Opinion ID: 4584792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Phase 1: Ultra Vires Taxation

Text: The disputes on appeal pertaining to Phase 1 involve only the second of the two types of property taxes implicated by this case — the tax on the value of FairPoint’s use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way. The Towns argue that the superior court erred in ruling that such taxation was ultra vires without the express inclusion of tax-shifting language pursuant to RSA 72:23, I(b) because: (1) licenses arising under RSA 231:160-a contain the required language as a matter of law; and (2) FairPoint’s use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way, “in substance,” constitutes a perpetual lease. The first argument was raised below as part of the Phase 1 litigation and was addressed by the trial court. We conclude that it is properly before us, and, on the merits, we agree with the Towns. In reviewing the superior court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party, and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Polonsky v. Town of Bedford, 171 N.H. 89, 93 (2018). If our review of that evidence discloses no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Id. We review the superior court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id.; RSA 21:2 (2020). We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Polonsky, 171 N.H. at 93. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Carr v. Town of New 4 London, 170 N.H. 10, 13-14 (2017). Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Id. at 14. Absent an ambiguity, we need not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. segTEL v. City of Nashua, 170 N.H. 118, 120 (2017). During the relevant times in this case, RSA 72:23, I(b) provided in pertinent part: All leases and other agreements, the terms of which provide for the use or occupation by others of real or personal property owned by the state or a city, town, school district, or village district, entered into after July 1, 1979, shall provide for the payment of properly assessed real and personal property taxes by the party using or occupying said property no later than the due date. . . . All such leases and agreements shall include a provision that “failure of the lessee to pay the duly assessed personal and real estate taxes when due shall be cause to terminate said lease or agreement by the lessor.” All such leases and agreements entered into on or after January 1, 1994, shall clearly state the lessee’s obligations regarding the payment of both current and potential real and personal property taxes, and shall also state whether the lessee has an obligation to pay real and personal property taxes on structures or improvements added by the lessee. RSA 72:23, I(b). Because no party argues otherwise, we will assume, without deciding, that licenses arising under RSA 231:160-a constitute “other agreements” for purposes of RSA 72:23, I(b). Thus, pursuant to RSA 72:23, I(b), any license arising under RSA 231:160-a “shall provide for the payment of properly assessed real and personal property taxes by the party using or occupying such property.” Id. In addition, any such license “shall” include a provision that failure to pay the taxes when due shall be cause to terminate the license, and “shall” clearly state the licensee’s obligations regarding the payment of taxes. Id. The use of the word “shall” demonstrates that these are mandatory requirements. See Appeal of Algonquin Gas Transmission, 170 N.H. 763, 774 (2018). RSA 231:160-a provides: Any poles, structures, conduits, cables or wires, the location of which have already been approved by the local land use board . . . , shall, if such location becomes a public highway, be deemed legally permitted or licensed without further proceedings under this subdivision; provided, that copies of the appropriate utilities’ easements, work plans, or other data showing locations of 5 such structures, are submitted to the municipality for recording purposes. RSA 231:160-a (emphasis added). RSA 231:160-a provides that certain poles, structures, conduits, and related property shall “be deemed legally . . . licensed” without further proceedings under the subdivision.1 Section 160-a applies when a local land use board has previously approved the location of poles, structures, conduits, and related property and that location then becomes a public highway. The usual procedure for obtaining a license for poles, structures, conduits, and related property is set forth in RSA 231:161, which provides, in part: Any such person, copartnership or corporation desiring to erect or install any such poles, structures, conduits, cables or wires in, under or across any such highway, shall secure a . . . license therefor in accordance with the following procedure: