Opinion ID: 218256
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inconsistent Verdict Claim.

Text: Before addressing the evidentiary issues in this case, we must address the Jail’s claim that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts. The Jail claims that, because it cannot be held liable under § 1983 for Mr. Bass’s injuries under principles of municipal liability unless Officer Goodwill violated Mr. Bass’s constitutional rights, see Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[a] municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers”), the jury’s verdicts are inconsistent since it returned a verdict in favor of Officer Goodwill, but still imposed municipal liability on the Jail, see Aplt. Br. at 8 (“Because the verdict in favor of Goodwill necessarily includes a finding that Goodwill’s actions were reasonable, not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to Bass, and therefore were not unconstitutional, that verdict is inconsistent with the verdict against the jail.”). As the district court pointed out in its order denying the Jail’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, however, “this assertion ignores the affirmative defense of qualified immunity which was asserted on behalf of defendant Goodwill.” Aplt. App. at 451. It is also based on the faulty premise -6- that the jury necessarily found that Officer Goodwill did not violate Mr. Bass’s constitutional rights. To assert an inconsistent verdict claim, a party challenging a general jury verdict must show that they objected to the verdict prior to the jury’s discharge. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1997). Because the Jail failed to lodge such an objection to the jury’s general verdict in this case, the Jail must show that the verdict is facially inconsistent such that entry of judgment upon the verdict is plain error. Id. In determining whether the verdict is inconsistent, we accept any reasonable explanation that reconciles the jury’s verdict. See Domann v. Vigil, 261 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2001). We begin our analysis by noting that the Jail is not challenging any of the jury instructions that were used by the district court at the trial of this case. We also note that counsel for defendants submitted the two instructions regarding Officer Goodwill’s affirmative defense of qualified immunity to the district court, see R., Doc. 143 at 3-4, and the district court used the instructions that were tendered by counsel for defendants when it instructed the jury about qualified immunity, see Aplee. App. at 18-19. Further, the instructions tendered by counsel for defendants permitted the jury to render the verdicts it returned, and the verdicts are in no way facially inconsistent. In Instruction No. 15, the district court instructed the jury as follows with regard to Mr. Bass’s failure to protect claim against Officer Goodwill: -7- In order to prove Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim against Defendant Jerry Goodwill, Plaintiff must demonstrate by the greater weight of the evidence the following: 1. Defendant Jerry Goodwill knew or should have known that placing Plaintiff in the [drunk pod] with Jason Grass posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff; 2. Defendant Jerry Goodwill was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety; and 3. Defendant Jerry Goodwill’s conduct caused substantial harm to Plaintiff. Id. at 17. The district court then gave two instructions regarding qualified immunity. In Instruction No. 16, the court instructed the jury as follows: If you find that Plaintiff has proven his claim, you must then consider the affirmative defense of Defendant Jerry Goodwill that his conduct was objectively reasonable in light of legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident at issue and that he is therefore not liable. This defense is known as qualified immunity. The qualified immunity defense recognizes that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here protection of a detainee, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to what the Constitution requires as protection of detainees in those circumstances. If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the qualified immunity defense. Id. at 18. In Instruction No. 17, the court then added the following: You are instructed that Defendant Jerry Goodwill cannot be held liable to Plaintiff in the event that you determine he is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. If you find, after considering -8- all the evidence before you, that the actions of defendant Jerry Goodwill were such that a reasonable person would have believed them to be lawful and not violative of some established statutory or constitutional right, which a reasonable person would have known, Defendant Jerry Goodwill is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 19. These instructions clearly contemplated that the jury could find: (1) that Officer Goodwill was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Bass’s safety and therefore violated Mr. Bass’s constitutional rights; but (2) that Officer Bass was not liable to Mr. Bass for the violation because he made a reasonable mistake as to what the law required in terms of protecting Mr. Bass from other detainees. As the introductory sentence in Instruction No. 16 stated, “[i]f you find that Plaintiff has proven his claim, you must then consider the affirmative defense of Defendant Jerry Goodwill that his conduct was objectively reasonable in light of legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident and that he is therefore not liable.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is a reasonable explanation that reconciles the jury’s verdicts, and the explanation is that the jury found that Officer Goodwill violated Mr. Bass’s constitutional rights, as necessary to support its verdict against the Jail under principles of municipal liability, but the jury did not impose liability against Officer Goodwill because it found that he nonetheless acted reasonably and was therefore entitled to qualified immunity. -9- The Jail’s facially appealing response to this explanation is that the jury could not have found that Goodwill both violated Bass’s constitutional rights and that he acted ‘objectively reasonably’ . . . [because] a jail employee who knowingly and recklessly disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate would, by definition, be acting in an objectively unreasonable manner which would preclude a qualified immunity defense. Aplt. Opening Br. at 11. But this argument fails for two reasons. First, if correct, this argument means that the jury should not have been instructed on qualified immunity in this case, and the Jail has never made such an argument either below or before this court. Second, it ignores the leading Supreme Court case law in this area which establishes that the reasonableness inquiry for purposes of the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is separate and distinct from the question of whether a government official had the mens rea required for the underlying constitutional violation. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203-06 (2001) (excessive force claim), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987) (unlawful search claim). In sum, because the jury was properly instructed that it could not impose liability on Officer Goodwill if he acted reasonably in the qualified immunity sense, even if it also found that he violated Mr. Bass’s constitutional rights, the jury’s verdicts were not facially inconsistent and there was no plain error. -10-