Opinion ID: 164700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proffered Instruction on Reasonableness of Opposition

Text: 68 Employer contends that the district court erred in declining to give a jury instruction on a reasonableness-of-opposition defense to Hertz's retaliation claim. Employer proffered an instruction containing the sentence, Unreasonable conduct does not constitute protected activity. Aplt.App. at 330. Under this proposed instruction, if Hertz's complaint to Loritsch had been conveyed in an unreasonable way, retaliation by Employer would not have violated Title VII. 69 Employer relies on the test set forth in Rollins v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.1989), which directs that reasonableness of an employee's conduct be determined on a case by case basis by balancing the purpose of [Title VII] and the need to protect individuals asserting their rights thereunder against an employer's legitimate demands for loyalty, cooperation and a generally productive work environment. Given this test, it urges, the jury could have found Hertz's response to Loritsch to have been intimidating and disruptive and therefore unreasonable. Aplt. Br. at 26. It points to Hertz's testimony that after Loritsch bolted out the door of Hertz's office, Hertz yelled at him very loud through the office door down the hall. Aplt.App. at 700. According to Employer, [I]t was unreasonable for Hertz to express opposition to perceived anti-Semitism by losing his temper and shouting at his superior, especially when Hertz concedes that other employees nearby heard his shouting. Reply Br. at 18. 70 The leading case on the issue in this circuit is Robbins v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 186 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir.1999). The plaintiff in Robbins was a secretary employed by the defendant school district. In response to allegedly discriminatory conduct, the plaintiff 71 lodged frequent, voluminous, and sometimes specious complaints and engaged in antagonistic behavior toward her superiors. The record reveals that, during the relevant time period, she (1) challenged [an] Assistant Superintendent ['s] ... decision to deny her union grievance; (2) accused [her supervisor] of slander, malicious intent, and untruthfulness; (3) questioned [her supervisor's] temporary delegation of authority to [a female co-worker]; (4) complained that [another] Assistant Superintendent['s] response to her grievances contained false statements, and dripped with hostility and bias; (5) called [an administrator] a puppet; and (6) accused the School District and specific individuals of intending to cover up for ... inappropriate actions taken by Risk Management administrators. 72 Id. at 1259 (citations omitted). After quoting the Rollins balancing test for reasonableness, we [b]alanc[ed] the purpose of Title VII against the barrage of inflammatory memoranda [the plaintiff] wrote, often bypassing her immediate superiors to complain to the assistant superintendent and even school board members and held that, as a matter of law, these activities were not reasonable and did not constitute protected opposition. Id. at 1260. 73 In the case before us now, the district court rejected the proffered instruction, calling Robbins an extreme case about an employee who was disruptive over a period of time and whose disruption was much more serious than [that of Hertz].... Aplt.App. at 1636. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision not to give a tendered jury instruction. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1062 (10th Cir.2003). The district court's implicit ruling that Employer had not presented sufficient evidence to justify the proposed instruction was not an abuse of discretion. 74 Although a party may be entitled to an instruction based on its theory of the case if it has produced appropriate evidence to support it, Woolard v. JLG Industries, 210 F.3d 1158, 1177 (10th Cir.2000), Employer did not do so here. Because the jury rendered its verdict in favor of Hertz on the retaliation claim, we must assume that Hertz's outburst constituted a protest against perceived discrimination. Even viewing that outburst in the light most supportive of the proffered instruction, it was nevertheless a solitary event (there was no other allegedly protected activity) that does not reach the threshold of unreasonableness necessary to deprive him of the protections of Title VII. An emotional response to a racial or religious epithet is a most natural human reaction. It would be ironic, if not absurd, to hold that one loses the protection of an antidiscrimination statute if one gets visibly (or audibly) upset about discriminatory conduct. Of course, there are limits. Actions accompanying an emotional outburst cannot be unchecked. But there is absolutely no evidence in this record that Hertz's exclamations from his office caused any injury to Employer's interests. Would that the rest of humanity could match the admirable (or perhaps not so admirable) self-restraint Employer recommends in accepting the unacceptable. To be sure, Loritsch's comments may not have been as offensive as some. But the nature of those comments relates to whether Hertz could reasonably believe he was the victim of discrimination, see Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (dismissing retaliation claim when [n]o reasonable person could have believed that the ... incident [complained of] ... violated Title VII's standard), not whether his response (assuming the reasonableness of the belief) was reasonable. The district court properly rejected the proffered instruction. 75