Opinion ID: 1190112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard

Text: As discussed above, the school uniform policies at issue here implicate the First Amendment only insofar as they place content-neutral restrictions on students' pure speech and place incidental restrictions on students' expressive conduct. [32] Because neither type of restriction is governed by Tinker, see supra Part II.A.1, we must now decide how to evaluate the constitutionality of these policies. Outside the school speech context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a law restricting speech on a viewpoint-and content-neutral basis is constitutional as long as it withstands intermediate scrutiny  i.e., if: (1) it furthers an important or substantial government interest; (2) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (3) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Turner, 512 U.S. at 661-62, 114 S.Ct. 2445. The same is true of a regulation that has an incidental effect on expressive conduct. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). [33] We agree with the district court that this same level of scrutiny should extend to the school speech context. See Jacobs, 373 F.Supp.2d at 1181; accord Canady, 240 F.3d at 443. [34] Applying intermediate scrutiny to school policies that effect content-neutral restrictions upon pure speech or place limitations upon expressive conduct (or, as is the case here, do both) not only strikes the correct balance between students' expressive rights and schools' interests in furthering their educational missions, but, as the Fifth Circuit explained, is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's other school speech precedents, not to mention the remainder of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. See Canady, 240 F.3d at 442-43. [35] Accordingly, if the District's school uniform policies advance important government interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and do so in ways that effect as minimal a restriction on students' free expression as possible, [36] then the uniform policies should be upheld. We now turn to whether those criteria are satisfied here.

The District claims its uniform policies further three important state interests: (1) increasing student achievement; (2) promoting safety; and (3) enhancing a positive school environment. [37] The District supports its claim with affidavits from school personnel confirming that the school uniform policies were implemented with these purposes in mind and that the policies have, in fact, been effective in advancing these goals. Plaintiffs do not contend that the District's stated interests are unimportant or insignificant. Instead, they argue that, even though these interests may be laudable, the District's real justification for its uniform policies was its goal of visible conformity  an interest Plaintiffs argue is not important or substantial. But this is not how the intermediate scrutiny test works. Indeed, a court's job in evaluating a policy under this test's first step is to determine whether the government's stated goals qualify as important or substantial. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (specifically, the court must determine whether the government's evidence demonstrate[s] that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way). Whether those stated goals are mere pretexts for a more insidious government purpose is taken up in the second and third steps of the analysis. See id.; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377-80, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Here, the government's stated goals unquestionably qualify as important. See Canady, 240 F.3d at 443-44 (finding comparable goals sufficiently important to withstand intermediate scrutiny); Blau v. Fort Thomas Public Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 391-92 (6th Cir.2005) ([B]ridging socioeconomic gaps between families within the school district, focusing attention on learning, increasing school unity and pride, enhancing school safety, promoting good behavior, reducing discipline problems, improving test scores, improving children's self-respect and self-esteem, helping to eliminate stereotypes and producing a cost savings for families ... are all important governmental interests [served by a school uniform policy].). Indeed, it is hard to think of a government interest more important than the interest in fostering conducive learning environments for our nation's children. Additionally, not only do affidavits from District administrators indicate that the school uniform policies have been effective in achieving the Regulation's three goals  which itself is evidence that the contemplated harms are real and that the policies do in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way, Turner, 512 U.S. at 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445  the Department of Education has also acknowledged the efficacy of school uniforms in advancing such state interests. See U.S. Dep't of Ed. Manual on Sch. Uniforms (1996), available at http://www.ed.gov/updates/uniforms. html. [38] In the absence of any evidence from Plaintiffs that the uniform policies fail to advance the important government interests of increasing student achievement, enhancing safety, and creating a positive school environment, we conclude that the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test is satisfied.
