Opinion ID: 2038757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retrial or Successive Prosecution?

Text: ¶ 25. The State contends that its plan to retry Henning on three counts of bail jumping is not barred by double jeopardy because double jeopardy imposes no limitation whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction reversed. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 131 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720). The State asserts that the court of appeals erred in preemptively foreclosing the possibility that Henning could be retried on the overturned bail jumping convictions. ¶ 26. Henning counters that double jeopardy does apply and does bar a retrial of the bail jumping charge. He insists that this case falls outside of the continuing jeopardy rule. Henning asserts that he cannot be successively prosecuted for bail jumping in this situation in which bail jumping is predicated on the commission of a new crime because the bail jumping offense and the new crime are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Because there was an acquittal on the new crime (possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver), any prosecution based on that crime or on a lesser-included offense is a successive prosecution that violates double jeopardy. ¶ 27. As we examine this situation, several principles are clear: Henning was acquitted of (1) possessing THC with intent to deliver; and (2) possessing LSD with intent to deliver. Consequently, he may not be charged with these same offenses in a second prosecution after acquittal. Moreover, he may not be charged with simple possession of THC or simple possession of LSD because these charges would violate Blockburger in that the lesser-included offense in each instance is the same offense as the offense of which Henning was acquitted. The lesser-included offense does not require proof of a fact which the greater offense does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. ¶ 28. If there were a retrial of bail jumping charges, Henning could not be tried for these charges on a theory that he had violated the conditions of his bond by possessing THC or LSD with intent to deliver because those two charges have already been decided against the State. If nothing else, the defendant could assert collateral estoppel. ¶ 29. The issue to be decided is whether the defendant could be retried for bail jumping on a different theory, that is, bail jumping predicated on the commission of the crime of simple possession of THC or LSD. ¶ 30. Henning devotes the bulk of his argument trying to establish that, for the purposes of successive prosecution, the elements of the substantive offense (possession with intent to deliver) are incorporated within the elements of bail jumping, and that therefore the two are the same offense as a matter of law. For this he relies on Dixon. ¶ 31. In Dixon, the defendant was arrested for second-degree murder and was released on bond. Id. at 691. His release form specified that he was not to commit any criminal offense. Id. He was subsequently arrested and indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Id. Under local procedure in the District of Columbia, the court issued an order requiring the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. After the show-cause hearing, the court concluded that the government had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of drugs and that those drugs were possessed with intent to deliver. Id. The court found the defendant guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to 180 days in jail. Id. at 691-92. He later moved to dismiss the cocaine indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 692. ¶ 32. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the indictment. Writing for himself and Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia wrote: Because Dixon's drug offense did not include any element not contained in his previous contempt offense, his subsequent prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The Court provided the following explanation: In this situation, in which the contempt sanction is imposed for violating the order through commission of the incorporated drug offense, the later attempt to prosecute Dixon for the drug offense resembles the situation that produced our judgment of double jeopardy in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam). There we held that a subsequent prosecution for robbery with a firearm was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant had already been tried for felony murder based on the same underlying felony. We have described our terse per curiam in Harris as standing for the proposition that, for double jeopardy purposes, the crime generally described as felony murder is not a separate offense distinct from its various elements. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1980). So too here, the crime of violating a condition of release cannot be abstracted from the element of the violated condition. The Dixon court order incorporated the entire governing criminal code in the same manner as the Harris felony-murder statute incorporated the several enumerated felonies. Here, as in Harris, the underlying substantive criminal offense is a species of lesser-included offense. Vitale, supra, at 420. Id. at 698 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). ¶33. Three other justicesWhite, Stevens, and Souterconcurred in the judgment of dismissal on different grounds. Justice Scalia's incorporation theory was able to command only two votes. Consequently, the holding in Grady that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecutedwas overruled. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510. ¶34. In the aftermath of Dixon, one can imagine a situation in which a defendant is prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, for an offense committed while the defendant is on pretrial release. If the defendant is tried on this single drug charge and acquitted and then the state turns around and brings a subsequent charge for bail jumping based on the crime of simple possession of the same controlled substance, this court would be faced with a situation comparable to Dixon, Harris, or Kurzawa that is, a second or subsequent or successive prosecution of the defendant initiated at a different time. ¶35. In that situation, according to Kurzawa, this court would engage in a Blockburger analysis. We believe that Blockburger, and the case law developed around it, adequately protect the interests embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause. Under Blockburger, [1] the state cannot successively prosecute a defendant for two offenses unless each offense necessarily requires proof of an element the other does not. