Opinion ID: 4388694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: California’s Statutes

Text: This case centers on three laws enacted by the California legislature with the express goal “of protecting immigrants from an expected increase in federal immigration enforcement actions.” Hearing on AB 450 Before the UNITED STATES V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 15 Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2017–18 Sess. 1 (Cal. 2017) (synopsis).
AB 450 prohibits “public and private employers” from “provid[ing] voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to enter any nonpublic areas of a place of labor,” unless “the immigration enforcement agent provides a judicial warrant.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 7285.1(a), (e). It similarly prohibits employers from “provid[ing] voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to access, review, or obtain the employer’s employee records without a subpoena or judicial warrant.” Id. § 7285.2(a)(1). It also limits employers’ ability to “reverify the employment eligibility of a current employee at a time or in a manner not required by” the IRCA. Cal. Lab. Code § 1019.2(a). In addition, AB 450 requires employers to “provide a notice to each current employee, by posting in the language the employer normally uses to communicate employmentrelated information to the employee, of any inspections of I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification forms or other employment records conducted by an immigration agency within 72 hours of receiving notice of the inspection.” Id. § 90.2(a)(1). 1 If an employer receives “the written immigration agency notice that provides the results of the inspection,” then she must provide a copy to each “employee identified by the immigration agency inspection results to be an employee who may lack work authorization” and each 1 AB 450 “does not require a penalty to be imposed upon an employer or person who fails to provide notice to an employee at the express and specific direction or request of the federal government.” Cal. Lab. Code § 90.2(c). 16 UNITED STATES V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA “employee whose work authorization documents have been identified by the immigration agency inspection to have deficiencies.” Id. § 90.2(b)(1)–(2).
Federal Detainees (AB 103) AB 103 requires the California Attorney General to conduct “reviews of county, local, or private locked detention facilities in which noncitizens are being housed or detained for purposes of civil immigration proceedings in California.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12532(a). 2 This includes “any county, local, or private locked detention facility in which an accompanied or unaccompanied minor is housed or detained on behalf of, or pursuant to a contract with, the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement or the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.” Id. It requires the California Attorney General to review “the conditions of confinement,” “the standard of care and due process provided,” and “the circumstances around [the] apprehension” of civil immigration detainees, and then prepare “a comprehensive report outlining the findings of the review.” Id. § 12532(b). To facilitate this review, the California Attorney General “shall be provided all necessary access for the observations necessary to effectuate reviews required pursuant to this section, including, but not limited to, access to detainees, officials, personnel, and records.” Id. § 12532(c).
2 California law generally requires biennial inspections of “local detention facilities,” focusing on health and safety, fire suppression, security, and rehabilitation efforts. Cal. Penal Code § 6031.1(a). UNITED STATES V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 17 SB 54 limits law enforcement’s “discretion to cooperate with immigration authorities.” Id. § 7282.5(a). Among other things, it prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies from “[i]nquiring into an individual’s immigration status”; “[d]etaining an individual on the basis of a hold request”; “[p]roviding information regarding a person’s release date or” other “personal information,” such as “the individual’s home address or work address”; and “[a]ssisting immigration authorities” in certain activities. Id. § 7284.6(a)(1). SB 54 contains some exceptions to these prohibitions. For example, although agencies generally cannot “[t]ransfer an individual to immigration authorities,” such an undertaking is permissible if “authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination,” or if the individual has been convicted of certain enumerated crimes. Id. §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a)(4). Similarly, the restrictions on sharing personal information are also relaxed if the individual has been convicted of an enumerated crime, or if the information is available to the public. Id. §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a)(1)(C)–(D). 3 3 California asserts that SB 54 was motivated by its “recogni[tion] that victims and witnesses of crime are less likely to come forward if they fear that an interaction with law enforcement will lead to their removal or the removal of a family member,” and that the law built upon prior legislative efforts. See Cal. Penal Code § 422.93 (“Whenever an individual who is a victim of or witness to a hate crime . . . is not charged with or convicted of committing any crime under state law, a peace officer may not detain the individual exclusively for any actual or suspected immigration violation or report or turn the individual over to federal immigration authorities.”); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 7284.2 (outlining the legislative findings undergirding SB 54 and reporting that “immigrant community members fear approaching police” and “[e]ntangling state and local agencies with federal immigration enforcement programs diverts already limited resources and blurs the lines of accountability between local, state, and federal governments”). 18 UNITED STATES V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA