Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying defense objections to jury instructions regarding venue and whether harrison county lacked jurisdiction to bring sexual battery charges.

Text: ś 216. Evans next challenges Jury Instructions S-1C and S-9 as incorrect statements of law. Instruction S-1C reads as follows: If you believe from all the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant, Donald Leroy Evans, on or about August 1, 1991, in the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously inveigle or kidnap Beatrice Louise Routh, with intent to cause Beatrice Louise Routh to be imprisoned against her will, and, while in the commission of said kidnapping, did, with or without deliberate design, then and there, kill Beatrice Louise Routh, a human being, regardless of where such killing took place, and without authority of law, then the defendant is guilty of Capital Murder in Count I, and it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. If the State has failed to prove any one or more of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the Defendant Not Guilty of Capital Murder in Count I. ś 217. Evans, relying on Pruett v. State, 431 So.2d 1101, 1105 (Miss.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 201, 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983), and after raising a proper objection at trial, argues that Instruction S-1C failed to require the jury to find that the alleged kidnapping continued unbroken until Beatrice was murdered in Louisiana. ś 218. In Pruett, the defendant was charged with capital murder with the underlying felony of kidnapping. There, the victim was kidnapped and taken hostage during a bank robbery in Hinds County. Pruett drove the victim to Sumter County, Alabama, where he forced the victim to disrobe in order to keep her under his control. Pruett left the victim for a short period in order to return to his car to take a shot of cocaine, after which he returned to the area and murdered the victim. ś 219. Pruett argued that Mississippi lacked jurisdiction because the killing occurred in Alabama. Pruett argued that although the kidnapping commenced in Mississippi, the period of time wherein he left the victim to return to his vehicle broke the chain of events constituting the `capital murder'. In Pruett, this Court held [a]t least it was for the jury to determine whether appellant abandoned the kidnapping and then resumed the act as a mere `murder.' Id. at 1105. ś 220. Here, as in Pruett, Evans was charged with capital murder with the underlying felony of kidnapping. Evans' confession, which is uncontradicted, indicates that Beatrice was killed in Louisiana. Thus, it was for the jury to determine whether Beatrice was murdered while Evans was engaged in a kidnapping. ś 221. The jury was instructed in S-1C that they had to find that Evans killed Beatrice while in the commission of a kidnapping. Implicit in this language is the requirement that the jury find that Evans was engaged in or committing the offense of kidnapping. Thus, as argued by Evans, the jury in the case sub judice was required to find the kidnapping unbroken until Beatrice was murdered in Louisiana. ś 222. Moreover, the record reflects ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Evans was engaged in a kidnapping which originated in Harrison County and continued into the State of Louisiana. Evans stated that he led Beatrice and her mother to believe that he was only going to the store to purchase items for a barbecue. This was confirmed by Sherry Lynn Vincent (Wilson) and Betty Vincent. Evans also stated that when Beatrice became concerned about the fact that he failed to stop at a grocery store he deceived her into believing that they were simply traveling around Gulfport. Moreover, Evans stated that his intentions were to rape and kill when he left with Beatrice. ś 223. Like Pruett, Evans maintained complete control over his victim until he reached Louisiana. Evans' statement establishes that he initially gained control over Beatrice by trickery and deceit and thereafter maintained control by trickery and deceit. Although Evans stopped momentarily in Hancock County to purchase ice cream and duct tape, Beatrice remained under his control. There is simply no indication that Evans ever abandoned the kidnapping. See also Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 895 (Miss.1994); Erwin v. State, 557 So.2d 799, 800 (Miss. 1990). Moreover, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-11-17 clearly states: Where an offense is commenced in this state and consummated out of it, either directly or by the accused or by any means or agency procured by or proceeding from him, he may be indicted and tried in the county in which such offense commenced or from which such means or agency proceeded. ś 224. Evans also argues that Instruction S-9 was error. Instruction S-9 reads as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that in considering Counts II and III of the Indictment, it does not matter what county or state the sexual battery (ies) occurred in as long as you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the kidnapping commenced in the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi. ś 225. Evans argues that Harrison County lacked both venue and jurisdiction over sexual battery charges. Evans argues that in Pruett, this Court relied on the fact that Pruett was charged with capital murder during the commission of kidnapping. There, this Court held that the killing of Mrs. Lowe in Alabama could not have been capital murder unless she first had been kidnapped. The acts are inseparable under that crime. Pruett, 431 So.2d at 1105. Here, however, Evans argues that there is no authority which holds that a when a defendant commits an offense against a victim in a county, the defendant may be tried in that county for all offenses he has committed against the victim. ś 226. In Erwin v. State, 557 So.2d 799, 800 (Miss.1990), the appellant challenged venue and jurisdiction of the trial court. This Court held that venue and jurisdiction were proper where the evidence clearly show[ed] that the kidnapping and violence leading to the rape clearly commenced at the Majik Mart, clearly established to be in Jackson County. Id. ś 227. Here, as in Erwin, the evidence at trial clearly established that the kidnapping which eventually led to the sexual assault of Beatrice commenced in Harrison County. Moreover, Evans, in his own words, stated that his intentions were to rape and kill from the time he left Jones Park, which was established to be in Harrison County. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-11-17. ś 228. As with Instruction S-1C, Evans argues that Instruction S-9 failed to instruct the jury that it must find that the kidnapping continued unbroken until the time of the sexual batteries. Here, as reflected in Erwin, the jury was instructed that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the kidnapping commenced in Harrison County. Therefore, this instruction was proper. Moreover, there is no affirmative requirement in Pruett that a jury be instructed that they must find the kidnapping continued unbroken. ś 229. Evans also argues that language in Instruction S-9 constituted a directed verdict on the kidnapping offense. Specifically, Evans argues that rather than the kidnapping the instruction should have stated a kidnapping. When considering a challenge against a jury instruction, the instructions should be read and considered as a whole. Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1202 (Miss.1996)( citing Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1177 (Miss.1990)). The language in S-9 did not constitute a directed verdict. First, the jury was instructed by Instruction C-1A that they were not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law but must consider the instructions as a whole. Moreover, the jury was repeatedly instructed that they were required to find each and every element of the kidnapping offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This issue without merit.