Opinion ID: 740289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Participation of a Felon-Juror

Text: 27 In 1974, Weinper was convicted in California on a marijuana possession charge. The statute under which Weinper was found guilty provided as follows: Every person who possesses any marijuana ... shall be punished by imprisonment in county jail for a period of not more than one year or the state prison for a period of not less than one year or more than 10 years. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11357(a) (1973), amended by Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11357 (1991). 28 When called for jury service, Weinper filled out the standard juror qualification questionnaire used by the district court clerk's office in Nevada. Question 6 of this form asked [h]ave you ever been convicted, either by your guilty or nolo contendere plea or by a court or jury trial, of a state or federal crime for which punishment could have been more than one year in prison? 4 Weinper checked the box marked NO. This answer was incorrect; under the statute in effect in 1974, Weinper could have been sentenced to more than one year in prison as a result of his guilty plea to the marijuana possession charge. But because he answered no, he was called for jury service. Neither the parties nor the district court raised Weinper's 1974 drug conviction until after the trial's completion. 29 Federal law directs the chief judge of each district court to set up a system to determine whether each person called for jury service is qualified to serve as a juror. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(a). A person is unqualified if, inter alia, he or she has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored. Id. § 1865(b)(5). The statute also provides a method for litigants to challenge the jury selection process. Id. § 1867(c). 30 Remarkably, however, little authority governs the situation presented here, where a statutorily disqualified juror slipped through the juror selection process and sat on a jury that rendered a verdict. The statutes discussed above are not helpful because they do not say anything about how this situation should be resolved. Two circuit court cases have faced a similar issue previously. In United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C.Cir.1992) (Boney I ), the D.C. Circuit declined to order a new trial where the defendant discovered after conviction that one of the jurors was a felon. The court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury does not require an absolute bar on felon-jurors. Id. at 633. The court did, however, remand the case to the district court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juror's failure to disclose his felon status resulted in actual bias to the defendant. Id. at 634-35. On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which the felon-juror testified, but the district court did not permit defense counsel to cross-examine the juror or call the other jurors to testify. As a result, when the defendant re-appealed the district court's ruling that the felon-juror's participation did not result in actual bias, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case a second time for a further evidentiary hearing. United States v. Boney, 68 F.3d 497, 503 (D.C.Cir.1995) (Boney II ). 31 In United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254 (8th Cir.1992), the Eighth Circuit held that no new trial was required where an embezzler sat on a jury which convicted the defendant of income tax evasion. The felon-juror revealed his prior conviction during voir dire but mistakenly indicated that his civil rights had been restored. The defendant moved for a new trial based on the felon-juror's participation in the verdict. The court held that a defendant presenting such a post-verdict challenge had to demonstrate actual bias or prejudice affecting the juror's impartiality and the fairness of the trial. Id. at 261. 32 We agree with Boney I and Humphreys that the participation of a felon-juror is not an automatic basis for a new trial. We also agree with Boney I and Humphreys that the participation of a felon-juror can be the basis for a new trial if the juror's participation in the case results in actual bias to one or more of the parties. Here, however, despite having the opportunity to examine Weinper on the witness stand during a two-day evidentiary hearing on their motion for a new trial, Hilton has failed to present even a shred of evidence suggesting that Weinper's 1974 drug conviction created actual bias or prejudice affecting his ability to analyze this case in an impartial fashion. Hilton relies on Weinper's participation alone as grounds for a new trial. Without a showing of actual bias or prejudice, we reject Hilton's position.