Opinion ID: 2499414
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reliance on prior findings and stipulations

Text: As a threshold matter, Josh argues that the superior court improperly relied on its October 2009 active efforts finding, the tribe's statement that necessary services might not be available in the village, and OCS's efforts on Robin's behalf. We disagree. Josh first argues that the superior court erred in relying on its prior active efforts finding in its termination order and in considering only OCS's efforts since October 2009 in determining whether OCS had made active efforts. But the parties conceded at the termination trial that OCS made active reunification efforts through October 5, 2009 and agreed they were not going to contest the trial court's prior active efforts finding. [15] Josh does not argue that he was prevented from challenging that finding at trial or presenting evidence on OCS's reunification efforts prior to October 2009. [16] Accordingly, the superior court did not err in relying on its prior finding and the parties' concession in its final order. [17] Josh next argues that the superior court erred in relying on the tribe's statement that [Eva] needed a lot of services that might not be available in the village. But the court merely noted this statement when describing the tribe's position in its overview of the case. The court did not rely on the statement in its active efforts analysis, which properly focused on OCS's reunification efforts. Finally, Josh argues the superior court erred in relying on OCS's efforts on Robin's behalf. Robin was not present at trial and her attorney orally stipulated OCS had made active efforts on her behalf. Josh argues that the superior court erred by accepting this stipulation because it did not comply with CINA Rule 14, which requires such stipulations to be in writing and signed by the parent, [18] and that we should not rely on OCS's efforts on Robin's behalf when reviewing the superior court's active efforts finding pertaining to him. He requests that we remand with instructions to the superior court to reconsider its active efforts finding without relying on Robin's attorney's stipulation. We reject this request. First, the superior court's order terminating Robin's parental rights did not rely on her attorney's oral stipulation, but summarized and relied on OCS's reunification efforts on her behalf. Second, the superior court properly considered OCS's efforts towards Robin in determining whether OCS made adequate efforts on Josh's behalf. In Dashiell R. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, [19] we held that the superior court properly considered OCS's reunification efforts on the mother's behalf in finding that OCS had made active, though ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to reunify an incarcerated father's family and prevent the termination of his parental rights: [T]he superior court was correct to point to efforts OCS made regarding the mother.... In this case, had the children been able to stay with the mother, who was not incarcerated, there is no indication Dashiell's parental rights would have been terminated, because there would have been no need for the children to be placed elsewhere. As the superior court notedand Dashiell does not contestthe [S]tate's efforts regarding the mother were very active. We view these efforts as an important aspect of the [S]tate's active efforts to keep the family together.[ [20] ] As in Dashiell R., given Josh's incarceration throughout OCS's custody of Eva and his 99-year sentence, OCS's efforts on Robin's behalf, the one parent available for reunification, were relevant when considering OCS's efforts to reunify the family and prevent the termination of Josh's parental rights.