Opinion ID: 3185830
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure-to-Accommodate Claim

Text: Jurach argues that Safety Vision failed to accommodate her disability, in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001 et seq. An express purpose of Chapter 21 is to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and its subsequent amendments. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001(3); see Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1024 n.4 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Texas state courts apply analogous federal statutes and cases when interpreting the TCHRA. See Talk, 165 F.3d at 1021; HoffmanLa Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 445-46 (Tex. 2004) (“[F]ederal case law may be cited as authority in cases relating to the Texas Act.”). The ADA and TCHRA place an affirmative duty on covered employers to reasonably accommodate the known mental and physical limitations of their employees. See Picard v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., 611 F.Supp.2d 608, 618 8 Case: 15-20018 Document: 00513425294 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/15/2016 No. 15-20018 (E.D.La. 2009). To make out a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) her employer knew of the disability and its consequential limitations on the plaintiff; and (3) the employer failed to make reasonable accommodations for such known limitations. Feist v. Louisiana Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). When an employer is required by law to provide an accommodation, its failure to do so is considered a prohibited form of discrimination. Picard, 611 F.Supp.2d at 618. In the case sub judice, Safety Vision challenges neither Jurach’s status as a qualified individual nor its knowledge of her disability and consequential limitations. Jurach’s appeal on this claim, therefore, turns on whether Safety Vision fell short of its duty to reasonably accommodate Jurach. An employee’s request for an accommodation triggers an obligation on behalf of the employer to engage with good faith in an interactive process to identify an appropriate accommodation. See Griffin v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 2011). The purpose of this required interaction is for the parties to identify reasonably available accommodations. See Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining the need for a bilateral dialogue due to information asymmetry). The exact contours of the process are unique to each case. Id. An employer is liable when its unwillingness to participate in the process leads to a failure to reasonably accommodate. Griffin, 661 F.3d at 224. However, “[a]n employer that ‘demonstrates good faith efforts’ to engage in the interactive process and to make a reasonable accommodation is shielded from liability.” Picard, 611 F.Supp.2d at 621 (E.D.La.2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3)). Ultimately, both the employer and the employee are obligated to communicate with one another so that the process of identifying an appropriate accommodation can 9 Case: 15-20018 Document: 00513425294 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/15/2016 No. 15-20018 unfold. See Loulseged, 178 F.3d at 737. In situations “where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer,” the burden is primarily on the employee “to specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations.” Griffin, 661 F.3d at 224 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 621 (5th Cir.2009)). 2 In this case, Safety Vision’s obligation to engage with good faith in an interactive process arose, at the earliest, when Jurach made her first workspace request related to her sensitivity to fluorescent light, which occured in late 2008 or early 2009. The request was specifically for a private office with windows. At the time, no such space was available, and Jurach was already assigned to a private interior office in which she was permitted to have disengaged as many of the fluorescent lights overhead as she pleased and work by lamplight. This setting was remarkably close to what Jurach describes in her affidavit as an appropriate accommodation: an area lit by lamp and not fluorescent lights. In fact, prior to Jurach’s second eye surgery in February, 2010, she admits to finding the interior offices to be “tolerable.” She also described Rominger’s promise in April, 2010 to pay attention to her situation in an upcoming relocation of the Marketing Department as “reasonable.” Beyond a private office with windows, which were to be found only on the second floor of Safety Vision’s two story building, Jurach made no other suggestions as to how her sensitivity to artificial light could be accommodated until the very end of her employment. 2 If the need for a requested accommodation is not obvious, an employer may require that the employee provide medical documentation in advance. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 n.9 (5th Cir.1996) (citing EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9, App.). However, the courts have not construed this rule to allow employers, such as Safety Vision, to delay in demanding documentation and then use the delay as a defense to its otherwise inexcusable failure to make an accommodation sooner. 10 Case: 15-20018 Document: 00513425294 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/15/2016 No. 15-20018 When Safety Vision moved Jurach and the Marketing Department to the second floor in September of 2010, it assigned Jurach to a cubicle next to a large exterior window. The cubicle, while it may not have been the windowed office that Jurach would have preferred, had the perceived advantage of natural light. When she expressed dissatisfaction, maintenance personnel disengaged fluorescent rods near her workspace. Jurach, however, still found the accommodation to be inadequate and requested that she be returned to an interior office. Then, in late September, more than a month after Safety Vision had requested medical documentation, Jurach produced the first of two doctor’s notes, both of which failed to provide clear accommodation instructions. 3 Just days later, a provisional arrangement was put in place allowing Jurach to work from home on three days of the week, while her manager, Dilber, sought a better solution. Unfortunately, Jurach would be released two weeks later. As frustrated as Jurach may have been with the Company's apparent lack of an established procedure for fielding accommodation requests, the evidence does not show that Safety Vision demonstrated bad faith or an unwillingness to engage in efforts to identify and provide a reasonable accommodation. Rather, the process was complicated – and protracted – by the inconsistent reasons that Jurach gave for her accommodation requests; the ambiguous medical documentation that she produced; and, ultimately, her insistence on a preferred accommodation, to which she was not necessarily entitled. By the fall of 2010, the evidence reveals that Safety Vision was actively seeking a reasonable solution that Jurach would also find to be suitable. The third phase of the RIF in October of 2010 curtailed those efforts. 3 Of the two notes from her healthcare provider, the most instructive merely stated that Jurach would benefit from less light. 11 Case: 15-20018 Document: 00513425294 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/15/2016 No. 15-20018 That is not to say, however, that Safety Vision failed its obligation to participate with good faith in an interactive process. Because Jurach has not created a genuine dispute on this point, the district court's grant of summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate claim is affirmed.