Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Reference to a Polygraph Test

Text: I agree that any reference to a polygraph test may be potentially mischievous and should, therefore, be brought to the trial judge's attention and carefully screened with enhanced scrutiny to assure that no other appropriate alternative evidence is available to establish the relevant operative fact sought to be admitted and that a restrictive instruction be crafted to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is being admitted. [557] I further agree that Whalen may not be read broadly to permit references to a lie detector test to prove a limitless range of operative facts. Nevertheless, a  per se exclusionary rule would go too far when there may be no other basis for admitting critical evidence, the trial judge conducts an appropriate Rule 403 analysis and then formulates a clear cautionary instruction for the jury. Here, I see little meaningful difference between admitting polygraph evidence to prove that under all of the circumstances a confession was voluntary (as in Whalen ) and admitting evidence that a witness believed he would have to submit to a polygraph  a belief which caused him to divulge more expansively his knowledge of facts relating to issues in this case. In light of the trial judge's cautionary instruction, I believe there is no basis to conclude that either (1) the jury would simply blatantly ignore the instruction and blindly find that Gerry both took the test and passed it, or (2) the jury proceeded, contrary to the instruction, to find through speculation about unreliable evidence that Gerry ultimately told the truth.