Opinion ID: 1262796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion and Retention of Prospective Jurors

Text: On appeal, we defer to the trial court's decision to exclude or retain prospective jurors because the trial judge has seen and heard each member of the venire, and is in a better position than this Court to decide whether something will prevent or substantially impair a particular person's performance of his or her duties as a juror. Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 88, 116 L.Ed.2d 60 (1991). Accordingly, a trial court's decision on these issues will not be reversed on appeal without a showing of manifest error. Id. Stewart argues that Vernon Carter should not have been excused for cause merely because he said my Bible belief says thou shalt not kill, and I just couldn't give someone the death penalty. According to Stewart, Carter later rehabilitated himself by indicating he could follow the court's instructions and that he could consider any penalty provided by law. Any question as to the propriety of the trial court's exercise of its discretion to exclude Carter is laid to rest by Carter's final answers which follow. THE COURT: Having considered the evidence in this case, could you under any circumstances give this man the death sentence? MR. CARTER: (Witness shakes his head in the negative.) My Bible belief is that thou shalt not kill. THE COURT: So your answer would be what; you have to tell us. MR. CARTER: No. THE COURT: You're saying no. I excuse this witness for cause on my own motion, it's obvious to me that he cannot consider it. Next, Stewart argues that the court should have excluded Nancy Brown, the wife of a Bedford City policeman, for cause. In support of this argument, Stewart points out Brown's initial statement that in most cases she would believe a police officer's testimony when it conflicted with a non-police officer's testimony. Then Stewart notes the fact that Brown was the wife of a police officer in [this] small community. Stewart concludes that these two factors meant that Brown was likely subjected to a police officer's perspective (her husband's) on the killings which would render her partial and unable to substantially perform a juror's duties. We do not agree. Brown's later voir dire examination made it clear that she would not necessarily accept a police officer's testimony that conflicted with other testimony. She said you have to weigh both options, observe whatever it is you get from those persons. Hence, her willingness to accept a police officer's statement in most cases did not disqualify her as a juror. See O'Dell, 234 Va. at 694, 364 S.E.2d at 503. Nor did Stewart establish a basis for disqualification merely because of Brown's marriage to a local police officer. Considering Brown's assurances that she could and would decide the case based on the evidence, and considering Stewart's failure to show that Brown had no more information about the case than what she had read in the newspapers some time before the trial, we conclude that Stewart has shown no manifest error in the court's retention of Brown as a prospective juror.