Opinion ID: 1536009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Other Trial Evidence

Text: Defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims that the trial court committed plain error and his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to determine whether the age of the victim would adversely impact a potential juror's ability to deliberate fairly. We disagree. The lengthy jury questionnaire and the individual voir dire provided the court and counsel with more than enough information to determine whether the victim's age would cause potential jurors automatically to impose the death penalty or refuse to consider the mitigating factors presented by the defense.
During juror orientation, the trial court informed each panel that the case involved the murder and sexual assault of a seven-year-old girl. Next, the court and the attorneys questioned 331 potential jurors in a lengthy voir dire based upon their review of an in-depth questionnaire filled out by each person. The process lasted from January 13 until April 21. The oral and written voir dire was designed to weed out jurors who expressed any doubt about their ability to remain impartial. Question number seven of the jury questionnaire asked whether the juror had any children or stepchildren. If the juror answered yes, question eight followed up by inquiring about the age, sex, education and employment status of the child, and whether the child lived with the prospective juror. Question ten asked whether the juror had any grandchildren, and if so, their ages, sexes, education, employment status and whether they lived with the prospective juror. Question nine asked if the potential juror, or anyone close to her, had suffered the loss of a child, and if so, to describe how the loss occurred. An entire section was devoted to the jurors' knowledge of Megan's Law. Jurors specifically were asked if their knowledge or suspicion that Megan's Law was an outgrowth of the case would prevent them from judging the case impartially. Questions 107 through 110 addressed whether the juror, or anyone she knew, had been a victim of child abuse or molestation, and whether the juror knew anyone who had ever been accused of committing child abuse or molestation. The juror also was asked if she had attended any class on or had studied child sexual abuse. Questions 128 through 130 dealt with the possible admission of victim impact evidence. Jurors were asked if they could listen to such evidence and still fairly consider the mitigating evidence presented by the defense under the guidelines set forth by the court. Question 131 asked how the juror felt about the possibility that she might be shown disturbing photographs of the victim. Question 132 asked if there was anything not covered by the questionnaire that the juror felt might affect her ability to be fair and impartial. Of those jurors questioned by the court, thirty-four were excused after indicating they would have problems being impartial because the case involved a child. The court specifically asked seventy-four of the remaining ninety-seven qualified jurors about their ability to remain impartial, given that the victim was seven years old. Nine of those jurors deliberated on the case. Defense counsel did not object to the court's voir dire about the juror's ability to remain impartial given that the victim was a child. Nor did counsel exercise any of the peremptory challenges allotted for defendant in jury selection.
To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution, a defendant must first establish that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 67, 519 A. 2d 336 (1987), (referencing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed. 2d 657 (1984)). Second, he must show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's deficiencies. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-69, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 695-98. The reasonableness of counsel's performance should be evaluated in light of all relevant circumstances at the time the alleged error occurred. Id. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694-95. The inquiry must include the possibility that counsel's decisions were based on sound trial strategy rather than incompetence or deficiency. Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 695-96. Defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's performance was unreasonable under the prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-66, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-95. The purpose of voir dire is to ensure an impartial jury and a fair trial. State v. Martini (Martini I), 131 N.J. 176, 210, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993). In a capital case, the voir dire should probe the minds of prospective jurors to ascertain whether the jurors entertain any biases that would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 129, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991). The questions also should determine whether the circumstances of the crime would prevent the prospective juror from considering relevant mitigating evidence. Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 211, 619 A. 2d 1208; State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 30-31, 594 A. 2d 172 (1991) ( Biegenwald IV ). A defendant's sentence should be affirmed if the voir dire was adequate to ensure that a fair and impartial jury was empaneled. Id. at 34-35, 524 A. 2d 130. In Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 451, 585 A. 2d 864, the Court stressed the importance of open-ended questions in voir dire regarding the status of the victims as it relates to any prejudice affecting the juror's ability to consider mitigating evidence. At issue was the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to probe prospective jurors on whether they would be unable to remain fair and impartial given that one of the victims was six months pregnant and the other was an infant. We refused to reverse, finding that the court's questioning otherwise had been probing enough to weed out prospective jurors who might have been biased by the facts of the case. Id. at 451-54, 585 A. 2d 864. Defects of the type in Moore, supra, can be cured if the voir dire was otherwise so thorough and probing as to ensure that the jurors empaneled had the `capacity to credit the evidence in mitigation,' State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 154, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II ), and the ability to perform their duties in accordance with the court's instructions and their oaths... Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 34-35, 594 A. 2d 172. The Court also has resisted reversing convictions due to inadequate voir dire with regard to victim status when it can be said that defense counsel had a strategic reason for not delving into the nature of the victim. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 93, 586 A. 2d 85 (finding no abuse of discretion given that defense counsel requested that questions regarding death-qualification be limited as part of well-considered strategic attempt to limit juror exposure to questions concerning capital punishment). There is no merit to defendant's claim that counsel did not adequately delve into the impact the victim's age might have on jurors. Both the court and defense counsel extensively questioned the jurors regarding the fact the victim was a child. Only two jurors were not questioned extensively on that issue, Delventhal and Livecchi. Nothing in either jurors' statement raise questions about their ability to remain impartial. In the first instance, Delventhal was asked if he could properly consider victim impact and mitigating evidence as instructed by the court. He answered that he could. Although defense counsel did not follow up and question Delventhal regarding his feelings on children, counsel probed whether the juror would consider mitigating evidence about the defendant and, if so, what type. Undoubtedly, counsel made a strategic decision not to go further with those questions because there was no indication from Delventhal that he would be unfriendly to the defense. In fact, Delventhal used to be a criminal defense attorney. More importantly, Delventhal was the only juror at that point who did not know of defendant's prior criminal record. Those facts presumably played a role in defense counsel's decision not to object to Delventhal's qualification as a juror. In Livecchi's case, there also was no evidence that she would have a problem remaining impartial. Although the court did not ask Livecchi the same in-depth questions regarding the victim's age as it had asked the other jurors, defense counsel probed the issue. Counsel questioned whether the Kankas' victim impact evidence would be overwhelmingly emotional for Livecchi. She answered no. When pressed, she insisted that she would consider the mitigating evidence as carefully and as equally as she considered the family's impact statements. Based on Livecchi's oral and written answers, defense counsel and the court had no reason to believe the victim's age would interfere with Livecchi's ability to remain impartial. Defense counsel's failure to object to Livecchi's qualification likely was a strategic decision. We conclude that the court adequately questioned the jurors regarding the possible bias that might result from their knowledge that the victim was seven years old. The court posed open-ended questions based on the answers the juror had given in the questionnaire. Defense counsel displayed no reluctance to question jurors extensively on the subject, indicating that counsel had strategic reasons for the omission in instances when it did not probe further. Every juror who said anything that would indicate bias was excused from the panel. In light of those facts, we find that no error was committed by the trial court. Defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel also is without merit. Counsel failed to elaborate on the court's questioning regarding the victim in only one instance, and there is a clear indication that that decision was strategic. Moreover, defendant offers no evidence to support the contention that but for counsel's deficiencies (if the Court were to find that there were any), the result of the proceeding would have been different. Defendant's claims, therefore, are rejected.

On April 18, 1997, defendant challenged the Hunterdon County's jury pool selection process on the ground that it was not random, as required by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1. He asked for a stay in the proceedings pending further investigation and hearings on the matter. In support of his motion, defendant relied solely on materials prepared by social psychologist John Lamberth, Ph.D. for a similar motion filed in the pending capital case of State v. Robert Simon. [10] Dr. Lamberth's statistical analysis of the jury pool in Simon revealed that, given the population of Hunterdon County, an extraordinary number of jurors were drawn from the same families. Lamberth offered no independent analysis of the jury pool in defendant's case. Defendant requested a stay so the defense expert could further investigate the County's compliance with statutory guidelines for jury pool selection under N.J.S.A. 2B:20-2, 20-3 and 20-4. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court observed that, pursuant to Rule 1:8-5, jury lists were made available to both parties on January 13, 1997, twenty days before voir dire commenced. One hundred and sixteen days had passed since that date. Moreover, defendant's motion offered no indication that defendant had attempted to view the information on Hunterdon County's jury selection procedures, as allowed by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4(e)(2). Defendant's motion was based on a speculative certification challenging a jury in another case. Because defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case for a violation, the court concluded that relaxing the rules would indulge a fishing expedition: There's nothing before me to suggest that random selection of the jury pool based upon electronic means was insufficient, was prejudicial, was not satisfactory. The court denied the motion, ruling that defendant had failed to show good cause to excuse the delay in filing.
