Opinion ID: 1418322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public v. Private Nuisance

Text: Given our conclusion that the statute of limitations does not present a bar to Appellants' temporary nuisance claims, we find it unnecessary to discuss at length the issue of whether Appellants should have been permitted to amend their complaint to assert a public nuisance claim. Because the Balls have not been precluded from seeking recovery for any damages that they can prove in connection with their temporary nuisance claim, there is no need for Appellants to seek the benefit of this Court's recognition in Kermit Lumber that violations of the Act, such as the spewing of sewage or effluents into this state's waters, are continuing violations for which the one-year statute of limitations [22] does not begin to run until the harm or endangerment to the public health, safety and the environment is abated. [23] Kermit Lumber, 200 W.Va. at 225, 488 S.E.2d at 905, syl. pt. 11, in part. We observe, however, that Appellees mistakenly conclude that the Balls are without standing to bring a public nuisance cause of action. While it is clear that the Act does not, unlike its federal counterpart, contain a citizen's suit provision, Appellees incorrectly assume that the absence of such provision bars private citizens, such as the Balls, from bringing lawsuits in connection with nuisances that are alleged to affect the corporate health and welfare of the public. The Act is clear that its provisions were enacted to provide additional and cumulative remedies to abate the pollution of the waters of the state and nothing herein contained shall abridge or alter rights of action or remedies now or hereafter existing .... The provisions of this article inure solely to and are for the benefit of the people generally of the state of West Virginia, and this article is not intended to in any way create new, or enlarge existing rights of riparian owners or others. W.Va.Code § 22-11-27 (emphasis supplied). The enactment of our Water Pollution Control Act, the objective of which is to provide the State with an enforcement mechanism for keeping the waters of this State free of pollutants, clearly left intact all existing common law actions for public nuisance. See Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 127 W.Va. 586, 595-96, 34 S.E.2d 348, 354 (1945) (noting distinction between public and private nuisance is that former affects general public and latter affects limited number of persons and that public officials ordinarily are proper parties to bring public nuisance actions). Accordingly, the DEP's action in filing a claim under the Act did not stand as a bar to the filing of a public nuisance action by the Balls or any other affected citizens. [24] In this Court's opinion, this case aptly demonstrates the need for common law remedies in addition to the Act, especially where it is arguable that the government agency charged with protecting the public's interests may not be acting with sufficient alacrity to eradicate the alleged nuisance which may be presenting serious public health concerns or posing a potential environmental hazard. The Balls had tried for years to get the situation resolvedonly when they were convinced that nothing short of legal action was going to make a difference did they file their notice of intent to sue. Even when the DEP got involved in this action, there was little indication that the gravity of what the Balls had been enduring for years was duly appreciated. Instead, everyone, including the trial court, agreed to look the other way until the regional wastewater treatment plant was built, based on the collective opinion that there is no practical, immediate alternative to eliminate the plant's problems in the meantime. [25] Nuisance law, as we recognized in Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 175 W.Va. 479, 334 S.E.2d 616 (1985), has been particularly effective in addressing environmental problems. Id. at 484, 334 S.E.2d at 621. Observing that `[n]uisance theory and case law is the common law backbone of modern environmental and energy law,' we offered this commentary: There is simply no common law doctrine that approaches nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and of technological abuse. Nuisance actions have involved pollution of all physical mediaair, water, landby a wide variety of means.... Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every major industrial and municipal activity which is today the subject of comprehensive environmental regulationthe operation of land fills, incinerators, sewage treatment facilities, activities at chemical plants, aluminum, lead and copper smelters, oil refineries, pulp mills, rendering plants, quarries and mines, textile mills and a host of other manufacturing activities. Sharon Steel, 175 W.Va. at 484, 334 S.E.2d at 621 ( quoting W. Rodgers, Jr., Handbook on Environmental Law § 2.1 at 100 (1977)). Were it not for the availability of nuisance actions as a remedy, it seems certain an inestimable number of business and private actions that have deleterious health and environmental results as a byproduct of their operations would have continued unabated. We take a dim view of WVAWC's suggestion that a reversal of the lower court's ruling will effectively halt other companies from ever agreeing to assume operation of utilities which are experiencing difficulties. We similarly find offensive the suggestion that the social value of providing a wastewater treatment plant so outweighs the gravity of the harm experienced by the Balls that there can be no recovery under nuisance law on the facts of this case. See generally, Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 181 W.Va. 31, 34-35, 380 S.E.2d 198, 201-02 (1989) (discussing use of balancing test for determining whether interference with landowner's private use and enjoyment of property is unreasonable and, therefore, a nuisance). Operating a business or providing a service that has societal benefits does not give a corporate entity license to freely pollute the waters of this State or to negatively affect the use and enjoyment of privately owned property.