Opinion ID: 2094180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Validity of Defendant's Other Sentences

Text: Defendant's next claim of error relates solely to his aggravated kidnapping conviction. According to defendant, the trial court committed reversible error because the elements of aggravated kidnapping that were included in the instruction to the jury varied from the elements alleged in the indictment. Defendant was indicted for aggravated kidnapping under section 10-2(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 10-2(a)(3)), which provides that a kidnapper is guilty of aggravated kidnapping when he [i]nflicts great bodily harm or commits another felony upon his victim. The indictment charged defendant under the latter alternative, alleging that he had committed both the felony of murder and the felony of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The fatal error was made, says defendant, when the trial court, instead of instructing the jury on the felony alternative, instructed the jury that one who kidnaps another commits aggravated kidnapping if he [i]nflicts great bodily harm upon the victim. As a result, defendant contends he was unconstitutionally convicted of an offense different from the one for which he was indicted. (See United States v. Miller (1985), 471 U.S. 130, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99; Stirone v. United States (1960), 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252; U.S. Const., amend. V (No person shall be held to answer for    [an] infamous crime, unless on [an]    indictment of a Grand Jury).) Defendant raises a claim under Federal constitutional law only. Because defendant's constitutional rights are at issue, we consider this argument despite his failure to object to the jury instruction (107 Ill.2d R. 615(a)). The leading cases upon which we must rest our decision are Miller and Stirone. In Stirone, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's substantial right to have a grand jury, a group of fellow citizens independent of a judge or prosecutor, enter charges against him was denied when the trial court effectively amended the indictment so as to allow the petit jury to consider whether the defendant violated the law under a theory different from the theory set forth in the indictment. The defendant had been indicted for unlawfully interfering with interstate commerce, specifically, interstate shipments of sand used to construct a steel mill. But at trial evidence was admitted concerning whether the defendant's conduct had also interfered with prospective interstate shipments of steel from that mill. More significantly, the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant if it found his conduct interfered with interstate shipments of either sand, as he was charged, or steel. ( Stirone, 361 U.S. at 213-15, 80 S.Ct. at 271-72, 4 L.Ed.2d at 254-56.) The Court stated the rule that a defendant cannot be tried on charges different, or at least broader, than those set forth in an indictment, and found that this rule had been violated because the trial court had, in effect, amended the indictment by allowing the jury to consider an additional charge. Yet, though the Court stated this rule in absolute terms ([t]he right to have the grand jury make the charge on its own judgment is a substantial right which cannot be taken away with or without court amendment ( Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218-19, 80 S.Ct. at 274, 4 L.Ed.2d at 258)), in laying out the reasons why the constructive amendment warranted reversal of the conviction, the Court suggested that such an amendment may not invariably warrant reversal. The Court's real concern in Stirone did not seem to be that the defendant was tried on a charge not in the indictment, but that he might have been convicted solely on that charge. And, significantly, the Court noted that it was unable to say whether the grand jury would have returned an indictment that included a charge of interference with interstate shipments of steel if such a charge had been presented to it. Therefore, reversal of the conviction seemed to be based not solely on the possibility that the jury convicted the defendant on a charge not set forth in the indictment, but also on the possibility that if this charge had been presented to the grand jury it would have been rejected. ( Stirone, 361 U.S. at 219, 80 S.Ct. at 274, 4 L.Ed.2d at 258.) In summary, Stirone established that a defendant's fifth amendment rights are violated when a trial court constructively amends an indictment by instructing a jury on a charge not included in the indictment, and thereby broadens the indictment; yet Stirone suggested that reversing a conviction is warranted only if the amendment caused prejudice to a defendant because it is not possible to tell, first, whether the conviction rested on the new charge and, second, whether the grand jury would have included the new charge in the indictment if it had been requested to consider it. The kinds of changes a court can make in an indictment without their being considered impermissible amendments were made clearer in Miller. The issue in Miller was whether a variance between the indictment, which charged three counts of mail fraud, and the proof at trial, which related to only two of the three counts, was significant enough to constitute a constructive amendment of the indictment. On appeal, the defendant, who was convicted on the two counts, argued that in presenting proof only as to two of three counts the State had tried him for a fraudulent scheme significantly narrower than the scheme charged by the grand jury. Trying him on the narrower charges, defendant argued, denied him his right to be tried only on charges entered by a grand jury. Fortifying his argument, defendant claimed that if the grand jury had been presented with the narrower fraudulent scheme, it might have been unwilling or unable to indict him. Unanimously rejecting these arguments, the Court held that a variance that merely narrows charges set forth in an indictment does not constitute an impermissible amendment because the defendant is still tried on charges included in the indictment. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed both Stirone and In re Bain (1887), 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849, the case that first declared the rule that a trial court cannot alter the charging part of an indictment, even to narrow it, because it cannot be determined whether a grand jury would have returned an altered indictment. ( Miller, 471 U.S. at 138-44, 105 S.Ct. at 1816-19, 85 L.Ed.2d at 106-10.) The Miller Court distinguished Stirone by the fact that there the proof at trial and jury instructions had broadened the indictment by adding a charge, while in Miller the indictment had been narrowed by the lack of proof as to one of three charges. The Miller Court then explained that there had been two holdings in Bain, one specific and one general. The Court explicitly rejected Bain 's specific holding that a narrowing of the indictment constitutes an amendment that renders the indictment void. ( Miller, 471 U.S. at 144, 105 S.Ct. at 1819, 85 L.Ed.2d at 110.) But the Court reaffirmed Bain `s more general proposition concerning the impermissibility of actual additions to the offenses alleged in an indictment. ( Miller, 471 U.S. at 144, 105 S.Ct. at 1819, 85 L.Ed.2d at 110.) In other words, an indictment is impermissibly amended only if it is so altered as to charge a different offense. Miller, 471 U.S. at 145, 105 S.Ct. at 1819, 85 L.Ed.2d at 110. Not Stirone, Miller, nor any other case we have found dealing with constructive amendments of indictments is factually similar to the present case, in which the indictment charged one alternative element of an offense and the jury instructions charged another, apparently by inadvertence. Nonetheless, guided by certain statements made in Stirone and Miller, we conclude that the trial court's error in instructing the jury did not amount to a constructive amendment of the indictment's aggravated kidnapping charge; defendant's fifth amendment rights were not violated. Although the trial court's instruction to the jury improperly changed an element of the offense of aggravated kidnapping, the effect was to narrow this charge, not to add a charge to the indictment: Whereas the indictment alleged the element of committing a felony (murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault), the jury instruction invoked the alternative element of doing great bodily harm to the victim; obviously, the conduct of doing great bodily harm to a person is inherent within, and narrower than, the conduct of murdering a person. Thus, by substituting a narrower alternative element for a broader element, the trial court improperly altered the indictment, but it did not impermissibly amend it, requiring reversal of defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction. This situation is similar to a defendant's being convicted of a lesser included offense, which is permissible. See People v. Lewis (1980), 83 Ill.2d 296, 300, 47 Ill. Dec. 314, 415 N.E.2d 319. Our conclusion is further supported by the lack of prejudice the erroneous instruction caused defendant. He was indicted for, prosecuted for, and convicted of the murder of Boyd. Because the same jury that convicted defendant of aggravated kidnapping also convicted him of murder, there is no doubt that, if the jury had been properly instructed that to find him guilty of aggravated kidnapping it had also to find that he had committed a murder, it still would have convicted him of aggravated kidnapping. Defendant does not, and cannot reasonably, argue that the erroneous instruction prejudiced his defense, for he knew he had to defend against a murder charge, and he did so by presenting an alibi, not by claiming that though he had done great bodily harm to Boyd he had not murdered her. In addition, the evidence the prosecution presented was not geared toward proving the narrower element of great bodily harm, but was sufficient to prove murder. Finally, we have no doubt that, if the jury had been presented with the charge that defendant committed aggravated kidnapping using the element of great bodily harm, it would have convicted him, for it found that sufficient evidence existed to support the element, as well as the separate felony, of murder. Therefore, we conclude, pursuant to the reasoning in Stirone and Miller, that although the trial judge erred by altering the charging terms of the indictment in the present case, because the alteration did not constitute an impermissible amendment of the indictment the trial judge did not commit reversible error, and defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction is valid. See United States v. Kuna (7th Cir.1985), 760 F.2d 813, 818 (constructive amendment occurs only when crime charged is `materially different or substantially altered at trial, [so that] it is impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved' or a `complex set of facts' is presented at trial distinctly different from set of facts in indictment, quoting United States v. Muelbl (7th Cir.1984), 739 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (also rejects per se rule that all judicial amendments are reversible error)); see also United States v. Thetford (5th Cir.1982), 676 F.2d 170 (instructing jury on theory of guilt not in indictment was harmless error because no evidence at trial supported theory and so defendant was not prejudiced); United States v. Marolda (9th Cir.1980), 615 F.2d 867 (jury instruction on definition of offense, which failed to include two elements alleged in indictment, served to amend indictment, and did so in such a way as to warrant reversal of conviction, because those elements were not surplusage, grand jury might not have indicted defendant on narrower charge, and theory of the defense was prejudiced). Defendant next claims that his conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault has to be reversed because the language force or threat of force in the criminal sexual assault statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-13(a)(1)), and bodily harm in the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14(a)(2)), is vague and overbroad, thus violating the constitutional guarantee of due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Defendant acknowledges this court's rejection of these identical arguments in People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill.2d 263, 113 Ill.Dec. 236, 515 N.E.2d 45, yet urges us to reconsider that holding. We will not. While we will not reverse defendant's conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault, we will reduce the extended-term sentence of 45 years' imprisonment he received. Aggravated criminal sexual assault is a Class X felony normally punishable by a sentence of from 6 to 30 years' imprisonment; however, if it is the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted, an extended-term sentence may be imposed. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 12-14(c), 1005-8-1(a)(3), 1005-8-2(a)(2).) But here murder was the most serious offense of which defendant was convicted. The sentencing judge therefore erred in imposing an extended-term sentence. Accordingly, we modify the sentence to 30 years' imprisonment. See People v. Whitehead (1987), 116 Ill.2d 425, 466, 108 Ill.Dec. 376, 508 N.E.2d 687.