Opinion ID: 1769614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District of Columbia Circuit

Text: The farce and mockery rule had its origin in Diggs v. Welch, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 148 F.2d 667 (1945), wherein the Court stated: It must be shown that the proceedings were a farce and a mockery of justice. Id. at 669 The same standard was applied in Jones v. Huff, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 152 F.2d 14 (1945). In Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App. D.C. 336, 379 F.2d 113 (1967), the District of Columbia Circuit started on its retreat from the farce and mockery rule by stating: These words are not to be taken literally, but rather as a vivid description of the principle that the accused has a heavy burden in showing requisite unfairness. Id. at 116. In Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App. D.C. 339, 427 F.2d 609 (1970), decided within one year after State ex rel. Richmond, supra , the D.C. Circuit declared that the farce and mockery standard was no longer valid as such but exists in the law only as a metaphor that the defendant has a heavy burden to show requisite unfairness. Further the Court declared: The appropriate standard for ineffective assistance of counsel ... is whether gross incompetence blotted out the essence of a substantial defense. Id. at 610. In 1973, there came before this Circuit, the case of United States v. DeCoster, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 487 F.2d 1197 (1973). The Court noted that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), has implied and that this Circuit had explicitly held in Scott, supra , that effective assistance, like the right to counsel itself, derives not only from the due process clause, but from the Sixth Amendment's more stringent requirements. The Court, in DeCoster, adopted the following standard: A defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate. 487 F.2d at 1202. We are impressed by Chief Judge Bazelon's language in this most excellent case, and because of its relevance and the conciseness of the expression, we quote from it as follows: In General  Counsel should be guided by the American Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function. They represent the legal profession's own articulation of guidelines for the defense of criminal cases. Specifically  (1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as often as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies and tactical choices with his client. (2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all actions necessary to preserve them... . Counsel should also be concerned with the accused's right to be released from custody pending trial, and be prepared, where appropriate, to make motions for a pre-trial psychiatric examination or for the suppression of evidence. (3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine what matters of defense can be developed. The Supreme Court has noted that the adversary system requires that all available defenses are raised so that the government is put to its proof. This means that in most cases a defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own witnesses but also those that the government intends to call, when they are accessible. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. And, of course, the duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research. Id. at 1203-04 Thus it will be seen that the farce and mockery rule has been abandoned in the court of its creation.