Capital appeals require special attention to procedural fairness. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A. 2d 641. [J]ury selection is an integral part of the fair process to which every criminal defendant is entitled. It is vital that juries be selected in a manner free from taint and suspicion. To that end the pertinent practice safeguards in the statute must be carefully observed. In capital cases, this responsibility is of the deepest concern. [ Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 230, 524 A. 2d 188 (citations omitted).] N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4d guarantees an impartial jury panel by requiring that [b]oth the drawing of names and the assignment of selected names to [jury] panels shall be public and random. Section 4e provides that [t]he Assignment Judge may provide for the random selection of jurors, and their assignment to panels, by the use of electronic devices, if ... (2) the specification of the method and any programs and procedures used to implement the method, including any computer programs which are utilized, are available for public inspection upon request. Any party can challenge the jury array on the ground that the jurors were not selected, drawn or summoned according to law. R. 1:8-3(b). In State v. Long, 204 N.J.Super. 469, 482, 499 A. 2d 264 (Law Div.1985), the court held that a defendant must challenge the petit jury within thirty days of entering an initial plea. (reading R. 1:8-3 and R. 3:10-2 in pari materia ). The court may enlarge the time period if good cause is shown. Id. at 483, 499 A. 2d 264. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of actual prejudice to his right to a fair and impartial jury, the court can relax the time period. State v. Butler, 155 N.J.Super. 270, 271, 382 A. 2d 696 (App.Div.1978). Challenges asserting constitutional rights, however, must be shown to rest on fact. Mere conclusions are inadequate. State v. Robinson, 128 N.J.Super. 525, 530, 320 A. 2d 533 (Law Div.1974) (holding that defendant had not made out prima facie case for non-randomness in grand and petit jury selection process given that no figures or information regarding source of selection process were presented). Where a defendant has ample opportunity to investigate improper jury pooling, courts likely will reject challenges to the jury array made in an untimely manner. State v. McClain, 263 N.J.Super. 488, 496-97, 623 A. 2d 280 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 477, 634 A. 2d 524 (1993); Robinson, supra, 128 N.J.Super. at 529, 320 A. 2d 533 (holding that because defense had many months to investigate jury pool selection procedures, challenge to array was properly denied). Time limitations on these challenges are strictly enforced to foster judicial efficiency. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 128, 549 A. 2d 792. Although a trial court does not abuse its discretion by granting untimely challenges to jury randomness, acceptance of such eleventh hour claims is by no means constitutionally compelled. Long, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 37, 486 A. 2d 351. Given the strict rules regarding jury pool sampling challenges, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a stay. Defendant failed to show good cause entitling him to an extension of time and he did not make a prima facie showing of prejudice. Defendant was given the panel list within the applicable twenty day period. Despite ample opportunity to challenge the array, the defense took few steps to investigate. Defendant never attempted to get information regarding the process Hunterdon County used in selecting its jury, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4e. Although he did present the analysis that Lamberth had conducted for the Simon case, showing that many members of the jury pool had the same last name, Lamberth did not analyze the data over time. Nor did Lamberth analyze the process used in defendant's case. In short, defendant's argument was based on speculation. He simply did not make out a prima facie case for non-randomness. Cf. Long, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 37, 486 A. 2d 351 (allowing stay while noting that it had no obligation to accept untimely challenges). Therefore, the court was within its discretion in denying defendant's application for a stay.

