Opinion ID: 1843760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the private/local legislation clause

Text: [2, 3] Article IV, sec. 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: No private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. It was adopted as part of the original Wisconsin Constitution of 1848 and has remained unchanged. In previous cases, we have explained that art. IV, sec. 18 has three underlying purposes: 1) [T]o encourage the legislature to devote its time to the state at large, its primary responsibility; 2) to avoid the specter of favoritism and discrimination, a potential which is inherent in laws of limited applicability; and 3) to alert the public through its elected representatives to the real nature and subject matter of legislation under consideration. Milwaukee Brewers v. Department of Health & Social Services, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 107-08, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986). The requirements of art. IV, sec. 18 are prescribed to ensure accountability of the legislature to the public and to guard against the danger of legislation, affecting private or local interests, being smuggled through the legislature. Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131 (1901). In Brookfield v. Milwaukee Sewerage, 144 Wis. 2d 896, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988), we further examined legislative accountability. Section 18 also recognizes the need to avoid internal logrolling [7] on the part of the legislature. Multi-subject bills by their nature are subject to a greater susceptibility of smuggling and logrolling. They intermingle a variety of unrelated legislation which singly may not have the support of the majority and, thus, tend to reduce accountability to the public. Nevertheless, the fact that a multi-subject bill contains a program such as the MPCP does not necessarily condemn the process in which the program was enacted as unconstitutional. The determination of whether a bill violates Wis. Const. art. IV, sec. 18 involves a two-fold analysis. We must first address whether the process in which the bill was enacted deserves a presumption of constitutionality. Second, we must address whether the bill is private or local. If the bill is found to be private or local, then the requirements of art. IV, sec. 18 apply; namely, that the legislation must be a single subject bill and the title of the bill must clearly reflect the subject. [4] The general rule in Wisconsin is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute is on the person attacking it, who must overcome the strong presumption in favor of its validity. ABC Auto Sales v. Marcus, 255 Wis. 325, 330, 38 N.W.2d 708 (1949). This presumption of constitutionality was recognized in the art. IV, sec. 18 context in Soo Line R. Co. v. Transportation Dep't, 101 Wis. 2d 64, 76, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981). However, we explained in Brookfield v. Milwaukee Sewerage, 144 Wis. 2d 896, 912-13, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988), that a distinction exists between assessing the constitutionality of the substance of legislation and assessing the constitutionality of the process in which the legislation was enacted. In Brookfield, we stated: In the sec. 18 context, the point of the rules listed in the text is to determine whether some sham or artifice is being perpetrated by smuggling through a local bill in the sheep's clothing of a statewide interest or a general bill. . . . By contrast to sec. 18, under equal protection the legislature is not being accused of violating a constitutionally mandated procedural rule. Therefore, because the legislature is now presumed to have intelligently participate[d] in considering such bill . . .. ( Isenring, 109 Wis. at 23) this court is not seeking to determine whether a sham has been perpetrated. Consequently, this court has repeatedly stated that a law attacked on equal protection grounds is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, see, e.g., Laufenberg v. Cosmetology Examining Board, 87 Wis. 2d 175, 181, 274 N.W.2d 618 (1979), which presumption attends the use of the rational basis test. Thus, although both sec. 18 and equal protection seek to determine whether one group is being accorded favored status, the difference between the sec. 18 and the equal protection contexts is this: In sec. 18 cases, because the legislature is alleged to have violated a law of constitutional stature which mandates the form in which bills must pass, the court will not indulge in a presumption of constitutionality, for to do so would make a mockery of the procedural constitutional requirement . . .. By contrast, in equal protection, as stated above, the court will presume constitutionality . . . given the quite different purposes of sec. 18 and equal protection. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 918-19 n.6. In Brookfield, there was no indication that the legislature had adequately considered or discussed the legislation in question that was passed as part of the budget bill. The record in the present case is replete with evidence that the MPCP was introduced by a significant number of legislators and was debated extensively by the legislature and its various committees and agencies. The program was proposed in several consecutive years. The Assembly Committee on Urban Education held a public hearing on the proposed program. The program was passed as a separate, single subject bill by the assembly. Unfortunately, the senate included it as part of the multi-subject budget bill, thereby creating the problem we address here. We are aware that time constraints sometimes force legislators to pass a variety of worthy legislation in one multi-subject package. However, multi-subject bills reduce accountability to the public and are very susceptible to the charge of violating the procedural requirements of Wis. Const. art. IV, sec. 18. The legislature could avoid litigatory challenges of this nature by using separate, single subject bills for legislation that is not plainly of statewide concern. [5] However, we find no evidence in this case that suggests the program was smuggled or logrolled through the legislature without the benefit of deliberate legislative consideration. [8] As mentioned earlier, the MPCP legislation was passed by the assembly as a single subject bill. Even though the senate included the MPCP as part of the budget bill, the budget bill was debated by the senate and the senate specifically amended the MPCP prior to enactment of the budget bill. Clearly, the legislature intelligently participate[d] in considering this program. Id. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, it is proper for us to apply a presumption of constitutionality to the process in which the MPCP was enacted into law. [9] Applying a presumption of constitutionality in this case was expressly authorized by the Brookfield court where we stated: [U]nder sec. 18, full scrutiny of the legislature, rather than the substituted process of smuggling through is the best determinant of need. Just as we seek not to err on the one hand by employing an inappropriate standard of deference through presuming constitutionality where such a presumption would render sec. 18 meaningless, so equally we seek not to err on the other hand by substituting our judgment for that of an attentive legislature. . . . If such legislation is passed after full consideration . . . that will be the proper time to engage in the presumption of constitutionality . . .. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 918-19 n.6 (emphasis added). The burden of overcoming this presumption of constitutionality falls upon Chaney, et al., the parties attacking the statute. Even though we conclude that there is no indication that the MPCP was smuggled or logrolled through the legislature without due consideration and we apply a presumption of constitutionality to such process, our analysis does not end here. Article IV, sec. 18 specifies certain procedural requirements that must be satisfied if legislation is found to be private or local. The previous discussion concerning legislative consideration is only relevant to the presumption of constitutionality portion of the analysis. It has no effect on our determination of whether the MPCP is a private or local bill. We now turn to the determination of whether the MPCP is private or local legislation. This court has developed three prongs of analysis for cases involving a challenge to legislation as being private or local. The first prong of analysis involves legislation that is specific on its face as to particular people, places or things that allegedly runs afoul of art. IV, sec. 18. See Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 85 N.W. 131 (1901); Monka v. State Conservation Comm., 202 Wis. 39, 231 N.W. 273 (1930); Soo Line R. Co. v. Transportation Dep't, 101 Wis. 2d 64, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981); and Milwaukee Brewers v. DH&SS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986). These cases explain that such legislation is private or local within the meaning of sec. 18 and therefore prohibited unless the general subject matter of the provision relates to a state responsibility of statewide dimension and its enactment will have a direct and immediate effect on a specific statewide concern or interest. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 911. The second prong of analysis involves legislation that is not specific on its face, but which involves classifications and allegedly runs afoul of the specific prohibitions of art. IV, sec. 31, which was adopted as an aid in a sec. 18 analysis. Section 31 explains specific areas in which the legislature is prohibited from enacting any special or private laws. The resolution of these cases depends on whether the legislation falls into the category of matters upon which the legislature is competent to legislate pursuant to sec. 32 notwithstanding the prohibition of sec. 31. Id. The third, and final, prong of analysis involves legislation that is not specific on its face, involves classifications, does not violate the provisions of sec. 31, but allegedly runs afoul of sec. 18. See Brookfield v. Milwaukee Sewerage, 144 Wis. 2d 896, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988). A statute creating a closed classification can be the same as legislation that is specific on its face to a certain locality. In Brookfield, we determined that such cases must be analyzed consistent with the classification concepts developed in cases under art. IV, secs. 31 and 32. Id. at 912. [6] Five primary elements comprise the Brookfield test. These elements are as follows: First, the classification employed by the legislature must be based on substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another. Second, the classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law. Third, the classification must not be based on existing circumstances only. Instead, the classification must be subject to being open, such that other cities could join the class. Fourth, when a law applies to a class, it must apply equally to all members of the class. . . .