Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims of misconduct and trial court error

Text: Defendant asserts the prosecution committed misconduct by manufacturing evidence  namely, telling Guillory that he had been the subject of a contract to kill, and then having Guillory parrot back that same assertion from the witness stand. As the People observe, defendant did not raise this claim of prosecutorial misconduct below (and accordingly the prosecution had no incentive to make a record on this point), and hence the claim has not properly been preserved for appeal. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) But in any event, we find no indication in the record that the prosecution manufactured this evidence. Based upon the combination of the testimony of Jacqueline Coghlan (concerning the transfer of $1,000 from defendant to Solvang), the testimony of Inspector Sjostrand (concerning the intercepted December 5, 1989, telephone call from Richard to Solvang), and defendant's reference in his letter to Donna Guthrie to the cookie and how one little mess can be cleaned, the existence of a contract to kill Guillory was a potential inference that reasonably could be drawn from the evidence. And, based upon Guillory's description of what he had been told by Pat, it appears that Guillory could well have reached, on his own, the conclusion that there was a plot to kill him. We conclude that the record does not establish that the prosecution manufactured evidence of a contract or plan to kill Guillory. Defendant also asserts that the prosecution, by asking Guillory questions that led to the testimony concerning the statements by Pat relating to the alleged plan to leave Guillory floating in the Sacramento River, committed misconduct by assuming a critical fact not in evidence  namely, the existence of a plan or contract to kill Guillory. Again, defendant did not raise this claim of prosecutorial misconduct below, and hence the claim has not properly been preserved for appeal. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Moreover, as noted above, the initial reference before the jury to a plan to terminate Guillory's life was made by Guillory in response to a question not from the prosecution, but from defense counsel on cross-examination  and, at that point, defense counsel voiced no objection to Guillory's statement and did not move to strike the response. In addition, as noted above, given the testimony of Jacqueline Coghlan and Inspector Sjostrand, the existence of a contract to kill Guillory was at least a logical inference that reasonably could be drawn from the evidence. This inference also was consistent with what Guillory testified he had heard elsewhere (apparently prior to the preliminary examination on December 6, 1989) from Pat. On this record, we cannot conclude that the prosecution committed misconduct in its follow-up questions by assuming facts not in evidence. Defendant further argues that the prosecution should not have elicited, and the trial court should not have admitted, Guillory's testimony about what Pat earlier had told him, namely that Guillory was supposed to get hit and should not travel to Sacramento because he was being set up and might end up floating in the river. Although defendant asserts this testimony was inadmissible hearsay, as noted above the trial court admitted the testimony under an exception to the hearsay rule, as relevant to establish the state of mind of the witness, Terry Guillory. As suggested above, Guillory was (at least initially) a reluctant witness. Moreover, throughout his entire testimony Guillory was shown frequently to be angry, rude, and coarse. On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to show that Guillory was manipulative and untrustworthy. Accordingly, on redirect examination, the prosecution attempted to demonstrate that Guillory's demeanor was based in part upon his belief that he had been the subject of a death contract instigated by defendant (and that he still feared retaliation by defendant) [28] and also was based in part on the circumstance that Guillory was angry at the prosecution for failing to inform him earlier of the potential threat to his safety. In other words, the People attempted to show that Guillory was angry with both parties, and hence the jury should not view Guillory's demeanor as simply reflecting a bias against or animosity toward defendant. Defendant asserts this testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative. But he made no such objection at trial, and hence that issue is waived. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a).) In any event, on this record, for the reasons alluded to above, we conclude that the jury properly was made aware of what Guillory had been told by Pat. Defendant insists that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a contemporaneous (or indeed any) limiting instruction, which would have advised that references in Guillory's testimony and counsel's questions to a contract or plan to kill Guillory and to Pat's statements were to be used only to illuminate Guillory's state of mind and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that is, to prove that defendant actually had instigated a plan to kill Guillory in Sacramento. When defense counsel first objected on redirect examination to Guillory's references to the contract or plan to kill him, counsel asked that the jury be admonished that questions are not evidence and complained, it's a question of misleading the jury as to whether or not these facts are true or not. The trial court observed that it had given instructions on that subject prior to presentation of the evidence [29] (and indeed such instructions were given again after the close of the case) [30] and that if defendant wanted a more focused instruction at a later point I'll entertain it. Trial counsel, however, never reasserted the issue of a more focused instruction and did not press then, or later during Guillory's testimony concerning Pat's statements to him, for a contemporaneous limiting instruction. Defendant asserts that in light of the limited use for which Guillory's testimony concerning a plot to kill him (rather than merely prevent his testimony by other means) was admitted into evidence, and because the claimed plot to kill Guillory assertedly became such a dominant part of the prosecution's evidence of guilt, the trial court erred by refusing to provide an immediate limiting instruction upon request and also bore a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury subsequently concerning the limited admissibility of that evidence. Viewing the record as a whole, we disagree with defendant's premise that the claimed plot to kill Guillory became a dominant part of the prosecution's evidence of guilt. The challenged aspect of Guillory's testimony was only briefly and obliquely referred to during the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury, and was not mentioned at all in the prosecution's rebuttal argument. [31] Under these circumstances, we believe it is clear the trial court did not err by failing on its own motion to give the additional limiting instructions to which defendant now asserts he was entitled. In any event, if we were to assume that the trial court erred in this regard, any such error would have been harmless. The truly dominant aspect of the prosecution's evidence of guilt did not focus upon the brief references to an alleged plot to prevent Guillory's testimony and also kill him. Instead, as recounted ante, part II.C, the prosecution's case focused upon the strong evidence of defendant's guilt of the three killings with which he was charged. In view of all of this evidence, it is not reasonably probable that Guillory's various statements of his belief that he was the subject of a plot by defendant to kill him affected the result in this case. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.)