Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Glathe

Text: Defendant contends the admission of the testimony of psychiatrist Dr. John P. Glathe regarding statements made to him by defendant violated the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges and defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Prior to defendant's first trial, the court appointed Dr. Glathe at the request of defense counsel. The appointment was made under Evidence Code section 1017, which provides that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies when the psychotherapist is appointed by the court to advise the defendant's lawyer regarding defendant's emotional or mental condition for the purpose of determining whether to raise insanity or some other mental defense. ( See Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 179, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) No type of mental defense was presented at defendant's first trial, and Dr. Glathe did not testify at that trial. ( Ibid. ) In the subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, one of the claims made by defendant was that his trial attorney, Mr. Parrish, failed to research adequately the facts and the law regarding the availability of a diminished capacity defense. The referee who conducted the habeas corpus hearing ordered defendant, over his objection, to provide to the prosecution Dr. Glathe's report and notes. At the hearing on the habeas corpus petition, the prosecution called Dr. Glathe as a witness, and his report was admitted into evidence. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 194, fn. 5, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) The report does not mention any confession by defendant, but Dr. Glathe testified at the hearing that defendant told him he had committed the charged offenses. ( Id. at p. 205, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) One of the defense experts, Dr. Evans, testified at the present trial that she had read portions of the transcripts of the hearing in the habeas corpus proceeding as well as this court's decision in Ledesma I. That decision quotes the full text of Dr. Glathe's report and includes a summary of Dr. Glathe's testimony at the habeas corpus hearing that references defendant's confession. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 194, fn. 5, & p. 205, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Evanswithout objectionwhether she was aware that defendant had confessed to Dr. Glathe. She testified that she was, but that defendant told her he was innocent. She commented further that Dr. Glathe had not performed any psychological tests and that the information he had was inadequate. Another defense expert, Dr. Clark, also had read this court's decision in Ledesma I. When the prosecutor attempted to cross-examine him concerning his awareness of defendant's confession to Dr. Glathe, defense counsel objected, arguing that defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe were privileged. Defense counsel objected to any reference to Dr. Glathe's report, on the grounds that defendant's statements to him were protected by the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges, and that the prosecution should not be able to benefit from any evidence produced at the habeas corpus hearing, because it was produced as a consequence of the ineffective representation provided by Attorney Parrish at the first trial. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could question the experts concerning their awareness of defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe, and could ask them hypothetical questions regarding the confession, but that the statements could not be considered for their truth unless Dr. Glathe testified. [12] Subsequently, defense counsel asked defense expert Dr. Rosenthal whether, if defendant had made a confession to a doctor, such a statement might be an example of his bragging or attempting to bolster himself. Dr. Rosenthal testified that it might be, and that making a shocking claim could be a way for defendant to accord himself a sense of power in a relationship with a person in authority. Defense counsel questioned Dr. Rosenthal concerning the statement in Dr. Glathe's report that defendant had exhibited an inappropriately macho affect. Dr. Rosenthal had read Dr. Glathe's report, and had testified about it at the habeas corpus hearing in 1985. In Dr. Rosenthal's opinion, Dr. Glathe's statement in the report that defendant probably was sane at the time of the crime was an indication that more work needed to be done before a conclusion could be reached on that issue. The prosecutor called Dr. Glathe to testify in rebuttal. The trial court heard further argument and ruled that his testimony was admissible. Dr. Glathe, consulting his notes from his one-hour interview with defendant in October of 1979, testified that defendant told him that at the time of the offense, he had been laid off from work and had broken up with his girlfriend. According to Dr. Glathe, defendant told him that he got the notion to commit an armed robbery. He robbed a gas station attendant of $60.00 and used the money to purchase the drug PCP. He warned the victim he would kill him if he reported the crime. Thereafter he received an anonymous phone call informing him that the police were looking for him. Dr. Glathe recounted defendant's assertions that he had not covered the license plate on his motorcycle and that one week after the robbery, he went back to the gas station and kidnapped the victim, took him to Watsonville, shot him in the head, back, and chest, and stabbed him. Dr. Glathe also testified that defendant stated, If I get the death penalty, I get it, I will hang myself first rather than give them the pleasure. At the time defendant made his statements to Dr. Glathe, they were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. (Evid.Code, § 1017; People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d 583, 621, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) But