Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Misleading jury as to extent of mitigating evidence

Text: The trial court instructed the jury, in the language of section 190.3, factor (k), that in determining the appropriate penalty it could consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. Defendant acknowledges that this language, taken from People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, footnote 10, 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813, and derived from Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, in the vast majority of situations, will not mislead the jury because defense counsel generally will argue, as a basis for a sentence less than death, all mitigating factors supported by the evidence. He asserts the contrary is true here because his counsel argued only defendant's current mental illness as a reason for the jury to spare him the death penalty, and failed to present evidence of other possible mitigating factors, such as the role of defendant's intoxication in the capital crimes and in some of his unadjudicated criminal conduct. Defendant notes that the prosecution's penalty phase case-in-chief did include such potentially mitigating evidence, but asserts the factor (k) instruction precluded the jury from considering it. The Attorney General argues defendant may not raise this contention on appeal because his counsel stated he had no objection to the giving of the section 190.3, factor (k) instruction. For the reasons given above in connection with defendant's claim that the instructions improperly permitted evidence of mental illness to be used in aggravation (see 32 Cal.Rptr.3d p. 75, 116 P.3d p. 538, ante ), we disagree. On the merits, however, we see no reasonable likelihood ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705) the jury understood the instructions in the manner defendant suggests. The instructions did not tell the jury not to consider any of the mitigating factors. Indeed, they directed the jury to consider all of the evidence received during any part of the trial, enumerated the statutory mitigating and aggravating factors, and advised the jury it was free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value it deemed appropriate to each of the factors it was permitted to consider. (§ 190.3; CALJIC No. 8.88.) As discussed, at the guilt phase the jury heard about defendant's consumption of alcohol and his use of marijuana before committing the Davies and Turner murders. As the Attorney General observes, moreover, in his summation the prosecutor discussed the various statutory mitigating factors, arguing either that the evidence did not support the existence of the factor (extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of the offenses, and whether defendant's ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was affected by mental disease or defect or intoxication) or that the factor was entitled to little weight (the absence of any prior felony convictions). There is no reasonable likelihood the instruction caused the jury not to consider any mitigating evidence in the record.