Opinion ID: 1407576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: the use of sequestration in death-qualifying a jury

Text: (10a) Petitioner asks this court to consider whether the procedures currently used in this state to identify death-qualified jurors alter the jury to the detriment of an accused. The specific question is whether the voir dire process in death-qualifying a jury inclines jurors to become more favorable to the prosecution than if a more refined technique were used. At the hearing below, petitioner presented testimony which indicated that current procedures create in the minds of the jurors certain expectations unfavorable to the accused and predispose the jurors to receive and interpret evidence in ways favorable to the prosecution. [117] Various refinements in the current procedure are suggested in order to minimize, if not eliminate, the most prejudicial of these effects. Presently, the defense counsel [118] and the prosecutor [119] have the right to question potential jurors about their attitudes toward the death penalty in order to lay a foundation for possible challenges for cause. The voir dire is usually conducted in open court with the entire jury panel present. Although each juror is questioned personally, he or she has the opportunity to observe the examination of many other venirepersons. [120] A typical death-qualifying voir dire includes repeated explanations of the procedural route the jury will travel if it is to reach the penalty phase. Potential jurors are examined in detail about their attitudes toward capital punishment. Frequently, this questioning is couched in hypothetical terms. Potential jurors are asked to assume that the accused has been found guilty of first degree murder and to imagine that the special circumstances allegations have been found true. They are then asked to indicate whether they could fulfill their legal responsibility to choose the appropriate penalty based on the evidence presented. The court has the task of ruling on whatever challenges for cause may be lodged against them. There are several reasons why these methods for death-qualifying a jury might be expected to have an impact on the expectations, perceptions, attitudes, and behavior at trial of the jurors exposed to them. These affect both the guilt and penalty determinations. The process presently used focuses attention on penalty before the accused has been found guilty. As a result, some jurors may be more likely to believe the accused is guilty as charged. Modern psychological theory suggests several reasons to anticipate such a result. Few human impulses are more fundamental than the need to make sense of one's surroundings. People who find themselves in novel, complicated, or confusing situations instinctively seek guidance in interpreting those situations. Accordingly, they become sensitive to the way other people around them seem to be behaving. When authority figures who appear to be familiar with the situation are present, they take on added importance and influence. In such a fashion, venirepersons who are in the unfamiliar and imposing surroundings of a courtroom, undergoing the oftentimes elaborate and sometimes baffling ritual of voir dire, will typically seek cues about appropriate ways of thinking, feeling, and believing. Such venirepersons are likely to look to the behavior of the most knowledgeable and respected figures in the courtroom, i.e., the judge and counsel. In a typical death-qualifying voir dire, the judge and the attorneys repeatedly instruct the jurors about the steps leading to the penalty trial and question each prospective juror, oftentimes at considerable length, concerning his or her attitudes about capital punishment. These repeated displays of concern about the death penalty before any evidence of guilt has been presented may prompt the jurors to infer that the court and counsel assume the penalty trial will occur. A penalty trial is contingent on a guilty verdict and a finding of special circumstances. Jurors undergoing death-qualification would have reason to infer that the judge and the attorneys personally believe the accused to be guilty or expect the jury to come to that conclusion. Only such an inference could serve to explain to the jurors why so much time and energy are devoted to an extensive discussion of penalty before trial. Provided with these cues from people who are not only experts in the courtroom but are also presumably acquainted with all the evidence in the case, the relevant law, and the correct application of the one to the other, death-qualified jurors may themselves become more inclined to believe that the accused is guilty as charged. The effects of such a predisposition on the jury's eventual verdict would be expected to be magnified by the particular ways in which a jury functions. Diversity of experience and viewpoint enables a jury to compensate for the perceptual and evaluative limitations inherent in any one particular point of view. (Cf., ante, at pp. 23-25.) However, current methods used in voir dire may impede these corrective mechanisms by the operation of what is known as perceptual set. The concept of perceptual set, explained one expert witness at the evidentiary hearing below, suggests that when people begin to form a framework for understanding, particularly with respect to complicated events with which they are somewhat unfamiliar, they begin early on in the process to form a perspective, to form a way of interpreting that information.... Perceptual set affects not only what they do with information, but indeed it also affects what they view as information. There is a notion of selective attention, the idea that people only attend to certain kinds of things. When they are presented with complicated information they tend to select out of that information for the most part information which conforms with their belief structure, which conforms with their attitudes, which conforms with their expectations. That is what they look for, that is what they see, and they interpret it differently based on attitudes, beliefs, and expectations. If a juror is predisposed by the very process of the death-qualifying voir dire to believe the accused is guilty, [121] the juror will tend, in consequence of that perspective: (1) to selectively perceive the evidence  e.g., forgetting, distorting, or actually failing to perceive evidence which conflicts with his or her preconceptions; (2) to draw only those inferences from the evidence which support those preconceptions and perhaps to create data to reinforce those beliefs; and (3) to evaluate the evidence perceived  e.g., assess credibility of witnesses, weigh