Opinion ID: 3063811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sentence Adjustment

Text: Smith’s final argument is that the district court erred in failing to adjust his federal sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1), for the time he already had spent incarcerated in connection with his underlying offense conduct.19 This 18 It is noteworthy that the medical records variously indicate that the source of Officer Henderson’s head injury was a rock, a brick, a C.D. player, and the gun found at the scene. Thus, Smith has difficulty demonstrating the prejudice required to obtain a retrial. 19 “We review the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de novo.” United States v. Descally, 254 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001). 36 includes both time spent in state custody on the charges arising from his August 5, 2006 arrest, and the time he spent in federal custody on writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to answer, and be sentenced for, the § 922(g) charge. Section 5G1.3(b)(1) provides that a court shall adjust a federal sentence for prison time already served if: (1) “a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)”; (2) the other offense “was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant offense under Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) or Chapter Three (Adjustments)”; and (3) “the court determines that such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1) (2007). The parties agree that (1) Smith’s state aggravated assault conviction represents relevant conduct, (2) it was the basis for an increase in his offense level for his federal conviction, and (3) the Bureau of Prisons is not authorized to credit the time Smith served on his state aggravated assault conviction to Smith’s federal sentence because this time was credited toward his state sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (stating that a defendant shall not be credited time spent detained before sentence commences if that time has “been credited against another sentence”). Accordingly, the government concedes that the district court erred in failing 37 to credit Smith, under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1), for his presentence period of incarceration. See Descally, 254 F.3d at 1333 (vacating sentence for failing to credit defendant under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1) for time served before federal sentencing in state custody for related crime). We therefore vacate Smith’s sentence and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of re-sentencing Smith to give him credit for the time he spent in custody between the time of his arrest and his federal sentencing.