists to enter a third-party residence, in the absence of exigent circumstances, is “not reliable enough” to justify a search of that private premises for the subject of an arrest warrant.31 The Court cited many examples of the “significant potential for abuse” inherent in a system administered without the benefit of “the detached scrutiny of a judicial officer.”32 The holding in Steagald, according to the Court, was dictated by its earlier reasoning in cases wherein the Court held that, “in the absence of exigent circumstances . . . judicially untested determinations are not reliable enough to justify an entry into a person’s home to arrest him without a warrant, or a search of a home for objects in the absence of a search warrant.”33 The search 30 Id. at 214 n.7. 31 Id. at 213. 32 Id. 33 Id. at 213-14 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, (1948)). -34- of a home for a person should entail no less of an assurance that every effort has been made to guarantee the reasonableness of that action on the part of law enforcement.34 While subsection (E.) of the Rules and Procedures Manual is a correct statement of the law apposite to law enforcement officers entering the home of the subject of an arrest warrant in the reasonable belief that the subject will be found there, it is unconstitutional as applied to a third-party private premises where the subject does not live, regardless of any reasonable belief as to his whereabouts. Steagald distinguished the two interests at stake in the latter situation: (1) the suspect’s interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure, and (2) the third party’s interest — here, Maddux’s interest — in being free from an unreasonable search of her home.35 If no exigent circumstances are apparent and the third party does not give consent for entry, the search of a third party’s home for purposes of locating the subject of a felony arrest warrant is “no more reasonable,” as viewed by the third party, “than it would have been if conducted in the 34 Id. at 214 & n.7 (adding that the second clause of the Fourth Amendment providing that “no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” supports the conclusion that a determination of probable cause to ensure the reasonableness of the search of a person’s home for an object is equally necessary when officers are seeking not an object, but another person). 35 Id. at 216. -35- absence of any warrant.”36 The language in subsection (E.) ignores “the right . . . of presumptively innocent people to be secure in their homes from unjustified, forcible intrusions by the Government.”37 The City’s continued maintenance of a written policy facially inconsistent with established constitutional rights renders suspect the entirety of the City’s protestations respecting its purported unwritten policy for execution of arrest warrants. The record shows that Maddux pleaded, argued, and then adduced evidence that (1) the City’s official policy on forcible entry of a third-party residence to execute an arrest warrant, the subject of which did not reside there, was memorialized in section 90.06 of the City Police Department’s Rules and Procedures Manual; (2) the City had every expectation that officers would follow those published rules and procedures that formed the basis of their training; (3) the Rules and Procedures Manual is intended to undergo change to keep pace with evolving law; (4) the Rules and Procedures Manual had not been amended to comply with Steagald; (5) the City’s written policy, as embodied in the Rules and Procedures Manual, was facially unconstitutional in light of this dereliction; and (6) the City’s argument that an unwritten practice of training and requiring officers to get consent, even if borne 36 Id. 37 Id. at 222 (acknowledging that in weighing this interest with that of the Government in enforcing its laws, the Fourth Amendment recognizes that the balance is struck in favor of protections against unreasonable searches and seizures). -36- out by the evidence, does not dismiss, or neutralize the effect of, the affirmatively unconstitutional written policy.38 Maddux was attempting to persuade the jury that officers entered the Maddux residence in the absence of all of the three Steagald exceptions and that their actions were sanctioned, as far as they and other officers with the Pasadena Police Department understood, by the express terms of section 90.06 in the Rules and Procedures Manual. The significance of the entire written policy to Plaintiffs’ case is evident insofar as the full text of the Rules and Procedures Manual is a part of the record, which is replete with references both to it and section 90.06 respecting the planned execution of arrest warrants. Counsel for Plaintiffs consistently questioned the officers in regard to the prominence of the Rules and Procedures Manual in the officers’ training and the Police Department’s expectation that they would familiarize themselves with, and adhere to, the written policy set forth therein. Officers were also asked specific questions about the methods prescribed for execution of arrest warrants in the Rules and Procedures Manual. For example, in questioning Assistant Police Chief Cunningham, counsel for Plaintiffs asked whether, to his knowledge, “the manual” drew any distinction between whether the subject was believed to be at his house or the house of an innocent 38 For example, counsel for Plaintiffs extensively questioned Assistant Police Chief Cunningham at trial in regard to promulgation of the written rules and procedures and the emphasis the Police Department placed on strict compliance with those provisions. -37- third party. Assistant Police Chief Cunningham responded that such a distinction did not exist in the written policy.39 An almost identical inquiry had earlier been directed to Officer Marshall, who replied that no provision of the Rules and Procedures Manual drew such a distinction. Officer Villareal was asked the more explicit question of whether he understood from his reading of “the whole section [90.06],” that a felony arrest warrant could be executed at any place, public or private, where the actor is reasonably believed to be, even though consent is not given and exigent circumstances are lacking.40 In analyzing the written policy of the City, we must do so in the context of the whole. Thus, to confine our consideration to a subsection that Maddux finds particularly troublesome, narrowly examining in a vacuum, a single sentence of section 90.06, would be inconsistent with generally applicable principles of interpretation regularly employed by this Court in the construction of a controlling writing. The district court appears not to have discerned the extent to 39 Assistant Police Chief Cunningham testified, moreover, that he did not realize until the time his deposition was taken in this case that the United States Supreme Court had in Steagald made specific findings with respect to the procedures law enforcement officers must follow in executing arrest warrants at third-party residences. 