Opinion ID: 864856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MPC's Counterclaim for Injunctive Relief

Text: ¶9. In 1964, MPC was granted an easement by the previous owner of Hanson's property to construct, operate and maintain electric lines and all telegraph and telephone lines, towers, poles, wires, and appliances and equipment necessary or convenient in connection therewith from time to time and counterpoise wire and other counterpoise conductors, upon, over, under and across a strip of land.... The easement also provides all the rights and privileges necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment or use thereof for the purpose above described. 5 ¶10. MPC cites McDonald v. Mississippi Power Co., 732 So. 2d 893 (Miss. 1999), a case that it had been previously involved in, for support of its right to use its existing easements to install and utilize fiber optic cables and to enter into third-party leases of the fiber optic lines. The easement in McDonald provides identical language as the easement at hand. McDonald, 732 So. 2d at 895. ¶11. In McDonald, this Court stated: Under the above easement, MPC has the right to maintain a telephone line for use in connection with providing electrical service. The clear intent of the easement was to grant MPC the right to install and maintain telephone lines to be used in connection with the providing of electrical service. A fiber optics cable is nothing more than a technologically advanced or new type of telephone line. The chancellor was correct in holding that the granting clause of the above easement gives MPC the right to maintain a fiber optics cable. Id. at 897. ¶12. However, this Court in McDonald ultimately held that MPC's rights, and those of its successors and assigns are limited by the language of the easements in question, the plain languages of which limits the use of telephone lines to be in connection with providing electrical services. Id. at 898. ¶13. MPC argues that the trial court erred by not addressing its counter-claim despite dismissing Hanson's lawsuit with prejudice. MPC’s primary concern on appeal and at trial with Hanson’s dismissal is that Hanson’s son and transferee, David Hanson, will now be able to pursue further litigation against them on the same issues raised in these proceedings filed and dismissed by Hanson. However, the record reflects that the trial court specially made a determination of MPC’s rights. Therefore, we find that MPC has received an adjudication of its rights subject to those rights being consistent with this Court’s holding in McDonald. 6 ¶14. The trial court determined that M.R.C.P. 25© and res judicata operate to alleviate the concerns raised by MPC regarding Hanson’s successor in interest. ¶15. M.R.C.P. 25© states, in its comments, that if the property is transferred the judgment is binding on the successor in interest, even if not named at the time of the judgment. M.R.C.P. 25© provides: In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party... The comments to M.R.C.P. 25© further state in pertinent part: The most significant feature of Rule 25© is that it does not require that any action be taken after an interest has been transferred; the action may be continued by or against the original party and the judgment will be binding on his successor in interest even though he is not named... ¶16. We find MPC's argument to be without merit.