the inferences drawn  in a manner which tends to fulfill his or her expectations. (See ante, at pp. 23-24.) Moreover, a juror who is predisposed to expect a guilty verdict will tend to arrive more readily at the conclusion that the evidence presented amounts to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. These tendencies would not be nullified by the evidence actually presented in the courtroom because what the jurors perceive to be evidence will itself be a function of the attitudes, beliefs, and expectations with which they view the proceedings. Of course, the jurors' perceptual sets are unlikely to determine the outcome in those cases in which the evidence points overwhelmingly in one direction or another. But the influence of the jurors' perceptual set increases  along with the dangers of miscarried justice  as the evidence becomes more closely balanced between guilt and innocence. It becomes especially important to scrupulously safeguard the accused's constitutional rights to a fair trial in such cases, because what might in a more clear-cut case have only an insignificant effect on the way the jurors view the evidence could provide[] the slight impetus which [swings] the scales toward guilt. ( Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 67 [86 L.Ed. 680, 698, 62 S.Ct. 457].) [I]t is with respect to those cases that the jury trial right has its greatest value. When the case is close, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not readily apparent, a properly functioning jury system will insure evaluation by the sense of the community and will also tend to insure accurate factfinding. ( Ballew v. Georgia, supra, 435 U.S. at pp. 237-238 [55 L.Ed.2d at p. 245].) A capital jury, which has been predisposed by virtue of the very process by which it has been selected to think the accused guilty in advance of trial, is unlikely to function properly or maintain its neutrality. As a jury's neutrality decreases, the quantum of evidence necessary to prove guilt also decreases. In addition to making a capital jury prone to convict, the current method of death-qualification may alter the states of mind of the jurors exposed to it in ways which make them more likely to impose a death sentence. It is important to recognize that in the penalty phase, no less than in the guilt phase, the jury serves as a representative of community values. [O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in making ... a selection [between life and death] is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system  a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect `the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' ( Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 519, fn. 15 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 783], citation omitted.) A jury in a penalty trial is thus called upon to express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. [122] ( Id., at p. 519 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 783], fn. omitted.) (11) A penalty jury can speak for the community only insofar as the pool of jurors from which it is drawn represents the full range of relevant community attitudes. In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that those who hold scruples against capital punishment must be included within this pool so long as they are willing to consider the choice of penalty provided by law and are not irrevocably committed to vote against the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the evidence. ( Id., at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785].) The court acknowledged that the caution, reluctance, and even aversion with which many members of the community would pronounce a sentence of death were appropriately represented on a jury which purported to express the conscience of the community: a jury [c]ulled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment  of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty, the high court found, cannot speak for the community. ( Id., at p. 520 [20 L.Ed.2d at pp. 783-784].) Thus, a process which systematically reduces whatever doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment or reluctan[ce] to pronounce the extreme penalty is as constitutionally infirm as a jury from which individuals who hold such views are systematically culled. Neither jury can speak for the community. ( Ibid. ) Both juries are less than neutral with respect to the choice of penalty. ( Id., at p. 520, fn. 18 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 784].) Several theories discussed at the evidentiary hearing below explain why the current modes of death-qualification might increase jurors' willingness to impose a sentence of death. During a death-qualifying voir dire, venirepersons are questioned in open court about their attitudes toward the death penalty. The fact that the court dismisses those venirepersons who express unequivocable opposition to the death penalty is likely to be interpreted by the remaining jurors as an indication that the judge in particular and the law in general disapprove of such attitudes. Jurors whose scruples against capital punishment are not so irrevocable as to disqualify them under Witherspoon may feel that in the eyes of the law, their attitudes are improper, or at least suspect. Those jurors may in consequence feel less willing to express or rely on such attitudes in their consideration of penalty. [123] Another relevant concern is drawn from research into the process of desensitization. For many people, even those who are in favor of the death penalty, the prospect of having to make a personal decision about whether another human is to live or die poses an understandably intimidating duty. While the state has a legitimate interest in a death penalty jury which is willing to consider the imposition of capital punishment in an appropriate case ( Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785]), the instinctive caution and reluctance with which many jurors approach this duty are representative aspects of the community conscience which the jury is called upon to express. When people are continually exposed to a stimulus which is intimidating or frightening to them, they become desensitized to what they earlier found to be threatening. [124] In a capital voir dire, prospective jurors are repeatedly prompted to think about the penalty decision they may later be called upon to make. What was initially regarded as an onerous choice, inspiring caution and hesitation, may be more readily undertaken simply because of the repeated exposure to the idea of taking a life. Some jurors initially face the penalty decision