Opinion ID: 2053596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Wilder's Statements

Text: Jones' third contention is that he was denied due process of law when his attorney was not permitted to testify about the remarks of Myron Wilder. A ruling on such evidentiary matters is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and does not amount to a violation of a defendant's right to due process of law unless it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. See Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Here, there is ample support for the judge's decision to exclude this hearsay evidence. Jones was tried before the Indiana Rules of Evidence became effective in 1994, therefore this claim is governed by the similar Federal Rules of Evidence § 804(b)(3) hearsay exceptions based on the unavailability of the speaker, which we adopted in 1991. [5] Thomas v. State, (1991), Ind., 580 N.E.2d 224. This rule permits a trial court to admit some hearsay evidence when the declarant is unavailable but there is sufficient indicia of the statement's trustworthiness. Assuming for the sake of argument that Wilder's departure rendered him unavailable, the trial court was justified in excluding the alleged statements because there were no corroborating circumstances indicating their trustworthiness. These statements, suddenly made to defense counsel on the morning the trial is scheduled to begin, were uncorroborated and contradicted Jones' own admissions. Wilder's flight from the courthouse, despite being subject to a court order to remain there, also cast doubt on the veracity of his remarks. The circumstances demonstrate that Judge Frese neither deprived Jones of due process when he excluded such unreliable evidence nor abused his discretion when he denied counsel's motion to withdraw.