Opinion ID: 844180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sutton

Text: In Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th 533, we addressed the right to a speedy trial under section 1382.3 In Sutton, appointed counsel for one of two codefendants 3 As relevant here, section 1382 provides: “(a) The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the action to be dismissed in the following cases: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) In a felony case, when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of the defendant‟s arraignment on an indictment or information . . . . However, an action shall not be dismissed under this paragraph (footnote continued on next page) 4 was unexpectedly engaged in another trial on the 60th day after the defendants‟ arraignment, but anticipated that the other trial would be completed very shortly. Based on these circumstances, the trial court found good cause to continue the trial of both defendants on a day-to-day basis, over the defendants‟ repeated objections, to the 66th day after arraignment, at which time counsel who had been engaged in another trial informed the court that his conflicting trial was completed. (Id. at pp. 542-544.) We granted review in Sutton to address whether counsel‟s engagement in another trial constituted good cause for the continuance. We observed in Sutton that “a number of factors are relevant to a determination of good cause” under section 1382 to continue a trial beyond the 60day period: “(1) the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution that is likely to result from the delay. [Citations.] Past decisions further establish that in making its good-cause determination, a trial court must consider all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case, „applying principles of common sense to the totality of circumstances . . . .‟ [Citations.] The cases recognize that, as a general matter, a trial court „has broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant a continuance of the trial‟ [citation], and that, in reviewing a trial court‟s good-cause determination, an appellate court (footnote continued from previous page) if either of the following circumstances exists: [¶] (A) The defendant enters a general waiver of the 60-day trial requirement. . . . [¶] (B) The defendant requests or consents to the setting of a trial date beyond the 60-day period. . . . Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” (§ 1382, subd. (a), italics added.) 5 applies an „abuse of discretion‟ standard.” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 546, fn. omitted.) With respect to the defendant whose counsel had been engaged in another trial, we distinguished a continuance resulting from unforeseen consequences from a continuance resulting from the state‟s failure to provide enough public defenders, and concluded that the trial conflict in Sutton “was the type of contingency that may occur even in a reasonably funded and efficiently administered trial court system that handles a large volume of criminal cases.” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 554; see People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 [delay resulting from the failure of the state to provide enough public defenders is not good cause for a continuance].) With respect to the defendant whose counsel was ready to proceed to trial within the 60-day period, we relied first on section 1050.1 in concluding that the continuance was permissible as to that defendant. Section 1050.1 provides that, when the trial of one jointly charged defendant is continued for good cause, “the continuance shall, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, constitute good cause to continue the remaining defendants‟ cases so as to maintain joinder.” We concluded that because the continuance of the first defendant‟s trial was supported by good cause, the continuance of the second defendant‟s trial was also supported by good cause under section 1050.1.4 4 The defendant in Sutton, whose counsel had been ready for trial, asserted that section 1050.1 did not apply because the prosecutor had not moved to continue the second defendant‟s trial. We disagreed, and held that section 1050.1 does not require an explicit motion by the prosecutor. “The statute does not purport to preclude a trial court from finding that the state interest in a joint trial constitutes good cause for a continuance in the absence of such a motion by the prosecuting attorney, and the evident legislative intent underlying the statute — to facilitate joint trials and to minimize the instances in which a severance is required (footnote continued on next page) 6 In Sutton, we also identified a second basis that supported the continuance of the trial of the joined defendant. “[L]ong before the enactment of section 1050.1 in 1990, California decisions had recognized that a trial court properly may find that the significant state interests that are furthered by conducting a single trial of jointly charged criminal defendants constitute good cause to continue a codefendant‟s trial beyond the presumptive statutory period designated in section 1382.” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 559.) Although the state interests in a joint trial must be “especially compelling” if the continuance to allow a joint trial will be lengthy, “when the proposed delay to permit a single joint trial is relatively brief, the substantial state interests that are served in every instance by proceeding in a single joint trial generally will support a finding of good cause to continue the codefendant‟s trial under section 1382, even when there is no indication that, were the defendants‟ trials to be severed, the separate trials would be unusually long or complex.” (Id. at p. 560.) We disapproved Sanchez v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 884 (Sanchez), People v. Escarcega (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 379 (Escarcega), and Arroyo v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 460 (Arroyo) “to the extent they hold or suggest that the state interests served by a joint trial cannot constitute good cause under section 1382 to continue a codefendant‟s trial beyond the presumptive statutory deadline.” (Sutton, supra, at p. 562.) After Sutton became final, we transferred the present case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Sutton. (footnote continued from previous page) — is consistent with a trial court‟s authority to make such a good cause determination on its own.” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 559.) 7