Opinion ID: 1127469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Roger's Mitigation

Text: In the trial court, Roger raised the following statutory mitigating circumstances: 1. Capacity to Appreciate Wrongfulness of Conduct or Conform Conduct to Requirements of Law 2. Relatively Minor Participation 3. Age On appeal, he also argues that the following statutory mitigators apply: 4. Duress 5. No Reasonable Foreseeability that Conduct Would Create a Grave Risk of Death At trial, he raised the following as nonstatutory mitigation: 6. Dysfunctional Childhood and Family Relations 7. Medical Treatment 8. Remorse 9. Drug and Alcohol Use 10. Mental Health Roger also raises for the first time on appeal: 11. Education 12. Residual or Lingering Doubt 13. Felony Murder Instruction 14. Cooperation As part of our independent review, we address each alleged statutory mitigating factor. 1. Capacity to Appreciate Wrongfulness of Conduct or Conform Conduct to Requirements of Law Roger argues that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired. See A.R.S. ง 13-703(G)(1). This factor is disjunctive, so that proof of incapacity as to either ability to appreciate or conform establishes the mitigating circumstance. State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 70, 881 P.2d 1158, 1175 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2588, 132 L.Ed.2d 836 (1995). He cites serious problems as a juvenile, hyperactivity, multiple head injuries, and increased susceptibility to the effect of alcohol and illicit substances as proof that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Roger was arrested for shoplifting at the age of 9. At 13, he was permanently expelled from junior high for bringing a gun to school and was placed on supervised probation in a detention home for juvenile delinquents. In his statement, he wrote that he told his friends at school that he could use the gun to blow Mr. [illegible]'s brains out if I wanted to. While serving in the detention home, an official reported: Roger is very destructive โ he constantly talks about killing people esp. policemen. Roger has serious emotional problems โ when he isn't crying he is cursing or destroying things around the house. He needs help that we cannot give him here. He is a time bomb waiting to go off. A psychologist who subsequently conducted an evaluation of Roger for legal authorities stated: My fear is that Roger will have no care for society. I believe that Roger and society are going to be at odds until some drastic steps are taken. It appears that it would be to Roger's benefit for those steps to occur as soon as possible if we are going to have a chance of changing his behavior. After vandalizing a cemetery at age 14, he was committed to the Alabama Department of Youth Services for Criminal Mischief. During this commitment a counselor reported that Roger was receiving behavioral counseling, but at present [he] just simply does not appear interested in rectifying his misdeeds. Roger also received drug and alcohol counseling. At 17, he pled guilty to the unauthorized use of a vehicle, and he was placed on probation. A few months later, he was again charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle. Also at 17, Roger was arrested for two separate incidents involving armed robbery and third degree burglary and theft. He admitted the theft and robbery. The robbery charge was dismissed. Roger was convicted as an adult for burglary and sentenced to boot camp, which he failed. He was then sentenced to prison for four years and was released in 1990. A sociologist testified that authorities became familiar with Roger's problems as a youth, including tendencies towards aggression, but did nothing about it. On cross-examination, the sociologist acknowledged that Roger received counseling from the Franklin County Juvenile Court. He also testified that Roger knew killing people was wrong. As is unfortunately true in so many murder cases, defendant's troubles with the law began early. His experiences, while demonstrating that his problems started early and were exacerbated by neglect, familial and official, also amply demonstrate his dangerousness. He has failed to show, however, that his juvenile experiences significantly impaired his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law.
Head injuries that lead to behavioral disorders may be considered a mitigating circumstance. See Rockwell, 161 Ariz. at 15, 775 P.2d at 1079. Roger's aunt testified that Roger fell and hit his head as a child, but provided no further details. Roger's mother testified that he hurt his head by slipping on ice as a child. The presentence evaluation by Dr. Potts indicated that Roger had a cerebrovascular accident, quite probably secondary to PCP ingestion in 1990. Dr. Potts concluded that multiple head injuries probably contributed to further deterioration leading to impulsive behavior. The foundational evidence concerning head injuries suggests nothing more than the normal childhood injuries. The trial court rejected them as a basis for a (G)(1) finding, and we agree.
