Opinion ID: 1450682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Taped Phone Conversation

Text: Appellant argues that this Court, in Major I, and thus, the trial court on retrial, erred by allowing introduction of a tape of Appellant's father's phone conversation from his home in Nova Scotia, Canada with Appellant at his home in Massachusetts, without Appellant's consent. In Major I, this Court held that: Since official proceedings had not been instituted against the Appellant for the murder of Marlene at the time of the taping, and he was not incarcerated, [the phone call] was not in violation of the Appellant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. Moreover, even though the phone conversation took place [between] James Major's residence in Nova Scotia [and] the Appellant's residence, then in Massachusetts, the activity was appropriate under Kentucky Criminal Law, KRS 526.010; thus not in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The practice of recording conversations with the consent of at least one party to the conversation has long been recognized in Kentucky jurisprudence. Carrier v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 115 (Ky. App.1980); see also Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963) 177 S.W.3d at 710. Our primary reasoning aside, we also noted, in footnote two (2) therein, that in Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 432 Mass. 43, 732 N.E.2d 875 (2000), a similar case involving a phone call from Nova Scotia to Massachusetts was approved. Major, 177 S.W.3d at 710 n. 2. [2] On retrial, Appellant offered evidence of Massachusetts law to show this Court misapplied Demoulas , as well as additional authority tending to establish the taped phone call would be inadmissible in Massachusetts under their two-party consent doctrine. [3] He concedes in his brief, however, that Nova Scotia, from whence the call was placed, has a one-party consent rule like Kentucky. Appellant thus argues that the Court's citation to Demoulas and its interpretation of Massachusetts law undermines the reasoning of Major I, thus entitling Appellant to relief. We disagree. First, the law-of-the-case doctrine mandates the trial court apply our holding. This is so because it is: an iron rule, universally recognized, that an opinion or decision of an appellate court in the same cause is the law of the case for subsequent trial or appeal however erroneous the opinion or decision may have been. The doctrine is predicated upon the principle of finality. Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 244 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Ky.App.2007) (internal citation omitted). When an appellate court decides a question concerning evidence ... the question of law settled by the opinion is final upon a retrial in which the evidence is substantially the same and precludes the reconsideration of the claimed error on a second appeal. Williamson v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Ky.1989). At retrial, the evidence was the same as ruled on in Major I. A final decision of this Court, whether right or wrong, is the law-of-the-case and is conclusive of the questions therein resolved. Williamson, 767 S.W.2d at 325. It is binding upon the parties, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals. It may not be reconsidered by prosecuting an appeal from a judgment entered in conformity therewith. Id. Moreover, [o]ne cannot accept the benefits of that portion of an opinion which is favorable and later relitigate that portion which is not. Id. at 326. The appropriate remedy to correct any alleged error in an opinion of this court is to move for rehearing, pointing out the movant's arguments for consideration by the appellate court. Id.; see also Buckley v. Wilson 177 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Ky. 2005). In Major I, we reached a final determination regarding the admissibility of the same taped call, so the trial court was precluded from entertain[ing] objections or mak[ing] modifications to our decision. Williamson, 767 S.W.2d at 326. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the tape of the phone call. Moreover, in multi-state matters, Kentucky traditionally follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1988). Cf., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., v. Marley, 151 S.W.3d 33, 42 (Ky.2004). In this instance, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 139(2) (1988) states: Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication but which is not privileged under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is some special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect. Thus, even were we to assume that Massachusetts had the most significant relationship with the communication  which we do not  there must be some special reason for Kentucky to forgo its acknowledged policy favoring admission of taped phone conversation with the consent of one party. Any other construction would in effect place the criminal jurisprudence of one sovereignty under the control of another. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 12 How. 361, 13 L.Ed. 1023 (1851), overruled on other grounds by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 38 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed. 406 (1918). Under the facts at hand, we found  and find  no special reason to exclude the tape. Moreover, our decision here, and in Major I, is in accord with many other jurisdictions. E.g., People v. Thompson, 950 P.2d 608, 611 (Colo.Ct.App.1997) (Although the communication occurred in Oregon, it directly concerned a serious crime allegedly committed by defendant in Colorado. The victim was a citizen of Colorado.); State v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60, 640 A.2d 553, 562 (1994) (We decline to apply the law of another jurisdiction merely because a portion of the police investigation occurred there.); State v. Lipham, 910 A.2d 388, 390 (Me.2006) (At the request of police, Lipham's wife placed a secretly recorded phone call to him in Alabama.); Larrison v. Larrison, 750 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa.Super.2000) (While this Commonwealth has an interest in protecting its citizens from having telephone conversations recorded without proper consent, we, as the courts of this Commonwealth, have no power to control the activities that occur within a sister state.); Kos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex.App.2000) (Section 139(2) recognizes the `strong policy' a forum state has in disclosing `all relevant facts that are not privileged under its own local law.'); State v. Mayes, 20 Wash. App. 184, 579 P.2d 999, 1005 (1978) (Defendant urges that we read the statute literally and hold that Officer Christian's interception of Cindy Dickerson's phone conversations was illegal even though the interceptions took place in California, were principally to aid California police, and were not used to further any criminal activity in the state of Washington.); and State v. Townsend, 307 Wis.2d 694, 746 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Ct.App.2008) (we conclude that Wisconsin law shall be applied to evidence gathered in a foreign state by a Wisconsin official charged with the duty to gather evidence for use in a Wisconsin criminal prosecution.). Appellant, of course, implies that Massachusetts had the most significant relationship to this transaction because Major was living in Massachusetts. We strongly disagree. At the time of Marlene's death, both she and Appellant were Kentucky residents. According to Appellant, her death occurred in Kentucky. Appellant transferred the alleged murder weapons in Kentucky to another Kentucky resident. Marlene's skull was found in Kentucky. D.O.'s sexual abuse, the beginning and continuation of which was advanced as a possible motive for Marlene's murder, occurred in Kentucky. The officers who participated in taping the phone conversation, with Appellant's father's permission, were Kentucky law enforcement officers, gathering information in a Kentucky investigation. The taped or intercepted conversation, between the father in Nova Scotia, Canada and the son, in Massachusetts, was intercepted with the father's permission, in Nova Scotia, not in Massachusetts. As Appellant has conceded, Nova Scotia, like Kentucky, allows taping with one-party consent. See, R. v. Durate, 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.1990). Thus, the only contact Massachusetts had with the call was that Appellant's conversation was transmitted from Massachusetts to Nova Scotia, where it was taped by the officers, with Appellant's father's consent. Moreover, as both this Court and the federal courts have recognized, Kentucky courts generally apply Kentucky law whenever it is justified. Breeding v. Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Company, 633 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky.1982) (Justice, fairness and the best practical result may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.); see also Johnson v. S.O.S. Transport, Inc., 926 F.2d 516, 519 n. 6 (6th Cir.1991) (Kentucky's conflict of law rules favor the application of its own law whenever it can be justified. ) (emphasis added). Thus, the application of Kentucky law was justified and the taped phone conversation was properly admitted.