Because the District's stated interests are unrelated to the suppression of free expression, we conclude that the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test is satisfied, as well. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S.Ct. 2445; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. On their face, the District's goals have nothing to do with quelling speech or limiting expression. Accord Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 548 (6th Cir.2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ([A] stable, disruption-free educational environment is a substantial government interest ... unrelated to the suppression of student expression.). Additionally, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that the District's stated goals were mere pretexts for its true purpose of preventing students from expressing their views on particular subjects, such as support for a particular faith (in Jacobs's case) or opposition to conformity (in Dresser's case). The District may have known that views like these would be incidentally suppressed because of its schools' uniform policies; however, its reasons for enacting the uniform policies were  as far as the record reveals  entirely divorced from preventing student speech. Again, the referendum sent home to parents is telling. Although the District acknowledges in this referendum that its school uniform policies would limit student creativity and restrict students' freedom to express themselves in nonviolent ways, it lists these effects in the Cons  Disadvantages column, thus implying that the District enacted the Regulation authorizing school uniforms not because of, but in spite of, the impact school uniform policies would have on students' expressive opportunities. We thus conclude that the District's interests are not pretexts for an underlying desire to limit free speech but, rather, are directed only at creating an educational environment free from the distractions, dangers, and disagreements that result when student clothing choices are left unrestricted. Cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (expressing less First Amendment concern regarding policies aimed not at the content of the forbidden speech, but rather at the secondary effects of that speech). [39]
The third prong of the intermediate scrutiny test has been stated in several forms but, for purposes of this case, it focuses on whether the regulation leave[s] open ample alternative channels for student communication. Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 551 (9th Cir.1998). As the district court appropriately noted, although the school uniform policies may limit students' abilities to express themselves via their clothing choices, students may continue to express themselves through other and traditional methods of communication throughout the school day. For example, students are still permitted (if not encouraged) to have verbal conversations with other students, publish articles in school newspapers, and join student clubs. Moreover, even a student's ability to communicate through his or her choice of clothing is not completely curtailed, as students are still permitted to choose what clothing to wear after school, on weekends, and at non-school functions. Because the District's uniform policies limit only one form of student expression (while leaving open many other channels for student communication) and apply during the narrowest possible window consistent with the District's goals of creating a productive, distraction-free educational environment for its students, [40] the District's uniform policies are a narrowly-tailored way of furthering the District's pedagogical goals without infringing upon students' First Amendment rights any more than is necessary to achieve these goals. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 661-62, 114 S.Ct. 2445; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Accordingly, the policies withstand intermediate scrutiny and do not unconstitutionally abridge a student's rights under the First Amendment to engage in free speech while at school.
Plaintiffs next argue that the District's uniform policies infringe upon students' First Amendment rights because they compel students to express support for conformity  a message with which students like Dresser disagree. [41] Although the district court did not address this argument in its order granting summary judgment, Plaintiffs did raise the argument both to the district court and in their opening brief here; thus, we will consider the contention on appeal. Donovan v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869, 874 (9th Cir.1982). Dresser contends that uniforms usually convey symbolic messages, see, e.g., Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 504 (5th Cir.2001) (wearing police uniform conveys message of government-sanctioned authority), and thus that, by requiring him to wear a school uniform, Bridger compelled him to convey a symbolic message  here, support for conformity and community affiliation  against his will. We disagree. First, although there are times when wearing a uniform is expressive, identifying the wearer with other wearers of the same uniform, and with the ideology or purpose of the group, Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir.2004), wearing Bridger's school uniform (which, here, consists of nothing more than plain-colored tops and bottoms) can hardly be compared to wearing the type of uniform contemplated in Kerik  i.e., a white hooded gown that clearly identifies its wearer as a member of the Ku Klux Klan and, presumably, as a subscriber to its views. [42] Second, given both the nature of [Dresser's] activity and the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken, the likelihood that a person viewing Dresser wearing his mandated school uniform would have understood Dresser to be conveying a message of conformity is extremely small. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974) (per curiam) (finding conduct to be expressive only when that likelihood was great). Wearing a uniform does not involve written or verbal expression of any kind, cf. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628-29, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (requiring students to pledge allegiance to the American flag each morning), it is passive rather than active, cf. id., and if it conveys a message at all, that message is imprecise, rather than particularized, cf. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411, 94 S.Ct. 2727. See Troster v. Pa. State Dep't of Corr., 65 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (3d Cir.1995) (citing these reasons when concluding that requiring state corrections officers to wear American flag patch on their uniforms was not likely a form of compelled speech). Indeed, Dresser puts forth no evidence to suggest that, even though every student at Bridger was required to wear the uniform, a person observing these similarly clad students would understand any of them to be expressing a personal affinity for conformity. See id. at 1092. Dresser's argument that Bridger's uniform policy amounts to a form of compelled speech thus fails. Indeed, Bridger does not force Dresser to communicate any message whatsoever  much less one expressing support for conformity or community affiliation  simply by requiring him to wear the solid-colored tops and bottoms mandated by its uniform policy. Accord Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 283-86 & n. 8 (5th Cir.2001). In sum, we conclude that none of Plaintiffs' speech-related rights were violated by the District's mandatory school uniform policies and, thus, summary judgment in the Defendants' favor on these claims was appropriate.
