Opinion ID: 2679197
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Austal’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Text: Under § 1988 or Title VII, a prevailing defendant may move to recover the fees and costs incurred litigating a claim that was “‘frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’” Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). “Factors that are important in determining whether a claim is frivolous include (1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Quintana, 414 F.3d at 1309 (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned against relying on hindsight to determine whether a claim was frivolous when it was filed or pursued. See Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 1985). We review the district court’s order denying attorneys’ fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. See Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 4 Case: 12-11722 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 5 of 7 2003) (§ 1988); Cullens v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir. 1994) (§ 2000e-5(k)).2 When a plaintiff asserts both frivolous and nonfrivolous § 1988 claims, a “court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant . . . but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims.” Fox v. Vice, — U.S. —, —, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2211, 180 L.Ed. 2d 45 (2011). The defendant need not prove that all of the claims were frivolous to recover fees for defending against one or more that was. Quintana, 414 F.3d at 1312 (citation omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Austal’s motion. “As we have stated previously, the abuse of discretion standard allows a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” See United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quotations and citations omitted). Though Sullivan did not make it past summary judgment, ten plaintiffs proceeded to trial on similar allegations and evidence. Austal cannot recover its fees and costs under § 1988 or Title VII 2 Austal argues that we must remand because the district court did not explain the denial of fees. (Blue Br. at 44). Austal notes that the “district court . . . must explain its reasoning in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee to give this court an adequate and informed basis of review.” Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 931 F.2d 811, 814 (11th Cir. 1991). In that case, the record did not give us a basis to “review the manner in which the district court determined the $75 per hour rate to be appropriate.” Id. Here, the record provides a basis to determine whether Sullivan’s claims were frivolous, and we “may affirm for any reason supported by the record.” United States v. Hall, 714 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 716 (11th Cir. 2012). 5 Case: 12-11722 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 6 of 7 because it has not shown that any of the claims Sullivan alleged in her third amended complaint were frivolous.