Opinion ID: 1389170
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaining and using qualified mental-health experts

Text: Defense counsel presented the testimony of three mental-health expertsDrs. Hewitt, McGee, and Samyduring the penalty phase of trial. Awkal contends that the presentation of these experts' testimony during the penalty phase, along with that of Dr. Rizk during the guilt phase, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to mitigation evidence. I disagree. Awkal reasons that Dr. Hewitt's testimony during the penalty phase was a mockery because Dr. Hewitt was discredited at the guilt phase when the trial judge struck his testimony. The force of Awkal's argument is diluted, however, by the fact that the judge did allow Dr. Hewitt to testify at the penalty phase of the case. Moreover, Dr. Hewitt gave lengthy testimony at the penalty phase about Awkal's background, family, troubled marriage, and religion. He testified that Awkal's emotional state collapsed on the day of the murders, that the murders were spontaneous, and that Awkal was unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Dr. Hewitt also testified that Awkal was not competent to know right from wrong or what he was doing and that this was a spontaneous kind of thing provoked by the overall situation at the time. This testimony supported defense counsel's argument that Awkal suffered from a mental disease or defecta mitigating factor under Ohio law. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(B)(3). Defense counsel clearly did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness by presenting Dr. Hewitt's testimony on this mitigating factor. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Awkal next argues that trial counsel demonstrat[ed] their complete lack of preparation for the mitigation phase by calling Dr. Rizk to testify at the guilt phase. He reasons that the presentation of Dr. Rizk at the guilt stage destroyed any meaningful mitigation presentation because Dr. Rizk previously testified that Awkal was sane. But the standard under Ohio law for a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity differs from the standard for the mental-disease-or-defect mitigating factor provided by Ohio Revised Code § 2929.04(B)(3). State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 530 N.E.2d 883, 890 (1988) (We note that the mitigating factor ... utilizes the term `substantial capacity[,]' which is a term allowing a broader range of [mental] conditions than the term `capacity' standing alone.). Awkal's argument accordingly fails because Dr. Rizk's guilt-phase testimony did not necessarily detract from the testimony of the penalty-phase experts about Awkal's mental condition. As for the testimony of Dr. Salah Samy, another psychiatrist, Awkal submits that trial counsel completely failed to prepare Dr. Samy for his testimony. In support of this assertion, Awkal cites Dr. Samy's testimony that he could not give a loss-of-control opinion without more detailed information about Awkal. Dr. Samy did, however, testify that Awkal was not malingering and that, at the time of the shootings, Awkal had developed [an] acute psychotic reaction. Awkal's counsel did not act unreasonably by presenting this favorable testimony. Finally, Awkal argues that Dr. McGee was a pediatrician, not board certified[,] and had no experience in forensic psychiatry. He accordingly reasons that defense counsel acted ineffectively by presenting such an unqualified expert to testify regarding his mental condition. But Awkal's argument overlooks Dr. McGee's testimony that she had started her professional training in child psychiatry in 1986, had taken a law-school class on forensic psychiatry, and had worked for four months with a forensic psychiatrist in Cleveland. At the time of the trial, Dr. McGee had closed her pediatric practice, had taken the test to become board-certified in psychiatry, and was practicing psychiatric medicine. Seventy percent of her patients were adults. Defense counsel did not act unreasonably by calling Dr. McGee. Her testimony demonstrates that she was clearly qualified to act as an expert witness on Awkal's behalf. See Joyce-Couch v. DeSilva, 77 Ohio App.3d 278, 602 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1991) (Under Ohio law, any doctor licensed to practice medicine is competent to testify about medical issues.). This court has held that [a] licensed practitioner is generally held to be competent, unless counsel has good reason to believe to the contrary. Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 772 (6th Cir.2006). Awkal can make no such showing regarding Dr. McGee. Because Dr. McGee was qualified under Ohio law to give an expert opinion, and in fact gave competent testimony that Awkal was mentally ill, Awkal's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for retaining her and presenting her testimony during the penalty phase of trial. In sum, Awkal has failed to demonstrate that defense counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial. I will thus move on to address his final remaining claim regarding prosecutorial misconduct.