Opinion ID: 3165963
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession of child erotica

Text: We have previously upheld a warrant to search a suspect’s home for child pornography where the supporting affidavit averred that child pornography had been made available on a file-sharing service from an internet protocol (“IP”) address traced to the suspect’s residence. Haymond, 672 F.3d at 959 (stating “[t]his information would cause a reasonable person to believe evidence of child pornography would be recovered 9 from [the defendant’s] residence.”).4 But the search-warrant affidavit here provided evidence only that Mr. Edwards possessed legal child erotica. Thus, we must consider whether the totality of the circumstances as presented to the magistrate judge in the search-warrant affidavit established probable cause that child pornography would be found at Mr. Edwards’s home. Although we have not previously addressed this precise issue, a panel of this court has considered the possession of child erotica as one of the circumstances supporting probable cause to search personal property kept in the workplace. In United States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir. 2005), a clerical employee in the Electrical Engineering Department at Oklahoma State University came upon a safe “behind a punch bowl on some boxes in a department supply room.” Although the department had made an attempt to locate the owner of the safe earlier that year, no one came forward to claim it. The employee, finding a key in the lock, “decided to open the safe, ostensibly to determine who owned it.” Id. Inside, the employee ________________ 4 See also United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 860–61 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming finding of probable cause to search a computer where the affidavit alleged the defendant called teenage boys for sexual gratification, his home contained hard-copy photos of child pornography, a receipt showed that he had digitized photographs, and that, in the investigating officer’s experience, “possessors of child pornography often obtain and retain images of child pornography on their computers”); United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a warrant was supported by probable cause where the affidavit detailed that the defendant had uploaded “child pornography” but did not describe the images or assert that they were, in fact, real children as opposed to computer generated children); United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant’s membership in child pornography website, coupled with evidence that collectors of child pornography overwhelmingly use the internet and computers to distribute and hoard this material, was sufficient to establish a “fair probability” the defendant would possess child pornography himself). 10 discovered letters and other documents addressed to Dr. Michael Soderstrand (a professor in the department), photos of Dr. Soderstrand, three CDs, a number of Polaroid-style and 35mm photos, and sixty-three 3.5-inch computer diskettes. Id. The employee then opened one of the CDs on her computer, and “[o]n it she found an image that appeared to be several nude Asian children about 10–12 years old.” Id. at 1150. The employee returned the CD to the safe and attempted to anonymously report her discovery to school authorities. Notably, she sent two emails to the department dean, “in which she alleged that Dr. Soderstrand kept child pornography in a safe in the storage room next to his office.” Id. The dean notified the campus police who took the safe as evidence. Campus police then sought a warrant to search the safe. An officer prepared a search-warrant affidavit that included the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the safe and the employee’s description of the image of the naked minors contained on the CD. Based on this information, the magistrate judge issued a search warrant to examine the contents of the safe. Id. at 1150–51. Upon execution of the warrant, officers discovered material in the safe which formed the evidentiary basis for a search of Dr. Soderstrand’s computers and files. The investigation ultimately resulted in the discovery of substantial amounts of child pornography on Dr. Soderstrand’s computers and two CDs. Id. at 1150. The government charged Dr. Soderstrand with possession of child pornography. In response, Dr. Soderstrand moved to suppress the evidence found in the safe, claiming the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. The district court denied the motion 11 to suppress and Dr. Soderstrand entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. Id. On appeal, Dr. Soderstrand first argued the search-warrant affidavit was facially deficient because it merely described an image depicting nude children, which does not necessarily constitute illegal child pornography and therefore did not give rise to probable cause that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the safe. Id. at 1151–52. In rejecting that argument, we acknowledged that “other circuits have concluded that depictions of mere nudity [are] not sufficient to constitute child pornography; rather, the nudity must be depicted in a lascivious manner in order to be criminal.” Id. (citing United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that nudity alone is not enough under the statute because there must be both an “exhibition” of the genital area and such exhibition must be lascivious) and United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 124 (3rd Cir. 1989) (same)). But we concluded that these cases spoke to the Government’s burden of proof at trial rather than the standard for probable cause, which requires “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.” Id. at 1153 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235). We nevertheless concluded the totality of the information contained in the affidavit was sufficient for the magistrate judge “to reasonably conclude that images of child pornography might reasonably be expected to be contained within the computer disks, CDs or other data storage devices contained in the safe.” Id. at 1153. We specifically noted that the