Opinion ID: 1255271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the defenses asserted

Text: As stated by the defendants, the question presented by their second assignment of error is whether the Swineys' continued use of the stove despite their admitted knowledge of its defective condition bar[s] the claim of reliance upon the implied warranty. The defendants say that the Swineys learned the day they first used the stove that the clock, the oven, and the burners malfunctioned and that, notwithstanding that knowledge, they continued to use the stove and ignored the instruction in the Owners' Guide to report the defect and have it repaired. Citing Layne-Atlantic Co. v. Koppers Co., 214 Va. 467, 473, 201 S.E.2d 609, 614 (1974), the defendants argue that there can be no recovery ... for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability when there has been a misuse of the article supplied and that the trial court erred when it failed to hold that continued use of a defective product constitutes misuse. We decline to apply such a rule to the facts in this case. It is true that the plaintiffs realized that the clock did not keep the right time and that the temperature controls did not work properly. But the stove functioned for its intended purpose for nearly nine months, and there is no evidence of record to show that the Swineys' continued use adversely affected its function. We have said that there can be no recovery against the manufacturer for breach of ... implied warranties when there has been an unforeseen misuse of the article supplied. Featherall v. Firestone, 219 Va. 949, 964, 252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979) (emphasis supplied). We hold, however, that continued use of a product with a latent manufacturer's defect is not a defense to a consumer's claim for breach of implied warranty when the defect merely restricts the utility of the product in the manner it did here. In such case, use by the consumer is foreseeable and cannot be characterized fairly as misuse.
In a related argument, the defendants contend that the Swineys persisted in their use of the stove, day after day, knowing it was dangerous, and assumed the risk of their injury. Without deciding whether the doctrine of assumption of risk is a defense to an action for breach of implied warranty, we find no merit in this argument. See Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 462-63, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965) (action is ex contractu and contributory-negligence defense does not apply). Assumption of the risk is venturousness and has two requirements: the nature and extent of the risk must be fully appreciated and the risk must be voluntarily incurred. Amusement Slides v. Lehmann, 217 Va. 815, 819, 232 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1977). The Swineys could not have appreciated the nature and extent of a risk resulting from a loose connection inside a stove which was unknown to anyone until the stove was examined by an expert. Margaret Swiney testified that she did not ever think that the stove was dangerous ... as long as you had those units cut off. And, while Roger Swiney testified that he considered the stove dangerous if you did not watch it, he had no reason to believe it was dangerous when it was not in use. Finding no merit in the defenses the defendants assert, we will affirm the judgment insofar as it resolves the liability issue in favor of the plaintiffs.