Opinion ID: 1296967
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Westbrook.

Text: The proposed amended complaint identifies Westbrook as the Hospital administrator ultimately responsible for Laura's care. It alleges that Westbrook knew or should have known about the relationship between Berry and Laura and about Berry's prior sexual relationship with another patient. Fairly understood, the allegations in the proposed amended complaint charge that Westbrook approved or tolerated Berry's relationship with Laura by failing to adequately investigate the matter or discipline Berry. Evidence submitted under section 425.13(a) concerning Westbrook consists primarily of excerpts from his deposition testimony. These materials were included in plaintiffs' reply papers, and suggest the following about Westbrook's involvement. In the fall of 1990, Westbrook, the chief administrator of the Hospital, heard third hand that a relationship might have developed between Laura and Berry  something more than just a patient passing an individual in the hallway. The information was given to Westbrook by an assistant administrator, who apparently attributed it to members of Laura's treatment team. Westbrook promptly confronted Berry with the rumor. Berry seemed shocked by the information and adamantly denied any personal contact with Laura. Westbrook advised Berry that the organization expected certain behavior of its managers and that anything other than a casual relationship with a patient might be perceived as questionable. Westbrook took no further action in the matter. (8a) Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are appropriate against the Hospital under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) because Westbrook personally exhibited malice towards plaintiffs in performing his managerial duties. They imply that any personal contact between a therapy patient and a hospital employee is presumptively harmful and that Westbrook's acceptance of Berry's denial without further investigation was inherently malicious. Such an approach overlooks the plain language of Civil Code section 3294. Malice is defined as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ( Id., § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) As noted earlier, the italicized words were added by the 1987 Reform Act. We assume they are not surplusage. ( Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) By adding the word willful to the conscious-disregard prong of malice, the Legislature has arguably conformed the literal words of the statute to existing case law formulations. (See Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896 [malice involves awareness of dangerous consequences and a willful and deliberate failure to avoid them].) (9) However, the statute's reference to despicable conduct seems to represent a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards. Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective despicable is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are base, vile, or contemptible. (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.) As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of despicable conduct must be found. (Accord, BAJI No. 14.72.1 (1992 re-rev.); Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal. App.4th 306, 331 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 594].) (8b) As a matter of law, plaintiffs have not established malicious conduct by Westbrook. The proposed amended complaint and the evidence submitted under section 425.13(a) do not show Westbrook knew or possessed information indicating that Berry was engaged in harmful activities towards plaintiffs. Specifically, such materials do not show that Westbrook was aware that the rumored relationship between Berry and Laura was sexual or destructive, that Berry had been involved in a prior relationship with a patient (destructive or otherwise), or that Berry lied when confronted with the rumor about Laura. As a result, plaintiffs have necessarily failed to state or demonstrate that Westbrook intended to injure plaintiffs or willfully disregarded their safety and well-being by accepting Berry's denial. For similar reasons, no vile or despicable conduct by Westbrook appears from the face of the proposed complaint or the evidence before us. Plaintiffs also have not established that Westbrook ratified Berry's conduct under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b). (10) For purposes of determining an employer's liability for punitive damages, ratification generally occurs where, under the particular circumstances, the employer demonstrates an intent to adopt or approve oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious behavior by an employee in the performance of his job duties. The issue commonly arises where the employer or its managing agent is charged with failing to intercede in a known pattern of workplace abuse, or failing to investigate or discipline the errant employee once such misconduct became known. (See, e.g., Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 793, 800-801 [274 Cal. Rptr. 139] [management knows Black employee is racially abused by colleagues at work and fires him after he complains]; Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co. (1987) 189 Cal. App.3d 1420, 1432-1433 [235 Cal. Rptr. 68] [management fails to stop known on-the-job sexual harassment of employee by coworkers]; Greenfield v. Spectrum Investment Corp. (1985) 174 Cal. App.3d 111, 118-121 [219 Cal. Rptr. 805], overruled on other grounds in Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179] [employee is retained even though management knows about his violent temper and assault upon a customer at work]; Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 681, 691-692 [117 Cal. Rptr. 146], overruled on other grounds in Egan, supra, 24 Cal.3d 809, 822, fn. 5 [insurer directs, reviews, and approves malicious claims settlement practices]; Schanafelt v. Seaboard Finance Co. (1951) 108 Cal. App.2d 420, 423-424 [239 P.2d 42] [employee follows finance company's directions and falsely imprisons pregnant customer while collecting on delinquent loan].) Corporate ratification in the punitive damages context requires actual knowledge of the conduct and its outrageous nature. (8c) Under no view of the proposed amended complaint or the evidence submitted under section 425.13(a) can Westbrook's conduct be characterized as ratification. As noted above, plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Westbrook knew about the relationship's allegedly sexual or harmful nature. Berry denied any contact with Laura, and there is no indication that Westbrook had personal knowledge to the contrary. By cautioning Berry against patient involvement, Westbrook attempted to repudiate  not adopt  such conduct on the Hospital's behalf. Thus, as a matter of law, plaintiffs have failed to state or substantiate a claim that Westbrook knowingly approved Berry's manipulative relationship with Laura. Accordingly, as with Berry, no basis appears for assessing punitive damages against the Hospital based on malicious or oppressive acts of its employees. [12]