Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assertedly Improper Characterization of Attack on de Maderos

Text: Defendant contends, in essence, that when the trial court instructed the jury regarding the evidence that defendant had attacked de Maderos 10 to 12 years earlier, it repeatedly and improperly directed a verdict that defendant's conduct constituted an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, and/or attempted murder. He asserts the erroneous instructions increased the aggravating effect of this evidence. We conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury that it was for them to determine whether the evidence of the attack on de Maderos amounted to an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, or attempted murder. In assessing whether the jury instructions given were erroneous, the reviewing court must consider the instructions as a whole ... [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given. ( People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal. App.4th 1107, 1111, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 433; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 13; see also People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 675, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752 [claims of instructional error are evaluated in the context of the overall charge to the jury].) Here, in addition to the challenged instructions, the court instructed the jurors under former CALJIC Nos. 2.90 and 8.87 that when determining whether defendant committed an attack on de Maderos that constituted an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, or attempted murder, they were to presume defendant was innocent until the evidence proved otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurors were specifically instructed that they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed such criminal activity before they could consider the evidence as an aggravating factor. In addition, the court told the jurors that if there was any reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved defendant committed the criminal activity, then the jurors must not consider the evidence for any purpose. Various other instructions informed the jurors that defendant was to receive the benefit of reasonable doubt: Former CALJIC No. 2.01 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence], former CALJIC No. 2.72 [proof of corpus delicti], and former CALJIC No. 2.91 [burden of proving identity]. Therefore, in considering the overall charge to the jury, we conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the instructions under the belief that the trial court was directing them to find the conduct alleged constituted an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, or attempted murder. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.)