Opinion ID: 1890458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Serious Bodily Injury

Text: The appellant claims on appeal that the government failed to prove at trial that the victim suffered serious bodily injury, an essential element of aggravated assault. See D.C.Code § 22-404.01. In closing argument at trial, however, defense counsel stated that [w]e're not on trial here to determine whether Ms. Arrington suffered significant permanent injuries. The government's proven that beyond a reasonable doubt. We'll concede that. The appellant is therefore estopped from questioning the sufficiency of the evidence of the complainant's injuries to constitute serious bodily injury on appeal. See Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C.1993) (defendant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal). Appellant's trial concession was unremarkable as the government clearly produced sufficient evidence at trial to sustain a finding of serious bodily injury. In Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145 (D.C.1999), we defined serious bodily injury for purposes of aggravated assault as bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. Id. at 149-50. Evidence at trial showed that the victim was stabbed multiple times on both arms and in the vagina. The government introduced medical records showing that the wounds resulted in a four-day hospitalization, and a total of seventy-two stitches. The complainant testified that the wounds caused her a great deal of ongoing pain, [8] and she showed the scars on her arms to the jury. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that she suffered serious bodily injury because she experienced extreme physical pain and obvious disfigurement. See also Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 918 (D.C.2000) (reasonable jury could infer from the nature of injuries and the victim's reaction to them that the injuries caused extreme pain). The appellant claims that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the elements of serious bodily injury also requires reversal. Because defense counsel did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we review for plain error. See Super. Ct.Crim. R. 52(b); ( Linwood E. ) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1088 (D.C.1978). As a general rule, since our holding in Nixon, the need to instruct the jury on the definition of serious bodily injury should be obvious to the trial court. In this case, however, where the point was conceded by defense counsel in closing argument, the error was not obvious; nor was the appellant substantially prejudiced thereby, nor were the fairness and integrity of the trial undermined by the lack of instruction where the evidence of serious bodily injury was clear. [9] See Riddick v. United States, 806 A.2d 631, 639 (D.C.2002) (no plain error where trial court did not instruct on the elements of serious bodily injury, but where the government nevertheless had produced ample evidence of the seriousness of the injuries in question). For the foregoing reasons, the appellant's conviction is Affirmed.