Opinion ID: 15662
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enhancements for Restraint and Abduction of Victims

Text: 74 The district court increased Chopane's base offense level by two levels because he had physically restrained victims during the Subway robbery. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Hickman's base offense level was increased four levels because he abducted victims during the robberies of AutoZone and Church's Chicken. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). Chopane and Hickman objected to the enhancements at their respective sentencings and now press for relief on appeal. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4) provides: 75 (4) (A) If any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 4 levels; or (B) if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 2 levels. 76 Physically restrained is defined earlier in the Guidelines as the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(i)). Abduct is defined as a victim was forced to accompany an offender to a different location. For example, a bank robber's forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would constitute abduction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(a)). 77 Chopane argues that he never tied, bound, or locked up the victims of the robberies. Rather, he contends that at best the evidence only demonstrated that he tapped a Subway employee on the shoulder with a gun. However, the district court reasoned that Chopane's pointing of a firearm at the employee restricted her movement. 78 The resolution of Chopane's sentencing challenge turns on the interpretation of the definition of physical restraint. The Guidelines define the term to include acts such as being tied, bound or locked up. Although we have never reached this question, those circuits which have reached it have been unanimous in concluding that [b]y the use of the words 'such as,' it is apparent that 'being tied, bound or locked up' are listed by way of example rather than limitation. United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 320-21 (2nd Cir.1993); United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir.1992); Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1246 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1468 (10th Cir.1990). We agree that it is possible for a district court to conclude that a defendant physically restrained his victims without evidence that he actually tied, bound, or locked them up. 79 The evidence supporting the district court's § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) finding as to Chopane showed that Chopane pointed a firearm at the Subway employee during the robbery. The Government argues that this action carried an implicit threat to obey his command or be shot and was enough to support a finding of physical restraint. The Government points to cases from other circuits implying that restraint need not encompass the use of actual physical force, so long as the defendant's actions permitted no alternative but compliance. See United States v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir.1993); Doubet, 969 F.2d at 347. However, the cases from other courts construing § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) do not support the Government's position. Physical restraint has been upheld in various circumstances involving either the physical holding of the victim or the confining of the victim in some manner coupled with a threat of violence. See, e.g., Rosario, 7 F.3d at 321 (defendant stood on victim's throat); United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1452-53 (9th Cir.1993)(defendant dragged and grabbed victims); Kirtley, 986 F.2d at 286 (defendant ordered victims at gunpoint to bind themselves); Doubet, 969 F.2d at 346 (defendant herded victims into an enclosed room at gunpoint); Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1246 (defendant pushed and grabbed victims to prevent them from leaving bedroom); Roberts, 898 F.2d at 1470 (defendant put right arm around victim and held knife to victim's face). Even the recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir.1997), which contained language indicating that physical restraint occurs anytime a victim has a gun pointed at her and is ordered to do something, involved the defendant forcing one victim to lie down on the floor and forcing another to walk a short distance at gunpoint. 80 Although Chopane's actions permitted no alternative but compliance, he did nothing to restrain his victim that an armed robber would not normally do. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, merely brandishing a weapon at a victim cannot support an enhancement under this section of the Guidelines, because, [w]ere it otherwise, enhancement would be warranted every time an armed robber entered a bank, for a threat not to move is implicit in the very nature of armed robbery. Doubet, 969 F.2d at 346. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in concluding that Chopane physically restrained his victim as contemplated by the Guidelines. Were we to rule otherwise, there would be no limiting principle on the application of this enhancement; every armed robbery would be enhanced by the physical restraint provision. 81 Next, we must determine whether the court erred in determining that Hickman abducted his victims. The district court found that the victims in the Jasper Church's Chicken and Hardee's robberies were initially accosted in the parking lots and then forced back into the restaurant by the robbers[.] 82 The district court cited United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 726-28 (5th Cir.1996) to support its finding that Hickman abducted his victims during these two robberies. In Hawkins, the defendants beat the victims at one location in a parking lot and then dragged them at gunpoint 40 or 50 yards away. Id. We upheld a four level sentence enhancement in that situation, pointing out that it was not necessary to cross a property line or the threshold of a building to establish a change of location. Id. The term a different location must be interpreted on a case by case basis, considering the particular facts under scrutiny, not mechanically, based on the presence or absence of doorways, lot lines, thresholds, and the like. Id. We cannot say that the district court erred in applying the four-level abduction enhancement, as interpreted by Hawkins, to Hickman under the facts of this case. 83