Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Batson/Wheeler Motions After Finding a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

Text: The prosecutor thereafter challenged the second and third Black prospective jurors, A.M. and S.B., who were the only two Black prospective jurors in the group then under consideration. Defendant again renewed the Batson/Wheeler motion. The trial court found defendant had made a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose in the challenge of the second and all subsequent Black prospective jurors, and asked the prosecutor to give his reasons for the challenges. [10] The prosecutor explained he had several reasons for challenging Prospective Juror A.M.: in his view, A.M. came from a family that did not have an abiding respect for the rule of law and was not smart enough to serve on the jury. Moreover, A.M. had considerable sympathy for Black people on trial and thought the justice system was unfair to Blacks. Next, the prosecutor explained he challenged S.B. because she was young, single, less sophisticated and less mature than was his ideal juror; she was opposed to the death penalty and found it to be the easy way out; and she harbored a wholly naïve view of the criminal mind. The court found that the reasons stated were not constitutionally infirm and denied the Batson/Wheeler motion. The prosecutor thereafter challenged Prospective Juror C.B., the fourth Black prospective juror, because of her unkempt and slovenly appearance, because she was unemployed and the unwed 33-year-old mother of a 14-year-old boy, because she harbored hostility toward the police, and because she felt the death penalty law treated Black people unfairly. The court found these explanations established race-neutral reasons for the challenges and denied the Batson/Wheeler motion. The prosecutor thereafter challenged Prospective Juror B.H., the fifth Black prospective juror, because of her youth and status as an unmarried mother of a two-and-a-half-year-old child. The court accepted this explanation, though it commented, I think [the prosecutor's] credibility is beginning to wear a little thin. Finally, the prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror M.M., the sixth Black prospective juror, explaining that she was acquainted with one of the defense witnesses, expressed some hostility toward the police, had a history of arrest, had family members in prison, and had reservations about imposing the death penalty. The court found these reasons to be race neutral and denied the Batson/Wheeler motion. Defendant argues the court erred in finding the prosecution's reasons to be race neutral. (7) [T]he question presented at the third stage of the Batson inquiry is `whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.' [ Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at p. 277 [125 S.Ct. 2317].] ( Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, 552 U.S. ___, ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1212].) [T]he critical question in determining whether [a party] has proved purposeful discrimination at step three is the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's justification for his peremptory strike. ( Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 338-339 [154 L.Ed.2d 931, 123 S.Ct. 1029].) The credibility of a prosecutor's stated reasons can be measured by, among other factors . . . how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy. ( Id. at p. 339.) The existence or nonexistence of purposeful racial discrimination is a question of fact. (See Miller-El v. Cockrell, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 339-340.) We review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard, [11] according deference to the trial court's ruling when the court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror. ( People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104-105 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400], citing People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874]; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) [T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor's race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine. ( People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852].) We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.] ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1].) A prosecutor's reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97.) `[J]urors may be excused based on hunches and even arbitrary exclusion is permissible, so long as the reasons are not based on impermissible group bias.' ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1186, fn. 6 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130].)
The first reason given by the prosecutor to justify his challenge to A.M. was that A.M. came from a family that did not have an abiding respect for the rule of law. Substantial evidence supports the statement, and the trial court could reasonably conclude it was race neutral: During voir dire, A.M. revealed his brother was in prison, and his daughter had been arrested for receiving stolen property and evidently prosecuted by the San Diego County District Attorney's Office. (8) The next reason given by the prosecutor was that A.M. had considerable sympathy for Black people on trial and thought the justice system was unfair to Blacks. Defense counsel argued that rather than being race neutral, the challenge of A.M. because of his attitudes about the treatment of Blacks in the justice system was itself race based. The court correctly ruled that a challenge based solely on the prospective juror's race is different from a challenge which may find its roots in part [in] the juror's attitude about the justice system and about society which may be race related. