Opinion ID: 159879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Webco's Motivation

Text: 25 Under Webco's thesis, it presumed the non-solicitation policy to be valid on its face and in its enforcement. As such, the company argues it acted under a good faith belief that the subject employees committed an act or acts of misconduct in the course of the violation of the non-solicitation policy. Webco contends that even if the employees were not in fact guilty of that conduct, we must consider Webco's good faith belief in and enforcement of the non-solicitation policy. 26 As to the propriety of the disciplinary actions imposed, Webco argues that the employees must establish that Webco acted with anti-union animus. Webco also contends that the events of March 1 created a chaotic situation not before seen at the plant. The company avers that the significant disruption of an important project through the employees' inattentiveness to their jobs warranted an immediate investigation of and response to the activities. 27 Webco's contention that we must consider its motivation is flatly inconsistent with NLRB v Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1964), in which the Supreme Court spoke to the requirement of a bad faith showing under 8(a)(1). In Burnup, the Court expressed concern about the example of employees who are discharged on false charges and the potential deterrent effect on other employees. Id. at 23. The Court held that an employer violates 8(a)(1) if (1) the discharged employee was at the time engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer knew it was such; (3) the basis of the discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activity; and (4) the employee was not, in fact guilty of that conduct. Id. at 23. Burnup requires no showing of the employer's anti-union hostility for the commission of an unfair labor practice. 28 Webco contends that the Supreme Court's holding in Burnup is no longer good law, and that a revised reading of Burnup will insulate the company from liability. Webco emphasizes that our application of Burnup must harmonize various changes in employment and labor law over the past three decades, specifically that the employees generally must establish proof of discriminatory intent. See Aplt's Br. at 37. The company relies on the vitality of Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Burnup, where Justice Harlan encouraged the Board to ignore an employers's motive only in a rare situation. Burnup, 379 U.S. at 25 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 29 Webco also suggests that the Supreme Court's holdings in NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), and American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), modified Burnup. This contention is misplaced. Unlike the present case, Brown and American Ship Building concerned employer lockouts. The Court held that these lockouts were not unfair labor practices, in part because the employer was not motivated by anti-union animus. However, the Brown Court, relying on Burnup, noted that an employer action that is demonstrably destructive of employee rights and is not justified by the service of significant or important business ends constitutes an unfair labor practice, notwithstanding the employer's motivation. Brown, 380 U.S. at 282. This reliance upon Burnup hardly suggests the overruling of Burnup's holding that motivation is irrelevant for mistaken employee discipline in the context of protected activities. 30 Given Burnup's continued vitality, Webco's assertions are unconvincing as they apply to the selective enforcement of Webco's non-solicitation policy in response to union solicitation. As discussed above, the record indicates that Webco knew, or should have known, that the non-solicitation policy was repeatedly violated by employees and supervisors alike. Whether Webco acted with anti-union animus when it selectively enforced the non-solicitation policy is irrelevant. 3 Our review of the incidents is best viewed on an individual employee basis.