Opinion ID: 1873849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admission of documents as competent evidence of prior convictions

Text: Finally, Cox asserts that documents used as exhibits to sentence him as a habitual offender under § 99-19-83 [2] were not admissible evidence of a prior conviction. The State produced a Mississippi conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon as evidence of a prior conviction and sought to prove a second prior conviction, as required by the statute. Cox does not challenge the Mississippi conviction, but challenges only the out-of-state exhibits presented to prove the second prior conviction. The State offered as evidence of a second conviction an exhibit prepared by the Bureau of Identification of the Memphis Police Department, which detailed his prior arrest and conviction record from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cox objected to this exhibit and questioned the authenticity of the document, due to the fact that it was attested to by a notary public and not by a clerk of court or official custodian of records. The State then offered a letter from J.W. Crawford, Correctional Records Supervisor III of the Reception and Medical Center of the Department of Corrections for the State of Florida that was also sworn before a notary public. The letter stated that Cox was sentenced for the crime of burglary and that he was detained by the Department of Corrections from November 3, 1980, until he escaped on September 4, 1981. Cox objected to the admission of the letter as an exhibit on the ground that the letter was hearsay. The State additionally offered as an exhibit a group of documents with a cover letter from James T. Wainwright, Superintendent of the Florida Department of Corrections. The documents were uncertified copies of commitment papers, judgment of conviction, fingerprints and photographs from the official file copies. Some of the copied documents had the seal of the clerk of the convicting court; none were certified under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1739, which provides the method of certifying documents for transmittal between states. Cox again objected to the documents on the ground that the documents were not properly authenticated and only notarized by a notary public. The trial court overruled the objection at that point and received the documents into evidence; the trial court then found that Cox was a habitual offender. Cox argues that if the actual judgment of conviction is not introduced, conviction may only be proved by documents accorded equivalent evidentiary weight by statute. DeBussi v. State, 453 So.2d 1030 (Miss. 1984). However, DeBussi was decided before the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, effective January 1, 1986. This trial was held in February of 1986. The issue of whether a document is legally authentic as to be admissible evidence of prior convictions is now governed by Rules 901 and 902 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Compare King v. State, 527 So.2d 641, 646 (Miss. 1988). Rule 901 states: Rule 901. REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION OR IDENTIFICATION (a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. (b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirement of this rule: ... . (7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept. M.R.E. 901(a), (b)(7), (1990). Rule 902 provides: RULE 902. SELF-AUTHENTICATION Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following: (1) Domestic Public Documents Under Seal. A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any State, district, Commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or of the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution. (2) Domestic Public Documents Not Under Seal. A document purporting to bear the signature in his official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine. ..... (4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. ... . M.R.E. 902(1), (2) and (4), (1990). This Court, in the pre-rule case of Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860 (Miss. 1987), anticipated the issue raised in this case. In Monroe, this Court stated: At the outset we must make clear that this issue is not governed by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, effective January 1, 1986. Monroe was tried in early October 1985, so we must rely on our statutory and common law rule of evidence. Similar future questions must be governed by M.R.E. 901(7), 902(1) and (4). See 5 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 532 (1981) for a helpful analysis of a similar problem under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Since certified copies are admissible, certification becomes the authenticating mechanism for admitting copies as originals. The certification provides self authenticity by which a copy might be admitted without further assurances of its genuineness. This statute is no more than a reflection of this country's common law. As a substitute for an original public record, which ought not to be constantly removed, our courts have long recognized the original should be permitted to be evidenced by a copy given by a public officer whose duty it is to keep the original. 