Opinion ID: 181488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Certified Issue: Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: The issue that the district court certified concerns whether the prosecutor's use of witness testimony for inconsistent purposes constitutes misconduct that warrants reversal. In the murder trial, the witness testified he overheard Towery refer to a struggle with a victim who was an old man. In a previous trial in a different case, however, the same prosecutor had elicited this testimony to prove that Towery committed an unrelated robbery, not the murder at issue here. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that, even assuming the prosecutor changed his mind in good faith as to which crime the overheard statement referred to, he committed misconduct by failing at least to alert the court that the first conviction was based on problematic evidence. Without specifically addressing whether this misconduct constituted a due process violation, the Arizona Supreme Court held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that this harmless error determination was objectively reasonable, and therefore habeas relief is not warranted.
Robert Towery lived with Randy Barker and John Meacham in Scottsdale, Arizona, and shared his bedroom with his girlfriend and her young daughter. As the Arizona Supreme Court recognized, the case against Towery relied largely on the testimony of Barker, who testified in exchange for a reduced charge of second-degree murder. See State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 920 P.2d 290, 296-97 (1996). Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are based on Barker's account. On September 4, 1991, Barker and Towery agreed to rob Mark Jones, whom Towery had previously met, at Jones' house. That evening, the two of them drove in Barker's car to a Denny's Restaurant and from there took a taxi to be dropped off in Jones' neighborhood. They knocked on Jones' door, and Towery asked if they could use his telephone because their vehicle had broken down. Towery said, Do you remember me? I'm from R and D Automotive. After the two were let in, Barker pretended to make a telephone call, while Towery pulled a gun out of his briefcase. Towery told Jones that they were robbing him, both men put gloves on and Barker handcuffed Jones. Over the course of about two hours, Barker kept watch on Jones while Towery collected about $1,200 in cash and loaded Jones' car with jewelry, electronics and other items. Towery and Barker then led Jones to the master bedroom at gunpoint, asking him whether he expected anyone soon. Towery asked Jones whether he preferred to be tied up or to be injected with a drug that would put him to sleep. Jones chose the latter option and was laid face down on the bed. Towery then tried several times to inject Jones with a large veterinary syringe that Barker believed contained battery acid. Believing Jones was pretending to have fallen asleep, Towery created a noose using a set of tie wraps from his briefcase and began to strangle him. Jones did not struggle, but made choking and gagging sounds. After removing the noose, Towery determined that Jones was not yet dead, made another noose and repeated his previous action. Towery and Barker then drove Jones' car to the Denny's to get Barker's car, unloaded the goods at their house and abandoned Jones' car in the parking lot of an apartment complex. A security guard at the complex saw the men and later identified Towery in a photo lineup. Jones' body was discovered the next morning. Towery testified and offered an alibi. He said he dropped Barker off at the Denny's and saw him get picked up by someone else. Towery then drove Barker's car to meet Tina Collins at an adult book shop. Towery drove with Collins to another parking lot, where they talked for about two hours. Afterward, not finding Barker at their planned meeting spot, Towery drove home. Barker arrived at the house with Jones' car and property, and Towery helped him unload the goods and dispose of the car. Towery also claimed that he bought the stolen items that the police found in his possession from Barker. Collins' videotaped deposition was admitted to corroborate Towery's story. She said they had first met a couple of weeks earlier and arranged to meet on September 4. She did not talk with Towery again until February 9, when she visited the prison at the suggestion of a friend of hers who happened to be visiting Towery's cellmate. In his closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that Collins had never met Towery prior to the prison visit and fabricated her testimony to bolster his alibi.
Towery and Barker were charged with first-degree murder, armed robbery, first-degree burglary, kidnapping, theft and attempted theft. After their trials were severed, the jury convicted Towery on all counts, and he was sentenced to death. During the trial, Towery's roommate John Meacham testified that on the morning after a large amount of property had appeared in their house, he heard Towery say he was having a hard time with an old man so he hadhe had a hard time tying him up, so he had to knock him down. Earlier, in March 1992, six months after the murder and five months before the murder trial, Towery was tried and convicted of an unrelated armed robbery in a separate case, but prosecuted by the same county attorney, John Ditsworth. In the robbery trial, Ditsworth had elicited Meacham's testimony that he heard Towery say, I tried to get this old man to do what I wanted him to do, but he wouldn't do it. The parties agree that Meacham's testimony in both trials referred to the same overheard statement. The same judge presided over both trials, but Towery had different defense lawyers. On automatic appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction and death sentence. See Towery, 920 P.2d at 312. On the issue of Meacham's testimony, the court first ruled that judicial estoppel did not apply to bar the state from taking inconsistent positions, because Meacham's testimony was a minor part of the robbery case. See id. at 306. The court then considered whether the prosecutor had committed misconduct, noting Ditsworth's explanation that he came to the conclusion after the first trial that the overheard statement was more likely made in reference to the murder. See id. at 306 & n. 15. The court reasoned that even assuming the prosecutor had changed his mind in good faith, he committed misconduct by failing to give the court in the first case any notice that testimony had wrongly been admitted. See id. at 306. The court decided, however, that under state law any error would be harmless if it could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that [the error] did not contribute to or affect the verdict. Id. at 307 (citing State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152, 1191, 1203 (1993)). The court noted that Towery's lawyer on cross-examination had elicited Meacham's testimony that he thought the overheard statement referred to a prior incident and not the murder of Jones. The court concluded that [a]ny impeachment defense counsel would have obtained from having known of the testimony in the prior trial was effectively achieved, and thus the prosecutor's misconduct did not affect the verdict. Id. Towery filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion to disqualify Judge Hendrix, who had presided over both of his trials. Another judge denied the disqualification motion, rejecting Towery's claims of bias. Judge Hendrix denied the petition, which raised due process, false evidence, Confrontation Clause, ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims. A different judge, Judge Keppel, denied Towery's motion for rehearing of the petition. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review except with regard to one issue that has now been resolved and is not relevant to this appeal. See State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828, 830 (2003) (holding that the federal constitutional right to have a jury decide whether aggravating circumstances exist in capital cases does not apply retroactively). In 2003, Towery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court for the district of Arizona, raising eight claims. On the prosecutorial misconduct issue, the court concluded that Towery had not shown that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony or failed to disclose exculpatory information. It also agreed with the Arizona Supreme Court that Towery suffered no prejudice. After denying all other grounds for relief, the court granted a COA on the prosecutorial misconduct issue only. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
A district court's decision to deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir.2009). Because Towery filed his habeas petition after April 24, 1996, our review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Id. at 750-51. Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant relief only if the underlying state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
On habeas review of a prosecutorial misconduct claim, we may grant relief only if the misconduct rises to the level of a due process violationnot merely because we might disapprove of the prosecutor's behavior. See Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 807 (9th Cir.2008). Although formally presented as a single question, the prosecutorial misconduct issue actually encompasses several different due process claims drawing on distinct lines of precedent. First, Towery argues that the prosecutor put on false evidence in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). Second, he argues that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Finally, Towery relies on more general cases discussing when prosecutorial misconduct violates due process. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that there was prosecutorial misconduct, but did not specifically find a due process violation or otherwise analyze the issue within any of the above frameworks. It instead resolved the case on the basis of harmless error. See Towery, 920 P.2d at 307. We begin our analysis there to give proper deference to the Arizona Supreme Court and hold that Towery's claim can be rejected on the harmless error ground alone. Nevertheless, we shall also consider whether Towery has established a due process violation warranting habeas relief under any of the prosecutorial misconduct frameworks recognized by the Supreme Court, and we conclude that he has not.
