Opinion ID: 158241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Calculation of Overtime Compensation Owed to Plaintiffs

Text: 26
27 The district court held that KRMI does not qualify for the 213(b)(29) exemption for any workweek in which a Plaintiff can prove that he worked more than fifty-six hours without time-and-a-half compensation. KRMI is not eligible for the exemption under these circumstances, the court reasoned, because 213(b)(29) embodies two conditions, both of which must be met. First, the employee must work for a recreational establishment in a national park or national forest or on National Wildlife Refuge System land. See 213(b)(29)(A). Second, the employee must receiv[e] compensation for employment in excess of fifty-six hours in any workweek at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate. See 213(b)(29)(B). According to the district court, KRMI must compensate each Plaintiff at a time-and-a-half rate for work in excess of forty hours during any given week that KRMI failed to comply with 213(b)(29)(B). 28 KRMI disputes this interpretation, contending that violation of 213(b)(29)(B) means only that the employer must retroactively comply i.e., that it must pay the employee overtime for work in excess of fifty-six hours. In support of its position, KRMI cites several cases regarding failure to comply with the conditions of other FLSA exemptions. See Martin v. Coventry Fire Dist., 981 F.2d 1358 (1st Cir. 1992) (construing 207(k) overtime exemption for firefighters and law enforcement officers); Mills v. State of Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551 (D. Maine 1994) (construing 207(k) exemption for state probation officers); Lantz v. B-1202 Corp., 429 F. Supp 421 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (interpreting 213(b)(8)(A) overtime exemption for restaurant employees). Two principles are common to these opinions. First, they suggest that receipt by an employee of overtime compensation according to the provisions of a FLSA exemption is not a condition precedent to the exemption's applicability. See Lantz, 429 F. Supp. at 424. Second, two of the cases cite the penalty provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216, for the rule that an employer who fails to pay statutorily required overtime . . . must simply pay the overtime owed (if the violation is merely technical and in good faith). Coventry Fire Dist., 981 F.2d at 1360; see Mills, 853 F. Supp. at 552. None of these cases construes 213(b)(29), however, and unlike KRMI, the defendant in Lantz was faced with a relatively new statutory amendment, which arguably excused its failure to comply. See Lantz, 429 F. Supp. at 423. 29 We next consider our precedent. In Spradling v. City of Tulsa, 95 F.3d 1492, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1996), we stated that an employer must affirmatively prove that it qualified for a FLSA exemption either because (1) it publicly declared its intent to establish a regime satisfying the exemption, or (2) the employee's working conditions actually met the requirements of the exemption. Although the employer failed to carry its burden in Spradling, proof that it actually paid overtime compensation in accord with 207(k) does not seem to have been required. However, because Spradling involved a 207(k) exemption, it does not provide a good model for determining whether KRMI adopted 213(b)(29). 30 Interpreting 207(k), which authorizes the establishment of non-traditional work periods for firemen, the Spradling court held that a public employer may establish a 7(k) work period even without making a public declaration, as long as its employees actually work a regularly recurring cycle of between 7 and 28 days. Spradling, 95 F.3d at 1505 (quoting McGrath v. City of Philadelphia, 864 F. Supp. 466, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1994)) (emphasis added). To trigger the exemption, the evidence had to show that the firemen regularly adhered to the 207(k) work period. Thus, the mere fact that a ski patroller worked at least one fifty-six-hour week per season does not prove that KRMI adopted 213(b)(29). 31 We are thus faced with an issue of first impression in the Tenth Circuit whether to construe 213(b)(29) to exempt KRMI from normal overtime rules based on a policy that it retrospectively adopted in response to this lawsuit. Although the First Circuit took this road, see Coventry Fire Dist., 981 F.2d at 1360, we decline to follow its lead. Section 213(b)(29) which consists of two conditions joined by the word and is meaningless if an employer does not have to satisfy both conditions. See Usery v. Associated Drugs, Inc., 538 F.2d 1191, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that, to avail itself of the professional employees exemption under 213(a)(1), employer had to prove each of the conditions or standards prescirbed by the Regulations). If KRMI cannot demonstrate compliance with 213(b)(29)(B), it must pay overtime compensation as required by 207(a). 32
33 The district court ruled that each work week must be analyzed separately and the exemption must be applied individually on a Plaintiff by Plaintiff basis. Aplt. App. at 584. The language of 213(b)(29) supports a plaintiff-by-plaintiff approach because it refers to any employee (instead of the plural employees) and because it makes the exemption contingent on what kind of establishment the employee works for and whether he receives overtime pay, rather than on the employer's overarching policy. Many of the regulations for implementing the FLSA also center on the employees covered by the Act, instead of employers subject to it. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 778.103 (1998) (referring to any workweek in which an employee is covered by the Act and is not exempt from its overtime pay requirements). 34 A workweek-by-workweek approach is also bolstered by the plain language of the statute and regulations. Section 213(b)(29) refers to any workweek, rather than some alternate unit of time, see 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(29)(B), and as KRMI notes, regulations governing the application of 207 make the workweek the proper unit for calculating overtime compensation. See 29 C.F.R. 778.103. The applicability of the 213(b)(29) exemption must be determined on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff and workweek-by-workweek basis. 35 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's interlocutory orders are AFFIRMED.