Opinion ID: 744671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of evidence on the assault charge and use

Text: 15 ENHANCEMENT. 16 In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, we must determine whether, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the crimes charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir.1994). 17 Old Chief argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the assault charge and, therefore, the use enhancement. Specifically, he argues that, assuming he did fire the shot at the victim, Anthony Calf Looking, there was no evidence that he acted with specific intent to do bodily harm, nor that the gunshot caused Calf Looking to fear immediate bodily harm. 18 The only uncontroverted occurrence regarding the assault is that the victim, Calf Looking, provoked the fight with Old Chief. Only one witness testified at trial that she actually saw Old Chief point the gun directly at Calf Looking and fire in his direction. 19 Once on the stand, Calf Looking apparently began to retreat from his earlier statements to the police. However, the prosecution witness's version of the events was corroborated by the investigating officer's testimony regarding his interview with Calf Looking the morning after the incident. Thus, despite the fact that the investigating officer's testimony impeaching Calf Looking may not be substantive evidence, it tends to bolster the direct testimony of the prosecution's key witness. Moreover, Calf Looking testified that he heard the shot, and that he ran because he must have been scared of Old Chief. 20 In addition, a rational fact finder could conclude that the testimony offered by Old Chief's two defense witnesses was not credible. Given the inconsistencies between the witnesses' accounts of the day's events, a rational fact finder could reasonably disregard both their testimony in favor of that of the prosecution witness. Thus, considering the prosecution witness's testimony, and Calf Looking's statements regarding his fear of Old Chief, a rational trier of fact could find sufficient evidence to convict Old Chief on the assault charge.IV. REFUSAL TO CONDUCT A POST-VERDICT EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 21 A district court's denial of a motion for a post-verdict evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 3235, 97 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). Old Chief argues that the district court should have conducted such a hearing to determine whether one juror's question to the judge and a second juror's whispers during the jury poll improperly influenced the jury's deliberations. 22 Despite Old Chief's attempt to characterize the whispers of one juror to another during the jury poll as an outside influence, he made no showing of improper external influence sufficient to warrant a post-verdict evidentiary hearing. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2750, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987)(holding that district court did not err in deciding that a post-verdict hearing was unnecessary, despite juror's allegations of excessive alcohol consumption and illegal drug use during deliberations). 23 This Court has held that where a trial court learns of a possible incident of jury misconduct, it is preferable to hold an evidentiary hearing 'to determine the precise nature of the extraneous information,' [internal citations omitted] [however,] not every allegation that extraneous information has reached the jury requires a full-dress hearing. United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir.1986)(emphasis added). Under Tanner and Langford, the jury's exposure or access to improper external influence guides the decision whether a court should conduct a post-verdict evidentiary hearing. 24 Here, the juror's rather innocuous question to the court during the poll- and the other juror's urging, if any,-did not imply any improper external influence on the jury's deliberations. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to contact the juror in order to hold a post-verdict evidentiary hearing. 25