Opinion ID: 2048220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections

Text: The other issue in this case is the constitutionality of section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004)). The State argues that the appellate court erred in finding the statute unconstitutional. The State argues that the $5 charge is a fine, not a fee, and fines need not satisfy the same due process concerns as fees. In the alternative, the State contends that collecting a $5 fee from drug offenders is reasonably related to the goal of funding spinal cord injury and paralysis research. Defendant responds that the statute must satisfy due process whether the charge is labeled a fee or a fine, and argues that the appellate court was correct in holding that simple drug possession is too attenuated from spinal cord injury for this court to find a rational relation between the two. Statutes are presumed constitutional ( Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill.2d 341, 351, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191 (1999)), and we have the duty to construe statutes so as to uphold their constitutionality if there is any reasonable way to do so ( People v. Inghram, 118 Ill.2d 140, 146, 113 Ill.Dec. 65, 514 N.E.2d 977 (1987)). The party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing a constitutional violation. In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d 291, 296, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233 (2001). Because constitutionality is a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo. Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill.2d 435, 443, 303 Ill.Dec. 773, 851 N.E.2d 1198 (2006). Defendant argues specifically that section 5-9-1.1(c) violates substantive due process. The parties agree that the statute does not impact on fundamental rights. Accordingly, the relevant standard by which the statute is evaluated is rational basis review. Davis, 221 Ill.2d at 450, 303 Ill.Dec. 773, 851 N.E.2d 1198. To be upheld under this standard, the statute need merely bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Davis, 221 Ill.2d at 450, 303 Ill.Dec. 773, 851 N.E.2d 1198. Although this standard of review is quite deferential, it is not toothless ( Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 97 S.Ct. 431, 434, 50 L.Ed.2d 389, 394 (1976)), and we must strike down provisions which run afoul thereof ( People v. Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, 184, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989)). The appellate court found that section 5-9-1.1(c) failed to pass the rational basis test. In so holding, the court, following Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d 44, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543, and Fort, 362 Ill. App.3d 1, 298 Ill.Dec. 417, 839 N.E.2d 1064, focused solely on whether the statute bore a rational relationship to the interest of funding research into finding a cure for spinal-cord-injury-related paralysis. The court held that whatever connection might exist between possession of a controlled substance and spinal-cord-injury-related paralysis was simply too tenuous and abbreviated to satisfy due process. Several recent decisions of the First District of the appellate court have reached the same conclusion, also relying on Fort and Rodriguez. See People v. Gorosteata, No. 1-04-2469, 2006 WL 2796421 (September 29, 2006); People v. Morrison, 367 Ill.App.3d 581, 305 Ill.Dec. 362, 855 N.E.2d 253 (2006); People v. Blakney, 366 Ill.App.3d 925, 304 Ill.Dec. 808, 853 N.E.2d 885 (2006); People v. Jones, 366 Ill.App.3d 666, 670, 304 Ill.Dec. 114, 852 N.E.2d 364 (2006). See also People v. McNeal, 364 Ill.App.3d 867, 875, 301 Ill.Dec. 832, 847 N.E.2d 842 (2006) (finding statute unconstitutional in context of possession with intent to deliver). The parties agree that the State has a legitimate interest in finding a cure for spinal-cord-injury-related paralysis. The dispute with respect to that interest centers on whether section 5-9-1.1(c) bears a rational relationship thereto. However, the State also argues that the charge imposed by the statute is a fine, and thus serves another interest: punishment of a convicted criminal. When viewed in this light, the State argues, the $5 charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(c) is clearly a rational nondisproportionate penalty to impose for the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, possession of a controlled substance. The State contends that it is irrelevant that the money collected is earmarked for a particular purpose; the only inquiry should be whether the charge imposed is rationally related to punishment for defendant's crime. The State argues that in light of the fact that possession of a controlled substance can incur a fine of up to $25,000 (see 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(a)(1) (West 2004)), the $5 charge imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1.1(c) cannot be considered disproportionate. The State argues that therefore the charge ought to be upheld. Defendant disagrees. He argues that the charge is a fee, as indicated by the plain language of the statute, and argues further that the State ought to be estopped from arguing otherwise, because the State argued that the charge was a fee in the appellate court proceedings. Defendant reasons that if the charge is a fee, it does not have the purpose of punishment, and thus the appellate court's analysis must be followed. Defendant argues in the alternative that even if we were to find the charge to be a fine, this court's precedent still requires that there be a rational relationship between the crime committed and the interest served by the particular punishment the legislature has chosen to impose, citing Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829.
Thus the first question we must address is whether the charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(c) is a fee or a fine. As a threshold matter, defendant argues that the State should not be permitted to take the position that the charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(c) is a fine, because the State stated that the charge was a fee in a footnote in its appellate court brief. We disagree that the State is precluded from arguing that the charge is a fine. Defendant's complaint sounds in the doctrine of judicial estoppel. As this court has explained, Five elements are generally required for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply: the party to be estopped must have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from it. (Emphasis added.) People v. Caballero, 206 Ill.2d 65, 80, 276 Ill. Dec. 356, 794 N.E.2d 251 (2002). Application of the doctrine is discretionary. Caballero, 206 Ill.2d at 80, 276 Ill.Dec. 356, 794 N.E.2d 251. The doctrine does not apply in this case for a number of reasons. First, the State's two positions were not factually inconsistentthere was no dispute that the charge was imposed, the only question was whether the charge was a fine or a fee. These positions were merely legally inconsistent. Second, the State's two positions were not adopted in separate proceedings. The appeal before this court is a continuation of the proceedings before the appellate court and the proceedings before the circuit court. Finally, the doctrine cannot apply because the State did not succeed or receive any benefit from its position in the appellate court. Accordingly, we proceed to the merits. Section 5-9-1.1(c) provides as follows: In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fee of $5 shall be assessed by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004). As defendant notes, the statute does call the charge a fee. This constitutes strong evidence as to how the charge should be characterized. However, as previously noted, the label attached by the legislature is not necessarily definitive. See Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (a charge labeled a fee was in reality a tax); Elizalde, 344 Ill. App.3d at 682, 279 Ill.Dec. 571, 800 N.E.2d 859. We note that the statute is ambiguous, in that although the statute does label the charge a fee it also states that the charge shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. If the charge were truly a fee, there would be no need for the legislature to have included this language because, as the parties agree, the credit for presentence incarceration can only reduce fines, not fees. See 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2004). Thus to conclude the charge is a fee would render this section of the statute superfluous, a construction to be avoided. Jones, 214 Ill.2d at 193, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239; Bonaguro, 158 Ill.2d at 397, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712. In this case, notwithstanding the label attached by the legislature, we believe that the charge at issue is in fact a fine. The legislature's label is strong evidence, but it cannot overcome the actual attributes of the charge at issue, as we have repeatedly recognized. See Boynton v. Kusper, 112 Ill.2d 356, 365, 98 Ill.Dec. 208, 494 N.E.2d 135 (1986) (holding that a portion of the marriage license fee which had no relation to the services supposedly supported by that fee is a tax); Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (although legislature labeled charge a fee it was in reality a tax because court charges imposed on a litigant are fees if assessed to defray the expenses of his litigation). See also Arangold, 204 Ill.2d at 148-49, 272 Ill.Dec. 600, 787 N.E.2d 786 (noting that the charges at issue in Boynton and Crocker, although labeled fees, were in fact taxes). In this case, the $5 charge imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1.1(c) possesses only the attributes of a fine and none of the attributes of a fee. To begin, the charge is imposed only after conviction for a criminal offense, it is contained in article 9 of chapter V of the Unified Code of Correctionsan article entitled Finesand it is payable to the state treasury. The appellate court in Rodriguez found these characteristics insufficient to override the plain language of the statute. See Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 51-52, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. But Rodriguez does not appear to have considered what we consider to be the most important fact, that this charge does not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant. This is the central characteristic which separates a fee from a fine. A charge is a fee if and only if it is intended to reimburse the state for some cost incurred in defendant's prosecution. Boynton, 112 Ill.2d at 364-65, 98 Ill.Dec. 208, 494 N.E.2d 135; Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346; White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 781, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836; People v. Terneus, 239 Ill.App.3d 669, 672, 180 Ill.Dec. 499, 607 N.E.2d 568 (1992). In this case, with respect to this charge, all evidence is to the contraryindeed, defendant's central argument is that the purpose of the charge is not even rationally related to the crime he committed. The charge is clearly a fine, the label notwithstanding. Defendant argues that the charge is not in the nature of a fine because the amount of the charge does not vary depending on the severity of defendant's conduct, citing People v. Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d 210, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423 (2006). We find this argument unconvincing. In Youngblood, the court addressed the question of whether the drug assessment pursuant to section 411.2 was subject to offset for presentencing credit pursuant to section 110-14. The court concluded that the drug assessment was in the nature of a fine-and, thus, subject to offsetbecause, inter alia, the funds are payable to a public treasury, and nothing indicated that the assessment was intended as a charge for labor or services. Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d at 214, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423. The court went on to note that the State argued that the assessment should be construed as a fee because it was `unrelated to the relative infamy of the defendant's behavior.' Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d at 214, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423. The court dispensed with this argument by simply noting that the assessment did vary with the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d at 214-15, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423, citing 720 ILCS 570/411.2 (West 2002). Youngblood does not stand for the proposition that a charge must vary with the severity of conduct in order to constitute a fine, and we decline to create any such rule. In this case, despite the fact that the charge does not vary with severity of behavior, the other attributes of the charge convince us that it is properly characterized as a fine, not a fee. Accordingly, the $5 charge may properly be viewed as a criminal penalty. [3]
Defendant argues that even viewed as a criminal penalty, the $5 charge still violates his due process rights. It is true that even criminal penalties must comport with due process. People v. Upton, 114 Ill.2d 362, 373, 102 Ill.Dec. 842, 500 N.E.2d 943 (1986). However, it is well established that the legislature has broad authority to determine the nature and extent of criminal penalties. Courts will not interfere with the legislature's determinations in this regard unless a challenged penalty clearly exceeds what is permitted by the very broad and general constitutional limitations applicable. People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill.2d 537, 542, 48 Ill.Dec. 228, 416 N.E.2d 259 (1981). There can be no serious argument that a $5 fine is so disproportionate to the offense of possession of a controlled substance as to violate defendant's substantive due process rights, and defendant does not so argue. Rather, he argues that it violates his due process rights that this portion of his fine is designated specifically for deposit in the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. We reject this argument. A defendant has no basis for protesting the usage to which his criminal fines are put. The sole inquiry is whether the amount of the fine is excessive when compared to the criminal conduct in which the defendant is found to have engaged. So far as the propriety of inflicting a pecuniary punishment on a defendant is concerned, it makes no difference whether the fines are designated for deposit in the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund or the general state treasury. As our appellate court has noted, We are unaware of a decision of a court of review in which the fact that the proceeds from a fine or penalty is earmarked for a particular fund serving a governmental purpose has affected the validity of the fine or penalty.    No case has been called to our attention in which as here,    fines or penalties are earmarked for a fund and a particular relationship has been required to exist between the offense for which the fine is imposed and the use to be made of the fund. People v. Wilson, 144 Ill.App.3d 290, 295, 98 Ill.Dec. 727, 494 N.E.2d 849 (1986). Indeed, if due process required that fines only go to purposes related to the particular crime committed by the defendant who incurred the fine, all fines might be called into question. Section 27.6(a) of the Clerks of Courts Act, with very few exceptions, guides the disbursement of all fines collected (among numerous other charges), and clearly not all moneys collected are directed to purposes specifically related to the crimes that individual defendants have committed. For instance, section 27.6(a) directs that a portion of all fines go to the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund, another portion to the Traffic and Criminal Conviction Surcharge Fund, another portion to the Drivers Education Fund, and still another portion is directed for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund. 705 ILCS 105/27.6(a) (West 2004). Given the wide variety of ends to which those moneys are directed, it is difficult