Opinion ID: 6323639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BSO Defendants’ Appeal

Text: The Phillipses submitted that Todd was subjected to an unconstitutional arrest in 2017 because the arrest warrant was based on the false statements of Lt. Bletz. The district court concluded that the Phillipses presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Lt. Bletz intentionally lied or recklessly disregarded the truth in his narrative report and testimony, and thus, reserved for trial whether Todd was subjected to a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The court further determined Lt. Bletz was not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage because (1) he may have intentionally or recklessly made false and misleading statements in support of the arrest warrant; and (2) those statements may have been necessary for the warrant issuer to find probable cause. As to the other defendants, however, the court found that the Phillipses could not state a claim because they failed to put forward any evidence to show that those other officers engaged in any intentional or reckless untruthful conduct. When a defendant appeals a denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, we review that decision de novo. Oliver v. Arnold, 3 F.4th 152, 160 (5th Cir. 2021). That said, we are limited in what aspects of the ruling we may review. Id. “[W]e must accept that the evidence gives rise to the factual disputes identified by the district court, and we may only review whether the version of those facts that is most favorable to the plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to overcome qualified immunity.” Id. In other words, the district court’s conclusions regarding whether a genuine dispute exists are final, and we may review only whether that genuine dispute is material. 11 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 The BSO Defendants appeal the denial of summary judgment as to the Phillipses’ false arrest claim and argue that Lt. Bletz is entitled to qualified immunity. The qualified immunity inquiry has two prongs: (1) “whether the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a federal right” and (2) “whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.” Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In the context of a false arrest claim, it is clearly established that a constitutional violation occurs, even if an independent magistrate approves a warrant application, when “(1) the affiant, in support of the warrant, includes ‘a false statement, knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,’ and (2) the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018)).6 Likewise, an officer may not omit exculpatory information that would preclude a magistrate from viewing all facts material to a finding of probable cause. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 2006). First, the BSO Defendants contend that the district court erred by finding that the Phillipses created a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Lt. Bletz knowingly or recklessly made false statements. At most, they contend, Lt. Bletz negligently made such statements. But that argument engages in precisely the sort of reweighing of facts that we are forbidden to engage in at this interlocutory stage, Oliver, 3 F.4th at 160; so, we lack jurisdiction to consider the argument. 6 On the other hand, if the statements were not necessary to the finding of probable cause, there is no constitutional violation at all. Id. at 898. 12 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 Second, the BSO Defendants argue that the district court erred by finding that Lt. Bletz’s alleged false statements were material to a finding of probable cause to support the 2017 arrest warrant for Todd Phillips. They argue that even if the hearing record is stripped of Lt. Bletz’s allegedly false statements and includes his allegedly fraudulent omissions, there would still be probable cause to support Todd’s arrest for arson, and thus, those statements and omissions were immaterial. But we agree with the district court that the materiality of these statements is dependent on the resolution of various factual disputes, and the resolution of such disputes must be reserved for trial. When ruling on a summary judgment motion sounding in qualified immunity, like in any case, “courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam). Factual disputes ordinarily are not a problem when reviewing a warrant for probable cause: the court simply strikes the statements determined to be false from the warrant’s supporting affidavit and then reviews whether the affidavit’s remaining facts still support finding probable cause. E.g., Davis v. Hodgekiss, 11 F.4th 329, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2021). Similarly, where an affiant omits exculpatory evidence, courts “insert the omitted facts into the affidavit and ask whether the reconstructed affidavit would still support a finding of probable cause.” Kohler, 470 F.3d at 1113. If so, then the officer’s statements were not necessary, and there was no constitutional violation. The problem with the instant case is that there is no underlying affidavit. Rather, the state supported its application for a warrant “[b]y reference” to “the entirety of the evidence adduced at the previous 404([b]) hearing which the state avers is more than sufficient to establish probable cause to believe the defendant committed this offense.” Thus, the district 13 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 court concluded that the facts were not easily reviewable and that it could not conclude as a matter of law that probable cause still exists. The district court’s logic is sound. The clearly established law here is that an officer may not make false statements to the magistrate judge to establish probable cause. Arizmendi, 919 F.3d at 897. It follows that if the court would need to resolve questions of fact to determine whether the false statements were necessary to the probable cause finding, then summary judgment must be denied. The 404(b) hearing included the competing testimonies of dozens of witnesses, but Lt. Bletz was the state’s primary witness, the primary proponent of Todd’s guilt, and the bolstering force for non-testimonial