Opinion ID: 475264
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Promotions and Transfers

Text: 26 The district court concluded that the defendants complied with the provisions of the plan regarding promotions and transfers. The court determined that the first two promotions in the street, water, and fire departments went to black employees. The first vacancy in the police department went to a white employee, and the district court found that the competing black employee, Denise Bell, was not qualified. The next three vacancies in the police department were filled in one day, when two blacks and one white were promoted. The court found that the city had thereafter followed the required procedures for promotions and transfers, looking first to qualified employees within the same department, then turning to other departments, and finally to public advertising. 27 The plaintiffs for the most part concede that the defendants complied with the plan's requirement that the first two promotions in each department go to blacks. 9 However, they contend that the defendants later violated the terms of the plan in two other ways. First, they contend that objective, non-discriminatory criteria for promotions were not developed. Second, they argue that the second stage of race-neutral promotion and transfer requirements were not met, alleging here as below that several black employees were denied the opportunity for advancement while vacancies were filled by whites. 28 We find no merit in the plaintiffs' contentions. The district court properly concluded that the proper procedures for filling vacancies were complied with. Our review of the record indicates that of the several class members who testified on the subject of promotions, the majority of the plaintiffs' witnesses who had requested promotions received every one requested. A few other class witnesses testified that they had been denied a promotion but had received one or more promotions later, and only four class members testified that they had received no promotions. Of these four, all had either resigned before a promotion could be received, possessed a poor work record, or were denied promotions that were given to other class members. We therefore find no support for the plaintiffs' sweeping claims of the defendants' contempt. 10 B. Refusal to Modify 29 The plaintiffs also urge us to reverse the district court's refusal to modify the grievance procedures outlined in the plan. The failure to modify injunctive relief is ordinarily reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961). However, in a sufficiently compelling case an appellate court can conclude that a district court erred in refusing to modify. See Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976). A district court should modify a decree if the prescribed relief has not put an end to the illegal conduct. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248, 252, 88 S.Ct. 1496, 1499, 20 L.Ed.2d 562 (1968) (district court has power to modify a decree even absent clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions). 30 The plaintiffs' December 1981 motion requested modification as follows: (1) allowing the filing of group grievances; (2) tolling the period within which to make a grievance until an employee has knowledge of an act complained of; (3) entry of an adverse decision to the city upon its failure to comply with time limits; (4) extending the time for filing grievances; and (5) prohibiting the city from retaining counsel to defend grievances. Several of the witnesses testified to their views of problems with the grievance procedures. However, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its broad discretion in failing to fashion new relief. 31 The plaintiffs' case for these modifications is far from a compelling one. The plaintiffs complain, without elaboration, that certain unspecified grievances, such as nepotism, cronyism, and favoritism could not be individualized and required group consideration. While some grievances were dismissed because untimely, the plaintiffs do not indicate whether the untimeliness was due to the employee's unawareness of the acts complained of. Although employees experienced delays in the processing of their grievances, the plan specified that an employee could take his grievance to the next higher level of the city hierarchy if he did not receive a response within the specified time. Although the plan did not provide sanctions if the city council did not act on the appeal of a grievance within the specified ten days, the plaintiffs have not indicated how any employee suffered prejudice. Finally, the plaintiffs do not establish the wisdom of prohibiting the city council from receiving legal advice pertaining to grievances. In sum, it is difficult to interpret the plaintiffs' flat statement that the city's grievance procedure was problematic for class grievants in that there were due process violations of fairness and impartiality. 32 The district court noted that some employees who filed grievances had received relief from city officials without resort to further action. Of the grievances taken through the chain of city officials without satisfaction and then presented to the EEOC, all but one were either dismissed or issued a no-cause determination. This final one was settled. 11 Some employees felt that it would not have done any good to file a grievance, and thus they either never filed grievances or dropped them during the process. We find no abuse of the district court's discretion. 12 C. Release of Jurisdiction 33 Lastly, the plaintiffs appeal the district court's release of its jurisdiction over the class action. The court stated that no useful purpose would be served by retaining jurisdiction of this cause. Such complaints as may arise should be pursued by individuals having grievances against the city's employment policies and practices by presenting same to the City Council, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, of course, in a federal court of competent jurisdiction. The district court thereupon dissolved all prior injunctive orders issued against the defendants and ordered the case closed for all purposes. The plaintiffs contend first that this dismissal was on the court's own motion, and thus premature, and second that individual instances of racial discrimination continue to occur. 34 The plaintiffs' claim that the dismissal of the class action was rendered without notice or hearing is not well taken. Cf. United States v. Texas, 509 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir.1975) (sua sponte dismissal of school desegregation case improper without notice, hearing, and completion of defendants' compliance reporting obligations). Shortly after the plaintiffs filed their contempt motion in December 1981, the defendants responded with a motion which requested in part the dissolution of the plan and indicated their desire to be released from the district court's jurisdiction. The hearing held in April 1984 was partially for the purpose of taking evidence on this request. If, as actually transpired, the district court were to find the defendants in compliance with the plan, it could not have been a surprise to the plaintiffs that the district court would consider ending the class action. The plaintiffs' reply brief has now conceded that the defendants did indeed file a motion to be relieved of the court's jurisdiction. 35 Turning to the plaintiffs' second contention, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible error in dismissing the plaintiffs' class claims. As we have discussed above, the district court properly found that its order had been complied with and that no further class-wide relief was warranted. The defendants met the court-imposed hiring and promotion goals, implemented the detailed grievance procedures, reported to the court on their compliance, and otherwise satisfied the strictures of the court's decree. No new class-wide claims of discrimination were presented. The record demonstrates that the defendants have eliminated the citywide effects of the prior racial discrimination practiced by the Grenada officials. Cf. United States v. Texas Education Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir.1981) (school desegregation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143, 102 S.Ct. 1002, 71 L.Ed.2d 295 (1982). We see no necessity for the district court to retain jurisdiction over the class claims. 36 However, our holding in this instance is linked in large part to the district court's express allowance of individual actions arising from the same circumstances relevant to the class claims. While the district court concluded that the class action was no longer the appropriate vehicle for litigation of the remaining claims of discrimination, it explicitly permitted such individual actions to be brought. 13 Nothing in our opinion should be read to impose any necessary barrier to the success of these future individual actions. 14 37 Accordingly, we affirm the final order of the district court in all respects. 38 AFFIRMED.