Opinion ID: 1737862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim I. CCP Jury Instruction

Text: In his first claim, Brown argues that his conviction must be reversed because the jury instruction given as to the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) was unconstitutionally vague. Brown points out that, in the direct appeal in this case, this Court rejected Brown's constitutionality argument on the basis that Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), did not apply to Florida and to this aggravating factor. See Brown, 565 So.2d at 308. Brown also notes that, subsequent to Brown, the United States Supreme Court in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), and Hodges v. Florida, 506 U.S. 803, 113 S.Ct. 33, 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992), undercut the efficacy of this Court's reasoning in the Brown decision. Although Brown does not refer to it in the present appeal, Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), was a decision subsequent to Brown in which we discussed Brown and acknowledged that this Court's opinion as to the inapplicability of Maynard to CCP instructions had been discredited in Espinosa  and undercut by Hodges.  Jackson, 648 So.2d at 88. In Jackson, we held that: Florida's standard CCP jury instruction suffers the same constitutional infirmity as the HAC-type instructions which the United States Supreme Court found lacking in Espinosa, Maynard, and [ Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980)]. 648 So.2d at 90. However, we then held: Claims that the instruction on the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator is unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless a specific objection is made at trial and pursued on appeal. James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 & n. 3 (Fla.1993). 648 So.2d at 90. We followed Jackson with Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1994), in which we held in respect to Jackson constitutional error as to the CCP instruction: To preserve the error for appellate review, it is necessary both to make a specific objection or request an alternative instruction at trial, and to raise the issue on appeal. Walls, 641 So.2d at 387. In Pope v. State, 702 So.2d 221 (Fla.1997), we again addressed the preservation issue and held: However, we have made it clear that claims that the CCP instruction is unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless a specific objection is made at trial and pursued on appeal. The objection at trial must attack the instruction itself, either by submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as worded. 702 So.2d at 223-24. Since our decision in Brown's direct appeal on this issue was reached on the basis of our holding that Maynard did not apply, we did not reach the issue of preservation of the claim at trial. We have in this appeal reviewed the trial record to determine whether the issue was preserved by an objection to the instruction as worded or by a request for a limiting instruction. We find that defense counsel's only objections to the CCP instruction were presented at the jury instruction conference and the allocution hearing: I object to that one. There is no basis in the evidence before the Court. It is insufficient evidence to border [sic] on the instruction on that. Later, at the allocution hearing before the court prior to sentencing, defense counsel argued against the application of the CCP aggravator as follows: The case law is quite clear that aside from legal premeditation, the proof that a capital felony is committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification requires proof of much greater weight than does the mere premeditation required to prove a first degree murder case.... I do not believe that the evidence is weighty enough or convincing enough to show that this capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditate[d] manner within the meaning of the aggravating circumstance in the statute. Defense counsel neither submitted a limiting instruction nor specifically objected that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, as we required in Pope. Accordingly, we find that defense counsel's objection did not preserve this issue for appellate review in accord with Jackson, Walls, and Pope.