Opinion ID: 1975227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ripeness of the opponents' constitutional claim

Text: Mr. Hessey and the Board argue that the constitutional objections to the proposed initiative raised by the opponents are not ripe for review because the initiative has not yet been enacted and, indeed, may be rejected by the voters. They liken the trial court's pre-election adjudication of the opponents' constitutional claims to an advisory opinion, which courts do not generally have the authority to issue. See Smith v. Smith, 310 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C.1973). The opponents contend, in response, that D.C.Code § 1-1320(b)(3) requires the trial court to consider constitutional objections to the proposed initiative before it is placed on the ballot. They point out that subsection (b)(1) requires an initiative measure to be a proper subject of initiative ... under the terms of [the District of Columbia Charter] (see notes 2 and 8, supra ). Since the Charter provides in part that all legislation in the District of Columbia must be consistent with the Constitution of the United States, D.C.Code § 1-204 (1992), the opponents argue that the initiative statute requires that all proposed subjects of initiatives be constitutional. That requirement, in the view of the opponents, compels a pre-election decision on the constitutionality of a proposed initiative. [17] Our case law does not answer the ripeness question presented in this case. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in an unpublished opinion, has held that [n]either the validity nor the constitutionality of the initiative ... may properly be resolved by this court. Those issues will be ripe for adjudication only if the initiative in fact passes and becomes law. Grano v. Barry, C.A. No. 83-2225 (D.D.C.1983), quoted in Grano v. Barry, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 292, 783 F.2d 1104, 1107 (1986). Mr. Hessey cites several unpublished Superior Court decisions in arguing that the opponents' constitutional claim is unripe. This court's only discussion of ripeness in the realm of constitutional challenges to proposed initiatives, however, came in a footnote in Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 898 n. 17 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion), where we simply noted the conflicting authority in other jurisdictions on the ripeness issue, which was not actually before us in Convention Center. In most other jurisdictions, the general rule with respect to pre-election review of proposed initiatives is that constitutional challenges are unripe. The Supreme Court of Colorado, for instance, has said that courts may not interfere with the exercise of this right [of initiative] by declaring unconstitutional or invalid a proposed measure before the process has run its course and the measure is actually adopted.... Then and only then, when actual litigants whose rights are affected are before it, may the court determine the validity of the legislation. McKee v. City of Louisville, 200 Colo. 525, 528-29, 616 P.2d 969, 972-973 (1980) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Oregon has held: If [a proposed initiative] is unconstitutional and should be adopted, the Constitution itself will require the courts, if the question is properly presented, to pronounce the measure to be unconstitutional, but the courts possess no such power as to any proposed bill before the same has become a law.... Johnson v. City of Astoria, 227 Or. 585, 589, 363 P.2d 571, 575 (1961), quoting State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or. 641, 649, 270 P. 513, 516 (1928). The same rule applies in Ohio: It is well-settled that this court will not consider, in an action to strike an issue from the ballot, a claim that the proposed amendment would be unconstitutional if approved, such claim being premature. State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 7 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 454 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 (1983) (citations omitted); see also Diaz v. Board of County Commissioners, 502 F.Supp. 190, 193-194 (S.D.Fla.1980); State ex rel. Williams v. Iannucci, 39 Ohio St.3d 292, 530 N.E.2d 869 (1988); Drockton v. Board of Elections, 16 Ohio Misc. 211, 216, 240 N.E.2d 896, 901 (C.C.P.1968); In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772, 782 (Okla.1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring); Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Texas 1980); State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis.2d 97, 102-103, 255 N.W.2d 449, 455-456 (1977). Moreover, any court ruling on the validity of a proposed initiative may be perceived as an unwarranted judicial intrusion into a legislative process. Gordon & Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 298, 304 (1989). Judges who strike a legislative proposal from the ballot before the voters have a chance to vote on it could be perceived, at least by the measure's supporters, as meddlers interfering with the process of popular legislation. Id. at 306. Some courts nevertheless have ruled on constitutional challenges to proposed initiatives before those initiatives have been enacted into law. In proceedings to compel elections, several courts have look[ed] into the question whether, if approved by the voters, the measure would be valid. West Hartford Taxpayers Ass'n v. Streeter, 190 Conn. 736, 739, 462 A.2d 379, 382 (1983) (citations omitted). The Kentucky Court of Appeals takes the position that in a proper case validity of a proposed legislative enactment may be determined before actual adoption in a proceeding to compel or to prevent its submission to a required referendum where the public interest requires prompt decision, or it is necessary to a decision of the case in hand, such as the right to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Utz v. City of Newport, 252 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Ky.1952) (citation omitted); see also Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 762 (Alaska 1980); AFL-CIO v. March Fong Eu, 36 Cal.3d 687, 695-697, 686 P.2d 609, 614-615, 206 Cal.Rptr. 89, 94-95 (1984); State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 65, 394 P.2d 761, 765 (1964). The courts that engage in pre-election review of proposed