Opinion ID: 775740
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Department of Justice's Regulations

Text: 40 Pursuant to the congressional mandate, the Department of Justice promulgated regulations in 1996 that are now codified at 8 C.F.R. &#167 3.2 (applicable to BIA decisions) and 8 C.F.R. &#167 3.23 (applicable to IJ decisions). Even though the congressional mandate is more probative of congressional intent than the regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice pursuant to that mandate, the regulations also support the conclusion that the filing deadline for motions to reopen is amenable to equitable tolling. These regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened . . . . 8 C.F.R. &#167 3.2(c)(2). 41 This language is neither unusually emphatic, Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350, nor is it as strong as the language of the time bar in the Federal Tort Claims Act, to which we have applied equitable tolling. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying tolling to a time bar that stated:  `A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues' ) (quoting 28 U.S.C. &#167 2401(b)). The time period -ninety days-is not unusually generous, such that equitable tolling would be inappropriate. Cf. Beggerly , 524 U.S. at 48-49. The time period does not already account for tolling by providing that it only begins to run when an alien knows or should have known that the BIA rendered a final decision in his or her case. Cf. id. at 48; Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991) ([T]he 1-year period, by its terms, begins after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, making tolling unnecessary.). 42 Presumably in response to the House Committee's instruction to consider exceptions in the interest of justice, the Department of Justice created four exceptions to the ninety-day filing deadline. The ninety-day deadline does not apply to motions to reopen (1) filed by aliens who are deported in absentia; (2) filed by aliens seeking asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed country circumstances; (3) jointly filed by the alien and the INS; and (4) filed by the INS where the basis of the motion is fraud in the original proceeding or a crime that would support termination of asylum. 8 C.F.R. &#167 3.2(c)(3)(i-iv). As noted by the Second Circuit, [t]hese exceptions to the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen imposed by the new rule appear to respond precisely to Congress' desire to provide for certain cases, `in the interest of justice' . . . that would otherwise be excluded by such limits. Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 132 (citation omitted). 43 Moreover, the BIA may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. &#167 3.2(a). The regulation does not specify when the BIA should exercise this sua sponte power to reopen, but the BIA has ruled that it will reopen cases that present exceptional circumstances. In re J-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976 (1997). In promulgating the regulations, the Department of Justice considered and rejected the suggestion, proposed by some commentators, that the ninety-day filing period for motions to reopen should contain a good cause exception. 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,902 (April 29, 1996). The Department of Justice did not reject the suggestion because it believed that a good cause exception should not exist; rather, it believed that the BIA's power sua sponte to reopen cases already covered the situation of an alien who filed beyond the ninety-day period with good cause. Id. 44 These exceptions to the time limit help convince us that Congress did not intend to bar equitable tolling. While the presence of detailed exceptions can sometimes undermine the argument for equitable tolling, see Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 351-52, the exceptions to the ninety-day limit are less specific than those in Brockamp (particularly the BIA's sua sponte power to reopen any case), and are all examples of equitable circumstances that warrant refraining from holding that the ninety-day time limit is jurisdictional. Cf. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480 n.12 (supporting application of equitable tolling by observing that the Social Security Administration's regulations governing extensions of time for filing are based on considerations of fairness to claimants). This kind of accommodation for exceptional cases is irreconcilable . . . with the strict application that would be required of a jurisdictional limitation. Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 132. 45 The Second Circuit makes the additional point that the Department of Justice itself has not treated the ninety-day filing deadline as if it were a jurisdictional requirement. Id. Shortly after the Department of Justice promulgated its final rule establishing the ninety-day limit for motions to reopen (on April 29, 1996), Congress enacted IIRIRA (on September 30, 1996). Congress codified the restrictions on motions to reopen and reconsider in IIRIRA &#167 304(a)(3). These restrictions follow the Department of Justice guidelines insofar as they restrict an alien to one motion to reopen, and require the motion to be filed within ninety days of the of the date of the entry of a final administrative order. INA &#167 240(c)(6)(A), (C)(i), 8 U.S.C. &#167 1229a(c)(6)(A), (C)(i). The statute only lists two exceptions to the ninety-day time limit: (1) the limit does not apply to motions to reopen based on changed country conditions; and (2) aliens who are deported in absentia may file a motion to reopen within 180 days after the entry of the final removal order. INA &#167 240(c)(6)(C)(ii), (iii), 8 U.S.C. &#167 1229a(c)(6)(ii), (iii). 46 Despite the codification of only two exceptions to the ninety-day limit, the regulations continue to permit IJs and the BIA to reopen cases sua sponte at any time, and also to reopen motions jointly filed by the INS and the alien. Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 132. If the Department of Justice truly perceived the ninety-day deadline to be jurisdictional, the regulations would not permit these additional, uncodified exceptions. Id. 47 A final point is worth discussing. Statutes impose different kinds of time limits. Some of these time limits, usually termed statutes of limitations, prescribe when a claimant must first file suit following the point at which the cause of action arose. Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Other time limits, usually termed statutes specifying the time for review, prescribe the time in which a person must remove from one adjudicative forum to another. Id. The INS suggests that because the filing deadline for motions to reopen is more akin to a statute specifying the time for review than to a statute of limitations, the filing deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional, and not subject to equitable tolling. See Stone, 514 U.S. at 405 (describing statutes specifying the time for review as mandatory and jurisdictional). Even if the deadline for filing a motion to reopen with the same body were more akin to a statute governing review -and it is not -we would reject the INS's argument. Like the Federal Circuit, we do not believe that the Supreme Court meant to distinguish between statutes of limitations and statutes specifying the time for review when it established the generally applicable rule in Irwin that time limits involved in filing suit against the government are presumed to be subject to equitable tolling. Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1366. 48 This conclusion seems inescapable given that Irwin itself as well as its jurisprudential forefather, Bowen , involved time limits that can be described both as statutes of limitations and as statutes specifying the time for review. The statute in Irwin can be viewed as a statute of limitations or a statute specifying the time for review, because the 30-day limit measured the time in which to initiate a case in the United States District Court that would revisit the charge of discrimination alleged before the EEOC. Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1364. Similarly, the statute in Bowen can be described both as a statute of limitations and as a statute specifying the time of review because the sixty-day limit there measured the time in which to bring a case in the district court that would challenge the denial of social security benefits by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 472 n.3 (quoting statute). Given that the Supreme Court held that equitable tolling could be applied to the time limits in both Irwin and Bowen, we reject the suggestion that equitable tolling can never apply to statutes specifying the time for review.