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d at 524. [2] Neither can the state prosecute an offense whose elements are `incorporated' into the elements of an offense already prosecuted. Finally, [3] the state cannot relitigate factual issues that have already been adjudicated to the defendant's benefit in an earlier prosecution. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). ¶36. This language, which shows some willingness to embrace the incorporation theory, must be put in the context of two separately initiated prosecutions, one of which would come to trial subsequent to the first prosecution after there had been an acquittal or a conviction on the other prosecution. ¶37. The Henning case is different. This case involved five simultaneous charges in a single prosecutionfive charges that went to trial at the same time. This case does not involve a second or subsequent or successive prosecution. Five charges filed at the same time do not implicate double jeopardy unless, after conviction, they violate double jeopardy's prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717. Here, if Henning had been convicted of all five offenses, he would not have had a double jeopardy claim, even if we assume that the three bail jumping charges incorporated all the elements of, say, possession with intent to deliver THC. Henning would not have had a double jeopardy claim for multiple punishments because in this line of analysis the Blockburger test is now seen as simply a rule of construction creating a rebuttable prescription of sameness. Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶ 24 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L. Rev. 1807, 1819 (1997) (citing cases)). ¶38. As we said in Davison, Looking then solely to cumulative punishments imposed in a single prosecution for the same offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). Even if the crimes are the same under Blockburger, if it is evident that a state legislature intended to authorize cumulative punishments, a court's inquiry is at an end. Johnson, 467 U.S. [493], at 499 n.8 [(1984)]; see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985). . . . . We read the Supreme Court as saying that when a defendant is convicted under more than one statute for a single act or transaction and the charges constitute the same offense because they are identical in law and fact, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits cumulative punishments from these convictions unless the relevant legislative body intended to authorize cumulative punishments. Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶ 28, 30. ¶ 39. In Wisconsin, bail jumping and the crime underlying a bail jumping charge are distinct and separate offenses for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 53, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997) (citing State v. Harris, 190 Wis. 2d 718, 724, 528 N.W.2d 7 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nelson, 146 Wis. 2d 442, 449, 432 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1988)), review denied 147 Wis. 2d 890, 436 N.W.2d 30 (1988)). These cases conclusively demonstrate that the legislature's purpose in enacting bail jumping laws was to authorize multiple punishments to promote multiple interests. [B]ail jumping laws are intended not only to deter bail jumping, but also to enhance the effective administration of justice in the courts. . . . [C]ourts impose bond conditions with the intent to protect members of the community . . . and prevent a defendant from violating the law. Jacobus, 208 Wis. 2d at 52. ¶ 40. These principles can coexist in harmony with the theory that a retrial of bail jumping charges would constitute continuing jeopardy. They are shattered if we determine that a retrial of bail jumping charges would constitute separate, successive prosecutions with respect to the drug charges of which Henning was acquitted. ¶ 41. Thus, the critical question is this: When a jury, in a multicount trial, both convicts and acquits, and an appellate court then overturns the conviction or convictions, do the acquitted charges pose any direct bar to retrial of the reversed convictions? After reviewing the analyses of relevant authorities, we conclude that an acquittal in these circumstances is not equivalent to a first prosecution in a successive prosecution scenario: an acquittal poses no direct bar to retrial on the reversed charges. Thus, even if we were to accept Henning's supposition that bail jumping and the underlying offense for the bail jumping are the same for double jeopardy purposes, there is still no direct double jeopardy bar to retrying him on convictions overturned on appeal because the retrial involves continuing jeopardy. ¶ 42. In the ensuing analysis, we rely on principles that have been drawn from two interrelated lines of cases addressing double jeopardy: (1) retrial following a conviction overturned on appeal; and (2) retrial following a mistrial. ¶ 43. Like a retrial after reversal of a conviction, [m]ultiple trials on a single charge are not prohibited if the first trial resulted in a mistrial that was justified under the manifest necessity doctrine or was requested or consented to by the defense (absent judicial or prosecutorial overreaching that is aimed at forcing the mistrial). 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 25.1(g)(4) (2d ed. 1999). Both situations are exceptions to the general rule that a second trial is a successive prosecution: [I]n a case of a retrial after a successful appeal from a conviction, the concept of continuing jeopardy on the offense for which the defendant was convicted applies, thereby making retrial on that offense permissible. In a slightly different context, the defendant's right to have the need for a retrial measured by the strict manifest necessity standard of United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), does not exist if the mistrial was granted at the defendant's request. Both the trial after the appeal and the trial after the mistrial are, in a sense, a second prosecution for the same offense, but, in both situations, the policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require prohibition of the second trial. