Opinion ID: 1236812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Individualized judgment of each juror.

Text: (12) The trial court also failed to repeat the guilt phase instruction that both parties were entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. (CALJIC No. 17.40.) Defendant contends the omission created an unacceptable risk the jury would improperly make its penalty determination on a majority rule basis. (See Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 108 S.Ct. 1860].) As previously explained, we do not regard such oversight as error, particularly since other instructions informed the panel each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value that the juror deems appropriate to each and all of the [aggravating and mitigating] factors on which you have been instructed. (CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (4th ed. 1984).) The court also told the jury, To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. (CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1984).) In light of these specific directions, the omission of the more general one raises none of the concerns expressed in Mills v. Maryland, supra, 486 U.S. 367. In that case, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a reasonable jury might interpret portions of Maryland's capital sentencing instructions and verdict form to preclude consideration of mitigating evidence unless they unanimously agreed the defendant had met his burden of proof, thereby requiring imposition of the death penalty even though at least one juror found the aggravating circumstances less than compelling when weighed against those in mitigation. ( Id., at pp. 377-380 [100 L.Ed.2d at pp. 395-397].) Moreover, [a] jury following the instructions set out in the verdict form could be `precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, [an] aspect of a defendant's character or record [or a] circumstanc[e] of the offense that the defendant proffer[ed] as a basis for a sentence less than death,' [citation], if even a single juror adhered to the view that such a factor should not be so considered. ( Id., at p. 380 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 397].) We find no reasonable likelihood that the jury in defendant's case similarly misinterpreted the instructions and failed to accord him the benefit of a fully individualized evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.