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, § 902(4)[01], at 902-25 (1983). Theoretically, however, this certification contains two components. Even if the custodian has made his attestation, the court must know that the custodian's attestation is genuine. McCormick states the issue thusly: [H]ow is the court to know without proof that the signature or seal appearing on the writing is actually that of the official whose name and title are recited? McCormick on Evidence, § 228 at 700 (E. Cleary ed. 1984). The authors note that many states have eliminated this hurdle by statute. We think this was the purpose of Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-77 (1972). Our statute provides that a certified copy from the custodial state officer shall be received in evidence in all cases. We think the intent of the statute was to allow domestic judicial records to be received without the need of authenticating the certification. We pause to note that this seems to be the position of our new Mississippi Rules of Evidence. See M.R.E. 902(4) and (1). While the rules are not controlling, they provide additional support for our proposition. The only question left is whether the sentencing order was properly certified. Monroe, 515 So.2d at 868. This Court has held that in habitual offender sentencing trials where the actual judgment of conviction is not introduced, the issue may only be proven by documents accorded the equivalent evidentiary weight by statute. DeBussi v. State, 453 So.2d 1030 (Miss. 1984); Pace v. State, 407 So.2d 530 (Miss. 1981). With the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence on January 1, 1986, the issue of what documents are afforded such evidentiary weight are no longer controlled by statute but rather by Article IX, Authentication and Identification, of the rules. M.R.E. 901(a) states the general rule that the requirement of authentication as a prerequisite to admissibility may be established by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it is. In this case, the State offered no proof whatsoever which would support such a finding. Rather the State sought to introduce the exhibits as self-authenticating documents under M.R.E. 902, which provides that certain documents may be admitted without extrinsic evidence of authenticity. However, the exhibits in question fail to meet the requirements of any of the provisions of M.R.E. 902. Paragraph (1) of M.R.E. 902 makes domestic public documents under seal self-authenticating. Paragraph (2) of M.R.E. 902 makes domestic public documents not under seal self-authenticating if another public officer certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity claimed and that the signature is genuine. Paragraph (4) of M.R.E. 902 makes certified copies of public record self-authenticating if the certification complies with Paragraphs (1), (2) or (3), any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. The certification must not only certify as to the authenticity of the signature but also as to the official capacity of the signor. Exhibits that are not properly authenticated cannot be accepted as evidence. In the case sub judice the State failed to produce evidence of a second felony conviction. Exhibit S-4, documents from the Shelby County, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, were not properly certified, as the copies were only notarized. Exhibit S-5, the Crawford letter was not a public document. Exhibit S-6, the file copies from the Reception and Medical Center of the Florida Department of Corrections, were copies of copies; they were not certified copies of a public record. Therefore, the trial court improperly sentenced Cox as an habitual offender; this Court reverses the sentencing as an habitual offender. In reversing the trial court's sentence, this Court is keenly aware of the burden placed on the State to obtain proof of prior convictions from sources that insure authenticity under the rules. This burden is not unreasonable, considering that the State seeks to enhance the sentence of a defendant; authentic documentation provides reliable proof that the defendant merits an enhanced sentence. The question now becomes whether the State has the right to a second chance at proving the [habitual offender] status of [Cox] as opposed to [Cox's] right not to be twice placed in jeopardy. DeBussi, 453 So.2d at 1032. Miss.Const. art. 3 § 22 (1890). Dycus v. State, 440 So.2d 246, 258 (Miss. 1983) (applying double jeopardy to capital sentencing proceeding). In DeBussi, this Court held that re-prosecution of an habitual offender was barred where there was not sufficient evidence to support a conviction apart from the evidence erroneously admitted by the trial judge. Although the State could possibly cure this error if it were given a second opportunity, the essence of the double jeopardy prohibition is to limit the State to one fair opportunity to offer what proof it could assemble. DeBussi, 453 So.2d at 1034. The habitual offender portion of this sentence must be vacated for reason of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the finding apart from the evidence erroneously admitted by the trial court. Only one valid conviction was admitted. The statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1990), requires sufficiently authenticated proof of two convictions. Failing in its attempt on the first trial, Miss.Const. art. 3, § 22 bars the State from perfecting its evidence through successive attempts. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2217, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). Resentencing for the affirmed conviction of arson of a dwelling house must be upheld. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-1 provides for a sentence of not less than two (2), nor more than twenty (20) years in the Department of Corrections. This case is remanded for re-sentencing under this statute. AFFIRMED AS TO THE CONVICTION FOR ARSON; REVERSED AND RENDERED AS TO THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER AND REMANDED FOR PROPER RE-SENTENCING UNDER MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1972). ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.