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his confessions. Defendant argues that the statements fail to satisfy the basic criterion of voluntariness and were not the product of a valid waiver, given his mental limitations. With regard to his initial statement in Cifelli's bedroom, defendant argues that the officers were engaging in custodial interrogation. Therefore, the officers should have administered Miranda warnings. Defendant further asserts that, although he was read his rights at the police station, the second statement made there was tainted by the earlier statement made in Cifelli's bedroom. Accordingly, those statements must be suppressed as well. Next, defendant contends the statement made when Brian Jenin entered the interrogation room should be suppressed on the ground that Jenin was acting as an agent for the State. Defendant also claims his request to speak with Jenin was tantamount to a request to end interrogation. Defendant asks the court to reverse the trial court's decision not to suppress all subsequent confessions as poisonous fruit derived from the tainted confession he made in response to Jenin's comment, They got you, they got you, they got you. Finally, defendant makes a totality of the circumstances argument. He contends that the statements cannot be considered voluntary in light of the long time period over which the interrogations took place, the late hours of the questioning, the fact he had little, if any, sleep, and his mental deficiencies. In addition to the physical deprivations suffered by defendant, he argues that the nature of the questioning was coercive and manipulative, and the use of the polygraph test exacerbated that coerciveness.
Defendant's statements to the police, made over a three-day period beginning on the day of the victim's disappearance, were important to the State's case. At the N.J.R.E. 104 suppression hearing, state witnesses described the circumstances under which defendant made his statements. On the night of the victim's disappearance, Hamilton Township detectives O'Dwyer, Kieffer and their supervisor, Stanley, arrived at defendant's residence, 27 Barbara Lee Drive. Patrol officers conducting interviews in the area had information that a released sex offender, Joseph Cifelli, lived at 27 Barbara Lee Drive. After Cifelli signed a consent to search form, the three detectives searched the house in which defendant, Cifelli, Jenin, and Cifelli's mother lived. Police initially considered Cifelli to be a suspect. They read him his Miranda rights and questioned him in his bedroom. Cifelli gave detectives an alibi and receipts to corroborate his account. He then informed the officers that defendant once had molested a seven-year-old girl. Jenin was called into the bedroom next. The detectives testified that they did not administer Miranda warnings because Jenin was not considered a suspect at that time. The police were just gathering information. Jenin corroborated Cifelli's story. Detectives then called defendant into the bedroom. Kieffer testified that at that time, defendant was no more a suspect than anyone else in the neighborhood. Therefore, the detectives did not administer Miranda warnings. Defendant was not told he was free to leave the room, but O'Dwyer testified that the questioning was non-custodial. According to O'Dwyer, defendant appeared very nervous and defensive and was perspiring heavily. When the detectives showed defendant a picture of the victim, defendant just stared at it. Detectives then asked defendant where he had been that day and when was the last time he had seen the victim. Defendant told the detectives that Megan stopped by his house with two friends while he was outside washing his boat. They had a brief conversation and the girls left. Defendant also was asked about his prior record. He told Kieffer that he had pushed a girl off a bike. When pressed by detectives, defendant admitted that he had tried to sniff her underwear. Defendant was asked if he would submit to a polygraph test. Defendant replied that, based on past experience, the machine did not work on him. At approximately 1:45 a.m., the detectives asked defendant if they could question him further at headquarters. He agreed, but insisted on driving his own car. Defendant was permitted to drive himself to headquarters, followed closely behind by the detectives. Kieffer wrote in his report that defendant was asked to come to headquarters for further questioning [d]ue to [his] demeanor [and] physical actions ... visible from the outset. It was not until the end of that initial questioning that police considered him a suspect. At 2:30 a.m., upon arriving at headquarters, O'Dwyer read defendant his Miranda rights. O'Dwyer placed a copy of the form in front of defendant so he could read along. The detectives read defendant his rights because they knew that there was something more involved, based on defendant's nervousness and physical behavior. Defendant said that he understood his rights and signed a form to indicate such. Police also read him a waiver form. Defendant signed it, agreeing that he waived his rights. O'Dwyer and Kieffer witnessed his signature. The detectives testified that defendant did not ask any questions and expressed a desire to help. He was alert and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The detectives made no threats or promises to induce defendant to sign the waiver. Detectives resumed questioning at approximately 2:40 a.m. They asked defendant about his day and the last time he had seen the victim. Defendant then was asked to write down this account, which he was left alone to do. Defendant finished