Roger argues that evidence of his hyperactivity shows that he acted impulsively and was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Roger's mother and aunt testified that he was hyperactive while growing up. In 1984, a psychologist gave a diagnostic impression that Roger had a conduct disorder and was undersocialized and aggressive, after which Roger received more than a year of treatment and rehabilitation at the Alabama Department of Youth Services. Dr. Potts diagnosed defendant with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Defense psychiatrists diagnosed Roger as having an anti-social personality disorder and traumatic stress disorder symptomatology. Dr. Potts concluded: The defendant's life has been directed by what is quite probably an organic brain disorder. The psychological testing conducted upon defendant since he was 14 is consistent with brain damage. It manifests as hyperactivity, poor impulse control, a short fuse, violent rages, and increased susceptibility to the effects of alcohol and other illicit substances. A sociologist opined at sentencing that the homicides appeared impulsive. In rebuttal on impulsiveness, the state offered testimony of a victim and investigating officer for a crime in Alabama for which the defendants were suspects. The 78-year-old victim testified that on April 30, 1991, two weeks before the crimes at Grasshopper Junction, she had been assaulted and robbed by two men at her home in Mt. Hope, Alabama. They came to her house about 9:00 p.m., armed, tied her up, beat her, ransacked her house, and took off with valuables. The heavy set man wore a mask and carried a pistol. The other man did not cover his face. She identified that person as Roger in a photo lineup on May 2. She also identified the mask, a sleeve cut out of a sweatshirt. Mike Ball, Alabama Bureau of Investigations, testified that a sweatshirt with a sleeve missing was found by the Murray brothers' father and turned over to police. The material matched that of the mask. The state also offered evidence concerning a shotgun sold to an individual in Las Vegas on May 11 or 12. The man who purchased the gun drove a white Ford sedan. Although the seller of the gun could not positively identify either defendant, the serial number of the gun matched the gun found in defendants' car. The gun had been sawed off since it was sold; a hacksaw was found in defendants' vehicle. The phone number and address of the man who sold the shotgun were also found in the car. Character or personality disorders alone are generally not sufficient to find that defendant was significantly impaired. Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377, 861 P.2d at 662. A mental disease or psychological defect usually must exist before significant impairment is found. Id. Despite the evidence of hyperactivity and anti-social personality disorder, [t]his case does not involve the same level of mental disease or psychological defects considered in other cases in which the ง 13-703(G)(1) mitigating circumstance was found to exist. Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505, 826 P.2d at 802. The trial court found that the offenses were not impulsive, but were planned in advance. The trial court noted that using the tow truck as a decoy is evidence that defendants knew their conduct was wrongful. See Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 520, 898 P.2d at 469. The atlas found in the Tempo that had Grasshopper Junction circled, though it was not marked otherwise, also suggests that defendants carefully chose this site for the crime. Although Roger's hyperactivity was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, there is no evidence that he did not know that his conduct was wrongful. Defendant also failed to show that his ability to control his actions was substantially impaired. See Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505-06, 826 P.2d at 802-03.
Intoxication may constitute statutory mitigation. Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 650-51, 832 P.2d at 667-68. Evidence was presented that Robert and Roger consumed alcohol on the night of the crimes. See supra Robert's Mitigation. However, no evidence quantified the amount of alcohol consumed. In the presentence investigation, Roger reported that he was a regular consumer of alcohol and user of illicit drugs, including cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and crack cocaine. Dr. Potts concluded that his abilities to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law are markedly diminished because of illicit substance abuse. The trial court noted there was no evidence that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense. Roger failed to show alcohol or illicit drugs impaired his ability to appreciate wrongfulness or conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. See Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 521, 898 P.2d at 470.
