Opinion ID: 2039833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Clearly the Act intends for tenants to provide income verification information to DHCR within 60 days after the Division serves notice of the landlord's petition to deregulate: the Act states that the notification shall require the tenant or tenants to provide the information to the division within sixty days of service (Rent Stabilization Law [Administrative Code] § 26-504.3 [c] [1]). And clearly the Act gives DHCR authority to issue an order of deregulation if at least 60 days have passed and the tenant has not responded: the Act states that DHCR shall issue an order of deregulation [i]n the event that the tenant or tenants fail to provide the information required pursuant to paragraph one of this subdivision ( id., § 26-504.3 [c] [3]). What remains at issue is whether the Division must issue an order of deregulation if the tenant responds after expiration of the 24th hour of the 60th day, or whether the agency has discretion to accept a late filing. For the reasons that follow, we reject the Division's contention that, under the statute, the hammer necessarily and invariably falls at 12:01 A.M. on the 61st day. At the outset, we owe little deference to DHCR's own interpretation of the 60-day provision in this matter of statutory construction. To be sure, where the interpretation of a statute involves specialized knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or entails an evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom, the courts should defer to the administrative agency's interpretation unless irrational or unreasonable ( Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459; see also, Matter of Union Indem. Ins. Co., 92 NY2d 107, 114-115; Matter of Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 42, 47-48). By contrast, where, as here, the question is one of pure statutory interpretation dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the administrative agency and its interpretive regulations are therefore to be accorded much less weight ( Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 49 NY2d, at 459). In the instant cases, as well as others decided today ( see, Matter of Elkin v Roldan, 94 NY2d 853; Matter of Shapiro v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 94 NY2d 853; Pledge v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 94 NY2d 851), DHCR urges that Administrative Code § 26-504.3 (c) (1) and (c) (3), by their terms, permit no exceptions where a tenant fails to send income verification information to the Division within 60 days of service of the notice. This, however, is not a correct reading of the unambiguous statutory language. While subdivision (c) (1) indeed requires the tenant to return the information within sixty days of service, it does not divest the Division of authority to forgive a late filing or excusable default in the sound exercise of its discretion. Notably, subdivision (c) (3) requires the Division to enter an order of deregulation only if the tenant or tenants fail to provide the information  (emphasis added). Significantly, the statute does notas DHCR contendsstate that such an order must be issued if the tenant does not respond within 60 days. Rather, the implication is that an order must be issued only if the tenant fails to respond at all. The legislative history additionally supports the interpretation that DHCR has discretion to review a case on the merits despite justifiable tenant tardiness. The Introducer's Memorandum in Support of the Act states that if the tenant fails to return the ICF to the landlord, the Division of Taxation and Finance is required by this bill to verify whether the income threshold    is exceeded and to advise DHCR of its findings (Bill Jacket, L 1993, ch 253, Introducer's Mem in Support, at 3). This indicates that, within the framework set by the statute, the Legislature intended for deregulation proceedings to be decided on the merits. Further, while DHCR reads the Act to require invariant application of the 60-day rule to tenants, the Division apparently shows little regard for the equally precise deadlines the statute imposes on it. Subdivision (c) (1), for instance, requires DHCR to notify tenants within 20 days after the landlord has filed a petition for deregulation. In the cases at hand, however, DHCR waited nearly four months before notifying Seymour, and two months before notifying either Dworman or Sudarsky. In addition, subdivision (c) (3) requires DHCR to enter a deregulation order by December 1 if the tenant has not responded to the notice. Here, however, the Rent Administrator did not enter the deregulation orders until February 27 in Dworman, January 31 in Sudarsky and December 21 in Seymour. Indeed, DHCR took so longmore than a yearto decide Dworman's 1995 case that she was confused as to whether the Division's November 8, 1996 letter applied to her landlord's 1995, or 1996, petition. To be sure, DHCR's delay in sending the notifications did not deprive it of jurisdiction over the proceedings, nor is there any allegation that the delay was so unreasonable as to constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial intervention ( see, Matter of Cortlandt Nursing Home v Axelrod, 66 NY2d 169, 180 [judicial intervention for excessive delay in administrative proceeding is warranted only under extraordinary circumstances], cert denied 476 US 1115; Matter of Geary v Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 59 NY2d 950, 952 [excessive delay would at most amount to legal error and would not divest agency of jurisdiction]; see also, State Administrative Procedure Act § 301 [1] [In an adjudicatory proceeding, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing within reasonable time]). However, DHCR's view of its own deadlines as merely advisory weakens its argument that, by mandate of the statute, a tenant's tardiness in complying with deadlines imposed under the same enactment can never, under any circumstances, be forgiven. [3] Nor do Matter of Mennella v Lopez-Torres (91 NY2d 474) and Matter of Brusco v Braun (84 NY2d 674) support DHCR's interpretation of the Act. In those cases, we held that RPAPL 732 (3), which requires the court to enter a default judgment in an eviction proceeding for nonpayment of rent if the tenant fails to answer within five days from the date of service, must be