Opinion ID: 2250034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Same Offence for Double Jeopardy Purposes

Text: On appeal, Stefan asserts that the appellate court erroneously relied upon the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306, for determining whether a subsequent prosecution is barred under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V). In addition, Stefan asserts that the appellate court failed to follow the recent case of Grady v. Corbin (1990), 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548, which constituted controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court as to the proper analysis for a double jeopardy claim. Stefan contends that the appellate court's continuing reliance upon People v. Jackson (1987), 118 Ill.2d 179, 113 Ill.Dec. 71, 514 N.E.2d 983, which this court decided prior to the Supreme Court's issuance of Corbin, leaves the law in Illinois unclear, because Jackson is, at least in part, inconsistent with Corbin. The issue for our determination is whether Stefan's offense of knowingly discharging certain chemicals into the public sewer system in violation of the Addison ordinance and the charged offenses of criminal disposal and reckless disposal of hazardous wastes into the Addison sewer system in violation of the Act constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. (U.S. Const., amend. V.) The double jeopardy clause of the Federal Constitution applies to the States through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ( Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707.) Although the Federal provisions are controlling, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 also provides a double jeopardy guarantee. Article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution provides: No person shall    be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 10. The double jeopardy principle has its origins in common law. As stated in Green v. United States (1957), 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, the common law prohibited not only a second punishment for the same offense, but also a second trial for the same offense, `whether the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether in the former trial he had been acquitted or convicted.' ( Green, 355 U.S. at 187, 78 S.Ct. at 223, 2 L.Ed.2d at 204, quoting Ex parte Lange (1874), 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169, 21 L.Ed. 872, 877.) The Court in Green further noted that the double jeopardy protection has as its basis the idea that: [T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. ( Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88, 78 S.Ct. at 223, 2 L.Ed.2d at 204.) The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy affords separate protections against three things: (1) a second prosecution after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 415, 100 S.Ct 2260, 2264, 65 L.Ed.2d 228, 235. The test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes has been set forth in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309: [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. As the Court stated in Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, the Blockburger test emphasizes the elements of the two crimes which are compared. Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Grady v. Corbin (1990), 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548, stated that the Blockburger test does not provide sufficient protection for defendants from the burden of multiple trials. ( Corbin, 495 U.S. at 520, 110 S.Ct at 2093, 109 L.Ed.2d at 564.) The Court in Corbin held that the Blockburger test provides only the initial analysis for double jeopardy purposes. Corbin stated: [T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. This is not an `actual evidence' or `same evidence' test. The critical inquiry is what conduct the State will prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove that conduct. ( Corbin, 495 U.S. at 521, 110 S.Ct at 2093, 109 L.Ed.2d at 564.) Thus, the Corbin test focuses on the conduct which the State will prove, rather than the elements of the offenses. The Court in Corbin reiterated its statement in Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, that Blockburger does not provide the only double jeopardy test Rather, as Brown stated: Even if two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences, successive prosecutions will be barred in some circumstances where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first. ( Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. at 2226 n. 6, 53 L.Ed.2d at 195 n. 6.) Corbin also cites the two earlier cases of Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, and In re Nielsen (1889), 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118, as examples where the double jeopardy clause barred subsequent prosecutions, even though application of the Blockburger test would have allowed multiple prosecutions. Corbin, 495 U.S. at 519, 110 S.Ct. at 2092, 109 L.Ed.2d at 563. In Corbin, the defendant's automobile crossed the median on a highway and struck two oncoming vehicles. As a result, one person was killed and another injured. The defendant was issued two traffic citations, one for driving while intoxicated and another for failing to keep right of the median. Three days later, an assistant District Attorney began investigating the accident for a homicide prosecution. However, the assistant District Attorneys who appeared in court on the traffic case were not aware of the death. Nor was the trial judge who presided over the traffic case aware of the death. The defendant pleaded guilty to the traffic offenses and was sentenced and fined. Corbin, 495 U.S. at 510-14, 110 S.Ct at 2087-89, 109 L.Ed.2d at 557-59. Two months later, an indictment was issued charging the defendant with reckless manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, third-degree reckless assault, and driving while intoxicated. The prosecution filed a bill of particulars, stating that it would rely upon conduct for which the defendant had already been convicted in the traffic casedriving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of the medianto prove the homicide and assault charges. ( Corbin, 495 U.S. at 513-14, 110 S.Ct at 2089, 109 L.Ed.2d at 559.) Because the same conduct would be proved in the second trial, the Court held that the successive prosecution was barred. Corbin, 495 U.S. at 522-23, 110 S.Ct at 2094, 109 L.Ed.2d at 565-66. In the instant case, Stefan asserts that the appellate court improperly relied upon the analysis in People v. Jackson (1987), 118 Ill.2d 179, 113 Ill.Dec. 71, 514 N.E.2d 983, which held that offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes only if they meet the Blockburger testthat is, where one of the offenses is wholly included within the other, or if one offense represents a species of lesser-included offenses as recognized in Harris v. Oklahoma (1977), 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054. Stefan notes that in applying Jackson, the appellate court concluded that the ordinance violations and the statutory offenses in the instant case were not the same for double jeopardy purposes because each offense required proof of a fact that the other did not. The appellate court held that the offenses charged in the indictment required proof of a mental stateknowledge for count I, and recklessness for count IVwhereas the Addison ordinance offenses did not include any mental state and constituted absolute liability offenses. The appellate court also stated that the ordinance violations required proof that the hazardous wastes be discharged into a public sewer, whereas under the Environmental Protection Act, the discharge of wastes could occur other than to public sewers. We agree with Stefan that the appellate court's analysis in this case demonstrates the result which may occur on these facts from an application of the Blockburger analysis, without the benefit of Corbin. However, in view of Corbin, we must go beyond the Blockburger test to determine whether Stefan is being afforded constitutional double jeopardy protections. In response to Stefan's argument, the State asserts that the Corbin decision merely renders the appellate court's decision in the instant case incomplete. We note that the appellate court opinion in the instant case was filed on February 5, 1991, after the Corbin opinion was issued. The State argues, however, that because this court may affirm the appellate court on any ground which appears of record ( People v. Sloan (1986), 111 Ill.2d 517, 522, 96 Ill.Dec. 55, 490 N.E.2d 1260), this court may affirm the appellate court's decision based on the other arguments presented by the State. Alternatively, the State asserts, this court should remand the case to the appellate or trial court for consideration of issues not fully addressed. We disagree with the State that a remand in the instant case is necessary. Further, we hold that insofar as the double jeopardy analysis set forth in Jackson is inconsistent with Corbin, Corbin has overruled the Jackson analysis as the proper double jeopardy test. Jackson relied principally upon the Blockburger analysis. Jackson, however, also took into account the Supreme Court's holdings in Harris v. Oklahoma (1977), 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054, Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, In re Nielsen (1889), 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118, and Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228. Jackson set forth the double jeopardy analysis as a two-part test. First, a court was to determine if the statutory elements for the two offenses were the same. If not, then the court would determine whether either of the offenses was a lesser-included offense of the other. Jackson relied upon Blockburger, Harris, Brown and Nielsen for the two-part test. Jackson's interpretation of a portion of Vitale, however, has effectively been overruled by Corbin. Jackson stated that certain dicta in Vitale appears to be inconsistent with, or at least to qualify, the holding of [ Vitale]. ( Jackson, 118 Ill.2d at 184, 113 Ill.Dec. 71, 514 N.E.2d 983.) Vitale involved facts similar to Corbin. In Vitale, the defendant was convicted of the traffic offense of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident. Subsequently, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter based on his reckless driving. The Court held that the second prosecution was not barred under the Blockburger analysis. However, the Court remanded the case for further analysis regarding the statutory offenses and a determination of which acts the State would rely upon to prove manslaughter. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267-68, 65 L.Ed.2d at 238-39. The Vitale language which Jackson found inconsistent with the Court's holding provides that if in the pending prosecution in Vitale, the State would rely upon and prove a failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, then the defendant could raise a double jeopardy claim. ( Jackson, 118 Ill.2d at 184, 113 Ill.Dec. 71, 514 N.E.2d 983, citing Vitale, 447 U.S. at 419-20,100 S.Ct. at 2267, 65 L.Ed.2d at 237-38.) This court in Jackson noted that this dicta from Vitale had not been cited by the Supreme Court in any cases subsequent to Vitale, and stated that the language apparently was inconsistent with the Court's decisions before and after Vitale. (Jackson, 118 Ill.2d at 184-85, 113 Ill.Dec. 71, 514 N.E.2d 983.) After Jackson was issued, however, the Supreme Court in Corbin made clear that the Vitale analysis was consistent with Brown, Nielsen, and Harris, and constituted a same conduct test. ( Corbin, 495 U.S. at 520,110 S.Ct at 2093, 109 L.Ed.2d at 564-65.) Accordingly, insofar as Jackson found that Vitale was inconsistent with other Supreme Court precedent, or that the cited dicta was inconsistent with the Vitale holding and the proper double jeopardy analysis, Jackson is overruled. Stefan asserts that application of the analysis set forth in Corbin to the facts of the instant case will result in a finding that the State's prosecution for criminal disposal and reckless disposal of hazardous waste is barred. The State responds that, even under the Corbin analysis, its indictment and bill of particulars do not charge the same conduct at issue in the ordinance violation actions. We note, however, that at oral argument before this court, the State conceded that where the dates of the indictment and the ordinance violation complaints