Opinion ID: 3045882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Inapplicability of Cases in Which All

Text: Charges Were Dismissed and Courts Analyzed Whether a Malicious Prosecution Claim Could Proceed Under the Probable Cause Element In response to the reasoning set forth above, Kossler cites a case that on its face has no applicability to the one at hand: Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007). In Johnson, the plaintiff, then a parolee, was involved in an altercation with an agent of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Id. at 77. As a result of the altercation, the plaintiff was charged with 24 simple assault, aggravated assault, making terroristic threats, and reckless endangerment. Subsequently and importantly, a state court dismissed all of the charges, so – unlike the present case – there was no question that the plaintiff had satisfied the favorable termination requirement. Id. The plaintiff then initiated a § 1983 and state law action against several state actors on theories of false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding, inter alia, that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for making terroristic threats, though it did not make a probable cause determination on the other bases for the plaintiff’s arrest. Id. On the plaintiff’s first appeal, we upheld the dismissal of his original claims and expressly upheld the district court’s finding with respect to probable cause to arrest for making terroristic threats. We nevertheless remanded to allow the plaintiff to assert claims for malicious prosecution, which the district court had not allowed him to do. Id. at 77-78, 80. On remand, the plaintiff amended his complaint to add a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 and state law. Id. at 80-81. The defendants again moved for summary judgment, which the district court again granted, this time on the basis that, because we had upheld the finding of probable cause for the terroristic threats charge, the plaintiff was barred from asserting a malicious prosecution claim on any of the criminal charges. Id. at 78. The plaintiff appealed a second time. In the second appeal we framed the issue as “whether the finding that the agents had probable cause to arrest [the 25 plaintiff] on a charge of making terroristic threats without findings that they also had probable cause for his arrest on the other charges made against him defeats [the plaintiff’s] cause of action for malicious prosecution on the remaining charges.” Id. Again, the question we answered in that case was whether the finding of probable cause on one charge prevented the claim for malicious prosecution with respect to the other charges, not whether the plaintiff’s criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. Because all of the charges had been dismissed, there was no dispute that the proceeding ended favorably and thus Johnson involved an entirely different analysis than the one at issue here.7 Yet Kossler argues that we should analyze the favorable termination element exactly as we analyzed the probable cause element in Johnson. We do not agree with that approach. The favorable termination element and the probable cause element are distinct requirements that a malicious prosecution plaintiff must satisfy to prevail and therefore should not be conflated. Although Johnson employed a charge-by-charge analysis in the context of the probable cause element, it does not undermine our conclusion that the favorable termination element properly focuses on the proceeding as a whole. Because the favorable termination element was satisfied in Johnson, we were not faced with the concern that a ruling for the malicious prosecution 7 Similarly, Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991), discussed favorably by Judge Aldisert, is not on point because “all charges against [the plaintiff] were dismissed on the motion of the District Attorney.” Id. at 94. 26 plaintiff would conflict with the results of a state court decision. Thus, in Johnson, we permitted a charge-by-charge analysis on its facts in order to assuage the fear that police officers tacked on unwarranted charges. In this specific context, we allowed the plaintiff as many opportunities to show an absence of probable cause as there were charges. By contrast, watering down the favorable termination element to protect against tacking on additional charges is particularly inappropriate because it ignores the fact that a court, not simply prosecutors and their agents, has essentially endorsed the criminal proceeding. This would interfere with the “strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Unlike the favorable termination element, the probable cause element does not have the effect of undoing another court’s judgment, and therefore loosening the plaintiff’s burden on that element does not carry with it the same undesirable ramifications. In short, these are two different elements, our caselaw has so held, and thus we are cautious not to categorically apply decisions covering one element to an analysis covering another. Although we have already explained why our analysis of the favorable termination element need not mirror our approach to the probable cause element, we nonetheless note the considerable tension that exists between our treatment of the probable cause element in Johnson and our treatment of that element in the earlier case of Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005). In Wright, the plaintiff faced charges of burglary, theft, criminal trespass, and criminal mischief for 27 breaking into a house in which she alleged that she was sexually assaulted. Id. at 596-98. City police officers conducted two separate investigations concerning the break-in and the sexual assault. Id. All of the charges brought against the plaintiff were eventually dismissed, so the favorable termination element was not at issue in this case. After concluding that there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff for criminal trespass