Opinion ID: 1467920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Springfield's Tax Ordinance

Text: Alltel and Cingular argue that the district court erred in granting Springfield's motion for summary judgment because cell phone services are not telephonic services. Alltel contends that the district court erred by not strictly construing Springfield's authority to tax telephone companies and by not strictly construing the terms telephones and telephonic services in the tax ordinance itself. Cingular asserts that it provides telecommunications services, not telephonic services, and that the district court erred by ignoring the 2000 modification of the tax ordinance and applying the language of the pre-2000 version. Defendants further argue that they are not subject to the tax on telecommunications services because Springfield's Charter grants it the authority to tax telephone companies, not telecommunications companies, and the 2000 recodification of the tax ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment. In the alternative, the defendants argue that the tax ordinance is ambiguous and therefore must be construed in favor of the defendants. We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis LLC, 519 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir.2008). In so doing, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and affirm if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We review de novo the district court's determinations of law. Id.
Section 70-452 of the Springfield Code states that [e]very person engaged in the business of supplying telephones, and telecommunications and telephonic service, and telecommunications services, within the city shall pay as a license tax a sum equal to six (6) percent of the gross receipts from such business. The ordinance does not define the terms telephones, telecommunications, telephonic services, or telecommunications services. To ascertain the meaning of a city ordinance, we utilize the same rules of construction applied to statutes. Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Mo.2007) (en banc). The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute. Missouri ex rel. Young v. Wood, No. SC 88840, 2008 WL 2346199, at  1 (Mo.2008) (en banc). The standard for determining whether a statute's terms are plain and clear is whether the terms are plain and clear to a person of ordinary intelligence. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo.1988) (en banc). When the statute's language is unambiguous, a court must give effect to the legislature's chosen language. Missouri ex rel. Young, 2008 WL 2346199, at  1. In the absence of statutory definitions, we turn to the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms as derived from a dictionary and consider the context of the statute in which the language appears. Missouri ex rel. Burns v. Whittington, 219 S.W.3d 224, 225 (Mo.2007) (en banc). In so doing, we presume that the legislature did not intend the statute to create an absurd result. Weeks v. Missouri, 140 S.W.3d 39, 47 (Mo.2004) (en banc). The Springfield Code does not explicitly define the term telephone. The use of the term throughout the Code, however, provides some insight into its intended meaning. See Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir.2007) (Missouri law requires courts to read statutes in pari materia by harmonizing sections covering the same subject matter). Several sections list the information that must be provided to apply for a franchise or license. See, e.g., Springfield, Mo., Code §§ 70-323(a), 70-594(b), 100-5.1. Among the information required is the applicant's telephone number. Certainly the request for a telephone number in this context is not limited to the individual's land-line telephone, for a cell phone number would satisfy the purpose of these sections and it is unlikely an application would be denied on the basis that the applicant had a cell phone but not a land-line telephone. Additionally, section 78-62 describes the criminal offense of Harassment by telephone. Surely this section is not limited to callers who harass others via a land-line telephone. See also Springfield, Mo., Code § 120-152(f)(1) (to report a potential problem regarding a discharge, it is the responsibility of the industrial user to immediately telephone and notify the POTW of the incident). It is also true that some provisions in the Springfield Code refer to telephones and their accompanying wires or cables. For instance, section 98-46(b) specifies the proper placement of underground telephone cables, junction boxes and appurtenances thereto. See also Springfield, Mo., Code §§ 70-481, 70-482. It does not necessarily follow, however, that because some telephones have wires or cables, certain aspects of which are regulated by Springfield, those devices that do not have wires or cables are not telephones. The word telephonic appears in only two Articles of the Code. Once in Article XI, which contains the tax ordinance at issue in this case, and secondly in Article V related to underground facility safety and damage prevention. Neither use suggests that the definition of the term is limited to land-line telephones. Because the Springfield Code does not explicitly define the terms telephone or telephonic services, we also look to the dictionary definition of these statutory terms to determine their ordinary meanings. See Schumacher v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 515 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir.2008) (looking to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary for the ordinary meaning of a statutory term). The district court analyzed definitions from older dictionaries to determine the meaning of the word telephone during the time when the original tax ordinance was in effect. See City of Jefferson V, No. 04-04099, 2007 WL 1965572 (W.D.Mo. July 3, 2007). The district court looked to the 1969 and 1982 editions of the American Heritage Dictionary, which both define a telephone as [a]n instrument that directly modulates carrier waves with voice or other acoustic source signals to be transmitted to remote locations and that directly reconverts received waves into audible signals; especially such an instrument connected to others by wire. The 1966 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines telephone as an instrument for reproducing sounds esp. articulate speech at a distance. The district court also looked at the 2000 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary, which defines telephone as [a]n instrument that converts voice and other sound signals into a form that can be transmitted to remote locations and that receives and reconverts waves into sound signals. Although the district court noted that these definitions provide examples of telephones that use wires, the examples are not exhaustive and do not preclude the conclusion that a device that meets the definition of telephone but which does not have wires is nonetheless a telephone. Accordingly, we also believe the following definition of telephone is especially helpful: any of various devices (as a sound-signaling device or a speaking tube) resembling or suggesting the telephone. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2350 (1981). The 1999 edition of Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines telephonic as of, relating to, or conveyed by a telephone. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1211 (10th ed.1999). The definition of telephonic in other dictionaries is substantially the same. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, for instance, defines telephonic as conveying sound to a distance, or of or relating to the telephone, or carried or conveyed by telephone. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2350 (1981). Applying Missouri's rules of statutory construction, we conclude that the plain language of the tax ordinance makes it clear that the ordinance was intended to cover all telephonic services, regardless of the type of technology used to provide the services. Cell phones are commonly described as telephones and are used to accomplish the same function and purpose as a land-line telephone. [12] Both devices convert voice and other sound signals into a form that can be transmitted to remote locations, both devices receive and reconvert waves into sound signals, and a cell phone resembles a telephone. Admittedly, cell phones have newer and more advanced features than the telephones commonly used when the tax ordinance was first enacted. Nevertheless, nothing about the term telephonic in the tax ordinance is limited to the technology generally used to operate telephones in 1944. In fact, cases dating back to pre-1944 which discuss telephones and telephone systems describe them in terms of their purpose and not with regard to the type of technology used to operate them. See Gilpin v. Savage, 60 Misc. 605, 112 N.Y.S. 802, 805 (N.Y.Sup.1908), rev'd on other grounds, 201 N.Y. 167, 94 N.E. 656 (1911) (The telephone is simply an instrument by which two persons may talk directly to each other.); see also Missouri ex rel. Baltimore & Ohio Tele. Co. v. Bell Tele. Co., 23 F. 539, 541 (C.C.E.D.Mo.1885) (A telephonic system is simply a system for the transmission of intelligence and news.). As the district court noted, there have been many advances in telephone technology over the past sixty years, and with each technological advancement we continue to refer to the product and services as telephonic. See City of Jefferson V, No. 04-04099, 2007 WL 1965572 (W.D.Mo. July 3, 2007). Springfield is not required to update its Code for the purpose of recognizing the advent of each new form of technology used to provide telephonic services. Accordingly, we conclude that the language of the tax ordinance is unambiguous and that the tax ordinance applies to cell phone services.
