Opinion ID: 1421477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Effect of Prior Determination of Disability

Text: Reliance on principles of collateral estoppel is inappropriate under the terms of the statute which specifically permits reconsideration of disability at periodic intervals. RCW 41.26.130(5); RCW 41.26.140(1). Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine intended to prevent relitigation of issues which have been actually and necessarily contested and determined ... Peterson v. Department of Ecology, 92 Wn.2d 306, 312, 596 P.2d 285 (1979). Estoppel by judgment is not appropriately invoked in judicial proceedings where there is an ambiguity in the prior judgment. Peterson, at 313; Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn.2d 109, 117-18, 431 P.2d 961 (1967). Under the statute, an administrative decision that a worker is disabled is not the sort of issue that is actually and necessarily contested and determined to a degree to be considered conclusive. A determination that a claimant is unable to continue his service ... under RCW 41.26.120 is not a final judgment. [2] Such an administrative determination need not even be adversarial. A determination may be based on a number of factors such as definitive medical evidence, speculative medical evidence, and subjective evidence from the claimant. When the evidence is vague or inconclusive, a disability retirement may be granted, awaiting future findings. Surely, such a determination of disability should not be considered a final litigation of the issue, subject to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [3] In fact, to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to disability decisions may work to the disadvantage of the claimant. The Department will be less likely to grant a disability pending future developments if a heavy burden of changed circumstances is required to cancel disability benefits. A better approach and one more consistent with statutory intent would be to adopt the principle that a determination of disability creates a presumption of a continuing disability, with the burden on the Department to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. This is one approach used by federal courts in addressing termination of social security disability benefits. See, e.g., Kuzmin v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir.1983). Application of the judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel to administrative decisions is also dependent upon policy considerations. State v. Dupard, 93 Wn.2d 268, 609 P.2d 961 (1980). In the present case, invocation of the doctrine is not consistent with the policy and intent of the statute. The clear intent of the statute is to provide economic security when a worker is disabled, and to return him to work when he is able. The statute strikes a careful balance between protecting the claimant's rights (by assuring a return at the same rank and at the same salary, and providing a full hearing before cancellation) and protecting the fiscal integrity of the retirement system. A disability retirement is not generally permanent, [4] being subject to periodic review of the disability. If, after reexamination, the Board determines that the beneficiary is not so incapacitated ... he shall be restored to duty ... RCW 41.26.140(2). The statute provides that a beneficiary over age 50 may refuse an examination without loss of benefits. RCW 41.26.140. But up until age 50, the intent of the statute is obvious: to restore disability beneficiaries to active employment if they become capable of performing their duties.