Opinion ID: 4530983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ability to Amend Complaint

Text: Finally, we turn to Borrás's assertion that the district court's failure to allow him to amend his complaint before dismissing it with prejudice violated his right to due process. Fisher v. Kadant, Inc. is directly on point. 589 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2009). In Fisher, we considered what effect, if any . . . a passing reference to a possible future motion to amend, contained in an opposition to a motion to dismiss, [has] on the district court's authority to allow amendment of a dismissed complaint after the entry of judgment. Id. at 507. We concluded that such a passing request is without effect in these circumstances, and that the Fisher plaintiffs' failure to avail themselves of the opportunity to amend their complaint as of right before the issuance of judgment against them rendered them without recourse after the entry of judgment. Id. Here, like the plaintiffs in Fisher, Borrás adverted to the need to amend his complaint in his opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, at no point did Borrás either take advantage of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), which allows a pleading to be amended once as a matter of course, or request leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)-(2) (allowing parties to amend pleadings once as a matter of course under certain limitations and, outside those limitations, with leave of the court or the other party's written - 22 - consent). Only after the issuance of a judgment against him did Borrás argue, on appeal, that he should have been permitted to amend his complaint. Because Borrás chose not to file an amended complaint prior to the issuance of judgment against him, there was no due process violation.