Opinion ID: 764058
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prohibiting Services Claim

Text: 26 Sprint claims that the Planning Board's refusal to approve its application to construct three towers prohibit[s] or [has] the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services in violation of subsection (B)(i)(II). 27 The essence of Sprint's argument is that it has the right under this provision of the TCA to construct any and all towers that, in its business judgment, it deems necessary to compete effectively with other telecommunications providers, wireless or not. Otherwise, Sprint argues in substance, the effect will be to prohibit ... the provision of personal wireless services. This untenable position founders on the statutory language. Since Sprint admits it would never propose to build towers it deems unnecessary to compete successfully, a fact which undoubtedly will hold true for most service providers, such a rule would effectively nullify a local government's right to deny construction of wireless telecommunications facilities, a right explicitly contemplated in 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). See AT & T Wireless PCS, 155 F.3d at 428. 28 In support of its claim to provide services as it sees fit, Sprint points to the TCA's purposes [t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. Pub.L. No. 104-104, 100 Stat. 56, preamble (1996). Sprint also argues correctly that some of the competition contemplated by the TCA may come from personal wireless services, since such services can be a substitute for traditional land-line based systems. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (commercial mobile service providers not exempt from state-imposed universal availability requirements where such services are a substitute for land line telephone exchange service for a substantial portion of the communications within such State). 29 We do not read the TCA to allow the goals of increased competition and rapid deployment of new technology to trump all other important considerations, including the preservation of the autonomy of states and municipalities. See Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enter., 173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1999) (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), is a deliberate compromise between [the] two competing aims). In the context of constructing a national wireless telecommunications infrastructure, Congress chose to preserve all local zoning authority over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A), subject only to the limitations set forth in section 332(c)(7)(B). Sprint's ability to compete with land-line based services simply is not part of the inquiry under subsection B. Subsection B(i)(I) speaks only to Sprint's ability to compete with functionally equivalent services, which does not include land-line services. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 208, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 222 (When utilizing the term 'functionally equivalent services' the conferees are referring only to personal wireless services that directly compete against one another.). Because subsection B(i)(II) only considers whether a town's decision will have the effect of prohibiting personal wireless services in a given area, Sprint's reliance on that subsection to contend that it cannot be prohibited from competing effectively with land-line systems is misplaced. 30 Moreover, mandating approval of all wireless facilities would act as a disincentive for wireless service providers to develop and deploy new technology that will provide better transmission and reception with less intrusive towers, effectively undermining the TCA's goal of increased innovation. See generally Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Competition in the Local Telecommunications Market: Legislate or Litigate?, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 353 (1996) (discussing innovation in light of the goals of the TCA). 31 The Planning Board's principal argument to the contrary is equally untenable. Quoting at length from AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 979 F.Supp. 416, 426-27 (E.D.Va.1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir.1998), the Board argues in substance that subsection B(i)(II) must be read as prohibiting only general bans. Absent an explicit policy banning personal wireless services, the Board contends, courts can only consider whether in aggregate a town's repeated denials of applications have the effect of a general ban. Since Ontario does not have a general ban in effect, as evidenced by its earlier approval of Frontier's application and professed willingness to accept some level of PCS service, the Board insists its actions must necessarily be in conformance with subsection B(i)(II). We disagree with this reasoning. 32 The Planning Board's interpretation would essentially convert subsection B(i)(II) into a simple directive to consider applications on a case-by-case basis. See AT & T Wireless PCS, 155 F.3d at 428. However, such a requirement is already explicitly found elsewhere in the statute. Subsection B(ii) requires local governments to act on an application, and subsection B(iii) requires a denial to be in writing and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Together these sections constitute a clear mandate to consider applications on a case-by-case basis. The Board's reading would therefore render the language or have the effect of prohibiting in subsection B(i)(II) duplicative. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); see also Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990); Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1992). Since the Planning Board's interpretation would run counter to the TCA's stated goals, and since the plain language of the statute compels a solution that accommodates the TCA's purposes and that does not render any portion of subsection B(i)(II) superfluous, we refuse to adopt the Board's interpretation. 33 Construing subsection B(i)(II) to apply only to general bans would lead to the conclusion that, in the absence of an explicit anti-tower policy, a court would have to wait for a series of denied applications before it could step in and force a local government to end its illegal boycott of personal wireless services. That solution does not fit well or easily within the statutory scheme of expedited appeal set forth in subsection B(v) and the preferred remedy of imposing injunctive relief on local governments that impermissibly deny tower construction applications. See Cellular Tel. Co., 166 F.3d at 497. Interpreting subsection B(i)(II) as only prohibiting general bans also would lead to the untenable result that once personal wireless services are available somewhere within the jurisdiction of a state or local government, whether by virtue of a facility located outside or inside its borders, the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of N. Stonington, 12 F.Supp.2d 247, 256 (D.Conn.1998) (no general ban and no violation of subsection B(i)(II) where town had approved a prior application to modify a tower). Although attractively simple, such an interpretation is contrary to the TCA's intent to encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2337-38, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (quotation omitted). 34 We believe that what is meant by the Act's proscription that local government regulation of wireless service facilities shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services lies between the extreme positions argued by Sprint and the Planning Board. The question for us to resolve is what Congress meant by personal wireless services. The plain statutory language of subsection B(i)(II) read in conjunction with the appropriate definitions set forth in the TCA provides the answer. 35 It would be [a] gross understatement to say that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 721, 738, 142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999). Our task, regrettably, requires a detailed parsing of the statutory language, including layers of highly technical definitions. From this exercise, however, we conclude that the parameters of the statutory proscription of local government's prohibition of personal wireless services in the context of this case depends upon a conception of personal wireless services that is the equivalent of the ability of mobile, handheld telephones to reach a cell site that provides access to a land-line exchange and allows phone calls to be made to and from the national telephone network. 36 Personal wireless services is defined, if somewhat opaquely, as  commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless services, and common carrier wireless exchange access services. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(C)(i). Each of the three individual terms are further defined in the TCA, although some of the definitions are lacking in both clarity and apparent usefulness. 2 Each will be considered in turn. 37 1. Commercial mobile services is essentially defined as mobile service for profit that makes interconnected service available to the public. See id. § 332(d)(1). 3 Interconnected service is in turn defined as service that is interconnected with the public switched network.... Id. § 332(d)(2). 4 The FCC defines public switched network, as [a]ny common carrier switched network, whether by wire or radio, including local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers, and mobile service providers, that use the North American Numbering Plan in connection with the provision of switched services, 47 C.F.R. § 20.3, which in plain language means the public telephone network. See id. § 68.2. Mobile service is defined in pertinent part as a radio communication service carried on between mobile stations or receivers and land stations. 47 U.S.C. § 153(27). 5 Commercial mobile services therefore means a for profit radio communication services carried on between mobile stations or receivers and land stations that are connected to the national telephone network. 38 2. Unlicensed wireless services, is defined as the offering of telecommunications services using duly authorized devices which do not require individual licenses.... Id. § 332(c)(7)(C). Since Sprint's PCS network requires a license, that part of the definition is not relevant to this case. 39 3. Common carrier wireless exchange access services, as with other definitions in this statutory maze, consists of several individually defined terms. Sprint is a common carrier as defined in id. § 153(10), because it offers its common carrier services for hire, 6 and this definition therefore is pertinent to this case. Exchange access is defined as the offering of access to telephone exchange services or facilities for the purpose of the origination or termination of telephone toll services. Id. § 153(16). In other words, this part of the definition of personal wireless services deals with the ability to make and receive telephone calls using wireless equipment. 