40 With his few preceding questions, counsel for Plaintiffs had been attempting to elicit a response to what the witness believed was the import of subsections (c) and (d), in addition to (b). Maddux did not expressly request that the witness read and interpret subsection (e) as well, but in directing the witness to read the whole section, the effect is the same. -38- which the City’s written policy necessarily ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment. City officers’ reliance on a facially unconstitutional written policy conflicted with the testimony offered to show that officers were in fact trained and required to secure consent before executing a felony arrest warrant at a third party’s residence. The written policy provided a legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which a reasonable jury could have found that the City’s official policy was other than what the district court found. The jury could have weighed the discrepant evidence regarding the City’s official policy and reasonably disbelieved the testimony of certain of the officers regarding an unwritten consent requirement. Maddux suggests that the district court “was under the misimpression that the policy to seek consent somehow absolved the City of an arrest warrant policy that was in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Steagald.” But to reiterate, this Court has found no statement in the record that definitively tells us the manner in which the district court scrutinized the written policy. Moreover, we note that the jury, once confronted with the evidence of a written policy such as the one at issue here, alongside evidence of an alleged practice of training and requiring officers to obtain consent under circumstances akin to those at issue here, could find in effect that a policy of seeking consent absolved the City of its problematic written policy. It is plausible that the jury could believe that, though the written -39- policy had not been updated to reflect current law, officers were nevertheless trained in protocol that complied with decisional law interpreting the extent of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. As a second matter already adverted to, the record also discloses that the district court overstated the quantity, and most probably the quality, of the testimony supporting the City’s claim that, in practice, its consent requirement ensured the constitutionality of arrests effected by its officers and any searches conducted in pursuance thereof. In response to Plaintiffs’ attempt to explain that officers entered the Maddux residence in a manner violative of Steagald and that they did so in accordance with the training that they had received, the district court rejected that characterization of the City’s official policy by stating: Every bit of evidence is that they [the officers] were trained to get consent. . . . [Y]ou’ve got a policy in place that, in essence, complies with the constitutional requirements that are applicable here, because they have advised their officers to get consent.41 C. The Testimony This Court has found notable instances in the trial testimony 41 The district court granted judgment for City as a matter of law based in part on a finding that the City’s official policy requiring consent was “designed to assure constitutional violations would not result.” -40- in which it was not at all clear whether at the time of the events underlying this case certain officers had received training in regard to, or otherwise knew of, the overarching consent requirement advanced by the City. Assistant Police Chief Cunningham testified unequivocally that throughout his tenure with the Pasadena Police Department, the policy had been to obtain “permission by a person in authority” before entering a private residence to execute a felony arrest warrant, but his statements were not corroborated in a consistent, coherent fashion by testimony elicited from the four other officers called by Plaintiffs as adverse witnesses. For example, Officer Marshall testified that, at the time he assisted in executing the felony arrest warrant, he understood he would have needed consent to enter a third-party residence, in the absence of a search warrant or exigent circumstances. Counsel for Maddux later used Officer Marshall’s deposition testimony to impeach his trial testimony: Q. Okay. And then were you asked: “. . . Since everyone is saying they did not go into the Maddux residence, my question to you is, even though you say you didn’t go into the Maddux residence, was it your understanding that you had the authority to go into the Maddux residence had you wanted to do so?” And your answer? A. “That did not cross my mind at the time I was going in the backyard.” Q. Next question. “As we sit here today, is it your -41- understanding that you would have had the authority to enter the Maddux residence because you had a felony arrest warrant for [the subject of the felony arrest warrant]?” What was your answer? A. “If the suspect was inside that residence.” Q. Were you then asked: “So it’s your understanding that if the suspect is in the residence and you have a felony arrest warrant for that suspect, then you have the authority to go into that residence to arrest that suspect?” What’s your answer? A. “If the suspect is there.” In an exchange following the impeachment, Officer Marshall testified that without consent, a search warrant or exigent circumstances, he could not enter a residence where the subject of an arrest warrant was reasonably believed to be. Likewise, Officer Villareal’s answers to similar questions were confusing and seemingly inconclusive. On direct examination, he testified thus: Q. What were you trained? A. In order to execute a search warrant–I mean, an arrest warrant, a felony arrest warrant, we have to obtain consent prior to going in