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1016 [a party does not offend Batson or Wheeler when it challenges prospective jurors who have shown orally, in writing, or through conduct in court, that they personally harbor biased views].) Substantial evidence supports the statement, and the trial court reasonably could conclude it was race neutral: A.M. did not expressly state as much, but his answers to three questions on the juror questionnaire indicate he harbored a skepticism regarding the fairness of the treatment of Blacks within the criminal justice system. Question 57 asked, Do you believe the death penalty law is administered fairly with respect to [Black men]? A.M. did not check either the Yes or No response, but wrote, Will all the facts be brought out for the jury? When asked in question 58 to explain why he thought Blacks make up a larger percentage of the prison population than of the general population, A.M. answered, In some cases the law is bias [ sic ]. Finally, question 75 asked, What do you believe are the major causes of crime in our society? A.M. answered, Society bias. Parents give a care attitude [ sic ]. The final reason given by the prosecutor was that A.M. had not risen above the rank of Petty Officer First Class after serving 20 years in the Navy. The prosecutor suggested that the reason for that was either A.M. was not smart enough to pass the tests that would have allowed him to rise in the ranks, or he may have felt he was discriminated against in the Navy because of his race, which the prosecutor linked to A.M.'s attitudes toward the treatment of Blacks in the justice system. The record reflects that A.M. did not graduate from high school and spent 20 years in the Navy as a Petty Officer First Class. Viewing these characteristics of A.M. in the light of his answers pertaining to his family's legal difficulties and his apparent sympathy for a Black defendant, the trial court's ruling that challenge of A.M. was unrelated to his race is supported by substantial evidence. The comparative juror analysis defendant suggests [12] does not further his claim. He suggests that seated Juror J.R., who was not Black, harbored an attitude similar to that of A.M. regarding the role race plays in the judicial system. He points to the portion of the record where the prosecutor discussed with the entire panel the verdict in the O.J. Simpson trial and the racial issues that arose therein. The prosecutor asked if there were any jurors for whom the situation in the O.J. Simpson verdict caused you to rethink your position regarding this case? ... That was a Black jury. Here as you look around you see this is a predominantly White jury. Anybody here that thinks race may play a role in this case? J.R. answered, The question I have is, if an all White jury would be truly of Mr. Hamilton's peers? The court explained that J.R. should not be concerned with that fact unless you think that would prevent you from being ... a fair and impartial juror. J.R. replied, It will not affect my decision. It was a question I had. Defendant asserts J.R.'s question revealed an attitude about race and the judicial system that was no different from that harbored by A.M. Not so. J.R.'s question revealed a curiosity about how the law defines a jury of one's peers, and, inferentially, a concern that an all-White jury might treat defendant differently than a diverse jury. The record reveals that A.M.'s attitude toward race and the judicial system was not just a curiosity or a concern, but amounted to a belief that the law and society were biased, and a lack of trust that the justice system would bring to light all the facts regarding a Black defendant. Comparing A.M. to J.R., therefore, does not show that the prosecutor challenged a Black juror who possessed the same characteristics as did a non-Black juror he did not challenge.
The prosecutor stated he challenged S.B. because she was young and single. The record reveals S.B. was 22 years old and unmarried. The prosecutor explained he did not want unsophisticated, immature jurors, since he thought the case would definitely appeal more to married people and particularly married people with children. His ideal juror would be between the ages of 40 and 65, although he would accept otherwise acceptable jurors who were over 30 years of age. (9) We need not examine the objective reasonableness of the prosecutor's stated basis for the challenge of S.B., namely his desire to exclude younger jurors. The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons. (See People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 917, citing Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 769 [131 L.Ed.2d 834, 115 S.Ct. 1769] [the prosecutor's reason for thinking a prospective juror would not make a good juror in the casethat the prospective juror had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard constituted a valid nondiscriminatory reason for exercising the challenge].) What matters is that the prosecutor's reason for exercising the peremptory challenge is legitimate. A `legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. [Citations.] (514 U.S. at p. 769.) Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has held that the exercise of peremptory strikes on the basis of age violates the Constitution. ( U.S. v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998) 160 F.3d 1071, 1075; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 278 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193].) There is nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecutor's desire for a more mature jury was not genuine. Substantial evidence also supports the prosecutor's contentions that S.B. was opposed to the death penalty and harbored a wholly naïve view of the criminal mind, and the trial court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral. S.B. wrote in her questionnaire that she opposed the death penalty because she felt it is the easy way out for a person who committed a crime. If one is guilty then I believe that he or she should get life in prison. So they can remember for the rest of their lives, the crime that he or she has committed. In voir dire, she elaborated, I think either way it would be the easy way out, whether he was in jail or if he died, because if he had no conscience he really wouldn't care where he was at the time. Thus, S.B.'s questionnaire and voir dire answers suggested she was not in the prosecutor's ideal age group, and might not be inclined to agree with his argument that the death penalty was the most severe of punishments. The comparative juror analysis defendant suggests does not further his claim. He points out the prosecutor did not challenge Alternate Juror J.S. even though, at age 23, she was only a year older than S.B., whom the prosecutor found objectionable at age 22. The record, however, reveals that unlike S.B., J.S. had characteristics apart from her age that were positive factors in the prosecutor's assessment of an ideal juror: J.S. was married and supported the death penalty. Comparing S.B. to J.S., therefore, does not show that the prosecutor challenged a Black juror who possessed the same characteristics as did a non-Black juror he did not challenge. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that the prosecutor challenged S.B. for reasons not related to her race.
