Opinion ID: 1310267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: federal appeals

Text: During the pendency of his various appeals in state courts, Palmer also sought habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. After our reversal in Palmer II, but before the third trial, Palmer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska (District Court). The petition asserted that Palmer's second trial had subjected him to double jeopardy and that his third trial would also subject him to double jeopardy because the properly admitted evidence in Palmer's first two trialsthe evidence that remained after the erroneously admitted evidence obtained by hypnosis had been thrown outwas legally insufficient to convict him. The District Court dismissed Palmer's petition as premature, finding that Palmer had not exhausted his state remedies because he could either petition this court before his third trial or pursue other avenues of relief if convicted. See Palmer v. Drum, No. CV84-L-144 (D.Neb. Mar. 1, 1984). Palmer appealed the dismissal of his habeas petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Court of Appeals), which remanded the cause to the District Court for further consideration. See Palmer v. Drum, No. 84-8041 (8th Cir. May 10, 1984). On remand, the District Court dismissed Palmer's claim as meritless, ruling that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by a retrial where a conviction is reversed based on errors in admission of evidence rather than on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to convict. The District Court also denied Palmer's motion to amend his petition to set forth in greater clarity his double jeopardy claims and the bases thereof. After rejecting Palmer's request that the District Court determine the sufficiency of the remaining evidence admitted during his second trial, the Court of Appeals stated: `In light of the nature of the claim asserted and the restrictive nature of the double jeopardy clause, I fail to perceive how the petition could be amended to state a nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim.... Therefore, the motion for leave to amend the petition will be denied.' Palmer v. Grammer, 863 F.2d 588, 590 (8th Cir.1988), quoting Palmer v. Grammer , No. CV84-L-144, slip op. (D.Neb. May 22, 1984). Palmer appealed the dismissal of this petition to the Court of Appeals, which held the matter in abeyance pending resolution of all proceedings in the Nebraska state courts. See Palmer v. Drum, No. 84-1689 (8th Cir. June 8, 1984). After we affirmed Palmer's conviction and death sentence in Palmer III, Palmer's habeas appeal was decided by the Court of Appeals. See Palmer v. Grammer, supra . The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision that the habeas petition lacked merit, but granted Palmer leave to amend his petition. Id. On March 9, 1989, Palmer filed his amended habeas petition in the District Court, asserting that his imprisonment before the third trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and denied Palmer due process. He contended that the totality of the evidence at each of his first two trials was insufficient to convict him and that the District Court should not consider Cherie Palmer's testimony when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at his second trial because the testimony was obtained through judicial and prosecutorial misconduct. Palmer contended that the prosecutor and the judge knew that Cherie Palmer's testimony was inadmissible, but offered it anyway, knowing that Palmer could be retried if this conviction was reversed based upon admission of Cherie Palmer's testimony. A magistrate judge originally granted Palmer's request to depose both the prosecutor and the trial judge who had presided at Palmer's second trial. After the State sought a protective order, the magistrate judge canceled the depositions and declined to consider Palmer's misconduct argument because the magistrate judge believed it was beyond the Court of Appeals' remand order and thus was not properly before the District Court. In reviewing all the evidence in each of the first two trials, including the improperly admitted evidence, the magistrate judge concluded that sufficient evidence supported Palmer's first two convictions. The District Court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied Palmer's petition. Palmer appealed, and the Court of Appeals found that although a jury convicted Palmer a third time while his habeas petition was pending, his pretrial double jeopardy challenge to his third trial was not moot, and that Palmer could raise constitutional challenges to his third conviction and sentence in a later habeas petition. See Palmer v. Clarke, 961 F.2d 771 (8th Cir.1992). The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court had not considered whether it should exclude Cherie Palmer's testimony based on Palmer's misconduct claim because the District Court believed it was beyond the scope of the Court of Appeals' order on remand. The Court of Appeals found, however, that because Palmer's misconduct claim was a part of his sufficiency of the evidence argument, the District Court should consider it. The determination of the sufficiency of the evidence at Palmer's second trial was remanded to the District Court. The conclusion by the District Court that the evidence at the first trial was sufficient to convict Palmer and the dismissal of Palmer's double jeopardy challenge to his second trial were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded Palmer's double jeopardy challenge to his third trial. Upon remand, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found there was no misconduct by the prosecutor or the trial judge because neither the prosecutor nor the judge knew that the testimony of Cherie Palmer was inadmissible. The District Court concluded that the testimony of Cherie Palmer should be considered when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at Palmer's second trial and that the evidence was sufficient to support Palmer's second conviction. The District Court found that Palmer's third trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Palmer v. Clarke, 12 F.3d 781 (8th Cir.1993). Subsequently, Palmer filed a motion for postconviction relief in the Hall County District Court, which denied his request for relief. Palmer then timely filed this appeal.