under the patient-litigant exception, the psychotherapist-patent privilege was lost when defendant put his mental and emotional state in issue at trial. (Evid.Code, § 1016.) Because Dr. Glathe conducted a confidential interview of defendant for the purpose of assisting defense counsel in the preparation and presentation of a defense, defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe also were protected by the attorney-client privilege unless that privilege was waived or an exception applied. ( People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 510, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) There is no client-litigant exception to the attorney-client privilege that is comparable to the patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. ( Id. at p. 514, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793; Evid.Code, § 1016.) The attorney-client privilege continues to protect a defendant's statements to a defense psychiatrist even if the defendant tenders a mental defense. ( Lines, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 514, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) The Attorney General argues that Dr. Glathe's testimony nevertheless was admissible because defendant waived all privileges when, in the habeas corpus proceeding, defendant claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate and present a diminished capacity defense. (See In re Gray (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 614, 615-617, 176 Cal.Rptr. 721.) Evidence Code section 958 provides that there is no privilege as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by client, of a duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship. Thus, for example, if the defendant in a criminal action claims that his lawyer did not provide him with an adequate defense, communications between the lawyer and client relevant to that issue are not privileged. (Recommendation Proposing an Evidence Code (Jan.1965) 7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1965) p. 176; see In re Gray, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 616, 176 Cal.Rptr. 721.) The exception established in section 958 was intended precisely for the type of situation that occurred at defendant's habeas corpus hearing. Defendant does not dispute that the attorney-client privilege was lost for purposes of the habeas corpus proceeding but contends that his statements to Dr. Glathe remained privileged for other purposes, including the retrial. Generally, a waiver of the privilege for purposes of one proceeding is applicable to all subsequent proceedings. ( People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1005, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [because the defendant waived attorney-client privilege by calling psychiatrist to testify during a suppression hearing, the defendant's statements to psychiatrist could be used to impeach other experts who testified at trial]; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 243, 276 Cal.Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323 [because the defendant waived privilege by calling psychiatrist to testify at first penalty trial, psychiatrist could testify regarding the defendant's admissions at penalty retrial].) Strictly speaking, however, Evidence Code section 958 establishes an exception to the privilege, not a waiver. A waiver occurs if the holder of the privilege discloses the communication or consents to disclosure by another, without coercion, or fails to claim the privilege in a proceeding in which he or she has the opportunity to do so. (Evid.Code, § 912, subd. (a).) Defendant asserted the privilege in the habeas corpus hearing, but the referee ruled that communications to Dr. Glathe were not privileged under Evidence Code section 958. The question presented here is whether the applicability of the section 958 exception in the habeas corpus proceeding rendered the privilege inapplicable in all further proceedings, including the retrial. This court has not previously had the occasion to address that question. Defendant relies on People v. Dennis (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 874-876, 223 Cal.Rptr. 236 ( Dennis ), which concluded that a defendant must be granted use immunity for disclosures he makes in support of a motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. [13] Dennis held that because the information a defendant would be required to disclose in support of a new trial motion might lighten the prosecution's burden in bringing about a conviction upon a new trial, the defendant should be granted use immunity for the material disclosed. Dennis relied upon the reasoning of a number of decisions by this court granting use immunity in other contexts in which it would be unfair to require the defendant to choose between maintaining a privilege and asserting other important rights. For example, in People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024, we concluded that when a defendant is subject to probation revocation proceedings upon grounds that are also the basis for criminal charges, his testimony at the revocation proceedings is inadmissible at a subsequent trial on the criminal charges (except to rebut inconsistent testimony by the defendant in the criminal trial). We recognized that the public interest in informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions would be furthered if the probationer were not discouraged from speaking freely at such proceedings. ( Id. at p. 874, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024.) On the other hand, the prosecution's burden to prove guilt at a criminal trial without requiring the defendant to incriminate himself would be lightened if the prosecution, simply by moving to revoke probation before the criminal trial, could attempt to force the probationer into making incriminatory statements at the revocation proceeding. ( Id. at p. 876, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024.) We concluded that to force an individual to choose among the unpalatable alternatives of self-accusation, perjury, or silence at the probation hearing in order to protect his or her constitutional right not to incriminate oneself at the criminal proceedings runs counter to our historic aversion to cruelty reflected in the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Id. at p. 878, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024.) Similarly, in Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 586-589, 102 Cal.Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079, we held that a minor's statements made in connection with juvenile court proceedings cannot be used against him at a subsequent criminal trial after he has been found unfit for treatment as a juvenile. We reasoned, in part, that the minor should not be put to the unfair choice of being considered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 587-588, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079; see also In re Wayne J. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602, 156 Cal.Rptr. 344, 596 P.2d 1 [admissions made to a probation officer at a required postdetention interview may not be used at the minor's juvenile court jurisdiction hearing]; People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991, 999-1000, 88 Cal.Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961 [use immunity applied to the defendant's discussion of case details with a probation officer after conviction].) Although few courts have addressed the issue directly, the weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports the reasoning of Dennis, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 223 Cal.Rptr. 236. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the policy inherent in the legislative recognition and judicial enforcement of the attorney-client privilege, as it implicates a defendant's exercise of the right to effective assistance of counsel and to freedom from compelled self-incrimination, restricts the use as well as the scope of permitted disclosures. Just as an attorney may not respond to allegations of ineffectiveness by disclosing confidences unrelated to such allegations, so the client confidences properly disclosed by an attorney at an ineffectiveness hearing may not be imported into the client's subsequent trial on criminal charges. ( Com. v. Chmiel (1999) 558 Pa. 478, 738 A.2d 406, 424.) A Missouri appellate court reached a similar conclusion, holding that a defendant's testimony at a postconviction hearing challenging his conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be admitted against him when he was retried. ( State v. Samuels (Mo.App. 1998) 965 S.W.2d 913.) Samuels relied upon the reasoning of Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247. In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's testimony at a pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress evidence of an illegal search could not be used against him at trial. The high court reasoned that a defendant should not be forced to surrender his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself in order to protect his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Missouri court similarly reasoned that a defendant should not be forced to choose between enforcing his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. ( Samuels, supra, 965 S.W.2d at p. 919; see also Waldrip v. Head (2000) 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 [defendant waived attorney-client privilege as to documents relevant to claims of ineffective assistance, but disclosure of such documents should be limited to the purpose of rebutting claim of ineffectiveness].) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly has held, in an en banc decision, that in federal habeas corpus proceedings the petitioner's waiver of the attorney-client privilege arising from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel extends only to litigation of the petition. ( Bittaker v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 715.) Bittaker upheld a district court's order precluding the disclosure of privileged attorney-client materials for any purpose other than litigating the federal habeas corpus petition. The court could conceive of no federal interest in enlarging the scope of the waiver beyond what is needed to litigate the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in federal court. ( Id. at p. 722.) On the other hand, [a] broad waiver rule would no doubt inhibit the kind of frank attorney-client communications and vigorous investigation of all possible defenses that the attorney-client and work product privileges are designed to promote. ( Ibid. ) Furthermore, [t]he fortuity that defendant's initial trial was constitutionally defective gives the prosecution no just claim to the lawyer's case file or testimony. To the contrary, allowing the prosecution at retrial to use information gathered by the first defense lawyerincluding defendant's statements to his lawyerwould give the prosecution a wholly gratuitous advantage. ( Id. at p. 724.) We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive. We have recognized that in some circumstances the attorney-client privilege may apply even when the communications at issue have been disclosed in another context and are no longer confidential. