Opinion ID: 2569463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Janet's motion to amend her amended answer

Text: After a responsive pleading is filed, a party may amend his or her pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. NRCP 15(a). Although the rule states that leave to amend shall be given when justice so requires, [t]his does not . . . mean that a trial judge may not, in a proper case, deny a motion to amend. If that were the intent, leave of court would not be required. Stephens v. Southern Nevada Music Co., 89 Nev. 104, 105, 507 P.2d 138, 139 (1973). Sufficient reasons to deny a motion to amend a pleading include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant. See id. at 105-06, 507 P.2d at 139. Furthermore, [a] motion for leave to amend pursuant to NRCP 15(a) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action in denying such a motion will not be held to be error in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. Connell v. Carl's Air Conditioning, 97 Nev. 436, 439, 634 P.2d 673, 675 (1981). In this case, the district court denied Janet's motion for leave to amend her amended answer because the parties relied on the validity of the premarital agreement, the motion was filed on the eve of trial and Janet was dilatory in requesting leave to amend. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Janet's motion for leave to amend her amended answer. The district court found that both parties relied on the validity of the agreement. Janet received $100,000.00 under the terms of the agreement. Additionally, Gary, in reliance on the validity of the agreement, continued to employ the same attorneys who drafted the agreement. Since Gary's attorneys were involved in the drafting and execution of the premarital agreement, they would have become key witnesses at the divorce trial had Janet been allowed to challenge the validity of the premarital agreement. Therefore, Janet's amendment to her amended answer would probably have resulted in the disqualification of Gary's attorneys under SCR 178, which generally prohibits a lawyer from trying a case if the lawyer is a necessary witness in the case. [2] By October of 1998, when Janet sought to amend her answer to challenge the validity of the premarital agreement, Gary had expended substantial sums in legal fees. Janet's counsel informed the court that she would not request the disqualification of Gary's attorneys. However, Janet cites no legal authority for the proposition that the opposing party may waive a violation of an ethical rule such as SCR 178. Therefore, we conclude that the district court's concern about the disqualification of Gary's attorneys was reasonable. After eleven months had passed since the filing of the complaint, Janet filed a motion to amend her amended answer seven weeks before trial. The district court found that Janet filed the motion on the eve of trial. Although Janet's counsel informed the court that she would not request a continuance of the trial, we agree with the district court that, in this multimillion dollar divorce case, a challenge to the validity of the premarital agreement made seven weeks before trial would have necessitated an extensive delay. The district court also found that Janet was dilatory in requesting leave to amend her amended answer. Janet contends that upon learning that Gary was attempting to differentiate between his income from KNC and his income from RDC, Janet promptly sought to amend her answer in order to challenge the validity of the premarital agreement. Janet also contends that she did not learn that Gary received income from sources other than KNC until after her expert analyzed financial documents obtained through discovery. We conclude that the district court's finding that Janet was dilatory in requesting leave to amend is supported by substantial evidence. The exhibits attached to the premarital agreement listed KNC and RDC as separate business entities. Also, Paragraph 6.1 of the agreement indicated that Gary's income for personal medical care and services (as a practicing physician) shall be community property. This paragraph further explained that all such salary or fees come to HUSBAND in the form of a salary from [KNC]. Furthermore, Janet was represented by counsel when she executed the agreement. This evidence indicates that Janet was aware that Gary's income from RDC was separate from income from KNC. Therefore, we conclude that the district court's finding that Janet was dilatory in her request for leave to amend was reasonable. In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Janet's motion for leave to amend her amended answer.