Opinion ID: 2368807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Liberty Interest of the Potential Detainee

Text: All partiesโand all judges of this courtโ agree: pretrial detention affects a clear and vital liberty interest. Indeed, [l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action. Greenholtz, supra 442 U.S. at 18, 99 S.Ct. at 2109 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [4] Pretrial liberty is all the more precious because constitutional protection drops off sharply once pretrial detention is properly imposed. At that point, due process bars only punishment, a term the Supreme Court now defines by reference to the government's purpose, not to impact on the accused. See Bell, supra, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. An accused, therefore, may have to live in a grim prison environment for months and months before trial, see Bell, supra 441 U.S. at 541-43, 548-60, 99 S.Ct. at 1875-76, 1879-85, shielded against only egregious delays by speedy trial guarantees. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 315 n.8, 318 n.9, 319, 324, 92 S.Ct. 455, 460 n.8, 462 n.9, 462, 465, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Although not necessarily punishment, but see note 12 infra, pretrial detention is likely to have substantially the same, painful impact on the individual as incarceration for a criminal offense. See Campbell v. McGruder, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 258, 267, 580 F.2d 521, 530 (1978). The accused is likely to lose employment, strain relationships with family and friends, and suffer indignities of the sorts already described; but, of even greater significance, a number of studies indicate that the defendant at liberty pending trial stands a better chance of not being convicted or, if convicted, of not receiving a prison sentence. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 67, 86 (1963); see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 281-83, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1065-66, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973) (Douglas, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting); Campbell, supra 188 U.S.App.D.C. at 268-69, 580 F.2d at 531-32; Vera Institute of Justice, Programs in Criminal Justice Reform: Ten-Year Report 1961-1971, at 31 (1972). This disparity may be attributable to [c]onditions of confinement that impede a defendant's preparation of his defense (apart, of course, from the fact of confinement itself), or that are so harsh or intolerable as to induce him to plead guilty, or that damage his appearance or mental alertness at trial. Campbell, supra, 188 U.S.App.D.C. at 269, 580 F.2d at 532. To say the very least, an accused has a substantial interest in not being arbitrarily classified as dangerous, and thus nonbailable as a matter of law. [5]