Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Guilt trial instructional issues

Text: A standard reasonable doubt instruction, as set forth in CALJIC No. 2.90 (5th ed.1988), was given with certain modifications at defendant's guilt trial. Defendant claims the instruction violated his constitutional rights to a jury trial, a fundamentally fair trial, and a reliable determination of guilt and penalty. In particular, he urges that the phrases moral evidence, moral certainty, and abiding conviction, as contained in this instruction, are contradictory, archaic, and incomprehensible to a modern jury. [26] However, the United States Supreme Court upheld this instruction, despite concerns about its language ( Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 [affg. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th 155, 185-186, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862] ), [27] and we have consistently rejected arguments similar to those defendant makes here. (E.g., People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 601, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492 ( Cook ); People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 637, 36 Cal. Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363 ( Robinson ); People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 429, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1 ( Maury ); People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 668, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175 ( Seaton ); People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 346-347, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 520-521, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 385-386, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) We do so again. [28]
Defendant urges the court erred by refusing a proffered defense instruction that a witness, for purposes of the witness-killing special-circumstance allegation, must be someone who actually witnessed a crime by the accused, and by later instructing that, for purposes of the special circumstance, a witness to a crime does not necessarily require an eyewitness. The contention lacks merit. As we have previously explained, the witness-killing special circumstance is not limited to eyewitnesses.
The trial court gave a standard general instruction (see CALJIC No. 2.51) on motive (motive is not an element and need not be shown, but the presence or absence of motive may tend to establish guilt or innocence; the jury is the exclusive judge of the weight of motive evidence). The court also instructed, in standard form (see CALJIC No. 2.71), on extrajudicial admissions by the defendant (an admission is a statement by defendant which, while not itself an acknowledgment of guilt, tends to prove guilt when considered with other evidence; the jury is the exclusive judge whether defendant made such an admission and, if so, whether it is true in whole or in part; an extrajudicial admission by defendant should be viewed with caution). Over defense objection, the trial court also gave an adapted version of CALJIC No. 2.71.7, stating there was evidence from which the jury might find that an oral statement of motive was made by the defendant before the offense with which he is charged was committed. In standard form, this instruction further advised that the jury was the exclusive judge whether such a statement was made, and that evidence of such an oral statement should be viewed with caution. On appeal, as below, defendant urges that the issue presented by CALJIC No. 2.71.7 was adequately addressed by the general instructions on motive and extrajudicial admissions. As given in his case, defendant contends, CALJIC No. 2.71.7 was an improper pinpoint instruction, cumulative to those described above, which gave undue emphasis to a vital part of the purported evidence. The jury was essentially told as a matter of fact that the accused had motive to commit the homicide in issue. As a result, he argues, he suffered violations of his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable verdict. However, we have held that both CALJIC Nos. 2.71 and 2.71.7 are standard cautionary instructions, intended for the defendant's benefit, which must be given sua sponte where applicable. (E.g., People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 194, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1021, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627 ( Lang ).) As the People note, defendant does not argue that CALJIC No. 2.71.7, as given in this case, was unsupported by evidence. [29] We have indicated that CALJIC No. 2.71 is broad enough to cover all out-of-court statements by the defendant offered to prove his guilt. Thus, the defendant suffers no prejudice when CALJIC No. 2.71.7 is not also given. ( Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1021, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) But this is not to say the defendant does suffer error or prejudice when both are given, as justified by the evidence. Defendant's claim that the instruction was biased in form also lacks merit. Far from presenting motive as a predetermined fact, the instruction merely stated that the jury may find the defendant expressed such a motive and must view any such expression with caution. No error occurred. In any event, inclusion of CALJIC No. 2.71.7 in the instructions was harmless by any applicable standard. As noted, the principal effect of the instruction was to reemphasize, on defendant's behalf, that his inculpatory extrajudicial statements, if any, should be viewed with caution. Insofar as the instruction focused on evidence that defendant had motives to commit the charged crimes, that evidence was overwhelming. CALJIC No. 2.71.7 cannot have altered the jury's views on the subject to defendant's prejudice. No basis for reversal appears.
