Opinion ID: 1385188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sentencing on Remand

Text: On remand, Judge Johnson decided to resentence Brown; the attorney who had represented Brown throughout virtually all of the prior district court proceedings was appointed to represent him. Thereafter, the parties submitted written arguments and the court held a hearing, attended by counsel and Brown. Brown's attorney reiterated his prior argument that notwithstanding the fact that the Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement was, on its face, applicable even if the defendant did not know the serial numbers were obliterated, Brown should not have his punishment increased on account of a fact that he denied knowing. (See, e.g., Sentencing Transcript September 23, 2005 (2005 S.Tr.), at 5 (Even though it is something the defendant doesn't have to know, he still has not pled guilty to that.).) Brown's attorney also advanced a new contention, saying he had missed it the first time around, arguing that Brown's 1993 felony of third-degree burglary should not have been considered a crime of violence. (2005 S.Tr. at 3.) He argued that burglary conviction resulted from Brown's plea of guilty to burglary of a building; that burglary of a building did not fall within the Guidelines definition of crime of violence, which referred to burglary of a dwelling, see 2003 Guidelines § 4B1.2(a); and that conviction thus could not justify a base offense level of 24 under § 2K2.1(a)(2). (2005 S.Tr. at 4.) Brown's attorney pointed out that if the 1993 burglary were not treated as a crime of violence and the enhancement for the obliterated serial numbers were eliminated, Brown's advisory Guidelines-recommended imprisonment range would be 46-57 months. ( See 2005 S.Tr. at 7.) The government opposed Brown's contentions, citing this Court's decision in Andrello, 9 F.3d 247, and the Guidelines themselves. The Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) argued that Andrello deem[ed] burglary in the third degree under New York law . . . to constitute [a] crime[ ] of violence (2005 S.Tr. at 8) and hence foreclosed Brown's contention that his 1993 burglary should not be considered a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). The AUSA also reiterated the government's position that Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4), calling for an offense-level increase for possession of a gun with an obliterated serial number, is a strict liability provision that did not require knowledge (2005 S.Tr. at 8). After hearing counsel's arguments and a statement from Brown, the district court resentenced Brown under the post- Booker sentencing regime and imposed the same 84-month term of imprisonment it had imposed originally. The court stated as follows: The sentencing landscape has been changed by Booker. . . . . . . Crosby tells us that the court must consider the guidelines because they are advisory and then look at the factors in 3553(a) and if you look at the factors in 3553(a)(2)(A), to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for an offense and in this situation the defendant is a prior felon who was selling a number of firearms to undercover police officers. . . . . . . . . . . And then 3553(a)(2)(B) says to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. This defendant is not unfamiliar with the criminal justice system. He has numerous run-ins with the criminal justice system and there are at least two felonies that he's been convicted of; is that correct? MR. ABENSOHN [the AUSA]: I believe there are three prior felonies but two qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of the statute, Your Honor. THE COURT: And 3553(a)(2)(C) says to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant and this defendant on one instance had escaped custody for a state conviction and while in that escape status committed another felony. . . . . . . . . . . Well, I have taken all of this into consideration and I have looked at the guidelines and I am going to impose the same sentence that I imposed before. I sentence the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General or his duly authorized representative for a period of 84 months to run concurrent on each count. . . . (2005 S.Tr. at 10-12.) Judgment was entered, and this appeal followed.