Opinion ID: 2060682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mistrial Denial

Text: On appeal Correia first claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to pass the case because of an allegedly improper comment made by a testifying policeman about Correia's decision not to answer further police questions after he had initially agreed to waive his rights and had begun to respond to their queries. We first observe that this is not a case in which a defendant immediately decided to remain silent after having been advised of his Miranda rights. On the contrary, after having been advised of his right to remain silent and of his other Miranda rights, defendant began to answer the police officers' interrogatories about the incident they were investigating. For instance Correia told the police that he was the person who had shoveled snow for the Peloquins some two days before the robbery. However, after claiming that he had remained in his apartment all evening, defendant apparently decided he should stop talking to the police, whereupon he indicated that he did not want to cooperate with them any further. At trial the interrogating police officer was asked whether Correia had stated anything further to him after admitting to his earlier encounter with Mr. Peloquin. The officer responded, The conversation terminated. He didn't want to cooperate. Correia's attorney immediately moved to pass the case because he claimed the officer had improperly commented on defendant's constitutional right to remain silent. Although the trial justice ruled that there was no reason to pass the case, she did give two separate cautionary instructions to the jurors telling them that Correia had a right to remain silent and that they could not draw any adverse inferences from his doing so. We conclude that the trial justice did not err in refusing to pass the case. Although a defendant's post-arrest silence may not generally be used against him or her at trial, see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the Doyle rule is inapplicable when, as here, a defendant waives his or her Miranda rights and decides to speak to the police after having been advised of his or her right to remain silent. See State v. Rossier, 672 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I. 1996) (holding no violation of the defendant's right to remain silent when the defendant made voluntary statements to the police after a knowing waiver of such rights); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In such a situation, police witnesses at trial are allowed to relate to the jury their observations concerning a defendant's decision to stop talking with the police after initially having done so. When as here a defendant initially waives his or her right to remain silent but later invokes that right by refusing to answer further questions, it is not improper for the prosecutor or the police witness to explain how or why the interview concluded. See United States v. Harris, 956 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir.1992) (prosecutor may note that, after making incriminating statements, the defendant concluded the interview); Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir.1984) (prosecutor may note without undue emphasis that the defendant had initially given statements but had ended interrogation); United States v. Williams, 556 F.2d 65, 67 (D.C.Cir. 1977) (recounting witness may conclude account of interview in natural fashion by indicating that the defendant chose to stop answering questions); but cf. United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 504 (1st Cir.1977) (noting that Miranda allows the defendant to invoke the right to remain silent at any time `prior to or during questioning  but finding no error because defendant voluntarily continued to make statements after having refused to respond to certain police inquiries). Moreover, even if the police officer's testimony commenting on Correia's alleged lack of cooperation had been improper, the trial justice's instructions to the jury were apt to dispel any prejudice resulting from such remarks. Thus we are not convinced that the cautionary instructions were untimely or ineffective or that the trial justice did not disabuse the jurors' minds of [any alleged] prejudicial effect. State v. Marrapese, 116 R.I. 1, 7, 351 A.2d 95, 98 (1976). In sum we hold that the trial justice correctly refused to pass the case because of the testifying policeman's comment about Correia's post-waiver decision to cease responding to further police questioning about his alleged involvement in the robbery.