Opinion ID: 2366253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: City Charter

Text: [¶ 11] Contrary to the MLRB's conclusion, the process does not conflict with the City Charter. The City Charter clearly provides that the Mayor is to serve as chair of the Board. [7] The Charter empowers the Board to adopt its own procedural rules, [8] and the Board is invested by the Charter with all necessary powers to manage the school department. [9] We will generally defer to the procedural rules adopted by agencies [i]n the absence of a controlling agency rule or a contrary requirement of statutory and constitutional law. Town of Wiscasset v. Board of Environmental Protection, 471 A.2d 1045, 1048 (Me.1984). Municipalities have general power to enact measures to advance the powers granted to them by the legislature. When no specific provision in a city charter exists in reference to the exercise of a municipal power, the city has all of the powers granted to towns or municipalities under the general law. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2004 (1996). The Board of Education is empowered to adopt its own procedural rules, and the procedure they adopted does not conflict with the Charter. The practical effect of the Board's adopted procedure is not different than to require a majority vote of the eight member Board. 20-A M.R.S.A. § 13201. [¶ 12] The MLRB also found that the procedure adopted by the Board conflicted with 20-A M.R.S.A. § 13201 (1993), [10] that places statutory authority to set teacher salaries with school boards. We have previously rejected local legislative action that conflicted with a state legislative scheme clearly intended by the Legislature to occupy the regulated field. See, e.g., Ullis v. Inhabitants of Town of Boothbay Harbor, 459 A.2d 153, 159 (Me.1983) (rejecting local liquor ordinance that works at cross purposes to the state's liquor licensing statutes, and therefore impermissibly conflicts with them). Although in Ullis we held that the legislature by clear implication has denied to municipalities the right to legislate in the area of liquor sales, we have not reached the same conclusion in the area of education. As we have stated, [g]iven the broad delegation of home rule authority and the standard of review of municipal legislation set out in section 3001, we conclude that Title 20-A is not an exclusive legislative scheme that implicitly preempts municipal legislation on education matters in the absence of an express grant of authority. School Comm. of Town of York v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935, 942 (Me.1993). [11] [¶ 13] The approval process adopted by the Board of Education did not divest the Board of its statutorily delegated authority to control teachers' salaries. Grattelo was not acting as Mayor when he utilized his veto power; rather, he was acting as chair of the Board of Education, exercising the procedural power granted to him by that body, subject to its authority to override its chair's action by a two-thirds majority vote. The Board did not override its chair's action. The procedure adopted by the Board was proper. The MLRB erroneously concluded that the tentative agreement was ratified and erroneously ordered the Board to execute the tentative agreement. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.