Opinion ID: 2588322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Haddock's Relevant Posttrial Motions

Text: On April 23, 1997, Haddock filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial abuse of discretion. On November 6, 1997, Haddock filed a pro se motion to dismiss judgment of conviction alleging among many other claims that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence that pointed to a third-party killer and offered false DNA testimony through its DNA expert, the Laboratory Director of GeneScreen, Dr. Robert C. Giles. On November 20, 2000, Haddock filed a motion for production of evidence for DNA testing requesting that the two hairs found in the victim's right hand, eyeglasses found at the scene, and fingernail scrapings from the victim be submitted for further DNA testing. A hearing on the motion for production of evidence for DNA testing was held on January 19, 2001. Dr. Dean Stetler reviewed a partial trial transcript of Dr. Giles' testimony and the August 13, 1993, GeneScreen lab report concerning the DNA analysis that had been performed in the case. The 1993 GeneScreen report identified the existence of three DQ Alpha types (also referred to as alleles or genotypes) in the hair of the right hand of the victim (faint 1.1, 1.2, 4). However, the report also provided in relevant part: In addition, specimen FOR1519-3639 (hair) typed as a 1.1/4. Due to the presence of the 1.1/4 DQ alpha type and the nature of the testing procedure, it is not possible to determine if a 1.2 type may also be present. The 1.1/4 type matches specimen FOR1519-3351 (blood-K.Haddock) which also typed as 1.1/4. The frequency of the DQ 1.1/4 alpha type in three North American populations is as follows: Blacks 9.1% Caucasians 7.4% Hispanics 5.9% . . . . Every individual has two copies of DNA, and therefore has two genotypes. The genotypes determined for each specimen are shown above. If a specimen has only one genotype detected, then that specimen is presumed to be homozygous, meaning both copies of DNA have the same genotype. A specimen with more than two indicated genotypes is a mixed specimen coming from more than one person. (Emphasis added.) At trial, Dr. Giles testified that the typing they achieved on the hair was 1.1/4, which was consistent with the blood of Mr. Haddock and is inconsistent with the blood of Mrs. Haddock. On cross-examination, Dr. Giles admitted that is was not possible to determine if a 1.2 DQ Alpha type, such as from the victim, was also present in the hair sample. After reviewing this report and transcript, with regard to the hair found in the victim's hand, Dr. Stetler testified that the DQ alpha analysis report showed the presence of a weak 1.1 allele, a possible 1.2 allele, and a 4 allele. Each individual has at least one allele but no more than two alleles; the victim was a type 1.1, 1.2, and Haddock was a 1.1/4. Dr. Stetler opined that it was significant the 1.1 allele was weak because if both alleles came from the same person, they would be expected to be the same. Dr. Stetler testified that it was unlikely, based on the report, that the hair came solely from Haddock or from a mixture of Haddock and the victim's hair, but it was possible that the hair had come from a mixture of the victim's hair with a third party or a mixture of the hair of Haddock, the victim, and a third party. Dr. Stetler opined that Dr. Giles' testimony at trial that the hair was inconsistent with the victim and consistent with Haddock was inaccurate or misleading. It was just as likely that the hair came from the victim as it was from Haddock, and only part of the contribution could have been made by Haddock as demonstrated by the presence of the 1.2 allele. Based on the DNA testing used at trial (polymerase chain reactionÔÇöPCR), the percentage of the population having Haddock's Alpha type (1.1/4) was 6% to 7%. Dr. Stetler suggested that the more advanced and discriminating Short Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA testing be performed which could pinpoint the DNA to one in several quadrillion. State's witness Johnson County Criminalistics Laboratory Director and forensic scientist Gary Dirks testified that he was involved in requesting GeneScreen to conduct the DNA testing in 1992 and 1993. Dirks opined that GeneScreen was and remained a representable DNA laboratory. Dirks reviewed the 1993 GeneScreen report generated by Dr. Giles. He acknowledged on cross-examination that the hair would be consistent with the victim's genotype (1.1, 1.2) or a third party with a genotype (1.2, 4) and that further testing could answer some of the questions raised by Dr. Stetler. In a March 30, 2001, memorandum and order, the district court denied Haddock's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and his motion for additional DNA testing. The district court relied primarily upon Mebane v. State, 21 Kan.App.2d 533, 902 P.2d 494, rev. denied 258 Kan. 859 (1995), in concluding that Haddock had failed to demonstrate that he would be exonerated of the murder conviction should the DNA evidence be tested as requested. The court found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain independent DNA testing because the reasons may have been tactical as in Sanders v. State, 26 Kan.App.2d 826, 995 P.2d 397 (1999), rev. denied 269 Kan. 934 (2000). Additionally, the court concluded that it need not reach the issues of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse of discretion, as those issues were found to be without merit on direct appeal. On April 9, 2001, Haddock filed a Motion, Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-252(b), to Amend Findings and to Make Additional Findings; Objection to Court's Findings and Conclusions. Haddock argued in part that the district court had failed to consider all of the ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct issues raised in the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and motion for DNA testing and asked the court for another hearing and to reconsider its previous rulings. On May 18, 2001, Haddock filed a Supplemental Briefing in Support of Post-Trial Motions and Request for DNA Testing, citing Harvey v. Horan, 2001 WL 419142 (E.D. Va., unpublished opinion filed April 16, 2001), rev'd 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir.), reh. denied 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir.2002). On July 19, 2001, Haddock filed a Second Supplement to Post-Trial Motions and DNA Testing Request; Petition for DNA Testing Pursuant to House Bill 2176. This motion referred to K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-2512, which became effective on July 1, 2001. Haddock argued he would be entitled to a new trial if the hair in the victim's hand, the glasses found at the crime scene, or the fingernail scrapings contained a third party's DNA or was different from the trial testimony. On July 31, 2001, the parties filed a joint agreement to allow DNA testing of the hair, the victim's fingernail scrapings, and the glasses. The parties agreed that the testing would be accomplished by Dr. Brian Wraxall, Chief Forensic Serologist of the Serological Research Institute of Richmond, California, who was selected by Haddock. On August 27, 2001, the court ordered DNA testing on these items and the taking of a blood sample from Haddock for comparison purposes. On April 10, 2002, Haddock filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing the DNA testing showed that the hair in the victim's hand came from a third party contrary to the State's expert's testimony at trial. Additionally, Haddock argued that a reanalysis of a typing strip obtained from GeneScreen revealed that blood on Haddock's shoe was consistent with his own blood rather than that of the victim, contrary to the expert testimony at trial. He reasserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a serious investigation into the State's DNA evidence. On July 31, 2002, the State filed a response to the motion to dismiss in which it argued in part that the defense had failed to comply with the parties' agreement regarding which three items were to be tested and improperly obtained the PCR typing strips generated from earlier testings by GeneScreen concerning the blood on Haddock's shoes. On August 7, 2002, an evidentiary hearing was held on Haddock's request for further DNA testing, the 60-1507 motion, and the motion to dismiss. Dr. Wraxall testified that the hair had been subjected to STR analysis, which was much more discriminatory than the HLADQ alpha system initially reported by GeneScreen; STR analysis determined that the hair was from a female that was not consistent with the victim. The hair also had a fair amount of cellular debris which was consistent with the hair being pulled out of the head. Dr. Wraxall concluded that the DNA of the fingernail scrapings was that of the victim and there was no indication of any other source of the DNA. The DNA on the eyeglasses was also consistent with that of the victim; however, there was extraneous DNA on the glasses, possibly from a male source, but not consistent with Haddock. The district court would not let Haddock elicit testimony regarding Dr. Wraxall's analysis of the GeneScreen DQ Alpha typing strips regarding the blood on Haddock's shoes because it was outside the scope of the court's jurisdiction as it was not one of the three items agreed to be tested in the motion for additional testing. Additionally, the court found that its relation to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims was not a basis to retry all of the issues and facts of the case. The defense did proffer that Dr. Wraxall would testify that the DNA profile on one spot of Haddock's shoe was from a person with the same profile as Haddock and that the DNA on the pants did not match the DNA found on the shoes, although the State produced evidence at trial that the DNA on both the pants and the shoes belonged to the victim. Dr. Wraxall recommended that further, more discriminatory PCR DNA testing be performed on the bloodstains on the shoes and other pieces of evidence at the crime scene. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found that overwhelming evidence of Haddock's guilt was presented at trial and Haddock had not met his burden of showing there is a substantial question of innocence in this case. The court found the Kansas Supreme Court had addressed the issues of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal, but the court clarified that it did not find any evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in this case. Although defense counsel suggested that the court had not addressed all of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims and it had moved for reconsideration, the court found that it had previously addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in detail in the 60-1507 motion. Defense counsel could not specify to the court which issues it was referring to at the hearing. The court ruled that it was denying the 60-1507 motion in its entirety, reasoning that the remaining issues concerning the competency of Dr. Bonita J. Peterson, chain of custody of evidence, and Haddock's alibi defenses were all matters that should have been addressed on direct appeal and that movant was attempting to retry the case under the guise of a 60-1507 motion. However, the court also granted defense counsel's request to file a motion seeking further testing on the shoes and clothing. On August 19, 2002, the defense filed a Motion for DNA Testing of Shoes, Pants, and Shirt. On October 31, 2002, Haddock filed a pro se Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on the `Motion for DNA Testing of Shoes, Pants, and Shirt' Portion of the Discovery Request/Motion filed August 19, 2002 under K.S.A. 21-2512. Haddock argued he was forced to file the motion pro se because his out-of-state attorney was