Opinion ID: 170350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: general verdict of death

Text: Although Fields was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death on two murder counts, the verdict form and instructions did not direct the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to each count and determine whether a death sentence was warranted for either murder. Rather, the jury was directed to weigh all of the aggravators and mitigators in the case at once and reach a single sentencing verdict. Specifically, the verdict form and associated instructions properly directed the jury to find those aggravators applicable to the murder of Charles Chick (substantial planning and premeditation; intentional killing of more than one person; future dangerousness; and victim impact relating to Charles) and those applicable to the murder of Shirley Chick (substantial planning and premeditation; intentional killing of more than one person; future dangerousness; victim impact relating to Shirley; and mental anguish of victim). R. Vol. 1, Doc. 228 at 34-37. The mitigators, which related to the defendant and thus did not vary with the victims, were properly found generally, without reference to each murder. Id. at 37-42. At that point, instead of being told to weigh the aggravators and mitigators on each count and record the resultant sentences on separate forms, the jury was given a general form with these directions regarding the Weighing Process and Imposition of Sentence, respectively: The question you must answer at this stage of your deliberations is whether the proven aggravating factor(s) sufficiently outweigh the proven mitigating factors and information to justify a sentence of death . . . If you unanimously find that the weight of the aggravating factor(s) is sufficient to justify a sentence of death, answer yes below [and] record your verdict on [the general verdict form for death] . . . If you do not unanimously find that a death sentence is justified, answer no below, stop your deliberations [and] sign [the general verdict form for life imprisonment].     This is the last step in your deliberations. If you have made all of the findings necessary to make the defendant eligible for a death sentence and have unanimously concluded that such a sentence is justified and that a sentence of death is therefore appropriate in this case, record your decision by collectively signing, the verdict [form for death] . . . and notify the court that you have reached a decision. If you do not unanimously conclude that sentence of death is justified and therefore must be imposed, sign the verdict for life imprisonment . . . and notify the court that you have reached a decision. Id. at 42-43. The form specifying that a sentence of death shall be imposed on the defendantwithout reference to any particular countwas signed by all of the jurors. Id. at 44. The court's subsequent poll of the jurors, all of whom affirmed the verdict, was likewise unitary. R. Vol. 22 at 3485-86. Pointing up the potential problem here, however, the Judgment and Commitment Order entered by the court reflected imposition of two separate sentences: The defendant is hereby sentenced to Death on each of Counts One and Three of the Indictment. R. Vol. 1, Doc. 237 at 2. Fields argues that it was error to allow the jury to consider a general death sentence in a multi-count case, based on a weighing process incorporating a set of aggravators that combined, and consequently exceeded, those it found applicable to the individual counts for which the death penalty was sought. Fields, however, did not object to the collective weighing process and general verdict below. Indeed, as the government emphasizes, the instructions and verdict form tendered by the defense were functionally the same as those ultimately used by the court. Therefore, because Fields invited any error of which he now complains, we decline to review it. See United States v. Deberry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir.2005) (the invited-error doctrine precludes a party from arguing that the district court erred in adopting a proposition that the party had urged the district court to adopt); United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1310-11 (10th Cir.2005) (stating that because defense counsel had proffered the allegedly erroneous instruction, a challenge thereto is precluded as invited error.) In his reply brief, Fields casts his objection to the general verdict in terms of jury unanimity in order to sidestep application of the invited-error doctrine. According to Fields, his objection is not barred by the invited-error principle because, under United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 247, 166 L.Ed.2d 194 (2006), invited error is a waiver principle, id. at 1314-15, and jury unanimity cannot be waived, id. at 1317. This argument to avoid invited error fails because the purported verdict error here does not implicate jury unanimity. Typically, the problem raised by the use of a general verdict does involve jury unanimity: presented with alternative bases for a verdict and simply asked whether it has unanimously reached that verdict, the jury's affirmative answer does not guarantee that all jurors agreed on the particular basis for it. In the classic example of Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 816, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), the jury found a continuing criminal enterprise based on the commission of three predicate crimes, but since more than three such crimes were alleged and the jury was not directed to specify which predicate crimes were the operative ones, there was no way of knowing whether it unanimously agreed on the same three. But that is not the type of purported error that occurred here. The jury was not presented with alternative routes to the death penalty; it was given a single basis for imposing a death sentencethe jury had to unanimously find that the aggravators (themselves unanimously found) collectively outweighed the mitigators. Thus, we know what the basis for the jury's verdict was and that it was unanimous. [10] In sum, because defense counsel induced any error by seeking to structure the verdict in precisely this improper way, we decline to review it.