Opinion ID: 2799539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Enforcement of the Board’s Findings of

Text: Section 8(a)(1) and (5) Violations and Uncontested Remedies Because Fallbrook has expressly abandoned its challenge to the Board’s determinations that Fallbrook violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to bargain in good faith, the Board’s award of an affirmative bargaining order, one-year extension of the Union’s certification period, cease-anddesist order, and notice posting, we summarily enforce the Board’s findings and order with respect to those charges and 10 uncontested remedies. See Allied Mech. Servs. v. NLRB, 668 F.3d 758, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2012). C. The Board’s Decision Ordering Reimbursement of Negotiation Expenses Fallbrook claims that the Board “singled out Fallbrook for the extraordinary remedy based upon three factors: (1) Fallbrook did not make any proposals until the eighth bargaining session by which point the Union had submitted the entirety of its proposals, (2) the short duration of two of the parties’ eleven bargaining sessions, and (3) Fallbrook’s suspension of negotiations based upon the Union’s refusal to cease distribution of the ADO[ Forms].” Br. of Petitioner 14. The Hospital also contends that the Board failed to consider some factors that “demonstrate that Fallbrook did not engage in any ‘unusually aggravated misconduct.’” Id. Fallbrook points to only two such factors: a claim that the Union and the Hospital had entered into a pre-certification agreement pertaining to certain subjects of bargaining; and a claim that the Hospital was operating under the belief that any dispute between the parties would be submitted to an arbitrator. See id. at 15. Fallbrook also disputes that its extensive unfair labor practices amounted to “unusually aggravated conduct.” See id. at 15–20. We find no merit in these arguments. Fallbrook’s claim that the Board based its order on only “three factors” both mischaracterizes the Board’s decision and fails to account for the fact that the Board affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s extensive factual findings that “the totality of the conduct indicates [Fallbrook] operated with a closed mind and put up a series of roadblocks designed to thwart and delay bargaining.” Fallbrook, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 9. Moreover, the Board found that it was “clear” that Fallbrook had “no intent to bargain, and [that Fallbrook’s] 11 continued attempts to challenge the Board’s certification make it clear it does not welcome the Union.” Id. at 15. Much more than basing its determination “upon three factors,” Br. of Petitioner 14, the Board based its decision on the extensive list of unfair labor practices found by the ALJ and uncontested by the Hospital. Given this litany of misconduct showing Fallbrook’s deliberate attempts to prevent any actual bargaining, see Fallbrook, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 5– 9, the Board’s chosen remedy is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Fallbrook’s claim that its misconduct did not amount to “unusually aggravated misconduct,” see Br. of Petitioner 15– 20, is belied by the record. Fallbrook has cherry-picked the record and then argued that isolated examples of its misconduct, in and of themselves, do not justify the Board’s chosen remedy. For example, Fallbrook argues that the duration of the bargaining sessions does not justify an award of negotiation expenses because “the Board has frequently encountered employers who walk out of bargaining sessions and . . . has not assessed the extraordinary remedy of negotiating expenses.” Id. 17–18. This argument entirely misses the point. The problem with Fallbrook’s approach is obvious: the Board’s decision rests on the Hospital’s entire record of unfair labor practices, which in this case is quite extensive. The Board found that the totality of Fallbrook’s misconduct justified the remedy. This is perfectly appropriate under established law. See Hosp. of Barstow, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 34, slip op. at 5 n.13 (explaining that “decisions [by the Board] make clear that, in determining whether to award negotiating expenses, [the Board] will consider each case on its own merits, evaluating the effect of the violation on the wronged party and the injury to the collective-bargaining process”). In this case, it cannot be seriously doubted that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. 