Opinion ID: 223527
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Severance Motions

Text: The district court initially severed the Defendants from their alleged co-conspirators in the Benabe trial, reducing the number of defendants in each case from fourteen to seven. This initial severance was a Solomonic compromise between the numerous and mutually exclusive severance proposals advanced by various defendants. Naturally, it was neither a perfect solution nor a pleasing one for the Defendants who sought individual trials. After a mistrial was declared as to Crowder due to a hung jury in the Benabe trial, the district court granted the government's motion to add him as a defendant in this case. Following this addition, and again after some defense counsels' opening statements, and then throughout trial, several of the Defendants renewed their severance motions; the district court denied each motion in turn. [2] On appeal, Handley, Lechuga, Rodriguez, and Crowder argue that the erroneous denials of their individual severance motions unduly prejudiced them. They request new trials where they would each be tried individually. The Defendants do not challenge the propriety of the initial joinder of each Aurora Deuce indicted in 2006 in a single trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b). Rather, they contend that the joinder of so many defendants  fourteen at the outset and even eight in their resulting trial  was inherently prejudicial and warranted discretionary relief from the district court. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow a district court to separate defendants or counts in light of possible prejudice: If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires. Fed. R.Crim.P. 14(a). As the permissive language of the rule indicates, the decision whether to grant a defendant's severance motion under Rule 14 is discretionary, and we review the district court's denial of such a motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 539 (7th Cir.2009). We will reverse the conviction on severance grounds only if actual prejudice resulted from the denial of the severance motion, United States v. Lopez, 6 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir.1993), and such prejudice requires that the defendant have been deprived of a fair trial, not merely a better chance at acquittal than an individual trial may have afforded, United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 948 (7th Cir. 1990). When alleged co-conspirators are indicted together, as they were here, there is a strong preference that they be tried together. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537-38, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); Alviar, 573 F.3d at 539. Considerations of judicial economy, consistency of verdicts, and systematic efficiency inform this preference, Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, as [o]ur system of criminal justice would crumple beneath the weight of individual trials if every defendant who demanded severance was provided one, McAnderson, 914 F.2d at 949. But we acknowledge that defendants may face some prejudicial spillover in large complex cases, and we therefore expect district courts to balance the risk to defendants who move for severance against the benefits gained by joint trials. Id. District courts should continue to evaluate the risk of undue prejudice resulting from joint trials throughout the proceedings. United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir.1985). In the end, however, Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39, 113 S.Ct. 933. Alternative mitigative measures, including limiting instructions, may suffice to offset prejudice where severance would be too drastic of a remedy. Id. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. On appeal, four of the Defendants allege undue prejudice, in that the joint trial raised the likelihood that they were convicted based on mere association with their co-defendants rather than on their own culpability. In general, the four argue that the logic behind Judge Castillo's initial severance of the fourteen-defendant trial into two separate trials applied with equal force to their resulting eight-defendant grouping. The trial lasted longer than two months, the indictment covered a period of three years, and the acts of exceedingly violent men were discussed at length. Specifically, the four contend that the district court abused its discretion in denying their severance motions despite the risk of evidence pertaining only to other defendants spilling over to them in the eyes of the jury  a risk that is heightened in large multi-defendant trials. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. We will consider each of their arguments independently, mindful that a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. Our touchstone is the jury's capacity to follow its instructions and consider the evidence as to each defendant independently. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1200 (7th Cir.1980). Handley sought an individual trial (or a narrow grouping with Lechuga and Rodriguez) because he (and the other two) were not accused of any murder or attempted murder. He argues that the district court acknowledged the possibility of prejudice but denied his severance motion in deference to judicial economy  despite the fact that no economy was actually realized through the joint trial. He further contends, without reference to any precedent, that it is obviously prejudicial to subject a defendant to a trial almost two months longer than an independent trial would have been. He touts his minimal involvement in the gang, as signified by a general lack of testimony about him particularly, the lack of drug charges against him, and the standing punishment order against him for his poor participation in the gang's activities. He concludes that he was highly prejudiced by spillover evidence, given the great disparity of the evidence against him compared to that against his