Even if we believed the tax ordinance was ambiguous, however, we would conclude that extrinsic evidence supports the conclusion that Springfield intended the original language of the ordinance to cover services such as cell phone services, that the ordinary meaning of the term telephone includes cell phones, and that cell phone services are telephonic services. The defendants describe their products as telephones and their services as telephonic services. See City of St. Louis v. Miss. River Fuel Corp., 57 F.Supp. 549, 554 (E.D.Mo.1944) (terminology related to a particular industry should be given the meaning attributed to it by the industry). Cingular's website states that [t]he world of wireless can be confusing. That's why we've provided this extensive glossary of terms to help you better understand the technologies behind wireless communications. The website's glossary defines telephony as [o]riginally meaning voice (analog) communication by telephone (land line), this term has come to encompass virtually all telecommunications, because virtually all telecommunications can be done over or while connected to a telephone line. Cellular is defined as [a] wireless telephone network that connects radio frequencies from a mobile phone to a system of multiple cell sites, each consisting of an antenna and a base station, to a mobile telephone switching office, and ultimately to the public wireline telephone system. CMRS is defined as [a]n FCC designation for any carrier or licensee whose wireless network is connected to the public switched telephone network and/or is operated for profit. Telecommunications is defined as [c]ommunicating by telephone, telegraph or radio technology. These definitions do not indicate that telephonic services and telecommunications services are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they support the conclusion that a cell phone, despite the fact that it is using a different technology than land-line telephones to accomplish the same purpose, is inherently telephonic in nature and should be subject to the same taxes as traditional land-line telephones regardless of what new terminology the defendants wish to use to describe their products and services in the course of this litigation. See Rhodes v. City of Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 513 A.2d 124, 126 (1986) ([o]ne should not be able to avoid a tax on shoes by calling shoes slippers (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted)). Although there is no case law specifically addressing Springfield's tax ordinance, the Missouri courts have recently discussed issues related to the question before us today. In City of Sunset Hills v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that Southwestern Bell, a provider of cellular communication services, is a telephone company for purposes of the Sunset Hills' Charter authorizing it to tax telephone companies. 14 S.W.3d 54, 58-59 (Mo.Ct.App.1999) (Southwestern Bell described its cell phone business as telecommunications antennae business). Thereafter, in City of Springfield v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., the Missouri Supreme Court characterized the holding in City of Sunset Hills as stating that it is absurd to deny that companies providing `wireless communications services' were a part of the class of `telephone companies' subject to a telephone business license fee. 203 S.W.3d 177, 187 n. 13 (Mo.2006) (en banc). Additionally, in other cases, Missouri courts have discussed cell phone companies and the services they provide in terms of telephones and telephonic services. See, e.g., Missouri v. Purl, 236 S.W.3d 680, 682 (Mo.Ct.App. 2007) (describing a call on a cellular phone as a telephone call); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Ennulat, 231 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (discussing a cellular telephone tower); Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 304, 312 (Mo.Ct.App.2005) (describing a customer of Alltel's as a wireless telephone customer and citing Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999), wherein a person purchased a cellular telephone service plan allowing them to make telephone calls within the local service area). These cases lead us to the conclusion that if presented with the question before us, the Missouri Supreme Court would conclude that a cell phone is a telephone and that cell phone services are telephonic services. Cases from other jurisdictions also support the conclusion that the ordinary definition of telephone includes cell phones and that a cell phone company is a telephone company. See Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 73 Ark. App. 222, 40 S.W.3d 838, 842 (2001) (concluding that CMRS providers are telephone companies because they use their assets to provide a service whereby persons who are at some distance from each other may communicate by voice in real time); Galloway v. Alltel Commc'ns, Inc., No. C99-2097, 2001 WL 34149071, at  1 (N.D.Iowa 2001) (Alltel is a communications-related corporation which includes the sale of wireless telephone service and equipment.); Cent. Ky. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth of Ky., 897 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky.Ct.App.1995) (The fact that the [cellular telephone companies] operate with technology that did not exist when the statute was adopted does not mean that they are not to be included for the purposes of [the statute].... This fact does not mean that telephone companies become something else simply because they use improved communication techniques.); Nebraska v. Robinson, 272 Neb. 582, 724 N.W.2d 35, 62 (2006) (describing Alltel's record keeping process for wireless telephones); Airtouch Comm'ns, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, State of Wyo., 76 P.3d 342, 349 (Wyo.2003) (concluding that cellular companies are telephone companies because, [t]o most reasonable people, Petitioners' business is indistinguishable from that of a telephone company. In fact, in today's society, many people use telephone services and cellular services interchangeably (internal quotation omitted)). The cases cited by the defendants in which cell phone companies