Opinion ID: 2637458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excluding Statutory Language from Jury Instruction

Text: ¶ 45 The Gorostietas requested that section 41-6-80 of the Utah Code be used verbatim as a jury instruction. This statute in its entirety reads: The operator of a vehicle shall exercise care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian and shall give an audible signal when necessary and exercise appropriate precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated, or intoxicated person. This section supersedes any conflicting provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80 (1998). [13] The court delivered this statute as a jury instruction, omitting the last sentence, This section supersedes any conflicting provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance. The Gorostietas argue that by omitting the last sentence, the court misled the jury as to the legal duties of Parkinson and Dalinda Gorostieta. ¶ 46 When reviewing jury instructions, we must consider the challenged instruction in context. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 37, 993 P.2d 191; Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ¶ 16, 977 P.2d 474. Generally, the rewording of a statute as a jury instruction is not error as long as it does not change the essential meaning of the statute. See 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1132, at 648; accord Holmes v. Heidebrecht, 10 Utah 2d 74, 75-76, 348 P.2d 565, 566 (1960). Therefore, we must determine the meaning of the omitted sentence to ascertain whether its omission from the jury instruction changed the meaning from that of the statute. ¶ 47 When interpreting a statute, we must first look to the statute's plain language for the legislative intent. See Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, ¶ 9, 4 P.3d 783. We look no further if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous on its face. See id. ¶ 48 Section 41-6-80 explains the duty a vehicle operator has with respect to pedestrians and in particular pedestrians who fall into the category of any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated, or intoxicated person. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80. The last sentence states, This section supersedes any conflicting provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance. Id. The Gorostietas argue that this last sentence indicates that the vehicle operator's duty supersedes or sets aside [14] the duty of a child pedestrian and the jury was therefore misled in finding that Dalinda was 35% at fault for her injuries. ¶ 49 The Gorostietas misinterpret the plain meaning of the last sentence of the statute. The statute sets forth the duty a vehicle operator has to pedestrians. The last sentence of section 41-6-80 states that the section sets aside any conflicting provision of the traffic rules and regulations found in chapter 6 of the annotated Utah Code or of a local ordinance. The plain language of the section clearly states that if either a local ordinance or a state statute under chapter 6 creates a duty for a vehicle operator that is any more or less than that stated in this section (which, inter alia, is to exercise the appropriate precaution upon observing any child), that ordinance or statute is set aside. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80. ¶ 50 The jury was given several instructions on the various duties of a driver and also on those of a pedestrian. Taken in context, with the proper meaning given to section 41-6-80, the omission of the last sentence from the jury instruction did not change the essential meaning of the statute. Therefore, there was no error.