Opinion ID: 394080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The DeFuria Stipulation.

Text: 111 Petitioner's final claim relates to the admission into evidence at trial of a stipulation. At the close of the evidence, the prosecutor informed the jury that he and defense counsel had stipulated that, if called, DeFuria would have asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify. See discussion supra at 261-262. 112 At no time did defense counsel object to the reading of the stipulation, move to strike the prosecutor's remarks, or request a cautionary instruction from the trial judge. The judge later routinely instructed the jury that they might draw a reasonable inference from the testimony, exhibits, and stipulations admitted into evidence. He cautioned the jurors, however, not to speculate as to the reason why any witness mentioned in the testimony has not testified here. Defense counsel neither objected to this portion of the charge, nor requested a more specific instruction concerning any inferences that might be drawn from the DeFuria stipulation. 113 Petitioner now contends that the prosecutor's reading of the stipulation and the court's alleged failure to caution the jury, sua sponte, not to draw any adverse inferences from it deprived him of his constitutional rights of due process and confrontation. He asserts, without any citation of supporting authority, that since it has been held improper under certain circumstances for a prosecutor to purposefully elicit a witness' assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury, it is necessarily also improper for the prosecutor to read a stipulation that, if called, a witness would have claimed the privilege and refused to testify. In either case, petitioner argues, the jury is invited to draw adverse inferences from testimony which cannot be challenged through cross-examination. 114 We doubt whether the district court, in denying relief, should have reached the merits of petitioner's claim in view of defense counsel's failure to object to the stipulation at trial. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In Wainwright, the Court held that, absent a showing of cause for trial counsel's failure to make a timely objection and a showing of actual prejudice from the admission of constitutionally tainted evidence, the failure to object in accordance with applicable state procedural rules constitutes an independent and adequate state ground which bars review of petitioner's federal constitutional claim in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. 115 Since Wainwright was decided, this Court has had several occasions to apply the cause and prejudice standard, including at least one in which petitioner claimed that her rights of cross-examination and confrontation had been violated at trial. See Cheek v. Bates, 615 F.2d 559, 562 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944, 100 S.Ct. 2172, 64 L.Ed.2d 800 (1980). Since petitioner has not even attempted to satisfy the rule, nor suggested any reason why it ought not apply in this instance, 11 it would appear that he has lost the right to challenge the admission of the DeFuria stipulation. However, since the district court did not rely on Wainwright, and neither party has addressed its application in this Court, we consider it appropriate to comment on the merits of petitioner's claim. 116 The leading case in this area is Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963). In Namet, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's rejection of the defendant's claim that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to knowingly elicit an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege from two key witnesses in the presence of the jury. The Court indicated that in order to determine whether prejudicial error has occurred, courts should examine the particular circumstances involved in each case focusing on two factors, each of which suggests a distinct ground of error. 117 First, the Court suggested that error may result from prosecutorial misconduct when the government makes a conscious and flagrant attempt to built its case out of inferences arising from the witness' assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 373 U.S. at 186, 83 S.Ct. at 1154. Second, the Court indicated that, in the circumstances of a given case, prejudicial error may be committed where inferences from a witness' refusal to answer add critical weight to the prosecution's case. Id. at 187, 83 S.Ct. at 1155. 118 On the facts of Namet, the Court refused to infer that the prosecutor's conduct amounted to planned or deliberate attempts by the Government to make capital out of witnesses' refusal to testify. Id. It stated: 119 We are particularly reluctant to fasten such motives on the Government's conduct where, as here, defense counsel not only failed to object on behalf of the defendant, but in many instances actually acquiesced in the procedure ... 120 Id. The Court also concluded that, because the claims of privilege were at most cumulative support for an inference already well established by other testimony, they were not so significant as to justify reversal in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to take affirmative steps to alleviate any prejudice arising from the prosecutor's conduct. 