Opinion ID: 213506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doctrine of Conscious Avoidance

Text: The doctrine of conscious avoidance stands for the principle that a person who deliberately shuts his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge has sufficient mens rea for an offense based on such words as `permitting,' `allowing,' `suffering' and `knowingly.' [2] Edwards, J. LL. J., The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L.REV. 294, 298 (1954). In our Circuit, a conscious avoidance charge must communicate two points: (1) that a jury may infer knowledge of the existence of a particular fact if the defendant is aware of a high probability of its existence, (2) unless the defendant actually believes that it does not exist. Kaiser, 609 F.3d at 565-66 (internal quotation omitted). While other circuits rarely have authorized the use of the instruction, see, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1222, 108 S.Ct. 2880, 101 L.Ed.2d 915 (1988), we have authorized it somewhat more readily, United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 457 (2d Cir.1993). Since adopting the conscious avoidance doctrine from English common law, American courts have balanced its application with a concern for defendants' actual beliefs. In Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 19 S.Ct. 812, 43 L.Ed. 1150 (1899), the Supreme Court first tacitly acknowledged the doctrine's legitimacy, but also recognized the improper usage of the conscious avoidance instruction deprived the defendant of his defense of honest belief. Spurr, 174 U.S. at 738-39, 19 S.Ct. 812. Later, this concern for defendants' actual beliefs was incorporated into the Model Penal Code's directive on conscious avoidance: When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1962). The Supreme Court expressed its approval of this formulation in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n. 93, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), and we require substantially similar language for a proper conscious avoidance jury instruction in our Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359, 360 (1988) (per curiam). District courts and prosecutors have been on notice for over three decades that the actual belief language must be incorporated into every conscious avoidance charge. Feroz, 848 F.2d at 361; see also United States v. Sicignano, 78 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam). The actual belief prong is critical to ensure a proper conscious avoidance jury instruction. The risk of the language's exclusion is dire because [f]ailure to include that proviso improperly permits the jury to convict a defendant who honestly believed that he was not engaging in illegal activity. Sicignano, 78 F.3d at 72. Moreover, as the proviso goes to what a defendant believes, and not what he knows or should know, the belief held by the defendant need not be reasonable in order for it to defeat a conscious avoidance theory of actual knowledge. See United States v. Catano-Alzate, 62 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ([T]he doctrine of conscious avoidance does not permit a finding of guilty knowledge if the defendant actually did not believe that he or she was involved in the transportation of drugs, however irrational that belief may have been.). In cases like this one, where a defendant relies on his lack of knowledge of a crucial fact as a central element of his defense, the actual belief language is particularly appropriate. United States v. Morales, 577 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.1975)).