Opinion ID: 2545831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's appointment in Sacramento

Text: Defendant raises another claim arising from Aplington's trial testimony. The prosecutor sought to elicit evidence that defendant made incriminating statements before and after he took a polygraph test on June 11, 1985, in Sacramento for the Butte County District Attorney investigators. To do so, the prosecutor questioned Aplington using the transcript of her November 18, 1985, deposition and, in an effort to refresh her recollection, had her look at the transcript. Earlier, at the hearing without the jury present (see pt. VI. B.3, ante ), the prosecutor had mentioned the polygraph when questioning Aplington about defendant's incriminating statements, but she denied any recollection of those statements. At trial, when the prosecutor began his questioning of Aplington about defendant's statements before and after the polygraph test, he tried to avoid mentioning the polygraph test itself by asking Aplington if she recalled defendant having an appointment in Sacramento that he was going to keep. Aplington replied that she did not understand what you're asking, and then asked, What appointment would that be? The prosecutor then requested a sidebar conference. The trial court suggested that to avoid the witness blurt[ing] something out that's inappropriate ... something to do with a ... polygraph, the parties should stipulate to a sanitized phrase to substitute for the word polygraph in the deposition transcript. Defense Counsel Houghton responded: I have no problems stipulating that the deposition [transcript] indicates that [defendant] had an appointment in Sacramento. But Defense Counsel Young disagreed, suggesting that the sanitized stipulation, in which the phrase appointment in Sacramento would be substituted in the transcript for the word polygraph would have no relevance ... to the D.A.'s burden of proof. The trial court then stated: I suppose [the prosecutor] could plunge into it. Under the circumstances, somebody mentions polygraph, I will tell [the jurors] they can't pay any attention to it. Thereafter, to lay a foundation for introducing Aplington's prior statements describing defendant's incriminating comments, the prosecutor questioned her about defendant's having a meeting in Sacramento. During this questioning, the prosecutor referred the witness to the deposition transcript. This exchange took place: Prosecutor: Now, do you remember the appointment that [defendant] had in Sacramento? Aplington: Well, I have read [the transcript]. I'm sure I said it. But at this point in time I don't remember those days. Prosecutor: Do you remember the appointment in Sacramento? Aplington: I won't have any reason to lie, but to this date I do not remember it. The questioning continued: Prosecutor: Well, last week, for example, when you testified [outside the jury's presence], you indicated that you didn't remember and then all of a sudden you later recalled. Aplington: That I talked to [defendant]? Prosecutor: About that appointment in Sacramento. Didn't you? Aplington: I think I felt pressured into it pretty much. Because I really don't recollect it. Prosecutor: Didn't last week you say in this Court, I don't recall, and then suddenly remembered the appointment in Sacramento? Responding to this question, Aplington blurted out: The polygraph? Defense counsel objected, and the trial court instructed the jury: Ladies and Gentlemen, there's been a mention of a polygraph. This is something that under no circumstances should enter into your considerations in this case. Whether there was or was not is not something that's permitted into your considerations. That's one of those things that you have to completely and totally strike from your memories and from any use in this trial. Certainly if somebody does think during your deliberations that that is something you should speculate about, then the rest of you are going to have to say, no, that can't be done. Is that okay with everybody? Anybody have any questions about that? No speculation. No use of it under any circumstances whatsoever? Thereafter, the prosecutor continued to question Aplington about defendant's incriminating statements and used as a point of reference the meeting in Sacramento. For example, the prosecutor asked: Before [defendant] left the meeting in Sacramento, did he tell you that if you did not hear from him you're to call the [Butte County] Sheriffs Department and `see what my bail is'? Defendant now contends the prosecutor badgered Aplington into revealing that defendant had taken a polygraph examination regarding his mother's disappearance and then exploited the error in a way that allowed the jury to infer that defendant had failed the test. According to defendant, this rendered the penalty trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Defendant's theory seems to be that the prosecutor was to blame for Aplington's mention of the polygraph, and that his continued questioning of her thereafter about defendant's meeting in Sacramento would have suggested to the jury that defendant took a polygraph test and flunked it. Defendant also accuses his trial counsel of incompetence for not asking the trial court to order the prosecutor to replace the phrase meeting in Sacramento with some less specific reference, such as sometime in the week after Mrs. Sapp's disappearance. We reject these contentions. Evidence Code section 351.1 provides that the results of a polygraph examination `shall not be admitted into evidence in any criminal proceeding ... unless all parties stipulate to the admission of such results.' The statute also excludes evidence of `an offer to take' or the `failure to take' such a test. ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 816, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.) Thus, evidence that a defendant took a polygraph test would violate California statutory law. No such evidence was introduced in this case, however. Rather, the prosecutor and the trial judge, both mindful that Aplington might blurt out something about defendant's taking a polygraph examination, sought to sanitize the language in the transcript the prosecutor was using when questioning Aplington. Although Attorney Houghton offered to enter into a stipulation that would have eliminated the word polygraph from the transcript, Attorney Young disagreed on the ground that such a stipulation would lighten the prosecution's burden of proof. While defense counsel had no obligation to enter into the stipulation suggested by the trial court, under the circumstances here, when the witness, as the trial court predicted, blurted out the word polygraph, defendant cannot fault the court or the prosecutor. (See People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 827, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) In any event, Aplington's comment was brief and did not directly tell the jury whether or not defendant had taken a polygraph test or inform it of the subject matter or results of any such test. The trial court immediately admonished the jury not to consider anything about a polygraph examination. We assume the jury complied with that admonition. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 240, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) Moreover, in light of the very strong, if not overwhelming, evidence that defendant killed his mother, the witness's blurting out the word polygraph resulted in no possible prejudice.