Opinion ID: 1890564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Cluster Evidence Issue

Text: The Third District also held that the trial court erred in allowing the Castillos to refer at trial to an alleged link between Benlate and unspecified clusters of children born without eyes in Great Britain. The Third District held this was error and that the evidence was vague and indefinite and whatever relevance it had, it was greatly outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury. DuPont relies on Frazier v. Otis Elevator Co., 645 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), which holds that as a general rule evidence of the occurrence or non-occurrence of prior accidents is admissible only if it pertains to the use of the same type of appliance or equipment under substantially similar conditions. Frazier was remanded for a new trial because the trial court admitted evidence of other pallet jack accidents where it was not shown that the accidents involved the use of an Otis pallet jack under substantially similar conditions. Contrary to what DuPont argues here, this case does not require virtually per se reversal. Indeed, the Frazier court remanded and required the plaintiff to show that the accident involved the same product in substantially the same conditions. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Grau v. Branham, 761 So.2d 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Overall, broad discretion rests with the trial court in matters relating to the admissibility of relevant evidence, and that ruling will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.). The Castillos argue that they intended to allow Mrs. Castillo to tell the jury why she thought DuPont was liable for her son's birth defect, and that was because a reporter from London contacted her and told her he was investigating the defect in a cluster of children exposed to Benlate in London. The trial court reasoned that Mrs. Castillo could tell the jury what happened to her, how she heard about Benlate, and why she brought suit so long as the testimony was not hearsay, especially because the jury had concerns in voir dire about people suing big companies and looking for deep pockets. In the context of how this information was presented, the trial court was within its discretion to admit references to the so-called cluster. The evidence was not used to argue that Benlate caused a cluster of children to suffer the same birth defect as John Castillo's; rather, it was a part of Donna Castillo's history, how she came to believe that DuPont caused her son's defect, that she heard of a study in England from a reporter, got a copy, and that is why she sued DuPont. In context, and in light of the fact that DuPont implied she was suing deep pockets, it was relevant, and its probative value was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. For reasons expressed above, we quash the Third District's decision. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.