Opinion ID: 2310808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because of Conflict of Interest

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right    to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that ordinarily two factors must be shown to reverse a conviction or sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment: First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. However, in more extraordinary contexts, including wherein an attorney is alleged to have had a conflict of interest, the Court utilizes a different framework for determining a violation of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to effective assistance of counsel. [18] Under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-47 (1980), the Court explained that the mere possibility of a conflict of interest is not enough to impugn a criminal conviction under the Sixth Amendment and rejected the contention that a criminal defendant is entitled to a reversal of his or her conviction whenever he or she makes some showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote   . Instead, the Court required that a criminal defendant who had raised no objection at trial [19] must demonstrate that his or her attorney `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d at 346-47. The Court has emphasized that an actual conflict of interest is one that requires that an attorney 'struggle to serve two masters.' See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1718, 64 L. Ed.2d at 347. As part of this analysis, the Court has looked to determine in the individual case whether the attorney's actions were motivated by divided loyalties and whether the attorney's conduct lacked a sound strategic basis. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784-85, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120-21, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, 651 (1987). [U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 347. After a finding of an actual conflict, the United States Supreme Court has also required an additional showing of impairment or harm to the defense, although prejudice need not be demonstrated. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 347; see also Burger, 483 U.S. at 785, 107 S.Ct. at 3121, 97 L.Ed.2d at 652. In State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1272 (R.I.1980), in applying Cuyler for the first time, we rejected an argument by a defendant that his conviction should be reversed because his counsel represented interests potentially in conflict with his own interests at plea and sentencing hearings. In doing so, we reasoned that the mere possibility that his attorney might have had a conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is insufficient to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment. See Feng, 421 A.2d at 1272. Instead, we held that the defendant would need to establish an actual particular conflict to constitute a violation of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. See id. We recently reaffirmed that holding in Toole v. State, 748 A.2d 806, 808 (R.I. 2000). In this case, Simpson first contends that where a public defender is required to argue the incompetency of another public defender in the same office, then there is a per se conflict of interest, which results in a denial of a client's right to counsel. As part and parcel of Simpson's automatic and immediate conflict of interest claim, he asserts that even the appearance of such an impropriety    should require a per se application and finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. We dispute as a threshold matter that an actual conflict immediately arises under the Sixth Amendment simply because one assistant public defender is called upon to have a client's potentially damaging pretrial testimony excluded when that testimony is alleged to have been brought about by the alleged ineffective assistance of another public defender. It is simply not enough for a defendant to argue that merely because the attorneys are from the same public defender's office that they have a potential for a conflict of interest. That fact alone will not automatically trigger the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. On the contrary, as we have earlier noted, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have consistently refused to recognize hypothetical or speculative conflicts of interest as constituting violations of Sixth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 348; Feng, 421 A.2d at 1272. Instead, in order to determine the existence of an actual conflict of interest, we are required to find that an attorney be motivated to serve two masters and to lack a sound strategic basis for his conduct. See Burger, 483 U.S. at 784, 107 S.Ct. at 3120-21, 97 L.Ed.2d at 651. It is far from axiomatic that a public defender would have per se divided loyalties between protecting the reputation of his or her office or that of a colleague and between serving his or her client. Several jurisdictions, in fact, had the occasion to consider that precise issue and have concluded, under state ethic rules, that an inherent conflict of interest does not exist when one assistant public defender in post-trial proceedings is called upon to challenge the effective assistance of counsel given by an attorney from the same public defender's office at a defendant's earlier trial. See, e.g., People v. Banks, 121 Ill.2d 36, 117 Ill.Dec. 266, 520 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1987); State v. Lentz, 70 Ohio St.3d 527, 639 N.E.2d 784, 786 (1994). These courts have rejected the contention that in such circumstances, the public defender naturally labors under conflicting loyalties between loyalty toward his client and loyalty toward his office. See Banks, 117 Ill.Dec. 266, 520 N.E.2d at 620; Lentz, 639 N.E.2d at 786. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Banks, in deciding three consolidated appeals all stemming from the common question whether a defendant is entitled to appointment of counsel other than a public defender when the defendant challenges the effectiveness of assistance rendered by an attorney from the same public defender's office, concluded that: Defendants nevertheless maintain that here a public defender's loyalty towards the reputation of his office is of such magnitude that a per se conflict of interest rule should apply whenever an assistant public defender asserts the incompetency of another assistant. We disagree. To begin, it is not clear to us that where an assistant public defender asserts the incompetency of another assistant, the reputation of the whole office is negatively impacted. To the contrary, it can be equally argued that a positive image is fostered where an office aggressively pursues allegations made against some of its members. More importantly, however, a per se rule would require us to presume that public defenders would allow any office allegiances to interfere with their foremost obligation to their clients. In our view, it is erroneous to assume that public defenders have such an allegiance and are unable to subordinate it to the interests of their clients. Banks, 117 Ill.Dec. 266, 520 N.E.2d at 620. The Ohio Supreme Court also reasoned in Lentz that a public defender's office would be more likely than a private firm to raise allegations of incompetence in its own office because it lacked similar financial incentives to retain the client's business. 