to conceive of any crime with respect to which the fines might be upheld were defendants permitted to contest their fines on the basis that they went to purposes unrelated to their particular crime. Defendant contends that our decision in Lindner did strike down a criminal penalty because the end served by the punishment was insufficiently related to the crime. We disagree with this reading of Lindner. There, we struck down on due process grounds a section of the Illinois Vehicle Code which provided for automatic revocation of the driver's licenses of convicted sex offenders. Initially we determined that the purpose of the revocation statute was the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles, based on explicit statutory language to that effect in the Vehicle Code. See Lindner, 127 Ill.2d at 182, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829. We found that the revocation in question bore no rational relationship to that interest, because the crime of which the defendant was convicted neither involved a motor vehicle nor bore any rational relationship to his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. Lindner, 127 Ill.2d at 182-83, 129 Ill. Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829. We went on to consider the State's arguments as to alternate purposes the statute might serve. The first purpose suggested by the State was punishment. We assumed, arguendo, that the license revocation constituted punishment but stated that, even so, We fail to see, however, how identifying the purpose as punishment cures the constitutional infirmity. The revocation of defendant's license would then be an additional penalty for a criminal offense, and the same rational-basis test would apply. [Citations.] The penalty of license revocation bears no relationship to the offense. Moreover, if punishment is the purpose, the statute is arbitrary for the same reason we identified earlier. There is no rational basis for choosing the particular offenses in section 6-205(b)(2), as opposed to other offenses not involving a vehicle, to receive the punishment of revocation. If the legislature may punish these offenses with revocation, nothing prohibits it from imposing that penalty for violating any provision of the Criminal Code, a result that would be plainly irrational. (Emphasis added and omitted.) Lindner, 127 Ill.2d at 184-85, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829. Our decision in Lindner does not support defendant's argumentquite the opposite. Defendant argues that even if the charge is a fine, we must evaluate whether spinal cord paralysis research bears a rational relation to drug possessionthe crime of which he was convicted. But we did not engage in this analysis in Lindner. There, once we assumed for purposes of analysis that license revocation was punishment, we did not address whether safe roads were related to sexual assault, the crime there at issue. Rather, we considered whether it was rational to inflict the punishment of license revocation for the offense of sexual assault. We did not look beyond the punishment inflicted to any other purpose that punishment might serve. Thus, Lindner would dictate that in this case, once having determined that the charge at issue was a punishment, we consider only whether it is rational to impose the punishment of a $5 fine for the offense of drug possession. The answer is clearly yes. Lindner does not support looking beyond the fine to whatever other purpose the fine might serve, i.e., spinal cord injury paralysis research. Nor does the last above-quoted sentence from Lindner suggest a different result, as it could not be considered plainly irrational for the legislature to choose to add a $5 fine to all provisions of the Criminal Code. Our decision in Crocker, 99 Ill.2d 444, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346, noted above, also does not support defendant's position. The case is distinguishable. There, the charge at issue constituted a litigation tax on matrimonial litigants. Here, by contrast, the charge is a fine imposed as punishment for a criminal conviction. The analysis in Crocker is inapposite to the present case. The $5 charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections, although labeled a fee, is in fact in the nature of the fine. Thus, its purpose is punitive. Accordingly, the fact that the proceeds of that fine are earmarked for a specific purpose is irrelevant to its constitutionality. So far as the defendant who is subject to a monetary fine is concerned, due process requires only that the punishment imposed be rationally related to the offense on which he is being sentenced. In the context of fines, the inquiry is whether the amount of the fine is grossly disproportionate to the offense. In this case, that test is clearly satisfied. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court on this issue is reversed. All other judgments of the appellate court which have held this statute invalid are hereby overruled on this point. Because we find the charge constitutional on this basis, we need not address the State's alternate argument that there is a rational relation between simple drug possession and spinal cord injury paralysis research.