Opinion ID: 1822047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: recognition and enforcement of a foreign country's judgment

Text: The United States Constitution requires that each state give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. [1] However, that provision of the Constitution does not bestow any right, privilege, or immunity in regard to the judgments of courts of foreign countries. Aetna Life Ins Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190, 32 S.Ct. 309, 310, 56 L.Ed. 398, 399 (1912). Instead, American courts generally hold that their recognition of foreign judgments is governed by the doctrine of comity. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895); Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017, 92 S.Ct. 1294, 31 L.Ed.2d 479 (1972); Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 109 (3d Cir.1969); Yoder v. Yoder, 24 Ohio App.2d 71, 263 N.E.2d 913, 914-15 (1970). The United States Supreme Court defined comity in 1895 as the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164, 16 S.Ct. at 143, 40 L.Ed. at 108. In the Guyot case, the United States Supreme Court outlined the basic requirements that must be met before an American court will recognize and enforce a judgment rendered in a foreign country: When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in a foreign court, unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given full credit and effect. 159 U.S. at 205-06, 16 S.Ct. at 159-60, 40 L.Ed. at 123. (Emphasis added.) One of the requirements mentioned by the United States Supreme Court as prerequisites for an American court to recognize and enforce a foreign country's judgment entered against an American citizen is that the citizen must have been given an opportunity to defend against the action filed against him in that foreign country's court. Implicit in that requirement is the need to notify an American defendant through acceptable service-of-process methods that a plaintiff has filed an action against him in another country's court. In Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635 (1946), the United States Supreme Court stated that a judgment, no matter where entered, would not be given legal effect, even as a matter of comity, if that judgment was obtained in violation of procedural due process. In order to further protect an American citizen against the entry of a foreign default judgment against him because of a plaintiff's failure to notify him through an acceptable method of service of process, the United States joined 24 other nations, including Israel, at The Hague, Netherlands, to sign the following multilateral agreement: Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force for the United States on February 10, 1969, and hereinafter referred to as the Hague Convention). Article 1 of the Hague Convention states that it shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit judicial or extrajudicial documents for service abroad. Because the Hague Convention has been held to have the status of a treaty, [2] under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, it is the supreme law of the land. [3] Generally, state courts, like this one, have held that the Hague Convention supersedes state service provisions by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. See Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1983); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.App.3d 755, 757-58, 177 Cal.Rptr. 155, 156 n. 1 (1981); Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (Ct.App.1980); Aspinall's Club Ltd. v. Aryeh, 86 A.D.2d 428, 450 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1982). There are three categories of permissible service of process methods set out in the Hague Convention. Process can be served by (1) the designated Central Authority of the receiving nation [4] (the designated Central Authority for the United States is the Justice Department), (2) various non-objectionable methods (i.e., service of process through diplomatic, consular, or postal channels), [5] or (3) any other method permitted by international agreements or the internal law of the receiving nation. [6] Parsons alleged in his motion to dismiss that he did not receive either an English or a French translation of the summons and complaint filed against him by Bank Leumi in Israel; that that fact constituted a defect in service that violated the Hague Convention; and, therefore, that that defect violated his procedural due process rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). We cannot accept Parsons's argument. Parsons's contention that the Hague Convention requires the service of either an English or French translation of the summons and complaint would be correct if Bank Leumi had chosen to effect service or process through the designated Central Authority for the United Statesthe Justice Department. See Arts. 2, 3, 5, 7, 20 U.S.T. at 362-63. The record indicates that service of process was not made through the Central Authority designated by the United States, but by means of an alternative method of service permitted by the United States. See Art. 19, 20 U.S.T. at 365. In this case, Bank Leumi sought to effect service by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). However, because it failed to receive acknowledgement of service from Parsons, Bank Leumi effected service upon Parsons through its attorney in Birmingham, Alabama, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(A). See Jugolinija v. Blue Heaven Mills, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 13, 15 (S.D.Ga.1986). Because service of process upon Parsons was not effected through this nation's designated Central Authority, but through an alternative method of service permitted under the Hague Convention, Bank Leumi was not required to provide him with either an English or a French translation of the summons and complaint served upon him; therefore, Parsons's argument that service of process upon him was ineffective under the Hague Convention is incorrect; we find, as did the trial court, that the procedures used for obtaining service of process complied with the Hague Convention. See Art. 15, 20 U.S.T. at 364. Finally, it should be noted that despite Parsons's attempt to contest the validity of the Israeli default judgment by asserting errors in law or in facts allegedly committed in the Israeli court proceeding, our judicial duty is not to retry the merits of that case. Our duty, as noted by the United States Supreme Court in Guyot, is only to ascertain whether the American defendant, Parsons, was subjected to such an unfair proceeding by the foreign court that this nation's policy of comity should not allow that judgment to be recognized and enforced through our court system. 159 U.S. at 202-03, 16 S.Ct. at 158, 40 L.Ed. at 122. Our review of the record does not indicate that the proceeding conducted against Parsons was unfair; in fact, the record indicates the opposite.