Opinion ID: 698692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against Dakota

Text: 9 Plaintiffs concede that their claims against Dakota under the Jones Act succeed only if Olson is excluded from the LHWCA. The LHWCA provides recovery to a wide range of land-based maritime workers for injuries sustained. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347, 111 S.Ct. 807, 813, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991). A master or member of a crew of any vessel is specifically excluded from the provisions of the LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 902(3)(G) (1988). The terms master or member of a crew are refinements of the term seaman in the Jones Act. McDermott, 498 U.S. at 347, 111 S.Ct. at 813. Accordingly, any person covered by the Jones Act is excluded from coverage under the LHWCA and vice versa. Id. Therefore, to determine whether Olson is entitled to recovery under the Jones Act or the LHWCA turns on determining whether Olson was a seaman and thus a master or member of a crew. If Olson was a seaman, he may pursue a Jones Act claim. If Olson was not a seaman, he was a longshoreman and cannot pursue a Jones Act claim. 10 If Olson is covered by the LHWCA, it provides the exclusive remedy against his employer, Dakota. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905 (1988). Furthermore, if Olson is covered by the LHWCA, he is not entitled to recover under the theory of unseaworthiness of the vessel. Id. Accordingly, the LHWCA creates a clear distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers. McDermott, 498 U.S. at 347, 111 S.Ct. at 813. 11 Seaman status is usually a fact-intensive inquiry properly left to the jury to resolve. Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1994). However, summary judgment is appropriate where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion. Id. (quoting McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991)). 12 In this circuit, [t]he traditional test for seaman status is: 1) the injured worker must perform at least a substantial part of his work on any floating structure used for transport in navigable waters; and 2) his work must contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission. Roth, 25 F.3d at 709. Within the first element there is also implied a definite and permanent connection with the vessel. Id. To satisfy this first element, the determinative factor is the employee's connection to a vessel, not the employee's particular job. McDermott, 498 U.S. at 354, 111 S.Ct. at 817. In other words, [t]he key to seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation. Id. at 355, 111 S.Ct. at 817. The employee's connection must have an element of permanency to it; a transitory connection to a vessel or group of vessels is not sufficient. Buras v. Commercial Testing & Eng'g Co., 736 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir.1984). This connection may be to either a particular vessel or a fleet of vessels. Id. 13 Plaintiffs argue that Olson had a connection to a vessel because he performed a substantial portion of his work on an identifiable fleet of vessels. We disagree with Plaintiffs' assertion that Olson had a connection with an identifiable fleet of vessels. A fleet of vessels is an 'identifiable group of vessels acting together or under one control.'  Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., 26 F.3d 1247, 1257 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc)). At the very least to constitute a fleet, the vessels must take their direction from one identifiable central authority. Id. at 1258. 14 Plaintiffs argue that the barges Olson worked upon were a fleet because the barges were grouped in a fleet diagram by Dakota. However, as noted by the district court, the  'fleet diagrams' were the functional equivalent of numbering systems used in commercial parking lots to keep track of the location of individual cars. Appellees' App. at 10. Furthermore, Dakota exercised only limited control over the barges in its custody; its control was confined to that necessary to fulfill its obligations under the repair contract. Dakota was not free to use the barges for any other purpose or direct the barges. The barges were owned by numerous companies, and Plaintiffs do not argue that the barges take their direction from one identifiable central authority. Accordingly, the barges that Olson worked upon at Dakota's facility were not a fleet because they were owned by numerous companies and were not under common control. Because there was no identifiable fleet which Olson was connected to, if he is to qualify as a seaman, he must have a connection to a particular vessel. 15 Alas, Olson cannot make this showing either. Olson worked on numerous barges entering Dakota's facility. He was assigned to barges randomly, with no permanent connection to any barge or group of barges. Olson did not sleep or eat on any of the barges and commuted to and from his employment with Dakota. It is clear that Olson's allegiance was strictly to Dakota, his land-based employer, and he had no connection to a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels. Accordingly, he is not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. Roth, 25 F.3d at 709. Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the Jones Act claim. Because Olson was a longshoreman, Dakota's liability to Olson is found exclusively under the provisions of the LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905. Furthermore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ContiCarriers on Plaintiffs' unseaworthiness claims because, as noted above, the LHWCA prohibits a longshoreman from pursuing unseaworthiness claims. Id. 16 The LHWCA requires Dakota to pay Olson's reasonable funeral expenses and make payments to a surviving spouse, child or other dependents. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 909 (1988). Olson was unmarried and childless at the time of his death. Plaintiffs concede that they did not reside with Olson or receive financial support from him. Therefore, they are not dependents and they are not entitled to recovery under the LHWCA. When there is no person entitled to compensation, the LHWCA requires a $5000 payment into a special fund. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 944(c)(1) (1988). 3 Dakota paid Olson's funeral expenses and made the required $5000 payment because Olson died without dependents.
17 Plaintiffs argue they may recover damages against Dakota as owner pro hac vice of the barge Olson was working upon at the time of his death under Sec. 905(b) of the LHWCA. Section 905(b) allows a ship repairman to pursue a claim for injuries caused by the negligence of a vessel. However, Sec. 905(b) expressly prohibits recovery by a longshoreman who was engaged in ship repair against his employer. 4 We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Dakota on this claim.