Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Tape Recordings of Statements by Michael Rojas

Text: At trial, Rojas testified he lied to police on August 8, 1991, when he denied being present at the North Hayes property on the night of the murders and denied knowing defendant, Richard, or Spradlin. He continued to lie to police when he was arrested on August 27, 1991, for the rape of Spring J. It was not until he was formally interviewed by police on August 28 that he finally admitted being on the property on the night of the murders. Defendant cross-examined Rojas at length about his prior interviews with police. Although Rojas testified that he did not remember his prior interviews in detail, he consistently testified that he had lied to the police. On at least two occasions, out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor expressed concern that detailed cross-examination about the numerous lies Rojas told to police during his interviews was consuming an undue amount of time. Defendant countered that all of the questions were relevant to credibility. He also moved to introduce Rojas's August 8 and 27 taped interviews with police under Evidence Code section 1237, [53] the exception to the rule against hearsay for past recollection recorded. [54] Citing Evidence Code sections 352 and 765 [55] , the trial court indicated it would not allow lengthy cross-examination on every untrue statement that Rojas made during his interviews with police, in light of his candid admission that he had lied to them. Later, Richard moved to play certain portions of the August 28 police interview for the jury to refresh Rojas's memory, to show Rojas's state of mind, or as prior inconsistent statements  all in an effort to impeach Rojas. Although defendant did not expressly join in Richard's motion, he did argue that all or a portion of the police interviews with Rojas should be admitted as prior inconsistent statements. The trial court allowed counsel to impeach Rojas using the transcript of the police interviews, but it refused to permit counsel to impeach Rojas by simply playing a recording of the interviews. The court, however, also indicated that it would reconsider the motion if counsel attempted to impeach Rojas using a transcript of the interviews and Rojas denied making a particular statement, or the prosecution argued that the transcription of the interviews was inaccurate. Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defense from playing for the jury the August 8 and 27, 1991, taped police interviews of Rojas, and that the court's ruling violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness, cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and to a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It was uncontested at trial that Rojas lied to police during his interviews on August 8 and 27. Indeed, defendant emphasized this point several times during cross-examination. Although defendant admits that Rojas was effectively impeached, he contends that the jury should have been allowed to listen to the recording of the police interviews because it was the clearest evidence of Rojas's skill at lying and thus should have been considered in determining his credibility. Although hearing Rojas's manner of speaking in the police interviews may have assisted the jury in determining credibility, the trial court acted well within its discretion in precluding the defense from playing the taped interviews, considering that the point defendant wanted to make by playing the tape  that Rojas was a liar  had already been established. (See People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 235, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; Evid.Code, § 352.) Although defendant relies on People v. Degner (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 1049, 184 Cal.Rptr. 179, he concedes it is not on point. There, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the defendant's taped confession to be played for the jury because he raised issues of drug and alcohol use and its effect, and Miranda waiver, and the jury was better able to determine these issues when it had before it the words uttered and the manner of delivery. ( Id. at pp. 1052-1053, 184 Cal.Rptr. 179.) Unlike in Degner, here only Rojas's credibility was at issue, and because Rojas admitted he lied to police, his manner of speaking was of limited probative value. For the first time on appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have permitted the taped interviews of Rodriguez and Juarez to be played for the jury. Defendant concedes he made no such requests below, but argues that such requests would have been fruitless given the court's ruling on playing Rojas's taped interviews. Assuming arguendo that defendant's request to play the taped interviews of Rojas extended to those of Rodriguez and Juarez such that the contention has been adequately preserved, it would fail. In essence, defendant argues the jury should have heard for itself the lies Rodriguez and Juarez told police during their interviews. But, as with Rojas, the credibility of Rodriguez and Juarez was extensively explored at trial. For example, Rodriguez testified his memory of the night of the murders was impaired because he had been drinking. He also admitted that he had, in the past, lied to police. As for Juarez, his testimony at trial was inconsistent, almost to the point of being incomprehensible, and, as Detective Ybarra testified, he gave a different story almost every time she spoke to him. Moreover, both entered into contracts with the prosecution not to be prosecuted for the murders in exchange for their testimony at trial, and thus under these circumstances, playing for the jury their taped police interviews would not have made a measurable difference for purposes of impeachment. Thus, we necessarily reject defendant's claim of constitutional error.