Opinion ID: 162495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Doctor Muckala

Text: 16 Dr. Muckala challenges the verdict on Ms. Wilson's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because, though alleged in the original complaint, it does not appear in the amended complaint, and was not clearly alleged in the pretrial order. The doctor argues that, throughout the trial, he was unaware that the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress remained alive, until after the close of the evidence, when Plaintiffs' counsel sought a jury instruction on the claim against him as well as the Hospital. Dr. Muckala then objected. 17 The district court wrestled with the status of the negligent infliction claim, and whether it had been sufficiently alleged. First, the court allowed it [i]n consideration of fairness to the plaintiff. Muckala App. at 193. However, Defendants pointed out that the claim clearly had been dropped in the amended complaint. In light of that argument, the court disallowed the claim, ruling that the clause in the pretrial order saying that, the defendants, are sued at common law, was insufficient to resurrect a claim previously dropped from the case. Muckala App. at 195. The court speculated that the phrase, the defendants, was mistakenly carried over from the original pretrial order and included the board members who were no longer parties in the case. Muckala App. at 197. Finally, though, the court allowed the claim and instructed the jury accordingly because of the conflict on that issue, but it reserved ruling on Dr. Muckala's objection until after the verdict. The jury found for the Plaintiff solely on the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. After the verdict, the court overruled the doctor's objection, concluding that, despite the wording of the amended complaint and the pretrial order, Dr. Muckala had not been unfairly surprised by the instruction to the jury. Muckala App. at 122-23. Dr. Muckala appeals the district court's ruling. 18 The original complaint clearly alleged the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Muckala, and the amended complaint just as clearly dropped the claim. The amended complaint alleged negligence only against the Defendants identified in paragraphs 3 and 4. Muckala App. at 30. The Hospital and the board members were named in paragraphs three and four, while Dr. Muckala was named in only the second paragraph. Muckala App. at 24-25. The amended complaint describes the negligence cause of action, but the heading of that section lists only the Hospital and the board members, and the descriptive language in that section cannot be construed to include a claim against the doctor. Muckala App. at 30-32. Predictably, the doctor's answer to the amended complaint addressed only the remaining claims — sexual assault and battery, tortious interference with contract, and invasion of privacy — and did not respond in any way to negligent infliction of emotional distress. Muckala App. at 132 (docs.23-24). 19 Ms. Wilson argues she reasserted negligent infliction of emotional distress in the pretrial order. However, the pertinent parts of that document are ambiguous. In the statement of the case, the pretrial order states that Dr. Muckala is a Defendant under two separate legal theories: sexual assault and battery, and invasion of privacy. 2 Muckala App. at 37. 20 The following paragraph, however, indicates generally that Defendants are sued under common law negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs argue that, though the order nowhere indicates that any claims have been added or amended, this paragraph alone suffices to renew a previously dropped claim. The doctor's actions belie Plaintiffs' suggestion that he was apprised of the claim — his statement of issues in the pretrial order was limited to the sexual assault and invasion of privacy claims, reflecting a belief that the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was no longer part of the case against him. Upon Dr. Muckala's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiffs' evidence, neither side mentioned the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, instead focusing on the three claims still clearly in play. Muckala App. at 167-176. 21 When an issue is set forth in the pretrial order, it is not necessary to amend previously filed pleadings because the pretrial order is the controlling document for trial. Expertise Inc., v. Aetna Fin. Co., 810 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir.1987); Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(e). As such, claims, issues, defenses, or theories of damages not included in the pretrial order are waived even if they appeared in the complaint and, conversely, the inclusion of a claim in the pretrial order is deemed to amend any previous pleadings which did not include that claim. 22 The preparation of a pretrial order requires careful attention and review by the parties and their attorneys. While we recognize that the pretrial order is treated as superceding the pleadings and establishing the issues to be considered at trial, Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1522, we do not normally expect to see claims or defenses not contained in the pleadings appearing for the first time in the pretrial order, especially in such cursory form. Such a practice deprives one's adversary of fair notice, possibly discovery, and the opportunity for motion practice, and is subject to abuse by those who employ a sporting theory of justice. The laudable purpose of Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 is to avoid surprise, not foment it. See Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir.1964) (the purpose of Rule 16 is to replace the old sporting theory of justice with a policy of putting the cards on the table). Should a new claim or defense appear for the first time in the pretrial order, it is incumbent upon opposing counsel to meticulously examine the order, taking exception, if necessary, to the additions, and recording their objection in the pretrial order. Meanwhile, the party seeking to add a claim or defense should do so with specificity and clarity so as to minimize the ill effects of that practice. Specificity and clarity provide the trial court with a fair opportunity to consider whether to approve or deny what is obviously an attempt to amend the pleadings at a rather late date. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a). 23 Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to sculpt and refine the pretrial order to include every allegation against Dr. Muckala. Their duty to do so was especially important if they intended to include, as they contend they did, a claim previously dropped in the amended complaint. Unfortunately, the pretrial order does not clearly convey their purported intent to re-allege any claim. 24 In dealing with an ambiguous pretrial order such as this, we must evaluate the order contextually to determine whether the claim was contained therein. In this case, the clear language of the amended complaint, coupled with the ambiguous language of the pretrial order, lead us to conclude that there was insufficient documentary support for the allegation of a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Muckala. Our conclusion is reinforced by the absence of any mention of this claim in the doctor's answer to the amended complaint, or in the pretrial order statement of the case, and the lack of any mention of the claim by Plaintiffs or Defendant at the hearing on Defendant's Rule 50 motion at the close of Plaintiffs' case, though all other claims were discussed. In light of these facts, we find that the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress did not run against Dr. Muckala and we reverse the verdict of liability on that claim.