Opinion ID: 2676157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appealability of a Special Motion to Quash

Text: Before we may consider the merits of the trial court‟s order denying Zujua‟s special motion to quash, we must determine whether such an order can be immediately appealed to this court.6 See McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylor, 3 A.3d 1132, 1135 (D.C. 2010) (“Before we may decide [the merits of the appeal], we must first determine whether this court has jurisdiction.”) 6 We do not address the related but separate question of whether an order denying a special motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP Act is immediately appealable. We note that this was an issue in a different case before this court, Mann v. Nat’l Review, Inc., et al., 13-CV-1043, but the appeal in that case was dismissed before an opinion was issued. Two days before oral argument for this case, the District of Columbia delivered to the court the amicus brief it filed in Mann. It is not clear what the District, which is not a party to this case, sought to accomplish, procedurally or substantively, with this submission. While the District is not required to ask permission to be amicus in this court, see D.C. App. R. 29 (a), it still must follow other rules pertaining to amicus filings, see, e.g., D.C. App. R. 29 (c)-(e). Moreover, if it meant to participate in this case as amicus by resubmitting its Mann amicus brief, that brief provides little guidance regarding the issue before us. In a footnote, the District in Mann took the position that whether the denial of a special motion to dismiss is immediately appealable is “related, but quite distinct” from whether the denial of a special motion to quash is appealable, and it never said whether the appealability of these distinct motions should be resolved similarly or differently. We see no reason to address the appealability of the special motion to dismiss in this case. 10 The appellate jurisdiction of this court is defined by statute. Specifically, D.C. Code § 11-721 (2012 Repl.) gives this court jurisdiction over “all final orders and judgments” of the Superior Court, as well as certain categories of interlocutory orders. D.C. Code § 11-721 (a)(1), (a)(2). Superior Court orders that do not finally resolve pending cases are therefore not ordinarily appealable pursuant to our “general policy against piecemeal review.” Umana v. Swidler & Berlin, Chartered, 669 A.2d 717, 722 (D.C. 1995). Furthermore, we have specifically held that “[a] pretrial order granting or denying discovery from a non-party witness is not ordinarily final for purposes of appeal unless, in the case of an order granting discovery, the subject of the order refuses to comply and is adjudicated in contempt.” Crane v. Crane, 657 A.2d 312, 315 (D.C. 1995) (emphasis omitted). With that said, this court also has jurisdiction to hear certain non-final orders not specifically enumerated in our jurisdictional statute. This court has recognized that the collateral order doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) and applied to the jurisdictional statute for the federal courts of appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1291-92 (2012), 11 likewise applies to D.C. Code § 11-721.7 See Stein v. United States, 532 A.2d 641, 643 (D.C. 1987); see also, e.g., McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1135-36. The collateral order doctrine “is best understood not as an exception to the final decision rule” codified in this court‟s jurisdictional statute “but as a practical construction of it.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). This doctrine permits appellate courts to assert jurisdiction over a “small class” of otherwise non-final orders, Stein, 532 A.2d at 643 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546), which “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. This court, like the Supreme Court, recognizes that “[p]ermitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . undermines efficient judicial administration and encroaches on the prerogatives of [trial] court judges who play a special role in managing ongoing litigation.” Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we have likewise emphasized that the reach of the collateral order doctrine is “modest” and the test 7 D.C. Code § 11-721 is modeled after and “virtually identical” to 28 U.S.C. § 1291-92 (2012). See Brandon v. Hines, 439 A.2d 496, 509 (D.C. 1981). 12 for applying it is “stringent.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1136 (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349-50). Three criteria must be satisfied; the subject order: (1) “must conclusively determine a disputed question of law,” (2) “must resolve an important issue that is separate from the merits of the case,” and (3) “must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1135 (quoting Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 339-40 (D.C. 2001) (overruled on other grounds)). Despite this “stringent” test, we conclude that an order denying a special motion to quash under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act satisfies the requisite criteria and is immediately appealable to this court.8 See id. at 1140 n.9 (explaining that a determination that an order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine is “not directed at the individual case, but to the entire category to which a claim belongs” (quoting Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 101) (internal quotation marks omitted)). First, the order denying the special motion to quash conclusively determines a disputed question of law. The trial court concluded that “[d]efendant fail[ed] to 8 Because we rely on the collateral order doctrine to resolve the jurisdictional issue, we do not address Zujua‟s alternative argument that the order denying the special motion to quash amounts to the denial of injunctive relief which is appealable under D.C. Code § 11-721 (a)(2)(A) (identifying as appealable orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions”). 13 present a prima faci[e] case that the writings at issue are protected under the D.C. Anti-[SLAPP] statute.” With this order, the court made a determination that Zujua‟s speech was not of the sort that the Anti-SLAPP statute intends to protect. See supra part II. Federal appellate courts that have examined similar state AntiSLAPP statutes have likewise found the conclusivity element satisfied when a trial court has determined the movant is ineligible for protection under the statute. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2010) (“the order conclusively decides that relief under Maine‟s [Anti-SLAPP statute] is unavailable to the individual defendants”); Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 566 F.3d 164, 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (“an order denying a[] . . . motion [under Louisiana‟s Anti-SLAPP statute] satisfies any concerns regarding conclusivity”).9 Next, the order denying the special motion to quash resolves an important issue separate from the merits of the lawsuit. On its face, whether Zujua‟s anonymous speech qualifies for protection under the statute is a separate question from whether Zujua may be held liable for defamation. Ms. Burke argues that our 9 We note that Godin and Henry apply the collateral order doctrine to special motions to dismiss. But just as in the statutory schemes reviewed in Godin and Henry, an anonymous speaker seeking to quash a subpoena in the District carries the burden to present prima facie evidence that his speech is eligible for the Anti-SLAPP statute‟s protections. See supra part II. 14 analysis cannot stop here, however, and that we must also consider that, upon the presentation of a prima facie case that the movant has engaged in protected activity, the plaintiff may defeat the special motion to quash by showing a likelihood of success on the merits. See D.C. Code § 16-5503 (b). This latter inquiry, Ms. Burke asserts, is not sufficiently separate from a merits inquiry. We disagree. Although a plaintiff may defeat a special motion to quash by showing a likelihood of success on the merits, the purpose of this inquiry is still “to determine whether the defendant is being forced to defend against a meritless claim, not to determine whether the defendant actually committed the relevant tort.” Henry, 566 F.3d at 175 (internal quotation mark omitted); see also id. (discussing numerous applications of the collateral order doctrine and concluding that “an order does not have to be separate from the entirety of the underlying dispute to satisfy Cohen”).10 Put another way, the “[d]enial of an anti-SLAPP motion resolves a question 10 In Henry, the court explained that the separability requirement is meant to promote the collateral order doctrine‟s goal of encouraging “efficient adjudication. . . . by preventing appeals on issues that will be definitively decided later in the case. In this way, one might characterize separability as a way of ensuring that a movant is not attempting to have an appellate court preemptively resolve a disputed issue still pending in the district court.” 566 F.3d at 175-76. But, the court further explained, “issues of immunity [like those considered in evaluating a motion under an Anti-SLAPP statute] are decided prior to trial and then not normally revisited.” Id. at 176. Because of the nature of the court‟s inquiry, therefore, the concerns that drive the separability requirement are not relevant here. 15 separate from the merits in that it merely finds that such merits may exist, without evaluating whether the plaintiff‟s claim will succeed.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, 774 A.2d at 340 (concluding that “the issue of immunity from having to defend against . . . [a] defamation claim is separate from the merits of that claim”). The final requirement to qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine is that the subject order be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1135. “We have said that the denial of a motion that asserts an immunity from being sued is the kind of ruling that is commonly found to meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and thus to be immediately appealable.” Id. at 1136 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here we consider the denial of a special motion to quash, not the denial of a special motion to dismiss, which explicitly protects the right not to stand trial. But we conclude that the former also confers an immunity of a sort from suit. See supra p. 7-8. An anonymous speaker who can preserve his anonymity can avoid service and thereby avoid ever becoming a named party to a suit. We have explained, however, that it is not enough that the unreviewable interest be in the “mere avoidance of a trial.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1136 16 (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 353). Rather, before we exercise our appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine we must confirm what is at stake is the “avoidance of a trial that would impair a „substantial public interest.‟” Id. at 1137. The right the Council sought to protect with the special motion to quash is the right to engage in anonymous speech, Comm. Report at 4, which is grounded in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 950-51 (D.C. 2009).11 In drafting the District‟s Anti-SLAPP statute, the Council took into account the experiences of states with similar statutes and determined that, in this respect, the District could do better in offering protection to the intended targets of SLAPP actions. We find it significant in our assessment of the public interest in the right at stake that the constitutional right of anonymous speech is specially protected in the District‟s Anti-SLAPP statute.12 11 While Ms. Burke correctly notes that anonymous defamation is not entitled to constitutional protection, see Solers, 977 A.2d at 951, the Council made a legislative judgment in choosing to broadly protect anonymous speech. If truly defamatory, a plaintiff may defeat the motion to quash if she can establish a likelihood of success on the merits. See infra part IV. 12 Citing Englert v. MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009), Ms. Burke argues that because the District‟s Anti-SLAPP statute does not explicitly provide for the immediate appeal of the denial of a special motion to quash, the (continued…) 17 The exercise of the statutorily protected right to anonymous speech would be substantially chilled if the denial of a special motion to quash were not immediately appealable. See McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1140 (“the crucial question . . . is not whether an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders.”). Deferring review of the denial of a special motion to quash would result in the irreversible loss of the anonymity that the Anti-SLAPP Act specifically seeks to protect. As a result, those who would speak out anonymously might choose not to speak at all. This is precisely the sort of injury to an important public interest that this court has (…continued) Council must not have believed that anonymity was an important value worthy of such protection. But because of the limitations placed on the D.C. Council under the Home Rule Act, we conclude that the D.C. Council‟s failure to codify an immediate appeal provision for the denial of a special motion to quash cannot reasonably be analogized to the Oregon legislature‟s failure to create an immediate appeal in Englert. Congress created the current District of Columbia Courts system, defined the jurisdiction of the District‟s courts, and prohibited the Council from legislating to expand (or contract) their jurisdiction. Although what constitutes an improper expansion of jurisdiction has been the subject of some dispute in this court, it is clear that this court possesses the sole power to interpret D.C. Code § 11-721, our jurisdiction-conferring statute. It was for these reasons that the Council, which originally sought to create a right of immediate appeal for special motions to dismiss, see Comm. Report at 7, deleted this provision. We therefore read little into the absence of a provision that the Council may not have been empowered to include in the first place. 18 acknowledged that the collateral order doctrine is meant to protect. See McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1138 (observing that the public interest in protecting the “valid exercise of the constitutional right[] of freedom of speech” and “encourag[ing] continued participation in matters of public significance” would be a “public interest worthy of protection on interlocutory appeal.” (quoting Henry, 566 F.3d at 169, 180)). Because each of the criteria of the collateral order doctrine is satisfied, we hold that an order denying a special motion to quash under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP statute will be immediately appealable to this court.