Opinion ID: 695854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McWilliams

Text: 16 McWilliams has contended on appeal that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of Duke, the key government witness, and has claimed that he was thereby deprived of his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. A trial judge has broad discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination. United States v. Caudle, 606 F.2d 451, 458 (4th Cir.1979). However, the trial court does not have discretion to curtail cross-examination until after the questioner has had a reasonable chance to pursue the matter raised on direct. Id. at 459. Thus, the trial judge's discretion to limit cross-examination does not come into play until a party has had at least some opportunity to delve into an issue. See id. 17 Duke was called as a witness at McWilliams' trial. After being questioned on the stand regarding his plea agreement, Duke was asked by the prosecution, Do you have any other criminal convictions, Mr. Duke?, to which he replied, No sir, I don't. During a bench conference, the defense stated that it wished to introduce Duke's 1991 juvenile delinquency adjudication for burglary of a habitat, for which Duke had successfully completed probation and was discharged. The defense argued that the prosecution had opened the door to the introduction of the adjudication by asking about Duke's prior convictions, but the prosecution pointed out that the question on direct examination had only addressed convictions, which the juvenile adjudication was not. The judge did not allow cross-examination on the juvenile adjudication, finding that such an adjudication was not considered a conviction and that the prosecution had not opened the door to such questioning by asking solely about convictions. In addition, taking into account Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, the court felt that it would be misleading to the jury to allow cross-examination on the topic. The defense has argued on appeal that evidence of the juvenile adjudication should have been admissible either (1) under FRE 608(b) as specific instances of conduct, or (2) to contradict Duke's direct testimony. 18 Under FRE 608(b), 19 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, .... may ... in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.... 20 The defense has contended that although Rule 609(d) states that [e]vidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule  (emphasis added), evidence of the facts underlying Duke's juvenile adjudication could be admitted under Rule 608(b) as specific instances of conduct. However, since the defense did not raise a Rule 608(b) argument in the district court, and the court did not have the opportunity to address the merits of such an argument, we decline to reach the defendant's Rule 608(b) claim, since no plain error has been committed. See United States v. Reedy, 990 F.2d 167, 168 n. 2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 210 (1993); see also Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52(b). 21 McWilliams' next argument in support of the admissibility of the juvenile adjudication is that evidence that is otherwise inadmissible may become admissible to contradict a witness' direct testimony. FRE 609(d) provides: 22 Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 23 McWilliams has asserted that the juvenile adjudication should have been admissible to contradict Duke's testimony on direct examination that he had no prior convictions. He has contended that by asking Duke about convictions, the prosecution opened the door to questions regarding Duke's other adjudications. McWilliams has further argued that the distinction between a conviction and a juvenile adjudication is technically fine. 24 We note that the distinction between convictions and juvenile adjudications is sufficiently important to have warranted explicit mention both in FRE 609 and in the case law. See, e.g., United States v. LeBlanc, 612 F.2d 1012, 1013 (6th Cir.) (assignment to youthful trainee status for larceny from a building, calling for one year's probation, was not considered a conviction under Rule 609), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 570-71 (2d Cir.1975) (youthful offender adjudications are not considered criminal convictions), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976). However, we agree with McWilliams that, under certain circumstances, the admission of juvenile adjudication evidence is warranted. In Canniff, the Second Circuit held that the admission of a question posed by the prosecution during trial regarding a youthful offender adjudication did not constitute error requiring reversal, in part because the witness' counsel had opened the door to such an inquiry by eliciting a statement from him that he had no prior convictions. 1 The court stated: 25 Although a youthful offender adjudication may not normally be used to impeach a witness, the attempt to do so in the present case does not require reversal. In the first place, the witness' own counsel, by eliciting from [the witness] that he had never been convicted of a crime, opened the door to the inquiry. Despite the distinction between a conviction and a youthful offender adjudication, it would be unfair to the government to permit a defendant who had been adjudicated a youthful offender to create the erroneous impression that he was lily-white by implying to the jury, which cannot be expected to draw such fine distinctions, that he had never committed any offense at all. 26 Canniff, 521 F.2d at 570 (citations omitted). Although the facts of Canniff differ from those of the instant case, the principles expressed in Canniff apply to the situation at hand. Duke was able, through the prosecution's question regarding prior convictions, to give the jury the impression that he had never committed another illegal act. The jury cannot be expected, without some explanation, to realize that a carefully worded question concerning convictions does not rule out other possible offenses. We find the reasoning of Canniff persuasive, and hold that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to permit questions relating to Duke's juvenile adjudication. 