Opinion ID: 1560801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Present Mitigation Evidence to the Penalty-Phase Jury

Text: Jackson validly waived his right to present mitigation evidence to the penalty-phase jury. Cf. Ocha v. State, 826 So.2d 956, 961 (Fla.2002) (stating that a capital defendant may waive the right to present mitigation evidence). On appeal, Jackson contends that his death sentences must be vacated because the trial court failed to comply with this Court's decision in Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343 (Fla.2001), because it (1) did not provide an alternative means for the jury to be advised of the otherwise available mitigation evidence, and (2) informed the jury that their recommendation would be afforded great weight. Foremost, Muhammad does not require the trial court to independently provide mitigation evidence to the jury in circumstances where the defendant has only waived his right to present such evidence. As clarified by this Court in Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181, 210 (Fla. 2005), the trial court is not required to present mitigation evidence to the jury. When a defendant waives mitigation evidence, Muhammad simply requires the trial court to order the preparation of a PSI and also permits the trial court to call witnesses to present mitigation evidence to the extent that the PSI alerts the court of the existence of significant mitigation. See Brooks, 918 So.2d at 210 (citing Muhammad, 782 So.2d at 363-64). Here, the trial court fully complied with these requirements by ordering the preparation of a PSI. In addition, the sentencing order reflects that the trial court utilized the PSI when it considered the appropriate sentences to be imposed for the murders. [9] Muhammad is entirely distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case. In Muhammad, the defendant presented two related arguments that we considered jointly. First, Muhammad discharged his penalty-phase counsel and requested a waiver of an advisory jury recommendation during the sentencing proceedings which the trial court denied. See 782 So.2d at 350. In addition, the trial court afforded great weight to the jury's recommendation despite the fact that the jury was not advised of any mitigation evidence because Muhammad refused to present mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. See id. at 361-62. We vacated Muhammad's death sentence because the trial court committed reversible error by assigning the advisory jury's recommendation great weight in light of Muhammad's refusal to present mitigating evidence and the failure of the trial court to provide for an alternative means for the jury to be advised of available mitigating evidence. Id. at 361-62. By doing so, the trial court failed to lessen its reliance on the jury's verdict when the lack of presentation of mitigation evidence hindered the ability of the jury to fulfill its statutory role in sentencing in any meaningful way and therefore lessened the dispositive weight of the recommendation. Id. at 362. In contrast, Jackson never sought to waive the penalty-phase jury; rather, he simply declined to present mitigation evidence, thereby tacitly agreeing to a jury recommendation. In addition, Muhammad discharged his penalty-phase counsel and, as a result, the jury heard only the State's evidence and argument as to why the death penalty should be imposed. Id. at 350. Conversely, in this case, defense counsel offered a closing statement to the jury which included assertions that (1) codefendant Nixon evaded the death penalty when he cooperated with the police, (2) Jackson's criminal history prior to the murders was limited to nonviolent crimes, and (3) Jackson was unaware of any plan to kill the Sumners. Thus, although Jackson did not offer any character and background mitigation, his counsel did not completely fail to offer mitigation matters for the jury's consideration. Finally, although the trial court orally informed the jury that its recommendation would be given great weight, there is no indication here that the trial court afforded great weight to the jury's advisory recommendation. In Muhammad, the sentencing order specifically provided, This Court must give great weight to the jury's sentencing recommendation. 782 So.2d at 362 (some emphasis omitted). However, here, the trial court merely noted the eight-to-four jury recommendations and then stated:  Having conducted a separate analysis of the aggravating circumstances and such mitigating circumstance as are present in this cause, the Court concludes that the aggravating circumstances far outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and that death is the appropriate penalty. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the trial court expressly conducted a separate analysis and did not consider the jury's recommendation as dispositive of the ultimate sentence. Cf. Brooks, 918 So.2d at 210 (rejecting a Muhammad challenge where the sentencing order did not reference the weight accorded to the jury recommendation and the order demonstrated that the trial court properly viewed the jury's recommendation); Grim v. State, 841 So.2d 455, 461 (Fla. 2003). Accordingly, we deny relief on this issue because the trial court here complied with the dictates of Muhammad when a PSI was ordered and properly conducted an independent analysis of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found in the record to determine the appropriate sentences without affording dispositive weight to the jury's advisory recommendation.