Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Attempted Rape

Text: The trial court found the evidence was insufficient to instruct the jury on a theory of premeditated and deliberate murder. Accordingly, the prosecution's sole theory supporting defendant's first degree murder conviction and the related rape-murder special-circumstance finding was felony murder during an attempted rape. Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to establish Powell was murdered during an attempted rape, and this court must reverse his first degree felony-murder conviction and strike the related rape-murder special-circumstance finding. In the alternative, he argues we should reduce his conviction to second degree murder. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceevidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319-320, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special-circumstance allegations. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 396, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) [I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. ( People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 143, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103.) A killing committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate one of several enumerated felonies, including rape, is first degree murder. [14] (§ 189) The rape-murder special circumstance equally applies to a murder committed while the defendant was engaged in ... the commission of, [or] attempted commission of rape. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C)); People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 524-525, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.) Forcible rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator against the person's will by means of force or violence. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 427, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) An attempt to commit rape has two elements: the specific intent to commit rape and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 387, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The act must be a direct movement beyond preparation that would have accomplished the crime of rape if not frustrated by extraneous circumstances. ( Ibid. ) An actual element of the offense, however, need not be proven. ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454, 456, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 [attempted robbery].) Intent to commit rape is the intent to commit the act against the will of the complainant. (See, e.g., People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 400, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1 [assault with intent to commit rape]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 757, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250 [an assault with intent to commit rape and an attempted rape require the same specific intent].) A defendant's specific intent to commit a crime may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. ( People v. Craig (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1593, 1597, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 96; see also People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 47, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224 [burglary].) Defendant first contends the evidence shows, at most, a sexual interest in Powell that cannot be equated with an intent to rape. Second, he contends because there was no physical evidence of a sexual attack, there was no evidence of attempted rape. We disagree and conclude the jury could reasonably infer defendant's intent to have nonconsensual intercourse with Powell by force and further find his actions at least went beyond mere preparation and constituted direct but ineffectual acts toward the attempted commission of a rape. In older cases involving a charge of sexual assault, in the absence of physical evidence that a sexual assault had occurred (e.g., the presence of semen or vaginal trauma), the court declined to infer an intent to commit a sexual assault on the victim, even if the victim was unclothed. (See, e.g., People v. Granados (1957) 49 Cal.2d 490, 497, 319 P.2d 346; People v. Craig (1957) 49 Cal.2d 313, 318-319, 316 P.2d 947; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 35, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942.) Recently, we distinguished these decisions by noting the lack of semen or absence of sexual trauma on the victim did not rebut an inference, based on the other physical evidence surrounding the attack, that the defendant entered the victim's house with an intent to rape. ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 138-139, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164.) We concluded there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer the defendant's intent to rape, notwithstanding the absence of physical evidence the victim suffered a sexual assault. ( Ibid. ) The jury could reasonably infer defendant's intent to rape from the condition of the victim's body and evidence of the defendant's attempted rape of the victim's sister. ( Ibid. ) Here, as in Holloway, despite the lack of physical evidence Powell had suffered a sexual assault, we conclude sufficient evidence established defendant intended to rape her. The record establishes defendant's escalating sexual interest in Powell. A few days before the murder, as defendant sat around the remodeling site with other coworkers, he used the word panocha, a slang term for female genitalia, in reference to Powell as he gyrated his hips in a sexual manner. On the day of the murder, defendant repeatedly entered Powell's property and house. In the morning, defendant walked through Powell's utility room door and into her kitchen. Powell asked Braziel to take defendant back to the remodeling site. After lunch, Braziel found defendant standing alone on Powell's back patio. Around 2:30 p.m., Sloane, the