with reluctance and aversion. This may represent a significant viewpoint in the community. A process which systematically erodes these attitudes would make the jury less representative of the community and more inclined to impose death. In 1979, Dr. Craig Haney, an assistant professor of psychology at the University of California at Santa Cruz, devised a controlled study to determine whether the process of death-qualification actually alters jurors' states of mind so that it affects their evaluation of guilt or their choice of penalty. [125] The subjects of the experiment were selected from adults eligible for jury duty in Santa Cruz County who had responded to a local newspaper advertisement. The researchers screened the respondents by telephone, and eliminated from the study those whose attitudes about capital punishment disqualified them under the Witherspoon criteria. Haney had prepared a two-hour videotape of a simulated voir dire in a capital trial. The voir dire was not scripted; the attorneys depicted on the tape based their questioning on the facts of an actual capital case. The roles of judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel were played by experienced private defense attorneys. The roles of most of the venirepersons were played by adult residents of Alameda County whose responses to an earlier survey had indicated that they would be qualified to serve under the Witherspoon guidelines. Two of the venirepersons who were questioned on the videotape were confederates placed by Haney. These two were instructed to respond to the voir dire questions concerning capital punishment as if they had views which would render them ineligible under Witherspoon. [126] The 67 subjects of Haney's study were randomly divided into two groups for purposes of viewing the videotaped voir dire. Both groups were asked to imagine themselves to be prospective jurors in this very case. One group  the experimental group  was shown the full two-hour videotape which included half an hour of death-qualification. [127] The control group saw the same videotape with the death-qualifying segment deleted. Each version of the videotape contained various introductory remarks and questions from the judge, including a nullification question patterned on Penal Code section 1074, subdivision 8. [128] After viewing the videotapes, both groups completed a questionnaire. Their responses were consistent with the predictions that the present procedures for death-qualifying a jury alter the jurors' perspectives. Haney found that the death-qualified subject/jurors in his experimental group were more likely than those in the control group to believe the accused was guilty of first degree murder, a finding that was statistically significant. [129] Moreover, the experimental group was more likely to think that the prosecutor and the defense attorney personally believed the accused guilty as charged. The subject/jurors in the experimental group were also more inclined to think that the judge believed the accused to be guilty as charged. Haney testified that these findings were consistent with the prediction that the fairly extensive concern with the penalty phase on the part of the attorneys as well as the judge may well indicate to persons in a somewhat unfamiliar situation, prospective jurors, that ... those participants in this process of death-qualification believe this person is guilty or believe that it is reasonably likely that the jury will find him guilty, such that the amount of time which is expended discussing penalty is justified. The subject/jurors were also asked to assess the likelihood that the accused would later be found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The experimental group was more likely to predict that the accused would be convicted and sentenced to death. In their responses to another question, those in the experimental group also revealed that they were more likely to expect that the accused would be convicted of some lesser included offense if not of first degree murder. These results lend support to the hypothesis that people who are asked to imagine the occurrence of the penalty phase of the trial should be more likely to expect that that penalty phase will take place.... [S]o one would ... predict that people who have been asked to imagine the occurrence of this penalty phase would predict that it was more likely that the defendant will be convicted and more likely that special circumstances will be found in this particular case. [130] The two groups were asked to select what they thought would be an appropriate penalty, assuming that the accused had been convicted and a special circumstance allegation of a prior conviction of first degree murder had been found true. Fifty-seven percent of the experimental group indicated that they would vote to impose the death penalty, compared to only 21.9 percent of the control group. [131] The subject/jurors were also asked whether they thought the law generally disapproves of people who are opposed to the death penalty. The subject/jurors in the experimental group were substantially more likely than those in the control group to believe that attitudes in opposition to the death penalty are legally disapproved. Haney explained this result as follows: What happens in the process of death-qualification is not only that those persons who were found to be acceptable from the point of view of Witherspoon are seated on the jury, but also of course people who are ... not able to consider the imposition of the death penalty ... are excluded from sitting on the jury.... It happens in the presence of other jurors. In fact it is quite likely, I think, to be interpreted by people who witness this event as a sign of disapproval, perhaps, on the part of the court, the judge who makes such a dismissal, perhaps more generally on the part of the law, the notion being that for the legal reason the law disapproves of people who have attitudes in opposition to the death penalty. The responses to another question lend support to the surmise that the present procedures for death-qualification are likely to increase the juror's beliefs that the judge personally favors the death penalty. The subject/jurors were asked how they thought the judge personally feels about the death penalty. Those in the experimental group rated the judge's support for the death penalty considerably higher than did those in the control group. [132] Haney testified that the altered perceptions of the judge's attitude by the subject/jurors in the experimental group may have resulted from the judgments which the judge was asked to make when forced to decide whether or not