have been found to be something other than telephone companies are distinguishable. For example, Alltel's citation to an order from the Administrative Law Court in South Carolina for the proposition that Alltel is not a telephone company is not instructive. See Alltel Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, Nos. 07-ALJ-17-0299-CC through 07-ALJ-17-0304-CC (Apr. 22, 2008) (order granting Petitioners' motion for summary judgment). In that case, the parties stipulated that [t]elephones and telephone companies transmit intelligence over a vast network of wires located in public rights of way and in easements over private property. Id. at 10, ¶ 50. The parties also stipulated that Alltel did not have any facilities located in public rights of way. Id. at 10, ¶ 51. As a result, the court's conclusion that Alltel did not meet the definition of a telephone company does not compel a similar conclusion in the present case because that definition is of no binding effect here. The citation to a Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission decision from 1982 is also unhelpful. See Mobile Radio Commc'ns, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, No. RS-79-0199, 1982 WL 12037 (Mo.Admin.Hrg.Com. Dec. 16, 1982). In Mobile Radio Commc'ns, the administrative commission relied on a Texas Supreme Court case in which mobile radio communications were not subject to a local ordinance because the ordinance referred to transmission of voice communication by lines and wires. Id. Because our analysis of whether the defendants are subject to the Springfield tax ordinance does not include stipulated definitions for telephone company or telephonic services, the cases cited by the defendants are inapposite. Likewise, Cingular's citation to a Massachusetts case does not further its position. See Bell Atl. Mobile of Mass. Corp., Ltd. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 451 Mass. 280, 884 N.E.2d 978 (2008). The case is interesting, however, because Bell Atlantic Mobile took the position that it provided telephone services and was therefore a telephone company for purposes of receiving a property tax exemption. See Id. at 984; Bell Atl. Mobile Corp., Ltd. v. Comm'r of Revenue, No. C269569, 2007 WL 597941 at  (Mass.App.Tax.Bd.2007) (Bell Atlantic defined telephone service as two-way, party-to-party voice communication and data transmission). The court reached its conclusion that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not a telephone company after considering the fact that it owned virtually none of the property eligible for the property tax exemption. Bell Atl. Mobile, 884 N.E.2d at 983-84. The court quickly dismissed one of its prior cases addressing the issue of whether a company that provided land-line telephone services, cable television, and Internet services, qualified as a telephone company for purposes of the property tax exemption. See 884 N.E.2d at 984 (discussing RCN-BecoCom, LLC v. Comm'r of Revenue, 443 Mass. 198, 820 N.E.2d 208 (2005)). Interestingly, in RCN-BecoCom, the court included dial-up Internet connections in the calculation of the financial receipts the company received from telephone service. 820 N.E.2d at 215, 216 n. 4. In so doing, the court reasoned that dial-up Internet service is analogous to the transmission of information by facsimile, which is a telephone service. Id. The court also noted that Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) Internet access was a telephone service, thus providing further support for our conclusion that the definition of telephones and telephonic services is indeed broad and is not limited to any particular type of technology. We acknowledge that tax ordinances are to be strictly construed and that if there is any doubt about the applicability of the tax, it must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. See Morton v. Brenner, 842 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Mo.1992) (en banc); Armack's Estate v. Missouri, 561 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Mo.1978) (en banc). Nevertheless, even if we apply the strictest of definitions to telephones and telephonic services, we conclude that the extrinsic evidence leaves no doubt that the phrase telephonic services covers cell phone services. Alltel contends that the appropriate standard is not whether telephonic services is broad enough to cover CMRS but whether reasonable minds can differ on the question of whether CMRS constitutes telephonic services. Springfield's authority to tax telephones and telephonic services is not at issue, however, and we conclude that the application of the tax to the defendants is clear. The fact that Alltel can present an argument that the ordinance is susceptible to more than one interpretation does not mean that the ordinance is ambiguous. See J.B. Vending Co., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 54 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo.2001) (en banc) (the mere fact that the litigants disagree over the meaning of `public' does not render the statute ambiguous). That courts in other jurisdictions, applying different statutory terms and definitions to different facts, have at times concluded that a particular business is not a telephone company does not alter our conclusion, for we find the Missouri Court of Appeals' 1999 holding that a cell phone provider could be taxed as a telephone company to be more compelling. See City of Sunset Hills, 14 S.W.3d at 58-59. Because we must assume that the Springfield City Council was aware of this case law when it modified the tax ordinance in 2000, we conclude that if the Council had intended that cell phone services be excluded from the tax on telephonic services, it would have made that intention clear in 2000. See Hudson v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 216 S.W.3d 216, 222-23 (Mo. Ct.App.2007) (The legislature is presumed to know the existing case law when it enacts a statute. (internal quotation omitted)). Thus, even if we assume that the tax ordinance is ambiguous and look to extrinsic evidence interpreting it, we conclude that the legislative intent to tax telephonic services makes the ordinance applicable to cell phone services.
The defendants argue that the 2000 modification of the tax ordinance must be given some effect. Cingular contends that it provides telecommunications services and that the definitions of telephonic services and telecommunications services are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, both defendants argue that they are not subject to the tax under the telecommunications language in the ordinance because Springfield's Charter authorized it to tax only telephone companies, and not telecommunications companies, and the 2000 modification of the ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment. When the legislature amends a statute, we presume its intent was to change the existing law or to accomplish some legislative purpose. Hagan v. Dir. of Revenue, 968 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo.1998) (en banc); Missouri v. Rousseau, 34 S.W.3d 254, 261 (Mo.Ct.App.2000). The legislative purpose of a statutory amendment can be to clarify the law rather than change the existing law. Andresen v. Bd. of Regents of Mo. W. State Coll., 58 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Mo.Ct. App.2001) (concluding that the amendment clarified the legislature's original intent to exclude academic institutions from the State Personnel Law); Flipps Nine, Inc. v. Mo. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 941 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (concluding that the amendment to the statute was intended to clarify and particularize existing law); Carter v. Pottenger, 888 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (concluding that the amendment indicated legislative intent that personal representative under the earlier version of the statute did not mean a representative of a probate estate appointed under the time constraints of another statute). We consider the legislative act in its entirety and harmonize all of its provisions if possible. Hagan, 968 S.W.2d at 706. If the legislature amends only part of a statute, we presume that the unamended and unchanged parts of the statute are intended to remain operative and effective. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 639 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo.1982). The Code contains several references to telecommunications and telecommunications services. Section 100-2.43 defines telecommunications as the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing (e.g. data, video, and voice), without change in the form or content of the information sent and received regardless of the technology used. See also The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (using substantially the same definition). The 1999 edition of Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines telecommunication as communication at a distance (as by telephone). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1211 (10th ed.1999). Telecommunication has also been defined as communication at a distance (as by cable, radio, telegraph, telephone, or television). Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2349 (1981). Given these definitions, we conclude that cell phone services could be considered both telephonic services and telecommunications services. Cell phones are telephonic, as discussed above. Cell phones may also be telecommunications devices under the definition in the Springfield Code and the ordinary definition of the term because they transmit information, including voice, data, and in the case of some newer cell phones, video. Thus, the terms used in the tax ordinance are not necessarily mutually exclusive and there is no merit to the argument that cell phones are telecommunications devices and therefore cannot be taxed as telephonic devices. This bring us to Cingular's argument that the 2000 modification must have had some purpose, to which we must give effect. See Schoemehl v. Treasurer of Mo., 217 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Mo.2007) (en banc) (noting that an entire clause of a statute should not be considered excess verbiage). We conclude that the legislative intent of the 2000 recodification that added the terms telecommunications and telecommunications services was to clarify the scope of the tax ordinance, making it clear that cell phone services are telephonic services subject to the tax, and not to expand the scope of the ordinance. See Missouri ex rel. Thomas v. Kelly, 631 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Mo.Ct.App.1982) (when a new act supersedes an old law for the purpose of repealing conflicting or inconsistent provisions, any variation in the terminology in the new law is not as meaningful for the purpose of showing legislative intent to change the effect of the statute). The record indicates that Springfield's recodification of § 70-452 in 2000 was not intended to be a substantive change to the scope of the ordinance. The modification occurred as part of a complete update of the Springfield Code, the purpose of which was to create an electronically searchable version thereof, eliminate inconsistencies or unclear provisions of the Code, and to identify ordinances of questionable enforceability, expired language, duplications and conflicts with state or federal law. The modification process was conducted by a private company and was specifically intended to create non-substantive changes in the Code unless needed to be internally consistent or consistent with state or federal law. Mary Mannix, Springfield's Assistant Director of Finance and Comptroller, testified in her deposition that We viewed [the recodification] as a modernization of the language. She testified further that Anything that was a substantial change to what the ordinances that existed at the time that