Opinion ID: 2234232
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misstating the Law

Text: McDaniel alleges that the prosecutor misstated the law by: (1) attempting to lessen the State's burden of proof, and (2) misstating the law as to the elements of the offense. First, McDaniel points to the beginning of the prosecutor's closing argument: [T]hough the defendant comes in here cloaked with the presumption of innocence where the burden rests on me to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, many men and women have come into rooms just like this like he has, who have left these rooms after having been found guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 105 (Minn.2009), a case arising from the trial of the two men who shot Christopher Lynch, we stated that [p]rosecutors improperly shift the burden of proof when they imply that a defendant has the burden of proving his innocence. See also State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 451-52 (Minn.1997). A misstatement of this burden is highly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2000). However, a prosecutor's comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defense theory does not improperly shift the burden. See State v. Race, 383 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn.1986). Additionally, corrective instructions by the court can cure prosecutorial error. Id. In Martin, we directly addressed the same alleged burden-shifting argument. The appellant claimed that the prosecutor reduced the State's burden of proof by stating that many people are still convicted under the stiff burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 105. We concluded that the prosecutor's argument neither misstated nor shifted the burden of proofrather, it was a legitimate explanation of the State's burden. Id. We further found no error, let alone plain error. Id. We reach the same conclusion here. A prosecutor commits misconduct by commenting on a defendant's failure to call a witness, because such a comment suggests that the defendant has some sort of burden of proof. State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 787 (Minn.2006). In Mayhorn, we determined that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he commented on the defendant's failure to call someone as an alibi witness to corroborate his version of events. Id. McDaniel's argument does not persuade us. As in Martin, the prosecutor's statement that people have been convicted under the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard was a suggestion to the jury that the State's burden is not an impossible one. In addition, the prosecutor stated the burden of proof correctly. The prosecutor restated the burden of proof on the State to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt numerous times throughout his closing argument, making any possible confusion or prejudice from this statement minimal at best. We see no error here. Second, McDaniel contends that the State improperly misstated the law by saying that all the State need[s] to prove was that the defendant was driving the car. Specifically, McDaniel relies on the prosecutor's statement: Did the defendant, was he driving the car. If you say he was driving the car, then we have met our burden of proof with respect to each and every element of both of these crimes and the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn.1993), we emphasized that courts must look at the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence to determine whether reversible error has occurred. As the State argues, the prosecutor's comment was addressing one of the central issues of the casethe identity of the driver. In addition, as with the burden of proof, the State clarified several times that it has the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and went through the other elements of the offense in detail during closing argument. Finally, as the State notes, defense counsel also framed the issue of the driver's identity in a similar manner: The trial is about is there proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. McDaniel was the driver of that car. That is what the trial is about. That's what we're here for. That's the evidence that we are looking at. As defense counsel did, the prosecutor was merely summarizing the key issue that would impact the jury's determination of guilt.