Opinion ID: 1965843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicant's Appeal

Text: Pierce appeals from that portion of the hearing justice's decision that declined to grant postconviction relief with respect to counts 1 and 7, which he alleges were duplicitous. He contends that the indictment referred to a general pattern of conduct rather than to a specific act alleged by the witness and that, consequently, he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial and a unanimous jury verdict under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. Pierce asserts that because multiple alleged acts of [cunnilingus and digital penetration] were presented at trial, there is no assurance that the jury unanimously agreed upon one specific act for each Count in the indictment. The state contends that applicant waived this argument because he failed to move to dismiss these counts before trial in accordance with Rule 12(b)(2)(3) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. [5] The appropriate method for challenging a duplicitous complaint, indictment, or information is by filing a pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)(3). State v. LaPlante, 122 R.I. 446, 449-50, 409 A.2d 130, 132 (1979) (upholding the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaints as being duplicitous because the motion was not raised on a timely basis). Although a defendant can be granted relief from the harsh effects of the waiver imposed by Rule 12(b)(2), this Court has declared that the burden is on a defendant to show cause why relief should be granted notwithstanding the untimely assertion of the defense. State v. Roberts, 420 A.2d 837, 840 (R.I.1980). Furthermore, [t]he determination whether to relieve defendant from the waiver is vested in the sound discretion of the trial justice. Id. In the present case, defendant did not file a motion to dismiss prior to trial, and therefore, this issue is waived. Nonetheless, Pierce contends that this issue was not waived because it is part of his claim for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has determined that a defendant must prove: (1) that the counsel's performance was so deficient and the errors so serious that they violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment guaranty of counsel; and, (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced his or her defense and deprived the defendant of his or her right to a fair trial. Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1139 (R.I.2001). There is no evidence in the record before us that supports Pierce's appellate contention that trial counsel's assistance was deficient or that Pierce was denied a fair trial. Notwithstanding, we are satisfied that the counts in the indictment were not duplicitous. The term `duplicity' refers to the joining of two or more offenses, however numerous, in a single count of an indictment. State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1253 (R.I.1998). We have explained the difficulty that arises when two or more distinct crimes are set forth in the same count of an indictment: If an indictment is duplicitous, a general verdict of guilty will not reveal whether the jury found defendant guilty of only one crime and not the other, or guilty of both.    Moreover, a guilty verdict on a duplicitous indictment does not indicate whether the jury found defendant guilty without having reached an [sic] unanimous verdict on the commission of a particular offense. Thus, the prohibition of duplicity is said to implicate a defendant's rights to notice of the charge against him, to a unanimous verdict, to appropriate sentencing and to protection against double jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution. Id. (quoting United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir.1980)). In Saluter, a nine-count indictment charged the defendant with sexual assault and child molestation that was alleged to have occurred over a three-year period. Id. at 1251. The defendant moved for a bill of particulars, and the state responded that the acts charged in seven of the counts were committed on multiple occasions and that a single incident of the sexual abuse was charged in only two counts of the indictment. Id. Saluter's motion to dismiss on the ground of duplicity was denied by the trial justice. Id. at 1252. Although the complainant was able to recount a number of specific incidents of sexual assault, we observed that [t]he transcripts of the trial indicate that there was confusion at times among the parties' counsel and the trial justice concerning what portions of Amy's testimony corresponded to the acts charged in the various counts of the indictment. Id. We held that the use of the phrase day and dates in the indictment to describe when the acts occurred was regrettable, but not fatal. Saluter, 715 A.2d at 1253. If an adequate bill of particulars had been filed, then any ambiguity about the time or location of the crimes could have been clarified. Id. at 1254. Instead, the bill of particulars for the seven counts in the indictment confirmed that the counts in the indictment charged more than one offense. Id. Moreover, the testimony at trial by the complainant was confusing, such that the jury could have returned a conviction on a charge with less than a unanimous verdict. Id. at 1255. We vacated Saluter's conviction on seven of the nine counts. Id. Although this Court has refused to recognize a crime of continuing sexual assault, we upheld the state's ability to successfully convict a defendant who has repeatedly abused or molested a child over time, as long as there is a properly constituted indictment or bill of particulars. Saluter, 715 A.2d at 1255, 1256. In the case before us, we are not confronted with a duplicitous indictment. The record discloses that a bill of particulars was filed in this case that made clear that a single act was charged in each of the seven counts. Indeed, the indictment was amplified by the bill of particulars in such a manner that explicitly sets forth that each count alleged but one criminal offense. Furthermore, the law does not require the state to prove that the charged sexual molestations occurred on any specific date or dates, but only that these offenses took place on some particular but unspecified day or date(s) during the period named in the indictment. State v. Silvia, 798 A.2d 419, 426 (R.I. 2002). We agree with the hearing justice's finding that Pierce's defense counsel was afforded considerable latitude on cross-examination to explore with the complaining witness dates, times, locations, and circumstances regarding the different and disparate instances that were alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, the hearing justice did not err in rejecting Pierce's application for postconviction relief based on duplicitous counts in the indictment.