Roger fails to show how any of these factors (juvenile problems, head injuries, hyperactivity, or alcohol or drugs), whether independently or combined, affected his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. 2. Relatively Minor Participation Under A.R.S. ง 13-703(G)(3), mitigation exists where the defendant shows that he was legally accountable for the conduct of another ..., but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution. Roger argued that letters to him from Robert exculpate him. In the jailhouse letters, Robert admits participating in the killing of Morrison and Appelhans, but does not indicate the role Roger did or did not play. On appeal, Roger also argues that there is no evidence to prove that he shot any of the guns at Grasshopper Junction. The trial court concluded that defendants acted in concert, considering the footprint evidence, the fact that both defendants were armed at the time of arrest, and that the victims suffered numerous bullet wounds from different weapons. Roger failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a minor participant in these crimes. 3. Age Roger was 20 years old at the time of the crimes. See A.R.S. ง 13-703(G)(5). When age is raised as a mitigating factor, the court should consider the defendant's criminal history, experience with law enforcement, maturity, intelligence, and extent of participation and deliberation in the murder. West, 176 Ariz. at 451, 862 P.2d at 211 (criminal history and experience); Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 66, 859 P.2d at 176 (maturity and intelligence); State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 34, 859 P.2d 131, 144 (extent of involvement), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 398, 126 L.Ed.2d 346 (1993); State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 513, 662 P.2d 1007, 1020 (1983) (deliberation). Evidence was presented that Roger's cognitive abilities were grossly within normal limits and his thought processes were goal directed and intact. He had a high school education and was a certified paralegal. There is no evidence that the crimes were a product of immaturity. As previously discussed, Roger had a long history in the juvenile justice system of Alabama. After his arrest for armed robbery, burglary, and theft at the age of 17, Alabama denied youthful offender status. In denying youthful offender status, the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles officer concluded, This subject bears a bad reputation in Colbert County. He is considered to be dangerous, as he has a thing about guns. He has been stealing since he was 9 years old. He has been through the Juvenile Court System, and this has not helped him any. He runs with a bad crowd [of] older people. He has never worked to amount to anything and as stated above, he is considered to be dangerous by the folks who know him. Another parole officer, who had first met Roger four years before, concluded, Roger Wayne Murray is a dangerous individual. I believe that if left to remain in society, he will harm and continue to harm people.... Roger ... should be treated as an adult, in order that society might be protected from such aggressiveness and abusive personality. He was released from prison in January 1990. In January 1991, defendant was charged with theft of property, attempt to elude, and driving without a license. At the time of these offenses at Grasshopper Junction, Roger was a suspect in Alabama for robbery and assault in the first degree. In light of Roger's intelligence, criminal history, experience with law enforcement, extent of involvement, and the deliberate nature of the murders, we agree with the trial court that his age is not a mitigating factor. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 314, 896 P.2d 830, 854 (1995) (age undermined as mitigating factor when defendant had been incarcerated as a juvenile, had prior felony conviction, and was awaiting trial for another crime); Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 169, 823 P.2d at 36 (age of 19 not sufficiently mitigating to call for leniency of defendant found with aggravating factors of pecuniary gain, cruelty, heinousness, and depravity, and multiple homicides). Roger fails to show how his age impaired his judgment in committing the crimes. See Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 414, 844 P.2d at 581. 4. Duress On appeal Roger raises the statutory mitigating factor of duress, arguing that Roger must have been doing whatever Robert desired in committing the crimes. See A.R.S. ง 13-703(G)(2). At the sentencing hearing a sociologist testified that Roger looked up to his brother Robert. Duress is defined as any illegal imprisonment, or legal imprisonment used for an illegal purpose, or threats of bodily or other harm, or other means amounting to or tending to coerce the will of another, and actually inducing him to do an act contrary to his free will. State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 394, 724 P.2d 1, 13 (1986). There is no evidence that Roger was under duress from Robert. Roger fails to show how his alleged desire to please his brother amounted to duress. 5. No Reasonable Foreseeability that Conduct Would Create a Grave Risk of Death Under A.R.S. ง 13-703(G)(4), Roger argues that he was immature, a follower, idolized his brother, and therefore could not foresee that the conduct would create a grave risk of death. Even if true, such evidence would fail to prove that he could not reasonably foresee his conduct would create a grave risk of death. 