Opinion ID: 474490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Language of Section 1961

Text: 30 Although section 1961(a) even as amended still does not expressly refer to judgments awarded against the federal government, appellants argue that the addition in 1982 of subsections (b) and (c) makes an interpretation of section 1961(a) which includes interest on government appeals obligatory under the plain meaning rule. We turn first to the addition of subsection (b) to section 1961. New subsection (b) provides that post-judgment interest shall be computed daily from the date of judgment to the date of payment, except as provided by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(b), which governs the time period for post-judgment interest paid by the United States on unsuccessful appeals to the Supreme Court from Federal Circuit decisions, and as provided by 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1304(b), which governs the time period for the payment of post-judgment interest when otherwise authorized by law on judgments against the United States payable out of the permanent judgment appropriation fund. 1 Under these two exceptions to the daily computation of interest, post-judgment interest is payable only for the limited time period running from the filing of the transcript of the judgment with the Comptroller General to the date of the mandate of affirmance, i.e., only during the period of an appeal by the federal government. Appellants argue that if section 1961(a) did not require the federal government to pay post-judgment interest, it would have been unnecessary to create these exceptions to the daily computation of post-judgment interest in section 1961(b). 31 This argument overreads section 1961(b). Section 1961(b) does not state that interest under section 1961(a) shall be computed daily except as provided in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(b) and 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1304(b). Section 1961(b) does not explicitly restrict itself to payments of post-judgment interest under section 1961(a) but rather sets out the time period during which post-judgment interest runs, regardless of the statutory source of the duty to pay such interest. 2 Section 1961(b), at best ambiguous, does not support an express waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States against awards of post-judgment interest in all unsuccessfully appealed district court judgments. 3 A court must construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign and may not enlarge a waiver beyond what the language requires. Library of Congress v. Shaw, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 2962 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983)). 32 This principle of statutory construction is mandated by section 1961 itself. Subsection (c)(4) of section 1961 explicitly announces that: 33 This section shall not be construed to affect the interest on any judgment of any court not specified in this section. 34 Section 1961 does not specifically authorize the award of interest on all judgments against the United States. Moreover, even if we ignored our clear obligation to resolve any ambiguities in section 1961 against the waiver of sovereign immunity, we could not adopt appellants' reading of the statute. As we shall demonstrate in Part II.B of this opinion, infra, the legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act supplies virtually no support for appellants' interpretation of this ambiguous provision. 35 Appellants point next to the addition of subsection (c)(1) to section 1961 as an indication that the United States waived its sovereign immunity in section 1961(a). This second plain meaning argument also fails. New subsection (c)(1) of section 1961 provides that section 1961 shall not apply in any judgment of any court with respect to an internal revenue tax case. Section 1961(c)(1) sets the interest rate for such claims at the rate established under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6621, i.e., the adjusted prime rate. Appellants argue that if new section 1961(a) did not require the payment of post-judgment interest on all district court judgments against the federal government, the exception provided in section 1961(c)(1) would be superfluous. 36 This argument is flawed in numerous respects: First, it ignores the fact that subsection (c)(1) is necessary to exempt private taxpayers from the interest provisions of subsection (a). Since 1975, taxpayers have been required to pay interest on underpayments of taxes at the rate specified in section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6601(a); see also Pub.L. No. 93-625, Sec. 7(a)(2)(A), 88 Stat. 2108, 2115 (1975). Subsection (c)(1) is not therefore relegated to the category of mere surplusage if section 1961(a) does not apply to the federal government. 37 Appellants' argument also misreads section 1961(c)(1) as operating solely to exclude tax cases from the application of the interest rate contained in subsection (a). Section 1961(c)(1) excludes the application not only of the rate announced in subsection (a), however, but also of the timing provisions announced in subsection (b) of section 1961. Section 1961(c)(1) is further necessary to exempt tax cases from section 1961(c)(2), which provides the general terms on which the United States shall be liable for post-judgment interest on appeals which it takes from decisions in the Federal Circuit. Section 1961(c)(1) would be necessary even if there was no section 1961(a) at all. In sum, we find in section 1961(b) and section 1961(c)(1) no persuasive indication that section 1961(a) waives sovereign immunity for post-judgment interest on all judgments against the United States in district court. Appellants' reading of the statute is not necessary to avoid making either subsection superfluous. 4 We therefore cannot find in the plain meaning of section 1961 any waiver of the no-interest rule for unsuccessful appeals from all district court judgments. 38