Opinion ID: 2055865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Rebuttal Testimony of Reverend Joseph Invernizzi

Text: The Reverend Joseph Invernizzi testified for the defense concerning a visit he made to the home of Fairbrothers. His testimony was apparently an attempt to establish an alibi for Fairbrothers on the day of the slaying. This witness testified that he had been in the Fairbrothers home, somewhere between 1:30 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and remained for 20 to 30 minutes. He did not testify, nor was he asked, either on direct examination or on cross by the prosecutor, what day of the week it was that he made this visit. However, on direct examination the priest had testified that on Saturday afternoons confessions were heard in his parish from 3 to 6 and 7 to 9 and that there was a schedule which assigned each priest to an hour. The cross-examination was concluded, and no redirect examination was desired. After a midmorning recess the prosecution requested leave to ask a few more questions of the witness on cross-examination. The court made no decision on this request until after the noon recess. At that time, noting that the prosecutor had interviewed the priest during the noon recess, the court refused to allow any further cross-examination but did say that the state could call him as a rebuttal witness if it so desired. After objections to this procedure were made known to the court, rebuttal evidence was adduced by the prosecutor to the effect that the priest could not testify that it was on Saturday that he went to the Fairbrothers home and that he could not say what day of the week it was. Thereafter, a motion was made by the defense to strike the rebuttal testimony, which motion was granted. The defendant now contends that the testimony offered in rebuttal was so prejudicial to defendant that it constituted reversible error. Obviously, any error arising out of the admission of the rebuttal testimony, so called, is not before us, the motion to strike having been granted. However, defendant, as we understand him, is arguing that this testimony referring to the inability of the priest to state the day of the visit to Fairbrothers' home was so prejudicial that it constituted reversible error. The defendant's argument rests, again, on the theory that a mere instruction to the jury that the evidence was being stricken and that they were to disregard it was insufficient to warrant an assumption that the jury would follow such an instruction. We were confronted with a contention of similar import in State v. Ouimette, 110 R.I. 747, 773, 298 A.2d 124, 139 (1972). There we held, relying on Bruton, supra, that it is not unreasonable to conclude that in many cases involving the mere admission of improper evidence the jury can and will follow the instruction of the court to disregard such evidence. Relying upon Bruton v. United States, supra , and the cases cited therein, we pointed out: `Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently.    It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information.' The defendant here, as in Ouimette, has failed to establish the peculiar risk of prejudice which we have held is necessary to constitute reversible error. Therefore, this exception is overruled.