based on the information available to the officers at the time of the arrest, we held: “Even though our discussion of probable cause was limited to the criminal trespass claim, it disposes of her malicious prosecution claims with respect to all of the charges brought against her, including the burglary.” Id. at 604. Thus we determined that the existence of probable cause for the arrest – stemming from the existence of probable cause for at least one charge – precluded the plaintiff from proceeding with her malicious prosecution claim with respect to any of the charges brought against her. Despite our clear statement in Johnson that the precedential status of Wright is not diminished, 477 F.3d at 82 n.9, we recognize that the holdings of these two cases are difficult to reconcile. Notwithstanding this difficulty, Wright and Johnson both illustrate that the analysis of malicious prosecution claims involving multiple charges is a fact-intensive one. Requiring a fact-based inquiry for the favorable termination element therefore conforms with the use of a factbased inquiry revealed by those two precedents, even though Johnson and Wright are not directly applicable to the instant case. Beyond observing that the underlying facts drive the analysis of each malicious prosecution case – regardless of the element at issue – we do not rely on the approach taken in either 28 Johnson or Wright, as those cases were analyzed under the probable cause element of malicious prosecution whereas this case was analyzed under the favorable termination element.8 We reiterate that district courts need not reach the probable cause element unless they first make a finding of favorable termination after examining whether the proceeding as a whole indicates the innocence of the accused with respect to the conduct underlying all of the charges. Only if the favorable termination element is satisfied under this test must a district court engage in an analysis of the probable cause element and wrestle with the approaches set forth in Johnson and Wright to determine which provides the more appropriate framework to apply to a given set of facts. Addressing the malicious prosecution elements in this order may alleviate some of the difficulty district courts would otherwise encounter if they began their analysis with the probable cause element; however, we do not intend to suggest that the favorable termination element should always be addressed prior to the probable cause element. Because the probable cause element goes to the foundation of whether there were reasonable grounds for the 8 Even assuming arguendo that Wright and Johnson are in unavoidable conflict, “[t]his Circuit has long held that if its cases conflict, the earlier is the controlling authority and the latter is ineffective as precedents.” Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, if one of those two cases must control for purposes of analyzing the probable cause element, it would be Wright, not Johnson, that controls. 29 initiation of the criminal proceeding, district courts may find it preferable to begin their analysis of a malicious prosecution claim with this element. In the present case, the District Court chose to focus on Kossler’s inability to demonstrate that his state criminal proceeding terminated favorably, but had the District Court instead focused its analysis on whether probable cause existed, it would have reached the same ultimate conclusion that Kossler’s malicious prosecution claim could not proceed. The record reflects that Crisanti had probable cause to believe Kossler committed the offenses charged based on Crisanti’s reasonable perception of the facts and circumstances surrounding Kossler’s conduct in the parking lot outside of Donzi’s on the night of the altercation. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that probable cause exists for an arrest if “at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was committing an offense” (citations omitted)); Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that probable cause to arrest “exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that the person committed the crime at issue”). In particular, the fact that Kossler intentionally made physical contact with Crisanti after exiting a bar provided probable cause for Cristanti to believe that the charged offenses had been committed.9 Therefore, had the District Court 9 In addition, Judge Colville’s findings suggest that probable cause existed. Specifically, Judge Colville found that 30 analyzed Kossler’s claims under the third element of malicious prosecution, it would have found that the existence of probable cause precluded his action from proceeding. In sum, starting with either the favorable termination element or the probable cause element would have produced the same result that we affirm here today. IV. Because Kossler’s conviction for disorderly conduct is not indicative of his innocence of the misconduct which all three charges aimed to punish, we hold that his prior criminal proceeding did not terminate favorably to him and, consequently, his malicious prosecution action necessarily fails. Therefore, we will affirm the two orders of the District Court. ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges SLOVITER, MCKEE and AMBRO join, dissenting in part and concurring in part. Michael Kossler appeals from an order of summary judgment, entered by the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, dismissing his state and federal malicious Crisanti’s actions were reasonable because “there were a lot of people moving around and there was a lot of involvement and anger and people were drinking”; Crisanti was the only one who “ha[d]n’t been drinking all night” and he “obviously put himself at risk” trying to control a volatile situation; and Kossler did in fact intentionally “strik[e] the officer’s hand away from him.” 31 prosecution claims against Donzi’s Bar and Police Officer Steven Crisanti. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm in part and reverse in part.
