Opinion ID: 2973479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficiency-of-Evidence Claim

Text: George argues that his conviction for passing counterfeit bills is not supported by substantial evidence. When reviewing an insufficiency-of-the evidence claim, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). George has not overcome this deferential standard. Numerous counterfeit $50 bills were found in the tills of several business establishments in the Lima, Ohio area in the fall of 2002. George argues that insufficient evidence existed to identify him as the individual who was paying with the counterfeit bills. This argument is unpersuasive. The record includes testimony from numerous witnesses identifying George as the person passing counterfeit money, either through direct eyewitness testimony or obvious circumstantial inference. For example, Lance Oleviri, a convenience store employee, testified that he remembered George -7- Nos. 04-3633, 04-3722 United States v. Katuramu paying for merchandise with an odd-looking $50 bill on the evening before counterfeit $50 bills were found in the store till. Stacy Johnson, another employee of the same store, testified that she remembered George attempting to pay with a $50 bill that “didn’t look right” on the very next day, which “looked like” the counterfeit bills that had been found in the store safe. Jung Owehta, an employee of another store, remembered George paying for merchandise with a $50 bill around the time that counterfeit bills were discovered in the store’s bank deposit, although she could not provide details about the transaction, and her testimony about the time frame of the transaction appears to be inconsistent with other witnesses. Randy Thatcher, the director of a pharmacy in Lima, testified that one of his employees told him that George had attempted to pay with a counterfeit $50 bill; while it does not appear that Thatcher actually witnessed George attempting to pay with the counterfeit bill, Thatcher testified that he examined the counterfeit bill in question and that he detained George at the store while awaiting local law enforcement, who took George into custody. The direct evidence provided by these witnesses’ testimony is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that George passed counterfeit bills. Additionally, circumstantial evidence alone can satisfy this court’s standard of review for sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, and the evidence need not remove every hypothesis except that of guilt. United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 1994). Although these witnesses may have had various levels of credibility, and although their testimony demonstrates varying degrees of detail, first-hand knowledge, and consistency, this court “do[es] not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury” in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a -8- Nos. 04-3633, 04-3722 United States v. Katuramu conviction. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1440 (6th Cir. 1994)). George also argues that there was insufficient evidence of mens rea. George correctly asserts that the crime with which he was charged requires him to have an intent to defraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 472. He argues that none of the witnesses could offer evidence that he knew any of his money was counterfeit. We reject this argument as well. The record contains testimony describing George’s repeated attempts to pass counterfeit $50 bills. It is also obvious that at least one of these attempts, namely, the incident at the pharmacy leading to his arrest, occurred after he had been explicitly warned by a convenience store employee that he was in possession of counterfeit money. Based on this evidence, the jury could have easily inferred that George had knowledge of the counterfeit nature of the money when he used it to complete transactions. Such circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the jury conviction. See Peters, 15 F.3d at 544.