639 N.E.2d at 786. [20] Employing the Ohio Supreme Court's approach, a case-by-case inquiry must always be conducted to determine whether any actual conflict of interest exists when an assistant public defender asserts that another public defender has given ineffective assistance. See Banks, 117 Ill.Dec. 266, 520 N.E.2d at 621; Lentz, 639 N.E.2d at 786. In this case, that was done, and simply because Simpson does not savor the result, that does not, without more, entitle him to the relief he seeks. Several other courts, we acknowledge, have determined the existence of an inherent divided loyalty when a public defender is retained to appeal directly from a criminal conviction, or to assert postconviction relief, when the ground relied upon for the relief sought is that another public defender has given ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. These courts, it should be noted, have found an inherent conflict of interest under particular state ethics rules, not under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Hill v. State, 263 Ark. 478, 566 S.W.2d 127, 127 (1978) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding denial of postconviction relief after public defender of Pulaski County represented defendant in postconviction proceedings who had asserted as basis for relief the ineffective assistance of another public defender from same office at trial); McCall v. District Court for the Twenty-First Judicial District, 783 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Colo.1989) (adopting per se disqualification rule and requiring withdrawal of public defender office's appellate division from representing a person who in seeking appellate relief from a judgment of conviction on the ground that a deputy public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court); Adams v. State, 380 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam) (disqualifying public defender's office from nineteenth judicial circuit from representing defendant in postconviction proceedings alleging ineffective assistance of counsel from same office during trial). Under similar circumstances, the Colorado Supreme Court in McCall, 783 P.2d at 1228, had also noted that: We believe that requiring a member of the appellate division to argue that a local deputy public defender rendered ineffective assistance of counsel would have an inherently deleterious effect on relationships within the public defender system and would be destructive of an office upon which the criminal justice system relies to provide competent legal services to indigent defendants. Moreover, notwithstanding the vigor and skill with which the appellate division attorney might present the ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the conflict of loyalties inherent in the attorney's role would make the quality of his or her representation, and thus the fairness and impartiality of the appellate process, necessarily suspect in the public eye. This would derogate from the prescription    that `[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.' Yet, the McCall court acknowledged that an inherent conflict of interest may not be present in every circumstance when a public defender is called upon to assess the ineffectiveness of another public defender. As that court aptly noted: We wish to stress the limitation of our holding. The case before us involves only one type of conflict of interest  the representation by the appellate division of a person who in seeking appellate relief from a judgment of conviction asserts that a deputy public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court. The types of possible conflicts of interest that the public defender may encounter in representing persons accused of crimes are myriad. The standards for evaluating conflicts other than the type at issue in the present case, and the remedies to be adopted should conflicts be found to exist, must be considered as the occasions arise and should be tailored to fit the particular circumstances. McCall, 783 P.2d at 1229. Indeed, in some of those jurisdictions wherein a per se conflict rule had been applied, those same appellate courts have not forbidden a public defender from participating in post-conviction activity asserting the ineffectiveness of another public defender if they are from different branch offices. See Hill, 566 S.W.2d at 127 (remanded for appointment of counsel who is not associated with the public defender of Pulaski County to represent appellant during his postconviction proceedings); Adams, 380 So.2d at 422 (authorizing the public defender's office of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit to be appointed to represent defendant in postconviction proceedings alleging ineffective assistance of counsel of the public defender's office of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit). In this case, Simpson has not alleged a violation of any particular state ethical rule or of any specific provision in our state constitution. Accordingly, we need not assess whether the mere interaction of the two public defenders in this case constituted a conflict of interest that might have impinged upon any right guaranteed him by our state constitution. See § 10-9.1-8; Sup.Ct.R.16; Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 478 (R.I.2000). We need only to address Simpson's specific appellate contention namely that the purported conflict of interest served to violate his right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [21] This is not to be interpreted as meaning that we are relaxing the ever-present need for our judicial oversight in matters pertaining to allegations of conflicts that might impinge upon a defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of his or her counsel. All we are saying here is that we will continue to oversee those claims on a case by case inquiry so we will be able to ferret out those real or actual conflicts from those that are purely speculative. This approach is an accord with the United States Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. [22]