Opinion ID: 3354754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court’s sanctions

Text: On appeal, Timms contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions. We disagree and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion. With respect to sanctions that strike complaints or grant default judgments against parties who fail to abide by discovery orders, we have required that two criteria be met: (1) the discovery violation was willful and (2) “a lesser sanction would not have substantially achieved the desired deterrent effect.” $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d at 376. We have also allowed the district court to consider “whether the discovery violation prejudiced the opposing party’s preparation for trial, and whether the client was blameless in the violation” when imposing sanctions. Id. Moreover, we require that the sanction “must comply with the mandates of due process.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. Timms’s first contention is that that she did not willfully disobey the order because it only required her to produce her phone and because she made a good faith effort to obtain the text messages Defendants requested but was hindered by technological difficulties. Her argument is unavailing. The district court specifically found that the order covered the text messages and that Timms was not credible in her explanation of why she did not produce said text messages. 4 Moreover, we previously have held that a failure to abide by discovery orders, combined with other evidence of a party delaying and incurring needless expenses—as in this case—is sufficient for a finding of bad faith. See Worrell v. Houston Can! Academy, 424 F. App’x 330, 336 (5th Cir. While Timms asserts on appeal that not turning over the text messages was, at most, 4 negligent based on her confusion of what the district court’s order meant, this is belied by her response to Defendants’ original motion to compel where she expressly recognized that Defendants sought access to her text messages. 5 Case: 15-20700 Document: 00513578237 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/05/2016 No. 15-20700 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished). Timms next contends that the district court failed to employ less drastic sanctions that were available. However, Timms does not point to any alternative options that the district court could have employed. And we previously found that a district court “was well within its discretion in awarding default judgment as a sanction,” where—as is the case here—a party was uncooperative in its initial discovery production and subsequently did not abide by a court’s discovery order aimed at remedying this problem. $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d at 379; see also Moore v. CITGO Ref. & Chems. Co., L.P., 735 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]his circuit has rejected the view that a court is ‘required to attempt to coax [parties] into compliance with its order by imposing incrementally increasing sanctions.’” (quoting $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d at 379)). Timms finally argues that there was insufficient evidence to justify the $8,500 in attorney’s fees and costs awarded to Defendants by the district court. Timms asserts that no affidavits or billing records were present at the time of the show cause hearing and that, therefore, there was no way of determining whether Defendants’ counsel’s hourly rate was reasonable. Timms, however, failed to raise any objection at the show cause hearing or file a motion for reconsideration, thereby waiving any argument on appeal. See Hogrobrooks v. Bally’s Olympia L.P., No. 02-60229, 2002 WL 31115080, at  (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished); Prince v. Poulos, 876 F.2d 30, 33–34 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 200 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2000). 5 Even if we were to evaluate the district court’s court feeshifting sanctions, we ask only if the district court’s factual findings were 5 Timms argues that it would not have been possible to object at the hearing, claiming that the transcript of the proceedings demonstrated the district court’s resistance to allowing Timms’s counsel to speak. However, the transcript shows that Timms’s counsel was asked, immediately following the imposition of monetary sanctions, if he had anything to add to the order and counsel declined to raise objections. 6 Case: 15-20700 Document: 00513578237 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/05/2016 No. 15-20700 clearly erroneous and whether it abused its discretion. Eastway Gen. Hosp., Ltd. v. Eastway Women’s Clinic, Inc., 737 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1984). As we have previously discussed, the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in assessing sanctions. Moreover, Timms does not demonstrate on appeal how the monetary figure of $8,500, which the district court calculated after discussions with Defendants’ counsel, is based on clearly erroneous facts. While Timms argues that the district court improperly included costs for her deposition in the monetary sanction, the court found that the costs of Timms’s deposition were the product of her refusals to cooperate with discovery and produce the relevant text messages. Cf. Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that, under Rule 37, a party could not recover monetary sanctions on discovery requests unrelated to a failure to comply with discovery). Given the “broad range of discretion” afforded to district courts in assessing sanctions, even absent waiver, we cannot say that the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees and costs. 6 Eastway Gen. Hosp., 737 F.2d at 505.