Opinion ID: 1234258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Prove Slander Per Se

Text: Hernstadt correctly argues that since there was no proof of special damages, Allen's case must be slander per se or he has no case. We are of the opinion that Allen has made out a case of slander per se. To constitute slander per se, the alleged defamation must be oral and must fall into one of four categories: (1) that the plaintiff committed a crime; (2) that the plaintiff has contracted a loathsome disease; (3) that a woman is unchaste; or, (4) the allegation must be one which would tend to injure the plaintiff in his or her trade, business, profession or office. Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 637 P.2d 1223 (1981). Hernstadt urges that Allen had no basis for claiming slander per se on the basis of injury to his professional reputation. Two reasons are stated for this claim. First, at the time of the campaign, Allen's only occupation was that of owner of a mobile home park in Carson City; therefore, since he was a non-incumbent, he had no political career which could have been injured. Second, Hernstadt argues that the bounced check charge could not injure Allen's reputation as a mobile home park owner. We disagree. At the time the remarks were made Allen was a candidate, and the statements were such that they could have injured Allen's reputation as a candidate for public office. They were thus actionable as slander per se. In the case of Devany v. Quill, 187 Misc. 698, 64 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y.App.Div 1946), it was held that defamatory words uttered against a non-incumbent candidate constituted slander per se if the words would tend to cause persons not to vote for the candidate. This rule has been followed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 comment b (1977). Hernstadt cites no authority to the contrary. Hernstadt urges that Allen could not make a case for slander per se unless Allen first proved that the defamatory comments implied an habitual course of similar conduct, or the want of the qualities or skill that the public is reasonably entitled to expect... . See Restatement (Second) Torts § 573 comment d (1977). Hernstadt argues that since he alleged only a single act of misconduct, namely, delivery of a bad check, the defamation could not constitute slander per se. There were, of course, three remarks  that Allen's check was no good, that because Allen did not pay his debts it was questionable how Allen might handle state funds, and that Allen was not an honorable candidate. Assuming at this point that these comments were defamatory, taken as a whole they clearly imply a want of qualities expected of a public officer and support a case for slander per se.