Opinion ID: 794279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper closing argument and rebuttal

Text: 29 Wicahpe next argues comments made by the government in closing argument and rebuttal were prejudicially improper. The prosecutor suggested in closing that Wicahpe's defense attorney was trying to mislead the jury with the red herring evidence that Bissonette had brass knuckles on him the day of the stabbing. (Trial Tr. Vol. II at 296, 320-21.) The prosecutor also referred to his twenty-plus years of experience in the United States Attorney's office as giving him the insight that the facts are not what the lawyers say they are. He followed this comment by again stating that Wicahpe's lawyer was pointing the jury to red herrings to distract you[,] to take you off the path. ( Id. at 321.) The prosecutor finally implored the jury not to let Wicahpe's lawyer twist those facts or con you. ( Id. at 325-26.)
30 To obtain a reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks were improper, and (2) such remarks prejudiced the defendant's rights in obtaining a fair trial. United States v. King, 36 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir.1994). If we find the comments were improper, we consider the cumulative effect of the improprieties, the strength of the evidence against the defendant, and whether the district court took any curative action. United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 526 (8th Cir.2000). This analysis is altered in Wicahpe's case because his attorney did not object to the improper comments or move for a mistrial on this basis, and the district court took no curative action sua sponte. The error is thus unpreserved, United States v. Griffin, 437 F.3d 767, 769-70 (8th Cir.2006), and we review for plain error, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). 31 The author of this opinion has no hesitancy in finding the comments made by the prosecutor to be inappropriate. This court has previously admonished counsel for focusing personal attacks on defense counsel. In United States v. Lopez, 414 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.2005) (en banc), the district court sustained an objection to the prosecutor's reference to defense counsel's slick tactics. Although we agreed that this comment alone did not warrant a mistrial, we noted that such conduct by a prosecutor was improper. Id.; cf. United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir.1996) (Referring to defendants as `bad people' simply does not further the aims of justice or aid in the search for truth, and is likely to inflame bias in the jury and to result in a verdict based on something other than the evidence.). Similarly, in United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 775 (8th Cir.2005), our court reversed a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor used closing argument and rebuttal to focus on the conduct and role of [the defendant's] attorney rather than on the evidence of [the defendant's] guilt. The prosecutor in Holmes, as here, suggested that the defense attorney was distracting the jury with red herrings, and insinuated that the attorney and defendant had conspired to fabricate a defense. The Holmes court found it particularly disturbing that the improper comments were made during rebuttal, when the defendant had no opportunity to respond. Id. at 776. 32 The government argues that if the prosecutor's comments were improper at all, they were fair, invited responses to the defendant's closing. I disagree. In Wicahpe's closing, he focused on the fact that Bissonette had brass knuckles. While the prosecutor might have considered this a red herring, it was central to Wicahpe's claim of self-defense, as he would feel the necessity to use more force if he knew or had reason to know that Bissonette used dangerous weapons. The government directs us to the vigorous, sometimes personal, argument made in Petan's closing. That, however, cannot excuse the prosecutor for comments directed at Wicahpe's lawyer.
33 Even where this court finds that the government has committed misconduct, we must determine its cumulative effect, the strength of the evidence against the defendant, and whether the district court cured any error. Beckman, 222 F.3d at 516. Although this analysis is altered slightly because we are reviewing for plain error, see United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir.2005) (en banc) (stating plain error standard), both inquiries consider whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the error. 34 In this instance, we find the cumulative effect of the errors do not require reversal. As detailed more fully above, the government established that Wicahpe stabbed Bissonette in retaliation for Bissonette's attack on Wicahpe's father. Eyewitnesses testified that Wicahpe sought revenge upon seeing his father injured. He recklessly drove a vehicle at a high rate of speed until he reached Bissonette's location. Upon entering the residence, Wicahpe armed himself with a knife, broke the telephone, and after a short time, stabbed Bissonette. Wicahpe argues that Petan's acquittal shows that the evidence against him was weak, but the evidence presented against Petan was quite different than the evidence presented against Wicahpe. Accordingly, although we find the prosecutor's comments improper, we nonetheless affirm Wicahpe's conviction.