[F]ifth, the characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of the other classes so as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 907-09. While these tests are similar to those used in the equal protection context, they are necessarily differently applied because sec. 18 and equal protection address quite different concerns. The rationale for using the five-factor test was aptly explained in Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 912-14 n.5. We shall not endeavor a reexplanation of that rationale here. We shall state only that sec. 18 addresses the form in which the legislation is enacted and not the substance of the legislation. In the classification legislation context, it is necessary to use the five-factor test to determine exactly what the substance of the legislation is in order to determine whether the procedural requirements of Wis. Const. art. IV, sec. 18 apply. Thus, although the five-factor test is used in both a sec. 18 context and an equal protection context, the tests are necessarily differently applied, given the quite different purposes of sec. 18 and equal protection. Id. at 913 n.5. Notwithstanding the fact that the title of sec. 119.23, Stats., expressly mentions Milwaukee, the text of the MPCP as well as its placement in the statutes suggests that it involves a classification and should be analyzed under Brookfield rather than Milwaukee Brewers. The MPCP applies to any school district in a city of the first class. It is not limited to Milwaukee because Madison presently meets the population requirement and could become a city of the first class by a simple declaration. While the title of legislation expressly refers to Milwaukee, titles of statutes are not part of the statute itself. [10] We find no reason why this rule should not encompass legislative bills as well. Therefore, the MPCP is similar to the statute in Brookfield in that it involves a classification and not expressly a specific person, place or thing. Thus, we are required to apply the Brookfield five-factor test to determine whether the MPCP is private or local legislation. [11] The first element of the Brookfield test requires that the classification employed by the legislature must be based on substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another. The MPCP does not create a new classification, but involves a classification that has consistently been recognized and accepted by this court: namely, cities of the first class. Cities of the first class is defined under sec. 62.05, Stats., as cities with a population of 150,000 or more. Presently, Milwaukee is the only city to declare itself a city of the first class in the state of Wisconsin. [7] In Brookfield, we acknowledged that the mere size of a particular city does not necessarily justify treating that city differently than any other city in the state. Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 916. However, cities of the first class, by virtue of their large population and concentration of poverty, are substantially distinct from other cities. In Camasco Realty Co. v. Milwaukee, 242 Wis. 357, 377, 8 N.W.2d 372 (1943), where the challenged law pertained to cities of the first class, we noted that the requirements of a metropolitan city like Milwaukee as against the smaller municipal corporations of the state are so obvious that any other result would be opposed to the public welfare. In State ex rel. Nyberg v. Bd. of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 570, 577, 209 N.W. 683 (1926), this court upheld a statute regarding first class city school districts and stated that there is a substantial basis for classifying for school purposes the large communities embraced in cities of the first class as established under our law and the smaller communities of the state. School districts located in areas with monumentally oppressive poverty problems as found in first class cities have particular educational problems as well. These problems were recognized also in Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 482-83, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989). As demonstrated by dropout rates, welfare statistics, and population data, the Milwaukee Public School District has significantly greater education and poverty problems than any other school district in the state. Various statistical analyses, while not entirely consistent, dramatically show the need for legislative attention. The dropout rate for the Milwaukee Public Schools is higher than any other area in the state. For example, in the 1988-89 school year, the dropout rate for students in grades 9-12 in the MPS reached 14.4 percent. [12] In contrast, the public school dropout rate for the state at large during the 1988-89 school year was 3.11 percent, with no county, other than Milwaukee County, having a dropout rate of greater than 4.3 percent. [13] During the 1988-89 fiscal year, Wisconsin spent $2.4 billion, or $499.57 per capita, on public welfare. Wisconsin ranked sixth among all states for welfarerelated expenditures. [14] In 1988, over 50 percent of the general public assistance in Wisconsin was spent in Milwaukee County alone and the city of Milwaukee comprises about two-thirds of the