Opinion ID: 773252
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: COGSA and the Carmack Amendment

Text: 20 COGSA is not a proper basis for Mill's joint and several liablity. By its express terms, COGSA only covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to [the ship] to the time when they are discharged from the ship. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (defining carriage of goods); see also id. § 1300 (COGSA covers contract[s] for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States, in foreign trade . . . .). Mill's negligence in failing to ensure that the reefer was set at the proper temperature occurred exclusively on land, while the humulin was being transported from Project Hope's Winchester warehouse to the Norfolk Terminal. Therefore, Mill's negligence was plainly outside COGSA's reach. 5 21 The Carmack Amendment, however, does govern Mill's negligence. 6 In pertinent part, the Carmack Amendment provides: [A] carrier and any other carrier that deliver[] the property and [are] providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under [49 U.S.C. § 13501 are] liable to the person entitled to recover under the . . . bill of lading. The liability imposed . . . is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the delivering carrier, or (C) another carrier over whose line or route the property is transported in the United States . . . . 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). 22 The Carmack Amendment's reach is determined by reference to 49 U.S.C. § 13501, the provision of the Interstate Commerce Act that now establishes the regulatory jurisdiction of the U.S. Surface Transportation Board (formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission) with respect to the transportation by motor carrier of passengers and property. In relevant part, § 13501 extends the reach of the Carmack Amendment to motor carrier transportation of property: 23
24 (A) a State and a place in another State; [or] 25 (E) the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States; . . . . 26 Where multiple carriers are responsible for different legs of a generally continuous shipment, whether either § 13501(1)(A) or (E) is satisfied to trigger application of the Carmack Amendment is determined by reference to the intended final destination of the shipment as that intent existed when the shipment commenced. See Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 799 F.2d 697, 699 (11th Cir. 1986) (The nature of a shipment is not determined by a mechanical inspection of the bill of lading nor by when and to whom title passes but rather by the essential character of the commerce, reflected by the intention formed prior to shipment, pursuant to which property is carried to a selected destination by a continuous or unified movement. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); cf. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. ICC, 565 F.2d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the reach of Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction). This intent fixes the character of the shipment for all the legs of the transport within the United States. See New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 131 (1953) (citing Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 168 (1928)); Greenwald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 159, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 27 Thus, if the final intended destination at the time the shipment begins is another state, the Carmack Amendment applies throughout the shipment, even as to a carrier that is only responsible for an intrastate leg of the shipment. See, e.g., Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 528 F.2d 1042, 1044 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing challenge to ICC ruling and stating [i]t is elemental that a carrier is engaged in interstate commerce when transporting goods either originating in transit from beyond Texas or ultimately bound for destinations beyond Texas, even though the route of the particular carrier is wholly within one state); Martinez v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 283 F. Supp. 514, 530-31 (D. Idaho 1968); cf. Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1559-60 (5th Cir. 1989) (Determining the existence of the requisite `fixed and persisting' intent to move goods in interstate commerce turns in significant part on the factual context of each case.); Burlington N. Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 719 F.2d 304, 310 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting intent manifested . . . at the time of shipment fixes interstate or intrastate character of shipment and finding intent was for intrastate shipment). Similarly, if the final intended destination at the time the shipment begins is a foreign nation, the Carmack Amendment applies throughout the entire portion of the shipment taking place within the United States, including intrastate legs of the shipment. See Swift Textiles, 799 F.2d at 698-700; cf. United States v. Erie R.R., 280 U.S. 98, 102 (1929) ([The character of a shipment] is not affected by the fact that the transaction is initiated or completed under a local bill of lading which is wholly intrastate . . . .); Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111, 126 (1913); Long Beach Banana Dist., Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 407 F.2d 1173, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1969). 28 Here, Project Hope's intention that the humulin travel in foreign commerce was fixed before Mill transported the humulin from Project Hope's Winchester warehouse to the Norfolk Terminal. As a result § 13501(1)(E) is satisfied, and the Carmack Amendment governs Mill's liability even though Mill's role in the humulin's shipment was restricted exclusively to Virginia. 29 Having concluded that the Carmack Amendment controls Mill's liability, we must consider whether the district court's imposition of the joint and several award was permissible under the Carmack Amendment. To answer this question, we look to the federal common law of damages, which informs the propriety of damage remedies under the Carmack Amendment. 7 See, e.g., Hector Martinez & Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1979) ([The Carmack Amendment] incorporates common law principles for damages.); J & H Flyer Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 316 F.2d 203, 205 (2d Cir. 1963); see also Camar Corp. v. Preston Trucking Co., 221 F.3d 271, 277 (1st Cir. 2000); F.J. McCarty Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 428 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1970). 30 Doing so, we find that the district court's imposition of joint and several liability in this case was consistent with the federal common law of damages and, therefore, permissible under the Carmack Amendment. The district court imposed joint and several liability only after concluding that--as between Blue Ocean and Mill--the record d[id] not permit a fair allocation of comparative fault. Project Hope, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 298. Where a fair allocation of liability cannot be made among multiple tortfeasors, the federal common law permits imposition of joint and several liability. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 879 (1979) (If the tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their conduct is concurring or consecutive.); W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 52, at 347-48 (5th ed. 1984) (Single Indivisible Result: Certain results, by their very nature, are obviously incapable of any reasonable or practical division and . . . [n]o ingenuity can suggest anything more than a purely arbitrary apportionment of such harm. Where two or more causes combine to produce [a single loss], each may be a substantial factor in bringing about the loss, and if so, each is charged with all of it.); cf. Gordon H. Mooney, Ltd. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 616 F.2d 619, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that, under the Carmack Amendment, comparative fault is the appropriate method for assigning liability among joint tortfeasors where fault is assignable). 31 Because the district court found that liability could not be fairly apportioned--a factual conclusion that is not challenged by Mill in this appeal--and because the common law of damages allows resort to joint and several liability in such instances, we hold that the district court's joint and several award against Mill was proper under the Carmack Amendment.