Opinion ID: 173374
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts XII, XIII, and XIV

Text: Count XII charged that, from on or about April 28, 2003, to on or about July 11, 2003, Huggins and Jermaine Franklin and others knowingly conspired to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count XIII charged that Huggins and Franklin knowingly managed a building, room, and enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully storing and distributing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 856(a)(2) and (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count XIV charged that, on or about 6 Huggins contends that Agent Ramos-Diaz’s trial testimony and Agent Miller’s notes require us to conclude that Rogers was not present in Huggins’s store on February 19, 2002, and thus there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Huggins aided and abetted the distribution of cocaine to Barner. We conclude to the contrary. At trial, Rogers testified that he was inside of Huggins’s store when Barner came in and spoke with Huggins. Barner, on the other hand, testified that Rogers was on his way into Huggins’s store as he was exiting it. Consistent with Barner’s testimony, Agent RamosDiaz testified, and Agent Miller’s notes confirmed, that Agent Ramos-Diaz saw Barner meet and speak with Rogers outside of the store. Although Huggins has identified inconsistencies among the trial testimony of Rogers, Barner, and Agent Ramos-Diaz with regard to whether Rogers was inside of Huggins’s store while Huggins was speaking with Barner, this does not establish that Rogers did not enter the store and speak with Huggins about selling cocaine to Barner on February 19, 2002. In fact, the testimony of Barner and Agent Ramos-Diaz support an inference that Rogers was headed into Huggins’s store after speaking with Barner. The jury, as the finder of fact, was entitled to draw such an inference or to credit the testimony of Rogers. Accordingly, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and these inconsistencies do not give us reason to overturn it. 18 May 28, 2003, Huggins and Franklin knowingly possessed with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal, Huggins makes three arguments with regard to these convictions. First, with regard to all three counts, he contends that there is no direct evidence that what he possessed was cocaine. With regard to Count XII, he also argues that the evidence did not support a conclusion that the conspiracy involved five or more kilograms of cocaine and that the evidence did not show an agreement between two or more persons. First, the government was not required to produce direct evidence that Huggins possessed cocaine during the conspiracy. Contrary to Huggins’s argument that the government was required to produce a chemical analysis to prove he conspired to distribute cocaine, the government may prove the identity of a controlled substance through circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 22 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that Huggins and Franklin were distributing cocaine. Significantly, three law enforcement officers testified that Huggins told them he was selling powder cocaine and that Franklin held his “stash” for him. In addition, Franklin testified that he had seen the contents of the bags Huggins brought to his apartment and that he believed the bags contained kilograms of cocaine because of their white color and rectangular shape. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Huggins was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine with Franklin. 19 With regard to Count XII, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Huggins and Franklin agreed to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and that their agreement involved more than five kilograms of cocaine. The jury heard testimony from the three law enforcement officers who interviewed Huggins at his home, and they testified that Huggins told them that Franklin held drugs for him at his apartment. The officers also testified that Huggins made comments about the quantity of drugs that Franklin held for him, and the jury could infer from this testimony that the conspiracy involved a total of more than five kilograms of cocaine. (App. at 275 (“He [Huggins] said he [Franklin] was holding one to two kilos and up to five kilos.”); 1585 (“He [Huggins] said that he [Franklin] holds one or two kilos, but less than five on a couple of occasions.”); 1713 (“Mr. Huggins stated that Jermaine Franklin has held one to two kilograms of cocaine, but less than five kilograms of cocaine a couple of times for Mr. Huggins.”)). Agent Greene also testified that Huggins said he purchased up to ten kilograms from Barnaby at one time. Franklin testified at trial that he agreed to hold Huggins’s drugs at his apartment in exchange for $1,000 a week and that Huggins would frequently bring over bags that contained packages of drugs. Although Franklin testified that he was not certain about the amount of cocaine in each bag, he stated that each bag appeared to have more than one kilogram of cocaine in it and that Huggins came by once a week between April and July of 2003 to drop off a bag of cocaine. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the conspiracy involved more than five kilograms of cocaine 20 and that Huggins and Franklin formed an agreement in which Huggins paid Franklin to store his drugs.