Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: inadmissibility of the NPCR as substantive evidence

Text: We hold, for two reasons, that the circuit court did not err in excluding the NPCR as independent, substantive evidence that the Series 510 straddle carrier was defectively designed. First, the contents of the NPCR constituted inadmissible hearsay, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' attempt at trial to characterize the NPCR as being excepted from the hearsay rule under HRE 803(b)(8)(C) (1993) (the public records exception), 803(b)(18) (1993) (the learned treatise exception), and 803(b)(24) (1993) (the catchall exception). [32] By its express terms, the public records exception set forth in HRE 803(b)(8)(C), see supra note 32, applies only to an investigative record or report conducted by a public agency pursuant to authority granted by law [.] (Emphasis added.) [33] The most superficial examination reveals that the NPCR was not the product of any investigation. Its avowed purpose was to conduct a survey to assist in the evaluation of mechanical equipment used for container transportation. Accordingly, with regard to accidents involving various types of straddle carriers, the NPCR relied exclusively on preexisting reports (themselves constituting hearsay) of varying quality and reliability. In addition, the plaintiffs failed to make an adequate showing that the National Ports Council was a public agency. See supra note 30. Moreover, although the plaintiffs proffered the affidavit of David G. Curtis, Senior Executive Officer, Department of Transport, United Kingdom  in which Curtis swore that NPCR had been produced by the National Ports Council and was currently in the custody of the Department of Transport , the Curtis affidavit failed to attest that the NPCR was prepared pursuant to authority granted by law ( i.e., pursuant to any legal mandate), that the NPCR was being maintained by the Department of Transport as a public record, that the affiant had any personal knowledge concerning the NPCR's preparation, or that the NPCR was otherwise trustworthy. [34] Finally, the public records exception presupposes that the sources of information or other circumstances do not indicate lack of trustworthiness; in this connection, the NPCR expressly cautions that some of its data may, indeed, be untrustworthy. For this reason, and because it does not hold itself out as a learned treatise, the NPCR was not admissible pursuant to the learned treatise or catchall exceptions to the rule against hearsay either. See HRE 803(b)(18), 803(b)(24), and the commentary thereto, supra note 32. Second, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the NPCR were not based on a study of the Series 510 straddle carrier, such as that involved in the present accident; rather, as noted above, the subjects of the NPCR were larger, newer, and structurally different straddle carriers. Thus, the circuit court could rightly have refused to admit the NPCR substantively into evidence on relevance grounds, any references to prior accidents contained therein lacking substantial similarity. See supra section III.D.3. In any event, for the foregoing reasons, including the multiplicity of straddle carrier types subsumed within the survey (none of which included the Series 510), the acknowledged unreliability of some of the data cited, and the paucity of facts regarding the reported accidents, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing, pursuant to HRE 403, to admit the NPCR into evidence. See Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 11, 928 P.2d at 853; Walsh, 80 Hawai`i at 215, 908 P.2d at 1201; Sato, 79 Hawai`i at 19, 897 P.2d at 946.