Opinion ID: 1263482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The New Scientific Evidence Claim

Text: Rucker argues that the state courts violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and to present a complete defense by denying his postconviction petition to require additional fingerprint testing of the gun found near Smith's body pursuant to the new state habeas cause of action enacted by the Arkansas Legislature in 2001. The firearm was tested for fingerprints during the initial murder investigation, but no identifiable prints were found. In the state courts, Rucker argued that additional tests should be performed using the latest technology, and that any prints found should be compared to those of four persons Rucker alleged might have committed the murder, and to a new state database containing some 600,000 sets of fingerprints. After an evidentiary hearing at which the chief latent prints examiner of the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory testified that no new technology would produce an identifiable print, the state courts denied relief on the ground that Rucker failed to show that the requested testing has the scientific potential to produce new noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-112-202(c)(1)(B) (2004). [2] This habeas claim is procedurally barred because Rucker raised no issue of federal constitutional law and cited no federal authority in the state courts. See Carney v. Fabian, 487 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir.) (federal due process violation must be specifically asserted in state court), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 721, 169 L.Ed.2d 564 (2007). Whether the state courts misinterpreted or misapplied the Arkansas statute authorizing state habeas relief based upon new scientific evidence is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Evenstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir.2006). Moreover, even if the federal claim had been raised in state court, Rucker cites no Supreme Court decision clearly establishing that the right to present a complete defense applies to postconviction proceedings, or that due process includes the right to postconviction testing using new technological advances. We did not resolve that due process issue in Tyler v. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696 (8th Cir.2005). Nor have our sister circuits resolved it. See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 106-08 (2d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1336-43 (11th Cir.2006); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 378-79 (4th Cir.2002), all actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rucker further argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering the fingerprint testing he requested under Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. We disagree. The good cause that authorizes discovery under Rule 6(a) requires a showing that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to [habeas] relief. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (quotation omitted). As Rucker's federal claim is procedurally barred because it was not raised in the state courts, he cannot satisfy this requirement. Moreover, the state courts' decision that Rucker failed to show more than a slight chance that additional testing would yield a favorable result was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.