Opinion ID: 621032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ADA & PWDCRA Claims

Text: Donald asserts that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and the PWDCRA, and that this disability motivated Sybra’s decision to terminate her. To state a claim under the ADA, Donald must establish that she is an individual with a disability, that she is otherwise qualified to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation, and that Sybra discharged her solely because of the handicap. Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996)). The PWDCRA “substantially mirrors the ADA, and resolution of a plaintiff’s ADA claim will generally, though not always, resolve the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim.” Cotter, 287 F.3d at 597. Donald provides no argument as to why we should treat the claims separately, nor does our review indicate as much. To broaden the definition of “disability,” Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which became effective on January 1, 2009; we have held that those amendments are not retroactive. Milholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 565 (6th Cir. 2009). As Donald’s termination occurred in 2008, the prior version of the ADA applies, which defined a “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). Donald argues that she falls under the third prong of the disability definition, in that Sybra regarded her as having an impairment. In support of this argument, she puts forth Houston-Barocko’s statement that Donald “should be disabled like [HoustonBarocko’s] husband because [Donald] had all the medical issues.” But, the prior version of the ADA makes clear that in order to be regarded as disabled, one must be regarded as having an impairment that limits a major life activity. This difference is technical, but important. And Donald agrees. In her brief, she cites to Todd v. City of Cincinnati, 436 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2006), in which we reversed a grant of summary judgment for the No. 10-2153 Donald v. Sybra, Inc. Page 10 employer. In Todd, a former police officer, who had previously been granted a disability pension, sought employment as a firearms instructor. Id. at 636. City officials denied him employment because they had doubts as to whether he could “physically do the demanding work required.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But, the basis for reversal was not that city officials attached the word “disabled” to the applicant, but their belief that he could not do the work because of his disability—that is, that he was impaired from engaging in the major life activity of working. Donald puts forth no such evidence here. At no point does she assert evidence indicating that Houston-Barocko, or any other Sybra employee, thought her unable to engage in a major life activity. Indeed, Donald notes in her brief that everyone at Arby’s, including Houston-Barocko, believed that she was a good employee. Under the prior version of the ADA, Donald cannot argue that she was regarded as disabled. We need not determine whether the 2009 amendments would change this outcome. Examination of the statement’s context further guts Donald’s argument. Houston-Barocko allegedly made the statement, as previously mentioned, in passing during a personal conversation, at least two months before the termination occurred. It was said in a manner neither to insult Donald nor to imply that she could not accomplish her work, but to assist her. Could animus or discrimination potentially be inferred from such a statement? Perhaps. But we need only consider “reasonable inferences,” which this is not, in Donald’s favor. Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). This isolated remark establishes the whole of Donald’s ADA and PWDCRA claims. With nothing more, these claims cannot survive Sybra’s motion for summary judgment. The district court correctly dismissed them.