population of Milwaukee County. Furthermore, of the $485 million spent in Wisconsin in 1988 for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, $213 million was allocated to Milwaukee County. [15] [8] The statistical data clearly illustrates that the socioeconomic disparities and the educational problems are greater in the large urban area of Milwaukee than any other part of Wisconsin. By definition, first class cities encompass large urban cities in Wisconsin, such as the city of Milwaukee. Therefore, we find that the classification of first class cities is based on substantial distinctions which make the class really different from all others. The first element of the Brookfield test is satisfied. The second element of the Brookfield test requires that the classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law. Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the MPCP was that it was an experiment intended to address a perceived problem of inadequate educational opportunities for disadvantaged children. Davis, 159 Wis. 2d 164-65. We agree with this conclusion. Improving the quality of education in Wisconsin is, without a doubt, a matter of statewide importance. It is apparent that on a national scale the educational needs of many students are not being met by the present educational structure and options. Average School Aptitude Test (SAT) scores fell from 978 in 1960 to just 870 in 1980. [16] Nearly 25 percent of public high school students drop out before graduation and the dropout rates for minorities often reach 50 percent. These are some of the highest dropout rates in the western world. [17] The educational problems that the nation is experiencing are also evident in the Milwaukee Public Schools, where 55-60 percent of MPS students do not graduate from high school or do not graduate in a sixyear period of time. A recent report by the Greater Milwaukee Education Trust states that only 40-45 percent of the students who start high school in the MPS graduate in four, five or six years. This completion rate is down from 57 percent in 1984. Of those who do graduate from high school, 36 percent graduate with a D average. [18] Students of MPS, in general, score below the national average on the basic skills tests, and minority students score dramatically below the average. The grade point average (GPA) on a scale of 4.0 for MPS students in general is 1.60, whereas the GPA for African-American students in the MPS is just 1.31. [19] The consequences of school dropouts and inadequate education are shocking. High school dropouts comprise 75 percent of the prison population and 80 percent of the families receiving Aid for Families with Dependent Children. Only 55 percent of the male dropouts under age thirty have jobs and only 20 percent have full-time jobs. [20] Recently, researchers have attempted to discover the reasons underlying inadequate public instruction. A Brookings Institution study examined data from more than 60,000 students in 1,000 public and private schools to test the relationship between 220 different variables. The study concluded that the three most important factors that affected student achievement were student ability, school organization, and family background. Chubb & Moe, Politics, Markets & America's Schools 140 (1990). The factor which is most amenable to legislative efforts appears to be school organization. In this respect, the researchers found that by itself, autonomy from bureaucracy is capable of making the difference between effective and ineffective organizations organizations that would differ by a year in their contributions to student achievement. [21] Id. at 181. We find especially interesting the study's conclusion that the educational credentials of teachers, teachers' scores on competency tests, how teachers are paid and other formal qualities do not make a significant difference on student achievement. Id. at 186. In response to the conclusions reached by the Brookings Institution study and others, the MPCP was drafted to include two main features to help fulfill the statewide purpose of improving education. The first feature empowers selected low-income parents to choose the educational opportunities that they deem best for their children. Concerned parents have the greatest incentive to see that their children receive the best education possible. Parental choice allows parents to send their children to nonsectarian private schools which, except for the statutory responsibilities of the State Superintendent, are autonomously operated free from the bureaucracy of the public school system. In so providing, the program will engender educational success competition between the public and private educational sectors for students of low-income families. However, the program is not an abandonment of the public school system. Rather, the MPCP would affect at most only 1 percent of the students in the MPS, giving the program a very small window of opportunity to test the effectiveness of an alternative to the MPS. Furthermore, the MPCP contains a second feature which not only should benefit the MPS but also the state at large. The second main feature of the MPCP creates an extensive data compilation and reporting process which the state can use to measure the effects of choice and competition in education. The experimental nature of the program is evident from these detailed compilation and reporting requirements. The experimental nature of the program can also be inferred from the