Opinion ID: 1679169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Assessments Claim: Do the 1991 Assessed Values Exceed the 1991 Fair Market Values?

Text: One basis upon which an assessment may be appealed is that the property is assessed for more than the value authorized by law. Iowa Code § 441.37(1)(b) (1993). The value authorized by law is the fair and reasonable market value of the property. Id. § 441.21(1)(a), (b). Consequently, an assessment is excessive if it is higher than the market value of the property. See id. § 441.37(1)(b). Thus, in deciding whether an assessment is excessive, it is necessary to determine the fair market value of the assessed property. Here the district court found that the market values of the subject properties did not increase in 1991 from the values established by the district court in the first set of appeals. Based on this finding, the district court concluded that the 1991 assessed values, which were higher than the market values, were excessive. The Board cross-appealed this decision. The burden of proof is on the property owner to prove that the assessed value is excessive. Iowa Code § 441.21(3) (1993). If the property owner offers competent evidence from at least two disinterested witnesses that the market value is less than that determined by the assessor, the burden of persuasion shifts to the board of review. Riso v. Pottawattamie Bd. of Review, 362 N.W.2d 513, 517-18 (Iowa 1985); Iowa Code § 441.21(3) (1993). The property owners here did not offer the testimony of two disinterested witnesses so the burden remains on the owners to prove that the valuations were excessive. Post-Newsweek Cable, Inc. v. Board of Review, 497 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 1993); Richards v. Hardin County Bd. of Review, 393 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Iowa 1986). The property owners are assisted, however, by a presumption arising from the court-established 1988 valuations of the Washington Avenue property and the 4161 McDonald Avenue parcel. [I]t is presumed that a valuation fixed by the court continues to be the true value of the property in subsequent years unless a change in value is shown. 16 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 44.111, at 471 (3d ed. rev. 1994). Cf. Cott v. Board of Review, 442 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Iowa 1989) (unless the use of property has changed, it is presumed that a classification adjudicated by the court continues). The same presumption arising from the district court's valuation of all the properties for 1989 and 1990 also helps the property owners. The Board did not appeal that portion of the district court's decree establishing the 1989 and 1990 market values of the properties. Therefore, in the absence of a proven change in value, we presume that the values of the properties in 1991 remained the same as the valuations fixed by the court for 1989 and 1990. We now turn to a review of the evidence offered by the property owners and the Board. The evidence is overwhelming that there was no change in the market for warehouse properties that would justify raising the market values of the subject properties in 1991. Additionally, the few physical changes made to the warehouses in 1990 do not support any increases in the 1991 market values of these properties. We believe the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the market values of the subject properties remained the same in 1991 as they had been in 1986 through 1990. Therefore, we agree with the district court that the market values of these properties are the values established by the district court in the first appeal. Because the 1991 assessments exceed these market values, we conclude that the property owners carried their burden to prove that the assessed values on these properties were excessive.