affidavit related the employee’s investigation of the safe; her discovery therein of photographs, computer disks, and Dr. Soderstrand’s personal effects; 12 her further discovery that one of the disks contained an image of naked children; her allegation of Dr. Soderstrand’s possession of child pornography to the Dean, and the Dean’s communication of this information to police. We concluded these circumstances, taken together, gave the magistrate judge “a substantial basis for determining probable cause existed.” Cf. id. at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted).5 We cannot reach the same conclusion regarding the affidavit here. We initially note that although the officers in Soderstrand sought to search an unattended safe in a department storage room,6 the officers here sought to search Mr. Edwards’s home. And “[t]he physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts of Soderstrand are also distinguishable in other significant respects. First, the safe in Soderstrand was found “behind a punch bowl on some boxes in a department supply room.” Soderstrand, 412 F.3d at 1149. When department personnel inquired about who owned the safe, Dr. Soderstrand did not come forward to claim ownership. Cf. United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 501 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n attempt to conceal actions may indicate an individual has a guilty conscience or is aware ________________ 5 We also concluded that the officers acted in good faith irrespective of the validity of the warrant. United States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that we may address the adequacy of a search warrant to provide guidance to law enforcement even if the conduct of the officers at issue manifested objective good faith). 6 We assumed for purposes of our analysis that Dr. Soderstrand had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the safe—despite leaving it unattended in a common storage room and failing to claim it—thus necessitating a warrant for the search. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d at 1152. 13 of the unlawfulness of the actions.”). Although this element of concealment or secrecy certainly does not by itself give rise to an inference of illegal activity, it contrasts with Mr. Edwards’s behavior here of posting legal images and comments to a public website from his home. Second, the employee in Soderstrand alleged that Dr. Soderstrand was keeping child pornography in the safe, and she related to the affiant-officer a description of a photo of naked, prepubescent children whose genital areas were visible. The photo thus described in layman terms could have been illegal child pornography or legal child erotica. But this description was coupled with the allegation from the employee—the only person who had at that point viewed the contents of the safe—that the safe contained child pornography, which the magistrate judge could have reasonably concluded increased the likelihood the photograph depicted child pornography rather than child erotica. See United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (observing that “the words ‘child pornography’ need no expert training or experience to clarify their meaning” and that “such generalized descriptions” are adequate to convey to the magistrate judge the nature of the evidence in evaluating an affidavit for probable cause (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the investigating officers never alleged that any of the material Mr. Edwards posted to the internet constituted child pornography. Indeed, the affiant-officer, trained to investigate and identify child pornography, averred only that Mr. Edwards was known to possess legal child erotica. None of the detailed descriptions contained in the affidavit described photographs conforming to the definition of child pornography also included in 14 the affidavit. There was no uncertainty here regarding the content of the images Mr. Edwards had posted, and the Government concedes they constituted legal child erotica. Resp. Br. 15. Thus, this case differs in several material respects from Soderstrand, and the affidavit here lacks averments comparable to those we relied on to conclude the search warrant in Soderstrand was properly issued. Although none of these circumstances standing alone is determinative of the existence of probable cause, absent the factors discussed above, we find that Soderstrand does not control here. Like the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hansel, 524 F.3d 841, 846 n.3 (8th Cir. 2008), Soderstrand did not decide “whether possession of child erotica alone could ever be enough to establish probable cause that an individual possesses child pornography.”7 And it is unnecessary for us to do so here. Instead, we consider whether, under the totality of the unique circumstances in this case, the affidavit established probable cause to believe child pornography would be ________________ 7 Hansel and other cases cited by the Government here relied on more than the possession of child erotica to support probable cause to search for child pornography. See, e.g., United States v. Hansel, 524 F.3d 841, 844–49 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the totality of the circumstances described in the affidavit established a fair probability that child pornography would be found” on the defendant’s computer where the affidavit combined allegations that defendant possessed 8x10 photographs of nude minors qualifying only as child erotica with allegations that two minor girls had reported the defendant had sexually abused them, the 8x10 photographs were “imprinted with an Internet address such as www.little-virgins.com,” and the defendant possessed computer equipment consistent with that used to make pornography); United States v. Flanders, 468 F.3d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 2006) (affidavit alleged the defendant had sexually abused his two-year-old daughter, his wife reported he spent a lot of time on pornographic websites and in chat rooms, and he took a digital photograph of his daughter naked). 15 found at Mr. Edwards’s home. We now discuss whether those additional facts, combined with Mr. Edwards’s possession of child erotica, established probable cause that child pornography would be found at his home. b. Correlation between possessing child pornography and collecting child erotica Mr. Edwards posted hundreds of images of child erotica depicting the same underage girl on the website. And his responses to the comments made by other users about the images suggested he is sexually attracted to children. Although this behavior is disturbing, the Government admits it does not constitute illegal conduct. In other contexts, courts are reluctant to presume that persons are inclined to engage in certain illegal activity based on having engaged in a particular legal activity. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 551, 554 (1992) (considering a criminal defendant’s entrapment defense to accusations of receiving child pornography through the mails). In Jacobson, the Court found the defendant was “acting within the law” when he received two magazines containing “sexually explicit depictions of children for noncommercial use” because neither federal nor state law prohibited such conduct at the time. After a change in federal law made it illegal to receive such magazines through the mail, two government agencies contacted him repeatedly over a period of two years under various guises in an attempt to interest him in receiving child pornography. The defendant eventually ordered a magazine from a catalogue he received through one of these guises. The Supreme Court held the defendant’s receipt of the initial two magazines could not establish the predisposition to receive or possess child pornography “independent of the Government’s acts” as would be required for the government to 16 overcome the defendant’s entrapment defense. The Court explained, “proof that petitioner engaged in legal conduct and possessed certain generalized personal inclinations is not sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he would have been predisposed to commit the crime charged independent of the Government’s coaxing.” Id. at 552 n.3. Admittedly, Jacobson is distinguishable not only because of its focus on entrapment but also because, like Horn, 187 F.3d 781, and Villard, 885 F.2d 117, both of which we distinguished in Soderstrand, 412 F.3d at 1153, Jacobson concerns the quantum of evidence required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Nevertheless, we find its reasoning instructive on the danger of assuming that legal conduct standing alone suggests the actor is also inclined to engage in criminal conduct. As noted in Jacobson, “most people obey the law even when they disapprove of it. This obedience may reflect a generalized respect for legality or the fear of prosecution, but for whatever reason, the law’s prohibitions are matters of consequence.” Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 551. Ultimately however, a “finding of probable cause rests not on whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but on the ‘degree of suspicion that attaches’ to the Government’s evidence.” United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 128 (2000)). For example, innocent or legal conduct may be infused with the degree of suspicion necessary to support a finding of probable cause when examined “through the lens of those ‘versed in the field of law enforcement.’” Id. (quoting Texas v. Brown , 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (holding probable cause supported by officer’s testimony, based on his participation in previous narcotics 17 arrests, that balloons tied like the one possessed by the defendant frequently contain narcotics)). Thus, the issue here is whether the warrant affidavit, when viewed through the insight provided by Officer Cornwell’s law-enforcement experience, provides a link between the posting of legal child erotica online and the possession of child pornography sufficient to establish a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The district court concluded that such a link was provided by Officer Cornwell’s averment in the affidavit that those who possess child pornography are highly likely also to possess child erotica. But in making that connection, the district court inverted the statement in the affidavit, reading it instead as an assertion that those who possess child erotica are highly likely to possess child pornography. See Tr. Mot. Hr’g. Mar. 5, 2014, at 28:14–16 (Dkt. No. 47) (denying motion to suppress in part on the basis that “[l]aw enforcement explained in the affidavit to the magistrate that those who collect child erotica are also likely to collect child pornography”). Although the statement as inverted might provide the necessary link between the legal possession of child erotica and the illegal possession of child pornography, that is not what Officer Cornwell avers. Instead, he states that persons found in possession of illegal child pornography are highly likely to also possess legal child erotica. This difference is significant. The warrant affidavit does not allege that Mr. Edwards was found in possession of child pornography. The affidavit also lacks any information based on Officer Cornwell’s law enforcement experience about the types of materials possessors of child erotica— such as Mr. Edwards—are likely to maintain in their homes. Consequently, a statement 18 that collectors of child pornography—a group that there was no evidence includes Mr. Edwards—are highly likely to also possess child erotica did not provide “a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed” that child pornography would be found in Mr. Edwards’s home. Danhauer, 229 F.3d at 1006. c. Correlation between possession of child pornography and other proclivities The same logical flaw underlying the correlation between child-pornography collectors and the possession of child erotica is also found in the affidavit’s allegations about the general proclivities of those who possess child pornography. For example, the affidavit states that people who collect child pornography tend to “reinforce their fantasies” and may do so by participating in online forums where they can interact with “other like-minded adults.” Search Warrant Aff. 16, ¶ 29 (Dkt. No. 23, Ex. A). Thus, we must decide whether the fact that possessors of child pornography frequent online forums, arguably like the website where Mr. Edwards posted child erotica and comments suggesting a sexual attraction to a child, combined with his possession of child erotica, provided probable cause that child pornography would be found at Mr. Edwards’s home. Although this circuit has not yet addressed the issue, other jurisdictions disagree as to whether a defendant’s pedophilic tendencies can support probable cause to search for child pornography. Some circuits have rejected the argument that evidence showing a defendant shares some proclivities with child-pornography collectors can establish probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography if no evidence is presented that the defendant is a collector of such materials. See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 433 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002) (disregarding expert opinion that child-pornography 19 collectors hoard their materials where the affidavit contained no information indicating that child pornography had been located in defendant’s home); United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that foundationless evidence of the habits of “child molesters,” “pedophiles,” and “child pornography collectors,” coupled with evidence that on one occasion the defendant had ordered but never picked up child pornography, was insufficient to establish probable cause); United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“Standing alone, a high incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child pornography.”). In addition, two decisions from the Second Circuit clash over the significance of a defendant’s participation in a website where pornographic images of children are exchanged. United States v. Coreas concerned a website called “Candyman,” which was “an interactive ‘e-group’ website that allowed its members to exchange information, upload and download electronic files, and chat with other members in ‘real time.’” 419 F.3d 151, 152 (2d Cir. 2005). In that case, the panel explained that “[t]he alleged ‘proclivities’ of collectors of child pornography, on which the district court relied, are only relevant if there is probable cause to believe that [the defendant] is such a collector,” which the affidavit had not alleged. Id. at 156. Absent evidence raising a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Coreas possessed or collected child pornography, the panel determined that information about the proclivities of child pornography collectors (which was virtually all that remained in the warrant affidavit after excising knowingly or recklessly false information stating that all users would automatically receive any pornographic 20 images uploaded by other users) should not be sufficient to establish probable cause to search the defendant’s home. Id. at 153, 156–57. Thus, the redacted affidavit in Coreas “[did] not remotely satisfy Fourth Amendment standards,” id. at 156, because the government did not meet its “burden to provide probable cause to believe that a defendant was undertaking some unlawful activity before a search warrant may issue,” id. at 158. Nevertheless, the panel reluctantly affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting conviction based on principles of horizontal stare decisis. Id. at 159.8 The Coreas panel determined it was bound by the outcome in United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2005), which had been decided by a different panel of the Second Circuit only weeks before Coreas. Martin concerned a defendant’s use of “girls12-16”—another, more explicit pedophilic e-group than Candyman—but also with a search based on a defective search-warrant affidavit by the same affiant and containing the same general averments about pornography collectors as in Coreas. Id. at 73–74. Specifically, the FBI affiant stated that in his training and experience, collectors of child pornography share common traits and characteristics including rarely disposing of their ________________ 8 A panel of this court considered the same defective affidavit in an unpublished case involving a defendant’s participation in the Candyman website in United States v. Hutto, 84 F. App’x. 6 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished). We upheld the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, adopting its findings that because the affidavit alleged “the [Candyman] group’s clear purpose was to share child pornography,” “the defendant voluntarily became a member of the group,” and “images containing child pornography were available to all members,” it “provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate judge to conclude that there was a fair probability that child pornography would be found at the defendant’s residence or on his computer.” Id. at 8. We did not have occasion, however, to address the inaccuracies later identified in the defective affidavit which, if redacted, would have eliminated most of the facts relied on in our decision. 21 collections and maintaining their collections in a private and secure place such as their homes. Id. at 75. The Martin panel acknowledged the inaccuracies in the affidavit, id. at 72–73, but held the excised warrant affidavit still established probable cause because “[i]t is common sense that an individual who joins such a site would more than likely download and possess such material,” id. at 75,9 and “a substantial likelihood of criminal activity may exist if an individual is a member of an internet e-group whose purpose is unlawful,” id. at 76. Although the Coreas panel roundly criticized the analysis in Martin, it was bound to follow Martin’s holding. Here, Officer Cornwell asserted various characteristics and proclivities of those who possess child pornography, such as that “child pornography collectors reinforce their fantasies” by, among other things, “interacting, both directly and indirectly, with other like-minded adults” in such online forums or other communities. Search Warrant Aff. 16, ¶ 29 (Dkt. No. 23, Ex. A). In much the same way that Officer Cornwell’s assertion that ________________ 9