co-defendants. We have repeatedly rejected similar arguments, noting that where the evidence against the appellant sufficed to convict him of the charges against him specifically, jury instructions and other mitigative measures sufficed to limit prejudicial spillover and rendered the severance denial proper. See, e.g., Alviar, 573 F.3d at 539 ([T]he fact that the government has greater evidence against one co-defendant does not automatically give the other defendant grounds for severance.); United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir.2003); McAnderson, 914 F.2d at 949; Hedman, 630 F.2d at 1200. Here, Handley stood charged only with racketeering conspiracy, and he denied only his participation in the conspiracy while conceding his knowledge of its existence. Recordings and testimony at trial implicated him directly in the conspiracy; although this evidence might have been susceptible to multiple interpretations, it was sufficient to sustain Handley's conviction. See United States v. Caliendo, 910 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Hall, 212 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir.2000) (Merely ceasing participation in the conspiracy, even for extended periods, is not enough.) ( quoting United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1477 (7th Cir.1991)). Further, his claim that he would not have been convicted in the absence of evidence admitted in the trial that would have been irrelevant and inadmissible in a separate trial is undermined by the jury's inability to reach a verdict regarding his co-defendant Perez. Like Handley, Perez was not charged with the murder and narcotics conspiracies, and the jury demonstrated its capacity to act on its limiting evidentiary and deliberation instructions by giving individual consideration to the defendants and the evidence against them. See Alviar, 573 F.3d at 539 (There was no actual prejudice to [the defendant] on account of `spillover' evidence because the jury distinguished between him and his co-defendants.). The bottom line is that Handley's simple disparity-in-the-evidence argument does not render the district court's disposition of his severance motion erroneous. The evidence presented against him was sufficient to support his conviction, [3] the more robust evidence against his codefendants notwithstanding. And the insufficiency of his disparity argument applies to both the quantity of the evidence against his co-defendants as well as its nature (describing violent acts). The jury was instructed to consider each defendant's case independently, and we assume that it heeded those instructions even though Handley argues that he was the smallest player in this drama. See McAnderson, 914 F.2d at 949. Indeed, the record strongly suggests that the jury did follow its instructions, given the individualized verdicts it returned. Lechuga also argues that the denial of his severance motion exposed him to undue prejudice. Like Handley, he argues that he was not indicted on any acts of violence and that the evidence of his co-defendants' acts of murder and assault tainted his case. He also contends, however, that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy in the mid-1990s. He therefore argues that, by refusing to sever him from the Defendants' trial, the district court prejudiced the jury against him in three ways. First, the evidence of his co-defendants' violent acts could not have been introduced against him in a separate trial, where he would have stipulated to many of the facts the government sought to prove in this trial. Second, he claims that there would have been no reason to empanel an anonymous jury in a separate case because he was not accused of violent acts. Third, a post-arrest statement from his co-defendant Morales, stating that Morales and other Senior Deuces were rolled back to Junior status, was inconsistent with his theory of defense and would not have been admissible in a separate trial against him. Lechuga's defense  unique among the Defendants  does not change the outcome of our severance analysis. The acts of violence forming the backbone of the gang's racketeering activities would have been admissible against Lechuga in a separate trial, even if he were not accused of perpetrating those acts himself. Further, he cites no authority suggesting that his withdrawal defense would preclude the introduction of this competent evidence, see Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 ([A] fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence.), and even his alleged willingness to stipulate would not necessarily bar the government from proving its case as it chose, see United States v. Phillippi, 442 F.3d 1061, 1064 (7th Cir.2006); United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1022 (7th Cir.2009). Further, Lechuga's withdrawal defense was quite uncertain; his recorded statements, far from showing an affirmative act to withdraw, indicated that he was willing to participate in the Deuces' activities during his purported withdrawal: I've told some of you in the room before that, hey, if there's somethin' I can do ... I'll help you out. While he claims to have been inactive for some time, [h]is not taking actions in furtherance of the conspiracy is not the same as taking affirmative action to withdraw. United States v. Wren, 363 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir.2004), vacated on Booker grounds sub nom. Yarbor v. United States, 543 U.S. 1101, 125 S.Ct. 1021, 160 L.Ed.2d 1005 (2005); see also Hall, 212 F.3d at 1024. Accordingly, his planned withdrawal defense did not distinguish his case from Handley's, so Lechuga cannot show prejudice requiring severance as a result of the evidence of his co-conspirators' violence. See United States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir.2004). Lechuga's second argument is likewise without merit. The violent tendencies of the individual on trial are not the sole determinant for jury anonymity. See Mansoori, 304 F.3d at 650-51. While Lechuga himself was not accused of any discrete acts of violence in the indictment, he tacitly admits that the organization engaged in violence, referring to numerous senseless acts of violence committed by other younger, active members of the Insane Deuces and describing his co-defendants as those who terrorized the streets of Aurora. As discussed above, some of the Aurora Deuces remained on the street, and one of the gang's purposes was to protect its members after they are arrested and if they are incarcerated. The sufficient reasons for empaneling an anonymous jury in this case may have applied, even if not as strongly, in an independent trial for Lechuga or for any smaller subset of the Defendants. The admission of Morales's statement  that he and other Senior Deuces had been rolled back to Junior status  also did not require severance at Lechuga's request. To succeed on this point, Lechuga must rebut the dual presumptions that a jury will (1) capably sort through the evidence and (2) follow instructions from the court to consider each defendant separately. Lopez, 6 F.3d at 1286. His only argument was that the statement was inconsistent with his withdrawal defense and was therefore prejudicial. But neither Morales's statement nor the testimony introducing it mentioned Lechuga by name, and recordings of Lechuga's own words demonstrated his reinvolvement in the gang's activities in 2002. Even if Lechuga's withdrawal defense had some merit, any minimal prejudice arising from the introduction of Morales's statement was adequately tempered by the district court's repeated instruction that Morales's statement was to be considered only against Morales. See United States v. Marshall, 75 F.3d 1097, 1105 (7th Cir.1996). We next consider Rodriguez's allegation of substantial prejudice from the severance denial. He proposed three separate trial groupings of the indictees before ultimately seeking an independent bench trial of his own. Like Handley and Lechuga, he argues that the evidence against his co-defendants prejudiced him and that an anonymous jury would not have been necessary in his various proposed separate trials. As these arguments are indistinguishable from his co-defendants', we reject them based on our earlier analysis. Rodriguez's only new argument is that, five times during the trial, witnesses and government counsel referred to him (Miguel Rodriguez) as Miguel Martinez. [4] Rodriguez argues that these misstatements prejudiced the jury against him because the jurors could have confused his culpability with Martinez's greater culpability. We can see neither how an individual trial would have prevented such unintentional misstatements nor how the jury could have confused Rodriguez with a fugitive who was not before the court. Of the five misstatements, one was immediately corrected by the witness, another was promptly corrected on counsel's objection, and the remaining three were not brought to the court's attention. There is no indication that these understandable and fleeting misnomers were intentional or related to the presence of the several Defendants in the trial. Further, Martinez was charged with nine murders or attempted murders while Rodriguez was charged with no violent acts, and Martinez was not tried in the same proceeding. Despite Rodriguez's assertion to the contrary, the jury did not have an impossible or insurmountable task in distinguishing Rodriguez from Martinez during its deliberations. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodriguez's severance motions. Crowder is the last appellant alleging actual prejudice from the district court's denial of his severance motion. He was grouped with the Defendants after the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charges against him in the preceding Benabe trial. He argues that he was not an official Insane Deuce, while each defendant in the second trial was an Insane Deuce gang member whose responsibility was to engage in all gang activities including selling drugs and shooting rival gang members. [5] (Appellants' Joint Br. at 56.) According to Crowder, his inclusion with the Defendants subjected the jury to evidence of his myriad violent acts that were extraneous to the Insane Deuces' activities and to evidence of his codefendants' acts that did not involve him. This evidentiary overlap, he concludes, left the jury unable to distinguish between his non-gang-related violent acts and his participation in the racketeering conspiracy. As his counsel summarized during oral argument, Crowder was one of the most violent individuals in this case.... [T]he absence of violence of his co-defendants made him appear much more heinous and increased the likelihood that the jury would take that into consideration and not appropriately examine his intent or agreement to join the conspiracy. Crowder's argument, despite being creative, is unconvincing. While he might not have formally been an Insane Deuce, the relevant question was whether he had joined the racketeering conspiracy. The government's theory was that the shootings Crowder committed were intended to benefit the Deuces, were part of the racketeering conspiracy, and were examples of Crowder merely mistaking the victims for Latin Kings. Crowder's argument that these were unrelated acts calls into question the weight of the evidence presented by the government, not its admissibility or prejudicial impact. It was the province of the jury to determine whether the evidence against Crowder indicated that he was acting as a member of the racketeering conspiracy. Further, others among the Defendants stood accused of violence in their own actions, including a plot to kill an Aurora Deuce suspected of cooperating with authorities and two murders in retaliation against Latin Kings. Even if we were inclined to hold that a violent actor could be prejudiced by juxtaposition with his (comparatively) benign co-conspirators in a joint trial, Crowder's circumstances simply do not fit that mold. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Crowder's motion to sever.