Opinion ID: 1849099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Ex Post Facto Considerations

Text: ś 115. The alleged crime for which Conley was convicted occurred on May 22, 1994. At this time two sentencing options were available under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21: death or life in prison. That provision was amended in July, 1994, to allow the option of life in prison without parole. ś 116. Instructions DS-12 and DS-13 provide that the jury should consider both life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and life in prison without the possibility of parole. The court denied DS-13 and amended DS-12 to exclude the life with the possibility of parole option. Conley asserts that, as a result, the jury was not properly instructed. The State rebuts that it would have been improper for the court to allow an instruction informing the jury of parole options. ś 117. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to sentence in this case; so the trial court sentenced Conley to life without parole, a punishment that was not permitted under the statute in effect when the crime was committed. Thus, Conley alleges an ex post facto problem with his sentence. ś 118. An ex post facto clause violation may be avoided by charging and sentencing the defendant according to the statute applicable at the time of his offense. Johnston v. State, 618 So.2d 90, 94 (Miss.1993); Porter v. State, 749 So.2d 250, 260 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Such was not accomplished in this case. ś 119. In Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So.2d 654, 660 (Miss.2000), this Court examined the United States Supreme Court's holdings regarding the ex post facto clause: The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Ex Post Facto clause is aimed at laws that `retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). The United States Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated.... Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937). A statute may violate the Ex Post Facto clause even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence ... [or where it] substantially alters the consequences attached to a crime already completed, and therefore changes `the quantum of punishment.' Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 32-33 (citation omitted) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977)). Applying this analysis to the case at bar, one could, at first glance, conclude that Conley's rights have been violated. Offering his jury the sentencing option of life without the possibility of parole, which was unavailable at the time his crime was consummated, works to change the quantum of punishment against Conley. ś 120. However, we have held that [statutory] amendments which are ameliorative or procedural do not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. West v. State, 725 So.2d 872, 879 (Miss. 1998) (citing Johnston v. State, 618 So.2d at 95). Further, we have reasoned that a sentence of life without parole is ameliorative (and thus does not pose an ex post facto problem) in that it provides a punishment less harsh than death. Barnett v. State, 725 So.2d at 801. See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). ś 121. The State asserts that Conley waived his ex post facto claim. The State contends that this waiver is evidenced in three ways. First, the State asserts that Conley's submission of Instructions DS-12 and DS-13, which contained the life-without-parole option, shows that Conley wanted the jury to consider this option. Second, the State points out that in closing arguments the trial defense counsel stated, And I ask you to spare Glen Conley's life. [Do not] sentence him to death-sentence him to life without parole or probation. Do not sentence him to death. Third, during sentencing deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the trial judge asking: Does it mean when the jury can't agree, will Glen Conley get life in prison, with the chance of parole, or without? The question was read aloud. The trial judge then asked if there would be an objection to his answering: life without parole. The State accurately notes that no objection was made. ś 122. In Barnett, 725 So.2d at 801, we found that a defendant had waived his ex post facto sentencing claim by failing to object at trial. Barnett, like Conley, was sentenced to life without parole even though that punishment was not permitted under the statute in effect at the time his crime was committed. We found that Barnett was aware that the sentencing option of life without parole would be given to the jury and that he relied upon the option to escape the harsher penalty of death. This Court stated, We refuse to allow Barnett to now claim that a life without parole sentence violates ex post facto laws. Id. Although Barnett, again like Conley, had raised the ex post facto violation in his motion for new trial, we held that even then it was not timely-given that the verdict had already been returned. Id. ś 123. Based on our holdings in West and Barnett, we find Conley's ex post facto claims to be without merit.