Opinion ID: 4472525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The subject-matter-jurisdiction question

Text: {¶ 17} Smith alleges that he is entitled to habeas relief because the juvenile court did not conduct “a proper bindover procedure.” In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995) (“Gaskins I”), this court held that a petition that alleges that a bindover was improper “state[s] a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus.” This court stated that “without a proper bindover procedure   , a juvenile court’s jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be waived.” Id. And without a valid transfer to adult court, a juvenile’s conviction and sentence are void, and habeas is “an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.” Id. {¶ 18} But more recently, we have held that key parts of the bindover procedure may be waived. See State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 21. And we have reviewed for plain error when a juvenile failed to object at a bindover hearing to a juvenile court’s procedural error. See State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 49. These cases implicitly provide, contrary to Gaskins I, that noncompliance with a statutory bindover requirement does not prevent a juvenile court from transferring its subject- 6 January Term, 2020 matter jurisdiction and does not render an adult court’s judgment void. We must decide whether to adhere to Gaskins I in view of this more recent caselaw.
{¶ 19} In Gaskins I, a prison inmate brought a habeas claim in a court of appeals, initially raising a constitutional challenge to his criminal conviction. Gaskins I at 149. That claim was dismissed as clearly meritless. Id. at 150. But the inmate also had asked the court of appeals for leave to amend his petition to add an improper-bindover claim based on the juvenile court’s purported failure to have him undergo mental and physical examinations as required by a statute that was in effect at that time. Id. at 149-150. The court of appeals did not allow the inmate to amend his petition. Id. at 150. On appeal, we held that the court of appeals should have allowed the amendment and considered the bindover claim. Id. We stated that “without a proper bindover procedure   , a juvenile court’s jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be waived.” Id. at 151, citing Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. {¶ 20} The central holding of Gaskins I—that a juvenile offender may collaterally attack an adult criminal conviction in a habeas action based on a bindover error—has been repeated by this court numerous times. For example, in Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 617, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001), we granted a writ of habeas corpus because the bindover was substantively invalid and, as a result, the juvenile “had not been lawfully transferred to [the adult] court.” In other cases, we have acknowledged the rule of Gaskins I but found it to be inapplicable under the facts of the case. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fryerson v. Tate, 84 Ohio St.3d 481, 484485, 705 N.E.2d 353 (1999); Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544, 751 N.E.2d 1043 (2001). And in State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 692 N.E.2d 608 (1998), a case concerning a defendant’s appeal of his adult-court conviction (therefore not involving a collateral attack), we applied Gaskins I and held that the juvenile court had “failed to accomplish a legal transfer of its jurisdiction” and that the criminal 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO prosecution in adult court was “void ab initio” because the juvenile court had failed to provide for a physical examination of the juvenile, id. at 547. {¶ 21} Gaskins I’s foundation was Wilson, a case in which the state prosecuted a juvenile in adult court under the mistaken belief that he was an adult when he committed his offense. In fact, Wilson was a juvenile when he committed the offense, and he was never bound over from a juvenile court. Wilson at 42, 44. Because Wilson had been deprived of a bindover proceeding altogether, this court agreed with the court of appeals that the adult court lacked jurisdiction. We held that “[a]bsent a proper bindover procedure   , the juvenile court has the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a delinquent.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. And “[b]ecause the general division of the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict Wilson, the judgment of conviction against him was void ab initio.” Id. at 44. See also State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 76 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 667 N.E.2d 1 (1996) (habeas case involving an allegedly mistaken belief that a child was an adult). Significantly, the Wilson court recognized that the General Assembly had compelled this result—the bindover statute expressly provided that “ ‘[a]ny prosecution that is had in a criminal court on the mistaken belief that the child was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense shall be deemed a nullity.’ ” (Emphasis added in Wilson.) Wilson at 44, quoting former R.C. 2151.26(E), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 27, 144 Ohio Laws Part II, 2745, 2747 (that provision, with nonsubstantive differences, is now R.C. 2152.12(H)). {¶ 22} Gaskins I significantly extended Wilson’s holding. The problem in Wilson was that a juvenile-court proceeding had never happened at all. The state had not used “the only method by which a juvenile court may relinquish its exclusive original jurisdiction concerning a delinquent child,” Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d at 44, 652 N.E.2d 196. That is quite different from Gaskins I, in which the subject-matter 8 January Term, 2020 jurisdiction of a juvenile court was invoked, a bindover proceeding was held, and subject-matter jurisdiction ostensibly was transferred to an adult court. {¶ 23} What is more, Gaskins I abandoned Wilson’s analytical focus on statutory language. The Wilson court rightly allowed the legislature to determine the sentencing court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution (“The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters    as may be provided by law” [emphasis added]). The Gaskins I court, in contrast, did not examine whether the bindover statute expressly made the juvenile court’s error jurisdictional. This court in Gaskins I simply applied Wilson’s broadly worded holding, despite the clear differences between the two cases. {¶ 24} Notably, the parties both seem to accept that Wilson’s focus on the statutory text was correct; they both cite United States Supreme Court cases that ultimately ask whether the legislature has “clearly state[d]” that a particular statutory requirement is jurisdictional, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.E.2d 1097 (2006). Indeed, we have used the same approach when deciding whether statutory requirements in other contexts are jurisdictional. See Pryor v. Dir., Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, ¶ 14, 16; Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 22, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980).
{¶ 25} When Gaskins’s case returned to this court after our remand, we abandoned Gaskins I’s main premise that a noncompliant bindover procedure renders the resulting adult criminal conviction void. Gaskins had alleged that the juvenile court had failed to have him undergo mental and physical examinations, which were required by statute at the time. Gaskins I, 74 Ohio St.3d at 150-151, 656 N.E.2d 1282. On remand, the warden presented evidence showing that Gaskins had affirmatively waived his right to those examinations. Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 76 Ohio 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO St.3d 380, 381, 667 N.E.2d 1194 (1996) (“Gaskins II”). In Gaskins I, this court had viewed all the requirements of the bindover procedure as jurisdictional (and thus not waivable). Gaskins I at 151. But Gaskins II held that the evidence of waiver showed that there had been “full compliance with the bindover procedure,” id. at 382, thus signaling that the mandates of the bindover statute were not jurisdictional after all. {¶ 26} Just last year, we validated Gaskins II. See Johnson v. Sloan, 154 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-2120, 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 16-17. And in another recent case, we held that a juvenile may waive the right to an amenability hearing, which is central to any discretionary bindover procedure. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 21. This all shows that a bindover procedure is “proper” even when the juvenile waives R.C. 2152.12’s mandatory requirements. And if the requirements are waivable, they are not jurisdictional. See Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196, at paragraph two of the syllabus (“The exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court cannot be waived”); State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10 (“Because subject-matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a case, the issue can never be waived or forfeited and may be raised at any time”). {¶ 27} While Gaskins II undermined Gaskins I by concluding that a juvenile may waive the bindover procedure’s statutory mandates, other cases have undermined Gaskins I by concluding that a juvenile may forfeit them. In Morgan, we held that R.C. 2151.281(A)(1) requires a juvenile court to appoint a guardian ad litem at an amenability hearing when the juvenile’s parents are deceased and there is no guardian or legal custodian. 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, at ¶ 28. But we held that noncompliance with the statute is subject to plain-error review. Id. at ¶ 49. We also reviewed for plain error in State v. Martin, another case in which a bindover error had occurred. 154 Ohio St.3d 513, 2018-Ohio-3226, 116 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 27. In these cases, we did not view an improper bindover procedure as a fundamental defect that prevented the juvenile court from transferring subject- 10 January Term, 2020 matter jurisdiction to an adult court. Indeed, in Martin, we distinguished Wilson, noting that the juvenile “was not deprived of R.C. 2152.12 bindover proceedings altogether.” Martin at ¶ 25.
