Opinion ID: 1197058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Collateral Order Doctrine in Relation to the Present Matter

Text: {15} Although the collateral order doctrine, and its procedural impetus, the writ of error, generally apply to determinations of immunity under Section 37-1-23(A), our review by writ of error is necessarily limited by the nature of immunity established by the Legislature. Governmental immunity under Section 37-1-23(A) is limited to unwritten contracts and does not apply to a contract action against the government that is based on a valid written contract. As a result, a governmental defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action based on contract may involve two separate questions: (1) whether the action is based on a written contract or is, instead, subject to governmental immunity under Section 37-1-23(A); and (2) whether the plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to the claim of breach of contract. The former, as a collateral order affecting interests that would be irretrievably lost if the case proceeded to trial, is subject to review by writ of error; the latter, a matter going to the heart of a breach of contract claim and representing a step toward final disposition of the merits of the case, Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, rather than a final decision on a collateral issue, is not. See id. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221 (allowing immediate appeal because the matters embraced in the decision appealed from are not of such an interlocutory nature as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of this case); cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (holding that a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final decision' (emphasis added)). Determinations at the summary judgment stage as to whether genuine issues of material fact exist on a claim of breach of contract do not require immediate appeal. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller ex rel. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (The collateral order doctrine is a `narrow exception,' Firestone [Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981)], whose reach is limited to trial court orders affecting rights that would be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal.). See generally 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.10, at 662 (1992) (stating that, under analogous circumstances, [o]fficial defendants are in the same position as any other defendants who, under the final judgment rule, must bear the burdens of trial following a mistaken refusal to dismiss or grant summary judgment). {16} The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, recently reached a similar conclusion with respect to claims of qualified immunity. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-19, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (discussing Johnson ). In Johnson, a governmental official being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that he did not participate in the conduct forming the basis of the claim. 515 U.S. at 307-08, 115 S.Ct. 2151. The trial court denied the motion, finding that sufficient evidence supported the plaintiff's theory, and the defendant sought immediate appeal. Id. at 308, 115 S.Ct. 2151. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply because the defendant's arguments were inseparable from the merits of the claim. Id. at 314, 115 S.Ct. 2151. The Court also concluded that considerations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources argue in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of `qualified immunity' matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law. Id. at 317, 115 S.Ct. 2151. We believe these same considerations apply to determinations beyond issues of immunity in actions against a governmental defendant based on contract. [1] Thus, even though determinations of sovereign immunity under Section 37-1-23(A) are generally subject to the collateral order doctrine, we believe that the limited nature of immunity granted in Section 37-1-23(A) requires us to scrutinize the specific factual context surrounding such determinations in order to determine whether issuance of a writ of error would be appropriate.
{17} In this case, Dr. Handmaker had written employment contracts with UNM. His breach of contract claim centers around the terms of employment under those contracts, including the procedure and grounds necessary for termination from an administrative position. UNM concedes that Dr. Handmaker's 1993-1994 written contract, which designated him as administrator of the developmental disabilities program and included a $10,000 administrative salary, included his position as director of the UAP. Dr. Handmaker does not claim that UNM entered into a separate unwritten contract with respect to his administrative position with the UAP. As a result, from the facts appearing in the record on summary judgment, we determine that this action is based on a written contract. Thus, applying Section 37-1-23(A), we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying UNM's motion for summary judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity. Cf. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 622, 845 P.2d at 145 (concluding that the trial court did not err in denying a motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity).