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d 583, 620-621, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127 [although defense psychologist properly disclosed communications to third parties to avert potential danger to them, thereby eliminating the psychotherapist-patient privilege, attorney-client privilege nevertheless applied].) In Clark, we noted that the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to promote the therapeutic relationship, a purpose that can no longer be achieved once the therapist has revealed the confidential communications to third parties. ( Id. at p. 621, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) In contrast, however, we found no provision in the Evidence Code that reflected an intent that the attorney-client privilege terminate if a communication to an attorney is made public without a waiver of confidentiality by the client. ( Ibid. ) The attorney-client privilege exists to permit a client to freely and frankly reveal confidential information, including past criminal conduct, to the attorney or others whose purpose is to assist the attorney, and to thereby enable the attorney to adequately represent the client. [Citation.] In a criminal case the privilege also serves to preserve the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination . . . . To make adequate representation possible, therefore, these privileges assure criminal defendants that confidential statements to their attorney will not be admissible in any proceeding. ( Id. at p. 620, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127, fn. omitted.) The purpose of the exception to the attorney-client privilege established by Evidence Code section 958 is to avoid the injustice of permitting a client either to accuse his attorney of a breach of duty and to invoke the privilege to prevent the attorney from bringing forth evidence in defense of the charge or to refuse to pay his attorney's fee and invoke the privilege to defeat the attorney's claims. (7 Cal. Law Revision. Com. Rep., supra, p. 176.) That purpose was fully met when Dr. Glathe was permitted to testify for the prosecution at the habeas corpus hearing. To interpret section 958 as abolishing the privilege for all purposes in this context would raise serious questions as to whether section 958 conflicts with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that the privilege is intended to promote. Furthermore, in a case such as this, in which the defendant successfully established that his previous attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, the disclosure of confidential communications at the habeas corpus hearing can be attributed to the attorney's ineffective assistance. The admission of those communications at a retrial may be viewed as a further consequence of the violation of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. (Cf. People v. Karlin, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 227, 41 Cal.Rptr. 786 [the defendant's admissions made at preliminary hearing, when his attorney had a conflict of interest, could not be used at his subsequent trial].) In light of these serious constitutional concerns, we conclude the attorney-client privilege continues to apply for purposes of retrial after otherwise privileged matters have been disclosed in connection with habeas corpus proceedings, under Evidence Code section 958. Nevertheless, we agree with the Attorney General's alternative argument that the privilege was waived at trial when the defense presented the testimony of expert witnesses who had reviewed and considered Dr. Glathe's report and prior testimony. Both Dr. Evans and Dr. Clark testified that they had reviewed this court's decision in Ledesma I, which included the complete text of Dr. Glathe's report and referred to defendant's confession to Dr. Glathe. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 195, fn. 5, 205, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Dr. Evans had reviewed a transcript of the hearing in the habeas corpus proceeding, which included Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's confession to him, and the prosecution cross-examined her about defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe without objection. An expert witness may be cross-examined as to the matter upon which his or her opinion is based and the reasons for his or her opinion. (Evid. Code § 721, subd. (a).) The scope of cross-examination permitted under section 721 is broad, and includes examination aimed at determining whether the expert sufficiently took into account matters arguably inconsistent with the expert's conclusion. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 712, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [under Evidence Code section 721, subd. (a), expert who was familiar with the defendant's juvenile record could be cross-examined about it to determine whether he took it into account in forming his opinion].) Once the defendant calls an expert to the stand, the expert loses his status as a consulting agent of the attorney, and neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work-product doctrine applies to matters relied on or considered in the formation of his opinion. ( People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 241, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669; compare People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 604-606, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081 [prosecutor's cross-examination of testifying defense experts about prior examinations of the defendant by nontestifying defense experts violated work-product privilege, when testifying experts were not aware of the earlier examinations].) In People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007 ( Combs ) we recognized that the prosecution is entitled to cross-examine an expert concerning an otherwise privileged report considered by the expert in formulating his or her opinion. In Combs, a psychiatrist, Dr. Oshrin, examined the defendant and provided a report to defense counsel. ( Id. at p. 862, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Although Dr. Oshrin did not testify, the prosecutor was permitted to cross-examine two other defense experts concerning Dr. Oshrin's report. Both doctors had read and considered Dr. Oshrin's report and relied upon portions of it in forming their opinions. ( Id. at p. 863, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) We rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in requiring the defense to provide a copy of Dr. Oshrin's report to the prosecution, noting that, contrary to the defendant's contention, the defendant voluntarily had furnished Dr. Oshrin's report to the prosecutor during the examination of another defense expert, Dr. Crinella. This court