Opinion ID: 2783159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Vonneida argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on Counts Two and Four, which relate to the production of child pornography, and Counts Six through Thirteen, which relate to Vonneida’s possession of child pornography, because none of the eight videos underlying those convictions satisfy the statutory definition for “sexually explicit conduct.” With respect to the production charges, it is illegal to persuade, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in “sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); see United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 2008). Vonneida’s possession charges similarly hinge on the finding that he possessed images containing a “visual depiction” involving “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(8). “[S]exually explicit conduct” is in turn defined to include, inter alia, “actual or simulated . . . (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(iii)–(v). “A criminal defendant who challenges the sufficiency of evidence shoulders a heavy burden, but not an impossible one.” United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2004). “Not only must the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the government and all permissible inferences drawn in its favor, but if the evidence, thus construed, suffices to convince any rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” then the conviction will stand. United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). Here, both of the victims depicted in these videos testified that Vonneida routinely instructed them to masturbate or feign injury and death, while Vonneida photographed or filmed the display. Upon independent evaluation of the two DVDs upon which Vonneida’s two production convictions were based, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Vonneida persuaded the victims to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a 2 visual depiction of such conduct. Even absent any lascivious exhibition of the genitals, it is undisputed that one video at least briefly depicts a minor victim complying with Vonneida’s request that he masturbate, while another depicts Vonneida pretending to stab and smother the children, whereupon he undresses them to only their underwear and caresses their almost entirely nude bodies. Indeed, each video upon which Vonneida was convicted contained scenes of simulated killings accompanied by sexual touching of the partially nude victims. A rational juror could therefore find that each count was sustained by a video depicting simulated sadistic abuse. See United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines sadism as including “the infliction of pain upon a love object as a means of obtaining sexual release”). Vonneida also challenges his two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) for transporting minors across state lines for the purposes of having them engage in illegal sexual activity. “To secure a conviction under § 2423(a), the government . . . must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) knowingly transported a minor across state lines and (2) with the intent that the minor engage in sexual activity for which some person could be criminally charged.” United States v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366, 375 (2d Cir. 2013). “The government need not prove, however, that the unlawful sexual activity actually took place: ‘§ 2423(a) is a crime of intent, and a conviction is entirely sustainable even if no underlying criminal sexual act ever occurs.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Broxmeyer, 616 F.3d 120, 129 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2010)). Echoing his first argument, Vonneida challenges these convictions solely on the basis that the videos he produced do not involve sexually explicit conduct so as to qualify as child pornography. As explained above, we reject this contention. We therefore reject Vonneida’s assertion that the evidence presented to the jury revealed only that Vonneida intended to produce depictions of simulated violence, which would not fall within the statutory ambit of “sexual activity.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2427 (“In this chapter, the term ‘sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense’ includes the production of child pornography, as defined in section 2256(8).”).