Plaintiffs next contend that the District's uniform policies violated their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. See U.S. Const. amend. I. Specifically, they claim that Liberty's uniform policy unconstitutionally forbade Jacobs from wearing shirts expressing her religious beliefs and that Bridger's refusal to grant Dresser an exemption from its uniform policy unconstitutionally forced Dresser to violate the anti-conformity teachings of his religion.
Jacobs's free exercise claim fails for the simple reason that both the Regulation and the school uniform policy Liberty implemented thereunder were valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability and, as such, did not implicate the Free Exercise Clause at all. See Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Liberty was motivated to enact its uniform policy because its administrators disapprove[d] of a particular religion or of religion in general. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Moreover, Liberty's policy prohibits students like Jacobs from wearing message-bearing t-shirts not because Liberty feared students would undertake to do so for religious reasons, but because Liberty did not want students to encounter any clothing-related distractions during the school day. Id. Indeed, a school uniform policy like Liberty's is the quintessence of a neutral [rule] of general applicability. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The policy applies to all students equally (regardless of the students' religious beliefs), and it prohibits conduct (i.e., wearing clothing in colors and styles other than that prescribed by the uniform policy) that presents no obvious impediments to the free exercise of any particular religion or religions. Thus, like other regulations that have been found to be neutral and of general applicability, [43] the District's Regulation (and the individual uniform policies it authorizes) do not implicate the Free Exercise Clause.
Although Dresser makes a somewhat different free exercise argument, our analysis is, in essence, the same. Dresser contends that his school arbitrarily denied him a religious exemption from its mandatory uniform policy and that this denial itself violated his free exercise rights. As the district court concluded, Dresser is correct that his school was not permitted to inquire into the validity or orthodoxy of Dresser's religious beliefs when deciding whether or not to exempt him from its mandatory uniform policy. See Jacobs, 373 F.Supp.2d at 1185 (citing Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 292-93). The district court, however, already struck the religious exemption on this ground  an aspect of its decision neither party appeals. See id. Thus, the only argument Dresser can make now (other than the argument that the district court's remedy for curing the Regulation's grant of unfettered discretion to school administrators impermissibly leaves the Regulation without any religious exemption whatsoever-an argument that is now moot) [44] is that he is entitled to at least nominal damages based on Bridger's prior refusal to grant him an exemption from its uniform policy. As explained in the previous section, however, the District's school uniform policies are neutral laws of general applicability and, thus, even if Dresser's beliefs about non-conformity were sincerely held and religious in nature, see Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir.1994), he had no right under the Free Exercise Clause to a religious exemption. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Accordingly, we conclude that the District's mandatory school uniform policies infringed upon neither Jacobs's nor Dresser's free exercise rights. [45]
Plaintiffs' final contention is that their due process rights were violated because they were each made subject to a mandatory school uniform policy that was implemented without following the parental survey procedures included in the original Regulation. [46] We first clarify that Plaintiffs are not making the due process argument typically made in school policy cases  i.e., that District schools disciplined students like Jacobs and Terry for violating the mandatory uniform policies without first confirming, via fundamentally fair procedures, that the alleged violations actually occurred. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (recognizing need for procedural due process before student can be suspended and thereby deprived of her legitimate entitlement to a public education and her interest in her good name, reputation, honor, [and] integrity). Jacobs and Terry admit they violated their schools' uniform policies and have never contended that they were disciplined  and, in Jacobs's case, repeatedly suspended  without being given fair warning of the prohibited conduct or an opportunity to explain their behavior. See id. at 579, 95 S.Ct. 729. Instead, Plaintiffs make the novel argument that the District schools at issue violated due process when they acted in complete defiance of their own regulations and instituted school uniform policies absent the requisite level of parental approval. As the district court correctly concluded, however, even if the manners in which these District schools implemented their uniform policies violated the Regulation, [47] they did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It has long been recognized that individuals have no due process right to participate in government policymaking. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 444-46, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915) (due process not violated when taxpayer adversely impacted by new local ordinance was given no opportunity to be heard before ordinance was passed). Moreover, Plaintiffs provide no authority for their suggestion that a federal due process claim lies whenever a local entity deviates from its own procedures in enacting a local regulation. [48] Accordingly, although it might be preferable for schools to seek parental approval before instituting controversial school policies, and it might be a violation of state law for schools not to do so if a local statute or regulation so dictates, [49] the Due Process Clause in no way requires this. See id. at 445, 36 S.Ct. 141.