Opinion ID: 76222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shooting

Text: 36 No disputes of material fact exist about the events immediately proceeding the shooting of McCormick. Officer Welker testified that McCormick was nonreactive to the pepper spray and ignored commands to drop his weapon. Although McCormick claims that he was only rushing outside and towards Officer Welker in an effort to regain his breathing after the pepper-spraying, McCormick admits he held on to the stick. McCormick claims in the affidavit that he heard others shouting at him but could understand nothing they were saying. McCormick's subjective perceptions have little bearing on how a reasonable officer in Officer Welker's position would have viewed McCormick's behavior. An objectively reasonable officer would have perceived McCormick as a threat. 37 Officer Welker claims that McCormick then was advancing towards Officer Welker, pumping or swinging the stick above McCormick's head. Officer Welker drew his gun in response to this threat. McCormick admitted in the statement given to the police three days after the shooting that he still had the stick in his hand when Officer Welker drew his gun, but he was not afraid that Officer Welker would shoot him. This admission is not contradicted by McCormick's affidavit of five years later. McCormick only says in the affidavit that he lifted [his] hands in submission out of fear that his assailant (the officer) would attack again. McCormick does not deny having the stick in his hand when his hands were allegedly raised in submission. 38 When Officer Welker tripped over the parking stone, he became quite vulnerable to attack by McCormick. McCormick charged Officer Welker as he was falling. Officer Welker was afraid that McCormick might have access to his firearm if McCormick was successful with his attack. Fearing that McCormick was a threat to the officer and others, Officer Welker shot McCormick. 39 The Supreme Court has said that if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, then it is constitutionally permissible to use deadly force to prevent escape of the suspect. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1701, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Because the Constitution permits the use of deadly force to prevent a violent suspect from escaping, the Constitution must also permit the use of deadly force against a suspect who poses not merely an escape risk (because he is not yet in police control), but also an imminent threat of danger to a police officer or others. 40 Officer Welker had probable cause to believe that McCormick earlier had committed a violent felony, could reasonably perceive that McCormick posed an imminent threat of violence to the officer and other bystanders, and noted that McCormick continued to ignore repeated commands to drop his weapon. Officer Welker's decision to shoot McCormick under these circumstances was objectively reasonable. See Graham, 109 S.Ct. at 1872 (The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.). Officer Welker responded within the confines of McCormick's constitutional rights. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Officer Welker on the claim about the shooting.