Opinion ID: 1145185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Military Members and Dependents

Text: Carpenter argues that the Board's decision to survey and exclude only non-resident military members [14] is unconstitutional since it resulted in the arbitrary exclusion of the military from the apportionment base, citing Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856 (Alaska 1972). The Governor asserts that the selective treatment of the military is permissible under the reasoning of Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1974). In Groh, this court held that the Reapportionment Board could exclude military non-residents even though it made no attempt to eliminate civilian non-residents. Groh, 526 P.2d at 870. We found the Board's selective treatment of the military was justified because at the time of the federal census civilian transients were not present in significant numbers. Furthermore, we concluded that even if civilian transients were present, they were probably not counted as residents by the federal census. Finally, we found that the involuntary nature of the military member's assignment to the state is distinguishable from a civilian's voluntary presence. Id. Carpenter acknowledges Groh but argues that its reasoning is inapplicable here. Carpenter distinguishes Groh on the ground that in this case there were a substantial number of civilian transients in the state. The state agrees that the 1980 census contained substantial numbers of civilian non-residents but claims that the Board properly ignored them for the following reasons: the federal census reallocated tourists and temporary business visitors to their true residence; there was no practical and reliable way to survey fish processing and lumber camp employees; the federal census substantially undercounted lumber and fish workers; deduction of some non-resident proportion of these groups would produce serious inaccuracies; and oil camp workers were allocated by the census to their true residences. [15] The state concludes that only military personnel and dependents were present in sufficient numbers and concentrations to impact apportionment. Next, Carpenter argues that the distinction between military and civilian transience is no longer valid. She cites Marks v. Township Committee of New Hanover, 124 N.J. Super. 504, 308 A.2d 24, 26 (App.Div. 1973): The fact that the person in military service may reside at his military reservation pursuant to order assignment, rather than as a result of his free and voluntary choice, differentiates him not at all from any other person whose business, employment or other pursuits compel his residence at or near a given community and involve regular or irregular transfer from place to place. (Footnote omitted.) [16] Finally, Carpenter argues that, even assuming the legal compulsion doctrine justified differential treatment for military personnel, it was unreasonable to apply it to the military dependents. According to Carpenter, none of these dependents are present under legal compulsion and therefore they should have been treated as civilians. Although this issue was not presented in Groh (only military personnel were excluded), this court stated that [d]ependents of military persons may be assumed, for the most part, to have the same residential characteristics as the uniformed personnel upon whom they are dependent. [17] In Groh, 526 P.2d at 869-70, we referred to the fact that in Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856 (Alaska 1972), we held invalid the constitutional requirement that reapportionment be based upon civilian population within each election district as reported by the census, on the ground that military personnel as a class should not be arbitrarily eliminated. We further noted that by holding such elimination unconstitutional, we were not precluding exclusion of some military personnel providing it was conducted to limit the impact of transients and non-residents on legislative districting. In Groh, we upheld the Reapportionment Board's decision to exclude military transients from the apportionment population base. We found the Board's decision reasonable on the following grounds: (1) it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that civilian transients are not present in significant numbers in April when the census data was obtained; (2) even if transients were present, they were not included in the Alaska census population, although all military stationed in Alaska were so included; (3) the special nature of military transience creates a reasonable basis to distinguish between military and civilian transients. [18] In Groh, 526 P.2d at 873 & n. 36, we further said: It is thus not offensive to notions of equal protection to exclude from the population base even military personnel who have lived in Alaska for substantial periods of time, so long as those people have exercised their option to remain residents and domiciliaries of other states. . . . . There is every reason to believe that military personnel who desire to be Alaska residents and domiciliaries will register to vote because voter registration is a prime index of intention to become a resident or domiciliary. For like reason, we think that those who do not want to become Alaskans demonstrate that intention by refusing to register to vote. Based on our decision in Groh v. Egan , we hold that the exclusion of non-resident military members and dependents from the apportionment population base did not violate equal protection, [19] and that the Board's alleged failure to identify and exclude other groups of non-residents including fish processors and lumber workers did not result in an inaccurate population base and substantial variations from the actual populations among the election districts. [20] We think it clear that a state has a legitimate interest in limiting its apportionment base to bona fide residents. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the states may exclude non-residents from the apportionment base. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1296-1297, 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 390-91 (1966). As noted previously, in Groh v. Egan we held that military non-residents may constitutionally be excluded from the state's population base. In the case at bar, the superior court found that the state, in attempting to exclude non-resident military from the apportionment base, demonstrated a compelling state interest, namely, the prevention of the dilution of its residents' voting strength. [21] We therefore hold that the state (Board) had a legitimate interest in limiting its apportionment base to bona fide residents, and further, that the means employed by the Board to cull out the non-residents was constitutionally permissible. [22]