Opinion ID: 1161008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: additional trial issues

Text: The defendant raises the following additional issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the withholding of exculpatory evidence; (3) the trial court's giving of an instruction on aiding and abetting over objection of the defendant; (4) the trial court's failure to remove three jurors for cause; and (5) the defendant's contentions that the clothing and buttons worn by the family of the victim prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. (1) Sufficiency of evidence We have previously set forth the facts regarding the crimes in detail. Under the facts, we have no hesitancy in concluding, after review of all the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Claiborne, 262 Kan. 416, Syl. ¶ 5, 940 P.2d 27 (1977). (2) Exculpatory evidence The defendant argues that the State withheld exculpatory evidence that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Specifically, he argued that a travel pass he received from a probation officer, which would indicate that he had a reason other than for the sale of a stolen vehicle to be in Oklahoma, was withheld by the State. The basic flaw with the defendant's contention is that the defendant had personal knowledge of this fact available to him before and during the trial. Thus, he is not prejudiced by the State's failure to produce such evidence. State v. Peckham, 255 Kan. 310, 341, 875 P.2d 257 (1994). Further, Landwehr testified at trial that the defendant did in fact have an appointment in Oklahoma and that he arrived at that appointment. Thus, the jury was informed that the defendant did have a legitimate noncriminal reason for being in Oklahoma, and no prejudice resulted from the failure of the State to inform the defendant of the travel pass. The defendant also contends that he was not informed by the State that State's witness, Benjamin Amaro, Jr., was sent to Lansing along with Copridge. The defendant contends that he was entitled to know this information. However, he fails to show how the failure to receive this information prejudiced his case. Further, it was clear from the transport orders filed in this case that both Copridge and Amaro were at Lansing. Therefore, the State did not withhold information, and the defendant is not entitled to relief. (3) Aiding and abetting The defendant contends there was not sufficient evidence to show that he aided and abetted in the crimes charged and at most, the evidence established that he merely associated with Copridge, the true perpetrator. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the evidence at trial disclosed that the defendant entered into a plan with Copridge to rob the victim and the defendant discussed this plan in the presence of others. The defendant admitted that he went with Copridge to the victim's residence the evening of the robbery and murder. Ample evidence supported the giving of an instruction on aiding and abetting. See State v. Words, 226 Kan. 59, 64-65, 596 P.2d 129 (1979). (4) Challenge for cause We have reviewed the record concerning the defendant's challenges for cause. Based upon this review, we conclude the defendant's assertions in this regard have no merit In one instance, defense counsel suggested that the challenged juror be made an alternate. This was done, and the challenged juror did not sit on the panel that convicted the defendant. In a second instance, the trial court carefully questioned a juror's prior knowledge of the Copridge trial. When it was determined that the challenged juror had no such knowledge, defense counsel decided not to object and the record supports that no subsequent challenge for cause existed. Finally, a juror indicated that she knew a witness who was to testify at trial. When the court determined there was no issue about the fact the witness was going to testify to, the court took no further action, Moreover, the defendant, in his statement to the police, admitted the very fact that the witness testified to at trial. Under the circumstances, there was no basis for a challenge for cause. (5) Clothing and buttons worn by the family of the victim The defendant next contends that the buttons and t-shirts worn by certain members of Williams' family prejudiced his right to a fair trial. He argues that his conviction should be overturned due to this prejudice. During trial, the defendant called the court's attention to the fact that members of Williams' family were wearing buttons in the courtroom with Williams' picture on them. The defendant asked that the family members be directed to remove the buttons, which request was denied by the court. Later, the defendant showed the court that the family members were wearing t-shirts with a picture of Williams on them. The defendant requested that the family members be directed to remove the shirts, which request was also denied. In denying the request, the court noted that the jurors had been directed to decide the case on the evidence presented. In State v. Bradford, 254 Kan. 133, 141-42, 864 P.2d 680 (1993), a similar incident was addressed when spectators wore buttons with the victim's picture. We determined in Bradford that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to ask the spectators to remove the buttons at the outset of trial. 254 Kan. at 142. In this case, however, the court refused to direct the spectators to remove the buttons and t-shirts and, thus, the case is more directly similar to State v. McNaught, 238 Kan. 567, 577, 713 P.2d 457 (1986). In McNaught, spectators at trial wore Mothers Against Drunk Driving and Students Against Drunk Driving buttons which the court refused to direct the spectators to remove. We held that, in the administration of justice, the trial judge is charged with the preservation of order in his or her court with the duty to see that justice is not obstructed by any person or persons whatsoever. We also noted that a large measure of discretion resides in the trial court in this respect and its exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that prejudice resulted from the denial of a legal right. 238 Kan. at 577. We then determined that where the record did not show the number of persons wearing buttons, or contain any evidence that the jurors showed concern about the buttons, no prejudice or abuse of discretion resulted. 238 Kan. at 580. As in McNaught, there was no evidence regarding the number of spectators wearing the buttons or t-shirts and also no evidence that the jurors were in any way affected by the buttons or t-shirts. That being said, however, it would seem that the wearing of such buttons or t-shirts is not a good idea because of the possibility of prejudice which might result. Under the circumstances, it would have been better for the district court to have ordered the buttons removed or the t-shirts covered up. However, under the standard we set in McNaught, the defendant has failed to show that his rights were prejudiced by the spectators' display.