Opinion ID: 2621193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Uncharged crime evidence

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence regarding the murder of Glenna. As noted, defendant's prior conviction for this crime was not admitted until after the jury reached its guilty verdict (see § 190.1, subds. (a) & (b) [trial of a special circumstance allegation that the defendant has suffered a prior murder conviction shall be held only after the jury has reached a guilty verdict and made findings on any other special circumstance allegation]), but evidence regarding the murder of Glenna was admitted as evidence of an uncharged crime made admissible by Evidence Code section 1101. Defendant, however, contends that the murder of Glenna did not bear common marks with the charged murders of Joyce and Martha. He contends the evidence relating to Glenna was not material to the issue of identity and did not tend to establish a common scheme or plan. Before trial, the prosecutor moved to admit evidence that defendant had murdered Glenna by administering paraquat. The prosecutor contended this evidence tended to demonstrate that Martha and Joyce were poisoned by a criminal agency, that this criminal agency was paraquat, and that defendant was the person responsible for the murders. Defendant objected on the basis of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The trial court announced that it would review the preliminary hearing transcript and the transcript of the hearing held on a motion pursuant to section 995. The following day, defense counsel urged that the evidence concerning Glenna was weak, did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's responsibility for her murder, had little probative value in the present trial, but would have considerable prejudicial impact. The court ruled that the evidence was probative and could be admitted. We review the trial court's determination for an abuse of discretion, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's ruling. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 369, 370, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) We have observed above that, despite the prohibition against admitting evidence of an uncharged crime to demonstrate a defendant's criminal propensity, such evidence is admissible to show identity or the existence of a common scheme or plan. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 369, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) This type of evidence, when offered on the issue of identity, must be highly similar to the charged offenses. (Ibid.) Evidence tending to establish a common plan or design should demonstrate `not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations.' ( People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) In the present case, the charged and uncharged crimes bore a number of highly distinctive common marks. As we already have discussed in connection with defendant's severance claim, each victim was a close female relative of the defendant wife or mother. In each instance, the defendant stood to gain financially from the victim's death. In the case of Glenna and Martha, it was overwhelmingly established that the victims had ingested paraquat before death. Expert opinion evidence based on observations regarding the clinical course of each woman's illness established that the cause of death for all three victims was paraquat poisoning. Such poisoning is rare and is unlikely to be the cause of death for three persons closely related to one individual. Rather, the occurrence of three similar poisonings of related persons supports inferences regarding identity and a common plan. (See People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 561-562, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 [multiple lidocaine poisonings]; People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 605-606, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854 [repeated disappearances of the wives of the defendant]; People v. Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 621, 638, 91 Cal.Rptr. 397, 477 P.2d 421 [multiple insulin poisonings of relatives of defendant].) The murders of Glenna and Joyce bore other common marksin each case the victim was the defendant's wife, each woman was healthy, then initially suffered flu-like symptoms, followed by respiratory collapse over a period of days. Evidence that defendant had poisoned one wife was relevant to establish that another apparently healthy wife had died through a criminal agency, namely poison. (See People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 606, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854.) [6] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence of the uncharged crime was relevant to identity and to show a common scheme or plan. Defendant complains that evidence establishing that Glenna died by paraquat poisoning should not have been introduced to show that Joyce died of the same cause. He contends that toxicological evidence existed to demonstrate that paraquat was the cause of Glenna's death, but that there was no toxicological evidence supporting the opinions of the prosecution's expert witnesses who had concluded that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning. In fact, he complains, the expert opinion evidence pertaining to Joyce was based not solely upon clinical observations regarding the course of her illness but also in part upon the evidence demonstrating that Glenna and Martha had died by paraquat poisoning. He accuses the prosecution of creating the common marks between the killing of Glenna and Joyce, rather than relying upon existing features in common between the two killings. As we have observed, the common marks between the murders of Glenna, Martha, and Joyce certainly were relevant to establish that all three died pursuant to a common design. It was not necessary that the prosecution be able to prove that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning by evidence entirely independent of the evidence relating to the murder of Glenna. [7] And, of course, the evidence relating to the uncharged murder of Glenna was not the only evidence tending to show the cause of Joyce's death. Evidence relating to the charge that defendant killed his mother Martha by paraquat poisoning had the same effect vis-a-vis the murder of Joyce. Strong expert opinion testimony based on clinical evidence and post-mortem examination of tissue also supported the conclusion that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning. Defendant makes a related claim that the evidence of the uncharged crime was more prejudicial than probative. He contends the evidence that was related to Glenna was unduly prejudicial, because the jury necessarily would realize that defendant had suffered a prior conviction for murder. Evidence of an uncharged crime may be admitted only if its substantial probative value is not outweighed by a danger of undue prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury. On appeal, a trial court's resolution of these issues is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] A court abuses its discretion when its ruling `falls outside the bounds of reason.' ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) The jury was not informed that defendant had suffered a conviction for the murder of Glenna until after it had returned its guilty verdict. Clearly, evidence regarding the circumstances of the murder of Glenna was of substantial probative value. In ruling upon the motion to admit evidence of Glenna's murder, the trial court reasonably could conclude that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk that the jury might suspect that defendant had been convicted of the murder of Glenna, despite the procedural protection provided by section 190.1. As respondent claims, the prospect of undue prejudice arising from a suspicion regarding a prior conviction was speculative, because the prosecutor did not plan to offer evidence of the conviction until after the guilty verdict. When at trial, as defendant now complains, an expert witness undergoing defense cross-examination referred to his testimony in a prior trial, defendant did not object or seek an admonition to the jury, and that prior testimony, of course, was not before the trial court when it ruled on the motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101. Defendant claims that the trial court erred prejudicially in failing to place on the record the process by which it concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact, but such explanations are not required. ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) In any event, it is clear that the court carefully considered lengthy transcripts, written motions, and the arguments of counsel in reaching its conclusion, taking the matter under submission for a day in order to complete its review. Defendant's contention that the admission of the other-crimes evidence violated his state and federal constitutional right to a fair trial is waived because it was not raised below. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 385, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) [8] In addition, he does not provide authority establishing that a state law permitting the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes violates a defendant's right to a fair trial. Reference to two federal cases discussing due process limitations on the admission of irrelevant character or criminal propensity evidence is unpersuasive; in both instances, the federal court determined that the disputed evidence was not material to any legitimate issue. (See Henry v. Estelle (9th Cir.1994) 33 F.3d 1037, 1042, revd. on another point in Duncan v. Henry (1995) 513 U.S. 364, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865; McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir.1993) 993 F.2d 1378, 1382-1385; see also People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-914, 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182.) By contrast, we have determined that the disputed evidence in the present case was material to issues of identity and common scheme or plan and was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101.