Opinion ID: 722609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: 35 TI next argues that the ITC's previous finding that the same defendants, using the same processes, infringed claims 12 and 14 of the '027 patent, and that our subsequent affirmance of that determination should be given preclusive effect. See In re Certain Plastic Encapsulated Integrated Circuits, Inv. No. 337-TA-315, USITC Pub. No. 2574 (Nov. 1992), aff'd, Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 26 USPQ2d 1018 (Fed.Cir.1993). In support, TI contends that preclusive effect is properly given to determinations made in a federal agency's adjudicatory capacity. TI also asserts that the district court erred in failing to permit the jury to be informed of the prior ITC holding. 36 The doctrine of issue preclusion 9 (or collateral estoppel) has been defined to mean that [w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The purpose of the doctrine is to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). The decision of an administrative agency may be given preclusive effect in a federal court when, as here, the agency acted in a judicial capacity. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797-98, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3225-26, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966). However, an administrative agency decision, issued pursuant to a statute, cannot have preclusive effect when Congress, either expressly or impliedly, indicated that it intended otherwise. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 2170-71, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). 37 Here, the administrative proceedings were commenced before the ITC under section 337, as amended, of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1994). In 1974, Congress passed the Trade Reform Act of 1974, amending the Tariff Act of 1930 to allow respondents in ITC proceedings to plead, and the ITC to consider, all legal and equitable defenses, including patent invalidity and unenforceablility. See Lannom Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1572, 1576-79, 231 USPQ 32, 35-36 (Fed.Cir.1986) (discussing the Trade Reform Act of 1974). In authorizing the Commission to consider these defenses, Congress cautioned that: 38 [I]n patent-based cases, the Commission considers, for its own purposes under section 337, the status of imports with respect to the claims of U.S. patents. The Commission's findings neither purport to be, nor can they be, regarded as binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws in particular factual contexts. Therefore, it seems clear that any disposition of a Commission action by a Federal Court should not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in cases before such courts. 39 S.REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7329. Based on this legislative history, we have stated that Congress did not intend decisions of the ITC on patent issues to have preclusive effect. See Tandon Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019, 4 USPQ2d 1283, 1285 (Fed.Cir.1987) ([O]ur appellate treatment of decisions of the Commission does not estop fresh consideration by other tribunals.). See also Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 851 F.2d 342, 344, 7 USPQ2d 1509, 1510 (Fed.Cir.1988) (stating that ITC determinations regarding patent issues should be given no collateral estoppel effect); Corning Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1570 n. 12, 230 USPQ 822, 830 n. 12 (Fed.Cir.1986) (stating that the legislative history of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 supports the position that ITC decisions have no preclusive effect in district courts). 40 Recent changes to ITC procedures and the formation of this court as the exclusive appellate court for patent cases, including ITC determinations, do not compel a different rule. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (granting appellate jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit in appeals from the ITC and district court patent cases) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (modifying ITC procedures) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337); Uraguay Round Agreements Act, Pub.L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (removing strict statutory time limits for ITC determinations) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337). While those changes have modified some ITC procedures and provided the ITC with the same appellate court of review as that of district courts deciding patent issues, none of these statutory amendments or their legislative histories dealt with the possible preclusive effect of ITC determinations or indicated an intent contrary to Congress's stated intention in 1974. Thus, the rule that decisions of the ITC involving patent issues have no preclusive effect in other forums has not changed. 10 41 TI also argues that by our denying preclusive effect to ITC determinations and to our decisions in appeals from ITC decisions, district courts would be free to ignore our decisions. That is not correct. District courts are not free to ignore holdings of this court that bear on cases before them. Subsequent panels of this court are similarly not free to ignore precedents set by prior panels of the court. 42 However, once we accept, as we have done at least since 1986, that ITC decisions are not binding on district courts in subsequent cases brought before them, it necessarily follows that accused infringers can raise whatever defenses they believe are justified, regardless whether they previously raised them and lost in the ITC. The district court can attribute whatever persuasive value to the prior ITC decision that it considers justified. And we, on appeal, must be free to thoroughly review the district court's decision. As a court we are bound to follow our own precedents, and, to the extent that we have previously ruled on a matter, a subsequent panel will have powerful incentives not to deviate from that prior holding, short of thoroughly justified grounds. 43 In this case, our construction of the term conductor is in fact consistent with the ITC's construction of the term and is consistent with our decision affirming the ITC's determination. See In re Certain Plastic Encapsulated Integrated Circuits, Inv. No. 337-TA-31 at  8-12,  38-39 (Oct. 16, 1991) (initial determination). Moreover, our construction of the limitation in claim 14 requiring the device to be disposed entirely on one side of the plane formed by the conductors was not the subject of a holding by either the ITC or the prior Federal Circuit panel; the parties did not litigate this claim construction issue in the prior proceeding. Thus, no holding in the prior ITC case or its affirmance by our court precludes our affirmance of the district court here. 11 44 In conclusion, this case has presented a fairly uncommon situation of a trial judge overriding a jury verdict in a patent case, following an earlier ITC decision on some of the same subject matter. Although we have been mindful of the deference accorded to a jury on fact findings, as the trial judge surely was, we have felt it necessary to affirm the district court's judgment. The trial judge did a careful and thorough job of analyzing the case. His factual and legal analyses fully support his decision. He observed the jury and believed that it lacked a grasp of the issues before it. The judge was convinced that the jury failed to meaningfully deliberate on the case. Under these circumstances, our duty to affirm is clear.