fact that the program, as originally drafted, would have been effective for only a five-year period of time. However, in a partial veto, the governor removed the five-year time limit. It is unclear whether the governor felt that the time limitation was too short or too long. It is apparent, though, that the governor and the legislature directed the gathering of extensive information for the purpose of reacting to this experimental program. The success of the program is dependent upon the participation of numerous and diverse nonsectarian private schools such that the fate of the program does not rest on the operations of one or a few schools. The record indicates that at least nine private schools in Milwaukee filed an intent to participate in the MPCP when it was first implemented. We assume no other city in Wisconsin offers as many private schools as Milwaukee. The significant availability of private schools is so necessary to a reliable sampling of alternative educational methods that it distinguishes a first class city such as Milwaukee from all other communities. [22] This experiment tests a theory of education. The possible failure in one or more private schools may be the fault of the school rather than the program's concept. Therefore, locating the program in a first class city such as Milwaukee where numerous and diverse private schools exist will enable the legislature to determine which, if any, of the private schools were most effective and why they are particularly successful in their mission of education. [9] We conclude that the classification of first class cities is germane to the purpose of the law. Clearly, improving the quality of education and educational opportunities in Wisconsin is a matter of statewide importance. The best location to experiment with legislation aimed at improving the quality of education is in a first class city, a large urban area where the socio-economic and educational disparities are greatest and the private educational choices are most abundant. The experimental nature of the MPCP places this case in direct contrast to Brookfield where we found no relationship between Milwaukee county's size and the challenged financing scheme. See Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 920. Therefore, the second element of the Brookfield test is satisfied. The third element of the Brookfield test requires that the classification not be based only on existing circumstances. Rather, the classification must be subject to being open, such that other cities could join the class. Granted, the title of the statute is Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. However, the statute is located in ch. 119, Stats., which addresses first class city schools and is applicable, by virtue of sec. 119.01, Stats., to cities of the first class. There are two requirements for a city to be of the first class. The city must have a population of at least 150,000 and the city's mayor must make an official proclamation that the city is of the first class. See sec. 62.05, Stats. [10] Presently, Milwaukee, with a population of 628,088, is the only city in Wisconsin which is officially a first class city. However, it is not the only city in Wisconsin which qualifies for such status, nor is the classification limited only to Milwaukee. Madison is large enough to qualify as a city of the first class. Madison has a population of 191,262. If the mayor of Madison officially declares Madison to be a first class city, it will be subject to all legislation affecting cities of the first class, including the parental choice program. Therefore, we conclude that the classification is subject to being open and is not based only on existing circumstances. The third element of the Brookfield test is satisfied. [11] The fourth element of the Brookfield test requires that the law be applied equally to all members of the class. As mentioned earlier, there is only one member of the class at the present time. Milwaukee is the only official first class city. However, if Madison or any other qualifying city were to become an official first class city, then there appears nothing to indicate that the benefits and obligations of the MPCP would not equally apply to these additional members. Therefore, we find that the law would apply equally to all cities of the first class. The fourth element of the Brookfield test is also satisfied. [12] The fifth, and final, element of the Brookfield test which is applicable to the present case requires that the characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of the other classes so as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation. The satisfaction of this element has already been addressed. Supra at 527-529. The immense disparity in the socio-economic conditions and educational problems in the MPS as well as the greatest potential private educational choices in the urban area of Milwaukee create the ideal testing ground for experimental legislation such as the MPCP. Therefore, we find that the MPCP also satisfies the fifth element of the Brookfield test. [13] The MPCP satisfies all elements of the Brookfield classification test. Therefore, we hold that the MPCP is not a private or local bill within the meaning of Wis. Const. art. IV, sec. 18 and, thus, not subject to its procedural requirements. We emphasize that the MPCP is not a private or local bill because it satisfies the applicable tests, not because of the amount of legislative consideration afforded to it.