Opinion ID: 1058658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Clause (ii)Basis in Law

Text: The Feld Attorneys argue that the motions also complied with the law component of clause (ii), because the motions were warranted by existing law or by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. See Code § 8.01-271.1. Further narrowing the focus of this provision, the Feld Attorneys contend that the motions were warranted by existing law. In support of their argument, the Feld Attorneys rely primarily on two Rules of this Court, Rule 1:12 and Rule 4:15, and on Canon 3(B)(7) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct. The Feld Attorneys contend that the two cited Rules of Court provided an objectively reasonable basis for the motions because those Rules collectively require that counsel of record in a case be given notice and provided copies of all pleadings, motions, and other papers filed in a pending case. The Feld Attorneys also assert that Canon 3(B)(7) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, which severely restricts a judge's consideration of ex parte communications, provided an objectively reasonable basis in law supporting the motions. We disagree with these arguments. Initially, we observe that Rule 1:12 requires that an attorney serve other counsel of record with copies of all pleadings, motions, and other papers not required to be served otherwise. Id. This Rule imposes a duty on counsel, not on the circuit court judge hearing a case. Thus, while the Feld Attorneys may have had a legal basis under Rule 1:12 for arguing that Judge Stitt committed error in considering the petition for a rule to show cause when PETA had not served a copy of the petition on the Feld Attorneys, Rule 1:12 did not provide an objectively reasonable basis on which to argue that Judge Stitt had violated his ethical duties and had shown actual bias in considering the petition. The provisions of Rule 4:15 likewise did not provide an objectively reasonable basis supporting the Feld Attorneys' assertion that Judge Stitt violated his ethical obligations and had shown actual bias in considering the petition for a rule to show cause. Like Rule 1:12, the provisions of Rule 4:15 cited by the Feld Attorneys assign duties to counsel of record, not to a circuit court judge hearing a case. Thus, in providing that [r]easonable notice of the presentation of a motion shall be served on all counsel of record, Rule 4:15(b) imposes on counsel filing a written motion the duty to notify opposing counsel of the intent to argue a matter before the circuit court. Because the cited provisions in Rules 1:12 and 4:15 do not impose any duties on a circuit court judge, those provisions did not provide an objectively reasonable basis on which to argue that Judge Stitt had violated his ethical responsibilities and had shown actual bias. Therefore, we consider the remaining authority cited by the Feld Attorneys, Canon 3(B)(7) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, which provides in material part: A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that: (a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits are authorized; provided: (i)The judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and (ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond. Although the Canons of Judicial Conduct are not a source of law, we nevertheless consider the cited provision from the Canons because they are instructive on a central issue before us, namely, whether the Feld Attorneys had an objectively reasonable basis in law for contending that Judge Stitt violated his ethical duties in considering the ex parte petition and in issuing the rule to show cause. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 28, 630 S.E.2d 326, 331 (2006). Thus, we review Canon 3(B)(7) to determine whether it provided an objectively reasonable basis for the Feld Attorneys' motions. We first observe that Canon 3(B)(7) addresses ex parte communications. This provision plainly is intended to restrict private oral and written communications with a judge and does not encompass pleadings that have been filed as a matter of public record with the clerk of a circuit court. [5] In contrast to private communications prohibited under Canon 3(B)(7), a rule to show cause is a procedural mechanism, employed as part of the public record in a case, that serves to place matters at issue before a court. A court's entry of such a rule affords all parties in a case an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the allegations prior to the court making any substantive findings of fact or any conclusions of law. See James v. James, 263 Va. 474, 478-79, 562 S.E.2d 133, 135-36 (2002). The question remains, however, whether after reasonable inquiry by the Feld Attorneys, this provision in Canon 3(B)(7) provided an objectively reasonable basis for their argument that Judge Stitt's consideration of the petition and issuance of the rule to show cause was a violation of his ethical duties. See Code § 8.01-271.1. We conclude that the Feld Attorneys' argument based on Canon 3(B)(7) was not objectively reasonable. Reasonable inquiry by the Feld Attorneys would have shown that the routine practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County is to consider ex parte petitions for a rule to show cause and to issue rules to show cause upon the filing of a sufficient affidavit by the petitioning party. At the time the Feld Attorneys made the motions, there was a longstanding published order entered in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County stating: It is the practice of this Court to issue summons on a rule to show cause upon affidavit or ex parte evidence without notice. The [r]ule simply puts the matter at issue. . . . Notice to the opposing party always is given thereafter by service of process and opportunity to be heard. Fairfax County v. Alward, 33 Va. Cir. 28, 28 (Va. Cir. Ct.1993). The published order in Alward, available upon simple legal research, would have informed the Feld attorneys that Judge Stitt merely followed the routine practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County when he considered the petition and issued the rule to show cause. In addition, the record shows that counsel for PETA obtained this same information concerning this routine practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County by placing a telephone call to a deputy clerk of the circuit court. We are not persuaded by the Feld Attorneys' argument distinguishing the holding in Alward on the basis that it involved a chancery suit, rather than an action at law. [6] The holding in Alward was not based on such a distinction. Moreover, even if this distinction provided the Feld Attorneys a basis for arguing that Judge Stitt committed error in considering and issuing the rule to show cause in an action at law, that distinction did not provide an objectively reasonable basis for arguing that Judge Stitt acted unethically in doing so. We emphasize that the legal issue the Feld Attorneys were required to consider, in drafting the motions alleging unethical conduct against Judge Stitt, was whether there was a reasonable basis in law for arguing that Judge Stitt had engaged in unethical conduct, not whether there was a reasonable basis for arguing that the routine practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County was erroneous because that practice was in conflict with other legal authority. In their argument before this Court, the Feld Attorneys confuse these two separate issues. Although the Feld Attorneys correctly observe that local practice cannot alter substantive rights of parties provided by statute, Rules of Court, and case law of this Court, see Lee v. Mulford, 269 Va. 562, 566-67, 611 S.E.2d 349, 351 (2005), the Feld Attorneys did not argue in their motions that the local practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County conflicted with such legal authority. Instead, the Feld Attorneys argued that Judge Stitt acted unethically, when reasonable inquiry on their part would have shown that there was no basis for such a charge. Thus, even if the Feld Attorneys were warranted by law in advocating for the reversal of the routine practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, their allegations were not objectively reasonable in accusing Judge Stitt of unethical conduct simply because he followed that routine practice. Accordingly, we hold that the record supports the circuit court's award of sanctions on this separate basis that the Feld Attorneys' motions were not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, as required by clause (ii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1.