Opinion ID: 1628838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Absence of Statutory Aggravators in Information

Text: Gill next argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash the information and exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing him to death because the information did not plead the statutory aggravators later submitted in the penalty phase. This, he contends, is required by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Gill's argument is based on the premise that while section 565.020 ostensibly establishes a single offense of first-degree murder, the statutes delineate two separate crimes: unaggravated first-degree murder, which does not require proof of a statutory aggravator and carries a maximum sentence of life without parole, and aggravated first-degree murder, which requires the additional element of at least one statutory aggravator and carries a maximum sentence of death. Because the information did not plead any statutory aggravators, Gill claims he was charged only with unaggravated first-degree murder, and, therefore, the court exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing him to death. This Court has repeatedly rejected this argument. E.g., State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 171 (Mo. banc 2002). Missouri's statutory scheme recognizes a single offense of murder with a maximum sentence of death, and the required presence of aggravating facts or circumstances to result in this sentence in no way increases this maximum penalty. Id. Gill also argues that this rationale is contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), but Blakely is inapposite because in that case, as in Apprendi and Ring , the trial judge increased the defendant's sentence without the required finding of fact by the jury. Here, the jury made all factual findings leading to Gill's conviction and sentence.