someone should be [excused] for cause. These modified perceptions of the attitudes of the most highly respected figure in the courtroom would, he suggested, lead [jurors who undergo the current procedures for death-qualification] to reconsider [their] attitude[s] and it may well lead [them] to favor the death penalty somewhat more than [they] had.... [133] Asked to describe the overall conclusion he drew from his study, Haney testified that people who have been through the process of death-qualification are in a different state of mind when compared to people who have not been through that process. They are in a different state of mind with relation to the ease with which they select the death penalty as an appropriate penalty or punishment. They are in a different state of mind with respect to the degree to which they believe the prosecutor, defense attorney and judge believe in the death penalty. They are in a different state of mind with respect to the degree to which they believe the prosecutor, defense attorney and judge believe in the guilt of the defendant. And they are also in a different state of mind with respect to the extent to which they expect the defendant would be convicted. And also different in respect to the extent to which they believe the defendant to be guilty. My conclusion is that they are in a very different state of mind, and that in each and every case they are in a state of mind which is prejudicial to the defendant in the case. Haney's findings indicate that the current process for selecting capital jurors creates certain side effects which shape the jury's attitudes toward a death sentence. The courts are appropriately concerned if procedures encourage [t]endencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative group. ( Glasser v. United States, supra, 315 U.S. at p. 86 [86 L.Ed. at p. 707].) It has always been the judiciary's duty to counteract processes which generate in jurors a bias in favor of the prosecution. ( Ibid. ) The high court has been vigilant in its review of procedures which undermin[e] and weaken[ ] the institution of jury trial. ( Ibid. ) These undermining processes ... should be sturdily resisted.... Steps innocently taken may, one by one, lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties. ( Ibid. ) Haney's study has served to alert this court to some of the pernicious consequences of our current voir dire procedures in capital cases. This court must be concerned about the threat these procedures present to an accused's constitutionally protected interests in a fair trial. Haney testified that the prejudicial alteration in attitudes which resulted from a juror's observations of the death-qualification of his or her fellow venirepersons is a function of exactly how extensive the questioning becomes. The more extensive the questioning, the more you would expect to find important differences between the state of mind of jurors who have been through the one process as compared with those who have been through the other. This proposition implies a corollary: the extent to which [these effects] are minimal will be a function of the extent to which the questioning is minimized. The most practical and effective procedure available to minimize the untoward effects of death-qualification is individualized sequestered voir dire. Because jurors would then witness only a single death-qualifying voir dire  their own  each individual juror would be exposed to considerably less discussion and questioning about the various aspects of the penalty phase before hearing any evidence of guilt. Such a reduction in the pretrial emphasis on penalty should minimize the tendency of a death-qualified jury to presume guilt and expect conviction. [134] While disputing petitioner's Witherspoon and Ballew contentions, the Attorney General indicated in oral argument that he had no objection to this court adopting a rule of sequestered voir dire in capital cases as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. He agreed with expert testimony that We could get rid of a lot of [the concerns raised by the Haney study] by sequestered voir dire. He also reminded this court that there's precedent for it in this state during the trial of Ruchell Magee and during the trial of Edmund Kemper in Santa Cruz County where the issue was venue.... So I can't see how I could have any objection to it. (10b) In order to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects identified by the Haney study, this court declares, pursuant to its supervisory authority over California criminal procedure, [135] that in future capital cases that portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror which deals with issues which involve death-qualifying the jury should be done individually and in sequestration. [136] This rule will not in any way affect the open nature of a trial. Although trial counsel or the court may pose general questions to the panel, the venirepersons should not respond to any questions beyond those routinely asked in any criminal trial until they are outside the presence of their fellow venirepersons. [137] Of course, this court cannot insure that a rule of sequestered voir dire in capital cases will alleviate all the untoward effects of the current procedures. Unless a juror is able to understand and respond with certainty to the Witherspoon questions, the juror may be subjected at the sequestered proceeding to considerable voir dire on his or her attitude toward capital punishment. It is unknown at this point whether such personal voir dire would entail the same dangers of inducing bias as do the current procedures for voir dire. Nonetheless, sequestered voir dire will minimize each juror's exposure to the death-qualifying voir dire of others. It will thereby minimize the deleterious effects of such exposure. Given the frailty of human institutions and the enormity of the jury's decision to take or spare a life, trial courts must be especially vigilant to safeguard the neutrality, diversity and integrity of the jury to which society has entrusted the ultimate responsibility for life or death.
Since petitioner has failed to establish his Witherspoon and Ballew contentions, the only relief to which he is entitled is to have that portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror, which deals with issues other than those traditionally inquired into at any criminal trial, conducted outside the presence of the other prospective jurors. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the trial court to conduct the voir dire in accordance with the views set forth in part VII hereof. In all other respects, the requested relief is denied.