To prove an action for malicious prosecution brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that the “criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003); Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000). Within this Court is a good faith disagreement as to whether Kossler has satisfied this element. The majority concludes that because Kossler was found guilty of disorderly conduct, it cannot be said that he met the “favorable termination” requirement of Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002). I disagree. My conclusion is premised on an understanding of the jurisprudential anatomy of Pennsylvania’s criminal offenses in general, and the summary offense of disorderly conduct in particular. In light of the substantial differences between a felony and a summary offense, I would not allow conviction of a summary offense to impede a malicious prosecution claim premised on acquittal of a felony, even where the two charges arose from the same incident.10 10 We note that under Pennsylvania law the summary offense of disorderly conduct is not a “lesser included” offense of aggravated assault. 32 In our current struggle to determine the proper rule of law, we must remain true to our polestar that a rule of law is a “detailed legal consequence [attached] to a definite, detailed state of facts.” Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 475, 482 (1933). In short-sleeves language this means that this case is fact-specific, limiting the issue to situations where a defendant is acquitted of a felony but convicted of the summary offense of disorderly conduct. It is beyond cavil that the criminal charges of disorderly conduct and aggravated assault emanated from the same event – an altercation that took place in a parking lot near a Pittsburgh bar. On appeal, Kossler challenges only the dismissal of his malicious prosecution claims premised on aggravated assault. Reduced to its essence, then, the issue we must decide pertaining to the favorable termination element is very limited: May we conclude that the criminal proceeding against Kossler ended in his favor where he was acquitted of aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2702, a felony, but was convicted of disorderly conduct for “engag[ing] in fighting,” 33 under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat Ann. § 5503, a summary offense? 11 My answer is yes. My reasons follow. A. Conviction of a summary offense does not “carr[y] a presumption that the underlying events leading to the conviction actually occurred,” Phoenixville Area Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 596 A.2d 889, 892 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); does not entitle a defendant to a jury trial, Rule 454(B), Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure; is inadmissible in a subsequent civil proceeding, Folino v. Young, 568 A.2d 171, 173-174 (Pa. 1990); and, in the case of disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace, does not count toward a criminal history calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).12 Summary offenses are usually punished 11 Under § 5503, the offense of disorderly conduct may also be a misdemeanor of the third degree “if the intent of the actor is to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503(b). Here, however, Kossler was convicted only of the summary offense of disorderly conduct. 12 The majority notes in response to my examination of the characteristics of summary offenses that the element of favorable termination requires disposition “‘in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused.’” See Majority Op. Section III-A (quoting Gavin, 280 F.3d at 383). I do not mean 34 “only by fine” and “justifiably should be summarily handled.” Commonwealth v. Koch, 431 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). By contrast, aggravated assault is a felony for which a term of imprisonment of more than ten years may be authorized. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2702(b), 106(b). B. I add that my views on the consequences of acquittal of a felony and conviction of a summary offense are admittedly at odds with the majority’s thoughtful analysis of the relationship between these two offenses. See Majority Op. Section III-A (“[A] finding in federal court that the defendants maliciously prosecuted Kossler for the same conduct underlying the aggravated assault . . . charge[] does indeed conflict with Kossler’s state court conviction [of the summary offense of disorderly conduct].”). Unlike my colleagues of the majority, I am impressed by and accept the reasoning of cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989), the court was faced with a scenario similar to ours – an appeal of a to suggest that conviction of a summary offense “indicates the innocence of the accused.” My suggestion is more modest: acquittal of a felony offense – which standing alone would be considered favorable termination – should not be rendered unfavorable merely because of a conviction of a summary offense, which does not carry the presumption that the underlying events leading to the conviction actually occurred. 