Opinion ID: 2790833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Foreclosure Evidence

Text: Foley also takes issue with the admission of evidence concerning foreclosures of properties on which the lending companies lost money, which he contends was irrelevant and highly inflammatory because foreclosures have reduced property values throughout the country and are blamed for the recent economic recession. Although Foley is correct that loss is not an element of wire fraud, we have recognized loss as probative of a defendant's knowledge or intent to commit fraud. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d at 62. Thus, while an ultimate purpose of either causing some 10 Larson itself held that the district court abused its discretion in prevent[ing] defense counsel from exploring the mandatory life sentence that [a witness] faced in the absence of a motion by the Government. 495 F.3d at 1107. The Ninth Circuit explained, however, that unlike a statutory maximum sentence, the witness knows with certainty that he will receive [a mandatory minimum sentence] unless he satisfies the government with substantial and meaningful cooperation so that it will move to reduce his sentence. Id. at 1106. -22- financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to oneself is not the essence of fraudulent intent, the knowledge that one's actions are, in fact, bringing about such losses may demonstrate one's intent to commit fraud. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Foshee, 606 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1979) (Fraudulent intent is supported by proof that [s]omeone was actually victimized by the fraud. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). At Foley's trial, former employees of the lending companies testified that but for the misrepresentations that buyers had brought money to the loan closings, the lenders would not have funded the mortgage loans. The jury could therefore infer that the lenders' losses were a direct consequence of Foley's mendacity and that Foley's misrepresentations were intentional. Moreover, any prejudice resulting from this evidence was relatively nugatory, as the testimony focused on the financial consequences to the lending companies rather than on the more palpable consequences for homeowners. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude this evidence as irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial.