Opinion ID: 1533219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Mitigating Factor

Text: For his second point for reversal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on each of the mitigating factors claimed by him. Although he admits that he was allowed to present evidence from a psychiatrist indicating that he functions in a borderline to mild retardation range, Appellant nonetheless argues that it was error for the trial court to refuse to specifically instruct the jury to consider mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance. We disagree. The record reflects that the trial court instructed the jurors regarding the finding of mitigating circumstances as follows: If you do unanimously find one or more aggravating circumstances, you should then complete Form 2, which deals with mitigating circumstances. Form 2 lists some factors that you may consider as mitigating circumstances. However, you are not limited to this list. You may, in your discretion, find, other mitigating circumstances. Unlike an aggravating circumstance, you are not required to be convinced of the existence of a mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. A mitigating circumstance is shown if you believe from the evidence that it probably existed. [Emphasis added.] The trial court then submitted the following mitigating factors to the jurors from Form 2: The capital murder was committed while [Appellant] was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The capital murder was committed while [Appellant] was acting under unusual pressures or influences or under the domination of another person. The capital murder was committed while the capacity of [Appellant] to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, intoxication, or drug abuse. The youth of [Appellant] at the time of the commission of the capital murder. The capital murder was committed by another person and [Appellant] was an accomplice and his participation relatively minor. [Appellant] had no significant history of prior criminal activity at the time of the murder. Other: Specify in writing: Appellant's proffered instruction contained the first four mitigating factors given by the trial court and the following additional factors: [Appellant] is remorseful for the commission of this offense. [Appellant] has demonstrated his ability to adjust to confinement. [Appellant] functions in the Borderline to Mild Mental Retardation range of intellectual functioning. Other (specify in writing): [Appellant] cooperated with police by making a statement and assisting in the recovery of evidence or property. [Appellant], although legally responsible, suffers from an intellectual deficit to some degree. [Appellant] has a good work history. The jury found only one mitigating circumstance, that Appellant adjusts well to confinement. Significantly, that mitigating factor was not specifically listed on Form 2, but rather, was written in by the jury foreperson under the category of Other. Thus, the jury obviously considered the mitigating evidence, given that they found one mitigating circumstance, and obviously considered more factors than just those listed on Form 2. Despite this, Appellant contends that it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the specific mitigating factors submitted on his proffered jury form. The State again asserts that this argument was previously rejected in Camargo I and is now the law of the case. In Camargo I , this court elected to address Appellant's remaining arguments regarding sentencing to provide guidance for the trial court on remand. One of the issues addressed was Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a modified instruction form of mitigating circumstances that included Appellant's mental retardation as a mitigating factor. This court rejected Appellant's argument, holding: Appellant relies upon a line of United States Supreme Court cases that hold that any death sentence resulting from a deliberate exclusion of any mitigating circumstance is presumptively invalid. Penry v. [ Lynaugh ], 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). We find no such deliberate exclusion, because appellant was permitted to make his argument to the jury. We rejected an identical argument in Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993), in which we held that when the defendant is allowed to present the possible mitigators and the jury is told it is not limited to the mitigators listed on the form, it is not error to submit the standard form to the jury in lieu of a form proposed by the defendant. Id. at 38, 852 S.W.2d at 779. 327 Ark. at 645-46, 940 S.W.2d at 471-72 (emphasis added). In Sheridan, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772, relied upon in Camargo I , this court examined the constitutional ramifications of failing to allow the defendant to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence: In Penry [ v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)], the United States Supreme Court found that a criminal defendant's Eighth Amendment prohibition upon the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment is violated where he is sentenced to death and no instructions were given informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental retardation and former abuse received. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is a mandatory safeguard of the Eighth Amendment for the sentencing body to be allowed to consider any mitigating factor that is relevant to the particular offender's case. The defense must be allowed during the sentencing phase to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence the defense proffers concerning the character or history of the offender or the circumstances of the offense. Not only must relevant mitigating evidence be admitted, it must be actually considered, which in appropriate cases means specifically instructing the jury to do so. In other words, any death sentence that results from a deliberate exclusion of any relevant mitigating evidence is presumptively invalid. Applying these U.S. Supreme Court rules to the instant case, it is clear to us that the jury was not limited to the mitigating factors listed on Form 2 but was invited by the judge to consider any others they saw fit and to write them in the blank spaces provided in each category. Therefore, the submission of Form 2 to the jury instead of the form proffered by Sheridan did not act as an impermissible exclusion of relevant mitigating factors. The court specifically told the jurors that the mitigating factors listed were not the sole ones to be considered and that they could consider other factors. Id. at 37-38, 852 S.W.2d at 779-80 (citations omitted). Accordingly, because we considered and decided in Camargo I the same constitutional argument raised in the instant appeal, our prior decision with regard to that matter is binding in this subsequent appeal from Appellant's resentencing trial. Appellant also raises two additional points regarding the instructions on mitigating circumstances, neither of which has any merit. First, Appellant argues that the jury, being extremely cautious to avoid the fate of the last jury which failed to properly execute the verdict forms, failed to consider any mitigating circumstances not enumerated on the instruction forms. This argument is without merit, as noted above, as the one mitigating circumstance unanimously found by the jury, that Appellant adjusts well to confinement, was not enumerated on the instruction forms. Second, Appellant argues that the fact that the jury executed AMCI 2d 1009, stating that it did not unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant was mentally retarded at the time he committed the murders, indicates that the jury perceived that its findings on that form precluded it from considering the evidence of his mental retardation or intellectual deficit as mitigating factors. We find no merit to this argument, as the trial court specifically instructed the jury on AMCI 2d 1009EXP, which provides in pertinent part: If you unanimously find that [Appellant] was mentally retarded when the offense was committed, you will sentence him to life imprisonment without parole. You should consider any evidence with respect to mental retardation first. Then, if you do not unanimously find that [Appellant] has proved mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence, you should consider the evidence presented on the issue of mental retardation in your deliberations on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. [Emphasis added.] Clearly, the jury was instructed that it could consider the evidence of Appellant's mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance even if it concluded that Appellant had not proven mental retardation by a preponderance.