Opinion ID: 1613387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Negligence

Text: To succeed on a claim of statutory negligence against a municipality, a plaintiff must first show the existence of a statute creating a mandatory duty to perform. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that he or she is among the class of persons the statute was enacted to protect; that the injuries were of a type contemplated by the statute; that the defendant violated the statute; and that the plaintiff's injuries proximately resulted from the violation. Thetford v. City of Clanton, 605 So.2d 835, 841-42 (Ala.1992). Where these elements exist, discretionary-function immunity will not shield the actors or their supervisors from liability. This is so because the statute itself removes the discretion on which the immunity is based. The dispute in Thetford in which this rule was appliedbegan when City of Clanton police officer Randy Morris investigated a report of domestic violence at the home of Michael and Shirley Ann Banks. Id. at 836-37. There, he discovered evidence that Mrs. Banks had suffered physical abuse at the hands of her husband, but he did not file a report of the incident as required by Ala.Code 1975, § 15-10-3(b). [6] When Mrs. Banks was subsequently beaten to death by Mr. Banks, Mary Thetford, the personal representative of Shirley Ann Banks, brought a wrongful-death action. The action alleged that the [City of] Clanton police were guilty of statutory negligence... because they failed to comply with § 15-10-3(b). 605 So.2d at 842. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the City of Clanton, and Thetford appealed. The dispositive issue on appeal as to the liability of the City of Clanton was proximate cause; the other elements of statutory negligence had been satisfied. Id. at 845 (Ingram, J., dissenting). More specifically, the issue as to the applicability of statutory negligence was whether the City's failure to comply with the terms of the statute proximately caused the [decedent's death]. Id. This Court affirmed the summary judgment. In doing so, it noted that although the statute requires the officer to file a report, [it] does not say where and does not say what should be done with the report. Id. at 842. Thus, it held, there was no basis on which a jury could ... conclude that the officer's failure to file the report required by the statute proximately caused the death of this victim of abuse. Id. [7] The Act at issue in this case exhibited none of the ambiguity that concerned the Court in Thetford. It expressly identified all the factors necessary to establish a claim of statutory negligence. First, the Act stated that if a driver, because of a prior conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, cannot produce a valid operator's license upon the demand of a law enforcement officer, then the vehicle shall be impounded regardless of ownership. Section 4(a)(2) and (c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the Act created and imposed upon law-enforcement officials a mandatory duty to perform. Second, the Legislature found and expressly declared in § 2 of the Act that a driver with a suspended license is more likely to be involved in a fatal accident than a properly licensed driver; that Alabamians who comply with the law are frequently victims of traffic accidents caused by unlicensed drivers; and that [a] large number of persons whose driving privilege has been suspended or revoked continue to drive regardless of the law. Thus, the Norrises, who were injured at the hands of Perkins, a driver whose driving privileges had been suspended or revoked because of a conviction for driving under the influence but who had, nevertheless, illegally operated a motor vehicle for four years preceding the accident, are clearly within the class of persons the Legislature sought to protect, and they suffered injuries of the type contemplated by the statute. Third, unlike the statute in Thetford, the Act provided the basis for a finding of proximate cause. [8] Section 4(c)(4) authorized the prompt release of an impounded vehicle to the registered owner, provided that the registered owner was not also the driver of the vehicle. The UTTCs issued in this case, however, list Perkins as the owner of the vehicle. In other words, the facts suggest that, had the vehicle been impounded as required by the Act, Perkins could not have procured its prompt release. If he had not, then he would not have been using it some five hours later when he collided with Coon's automobile. On these facts, a jury might reasonably conclude that Officer Perkins's violation of the Act proximately caused the death and the injuries that are the basis of this action. Cf. Williams, supra, 741 So.2d at 1075 (the discretionary-function `immunity from tort liability' granted by § 6-5-338(a) to the driver of an `authorized emergency vehicle' applies only when the driver is using an audible signal meeting statutory requirements and is meeting the requirements of any law requiring that visual signals be used on emergency vehicles); City of Birmingham v. Benson, 631 So.2d 902, 904 (Ala.1993) (police officer was not immune from suit for failing to provide protection, where an internal affairs investigator concluded that he had violated rules and regulations of the department, that he had neglected his duties, [and] that he had failed to take appropriate action). Because discretionary-function immunity evaporates upon the violation of a statute imposing a mandatory duty, the facts of this case support a claim of statutory negligence, which is not barred by the doctrine of discretionary-function immunity. For these reasons, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the City defendants (with the exception of then Mayor Folmar, as discussed in Part III of this opinion) on the claim of statutory negligence. Insofar as it did so, the judgment is reversed. However, it does not follow that the immunity defense to the Norrises' wantonness claims is subject to the same infirmity.