Opinion ID: 3160802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review the district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo. See Paper, Allied-Indus. Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union, Local 4- 12 v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 657 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2011). It is within the district court’s discretion to decide whether to compel arbitration pursuant to equitable estoppel. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000). The district court abuses that discretion when it premises its decision on either an erroneous application of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. See Crawford Prof’l Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2014); Grigson, 210 F.3d at 528. Whether an alter ego relationship existed is a question of fact that we review for clear error. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 2003). We will only reverse a fact finding as clearly erroneous if we have “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2000). 5 South filed an amended notice of removal correcting similar pleading deficiencies at the behest of the district court before the cases were all consolidated. South’s pleadings properly plead that he is domiciled in Florida and thus that he is diverse from USHealth. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954). 6 Case: 15-10117 Document: 00513298704 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 No. 15-10117