Opinion ID: 2451189
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Homer City Code Provisions Limiting Standing In Land Use Appeals Are Lawful.

Text: Alaska Statutes 29.40.050 and .060 provide for two levels of review of certain municipal land use actions and determinations. [26] The statutes provide for first level review within a borough: AS 29.40.050(a) requires the assembly to provide for an appeal from an administrative decision of a municipal employee, board, or commission made in the enforcement, administration, or application of a land use regulation. That appeal may be to a court, hearing officer, board of adjustment, or other body. [27] The statutes provide for second level review by the superior court: AS 29.40.060(a) requires [t]he assembly to provide ... for an appeal by a municipal officer or person aggrieved from a decision of a hearing officer, board of adjustment, or other body to the superior court. Griswold argues that HCC 21.68.020(c) [28] and .040(b)(6) [29] conflict with AS 29.40.050, and that HCC 21.68.020(c) provides for a more restrictive definition of `person aggrieved' than that adopted by this court. Both arguments are flawed. HCC 21.68.020(c) and .040(b)(6) satisfy AS 29.40.050 and .060. In Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, we examined municipal code provisions limiting standing in land use cases (both for internal appeals and appeals to the superior court) to [a]ny person adversely affected by a decision or determination. [30] We interpret[ed] the phrase `adversely affected' as used in the [municipal] ordinance to mean the same as the word `aggrieved' as used in the [state] statute. [31] We held that the denial of standing to a business competitorwhose only potential injury would have resulted from increased competitionunder the municipal code provisions was lawful under AS 29.40.050 and .060 because the competitor was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of AS 29.40.060(a). [32] In so holding, we looked to several sources of law, including cases from other jurisdictions, [33] and noted that [t]he legislature chose to provide review for those `aggrieved,' indicating that it follows the general practice of review in zoning cases. [34] We then adopt[ed] the majority interpretation of `aggrieved.' [35] The definition of aggrieved in Homer City Code 21.68.020(c) mirrors that presented in Earth Movers: one who is adversely affected. [36] The Homer City Code's definition of aggrievement is not more restrictive than our interpretation of AS 29.40.060(a). The provisions of the Homer City Code therefore do not violate either AS 29.40.050 or .060. [37]
Griswold argues that the provisions of the Homer City Code limiting standing unlawfully eliminate taxpayer-citizen standing in land use cases, and that the Earth Movers rationale applies only to cases involving business competition, rather than all land use cases. We have noted that [i]n the area of land use law, the legislature has chosen to limit standing by statute. [38] In Earth Movers, [g]eneral Alaska standing law [was] not applicable because it was a municipal land use case generally, not because it was a business competition case. [39] The Alaska Legislature, not the Homer City Council, eliminated taxpayer-citizen standing in land use cases by enacting AS 29.40.050-.060. [40]

Griswold argues that HCC 21.68.020(b)(3)'s requirement that a person have participated in the proceedings before the [Planning] Commission in order to have standing to appeal an action or determination violates due process. The participation requirement, Griswold argues, encourages arbitrary decision-making and cronyism because if no member of the public `actively' participates in a proceeding the Planning Commissioners know there is little likelihood their decisions will be subjected to judicial review. Griswold attended the February 20, 2008 meeting at which the Planning Commission approved Permit 07-14 and spoke in opposition to the Permit. Because he actively participated in the proceedings, it appears Griswold is attempting to assert the due process rights of others who did not participate in the proceedings. Regardless, the participation requirement did not preclude Griswold from having standing; HCC 21.68.020(b)(3)'s requirement that a person also be aggrieved by an action or determination did. Because HCC 21.68.020(b)(3)'s participation requirement did not preclude him from having standing, Griswold is not the proper party to request an adjudication of this issue, [41] and he lacks standing to assert the due process claims. [42]
Griswold also argues that HCC 21.68.020(c)'s provision that [a]n interest that is no different from that of the general public is not sufficient to confer standing violates ... due process and common sense. The City argues that HCC 21.68.020(c) did not deprive Griswold of a property interest sufficient to warrant constitutional protection. The test for deprivations of procedural due process under both the Alaska Constitution [43] and the United States Constitution [44] is the test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge . [45] Under the Mathews test, a litigant claiming a due process violation must have been deprived of a cognizable liberty or property interest. [46] Griswold identifies no liberty or property interest of which HCC 21.68.020(c) deprived him. And the City is correct that any property interest great enough to be cognizable for the purposes of a due process violation would also have been sufficient to confer standing on Griswold under the Homer City Code.
Griswold does not directly cite the equal protection provisions of either the Alaska Constitution [47] or the United States Constitution, [48] but he does argue that HCC 21.68.020(c) discriminates against both him and renters and other affected parties who do not own real property. The City interprets this as an equal protection claim, [49] and argues that Griswold's claim does not invoke any heightened level of equal protection scrutiny and that Griswold does not have standing to assert the equal protection interests of renters and other affected parties. Griswold owns real property in Homer. For the same reasons discussed in Section III(C)(3)(a) above, Griswold cannot assert the equal protection rights of renters and other parties who do not own real property. [50] He also does not satisfy the requirements for any of the exceptions to the general rule that a litigant lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of others. [51] We therefore limit our inquiry to Griswold's claim that HCC 21.68.020(c) discriminates against him. Under the Alaska Constitution, the legitimate reason test is the standard level of scrutiny ... in equal protection cases, [52] and we apply it to laws that do not employ classifications based on suspect factors or infringe on fundamental rights. [53] Under this test, a law will survive as long as a `legitimate reason for the disparate treatment exists' and the law creating the classification `bears a fair and substantial relationship to that reason.' [54] In defining who is aggrieved for the purposes of standing, HCC 21 .68.020(c) creates a classification based only on whether people can demonstrate that an action or determination has or could have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment, or value of real property owned by [them]. It therefore does not employ a classification based on a suspect [55] (or quasi-suspect [56] ) factor, nor does it infringe on a fundamental right. [57] Applying the test to the present case, the reason for HCC 21.68.020(c)'s classification of who is a person aggrieved is to limit standing to persons with a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome on the matter, [58] in order to prevent excessive litigation and undue delay of final dispositions. [59] Indeed, when the City of Homer enacted the ordinance establishing its person aggrieved standard for standing, it expressly justified the standard as follows: [A] municipality is required by Alaska Statute § 29.40.060 to grant standing to a person aggrieved by a zoning decision made by municipal officials, and this signifies that the legislature has chosen to limit standing in the area of land use law, primarily in order to prevent excessive litigation and undue delay of final dispositions, ... but also because an expansive rule of standing would potentially create a land use battleground that would unduly tax the resources of the municipality as well as impair the free enterprise system,... and unreasonably interfere with the use and development of private property. [60] These reasons are legitimate. And the law's requirement that an action potentially have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment, or value of real property owned by the person seeking to appeal that actionin a manner different from that of the general publicbears a fair and substantial relationship to that reason. [61] Indeed, the requirement is a relatively common method of achieving this goal. [62] Thus, HCC 21.68.020(c) does not deprive Griswold of equal protection under the Alaska Constitution or the United States Constitution. [63]