Opinion ID: 2639205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disqualification of state farm policyholders

Text: I also disagree with the opinion's decision to affirm the trial court's denial of Fleegel's alternative motion to excuse State Farm policyholders from serving on her jury. As a contingent remedy to be used in the event that the court denied her motion to preclude evidence of Boyles's insurance coverage, Fleegel asked the superior court for voir dire examination to identify and excuse for cause all members of the jury panel who were insured by State Farm. The court denied the motion, instead precluding any mention of State Farm by name and barring any inquiry as to the identity of prospective jurors' insurers. In upholding this ruling, today's opinion posits that [w]hether a juror is dismissed for cause is within the discretion of the trial court. [21] The opinion then concludes that the superior court did not abuse its discretion. [22] But the opinion is mistaken in assuming that Fleegel's challenge for cause raised a discretionary issue. Alaska Civil Rule 47(c)(10) and (12) categorically require a challenge for cause to be granted as to any prospective juror who is a client of a party or who has a financial interest in the outcome of the case. [23] Our decisions applying these provisions explicitly recognize that they prohibit certain relationships between jurors and parties and that [a] trial judge does not have discretion to deny a challenge for cause once that relationship has been established. [24] In my view, when a court presiding over a punitive damages claim allows an insured defendant to tell the jury that the defendant's insurance company is the real party in interestthe plaintiff's real targetthis information inevitably creates a genuine risk that jurors who are policyholders of the same insurer, or who think that they might be, will perceive a financial interest in the outcome. The financial interest here is certainly no more attenuated than the one at issue in Reich v. Cominco Alaska, Inc ., where we held that Rule 47(c)(12) required automatic disqualification of all prospective jurors who were shareholders in an Alaska Native corporation that was not a party to the litigation but had financial ties to the named defendant and stood to benefit indirectly from the outcome of the case. [25] And this interest is at least as substantial as the one in Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co ., where we held that Rule 47(c)(10) categorically required exclusion of all prospective jurors who had accounts with J.C. Penney and therefore technically qualified as the company's debtors. [26] In reaching the opposite conclusion here, today's opinion posits that [t]he financial interest that State Farm insured jurors have in this case is speculative at best. [27] But the opinion's analysis of the closeness of the relationship between policyholders and their insurers is misdirected, for Rule 47(c)(10) expressly preempts the issue. As already mentioned, Rule 47(c)(10) categorically excuses all prospective jurors who are clients of a party or an attorney. [28] Since policyholders are undeniably clients of their insurers, Rule 47(c) unequivocally deems the financial relationship between insurance companies and their policyholders sufficiently close to require automatic disqualification in any action where a policyholder's insurer is a party or an attorney. Suppose for example that State Farm was actually named as a defendant in a lawsuit: there would be no doubt that its policyholders would have a sufficiently close financial interest to require their automatic disqualification as clients under Rule 47(c)(10). Because the financial relationship between State Farm and its policyholders is no different here than it would be if State Farm were a named party, it follows that the policyholder/insurer relationship itself is sufficiently close to warrant disqualification, provided that the other requirements of Rule 47 are met. The critical question, then, is whether the role State Farm played in this case justifies treating it as a party. In the run-of-the-mill personal injury case against an insured party, of course, an insurer's role might be insufficient to warrant treating it as a party under Rule 47. But when a policyholder acting through counsel retained by an insurer expressly reveals the existence of coverage and portrays the insurer as the plaintiff's true target, it seems to me that, in terms of triggering concerns for potential jury bias, the insurer's role becomes virtually indistinguishable from the role it would play as an actual party. Hence, in this situation I would conclude that the insurer must be treated as a party under Rule 47(c)(10)'s provisions governing automatic disqualification of clients. In the proceedings below, the superior court's order restricting jury voir dire precluded Fleegel from establishing the very relationship that would have triggered Rule 47(c)'s mandatory right to a challenge for cause. True, the order also prevented the jury panel from learning the name of Boyles's insurer. But this precaution hardly cured the potential for prejudice: by allowing Boyles to tell the jury that he was insured by an unnamed insurer, the trial court effectively left all insured jurorsnot just those insured by State Farmto speculate about what impact a punitive damages verdict might have on their own insurance premiums. Thus, in my view, concealing State Farm's identity was no more acceptable here than shielding J.C. Penney's identity would have been in Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co . or shielding the Native corporation's identity would have been in Reich v. Cominco Alaska, Inc . As shown by the jury's question and its ensuing verdict, the superior court's approach simply spread the danger of prejudice; it failed to protect Fleegel from potential jury bias as required under Rule 47(c). Accordingly, given the superior court's decision allowing defense counsel to tell the jury of Boyles's insurance coverage, I would hold that Rule 47(c)(10) required the court to grant challenges for cause as to all prospective jurors who were State Farm policyholders.