Opinion ID: 802339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Government’s Appeal and Efforts to

Text: Determine Which Counts to Try Next Shortly thereafter, the government inquired “about rulings that [the Court] made excluding evidence,” asking the Court to clarify if it was “going to adhere to those; Pozo and Esteves and the things that were contained in the … 404(b) ruling.” (Id. at 49.) The Court responded as follows: “Absolutely. I don’t see – unless you can convince me otherwise, as to why those rulings – I know you feel otherwise – but on reflection I feel strongly that those rulings were appropriate. So I don’t expect I would be changing those rulings.” (Id. at 49-50.) On November 30, 2011, the 24 government filed a notice of appeal challenging those evidentiary rulings. 17 The next day, the government moved to try the remainder of the counts in the Indictment at the January 2012 retrial, though it stated it would be willing to sever the tax evasion counts upon Bergrin’s request. The Court held a hearing on December 8, 2011 to consider which counts to try next. Bergrin appeared at the hearing and asked the Court to stay proceedings pending our disposition of the government’s appeal of the evidentiary rulings. After consulting with the government, the Court suggested a second severance in which the drug-trafficking counts and the witness-tampering counts pertaining to the Esteves Plot would be severed and tried before the rest of the Indictment. 18 The government declined the Court’s suggestion, however, prompting Bergrin to file a severance motion. At an ensuing hearing on December 14, 2011, the government again requested that it be permitted to try the 17 As discussed infra in Part II.A, the government invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3731 as the basis for appellate jurisdiction. 18 Under that proposal, Count 5 of the Indictment – which charges a drug-trafficking conspiracy and lists the Kemo murder, the Pozo Plot, and the Esteves Plot as part of the conspiracy’s “manner and means” – would have been altered to delete allegations relating to the Kemo murder so that “the Government [would be precluded] from introducing any such evidence.” (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 352, at 1.) 25 entirety of its case against Bergrin, because “[t]he Kemo murder and the Esteves thing [were] not [disconnected] bookends” but rather were charged as “a racketeering RICO violation because” that was what they were. (Id. at 4436.) The Court, however, made clear that it would not accept the government’s request to “go forward with the Kemo allegations … in the” RICO counts: The concern I always had and the reason I severed out [the Kemo Murder Counts] was because of what I believed, and still do believe – and I think, frankly, the result of the jury being hung reflects what I had a concern about – is that charge, standing alone, for the reasons I stated in the severance, I always was concerned about the prejudice there would have been if [it] would have been tried with Esteves and all of the drug evidence that occurred subsequently. And I still feel the jury wouldn’t have been able to separate that out and decide the Kemo case just based on that case and the prior crime evidence that this Court didn’t let in. (Id. at 4433.) Trying the RICO counts next, the Court said, would unfairly expose Bergrin to a potential life sentence: The Court: … [I]n my opinion it would have been inherently unfair to have him convicted under a RICO – the way that was framed for the murder case facing a life in prison sentence tried that way. That’s how I felt and I still feel that way. And yet, you still feel insistent on that’s a fair trial, he should be facing that kind of penalty on the Kemo part of 26 the case when you already now saw a jury come back and couldn’t reach a verdict on that. Sure, if you get all your other evidence in he’ll get convicted on the Kemo murder part of the case and, you know, that’s what you want. [Government’s Counsel]: Well, Judge – The Court: And that’s the way you want to do it, and that’s what I have a real difference of opinion with. [Government’s Counsel]: I understand. The Court: And the Government, you know, they can charge a ham sandwich. I know that; you know that. So if you charge a RICO case on its face on the indictment, it doesn’t take a whole lot to charge a RICO case. (Id. at 4463-64.) Given that, in the Court’s view, the government’s case on the charges other than the Kemo Murder Counts and the related RICO counts was “very strong,” 19 that it could be proven without the witnesses who 19 The Court opined that, aside from the Kemo Murder Counts, the government had a “very clean, strong case,” with witnesses “more credible than Anthony Young and Castro type witnesses.” (Joint App. at 4461.) 27 had testified in the trial on the Kemo Murder Counts, and that it would warrant a “sentence that would reflect the severity of [those other charges],” the Court suggested that the government should not “spend the taxpayers’ money to come in here, put on [the Kemo Murder Counts] evidence again, [and] stand behind those kinds of witnesses again when [the government did not] have to do it.” (Id. at 4460.) In response to those concerns, the government invited the Court to dismiss the RICO counts if it believed “that Mr. Bergrin [could not] get a fair trial … as presently constituted.” (Id. at 4458.) The Court, however, refused to dismiss the Indictment’s RICO counts, stating that it had already “[done] that once … because at the time I still was concerned about the RICO allegations, quite frankly, mostly for the same reason.” (Id.)