initiatives generally justify such review on the ground that the electorate has no right to enact an unconstitutional law. They hold that the initiative right, as closely guarded as it is, does not extend to legislation which violates the United States Constitution or that of the state involved. See Whitson, supra, 608 P.2d at 762. Efficiency and fiscal responsibility are also put forth as reasons for pre-election review: The court ought not to compel the doing of a vain thing and the useless spending of public money. Utz, supra, 252 S.W.2d at 437. Holding an election on an unconstitutional initiative would clearly be inefficient in hindsight, although that inefficiency must be weighed against the cost in judicial resources of pre-election review. [18] Several of the cases cited above allow pre-election consideration of constitutional challenges to proposed initiatives if those initiatives cross a threshold of patent unconstitutionality. The Whitson case, on which the trial court principally relied in deciding that the constitutional issues in this case were indeed ripe for review, establishes a threshold test: In the case of explicit constitutional prohibitions against proposed initiatives, we have noted that [u]nless the courts had power to enforce those exclusions, they would be futile.... Similarly, where, as here, a municipal charter amendment proposed by initiative is in clear conflict with a state statute, it would be useless [to allow an election on the measure]. Whitson, supra, 608 P.2d at 762 (citations omitted); see also State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, supra, 144 Mont. at 65, 394 P.2d at 765 (purported Initiative Measure No. 63 seems almost designedly drafted to be unquestionably and palpably unconstitutional on its face). This threshold showing of patent unconstitutionality would also justify pre-election review in Florida, which otherwise has abided by the general ripeness prohibition against such review. Dulaney v. City of Miami Beach, 96 So.2d 550, 551 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1957) (An election should not be held if the ordinance proposed was clearly invalid on its face). In the instant case, the trial court held that the opponents' constitutional claims were ripe for review even before the proposed initiative was placed on the ballot. The court accepted the opponents' argument that the initiative statute, with its reference to the District of Columbia Charter, compels pre-election review of the constitutionality of a proposed initiative. We do not agree that the statute requires either the Superior Court or the Board to entertain and rule on constitutional challenges before an election. While we recognize that the District's legislative power is unlike that of any state government because the District of Columbia is a unique political entity, In re O.M., 565 A.2d 573, 583 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1086, 110 S.Ct. 1824, 108 L.Ed.2d 953 (1990), we do not think that power is as limited as the opponents suggest. We are therefore not persuaded that D.C.Code § 1-1320(b) requires that all legislation enacted by initiative be held constitutional by either the Board or the Superior Court before that initiative may be classified as a proper subject. Nevertheless, we stop short of joining the list of jurisdictions which forbid pre-election review of constitutional challenges to proposed initiatives. We agree with the majority of courts which hold that such review is imprudent. But there may be extreme cases in which it would be both appropriate and efficient to decide the constitutionality of a proposed initiative. An initiative proposing to establish an official religion in the District of Columbia, for example, would be patently unconstitutional. If someone proposed such a measure for submission to the voters, the Board and the Superior Court might well decide to classify it as an improper subject before public funds are spent on an election. Thus we are not willing to say that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to consider pre-election constitutional objections to an initiative. We think, however, that the court's jurisdiction should be very sparingly exercised, and that in the great majority of cases the court in its discretion should decline to consider pre-election challenges to the constitutionality or legality of an initiative. We are not prohibiting pre-election review of initiatives, but we are saying that, as a matter of trial court discretion, such review should be reserved for the truly extreme case. The Superior Court's discretion to adjudicate constitutional challenges to proposed initiatives is based in part on the nature of a mandamus proceeding, the type of action authorized by D.C.Code § 1-1320(b)(3). When the proponent of an initiative petitions the court for a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel the Board to accept a proposed initiative, he or she is asking the court to bestow a kind of judicial blessing on that initiative. The request for such extraordinary relief requires and empowers the court to give the initiative a very close inspection and to consider every non-frivolous objection to it that has been properly raised. See 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.69, at 324 (3d ed. 1989) (it has been ruled that, in a proceeding to compel submission to the electors, in accordance with initiative procedure, a court will look into the question whether, if approved by the voters, the measure would be valid and constitutional (emphasis added)). But the court's discretion to rule (or not to rule) on constitutional objections to a proposed initiative is not tied exclusively to the proponent's petition for mandamus. As we have already held in part III of this opinion, the court may exercise its discretion to evaluate such constitutional claims before an election when it is acting within its general equity jurisdiction. For these reasons we cannot say that the trial court in the instant case erroneously ruled on an unripe issue, though we emphasize again the court's discretion to refuse to decide a constitutional issue at this stage. We conclude that the court acted within its discretion, and within its statutory authority, in considering the opponents' challenges to the proposed initiative, and thus we turn to the merits of those challenges.