Opinion ID: 2756011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boswell’s Sentence under the ACCA

Text: As this Court has recognized, it is hard to overstate the consequences that flow from Boswell's status as an armed career criminal. Although an ordinary felon found in possession of a firearm is subject to a term of imprisonment not to 16 No. 13-3641 exceed ten years, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), an armed career criminal charged with possession of a firearm faces a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years and a maximum of life. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Subject to this comparatively harsh punishment, Boswell now challenges his sentence on appeal, arguing that the three qualifying felony predicates used to sentence him under the ACCA had to be alleged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. These failures, he claims, violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, respectively. Boswell concedes, however, that this argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), see, e.g., United States v. Long, 748 F.3d 322, 328–29 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Coprich v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2832 (U.S. 2014), and he raises the argument merely to preserve his right to seek review by the Supreme Court. In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court held that recidivism used to enhance a defendant’s maximum penalty is not an element of the crime that must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but is instead a traditional sentencing factor decided by the judge. 523 U.S. at 239, 243–44. Because Almendarez-Torres remains the law of the land, we will continue to apply its holding until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise. Accordingly, we decline to set aside Boswell's sentence.