Opinion ID: 1361921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Oberti Analysis Applied to This Case

Text: We now turn to whether the Board's actions with respect to the 2005-2006 IEP pass muster under the test we have adopted, which both the district court and hearing officer referenced and applied. [5] Our review is against the backdrop of the ultimate conclusion of the IEP, which resolved that P. would be in the regular classroom 74% of the time, and Dr. Whitbread's statements that P.'s regular-classroom time should be gradually ramped up to 80%. The first prong of the test asks whether a student can be satisfactorily educated in the regular classroom with the benefit of supplemental aids and services. As noted, we also consider whether the school made reasonable efforts to accommodate the student, the benefits and drawbacks to the student of full-time integration into the regular classroom, and the possible negative impact on other students of the disabled student's presence. Although, in light of the improvements in P.'s behavior, there did not appear to be a significant negative impact on other students arising from his inclusion in the regular classroom, we see no error in the district court's conclusions that P. could not be educated in the regular class room full-time [6] and that the school had made significant efforts to integrate P. to the maximum extent possible. The school utilized a variety of supplemental aids, including several additional professionals, and modified the curriculum appropriately. Moreover, the hearing officer permissibly relied on the testimony of Dr. Whitbread that P. required pull-out services for reading, math, and speech therapy. See Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir.1995) (affirming adequacy of IEP when the school offered a variety of supplemental aids and services, coupled with varying degrees of placement in the regular classroom to mainstream [the student] to the maximum extent appropriate); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050 (affirming some special-classroom instruction when the school has taken creative steps to provide [the student] as much access to nonhandicapped students as it can, while providing him an education that is tailored to his unique needs). We therefore agree with this district court's conclusion that the evidence produced during the administrative proceeding demonstrates that education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, could not be achieved satisfactorily for the 2005-2006 school year. P., 512 F.Supp.2d at 108. Turning to the second prong of the test, we must assess whether the school has included the child in school programs with nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropriate. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218. Continuing to keep in mind that the IEP mandated 74% inclusion in the regular classroom, as opposed to P.'s parents' proposed 80%a difference of approximately 2-3 hours per weekwe find no error in the district court's conclusion that, given P.'s need for some specialized instruction outside the regular classroom, he was mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate. P. argues that this Court should adopt a presumption that a student should be placed in a regular classroom 80% of the time and contends that the district court erred by failing to apply such a presumption. P. bases this argument on a class-action settlement in which the Connecticut State Department of Education agreed that it would be a desired outcome[ ] for disabled students to spend 80% of the school day with non-disabled students. Recognizing that Connecticut school authorities may have found this percentage figure useful, we conclude that mandating such a percentage in every case would be inconsistent with the IDEA's directive that schools take an individualized approach to each student. See Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 363 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the IDEA requires special education and related services tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child) (internal quotation marks omitted); Briggs, 882 F.2d at 692 (noting that the presumption in favor of mainstreaming must be weighed against the importance of providing an appropriate education to handicapped students); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050 (noting that the IDEA does not envision an all-or-nothing approach, but a continuum of services on which the best program for each child may be identified). We do not think that 80% is presumptively adequate or that less than 80% is presumptively inadequate. Children with disabilities must be educated with their non-disabled peers [t]o the maximum extent appropriate, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122. As the word appropriate suggests, the objective of providing an education tailored to each student's particular needs does not admit of statistical generalizations. While including students in the regular classroom as much as is practicable is undoubtedly a central goal of the IDEA, schools must attempt to achieve that goal in light of the equally important objective of providing an education appropriately tailored to each student's particular needs. See Bd. of Educ. of Murphysboro v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir.1994) (stating that least-restrictive-environment requirement was not developed to promote integration with non-disabled peers at the expense of other IDEA educational requirements). We recognize and appreciate P.'s parents' dedicated advocacy on his behalf. But the evidence before the hearing officer and the records of the several PPT meetings devoted to developing P.'s 2005-2006 IEP demonstrate that the school fulfilled its duty under the IDEA to craft a tailored educational plan that included P. in regular classes to the maximum extent appropriate. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the school's actions were sufficient under the two-pronged test and that the 2005-2006 IEP placed P. in the least restrictive environment under the IDEA.