Opinion ID: 751803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Questioning of Klehm Regarding His Prior Conviction

Text: 89 The defendant's fourth and final contention is that the district court erred in allowing the Government to question Klehm in detail regarding his prior conviction for harboring illegal aliens. The defendant's lawyers asked Klehm to testify on Fawley's behalf. Upon being questioned on direct examination whether he had been convicted of a felony in 1996, Klehm responded that he had. After the conclusion of direct examination, the district court gave a limiting instruction advising the jury that the evidence of Klehm's conviction only went to the issue of Klehm's credibility and was not to be used as evidence against Fawley. During cross-examination, the Government sought to question Klehm in more detail concerning the nature of his conviction. Over Fawley's objection, on cross-examination Klehm revealed for the first time that he had been convicted of harboring and employing illegal aliens at his nursery in Champaign, as well as the date of his conviction and the names of the aliens he had harbored (who also happened to be witnesses in Fawley's perjury trial). 90 The defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion in permitting Klehm to testify regarding the identity of the illegal aliens listed in Klehm's indictment. In eliciting the names of the aliens, the defendant claims that the Government was allowed to unfairly delve into the details of Klehm's earlier conviction and bolster the credibility of these individuals, who also happened to be witnesses at Fawley's trial. That is, the jury could have concluded that because Klehm was ultimately convicted, the testimony given by the aliens at Fawley's trial was truthful. Neither party denies the fact that the aliens figured prominently in Klehm's conviction for harboring illegal aliens; the defendant argues that a danger existed that the jury concluded that Fawley was guilty of harboring illegal aliens, and not of perjury. 91 This Court has previously held that, during trial, when questions asked on direct examination of a witness concerning prior crimes have been perfunctory in nature, a prosecutor is entitled to amplify them. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir.1985), modified, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124, 106 S.Ct. 1647, 90 L.Ed.2d 191 (1986). In Fountain, a co-defendant on direct examination was asked simply whether he had previously been convicted of several crimes, including the murder of a prison guard. Id. Although the defendant initially answered this question in the affirmative, on cross-examination, the prosecutor then amplified the question, asking for more details about the killing (i.e., when and where it had taken place). This Court held that the prosecutor on cross-examination was permitted to amplify the perfunctory question asked on direct examination by the defendant's attorney. Id. The mere amplification was permissible since the prejudice of including evidence of the defendant's prior felony was outweighed by its probative value, despite the prosecutor's amplification. Id. Although there are differences between the facts in Fountain and those in our case (most notably, the witness being subjected to cross-examination, Klehm, is not the defendant, as was the case in Fountain), we nonetheless find the result in Fountain instructive. Under Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1), defendants under cross-examination may be questioned regarding a prior felony only if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect .... (emphasis added). 92 On the other hand, Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1) affords a prosecutor wider latitude to impeach a witness, like Klehm, who is not the accused. Rule 609(a)(1) makes it more difficult in the impeachment of a defense witness to exclude evidence of a prior felony. This is due to the fact that the prejudice of evidence of a prior felony merely needs to outweigh the probative value of such evidence when the accused is on the witness stand. For a defense witness who is not the accused, however, prejudice must substantially outweigh the probative value for the felony evidence to be excluded. In our case, the defendant's lawyers asked Klehm to testify on Fawley's behalf. During direct examination, Klehm admitted that he had been convicted of a felony. The prosecutor in Fawley's case, acting pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), then properly asked Klehm, for purposes of impeachment, the nature of his felony conviction and when it took place. This Court has previously held that a prosecutor's questions on cross-examination must be limited to only whether the witness had previously been convicted of a felony, to what the felony was and to when the conviction was obtained. United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir.1972) (citation omitted). In asking Klehm for the nature and date of the conviction, the prosecutor was merely amplifying the perfunctory nature of the question asked during direct examination, similar to the exercise in Fountain. We hold that a limited amplification certainly avoids the risk of substantial prejudice addressed in Rule 609(a)(1) because, as discussed above, Klehm was not the defendant in this case. The avoidance of prejudice was further safeguarded as the Government refrained from addressing Klehm's conviction after eliciting this information. Additionally, the district court specifically cautioned the jury: 93 Evidence of a prior conviction of a felony is admissible on the question of credibility as it may or may not in your deliberations affect your judgment of the credibility of the witness. The fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony is proper for you to consider in weighing the witness's credibility. But the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony isn't evidence against Mr. Fawley on the issues in this case. The evidence of conviction of a felony only relates to Mr. Klehm's credibility. 94 On the other hand, the defendant argues that by eliciting the names of the illegal aliens in Klehm's harboring counts, the prosecutor was permitted to unfairly delve into the details of Klehm's earlier conviction. In support of his theory, the defendant relies on United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 399 (7th Cir.1993), a case wherein the defendant was charged with mail, wire and tax fraud. The defendant testified on direct examination that he had previously been convicted of being an accessory after the fact to the crime of attempted murder. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Robinson questions concerning the identity of the intended victim of the attempted murder. Id. at 408-09. On appeal, Robinson argued that the cross-examination was improper because the prosecutor impermissibly delved into the details of prior conviction, thus violating Federal Rule of Evidence 609. Id. at 407. This Court noted that [t]he examination must be limited to whether the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony, to what that felony was and to when the conviction was obtained. Id. at 409 (citing Dow, 457 F.2d at 250). 95 However, in relying on Robinson, the defendant fails to give a complete characterization of the case. In Robinson, this Court went on to hold that the prejudice from the prosecutor's improper questioning of the defendant Robinson regarding his prior conviction was harmless and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 411. This was due to the fact that: (1) evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming; (2) the district judge had told the jury to disregard the improper questions and answers; (3) the prosecutor did not refer to the prior conviction again during the trial; and (4) the improper material amounted to a minuscule three pages in a trial transcript exceeding 2,400 pages. Id. We likewise hold that the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's questioning of Klehm was harmless.