Opinion ID: 15663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Supplemental Jurisdiction over State Claims

Text: The final question posed by the district court is whether it may now [exercise] supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 958 F.Supp. at 283. In determining whether it could properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims, the district court appropriately considered the four factors enumerated in section 1367(c). 909 F.Supp. at 464. Concluding that the case did not involve novel issues of state law, that the state claims did not predominate over the federal claims, and that there existed no 39 We note that our analysis may seem somewhat terse. Our brevity, however, is occasioned by the failure of the parties to give detailed attention to this issue on appeal. We decline to attempt to anticipate and resolve every possible argument that Mobil could have, but did not, make on appeal. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the provisions of section 502(a) and our caselaw, and it does not appear to us that the plaintiffs’ motion falls within any of the causes of action provided by section 502(a), so as to be completely preempted. 27 other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, the district court held that retaining the state law claims was appropriate. Id. The court did not consider the factor stated in section 1367(c)(3), the dismissal of all federal claims, to be relevant because of its holdings regarding complete preemption. We review the district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over pendent state law claims for abuse of discretion. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992). Our review is guided by the relevant statutory provisions governing the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), as well as the Supreme Court’s articulation of the scope and nature of district courts’ discretion in exercising jurisdiction over pendent state law claims. See, e.g., CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S.Ct. 614, 618-20 (1988), and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138-39 (1966). In the case sub judice, it seems appropriate to begin by noting that when all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case prior to trial, we have stated that our general rule is to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims. Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989). This general rule, however, is not always mandatory or absolute. See Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 941 F.2d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 1991). Thus, while our determination that the district court erred in concluding that the case before it 28 included judiciable federal claims provides a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction, Cohill, 108 S.Ct. at 619, no single factor is dispositive in this analysis. Parker & Parsley, 972 F.2d at 587. Thus, we review the district court’s decision in light of the specific circumstances of the case at bar, beginning with the factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).40 With regard to the first of the section 1367(c) factors, it appears that this case may involve at least one novel or complex issue of state law. Although it is not entirely clear from the briefs on appeal, the class claims regarding Mobil’s noncompliance with state insurance regulations may raise novel issues both as to the interpretation and applicability of these regulations and as to whether they give rise to a private right of action. Turning to the second and third statutory factors, our analysis above mandates that the only two federal claims alleged, i.e., the complete 40 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that [t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—— (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. “ 29 preemption claims, must be dismissed. Consequently, the state law claims now clearly predominate over the (now nonexistent) federal claims. Finally, we find no exceptional circumstances that would make the fourth section 1367(c) factor relevant. Thus, our section 1367(c) analysis results in the conclusion that remand is appropriate. Furthermore, as noted above, not only have we stated that it is our general rule to remand cases when all federal claims are disposed of prior to trial, but the Supreme Court has counseled that the dismissal of all federal claims weighs heavily in favor of declining jurisdiction. See Gibbs, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, and Cohill, 108 S.Ct. at 619. The Supreme Court has also provided additional guidance regarding review of the discretionary retention of pendent state law claims. In Cohill, the Supreme Court discussed the seminal case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966), specifically focusing on the considerations appropriate to the exercise of jurisdiction over pendent state law claims after all federal claims had been eliminated from a case. 108 S.Ct. at 61819. The Court counseled that, pursuant to the reasoning and holding of Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims. Cohill, 108 S.Ct. at 30 619. The Court went on to state that when a balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. (footnote and internal citation omitted). Thus, both our general rule and the reasoning contained in Gibbs and Cohill indicate that remand is the correct disposition in the case at bar. Finally, based on a case presenting issues somewhat analogous to those under consideration here, this Court held that remand was mandated due to concerns of comity and the Congressional intent that cases involving workers’ compensation issues be resolved in state courts. In Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991), we construed 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), which bars the removal of workers’ compensation cases, as indicating that Congress intended that all cases arising under a state’s workers’ compensation scheme remain in state court. Id. at 1092. Accordingly, after the complete preemption claim asserted by the defendant was eliminated on appeal, we held that the case must be remanded to state court. Id. (emphasis added). We concluded that remand was required in order to satisfy Congress’ dictate that, to the extent possible, workers’ compensation cases remain in state court. Id. On petition for rehearing, we stated that the principal issue on appeal in Roadway Express had been whether to 31 remand the case to state court when only a state-law claim remained, the question we consider in the case sub judice. Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 936 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1991).41 We went on to clearly restate our prior holding that [g]iven the discretion vested in the court to remand pendent state-law claims to state court, we believe that the intent of Congress——that, whenever feasible, state workers’ compensation claims be resolved in state court——favors remand to state court. Id.42 The factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a balancing of the Gibbs values as articulated in Cohill, and our holding in Roadway Express all lead to the conclusion that this case properly belongs in the state court where it began. We can find no significant factor that would justify retaining jurisdiction rather than remanding, while the statutory, Supreme Court, and circuit law and analyses relevant to review of the case at bar each weigh heavily in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining removed state law claims. Accordingly, we hold that 41 Of course, section 1445(c) applies only to cases commenced in state court, and it does not govern, expressly or by analogy, cases properly commenced in federal court. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1994). 42 We are not suggesting that any of the state law claims in this case are ones “arising under the workmen’s compensation laws” of Texas for purposes of section 1445(c). See Patin v. Allied Signal, Inc., 69 F.3d 1 (5th Cir. 1995). Clearly, however, Texas workers’ compensation laws are significantly implicated in many of the claims. What we are addressing is, and is only, remand under section 1367(c) and the Gibbs and Cohill factors. 32 retaining jurisdiction over, rather than remanding, the state law claims in this case would constitute an abuse of discretion.