Opinion ID: 2118343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is This An Unnatural Will?

Text: Appellant begins with the assertion that the 1959 will is an unnatural one in that it disinherited Beale's ten-year-old son. Then he states his proposition that proponents of an unnatural will have burden to give a reasonable explanation for its unnatural provisions. The learned trial court filed a written decision which demonstrated the meticulous study which the court gave to the will itself and to the evidence adduced in the several hearings, and the court concluded that the will was not unnatural. Thomas' inheritance was reduced by the 1959 will to a contingent remainder but whether this rendered the will an unnatural one seems to us to be immaterial in the absence of any contention by appellant that, because of testamentary incapacity, undue influence, or other factors appearing in the evidence, the will does not express the testator's true desires and intent. There are present no such factors to impugn the conclusion that the 1959 will exactly stated Professor Beale's own wish and purpose in respect to provision for his son Thomas. As the provisions or the lack of them are within the permission of the law neither Beale nor anyone else has to justify them or please any other person. Appellant's brief further informs us that the right to make a will is not a constitutional or natural right, but a `creature of statutory law,' citing a Pennsylvania case. We have frequently held to the contrary, even so recently as in Estate of Ogg (1952), 262 Wis. 181, 54 N. W. (2d) 175, and Will of Wright (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 375, 107 N. W. (2d) 146. See also Will of Rice (1912), 150 Wis. 401, 450, 136 N. W. 956, 137 N. W. 778. In each of those cases we have emphasized that the right to make a will is a sacred and constitutional right, which right includes a right of equal dignity to have the will carried out. And see Will of Hopkins (1956), 273 Wis. 632, 639, 79 N. W. (2d) 131, where we said: Appellant claims that the will was an unnatural will, because after the administration of the specific bequests, the bulk of which was to the Masons, no residue remained to distribute to the surviving relatives. When a valid last will and testament has disposed of the owner's estate, the interest of surviving relatives is controlled by its provisions and not by the statute of descent. As said by the trial court, `the law gives the testator the right to dispose of his property in any manner he may desire as long as it is his own act and free will, and the court is fully satisfied in this instance that the testator knew what he was doing at the time he signed his will and disposed of his property in the manner indicated therein ... it is the responsibility of this court to so respect his wishes.' In the Rice Case, supra, at page 446, we cited with approval Will of Dardis (1908), 135 Wis. 457, 115 N. W. 332, to the effect that ... regardless of holdings elsewhere, in this state, a will, once validly made and subsisting to the death of the testator, must be taken and judicially enforced according to his intent, if that can be ascertained; ... The long line of Wisconsin decisions does not permit the probate court to entertain the argument that a will can be denied probate only because it appears to be unjust to a natural object of a testator's bounty. Here appellant has made no attack on the testamentary capacity of Beale nor has he claimed he was unduly influenced. Will of Dobson (1951), 258 Wis. 587, 588, 46 N. W. (2d) 758, states the following, relying upon Will of Schaefer (1932), 207 Wis. 404, 241 N. W. 382: We might, without great difficulty, conclude that in equity the instrument provides an unjust distribution of the estate. However, we may not consider it in the light of what we may deem just or unjust. If it was made by Joseph Dobson with full testamentary capacity, expresses his desires, and is not the result of undue influence, it is our duty to give it effect. That it does not divide the estate equally between the natural objects of testator's bounty is not controlling. Thus this court, as well as the county court, is precluded from considering whether Professor Beale's 1959 will is an unnatural will, with a view to denying probate to it.