Opinion ID: 5813480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Restitution

Text: Legal Background “We review the legality of a restitution order de novo, the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and the amount of restitution for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1323 (10th Cir. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion if it orders a restitution amount based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Anthony I, 942 F.3d at 964 (quotations omitted). A district court may order restitution “only for losses actually resulting from the offense of conviction.” Id.;see United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 680 (10th Cir. 2002) (“A restitution order must be based on actual loss.”). The Government must prove those losses by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1265 (10th Cir. 2017); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). It must 11 Appellate Case: 21-6015 Document: 010110630862 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 12 also prove the amount of loss by a preponderance. United States v. Galloway, 509 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007). But “[t]he court need not calculate the harms with ‘exact precision.’” Anthony I, 942 F.3d at 970 (quoting United States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2015)). To meet its burden, the Government must establish “that the defendant’s conduct has directly and proximately caused” the losses for which the Government seeks restitution. Id. at 966. To prove direct causation, it must show that, but for the defendant’s conduct, the victim would not have suffered those losses. But-for causation “is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened ‘but for’ the purported cause.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020). “In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.” Id. “[A] defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to” the harm. Id. By contrast, the sufficient-causation test is satisfied “when multiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently, produce a result.” Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014). “To illustrate, if A stabs B, inflicting a fatal wound; while at the same moment X, acting independently, shoots B in the head . . . also inflicting [a fatal] wound; and B dies from the combined effects of the two wounds, A will generally be liable for homicide even though his conduct was not a but-for cause of B’s death (since B would have died from X’s actions in any event).” Id. at 215 (quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 12 Appellate Case: 21-6015 Document: 010110630862 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 13 As the Supreme Court has said about but-for causation, “[s]ometimes that showing could be made with little difficulty.” Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 450 (2014); see also Burrage, 571 U.S. at 217 (“[B]ut-for causation is not nearly the insuperable barrier the Government makes it out to be.”). Application
The Government sought $853,000 in restitution to cover R.W.’s treatment costs, including a lifetime of therapy and medication. As in district court, it relies on Dr. Missar’s report and argues the report establishes that but for Mr. Anthony’s offenses, R.W. would not have suffered these losses. We disagree. The report failed to show how much of the treatment costs should be attributed to Mr. Anthony. At most, Dr. Missar’s report proves that Mr. Anthony’s offenses were sufficient causes for some of R.W.’s losses.9 In recommending restitution for a lifetime of therapy and medication costs, Dr. Missar did not even attempt to disaggregate the harms Mr. Anthony caused from the other harms R.W. suffered. Instead, he opined that R.W. “will require specific therapy to address the trauma that she suffered during the abuse she endured from her step-grandfather, Mr. William Johnson, Mr. Maurice Johnson, Ms. Gum, Mr. Duong, Mr. Baker, and Mr. Anthony.” App., Vol. 4 at 244. His opinion that R.W. “would need identical treatment for Mr. 9 We are not convinced that Dr. Missar’s recommended restitution would survive scrutiny under a sufficient-cause analysis, but we need not address that question here. 13 Appellate Case: 21-6015 Document: 010110630862 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 14 Anthony’s offenses . . . even if she had sustained no prior traumas,” id. at 245, completely sidesteps whether Mr. Anthony was the but-for cause of her need for the full amount of lifetime treatment he recommended. In relying on Dr. Missar’s report, the Government thus repeats the mistake it made in Anthony I and fails to “differentiate the harms” caused by Mr. Anthony’s offenses “from the harms that [other abusers] had caused” R.W. Anthony I, 942 F.3d at 967. Rather than heed Anthony I, the Government again relies on its sufficientcausation theory. It points to Dr. Missar’s statement that R.W. “would need identical treatment for Mr. Anthony’s offenses . . . even if she had sustained no prior traumas” and mistakenly argues it proves but-for causation. App., Vol. 4 at 245, Aplt. Br. at 31. Whether or not this opinion may show, as a matter of sufficient causation, that R.W. would need a lifetime of therapy and medication regardless of whether she had suffered other traumas, it falls short of proving but-for causation. It fails to identify the treatment R.W. would need solely because of Mr. Anthony’s offenses. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. The Government tries to salvage its argument by pointing to Dr. Missar’s detailed description of the trauma Mr. Anthony inflicted on R.W. Aplt. Br. at 31-32. As we said in Anthony I, however, Mr. “Anthony’s conduct toward R.W. was reprehensible, but the government still must prove how that conduct warrants compensation for a lifetime of psychological treatment [and medication].” 