Opinion ID: 1316290
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coverage for accident

Text: The family liability coverage part of Allstate's policy covered an insured person against liability claims for bodily injury ... arising from an accident. It provides: Subject to the terms, limitations and conditions of this policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an accident and covered by this part of the policy. This part also imposed defense duties on Allstate: If an insured person is sued for [covered damages], we will provide a defense ... even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. Harold, Dolan, and Eleanor Lancaster are insured persons under Allstate's policy. There is no dispute about whether C.P. suffered bodily injury as the policy defines that term. Allstate first argues that there is no coverage because C.P.'s damages arise not from an accident, as that word is used in the liability coverage part, but from Harold's non-accidental acts. Allstate reasons that the elder Lancasters' purported negligence was only an antecedent contributing circumstance, and not the proximate cause of the loss. In essence, Allstate reasons that because Harold's conduct caused C.P. to suffer injury, it is irrelevant that his parents' independent conduct also allegedly contributed causally to the loss. C.P. argues that from the elder Lancasters' perspective, this was an accidental loss, and cites in support the arbitrator's finding to that effect. The policy does not define accident. [41] Nor does it specify whether we are to apply the term subjectively  from the perspective of either the insured claiming coverage or the victim  or objectively. [42] Absent contract language clearly specifying an objective perspective, our practice of enforcing the insured's reasonable expectations requires us to determine whether the loss was the result of an accident from the perspective of the insureds claiming coverage. From the standpoint of the elder Lancasters, it is not unreasonable that their interpretation of the policy focuses on the acts C.P. attributed to them, as distinct from the acts she attributes to Harold. They were sued for their conduct, not Harold's. C.P. did not attempt to make them vicariously liable for Harold's acts. Rather, her complaint alleged that the elder Lancasters' negligence legally caused injury to her. To prevail against them on that theory, C.P. had to prove that her injuries resulted from their negligence, i.e., from unintended or unexpected consequences of their conduct, regardless of whether there was more than one cause of her injuries. [43] Thus, their liability was effectively contingent on proof that an accident was a cause of harm to C.P. Allstate's argument that the Lancasters' negligence was only a cause and not the proximate cause of C.P.'s injuries is unavailing. The policy covers claims for injury arising from an accident. That language does not incorporate any requirement that an accident have been  the proximate cause. Nor does it foreclose coverage if an accident was only a cause. The language arising from is consistent with multiple causes. It is also consistent with our case law that recognizes in a tort context that a claimant need only prove that a breach of duty is a proximate cause of harm, not the proximate cause. [44] Only a few cases appear to have dealt with this precise issue and identical policy language. [45] In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Worthington, [46] the Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, found coverage where a man took hostages at a hospital and fatally wounded a nurse. The man's ex-wife (Brown) was sued for negligently entrusting weapons to him and failing to warn the victims. [47] Worthington reasoned that neither the policy's intentional and criminal act exclusions nor its joint obligations clause barred coverage for the negligence claims against Brown. [48] Further, the court held that the allegations against her constituted an accident under the policy's terms, even if her ex-husband's acts were intentional. [49] The Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Steele. [50] In that case, a sixteen-year-old boy raped his twelve-year-old stepsister while she was visiting her father and stepmother. [51] The victim's mother asserted a negligent supervision claim against the father and stepmother. [52] The court, applying Minnesota law, reasoned that under the insurance policy's exclusions and joint obligations clause, one insured's intentional act barred coverage for claims against other insureds for negligent supervision. [53] Further, the court found that the stepbrother's intentional and criminal sexual conduct was not an accident within coverage provisions of the policy. [54] Allstate argues that Worthington is unpersuasive, and, moreover, is now contrary to Utah law. [55] We nonetheless find its reasoning more persuasive and more consistent with the principles that govern insurance coverage disputes in Alaska. Reading the liability coverage language in isolation, we consequently reject Allstate's accident argument and hold that C.P.'s claims against the elder Lancasters were within the liability coverage part.