writing the statement at 3:50 a.m. The statement basically was consistent with his oral statements. Defendant then consented to a search of his truck. Defendant had been with O'Dwyer since 1:15 a.m. Although the detective had not seen him sleep at all during that time, O'Dwyer submitted that defendant was alert and understood all that was going on. Defendant never asked for an attorney at any point during the questioning. No promises or threats were made. He was not told that he would be treated more favorably if he cooperated. At 4:00 a.m., after detectives completed the search, defendant was permitted to leave headquarters with the understanding he would return later that day for a polygraph test. The next day, July 30, at about 10:40 a.m., Kieffer, O'Dwyer and Stanley went to 27 Barbara Lane and asked Cifelli, Jenin and defendant to come to headquarters for more questioning. The three agreed to go and were transported in police vehicles. Cifelli and Jenin were questioned in separate rooms and defendant was placed in a room with two polygraph operators, Detectives Pukenas and McDonough, Pukenas testified that he filled out a polygraph Miranda, form, which contained an authorization to disclose information resulting from the test. Pukenas read the form aloud and explained it to defendant. Pukenas described defendant as awake, calm, and alert. Pukenas maintained that defendant understood this was a non-stipulated polygraph test and could not be admitted at trial. At 12:24 p.m., defendant signed the form. Pukenas first performed a background test on defendant to determine if he was mentally and physically suitable for the polygraph. Defendant responded that he had taken a polygraph test before. He stated that he never had been treated for a nervous condition, but he had received some psychological treatment at Avenel between 1979 and 1988. Defendant also stated that he was a little tight from nerves, but had no other apparent physical ailments. Defendant told Pukenas that he had two-and-one-half to three hours of sleep the day before but had slept real good for an hour. Defendant described himself as a little bit tired but okay. When asked if he had eaten anything, defendant said no and claimed he was not hungry. He accepted a Pepsi at 12:37 p.m. In response to questions regarding his educational background, defendant told the detective he had dropped out of 11th grade and obtained a GED. After this preliminary questioning, Pukenas explained the polygraph test to defendant. Pukenas testified that defendant had no problems understanding and did not hesitate to take the test. Pukenas then asked defendant to write his account of the previous day's events and left the room. When defendant completed his statement, Pukenas read it back to defendant. The two discussed it to make sure defendant had left nothing out. Although the statement contained a number of spelling and grammatical mistakes, the detectives testified that it was comprehensible. Nothing in the statement was explicitly inculpatory. Pukenas then asked defendant a number of standard behavioral observation questions. Pukenas testified that these questions were not related, on the whole, to the polygraph, but rather to the whole day, or the overall investigation. They then took a short break, during which time defendant used the bathroom. Pukenas then read defendant the questions he would ask during the polygraph test and advised him that they were the only questions he would ask. Defendant was still cooperative and showed no hesitation. The test was administered three times, concluding at 2:25 p.m. Defendant's answers were consistent with his prior responses. Defendant then signed the polygraph charts. Shortly after 3:00 p.m., Pukenas informed defendant that he had failed the test. Pukenas explained that failure to pass meant that defendant was not being completely truthful. Defendant continued to deny involvement in the victim's disappearance. Defendant used the bathroom at 4:12 p.m. and Pukenas brought him pizza and soda at 4:39 p.m. From 4:50 to 5:20 p.m., Detective Schwartz from Middlesex Borough, whom defendant knew from a prior arrest, was alone with defendant. Pukenas asserted that Schwartz was probably questioning defendant during that time to elicit an admission. Beginning at about 5:30 p.m., Pukenas and McDonough met with defendant alone. They told him that certain things didn't look good in his favor. When asked if he would like to speak to a friend, like Jenin, defendant answered, Sure, bring him in. The detectives went to find Jenin, while Schwartz came in to sit with defendant. Pukenas and McDonough told Jenin they believed defendant had something to do with the victim's disappearance. Pukenas asked Jenin if he would like to speak to defendant, telling him that defendant wanted to speak to him. Pukenas testified that Jenin's talking to defendant was either Pukenas' or McDonough's idea, adding that he did not know what Jenin would say to defendant, nor did any of the detectives tell him what to say. Jenin told Pukenas he believed defendant was probably guilty. Jenin was brought into the room with defendant at 6:29 p.m. According to Pukenas, Jenin initiated the conversation with defendant, immediately saying defendant would need a friend on the outside. He then said, they got you, they got you, they got you. At that point, defendant made his first admission. Defendant told Jenin, [s]he's in Mercer County Park. Pukenas testified that neither Jenin nor the detectives said, Tell [me] ... where the body is. Pukenas asked defendant if there was a possibility that Megan was still alive. Defendant answered, [n]o, she's