Opinion ID: 4519519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Montana Statutory Law

Text: ¶47 Since the INA generally defers to state law regarding the authority of state law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests, as required by foundational principles 8 Examples of cooperation include “responding to requests for information about when an alien will be released from [state] custody” and “situations where States participate in a joint task force with federal officers, provide operational support in executing a warrant, or allow federal officials to gain access to detainees held in state facilities.” Arizona, 567 U.S. 410, 132 S. Ct. at 2507(citing DHS guidance materials). 23 of state sovereignty, we now turn to whether Montana statute provides such authority. In determining legislative intent, “an express mention of a certain power or authority implies the exclusion of nondescribed powers.” In re M.P.M., 1999 MT 78, ¶ 23, 294 Mont. 87, 976 P.2d 988. Montana statutes exhaustively regulate the violations officers can arrest for, and in what circumstances. They do not provide authority for warrantless civil immigration arrests. ¶48 Only in very limited circumstances do Montana statutes authorize warrantless arrests for civil violations. Montana’s general warrantless arrest statute authorizes arrests only for “offense[s],” § 46-6-311(1), MCA, which are defined as “violation[s] of any penal statute,” § 46-1-202(15), MCA (emphasis added). As defined in Title 46 of the MCA, “offense” does not include violations that are “civil in nature.” See State v. Boulton, 2006 MT 170, ¶ 16, 332 Mont. 538, 140 P.3d 482; § 46-1-202(15), MCA. Rightly so, warrantless arrests for civil violations are rare. See, e.g. § 53-21-129, MCA (emergency mental health arrests); § 53-24-107, MCA (public intoxication); § 10-1-611, MCA (military arrests). Other civil arrests require judicial authorization. Sections 3-1-511 to -515, MCA (civil contempt of court requiring a judicial order); § 25-14-102, MCA (arrest authority for absconding debtor). Section 27-16-101, MCA, specifically provides that “[n]o person may be arrested before judgment in a civil action except as prescribed by this chapter.” Nowhere in Title 27, chapter 16, MCA—“Arrest and Bail in Civil Actions”—is law enforcement granted arrest authority for a civil immigration violation. See § 27-16-102, MCA. 24 ¶49 While warrantless arrests for civil violations are tightly regulated by Montana statute, the District Court, as well as the Appellee and the United States, incorrectly relied on § 7-32-2203, MCA, to provide the Detention Center with state law authority to arrest Ramon. Specifically, the District Court held, and Appellee and the United States argue, that subsection 3 of § 7-32-2203, MCA, defining who may be confined in a detention center, provides the authority. Section 7-32-2203(3), MCA, states that detention centers are used “for the confinement of persons committed for contempt or upon civil process or by other authority of law.” Appellee, and the United States, assert that since immigration enforcement is a civil process, § 7-32-2203(3), MCA, authorizes local jails to cooperate with federal immigration authorities. ¶50 Section 7-32-2203, MCA, is not an arrest statute and does not confer any arrest authority. As made clear by the title of § 2203, “Who may be confined in a detention center,” the section does not provide arrest authority; rather, it concerns who can be housed in a detention center after they have been validly “committed,” “sentenced,” or “charged with a crime and committed for trial.”9 Section 7-32-2203, MCA. ¶51 Likewise, a detention center “means a facility established and maintained by an appropriate entity for the purpose of confining arrested persons or persons sentenced to the detention center.” Section 7-32-2241, MCA (emphasis added). It is clear that § 2203, and the entirety of Title 7, chapter 32, part 22, MCA—“Detention Centers”— describes the operational requirements of detention centers and is not an independent 9 The MCA uses the term “detention centers” to mean county jails. See City of Hardin v. State, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 171, . 25 source of arrest authority. See Creedle, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 1307 (holding that a similar Florida statute did not provide an independent source of authority for local law enforcement to arrest individuals for civil immigration violations). ¶52 The theory of lawful cooperation between local law enforcement and DHS to make civil immigration arrests under Montana law is misguided. Tellingly, the Legislature has taken several actions related to increasing cooperation between local and federal officials regarding immigration enforcement, yet none authorize civil immigration arrests. See § 1-1-411(3), MCA, invalidated by Mont. Immigration Justice All. v. Bullock, 2016 MT 104, ¶¶ 45-46, 383 Mont. 318, 371 P.3d 430 (invalidated statute instructed state agencies to notify DHS of any illegal alien applying for a state service); § 61-5-147(1), MCA (allowing for communication with DHS regarding threat assessment analysis in hazardous material transport licensing decisions); § 46-6-210(2), MCA (authorizing a felony warrant arrest that was issued in another jurisdiction); § 46-30-301, MCA (authorizing warrantless extradition arrests for individuals accused of “a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of 1 year or more”); § 46-31-101, MCA (authority to execute criminal detainers). The Legislature has specifically authorized DHS officers to conduct arrests for state crimes, § 46-6-412, MCA, yet it has not done the inverse for state officers. ¶53 Montana statutory law does not, either directly or indirectly, authorize the arrest of individuals based solely on a federal civil immigration detainer. 26