27 However, the court's ruling constituted harmless error. See United States v. Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir.1994) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 950 (1995). In deciding whether a constitutional error was harmless, a reviewing court must be satisfied that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1262 (4th Cir.1992). Assessing whether the denial of cross-examination on a certain subject constitutes harmless error requires a quantitative assessment of the likely impact of the error measured against the other evidence presented at trial. Id. at 1263; see also United States v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140, 143 (4th Cir.1988) (the questionable admission of evidence may be harmless where other overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt exists). 28 In the instant case, Duke's credibility was attacked on the stand despite the exclusion of the juvenile adjudication evidence. Duke was questioned regarding his plea and the time that he would serve in prison. His involvement in the instant offense was thereby made clear to the jury. See United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 979 (5th Cir.) (finding that the trial court's refusal to allow a juvenile conviction into evidence for purposes of impeachment was harmless error, because evidence of the conviction would have been cumulative to that of other convictions which could be used for impeachment), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978). In addition, there was a great deal of evidence concerning McWilliams' guilt. He was identified by tellers in the bank as someone who had been there shortly before the robbery; he admitted helping Duke escape; he admitted casing a convenience store the night before the robbery; he admitted possessing some of the money that came from the robbery; he admitting lying to law enforcement officers; and when questioned, he directed police to the gun used in the robbery. 29 In view of the overwhelming evidence of McWilliams' guilt, it was harmless error for the trial judge to prohibit questioning of the government's witness on a juvenile adjudication.
30 McWilliams has further argued that it was error on the part of the district court to prohibit him from questioning Duke regarding charges pending for Duke's issuance of worthless checks. There was a warrant outstanding in New Mexico for Duke's arrest on these charges. McWilliams wished to question Duke at trial regarding the charges and each of the facts underlying them until Duke felt compelled to invoke his privilege under the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury. He has argued that the district court erred in preventing him from doing so. 31 McWilliams' argument is flawed. McWilliams has stated that he should have been able to ask about the facts underlying Duke's charges, because they were highly probative of Duke's credibility. However, McWilliams was permitted to ask Duke about the pending charges; the trial court did not prevent that line of questioning. In fact, the defense asked Duke about the charges three separate times on the stand. After the third time, the district judge told defense counsel to cease questioning regarding the pending charges. Counsel asked about the charges yet again, and Duke specifically stated that he did not wish to talk about that case. The government stipulated to the fact that there were warrants outstanding for Duke's arrest, even though the witness had already admitted the existence of the warrants. The district judge did not prohibit defense counsel from inquiring about the worthless check charges, and the judge was certainly within his discretion in preventing counsel from persisting in the line of questioning after counsel had asked three times and had received the same answer each time. See FRE 611(a) (The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.). 32 McWilliams also wished Duke to be forced by his counsel's questioning to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury. McWilliams seems to have thought that Duke's explicit assertion of the privilege would have been more prejudicial to Duke's credibility than his refusing to answer the questions posed to him and repeatedly stating that he did not wish to discuss the matter. The prosecution asserted at trial, and has reasserted in its brief, that Duke's unwillingness to answer the questions posed to him was equivalent to invoking the privilege. The prosecution's argument has the support of the Supreme Court: 33 It is agreed by all that a claim of the privilege does not require any special combination of words. Plainly a witness need not have the skill of a lawyer to invoke the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause.... [T]he fact that a witness expresses his intention in vague terms is immaterial so long as the claim is sufficiently definite to apprise the [court] of his intention. As everyone agrees, no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege. 34 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162, 164 (1955) (footnotes omitted); see also Mills v. United States, 281 F.2d 736, 740-41 (4th Cir.1960) (affirming the district court's finding that the statement I just refuse to answer constituted an invocation of a witness' Fifth Amendment rights). 35 Duke's statements in the instant case were tantamount to an invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. The district court was thus correct in cutting off McWilliams' questioning regarding Duke's pending bad check charges. The judge had discretion to limit harassing cross-examination of a witness.