dead. I put a plastic bag over her head. Defendant then agreed to accompany the officers to the park. Pukenas testified that defendant was not asked any questions in the car, nor was he threatened. Defendant volunteered that he had been able to take the victim to the park, go to a WaWa and return home in 15 minutes. At the park, defendant led the officers directly to the victim's body. In the car on the way back from the park, the detectives asked defendant what had occurred. Defendant then gave his account of the events on the day of the incident. Again, Pukenas testified that they made no threats and used no coercion. Back at headquarters, Pukenas asked defendant to write a statement about the events that occurred on the day the victim disappeared. The detective did not administer Miranda warnings at that time. Pukenas testified that defendant still appeared awake, alert, and not confused. Defendant wrote out his statement. At the same time, Pukenas went to the detective bureau and wrote a report detailing defendant's oral statements in the car. In the car, defendant admitted to sexually touching Megan, killing her when she tried to get away, carrying her body outside the house in a toy box, and bringing her to the park. Pukenas testified that defendant appeared sufficiently awake to give a formal statement. Defendant never asked for an attorney or if he could stop talking. Defendant never complained about how police treated him the entire time he was in custody. After reading defendant's written statement, O'Dwyer went to speak with defendant. Defendant was given the opportunity to use the restroom and smoke. He was asked if he wanted food. He accepted only a soda. O'Dwyer testified that defendant was alert, seemed to have no difficulty understanding the questions posed to him, and exhibited no hesitation in answering. O'Dwyer observed that defendant appeared less nervous than beforealmost relieved. Defendant was offered breaks during the session but did not ask to eat or use the bathroom. At 8:25 p.m., O'Dwyer read defendant his rights. O'Dwyer testified that defendant had no questions; he felt that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and agreed to speak.... Defendant's oral responses were then typed into the computer. After the final statement was printed, O'Dwyer showed it to defendant, read him his rights again, and asked if he understood them. Defendant initialed the line on the form reading, do you wish to give a statement at this time[ ] The statement was marked concluded at 9:55 p.m. Defendant was asked to read the statement and make any changes he wanted. Defendant initialed the bottom of each page, making no changes and asking no questions. Shortly after midnight, defendant was arrested on a complaint sworn out by Kieffer. Defendant was then placed in a cell and presented with charges. He was fingerprinted at 1:30 a.m., and was asked for his consent to take fingernail clippings at 4:00 a.m. At 4:00 p.m. on the following day, defendant consented to and was examined by Dr. Haskell Askins, a forensic dentist. Defendant agreed to have his teeth and right hand photographed. This took about 45-60 minutes, during which time Kieffer observed that defendant was awake, alert and cooperative. At 4:55 p.m. defendant gave yet another statement. This statement was prompted by the discovery of evidence at Megan's autopsy that contradicted defendant's previous accounts. Kieffer handed defendant a rights form and told him to read it to himself. Defendant appeared to be awake and paying attention, according to the detective. Kieffer was convinced that defendant understood his rights and waived them voluntarily. After Kieffer told defendant of the autopsy findings, defendant stated that he had not been entirely truthful the day before but that he would be. The detectives questioned defendant for thirty minutes. Defendant gave a complete account of the incident, admitting to hitting the victim and attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. Kieffer then re-read defendant his rights. Defendant signed a waiver form and made another formal statement. He asked the officers no questions. When the statement was printed, defendant read it over and initialed each page. He then made a few other assertions about the incident and stated, I feel better after telling you the rest of the truth about what happened. At the suppression hearing, the trial court held that all of defendant's statements were admissible. First, the court found that defendant was competent to waive his constitutional rights. He had a GED, could read and write, and understood all that occurred about him. Defendant's actions also demonstrated his cleverness and ability to deal with the police. With regard to the questioning at defendant's home, the court held that the setting was not custodial. The questioning was brief and non-coercive; defendant could have ended the encounter at any point. Miranda warnings, therefore, were not required and subsequent statements were not tainted by the failure to Mirandize defendant. With regard to defendant's formal statements, the court found that adequate warnings were administered and defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. The court found the police witnesses to be credible and believable. There was no evidence that the police intimidated, threatened, deceived or coerced defendant or overbore defendant's will. The court also rejected the claim that the statements should be suppressed because of defendant's lack of sleep, delay in arraignment, and lack of warning of potential death penalty charges. Defendant's motion was denied in its entirety.
