Opinion ID: 664075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Request for Voir Dire Concerning Mid-Trial Publicity

Text: 42 Toler complains that the district court erred in denying his request for a voir dire of the jury concerning mid-trial publicity. On the first day of trial, the district court admonished the prospective jurors at length on the importance of avoiding press reports during the trial. 22 At the beginning of the second day of trial, after the jury was selected, the court again admonished the jury to avoid press reports of the trial. 23 Shortly thereafter, out of the jury's presence, counsel for Faulkner informed the court that he had been told that on the previous evening a local television newscast had reported that the first trial had ended in a mistrial caused by jury tampering. 24 None of the attorneys indicated that they had seen the broadcast, and counsel for Faulkner did not identify who had informed him of the broadcast. Counsel expressed his deep concern that such a story would be prejudicial to his client, and asked the court to voir dire the jury to determine whether any members had heard the broadcast. The court denied this request, but offered to tell them what happened at the last trial. Counsel for Blain suggested that the jury be advised that there has been a prior trial and that the trial ended as a result of the jury's inability to reach a verdict, and specifically address that fact that you have been told there is news reports that the trial ended for some other reason and that is not true. Counsel for Toler then joined in the suggestions of counsel for Faulkner and Blain. The jury returned and the court advised it: 43 [T]here was a previous trial. And the reason that we had to do it again is because the Judge did declare a mistrial in that case. I have been advised that there may have been a news account as to the reason for it, why they had a mistrial before, and the reason simply was that the Jury was unable to resolve the differences that they had in the case and could not render a verdict. That was the only reason. 44 At the end of the second day of trial, the district court again admonished the jury not to read or listen to press reports. 45 On a number of occasions this court has addressed whether the failure to conduct a jury voir dire concerning mid-trial publicity constitutes reversible error. Recently, we found that the failure to conduct such an inquiry was reversible error in United States v. Aragon, 962 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.1992). Aragon offers a thorough analysis of the subject of mid-trial publicity and our court's treatment of the subject in prior cases, and accordingly provides a framework for our own analysis. 46 In Aragon, three defendants were convicted of drug offenses after a two-day trial in El Paso. On the first morning of the trial, the city's largest newspaper published an article about one of the defendants on the first page of the metropolitan section. Among other things the article recounted (1) the defendant's prior history of drug arrests and convictions, (2) his alleged boasting of the smuggling of tons of marijuana through a smuggling pipeline, and (3) his dealings with a notorious narcotics kingpin. Id. at 441-42. The district court refused a request by defense counsel to conduct additional voir dire to determine whether any juror had read or heard of the article. On appeal this court explained that the denial of such a request is subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 443. It further explained that voir dire is required if there could arise serious questions of possible prejudice. Id. This question is to be answered by following a two-step inquiry to determine whether such serious questions exist: 47 First, the district court must look at the nature of the news material to determine whether the material is innately prejudicial. Factors such as the timing of the media coverage, its possible effects on legal defenses, and the character of the material disseminated merit consideration. Second, the court must then discern the probability that the publicity has in fact reached the jury. At this juncture, the prominence of the media coverage and the nature, number, and regularity of warnings against viewing the coverage become relevant. 48 Id. at 444. Finally, the court noted that [e]very claim of potential jury prejudice must turn upon its own facts. Id. See also United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099, 1105 (5th Cir.1978) (stating that cases involving questions of prejudicial publicity necessarily tend to turn on their own facts). 49 In our case, we consider the issue a close one, and believe that the better practice would have been for the trial judge to conduct the requested voir dire. Considering all of the circumstances, however, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion, and find Aragon and other cases finding reversible error distinguishable for a number of reasons. 50 First, the instructions given by the court in our case on the first day of trial, regarding the need to avoid press reports, were unusually lengthy and emphatic. These instructions, reprinted at the margin, cannot fairly be characterized as boilerplate or casual recitations of standard jury instructions. For example, one admonishment began with the words now, most important and if you don't remember anything else I say today.... Another warning ended with the words we do not wish to be responsible for you having to violate your oath to God. See United States v. Arzola-Amaya, 867 F.2d 1504, 1514 (5th Cir.) (finding no reversible error where trial judge was very careful and very specific in giving two cautionary instructions prior to the introduction of evidence), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 322, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989); Aragon, 962 F.2d at 445 (finding instructions inadequate where they were given rather quickly and casually by the court). Second, the court here gave a specific statement to the jury regarding the aspect of the broadcast alleged to be prejudicial, namely the statement in the broadcast that the earlier trial had ended in a mistrial due to jury tampering. The court explained that the only reason for the mistrial simply was that the Jury was unable to resolve the differences that they had in the case and could not render a verdict. Such an instruction was in fact suggested by one of the defense counsel. Our prior cases have not involved a statement by the court to the jury attempting to rebut directly the alleged prejudicial statement in the press report. 51 Third, the jury acquitted all of the defendants on at least one count, and we have held that such acquittals weigh in favor of finding no abuse of discretion. 25 We do not believe that this fact standing alone is an important one, but we must agree with our prior panels that it should inform our analysis. Fourth, the instructions described above were given four times during the first two days of trial, and the court on numerous occasions throughout the trial continued to direct the jury to avoid press reports. The frequency of such warnings is a factor to consider in this context. Aragon, 962 F.2d at 444 (noting that number and regularity of warnings against viewing press coverage is relevant to the second step of the two-step inquiry); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1164 (5th Cir.) (finding no reversible error where court repeated cautionary instruction regarding extraneous matter each day of the trial), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908, 106 S.Ct. 277, 88 L.Ed.2d 241 (1985). 52 Fifth, the district court and this court were given very sketchy details about the content of the broadcast in question. It is therefore difficult to determine just how potentially prejudicial the broadcast was. We have sufficient trust in our bar to presume that the broadcast occurred and that it did mention the mistrial and alleged jury tampering. However, none of the trial counsel actually saw the broadcast. Counsel for Faulkner stated that he had been told by others about the broadcast, but did not even identify those other persons. A tape or transcript of the broadcast is not available. 26 Defense counsel did not know for certain which network had broadcast the story, stating only that I think it was an ABC affiliate. 27 We cannot tell whether the broadcast stated as an unqualified fact that jury tampering occurred, or whether it stated that such tampering had merely been alleged. We cannot know the length of the story, and whether the alleged jury tampering was the thrust of the story or a minor aside. 28 We do not mean to suggest that appellants waived their right to appeal this point by failing to provide a copy of the broadcast. 29 However, the lack of details about the broadcast militates in favor of finding no abuse of discretion. For example, we have no basis for concluding that the prejudicial impact of the broadcast approached the prejudicial impact of the newspaper story in Aragon, which described the defendant's prior drug history and convictions, detailed his boasts of having imported tons of marijuana, and linked him to a notorious drug kingpin. 53 Finally, we believe that the length of the trial is relevant to determining the prejudicial impact of mid-trial publicity. Here, the broadcast occurred on the first day of a trial that lasted approximately seven weeks. The press report in Aragon came in the middle of a two-day trial. We believe that, given the length of the trial, the potential prejudicial impact of the press report in our case was far less than the impact in Aragon.