Opinion ID: 151087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: hall's miranda waiver and confession

Text: Hall argues that his waiver and confession were not knowing and voluntary and should have been suppressed. We first review the general principles governing Miranda warnings in the juvenile context and then Hall's confession claims. Under Miranda, the State must warn the accused prior to such questioning of his right to remain silent and of his right to have counsel, retained or appointed, present during interrogation. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2568, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (juvenile case) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). If a defendant unambiguously requests for counsel or to remain silent, police must cease interrogation. Berghuis v. Thompkins, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2259-61, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (concluding defendant's silence during two-hour-and-45-minute interrogation did not invoke right to remain silent or right to counsel because defendant must make an unambiguous request to invoke his Miranda rights); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (concluding if accused makes a statement concerning right to counsel that is ambiguous or equivocal or makes no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation). The government cannot introduce a suspect's statement taken without the presence of an attorney without first showing that the suspect made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Hart v. Att'y Gen. of Florida, 323 F.3d 884, 891 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628). The government bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that this `heavy burden' is not more than the burden to establish waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. at 2261 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). The prosecution does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express, and an implicit waiver of the Miranda rights is sufficient. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. at 2261; accord North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 375-76, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). The inquiry into whether a waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent is twofold, or, stated another way, has two distinct dimensions. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). First, the waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Id.; accord Hart, 323 F.3d at 892 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141). Second, the waiver must be made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Hart, 323 F.3d at 892 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141). Even if a defendant's statement is voluntary and not coerced, the prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused understood these [ Miranda ] rights. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. at 2262; see Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421-22, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. The Supreme Court utilizes a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to ascertain whether a juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights and confession were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572 (stating [t]he totality approach permits indeed, it mandatesinquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation). The totality approach includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Id.; accord Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1426 (11th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has warned that admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1453, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). In cases where a juvenile is involved, [i]f counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. Id. at 55, 87 S.Ct. at 1458. [W]hen . . . a mere childan easy victim of the lawis before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 303-04, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). The Supreme Court has held waivers and confessions involuntary where a young defendant was isolated or interrogated intensely for long periods of time or overnight without the presence of a guardian or counsel. In Haley, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that where a 15-year-old boy was questioned hour after hour without the presence of a friend or an attorney for five hours, in the dead of night from midnight to 5 a.m., by five or six police officers acting in relay teams of one or two each, his confession was involuntary. Haley, 332 U.S. at 598-601, 68 S.Ct. at 303-04. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the written confession of a 14-year-old defendant was inadmissible where the written confession was obtained after the defendant had been held for five days during which time he saw no lawyer, parent or other friendly adult, even though there was no evidence of prolonged questioning by officers. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 50, 53-54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 1210, 1212, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). In Gallegos, the Supreme Court cited these factors in concluding the 14-year-old's confession was involuntary: [t]he youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, [and] the failure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or friend. . . . Id. at 55, 82 S.Ct. at 1213. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held a juvenile's waiver and confession were knowing and voluntary where the circumstances indicate that the juvenile fully understood his rights and was not coerced into waiving them or making a confession by long periods of interrogation or other pressure tactics. In Fare, for instance, the Supreme Court held that a 16-and-1/2-year-old defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights despite the fact that he requested to see his probation officer during questioning. 442 U.S. at 726, 99 S.Ct. at 2572. The officers explained his Miranda rights to him and there was no indication at that time that he did not understand them. Id. After his request to see his probation officer was denied and after the Fare juvenile defendant was informed of his rights a second time, he agreed to waive his rights and continue the interrogation. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the defendant had considerable experience with the police, several arrests, and had been on probation for several years. Id. at 726-27, 99 S.Ct. at 2572-73. The defendant was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit. Id. Similarly, this Court has held that a 17-year-old defendant's confession was knowing and voluntary where the defendant had a substantial history of involvement in the Juvenile Justice System and, in fact, was a run-away from a state facility. United States v. Kerr, 120 F.3d 239, 241 (11th Cir.1997). In Kerr, the defendant was read his state juvenile rights from a juvenile waiver of rights form, read the form himself, and then signed it before confessing to the crime. Id. at 241-42. Another officer then gave the defendant his adult Miranda warnings before recording the defendant's statement. Id. at 241. The defendant never asked for an attorney or a guardian and did not allege that he was mistreated or coerced into making a confession. [38] Id. at 242. In addition, in Paxton v. Jarvis, 735 F.2d 1306, 1308-10 (11th Cir.1984), this Court concluded that the juvenile defendant's confession was knowing and voluntary where he was one month shy of his sixteenth birthday, was questioned from 8:30 p.m. until 4:30 a.m., was told of the charges against him, and was twice given Miranda warnings. Id. at 1308-09. The defendant's mother was present until 12:30 a.m., during which time the defendant admitted breaking into the victim's home with two other boys but denied raping and murdering the victim and stated he left the home before any harm was done. The defendant's mother then left the police station at 12:30 a.m.; the officers continued the questioning, and, at 4:27 a.m., the defendant signed a statement incriminating himself in the rape and murder. Although the defendant and his mother claimed the police had not read all of the Miranda rights, had yelled at the defendant, threatened physical harm to the defendant, had beat him, and had tried to intimidate him by alluding to the electric chair, the police denied all of these allegations in a hearing before the state trial court. Id. at 1309. In his § 2254 petition, the defendant claimed his confession to the rape and murder was involuntary. This Court affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's § 2254 petition, noting the entire record was before the state court which found the defendant's confessions were voluntary and the record amply supported that finding. Id. at 1309-10. In affirming, this Court found significant that the defendant was almost sixteen years old, he had ample contact with family members at the station, he was told of the charges and given Miranda warnings and the questioning, although extending over most of the night, was neither continuous nor conducted by use of threats or beatings. Id. at 1310. Even where a juvenile defendant has a lower-than-average intelligence or reading level, his waiver and confession may still be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary if the totality of the circumstances indicate that he understood his rights when he waived them. See Henyard v. McDonough, 459 F.3d 1217, 1241 (11th Cir.2006). In Henyard, this Court concluded that an 18-year-old defendant's confession was voluntary and the defendant understood his rights where: (1) the police explained his rights to him twice, and he waived them twice, (2) his intelligence, although below average, was not so low that he could not understand his rights, (3) the transcript of the interrogation revealed no indication that the defendant was confused or misunderstood the seriousness of the interrogation, (4) the police did not engage in any trickery, deception, or improper interrogation tactics, and (5) the defendant had previous experience with the justice system. Henyard, 459 F.3d at 1241. Likewise, in Rogers v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 365, 175 L.Ed.2d 62 (2009), the Fifth Circuit concluded that a 15-year-old's confession was knowing and voluntary where he was read his Miranda rights twice, and both times confirmed that he understood those rights. Id. at 485, 494-95. He was not subjected to any physical abuse or trickery. Id. at 495. The Fifth Circuit noted that the petitioner could read only at a third or fourth grade level and was a slow learner with a low IQ. Id. at 493. But the court also noted (1) the petitioner was in the eighth grade passing all his classes and was not mentally retarded, (2) the magistrate judge who took his statement testified that the petitioner read it aloud and read it well, and (3) the petitioner was alert, well-oriented, and able to communicate ideas without difficulty. Id. Although the 15-year-old petitioner in Rogers had no prior experience with the criminal justice system and functioned at an intellectually younger age, the Fifth Circuit also noted that he was not continuously or lengthily interrogated, [] was detained for a period of hours rather than days . . . [,] was continuously apprised of his rights, and while he may have functioned at a younger age intellectually, the record indicated he understood those rights. Id. at 495. We now apply these principles to Hall's case.