Opinion ID: 1383145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the verdict was the product of passion and prejudice by the jury.

Text: Gibson contends that the jury's verdict was the product of passion and prejudice, and that the trial court's denial of it's motion for new trial because of this fundamental unfairness constitutes an abuse of discretion and is reversible error. We disagree. The record in this case reflects that after several hours of deliberation, the jury submitted a series of questions to the trial court, the first of which was not documented by the court reporter and is not part of the record herein but, according to appellant, concerned whether the refrigerator was grounded at the time of the fire. The jury stated in its next question that it could perhaps reach a compromise but that it needed to know which alternative in the comparative-fault instruction would not affect the credibility of Nationwide's insured couple, the Rosses, whose home was the site of the fire. The jury was then instructed that it was only to base its verdict on the evidence in the case. The final jury question simply asked whether the Rosses could be sued. After being advised by the court that the Rosses could not be sued, the jury returned its verdict within fifteen minutes. Gibson contends that the jury clearly made its compromise decision on the basis of whether or not the Rosses could be sued for the damage caused by the fire, and not on the basis of the evidence. Gibson contends that the jury's obvious concern with the legal ramifications of its factual conclusions on a disinterested third party clearly shows that the jury's verdict was influenced by passion and prejudice for the Rosses. We find appellant's arguments to be unpersuasive. First, there is no evidence to support appellant's contention on this point. The sole fact that the jury asked questions in regard to the Rosses fails to prove that the jury's verdict was based on passion or prejudice. In fact, the verdict that the jury awarded, in and of itself, was substantially less than the amount of damages sustained and stipulated; this clearly demonstrates that the jury's determination was not improperly influenced. Further, the appellant cites no case law or other authority in support of its position on this point. As discussed previously, if Gibson was of the opinion that the jury's verdict was irregular or inconsistent, or even unclear, it had a duty to raise these issues at trial and before the jury was discharged; it chose not to do so. In short, it is clear that the jury chose to believe Nationwide's theories as to the cause and origin of the fire, which it was certainly at liberty to do, and discounted those theories proffered by Gibson. At the same time, it would amount to little more than speculation and conjecture for us to attempt to ascertain at this point the basis for the jury's verdict, which was general in nature and was not questioned at the appropriate time. Quite simply, Nationwide put on sufficient and substantial evidence to support its claims against Gibson, as well as create a question for the jury on the issues of product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's actions were proper, and the jury's verdict should stand. Affirmed.