Confessions obtained by police during custodial interrogation are barred from evidence unless the defendant has been advised of his constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 707 (1966); State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 354, 700 A. 2d 306 (1997); Chew I, supra, 150 N.J. at 60-61, 695 A. 2d 1301. A waiver of rights is valid only if it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 706-07; State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 657, 628 A. 2d 735 (1993). In order to survive a suppression challenge, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary and not the product of official misconduct. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654, 628 A. 2d 735. The court must look at the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the interrogation. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 356, 700 A. 2d 306; Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654, 628 A. 2d 735. Among the factors to consider in determining voluntariness are the suspect's age, education, intelligence, previous encounters with law enforcement, advice received about his or her constitutional rights, the length of detention, the period of time between administration of the warnings and the volunteered statement, and whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature or involved physical or mental abuse. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654, 628 A. 2d 735; State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402, 388 A. 2d 218 (1978); State v. J.G., 261 N.J.Super. 409, 424, 619 A. 2d 232 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 436, 627 A. 2d 1142 (1993). The court must be satisfied that the statement was made of the defendant's own rational, free and unconstrained choice. United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F. 3d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1153, 116 S.Ct. 1032, 134 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1996); see also State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 257, 571 A. 2d 914 (1990) ( DiFrisco I ). Confessions are not voluntary if derived from very substantial coercive tactics that overbear the suspect's will. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654-56, 628 A. 2d 735.
The Miranda requirement is triggered by custodial interrogation, i.e., questioning by law enforcement officers after a suspect has been deprived of freedom of action in a significant way. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 706; State v. Smith, 307 N.J.Super. 1, 8-9, 704 A. 2d 73 (App. Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 216, 708 A. 2d 67 (1998); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 102-03, 703 A. 2d 901 (1997). In determining whether the defendant would have felt free to leave, the court should consider the nature and degree of pressure applied to detain the suspect, the duration of the questioning, the physical surroundings, and the language used by police. Smith, supra, 307 N.J.Super. at 9, 704 A. 2d 73. If the questioning is simply part of an investigation and is not targeted at the individual because she or he is a suspect, the rights provided by Miranda are not implicated. State v. Pierson, 223 N.J.Super. 62, 67, 537 A. 2d 1340 (App.Div.1988). In this case, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the oral statements made by defendant in Cifelli's room did not involve custodial interrogation and were admissible. The police questioned defendant and other neighbors in connection with the early stages of a missingchild investigation. Because the questioning took place in defendant's house, not in a police station, the location of the questioning was not inherently intimidating. The interview was not lengthy in duration and defendant was not restrained in any way. The fact that defendant was permitted to drive his own car to the police station supports the finding that defendant was free to leave. Moreover, the fact that defendant witnessed both Jenin and Cifelli emerge from questioning should have indicated he was free to leave. There is no evidence that detectives considered defendant a suspect at that point, sought to detain him, or pressured him in any fashion. Accordingly, we also conclude that the initial statements could not, and did not, taint subsequent statements made pursuant to a valid Miranda waiver.
