Opinion ID: 1986216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: adopting the objective test

Text: Over thirty years later, this Court formally adopted the objective test for entrapment in People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973). We began the Turner opinion by noting Justice MARSTON'S strong condemnation of entrapment in Saunders (which we characterized as the origin of the entrapment defense) and the divergent views of the various United States Supreme Court justices in Sorrells, Sherman and Russell. See Turner, supra at 15-19, 210 N.W.2d 336, quoting People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 116-120, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972) (SWAINSON, J.). We then opined that Justice Stewart's dissenting view in Russell persuasively articulated why the objective test should be adopted in Michigan. Turner, supra at 19, 210 N.W.2d 336. After quoting much of Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, we described the Michigan rule of entrapment as follows: We agree with the position of Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Stewart of the United States Supreme Court and the view articulated by Justices MARSTON and CAMPBELL of our Supreme Court and adopt an objective test of entrapment in Michigan. [ Turner, supra at 22, 210 N.W.2d 336.] In People v. D'Angelo, 401 Mich. 167, 257 N.W.2d 655 (1977), this Court addressed some of the procedural mechanics of the entrapment defense. There, we described the nature of our entrapment defense as follows: When an accused claims entrapment he is asserting, in essence, entitlement to the benefit of a judicial policy that his claim, if true, is a bar to the prosecution of the case. His claim does not involve an assessment of guilt or innocence and, in fact, is irrelevant to it. It is in that respect that the entrapment claim is unique and distinguishable from the more common defenses in criminal cases such as alibi, insanity, self-defense, lack of specific intent and the like, which assert the absence of one or more elements of the crime charged and involve therefore the assessment of guilt or innocence. The defense of entrapment is not interjected to establish the absence of an essential element of the crime but to present facts collateral or incidental to the criminal act which justify acquittal on the ground of an overriding public policy to deter instigation of crime by enforcement officers in order to get a conviction. [ Id. at 179, 257 N.W.2d 655.] Seventeen years after adopting the objective test, this Court considered, in People v. Jamieson, 436 Mich. 61, 65, 461 N.W.2d 884 (1990), whether to abandon that view in favor of the subjective view advocated by the majority opinions in Russell and Sorrells. In five separate opinions, none of which garnered a majority of the Court, we elected to adhere to the objective test. The lead opinion in Jamieson, authored by Justice BRICKLEY and joined by Chief Justice RILEY and Justice BOYLE, began by noting what it described as the overlap between the objective and subjective tests for entrapment: As a matter of practicality, in many instances the application of the two theories overlap. When applying the subjective test, to determine if the accused is predisposed, the court must consider the official's conduct. Predisposition is linked to the amount of inducement and pressure offered by an agent as well as how long the agent persisted before commission of the illegal act. Similarly, courts applying the objective approach use the state of mind of the accused as a factor. When applying the objective test, consideration is given to the willingness of the accused to commit the act weighed against how a normally law-abiding person would react in similar circumstances. Under either approach, courts adhere to the fact that the function of law enforcement is to deter crime and not to manufacture it. [ Id. at 74, 461 N.W.2d 884.] Justice BRICKLEY then observed that the precise theoretical underpinnings [of the entrapment defense] have been difficult to discern and that each test has its flaws. Id. at 78, 461 N.W.2d 884. Given the overlap between the two tests and the problems associated with each test, Justice BRICKLEY found insufficient justification to abandon the objective entrapment test in Michigan. Justice CAVANAGH concurred in the result and with the lead opinion's adherence to the objective test for entrapment. He wrote separately because he did not agree with Justice BRICKLEY'S suggestion that a court applying the objective test should assess the state of mind of the accused. Under a proper understanding of the objective test, he explained, the defense of entrapment should be available even to persons ready and willing to commit the crime charged. [15] Finally, Justice GRIFFIN opined separately that the defense of entrapment should be eliminated: Unless police conduct in a given situation is so reprehensible as to violate constitutional standards imposed by the Due Process Clause, I do not believe that one who is guilty of committing a criminal act should be exonerated by the judiciary simply because it disapproves of conduct on the part of another branch of government. While constitutional limitations must be strictly observed, it is my view that the defense of entrapment, which has no constitutional base whatever, should be eliminated. [ Id. at 98, 461 N.W.2d 884.] One year later, this Court revisited the entrapment question in Juillet. Once again, a majority could not agree on a single statement of the law of entrapment. Justices BRICKLEY, joined by Justices RILEY and GRIFFIN, adhered to the objective test set forth in his Jamieson opinion. [16] Id. at 41, 59-60, 475 N.W.2d 786. Clarifying his view, Justice BRICKLEY explained that the unique circumstances of the particular defendant are relevant to whether the police conduct rose to a reprehensible level. He explained that the court should ask whether the police conduct would be likely to instigate crime by a hypothetical normally law-abiding person in the defendant's unique situation. See id. at 54-56, 475 N.W.2d 786. Finally, Justice BRICKLEY provided a nonexclusive list of factors for courts to consider, in addition to the defendant's situation, to determine whether police conduct amounted to entrapment. Id. at 57, 475 N.W.2d 786. Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justices LEVIN and MALLETT, filed a separate opinion supporting the objective test. Id. at 70-71, 475 N.W.2d 786. As in Jamieson, he disagreed with Justice BRICKLEY'S focus on the character and circumstances of the particular defendant in applying the objective test. Id. at 72, 475 N.W.2d 786. In addition to advocating a more traditional objective test for entrapment, he embraced the view advanced by Justice Douglas in Russell, supra at 439, 93 S.Ct. 1637, that certain reprehensible police conduct should not be tolerated by courts without respect to issues of causation. Juillet, supra, at 77, 475 N.W.2d 786. Finally, Justice CAVANAGH addressed the fundamental question regarding the legal authority upon which courts have enforced the defense of entrapment. Id. at 84, 475 N.W.2d 786. After rejecting the legislative-intent justification and questioning the validity of the inherent judicial supervisory power justification, he opined that the objective entrapment defense adopted in Turner, was necessarily rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution. Juillet, supra at 84-85, 475 N.W.2d 786. In a separate opinion, Justice BOYLE provisionally aligned herself with Justice BRICKLEY'S version of the objective entrapment defense, [17] and indicated that she would also recognize a reprehensible-conduct test for entrapment, although to a different degree than recognized by Justice CAVANAGH. Id. at 87, 475 N.W.2d 786. She then opined that the best policy would be to adopt a dual view incorporating both a subjective entrapment test and an objective reprehensible-conduct defense. [18] Justice BOYLE did not offer a particular legal justification for adopting a subjective entrapment test, but implicitly suggested that imposition of an objective reprehensible-conduct defense would be within the Court's supervisory authority. See id. at 94, 475 N.W.2d 786, citing Sherman, supra at 381, 78 S.Ct. 819 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). Finally, Justice BOYLE expressly disassociated herself from Justice CAVANAGH'S assertion that the entrapment doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution. Juillet, supra, at 109, n. 30, 475 N.W.2d 786.