35 denial of a malicious prosecution claim premised upon an acquittal of resisting arrest and a conviction of disorderly conduct. As a prelude to its discussion of the merits, the general comments of the court deserve our attention: Favorable termination is not so much an element of a malicious prosecution claim as it is a prerequisite to commencement of the action. See Munoz v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 6, 10, 218 N.E.2d 527, 529, 271 N.Y.S.2d 645, 649 (1966) (“It is a kind of pre-condition to the later action, the sine qua non . . . .”); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton On Torts § 119, at 874 (5th ed. 1984). The requirement of favorable termination ensures against inconsistent judgments. It also permits a finding that probable cause was lacking. Id. at 189 (internal citations omitted). I associate myself completely with Janetka’s reasoning: To hold that an acquittal does not constitute a favorable termination would be particularly inappropriate in this case, where the charge for which [the appellant] was acquitted was more serious than the one for which he was convicted. Resisting arrest is a “misdemeanor,” see N.Y.Penal Law § 205.30 (McKinney 1988), punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year, see N.Y.Penal Law § 10.00(4) (McKinney 1987). Disorderly conduct is a “violation,” see 36 N.Y.Penal Law § 240.20 (McKinney 1989), punishable by a maximum prison sentence of 15 days, see N.Y.Penal Law § 10.00(3). Allowing police officers to add unwarranted misdemeanor charges to valid violation charges may force an accused to go to trial on the misdemeanor when he otherwise would plead to the violation. If the dispositive factor is whether, as the district court held, the charge resulting in acquittal “arose out of events that occurred on the same occasion” as a charge resulting in conviction, then police officers could add unsupported serious charges to legitimate minor charges with impunity. Id. at 190. Similarly, in Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “we should not allow a finding of probable cause on [the charge of disorderly conduct] to foreclose a malicious prosecution cause of action on charges requiring different, and more culpable, behavior.” Id. at 100. Although Posr addressed the probable cause element of malicious prosecution rather than the favorable termination element at issue here, the stated rationale is significant: If the rule were [otherwise], an officer with probable cause as to a lesser offense could tack on more serious, unfounded charges which would support a high bail or lengthy detention, knowing that the probable cause on the lesser offense 37 would insulate him from liability for malicious prosecution on the other offenses. Id.13 Where there has been acquittal of a felony and conviction of a summary offense of disorderly conduct arising out of the same event, this constitutes the necessary favorable termination element of a subsequent malicious prosecution claim.
My analysis of the favorable termination element, however, does not end my analysis of this case. To prove malicious prosecution, Kossler must also show that “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; . . . (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d at 521.14 13 Of course, there is an obvious distinction between the terms “lesser offense” and “lesser included offense.” 14 The fifth requirement is unique to malicious prosecution claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 38 Donzi’s contends that it did not initiate the proceeding, and the District Court dismissed the malicious prosecution claims against Donzi’s on this alternate ground. Kossler predicates his malicious prosecution claims against Donzi’s on vicarious liability. This Court has held: A defendant in a [federal] civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). Because Kossler does not allege participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence on the part of Donzi’s, I would affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Kossler’s federal malicious prosecution claim against Donzi’s and, in this respect, express my agreement with the majority. But I cannot go further. A. Unlike the federal malicious prosecution claims, it appears that liability for malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law may be imposed on the basis of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Butler v. Flo-Ron Vending Co., 557 A.2d 730, 737 (Pa. Super. 1989); Randall v. Fenton Storage Co., 182 39 A. 767, 768 (Pa. Super. 1936); Riddell v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 80 Pa. Super. 176 (1922). Donzi’s contends that Crisanti did not initiate the criminal proceeding against Kossler, and relies on Gatter v. Zappile, 67 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D. Pa. 1999), where the district court dismissed a malicious prosecution claim against two police officers, observing, “Generally, it is the prosecutor, not the police officer, who is responsible for initiating a proceeding against a defendant.” Id. at 521. The court in Gatter, however, proceeded to explain that “[a]n officer may . . . be considered to have initiated the criminal proceeding if he or she knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the prosecutor’s informed discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The facts of this case can be distinguished from those of Gatter, where the two police officer defendants “had no input into the decision to prosecute Gatter . . . .” Id. Here, the argument is that Crisanti, the police officer, did in fact file criminal charges. Kossler alleges that “Crisanti, although he did not have probable cause or any reasonable suspicion to believe that Michael Kossler had committed the criminal offenses of aggravated assault and public intoxication, nevertheless filed criminal charges against Kossler for such criminal offenses.” App. 37a. The District Court entered summary judgment against Kossler. Drawing all inferences in favor of Kossler, however, I am unable to agree that no genuine issue of fact exists (a) as to whether Crisanti initiated the proceedings against Kossler and (b) whether Crisanti was no longer acting in the scope of his employment with Donzi’s when he initiated the proceedings 40 against Kossler. These are issues for a fact-finder proceeding and are not appropriate for resolution at summary judgment.