Opinion ID: 891585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legality of the Length and Scope of the Detention.

Text: {15} This Court recently discussed in considerable detail the limitations imposed by the Fourth Amendment on the scope and length of an investigatory detention. State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. We note that the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Funderburg at the time it issued its opinion in this case, which was filed three months before Funderburg. Although we need not repeat here all that is contained in the extended Funderburg analysis, we will summarize the basic principles set out in Funderburg and other controlling precedents that are applicable to determining the constitutional reasonableness of the length and scope of a lawful investigatory stop. {16} We start with the underlying constitutional maxim that the reasonableness of the officer's actions is determined by objectively evaluating the particular facts of the stop within the context of all the attendant circumstances. State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 23, 35, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836. The federal and New Mexico Constitutions are not a guarantee against all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 29. Although Defendant would not have standing to object to an unlawful seizure from another person because it violated the other person's rights, he does have standing to object to a seizure from a third person which occurred as a result of the exploitation of Defendant's own unlawful ... detention. State v. Hernandez, 1997-NMCA-006, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 809, 932 P.2d 499 (1996) (holding a driver had standing to suppress the drugs found in the underwear of the driver's passenger during an unreasonably prolonged roadside stop of both driver and passenger). {17} A court should consider both the length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out when determining whether a lawfully-initiated investigatory detention has become unlawfully extended. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 35. We first address briefly the overall length of the detention, from initial stop to discovery of the drugs, which was described as five minutes by one of the officers and definitely less than ten minutes by the other. While there is no bright-line time limit for a reasonable investigatory detention, we have found no reported case in which a New Mexico court has ever held that a ten minute detention was impermissibly long in any set of circumstances where there was reasonable suspicion to make a roadside drug stop. See, e.g., Werner, 117 N.M. at 318, 871 P.2d at 974 (providing forty-five minute detention unreasonable under circumstances); State v. Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶¶ 21, 22, 25, 145 N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587 (summarizing New Mexico cases and upholding reasonableness of thirty minute detention under circumstances); State v. Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 31, 139 N.M. 569, 136 P.3d 570 (upholding reasonableness of forty minute detention); State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, ¶¶ 12-13, 122 N.M. 84, 920 P.2d 1038 (determining first hour at roadside detention reasonable, relocation to warehouse for additional two to three hour detention unreasonable); State v. De Jesus-Santibanez, 119 N.M. 578, 582, 893 P.2d 474, 478 (Ct.App.1995) (upholding reasonableness of twenty minute detention). {18} Temporal duration is neither the controlling nor the only factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the extent of an investigatory detention. In this case, the Court of Appeals expressed no criticism of the events during the five minutes or less that it took to stop the car and conduct an initial search; instead, it focused on the purpose for the officer's talking to the passenger during the sixty to ninety seconds after the car search was completed. Sewell, 2008-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 19, 24, 27. Even where an initial stop was justified, the detention may become unlawful if the officer unjustifiably expands the scope of the detention or, without a valid factual basis, makes inquiries about other criminal activity unrelated to the original justification for the stop. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 14. {19} Funderburg emphasized that an officer does not have to ignore new information that becomes known to him after the initial stop. Id. ¶ 27. [W]hen considering whether a detention is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the case, a reviewing court must consider whether the officer's subsequent actions were fairly responsive to the emerging tableauthe circumstances originally warranting the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer learned, as the stop progressed. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). {20} In this case, the purpose of the stop was to investigate whether the occupants of the Cadillac had just participated in a drug transaction. The questions the officers addressed to the occupants and their search of the car were all focused on finding evidence related to drug trafficking. The officers' actions up to the point of speaking separately with the passenger undeniably were reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. Werner, 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973. {21} The Court of Appeals seemed to view anything occurring after the brief unsuccessful search of the car as being unjustified by the reasonable suspicion that made the investigatory stop lawful. Sewell, 2008-NMCA-027, ¶ 27. In essence, the Court determined that the police were required as a matter of law to abruptly end the investigatory encounter the second the unsuccessful car search was completed, because taking even a minute or so to find out what the passenger was trying to communicate to the officers would violate Defendant's constitutional rights. There are two reasons why that analysis is flawed. {22} First, there is nothing in the record that indicates the officers were finished with their minimally intrusive questions to confirm or dispel [their] initial suspicion, Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), particularly in light of the passenger's indication that she had something she wanted to tell the very officers who had told her they were actively looking for drug evidence. The permissive scope of these on-the-scene investigatory stops simply cannot be sliced as finely as the Court of Appeals approach would require, as we have previously indicated in our case law. We have repeatedly required an examination of the evolving circumstances facing an officer instead of a mechanical set of rigid guidelines. Id. ¶ 26. Numerous precedents of the Court of Appeals have recognized and applied that same principle. See, e.g., Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 24 (stating officers not necessarily required to stop roadside drug investigation immediately after drug-sniffing dog failed to alert); Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶¶ 24-25 (stating officers not required to cease investigation when initial investigatory inquiries did not dispel officers' reasonable suspicions); State v. Williamson, 2000-NMCA-068, ¶ 16, 129 N.M. 387, 9 P.3d 70 (stating officer not required to cease the investigation abruptly after unsuccessful initial results because [d]iligence in conducting an investigation allows a reasonable opportunity to analyze and integrate information received and to consider additional action that may be taken). {23} Second, by basing its holding on the proposition that the only reason for talking to the passenger after the car search was in the hope of developing further suspicion or probable cause to justify [the officers'] actions or ... suspicions, Sewell, 2008-NMCA-027, ¶ 19, the opinion below ignores the district judge's explicit and factually supported findings recited from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing. The judge relied on Officer Borunda's testimony in finding that the officer responded to the passenger's indications that she wanted to say something to the officer privately because she was indicating that she was in fear of Defendant. As we have repeatedly cautioned, appellate courts, including this Court, do not sit as trier of fact, recognizing that the district court has the best vantage from which to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 15. In this case, the district judge did not even have to make evidentiary inferences in arriving at his findings; they were based directly on the explicit sworn testimony of the officer. {24} We agree with the district court that it would have been inappropriate and unreasonable had the officers close[d] their eyes and plug[ged] their ears to anything else immediately following the vehicle search, given the passenger's demeanor. In separating Defendant and the passenger in order to assure her of her safety and ask what was happening, Officer Borunda took the only reasonable action he could have taken to dispel reasonable concerns raised by the passenger's fearful conduct and her attempt to communicate something to him. {25} In Funderburg, we articulated what is ultimately the dispositive question in this case: In weighing the officer's intrusion on Defendant's privacy, we should ask ourselves what other actions a reasonable officer would be expected to take under similar circumstances, if not those taken in this instance. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 32. Two years before that question was posed by this Court, the district court in this case answered it in summing up his findings at the conclusion of the suppression hearing: I think he would have been remiss in his responsibilities as a law enforcement officer not to separate and find out what was going on. We agree with that answer, and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution imposes no demand that we answer the question any differently.