Opinion ID: 2107885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Appeal: Failure to Complete Service by Publication.

Text: Referring to the underlying action, Steenson claims on appeal that service by publication on Campbell two times within 6 months from the date the petition was filed was satisfactory service and that the district court erred when it concluded that the underlying action stood dismissed under § 25-217. Contrary to Steenson's claim, we agree with the district court's legal conclusion that in order for service by publication to be complete, all three publications must be accomplished within 6 months from the date the petition was filed and that service on Campbell was not complete. However, because State Farm had appeared in the underlying action, that action stood dismissed only as to Campbell and was not entirely dismissed as the district court stated. The underlying action was filed on July 26, 2001, and we, therefore, refer to the statutory pleading procedure in effect at that time. See Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 1 (rev.2003). The following statutes control our resolution of the legal question at issue: At the time the declaratory judgment action was filed, § 25-217 provided: An action is commenced on the date the petition is filed with the court. The action shall stand dismissed without prejudice as to any defendant not served within six months from the date the petition was filed. Section 25-519 provided: The publication shall be made once in each week for three successive weeks in some newspaper printed in the county where the petition is filed if there is any printed in such county and, if there is not, in some newspaper printed in this state of general circulation in that county. It must contain a summary statement of the object and prayer of the petition, mention the court wherein it is filed, and notify the person or persons thus to be served when they are required to answer. We also refer to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-821 (Reissue 1995), since repealed, in our consideration of this case. See 2002 Neb. Laws, L.B. 876 (operative date January 1, 2003). Section 25-821 provided: The answer or demurrer of the defendant shall be filed within thirty days after service of the summons and petition or completion of service by publication. The reply or demurrer of the plaintiff shall be filed within fifteen days after the filing of the answer. It is undisputed that the petition in the underlying action was filed on July 26, 2001, and service by publication occurred on January 16, 23, and 30, 2002. Although the third publication occurred later than 6 months after the petition was filed, under a variety of theories such as tolling and liberal construction of statutory language, Steenson invites this court to conclude that service on Campbell was sufficient for purposes of § 25-217. We reject this invitation. The controlling statutes allow for service by publication which shall be made once in each week for three successive weeks, § 25-519, and that [t]he action shall stand dismissed ... as to any defendant not served within six months from the date the petition was filed, § 25-217. We read §§ 25-217 and 25-519 in pari materia. Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 267 Neb. 586, 676 N.W.2d 29 (2004). Looking at the language in §§ 25-217 and 25-519, it is clear that service on a defendant is not an evolutionary process as urged by Steenson, but, rather, an event accomplished at a definite point in time. In the case of substitute service by publication under § 25-519, service is not made until the third publication, and prior to the third publication, a defendant is not served under § 25-217. Our reading of these statutes is consistent with § 25-821, which, at the time the underlying case was commenced, provided for filing an answer or demurrer within 30 days after completion of service by publication. Section 25-821 indicates that service must be completed, not partially completed, to be effective. In the case of service by publication, service is completed upon the third publication. Giving the controlling statutes their plain meaning, we conclude that where service by publication has been approved, a defendant is not served within six months from the date the petition was filed under § 25-217 unless the third publication under § 25-519 has occurred within 6 months from the date the petition was filed. The district court's conclusion to the same effect was correct, and Steenson's assignment of error challenging this conclusion is without merit. Although the district court correctly concluded that Campbell had not been served in the underlying action, the district court further stated in its March 19, 2003, order that on January 26, 2002, the [underlying] action ... was automatically dismissed pursuant to § 25-217, Neb.Rev.Stat. After that date, said action was no longer pending and the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, lost jurisdiction to make any further orders, except those orders necessary to formalize the dismissal of the action. The latter pronouncement by the district court in which it concluded that the underlying action in its entirety was no longer pending was error. Under § 25-217, a case stands dismissed as to any defendant not served within six months from the date the petition was filed. We read the expression any defendant to mean that dismissal is indicated as to that defendant who is not served but not all defendants in the action. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 97 (1993) (defining any as one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind). Referring to the underlying action, it is agreed that State Farm had appeared in the underlying action and that although Campbell was not served, dismissal of State Farm was not warranted under § 25-217. Because the district court believed that the underlying action stood dismissed, it reasoned that there was no justiciable controversy among or between the parties in the declaratory judgment action and dismissed the instant declaratory judgment case. The district court's reasoning was flawed. In the underlying personal injury action, Steenson sought to recover from Campbell, the driver of the other vehicle, who was allegedly at fault. Had Campbell been served and if it was established that he was negligent, and it was further established that Campbell was driving Harvey's vehicle with permission, recovery may well have been forthcoming from Harvey's insurance carrier, Allstate. If, however, it was established that Campbell was driving Harvey's vehicle without permission, then Steenson would seek recovery from his own carrier, State Farm, based on uninsured coverage. Because Campbell was not served within 6 months of the date the petition was filed in the underlying action, and given that the 4-year statute of limitations on Steenson's negligence claim against Campbell has run, Steenson cannot recover from Campbell on the basis alleged in his petition in the underlying action and Harvey's insurance carrier, Allstate, has no obligation to defend or indemnify. However, because the issue of whether or not Campbell was driving Harvey's vehicle with permission has not been determined, and the resolution of this issue impacts State Farm's obligation to Steenson, there remains a real controversy between Steenson and State Farm. The issue of whether Campbell was driving Harvey's vehicle with permission is implicit in the underlying action, and such action is still pending between Steenson and State Farm.