Opinion ID: 626941
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Address All Factors

Text: Rosetta Stone contends that the district court's failure to consider all nine of the traditional likelihood-of-confusion factors was reversible error. We cannot agree. This judicially created list of factors is not intended to be exhaustive or mandatory. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir.1984) (setting forth factors one through seven); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 463-64 (4th Cir.1996) (identifying factors eight and nine). These factors are not always weighted equally, and not all factors are relevant in every case. Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 259-60. In fact, there is no need for each factor to support [the plaintiff's] position on the likelihood of confusion issue. Synergistic Int'l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir.2006). Rather, the confusion factors are only a guidea catalog of various considerations that may be relevant in determining the ultimate statutory question of likelihood of confusion. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir.1992). Accordingly, there is no hard and fast rule that obligates the district court to discuss each non-mandatory factor. This is especially true when the offending use of the plaintiff's trademark is referential or nominative in nature. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike the typical infringement fact-pattern wherein the defendant passe[s] off another's mark as its own and confus[es] the public as to precisely whose goods are being sold, id., a nominative use is one in which the defendant uses the plaintiff's trademark to identify the plaintiff's own goods, see Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir.2010), and makes it clear to consumers that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is the source of the trademarked product or service, Century 21, 425 F.3d at 220; see Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 102 (explaining that a nominative fair use does not create confusion about the source of [the] defendant's product (internal quotation marks omitted)). An example of this type of use would be where an automobile repair shop specializing in foreign vehicles runs an advertisement using the trademarked names of various makes and models to highlight the kind of cars it repairs. See New Kids On The Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306-07 (9th Cir.1992). In the context of a referential or nominative type of use, the application of the traditional multi-factor test is difficult because often many of the factors are either unworkable or not suited or helpful as indicators of confusion in this context. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224; see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir.2002). For example, the first two factors in our listthe similarity of the marks and the strength of the plaintiff's markare clearly of limited value for assessing the kind of use at issue here. Consideration of the similarity of the marks will always suggest the presence of consumer confusionthe mark used will always be identical because, by definition, nominative use involves the use of another's trademark in order to describe the trademark owner's own product. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224. The similarity factor does not account for context and lead[s] to the incorrect conclusion that virtually all nominative uses are confusing. Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801. The strength of the plaintiff's mark is also of limited probative value as to the confusion created by a nominative use. When a defendant creates an association between its goods or services and plaintiff's mark, the strength of the mark is relevant since encroachment upon a strong mark is more likely to cause confusion. See CareFirst of Md., 434 F.3d at 270 (A strong trademark is one that is rarely used by parties other than the owner of the trademark, while a weak trademark is one that is often used by other parties. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, in the nominative use context, the defendant is not passing off its products under the plaintiff's mark but rather is using plaintiff's mark to refer to plaintiff's own products. The strength of the mark is often not informative as to confusion in this context. See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 225. The district court also did not address the two factors relating to the trademarked goodsthe similarity of the parties' goods and services and the quality of the defendant's goods. Because Google offers no products or services under Rosetta Stone's mark, these factors are irrelevant in this context. The final two factors not addressed by the district courtthe similarity of facilities and the similarity of advertisingare likewise of no relevance here. When considering the similarity of facilities, courts are trying to determine if confusion is likely based on how and to whom the respective goods of the parties are sold, and the key question is whether both products [are] sold in the same `channels of trade.' 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:51 [hereinafter McCarthy on Trademarks]; see Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 466 (similarity of distribution channels favored confusion where the parties' products were sold, often side-by-side, in the same mass merchandising outlets). As Google distributes no respective product via the Internet or other outlets, this factor does not aid the likelihood-of-confusion analysis in this case. We hasten to add that we are not adopting a position about the viability of the nominative fair-use doctrine as a defense to trademark infringement or whether this doctrine should formally alter our likelihood-of-confusion test in some way. That question has not been presented here and we leave it for another day. We have merely attempted to highlight the problems inherent in the robotic application of each and every factor in a case involving a referential, nontrademark use. Accordingly, the district court did not commit reversible error in failing to address every factor. In the future, however, a district court opting not to address a given factor or group of factors should provide at least a brief explanation of its reasons.