presume[d] that defense counsel provided Dr. Oshrin's report because he knew that the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Dr. Crinella about its contents. ( Id. at p. 862, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) The defendant in Combs also argued that allowing the prosecutor to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness violated the attorney-client privilege. Although we concluded that the defendant had forfeited the issue by failing to assert the attorney-client privilege at trial, we addressed the merits of the claim, stating that [d]efendant waived any protections that the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, and the privilege against self-incrimination afforded him regarding all matters that [the testifying defense experts] considered or on which they relied, including Dr. Oshrin's report. ( Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 864, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) We rejected the defendant's argument that the defense experts could be cross-examined only as to those portions of Dr. Oshrin's report that they had adopted and relied upon. ( Id. at pp. 893-894, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Furthermore, because the defendant waived all privileges regarding Dr. Oshrin's report, the prosecutor was free to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness and to question him about that report. ( Id. at p. 864, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Likewise, in the present case, defendant waived the protections of the attorney-client privilege as to his statements to Dr. Glathe by presenting the testimony of experts who had reviewed and considered Dr. Glathe's report and his testimony at the habeas corpus hearing. [14]
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's confession to him could be considered for the truth of the matter and as evidence of guilt. The trial court did not formally instruct the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony could be considered as evidence of guilt, but did make statements in the jury's presence indicating that the testimony had been admitted for that purpose. During the cross-examination of Dr. Glathe, defense counsel asked the court whether it was correct that what the witness had been told by defendant had not been received for the truth of the matter stated. The court, in the presence of the jury, replied, No, it has been offered for the truth of the matter stated. Later during the cross-examination, the court sustained an objection to a question asked by defense counsel that may have appeared to relate to the witness's opinion concerning whether defendant had been telling him the truth. The court explained its ruling as follows: The doctor has testified to a statement made by the defendant. . . . [B]ut it's for the jury to determine whether or not that statement is to be believed. . . . [I]t's the truth or falsity of the statement that is in question and this witness cannot help us on that. Defendant asserts that the court's comments were erroneous, because under In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33 ( Spencer ) defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe could be considered only as the basis for his expert opinion. We have stated, It is well settled that an expert's testimony as to a defendant's incriminating statements may not be regarded as proof of the facts described in such statements. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1327, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221, citing People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 and Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d 400, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) This rule derives from our decision in Spencer. Spencer held that a defendant may be examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist without the presence of his attorney, but established two safeguards in order to protect the defendant's right to counsel: First, the psychiatrist may not testify unless the defendant puts his or her mental state in issue. Second, if the psychiatrist testifies, the jury must be instructed that any incriminating statements made to him or her by the defendant may be considered only as the basis for an opinion, and not for the truth of the matters stated. ( Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 412-413, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) Even if Spencer is applicable (and, as discussed below, we conclude it is not), defendant has forfeited any claim that the trial court's comments were erroneous, because he did not request an instruction that Dr. Glathe's testimony could be considered only for the limited purpose of evaluating the basis of the experts' opinions. The trial court is not required to give the limiting instruction prescribed by Spencer in the absence of a request. ( People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d 672, 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256.) Defendant argues that the issue has not been forfeited because any request for a limiting instruction would have been futile. We disagree. The trial court did indicate in response to defense counsel's questions that the testimony was admissible for its truth, but defense counsel never argued that it could be admitted only for a limited purpose under Spencer. Rather, counsel argued that Dr. Glathe could not testify at all, because of the attorney-client privilege. Defense counsel also objected to Dr. Glathe's testifying on the ground that his testimony should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative, and as cumulative. Defense counsel did not argue that the testimony, if admitted, could be admitted for a limited purpose. Even if the issue had not been forfeited, we would find no error, because Spencer applies when the defendant's admissions are made to an expert who has been appointed to report to the court, but not when the defendant's admissions are made to an expert appointed to assist defense