Opinion ID: 77969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Issue Preclusion

Text: Congress has vested the review of final judgments by a state's highest court within the sole jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine acknowledges the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction in this respect by prevent[ing] lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by `state-court losers' challenging `state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.' Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1199, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that lower federal courts could not entertain a proceeding to review substantive constitutional questions decided in a state court judgment); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (holding that Article III of the Constitution mandates that a claim of right denied by a judicial order of a state court may only be reviewed by the Supreme Court when federal questions are raised). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is distinct from issue preclusion, formerly collateral estoppel, although the two principles are closely related. Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, ex rel. Manager, 195 F.3d 1225, 1229 n. 7 (11th Cir.1999); see also Lance, 546 U.S. at 466, 126 S.Ct. at 1202. While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine pertains to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, issue preclusion relates to the question of when a federal court may decline to hear a matter of dispute within its jurisdiction. As to the latter inquiry, issue preclusion bars identical parties to a proceeding from relitigating issues that were adjudicated in the former proceeding. A court may give preclusive effect to a matter in dispute only when (1) that issue is identical to an issue decided in an earlier proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated on the merits; (3) the issue was decided in the earlier proceeding, meaning the prior determination of the issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier decision; and (4) the burden of proof in the earlier proceeding is at least as stringent as the burden of proof in the current proceeding. In re Southeast Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1552 (11th Cir.1995). Moreover, the party against whom issue preclusion is being sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Wingard v. Emerald Venture Florida LLC, 438 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). Deputy Harvey claims that by denying Mrs. Bates's motions in limine to exclude the officers' testimony and for a directed verdict in her felony obstruction trial, the Georgia trial court necessarily decided that the officers lawfully entered Mrs. Bates's house and had probable cause to arrest her, and the district court thus should have held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and issue preclusion bar Mrs. Bates from re-litigating those issues. We reject this argument. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments. . . . Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521-22. The doctrine's jurisdictional bar does not extend to federal actions that simply raise claims previously litigated in state court. Id. at 287 n. 2, 125 S.Ct. at 1524 n. 2. Mrs. Bates is not a state-court loser; nor does she complain of an injury caused by a state-court judgment. Not only was she acquitted in her felony obstruction trial, but the state court trial transcript reveals that the state court never held, either expressly or by fair inference, that the officers had consent to enter the Bates home, that their entry was otherwise lawful, or that they had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Bates. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Similarly, Mrs. Bates is not precluded from re-litigating the issues of consent or probable cause. In denying Mrs. Bates's motion in limine, the state court merely opted to rule on contemporaneous objections to proffered evidence. With respect to Mrs. Bates's directed verdict motion, the state court simply allowed the jury to decide whether Mrs. Bates violated Georgia's felony obstruction statute. [9] There was no finding by either the state court or the jury as to whether the officers lawfully entered the Bates home or had probable cause at the time they arrested Mrs. Bates. Because the questions of lawful entry and probable cause were not actually litigated and decided, issue preclusion is inapplicable.