strictly enforced. Unlike the statute at issue, however, RPAPL 732 (3) explicitly states that a default must be entered if the tenant fails to answer within five days. Moreover, we noted in Mennella that despite the unequivocal language of the statute, the trial court may nonetheless retain the power to stay execution of the warrant of eviction for particularized good cause ( Matter of Mennella v Lopez-Torres, supra, at 480). Significantly, the Rent Stabilization Code states that DHCR may, at any stage of a proceeding    for good cause shown, except where prohibited by the RSL, accept for filing any papers, even though not filed within the time required by this Code (9 NYCRR 2527.5 [d]; see also, 9 NYCRR 2507.5 [d]; 9 NYCRR 2210.1 [unless it conflicts with the statute, the Rent Stabilization Code applies to all proceedings under the Rent Stabilization Law]). Since Administrative Code § 26-504.3 does not prohibit DHCR from accepting late filings, it may exercise its discretion under the Code to accept late filings when good cause is established. Further, Code sections 2507.5 (d) and 2527.5 (d) permit DHCR to accept late filings for good cause shown at any stage of a proceedingthat is, at any point before the Commissioner has entered a final order dismissing the PAR ( see, Matter of Magnone v Halperin, 238 AD2d 207 [a final decision was not rendered until the resolution of the tenant's petition for administrative review]; see also, 9 NYCRR 2529.8 et seq. [regulations governing (f)inal determination by the Commissioner]). Of course, a tenant who waits to supply the required information until an order of deregulation has been entered faces a far heavier burden in establishing good cause for the delay. Nevertheless, where good cause is shown, DHCR has the discretion to permit a late filing either before or after the Rent Administrator has issued a deregulation order, until the Commissioner has taken final action. We underscore that DHCR may reasonably interpret good cause to mean more than any cause. By fixing timetables for income verification and deregulation, the Legislature made plain its desire that these proceedings not languish but that they be conducted, and resolved, expeditiously. While ameliorating undue severity, DHCR's discretion to excuse a default should not be viewed as an invitation to ignore filing deadlines or as a prescription for laxity. DHCR is within its discretion to hold that a tenant who does not demonstrate good cause is simply not entitled to relief ( cf., Matter of Fruci [Commissioner of Labor], 260 AD2d 831, 832 [declining to vacate default where claimant failed to show that Board abused its discretion in denying claimant's application to reopen the default decision]). However, where a tenant does demonstrate good cause for failing to submit the required information within 60 days, DHCR may accept the late filing. Turning to the cases at hand, we remit Dworman and Sudarsky to DHCR so that the agency may evaluate them under the good cause standard. Dworman alleges what might, or might not, amount to good cause: she claims that her response was 11 days late because she was in Europe for three months and did not see the notice until after the deadline had expired. In denying Dworman's PAR, DHCR held that the 60-day time limit was  statutory  in nature and that it was outside the discretion and purview of DHCR to alter it. Although the Commissioner commented in passing that Dworman had not provided a sufficient explanation for the late filing, the analysis is otherwise devotedin its entiretyto asserting that the 60-day limit is inflexible and insurmountable. Significantly, in its several communications with Dworman, DHCR never asked her to provide an explanation for her late filing; rather, it asked only for proof that her response had in fact been timely filed. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to remit the case to DHCR for reconsideration under the proper standard. Further, on remittal, DHCR may consider, in its discretion, whether the 11-day delay was so minimal as to be excusable under the maxim of de minimis non curat lex ( cf., Van Clief v Van Vechten, 130 NY 571, 579; Flora Co. v Ingilis, 233 AD2d 418, 419). Similarly, Sudarsky alleged what might possibly be good cause: he claimed that he mistakenly sent the information to the landlord rather than to DHCR. Contrary to DHCR's holding, the fact that he recalled having sent the information in late July 1994 (rather than early August when the notice was mailed) did not necessarily defeat his claimhis recollection of the dates might simply have been off by a few days. Thus, we remit Sudarsky as well to DHCR for reconsideration. In Seymour, however, the Appellate Division erred in remitting the matter to DHCR; the order deregulating Seymour's apartment should not be disturbed. In denying Seymour's PAR, DHCR did not apply the wrong standard: it did not assert that it could never forgive violations of the 60-day deadline. Rather, the Division found that Seymour's [i]nadvertent neglect concededly the cause of her delaydid not excuse her default. DHCR was within its discretion to conclude that, absent any allegation of good cause, the policy of deciding cases on their merits does not override the statutory mandate that information be provided expeditiously. Nor can Seymour's five-month delay fairly be characterized as de minimis. Thus, we cannot say that the Division abused its discretion in denying Seymour's PAR. The parties' remaining contentions are without merit. Accordingly, the Appellate Division's order in Dworman should be modified, without costs, and the matter remitted to Supreme Court with instructions to remand to DHCR for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, and, as so modified, affirmed; the Appellate Division's order in Sudarsky should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to Supreme Court with instructions to remand to DHCR for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion; and the Appellate Division's order in Seymour should be reversed, with costs, and the petition dismissed. In Matter of Dworman v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal: Order modified, etc. In Matter of Seymour v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal: Order reversed, etc. In Matter of Sudarsky v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal: Order reversed, etc.