Opinion ID: 1282292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: consequences of employment at will

Text: The evidence authorizes the verdict that Blair had an unmodified oral contract for employment at PMI's will rather than a contract of employment which might be terminated only for cause. The employee manual states that the manual is not a contract for employment and does not provide terms of employment with PMI, and expressly informs employees that their employment with PMI is an at will relationship [which] may be terminated without cause. It is well established in Nebraska that when employment is not for a definite term, and there are no contractual or statutory restrictions upon the right of discharge, an employer may lawfully discharge an employee whenever and for whatever cause it chooses without incurring liability. Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., 225 Neb. 732, 736, 408 N.W.2d 261, 265 (1987). See, also, Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 222 Neb. 829, 387 N.W.2d 692 (1986); Mueller v. Union Pacific Railroad, 220 Neb. 742, 371 N.W.2d 732 (1985). In Blair's case, the jury, having considered the evidence under proper instruction, concluded that Blair was employed pursuant to an unmodified oral contract at PMI's will. Consequently, consistent with existing Nebraska law, Blair's employment was terminable at PMI's will without any prerequisite legally valid cause for termination of employment. Since Blair was PMI's at-will employee, PMI could terminate Blair's employment at any time without cause. See, Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., supra ; Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., supra ; Mueller v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra . Certain exceptions to the terminable-at-will rule have, however, been recognized by this court. Those instances include where the discharge infringes upon a constitutionally protected interest of the employee and where a statute or contract prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for a particular reason or without good cause. White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 15, 430 N.W.2d 27, 30 (1988). None of the exceptions indicated in White v. Ardan, Inc . are present in Blair's case. As an at-will employee whose employment was terminated, Blair is not entitled to recover from PMI under the facts determined by the jury or the law enunciated by this court. Consequently, the verdict against Blair is sustained. We need not delve into admissibility of the transcribed stenographic notes during the interview by the PMI investigator. Admissibility of the transcription is immaterial in Blair's appeal because PMI could have discharged Blair from at-will employment even without the information contained in the transcribed notes and even if the interview itself had never taken place. For the same reason, we do not examine the propriety of the district court's ruling on Blair's request for compulsory discovery concerning PMI's answers to interrogatories and production of the investigative documents. In her appellate brief, Blair argues that [d]isclosure of the information and documents requested in the remaining Interrogatories and Request for Documents is necessary to allow the Plaintiff to rebut the allegation that Blair was terminated for cause.... Brief for appellant at 38. In light of the basic questions for submission to the jury in Blair's case, cause for termination of employment was irrelevant to disprove a contract for employment at will and irrelevant to prove a modified at-will contract requiring cause for employment termination. Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion regarding the district court's ruling on discovery matters. See Bump v. Firemens Ins. Co., 221 Neb. 678, 380 N.W.2d 268 (1986) (discovery rulings are upheld on appeal in the absence of a trial court's abuse of discretion). See, also, Younkin v. Younkin, 221 Neb. 134, 375 N.W.2d 894 (1985). Blair's complaint about the district court's sustaining PMI's demurrer and eliminating malicious termination of employment is without merit. In White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. at 15, 430 N.W.2d at 30, this court stated: [O]ur attention has not been directed to, nor have we found, any Nebraska case that recognizes a cause of action sounding in tort for malicious termination of employment. As previously stated, unless constitutionally, statutorily, or contractually prohibited, an employer may terminate an at-will employee at any time with or without reason and not be liable for his actions. Consequently, the district court properly removed malicious termination of employment as an aspect of the proceedings against PMI. Next, Blair contends that her discharge from employment violates public policy of the State of Nebraska. However, in Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., 225 Neb. at 742-43, 408 N.W.2d at 268-69, this court reaffirmed rejection of the public policy exception as a basis for recovery on an employment at-will contract: We discussed the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule in Mueller v. Union Pacific Railroad, 220 Neb. 742, 371 N.W.2d 732 (1985): `We recognize, however, that the employment at will rule is not, in some jurisdictions, an absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge. In a number of jurisdictions, an exception to the terminable at will rule has been articulated in recent years. Under this exceptions, an employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy. [Citations omitted.] `So far as we are able to ascertain, Nebraska has not adopted this exception to the present time. Assuming arguendo, however, that such an exception were to be recognized in this jurisdiction, it is clear in this case that the plaintiff has failed in his burden to prove that his discharge was violative of a public policy of this state. We have held that [c]ourts should be cautious in holding contracts void on ground of public policy and before they do so prejudice to the public interest should clearly appear. Beaver Lake Assn. v. Beaver Lake Corp., 200 Neb. 685, 691, 264 N.W.2d 871, 875 (1978).' 220 Neb. at 749-50, 371 N.W.2d at 737-38, quoting Mau v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980). We again decline to adopt the public policy exception at this time. Finally, Blair claims that the trial court should have given her tendered instruction: If the jury found that Blair's employment contract was modified and required cause for termination of employment, then PMI cannot use as cause conduct, knowledge of which [PMI] did not have at the time of the termination. The preceding instruction was conditioned on existence of a modified at-will contract of employment. The jury determined that PMI did not modify its employment contract with Blair. Therefore, the court's refusal to give the tendered and conditional instruction was not prejudicial under the circumstances. Because Blair's employment with PMI was pursuant to a contract which was terminable at PMI's will, and since Blair has shown no exception to the general rule that employment of an at-will employee may be terminated without cause, we affirm the district court's judgment entered on the verdict for PMI. AFFIRMED.