Opinion ID: 201670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Misapplication of the Prima Facie Case Standard

Text: 7 Appellants contend that the district court incorrectly applied a heightened pleading standard to Ramírez's, De la Rosa's, and Vega's motion to dismiss. Although the district court in large part correctly described the motion to dismiss standard, see Rivera v. Fagundo, 301 F.Supp.2d 103, 106 (D.P.R.2004), it also stated that appellants' claims should be dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, id. at 108. Appellees concede that appellants did not have the burden of establishing a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss. However, they argue that appellants nevertheless clearly failed to meet their burden under the proper Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) standard, and thus, the ultimate decision to dismiss should be affirmed. We agree. 8 For years, courts in this circuit [had] required plaintiffs to satisfy a heightened pleading standard in civil rights actions. Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir.2004). However, in Hernández, this court recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), sounded the death knell for the imposition of a heightened pleading standard except in cases in which either a federal statute or specific Civil Rule requires that result. Hernández, 367 F.3d at 66. In all other cases, courts faced with the task of adjudicating motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must apply the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Id. Since there is no federal statute or specific Federal Rule of Civil Procedure mandating a heightened pleading standard for civil rights actions such as the political discrimination claims at issue in this appeal, the notice pleading standard, not the heightened pleading standard formerly applied in this circuit, governs motions to dismiss. 9 The case before us appears at first glance to present precisely the same situation that we resolved in Hernández. As in Hernández, the district court in this case dismissed plaintiffs' political discrimination claims on the basis that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case. Compare Rivera, 301 F.Supp.2d at 108, with Hernández, 367 F.3d at 63. On this basis, in Hernández, we remanded the case to the district court to proceed in light of the proper standard. 367 F.3d at 68. Appellants ask that we follow suit in the instant case. 10 Notwithstanding the citations to the  prima facie case standard, it does not, however, appear that the district court in this case applied a heightened pleading standard. Rather, it looked to the complaint and found that the allegations therein failed to make out a claim against these defendants. Furthermore, we find that remand would be unnecessary, because appellants' claims in question clearly fail to survive the proper Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading standard. 11 Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint need only include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 66. This statement must `give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Under this standard, a court confronted with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion `may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.' Id. (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). 12 Appellants' allegations against defendants Ramírez, De la Rosa, and Vega are not simply vague or lacking in specificity. Rather, they consist entirely of speculation about possible future conduct by the defendants. Defendants are members of PRHA's Appeals Committee, which is to hear the administrative complaints Cepero-Rivera filed as a result of the actions taken against him. Cepero-Rivera claims that these defendants  will entertain a pending appeal. . . and will carry out the public policy of discrimination because of their political ideology against plaintiff and are ready to rubber stamp the decision of co-defendant Fagundo. Rivera, Amended Complaint, ¶ 10 (emphasis added). To date, the only proceedings that have taken place on this matter before the Appeals Committee, have been: 13 (1) attempts by Cepero-Rivera to consolidate both complaints, which were denied; (2) a request by the PRHA for Cepero-Rivera's counsel to withdraw, because of conflict of interest issues; (3) a request by Cepero-Rivera to stay the administrative proceedings pending resolution of this case; and (4) a hearing called by Ramírez for the sole purpose of recusing himself from both complaints because he appeared as a defendant in this case. 14 Rivera, 301 F.Supp.2d at 107-08. 15 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to support a determination (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that [the alleged] conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Romero-Barceló v. Hernández-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted). As an additional corollary, only those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of his rights can be held liable. Cf. Febus-Rodríguez v. Betancourt-Lebrón, 14 F.3d 87, 91-92 (1st Cir.1994) (finding that there is no § 1983 liability on the basis of respondeat superior, and thus, [a] supervisor may be found liable only on the basis of his own acts or omissions); Wilson v. City of N. Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir.1986) (finding, in a § 1983 action against police officers, that [l]iability may be found only if there is personal involvement of the officer being sued). As the district court correctly recognized, defendants Ramírez, De la Rosa, and Vega have not taken any action adverse to plaintiff, nor did they have anything to do with Fagundo's and PRHA's decision to terminate Cepero-Rivera from his employment. Rivera, 301 F.Supp.2d at 108. Since these defendants clearly played no part in any action taken against plaintiff, we have no difficulty concluding that it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations against these defendants. Hernández, 367 F.3d at 66 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, this unusual attempt to rope in defendants whose only actions against defendant might come at some point in the future fails the notice pleading standard. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims against defendants Ramírez, De la Rosa, and Vega. 16