Opinion ID: 1732761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Iowa's Kidnapping Statute.

Text: Defendant claims that Iowa's definition of kidnapping, section 710.1, is unconstitutional on its face because the statute is vague and overbroad, failing to give fair notice of the conduct proscribed. Specifically, defendant asserts the legislature's failure to define the terms removes and confines is fatal. We reject defendant's argument. We considered a somewhat similar claim in State v. Whetstine, 315 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1982), (quoting State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 270-71 (Iowa 1980)), where we said: The principles we apply in this type of case are well established .... The person mounting the constitutional challenge on a legislative enactment carries the heavy burden to rebut a strong presumption of constitutionality. If a statute can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction, this court is under the duty to give the statute that construction. The specificity [that] due process requires of a penal statute need not be apparent from the face of the statute but may be ascertained by references to prior judicial decisions, similar statutes, the dictionary, or common generally accepted usage. 315 N.W.2d at 764. When these principles are applied to the instant facts, defendant's constitutional challenge fails because he has not carried his heavy burden of rebutting the presumed constitutionality of section 710.1. Even if we accept defendant's argumentwhich we do not dothat the statute does not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, defendant's argument ignores the guidelines established by Rich and cases following the Rich rationale. They provide the specificity necessary to meet constitutional standards. Defendant's argument is without merit.