Opinion ID: 796815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Claim

Text: 32 The plaintiff alleges an alternative claim for relief. If he fails to establish that he is a seaman under the Jones Act, then, he argues, he is a harbor worker entitled to relief under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. Pursuant to § 905(a), an employee may not recover in tort for the negligence of his employer ; rather, he is entitled to statutory payments. However, § 905(b) allows an employee to recover for the negligence of a vessel owner: In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel . . . . 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). 33 Here, the defendant is both the employer and the vessel owner, thus a case such as this is commonly referred to as a dual-capacity suit. When the vessel owner and the employer are the same entity, an employee may recover for negligence if the negligence was that of the employer acting in its capacity as a vessel owner, not as an employer. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 531 n. 6, 532, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983). 4 The question here is whether Traylor Brothers' alleged negligence with respect to the ramp-float-skiff system of entry was as vessel owner or as employer. We conclude that there is a genuine issue of material facts as to whether the duty owed to Scheuring belonged to Traylor Brothers as the vessel owner. 34 The Supreme Court has indicated that Congress left to the courts the task of defining the vessel owner's duty of care. See Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92, 97-98, 114 S.Ct. 2057, 129 L.Ed.2d 78 (1994); Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 165-66, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). In Scindia, the Court first considered the duties a vessel owner owed to an injured longshore worker, which in a subsequent case were divided into three categories: 35 The first, which courts have come to call the turnover duty, relates to the condition of the ship upon the commencement of stevedoring operations. The second duty, applicable once stevedoring operations have begun, provides that a shipowner must exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries to longshoremen in areas that remain under the active control of the vessel. The third duty, called the duty to intervene, concerns the vessel's obligations with regard to cargo operations in areas under the principal control of the independent stevedore. 36 Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98, 114 S.Ct. 2057 (quoting Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167-68, 101 S.Ct. 1614) (citations omitted). 5 The present case concerns the turnover duty, of which there are two discrete duties—the duty of safe condition and the duty to warn. Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enterprises, 42 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir.1994); Bjaranson v. Botelho Shipping Corp., Manila, 873 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1989). For our purposes, we are most concerned with the duty of the owner to turn over the vessel in safe condition. In order to fulfill this duty: 37 A vessel must exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to turn over the ship and its equipment and appliances in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedoring contractor, mindful of the dangers he should reasonably expect to encounter, arising from the hazards of the ship's service or otherwise, will be able by the exercise of ordinary care to carry on cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property. 38 Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98, 114 S.Ct. 2057 (quoting Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 416-17 n. 18, 89 S.Ct. 1144, 22 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969)). 6 In light of this duty to turn over the vessel in safe condition, the present case poses two issues. The first issue is whether the ramp is part of the William F's equipment and appliances. Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98, 114 S.Ct. 2057. The second issue is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Traylor Brothers acted reasonably in fulfilling its turnover duty. 39 In rejecting Scheuring's LHWCA claim, the district court analogized the ramp to a dock or pier. Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., No. CV 03-06613-RZ, slip op. at 9 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2004). In opposition, the plaintiff asks us to view the ramp as a gangway. This distinction is critical since a gangway constitutes an appliance of a vessel but a dock or pier does not. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (holding that a gangway is the dividing line between admiralty and state jurisdiction); see also Romero Reyes v. Marine Enterprises, Inc. 494 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir.1974) (noting that the authorities are virtually unanimous that maritime liability encompasses the gangway). There is a genuine issue of material fact whether the ramp at issue in the present case is more like a gangway than a dock or pier. 40 In order to board the barge, the plaintiff and the other individuals working aboard the William F had to use the ramp. There were no other means of embarking. Some of our sister circuits have held that a gangway or ramp which is necessarily used for embarking and disembarking becomes a basic appurtenance of the vessel. Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp., 655 F.2d 526, 528 (3d Cir.1981); see also Romero Reyes, 494 F.2d at 869 (holding that the apparatus which was the regular means of boarding and leaving the vessel was included in the seaworthiness warranty). Even if the ramp could not be fairly characterized as a gangway, the turnover duty, at a minimum, requires a vessel to provide a safe means of access. See Gay v. Barge 266, 915 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1990); Romero Reyes, 494 F.2d at 869; cf. Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. Normannia, 657 F.2d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the vessel owner had a responsibility to correct the positioning of the gangway). 7 The only difference between the ramp used by the plaintiff here and a gangway is that the ramp was not attached to the barge. The fact that the ramp did not extend to the barge, which presumably would have made it safer, should not preclude Scheuring's lawsuit. Such logic would allow a barge owner to avoid liability by providing no means of access and effectively requiring harbor workers to swim to the barge. Accordingly, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact involving the characterization of the ramp at issue here. 41 The second issue before us concerns whether Traylor Brothers discharged its turnover duty by providing the ramp-float-skiff means of access. The vessel owner has only to exercise ordinary care in light of the fact that the operation will be conducted by an expert and experienced stevedoring contractor, mindful of the dangers he should reasonably expect to encounter. Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98, 114 S.Ct. 2057. This implies that certain dangers that may be hazardous to unskilled persons need not be remedied if an expert and experienced stevedore could safely work around them. Bjaranson v. Botelho Shipping Corp., Manila, 873 F.2d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir.1989). But, any hazardous condition must not constitute an unreasonably dangerous work environment to experienced longshoremen exercising reasonable care. Martinez v. Korea Shipping Corp., 903 F.2d 606, 610 (9th Cir.1990). 42 We have previously affirmed grants of summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to act as an expert and experienced stevedore. In Bjaranson, we held that a bare boat charterer did not breach the duty of safe condition where an expert and experienced stevedore could have safely conducted the cargo operation. 873 F.2d at 1208. Similarly, in Ludwig v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., 941 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam), we held that the plaintiff could have avoided the hazardous situation, and therefore, the plaintiff failed to show that he acted as an expert and experienced stevedore. 43 But, the question whether a defendant acted reasonably is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact. Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir.1994); Martinez, 903 F.2d at 609. In Thomas, we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant vessel owner, finding a material issue of fact as to the ultimate issue of unreasonable dangerousness. In that case, the plaintiff fell through a hatch opening which was completely uncovered and unguarded. 42 F.3d at 1268. Similarly, in Martinez, we reversed a summary judgment order in favor of the vessel owner reasoning that whether an unguarded ladder opening on a lashing platform was unreasonably dangerous to longshore workers was a question of fact for the jury. 903 F.2d at 609. 44 Here, Scheuring has established that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to the ramp's status and Traylor Brothers' exercise of its turnover duty. Since these issues should have gone to a jury, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the LHWCA claim. 45 REVERSED AND REMANDED.