evidence against Todd. The state court weighed Lt. Bletz’s testimony and ultimately credited it over the testimony of others when the court made its 404(b) admissibility determinations. So, finding that Lt. Bletz testified falsely would also undermine the remaining evidence that supports probable cause for the arrest. As a relevant example, Lt. Bletz testified that the Phillipses’ dogs prevented a stranger from entering their property and that Todd confirmed ownership of both the green Coleman fuel bottle and the purple Powerade bottle; if it is found that those statements were false, that physical evidence loses much of its probative value. Assuming those statements were false, the district court must reweigh the remaining evidence and make new credibility determinations to make an informed probable cause determination—and these are questions reserved for trial. Lt. Bletz’s allegedly fraudulent omissions of exculpatory evidence compound this problem. Whether these events were inappropriately excluded depends on genuinely disputed facts. The Phillipses highlight up to fifteen incidents where Todd had an alibi, which, if all were admitted, would exculpate Todd given the BSO’s understanding that all the crimes were 14 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 committed by the same perpetrator. But it would take factual determinations regarding Lt. Bletz’s knowledge to determine whether he improperly excluded them.7 Thus, the appropriate course is to send the issue to trial. The need for a trial is made clear by reviewing the state court’s justification for finding the November 2012 arsons admissible against Todd. The state court credited three pieces of evidence. First, it credited Caston’s testimony about the GPS. Caston’s testimony “established [that] the GPS left his now burned deer stand, made its way to the road and traveled directly to the property of Phillips. He further detailed it traveled up the driveway and moved about extensively over the Phillips property.” Specifically, Caston testified that the perpetrator took the GPS at the deer stand, turned the GPS on, and traveled down Old Plain Dealing Road to the Phillipses’ driveway. Once there, the holder of the GPS stopped at the end of the driveway, walked in several circles, moved up the driveway, made several more circles, and then turned the GPS off. Second, the state court credited the attentive and protective nature of the dogs at the Phillipses’ home, as testified to by Lt. Bletz, which persuaded the court “that others could not come on to the property and move around extensively on the property without being detected by man or beast.” Finally, it credited “the consistent pattern of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan and knowledge of Phillips and the method by which his objectives were carried out[.]” Striking Lt. Bletz’s allegedly false statements, the second and third supporting pieces of evidence are lost. Without Lt. Bletz’s testimony about the dogs, it is no longer clear that someone would have difficulty entering the Phillipses’ property, as several witnesses testified that they were able to enter 7 For instance, Lt. Bletz explained why he excluded one incident but not the fourteen others. Factual determinations about the legitimacy of the exclusions must be made for each incident. 15 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 the property and that the dogs were not aggressive. Cf. Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 400 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting as a relevant distinction for the purposes of probable cause that an officer mislabeled “guard dogs” as “attack dogs”). Todd’s motive and intent also are dependent on disputed portions of Lt. Bletz’s testimony, as it was Lt. Bletz who testified that Todd disdained hunters and offered a negative psychological profile of Todd. All that remains is the stolen GPS that entered the Phillipses’ property. The court acknowledged there were two theories offered at the 404(b) hearing regarding the GPS: (1) the perpetrator was attempting to frame Todd; or (2) Todd had turned the GPS on and tracked himself. The state court found the latter more persuasive. But that finding may be undermined based on what exculpatory evidence is added and what current evidence is removed. For instance, several omitted incidents include the perpetrator attempting to frame other people and crimes for which Todd had an alibi. If it is found that those incidents, among others, were fraudulently omitted by Lt. Bletz, a court may instead find the former theory more persuasive. But this depends on questions of fact, and thus, cannot be determined at summary judgment. In conclusion, the district court properly denied summary judgment because any finding regarding whether probable cause could still exist once Lt. Bletz’s false statements are removed, and improperly omitted evidence is included, depends on the answers to genuinely disputed questions of fact. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656 (“[A] ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986))); Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 481–82 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[B]ased on the present disputed state of factual development, it is not now possible to conclude as a matter of law . . . that [the officer] acted in an objectively reasonable manner in arresting [the 16 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 plaintiff.]”). The district court correctly analyzed the issue, and so, we must dismiss the interlocutory appeal. See Oliver, 3 F.4th at 162 (explaining that a court must dismiss an interlocutory appeal where the appellants’ “legal arguments are inextricably intertwined with his challenges to the facts . . . over which we lack jurisdiction”). Finally, the BSO Defendants challenge the surviving Monell claim arguing that there is no constitutional violation on which the Monell claim could lie. Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578–79 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a Monell claim cannot exist without an underlying constitutional violation). Since the district court did not err in finding the false arrest claim survives summary judgment, however, the Monell claim also survives.