Opinion ID: 740391
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spurlock's Testimony.

Text: 23 WMATA also objects to the trial court's determination that Spurlock's testimony would assist the jury, arguing that it was error to permit Spurlock to offer legal conclusions concerning whether WMATA had violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. FED.R.EVID. 704(a) provides that otherwise admissible opinion testimony is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. As a result, WMATA cannot successfully argue that Spurlock improperly testified as to an ultimate issue. Rather, WMATA argues that Spurlock's testimony was not otherwise admissible. 24 Whether expert opinion testimony is otherwise admissible depends, in part, on whether it will assist the trier of fact in either understand[ing] the evidence or ... determin[ing] a fact in issue. See FED.R.EVID. 702. Expert testimony that consists of legal conclusions cannot properly assist the trier of fact in either respect, and thus it is not otherwise admissible. See Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that expert testimony couched in terms of a legal conclusion is not helpful to the jury); see also Weston v. WMATA, 78 F.3d 682, 684 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1996) (stating that legal conclusions on domestic law ... are outside [an expert] witness' area of expertise). 25 Of course, the line between an inadmissible legal conclusion and admissible assistance to the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue is not always bright. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6661, at 327 (Interim ed.1992); see also Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: Time to Take the Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L.REV. 831, 864 n.210 (1988). The Sixth Circuit has concluded that [t]he best resolution of this type of problem is to determine whether the terms used by the witness have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular. If they do, exclusion is appropriate. Torres, 758 F.2d at 151. Applying this principle in a Title VII suit, the Torres court concluded that it was improper to permit an expert to testify as to whether the plaintiff had been discriminated against because of her national origin. Id. As the court explained, the expert's actual testimony constituted a legal conclusion for two reasons: it tracked the language of the applicable statute, and the term discrimination has a specialized legal meaning that is more precise than the lay understanding of the term. Id. However, the court noted in dicta that it would have been permissible for the expert to testify as to whether national origin 'motivated' the hiring decision. Id. Testimony phrased as such would address the factual issue of ... intent without implicating any legal terminology. Id. 26 The Sixth Circuit's distinction between legal conclusions and factual opinions is consistent with the notes accompanying Rule 704 which explain that the rule does not permit opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach or which are phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. FED.R.EVID. 704 advisory committee's note. For example, the question, 'Did T have capacity to make a will?' would be excluded, while the question, 'Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?' would be allowed. Id. Just as the advisory committee stated that an expert cannot testify as to whether an individual possessed the capacity to make a will, so the Sixth Circuit concluded that an expert cannot testify as to whether discrimination occurred for purposes of Title VII. Both terms have specialized legal meanings that are inherently beyond the area of a witness' expertise. See Weston, 78 F.3d at 684 n. 4. In other words, an expert may offer his opinion as to facts [324 U.S.App.D.C. 247] that, if found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at issue was satisfied, but he may not testify as to whether the legal standard has been satisfied. 27 In this case, the testimony of Burkhart's expert consisted of impermissible legal conclusions rather than permissible factual opinions. Concerning Officer Gray's communication with Burkhart, Spurlock testified that the means of communication employed by Officer Gray were not as effective as the means of communication with others. In addition, Spurlock testified that if a person asked for a translator, the ADA required that they be given one unless it would change the service provided or cause an extraordinary expense or administrative requirement. Still further, Spurlock testified that communication with the disabled must be equal to that of a person who is not disabled. 28 We are troubled by this testimony in two respects. First, Spurlock grossly misstated the law as to what constitutes as effective communication with the disabled. Nothing in the ADA itself or its implementing regulations dictates that a disabled individual must be provided with the type of auxiliary aid or service he requests unless it would alter the service provided or create an unreasonable burden or expense. The regulation to which Spurlock was apparently referring provides only that the type of aid or service an individual requests should be given primary consideration. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2). However, the Attorney General's section-bysection analysis of this provision recognizes that the individual's request need not be honored if another effective means of communications exists. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160. While [d]eference to the request of the individual is desirable, it is by no means required. See id. (emphasis added). As a result, Spurlock's testimony as to the applicable legal standard was plainly erroneous, thus demonstrating the danger in allowing experts to testify as to their understanding of the law. See Torres, 758 F.2d at 150. Each courtroom comes equipped with a legal expert, called a judge, and it is his or her province alone to instruct the jury on the relevant legal standards. See Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509-10 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861, 98 S.Ct. 188, 54 L.Ed.2d 134 (1977). 29 Even aside from Spurlock's erroneous formulation of the pertinent law, we are also troubled by Spurlock's testimony that Officer Gray's communications with Burkhart were not as effective as the means of communication with others. The phrase as effective is lifted directly from the text of the Attorney General's regulations implementing the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a). Moreover, the phrase as used in the regulations is a term of art with a meaning separate and distinct from the vernacular. Torres, 758 F.2d at 151. Whether a particular form of communication is as effective as another is not judged on an absolute scale, but rather is a contextual determination based on the type of communication and number of people involved as well as the importance of the communication. See 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160 (explaining that the factors to be considered in determining whether an interpreter is required include the context in which the communication is taking place, the number of people involved, and the importance of the communication). Therefore, by invoking a legal term of art, Spurlock's testimony constituted an impermissible legal conclusion. See Torres, 758 F.2d at 151 (finding inappropriate testimony that a defendant did not discriminate). 30 It may well be permissible for an appropriate 3 expert to testify as to the difficulty an individual like Burkhart would have communicating with Officer Gray under the circumstances. It may also be permissible for an appropriate expert to testify concerning the relative merits of alternative forms of communication. But by allowing Spurlock to testify as to the legal question at issue, the trial court erred. 31 Spurlock also testified that Officer Gray was not ... trained to proficiency in the requirements of the [ADA] and the Rehabilitation Act. Again, the phrase trained to proficiency is lifted directly from the text of one of the regulations implementing the [324 U.S.App.D.C. 248] ADA, 49 C.F.R. § 37.173, and is a legal term of art defined by context, id. app. § 37.173 (stating that training must be appropriate to the duties of each employee). By invoking this nuanced statutory term, Spurlock again offered an impermissible legal conclusion. 32 As a final example of impermissible expert testimony we note Spurlock's response to the question: Were all proper police practices--with respect to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and in the national standards thereby, were all the police practices in this case proper? Spurlock responded to this question by stating that Officer Gray should have, but failed to gain control of the situation so that any combatants no longer cause harm to each other. Spurlock further testified that Officer Gray failed to search for witnesses and seize relevant evidence. This testimony plainly misstated the requirements of those statutes, as we are unable to identify any provision of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act requiring that such steps be taken. 33 In sum, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Spurlock to offer legal conclusions and misstate relevant legal principles. We emphasize that our discussion of the improper testimony by Spurlock is by no means exhaustive. We have simply highlighted those portions of the testimony we find most troubling. These examples should provide a sufficient guide on remand. 34