A constitutional violation arising from prosecutorial misconduct does not warrant habeas relief if the error is harmless. See Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 778 (9th Cir.2000). When a state court has found a constitutional error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's determination is objectively unreasonable. See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (per curiam); Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 921 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the Arizona Supreme Court did not specifically address whether Towery's federal due process rights were violated, but found beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's misconduct did not contribute to the verdict. It thereby performed the same harmless error analysis it was required to do for a constitutional violation under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and its conclusion warrants our deference. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam) (explaining that deference is proper so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts Supreme Court precedent). The Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that if Towery's lawyer had been aware of Meacham's prior testimony in the robbery trial, the trial court would nevertheless have permitted the evidence to be introducedsubject to impeachment based on its prior inconsistent use. See Towery, 920 P.2d at 307. The court then noted the cross-examination that actually did take place: Q. Do you know for sure that [Towery was] talking about Mr. Jones [the victim]? A. I thought [Towery was] talking about when [he] got busted before. Q. So, in fact, you didn't think [Towery was] talking about Mr. Jones? A. No, sir, I didn't. Id. On redirect, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate the witness, but his attempt was limited to showing that Meacham was uncertain either way about what Towery was referring to: Q. Okay. The conversation that you overheard, was it before or after all of this property came into the house? A. I believe it was after. Q. And you don't really know what the conversation that you heard pertains to, do you? A. No, sir. Id. Because these exchanges undercut the value Meacham's testimony had to the prosecution's case, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that [a]ny impeachment defense counsel would have obtained from having known of the testimony in the prior trial was effectively achieved. Id. This conclusion was objectively reasonable. We agree that the cross-examination of Meacham created significant doubt about whether the overheard statements had anything to do with the murder of Jones. If Towery's lawyer had known about Meacham's testimony in the robbery trial, any further impeachment based on this prior inconsistent use would have been largely cumulative. See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 599 (9th Cir.2004) (holding the defendant suffered no prejudice from the suppression of cumulative impeachment evidence because the witness at issue would not have been cast in a significantly worse light). We are also unpersuaded by Towery's argument that Meacham's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case. Towery notes the relative lack of physical evidence and the state's heavy reliance on Barker's testimony, and he suggests Meacham's testimony provided the primary source of corroboration. It is true that the prosecutor relied on Meacham's testimony in his closing argument. Towery's counsel rebutted this argument in his closing, however, highlighting both Meacham's hearing disability and his expressed uncertainty about what the statement referred to. Moreover, even granting that Meacham's testimony was important enough for the prosecutor to mention, we still must view that evidence in the context of the case as a whole. The prosecutor asserted from the outset of his closing that his case rested on Barker's testimony. After extensively summarizing Barker's testimony, the prosecutor offered several sources of corroboration. Some of these, such as the stolen items found in Towery's room and the security guard's identification of Towery as one of the people he saw dropping off Jones' car, were technically consistent with Towery's alibi, as he admitted to purchasing items from Barker and being involved in the disposal of Jones' car. However, the prosecutor's strongest source of corroboration was the testimony of Monique Rousseau, who was Barker's girlfriend at the time of the incident. She testified that she heard Towery remark upon seeing gay pornographic photographs found among the stolen items, [Jones] deserved it. The guy's a pervert. [1] She also testified that Towery took the lead in evenly dividing the stolen money between himself and Barker, and that Barker was in a state of shock, corroborating his testimony that he was unprepared for and horrified by Towery's murder of Jones. Even though Rousseau was not an ideal witness, given her arguable bias as Barker's girlfriend at the time and her acknowledged drug use, her detailed testimony of the evening's events had substantially more corroborative value than Meacham's equivocal testimony. In sum, the Arizona Supreme Court's harmless error determination was objectively reasonable. Because we must deny habeas relief if the error is harmless, we would affirm the district court on this ground alone. However, given the stakes involved, we think it is important to analyze the issues thoroughly. We shall therefore separately address Towery's claims of error under the clearly established due process frameworks governing prosecutorial misconduct.
