Opinion ID: 167915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Law Antitrust C laim

Text: After granting summary judgment on the federal antitrust claim for lack of evidence of a conspiracy, the district court considered Champagne’s claim that the Established Distributors’ conduct violated the § 203(A) of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act. 18 Correctly explaining that, unlike the federal antitrust statute, the state statute reaches purely unilateral acts that unreasonably restrain trade, see Green Country Food M kt., Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004); Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1550 (10th Cir. 1996), the district court ruled that the lack of evidence of a conspiracy did not preclude state antitrust liability. Even so, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment for the Established Distributors, finding “no evidence that th[e] individual acts harmed competition.” (Emphasis added). Our earlier conclusion that Champagne might be able to survive summary judgment on its federal antitrust claim leads us to reverse, in part, the district court’s ruling on Champagne’s state antitrust claim as w ell. See generally Oakridge Invs., Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 719 P.2d 848, 850 (Okla. Civ. App. 1986) (“The Oklahoma antitrust statutes are similar to federal antitrust 18 Section 203(A) provides that [e]very act, agreement, contract, or combination in the form of a trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within this state is hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal. 79 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 203(A). - 35 - legislation.”). On remand, the district court should consider whether the evidence is sufficient to allow this claim to go to the jury on a collective action theory. However, we agree with the district court’s decision that the Established Distributors are entitled to summary judgment on Champagne’s unilateral action theory; we therefore affirm the district court’s ruling on this ground. On appeal, Champagne makes three arguments in support of its claim that the district court erred by granting summary judgment as to its unilateral action theory: (1) the court erroneously reached the issue without adequate briefing; (2) the state law claim should have been subjected to per se treatment and thus harm to competition was irrelevant; and (3) even assuming harm to competition was relevant, the evidence in this case is stronger than that in Harolds Stores, in which we upheld the jury’s verdict because, inter alia, there was evidence of unilateral action that injured competition and unreasonably restrained trade. W e consider these issues in turn. First, Champagne argues that the only issue presented to the district court in support of the Established Distributors’ motion for summary judgment on the state antitrust claim was that a ruling in their favor on the federal claim ipso facto compelled a ruling in their favor on the state claim. In other words, Champagne claims that the district court erred in reaching an issue (whether there was injury to competition from unilateral conduct) that was not adequately briefed. The Established Distributors dispute this characterization of the record, - 36 - and respond that the issue of injury to competition was briefed as relevant to both the federal and state antitrust claims. Regardless of the state of the record, however, we decline to find for Champagne on this ground, as Champagne makes no real argument (other than conclusory statements that the district court erred) and cites no legal authority in support of its position. See, e.g., Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (“To make a sufficient argument on appeal, a party must advance a reasoned argument concerning each ground of the appeal, and it must support its argument with legal authority.”) (citation omitted). Champagne next argues that, because the state and federal antitrust laws are generally treated similarly, the district court should have subjected its state unilateral action claim to per se treatment and forgone its inquiry into whether these unilateral acts harmed competition. See I ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 43 (4th ed. 1997) (“Under the per se rule, a restraint is conclusively presumed unreasonable without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm it has caused . . . .”) (quotations, alterations omitted). However, even assuming Champagne’s collective action claim merits per se treatment, 19 Champagne points to no case that suggests that unilateral conduct intended to exclude a competitor is properly placed in this category. 20 As “applying a per se 19 As noted earlier, we do not decide this issue today. 