6. Dysfunctional Childhood and Family Relations [4] Roger's younger sister testified that their father hit Roger with fists, a belt, and a switch and that Roger left the house at the age of 14 or 15. On cross-examination she stated that she only saw her father hit him with a fist once or twice. Roger's mother also testified that his father hit him with his fists about six times and with a switch about once or twice a month. Evidence was presented at trial that the divorce of Robert's parents had an effect on him. After the divorce, his father shunned him. A sociologist who reviewed the presentence investigation report, Roger's school records, Dr. Potts' report, and interviewed Roger, concluded that Roger was raised in a nonnurturing dysfunctional family environment. A difficult family background alone is not a mitigating circumstance. Wallace, 160 Ariz. at 427, 773 P.2d at 986. If it were, many homicide defendants could point to some circumstance in their background that would call for mitigation. Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 314, 896 P.2d at 854. Family background is a mitigating circumstance only if a defendant can show that something in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the defendant's control. Id. The trial court found Roger's dysfunctional childhood was a mitigating factor. The trial court agreed that defendant suffered from a less than ideal environment as a child. We agree that Roger comes from a dysfunctional family, but he fails to show how this background impacted his behavior at Grasshopper Junction. 7. Medical Treatment Roger claims that medical problems as a child constitute mitigation. Dr. Potts concluded: Had he been in a more understanding and caring environment where there was less conflict and abuse, he may have been referred for and accepting of medical treatment. We find nothing mitigating in connection with his claimed alleged medical problems as a child. 8. Remorse Remorse may be considered in mitigation. Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 507, 826 P.2d at 804; State v. Tittle, 147 Ariz. 339, 344, 710 P.2d 449, 454 (1985). In a letter to the trial judge just prior to the aggravation/mitigation hearings, Roger wrote, There is not one piece of evidence that points to me as having killed Mr. Morrison or Ms. Appelhans. There is evidence that someone did. But I am not responsible. Defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was remorseful. 9. Drug and Alcohol Use If impairment does not rise to the level of a statutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court should still consider whether such impairment constitutes nonstatutory mitigation, when viewed in light of defendant's alleged history of alcohol and drug abuse. Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 523, 898 P.2d at 472. In the presentence investigation, Roger reported that he was a regular consumer of alcohol and user of illicit drugs. However, defendant's historical substance abuse is self-reported and uncorroborated. See Gallegos, 178 Ariz. at 18, 870 P.2d at 1114 (defendant's claim of serious alcohol dependency is largely uncorroborated). The trial court noted there is some evidence that Roger habitually used drugs and alcohol. The court rejected intoxication as a mitigator because Roger performed complicated physical maneuvers at Grasshopper Junction. Roger has failed to prove that his alcohol or drug use is a nonstatutory mitigating factor. 10. Mental Health The trial court found that Roger's mental health is entitled to some weight as nonstatutory mitigation. See Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 524, 898 P.2d at 473. We agree that Roger proved that he suffers from hyperactivity and may suffer from other mental disorders. However, he fails to prove that he suffers from brain damage. His mental health is entitled to some nonstatutory mitigating weight. 11. Education Although Roger dropped out of high school, he received his diploma and became a paralegal. He argues that this constitutes mitigation because it demonstrates that in a controlled environment, [he] can reside within our society and abide by the rules and be an asset. Obviously, such accomplishments did not prevent the terrible crimes in this case. 12. Residual or Lingering Doubt Roger argues that a residual or lingering doubt exists regarding whether he actually participated in the homicides. We find no such doubt. 13. Felony Murder Instruction A felony murder instruction can only be mitigating where there is some doubt regarding defendant's specific intent to kill. Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 315, 896 P.2d at 855. Such mitigation is therefore precluded where there has been a finding of guilt for premeditated first degree murder. 14. Cooperation Roger argues that he was fully cooperative at the time of the arrest and that he never pointed his gun [at the officer], even though he was in a position to shoot if he had wanted to. Not murdering an additional person hardly demonstrates cooperation. Roger and Robert were apprehended only after a high speed chase, during which they ran an armed roadblock. Their behavior before and after arrest was not cooperative.