Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marsden Motions

Text: Defendant had his first appointed counsel removed after a Marsden motion. ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44.) Defendant made several subsequent Marsden motions before and during trial. He also on several occasions informally expressed displeasure with his counsel and asked for substitution. He states on appeal that while the record of any particular Marsden motion does not by itself indicate a specific conflict between counsel and defendant, the record of the entire trial reveals an essential conflict between the defendant and his counsel resulting in a complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship.... At the heart of the conflict was a fundamental disagreement as to the defense to be presented. As noted above, defendant wanted a defense of actual innocence and mistaken identity, whereas counsel pursued the defense that defendant acted impulsively, in part under the influence of drugs an d alcohol, and lacked premeditation and deliberation. Under the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel `[a] defendant is entitled t[o substitute another appointed attorney] if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' ( People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 857, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305 ( Memro ).) Furthermore, `When a defendant seeks to discharge appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance.' ( Ibid. ) We review the court's rulings for an abuse of discretion. ( Ibid. ) A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. (See People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1162, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730.) Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an irreconcilable conflict. When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is `captain of the ship' and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) In the present case, trial counsel decided, in light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant on the question of his guilt for the six murders, to argue lack of premeditation. Counsel likely `was trying to enhance his credibility with the jury by [all but] conceding his client's guilt of the offense of which the evidence was overwhelming, and to focus his efforts on the weakest link in the state's case' ( Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 858, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305). That tactical choice was not ineffective representation on counsel's part. Defendant does not assert on appeal that the trial court failed to permit him adequate opportunity to present his Marsden motions. Nor, from our review of the record, is there evidence that counsel lacked diligence or competence in other respects. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's various Marsden motions.