Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 50

Heading: Thomas Williams

Text: Thomas Williams and his mother got into an argument because Williams was living on her resources and wanted his girlfriend to spend the night. His mother may also have learned that he was renting a basement apartment to neighborhood prostitutes. During this argument or soon thereafter, Williams stabbed his mother nine times in the chest and heart and then left her body beneath a blanket in the basement of her apartment building. Some weeks later, on August 20, 1993, Williams notified the police that he had found his mother murdered. When the officers arrived, Williams was calm and unconcerned. The police soon discovered that Williams had attempted to cash some of his mother's checks and that he had filed a false report claiming that his mother's car had been stolen. He had actually given the car to a juvenile in exchange for a twenty-dollar bag of cocaine. At the time of the offense, Williams was thirty-eight-years old and lived with his mother. He had a ninth-grade education and was self-employed. He admitted using cocaine and has since sought treatment. He claimed to be in otherwise good physical and mental health. Williams had prior convictions for murder, atrocious assault and battery, unlawful possession of a weapon and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. The prior murder conviction stemmed from an altercation with his girlfriend and her landlord in which Williams shot both, killing the landlord. Williams was convicted of noncapital murder and sentenced to serve a life sentence, with a minimum term of thirty years. HANDLER, J., dissenting. Gary Marsh, a night clerk at a gas station in Lawrenceville, was fatally shot at work during an apparent robbery. When found, he was laying among coins on the floor in the small office of the gas station, his keys were in the door, and the cash drawer was empty on the counter. Approximately ninety dollars was missing, but otherwise nothing in the small office was disturbed. Defendant, twenty-six years old at the time, was arrested four days after the killing. Charged and prosecuted for capital murder, he was found guilty, on July 8, 1994, of purposeful or knowing murder by his own conduct, with the requisite intent to kill the victim. On December 6, 1994, a separate jury returned a death sentence. The penalty-phase jury determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt three statutory aggravating factors: N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) (conviction for prior murder); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f) (murder committed to escape apprehension for another offense); and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g) (murder committed during the course of a robbery). All of the jurors concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and defendant was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, defendant's conviction and death sentence were affirmed. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996) ( Loftin I ). The present appeal concerns the proportionality of defendant's death sentence. The Court holds that defendant's sentence is not disproportionate under the current standards and methodology for determining proportionality in capital cases. In reaching that determination, it eliminates one component of that methodology, namely, a statistical analysis based on the numerical preponderance of aggravating and mitigating factors. The Court rules further that proportionality review should be studied to determine whether its methodology should be revised. Anticipating such a revision, the Court also decides that a statutory amendment to the capital murder statute, which drastically changed the universe of cases that constitutes the basis for comparisons of defendants, need not be applied in this case; its constitutionality, therefore, need not be determined. Finally, the Court acknowledges that proportionality review and the evidence adduced in its implementation are material in determining whether racial discrimination exists in the administration and application of the death penalty. The signs of discrimination are undeniable, so the Court rules that racial discrimination should be the subject of continuing study. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that the evidential findings do not demonstrate discrimination sufficiently pervasive to establish constitutional violations. I disagree with the Court's disposition of each of the important issues in this case. First, because the Court has acknowledged that our current method of proportionality review requires further revisions, I take issue with the application of proportionality review to defendant's case at this time. Given that the Court has chosen to review defendant's sentence, I conclude that the evidence considered within the framework of current proportionality review standards indicates that defendant's death sentence is disproportionate. Further, consideration of the constitutionality of the 1992 amendment should not be avoided or postponed on the assumption that a determination of its constitutionality may be obviated by any changes in proportionality review contemplated by this Court: the amendment, which changes and drastically limits the analysis required for meaningful proportionality review, is blatantly unconstitutional. Finally, and most importantly, the evidence presented by defendant demonstrates strongly and inescapably that a constitutionally impermissible risk of racial discrimination exists in the imposition of the death penalty in this State. We should declare the capital-murder statute unconstitutional because it discriminatorily singles out black persons for death. I, therefore, dissent.