Opinion ID: 1061025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutionality of the tennessee plan

Text: In the consolidated appeals before the Court, both appellants and amicus curiae John King have attacked the validity of T.C.A. § 17-4-101, et seq. (the Tennessee Plan of appellate judicial selection) as unconstitutional under various provision of the Constitution of Tennessee, specifically Article I, Sections 1, 4 and 5, [10] Article II, Section 1, [11] Article VI, Section 3, [12] and Article XI, Section 16. [13] Appellant Hooker has also claimed that the Tennessee Plan violates his rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. At the outset, we note that laws enacted by the legislature are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality; see, e.g., State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tenn.1979). This Court dismisses as without merit, and irrelevant to these cases, appellants' contentions that the Tennessee Plan of appellate judicial selection violates any of the following provisions of the Constitution of Tennessee: Article I, Sections 1 (All power inherent in the peopleGovernment under their control -) and 4 (No religious or political test -) and Article XI, Section 16 (Bill of rights to remain inviolate -). However, Appellants' arguments regarding Article I, Section 5 (Elections to be free and equal Right of suffrage); Article II, Section l(Division of powers), and Article VI, Section 3 (Supreme court judges to be elected by the qualified voters of this State) raise substantial constitutional issues and bear further analysis and discussion. The gravamen of appellants' position is that a retention election, as contemplated under the Tennessee Plan, is not a free and equal election and deprives the qualified voters of this state of the opportunity to elect Supreme Court judges. The issue of whether yes/no retention elections violate the Constitution of Tennessee has previously been decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn.1973), and no compelling reason has been given to persuade this Court that it should disturb that ruling. The Higgins opinion specifically dealt with the issue of whether a retention election involving only a yes/no vote is the type of election that is contemplated in Article VI, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution, answering that question in the affirmative. The Higgins Court noted: The Constitution of Tennessee does not define the words, elect, election, or elected and we have not found nor have we been referred to any provision of the Constitution or of a statute or to any decision of one or our appellate courts defining these words. Id. at 489. In the absence of a definition of election to the contrary, the Higgins Court then cited a number of instances in which the Tennessee Constitution provides for referenda and refers to them as elections. Thus, the Court reasoned: It seems to us that if the Constitution itself denominates these methods of ratification as elections, it cannot be that Chapter 198 is unconstitutional because the elections therein provided are limited to approval or disapproval. So are the elections provided in Sections of the Constitution referred to above. Id. at 489. Although the dissent of Justice Humphreys makes a number of good points, this Court concludes that it must follow the majority in Higgins. To rule the meaning of the term election as used in the Tennessee Constitution is limited to the popular concept of an election (i.e., a choice among one or more candidates in which the candidate with the most votes wins the office), would be to hold, in effect, that the Tennessee Constitution uses an internally inconsistent definition of election. This conclusion is further dictated by the fact that the framers specifically provided for a choice among candidates for the election of the Governor; Article III, Section 2 provides: The Governor shall be chosen by the electors of the members of the General Assembly, at the time and places where they shall respectively vote for the members thereof . . . The person having the highest number of votes shall be Governor; but if two or more shall be equal and highest in votes, one of them shall be chosen Governor by joint vote of both Houses of the General Assembly. Thus, it being the duty of this Court, if there is a doubt as to the meaning of the Constitution or a seeming conflict, . . . to harmonize such portions and favor the construction which will render every word operative . . . Shelby County v. Hale, 200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956), this Court holds that the yes/no retention vote provided for in the Tennessee Plan is in compliance with the Article VI, Section 3 mandate of the Tennessee Constitution that Judges of the Supreme Court be elected by the qualified voters. No authority was cited by any party to these proceedings, nor has any been found by this Court, that would dictate a different result under the United Stated Constitution. [14] It follows that Appellants' contention that the Tennessee Plan violates Article I, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution requiring that . . . elections shall be free and equal is also without merit, since the constitutional definition of election in this state encompasses the yes/no retention vote and it has previously been held that the free and equal requirement relates only to the rights of suffrage and not the nature of elections. Compare, Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897, at 901 (Tenn.1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 930, 108 S.Ct. 1102, 99 L.Ed.2d 264 (1988). With respect to Appellants' argument that the Tennessee Plan violates the separation of powers provision of Article II, Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, we hold that it does not. Recognizing that the doctrine of separation of powers is a fundamental principle of American constitutional government, Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn.1975) and that a judge must be secured against the political caprice of other departments of government, Summers v. Thompson 764 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn.1988), Drowota concurring opinion at 190, this Court acknowledges that Justice Humphreys in his dissent in Higgins postulates the potential for legislative action that could violate the independence of the judiciary. [15] We hold, however, that the Tennessee Plan which provides for a yes/no retention vote based on a majority vote does not cross that threshold. Having found the Tennessee Plan is constitutional, we turn to its interpretation as applied to the factual situations in these consolidated cases.