Opinion ID: 2621329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Administrative License Suspension Hearing [9]

Text: The Legislature enacted RCW 46.20.308 to address the increasing numbers of individuals who drive on Washington roads under the influence of alcohol. The statute provides for a breath test and specifies the consequences of its results. If the breath test results in a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or more, or if the driver refuses to consent to a test, the driver's license may be suspended or revoked at an administrative hearing. [10] RCW 46.20.308(2)(a), (b). This hearing is to be conducted within 60 days. RCW 46.20.308(8). Because the hearing is not governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, [11] it is limited in scope. It will only cover the issues of whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug. Id. Furthermore, under RCW 46.20.329, which governs the license suspension hearing, the hearing officer may be the director of the Department of Licensing or one of the employees of the agency legal training is not required. [12] Reviewing the legislative history to RCW 46.20.308, the public policy, which was intended to be furthered by its enactment, is clear. Similar to the states of Hawaii, Idaho, and Illinois, the Washington Legislature enacted this statute to insure swift and certain punishment for those who drink and drive. RCWA 46.20.308 Historical and Statutory Notes, Legis. finding, intent1983 ch. 165 at 387. The Legislature found this statute to be necessary for the  immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, to free Washington roads of drivers who take the wheel under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. RCWA 46.20.308 Historical and Statutory Notes, Effective dates1995 ch. 332 at 386 (emphasis added). The suspension and revocation hearings provided in the statute are expressly separate from the judicial action applicable to a person who is tried and convicted of DUI in court. 1983 FINAL LEGIS. REPORT, 48th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. at 96. To expedite the suspension and revocation hearings, RCW 46.20.308(8) relaxes evidentiary rules providing that the sworn report ... of the law enforcement officer and any other evidence accompanying the report ... and the certifications authorized by the criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction shall be admissible without further evidentiary foundation. Because this statute allows the arresting officer's report to come in as prima facie evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was under the influence, officers rarely attend the administrative hearings to testify unless they are subpoenaed. It is evident that the Legislature intended the administrative license suspension hearing to be adjudicated in a short span of time. In this case, the issue of probable cause was resolved in an administrative license revocation hearing before the conclusion of Vasquez's criminal prosecution. [13] We do not have a complete record of the administrative hearing, the only evidence of the hearing being the order of dismissal. CP at 44. However, it is apparent that the hearing was conducted with little formality. The order states that the hearing was conducted telephonically between Vasquez, his attorney, and the hearing officer. Id. The State submitted two exhibits: (1) a copy of the report of breath/blood test for alcohol; and (2) the officer's report and accompanying documents. Id. at 44-78. No witnesses, not even Sergeant Jones, appeared to testify. The hearing officer made his decision based solely on the two exhibits that were submitted by the State. [14] In a criminal trial, an officer's report is primarily used to refresh the testifying officer's memory of the events in question. Here, once he was refreshed with his report, Sergeant Jones was able to testify at the criminal trial in much greater detail to his recollection of the events preceding his stop of Vasquez, which constituted probable cause for the stop. [15] By contrast, there was neither testimony nor opportunity for direct cross-examination in the administrative hearing. The hearing officer adjudicated the issue of probable cause on limited evidence. In Vasquez's criminal prosecution, the issue of probable cause was litigated exhaustively. [16]