Opinion ID: 1095432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Against Cooper

Text: In order for Aetna to maintain an indemnity action against Cooper, it must legally stand in the shoes of the State Docks. When an insurer is sued pursuant to a direct action statute, which is the case here, it legally stands in the shoes of the insured. Alabama Code 1975, § 33-1-25; Ex parte Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.1963); Degelos v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 313 F.2d 809 (5th Cir.1963). Therefore, Aetna's rights and liabilities are derivative of those of the State Docks. The next question presented is whether the indemnity clause in the tariff between Cooper and the State Docks is valid and enforceable. An indemnity agreement between a stevedoring company and the owner of port terminal facilities, such as the State Docks, is a maritime contract, and the interpretation of such an agreement must be made by applying federal maritime law. Maryland Port Administration v. SS American Legend, 453 F.Supp. 584 (D.Md.1978). Cooper argues that Aetna's claims for indemnity are non-contractual and, thus, barred under the LHWCA, citing Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Brothers Oilfield Service, 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849, 88 S.Ct. 102, 19 L.Ed.2d 118 (1967). Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in that case stated that there was no indemnity based upon a tort theory, it emphasized that the employer continued to remain liable for indemnity on the basis of an expressed or implied contractual obligation. 377 F.2d at 514-15. We have already stated in the beginning of this opinion that Aetna legally stands in the shoes of the State Docks; therefore, Aetna should enjoy the benefits of the indemnity contract that the State Docks has with Cooper. The court in Ocean Drilling also noted that the workmen's compensation benefits under the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905, are the exclusive liability of an employer to its employees or to anyone claiming under or through such employee. However, the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA have been interpreted to allow contractual indemnity between a non-vessel, such as the State Docks, and a third-party employer, such as Cooper, where the employer is negligent in causing injury to an employee and the non-vessel is sued by the employee for his injury. [4] Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 595 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979); Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.1978); Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boat Service, Inc., 403 F.Supp. 920 (E.D.La.1975). Thus, Aetna is not prohibited by the LHWCA from asserting indemnity claims against Cooper. Cooper's next argument is that the indemnity clause in the tariff in the instant case is invalid and unenforceable because clauses which seek to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence have been struck down by the Federal Maritime Commission and various courts. However, in the instant case, Aetna is not seeking indemnification for negligence on the part of the State Docks; rather, it is seeking indemnification for an injury caused by Cooper's negligence and the negligence of its employees. The indemnity clause in the tariff between Cooper and the State Docks provides: Each person using a facility of the Alabama State Docks Department and each person performing any service on the property of the Alabama State Docks Department shall indemnify and save the Alabama State Docks Department harmless from and against any and all claims, actions, damages, liability, and expense, including reasonable attorneys fees and litigation expenses, in connection with loss of life, personal injury and damage to property (including property of such person) occurring in connection with the use of any facility of the Alabama State Docks Department and the performance of any service on the property of the Alabama State Docks Department caused in whole or in part by such person, or the employees (including loaned employees), agents, contractors and invitees of such person, without regard to fault ... (C.R. 75-76, 308). Based upon the facts in the instant case, Aetna is attempting to enforce an indemnity clause which is recognized as valid and enforceable under federal maritime law. In view of our holding that Aetna stands in the shoes of the State Docks and is attempting to enforce a valid agreement, we turn to the merits of the claim for indemnity. Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable toward the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Sexton v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 405 So.2d 18 (Ala.1981). Aetna contends that it presented a scintilla of evidence of negligence on the part of Cooper which would entitle it to indemnification from Cooper. The deposition testimony indicated that the cause of Franklin's injury was improper stacking or piling in of bundles of lumber that were unloaded at Franklin's direction. The lumber was stacked by Cooper employees approximately 12 to 15 feet high. The testimony showed that Franklin gave directions concerning the placement and storage of the lumber. There was also testimony that two of Franklin's immediate supervisors were aware of the fact that the floor in the warehouse was sunken and uneven but they did not mention this condition to Franklin. We find that the above testimony presents a scintilla of evidence which creates a genuine issue as to negligence on the part of Cooper. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Cooper is improper.