Opinion ID: 2242138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Additional Contentions

Text: Following separate trials, Williams was sentenced to death, and Ward was sentenced to a prison term of natural life. Defendant contends that his sentence was unreasonably disparate to the sentence of Ward. Comparative proportionality review in death penalty cases is not required by the United States Constitution and is not a feature of the Illinois death penalty statute. Nonetheless, this court has the constitutional duty to determine whether a death sentence has been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, or is unduly severe, considering the circumstances of the offense and the character and rehabilitative prospects of the defendant. To guarantee the individualized sentencing that the eighth amendment requires, this court has compared a defendant's death sentence to the sentence of a codefendant or an accomplice. This court has focused on the nature of the offense, each individual's relative involvement, his character and background, and his criminal record and potential for rehabilitation. People v. Easley, 192 Ill.2d 307, 345, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975 (2000); People v. Bean, 137 Ill.2d 65, 133-35, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258 (1990). In this case, defendant argues that Ward is at least as culpable as defendant, if not more so. Defendant points to Rozema's testimony at Ward's trial. According to Rozema, Ward confessed that he shot Debra in the head and stabbed Samantha, and Williams cut Elijah out of Debra's stomach. In contrast, at defendant's trial, the State presented no evidence that defendant inflicted any injuries upon Debra or Samantha. According to defendant, Ward is more culpable because he killed two of the three victims. Also, defendant notes that Ward generally had a significant criminal record. We cannot accept this contention. We view defendant's participation in these crimes as not significantly less than that of Ward. As the State notes, defendant participated in a planned killing and a kidnapping that resulted in the murder of a pregnant mother and her two children. Defendant personally killed Joshua and helped dump the child in an alley to die. Although Ward's criminal record may be quantitatively more severe than defendant's, that is only one factor in our evaluation. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill.2d 453, 480, 221 Ill.Dec. 419, 675 N.E.2d 614 (1996). Further, that defendant and Williams each received a death sentence persuades us that defendant's sentence was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Byron, 164 Ill.2d at 303, 207 Ill.Dec. 453, 647 N.E.2d 946. We conclude that defendant's death sentence was not unreasonably disparate to Ward's natural life prison sentence.
Defendant lastly contends that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional. U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11. Defendant argues that current procedural safeguards are inadequate to minimize the risk that the death penalty will be applied to innocent persons, and because it is inevitable that innocent people will be executed. This court has repeatedly rejected these arguments. Kirchner, 194 Ill.2d at 558-59, 252 Ill.Dec. 520, 743 N.E.2d 94; People v. Hall, 194 Ill.2d 305, 357-58, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (2000); People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179, 211-20, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824 (1998). Defendant has not persuaded us to overturn these decisions. We note the Chief Justice's belief that this court has inflicted harm on the integrity of the criminal justice system by refusing to acknowledge deficiencies so egregious that a Republican governor was forced to step in and suspend the implementation of every sentence of death we approved. 205 Ill.2d at 137-38, 275 Ill. Dec. at 443, 792 N.E.2d at 1216 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Once again, the Chief Justice has impugned the integrity of this court. See, e.g., People v. Simpson, 204 Ill.2d 536, 579, 275 Ill.Dec. 34, 792 N.E.2d 265 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (accusing this court of having found ways to uphold convictions in capital cases); People v. Simms, 192 Ill.2d 348, 432, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092 (2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (stating that our court no longer felt any compunction about illegally dismissing a death row inmate's appeal and having him summarily put to death); Bull, 185 Ill.2d at 221-22, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824 (Miller, J., specially concurring) (collecting statements). The Chief Justice's statement regarding the Governor's motives for imposing the moratorium lacks factual support. The Governor has in no way publicly stated that the moratorium was based on any action or omission of this court. Press Release, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (George H. Ryan, Governor) Jan. 31, 2001. Further, the Chief Justice's statement also lacks legal support. In People v. Hickey, 204 Ill.2d 585, 624, 275 Ill.Dec. 1, 792 N.E.2d 232 (2001), this court recently acknowledged the Governor's moratorium on future executions: While we certainly are aware of those cases in which a defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death, but later was exonerated and released from prison, we do not infer from these cases that the entire system has collapsed. The Governor declared a moratorium on future executions after several death row defendants were exonerated. We do not infer from the moratorium, however, that every capital trial has been unreliable and that all appellate review has been haphazard. Once again, we must remind the Chief Justice that honorable people disagree over whether this state should have a death penalty. His deeply held view against the death penalty does not give him license to misstate the facts so as to impugn the integrity of this court. See People v. Simpson, 204 Ill.2d at 579, 275 Ill.Dec. 34, 792 N.E.2d 265 (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).