12 Fallbrook further protests that the Board failed to credit the fact that there was a pre-certification agreement between the Union and Fallbrook’s parent company. However, the ALJ found that “[t]here is no evidence of record about what happened during these [pre-certification] negotiations other than they resulted in agreement [between the Union and Community Health Systems, the parent company] on certain provisions and [Community Health Systems] was not named as a respondent in this case.” Fallbrook, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 9 n.12. In other words, Fallbrook never executed an agreement with the Union; the pre-certification negotiations involved only the parent company, not Fallbrook. Thus, the ALJ concluded, “[t]hat there may have been good faith negotiations between the Hospital’s parent company and the Union at some point in the past does not impact my findings [regarding Fallbrook’s unfair labor practices] based on the record before me.” Id. at 9. The Board adopted these findings and the conclusion. The Board’s decision here is also consistent with its decision in Harowe Servo Controls, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 958 (1980). In that case, the Board held: That the Respondent can cite some evidence of agreement on specific issues is therefore of no consequence in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, these circumstances lead inexorably to the conclusion that such agreement as was reached was no more than the vehicle chosen by the Respondent to conceal a strategy designed to render bargaining futile. It is thus evident that the economic resources wasted by the Union in the futile pursuit of a collective-bargaining agreement are a direct and proximate result of the 13 Respondent’s willful defiance of its statutory obligation. Accordingly, in order to restore the status quo ante, we shall require that the Respondent reimburse the Union for the bargaining expenses it incurred during the period here in question. Id. at 965 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The same considerations apply here. Fallbrook moreover argues that “the Board ignored the fact that, at the time the negotiations were taking place, the Hospital believed that . . . any disputes would be brought to the parties’ arbitrator.” Br. of Petitioner 15. There is no finding of fact to support this claim and Fallbrook has not contested the Board’s findings in this case. Furthermore, the Board expressly adopted the ALJ’s “finding that deferral to arbitration under Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971), is not appropriate here, because the parties [had] not executed a written contract setting forth an agreed-upon grievance-arbitration procedure.” Fallbrook, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 1 n.2. Fallbrook does not contend that the Board’s decision on this point is wrong either as a matter of fact or law. Fallbrook additionally contends that the Board’s decision to award negotiation expenses is contrary to law. In particular, Fallbrook contends that its misconduct was not as egregious as the employers’ conduct in Unbelievable, 318 N.L.R.B. 857, Harowe Servo Controls, 250 N.L.R.B. 958, and other cases in which the Board has ordered a respondent to reimburse the charging party for negotiation expenses. Fallbrook’s view of the applicable precedent is distorted. The Board has made it clear that: 14 [the decision in Unbelievable] . . . did not set the bar for an award of negotiating expenses at the level of the misconduct in that case. Nor did the Board in Harowe Servo Controls set some threshold level of egregiousness that must be satisfied in order to conclude that an employer’s conduct infected the core of the bargaining process. Hosp. of Barstow, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 34, slip op. at 5 n.13. The Board’s approach in each case is to weigh the facts in the record to determine whether a reimbursement of negotiation expenses is appropriate to “to make the charging party whole for the resources that were wasted because of the unlawful conduct, and to restore the economic strength that is necessary to ensure a return to the status quo ante at the bargaining table.” Unbelievable, 318 N.L.R.B. at 859. The Board adhered to this standard in this case. The Board found that Fallbrook “deliberately acted to prevent any meaningful progress during bargaining sessions that were held” and “deprive[d] the [U]nion of the opportunity to bargain during the time of the [U]nion’s greatest strength.” Fallbrook, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Union fruitlessly expended time and financial resources associated with arranging dates to be available for bargaining, developing and drafting proposals and counter-proposals, consulting with the mediator, and keeping union members apprised of bargaining efforts.” Br. for NLRB 26. Thus, the Board’s determination that Fallbrook’s deliberate misconduct so infected the core of the bargaining process as to justify a reimbursement of negotiations expenses remedy is supported by substantial evidence in the record and it is eminently rational. 15 “The Board’s discretion in fashioning remedies under the Act is extremely broad and subject to very limited judicial review.” St. Francis Fed’n of Nurses & Health Prof’ls v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This means that the court has no business second-guessing the Board’s judgments regarding remedies for unfair labor practices. The “choice of remedies is entitled to a high degree of deference” by a reviewing court. Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (the Board’s remedial power “is a broad, discretionary one, subject to limited judicial review”). In fashioning an appropriate remedy to address the substantial unfair labor practices in this case, the Board was acting at the “zenith” of its discretion. Niagara Mohawk, 379 F.2d at 159. Under this highly deferential standard of review, we have no basis upon which to overturn the Board’s order requiring Fallbrook to reimburse the Union for negotiation expenses.