Opinion ID: 2971748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sullivan Standard

Text: Petitioners claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland have a heavy burden of proof. See Lewis v. Alexander, 11 F.3d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1993). This burden applies regardless of whether a Petitioner is claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel or ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Munson v. Kapture, 384 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however, a petitioner’s attorney had an actual conflict of interest, at least in cases involving multiple representation, a lesser standard has been applied. In Sullivan’s predecessor, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), three defendants were represented by the same attorney. The trial court refused to consider the appointment of separate counsel despite the defense lawyer’s argument that his clients’ interests were in conflict. Under those circumstances, the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, and no showing of prejudice was required to reverse the conviction. The Court pointed out that a rule requiring a showing of prejudice in a joint representation case would require “unlike most cases, unguided speculation.” Id. at 491. This is because in joint representation cases of conflicting interests, the evil is in what the attorney finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial, but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. Accordingly, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the prejudicial impact on the defendant in such cases. Sullivan was also a joint representation case but, unlike Holloway, there was no objection made to the trial judge concerning any conflict of interest. Under these circumstances, the Court held that, “[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348. The Court, citing Holloway, reiterated the rule that a defendant in such a case who is able to show that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. Subsequently, in Strickland, the Court recognized that, in certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Examples given included actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether and various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance. “Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. The Court referred to its earlier discussion in Sullivan and a conflict of interest claim as involving “a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice.” Id. It noted that the rule in Sullivan: is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 350). In Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), the Supreme Court revisited Sullivan in another alleged conflict of interest case, one in which the defendant’s attorney had previously represented the victim of defendant’s murder in an earlier, different proceeding. The case was presented and argued on the assumption that the Sullivan standard – requiring a showing of defective performance but not requiring a showing of prejudice – was applicable not only to cases of multiple representation, but also to cases of successive representation. Because the Court held that the judge’s failure to inquire into a potential conflict of interest did not itself relieve the defendant of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected defendant’s representation, the Court did not decide whether, when an actual conflict of interest is shown, the Sullivan No. 03-1894 Whiting v. Burt Page 17 “prophylaxis” of not requiring a showing of probable effect on the outcome of the trial applies to successive representation cases. Of major significance to the present case was the Supreme Court’s limitation on Sullivan. The Court pointed out that Sullivan had been applied by courts of appeals “unblinkingly,” not only to successive representation cases, but in a variety of other cases involving alleged conflicts of interest. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174. The Court noted that Holloway and Sullivan had emphasized the high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent representations and the difficulty of proving that prejudice, but stressed that “[n]ot all attorney conflicts present comparable difficulties.” Id. at 175. Whether Sullivan should be extended to successive representation cases “remains, as far as the jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open question.” Id. at 176. In Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 460 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879 (2003), the Sixth Circuit noted that, “[i]n the wake9of Mickens, no court has applied the Sullivan presumption to a case of successive representation.” Last year, in Lordi v. Ishee, 384 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2004), this Court expressly held that: [t]he presumed prejudice standard for ineffectiveness claims based on a conflict of interest detailed in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), is inapplicable to cases of successive representations. Lordi, 384 F.3d at 193. See also Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 2002)(refusing to extend Sullivan to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on an attorney’s conflict of interest arising from anything other than joint representation), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 971 (2003); Benge v. Johnson, 312 F. Supp. 2d 978, 994 (S.D. Ohio 2004)(refusing to apply the Sullivan standard outside the concurrent joint representation context). Based on Supreme Court and prior Sixth Circuit law, it is our opinion that the District Court erred in applying the Sullivan standard to Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on an alleged conflict arising from the same counsel representing the Defendant both at trial and on appeal. The Sullivan standard has been applied by the Supreme Court only in cases, like those involving multiple concurrent representation, where: (1) prejudice was obvious, e.g., a denial of the assistance of counsel, or where there was a “high probability of prejudice;” and (2) it was difficult to prove that prejudice. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175. Neither of these factors has any application to the rather common occurrence of trial counsel also acting as counsel on direct appeal. That situation, in itself, does not create any obvious prejudice.10 Furthermore, there is no comparable difficulty in proving whether counsel was ineffective at the appellate level for failing to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Whether that claim is based on the attorney’s own conduct at trial, e.g., failing to object, or on the conduct of the judge or opposing counsel, the effectiveness of appellate counsel can be measured by the well-established Strickland standard and, in this Circuit, with the assistance of the eleven questions set forth in Mapes. In addition, expanding Sullivan beyond its present borders of multiple concurrent representation would result in the creation of a new rule of law – one that clearly has not been dictated by prior Supreme Court precedent. The AEDPA, as previously noted, provides, in part, that 9 The Court in Moss did apply Sullivan, because the facts of that case placed it outside the traditional class of successive representation cases that was considered in Mickens. 10 In fact, the rules of this Court provide that trial counsel in criminal cases, whether retained or appointed by the district court, is responsible for the continued representation of the client on appeal unless specifically relieved by this Court. 6 Cir. R. 101(a). No. 03-1894 Whiting v. Burt Page 18 an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted with respect to any claim “that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings”11 unless the adjudication of the claim involved an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law,” as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.12 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, in order for the Petitioner to establish his ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claim, he will have to show that the Michigan courts’ rejection of that claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law, applying the Strickland standard as the clearly established law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-04 (2000). The District Court erred by extending Sullivan to the facts of this case. The District Court could not properly find that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was an unreasonable application of the Sullivan standard when the Strickland standard, and not the Sullivan standard, is the clearly established law applicable to the type of conflict of interest alleged in this case. C. Other Claims
It is, of course, undisputed that Petitioner presented his first claim, concerning the voluntariness of his statement to the police, to the state courts on direct appeal, and it was decided adversely to him. The District Court, however, did not address the merits of this claim; instead, it ordered a new appeal on the other claims in the Petition. On remand, the District Court shall consider the merits of this claim as its first priority.
Petitioner’s second claim (regarding testimony concerning a prosecution witness agreement), third claim (alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel), and fourth claim (regarding the trial court’s instructions to the jury), were not presented to the Michigan courts on direct appeal. Respondent alleged in her Answer to the Petition that these claims were procedurally defaulted. The District Court, however, made no determination regarding the apparent procedural default of these claims. It simply stated: Because this Court’s conclusion that petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on this fifth claim is dispositive of the petition, the Court considers it unnecessary to review petitioner’s other claims and declines to do so. See Haynes v. Burke, 115 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819-20 (E.D. Mich. 2000); aff’d sub nom Miller v. Straub, 229 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2002); cert. den. sub nom Burke v. Haynes, 123 S. Ct. 996 (2003). JA at 240. The Haynes case, unlike the present case, involved just one issue – whether a guilty plea was involuntary. The district court in that case concluded that, “in light of this Court’s finding that counsel was ineffective in failing to advise petitioner of the prosecutor’s right to appeal, it is 11 This Court has found that, in the present case, the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, with its alleged conflict of interest component, was fairly submitted to the state courts, and was decided adversely to Petitioner. 12 Such a rule of law must be clearly established at the time of defendant’s conviction in state court. See Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666, 672 (6th Cir. 2004). No. 03-1894 Whiting v. Burt Page 19 unnecessary to address petitioner’s remaining claims concerning the involuntariness of his guilty plea and this Court declines to do so.” 115 F. Supp. 2d at 819-20. The reasoning of Haynes does not apply to this case, which involves numerous claims. With respect to the procedurally defaulted claims, we believe that the District Court should have determined whether Petitioner can demonstrate cause for his failure to comply with the state’s procedural rules and actual prejudice flowing from the alleged constitutional violation or can demonstrate that a lack of federal habeas review of the claims’ merits “will resort in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).13 While the fact that Mr. Schultz, who represented Petitioner on direct appeal, also served as Petitioner’s attorney at trial might serve as cause for Petitioner’s failure to assert on direct appeal any claims based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must still show prejudice before the default can be excused.