Opinion ID: 741833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assaulting a Vulnerable Victim

Text: 3 Defendant objects to the district court's finding that the seventy-one-year-old victim was unusually vulnerable. We review this factual finding for clear error. United States v. Brunson, 54 F.3d 673, 676 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 397, 133 L.Ed.2d 317 (1995). 4 Section 3A1.1(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines allows a two-level enhancement [i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct. This circuit has ruled that a victim's elderly status, without more, is insufficient to justify a vulnerable victim enhancement. United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir.1991). The label 'elderly,' like the label 'young,' is too vague, standing alone, to provide the basis for a finding of unusual victim vulnerability. Id. In order to classify a victim as 'vulnerable,' the sentencing court must make particularized findings of vulnerability. The focus of the inquiry must be on the victim's personal or individual vulnerability. Brunson, 54 F.3d at 676 (quotation and citation omitted). 5 In this case, the government did not present any evidence of the victim's individual or personal vulnerability. The presentence report notes only that the victim was seventy-one years old at the time of the assault, and on that basis, recommends the vulnerable victim enhancement. The amended presentence report adds that the victim was particularly vulnerable due to his age, when one considers the defendant's age, health, and history of aggressive behavior. 1 Addendum to Presentence Report at 2. At the sentencing hearing, the district court found only that considering the age of the defendant and the age of the victim, ... it was a vulnerable victim. III R. at 7. 6 A comparison of the defendant's age with the victim's is an insufficiently particularized finding of the victim's vulnerability. As in Smith, the district court here did little more than equate[ ] the victim's 'elderly' status with per se vulnerability. 930 F.2d at 1455. A finding that the victim is elderly is insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify adjustment of appellant's offense level under § 3A1.1. Id. 7 The government urges us to uphold the vulnerable victim enhancement because the presentence report, adopted by the district court, contains additional facts about the defendant's age, health, and criminal record, all of which the probation officer relied upon in concluding that the victim was vulnerable. We agree that information about a defendant may be relevant in assessing a victim's vulnerability. See United States v. Coates, 996 F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir.1993) (noting that vulnerable victim enhancement is permissible in cases ... where the defendant chose the particular victim for his age, his mental condition, [or] his physical stature compared to that of the defendant. (quotation omitted)); see also United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1506 (2d Cir.1992) (While the focus must remain on the victim's individual vulnerability, the totality of the circumstances, including the status of the victim and the nature of the crime, must be taken into account in determining the applicability of the vulnerable victim enhancement. (citation omitted)). As a general rule, however, standard biographical information about a defendant cannot salvage a vulnerable victim enhancement when the only information known about the victim is his or her age. See Brunson, 54 F.3d at 676 (vulnerable victim enhancement requires a specific finding of the victim's particular vulnerability). 8 The government argues that a particularized finding of vulnerability should not be required for victims of violent crimes--that membership in a class of elderly persons should be enough in such cases to support enhancement. Most of our prior cases have not involved victims of violent offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Hardesty, 105 F.3d 558 (10th Cir.1997) (ninety-year-old victims of embezzlement); Brunson, 54 F.3d 673 (scheme to defraud foreign business); United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467 (10th Cir.1993) (elderly victims of fraud); United States v. Lee, 973 F.2d 832 (10th Cir.1992) (elderly victims of embezzlement); Smith, 930 F.2d 1450 (elderly victim of automobile theft accomplished by trickery). In United States v. Pearce, 967 F.2d 434 (10th Cir.1992), which involved an elderly victim of a kidnaping and sexual assault, we had no occasion to consider whether the victim's elderly status, standing alone, supported the vulnerable victim enhancement because there was sufficient additional evidence of the victim's vulnerability. See id. at 435 (detailing evidence of victim's frail and weakened physical condition). 9 We agree with the First Circuit that [i]n some cases the inference to be drawn from the class characteristics may be so powerful that there can be little doubt about unusual vulnerability of class members within the meaning of section 3A1.1. United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 487 (1st Cir.1996). For example, in United States v. Drapeau, 110 F.3d 618, 620 (8th Cir.1997), the district court ruled that a one-year-old victim of assault resulting in serious bodily injury was vulnerable because of his age. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding it obvious that a one-year-old child would not have the physical ability to protect himself or the verbal or mental skills to report the incident. See id. Likewise, the Guideline commentary suggests that class membership may be determinative in certain cases. See § 3A1.1, comment. (n.2) (The adjustment would apply ... in a robbery where the defendant selected a handicapped victim.). In the present case, however, the inference of vulnerability to be drawn from the assault victim's age of seventy-one is not so powerful that there can be little doubt, Gill, 99 F.3d at 487, as to the victim's unusual vulnerability. The enhancement in this case cannot stand without particular findings of the actual victim's unusual vulnerability. This comports with the holding in the unpublished case of United States v. Dutchie, No. 95-4052, 1996 WL 400220 (10th Cir. July 17, 1996) (reversing vulnerable victim enhancement for seventy-year-old victim of stabbing, where district court failed to make particularized findings as to the victim's vulnerability). Because the district court did not undertake the required analysis, we reverse the vulnerable victim enhancement and remand for the purpose of conducting this analysis. 2