Opinion ID: 2086811
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Post-trial and Miscellaneous Matters

Text: Appellant further asserts that certain after discovered evidence requires a new trial. Appellant sought a new trial based on the after discovered evidence that Barbara Smith told defense counsel, on February 26, 1986, that she planned the killing with Kimberleigh Green and Levi Rucker and that she saw Levi Rucker commit the murder. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, which appellant asserts was erroneous. Appellant also claims the court erred in refusing to grant him a continuance to locate, serve and present the testimony of two witnesses who, Barbara Smith purportedly told counsel at a court hearing on April 16, 1986, would state that Levi Rucker told them he had shot Davis Kelly. Points 35 and 37. These claims are without merit. After discovered evidence may provide a basis for a new trial if it is demonstrated that the evidence (1) has been discovered after the trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely for impeaching credibility of a witness; and (4) is of such nature and character that a different verdict will likely result if a new trial is granted. Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 393, 508 A.2d 1167, 1182 (1986). Furthermore, the proposed new evidence must be producible and admissible. Commonwealth v. Scott, 503 Pa. 624, 628, 410 A.2d 91, 93 (1983). In the instant case, whatever Barbara Smith may have told counsel on February 26, 1986, she did not tell the court anything that would justify a new trial. In fact, she refused to tell the court anything. The docket entries show that, at a hearing on April 16, 1986 on this motion for a new trial and other matters, Ms. Smith refused to testify. There is no transcript from this hearing, but the relevant docket entry reads: Witness Smith exercises Fifth Amendment privilege and refuses to testify upon being called by defense. Thus, as in Commonwealth v. Scott, supra , appellant has failed to show this alleged exculpatory statement would be producible or admissible at his trial. 503 Pa. at 630, 470 A.2d at 95. See also Commonwealth v. Kent, 355 Pa. 146, 49 A.2d 388 (1946) (alleged after discovered evidence was but a persistent and importuning effort on the part of defendant to have his sister incriminate herself as perpetrator and exonerate himself, and fell short of justifying new trial). The court did not err, therefore, in refusing to grant relief based on appellant's after discovered evidence motion. Appellant has also filed with this Court a pro se Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel Inter Alia Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. In this motion, appellant sets forth general allegations that his trial counsel was ineffective in his representation of him at trial. [10] Appellant has not set forth any of the particulars as to how counsel's asserted ineffective assistance may have prejudiced him or how an alternative strategy would have benefited him, i.e., he raises these assertions in a vacuum. Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1332 (1981). We believe it would be best to treat this motion as an application for appointment of new counsel to represent appellant in further proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and we will remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for appointment of new counsel for that purpose. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 511 Pa. 429, 445, 515 A.2d 531 (1986). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's convictions and his judgments of sentence, including his judgment of sentence of death. [11] We remand the matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for the appointment of new counsel to represent appellant in further proceedings under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. PAPADAKOS, J., filed a concurring opinion. STOUT, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.