Opinion ID: 2629933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Offsets

Text: Easley also contends that, even if this court upholds the board's finding of liability, it is entitled to a modification of the board's order by receiving offsets to Lindekugel's disability benefits. As noted above, Easley filed three separate petitions with the board under AS 23.30.130(a) [32] seeking offsets to the PTD disability payment from Lindekugel's social security benefits, the Fluor settlement, and the legal malpractice settlement between Lindekugel and Johnson. The board denied Easley's petitions on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction to rule while the case was on appeal to the superior court and, alternatively, that it would deny the petitions on their merits. On appeal Easley argues that it is entitled to modification of the award under AS 23.30.130(a) because it asserted a mistake of fact, notably the board's calculation of Lindekugel's compensation rate. [33] We hold that AS 23.30.130(a) does not apply to offsets sought from the benefits that Lindekugel received from Fluor and Gil Johnson, as the resolution of those issues turns upon alleged mistakes of law rather than mistakes of fact. While Easley's claim that it was entitled to an offset for Lindekugel's SSDI award did present a question of fact that the board could review under AS 23.30.130(a), its denial of Easley's claim was not an abuse of discretion. [34] A party to a worker's compensation case has three methods by which to pursue its position before the board's award is final. The party may raise the issue in a pleading, [35] petition for review of all or part of the case within the time limits set forth in AS 44.62.540, [36] or, in the case of a factual mistake or a change in conditions, it may ask the board to exercise its discretion to modify the award at any time until one year after the last compensation payment is made. [37] Continuing jurisdiction over matters of worker's compensation is conferred upon the board by AS 23.30.130(a). [38] This statute provides an exception to the common law doctrines that prohibit the relitigation of factual issues, such as waiver and res judicata. [39] The board's power under AS 23.30.130(a) is broad, giving it the discretion to review a compensation award because of a change in condition or mistake in the determination of a fact, even if the party cannot produce any new evidence on the factual question at issue. [40] The question presented by this case is whether AS 23.30.130(a) may be invoked by a party to request reconsideration on the basis of mistakes of law that have allegedly led to an incorrect rate of compensation. For the reasons explained below we hold that it may not. Alaska Statute 23.30.130(a) is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, 33 U.S.C. § 922 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. [41] The United States Supreme Court held that the federal Department of Labor has broad discretion under § 922 to correct mistakes of fact, whether demonstrated by wholly new evidence, cumulative evidence, or merely further reflection on the evidence initially submitted. [42] But courts considering § 922 have held almost uniformly that an argument of error in legal analysis does not fall within the scope of reconsideration on grounds of change or mistake of fact. [43] Similarly, in McShea v. State, Department of Labor, we affirmed the board's decision not to entertain a party's allegation of factual error when the board's decision was legal, not factual. [44] Alaska Statute 23.30.130(a) was never intended to be a vehicle by which a party could raise errors of law or introduce new evidence that the party, exercising due diligence, could have introduced while the case was first before the board. As we have previously held: The concept of mistake requires careful interpretation. It is clear that an allegation of mistake should not be allowed to become a back-door route to retrying a case because one party thinks he can make a better showing on the second attempt.[ [45] ] The appropriate recourse for allegations of legal error is a direct appeal or petition to the board for reconsideration of the decision within the time limits set by AS 44.62.540(a). We thus conclude that modification under AS 23.30.130(a) is not appropriate when a party is seeking to adjust the compensation rate based on an allegation that the board committed a mistake of law. This holding disposes of two of Easley's claims for offsets. Easley argues that it is entitled to an offset from Lindekugel's malpractice award from Gil Johnson because an attorney from whom a worker receives a malpractice award constitutes a third party under AS 23.30.015. Easley also seeks an offset for payments Lindekugel received from Fluor, arguing that, pursuant to our decision in Wagner v. Stuckagain Heights, [46] Lindekugel cannot legally recover more than his maximum benefit allowance at any given time. Because both of these claims raise legal questions and do not allege a change in condition or a mistake of fact, they are not grounds upon which modification may be sought under AS 23.30.130(a). Easley's claim for an offset from Lindekugel's SSDI award pursuant to AS 23.30.225 does allege a mistake of fact. Whether Easley is entitled to an offset for Lindekugel's SSDI payments turns only on the resolution of a disputed fact  whether the SSDI payments were intended to serve as compensation for Lindekugel's condition resulting solely from the accident at Fluor without considering the aggravating effect of the Easley accident  and does not involve the resolution of legal questions. [47] But the board resolved this question in favor of Lindekugel when it found that Easley could not receive an offset from this award because the SSDI payments were compensation for Lindekugel's injury at Fluor, not at Easley. [48] Although questions remain as to the exact reason why Lindekugel's SSDI payments were reinstated, the fact that they were made retroactive to April 1981, months before Lindekugel's injury at Easley, [49] provided the board with a permissible reason to deny the petition, given that no specific facts [50] contradicting the inference that the board drew from the April 1981 retroactive date were introduced. Because AS 23.30.130(a) vests the board with the discretion to change or maintain the compensation award based on a factual determination, [51] we will reverse the board's denial of a petition to modify an award under this statute only if the board abused its discretion. [52] For the above reasons, we conclude that the board did not abuse its discretion in this case.