Opinion ID: 584190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: success or failure of plaintiff-appellant's prima facie case

Text: In order to make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show: (1) that she is a member of a protected class under Title VII; (2) that she was a candidate for tenure and was qualified under Clark University standards, practices or customs; (3) that despite her qualifications she was rejected; and (4) that tenure positions in the Department of Sociology at Clark University were open at the time plaintiff was denied tenure, in the sense that others were granted tenure in the department during a period relatively near to the time plaintiff was denied tenure. See, e.g., Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 648 F.2d 61, 62 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098, 102 S.Ct. 671, 70 L.Ed.2d 639 (1981). The only contested element of plaintiff's prima facie case is the second element--her qualifications. To pass this portion of the prima facie test, plaintiff need only show that [s]he was sufficiently qualified to be among those persons from whom a selection, to some extent discretionary, would be made. That is, [s]he need not show only that h[er] qualifications were at least sufficient to place h[er] in the middle group of tenure candidates as to whom a decision granting tenure and a decision denying tenure could be justified as a reasonable exercise of discretion by the tenure-decision making body. Banerjee, 648 F.2d at 63, quoting Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F.Supp. 1148, 1155-56 (D.Mass.1980). In concluding that Dr. Fields had not fulfilled the requirements of the second element of her prima facie showing, the court below stated: Having weighed the evidence presented by plaintiff in this case, I find that she has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that she was sufficiently qualified to place her in the middle group of tenure candidates in the sociology department at Clark University.... plaintiff was denied tenure by unanimous vote at each stage in the tenure review process, and failed to receive support from other men and women on the Clark faculty. Plaintiff's own testimony established that she had difficulties teaching some of the large courses to which she was assigned, and much of plaintiff's testimony was in the form of argument as opposed to recitation of fact. Defendant has introduced student evaluations and testimony from the plaintiff and the defense witnesses showing that her teaching was criticized by several of her students and that the chair of her department told her on numerous occasions that he was receiving complaints from her students. Fields, No. 80-1011-K, slip op. at 9-10. In reviewing a university's tenure decision, neither the trial court nor the appellate court may simply speculate that [the] plaintiff may have been denied tenure for reasons of [gender].... Inevitably, some tenure decisions ... will be very close.... Courts have no license to resolve such disputes except where there is evidence from which to conclude that an illicit motive was at work. Kumar v. Board of Trustees, Univ. of Mass., 774 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.1985) (Campbell, C.J., concurring). [T]enure decisions are by their nature judgmental and subjective. In close cases reasonable people can differ. It is the choice of the university, however, not of the court, that is called for in a faculty member's contract. Id. at 15. Moreover, [i]n the very complex and nuanced environment of university tenure decisions, a discrimination case with no 'smoking gun' evidence can be excruciatingly close for the district court. Id. at 21 (Coffin, J., dissenting). 1 We quote extensively from Kumar to emphasize the high degree of deference due to both the University's tenure decision and the District Court's Opinion. While we might be suspicious of Defendant-Appellee's motives, thorough review of the record provides no opportunity for this Court to find that the District Court's decision was clearly erroneous. 3