Opinion ID: 411995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Case Proceedings and the District Court Decision on Remand

Text: 5 After a two-day bench trial in March 1979, the District Court found for appellees on all claims, including the JOA 275 claim. 10 The trial court's April 26, 1979 Memorandum Opinion first concluded that appellants had made out an extremely strong prima facie case of discrimination, and that, as a consequence, under Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), the burden had shifted to the appellees to demonstrate 'that all the allegedly illegal employment decisions were based on legitimate nondiscriminatory considerations.'  Milton I, 645 F.2d at 1073. The opinion then noted that the Government 'relies primarily on the proposition that, regardless of whether or not the defendants could be found to have discriminated on the basis of sex, plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they request.'  Id. The District Court accepted this proposition and, under the evidentiary standard of Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C.Cir.1976) (per curiam), required appellees to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that, even absent the alleged discrimination, neither appellant would have been promoted. Milton I, 645 F.2d at 1073. The trial court finally concluded that, because of their low rating scores, the evidence was clear and convincing that neither appellant was the best qualified candidate for JOA 275. Id. at 1074. 6 On appeal, we held that the rating scores did not provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for appellants' promotion denials because the record indicated that rating scores determine only whether an applicant makes it to the final interview. Id. at 1079. We thus reversed and remanded, instructing the District Court 7 to determine whether there is on the existing record a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not promoting the appellants, and if so, whether [pursuant to Day v. Mathews ] there is clear and convincing evidence that, even absent the alleged discrimination, neither appellant would have been selected for the job under review. 8 Id. (emphasis in original). As will be clear from the discussion below, see Part II.A. infra, this instruction may have been confusing to the District Court in its consideration of the case on remand. On re-reading the instruction, it appears that the words and if so should have been and if not. This error in wording was probably caused by the fact that on the first appeal appellees did not seriously contest appellants' prima facie case and virtually conceded that unlawful discrimination may have been a factor in certain of the disputed employment decisions. Id. at 1077 n. 17. We therefore assumed that no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason existed, and that Day v. Mathews was the appropriate test to be applied on remand. Id. 9 On remand, the District Court again entered judgment for appellees. Its September 15, 1980 Memorandum Opinion 11 first considered the applicability of Day v. Mathews in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Burdine, decided the same day as Milton I, held that, in rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination, a Title VII defendant need only articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. The District Court held Day applicable notwithstanding Burdine, explaining that 10 this Circuit adhered to the standard announced in Burdine even before that case was decided; however, it is the law in this Circuit that the defendants are held to a much more stringent showing that required by Burdine if the plaintiffs have gone beyond a prima facie showing. In this instance, this Court held that plaintiffs had made an extremely strong prima facie showing. 12 11 Even under the stringent evidentiary standard of Day, however, the District Court found that appellees had borne their burden. The court found, first, that [i]f Whelan had applied for JOA 275 she would not have been selected for the position because [based on her ratings for comparable jobs] she would not have rated high enough to be placed in the top group of applicants eligible for interview by the selecting official. Memorandum Opinion, reprinted in App. A.11. As for Milton, the District Court based its finding of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason on her inability to answer Cisco's management-concept question during the selection interview. The court concluded that, because Milton was applying for a position involving matters 'germane to program administration and management,' her ability to answer this question was obviously relevant to her capacity to function effectively in [the] position. Id. A.11-12. Pointing out that Cisco had no prior knowledge of Milton's rating score, the District Court opined that Milton's low score in some measure corroborates the conclusion of the interviewing official that Milton was not the best qualified [candidate] .... Id. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, and this appeal followed.