Opinion ID: 1253110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Damages Limitation

Text: ¶ 64. The two remaining issues presented in this case concern the damages cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). [15] The parties disagree whether an award of front pay is subject to the damages cap, and whether the number of employees for purposes of the damages cap should be measured at the time the discrimination occurs or at the time the award is given. We turn first to the question of the applicability of the damages cap to awards of front pay. ¶ 65. The circuit court determined that the front pay it awarded to Salveson is not subject to the damages cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The court based its decision of the legislative history of Title VII, and noted that front pay was awarded before Title VII was amended in 1991 and therefore does not constitute compensatory damages awarded under § 1981a(b)(3)). ¶ 66. The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court's decision that front pay is not subject to the damages cap, also basing its determination on the legislative history of the statute, and on its finding that front pay was often awarded prior to the 1991 amendment to Title VII. Salveson, 234 Wis. 2d 413, ¶ 35. ¶ 67. After the circuit court and court of appeals issued their decisions in this case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that front pay is not subject to the damages cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Pals v. Schepel Buick and GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2000). ¶ 68. The County urges this court to reject the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Pals. It contends that under the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), front pay is compensatory damages...for future pecuniary losses. ¶ 69. After the parties briefed and argued this case, the United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether front pay is included under the damages cap. In Pollard v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., the Supreme Court held that the statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3) is inapplicable to front pay. 121 S. Ct. 1946, 1949 (2001). The Court found that courts may award front pay under § 706(g), id. at 1950, which, as amended in 1972, authorizes any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Id. It therefore concluded that front pay is not within the meaning of compensatory damages in § 1981a(b)(3), and thus front pay is excluded from the statutory cap. Id. at 1951. [29] ¶ 70. This issue is settled. The circuit court correctly applied § 1981a(b)(3) and properly excluded the front pay awarded to Salveson from the damages cap.