Opinion ID: 867293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tantamount to a Guilty Plea Standard

Text: ¶ 15 Allen contends, and the court of appeals concluded, that a colloquy was required because Allen's stipulation on the marijuana charge gave up so much that it was the practical equivalent of a guilty plea. Allen, 220 Ariz. at 434 ¶ 19, 207 P.3d at 687. At one time, Arizona cases extended the Boykin colloquy requirement to a stipulation that was tantamount to a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 114 Ariz. 385, 388, 561 P.2d 306, 309 (1977); State v. Gaines, 113 Ariz. 206, 207, 549 P.2d 574, 575 (1976); State v. Crowley, 111 Ariz. 308, 310, 528 P.2d 834, 836 (1974). Nearly thirty years ago, however, we explicitly rejected the tantamount to a guilty plea standard as unworkable. State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21, 23, 617 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1980). ¶ 16 In Avila, the defendant submitted his case to the court for determination based solely on the preliminary hearing transcript and a police report. Id. at 22, 617 P.2d at 1138. We noted that while it must appear from the record that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, defining when a submission became the functional equivalent of a guilty plea had proven difficult. Id. at 25, 617 P.2d at 1141. We observed that if a proffered submission does not concede all elements of an offense, the judge may not know when it is offered whether it is tantamount to a guilty plea, or whether the defendant will instead vigorously contest the remaining elements of the charge. Id. at 24, 617 P.2d at 1140. We also noted the unfair advantage permitted the accused provided by the tantamount to a guilty plea standard. Id. It allowed a defendant to essentially plead guilty, yet retain rights typically waived when entering a guilty plea, such as the right to test searches, [the] right to challenge the voluntariness of pretrial admissions, and [the] right to test identification on appeal. Id. ¶ 17 The standard creates other problems as well. It may cause interruptions in a trial to ascertain whether warnings are required and, if so, to give them. See Adams, 968 F.2d at 840 (relying on United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.1975)). Concurring in Adams, Judge Kozinski observed that it would be entirely unworkable to demand a Boykin inquiry every time the defense and prosecution come to some arrangement... that narrows the issues for trial. Id. at 846. Moreover, such a standard requires inappropriate judicial speculation as to defense counsel's trial strategy. Id. at 842. Presumably, if the court can imagine a strategy, the stipulation may be accepted without the necessity of warnings. If, however, the court cannot identify a reason for a stipulation, a colloquy is required. Courts should not have to guess whether a stipulation will turn out to be strategic or tactical or whether stipulations are sufficiently significant that they will be like pleading guilty. For these reasons, we once again reject the tantamount to or functional equivalent of a guilty plea standard.