Opinion ID: 1279175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The Hearsay Error

Text: In the course of rejecting the doctor's testimony, the court said: THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, I don't think it is admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule, because I think that the rule contemplates that somebody goes to a physician, doctor or psychiatrist, whatever, for treatment before he is involved in something, and that he cannot go after he is charged with a crime and then be treated for and consulted and examined for the sole purpose of having this doctor testify in a trial. [18] Rule 803(4), W.R.E., provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:       (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The trial court concluded that statements made by Jahnke to Dr. McDonald in preparation for trial did not fall within the exception to the hearsay rule embodied in Rule 803(4). Rule 803(4) clearly encompasses statements made to a doctor for purposes of medical diagnosis, even though the doctor's diagnosis was obtained solely for use at trial. The Advisory Committee's Note to the identical federal rule indicates that Rule 803(4), F.R.E., changes prior doctrine to the contrary: Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While these statements were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation. The broad scope of Rule 803(4) was emphasized by the Court of Appeals in O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1088-1089 (2nd Cir.1978), where the plaintiff did not call treating physicians as witnesses, but called instead the doctor whom plaintiff consulted for litigation purposes more than four years after the accident. The court said: Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a non-treating doctor such as Dr. Koven would have been permitted to recite his patient's statements to him, not as proof of the facts stated, but only to show the basis of his opinion.    The Federal Rules, however, rejected this distinction as being too esoteric for a jury to recognize. 570 F.2d at 1089. It may be that the judge in the instant case held reservations about admitting a criminal defendant's possibly self-serving statements to a psychiatrist. However, modern courts have generally held that statements by the accused to a psychiatrist hired for trial purposes come within Rule 803(4). United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 845, 96 S.Ct. 83, 46 L.Ed.2d 66; Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir.1967); Annot., 55 A.L.R.Fed. 689, § 5; 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence § 444, pp. 610-612. Any concerns about the lack of candor of the defendant in relating information to the psychiatrist or about the speculative nature of the psychiatrist's diagnosis may be developed through cross-examination and ultimately resolved by the jury. For the above reasons, and under cited authority, it was error to reject the proffered testimony as not coming within the Rule 803(4), W.R.E. exception to the hearsay rule.