remodeling contractor, heard the gate to Powell's backyard close and saw defendant emerge from the hedge separating the properties. When Sloane asked defendant why he was next door and not working, defendant apologized and assured him it would not happen again. Later, after defendant had stepped through Powell's patio door and into her den, Powell again asked Braziel to take defendant back to the remodeling site. Defendant repeatedly chanted Kathy for me, me for Kathy and gyrated his hips in a sexual manner. Braziel tried to persuade defendant to leave and told him, [N]o, Francisco, Powell's like being a nice person. She don't like you that way. She likes you like a friend. Defendant responded by continuing to repeat his Kathy for me, me for Kathy chant and gyrating his hips. Still later, Canale, the electrical contractor, observed defendant alone inside Powell's utility room, drinking a brown beverage. In addition, the evidence shows defendant fabricated a reason for remaining at the remodeling site after all of the construction workers had left for the day. At trial, defendant claimed that he told Antonio Flores, a coworker, he intended to stay at the site until his boss, Kevin Cozen, returned. However, Cozen testified he had made no arrangement to meet defendant at the site in the afternoon. Defendant also had asked Michel, a neighbor who was walking by the remodeling site after 4:00 p.m. whether she had come from Powell's house, and she replied, No. A jury could reasonably infer from such evidence that defendant planned to catch Powell alone after the other construction workers had left. Evidence of Powell's injuries also support a conclusion that defendant attempted to rape her and stabbed her to death when she resisted having sex with him. The most telling of Powell's injuries are the poke wounds and the slash wound on each of Powell's breasts. The wounds were essentially parallel and indicate defendant deliberately poked Powell in one breast with the tip of his knife and then poked her in the other breast in the same manner. Then, after poking her breasts, defendant slit one of Powell's breasts open and slashed the other. Such wounds obviously were not accidental. A jury could reasonably infer that by inflicting these wounds, defendant intended to force Powell to do something against her will. The nature and location of Powell's injuriesconsidered in conjunction with the above circumstantial evidence of defendant's escalating sexual interest in Powell, demonstrated persistence in entering Powell's house, and efforts to ensure that he would be alone with Powell at the end of the daysupport the jury's finding that defendant intended to force Powell to submit to his sexual intent. Defendant argues that a myriad of circumstances was presented by the evidence and that an attempted rape was not the only explanation that accounted for Powell's murder. For example, assuming he poked Powell's breasts with a knife, he maintains the evidence suggests equally that those wounds were inflicted as a result of his taunting her for having rejected his sexual advances rather than attempting to force her to have sexual intercourse with him. But the defense offered no evidence at trial to contest the People's evidence that defendant acted with intent to rape Powell. Defendant testified he was not interested in Powell romantically and found her upon hearing her screams, implying that some unidentified third party must have attacked her in her utility room and stabbed her to death. The jury obviously did not believe his version of events. His defense at trial thus provides no support for his argument on appeal that the People's evidence was insufficient to establish his intent to rape Powell. The jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant assaulted Powell with the intent to rape. Further, the jury could have reasonably found defendant's conduct constituted a direct but ineffectual act in furtherance of his intent to rape, thereby establishing his attempted rape of Powell. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 387, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Proof of even slight acts beyond preparation done in furtherance of the intent to rape will constitute an attempt. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 698, 700 P.2d 446; People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 456, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697.) Under the prosecution's theory, defendant's infliction of poke wounds on Powell's breasts, while she was alive, constituted an act in furtherance of an attempted rape. Defendant complains that the poke wounds were not necessarily inflicted in a sexual manner and that some sort of physical sexual assault is required to establish attempted rape. Not so. In Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 387, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, we declined to hold that an attempted rape requires some physical conduct of a distinctly and unambiguously sexual nature. ( See also People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 376-377, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169 [a demand for oral copulation followed by the actual or attempted use of force constitutes more than mere preparation].) Here, consistent with the prosecution's theory, the jury could reasonably find that defendant attempted consensual sexual intercourse with Powell, was rejected by her, and then attempted to force her to comply by poking her breasts with the tip of his knife. [15] In doing so, defendant's use of force amounted to more than mere preparation and progressed into an attempted rape. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 387, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) For these reasons, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant killed Powell during an attempted rape and, accordingly, defendant's first degree felony-murder conviction and the related rape-murder special-circumstance finding.