Opinion ID: 1917626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor violated constitutional provisions requiring the separation of church and state.

Text: ¶ 8. The Board of Deacons and Griffin argue that the chancellor's judgment violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in that a civil court became involved in a ecclesiastical dispute. Their only supporting authority is the Court of Appeals decision in Mallette v. Church of God International, 789 So.2d 120 (Miss.Ct.App. 2001). In Mallette, a pastor sued the Church of God International and others for defamation after his ministerial license was revoked. 789 So.2d at 121. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Church holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred such a civil suit. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to determine if the pastor's claim was in fact barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, and the trial court again granted summary judgment. Id. On a second appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and stated the United States Supreme Court held that in accordance with the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention, civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them.... This abstention includes church-related questions of discipline, faith, rule, custom, or law. Id. at 124 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976)). ¶ 9. The Church of God International in Mallette and the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church in Milivojevich are quite different than the Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church in the instant case. Both of those aforementioned churches are hierarchical in that they are subject to a general or higher church authority. [3] Baptist churches, on the other hand, are congregational in that [e]ach church is a distinct organization, independent of others. Allen v. Roby, 109 Miss. 107, 67 So. 899, 900 (1915). Such an arrangement bears on the extent of a civil court's jurisdiction over disputes within the church or among its members. ¶ 10. This case presents an interesting situation in that it questions not the propriety or justification for dismissing a pastor but whether the court had the authority to order an election in the first place. The Ohio Court of Appeals addresses this dilemma in Tibbs v. Kendrick, 93 Ohio App.3d 35, 637 N.E.2d 397 (1994). Collecting authorities from many states, the court summarized the extent of a trial court's jurisdiction: If the church is congregational, a civil court retains jurisdiction to determine whether the decision concerning `who shall preach from the pulpit' was made by the proper church authority. The court's jurisdiction is limited to purely secular issues, and the court must not be involved in ecclesiastical issues. 637 N.E.2d at 402 (citations omitted). ¶ 11. It clear in this case that the chancellor merely established a procedure whereby the members of Pilgrim Rest could vote on whether they wanted to retain Reverend Griffin as their pastor. She did so in the absence of clear by-laws and a higher church authority. We are keenly aware, as was the chancellor in her order, of a civil court's extreme reluctance to meddle in the ecclesiastical affairs of a church and impotence to rule on matters pertaining thereto. See Stegall v. Newsom, 326 So.2d 803, 807 (Miss.1976); Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 216, 44 So.2d 52, 55 (1950). However, we cannot say that the chancellor overstepped her bounds of jurisdiction in ordering an election when doing so was secular in purpose and sanctioned by other jurisdictions. See McKinney v. Twenty-Fifth Ave. Baptist Church, Inc., 514 So.2d 837 (Ala.1987) (finding no abuse of discretion in ordering members of competing church factions to compile a list of church members eligible to vote in an election); Beulah Missionary Baptist Church v. Spann, 132 Mich.App. 118, 346 N.W.2d 911, 914 (1984) (holding that the trial court properly ordered the parties to compile a list of eligible voters not only to assure a fair election, but also to assure that any eligibility questions be resolved before the election was held.). The chancellor did not rule on whether Reverend Griffin was entitled to be pastor. See Blue v. Jones, 230 So.2d 569 (Miss.1970) (finding question of who were proper trustees, pastor and deacon of congregational church to be ecclesiastical that must be decided by congregation); Grantham v. Humphries, 185 Miss. 496, 188 So. 313 (1939) (holding that church authorities and such tribunals as they may set up for themselves are supreme in such matters. Their decision is final as to who shall be the pastor and other officers. Such disputes are ecclesiastical in their nature and the courts have no control over them.). The problem with applying Blue and Grantham is that they assume the church has a viable means of passing on such questions. It is clear that Pilgrim Rest did not. [4] ¶ 12. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized the dilemma courts face when confronted with discord within a congregational church: It is not for this court to determine who shall or shall not be members of the Mount Zion Baptist Church. It is not for this court, to dictate procedure for the church to follow. It is the function of this court, however, in these circumstances, to assure that the church itself has spoken. If it has, this court inquires no further. If it has not, this court may restore the status quo to enable the church to act. We note that this case deals with a congregational church. The situation is substantially different when a hierarchical church is involved. In that situation any judicial relief, if appropriate, would ordinarily await final determination by the highest hierarchical tribunal having jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters. Bowen v. Green, 275 S.C. 431, 272 S.E.2d 433, 435-36 (1980) (emphasis added). [5] ¶ 13. The chancellor's resolution also complies with Mississippi's Nonprofit Corporations Law. Pilgrim Rest is a religious society under the Nonprofit, Nonshare Corporations and Religious Societies Law. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-31 (2001). It is also a religious corporation [6] under the Mississippi Nonprofit Corporation Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-127(cc). In the event a corporation is unable to conduct a meeting and vote, directors, officers, delegates or members can seek assistance in chancery court pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-131 which states in pertinent part: (1) If for any reason it is impractical or impossible for any corporation to call or conduct a meeting of its members, delegates or directors, or otherwise obtain their consent, in the manner prescribed by its articles, bylaws or Sections 79-11-101 et seq., then upon petition of a director, officer, delegate, member or the Attorney General, the chancery court of the county where the corporation's principal office ... is located may order that such meeting be called or that a written ballot or other form of obtaining the vote of members, delegates or directors be authorized in such a manner as the court finds fair and adequate under the circumstances. (2) The court shall, in an order issued pursuant to this section, provide for a method of notice reasonably designed to give actual notice to all persons who would be entitled to notice of a meeting held pursuant to the articles, by-laws and Sections 79-11-101 et seq., whether or not the method results in actual notice to all such persons or conforms to the notice requirements that would otherwise apply. In a proceeding under this section the court may determine who the members or directors are. (emphasis added). Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-401, dealing with applicability of the Nonprofit Corporation Act to religious corporations, does not except Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-131. ¶ 14. We recognize the chancellor's awareness of the religious thicket [7] in which she was entangled. There is absolutely no indication of her imposing an ecclesiastical dictate on the congregation of Pilgrim Rest. On the contrary, she merely sought to establish a procedure in which the majority of the Church could be heard thereby preserving the peace. We hold that the chancellor was not hamstrung to resolve by secular and statutorily-justifiable means a dispute which could likely lead to a breach of peace.