Opinion ID: 1949728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Uncertain Impact of the Montana Proceedings

Text: The order of the Virginia Circuit Court described the proceedings in Montana: The Commission [on Character and Fitness] found, and the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed upon appeal, that the Respondent had displayed a long history of unlawful and criminal conduct and abuse of legal process. This recitation of procedural history by the Circuit Court is not a finding of misconduct, however. Notification of the decision in Montana may have precipitated the inquiries in Virginia and the District of Columbia, but Montana was not conducting disciplinary proceedings and, for reasons we will explain, the ruling there does not provide a basis for reciprocal discipline. In our original discipline proceedings, misconduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Anderson, 778 A.2d 330, 335 (D.C.2001); In re Williams, 464 A.2d 115, 119 (D.C. 1983) (The burden of proving the [disciplinary] charges rests with Bar Counsel and factual findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.). The proceedings in Montana did not involve the imposition of discipline, however, and the burdens were reversed. The Supreme Court of Montana explained that Ditton has failed to meet his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he is fit to perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney, and that he is possessed of good moral character and general fitness to practice law in the State of Montana. See Mont. Rules of Proc. of the Comm. on Character and Fitness, § 4(a) (Every applicant for the Montana Bar Examination shall be of good moral character and fitness. The applicant shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is possessed of good moral character and fitness.); Petition of Steele, 262 Mont. 481, 865 P.2d 285, 289 (1993) (The rules for admission to the State Bar of Montana provide that the burden of proof is on the applicant to demonstrate good moral character and general fitness to practice....). We encountered a comparable situation in In re Maxwell, 798 A.2d 525 (D.C.2002), where the Board recommended that we impose reciprocal discipline greater than that imposed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. Maxwell had consented to discipline in Maryland; the parties had not reached any relevant stipulations of fact, nor had the Maryland court made any such findings. Id. at 525-26. The underlying facts had been well-developed in a bench trial held in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, but we concluded that we could not accept the Board's recommendation of increased discipline because to do so would give preclusive effect to factual findings made in a non-disciplinary proceeding and present grave questions about the adequacy of the notice and opportunity to be heard that Maxwell received. Id. at 529. It cannot fairly be said that in his own civil suit for declaratory relief, even coupled with a counterclaim alleging his wrongdoing as a lawyer, Maxwell was on notice that conclusions could one day be drawnirrebuttablyfrom that record as to what discipline to impose for ethical breaches arising from the transaction. Id. at 530. Moreover, the Superior Court judge had applied a preponderance standard when making his findings. Accepting the Board's recommendation on this record would thus come dangerously close to disciplining Maxwell for misconduct... on the basis of facts proven only by a preponderance of the evidence, contrary to this jurisdiction's standard in original discipline proceedings. Id. We therefore return[ed] the matter to the Board for reconsideration whether to recommend identical reciprocal discipline or to direct further proceedings under D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(g)(2) or (3). [5] Id. at 526. [6] In this case, the Board relied to some extent upon the Montana proceedings when it added a recommendation that we impose a fitness requirement. It explained that [t]he record in [the Virginia] proceeding including the rejection of admission to the Montana Bar casts doubt on Respondent's mental and emotion[al] fitness generally, and raises very real questions concerning current fitness for the practice of law. We certainly agree that the opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana raises these concerns, but, as we have seen, it does not provide a basis for imposing either reciprocal or original discipline. Perhaps the Board had access to the evidence presented in Montana, but neither it nor a Hearing Committee has made independent findings by clear and convincing evidence related to respondent's mental and emotional fitness.