Opinion ID: 2121874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim Against Officer Horka

Text: In order to state a section 1983 claim against Officer Horka, plaintiffs' must allege sufficient facts to support two elements. First, the plaintiffs must allege that Officer Horka has deprived them of a Federal right. Second, plaintiffs must allege that Officer Horka acted under color of State law. ( Fellhauer v. City of Geneva (1991), 142 Ill.2d 495, 514, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870, quoting Gomez v. Toledo (1980), 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572, 577.) As a police officer responding to a call while on duty, there is no doubt that Officer Horka was acting under color of State law, and he raises no issue in regard to this element. Therefore, the sole issue presented is whether the facts in plaintiffs' complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show a deprivation of a Federal right. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges gender discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend. XIV.) The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause protects individuals from invidious classifications made by State and local governments. ( Personnel Administrator v. Feeney (1979), 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870.) The equal protection guarantee applies not only to legislative classifications, but also to discriminatory administration and enforcement of the law. ( Smith v. Ross (6th Cir. 1973), 482 F.2d 33, 36-37; Huey v. Barloga (N.D. Ill. 1967), 277 F. Supp. 864.) Where gender discrimination is at issue, the differential treatment of men and women must bear a close and substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Craig v. Boren (1976), 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 457, 50 L.Ed.2d 397, 407. In support of the gender discrimination claim, plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Officer Horka violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protection by treating Jane's complaint differently than if it were made by a male and by acting on gender-based stereotypes of females. Plaintiffs purport to state a cause of action for gender discrimination on behalf of Jane, Betty and John. However, the allegations in the complaint are directed only to gender discrimination suffered by Jane. Plaintiffs have provided no support for their contention that section 1983 can provide redress for an injury that resulted from the deprivation of a constitutional right of another person. Therefore, we treat Jane as the sole plaintiff in our analysis of the section 1983 claim. We find that the allegations in the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, make out a cognizable claim of gender discrimination. Initially, the manner in which Officer Horka treated Jane raises an inference of gender discrimination. Jane was clothed only in undergarments and had just suffered a sexual assault and a battle to escape her attacker. She also feared for her children, who remained at the mercy of her attacker. After being informed of this situation, Officer Horka allegedly questioned Jane in a rude and demeaning tone as to why she would leave her apartment with a strange man there and leave without a key. Horka allegedly also stated that he could not understand Jane and that she was not coherent, while neighbors present could understand Jane at all times. In addition, Officer Horka described Jane, a woman old enough to have two children, as a girl. A reasonable trier of fact could determine that such conduct shows Officer Horka discredited Jane's statements and dismissed her complaints based on her gender. Against the backdrop of Officer Horka's treatment of Jane, Officer Horka's alleged comments give additional support for finding a cause of action for gender discrimination. Several cases have found potential equal protection violations where police fail to adequately respond to domestic violence complaints lodged by women. (See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington (D. Conn. 1984), 595 F. Supp. 1521; Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department (9th Cir. 1990), 901 F.2d 696.) Despite being told of the attack on Jane and the threats against her children, Horka asked, Where is your husband? and Do you know the guy? before determining that he would not break down the door. Whether the attacker was Jane's husband or someone she knew would not change the nature of the attack on Jane or the danger to Betty and John. We acknowledge that these comments are capable of an innocent construction. However, against the backdrop of Officer Horka's alleged treatment of Jane, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Officer Horka dismissed Jane's plea for swift action because he continually believed this was a domestic situation less deserving of his attention. Such conduct is not at all related to any governmental purpose. Therefore, the complaint adequately states a cause of action for gender discrimination on behalf of Jane against Officer Horka. We also note that the appellate court was in error when it incorrectly required a showing of a culpable municipal policy to impose personal liability on Officer Horka under section 1983. This error resulted from a failure to determine the capacity in which Officer Horka was sued. A suit against a government official in his personal capacity seeks to impose personal liability for actions taken under color of State law. (See Kentucky v. Graham (1985), 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114, 121-22 (distinguishing personal and official capacity suits).) Where a judgment is obtained against a government official in his personal capacity, the judgment must be executed only against the official's personal assets. In contrast, a suit against a government official in his official capacity is essentially another manner of pleading an action against the entity of which the official is an agent. ( Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d at 121.) A judgment against a government official sued in his official capacity is satisfied by the government entity itself. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d at 121. There are different requirements for establishing personal and municipal liability in a suit brought under section 1983. In order to establish personal liability, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. ( Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d at 122.) Personal liability can be imposed regardless of whether the conduct of the offending party was pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. In order to impose municipal liability, regardless of whether the municipal liability is pleaded as official capacity liability, a plaintiff must make the further showing that the underlying deprivation resulted from a municipal policy or custom. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in section 1983 litigation and municipal liability cannot be premised merely on the employment relationship between the actor and the municipality. ( Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 636.) Instead, municipal liability under section 1983 requires that the municipality be at fault by having some municipal policy, custom or usage that is the moving force behind the deprivation of a Federal right. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638. Plaintiffs' complaint was inartfully drawn in that it does not specifically state that the action against Horka was brought against him in his personal capacity. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that some complaints may not clearly specify whether the suit is brought against a defendant in his official or personal capacity. ( Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3106 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d at 122 n. 14.) In such cases, the `course of proceedings' will typically indicate the nature of the liability sought to be imposed. ( Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3106 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d at 122 n.14, quoting Brandon v. Holt (1985), 469 U.S. 464, 469, 105 S.Ct. 873, 876, 83 L.Ed.2d 878, 884.) In the present case, Calumet City was also listed as a defendant and considering the action against Horka in his official capacity would therefore be redundant. Thus, plaintiffs' action was brought against Officer Horka in his personal capacity and no policy or repeated instances of similar conduct need be shown to impose this liability.