Opinion ID: 2275536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Testimony about the alleged gang-related motivation behind the murder.

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed testimony from which the jury could speculate that gang retaliation was the motive for the killing of Dennis Hines on July 2, 1996, and the killing of Tia Mitchell two days later. He argues that even the limited explanation of Gaither's understanding of the conversation he had with appellant about squashing the beef was irrelevant to the question the jury had to decide whether it was appellant who killed Dennis Hines. Contending that Gaither's testimony was unfairly prejudicial because it supplied a motive to an otherwise unexplained murder, appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial. [7] The government responds that the evidence of the gang feud was relevant because Gaither's testimony about squashing the beef had left the character of the victim potentially at issue, as the jury could have thought that Hines had killed someone, and that appellant had shot him in retaliation. This potential misunderstanding, according to the government, needed to be cleared up for the jury. The trial court's decisions about admission or exclusion of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1182 (D.C.1999). [8] Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Street v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C.1992). [O]rdinarily, any evidence which is logically probative of some fact in issue is admissible [and][i]f the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of [a] fact in controversy, it should go to the jury. Dockery v. United States, 746 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). That evidence may be relevant, however, does not end the trial court's analysis. See Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1184. The weighing of probative value versus prejudice must always be part of the trial judge's consideration, and the trial judge has the discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See id. Unfair prejudice within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Specifically, we have cautioned trial judges to consider carefully before admitting evidence of gang retaliation, and then only after ensuring that the government's evidence is relevant, necessary and supported by competent evidence. In Mercer, we held that evidence of threats against a witness had the potential for great prejudice against the defendant because it implied that [the witness] had received some type of threat [from the defendant] regarding her testimony. This type of evidence could very well have aroused the passions of the jury.... Id. at 1186. In this case, appellant argues that Gaither's testimony on what he meant by squashing the beef was irrelevant to the issue of appellant's guilt for the shooting of Dennis Hines, and there also was no need to inform the jury that Dennis Hines had not committed a murder for which appellant was retaliating because the only other killing that had been alluded tothat of Tia Mitchelloccurred two days after Dennis Hines was killed, and could not have been committed by him. Further, he argues, Gaither's testimony was unfairly prejudicial to the extent it suggested without substantiation [9] that the murder before the jury was in retaliation for a gang-related dispute, particularly after Gaither added that he told appellant we lost one; you lost one. All this, according to appellant, could have been interpreted by the jury as a reference to gang violence. He argues that the prosecutor drove the point home when he commented during closing that Gaither had become friendly [with appellant] even though you guys were part of the opposite side of things. We need not decide whether allowing the testimony referring to gang violence was error, [10] because we conclude that it was harmless in light of the evidence arrayed against appellant. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366 (D.C.1979) (noting that part of abuse of discretion is whether error was of a magnitude requiring reversal). References to a gang feud can supply to the jury a motive for an otherwise unexplained killing or suggest witness intimidation. Unlike in Mercer, however, Gaither did not testify that appellant had threatened him for testifying. Even though the reference to opposing neighborhood groups could have suggested a motive for appellant's killing of Dennis Hines, appellant concedes in his brief that Gaither's testimony about appellant's purported confession was extremely vague, and could be interpreted by the jury either as appellant saying he was sorry that Dennis Hines, who was Gaither's friend, was killed, or that he was sorry he had killed Dennis Hines. In addition, Gaither's testimony implied that appellant wanted the violence to end after the two killings. We also take into account that Gaither was extensively impeached with the fact that he was incarcerated when both of the killings he testified about were committed, as well as with his failure to tell the government at the time of appellant's apology for the killing of Dennis Hines, even though Gaither then had an agreement to cooperate with prosecutors, and did not do so until his own sentencing was imminent. More importantly, the evidence at trial of appellant's guilt was considerable, including three eyewitnesses who knew appellant from the neighborhood. The jury was made aware that while these witnesses had not come forward immediately after the shooting, they had no apparent motive to lie. Viewing the testimony about gang violence in the context of the entire record, we conclude the error was harmless. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).