Opinion ID: 779234
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merrell Dow Inc. v. Thompson

Text: 12 Federal courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions that arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Most federal-question jurisdiction cases are those in which federal law creates a cause of action. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). A case may also arise under federal law where it appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims. Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). However, the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813, 106 S.Ct. 3229. Rather, courts should approach the issue of federal question jurisdiction as one requiring sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal question. Id. at 810, 106 S.Ct. 3229. Accordingly, when determining the propriety of federal question jurisdiction, courts look both to congressional intent and the nature of the federal interest at stake. See id. at 810, 814 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 3229. 13 These two factors are illustrated in Merrell Dow. There, the plaintiffs brought a tort lawsuit in state court against the manufacturer of the drug Bendectin, claiming that the drug caused birth defects in two infants whose mothers ingested the drug during pregnancy. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Bendectin had been misbranded in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. They alleged that the drug's label did not provide adequate warnings of its danger, and that the violation of the FDCA constituted a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The manufacturer removed the case to federal court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction. 14 The Supreme Court phrased the question as follows: [W]hether the incorporation of a federal standard in a state-law private action, when Congress has intended that there not be a federal private action for violations of that federal standard, makes the action one `arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States,' 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court answered that it did not. 15 The Court emphasized that Congress did not intend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to create a private right of action for its violation. The Court held that Congress's choice to foreclose a private right of action was tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction. 478 U.S. at 813, 106 S.Ct. 3229. The Court reasoned: 16 It would flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for violation of the federal statute. We think it would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because the violation is said to be a rebuttable presumption or a proximate cause under state law, rather than a federal action under federal law. 17 Id. at 812, 106 S.Ct. 3229. 18 Wander's case is materially indistinguishable from Merrell Dow. Wander would have the federal court exercise jurisdiction over his state-law damage suit, premised on a violation of the ADA, even though Congress intended that such ADA violations not give rise to a federal cause of action for damages. Federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim is not created just because a violation of federal law is an element of the state law claim. We think it is clear that the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction under these circumstances would fly in the face of clear congressional intent. We agree with the district court that Wander's state law cause of action claim does not arise under federal law even though it is premised on a violation of federal law.