Opinion ID: 2548438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arbitrary, Capricious, or Unreasonable

Text: Because we hold that the city council's action was legislative in nature, we turn next to the question of whether the circuit judge clearly erred in holding that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. PH contends that the circuit judge erred in finding that there were legitimate concerns regarding the rezoning request and that the City did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. It specifically asserts that (1) the city council acted outside of its authority in considering factors that were only to be analyzed by the planning commission; (2) the city council's decision constitutes illegal reverse spot zoning; (3) the city council's actions constituted improper contract zoning; and (4) the city council's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We begin by observing once more that the standard for review of legislative acts by the city council is well settled. The court should affirm the city council's decision unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See City of Lowell, 323 Ark. at 336-37, 916 S.W.2d at 97. The circuit judge highlighted the following factors on the arbitrariness point and made his findings and conclusions as follows: 1. The deference that must be given to the city council's actions as being legitimate. 2. The unique configuration of the property in question here today. 3. The location of the property as it relates to the elementary school and the safety concerns expressed by the citizens, especially in light of Mr. Pennington's recommendations of what he would do to go above and beyond what was required under R-1. 4. Mr. Castain's assessment that an alleyway in the back may be better, given the fact that an R-1 zoning would require all lots be given access to Country Club, which is a collector street. 5. The Court finds at this point in time that there are legitimate concerns regarding the rezoning request and that the City did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. 6. With respect to PH's contentions regarding Richardson v. City of Little Rock Planning Comm'n, 295 Ark. 189, 747 S.W.2d 116 (1988) and reverse spot zoning, the Court thinks the one thing that is very imperative is that the cases all talk about property that is similarly situated. Just because the property is surrounded by R-1 does not require that the city council automatically rezone this property as R-1. The Jefferson Place, Applewood, Westfield and White Oak Drive areas all have been zoned as R-1 and developed and do not dump onto the collector street. I think that is different and shows that those properties, as developed, are not similarly situated as it relates to the property in question. So I do not find that Richardson controls. 7. The Court does not find any reverse spot zoning or attempt to contract zone. 8. Based upon, but not limited to, the above and forgoing, the Court hereby denies all the claims of PH, LLC. This court's standard of review on appeal is also well settled. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Little Rock, 279 Ark. 4, 648 S.W.2d 454 (1983); see also Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2009). This court will affirm the circuit judge's findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 7, 648 S.W.2d at 456; see also City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. at 442, 619 S.W.2d at 667. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court based on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed; disputed facts and determinations of credibility are within the province of the fact-finder. See, e.g., Chavers v. Epsco, Inc., 352 Ark. 65, 70, 98 S.W.3d 421, 423 (2003).
PH devotes a substantial part of its brief before this court to its argument that the city council considered impermissible factors. PH specifically maintains that the Planning Commission is vested with the exclusive authority to administer the Subdivision Regulations regarding the development of land and `provisions of access to lots and parcels.' PH contends that once the planning commission determined that the proposed plat met the minimum requirements under Conway's Subdivision Regulations for an R-1 zoning designation, this court's decision in Richardson v. City of Little Rock Planning Commission precluded the city council from weighing traffic and safety concerns in deciding whether to grant the rezoning request. 295 Ark. 189, 747 S.W.2d 116 (1988). This argument must fail. In Richardson, a landowner submitted a subdivision application to the Little Rock Planning Commission, which was denied. The landowner brought an action in circuit court challenging the denial, and the judge found that, even though certain technical violations of the subdivision regulation were not the basis for the planning commission's denial, nevertheless the commission had the discretion to disapprove the application. This court reversed, holding that [w]hen a subdivision ordinance specifies minimum standards to which a preliminary plat must conform, it is arbitrary as a matter of law to deny approval of a plan that meets those standards. Id. at 191-92, 747 S.W.2d at 117. PH argues in the instant case that the city council's denial of his rezoning petition was an end run around Richardson because the city council expressed traffic concerns that were only to be weighed by the planning commission in determining whether to approve the preliminary plat. We disagree. Nothing in Richardson prevents the city council from considering potential traffic problems or public safety in deciding whether to rezone. In fact, the Richardson case specifically says that if the plat is within the use permitted by the zoning classification and meets the development regulations set forth in the subdivision ordinance, then the plat by definition is in `harmony' with the existing subdivisions. Id. at 192, 747 S.W.2d at 117 (emphasis added). In the instant case, the preliminary plat was not within the use permitted by the zoning classification because the land was still zoned A-1. The fact that the planning commission approved a preliminary plat, in the event the land was rezoned to R-1, does not automatically entitle PH to have the property rezoned. We further observe that PH cites no authority for the proposition that the city council was precluded from considering traffic and safety concerns in assessing its rezoning request. It is well settled that this court requires parties to cite authority for arguments made on appeal. See, e.g., Gatzke v. Weiss, 375 Ark. 207, 215, 289 S.W.3d 455, 461 (2008). The circuit judge's decision that Richardson did not apply in the instant case and that the city council's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable was not clearly erroneous.
