Opinion ID: 774103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: As Applied to Cooley and Foltz

Text: 31 To recap, Milstein's complaint alleges that Cooley and Foltz:(1) fabricated evidence by recruiting Gutierrez to recant his trial testimony and instead falsely claim that Milstein had solicited him to commit perjury; 32 (2) used that false statement as the basis for filing a crime report against Milstein, listing themselves as the complaining witnesses or crime victims; 33 (3) investigated the offense reported in the crime report; 34 (4) secured an indictment by posing as advisors to the grand jury; 35 (5) after the indictment was dismissed, secured an information and an arrest warrant by instructing a subordinate (Doe 1) to sign a false criminal complaint; 36 (6) opposed the re-appointment of Milstein's prior counsel; and 37 (7) made false statements to the press. 38
39 Appellees are not entitled to absolute immunity if one accepts as true the allegations that they knowingly obtained false statements from Gutierrez for the purpose of prosecuting Milstein. Shopping for a dubious expert opinion is fabricating evidence, which is unprotected by absolute immunity. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276. It follows, then, that acquiring known false statements from a witness for use in a prosecution is likewise fabricating evidence that is unprotected by absolute immunity. This alleged conduct occurred before the grand jury was empaneled, id. at 275, before Milstein was arrested, Burns, 500 U.S. at 492, and it must necessarily have occurred before the existence of probable cause, Buckley , 509 U.S. at 274, (which, if Milstein is believed, can never occur because Appellees concocted the essential facts). This alleged act is not protected by absolute immunity. 40
41 Filing a crime report as a complaining witness or crime victim is analogous to filing an affidavit or oath in support of an arrest warrant, see Kalina 522 U.S. at 129-31; Morley, 175 F.3d at 760. Although Milstein's complaint does not indicate that the crime report was sworn, the function is nonetheless that of a witness, not an advocate. Absolute immunity does not protect Appellees for this alleged act. 42
43 From the chronology of Milstein's complaint, Appellees are alleged to have conducted their investigation after filing the crime report and before empaneling the grand jury. This suggests that any investigating was done in the role of detective rather than advocate. This alleged act is not protected by absolute immunity. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. 44
45 Milstein alleges that Appellees posed as advisors before the grand jury when in reality they were complaining witnesses. Before the grand jury the prosecutor has the dual role of pressing for an indictment and of being the grand jury adviser. In case of conflict, the latter duty must take precedence. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 63 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). If Cooley and Foltz were advising rather than advocating, they could arguably not be entitled to absolute immunity. However, Milstein does not argue that Appellees were actually functioning as advisors rather than advocates. Instead, he suggests that Appellees, while actually pressing for an indictment, gave the misleading impression to the grand jury that they were merely neutral advisors. 46 Because using a grand jury is one way of initiating a prosecution, Imbler, at 431, any acts of a prosecutor before a grand jury could arguably be covered by absolute immunity. See Herb Hallman Chevrolet, 169 F.3d at 643 (prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under §§ 1983 for their conduct before grand juries) (quoting Burns , 500 U.S. at 490 n.6); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1990) (affording absolute immunity to prosecutor who oversaw confiscation of material from grand jury that was attempting to initiate an indictment sua sponte). However, because grand juries can be empaneled for investigative purposes, well before probable cause exists, see Williams, 504 U.S. at 48, such a proposition seemingly runs afoul of Buckley's rule that a prosecutor cannot function as an advocate before probable cause exists. 47 We need not determine the exact scope of protection afforded by absolute immunity for acts performed by prosecutors before grand juries. Milstein's allegations as to this particular grand jury focus on Appellee's efforts to indict, not to investigate a crime. Initiating a prosecution has consistently been identified as a function within the prosecutor's role as advocate. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431; Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (Filing charges and initiating prosecution are functions that are integral to a prosecutor's work.) Accordingly, Appellees' functions before this grand jury are protected by absolute immunity. 48
49 The foregoing reasoning applies with even more force to the prosecutor's actual decision to prosecute, whether it be by grand jury indictment or information. Appellees are alleged to have re-prosecuted Milstein via an information that was supported by Doe 1's criminal complaint. To the extent that Doe 1's criminal complaint resulted in an information charging Milstein, Appellees enjoy absolute immunity. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431; Mishler, 191 F.3d at 1008. 50 However, Milstein also states that the criminal complaint supported the issuance of an arrest warrant. On the one hand, Milstein's Second Amended Complaint may be attempting to cast the criminal complaint as akin to the affidavits or oaths at issue in Kalina and Morley--more the product of witness participation than prosecutorial advocacy. But on the other hand, the usual function of a criminal complaint is not for the prosecutor to attest to facts based on personal knowledge. Instead, the prosecutor simply recounts the facts, produced by an investigation, that provide probable cause to arrest--in this case, Gutierrez's statements. Kalina indicated that but for counsel personally swearing to the facts contained in her certification supporting the motion for an arrest warrant, she would have been protected by absolute immunity. Id., 522 U.S. at 129. Because Milstein does not allege that Appellees (or Doe 1) personally swore to the facts in the criminal complaint, absolute immunity is appropriate for this act. 51
52 Appearing in court to argue a motion is a quintessential act of advocacy. Burns, 500 U.S. at 492. Accordingly, absolute immunity is warranted as to Appellee's appearance in court to urge that Milstein's prior counsel not be reappointed. Milstein's allegations of Appellees' motives are irrelevant. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078. 53
54 Absolute immunity does not protect prosecutors for comments they make to the media. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277. We express no opinion as to whether the comments at issue here give rise to a valid claim under §§ 1983.