Opinion ID: 1197771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admissibility of Testimony of Richard B. Kelley

Text: 28. David next contends that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Richard B. Kelley (Kelley). Kelley testified that before Debbie's murder David had solicited his assistance in planning the murder of Debbie's female friend, who David believed was responsible for the deterioration of his marriage. David argues that this testimony was inadmissible collateral evidence of a prior bad act unrelated to the offenses charged. 29. The evidentiary rule regarding prior bad acts reads: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. SCRA 1986, 11-404(B). See also State v. McGhee, 103 N.M. 100, 104, 703 P.2d 877, 881 (1985) (holding that evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if it is probative of a material element at issue); State v. Niewiadowski, 120 N.M. 361, 363-64, 901 P.2d 779, 781-82 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 120 N.M. 184, 899 P.2d 1138 (1995) (holding that evidence of Defendant's other bad acts can be admissible if it bears on a matter in issue, such as intent, in a way that does not merely show propensity). In Williams, we noted that [i]f evidence of prior acts is relevant and admissible for a purpose other than proving a defendant's propensity to commit a crime, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. 117 N.M. at 557, 874 P.2d at 18. 30. The record indicates that the trial court carefully weighed Kelley's testimony during a proffer outside the presence of the jury. The court admitted the evidence as relevant to and probative of David's motive the State was trying to show that David was obsessed with preserving his marriage and controlling Debbie, at all costs. As discussed above in connection with Steve's testimony, evidence of motive, intent, plan, or knowledge was relevant to the requisite mental state for first-degree murder. See Hernandez, 115 N.M. at 19, 846 P.2d at 325. 31. After Kelley testified before the jury, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that the jury could consider his testimony only to determine a motive for Debbie's murder. See Gonzales, 113 N.M. at 230, 824 P.2d at 1032 (The jury is presumed to follow the court's [limiting] instructions.). Furthermore, the trial court excluded Kelley's testimony regarding two other incidents involving David, after weighing their probative value against their prejudicial effect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting portions of Kelley's testimony as evidence of motive.