Opinion ID: 1184398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The finding by the trial court was supported by substantial evidence.

Text: After considering this evidence the trial court, in a written opinion, made the following finding of fact: The Lane County claims made against defendant W. Dean Fitzwater related to his actions as a director of Enz-A-Bac, not to his professional conduct. No evidence was adduced to suggest that the Board decision to issue the notes was predicated upon defendant's legal judgment, advice or opinion. Neither was it proved that the attitude of any director was influenced by the knowledge that defendant, a lawyer acquiesced in the decision to issue the unregistered notes. I find, therefore, on the basis of the evidence offered before this Court, defendant W. Dean Fitzwater was unaware that any claim might reasonably be asserted against him in his capacity of attorney as the result of his participation in the aforementioned decision until the Marion County action was filed.    [1] In appealing from that finding plaintiff contends:    The lower court concluded that the insured was not shown to be under a duty to give notice because it was not shown that he was aware that an action for malpractice might be brought. All that is required is that the insured have notice of facts indicating that it is reasonable to expect that a malpractice claim may be asserted or that a suit may be filed.    [2] (emphasis added) Upon reading the finding of fact by the trial court, as set forth above, we do not believe that it was confused by the distinction between the existence of a cause of action for malpractice and the reasonable expectation of a claim for malpractice. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that defendant was unaware that any claim for malpractice might reasonably be asserted. Plaintiff also argues that:    It is inconceivable that this potential claim would not immediately occur to any attorney that received the demand letter of March 19, 1970. A businessman-lawyer may wear two hats, but he knows that his layman associates will look to his lawyer's hat where there are legal foul-ups, as here. His neck was out and he knew it. We might agree that under the facts of this case an attorney experienced in securities matters would have recognized that a claim or suit for legal malpractice might reasonably be expected. We also recognize that there may have been sufficient evidence to support a finding of fact that at some time in 1970 or early 1971 this defendant should have been aware of that possibility. Cf. Falk v. Sul America Terrestres, supra . The question to be decided in this case, however, is whether the evidence was so strong as to be conclusive and to require a finding, as a matter of law, and to thereby nullify the finding of fact by this trial court to the contrary. During the trial of this case it appears that counsel for plaintiff expressly agreed with a statement by the trial court that the question I am ultimately going to have to decide is what a reasonable attorney would have done under like or similar circumstances. That was the question submitted by the plaintiff to the trial court for decision in this case. It is also a question which cannot be properly decided by hindsight, but which must be decided by a review of the various events and other facts of which the defendant became aware and as of the time of the occurrence of such events or other facts. The question of what a reasonable person would do under various circumstances, as in the usual negligence case, is usually a question of fact to be decided by the jury or, as in this case, by the trial court as the trier of the facts. This is ordinarily true even though the evidence in a case is uncontradicted, as in this case, if different inferences or conclusions may be reasonably drawn from such evidence. Thus, it is well established that even in a case in which the evidence is uncontradicted, the question whether a person has acted reasonably becomes a question of law when, and only when, from the facts, reasonable men can draw but one inference and that inference points unerringly to the conclusion that the person has not acted as a reasonable person would have acted under those circumstances. See Loibl v. Niemi, 214 Or. 172, 177, 327 P.2d 786, 789 (1958), and cases cited therein. See also Troupe v. Ledward, 238 Or. 531, 535, 395 P.2d 279 (1964), and Rickard v. Ellis, 230 Or. 46, 55, 368 P.2d 396 (1962), and cases cited therein. Although it may be said that this case involves a question of perception, rather than conduct, as such, we believe that these same rules are applicable. It may be contended that the language used by the trial court in this case in its findings of fact could have been more precise. We believe, however, that it is clear from its decision, taken as a whole, that what it found, in effect, was that although defendant was aware of facts which might reasonably be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit by holders of the notes against him and the other defendants in those cases as directors of the corporation, defendant was not aware of any act or omission which might reasonably be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit against him for malpractice as an attorney and that the trial court based that conclusion upon an inference from the fact that there was no evidence that the other directors had relied in any way upon his advice as an attorney. Indeed, there was no evidence that any of the other directors had expressed to the defendant any dissatisfaction with his services as an attorney at any time, even after being sued. Neither was there any evidence that any of the other directors had intimated in any way or at any time that a claim might be made against defendant for malpractice as an attorney. Under these facts, we are not prepared to hold that the trial court in this case was required, as a matter of law, to find that a reasonable attorney must have realized that his conduct as an attorney for the corporation might reasonably be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit for malpractice as an attorney, particularly one made by one of the persons with whom he had served as a director of this small corporation. Cf. Bernard v. National Guaranty Ins. Co., supra . [3] For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.