Opinion ID: 2166754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Prejudice Due to Expert Witness's Background

Text: Stradley also contends that the trial court erred in permitting Panaccion's expert witness to identify himself before the jury as a former judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania. The thrust of Stradley's argument is that the witness's experience as a judge was totally irrelevant to his expertise in the case; hence, the only possible effect of the testimony was to prejudice the jury. Stradley's argument would have us presume that the jury found the witness's testimony credible merely because he was a former judge. We decline to accept such a far-reaching presumption. The question of whether to exclude or admit evidence is one within the discretion of the trial court. Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa.Super. 14, 22, 473 A.2d 584, 588 (1984). A trial court may properly exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues or misleading the jury. Id. Evidence is prejudicial not where it merely hurts a party's case, but where it tends to fix a decision which has an improper basis in the minds of the jury. Id. Contrary to Stradley's assertion, we agree with the trial court that the witness's background and experience was relevant in establishing his qualifications to testify as an expert. The witness was not called to testify as a judge; he testified as a practicing attorney who could best render an opinion as to the cause and extent of Panaccion's loss. Having the witness relate that, for a brief time, he served on the bench merely gave the jury a comprehensive view of his legal background since graduating from law school. We find no undue prejudice in this statement. Further, Stradley was given ample opportunity and, indeed, did cross-examine the witness regarding his qualifications. In particular, Stradley elicited that this witness was appointed, not elected, to the court for a term of only twenty-six months (over the course of a career which spanned thirty years), and that he was defeated when he ran for election. The witness also stated that he had never presided in a malpractice case and had never before testified as an expert witness (N.T. 461). In addition, the court prohibited Panaccion's counsel from referring to the witness as Judge, and instructed the jury to give weight only to such expert testimony which was supported by the facts and deemed worthy of belief. In short, the court weighed the probative value of disclosing the witness's background with the prejudice, if any, attendant to such information. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion by admitting such testimony. Accordingly, we find that this claim of error does not warrant the grant of a new trial. The order of the trial court is vacated and the case is remanded for a new trial. Jurisdiction is relinquished.