Opinion ID: 76594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trade dress infringement of DDI's product design

Text: 18 Section 43(a) creates a federal cause of action for trade dress infringement. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir.1986). The term `trade dress' refers to the appearance of a product when that appearance is used to identify the producer. Publications Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir.1998). `Trade [d]ress' involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color ..., texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques. AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1535 (internal quotation omitted). In order to prevail on this claim for trade dress infringement under § 43(a), DDI must prove that (1) the product design of the two products is confusingly similar; (2) the features of the product design are primarily non-functional; and (3) the product design is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning. Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034, 1038 (11th Cir.1996); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) ([T]he person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, 121 S.Ct. 1255, 1259, 149 L.Ed.2d 164 (2001) (stating that trade dress protection may not be claimed for product features that are functional). [A]s all three elements are necessary for a finding of trade dress infringement, any one could be characterized as threshold. Epic Metals, 99 F.3d at 1039. Because we conclude that DDI has not met its burden of establishing the non-functionality of its product design, 5 we decline to address the other two elements of the claim. 19 The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164, 115 S.Ct. 1300,1304, 131 L.Ed.2d 248 (1995); see also In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A.1982) (This requirement of `nonfunctionality'... has as its genesis the judicial theory that there exists a fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor's product, which right can only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright laws.). Functional features are by definition those likely to be shared by different producers of the same product and therefore are unlikely to identify a particular producer. Landoll, 164 F.3d at 340. [T]hese features cannot be appropriated; otherwise, competitors would be prevented from duplicating the new product even to the extent permitted by the branches of the law of intellectual property that protect innovation rather than designations of source. Id. 20 The line between functionality and non-functionality is not ... brightly drawn. Epic Metals, 99 F.3d at 1039 (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, two tests exist for determining functionality. See id. Under the first test, commonly referred to as the traditional test, `a product feature is functional ... if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.' TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32, 121 S.Ct. at 1261 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165, 115 S.Ct. at 1304). Under the second test, which is commonly called the competitive necessity test and generally applied in cases of aesthetic functionality, a functional feature is one the `exclusive use of [which] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.' Id. (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165, 115 S.Ct. at 1304). Where the design is functional under the traditional test, there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature. Id. at 33, 121 S.Ct. at 1262. 21 The features of product design that we must analyze in this case are the size, color, and shape of dippin' dots. DDI argues that the district court erred because it did not consider the functionality of DDI's product design as a whole, but rather erroneously analyzed each element independently. See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1538 (stating that a court should consider the totality of the trade dress features). 6 DDI mischaracterizes the district court's analysis. As this court has stated, [a]lthough we have described the elements of the [products] that are [dis]similar, we are not making a comparison of individual elements. Rather, we are explaining why the overall impression of each [product] is [dis]similar. The district court correctly followed this same approach. Id. at 1541, n. 48. 22 Furthermore, the product design of dippin' dots in its individual elements and as a whole is functional under the traditional test. 7 The color is functional because it indicates the flavor of the ice cream, for example, pink signifies strawberry, white signifies vanilla, brown signifies chocolate, etc. See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163, 115 S.Ct. at 1303 (explaining that the words `Suntost Marmalade,' on a jar of orange jam immediately ... signal a brand or a product `source'; the jam's orange color does not do so); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853, 856, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2188-89, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (concluding that district court did not err in finding that colors of certain prescription drugs were functional because, inter alia, many patients associated color with therapeutic effect); Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory's Corp., 718 F.Supp. 389, 396 (D.N.J.1989) (finding that in the mouthwash field, an amber colored liquid signifies a medicinal-tasting product, red signifies a cinnamon flavor, blue signifies peppermint, and green signifies mint). The district court took judicial notice of the fact that color indicates flavor of ice cream. DDI argues that such judicial notice was improper. We disagree. 23 Judicial notice is a means by which adjudicative facts not seriously open to dispute are established as true without the normal requirement of proof by evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 201(a) and (b); see also Fed.R.Evid. 201(a) advisory committee's note (explaining that it is proper to take judicial notice of facts with a high degree of indisputability that are outside the area of reasonable controversy). Adjudicative facts are facts that are relevant to a determination of the claims presented in a case. Id. 24 One category of adjudicative facts subject to judicial notice (and the only category relevant in this case) is facts that are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Such judicially-noticed facts are of breathtaking variety. See, e.g., Friend v. Burnham & Morrill Co., 55 F.2d 150, 151-52 (1st Cir.1932) (noting the method for canning baked beans in New England); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 491 F.Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D.Fla.1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.1981) (noting that bingo is largely a senior citizen pastime); First Nat'l Bank of South Carolina v. United States, 413 F.Supp. 1107, 1110 (D.S.C.1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.1977) (noting that credit cards play vital role in modern American society); Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 277 F.Supp. 326, 330 (N.D.Ga.1967) (noting that most establishments that sell beer also sell tobacco products); Colourpicture Publishers, Inc. v. Mike Roberts Color Prods., Inc., 272 F.Supp. 280, 281 (D.Mass.1967), vacated on other grounds, 394 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.1968) (noting that calendars have long been affixed to walls by means of a punched hole at the top of the calendar). 25 A court may take judicial notice of appropriate adjudicative facts at any stage in a proceeding, including at the summary judgment stage. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(f). While a court has wide discretion to take judicial notice of facts, see Fed.R.Evid. 201(c), the taking of judicial notice of facts is, as a matter of evidence law, a highly limited process. Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir.1997). The reason for this caution is that the taking of judicial notice bypasses the safeguards which are involved with the usual process of proving facts by competent evidence in district court. Id. In order to fulfill these safeguards, a party is entitled ... to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice. Fed.R.Evid. 201(e). 26 In this case, the district court took judicial notice of the fact that color is indicative of flavor in ice cream. This fact is adjudicative in nature and is generally known among consumers. 8 In addition, the district court specifically questioned DDI's counsel regarding the propriety of taking judicial notice of the fact: 27 THE COURT: — would you agree that I could take judicial notice that chocolate ice cream is, generally speaking, brown, vanilla is white, strawberry is pink? 28 [COUNSEL]: I think you could do that, I think you could, sir, but I think it would be appropriate to acknowledge that sometimes it's not. Chocolate can be white. I mean, that's not an uncommon occurrence. Certainly with M&M's, chocolate comes sometimes in a blue color. 29 THE COURT: I'm just talking about ice cream. 30 [COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. 31 THE COURT: Ice cream is, generally speaking, chocolate is brown, vanilla is white, and strawberry is pink. 32 [COUNSEL]: That's correct, sir, but it's not necessarily so. 33 [R. Vol. 326 at 43.] Therefore, the district court properly took judicial notice of the fact that the color of ice cream is indicative of its flavor. Likewise, we, who also questioned DDI's counsel at oral argument regarding the propriety of taking judicial notice, take judicial notice of the fact that color of ice cream is indicative of flavor. 9 Accordingly, we conclude that color is functional in this case because it is essential to the purpose of the product and affects its quality. 34 Size is also functional in this case because it contributes to the product's creamy taste, which would be different in a larger dot. Plaintiff produced materials that emphasized how the quick freezing of tiny round beads was crucial to the taste and consistency of the product because the Patent '156 method of freezing tiny beads reduced the number of ice crystals in the product. [R. Vol. 249 Ex. C ¶ 4; R. Vol. 168 Ex. 3.] It necessarily follows that larger pieces of ice cream, which would take longer to freeze, would have increased ice crystals, thus affecting the creamy quality of the finished product. This is further evidenced by DDI founder Jones's Declaration of Commercial Success, submitted to the Patent Office, which emphasized dippin' dots' superior characteristics and benefits that are produced by using the Patent '156 method to create small pieces of ice cream. [R. Vol. 249 Ex. C ¶ 4.] These superior characteristics and benefits include the better taste and texture of dippin' dots, their easy dispensability, and the novel way in which they are consumed. [R. Vol. 249 Ex. C ¶ 4.] In addition, several documents from the Patent '156 application denote the preferable size of the beads in specific millimeter measurements. [R. Vol. 168 Ex. 3.] 35 Likewise, the shape of dippin' dots is functional because dripping the ice cream composition into the freezing chamber, as described in Patent '156, creates a bead that facilitates the product's free flowing nature. [R. Vol. 245 at 160-61.] Jones testified to this, stating he experimented with different procedures in order to create a uniform bead [R. Vol. 245 at 150], 10 and that the beaded shape of dippin' dots is a result of the method enunciated in Patent '156 [R. Vol. 245 at 158]. Moreover, a DDI product brochure states that the spherical shape is a result of the Patent '156 process and allows the quick, yet even freeze that is so important to the taste and consistency of the product. [R. Vol. 245 at 207.] 36 Based on our review of the record and dippin' dots' individual elements, we conclude that the totality of the dippin' dots design is functional because any flash-frozen ice cream product will inherently have many of the same features as dippin' dots. See Landoll, 164 F.3d at 342 (stating that when each of the elements is functional, [i]f the product nevertheless present[s] a distinctive appearance, that appearance would be eligible for legal protection as trade dress unless it [is] the only way the product [can] look, consistent with its performing each of the product's functions optimally) (emphasis added). Therefore, DDI's product design as a whole is essential to its purpose and affects its quality. Accordingly, it is functional under the traditional test, and not subject to trade dress protection. 37 Lastly, DDI argues that because Patent '156 does not specify color or size, 11 these elements cannot be functional. DDI's argument is unavailing. The Supreme Court held in TrafFix that a utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29, 121 S.Ct. at 1260. It did not, however, conclude the inverse, i.e. that the absence of such features in the patent is strong evidence that the features are not functional. Nonetheless, even if this inverse conclusion were the law, the outcome would remain the same in this case because features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection. Id. at 30, 121 S.Ct. at 1260. DDI has not met its burden regarding non-functionality. 38 After a careful review of the record, we conclude that DDI's product design is functional as a whole and in its individual elements. To hold otherwise runs counter to intellectual property law because it would give DDI a monopoly more effective than that of the unobtainable patent. See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1337. It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164, 115 S.Ct. at 1304. Therefore, DDI's product design is not subject to trade dress protection. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of FBD was proper.