The knowing use of false evidence by the state, or the failure to correct false evidence, may violate due process. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. To establish a Napue claim, a petitioner must show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) . . . the false testimony was material. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71, 79 S.Ct. 1173). We hold that Towery's argument fails at the second Napue prong and thus do not decide whether it would also fail at the first. The state argues there was no false evidence, because Meacham testified accurately about what he had heard and then acknowledged on cross-examination that he thought the statement referred to a different incident. In response, Towery argues that Meacham's testimony as used in the murder trial was false. In other words, the testimony, even if technically accurate about what Towery had said, was elicited in a manner that would mislead the jury about what Towery actually meant. There is some support for Towery's view that accurate testimony could be delivered in a sufficiently misleading context to make the evidence false for Napue purposes. Compare United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 390 (2d Cir.1997) (recognizing that Napue applied to the use of evidence that was in part false and otherwise so misleading as to amount to falsity), and United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 240-41 (5th Cir.1979) (holding evidence was false when witnesses testified they had not been offered leniency by any of the attorneys or anybody in the Northern District of Alabama, but had in fact received promises from other authorities), with Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that in order to establish a claim of prosecutorial misconduct or denial of due process, . . . the defendant must show that the statement in question was `indisputably false,' rather than merely misleading. (quoting United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 823 (6th Cir.1989))). We do not decide whether the use of Meacham's testimony was sufficiently misleading to satisfy the first Napue prong, because to satisfy its second prong Towery would in any event still have to show that the state knowingly created a false impression. In Barham, 595 F.2d at 239, for example, the prosecution knew its witnesses had received leniency promises and were answering questions in a very specific manner to create the misleading impression that they had not. Here, by contrast, the prosecutor did not have knowledge of any such underlying facts. Towery argues that Ditsworth knew Meacham believed the statement referred to the robbery incident. But because Towery's statement was actually ambiguous, Meacham's subjective belief about what Towery was referring to is irrelevant. Ditsworth could not have knowingly created a false impression unless he knew what Towery himself meant, and Towery does not argue that Ditsworth had any such knowledge. We therefore hold that Towery's Napue claim fails at the second prong.
Under Brady, suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. For a Brady claim to succeed, [1] [t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Towery argues that the state failed to disclose it had already relied on Meacham's testimony for a different purpose in the previous unrelated robbery case. The state argues that the prosecutor fulfilled his disclosure obligation by informing defense counsel that Meacham had testified in the prior trial. As the Supreme Court made clear in Banks, the prosecution's obligation under Brady includes the disclosure of potential impeachment evidence, and the use of Meacham's testimony for a different purpose would certainly have been a helpful impeachment device. Therefore, the question is whether the prosecutor was obligated to do more than he did to make the defense aware of Meacham's prior testimony and the manner in which it was used. The Arizona Supreme Court held that he was. The court's finding of prosecutorial misconduct encompassed the determination that it was improper for the State to fail to first notify defense counsel and the court of its intent to use the evidence in this manner. Towery, 920 P.2d at 306. Under the unique circumstances of this case, where the prosecutor knowingly put Meacham's testimony to inconsistent use in two separate trials for two separate crimes, the court concluded that the prosecutor had an obligation to do more than just reveal that Meacham had testified in both trials. See id. at 306-07. Presuming that the Arizona Supreme Court's conclusions are correct, and therefore steps one and two of Brady are met here, Towery's argument nonetheless fails at step three because he cannot show prejudice. As we discussed above, and as the Arizona Supreme Court explained, had the prosecutor notified Towery and the court of the nature of Meacham's prior testimony, the testimony would likely still have been permitted. See id. at 307. Defense counsel presumably would have impeached Meacham with his testimony in the prior robbery trial, raising doubts about whether the admission related to the murder or the robbery. See id. As it turned out, even though he did not have access to the robbery trial transcript, Towery's counsel still managed to do this on cross-examinationhe elicited testimony indicating Meacham either believed Defendant admitted some crime other than the charged murder or was not sure what Defendant was admitting. Id. Because the defense was able to undercut the value of Meacham's testimony to the prosecution, the court concluded that [a]ny impeachment defense counsel would have obtained from having known of the testimony in the prior trial was effectively achieved. Id. Accordingly, the court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's misconduct did not affect the verdict. Id. We have concluded this finding was objectively reasonable, as discussed above, so Towery cannot show the prejudice necessary to sustain his Brady claim.
Finally, we note the more general line of authority regarding prosecutorial misconduct and due process. These cases do not address particular forms of misconduct, but instead establish the test for whether some generic misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' [misconduct] `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). The Arizona Supreme Court found that there was misconduct even if it was unintentional. Towery, 920 P.2d at 306. Assuming that is so, we need only decide whether the prosecutor's misconduct so tainted the trial as to violate due process. In section I.D.1, supra, we have held that the Arizona Supreme Court's harmless error determination was objectively reasonable. For the same reasons, we also hold that the court's analysis was correct and that it applies here. Because we agree that beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the prosecutor's misconduct did not affect the verdict, Towery, 920 P.2d at 307, we conclude the trial was not significantly infected with unfairness. Any misconduct by Ditsworth therefore did not violate due process under the Darden/Donnelly standard.