Opinion ID: 590900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tactical Reasons

Text: 22 Vermont permits strict liability and negligence to be presented to juries as alternative theories of recovery, see, e.g., Brennen v. Mogul Corp., 557 A.2d 870, 870-72 (1989), though no court in Vermont has ruled specifically on whether negligence is subsumed within the theory of strict liability, that is, whether a finding of negligence but a finding of no strict liability are inconsistent with one another. Defendant asserts it had no reason therefore to object to the form of the jury charge because findings of strict liability but no negligence--the opposite of which is presently before us--are not inconsistent. The jury instructions and questions submitted on the verdict form do not support defendant's position. Both expressly provided that the jury might find Pacific was negligent but not strictly liable. 23 For instance, in his instructions Judge Coffrin stated: [w]hether or not you find Defendant Pacific strictly liable you must go on to consider the Plaintiff's next claim against Pacific, the claim that Pacific was negligent. Defendant's proffered excuse for not objecting to the charge would only make sense logically if the district court had given a charge in the reverse order: if you find defendant not strictly liable, you must also find it not negligent. On the other hand whether or not you have already found defendant negligent you may go on to determine whether it is strictly liable. In addition, in both verdict forms, the jury is asked to determine whether defendant was negligent after it has first determined if defendant was strictly liable. Again, defendant's reason for failing to object would make sense only if the questions posed to the jury were in reverse order. 24 Failure to object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51; Hagelthorn v. Kennecott, 710 F.2d 76, 85 (2d Cir.1983). Surely litigants do not get another opportunity to assign as error an allegedly incorrect charge simply because the jury's verdict comports with the trial court's instructions. See Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545 F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir.1976) (objection to allegedly inconsistent verdicts waived when party failed to object to charge which instructed jury you must consider and make a separate determination as to this second or alternative theory no matter how you decide the [first] theory), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938, 97 S.Ct. 2650, 53 L.Ed.2d 256 (1977).