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). ¶ 44. Double jeopardy principles are often difficult to apply, [10] and this difficulty is magnified when, on appeal, the issues involve multi-count indictments that produce different results on different charges. Courts that have addressed such situations handle these complex situations as if each different charge proceeds along a parallel track. The termination of jeopardy on one track does not directly impact charges on the different parallel tracks. In other words, when jeopardy on one count of a multi-count complaint terminates, this does not mean that other counts brought simultaneously become subject to successive prosecution analysis. ¶ 45. This analysis was well stated in Mauk v. State, 605 A.2d 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), [11] where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals issued a scholarly opinion about the retrial of particular charges in a multi-count indictment when jeopardy has terminated on some but not all charges. The defendant stood trial on a multi-count indictment that included possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and simple possession of marijuana. Id. at 158. The jury could not reach a verdict on the possession with intent to deliver charge, and the court declared a mistrial on that count. At the same time, the jury convicted the defendant of the simple possession charge. Id. ¶ 46. The defendant moved to preclude retrial of the possession with intent to deliver charge on double jeopardy grounds. The motion was denied, and the defendant appealed. On appeal, the court considered the defendant's syllogism: (1) the defendant had been placed in jeopardy once because he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced (and had even served his sentence) on the simple possession charge; (2) simple possession and possession with intent to deliver are the same for double jeopardy purposes; (3) therefore, retrying the defendant on a charge of possession with intent to deliver would place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Id. at 159. ¶ 47. The court concluded that there was no double jeopardy bar to the retrial. The appellant's problem is that he points to an impact that would be legally and logically compelling in a context involving sequential jeopardy but he misapplies it to a very different context involving continuing jeopardy. His syllogism is a valid one and would be persuasive in an appropriate setting. Id. at 160. Thus, even though the new trial on the mistried possession with intent to deliver charge would be for the same offense, the Blockburger test is inapplicable to continuing jeopardy problems, not through any fault of its own but for the larger reason that the double jeopardy protection itself is inapplicable. Id. ¶ 48. Even though jeopardy on the simple possession count terminated when the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court noted that jeopardy on the possession with intent to deliver charge continued on through the mistrial and through the appellate process. The court explained: In the context of a multi-count indictment or a multi-indictment trial involving related offenses, multiple jeopardies for different manifestations of the same offense routinely begin simultaneously and run along parallel tracks. Clearly, no double jeopardy problem is involved. In a multi-count indictment for armed robbery, for instance, simultaneous jeopardies will be suffered for 1) armed robbery, 2) simple robbery, 3) theft, and 4) assault and battery. In a literal sense, this involves not simply double jeopardy or even triple jeopardy but quadruple jeopardy for the same offense, except that that is not the way we count. The reason there is no impediment to these apparently multiple parallel jeopardies is that double jeopardy essentially means former jeopardy and is primarily concerned, therefore, with regulating subsequent and sequential jeopardies. In the fundamentally different environment of simultaneous jeopardy, its only concern is with the avoidance of multiple punishment and that is a concern that is not addressed until the time for sentencing. While these routinely simultaneous jeopardies are legitimately proceeding along their parallel tracks, the termination of jeopardy on one or more of the tracksthrough the declaration of a mistrial, the entry of a nol pros, the granting of a directed verdict of acquittal, the rendering of a verdict of acquittal, the rendering of a verdict of conviction, etc.has no carry-over effect on the other jeopardies still proceeding along their own tracks. . . . . However long its life may be, the continuing original jeopardy for possession with intent to distribute will not be at all affected, under double jeopardy principles at least, by the fates of its doctrinal littermates, whose jeopardies began simultaneously with its own. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). Thus, where multiple offenses are consolidated in one trial, termination of jeopardy on one count does not directly impact the proceedings on other counts, even if the offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. ¶ 49. Mauk arrived at this conclusion by exhaustively analyzing United States Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court seems partial to the concept that termination of jeopardy on one count of a multi-count indictment does not terminate jeopardy for all counts, although the precise issue in this case has never been directly presented to the Court. For example, in Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), the defendant was charged with murder, robbery, and the respective lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and theft. Id. at 494. The defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser offenses of manslaughter and theft, and the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the greater-included offenses on double jeopardy grounds. Id. Ohio appellate courts affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at 496. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant could be tried on the greater-included offenses despite the guilty pleas to the lesser-included offenses. ¶ 50. In the Johnson opinion, the Court responded to the defendant's position that, if the state prosecuted the defendant for murder and robbery following conviction and sentencing for manslaughter and theft pursuant to the plea, the prosecution would violate double jeopardy's bar against retrial following conviction. The Court roundly rejected this argument: The answer to this contention seems obvious to us. Respondent was indicted on four related charges growing out of a murder and robbery. The grand jury returned a single indictment, and all four charges were embraced within a single prosecution. Respondent's argument is apparently based on the assumption that trial proceedings, like amoebae, are capable of a being infinitely subdivided, so that a determination of guilt and punishment on one count of a multicount indictment immediately raises a double jeopardy bar to continued prosecution on any remaining counts that are greater or lesser included offenses of the charge just concluded. We have never held that, and decline to hold it now. Id. at 500-01 (emphasis added). ¶ 51. The Johnson case admittedly addresses the termination of jeopardy following a conviction rather than following an acquittal, but it sets out an important principle. It has been read to stand for the proposition that the termination of jeopardy on the [lesser-included offense] counts had no crossover effect on other, already-charged counts. Mitchell Keiter, The Mauled Verdict: The Knoller Case Shows Why Res Judicata Should Protect Partial Convictions As Well As Acquittals, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 493, 497 (2002). ¶ 52. Later the same month, the Court issued another double jeopardy decision suggesting the same thing. In Richardson v. United States, the government brought three charges against the defendant: two counts of distributing a controlled substance, and one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. 468 U.S. 317, 318 (1984). The jury acquitted the defendant on one of the two distributing a controlled substance charges, but failed to reach consensus on the other two charges. Id. at 318-19. The trial court declared a mistrial on those two counts. Id. ¶ 53. The Court analyzed the defendant's claim that a retrial was prohibited by double jeopardy. The Court noted that it has constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a `hung jury' does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 324 (citing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 297-98 (1892)): [T]he protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. Since jeopardy attached here when the jury was sworn, petitioner's argument necessarily assumes that the judicial declaration of a mistrial was an event which terminated jeopardy in his case and which allowed him to assert a valid claim of double jeopardy. . . . . [W]e hold . . . that the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325. ¶ 54. In its discussion, the Court notably omitted any discussion of whether the other charge of which the defendant had been acquitted created a preclusive effect on retrial of the mistried counts. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Richardson to reject the argument that an acquittal on some counts of a multi-count prosecution should control whether a retrial of other mistried counts for the same conduct is barred by double jeopardy. Bailin, 977 F.2d at 274. In Bailin, the government brought 195 charges related to alleged improprieties the 12 defendants committed while traders at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Id. at 272. The jury acquitted the defendants on the majority of the counts, but could not reach a verdict on the remaining charges, and the federal district court declared a mistrial. Id. at 273. [A] `trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy,' even if there has been an acquittal on another count. Id. at 274 (emphasis added) (quoting Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324). Double jeopardy applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. Id. (quoting Richardson, 468 U.S at 324). The court concluded that, even when the defendant secured a partial acquittal in the first trial, the government could still retry the defendant following the mistrial. Id. ¶ 55. The court in Bailin held that double jeopardy did not apply and directed the focus of its analysis to estoppel. Id. at 275. Estoppel in a retrial context is more appropriately considered direct than collateral because the retrial is a continuation of the first trial, not a collateral event. Id. at 276. Bailin held that direct estoppel prevented the government from relitigating issues in the retrial that had been previously decided in the defendant's favor. Id. According to Bailin, Direct estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided. Id. (quoting Jeffers, 432 U.S. 137, 152). ¶ 56. Under the principles recognized in Mauk, Johnson, Richardson, and Bailin, even if we accepted defendant's contention that bail jumping and the underlying offense are the same for double jeopardy purposes, there is still no bar to retrying a reversed conviction for bail jumping because this is simply a case of continuing jeopardy, not successive prosecution. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals erred when it held that the State could not retry Henning for bail jumping. ¶ 57. However, it is important to note the protections defendants enjoy through issue preclusion. As the Seventh Circuit made clear, collateral estoppel applies where double jeopardy does not foreclose a second trial entirely, see Bailin, 977 F.2d at 275, and therefore when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443. According to Bailin, direct estoppel, like collateral estoppel, bar[s] the government from relitigating issues that were necessarily and finally decided in the defendant's favor by reason of the jury's partial acquittal on other counts. Bailin, 977 F.2d at 276. ¶ 58. While this court is sensitive to the dangers the Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to preventrepeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence, Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498-99 (citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957))these concerns must be balanced against the underpinnings of continuing jeopardy. Where there are multiple charges proceeding simultaneously, Ashe's estoppel principles provide a substantial bulwark that mitigates any harsh effects that the continuing jeopardy principle might work against a defendant. ¶ 59. Because the State already tried Henning unsuccessfully for possession with intent to deliver, the State cannot retry him on that issue. Therefore, the State cannot base a retrial for bail jumping on possession with intent to deliver. However, whether Henning is guilty of committing the crime of simple possession is not an issue that has been litigated in his favor. The State would not violate double jeopardy if it retried Henning for the bail jumping predicated upon simple possession.