Opinion ID: 1827595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether judge boland should publicly be reprimanded and assessed all costs as recommended by the commission.

Text: ¶ 46. The Commission recommended that Judge Boland publicly be reprimanded and assessed all costs associated with this proceeding in the amount of $4,108.42. ¶ 47. Imposing sanctions is left solely to the discretion of this Court. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Jones, 735 So.2d 385, 389 (Miss.1999). The sanction, however, must fit the offense at issue. Boykin, 763 So.2d at 876. We find precedent for imposing a public reprimand and suspension from office for a period of time, and assessing the costs of these proceedings. However, Judge Boland was defeated in a recent election and no longer holds the office of Justice Court Judge for Hinds County, District One, Mississippi. Therefore, any imposition of a suspension from office is moot. ¶ 48. The Commission found that Judge Boland violated Canons 1, 2, 3 B(4), 3 B(5), and 3 C. Judge Boland disputes those findings in her brief. ¶ 49. Canon 1 provides: An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective. ¶ 50. Judge Boland argues that Canon 1 is hortatory in nature and an expression of the general overview of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, Judge Boland relies on Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Judge U.U., 875 So.2d 1083, 1089-90. In Judge U.U., this Court found that a chancellor violated Canon 3(A)(5) for failure to timely issue opinions, and imposed a private reprimand. Id. at 1096. This Court held that Judge U.U., based on the facts of that case, did not violate Canon 1, because his actions did not involve questions of independence and were not dishonorable. Id. at 1090. Judge Boland argued that in Judge U.U., this Court held that the language of Canon 1 emphasizes failure which rise[s] to the level of impugning the independence and honor of the judiciary, which did not occur in her case. Id. at 1089. ¶ 51. The comments to Canon 1 initially concern deference to judgments and rulings that rely upon the integrity and independence of a judge. See Canon 1 cmt. However, the comments to Canon 1 also address generally the need for judges to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct, stating, Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government under law. See Canon 1 cmt. ¶ 52. In Judge U.U., the Court addressed a judge's delay in writing opinions. The Court in Judge U.U. also considered the facts and circumstances peculiar to [that] particular case. Judge U.U., 875 So.2d at 1090. Here, the facts of Judge Boland's case were that, in her capacity as judge, she made a derogatory, public statement concerning African-American members of her community. While the statement was insulting as opposed to a chargeable, dishonest act, the statement brought the integrity of the judiciary into question. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from Judge U.U. This Court finds that Judge Boland's actions violated Canon 1. ¶ 53. Judge Boland also argues that she did not violate Canon 2. The basis of her assertion is that there was no evidence that she violated the law, and Canon 2 prohibits a judge from violating the law. Canon 2 A and its commentary provides: A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Commentary Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the Code. Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether, based on the conduct, the judge's impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances. (Emphasis added). ¶ 54. Canon 2 and its commentary clearly go beyond a judge's potential violation of law. Canon 2 addresses a judge's avoidance of the appearance of impropriety. The test for impropriety is whether a judge's impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances. See Commentary Canon 2. In Judge U.U., this Court found that there was no violation of Canon 2, even though the judge clearly exhibited a lack of diligence and timeliness in the disposition of the subject cases, however the facts as revealed in the record before us do not involve moral turpitude or bias so as to constitute a violation of this specific canon. Judge U.U., 875 So.2d at 1090. Here, Judge Boland's statement concerning the African-Americans within her community might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances, and thus, it meets the test for impropriety. ¶ 55. Judge Boland also contends that she did not violate Canons 3(B)(4) and 3(B)(5), since her comment was not made at an adjudicative proceeding. The record is clear that Judge Boland made her comment at a break-out session of the National Drug Court Institute in Dallas. The overview or caption of Canon 3(B) refers to adjudicative responsibilities. See Canon 3(B). Canon 3 B(4) provides: Judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom they deal in their official capacities, and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, and of their staffs, court officials, and others subject to their direction and control. Canon 3 B(5) provides: A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so. A judge shall refrain from speech, gestures or other conduct that could reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment and shall require the same standard of conduct of others subject to the judge's direction and control. The comments that directly follow Canons 3(B)(1)-(4) and the comments directly following Canon 3(B)5 are written in terms of proceedings. We agree with Judge Boland's position that she did not violate Canons 3(B)(4) and (5). While Judge Boland's comment was made in her capacity as a judge, the comment was not made at an adjudicative proceeding. Therefore, the Commission erred by finding that Judge Boland violated Canon 3(B)(4) and (5). ¶ 56. Lastly, Judge Boland argues that she did not violate Canon 3(C). More specifically, Judge Boland contends that: (1) no one addressed the provisions of Canon 3 at the hearing; (2) the Commission never specified which subsection of Canon 3(C) that she allegedly violated; (3) she has never violated any of the subsections; and (4) Canon 3(C) is simply irrelevant. Canon 3 C provides: (1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business. (2) A judge shall require staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties. (3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other judges shall take reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper performance of their other