Opinion ID: 1443085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Discovery Schedule Properly Enforced

Text: On December 14, 2005, the appellants filed a motion to extend the discovery cutoff, along with an accompanying form of order requesting that discovery be extended to April 9, 2005, less than a month before the scheduled commencement of trial. On January 28, 2005, the trial judge denied that motion, for the following reasons: (i) that the case [had not] been properly discovered when the discovery period started up anew right after September 28th, based on the fact that appellants waited nearly two months to serve any interrogatories or document requests on PwC; (ii) that the appellants' auditing and accounting expert had been the appellants' expert in the prior Carello case, and as such already had reviewed the relevant PwC work papers and written a report opining as the 1997 financial statements and PwC's audit report thereon; (iii) that 25 depositions already taken in Carello were fully usable in the instant case by agreement of the parties, substantially decreasing the amount of time needed to conduct additional discovery; (iv) that the appellants' counsel had agreed to the schedule set in this case on September 29, 2005; (v) that the appellants had failed to set forth any facts constituting good cause for undoing the discovery schedule; (vi) that it was the trial court's practice not to routinely permit discovery extensions in the absence of good cause; and (vii) that the requested extension would undoubtedly jeopardize the trial date, because there wouldn't be time to [properly] file and then have the Court consider dispositive motions. It is well settled that the trial court has discretion to resolve scheduling issues and to control its own docket. [7] The trial court's resolution of pretrial scheduling issues will only be disturbed on appeal if there has been an abuse of discretion. In this case, the appellants have not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that no good cause had been shown to extend the discovery schedule. [8] As noted by the appellants, `[G]ood cause' is likely to be found when the moving party has been generally diligent, the need for more time was neither foreseeable nor its fault, and refusing to grant the continuance would create a substantial risk of unfairness to that party. [9] The record reflects that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in concluding that the discovery schedule should not be extended, as reflected in the numerous factors stated in his bench ruling on January 28, 2005.