Opinion ID: 1741615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claims of the Plaintiff

Text: Not all controversies, even very public ones, are justiciable. Justiciability is a compound concept, composed of a number of distinct elements. Chief among these elements is the requirement that a plaintiff have standing to invoke the power of the court in his behalf. Ex parte Izundu, 568 So.2d 771, 772 (Ala.1990). Unless a plaintiff's interest in acquiring a favorable judgment is one that is tangible, Reid v. City of Birmingham, 274 Ala. 629, 639, 150 So.2d 735, 744 (1963), and concrete, Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So.2d 932, 937 (Ala.1983), he has no standing to assert his claims. Moreover, as we explained in Reid: `Not only must the plaintiff prove his tangible interest in obtaining a judgment, but the action must be adversary in character, that is, there must be a controversy between the plaintiff and a defendant, subject to the court's jurisdiction, having an interest in opposing his claim. Unless the parties have such conflicting interests, the case is likely to be characterized as one for an advisory opinion, and the controversy as academic, a mere difference of opinion or disagreement not involving their legal relations, and hence not justiciable.' 274 Ala. at 639, 150 So.2d at 744 (quoting E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 29-30) (emphasis added). Thus, `[t]he absence of adversary or the correct adversary parties is in principle fatal.' Rogers v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 392 So.2d 235, 237 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980) (quoting E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 76 (2d ed.1941)) (emphasis added). See also Stamps, 642 So.2d at 944. These principles were thoroughly discussed and applied in State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 300 So.2d 106 (1974). That case involved an action commenced by the State upon the relation of the attorney general, against the Superintendent of Banks of the State of Alabama. 293 Ala. at 71, 300 So.2d at 106. The State purported to seek a judgment declaring that certain lending institutions, which were subject to provisions of the Mini-Code, currently codified at Ala.Code 1975, §§ 5-19-1 to -32, were imposing finance charges in excess of then existing interest and usury provisions. 293 Ala. at 71, 300 So.2d at 108. The State alleged that the superintendent had failed to order [the] institutions to cease and desist making finance charges at rates above the amounts prescribed by statute. Id. Present at the trial of the cause were the parties and representatives of a group of lending institutions that were appearing only as amici curiae. The assistant attorney general representing the State stated: [W]e feel that there is a great deal of confusion in the State of Alabama as to the interest rates and finance charges allowable ... and as to the various items that go into the finance charge.' Id. (Emphasis added.) Counsel for the superintendent of banks asserted that the superintendent ha[d] no position in the case except, of course, to defend the lawsuit itself. 293 Ala. at 71-72, 300 So.2d at 108 (emphasis added). No pertinent facts were in dispute. The State and the superintendent stipulated that certain ... institutions who regularly extend[ed] credit and [made] finance charges... [were] charging rates in excess of that allowed by Title 9, Section[s] 60 and 61, Code of Alabama 1940, Recompiled [current version at Ala.Code 1975, §§ 8-8-1 and -2]. 293 Ala. at 72, 300 So.2d at 109. The trial court found against the contentions of the Attorney General and in conformity with the position taken by amici curiae, and the State appealed. Id. This Court dismissed the appeal, stating: We are convinced that this lawsuit is a sham, contrived to secure an advisory opinion on the Mini-Code and that it presented no justiciable controversy between the parties. 293 Ala. at 72, 300 So.2d at 109 (emphasis added). The dispositive facts leading to that conclusion were (1) that the State chose to sue only the superintendent, another state official, not one of the entities said to be violating the statutory scheme, and (2) that the superintendent, who took no adversarial position, had a complete defense to any judgment that could have been entered in the case. That was so, because the Mini-Code expressly exempted those lending institutions appearing as amici from licensing, thus effectively placing them beyond the superintendent's control. 