The prosecutor explained he challenged C.B. because she was unkempt and slovenly in appearance, she was unemployed and the unwed 33-year-old mother of a 14-year-old boy, she harbored hostility toward the police and favoritism toward the defense, and she felt that the death penalty law treated Black people unfairly. Substantial evidence supports the prosecutor's contentions, and the trial court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral. According to the prosecutor, C.B. stood out from all the other jurors because [s]he dressed in a way which is extraordinary for somebody of her age. She's 33 years old but she dressed like a 15-year-old, with baggy clothes ... very unkempt and slovenly looking person. We can assume this description was accurate, as neither the court nor defense counsel challenged it. The record reveals C.B. did not respond to question 44, which asked if she supported or opposed the death penalty, but later indicated that she would support the death penalty depending on the circumstances that led up to the crime. She answered only Confidential to question 57, which asked if she thought the death penalty was administered fairly with respect to Blacks, and to question 58, which asked her to explain why Blacks make up a larger percentage of the prison population than of the general population. She explained further during voir dire that she thought the number of Blacks in prison probably has a lot to do with the way Blacks are treated and are still treated, and probably a lot of themselves [ sic ]. When asked in question 83 what she thought was the role of a defense attorney, she wrote, I hope he knows what he's doing. She explained during voir dire that she meant, I don't put much hope in the legal system. When asked during voir dire why she did not give an answer to question 82, which asked her attitude toward the prosecuting attorney, she answered, Probably didn't pay attention to just wanted to get out of here. The record thus suggests that C.B.'s appearance revealed characteristics legitimately undesirable to the prosecutor, and her answers hinted she might have harbored a bias in favor of a Black defendant and against the prosecution. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling that the prosecutor challenged C.B. for reasons unrelated to her race.
The prosecutor explained he challenged B.H. because of her youth and her status as a single mother. Substantial evidence supports the prosecutor's contentions, and the trial court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral. B.H. was 24 years old and the unmarried mother of a two-and-a-half-year-old child. She was therefore younger than the prosecutor's ideal juror, and would not appear to represent traditional family values as did Eleanore and Terry Buchanan. The comparative juror analysis defendant suggests does not further his claim. He points to C.M., who was White and who served as a juror. C.M. indicated in the questionnaire that she had been married and divorced twice and was then living with [a] domestic partner or significant other. Defendant argues that, by living out of wedlock, C.M., like B.H., also failed to represent the traditional family values the prosecutor sought in his ideal jurors. The record reveals, however, that C.M. had other characteristics that were positive factors in the prosecutor's assessment of an ideal juror: She was 44 years old and supported the death penalty. Comparing B.H. to C.M., therefore, does not show that the prosecutor challenged a Black juror who possessed the same characteristics as did a White juror he did not challenge. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling that the prosecutor challenged B.H. for reasons unrelated to her race.
The prosecutor explained he challenged M.M. because she was acquainted with one of the defense witnesses, expressed some hostility toward the police, had a history of arrest, had family members in prison, and had reservations about imposing the death penalty. Substantial evidence supports the prosecutor's contentions, and the trial court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral. M.M. indicated that defense witness Reverend Forest Hancock had officiated at her fiance's funeral. While her nephew was living with her, police had arrested but not charged M.M. for possession of a stolen handgun. At the time of jury selection, one of her nephews was in prison in Texas for murder, and a second nephew was in jail in San Diego on drug charges. She indicated she would feel more comfortable if someone other than herself made the decision regarding the imposition of the death penalty and she agreed with the prosecutor's assessment that she had serious reservations about [her] ability to impose the death penalty on anybody, even though [she] support[ed] it. The record thus suggests M.M. might be sympathetic to a defendant whom the police had arrested for a crime but who professed his innocence, or who was charged with a crime of violence, and might have difficulty returning a death verdict, all characteristics that would not appeal to the prosecution. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling that the prosecutor challenged M.M. for reasons unrelated to her race.