Opinion ID: 1156488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions Concerning Jury

Text: On the morning of trial, Pruett moved the trial court to impanel two juries, one to determine guilt, and, in the event of conviction, one to determine punishment. Pruett argued that it was against [his] constitutional rights and rights to fair trial that [the] jury be death qualified before it even determines the issue of guilt and innocence. The court denied the motion. Pruett acknowledges that in Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 479-80, 331 S.E.2d 422, 431 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 1503 (1986), we upheld the constitutionality of the provision in Virginia's death penalty statutes for the use of the same jury in both the guilt and punishment stages of a capital trial. [4] Pruett says, however, that the accused in Watkins contended that once a jury finds a man guilty of a capital offense, it is incapable of impartiality in fixing his punishment. Id. at 479, 331 S.E.2d at 431. His contention, Pruett says, is different: a jury which has been death qualified and hence capable of fixing punishment is incapable of impartiality in determining guilt or innocence. We disagree. In Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 690-91, 251 S.E.2d 202, 207, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979), we rejected the argument that a defendant's rights to due process and an impartial trial under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated by the use of death-qualification questions during voir dire in a capital murder case. And in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986), the United States Supreme Court recently rejected the argument that the very process of questioning prospective jurors at voir dire about their views of the death penalty violates the Constitution. Id. at n.7, 106 S.Ct. at 1763 n.7. The Court said the states have an entirely proper interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially decide all of the issues in [a capital murder] case, id. at , 106 S.Ct. at 1768, and that the process of death qualification of jurors is proper even assuming it produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries, id. at , 106 S.Ct. at 1764. After the trial court denied Pruett's motion for two juries, he moved the court to permit him to plead guilty and submit to the jury the question of punishment alone. The court denied this motion. The court's action was correct. Rule 3A:13(a) provides that [t]he accused is entitled to a trial by jury only in a circuit court on a plea of not guilty. Pruett points out, however, that Rule 3A:18 provides that [t]he trial of capital cases shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of Article 4.1 of Chapter 15 of Title 19.2 [Code || 19.2-264.2 to -264.5] and, except to the extent conflicting therewith, the provisions of this Part Three A shall be applicable thereto. Pruett argues that because Article 4.1 of Chapter 15 of Title 19.2 provides for a bifurcated trial, with a separate hearing on the issue of punishment, . . . he is entitled to a jury on the issue of punishment alone following a plea of guilty on all charges to the court. But there is no provision in Article 4.1 of Chapter 15 of Title 19.2 concerning the entry by an accused of a plea of guilty in a capital murder case. There is no conflict, therefore, between Article 4.1 and Rule 3A:13(a), and, hence, pursuant to Rule 3A:18, the provisions of . . . Part Three A shall be applicable [to the entry of a plea of guilty in a capital case].