Opinion ID: 820615
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Frederick

Text: Mr. Frederick raises five issues. He argues that the District Court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress wiretap evidence; (2) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence; (3) denying his various motions for mistrial; and (4) denying his motion for a new trial. Finally, he contends that cumulative error throughout the proceedings denied him a fair trial.
Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence The government’s case against Mr. Frederick (and the others) was based in significant part on evidence derived from the wiretap. Prior to trial, Mr. Frederick 7 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 8 of 41 moved “for entry of an Order suppressing wiretap evidence, [and] other evidence [derived from the wiretap] under the ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.” As the basis for his motion, Mr. Frederick alleged that “[t]he Government’s Affidavit in support of its Application to wiretap [his] cell phone contain[ed] . . . misleading statements made recklessly.” The District Court referred Mr. Frederick’s motion to the Magistrate Judge, who recommended that the motion to suppress be denied because Frederick had not established that the wiretap affidavit would fail for want of probable cause absent the alleged “misleading statements.” The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation without discussion and entered an order denying Mr. Frederick’s motion to suppress. Here, Mr. Frederick reasserts his claim that “the Wiretap Affidavit contained misrepresentations or omissions which required suppression of the wiretap evidence.” Alternatively, Mr. Frederick argues that “at a minimum, [he] should have been afforded a full and fair . . . [evidentiary] hearing” on this issue, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978). “In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we review factual findings for clear error and the court’s application of law to those facts de novo.” United States v. Goddard, 312 F.3d 1360, 1362 (11th Cir. 2002). “The facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. 8 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 9 of 41 “[I]n reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the entire record, including trial testimony.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007). Franks v. Delaware provides, in pertinent part, that where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 438 U.S. at 155–56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676 (emphasis added).6 Mr. Frederick argues that three paragraphs of the forty-page warrant affidavit contained “misleading statements,” such that the wiretap evidence should have been suppressed. But Mr. Frederick has not explained how the purported misleading statements were “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Id. If probable cause still exists once the statements identified as misleading are extracted from the warrant, there is no need to conduct a hearing and no Franks violation. Id. at 171–72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684–85; see also United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 492 (11th Cir. 2011). Because Mr. Frederick failed to do this analysis, he has abandoned any claim that 6 The rule in Franks has since been held applicable to affidavits submitted in support of courtordered electronic surveillance. E.g., United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 581 n.18 (11th Cir. 2011). 9 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 10 of 41 “the allegedly false statement[s] [were] necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. He therefore cannot prevail in his arguments that the District Court erred in failing to suppress this evidence, and in failing to afford him a full evidentiary hearing on the issue. See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The law is by now well settled in this Circuit that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, Mr. Frederick moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The District Court denied Mr. Frederick’s motion. Mr. Frederick argues here that this ruling was error as to Counts 10–13, 16–20, 23, 28, 30, 31, 33, 39, and 41, and the firearms offenses as alleged in Counts 42 and 43.7 We review de novo a District Court’s denial of judgment of acquittal on sufficiency of evidence grounds, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the Government’s favor. United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1290– 7 Mr. Frederick does not argue on appeal that the District Court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion as to Count 1 (conspiracy), or Counts 21, 22, and 23 (possession with intent to distribute cocaine). 10 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 11 of 41 91 (11th Cir. 2011). “A jury’s verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Herrera, 931 F.2d 761, 762 (11th Cir. 1991). “The evidence need not be inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and the jury is free to choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence presented at trial.” United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir. 1989). But “[w]hen the government relies on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences, not mere speculation, must support the conviction.” United States v. Mendez, 528 F.3d 811, 814 (11th Cir. 2008). We have little trouble rejecting Frederick’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the substantive drug counts in the indictment. To support a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government must show that the defendant had (1) knowing (2) possession of the drugs and (3) an intent to distribute them. See United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012). The evidence at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that Mr. Frederick and Mr. Burke operated a drug distribution network generating upwards of $1,500 revenue each day from the 3171/3173 duplex. Frederick was the “boss man” and was intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the Coconut Grove drug ring. He was solely responsible for sales of the “big stuff,” and shared 11 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 12 of 41 responsibility with Burke for distribution of the “small stuff.” The jury heard testimony about this from several co-conspirators, and received a number of transcripts of phone conversations between Mr. Burke and Mr. Frederick detailing the specific drug transactions underlying the challenged counts. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Mr. Frederick knowingly possessed the drugs charged in these counts, and intended to distribute them. We also have little trouble rejecting Frederick’s claim that there was insufficient evidence of possession to convict him of the drug and gun offenses resulting from the search of his Sunny Isles condominium, based on his argument that “there was no proof [he] ever exercised any dominion or control over the drugs and firearms at issue in those counts.” It is well established that possession can be either actual or constructive, and that “‘[c]onstructive possession’ of a thing occurs if a person doesn’t have actual possession of it, but has both the power and the intention to take control over it later.” Cochran, 683 F.3d at 1316 (quoting 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal), Special Instruction 6 (2010)). Here, the jury received evidence that in addition to drugs and the gun, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents recovered several pieces of Mr. Frederick’s identification, and mail sent to him at the condominium. This evidence was sufficient for the jury 12 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 13 of 41 to reasonably determine that Frederick possessed “both the power and intention to take control” of the drugs and gun recovered in the condominium. Id.
Motions for Mistrial In the course of his trial, Mr. Frederick filed three written motions for mistrial alleging a number of discovery violations, Jencks Act violations, Giglio violations, Rule 404(b) violations, and a failure to correct misleading testimony. The government responded to the allegations in Mr. Frederick’s motions and the District Court denied relief on all grounds. On appeal, Mr. Frederick argues that the District Court erred in failing to grant his motions for mistrial. We review a District Court’s decision not to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009). “A mistrial should be granted if the defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially affected. This occurs when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the [alleged error], the outcome of the trial would have been different.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen the record contains sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any error was harmless.” Id. Mr. Frederick’s claim that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motions for mistrial does not prevail. First, any failure by the government to comply with the requirements of the Standing Discovery Order was rendered 13 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 14 of 41 harmless by the substantial independent evidence of Mr. Frederick’s guilt. Second, Mr. Frederick’s claim that the government failed to comply with the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, is not persuasive because the material the government failed to turn over—specifically, the 1999 federal grand jury testimony of government’s witness Donald Grant related to the murder of Grant’s sister—was not related in any way to the subject matter of Grant’s testimony in this trial. See id. § 3500(b) (requiring the government, upon motion of the defendant, to “produce any statement . . . of the [government’s] witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” (emphasis added)). Third, Mr. Frederick offers nothing to rebut the government’s statement to the District Court that it had fully complied with its obligations under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972), so we would be hard-pressed to say that the District Court abused its discretion by relying on those representations as true. Fourth, the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) violations alleged by Mr. Frederick involved criminal activities inextricably intertwined with the criminal conspiracy and therefore not governed by the requirements for admission of evidence under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1054–55 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were 14 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 15 of 41 demonstrative of the conspirators’ conduct). Finally, Mr. Frederick impeached the government’s witness on precisely the misleading testimony that he now claims the government failed to correct. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Frederick’s various motions for mistrial.
Motion for New Trial After the jury returned its verdict, Mr. Frederick filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. In support of that motion, Mr. Frederick incorporated the same grounds that he alleged in his three written motions for mistrial, discussed above. The government opposed in writing. Although there is no docket entry, we gather that the District Court denied this motion. Mr. Frederick appeals this denial. We review the District Court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). We have already concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Frederick’s motions for mistrial on these grounds. For those same reasons, it also did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Frederick’s motion for new trial on these grounds. 15 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 16 of 41
Finally, Mr. Frederick contends that “cumulative error warrant[s] reversal of his convictions.” Specifically, he draws our attention to “the Judge’s failure to grant a mistrial” and “additional errors involv[ing] evidentiary rulings.” “The cumulative error doctrine provides that an aggregation of nonreversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). “The harmlessness of cumulative error is determined by conducting the same inquiry as for individual error—courts look to see whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Mr. Frederick cannot prevail on his claim that cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. First, for reasons explained, the District Court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in denying his various motions for mistrial. Second, even if we assume without deciding that the various evidentiary rulings Mr. Frederick complains of were erroneous, he has failed to demonstrate, or offer any explanation, for how the aggregate effect of these errors substantially influenced the outcome of his trial, as required to establish that cumulative error rendered his trial unfair. See id. at 1223–24. Thus, Mr. Frederick’s cumulative error argument fails. 16 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 17 of 41