Opinion ID: 481732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Detrimental Impact of Voting in Escambia County.

Text: 82 Taken together, the minimal student crossover, the equality of bargaining power about shared programs, and the non-existence of financial input from city to county, lead to the conclusion that there is no substantial interest under the Creel, Phillips, and Hogencamp standard. In assessing this minimal interest, this court must also consider the harmful effect of the city enfranchisement on the county electoral process. While the harmful effect is admittedly not as obvious as in the Phillips and Hogencamp cases, the record of the case reveals the harm, both potential and actual. I would reject a suggestion (not made by the majority) that, before we find this type of voting scheme unconstitutional, there must be a city resident on the county board or the city residents must clearly have decided an election. The harmful effect of the voting scheme can be evident long before either of those events occur, and the evidence shows that in this case there has already been impermissible influence in the elections and the operation of the schools. 83
84 While the final vote totals of the elections considered by the district court do not indicate that the elections would have been different had the city voters not participated, the numbers do reveal the potentially decisive role the city voters play in the elections. This voting power in turn creates the non-numerical harm discussed in the next section. 85 Of the 14 contested elections considered by the lower court, 7 would have had different winners had the city voted more heavily for the loser. This is most clearly seen in the 1972 Democratic primary runoff, in which the victor, Mr. Beasley, carried the county by only 15 votes (out of almost 6,000); had the city residents preferred Beasley's opponent by 16 or more votes, the victor would have been a candidate who did not carry the county vote. As it turned out, Beasley took almost 60% of the city vote, and won with what appeared to be a comfortable margin. 86 The city and the county clearly have divergent concerns and preferences. In the 1976 Democratic primary runoff, for instance, the city voters supported Mr. Salter by 72%, while only 55% of the county supported him. It is not implausible that the city voters would prefer one candidate and the county voters another. 87 Even when the city and county voters tend to agree about the relative rankings of candidates, the city votes can still effect the election results by creating an artificial momentum or an appearance of a solid electoral lead. In the 1976 Democratic primary, for instance, Mr. Salter had a less than 200 vote edge over his closest opponent in the three way contest, in terms of county votes; however, when the city votes were included, Mr. Salter's edge increased to over 500 votes. The larger edge may well have contributed to Mr. Salter's victory in the runoff that followed. Another election, the Democratic primary of 1972, illustrated by the following chart, demonstrates this problem: 88 Candidate City Vote County Vote Total Vote --------- --------- ----------- ---------- Beasley 52.4% 37.7% 41.0% Johnson 28.9% 32.7% 31.9% Hoomes 18.7% 29.5% 27.1% --------- ----------- ---------- TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 89 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 at 2. If only the county vote was counted, Beasley and Johnson would have been very close going into the runoff. However, because the city vote went so heavily for Beasley, the final vote totals showed Beasley with an almost 10 point lead, instead of the 5 point lead he held in the county. In the actual runoff, Beasley took the county by only 15 votes. I cannot say with any confidence that Beasley would have won without the boost of the city votes in the original primary. 90 While much of this is admittedly speculative, the data in the record does show that the city could easily control the outcome of an election. This potential creates and contributes to the non-numerical impact of the city votes on the county school board. 91
92 The most obvious harm that cannot be easily quantified is the chill over the election and the fact that some candidates may choose not to run for the county school board because they know the city voters participate. A candidate espousing, for instance, the consolidation of all of the county summer programs into one program at a location remote from the city of Brewton may face strong opposition within the city, and may thus avoid entering the contest. Even if the city voters have not in the past clearly controlled an election, they still do make up about 25% of the votes cast in the county school board elections. This 25% may well deter potential candidates from participating. 93 As important as the effect on the actual outcome of the elections is the effect on the actions of the members of the school board once they are in office. Members of the board, of course, are at least to some extent politicians. It is clear from the record that these members run for re-election. It is not difficult to assume that while in office, the members of the school board would prefer to avoid alienating 25% of the electorate. Because of this, the school board members (like many politicians) may take their constituents' views as guides to their actions. A problem arises when, as in this case, their electoral constituency is not exactly the same group that they serve (in this case, the residents served by the county school system). 94 These intangible harms can still be very real. Given the minimal interest of the city residents in the county schools, the actual and potential harms to the electoral process are higher than this court should be willing to accept. 95