Opinion ID: 1699323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: IAOC During Jury Selection

Text: In his second claim, Pietri asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective during the jury selection process. The trial court held that this claim, or a variation of it, was decided adversely to Pietri on direct appeal and is, therefore, procedurally barred. In his direct appeal, Pietri raised two issues regarding challenges for cause. As a guilt phase issue, Pietri argued that the trial court erred when it denied his challenges for cause. See Pietri, 644 So.2d at 1350 n. 6. This Court held that, pursuant to Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990), the issue had not been preserved for review because Pietri's counsel had failed to identify, at trial, a specific juror that he would have excused. See Pietri, 644 So.2d at 1352. The second issue was raised as a penalty phase claim. Pietri asserted that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause of a juror who would automatically vote for death if someone was convicted of the first-degree murder of a police officer. See id. at 1350 n. 6. With respect to that issue, we wrote: Pietri claims the trial court should have excused juror Howard Carroll for cause because he said during voir dire that he would automatically vote for the death penalty if there was a verdict of first-degree murder with a police officer as a victim. The defense challenged Carroll for cause specifically because of his views on the death penalty and renewed that motion before the penalty phase began. After Pietri's counsel initially challenged Carroll, the judge explained the system of aggravating and mitigating factors, and Carroll said he could weigh those factors in making a sentencing recommendation. Pietri's counsel challenged Carroll for cause because of his views on the death penalty. But when he sought additional peremptory challenges, he failed to identify Carroll as a juror he would have struck peremptorily. Thus, this issue has not been preserved for our review. See Trotter, 576 So.2d at 693. The fact that Pietri again challenged Carroll for cause before the penalty phase does not preserve this issue. Id. at 1353. As previously noted, the postconviction trial court summarily denied Pietri's instant claim, finding it had been presented and decided adversely to him on direct appeal. The trial court's summary denial was in error. It is well recognized that a defendant may not couch a claim decided adversely to him on direct appeal in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel in an attempt to circumvent the rule that postconviction may not serve as a second appeal. See Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.1995). However, that is not what Pietri is attempting to do here. The merits of this claim were not decided adversely to Pietri on direct appeal. Instead, this Court held that the issue had not been preserved for review. See id. at 1352-53. Pietri is now timely asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, maintaining that trial counsel should have properly preserved the issue for review. However, while the trial court's justification for denial of this claim was erroneous, its ultimate conclusion that the claim should be denied was proper because Pietri cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. We have explained that a court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986). We recently held that [t]o establish prejudice, `[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Gaskin v. State, 822 So.2d 1243, 1246-47 (Fla.2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In the instant action, it is unnecessary to determine if the performance by trial counsel was deficient for failing to properly preserve the issue concerning Pietri's challenge for cause of juror Carroll because even if the issue had been properly preserved, it is clear the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause was not in error. Therefore, Pietri has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. During voir dire, juror Carroll responded to inquiry and made the following statement: I have to say if the verdict came down from the jury as being guilty of first degree murder, then I would have a stronger opinion about the Defendant killing a police officer than not a police officer. Defense counsel, Peter Birch, then asked juror Carroll: Would you automatically vote for the death penalty if there was a verdict of first degree murder as to a police officer? Juror Carroll's response was I would. Subsequently, defense counsel challenged Mr. Carroll's placement on the jury based on his position on the death penalty. The court and state attorney then conducted additional questioning of the challenged juror. The judge then explained what would occur during the penalty phase with regard to the presentation of evidence in support of both aggravating and mitigating factors, and the law that a juror must follow in finding and weighing the factors prior to voting on whether to impose the death penalty. The record reflects that at the conclusion of the additional questioning and upon being provided the appropriate criteria, juror Carroll affirmed that he could follow the law and would not automatically vote for death simply upon the existence of a verdict of guilt. Jurors who initially may express firm views pertaining to the death penalty are permitted to serve if they clearly indicate an ability to abide by the trial court's instructions. See Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637, 644 (Fla.1995); Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla.1995); Penn v. State, 574 So.2d 1079, 1080-81 (Fla.1991). We have held that: The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court. Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984). In applying this test, if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror possesses the state of mind necessary to render an impartial recommendation as to punishment, the juror must be excused for cause. Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985). Bryant, 656 So.2d at 428 (citations omitted). Further, in Johnson, we reasoned: On this question, the trial court is in the best position to observe the attitude and demeanor of the juror and to gauge the quality of the juror's responses. If there is competent record support for the trial court's conclusions regarding rehabilitation, then the appellate courts of this state will not reverse the determination on appeal based on a cold record. Johnson, 660 So.2d at 644. In Penn, a prospective juror initially indicated that he strongly favored the death penalty. See Penn, 574 So.2d at 1080. After questioning by the court and the state, the prospective juror said that he would follow the law as instructed. See id. This Court held in that decision that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to excuse the juror for cause because he had demonstrated his competency by stating that he would base his decision on the evidence and instructions. See id. at 1081. Similarly, in Bryant, during initial questioning, six prospective jurors expressed strong support of the death penalty and a predisposition to impose the death penalty if the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. See Bryant, 656 So.2d at 428. However, during questioning by the state, five of the six jurors stated that they would either follow the court's instructions or would weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether death was the appropriate sentence. See id. As in Penn, this Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to excuse those five jurors for cause. See id. Juror Carroll initially indicated that he was predisposed to vote for a sentence of death when a defendant is found guilty of the first-degree murder of a police officer. However, after receiving information concerning the controlling law, Carroll clearly expressed that he would be a proper juror. He clearly indicated that he would follow the law and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. Therefore, as in Bryant and Penn, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pietri's challenge for cause of juror Carroll. Because the trial court's ruling was not erroneous, Pietri has failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to properly preserve this issue for appeal. Pietri's second claim is therefore denied.