Opinion ID: 185541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Evidence Relating to Hasan's Discharge

Text: 38 The final issue in dispute concerns the Board's holding that the Foundation committed an unfair labor practice when it reprimanded and discharged Hasan. The Foundation claims that Hasan was disciplined for insubordination. The Board, however, found that the acts of defiance by Hasan and Borgs against their supervisors were merely attempts by the employees to raise issues related to their conditions of employment. Board Decision, at 6-7. Thus, according to the Board, Hasan was engaged in protected concerted activity which was the motivating factor for his employer's decision to reprimand and thereafter terminate him. Id. at 6. Because we can find no support in the record for the Board's decision, we reverse. 39 It is well understood that this court must uphold factual findings of the Board if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). The Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both. Id. at 490. Thus, a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view. Id. at 488. On the record at hand, we find that the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view is overwhelming. 40 The Foundation reprimanded and then terminated Hasan because of his gross insubordination in signing and delivering the January 17 memo to his supervisors, and for his subsequent refusal to sign performance objectives. In the January 17 memo, Borgs and Hasan defiantly reiterate[d] to their supervisor that [his] supervision of the program operations performed by them [was] not required. Board Decision, at 1 n.4. This was indisputably an act of gross insubordination, just as the Foundation claims. The Board, however, purports to excuse the insubordination by finding that the employees' January 17 and 29 memoranda were inextricably intertwined, see id. at 6, and that the January 29 memo somehow alleviated the preceding insubordination. This outlandish reasoning draws no support from the evidence in the record. 41 On January 17, Hasan flatly asserted that he would not recognize the authority of his current supervisor, or any other supervisor for that matter. See Board Decision, at 1 n.4 (stating [o]nly support staff assistance is needed). The memo contained no specific objections to any terms and conditions of employment, but, rather, simply rejected Berger's supervision. Therefore, the situation here does not fall within the narrow category of cases where the identity of the supervisor is directly related to terms and conditions of employment and concerted activity to effect the discharge or replacement of [that] supervisor may thus be protected. See NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1990). The January 29 memo, sent nearly two weeks later, merely discussed the opinions and feelings of Hasan; it did not address Hasan's prior insubordinate conduct. Even if Hasan could somehow recast his prior conduct as protected activity, the January 29 memo did not do so, because Hasan never purported to apologize or distance himself in any way from the January 17 memo. At oral argument, counsel for the Board suggested that Hasan and Borgs were simply inartful in their objection to their working conditions and that the January 29 memo more accurately explains Hasan's and Borgs' complaints regarding the terms and conditions of their employment. See also Board Decision, at 7. This position is wholly untenable. The January 17 memo admits of only one fair reading: Borgs and Hasan told their supervisor that they would not recognize his authority in connection with their work. That was insubordination, not protected concerted activity. Therefore, Hasan was properly reprimanded for this act of insubordination. 42 Hasan received a written reprimand immediately after his meeting with management on February 1 concerning the January 17 memo. He knew from this written reprimand that he had committed an act of gross insubordination and that any further acts of misconduct or insubordination would result in his termination. Despite this fair warning (which, so far as we can tell, he never protested), Hasan subsequently refused to sign performance objectives given to him by his supervisor. He was then fired. The Board does not suggest that Hasan's refusal to sign the performance objectives was protected activity, for it was not. Rather, according to the Board, the discharge was not solely due to the failure to sign the performance objectives, but rather was linked to the Respondent's anger at Hasan for his protected activity, especially his involvement with the January 17 memo. Board Decision, at 7. The glaring flaw in the Board's reasoning is the erroneous assumption that the January 17 memo was protected. It was not, so the termination of Hasan for his involvement with the January 17 memo and his subsequent refusal to sign performance objectives was not unlawful. 43 The Board suggests that an attempt by employees to cause the removal of their supervisor is protected when 'it is evident that [the supervisor's conduct] had an impact on employee working conditions.'  Id. at 6. This may be true, but the principle is inapposite in this case. The January 17 memo was a directive from Borgs and Hasan to their supervisor that they would no longer recognize his supervisory authority. The memo did not otherwise mention working conditions, nor did it protest that the supervisor's conduct was somehow having an adverse impact on employee working conditions. See Board Decision, at 22-23 (dissenting opinion of Member Brame); 31 (ALJ's findings regarding the January 17 memo). The dissenting opinion of Member Hurtgen summarizes the record evidence perfectly: 44 In sum, the January 17 memo was unprotected because it sought the discharge of supervisor Berger. There is no showing that the effort to discharge the supervisor was prompted by supervisory conduct affecting employees' terms and conditions of employment. The January 17 memo did not become protected by reason of the later memo of January 29. The [Foundation] was critical of the January 17 memo, and thus Hasan and Borgs wrote another memo on January 29. As the [ALJ] correctly found, this memo was simply an after-the-fact attempt at damage control. In any event, the January 29 letter did not raise the anger of the [Foundation]. Indeed, the [Foundation], through Loehrke, met with Hasan to discuss that memo. It was the January 17 letter that raised the anger of [Foundation], and that letter was unprotected. Board Decision, at 10. 45 The Board does not have authority to regulate all behavior in the workplace and it cannot function as a ubiquitous personnel manager, supplanting its judgment on how to respond to unprotected, insubordinate behavior for those of an employer. It is well recognized that an employer is free to lawfully run its business as it pleases. This means that an employer may discharge an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason, so long as it is not for an unlawful reason. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 394 (1983) (The National Labor Relations Act ... makes unlawful the discharge of a worker because of union activity ... but employers retain the right to discharge workers for any number of other reasons unrelated to the employee's union activities.); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (establishing a test to determine the relationship, if any, between employer action and protected employee conduct). Although the Board has considerable leeway in determining the exact scope of protected activity, see Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266, it has no authority to extend the protections of the Act to plainly insubordinate behavior unrelated to the terms and conditions of employment. Because absolutely no evidence supports any nexus between the January 17 memo and any protected activity by Hasan concerning the terms and conditions of his employment, we reverse the NLRB's finding with regard to Hasan.