counsel. Spencer required a limiting instruction when an expert who was appointed by the court to examine the defendant testified regarding the defendant's mental state. Spencer acknowledged that under Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, the defendant has a right to have counsel present at such an examination, but that such presence may largely negate the value of the examination. ( Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 411, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) The court concluded that the presence of counsel at such a psychiatric examination is not constitutionally required so long as certain safeguards are afforded to defendant. ( Id. at p. 412, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) These safeguards include the following: (1) before submitting to an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist, the defendant must be represented by counsel or must waive that right; (2) counsel must be informed of the appointment of the psychiatrist; (3) if the defendant does not place his or her mental state in issue, the psychiatrist should not be permitted to testify; and (4) if the psychiatrist does testify, the court should instruct the jurors that the psychiatrist's testimony as to defendant's incriminating statements should not be regarded as proof of the truth of the facts disclosed by such statements and that such evidence may be considered only for the limited purpose of showing the information upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion. ( Id. at p. 412, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) These safeguards are sufficient to justify the exclusion of counsel from the psychiatric examination and at the same time avoid a deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights. ( Id. at p. 413, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) Under this formulation, a defendant's constitutional rights are amply protected, while the court, the prosecution, and the defendant will obtain the benefit of the testimony of an impartial psychiatrist as to defendant's mental condition. ( Ibid. ) Spencer's rationale is inapplicable when the psychiatrist is appointed to assist the defense and the communications between defendant and the psychiatrist are, hence, protected by the attorney-client privilege. When, as in the present case, the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense and operates under the attorney-client privilege, the state has not interfered in any way with the defendant's right to counsel. The defendant and his or her attorney may decide whether the attorney should be present when the psychiatrist interviews the defendant and may decide whether or not to use the results of the examination at trial. Even if the defendant places his or her mental state in issue, the defendant does not thereby waive the attorney-client privilege. ( People v. Lines, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 514, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) The psychiatrist may testify only if the defendant calls the psychiatrist as a witness or waives the privilege in some other manner. Defendant cites this court's decision in People v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607 ( Morse ) for the proposition that the safeguards set out in Spencer apply even when the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense. Morse sometimes has been cited for that proposition, and on occasion we have assumed that Spencer does apply to defense psychiatric experts. ( See, e.g., People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1008, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [jury was admonished not to consider statements made by defendant to defense psychiatrist for the truth of their contents; defendant's claim that evidence was misused for its substance was rejected]; People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d 672, 683-684 & fn. 2, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 [finding no error in the court's failure to give a limiting instruction under Spencer, because the defendant had not requested one when three psychiatrists, called by the defense (one of whom had been selected by the defendant's counsel to advise the defense), testified concerning the defendant's incriminating statements]; see also People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 167, fn. 7, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480 [trial court admonished jury to consider defense expert's testimony concerning the defendant's admissions only as bearing on his opinion and not as evidence of guilt].) Nevertheless, Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d 711, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607, does not hold that the Spencer safeguards apply whenever the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense. In Morse, a psychiatrist testified for the defense and gave an opinion concerning the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. During cross-examination, the psychiatrist admitted he had reviewed a transcript of an interview between the defendant and police officers. The trial court previously had ruled this interview inadmissible because it was conducted in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to question the psychiatrist about several of the statements made by the defendant during the police interview but admonished the jury that it could consider those statements only for the purposes of testing the psychiatrist's credibility and opinion. ( Id. at p. 725, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) On appeal the defendant argued that, because the interview had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, it could not form the basis of cross-examination without infringing upon those same rights. ( Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 725, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) Analogizing to Spencer, this court rejected the defendant's argument, because the jury had been admonished to consider the