Opinion ID: 518484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The habitual criminal finding

Text: 10 Alford contends that, in upholding his habitual criminal finding, the Washington Court of Appeals denied him a constitutionally required due process hearing. Alford claims that the court of appeals denied him the opportunity to argue that Washington law required reversal of the habitual criminal finding. 3 11 Alford's claim is contradicted by the record. The court of appeals first vacated Alford's sentence to life imprisonment. After granting the state's motion to clarify its decision, and before issuing its clarifying decision, the court allowed Alford to file a supplemental brief. In that brief, Alford argued that Washington law required reversal of the habitual criminal finding, the very issue on which he now claims he was denied a hearing. That the court of appeals was not persuaded, and affirmed the habitual criminal finding and life sentence, does not mean Alford lacked a due process hearing. 12 Alford argues that the Washington Court of Appeals denied him equal protection of the laws by treating him differently from other Washington defendants who appeal habitual criminal findings. 4 Alford refers us to Washington case law, where defendants appealing habitual criminal findings have succeeded in obtaining reversal of the findings. 5 13 Alford's equal protection claim is without merit. The Supreme Court has said that [the Equal Protection Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment does not 'assure uniformity of judicial decisions ... [or] immunity from judicial error....' [O]therwise, every alleged misapplication of state law would constitute a federal constitutional question. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554-55, 82 S.Ct. 955, 962-63, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962) (quoting Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin ex rel. Milwaukee, 252 U.S. 100, 106, 40 S.Ct. 306, 309, 64 L.Ed. 476 (1920)). See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.1985) (habeas corpus relief is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law). 14 Finally, Alford contends that the habitual criminal finding was unsupported by the evidence. Aside from the invalid forgery conviction, two prior UCSA violations support this finding. Alford claims that the 1978 UCSA conviction was not introduced into evidence at his habitual criminal trial, and that therefore the single remaining UCSA conviction is insufficient to support the finding. 15 The record supports the habitual criminal finding. In Washington, whether the state proves the convictions necessary to support a habitual criminal finding is a question of fact. See State v. Hennings, 100 Wash.2d 379, 382, 670 P.2d 256, 257 (1983) (en banc). In habeas corpus proceedings, we presume a state court's finding of fact to be correct, unless a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2554(d) factor is present, 6 or the finding is not fairly supported by the record. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1304, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982). 16 The record here reveals that the 1978 conviction was received in evidence, without objection, at a motion immediately prior to the habitual criminal trial. The bench trial was before the same judge who presided at the pretrial motion. During trial, the parties and the trial judge assumed that the conviction was in evidence, since the parties stipulated that Alford was the person convicted for the 1978 UCSA violation. Verbatim Record of Proceedings, April 30, 1979, at 45-46. We conclude that no Sec. 2254(d) factor is present. Although the evidentiary status of the 1978 conviction at trial could have been made clearer, the trial court's finding that the 1978 conviction had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is fairly supported by the record.