Defendant asserts that his request to see Jenin was tantamount to an invocation of his right to remain silent and to end all questioning. A request to end interrogation, however ambiguous, must be scrupulously honored by the authorities. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed. 2d 313, 321-22 (1975); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 64, 548 A. 2d 846 (1988) ( Bey I ); State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 415, 581 A. 2d 483 (1990) (Harvey I) , cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct. 1336, 113 L.Ed. 2d 268 (1991). In Harvey, supra, the defendant requested to speak with his father. Id. at 417, 581 A. 2d 483. At the conclusion of their meeting, which lasted over three hours, the defendant made a statement to police. Ibid. The police did not issue new Miranda warnings until after the statement was recorded. Immediately after his rights were read, the defendant requested an attorney. Ibid. The Court held that the defendant's request to speak with his father constituted a request to terminate the interrogation. Id. at 419-20, 581 A. 2d 483. The defendant had maintained that he did not want to talk about the murder throughout the three days of questioning. Ibid. The Court reasoned that defendant would have invoked his rights earlier, had the police read them. Ibid. This case is different. Defendant had been given an opportunity to invoke his rights several times prior to seeing Jenin. He never once invoked them. The meeting with Jenin was not in private, it occurred in the presence of officers. Defendant never requested to be alone with Jenin. The meeting was brief (only a few minutes), because it took defendant very little time to confess. Jenin was not called into the room on defendant's initiative. The meeting was arranged by the detectives. Defendant merely responded in the affirmative to the officers' suggestion that he talk to Jenin. In short, we find no evidence that defendant had any intention of invoking his constitutional right to silence or to terminate interrogation by agreeing to speak with Jenin. We also see little merit in defendant's assertion that Jenin was acting as a police agent, and therefore the failure to readminister Miranda warnings prior to Jenin's involvement violated defendant's right to counsel. There is no evidence that Jenin was acting as a government agent. The police did not direct Jenin to elicit any information from defendant. Jenin's outburst and defendant's response were unexpected. Moreover, the rule regarding the use of government agents to elicit incriminating statements applies only when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been triggered by indictment and he is represented by counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169-74, 106 S.Ct. All, 483-86, 88 L.Ed. 2d 481, 491-95 (1985); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-06, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1202-03, 12 L.E6L2A 246 (1964). State v. Bey, 258 N.J.Super. 451, 466, 610 A. 2d 403 (App.Div.1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19, 611 A2d 657 (1992); State v. Leopardi, 305 N.J.Super. 70, 76, 701 A2d 952 (App.Div.1997) certif. denied, 153 N.J. 48, 707 A2d 152 (1998). Neither of those factors was present here.
Defendant argues that the circumstances under which he was questioned over a period of 44 hours with little sleeprendered his statements involuntary because his will was overborne by the detectives. The questioning began on the evening of June 29, 1994, shortly before midnight, and continued until 4:00 a.m. the following morning. Defendant was back at headquarters at 10:45 a.m. after only a few hours of sleep. He was engaged in a lengthy period of questioning, lasting until 6:25 p.m. when he confessed. Defendant was taken directly to the park to locate the victim's body, returned to custody immediately afterwards, and questioned in the car on the way back. Defendant was then placed in a cell, where he was disturbed several times. The questioning resumed at 3:00 p.m. the following day. Although repeated questioning by the authorities when a defendant has had little sleep, combined with statements intimating that the defendant was not being truthful and the police had evidence against him, in certain circumstances, could render the defendant's statements involuntary, the record in this case does not support that conclusion. First, the questioning was not around the clock or continuous. Defendant was allowed to go home. During the periods he was at the station, the officers offered him many breaks. Moreover, defendant never indicated to officers that he was too tired or hungry to continue. His demeanor, appearance, and responses indicated to the officers that he was alert and in control. There is also ample evidence indicating that defendant's confessions were the product of his own free will. The officers administered Miranda warnings to defendant several times and he waived them each time. He never requested counsel or asked to terminate the interviews. He sat with police and went over his statements with them. He was allowed to make any corrections, but made none. The officers never threatened defendant or physically coerced him to cooperate or confess. In fact, defendant repeatedly stated his desire to cooperate in finding the victim. In short, there is no evidence that police used coercive tactics in obtaining any of the confessions. Nor is there any evidence indicating that defendant was so mentally deficient as to be incapable of comprehending his constitutional warnings. Defendant went to high school through the eleventh grade and obtained a GED. No one testified, and defendant presented no evidence, to support his claim that he was incapable of understanding the police warnings. We therefore agree with the trial court that defendant was competent to waive his constitutional rights Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that defendant understood his rights and intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights over and over again. The record reveals a defendant who was alert and responsive and who confessed by his own free will. Accordingly, defendant's statements were properly admitted into evidence.
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly excluded a statement made to police by defendant's housemate Brian Jenin. Defendant contends the statement was against Jenin's penal interest in that it strongly indicated that Jenin knew of the victim's death before defendant confessed to the crime. Defendant argues that the exclusion violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and his corresponding rights under the New Jersey Constitution, necessitating reversal of his conviction.