this was codified would have been covered by a separate city council ordinance at that time. Nancy Yendes, a Springfield city attorney, testified that the tax ordinance was not brought before the Council separately and that no one working for Springfield was aware of the updated language in the tax ordinance until after the Council approved the recodification of the entire Code. In sum, this evidence reveals that the modification of the tax ordinance was not intended to be, and was not viewed as, a substantive change to the scope of the ordinance. The record also indicates that prior to the 2000 modification, Springfield interpreted the tax ordinance as applying to cell phone services. The original ordinance, enacted in 1944, included the phrase telephonic services, a phrase that, despite Cingular's argument to the contrary, is broader than the term telephone. As indicated by the definitions of these terms analyzed above, telephonic means something that is related to a telephone, which necessarily includes items or services that are not the physical telephone itself. The record also indicates that Springfield interpreted the tax ordinance to apply to cell phones before 2000. Yendes testified that she believed the term telephonic is broader than telecommunications, and that the new language in the tax ordinance was only included to update the ordinance with the new phraseology and clarify the scope of the ordinance. [13] Yendes also testified that she had discussions with cell phone companies, including Alltel, in the mid-tolate 90s regarding their need to comply with the tax ordinance. The fact that Springfield did not send the cell phone companies a demand letter prior to 2004 does not establish that Springfield believed that the ordinance did not apply to the defendants and, in any event, does not relieve the defendants of their obligation to pay the tax. See Med. House, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 799 S.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mo.1990) (en banc). Thus, we conclude that the original scope of the ordinance included cell phones, and that the legislative purpose of the 2000 modification was to clarify this interpretation and not to expand the scope of the ordinance. The defendants argue that because Springfield referred to them as telecommunications companies in the original pleadings, it cannot succeed in taxing them under the original language of the ordinance. Springfield's pleadings do not, however, change the scope of the question before us. Springfield has always asserted its authority to tax the defendants as telephone companies. Furthermore, Count III of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Springfield Ordinance, which includes the terms `telephone' and `telephonic' applies to the Wireless Defendants' services; and that the Wireless Defendants [are] liable to pay taxes under the Ordinance. Springfield's motion for summary judgment clearly argued that CMRS is subject to taxes applicable to telephones and telephonic services. Additionally, the record indicates that the district court and the parties treated the declaratory judgment as an issue of whether the defendants provide telephones and telephonic services. The defendants also argue that Springfield's attempt to tax them exceeds the scope of Springfield's Charter. Section 18.1(3) of Springfield's Charter authorizes it to tax telephone companies. A company that provides telephones and telephonic services is a telephone company. Thus, a tax on the defendant's cell phone services, which are telephonic services, is authorized by the Charter. We need not reach the question whether the City's Charter grants it the authority to tax telecommunications companies, but we note that Springfield has the authority to tax a business and occupation that, although not specifically listed as subject to a license tax, clearly comes within the definition and meaning of the enumerated subjects or is in fact a genus of one of the named occupations. See City of St. Charles v. St. Charles Gas Co., 353 Mo. 996, 185 S.W.2d 797, 798 (1945). Whether a telecommunications company clearly comes within the definition of, or is a genus of, a telephone company is a question we leave for another day. The defendants' final argument is that the 2000 recodification of the tax ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution, with the result that they cannot be taxed under the language added in 2000 or under the original language of the ordinance. See Mo. Const. art. X, § 22(a). Because we are not applying the language of the ordinance that was added in 2000 to the facts of this case, we do not need to reach the question whether the 2000 recodification violated the Hancock Amendment. [14] Even if the language added in 2000 was unconstitutional, a question we do not decide, we see no reason why the original language of the ordinance cannot be severed. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.140 (allowing unconstitutional language to be severed from a statute unless the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent). The 2000 modification merely added language to the ordinance and did not affect the validity of the original decades-old language. [15] See Mo. Ass'n of Club Executives v. Missouri, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888-89 (Mo.2006) (en banc) (challenged provisions could be severed); Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 219-21 (Mo.2006) (en banc) (provisions were not severable). Therefore, even if the language added to the ordinance in 2000 was unconstitutional, because the defendants provide telephones and telephonic services within Springfield, they are subject to the tax ordinance. The judgment is affirmed.