Opinion ID: 1401759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The TAM as the DOJ's Interpretation of Its Own Regulation

Text: What is challenged here is whether the lines-of-sight provision in the Attorney General's 1994 Supplement to the TAM is a valid construction of § 4.33.3. While Chevron addresses what kind of deference we must afford an agency in the interpretation of the statute it has been charged with enforcing, see 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, here we are dealing with the leeway we must grant an agency in the interpretation of its own regulations. We must give an agency's interpretation of its own regulations controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945). In other words, we must defer to the [agency's] interpretation unless an `alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation.' Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430, 108 S.Ct. 1306, 99 L.Ed.2d 515 (1988)). We have explained that [w]hen the meaning of regulatory language is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation controls `so long as it is reasonable, that is, so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations.' Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991)). Furthermore, we have previously held that the TAM itself is entitled to substantial deference. The guidance provided in the technical assistance manual is an interpretation of the DOJ's regulation and, as such, is entitled to significant weight as to the meaning of the regulation. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 875-76 (9th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). Where [t]he DOJ's interpretation [in the TAM] is entirely consistent with the regulation,. . . it is due deference. Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, [t]he Justice Department's interpretation of its own regulations, such as the Technical Assistance Manual, must also be given substantial deference and will be disregarded only if `plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' Bay Area Addiction Research v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 732 n. 11 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381). The language of § 4.33.3 requiring lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public is ambiguous. Indeed, both the Third and the D.C. Circuits, although they ultimately reach opposite conclusions on the merits, agree that the plain language of the regulation is ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations. See Caruso, 193 F.3d at 733 (In the end it seems that both interpretations of the `lines of sight' language are plausible.); Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 583 (the phrase is ambiguous). We agree that the phrase lines of sight in § 4.33.3 is subject to several interpretations. One possible interpretation is that the phrase means that wheelchair patrons must have a view without physical obstructions. See Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir.2000). We have already held that this reading is too narrow to be compelled by the language of § 4.33.3, and the Attorney General is entitled to read the provision more broadly. Regal Cinemas, 339 F.3d at 1132. A more plausible interpretation of the phrase is that it means that wheelchair areas are to be dispersed throughout a facility, such that wheelchair users have a variety of horizontal viewing angles from which to choose. See Caruso, 193 F.3d at 732. This ensures that wheelchair patrons at a football game are not all stuck, for example, behind the goalposts. This interpretation is supported by the fact that § 4.33.3 also requires a choice of admission prices to account for the difference between an end zone and a mid-field seat. Alternatively, the phrase can be read to require more than horizontal dispersal; it could be read to require vertical dispersal as well, so that patrons have a choice of seatsfor example, between the orchestra and the logesto obtain a different viewing angle. Under this reading, the phrase lines of sight would refer to the angle of sight between the viewer and the stage, screen, or playing field. The latter definition of lines of sight would encompass both the notion of a horizontal line of sight and a vertical line of sight. Finally, yet another interpretation does not merely involve the horizontal or vertical dispersal of the wheelchair seating options, but rather suggests that the line of sight of a wheelchair patron must be comparable to the line of sight of a non-wheelchair patron who has chosen the same seat. Under this interpretation it is easy to see that at some events (principally sporting events), a comparable line of sight would encompass an unobstructed line of sight when other patrons are standing. When the crowd is generally standing, most spectators can also stand and, in doing so, enable themselves to substantially see the event. Therefore, in order to be given a comparable line of sight, wheelchair users must also be able to see the event when the crowd is standing. Any of these interpretations would be a reasonable reading of the ambiguous plain language of the regulation. In fact, the phrase lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public could be interpreted to require a combination of the proposed interpretations. That is, it is possible that a comparable line of sight means that the view is unobstructed by physical obstacles, that the seats must be horizontally and vertically dispersed, and that wheelchair patrons must be able to see over standing patrons. In its 1994 supplement to the TAM, the DOJ made it clear that at the very least the phrase lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public in § 4.33.3 required that in assembly areas where spectators can be expected to stand during the event or show being viewed, the wheelchair locations must provide lines of sight over spectators who stand. TAM § III-7.5180 (1994 Supp.). The Attorney General's interpretation of § 4.33.3 is neither plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the regulation. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381. As a linguistic matter it is perfectly reasonable to interpret the term lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public as requiring lines of sight that are comparable in the actual conditions under which a facility operates. If spectators are widely expected to stand during the key moments of an event, then comparable lines of sight for wheelchair users could be lines of sight that enable the wheelchair users to see during those moments. If the spectators stand during the singing of the national anthem, routinely jump to their feet during the fourth quarter, or insist on standing on their chairs during the third overtime, it does not take a fertile legal imagination to understand that relatively immobile patrons will not have a comparable line of sight. Furthermore, the DOJ's 1994 interpretation is consistent with the statutory requirement that the facilities be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). To meaningfully use the Speedway facilities, a wheelchair patron needs to be able to see the event in the circumstances under which the race typically takes place, with a standing audience. Otherwise the Speedway race track is not usable as a practical matter. Because the DOJ's interpretation is a reasonable, practical construction in light of the ambiguity of the regulation, it is entitled to substantial deference. Our decision is consistent with our treatment of the DOJ's comparable lines-of-sight regulations in the context of theater seating in Regal Cinemas, 339 F.3d at 1127. The district court had held that the language about `lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public' in § 4.33.3 does not require that wheelchair-accessible seating afford patrons comparable viewing angles to those in non-accessible seating. Id. at 1129 (citing Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 142 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1297-98 (D.Or.2001)). The district court had followed Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir.2000), in which the Fifth Circuit pointed out that questions regarding `viewing angle' did not arise until well after the DOJ promulgated section 4.33.3 and concluded that lines of sight referred to nothing more than unobstructed views. Id. at 788-89. We rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and reversed the district court. We concluded that lines of sight [i]n the context of a movie theater, [ ] means a line extending from the viewer's eye to the points on the screen where the film is projected, taking into account the angle from the viewer's eye to those points. Regal Cinemas, 339 F.3d at 1131. We framed the question as whether it is unreasonable for DOJ to interpret `comparable line of sight' to encompass factors in addition to physical obstructions, such as viewing angle. The answer, in light of the plain meaning of the regulation both in general and as understood in the movie theater industry, is `no.' Id. at 1132. Accordingly, we held that DOJ's interpretation of § 4.33.3 was valid and entitled to deference. Id. at 1133. A sporting event presents a different set of challenges from a movie theater, which has a fixed screen and relatively placid patrons. By contrast, sporting events typically involve live action, moving rapidly over playing surfaces many times larger than a movie screen. When the audiencelike the athletesis in motion, arena designers, owners and patrons have a set of problems to address that are not present in a theater setting. It was not unreasonable for the DOJ to interpret lines of sight as the actual line extending from the viewer's eye to the [playing field], taking into account the angle from the viewer's eye to those points. Id. at 1131.