Opinion ID: 194980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definition of Employee in Section 4105.

Text: 27 Finally, Nieves contends that a genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to whether Drs. Gelpi and Gonzalez Recio were independent contractors working for UPR pursuant to a contract with the Hospital, a privately-owned medical facility. See Flores Roman v. Ramos, 90 J.T.S. 132, at 8243-44 (1990) (holding that physicians who were merely independent contractors of Commonwealth, and not its employees, were not entitled to section 4105 immunity). To determine whether a physician claiming section 4105 immunity is an independent contractor, or merely a Commonwealth employee, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, focusing principally on the level of control contractually reserved to the governmental entity over the physician's provision of patient services. See Flores Roman, 90 J.T.S. 132, at 8244. Relevant indicia of independent contractor status may include, inter alia, evidence that the physician 28 (1) earned compensation on a per-patient basis, rather than a flat salary; 29 (2) received no fringe benefits of a type given to the principal's employees (e.g., vacation or sick leave, pension benefits, tax withholding); 30 (3) personally owned, invested in, or paid for the medical equipment and supplies used to treat patients, or the facilities which formed the situs of that treatment, or personally hired and supervised her own administrative or subsidiary medical personnel; 31 (4) held and paid for her own medical malpractice insurance policy; or 32 (5) exercised final judgment as to the appropriate medical treatment to render to patients. 33 Id.; see also Rivera v. Hospital Universitario, 762 F.Supp. 15, 17 (D.P.R.1991). 34 On appeal, Nieves and the appellees bandy various statements relating to the physicians' status, without much regard to whether these facts were ever substantiated in the summary judgment record as required by Rule 56. In their answer and motion to dismiss, Drs. Gelpi and Gonzalez Recio claimed that they were state employed physicians entitled to section 4105 immunity. Later, they introduced a sworn statement by John M. Roman Rodriguez, Dean of UPR's Medical Science Campus and custodian of its personnel records, attesting that Dr. Gonzalez Recio was an employee of the UPR medical school in December 1983, and that Dr. Gelpi, while not an employee of UPR, was enrolled as a resident in training in UPR's medical graduate program. 16 35 Nieves conceded at oral argument that the motion to dismiss was properly converted to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)-(c). As the nonmoving party, Nieves was required to set forth specific facts demonstrating a trialworthy issue as to whether these defendant physicians were independent contractors. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In support of her independent contractor theory, Nieves contends that (1) prior to December 1983, pursuant to contract, UPR placed its faculty and medical graduate students (residents and interns) at the Hospital for training purposes, the Hospital paid UPR for their services, and UPR paid the physicians a salary out of the contract proceeds; (2) Dr. Gonzalez Recio, Dr. Gelpi's supervisor, headed the Hospital's OB-GYN department, and received no direct supervision in the performance of her Hospital duties from any UPR official; (3) UPR carried malpractice insurance coverage on both physicians at its own expense, allegedly a superfluous expenditure if the physicians were employees entitled to section 4105 immunity; and (4) the medical equipment and facilities the defendant physicians used to treat patients were neither provided nor owned by UPR. Nieves faces two difficulties on appeal. 36 First, assuming these facts to be probative on the issue of independent contractor status (e.g., minimal UPR supervision of Dr. Gonzalez Recio), the only proof presented by Nieves consisted of the undocumented and unsubstantiated assertions contained in her opposition memorandum of January 31, 1992. Although Nieves argues that the facts ... depend on the supervision and control over [the doctors'] functions pursuant to contract, and even though she deposed both physicians and conducted discovery for eight months prior to dismissal, she never submitted the pertinent contract provisions, the malpractice insurance policies, or an affidavit in support of the factual assertions set forth in her opposition memorandum. 17 Factual assertions by counsel in motion papers, memoranda, or briefs are generally not sufficient to generate a trialworthy issue. See Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 887 (1st Cir.1993); see also In re Morris Paint and Varnish Co., 773 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir.1985); S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir.1982). 37 Second, even though a party may not generate a trial-worthy dispute at summary judgment merely by presenting unsubstantiated allegations in its memoranda or briefs, a party may nonetheless concede facts adverse to its position on summary judgment. See 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2723, at 63-65 (1983 & Supp.1993) (adverse facts are the functional equivalent of admissions on file explicitly cognizable under Rule 56). Nieves makes several important concessions relevant to the appropriate independent contractor analysis prescribed by Flores Roman. The mere existence of a residency contract between UPR and the Hospital, together with UPR's payment of the physicians' salaries, indicates that UPR exercised ultimate control over the conditions under which the doctors were to provide medical services at the Hospital. Further, UPR's provision and payment of medical malpractice insurance coverage for these physicians suggested, unless competently rebutted, an employer-employee relationship between UPR and these physicians under the UPR-Hospital contract. Cf. Flores Roman, 90 J.T.S. 132, at 8244 (because physicians' contract with state agency gave them absolute control over medical treatment, contract also required the doctors to pay for, and maintain in force at all times, their own malpractice insurance policies, and to reimburse government entity for all legal expenses arising from the doctors' negligent acts). 18 Finally, Nieves misapprehends the fundamental message of Flores Roman, by arguing that the Hospital's ownership of the medical equipment and facilities establishes that the doctors were independent contractors. The proper focus is not whether the putative principal (viz., UPR) owns or controls the equipment and facilities, but whether the performing party (viz., the physician) uses his own tools to perform the required services. Nieves readily concedes that these physicians did not own the medical equipment used to treat their patients, nor did they hire or supervise their own support personnel, nor contribute to Hospital operating expenses. Moreover, individual physicians did not contract with the Hospital to obtain privileges or accommodations. Cf. Flores Roman, 90 J.T.S. 132, at 8244 (noting that the contract provided that the contract doctors would hire their own support personnel, and treat patients with their own equipment, at their own facilities). 38 We conclude that the summary judgment record contained no competent evidence, and accordingly did not raise a colorable factual dispute, from which the district court could have made a determination that either physician was an independent contractor of UPR. Appellees therefore were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 19 39 Affirmed.