Opinion ID: 170734
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stock-Raising Homestead Act includes sand, gravel, and rock

Text: First, Western Rock argues that, unlike in Western Nuclear, the sand, gravel, and rock on the relevant property is not found in a deposit that is separable from the surface estate. The Western Nuclear Court has already reversed this circuit on a similar issue, so we take extra precaution here. As noted by the district court, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test in Western Nuclear to aid in the determination of what the Stock-Raising Homestead Act mineral reservation encompasses: we interpret the mineral reservation in the Act to include substances [a] that are mineral in character (i.e., that are inorganic), [b] that can be removed from the soil, [c] that can be used for commercial purposes, and [d] that there is no reason to suppose were intended to be included in the surface estate. 462 U.S. at 53, 103 S.Ct. 2218. First, there is no debate that the rock, sand, and gravel at issue are inorganic substances and are minerals. Western Rock challenges the removability of the sand and gravel: Where common sand and gravel are pervasive as in this case, it can hardly be considered removable from the soil. Aplts' Opening Br. at 24. While Western Rock is correct that the gravel deposit at issue in Western Nuclear was an alluvial deposit covered with 12-18 inches of topsoil overburden, id. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 2218; see also Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 40, 103 S.Ct. 2218, the physical characteristics of the deposit played no direct role in the Court's analysis in Western Nuclear. In fact, the Court devoted only a single line in its opinion to the removability issue. See Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 55, 103 S.Ct. 2218 (What is significant is that gravel can be taken from the soil and used for commercial purposes.). Similarly, while the BedRoc plurality noted that the sand and gravel at issue in that case were plentiful and visible on the surface of the . . . land, BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 180, 124 S.Ct. 1587, the plurality did not rely on that fact to distinguish Western Nuclear. Consequently, because it is undisputed that the sand, gravel, and rock at issue in this case can be taken from the soil and used for commercial purposes, Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 55, 103 S.Ct. 2218, we do not see any basis for distinguishing Western Nuclear. Western Rock also challenges the commercial viability of sand, gravel, and rock at the time the Government made its mineral reservation. According to plaintiffs, this case should therefore be governed by BedRoc, not Western Nuclear. As plaintiffs explain in their opening brief: In this case, Landowners have demonstrated that gravel was not commercially viable in 1925 when the patent was issued. Because the subject property is in the same semiarid, undeveloped and sparsely populated desert area as the Nevada property at issue in BedRoc, the Court's conclusion that sand and gravel were . . . commercially worthless in 1919 [to prospectors] due to Nevada's sparse population and lack of development is facially applicable here. BedRoc, at 184, 124 S.Ct. 1587. Aplts' Opening Br. at 25. The Secretary of the Interior once took a similar view: Deposits of gravel and sand, suitable for mixing with cement for concrete construction, but having no peculiar property or characteristic giving them special value . . ., do not render the land in which they are found mineral in character within the meaning of the mining laws, or bar entry under the homestead laws, notwithstanding the land may be more valuable on account of such deposits than for agricultural purposes. Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310, 310 (1910); see also BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 184 n. 6, 124 S.Ct. 1587 (Indeed, as petitioners aptly point out, `[e]ven the most enterprising settler could not have sold sand in the desert.') (quoting Brief for Petitioners 6). But, the Court in Western Nuclear wrestled with the identical argument, and rejected it: Respondent errs in relying on Zimmerman as evidence that Congress could not have intended the term minerals to encompass gravel. Although the legal understanding of a word prevailing at the time it is included in a statute is a relevant factor to consider in determining the meaning that the legislature ascribed to the word, we do not see how any inference can be drawn that the 64th Congress understood the term minerals to exclude gravel. It is most unlikely that many members of Congress were aware of the ruling in Zimmerman, which was never tested in the courts and was not mentioned in the reports or debates on the SRHA. Even if Congress had been aware of Zimmerman, there would be no reason to conclude that it approved of the Secretary's ruling in that case rather than this Court's opinion in [ Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 536, 23 S.Ct. 365, 47 L.Ed. 575 (1903)] which adopted a broad definition of the term mineral and quoted with approval a statement that gravel is a mineral. 