Opinion ID: 1972633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: new trial motions

Text: The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding $10,000 for Jessica for pain and suffering and $9,269.87 to Worth Fox for his daughter's medical expenses. Because the jury found Jessica's contributory negligence to be a 50 percent cause of the accident, the jury reduced these awards to $5,000 and $4,634.94 respectively. The defendant moved for a new trial, and plaintiffs moved for additur or a new trial on the issue of damages. These motions were denied, and both parties appeal. The rules for considering a motion for a new trial following a jury verdict are well settled. In Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. 191, 196 A.2d 836 (1964), this court clearly delineated the function of a trial justice in considering such a motion. The trial justice first must consider all material evidence in the case in the light of the charge to the jury. In so doing, the trial justice must pass upon the weight and credibility of the evidence, accepting and rejecting conflicting testimony as if he were sitting as a fact-finder. Similarly, the judge may give weight to those facets of the evidence that he concludes are credible, drawing therefrom all proper and appropriate inferences. Having completed this process, the trial justice next must decide whether to approve the verdict even against doubts as to its correctness because the evidence is nearly balanced, or is such that different minds can naturally and fairly come to different conclusions thereon   . Id. at 194, 196 A.2d at 837 (emphasis added). We stated in Galusha v. Carlson, R.I., 386 A.2d 634 (1978), that as long as the trial justice undertakes the evaluation required in Barbato, we will overturn his decision only when the trial justice in so performing his duty    overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong   . 386 A.2d at 635. Furthermore, even if we believe that the trial justice erred in performing his function under Barbato, the jury's verdict will remain unchanged if this court, upon looking at the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, finds any competent evidence which sustains the jury's verdict. Powers v. Carvalho, 117 R.I. 519, 525, 368 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1977); Morinville v. Morinville, 116 R.I. 507, 516, 359 A.2d 48, 54 (1976). In the instant case there is no doubt that the trial justice carefully undertook to review all evidence in passing upon this motion. In so doing, he concluded that had he been deciding the case as trier of fact, he would have found for defendant. Having concluded that he would have reached a different verdict, the trial justice's task was not complete. As required in Barbato, he next considered whether to approve the verdict even against his doubts as to its correctness. 97 R.I. at 194, 196 A.2d at 837. Reasoning that the jury had concluded that an attentive driver could have taken some form of evasive action, the trial justice concluded that this is one of those rare cases    where on the credible evidence reasonable minds could differ as to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence and the ultimate conclusion (emphasis added). Because the trial justice clearly performed the steps outlined in Barbato, our rule permits us to reverse only if the appealing party shows that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong  . Galusha v. Carlson, R.I., 386 A.2d at 635; Bailey v. Huling, R.I., 377 A.2d 220, 224 (1977). The defendant, however, points to no evidence that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived. Nor does the defendant advance any theory to support the proposition that the trial justice was clearly wrong. Because the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material evidence, we affirm the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. Id. at 377 A.2d at 224. The plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of damages required the trial justice to perform the same function that he performed in considering the defendant's general motion for a new trial. Roberts v. Kettelle, 116 R.I. 283, 301, 356 A.2d 207, 218 (1976); see Morinville v. Morinville, supra . As long as the trial justice performs this task, we shall not disturb his decision unless it is clearly wrong. Roberts v. Kettelle, supra . After weighing the evidence regarding damages, the trial justice in the instant case concluded that the damages awarded by the jury were adequate. We see nothing in the trial justice's decision or on the record to persuade us that this decision was clearly wrong. For this reason we affirm the denial of the plaintiffs' motions for additur and a new trial on the issue of damages. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal and the plaintiffs' cross-appeal are denied and dismissed, the judgment below is affirmed, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court.