293 Ala. at 72-73, 300 So.2d at 109. The Court explained: The record before us depicts a case, a trial, and an appeal between a plaintiff and defendant who had no real differences between themselves, but the trial and the appeal were for the accommodation of the institutions which appeared as amici curiae in the trial court and later filed a brief in this court. .... `The declaratory judgment statutes do not empower courts to decide moot questions, abstract propositions or to give advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have the questions decided for the government of future cases.' ... ... [W]hen the only defendant in the case took no position and the statute under consideration stated that the defendant was without power to apply the Act to the institutions involved in the case, there was no longer a justiciable controversy and one has not existed in the instant case since. Under those circumstances, the decree of the trial court was void.... .... Since there was no justiciable controversy and only a ` straw man' defendant, the decree of the trial court was void [and] would not support an appeal and the appeal must be dismissed. 293 Ala. at 73-74, 300 So.2d at 109-10 (emphasis added). The Court acknowledged that the Attorney General has the right and power to file suits for declaratory judgment, but, nevertheless, pointed out that the parties must be damaged and seeking a remedy, not just advice. 293 Ala. at 74-75, 300 So.2d at 111. (Emphasis added.) The observations of Justice Jones in a special concurring opinion were even more pointed. He stated: The Office of the Attorney General allowed itself, wittingly or unwittingly, to be ` used ` and in turn sought to 'use' this Court in order to get an advisory ruling .... The narrow scope of review invoked by the issues ... is indicative of the `sweetheart' nature of the proceedings. 293 Ala. at 75, 300 So.2d at 111 (emphasis added). Reduced to its essence, therefore, the holding in Johnson was that the controversy was nonjusticiable because the plaintiff (the State), acting upon the relation of the attorney general, had sued a straw man defendant, that is, one whose position was not adverse to that of the plaintiff and one against whom the judgment would be ineffective in any event. Also more or less implicit in the Court's rationale was the conclusion that the State had no standing to commence the action, because it had suffered no injury and, consequently, was not seeking a remedy. The controversy in Johnson is closely analogous to the one in this case, and the rationale in that case is particularly pertinent in this one. Indeed, as to the claim of the plaintiff State against the defendant Judge Moore, there is not even facial adverseness. On the contrary, the pleadings show, on the face, that the plaintiff and Judge Moore actually support one another. More specifically, the State does not seek a declaration that Judge Moore's actions are incorrect in any respect. On the contrary, the complaint particularly, in those emphasized portions quoted above extols the actions of Judge Moore and seeks a judgment declaring that his practices are eminently correct and must be sanctioned. The State does not allege that it has been harmed in any manner by Judge Moore's practices. It does not seek to interfere with this defendant's practices, but, in fact, seeks to perpetuate this defendant's conduct. Predictably, Judge Moore, in his answer, admitted all the substantive allegations in the complaint. [3] As we stated above, Judge Moore  join[ed] with the State of Alabama in requesting a judgment declaring that the challenged practices were constitutional. (Emphasis added.) In other words, this defendant expressly agrees with the plaintiff that his practices are constitutional and that he is entitled to continue them in perpetuity. The absence of adverseness has been evident throughout this litigation. It was evidenced, for example, by the fact that Judge Moore was the only defendant who opposed removal of the action to the federal court. Indeed, the AFA and the ACLUA, at various times throughout the litigation in the trial court, contended that Judge Moore should be realigned as a plaintiff. Judge Moore thus goes further than the defendant superintendent of banks in Johnson, who took no position on the merits. Judge Moore takes a position on the merits, but he takes a position that is identical to that of the State, and he argues it strenuously. As between the State and Judge Moore, there exists no controversy, whatevernot even a contrived one. This is not what lawsuits are about. Moreover, [d]eclaratory judgment actions cannot be invoked merely to try disputes involved in another action, for such contentions may legally be made an issue in the pending action. 2 W. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments § 401, at 972 (2d ed.1951). When the State filed its complaint, any controversy that did exist had been presented in a case then pending in the United States District Court. We are convinced, therefore, as was Justice Jones in Johnson, that [t]he Office of the Attorney General [has] allowed itself, wittingly or unwittingly, to be ` used ` and in turn [has] sought to 'use' this Court in order to get an advisory ruling. 293 Ala. at 75, 300 So.2d at 111. We will not, however, allow the judiciary of this state to become a political foil, or a sounding board for topics of contemporary interest. We hold, therefore, that the claims of the plaintiff, the State of Alabama, are not justiciable. As we shall now demonstrate, the claims of the counterclaim plaintiffs, the AFA and the ACLUA, stand on no better ground.