Opinion ID: 2972386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Petitioners’ objections

Text: Petitioners argue in support of their petition for review that the IJ and BIA misinterpreted the definition of “persecution,” improperly considered, disregarded, and/or distorted substantial evidence submitted in support of the application, and made a decision against the great weight of the evidence. Petitioners contend that the issue to be resolved is whether a reasonable person would consider the actions taken against them to be “offensive.” In arguing that such actions are offensive and constitute persecution, petitioners place heavy reliance on a publication that they characterize as the “primer for adducing whether an activity constitutes persecution,” which is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2d ed. 1992). Petitioners place particular emphasis on ¶ 51 of the Handbook, which they contend defines “persecution” as “an unjustified threat of serious harm, including but not limited to a threat to life or freedom.” Petitioners assert that the United Supreme Court has acknowledged that a prior edition of the Handbook provides “significant guidance” in construing the definition of “refugee.” See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1217 (1987). Petitioners argue that being targeted for mistreatment and subjected to serious threats and attacks by “politically-motivated thugs” associated with the political party that was to become the government of Albania rises well above mere harassment and constitutes persecution. Petitioners further allege that they were denied the due process to which aliens are entitled in connection with deportation proceedings as a result of the IJ’s failure to allow a closing argument at the hearing on the merits. Petitioners claim that a closing argument is part of a fair hearing and that the denial of an opportunity to present one resulted in a fundamentally unfair decision. Finally, petitioners claim that the IJ and the BIA abused their discretion in denying petitioners’ claims for relief. Petitioners argue that, given the facts described in their testimony, the case appears to have been decided contrary to established policy and precedent. In particular, petitioners argue that the BIA’s concern with an alleged lack of specificity in Mrs. Gilaj’s testimony as to how police officers “provoked [her] as a woman” demonstrates the inadequacy of the BIA’s decision-making.