40 For the reader who has chosen to follow this exercise, the end is near. Putting together the first and third components of the definition of personal wireless services, those relevant to this case, we can conclude that the local government is proscribed from prohibiting for-profit radio communication services carried on between mobile stations or receivers and land stations that (1) are connected to the national telephone network and that (2) provide wireless phones with access to telephone exchange services or facilities for the purpose of the origination or termination of telephone toll services. 41 By speaking in terms of communications between land stations (cell sites that connect directly to land-lines) and mobile stations (wireless telephones) and access to facilities necessary to make and receive phone calls, the plain focus of the statute is on whether it is possible for a user in a given remote location to reach a facility that can establish connections to the national telephone network. In our view, therefore, the most compelling reading of subsection B(i)(II) is that local governments may not regulate personal wireless service facilities in such a way as to prohibit remote users from reaching such facilities. In other words, local governments must allow service providers to fill gaps in the ability of wireless telephones to have access to land-lines. 42 The Planning Board argues that our interpretation would render illusory the town's right to deny applications, a right contemplated in subsection B(iii). See also AT & T Wireless PCS, 155 F.3d at 428. We disagree. 43 A local government may reject an application for construction of a wireless service facility in an under-served area without thereby prohibiting personal wireless services if the service gap can be closed by less intrusive means. See Town of Amherst, 173 F.3d at 14 ([I]ndividual denial is not automatically a forbidden prohibition, but disallowing the only feasible plan ... might amount to prohibiting personal wireless service.). There are numerous ways to limit the aesthetic impact of a cell site. It may be possible to select a less sensitive site, see Gearon & Co. v. Fulton County, 5 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1355 (N.D.Ga.1998), to reduce the tower height, see Town of Amherst, 173 F.3d at 14-15, to use a preexisting structure or to camouflage the tower and/or antennae, see, e.g., Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Farmington, 3 F.Supp.2d 178, 185, 186 (D.Conn.1998) (describing antennae placed on water tower, and permitting applicant to reconstruct church steeple with six antennae placed inside); Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n of Stratford, 995 F.Supp. 52, 59 (D.Conn.1998) (describing an antenna placed on a billboard and current applicant seeking to conceal tower with seven evergreen trees). See also Nancy D. Holt, Developments: It May Be Art, But Can You Hear Me?, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1997, at B14 (describing a multitude of camouflaged towers ranging from artful designs to silos, windmills, cactuses and pine trees). A local government may also reject an application that seeks permission to construct more towers than the minimum required to provide wireless telephone services in a given area. A denial of such a request is not a prohibition of personal wireless services as long as fewer towers would provide users in the given area with some ability to reach a cell site. 44 Furthermore, once an area is sufficiently serviced by a wireless service provider, the right to deny applications becomes broader: State and local governments may deny subsequent applications without thereby violating subsection B(i)(II). The right to deny applications will still be tempered by subsection B(i)(I), which prohibits unreasonable discrimination. However, it is not unreasonably discriminatory to deny a subsequent application for a cell site that is substantially more intrusive than existing cell sites by virtue of its structure, placement or cumulative impact. We hold only that the Act's ban on prohibiting personal wireless services precludes denying an application for a facility that is the least intrusive means for closing a significant gap in a remote user's ability to reach a cell site that provides access to land-lines. 45 Turning to Sprint's application in this case, the evidence in the record establishes that two towers and possibly even a single tower would allow Sprint to provide in-vehicle coverage throughout the entire town of Ontario, and in-building coverage throughout most of it, including the more densely populated areas. Where the holes in coverage are very limited in number or size (such as the interiors of buildings in a sparsely populated rural area, or confined to a limited number of houses or spots as the area covered by buildings increases) the lack of coverage likely will be de minimis so that denying applications to construct towers necessary to fill these holes will not amount to a prohibition of service. See Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231, 112 S.Ct. 2447, 120 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992) (De minimis principle is part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept.). See also Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); Abbott Lab. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1, 18, 96 S.Ct. 1305, 47 L.Ed.2d 537 (1976); Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 84, 45 S.Ct. 403, 69 L.Ed. 849 (1925). 46 Because there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that virtually all of Ontario could be serviced with fewer than three towers, the Planning Board did not violate subsection B(i)(II)'s ban on prohibiting personal wireless services by rejecting Sprint's all or nothing application. See Town of Amherst, 173 F.3d at 14 (no prohibition of personal wireless services where lower towers could be used (and possibly resited)).