Opinion ID: 1058506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: prosecutorial misconduct and witness jarvis shipp

Text: The defendant complains that prior to trial, Shipp attributed various acts to Prentiss Phillips, not to the defendant, and failed to identify the defendant as a co-perpetrator in these crimes. The defendant specifically alleges violations of Brady, 373 U.S. at 87,83 S.Ct. 1194 and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The defendant asserts that the prosecution withheld information of: (1) an informal wink and a nod ... in exchange for Shipp's testimony, by which the state would not seek the death penalty against him if he went to trial; and (2) the transcript of a hearing held on Shipp's motion to suppress his own statement given to police (which had been denied), in which Shipp testified to a motive why he had confessed to the crime [which] was dramatically at odds with the claimed motives he (and the State's prosecutors) told the jury were his courageous reasons to do so (remorse for the victim and a desire to make amends to the victim's family). The defendant claims he requested exculpatory information during pretrial discovery; the state failed to produce the information; and the information would have impeached Shipp's credibility. The duty to disclose exculpatory evidence extends to all favorable information irrespective of whether the evidence is admissible at trial. Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn.2001). The prosecution's duty to disclose Brady material also applies to evidence affecting the credibility of a government witness, including evidence of any agreement or promise of leniency given to the witness in exchange for favorable testimony against an accused. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56. While Brady does not require the state to investigate for the defendant, it does burden the prosecution with the responsibility of disclosing statements of witnesses favorable to the defense. State v. Reynolds, 671 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984). However, this duty does not extend to information that the defense already possesses, or is able to obtain, or to information not in the possession or control of the prosecution or another governmental agency. State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn.Crim. App.1992). In order to prove a due process violation under Brady, the defendant must show the state suppressed material information. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn.1995). Undisclosed information is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (citations omitted); Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 58. Furthermore, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. To establish materiality, an accused is not required to demonstrate by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Therefore, [t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Id.
During the defendant's trial, Jarvis Shipp testified on direct examination that the state had not made him any promises in exchange for his testimony and that he was testifying freely and voluntarily. On cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred between defense counsel and Shipp: Q: ... Let me ask you this. Do you expect some typealthough there's not a formal deal, do you expect some type of consideration for your testimony here today? A: Yes, because the simple fact I'm facing the death penalty. Q: Okay. So you do expect to gain something in your case by testifying here today, correct? A: If it's in the progress[sic]. ... Q: Okay. So let me ask you this. You feel like by telling the story that you've told today that that could help you, correct? A: Yes. ... Q: And you feel that if you help them convict Mr. Robinson that they might not seek that death penalty against you, right? A: No, because they stillI still could go to trial and they still get the death penalty. Q: But you're hoping that they consider that, correct? A: Yes. Q: And you're hoping that that consideration will result in you [sic] not looking at a death-penalty situation, correct? A: Correct. The defendant asserts that, in two subsequent trials, i.e., State v. Antonio Jackson and State v. Prentiss Phillips , Jarvis Shipp acknowledged he had an agreement with the state. During co-defendant Antonio Jackson's trial, Shipp initially denied that he had an agreement with the state. Later, however, he stated that his attorney had informed him that if he pled guilty, he would receive a sentence of life with the possibility of parole or less. Shipp further stated that, by testifying at Jackson's trial, he was hoping for a better deal from the state. Later in co-defendant Prentiss Phillips' trial, Shipp admitted that he intended to enter a guilty plea as to his involvement in the events. He further stated, I expect my life to be saved. At the defendant's hearing on his motion for new trial, Shipp's attorney, Gerald Skahan, was called to testify regarding any agreement between his client and the state. The following colloquy occurred: Q: Do you recall telling me when I asked what sort of agreement, if you had an agreement with the prosecutors, do you recall telling me basically it was a wink and a nod?... A: I did use ... those words but in a context thatlike I testified to earlier,... I was fortunate enough to have somebody that was able to give testimony.... What my personal opinion is about the way it's done, I think everybody knows what's happening. I think the defense lawyers know. I think the prosecutors know. And I think the defendants know from being in jail. But that's the way it's done