Opinion ID: 177996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admission of evidence regarding Bahrani's prior litigation history

Text: In his third and final challenge to the jurisdictional trial proceedings on remand, Bahrani contends the district court erred in allowing ConAgra to cross-examine him regarding his participation in prior lawsuits. We review a [district] court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, according `deference to a district court's familiarity with the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters.' Frederick v. Swift Transp. Co., 616 F.3d 1074, 1082-83 (10th Cir.2010) (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384, 128 S.Ct. 1140, 170 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008)). Prior to the jurisdictional trial, Bahrani filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of his litigation history. The district court granted Bahrani's motion in part to exclude testimony [of Bahrani] alleging national origin discrimination against three employers; filing lawsuits against two different employers alleging national origin discrimination; filing discrimination charges against four prospective employers for not hiring him, ultimately suing two of them. Aplt.App. at 298-99. The district court also granted Bahrani's motion to exclude evidence of his filing discrimination charges against two newspapers that ran ads for jobs for which he was not hired; filing a grievance against a former lawyer and suing a former lawyer. Id. at 299. The district court denied Bahrani's motion in part and agreed to permit evidence to show bias, prejudice that he has accused three employers of forcing him to falsify records or documents twice in litigation that he brought against those employers. Id. The district court advised that its rulings were subject to change at trial and that Bahrani should be very careful not to open the door to further inquiry. Id. at 300-01. Bahrani was the first witness to testify at the jurisdictional trial. During his direct examination, he and his counsel engaged in the following exchange regarding his knowledge of Rule 26 disclosures, which pertained to the question of whether Bahrani's FCA claims were based upon information publicly disclosed during the  Kim litigation in California, see Bahrani I, 465 F.3d at 1208 (discussing Kim litigation): Q. So May 25th, 2000 you filed your False Claims Act case against the defendants. And I want to ask you in 1998, August of 1998 when you went to the FBI, did you know what a False Claims Act case was? A. No, I did not. Q. Had you ever heard of the False Claims Act? A. No, not until later. Q. You were alsolet mestrike that. Also during opening statement Mr. Waas [ConAgra's counsel] talked to the jury about disclosures, Rule 26 disclosures in this case. Do you recall that in his opening statement? A. Yes, I do. Q. Do you know what a Rule 26 disclosure is? A. No, I don't. Q. Do you know what the purpose of a Rule 26 disclosure is? A. It has something to do with disclosure. Q. Did you prepare any Rule 26 disclosures in this case, you personally? A. No, I did not. Q. Do you know what the lawyers are required to disclose in a Rule 26 disclosure? A. No, I don't. Q. Did you collect any or obtain any of the documents that are identified in the Rule 26 disclosure? A. I don't even know what they are. Q. Well, you recall Mr. Waas was relating that all of these documents [came] from the Kim litigation. Do you recall that? A. Yes, I do. Q. Did you obtain those documents from the Kim litigation? A. No, I did not. Q. Did you review any documents from the Kim litigation? A. No, I did not. Q. Okay. One other thing here. Let's see if I can find that. Okay. It's Defendant's Exhibit K. This is what Mr. Waas was talking about, the Rule 26 disclosure. You see that? A. Yes, I do. Q. Okay. And again, if we go to the back here, if we can get there, do you see the date on those disclosures? A. February 2002. Q. Okay. And again, is that before or after you filed this False Claims Act case? A. Well, I filed my False Claims Act case in 2000, so it was almost two years later that this disclosure happened. Aplt.App. at 470-72. During cross-examination, ConAgra's counsel engaged in the following exchange with Bahrani: Q. Mr. Ulmer [Bahrani's counsel] showed youremember those Rule 26 disclosures that I used in my opening statement that had all those references to the Kim litigation? A. Yes, sir. Q. Mr. Ulmer asked you a little bit about whether you even knew what Rule 26 disclosures were, and I think you said you really don't know. A. All I know is it's about disclosure. Q. Mr. Bahrani, you have been involved in litigation before, haven't you? A. Yes, I have. Q. You, in fact, served as your own attorney in litigation, haven't you? A. Yes. Q. Many times? MR. ULMER: Objection, Your Honor, relevance. THE COURT: Overruled. A. I don't remember how many times I represented myself. Q. Take a stab. A. I think three times, four times. Q. And how many times with a lawyer that you have worked with? A. I don't remember the total. Q. More than a dozen? A. Possibly. Q. So you have been around the litigation block a few times, Mr. Bahrani, haven't you? A. Yes. Q. As a plaintiff? A. Yes. Q. You understand the concept that in a lawsuit a plaintiff has to come forward with information to support their claim at some point, right? A. Yes. Q. And you may not know exactly which Rule 26 whatever [sic] that required someone to come forward with information in this case, but you are very familiar with that process, that if you make a claim you have to come forward and you have to say what supports your claim, right? A. Right. MR. ULMER: Objection, Your Honor. I don't think that's what the testimony is and I think it's irrelevant. THE COURT: It's not irrelevant. The direct testimony talked about his familiarity or lack there [sic] with the rules, discovery rules, Rules of Civil Procedure. The objection to the last question, however, is sustained. You can rephrase. Q. Mr. Bahrani, you are familiar with the disclosure process and how that works in litigation, aren't you? A. I am generally, roughly familiar with it. Q. And you understand that when you are the plaintiff, when you are the party seeking recovery in a lawsuit, you have obligations to disclose information to the other side, correct? A. Yes. Q. And you know that because you have been the plaintiff in many cases. Can we just say many? A. Yes. Aplt.App. at 480-82. Bahrani now contends on appeal that [a]llowing this line of questioning [on cross-examination] was error. Aplt. Br. at 37. Specifically, Bahrani contends the testimony was irrelevant because [his prior lawsuits] involved different types of cases, such as discrimination, and different defendants, such as former employers, prospective employers, and newspapers. Id. at 38. Beyond being irrelevant, Bahrani also contends, evidence of [his] prior lawsuits is unfairly prejudicial, substantially outweighing any probative value. Id. The risk, he contends, is that evidence of prior lawsuits persuades a jury to conclude that [he] simply acted in conformity with his purported character trait, and that his claims lacked merit. Id. Bahrani's arguments notwithstanding, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing ConAgra to cross-examine Bahrani regarding his prior litigation history. As noted by defendants, Bahrani effectively opened the door to this cross-examination by attempting to suggest to the jury, by way of his testimony that he was unfamiliar with the FCA and knew essentially nothing about Rule 26 disclosures, that he was unfamiliar with the litigation process and that his motives in reporting ConAgra's alleged fraud to the FBI were innocent, i.e., that he was not motivated by the desire to file suit against ConAgra. [7] 2. Hide export certificate trial issues Bahrani contends the district court committed five errors during the hide export certificates trial: (a) it erroneously excluded all evidence of official USDA policy; (b) it gave erroneous materiality instructions; (c) it erroneously took judicial notice of the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) involvement in the case; (d) it allowed a witness, not authorized by Federal Rule of Evidence 615, to remain present during the trial; and (e) it admitted the hearsay affidavit of a witness that did not fit into any exception to the hearsay rule. As we discuss below, however, none of these challenged rulings constitute reversible error.