Opinion ID: 2999722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourth Amendment and Indiana Law

Text: Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance allows for searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the Ordinance is preempted by Indiana Law. Both of these arguments are waived because the plaintiff failed to raise them before the district court. See Estremera v. United States, 442 F.3d 580, 587 (7th Cir. 2006) (“arguments not raised in the district court are waived on appeal”) (quoting Belom v. National Futures Ass’n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002)). When moving for summary judgment, the City defended an inspection provision in the Ordinance against a possible Fourth Amendment challenge by arguing first, that sexually oriented businesses have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public areas of their premises during business hours; and, second, that if plaintiffs were able to establish a privacy interest implicating the Fourth Amendment that the businesses were “closely-regulated indus12 Nos. 05-2225, 05-2287 & 05-2288 tries” for which no warrant is necessary.3 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987) (applying the “closelyregulated industry” exception to the Fourth Amendment). In response, the plaintiffs simply assumed that the inspection provision implicated the Fourth Amendment, and only argued that sexually oriented businesses are not closelyregulated industries— despite the fact that the Ordinance only allows inspections in areas open to the public during business hours. As the district court explained, plaintiffs “simply ignore[d] the law’s clear mandate” that the inspection provision did not implicate a privacy interest. Finding persuasive the City’s unrebutted argument on this point, the district court did not address the plaintiffs’ argument that adult businesses were not “closely-regulated industries.” Plaintiffs’ failure to argue the existence of a privacy interest implicated by the Ordinance below waives the issue on appeal. In any event any concerns about privacy violations are abated by the language of the statute that limits inspection to assuring compliance with the specific requirements of the Ordinance—that is the open booth requirement, the hours of operation restrictions, the prohibition of physical contact, and other requirements as specifically listed in the Ordi- 3 The inspection provision states: (A) Sexually oriented business operators and sexually oriented business employees shall permit officers or agents of the City of Gary who are performing functions connected with the enforcement of this Chapter to inspect the portions of the sexually oriented business premises where patrons are permitted, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with this Chapter, at any time the sexually oriented business is occupied by patrons or open for business. (B) The provisions of this Section do not apply to areas of an adult motel which are currently being rented by a customer for use as a permanent or temporary habitation. Nos. 05-2225, 05-2287 & 05-2288 13 nance. Ordinance at § 7(A). In other words, as counsel assured the panel at oral argument, officers or agents of the City cannot enter non-public areas of the premises, cannot enter when the business is closed to the public, cannot remove anything from the premises, cannot take pictures or videos, cannot ask patrons to disclose their names, or do anything other than check for compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance. (Oral argument at 25-30 min). Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court’s ruling that the Ordinance does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs also attempt to raise a preemption argument relying on Indiana law. Before the plaintiffs filed their brief in the district court, the Indiana Attorney General asked for permission, which was granted, to file an amicus brief with the district court addressing the issue “that state alcoholic beverage statutes preempt local regulation of adult entertainment establishments.” See Ind. Code § 7.1-3-9-6 (prohibiting certain local interference with liquor licenses provided by the state). The plaintiffs then filed their brief opposing summary judgment without raising this issue. The very next day the Indiana Attorney General informed the district court that no amicus brief would be filed because no state law issues had been raised by the briefing. Plaintiffs now attempt to argue that the Ordinance is preempted by Indiana law. But their earlier approach in the district court has deprived us of an analysis by the magistrate judge (and the views of the Indiana Attorney General), and, therefore, plaintiffs have waived the issue. See Estremera, 442 F.3d at 587.