Opinion ID: 1909036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right To Inquire Into The Dog's Training

Text: Whether or not Dover Downs rebutted Thompson's prima facie showing of discrimination depends upon whether (1) Dover Downs' personnel were legally entitled to inquire into the training Thompson's dog had received, and (2) whether Thompson's refusal to answer those inquiries was Dover Downs' true reason for denying access to Thompson's dog. The first issue is legal; the second, factual. We address the legal issue initially. Section 4502 of the DEAL defines a support animal as: any animal individually trained to do work or perform tasks to meet the requirements of a physically disabled person, including, but not limited to, minimal protection work, rescue work, pulling a wheelchair or fetching dropped items. [15] Neither the DEAL nor other Delaware law provides further guidance on how a business may proceed to identify such a support animal. In such circumstances, it is common practice for Delaware courts to consider interpretations of analogous federal law that is substantially the same as the Delaware law. [16] Because it found that Section 12182 of the ADA was sufficiently similar to Section 4504(a) of the DEAL, the Superior Court relied on the USDOJ's interpretation of the ADA. Section 12182 provides that: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or other accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases ... or operates a place of public accommodation. [17] That provision, and its counterpart provision in the DEAL, 6 Del. C. § 4504(a), are nearly identical. The only difference is that Section 4504(a) goes on (in the next sentence) to provide that [f]or the purposes of training support animals to be used by the handicapped, all trainers and their support animals shall be included within those covered by this section. Thompson claims that that language evinces the General Assembly's specific intent to prohibit discrimination against support animals, even if those animals are not yet trained to perform certain task. Therefore, argues Thompson, under the DEAL an animal's ability to perform certain tasks is an irrelevant inquiry. Thompson reads too much into that sentence of Section 4504(a), which does not support, let alone compel, his reading. Nothing in the language of Section 4504(a) alters the conclusion that Section 4504(a) and Section 12182 of the ADA are substantially similar for purposes of permitting reliance upon the interpretation of the analogous federal law to guide the interpretation of the DEAL. Such reliance was necessary here, because nothing in the DEAL, or other Delaware law, instructs how a business may permissibly verify an animal's status as a support animal. The absence of such guidance was problematic here, because Dover Downs' security personnel were uncertain whether Thompson's dog was a support animal. Although Thompson could have resolved that uncertainty by answering the questions about the dog's training, he refused to do that. Instead, he referred Dover Downs' personnel to the ADA Information Line. The ADA Information Line representative advised Dover Downs' employee, consistent with the USDOJ Business Brief, that questions about the dog's training were permissible. Having himself referred Dover Downs to the ADA Information Line for guidance, Thompson now argues that it was error for the Superior Court to hold that Dover Downs properly relied upon the source of that guidance the USDOJ Business Brief, which interpreted the analogous federal statute. Apart from failing to disprove the manifest similarity between Section 4504 of the DEAL and Section 12182 of the ADA, Thompson's position is at odds with his own contemporaneous conduct. The Superior Court correctly concluded that Dover Downs' personnel were entitled to ask Thompson about his dog's training. [18]