Opinion ID: 1363671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intent of departing family member.

Text: The superior court cited the case of Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 387 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1963), in which we faced a situation parallel to the one presented here. There, the husband (the insured) moved out of the family house in late July of 1960; the wife filed suit for divorce on August 9; the policy was issued on August 19, with the insured listing the family home as his place of residence; and the wife was killed in an automobile accident in October of the same year. We emphasized that no general rule can be formulated and that the facts of each case must be examined to determine whether the named insured, his spouse, and his relatives have ceased to be residents of the same household. Id. at 106. We noted that [i]f either [spouse] was eating and sleeping away from the family residence for a temporary period of time with the intention of returning, it could not ordinarily be said that their usual residence had been abandoned, and that under such circumstances, both spouses should still be regarded as residents of the same household. Id. After examining a variety of facts, we concluded that the insurer had failed to demonstrate an intent not to return on the part of the departing spouse. [5] Applying the criteria set out in Lumbermens, the superior court found that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding the finality of the separation between [Wainscott] and his wife and that 6410 Ridgeview Circle was not the household of the plaintiff under the terms of the insurance policies. [6] The issue is not, however, the intention of Robert and Juanita as to whether they planned to reconcile or remain apart; rather, the focus must be on the relationship between Robert and his daughter Deborah. If that separation was intended to be only temporary, then they would still be considered as being in the same household. [7] A permanent separation between husband and wife does not necessarily remove a child from the household of either; this is shown most graphically in cases indicating that a child of divorced parents may, depending on the facts, be regarded as being in the household of both. See, e.g., Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 127 N.J. Super. 37, 316 A.2d 51, 54-55 (1974). The fact that the superior court's finding of permanent separation was concerned with the inter-spousal relationship, rather than the parent-child relationship, requires reversal of the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm. Additionally, we believe it would be inappropriate to further rule that Wainscott should have been awarded summary judgment on this ground. Although there was evidence in the record to support a finding that Robert Wainscott intended his separation from Deborah to be only temporary, [8] there is also evidence in the record to the contrary. [9] We are therefore convinced that there is a genuine issue of fact presented, and that summary judgment is appropriate for neither side on this ground.