Opinion ID: 2995646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enhancement for Possession of Crack

Text: Cocaine Johnson next maintains that the district court erred by not requiring the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Johnson possessed crack cocaine as opposed to powder cocaine. In response, the government argues that Johnson waived any challenge to this issue. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, United States v. Valenzuela, 150 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1998), and represents the manifestation of an intentional choice . . . . United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2001). Waiver is distinct from forfeiture, which is an accidental or negligent omission, or an apparently inadvertent failure to assert a right in a timely fashion. Id. While we review forfeited issues for plain error, a waived issue leaves no error and extinguishes all appellate review. Id. at 415. When Johnson first raised the possibility of contesting the finding of crack cocaine in the district court, the following colloquy took place between Johnson, the district court and the government: THE DEFENDANT: Okay. One question, Your Honor. Is my sentencing, can I appeal [the finding of crack cocaine] as far as on appeal if I have any appeal issues? Would that be a problem? THE COURT: That depends on your plea agreement as well. THE GOVERNMENT: Yes, he would be able to, Your Honor. There is no appellate waiver, and, in fact, he reserved, it was a conditional plea, so he reserved some of the suppression issues as well. Tr. of Proceed., July 20, 2001 at 15. We would be troubled with the government’s assertion of waiver had subsequent events not intervened. Immediately following the colloquy at which the prosecutor informed Johnson that he could appeal the issue, the district court offered to continue the proceedings until Johnson had the opportunity to speak with counsel. The district court then held another hearing several weeks later. At that time, the district court inquired whether Johnson intended to dispute the district court’s finding that he possessed crack cocaine. Johnson’s counsel responded, We are not challenging the issue of crack, Judge. Tr. of Proceed., Aug. 14, 2001 at 2-3. This statement constitutes an affirmative waiver and reflects precisely why the intentional relinquishment of a right forecloses appellate review. By agreeing not to contest the crack/powder cocaine distinction before the district court, Johnson precluded the court from establishing on the record the factual justifications that supported its decision. We are unable to find that the district court erred on an issue that Johnson never challenged. Accordingly, we hold that Johnson waived the issue and may not raise it on appeal. Even if we were to consider the merits of Johnson’s claim, the written plea agreement Johnson signed uses the terms crack and cocaine base interchangeably. Indeed, Johnson pled guilty to possessing 164 grams of cocaine base, commonly known as ’crack’ cocaine. Besides further undercutting Johnson’s claim of the absence of waiver, these admissions--coupled with his statements during several status hearings--provide ample basis from which the district court could conclude that Johnson possessed crack cocaine. See United States v. Benjamin, 116 F.3d 1204, 1207 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wade, 114 F.3d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1997).