20 The federal cases to which Champagne cites are inapposite— as the district court correctly noted, Section 1 of the Sherman Act simply does not reach (continued...) - 37 - rule to particular conduct risks sweeping potentially procompetitive activity within a general condemnation and prohibits a defendant from justifying its conduct,” courts are (and should be) wary of departing from the rule-of-reason standard without “demonstrable economic effect.” Id. at 46. W e are not prepared to determine that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would hold this unilateral conduct to be a per se violation absent some guidance from that Court. Finally, Champagne claims that, even if injury to competition is relevant, it put forth sufficient evidence of anticompetitive effect stemming from the unilateral actions of each Established Distributor. Specifically, Champagne compares its evidence with the plaintiff’s evidence in Harolds Stores. In that case, the plaintiff’s economist provided evidence that the defendant “adversely impacted competition in general and unreasonably restrained trade.” 82 F.3d at 1549. Specifically, the economist testified that the defendant’s illegal infringement on the plaintiff’s copyrights d[id]n’t just do damage to [the plaintiff], it sen[t] a signal to anybody else that wants to enter this market, that if you come in here, you’re going to get squashed because this big company will exercise its power and take your copyrights. In that regard, in economics, we would say it raise[d] a barrier to entry. That itself is anti-competitive. That, in my judgment, is an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. (quotation, original alterations and emphasis omitted). (...continued) unilateral conduct in restraint of trade. - 38 - Champagne argues that, as in Harolds Stores, the harm to competition in the present case is the barrier to entry that the actions of each Established Distributor (i.e., the threats against the mills) erected. Specifically, Champagne points to three pieces of evidence that it contends demonstrates harm to competition: (1) evidence that the Established Distributors w ere significant mill customers; (2) evidence that there has been very little entry into the aluminum service center market over the last twenty years; and (3) evidence that Champagne has not been able to compete on the same terms as the Established Distributors due to its inability to attain mill recognition. The glaring difference between this case and Harolds Stores, however, is that, here, Champagne points to no evidence of an actual barrier to entry created by the Established Distributors’ unilateral conduct. The Established Distributors presented an economic expert who testified that there were no significant barriers to entry in the aluminum service center industry, and that any lack of entry stems from the industry’s poor economic performance. On appeal, Champagne points to no evidence to counter this testimony. Thus, the evidence before us shows, at most, that (1) the Established Distributors individually have “clout” w ith the mills such that they could convince the mills to accede to threats not to sell to new entrants, (2) very few new service centers have entered the industry over the past twenty years, and (3) this lack of entry was due to the industry’s lackluster performance. However, to show a unilateral unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of § 203(A ), a - 39 - plaintiff must show a barrier to entry— or some other harm to competition— caused by the defendant. See Harolds Stores, 82 F.3d at 1548. W ithout such evidence, Champagne has not shown that the unilateral conduct of the Established Distributors constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. 21 IV . State Law Tortious Interference Claim Champagne also alleged that the Established Distributors tortiously interfered with its relationships with the mills. To prove a claim of tortious interference with business relations, one must show (1) a business or contractual right that was interfered with, (2) interference that was malicious and wrongful and was neither justified, privileged nor excusable, and (3) damage caused by interference. Brown v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002). The district court found that the alleged acts of interference that 21 As noted, the evidence of the barrier to entry/injury to competition in Harolds Stores was the testimony of the plaintiff’s economic expert. 82 F.3d at 1549. Champagne’s economic expert did state that the threats by the Established Distributors “[are] a deterrent to any other investors contemplating entry into the service center business in the relevant market.” H owever, the district court excluded this evidence and we affirmed, thus the testimony is not part of the record. W e do not mean to imply that there might not be other evidence of injury to competition to be found in this case’s voluminous record; we note only that Champagne fails to point to any such evidence on appeal. - 40 - fell within the two-year statute of limitations period 22 were directed at Champagne’s relationship with only two mills— Ormet and Commonwealth. 23 A. Interference W ith C ham pagne’s Relationship W ith O rmet Turning first to the alleged interference between Champagne and Ormet, the district court noted that, as no business relationship yet existed between the two, Champagne’s claim of interference with business relations was more properly a claim of interference with prospective business advantage. 24 The district court then ruled that there was no evidence of improper interference and 22 On appeal, the Established Distributors argue that Champagne’s tortious interference claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations because Champagne knew of the Established Distributors’ conduct in 1996— six years prior to its bringing suit. The district court explained that recovery was permissible for each tortious act occurring inside of the limitations period— that is, after April 22, 2000. The Established Distributors provide no support for their claim that Champagne w as required to bring its claim within two years of the first act or lose the ability to sue for any subsequent act, thus we will not consider the argument. See Eateries, Inc., 346 F.3d at 1232 (“A party forfeits an issue it does not support with legal authority or argument.”) (quotations omitted). 23 Champagne does not challenge this ruling on appeal. Further, the district court ruled that, as none of the alleged acts within the limitations period involved defendant Earle M . Jorgensen Co., summary judgment in Jorgensen’s favor was appropriate. Champagne does not challenge this ruling on appeal; we therefore affirm summary judgment for Jorgensen on the tortious interference claim. 24 Interference with prospective economic advantage requires a party to show (1) the existence of a valid business relation or expectancy, (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy by the defendant(s), (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and (4) resultant damage. Boyle Servs., Inc. v. Dewberry Design Group, Inc., 24 P.3d 878, 880 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001). - 41 - that, even if there was, there was nothing to suggest that the interference was wrongful because “[i]f [Champagne] cannot demonstrate that [the Established D istributors’] actions rise to an unreasonable restraint of trade, as a matter of law , it cannot” succeed on its tortious interference claim. On appeal, Champagne argues that it did not need to separately plead interference with prospective business advantage, because this tort is “encompassed” within the tort of interference with business relations. This is incorrect. See Overbeck v. Quaker Life Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 846, 847-48 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984) (“Appellant argues that interference with a prospective economic advantage is synonymus [sic] with interference w ith contractual or business relations. This comparison is not entirely accurate. Although both torts do have similarities, the underlying theories of liability differ . . . . W e believe the subtle differences between tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage and tortious interference with a contractual or business relation is more than just a semantical one, and thus we decline to treat the two synonymously . . . .”); see also Gaylord Entm’t Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128, 150 n.96 (Okla. 1998) (noting that there is a “difference between interference with a prospective economic advantage and with contractual or business relations”). 25 W e therefore 25 Champagne argues that the two claims are interrelated because interference with an existing business relationship might cause damage in the form of the loss of a prospective economic advantage. Be this as it may, the district court’s ruling had nothing to do with damages; rather, the court focused (continued...) - 42 - restrict Champagne to its pleadings and consider only whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Champagne’s interference w ith business relations claim. As noted, the district court rejected this claim because it found Champagne failed to establish that it had any right to a relationship with Ormet— a critical element of the claim. See Brown, 58 P.3d at 223. On appeal, C ham pagne does not present any argument that this ruling was wrong; we therefore affirm the district court’s disposition of this claim. B. Interference W ith Champagne’s R elationship W ith Commonw ealth As the Established Distributors acknowledge, Champagne does have a business relationship w ith Commonwealth. The district court granted summary judgment for the Established Distributors on this claim based on its conclusions that there was no evidence of any wrongful conduct in the form of an unreasonable restraint of trade and any “interference” was protected by the competitors privilege. Our reversal of the district court’s decisions on Champagne’s federal and state antitrust claims compels a reversal of this claim as well; if Champagne can show evidence of anticompetitive conduct, it can, by definition, show wrongful conduct in support of its interference w ith business relations claim. Cf. Krebsbach v. Henley, 725 P.2d 852, 856-59 (Okla. 1986) (discussing whether defendants unlaw fully and wrongfully interfered with 25 (...continued) on the fact that Champagne had shown no existing relationship with Ormet. - 43 - plaintiff’s business relations by looking at whether defendants violated federal or state antitrust law and concluding that “[a]s the evidence fails to support an inference that appellees’ actions constituted an unlawful restraint of trade, it also fails to support any other inference which would establish that their actions in refusing to work in conjunction with appellant were in any way wrongful”). W e therefore remand this claim for further consideration. 26