Opinion ID: 2301516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Charles Johnson's Request for a Benefit

Text: 1. State Suppression The State argues that the post conviction hearing judge correctly found that Charles Johnson did not seek a benefit in exchange for the information he provided the police on 23 November 1994; accordingly, so the argument goes, the State could not have suppressed evidence of such a request. For that same reason, the State contends the hearing judge correctly concluded that Johnson and Detective Marll testified accurately and truthfully in the lower court proceedings when they denied that Johnson requested a benefit in exchange for the incriminating information against Petitioner. Moreover, the State asserts Johnson's receipt of a benefit, i.e., the plea agreement relative to the robbery charges, in exchange for his later testimony, was known by Petitioner. [30] The State invites this Court to accept the post conviction judge's rationale that reconciled Detective Marll's post conviction testimony with his prior testimony by drawing a meaningful distinction between Johnson's willingness to provide the police with the incriminating information in 1994, gratis, and his subsequent successful negotiation with the State for a benefit in exchange for his 1996 and 1998 testimony against Petitioner. We decline the invitation. It is well settled that this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the post conviction court unless they are clearly erroneous. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 348, 768 A.2d at 683; Oken, 343 Md. at 299, 681 A.2d at 51; Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 672, 629 A.2d 685, 696 (1993). Finding that Charles Johnson did not seek a benefit in the course of his 1994 meeting with police, the post conviction hearing judge stated: Charles Johnson willingly provided information to the police with no prearranged agreement or deal. He apparently elected not to sign the written statement he willingly provided in the hope that he could arrange an agreement with the State's Attorney's Office in exchange for his testimony at trial. Charles Johnson was telling the truth when he said that he didn't right out ask for a deal [of the police]. He correctly didn't feel the police could offer a deal. Detective Marll was telling the truth that Charles Johnson didn't ask for any promises or favors in return for the information he gave to the police. This is verified by the fact that he did give the information to the police with no agreement or deal. Charles Johnson did want an agreement in exchange for his testimony. He knew and/or was told that the police could not accomplish that. The only evidence which could refute the initial motivation is his subsequent act of securing an agreement to testify for the State in exchange for a benefit for him. This information was provided by the State to all counsel for the Petitioner and was the primary subject of cross-examination. Having reviewed the entire record regarding the alleged Brady suppression of Johnson's full negotiations for a benefit, we find the post conviction court's factual findings are not supported by the record, and we disagree with its conclusions of law. The State's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence as enunciated in Brady is to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (noting that [s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair.). See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (stating that [t]he Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.... [T]he prosecutor is ... to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial....). Evidence will be deemed to be suppressed within the meaning of Brady if it is `information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.' Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 557 (4th Cir.1999) (noting the prosecutor acknowledged withholding evidence pertaining to inconsistent statements of its key identification witness to defendant's counsel) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342); Ware, 348 Md. at 39, 702 A.2d at 709 (stating that the necessary inquiry is whether the defendant knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence). There is no question that the State knew that Johnson was seeking a benefit when he met with police in 1994. Detective Marll's post conviction testimony revealed that Johnson asked what could be done for him, albeit subsequent to his providing the police with a written, but unsigned, statement of Petitioner's alleged confession to him. The following exchange took place between Petitioner's counsel and Detective Marll at the post conviction hearing: [Counsel:] Did Mr. Johnson ask you or mention anything in any way in the first hour and a half of his interrogation about his pending charges? [Detective Marll:] I don't recall....It seems to me that once the written statement was done, obviously, because there was a question about Mr. Johnson not signing the bottom of the form that he brought up that basically he wanted something done in his behalf by the State's Attorney's Office, and that's why he initialed the form in our presence. We have no doubt that Detective Marll understood the implications of Johnson's request, as Johnson refused to sign his statement without a commitment for a benefit, choosing instead only to initial the pages. In that regard, Detective Marll testified: At that time, I asked if he would sign the bottom of the statement form, and he said he didn't want to, he didn't feel comfortable signing it, but he said he would put his initials there, and he did, he wrote them on each page in front of us and placed his initials on each line next to the signature block area, and at that time, we were done. It is equally clear that Detective Marll ostensibly offered to act as an intermediary between Johnson and the State's Attorney's office. Detective Marll testified: After these seven pages were done, what I asked Mr. Johnson to do was to review and sign each one of them, and that's when the question came up about hishe would have hadwhatever charge it was that he had that he wanted to know what can be done for him. And at the time, we said we don't make any deals, we can't make any promises. The only thing we can do is take the statement to the State's Attorney Office, and they can get in touch with your attorney and anything along that line can be done by them. We stay entirely out of it. Facts known to the police will be imputed to the State for Brady purposes. