Opinion ID: 796168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Age and Sex Discrimination

Text: 18 Ms. Merillat submits that, employing the McDonnell Douglas framework, she has established a prima facie case of age and sex discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. Although McDonnell Douglas itself outlined a particular four-part showing that a plaintiff must make to establish her prima facie case, we long have recognized that the test is not inflexible and is appropriately adapted where necessary to reflect more fairly and accurately the underlying reality of the work-place. Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 494. In a mini-RIF context, a situation in which the dismissed worker's duties have been absorbed by another employee rather than eliminated, we employ one such modified version of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Johal v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., 434 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2006); Paluck, 221 F.3d at 1011 n. 5. This approach requires that Ms. Merillat demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer's legitimate performance expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) her duties were absorbed by employees not in the protected classes. 1 Johal, 434 F.3d at 946; Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 209 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2000). 19 Metal Spinners does not dispute that Ms. Merillat is in a protected class with respect to both her age and her sex. Both parties also agree that Ms. Merillat suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated. We therefore shall focus on the two contested prongs: whether Ms. Merillat was meeting her employer's legitimate expectations and whether her duties were absorbed by individuals not within her protected classes. 20
21 Ms. Merillat contends that she was meeting her employer's expectations. She invites our attention to her yearly reviews for 2001 and 2002 in which Wiland's overall rating of her performance was Satisfactory/Good. R.44, Ex.E-F. She also points to a letter that she received in January of 2003 that notes that she had been awarded a raise in her salary and that this adjustment in salary recognize[d her] performance during the past year. R.44, Ex.L. 22 Metal Spinners relies on the same reviews. It submits that the written comments on those reviews indicate that Ms. Merillat was not meeting her employer's expectations. More specifically, Wiland testified in his deposition that Ms. Merillat did not meet his expectations for the following areas: ability to entertain strategic concepts and manage new projects, willingness to accept new challenges, ability to get along with others and willingness to implement a computer system. R.35 at 9-10. 23 The evaluations, while providing some negative comments, seem to be largely positive. In her 2001 evaluation, Ms. Merillat received an excellent rating in ten categories and satisfactory/good ratings in seventeen categories, with no categories rating below satisfactory/good. 2 See R.36 at 14-15. Some comments included on the evaluations are positive, such as Jan has made tremendous progress with areas previously noted for improvement, id. at 15, and, in the area of work habits, [s]he is performing at a level commensurate with her position and she needs to continue developing personally as an effective manager, id. Some comments, however, are more negative, such as Ms. Merillat may need to consider delegating additional tasks, id., and she needs to explore alternatives to her current methods and practices so cost improvements can be realized, id. at 14. 24 Similarly, in her 2002 evaluation, she received one outstanding rating, ten excellent ratings and sixteen satisfactory/good ratings, with no category rated lower than satisfactory/good. Id. at 18-19. Again, there are some positive comments, such as Ms. Merillat demonstrates continued improvement in teamwork, id. at 18, and she did an outstanding job of reducing raw materials inventories in 2002, id. There are also negative comments, such as she has too many redundant/duplicative business practices that must be challenged, id., and she must work on developing rapport with coworkers and with improving her overall morale and demeanor, id. at 19. 25 Mr. Wiland stated in his deposition that he had attempted to make the written evaluations as fair as possible. He first admitted in his deposition testimony that he did not indicate specifically on these evaluations that Ms. Merillat was failing in her expectations, R.35 at 20, but later stated that printed words [on the evaluation forms] in conjunction with [the conversation he had with Ms. Merillat while going over the forms with her] indicate that she was not fulfilling the expectations that we had for her at that position, id. at 23. 26 For her part, Ms. Merillat admitted to getting ugly with co-workers when they didn't do something right, in 2001, but also stated that later she changed. R.33 at 13-15. She contends that her job performance was largely positive and that the reason for some of her failings was that she did not get the necessary computer upgrades and training to utilize the Vantage system and eliminate some of her redundant practices. 27 We must conclude that, based on this record, material issues of fact certainly remain with respect to whether Ms. Merillat was meeting her employer's expectations. Her employment evaluations are, at best, inconclusive. Additionally, she did receive a raise that stated it was based, in part, on her performance. Therefore, summary judgment for Metal Spinners on this prong would be inappropriate. 28
29 There is agreement that a good deal of Ms. Merillat's responsibilities were assumed by Wehr, who is neither female nor within the protected age group. We therefore must conclude that Ms. Merillat has met this prong of the modified McDonnell Douglas test.
