Opinion ID: 1200348
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession with the Intent to Sell Marijuana as an Aggravated Felony

Text: Rendon next argues that the BIA and the IJ incorrectly found his Kansas conviction to be an aggravated felony for purposes of cancellation of removal, asylum, and withholding of removal. [3] As an applicant for cancellation of removal and asylum, Rendon bears the burden of proving that he is eligible for the discretionary relief he is seeking. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 1229a(c)(4)(A); Salviejo-Fernandez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2006). When the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). An applicant for asylum or for cancellation of removal is not eligible for these forms of relief if he has been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (making individuals convicted of a particularly serious crime [who] constitute [] a danger to the community of the United States ineligible for asylum); 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (classifying aggravated felonies as particularly serious crime[s] for purposes of § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)); 1229b(a)(3) (making aliens convicted of any aggravated felony ineligible for cancellation of removal). An applicant for withholding of removal is ineligible for relief if he has been convicted of certain types of aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (making aliens who have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime ineligible for withholding of removal); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (defining particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of removal to include aggravated felonies with prison terms of more than five years and giving discretion to the Attorney General to determine that aggravated felonies with shorter prison terms are also particularly serious crimes); Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir.2007) (We hold that the Attorney General's construction of § 1231(b)(3)(B) as providing him with discretion to create a strong presumption that drug trafficking offenses are particularly serious crimes is not impermissible. Under Chevron, we therefore defer to that construction.); In re Y.L., 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (B.I.A.2002) (establishing the presumption that aggravated felonies involving unlawful trafficking in controlled substances constitute `particularly serious crimes' under § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)). The first step in determining Rendon's eligibility for relief, therefore, is to decide whether Rendon's Kansas conviction is an aggravated felony. In determining whether a state drug crime fits the general definition of an aggravated felony, we first make a categorical comparison of the elements of the statute of conviction to the generic definition, and decide whether the conduct proscribed by [the statute] is broader than, and so does not categorically fall within, this generic definition. Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2003); see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). The statutory definition of aggravated felony includes felonies involving illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . ., including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). This statutory definition has given rise to two possible routes for a state drug felony to qualify as an aggravated felony. See In re Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 541-43 (B.I.A.1992). First, under the phrase illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, a state drug crime is an aggravated felony if it contains a trafficking element. Salviejo-Fernandez, 455 F.3d at 1066. Second, under the phrase including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18), a state drug crime is an aggravated felony if it would be punishable as a felony under the federal drug laws. [4] See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 127 S.Ct. 625, 630, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006) (The [Immigration and Nationality Act] makes [an alien] guilty of an aggravated felony if he has been convicted of `illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including,' but not limited to, `a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).'); id. at 633 ([A] state offense constitutes a `felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act' only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.). Thus, our court has recognized that a state drug crime is also an aggravated felony in immigration law if it would be punishable as a felony under federal drug laws. Salviejo-Fernandez, 455 F.3d at 1066; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Rendon's conviction under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4163(a) is categorically an aggravated felony only if the fact of his conviction necessarily means that he was convicted of a crime satisfying either prong of the statutory definition, or, in other words, that § 65-4163(a) only criminalizes conduct that satisfies the definition of an aggravated felony. Section 65-4163(a) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale or have in such person's possession with the intent to sell, deliver or distribute; cultivate; prescribe; administer; deliver; distribute; or dispense a controlled substance, including marijuana. As the government concedes, § 65-4163(a) criminalizes a solicitation offense, which this court has determined does not constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir.2001). Conviction under § 65-4163(a) therefore does not necessarily mean that Rendon committed an aggravated felony. When the statute of conviction does not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony, we use the modified categorical approach to decide whether the conduct for which the alien was actually convicted qualifies as an aggravated felony. See Huerta-Guevara, 321 F.3d at 887. When applying the modified categorical approach to divisible statutes such as § 65-4163(a), we may consider the state charging document, a signed plea agreement, jury instructions, guilty pleas, transcripts of a plea proceeding and the judgment to determine which portion of the divisible statute formed the basis of the conviction. Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B). The administrative record in this case contains both the state charging document and the judgment of the Kansas conviction. [5] The judgment lists the primary offense of conviction as POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO SELL. The charging document alleges that Rendon unlawfully, intentionally, possess[ed] with intent to sell a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana. These two documents clearly indicate that Rendon was convicted of possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, not one of the other possible bases of conviction under the statute. [6] The question thus becomes whether conviction' of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell contains a trafficking element or would be punishable as a felony under federal drug laws. See Salviejo-Fernandez, 455 F.3d at 1066. The statutes and case law provide little guidance on what constitutes a trafficking element. An aggravated felony is defined in part as illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . ., including a drug trafficking crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). However, the statute does not further define trafficking. The Supreme Court has stated that ordinarily `trafficking' means some sort of commercial dealing. Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 127 S.Ct. 625, 630, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006). Our own court has somewhat circuitously stated that a drug offense with a trafficking element is `illicit trafficking.' Cazarez-Gutierrez, 382 F.3d at 910 n. 5. The Third Circuit has provided a slightly more concrete definition, stating that [t]o contain a trafficking element, a state felony must involve `the unlawful trading or dealing of a controlled substance.' Jeune v. Att'y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir.2002)). The Sixth Circuit has followed the same approach as the Third Circuit, but noted that under the Third Circuit definition [i]t is not clear whether possession with intent to resell constitutes `unlawful trading or dealing,' and thus trafficking. Garcia-Echaverria v. United States, 376 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 313). Nevertheless, we need not elaborate beyond the Supreme Court's statement in Lopez to determine that Rendon's Kansas conviction contains a trafficking element. Possession of marijuana with intent to sell necessarily means that Rendon possessed the marijuana with the intent to engage in some sort of commercial dealing. Lopez, 127 S.Ct. at 630. We therefore hold that possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell contains a trafficking element and is an aggravated felony. [7] Because the Kansas conviction is an aggravated felony, Rendon is ineligible for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). An aggravated felony is considered to be a particularly serious crime that makes Rendon ineligible for asylum as well. Id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii); 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). Finally, an aggravated felony containing a drug trafficking element is presumed to be a particularly serious crime which would make Rendon ineligible for withholding of removal. He has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B); 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); Miguel-Miguel 500 F.3d at 949. We therefore deny his petition for review of the BIA's determination that his Kansas conviction is an aggravated felony, which makes him ineligible for the relief he requested. The petition for review is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.