{18} UNM also claims as a basis for issuing a writ of error that the trial court improperly determined that Dr. Handmaker raised genuine issues of material fact regarding his claim that UNM breached the employment contract. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ciup v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 1996-NMSC-062, ¶ 7, 122 N.M. 537, 928 P.2d 263. On review, we examine the whole record for any evidence that places a genuine issue of material fact in dispute, Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 1997-NMSC-041, ¶ 15, 123 N.M. 752, 945 P.2d 970, and we view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable inferences in support of a trial on the merits, see Silverman v. Progressive Broad., Inc., 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 7, 125 N.M. 500, 964 P.2d 61. {19} In reviewing UNM's argument, we first note that the face of the 1994-1995 contract is ambiguous concerning Dr. Handmaker's administrative responsibilities for two reasons: (1) neither the 1993-1994 nor the 1994-1995 contract made any mention of the UAP, yet UNM conceded that directorship of the UAP was included in the 1993-1994 contract; and (2) the contract contained an apparent contradiction between the change in administrative designation, from administrator of the developmental disability program to director of the division of developmental disabilities, and the failure to modify Dr. Handmaker's administrative salary from his 1993-1994 contract. See Mark V. Inc. v. Mellekas, 114 N.M. 778, 845 P.2d 1232 (1993) (An ambiguity exists in an agreement when the parties' expressions of mutual assent lack clarity. The question whether an agreement contains an ambiguity is a matter of law to be decided by the trial court. (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, in light of the express written notice Dr. Handmaker received of his termination as director of the UAP prior to signing the 1994-1995 contract, we are skeptical that Dr. Handmaker could have raised a genuine issue of material fact that the administrative designation in the 1994-1995 contract was intended to include his directorship of the UAP. See C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (1991) ([I]n determining whether a term or expression to which the parties have agreed is unclear, a court may hear evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract and of any relevant usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance. (footnote omitted)). Additionally, UNM correctly asserts that in New Mexico there is a presumption that termination from employment is at will unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, Garcia, 1996-NMSC-029, ¶ 10, 121 N.M. 728, 918 P.2d 7, and UNM thus claims that, because only his position as associate professor was protected by tenure, Dr. Handmaker's administrative positions were terminable at will. [2] {20} However, we believe that these assertions are not properly before this Court on petition for writ of error. UNM's claims require the interpretation of a written contract and are unrelated to its assertion of sovereign immunity. Cf. 15A Wright et al., supra, § 3914.10, at 662 (One possible approach to ... cases [involving qualified immunity in which the defendant denies committing the acts that form the basis of the claim] is to conclude that a factual argument of noninvolvement presents issues that intrinsically do not involve official immunity.). The true issue raised in UNM's motion for summary judgment was not whether a written contract with a governmental agency existed but, instead, the meaning of the terms and conditions of an existing written contract between UNM and Dr. Handmaker, specifically the terms of removal from administrative positions. Cf. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 318, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (suggesting that appellate courts will be cautious to limit appellate review in a case where the appealable issue appears simply a means to lead the court to review the underlying factual matter). UNM's reliance on the presumption of at-will employment for administrative positions and extrinsic evidence to prove that the 1994-1995 contract withdrew Dr. Handmaker from director of the UAP only serves to emphasize the extent to which UNM's arguments are intertwined with the merits of Dr. Handmaker's breach of contract claim. Cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (An appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim.). The trial court's order denying UNM's motion for summary judgment entails issues involving the ultimate facts necessary for disposition of the merits of the action. Cf. Allen, 106 N.M. at 674-75, 748 P.2d at 517-18 (holding that, because the issue of immunity raised in the interlocutory order requires a determination of the very ingredients of the causes of action themselves, it fail[ed] to meet the Cohen requirements for appellate review under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule). Further, the trial court's order does not finally determine these issues; the trial court concluded only that Dr. Handmaker had raised genuine issues of material fact and did not conclude that UNM had in fact breached its contract. Cf. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 622-23, 845 P.2d at 145-46 ([A]n adjudication [denying a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity] does not determine that defendants are liable ... Establishing the defendants' liability or nonliability must await the outcome of the trial that a denial of summary judgment entails.). {21} As with most denials of motions for summary judgment, this portion of the district court's order is more appropriately left to further examination by the district court and a trial on the merits and can be reviewed more effectively on appeal from final judgment following a more complete development of the facts. We reject UNM's contention that an immediate appeal on these issues is necessary to minimize the impact of a trial on public funds. Cf. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 472 U.S. at 436, 105 S.Ct. 2757 ([T]he possibility that a ruling may be erroneous and may impose additional litigation expense is not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement....). As a policy matter, we believe that immediate appellate review of these issues would cause undue delay in trial court proceedings, especially considering the policy in New Mexico disfavoring summary judgment and the standard of review applicable in such matters. See Pharmaseal Lab., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 756, 568 P.2d 589, 592 (1977) (Summary judgment is a drastic remedy to be used with great caution.). See generally Richardson-Merrell Inc., 472 U.S. at 434, 105 S.Ct. 2757 (One purpose of the final judgment rule ... is to avoid the delay that inherently accompanies time-consuming interlocutory appeals.). Therefore, we conclude that, to the extent that the trial court's order resolved matters beyond immunity under Section 37-1-23(A), it would be inappropriate to apply the collateral order doctrine, and we dismiss UNM's appeal from this portion of the trial court's order. Cf. Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir.1997) (To the extent that [the defendant's] appeal requires the determination of a fact-related dispute, namely whether the evidence in the pretrial record is sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial, we lack jurisdiction.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045, 118 S.Ct. 686, 139 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), Stella v. Kelley, 63 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir.1995) ([A] summary judgment order which determines that the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact ... is not reviewable on demand.).