statements only for the purpose of impeaching the expert and not for their substance. ( Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d. at p. 726, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) This court indicated that the circumstances that the psychiatrist involved was appointed specifically to aid the defense, and that there were other differences between the two cases, do not render our Spencer rationale inapplicable. ( Ibid. ) In both situations the defendant's interview with the court-appointed psychiatrist without the presence of counsel in Spencer, and the defense experts' consideration of the defendant's statements to the police made without counsel in Morse defense counsel has consented to the use of incriminating statements for the purpose of psychiatric evaluation. . . . In either situation the defense can have no cause for complaint when the incriminating statements are brought to light as one of the bases of the expressed opinion, provided of course that the proper limiting instruction has been given. ( Ibid. ) The Spencer rationale that applied in Morse was Spencer's conclusion that a defendant's right to counsel is not violated if a limiting instruction is given. A violation of the defendant's right to counsel in Morse occurred because he was interviewed by the police without his counsel being present, not because he was interviewed by the defense psychiatrist without his counsel being present. Morse does not support the proposition that the defendant's right to counsel, or any other constitutional right, is violated when a defense psychiatrist testifies concerning statements made to him or her by the defendant. Neither Spencer nor Morse supports the conclusion that a limiting instruction must be given even when the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is not at issue. Accordingly, the trial court was not required by Spencer to instruct the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's statements could not be considered as proof of the truth of the matter stated. [15] Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the absence of a limiting instruction denied defendant a fair trial. Defendant's confessions to other witnesses already were properly before the jury. It was permissible for the jury to consider the fact that defendant made a confession to Dr. Glathe for the nonsubstantive purpose of rebutting the defense experts' theory that his similar confessions to other witnesses were false. Under these circumstances, a limiting instruction would have had little or no effect. ( People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 [absence of a limiting instruction required by Spencer did not deny the defendant a fair trial when incriminating statements he made to psychiatrists were essentially the same as those he made to other witnesses].)
Defendant further asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Glathe's testimony under Evidence Code section 352, asserting that it was more prejudicial than probative. We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 134, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164.) The evidence was relevant to rebut defendant's assertions that he had not confessed to other witnesses or that in doing so he was merely bragging. Defendant contends the jury could not properly evaluate whether Dr. Glathe's testimony related a true or false confession without considering the context in which defendant's statement was made, including the ineffective assistance of prior counsel, and that such consideration could not be accomplished without undue prejudice. The question of whether defendant's confessions were false was fully litigated, however. Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Glathe concerning his failure to conduct further psychological tests or explore the truth or falsity of the confession, and Dr. Glathe admitted thathad he been aware defendant had a pattern of telling stories and had brain damagethose circumstances might have affected his expert opinion. Defense expert Dr. Rosenthal testified that defendant could have made a false confession to Dr. Glathe as a means of establishing power in a relationship with an authority figure. We find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant argues alternatively that Dr. Glathe's testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 804, because Dr. Glathe was defendant's agent within the meaning of that statute. Subdivision (a) of section 804 provides that if an expert witness testifies that his opinion is based in whole or in part upon the opinion or statement of another person, such other person may be called and examined by any adverse party as if under cross-examination concerning the opinion or statement. Section 804 does not apply if the person upon whose opinion the expert relied is identified with a party, a term that includes someone who is an agent of the party. (Evid.Code, §§ 804, subd. (b), 776, subd. (a).) Defendant's argument is misplaced. Evidence Code section 804 governs the manner of examination; it permits a party to cross-examine the expert even though the expert is the party's own witness. (See 7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, p. 152.) The circumstance that section 804 does not apply if the expert is an agent of a party does not preclude calling the expert as a witness; that circumstance simply signifies that the examination is governed by other applicable statutes. (See, e.g., Evid.Code, § 776 [authorizing a party or person identified with a party to be called as a witness by an adverse party, but requiring that counsel for the party who is the witness or is identified with the witness examine the witness as if on redirect examination]; 7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, p. 1221 [noting that language of Evidence Code section 1203, subdivision (b), which is identical to the relevant language of Evidence Code section 804, subdivision (b), would prohibit counsel for a party from examining his or her own client as if under cross-examination].)