Opinion ID: 2374837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to grant the petition to amend

Text: In our opinion, the observations by Judge Oppenheimer, for the Court, in Town of Somerset, are quite applicable to the present case. He stated: Maryland Rule 320 d 1 (b) provides that `an amendment shall not be made without leave of court but leave to amend shall be freely granted in order to promote justice.' We have repeatedly held that an order denying or allowing amendment will not be reviewed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Blevins v. Mullan Contracting Co., 235 Md. 188, 194, 201 A.2d 348 (1964); Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 277, 170 A.2d 220 (1961), and cases therein cited. We re-affirm that rule, but, in this case, we are constrained to hold that in denying leave to amend the court below went beyond the proper limits of discretionary action. Ordinarily, our holding that the demurrer to the petition of appeal should have been overruled would make moot the question of the judge's refusal to permit the requested amendment. However, the appellants' request to amend the petition by making the allegations set forth was proper and perhaps necessary. The requested amendments were specific allegations as to the aggrievement of each of the appellants. The allegation in the petition which, as we have held, implied that they were aggrieved parties, without the supporting details of the requested amendments, of itself might not have been sufficient for them to show why they had standing to appeal. Had the motion been granted, the issue as to standing would have been calrified by the raising of pertinent questions of fact and law and the administration of justice would thereby have been served. In the present case, the petition to amend was filed approximately six months after the motion to dismiss was filed. However, it was filed promptly after the hearing in the case and within the time fixed by the lower court for filing a memorandum by the appellant. Due notice of the filing of the petition to amend was given, pleadings and memoranda in opposition to granting leave to amend were duly filed more than three weeks prior to the decision of the lower court. There was no prejudice resulting from the delay in filing the petition to amend and the lower court had ample time to consider the petition and the pleadings in opposition to it and, in fact, did consider them in its opinion. The lower court in the present case did not consider the merits of the questions raised in the petition for appeal  as the lower court did in Town of Somerset  so that there has been no determination of these issues. It is clear to us that the record indicates that the appellant was a party to the proceedings before the Board. The filing of the letter of August 26, 1965 by the appellant and its acceptance into evidence by the Board were sufficient to make Hertelendy a party to the proceeding. It is not required that he personally appear or personally testify at the hearing. He had registered his objections to the granting of the variance, his reasons for his objection and showed the location of his property across the street from Lot 23-B as well as the resulting injury to the value of his property which would allegedly result if the Board granted the variance. It is obvious that the Board considered Hertelendy to be a party and a party aggrieved. It did not dismiss the motion for the reargument because of lack of status on his part, but because the motion did not set forth any new evidence which could not reasonably have been presented at the hearing. Then too, when the appeal was taken by Hertelendy to the Circuit Court, the Board, pursuant to Sec. 2-92 of the Montgomery County Code (1965) above quoted, gave his counsel notice of that appeal along with counsel for Landow and interested officials, thereby indicating that the Board considered Hertelendy to be a party to the case before it. Ordinarily we would reverse and remand the case to the lower court with directions to overrule the motion to dismiss, to grant the petition to amend and if the issue of standing were then raised, to take testimony on that issue. As Judge Oppenheimer stated, for the Court, in Town of Somerset : When the issue of the standing of an appellant to appeal is raised in the court in which review of the administrative action is asked, we have approved the practice of trial judges in permitting testimony on the point to be taken before them, see e.g., Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 243 Md. 138, 148, 220 A.2d 589 (1966) and Wilkinson v. Atkinson, 242 Md. 231, 218 A.2d 503 (1966). The question is not one of taking additional testimony on the merits of the substantive issues decided by the Board (compare Suburban Properties, Inc. v. Rockville Council, 241 Md. 1, 5-6, 215 A.2d 200 (1965) and cases therein cited), but of determining whether the appellants have the requisite standing to have those issues reviewed. In the present case, however, we think further consideration should be given by the Board to the issues raised before it and a determination of these issues made by it. In the first place, it is not clear in the record before the Board at what date the provisions of the Zoning Ordinance relating to front yard set-backs applied to Landow's Lot 23-B. Section 104-22(a)(1) of the Montgomery County Code (1960) gives the Board the power to grant variances from the strict application of the chapter  [W]hen by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of specific parcels of property at the time of the original enactment of this chapter or amendments thereto or by reason of exceptional topographical conditions or other extraordinary situations or conditions of specific parcels of property, the strict application of these regulations or amendments thereto would result in peculiar and unusual practical difficulties to, or exceptional or undue hardship upon the owner of such property; provided that such relief or variance can be granted without substantial impairment of the intent, purpose, and integrity of the general plan, as embodied in this chapter. (Emphasis supplied). Section 111-30(a)(1) of the Montgomery County Code (1965) is substantially the same except it is even more explicit in regard to time as it provides:    by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of specific parcels of property on June 1, 1958 or at the time of amendments to this chapter.   . (Emphasis supplied). On the remand, the Board should consider and determine whether Lot 23-B was created prior to the applicable provision of the Zoning Ordinance or after the effective time provided for in the Zoning Ordinance, bearing in mind that the Lot 23-B was created on May 1, 1958. It will be important to consider whether Ordinance of Montgomery County No. 3-206, dated May 31, 1958, effective June 1, 1958 was a repeal of the original enactment of the then existing Zoning Ordinance and the enactment of a new Zoning Ordinance (see the Editor's note to Chapter 104 of the Montgomery County Code (1960)) or whether it is merely a repeal and re-enactment with amendments of the then existing Zoning Ordinance, resulting in a continuation  where not amended  of the then existing Zoning Ordinance. See the language of Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3-206. Assuming, Ordinance No. 3-206 is an amendment of the then existing Zoning Ordinance, the Board should nevertheless consider whether the date of the amendment  June 1, 1958  might possibly be the determining date in view of the above-quoted provisions of Section 104-22(a)(1) of the Montgomery County Code (1960) and Section 111-30(a)(1) of the Montgomery County Code (1965). Secondly, it is not clear from the record whether the question of a possible error in the Building Inspector's construction of the front yard set-back provision was before the Board for decision and if it was, whether that construction was correct in the present case. We have indicated that counsel for Landow considered this question to be before the Board and pressed the point that no front building line had been established by the buildings erected on the lots on the east side of Arrowood Road to the south of Lot 23-B. There is some suggestion in the majority opinion of the Board that there had been no building line established, but this is not clearly set forth in the opinion, and should be clarified by the Board upon the remand. In this connection it may be important to ascertain when the buildings on Lots 24 to 32  varying in set-backs from 35 feet to 140 feet  were erected as compared with May 1, 1958 when Lot 23-B was created. If the buildings used to establish the building line were erected after the applicable ordinance became effective, the set-back sought to be established may be invalid as an unlawful delegation of powers to private individuals. See Sierra Construction Co., Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Town of Greece, 224 N.Y.S.2d 787, 15 A.D.2d 859 (1962) and cases cited, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 788; aff'd 12 N.Y.2d 79 (1962); Boardman v. Davis, 231 Iowa 1227, 3 N.W.2d 608 (1942). This possible constitutional infirmity might well lead to construing the ordinance as referring only to buildings existing at the time of the effective date of the ordinance. The same information may be relevant to the building on Lot 23-A and the buildings on Lots 1-A, 1-B and 1-E on Redwood Avenue, since, if a front building line has been established at all, the controlling line might be that established by the buildings on Redwood Avenue rather than those on Arrowood Road. Furthermore, even if different lines are validly established by the buildings on both Redwood Avenue and Arrowood Road, the Board should consider whether either building line could control Lot 23-B in that it equally fronts on both Arrowood Road and Redwood Avenue. Thirdly, the provisions of the ordinance in regard to a set-back established by buildings may not apply to Lot 23-B as the lot may not be between two intersecting streets as the front of Lot 23-B is on two different streets  Arrowood Road and Redwood Avenue. The Board, itself, described Lot 23-B as situated at the intersection of Arrowood Road and Redwood Avenue, (emphasis supplied) and the proof indicated this also. Fourthly, the set-back provisions for a front line established by buildings may be incapable of enforcement (and possibly unconstitutional) because of vagueness in that the provisions give no method of computing what the previously established line is. See O'Connell v. City of Brockton Board of Appeals, 344 Mass. 208, 181 N.E.2d 800 (1962) and the comprehensive Annotation, Zoning-Front setback provisions, 93 A.L.R.2d 1244, 1255 (§ 6). We will accordingly remand the case, pursuant to Maryland Rule 871 a, without affirmance or reversal, for remand by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to the Board for further consideration and determination, including the introduction of additional evidence if the Board deems this necessary. We think it was unnecessary to print the memoranda submitted to the lower court in full and we determine that approximately 25% of the appendix to the appellant's brief consists of such unnecessary printing. We will, pursuant to Maryland Rule 882 c, divide the costs of printing this appendix so that the appellant will pay 25% of the cost of such printing and Montgomery County, one of the appellees, will pay the remaining 75% of this cost as well as all of the other costs in the case including that of the appellant's brief. Case remanded, without affirmance or reversal, for remand by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to the Montgomery County Board of Appeals for further consideration and determination in accordance with this opinion, including the introduction of evidence or otherwise; twenty-five per cent of the cost of printing the appendix to the appellant's brief to be paid by the appellant, the remaining seventy-five per cent thereof and all of the remaining costs, including the cost of printing the appellant's brief, itself, to be paid by Montgomery County.