not responding to his letters or calls. Attached to the motion was an affidavit from Judith Floyd, forensic manager of GeneScreen, providing that the DNA in question on the shoe was most likely a mixture of two types of DNA (rather than just the victim's DNA as was presented at trial) and recommended that additional STR DNA analysis be performed to resolve the ambiguity presented by the typing strip. On November 22, 2002, defense counsel withdrew from the case, and Haddock was permitted to proceed pro se. On December 3, 2002, the district court filed an Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss journalizing its rulings from the August 7, 2002 hearing. On January 8, 2003, Haddock filed a motion to dismiss the December 3, 2002 order. On January 30, 2003, a hearing was held on Haddock's motion for additional testing of the shoes, shirt, and pants and on his motion to dismiss (which was construed by the court as a motion for reconsideration). The State stipulated that it was willing to submit the items for further testing to the Laboratory Corporation of America (Lab Corp.). However, Haddock wanted the testing performed by Dr. Wraxall. Nevertheless, the district court directed that the Johnson County Criminalistics Lab direct Lab Corp. to do the testing and report the results to the court. On February 18, 2003, the district court issued an order denying Haddock's motion for reconsideration; granting Haddock's motion for additional DNA testing on Haddock's shoes, shirt, and pants; denying the motion to subpoena the prosecutor as a witness for the defense; and denying his motion for an accident reconstructionist. The March 21, 2003, Lab Corp. report found that the testing of the cuff area of the shirt failed to reveal the presence of blood, that an attempt to develop a DNA profile from the cuff area of the shirt and the extracted DNA from the shoe failed to yield results due to insufficient quantities of DNA, and the DNA extract from the slacks was consistent with coming from a female source. On June 25, 2003, Haddock filed a pro se request for admissions for purposes of the pending K.S.A. 60-1507, which is awaiting a final hearing on Lab Corp's DNA test results (which now incorporates K.S.A. 21-2512) for the truth of any matters within the scope of K.S.A. 60-226. On July 25, 2003, the State filed a response to this request suggesting in part that Lab Corp. perform an additional process where the remaining shoe extract could be concentrated which would enhance the chances of obtaining a DNA profile. However, Haddock objected to this process because it would require the complete consumption of the remaining extract. On August 29, 2003, Haddock filed a petition for mandamus and immediate restraining order with the Kansas Supreme Court requesting that the court take over jurisdiction of the case and provide immediate relief. The petition and motion for rehearing were denied by this court on September 23, 2003, and November 12, 2003. On July 23, 2004, Haddock, through current counsel, filed a Motion for Final Decision Pursuant to K.S.A.  60-254 requesting that a final order resolving all issues presented to the district court be filed so that he could file an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The motion argued that the Lab Corp. report and the results contained therein must be considered by the district court in the context of the entire proceeding or controversy in combination with all of the claims previously raised by Haddock. On October 25, 2004, the district court issued an order denying Haddock's motion. The court found that it had issued orders ruling upon or otherwise addressing the issues raised in each motion between April 1997 and November 2003. The court found that arguably the only remaining issue before the court was the motion for additional DNA testing on the shoes, shirt, and pants; however, Haddock's refusal to agree to further testing/consumption by Lab Corp. results in the fact that the lab cannot proceed and thus there were no substantive issues regarding the most recent DNA testing before the court. The court found that K.S.A. 60-254 is both inapplicable to Mr. Haddock's request, and ineffective to resurrect jurisdiction over the Court's previous rulings. On November 4, 2004, Haddock filed a notice of appeal from all adverse rulings prior to and including the final ruling by the district court on October 25, 2004. The case was subsequently transferred to this court by its own motion pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c). On February 25, 2005, the parties stipulated that a January 19, 2005, letter from Assistant Attorney General Jane E. Nohr to the prosecution and a 3-page response, generated by the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) Biology Supervisor Sindey Schueler, to questions presented by Haddock in a December 12, 2003, letter regarding the DNA evidence should be added to the record. The parties stipulated that the KBI response was generated while the case was pending and was not presented to Haddock until after his appeal was docketed. The letter provided: We are in receipt of Richard Ney's letter dated January 10, 2005 requesting the KBI's opinion on DNA testing. We received [Haddock's] letter dated December 12, 2003, with limited information provided. Our Biology Supervisor Sindey Schueler was reluctant to respond since she had not been provided all of the DNA files, notes and other relevant laboratory information. We were only being provided what [Haddock] thought was important or relevant in his letter. As a matter of practice, our laboratory does not provide expert opinions on evidence it has not examined. If the court wants us to review the evidence, that is entirely a different matter. Ms. Schueler did generate a response as to the questions asked by [Haddock]. This response was generated for internal purposes and was not intended to be distributed to [Haddock] or others outside of the