462 U.S. at 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 2218 (internal citations omitted); see Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 536, 23 S.Ct. 365, 47 L.Ed. 575 (quoting with approval a statement in an English case that everything except the mere surface which is used for agricultural purposes; anything beyond that which is useful for any purpose whatever, whether it is gravel, marble, fire clay, or the like, comes within the word `mineral' when there is a reservation of the mines and minerals from a grant of land.) (quoting Midland Ry. Co. v. Checkley, (1867) L.R. 4 Eq. 19, 25 (Court of Chancery)). We cannot agree that BedRoc is the applicable Supreme Court precedent. The BedRoc plurality looked back in time to 1919 in order to determine whether the sand and gravel at issue in that case were valuable minerals for purposes of the Pittman Act, which applied only to water development lands in Nevada. See 41 Stat. 293 (granting permit to drill[ ] or otherwise explore for water beneath the surface of . . . nonmineral, nontimbered public lands . . . in the State of Nevada); BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 183-84, 124 S.Ct. 1587. The BedRoc Court refused to extend the rationale of Western Nuclear to the Pittman Act because the Court found that the Pittman Act's plain meaning would not support it. The Court emphasized Congress's addition of the modifier valuable, in holding that sand and gravel were not valuable minerals reserved by the Pittman Act. Id. at 186-87, 124 S.Ct. 1587. According to the plurality, this retrospective inquiry into the question of commercial value was required by the different statutory language in the Pittman Act, id., 124 S.Ct. 1587 and the plurality explicitly acknowledged that such an inquiry is not required under Western Nuclear's interpretation of the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, id. at 183 n. 5, 124 S.Ct. 1587 (noting that  Western Nuclear defined `minerals' . . . as substances . . . that `have separate value' from the soil, and that this definition involves only a minimal inquiry into whether a substance might at some point have separate value from the soil and might, in the abstract, be susceptible of commercial use) (emphasis added). Consequently, even if the sand, gravel, and rock located on plaintiffs' property could not have been realistically used for commercial purposes in 1925, that fact is not determinative of our analysis under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. Instead, for purposes of the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, we examine only whether the materials might, in the abstract, be susceptible of commercial use, id., and we have no difficulty answering that inquiry in the affirmative. See New W. Materials LLC v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals, 398 F.Supp.2d 438, 447 (E.D.Va.2005) (finding that the Small Tract Act of 1938, which contains identical wording as found in the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, is governed by Western Nuclear, and that mineral deposits included sand and gravel), aff'd, 216 Fed.Appx. 385 (4th Cir.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 863, 169 L.Ed.2d 723 (2008). Finally, Western Rock wisely does not argue that sand, gravel, and rock were intended to be included in the surface estate. As in Western Nuclear, If we were to interpret the [Stock-Raising Homestead Act] to convey gravel deposits to the farmers and stockmen who made entries under the Act, we would in effect be saying that Congress intended to make the exploitation of such deposits dependent solely upon the initiative of persons whose interests were known to lie elsewhere. In resolving the ambiguity in the language of the [Act], we decline to construe that language so as to produce a result at odds with the purposes underlying the statute. Instead, we interpret the language of the statute in a way that will further Congress' overriding objective of facilitating the concurrent development of surface and subsurface resources. 462 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. 2218. Although we expand our focus to include rock and sand here, the analysis is the same. There is no reason to suppose that rock, sand, and gravel were meant to be included in the surface estate (intended for livestock grazing), for that would hinder the concurrent development of surface and subsurface resources. See also New W. Materials, 398 F.Supp.2d at 449 (Just as Congress would not have expected the ranchers and farmers who received grants pursuant to the [Stock-Raising Homestead Act] to exploit the subsurface estate, Congress likewise could not have expected the homeowners or small business owners of five acre plots to exploit the subsurface estates sold or leased pursuant to the [Small Tract Act].).