Opinion ID: 1843876
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Heading: Necessaries

Text: Section 8, Title 57, Code, provides that where necessaries are sold to a person of unsound mind he must pay a reasonable price therefor. That includes goods suitable to his condition in life. Section 43, Title 9, Code, is to the same effect. We have held that taxes are necessaries under this statute. Wiggins Estate Co. v. Jeffery, 246 Ala. 183, 19 So.2d 769. There are many goods and services properly termed necessaries under that statute. Ragan v. Williams, 220 Ala. 590, 127 So. 190, 68 A.L.R. 1182; Flexner v. Dickerson, 72 Ala. 318. Section 284, Buswell on Insanity is as follows: Costs and counsel fees reasonably incurred by either party in proceedings to establish the lunacy of a person are regarded, both at law and in equity, as necessary expenses incurred for the benefit of the lunatic, and are recoverable against him or his estate. In an early case it was held that a solicitor employed by the party alleged insane could have no action against such party for his costs, but might have a lien on real estate recovered for the use of the lunatic, while in the hands of the committee, but not in the hands of the lunatic's heir. But the modern view of the matter is that the costs, charges, and expenses in lunacy proceedings are not to be considered so much as a charge on the lunatic's real estate as a simple contract debt due by the lunatic for necessaries. See, also, Alexander v. Alexander, 8 Ala. 796. There are many cases which hold that an attorney's fee in such a proceeding is a proper charge against the estate of the non compos mentis. They are where there is a statute which allows the costs and expenses to be thus paid. They also emphasize the value of the proceeding to the estate to care for and preserve it. We cite them as follows: Wier v. Myers, 34 Pa. 377; In re Sulk, 74 N.J.Eq. 736, 70 A. 661; In re Bundy's Estate, 44 Cal.App. 466, 186 P. 811; McCracken's Case, 45 Pa.Super. 229; In re Frankish, 86 N.J.Eq. 280, 98 A. 395; In re Gould, 255 App.Div. 433, 8 N.Y. S.2d 714; Brownlee v. Switzer, 49 Ind. 221. 32 Corpus Juris 651 is to that effect, citing the above cases; also 44 Corpus Juris Secundum, Insane Persons, § 34, page 99, note 45, citing also In re Goldberg, 108 N.J.Eq. 366, 155 A. 137. We do not think they are all controlling here, but the discussion in many of them shows that such fees are properly termed necessaries. In Ex parte Graham, 136 Fla. 20, 186 So. 202, an attorney's fee was disallowed in the circuit court. It is not clear from the report whether the court was sitting in equity or at law. A next of kin of the incompetent filed a petition in the circuit court, as authorized by the statute of Florida, praying for appointment of a guardian of the person of the incompetent and a curator to take charge of her property. The prayer of the petition was granted. A firm of attorneys filed their petition in said court at a later date for the purpose of having a solicitor's fee awarded them from the estate of the incompetent for services rendered in having the guardian and curator appointed for the incompetent. The petitioners contended that since there was authority to pay an attorney's fee in a proceeding in lunacy that their services rendered under said special statutory authority should be paid by analogy to a lunacy proceeding. The court observed that the proceeding is somewhat analogous to a lunacy proceeding, but there was little analogy between it and a chancery proceeding where a fund is brought into court for settlement and distribution. It was said that in the latter case the rem is the thing in litigation, while in this proceeding the rem is merely incidental. Upon the basis of that reasoning the court disallowed the attorney's fee. We are not willing to follow that course of reasoning. The inquisition resulted in a finding of the incompetency of the party and directly and immediately in the appointment of a guardian who in the instant case was the only other next of kin of such incompetent who is here objecting to the fee. The proceeding was necessary under the law of this State in order to appoint a guardian of the incompetent. Section 10, Title 21, Code. The guardianship was the result sought to be accomplished and that created a trust fund, so that the creation of the trust fund and its administration was the sole purpose sought to be accomplished. It is the same in principle as an attorney's fee for services in probating a will. We think that the allowance of an attorney's fee can be sustained on the theory that as here rendered it was necessary to the interest of the non compos mentis under out statute, and also that it created a trust fund and brought it into court for administration under the doctrine of Trustees v. Greenough, supra, otherwise called costs as between solicitor and client, as the same was enacted into what is now section 63, Title 46 of our Code, which serves the same purpose. Appellees have cross-assigned errors upon the ground that the trial court in reversing the judgment of the probate court remanded the matter to that court for decision. The trial in the circuit court was on the same evidence and facts that were presented in the probate court as shown by an agreed statement of facts. We see no reason why the cause should have been remanded to the probate court for the rendition of the judgment in favor of appellees. We think the circuit court should have reversed and rendered the judgment, and this Court will proceed to render such judgment as should have been rendered in the circuit court. Sections 775, 785 and 810, Title 7, Code. The judgment of the circuit court is therefore modified so as to render the judgment in favor of appellees against appellant Paul M. Penney as guardian of J. E. Penney for the sum of $7,500, which is shown without controversy to be a reasonable fee. Modified and affirmed. BROWN, LAWSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur.