Opinion ID: 157402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Selective and Vindictive Prosecution

Text: 15 Boos claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on grounds of selective and vindictive prosecution. We review the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss on the ground of selective prosecution for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Furman, 31 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir.1994). The claim of vindictive prosecution is a mixed question, wherein we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, and the legal principles guiding the district court de novo. See United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 116, 139 L.Ed.2d 68 (1997). 16 To prevail on a claim of selective prosecution, Boos must show that he has been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated generally have not been proceeded against for the type of conduct forming the basis of the charge against him. Furman, 31 F.3d at 1037 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In addition, he must prove that the government's selection of him for prosecution was invidious or in bad faith and was based on impermissible considerations such as ... the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 17 In this case, Boos alleges that he was singled out for prosecution because of his status as a tax protestor, and because of his association with other tax protestors. However, Boos offers no evidence that he was singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated have not been prosecuted, or that the government selected him because of the exercise of his First Amendment right of association. Instead, he speculates that [o]f the literally hundreds of thousands of tax violators in the form of failures to timely file, making false statements, evasion crimes, and others of that nature, it seems that the statistical data would support an allegation of selective prosecution. Mere conjecture does not meet the rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); see Furman, 31 F.3d at 1037 (district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing claim of selective prosecution based on conclusory allegations). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Boos' motion to dismiss. 5 18 To succeed on his vindictive prosecution claim, Boos must show either actual vindictiveness or a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, which would raise a presumption of vindictiveness. See Contreras, 108 F.3d at 1262. While a prosecutor may penalize a defendant for violating the law, a prosecutor may not punish a defendant for 'exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). Thus, we must focus on whether, as a practical matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for hostility or punitive animus toward the defendant because he exercised his specific legal right. Id. (internal quotations and citations and quotations omitted). 19 Although unclear, Boos appears to allege that his prosecution was vindictive because he obeyed the injunction issued by the Northern District and so could not be cited for contempt, prompting the government to increase the ante by filing criminal charges. As additional support, Boos cites the fact that the government could have filed criminal charges against him in 1993, at the time of the civil proceedings in the Northern District, but instead choose to wait until 1997. 20 Boos fails to show either actual vindictiveness or a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. Boos has not exercised any specific protected statutory or constitutional right against which the government may have retaliated, Contreras, 108 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372), and we can find no precedent for his novel claim that a prosecution following compliance with a civil order is vindictive. 6 Furthermore, Boos does not present any evidence that the government prosecuted him in retaliation to his compliance with the Northern District order. On the other hand, as the government points out, the United States had ample reasons for proceeding against him in two separate proceedings. The government could have wanted the liens filed against the IRS agents removed as quickly as possible, and the separate civil proceeding offered an expedited means of relief as well as a lower standard of proof. Moreover, the criminal investigation had not been completed. As Boos fails to show a reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness, we affirm the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss.