Opinion ID: 2166953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mitigating factor of youthful age

Text: Upon a finding of guilt in a capital murder case, the sentencing body is required to evaluate various circumstances when determining if a sentence of death shall be imposed. At the sentencing phase of this case, a bench trial, the trial judge weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as set forth in Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, § 413 [4] in considering whether a sentence of death was the appropriate penalty for Appellant. One of the mitigating factors to be considered is the youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Section 413(g)(5). During the hearing, while delivering his oral opinion, the trial judge stated, Next, number five, the defendant was of youthful age at the time of the crime. Taking the phrase `youthful age' to refer to chronological age, and having considered the case law, I find by a preponderance of the evidence that that circumstance likewise does not exist. (Emphasis added). Appellant objects to the trial court's application of chronological age as the appropriate definition when considering the mitigating factor of youthful age. This Court has clearly rejected a pure chronological age approach when evaluating the youthful age mitigating factor. Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 367, 473 A.2d 903, 921 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984). As we recently explained in Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 657, 702 A.2d 261, 278 (1997), there is now an absolute minimum age requirement of eighteen years at the time of the murder in order to be death eligible. At the time the General Assembly amended the statute to require the minimum age of eighteen it did not amend the mitigating circumstance of youthful age, thus giving support to our case law holding that youthful age is not measured solely by chronological age, but rather there are additional factors to be considered. In White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 738, 481 A.2d 201, 210 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 837 (1985), we defined the factors to be considered which include prior criminal conduct, home environment, marital status, degree of maturity, and alcohol and drug abuse, among others, as factors relevant to the concept of youthful age. Johnson's age at the time of the murder was nineteen years and two months. During the course of the sentencing hearing, substantial evidence was introduced demonstrating that Appellant was the product of extremely abusive parents, that he had a severe alcohol and drug abuse problem, that he was very poorly educated and that he lacked maturity. On the other hand, evidence was also introduced revealing that Appellant had a substantial prior criminal record and that he had a girlfriend. As we have held, the burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a mitigating circumstance. Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. at 361, 473 A.2d at 918. In the instant case, it was the trial judge's responsibility to determine whether this burden had been met, upon a consideration of all of the factors to be considered in determining youthful age. Because the trial judge stated during his oral opinion that he equated youthful age with chronological age and no other factors were stated we must vacate the sentence and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Where a trial judge in a bench trial determines that the mitigating factor of youthful age has not been proven, our standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational sentencing authority could have concluded that the accused failed to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 362, 473 A.2d 903. The sentencing authority is not required, as a matter of law, to find that the mitigating circumstance of youthful age exists under these circumstances. As we recently reiterated in Lovell v. State, 347 Md. at 656, 702 A.2d at 277 the holding in Stebbing does not compel the sentencing judge to find the mitigating circumstance of youthful age, under all of the circumstances, where the defendant was nineteen years of age at the time of the murder. Thus, on remand, the trial judge has the discretion to reach whatever conclusion he deems appropriate, consistent with this opinion, applying the factors cited herein. The State asserts that even if the trial judge erred in restricting his consideration of the mitigating circumstance of youthful age to Johnson's chronological age, the issue is not preserved for appellate review. The State bases this contention on the fact that defense counsel did not object to the definition that was articulated by the trial judge while delivering his oral opinion during the sentencing phase. After all of the evidence is presented, the sentencing authority then evaluates the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in order to determine if a sentence of death is the appropriate penalty. After considering all of the evidence in this case, the trial judge articulated each circumstance and rendered his opinion as to whether or not the circumstance existed. Given the nature of the proceedings, defense counsel was not required to object. To do so would require that defense counsel interrupt the judge during his delivery of an oral opinion and make an argument as to his findings. In the first instance, this Court is required under § 414(e) as follows: (e) Considerations by Court of Appeals. In addition to the consideration of any errors properly before the Court on appeal, the Court of Appeals shall consider the imposition of the death sentence. With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine:    (2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or court's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstances under § 413(d); (3) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or court's finding that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances: and.... (Emphasis added). This Court cannot fulfill its statutory obligation as outlined above if the sentencing authority does not properly evaluate the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. As we have explained, in this case the trial judge did not apply the correct definition when deciding that the mitigating circumstance of youthful age did not exist. Thus, it is not clear whether or not this may have had any greater weight when properly applied and when balanced against the aggravating circumstances. The enacted statutes outlining the procedures to be followed for the imposition of the death penalty in this State have been structured to guide the discretion vested in the sentencing authority with `clear and objective standards' to ensure that the death penalty is not inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of constitutional principles. Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 437, 439 A.2d 542, 560 (1982). To that end, we are required to remand this case for a proper consideration of whether the mitigating factor of youthful age exists and, if so, whether the aggravating circumstances are outweighed by the mitigating circumstances. The State further asserts that if the error did exist it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore does not warrant vacating the sentence and remanding for a new sentencing hearing. We do not agree. We have repeatedly held that when an error is made as to a matter of law, the proper recourse is to remand for a new trial or hearing. In Johnson, we held that where, as here, the sentencing authority fails to comply with the statutory design we must vacate the sentence. Id. at 440, 439 A.2d at 562. In Maziarz v. State, 302 Md. 1, 485 A.2d 245 (1984) we vacated a death sentence and remanded for a new hearing for reasons involving the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In that case, the trial judge stated that unless the mitigating circumstances are overwhelming, the death penalty is mandated if any one of the aggravating circumstances is proven by the State. Id. at 5, 485 A.2d 245. We held that [t]he standard applied by the trial court, whereby death is said to be `mandated' unless the mitigating circumstances are `overwhelming,' grossly distorts the statute to the prejudice of the accused. We must therefore vacate the death sentence and remand for new sentencing proceedings on the verdict of guilty under Count I of the indictment, the first degree murder count on which the State gave notice that it was seeking the death penalty. Id. at 6, 485 A.2d 245. The same reasoning applies to the instant case, where the failure to consider all factors relevant to the concept of youthful age is prejudicial to the defendant, thus requiring that we remand for a new sentencing hearing. See also Sucik v. State, 344 Md. 611, 689 A.2d 78 (1997) (A sentence of life without the possibility of parole was vacated and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing based on the failure of the trial court to consider the findings contained in a presentence investigation report prior to imposing the sentence as the report was never prepared. We held that the PSI ensures that the sentence will be imposed only after all relevant considerations are assessed.)