After the jury was instructed, but before guilt deliberations commenced, defendant raised a concern about CALJIC No. 2.71, the general instruction regarding extrajudicial admissions by the defendant, as read to the jury. Defense counsel suggested that the instruction, as given, was not pinpoint enough, because it failed to specify that the admonition to view such statements with caution did not apply to exculpatory portions of the defendant's statement. The trial court ruled that the instruction as read required no supplementation. On appeal, defendant urges the trial court erred by giving CALJIC No. 2.71 over defense objection, because the jury could interpret the instruction's definition of admissions to be viewed with caution as including exculpatory portions of a defendant's statement. The instruction unfairly compromised his defense, he asserts, because that defense was based primarily on his own testimony. He claims violations of his constitutional rights to a fair trial and a reliable verdict. We rejected a similar challenge to CALJIC No. 2.71 in People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559. As we noted, the instruction, considered as a whole, [does] not tell the jury to distrust those portions of defendant's statements ... that [do] not either acknowledge or tend to show his guilt. ( Id. at p. 129, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559.) Moreover, insofar as defendant claims the instruction hampered his defense by inviting the jury to view his trial testimony with caution, the assertion is patently without merit. Both in standard form and as modified in this case, the instruction addresses only the subject of extrajudicial admissions. [30] Nothing in CALJIC No. 2.71 admonishes the jury to be skeptical of statements made by the defendant on the stand. No error occurred.
The court instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.06, that if the jury found defendant attempted to suppress evidence, the jury could consider this as a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt, but must judge for itself the weight and significance of such evidence. The court also gave CALJIC Nos. 2.01, regarding circumstantial evidence generally, and 2.02, regarding circumstantial evidence of a specific mental state. Among other things, these instructions explained that all circumstances leading to an inference of guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; that circumstantial evidence cannot support a conviction unless it cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion; that, between two reasonable interpretations of the evidence, the one more consistent with innocence must be accepted; but that a reasonable interpretation must be accepted over an unreasonable one. Defendant urges that all such instructions diluted the presumption of innocence, reduced the prosecution's burden of proof, and created a mandatory conclusive presumption of guilt, in derogation of his constitutional rights to due process and reliable factfinding. As defendant concedes, we have rejected similar arguments on many occasions. (E.g., People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 127, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400 ( Jurado ) [CALJIC No. 2.01]; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1139-1140, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321 [same]; Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th 592, 637, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363 [same]; People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 330, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758 [CALJIC No. 2.06]; Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1, 103, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30 [same]; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 428, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1 [CALJIC No. 2.01]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 346-347, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [same]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223-1224, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 [CALJIC No. 2.06].) Defendant presents no compelling reason to reconsider these authorities. We find no error.
The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to section 1127c and CALJIC No. 2.52, that a person's flight immediately after a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, cannot alone establish guilt, but may be considered together with other proven facts in deciding the accused's guilt or innocence. Defendant urges the instruction was improper, because he freely admitted his identity with respect to all the charges, disputing only the nature and degree of the offenses as determined by his mental state. Because his flight following the crimes had no logical tendency to resolve that issue, defendant asserts, the instruction allowed the jury to infer, on an arbitrary basis, the most culpable mental state, and thus the maximum degree of guilt. This, he argues, violated his constitutional right to due process. We disagree. At the outset, defendant's claim that he admitted he committed crimes against the Mishells and Reyna is, in significant part, wrong. As to Reyna's death, defendant testified that Reyna pulled a gun, which went off accidentally during the ensuing struggle. (See discussion, ante. ) In closing argument, defense counsel reminded the jury that defendant's testimony was the only direct evidence of what happened to Reyna. Counsel alluded to the possibility that the killing was accidental, and therefore urged the jury to acquit defendant of any crime against Reyna. The jury was instructed that an accidental killing is not a crime, and that any reasonable doubt on the issue must be resolved in defendant's favor. We have explained that the flight instruction, as the jury would understand it, does not address the defendant's specific mental state at the time of the offenses, or his guilt of a particular crime, but advises of circumstances suggesting his consciousness that he has committed some wrongdoing. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 327, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374 ( Bolin ); People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423 ( Crandell ).) Thus, the flight instructionamply supported by evidence of defendant's sudden departure for Mexico within days of Reyna's disappearance was manifestly relevant to the issue whether defendant held an honest belief that Reyna's death was an accident for which he bore no criminal responsibility. In any event, we have repeatedly rejected the argument that instructions on consciousness of guilt, including instructions regarding the defendant's flight following the crime, permit the jury to draw impermissible inferences about the defendant's mental state, or are otherwise inappropriate where mental state, not identity, is the principal disputed issue. (E.g., Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th 72, 125, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591 ( Moon ); People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 983, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 327, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 871, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 579-580, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893.) As we have said, even where the defendant concedes some aspect of a criminal charge, the prosecution is entitled to bolster its case, which requires proof of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, by presenting evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. (E.g., Moon, supra, at p. 28, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; Nicolaus, supra, at pp. 579-580, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893.) No reason appears to reconsider the soundness of these decisions and conclusions. We find no error.