KBI. The response was written only based upon the written information provided by the defendant as we are not aware of all the facts involved with this particular case. These responses might change if provided with the complete laboratory file. Please provide this information to the defense should you feel the information is exculpatory. The KBI report included answers to questions asked by Haddock but did not include the questions themselves. The report did include an opinion on the relevant items which will be discussed in our analysis below. POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING Haddock argues that his conviction should be vacated and he should be granted a new trial because postconviction DNA testing proved that false DNA evidence was introduced at his trial. Under the umbrella of this issue, Haddock argues he is entitled to a new trial because: (1) favorable exculpatory DNA evidence was established under K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-2512, requiring a new trial; (2) his conviction was based upon false evidence put on by the State through its DNA expert at trial, Dr. Giles; and (3) exculpatory DNA evidence was withheld by Dr. Giles at the same time the false evidence was introduced into evidence. As a preliminary matter, we first consider whether some of the DNA evidence relied upon by Haddock in support of this issue was presented to the district court and should be considered by this court on appeal. See Volt Delta Resources, Inc. v. Devine, 241 Kan. 775, 782, 740 P.2d 1089 (1987) (Evidence not presented to the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.). The State takes issue specifically with three items: (1) April 15, 2002, affidavit of GeneScreen Analyst Judith Floyd; (2) March 25, 2002, affidavit of Dr. Brian Wraxall regarding DNA typing of blood on shoes and corresponding proffer of this evidence; and (3) 2004 Report of KBI Biology Supervisor Sindey Schueler. The State first urges the court not to consider the Floyd affidavit because it was not admitted into evidence. While this is true, it was attached to Haddock's October 31, 2002, motion regarding DNA testing of the shoes, pants, and shirt; the defense referred to it at the January 30, 2003, oral argument; and it was seemingly considered by the district court in denying Haddock's motion to reconsider. As such, we will consider it on appeal. Second, the State points out that the district court refused to consider Dr. Wraxall's affidavit and corresponding testimony concerning his review of the GeneScreen typing strips regarding the blood on the shoes at the August 7, 2002, hearing because it constituted unfair surprise and, at the time, the parties had only agreed to additional testing on the hair, glasses, and fingernail scrapings. Haddock responds that it would be unconstitutional for this court to turn a blind eye to this exculpatory evidence which demonstrates that his conviction rests on false evidence. It is important to note that although numerous motions have been filed in this case over the years, and many of them are interrelated, the key proceedings to this case are the initial 60-1507 proceeding (and corresponding motion for DNA testing pre -K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-2512); the motion for additional DNA testing of the hair, glasses, and fingernails under K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-2512; and the subsequent motion for DNA testing of the shoes, pants, and shirt under K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-2512. The district court refused to consider Dr. Wraxall's review of the shoe evidence in the context of first motion under K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-2512 because such a review was not authorized by the court. However, in the context of the subsequent motion for additional DNA testing of the shoes, this evidence was relevant, and it was referred to in the October 31, 2002, motion concerning this additional DNA testing under K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-2512. As such, we will consider this affidavit on appeal. Finally, the State argues that the 2004 KBI report was neither presented to nor considered by the district court. Haddock argues that the stipulation by the parties provides that the report was generated while the case was pending and had he been informed of the exculpatory report pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), it would have been presented to the district court. It is undisputed that this evidence was not considered by the district court in this case, nor was Haddock given an opportunity to request a motion to reconsider because the district court no longer had jurisdiction once the appeal was docketed. See ARY Jewelers v. Krigel, 277 Kan. 464, 473, 85 P.3d 1151 (2004) (`A trial court does not have jurisdiction to modify a judgment after it has been appealed and the appeal docketed at the appellate level.') However, Haddock bears some responsibility for never receiving this report. The January 19, 2005, letter from the KBI indicates that although Haddock sent the KBI a list of questions concerning his DNA testing in December 2003, defense counsel did not request the response to this letter until January 10, 2005, nearly 2 years later and 2 months after the notice of appeal was filed in this case. Moreover, it is especially important that this report be considered by a factfinder because the report was prepared for internal use only, answers questions posed by Haddock which are not included in the report, utilizes only the information provided by Haddock, and clearly states that the KBI's opinions might change if it was privy to all of the facts and evidence of the case. As this report was never considered by the district court, we will not consider it on appeal. See Volt Delta Resources, 241 Kan. at 782, 740 P.2d 1089 (Evidence not presented to the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.).