Opinion ID: 394034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Being at the Mercy of the Parole Commission is Part of the Punishment

Text: 53 Thus, while it is uncertain that the guidelines in fact work to Warren's detriment, and while the functional basis of the ex post facto clause is not substantially implicated in Warren's case, we do not rest our decision on those grounds alone. What clinches the case is that Warren was sentenced to be held in federal prison at the discretion howsoever exercised of the parole authorities, so that guidelines which merely rationalize the exercise of that discretion do not offend the ex post facto clause. 54 The key here is that Warren was not sentenced under a law fixing a definite term of imprisonment, or even an indefinite but more or less predictable term. Warren was convicted under a statute committing the determination of his period of confinement to the almost unfettered discretion of the Parole Board to be exercised at some future date. In fact, at the time of Warren's crime and conviction, the law failed to entitle Warren even to an explanation of the Board's action in his case. Moreover, because the Board's actions were utterly within its discretion, the law did not provide any meaningful recourse to review elsewhere. A prisoner seeking parole was like an alien seeking entry into the United States. 55 55 A change merely in the manner in which the Board, now the Commission, exercises its discretion thus cannot offend the ex post facto clause. The punishment prescribed for Warren's armed bank robbery was service of a minimum term in prison plus whatever additional term (up to a maximum set at the time of sentencing) as the Board, in its sole discretion, should later determine. The power the Parole Commission now has over Warren is an essential part of the punishment for the crime he committed. The existence of that power of discretion in the Commission has not been altered since Warren committed his crime. So, although the manner in which the Commission exercises its discretion has changed perhaps for the better Warren's punishment has not been augmented since his conviction. No promise, real or implied, was ever held out that the Board would exercise its discretion in some set fashion. The Board was free to act as it saw fit, and such was or could have been known to Warren at the time of his plea bargain. 56 Warren is charged with the knowledge at the time of his crime and conviction that any number of possible factors could enter into the Board's future exercise of its discretion, with many of those factors susceptible to change over time. One factor, for example, could be the extent of overcrowding in federal prisons. A high level of overcrowding when Warren came up for parole might tilt the Board in the direction of releasing him to make room for even more dangerous criminals or to prevent his progress from actually being impeded by further confinement in an overcrowded institution. On the other hand, a situation in which federal prisons had only partial occupancy, perhaps as a result of an utterly unpredictable spurt in the construction of new facilities, might propel the Board to confine Warren for a longer duration. Either way, Warren cannot complain that a change in the Board's calculations after the date of his crime and conviction has violated the ex post facto clause. Nor, for example, could he complain that, shortly before his case came up for review, a photocopy of a scholarly article espousing the view that men like Warren rarely can be rehabilitated had been passed from Board member to Board member. And so forth. 57 In short, Warren was not sentenced to be considered for parole and reparole by a Board acting as the Board would have acted had it met to pass on his case at the time of his conviction. He was sentenced to be considered for parole at some much later time, when the nation's circumstances, the Board's membership, and the prevailing views of penologists all could have shifted against him. Under the penal theory behind the parole system, Warren's sentence was deliberately designed to be indeterminate within a broad range so that the precise date of his release could be determined by the best professional judgment available at the time of his release as to his prospects for a law-abiding life, among other things. It is contrary to the spirit of that theory to freeze the exercise of discretion by the parole authorities at the moment of Warren's crime. The punishment prescribed for Warren was to be held after his minimum term at the mercy of parole authorities exercising their judgment as best they could. The mere fact that the Parole Commission's mercy is now channeled, structured and rationalized by a formal system of guidelines does not worsen Warren's position. He was sentenced to be held at their discretion. He is being held at their discretion. Such are the wages of crime. 58 It is important to point out that, precisely because Warren was sentenced to be held at the discretion of the parole authorities, under the ex post facto clause he is entitled to an opportunity to have that discretion exercised; anything less would impermissibly augment his penalty. 56 But an entitlement to have discretion exercised does not imply an entitlement to have it exercised in a particular way; the essence of discretion is the absence of fixed rules. We thus hold that the application of the Parole Commission's reparole guidelines to Warren does not offend the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 57 59 We note that we are joined in this conclusion by all Circuits that have considered the question save one. 58 60 Affirmed.