overlap, for instance, on January 27, 1984, the same conduct is alleged for double jeopardy purposes. In its brief, the State asserts that Corbin rejected a single transaction view of the double jeopardy clause, and that, under Corbin, the State may seek to convict a defendant for certain conduct even where the conduct occurred simultaneously with the conduct for which the defendant already has been convicted. ( Corbin, 495 U.S. at 522-23, 110 S.Ct. at 2094, 109 L.Ed.2d at 566.) The State also asserts that Garrett v. United States (1985), 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764, holds that the double jeopardy clause does not bar prosecution for a continuing criminal enterprise where the defendant already had been tried and convicted of one of the predicate offenses. Alternatively, the State asserts that this court should remand the case to the appellate court for further consideration of this issue, or remand the case to the circuit court with a mandate that the circuit court order the State to amend the bill of particulars to exclude the specific dates or chemicals referenced in the ordinance violation complaints. We reject the State's contention that a remand is necessary. Further, we find that the nature of the conduct and offenses charged in Garrett is distinguishable from that in the instant case. In Garrett, the defendant had engaged in an extensive marijuana importation and distribution operation, involving his attending meetings and making telephone calls in several States, including Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Texas, and Washington. The defendant pleaded guilty to importation of marijuana in an action brought in Washington. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted in Florida under a Federal drug-abuse prevention statute for a continuing criminal enterprise violation. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 775-76, 105 S.Ct. at 2409-10, 85 L.Ed.2d at 769-70. The continuing criminal enterprise offense in Garrett required proof that the defendant had committed a felony that was part of a series of three or more violations of the statute over a definite period of time with a substantially similar purpose. Further, a conviction would require a finding that the defendant acted in concert with five or more other persons; that the defendant acted in a supervisory position in the criminal operation; and that the defendant received substantial income from the operation. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 776,105 S.Ct. at 2410, 85 L.Ed.2d at 770. The Court in Garrett stated that the fact that one of the three predicate offenses was committed during the five-year time period did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the defendant would then have committed the other two requisite offenses. ( Garrett, 471 U.S. at 788-89, 105 S.Ct. at 2416, 85 L.Ed.2d at 777-78.) The Court stated that the conduct charged was multilayered as to time and place. Under such circumstances, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar the later prosecution. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 792-93, 105 S.Ct. at 2418-19, 85 L.Ed.2d at 780-81. The Court noted that the conduct charged was not comparable to a single course of conduct, such as stealing a car and joyriding, as were charged in Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187. By contrast to Garrett, in Brown, Every moment of [defendant's] conduct was as relevant to the joyriding charge as it was to the auto theft charge. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 787, 105 S.Ct. at 2416, 85 L.Ed.2d at 777. Similarly, the offenses in the instant case, unlike Garrett, do not involve multilayered conduct as to time and place. It appears that Stefan's conduct of discharging hazardous wastes in 1984 is as relevant to the Addison ordinance offenses as it is to the indictment charges. Further, the State's amended bill of particulars does not distinguish any of the alleged conduct from the conduct which formed the basis for the ordinance convictions. The amended bill of particulars characterizes the conduct charged in the indictment as a repeated and continuous course of conduct by Stefan. However, as Stefan points out, that the conduct charged is continuous conduct over several dates does not preclude a double jeopardy bar. See Brown, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187; In re Nielsen (1889), 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118. Under the Corbin analysis, the conduct for which the State is prosecuting Stefan is the same conduct for which Stefan was convicted in the ordinance violation cases. The indictment charges the criminal disposal and reckless disposal of hazardous wastes into the Village of Addison sewer system between January 1, 1984, and January 1, 1985. The hazardous wastes which allegedly were disposed were cyanide, cadmium, and chromium. The ordinance violation actions convicted Stefan of knowingly discharging cyanide, cadmium, zinc, and chromium into the public sewer system on specific dates in January, February, April, and May 1984. The State's amended bill of particulars failed to specify chemicals other than those already included in the ordinance prosecutions. Further, the amended bill does not specify dates between January 1, 1984, and January 1, 1985, on which Stefan allegedly discharged hazardous wastes, to distinguish the time of the conduct alleged in the State's action from the time of the conduct of which Stefan was convicted in the ordinance violation actions. As Corbin noted: All nine federal Circuits which have addressed the issue have held that `when a defendant puts double jeopardy in issue with a non-frivolous showing that an indictment charges him with an offense for which he was formerly placed in jeopardy, the burden shifts to the government to establish that there were in fact two separate offenses.' ( Corbin, 495 U.S. at 522 n. 14, 110 S.Ct at 2094 n. 14, 109 L.Ed.2d at 565 n. 14, quoting United States v. Ragins (4th Cir.1988), 840 F.2d 1184, 1192.) The State in the instant case has made no such showing that the offenses charged are separate from those already prosecuted. Accordingly, the State's prosecution on counts I and IV of the complaint are barred by the double jeopardy clause.