Opinion ID: 1058905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consolidation of the Offenses

Text: The majority has concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by consolidating the March 1, 1998 and April 9, 1998 offenses for a single trial. In my view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the offenses and the majority has substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. The two offenses of aggravated child abuse were charged in separate indictments. The offense of child abuse is committed when a person knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury. . . . Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-401(a) (1997). The offense of aggravated child abuse is committed when (1) the act of child abuse results in serious bodily injury to the child, or (2) the act of child abuse is accomplished with a deadly weapon. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-402(a) (1997). A deadly weapon is: (A) A firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or (B) Anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(5) (1997) (emphasis added). A serious bodily injury is one involving: (A) A substantial risk of death; (B) Protracted unconsciousness; (C) Extreme physical pain; (D) Protracted or obvious disfigurement; or (E) Protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(34) (1997) (emphasis added). The State orally moved to consolidate the charges on the day of trial [1] on the basis that the charges showed a pattern and a common scheme of plan, and that in both of these cases the allegations will be that the defendant [] hit the child with the same braided extension cord. . . . The trial court determined that the March 1, 1998 and April 9, 1998 incidents were identical to one another in several key respects and relevant to the defendant's intent: Since the crimes ... are identical in every feature, the same place, the same room, the same method of administering this type of injury, the same weapon, or the same object ..., they're so identical to each other, going to that issue of intent, I'm going to allow the State to proceed on both of these indictments. The trial court therefore granted the State's oral motion to consolidate. The trial court's decision on a motion to consolidate offenses or a motion to sever offenses may be overturned only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn.1999). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the court applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining. Id. Rule 8(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [t]wo or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment, presentment, or information, with each offense stated in a separate count or consolidated pursuant to Rule 13 if the offenses constitute parts of a common scheme or plan or if they are of the same or similar character.  Tenn. R.Crim. P. 8(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 13(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the trial court may order consolidation of two or more indictments, presentments, or informations for trial if the offenses and all defendants could have been joined in a single indictment, presentment, or information pursuant to Rule 8. When a defendant objects to consolidation, the state must then demonstrate that the offenses are parts of a common scheme or plan and that evidence of each offense is admissible in the trial of the others. Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Tenn.2000). Accordingly, as the majority correctly summarizes, a trial court must find that the multiple offenses are parts of a common scheme or plan, that evidence of each offense is relevant to some material issue in the trial of the other offenses, and that the probative value of the evidence of other offenses is not outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the defendant. Id. at 445. Unlike the majority, I would conclude that these requirements were satisfied in the present case.