Opinion ID: 853099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ordinary Care as an Objective Standard

Text: There is a second problem with the instruction. Even if the Manual reflected Wal-Mart's subjective view of ordinary care, the second paragraph of the instruction incorrectly states the law because it invites jurors to apply Wal-Mart's subjective viewas evidenced by the Manual rather than an objective standard of ordinary care. It is axiomatic that in a negligence action [t]he standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 32, at 173-74 & n. 3 (5th ed.1984) (citing The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589, 25 S.Ct. 317, 49 L.Ed. 610 (1905)); see also id. § 32, at 174 n. 2 (`The standard of care exacted by the law is an external and objective one and the law does not permit the defendant to make the determination ....') (quoting Fancher v. Southwest Mo. Truck Ctr., Inc., 618 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Mo.Ct.App. 1981)); cf. Ware v. State, 441 N.E.2d 20, 21 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1982), reh'g denied (An objective standard of conduct is external, formulated with reference to community values. A subjective standard, by contrast, refers to the judgment or perceptions of the particular actor.) (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 150 (4th ed.1971)). An individual actor's belief that he is using reasonable care is immaterial. Keeton, supra, § 32, at 174 n. 3. This door swings both ways. A defendant's belief that it is acting reasonably is no defense if its conduct falls below reasonable care. Similarly, a defendant's belief that it should perform at a higher standard than objective reasonable care is equally irrelevant. As one court succinctly put it, a party's own rules of conduct are relevant and can be received into evidence with an express caution that they are merely evidentiary and not to serve as a legal standard. Mayo v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 686 So.2d 801, 802 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1997). Wright cites four cases in support of the instruction: Smith v. Cleveland C.C. & St.L. Ry. Co., 67 Ind.App. 397, 117 N.E. 534 (1917); N.Y. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Wyatt, 135 Ind.App. 205, 184 N.E.2d 657 (1962); Cent. Ind. Ry. Co. v. Anderson Banking Co., 143 Ind.App. 396, 240 N.E.2d 840 (1968); and Frankfort v. Owens, 171 Ind. App. 566, 358 N.E.2d 184 (1976). These authorities support the admissibility of the Manual, which Wal-Mart does not contest. They do not support an instruction to consider any violation of the Manual as evidence tending to show the degree of care recognized by Wal-Mart as ordinary care under the conditions. We conclude that the second paragraph of Final Instruction 17 was an improper invitation to deviate from the accepted objective standard of ordinary care and therefore incorrectly stated the law.