121 In applying the two-pronged Namet test in particular cases, courts have considered a number of factors including: the prosecutor's intent in calling the witness; the number of questions which elicit an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege; whether defense counsel objects to the prosecutor's conduct; whether the prosecutor attempts to draw adverse inferences in closing argument from the witness' refusal to testify; whether defense counsel himself attempts to rely upon the assertion of privilege or other aspects of the witness' testimony; whether the allegedly adverse inferences drawn from an assertion of the testimonial privilege relate to central issues in the case or collateral matters; and whether the inference is the only evidence bearing upon the issue or is cumulative of other evidence. See Namet, supra; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1964); 12 Robbins v. Small, III, 371 F.2d 793 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033, 87 S.Ct. 1483, 18 L.Ed.2d 594 (1967); Rado v. State of Connecticut, 607 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 3009, 65 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1980). 122 Assuming that the above principles apply at all in a case where defense counsel voluntarily stipulates that a witness, if called, would have refused to testify, and fails to object when the stipulation is read to the jury, we are convinced that there was no constitutional error in this instance under either prong of the Namet test. To begin with, the reading of the stipulation was merely one isolated event in the course of a relatively lengthy trial. The prosecutor did not even mention the stipulation in closing argument, much less ask the jury to draw any inferences from it. 123 The record does not disclose the prosecutor's actual motivation in reading the stipulation. Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor improperly sought to bolster the inference that Zeigler bribed DeFuria to cover up the cause of the fire, an inference that could fairly be drawn from the earlier testimony of Shaheen and Lincoln. However, it appears equally possible that because of the many references to DeFuria during the trial, the prosecutor simply did not want the jury to speculate as to why he had not produced this seemingly important witness. 124 Turning to the second prong of the Namet test, we note that any adverse inferences drawn from the stipulation relate only to whether Zeigler bribed DeFuria. This issue, while not insignificant, was certainly collateral to the central issue in the case, i. e., whether Zeigler procured the burning of his own building at 62 Louis Prang Street. Compare Robbins, 371 F.2d at 795 (adverse inference, if drawn, would have furnished evidence on practically every essential element of the crime). In addition, since DeFuria had already been linked to the fire and alleged cover-up by Shaheen and Lincoln, any impermissible inference drawn from DeFuria's refusal to testify was merely cumulative of their testimony. See Namet, 373 U.S. at 189, 83 S.Ct. at 1156. 125 However, by far the strongest indication that Zeigler was not prejudiced by the reading of the stipulation is the fact that defense counsel failed to object to the procedure. While the record does not clearly indicate that the failure to object was the result of a conscious tactical decision, it does suggest at a minimum that defense counsel did not perceive the stipulation as so clearly harmful to his client's position to require corrective action. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 at 510 n.5, 96 S.Ct. 1691 at 1696 n.5, and 512 n.9, 96 S.Ct. at 1697 n.9 (1976). 126 The defense theory of the case was that Zeigler was not responsible for the fire because he lacked any motive to burn the property. Throughout the trial, but particularly in closing argument, counsel sought to contrast Zeigler's position with that of other figures, such as the mortgage loan officer at South Boston Savings who, he claimed, had a strong financial incentive to burn the property at 62 Louis Prang Street. Counsel never contended that DeFuria was not bribed to cover-up the cause of the fire. Rather, the defense impliedly suggested that if anyone bribed DeFuria it was an official at South Boston Savings. Since there is nothing inconsistent between the above theory and the knowledge that, if called, DeFuria would have refused to testify about his involvement in the fire, there was no apparent prejudice and therefore no reason for defense counsel to object to the reading of the stipulation. 127 Finally, we disagree with petitioner's contention that the trial judge made no attempt to minimize the effect of the stipulation. His admonition that the jury not speculate about the reasons why any witness failed to testify, in our view, eliminated any prejudice that might have resulted from the reading of the stipulation. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to imagine what more the trial judge could have done to safeguard petitioner's rights. 128 Affirmed.