{¶ 28} Gaskins I wrongly extended Wilson’s holding with no analysis reconciling the significant differences between the two cases. Specifically, unlike Wilson, Gaskins I did not involve a statutory provision expressly depriving the adult court of jurisdiction. The Gaskins I court was wrong in adopting the broad rule that any deviation from the statutory bindover procedure renders the adult court’s judgment void. The Gaskins I court should have examined the statute’s text concerning the specific error alleged, to determine whether the statute clearly established a barrier to the adult court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Pryor, 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, at ¶ 14. That error has led to significant confusion about when a defendant can challenge a procedural defect in a juvenile-court bindover proceeding, and it necessitates this court’s clarification. {¶ 29} Juveniles facing bindover to an adult court maintain the right to object to a juvenile court’s noncompliance with bindover procedures and the right to appeal from any error in the ordinary course of law. See In re D.H., 152 Ohio St.3d 310, 2018-Ohio-17, 95 N.E.3d 389, ¶ 19. However, we overrule Gaskins I’s holding that any deviation from the statutory bindover procedure creates a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus. Deviation from a bindover procedure gives rise to a potentially valid habeas claim only if the applicable statute clearly makes the procedure a prerequisite to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction to an adult court. See Pryor, 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, at ¶ 14. 4. Smith’s sentencing court had subject-matter jurisdiction {¶ 30} No language in R.C. 2152.12(G) suggests that the provision of notice is a prerequisite to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction to an adult court. Smith’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 31} Initially, Smith focuses on R.C. 2152.12(G)’s mandatory language— “[t]he court shall give notice.” According to Smith, treating the notice requirement as waivable or subject to forfeiture renders it nonmandatory and ineffective. But “not every requirement, even if mandatory, is jurisdictional in nature.” Pryor at ¶ 15; see also Martin, 154 Ohio St.3d 513, 2018-Ohio-3226, 116 N.E.3d 127, at ¶ 27 (“R.C. 2152.021’s mandates are not jurisdictional requirements”); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 146, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (“calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory or that a timely objection can be ignored”); Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen Gen. Commt. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81, 130 S.Ct. 584, 175 L.Ed.2d 428 (2009), quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.E.2d 1097 (“Not all mandatory ‘prescriptions, however emphatic,’ ” are properly classified as “ ‘jurisdictional’ ”). Holding that R.C. 2152.12(G) is nonjurisdictional would not mean that notice is nonmandatory. A juvenile still may object to noncompliance and, even absent an objection, may raise an issue of noncompliance on direct appeal following conviction. See Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 692 N.E.2d 608. But it would mean that a criminal offender may not collaterally attack a final judgment years after the fact. {¶ 32} Smith next points to the notice requirement’s inclusion within R.C. 2152.12, the statute providing the exclusive means for the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction. To be sure, this court has in some cases viewed R.C. 2152.12’s mandatory requirements as prerequisites to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction. But in view of our decision to overrule Gaskins I, Smith’s argument has little force, because he does not consider whether R.C. 2152.12(G), in particular, clearly establishes a barrier to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction. {¶ 33} Finally, Smith emphasizes that the statutory notice requirement is a due-process protection. Invoking language used in some United States Supreme Court cases, he contends that such an important constitutional protection cannot be 12 January Term, 2020 treated as a mere “claim-processing rule,” see, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010). This argument misses an important fact. We have held that a juvenile may waive other key parts of the bindover procedure, such as an amenability hearing. D.W., 133 Ohio St. 3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 21. In support of that holding, we explained that “[e]ven though ‘[t]here is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights,’ an individual can still waive his constitutional rights as long as the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently and is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966). Smith has not shown why his waiver of R.C. 2152.12(G)’s protections—even if they are constitutional in character—was not permissible. {¶ 34} Because R.C. 2152.12(G) does not clearly make the provision of notice a jurisdictional barrier, Smith’s sentencing court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction.