Opinion ID: 1792009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: In Nebraska, where there is no impact or physical injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff seeking to bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress must show either (1) that he or she is a reasonably foreseeable bystander victim based upon an intimate familial relationship with a seriously injured victim of the defendant's negligence or (2) that the plaintiff was a direct victim of the defendant's negligence because the plaintiff was within the zone of danger of the negligence in question. See, Hamilton v. Nestor, 265 Neb. 757, 659 N.W.2d 321 (2003); James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985). In addition, such plaintiffs whose only injury is an emotional one must show that their emotional distress is medically diagnosable and significant and is so severe that no reasonable person could have expected to endure it. See Hamilton v. Nestor, supra . The evidence is undisputed that Catron suffered no physical impact or injury from the accident which he attributes to the negligence of the defendants. Furthermore, Catron makes no argument that he had an intimate familial relationship with the fatally injured victim of the accident, Rader. The defendants argue that regardless of whether Catron's alleged emotional distress is of sufficient severity to be legally compensable, he cannot recover for such emotional distress because he was not within the zone of danger of the accident. We agree that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Catron, he was clearly not within the zone of danger, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on that basis. See Logan Ranch v. Farm Credit Bank, 238 Neb. 814, 472 N.W.2d 704 (1991) (this court may affirm grant of summary judgment on any ground available to trial court, even if it is not same reasoning relied upon below). In James v. Lieb, supra , in differentiating bystanders from direct victims, we described the fact that bystanders are not immediately threatened with physical injury. 221 Neb. at 49, 375 N.W.2d at 111. See, also, Nielson v. AT & T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434 (S.D.1999) (zone of danger includes all parties who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by defendant's negligent conduct); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill.2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1, 75 Ill.Dec. 211 (1983) (to be in zone of danger, party must have been in such proximity to accident in which direct victim was physically injured that there was high risk to him of physical impact). The zone of danger has been described as a complement to the basic requirement that persons exercise reasonable care to protect others from injury. Those who breach their basic duty of care to others will be required to compensate those who are injured, even when the injuries are not caused by direct impact, but by the operation of foreseeable emotional distress. Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 240-41 (Utah 1992). Persons in the zone of danger are clearly foreseeable plaintiffs to the negligent actor insofar as they have been placed at unreasonable risk of immediate bodily harm by the actor's negligence. The fact that the harm results solely through emotional distress should not protect the actor from liability for such conduct. See, Lozoya v. Sanchez, 133 N.M. 579, 66 P.3d 948 (2003); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436 (1965). In Zea v. Kolb, 204 A.D.2d 1019, 613 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1994), the court held that an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress should have been dismissed because the plaintiff was never in any danger from the vehicle that struck and killed the victim. The plaintiff saw the vehicle while standing in a driveway and feared for the victim who was riding her bicycle on the opposite shoulder of the road. The plaintiff immediately ran after the vehicle, but remained on the opposite shoulder of the road and never overtook it. When the vehicle struck the victim, the plaintiff was 12 to 15 feet away. The plaintiff admitted she was never in any danger from the defendant's vehicle. Similarly, in Iacona v. Schrupp, 521 N.W.2d 70 (Minn.App.1994), the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff was not within the zone of danger of a truckdriver's negligent conduct. The plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress resulting from witnessing his friend get run over by the truck that was backing up alongside the road to assist the plaintiff who was lying in the grass disorientated. Since the plaintiff was not actually in the road at the time the truckdriver was backing up, the court found he was not in danger of physical injury. Stating that a defendant has no duty to avoid injury to those not placed in peril by his conduct, the court concluded that to hold the truckdriver liable for the plaintiff's distress would impose on a negligent tortfeasor liability out of proportion to his culpability. Id. at 73. Compare Hamilton v. Nestor, 265 Neb. 757, 659 N.W.2d 321 (2003) (as operator of one of vehicles involved in collision, motorist was clearly within zone of danger). Here, it is clear that Catron was not immediately threatened with physical injury as a result of the alleged negligence which resulted in Rader's death. While Catron described the jet skis at one point as coming directly toward him at a rapid speed, Catron admitted he was not in immediate danger. Rather, at that point, the jet skis were approximately 75 yards away, and Catron assumed the jet skis would either stop or turn in order to avoid a collision with the boat. This is what apparently happened, resulting in the collision with Rader, who was riding in the tube some 61 feet away from the rear of Catron's boat. While it might be argued that others outside the zone of danger are also foreseeable victims, no jurisdiction allows recovery for all emotional harms, no matter how intangible or trivial, that might be causally linked to the negligence of another. Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). This is true because there are no necessary finite limits on the number of persons who might suffer emotional injury as a result of a given negligent act, and thus, to allow recoverability for all such injuries holds out the very real possibility of nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for defendants. 512 U.S. at 545-46, 114 S.Ct. 2396. This court has extended the class of potential plaintiffs to bystanders outside the zone of danger who have a close familial relationship with a seriously injured victim because, as the court in Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corporation, 426 Mass. 629, 637, 690 N.E.2d 413, 418 (1998), explained, [p]ersons bearing close `familial or other relationship' to the directly injured third person comprise a discrete and well-defined class, membership in which is determined by preexisting relationships. For witnesses having no such close relationship with the victim, however, we limit recoverability to those persons who are within the zone of danger of the negligent conduct which resulted in the incident in question.