Opinion ID: 621507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Joint Defense Privilege

Text: The joint defense privilege was first recognized by our court in Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir.1964). Employees of two different oil companies had been summonsed to testify before the Grand Jury; each was interviewed by their respective counsel. Counsel then prepared memoranda about the information received and exchanged such memoranda in confidence in order to apprise each other as to the nature and scope of the inquiry proceeding before the Grand Jury and to make their representation of their clients in connection with the Grand Jury investigation and any resulting litigation, more effective. Id. at 348-49. When the government later sought to discover these memoranda, asserting that the attorney-client privilege had been waived by disclosing the information to third parties, we rejected the claim and ordered the subpoena quashed. Id. at 350. We reasoned that the communication was made for the limited and restricted purpose to assist in asserting their common claims and that thus the recipient of the copy stands under the same restraints arising from the privileged character of the document as the counsel who furnished it, and consequently he has no right, and cannot be compelled, to produce or disclose its contents. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir.1965) ([W]here two or more persons who are subject to possible indictment in connection with the same transactions make confidential statements to their attorneys, these statements, even though they are exchanged between the attorneys, should be privileged to the extent that they concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in possible subsequent proceedings.). The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that the joint defense privilege is an extension of the attorney-client privilege. United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a JDA had established an implied attorney-client relationship between the codefendants and their counsel); see also United States v. Austin, 416 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.2005) (recognizing joint defense privilege as extension of attorney client privilege that protects not only the confidentiality of communications passing from a party to his or her attorney but also `from one party to the attorney for another party where a joint defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their respective counsel') (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir.1989)). The privilege is also referred to as the common interest privilege or doctrine, because it has not been limited to criminal defense situations or even situations in which litigation has commenced: Whether the jointly interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for the joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a common interest in litigation should be able to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir.1990). Here, the district court assumed for the sake of argument that an implied JDA existed, but nonetheless held that no such agreement should or can be allowed to bar discovery or use of pertinent communications to and from trial counsel in a later Section 2255 proceeding. 2010 WL 5399216, at . The court reasoned that the joint defense agreement does not create a duty of loyalty to an individual who is not one's own client, and it is not the same as joint representation. Id. at . The court thus concluded that communications between counsel are more appropriately characterized as work product communications, intended to aid in preparation for litigation, and that such privilege is not absolute; the court went on to hold that there existed the required necessity and unavailability by other means for discovery of the work product. Id. at -9; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3). On appeal, the government does not advance the rationale proffered by the district court. [3] Rather, it argues that (1) Gonzalez did not sufficiently establish on the record that a JDA actually existed, (2) that such an agreement could not exist in the circumstances here, where Gonzalez's defense was adverse to Paiz's, and (3) even if one existed, the court correctly held that Paiz's section 2255 claim acted as a unilateral waiver of the privilege in these circumstances.