Opinion ID: 1418276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: By the terms of ORS 45.600 plaintiff was entitled to impeach defendant as a witness by proof of the prior conviction of any crime.

Text: The first ground on which the trial judge excluded the proof of the prior conviction for purposes of impeachment was an attempt to exercise a discretion to forbid the impeachment of a witness by proof of the prior conviction of a crime when the circumstances were such, in his opinion, as to result in prejudice. While we understand the view of those who advocate the adoption of such a rule, we had thought that the position of this court on this subject had been made abundantly clear for the benefit of both trial lawyers and trial judges in two recent decisions. ORS 45.600 provides: A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence or by evidence that his general reputation for truth is bad or that his moral character is such as to render him unworthy of belief; but he may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by his examination or by the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a crime.  (Emphasis added) In Marshall v. Martinson, 268 Or. 46, 518 P.2d 1312 (1974), after reference to our prior decisions on this subject, the majority of this court (at 49-50, 518 P.2d 1312) expressly rejected the contention that trial judges have any discretion whether to permit or forbid the impeachment by proof of conviction of any crime and said (at 51, 518 P.2d at 1314) that:    By the adoption of what is now ORS 45.600 the Oregon legislature has apparently adopted the view, as a matter of public policy, that a jury may properly find that a person who has been convicted of any crime may be less reliable as a witness than a person who has never been convicted of any crime. While we may or may not agree with this view, we believe that because ORS 45.600 is clear and unambiguous to that effect, any change to be made in this rule must be made by the legislature, rather than by this court. It follows that the trial court had no discretion to reject plaintiff's offer of proof of the prior conviction upon the ground that undue prejudice would result.    In Smith v. Durant, 271 Or. 643, 534 P.2d 955 (1975), after citing and reconsidering all of our previous decisions on this subject, the majority of this court reaffirmed its previous decision in Marshall, saying (at 661-62, 534 P.2d at 964): We do not disagree with the view that there may be a `need for revision' of ORS 45.600,    but that    such a change should be accomplished by that [legislative] means rather than by the decision of this court    particularly after so recently reaffirming in Marshall such a well established rule and one of such long standing. We recognize that the application of this rigid rule may result in occasional prejudice to the defendant in a personal injury case. The same may also be true in such a case when the defendant contends that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in the operation of his automobile. As we said, however, in Smith v. Durant, supra at 647, 534 P.2d at 957: `Prejudice' is possible in both civil and criminal cases whenever a witness is impeached by the proof of conviction of any crime. However, the question of whether and how to limit the scope of permissible impeachment for prior conviction of crime is one of public policy. In this instance, the Oregon legislature not only has power to legislate but has adopted a statute on this subject. We can neither repeal nor amend that statute, but only endeavor to see that it is applied in accordance with the intent of the legislature. It is significant that the 1975 Legislature adopted a statute which, when effective, will forbid the impeachment of witnesses by the use of convictions for offenses now classified as traffic infractions, rather than as crimes. [1] That statute, however, made no change in the provisions of ORS 45.600, under which a witness may be impeached by proof of a prior conviction of any crime, including crimes involving the same transaction, despite the fact that prejudice may sometimes result, depending upon the circumstances, as in this case. Also, that statute had not been enacted at the time of the trial of this case and is not yet in effect. It follows, under the rule which we have reaffirmed in Marshall and in Smith, that the trial court was in error in excluding the record of defendant's conviction for failure to yield the right-of-way on the ground that it would be interpreted by the jury as an adjudication of guilt on the merits of the case.