Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegations of Juror Misconduct Insufficient to Warrant New Trial

Text: (56) `The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.' [Citations.] ( People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1318.) Of the six proffered allegations of misconduct, four clearly would not be grounds for a new trial. Accordingly, the court properly rejected defendant's motion as to those matters. Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), provides: Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined. (57) The statute thus makes a distinction between proof of overt acts, objectively ascertainable, and proof of the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror, which can be neither corroborated nor disproved.... ( People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [78 Cal. Rptr. 196, 455 P.2d 132].) This limitation prevents one juror from upsetting a verdict of the whole jury by impugning his own or his fellow jurors' mental processes or reasons for assent or dissent. ( Id., at p. 350; People v. Ozene (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 905, 914 [104 Cal. Rptr. 170].) (58) Applying these principles, we must reject the allegations of misconduct predicated on the intimidation of nonsmoking jurors and the expressed desire of some jurors to resolve the penalty and avoid prolonged deliberations, to the extent they clearly implicate fellow jurors' mental processes or reasons for assent or dissent. ( People v. Hutchinson, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 350.) In People v. Orchard (1971) 17 Cal. App.3d 568 [95 Cal. Rptr. 66], the defense sought a new trial because the foreman had chastised one of the jurors during deliberations, which `so embarrassed and humiliated [her] in front of the other members of the jury that she voted guilty on the next ballot rather than be subjected to the domination and coercion of the foreman.' ( Id., at p. 572, fn. 1.) Discounting those portions of the affidavit recounting the effect of the foreman's conduct, the Court of Appeal concluded the remainder simply describe[d] an account of interchange between jurors.... To permit inquiry as to the validity of a verdict based upon the demeanor, eccentricities or personalities of individual jurors would deprive the jury room of its inherent quality of free expression. ( Id., at p. 574.) Under similar circumstances here, we are precluded from considering any matters concerning the jurors' ratiocinations. Thus, while the conduct of jurors disregarding an agreement on smoking or complaining about the pace of deliberations may be scrutinized, the effect of this conduct on subsequent votes may not be. When we exclude the latter, the former, standing alone, does not implicate juror misconduct; nor does the record otherwise demonstrate that some members of the jury were prevented from freely expressing their views because of these two circumstances. Accordingly, these allegations would not sustain defendant's motion for a new trial. (See also People v. Aeschlimann (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 460, 471-472 [104 Cal. Rptr. 689].) (59) As to the assertion one of the jurors imbibed during lunch, the rule is now fairly well established that a verdict will not be set aside in the absence of some showing or some reasonable ground to suspect that the consumption of alcohol actually affected the jurors' capacity to competently perform their duties. [Citation.] ( People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1266; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 693, fn. 27 [217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221.) Here, the defense represented that [a juror] was drinking during lunch but failed to allege any impairment of his abilities during trial or deliberations. Thus, no misconduct appears. Nevertheless, given our particular concern to preserve the reliability of death penalty verdicts, we reiterate an earlier admonition on this subject: The consumption of alcoholic beverages by jurors, whether during the presentation of evidence or during deliberation, is clearly to be discouraged. The defendant as well as the People have a right to the reasoned, dispassionate and considered judgment of the jury. Because the consumption of alcoholic beverages may impair one's ability to perceive and judge, use of such intoxicants by jurors threatens both the fairness of the trial and the integrity of the entire judicial process. ( People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1265.) (60) We also find no merit to the allegation that one of the jurors referred to former Chief Justice Rose Bird and the fact that the death penalty had not been exercised in California since the 1960s; ... so it didn't matter whether they gave him death or not. The latter portion of the statement implicates the jurors' reasoning process and, under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), may not be considered on motion for a new trial. As to the former portion, these references come within the ambit of knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience, which jurors necessarily bring to their deliberations because our jury system is fundamentally human. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 950.) At the time the jury was considering defendant's penalty, February 1986, Chief Justice Bird and Associate Justices Grodin and Reynoso were the objects of a strenuous and well publicized campaign to unseat them at the impending retention election. It coalesced around the high percentage of death penalty reversals and the claim that, led by the Chief Justice, this court was intentionally evading the law in refusing to affirm more of those decisions and allow executions to recommence. Regardless of their political interest or inclination, few citizens of the state could have been unaware of the situation or the circumstances prompting these efforts. (See, e.g., People v. Morris, supra, ante, at pp. 180-181.) We find no misconduct in a single reference to factual matters of which the entire jury undoubtedly had some independent knowledge.