Opinion ID: 2395374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Helpful to the Trier of Fact

Text: The third threshold requirement for admissibility is a determination by the trial court that a lay opinion will be helpful to the trier of fact in resolving a fact at issue in the case. Md. Rule 5-701. Ultimately, the question is whether the witness's perception was sufficient under all the circumstances to warrant the conclusion his opinion will be helpful. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra, § 6254, at 144 (footnote omitted). When lay opinion testimony is offered without sufficient factual support, the jury may be lulled by a convincing witness into accepting a flawed or unfounded opinion. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra, § 6255, at 153 (footnote omitted). Wigmore also recognized the danger of the trier of fact attribut[ing] greater evidential value to the evidence than is warranted. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 10a, at 684 (Tillers rev.1983). This danger is especially prevalent in a case such as this, where the lay opinion testimony is offered by a police officer. Thus, in the first instance, lay opinion testimony will not be helpful if the opinion as offered deprives the trier of fact of information necessary to resolve the fact at issue. In other words, a lay opinion is not reliable if that opinion is incomplete in a critical area. Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 423; see Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175 (3rd Cir.1993) (An opinion based on false assumptions is unhelpful in aiding the jury in its search for the truth, and is likely to mislead and confuse.) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the present case, for example, Troopers Harrison and Karwacki did not offer the court in the first instance a factual predicate for distinguishing between crack cocaine and a counterfeit substance similar in appearance. In the context of expert testimony, this Court has repeatedly held that such a witness must base his or her opinion on probability and not on mere possibility. Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 203-04, 167 A.2d 96, 99 (1961). This limitation applies with equal force to the trial court's determination of whether lay opinion testimony is admissible in the first instance. See Neusbaum v. State, 156 Md. 149, 163, 143 A. 872, 878 (1928); MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra, § 701.1, at 194; accord Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1201 (3rd Cir.1995); United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 139 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1062, 112 S.Ct. 945, 117 L.Ed.2d 114 (1992); United States v. Hoffner, 777 F.2d 1423, 1426 (10th Cir.1985). Thus, it follows that a speculative opinion will not be helpful to the trier of fact. See Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1201 ([I]n order to be `helpful,' an opinion must be reasonably reliable.); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex.1995) (Unreliable evidence is of no assistance to the trier of fact....). In their testimony at Robinson's trial, Troopers Harrison and Karwacki both testified with certainty that the substance seized from the defendant was in fact crack cocaine. The troopers made an assumption, based on their relative experience, that the substance seized was crack cocaine. This assumption, although possessing a certain common sense appeal, was too conjectural to establish the chemical composition of the alleged contraband with substantial certainty. See Calhoun, 738 F.2d at 131-33 (rejecting testimony when the witness's assumption... is not supported by the type of evidence necessary to reach th[e] conclusion). Accordingly, the troopers' lay opinion testimony in this case was not helpful to the jury, and should not have been admitted.