Opinion ID: 885468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Foreseeability and Proximate Cause

Text: ¶ 27 The causal issue of intervening acts of third parties normally involves questions of fact more properly left to the fact finder for resolution and, therefore, it is only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion regarding foreseeability that it is appropriate for a court to determine the issue as a matter of law. Lopez, ¶¶ 34-35, 986 P.2d 1081 (quoting Estate of Strever, 278 Mont. at 178, 924 P.2d at 674; Kiger v. State (1990), 245 Mont. 457, 462, 802 P.2d 1248, 1251). ¶ 28 Here, as in Lopez, we are concerned with whether Shawn's assault was a superseding cause of the harm incurred by LaTray which, if not reasonably foreseeable, would break the chain of causation and absolve the City of liability. See Lopez, ¶ 33, 986 P.2d 1081. In analyzing foreseeability in the context of proximate cause, this Court elucidated in Lopez that we are concerned with whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury incurred by the plaintiff. Lopez, ¶ 32, 986 P.2d 1081. The conduct at issue here, as the City suggests, was the officers' decision to allow Shawn to accompany them to the hospital and their alleged failure to control Shawn while at the hospital. ¶ 29 The City contends that even if a legal duty existed, summary judgment was still properly granted because the LaTrays have failed to establish causation. Specifically, the City argues that since the officers testified that they had no reason to believe that Shawn would become aggressive or violent upon their arrival at the hospital, it was not reasonably foreseeable that a failure to adequately control Shawn would result in an intentional assault on LaTray. Therefore, the City asserts that based upon the record, reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion regarding foreseeability and proximate cause. We disagree. ¶ 30 As the LaTrays correctly indicate, this Court has held that summary judgment is improper where, as here, the credibility of a defendant's affiant may be crucial to adjudication of a material fact: [W]here . . . credibility, including that of the defendant, is crucial, summary judgment becomes improper and a trial indispensable. It will not do, in such a case, to say that, since the plaintiff, in the matter presented by his [or her] affidavits, has offered nothing which discredits the honesty of the defendant, the latter's deposition must be accepted as true. We think that Rule 56 was not designed thus to foreclose plaintiff's privilege of examining defendant at trial, especially as to matters peculiarly within defendant's knowledge . [Emphasis added.] Morrow v. FBS Ins. Montana-Hoiness LaBar, Inc. (1988), 230 Mont. 262, 265, 749 P.2d 1073, 1075 (quoting Arnstein v. Porter (2d Cir.1946), 154 F.2d 464, 471). ¶ 31 As the LaTrays point out, the only individuals who observed the majority of events leading up to the assault were the two girls and the officers. The girls could not be located and did not testify at trial. LaTray herself witnessed only the events immediately preceding her injury, and during that time her attention was focused on Marsha rather than Shawn. Thus, the City's argument regarding lack of foreseeability is premised entirely upon the testimony of the officers that Shawn's conduct prior to the assault was cooperative, non-violent, and gave no indication that she posed any danger to those around her. As in Morrow, because most of the events leading up to the assault were matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the City's affiants and crucially dependent upon their veracity and believability, summary judgment was improper and a trial indispensable. ¶ 32 Furthermore, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the LaTrays, we determine that summary judgment was improvidently granted because there was sufficient evidence of Shawn's irascible conduct on the day in question to raise a jury question as to whether Shawn posed a danger to those around her. First, the officers received a report of two girls fighting in downtown Havre, and observed two girls yelling at each other upon arriving at the scene. Second, according to the officers' police report, the girls were intoxicated. Third, even after a degree of force was applied, Shawn steadfastly refused to obey the officers' directive to ride in a separate squad car from her sister. Fourth, during the short drive to the hospital, the two girls continued to argue with each other. Fifth, once at the hospital, the officers observed Shawn attempt to extricate her sister from the squad car by physically pushing against her, and then by pulling her hair. Sixth, one of the officers observed that just prior to the assault, Shawn appeared increasingly impatient with the situation at the hospital. Lastly, Marsha was screaming profanities when LaTray approached her, and LaTray further recounted hearing Shawn yelling in the background immediately preceding the assault. The LaTrays also presented expert testimony that, in view of the aforementioned facts, the officers should have known that Shawn presented a foreseeable risk of harm to bystanders. ¶ 33 The evidence in this case amply raises a jury question. Based on the record, reasonable jurors clearly could differ as to whether Shawn presented a foreseeable risk of injury to persons in her immediate vicinity, including LaTray. We hold that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. There are contested issues of material fact which preclude the granting of judgment as a matter of law. Where, as here, the facts of a given case suggest that the intervening criminal act of a third party is one which the defendant might reasonably foresee, `then there is no reason why the fact finder should not decide causation the same as with any other intervening causation case.' Starkenburg, 282 Mont. at 10, 934 P.2d at 1023 (quoting Estate of Strever, 278 Mont. at 178, 924 P.2d at 674).