Opinion ID: 2605280
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury's Sentencing Discretion

Text: The most significant difference between the 1977 provision  former section 190.3  and the 1978 provision  the current section 190.3  lies in the scope of the discretion afforded the jury in choosing between a sentence of death and one of life without possibility of parole. Both the former and current versions of section 190.3 direct the jury to consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated by the court. Former section 190.3, however, contained no further guidance or limitation on the jury's sentencing discretion, providing simply that the jury  after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances  shall determine whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. [13] By contrast, section 190.3 as amended by the 1978 initiative provides specific directions for the jury's exercise of its sentencing power, decreeing that the jury  after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances   shall impose a sentence of death if [it] concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If [it] determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances [it] shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. [14] As noted, in this case the trial court instructed the jury under the 1978, rather than the 1977, provision. [15] Defendant, again adopting the arguments first advanced by amicus, levels a two-pronged attack on the giving of the instruction in question. First, he contends that the trial court was not statutorily authorized to use the provisions of the 1978 law, and that a reversal is required because the 1978 provision reduced the latitude which the 1977 law afforded a jury to exercise discretion in favor of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Second, he contends that even if the giving of the 1978 instruction could be sustained as a statutory matter, the 1978 instruction is unconstitutional insofar as it requires a jury to return a judgment of death whenever aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, even if the jury does not believe that the net aggravation in a particular case is sufficient to make death the appropriate punishment. Because we conclude that the statutory contention has merit, we need not reach the constitutional question in this case. (14a) In analyzing the statutory argument, it appears plain at the outset that  as a matter of both legislative intent and ordinary principles of statutory interpretation  the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to the 1978, rather than the 1977, provision. In the ballot argument accompanying the 1978 initiative, the proponents and principal drafters of the measure made it clear that they believed that the initiative would be purely prospective in effect [16] and both statutory and judicial authorities establish that, in the absence of a contrary declaration, penal legislation is not retroactive. (See § 3; People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 116-119 [151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773].) [17] Thus, even without considering potential ex post facto problems, we conclude that the court was mistaken in instructing under the 1978 provision. (15) The Attorney General does not contend that the 1978 provision was applicable here, but argues that the error did not prejudice Easley and may have even benefitted him. The argument relies on the fact that whereas under the 1977 law the jury could return a death penalty without regard to the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the 1978 law permits a death sentence only if the jury finds that aggravation outweighs mitigation. Defendant responds, however, that an accused is nonetheless generally worse off under the 1978 law. He points out that while the 1977 law left the jury free to determine the proper interplay between aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to impose life imprisonment without possibility of parole whenever it believed that death was not called for, the 1978 provision mandates a death sentence whenever aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, even if the jury does not think that the net aggravation is sufficient to warrant death. To illustrate the detrimental effect of the 1978 formulation, defendant observes that in a case in which the prosecutor introduces no new evidence at the penalty phase  choosing to rely on the circumstances of the offense and the special circumstances that have been found to exist as aggravating circumstances  and the accused offers no evidence in mitigation, the 1978 provision would mandate a death sentence without regard to the relative egregiousness of the offense, because there would be at least some evidence of aggravation and none of mitigation. Under the 1977 law, a jury would be free in these same circumstances to impose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it believed that the offense itself did not warrant the death penalty. Although the 1978 amendment of section 190.3 may in some cases conceivably aid a defendant in the one respect that the Attorney General has identified, [18] we have little doubt that, on balance, the 1978 version is much less favorable to a defendant than the 1977 provision. In determining prejudice in this case, however, we need not rely on an assessment of the relative benefits and detriments of the 1978 provision as to defendants in general, because we believe that, in any event, a new penalty trial is required here. Since it was instructed under the 1978 law, the jury in this case was told that if it found that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, it must return a verdict of death. Given its verdict, of course, it is clear that the jury did in fact find that aggravation outweighed mitigation. If it had been properly instructed under the 1977 law, however, the jury would have understood that even if aggravation outweighed mitigation, it was not required to impose a death sentence but could exercise mercy and return a verdict of life without possibility of parole. Thus, the erroneous instruction deprived defendant of the opportunity to have the jury exercise the discretion that the 1977 statute provided when aggravation outweighs mitigation. Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendant is entitled to a retrial of the penalty phase before a jury that is properly instructed under the 1977 law and that understands that  even if aggravation outweighs mitigation  it may properly spare his life. [19]