Opinion ID: 76580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deliberate Indifference to R.M.'s Constitutional Right to Safety

Text: 17 Defendants are not subject to this damage suit unless they were deliberately indifferent to R.M.'s right to be reasonably safe. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797. Only where it is alleged and the proof shows that the state officials were deliberately indifferent to the welfare of the child will liability be imposed. Id. 18 Deliberate indifference is not the same thing as negligence or carelessness. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). On the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear that a state official acts with deliberate indifference only when he disregards a risk of harm of which he is actually aware. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (to be deliberately indifferent a state official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference ) (emphasis added). Defendants, then, cannot be liable to the Rays unless they both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of abuse to R.M. Id. 19 Following this guidance, we have stated that in order to establish deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must be able to allege (and prove at trial) that the defendant (1) was objectively aware of a risk of serious harm; (2) recklessly disregarded the risk of harm; and (3) this conduct was more than merely negligent. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.1999). As we said in Taylor, [a] child abused while in foster care ... [is] faced with the difficult problem of showing actual knowledge of abuse or that agency personnel deliberately failed to learn what was occurring in the foster home. 818 F.2d at 796 (emphasis added). We must now look at the Rays' complaint to see if they have claimed that the defendants had actual knowledge or deliberately failed to learn of the serious risk to R.M. of the sort of injuries he ultimately sustained. 20 First, the Rays claim that the defendants failed to take various actions that, if taken, would have led to the discovery of adverse information about the Cumberbatches and their fitness to serve as foster parents. 4 These allegations, however, even if true, which we assume, do not show that the defendants had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to R.M. In fact, the allegations show that the defendants were ignorant of certain risks that the information may have revealed. Nor do the Rays claim that the defendants deliberately failed to gather this information. At most, their claim is that the defendants were negligent or careless in not gathering the information, or that they negligently or carelessly failed to follow Department guidelines. 21 Second, R.M. alleges that the defendants ignored certain adverse information about the Cumberbatches and their fitness to serve as foster parents. 5 As with the foregoing allegations, we are unable to conclude from these allegations that defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm to R.M. In fact, there is not even an allegation here that defendants even knew of these incidences, much less that they inferred from them that R.M. was in grave danger. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (to be deliberately indifferent, and official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference). 22 Nor is there any specific information accompanying these allegations from which we might conclude that they, if known, would have alerted defendants to a serious risk to R.M. For example, the most serious of these allegations is that within days of his placement in the Cumberbatches' home, R.M. began showing signs of abuse and neglect, which included bruises, blisters, and rashes. There is, however, no claim that any of these defendants knew of these problems, or even any specific support for the allegation that they were the product of abuse. In the absence of allegations that defendants knew of these problems, we cannot conclude that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to them. Id. 23 Finally, the Rays' claim that the defendants failed to require the Cumberbatches to complete certain training that might have produced more information about them and violated Department rules by placing too many children in that home. 6 Like many of the foregoing allegations, the gravamen of these claims is that the defendants violated Department guidelines and established procedures in granting a foster home license to the Cumberbatches. Under the law, however, such allegations do not support the Rays' claim for monetary damages. In Taylor, we made clear that allegations that foster care officials have not followed guidelines set forth by their Department state a claim for violation of one's right to procedural due process. 818 F.2d at 798-800. 7 We said then: 24 Thus, the Georgia scheme mandates that officials follow guidelines and take affirmative actions to ensure the well being and promote the welfare of children in foster care. These children can state a claim based upon deprivation of a liberty interest in personal safety when the officials fail to follow this mandate.... [The child] is entitled to be protected in the manner provided by the statute. 25 Id. at 799-800. 26 Allegations of failure to follow state policies and procedures, however, do not support a claim for damages, such as the Rays'. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 800. 8 Where damages are sought, more must be shown than negligent failure to follow Department guidelines and procedures. 9 The Rays must be able to allege that the defendants had actual knowledge that R.M. was being abused (or at substantial risk of being abused) or that they deliberately chose not to learn of the abuse. In the absence of such allegations, the Rays have not stated a claim under Section 1983. 10