Opinion ID: 2317473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Gilmore claims that he was convicted on the basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence. He contends that the State must prove by direct evidence that [Gilmore] was in or near the apartment of the decedent at the time of her death, and failing to prove this, the trial court was without sufficient evidence, circumstantial or direct, to connect [him] with any assault upon the decedent.    Appellant's reasonable explanation of his possession of the identified items should have been accorded the greater weight when balanced against the record of proceedings in this case, and an acquittal of murder and robbery should have been found by the trial court. We find relevant much of what was said by Judge Orth for the Court of Special Appeals in Nichols v. State, 5 Md. App. 340, 247 A.2d 722 (1968), where he said: The law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for in either case the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.       In considering the evidence the lower court was guided by established rules of law. Proof of guilt beyond all doubt has never been required. Young v. State, 4 Md. App. 286. To prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt it is not necessary that every conceivable miraculous coincidence consistent with innocence be negatived. Hayette v. State, 199 Md. 140, 144. The lower court could weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Roeder v. State, 4 Md. App. 705; Gibson v. State, 4 Md. App. 222. It was under no obligation to believe the appellant's denials or explanations. Eley v. State, 4 Md. App. 230; Tillery v. State, 3 Md. App. 142. It could weigh the alibi testimony and was not required to accept its truthfulness. Logan v. State, 1 Md. App. 213. And if we assume that the evidence against the appellant was solely circumstantial, such assumption would not change the result. The lower court could have properly found that the circumstances, taken together, were inconsistent with, or such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis or theory of innocence. `[C]ircumstantial evidence need not be such that no possible theory other than guilt can stand   . It is not necessary that the circumstantial evidence exclude every possibility of the defendant's innocence, or produce an absolute certainty in the minds of the jurors. The rule does not require the jury to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish the defendant's guilt.' 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence (12th Ed. 1955) § 980, p. 477. While it must afford the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that each circumstance, standing alone, be sufficient to establish guilt, but the circumstances are to be considered collectively. 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence (5th Ed. 1956) § 17, p. 23 and p. 25. Id. at 350-51. (Emphasis in original.) As Judge (later Chief Judge) Henderson said for the Court in Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193, 198, 151 A.2d 743 (1959), We think the [trier] of fact could properly draw the inference, from all the circumstances of the case, that she met her death at his hands, and that the killing was premeditated and with malice aforethought.