Opinion ID: 777320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mandamus in Russia and Mato Grosso

Text: 13 The tobacco companies also petition this court for a writ of mandamus prohibiting the district court from issuing any orders remanding Russia and Mato Grosso to the Florida Circuit Court where they were filed. The companies contend the lawsuits arise under federal common law because they implicate the vital interests — economic and sovereign — of a foreign nation and, hence, the foreign relations of the United States. (We will assume without deciding that the companies are correct about the significance of these cases to American foreign policy.) The foreign states respond that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint, and that a federal court may not assert jurisdiction over a case that raises no question of federal law simply because the plaintiff is a foreign sovereign. We need not resolve this dispute unless we determine first that a writ of mandamus is at least potentially available in the circumstances of this case. 14 As a threshold matter, we agree with the tobacco companies that § 1447(d) is not a jurisdictional bar to the relief they request. The statute prohibits review of all remand orders issued pursuant to § 1447(c) whether erroneous or not and whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ, Thermtron Prods., 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 589, but the district court has not issued an order of remand in Russia or Mato Grosso. By its terms, therefore, § 1447(d) does not prevent the court from entertaining the present petitions. But see Black & Decker v. Brown, 817 F.2d 13, 14 (3d Cir.1987). We will not infer a jurisdictional limitation upon our normal and traditional function when no statute requires that we do so. Id. at 15 (Garth, J., dissenting). 15 As we often have noted, the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations. National Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Inc. v. United States DOJ, 182 F.3d 981, 986 (1999) ( NACDL ). We are particularly disinclined to issue the writ before the district court has acted, as the petitioners here request. See In re Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n, Inc., 949 F.2d 1165, 1167 (D.C.Cir.1991) (indiscriminate use of the remedy [would] avoid the stricture of the final judgment rule). In resolving such a preemptive petition, we consider instructive the following factors: 16 (1) whether the party seeking the writ has any other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the desired relief; 17 (2) whether that party will be harmed in a way not correctable on appeal; 18 (3) whether the district court clearly erred or abused its discretion; 19 (4) whether the district court committed an oft-repeated error; and 20 (5) whether the decision of the district court raises important and novel problems or issues of law. 21 See NACDL, 182 F.3d at 986-87. As the tobacco companies correctly observe, a petitioner need not be favored by all five factors in order to demonstrate its entitlement to the writ of mandamus; indeed, it is difficult to envision a case that involves both an oft-repeated error as well as an issue of law of first impression. Valley Broad. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1292 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986). Our cases also make clear, however, that two of the factors are actually prerequisites, for no writ of mandamus — whether denominated advisory, supervisory, or otherwise — will issue unless the petitioner shows (1, above) that it has no other adequate means of redress, see NACDL, 182 F.3d at 987, and (3, above) that the writ is necessary to emend a clear error or abuse of discretion. See Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir. 1999). 22 We doubt the tobacco companies satisfy the first condition. It is true, as the companies assert, that they could not seek review of an order remanding Russia or Mato Grosso to the state court in Florida, but that is not because some practical exigency prevents the companies from availing themselves of their remedy at law. Compare, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C.Cir.1998) (issuing writ to prevent transfer of motion to quash third-party subpoena). On the contrary, the companies have no legal right to appellate review. Rather, the court of appeals is prohibited by statute from reviewing remand orders — by appeal or otherwise — of the sort the district court might issue in Russia and Mato Grosso. Although, as we have said, § 1447(d) does not deprive this court of jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus, the determination of the Congress that we should not review a remand order certainly militates against our opining in advance upon the propriety of a remand order the district court might otherwise issue. See Ex parte Pennsylvania, 137 U.S. 451, 454, 11 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed. 738 (1890) (it is unquestionably a general rule that the abrogation of one remedy does not affect another. But in this case, we think, it was the intention of [C]ongress to make the judgment of the circuit court remanding a cause to the state court final and conclusive). 23 In any event, the tobacco companies do not come close to demonstrating that it would be a clear error or an abuse of discretion for the district court to order the cases remanded. The companies identify no precedent of this court or of the Supreme Court even suggesting there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over a case merely because the plaintiff is a foreign government with a sovereign or an economic interest in the outcome of the lawsuit. The other circuits to have considered the companies' theory — in cases where the foreign sovereigns were not the plaintiffs but had a material interest in the outcomes — are divided over the issue of federal jurisdiction. Compare Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377 (11th Cir.1998) (Where a state law action has as a substantial element an issue involving foreign relations or foreign policy matters, federal jurisdiction is present), and Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir.1997) (same), with Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir.2001) (rejecting reasoning of Pacheco and Torres and citing with approval decision of district court to remand in Venezuela ). Considering that the Ninth Circuit has adopted as its own the district court's reason for remanding in the Latin America Cases, we cannot agree with the companies that the district court is now poised to commit a clear error that would justify our issuing a writ of mandamus.  See Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1999) (denying petition for writ of mandamus because it [was] far from clear that the district court erred); In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1507 (D.C.Cir.1989) (the petitioner must demonstrate that [its] right to relief is `clear and indisputable') (quoting Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Ca., 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976)). 24 In sum, the companies have failed to make out one if not both prerequisites for a writ of mandamus. Therefore, we deny the companies' petitions without considering the other factors mentioned in NACDL. 25 Finally, we decline, as we must, the companies' invitation to issue an advisory opinion to the effect that the district court should not remand Russia or Mato Grosso. See Br. of Appellants at 31 ([I]t may be entirely possible for this Court to grant petitioners effective relief in this proceeding while stopping short of actually issuing a writ of mandamus at this time). Article III does not authorize a federal court to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314, 13 S.Ct. 876, 37 L.Ed. 747 (1893).