Opinion ID: 1985791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues on Appeal and Governing Legal Principles.

Text: This case requires the court to interpret the meaning of retained by the employer in Iowa Code section 85.39. Based on our interpretation of this language, we must then consider whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the industrial commissioner's determination that, pursuant to section 85.39, Harker is entitled to an IME at IPB's expense. In reviewing the commissioner's interpretation of the statutes governing the agency, we defer to the expertise of the agency, but reserve for ourselves the final interpretation of the law. Second Injury Fund v. Bergeson, 526 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Iowa 1995); accord Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1995) (The proper interpretation of the workers' compensation statute is a question of law for this court.). Well-established rules govern our interpretation of statutes: When interpreting a statute, our ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. We seek a reasonable interpretation that will best effect the purpose of the statute and avoid an absurd result. We consider all portions of the statute together, without attributing undue importance to any single or isolated portion. John Deere Dubuque Works v. Weyant, 442 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa 1989) (citations omitted). To ascertain legislative intent, we look to what the legislature said. We do not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart from the words used in the statute. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996). Absent legislative definition or a particular and appropriate meaning in law, we give words their plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1996). The court applies the rules of statutory construction only when the terms of the statute are ambiguous. See William C. Mitchell, Ltd. v. Brown, 576 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Iowa 1998). A statute is ambiguous if reasonable persons could disagree as to its meaning. Ambiguity may arise in two ways: (1) from the meaning of particular words; or (2) from the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined. Id. (quoting Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995)). In those cases where ambiguity is found, [t]o resolve ambiguity and ultimately determine legislative intent [the court] consider[s] (1) the language of the statute; (2) the objects sought to be accomplished; (3) the evils sought to be remedied; and (4) a reasonable construction that will effectuate the statute's purpose rather than one that will defeat it. Voss v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Green, 470 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1991)). [A] statute should be accorded a logical, sensible construction which gives harmonious meaning to related sections and accomplishes the legislative purpose. McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1980). The primary purpose of the workers' compensation statute is to benefit the worker and his or her dependents, insofar as statutory requirements permit. Id. Thus, the court liberally construe[s] workers' compensation statutes in favor of the worker. Ewing, 592 N.W.2d at 691.