Opinion ID: 386061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Requested Pretrial Procedure Jury Instructions

Text: 93 Defendant asserted at trial that he was entitled to qualified immunity since his actions the very ones we hold to be nonjudicial were consistent with his state constitutional status as a conservator of peace. 23 We regard that status for purposes of the immunity question, as analogous to that of a police officer empowered to arrest and detain suspected violators of the law. Accordingly, the immunity potentially applicable to Merckle is qualified: he would be immune from damage liability under § 1983 unless he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took ... would violate the constitutional rights of (plaintiff) ..., or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of (plaintiff's) constitutional rights .... Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Essentially, then, defendant may show good faith and probable cause, Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S.Ct. at 1219, clearly a cognizable defense under § 1983, id; Bryan v. Jones, supra. 94 These principles were recognized by the district court and were embodied in special interrogatories 8 and 9 submitted to the jury. Plaintiff, however, argues that the trial court committed reversible error through its refusal to charge the jury the text of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.130(a) & (b). 24 The contention is that the relevant subsections of the Florida rule, which deals with bail 25 and first appearance procedures, could have given the jury a basis upon which to determine good faith vel non. The defendant counters that this infirmity can only be viewed as harmless, since the jury never reached the qualified immunity issue, as the responses to the special interrogatories indicate. 95 While we agree that the relevant subsections of the Florida rule are germane to the question of good faith in its objective sense, 26 we think defendant's argument that this error alone could not be reversible is well taken. Accordingly, and in light of our reversal on other grounds, we need not hold that failure to charge both requested portions of the Florida rule constituted reversible error. Instead, we instruct the trial judge to so charge the jury on retrial of this case, providing the defendant asserts the defense of qualified immunity.