Opinion ID: 3053286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Text of the Consent Decree

Text: [3] We turn first to the text of the consent decree, viewed in the context of the document as a whole. The third paragraph of the consent decree contains the disputed provision: 3. Defendant Public Employee Retirement System is permanently enjoined and restrained from the EBNER v. OREGON 13129 use of sex-segregated life expectancy tables in calculating “refund annuity” retirement allow- ance prospectively only for members retiring effective July 1, 1978, and thereafter, shall provide a monthly “refund annuity” retirement allowance to female members retiring after that date which is identical to the “refund annuity” retirement allowance males of the same age and amount received prior to that date. Defendant shall have no obligation to recalculate “refund annuity” retirement allowances to female mem- bers already retired or retiring before July 1, 1978. (Emphasis added.) The PERS members argue that the disputed provision means that, from the date of the consent decree onward, all PERS members were entitled to receive refund annuity allowances in the same amount as those received by male PERS members before 1978. Thus, the PERS members believe that the consent decree created a perpetual “floor” on benefits.5 They argue that the “thereafter” clause is superfluous if it is not interpreted to create a benefits floor. By contrast, the Board argues that the disputed provision means that, from the date of the consent decree onward, all similarly situated male and female PERS members were entitled to receive identical refund annuity allowances. The Board contends that the “thereafter” clause memorializes the Board’s decision to “top up” (i.e., raise) female allowances on July 1, 1978 to the male allowance levels in effect prior to that date; the clause does not demonstrate an agreement between the parties to lock in a permanent allowance rate. 5 Notably, the PERS members do not argue that the consent decree also created a “ceiling” on benefits. In other words, the PERS members would like us to read the term “identical” as used in the decree to mean “not less than.” We are unwilling to do so. 13130 EBNER v. OREGON As we previously stated in our 2006 memorandum disposition, given the Title VII context of this case, both parties’ constructions of the disputed provision are arguably plausible. There, we explained: The “prior to that date” language of the Henderson consent decree to a degree supports [the] argument that the consent decree literally established a floor for female employee refund annuity tables. But taken in its context, a Title VII claim of sex discrimination, in which parity on payments to men and women was the goal, the consent order’s prohibition might be read only to order PERB to stop using segregated actuarial tables, and from July 1, 1978, onward, to use identical refund annuity tables for women and men. 203 Fed. Appx. at 49-50.6 [4] Because the disputed provision is susceptible to at least two plausible interpretations when examined in the context of the contract as a whole, it is legally ambiguous. Moon v. Moon, 914 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Or. 1996). Therefore, we proceed to the extrinsic evidence analysis.