Opinion ID: 368287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: government's promise to consider deferred prosecution

Text: 77 Finally, defendant Richman argues that the Government attorney did not in good faith carry out a promise to consider deferred prosecution and that, therefore, all evidence induced by such promise should be suppressed. At oral argument and in a subsequent letter to this court, counsel for Mr. Richman has urged that the recent decision in United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978), dictates grant of his motion for suppression. However, that case is inapposite. 78 Bowler concerned ambiguous language in a written plea agreement. The defendant construed the language as a promise by the prosecution to consider reducing its recommendation as to jail sentence; the Government construed it merely as a unilateral option to recommend a lesser sentence. The court interpreted the agreement most favorably to the defendant, finding a promise to consider in good faith a lesser sentence recommendation by analyzing specific mitigating factors enumerated in the plea agreement. The Government's presentation to the sentencing judge showed no evidence that it had evaluated two of the three specific factors and showed affirmative evidence that it had not evaluated one of the factors. On these facts, the court of appeals vacated the sentence and ordered specific performance of the Government's implied promise, requiring that the prosecution set forth its evaluation of each specific mitigating factor in the record at the time of resentencing. 585 F.2d at 855. 79 The instant case involves different facts and a different procedural history. There was no dispute that there was an oral promise to consider recommending deferred prosecution, but merely a dispute whether the Government had carried out its promise. The parties had the benefit of a hearing addressed specifically to that issue of fact, unlike the parties in Bowler. After hearing live testimony from both sides, the district court in this case found as a fact that the prosecutor did in fact, in good faith, consider all of the relevant factors known to him in making his decision against recommending deferred prosecution. 68 That finding is not clearly erroneous. 69 Therefore, Mr. Richman's argument must fail.