Opinion ID: 782104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pro Se Litigants and Summary Judgment

Text: 33 Short's final argument on appeal alleges that the district court erred in failing to alert him to the consequences of a summary judgment motion and his responsibilities to respond. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When the moving party files a motion for summary judgment, the non moving party cannot rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quotation omitted). Short argues that, because he was proceeding pro se after being denied his request for appointed counsel, he was unaware of the need to file affidavits and other responsive papers in opposition to the government's motion to avoid summary judgment against him. In support of his argument, he cites authority from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits: Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1522-23 (9th Cir.1997), and United States v. One Colt Python.357 Caliber Revolver, 845 F.2d 287 (11th Cir.1988). 34 The majority of circuits have held that a pro se litigant 2 is entitled to notice of the consequences of a summary judgment motion and the requirements of the summary judgment rule. See, e.g., Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir.1988) (reaffirming its agreement with the rule providing pro se prisoners with notice of the summary judgment requirements); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir.1988) (holding that in all fairness a pro se litigant, who is unaware of his obligation to respond, should not have summary judgment entered against him); One Colt Python .357 Cal. Revolver, 845 F.2d at 289 (A motion for summary judgment should only be granted against a litigant without counsel if the court gives clear notice of the need to file affidavits or other responsive materials and of the consequences of default.); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir.1982) ([W]e think it appropriate to lay down a general rule that a prisoner who is a plaintiff in a civil case and is not represented by counsel is entitled to receive notice of the consequences of failing to respond with affidavits to a motion for summary judgment.); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.1975) (requiring that the plaintiff be advised of his right to file counter-affidavits or other responsive material and alerted to the fact that his failure to so respond might result in the entry of summary judgment against him); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C.Cir.1968) (holding that at a bare minimum the district court was required to provide a pro se prisoner with fair notice of the summary judgment rule requirements); see also Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1140 (citing some of the above listed cases to support its holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide the plaintiff, pro se civil litigant, a meaningful opportunity to remedy the obvious defects in his summary judgment materials (quotation omitted)). However, this court clearly has held that no such rule providing special assistance exists with respect to nonprisoner pro se litigants. Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 3339, 343 (6th Cir.1988). The Brock court, relying on the rationale of the Ninth Circuit, stated that prohibiting special treatment for nonprisoner pro se litigants was only fair because parties choosing to have counsel must bear the risk of their attorney's mistakes, and thus, a `litigant who chooses himself as a legal representative should be treated no differently.' Id. (quoting Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th Cir.1986)). However, this court specifically noted in Brock that [t]his approach was carefully held not to be applicable to prisoners proceeding without counsel since they often have little choice in proceeding on their own behalf. Id.; but see Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir.1992) (deciding that Rule 56 was satisfied where the defendant prisoner's typewritten form complaint was verified and has the same force and effect as an affidavit). While the Williams court stated that this circuit has no authority... for the proposition that a district court must advise a pro se prisoner of his right to file counter-affidavits or other responsive material or that he must be alerted to the fact that his failure to so respond with such material might result in entry of summary judgment against him, it failed to cite Brock, which appears to reach the opposite conclusion. Williams, 981 F.2d at 903. 35 The difficult question in this case is whether to consider Short a prisoner pro se litigant or a nonprisoner pro se litigant. At the time the judicial forfeiture action was brought, Short remained incarcerated with little choice in proceeding on [his] own behalf, Brock, 840 F.2d at 343, but when the motion for summary judgment was filed, Short had been released. Considering the rationale behind this special treatment, it makes sense to afford Short the protection of a prisoner pro se litigant because he was a prisoner when the initial forfeiture action was filed, and even after his release he still was unsuccessful in securing counsel. Nonetheless, there is no need for us to address this question because any error here is harmless. Short indicates that he did not respond to the government's motion and that he has meritorious arguments, but he fails to offer us even a hint of what these arguments would have been. Thus, we conclude that any affidavits or responsive papers that Short would have filed would not have raised genuine issues of material fact and would not have altered the decision to grant summary judgment.