Opinion ID: 2486429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: McCRAY's Request During the State's First Witness

Text: McCRAY also contends that the trial court's Faretta inquiry following his third request for self-representation, which was made in the middle of the State's direct examination of its first witness, was inadequate and that the trial court unconstitutionally imposed counsel upon him following that request. The record shows that while the State was conducting its direct examination, defense counsel informed the trial court that McCRAY, who was being detained in the holding cell, desired to proceed pro se. Based on this information, the court had the jury exit and McCRAY return to the courtroom. The judge then expressly inquired of McCRAY: [Y]ou want to discharge your lawyers, is that what you're telling me?... And only you will represent yourself without counsel, correct? McCRAY responded yes to both questions. The court followed by conducting a Faretta inquiry, asking McCRAY about his age, education, and experience in the legal field. As part of this inquiry, the court issued several admonitions, which informed McCRAY that he would be bound by the same rules of evidence and trial procedure by which attorneys are bound, he would not receive assistance from anyone, including the judge, and the penalty for the charges against him were serious (i.e., either life without parole or death). In light of these admonitions, the court asked McCRAY whether he still thought he should proceed pro se. McCRAY responded that he understood these warnings and noted that [t]he case [was] very simple and that he could handle it and represent [himself] easily. Accepting McCRAY's statements, the trial court discharged counsel, but allowed them to remain as standby. The record reflects that the trial court never actually allowed McCRAY to represent himself or question any witnesses because after this colloquy, McCRAY refused to abide by the rules of criminal procedure, made repeated untimely and irrelevant objections, and attempted to introduce irrelevant evidence during the State's case-in-chief concerning FDLE case tracking reports allegedly stolen from McCRAY's cell. Consequently, the trial judge reinstated defense counsel and again removed McCRAY from the courtroom, stating that counsel would be permitted to discuss witness questioning with McCRAY while he was inside the holding cell. The jury then returned to the courtroom with McCRAY being represented by counsel. McCRAY now challenges the adequacy of the Faretta inquiry and the trial court's decision to reinstate counsel. We question McCRAY's assertion that a Faretta inquiry was even required under these circumstances because the record is clear that he never actually represented himself due to his own obstreperous behavior. However, even if McCRAY's behavior could be interpreted as triggering Faretta, we would conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that McCRAY had a general understanding of his rights and that his decision to proceed without counsel was made with eyes open. See Potts v. State, 718 So.2d 757, 760 (Fla.1998) (finding Faretta inquiry sufficient where [c]ompetent substantial evidence support[ed] the conclusion that Potts had a general understanding of his rights and that his decision to proceed without counsel was made with eyes open). In the Faretta decision itself, the United States Supreme Court advised: Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the importance of Faretta as the foundational `self-representation' case because the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments include a `constitutional right to proceed without counsel when' a criminal defendant `voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.' Edwards, 554 U.S. at 170, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525). In Potts, this Court explained that in assessing the validity of a waiver of counsel, a reviewing court should focus not on the specific advice rendered by the trial courtfor there are no `magic words' under Faretta but rather on the defendant's general understanding of his or her rights. 718 So.2d at 760. In Aguirre-Jarquin, 9 So.3d at 602, we reaffirmed that principle of law, holding that what matters is not the words the trial court employs but rather that the record reflects a defendant who makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. Although acknowledging our approval of a standard colloquy for trial courts to utilize, [7] we stressed that a trial judge is not required to follow the colloquy word for word; rather, the essence of the colloquy is to ensure that the defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. 9 So.3d at 602; see also McKenzie v. State, 29 So.3d 272, 280-81 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 116, 178 L.Ed.2d 71 (2010) (rejecting defendant's claim that Faretta inquiry was defective because the court did not specifically inquire as to his criminal justice experience and noting that a precise colloquy is not a constitutional prerequisite). Accordingly, the omission of one or more warnings in a particular case does not necessarily require reversal so long as it is apparent from the record that the defendant made an intelligent and knowledgeable waiver of his right to counsel. In this case, while the record demonstrates that the trial court's inquiry was not as exhaustive as it could have been and did not follow the standard colloquy as written, the trial court's inquiry satisfied the constitutional predicate for allowing self-representation. Specifically, the trial court inquired about McCRAY's age, his education, and his experience in the legal field. The trial court also advised McCRAY of the seriousness of the charges against him, the potential sentence he might face if found guilty, that he would be on his own if he chose to pursue self-representation, and that he would be bound by the same rules of evidence and procedure with which lawyers must comply. In addition, during the courts discussion with McCRAY after he interrupted the States opening, the trial court inquired as to whether McCRAY had ever represented himself and asked about his previous work experience. Moreover, Judge Wilkes, who made this determination, had been previously and thoroughly apprised of McCRAY's competency at a hearing on that precise issue conducted just several weeks prior, after which the judge found McCRAY competent to stand trial. Based on the record, competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that McCRAY's decision in this instance was an intelligent and knowing waiver of representation by counsel. McCRAY also asserts that the trial court's imposition of counsel upon him following this request warrants reversal. We disagree. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are limits on the right to act as one's own attorney, and  Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 171, 128 S.Ct. 2379. Accordingly, the trial court has the power to terminate a defendant's self-representation if he continues to abuse the court system. Perry v. Mascara, 959 So.2d 771, 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); see also Amend. to Fla. Rule of Crim. Pro. 3.111(d)(2)-(3), 719 So.2d at 877 (setting forth as part of model Faretta inquiry that (1) if the defendant demonstrates an unwillingness to abide by the rules of criminal law or courtroom procedure, the trial judge may terminate self-representation; or (2) if the defendant is disruptive in the courtroom that the judge can terminate self-representation and remove the defendant from the courtroom). Here, following McCRAY's request, the trial court was faced with an obstreperous defendant who might well have attempted to further disrupt and obstruct the trial proceedings; McCRAY refused to cooperate and persisted in obstructionist conduct even after the trial court warned McCRAY that his commentary was improper. McCRAY's chosen course made it practically impossible for the court to move forward with the proceedings. Given McCRAY's uncooperative behavior, coupled with his history of disruption, we conclude that the trial court did not err in removing McCRAY and reinstating counsel. See United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079-81 (7th Cir.1998) (concluding that when a defendant's obstreperous behavior is so disruptive that the trial cannot move forward, it is within the trial judge's discretion to require the defendant to be represented by counsel and affirming the district court's revocation of the defendant's pro se status and mandating the appointment of counsel over the defendant's wishes).