that house. Q. What if you don’t obtain consent? A. Then I’m not going into that house. Q. You didn’t know that at the time your deposition was taken, did you? A. I don’t know that that question was even asked. I don’t remember. In reading the relevant portion of Officer Villareal’s -42- deposition for the jury thereafter, the following occurred: Q. “Let’s put us back at the police academy; okay? And you’ve got an arrest warrant for suspect A and suspect A is not in suspect A’s house, he’s in B’s house. Does it make any difference to you in executing that warrant whether suspect A is in his own house or whether he’s in B’s house?” What’s your answer? A. “It’s a felony warrant. No.” Q. Okay. Isn’t it true that on May 22nd, 2000, your understanding is that you had a felony arrest warrant and didn’t make any difference whether he was in his own house or an innocent third party’s house? A. Correct. Q. You’ve found out since your deposition that that’s not the way it works; correct? A. Correct. Q. But the way that you were trained by the City of Pasadena is consistent with what you’ve said in the deposition, that it didn’t make any difference which house; correct? A. Not according to the rules manual, yes. Q. And according to the way you were trained at the police academy; correct? A. Correct. Q. You also testified in your deposition, did you not, that the arrest warrant alone gave you the right to enter the Maddux residence to arrest [the subject of the felony arrest warrant]? -43- A. If I remember correctly, that question I replied was I never went inside the Maddux residence. Q. Correct. And I understand that, but the, hypothetically, that arrest warrant gave you the authority to enter the Maddux residence to arrest [the subject of the felony arrest warrant]. It gave you that authority even though you never went in the house. Isn’t that what you’ve testified to at your deposition? A. Yes. During the subsequent cross-examination, Officer Villareal testified that the City’s official policy on executing felony arrest warrants was to obtain consent to enter a residence, that he “always practiced that policy,” that this comported with the training he had received, and that he had never been denied consent to enter a residence. Finally, in one of the last series of questions asked of Officer Villareal on redirect, he was asked to read section 90.06 and answer whether it was his understanding from that section that a felony arrest warrant could be executed “at any place, public or private, where the actor is reasonably believed to be, even if you do not have consent and even if there are not exigent circumstances.” He indicated that this was his understanding of the Rules and Procedures Manual, and further, that this was the way he had been trained “prior to this incident.” Officer Villareal’s testimony is, in sum, puzzling. Although he seemed to give a definitive answer on cross-examination -44- regarding what the City’s official policy for execution of felony arrest warrants was at the time of the underlying events, his answers to questions posed by counsel for Plaintiffs, both at trial and during his deposition, reasonably undercut the statements he made during cross-examination. The testimony of Officers Marshall and Villareal alone was sufficient to create an issue of fact regarding the existence of a consent requirement. In particular, Officer Marshall’s, and possibly Officer Villareal’s, knowledge of what was required to execute a felony arrest warrant at a private premises, at the time relevant herein, seems to coincide with section 90.06 of the Rules and Procedures Manual, according to their own statements. Thus, reasonable jurors could find that at least these officers were following, and indeed may only have known of, the procedures set forth in section 90.06. At a minimum, the testimony elicited raises a factual question as to what City officers seeking to execute a felony arrest warrant at a private premises were trained to do if consent was withheld. Officer Marshall’s deposition testimony indicated his belief that, so long as he held a valid felony arrest warrant, his entry by whatever means necessary was validated. The law does not condone such a course of action if the subject in fact is not in residence, no exigent circumstances exist, and no search warrant has been procured to protect the privacy interest of the third-party owner. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, this evidence -45- conflicts with the evidence that the officers were trained to get consent, demonstrating that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on this issue. Though the City may ultimately prove that it trained its officers to seek consent before entering a private residence to execute a felony arrest warrant, the record raises a salient factual question that precludes judgment as a matter of law. Did the City and its officers apprehend that if an innocent third party withheld consent to enter her home, officers would then be unable to enter forcibly in the absence of exigent circumstances or a search warrant? It does not appear that officers were made unaware that in executing a felony arrest warrant, the United States Supreme Court had drawn from its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches a fundamental distinction between the circumstances under which law enforcement officers could lawfully enter the subject’s home, as opposed to that of an innocent third party. The written policy condoned forcible entry of a third-party premises despite the absence of the Steagald exceptions, and certain testimony in the record causes us to question whether the City in practice went any further in protecting the privacy interests of third parties caught in the melee.42 42 Assistant Police Chief Cunningham testified that in his view, Steagald had not changed the City’s policy in any way. He stated that -46- Paradigmatically, a district court regarding a Rule 50 motion under these circumstances would thoroughly study the entirety of the written policy, as well as evaluate the testimony of the officers on the issue of consent. The district court would itself only rule as to the substance of the City’s official policy if the facts and inferences favored one party so profoundly that reasonable minds would be incapable of disagreeing. Beyond cavil, it is critical that the district court be certain that no factual issue remains in order to justify taking a case from the jury.