942 F.3d at 969 n.10. Dr. Missar needed to show that, had R.W. never encountered Mr. Anthony, she would not have needed the requested therapy and medications. 14 Appellate Case: 21-6015 Document: 010110630862 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 15 Because he failed to do so, we cannot find error in the district court’s denial of restitution.10 The Government also argues the district court should have fashioned a restitution award based on the evidence it presented during the initial restitution proceedings. It points to physician assistant Bryant’s testimony and R.W.’s trial testimony and victim impact statement. Aplt. Br. at 36-39. It argues this evidence, when viewed in conjunction with Dr. Missar’s report, is sufficient to prove Mr. Anthony’s offenses caused R.W.’s losses. Id. at 36. But this argument fails for three reasons. First, on remand at the district court, the Government did not present arguments for restitution based on the evidence from the initial restitution proceedings and cannot do so now. See Little v. Budd Co., Inc., 955 F.3d 816, 821 (10th Cir. 2020). Second, we held in Anthony I that this evidence did not satisfy the Government’s burden. Anthony I, 942 F.3d at 967-68. Third, and most important, the Government ignored our holding in Anthony I and made no effort to explain how physician assistant Bryant’s report and R.W.’s testimony and victim impact statement, along with Dr. Missar’s report, proved that Mr. Anthony’s offenses were the but-for cause of her losses. The district court thus did not err in declining to 10 The Government cites United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 2018), to argue it was an abuse of discretion to set restitution at zero dollars. Aplt. Br. at 24. But in those cases, it was undisputed that the Government met its burden—those cases are therefore inapposite. See Monzel, 651 F.3d at 539-40; Dillard, 891 F.3d at 160. 15 Appellate Case: 21-6015 Document: 010110630862 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 16 order restitution for treatment costs based on evidence from the initial restitution proceedings.11 Finally, the Government argued for the first time at oral argument that Dr. Missar’s report recommended treatment that is independent from the treatment R.W. needed for the trauma she suffered from other abusers in her life. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral argument. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 800, 805 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Issues raised for the first time at oral argument are considered waived.”). At any rate, this argument is inconsistent with Dr. Missar’s report, which fails to identify the treatment costs R.W. would not have accrued but for Mr. Anthony’s conduct. It instead lumps together the lifetime of treatment R.W. will have to undertake due to “the abuse she endured from her stepgrandfather, Mr. William Johnson, Mr. Maurice Johnson, Ms. Gum, Mr. Duong, Mr. Baker, and Mr. Anthony.” App., Vol. 4 at 244. Dr. Missar did not identify, as Anthony I requires, the separate therapy and medication needed to address the trauma R.W. suffered from Mr. Anthony. Nor did Dr. Missar propose that Mr. Anthony cover a subset of the treatment costs R.W. needs. The district court did not err by denying restitution for R.W.’s treatment costs. 11 To support restitution for R.W., the Government attempts to draw upon M.M.’s victim impact statement, the costs of tests and examinations M.M. undertook, and the ill-gotten gains from the conspiracy. Aplt. Br. at 39-41. In his brief, Mr. Anthony states that “[t]he government has not advanced, and has therefore waived, any argument that the district court erred in limiting its analysis to the losses R.W. incurred as a result of her encounter with Mr. Anthony.” Aplee. Br. at 13 n.2. We agree. See Little, 955 F.3d at 821. 16 Appellate Case: 21-6015 Document: 010110630862 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 17
The Government also failed to meet its burden to award restitution for tutoring and lost wages. Again, as in district court, it relies on Dr. Missar’s report; and again, the report does not even attempt to establish but-for causation. Rather than disaggregate the education and income losses attributable to Mr. Anthony’s offenses, Dr. Missar opined that “the impact that sex trafficking had on [R.W.] has . . . impaired her ability to work to her potential.” App., Vol. 4 at 245. Dr. Missar did not even try to differentiate between the losses R.W. suffered at the hands of other abusers and the losses caused by Mr. Anthony’s offenses. Instead, he combined all of R.W.’s losses from the sex trafficking incidents. Dr. Missar even failed to mention Mr. Anthony’s name or his offenses of conviction when discussing his recommendation for restitution for R.W.’s tutoring and lost wages. The Government points to Dr. Missar’s methodology,12 which led to a lower figure than what the Government requested during the initial restitution proceedings. Aplt. Br. at 34-35. But that again misses the mark. Indeed, Dr. Missar’s methodology is the problem. It fails to differentiate between the losses attributable to Mr. Anthony’s offenses and the losses attributable to the other individuals who trafficked R.W. The district court thus did not err in denying the Government’s request for restitution for tutoring and lost wages. 12 Dr. Missar calculated lost wages based on Social Security Administration data to approximate the lower earnings R.W. would earn the rest of her life. Aplt. Br. at 34. 17 Appellate Case: 21-6015 Document: 010110630862 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 18