Opinion ID: 1451468
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Perjury and Negrete's Right to Testify

Text: Negrete argues that the district court's application of the enhancement burdens his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because the application of such an enhancement would chill his right to testify. See Frey v. Schuetzle, 78 F.3d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the right to testify as having its origins in the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause). We have held, however, that if the district court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed perjury, such a finding is a sufficient basis to support the obstruction of justice enhancement. United Sates v. Flores, 362 F.3d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir.2004). In light of the defendant's testimonial rights, the sentencing court must conduct an independent evaluation of the evidence and decide whether the defendant has, in fact, committed perjury. Id. The district court's determination is sufficient if `the court makes a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.' Id. (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993)). A finding of perjury requires that the district court determine that the defendant gave `false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.' Id. at 1038 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 207 F.3d 452, 454-55 (8th Cir.2000)). In this case, the district court found that Negrete's denial of a supervisory role and knowledge of the drug transaction constituted perjury given the weight of credible contrary evidence. Given the nature of the case, Negrete's supervisory role and knowledge of the drug transaction were material issues; therefore, the dispositive issue is whether sufficient evidence of willfulness exists in the record. The district court made its perjury findings based on inferences drawn from the jury verdict. While it is preferable for the district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding, Flores, 362 F.3d at 1037, district courts are not required to go into extensive review of the evidence; a court's findings are sufficient if they clearly indicate that the court has undertaken a review of the evidence that is independent from the jury verdict. See United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that the district court's statement that I heard the trial testimony, and I think [it constitutes] obstruction of justice was sufficient to demonstrate an independent finding). Here, the district court merely compared Negrete's testimony to the jury verdict and found the two to be plainly inconsistent. The district court erred by not making an independent assessment of the record to determine if Negrete committed perjury. However, we have repeatedly affirmed obstruction-of-justice enhancements, despite the absence of specific findings on the elements of perjury, when the evidence of the defendant's willfulness was `unequivocal' and `the record left no doubt that the defendant's false testimony at trial was not the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.' United States v. Brown, 311 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2002); see also United States v. Simms, 285 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir.2002) (stating that [a]lthough the district court did not specifically make a willfulness finding, the omission does not warrant a remand); United States v. Esparza, 291 F.3d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir.2002) (refusing to remand for more specific findings where the evidence in the record clearly indicated that the defendant's testimony was intentionally false). In Simms, the defendant was charged with participation in a crack cocaine conspiracy. Simms testified in his own defense and denied that he sold crack cocaine, introducing the witnesses to sources for the purposes of obtaining crack cocaine, and denied conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. Simms, 285 F.3d at 1101. In concluding that a remand was unnecessary, we noted that [Simms's] denials of involvement in the crack cocaine conspiracy were `flatly contradicted by ... the unequivocal testimony of his former co-conspirators[.]' Id. at 1102. In Esparza, we held that a reversal would be a waste of time and effort where the defendant's testimony was plainly inconsistent with the jury's verdict. 291 F.3d at 1056. Similarly, the record in the present case leaves no doubt that Negrete's testimony was not the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. Much like the defendants in Simms and Esparza, Negrete testified that he lacked knowledge of the drug crime for which he was charged and the only purpose for this erroneous testimony could be `to deceive the jury and obstruct the judicial process.' Simms, 285 F.3d at 1101 (internal citation omitted). Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement.