Opinion ID: 2640013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicability of utah code section 78-12-25.1

Text: ¶14 We next look to section 78-12-25.1(5) of the Utah Code to determine whether it serves as a bar to the Savages' claims. Section 78-12-25.1, Civil actions for sexual abuse of a child, reads in relevant part as follows: (1) As used in this section: . . . . (e) Negligently means a failure to act to prevent the child sexual abuse from further occurring or to report the child sexual abuse to law enforcement when the adult who could act knows or reasonably should know of the child sexual abuse and is the victim's parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, foster parent, legal guardian, ancestor, descendant, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, niece, grandparent, stepgrandparent, or any person cohabitating in the child's home. . . . . (g) Sexual abuse means acts or attempted acts of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or molestation directed towards a child. (2) A person shall file a civil action for intentional or negligent sexual abuse suffered as a child: (a) within four years after the person attains the age of 18 years; or (b) if a person discovers sexual abuse only after attaining the age of 18 years, that person may bring a civil action for such sexual abuse within four years after discovery of the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (3) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse incidents caused the injury complained of, but may compute the date of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same perpetrator which is part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse. (4) The knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian shall not be imputed to a person under the age of 18 years. (5) A civil action may be brought only against a living person who intentionally perpetrated the sexual abuse or negligently permitted the sexual abuse to occur. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1 (2002). ¶15 The district court found that a plain language interpretation of subsection (5) of the statute bars the Savages' claims; accepting the Village's argument that the statute creates and defines the cause of action for sexual abuse of a child in Utah as abuse committed only by a living person. Since it is a corporate entity, it is not a living person as required in subsection (5) of the statute, and therefore cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from the sexual abuse of a child. ¶16 The Savages argue that the statute is simply a delayed discovery statute of limitation and therefore not applicable as a bar to their claims against the Village, since their claims were filed within the normal statute of limitation and do not rely on the extended time period provided by section 78-12-25.1(2), designed to deal with repressed memory cases. The Savages rely on the legislative history, placement, and previous interpretation of the statute to support their position. We agree that section 78-12-25.1 is a delayed discovery statute of limitation that applies only to extend the time for filing child sexual abuse claims where victims have repressed memories; the Savages' claim for negligent placement is not an action for the tort of child abuse (akin to assault), but rather a claim for negligent performance of a duty to exercise due care in placing a child in a foster home. ¶17 We grant no deference to a district court's interpretation and application of a statute, instead reviewing for correctness. Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1079 (Utah 1998). ¶18 It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that this court looks first to the plain language of the statute when interpreting meaning. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997); see also Arrendondo v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29, ¶ 12, 24 P.3d 928; C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 479; Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995); Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994); 2A Sutherland Statutory Constr. § 46:1 (6th ed. 2004). An equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute. Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1992). Above all, [t]his court's primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996). ¶19 The Savages point out that the statute, when read in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, creates an absurd result in a number of situations. Most notably, if subsection 2(a) is read literally, an action for intentional or negligent sexual abuse suffered as a child can only be filed within four years after the person attains the age of 18 years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.1(2)(a) (emphasis added). Such a reading of the statute would mean that a sexually abused minor would be barred from pursuing any civil action against an assailant until the victim reached the age of eighteen. In this case, under a literal reading of that portion of the statute, John Doe would be barred from filing a cause of action for at least twelve years. Such a result would be absurd. ¶20 The legislative history of section 78-12-25.1 shows that the legislature intended merely to expand the rights of sexual abuse victims with repressed memories, not to create and define a new cause of action encompassing all actions in any way related to child sexual abuse. The original bill, entitled An Act Relating to the Judicial Code for Sexual Abuse of a Child; Providing a Four Year Statute of Limitation in Civil Actions for Negligent or Intentional Sexual Abuse of a Child; Providing for Extension of the Statute of Limitation Period Where Sexual Abuse is Discovered After Age 18 and its subsequent discussion in the Utah House of Representatives and Utah Senate, reflect an intent to extend the current statute of limitation for filing child sexual abuse actions because legislators believed many victims with repressed memories were unable to file claims at all due to the delayed discovery of the abuse. H. R. Reg. 92, 49th Leg. (Utah 1992). During the House and Senate debates of the bill, there was substantial dispute about the definition of negligently as used in subsection (1) and the applicability of the statute to relatives beyond the immediate family. There was, notably, no discussion of the living person language in subsection (5). Id. Neither the sponsors of the bill, in their introductions containing background information and justification for the bill, nor the representatives and senators, in thorough discussions of the bill's potential effects and problems, mentioned the phrase living person. Id. ¶21 Other factors affect our reading of the statute as well. First, the statute is placed in Chapter 12 of Title 78, entitled Limitation of Actions. The statute's placement in this chapter was an important factor in two previous cases wherein we described section 78-12-25.1 as a delayed discovery statute of limitation rather than a statute that creates and defines a new cause of action. See Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1060 n.4 (Utah 1995); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1348 n.2 (Utah 1993). In Roark, we stated: Roark contends that section 78-12-25.1 created a new cause of action entitled sexual abuse of a child. However, chapter 12 of Title 78, Limitations of Actions, addresses solely the applicable statutes of limitations for various causes of action. Section 78-12-25.1 extends the statutory period for a specific type of assault and battery, namely, sexual abuse of a child, until four years after discovery of the sexual abuse in those cases in which a person discovered the sexual abuse only after attaining the age of eighteen years. 893 P.2d at 1060 n.4 (emphasis added). ¶22 The language of subsection (5) might be interpreted as creating and defining a new cause of action for negligently permitting sexual abuse to occur, as the Village argues. The restriction that such a claim could be brought only against a living person makes sense in that context because only a living person could intentionally perpetrate sexual abusedefined as acts or attempted acts of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or molestationof a child. A corporate or other non-living entity cannot physically commit such acts of sexual abuse, and therefore the statute reasonably excepts such entities from its treatment. We believe subsection (5)'s clause negligently permitted the abuse to occur refers back to the term negligently as defined in subsection (1)(e), meaning the allowing of abuse by the specific relatives listed. ¶23 The Savages do not claim that the Village negligently permitted sexual abuse to occur to their son. Instead, they claim that the Village negligently placed J.B., a youth with a documented history of sexual abuse, in their home without adequately disclosing that history. A claim for negligent placement is different from a claim for negligently permitting sexual abuse to occur. A corporate entity and placement agency like the Village, which cannot physically commit the sexual abuse described in section 78-12-25.1, or as subsection (5) indicates, negligently permit such sexual abuse to take place, can nevertheless be liable for negligently placing children in circumstances where it knows or should know they are at risk of being abused or perpetrating abuse. ¶24 After examining the statute's plain language and legislative and procedural history, we conclude, as we explained in Roark, that this statute is simply a delayed discovery statute of limitation for victims with repressed memories who were sexually abused as children. See Roark, 893 P.2d at 1060 n.4. By enacting section 78-12-25.1, the legislature expanded the rights of sexual abuse victims with repressed memories; there is no reason to believe it intended to create and define a cause of action for sexual abuse of a child. Thus, section 78-12-25.1 does not directly affect causes of action for negligent placement. We therefore hold that section 78-12-25.1 only applies to victims of child sexual abuse with repressed memories, and this statute does not touch any civil claim for negligent placement.