30 If the plaintiff does establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. See Johal, 434 F.3d at 946. If the defendant does articulate such reasons, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the proffered reasons were pretextual. See id. 31 In the present case, where there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Ms. Merillat was meeting expectations, Metal Spinners can prevail on its motion for summary judgment only if it can show that there remains a non-pretextual and non-discriminatory reason for her discharge. Metal Spinners offers several nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Ms. Merillat as part of its RIF: Many of her duties could be eliminated by the implementation of the Vantage computer system; she had a history of difficulty working with co-workers and suppliers; she had less desirable education and experience than Wehr and Wehr was more willing and better able to implement new strategies. 32 Ms. Merillat admits that many of her tasks are now performed by the Vantage computer system and therefore, at least one of the reasons given by Metal Spinners for her termination is not pretextual. 3 She nevertheless contends that Wehr has done a poor job because he has had inventory sitting idle for longer periods than she did when she was doing the metals purchasing. Ms. Merillat submits that Wehr's comparatively weaker performance demonstrates that Wiland was biased against her when he decided to terminate Ms. Merillat but to leave Wehr in his position. However, much of Ms. Merillat's explanation for Wehr's poor performance refers to his performance after her termination. Metal Spinners may have made a mistake in terminating Ms. Merillat rather than Wehr during the RIF. However, such information, even if proven to be true, would not be relevant to our present inquiry. Our only task is to determine whether Metal Spinners honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered, even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless. Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 984 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine, 328 F.3d 309, 323 (7th Cir. 2003) ([A] plaintiff must do more than demonstrate that the employer made a mistake . . . .). Even if Metal Spinners' decision was, in retrospect, a mistake, that conclusion, made with the benefit of hindsight, does not mean that Metal Spinners honestly did not believe that retaining Wehr and terminating Ms. Merillat was the appropriate decision at the time it was made. See Johal, 434 F.3d at 946 (stating that, when examining a claim of pretext, it is not our role to question the wisdom of a company's decisions on how to run its business); McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 1998) (An articulated motivating reason is not converted into pretext merely because, with the benefit of hindsight, it turned out to be poor business judgment.). 33 Ms. Merillat further submits that the district court created a new standard when it stated that what constitutes `satisfactory' work shifts a bit in a reduction in force case. Appellant's Br. at 25 (quoting R.50 at 9). However, when read in context, it is clear that the district court was only stating what we have already recognized: that, even if an employee would not have been fired under normal circumstances, [i]n a reduction in force, someone has to go. It is usually the least qualified or least productive employee. Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 1998). Even though, as noted above, Ms. Merillat's performance may have been satisfactory, it does not mean that her termination as part of a RIF was discriminatory. See Balderston, 328 F.3d at 324 (holding that the plaintiff did not demonstrate pretext when there was no evidence to show that the employer did not honestly believe [it] was dismissing a poorer performing, less suitable employee in a RIF). 4 34 Relatedly, Ms. Merillat points out that, when Wiland told her that she was terminated, he told her it was due to the poor performance of the company and economic softening in the marketplace. Wiland Dep., R.44, Ex.D-2 at 27. He admitted in his deposition testimony that he accurately represented to her the reasons for her termination. 5 Id. This statement is consistent with a termination under a RIF. Even if Ms. Merillat's performance was sufficiently acceptable to justify retaining her in better times, that consideration does not establish that Metal Spinners' reasons for terminating her in a RIF situation were pretextual. See Fairchild, 147 F.3d at 573. In a RIF, it is not pretextual to terminate an individual perceived to be a weak performer in an organization even if that individual's performance could also be characterized as satisfactory or adequate. 35 Next, Ms. Merillat contends that Wiland preferred to work with members of his social group and therefore chose a younger male colleague over Ms. Merillat. In support of this contention, Ms. Merillat points to the several occasions on which Wiland had lunch, drinks or dinner with Wehr, while he had never done any of the same with Ms. Merillat. However, in this context, socializing with someone who is not a member of a protected class does not demonstrate bias against those who are in a protected class. The fact that Wiland and Wehr had a more amiable social relationship is not enough to demonstrate that Wiland's reasons for terminating Ms. Merillat were pretextual and that he was actually motivated by age and/or sex discrimination. See, e.g., Pope v. ESA Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that the fact that a decision-maker went to lunch with white managers does not mean that his decision not to promote a minority employee was pretextual). 36 Finally, Ms. Merillat points to Wiland's request that she remove the cartoon lampooning the differences between male and female salaries that she had hanging on her bulletin board. Ms. Merillat argues that this incident is relevant to show bias toward women in the workplace. We have said, however, that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the workplace are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus. See Cullen v. Olin Corp., 195 F.3d 317, 323 (7th Cir. 1999). We have cautioned that this general rule may give way where particular remarks in fact support an inference that unlawful bias motivated the decision-maker, such as when those remarks are made by the decision-maker or one having input in a decision, and are made (1) around the time of, and (2) in reference to, the adverse employment action complained of. Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois, 219 F.3d 649, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2000). Wiland's statement regarding the cartoon fits neither of those categories, nor does it otherwise demonstrate a bias on Wiland's part sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory animus. It is, therefore, clearly insufficient to sustain a determination that the reasons for the discharge stated by Wiland and supported by evidence were pretextual in nature. 37 Accordingly, we must conclude that although Ms. Merillat has demonstrated disputed material facts sufficient to prevent summary judgment for failure to meet her prima facie burden, Metal Spinners has proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to support her termination; in response, Ms. Merillat has not produced evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact with respect to her burden of demonstrating that those reasons are pretextual. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Metal Spinners on Ms. Merillat's age and sex discrimination claims.