Opinion ID: 1973414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cumulative fresh complaint evidence

Text: The Appellate Division decided that the trial court had erred by admitting duplicative fresh-complaint evidence. We agree to the extent that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of a complaint extracted through coercive questioning. Yet this raises the issue of when otherwise admissible testimony regarding fresh-complaint evidence should be excluded because it is duplicative or prejudicial. We have traditionally left it in the hands of the trial court to decide whether to limit or exclude witnesses. See State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 433, 136 A. 2d 761 (1957) (The question of limiting witnesses calls for the exercise of sound discretion in the context of the circumstances of the particular case. There can be no doubt as to the power of the trial judge to restrict the number of witnesses). It would usurp the trial court's discretion to establish a blanket policy restricting testimony that fully qualifies for admissibility under the fresh-complaint rule but is duplicative or prejudicial. In such cases, the trial court must first determine whether the testimony fulfills the requirements of the fresh-complaint rule. If so, then the trial court should assess, in light of the rule's narrow purpose of negating inferences that the victim had failed to complain, whether repeated testimony of the victim's complaint is irrelevant or prejudicial to the defendant. There may be instances in which the trial court may find no prejudice from duplicative fresh-complaint testimony. That may occur when the victim complained at various times to different people, or when so much other evidence exists that duplicative testimony is unlikely to tip the scales. Yet, in close cases in which the victim's complaint has already been once established and it appears that repeated fresh-complaint testimony would leave the jury with the impression that the State has gathered a greater number of witnesses than the defense, the trial court may properly exercise its discretion and exclude the testimony. If the trial court determines that Ms. McCabe's and Detective Hoffman's testimony is admissible, then it will have to decide whether D.R.'s testimony had already established the fact of a complaint, whether the jury would find evidence of further complaints of any relevance, and whether in a close case like this one the testimony could prejudice defendant. In short, the court would need to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effects. We cannot establish a blanket rule because in each case the weight of each of those variables will be different.