Opinion ID: 6226738
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: M.R.’s use of a pseudonym

Text: {¶ 36} It is the rare exception for a litigant to be allowed to proceed anonymously. See Megless at 408. A court may excuse a plaintiff from identifying himself only when his “privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings.” Porter at 560. Courts have identified numerous factors that may be relevant to balancing a plaintiff’s privacy interests against the presumption of openness. See, e.g., Porter at 560-561, citing Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186; Sealed Plaintiff at 190. Relevant to the cases before us, two factors are at issue—threat of retaliation against the plaintiff and public disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity. {¶ 37} M.R. asked to remain anonymous based on his concern that someone had threatened to publish his personal information. Judge Shanahan found that this threat was real and could lead to an act of violence against M.R. or his family. But this potential threat against M.R. was insufficient to justify his use of a pseudonym. A plaintiff seeking to proceed anonymously for fear of retaliation must show that the filing of the lawsuit causes a risk of retaliation. See Porter, 370 F.3d at 560- 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 562; Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 190; Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186; Bruner, 2012-Ohio761, at ¶ 9. M.R. did not establish that causal connection; he did not show that any risk of harm against him or his family would increase if he were required to prosecute his lawsuit using his name. {¶ 38} Moreover, M.R. did not show that the threat of his name, address, and phone numbers being published was the sort of threat that could justify the use of a pseudonym. The Ninth Circuit has identified three factors that courts should consider when a plaintiff alleges that the use of a pseudonym is necessary to protect against a threat of retaliation: “(1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, and (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation.” (Citations omitted.) Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1068. M.R. did not show that anyone actually threatened him or his family or that his concerns are reasonable. {¶ 39} As noted in a parenthetical above, a threat to publicize someone’s name, address, and phone numbers, though potentially “offensive and disagreeable,” does not create an inherent risk of injury to that person. Cook, 472 F.Supp.3d at 335. M.R. and Judge Shanahan both cited real risks that police officers face, and they referred to current societal factors that may put law-enforcement officers at an even greater risk of harm. But these general risks do not show that M.R. “uniquely will face an increased threat of violence—above the generalized threat of violence that all police officers face—as a result of filing [his] lawsuit,” Doe v. McKesson, 322 F.R.D. 456, 458 (M.D.La.2017), vacated on other grounds sub nom. McKesson v. Doe, __ U.S. __, 141 S.Ct. 48, 208 L.Ed.2d 158 (2020); see also Doe v. McKesson, 945 F.3d 818, 835 (5th Cir.2019), fn. 12 (affirming the district court’s decision disallowing the use of a pseudonym), vacated on other grounds sub nom. McKesson v. Doe, __ U.S. __, 141 S.Ct. 48, 208 L.Ed.2d 158. {¶ 40} And finally, even if M.R. had identified a threat of harm attributable to the filing of his lawsuit, the weight of his privacy interest diminished 14 January Term, 2022 significantly when he disclosed in his complaint that on June 25, 2020, Terhas White and Alissa Gilley filed citizen complaints against him with the Citizen Complaint Authority. M.R. acknowledged that those complaints—which disclose his name—are public records. And the Enquirer referred to the citizen complaints when it published four news articles identifying M.R. by name. Thus, M.R. himself did not completely conceal his identity in filing his lawsuit and undermined his claimed right to privacy. In addition, M.R.’s attorney disclosed M.R.’s identity in open court while seeking a civil protection order on behalf of M.R.’s wife. {¶ 41} Judge Shanahan suggests that the reporting of M.R.’s identity supports the continued use of a pseudonym, because it shows that the Enquirer and Volokh know his identity and have not been harmed. The judge argues that “[t]he only practical effect of [her] order allowing M.R. to proceed pseudonymously is that a member of the public cannot glean his identity with a simple search of the clerk’s website.” But that is exactly the point—the public (not just the relators in these cases) has a right to know who is using the court. Except in rare cases, the public has a right to learn that information from the court itself. {¶ 42} Judge Shanahan has the authority to excuse M.R. from identifying himself in his complaint only if M.R.’s “privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings.” Porter, 370 F.3d at 560. M.R. failed to identify any significant privacy interest, and he undermined any privacy interest he did have by disclosing information that led to the discovery of his identity. We grant a writ of prohibition in both cases vacating Judge Shanahan’s orders and barring Judge Shanahan from allowing M.R. to proceed using a pseudonym.