Opinion ID: 2669163
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Connection Between the Violent Crimes and the

Text: Enterprise (TCG) Accordingly, we address the Defendants’ contention that the Government failed to prove the fifth VICAR element: that they committed the underlying violent predicate to maintain or advance their positions within TCG. 14 A VICAR “enterprise” includes “any partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2) (2006). As previously discussed, RICO similarly defines “enterprise” as “includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). Perhaps because of the similarity in the definitions, the parties do not suggest any differences in the assessment of an “enterprise” under VICAR and RICO. See United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 843 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[C]ases decided under [RICO] may also be used to determine what constitutes an enterprise under [VICAR].”). 37
Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki challenge the sufficiency of the evidence arising from the shooting into the Faamausili home. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, they argue that the Government failed to prove that they had acted with the purpose of maintaining or increasing their positions within the enterprise. According to the Defendants, the shooting was personal. We conclude that three factors support the jury’s conclusion that the shooting was to further or maintain the Defendants’ positions in TCG: (1) Mr. Toki enlisted two of his fellow gang members to retaliate; (2) during the commission of the shooting, Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Kamoto donned blue bandanas, which were insignia of TCG; and (3) the shooting was in broad daylight, suggesting that the shooters wanted the family and others to know that TCG was responsible. From these factors, the jury could have inferred an intent to commit violent crimes to maintain or further TCG’s reputation in the community as a fearsome gang and to maintain or enhance their own positions within TCG. The Government does not need to prove that the defendant’s “sole or principal motive” was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise. United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). Rather, the Government need only establish that the predicate violent crime was committed as an “integral aspect of membership” in the enterprise (TCG). Id.; see 38 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that one could be guilty under § 1959 if the violent crime was “an integral aspect of membership” even if it was not the “sole or principal motive”). Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki focus on the personal nature of the dispute. In their eyes, Mr. Toki wanted to retaliate for being interrupted during sex and punched in the face. Because the shooting was based on personal motives, they continue, the evidence was insufficient to tie the shooting to their status in TCG. For this argument, Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki cite cases holding that the fifth element was satisfied when the predicate assault was directed at a rival gang or at someone who had threatened the activities of the gang. E.g., Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 19-23. The two defendants argue that these cases are distinguishable because they involved the functioning of the gang, unlike the personal affront to Mr. Toki. Id. at 24-27. In the view of Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki, the Government’s evidence resembles that in United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994), and United States v. Jones, 291 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Conn. 2003), two of the cases invoked by Mr. Daniel Maumau. E.g., Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 21-23. In Thai, the defendant, a gang leader, was offered $10,000 to bomb a building; in attempting to execute his plan, the gang leader employed fellow gang members. See Thai, 29 F.3d at 818. The Government argued that the fifth element 39 was satisfied because the gang’s purpose was to make money through crime. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the evidence did not connect the bombing to the gang. Id. Because any such connection was based on “pure speculation,” the court reversed the § 1959 conviction. Id. The facts in United States v. Jones, 291 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Conn. 2003), were similar. There the defendant, another gang leader, confronted an acquaintance who had allegedly disrespected the defendant’s girlfriend; the defendant retaliated by killing the acquaintance with the help of two friends. The Government argued that without retaliation, the insult would have diminished the defendant’s reputation in the gang. But the district court concluded that the evidence did not “support an inference that any act of disrespect directed at Jones personally was also an affront or threat to the [gang’s] and Jones’s leadership position.” Jones, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 88, 92. Our facts bear some similarity to the facts in Thai and Jones. For example, the jury could infer that Mr. Toki went to the Faamausili home for personal reasons rather than to advance the standing of his gang. But the jury could also have inferred an effort to promote the gang and Mr. Toki’s status within the gang. In inferring an intent to promote the gang, the jury could have focused on three aspects of Mr. Toki’s retaliation. First, Mr. Toki retaliated by recruiting two other TCG members, Mr. Kamoto and Mr. Daniel Maumau. Second, when the three men fired, two of them donned blue bandanas, the signature clothing of 40 TCG. Third, the shooting took place in broad daylight. Without any evidence of concealment, the jury could infer that Mr. Toki intended to instill fear in the community, one of TCG’s purposes. The jury could have found not only an intent to promote the reputation of TCG, but also an intent to enhance Mr. Toki’s standing with the gang. See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that “section 1959 encompasses violent crimes intended to preserve the defendant’s position in the enterprise or to enhance his reputation and wealth within that enterprise”). For example, the jury could have inferred that Mr. Toki’s reputation for toughness would have diminished by a failure to retaliate after being punched in the face. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Kamoto responded to an assault on Mr. Toki, one of their fellow gang members, to maintain their reputations and TCG’s. Though the motive may have been partly personal, the jury could also have found that Mr. Toki acted with the “integral or essential” purpose of promoting the gang and maintaining or advancing his position in the gang.