here.... And as for Giglio and stuff like that, I thinkthat's where I use it in the context of a wink and a nod; ... I think everybody knows what's going to happen, but there is never an offer conveyed. There is never something saying that we will specifically do this. It's just at the end of every one of these trials, it works out. And that's what I mean by a wink and a nod. In its order denying the defendant's motion for new trial, the trial court found that at the time of the defendant's trial, Shipp did not have a deal with the state, although Shipp may have hoped his testimony would lead to a deal. It further found the state did not withhold evidence of a deal from the defendant, and the defendant thoroughly questioned Shipp at trial regarding a possible deal. The trial court concluded the state did not violate Brady or Giglio . We agree with the trial court. While Shipp may have hoped that his testimony would result in favorable treatment, the record does not establish that an agreement existed between the state and Shipp at the time of the defendant's trial. See Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 101-02 (Tenn.1995). Furthermore, the fact that Shipp later pled guilty to a lesser charge of facilitation of the offenses does not establish the existence of a prior agreement. See State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 525 (Tenn.1985). Moreover, Shipp testified in this case that he indeed expected to receive favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony. In the absence of any proof that an agreement indeed existed at the time of the Shipp's testimony at the defendant's trial, this issue is without merit.
Next, the defendant asserts that the state, in violation of Brady, failed to provide a copy of the transcript from Shipp's hearing on the motion to suppress his statement to police. In that transcript, Shipp averred that his original statement to police was given out of fear that he would be placed in a pod with members of the Traveling Vice Lords. The defendant claims that Shipp's motive of fear in giving the statement was at odds with his alleged noble motive of testifying at trial, which was to tell the truth on my behalf and on behalf of the victim's family. In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court found this information would not have affected the verdict. We likewise see little benefit that would have been derived from pointing out to the jury that Shipp's motive for giving the pretrial statement was fear, whereas his alleged motive for testifying at trial was more noble. In fact, it was the defendant's position at trial that the contents of Shipp's pretrial statement, which did not mention any involvement by the defendant, was accurate. Regardless, we conclude this transcript does not meet the Bagley test for materiality. The trial court noted Shipp testified he hoped to gain some favor with the state through his testimony. The trial court found that defense counsel had questioned Shipp extensively regarding inconsistencies between his statement to police and his testimony at trial. Accordingly, we conclude there was no reasonable probability that, had this evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. The failure to reveal this transcript did not undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. [2] The defendant also contends that by failing to provide the transcript to Shipp's suppression hearing at the conclusion of Shipp's testimony, the state violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2 by failing to provide what is commonly referred to as Jencks material. [3] Rule 26.2(a) provides that: After a witness other than the defendant has testified on direct examination, the trial court, on motion of a party who did not call the witness, shall order the attorney for the state or the defendant and the defendant's attorney, as the case may be, to produce, for the examination and use of the moving party, any statement of the witness that is in their possession and that relates to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testified. A statement of a witness includes [a] written statement made by the witness that is signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 26.2(g). Numerous federal courts have held that prior testimony does not qualify as Jencks material because the witness's statements are a matter of public record. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1254-55 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that the prior trial testimony of an expert witness was not Jencks material), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 992, 122 S.Ct. 457, 151 L.Ed.2d 376 (2001); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 479 n. 5 (8th Cir.1998) (noting that matters of public record do not fall within the scope of the Jencks Act); United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that trial testimony is not within the scope of the Jencks Act), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985, 113 S.Ct. 1581, 123 L.Ed.2d 148 (1993); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir.1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934, 97 S.Ct. 1558, 51 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977). The Tennessee rule is similar to the federal rule. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 26.2. Here the defendant contends he did not have ready access to this transcript. We need not determine this issue. For the same reasons we found the transcript did not meet the materiality test under Bagley, we conclude the defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged violation of Rule 26.2.