Opinion ID: 2102659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation on Cross-Examination of Victim

Text: McQuay argues his right to confront witnesses against him was violated when the trial court limited defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim regarding her relationship with another man, Andre Gandy, who was present at the party. At trial, defense counsel explained that he was trying to attack the victim's credibility because she was understating the extent of her relationship with Gandy. The trial court limited the examination into this matter, finding such evidence to be irrelevant to the issues. Defense counsel was allowed to proceed to the point of having the victim admit to certain peripheral facts that arguably impeached her credibility. She admitted that during a deposition, she testified that Gandy's name was Andre Smith and that she misstated his address. She also admitted that she had known Gandy for approximately one year before the incident, that he had taken her to the party and that she had gone to Gandy's house the next day to get some clothes even though she said she lived elsewhere. A defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation requires that he be afforded an opportunity to conduct effective cross-examination of state witnesses in order to test their believability. Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 315-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110-11, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353-55; Coates v. State (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 1087, 1095. However, this right is subject to reasonable limitations placed at the discretion of the trial judge. Id. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, the United States Supreme Court stated: It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d at 683. In McQuay's case, further inquiry into the nature of the victim's relationship with Gandy was irrelevant. In our opinion, defense counsel already had been given a sufficient opportunity to impeach the victim by pointing out inconsistencies between her testimony at the deposition and at the trial. No error was committed in not allowing the inquiry into such extraneous matters to proceed further. The trial court is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and DICKSON, JJ. concur.