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (noting the Brady rule encompasses evidence `known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor') (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1568, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 451 (4th Cir.1976) (attributing the knowledge of the police to the Government, the Court noted, `[t]he police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure.' ) (quoting Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.1964)). It is undisputed that the substance of Detective Marll's testimony concerning the commencement and course of Johnson's negotiations for a benefit was withheld from Petitioner until the post conviction hearing. Petitioner's pretrial requests for disclosure of Brady material, discussed supra, failed to elicit any documentation concerning Johnson's negotiations for a deal. Petitioner reasonably relied upon the State's open file policy as fulfilling the prosecution's duty to disclose the evidence he requested. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 283 n. 23, 119 S.Ct. at 1949 n. 23, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (stating that if a prosecutor asserts that he complies with Brady through an open file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file to contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated to disclose under Brady. ). The reasonableness of Petitioner's reliance was confirmed by the State's statement that it had well exceeded the requirements of Brady by providing Petitioner with all pertinent portions of its files. We shall not entertain the State's hair-splitting in honoring form over substance. The record demonstrates that Petitioner's counsel attempted, based on the plea bargain alone, to persuade the jury that Johnson sought a favor for his allegedly fabricated testimony regarding Petitioner's alleged confession. [31] Petitioner's various counsel were understandably unsuccessful in uncovering on their own the full circumstances precipitating the ultimate plea bargain. The sole basis offered by the State, and accepted by the post conviction judge, for resisting disclosure of the full extent of the negotiations was the State's arbitrary and circumscribed interpretation of Petitioner's cross-examinations of Johnson and Detective Marll concerning the matter. Indeed, Johnson and Detective Marll nimbly sidestepped complete and accurate responses by interpreting the questions posed to them in terms of promises or favors in exchange for Johnson's 1994 information, rather than for his later testimony. In effect, these witnesses intellectually bifurcated the pertinent course of events in order to make the nice distinctions offered at the post conviction hearing as explanations for why their earlier testimony was not incomplete or perhaps simply false. [32] The State's lack of candor was never more apparent as when, at sentencing, the State pointedly asked Detective Marll if Johnson had at any time during the course of their conversations ever asked him for any promises in return for the information that he provided, eliciting Detective Marll's categorical response, No sir, he did not. (Emphasis added). It is clear to us that the State's and the witnesses' deceptive approach was intended to evade the thrust of Petitioner's questioning. We find the commencement of Johnson's negotiations leading up to the plea agreement for his testimony against Petitioner, and the fact that he declined to sign the written statement because no immediate commitment for a benefit was forthcoming, to be inseparable conceptually from his initially apprising the police of the incriminating information. After all, Johnson's unsigned, written statement would be of limited or no value to the State without his consistent in-court testimony. [33] We find that the evidence concerning Johnson's initial request for a benefit and his refusal to sign the written statement when such a benefit was not immediately forthcoming was within the exclusive control of the State, and the State's failure to disclose this evidence upon request consequently constituted a suppression within the meaning of Brady. 2. Evidence Favorable to the Petitioner To succeed on a Brady claim, Petitioner also must establish that the suppressed evidence was favorable to his defense. As indicated above, favorable evidence encompasses not only exculpatory evidence, but also evidence that may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 345-46, 768 A.2d at 681-82. The Court has recognized the importance of impeachment evidence, noting that `if disclosed and used effectively, [impeachment evidence] may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.' Spicer, 194 F.3d at 556 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481). See also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282 n. 21, 119 S.Ct. at 1949 n. 21, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (recognizing that Brady's disclosure requirements extend to materials that, whatever their other characteristics, may be used to impeach a witness). Cf. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. at 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.). It is well established that the State's failure to disclose the existence of a plea agreement with a key witness violates Brady standards, because the terms of the agreement might provide evidence regarding the witness's motivation to testify. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. at 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104; Wilson, 363 Md. at 348, 768 A.2d at 683; Ware, 348 Md. at 50, 702 A.2d at 714 (recognizing that evidence of a plea agreement between the State and a witness is powerful impeachment evidence that enables a defendant to attack the motive or bias of a witness .... and must be disclosed to the accused); Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 198, 695 A.2d 184, 190 (1997) (recognizing that a jury is entitled to know the terms of a plea agreement between a State and its witness so that it may assess whether the witness's testimony has been influenced by bias or motive to testify falsely); cf. Napue, 360 U.S. at 270, 79 S.Ct. at 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (holding that the failure of the prosecutor to correct the false testimony of a witness relating to the absence of an inducement by the State for his testimony was prejudicial for impeachment purposes). Recently, under the dictates of Brady, this Court, in Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 768 A.2d 675 (2001), reversed a petitioner's conviction where the State failed to disclose the specific terms of its written plea agreements with two key codefendant witnesses, even where the jury had been apprised of the existence of the agreements through the testimony of the State's witnesses. Wilson, 363 Md. at 356, 768 A.2d at 687. We rejected the State's argument that its disclosure was sufficient, determining that the specific terms of the written plea agreements were favorable to Wilson's impeachment strategy and should have been disclosed. Wilson, 363 Md. at 349, 768 A.2d at 683-84. This was particularly true, the Court noted, where the witnesses' testimony concerning the terms of the agreements were inaccurate, and were then further mischaracterized by the State in closing arguments. Wilson, 363 Md. at 356, 768 A.2d at 687. Wilson is instructive in the present case. Here, while Petitioner and the jury were aware of the existence of Johnson's plea agreement in return for his testimony, the State withheld arguably related circumstances leading up to its consummation, namely, that Johnson, indeed, requested a favor, and that he refused to sign his written statement absent such a commitment. This was evidence that disputed Johnson's later testimony (and the State's trial arguments), which information would have strengthened Petitioner's assertion that Johnson had fabricated Petitioner's alleged confession in an effort to garner a benefit on outstanding charges. The State argues that Johnson's self-interest was more than adequately presented to the jurors, and that they were presented with a full picture of Johnson through his testimony. We disagree. Defense counsel was entitled to explore and argue from all of the pertinent evidence as to Johnson's bias and credibility. Suppression of this evidence deprived the jurors of a full opportunity to evaluate the credibility of Johnson's testimony, and Detective Marll's corroborating testimony, and deprived Petitioner of potentially valuable impeachment evidence. The difference in potential impeachment value of this information increased during the sentencing phase, as we discuss further infra, because of Johnson's position as the key witness to Petitioner's principalship in the murder of Wanda Johnson. Similar to Wilson, the value of the suppressed information as impeachment evidence was confirmed by the State's efforts to conceal it from Petitioner. The State offered, without correction, Johnson's testimony asserting his altruistic motives in contacting the police and repeated denials of his solicitation of a quid pro quo for the information. The State persisted in this tact by placing a police detective on the witness stand to bolster indirectly Johnson's testimony, both as to motive in giving it and in substance. The State's conduct continued in its closing arguments, at trial and sentencing, in which it extolled Johnson's credibility as a witness, knowing its own sins of omission. While it is true that Petitioner vigorously cross-examined Johnson in an attempt to discredit his testimony, and argued by inference a link between Johnson's motive in coming forward and the plea agreement, that does not necessarily vitiate any error caused by the State's failure to disclose this impeachment evidence. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 351, 768 A.2d at 684 (stating that cross-examination of a witness regarding inducement to testify does not substitute for adequate disclosure); Boone, 541 F.2d at 451 (noting that [n]o matter how good defense counsel's argument may have been, it was apparent to the jury that it rested upon conjecturea conjecture which the prosecutor disputed.). See also Martin v. State, ___ So.2d ___, ___, 2001 WL 1520631, 2001 Ala. Crim.App. Lexis 298, 21 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (likening defendant to a fighter with one hand tied behind his backthe fact that he was able to land a few punches in cross-examination with one fist did not make the match a fair one). Under the facts of this case, the State's failure to disclose the impeachment evidence violates Brady principles. 3. Material Evidence Petitioner's final obstacle in establishing a Brady violation is materiality. As this Court explained in Wilson, discussed supra, there are two different materiality standards [34] that may be applied to the analysis of suppressed exculpatory evidence. The strictest, and more defendant-friendly, Napue/Agurs standard applies in those cases where `the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and ... the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury.' Wilson, 363 Md. at 346-47, 768 A.2d at 682 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342). The Supreme Court explained in Agurs that `a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair,' accordingly, it `must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.' Id. (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342). See Napue, 360 U.S. at 272, 79 S.Ct. at 1179, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217. A different standard of materiality applies in those cases where there is no perjured testimony, but there is prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Under the Brady/Bagley materiality standard, evidence will be deemed material if `there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the case. Wilson, 363 Md. at 347, 768 A.2d at 682 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (opinion of Blackmun, J.)). See also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34, 115 S.Ct. at 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490. This Court has interpreted the Strickland reasonable probability standard to mean a `substantial possibility that ... the result of [the] trial would have been any different.' Wilson, 363 Md. at 347 n. 3, 768 A.2d at 683 n. 3 (quoting State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160, 190, 599 A.2d 1171, 1185 (1992)). See also Thomas, 325 Md. at 190 n. 8, 599 A.2d at 1185 n. 8; Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426-27, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990). This standard applies to the `no request,' `general request,' and `specific request' cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). [35] See Ware, 348 Md. at 48, 702 A.2d at 713 (noting that under Bagley, the Court no longer distinguish[es] for purposes of determining the standard of materiality among cases in which the defense made a specific request as opposed to a general request or no request at all). Petitioner asserts that the stricter standard of materiality enunciated in Napue applies under the facts of this case, arguing that the State affirmatively presented perjured testimony. Accordingly, Petitioner contends, a new trial, or at least a new sentencing, is required because there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Wilson, 363 Md. at 347, 768 A.2d at 682 (citation omitted). Petitioner alternatively argues that he is entitled to a new trial or sentencing because he meets the Brady/Bagley standard of materiality, as there was a substantial possibility that the outcome of the trial or sentencing would have been different had the withheld information been disclosed. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 347 n. 3, 768 A.2d at 683 n. 3. (citations omitted). While the Napue standard of materiality is not indicated in the present case, supra note 32, we are satisfied that Petitioner has met the stricter standard of showing materiality under Brady/Bagley. The record supports our conclusion that, had the evidence relating to Johnson's complete negotiations for a benefit been disclosed, there was a substantial possibility that the outcome would have been different. We base our conclusion on several factors this Court has used to assess materiality for purposes of suppressed impeachment evidence. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 352-55, 768 A.2d at 685-87. [36] First, Johnson was a key State's witness as to Petitioner's principalship in Wanda Johnson's murder. Principalship directly governs Petitioner's eligibility for the death penalty. See Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Art. 27, § 413(e)(1) (restricting the death penalty only to persons convicted of first degree murder as a principal in the first degree). A principal in the first degree is `one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by [an] inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent.' Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 520, 671 A.2d 495, 498 (1996) (quoting Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 510, 495 A.2d 1, 12 (1985) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Johnson's testimony concerning Petitioner's alleged confession affirmatively and directly cast Petitioner, rather than his alleged accomplice (Bradshaw), as the actual perpetrator of her murder. [37] Second, a determination of the relative significance of the suppressed evidence requires an understanding of the evidence that was presented at trial and sentencing. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 353, 768 A.2d at 685 (noting that the testimony of a codefendant witness provided the only direct link between Petitioner and the crime). The State disputes that Johnson's testimony at trial and sentencing was the only evidence of Petitioner's involvement or, as to Ms. Johnson's death, his principalship, respectively, in the murders. While that may be so, the other evidence to which the State refers is circumstantial. As indicated supra, the sentencing testimony, other than Johnson's, placed only Lawrence Bradshaw in the victim's home at the time of her murder. While there was circumstantial evidence adduced during the guilt/innocence portion of the trial that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Petitioner was a participant in her murder, it is less apparent that, absent belief of Johnson's testimony, the evidence would have been sufficient to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, Petitioner was the principal. If Johnson's testimony is to be believed, there are no inferences that need be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, either at trial or sentencing, in order to conclude that Petitioner was involved, or the shooter, in both murders. We should not be understood to hold, however, that the circumstantial evidence at trial and sentencing, exclusive of Johnson's testimony, necessarily was constitutionally insufficient for a reasonable jury to convict or render a sentence of death. We hold only that the taint of the Brady suppression matters on this record so undermines our confidence in the murder convictions and death sentence that a new trial is in order. We reject the State's argument that the jury was provided with a full picture of Johnson through the testimony at both trial and the sentencings, referring to vigorous efforts by Petitioner's lawyers to portray Johnson as a jailhouse snitch out to get a deal. For the reasons discussed supra, we cannot say that if the jury was informed of the totality of the circumstances leading up to Johnson's ultimate plea agreement, there would not be a substantial possibility that the outcome would have been different had the withheld information been disclosed. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 353, 768 A.2d at 686 (noting that Wilson's trial counsel's attempt to cross-examine the State's key witnesses was far less effective than it would have been had he possessed the written agreements that specified the terms). Finally, the State was an active participant in the `smoke and mirrors' effort to mislead the Petitioner and jury as to the full circumstances preceding and precipitating Johnson's plea agreement. As previously noted supra, the prosecutor at sentencing expressly asked Detective Marll if Johnson had at any time ever ask[ed][him] for any promises or favors in return for the information he was giving [him], deliberately eliciting Detective Marll's denial. In closing argument at trial, the prosecutor trumpeted Johnson's version of why he contacted police by claiming Johnson told the truth because it was the right thing to do. In both proceedings, the State emphasized Johnson's credibility as a witness. The importance of Johnson's credibility was evidenced by the State's efforts to argue his credibility in its last words to the jury. See Wilson, 363 Md. at 355, 768 A.2d at 687 (recognizing that the `likely damage' of the State's suppression of evidence in this case `is best understood by taking the word of the prosecutor... during closing argument.') (quoting Ware, 348 Md. at 53, 702 A.2d at 715 (citations omitted)). Applying the final test of materiality pertinent to these facts, we conclude that the State suppressed material impeachment evidence of Johnson's negotiations for a benefit. Accordingly, we reverse, based on the Brady claims, the lower court's judgment denying Petitioner post conviction relief. We remand this case to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County for a new trial. We shall not reach Petitioner's remaining issues. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WICOMICO COUNTY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS TO BE PAID BY WICOMICO COUNTY. Dissenting opinion by CATHELL, J. in which WILNER, J., joins I respectfully dissent. The majority's opinion in this third examination of Conyer's conviction ( Conyers III, I suppose) is a result looking for justification that, in actuality, does not exist. The majority's reversal is based solely on the Brady [1] issue. It does not address the remaining issues (other than those relating to waiver with which I do not take issue). The majority states: [W]e must determine whether (1) the State suppressed or withheld evidence that was (2) favorable to the Petitioner and (3) whether the suppressed evidence was material. I agree that if the evidence of Johnson's attempts to obtain favorable treatment in return for his testimony had been suppressed by the State, it was both favorable to the petitioner and material. The problem is, regardless of the majority's massive dumping of legal authority in its opinion and the discussion of perjury by the majority in a footnote, that the evidence was not suppressed or withheld in the first instance. I have no dispute about the application of Brady. The extensive discussion of that case and its progeny in the majority's opinion serves primarily to obfuscate the weakness of its factual determination in the case. The majority's reversal is based not upon the law but upon its interpretation of the facts. What is clear is that the purpose of the whole line of Brady cases is to insure that the trier of fact has before it any material impeachment (in this case) evidence. The impeachment evidence in this case was that Johnson, the witness at issue, received benefits for his testimony by way of a favorable plea bargain in respect to unrelated charges he was facing. The majority states: Here, while Petitioner and the jury were aware of the existence of Johnson's plea agreement in return for his testimony, the State withheld arguably related circumstances leading up to its consummation, namely, that Johnson, indeed, requested a favor, and that he refused to sign his written statement absent such a commitment. The favor Johnson requested was the plea agreement he received from the State and that plea agreement was made known to the jury. It is almost, I would suggest, universally understood that plea bargaining constitutes favors. Additionally, the very use of the general term bargain implies a give and take procedure where things are withheld and other things offered; some are accepted, some are rejected. When the jury was informed of the plea agreement, it, impliedly, was informed that a give and take process for Johnson's testimony had been undertaken and been consummated. Additionally, the majority's reasoning is, in my view, sophistic in nature. Parsed of extraneous material, the majority is holding that because the detective's and Johnson's testimony about their prior communications was the type of testimony that could tend to obscure the existence of a beneficial plea bargain for Johnson on his unrelated charges, the case must be reversed under Brady, even though the beneficial plea bargain was, in fact, fully disclosed to the jury. The jury was fully apprised of the possible motive of Johnson to fabricate his testimony. The purpose of the Brady holding (as applied in the impeachment context) is to insure that the jury is made aware of the motive for fabrication on the part of the witness, not to mandate that every nuance of the process from which the motive to fabricate originates be remembered and/or disclosed. Had Johnson's plea bargain not been disclosed to the jury, the dictates of the Brady line of cases would not have been met and I would join the majority. In my view, however, the requirements of Brady were met. The majority does not address the other issues. Nonetheless, were I writing for the majority of the Court, I would affirm on all issues presented. Judge WILNER has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent.