Opinion ID: 2091985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wait and See Approach

Text: Defendants next urge that we adopt the wait and see approach to the Rule against Perpetuities: an interest is valid if it actually vests during the perpetuities period, irrespective of what might have happened ( see , Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities , 74 Cal L Rev 1867, 1880). The option here would survive under the wait and see approach since it was exercised by 1987, well within the 21-year limitation. This Court, however, has long refused to wait and see whether a perpetuities violation in fact occurs. As explained in Matter of Fischer (307 N.Y. 149, 157), [i]t is settled beyond dispute that in determining whether a will has illegally suspended the power of alienation, the courts will look to what might have happened under the terms of the will rather than to what has actually happened since the death of the testator ( see also , Matter of Roe , 281 N.Y. 541, 547-548). The very language of EPTL 9-1.1, moreover, precludes us from determining the validity of an interest based upon what actually occurs during the perpetuities period. Under the statutory rule against remote vesting, an interest is invalid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after one or more lives in being (EPTL 9-1.1 [b] [emphasis added]). That is, an interest is void from the outset if it may vest too remotely ( see , Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 17B, EPTL 9-1.1, at 481; see also , Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v Bruken Realty Corp. , 67 NY2d at 163, supra [(t)he validity of the provision must be judged by the circumstances existing at the time of the grant]). Because the option here could have vested after expiration of the 21-year perpetuities period, it offends the Rule. We note that the desirability of the wait and see doctrine has been widely debated ( see , 5A Powell, Real Property ¶ 827F [1], [3]; see also , Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform , 81 Mich L Rev 1718 [describing wait and see as (t)he most controversial of the reform methods]). Its incorporation into EPTL 9-1.1, in any event, must be accomplished by the Legislature, not the courts. We therefore conclude that the option agreement is invalid under EPTL 9-1.1 (b). In light of this conclusion, we need not decide whether the option violated Symphony's equitable right to redeem the mortgage.