Opinion ID: 2709070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ross’s Motion to Suppress the Handgun

Text: Ross first argues that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress the handgun discovered in his home because it was the fruit of Officer Buchanan and his partner’s warrantless entry into his home. The district court concluded that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless entry into Ross’s home. “Warrantless searches of areas entitled to Fourth Amendment protection are presumptively unreasonable, but the government may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that, from the perspective of the officer at the scene, a reasonable officer could believe that exigent circumstances existed and that there was no time to obtain a warrant.” United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2012). “In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual findings for clear error No. 13‐2015 Page 6 and issues of law de novo, and whether exigent circumstances existed is a mixed question of fact and law that is reviewed de novo.” Id. Exigent circumstances exist, for example, when officers are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, there is a need to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury, or there is a need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). In this case, the district court was concerned that Ross would retrieve and use the handgun again after shutting the door on Officer Buchanan and his partner. We have found exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entries where officers fear that a gun may be fired at them or others from within the dwelling. See United States v. Kempf, 400 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding exigent circumstances for warrantless entry into home where officers believed the defendant could access potentially loaded gun inside); United States v. Taylor, 179 F. App’x 957, 959 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding exigent circumstances for warrantless entry into home “to ensure that no one posed a threat to them or anyone else” where, although suspect was observed leaving the house, officers knew that a gun was likely within the home); United States v. Craig, 12 F.3d 1101, at  (7th Cir. 1993) (unpublished Table decision) (finding exigent circumstances for officers’ warrantless entry into garage because the defendant “might have been able to shoot at them from inside the garage or the house.”); see also United States v. Huddleston, 593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]here police reasonably believe that their safety, or the safety of the public, may be threatened, exigent circumstances exist.”).3 But we need not decide whether exigent circumstances existed here. As Ross’s counsel correctly conceded at oral argument, the officers’ warrantless entry did not causally contribute to the subsequently obtained search warrant. The police did not see the handgun when they entered Ross’s home prior to obtaining the search warrant and they did not find the handgun on Ross when they arrested him. Rather, the police legally obtained the evidence that established probable cause to believe the handgun was in the house. Therefore, the warrantless entry did not taint the search warrant that led to the discovery of the handgun, and so the handgun was not the fruit of the 3 On the other hand, at the time of the warrantless entry, the officers apparently did not know Ross was a felon. We are troubled by the idea that exigent circumstances exist simply because law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe a person has a firearm in his home—a right guaranteed by the Constitution—though, that Ross had recently fired the handgun at the home of his former lover may alter the equation. No. 13‐2015 Page 7 warrantless entry. See United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 736‐38 (7th Cir. 2010) (a detective’s entrance into a defendant’s apartment while another detective worked on a warrant application did not require exclusion of evidence obtained while executing the warrant because Segura’s “wholly unconnected” rule applied) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813–16 (1984)). Consequently, Ross was not entitled to have the handgun suppressed.