Opinion ID: 661523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the child witness instruction

Text: 22 Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested jury instruction stressing the suggestibility of children. He contends that the instruction was particularly necessary here because it went directly to his defense theory--namely, that the child's mother coerced him into fabricating these accusations against the defendant as a result of a bitter feud between the child's mother and appellant. 23 We decline appellant's invitation to establish as the law of Guam a rule requiring the trial court to give a special child witness instruction when a child testifies in a sexual abuse case. We know of not a single jurisdiction that has adopted the view taken by appellant and the dissent. See Connecticut v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 560 A.2d 426, 433-35 (1989) (overruling case requiring such an instruction and collecting cases). 4 All jurisdictions that have considered the matter either prohibit such an instruction, see, e.g., Lewis v. Indiana, 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1976) (murder conviction), or entrust the matter to the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., California v. Thomas, 20 Cal.3d 457, 470-71, 143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433 (1978). We think the better view is the prevailing view, that a trial judge retains discretion to determine whether the jury should receive a special instruction with respect to the credibility of a young witness, and if so, the nature of that instruction. Massachusetts v. Avery, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 137, 437 N.E.2d 242, 245 (1982). Such a view accords with the federal rule that the trial court has discretion to comment on evidence as long as it makes clear that the jury must ultimately decide all questions of fact for itself. See United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 553 (9th Cir.1989). 24 In this case, the trial judge refused to give a special child witness instruction, relying instead on the general credibility instructions. We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in doing so. 5 Appellant's defense at trial was that the ten-year old child was lying and that his mother put him up to it as part of a vendetta against her brother, the defendant. Appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine the child and to present testimony in support of his theory of the case. He also could have, but did not, present expert testimony on the issue of sexual abuse of children or the susceptibility of children to suggestion. By the close of trial, the issue for the jury was clear: one of the two, the child or the appellant, was not telling the truth. The proffered child witness instruction would have added nothing to the jury's ability to understand and evaluate appellant's defense or to evaluate the credibility of the child vis-a-vis the defendant. The essential point of such an instruction--that the jury should carefully scrutinize the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony--was adequately conveyed to the jury by the general witness credibility instructions. The only possible effect of appellant's proposed instruction would have been to undermine the believability of the child's testimony by denigrat[ing] a child as usually less worthy of belief than an adult. James, 560 A.2d at 435. 6 25 We agree with the dissent that the consequences of an erroneous verdict in a case involving the alleged sexual abuse of a child are grave and that courts must exercise great care in trying to assure that justice is done in every case. We simply disagree that the solution lies in requiring special jury instructions stressing the susceptibility of children to suggestion. Such courtroom weapons as cross-examination, contradictory evidence, evidence that a witness has been influenced by others, and argument are the time-honored methods of educating a jury on issues of credibility. We leave it to the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether the ends of justice would be served by supplementing these methods with an instruction commenting on the credibility of a particular child witness. 26 The decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam is AFFIRMED.