judicial responsibilities. (4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments. A judge shall exercise the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit. A judge shall avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. (5) A judge shall not appoint a major donor to the judge's election campaign to a position if the judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that the major donor has contributed to the judge's election campaign unless (a) the position is substantially uncompensated; (b) the person has been selected in rotation from a list of qualified and available persons compiled without regard to their having made political contributions; or (c) the judge or another presiding or administrative judge affirmatively finds that no other person is willing, competent and able to accept the position. ¶ 57. Judge Boland is correct in her assertion that the Commission did not specify which of the subsections of Canon 3(C) that she allegedly violated. A review of the record reveals that the only subsection of Canon 3(C) at issue before this Court is subsection (1). Judge Boland volunteered to attend the drug court training in Dallas. She attended the conference in her official capacity as a judge. While at the conference, she made a derogatory comment. The statement placed Judge Boland's impartiality at issue. In addition, her actions lacked professional courtesy and cooperation with others in the administration of court business. Accordingly, we find that Judge Boland violated Canon 3(C)(1). ¶ 58. In determining the appropriate sanction for each case before this Court, we review mitigating factors pursuant to this Court's holding in In re Baker, 535 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss.1988). In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 2004), this Court modified Baker to apply generally to the determination of all sanctions in judicial misconduct proceedings rather than merely to apply to the question of public reprimand. We now examine the appropriateness of sanctions here based on the following factors: (1) The length and character of the judge's public service. ¶ 59. Judge Boland held her position from January 2004 until her recent defeat. The Commission's and Judge Boland's briefs, Judge Boland's testimony, and other witnesses testimony contained information concerning the judge's abundant public service. Judge Boland has worked on a large number of projects within the Hinds County community and has assisted or implemented a number improvements within the Hinds County court system. (2) Whether there is any prior case law on point. ¶ 60. Judge Boland argues that there is no precedent for giving a public reprimand for her statements. This is incorrect. In Mississippi Judicial Performance Commission v. Walker, 565 So.2d 1117, 1126 (Miss.1990), this Court imposed a public reprimand for one offense. In Walker, a circuit court judge jailed a litigant for more than twenty-four hours without bond because of an alleged slur against the judge. Id. at 1125. In In re Anderson, 451 So.2d 232, 234 (Miss.1984), this Court also imposed a public reprimand where a judge failed on three occasions to issue writs of garnishments. These cases demonstrate that a public reprimand is appropriate whether viewed as one occurrence or many occurrences of the same offense. ¶ 61. Furthermore, this Court has created precedent for imposing a thirty-day suspension, in addition to a public reprimand and costs, for a judge with no prior pattern of inappropriate conduct. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Sanford, 941 So.2d 209, 216 (Miss.2006). In Sanford, the judge requested that an officer arrive late to court so that first-offense, driving-under-the-influence charges could be dismissed against a party. Id. at 210. Despite no evidence of a pattern of inappropriate conduct, this Court imposed a public reprimand, thirty-day suspension, and assessment of costs. Id. at 218. This Court held that we now disagree that a public reprimand, alone, is the appropriate sanction for a judge who engages in such egregious conduct which undermines our system of justice. Id. at 217. While Judge Boland made a derogatory comment as opposed to dismissing charges against a defendant, her actions also were egregious and undermined our system of justice. (3) The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered. ¶ 62. Judge Boland, in her official capacity as a judge, made a derogatory and offensive comment in a drug court seminar. This action involved Mississippi team members and national drug court representatives. All of the witnesses who attended the conference and testified before the Commission stated that they were shocked, appalled, and embarrassed by Judge Boland's statement. (4) Whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct. ¶ 63. The Commission and Judge Boland acknowledged that she had no prior disciplinary history. Therefore, Judge Boland has no pattern of conduct to consider. (5) Whether moral turpitude was involved. ¶ 64. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Justice Court Judge T.T., 922 So.2d 781, 786 n. 4 (Miss. 2006), this Court defined moral turpitude to include actions which involve interference with the administration of justice, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, or other such actions which bring the judiciary into disrepute. More recently, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Sanford, 941 So.2d 209, 217 (Miss.2006), this Court expanded the meaning of moral turpitude to include respecting and upholding the dignity of the judiciary through appropriate conduct and behavior towards others. Here, Judge Boland's statement was inappropriate, and her conduct and behavior were contrary to the dignity of the judiciary. (6) The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. ¶ 65. Aggravating circumstances are present in this case. Judge Boland made derogatory statements toward members of her constituency which adversely affected a multitude of individuals, including court staff and parties appearing before her. Mitigating circumstances are present in that Judge Boland was exhausted and fatigued at the time of her statements. ¶ 66. We find that Judge Boland shall be publicly reprimanded and assessed all costs associated with this proceeding, amounting to $4,108.42. Judge Boland no longer holds the position of Justice Court Judge, District One, Hinds County, Mississippi, and, therefore, the additional imposition of a suspension from office for a period of time is moot.