and Jack in the Box Mr. Kepa Maumau challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his VICAR conviction relating to the 2008 robberies of the Gen X Clothing store, the 41 El Pollo Loco, and the Jack in the Box. He argues that the Government failed to provide sufficient evidence that he had committed these robberies for the purpose of maintaining or increasing his position in TCG. We disagree. The evidence allowed the jury to infer the required connection to TCG from: (1) an accomplice’s testimony that TCG members were expected to commit crime and that the robberies served to enhance his reputation and Mr. Kepa Maumau’s, (2) the “Exit Plan” document, which was written by Mr. Kepa Maumau and found in his car, describing his involvement with TCG and his desire to enhance his criminal reputation by committing crimes, and (3) testimony that the two robbers wore blue bandanas (TCG insignia) when stealing from the Jack in the Box. According to Mr. Kepa Maumau, “there was no evidence presented here that these robberies had any connection to TCG other than the fact that Mr. [Kepa] Maumau and Mr. Kamoto were allegedly members.” Kepa Maumau’s Opening Br. at 49. But Mr. Kepa Maumau’s accomplice (Mr. Kamoto) testified that he and Mr. Kepa Maumau were TCG members, that TCG members were expected to commit crimes, and that criminal activity served to advance their reputations in the gang. Mr. Kamoto also testified that the crimes had raised his status in the gang and that he had received greater attention from fellow gang members upon his release from prison. This testimony supports the inference that the gang not only knew about the robberies, but also encouraged members to engage in this type of criminal behavior. 42 The Government also presented a document titled the “Exit Plan,” which was discovered in Mr. Kepa Maumau’s car after the Arizona robberies. In this document, Mr. Kepa Maumau described his involvement in TCG and confirmed that he had committed crimes to advance his reputation in the gang. Finally, a witness to the Jack in the Box robbery testified that the two robbers were wearing blue bandanas, the signature clothing of TCG. When viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, this evidence sufficed for a jury to conclude that Mr. Kepa Maumau had committed the robberies to maintain or further his position in TCG. 4. Sufficiency of the Gun Evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Finally, Mr. Tuai argues that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find that he brandished a gun during the Wal-Mart robbery. The deficiency, according to Mr. Tuai, is the absence of any evidence that the gun was real. We disagree. A jury could infer that the gun was real based on testimony by Mr. Tuai’s accomplice in the Wal-Mart robbery and a victim in the robbery, surveillance video of the robbery, and the discovery of a matching gun used by Mr. Kamahele during another robbery. The Government must prove that the defendant used a real gun when committing the predicate offense. See United States v. De León-Quiñones, 588 F.3d 748, 751 (1st Cir. 2009) (“A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires proof that the defendant used a real firearm when committing the predicate 43 offense.”); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) (2006) (defining the term “firearm”). But the Government need not produce the actual gun that was used. See United States v. Floyd, 81 F.3d 1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under § 924(c) based on a failure to present the actual gun in evidence). Rather, “[c]redible witness testimony is sufficient to establish that a defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a crime.” Id. Sufficient evidence existed for the jury to infer that the gun used in the WalMart robbery was real. For example, Mr. Latutaofieiki Fakaosiula, who acted as the lookout during the robbery, testified that: (1) the plan had called for Mr. Kamahele to carry a gun, and (2) Mr. Kamahele had carried a sawed-off shotgun on the night of the robbery. Wal-Mart employee Bethany Powell confirmed Mr. Fakaosiula’s testimony. Ms. Powell testified that when Mr. Kamahele had approached her outside the cash office, he lifted his shirt and showed her a gun that looked like a sawed-off shotgun. She added that she had felt the gun being pushed against her back during the robbery. The jury not only heard this testimony, but also saw the surveillance videos showing one of the robbers carrying a long gun. Finally, the jury heard evidence that Mr. Kamahele had used a sawed-off shotgun (the same type of weapon) when he robbed the Republic Parking Garage 44 earlier that year, as well as evidence that the police discovered two shotguns—one of which was sawed-off—outside the house where Mr. Kamahele was arrested. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Kamahele had used a real shotgun during the Wal-Mart robbery. See United States v. Bowers, 638 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “[t]he possibility that a gun is fake does not prevent a reasonable jury from determining the gun was real”); see also United States v. Kirvan, 997 F.2d 963, 966-67 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a conviction under § 924(c) based on two lay witnesses’ testimony); Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382, 1383-85 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding a conviction under § 924(c) when the gun was never recovered and the only evidence offered by the government was the testimony of two bank employees that the defendant had carried a gun and that he had threatened to “‘[b]low [their] . . . head[s] off’”). Accordingly, we reject Mr. Tuai’s argument.