Opinion ID: 788213
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Washington's Detention in the Hallway Outside His Room

Text: 25 Because the district court analogized Washington's encounter with the six RPD officers to a Terry -stop, and because Washington argues that the officers first violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they unconstitutionally seized him in the hallway outside of his room, our analysis necessarily begins with a discussion of Terry and Washington's encounter with the six RPD officers in the hallway outside of his room. 26 In Terry, a police officer became suspicious of two men standing on a street corner in a downtown area. See 392 U.S. at 5, 88 S.Ct. 1868. While being observed by the officer, one of the men walked up the street, peered into a store, walked on, turned around, looked into the same store again, and then joined his companion and began speaking with him. See id. at 6, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Both men individually repeated this ritual, until, between them, they had done so approximately a dozen times. See id. The two men then began speaking with a third man and, about ten minutes after the third man's departure, headed up the street in his direction. See id. The officer, concerned that the three men were casing the store for a possible armed robbery, followed and confronted them. See id. at 6-7, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The officer identified himself and asked the men their names, but they only mumbled inarticulable responses. See id. at 7, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The officer then spun one of the men (Terry) around and patted his breast pocket. See id. The pat-down revealed a pistol. See id. A pat-down of the second man also revealed a pistol. See id. The officer's frisk of the third man revealed nothing, and he was not searched any further. See id. Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and moved to suppress the recovered pistol as the product of an unconstitutional search. See id. at 7-8, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of Terry's motion to suppress, finding that 27 where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 28 Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. After the Supreme Court's approval of the officer's brief, carefully limited, and public search of the three suspects, courts began referring to such encounters as  Terry -stops. See, e.g., United States v. Burrell, 286 A.2d 845, 852 (D.C.1972) (Gallagher, J., dissenting) (referring, for the first time in a published opinion, to a  Terry -stop). 29 Since the Supreme Court decided Terry, it has expanded the scope of a permissible Terry -stop from simply conducting a weapons pat-down to ask[ing] the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). The Court has also expanded Terry to allow officers to effect a Terry -stop of a vehicle on a public roadway. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (comparing being on foot on public sidewalks to being in an automobile on public roadways). But it has never expanded Terry to allow a Terry -stop at an individual's home. 30 Indeed, Terry's twin rationales for a brief investigatory detention—the evasive nature of the activities police observe on the street and the limited nature of the intrusion, see 392 U.S. at 20-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868—appear to be inapplicable to an encounter at a suspect's home. Officers on the beat may lose a suspect before the officers have gathered enough information to have probable cause for an arrest. In contrast, officers who know where a suspect lives have the opportunity to investigate until they develop probable cause, all the while knowing where to find the suspect. Because [n]owhere is the protective force of the fourth amendment more powerful than [within] the sanctity of the home, United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir.1998), the second rationale for a Terry -stop seems almost absent by definition when the intrusion is at a suspect's home. 8 Nonetheless, we need not decide the purely legal question whether police officers may constitutionally conduct a Terry -stop at an individual's home or whether the RPD officers in this case would have had reasonable suspicion to do so because we find that the officers' encounter with Washington exceeded the limits of any permissible detention under the Fourth Amendment. 31
32 A seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer, through coercion, physical force[,] or a show of authority, in some way restricts the liberty of a person. United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir.1997). A person's liberty is restrained when, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would `have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.' Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988), and citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)). 33 In Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir.1994), we identified five factors that aid in determining whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. Id. at 494 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382). These factors are: (1) the number of officers; (2) whether weapons were displayed; (3) whether the encounter occurred in a public or non-public setting; (4) whether the officer's officious or authoritative manner would imply that compliance would be compelled; and (5) whether the officers advised the detainee of his right to terminate the encounter. Id. at 494-96, 111 S.Ct. 2382. 34 In this case, Washington was confronted by six officers, five of whom were uniformed and visibly carrying weapons, and all six of whom—in Officer Sceirine's words—were around him. Like the encounter in Orhorhaghe, Washington's encounter with the six RPD officers began in the hallway of his apartment building— private property shielded from the view of the vast majority of the public and continued into Washington's one-room residence. Id. at 495. The six officers moved Washington twenty to thirty feet away from his door, refused to heed Washington's request to shut the door to his own residence, and thrice repeated that Washington faced an arrestable charge of failing to register with the RPD. Moreover, by Officer Sceirine's own admission, he repeatedly admonished Washington about the arrestable charge to convey to Washington that he could be arrested if he did not cooperate and that he was not free to terminate the encounter. Finally, the officers never notified Washington that he had a right to refuse to answer their questions and to terminate the encounter. Taking into account all of these circumstances, we conclude that Washington was seized when he was confronted by six officers. A reasonable person in his position would not have felt at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. Id. at 494. 35 Our analysis of whether Washington was unconstitutionally seized does not end there, however; Orhorhaghe only answers the question whether Washington was seized—not whether his seizure was unconstitutional. 36
37 A seizure premised on reasonable suspicion, such as a Terry -stop, is not per se unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, so long as it is sufficiently brief and minimally intrusive. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (examining, under Terry, whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion). Here, Washington's detention by the six RPD officers violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not sufficiently brief and not minimally intrusive. 38 In United States v. Miles, [247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.2001),] we described the test for determining when a Terry -stop becomes an arrest: whether the detention exceeded a brief stop, interrogation and, under proper circumstances, a brief check for weapons. Then, if the stop proceeds beyond these limitations, ... an arrest occurs ... if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he was not free to leave after brief questioning. 39 United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1011 n. 8 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Miles, 247 F.3d at 1012). 40 After Washington left his room and entered the hallway, he voluntarily consented to Officer Sceirine's request for a brief check for weapons. Id. (quoting Miles, 247 F.3d at 1012). The pat-down revealed no weapons or evidence of drug manufacturing or distribution. Officer Sceirine then asked Washington whether he had a methamphetamine lab in his room and whether he was selling drugs. Washington emphatically and unequivocally denied that he was running a methamphetamine lab in his room or involved in methamphetamine distribution. The officers' encounter with Washington should have ended there, but it did not. See Ganwich v. Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir.2003) (A seizure becomes unlawful when it is `more intrusive than necessary.' The scope of a detention `must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.' (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 504, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983))). Instead, the officers continued to press Washington into allowing them to enter his room and, notwithstanding their failure to obtain permission to do so, entered it in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 9 41 The officers'underlying justification for initially detaining Washington was to question him about whether he was involved in producing and/or distributing methamphetamine. See id. But the officers' extended detention of Washington was more intrusive than necessary because the officers' actions—in particular, their repeated attempts to gain entry into Washington's room—were not carefully tailored to the detention's underlying justification. Id. Rather, we find that the officers' actions were calculated to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained to search an individual's home. See Lalonde, 204 F.3d at 954 (The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from making a warrantless entry into a person's home, unless the officers have probable cause and are presented with exigent circumstances. (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371; United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir.1978))). Thus, the officer's extended seizure of Washington was beyond the scope of any permissible detention under the Fourth Amendment. 42