Opinion ID: 175740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Registration Requirements.

Text: The defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Among other things, this section imposes criminal penalties when a person required to register as a sex offender under SORNA knowingly fails to register after traveling in interstate commerce. For SORNA purposes, a sex offender is an individual who was convicted of a sex offense. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). The defendant concedes that he falls within this taxonomy. To understand his argument that SORNA's registration requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a), (c), nonetheless do not apply to him, we must understand the architecture of the statutory scheme. The registration requirements are laid out in section 16913, which provides: (a) In general A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of residence. (b) Initial registration The sex offender shall initially register  (1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or (2) not later than 3 business days after being sentenced for that offense, if the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. (c) Keeping the registration current A sex offender shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status, appear in person in at least 1 jurisdiction involved pursuant to subsection (a) and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the information required for that offender in the sex offender registry. That jurisdiction shall immediately provide that information to all other jurisdictions in which the offender is required to register. (d) Initial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection (b) The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b). 42 U.S.C. § 16913. [2] SORNA became law on July 27, 2006. On February 28, 2007, the Attorney General, acting pursuant to the authority explicitly granted to him in section 16913(d), promulgated an interim rule to eliminate any possible uncertainty about the applicability of [SORNA's] requirements . . . to sex offenders whose predicate convictions predate the enactment of SORNA. Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed.Reg. 8894, 8896 (Feb. 28, 2007). This rule declares that SORNA's requirements apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of [SORNA]. 28 C.F.R. § 72.3. The courts of appeals have disagreed about the meaning and effect of this statutory/regulatory mosaic. See Carr v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2234 n. 2, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010) (noting circuit split). The disagreement centers on subsection (d), which contains two pertinent clauses. The question boils down to whether the first clause, stating that [t]he Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, gave the Attorney General authority to determine the applicability of SORNA to all persons who stood convicted of sex offenses on SORNA's effective date or, alternatively, as indicated in the following clause of subsection (d) (to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b)), to determine its applicability only as to specific subsets of those offenders. Some courts have determined, often over emphatic dissents, that the statute unambiguously gave the Attorney General the authority to determine SORNA's applicability to all persons previously convicted of sex offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 414-15 (6th Cir.2009); United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir.2009); United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 858 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam). If this view is correct, SORNA did not apply to previously convicted sex offenders until the Attorney General promulgated the interim rule. See Hatcher, 560 F.3d at 229. Other courts, deeming the statute ambiguous, have construed it to signify that the Attorney General only had authority to determine SORNA's applicability to previously convicted sex offenders who were unable initially to register under SORNA. [3] See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 930, 932-33, 935 (10th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2383, 173 L.Ed.2d 1301 (2009); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 918-19 (8th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2431, 174 L.Ed.2d 229 (2009); see also Cain, 583 F.3d at 424 (Griffin, J., dissenting); Hatcher, 560 F.3d at 229 (Shedd, J., dissenting). Under this view, registered sex offenders who had a state-law duty to keep their registrations current on SORNA's effective date became subject to a new obligation to register for federal purposes when, thereafter, they moved to a different state. See May, 535 F.3d at 919. If this view is correct, SORNA applied to previously convicted sex offenders as of the date of its enactment. The defendant urges us to follow the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that SORNA's registration requirements did not apply to him when he traveled interstate. In his view, the plain language of subsection (d) delegates to the Attorney General sole authority to determine whether SORNA applies to any or all sex offenders with preexisting convictions and, inasmuch as the Attorney General did not exercise this authority until February 28, 2007 (when he promulgated the interim rule), convicted sex offenders who traveled before that date and failed to register did not violate SORNA's registration requirements. Any other reading of the statute, he contends, would transgress the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, which prohibits punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867)). Because this claim presents a question of statutory construction, we afford de novo review. United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 405 (1st Cir.2007). Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007). Absent some indication that the words of a statute have an exotic meaning, we normally assume that the language employed carries its usual and ordinary meaning. SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir.2010) (en banc). If the meaning of the text is plain, we generally need go no further. In re Hill, 562 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.2009). This general rule, like virtually every general rule, admits of exceptions. One such exception is pertinent here. No less an authority than the Supreme Court has warned that the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994)); see also Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treas., 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989) ([W]ords of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.). The language at issue here  the first clause of subsection (d)  states that [t]he Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). Although this language might appear straightforward if read in a vacuum, a mechanical reading of it as applying to all previously convicted sex offenders would wrest it from its contextual moorings. Taking into account the context in which this provision operates, we do not believe that such a mechanical construction is what Congress intended. In our judgment, a different canon of construction dominates the interpretive landscape in this instance. When congressional intent is clear and a statute plausibly can be read to effectuate that intent, that reading must prevail over a more semantically correct reading of the statutory language. See, e.g., In re Hill, 562 F.3d at 32 ([P]lain meaning sometimes must yield if its application would bring about results that are either absurd or antithetical to Congress's discernible intent.). We explain below why we think that this is such a case. In the absence of a clear congressional direction to the contrary  and there is none here  a law takes effect on the date of its enactment. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991). SORNA was signed into law on July 27, 2006. Subsection (a), which requires that sex offenders register, and keep the registration current, 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a), unarguably became law at that time. The same is true of subsection (b), which describes SORNA's initial registration requirements, id. § 16913(b), and of subsection (c), which demands the updating of registration information within three business days of a change of name, residence, employment, or student status, id. § 16913(c). Thus, but for subsection (d), any argument that the section cannot operate in advance of action by the Attorney General would be absurd. Based on this analysis, we disagree with the Sixth Circuit's reading of subsections (a)-(c). See Cain, 583 F.3d at 414-15 (Congress did not enact language providing a default position . . . the statute does not read `the Attorney General shall have the authority to waive the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter.'). Subsections (a), (b), and (c) contain clear and directory language, and when statutory language is written as a clear directive, the rule is that, in the absence of limiting language, the statute is effective as of the date of its enactment. See United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3433, 177 L.Ed.2d 341 (2010). There is no limiting language here. Subsection (d) is anything but a clear direction to the contrary. Courts holding otherwise have read the language of this subsection as giving the Attorney General the exclusive authority to apply the registration requirements to any and all previously convicted sex offenders. See, e.g., Hatcher, 560 F.3d at 227. To arrive at this interpretation, those courts have surgically removed subsection (d) from the rest of the section and have read its text in a vacuum. See, e.g., Cain, 583 F.3d at 414. We are unwilling to take so struthious an approach. Cf. United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849) (explaining that [i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy). Context must be considered  and contextual awareness is especially important when interpreting the provisions of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (directing courts to interpret such a statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995))). Congress intended SORNA to function as such a scheme. See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (stating that Congress sought to establish[] a comprehensive national system for the registration of [sex] offenders); see also May, 535 F.3d at 919-20 (discussing Congressional intent to create regulatory scheme when enacting SORNA). When viewed as a part of a seamless regulatory scheme, subsection (d) has a distinct office: it appears to reflect Congress's recognition that specific applications of the registration requirements to previously convicted sex offenders may have unintended consequences. Thus, subsection (d) allows  but does not compel  the Attorney General to narrow SORNA's sweep if and to the extent that he concludes that specific situations invite such narrowing. Several contextual considerations support this view. First, it cannot be gainsaid that Congress enacted SORNA to establish[] a comprehensive national system for the registration of [sex] offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16901. The Act defines a sex offender as an individual who was convicted of a sex offense. Id. § 16911(1) (emphasis supplied). It is significant that this past-tense definition makes no exceptions. See Hatcher, 560 F.3d at 232 (Shedd, J., dissenting) (concluding that this past-tense usage expressly sweeps persons . . . convicted of sex offenses prior to SORNA's enactment within the statute's scope); see also Carr, 130 S.Ct. at 2236 (noting importance of Congress's choice of verb tense in interpreting statute's temporal reach). Second, the structure of section 16913 strongly suggests that this past-tense usage is not a scrivener's error. The office of subsection (a) is to ensure the registration of all sex offenders. Congress spoke with conspicuous clarity in making subsection (a) all-encompassing: A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a). By the same token, neither subsection (b), which elaborates on initial registration requirements, nor subsection (c), which delineates continuing registration requirements, distinguishes between pre-SORNA and post-SORNA sex offense convictions. See id. § 16913(b)-(c); see also Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 944 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Third, SORNA was tailored to fashion a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 16901. Construing subsection (d) to exempt a broad swath of the convicted sex offender population  indeed, the entirety of it, until the Attorney General acts  would fit uncomfortably with the remainder of the Act. Fourth, the title of subsection (d) specifies that the authority it describes relates to the [i]nitial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection (b). This language clearly indicates that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Attorney General by subsection (d) is limited to prescribing rules governing those offenders unable to comply with SORNA's initial registration requirements under subsection (b) and not pre-SORNA sex offenders more generally. See Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 933. Some of the courts that have endorsed a contrary construction of subsection (d) have disregarded the title of the subsection based on the principle that courts only look to the title of a law in the event of ambiguity. See, e.g., Cain, 583 F.3d at 416; Hatcher, 560 F.3d at 226. But that principle does not pertain where, as here, an inquiring court's primary task is to place a statute in context before attempting to construe it. Thus, we do not use the title to undo or limit what the text makes plain. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947). Fifth, the language of the second clause of subsection (d), which states that the Attorney General shall have the authority to prescribe rules . . . for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b), informs our understanding of the first clause of subsection (d). The second clause suggests that the authority conferred by the first clause of subsection (d) was intended to extend only to those previously convicted offenders who were unable to comply with subsection (b), and not to previously convicted offenders more generally. The use of the word other in the second clause is most naturally read to indicate Congress's contemplation that the sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter referenced in the first clause will form one subset of offenders unable to comply with subsection (b). Cf. United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st Cir. 1985) (All words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.). This interpretation of the interaction between the two clauses of subsection (d) leaves intact the registration requirements articulated in subsection (a) and limits the applicability of subsection (d) to those offenders unable to comply with the requirements of subsection (b). See Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 932. Sixth, and finally, our view of the scope of subsection (d) is informed by the way in which Congress chose to delegate authority to the Attorney General. The subsection provides that the Attorney General shall have the authority to determine the applicability of the requirements imposed by SORNA. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). It is thus apparent that the drafters eschewed the use of mandatory language (e.g., shall determine) that would have compelled the Attorney General to make an affirmative determination before the statute could be applied to any previously convicted sex offender. In its use of permissive language, subsection (d) differs from other SORNA provisions in which Congress mandated action by the Attorney General. See, e.g., id. § 16917(b) (directing that the Attorney General shall prescribe rules for the notification of sex offenders). Congress's decision to couch some provisions of the statute in mandatory language but to couch subsection (d) in discretionary language is a telltale sign. [4] See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-74, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). We think that this language says what it means and means what is says: that the Attorney General does not have to act before SORNA's registration requirements become effective as to previously convicted sex offenders. See Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 157-58. Congress obviously knew how to direct action by the Attorney General and how to give discretionary authority to him. In drafting subsection (d), Congress chose the latter course. We regard this choice as deliberate and, thus, as favoring a reading of subsection (d) as a grant to the Attorney General of discretion to provide limited relief from the broad requirements imposed by SORNA in order to account for problematic permutations that might arise with respect to some previously convicted sex offenders. These lampposts light the path that we must follow. The language, structure, and purpose of subsection (d) and the context in which it operates combine to show its unambiguous meaning. We hold that, in framing subsection (d), Congress did not contemplate a statutory scheme in which the application of the general rules limned in subsections (a), (b), and (c) to previously convicted sex offenders would hinge on action by the Attorney General. [5] For purposes of the case at hand, this holding gets the grease from the goose. It teaches that the general rules requiring updates to sex offender registration took effect when SORNA was signed into law. Those requirements were thus in full force when, in February of 2007, the defendant traveled to a new state. When he failed to register there, he violated federal law. His prosecution for that offense poses no Ex Post Facto concerns. [6]