PH also claims that the city council's denial of the rezoning request was reverse spot zoning because the property is an agricultural island in a sea of residential. This court has acknowledged that spot zoning, by definition, is invalid because it amounts to an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable treatment of a limited area within a particular district. See Riddell v. City of Brinkley, 272 Ark. 84, 87, 612 S.W.2d 116, 117 (1981) (quoting R. Wright and S. Webber, Land Use (1978)). Furthermore, we have said that spot zoning is arbitrary because it departs from the comprehensive treatment or privileges not in harmony with the other use classifications in the area and without any apparent circumstances which call for different treatment.  Id. (emphasis added). Reverse spot zoning has been recognized where a city arbitrarily refuses to rezone property to bring it in conformity with the surrounding property. See Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 132, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (Reverse spot zoning is a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.). The circuit judge did not clearly err in finding that there was no reverse spot zoning in the instant case and that the city council's decision was reasonable and based on legitimate concerns. According to the testimony of seven aldermen, they denied PH's request based on the unique configuration of the land involved and the restrictions of an R-1 zoning classification. They also emphasized legitimate traffic and safety reasons for the denial. We further note that the instant case is distinguishable from the cases cited by PH from other jurisdictions in that the city council has not refused to rezone PH's property from agricultural to residential. Rather, it determined that R-1 was not the appropriate residential zoning classification. In City of Conway, this court affirmed the circuit judge's finding that the city acted arbitrarily in refusing to rezone the landowner's property from residential to business. The circuit judge based the decision, in part, on the fact that the property on all four sides of the parcel in question had already been rezoned to business. 266 Ark. at 410, 584 S.W.2d at 13. In that case, however, the evidence supported the circuit judge's additional finding that the city actually wanted to purchase the property from the landowner, and its denial of the rezoning request was arbitrary because it was aimed at inducing the landowner to sell to the city. Id. That is a very different scenario from that set out in the instant case. As a final point, this court has repeatedly stated that the fact that property is surrounded by parcels with different zoning designations does not automatically entitle a landowner to have his or her property rezoned. See id. at 409, 584 S.W.2d at 13. We have said that this is so even though the highest and best use of the property might be other than the current zone designation. Id. The City of Conway court clearly said that [i]f we were to allow any property abutting business property to be rezoned as business property, there would be no need of a zoning ordinance in the first place. Id. We affirm on this point.
PH also urges that the city council's suggestion that it would consider rezoning the property to Planned Use Development (PUD) as an alternative residential designation indicates that it intended to force improper contract zoning on PH. Contract zoning occurs when there is an agreement between a property owner and a local government in which the owner agrees to certain conditions in return for the government's rezoning or enforceable promise to rezone. See Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 352 Ark. 315, 322, 101 S.W.3d 221, 226 (2003). The City of West Memphis case indicates that some jurisdictions hold that contract zoning is prohibited and others hold that it is permissible. Id. However, this court did not determine whether contract zoning would be permitted in Arkansas in City of West Memphis and has not done so since. Id. We likewise decline to do so in the instant case. PH has not shown this court that there was an agreement to rezone the property or that it agreed to any conditions proposed by the city council. Furthermore, despite the citation to authority from other jurisdictions regarding contract zoning, PH has not cited this court to any case in which a court found improper contract zoning where a city council considered a different, more suitable, zone designation in determining whether to approve a petition to rezone. Instead, PH makes the conclusory statement that the only purpose for requiring PH to go through the PUD in this instance is to allow the City to have subjective control over the development and to exact promises from PH as a quid pro quo for rezoning. As already discussed, however, that is not the only reason the city council might prefer the PUD. The record reflects that the PUD, unlike the R-1 designation, could accommodate the city council's legitimate concerns about traffic and safety.
PH finally contends that the city council's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. This point on appeal, though, incorrectly frames our standard of review. The circuit judge determined that the city council's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by any rational basis. As has already been discussed, the circuit judge did not clearly err in finding that there were legitimate, reasonable concerns about rezoning the property. Affirmed.